The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 9780199686049, 0199686041

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t h e Ox f o r d H a n d b o o k o f

U N I T E D NAT ION S P E AC E K E E P I N G OP E R AT ION S

the Oxford Handbook of

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS Edited by

JOACHIM A. KOOPS NORRIE MACQUEEN THIERRY TARDY and

PAUL D. WILLIAMS

1

3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, ox2 6dp, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © The several contributors 2015 The moral rights of the authors‌have been asserted First Edition published in 2015 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2015936798 ISBN 978–0–19–968604–9 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, cr0 4yy Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

About the Editors

Joachim A.  Koops is Dean of Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), Research Professor at the VUB’s Institute for European Studies and Director of the Global Governance Institute (GGI). Norrie MacQueen is an Honorary Research Fellow, School of International Relations, University of St Andrews. Thierry Tardy is a Senior Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris. Paul D. Williams is Associate Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. He is also a non-resident senior adviser at the International Peace Institute in New York City.

Contents

Abbreviations  List of Contributors  Introduction: The United Nations and Peacekeeping  The Editors

xv xxi 1

PA RT I :   C ON C E P T S A N D P E R SP E C T I V E S 1. Trends in Peace Operations, 1947–2013  Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams

13

2. Peacekeeping and International Law  Nigel D. White

43

3. The United Nations’ Inter-organizational Relations in Peacekeeping  Joachim A. Koops and Thierry Tardy

60

4. Peace Operations and Humanitarian Interventions  Thomas G. Weiss

78

5. Evaluating Peace Operations  Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman

93

PA RT I I :   U N P E AC E K E E P I N G OP E R AT ION S — 1 94 8 – 2 013 Section 1: Early Experiences—1948–1963  Introduction: Early Experiences: 1948–1963  The Editors

113

6. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)  Andrew Theobald

121

viii   Contents

7. United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)  Christy Shucksmith and Nigel D. White

133

8. First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)  Paul F. Diehl

144

9. United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)  Ana Guedes Mesquita and Nigel D. White

153

10. United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)  Jane Boulden

160

11. United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF)  Norrie MacQueen

171

12. United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)  Norrie MacQueen

179

Section 2: Cold War Peacekeeping—1964–1987  Introduction: Cold War Peacekeeping: 1964–1987  The Editors

189

13. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)  Jan Asmussen

197

14. Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)  Bernardo Rodrigues dos Santos

214

15. United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)  P. K. Singh

222

16. Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)  Paul F. Diehl

229

17. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)  Peter Rudloff and Paul F. Diehl

238

18. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL I)  Alexandra Novosseloff

248

Contents   ix

Section 3: Post-Cold War Peacekeeping—1988–1998  Introduction: Post-Cold War Peacekeeping: 1988–1998  The Editors 19. United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)  Adam Baczko and Gilles Dorronsoro

261

269

20. United Nations Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)  Shahedul Anam Khan

275

21. United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)  Caroline Guyot and Alex Vines

283

22. United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)  Lise M. Howard

294

23. United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)  Joachim A. Koops

306

24. United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)  Jan Bury

314

25. United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)  Anna Theofilopoulou

325

26. United Nations Angola Verification Missions II and III (UNAVEM II and III)  338 Caroline Guyot and Alex Vines 27. United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)  Lise M. Howard

351

28. United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)  Benny Widyono

363

29. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR—Croatia)  Thierry Tardy

371

30. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR—Bosnia-Herzegovina)  Thierry Tardy

383

x   Contents

31. United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)  Benny Widyono

395

32. United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)  Paul D. Williams

408

33. United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)  Mats Berdal

416

34. United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)  Paul D. Williams

429

35. United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)  Bruno Coppieters

443

36. United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)  Kathleen Jennings

454

37. United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR) and United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda I (UNAMIR I)  Linda Melvern

462

38. United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda II (UNAMIR II)  Linda Melvern

473

39. United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)  Hubertus Jürgenliemk and Joachim A. Koops

484

40. United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)  Joachim A. Koops

492

41. United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP—Macedonia)  Thierry Tardy 42. United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)  Thierry Tardy 43. United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) and UN Civilian Police Support Group in Croatia (UNPSG)  Richard Gowan

500 511

519

Contents   xi

44. United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)  Richard Gowan

532

45. United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)  Antonio Ramalho and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto

