The Pacific Islands in China's Grand Strategy: Small States, Big Games 9781349294978, 9780230339750, 2011014994

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The Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy

The Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy Small States, Big Games Jian Yang

THE PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

Copyright © Jian Yang, 2011. Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2011 All rights reserved. First published in 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-349-29497-8 ISBN 978-0-230-33975-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-0-230-33975-0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Yang, Jian, 1962– The Pacific Islands in China's grand strategy : small states, big games / Jian Yang. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. China—Foreign relations—Oceania. 2. Oceania—Foreign relations—China. 3. Oceania—Strategic aspects. 4. China—Relations— Oceania. 5. Oceania—Relations—China. 6. China—Foreign relations— 1976– I. Title. DU68.C6Y36 2011 327.5109—dc22

2011014994

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: November 2011

For Xiaojin, Suzie, and Evelyn

Contents

List of Figures, Tables, and Map

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

List of Abbreviations

xv

Introduction

1

One

China’s Growing Involvement in the South Pacific

5

Two

The Evolving Regional Order in the South Pacific: The Rise and Fall of External Players

19

Three

China’s Security Concerns and Grand Strategy

37

Four

The Taipei-Beijing Diplomatic Rivalry

51

Five

China in Fiji: Displacing Traditional Players?

75

Six

Interactions with Australia and New Zealand: Balancing Interests

89

Seven Eight

China’s World Wide Web: Overseas Chinese in the South Pacific

105

Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy

127

Conclusion

143

Appendices Appendix 1 Official Visits between PICs, PRC, and Taiwan

147

Appendix 2 Trade between PICs and Selected Economies

157

Appendix 3 Australian Net ODA Disbursements to the South Pacific

159

Appendix 4 New Zealand’s Net ODA Disbursements to the South Pacific

161

viii

CONTENTS

Notes

163

Bibliography

199

Index

221

Figures, Tables, and Map

Figures 1.1 3.1

China’s Trade with 14 PICs China’s Grand Strategy

12 49 Tables

1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 4.1 4.2 5.1 6.1 7.1 7.2 8.1

Students Studying in China from the PICs that Recognize China European Colonies in the South Pacific Major Donors’ Bilateral Aid to the Pacific Region in the 1990s Major Donors’ Net ODA Disbursements to the 14 PICs and South Pacific Regional Programs and Agencies in the 2000s Countries Recognizing Taiwan Beijing-Taipei Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific Australian and New Zealand ODA to Fiji Membership of Some Major Regional Institutions in the South Pacific Ethnic Chinese in the South Pacific Ethnic Chinese Associations in Fiji Search Results of China Academic Journals Full-Text Database

14 25 28 29 52 56 86 93 112 115 139

Map Pacific Island Countries and Cultural Areas

23

Acknowledgments

I

started to pay attention to China’s involvement in the South Pacific in the early 2000s. My knowledge of the South Pacific was limited at that time although my undergraduate course International Relations in Asia Pacific covered the region. In 2005, Mr. Rene Wilson, a career diplomat who later became New Zealand’s first resident ambassador to Egypt, came to my office to introduce himself as the new director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (MFAT) Auckland Office. We touched upon Chinese involvement in the South Pacific. Mr. Wilson, who had just served as director of the Pacific Division at the MFAT, stressed that it was a topic worth studying. He encouraged me to apply for a research grant. A few days later, Mr. Michael Field, a veteran Pacific journalist, sent me an e-mail and asked me a number of questions about Chinese involvement in the South Pacific. My interest in the topic was ignited at that point. I, therefore, feel indebted to Ambassador Wilson and Mr. Field. I have since received financial support from the University of Auckland and have published articles and book chapters on the topic. These publications form the basis for this book. I would like to acknowledge the following publications: The Pacific Review 22, no. 2 (2009), New Zealand International Review 34, no. 1 (2009); Emilian Kavalski (ed.), China and Global Politics of Regionalization (Farnham, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009); Jim Veitch (ed.), Strategic Manoeuvres: Security in the Asia-Pacific (Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington and Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, 2009); Anne-Marie Brady (ed.), Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific (New Jersey, et al.: World Scientific, 2010); and Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 3 (2011). I also presented papers on this topic at conferences or workshops held in San Francisco, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Christchurch, Wellington, and Dunedin. Comments on my conference papers helped me to shape and consolidate my arguments. I learned a great deal from many wellrespected analysts, such as Anne-Marie Brady, Han Feng, Fergus Hanson, Jenny Hayward-Jones, David Hegarty, Ji Zongan, John Henderson,

xii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Ma Ying, Steven Ratuva, Philip Sounders, Wang Yong, Xu Yun, Zhai Kun, and Zhang Yinlong. I also learned a lot from the late Professor Ron Crocombe, who was described as a “father of Pacific Studies.” I had kept communicating with Ron about a grant application for a joint research project on Chinese involvement in the South Pacific until June 9, 2009, 10 days before he passed away in Auckland. Ron once invited me to visit Rarotonga where he lived. It is a wish that I hope will be fulfilled before long. My interviews and conversations on a number of occasions with Mr. Lu Weixiong and Mr. Zheng Jianmin, director and deputy director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of Guangdong Province respectively, greatly substantiated my understanding of the Chinese policy toward overseas Chinese. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of some students who have worked as my research assistants. Among them are Sebastian Rattansen, Morgan Slebos, Nova Mercier, Michelle Parish, Marcus Chu, Corey Wallace, and Shahzad Akhtar. My colleagues at the University of Auckland have provided a supportive and stimulating environment. I appreciate Associate Professor Stephen Hoadley’s comments on an earlier draft paper and Professor Gerald Chan’s encouragement. I have gained tremendously from Drs. Maria Rublee, Geoff Kemp, Anita Lacey, and Stephen Winter. We are the members of the Political Studies writing group that was initiated by Maria. Our weekly meetings have been an important source of commitment, inspiration, and information. I am especially grateful to Lin Haiqing in the Asian Languages Collection at the University of Auckland library. Not only do I admire Haiqing’s professionalism, I also see him as a man who is able to create miracles. He has never disappointed me. To illustrate his effort to help, he asked his father to go out and buy a book for me the day before his father left China for New Zealand. I am also grateful to a number of people who facilitated my fieldwork in the South Pacific. I feel particularly indebted to Mr. Ma Chongren, Chinese ambassador to Samoa, and his colleagues in Apia, Suva, and Beijing, especially Mr. Fei Mingxing, political counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Fiji. My friends in the Chinese communities in Auckland and Suva played an essential role in making my fieldwork productive. They are Peter Lu, Ou Ben, Shi Jie, Ou Weigang, and Yuan Bintang. I also would like to thank those who kindly accepted my interviews, particularly Dr. Sandra Tarte from the University of the South Pacific; Mr. Aiono Mose Pouvi Sua, Chief Executive Officer of Samoan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Ambassador Afamasaga Toleafoa, former Samoan ambassador to the United Nations, former member of parliament, and former editor of

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xiii

Samoa Observer; Mr. Vaeolenofoafia Vui Tapasu Leung Wai, associate minister of Samoan Foreign Affairs and Trade, president of Samoa Association of Sports and National Olympic Committee. While in Suva, I also interviewed a few high-ranking officials, including a senior minister. My informal talks with local people in Fiji and Samoa were also rewarding. My friends and former students in the MFAT have always been ready to help me out. Among them are Pip McLachlan, Alexandra Pierard, and Leonard Chan. I have had many opportunities to exchange views with some retired New Zealand diplomats. Such exchanges gave me firsthand information about New Zealand’s policy toward the South Pacific and New Zealand’s perceptions about China’s role in the region. In this respect, I would like to thank Ambassador Michael Powles, former high commissioner to Fiji and ambassador to China, Indonesia and the United Nations; Ambassador Terence O’Brien, former high commissioner to the Cook Islands and ambassador to the United Nations; Mr. Brian Lynch who once headed the Asian and Pacific Division of MFAT and is currently director of New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, and Dr. Richard Grant, executive director of the Asia New Zealand Foundation and former ambassador or high commissioner to several countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Singapore. I would especially like to thank my wife and two daughters. I dedicate this book to them.

Abbreviations

AusAID CCP CCPPU CDB CPAFFC CPPCC CRS DPP EEZ EU FAS FDI FSM FTA GDP GNP KMT MFAT MP NPC NZ NZAID ODA OECD PALM PC PICs PIF PLA

Australian Agency for International Development Chinese Communist Party China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification China Development Bank Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Congressional Research Service Democratic Progressive Party exclusive economic zone European Union freely associated states foreign direct investment Federated States of Micronesia free trade agreement gross domestic product gross national product Kuomintang Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Member of Parliament National People’s Congress New Zealand New Zealand Agency for International Development official development assistance Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting Pacific Community Pacific island countries Pacific Islands Forum People’s Liberation Army

xvi

ABBREVIATIONS

PLAN PNG PPCC PRC ROC SPC SPF SPRFMO SPTO WHO

PLA Navy Papua New Guinea People’s Political Consultative Conference People’s Republic of China Republic of China (Taiwan) South Pacific Commission South Pacific Forum South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization South Pacific Tourism Organization World Health Organization

Introduction

T

he South Pacific region is a huge area stretching 17,000 km longitudinally from Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) in the west to South America in the east, and 7,000 km latitudinally from the equator to the Antarctic Ocean.1 There are two key regional organizations in the South Pacific—the Pacific Community (PC, formerly known as the South Pacific Commission) and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF, formerly known as the South Pacific Forum). While the PC consists of 22 members including colonial territories, the 16 members of the PIF are either sovereign or self-governing states. Since China’s regional interactions in the South Pacific are mainly centered on the PIF, the term South Pacific used in this book refers to the 14 Pacific island countries (PICs) in the PIF excluding Australia and New Zealand. These 14 PICs are the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa (known as Western Samoa before July 1997), the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The Cook Islands and Niue are self-governing states in free association with New Zealand. The other 12 PICs are fully independent sovereign states and member states of the United Nations. The above definition of the South Pacific may be different from other publications cited in this book. Scholars have also used terms such as the Southwest Pacific, the Pacific, the Pacific states, and the Pacific Islands to refer to the South Pacific. The Pacific Islands is used in this book from time to time. Some analysts use Oceania for a similar purpose. However, the term Oceania often includes New Zealand and Australia and even Indonesia. The South Pacific has its distinctive characteristic features, including remoteness of the region from global metropolitan centers, wide geographical dispersion of countries and territories within the region, fragile ecosystems, limited resource base, cultural clashes between traditional lifestyles and the individualistic orientation of cash economies, and cultural diversity within the PICs.2 The book occasionally touches upon other members of the PC, such as French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Northern Marianas.

2

PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

Observers have long noted that China would eventually become a major player in the South Pacific. But it was not until the late 1990s that China’s influence in the region started to grow substantially. What are the main driving forces behind China’s deepening involvement in the region? The question is important because analysts are divided over the implications of China’s expanding involvement in the South Pacific. Some are worried that the chequebook diplomacy rivalry between Beijing and Taipei is making Pacific politics more corrupt and more violent and is exacerbating underlying political, social, and economic tensions in the region. A deeper concern is that China has a strategic plan to replace the United States as the preeminent power in the Pacific Ocean. More alarmist analysts have even suggested that the South Pacific could in future become the venue for a new Cold War, where the United States and China compete for client states and strategic advantage. These concerns underline the evolving regional order in the South Pacific. It is expected that the Chinese economy will continue to grow at a rapid pace in the coming years. China’s influence in the South Pacific is, therefore, likely to keep growing, which will have ongoing implications for the evolution of the regional order. But to what extent should the West be concerned? Does China have a well-calculated strategy, and capability, to displace the traditional Western players in the region for its own national security as some observers have suggested? The study of Chinese involvement in the South Pacific is part of the great debate on the rise of China, and it remains the weakest part of this debate. Compared with Chinese involvement in other parts of the world, Chinese involvement in the South Pacific is understudied. However, Chinese policy toward the South Pacific is an integral part of China’s grand strategy. More importantly, it is a representative reflection of China’s global foreign policy. Compared with Chinese involvement in other parts of the world, for instance, in Africa and Latin America, Chinese involvement in the South Pacific is as equally comprehensive in terms of the scope of issues. Beijing has to deal with issues of economic interests, political interests, Taiwan, relations with military regimes, relations with global and regional powers, the role of overseas Chinese and the perceived “China threat,” and strategic implications. These are all crucial challenges to the implantation of China’s grand strategy. Given the relatively small number of countries and much smaller populations in the South Pacific, these issues can be examined more thoroughly, contributing to our understanding of China’s global strategy and foreign policy. China’s growing involvement in the South Pacific has attracted more attention from academics, commentators, policymakers as well as media in recent years. However, more coherent and comprehensive studies from

INTRODUCTION

3

an international relations perspective are needed. This book attempts to fill that gap. The book is unique in that it is the very first single-authored book on the topic and that it looks at Chinese involvement in the South Pacific in the context of China’s grand strategy. It uses both English and Chinese material and is supplemented with the author’s interviews and conversations with policymakers, officials, diplomats, academics, reporters, and local people in Oceania and China. The book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter One is an overview of China’s growing involvement in the South Pacific. Chapter Two investigates China’s security concerns and its grand strategy, which serves as the theoretical framework for the book. Chapter Three investigates the evolving regional order in the South Pacific. Chapter Four focuses on the Taipei-Beijing diplomatic rivalry in the region. Chapter Five examines China’s policy toward Fiji, the most important country in the region. Chapter Six discusses China’s interactions with two regional powers and major players in the South Pacific, Australia, and New Zealand. Chapter Seven is an investigation of the connection between China’s foreign policy and overseas Chinese in the South Pacific. Chapter Eight further elaborates on the South Pacific’s strategic value to a rising China and, more importantly, assesses its value in a bigger context of China’s global foreign policy and grand strategy. In the conclusion, the book briefly considers potential future developments.

ONE

China’s Growing Involvement in the South Pacific

T

his chapter briefly reviews Chinese involvement in the South Pacific in the past two or three centuries, with an emphasis on the postCold War period. It also introduces observers’ main concerns about China’s growing influence in the region. Chinese Involvement before 1949

China’s connections with the South Pacific have “deep cultural and historical roots.”1 These connections could be traced back to 5,000 years ago as the languages used by the first settlers in the South Pacific originated in Taiwan. It is also believed that the Polynesian, Micronesian, and eastern Melanesian people of the Pacific are related to the indigenous people of Taiwan.2 In the eighteenth century, trade between the South Pacific and China started to grow. By the nineteenth century, there were Chinese laborers in Pacific island plantations and phosphate mines. These early Chinese laborers became the ancestors of today’s “small but usually prominent Chinese communities in most Pacific island states.”3 The great majority of Chinese labor migrants were drawn from the southern provinces of China, mainly Guangdong (Kwangtung) and Fujian (Fukien) provinces with the international port of Canton as the point of departure. The impetus to emigrate was the frequent famines and wars in China. As Margaret Wilson and her colleagues have noted, “To keep their families from starvation many sons left home and travelled overseas in search of money that they could remit.”4 China was in turmoil in the nineteenth century. The once strong and prosperous empire had declined and was in the process of collapsing. The last dynasty was established in 1644, when

6

PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

the Manchus overthrew the native Ming dynasty and established the Qing (Ch’ing) dynasty. In 1842, the Qing dynasty lost the first Opium War against the British Empire. In the following “Century of Humiliation,” China was forced to sign numerous unequal treaties with foreign powers. A revolutionary military uprising on October 10, 1911, led to the founding of the Republic of China (ROC) and the abdication of the last Qing monarch in February 1912. The revolution, however, did not result in a united China with a strong government. China was first ruled by various warlords and then had to fight against a Japanese invasion. The Japanese surrender in 1945 marked the end of the Century of Humiliation, but it was followed by a civil war between the Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party or Guomindang) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In October 1949, the CCP established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the KMT government retreated to Taiwan. Until the late 1840s the Chinese did not emigrate in large numbers. Some emigration took place during the Tang (T’ang) (AD 618–AD 907) and the Ming (AD 1368–AD 1644) dynasties for trading purposes, mainly to Southeast Asia.5 The Qing government largely continued to prohibit the emigration of its subjects during the early years of the coolie trade. The Qing dynasty’s laws were based on those of the Ming dynasty. They were believed, however, to be “more oppressive and more rigidly enforced.”6According to a Qing law, All officers of government, soldiers and private citizens who clandestinely proceed to sea to trade, and who move to foreign land for the purpose of inhabiting and cultivating the same, shall be punished according to the law against communicating with rebels and enemies and consequently suffer death by being beheaded.7

The Manchu rulers believed that the emigrants would be recruited as soldiers by the loyalists of the Ming dynasty and, being a foreign dynasty, they feared that the overseas Chinese communities would threaten their rule.8 However, the chaotic social, economic, and political conditions led to an exodus of large numbers of Chinese in the nineteenth century. When a mass of Chinese joined the gold rush in California and Australia in the late 1840s, it became almost impossible for the Qing government to enforce its laws. Yet it was not until 1860 that, under the pressure from Great Britain and France, the Qing government agreed to modify its prohibitions.9 In the Burlingame Treaty between China and the United States, which was ratified in 1868, the Chinese government “cordially” recognized the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance.10

GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

7

The Pacific Islands were administered, to various degrees, by colonial powers in the nineteenth century. The Europeans developed plantations in the region. The Pacific islanders, however, had no interest in the work as they had their own lands and could survive easily. For instance, in their report to the New Zealand Parliamentary Committee, the planters in Western Samoa pointed out that by cutting out 400 lb. of dry copra—an easy task—a native and his wife could earn in one day more than the planters could afford to pay them in a month.11 Therefore, the planters had to turn to other sources for the required labor supply and China was one of obvious choices. Before Chinese contract labor was introduced into the South Pacific in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, there were already Chinese traders in the region. They arrived in the first half of the nineteenth century as carpenters and cooks aboard the ships of traders searching for sandalwood for the Canton market. While Sydney was the hub of Chinese trade in the Pacific, other local centers gradually emerged. Tahiti was the center for what is now French Polynesia and the Cook Islands, Levuka, for the Fijian islands, and Rabaul for what is now Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Solomon Islands. By the 1920s, Chinese traders were found on islands “in every corner of the South Pacific.”12 Chinese contract labor in the South Pacific was first introduced into Tahiti in 1865, then New Guinea in 1898, Samoa in 1903, and Nauru in 1906. There were a few Chinese contract laborers in the first two decades of the twentieth century in Fiji.13 By 1914 when the Australian army took control of German PNG, there were 1,400 Chinese in New Guinea.14 In April 1921, out of a total population of 2,166 in Nauru, the Chinese numbered 597.15 By December 1921, the total number of Chinese in Western Samoa reached 1597.16 Between 1865 and 1941, about 20,000 Chinese went to the South Pacific as indentured laborers.17 By the beginning of World War II, however, most Chinese indentured laborers had been repatriated. In terms of official contacts between China and the South Pacific in the 1890s and early 1900s, China’s main interest was to protect Chinese workers. The Chinese authorities, central or provincial, played an important role in regulating the indentured labor. In 1908 the authorities of Guangdong province, in protest against a German company’s recruiting irregularities and in the light of the ill-treatment of Chinese plantation workers in German Samoa, banned the emigration of its citizens to Nauru.18 In 1909, the Chinese consul in Samoa reported that the laborers’ conditions were intolerable. He demanded specifically that flogging be abolished, Chinese holidays be respected, and that Chinese be granted equal legal status with Europeans. Further recruitment was allowed in

8

PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

1911 after considerable negotiation, which resulted in the Samoan government’s agreement to give Chinese laborers better treatment.19 The Chinese government was not really capable of protecting its nationals overseas, however. In the late 1850s when the Qing government was negotiating with foreign powers over the Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin), the Chinese negotiators were urged to send envoys abroad to oversee their subjects. It was not until 1875 that imperial permission to dispatch permanent envoys was sought and received. China then appointed representatives to the major foreign capitals.20 In the South Pacific, China’s diplomatic representation was centered in Sydney. It did open a consulate in Western Samoa in 1909 and then in Fiji. The two consulates were closed in 1947 and 1950 respectively. The KMT government also appointed an honorary consul in New Guinea.21 Overall, Chinese consular oversight in the region was minimal. Other than contract labor, China’s contact with the South Pacific was very much limited. In the 1800s, exports from the South Pacific to China consisted of exotic raw products, such as sandalwood and bêchede-mer (sea cucumber). However, both were exploited by Europeans to near extinction before long and the Islands then had little to export to Asia. Meanwhile, China, and Asia as a whole exported little to the South Pacific. Overall, the Islands’ trade with Asia was just “a fraction” of their trade with Western countries.22

Involvement in the Cold War Years From 1949, when the PRC was established, to the early 1970s when the PRC started to normalize its relations with the West, Beijing did not have much contact with the South Pacific although its ideology-driven foreign policy ensured Beijing’s moral support for the independence movement in the region. The South Pacific was under Western hegemony in terms of the prevailing Cold War spheres of influence.23 A series of developments in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to a more active Chinese policy toward the South Pacific. In 1960, the dispute between Beijing and Moscow became public and the two giants in the Communist camp split. The Soviet Union thus emerged as Beijing’s primary security concern. Consequently, China sought to normalize its relations with the United States. The rapprochement between Beijing and Washington paved the way for U.S. allies to normalize their relations with Beijing. Australia established its diplomatic relations with China on December 21, 1972, and New Zealand followed the very next day. Meanwhile, the decolonization process swept through the South Pacific,

GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

9

enabling China to establish diplomatic relations with the Pacific island countries (PICs). It also allowed China to protect its “maritime sovereignty” from “Soviet-American hegemony,” by using South Pacific waters for missile testing and to search for seabed minerals.24 What was also important in the early 1970s was that Beijing replaced Taipei in the United Nations Security Council in 1971. Taipei was forced to seek new friends among the emerging independent states to offset Beijing’s diplomatic victory. It outmaneuvered Beijing and established diplomatic relations with Fiji in 1971 and with Western Samoa and Tonga in 1972.25 Beijing did not seem to have a comprehensive policy to engage with the PICs until 1974. In that year, the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Fiji and the Soviet Navy paid several “conspicuous” visits. The South Pacific subsequently gained its importance in China’s strategy to counter Soviet influence in the Third World. Michael Godley observed that “by the closing months of 1975, a Chinese South Pacific strategy was almost fully developed.”26 China established diplomatic relations with Fiji on November 5, 1975, and with Western Samoa the following day. Up till then, Fiji and Western Samoa had recognized Taipei. About one year later, in October 1976, China established diplomatic relations with PNG. China made efforts to develop its relations with the PICs in various areas. Economically, it supported the concept of exclusive economic zones (EEZ) which was of particular importance to the Pacific Islands.27 Chinese trade delegations started to visit the PICs in the mid-1970s. China even opened a popular trade fair in Suva in 1978. There was also more social and cultural interaction. Chinese and South Pacific athletic teams exchanged visits. In 1975, China sent a soccer team on a goodwill tour to Fiji. The Chongqing acrobatic troupe made a goodwill tour of Western Samoa and PNG in 1977. Politically, leaders from PNG, Vanuatu, Fiji, Kiribati, and Western Samoa all paid a visit to Beijing shortly after China established diplomatic relations with these countries. A highlight of the bilateral relationship at that time was the 1978 announcement by the Fijian prime minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, after his visit to China, that his government intended to reject Soviet efforts to set up an embassy.28 Clearly, China appreciated the value of the words and votes of the PICs. China’s policy toward the South Pacific, like its policies toward other regions, had a clear ideological element; that is, both China and the PICs belonged to the Third World and it was their common interest to fight against imperialism. Indeed, China’s pledge to resist great power hegemonism seemed to strike “the most-responsive chord” in the PICs.29 However, by the mid-1980s, China’s global foreign policy was no longer

10

PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

based on “de facto alignment with the West in confronting the Soviet Union” but had adopted a more independent posture.30 In the South Pacific, China had become more interested in maintaining the status quo of regional stability than emphasizing the common struggle against hegemonism. In 1985, Hu Yaobang, the general secretary of the CCP, visited PNG, Fiji, and Western Samoa and articulated three principles that would guide China’s policy: (1) full respect for the foreign and domestic policies of the PICs; (2) full respect for the existing close relations among these countries; and (3) full respect for the treaties the PICs had signed with third parties.31 Notwithstanding the new development in Chinese foreign policy, it was believed that to counter the increasing influence of the Soviet Union in the South Pacific was a key reason why Hu paid a visit to the region.32 In terms of economic relations, the Asian region as a whole did not maintain a major trade relationship with the Pacific Islands until the 1970s. Trade started to grow from this time largely due to the discovery of copper in PNG, the demand for tropical hardwoods in Asia, and the growing Asian and Euro-American demand for fish. Japan was the largest buyer. The volume of China’s trade with the region remained small until the 1990s, partly because China was a closed society with a planned economy until the late 1970s. It was also because many Chinese businessmen in the region emigrated from the 1950s due to the uncertainties associated with the independence movements in the region. It was not until the 1980s that Chinese started to come to the region in large numbers again.33 The government of the PRC prohibited emigration until the 1980s. Meanwhile, there was growing resentment toward the Chinese in some PICs, such as PNG, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Many earlier Chinese settlers moved out amid concerns about their security after the independence of the Pacific Islands. A large number of Chinese left PNG when it became independent in 1975.34 In the Solomon Islands, the number of Chinese grew from 177 in 1949 to around 600 in the 1970s. Over 200 of them had migrated to Australia, Canada, or the United States by the time the Solomon Islands gained its independence in 1978. Similarly, in Vanuatu, many Chinese emigrated to Australia or the United States after its independence in 1980.35 While China prohibited emigration in those years, ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asia kept moving into the Pacific Islands. Nauru again recruited Chinese for phosphate mining after World War II. It had the highest proportion of Chinese in the region in the 1960s. Out of a national population of 6,048 in 1966, 1,167 were Chinese.36 On the other hand, Fiji restricted the entry of Chinese after World War II, particularly after 1949.

GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

11

The 1966 census found 5,149 Chinese (excluding many who were partFijian), accounting for 1 percent of Fiji’s population. The number did not increase until the late 1990s.37

Involvement since the End of the Cold War Edgar A. Porter and Terence Wesley-Smith noted that China began to show its genuine interest in the South Pacific shortly after its opening up. Beijing sent its diplomats to Hawaii to study the history, politics, and culture of the Pacific Islands in the early 1980s.38 Having observed the development of Chinese relations with the PICs, Godley concluded in 1983 that “China is in the Pacific to stay and there is no question that she is a potential giant in the area.”39 Likewise, Thomas Biddick observed in 1989 that “in the long term, the PRC is likely to play a larger role as a Pacific maritime power, raising new questions for this region of traditional Western influence.”40 He believed that Beijing regarded the South Pacific as a region in transition that presented “opportunities for outside powers to expand their political influence.”41 At about the same time, Ramesh Thakur argued that “as an Asian-Pacific regional power with global aspirations, China is a reminder of emerging multipolarity even in the isolated South Pacific.”42 He thereby anticipated that “in a longer perspective, China could be seriously interested in gaining access to the region’s fisheries and seabed resources, and perhaps even emerge as a major maritime power in Asia-Pacific.”43 Such analyses share the conviction that China’s influence in the South Pacific is inevitable. But it was not until the late 1990s that China’s influence in the region started to grow substantially. In 1991, China had only 4 diplomatic posts in the South Pacific while Australia and New Zealand had 10 each and the United States had 6.44 Currently, China has the largest number of diplomats in the region,45 although arguably it is mainly because the Chinese are unable to find qualified local staff due to the language barrier.46 Moreover, John Henderson and Benjamin Reilly have noted that “it is now accepted routine that the first official overseas visit by a new head of government from the region is made to Beijing, not to Canberra, Washington or Wellington.”47 Economically, China’s trade with the region has grown consistently in the past two decades (see Figure 1.1). China’s growing economic interactions with the region are not limited to trade. In 1997, China invested US$800 million in 300 enterprises in the PICs.48 By 2006, about 3,000 state and private Chinese companies were doing business in the South Pacific, with nearly US$2 billion invested

12

PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500

Total

Figure 1.1

Export

09

08

20

07

20

06

20

20

04 05 20

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20

02

20

01

20

20

99 00 20

98

19

19

96 97 19

19

19

95

0

Import

China’s Trade with 14 PICs (US$ million)

Sources: Zhonguo Guojia Tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian, 1996–2010 (China Statistical Yearbook, 1996–2010) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tonji Chubanshe—China Statistics Press, 1996–2010).

in minerals, hotels, plantations, garment factories, fishing and logging operations.49 In the following two years, Chinese enterprises invested another US$300 million in the PICs.50 The number of Chinese tourists to the South Pacific reached 50,000 in 2005, up from 35,000 in 2002.51 And the number has kept growing. The number of Chinese tourists to Fiji jumped from 8,453 in 2007 to 13,820 in 2009.52 More importantly, Chinese demand for the natural resources found in the South Pacific, including fisheries, minerals, gold, copper, lumber, timber, and some hydrocarbons, is high. As Michael Powles has clearly explained, China has a strong interest in the marine and seabed resources in the South Pacific.53 In terms of minerals, an oft-cited example is the majority Chinese-owned nickel mine in PNG’s Madang province. A major shareholder is China’s state-owned Metallurgical and Construction Corporation (MCC). It is one of the biggest offshore mining developments undertaken by a Chinese company valued at US$800 million.54 It is said that MCC controls management and will buy the whole output of 33,000 tonnes a year for 40 years for China’s steel mills.55 Beijing has offered various financial assistance packages aimed at enhancing trade, building infrastructure, equipping government and military assets, and developing natural resources.56 China is now believed to be one of the region’s top three aid donors after Australia and the United States. Its estimated annual aid to the region is somewhere between US$100 million and US$150 million.57 This represents a rapid increase although it is still much smaller than Australian aid to the region. During his visit to the South Pacific in April 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced that China would provide 3 billion yuan (US$375 million) in preferential loans in the next three years to boost cooperation in resource

GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

13

development, agriculture, fisheries, and other key industries. China would also offer zero tariffs for exports from the least developed countries in the region, as well as the cancellation of any debts that matured at the end of 2005.58 He also announced that free antimalaria medicines would be provided to affected Pacific countries over the next three years and training for 2,000 government officials and technical staff.59 In addition, Wen added PNG, Samoa, and the FSM to the list of destinations Chinese tourists are allowed to visit.60 Chinese immigration to the South Pacific since the opening up of China in 1979 has also been a source of increasing influence for China. There is no official figure of Chinese in the South Pacific and estimates vary widely. For instance, according to Taiwan’s Overseas Compatriots Affairs Commission, by the end of 2008, among the 930,000 overseas Chinese in Oceania, 730,000 were living in Australia and 150,000 in New Zealand. That means only 50,000 overseas Chinese were living in the South Pacific.61 On the other hand, both Zheng Jianmin, deputy director of Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, and Ron Crocombe put the total number of Chinese in the South Pacific at about 80,000, and Zheng set the upper limit at 100,000.62 However, their estimates of Chinese in individual countries can be very different. Crocombe estimated in 2007 that there could be 20,000 Chinese in Fiji and PNG respectively and 1,200 in the Solomon Islands,63 whereas Zheng noted in 2008 that the numbers of Chinese in these three countries were 8,000, 6,000, and 3,000 respectively.64 Pacific Islanders now have more opportunities to get to know the Chinese culture. Chinese cultural representatives, such as acrobatic troupes and martial arts performers, visit the PICs regularly. There is an increasing number of Chinese language teachers in the region. China’s only 24-hour English language TV channel—Channel Nine of the Chinese Central Television (CCTV-9), which was renamed CCTV NEWS in April 2010—has arrived in a number of PICs, including Tonga (July 2003, 30,000 users), Samoa (March 2005, 40,000 users), Vanuatu (August 2005, 40,000 users), PNG (March 2009, 5,000 users).65 The CCTV also signed an agreement with Fiji in September 2006, but no progress has been reported and Fiji is not on the CCTV’s list. Some CCTV NEWS programs are also relayed in Micronesia. In terms of education, 800 Chinese students studied in the Fiji branch campus of the Central Queensland University in Australia before the campus was sold to the University of the South Pacific in 2003.66 More importantly, more and more students from the South Pacific are studying in China; most of them are sponsored by the Chinese government (see Table 1.1).

14

PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

Table 1.1

Students Studying in China from the PICs that Recognize China

Country Fiji Kiribati Micronesia, Fed States of Nauru PNG Samoa Tonga Vanuatu

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008 2009

5 10 —

9 — 4

5 — 3

7 — 5

24 — 21

29 — 30

41 — 53

56 — 54

2 2 7 25 —

2 5 8 7 —

2 4 9 9 3

— 9 9 14 2

— 16 31 10 5

— 30 26 46 10

— 69 37 73 18

— 81 68 90 25

Sources: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaobu Zhengce Yanjiushi (Policy Research Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC), Zhongguo Waijiao, 2003–2010 (China’s Foreign Affairs, 2001–2010) (Yearbook) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe—World Affairs Press, 2003–2010).

China is also increasingly involved in South Pacific regionalism. A pioneer governmental institution in the South Pacific is the South Pacific Commission (SPC) that was established in 1947. It was first initiated in 1944 by Australia’s External Affairs Minister H. V. Evatt and New Zealand’s Prime Minister Peter Fraser and set up by the six colonial powers with territories in the Pacific—Australia, Britain, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States.67 The intention of the SPC appeared “honorable”—to assist postwar recovery, to work for health and education improvements for Pacific people, and to promote social and economic development in the region.68 The principal interest of the colonial powers was actually to help lay the foundation for a region that would continue to stay within the alliance formed around the United States and the United Kingdom.69 The SPC was not supposed to be a political forum and political activity was not allowed. It thus became outdated when the decolonization movement gained momentum. In 1962, Western Samoa became the first Pacific Islands group to gain its independence. Then in 1968, Nauru became the world’s smallest independent state. In the next few years, Fiji, Tonga, PNG, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu became sovereign states. The increasingly independent PICs attempted to break up the constraints of the SPC on political issues, which resulted in the establishment of the South Pacific Forum (SPF) in 1971. Unlike the SPC, the SPF was purposefully set up to discuss political issues. The founding members of the SPF were Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Tonga, and Western Samoa. The organization quickly expanded in terms of both membership and scope of cooperation. It became, and still is, the leading organization for political

GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

15

discussion and economic cooperation in the region. The membership requirements of the SPF were different from those of the SPC. While the SPC was open to all states and territories in the region, including the colonial powers, the SPF was closed to most colonial powers, except for New Zealand and Australia. Both New Zealand and Australia strongly supported the decolonization of the region and played an indispensable role in the development of the SPF through funding and other assistance. The SPF was renamed the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in October 2000. It is argued that the PICs were “too protective of their national sovereignty, too occupied with nation building” to follow the European Union (EU) and to integrate more closely.70 Nevertheless, they had become better positioned to deal with the outside world by the late 1980s. One major step to engage the actors from outside the region was the introduction of a new arrangement known as “Dialogue Partners.” There are currently 14 Dialogue Partners: Canada, China, the EU, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. China has shown an increasing interest in participating in South Pacific institutions. It supported the SPF and a Pacific Common Market in the 1970s and 1980s. It also expressed its support for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone at an early stage and signed the protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in 1987. In the post-Cold War years, involvement in South Pacific institutions has become an integral part of Beijing’s strategy toward the region. The Chinese involvement has been centered on the SPF and later the PIF. The Chinese ambassador to Fiji was first invited to the SPF in 1988. China then sent its first delegation to the Forum in 1989 and has sent government representatives to attend the annual Post-Forum Dialogue Meeting since 1990. China has used these meetings to assure the PICs that its fundamental policy toward the South Pacific is based on “mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, opening to each other, common prosperity and reaching unanimity through consultation.”71 Beijing has also used the PIF to project its benign and cooperative image. At the October 2007 PIF meeting, Chinese deputy foreign minister Zhang Yesui insisted that “the ultimate goal of China’s Pacific island policy is the maintenance of the regional stability and the promotion of common development.”72 From the late 1990s, China’s interactions with the PIF have been supported by generous financial assistance. In 1999, the China–Pacific Islands Forum Cooperation Fund was established. In the following year, China and the PIF signed an agreement under which the Chinese government donated US$3 million to the Forum Secretariat, US$1 million of which would fund the opening and operation of the Pacific Islands

16

PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

Trade Office in Beijing for three years. The rest of the fund was to be used to encourage bilateral cooperation to promote trade, investment, tourism, personnel exchange, and training.73 In 2003, China pledged another US$100,000 annually to supplement the membership contributions to the Forum Presiding Offices Conference, which represents the Speakers of Parliament and Congress in the Pacific. In 2004, a further US$800,000 was provided to fund the PIF Trade Office up until 2008.74 At the 2005 Post-Forum Dialogues, China pledged additional funds of US$2 million to the China-PIF Cooperation Fund for the period 2006–2010 at the rate of US$400,000 per year for cooperation projects under the Pacific Plan. In January 2007, China released US$400,000 to the PIF Secretariat for the development of Information and Communications Technology, as well as air and sea transport services within the region.75 China has also made efforts to join other regional institutions in the South Pacific. It joined the South Pacific Tourism Organization (SPTO) in April 2004, becoming the organization’s first member from outside the region. The SPTO, established in 1986 and based in Suva, is a regional intergovernmental organization for the joint promotion of the region as a tourist destination. It was claimed that China’s presence in the organization would help boost regional tourism, enhance understanding between China and the island countries, and encourage other major powers from outside the region to join.76 Perhaps more importantly, China has set up its own dialogue platform with the PICs. In April 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao flew to Fiji and attended the first China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum (the China–PICs Forum). Wen announced a number of generous aid packages to the region as mentioned earlier. After the opening ceremony for the First Ministerial Conference of the China–PICs Forum, China and the PICs signed the China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Guiding Framework. That document covered trade cooperation, closer economic ties, agriculture cooperation, and tourism cooperation. Michael Somare, prime minister of PNG and chair of the PIF, praised the Framework as a “historic milestone in the further strengthening of relations between the People’s Republic of China and countries of this region.” 77

Concerns about China’s Growing Influence It is believed that “most Pacific governments have welcomed China’s overtures, adopting official ‘look north’ (or ‘look east’) policies and, at

GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

17

times, playing the ‘China card’ in an attempt to remind longstanding but demanding aid donors like Australia that they have other options.”78 Analysts have made efforts to explore the motivations behind China’s deepening involvement in the South Pacific. Some argue that China wants to secure Pacific island nations’ votes in international organizations.79 Others note the growing Chinese communities in the region and Beijing’s responsibility to protect the Chinese diaspora.80 Most observers focus on Beijing’s diplomatic rivalry with Taipei, China’s economic interests, its thirst for natural resources, and increasingly, China’s strategic interests. What pervades the English language literature is a concern about China’s role in the region. These analysts are worried that the chequebook diplomacy rivalry between Beijing and Taipei is “making Pacific political rugby more corrupt and more violent”81 and “may exacerbate underlying political, social, and economic tensions in the region.”82 They argue that the region is particularly vulnerable due to weak political and legal institutions, corruption, civil unrest, and the economic scarcity that exist in some countries. A deeper concern is that China’s growing influence in the South Pacific has strategic implications. China’s deepening involvement in the region coincides with the waning influence of the United States and its European allies. Crocombe noted in 1995 that the United States was facing “decreasing leverage,” in large part because of growing East Asian competition in trade, aid, investment, tourism, education, research, and political influence.83 Reilly was concerned in 2001 that “there’s the potential that in five or 10 years, we could have in our immediate neighborhood a collection of states that owe their primary allegiance to a country outside our alliance.”84 Two years later, Henderson and Reilly claimed that “China’s long-term goal is to ultimately replace the United States as the pre-eminent power in the Pacific Ocean.”85 As a result, it could no longer be taken for granted that Oceania would remain a relatively benign “American lake.”86 The concern has deepened since then. Susan Windybank emphasized in 2005 that “foreign policy pundits are already calling a new geopolitical game of power politics and interstate rivalry as a rising China seeks to draft as many countries as possible into its sphere of influence.”87 Similarly but more subtly, Tamara Renee Shie argued in 2007 that China might be attempting to challenge American predominance by weakening U.S. alliances in the region. “By politically and economically strengthening its partnerships in the South Pacific, Beijing may be able to build its own strategic alliances in the long term,” says Shie.88 Henderson suggested in his submission to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the New Zealand

18

PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

Parliament that China could use the need to protect its overseas community “as a justification for ramping up its military presence in the region.”89 And as mentioned earlier, it is even suggested that the United States and China could engage in a Cold War in the region. Conclusion Though the Chinese connections with the Pacific Islands can be traced back to 5,000 years ago, substantial contacts did not begin until the nineteenth century when Chinese laborers started to come to the region, mainly working as indentured laborers in Pacific island plantations and phosphate mines. Official contacts were limited before 1949 when the PRC was established. In the following two decades, the government of new China did not have much contact with the South Pacific other than through its moral support for the independence movement in the region. The Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s and the decolonization process in the South Pacific enabled China to establish diplomatic relations with the PICs in the 1970s and 1980s. China’s policy toward the region in those years was largely determined by its Communist ideology of uniting Third World countries to fight against imperialism. Its economic and military interactions with the region were minimal. Since the late 1990s, China’s influence in the region has been growing rather rapidly. China’s developing involvement in the South Pacific has worried some observers. Their concerns vary but are mainly centered on two aspects. Politically, they are worried that the chequebook diplomacy rivalry between Beijing and Taipei has contributed to the instability of the region. Strategically, they are concerned that Chinese policy toward the region is driven by Beijing’s strategic calculation—the region will no longer be a relatively benign “American lake.” These concerns reflect the evolving regional order in the South Pacific. To these observers, China’s rising influence is undermining traditional Western influence in the region and, more importantly, will pose a threat to the West. China’s influence in the South Pacific is likely to keep growing, which means continuous implications for the evolution of the regional order.

TWO

The Evolving Regional Order in the South Pacific: The Rise and Fall of External Players

T

his chapter investigates the rise and fall of the major players in the region. Australia and New Zealand are two residential major players in the South Pacific. Despite the adjustments of their policies toward the region, both Canberra and Wellington have remained committed to the region over the years. For this reason and given that this book will constantly touch upon the active involvement of Australia and New Zealand in later chapters, this chapter focuses on the external major players other than mainland China and Taiwan. These traditional external major players include the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan. It is hoped that the discussion will provide a useful context for understanding Chinese growing involvement in the region. The United States The Pacific was called “the American Lake” or the “homesea” of the U.S.-led West during the Cold War years.1 This highlights both U.S. dominance and the Pacific’s strategic importance to the United States. The Pacific is vast, however, and U.S. interest has never been equally spread across the region. In a sense, to emphasize the importance of the South Pacific by referring to the American Lake is misleading. The Northwestern part of the Pacific, off the coast of Northeast Asia, has been more important than the Southwestern part of the Pacific. Hal M. Friedman made it clear that the driving force behind the concept of the

20

PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

Pacific as an American lake was U.S. strategic interests in East Asia. Friedman has observed that [f]aced with fears of a future Pearl Harbor-style attack by a potentially resurgent Japan, and facing an even more likely confrontation with the Soviet Union, American policymakers, planners, and strategic analysts saw the creation of an “American lake” in the postwar Pacific as the best means by which to guarantee U.S. security interests vis-à-vis East Asia. 2

The United States entered the Pacific a few years after its independence. At that time, the Americans saw the ocean “more as a zone of transit than as a field of national interest.”3 Their first contact was with Northeast Asian nations. In 1784, the first American ship, the Empress of China, sailed to Canton in China. In the following years, American private trading and whaling vessels increased their visit to the islands and mainland coasts of the Pacific, particularly the Northwestern Pacific. With the growing value of the trade and properties involved, the U.S. government found it necessary to provide support and protection for American citizens and companies. It was no surprise that the United States followed the suit of Great Britain and forced Qing China to sign the Treaty of Wang-Xia (Wang-hsia) in 1844. The unequal treaty enabled the Americans to expand their trade with the Chinese. A decade later, Commodore Matthew Perry and his “black ships” forced Japan to open up. More importantly, the United States annexed Hawaii in 1898 for its strategic value. However, the importance of the Pacific to the United States remained a myth to be fulfilled in the first half of the twentieth century. Although the net profit of the first voyage of the Empress of China was impressive, in the subsequent century, the dreams of a vast, lucrative commerce with Asia failed to become a reality. By World War I, U.S. trade with Asia accounted for just about 5 or 6 percent of U.S. foreign trade.4 U.S. investment in the region was also small and the United States had minimal direct diplomatic contact with the Pacific dependencies of European powers. Washington did not even have clear political and economic policies toward its own Pacific dependencies. U.S. interest in the Pacific grew substantially before World War II, mainly due to its rivalry with Japan, interest in China, and its desire to expand trade and investment. The South Pacific still was not in the strategic picture. While World War II forced the Americans to give “major attention” to the Pacific for the first time, U.S. allies were unable to get a clear message from Washington about U.S. plans for a postwar Pacific security. Frustrated, Australia and New Zealand decided to issue their

THE EVOLVING REGIONAL ORDER

21

joint statement of principles about postwar South Pacific security in 1944, which annoyed Washington.5 In the postwar years, most Americans continued to perceive the Pacific Islands as “a tranquil backwater where essentially passive U.S. interests required little attention.”6 The United States dominated the North Pacific while its traditional allies, Australia, Britain, France, and New Zealand maintained colonial influence over South Pacific islands with the exception of American Samoa. John C. Dorrance noted that “the absence of hostile influences, the distance of the region from actual and potential conflicts, the turmoil associated with decolonization elsewhere, and the distractions of the Cold War assured American inattention to the region until the recent past.”7 President Harry Truman even considered the end of Navy control over American Samoa and Guam. Wary of the interests of Australia and New Zealand, Washington was deliberately inactive on regional issues.8 The decolonization cycle since 1962 did not fundamentally change U.S. perceptions. The Soviet Union was not active in the region and did not have diplomatic relations with any island states. Moscow did not have an aid program to the region either and no Soviet naval vessels ever reached a South Pacific island port.9 The Soviet Union did make a few attempts to get into the region. In April 1976, the Soviet Union made an offer of aid to Tonga. The Soviets would build a dock and extend Tonga’s main airport. In return, the Soviets would use Tonga as a base for their fishing boats and Tonga would provide facilities for crew exchange.10 The deal did not materialize and the King of Tonga made it clear that he preferred aid from the West.11 Nevertheless, the news sent a shock wave in the region and alerted the United States and its allies Australia and New Zealand. The U.S. Senate held a hearing on the “Emerging Pacific Island Community” in July 1978. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke said in his testimony, “The region . . . has been relatively overlooked since the end of World War II, but is now emerging into a new and important role in the world.”12 However, it was a shared understanding in Congress and the administration that the United States should not challenge Australia and New Zealand over leadership in the region.13 The Soviet Union made more attempts in the 1980s. In 1984, Moscow offered fishing and commercial deals to most Pacific island countries (PICs) and later reached a deal with Kiribati and Vanuatu. While the agreements lapsed after just one year,14 they “gave rise to considerable alarm and a degree of skepticism about Soviet intentions in the region at large.”15 David Hegarty pointed out that “In the mid-1980s the barometer of external power interest in the South Pacific rose.”16 The Soviet

22

PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

Union even opened an embassy in Port Moresby, capital of Papua New Guinea (PNG), in early 1990.17 It was the Soviet Union’s first embassy in the region, although it was closed in 1993, shortly after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.18 Despite much speculation about the Soviet Union’s strategic intentions in the region,19 both Australia and New Zealand were not particularly alarmed. While the Australian prime minister welcomed the Soviet Union’s “constructive involvement” in the region, the New Zealand government recognized “that the Russians have an established and legitimate interest in security issues in the Pacific.”20 Hegarty concluded that “an extension of political influence is the Soviet Union’s major goal in the South Pacific rather than hard strategic targets.”21 Against this background, although Washington increased its attention to the region and assigned more staff to embassies in the region, its policy toward the region remained largely indifferent.22 Indeed, as Yves Pimont noted shortly before the end of the Cold War, while rhetorically the United States was determined to increase its involvement in the region in the late 1980s, “in truth the United States has been able, up to now, to entrust Australia with the role of defending Western interests in the zone.”23 The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s further reduced U.S. interest in the South Pacific. In October 1990, shortly before the end of the Cold War, President George Bush invited island leaders to an “unprecedented” summit. At the summit, Bush emphasized U.S. commitment to the region and announced a number of initiatives.24 PIC leaders were impressed, so much so that the Cook Islands premier believed that Bush had begun “to replenish the pool of goodwill.”25 By the mid-1990s, however, the focus of security had shifted from “protection from external threats,” where the Soviet Union was seen as the “single major threat” to “protection from internal instability in Pacific island states.”26 U.S. interest in the region has been largely limited to the freely associated states (FAS) in Micronesia. Richard J. Payne has summarized U.S. perceptions of the South Pacific succinctly: The islands’ small size, remoteness from major industrial countries, and relative economic insignificance have contributed to their marginalization in American foreign policy. Furthermore, the Pacific Islands’ tranquillity, especially where compared to other parts of the world has reinforced American neglect and lack of interest . . . Moreover, the remoteness of the Pacific islands guaranteed, in the minds of most strategic thinkers, that problems in the Pacific would naturally be contained to individual islands.27

The Islands’ long-held perception has been that the United States has neglected them. American policies since the end of the Cold War have only helped to reinforce this perception.28 The United States has since

THE EVOLVING REGIONAL ORDER

23

closed the State Department Office of Pacific Island Affairs that was created in the 1980s,29 reduced diplomatic activities in the South Pacific, limited its participation in regional organizations and reduced development assistance.30 Washington closed its South Pacific embassies except for those in PNG and Fiji shortly after the Cold War came to its end.31 It also withdrew its aid mission in Fiji. While U.S. aid to the region remained steady (Tables 2.2 and 2.3), most of the aid goes to the three freely associated states in Micronesia. In the late 1990s, only about 7 percent of its total aid to the region was directed to other PICs.32 Having said that, the United States can still be an influential player in the region. The South Pacific includes three broad ethnogeographic areas—Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia (see Map 2.1). The United States exerts predominant soft power in Micronesia, so much so that it is labelled “The American Pacific.”33 The Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and Palau remain freely associated with the United States under a “compact relationship.” Under the Compact, Micronesians can live, work, and study in the United States without a visa.34 The Marshall Islands, the FSM, and Palau joined the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq. Hundreds of FAS recruits serve in the U.S. military.35

Los Angeles

Japan

North Pacific Ocean China Taiwan

Hawaii

Philippine Sea

Manila Philippines

Guam

Northern Mariana Islands

Marshall Islands Fed States of Micronesia

Palau

Micronesia

Melanesia Indonesia

Dili

Irian jaya

Arafura Sea

East Timor

Gulf of Carpentaria

Timor Sea

Australia

Adelaide

Nauru

Kiribati

Kiritimati (Christmas Islands)

Solomon Tuvalu Papau Islands Marquesas Islands New Guinea Port American Samoa Moresby Polynesia Samoa Vanuatu Cook Islands Coral Sea Niue Fiji French Polynesia New Tonga Caledonia Brisbane

South Pacific Ocean

Sydney Canberra Auckland Melbourne Iasmam Sea New Zealand

0

Wellington

0

450 450

950 KM

950 KM

Pacific Island Countries and Cultural Areas (Source: Lum and Vaughn 2007: 27).

24

PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

American influence is not limited to Micronesia. Between June and December 2004, Tonga provided a unit of 45 troops as part of the U.S. coalition in Iraq.36 More broadly, Payne has noted that “important cultural reservoirs” exist between the United States and the Pacific Islands. Payne further explains: A cultural reservoir may be defined as an accumulation of goodwill and understanding that stems from a set of values, beliefs, attitudes, historical experiences, and ethnic links that two or more countries have in common. Similarities are strengthened by migration, international exchanges, military alliances, and economic and cultural interdependence. Cultural reservoirs strengthen the perception that friendly relations are the norm between culturally similar countries and that a disagreement is a deviation from an otherwise peaceful relationship.37

The foundation of the cultural reservoirs was established during World War II and has been consolidated through numerous strategic, economic, and political arrangements. A good example is the establishment of the East-West Center in Hawaii.38 Traditional European Players Gotz Mackensen has observed that the normal European view of the Pacific is of it being “something on the other side of the world, like the very edge of the world, [and] a mixture of cannibalism and paradise.”39 Most European powers had colonies in the South Pacific. This by no means suggests that they considered the region strategically important. One important reason for this colonial interest was that “in classic colonial times everyone in Europe was very proud to have some Pacific colonies and had a very impressive list of business investments in this region, too.”40 The past century has witnessed dramatic changes in European relations with the South Pacific (see Table 2.1). Germany lost its Pacific colonies in 1914. The Netherlands lost its only Pacific colony West New Guinea in 1962. Well before the end of the Cold War, the Europeans on the whole believed that the Pacific offered “no opportunities for big investments or trade in the short run. The long term strategies are seldom seen or understood by politicians or businessmen.”41 European nations showed an increased interest in the South Pacific in the 1970s when the PICs declared 200-mile economic zones and when the Europeans were concerned about the coming shortage of industrial raw materials, especially oil and minerals. Such interest did not result in substantive economic activities however, mainly because Europe is too far away from

Table 2.1

European Colonies in the South Pacific

Colonial Power

Colony

Status

France

French Polynesia (1880–) New Caledonia (1853–)

French overseas collectivity On the United Nations list of NonSelf-Governing Territories since 1986; independence referendum to be held between 2014 and 2019 Independence since July 30, 1980

Vanuatu (administered jointly with the United Kingdom, 1906–1980) The Wallis and Futuna (1917–) Germany

Federated States of Micronesia (1899–1914)

German Protectorate over the Northern Solomons (1886–1899) Marshall Islands (1885–1914)

Nauru (1888–1914)

New Guinea (1884–1914)

Palau (1899–1914)

Western Samoa (1900–1914)

French overseas collectivity Occupied by Japanese troops in 1914; taken by the United States in 1944; part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands administered by the United States; independence since May 10, 1979; signed a Compact of Free Association with the United States in 1986 (effective on November 3, 1986) Transferred to the United Kingdom in 1899 in exchange for recognition of the German claim to Western Samoa Occupied by Japanese troops in 1914; taken by the United States in 1944; part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; independence since May 1, 1979; signed a Compact of Free Association with the United States in 1986 (effective on October 21, 1986) Captured by Australia in 1914; League of Nations Trust Territory administered by Australia until 1968; independence since January 31, 1968 Occupied by Australian troops in 1914; combined with Papua in an administrative union; independence since September 16, 1975 Occupied by Japanese troops in 1914; taken by the United States in 1944; part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; independence on October 2, 1994; signed a Compact of Free Association with the United States in 1982 (effective on October 1, 1994) Occupied by New Zealand troops in 1914; Independence since January 1, 1962 Continued

26

PACIFIC ISLANDS IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

Table 2.1

Continued

Colonial Power

Colony

Status

Netherlands

West New Guinea (1828–1962)

United Kingdom

British New Guinea (the southern coast of New Guinea and its adjacent islands, 1888–1975) British Solomon Islands Protectorate over the southern islands (1893) and the northern islands (1899) till 1978 Fiji (1874–1970) Kiribati (1916–1979) Niue Island (end of nineteenth century–1974) Pitcairn Islands (1838–)

Part of United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (October 1, 1962– May 1, 1963); subsequently incorporated into Indonesia Under Australian administration from 1906 to 1975 as the Territory of Papua

Tokelau (1877–1948, initially as a protectorate) Tonga (British protected state with indigenous governance, 1900–1970) Tuvalu (1892–1916 as a British protectorate; 1916– 1978 as a British colony, known as the Ellice Islands before 1975) Vanuatu (administered jointly with France, 1906–1980)

Renamed Solomon Islands on June 22, 1975; self-government in January 1976 and independence since July 7, 1978

Independence since October 10, 1970 Independence since July 12, 1979 Independence since 1974 but still in a free association with New Zealand Overseas territory of the United Kingdom Sovereignty transferred to New Zealand in 1948 Independence since June 4, 1970

Independence since October 1, 1978

Independence since July 30, 1980

the region. The Soviet Union’s increasing involvement in the region also caused some concern in Europe but overall European reactions were measured.42 The end of the Cold War further reduced European interest in the South Pacific. The United Kingdom was the most important external player in the South Pacific during the 1800s and early 1900s. Its influence in the region shrank quickly along with its decline as a great power in world politics after World War II. In 1960, Britain decided to withdraw from its colonies

THE EVOLVING REGIONAL ORDER

27

once economic, educational, constitutional, and security arrangements were made for independent governments in these colonies. In the South Pacific, British colonies gained their independence in the 1970s and early 1980s (see Table 2.1). Consequently, British involvement in the region dwindled steeply. By 1987 British aid had slipped to seventh and constituted just 2 percent of the aid to the region.43 The trend of increasing disinterest continued after the end of the Cold War. By 1998, Britain’s annual direct aid to the Pacific Islands was less than one-fifth of what it had been only six years earlier.44 Then, it closed its embassies in Kiribati, Tonga, and Vanuatu during 2004–2006. It also withdrew from the Pacific Community and the University of the South Pacific in August 2004. In 2009, Britain’s net official development assistance (ODA) disbursements to the 14 PICs and regional programs/ agencies were merely US$2.1 million and US$3.7 million respectively.45 One key linkage between Britain and the South Pacific is through the Commonwealth of which a number of PICs are members. Even that linkage is not as strong as it appears. The Commonwealth PICs are largely under the leadership of other two Commonwealth members—New Zealand and Australia. French commitment to the region was more consistent. Instead of gaining independence, French overseas territories were integrated “constitutionally, politically and economically with the metropol.”46 France even competed with Australia and New Zealand for influence in the “Anglo-Saxon Lake,” mainly due to Australia’s support for the independence movement in New Caledonia, and Canberra’s and Wellington’s opposition to French nuclear testing in the region.47 After the second coup of September 1987 in Fiji, Australia and New Zealand imposed further economic sanctions on Fiji and ended political relations. However, France offered Fiji AUS$16 million in aid. Partly because of France’s attempt to start fishing in the troubled waters, Australia decided to recognize the new Fiji state and restore economic, and later military, assistance. There were various reasons why France remained a South Pacific power, including the region’s symbolic importance to an empire, national prestige, resources, the need for a nuclear testing site, and regional security and economic interests.48 Comparatively speaking, the symbolic importance and prestige carried more weight than resources and economic interests.49 Some French officials tried to justify French involvement in the region by asserting that the absence of France would leave a power vacuum in the region and the Soviet Union would move to fill it, 50 the so-called strategic denial.51 Such assertions were not believed to be credible, however.52

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Some argue that French security interest derives from the fact that “French Polynesia alone adds five million square kilometres of ocean to the orbit under French control.”53 Karin von Strokirch notes that “Both territories (New Caledonia and French Polynesia) provide Francophone venues for rest and recreation for French military forces.”54 For many years, however, French security interests also lay in the fact that the South Pacific was a French nuclear testing site and was considered indispensible to France. The maintenance of a working nuclear deterrent was an “absolute priority” for France.55 France established the Pacific Experimentation Center in 1966 and it was in the Pacific that all French nuclear tests were carried out.56 To Australia and New Zealand, French nuclear testing posed a regional security threat.57 France was determined to keep its overseas possessions and, for that matter, to stay in the various regions including the South Pacific.58 Strokirch noted in 2003 that France was the only country apart from the United States that maintained a genuinely global network of military bases, communications facilities, and some 20,000 troops in its territories. France was “determined to retain that distinction both for strategic and symbolic reasons,” says Strokirch.59 Table 2.2 shows that French aid to the region was much larger than other donors in the 1990s. However, most of the aid was directed to its territories d’outre-mer (overseas territories) such as French Polynesia and New Caledonia that became French collectivité d’outre-mer (overseas collectivity) in 2003 after a constitutional reform. Strictly speaking, such aid should not be counted as ODA as it serves as maintenance costs for the colonies.60 In any case, only some 1.3 percent of the total aid to the region was spent in other PICs.61 French aid to the region increased markedly in the mid-1990s. This was due to French “charm offensive in response to a regional furore over the final series of tests held in 19951996.”62 French interest in the region outside its collectivité d’outre-mer Table 2.2 million)

Major Donors’ Bilateral Aid to the Pacific Region in the 1990s (US$

Country

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

France Australia U.S. Japan UK

737.5 295.8 181.0 138.5 53.0

780.7 322.6 337.0 127.7 55.8

897.5 331.0 221.0 159.9 70.0

836.5 336.3 231.0 197.7 69.9

712.6 313.1 151.0 159.1 71.7

756.8 332.1 184.5 147.2 64.7

1,424.2

1,666.0

1,710.8

1,698.3

1,433.0

1,525.7

Total

Source: Yoshiaki, “Pacific Island States and Japan in the Global Context,” p. 103.

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29

quickly diminished after France ended its nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific permanently in 1996. French net ODA disbursements to the 14 PICs in the past decade have been minimal, US$5.3 million in 2009. Its net ODA disbursements to regional programs and agencies have been more substantial, a total of US$19.8 million in 2009. 63 Nevertheless, to say that France still plays “a foundational role” in the region is not an accurate assessment unless we include its collectivité d’outre-mer as part of the region.64 While European powers like Britain and France have reduced their involvement in the region, the European Union (EU) has substantially increased its aid to the region in the 2000s (see Table 2.3). Both Britain and France have been active in advocating a strong relationship between the EU and the Pacific. France, for instance, is a strong advocate for the Pacific as a member of the EU. The first formal strategy for EU-Pacific relations in 30 years was announced in mid-2006. The strategy consists of three components: • stronger political relations on matters of common interest such as global political security, trade, economic and social development, and the environment; • more focused development action, with greater emphasis on regional cooperation to build up critical mass, enhance regional governance, and facilitate mutual enrichment; and • more efficient aid delivery, including greater use of direct budget support and closer coordination with other partners, in particular Australia and New Zealand.65

Table 2.3 Major Donors’ Net ODA Disbursements to the 14 PICs and South Pacific Regional Programs and Agencies in the 2000s (US$ million) Country

2000

2001

2002

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Australia 267.3 240.2 269.7 376.8 445.9 483.0 546.3 649.2 723.1 702.8 United States 160.3 225.2 167.8 174.3 144.6 159.2 187.0 171.7 188.0 215.9 NZ 48.8 47.9 44.1 59.7 71.5 88.3 106.5 120.9 135.3 127.1 EU* 77.7 75.6 45.2 49.3 109.1 142.5 118.4 93.6 128.2 121.7 (EU Institutions) 53.5 50 22.7 34.3 65.1 84.6 77.8 71.2 93.4 82.1 Japan 151.1 101.5 93.5 52.1 42.1 93.7 76.2 70.3 72.9 111.9 *EU Institutions plus EU members Sources: For 2000–2002: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2008: Disbursements, Commitments, Country Indicators, OECD, 2008. For 2003–2009: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2011: Disbursements, Commitments, Country Indicators, OECD, 2011.

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The EU emphasizes that this strategy “reflects the growing environmental, political and economic importance of the Pacific region.”66

Japan Stephen Hoadley noted in 1992 that “Japan regards itself as a natural member of the island Pacific by virtue of its proximity, insular geography and historical involvement.”67 Japan became a colonial power in the first half of the twentieth century.68 Its relations with the South Pacific were very much limited after its defeat in World War II. In the 1970s, however, Japan started developing its aid ties with the region. There were several reasons why Japan regained its interest in the region. The “oil shocks” of 1973 highlighted the importance of “resource diplomacy” and the South Pacific had value in this respect. In addition to minerals and timber, the region was known for its fisheries. Related to fisheries was the new Law of the Sea regime. The regime created 200nautical-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ). The South Pacific EEZs were particularly important to Japan, the world’s leading fishing country that had the world’s largest fishing industry until 1989 when it was overtaken by China. It is, therefore, unsurprising that until the l980s, marine resources were the key focus of Japan’s foreign policy in this region.69 In 1975 more than 85 percent of Japan’s tuna catch was from the Pacific.70 In the 1980s, exploration of the Pacific seabed for minerals was Japan’s other key interest in the region.71 Meanwhile, the independence of the PICs had enabled Japan to establish and strengthen the bilateral relationships. There was a sudden surge in Japan’s interest in the South Pacific in the late 1980s to the degree that Japanese aid basically doubled in 1986.72 Japan’s foreign minister, Mr. Tadashi Kuranari, paid an 11-day South Pacific tour that ushered in what he called a “postwar new deal.” The pace at which Japan wanted to increase its aid to the South Pacific was so great that it was having difficulty finding enough suitable projects to sponsor. Tokyo even dispatched a special task force to the PICs to speed the quest.73 By the end of the 1980s, Japan was the largest or secondlargest bilateral donor to almost all PICs.74 Japan’s increased interest was largely an attempt to limit the Soviet Union’s perceived expansionism in the region. With the end of the Cold War, Japan quickly moved into the vacuum that opened as the traditional major players such as the United States disengaged with the region. It provided ODA worth US$127 million to the South Pacific in 1994 and it was increased to US$160 million in 1995.75 In

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1997, the Japanese government decided to slash its aid budget by 10 percent. Tokyo assured the South Pacific that the decision did not apply uniformly to all countries and to all forms of assistance.76 Indeed, while the South Pacific accounted for around 1 percent of Japan’s total ODA budget in 1997,77 it now receives about 1.5 percent.78 On a per capita basis, Japan’s aid to the South Pacific exceeds that provided to any other region.79 The PICs received US$22.70 per capita in 1997, compared with US$0.47 in China, US$2.40 in Indonesia, and US$7.70 in Thailand, Japan’s three largest ODA recipients.80 It should also be noted that while Japan’s aid to the region in the 1990s was smaller than that of France, Australia, and the United States, Japan’s aid was much more “evenhanded.”81 As mentioned earlier, while over 98 percent of the French aid went to its own colonies, over 92 percent of the U.S. aid was directed to the three freely associated states. As for Australia, 72.9 percent of Australia’s 1997 aid to the region went to PNG.82 Therefore, it should not be difficult to imagine that Japan had significant influence in the region in the 1990s. As being heavily dependent on aid was a common characteristic of most PICs, ODA was a major factor in gaining influence in the Pacific. In the 1990s, the ratio of aid to gross domestic product (GDP) was more than 20 percent for many PICs. For some of them, it was as high as 70 to 80 percent.83 Meanwhile, Japan worked closely with the South Pacific Forum (SPF) and later the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). It has attended Post-Forum Dialogues ever since 1989. In addition, each year the chairman of the SPF/ PIF is invited to Japan for talks as a guest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As an effort to strengthen its ties with the South Pacific, the Japanese government, in cooperation with the secretariat of the SPF, set up a Pacific Islands Center in Tokyo in October 1996 to promote economic exchanges with the region.84 The first-ever summit-level meeting between Japan and the members of the SPF/PIF, or Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM), took place on October 13, 1997, in Tokyo. Four more meetings have been held in Japan since then, with the fifth one held in Tomamu, Hokkaido, in May 2009.85 Japan has multiple interests in the South Pacific. According to the Japanese government, the PALM is focused on issues like security, trade and investment, environment, education and human resources development, and health and hygiene.86 It is also believed that Japan is using it to bolster international support for its bid for a permanent seat on an expanded UN Security Council and to further its own economic interests, which include securing fishing access and deep ocean mining rights inside the EEZs of the PICs.87 In June 1995, prime minister of Vanuatu Maxime Carlot told Japanese prime minister Tomiichi

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Murayama that he supported Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. At the same time, Carlot requested that Japan increase its economic assistance. Murayama thanked Carlot for his support for the Security Council seat bid and promised to consider the request for economic assistance.88 As another example, in a communiqué issued in September 1996, the SPF expressed its “strong and unanimous support” for Japan’s bid for a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council for 1997–1998.89 Hoadley observed in 1992 that “Japan appears to have had no grand design beyond keeping the Pacific island region politically and militarily tranquil, free for shipping, air travel and tourism, open for the purchase of fish, timber and minerals, and closed to the weapons and agents of hostile outside powers.”90 One may argue that these interests are tantamount to a grand design. One of Japan’s prominent interests in the region is whaling. It has been widely reported that Japan has been using development aid to buy votes at the International Whaling Commission to block the establishment of a South Pacific Whale Sanctuary.91 Crocombe notes that “all intergovernmental aid has a goodwill-buying and vote-buying element, but few were as blatant as Japan in relation to fisheries.”92 Japan’s aid, like aid from some other countries, should be put in perspective for another reason. In the 1990s, Japan paid only 5 percent of its reported catch in the EEZs of the PICs while it paid 11 percent of its reported catch in Australian waters. Japanese officials claimed that it was because the PICs received aid from Japan. Crocombe thus points out that “it is not aid but payment for access (and there is at least some truth in that).”93 According to Sandra Tarte, Japan had four broad sets of policy goals in the South Pacific in the 1990s. They were foreign economic (the traditional policy goals: resource security, trade development, and the promotion of foreign investment); diplomatic (more traditional foreign policy priorities, including support for Japan’s position in international fora, international prestige and status, and security); domestic interest groups (the fisheries sector and other private sector actors whose interests were in extracting commercial benefits from delivering aid projects); and bureaucratic (different ministries and agencies viewed the ends of aid policy in terms of the interests and objectives of their organization).94 One may add a motive that is unique to Japan, namely compensation for damage and atrocities in World War II,95 although the importance of that motive has been declining with time. To secure its interests in the region, Japan has also adopted a benign diplomatic stance on domestic political issues in the PICs. For instance, it did not condemn the two coups in Fiji in 2000.96

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33

The relative weight of Japan’s contribution then declined steadily with China’s contribution increasing rapidly since the late 1990s. China’s growing influence in the region may have had an impact on Japan’s policy goals in the region. In 2006, Japan decided to cooperate with Australia and New Zealand and coordinate aid to the PICs more closely. The main motive is believed to be their common security interests, especially vis-à-vis China.97 In July 2008, Japan offered to contribute peacekeepers to the Australian-led stabilization mission in the Solomon Islands. This, according to Reilly, “signals Japan’s willingness to cooperate with Australia and other liberal democracies in securing regional stability—and to balance the growing weight of China.” 98 Similarly, Kabayashi Izumi argues that the China factor played an important role in Tokyo’s decision to increase its aid to the region despite its economic difficulties and declining ODA.99 At the closing of the fifth PALM in May 2009, Japanese prime minister Taro Aso confirmed 50 billion yen (US$528 million) in aid to the PIF for the coming three years, which was an increase of more than 10 percent from its previous aid package of 45 billion yen (US$476 million).100

Other Players Other than the above-mentioned players, Libya, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, India, and even Israel expressed some interest in the region in the Cold War years. Not only did these countries have interest in the region, some PICs also encouraged their involvement as they saw these countries as alternatives to the former colonial powers. Commenting on Asian states’ involvement in the region in 1992, Hoadley noted that “Asian contacts offer new diplomatic perspectives, trade opportunities, investment and aid, and assist island representatives to gain access to the services of international organizations.”101 Libya’s involvement, mainly supporting the independence movements in the region, alarmed Australia, so much so that senior Australian politicians and officials suggested in 1987 that “the Libyan threat was potentially more dangerous in the short term than that of the Soviet Union.”102 As for Israel, its main interest might be to counter Libya’s influence in the region.103 Seeing itself as the natural leader of the four “nesias” (Indonesia, Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia),104 Indonesia has “a sense of entitlement to leadership.”105 Indonesia was diplomatically active in the region. Its interest was derived from its concerns about the Free Papua Movement in Irian Jaya (West Papua). Nevertheless, its influence was

34

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limited with a reasonably high visibility only in PNG.106 Today, the PICs are “a very small item on Indonesia’s radar screen,” argues Crocombe.107 Relations with PNG remain the most important element in Indonesia’s policy toward the region today and Indonesia’s priority is still to deny support for West Papua independence.108 Singapore, Malaysia, and South Korea are focused on commercial and investment opportunities.109 South Korea hosted the First Korea– Pacific Islands Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Seoul in May 2011. These countries are not major players in the region although Singapore is Fiji’s largest merchandise import market, with an imports volume of US$558.33 million in 2008.110 India’s involvement in the region was largely due to its concerns about the well-being of the Indo-Fijian community in Fiji. In the Cold War years, the PICs did not have much trust in India given India’s close relationship with the Soviet Union. India has become more active in the region since the end of the Cold War. Crocombe concluded in 2007 that Indian trade, investment, and security interests in the region were minor but “common interests keep broadening.”111 Conclusion Like other parts of the world, the South Pacific has witnessed the rise and fall of the influence of external players. As former European colonies, the region was traditionally dominated by European powers, particularly the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. These European powers are still involved in the region to various extents with France being the most active due to its involvement in its two overseas collectivities. The European countries have also been happy to delegate to the EU engagement activities in the region. As one of the two superpowers in the Cold War years, the United States was a major player in the region by default. However, the United States never genuinely committed itself to the region other than through its three freely associated states in Micronesia. Washington was deliberately restrained in its involvement as it was wary of the leadership role played by its allies Australia and New Zealand. It had no intention or interest in challenging its allies’ leadership role in the region. Japan was the most influential Asian player in the region for many years thanks to its substantial official aid. Since the late 1990s, Japan’s influence has been challenged by China with China overtaking Japan as a more important aid donor in the region. China’s fast growing

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35

involvement and influence has become a worry to Japan. Tokyo now has more incentives, political and economic, to continue its relations with the PICs. Other players in the region have been less influential, including Libya, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, India, and even Israel.

THREE

China’s Security Concerns and Grand Strategy

A

nalysts have provided various definitions of grand strategy. According to Michael Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, a grand strategy is a country’s “basic approach to politico-military security.”1 More specifically, Avery Goldstein notes that “what distinguishes grand strategy as a concept is not its nature, but rather its scope. It is labelled ‘grand’ because it refers to the guiding logic or overarching vision about how a country’s leaders combine a broad range of capabilities linked with military, economic, and diplomatic strategies to pursue international goals.”2 Christopher Layne clearly details “a three-step process” that leads to the implantation of a grand strategy—“determining a state’s vital security interests; identifying the threats to those interests; and deciding how best to employ the state’s political, military, and economic resources to protect those interests.”3 Peter Feaver is more sophisticated, saying that grand strategy is a term of art from academia, and refers to the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state’s national interest. Grand strategy is the art of reconciling ends and means. It involves purposive action—what leaders think and want. Such action is constrained by factors leaders explicitly recognize (for instance, budget constraints and the limitations inherent in the tools of statecraft) and by those they might only implicitly feel (cultural or cognitive screens that shape worldviews).4

What deserves particular attention, but is often neglected by analysts, is that it is the leaders, not the abstract “state,” who determine a country’s grand strategy. This is important because, as shown below, the realist assumption of the existence of a sharp boundary between domestic

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“order” and international “anarchy” is problematic for the analysis of Chinese grand strategy. This is despite the informed observation that China “may well be the high church of realpolitik in the post-Cold War world.”5 Against this background, this chapter first examines China’s security concerns and then discusses China’s grand strategy.

China’s Security Concerns The concept of security is evolving. In the Cold War years, it was conflated with that of national security based on power and strength represented by military capabilities. This state-centric definition of security is in line with realist assumptions that the most important issues in world politics concern national political/military security, or high politics as opposed to the low politics of economic relations. In the view of realists, as summarized by Brian White, “International relations, because of mutual insecurity and the absence of a superior political authority, is characterized by anarchy and, therefore, the ever constant danger of war between states.”6 Consequently, “The first and most difficult task of government is to ensure the survival of the state in a hostile, violent, Hobbesian environment.”7 Therefore, realists focus on “external” rather than “internal” factors as the important determinants of state behavior. In the post-Cold War world, as noted by Chris Brown, “As concern over military security becomes less pressing, so a wider conception of security has come to the fore.”8 In the West, more attention is given to nonmilitary security threats and the focus of security policy is contested. Should the focus be traditional national and international security or individual security such as poverty and denial of human rights? Should it be societal security like ethnic conflicts? Or should it be global security such as the breakdown of the global monetary system or global warming? Not surprisingly, China defined its national security in excessively narrow military terms in the Cold War years. After all, China was under constant threat from the United States and then the Soviet Union. Beijing’s ideology-oriented worldview determined that it would always have a strong sense of military insecurity. The post-Cold War security debate in the West has influenced the Chinese understanding of national security. Chinese analysts accept that security now means “comprehensive security” (zonghe anquan). It no longer equals national defense and diplomacy and is no longer limited to the defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. For Chinese leaders, China’s security map is complex. As an undemocratically elected government, Beijing’s security concerns

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are closely related to domestic politics. Moreover, not only does Beijing have external and internal security concerns, it also has to deal with the complicated Taiwan issue.

External Security Challenges In the 1980s, an increasingly pragmatic China reexamined world politics and decided that peace and development were the twin dominant themes of the time. The political crisis in 1989 (Tiananmen Square crackdown) and the end of the Cold War ushered in some uncertainties. The events highlighted the West’s political threat to the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The end of the Washington-BeijingMoscow grand triangle also reduced China’s strategic importance to the United States. China tried to redefine its main potential threats in the years immediately after the end of the Cold War. According to some analysts, Japan was likely to replace the Soviet Union/Russia to become the Chinese leadership’s major concern.9 China’s perceptions of security threats became more complicated in 1996 when the Taiwan Strait crisis made clear the possibility of a military clash between China and the United States over Taiwan.10 Just one month after the dangerous escalation of the Taiwan Strait crisis, U.S. president Bill Clinton and Japanese prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto held a summit meeting in Tokyo and signed the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century. The crisis and the joint declaration as well as subsequent revision of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation in 1997 deepened China’s suspicion of U.S. motives regarding Taiwan and, in the longer term, U.S. strategy toward the rise of China. The rise of China also poses a challenge to Beijing because it has profound implications for international security, which in turn poses challenges to Beijing in terms of how to manage perceptions of this rise. According to Chinese analysts, Beijing so far has experienced four waves of the “China threat theory.”11 The first wave (1992–1993) started with Ross Munro’s “Awakening Dragon” published in 1992. The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis triggered the second wave, represented by The Coming Conflict with China. The third wave followed closely (1998–1999) and was highlighted by the Cox Report, the Wen Ho Lee espionage case, and the 1996 U.S. campaign finance controversy, along with the publications of Year of the Rat and Red Dragon Rising. The most recent “China threat theory” is, in the words of a Chinese analyst, “the most substantive.”12 It began with the release of the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on China’s military power on July 19, 2005, which was followed by the

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U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s annual report issued in early November 2005, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and a series of “anti-China” articles published by American media such as the Weekly Standard and the New York Times. In addition to the military dimension, the “China threat theory” has ideological and economic dimensions represented by “China economic threat,” “China grain threat,” “China environment threat,” “China civilization threat,” “China energy threat,” “China diplomacy threat,” “China model threat,” and so on. A variant of the “China economic threat theory” points to the collapse of the Chinese economy as a cause for concern, rather than the ascendance of Chinese economic power. China’s energy thirst has generated much discussion in recent years. It is often perceived as a security threat in various ways—from its role in territorial disputes, such as those over South China Sea and East China Sea, to cooperation with regimes in trouble with the West, including the Iranian, Sudanese, and Venezuelan governments. It was mainly out of energy security concerns that Japan engaged China in a drawn-out competition over an oil pipeline from Russia’s Far East. Similarly, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was forced to withdraw its acquisition offer for Unocal, a U.S. oil company, in 2005. The “China threat theory” has contributed to the Chinese perception that the United States and some of its allies regard China as an adversary. A Chinese analyst asserted in 2001 that although American scholars and policymakers disagreed on policies toward China, they all took China as an adversary. “They do not disagree about whether China will challenge the United States but about when China will become strong enough to pose this challenge,” the analyst asserted.13 Meanwhile, territorial disputes with its neighboring countries have been a constant challenge to Beijing. China has territorial disputes with a number of countries, including the disputes over Kashmir with India, the Spratly Islands (Nansha) with Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and possibly Indonesia, some of the Paracel Islands (Xisha) with Vietnam, Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands with Japan, Japan’s unilaterally declared equidistance line in the East China Sea, and certain islands in the Yalu and Tumen rivers with North Korea.14 In the South China Sea disputes, China, like other claimants, is interested in the potentially large amount of natural resources, particularly possible energy resources, that the area holds. The Chinese media claim that the South China Sea is the second “Persian Gulf.” China had two military clashes in the South China Sea, one in 1974 over the Paracels with South Vietnam and the other in 1988 over the Spratly Islands with the united Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Sino-Japanese dispute over

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the East China Sea is another territorial dispute influenced by energy security concerns.

Internal Security Concerns Since 1978, the Chinese government has been reforming its economy from a Soviet-style centrally planned economy to a more market-oriented economy. As a result, private ownership of production assets was legalized, although some nonagricultural and industrial facilities are still state owned and centrally planned. With no intention to change China’s political system, the CCP labelled the economic system “Socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Since the late 1970s, the Chinese economy has been the world’s fastest growing economy, with an average economic growth of over 9.5 percent. Despite its success in economic reforms, Beijing faces a variety of challenges. It has to maintain a high growth rate to reduce unemployment, which is in the 8–10 percent range in urban areas,15 while protecting the environment and improving social equity. The income gap between rural and urban residents has kept growing, and China has become one of the countries with the largest urban-rural gap in the world. According to the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, the average annual income in China’s cities stood at 17,175 yuan in 2010, more than 3.33 times the average income of 5,153 yuan in the countryside,16 up from 3.31 times in 2008, 3.28 in 2006, 3.22 in 2005, 3.21 in 2004, and 2.47 in 1997.17 About 55 percent of the Chinese population lives in rural areas. They share just 11.3 percent of the society’s wealth, however.18 The poorest 20 percent of China’s population accounts for only 4.7 percent of total income while the most affluent 20 percent earns 50 percent of total Chinese income.19 China’s growing “floating population” is also a major concern. With economic reforms and a loosening of control over where people live, millions of Chinese have migrated from the countryside to urban areas, from economically underdeveloped areas to developed areas, and from the central and western regions to the eastern coastal region. Before 1978, the needs of society were taken care of from cradle to grave by the government. Societal support included child care, education, job placement, housing, subsistence, health care, and old-age care. As those systems disappeared or were reformed, the “iron rice bowl” approach to social security changed. Social security reforms since the late 1990s have included unemployment insurance, medical insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, maternity benefits, communal pension funds, and

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individual pension accounts. Such reforms still have a long way to go, and Beijing needs to do much more to stabilize the society. The instability in the regions of Tibet and Xinjiang poses another security challenge to Beijing. While Beijing is able to control the separatist movement in both “autonomous regions,” the unrest there could deepen Chinese suspicion of anti-China forces abroad and consequently has an impact on Chinese foreign policy. Muslim separatists in Xinjiang also present China with its most significant terrorist threat, which emerged in the late 1980s. The East Turkistan Islamic Movement is listed as a terrorist organization by China, the United States, and the United Nations. This and other Uyghur separatist groups reputedly were trained in Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban and al Qaeda. The separatists have resorted to violence, bomb attacks, assassinations, and street fighting.

The Taiwan Issue The Taiwan issue is closely related to both China’s external security and internal stability. Externally, a military clash across the Taiwan Strait could end up in a China-U.S. military conflict. Internally, the mishandling of the Taiwan issue could trigger social instability and a power struggle in China. With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decrease of China’s strategic importance to the United States, some major diplomatic conflicts over Taiwan have erupted between Beijing and Washington. Taipei has scored a few major breakthroughs in its relations with Washington. The first was President George Bush’s 1992 decision to lift a decade-old ban and sell 150 F-16s to Taiwan. The sale smoothed the way for other U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. A much more important breakthrough was that, under congressional pressure, the Bill Clinton administration changed the 16-year-old U.S. policy of barring Taiwanese leaders from the United States and granted the then Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit America. Lee’s U.S. visit resulted in a deep crisis in Sino-American relations and across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing “indefinitely” recalled its ambassador to Washington. It conducted ballistic missile tests in waters close to Taiwan and staged large-scale military exercises in the coastal areas facing Taiwan. In March 1996, in an attempt to influence Taiwan’s presidential election, Beijing staged guided-missile tests and conducted live fire military exercises at the southern end of the Taiwan Strait. To send a warning signal to Beijing, Clinton ordered two aircraft carriers and their battle groups to waters off Taiwan.

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In his second term, Clinton was more accommodating to Beijing and was willing to resist congressional pressure on the Taiwan issue. However, the Taiwan issue came back as a focus of dispute between Beijing and Washington shortly after George W. Bush entered the White House. In late April 2001, Bush promised new submarines, destroyers, and aircraft to Taiwan and pledged to help Taiwan defend itself against a mainland military attack. The controversial victory of the incumbent proindependence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian in the 2004 presidential election further deepened Beijing’s concerns. It ominously warned that Taiwan’s independence timetable would be Beijing’s reunification timetable.20 Taiwan’s domestic political situation has been developing in Beijing’s favor since April 2005 when chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT) Lien Chan and the CCP general secretary Hu Jintao had a historic meeting in Beijing. After regaining power in 2008, the KMT government under Ma Ying-jeou has been trying to reduce the tensions across the Taiwan Strait. However, strong opposition to and mistrust of Beijing still exists in Taiwan.

Prioritizing China’s Security Concerns Many Chinese analysts tend to perceive the United States as a competitor rather than a threat. A basic assessment is that “in short and medium terms the United States will not publicly challenge the overall integrity of our territory and sovereignty by using forces.”21 Although the relatively benign view has been challenged from time to time, such as the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the midair collision between a U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane and a Chinese interceptor in 2001, it is unlikely that China will enter a military conflict with the United States in the foreseeable future. At the turn of the twenty-first century, Chinese leaders judged that China would not engage other great powers in major military clashes before 2020. They deemed the first 20 years of the twenty-first century “an important period of strategic opportunities” (zhongyao zhanlue jiyuqi) for China’s economic development. As for the “China threat theory,” while it has strategic implications, there is no great urgency. Beijing has succeeded to some extent in reassuring the world of its peaceful rise/development.22 Since it opened up in 1978, China has made a consistent effort to integrate with the international society; for example, its support for the United Nations and for various international regimes. In the 29 years from 1949, when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established, to 1977, China was a party to a

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total of 31 international treaties. In contrast, in the 27 years from 1978 to the end of 2004, China signed 236 international treaties.23 Meanwhile, some of the China threat theories have proven to be unfounded. Lester R. Brown’s 1995 Who Will Feed China?: Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet was a sensation at the time but provides a good example of this kind of false prediction. Brown concluded that China’s emergence as a massive grain importer will be the wake-up call that will signal trouble in the relationship between ourselves . . . and the natural systems and resources on which we depend. It may well force a redefinition of security, a recognition that food scarcity and the associated economic instability are far greater threats to security than military aggression is.24

Brown’s sensational warning has been proven wrong. China completed its transition from aid recipient to international donor in 2005. The World Food Program made its last donation to China in April 2005, marking the end of a 26-year program that started in 1979 and supported more than 30 million hungry people. In the same year, China surpassed Japan to become the world’s third-largest food aid donor, following the United States and the European Union.25 In terms of territorial disputes, though they do have the potential to trigger off military clashes, they are not necessarily life-or-death issues to the parties involved. In the case of Chinese policy toward the Spratly Islands dispute, it should be considered in the broad context of China’s overall strategy toward Southeast Asia. The region is important to China for a number of reasons. It is a key to China’s regional influence, a major market and an important player in China’s strategy of promoting multipolarity. Southeast Asia also plays an important role in China’s effort to discredit the “China threat theory.” For these reasons, China has adopted a “soft power approach” in the Spratly Islands.26 Chinese observers long believed that while Washington appeared to remain neutral in the dispute, it was more sympathetic to and supportive of Southeast Asian claimants. Indeed, U.S. state secretary Hillary Clinton rejected China’s territorial claims at the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) forum in Vietnam on July 23, 2010, and proposed establishing a multilateral mechanism for negotiating a settlement of the region’s territorial disputes.27 However, it is unlikely that the United States will deeply involve itself in the dispute at the expense of its stable relations with China. Although China may appear assertive from time to time for various domestic and international reasons, it will continue to avoid military clashes with other claimants.28

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Similarly, Japan has been one of the most important players in the Chinese economy since China began to liberalize its economy in the late 1970s. In 2009, Sino-Japanese trade volume reached US$228.78 billion. 29 Japan is important to China not only economically but also politically. First, as a strong ally of the United States, Japan plays a key role in U.S. strategy toward China. How to deal with Japan is, therefore, crucial in China’s strategy toward the United States. Second, a strained relationship with Japan is not helpful in promoting the concept of “China’s peaceful rise/development.” Therefore, a large-scale military conflict with Japan over the East China Sea is not in China’s interest. However, external security issues are often connected with domestic politics. William Callahan believes that Chinese responses to the “China threat theory” are mainly targeted at domestic audiences for the purpose of identity construction in China. “Chinese identity production involves spreading anti-China discourse within the PRC in order to draw the symbolic boundaries that clearly distinguish Chinese from foreigners,” Callahan argues.30 By refuting “Chinese” threats, China is actually facilitating the production of a series of foreign threats, such as an America threat and a Japan threat. This serves to affirm China’s national identity. There is no clear indication that the “China threat theory” discourse in China is a well coordinated, purposeful project of identity construction. Yet Callahan’s observation has its merit. Historically, China was more a civilization than a nation. It was largely because of foreign invasions in the nineteenth century that “an essentially peaceful and ‘Utopian’ civilization” lost “many of its admirable features” and gradually developed into “a self-conscious national being in the modern Western sense.”31 Ever since then, victimhood has been part of Chinese identity. Another example of external security issues connecting with domestic politics is the Chinese government’s attention to Chinese nationalism. Peter Gries argues that a “genuine popular nationalism” emerged in the 1990s and that the CCP has to accommodate popular nationalist demands to maintain its legitimacy. Therefore, Chinese foreign policymakers “must take popular opinion into account” when they deliberate foreign policy.32 Nationalism is especially important to the Chinese government today due to the stresses placed on the Chinese society. Indeed, internal instability can be seen as Beijing’s core security concern. As an undemocratically elected government in a globalized world, Beijing is acutely aware of its vulnerability. Marxist thinking or Communist utopias are no longer appealing to the Chinese, and the Chinese economy is now more capitalist than socialist. Beijing is characterized by a persistent sense of

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internal crisis. The CCP has largely succeeded in stabilizing the Chinese society and consolidating its control since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. It achieved this by appealing to nationalism and patriotism, controlling personnel, media, and the security apparatus, and by substantially improving the living standards for most Chinese. However, China has shown signs of social instability. According to Chinese Ministry of Public Security, in 2003 there were more than 58,000 “mass incidents”— the term the Chinese government uses to describe public protests—involving 3 million people, an increase of almost 15 percent over the year before.33 The figure increased to 87,000 in 2005. The ministry has not released the latest figures. It is generally believed that there were 90,000 mass incidents in 2006 and 120,000 in 2008. The first half of 2009 witnessed a dramatic increase of “mass incidents,” which alarmed the central government. On July 12, 2009, the office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the office of the State Council publicly issued the “Temporary Regulations Concerning the Implementation of an Accountability System for Senior Cadres of the Party and Government.” According to the regulations, senior members of the party and government are to be held accountable for the inappropriate handling of mass incidents. The regulations clearly stipulate that in seven circumstances, including abuse of power that triggers mass incidents, or mishandling of sudden mass incidents, senior cadres of the party and government will be held accountable.34 The immediate causes of mass incidents are diverse, and include the widening gap between the rich and the poor, bureaucracy and corruption, compulsory resettlement, violent law enforcement, environmental pollution, defaulting on workers’ wages, and so on. These mass incidents are not necessarily attempts to overthrow the government. 35 However, in the words of two analysts from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “if such incidents cannot be solved properly, both society and the whole country will pay a heavy price.”36 More importantly, these incidents pose challenges to the credibility of the CCP. The biggest threat to China is that internal and external threats could combine forces. China’s late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping used to remind his comrades that the 1989 Chinese students’ antigovernment demonstrations were the result of a combination of external influence and internal problems. Externally, the West had been trying to “peacefully change China” by exporting Western values to China. Internally, antigovernment forces had played upon China’s social problems, such as corruption and inflation. Similarly, Falun Gong and separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang have all been accused of plotting with foreign hostile forces in engaging in anti-China activities.

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On the issue of Taiwan, Beijing has taken the opportunity of the KMT’s coming back to power and has achieved much progress in reducing the tensions across the Taiwan Strait and enhancing mutual trust. A large-scale military clash across the Strait is unlikely in the near future. Nevertheless, Taiwan remains a long-term security concern to Beijing. The use of force is still the last resort in Beijing’s reunification strategy although economic integration and social exchanges are now a crucial part of Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan.

China’s Grand Strategy The above discussion demonstrates that despite the possibility of military clashes over disputed territories, large-scale direct military threat is not Beijing’s top security concern today and for the foreseeable future. What is of greater concern is domestic instability as it can be a direct threat to the survival of the regime. This explains why the Chinese government spent almost as much on maintaining internal security as on defense in 2010.37 Such prioritizing of security concerns has significant implications for China’s domestic and foreign policies. As Phillip Saunders has succinctly noted, “Chinese leaders are pursuing a long-term grand strategy based on maintaining a peaceful international environment that allows China to build the economic and technological foundations necessary to become a rich and powerful country.”38 Economic development is important because to claim its legitimacy, the CCP has to substantially raise the living standard of the Chinese people. Beijing’s attention to economic development is also due to its realization that without a strong economy, the military dimension of national security is not sustainable. The Chinese often remind themselves that the Soviet Union lost the Cold War to the West mainly because the Soviet economy was not able to sustain the conflict. This is the fundamental change in China’s understanding of national security. This change contributed to China’s concept of “comprehensive national power” (zonghe guoli, CNP), which was adopted in the 1990s and has constituted the foundation of China’s foreign policy. Like Western scholars, Chinese analysts have defined CNP in different ways. The essence is the same, however. Some analysts point to seven elements of CNP, which include resources, manpower, economy, science and technology, education, defense, and politics. Others put various elements into four categories: basic power (population, resources, national unity); economic power (industrial power, agricultural power, scientific and technological power, financial power and commercial power); national defense power (strategic resources, technology, military strength, nuclear

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power); and diplomatic power (foreign policy, attitude toward international affairs, foreign aid, etc.).39 Michael Pillsbury defines China’s CNP as “the combined overall conditions and strengths of a country in numerous areas.”40 Unlike the Cold War years, military might is no longer the main defining factor of strength. Pillsbury further elaborates: An evaluation of current and future strength requires the inclusion of a variety of factors, such as territory, natural resources, military force, economic power, social conditions, domestic government, foreign policy, and international influence. CNP is the aggregate of all these factors, as Deng Xiaoping stated: “In measuring a country’s national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides.”41

To enhance its comprehensive national power has been China’s “national strategy” and economic development has been “the highest goal in making external strategies.”42 It has been widely accepted in China that to develop the economy remains China’s “ultimate solution (genben chulu) to all internal and external problems.”43 This also applies to the Taiwan issue, not only because economic modernization is the foundation of military modernization, but also because military coercion may not be effective. In fact, military intimidation contributed to the “China threat theory.” Economic competition and integration and social exchanges have emerged as more acceptable and perhaps more effective approaches. Swaine and Tellis argue that China’s grand strategy seeks to preserve domestic order, defend against external threats, and eventually attain geopolitical influence as a major, and perhaps, primary state.44 This is largely in line with the above discussion, which demonstrates that China’s security concerns include external security, internal stability, and the Taiwan issue, and that China’s overall goal is to enhance its “comprehensive national power.” China’s grand strategy thus consists of three main components—the national security strategy, national development strategy, and national reunification strategy (see Figure 3.1). The national reunification strategy is somewhat different in that it is closely related to other two main strategies as discussed earlier. On the other hand, the Taiwan issue is China’s core national interest and thus has its own right to stand alone as a component of China’s grand strategy. The national security strategy is based on diplomatic strategy and national defense strategy. The national development strategy is more complicated. It encompasses economic, political, technological, social, and cultural development strategies. While the national reunification strategy is closely related to national security strategy and national

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China’s Grand Strategy

National Development Strategy

Public Goods

Economic Development Strategy

Internal Economic Development

Figure 3.1*

National Security Strategy

National Reunification Strategy

Reforms

External Economic Development

Technological Development Strategy

Economic Reforms

National Interests

Social Development Strategy

Political Reforms

Cultural Development Strategy

Diplomatic Strategy

National Defence Strategy

China’s Grand Strategy

* Based on Zhou Jianming and Wang Hailiang, “guojia dazhanlue guojia anquan he guojia liyi” (National Grand Strategy, National Security and National Interest), Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), no. 4 (2002): 22.

development strategy, the latter two are also interrelated. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese are aware that a strong economy is the foundation of the military dimension of national security. On the other hand, economic development needs a peaceful environment, and economic development will not automatically result in security. Many analysts tend to neglect “the richness” of China’s grand strategy, however. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard observed in 2011 that “specialists concentrating on Chinese security interests have hijacked and narrowly conceptualized Chinese grand strategy in terms of China’s military modernization, increasingly ambitious defence strategies, and efforts to warm relations with diverse countries such as Russia.”45 Blanchard points out that in addition to “blinding us” to the nonmilitary elements of China’s grand strategy, such narrow conceptualization “neglects the fact that ‘security interests’ entail not only international elements like territorial integrity, but also domestic elements such as regime preservation.”46

Conclusion Few observers see China as an immediate military threat to its neighbors. China does not see any immediate external threat to its national

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security either. There is a good chance that China’s external environment will remain largely peaceful in years to come. China is likely to continue to focus on its economic development and to enhance its comprehensive national power. China’s foreign policy has been deeply influenced by domestic political necessity. That China has endeavored to improve its relations with great powers, especially the United States, and its neighbors is largely due to the necessity of maintaining high levels of economic growth, on which the Chinese government has been basing much of its appeal. Continued high levels of economic growth have so far helped reinforce the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule. China’s effort to integrate into the international society is also driven by its pursuit of economic development. China’s biggest security concern has been the Taiwan issue. Beijing was worried about growing independence sentiment in Taiwan and the seemingly deepening U.S. involvement in the issue until 2008 when the KMT regained power in Taiwan. While cross-Strait relations have improved substantially since 2008, there are still many uncertainties and Beijing remains cautious. China’s security perceptions are, therefore, of multiple dimensions, reflecting the changes in world politics. While the military dimension remains a key element, the political and economic dimensions have become more prominent since the end of the Cold War. China is now in a process of fundamental changes that it can barely control. Its decision more than three decades ago to open up and to make economic reforms has substantially enhanced its national power. Meanwhile, its economy has become deeply integrated with the world economy and its people are increasingly exposed to Western values. China now has no choice but to further integrate into the international community. It feels the pressure of accepting the rules of the game and acting as a responsible power. One key weakness of the existing literature on China’s policy toward the South Pacific is a lack of good understanding of China’s security concerns and its grand strategy. Without a solid understanding of such big pictures, analysts tend to misread Chinese strategies and become alarmed when they see increasing Chinese influence developing in the South Pacific.

FOUR

The Taipei-Beijing Diplomatic Rivalry

W

ang Yongqiu, the head of Pacific relations at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in August 2009, “I want to emphasise that China’s aid to other countries has nothing to do with our relations with Taiwan.”1 This is a standard statement people will hear in their public, formal discussions with Chinese diplomats. Privately, however, Chinese diplomats do not deny Beijing’s diplomatic rivalry with Taipei in the region. The reality is that for many years until recently to compete with Taiwan diplomatically was perhaps the most important factor for China’s growing involvement in the South Pacific. The Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou’s victory in Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election has substantially reduced the tensions across the Taiwan Strait. The improvement of the cross-Strait relations and the “diplomatic truce” between the two sides has had a strong impact on their policies toward the South Pacific. This chapter begins with a background discussion of the BeijingTaipei diplomatic rivalry. It then examines their diplomatic competition in the South Pacific, focusing on Taiwan’s diplomacy. The final section looks into Ma Ying-jeou’s “flexible diplomacy” and its implications for the Beijing-Taipei diplomatic rivalry. Beijing-Taipei Diplomatic Rivalry: What, Why, and How Since 1971 when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially replaced Republic of China (ROC) in the United Nations, Taiwan has attempted to offset the PRC’s diplomatic victory by securing its existing relations and establishing new relations with Third World countries. Beijing and Taipei have engaged in a “fierce contest for diplomatic recognition and

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political influence” around the world.2 Aiming at future reunification with Taiwan, Beijing accepts only formal singular recognition by other countries. Beijing is determined to contain Taiwan globally, particularly in the strongholds of Taiwanese support, including Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the South Pacific (See Table 4.1). On the other hand, the desire to maintain relative status with China lies at the heart of Taiwan’s foreign policy. Taipei used to accuse Beijing of a “Three-exhaust Policy” (sanguang zhengce)—to “exhaust the states that recognize Taipei, to exhaust Taiwan’s international political space, and to exhaust Taiwan’s bargaining chips.”3 In 1998, Taiwan’s Foreign

Table 4.1 Countries Recognizing Taiwan (As of March 31, 2011) Region

Country

Year Diplomatic Relations Established

Republic of Panama Republic of Guatemala Republic of El Salvador Republic of Honduras Belize Republic of Nicaragua Republic of Haiti Dominican Republic Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Republic of Paraguay

1912 1960 1961 1965 1989 1990 1956 1957 1981 1983 1984–1997, 2007 1957

Republic of Nauru Republic of Marshall Islands Republic of Palau Republic of Kiribati Solomon Islands Tuvalu

1980–2002, 2005 1998 1999 2003 1983 1979 1994 1995 1997

Southern Africa

Burkina Faso Republic of Gambia Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe Kingdom of Swaziland

1968

Europe (1) Southern Europe

The Holy See (Vatican City)

1942

Latin America (12) Central America

Caribbean

South America South Pacific (6) Micronesia

Melanesia Polynesia Africa (4) Western Africa

Total: 23

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Minister Jason C. Hu claimed that Beijing had once said it would reduce the number of the countries recognizing Taiwan to zero by 2000.4 The number is important as there is a perception that the dwindling number of diplomatic allies would “severely cripple” any sovereignty claim.5 At the moment, all countries that officially recognize Taiwan, with the exception of the Vatican, are in the developing world. While insignificant in the general international system, these countries are of importance when it comes to having Taiwan’s voice heard in international organizations, such as the United Nations, of which Taiwan is not a member. Each diplomatic ally, no matter how small, is important to Taiwan as it fears that should any one state switch its recognition to China, it would create a domino effect, encouraging other states to do so as well. To counter China’s attempts to lure its last remaining allies, Taiwan has attempted to broaden and diversify avenues used for interaction. As Richard C. Lin has observed, “various channels have become major instruments of diplomatic rivalry, in which foreign aid is prominent.”6 Aid competition includes grants, soft loans, and technical assistance. For many years, Taipei has provided financial aid to countries that maintain official relations with Taiwan along with establishing trade offices in countries where no diplomatic relations have been established. Aid from Taiwan, like that from China, comes without specific political conditions. However, it is clear to the recipients that diplomatic recognition is expected from the donor. Currently, of the 33 independent countries in Latin America, China has official diplomatic relations with 21, while the remaining 12 nations maintain relations with Taiwan. Countries in Central America and the Caribbean have become “strategically significant ‘swing states.’ ”7 Accordingly, they have encountered pressure from China to cut relations with Taiwan in favor of establishing diplomatic relations with China. In the 1950s, most Latin American countries had diplomatic relations with Taiwan. But in 1960 Cuba’s Fidel Castro regime established ties with China, and then in the 1970s, Chile “led a major shift” in favor of China.8 In January 2005, Grenada established diplomatic relations with Beijing. Observers believe that Grenada’s decision was motivated in a bid for Chinese assistance to help the country recover from the destruction wrought by Hurricane Ivan the previous year. Although Grenadian prime minister Keith Mitchell said in 2003 that maintaining ties with Taiwan was “practical,” in 2005 he signed a joint communiqué declaring support for the “one-China” policy, saying that he did not believe that the Caribbean had “any other choice but to develop a relationship

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with China.”9 In exchange for ending a 15-year relationship with Taiwan, China supported Grenada financially in the following ways: • helped to rebuild and expand Grenada’s national stadium for the 2007 Cricket World Cup; • constructed 2,000 housing units and new hospital facilities; • provided agricultural support; • gave a US$6 million grant to complete projects previously financed by Taiwan; and • offered a US$1 million scholarship fund.10 Dominica acted similarly. On March 31, 2004, Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit received a pledge of US$112 million in Chinese aid over a 6-year period in exchange for Dominica switching its allegiances from Taipei to Beijing.11 Most countries do not care much who the “real” China is, and would opt for relations with both if possible. These countries do see political and financial benefits of having the Beijing-Taipei diplomatic rivalry as they can mobilize aid to promote their own economic and political interests. Meanwhile, the states that do choose to formalize relations with China still try to maintain good “nonofficial” relations with Taiwan, such as opening reciprocal missions, disguised as nonprofit foundations or businesses.12 China’s approach to the countries that recognize Taiwan has also evolved. In the past, China resorted to putting heavy pressure on countries to get them to switch allegiances. Macedonia recognized Taiwan in 1999, but switched diplomatic recognition in 2001 after China imposed economic sanctions and used its veto power on the UN Security Council to block Macedonia’s desired peacekeeping efforts.13 Over the years, strategically, China has become more pragmatic. It increasingly considers its immediate term interests in conjunction with its overall long-term desire to reunify China. Consequently, China has been interacting with the countries that recognize Taiwan, such as sending 125 riot police to Haiti.14 China also increasingly uses soft power tools to entice countries to drop alliances with Taiwan. In Latin America, as in other parts of the world, China works hard to develop and strengthen key diplomatic relations with various government officials. Beijing has also been actively promoting Chinese culture and language as part of its new public diplomacy. As a result, China has increased student and educational exchanges with Latin American countries, and in 2006, it established a Confucius Institute in Mexico City, the first in the region. The small but fast-growing

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overseas Chinese community in Latin America also plays a key role in advancing Chinese economic interests and in supporting China’s reunification cause.15 What happened in Africa is similar. After South Africa announced in November 1996 that it would switch recognition from Taiwan to China as of January 1, 1998, Taiwan was recognized only by African states that were either geographically small or economically poor, or both. For example, Burkina Faso, Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Swaziland all officially recognize Taiwan. In addition to embassies in these countries, within Africa, Taiwan has also set up consulate offices in Angola, Madagascar, Mauritius, and South Africa to promote bilateral trade and economic relations. Ian Taylor points out that the decision by South Africa to alter its relationship depended upon a number of political and economic factors and came after significant pressure from China, although many South African commentators had wanted a dual recognition policy. South Africa had a close relationship with Taiwan that had lasted 20 years. Over 620 Taiwanese trading companies employing a total of around 45,000 people were operating in South Africa, and two-way trade between Taipei and Pretoria amounted to around US$1.7 billion. Trade between South Africa and Taiwan was important, but China’s trade with South Africa was US$1 billion more. And Hong Kong’s return to China also undermined Taiwan’s competitive trade relationship advantage as many trading goods came to South Africa via Hong Kong. Politically, South Africa was worried that if it did not switch allegiances, had the question of enlarging the UN Security Council come up, China would have vetoed any application that South Africa would make.16 Taiwan’s Diplomacy in the South Pacific Anthony van Fossen believes that recognition by relatively remote countries in Central America, the Caribbean, and Africa can mean considerably less “in terms of genuine and sustained interaction as well as leverage in regional organisations” than if recognized by the geographically closer South Pacific nations such as Palau.17 The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has an official relationship with China, yet 6 of its 16 members officially recognize Taiwan. Samoa, Tonga, the Cook Islands, Niue, Fiji, Vanuatu, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and Papua New Guinea (PNG) recognize China, together with two regional powers, Australia and New Zealand, while Palau, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Nauru, and Tuvalu recognize Taiwan. Several Pacific Islands are “swinging”—that is, they switch sides in a bid to maximize profits (see Table 4.2).