540

46. United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)  Maira Siman and Vahan Galoumian

547

47. United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)  Amy Ross

555

48. United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)  Caroline Guyot and Alex Vines

563

49. United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)  Blanca Antonini

572

50. United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)  Blanca Antonini

580

51. United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)  Romain Esmenjaud 52. United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)  ‘Funmi Olonisakin

588 597

Section 4: Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century—1999–2013  Introduction: Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century: 1999–2013  607 The Editors 53. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)  Richard Caplan 54. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)  ‘Funmi Olonisakin 55. United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)  Norrie MacQueen

617 629

642

xii   Contents

56. United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)  Alan Doss

656

57. United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)  Patrick Cammaert and Andreas Sugar

671

58. United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)  Norrie MacQueen

683

59. United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)  Kathleen Jennings

694

60. United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)  Alexandra Novosseloff

707

61. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)  Nicolas Lemay-Hébert

720

62. United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)  Arthur Boutellis

731

63. United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)  Wibke Hansen

742

64. United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)  Norrie MacQueen

755

65. Expanded United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II)  Alexandra Novosseloff

767

66. African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)  David Lanz

779

67. United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad I and II (MINURCAT I and II)  John Karlsrud

791

68. United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)  Alan Doss

803

Contents   xiii

69. United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)  Holger Osterrieder, Johannes Lehne, and Vladimir Kmec

818

70. United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)  Diana Felix da Costa and Cedric de Coning

830

7 1. United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS)  Richard Gowan and Tristan Dreisbach

842

72. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)  Walter Lotze

854

Index 

865

Abbreviations

AFISMA

African-led International Support Mission to Mali

AMIB

African Union Mission in Burundi

AMIS

African Union Mission in Sudan

AMISOM

African Union Mission in Somalia

APSA

African Peace and Security Architecture

AQIM

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

ASF

African Standby Force

AU African Union AUPSC

African Union Peace and Security Council

BRICS

Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

CAR

Central African Republic

CEMAC

Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy [EU]

CNDP

National Congress for the Defence of the People

CPA

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CSDP

Common Security and Defence Policy [EU]

DDR

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

DDRRR

disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration

DFID

Department for International Development [UK]

DFS

Department of Field Support [UN]

DOMREP

Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic

DPA

Darfur Peace Agreement

DPA

Department of Political Affairs [UN]

DPKO

Department of Peacekeeping Operations [UN]

DRC

Democratic Republic of Congo

ECCAS

Economic Community of Central African States

xvi   Abbreviations ECOMIB

ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau

ECOMOG

ECOWAS Monitoring Group

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

EU European Union EUPOL

European Union Police Mission

EUSEC

European Union Security Sector Reform Mission

EUTM

European Union Training Mission

FDLR

Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda

FN

Forces Nouvelles

FPI

Front Populaire Ivoirien

FRCI

Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire

FYROM

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

HRE

High Representative for Elections

IBSA

India, Brazil, and South Africa

ICC

International Criminal Court

ICJ

International Court of Justice

IDP

internally displaced person

IEC

Independent Electoral Commission

IGAD

Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGO

intergovernmental organization

IPTF

International Police Task Force

ISSSS

International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy

IWG

International Working Group

KDF

Kenyan Defence Forces

LRA

Lord’s Resistance Army

M23

March 23 movement [Democratic Republic of Congo]

MICEMA

ECOWAS Mission in Mali

MINUGUA

United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala

MINURCA

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic

MINURCAT

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

MINURSO

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MINUSMA

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MINUSTAH

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MIPONUH

United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti

Abbreviations   xvii MISSANG

Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau

MLC

Movement for the Liberation of the Congo

MNLA

Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad [Mali]

MONUA

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola

MONUC

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

MONUSCO

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC

MUJWA

Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa

NARC

North African Regional Community

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCP

National Congress Party

NGO

non-governmental organization

OAU

Organization of African Unity

ONUB

United Nations Mission in Burundi

ONUC

United Nations Operation in the Congo

ONUCA

United Nations Observer Group in Central America

ONUMOZ

United Nations Operation in Mozambique

ONUSAL

United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador

OPA

Ouagadougou Political Agreement

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PoC

protection of civilians

PRC

People’s Republic of China

PSC

Peace and Security Council [AU]

PSO

peace support operation

REC

Regional Economic Community

RPF

Rwandan Patriotic Front

RtoP

Responsibility to Protect

SADC

Southern African Development Community

SADCC

Southern African Development Coordination Conference

SRSG

Special Representative of the Secretary-General [UN]

SSR

security sector reform

STAREC

Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas

TCC

troop-contributing country

TFG

Transitional Federal Government [Somalia]