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Table 4. 2

Beijing-Taipei Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific

Country

Date Diplomatic Relations Established with China

Cook Islands FSM Fiji Kiribati Marshall Islands Nauru

1997 (July 25) 1989 (September 11) 1975 (November 5) 1980–2003 1990–1998 2002–2005

Niue Palau Papua New Guinea Samoa Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu

2007 (December 12)

Date Diplomatic Relations Established with Taiwan

1971–1975 2003 (November 7) 1998 (November 20) 1980–2002 2005 (May 14) 1999 (December 29)

1976 (October 12) 1975 (November 6) 1998 (November 2)

1972–1975 1983 (March 24) 1972–1998 1979 (September 19)

1982 (March 26)

Taiwan has multiple interests in the South Pacific. In addition to trade, the South Pacific is one of the Taiwan’s major net-fishing grounds. In July 1999, in the wake of PNG’s brief diplomatic recognition of Taipei, Taiwan emphasized that Taiwan’s 42 well-equipped tuna boats operating in the South Pacific surpassed Japan’s 32 vessels and South Korea’s 28 vessels working in that region.18 Taiwan’s fisheries interest in the region is not limited to tuna. In December 2009, Taiwan signed an agreement to join the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO) to guarantee the rights of Taiwanese fishing vessels in the region. SPRFMO is the first nontuna management organization Taiwan has entered. Roughly 25 squid trawlers from Taiwan operate in the seas governed by this organization every year, fishing primarily for Humboldt squid (Dosidicusgigas). The annual haul amounts to some 20,000 to 30,000 metric tons.19 Taiwan’s key interest in the region has been political, however, namely to continue to affirm Taiwan’s sovereignty and secure international space through its diplomatic allies in the region. Take Taiwan’s attempt to reenter the United Nations, for example. To become a member of the United Nations has been Taiwan’s key diplomatic goal. Taiwan doubled its effort in the eight years of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency (May 2000–May 2008). From 1993 to 2004, Taiwan encouraged its allies to propose a move in support of Taiwan’s membership every year. In 2005, it changed its strategy. While encouraging 12 of its allies, including the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, and the Solomon Islands, to propose a move about Taiwan’s UN

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membership, Taipei also encouraged 15 of its allies, including all 6 allies in the South Pacific, to propose another move in regard to the UN’s role in maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait. The two moves were then combined for discussion at the UN’s general committee. The discussion lasted about 45 minutes and the item was, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one that was “discussed the longest and debated most thoroughly” out of 158 items.20 Although the moves were rejected and did not make it to the General Assembly for formal discussion, Taipei considered the strategy a great success. Taiwan’s diplomatic allies routinely express their strong support for Taiwan’s membership in international organizations. Palau and the Solomon Islands are considered the most active. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these two countries “have done their utmost” to support Taiwan becoming a member of international organizations like the UN and World Health Organization (WHO).21 In 2007, Palau’s president delivered a decisive, if (according to his own staff) rather embarrassing, speech at the General Assembly of the UN, demanding immediate acceptance of Taiwan as a full member.22 As in other parts of the world, Taiwan has engaged in various sorts of diplomacy to secure or establish new diplomatic relations in the South Pacific. The following paragraphs look at Taiwan’s “dollar diplomacy,” “visit diplomacy,” “summit diplomacy,” and “transit diplomacy” in the region, with a focus on dollar diplomacy. Aid and Dollar Diplomacy It is impossible to get an accurate figure of Taiwan’s aid to the Pacific island countries (PICs). When asked what Taiwan’s annual grants to the Marshall Islands amounted to, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman David Wang said that the Taiwanese government wanted to keep the total secret from China.23 Taiwan’s 2009 white paper on foreign aid policy states: Taiwan’s total official development assistance (ODA) in 2008 exceeded US$430 million, or 0.11% of the gross national income (GNI). This aid, of which 92% is bilateral and 8% multilateral, focuses on the construction of diplomatic allies’ basic infrastructure (66%); technical assistance (11%); education and training (4%); humanitarian assistance (6%); and other areas (5%).24

In the South Pacific, Taiwan usually spends around US$10 million a year on each of its diplomatic allies.25 While its aid amount in total is

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understandably smaller than many other major donors in the South Pacific, Taiwan has been a top donor for some PICs, such as Palau and the Marshall Islands. It is believed that Taiwan probably donated around US$100 million to Palau from 1999, when the formal diplomatic relationship was established, to 2007.26 With a population of about 20,000, Palau received aid of approximately US$5,000 per capita from Taiwan during this period. Taiwan’s annual aid to the Marshall Islands, with an estimated population of 61,300 in 2009,27 is estimated in excess of US$14 million.28 It is unfair to label Taiwan’s aid in general as dollar diplomacy. Much of Taiwan’s aid to the South Pacific is as genuine as that of other donors. Taiwan has been sending its technical and medical missions to various countries, mostly those that recognize Taiwan. In 2008, Taiwan dispatched 30 technical missions consisting of a total of 210 professionals and 80 alternative military servicemen to 28 countries.29 It also provides scholarships to these countries. In 2005, it awarded 295 “Taiwan Scholarships.” Fortytwo of them went to eight countries in the Asia Pacific.30 In 2008, some 1,355 students from developing countries received the Taiwan Scholarship and 223 students received the Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund’s (Taiwan ICDF) Higher Education Scholarship for their tertiary education in Taiwan.31 Taiwan has repeatedly denied that it has been conducting dollar diplomacy. In its announcement of ending its diplomatic relations with Nauru after Nauru switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 2002, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that Taiwan would “never waste tax payers’ money earned by hard toil to engage with China in a meaningless race of ‘dollar diplomacy.’ ”32 According to the Taiwanese government, the percentage of foreign aid in Taiwan’s gross national product (GNP, about 0.1 percent) has been much smaller than the average percentage of OECD countries (over 0.2 percent) and far below the target percentage of 0.7 percent set by the United Nations.33 In his speech on his return from Central America and Caribbean on June 5, 2001, President Chen Shui-bian said: Some people are doubtful about the government’s ability to get rid of the old practice of “dollar diplomacy.” I would like to make it clear to my compatriots that what we discussed at my meetings with the leaders of our friendly states in Central and South Americas was mostly about our common belief in democracy and universal values as well as our private friendship.34

Similarly, in his last year in office, Chen emphasized that Taiwan was different from China in terms of offering aid packages, because “we

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don’t write blank checks. Instead, we offer practical and useful programs designed to solve their problems.”35 Nevertheless, it is widely believed that Taiwan has been actively engaged in dollar diplomacy. Kiribati President Anote Tong decided to switch his government’s recognition from Beijing to Taipei after winning elections in 2003. Tong responded to his vocal critics: “Well, what can we do? We need to work with the nation that can support us!”36 Tong explained that the decision was not based on the ideological differences between China and Taiwan. The decisive factor was Taiwan’s offer of US$8 million of untied aid yearly for four years. Chinese aid was believed to be less than a quarter of Taiwanese offer.37 When Nauru switched its diplomatic recognition to Beijing in 2002, which was announced in Beijing on the day when Chen Shui-bian assumed the position of chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan claimed that Beijing bought Nauru with a loan of US$130 million.38 Nauru switched back to Taiwan in 2005 after Taiwan assisted Nauru with US$4 million to resolve the issue of the workers from Kiribati and Tuvalu who had not been paid for years. In the following year, Taiwan gave US$10 million to bail out the Nauru airline that would otherwise have been permanently grounded.39 It is said that only six months after recognizing Beijing, Nauru started to pressure Beijing to provide loans to prevent it from reverting to Taipei.40 In the end, Nauru was not happy with Beijing. According to a senior Chinese diplomat, Beijing considered Nauru’s request of buying a plane for Nauru seriously but decided to turn it down. Beijing was concerned that Nauru would continue to ask China to help maintain the plane, which would be rather troublesome.41 Chen Shui-bian’s administration also paid a large sum of money to various states secretly. And it was not uncommon for much of it to go into the pockets of corrupted officials in these countries. In the South Pacific, Chen attempted to buy diplomatic relations with PNG for US$30 million. The money was pocketed by two self-styled diplomatic brokers. Chen himself has been under investigation for corruption in connection with the misuse of his secret “state affairs” fund and the laundering of millions of dollars Chen claimed was used for the conduct of his personal secret diplomacy.42 Similarly, the Marshall Islands switched its diplomatic relations from Beijing to Taipei in 1998 because the island state was under financial pressure as it was renegotiating the Compact of Free Association with the United States and could not “beg” the United States for money. “China’s aid to the Marshall Islands at that time was negligible. That is when we decided to go back to Taiwan, which was offering substantial financial assistance,” said a senior Marshall Islands politician.43

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In Palau, Taiwan funded a conference center (US$3 million), airport expansion (US$15 million), and the National Museum (US$2 million). Taiwan even lent US$20 million for the construction of a new capital city, Melekeok, which is locally referred to as “Washington Jr.” for its architectural resemblance to Capitol Hill. Andre Vltchek claims that Melekeok is “one of the most ludicrous and wasteful construction projects in the history of the Pacific.”44 Taiwan also funded Palau’s hosting of the South Pacific Games, the Festival of Pacific Arts, and other “symbolic acts that Palauans value.”45 Joel Atkinson has observed that “it seems likely that over the years, South Pacific polities have developed a greater understanding of the China-Taiwan conflict, facilitating still greater aid extraction.”46 Trying to make the best use of their value to the Beijing-Taipei diplomatic rivalry, some PICs are not shy to bargain for more. The Solomon Islands is a good example. It intended to recognize both Beijing and Taipei in 1983 but this plan was rejected by Beijing. Taiwan gave the Solomon Islands US$9 million per year in the 1990s plus extra grants. According to Ron Crocombe, in 2000 the Solomon Islands demanded US$40 million for its recognition of Taiwan. After being declined by Taiwan, Solomon Islands foreign minister went to Hong Kong to meet Chinese leaders. It is said that there he asked for US$200 million in return for changing sides. After being rejected by Beijing, the Solomon Islands remained “committed” to Taiwan and asked Taiwan for US$150 million.47 While these figures appear unrealistic and may well be an exaggeration, they nevertheless underscore the extent of the bargaining game. What happened to Vanuatu in late 2004 was more dramatic. China had given Vanuatu about US$10 million annually and had regularly funded Vanuatu politicians’ trips to Beijing. Serge Vohor, who came to power in July 2004, “had benefited politically and personally from Chinese largess.”48 However, Vohor was not satisfied with China’s provisions and turned to Taiwan. He made a secret trip to Taipei and signed an agreement normalizing Vanuatu’s relations with Taiwan on November 3, 2004. There were conflicting reports about the size of the financial package that Taiwan offered to Vohor. The US$6 billion as reported in the Taiwanese media is believed to have been “unrealistic.” Other indications, such as US$28 million over five years “with no strings attached” or even US$40 million a year, are not impossible, however.49 This particular drama of dollar diplomacy lasted for over a month. During this period, Vanuatu recognized both Beijing and Taipei, causing much uncertainty. In the end, Vohor lost in a vote of no confidence and the new government switched Vanuatu’s diplomatic recognition back to China in December 2004. Atkinson has noted, however, that while the

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vast majority of government ministers chose China over Taiwan, they nevertheless attempted to manipulate China into greater commitments. The health minister is cited as saying: Taiwan has offered Vanuatu US$20 million a year for 5 years according to the Prime Minister . . . if we are united in not taking up this offer to not . . . have relations with Taiwan[,] then China needs to increase their financial assistance to Vanuatu to develop our rural areas. So far China has not responded and this is a concern. I support the raising of the Taiwan flag to send a message to China.50

Even more dramatic was PNG’s behavior in 1999. Given that PNG is the largest country among the PICs in terms of geographical and populations sizes and that PNG has a strong relationship with Taiwan, Taipei has pushed hard for PNG’s recognition. PNG had been problematic to Beijing for some years. It established diplomatic relations with Beijing early in 1976. In December 1988, then PNG foreign minister Michael Somare paid a visit to Taipei and signed a “Memorandum on Establishing Relations” on December 27, 1988. On February 12, 1990, Taiwan set up its trade mission in Port Moresby. Unlike the titles of such offices in most other countries, the Taiwanese trade mission in PNG carries Republic of Taiwan and is called the Trade Mission of the Republic of China (on Taiwan) in Papua New Guinea. Despite Beijing’s displeasure, the title has remained unchanged ever since. What is more, in May 1995, PNG deputy prime minister and finance minister Chris Haiveta visited Taipei and signed a communiqué of mutual recognition. PNG recognized Taiwan as a “country” as defined by international law.51 Afterward, China pledged more aid, investments and low-interest loans to forestall the final step of diplomatic recognition. At the same time, Beijing was not pleased with PNG’s unofficial ties with Taiwan and was not forthright in delivering the aid. Then in early July 1999, PNG prime minister Bill Skate flew to Taipei and on July 5 signed a communiqué for the establishment of diplomatic relations.52 As is discussed in Chapter 6, after Beijing’s protest and pressure from Canberra, Skate had to resign shortly after, and the declaration was nullified. The PNG government has maintained its political contacts with Taiwan after the 1999 drama, as represented by its official visits to Taiwan. PNG also voices its support for Taiwan at international forums from time to time. Beijing has repeatedly urged PNG not to have political contact with Taiwan and not to give Taiwan any political support, such as the support for Taiwan’s membership of international organizations. Chinese pressure and aid led to the signing of a joint press communiqué

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between China and PNG on February 16, 2004. The joint communiqué states: The PNG side opposes any unilateral action or move, including “referendum,” on the part of the Taiwan authorities, to seek “Taiwan independence.” The PNG side supports the maintenance of peace and security across the Taiwan Straits and the region at large. In this connection, the PNG side reassures the Government of the People’s Republic of China that all contacts between PNG and Taiwan will be strictly confined to the economic area and that PNG will not have any contact of any form with Taiwan that would contravene the one-China position.53

The diplomatic rivalry between Taipei and Beijing is not limited to regional countries on the bilateral level. It also takes place in regional organizations. One battlefield has been the PIF’s Post-Forum Dialogue Meeting. Taiwan is not an official Dialogue Partner but since 1992 it has held its own separate postforum meeting with friendly Pacific island states at a closed setting, after all postforum dialogues have already taken place. In 2000, representatives from Fiji and PNG and officials from a number of PIF agencies that had accepted financial support from Taiwan, including the PIF Secretariat, PIF Fisheries Agency, South Pacific Trade Office, and the University of the South Pacific also attended the postforum meeting with Taiwan.54 China strongly objected to Taiwan’s presence at the Kiribati meeting and urged the PIF to uphold the “one-China” policy in arranging for the postforum dialogue. It requested that PIF members having diplomatic relations with China, the PIF Secretariat, and other regional organizations in the South Pacific should not participate in the Post-Forum Dialogue Meeting with Taiwan. Beijing declared that “the question of Taiwan must not be put off indefinitely . . . We strongly demand that the Forum take seriously China’s position.”55 In 2003, Beijing again reminded the PICs that as an intergovernmental organization of sovereign states, the PIF should refrain from any exchanges of an official nature or engaging in a dialogue partnership of any form with Taiwan.56 China’s donations to regional institutions are also closely linked to the Taiwan issue. China donated US$1 million to set up the Pacific Islands Trade Office in Beijing in 2000, but only after the PIF agreed to switch its chairmanship from Palau, which recognized Taiwan, to Kiribati, which at the time recognized China.57 At the First Ministerial Meeting of the China–PICs Forum, the countries that recognized Taiwan were not invited and were excluded from many of the benefits. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao stated that only those countries recognizing China would be approved as Chinese tourist destinations.58 In the South Pacific Tourism

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Organization (SPTO), the rivalry between Beijing and Taipei grew to the extent that the unity of the SPTO was fractured. Because of a lack of external participation, Taiwan is one of the SPTO’s few sources of cash. Three of the SPTO’s ten Pacific island members—Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Solomon Islands—have been insisting that Taiwan be treated equally with China. Taiwan supplied the SPTO with about US$400,000 in aid in the five to six years before China joined the SPTO in 2004. In October 2005 when the SPTO was having a conference, Beijing lobbied against Taiwan’s inclusion. It pledged an additional US$100,000 a year for five years in organizational support. The following week SPTO members voted against Taiwan’s admission to the organization.59

Visit Diplomacy John Henderson noted in 2001 that visit diplomacy was important because Pacific islands nations’ decision making might rest with only a few key figures.60 As Appendix 1 demonstrates, Taipei has had many exchanges of official visits with its diplomatic allies in the South Pacific. President Chen Shui-bian visited the region every year in the four years from 2004 to 2007. Tonga’s late King Tāufa‘āhau Tupou IV visited Taiwan eight times, each time invited by Taiwan, in 1977, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1994, and 1997 respectively.61 Similarly, Marshall Islands president Kessai Note visited Taiwan six times from 2002 to 2007. His successor Litokwa Tomeing visited Taiwan each year in his two years in office from January 2008 to October 2009. Most, if not all, of the visits from the PICs to Taiwan were funded by Taiwan. When Litokwa Tomeing went to Taiwan in 2009 for his second visit, Taiwan covered the “airfares, accommodation and meals” of the president, the first lady and their entourage.62 What is more, in his 2008 visit to Taiwan Tomeing was welcomed with a 21-Gun Salute.63 Tomeing’s high-profile visit came just two months after he was elected president in January. Before the national election in November 2007, Tomeing announced that he wanted to return to the “one-China” policy and recognize the PRC. Two days after Tomeing was elected president, Chen Shui-bian called to congratulate him and then invited him to make a state visit to Taiwan as soon as he had selected his cabinet. Chen also told Tomeing that Taiwan would continue its aid activities (estimated to be in excess of US$14 million annually) in the Marshall Islands and was ready to bail out the ailing national airline that had seen all flights cancelled for three months. “I pledge Taiwan will do all it can to solve all of Air Marshall Islands’ problems,” Chen stated.64 Chen also sent a five-

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member delegation, headed by Taiwan’s vice minister of foreign affairs, to Majuro to congratulate Tomeing. Not surprisingly, Beijing has also tried to use high-level official visits to entice the PICs that recognized Taipei to defect to Beijing. For instance, Beijing worked hard on Palau, a staunch supporter of Taiwan internationally. As mentioned earlier, it is estimated that Taiwan gave about US$100 million in aid to Palau from 1999 to 2007. In addition, Taiwan was Palau’s top source of tourists with 34,000 Taiwanese tourists or 42 percent of total foreign visitors to Palau in 2005.65 Taiwan also provides about a third of all foreign investment in Palau.66 Beijing made a significant effort to win over Palau from Taipei. In addition to forming an alliance with opposition politicians and proposing large-scale investment projects,67 Beijing stepped up high-level visits to Palau. In 2006, the vice chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National People’s Congress visited Palau. In the following year, Wang Yunxiang, vice president of Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, which is a “nongovernmental organization” closely related to the Chinese government, led a high-level delegation to Palau. Wang said in Palau that China was ready to establish diplomatic ties with Palau provided that it would first stop its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. “It’s up to the government of Palau to take this opportunity,” Wang said.68 As it turned out, China’s efforts were not successful.

Summit Diplomacy In addition to visit diplomacy, there are instances of summit diplomacy. This approach was energetically promoted during Chen Shui-bian’s second term in office in particular. The First Taiwan-Africa Summit opened in Taipei on September 9, 2007. The five African states that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan sent their representatives to Taipei, including presidents of Malawi, Burkina Faso, and São Tomé and Príncipe, King of Swaziland, and vice president of Gambia. The summit ended with a Taipei Declaration that expressed Taiwan’s African allies’ support for Taiwan to join the United Nations and other international organizations. Just over two weeks before the First Taiwan-Africa Summit, Chen flew to Honduras to attend the Sixth Summit of the Heads of States and Governments of the Republic of China, Central American Countries, and the Dominican Republic in Honduras. The summit was established by Chen’s predecessor Lee Teng-hui in 1997. One month after the First Taiwan-Africa Summit, the Second TaiwanPacific Allies Summit was held in the Marshall Islands. The First

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Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit was held in Palau in September 2006. The six PICs maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan sent their heads of government to the summit, including Palau president Tommy E. Remengesau Jr, Marshall Islands president Kessai Note, Kiribati president Anote Tong, Nauru president Ludwig Scotty, Solomon Islands prime minister Mannaseh Sogavare, and Tuvalu prime minister Apisai Ielemia. According to a Taiwanese newspaper, officials from Fiji and Guam, which had no official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, also attended the summit.69 The summit reaffirmed Taiwan’s commitment to its Pacific allies and the latter’s political support for Taiwan. The Palau Declaration states: The Leaders of Taiwan’s Pacific allies strongly support Taiwan’s achievements in political democratization and economic development. Taiwan’s Allies acknowledge Taiwan as a sovereign nation whose right to participate in international organizations, such as the United Nations and World Health Organization, cannot be deprived. Taiwan’s Allies (are) committed to continuing their firm support of Taiwan’s entitlement to undertake full involvement in international and regional organizations and initiatives.70

Transit Diplomacy Related to the summit diplomacy is transit diplomacy. Taiwan’s transit diplomacy is an attempt to raise its profile and “to show defiance to Beijing as well as to demonstrate Taipei’s sovereignty” by passing through countries that have no diplomatic relations with the island, especially the United States.71 Taiwan has succeeded in having a few “transit stops” in the mainland United States. In May 2001, Chen was allowed to stop over at New York. It was “an epoch-making achievement” for Taiwan. Chen became the first Taiwanese leader to visit New York in almost half a century. The number of his interviews and visits was second to none compared with former Taiwanese leaders and he became the first ever local leader to be visited by a host of 20 Congressmen.72 However, Chen was accused of taking the tactic of transit diplomacy “too far” while in office. A most telling example was his trip to Paraguay and Costa Rica in early May 2006. Taiwanese officials had hoped that Chen would be able to stop in San Francisco and New York en route to Latin America. Washington, which was unhappy with Chen’s “reckless” effort to push for independence, rejected the plan and insisted that Chen could make refuelling stops only in Hawaii or in Anchorage, Alaska, rather than in the mainland United States. To show his displeasure with the U.S. decision, Chen decided to drop his plan to stop in the United States only

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hours before he started his trip. He intended to land in Beirut, Lebanon, on its way to Asuncion, Paraguay. Unable to get Lebanese permission to land, Chen had to land in Abu Dhabi instead. Chen then planned to fly to the Dominican Republic from Abu Dhabi. However, the plane was forced to land in Amsterdam for a second refuelling stop as the plane was unable to take on enough fuel in Abu Dhabi due to technical reasons. Taiwanese media dubbed his trip “a journey to nowhere.” Chen also engaged in transit diplomacy in the South Pacific. In 2005, Chen transited Fiji en route home from Nauru, Kiribati, and Tuvalu. Fiji sent its vice president to welcome Chen.73 Fiji’s prime minister was staying in the same hotel and scheduled to meet Chen informally. The meeting was cancelled due to Beijing’s “strenuous objections.” However, Chen was met by an official delegation, given a Fijian traditional welcome attended by Fiji’s chief justice and chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs. Chen also breakfasted with Fiji’s vice president.74 Beijing was angered at Chen’s overnight stay. However, Fiji’s foreign minister later argued defiantly that “even when considering Taiwan as a province of China, the President of a province is a man of high profile, so when he comes there is an urge to extend hospitality . . . There’s no way we are going to change that overnight when Taiwan comes knocking on our door.”75 Implications of the Beijing-Taipei Rivalry Despite the fierce diplomatic competition, Beijing has continued its economic relations with those countries that recognize Taipei. In the South Pacific, China’s second- and third-largest trading partners are the Marshall Islands and the Solomon Islands—Taipei’s diplomatic allies. However, those recognizing Beijing are rewarded economically in other ways. For instance, China has given “approved destination status” to all Pacific island nations that support China politically, but not to those that support Taiwan.76 Analysts have expressed their concerns about the Beijing-Taipei diplomatic rivalry in the South Pacific. A general understanding is that China and Taiwan should be blamed for contributing to corruption and instability of the region. A representative view is voiced by Stuart Harris: The context in which this competition plays out is a region largely of states that are weak in economic and governance terms, with governments that are often basically unstable. Aid dependency is widespread and so is corruption. The impact of the competition between Taiwan and China, usually in the form of financial aid, undermines the considerable efforts made in a number of these states, such as the Solomon Islands and in Nauru, to improve regional governance.77

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Not all observers agree with such views, however. Terence Wesley-Smith argues that [t]here is little evidence to support the notion that China has gained influence by exploiting regional vulnerabilities, or that its activities have encouraged corruption and instability in Oceania. The Pacific Islands region compares well with other parts of the developing world on measures of corruption . . . Although China-Taiwan competition was a major issue in the domestic politics of Kiribati in 2003, this political entity remains one of the most stable in the region.78

The above analysis suggests that the Taipei-Beijing diplomatic rivalry does have a strong impact on some PICs’ domestic politics. It is true that it is unfair to blame Taipei and Beijing for the culture of corruption in the region. However, the lack of transparency in Taipei and Beijing’s aid policy has made addressing the corruption issue more difficult. Not surprisingly, the governments of the PICs generally welcome the involvement of both mainland China and Taiwan. Crocombe is of the view that competition among donors benefits the region in terms of aid. He argues that “if China and Taiwan became one, or became friends as two, aid to the Pacific Islands would shrink, not only from them, but from their Asian and Western competitors too. If Japan and China resolved their differences, the Pacific Islands would suffer.”79 Similarly, one observer is concerned that Ma Ying-jeou’s pledge to stop dollar diplomacy in the region, as discussed below, could harm fragile PICs that rely on aid from Taiwan and the PRC.80 China and Taiwan are not alone in using aid to advance their interests in the region. In the mid-1990s, both Japan and Korea wanted their candidates to be elected to head the WHO for the Asia-Pacific. Both countries sent large delegations to the PICs, offering extra aid for health and a free trip to Japan or Korea for each minister who would have a vote. “Japan is richer than Korea. Japan won,” concludes Crocombe.81 One of Japan’s prominent interests in the region is whaling. As mentioned earlier, Japan has been using development aid to buy votes at the International Whaling Commission to block the establishment of a South Pacific Whale Sanctuary. Taiwan’s Flexible Diplomacy Relations across the Taiwan Strait have experienced “big-leaps-forward” since April 2005 when the KMT Chairman Lien Chan had a historical meeting with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Hu Jintao in Beijing. The meeting was the highest level exchange of the

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two parties since August 1945 when the leaders of the two parties met to celebrate the end of the eight-year Anti-Japanese Resistance War and to discuss a possible truce in the impending Chinese civil war. After the April 2005 meeting, the interactions between the KMT and CCP became more viable. A new era in cross-Strait relations began in March 2008 when the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election. The KMT regained power after an eight-year absence. In his inaugural address in May 2008, Ma pledged that there would be “no reunification, no independence, and no war” during his tenure. He also proposed that talks with Beijing resume on the basis of the “1992 consensus,” by which both sides agree that there is only one China but agree to disagree on what the term “one China” means. To find a way out (chulu) for Taiwan’s diplomacy, the new KMT government proposed that Taiwan reject the DPP’s zero-sum “scorched earth diplomacy” (fenghuo waijiao) that tried to get China’s diplomatic allies to defect to Taiwan almost at any cost. Instead, Taiwan should have “flexible diplomacy” (huolu waijiao). Its basic approach is to maintain a positive relationship with mainland China.82 According to Ma, flexible diplomacy rules out dollar diplomacy, transit diplomacy, summit diplomacy, and secret diplomacy, all of which were used by Chen Shui-bian in the South Pacific.83 A corollary of “flexible diplomacy” is diplomatic truce (waijiao xiubin), which means that Taiwan and China cease competing for diplomatic recognition. Ma believes that Taiwan needs to reconsider the goal, strategy, method, and criteria of its foreign aid and reject “chequebook diplomacy.” He emphasizes that “the biggest assets of Taiwan’s diplomacy today is not Taiwan’s currency but free, democratic political system and lifestyle.”84 As Ma has pointed out, flexible diplomacy is similar to pragmatic diplomacy in nature. Taiwan has paid dearly for the diplomatic recognition it receives. Moreover, China’s pockets appear almost bottomless, while Taiwan’s are increasingly less so. The Taiwanese foreign minister acknowledged in 2007 that “Taiwan is unable to compete with China in terms of dollar diplomacy.”85 Taiwan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Andrew Hsia also stated publicly that “we are no longer interested in the vicious battle for recognitions. It is almost impossible to compete with China because of its economic, diplomatic and military rise.”86 In addition, Taiwan’s dollar diplomacy tarnished Taiwan’s international image, resulting in “both image and financial losses” (mingcai liangkong).87 In the South Pacific, Taiwan’s dollar diplomacy had repercussions. One observer noted in 2008 that despite Taiwan’s generous financial aid to the Marshall Islands, it was “rapidly losing its popularity among citizens” there.88 Hsia also noted

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in August 2008 that “for too long, we have suffered the infamous label of using chequebook diplomacy and being troublemakers in the Pacific.”89 China’s increasing economic might only adds to pressure for countries to formalize ties with Beijing. For instance, 20 years ago Taiwan sold more goods to Latin America than did China. Today, Taiwan’s trade with the region is lagging far behind that of China. Thus, Ma believes that Taiwan will not lose anything from the diplomatic truce. He further points out that during its eight-year rule, the DPP government established diplomatic relations with three more countries but nine countries switched their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.90 Ma emphasizes that the diplomatic truce does not mean a “diplomatic rest” (waijiao xiuxi), a “diplomatic holiday” (waijiao xiujia), or a “diplomatic shock” (waijiao xiuke).91 Taiwan’s foreign minister has interpreted flexible diplomacy as having two components—diplomatic truce and “active diplomacy” (jiji waijiao). Active diplomacy means that Taiwan should concentrate its resources to strengthen its existing diplomatic relations, improve its relations with major powers in various regions, actively participate in Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, join more professional and functional international organizations, and create an external environment that is conducive to Taiwan’s economic development.92 In terms of foreign aid, Ma reiterated his five strategic areas while visiting Belize in June 2009, including eliminating extreme poverty and famine, developing human resources, dealing with pandemic diseases, promoting sustainable development, and strengthening global development partnership. He also emphasized that all foreign aid must stick to the principle of “proper goal, legitimate procedure, and effective execution.”93 While Ma made it clear that Taiwan would refrain from attempting to win over China’s diplomatic allies, he was not sure if Beijing would reciprocate in kind.94 It turned out that Beijing clearly had genuine interest in responding to Ma’s new diplomatic approach. Years of diplomatic rivalry with Taipei has also been costly to Beijing. Financially, to secure its relations with its diplomatic allies and to squeeze Taipei internationally, Beijing has to provide more aid and to allocate more staff to certain countries. Politically, Beijing’s nonflexible stance over Taiwan leads it to be often perceived as a bully. This is especially so since Taiwan’s political liberalization in the 1990s. Ma believes that his flexible diplomacy and diplomatic truce will create a win-win situation. Beijing tends to agree. Evidence of Beijing’s interest in the diplomatic truce is its policy toward Panama, one of the most strategically significant countries in Central America.95 Panama was a potential Latin American “swing state” before Ma came to power. It established diplomatic relations with the Qing

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Empire in 1909, and has continued to maintain relations with Taiwan since 1912 when the Republic of China was established.96 China and Taiwan engaged in a fierce rivalry in Panama.97 As a significant leader in the region, Panama’s switching to Beijing could have strong implications for the region. Neighboring states may also “swing.”98 The May 2009 presidential election brought Ricardo Martinelli to power in Panama. One of Martinelli’s campaign platforms was to establish diplomatic relations with China. Reportedly, Martinelli had approached China and offered his country’s allegiance in exchange for formal recognition. However, Beijing declined the offer. While dismissing the report, the Panamanian ambassador to Taiwan said to the Taiwanese media in February 2010 that Panama’s government respected the diplomatic truce between Taiwan and China but did not definitively rule out establishing official ties with Beijing.99 Panama is not the only country that has not been able to switch its diplomatic recognition. According to Taiwanese media, a few countries have indicated that they might swing to China but have not received any positive response from Beijing. El Salvador invited China to send a delegation to the presidential inauguration. The invitation was turned down.100 Ma Ying-jeou’s effort to reconcile with the PRC has reduced the tensions across the Taiwan Strait and has resulted in substantial progress economically and politically. Economically, the long-delayed cross-Strait direct air and sea links, normal charter flights, full-scale postal connections, a framework for financial cooperation and investment, and the opening up of Taiwan to mainland Chinese visitors have all been realized. By March 2010, the two sides had been linked by 270 direct flights per week and this is expected to increase sharply. The number of mainland tourists to Taiwan totalled 707,400 people in the first seven months of 2010; double that of the same period in 2009.101 The two sides also signed an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010.102 Mainland China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner with cross-Strait trade totalling US$145.37 billion in 2010, up an annual 36.9 percent.103 Politically, Beijing has become more flexible on Taipei’s request to participate in international organizations. In early 2009, China dropped objections to Taiwan’s participation in the WHO’s International Health Regulations, which allows the WHO to disseminate health-related information directly to Taiwan authorities instead of having to go through the PRC government. In May 2009, under the name of Chinese Taipei, Taiwan was invited to participate as an observer in that year’s annual meeting of the World Health Assembly, the WHO’s executive body. This was the first time since 1971 when the ROC was replaced by the PRC in the United Nations. It is observed that “these various significant breakthroughs since the KMT’s return to power in 2008 have created the best

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condition for cross-Strait relations after 50 years, virtually bringing forth a new historical moment in cross-Strait relations.”104 The changes have been so dramatic that they are having “ripple effects in Washington.”105 Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, an ardent anti-Communist, was so angered by Ma’s conciliatory approach to China that he quit his post as co-chair of the congressional Taiwan Caucus in 2009.106 Ma’s “flexible diplomacy” has had a strong impact on Taiwan’s policy toward the South Pacific. While continuing Taiwan’s aid to the region, “Ma brought a fresh message—one that means we can, perhaps tentatively, declare the end of the Pacific battle for diplomatic loyalty between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China,” says Rowan Callick.107 In his visit to the region in March 2010, Ma explained his government’s “new foreign assistance policy concepts” and emphasized that “Taiwan is no longer competing with China for allies in the Pacific.”108 Ma promised that Taiwan would abide by the Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development Coordination in the Pacific, which was endorsed by the PIF leaders in August 2009, and would work cooperatively with organizations like the PIF and, in the case of the Solomon Islands, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands.109 Ma also announced distinct programs “designed for each country” in health and medicine, fisheries and marine products, agricultural cooperation, vocational resources, solar energy, and cultural exchange. To coordinate its aid to the South Pacific with other countries in an effort to improve its international image is just one major change to Taiwan’s policy toward the region. One other change is Ma’s decision to stop the summit diplomacy initiated by his predecessor Chen Shuibian. The Third Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit was scheduled for 2008 in Taiwan’s Kaohsiung. It was cancelled “as Ma courted China” in his first year in office.110 The summit was then rescheduled for October 2009 in Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands. It was cancelled again because a flood disaster had hit Taiwan. When Ma finally paid his sevenday visit to the region, he changed the summit into individual state visits. Ma argued that such visits were better than summit meetings because it would be easier “to raise individual concerns.”111 It is also in line with Ma’s dislike of summit diplomacy as discussed earlier. After all, Ma wanted to make his trip low profile to show his goodwill to Beijing. The effect of Taiwan’s new policy on the governance of the PICs remains to be seen. Taiwan gives US$10 million assistance to 50 Members of Parliament (MP) in the Solomon Islands each year. The Solomon Star claims that it is “public knowledge” that most MPs used the funds only to support people who elected them into power and not the rest of people in their constituencies. During Ma’s visit to the Solomon Islands, a Solomon

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Star’s editorial asked Ma to stop giving the funds to MPs. In his address to the Parliament of the Solomon Islands, Ma did not touch on the US$10 million assistance.112 The long-term future of the diplomatic truce in the South Pacific also remains uncertain. Callick has noted that “China has pragmatically shifted its operations in the islands accordingly.”113 The leaders of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in the region, such as Solomon Islands prime minister Derek Sikua, have not received any inducements from Beijing to change loyalty.114 However, the pro-DPP Taiwan News accused Ma’s abandoning of summit diplomacy “shortsighted.” It warned in its editorial that “if Ma loses his re-election bid in March 2012, Beijing will engineer the defection of several of our Pacific allies, some of which plan to allow Beijing to set up ‘commercial offices.’ ”115 Phillip Saunders and Scott Kastner have argued powerfully that “there is a real possibility that Taiwan and China could reach a peace agreement.”116 Cheng-yi Lin is also hopeful that “Taipei and Beijing’s patterns of interactions with the region [South Pacific] may gradually change.”117 Nevertheless, despite the substantial improvement of the cross-Strait relations, there are still many uncertainties. After all, “the most fundamental and the ultimate goal” of Taiwan’s diplomacy still is to consolidate its relations with the 23 countries with which Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations.118 More importantly, distrust remains across the Taiwan Strait. Some mainlanders fear that Taiwan’s “flexible diplomacy” may be a temporary measure and future Taiwanese leaders may be less flexible. On the other hand, some observers in Taiwan are concerned that the diplomatic truce is the Ma government’s “unilateral, wishful surrender” to Beijing.119 The Taiwanese public remains sensitive about Taiwan’s sovereignty and many are concerned that closer cross-Strait relations may compromise it. Against this background, it is still too early to say that the Taipei-Beijing diplomatic rivalry is approaching an end.

Conclusion As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Taiwan issue is China’s core national interest and the national reunification strategy is one of the three main components of China’s grand strategy. Given the importance of the South Pacific in Taiwan’s struggle for international recognition, it is no surprise that Beijing and Taiwan have been embroiled in a fierce diplomatic rivalry in the region. Taiwan has been engaged with the region by using various forms of diplomacy in its diplomatic competition with mainland China, including

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dollar diplomacy although past Taiwanese governments have repeatedly denied it. Similarly, despite Beijing’s rejection that Taiwan has been a major factor in its policy toward the South Pacific, the Taiwan factor has been a driving force behind China’s growing involvement in the region. The governments of most PICs not only became used to the TaipeiBeijing diplomatic rivalry but also made a consistent effort to take advantage of it. As Eric Harwit noted in 2000, many PICs “played the two Chinas off against each other in order to obtain the maximum economic and political benefit.”120 Both China and Taiwan have been accused of contributing to corruption and political instability in the region because of their diplomatic rivalry. On the other hand, some observers emphasize that the PICs have financially benefited from the rivalry. Ma’s flexible diplomacy has correlated with the dramatic improvement of the cross-Strait relations. The diplomatic truce so far has stabilized Taiwan and China’s diplomatic relations with their diplomatic allies. Both sides have continued to consolidate their relations with their allies and have refrained from enticing away each other’s allies. However, given that the distrust between Taiwan and mainland China is likely to persist for years to come and that a change of government in Taiwan is always possible, the future of the diplomatic truce is uncertain.

FIVE

China in Fiji: Displacing Traditional Players?

A

s the political and economic hub of the South Pacific, Fiji is of particular importance in regional politics and economy. China’s influence in Fiji has been growing since December 2006 when Commodore Josaia Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama staged a military takeover.1 Instead of condemning the coup, China called on Fiji’s neighbors to display a more understanding and reasonable attitude toward Fiji. While New Zealand and Australia have imposed a travel ban on members of Fiji’s military regime, Beijing invited Bainimarama to the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony. China has also been training Fijian civil servants and technical staff in China. What was particularly alarming to observers in the region was the report that China’s pledged aid to Fiji increased by sevenfold one year after the coup, from US$23 million in 2006 to US$161 million in 2007. The increase was even more dramatic if compared with China’s pledged aid of US$1 million in 2005.2 Against this background, it is unsurprising that Bainimarama expressed his gratitude to Beijing, saying that “Fiji will not forget that when other countries were quick to condemn us following the events of 1987, 2000 and 2006, China and other friends in Asia demonstrated a more understanding and sensitive approach to events in Fiji.” More specifically, Bainimarama emphasized that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China expressed confidence in our ability to resolve our problems in our way, without undue pressure of interference.”3 What are the real motivations behind increased Chinese aid and involvement in Fiji since 2006? Has Chinese support for the military regime in Suva been unreserved? Most importantly, does China have a well-calculated strategy to displace traditional players like Australia and New Zealand? This chapter attempts to answer these questions. Given that the current concerns—political, strategic, and economic—mainly

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originated from the alleged sudden surge of Chinese aid to Fiji after the 2006 coup, this chapter pays special attention to the analysis of Chinese aid to Fiji.

Putting Chinese Aid in Perspective Historically, coups in Fiji have been driving forces for closer Fiji-China relations. In the 1987 coups, Beijing took a neutral approach, which was different from the reactions of Australia and New Zealand. With sanctions put into place against Fiji after the 1987 coups, Fiji’s interim government decided to extend its contact with Asia. China’s importance to Fiji was further strengthened after the 2000 coup. With New Zealand, Australia, and the Commonwealth imposing “smart” sanctions against Fiji, Fiji’s interim government initiated what it called a “Look North” foreign policy and China became “the primary focus” of Fiji’s foreign relations.4 However, China’s support for Fiji’s interim government was not unequivocal in the months immediately after the 2006 military takeover. China and Fiji had had top-level visits every year ever since 1990. Such top-level visits did not take place in 2007 (see Appendix 1). There were no Chinese official visits to Fiji even at the ministerial level although two Fijian ministerial delegations visited China. 5 China resumed toplevel visits with Fiji in 2008 with Bainimarama attending the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony. China’s official Xinhua News Agency reported his arrival with just one sentence: “Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama of Fiji’s interim government arrived at the Beijing Capital International Airport Wednesday evening for the Olympic Games.”6 In terms of China providing training to Fijian civil servants, it was part of a Chinese plan that was announced during Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to the region before the coup, in April 2006. According to the plan, China would provide training to 2,000 government officials and technical staff from the Pacific island countries (PICs). And China is not alone in providing training to Fijian civil servants. In mid-2009, a total of 41 Fijian civil servants attended short courses overseas. Among them, 7 underwent training in Australia with the assistance of Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), 24 at the Australian Pacific Technical College in Samoa, which was also sponsored by AusAID, 7 in China, 2 in South Korea, and 1 in Germany but sponsored by Japan.7 Most importantly, the dramatic increase of China’s pledged aid should also be put in perspective. First, most of the aid is in the form of soft loans instead of grants. China’s decision to increase its aid in the form of soft

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loans was announced in April 2006 by Wen Jiabao in Fiji, well before the coup in December that year. China’s soft loans in the South Pacific are at an interest rate of 2 percent and are repayable over 15–20 years with a 5-year grace period. The loans may be forgiven, but only on a case-by-case basis.8 Also, the China-funded projects are normally given to Chinese companies and use Chinese material, so much so that some Western aid officials claim that China’s assistance cannot be properly called aid.9 Second, compared with Samoa, Fiji has not necessarily received more soft loans from China. Although Fiji is a much more important player in international relations, “Samoa has never wavered in its support of China” over Taiwan.10 Since 2007, Samoa has received a substantial amount of soft loans from China to fund a few major projects, including • Parliament Offices (construction period: September 18, 2007– September 17, 2008; cost: US$9 million); • The Ministry of Justice and Courts Administration court house (construction period: September 18, 2007–January 25, 2010; cost: US$15 million); • Government Offices Building Complex II and multipurpose Conference Centre (construction commenced on January 25, 2010; cost: RMB 300 million Yuan or US$44 million); and • Samoa National Medical Centre and the Headquarters of the Samoa Ministry of Health Project (agreement signed on January 16, 2010, not exceeding RMB 210 million Yuan or about US$31 million; breaking ground on September 16, 2010.)11 In Fiji, China has been involved in three major projects since 2007, namely Phase I of Fiji-China e-Government Program, squatter resettlement, and the Nadarivatu Hydro Power Project. A close look at the three projects reveals that China’s actual aid to Fiji after the 2006 coup has been rather modest. The details and development of the three projects are as follows. 1. The Export and Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) has provided US$20 million to the Fiji-China e-Government Program. However, the loan was agreed upon before the coup. 2. The Fiji government plans to apply for a soft loan of FJ$260 million (about US$123 million) from China for its squatter resettlement program. On March 3, 2009, China Railway First Group Construction Limited signed a preliminary agreement with the Housing Authority of Fiji to build 1,500 residential lots on 184 acres of land. China Eximbank was supposed to fund the initial stage of the project with FJ$70 million (US$30 million). However, no

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progress has been reported since then. Fergus Hanson believes that it has failed to commence “apparently over a failure to reach agreement on quality issues and use of local labour (which the Chinese are resisting).”12 3. Nadarivatu Hydro Power Project is not a typical aid project. It is a “commercial cooperation project,” according to a Chinese senior diplomat.13 The total cost of the project is FJ$283.2 million (US$150 million). The FJ$132.45million (US$70 million) that China provided was from the China Development Bank (CDB) instead of China Eximbank. The lead banker for the project is Australia’s ANZ Bank, which has a partnership with the CDB.14 China’s Sinohydro Corporation won the tender after “fierce competition” to carry out the construction.15 China’s actual aid to Fiji since 2007 has been largely an anticlimax. “For all the hype things have been pretty quiet,” observed Hanson,16 the author of the widely publicized report about the alarming increase of China’s pledged aid to Fiji in 2007. There could be multiple reasons why China’s pledged aid did not materialize. It could just be because the projects were not well considered when the Chinese pledged the aid in 2007. Subsequently, they may have come across difficulties when the involved parties got into the details, causing delay. In his welcome speech for Chinese vice president Xi Jinping’s stopover visit to Fiji in February 2009, Bainimarama claimed that Fiji was “very close to concluding preparatory works” for accessing China’s soft loan funding announced by Wen Jiabao in April 2006. “We are in the final stages of accessing funding under the soft loan facility for the projects we have identified for such funding,” said Bainimarama.17 Not much progress has been made since then, however. The slow progress of the aid projects may also be because Beijing is “having second thoughts about being the military regime’s saviour.”18 In an effort to be perceived as a “responsible player,” Beijing has become more cautious in dealing with military regimes that are in trouble with the West. In the case of Fiji, China told the visiting New Zealand prime minister John Key in April 2009 that China would “take note” of the concerns of New Zealand and other countries in regard to the situation in Fiji and promised that China would play a constructive role in the resolution of the Fiji issue.19 Bainimarama even made an effort to explain the political development in Fiji to Xi Jinping and emphasized that Fiji would “definitely return to Parliamentary democracy” although “the timing of which will be determined by the people of Fiji alone.”20

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China’s pledged aid should also be put in perspective for other reasons. First, the duration of the aid projects are spread out over time, as is the money dedicated to the projects. For instance, Phase I of the Fiji-China e-Government Project will last for over four years. The construction of the Nadarivatu Hydro Power Project is expected to take 35 months and the squatter resettlement program will also last for some years if it goes ahead in the end. Second, some projects had been under discussion for years before the coup. For instance, a Chinese technical team was sent to Fiji to analyze and assess the possibility of an e-Government development project as early as 2004.21 A more telling case is the China-Fiji Friendship Bridge—Navuso Bridge, which China handed over to the Fiji government in May 2009. The bridge, 104.5-meter long and 9.1-meter wide with a cost of RMB 16 million Yuan (US$2.4 million), was financed and built by China. While it took just one year to build the bridge, the planning for the construction of the bridge began in the early 1990s. The project went ahead only when a major breakthrough took place in the late 1990s with a visiting Chinese delegation offering to finance some of the country’s urgent infrastructure development through bilateral agreements.22 One other striking feature of Chinese aid to Fiji is that most of China’s aid projects are given to Chinese firms using Chinese material. It is said that “virtually the entire workforce and supplies are sourced from China” for the Nadarivatu Hydro Power Project.23 Even the e-Government project is not an exception. On November 2, 2006, Alcatel announced that it had been selected by the Fiji government as the sole provider of an advanced information and communications solution for the e-Government program. The contract was won through Alcatel Shanghai Bell, Alcatel’s flagship Chinese company. Alcatel Shanghai Bell is the first foreign-invested company limited by shares in the telecommunications sector in China, with Alcatel holding 50 percent+1 shares and Chinese shareholders holding the remainder. 24

Understanding China’s Policy toward Fiji: Chinese Interests Chinese policy toward Fiji reflects China’s proclaimed principle of noninterference in a country’s political system. Fiji is just one of many examples. A good comparison is China’s policy toward Africa. Ian Taylor has noted that “Chinese activity in Africa is increasing at an exponential rate.”25 Beijing had close diplomatic relations with African countries in the 1950s and 1960s. In the first decade of China’s opening up in 1978, Beijing focused on improving its relations with developed countries and its

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neighbors. It rediscovered its “African friends” when, in Dennis M. Tull’s words, “developing countries were effectively elevated to a ‘cornerstone’ of Chinese foreign policy in an effort to build coalitions to shield Beijing from Western criticism” after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.26 More broadly, Beijing’s policy toward Africa is “designed to secure natural resources, consumer markets, and its position as leader of the developing world.”27 Another major factor has been Beijing’s diplomatic rivalry with Taipei. China’s aid to African countries “does not hinge on conditionalities pertaining to specific political objectives or standards,” such as human rights and political democratization. The “notable exception” is that the countries must recognize that Beijing is the only legitimate representative of China and Taiwan is a part of China.28 Angola and Sudan are two good examples. Although Angola is believed to be “a state where patronage and corruption reign supreme,”29 Beijing’s relations with Angola have not been affected. Angola is China’s largest trading partner in Africa with a trade volume of about US$25 billion in 2010. Crude oil was almost the sole product that China imports from Angola. In that sense, Angola is important to China’s energy security. In the early 2000s, China offered a US$2 billion loan at an interest rate of 1.5 percent over 17 years. The deal was tied to an agreement to supply a certain amount of oil to China as well as the award of substantial construction contracts to Chinese companies. No “humiliating conditions,” such as those regarding corruption or graft, were imposed on Angola. 30 Sudan is a better known case. As the largest buyer of Sudan’s energy resources, Beijing has been criticized for its indifference to governance and human rights issues in Sudan. Like Angola, Sudan also plays an important role in China’s energy security. The China National Petroleum Corporation, an influential state-owned enterprise, owns the largest share (40 percent) in Sudan’s largest oil venture, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company.31 Beijing also attempts to be consistent in upholding its long-held core foreign policy principle of respect for sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs, although the principle can be “an excuse for China’s inaction and protection of its economic interests.”32 In addition, China itself has been a target of criticism on issues like human rights and political liberalization. A senior Chinese diplomat in Africa is known for saying that “there are no rogue states. China has been labelled this in the past and other governments should not criticize.”33 Thus, the fact that Fiji is ruled by a military-led regime is unlikely to stop China continuing or strengthening the bilateral relationship. Mirroring the Chinese statement that “there are no rogue states,” a Chinese senior diplomat in Fiji said to Fijian officials that “there is no ‘economic sanction’

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in our diplomatic vocabulary.”34 After all, China was a target of economic sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. An important driving force behind China’s policy toward Fiji is its economic interest. Fiji is China’s fourth-largest trading partner in the South Pacific. The trade volume has grown substantially in the past decade, from US$17.85 million in 1998 to US$97.13 million in 2009.35 China has invested in over 20 companies in the Fijian fisheries industry. The Chinese see potential in its economic relations with Fiji. They emphasize that while China has market size, capital, and technology, Fiji is rich in resources, including a large amount of unused land, scenery, minerals, and fisheries.36 However, China’s economic interests in Fiji should not be exaggerated. China’s trade with Fiji in 2009 remained much smaller than its trade with the Marshall Islands (US$1366.13 million), Papua New Guinea (PNG) (US$885.28 million), and the Solomon Islands (US$194.24 million) in the same year. In terms of investment, the actually utilized foreign direct investment (FDI) from Fiji to China in 2008 was a mere US$500,000, which is negligible compared with China’s total actually utilized FDI of US$92.4 billion in that year. In 2009, the actually utilized FDI from Fiji to China was not even recorded.37 On the other hand, China does not regard Fiji as a major destination of its FDI and has not even recorded its FDI in Fiji in its statistics yearbook. The reason why China pays more attention to Fiji thus goes beyond the bilateral economic relationship. A key reason is the fact that Fiji is located in the middle of the South Pacific and is the hub of the region. Politically, Fiji is home to the regional headquarters of many international organizations and international nongovernmental organizations. The secretariat of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and a number of other important regional institutions are also based in Suva. Also, Fiji hosts a large number of overseas media and diplomatic missions, and the main campus of the University of the South Pacific serves up to 10,000 students from 12 Pacific island states.38 Economically, Fiji is an aviation hub for the region and Fiji’s ports are an “important crossroads” for shipping services between North America, Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and the PICs. 39 China also has strong political interests in Fiji. Fiji has lent its support to Beijing when it is needed. For instance, the Fiji government supported Chinese handling of the deadly riot in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, in March 2008, saying that “this is an internal matter for the Chinese government to deal with” and that it was necessary for China to take proper measures to safeguard national peace and stability.40 In addition, as indicated earlier, China’s policy toward developing countries is often based on its long-held conviction that China is “the de facto leader of the

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developing world.”41 The Chinese tend to categorize Sino-Fijian relations as part of “South-South cooperation.”42 There is no clear evidence to suggest that security strategy is a major factor behind China’s policy toward Fiji. As is discussed in Chapter 8, the value of the South Pacific to China’s national security strategy is limited. The region is too far away from the Taiwan Strait, a potential flashpoint, and it is not part of China’s strategic sea lanes.43 Military contacts do exist between China and some PICs, including Fiji. However, the contacts are logistics based and far from resembling moves toward a deeper military alliance. In 2007, Fiji’s interim government did indicate a willingness to move closer to China in the military arena. It appointed a leading military figure and coup supporter as its defense attaché to China and sent a military official to Beijing for talks.44 Beijing did not respond to the moves enthusiastically.

Understanding China’s Policy toward Fiji: The Taiwan Factor On top of these interests has been Beijing’s diplomatic rivalry with Taipei. Fiji established diplomatic relations with Taipei in 1971, shortly after it gained its independence in 1970. In 1975, it switched its diplomatic recognition to Beijing. While Fiji has been consistent in its official relations with Beijing, it was one of the countries in the region that maintained close political relations with Taipei before the 2006 coup. Fiji’s relationship with Taiwan is somewhat special in that Taiwan’s representative office in Fiji is called the Trade Mission of the Republic of China. The standard official name for Taipei’s representative office in any country that recognizes Beijing is the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Office,” without “Republic of China” being included in the name. Beijing has long expressed its displeasure to the Fiji government about the name but has not been able to force a change. In 2008, of Taiwan’s 93 representative offices (excluding those in Hong Kong and Macau) in 61 countries that recognize Beijing, only 6 bear the Republic of China designation.45 From time to time Beijing was worried that Fiji was swinging toward Taipei. For instance, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister John Chang and his Fijian counterpart, Filipe N. Bole, signed a communiqué of mutual recognition between Fiji and Taiwan in Taipei on October 4, 1996. The communiqué affirmed the official recognition of each other while Fiji maintained formal diplomatic relations with China. Although such recognition falls short of full diplomatic ties, it is a higher level of relationship than “substantive relations.” Since Fiji recognizes Taiwan as a sovereign state,

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theoretically officials of both governments could deal publicly and formally with each other. Given Fiji’s special status in the South Pacific, Beijing paid special attention to the development. Right after Fiji signed the joint communiqué, Beijing warned other countries that the establishment of formal recognition with Taipei would damage their relations with Beijing. It stated that China strongly opposed Taipei’s effort to play the game of “dual recognition” and create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”46 As punishment, in 1997 China ended preferential treatment of Fiji sugar imports and imposed a 40 percent tariff.47 Nevertheless, Beijing did not terminate its diplomatic relations with Fiji. In the following year, Fiji established its representative office in Taiwan with the official name of Trade and Tourism Representative Office in the Republic of China. Fijian president Kamisese Mara opened the office on December 25, 1997. Fiji’s determination to maintain a close political relationship with Taiwan has historical roots. After Fiji’s 1987 coups, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States refused to provide military equipment to Fiji. Taiwan, along with several countries, instead supplied the equipment. Kamisese Mara made several “private visits” to Taiwan and consulted with the Taiwanese president when he was prime minister and later president of Fiji.48 Fiji’s close relations with Taiwan clearly worried Beijing. Just one year before Fiji and Taiwan signed the “mutual recognition” joint communiqué, China sent to Fiji a large delegation led by Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.49 Before the 2006 coup, Fiji was consistent in supporting Taiwan on issues like Taiwan’s membership in international organizations, such as the United Nations. It also repeatedly emphasized at the UN the necessity of dialogue for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue. As part of the close relationship, Fiji and Taiwan continued to exchange high-profile official visits. In 1998, Taiwan’s president of the Executive Yuan (premier) visited Fiji and met high-ranking government officials. Before the 2006 coup, high-profile visits were rather frequent between Fiji and Taiwan, reaching a height in 2005. In that year, a senior presidential advisor, foreign minister, and the head of the ministry-level Overseas Compatriots Commission from Taiwan visited Fiji. Most importantly, Taiwan’s president Chen Shui-bian was allowed to pay a stopover visit. What is also significant is that 2005 was the thirtieth anniversary of the diplomatic relationship between China and Fiji. To celebrate the anniversary and to consolidate the bilateral relationship, China sent a number of delegations to Fiji, including those headed by the vice president of the state, the chairman and vice chairman of the Chinese People’s

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Consultative Conference, the vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the head of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and a delegation from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Taiwan’s relations with Fiji have cooled off to a considerable extent since December 2006. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan was not enthusiastic about exchanging official visits with Fiji in 2007 because the military takeover in Fiji was condemned by the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and other “important” states.50 Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 3, a new era in cross-Strait relations began in May 2008 when the Kuomintang (KMT) regained power in Taiwan and decided to reject the proindependence DPP’s zero-sum “scorched earthdiplomacy” that tried to get China’s diplomatic allies to defect to Taiwan almost at any cost. With the diplomatic truce between Beijing and Taipei and the Fijian military regime’s continuous isolation by the West, it appears that Taipei is not in a hurry to resume high-ranking official visits to Fiji. However, Taipei has not been critical of the military regime. Its representative to Fiji, Victor Chin, said in March 2008 that people should respect the interim government’s announcement on moves to return Fiji to democratic rule.51

China Displacing the Traditional Players? Both Australia and New Zealand are concerned that China’s support for Fiji is undermining their efforts to put diplomatic and economic pressure on the military regime. Australia has been pressing China to curb its support for Fiji. According to Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australia engages in regular dialogue with China, and other donors, in support of effective development co-ordination in the Pacific Islands region.”52 Similarly, New Zealand foreign minister Murray McCully said that the New Zealand government was trying to get China to understand the benefits of working more closely with New Zealand and Australia.53 Some observers in the region are also concerned. They point out that by imposing sanctions against Fiji’s military regime, Australia and New Zealand are forcing the regime “to distance itself from its traditional bilateral trade partners.”54 They cite as precedents the 1987 and 2000 coups. What worries these observers is China’s increasing influence in Fiji. Western (mainly Australia and New Zealand) sanctions and travel bans have indeed facilitated China’s growing influence in Fiji, so much so that Richard Herr and Anthony Bergin urged

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the Australian government not to “drive Fiji further into China’s open arms.”55 However, the above analysis shows that there is no clear evidence to suggest that China is pursuing a well-calculated strategy of displacing the traditional Western players in Fiji since 2006. Sandra Tarte argues that “While not wishing to antagonize Fiji (or push it into closer links with Taiwan), China will nevertheless be mindful of the wider regional audience and the need to balance its strategic and political interests in the Pacific.”56 Nevertheless, China will end up competing with the traditional players in Fiji. It is, therefore, necessary to look at these traditional players’ influence in Fiji, particularly that of Australia and New Zealand. Jenny Hayward-Jones has summed up Australia’s influence in Fiji rather succinctly. Australia remains “the dominant foreign influence” in Fiji based on its “deep connections” with the country. Australia is the largest investor in Fiji and its investments “range across a number of sectors,” including banking, financial, insurance and legal services, tourism, transport, logistics, and manufacturing. Australian banks dominate the Fiji market. Australia’s national airline Qantas owns 46 percent of Air Pacific and the Fiji government holds 51 percent.57 In terms of trade, two-way merchandize trade between Fiji and Australia was worth US$368 million in 2009 (see Appendix 2). As Fiji’s second-largest merchandize import market, Australia occupies about 23 percent of the Fiji market.58 With a trade volume of US$233 million in 2009 (see Appendix 2), New Zealand’s trade with Fiji is also substantial. New Zealand’s interests and influence in Fiji extend well beyond the economic area. According to the 2006 census, 37,746 New Zealand residents of various ethnicities were born in Fiji, making Fijians the second-largest Pacific group living in New Zealand after Samoa-born people.59 The total number of New Zealanders with Fijian ancestry is even higher due to the rapidly increasing percentage of New Zealand-born Fijians.60 The New Zealand government notes that “New Zealand and Fiji are old friends, sharing links through history, culture, migration, business, education and sport as well as through engagement between the two governments across a wide spectrum of issues.”61 Both Australia and New Zealand have made an effort to protect their economic interests in Fiji, such as trade and investment. Despite its sanctions and travel bans, Australia has maintained its contact with Fiji at the level of officials “in order to pursue key interests,” in the words of the Australian government.62 New Zealand has not imposed restrictions on tourism, trade, or investment. New Zealand’s sanctions, according to Foreign Minister McCully, “are tightly targeted at members of the regime and their immediate families.” What is more, McCully and

Allocation Expenditure

New Zealand

3.9 2.4

19.7 20.9 4.1 2.1

20.0 21.9 4.1 2.1

25.1 29.4 6.1 7.8

30.5 29.8 8.0 2.5

33.8 25.9 6.0 2.2

28.7 34.8 5.0 3.8

26.9 36.6

6.5 4.8

35.4 35.9**

37.2

2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011

* Total Australian ODA from all agencies and programs. ** Estimated outcome. Sources: AusAID, Australian Government, “Australia’s International Development Assistance Program.” http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pubout.cfm?ID=2922_448 2_7617_9772_1761. For NZ ODA in 2002–2003 and 2003–2004, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Official Development Assistance Annual Review in the respective years. For 2004–2005, 2005–2006, and 2006–2007, New Zealand International Aid & Development Agency (NZAID), Annual Review in the respective years. For 2007–2008, 2008–2009 and 2009–2010, see New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 2009–10: For the Year Ended 30 June 2010.

Budget Estimate Actual

Australia*

Country

Table 5.1 Australian and New Zealand ODA to Fiji (AU$ million and NZ$ million)

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his colleagues “have been extremely liberal in providing exceptions to the ban.”63 In terms of aid, Table 5.1 shows that Australia’s official development assistance (ODA) contribution to Fiji has increased substantially since the 2006 coup. Its actual ODA increased, from AU$25.9 million in 2006– 2007 to AU$36.6 million in 2008–2009 and its budget estimate reached an all time high of AU$37.2 million in 2010–2011. New Zealand’s ODA to Fiji came down from NZ$3.4 million in the 2000–2001 financial year to NZ$2.1 million in 2004–2005. It shot up to NZ$7.8 million in 2005– 2006, fell back to NZ$2.5 million and NZ$2.2 million in 2006–2007 and 2007–2008 respectively, and then climbed back to NZ$3.8 million in the 2008–2009 financial year and further to NZ$4.8 million in the 2009–2010 financial year. The full aid Fiji received from New Zealand from all programs (including regional and thematic programs) in the three financial years immediately after the 2006 coup was NZ$3.2 million, NZ$4.9 million, and NZ$5.8 million respectively.64 There was “a realignment” of New Zealand’s aid to Fiji, with a new focus on delivery through nongovernmental channels. Its 2008–2009 aid, however, was delivered through the official New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID).65 Australia and New Zealand have strong influence and remain deeply committed to the region. Beijing’s policy options in Fiji and the South Pacific in general are limited. As pointed out by Hanson, “displacing Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific would come at a huge cost to China and bring no tangible additional benefits.”66 As is discussed in the next chapter, China has a big political, economic, and strategic stake in a good relationship with both Australia and New Zealand. Politically, Australia and New Zealand are crucial to Beijing’s diplomatic rivalry with Taipei in the region. As a strong U.S. ally, Australia is also well positioned to play an important role in China’s security strategy. Economically, the Australia and New Zealand markets are much more important than the South Pacific market as a whole.

Conclusion China’s influence in Fiji has been growing and will continue to grow. As noted by McCully, “China is a rising superpower with an interest in acquiring markets and resources in this region [South Pacific].”67 McCully is right in arguing that “with or without a coup, China would be a strong player in the region, and a strong competitor in our markets.”68 Though Western sanctions have pushed Fiji closer to China, there is no clear evidence to suggest that China has been engaged in an active strategy of

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displacing the traditional players like Australia and New Zealand in Fiji. It is unlikely that China will be able to displace Australia and New Zealand any time soon. Both Australia and New Zealand have made an effort to find a balance between their interests and moral responsibility in Fiji. The foundation of their influence in Fiji remains strong. On the other hand, China has strong interests in maintaining good relations with Australia and New Zealand. It is not in China’s interest to increase its influence in Fiji at the cost of its relations with these two traditional players.

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Interactions with Australia and New Zealand: Balancing Interests

A

ustralia and New Zealand occupy a special place in the South Pacific due to their proximity and historical linkages. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade states in its website that Australia values its links with the Pacific Islands and “is committed to playing an active and constructive role in the region of which it is a part.”1 Similarly, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade deems the Pacific region to be “of central importance” and emphasizes that New Zealand has “strong bonds of shared interests: history, culture, trade, family and future” with the region. 2 Former foreign minister Winston Peters said in 2006 that “indeed, articulating our role in the Pacific has become a cornerstone of New Zealand’s wide foreign policy.”3 The growing influence of China in the region has caused concerns and sparked a contentious debate in both Australia and New Zealand. It is clear that China’s rise will have a strong impact on the region. What that impact may be, and its full extent, is not completely clear. While visiting the region in April 2006, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao stated that “as far as China is concerned, to foster friendship and cooperation with the Pacific island countries is not a diplomatic expediency. Rather, it is a strategic decision.”4 Australia and New Zealand, however, are not necessarily assured. This chapter first outlines Australia and New Zealand’s interests in the region and their concerns regarding China’s “strategic decision.” The chapter then investigates the interactions between China, Australia, and New Zealand.

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Australian and New Zealand’s Regional Interests In the words of former Australian prime minister John Howard, Australia sees the South Pacific as its “special patch.” The Australian government has been consistent in stating that it “places a special value on its close historical, political, economic, aid and community links with the island countries and territories of the Pacific.”5 This special value is reflected in the fact that Australia is the leading donor of aid to the independent countries of the Pacific. Australia also has a program of defense cooperation with many of the Pacific island countries (PICs).6 While the defense of Australia against direct armed attack remains its most basic strategic interest, the Australian government deems “the security, stability and cohesion” of its immediate neighborhood, which includes the PICs, to be Australia’s “next most important strategic interest.” 7 “What matters most,” according to the Australian Defence White Paper 2009, is that the neighbors “are not a source of threat to Australia.”8 This refers not only to the military intentions and power of both regional states and external players, but also challenges to the stability and cohesion of the neighboring states, “not least because that could make them vulnerable to external influences that might be inimical to Australia’s interests.”9 Australia’s involvement in the South Pacific is deep-rooted. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade summarizes Australia’s role in the region as follows: Australia helped to shape some of the island states as they became independent—their economic bases, power-sharing arrangements between the centre and the provinces, and philosophy of governance. And in some cases we passed on our institutions and the ideas underpinning them—constitutions, parliaments, public services, legal systems and security forces. Australia is the region’s main source of imports and investment, a leading aid donor and major defence and security partner.10

On the other hand, many Pacific island leaders and citizens reportedly have viewed Australia’s past and present leadership role and armed presence in the region with resentment and deep ambivalence.11 Indeed, Australia’s colonial history in the region and the “perceived big brother syndrome” has alienated some regional elites.12 Nevertheless, the governments of the PICs still turn to Canberra for help at times of crisis. Anthony van Fossen notes that “Pacific Islands states expect Australia or the US to protect their sovereignty in an emergency.”13 Canberra played a

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crucial role in the Bougainville’s peace process in the 1990s. Since 2003, Australia has sent a large number of peacekeeping forces and channelled millions of dollars to one of the unstable countries in this region, the Solomon Islands, through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which is led by Australia. Both Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Solomon Islands are located in Melanesia, one of the region’s three broad ethnogeographic areas. The other two are Micronesia and Polynesia (see Map 2.1). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the United States has predominant influence in Micronesia thanks to its “compact relationship” with the Republic of Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau.14 Australia exerts its influence across the South Pacific, and particularly in Melanesia. It gives special emphasis to Melanesia because the region lies on Australia’s north-northwestern borders. Australia also has significant trade and commercial interests in the South Pacific, Australia’s closest market. This is particularly the case in Melanesia. Australia dominates PNG and the Solomon Islands. As discussed in Chapter 5, Australia has a strong economic interest in Fiji. Compared with Australia, New Zealand is geographically and culturally closer to the South Pacific.15 New Zealand is believed to be “a more Pacific country than Australia,” thanks to its “keen appreciation of Pacific Island cultural sensibilities.”16 Stewart Firth has observed that “Unlike Australia, New Zealand was not tainted by years of opposition to Bougainvillean independence, support for PNG territorial integrity and direct military assistance to the PNG Defence Force.”17 Indeed, among all the regional actors, New Zealand shares perhaps the strongest cultural ties with the South Pacific, a crucial element of soft power. According to the 2006 census, about 6.9 percent of New Zealand’s population is Pacific Islander.18 New Zealand’s interest and influence is most visible in the South Pacific countries to its north and northeast, the Polynesian area. If indigenous Maori are included, Polynesians make up about 25 percent of New Zealand’s population.19Auckland is often described as the largest Polynesian city in the world. New Zealand has special interests and responsibilities for several Pacific Islands, including responsibility for the defense and security of Tokelau. Cook Islanders and Niueans have NZ citizenship and are free to immigrate to New Zealand. Officially, both the Cook Islands and Niue are self-governing states in free association with New Zealand. Sometimes the number of Pacific Islanders living in New Zealand outnumbers those remaining in their native country. For example, 79 percent of Cook Islanders, 81 percent of Tokelauans, and 93 percent of Niueans live in New Zealand.20 Tonga, Samoa, and Tuvalu also

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have significant proportions of their populations living in New Zealand. Fuimaono Les McCarthy emphasizes that these strong family connections cannot be ignored by their homeland governments . . . The Cook Islanders even used to have one of their parliamentary seats located in Auckland . . . People in positions of authority in the homelands, from Cabinet down and in the private sector, are predominantly people with close affiliations with New Zealand, largely as a result of education, sports or family connections.21

Somewhat different from Australia, New Zealand’s strategic interest in the South Pacific is less military-oriented. It is more concerned about the destabilizing factors in the region. Its Defence White Paper 2010 states: It is in New Zealand’s interests to play a leadership role in the South Pacific for the foreseeable future, acting in concert with our South Pacific neighbours. A weak or unstable South Pacific region poses demographic, economic, criminal, and reputational risks to New Zealand. Active and stabilising involvement by New Zealand in the region, and our readiness to respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises, is something which New Zealanders and the wider international community expect. It will remain in our interests for Pacific Island states to view New Zealand as a trusted member and friend of the Pacific community.22

New Zealand also has a strong economic interest in the South Pacific. Its merchandize exports to the 14 PICs have grown by an average of 5.3 percent per year since 2000. They were valued at NZ$820.3 million in 2009, representing 2.1 percent of New Zealand’s total merchandize exports. Major commodities exported include sheep meat, iron, oil (noncrude), medicine, timber, milk, and butter. Imports from the 14 PICs have fluctuated over the past decade, but fell by NZ$97.4 million (46.4 percent) in 2009 due to reduced oil imports. Even so, New Zealand merchandize imports from the 14 PICs in 2009 were valued at NZ$112.6 million. In addition to merchandize trade, a number of the PICs are significant exporters of services to New Zealand, principally through tourism with around 144,000 New Zealanders holidaying in the Pacific every year.23 In addition to taking care of the external security of several PICs and playing roles as intermediaries and peacekeepers in the region, Australia and New Zealand also pay attention to the potential security impacts of issues like changing climate patterns, resource and energy security, and persistent patterns of poverty and poor governance.24 The two metropolitan powers in the region provide the bulk of funding to the 14 PICs for such nontraditional security issues.25

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A key indication of Australia and New Zealand’s commitment to and influence in the region is the two countries’ membership in various regional organizations. Despite China’s growing presence in the region, it is still a relatively minor player in the region’s institutions compared Table 6.1 Membership of Some Major Regional Institutions in the South Pacific Organization Pacific Community University of the South Pacific Pacific Islands Forum South Pacific Applied Geosciences Commission (Pacific Islands) Forum Fisheries Agency Pacific Islands Development Program South Pacific Board for Education Assessment Pacific Regional Environment Program South Pacific Tourism Organization Pacific Islands Trade & Invest** Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Pacific Aviation Safety Office South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization

Year Members Australia New United China Established Zealand States 1947 1968

26 12

√

√

√

1971 1972

16 21

√ √

√ √

*

1979

17

√

√

1980

20

1980

11

√

√

1982

25

√

√

1986

15

1988

14

2004

25***

√

√

√

2005

13

√

√

****

2009

10*****

√

√

√

*

√ √

√

√

* The United States and China are dialogue partners of the Pacific Islands Forum, which means they meet with members afterward at a Ministerial level. ** Known as the South Pacific Trade and Investment Commission before August 2010. It is an arm of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Its office in New Zealand is fully funded by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *** Plus 7 participating territories and 9 cooperating non-members **** The U.S. Federal Aviation Agency is an associate member. ***** The United States is not a signatory to the Convention on the Conservation and Management of the High Seas Fishery Resources of the South Pacific Ocean but participated in the international meetings on the establishment of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization. The organization’s website lists the United States along with other 9 signatories. (accessed on March 8, 2011.)

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to the long-dominant Western powers (see Table 6.1). In the region’s predominant body, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), New Zealand, and Australia are both members but China is not included. Instead, China is a “dialogue partner” to the Post-Pacific Islands Forum, which meets immediately after the Forum itself and is conducted at ministerial level. In another major regional institution, the Pacific Community, New Zealand, Australia, France, and the United States are members while China is not included.

Concerns over Chinese Involvement Australia and New Zealand have historically been sensitive to the involvement of external players. As noted in Chapter 2, the two metropolitan powers resented French nuclear tests in the region and were alarmed by Soviet attempts to strengthen its relations with some of the regional governments in the Cold War years. Today, while welcoming the involvement of external players, Australia and New Zealand are concerned that these external players may pursue their own interests at the expense of the PICs. Winston Peters made it clear that “While New Zealand firmly believes that dynamic partnerships are a key to the region’s future prosperity and security, we must also ask ourselves the question: ‘what defines the quality of external engagement in the region?’ ”26 As mentioned in Chapter 1, China’s growing involvement in the South Pacific has caused concerns. Most of these concerns have originated in Australia and New Zealand. They should be understood in the context of the evolving regional order that is characterized by the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the waning of European and American influence, the possible rise of Japan’s influence and, most importantly, China’s rapidly growing influence. While Australia and New Zealand have remained committed to the region, its influence is challenged by the PICs’ “Look North” policy. Very often, such policies resulted from Australian and New Zealand governments’ emphasis on political issues such as good governance, human rights, and democratic values. “The first marked jolt” was Fiji’s decision to strengthen diplomatic and economic relations with Asian countries, including Japan, Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and China, due to the reaction of Australia and New Zealand to Fiji’s 1987 coups. In the following year, the PNG prime minister announced PNG’s “Look North” policy after a quarrel with Australia over aid. The two countries reiterated and consolidated their “Look North” policy in the following years although not necessarily toward China. Later on, Solomon Islands politicians advocated closer relations with Asia after an

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Australian official document alleged corruption in the Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands government announced its “Look North” policy in 2006, following another disagreement over Australia’s alleged interference in its internal affairs.27 Chinese involvement can be a strategic concern to the two countries as the region is in their sphere of immediate strategic interest.28 Roger Baker, an analyst with the Texas-based private intelligence group Stratfor, believes that China wants naval access to the South Pacific and that Australian fears of increasing Chinese influence are prompting it to increase its own influence with the countries on its periphery, PNG, and the Solomon Islands. 29 On the other hand, leaked diplomatic cables from the U.S. Embassy in Wellington show that links by Chinese military to Pacific countries were a growing concern for New Zealand. It was noted in 2006 that the Chinese military gave substantially more aid to defense forces in Fiji and in Tonga than New Zealand did and that China had links to paramilitary forces in Vanuatu. According to a senior New Zealand defense official, Chinese military’s activities in the Pacific Islands “pose real security problems for New Zealand.”30 Therefore, a military aid package with PNG from China in mid-2008 raised eyebrows. The package reportedly includes the military refurbishment of the Defence Force Headquarters and military studies courses in China for PNG officers for periods of up to three years.31 Historically PNG soldiers had received supplementary training from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.32 The diplomatic competition between mainland China and Taiwan has drawn the attention, and annoyance, of Australia and New Zealand. In May 2005, the then Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer stated that “we . . . don’t like to see an unseemly competition within the South Pacific between China and Taiwan over recognition. It obviously doesn’t contribute to the stability of the region, so we’d rather not see that.”33 Similarly, Peters said in August 2006 that “New Zealand encourages external partners to respect the critical local development and security needs of the region and not overwhelm these in pursuit of their own external agendas.”34 As discussed in Chapter 5, China’s involvement in Fiji in particular has been a major concern to some observers. The “un-conditionality” of Chinese aid impedes the efforts of some Western donors, particularly Australia and New Zealand, to improve governance standards in Fiji. Similar concerns apply to Chinese aid to other PICs. A study by the Lowy Institute in Australia suggests that some aid is given in a way that often undermines Australia’s interests. The report asks: “How can Australia ensure that China’s aid program in the Pacific complements rather than undercuts our own efforts?” Such concerns are related to

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Australia’s concerns over the “arc of instability”—spanning from the North of Australia, from the Southwest Pacific throughout the archipelagic Southeast Asia. There is continuing instability in East Timor, West Papua, Bougainville, and the Solomon Islands.35 The Australian Defence White Paper 2009 states that there are “fragile and vulnerable nations, particularly in our region . . . such nations may struggle to meet the demands of their citizens, and may be easier targets for foreign influence in ways that might be unfavourable to long-term strategic stability.”36 The White Paper notes that it is of strategic importance that “no major military power that could challenge our control of the air and sea approaches to Australia has access to bases in our neighbourhood from which to project force against us.”37 New Zealand is smaller and more vulnerable to global processes and, therefore, in the words of Foreign Minister Murray McCully, “more dependent than most upon strong, honest international organisations and clear principled rules of behaviour.”38 McCully was commenting on the suggestions that New Zealand should be indifferent to human rights and other political issues in the South Pacific, such as military coups in Fiji. China’s support for and growing influence in Fiji is thus a concern to New Zealand. New Zealand’s concerns are exacerbated by the difficulty of having an effective aid program. In 2008, Peters spoke contemptuously of those who might take its place if New Zealand failed to sustain its aid effort: There is nothing easy about delivering an effective aid program. It is tough and there may be failures, mistakes and frustrations. But the alternative is to do nothing, and allow others to quickly and perversely fill the void. The consequences would be unknown but most likely seriously adverse to our neighbourhood, and to our own national interests.39

Canberra and Wellington are also concerned that there may be a popular shift in allegiances from Australia and New Zealand to China. “We are very impressed by the way China furthers its cooperative relations with the South Pacific region, and we are grateful for what China has done to enhance development of the Pacific island states,” said Greg Urwin, the then secretarygeneral of the PIF, to Chinese media in October 2005.40 PIC leaders tend to agree. After Premier PICs that recognized China, and . . . Wen’s summit with the leaders of the PICs that recognized China, and the signing of the 3 billion yuan development assistance package in April 2006, Fiji’s Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase said the summit reflected the shifting patterns of diplomacy and political alignments in the Pacific. “China defines a new and compelling reality politically and economically,” Qarase claimed.41

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As illustrated in Chapter 4, until recent years, the Beijing-Taipei diplomatic rivalry was a major concern for both Australia and New Zealand. Some believe this rivalry was destabilizing the already weak and unstable governments, and feeding the already endemic corruption in the region. They see the Solomon Islands as a good example. The region, led by Australia, made expensive and difficult efforts to enhance security and development in the Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands tried to play off the two Chinas in 2000, but stayed with Taiwan in exchange for more aid. This meant that the 2003 intervention by Australia would not have been able to get United Nations approval due to the likely Chinese veto in the Security Council. The rivalry also triggered off the riots in 2006. Anthony van Fossen argues that in fact Beijing and Taipei are only “renting” friends in the Pacific Islands, as PICs may switch allegiances.42 The long-term interest of Pacific states, and Australia, may not be sufficiently met in these circumstances. Some are also concerned that China may interfere in the internal affairs of the PICs to ensure or advance its economic interests. The opening of the Chinese-owned Ramu nickel mine in PNG is one of the biggest offshore mining developments undertaken by a Chinese company. One observer notes that for Australia, the biggest concern is whether China will interfere in the internal affairs of PNG to safeguard its investment.43 Increasing crime is a significant concern in several PICs and some crimes are said to be associated with Chinese immigrants or business interests. Reports abound of passport scams, people smuggling, and the threats posed by Chinese gangs. Considering Australia’s efforts to combat crime in the region, crime is becoming a major concern for Canberra.44 In New Zealand, a leaked February 2006 cable said that then prime minister Helen Clark was increasingly concerned about “unofficial” Chinese activity in the region, such as rising Chinese criminal activity in PNG. She even worried that the perpetrators might have links with some officials in the Chinese government.45

Interactions with China: Chinese Interests in Australia and New Zealand China’s growing influence in the region may have prompted Australia and New Zealand to increase their aid to the region. In the decade or so since 1988, the proportion of Australia’s gross domestic product (GDP) devoted to foreign aid dropped from 0.41 percent to 0.22 percent. From 2004, however, Australia more than doubled its aid to the PICs. It is believed that its concern about the role of China and Indonesia was a big

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factor in Australia’s increased aid. Similarly, New Zealand’s aid fell from a high of 0.50 percent of its GDP to 0.22 percent, but rose in 2006 to 0.28 percent due to security concerns in the region.46 Meanwhile, Australia and New Zealand have been trying to influence China’s aid policy. Ron Crocombe has observed that “aid from any country is shaped not only by recipients’ and donors’ needs, but also by deals between large external partners on other criteria.”47 He notes that Japan has coordinated its aid to the PICs with Australia since 1985. Further, in 2006, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand decided to coordinate aid to these countries more closely. Crocombe is of the view that the main motive is these countries’ common security interests, especially vis-àvis China.48 In August 2009, the Fortieth Pacific Islands Forum leaders passed the Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development Coordination in the Pacific. The objective of the Compact is “to drive more effective coordination of available development resources from both Forum Island Countries and all development partners, centred on the aim of achieving real progress against the MDGs [the Millennium Development Goals].”49Australia and New Zealand were the key driving force behind the Compact and have been hoping that China will become part of the processes of strengthening donor coordination in the region.50 Publicly, however, both Australia and New Zealand have been restrained in voicing their concerns. According to Fergus Hanson, Australia’s response to China’s increasing involvement in the South Pacific has been “measured.” While officials are concerned about China’s no-strings-attached aid, it is also perceived that Chinese interests in the region “broadly align with Australia’s,” such as the common interest in continued regional stability.51 An official statement from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade reads: The Government regards it as imperative that we deepen our discussion with our Pacific island neighbours—and other partners such as China—of trade and economic cooperation. This holds a key to delivering better prospects for genuine, stable and long-term growth in the Pacific. Australia welcomes the increasingly important role China is playing in the Pacific. China’s economic engagement presents opportunities for Pacific island countries, including expanded trade opportunities and improved links with the global economy.52

Australia has ongoing dialogues with China on the importance of transparency and accountability in aid delivery to PICs.53 In September 2008, Australian foreign minister Stephen Smith travelled to China to represent Australia at the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development

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and Cooperation Forum on September 7–10. In addition to addressing the Forum, Smith undertook bilateral discussions with Pacific island representatives and met China’s Assistant Commerce Minister Wang Chao.54 An excerpt from a 2009 China-Australia Joint Statement reads: “Both sides acknowledged the importance of enhanced dialogue and coordination on matters concerning PICs and the key role of the Pacific Islands Forum.55 On the Fiji issue, Smith urged China to back Australia’s efforts to return Fiji to a democracy.”56 New Zealand’s responses have been similar. In May 2007, Foreign Minister Winston Peters met with Chinese premier Wen Jiabao and they pledged to engage in the Pacific in a cooperative manner.57 In his visit to China in April 2009, Prime Minister John Key also expressed New Zealand’s concerns about Chinese policy toward Fiji. Beijing has made an effort to reduce the concerns of both Australia and New Zealand. China’s ambassador to New Zealand said in 2006 that on development issues in Oceania, “we want to work together with New Zealand, with Australia, consistent with the Pacific Plan.”58 China has also started its consultations with New Zealand on the Pacific. In his visit to New Zealand in the first round of consultations in July 2006, China’s Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei said that China was willing to coordinate aid efforts on a policy level with New Zealand.59 In terms of China’s military aid to the region, some argue that China has actually been cautious and restrained.60 All this by no means suggests that cooperation and coordination from China is readily available. After all, Beijing’s interests in the region can be different from those of Australia and New Zealand. In defending its policy toward Fiji, Beijing claims that “we have always respected Fiji’s status as an independent nation and we have called on the other countries to do the same and reconsider their attitudes towards Fiji and the current situation in the country.”61 Beijing has also decided not to sign up to the Cairns Compact, arguing that “we feel it is unnecessary to accept this multilateral co-ordination mechanism, but we need time to study it.”62 A senior Chinese diplomat explained that China preferred bilateral to multilateral negotiations.63 Nevertheless, while remaining independent in its policy toward the South Pacific, China has a strong interest in cooperating with Australia and New Zealand on regional issues. This is determined by Chinese weaknesses, the traditional influence of Australia and New Zealand, and Chinese interest in both Australia and New Zealand. As mentioned above, many governments in the region welcome China’s involvement in the South Pacific. These governments have adopted the “Look North” policy. What they are looking at, however, are the carrots

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such as interest-free, no-strings-attached, open-ended style of financial support, major projects and red-carpet, expense-paid visits to Beijing. China’s aid is appreciated in that “aid is often essential to survival” and China offers an alternative to traditional aid donors such as Australia and New Zealand.64 Though China’s influence has subsequently increased, its “soft power” remains weak.65 By definition, soft power is different from influence. Influence can be achieved by various means, including force and bribery. In contrast, according to Joseph Nye who coined the term, soft power is “when you can get others to admire your ideals and to want what you want,” and, therefore, “you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction.”66 Thus soft power is related to how a country is seen in the world as a model to emulate or follow. One weakness of China’s soft power lies in the weak linkage between the South Pacific and Asia in terms of ideas and information. In his 624-page book on how Asia is “replacing the West” in the South Pacific, Crocombe acknowledges that [l]ong after the tides of population, trade and investment turn in favour of Asia, Western influences are likely to remain in other aspects of life because of [the] English language, Christian religion, and Western-derived education, entertainment and organization . . . Pacific Islands schools, radio and television do not teach nearly enough about Asia in view of the level of interaction. Asians learn even less about the Islands, and incentives for them to do so are few.67

More importantly, China has major image problems in the region. First, ideological and cultural differences still exist between the South Pacific and China. The Pacific island nations’ strong Christian traditions meant that during the Cold War the island countries implicitly formed part of the Western association of nations. Stephen Henningham notes that “strong Christian traditions encourage firm anti-Communism.”68 In the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the U.S.-led West during the Cold War years, the PICs did not play the “Soviet card” frequently and when they did they expressed “a clear preference” for Western assistance.69 Stephen Hoadley noted in 1992 that in the island countries “there is a general acceptance of the Anglo-American and French ideals of respect for human rights and civil liberties.”70 Van Fossen wrote in 2007: There is a growing, but still subdued, disquiet in Oceania over the PRC’s human rights abuses, oppression of the indigenous Tibetans, absence of political democracy, and its argument (expressed outside the region) that

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it deserves recognition because it is a macrostate while Taiwan is, relatively speaking, an Island microstate.71

Second, Chinese nationals and immigrants are doing much damage to China’s image. In 2002, Fiji’s commissioner of police stated publicly that Asian (almost all Chinese) organized crime in Fiji was “out of control.” 72 In 2006, Fiji’s former ambassador to China observed that “unfortunately, it still remains a tendency for Pacific island nations to look at China as a country that produces criminals.” 73 His successor echoed this view in 2007.74 It is observed that the recent influx of Chinese immigrants is resented by local islanders because they compete with locals for jobs and are seen as corrupting local officials and politicians.75 Resentment against ethnic Chinese businesses is another problem. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, released in July 2007, states that “the ethnic-Chinese economic presence, while often welcomed by PIN [Pacific island nations] governments, has engendered some resentment among indigenous peoples.”76 Moreover, the CRS report points out that “in some cases, public anger against the national government has spilled over into anti-ethnic Chinese activity.”77 Such resentment seems rather common in the region. As is discussed in the next chapter, riots targeting Chinese businesses broke out in the Solomon Islands and Tonga in April and November 2006, respectively. Some say that these riots are “the tip of the Pacific iceberg.”78 On top of these three image problems, there is the perception among Pacific Islanders that Chinese government money is used to influence local politicians. During the Solomon Islands’ riots in April 2006, the Chinese were targeted because of the belief that Asian bribes had bought the prime ministership for Snyder Rini. It was said that Taipei was involved in the deal. However, Joel Atkinson argues that “although the possibility that Taiwan bribed Members of Parliament to support Rini cannot be ruled out, no evidence has emerged linking Taiwan to Rini’s election, and the simplest explanation is that the cash inducements came wholly from locally based businessmen.”79 Nevertheless, the widespread public perception was that “Asian—especially Chinese—businessmen bribed members of parliament into supporting Rini and the ‘old guard’ who served their interests.”80 The public paid little attention to the difference between the Taiwanese and the mainland Chinese. Beijing is aware of the problems caused by new Chinese immigrants and criminal gangs. However, as explained by James To, Beijing faces many challenges in dealing with the overseas Chinese problems, 81 and China’s image in the region is unlikely to improve substantially in the

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near future. With Australia and New Zealand deeply committed to the region, Beijing’s policy options in the South Pacific are limited. China has a big stake in the good relationship with both Australia and New Zealand. As discussed in Chapter 4, a good relationship with Australia and New Zealand is crucial to Beijing’s diplomatic rivalry with Taipei. Although both Australia and New Zealand are “firmly in China’s corner” in the Beijing-Taipei diplomatic rivalry,82 a positive image of China would help to sideline politicians who question the one-China policy. More importantly, as noted by Anne-Marie Brady and John Henderson, China expects New Zealand and Australia to discourage the PICs from granting diplomatic recognition to Taiwan.83 There are examples of Australia and New Zealand assisting China in this respect. A good example is the active role that Australia played in helping Beijing to foil Taipei’s attempt to win PNG’s diplomatic recognition in July 1999. Hoping to survive a series of political difficulties, PNG prime minister Bill Skate negotiated a confidential deal with Taiwan. Taiwan would provide US$2.35 billion of aid, soft loans, and investment in timber and fishing in return for PNG’s diplomatic recognition. The deal was signed in Taipei on July 5, 1999. Canberra reacted quickly and Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer flew to Beijing to communicate with the Chinese. Canberra subsequently pressured Port Moresby to rescind the deal. Skate resigned as prime minister on July 7 before a no-confidence vote in PNG’s parliament. The new prime minister, Mekere Morauta, quickly rescinded the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Both Canberra and Beijing soon pledged further aid to PNG.84 Reportedly, Australia also imposed pressure on Kiribati president Anote Tong when he decided to recognize Taipei in November 2003 and on Vanuatu when Vanuatu’s Prime Minister Serge Vohor made an unsuccessful attempt to switch Vanuatu’s recognition from Beijing to Taipei in November 2004.85 More broadly, given the strong soft power of Australia and New Zealand in the South Pacific, how the two countries characterize China’s behavior may influence some island states’ perceptions of China. More importantly, the two countries, especially Australia, play an important role in China’s security strategy. Australia is a close ally of the United States. John Howard was once alleged to have said that Australia could be America’s “deputy sheriff in the Pacific.”86 Alan Dupont notes that China sees Australia “as a country which has the ear of the United States, is an influential player in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific and is a natural trading partner and provider of the energy resources China needs for its long term development.”87 Of great interest to China is the fact that Canberra attempted to position itself neutrally in the event of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan.

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On August 17, 2004, after meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao in Beijing, Alexander Downer commented that under the Australia-New ZealandUnited States (ANZUS) alliance Australia might not automatically have to support the United States in a conflict with China over Taiwan. Canberra later backtracked when Howard said that “we have to consult and come to each other’s aid when we’re under attack or involved in conflict. That’s the situation.”88 Nevertheless, it is clear that Australia deems it detrimental to its national interest to be involved in a military conflict with China over Taiwan. Beijing is aware that blunt attempts to increase its hard power, particularly its military power, in Australia’s sphere of influence will have the effect of pushing Australia closer to the United States. New Zealand, although a small power globally, has got China’s attention and, to a considerable extent, admiration for its independent foreign policy. As the first developed country to recognize China’s market economy status and the first developed country to conclude talks on China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, New Zealand was rewarded as the first developed country to start free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations with China and the first developed country to sign an FTA deal with China in April 2008. New Zealand’s relations with China were so close that a senior U.S. official expressed his concern. In his visit to New Zealand in April 2008, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Christensen observed that “some genuine Chinese warfighters”—not just “the respectable faces” Beijing deployed to Western countries—visited New Zealand. New Zealand explained that China used Australia and New Zealand as a “testing ground” for such visits.89 The strategic value of Australia and New Zealand would increase if we add Japan to the equation. While it is in their common interest to deepen their mutual understanding, China and Japan still have little trust in each other. The two giants are believed to have engaged in a strategic competition in East Asia. Australia and New Zealand can play an important role in such a competition. It was Japan that advocated membership of the East Asia Summit for Australia and New Zealand to balance Chinese influence in the forum as the two countries are closer to Japan in terms of values.90 Japan also strengthened its security cooperation with Australia by signing a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March 2007. The security pact is widely believed to target China.

Conclusion As the two metropolitan powers in the region, Australia and New Zealand have multiple interests in the region and have historically been key players

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in regional affairs. Despite the dramatic changes in world politics, the two countries have largely remained committed to the region. Nevertheless, their commitment can be influenced by the involvement of external powers. Historically, both France and the Soviet Union caused concern in Canberra and Wellington and thus were important factors for the two regional powers to increase their aid for and contact with the region. Today, China’s involvement has also generated some uncertainties and concerns, which is likely to result in the increasing interest of other great powers in the region. Consequently, Australia and New Zealand will find it necessary to maintain close attention to the region. The concerns of Australia and New Zealand over China’s growing involvement in the region should be put in perspective. China’s influence in the region is not deep-rooted. China has serious image problems in the region that compromise its influence to a considerable extent. The success of its diplomacy in the South Pacific also needs the goodwill of Australia and New Zealand. Although they are rapidly deepening their economic relations with China, both Australia and New Zealand maintain a close relationship with the United States. Also, it can be argued that Australia and New Zealand are more important than the South Pacific to China. To advance China’s interests in the region without respecting the two influential regional players’ interests would be detrimental to China’s key foreign policy goal of the past two or three decades, that is, to create a peaceful external environment that is conducive to China’s economic development.

SEVEN

China’s World Wide Web: Overseas Chinese in the South Pacific

O

verseas Chinese are living in “virtually every country of the world.”1Academic studies have put the number of ethnic Chinese living outside Greater China (mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) at 35–39 million, 2 an increase from around 22 million in 1985, and from 12.7 million in the early 1960s.3 According to the Chinese government, the number is much higher. Ma Peiru, Chinese vice minister of Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, said in February 2011 that there were about 50 million overseas Chinese (haiwai huaqiao huaren) and about 30 million returned overseas Chinese and close relatives of overseas Chinese (guiqiao qiaojuan) in China.4 Ma emphasized that overseas Chinese are an important force and the numbers reflected the resources and advantages unique to China.5 Indeed, overseas Chinese have played an important role in Chinese foreign policy and remain an important force in China’s grand strategy. This chapter first introduces the position of overseas Chinese in China’s grand strategy. It then examines the economic and political relations between China and overseas Chinese in the South Pacific. The final section of the chapter discusses the problems of overseas Chinese in the region and their implications for Chinese policy.

Overseas Chinese in China’s Grand Strategy Before we begin our discussion, it is necessary to clarify three concepts: overseas Chinese, Chinese overseas, and the Chinese diaspora. The Chinese government has divided the Chinese living outside Greater China

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into two main categories, huaqiao and huaren. The former is translated into overseas Chinese and refers to Chinese citizens temporarily residing outside of Greater China. The English translation of huaren is Chinese overseas and it refers to the ethnic Chinese who are living outside of Greater China and are no longer Chinese citizens. The word diaspora is used to refer to the population of Jews exiled from Israel in early history. It is, therefore, argued that “the historically loaded meaning of the word ‘diaspora’ does not fit the Chinese experience.”6 However, it is still common to use “Chinese diaspora.” The Chinese government uses overseas Chinese to refer to people of Chinese ethnicities who live outside Greater China, regardless of citizenship. As a matter of convenience, this book adopts the Chinese government’s concept and uses overseas Chinese as a general reference to both “Chinese overseas” and “overseas Chinese.” Although Chinese international migrations can be traced back to almost 2,000 years ago,7 it was in the nineteenth century that largescale Chinese international migrations began. Observers have identified three “distinctive periods” in Chinese emigration history. From the early nineteenth century to 1949, when China experienced internal chaos and external invasion, an increasing number of Chinese, predominantly from Guangdong and Fujian provinces in South China, left for Southeast Asia as laborers, traders, and farmers. From the 1950s to the early 1990s, amid continuous political instability in the region, a large number of ethnic Chinese left Greater China and Southeast Asia for North America, Europe, and Oceania. The third wave, which has taken place since the 1990s, is a result of technological, economic, and immigration policy changes in Western societies. What should be emphasized is that as a result of the third wave, new emigrants from mainland China have begun to occupy a dominant position in the overseas Chinese population.8 Zhuang Guotu argues that the new Chinese immigrants are different from the old Chinese immigrants in at least three aspects. First, the new immigrants are better educated than old immigrants. Second, they are no longer the poor people from a poor country. They, especially those from Hong Kong and Taiwan, have become a formidable economic force domestically, regionally, and even globally. It is well known that ethnic Chinese played a crucial role in Southeast Asia for over 600 years. However, it was not until after the late 1970s that the wealth of ethnic Chinese increased rapidly. According to an estimate of the World Bank, the output of overseas Chinese enterprises increased from US$400 billion in 1991 to US$600 billion in 1996.9 Writing in 2001, Zhuang also noted that ethnic Chinese dominated Southeast Asian economies: 80 percent of enterprise assets in Indonesia; 90 percent of Thai manufacturing; 50 percent of Thai service industry. Out of 1,000 large-scale enterprises in

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the Philippines, one-third of them were controlled by ethnic Chinese; ethnic Chinese controlled 60 percent of Malaysia’s capital market.10 Finally, the new immigrants maintain “unprecedentedly close” relations with China.11 The relationship between China and the overseas Chinese has been well studied.12 The Qing Empire initially condemned the emigrants as “traitors.” In the 1870s, in an effort to “bolster the prestige of the empire,” the imperial government started to establish diplomatic representation and extend official protection to overseas Chinese.13 Later on, overseas Chinese became “a fruitful source of financial contributions and loyalty.”14 Overseas Chinese nationalism did not emerge until the turn of the twentieth century when China experienced wars and revolution. It was a dream shared by overseas Chinese to have a strong and sovereign China.15 In the process, they began to “reconceptualize their understandings of home, culture, loyalty, and self within the terms set by those nations and borders.”16Adam McKeown has observed: Home was no longer just a village where the family altar was located, a central node in a chain of relationships. It was part of a much larger entity, a motherland, which included strangers who spoke unintelligible dialects and, yet, if nationalist propaganda were to be believed, were inalienably linked to each other and to China by virtue of race, culture, history, and affection.17

The anti-American boycott of 1905 is an early example of overseas Chinese nationalism. Overseas Chinese resented and felt humiliated by the American exclusion laws that singled out the Chinese from other nationalities and were unilaterally imposed despite treaty agreements. It is noted that “much of the boycott revolved around protecting the international honor of China as something more than a land of uneducated laborers.”18 Overseas Chinese nationalism reached a new level in the 1911 Revolution, which ended China’s last dynasty and was the first attempt to establish a republic in China. Overseas Chinese nationalism further developed and reached the zenith in China’s struggle against Japanese invasion from 1931 to 1945.19 Overseas Chinese nationalism has always been linked to the status of overseas Chinese themselves. McKeown points out, rightly: What all of these nationalisms had in common was their conviction that the experience and status of Chinese abroad was a direct result of the status of China within the international system. If Chinese people were bullied

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locally, that was because China received no respect internationally. To be Chinese, anywhere in the world, was to be a representative of the motherland, to have a state in the future of China, and to recognize the claims of China and Chinese culture over their loyalty.20

Sheng Ding has observed that overseas Chinese nationalism has had much to do with the overseas Chinese “sojourner mentality” and their lack of “a sense of permanence in their adopted countries.”21 He further notes that “Chinese ethnic identity seems to be growing stronger as certain attributes of the Westphalian state system fall away.”22 This is related to the rise of China. Ding argues that “as China strengthens its international status . . . it is reasonable to expect more Chinese diasporas to re-embrace their ethnic identities and seek to build even tighter bonds with their ethnic homeland.”23 This is particularly the case for the new generation of Chinese immigrants from mainland China. While they are making efforts to integrate themselves into the local mainstream societies, “they struggle for cultural autonomy and try to maintain their close connections with the Chinese nation.”24 The revival of overseas Chinese nationalism among new Chinese immigrants has three “key agendas”: China’s economic prosperity, cultural regeneration, and national unification. “It is widely held by the new migrants that while overseas Chinese could contribute to these agendas, they too would benefit significantly from the realization of these goals,” according to Ding.25 The Chinese government has also changed its policy toward overseas Chinese since the late 1970s when it started its opening up and economic reforms. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) policy toward overseas Chinese experienced four phases. In its first phase (1950–1955), Beijing treated overseas Chinese, including Chinese overseas, as part of Chinese population and committed itself to their protection. In return, overseas Chinese should be loyal to the newly established government in their motherland China. The policy strained China’s relations with its neighboring countries. Beijing then changed its policy from 1955 to 1966. It promoted the “diplomacy—overseas Chinese affairs” principle, which put diplomacy ahead of overseas Chinese affairs. A major change was the abolishment of the dual citizenship for Chinese overseas. It encouraged overseas China to become citizens of their residential countries and to discontinue their political and legal relations with China. The third phase of Chinese policy toward overseas Chinese (1966–1976) overlaps with China’s Great Cultural Revolution. During this period, internally Beijing was hostile to overseas Chinese who had returned to China and to the relatives of overseas Chinese. Externally, Beijing actively encouraged and supported Communist movements among overseas Chinese

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in Southeast Asia. This resulted in serious deterioration of China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries. China’s opening up and economic reforms marked the beginning of the latest phase of its policy toward overseas Chinese. During this period, Beijing again befriended overseas Chinese while at the same time encouraging them to integrate with local communities and become citizens of their adopted countries. Beijing’s new policy has called upon overseas Chinese to “serve the country from abroad” (weiguo fuwu) instead of asking them to “return and serve the country” (huiguo fuwu). Beijing also terminated its support for the Communist movements in Southeast Asia in its effort to normalize its relations with these countries.26 Beijing has had four main expectations for overseas Chinese since 1978. They are to actively participate in Chinese modernization, to actively promote the reunification of the Chinese nation, to actively spread Chinese civilization, and to actively promote the friendship between China and the people all over the world.27 These aspects are closely related to China’s grand strategy, and overseas Chinese have proved particularly important in the first two areas. From the late 1970s to the end of 2005, foreign direct investment (FDI) in China amounted to US$622.4 billion with 67 percent coming from businesses owned or dominated by ethnic Chinese.28 In terms of national reunification, there has been a strong movement against Taiwan’s independence in overseas Chinese communities. In 1991, the very first Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China was established in Brazil. Since then, over 170 similar councils have been established in over 80 countries.29 Overseas Chinese organizations are numerous. According to a Taiwanese survey, the number of major overseas Chinese organizations of various functions increased from 4,847 in 1950 to 9,093 in 1991.30 Another survey found that there were 9,255 Chinese organizations in 1996.31 These figures vastly underestimated the real number of overseas Chinese organizations in those years. For instance, according to the registration records of the Malaysian government, there were 3,268 Chinese organizations in Malaysia in 1969, 3,582 in 1975, and 5,762 in 1993. By June 2001, the number had increased to 7,276.32 There has been an increase not only of overseas Chinese organizations, but also of a trend of alliance, regionalization, and globalization among these organizations. According to an incomplete survey, by the end of the 1990s there were over 70 world-level Chinese organizations with 70 percent of them being established after the 1980s.33 Another survey suggests that by the mid-1990s, the number of world-level Chinese organizations had surpassed 100. Most of these organizations are based on kinship, hometown, or profession.34 On January 24, 2001, the World

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Federation of Overseas Chinese Associations was established in Hong Kong.35 It was endorsed by both the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the central government of the PRC. The networks of numerous Chinese organizations have formed a World Wide Web. This Web has played a crucial role in strengthening the Chinese identity of overseas Chinese and in facilitating their commercial activities. For the Chinese government, the Web has been helpful in mobilizing overseas Chinese to serve China’s economic and political interests. It is observed that the two entities, China and the Chinese diaspora, are mutually reinforcing each other. The de facto recognition by the Chinese authorities of the diaspora as an autonomous entity having a life of its own shows that they do not regard the latter as a sort of “China outside China.” More pragmatically, China views it as a privileged partner—the most privileged—in serving the interests of China. This will enhance the standing of the diaspora; it is now seen less as an extension of China than as a transnational socialeconomic entity.36

It is a fair observation that Beijing does not see overseas Chinese as “China outside China.” There are exceptions, however. The most prominent example is on the Taiwan issue. In 1988, at the behest of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing set up the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification (CCPPU).37According to the official website of the CCPPU, by June 2008, a total of 131 Councils for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China had been set up in various parts of the world, including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (6), Asia (10), Europe (29), North America (20), South America (24), Africa (23), and Oceania (19).38 These councils are basically branches of the CCPPU with many council chairpersons among the China Council’s 394 council members (elected in September 2009).39 Indeed, the Chinese government, through its overseas representatives, has been deeply involved in the formation and the activities of the councils. It has been supportive of high-profile “oppose independence, support reunification” meetings organized by the councils in various countries. Taiwan’s former foreign minister Tien Hung-mao noted in 2001 that “they [Beijing] are going all-out to rally the Overseas Chinese community.”40 The growth of overseas Chinese and their close connections have become a concern of some observers. One observer argues that “intentionally or not, the large-scale migration of its people is reinforcing China’s emergence as a big—and global—power.”41 A concern is that if the Chinese begin to outnumber the native population in a country,

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“it will inevitably lead to entirely new ethnic, social and political structures in those territories.”42 Such concern should be put in perspective. While China has benefited economically and, arguably, politically from overseas China, not a single country has become a Chinese ally because of the influence of ethnic Chinese in that country. There are cases that suggest the opposite, namely a country distances itself from China because of their concerns about the ethnic Chinese within, such as Indonesia and Malaysia before the 1990s. The two countries have since moved closer to China, which can hardly be attributed to ethnic Chinese whose political influence is still limited. Singapore is the only country, other than China, where ethnic Chinese are a majority. Yet Singapore did not have a normal diplomatic relationship with China until 1992. While it is encouraging its people to learn Chinese so that Singapore is able to take advantage of China’s rise, Singapore remains closer to the United States than China in terms of security cooperation.