TNG

Transitional National Government

xviii   Abbreviations UIC

Union of the Islamic Courts

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nations

UNAMIC

United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia

UNAMID

African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

UNAMIR

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNAMSIL

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNASOG

United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group

UNAVEM

United Nations Angola Verification Mission

UNDOF

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

UNEF

United Nations Emergency Force

UNFICYP

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNGOMAP

United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan

UNIFIL

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNIIMOG

United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group

UNIKOM

United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission

UNIOGBIS

United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

UNIPOM

United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission

UNISFA

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

UNITAF

Unified Task Force [Somalia]

UNLOPS

UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security

UNMEE

United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNMIBH

United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

UNMIH

United Nations Mission in Haiti

UNMIK

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL

United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMIS

United Nations Mission in Sudan

UNMISET

United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

UNMISS

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

UNMIT

United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

UNMOGIP

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNMOP

United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

UNMOT

United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan

UNOAU

UN Office to the African Union

Abbreviations   xix UNOCA

United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

UNOCI

United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

UNOGIL

United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon

UNOM

United Nations Office in Mali

UNOMIG

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

UNOMIL

United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOMSIL

United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

UNOMUR

United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda

UNOSOM

United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNOWA

United Nations Office for West Africa

UNPA

United Nations Protected Areas

UNPOS

United Nations Political Office for Somalia

UNPREDEP

United Nations Preventive Deployment Force [Macedonia]

UNPROFOR

United Nations Protection Force [Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina]

UNPSG

United Nations Civilian Police Support Group in Croatia

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

UNSF

United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea

UNSMIH

United Nations Support Mission in Haiti

UNSMIS

United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria

UNSOA

United Nations Support Office for AMISOM

UNSOM

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

UNTAC

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

UNTAES

United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium

UNTAET

United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

UNTAG

United Nations Transition Assistance Group

UNTMIH

United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti

UNTSO

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

UNYOM

United Nations Yemen Observation Mission

US United States USAID

United States Agency for International Development

List of Contributors

Blanca Antonini is former Deputy Director of the Americas and Europe at the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, and currently invited Professor at the University Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina. Jan Asmussen is Privatdozent at the Institute of Social Sciences at the Christian-Albrechts-University in Kiel, Germany. Adam Baczko  is a PhD candidate in Political Science, School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS), Paris. Alex J. Bellamy  is Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at The University of Queensland, Australia. Mats Berdal  is Professor of Security and Development at King’s College London. Jane Boulden  is a Professor in the Department of Political Science and the War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada. Arthur Boutellis  is a non-resident advisor with the International Peace Institute (IPI) in New York. Jan Bury  is Assistant Professor at Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Warsaw. Patrick Cammaert served as United Nations Force Commander in Ethiopia and Eritrea and Military Advisor to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Richard Caplan  is Professor of International Relations and Official Fellow of Linacre College at Oxford University. Cedric de Coning  is a Senior Research Fellow in the Peace Operations and Peacebuilding Research Group at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and a Senior Advisor on Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding for ACCORD. Bruno Coppieters  is Professor of Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Diana Felix da Costa  is a research associate at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and a PhD candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. Paul F. Diehl  is Associate Provost and the Ashbel Smith Professor at the University of Texas-Dallas.

xxii   List of Contributors Gilles Dorronsoro  is Professor of Political Science at Sorbonne University, Paris. Alan Doss  is a former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. He is the Executive Director of the Kofi Annan Foundation. Tristan Dreisbach is a Senior Research Specialist at Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton, US. Daniel Druckman  is Professor of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. Romain Esmenjaud  is an Expert on African peace and security. Vahan Galoumian  is a Senior Analyst at the Government of Canada. Richard Gowan  is Associate Director, Center on International Cooperation, New York University. Caroline Guyot  is Business and Partnerships Manager, Ashoka, UK. Wibke Hansen  is Head of the Analysis Division at the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin. Lise M.  Howard is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. Kathleen Jennings  is a researcher at the Applied Institute for International Studies (FAFO), Norway. Hubertus Jürgenliemk  is a PhD Candidate at the University of Cambridge and a Senior Analyst at the Peace and Security Section of the Global Governance Institute (GGI). John Karlsrud  is Deputy Manager of the Peace Operations and Peacebuilding Group at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). Shahedul Anam Khan  was the Acting Chief Military Observer of the UN Iraq-Iran Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). Vladimir Kmec  is a Peterhouse Postgraduate Scholar in Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge. Joachim A. Koops  is Dean of Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), and Research Professor at the VUB’s Institute for European Studies and Director of the Global Governance Institute (GGI). David Lanz  is a PhD candidate at the University of Basel. Johannes Lehne  is Leader of the Sudan/South Sudan team at the German Foreign Office. Nicolas Lemay-Hébert is Senior Lecturer in the International Development Department, University of Birmingham.