Overseas Chinese in the South Pacific: Economic and Political Roles in China’s Grand Strategy Bertil Lintner observed in 2007 that the South Pacific “is becoming one of three areas of the world where Chinese influence is spreading so rapidly that it may soon make not only an economic but also a significant demographic difference.”43 The other two areas were the Russian Far East and contiguous parts of Southeast Asia. Lintner emphasized that “there are bigger geostrategic stakes in the Pacific. While the United States was focused on conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, China was making substantial human inroads into a region that has long been regarded as America’s sphere of influence.”44 Citing other observers, Lintner further claimed that “as more and more Chinese migrants settle into the region and contribute to changing the region’s ethnic demographics, the Pacific is steadily becoming a Chinese sphere of influence.”45 Lintner seems to suggest that Beijing has a calculated strategy of encouraging Chinese citizens to emigrate to the South Pacific with an attempt to increase Chinese influence and power there. Though Beijing has realized the value of overseas Chinese, there is not enough evidence to support Lintner’s suggestion. As discussed earlier, the PRC’s door was closed most of the time from 1949 to the late 1970s. It has changed its policy since then as part of its opening-up and economic reforms. Furthermore, in the 1980s and 1990s, Beijing was constantly criticized for restricting emigration. It was a major human rights issue between China and the United States.46 Nevertheless, overseas Chinese in the South Pacific, like

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overseas Chinese in other parts of the world, have played an important role in China’s national development and unification strategy. There is no official figure of overseas Chinese in the South Pacific and the estimates vary widely.47 Table 7.1 is a list of estimated numbers of ethnic Chinese in the Pacific Islands. Zheng Jianmin, deputy director of Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of China’s Guangdong Province, divides overseas Chinese in the South Pacific into three groups. The first group is the old generation immigrants who came from Guangdong Province and their descendants. Most of them are involved in wholesale grocery selling, in running minisupermarkets or restaurants, or in the processing industry. Those who arrived in the past several decades from Southeast Asian countries and Hong Kong or Taiwan make up the second group. These immigrants are mostly in the timber and fishery industries or run large supermarkets and restaurants. The final group consists of the new immigrants from mainland China, particularly from Fujian Province. They often run small grocery

Table 7.1 Ethnic Chinese in the South Pacific (Estimated) Country/Territory American Samoa Cook Islands Federated States of Micronesia Fiji French Polynesia Guam Kiribati Marshall Islands Nauru New Caledonia Niue Northern Marianas Palau Papua New Guinea Samoa Solomon Islands Tokelau Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu Wallis and Futuna Total

Number

National Population

300 40 Over 400 8,000–20,000 14,000 4,000 50 570 n/a 1,000 n/a 13,000 1,150 6000–20,000 100 1,200–3,000 n/a 700 n/a 600–700 50

64,000 14,000 110,000 831,000 260,000 168,000 93,000 56,000 10,000 238,000 1,300 85,000 20,000 6,200,000 185,000 500,000 1,400 100,000 9,600 221,000 15,200

80,000–100,000

9,182,500

Sources: Based on various sources, most importantly Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, pp. 94–97, 484–490.

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stores, restaurants, or are employees (dagong). Although they are small in number, overseas Chinese in the South Pacific have done well economically and generally occupy the middle class.48 For Beijing, overseas Chinese in the South Pacific, like overseas Chinese in other parts of the world, play an important role in China’s national development strategy and national reunification strategy. Economically, the Chinese immigrants are dominating the economy of some Pacific Islands. Ethnic Chinese are believed “the largest investors in the Islands today” and they have taken over wholesaling and retailing in most Pacific island nations.49 Even in Fiji, Chinese immigrants are filling the “commercial vacuum” created by the departure of the Indians due to political uncertainties. “A stroll along Victoria Parade, the main thoroughfare in the capital, Suva, reveals as many shop signs in Chinese as in English, and considerably more than in Hindi,” observed Lintner. 50 Ron Crocombe argues that whether or not the numbers of Chinese are large, their economic and political influence is likely to be great in the region.51 The above observations can be a simplistic generalization of a more complicated reality. Bill Willmott argues that “there is significant disparity in the historical experience and geographical origin between Chinese communities in the Pacific.”52 Wilmott points out that it is impossible to fit all Chinese into a narrow economic niche and it is important for us to note this disparity if we really want to understand the events in the region.53 Nevertheless, overseas Chinese in the South Pacific as a whole are economically influential. Though overseas Chinese in the South Pacific have not played a major role in China’s FDI, with their economic influence and connections with government officials, they are well positioned to help Chinese businesses to “go out” and to strengthen China’s economic relations with the region. In the words of Zheng Jianmin, overseas Chinese in the region have played a “crucial role” (juzuqingzhong de zuoyong) in deepening China’s economic and trade relations with the region. 54 Politically, among the 131 Councils for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China listed on the CCPPU’s website, 4 are in Pacific Islands. They are the Fijian Council (established on December 28, 2003), the Tongan Council (January 18, 2004), Vanuatu Council (March 15, 2004), and the Vanuatu-Santo Council. As noted earlier, the actual number of the councils worldwide is over 170. In Oceania, at least two councils are missing from the CCPPU’s list. They are, however, on the list of the regional Oceanian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China (established on April 23, 2004). These two councils are the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Council and the Solomon Islands Council.55

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As part of a worldwide phenomenon, new immigrants from mainland China (those who left China since the late 1970s) have grown substantially in terms of number and influence in the South Pacific. They are also increasingly important in Beijing’s diplomacy. As discussed earlier, these new immigrants maintain close connections with China and retain a strong Chinese identity. They have become an indispensible medium between motherland China and their adopted countries. The growing influence of the new Chinese immigrants is reflected in the growth of Chinese associations in Fiji. Table 7.2 shows that most of the 20 Chinese organizations in Fiji were established after 1990. These organizations are dominated by the new Chinese immigrants. According to a Chinese community leader, there are actually 23 Chinese organizations that are “recognized” by the Chinese embassy. Among them, the Fijian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China has a special status. The Council has always had a goal of leading and uniting the Chinese organizations in Fiji. They achieved a breakthrough in 2006. All except for three Chinese organizations agreed to affiliate with the Fijian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China. Among the three organizations that declined to affiliate with the Council are the Taiwanese Association of Fiji and the Fiji Association of Chinese Youth—both are based in the Taiwanese community.56 Most chairpersons of these organizations became vice chairpersons of the Fijian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China. As a result, the Council now has over a dozen vice chairpersons. Although these organizations have their own events, they are prepared to participate in the events organized by the Council. The Council itself is no longer narrowly focused on the unification issue. It now organizes events like celebrating the PRC’s National Day and welcoming high-profile Chinese delegations. The Chinese embassy gives financial support for such events. The total number of members of the Chinese organizations is about 500. Nonmembers are welcome to most activities organized by the organizations. The membership of the Taiwanese Association of Fiji is by comparison only about 30.57 The decline of Taiwan’s influence among overseas Chinese in Fiji is highlighted by a change in the well-known Yat Sen Chinese School. Opened in June 1936 as the Fiji Chinese School, 58 the school had always used traditional Chinese as the teaching language. That was changed in 2009 with the school switching from traditional Chinese, which is used in Taiwan, to the simplified Chinese that is used in mainland China.59 Although the school is a property of the Chinese community, it is a public school funded by the Fijian government and open to all races. Taiwan has provided financial support to the school for many years. In January 1986,

Table 7.2 Ethnic Chinese Associations in Fiji Title

Established

Feiji Huaren Jiaoyu Xiehui 1937 (Fiji Chinese Education Association) Feiji Zhonghua Xiehui (Fiji 1955 China Association) Feiji Huaren Xiehui (Fiji 1965 Chinese Association)

Feiji Huaren Qingnianhui (Fiji Association of Chinese Youth) Feiji Taiwan Tongxiang Lianyihui (Taiwan Association of Fiji) Feiji Bacheng Huaren Lianyihui (Ba Chinese Association)

1971

March 3, 1991

Missions Specifically for the management of Chinese schools and classes Nonpolitical, socialization, and cultural exchanges. Peak membership about 600 Political organization for the rights of ethnic Chinese. Ceased to operate in 1987 for 15 years. Revitalized in 1992; membership mainly professionals To promote the Chinese culture among the young generation of the ethnic Chinese and to the wider community Socialization club for the Taiwanese

Unknown. Originally set up to look after Chinese Current tombs, now for socialization name since 1992 Feiji Zhonghua Shanghui November To help Chinese businesses in Fiji and to (Fiji Chinese Businesses 1994 promote economic cooperation between Association) Fiji and China Feiji Dongguan December Club for the ethnic Chinese from Dongguan Tongxianghui (Dongguan 14, 1997 of Guangdong Province Association of Fiji) Feiji Kaiping Xiangqinhui 1999 Club for the ethnic Chinese from Kaiping of (Kaiping Association Guangdong Province; Mainly for sports of Fiji) and education Feiji Huaren Wenhua 2001 For cultural and economic exchanges Yishu Jingji Lianhehui between Fiji and China (Fiji Chinese Federation of Culture, Art and Economics) Feiji Huaren Yishu Wenhua January 2003 For cultural and economic exchanges Jingji Lianhehui Xibeiqu between Fiji and China Fenhui (Northwest Branch of Fiji Chinese Federation of Culture, Art and Economics) Feiji Zhongshan March 23, Club for the ethnic Chinese from Zhongshan Tongxianghui (Zhongshan 2003 of Guangdong Province Association of Fiji) Beifang Huaren Xiehui June 22, 2003 Members mostly business people with a (Chinese Association of mission of uniting and strengthening the Northern Fiji) Chinese community Continued

Table 7.2 Continued Title

Established

Missions

Feiji Xibeiqu Zhongshan Tongxianghui (Northwest Branch of Zhongshan Association of Fiji) Feiji Zhongguo Heping Tongyi Cujinghui (Fijian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China) Feiji Huaren Yishutuan (Fiji Chinese Troupe) Feiji Enping Lianyihui (Enping Association of Fiji) Feiji Huaren Wenhua Tiyu Xiehui (Fiji Chinese Association for Culture and Sport)

October 15, 2003

Club for the ethnic Chinese from Zhongshan of Guangdong Province

December 28, 2003

Political organization for the reunification of China

End of 2003

Club for Chinese performers

March 21, 2004

Club for the ethnic Chinese from Enping of Guangdong Province

March 2004

Originally named Feiji Huaren Tiyu Julebu (Fiji Chinese Sports Club); renamed in November 2009; to organize sports activities for the Chinese community and to promote sports exchanges between Fiji and China Club of ethnic Chinese business people for economic cooperation, ethnic relations, unity of the Chinese community, China’s reunification, Fiji-China trade, etc. Club for the ethnic Chinese from Taishan of Guangdong Province

Feiji Huaren Gongshang Lianhehui (Fiji Chinese Federation of Industry and Commerce) Feiji Taishan Tongxianghui (Taishan Association of Fiji) Feiji Huaren Wenti Yishutuan (Fiji Chinese Recreation and Art Troupe) Feiji-Zhongguo Maoyi Weiyuanhui (Fiji-China Business Council) Feiji Guangdong Lianyihui (Guangdong Association of Fiji) Feiji Wushu Xiehui (Fiji Wushu Association) Feiji Huaren Funu Xiehui (Fiji Chinese Women Association)

November 17, 2004

Before 2005

End of 2006

April 24, 2007

To promote cultural exchanges between Fiji and China; to promote Chinese culture and to help organize celebration and recreation activities in the Chinese community For the promotion of Fiji-China economic relations

2007

Club of the ethnic Chinese from Guangdong Province

2008

Wushu (Chinese Marshal Arts) club, supported by Chinese Wushu Association For the welfare of ethnic Chinese women

January 31, 2010

Sources: “Feiji huaren shetuan jianjie” (A Brief Introduction to the Chinese Associations in Fiji). http:// fijichinese.com/chinese_society/chn_society.htm (accessed on May 13, 2010); “Bufeng Feiji huaren shetuan xiehui” (Some Chinese Associations in Fiji). http://www.fijicn.com/shetuan.html (accessed on May 14, 2010); interviews with leaders of the Chinese communities in Suva in January 2010.

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the Yat Sen Secondary School opened. Since then, Taiwan has been giving aid to the Yat Sen Primary School while mainland China has been giving to the Yat Sen Secondary School.60 Among overseas Chinese in Fiji, about 95 percent are from Guangdong Province and, therefore, speak Cantonese. This is reflected in Table 7.2. Except for the Taiwanese Association, the other four geographically based Chinese associations are all Cantonese, including associations of Dongguan, Kaiping, Zhongshan, and Enping. Most of these immigrants did not receive tertiary education in China. However, Fijian Chinese community leaders are proud that “in Fiji there are no Falun Gong members, no Tibetan separatists, no Xinjiang separatists and no Taiwan separatists.”61 Several Falun Gong members arrived in Fiji in 2004. The Chinese community lobbied the Fijian government and they were expelled out of Fiji before long.62 Vanuatu is another case of overseas Chinese helping Beijing with its national unification effort. Many old generation Chinese immigrants emigrated to Australia or the United States after Vanuatu’s independence in 1980. The number of mainland Chinese immigrants grew in the 1990s. A vast majority of them run small businesses in towns and thus maintain close economic relations with China.63 Such close economic relations allow them to retain a strong Chinese identity, as well as social, cultural, and political relations with China. As discussed in Chapter 3, Vanuatu recognized Taipei briefly in late 2004. The episode ended with Prime Minister Serge Vohor stepping down. In the month-long drama, the Vanuatu Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification played a crucial role in foiling Taiwan’s effort. The Chinese ambassador to Vanuatu praised the Council for its contribution in his 2005 Chinese New Year celebration speech. Members of the Council collected information and constantly reported to the embassy. The embassy staff did not know the local language Bislama and, therefore, had difficulty understanding local media reports. Council members would record or tape the reports and then translate them into Chinese for the Chinese embassy. They later also noted from local banks that a large amount of American notes entered the market in Santo, so much so that there was not enough local currency to buy off American notes. In addition, some members of the Council noticed that a number of local residents came to their shops and purchased major items with a large sum of cash. They thus judged that Taiwan had started its “silver bullet offensive” and immediately reported to the Chinese embassy.64 Some well-established Chinese immigrants were firmly on China’s side. Vanuatu’s honorary consul in China, who was also the honorary chairman of the Council, returned to Vanuatu without delay. He lobbied

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the high-ranking officials against Taiwanese recognition. Another influential old generation Chinese immigrant also sided with Beijing and persuaded his family members and many others to support Beijing. Meanwhile, the Chinese embassy talked to the Council members and encouraged them to fight on.65 The Image Problem: Riots and Beijing’s Dilemma Though overseas Chinese in the South Pacific have made contributions to China’s national development and unification strategy, they are doing much damage to China’s image. Graeme Dobell pointed out that “some of the new Chinese bring little credit on their homeland, venturing into forms of crime from passport scams to the smuggling of both people and drugs.”66 Crocombe claimed in 2007 that “now the most extensive and virulent crime is from China.”67 It is also believed that there are a large number of illegal Chinese immigrants in some Pacific Islands. According to Crocombe, many Chinese new immigrants were illegally sponsored by politicians or officials via smuggling gangs in China.68 Perhaps more importantly, there is now a strong anti-Chinese resentment in some Pacific islands as demonstrated in the 2006 riots in the Solomon Islands and Tonga and the 2009 riots in PNG. Riots in the Solomon Islands Around 3 p.m. on April 18, 2006, riots started in the capital city of Honiara. Over 20 Chinese stores were reported to have been torched. The main shopping street was razed to the ground. Chinatown was the main target. Approximately 90 percent of it was destroyed. As they burned Chinatown, rioters chanted the word “Waku,” meaning Asian or Chinese. Fortunately, violence was not targeted at individuals but was limited to the destruction of property. There were no fatalities.69 The election of Snyder Rini triggered the violence. Rini was accused of being too closely aligned with ex-prime minister Sir Allan Kemakeza who was tainted by corruption allegations. Rini was also accused of accepting money from Taiwanese and Chinese backers to bribe Members of Parliament into voting for him. It was generally believed that people had hoped that the election would herald a new era in their country and that their hopes were dashed. It is important to note that the riots occurred against a backdrop of prolonged ethnic and political tensions. Differences in economic, political, and social standing of different ethnic groups exacerbated the situation.

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Nevertheless, these riots still came as a surprise to the international community, as Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) had been considered to have done a successful job in ensuring stability in the region up to that point.70 At the time of the riots, the Chinese population numbered around a few thousand out of an overall population of 500,000. The Solomon Islands Chinese community had been in existence for nearly 90 years.71 Many had lived there for generations. In recent years, however, the country has seen a new influx of Chinese, with money and the desire to do business. The rioting in the Solomon Islands highlighted the sensitivities over Chinese business influences, both in the Solomon Islands and across the South Pacific. Solomon Islanders complained of low wages and poor working conditions under the Chinese, as well as alleged unethical business practices. Allegations of property being bought without proper planning procedures have been aired, as have claims that visas and local passports had been handed out to Chinese without the applications going through the official channels.72 Michael Morgan and Abby McLeod state that Chinese storekeepers present a conspicuous target to disgruntled Solomon Islanders, not least for their wealth but also the perception that they grow rich on the proceeds of their businesses without contributing back into Solomon Islands society. Solomon Islanders assume that sweet deals are struck between local Chinese businesspeople and senior politicians for mutual benefit, while they are left to subsist on garden food and whatever other meagre resources they can find. The looting . . . reportedly resulted in the redistribution of these goods to the regional communities.73

The Solomon Islands is aligned diplomatically with Taiwan, which has been perceived as abetting corrupt practices. Taiwanese money came in the form of loans, investments, road construction, and sports facilities as a means to foster loyalty.74 According to Dobell, in the 2006 election Taiwan interfered with Solomon Islands domestic politics by supporting individual candidates. It even funded two or three candidates in some seats. The lack of transparency in Taiwanese aid fuelled the public’s suspicion.75 Resentment against ethnic Chinese and Asians is a reflection of deeper social problems in the Solomon Islands. Arguments exist that poor governance was the key causative factor of the riots, rather than the Chinese themselves.76 Prior to the riots, a UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) report stated that the likelihood of conflict was high in the Solomon Islands due to the lack of trust between political groups,

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high frequency of disputes concerning land, economic inequality within the population, and ongoing friction in social and ethnic relations.77 It is argued that the rioters reacted to what they perceived was a “corruption of the democratic process, in particular, concerns about the process of selecting a prime minister, and how ‘business interests’ allegedly influenced the formation of governments.”78 Other observers have noted that Solomon Islands politics, like those elsewhere in Melanesia, are commonly more about patronage than participation79 and that the Solomon Islands has little in the way of a social or economic safety net. 80 Willmott points out that at the time of the riots, Honiara had a growing squatter population that was envious of anyone with property, and the Chinese held all the goods that they coveted.81

Riots in Tonga Starting at around 3.30 p.m. on November 16, 2006, in the capital of Nuku’alofa, the riots began and later spread throughout the main business district. The rioting started after the parliament went into recess for the year without voting on proposals for sweeping democratic reforms to Tonga’s “semifeudal” system. A political demonstration calling for democratic reform ran out of control and turned into riots. Predominantly Chinese-owned shops and business were then targeted. Disaffected and unemployed youth made up the bulk of the rioters. Like the Solomon Islands riots, the main target of the riots was property rather than people.82 On November 18, 2006, 110 troops and 44 police came from New Zealand and Australia into Tonga at the request of the Tongan government. Later, eight Tongan citizens were confirmed dead, and around 80 percent of the Central Business District was estimated to be destroyed. Hundreds of people were left jobless.83 Many Chinese sought sanctuary in the Chinese embassy in Tonga, and flights were arranged to evacuate them out of the country.84 Unlike other Pacific island countries (PICs), there were no official commercial plantations and thus no Chinese migrant labor in Tonga. This meant that there was limited migration from China until recent times. 85 Thus the Tongan Chinese community has very recent origins, and was not necessarily welcome. A significant protest in 1991 saw around 1,500 people march against the sale of Tongan citizenship to non-Tongans, particularly the Chinese.86 The Tongan government encouraged the Chinese to migrate to Tonga from 1983 to 1991. They were sold passports and

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citizenships as part of a money-making scheme initiated by the Tongan government.87 Later, Chinese were given work permits that were supported by the Tongan Royal family. Reportedly, some Royal family members had hoped that the Tongans may learn from the Chinese about hard work and saving.88 Some believe that the riots were “mostly ignited by racism” and that “there is envy toward hard-working Chinese immigrants.”89 There was also talk that several local businessmen paid young kids money to destroy Chinese shops.90 Others point out that government buildings and the business interests of the monarchy were the initial targets and that the rioters burnt down most businesses in Nuku’alofa regardless of who owned them.91 Like the riots in the Solomon Islands, the riots in Tonga occurred in the context of a changing Tongan society. Challenges to the traditional lifestyle, growing economic inequality, and ethnic identity issues all contributed to the onset of the April riots.92 Some note that Chinese migration has upset traditional ethnic and economic patterns. It was observed that in Nuku’alofa there was not a single Chinese-owned grocery store 20 years ago. Now, more than 70 percent of them are owned by newly arrived Chinese migrants.93 In 2001 the New Zealand Herald indicated that Tonga looked up to and took the lead from Fiji. Fijian animosity toward its Indian population might have spread over to Tonga and its attitude toward its own Chinese population. Concerns that the growing Chinese population would dominate Tonga’s economy as the Indians did in Fiji fuelled resentment.94 At the time of the riots there were fears that the Chinese presence would ensure that Tongans would become second-class citizens. Rising unemployment in Tonga also helped to increase resentment toward the Chinese. In 2001, it was reported that only around a quarter of the 2,000 young people who left school each year were able to find jobs without moving abroad.95 As in the Solomon Islands, the recent movement of Chinese into trades traditionally in the hands of Tongans, such as taxis, food stalls, and small dry-goods shops, caused resentment, as did their evident wealth compared to most indigenous Tongans. Tonga is the only monarchy left in the Pacific region. However, in more recent times, there has been a greater push for democracy. The desire for political changes has partly originated from Tongan people witnessing how democratic systems operate in foreign countries. Although Tonga has a parliament, a cabinet, and free elections, many Tongans still feel that it is not democratic. The death of King Tāufa’āhau Tupou IV on September 10, 2006, after being in reign for 41 years, saw an outpouring of growing

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popular resentment of aristocratic privilege. All existing resentment simmering below the surface in Tongan society capitalized on the political demonstration for democratic reform. Both Chinese and Indian shops were targeted for looting, thus indicating a disaffection with not just the Chinese, but also those perceived to be in the more general category of “foreigner.”96 Riots in Papua New Guinea On May 13, 2009, about 100 people attended a protest march in Port Moresby for the purpose of petitioning the government to reduce Asian immigration. The march ended in looting and violence, involving tens of thousands of people. Banks, shops, and other businesses run by ethnic Chinese and others of Asian origin were targeted in towns across the country. Four people died in total.97 No Chinese were injured or killed. Nevertheless, the riots prompted China to express its concern and urge the PNG government to protect its nationals and enterprises.98 As in other Pacific Islands, the anti-Chinese resentment partly resulted from a perception that foreigners, particularly the Chinese, were taking away small businesses that were traditionally dominated by local Papua New Guineans. Local businesses were in no position to compete with Asian, most Chinese, newcomers simply because the latter had access to much cheaper products. It was also believed that Asians were involved in crimes such as drug trafficking, people smuggling, illegal gambling, and prostitution.99 Adding to the resentment was the view that government officials were corrupt and “had opened the floodgates to Asians.”100 The high unemployment rate, in some towns as high as 80 percent, was also blamed for the riots.101 Anti-Chinese sentiment is also strong in other parts of the South Pacific, such as in Majuro, capital and the largest city of the Marshall Islands, due to a rapid increase of Chinese. Other than the causes mentioned above, the limited land available in the Pacific is also a significant factor. On some islands, there are too many people in a small area for the land and sea to sustain the population. Consequently, there is a strong likelihood of internal conflict.102 The Chinese can become an easily recognizable target. Beijing’s Reactions to and Reflections on the Riots Beijing’s response to the riots in the South Pacific has been very much restrained. The “curiously muted response” was not surprising.103 As

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discussed earlier, historically Beijing’s strong defense and promotion of overseas Chinese interests had only strained its relations with its neighbors and led to further persecution. Nevertheless, as part of its “people-centered” (yiren weiben) foreign policy, Beijing did feel inclined to act swiftly to help the overseas Chinese. During the Solomon Islands riots, ethnic Chinese took refuge in hospitals, churches, and local police offices. Although the PRC does not maintain official ties with the Solomon Islands, it still took measures to ensure the safety of Chinese citizens there, officially stating “The Chinese government attaches great importance to protecting the legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese citizens and legal persons including the Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan compatriots.”104 President Hu Jintao, on a state visit to Saudi Arabia, called on the Foreign Ministry and Chinese embassies and consulates in PNG and other countries in the region to take action to protect overseas Chinese.105 Shortly after the April 18, 2006, riots, the Chinese government rented a plane and evacuated 312 ethnic Chinese. As China’s very first international air evacuation of overseas Chinese from riots, the operation was heralded as an example of the Chinese government’s “people-centered” foreign policy and a reflection of China’s power and international status. On the other hand, Chinese officials have been critical of the behaviors of some overseas China in the region. Four days after the riots, Lu Weixiong, director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, and his colleague Zheng Jianmin paid a private visit to the Solomon Islands. After a five-day inquiry, Lu and Zheng left with sadness and frustration. In their report entitled “Who should be blamed for the cases of ‘resentment against overseas Chinese’—reflections on the burning down of the China Town in the Solomon Islands,”106 Lu and Zheng sharply criticized the Chinese immigrants newly migrated from Guangdong Province who represented about 80 percent of the Chinese community in the Solomon Islands. These new immigrants were of “low quality.” Most of them did not know a foreign language and had little knowledge of the rules for doing foreign trade. They went overseas mainly because they could not compete in China. They tended to use whatever means to make quick money. “Their ‘outrageous’ (lipu) behavior . . . turned the local people’s respect for Chinese into resentment,” Lu and Zheng emphasized.107 They warned that what was at stake was the image of China: As China is playing an increasingly important role in world politics and economy, how the Chinese behave abroad is no longer a matter for China,

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but a matter for the world. Once a Chinese has emigrated to another country, his behavior is no longer an individual behavior but represents the image of the Chinese nation. Our national leaders continuously promise to the world that China is a “responsible power.” However, if Chinese all over the world give the world a negative image of low quality, it will be hard for China to win genuine respect from international society, no matter how impressive China’s hard power is and whatever we say about “the harmonious world.”108

Lu and Zheng also urged the Chinese government to reconsider its policy toward helping overseas Chinese. They questioned the evacuation operation. “Can we do this [evacuation] everyday, every month and every year?” Lu and Zheng asked. They pointed out that in the eyes of the local people the Chinese immigrants had another master (zhuren). “If we do a few more evacuations of overseas Chinese, world opinion may well become negative,” Lu and Zheng argued. Conclusion Overseas Chinese have been important actors in China’s grand strategy. They have made a substantial contribution to China’s national development strategy. In the early years of China’s reformation and opening up, ethnic Chinese (particularly those in Hong Kong and Taiwan) brought in the investments that were indispensable in China’s economic development. Politically, overseas Chinese have become an integral part of China’s national unification strategy. They have also played an active role in other issues related to China’s unity, such as the Tibet and Xinjiang issues. The Chinese communities in the South Pacific are no different to those in other parts of the world in that they maintain close connections with China and are strong supporters of Beijing’s national unification cause. They have played a vital role in Beijing’s diplomatic rivalry with Taipei in the region. Given their relatively small number and wealth, they have not been a major player in China’s economic development. Nevertheless, they have played an important role in China’s economic relations with the region. On the other hand, the rather widespread anti-Chinese resentment in the region has damaged China’s image. While such resentment has deep social, economic, and political causes, the behavior of the Chinese immigrants has been a key factor. It is unlikely that such resentment will disappear in the near future. It has become a major task for China’s diplomatic

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missions in the region to urge the Chinese immigrants to pay more attention to their behavior and give back to the societies in which they are residents. For overseas Chinese in the region, and in other parts of the world, to be a genuine contributor to China’s grand strategy, a positive image is of fundamental importance.

EIGHT

Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy

C

hina’s growing involvement in the South Pacific is part of China’s growing involvement worldwide. Similarly, concerns about China’s growing influence in the South Pacific are part of concerns about the rise of China. The discussion of Chinese involvement in and policy toward the South Pacific should be placed within this bigger picture. An isolated study without understanding China’s grand strategy and overall foreign policy goals can be misguided. This chapter first comments on China’s rise and some related concerns. It then reiterates and further explains some key points about the position of the South Pacific in China’s grand strategy. One area that deserves special attention in this concluding chapter is the region’s value to China’s security strategy. The chapter also assesses the region’s position in China’s strategic landscape. The Rise of China China is rising, but for how long? Gordon G. Chang predicted in 2001 that China “has five years, perhaps ten, before it falls.”1 Five years later, in 2006, Chang insisted that China was “halfway” to its collapse. However, he was no longer basing his “China collapse” theory on China’s economic problems. Instead, he mainly focused on China’s external environment, which, in his view, was worsening and would continue to deteriorate. Chang also claimed that China’s economic growth and progress would bring down the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime within five years to fulfill his prediction.2 Chang is only one of many who have predicted the collapse of China, unsuccessfully. In the wake of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations

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and the subsequent crackdown in 1989, it was a rather common view in the West, and in Washington in particular, that the CCP regime would collapse before long. Many have since realized that the CCP and the Chinese people are unusually adaptable to their environment, internal and external. China today continues to face daunting challenges in various domains including the economical, political, and social. Nevertheless, the prospects for it continuing its rise in the coming years are good. With the rise of China, various China threat theories have emerged, such as environmental threat, energy threat, and food threat. The most worrisome are China’s “military threat” and “economic threat.” Of the two, the military threat is more sensitive. In its 2006 report on China’s military power, the U.S. Defense Department said that the growth of China’s military power posed a threat to the regional military power balance, which, in the long term, could form an effective and credible threat to the armed forces of the United States and other countries in Asia. The report said that China’s total defense-related expenditure was actually “twice or three times” the military budget declared by the Chinese government. The report also claimed that based on the ratio of China’s defense expenditure against its gross domestic product (GDP), the country’s defense spending could possibly grow threefold or more by 2025. The United States and other countries, therefore, had to take “precautionary measures” against what the Pentagon called “unknown elements caused by China’s military build-up.”3 Subsequent reports continue to emphasize China’s military buildup although the report’s title was changed in 2010 from “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” to “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” More alarmist views are readily available. Not surprisingly, China has consistently refuted the “China threat” theories. In late 2003, Beijing started to promote “China’s peaceful rise” theory. Beijing is so sensitive to the China threat perception that it often shies away from the word “rise” and opts for “development.” Zheng Bijian, the architect of China’s peaceful rise theory, emphasizes that one of China’s major strategies is to avoid the fate of the rising powers in modern history that used force to grab resources and to seek hegemony.4 China’s rise is highlighted by its rapid economic growth. China’s GDP in 2010 reached US$5.88 trillion, surpassing Japan’s US$5.47 trillion as the world’s second-largest economy. This is in sharp contrast with China’s GDP of US$200 billion in 1978 when China began to open up. China’s rise is the most spectacular in human history, with GDP per capita increasing about 8 percent per year for the 25 years from 1979 to 2004.

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By comparison, the strongest average per capita growth for the last rising power, the United States, for any 25-year period since 1830 was less than 4 percent per year.5 China’s rise should be put in perspective, however. China’s economic power may not be as great as it appears. In terms of GDP per capita, China ranks behind more than a hundred countries and it is only a small fraction of that of the United States, though the figures vary from the Chinese government’s about US$4,000 (based on official exchange rate) to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) about US$7,400 (on a purchase power parity basis). Even based on the CIA’s figure, China is ranked 127th while the United States is ranked 10th with a GDP per capita of $47,400.6 Zhang Monan, an economics researcher with China’s State Information Center, points out that compared with Japan, China’s overseas investment is still in its initial stage and its gross national product (GNP), a more accurate reflection of a country’s economic power, is less than Japan’s.7 China’s economy is likely to continue to grow fast, but may not be as fast as it was in the past 30 years due to resources, social, and environmental constraints. Militarily, while it is generally believed that China has been rapidly modernizing its military, various independent research institutions have concluded that China will not be able to challenge the United States globally for the foreseeable future. In 2003, a task force report of the Council on Foreign Relations found that China was at least two decades behind the United States in terms of military technology and capability and the balance was likely to “remain decisively in America’s favor beyond the next twenty years.”8 The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) concludes in its 2011 edition of The Military Balance that although China is building its military capability at a rapid pace, “by and large, China remains a regional power with regional concerns, as demonstrated in 2010 by a series of exercises, construction projects, and equipment purchases.”9 Most importantly, the Chinese have found it unnecessary and unable to challenge U.S. dominance in the past 30 years. This is unlikely to change fundamentally for years to come. The Chinese understand that while the current international order is not perfect, China has to and can live with it. They are also pragmatic. After all, “other great powers do not wish to directly confront U.S. hegemony,” says Liu Jianfei of the Party School of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.10 Beijing’s pragmatism is also determined by its complicated security map. As discussed in Chapter 3, China’s grand strategy consists of three main components—the national security strategy, national development strategy, and national unification strategy. The Chinese are aware that a

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strong economy is the foundation of the military dimension of national security and the key to internal stability. Economic competition and integration with Taiwan is also emerging as a more acceptable and effective strategy. It can be argued, therefore, that China is genuinely concentrating on its economic development. This is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future.

The South Pacific in China’s National Reunification and Development Strategies By now it should be clear that the South Pacific plays an important role in Beijing’s reunification strategy. This is highlighted by the fact that 6 of the 23 countries that have diplomatic relations with Taipei are in the South Pacific. Thomas Biddick noted just before the end of the Cold War that Beijing and Taipei had been and remained most immediately concerned with their competition for diplomatic recognition and political influence in the South Pacific.11 The competition escalated in the 20 years prior to 2008. To halt and reverse diplomatic recognition of Taiwan was “the main driver” of Chinese aid to the region.12 The long-term future of the “diplomatic truce” between Taipei and Beijing, which began in 2008 when the Kuomintang (KMT) regained power in Taiwan, remains uncertain. While both sides have refrained from enticing away each other’s allies, they have been consolidating their relations with their existing diplomatic allies. The South Pacific has a small but not necessarily insignificant role to play in China’s national development strategy. The trade volume between China and the 14 island states has increased substantially in recent years, albeit from a low base. Chinese investment in the region has also been growing. In addition, service industries, such as tourism, have a great potential. More importantly, China has a demand for the natural resources found in the South Pacific, including fisheries, timber, gold, copper, other minerals, and some hydrocarbons. The majority Chineseowned Ramu nickel mine in Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) Madang province is one of the largest offshore mining developments undertaken by a Chinese company. In addition to the Ramu nickel project, China has also replaced Japan as the most important market for Melanesian timber. Chinese imports from Melanesia multiplied 26-fold between 1995 and 2005. In 1997, only 8 percent of PNG’s logs went to China, but by 2006 Ron Crocombe was arguing that “nearly all trees logged in PNG end up in China.”13 Fisheries

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also are important resources and many Chinese companies have invested in this industry.14 However, it should be noted that for many years resources have been a “secondary interest” and China’s economic interests in the South Pacific have been limited.15 The trade volume of US$2.67 billion between China and the 14 Pacific island countries (PICs) in 2009 was a tiny fraction of China’s total trade of US$2,208 billion in the year.16 In terms of natural resources, on the whole, the region is not resource rich on a large scale. Pacific ocean-floor resources will be difficult to extract for the foreseeable future. Internal instability, such as that in PNG, remains a challenge to China’s economic interests in the region. Nevertheless, if the Beijing-Taipei diplomatic rivalry continues to ease, the importance of China’s other interests, particularly its economic interests in the resources and political interests as leader of the developing world, are likely to increase.

The South Pacific in China’s National Security Strategy What is more controversial is the South Pacific’s value to Chinese national security. China’s deepening involvement is often portrayed as part of a longer term political and strategic investment aimed at challenging the leadership of the United States in the greater Asia Pacific region. More specifically, it has been suggested that China could set up missile bases in the region to attack American warships. George Friedman, CEO of the U.S.-based private intelligence corporation Stratfor, claimed in 2001 that China could place some antiship missiles on a number of South Pacific islands and “if . . . U.S. carriers came sailing through from Pearl Harbor, things could get very nasty.”17 This point has been repeated by other observers from time to time.18 Beijing so far does not have any military presence in the region. The question is whether China has any intention to dominate the region militarily in the future. We are reminded that “Chinese involvement in improving infrastructure such as airports, bridges, and highways, as well as seeking agreements to allow Chinese ships in Pacific exclusive economic zones, may have strategic implications in the future.”19 Some even believe that increased Chinese tourism and migration are part of Beijing’s “economic and strategic penetration of Oceania.”20 These writers tend to perceive China’s increasing influence in the region from a realist perspective, which is understandable to some extent. After all, Chinese policymakers are no strangers to realist thinking. However, as

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Terence Wesley-Smith has pointed out, these writers “assume, rather than demonstrate” that these are Chinese motivations,21 and on that basis alone they argue that China poses a long-term security threat to the West. The South Pacific’s value to China’s national security strategy should not be exaggerated. To start with, Beijing does not see an imminent military threat. David Shambaugh observed about a decade ago that “at the beginning of the twenty-first century . . . it would seem that China faces no tangible or immediate external military threat.”22 Beijing’s top security concern has been the Taiwan issue. In recent years, the supply of energy and natural resources has become an increasingly important security issue.23 Much of the South Pacific is too far away from the Taiwan Strait to be part of China’s limited military strategy to attack Taiwan. And, as Wesley-Smith points out, “None of the island states lie close to the strategic sea lanes that service the bulk of China’s trade in energy and raw materials or, for that matter, to other important trans-Pacific commercial or military sea routes.”24 Even if China deemed the South Pacific crucial to its security strategy, it is difficult to imagine that it would be able to challenge the United States and dominate the region militarily. Much of the discussion about China’s strategic intention in the region centers on Western worry over China’s “second island chain” strategy—running from west of the Aleutians down through the Marianas and Guam to the vicinity of New Guinea. The concept of three “island chains” originated from Admiral Liu Huaqing’s 1988 instruction to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) to establish a long-term development plan. According to this strategic plan, by 2010 the PLAN should have established a blue-water presence in the first island chain running south from Japan past Taiwan to the Philippines, followed by the second island chain by 2025 and the third island chain, extending from the Aleutian Islands in the north to Antarctica in the south by 2050.25 This is easier said than done, however. China’s military modernization started from a very low point. Shambaugh observed that the PLA had been implementing reforms for well over a decade since the 1991 Gulf War, which “starkly demonstrated that it [China] was still operating in terms of a bygone era of warfare.”26 Beijing has since made an effort to speed up its defense modernization. However, without access to equipment and technologies from the West, the PLA has found it difficult to close the conventional weaponry and defense technology gaps with the West.27 Shambaugh found in 2002 that while “Taiwan’s destroyers and frigates are truly blue-water capable; the same cannot be said of the PLAN, which remains principally a coastal fleet.”28

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Many observers and think tanks continue to argue that China’s military power should be put in perspective. Drew Thompson concluded in 2010 that [f]or all the jargon-laden, prideful articles about China’s inevitable rise in the world, Chinese strategists are cautious not to openly verbalize aspirations to conquer the globe or establish distant bases, outposts, or supply stations. Perhaps a generation from now, Chinese military planners might be strategizing more openly about how to acquire overseas basing rights and agreements with allies where they might station their forces abroad, just as the French and British have done since the Napoleonic wars and the Americans have done more recently. But with China, that process has not begun in earnest. At least, not for now.29

A more comprehensive study is Steve Chan’s comparison of the power scores of some great powers, including China and the United States. Chan concludes that “although China has been getting stronger the U.S. is not in the process of being overtaken, globally or regionally.”30 In terms of military power, Chan notes that “no other state—or combination of states—even approaches the pre-eminence enjoyed by the U.S. in military assets.”31 He has observed that “analysts generally agree that China will remain in the foreseeable future substantially behind the U.S. on this dimension of national power.”32 Many others are worried, however. Robert Kaplan noted in 2010 that “while U.S. is distracted, China develops sea power.”33 Kaplan acknowledges that “China is not going to attack a U.S. carrier anytime soon, of course, and it is still a long way from directly challenging the United States militarily.”34 However, he points out that the Chinese aim is “to develop such capabilities along its seaboard to dissuade the U.S. Navy from getting between the first island chain and the Chinese coast whenever and wherever it wants.”35 Kaplan sees this as a problem because, according to offensive realist John Mearsheimer, “the United States, the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere, will try to prevent China from becoming the hegemon of much of the Eastern Hemisphere.”36 Nevertheless, even taking this assumption at face value, the area of key strategic importance is between the first island chain and the Chinese coast. It is difficult to fit the South Pacific in this strategic scenario. Furthermore, along with its ally Australia, the United States has a strong control over the “second island chain.” While Australia has predominant influence in PNG—the southern end of the second island chain, the United States maintains a firm control over the northern part, particularly Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands where the U.S. military

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could stage and manoeuvre in the event of any conflict with China over Taiwan. In addition, it has three freely associated states (FAS)—the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and Palau. Together with Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, they form the security perimeter of the United States.37 The United States could build military facilities in Palau but so far has found it unnecessary. In a 2002 report to Congress, the U.S. General Accounting Office even argued that the FSM and the Marshall Islands no longer play any role in U.S. strategy in the Asia Pacific region.38 Nevertheless, under the Compact of Free Association, the United States is obliged to defend the FAS against attack or threat of attack. The United States may block FAS government policies that it deems inconsistent with its duty to defend the FAS, the so-called defense veto.39 Widely cited evidence of the region’s strategic value to China has been China’s satellite tracking station at Temawaiku village, South Tarawa atoll in Kiribati, which was opened in October 1997. Jane’s Defence Weekly quickly claimed that the station was China’s “strategic foothold in the South Pacific.”40 In 2001, John Henderson cited the station as evidence of existing and potential wider strategic significance of Pacific island states.41 He was nevertheless cautious at the time, saying that without the necessary data, it was difficult to assess the capabilities of the Chinese facility.42 Henderson was critical of a U.S. think tank’s report that drew “somewhat exaggerated parallels between the potential future strategic significance of the Island states and their undoubted past strategic significance in the World War II US-Japan battle for control of the Pacific.”43 Two years later, however, Henderson and Reilly bluntly stated that “the facility is run by the Chinese military and plays an important role in the development of China’s space warfare program.”44 The military nature of the facility seemed obvious to Henderson, Reilly, and other analysts also because it might be used to spy on the U.S. Army’s Kwajalein Atoll/ Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands, a center of operations for the development of the U.S. ballistic missile defense system approximately 600 miles from Tarawa.45 It has been claimed that in 2002 two American Navy F-16 fighter jets buzzed the station.46 While the satellite tracking station was important to China’s space program, the concerns about its military nature were largely based on speculation. Some observers have argued that the satellite dishes in the tracking station were too small for monitoring U.S. missile tests on Kwajalein.47 Even if the station had indeed been used for that purpose, it would still have been a weak basis for claiming that China had a well-calculated military strategy that would lead China to setting up missile bases and even forming some kind of alliances in the region.

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The real point was not the actual military value of the tracking station. What really concerned the above observers was the fact that it was owned by China. That explains why China’s dismantling of the station after Kiribati shifted its diplomatic relations from Beijing to Taipei in November 2003 has not silenced these observers. Realizing that the station might be closed with a change of government in Kiribati, Henderson and Reilly insisted that “whatever the real purpose of the space-tracking station, the fact that China operates a military facility on the territory of a Pacific Island Forum member stands as a reminder that the potential strategic significance of the Pacific islands may be exploited by non-Western powers.”48 Arguably, such views are based on a realist and ideological belief that a rising China, a non-Western country, is likely to be a trouble maker (to the West). For those coming from this school of thinking, whatever China does in the South Pacific can be interpreted as a strategic move against the West. Admittedly, as Wesley-Smith has observed, China’s foreign policy in Oceania “has always had a powerful strategic component” and that “it was China’s intense antagonism toward the Soviet Union that spurred its early involvement in the region.”49 However, with the end of the Cold War and China’s opening up, Beijing’s strategic thinking and the strategic environment have changed. While China has been preparing for a limited war over Taiwan in which the United States could be involved, it is too early to conclude that China has put in place a strategy in preparation for a global conflict with the United States or the West that will involve the South Pacific. As mentioned earlier, China does not necessarily see the United States as a threat and Beijing has been preoccupied with massive internal challenges. More optimistic analysts have argued that with its economy well integrated with the world economy, Beijing is more likely to cooperate and compromise. As Quansheng Zhao and Guoli Liu point out, [a]lthough no one can declare that “military force is largely irrelevant” in U.S.-China relations, as Keohane and Nye envisioned for the community of industrialized nations, it is reasonable to argue that both Washington and Beijing are considering their complex relationship in much broader terms than their military relationship.50

David M. Lampton, a China expert well respected by the Chinese, has made it bluntly clear to his Chinese audience: Don’t underestimate the United States, even though America has a number of big problems at the moment and it’s not self-evident yet whether or not

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the U.S. will be able to solve them all. Don’t underestimate our capacity for self-renewal because we have a lot of resources . . . If you put the U.S. and China together, we account for nearly 40% of the world’s GDP, a percentage which will rise as China continues to grow. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that we cooperate.51

To sum up, there is little evidence to suggest that traditional strategic ambition driven by military security is a key factor for China’s deepening involvement in the South Pacific. Military contacts do exist between China and some South Pacific countries, but they are logistics based and far from what one would consider as equalling an alliance. Such military contacts may have more to do with China’s strategy to strengthen its overall relations with these states. That is, military relations can be a tool for deepening China’s relations with these states to serve China’s political and economic interests. It does not necessarily reflect China’s security strategy. This is because China is unlikely to be able to militarily challenge the United States and its allies globally in the foreseeable future. And China will find it unnecessary to embark on the dangerous military adventure. At this stage, the evidence shows that China is not actively pursuing policies for its national security strategy in the South Pacific. The South Pacific is just one example of China not actively pursuing military goals while deepening economic and political relations in a developing region. Latin America is also a good case to consider. As is discussed below, Latin America is of much greater strategic importance to China. While increasingly involved in Latin America, Beijing is anxious to avoid any perceptions of geopolitical threat to the United States. Nevertheless, Washington has been anxiously scrutinizing Chinese involvement in the region. Latin America thus can be seen as “an intriguing microcosm of the geopolitical tensions and dilemmas that are intrinsic to China’s wider strategy in the developing world.”52 The South Pacific in China’s Strategic Landscape The Chinese tend to see Oceania as a part of China’s “greater periphery” (da zhoubian).53 As part of its foreign policy, China has established the concept of “greater periphery diplomacy” (da zhoubian waijiao). This is in contrast to China’s traditional “periphery diplomacy” (zhoubian waijiao) that focuses on neighboring countries and countries that do not physically neighbor China but are in China’s immediate neighboring regions, such as Southeast Asia and Central Asian. China’s “periphery diplomacy” has tended to be the most important to Chinese foreign policy and grand strategy.

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The concept of “greater periphery,” on the other hand, has emerged only in the past decade. It was largely because China’s national interests have expanded after a rapid development of more than two decades. However, the concept has not been clearly defined. It is generally understood that it includes but goes beyond China’s immediate periphery. More importantly, it is not necessarily a geographical concept. According to Ruan Zongze, [g]reater peripheral environment is not just a geographical concept. It is more a three-dimensional concept (liti gainian). This concept includes the countries literally neighboring China and the countries or forces which do not neighbor China but are important to China’s critical interests. They can be regarded as an extension of China’s periphery.54

Ruan thus argues that the United States and the European Union are considered parts of China’s greater periphery. Indeed, though there is no clear definition of China’s “greater periphery,” Chinese analysts tend to agree that it is mainly an interest-based concept. Such interests are not limited to security but include other areas, such as economic, energy, and cultural interests. As a matter of fact, most Chinese analysts do not think security interest is a priority. They focus on China’s economic interests and its diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan.55 The above clarification is important in that we need to assess Chinese interests in the South Pacific against its interests in other parts of the world to have a better understanding of the strategic value of the South Pacific to China. The South Pacific is marginal in China’s “greater periphery.” In its effort to create a peaceful external environment conducive to its economic development, Beijing has been focusing on improving its relations with great powers and its immediate peripheral regions like Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia in parallel with other regions, such as the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. The South Pacific is a low priority to Beijing in terms of strategic attention. This can be illustrated by a comparison between the South Pacific and two similar regions— Latin America and Africa. Latin America and Africa are similar to the South Pacific in that there are a number of countries in each region that recognize Taiwan (see Table 4.1). This means both regions, like the South Pacific, play a part in China’s national reunification strategy. But Latin America and Africa’s importance to China goes beyond the Taiwan issue. They are more important strategically to China. It is noted that Latin America “fits squarely into China’s global strategy in a number of respects: as

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a supplier of natural resources and energy, as an export platform for enhanced access to the US market, and as the key area for diplomatic goals associated with the Taiwan question.”56 Such observation can also be applied to Africa. First, both Africa and Latin America have a large base of natural resources, and most critically, oil. Since China’s economic expansion is heavily reliant on a continued inflow of natural and energy resources, it is no surprise that the two regions have become an integral part of its national development strategy. China had to import about 55 percent of its oil and about 30 percent of that was from Africa in 2010. 57 And China’s oil imports from Latin America amounted to over 3 percent of its total oil imports in 2005 and have been increasing since. More importantly, Latin America holds 9.7 percent of world oil reserves. As Francois Lafargue notes, this could potentially enable China to meet its projected energy requirements.58 Beginning in the 1990s, China has steadily improved its political relations with both regions in order to create an environment conducive to investment by Chinese corporations. These efforts have been rather successful, and China now has substantial investments across both continents. By the end of 2009, China’s investment in 49 African countries had totalled over US$9 billion.59 In Latin America, China spent more than US$15 billion in energy deals in 2010.60 China’s investment in the South Pacific is much more modest. Second, Africa and Latin America have become increasingly important markets for China, with trade surging over the past decade. From 2000 to 2010, China’s trade with Latin America grew from about US$13 billion to more than US$180 billion. In the same period, China’s trade with Africa increased from US$11 billion to well over US$110 billion. Both regions provide valuable markets for China’s exports while China has a strong demand for the natural resources exported by each region. Although China-South Pacific trade grew at a similar speed during this period, the volume was much smaller. The South Pacific also lacks the potential offered by Latin America and Africa in terms of future economic development. Third, Latin America, with its geographical proximity to the United States, could be crucial to China’s long-term strategy. Beijing knows that it is playing in the only superpower’s backyard, and does not want to arouse suspicion. Despite China’s caution, the United States has shown that it is not oblivious to China’s growing presence in the region. In early 2006, U.S. assistant secretary of state Tom Shannon traveled to Beijing to discuss China’s activities in Latin America. This was the first visit by a U.S. official for this purpose.61 The South Pacific, on the other hand, plays a comparatively minor role in U.S. strategy.

Nantai (South Pacific, short version) Nan Taipingyang (South Pacific) Lading Meizhou (Latin America) Lamei (Latin America, short version) Feizhou (Africa)

Title Title Title Title Title

*Some articles are included in both root catologs.

Term

Field

2000–March 13, 2011 2000–March 13, 2011 2000–March 13, 2011 2000–March 13, 2011 2000–March 13, 2011

Date Range

Search Results of China Academic Journals Full-text Database

Table 8.1

Precise Precise Precise Precise Precise

Matching

9 34 306 1147 1994

3 47 323 1261 2292

Root Catalog: Politics/ Root Catalog: Economics Military Affairs/Law and Management*

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Chinese analysts’ attention to the three regions reflects their different strategic importance to China. While Chinese analysts have a well-established interest in Africa and Latin America, they are unfamiliar with and uninterested in the South Pacific. The lack of interest in the South Pacific is evident in the comparatively much smaller number of Chinese publications about the region (see Table 8.1). The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences established its Center for Australian, New Zealand and South Pacific Studies on June 23, 1994. The China Institute of International Studies has its Center for South Pacific Studies, and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations also have the Institute of South/ Southeast Asian and Oceanian Studies to cover the South Pacific. However, compared with numerous other centers and institutes of regional studies in China, the institutions of the South Pacific studies have been much less active. Hardly any of the publications counted in Table 8.1 can be treated as substantive academic publications. Many of them are brief introductions and travelogues and quite few are about Australia and New Zealand instead of the PICs discussed in this book. On the other hand, it is argued that “paradoxically, the very fact that the Southwest Pacific is considered a strategic backwater may make it more attractive as a testing ground for China’s growing power and ability to shore up allegiances in a region hitherto considered an ‘American lake.’ ”62 This could be the case. However, as Wesley-Smith rightly points out, this sort of argument “could be applied indiscriminately to any part of the globe . . . At best, this seems like a shaky basis for serious policy planning and analysis.”63 Also, it should be noted that the U.S. military has a vested interest in exaggerating U.S. security threats. In the 1980s, the U.S. Navy claimed that “the Pacific moat’s integrity is being challenged by the Soviet Union and, today, it is a waterway over which the Soviet Pacific Fleet is probing, providing, and testing.”64 Admiral Sylvester Foley, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, warned in 1985 that “it could turn into a Soviet lake out there.”65 In reality, the Soviet strategic position in Asia was bleak at that time. The major portion of the Soviet Union’s Far East military effort was directed at China. The actual picture then was that the Soviet Union was surrounded by hostile powers, including the United States, Western Europe, China, and Japan.66

Conclusion China’s economic growth has been breathtaking. Parallel to China’s economic growth is the increase of Chinese influence. And with the rise of

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China’s influence comes the emergence of “China threat” theories. The China threat discourse in the South Pacific thus has become a fixture of geopolitical analysis. Concerns about Chinese strategic intentions are, however, not well founded. China’s deepening involvement in the region has been driven mainly by its diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan, its economic interests including markets and natural resources, and its attempt to secure its position as leader of the developing world. The region’s support for China on issues like human rights, Xinjiang, and Tibet are also important. There is no clear evidence to suggest that China’s growing involvement in the South Pacific has been a calculated strategic move for China’s military security. Examples like China’s satellite tracking station in Kiribati by no means constitute a well-calculated military strategy that has been driving China’s involvement in the region. The decade-old concerns about China setting up missile bases and forming some kind of alliances against the West in the region have not materialized and are unlikely to happen for the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

C

hina regards the Pacific island countries (PICs) as “important partners.”1 Though its influence in the region has been growing fast, China is not well positioned to challenge the U.S.-led West militarily for the foreseeable future. As Fergus Hanson rightly argues, “China’s defence aspirations in the South Pacific are likely to remain limited. Any significant military move by China in the region would be counterproductive.”2 China’s influence in the region is not deep-rooted either. China does not have strong connections with the South Pacific in noneconomic areas. Such connections are important for a stable, longlasting relationship. Culturally, the linkages between the South Pacific and China remain weak. China has serious image problems in the region, which have compromised its influence to a considerable extent. The success of China’s diplomacy in the South Pacific also requires the goodwill of regional major players, particularly Australia and New Zealand.3 China may well come to cooperate with Australia and New Zealand more on regional issues, such as on good governance and stability. As Michael Powles argues, “Only the most hardened adherent to the darkest ‘China threat’ scenarios would believe that China could see any benefit in the national and regional instability that bad governance can bring.”4 China, on the other hand, has the advantage of sharing with the PICs the identity of a developing country. Beijing has used this advantage consistently and skillfully. China’s developing country identity is well received in the region as highlighted by Papua New Guinea (PNG) prime minister Michael Somare’s welcome speech to Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to the South Pacific in April 2006. Somare noted that China’s attractiveness came from the fact that it was also a developing country. In this respect, “there is much we can learn from one another,” said Somare. 5 Somare might well be playing the “China card” by reminding other external actors that the PICs have options for independent policymaking. During the Cold War, the rivalry between the two ideological camps resulted in disproportionate influence of the PICs. After the Cold War, the PICs’ strategic importance to the great powers sharply decreased,

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greatly reducing their influence. China’s presence is thus welcome to the PICs. Chinese involvement will enhance the value of the region and hence more attention from the outside world. This is already happening. U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s visit to the region in November 2010 and the U.S. government’s initial decision to open a USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) office in Fiji with a US$20 million climate change fund in 2011 indicate American-renewed interest in the region.6 China’s involvement also presents the PICs with a welcome alternative to other donors. According to Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A. Porter, a “general consensus” is that “while there is concern about such an enormous and relatively unfamiliar power [China] acquiring a significant stake in Pacific futures, there is also clear appreciation for China’s recent efforts in the region.” 7 China should be more transparent in its aid policy toward the region and make sure that its aid does benefit local people. On the other hand, confusion does exist in China over Chinese overseas assistance. George Yu has observed that China does not have a central aid agency. Different government units administer disparate tasks. As a matter of fact, China has created a whole new set of institutions to administer economic relations with Africa. “A vast and diffused structure provided support for the diverse range of Chinese aid,” Yu notes.8 The Chinese authorities admit that “too many units were involved in foreign assistance work.”9 However, while it can be challenging for China to publish internationally acceptable statistics for its overseas assistance, it should not be prohibitively difficult. It is equally important that the international society does not exaggerate the problems caused by Chinese aid. Joel Atkinson notes that the Australian government’s perception of China-Taiwan rivalry was one of “a mix of reality and exaggeration.”10 Atkinson argues that it is debatable to what extent China and Taiwan weaken Australia’s reform agenda simply through providing South Pacific governments with funds to misuse. Presumably, if Australia’s efforts were effective, the administration of aid from China and Taiwan would improve accordingly . . . the Australian government has a strong incentive to exaggerate the impact of China and Taiwan on Australian policy and on the South Pacific, as this diverts responsibility for any failure to carry out its governance reform policy, or in the conception of that policy.11

Moreover, the international society should give fair credit to Chinese assistance. Analysts have noted that criticisms of Chinese involvement in developing countries/regions often are not well founded. A typical

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example is China’s relations with Africa in which China’s economic interest has grown exponentially since 2001. There has been much criticism along the lines that China is colonizing Africa. Scholars started to question such criticism in recent years. In 2008, the contributors of China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace found that “the new Sino-African encounter doesn’t lend itself to easy generalization.”12 In 2009, based on a wide range of interviews, Deborah Brautigam concludes that China is not a “vogue donor” in Africa. “Many of the fears about Chinese aid and engagement are misinformed, the alarm out of proportion,” argues Brautigam.13 China is likely to continue rising in the coming years. China’s influence in the South Pacific, thus, will continue to grow, as noted by New Zealand foreign minister Murray McCully. China’s economic interactions with the South Pacific are set to increase and the PICs will find China increasingly important in terms of trade, investment, and aid. Therefore, China is likely to continue to play an important role in the evolution of the regional order in the South Pacific.

From PRC

To Cook Islands: delegation of the National People’s Congress (NPC); To Fiji: Vice President (stopover), Vice Commerce Minister, Vice Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Committee of the NPC, Assistant Minister of Culture; To PNG: Deputy Prime Minister, Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); To Samoa: Vice Commerce Minister; To Tonga: Vice President of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC); To Vanuatu: Vice Commerce Minister, Assistant f Culture Minister, Vice Governor of Henan Province.

Year

2009

From Cook Islands: Minister of Infrastructure, Energy, Transportation and Tourism; From Fiji: Commissioner of Police, Minister of Primary Industry; From Micronesia (FSM): Vice President (twice), Minister of Transportation, Communication and Infrastructure, Minister of Resource Development; From Niue: delegation from the Legislative Council; From PNG: Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Immigration, Health Minister, Chief of Defense Forces, Minister of State Enterprises; From Samoa: Deputy Prime Minister (twice), Minister of Natural Resources, Environment and Climate, Minister of Women, Community and Social Development, Minister of Communication and Information Technology, Health Minister, Chief Justice, Minister of Engineering, Transportation and Infrastructure; From Tonga: Prime Minister, Parliament Speaker (as a delegate of the Pacific Islands Parliamentary delegation); From Vanuatu: Health Minister, Agriculture Minister, Minister of Trade and Industry, Minister of Internal Affairs.

To PRC To Marshall Islands: Foreign Minister; To Palau: President of Examination Yuan; To Kiribati: Speaker of Legislative Yuan (Parliament).

From Taiwan

Continued

From Marshall Islands: Parliament Speaker, Transportation Minister, Minister of Internal Affairs; From Palau: President; Senate Speaker, House Speaker; From Solomon Islands: Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister (and Minister for Rural Development and Indigenous Affairs); From Tuvalu: Prime Minister.

To Taiwan

Appendix 1 Official Visits between PICs, PRC, and Taiwan

From PRC

To Cook Islands: delegation led by Assistant Minister of Commerce; To Fiji: Vice Chairman of People’s Political Consultative Conference (PPCC) of Shanghai Municipality, Shanghai Expo official, Vice Chairman of PPCC of Guangdong Province, Vice Minister of National Population and Family Planning Commission, Executive Vice President of the China Family Planning Association; To Niue: Assistant Foreign Minister; To PNG: Vice President of the CPAFFC; To Tonga: Chinese Special Envoy to the China-Pacific Islands Forum Dialogue; To Vanuatu: Vice Minister of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee.

Year

2008

Continued

From Cook Islands: Representatives of the Queen (for Olympics opening ceremony, hereafter Olympics) and Deputy Prime Minister (for the Investment, Trade and Tourism Ministerial Conference of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, hereafter Ministerial Conference); From Fiji: Prime Minister (Olympics), Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Civil Aviation (Ministerial Conference); From Micronesia: President (Olympics), Vice President, Foreign Minister (Para-Olympics), Minister for Resources and Development (Ministerial Conference), Parliament Speaker; From Niue: Prime Minister; From PNG: Defense Minister, a delegation of four ministries (Commerce and Industry, Fisheries, Culture and Tourism, Corrective Services) to the Ministerial Conference; From Samoa: Head of State (Olympics), Prime Minister (Para-Olympics), a political party delegation led by Parliament Speaker, Deputy Prime Minister ( Minister for Tourism, for Ministerial Conference), Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries; From Tonga: King, Defense Minister, Prince (Olympics), Prime Minister (Olympics), Deputy Prime Minister (Para-Olympics); From Vanuatu: President (Olympics), Prime Minister (Olympics), Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (twice), Minister for Trade, Industry, Commerce and Tourism, Parliament Speaker, chairmen of two political parties.

To PRC To Marshall Islands: Vice President, Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Vice Foreign Minister, Vice Health Minister, Mayor of Taichung City, one legislator and the “Naval Goodwill Squadron” of three ships with 741 officers and crew; To Nauru: Vice President; To Palau: Mayor of Keelung City and three legislators; To Solomon Islands: Vice President, Speaker of the Legislative Yuan and Health Minister.

From Taiwan From Kiribati: President, Parliament Speaker, Vice Foreign Minister, Minister and Vice Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Minister of Health and Medical Services and two senators; From Marshall Islands: President, Former President, Foreign Minister, Minister in Assistance to the President, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Resources & Development and two senators; From Nauru: President, Former President, and Health Minister; From Palau: President, Senate Speaker, President-elect and three senators; From Solomon Islands: Prime Minister and Health Minister; From Tuvalu: Prime Minister and three ministers (Finance, Agriculture and Internal Affairs); From PNG: Fisheries Minister and Health Minister.

To Taiwan

2007

To Samoa: two Politburo members (one stopover visit); To PNG: Deputy Premier; To Tonga and Micronesia: Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee; To Vanuatu: Deputy Premier, delegations from National Federation of Women and General Administration of Sport of China; To Palau: Vice President of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs.

From Cook Islands: Prime Minister and Immigration Minister (to China International Travel Mart 2009); From Micronesia: President; From Niue: Prime Minister; From Fiji: Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, delegation led by Commerce Minister, Tourism Minister (to China International Travel Mart 2009); From PNG: Tourism Minister; From Samoa: Prime Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister (Tourism Minister) and Parliament Speaker; From Tonga: Prime Minister, Parliament Speaker, Foreign Minister, Finance Minister and Chief of Defense Forces; From Vanuatu: President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minster, Minister of Infrastructure, Finance Minister and Agriculture Minister. To Marshall Islands: President (for the Second Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit), Foreign Minister, Vice Foreign Minister, six other ministers (Economy, Agriculture, Health, Environment, Government Information Office, Council of Indigenous Peoples) and a former Senior Presidential Advisor; To Kiribati: Vice Foreign Minister; To Palau: a delegation led by a legislator.

Continued

From Marshall Islands: President; From Solomon Islands: Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, other seven ministers (Forestry, Environment and Conservation; Police and National Security; Communication and Civil Aviation; Land, Survey and Housing; Provincial Government and Constituency Development), President of the opposition party, Opposition Leader, four Members of Parliament (MPs) and a delegation of wives of ministers and new MPs led by the wife of Prime Minister; From Tuvalu: Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minster, Parliament Speaker, and three ministers (Health, Transport and Internal Affairs); From Nauru: President, Foreign Minister and Parliament Speaker; From Palau: President, Vice President, Former President, House Speaker and Defense Minister; From Marshall Islands: President, Foreign Minister, Deputy Speaker, Minister in Assistance to the President, Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Resources & Development, and three senators; From Kiribati: President, Vice President (Minister of Environment, Lands and Agricultural Development), Attorney General, Auditor General, Ministers of the Line and Phoenix Islands, Minister of Health and Medical Services and Vice Foreign Minister; From PNG: two state governors and Minister of Agriculture and Livestock.

From PRC

To China-Pacific Islands Economic Cooperation Forum (in Fiji) by Prime Minister; To Cook Islands: Foreign Minister, Assistant Foreign Minister, To Fiji: Premier, Foreign Minister, Vice Commerce Minister, Vice Agriculture Minister, Vice Health Minister, Chief Procurator; To Micronesia: Foreign Minister, Vice Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the NPC; To PNG: Foreign Minister, Vice Minister of General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, Vice President of the Export-Import Bank of China; To Samoa: Foreign Minister, Vice Minister of Tourism, Assistant Foreign Minister, Vice Minister of the International Department of the CCP Central Committee; To Tonga: Foreign Minister, Governor of Heilongjiang Province, Vice Minister of Tourism; To Vanuatu: Foreign Minister, Vice Minister of Commerce, Vice Agriculture Minister, Vice President of the Export-Import Bank of China, Vice Minister of China Earthquake Administration; To Palau: Vice Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the NPC; To Niue: Foreign Minister.

Year

2006

Continued

From Cook Islands: Secretary General of Ministry of Education and Acting Tourism Minister; From Fiji: Chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs and Education Minister; From Micronesia: President, Vice President, Foreign Minister, Deputy Speaker, and Chairman of Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee; From PNG: Governor-General, Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, Minister for Communication and Information, Minister for Justice (for a conference), Minister for Culture and Tourism, a state governor; From Samoa: Deputy Prime Minister, Health Minister and a delegation of the ruling party led by Minister for Customs and Revenue; From Tonga: Prince, Finance Minister and Chief of Defense Forces; From Vanuatu: Deputy Prime Minster (Foreign Minister), Minister of Infrastructure and Public Utilities, Minister of Trade and Tourism and a delegation of the ruling party.

To PRC To Palau: President for the First TaiwanPacific Allies Summit) and a legislator; To Marshall Islands: a former Senior Presidential Advisor; To Kiribati: Director General of Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; To Fiji: Minister of Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission.

From Taiwan

From Solomon Islands: Prime Minster, Parliament Speaker and Foreign Minister; From Tuvalu: Prime Minister and Finance Minister; From Nauru: President and Foreign Minister; From Palau: Chief of Staff to the President, House Speaker and Education Minister; From Marshall Islands: President, Foreign Minister, Minister of Public Works and Minister of Resources & Development; From Kiribati: President, Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Minister of Internal Affairs, and Former President; From Fiji: Parliament Taiwan-Friendship Group, Agriculture Minister and Chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs; From PNG: two state governors (one of them MP).

To Taiwan

2005

To Fiji: Chairman (stopover) and Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Vice President (stopover), Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, Minister of the International Department of the CCP Central Committee, and a PLA delegation; To Micronesia: two Vice Foreign Ministers; To PNG: Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, Minister of the International Department of the CCP Central Committee, and Vice Foreign Minister; To Samoa: President of China-Oceania Friendship Society; To Tonga: delegations from the NPC and the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television; To Vanuatu: Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and Minister of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television From Cook Islands: Prime Minister (leading a delegation of Tourism Ministers of the PICs); From Fiji: Prime Minister, Commander of Armed Forces; From Micronesia: Speaker and Vice Foreign Minister; From PNG: Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Minister for Culture and Tourism, Minister for Petroleum and Energy, Minister for Mineral Resources, a delegation led by vice chairman of the ruling party; From Samoa: Prime Minister, Minister of Revenue and Customs, Minister of Education, Sports and Culture, Communications Minister, Minister of Natural Resources (Minister of Environment), Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism; From Tonga: Prince, Foreign Minister, Queen, Princess, and four minister (Finance, Works, Education, and Forestry); From Vanuatu: Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister (Foreign Minister), three ministers (Infrastructure, Internal Affairs, Agriculture) and delegations of political parties. To Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu: President; To Kiribati: National Security Chief; To Marshall Islands: a former Senior Presidential Advisor; To PNG: two members of the Control Yuan; To Fiji: Minister of Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission and a Senior Presidential Advisor.

Continued

From Solomon Islands: Governor General, Prime Minster, Minister for Commerce, Industries and Employment, and Minister for Culture and Tourism; From Tuvalu: Finance Minister, Minister for Natural Resources and Minister for Internal Affairs; From Nauru: President and Foreign Minister; From Palau: President, Defense Minister and Chief Justice; From Marshall Islands: President, Foreign Minister, Former Foreign Minister, four other ministers (Resources & Development; Education; Public Works; Justice) and President of College of Marshall Islands; From Kiribati: Vice President; From PNG: Attorney General, Minister for Fisheries and Marine Resources, Minister for Agriculture and Livestock, Minister for Health and HIV/AIDS, two MPs and two state governors (both MPs); From Fiji: Deputy Speaker of the Senate, Vice Chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs, and Vice Agriculture Minister.

From PRC

To PNG: Vice Foreign Minister; To Samoa: Vice Foreign Minister (to the PIF dialogues); To Naru: delegations from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Affairs Committee of the CPPCC.

Year

2004

Continued

From Cook Islands: Prime Minister; From Fiji: Prime Minister and a delegation of political parties; From Micronesia: President, Foreign Minister, Assistant Foreign Minister; From Nauru: President, Finance Minister, Health Minister (conference); From PNG: Prime Minister, Education Minister and a delegation of a political party; From Samoa: Education Minister, Police Minister, Works Minister, Communications Minister, Heath Minister (conference), Minister for Commerce, Industry and Labor (conference); From Tonga: King, Prince (twice) and three ministers (Policy, Agriculture and Health); From Tuvalu: Prime Minister (led to his resignation); From Vanuatu: Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

To PRC To Solomon Islands: Auditor General, a Senior Presidential Advisor, Secretary General of the Legislative Yuan; To Palau: President and three legislators; To Marshall Islands: a Senor Presidential Advisor, Foreign Minister and four legislators; To Kiribati: Foreign Minister, Vice Foreign Minister and four legislators; To Tuvalu: Vice Foreign Minister; To Fiji: Minister without Portfolio and Vice Foreign Minister.

From Taiwan

From Solomon Islands: Parliament Speaker, Foreign Minister, Deputy Speaker, Minister for Fisheries and Marine Resources, Minister for National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace, Minister for Tourism and Culture, Minister for Provincial Government and Constituency Development, Acting Secretary General of Ministry of Health and 16 MPs; From Tuvalu: Governor General, Prime Minister, Parliament Speaker, Finance Minister, Minister for Home Affairs and Rural Development, Minister for Natural Resources, Health Minister, Opposition Leader, Secretary General of the Parliament and Permanent Representative to the UN; From Palau: President, Vice President (Health Minister), Defense Minister, Senate Speaker, House Speaker, Finance Minister, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Chief Justice and three MPs; From Marshall Islands: President, Foreign Minister, Former Foreign Minister, Minister for Resources and Development, Minister for Public Works, Education Minster, President of College of Marshall Islands and two senators; From Kiribati: President, Vice Foreign Minister, Minister for Public Works, Minister for Fisheries and Marine Resources Development, Minister for Internal Affairs, former leader of the ruling party, and leader of the Kiribati Protestant Church; From PNG: Minister for Fisheries and Marine Resources, Agriculture Minister, Minister for Health and HIV/AIDS, Attorney General, Minister for Agriculture and Livestock, Vice Minister for Commerce and Industry and two MPs; From Fiji: Deputy Speaker of the Senate, Vice Agriculture Minister, Vice Chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs, and Chairman of the Kadavu Provincial Council, Former Prime Minister and three House Members.

To Taiwan

2003

To Fiji and Vanuatu: Vice Foreign Minister; to PNG and Vanuatu: a Politburo member (Minister of Propaganda) and a Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee.

From Fiji: President, President of the Senate and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade; From Micronesia: a women’s delegation led by the wife of Parliament Speaker; From PNG: Governor-General, Minister for Petroleum, Energy and Mineral Resources, Secretary-General of Prime Minister’s Office; From Tonga: Chief Justice, Opposition Leader, Minister for Natural Resources and Environment (conference); From Samoa: Parliament Speaker, Deputy Prime Minister and Culture Minister (conference); From Vanuatu: Prime Minister. To Marshall Islands: a Senior Presidential Advisor; To PNG: two members of the Control Yuan; To Fiji: a Senior Presidential Advisor and Minister of Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission.

Continued

From Solomon Islands: Parliament Speaker, Foreign Minister, Deputy Speaker, Minister for Fisheries and Marine Resources, Minister for National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace, Minister for Tourism and Culture and 26 MPs; From Tuvalu: Governor-General, Prime Minister (Foreign Minister), Parliament Speaker, Finance Minister and Opposition Leader; From Palau: Vice President (Health Minister), Defense Minister, Senate Speaker, Chair of Foreign Affairs Committee in the Parliament, a state governor; From Marshall Islands: First Lady, Foreign Minister, former Foreign Minister and a 20-member delegation led by Minister for Resources and Development; From PNG: Minister for Fisheries, Agriculture Minister, Health Minister, Attorney General, two MPs; From Fiji: Deputy Speaker of the Senate, Vice Agriculture Minister, Vice Chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs, Chairman of the Kadavu Provincial Council.

From PRC

To Fiji: Vice Minister of Land Resources, Vice Minister of the Overseas Chinese Office of the State Council, Deputy Chief of Staff of PLA; To PNG: Vice Chairman of Central Military Committee and a deputy minister; To Samoa: Vice President of the CPAFFC, Vice Chairman of China Council for the Promotion of International Trade; To Tonga: Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vice Chairman of China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, Deputy Mayor of Tianjin Municipality.

Year

2002

Continued

From Fiji: Prime Minister, House Speaker and Senate President(both for a conference), Foreign Minister, Fisheries Minister, Minister of Youth and Sports, Finance Minister; From Kiribati: President, Vice President, Parliament Speaker, Education Minister and Minister for Communication and Transport; From Micronesia: Vice President, Parliament Speaker (conference); From Nauru: Minister for Economic Development, Finance Minister, Minister for Health and Sports; From PNG: Health Minister; From Samoa: Deputy Prime Minister (Finance Minister), Parliament Speaker, Justice Minister and Health Minister; From Tonga: Prime Minister and Princess for the opening of the Honorary Consulate; Minister for Trade and Commerce, Police Minister and Finance Minister for official visits; Deputy Prime Minster, Parliament Speaker and Education Minister for conferences; From Vanuatu: Deputy Prime Minster (Foreign Minister), Former Prime Minister and Health Minister.

To PRC To Palau: Minister of the Council of Indigenous Peoples, three legislators, Hsinchu Countymagistrate and Mayor of Taitung City; To Marshall Islands: Parliament Speaker (conference) and one legislator; To PNG: Director General of Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; To Fiji: President of the Examination Yuan, two Presidential Policy Advisors, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and six legislators.

From Taiwan

From Solomon Islands: GovernorGeneral, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Deputy Speaker and one MP; From Tuvalu: Prime Minster, Deputy Prime Minister, former Prime Minister, Minister for Internal Affairs, Minister for Natural Resources, Deputy Secretary to Government and two MPs; From Palau: President, Senate Speaker and Deputy Speaker, House Speaker and Deputy Speaker, Minister for Commerce and Trade, Paramount Chief, Queen of Koror and ten MPs; From Marshall Islands: President, Chairman of the Council of Iroij (the upper house), House Speaker, Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, Minister for Resources and Development, Minister for Public Works, Deputy Speaker of the Nitijela, four chairmen of Parliament committees (Justice and Inter-Government Relations; Finance; Resource Development; Public Accounts)and two Senators; From PNG: Deputy Prime Minister (Minister for Commerce and Industry); From Fiji: House Majority Leader, Vice Chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs, Chairman of the Kadavu Provincial Council and one MP; From Vanuatu: one MP.

To Taiwan

2001

To Vanuatu: Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and Assistant Foreign Minister; To Fiji: Chairman of the National Committee of CPPCC, Vice President of AllChina Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese; To PNG: Chairman of the National Committee of CPPCC, Vice Foreign Minister and Vice Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation; To Tonga: a delegation led by Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Deputy Chief of Staff of PLA.

From Kiribati: Secretary-General of the Cabinet and Minister of Environment and Social Development (for a conference); From Samoa: Secretary-General of the Cabinet, Minister of Environment and Chief Health Inspector of Ministry of Health; From Vanuatu: Vice President of Majority Party, Deputy Prime Minister (Minister of Trade and Commerce) and Foreign Minister; From Fiji: Minister for Youth, Employment and Sport (twice), Minister for Foreign Affairs and Sugar Industry; From PNG: Prime Minister, Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Prime Minister (Minister of Forestry), former Prime Minister; From Tonga: Prince, Foreign Minister, Commander of Defense Forces, Education Minister and a women’s delegation. To Nauru: Vice Foreign Minister (for PIF dialogues); To Marshall Islands: a Senior President Advisor and naval ships; To Palau: President of Judicial Yuan, Minister of the Council of Indigenous Peoples, Vice Foreign Minister and three legislators.

Continued

From Solomon Islands: Finance Minister, Police and Justice Minister, Minister for Youth, Sports and Women Agriculture Minister and nine state governors; From Tuvalu: Prime Minister, former Prime Minister, Parliament Speaker, former Minister for Local Government, Women and Youth, Deputy Secretary General of the Government and four MPs; From Marshall Islands: Minister for Internal Affairs, Tourism Minister, one MP and one city mayor; From Palau: former President, State Minister, Minister of Resources and Development, Paramount Chief, one state governor and one MP; From PNG: Minister of Fisheries and Director of National Research Institute.

To Kiribati: Vice Foreign Minister (for Post-Forum Dialogue); To Samoa: Agriculture Minister; To Cook Islands: Agriculture Minister; To Vanuatu: a working group led by Deputy Secretary-General of the International Department of the CCP Central Committee; To Fiji: Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, a military group led by Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs of Ministry of Defense; To PNG: a working group led by Deputy Secretary-General of the International Department of the CCP Central Committee, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA, a military group led by Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs of Ministry of Defense; To Tonga: Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and a PLA delegation led by Deputy Chief of Staff.

2000

From Kiribati: Parliament Speaker, Minister for Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister for Natural Resources Development; From Samoa: Prime Minster, Permanent Secretary of Prime Minister’s Office, Minister of Works, a Parliamentary delegation; From Cook Islands: Minister for Foreign Affairs and Immigration (Agriculture Minister); From Vanuatu: Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister (private visit), Minister of the Comprehensive Reform Program; From Fiji: Minister for Women and Culture; From PNG: two delegations of two political parties, a state governor, Parliament Speaker, Foreign Minister; From Micronesia: President; From Tonga: King, Parliament Speaker, a delegation led by Minister of Works.

To PRC To Tuvalu and Marshall Islands: Vice Foreign Minister; To Palau: Foreign Minister, Vice Foreign Minister and a member of the Control Yuan.

From Taiwan

From Solomon Islands: GovernorGeneral, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, Fisheries Minister and Health Minister; From Tuvalu: Governor-General, former Prime Minister, Prime Minister (Foreign Minister); From Nauru: President and Education Minister; From Marshall Islands: Foreign Minister, Chairman of the Council of Iroij (the upper house), Deputy Speaker of the House, Finance Minister, two MPs and Chairman of the ruling party; From Palau: President, Chief of Staff to the President, Presidentelect, Minister of Commerce and Trade, Defense Minister; From Fiji: one senator.

To Taiwan

Sources: From and to PRC: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaobu Zhengce Yanjiusi (Policy Research Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC), Zhongguo Waijiao 2001–2010 (China’s Foreign Affairs, 2001–2010) (Yearbook) ( Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe—World Affairs Press). From and to Taiwan: Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC), Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Nianjian, 2000–2008 (Foreign Relations Yearbook, the Republic of China, 2000–2008); for visits to and from Taiwan in 2009, the news pages of Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/lp.asp?CtNode=1546&CtUnit=49&BaseDSD=40&mp=1 (accessed March 22, 2011).

From PRC

Year

Continued

China

Japan

New Zealand

Taiwan

United Kingdom

United States

98 4 — 1 877 45 195 8 6 48

59 23 1 6 394 22 29 21 — 40

99 14 — 30 575 24 22 12 7 59

79 15 2 21 791 13 16 3 57 99

116 2 12 — 66 36 7 19 1 8

Sources: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2007 and 2010.

39 1 — 1 245 7 51 17 6 18

286 5 — — 135 70 10 40 1 18

233 4 3 — 131 77 16 36 2 30

18 — — — 19 4 1 1 — 7

13 — — — 23 3 1 1 — 5

34 — — — 99 12 2 1 — 1

107 1 3 — 93 1 9 4 — —

126 — — — 116 3 3 4 — 5

134 2 — — 106 2 6 — — 9

183 5 7 — 63 72 7 14 — 10

216 3 2 — 117 24 4 17 — 12

198 2 4 — 325 24 7 17 — 6

2000 2005 2009 2000 2005 2009 2000 2005 2009 2000 2005 2009 2000 2005 2009 2000 2005 2009 2000 2005 2009

Australia

Fiji 511 460 368 15 Kiribati 16 23 20 1 Nauru 18 10 19 — Palau — 2 1 2 PNG 1,396 2,510 3,788 2,126 Samoa 106 93 60 2 Solomon Is 34 52 67 14 Tonga 8 12 11 2 Tuvalu 2 3 4 — Vanuatu 28 48 57 1

Country

Appendix 2 Trade between PICs and Selected Economies (US$ million)

240.3

269.7

— — — — —

0.7 8.6 7.2 0.7 1.2 11.4 0.4 0.2 180.4 9.1 19.9 7.5 2.1 9.9 10.4

2002

376.9

— — — 0.1 —

1.0 12.9 6.0 0.7 1.1 15.8 0.6 0.5 208.9 9.4 69.0 6.2 1.9 15.5 27.4

2003

446.4

— — — 0.5 —

2.0 15.8 5.4 0.9 1.6 13.3 4.3 0.8 242.3 12.7 102.2 7.9 2.9 19.1 14.7

2004

483.4

— — — 0.4 —

2.1 20.5 7.0 1.0 1.8 7.3 1.2 0.9 233.7 12.1 143.0 8.8 2.9 19.1 21.9

2005

550.3

— — — 4.0 —

1.7 21.9 6.7 0.8 1.8 16.6 0.8 0.5 242.2 13.3 146.4 7.7 3.0 21.5 61.5

2006

649.5

— — — 0.3 —

2.7 18.6 5.8 0.7 1.1 21.6 0.7 0.6 281.4 12.9 201.8 10.5 3.5 22.1 65.3

2007

723.5

— — — 0.4 —

0.6 18.3 8.1 0.5 1.3 26.8 0.9 0.3 321.3 12.4 185.8 11.7 4.4 26.8 103.8

2008

703.6

— — — 0.8 0.0

3.0 20.1 10.1 1.6 2.1 18.3 1.3 1.0 301.9 17.8 168.8 14.4 4.6 40.0 97.9

2009

Sources: For 2000–2002: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2008, p. 23. For 2003–2009: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2011, p. 23.

267.4

— — — 0.1 —

— — — 0.1 —

TOTAL

1.4 8.5 5.4 0.6 0.7 7.0 0.4 0.3 158.2 7.9 19.8 5.4 1.4 10.2 13.1

1.0 10.7 4.9 0.6 0.8 1.7 0.6 0.2 198.2 7.0 13.0 5.1 1.7 8.7 13.2

Cook Islands Fiji Kiribati Marshall Islands Micronesia, Fed States of Nauru Niue Palau Papua New Guinea Samoa Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu Regional Other Pacific French Polynesia New Caledonia Northern Marianas Tokelau Wallis & Futuna

2001

2000

14 PICs

Appendix 3 Australian Net ODA Disbursements to the South Pacific (US$ million)

— — — 3.8 0.1 51.7

— — — 3.3 0.0 52.1

— — — 4.5 0.0 48.6

2.7 2.8 1.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.2 5.9 4.6 3.3 3.7 1.0 3.3 11.0

2002

— — — 6.2 0.0 65.9

3.4 2.7 2.1 0.2 0.4 — 8.2 0.1 7.7 4.7 6.2 3.8 1.3 4.7 14.2

2003

— — — 7.9 0.0 79.4

3.8 2.8 2.1 0.1 0.3 — 8.8 0.0 8.4 5.9 11.6 3.9 1.2 4.7 18.0

2004

— — — 15.5 0.0 103.8

4.7 3.5 1.7 0.1 0.4 0.4 18.8 0.0 9.5 4.3 10.4 4.8 1.6 5.0 23.3

2005

— — — 6.8 0.0 113.3

4.8 5.9 2.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 7.7 — 13.7 7.3 17.7 6.1 1.4 7.0 32.5

2006

— — — 12.3 0.0 133.2

5.7 3.6 2.4 0.1 0.2 1.3 13.0 0.0 12.7 6.3 17.6 11.9 2.2 7.4 36.6

2007

— — — 21.0 0.0 156.3

3.8 3.9 3.6 0.2 0.1 0.8 15.4 0.0 17.2 7.6 22.1 6.4 4.5 10.5 39.2

2008

— — — 8.8 0.0 135.9

2.9 3.3 5.3 — 0.1 1.1 5.6 0.0 14.7 10.3 26.8 7.2 1.3 15.5 32.8

2009

Sources: For 2000–2002: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2008, p. 51. For 2003–2009: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2011, p. 53.

2.3 1.8 1.5 0.1 0.2 — 2.7 0.2 6.8 4.3 6.5 3.6 0.9 3.7 13.5

2.1 2.1 1.7 0.1 0.2 — 2.3 0.1 6.7 4.2 5.3 3.5 1.1 4.2 15.1

Cook Islands Fiji Kiribati Marshall Islands Micronesia, Fed States of Nauru Niue Palau Papua New Guinea Samoa Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu Regional Other Pacific French Polynesia New Caledonia Northern Marianas Tokelau Wallis & Futuna TOTAL

2001

2000

14 PICs

Appendix 4 New Zealand’s Net ODA Disbursements to the South Pacific (US$ million)

Notes

Introduction 1. Ramesh Thakur, “Introduction to the South Pacific,” in The South Pacific: Problems, Issues and Prospects, edited by Ramesh Thakur (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional, 1991), p. 1. 2. Kennedy Graham, “Models of Regional Governance: Is There a Choice for the Pacific,” in Models of Regional Governance for the Pacific: Sovereignty and the Future Architecture of Regionalism, edited by Kennedy Graham (Christchurch: University of Canterbury Press, 2008), p. 23.

One China’s Growing Involvement in the South Pacific 1. John Henderson and Benjamin Reilly, “Dragon in Paradise: China’s Rising Star in Oceania,” The National Interest, 72 (2003): 98. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Margaret Wilson et al., “Asian Workers in the Pacific,” in Labour in the South Pacific, edited by Clive Moore et al. (Townsville: James Cook University of Northern Queensland, 1990), p. 79. 5. Sin Joan Yee, The Chinese in the Pacific (Suva: South Pacific Social Sciences Association, 1974), p. 1. 6. Robert L. Irick, Ch’ing Policy toward the Coolie Trade: 1847–1878 (Taiwan: Chinese Materials Center, 1982), p. 12. 7. Yee, The Chinese in the Pacific, p. 1. 8. Irick, Ch’ing Policy toward the Coolie Trade: 1847–1878, p. 11; Yee, The Chinese in the Pacific, pp. 1–2. 9. Irick, Ch’ing Policy toward the Coolie Trade: 1847–1878, p. 13. 10. Kwok B. Chan, Smoke and Fire: The Chinese in Montreal (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991), p. 12. 11. Persia Crawford Campbell, Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire (London: Frank Cass, 1971), p. 218. 12. Lynn Pan (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas (Richmond: Curzon, 1998), p. 292. 13. Ibid.

164

NOTES

14. David Y. H. Wu, “To Kill Three Birds with One Stone: The Rotating Credit Associations of the Papua New Guinea Chinese,” American Ethnologist 1, no. 3 (August 1974): 567 15. Campbell, Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire, p. 232 16. Ibid., p. 229. 17. Pan, The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas, p. 292. 18. Wilson et al., “Asian Workers in the Pacific,” p. 92 19. Ibid., p. 97. 20. Irick, Ch’ing Policy toward the Coolie Trade: 1847–1878, pp. 275–276. 21. Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West (Suva, Fiji: IPS, University of the South Pacific, 2007), p. 230. 22. Ibid., p. 7. 23. Ralph Premdas, “Ideology, Pragmatism, Identity,” in Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics (Suva: IPS, 1983), p. 219. 24. Stephen Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the NZ Institute of International Affairs, 1992), p. 48 25. Thomas V. Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific: The PRC and Taiwan,” Asian Survey 20, no. 8 (1989): 804. 26. Michael Godley, “China: The Waking Giant,” in Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics (Suva: IPS, 1983), p. 131. 27. Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific,” p. 811. 28. Godley, “China: The Waking Giant,” pp. 137–138. 29. Ibid., pp. 131–132. 30. Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific,” p. 812. 31. Ibid. 32. David Hegarty, “The Soviet Union in the South Pacific in the 1990s,” in The Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, edited by Ross Babbage (NSW, Australia: Brassey’s Australia, 1989), p. 122. 33. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 8. 34. Wu, The Chinese in Papua New Guinea, pp. 137–156. 35. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 64. 36. Ibid., p. 65. 37. Ibid., p. 66. 38. Edgar A. Porter and Terence Wesley-Smith, “Introduction: Oceania Matters,” in China in Oceania: Shaping the Pacific? edited by Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A. Porter (London: Berghahn Books, 2010), p. 1. 39. Godley, “China: The Waking Giant,” p. 140 40. Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific,” p. 802. 41. Ibid., p. 813. 42. Ramesh Thakur, “Introduction to the South Pacific,” in The South Pacific: Problems, Issues and Prospects, edited by Ramesh Thakur (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional, 1991), p. 21. Italic original. 43. Ibid., p. 22. 44. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, p. 35.

NOTES

165

45. Graeme Dobell, “China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: Diplomatic Chess versus Pacific Political Rugby” (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, January 2007), p. 6. 46. Interview with a senior Chinese diplomat in Apia in February 2011. 47. Henderson and Reilly, “Dragon in Paradise,” p. 95. 48. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 122. 49. Ibid., p. 123. 50. Chen Mingde, “Zhongguo shangwubu buzhang Chen Deming zai Zhongguo-Taipingyang daoguo jingji fazhan hezuo luntan buzhang ji huiyi shang de jianghua” (Speech by Chinese Commerce Minister Chen Mingde at the Ministerial Meeting of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum) September 9, 2008. http: //chendeming.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/speeches/200810/20081005820577 .html (accessed on March 13, 2011). 51. Kalinga Seneviratne, “South Pacific: Chinese relief from domineering Australia,” Inter Press Service (IPS), April 17, 2006. http://ipsnews.net/news .asp?idnews=32909 (accessed on March 19, 2008). 52. Preethi Sundaram, “China—The new Pacific power: Chinese visitors, Chinese aid on the rise,” Island Business. http://www.islandsbusiness.com /fiji_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle /focusModuleID=19420/overideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl (accessed on March 13, 2011). 53. Michael Powles, “Challenges, Opportunities, and the Case for Engagement,” in China in Oceania: Shaping the Pacific? pp. 67–84. 54. Susan Windybank, “The China Syndrome,” Policy 21, no. 2 (2005): 32. 55. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 124. 56. Tamara Renee Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” Asian Survey 47, no. 2 (2007): 309. 57. Fergus Hanson, “The Dragon in the Pacific: More Opportunity than Threat” (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2008), p. 3. 58. By September 2008, China had cancelled the debt of Samoa and Vanuatu totalling 170 million yuan (about US$25 million). M. Chen, “Speech by Chinese Commerce Minister Chen Mingde at the Ministerial Meeting of the ChinaPacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum.” 59. AFP, “China offers aid package to Pacific Islands,” China Daily, April 5, 2006. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-04/05/content_560910 .htm (accessed on March 9, 2010). See also Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” p. 314. 60. Greg Ansley, “Beijing’s moves have Canberra in a bind,” New Zealand Herald, April 11, 2006. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article. cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10376876 (accessed on April 12, 2010). 61. Zhonghua Minguo Qiaowu Weiyuanhui (Overseas Compatriots Affairs Commission, ROC), Zhonghua Minguo 98 Nian Qiaowu Tongji Nianbao (2009 Statistical Yearbook of the Overseas Compatriots Affairs Commission of the Republic of China, p. 10. http://www.ocac.gov.tw/public/public .asp?selno=951&no=951&level=B#1 (accessed on March 26, 2011).

166

NOTES

62. Zheng Jianmin, “huaqiao huaren zai fazhan Zhongguo yu Nantaipingyang daoguo guanxi zhong de zuoyong” (The Role of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas in the Development of China’s Relations with Pacific Island Countries), in Haiwan Huaren Shehui Xin Shiye (New Perspectives of Overseas Chinese Societies), edited by Lu Weixiong (Hong Kong: Xianggang Shehui Kexue Chubanshe Youxian Gongsi—Hong Kong Social Sciences Press, 2008), p. 335. 63. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, pp. 94–95. 64. J. Zheng, “The Role of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas in the Development of China’s Relations with Pacific Island Countries,” p. 335. 65. CCTV, “CCTV NEWS quanqiu luodi xiangmu yilanbiao 2” (Table 2 of CCTV News Global Landing Programs), June 7, 2010.http://big5.cctv.com /gate/big5/blog.cctv.com/html/73/806173–165900.html (accessed on March 18, 2011). 66. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, “Fiji: Bilateral Relations,” December 9, 2003. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/bmdyzs/gjlb/3392/ (accessed on April 9, 2010). 67. Greg Fry, “The Politics of South Pacific Regional Cooperation,” in The South Pacific, edited by Thakur, p. 171. 68. Philip Goff, “Pacific Regionalism: Tradition, Continuity, Renewal,” in Redefining the Pacific? Regionalism Past, Present and Future, edited by Jenny Bryant-Tokalau and Ian Frazer (Aldershot, Hampshire; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), p. 26. 69. Ian Frazer and Jenny Bryant-Tokalau, “Introduction: The Uncertain Future of Pacific Regionalism,” in Redefining the Pacific? Regionalism Past, Present and Future, edited by Bryant-Tokalau and Frazer, p. 5 70. Frazer and Bryant-Tokalau, “Introduction,” p. 11. 71. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, “Pacific Islands forum,” Press release, December 9, 2003. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2616 /t55904.htm (accessed on April 12, 2010). 72. Xinhua, “FM: China, Pacific islands countries ties important,” October 20, 2007. http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/228960.htm (accessed in April 12, 2010). 73. The Senate—Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, China’s Emergence: Implications for Australia (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, March 2006), p. 180. http://www.comw.org/cmp /fulltext/0603chinareport.pdf (accessed on March 21, 2011). 74. Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” p. 314. 75. Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “China assists ICT & transportation in PICs,” January 26, 2007. http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom /press-statements/2007/china-assists-ict-transportation-pics.html (accessed on April 2, 2010). 76. Xinhua, “China joins South Pacific tourism organization,” March 20, 2004. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004–04/20/content_1430860.htm (accessed on April 12, 2010).

NOTES

167

77. Michael Somare, “China-Pacific development,” April 5, 2006. http://www .forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom/speeches/speeches-2006/pm-somare -china-pacific-development-5apr06-.html (accessed on April 12, 2010). 78. Windybank, “The China Syndrome,” p. 31. 79. Ibid., pp. 28–33. 80. Henderson and Reilly, “Dragon in Paradise,” p. 99. 81. Dobell, “China and Taiwan in the South Pacific,” p. 10. 82. Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn, “The Southwest Pacific: U.S. Interests and China’s Growing Influence,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, 2007, Summary page. 83. Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” pp. 322–323 84. Elizabeth Feizkhah, “How to win friends . . . Beijing is courting tiny Pacific nations,” Time International 157, no. 22 (4 June 2001): 34. Also available online http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2056147,00.html (accessed on March 22, 2011). 85. Henderson and Reilly, “Dragon in Paradise,” pp. 94–95. 86. Ibid. 87. Windybank, “The China Syndrome,” p. 28. 88. Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” p. 322. 89. “Riots the tip of the Pacific iceberg,” New Zealand Herald, December 14, 2007. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/topic/story.cfm?c_id=209&objectid=10482257 (accessed on April 12, 2010).

Two The Evolving Regional Order in the South Pacific: The Rise and Fall of External Players 1. Gotz Mackense, “Europe: Raw Materials, Markets and Security Interests,” in Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics (Suva: IPS, 1983), p. 166. 2. Hal M. Friedman, Arguing over the American Lake: Bureaucracy and Rivalry in the U.S. Pacific (Texas: A & M University Press, 2009), p. 1. 3. Donald D. Johnson, “The United States: The Big Umbrella,” in Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics (Suva: IPS, 1983), p. 68. 4. Ibid., p. 72. 5. Ibid., pp. 72–75. 6. John C. Dorrance, “The Soviet Union and the Pacific Islands: A Current Assessment,” Asian Survey 30, no. 9 (September, 1990): 909. 7. Ibid. 8. Johnson, “The United States: The Big Umbrella,” p. 76. 9. Ken Ross, Regional Security in the South Pacific: The Quarter-century 1970–95 (Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University, 1993), p. 30. 10. David Hegarty, “The Soviet Union in the South Pacific in the 1990s,” in The Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, edited by Ross Babbage(NSW, Australia: Brassey’s Australia, 1989), p. 114.

168 11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16. 17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39.

NOTES

Ibid. Johnson, “The United States: The Big Umbrella,” p. 85. Ibid. Stephen Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook (Sydney: Allen &Unwin in association with the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1992), p. 49. David Hegarty, “The External Powers in the South Pacific,” in South Pacific Security: Issues and Perspective, edited by Stephen Henningham and Desmond Ball (Canberra: Australian National University, 1991), p. 95. Ibid. Dorrance, “The Soviet Union and the Pacific Islands,” p. 916. Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West (Suva, Fiji: IPS, University of the South Pacific, 2007), p. 269. John Connell, Papua New Guinea: The Struggle for Development (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 307; Stewart Firth, “Conceptualizing Security in Oceania: New and Enduring Issues,” in Security in Oceania: In the 21st Century, edited by Eric Shibuya and Jim Rolfe (Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003), pp. 41–42. Hegarty, “The Soviet Union in the South Pacific in the 1990s,” pp. 122–123. Hegarty, “The External Powers in the South Pacific,” p. 96. Ibid., p. 99. Yves Pimont, “France in the South Pacific,” in South Pacific Security: Issues and Perspectives, edited by Henningham and Ball, p. 126. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, p. 39. Ibid., p. 40. Firth, “Conceptualizing Security in Oceania,” pp. 41–43. Richard J. Payne, “The Changing US Security Policy in the Pacific,” in Security in Oceania: In the 21st Century, edited by Shibuya and Rolfe, p. 53. Ibid. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, p. 39. Payne, “The Changing US Security Policy in the Pacific,” p. 53. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, pp. 230–231. Tanaka Yoshiaki, “Pacific Island States and Japan in the Global Context: Democracy, Foreign Aid and Economic Development,” in Security in Oceania: In the 21st Century, edited by Shibuya and Rolfe, p. 104. Ken Ross, Regional Security in the South Pacific, p. 25. US Department of State, “Background note: Micronesia,” December 2007. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm (accessed on February 11, 2008). Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn, “The Southwest Pacific: U.S. Interests and China’s Growing Influence,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, 2007, p. 6. Tamara Renee Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” Asian Survey 47, no. 2 (2007): 325. Payne, “The Changing US Security Policy in the Pacific,” p. 56. Ibid., pp. 56–57. Mackense, “Europe: Raw Materials, Markets and Security Interests,” p. 165.

NOTES

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

169

Ibid. Ibid., p. 166. Ibid., pp. 166–170. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, pp. 47–48. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 230. OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2011: Disbursements, Commitments, Country Indicators (OECD, 2011), p. 65. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, p. 40. Pimont, “France in the South Pacific,” pp. 127–131. Hegarty, “The External Powers in the South Pacific,” pp. 100–101. Pimont, “France in the South Pacific,” p. 114. Robert Aldrich, “France in the South Pacific,” in No Longer an American Lake? Alliance Problems in the South Pacific, edited by John Ravenhill (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989), pp. 93–94; Hegarty, “The Soviet Union in the South Pacific in the 1990s,” p. 122 Karin von Strokirch, “The Role of France in Pacific Islands Security,” in Security in Oceania: In the 21st Century, edited by Shibuya and Rolfe, p. 72. Hegarty, “The Soviet Union in the South Pacific in the 1990s,” p. 122. Von Strokirch, “The Role of France in Pacific Islands Security,” p. 72. Ibid. Stephen Henningham, France and the South Pacific: A Contemporary History (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), p. 169. Pimont, “France in the South Pacific,” p. 116. Firth, “Conceptualizing Security in Oceania,” p. 42. Henningham, France and the South Pacific, p. 193. Von Strokirch, “The Role of France in Pacific Islands Security,” p. 72. Yoshiaki, “Pacific Island States and Japan in the Global Context,” p. 103. Ibid. Von Strokirch, “The Role of France in Pacific Islands Security,” p. 89. OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2011, p. 36. Winston Peters, “Influences in the Pacific,” August 16, 2006. http://www .beehive.govt.nz/node/26805 (accessed on February 25, 2011). Europa, EU-Pacific Strategy (European Commission, EU relations with the Pacific Islands—A Strategy for a Strengthened Partnership), May 29, 2006. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/african_caribbean _pacific_states/r12556_en.htm (accessed on February 27, 2011). Europa, EU-Pacific Strategy. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, p. 43. Terutaro Nishino, “Japan: The Risen Sun,” in Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics (Suva: IPS, 1983), pp. 112–129. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 244. Sandra Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands (Canberra: Australian National University; Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1998), p. 2.

170

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71. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Island, p. 244. 72. Ibid., p. 245. 73. Peter Hartcher, “Japan ready to increase its involvement in South Pacific,” Sydney Morning Herald, January 16, 1987 (Database Factiva). 74. Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, p. 11. Benjamin Reilly noted in 2008 that a decade earlier Japan contributed more bilateral aid to the region than any other country with the exception of Australia in Papua New Guinea. Benjamin Reilly, “Japan’s aid to the South Pacific and the China factor,” August 6, 2008. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2008/08/06 /japan%E2%80%99s-aid-to-the-south-pacif ic-and-the-china-factor / (accessed on August 21, 2009). 75. “Japan-S.Pacific islands ties entering new era,” Japan Policy & Politics, October 14, 1996. (Database Factiva). 76. Japan Economic Newswire, “S. Pacific nations told aid levels won’t plunge,” October 13, 1997. (Database Factiva). 77. Ibid. 78. Reilly, “Japan’s aid to the South Pacific and the China factor.” 79. Japan Economic Newswire, “S. Pacific nations told aid levels won’t plunge.” 80. Yoshiaki, “Pacific Island States and Japan in the Global Context,” p. 104. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid. 83. Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, p. 11. 84. Asia Pulse, “Pacific Islands centre in Japan to open,” October 8, 1996 (Database Factiva). 85. For more information, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan and the Pacific Islands Forum Relations.” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia -paci/spf/index.html (accessed on March 19, 2011). 86. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Why Japan is hosting the PALM summit being held? Objectives of the PALM summit,” 2003. http://www.mofa.go.jp /region/asia-paci/spf/palm2003/host.html (accessed on August 25, 2009). 87. Japan Economic Newswire, “S. Pacific nations told aid levels won’t plunge.” 88. Japan Economic Newswire, “Vanuatu prime minister backs Security Council seat bid,” June 28, 1995. (Database Factiva). 89. Jiji, “SPF unanimously supports Japan’s UNSC bid,” September 5, 1996 (Database Factiva). 90. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, p. 47. 91. PACNEWS, “Japan paid Solomon Islands for whaling support,” March 10, 2008. (Database Factiva); Pacific Islands Broadcasting Association News Service, “Japan accused of buying support from countries for whaling,” November 12, 1999. (Database Factiva). 92. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 248. 93. Ron Crocombe, The South Pacific (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies of the University of the South Pacific, 2001), p. 333. 94. Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, pp. 6–7. 95. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 245.

NOTES

171

96. Yoshiaki, “Pacific Island States and Japan in the Global Context,” pp. 105–106. 97. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 245. 98. Reilly, “Japan’s aid to the South Pacific and the China factor.” 99. Kabayashi Izumi, “China’s Advances in Oceania and Japan’s Response,” in China in Oceania: Shaping the Pacific? edited by Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A. Porter (London: Berghahn Books, 2010), pp. 85–92. 100. “Press conference by prime minister Taro Aso and premier Toke Tufukia Talagi of Niue following the fifth Pacific Islands leaders meeting (PALM5),” May 23, 2009. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign /asospeech/2009/05/23kaiken_e.html (accessed on August 21, 2010). 101. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, p. 52. 102. Hegarty, “The External Powers in the South Pacific,” p. 101. 103. Ibid., pp. 101–105. 104. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, pp. 301–306. 105. Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook, p. 50. 106. Ibid., p. 51. 107. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 281. 108. Ibid., p. 301. 109. Hegarty, “The External Powers in the South Pacific,” pp. 101–105. 110. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2009, p. 819. 111. Ibid., p. 274.

Three China’s Security Concerns and Grand Strategy 1. Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), p. ix. 2. Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 18. 3. Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 88. 4. Peter Feaver, “What is grand strategy and why do we need it?” Foreign Policy, April 8, 2009. http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08 /what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_it (accessed on March 11, 2011). 5. Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (September–October 1996): 37. 6. Brian P. White, “Decision-Making Analysis,” in Approaches and Theory in International Relations, edited by Trevor Taylor (London and New York: Longman, 1978), p. 142. 7. Ibid. 8. Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, England; New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 238.