List of Contributors    xxiii Walter Lotze  is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin. Norrie MacQueen is Honorary Research Fellow in the School of International Relations, University of St Andrews. Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto is a PhD candidate at the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge. Linda Melvern  is an Honorary Professor in the Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth. Ana Guedes Mesquita  is a human rights professional. Alexandra Novosseloff  is a Research Associate at the Centre Thucydide, University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) and a Senior Expert at the Global Governance Institute (GGI). ‘Funmi Olonisakin is Director of the Conflict, Security and Development Group, King’s College London. Holger Osterrieder  is an advisor at the European External Action Service on mediation, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding. Antonio Ramalho  is Associate Professor at the Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Campus Universitário Darcy Ribeiro. Bernardo Rodrigues dos Santos  is a field officer with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Amy Ross is Associate Professor in the Department of Geography, University of Georgia. Peter Rudloff is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Oklahoma State University. Christy Shucksmith  is a lecturer at the University of Lincoln. Maira Siman  is a lecturer at the Institute of International Relations at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. P. K. Singh  is the Director of the United Services Institute of India. Andreas Sugar  is Programme Manager at International Media Support and a former Political Affairs Officer in the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Thierry Tardy is a Senior Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris. Andrew Theobald  is an independent scholar. Anna Theofilopoulou  is an independent political analyst, and former UN official and member of James Baker’s negotiating team covering the Western Sahara conflict.

xxiv   List of Contributors Alex Vines  is Director of Area Studies and International Law, Chatham House and codirector, African Studies Centre, Coventry University. Thomas G. Weiss  is Presidential Professor of Political Science at The CUNY Graduate Center and Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies. Nigel D.  White is Professor of Public International Law at the University of Nottingham. Benny Widyono is Professor of Economics at the University of Connecticut in Stamford, and the former UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cambodia. Paul D. Williams  is Associate Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University.

I n t rodu c tion The United Nations and Peacekeeping The Editors

Peacekeeping is arguably the most visible activity of the United Nations and certainly one of its most important contributions to what the Charter of the United Nations calls “the maintenance of international peace and security.” The UN’s distinctive “blue helmets” are now widely recognized all over the world. Sometimes praised, often maligned, since their entry onto the world stage in the late 1940s they have become a ubiquitous feature of multilateral crisis management. As a consequence, anyone interested in the international politics of conflict resolution and the dynamics of international peace and security more generally needs to understand the politics, practice, and impact of UN peacekeeping. Although the UN does not have a monopoly on conducting or authorizing peace operations, it is the single most important institution in the field, having carried out many more operations over more decades than any other actor (see chapter 1). This Handbook therefore confines its analysis to UN blue helmet (or, given the increasing use of civilian police, “blue beret”) operations. It does not attempt to cover the wider universe of peace operations authorized by the UN but not led by the organization in the field, nor does it analyze those peace operations conducted by other actors outside the UN system (the relationship between the UN’s blue helmets and these other types of operations is assessed in chapters 1 and 3 of the Handbook). More specifically, the Handbook is limited to those operations which involve a “uniformed” UN presence, that is, they entail the deployment of military and/or police personnel. This excludes the many civilian peacebuilding or political missions that have been deployed by the UN. Since 1992, this division has been broadly reflected by the fact that the majority of the UN’s civilian peacebuilding or political missions have been deployed under the auspices of the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), whereas its “uniformed” missions were the responsibility of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).1 This Handbook focuses on the latter.

2   The Editors UN peacekeeping was “invented” in the late 1940s, though it drew on previous experience with multinational operations during the inter-war years such as the League of Nations’ multinational “Saar Force” deployed to supervise the Franco-German referendum in 1935. At this early stage it was designed by a few key architects working within a system with no formal processes for recruiting personnel, deploying them to the conflict zone in question, or paying the required financial costs. Since then, however, UN peacekeeping has evolved from a series of relatively small ad hoc commitments designed to address specific challenges, to a much larger, more visible, and institutionalized enterprise that since its beginnings has involved hundreds of thousands of uniformed personnel from over 120 UN member states.2 Those beginnings themselves were modest, however; the first observation missions in the late 1940s in Palestine and Kashmir between them deployed barely 100 military personnel. And it was only in 1956 in the context of the Suez crisis that the first peacekeeping operation composed of infantry battalions was established (chapter 8). In total, 67 operations have been created between 1948 and 2013 on all five continents: 13 during the Cold War and 54 between 1988 and 2013. Despite its lengthy evolution and the frequency with which the UN deployed operations, peacekeeping as a distinct set of tasks and activities undertaken by the UN remains difficult to define. Most attempts to do so have focused on the “core principles” and the objectives behind peacekeeping. As far as these core principles are concerned, UN peacekeeping began as a pacific set of activities carried out by uniformed personnel, initially soldiers, but later also police. These activities were not specifically located in the UN Charter; the word “peacekeeping” does not appear in that document. Most international lawyers working in the area, however, consider peacekeeping to be covered under the framework set out in Chapter VI (“Pacific Settlement Disputes”). Peacekeeping was originally seen as entirely distinct from activities undertaken with reference to Chapter VII (“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”) enforcement measures (see chapter 2). Indeed, some early pioneers and architects of UN peacekeeping have attributed its emergence and evolution to the fact that the Security Council itself was incapable of fulfilling its envisaged tasks under Chapters VI and VII. Initially at least, peacekeeping activities were meant to be guided by the principles of consent, impartiality/neutrality, and the minimum use of force: UN peacekeepers required the consent of the host state to operate on its territory; they were to remain impartial in their relations with the conflict parties; and they were to use military force only in self-defense. The main aim of peacekeeping during the early years was conflict control and the insulation of regional conflicts. Over time, and especially after the 1980s, encouraged by the increasing number of operations which deployed into civil wars and complex internal armed conflicts, these principles and aims evolved. With respect to consent, while UN peacekeepers still required permission from the host government to deploy, they did not always require consent from other conflict parties such as insurgents and rebel militias. Second, whereas impartiality was initially interpreted as requiring UN peacekeepers to remain neutral in the dispute in question, by the late 1990s peacekeepers were instead expected to act as impartial referees, making sure all

Introduction: The United Nations and Peacekeeping    3 the conflict parties respected the rules of the respective peace processes as well as the broader norms and standards embedded in the UN Charter and the laws of armed conflict. The use of force also underwent a significant evolution from being authorized only in self-defense to the much broader idea that peacekeepers could use force in defense of the mission mandate. While the concept of “self-defense in the defense of the mandate” had already been tentatively outlined by Secretary-General U Thant in a memorandum to the UNFICYP in April 1964, this wider interpretation only gained broader acceptance in the post-Cold War era.3 These core principles were first developed, most prominently by the organization’s second Secretary-General (1953–61), Dag Hammarskjöld, to ensure that UN peacekeeping operations could fulfill a variety of objectives and influence outcomes on the ground. Initially, such objectives were framed by the international context of the Cold War. For most of the period between the late 1940s to the 1980s—with the exception of the first Congo operation (see chapter 10)—the objectives of UN peacekeepers tended to focus on monitoring ceasefire agreements and demilitarized zones and helping to build confidence among the conflict parties in order to give the peace process in question a chance to progress. With the end of the Cold War, the objectives given to peacekeepers were broadened considerably—and some would argue explicitly politicized. From this point on, it became common for peacekeepers to be mandated to help build broadly liberal democratic polities, elements of liberal civic societies, and even market economies in the host states. In some cases, notably Kosovo and East Timor, the UN was even given authority to temporarily administer the territory. The core elements of these mandates tended to mirror what, in the early 1990s, the World Bank referred to as “good governance.” For some of its critics, however, UN peacekeeping had entered into a dangerous new era, one in which it was trying to “impose” a possibly misguided notion of liberal peace upon often unwilling or at least unprepared recipients. The UN’s peacekeeping operations also went through a major transformation in terms of how they were created, planned, organized, managed, and financed. Peacekeeping operations are customarily established by the UN Security Council by a resolution formulated on the basis of a Secretary-General’s report. Within the Security Council, the permanent members play a central role, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom in particular. Although by the 1980s the UN’s peacekeeping operations were authorized exclusively by the Security Council, this had not always been the case, with a number of early missions seeing a leading role taken by the Secretary-General and the General Assembly, including in UNEF I (1956–67, chapter 8) after the Suez crisis, the mission in West New Guinea (1962–63, chapter 11), and the India-Pakistan observer mission (1965–66, chapter 15). The General Assembly also retained an important role in determining the mission budgets. The precise planning of peacekeeping operations remains the preserve of a small group of individuals within the UN Secretariat who work in conjunction with the members of the Security Council. Since 1992, the principal roles in drawing up the force requirements for UN missions have fallen to the personnel within the DPKO’s Office of