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9. Chu Shulong, “The PRC Girds for Limited, High-Tech War,” Orbis 38, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 180–183; David Shambaugh, “The Insecurity of Security: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions towards 2000,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 13, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 6. 10. For more information, see Jian Yang, Congress and US China Policy, 1989– 1999 (New York: Nova Science, 2000). 11. Yan Bai, “ ‘Zhongguo weixielun’ de sici chaoliu” (The Four Waves of the “China Threat Theory”), Shishi Baogao (Current Affairs Report), no. 10 (2005): 70. 12. Ibid. 13. Qin Yaqing, “A Response to Yong Deng: Power, Perception, and the Culture Lens,” Asian Affairs, an American Review 28, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 157–158. 14. China’s territorial disputes with Russia have been mostly resolved. 15. U.S. Department of State, “Background note: China,” October 2009. http: //www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm (accessed on April 12, 2010). 16. Malcolm Moore, “China’s wealth gap the widest since economic reforms began,” The Telegraph, March 2, 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news /worldnews/asia/china/7350677/Chinas-wealth-gap-the-widest-since -economic-reforms-began.html (accessed on June 13, 2011). 17. Xinhua, “China needs to close wealth gap,” October 13, 2007. http://www .chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/13/content_6172289.htm (accessed on March 6, 2011); Reuters, “China’s urban-rural wealth gap widens in 2008,” January 22, 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-CreditCrisis /idUSTRE50L21220090122 (accessed on April 12, 2010). 18. Chen Jia, “Wealth gap poses threat to stability,” China Daily, January 9, 2010. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010–01/09/content_9292221.htm (accessed on March 6, 2011). 19. “China focus: Wealth gap challenges China’s endeavor to build harmonious society,” People’s Daily Online, October 5, 2005. http://english.people.com .cn/200510/05/eng20051005_212586.html (accessed on April 12, 2010). 20. Xing Zhigang, “Taiwan: Don’t test Beijing’s resolve,” China Daily, July 29, 2004. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004–07/29/content_352565 .htm (accessed on March 26, 2011). 21. Chu Shulong and Wang Zaibang, “guanyu guoji xingshi he wo duiwai zhanlue ruogan zhongda wenti de sikao” (Some Thoughts on Several Major Issues about International Situation and Our External Strategy), Xiandai Guoji Guangxi (Contemporary International Relations), no. 8 (1999): 5. 22. Beijing initially used “peaceful rise.” Now it prefers “peaceful development.” 23. Rao Geping, “guoji falu zhixu yu Zhongguo de heping fazhan” (International Legal System and China’s Peaceful Development), Waijiao Pinglun (Foreign Affairs Review), no. 6 (2005): 51. 24. Lester R. Brown, Who Will Feed China?: Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet (New York: W.W. Norton; Worldwatch Institute, Environmental Alert Series. 1995), p. 32. 25. Jonathan Watts, “China shifts from receiving to giving foreign aid as economic boom continues,” The Guardian, December 15, 2004. http://www.guardian

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.co.uk/china/story/0,7369,1373830,00.html#article_continue (accessed on April 11, 2010); “China emerges as major food donor,” People’s Daily Online, July 21, 2006. http://english.people.com.cn/200607/21/eng20060721_285296 .html (accessed on April 11, 2010). B. A. Hamzah, “Pax Sinica and regional maritime order in the Spratlys,” April 20, 2009, p. 5. http://www.iseas.edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/ascdf2c2 .pdf (accessed on April 12, 2010). Stephen Kaufman, “Clinton urges legal resolution of South China Sea dispute,” July 23, 2010. http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2010/July /20100723154256esnamfuak4.879177e-03.html (accessed on February 9, 2011). Hamzah, “Pax Sinica and regional maritime order in the Spratlys,” p. 5. Zhongguo Guojia Tongjiju, China Statistical Yearbook 2010, p. 238. William A. Callahan, “How to Understand China: The Danger and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power,” Review of International Studies 31, no. 4 (2005): 709. T’Ang Leang-Li, China in Revolt: How a Civilization Became a Nation (London: N. Douglas, 1927), p. xv. Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 19–20. Louisa Lim, “Chinese protests on the rise,” BBC, June 8, 2004. http://news .bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3786541.stm (accessed on October 26, 2009). Qin Xudong, “chuzhi quntixin shjian shidang deng jiang bei wenze” (Officials to be held accountable for “inappropriate handling” of mass incidents and other issues), Caijing Wang (caijing.com.cn), July 12, 2009. http://www .caijing.com.cn/2009–07-12/110196587.html (accessed on March 19, 2011). Tracy Quek, “China riots ‘won’t lead to rebellion,” The Straits Times, February 12, 2009. http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?sec=3&id=3903 (accessed on June 14, 2011). Yu Jiangrong and Yu Debao, “China civil society report: Mass incidents in China,” Policy Forum Online, August 26, 2008. http://www.nautilus.org /fora/security/08065YuYu.html (accessed on April 12, 2010). Chris Hogg, “China’s security tsar warns over ‘jasmine revolution,” BBC, February 21, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12522856 (accessed on March 6, 2011). Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers and Tools, Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, October 2006), p. 112. Guo Wanchao, Zhongguo Jueqi (The Rise of China) (Nanchang, Jiangxi: Jiangxi People’s Press, 2004), p. 24. Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, January 2000). http: //www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/pills2/ (accessed on April 12, 2010). Guo, Rise of China, p. 24.

174

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42. Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo Guojia Liyi Fenxi (An Analysis of China’s National Interests), (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe—Tianjin People’s Press, 1996), p. 309. 43. Chu and Wang , “Some Thoughts on Several Major Issues about International Situation and Our External Strategy,” p. 6; Yan Xuetong, “guoji huanjing ji waijiao sikao” (International Environment and Thoughts on Diplomacy), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) no. 8 (1999): 10. 44. Swaine and Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy, p. ix. 45. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “China’s Grand Strategy and Money Muscle: The Potentialities and Pratfalls of China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund and Reminbi Policies,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2011): 31. 46. Ibid.

Four The Taipei-Beijing Diplomatic Rivalry 1. Rowan Callick, “China and Taiwan end war over Pacific aid,” The Australian, August 10, 2009. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/china-and-taiwan -end-war-over-pacific-aid/story-e6frg6t6–1225759586179 (accessed on April 3, 2010). 2. Daniel P. Erikson and Janice Chen, “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 31, no. 2 (2007): 69. 3. Taipei repeatedly condemned Beijing’s policy in its yearbooks before 2008. 4. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC), Zhonghua Minguo 87 Nian Waijiao Nianjian (Foreign Relations Yearbook 1998, the Republic of China). http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac /almanac1998/preface/list.htm (accessed on April 12, 2010). 5. Erikson and Chen, “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America,” p. 80. 6. Richard C. Lin, “Complementary Measures to Foreign Aid: Taiwan and the P.R.C. under Diplomatic Rivalry,” Contemporary Economic Policy 19 no. 3 (2001): 360. 7. Erikson and Chen, “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America,” p. 70. 8. Stephen Johnson, “Balancing China’s Growing Influence in Latin America,” The Heritage Foundation, October 2005. http://www.heritage.org/Research /LatinAmerica/bg1888.cfm (accessed on January 10, 2010). 9. Larry Luxner, “In Caribbean and Latin America, Chinese dragon wakes up,” Seis Continentes (2005). http://www.luxner.com/cgi-bin/view_article .cgi?articleID=1378 (accessed on March 6, 2011). 10. Dan Erikson, “China in the Caribbean: A Benign Dragon?” FOCAL Point Spotlight on the Americas 4, no. 5 (April 2005): 1. 11. Luxner, “In Caribbean and Latin America, Chinese dragon wakes up.” 12. Erikson and Chen, “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America,” p. 72. 13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC, “The government of the Republic of China deeply regrets that the government of the Republic of Macedonia has disregarded the friendly relations existing between the two countries

NOTES

14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

19.

20.

21. 22.

23.

24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31.

175

and acquiesced in the pressure and enticement of Mainland China,” (2001). http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=2284&ctNode=1902&mp=6 (accessed on January 7, 2010). Li He, “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America: Challenges and Opportunities,” E.A.I. Background Brief no. 411 (2008): 13. Ibid., p. 10. Ian Taylor, “Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and Africa: The Limitations of Dollar Diplomacy,” Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 30 (2002): 127–128. Anthony van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition: Diplomatic Competition between China and Taiwan in Oceania,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 12, no. 2 (2007): 132. Frank Chang, “Papua New Guinea signs new fishery agreement with ROC,” July 16, 1999. http://taiwanauj.nat.gov.tw/fp.asp?xItem=17325&ctNode=118 (accessed on April 7, 2010). “Taiwan joins South Pacific fisheries pact,” December 8, 2009. http://roc -taiwan.org/ct.asp?xItem=119759&ctNode=2237&mp=1&nowPage=68& pagesize=15 (accessed on April 7, 2010). Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2005, the Republic of China. http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac/ almanac2005/index.htm (accessed on April 12, 2010). Such comments have been repeated for years in the ministry’s foreign affairs yearbooks. Andre Vltchek, “Wooing the Islands: China and Taiwan high stakes bid for Pacific Island support,” Japan Focus, 20 (April 2008). http://www.japanfocus. org/-Andre-Vltchek/2727 (accessed on December 28, 2009). Ko Shu-ling, “Marshall Islands president set to visit,” Taipei Times, June 26, 2007, p. 3. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives /2007/06/26/2003366902/print (accessed on December 23, 2009). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC, “Progressive partnerships and sustainable development: white paper on foreign aid policy (summary),” May 2009, p. 5. http://www.mofa.gov.tw/public/Attachment/95714272071.pdf (accessed on March 19, 2011). Joel Atkinson, “Vanuatu in Australia-China-Taiwan Relations,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 3 (2007): 357. Vltchek, “Wooing the Islands.” U.S. State Department, “Background note: Marshall Islands,” January 2010. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26551.htm (accessed on April 5, 2010). Giff Johnson and Suzanne Chutaro, “Chen, Tomeing Reaffirm Friendly Ties,” Pacific Magazine, January 9, 2008. http://www.pacificmagazine.net /news/2008/01/09/chen-tomeing-reaffirm-friendly-ties (accessed on January 10, 2008). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC, “Progressive partnerships and sustainable development.” Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2005. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC, “Progressive partnerships and sustainable development.”

176

NOTES

32. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2002, the Republic of China. 33. http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac/almanac2002 /homepage.html (accessed on March 19, 2011). 34. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 1999, the Republic of China. http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac /almanac1999/home.htm (accessed on March 19, 2011). 35. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2001, the Republic of China. http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac /almanac2001/homepage.htm (accessed on March 19, 2011). 36. Ko, “Marshall Islands president set to visit.” 37. Vltchek, “Wooing the Islands.” 38. Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West (Suva, Fiji: IPS, University of the South Pacific, 2007), pp. 258–259. 39. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2002. 40. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 265. 41. Van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition: Diplomatic Competition between China and Taiwan in Oceania,” p. 136. 42. Conversation with a senior Chinese diplomat in Shanghai in September 2009. 43. “President Ma defines ‘flexible diplomacy,’ ” The China Post, November 11, 2008. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news /2008/11/11/182601/President-Ma.htm (accessed on February 14, 2010). 44. As cited in Vltchek, “Wooing the Islands.” 45. Ibid. 46. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 265. 47. Atkinson, “Vanuatu in Australia-China-Taiwan relations,” p. 353. 48. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 262. 49. Atkinson, “Vanuatu in Australia-China-Taiwan relations,” p. 356. 50. Ibid., p. 357. 51. Ibid., p. 361. 52. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2007, the Republic of China. http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac /almanac2007/index.html (accessed on March 19, 2011). 53. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 1999. 54. “Joint Press Communiqué between the People’s Republic of China and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea,” February 16, 2004. http://pg .china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t66029.htm (accessed on March 28, 2010). 55. John Henderson, “China, Taiwan and the Changing Strategic Significance of Oceania,” Revue Juridique Polynesienne 1, no. 1 (2001): 152. 56. Ibid. 57. Embassy of PRC in PNG, “China announces initiatives to expand ties with PIF member countries,” November 24, 2003. http://pg.china-embassy.org /eng/zbgx/t46835.htm (accessed on March 19, 2011). 58. Tamara R. Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” Asian Survey 47, no. 2 (2007): 319.

NOTES

177

59. Ibid., p. 320. 60. Ibid., p. 319. 61. Henderson, “China, Taiwan and the Changing Strategic Significance of Oceania,” p. 150. 62. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 1997, the Republic of China. http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac /almanac1997/index.html (accessed on March 19, 2011). 63. Aenet Rowa, “RMI President’s Office reports on Taiwan visit,” Yokwe Online, August 29, 2009. http://www.yokwe.com/modules.php?op=modload&name =News&file=article&sid=2462 (accessed on April 4, 2010). 64. “Marshall Islands President Tomeing arrives in Taiwan for 5-day state visit,” Yokwe Online, March 10, 2008. http://www.yokwe.com/modules.php?op =modload&name=News&file=article&sid=2098 (accessed on April 4, 2010). 65. Johnson and Chutaro, “Chen, Tomeing Reaffirm Friendly Ties.” 66. Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn, “The Southwest Pacific: U.S. Interests and China’s Growing Influence,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, 2007, p. 17. 67. Van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition: Diplomatic Competition between China and Taiwan in Oceania,” p. 133. 68. Ibid. 69. “China offers ties with Palau, if Taiwan dumped,” Pacific Islands Report, June 26, 2007. http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2007/june/06–25-05.htm (accessed on April 4, 2010). 70. “How Ma is undercutting Taiwan-Pacific links,” Taiwan News, March 22, 2010, p. 6. http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id =1208565&lang=eng_news&cate_img=46.jpg&cate_rss=news_Editorial (accessed on April 2, 2010). 71. “The first Taiwan-Pacific allies summit Palau declaration: Strengthening oceanic democratic alliances and realizing comprehensive partnership,” September 4, 2006. http://marshall.wetserver.net/livefiles/1sttaiwan-pacificalliessummitp alaudeclaration,2006_documents_30.pdf (accessed on April 2, 2010). 72. Minxin Pei, “Crash landing for transit diplomacy,” Straits Times, May 9, 2006. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view& id=18337 (accessed on April 2, 2010). 73. Sun Dangen, “The farce of Chen Shuib-bian’s ‘transit diplomacy,’ ” September 9, 2004. http://english1.peopledaily.com.cn/200409/09/eng20040909_156436 .html (accessed on April 2, 2010). 74. Angela Gregory, “Islands of influence,” New Zealand Herald, December 10, 2005. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid =10359277&pnum=0 (accessed on April 7, 2010). 75. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, pp. 226–227. 76. Gregory, “Islands of influence.” 77. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 155. 78. As cited in Vltchek, “Wooing the Islands.” 79. Terence Wesley-Smith, China in Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2007), p. 2.

178

NOTES

80. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 15. 81. Xavier La Canna, “Halt to Taiwan aid would harm Pacific nations: Expert,” The Canberra Times, March 28, 2008. http://canberra.yourguide.com. au/news/world/general/halt-to-taiwan-aid-would-harm-pacific-nations -expert/1211548.html (accessed on April 6, 2008). 82. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 218 83. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2008, the Republic of China. http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac /almanac2008/index.html (accessed on March 19, 2011). 84. “President Ma defines ‘flexible diplomacy,’ ” The China Post, November 11, 2008. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news /2008/11/11/182601/President-Ma.htm (accessed on February 14, 2010). 85. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2008. 86. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2007. 87. Rowan Callick, “China and Taiwan end war over Pacific aid,” The Australian, August 10, 2009. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/china-and-taiwan -end-war-over-pacific-aid/story-e6frg6t6–1225759586179 (accessed on April 3, 2010). 88. The China Times, “shelun: cong huolu waijiao dao zhengchang waijiao” (Editorial: From flexible diplomacy to normal diplomacy), June 5, 2009, p. A25. http://www.president.gov.tw/2_special/2009p01/esp/domestic_news _06.htm (accessed on February 14, 2010). 89. Vltchek, “Wooing the Islands.” 90. Callick, “China and Taiwan end war over Pacific aid.” 91. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2008. 92. Chen Xiuling, “Ma: tuozhan guoji kongjian youzhuyu shenhua liangan guanxi” (Ma: Expanding international space conducive to deepening crossStrait relations), The China Times, March 24, 2010. http://news.chinatimes .com/politics/0,5244,50203155x112010032400122,00.html (accessed on April 4, 2010). 93. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2008. 94. The China Times, “Editorial: From flexible diplomacy to normal diplomacy.” 95. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2008. 96. Erikson and Chen, “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America.” 97. Office of the President of the Republic of China, “President Ma departs on trip to Central America to attend inauguration of Panama President-Elect Ricardo Martinelli,” Press release, June 29, 2009. http://www.president.gov .tw/en/prog/news_release/document_content.php?id=1105500011&pre_id =1105500011&g_category_number=145&category_number_2=145 (accessed on April 12, 2010). 98. Vanessa Hua, “China, Taiwan wage economic, political battle in Panama,” International Reporting Project, June 30, 2002. http://www.international reportingproject.org/stories/detail/659/# (accessed on April 8, 2010). 99. Cynthia Watson, “Adios Taipei, Hola Beijing: Taiwan’s Relations with Latin America,” China Brief 4, no. 11 (2004): 8.

NOTES

179

100. Jenny W. Hsu, “Panama respects Taiwan, China ‘truce’: Ambassador,” Taipei Times, February 6, 2010, p. 1. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News /front/archives/2010/02/06/2003465314 (accessed on April 8, 2010). 101. The China Times, “Editorial: From flexible diplomacy to normal diplomacy.” 102. Xinhua, “More tourists travel across Taiwan Strait in H1,” August 13, 2010. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010–08/13/content_11149730 .htm (accessed on March 6, 2011). 103. David B. Shear, “China-Taiwan: Recent economic, political and military developments across the Strait and implications for the United States,” Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 18, 2010. http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/03/138547.htm (accessed on March 28, 2010). 104. “Robust trade between Chinese mainland and Taiwan,” People’s Daily Online, January 21, 2011. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/7268219. html# (accessed on March 6, 2011). 105. Hsiao-Yun Yu and Johnny Shaw, “The New Development of Cross-Strait Relations (2005–2008),” paper presented at the 2009 International Studies Association (ISA) Conference in New York in February 2009, p. 2. http: //convention2.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa09/index.php?click_key=1 (accessed on March 28, 2010). 106. Joseph J. Schatz, “Taiwan Builds Economic Bridges to the Mainland,” CQ Weekly, November 9, 2009, p. 2577. 107. Ibid. 108. Rowan Callick, “Taiwan purges Pacific island graft,” The Australian, March 29,2010.http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/taiwan-purges-pacific -island-graft/story-e6frg6ux-1225846599163 (accessed on April 3, 2010). 109. “Taiwan is no longer competing with China: President Ma,” Solomon Times, March 30, 2010. http://www.solomontimes.com/news.aspx?nwid=5048 (accessed on April 2, 2010). 110. Eddie Osifelo, “Abana lauds Taiwan’s new approach,” Solomon Star, March 31, 2010. http://www.solomonstarnews.com/news/national/4447-abana -lauds-taiwans-new-approach (accessed on April 4, 2010). 111. Reuters, “Taiwan, diplomatic allies meet,” The Straits Times, April 21, 2009. http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory _366454.html (accessed on March 29, 2010). 112. “Ma: Our allies prefer state visits,” Solomon Star, March 27, 2010. http: //www.solomonstarnews.com/news/national/4287-ma-our-allies-prefer -state-visits- (accessed April 4, 2010). 113. Osifelo, “Ma says Taiwan has new aid policy.” 114. Callick, “Taiwan purges Pacific island graft.” 115. Ibid. 116. “How Ma is undercutting Taiwan-Pacific links.” 117. Phillip C. Saunders and Scott L. Kastner, “Bridge over Troubled Water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement,” International Security 33, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 112.

180

NOTES

118. Cheng-yi Lin, “The Security Implications of Cross-Strait Competition in the South Pacific from a Taiwanese Perspective,” in Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific, edited by Anne-Marie Brady (New Jersey et al.: World Scientific, 2010), p. 131. 119. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu, Foreign Relations Yearbook 2008. 120. Li Mingjun, “Ma Yingjiu chufang Naitai youbang yu ‘waijiao xiubing’ ” (Ma Ying-jeou’s visit to the South Pacific friendly countries and ‘diplomatic truce’ ”) Taiwan Shibao (Taiwan Times), March 20, 2010. http://www .twtimes.com.tw/html/modules/news/article.php?storyid=85509 (accessed on April 4, 2010). 121. Eric Harwit, “Taiwan’s Foreign Economic Relations with Developing Nations: A Case Study of its Ties with Palau,” The Contemporary Pacific 12, no. 2 (2000): 467.

Five

China in Fiji: Displacing Traditional Players?

1. For more information about the coup, see Jon Fraenkel, Stewart Firth, and Brij V. Lal (eds.), The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups? (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009). 2. Fergus Hanson, “Don’t ignore the big new player in Fiji,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 9, 2008. http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/05/08/12101311 63040.html (accessed on March 20, 2011). 3. “Fiji-Sino ties strong: Interim PM,” Fiji Daily Post, August 12, 2009. http: //fijidailypost.com/news.php?section=1&fijidailynews=18152 (accessed on February 23, 2010). 4. Bessie Ng Kumlin Ali, Chinese in Fiji (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 2002), p. 203. 5. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaobu Zhengce Yanjiushi (Policy Research Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC), Zhongguo Waijiao 2008 (China’s Foreign Affairs 2008) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Press, 2008), p. 90. 6. Xinhua, “Fijian PM arrives in Beijing for Olympics,” August 7, 2008. http: //en.beijing2008.cn/ceremonies/headlines/n214511046.shtml (accessed on April 10, 2010). 7. “Skills development for civil servants,” Fiji Daily Post, July 2, 2009. http: //w w w.f ijidaily post.com/news.php?section=1& f ijidailynews=24208 (accessed on March 9, 2010). 8. Fergus Hanson, The Dragon Looks South (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2008), pp. 10–11. 9. Ibid., p. 16. 10. Iati Iati, “China and Samoa,” in China in Oceania: Shaping the Pacific? edited by Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A. Porter (London: Berghahn Books, 2010), p. 156. 11. Based on various sources, mainly reports, interviews, and websites of the Chinese government.

NOTES

181

12. Fergus Hanson, “Chinese aid in Fiji: Behind the hype,” February 4, 2010. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/02/04/Chinese-aid-in-Fiji -Behind-the-hype.aspx (accessed on February 27, 2010). 13. Interview with a senior Chinese diplomat in Suva in February 2010. 14. Michael Sainsbury, “ANZ seals tie with Chinese banking giant,” The Australian, September 30, 2009. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business /in-depth/anz-seals-tie-with-chinese-banking-giant/story-e6frgah6 –1225780961593 (accessed on April 12, 2010). 15. Huijun Yang, “Liu Qitao fangwen Feiji bing chuxi Feiji Nanderuiwatu shuidianzhan hetong tanpai jiyao qianshu yishi” (Liu Qitao visits Fiji and Attends the Ceremony of Signing the Contract Negotiation Summary for the Nadarivatu Hydro Power Project,” Zhongguo Shuidian Xinwen Zhongxin (Sinohydro Press Centre), September 11, 2008. http://www .sinohydro.com/427-998-12587.aspx (accessed on February 26, 2010). According to Matthew Dornan, one condition that the China Development Bank attached to its support for the project was that the construction should be awarded to Sinohydro Corporation Ltd. Matthew Dornan, “Nadarivatu hydro scheme—A Chinese-Fijian partnership with pros and cons,” East Asia Forum, May 22, 2010. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/22/nadarivatu -hydro-scheme-%e2%80%93-a-chinese-fijian-partnership-with-both-pros -and-cons/ (accessed on July 20, 2010). 16. Hanson, “Chinese aid in Fiji.” 17. “Regime honoured with visit,” Fiji Daily Post, February 11,2009. http://www .fijidailypost.com/opinion.php?date=20090211 (accessed on March 9, 2010). 18. Hanson, “Chinese aid in Fiji.” 19. Ian Llewellyn, “China says it hopes Fiji will pay attention to Pacific concerns,” NZPA, April 16, 2009. http://www.guide2.co.nz/politics/news/china -says-it-hopes-fiji-will-pay-attention-to-pacific-concerns/11/7100 (accessed on March 9, 2010). 20. “Regime honoured with visit.” 21. Fiji Government press release, “Chinese technical team to assess e-government project—Kaitani,” October 21, 2004. http://www.fiji.gov.fj/cgi-bin /cms/exec/view.cgi/36/3447/printer (accessed on February 25, 2010). 22. “Navuso Bridge officially opens,” Fiji Daily Post, May 20, 2009. http://www .fijidailypost.com/news.php?section=2&fijidailynews=23665 (accessed on March 8, 2010). 23. Paul McGeough, “Pressure on Fiji fails as China lends hand,” The Sydney Morning Herald, December 1, 2009. http://www.smh.com.au/world /pressure-on-fiji-fails-as-china-lends-hand-20091130-k14u.html (accessed on February 27, 2010). According to a senior Chinese diplomat in Fiji, over 200 Chinese workers have been working on the project and the Chinese company hired more than 200 local workers at one stage (Interview 2010). 24. Alcatel, “Fiji government selects Alcatel for a Euro 16 million e-government program,” November 2, 2006. http://www.noticias.info/Archivo/2006/200611 /20061103/20061103_237337.shtm (accessed on February 25, 2010).

182

NOTES

25. Ian Taylor, “China’s oil diplomacy in Africa,” International Affairs 82, no. 5 (2006): 937. 26. Denis M. Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences,” Journal of Modern-African Studies 44, no. 3 (2006): 460. 27. Joshua Eisenman, “China’s Post-Cold War Strategy in Africa: Examining Beijing’s Methods and Objectives,” in China and the Developing World: Beijing’s Strategy for the Twenty-first Century, edited by Joshua Eisenman et al. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 29. 28. Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa,” p. 463. 29. Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa,” p. 946. 30. Ibid., pp. 947–948. 31. Eisenman, “China’s Post-Cold War Strategy in Africa,” p. 39. 32. George T. Yu, “China’s Africa Policy: South-South Unity and Cooperation,” in China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic, edited by Lowell Dittmer and George T. Yu (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2010), p. 145. 33. Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa,” p. 946. 34. Interview with a senior Chinese diplomat in Suva in February 2010. 35. Zhongguo Guojia Tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 2010 (China Statistical Yearbook 2010) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe—China Statistics Press, 2010), p. 241. The trade balance between China and Fiji is overwhelmingly in China’s favor, with Chinese exports of US$96.55 million and Chinese imports of just US$0.58 million in 2009. 36. Interview with a senior Chinese diplomat in Suva in February 2010. 37. Zhongguo Guojia Tongjiju, China Statistical Yearbook 2010, p. 251. 38. Jenny Hayward-Jones, “Fiji: A Flailing State” (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, April, 2009), p. 5. 39. Ibid. 40. “Fiji backs China’s action in Tibet,” Fijilive, March 24, 2008. http://www .fijilive.com/news_new/index.php/news/show_news/3075 (accessed March 2010). 41. Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa,” p. 940. 42. Interview with a senior Chinese diplomat in Suva in February 2010. 43. Jian Yang, “China in the South Pacific: Hegemon on the Horizon?,” The Pacific Review 22, no. 2 (2009): 144–146. 44. “Fiji military leader appointed to China,” The Age, July 10, 2007. http: //www.theage.com.au/news/World/Fiji-military-leader-appointed-to -China/2007/07/10/1183833500209.html (accessed on July 23 2010). 45. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC), Zhonghua Minguo 97 Nian Waijiao Nianjian (Foreign Relations Yearbook 2008, the Republic of China). http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8 /almanac/almanac2008/index.html (accessed on March 19, 2011). The other five were in PNG, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, and Ecuador. 46. Weiling Liu, “ROC-Fiji communiqué affirms official recognition,” October 12, 1996. http://taiwanauj.nat.gov.tw/fp.asp?xItem=14602&ctNode=118 (accessed on March 14, 2010).

NOTES

183

47. John Henderson, “China, Taiwan and the Changing Strategic Significance of Oceania,” Revue JuridiquePolynesienne 1, no. 1 (2001): 258. 48. Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West (Suva, Fiji: IPS, University of the South Pacific, 2007), p. 261. 49. Liu, “ROC-Fiji communiqué affirms official recognition.” 50. Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaobu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC), Zhonghua Minguo 96 Nian Waijiao Nianjian (Foreign Relations Yearbook 2007, the Republic of China). http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8 /almanac/almanac2007/index.html (accessed on March 19, 2011).. 51. Fiji Broadcasting Corporation, “Give Fiji’s govt time,” Radio Fiji, March 25, 2008.http://www.radiofiji.com.fj/fullstory.php?id=9709 (accessed on March 14, 2010). 52. Jonathan Pearlman, “China’s ‘chequebook diplomacy’ in Fiji under fire,” Sydney Morning Herald, April 21, 2009. http://www.smh.com.au/world /chinas-chequebook-diplomacy-in-fiji-under-fire-20090420-acpr.html (accessed on April 12, 2010).. 53. TVNZ, “Little NZ can do about Fiji,” April 19, 2009. http://tvnz.co.nz/view /page/536641/2654932 (accessed on March 7, 2010). 54. Shailendra Singh, “South Pacific:Western sanctions make Fiji turn to China, Asia,” IPS, December 13, 2006. http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=35823 (accessed on February 14, 2010). 55. Richard Herr and Anthony Bergin, “Let’s not drive Fiji further into China’s open arms,” The Australian, October 12, 2010. http://www.theaustralian. com.au/news/opinion/lets-not-drive-fiji-further-into-chinas-open-arms /story-e6frg6zo-1225937347314 (accessed on March 26, 2011). 56. Sandra Tarte, “Fiji’s ‘Look North’ Strategy and the Role of China,” in China in Oceania: Shaping the Pacific? edited by Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A. Porter (London: Berghahn Books, 2010), p. 128. 57. Hayward-Jones, “Fiji: A Flailing State,” p. 6. 58. Ibid. Fiji’s merchandise imports from Australia in 2008 were worth US$375.57 million. Singapore has been Fiji’s largest merchandise import market, with an imports volume of US$558.33 million in 2008 and US$383.16 million in 2009. See International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2010, p. 223. 59. Jacqueline Leckie, “Fijians—Facts and figures,” Te Ara—The Encyclopedia of New Zealand, March 4, 2009. http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/fijians/6 (accessed on April 10, 2010.) 60. Jacqueline Leckie, “Fijians—The Fijian community,” Te Ara—The Encyclopedia of New Zealand, March 4, 2009.http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en /fijians/1 (accessed on April 10, 2010.). 61. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Frequently asked questions about New Zealand’s policy towards Fiji,” April 10, 2010. http://www .mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/0-Fiji-FAQ.php (accessed on April 10, 2010). 62. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Republic of the Fiji Islands country brief,” February 2011. http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fiji/fiji _brief.html (accessed on June 13, 2011).

184

NOTES

63. Murray McCully, “Address to NZ-Fiji Business Council,” September 18, 2009. http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/address+nz-fiji+business+council (accessed on July 21, 2010.). 64. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 2009–10: For the Year Ended 30 June 2010, p. 30. 65. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Frequently asked questions about New Zealand’s policy towards Fiji.” 66. Fergus Hanson, “The Dragon in the Pacific: More Opportunity than Threat” (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2008), p. 8. 67. McCully, “Address to NZ-Fiji Business Council.” 68. Ibid.

Six Interactions with Australia and New Zealand: Balancing Interests 1. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “South Pacific.” http: //www. dfat.gov.au/geo/spacific/regional_orgs/index.html (accessed on February 15, 2010). 2. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Pacific snapshot seminar,” November 19, 2009, p. 3. http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations /Pacific/index.php#papers (accessed on February 2, 2011). 3. Winston Peters, “Influences in the Pacific,” August 16, 2006. http://www .beehive.govt.nz/node/26805 (accessed on February 25, 2011). 4. Wen Jiabao, “Win-win Cooperation for Common Development” (Chinese Premier’s keynote speech at opening of 1st Ministerial Conference of ChinaPacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum), April 5, 2006. http://www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/zyjh/t244242.htm (accessed on February 5, 2010). 5. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “South Pacific.” 6. Ibid. 7. Australian Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defence White Paper 2009, p. 42. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. The Senate—Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, A Pacific Engaged: Australia’s Relations with Papua New Guinea and the Island States of the Southwest Pacific (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, August 2003), p. 152. http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/Committee/FADT _CTTE/completed_inquiries/2002–04/png/report/index.htm (accessed on July 20, 2008). 11. Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn, “The Southwest Pacific: U.S Interests and China’s Growing Influence,” CRS Report for Congress, July 6, 2007, p. 3. 12. The Senate, A Pacific Engaged, p. 158. 13. Anthony van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition: Diplomatic Competition between China and Taiwan in Oceania,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 12, no. 2 (2007): 131.

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14. U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Micronesia,” December 2007. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm (accessed on February 11, 2008). 15. Roger Carrick, “Security in the Asia-Pacific: Australia and New Zealand,” Asian Affairs 33, no. 3 (2002): 336 16. Stewart Firth, “Conceptualizing Security in Oceania: New and Enduring Issues,” in Security in Oceania: In the 21st Century, edited by Eric Shibuya and Jim Rolfe (Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003), p. 45. 17. Ibid., pp. 44–45. 18. Statistics New Zealand, Quick Stats National Highlights (Revised August 9, 2007). http://www.stats.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/9EA758CE-CEC54869 –9FB8-B6644C2A9838/0/2006censusquickstatsnationalhighlightsrevised. pdf (accessed on July 22, 2008). 19. Anne-Marie Brady and John Henderson, “New Zealand, the Pacific and China: The Challenges Ahead,” in Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific, edited by Anne-Marie Brady (New Jersey et al.: World Scientific, 2010), p. 190. 20. Fuimaono Les McCarthy, “New Zealand’s Pacific Advantage,” in Securing A Peaceful Pacific, edited by John Henderson and Greg Watson (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2005), p. 44. 21. Ibid., p. 47. 22. New Zealand Government, Defence White Paper 2010 (Wellington, 2010), p. 19. 23. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Key Pacific issues— Trade.” http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/Trade/index .php (accessed on February 2, 2011). 24. Australian Department of Defence, “Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century,” p. 16. 25. Van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition,” p. 130. 26. Winston Peters, “Influences in the Pacific,” August 16, 2006. http://www .beehive.govt.nz/node/26805 (accessed on February 25, 2011). 27. Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West (Suva, Fiji: IPS, University of the South Pacific, 2007), p. 211. 28. Lum and Vaughn, “The Southwest Pacific,” p. 21 29. Michael Powles, “China’s Rise: A Pacific View,” Center for Chinese Foreign Policy Studies Working Papers—Fudan University no. 6 (March 2009), p. 27. http://www.asianz.org.nz/our-work/track-2/track-2-research/michael -powles-china (accessed on March 1, 2011). 30. Audrey Young, “NZ wary of China’s emergence—WikiLeaks,” New Zealand Herald, 31. December 21, 2010. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c _id=2&objectid=10695661 (accessed on December 21, 2010). 32. Radio New Zealand International, “Concern in PNG at defence training links with China,” May 19, 2008. http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news .php?op=read&id=39839 (accessed on February 26, 2011). 33. Powles, “China’s Rise: A Pacific View,” p. 25. 34. The Senate—Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, China’s Emergence: Implications for Australia (Canberra: Commonwealth

186

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40. 41.

42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55.

56.

57.

58. 59. 60. 61.

NOTES

of Australia, March 2006), p. 174. http://www.comw.org/cmp/fulltext /0603chinareport.pdf (accessed on March 21, 2011). Peters, “Influences in the Pacific.” Lum and Vaughn, “The Southwest Pacific,” p. 19. Australian Department of Defence, Defence White Paper, p. 31. Ibid., p. 42 Murray McCully, “Address to NZ-Fiji Business Council,” September 18, 2009. http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/address+nz-fiji+business+council (accessed on February 10, 2010) Powles, “China’s Rise: A Pacific View.” Xinhua, “Interview: China, South Pacific relations reach new level,” October 27, 2005. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200510/28/eng20051028_217344 .html (accessed on March 1, 2011). Kalinga Seneviratne, “South Pacific: Chinese relief from domineering Australia,” Inter Press Service (IPS), April 17, 2006. http://ipsnews.net/news .asp?idnews=32909 (accessed on March 1, 2011). Van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition,” p. 138. Susan Windybank, “The China Syndrome,” Policy 21, no. 2 (2005): 32. Powles, “China’s Rise: A Pacific View,” pp. 32–33 Young, “NZ wary of China’s emergence—WikiLeaks.” Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands,” p. 219. Ibid., p. 245. Ibid. Pacific Islands Forum, Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development Coordination in the Pacific, 2009, p. 1. ABC Radio Australia, “AusAID scrutinised by Parliamentary committee,” June 3, 2010. http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/pacbeat/stories/201006 /s2917615.htm (accessed on February 26, 2011). Fergus Hanson, “The Dragon Looks South” (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2008), pp. 14–15 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “South Pacific.” Jenny Hayward-Jones, “Fiji: A Flailing State” (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, April, 2009), p. 8. Stephen Smith, “Media release,” September 5, 2008. http://www .foreignminister.gov.au/parlsec/releases/2008/dk008.html (accessed on February 19, 2010). “Australia-China joint statement,” October 30, 2009. http://www.dfat .gov.au/geo/china/joint_statement_091030.html (accessed on February 3, 2010). BBC, “China support for Fiji questioned,” BBC News, June 19, 2009. http: //news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8108536.stm (accessed on February 3, 2010). Powles, “China’s Rise: A Pacific View,” p. 45 Ibid. Young, “NZ wary of China’s emergence—WikiLeaks.” Powles, “China’s Rise: A Pacific View,” p. 25.

NOTES

187

62. “China likes to help developing nations,” Fiji Times, November 10, 2007. http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=74059 (accessed on February 3, 2010). 63. Fergus Hanson, “Chinese aid in the Pacific: Playing the short game,” East Asia Forum, September 2, 2009. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/09/02/china -in-the-pacific-playing-the-short-game/ (accessed on February 27, 2011). 64. Interview with a senior Chinese diplomat in Suva in early February 2010. 65. Tamara Renee Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” Asian Survey 47, no. 2 (2007): 315. 66. Ron Crocombe, “The Software of China-Pacific Island Relations,” in Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific, edited by AnneMarie Brady (New Jersey et al.: World Scientific, 2010), pp. 35–47. 67. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. x. 68. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, pp. 13–14. 69. Stephen Henningham, “The Foreign and Defence Stances of the South Pacific States,” in South Pacific Security: Issues and Perspectives, edited by Stephen Henningham and Desmond Ball (Canberra: Australian National University, 1991), p. 62. 70. David Hegarty, “The Soviet Union in the South Pacific in the 1990s,” in The Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, edited by Ross Babbage (NSW, Australia: Brassey’s Australia, 1989), p. 124. 71. Stephen Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in Association with the NZ Institute of International Affairs, 1992), p. 20. 72. Van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition,” p.132. 73. Ron Crocombe, “The growing Chinese presence in the region,” Islands Business, Suva, January 2005. http://www.islandsbusiness.com/islands _business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle /focusModuleID=3869/overideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl (accessed on February 11, 2008). 74. As cited in Sandra Tarte, “Fiji’s ‘Look North’ Strategy and the Role of China,” in China in Oceania: Shaping the Pacific? edited by Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A. Porter (London: Berghahn Books, 2010), p. 127. 75. Ibid. 76. Ron Crocombe, “The Fourth Wave: Chinese in the Pacific Islands in the 21st Century,” CSCSD Occasional Paper, no. 1 (May 2007): 28; Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” p. 317. 77. Lum and Vaughn, “The Southwest Pacific,” p. 18. 78. Ibid. 79. “Riots the tip of the Pacific iceberg,” New Zealand Herald, December 14, 2007. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/topic/story.cfm?c_id=209&objectid=10482257 (accessed on February 13, 2008). 80. Joel Atkinson, “Big Trouble in Little Chinatown: Australia, Taiwan and the April 2006 Post-election Riot in Solomon Islands,” Pacific Affairs 82, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 56.

188

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81. Graeme Dobell, “China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: Diplomatic Chess versus Pacific Political Rugby” (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, January 2007), p. 3. 82. James Jiann Hua To, “Sino-Pacific: Extra-Territorial Influence and the Overseas Chinese,” in Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific, edited by Anne-Marie Brady (New Jersey et al.: World Scientific, 2010), pp. 49–82. 83. Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” p. 317. 84. Brady and Henderson, “New Zealand, the Pacific and China: The Challenges Ahead,” p. 197. 85. Van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition,” p. 134. 86. Ibid., pp. 137–138. 87. Howard never uttered this phrase, but failed to promptly refute a journalist who made the suggestion. See Gerard Henderson, “Howard should end confusion on foreign policy,” The Age, June 2, 2003. http://www.theage.com.au /articles/2003/06/02/1054406130164.html (accessed on April 14, 2008). 88. As cited in Stephen Hoadley and Jian Yang, “China’s Cross-Regional FTA Initiatives: Towards Comprehensive National Power,” Pacific Affairs 80, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 341. 89. The Senate, China’s Emergence, p. 122. 90. Young, “NZ wary of China’s emergence—WikiLeaks.” 91. Author’s meeting with a senior Japanese diplomat in Tokyo in May 2006.

Seven China’s World Wide Web: Overseas Chinese in the South Pacific 1. Ronald Skeldon, “China: From exceptional case to global participant,” Migration Information Source, April 2004. http://www.migrationinformation .org/profiles/display.cfm?ID=219 (accessed on April 27, 2010). 2. Ren Guixiang, an analyst in mainland China, gives a figure of 35 million in his book published in 2009 while Sheng Ding cites the Taiwanese government webpage and puts the figure at 38.38 million as of the end of 2005. Sheng also says that the growth of the overseas Chinese population has held steady at roughly 1.8 percent annually. See Ren Guixiang, “Haiwai Huaren Huaqiao yu Zhongguo Gaige Kaifang” (Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas in China’s Reforms and Opening Up.) (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe—History of Chinese Communist Party Press, March 2009), p. 208; Sheng Ding, “Digital Diaspora and National Image Building: A New Perspective on Chinese Diaspora Study in the Age of China’s Rise,” Pacific Affairs 80, no. 4 (Winter 2007–2008): 627. 3. Skeldon, “China: From exceptional case to global participant.” 4. Zhongxinshe (China News), “Ma Rupei: Haiwai huaren huaqiao shi zhongyao liliang” (Ma Rupei: Overseas Chinese and Chinese overseas are important forces), Xinhua Wang (Xinhuanet), February 27, 2011. http://news.xinhuanet .com/overseas/2011–02/27/c_121126179.htm (accessed on March 6, 2011.)

NOTES

189

5. Ibid. 6. Haiming Liu, “The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity” (Book Review), Journal of Chinese Overseas 2, no. 1 (May 2006): 150. For more discussion, see Ronald Skeldon, “The Chinese Diaspora or the Migration of Chinese Peoples?” in The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity, edited by Laurence J. C. Ma and Carolyn Carrier (Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 51–53. 7. Zhu Guohong, “A Historical Demography of Chinese Migration,” in The Chinese Overseas, edited by Hong Liu (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 139; Cai Deqi and Jiang Yongliang, Huaqiao Huaren de Xin Fazhan (The New Development of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas) (Xiamen: Xiamen Daxue Chubanshe—Xiamen University Press, 2001), pp. 44–48. 8. Ding, “Digital Diaspora and National Image Building,” pp. 634–635. 9. Zhuang Guotu, Huaqiao Huarenyu Zhongguo de Guanxi (The Relationship between Overseas Chinese, Chinese Overseas and China) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Gaodeng Jiaoyu Chubanshe—Guangdong Higher Education Press, 2001), pp. 283–284. 10. Ibid., pp. 285–286. 11. Ibid., pp. 286–288. 12. A representative work is Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991). 13. Adam McKeown, “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949,” in The Chinese Overseas, edited by Hong Liu, p. 118. 14. Ibid. 15. Li Guoliang et al., Huaqiao Huarenyu Zhongguo Geming he Jianshe (Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas in China’s Revolution and Construction) (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe—Fujian People’s Press, 1993), pp. 65–68. 16. McKeown, “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949,” p. 117. 17. Ibid., p. 118. 18. Ibid., p. 120. 19. Wu Qianjin, Guojia Guanxizhong de Huaqiao Huaren he Huazhu (Overseas Chinese, Chinese Overseas and Ethnic Chinese in International Relations) (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe—Xinhua Press, 2003), p. 82. McKeown, “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949,” pp. 120. 20. McKeown, “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949,” p. 121. 21. Ding, “Digital Diaspora and National Image Building,” p. 638. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid., p. 639. 25. Ibid. 26. Q. Wu, Guojia Guanxizhong de Huaqiao Huaren he Huazhu, pp. 126–128. 27. Ren, “Haiwai HuarenHuaqiao yu Zhongguo Gaige Kaifang,” p. 207. 28. Ibid. Some say that as much as 80 percent of the total FDI into China came from Chinese outside the borders of China, with about 50 percent from Hong Kong and 7 percent from Southeast Asia. See Zhuang Guotu, “China’s

190

29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38.

39. 40. 41.

42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47.

NOTES

Relations with Ethnic Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia: A Research Agenda,” NIAS Nytt 3 (September 2004): 22. See also Cai and Jiang, The New Development of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas, pp. 224–233. Ren, “Haiwai Huaren Huaqiao yu Zhongguo Gaige Kaifang,” p. 210 Liao Xiaojian, “dangdai huaqiao huaren shetuan de fazhan tedian” (The Characteristics of the Development of Contemporary Organizations of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas). http://www.docin.com /p-14389312.html (accessed on June 12, 2011). Cai and Jiang, The New Development of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas, p. 186. X. Liao, “The Characteristics of the Development of Contemporary Organizations of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas.” Cai and Jiang, The New Development of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas, p. 191. X. Liao, “The Characteristics of the Development of Contemporary Organizations of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas.” Cai and Jiang, The New Development of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas, p. 191. Emmanuel Ma Mung, “Chinese Migration and China’s Foreign Policy in Africa,” Journal of Chinese Overseas 4, no. 1 (May 2008): 105. Zhongguo Heping Tongyi Cujinghui (China Council for the Promotion of PeacefulUnification), “Zhongguo Heping Tongyi Cujinghui jianjie” (Brief Introduction to China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification), April 23, 2008. http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/cjh/200804 /t20080423_629991.htm (accessed on May 13, 2010). Zhongguo Heping Tongyi Cujinghui, “Haiwai Cutonghui” (Overseas Councils for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification). June 16, 2008. http: //www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/cjh2/200806/t20080616_672620.htm (accessed on March 16, 2011). Zhongguo Heping Tongyi Cujinghui, “Brief Introduction to China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification.” Maureen Pao, “Wanted: Overseas Chinese,” Far Eastern Economic Review 164, no. 24 (June 21, 2001): 24–25 . Bertil Lintner, “China’s third wave, part I: A new breed of migrants fans out,” Asia Times Online, April 17, 2007. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China /ID17Ad03.html (accessed on July 14, 2009). Ibid. Bertil Lintner, “China’s third wave, part II: The Sinicizing of the South Pacific,” Asia Times Online, April 18, 2007. http://www.atimes.com/atimes /China/ID18Ad02.html (accessed on July 14, 2009). Ibid. Ibid. Jian Yang, Congress and US China Policy: 1989–1999 (New York: Nova Science, 2000). James Jiann Hua To, “Sino-Pacific: Extra-Territorial Influence and the Overseas Chinese,” in Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and

NOTES

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49. 50. 51. 52.

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59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

65. 66.

67. 68. 69.

191

the South Pacific, edited by Anne-Marie Brady (New Jersey et al.: World Scientific, 2010), p. 52. Zheng Jianmin, “huaqiao huaren zai fazhan Zhongguo yu Nantaipingyang daoguo guanxi zhong de zuoyong” (The Role of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas in the Development of China’s Relations with Pacific Island Countries), in Lu Weixiong (ed.), Haiwan Huaren Shehui Xin Shiye (New Perspectives of Overseas Chinese Societies) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Press for Social Sciences, 2008), p. 335. Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West (Suva, Fiji: IPS, University of the South Pacific, 2007), p. 123. Lintner, “China’s third wave, part II.” Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 69. Bill Willmott, “Varieties of Chinese Experience in the Pacific,” Occasional Paper No. 1, Centre for the Study of the Chinese Southern Diaspora, ANU: May 2007, p. 36 Ibid. See also Bill Willmott, “The Overseas Chinese Experience in the Pacific,” in China in Oceania: Shaping the Pacific? edited by Terence WesleySmith and Edgar A. Porter (London: Berghahn Books, 2010), pp. 93–94. J. Zheng, “The Role of Overseas Chinese and Chinese Overseas in the Development of China’s Relations with Pacific Island Countries,” p. 338. Oceania Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China, http://www .acpprc.org.au/schinese/dayangzhou/others.htm (accessed on May 13, 2010). Interviews with Chinese community leaders in Suva in January 2010. Ibid. It was renamed as Yat Sen School in 1976. Nitisha Lal and Johnson Yuen, “History of Yat Secondary School.” http://www.yatsen.school.fj/History.htm (accessed on May 14, 2010). Interviews with Chinese community leaders in Suva in January 2010. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 64. Song Hongwei, “Taipingyang shang de yichang fan ‘taidu’ zujizhan” (An “Anti-Taiwanese Independence Battle” in the South Pacific), Tongyi Luntan (Reunification Forum), no. 5 (2005): 15. Ibid. Graeme Dobell, “The Pacific Proxy: China vs Taiwan,” Australia Network, February 7, 2007. http://australianetwork.com/news/infocus/s1842245.htm (accessed on March 20, 2008). Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, p. 6. Ibid., p. 64. Michael G. Morgan and Abby McLeod, “Have We Failed Our Neighbour?” Australian Journal of International Affairs 60, no. 3 (September 2006): 422. For more information, see Joel Atkinson, “Big Trouble in Little Chinatown: Australia, Taiwan and the April 2006 Post-election Riot in Solomon Islands,” Pacific Affairs 82, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 47–65.

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70. Kate Romer and Andre M. N. Renzaho, “Re-emerging Conflict in the Solomon Islands? The Underlying Causes and Triggers of the Riots of April 2006,” Journal of Peace Conflict and Development 10 (March 2007): 3. 71. Willmott, “Varieties of Chinese Experience in the Pacific,” p. 41. 72. BBC, “Riots Highlight Chinese Tensions,” April 21, 2006. http://news.bbc .co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4930994.stm (accessed on January 26, 2010). 73. Morgan and McLeod, “Have We Failed Our Neighbour?” p. 422. 74. BBC, “Chinese rivals grapple for Pacific,” April 4, 2007. http://news.bbc .co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6525747.stm (accessed on January 26, 2010). 75. Dobell, “China and Taiwan in the South Pacific,” p. 18. 76. Shailendra Singh and Som Prakash. “Politics, Democracy and the Media: Case Studies in Fiji, Tonga and the Solomon Islands,” Pacific Journalism Review 12, no. 2 (2006): 78. 77. Ibid., p. 77. 78. Ibid., p. 79. 79. Morgan and McLeod, “Have We Failed Our Neighbour?” p. 417. 80. Helen Ware, “Demography, Migration and Conflict in the Pacific,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 4 (2005): 449. 81. Willmott, “Varieties of Chinese Experience in the Pacific,” p. 41. 82. John Maloney and Jason Reed Struble, “A New Day in Tonga: The Judiciary, the Reformers and the Future,” Journal of South Pacific Law 11, no. 2 (2007): 167. 83. TVNZ, “NZ, Aust troops land in Tonga,” November 18, 2006. http://tvnz .co.nz/view/page/411424/895213 (accessed on January 25, 2010). 84. ABC News, “Flight chartered to evacuate Chinese in Tonga,” November 22, 2006. http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200611/s1795155.htm (accessed on January 25, 2010). 85. Palenitina Langa`oi, “The roots of instability: Administrative and political reform in Tonga.,” September 9, 2009. http://r-cube.ritsumei.ac.jp /bitstream/10367/859/1/02-RJAPS24_The%20Roots%20of%20Instability .pdf (accessed on March 22, 2011). 86. Singh and Prakash, “Politics, Democracy and the Media,” p. 73. 87. Palenitina Langa`oi, “China’s diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Tonga,” in China in Oceania: Shaping the Pacific? edited by Terence WesleySmith and Edgar A. Porter (London: Berghahn Books, 2010), p. 165. 88. “Racist moves will rebound on Tonga,” New Zealand Herald, November 21, 2001. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=229612 (accessed on January 26, 2010). 89. Andre Vltchek cites principal of Tonga High School. Andre Vltchek, “Wooing the Islands: China and Taiwan High Stakes Bid for Pacific Island Support,” http://www.japanfocus.org/-Andre-Vltchek/2727 (accessed on December 28, 2009). 90. Ibid. 91. Mike Harman, “Tongan riots, 2006,” libcom.org, June 28, 2008. http: //libcom.org/history/tongan-riots-2006 (accessed on March 27, 2011).

NOTES

92. 93. 94. 95.

96.

97.

98. 99.

100. 101. 102. 103.

104.

105. 106.

107. 108.

193

Langa`oi, “The Roots of Instability.” Lintner, “China’s third wave, part II.” “Racist moves will rebound on Tonga.” “Tonga to expel race-hate victims,” New Zealand Herald, November 22, 2001. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2& objectid=229521 (accessed on January 26, 2010). “Pacific Island Conflicts—Challenges for Australia and New Zealand,” International Institute for Strategic Studies Comments 13, no. 4 (May 2007): 1–2. http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/155087_751320728_779135351.pdf (accessed on March 16, 2011). Rowan Callick, “Looters shot dead amid chaos of Papua New Guinea’s antiChinese riots,” The Australian, May 23, 2009. http://www.theaustralian .com.au/news/looters-shot-dead-amid-chaos-of-papua-new-guineas-anti -chinese-riots/story-e6frg6no-1225715006615 (accessed on January 26, 2010). “China urges Papua New Guinea to protect nationals, enterprises,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, May 19, 2009. (Database Factiva) ABC Radio Australia, “Inquiry into PNG riots hears of anti-Asian sentiments,” November 10, 2009. http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/pacbeat /stories/200911/s2738174.htm (accessed on January 26, 2010). Callick, “Looters shot dead amid chaos of Papua New Guinea’s anti-Chinese riots.” Ibid. Ware, “Demography, Migration and Conflict in the Pacific,” p. 443. “Overseas and under siege,” Global Agenda, August 11, 2009. http://find .galegroup.com.ezproxy.auck land.ac.nz/itx/start.do?prodId=ITOF (accessed on September 3, 2009). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, “Overseas Chinese Suffer from the Riot on the Solomon Islands. Chinese Government Provides Emergency Aids,” April 22, 2006. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t248643.htm (accessed on January 26, 2010). “Protect Chinese overseas,” China Daily (North American ed.). New York: April 25, 2006, p. 4. Lu Weixiong and ZhengJianmin, “ ‘yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo— cong Suoluomen Tangrenjie bei shao shuoqi” (Who Should Be Blamed for the “Resentment against the Overseas Chinese”—Reflections on the Burning Down of the China Town in the Solomon Islands), in Haiwan Huaren Shehui Xin Shiya (New Perspectives of Overseas Chinese Societies), edited by Lu Weixiong (Hong Kong: Xianggang Shehui Kexue Chubanshe Youxian Gonsi—Hong Kong Social Sciences Press, 2008), pp. 303–322. The report was initially circulated as an internal report before it was revised and published. Lu and Zheng, “Who Should Be Blamed for the ‘Resentment against the Overseas Chinese,’ ” p. 307. Ibid., p. 320.