4   The Editors Military Affairs, usually on the basis of a technical assessment mission conducted in the theatre in question. The process of force generation became more regularized after the establishment of both the DPKO and the DPA in 1992. DPKO staff have subsequently focused on planning and preparing most technical aspects of the missions, including their force requirements and initial budget requests. The General Assembly’s Fifth Committee has dealt with the financial aspects, while the Security Council has authorized the specific mandate for the mission. In 2007, a further round of institutional reforms saw the creation of the Department of Field Support (DFS), which was tasked with administering and managing personnel on the ground, logistical support, budgetary management, and information/communications technology. In terms of financing, the first UN peacekeeping operations were carried out without a system in place. The issue proved to have the potential to cause major damage within the United Nations. Suspicious of apparent Western enthusiasm for this innovative activity with no clear legal basis in the Charter, the Soviet Union, but also France under Charles de Gaulle, resisted any attempt to finance peacekeeping from the regular UN budget. The dispute became especially intense during the Congo operation (1960–64) and the issue reached the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1962 where the Soviet position was rejected. Instead the ICJ ruled that peacekeeping was to be regarded and financed as a “general expense” of the UN under Article 17 of the Charter.4 The following years brought the General Assembly to the edge of paralysis as the United States threatened Soviet voting rights. It took until 1973 and the broader détente between the superpowers for the General Assembly to formalize the scale of financial assessments each UN member state would pay. Even then, voluntary contributions played a significant role in supporting UN missions. The central idea of the assessed peacekeeping budget was that the financing of UN peacekeeping operations should reflect the collective nature of the enterprise and all UN member states should contribute, although at different levels, depending on national wealth. The permanent members of the Security Council were also expected to pay an additional share of the costs owing to their special responsibilities for global peace and security. This system remained in place until the 1990s. Then, following considerable pressure from the United States Congress and years of internal debates at the UN, the system for financing peacekeeping was reformed in 2005 with the adoption of a new scale of assessments. This saw all UN members placed in one of ten financial categories to determine their share of the peacekeeping budget. Overall, the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) pay the vast majority of UN peacekeeping costs. Arguments over how to finance UN peacekeeping have embraced both the overall annual cost of UN operations and the specific rates of compensation for troop and police contributing countries. The debate has grown more intense as the sums of money involved have increased. While during the 1980s the UN routinely spent approximately $300 million each year on peacekeeping, the figure jumped to nearly $4 billion in 1993 and by the late 2000s the annual bill was consistently over $7 billion.

Introduction: The United Nations and Peacekeeping    5 Another area of persistent debate and evolution is the UN’s relationship with other actors involved with peacekeeping (see chapter 3). Because the UN does not have its own armed forces, its peacekeeping operations have always involved a variety of different actors who collaborate to produce a single mission. Particularly after the Cold War, however, the UN entered into a range of partnerships with regional organizations and other coalitions of states. While not all of the world’s regional institutions have conducted peace operations, some have developed a significant track record of carrying out such missions, either alone or in collaboration with the UN. Most notable have been the European Union (EU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which have partnered with the UN in various peacekeeping theatres. While these partnerships have often been fruitful, some have generated considerable tension and debates, particularly about how to interpret Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (with respect to Regional Arrangements) and what a strategic relationship between the UN and a regional arrangement should entail in practice.5 Exclusively UN peacekeeping operations have attracted participation by a wide range of states for a variety of material and institutional reasons. Often, states’ involvement in UN peacekeeping has been motivated by security imperatives related to stabilizing a particular conflict zone. At other times, the deployment of personnel has been part of a broader normative commitment to help maintain “international peace and security.” But participation in UN peacekeeping has also served a range of other purposes. For some states, providing UN peacekeepers helped to raise their profile and reputation on the international stage. For others, there were economic incentives for their personnel to deploy on UN missions, as well as institutional benefits for their security forces of serving in such multinational deployments. During the Cold War, these various motives led to the formation of a largely homogeneous group of contributing states, the so-called “middle powers.” This significantly changed at the end of that period, with the participation of former Eastern bloc states, which had hitherto played only a very limited role because of the Soviet Union’s long-standing suspicion of peacekeeping, and also with the involvement of permanent members of the Security Council. Over time, this range of motives encouraged a greater proportion of the UN’s Member States to become troop, or police, contributing countries.

Achievements UN peacekeeping operations can be credited with a variety of achievements. These have often been understated, especially by media commentators, in favor of the more negative—and more newsworthy—consequences of some missions. Nevertheless, the persistence, and indeed growth of UN peacekeeping is testament to the fact that for all its limitations, it remains a crucial multilateral conflict management mechanism.

6   The Editors During the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were important in stopping the further escalation of conflicts in Lebanon (1958), Yemen (1963–64), Cyprus (1964–), the Dominican Republic (1965–66), and the India–Pakistan conflict (1965–66)— though it was less successful in this in the Congo (1960–64) and in the rather hastily deployed UNIFIL operation in Lebanon (1978–). In each of these missions the positive roles of peacekeeping included confidence-building and, in the cases of Lebanon (in 1958), Yemen, and Congo, also assisting the process of decolonization. While the first four decades of UN peacekeeping were heavily constrained by superpower rivalry in and outside the Security Council, the thirteen operations highlighted the role that peacekeeping could play in regional conflict management and, when accompanied by favorable diplomatic initiatives, as an important tool to facilitate conflict resolution. With the end of the Cold War, however, UN peacekeeping entered uncharted waters with a much more cooperative Security Council and, with Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a Secretary-General who articulated a wide range of tasks for the organization’s peacekeepers. As a consequence, a significant number of multidimensional operations were created to accompany the implementation of peace processes. Although UN peacekeepers were then deployed into many civil war zones, the decade after 1990 saw a reduction in the number of such conflicts worldwide by as much as 40 percent and some analysts gave peacekeeping operations an important part of the credit.6 The post-Cold War period also saw a significant rise in the number of armed conflicts ended (albeit sometimes only temporarily) by negotiated settlements. While UN peacekeeping operations were not in a position to facilitate such settlements—indeed, by definition, peacekeepers tended to arrive after agreements had been reached—they were able to significantly reduce the likelihood of wars reigniting after such deals had been concluded. Specifically, some studies have concluded that where peacekeeping took place, the likelihood of war reigniting fell by at least 75–85 percent compared to those cases where no peacekeepers deployed.7 In many instances, peacekeeping operations have also facilitated the delivery of humanitarian assistance, thus contributing to the alleviation of human suffering in conflict zones. It is also important to note that despite the significant increase in the cost of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era, it remained relatively cost-effective, especially when compared to deployments of Western armed forces. While the budget for UN peacekeeping between July 2013 and June 2014 is calculated at $7.54 billion, this represents less than half of one percent of global military spending (estimated at $1,756 billion in 2012).8 As far as the United States is concerned, a 2006 study by the US Government Accountability Office estimated that the UN could deploy for half the price of a US mission (assuming an operation of the size and complexity of MINUSTAH in Haiti the costs would be $876 million compared to $428 million for the first 14 months).9

Introduction: The United Nations and Peacekeeping    7

Challenges Despite their notable achievements, peacekeeping operations have consistently been plagued by a series of interrelated challenges that can be broken down into three broad categories. First and foremost, UN peacekeeping operations have often suffered as a result of policies pursued by the organization’s own member states. In particular, many of these have given weak political and/or material support to missions while the Security Council has often failed to stand united behind specific operations, such as those in Somalia (chapters 32 and 34), Bosnia (chapter 30), and Rwanda (chapters 37 and 38) in the first half of the 1990s. Many of the chapters of this Handbook allude to a weak or inconsistent level of support from the member states as a major source of ineffectiveness or failure. Second, the institutional structure of the UN often proved to be inadequate to the rapid deployment and subsequent management of large multidimensional and multinational operations. Not only did the UN lack a dedicated bureaucracy for peacekeeping until 1992, but it remained ill-equipped for the rapid creation of multinational forces, deploying militarily effective headquarters in the field, locating the necessary logistics support and force enablers, integrating various components of the operations, and ensuring that command and control structures worked effectively. In part to overcome some of these problems, throughout the history of UN peacekeeping more than a dozen separate diplomatic attempts were made to create a standing UN peacekeeping army and to give real effect to Articles 43–45 of the UN Charter. Third, the nature of peacekeeping itself has become more complicated in contrast to its early days of monitoring, observation, and interposition. Peacekeeping and its peacebuilding component are about helping to establish sustainable peace in some of the world’s worst conflict zones and underdeveloped regions. Difficulties and failures are inherent to the task, irrespective of the degree of political support and institutional efficiency. In addition, rivalries within the UN system—between DPKO and DPA and later the newly created UN Peacebuilding Commission—further complicate peacebuilding tasks. Furthermore, UN peacekeepers have usually had to carry the weight of very high expectations, especially when given an explicit mandate to protect local civilians. They have certainly not always lived up to these but whether the expectations themselves have always been realistic is at the very least debatable. Finally, debates on the effectiveness and inherent flaws of peacekeeping have, over the last decade, focused on issues such as inter-agency coherence (“integrated missions”), the virtues of the use of force within operations (“robust peacekeeping”), the political limitations of external interventions (“liberal peace” debate), and the tensions arising from the divide between decision making mandate formulation at Security Council level and mandate implementation on the ground. All these debates about peacekeeping