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Eight Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy 1. Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001). 2. Gordon G. Chang, “Halfway to China’s Collapse,” Far Eastern Economic Review 169, no. 5 (2006): 25–28. 3. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20 Report%202006.pdf (accessed on March 24, 2011). 4. Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 18–24. 5. Michael J. Mandel, “Does it matter if China catches up to the U.S.?” Business Week, December 6, 2004. http://www.businessweek.com/magazine /content/04_49/b3911413.htm (accessed on March 31, 2011). 6. CIA, “The world factbook: China,” March 1, 2011. https://www.cia.gov /library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (accessed on March 9, 2011); CIA, “The World Factbook: United States,” March 1, 2011. https://www .cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (accessed on March 9, 2011). 7. Zhang Monan, “China should learn from Japan,” China Daily, January 28, 2011. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-01/28/content_11930925 .htm (accessed on March 9, 2011). 8. Council on Foreign Relations, “Chinese military at least two decades away from rivaling U.S. forces, concludes newly released council task force report,” May 12, 2003. http://www.cfr.org/world/chinese-military-least-two -decades-away-rivaling-us-forces-concludes-newly-released-council-task -force-report/p5984 (accessed on March 22, 2011). 9. AFP, “Chinese military growing fast but concerns ‘regional,’ ” The Straits Times, March 8, 2011. http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/Asia /Story/STIStory_642765.html (accessed on March 9, 2011). 10. As quoted in Liu Yantang and Liu Xinyu, “guoji biange: shijie yu Zhongguo de zhanlue hudong” (International Changes: Strategic Interactions between the World and China), Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan (Liaowang Weekly) no. 9 (February 28, 2005): 28. 11. Thomas Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific: The PRC and Taiwan,” Asian Survey 20, no. 8 (August 1989): 801. 12. Fergus Hanson, “The Dragon in the Pacific: More Opportunity than Threat” (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2008), p. 3. 13. Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West (Suva, Fiji: IPS, University of the South Pacific, 2007), p. 135. 14. Ibid., p. 130. 15. Hanson, “The Dragon in the Pacific,”p. 4. 16. Zhongguo Guojia Tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 2010 (China Statistical Yearbook 2010) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe—China Statistics Press, 2010), pp. 238, 241.

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17. Elizabeth Feizkhah, “How to win friends . . . Beijing is courting tiny Pacific nations,” Time International, 157, no. 22 (June 4, 2001): 34. Also available online http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2056147,00.html (accessed on March 22, 2011). 18. John Henderson and Benjamin Reilly, “Dragon in Paradise: China’s Rising Star in Oceania,” The National Interest, 72 (2003): 94–104; Susan Windybank, “The China Syndrome,” Policy 21, no. 2 (2005): 28–33. 19. Tamara Renee Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” Asian Survey 47, no. 2 (2007): 322. 20. Bertil Lintner, “China’s third wave, part II: The Sinicizing of the South Pacific,” Asia Times, April 18, 2007. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China /ID18Ad02.html (accessed on July 14, 2009). 21. Terence Wesley-Smith, China in Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2007), p. 14. 22. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 284. 23. Russell Ong, China’s Security Interests in the 21st Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 17. 24. Wesley-Smith, “China in Oceania,” p. 14. 25. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, p. 67. 26. Ibid., p. 3. 27. Ibid., p. 330. 28. Ibid., p. 322. 29. Drew Thompson, “Think again: China’s military,” Foreign Policy, March/ April 2010. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/think_again _chinas_military?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full (accessed on March 10, 2011). 30. Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique (London and New York: Routlege, 2008), p. 25. 31. Ibid., p. 15. 32. Ibid. 33. Robert D. Kaplan, “While U.S. is distracted, China develops sea power,” The Washington Post, September 26, 2010, p. A25. http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/24/AR2010092404767.html (accessed on March 1, 2011). 34. Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (May–June 2010): 35. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., p. 41. 37. Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn, “The Southwest Pacific: U.S. Interests and China’s Growing Influence,” CRS Report for Congress, July 6, 2007, p. 5. 38. Wesley-Smith, “China in Oceania,” p. 15. 39. Lum and Vaughn, “The Southwest Pacific,” p. 7. 40. “New Chinese Tracking Station,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 29, no. 7 (February 18, 1998): 17.

196

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41. John Henderson, “China, Taiwan and the Changing Strategic Significance of Oceania,” Revue Juridique Polynesienne 1, no. 1 (2001): 153–154. 42. Ibid., p. 154. 43. Ibid., p. 153. 44. Henderson and Reilly, “Dragon in Paradise: China’s Rising Star in Oceania,” p. 99. 45. Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” p. 322. 46. Anthony van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition: Diplomatic Competition between China and Taiwan in Oceania,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 12, no. 2 (2007): 136. 47. Bertil Lintner, “The South Pacific: China’s New Frontier,” in Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific, edited by Anne-Marie Brady (New Jersey et al.: World Scientific, 2010), p. 29. 48. Henderson and Reilly, “Dragon in Paradise,” pp. 100–101. 49. Wesley-Smith, “China in Oceania,” p. 12. 50. Quansheng Zhao and Guoli Liu, “Managing the Challenges of Complex Interdependence: China and the United States in the Era of Globalization,” Asian Politics & Policy 2, no. 1 (January–March 2010): 20. 51. David M. Lampton, “Power and Trust in U.S.-China Relations,” Speech at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, June 2, 2010. http://www.siis .org.cn/en/zhuanti_view_en.aspx?id=10038 (accessed on March 2, 2011). 52. Nicola Phillips, “China and Latin America: Development Challenges and Geopolitical Dilemmas,” in China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic, edited by Lowell Dittmer and George T. Yu (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2010), p. 197. 53. Interview with a senior Chinese diplomat in Suva on February 1, 2010. See also Zhang Lu and Huang Ji, “Zhongguo zhoubian zhanlue zhong de Aodaliya— ‘da zhoubian’ zhanlue linian yu waijiao mouhua de xin tansuo” (Australia in China’s Peripheral Strategy—The Concept of “Greater Periphery” and an Exploration of Diplomatic Strategy), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), no. 2 (2007): 40–46. 54. Ruan Zongze, “suzao youli yu Zhongguo fazhan de da zhoubian huanjing” (Create a Greater Peripheral Environment Conducive to China’s Development), Zhongping Wang (China-Review.com), February 21, 2005. http://www.china-review.com/gao.asp?id=11722 (accessed on June 12, 2011). 55. Liao Yameng, “Zhongguo ‘da zhoubian’ waijiao zhanlue chengxing” (China’s “greater periphery” diplomatic strategy shaping up), Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong). Carried in Zhongan Wang (Anhui News), December 22, 2004. http: //mil.anhuinews.com/system/2004/12/22/001082169.shtml (accessed on March 22, 2011). 56. Phillips, “China and Latin America,” p. 196. 57. Michael Richardson, “China’s reliance on the Mid-East oil a strategic vulnerability,” Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, February 14, 2011. http://web1 .iseas.edu.sg/?p=2237 (accessed on March 29, 2011).

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58. Francois Lafargue, “China’s Strategies in Latin America,” Military Review 86, no. 3 (May–June 2006): 80. 59. Zhang Xinyi, “Chinese investment in Africa cements friendly ties,” People’s Daily Online, February 15, 2011. http://english.peopledaily.com .cn/90001/90780/91421/7288802.html (accessed on March 12, 2011). 60. Kerri Shannon, “Sinopec Continues China’s Latin American Energy Moves with $2.45 Billion Argentina Deal,” Money Morning, December 14, 2010. http: //moneymorning.com/2010/12/14/sinopec-china-latin-american-energy -billion-dollar-argentina-deal/ (accessed on March 12, 2011). 61. Daniel P. Erikson and Janice Chen, “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 31, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 83. 62. Windybank, “The China Syndrome,” p. 29. 63. Wesley-Smith, “China in Oceania,” p. 16. 64. Peter Hayes et al., American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific (Ringwood, Victoria, Australia and New York: Penguin, 1986), pp. 8–9. 65. Ibid., p. 9. 66. Ibid.

Conclusion 1. Xinhua, “Waijiaobu fubuzhang Cui Tiankai: Taipingyang Daoguo shi Zhongguo de zhongyao hezuo huoban” (Vice foreign minister Cui Tiankai: Pacific Island countries are China’s important partners), August 7, 2010. http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010–08/07/c_12419664.htm (accessed on August 8, 2010). 2. Fergus Hanson, The Dragon in the Pacific: More Opportunity than Threat (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2008), p. 4. 3. Jian Yang, “China in the South Pacific: Hegemon on the Horizon?” Pacific Review 22, no. 2 (2009): 139–158. 4. Michael Powles, “China and the Pacific: Confrontation or Co-operation?” New Zealand International Review 32, no. 3 (May–June 2007): 11. 5. Michael Somare, “China-Pacific development,” April 4, 2006. http://www .forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom/speeches/speeches-2006/pm-somare -china-pacific-development-5apr06-.html (accessed on March 1, 2011). 6. Heda Bayron, “Clinton visit signals renewed diplomatic interest in South Pacific,” VOA News, November 2, 2010. http://www.voanews.com/english /news/Clinton-Visit-Signals-Renewed-Diplomatic-Interest-in-South -Pacific-106512978.html (accessed on March 31, 2011). See also Jian Yang, “Fiji’s global attention—mixed bag for NZ,” The Dominion Post (New Zealand), November 9, 2010, p. 5. It was later reported that the office would be set up in PNG. 7. Edgar A. Porter and Terence Wesley-Smith, “Introduction: Oceania Matters,” in China in Oceania: Shaping the Pacific? edited by Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A. Porter (London: Berghahn Books, 2010), p. 2.

198

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8. George T. Yu, “China’s Africa Policy: South-South Unity and Cooperation,” in China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic, edited by Lowell Ditnner and George T. Yu (Boulder, CO, and London: 2010), p. 138. 9. Ibid. 10. Joel Atkinson, “Big Trouble in Little Chinatown: Australia, Taiwan and the April 2006 Post-election Riot in Solomon Islands,” Pacific Affairs 82, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 52. 11. Ibid., pp. 52–53. 12. Chris Alden et al. (eds.), China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace (London: Hurst, 2008), p. xvii. 13. Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 307.

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Index

acrobatic troupes, 9, 13 Afghanistan, 42, 111 Africa and diplomatic and other ties with China, 2, 55, 79–80, 110, 137–138, 139, 140, 144, 145 and diplomatic and other ties with Taiwan, 52–55, 64 see also corruption; individual countries agriculture, 13, 16, 47, 54, 71 aid, 12, 17, 27–33, 44, 67, 69, 71–72, 77, 86–87, 95, 98, 100, 104, 130, 144–145 military, 12, 95, 99 see also individual countries and political groupings aid dependency, 31, 66 airlines and aviation, 16, 32, 70, 81, 96 Air Marshall Islands, 63 Air Nauru, 59 Air Pacific, 85 Qantas, 85 see also Pacific Aviation Safety Office al Qaeda, 42 Alcatel Shanghai Bell, 79 Aleutian Islands, 132 American Samoa, 21, 23, 112 see also German Samoa; Samoa; Western Samoa Angola, 55, 80 Antarctica, 1, 132 anti-Chinese sentiment, 10, 101, 118–22, 124

see also ethnic conflict; Tonga, anti-Chinese riots in; Solomon Islands, anti-Chinese riots in Anti-Japanese Resistance War, 68 ANZ Bank, 78 ANZUS, 103 arc of instability, 96 arms sales and military training, 42–43, 83, 91, 95 Aso, Taro, 33 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 44 athletics, 9 Atkinson, Joel, 60–61, 101, 144 Australia, 1, 14, 23, 120, 140 and aid to Pacific, 12, 17, 28, 29, 31, 33, 76, 78, 86–87, 88, 90, 94, 95–96, 97–98, 100, 102, 144 and China, 3, 8, 13, 88, 98–99, 102, 103, 104, 140, 143 and China–Taiwan rivalry, 87, 95, 97, 102, 144 and Chinese migration to, 10, 13, 117 and diplomatic ties with China, 8, 55, 89 and EEZ, 32 and Fiji, 27, 75, 76, 83, 84–87, 88, 91, 95, 99 and French nuclear testing, 28 and Pacific, 3, 7, 11, 14–15, 19, 20–21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 29, 33, 34, 81, 87, 89, 90–95, 96, 97, 99, 102, 103–104, 143, 144 and Papua New Guinea, 7, 91, 94–95, 97, 102, 133

222

INDEX

Australia—Continued and Solomon Islands, 33, 91, 94–95, 97 and U.S., 34, 87, 102–103, 104, 133–134 see also airlines and aviation, Qantas; ANZ Bank; diplomatic representation; gold rush; investment, in Pacific; Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation; security and defence issues; trade Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), 76, 86 Australian Pacific Technical College (Samoa), 76 “Awakening Dragon,” 39 Ba Chinese Association (Feiji Bacheng Huaren Lianyihui), 115 Bainimarama, Josaia Voreqe (Frank), 75, 76, 78 Baker, Roger, 95 bêche-de-mer, 8 Beifang Huaren Xiehui, see Chinese Association of Northern Fiji Belgrade, Chinese embassy bombing in, 43 Belize, 52, 69 Bergin, Anthony, 84–85 Biddick, Thomas, 11, 130 Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., 49 Bole, Filipe N., 82 Bougainville, 91, 96 Brady, Anne-Marie, 102 Brautigam, Deborah, 145 Brazil, 109 British Commonwealth, 27, 76 British Empire, 6 British New Guinea, 26 see also New Guinea; Papua New Guinea Brown, Chris, 38 Brown, Lester R., 44 Brunei, 40 Burkina Faso, 52, 55, 64

Burlingame Treaty (1868), 6 Bush, George, 22, 42 Bush, George W., 43 Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development Coordination in the Pacific, 71, 98, 99 Callahan, William, 45 Callick, Rowan, 71, 72 Canada, 10, 15 Canton, 5, 7, 20, 117 Caribbean, 52, 53, 55, 58 see also individual countries Carlot, Maxime, 31–32 Castro, Fidel, 53 Center for Australian, New Zealand and South Pacific Studies (China), 140 Central America, 52, 53, 55, 58, 64, 69 see also individual countries Central Queensland University, 13 Chan, Steve, 133 Chang, Gordon G., 127 Chang, John, 82 Chen Shui-bian, 43, 56, 58–59, 63–64, 65–76, 68, 71, 83 chequebook diplomacy, see dollar diplomacy Chile, 53 Chin, Victor, 84 China Aid and Foreign Policy aid to, 31, 44, 53, 95 and aid to Pacific, 12, 16, 34–35, 54, 61, 63, 67, 69, 75–79, 95–96, 97–98, 99, 100, 102, 130, 144, 145 and aid worldwide, 44, 48, 51, 53–54, 80 and global foreign policy, 2–3, 9–10, 11, 42–43, 47, 48–50, 53–54, 79–80, 104, 127, 131–136, 137–138 and its grand strategy, 2–3, 33, 34–35, 37–38, 47–50, 72, 105–111, 124–125, 127, 129, 136

INDEX

see also individual countries; missile testing; security and defence issues Dynasties, 5–6, 107 see also Manchu; Ming; Qing; Tang Economy and economic development of, 2, 11–12, 41, 45–46, 47–50, 68, 104, 124, 127–128, 129–131, 140–141 see also free trade agreement, China–New Zealand; investment, in Pacific; natural resources, Chinese demand for; trade Foreign Affairs and Australia, 3, 8, 13, 88, 98–99, 102, 103, 104, 140, 143 and Fiji, 3, 8, 9–11, 13–14, 15, 55–56, 66, 75–88, 94, 95, 96, 99, 113, 114–116, 117 and Japan, 6, 39, 40–41, 45, 67, 103, 107 and New Zealand, 3, 8, 17–18, 55, 78, 89, 97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 140 143, 145 and Pacific, 1, 11, 15–18, 50, 51, 89, 94–97, 100, 111, 122–124, 130–131, 136, 137, 139, 140, 143 and Papua New Guinea, 9, 10, 12, 13–14, 16, 55–56, 59, 61–62, 81, 95, 97, 102, 112, 113, 130, 143 and Soviet Union, 8–10, 38, 39, 41, 135, 140 and U.S., 2, 6, 8, 17, 18, 38, 39–40, 43–44, 45, 50, 102–103, 107, 111, 128–130, 131–136, 137, 138 see also diplomatic recognition, of China and Taiwan; diplomatic representation; one-China policy; reunification, Chinese; Taiwan, and China; tourism Geography rural–urban divide, 41 social security in, 41–42

223

unemployment in, 41 see also Canton; Dongguan; Enping; Fujian; Guangdong; Kaiping; Taishan; Tibet; Uyghur people; Xinjiang; Zhongshan Political Structure People’s Republic of China, 6, 8, 43, 63, 108 undemocratic government in, 38–9, 45, 100 see also Chinese Communist Party; corruption China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification (CCPPU), 110 China Development Bank (CDB), 78 China Eximbank, 77–78 China–Fiji Friendship Bridge (Navuso Bridge), 79 China Institute of International Studies, 140 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), 40 China National Petroleum Corporation, 80 China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum/Guiding Framework, 16, 98–99 China–Pacific Islands Forum Cooperative Fund, 15 China–PICs Forum, 16, 62 China Railway First Group Construction Limited, 77 China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, 145 China threat theory, 2, 18, 39–40, 43–45, 48, 128, 132, 141, 143 Chinese, overseas populations of, 105–111, 112, 125–126 in Pacific, 5, 6, 97, 101, 111–118, 122–125 in Latin America, 54–55

224

INDEX

Chinese, overseas populations of—Continued see also Australia, and Chinese migration to; diaspora, Chinese; Fiji, and Chinese migration to; migration, Chinese; New Zealand, and Chinese migration to; Papua New Guinea, and Chinese migration to; Solomon Islands, and Chinese migration to; United States of America, and Chinese migration to Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 46, 140 Chinese Association of Northern Fiji (Beifang Huaren Xiehui), 115 Chinese Central Television, 13 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 6, 10, 39, 41, 43, 45, 46, 47, 50, 67–68, 84, 127–128, 129 Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, 41 Chinese Revolution (1911), 107 Ch’ing, see Qing Chongqing acrobatic troupe, 9 Christensen, Thomas, 103 Christianity, 100 CIA, 129 civil liberties, 100 civil servants, Pacific, training of, 75, 76 civil war, Chinese Communist Party– Kuomintang, 6, 68 Clark, Helen, 97 climate change, 38, 92, 144 Clinton, Bill, 39, 42–43 Clinton, Hillary, 44, 144 Cold War, 8–11, 19, 21, 22–23, 24, 26, 30, 33, 34, 38, 39, 42, 47–48, 50, 94, 100, 130, 135, 143 see also post-Cold War era colonization, 7, 14, 15, 21, 24–27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 90, 133 see also decolonization Communism, 8, 18, 45, 71, 100, 108–109

see also Chinese Communist Party Compact of Free Association with the United States (Marshall Islands), 59 comprehensive national power (CNP), 47–48, 50 Congressional Research Service (CRS), 101 Cook Islands, 1, 7, 14, 22, 23, 91–92, 112 and diplomatic ties with China, 55–56 copper, 10, 12, 130 copra, 7 corruption in Africa, 80 in China, 46 in Pacific island countries, 2, 17, 59, 66–67, 73, 95, 97, 101, 118–119 in Taiwan, 59 Costa Rica, 65 Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China (CCPPU), 109, 113 Cox Report, 39 crime, in Pacific island countries, 97, 101, 118, 122 Crocombe, Ron, 13, 17, 32, 34, 60, 67, 98, 100, 112, 113, 118, 130 Cuba, 53 cultural interaction, between China and Pacific island countries, 9, 13, 54–55, 71, 115–116, 117, 137 decolonization, 8–9, 14–15, 18, 21 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (Taiwan), 43, 59, 68, 69, 72, 84 democratization and democratic values, 58, 65, 68, 80, 94, 120, 121–122 in Fiji, 78, 84, 99 Deng Xiaoping, 46, 48, 110 developing countries, 13, 53, 58, 67, 79–82, 131, 136, 141, 143–145 see also Third World diaspora, Chinese, 17, 105–106, 108, 110

INDEX

diplomatic recognition, of China and Taiwan, 3, 8, 17, 51–55, 56, 58–73, 80, 82–83, 84, 87, 95, 96–97, 100–101, 102, 109–111, 124, 130–131, 135, 137, 138, 141 diplomatic representation, 33, 48, 96 Australian, 8, 11, 84 British, 27 Chinese, 8, 9, 11, 18, 37, 38, 40, 48, 49, 51–54, 61, 62, 64, 69–70, 73, 79, 80–81, 89, 104, 107, 108, 111, 114, 124–125, 136, 143 Japanese, 32 New Zealand, 11, 84 Soviet, 9, 21–2 Taiwanese, 51–54, 56, 57–58, 61, 64–66, 67–73, 130 United States, 11, 20, 22–23 see also dollar diplomacy; individual countries; resource diplomacy; summit diplomacy; transit diplomacy; visit diplomacy disputes, see East China Sea, dispute over; oil pipeline dispute, Japan and China; South China Sea, dispute over; territorial disputes Dobell, Graeme, 118, 119 dollar diplomacy, 2, 17, 18, 57–63, 67, 68–69, 73 Dominican Republic, 52, 54, 64, 66 Dongguan, 115, 117 Dongguan Association of Fiji (Feiji Dongguan Tongxianghui), 115 Dorrance, John C., 21 Downer, Alexander, 95, 102, 103 Dupont, Alan, 102 East Asia, 17, 20, 21, 103 East China Sea, dispute over, 40–41, 45 East Timor, 23, 96 East Turkistan Islamic Movement, 42 East–West Center (Hawaii), 24 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) (China– Taiwan), 70

225

El Salvador, 52, 70 election fixing/interference in, 42, 101, 118, 119, 120 emigration, Chinese, see migration, Chinese Empress of China (ship), 20 energy, and energy security issues, 40–41, 71, 80, 92, 102, 128, 132, 137, 138 see also Nadarivatu Hydro Power Project; Sinohydro Corporation Enping, 116, 117 Enping Association of Fiji (Feiji Enping Lianyihui), 116 ethnic conflict, 38, 118–120, 121, 122–123, 124–125 see also anti-Chinese sentiment European Union (EU), 15, 137 and aid to Pacific, 29–30, 34 and aid worldwide, 44 see also security and defence issues Evatt, H. V., 14 exclusive economic zones (EEZ), 9, 24, 30, 31, 32, 131 Export and Import Bank of China, see China Eximbank Falun Gong, 46, 117 Feaver, Peter, 37 Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), 1, 23, 25, 34, 112 aid to, 31 and Chinese tourism in, 13 and U.S., 23, 91, 134 Feiji Bacheng Huaren Lianyihui, see Ba Chinese Association Feiji Dongguan Tongxianghui, see Dongguan Association of Fiji Feiji Enping Lianyihui, see Enping Association of Fiji Feiji Guangdong Lianyihui, see Guangdong Association of Fiji Feiji Huaren Funu Xiehui, see Fiji Chinese Women Association

226

INDEX

Feiji Huaren Gongshang Lianhehui, see Fiji Chinese Federation of Industry and Commerce Feiji Huaren Jiaoyu Xiehui, see Fiji Chinese Education Association Feiji Huaren Qingnianhui, see Fiji Association of Chinese Youth Feiji Huaren Wenhua Tiyu Xiehui, see Fiji Chinese Association for Culture and Sport Feiji Huaren Wenhua Yishu Jingji Lianhehui, see Fiji Chinese Federation of Culture, Art and Economics Feiji Huaren Wenti Yishutuan, see Fiji Chinese Recreation and Art Troupe Feiji Huaren Xiehui, see Fiji China Association Feiji Huaren Yishu Wenhua Jingji Lianhehui Xibeiqu Fenhui, see Northwest Branch of Fiji Chinese Federation of Culture, Art and Economics Feiji Huaren Yishutuan, see Fiji Chinese Troup Feiji Kaiping Xiangqinhui, see Kaiping Association of Fiji Feiji Taishan Tongxianghui, see Taishan Association of Fiji Feiji Taiwan Tongxiang Lianyihui, see Taiwanese Association of Fiji Feiji Wushu Xiehui, see Fiji Wushu Association Feiji Xibeiqu Zhongshan Tongxianghui, see Northwest Branch of Zhongshan Association of Fiji Feiji Zhongguo Heping Tongyi Cujinghui, see Fijian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China Feiji-Zhongguo Maoyi Weiyuanhui, see Fiji-China Business Council

Feiji Zhonghua Shanghui, see Fiji Chinese Business Association Feiji Zhonghua Xiehui, see Fiji China Association Feiji Zhongshan Tongxianghui, see Zhongshan Association of Fiji Fiji, 1, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 23, 26, 32, 34, 81, 94, 95, 101, 144 aid and soft loans to, 27, 75–79, 85–87, 95, 144 and Australia, 27, 75, 76, 83, 84–87, 88, 91, 95, 99 and Chinese migration to, 7, 10–11, 13, 112, 113, 114, 117 and diplomatic and other ties with China, 3, 8, 9–11, 13–14, 15, 55–56, 66, 75–88, 94, 95, 96, 99, 113, 114–116, 117 and diplomatic and other ties with Taiwan, 9, 56, 62, 65, 66, 82–84, 114, 117 and Indian population in, 34, 113, 121–122 and New Zealand, 27, 75, 76, 78, 83, 84–87, 88, 94, 95, 96 and Soviet Union, 9 and tourism in, 12, 13, 16, 83 and U.S., 23, 144 coups in, 27, 32, 75–77, 79, 82, 83–85, 87, 94, 96, 99, 117 see also airlines and aviation, Air Pacific; China–Fiji Friendship Bridge; democratization and democratic values; Nadarivatu Hydro Power Project Fiji Association of Chinese Youth, 114, 115 Fiji China Association (Feiji Zhonghua Xiehui), 115 Fiji-China Business Council (Feiji-Zhongguo Maoyi Weiyuanhui), 116 Fiji Chinese Association (Feiji Huaren Xiehui), 115

INDEX

Fiji Chinese Association for Culture and Sport (Feiji Huaren Wenhua Tiyu Xiehui), 116 Fiji Chinese Business Association (Feiji Zhonghua Shanghui), 115 Fiji Chinese Education Association (Feiji Huaren Jiaoyu Xiehui), 115 Fiji Chinese Federation of Culture, Art and Economics (Feiji Huaren Wenhua Yishu Jingji Lianhehui), 115 Fiji Chinese Federation of Industry and Commerce (Feiji Huaren Gongshang Lianhehui), 116 Fiji Chinese Recreation and Art Troupe (Feiji Huaren Wenti Yishutuan), 116 Fiji Chinese Troupe (Feiji Huaren Yishutuan), 116 Fiji Chinese Women Association (Feiji Huaren Funu Xiehui), 116 Fiji Wushu Association (Feiji Wushu Xiehui), 116 Fijian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China (Feiji Zhongguo Heping Tongyi Cujinghui), 113, 114, 116 Firth, Stewart, 91 fish and fisheries, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 27, 30, 31, 32, 56, 71, 81, 102, 112, 130–131 see also (Pacific Islands) Forum Fisheries Agency; PIF Fisheries Agency; South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization; Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Foley, Admiral Sylvester, 140 France, 100, 133 and aid to Pacific, 27, 28–29, 31 and China, 6 and Pacific, 14, 15, 19, 21, 25, 26, 27–29, 34, 94, 104 see also nuclear testing; security and defence issues

227

Fraser, Peter, 14 free trade agreement, China–New Zealand, 103 French Polynesia, 1, 7, 23, 25, 28, 112 Friedman, George, 131 Friedman, Hal M., 19–20 Fujian (Fukien), 5, 106, 112 Fukien, see Fujian Gambia, 52, 55, 64 German Papua New Guinea, 7 see also New Guinea; Papua New Guinea German Samoa, 7, 25 see also American Samoa; Samoa; Western Samoa Germany, and Pacific, 7, 24, 25, 34, 76 global monetary system, 38, 98 globalization, 109 Godley, Michael, 9, 11 gold, 12, 130 gold rush Australian, 6 Californian, 6 Goldstein, Avery, 37 grand strategy, China’s, see China, Aid and Foreign Policy Great Britain and aid to Pacific, 27, 28, 29 and China, 6, 20 and Pacific, 14, 15, 19, 21, 25, 26–27, 29, 34 see also diplomatic representation; security and defence issues Great Cultural Revolution, 108–109 Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, 80 Grenada, 53–54 Gries, Peter, 45 Guam, 21, 23, 65, 112, 132, 133–134 Guangdong (Kwangtung), 5, 7, 13, 106, 112, 115, 116, 117, 123 Guangdong Association of Fiji (Feiji Guangdong Lianyihui), 116 Guatemala, 52

228

INDEX

Gulf War (1991), 132 Guoli Liu, 135 Guomindang, see Kuomintang Haiti, 52, 54 Haiveta, Chris, 61 Hanson, Fergus, 78, 87, 98, 143 Harris, Stuart, 66 Harwit, Eric, 73 Hashimoto, Ryutaro, 39 Hawaii, 11, 20, 23, 24, 65, 131 Haywood-Jones, Jenny, 85 He Yafei, 99 Hegarty, David, 21–22 Henderson, John, 11, 17–18, 63, 102, 134–135 Henningham, Stephen, 100 Herr, Richard, 84–85 Hoadley, Stephen, 30, 32, 33, 100 Holbrooke, Richard, 21 Honduras, 52, 64 Hong Kong, 55, 60, 82, 105, 106, 110, 112, 123, 124 Howard, John, 90, 102, 103 Hsia, Andrew, 68–69 Hu, Jason C., 53 Hu Jintao, 43, 67–68, 123 Hu Yaobang, 10 human rights, 38, 80, 94, 96, 100, 111, 141 humanitarian crises, 92 Hurricane Ivan, 53 hydrocarbons, 12, 130 identity, Chinese, 45, 108, 110, 114, 117, 143 Ielemia, Apisai, 65 immigration, see migration, Chinese imperialism, 9–10, 18 independence, Pacific island countries, 1, 8, 9, 10, 14, 18, 25–27, 30, 33, 34, 82, 90, 91, 99, 117 India, 15, 33, 34, 35, 40 see also security and defence issues

Indonesia, 1, 15, 23, 26, 33–34, 35, 40, 94, 97, 106, 111 aid to, 31 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (London), 129 International Whaling Commission, 32, 67 investment, foreign direct (FDI), 81, 109, 113 investment, in Pacific Asian, 33–34 Australian, 85, 90 Chinese, 11–12, 16, 17, 61, 80–81, 97, 113, 130–131, 138, 145 European, 24 Japanese, 31, 32 New Zealand, 85 Taiwanese, 64, 70, 102, 119 U.S., 20 see also Pacific Islands Trade and Invest Iran, 40 Iraq, 23–24, 111 Irian Jaya (West Papua), 23, 33–34, 96 Israel, 33, 35, 106 Italy, 15 Izumi, Kabayashi, 33 Jane’s Defence Weekly, 134 Japan, 23, 132 and aid to Pacific, 28, 29, 30–33, 34, 44, 67, 76, 98 and aid worldwide, 44 and China, 6, 39, 40–41, 45, 67, 103, 107 and Pacific, 10, 15, 19–20, 25, 30–33, 34–35, 56, 94, 130 and U.S., 20, 39, 45, 134 and World War II, 6, 30, 134 economy of, 32, 129 see also Anti-Japanese Resistance War; diplomatic representation; investment, in Pacific; Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation; security and defence issues; South

INDEX

Pacific Whale Sanctuary; whaling Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (Australia–Japan), 103 Kaiping, 115, 117 Kaiping Association of Fiji (Feiji Kaiping Xiangqinhui), 115 Kaplan, Robert, 133 Kashmir, 40 Kastner, Scott, 72 Kemakeza, Sir Allan, 118 Key, John, 78, 99 Kiribati, 1, 21, 23, 26, 27, 52, 59, 62, 63, 112 and diplomatic and other ties with China, 9, 14, 56, 59, 62, 67, 134–135, 141 and diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 52, 55–56, 59, 62, 65, 66, 67, 102, 135 see also Temawaiku village, South Tarawa Korea, North, 40 Korea, South, 15, 33, 34, 35, 56, 67, 76, 94 Kuomintang (KMT) (Nationalist Party or Guomindang), 6, 8, 43, 47, 50, 51, 67–68, 70–71, 84, 130 Kuranari, Tadashi, 30 Kwajalein Atoll/Missile Range, 134 Kwangtung, see Guangdong laborers, Chinese, nineteenth and twentieth century, 5, 7–8, 18, 106, 107, 120 Lafargue, Francois, 138 Lampton, David M., 135–136 language, Chinese: teaching of, 13, 54, 114 Latin America Chinese involvement with, 2, 53, 54–55, 69–70, 136, 137–138, 139, 140

229

Taiwanese involvement with, 52, 53, 65–66, 69–70 Law of the Sea, 30 Layne, Christopher, 37 League of Nations Trust Territory, 25 Lebanon, 66 Lee Teng-hui, 42, 64 Libya, 33, 35 Lien Chan, 43, 67–68 Lin, Cheng-yi, 72 Lin, Richard C., 53 Lintner, Bertil, 111, 113 Liu Huaqing, Admiral, 132 Liu Jianfei, 129 loans, preferential and soft, 12–13, 53, 59, 61, 76–78, 80, 102, 119 Look North policy, 16, 76, 94–95, 99–100 Lowy Institute, 95 Lu Weixiong, 123–124 Ma Peiru, 105 Ma Ying-jeou, 43, 51, 67, 68–69, 70, 71–72, 73 Macau, 82, 110, 123 Macedonia, 54 Mackensen, Gotz, 24 Madagascar, 55 Madang nickel mine (Papua New Guinea), 12, 130 Malawi, 64 Malaysia, 15, 33, 34, 35, 40, 94, 107, 109, 111 Manchu dynasty, 6 Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, 9, 83 Mariana Islands, see Northern Marianas Marshall Islands, 1, 23, 25, 52, 112, 122 aid to, 57–58, 68 and diplomatic and other ties with China, 56, 59, 66, 81 and diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 52, 55–56, 57–58, 59, 63, 64–65 and U.S., 23, 91, 134 see also airlines and aviation, Air Marshall Islands

230

INDEX

martial arts performers, 13 Martinelli, Ricardo, 70 mass incidents, in China, 46 see also Tiananmen Square crackdown Mauritius, 55 McCarthy, Fuimaono Les, 92 McCully, Murray, 84, 85, 87, 96, 145 McKeown, Adam, 107–8 McLeod, Abby, 119 Mearsheimer, John, 133 Melanesia, 5, 23, 33, 52, 91, 120, 130 see also individual countries Metallurgical and Construction Corporation (MCC) (China), 12 Mexico City, 54 Micronesia, 5, 13, 14, 22, 23–24, 25, 33, 34, 91 and diplomatic ties with China, 55–56 and diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 52 see also Federated States of Micronesia; individual countries Middle East, 137 migration, Chinese 5, 6, 7, 10–11, 13, 17, 97, 101, 106–107, 108, 111–114, 117, 118, 121, 122, 123, 124–125 military regimes, China’s attitude to, 2, 75, 76, 78, 80–81, 84 military training, see arms sales and military training Millennium Development Goals, 98 minerals, 12, 24, 30, 32, 81, 130 seabed, 9, 11, 12, 30, 131 Ming dynasty, 6 missile testing Chinese, 9, 42, 131, 134, 141 U.S., 134 Mitchell, Keith, 53–54 Morauta, Mekere, 102 Morgan, Michael, 119 Munro, Ross, 39 Murayama, Tomiichi, 31–32 Muslim populations, in China, 42

Nadarivatu Hydro Power Project (Fiji), 77, 78, 79 nationalism, Chinese, 45–46, 107–108 Nationalist Party, see Kuomintang natural disasters, 71, 92 see also Hurricane Ivan natural resources, Chinese demand for, 11, 12–13, 17, 37, 40, 47–48, 80, 87, 130–131, 132, 138, 141 Nauru, 1, 7, 10, 14, 23, 25, 112 aid to, 66 and diplomatic ties with China, 14, 56, 58, 59 and diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 52, 55–56, 58, 59, 65, 66 see also airlines and aviation, Air Nauru Navuso Bridge, see China–Fiji Friendship Bridge Netherlands, and Pacific, 14, 24, 26 New Caledonia, 1, 23, 25, 27–28, 112 New Guinea, 7, 8, 25, 26, 132 see also British New Guinea; German Papua New Guinea; Papua New Guinea New York Times, 40 New Zealand, 23, 81, 140 and aid to Pacific, 29, 86–87, 95, 96, 97–98, 100, 102 and China, 3, 17–18, 89, 97, 102, 104, 140 143, 145 and China–Taiwan rivalry, 95, 97, 102 and Chinese migration to, 13 and diplomatic ties with China, 8, 55, 78, 89, 99, 103 and Fiji, 27, 75, 76, 78, 83, 84–87, 88, 94, 95, 96 and French nuclear testing, 28, 94 and Pacific, 1, 3, 7, 11, 14–15, 19, 20–21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 29, 33, 34, 89, 91–94, 96, 97, 102, 103–104, 120, 143 and U.S., 21, 34, 103, 104

INDEX

foreign policy of, 89, 96, 103 see also diplomatic representation; investment, in Pacific; security and defence issues; tourism; trade New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID), 87 New Zealand Herald, 121 Nicaragua, 52 nickel mining, 12, 97, 130 Niue, 1, 23, 26, 91, 112 and diplomatic ties with China, 55–56 noninterference, principle of, 79–80 Northern Marianas, 1, 23, 112, 132, 133–134 Northwest Branch of Fiji Chinese Federation of Culture, Art and Economics (Feiji Huaren Yishu Wenhua Jingji Lianhehui Xibeiqu Fenhui), 115 Northwest Branch of Zhongshan Association of Fiji (Feiji Xibeiqu Zhongshan Tongxianghui), 116 Note, Kessai, 63, 65 nuclear power, Chinese, 47–48 nuclear testing, French, 27–29, 94 see also South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone; South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Nye, Joseph, 100, 135 Oceanian Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification of China, 113 oil acquisition/exploration, 24, 80, 92, 138 see also China National Offshore Oil Corporation; Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company oil pipeline dispute, Japan and China, 40 Olympic Games (Beijing), 75, 76

231

one-China policy, 53, 62, 63, 68, 83, 102 see also diplomatic recognition, of China and Taiwan; reunification, Chinese; Taiwan, and China Opium War, 6 organizations Chinese, 109–110, 114, 115–116 regional, 1, 93–94 see also individual organizations Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (Guangdong), 13, 105, 112, 123 Overseas Compatriots Affairs Commission (Taiwan), 13, 83 Pacific Aviation Safety Office, 93 Pacific Common Market, 15 Pacific Community (PC), 1, 27, 93, 94 Pacific Islands Center (Tokyo), 31 Pacific Islands Development Program, 93 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), 1, 15–16, 31, 33, 55, 62, 71, 81, 93–94, 96, 98, 99, 135 (Pacific Islands) Forum Fisheries Agency, 62, 93 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 16, 62, 93 Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM), 31, 33 Pacific Islands Trade and Invest, 93 Pacific Islands Trade Office (Beijing), 15–16, 62 Pacific Regional Environment Program, 93 Palau, 1, 23, 25, 52, 55, 112 aid to, 57–58, 60, 64 and diplomacy from China, 64 and diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 52, 55–57, 60, 62, 64, 65 and U.S., 23, 25, 91, 134 Palau Declaration, 64–65 Panama, 52, 69–70

232

INDEX

Papua New Guinea (PNG), 1, 7, 10, 13, 14, 21–22, 23, 34, 56, 59, 91, 95, 97, 131, 132 aid to, 31, 94, 95, 102 and Australia, 7, 91, 94–95, 97, 102, 133 and Chinese migration to, 13, 112 and diplomatic and other ties with China, 9, 10, 12, 13–14, 16, 55–56, 59, 61–62, 81, 95, 97, 102, 113, 130, 143 and diplomatic and other ties with Taiwan, 56, 59, 61–62, 102 and U.S., 23, 95 anti-Chinese riots in, 118, 122, 123 see also British New Guinea; German Papua New Guinea; New Guinea Paracel Islands, 40 Paraguay, 52, 65–66 Payne, Richard J., 22, 24 peacekeeping mission to Solomon Islands, 33, 90–91, 92 see also Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 84, 132 People’s Republic of China (PRC), see China Perry, Commodore Matthew, 20 Peters, Winston, 89, 94, 95, 96, 99 Philippines, 15, 23, 40, 107, 132 phosphate mines, 5, 10, 18 Pillsbury, Michael, 48 Pimont, Yves, 22 Pitcairn Islands, 26 plantations, Pacific, 5, 7, 12, 18, 120 pollution, 46 Polynesia, 1, 5, 23, 33, 52, 91 see also French Polynesia; individual countries Porter, Edgar A., 11, 144 post-Cold War era, 5, 11–15, 22–23, 27, 30, 34, 38, 39, 42, 50, 135, 143 poverty, 38, 69, 92 Powles, Michael, 12, 143

protests, public in China, see mass incidents Qarase, Laisenia, 96 Qian Qichen, 83 Qing dynasty/Empire, 6, 8, 20, 69–70, 107 Quansheng Zhao, 135 racism, see anti-Chinese sentiment; ethnic conflict Ramu nickel mine (Papua New Guinea), 97, 130 Red Dragon Rising, 39 Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), 71, 91, 119 Reilly, Benjamin, 11, 17, 33, 134–135 Remengesau, Tommy E. Jr, 65 Republic of China (ROC), see Taiwan resource diplomacy, 30 resource security, 32, 92 reunification, Chinese, 43, 47, 48, 49, 51–52, 54–55, 68, 72, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 124, 129–131, 135, 137 see also diplomatic recognition, of China and Taiwan; one-China policy; Taiwan, and China Rini, Snyder, 101, 118 Rohrabacher, Dana, 71 Ruan Zongze, 137 Russia, 39, 49 Russian Far East, 40, 111 Saint Kitts and Nevis, 52 Saint Lucia, 52 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 52 Samoa, 1, 7–8, 13, 14, 23, 85, 91–92, 112 aid and soft loans to, 76, 77 and diplomatic ties with China, 13, 14, 55–56, 77 and diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 56 see also American Samoa; German Samoa; Western Samoa sanctions, 27, 54, 76, 80–81, 84–85, 87

INDEX

sandalwood, 7, 8 São Tomé and Principé, 52, 55, 64 satellite-tracking station, 134–135, 141 Saunders, Phillip, 47, 72 Scotty, Ludwig, 65 security and defence issues, 37–41, 47–50, 82, 90–91, 92, 102, 131–136, 140–141 Australian, 20–1, 22, 27, 28, 33, 90, 92, 95–6, 97, 102–3, 131, 134 British, 26–27 Chinese, 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 17–18, 20–21, 37–45, 47–50, 68, 82, 87, 95, 98, 102–103, 127, 128–130, 131–137, 140–141, 143 European Union, 29 French, 27–28 Indian, 34 Japanese, 31–33, 39–41, 45, 103, 132, 140 New Zealand, 20–21, 22, 28, 33, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 98, 103 Singaporean, 111 Soviet, 21–22, 27, 38, 140 U.S., 17, 19–20, 22, 23, 24, 28, 34, 38, 39–40, 42, 43, 87, 95, 102, 103, 111, 128, 131–136, 140, 143 see also ANZUS; arc of instability; arms sales and military training; China threat theory; defense cooperation; energy, and energy security issues; Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation; missile testing; nuclear testing; separatist movements; terrorism; treaties, Chinese with foreign powers; United Nations Security Council; U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission; U.S.– Japan Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century; U.S.–Japan Security Cooperation Senkaku Islands, 40

233

separatist movements, 42, 46, 117 see also Tibet; Uyghur people; Xinjiang Shambaugh, David, 132 Shannon, Tom, 138 Sheng Ding, 108 Shie, Tamara Renee, 17 shipping, in Pacific, 7, 20, 32, 81, 131 Sikua, Derek, 72 Singapore, 33, 34, 35, 94, 111 see also security and defence issues Sinohydro Corporation, 78 Skate, Bill, 61, 102 Skerrit, Roosevelt, 54 Smith, Stephen, 98–99 soccer, 9 soft power, 23, 44, 54, 91, 100, 102 Sogavare, Mannaseh, 65 Solomon Islands, 1, 7, 10, 14, 23, 25, 26, 91, 94–95 aid to, 60, 66, 71–72 and Australia, 33, 91, 94–95, 97 and Chinese migration to, 10, 13, 112 and diplomatic and other ties with China, 60, 66, 81, 95, 97, 113, 123 and diplomatic and other ties with Taiwan, 52, 55–57, 60, 63, 65, 66, 71–72, 97, 119, 123 anti-Chinese riots in, 101, 118–120, 121, 123 emergency/instability in, 33, 91, 95, 96, 97 see also peacekeeping mission to Solomon Islands; Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands Somare, Michael, 16, 61, 143 South Africa, 55 South America, 1, 52, 58, 110 see also individual countries South China Sea, dispute over, 40 South Pacific Applied Geosciences Commission, 93 South Pacific Board for Education Assessment, 93

234

INDEX

South Pacific Commission (SPC), 1, 14–15 South Pacific Forum (SPF), 14–15, 31, 32 see also Pacific Islands Forum South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, 15 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 15 South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO), 56, 93 South Pacific Tourism Organization (SPTO), 16, 62–3, 93 South Pacific Trade and Investment Commission, see Pacific Islands Trade and Invest South Pacific Trade Office, 62 South Pacific Whale Sanctuary, 32, 67 Southeast Asia, 6, 10, 44, 96, 102, 106, 109, 111, 112, 136, 137, 140 Soviet Union and aid to Pacific, 21 and China, 8–10, 38, 39, 41, 135, 140 and Cold War, 22, 34, 47, 94, 100 and Pacific, 9, 10, 21–22, 26, 27, 30, 33, 94, 104, 140 and U.S., 9, 20, 21, 22, 100, 140 as threat, 22, 33, 140 see also diplomatic representation; security and defence issues Spratly Islands, 40, 44 Stratfor, 95, 131 Strokirch, Karin von, 28 students Chinese in Pacific, 13–14 exchanges of, 54 Pacific in China, 13–14 Pacific in Taiwan, 58 see also Central Queensland University; University of the South Pacific Sudan, 40, 80 summit diplomacy, 57, 64–65, 68, 71–72 Swaine, Michael, 37, 48 Swaziland, 52, 55, 64

Tahiti, 7 Taishan, 116 Taishan Association of Fiji (Feiji Taishan Tongxianghui), 116 Taiwan, 5, 6, 19, 23, 51, 70, 105, 106, 112, 123, 124, 132 and aid to Pacific, 53, 54, 57–63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 71, 97, 102, 117, 119, 144 and China, 2, 6, 9, 17, 18, 39, 42–43, 47, 48, 50, 51–73, 80, 87, 95, 101–103, 109, 110–111, 124, 130–131, 132–134, 135, 137, 141, 144 and Fiji, 82–84, 85, 114, 117 and global foreign policy, 52–57, 67–73 and Pacific, 51–53, 55–57, 63–65, 66, 71–73, 77, 82–83, 97, 102, 112, 114, 117, 118–119, 123, 137–138 and UN, 53, 56–57, 64, 65, 70, 83 and U.S., 39, 42–43, 50, 65–66, 102–103, 135 see also corruption; diplomatic recognition, of China and Taiwan; diplomatic representation; investment, in Pacific; one-China policy; reunification, Chinese; tourism; trade Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund (Taiwan ICDF), 58 Taiwan News, 72 Taiwan Strait crisis, 39, 42, 51 Taiwanese Association of Fiji, 114, 115, 117 Taliban, 42 Tang dynasty, 6 Tarte, Sandra, 32, 85 Täufa’ähau Tupou IV, King, 63, 121–122 Taylor, Ian, 55, 79 television, 100 see also Chinese Central Television

INDEX

Tellis, Ashley J., 37, 48 Temawaiku village, South Tarawa, 134–5 territorial disputes, 40–1, 44, 47 terrorism, 42, 43 Thailand, 15, 31, 94, 106 Thakur, Ramesh, 11 The Coming Conflict with China, 39 Third World, 9–10, 18, 51 see also developing countries Thompson, Drew, 133 Tiananmen Square crackdown, 39, 46, 80, 81, 127–128 Tibet, 42, 46, 81, 100, 117, 124, 141 Tien Hung-mao, 110 timber, 10, 12, 30, 92, 102, 112, 130 To, James, 101–102 Tokelau, 26, 91, 112 Tomeing, Litokwa, 63–64 Tong, Anote, 59, 65, 102 Tonga, 1, 14, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 91–92, 112 aid to, 21, 95 and diplomatic and other ties with China, 13, 14, 55–56, 113 and diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 9, 56, 63 anti-Chinese riots in, 101, 118, 120–122 tourism Chinese, 12, 13, 16, 62–63, 70, 131 in Pacific, 16, 17, 32, 83, 85, 92, 130, 131 New Zealand, 92 Taiwanese, 64, 83 see also South Pacific Tourism Organization (SPTO); Trade and Tourism Representative Office trade, 5, 8, 10, 17, 24, 33, 34, 55, 98, 100, 145 Australian 85, 89, 90, 98 Chinese, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11–12, 16, 45, 55, 62, 66, 69, 70, 80, 81, 84, 113, 116, 123, 130–131, 132, 13, 145 Japanese, 31, 32, 45

235

New Zealand, 85, 89, 92, 103 Taiwanese, 53, 55–56, 61, 62, 69, 70, 82–83 U.S., 20 see also Pacific Islands Trade and Invest; South Pacific Trade Office Trade and Tourism Representative Office (Fiji, in Taiwan), 83 transit diplomacy, 57, 65–66, 68 treaties, Chinese with foreign powers, 6, 10, 20, 43–44, 107 see also Burlingame Treaty; Treaty of Tianjin; Treaty of Wang-Xia Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin), 8 Treaty of Wang-Xia (Wang-hsia), 20 Truman, Harry, 21 Tull, Dennis M., 80 Tuvalu, 1, 23, 26, 52, 59, 91–92, 112 and diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 55–56, 63, 65, 66 UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women), 119–120 United Kingdom, see Great Britain United Nations, 1, 25, 26, 42, 43, 51, 53, 56–57, 58, 70, 83, 97 see also Taiwan, and UN; UNIFEM; World Food Program; World Health Assembly; World Health Organization United Nations Security Council, 9, 31–32, 54, 55, 97 United States of America, 42, 95, 131, 138 and aid to Pacific, 12, 23, 28, 29, 31, 59, 95, 144 and aid worldwide, 44 and Australia, 34, 87, 102–103, 104, 133–134 and China, 2, 6, 8, 17, 18, 38, 39–40, 43–44, 45, 50, 102–103, 107, 111, 128–130, 131–136, 137, 138 and Chinese migration to, 10, 117 and Cold War, 19, 21–22

236

INDEX

United States of America—Continued and Fiji, 23, 84–4, 144 and Japan, 20, 39, 45, 134 and New Zealand, 21, 34, 103, 104 and Pacific, 2, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19–21, 22–24, 30, 34, 38, 59, 91, 93–94, 111, 144 and Papua New Guinea, 23, 95 and Soviet Union, 9, 20, 21, 22, 100, 140 and Taiwan, 39, 42–43, 50, 65–66, 102–103, 135 and World War II, 20–21, 25, 134 economy of, 129 see also diplomatic representation; Federated States of Micronesia; gold rush; Hawaii; investment, in Pacific; Marshall Islands; missile testing; security and defence issues; trade University of the South Pacific, 13, 27, 62, 81, 93 Urwin, Greg, 96 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 144 U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 40 U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century, 39 U.S.–Japan Security Cooperation, 39 Uyghur people, 42 van Fossen, Anthony, 55, 90, 97, 100–101 Vanuatu, 1, 9, 14, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 31–32, 112 aid to, 60–61 and diplomatic and other ties with China, 9, 10, 13, 14, 55–56, 60–61, 95, 102, 113, 117–118 and diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 60–61, 102, 117 Vanuatu Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification, 117

Vatican City, 52, 53 Venezuela, 40 Vietnam, 40, 44 visit diplomacy, 57, 63–64, 83–84 Vltchek, Andre, 60 Vohor, Serge, 60, 102, 117 Wallis and Futuna Islands, 25, 112 Wang, David, 57 Wang Chao, 99 Wang Yongqiu, 51 Wang Yunxiang, 64 Weekly Standard, 40 Wen Ho Lee, 39 Wen Jiabao, 12–13, 16, 62, 76, 77, 78, 89, 96, 99, 103, 143 Wesley-Smith, Terence, 11, 67, 132, 135, 140, 144 West New Guinea, 24, 26 West Papua, see Irian Jaya Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 93 Western Samoa, 1, 7, 9, 14, 25 and diplomatic and other ties with China, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 and diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 9 see also American Samoa; German Samoa; Samoa Western values impact on China, 46, 50 impact on Pacific island countries, 11, 18, 100 whaling, 20, 32, 67 see also International Whaling Commission; South Pacific Whale Sanctuary White, Brian, 38 Who Will Feed China?: Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet, 44 Willmott, Bill, 113, 120 Wilson, Margaret, 5 Windybank, Susan, 17 World Bank, 106 World Federation of Overseas Chinese Associations, 109–110

INDEX

World Food Program, 44 World Health Assembly, 70 World Health Organization (WHO), 57, 65, 67, 70 World Trade Organization (WTO), 103 World War I, 20 World War II, 6, 7, 10, 20–21, 24, 25, 26, 30, 32, 131, 134 Xi Jinping, 78 Xinhua News Agency, 76 Xinjiang, 42, 46, 117, 124, 141 Xisha, see Paracel Islands

237

Yat Sen Chinese School (Primary/ Secondary) (Fiji), 114, 117 Year of the Rat, 39 Yu, George, 144 Zhang Monan, 129 Zhang Yesui, 15 Zheng Bijan, 128 Zheng Jianmin, 13, 112, 113, 123–124 Zhongshan, 116, 117 Zhongshan Association of Fiji (Feiji Zhongshan Tongxianghui), 115 Zhuang Guotu, 106–107