8   The Editors have to some degree mirrored broader issues of contemporary world politics and the norms and principles of global security governance.

The Structure of the Handbook The Handbook begins with a series of chapters that analyze important thematic issues related to peacekeeping. Chapter 1 provides an overview and comparative analysis of the major patterns evident in UN-led as well as UN-authorized and non-UN peace operations since 1947. Chapter 2 explores the legal basis of UN peace operations, while chapter 3 examines the UN’s various operational partnerships with other actors. In chapter 4, the often blurred boundary between the consensual nature of traditional peacekeeping and more coercive enforcement operations is examined with reference to the concept of “humanitarian intervention.” Finally, chapter 5 discusses the complex issues involved in evaluating the success and failure of peace operations. After this thematic part, the Handbook provides a systematic analysis of all 67 UN peacekeeping operations created between 1948 and 2013. This is done in chronological order according to the mission’s initial deployment. Each chapter gives a historical overview of the mission’s mandate and activities and assesses its principal achievements and weaknesses. The mission’s contribution to the wider history and evolution of the peacekeeping enterprise is also appraised. These case studies are divided into four sections based on distinct historical periods, each of which has a short introduction by the editors. The four periods are organized around the beginnings of UN peacekeeping, from 1948 to 1963; peacekeeping during the mid and later Cold War years, from 1964 to 1987; the first decade of the post-Cold War period, 1988 to 1998; and the twenty-first century, from 1999 to 2013.

Notes 1. There are exceptions, such as UNAMA, when DPKO has taken the lead on running civilian missions. These missions are not included in this Handbook. 2. For a range of key peacekeeping statistics see www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/ statistics/factsheet.shtml 3. Note by the Secretary-General (S/5653, 11 April 1964), paras. 10 and 18c. 4. The ICJ judgment is available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=290&code=ceun &p1=3&p2=4&case=49&k=4a&p3=5 5. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter deals with “Regional Arrangements” and was originally designed to enable the UN to co-opt regional alliances into enforcement actions under Chapter VII. This was obviously unachievable during the Cold War. 6. See, for example, Human Security Report 2005:  War and Peace in the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Introduction: The United Nations and Peacekeeping    9 7. Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 171. 8. SIPRI Yearbook 2013 (Oxford: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 2013), ­chapter 3. 9. “Peacekeeping:  Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti,” in Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives (US Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-331, February 2006), 7.

Pa rt  I

C ON C E P T S A N D P E R SP E C T I V E S

Chapter 1

Trends in Pe ac e Operations, 194 7 –2 013 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams

Introduction This chapter provides an analysis of trends in peace operations using a dataset of UN-led, UN-authorized, UN-recognized, and non-UN peace operations that took place between 1947 and 2013. Simply put, UN-led or “blue helmet” missions are those authorized by the UN (usually the Security Council, but occasionally the General Assembly) and managed at the operational level by the UN itself (today through the Department for Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support). UN-authorized missions are those expressly mandated by one of the UN’s Principal Organs (usually the Security Council) but managed at the operational level by a non-UN entity such as a regional arrangement, coalition, or lead-state. UN-recognized operations are welcomed or supported by one of the UN’s Principal Organs but not mandated by them. They are managed at the operational level by a non-UN actor. Finally, non-UN operations are neither mandated nor managed by the UN but meet the definition of a peace operation discussed in this chapter. They have usually deployed at the invitation of the host state. This chapter uses this list of 175 distinct missions to develop seven general propositions about some of the most significant trends related to the type, size, location, and duration of peace operations as well as their relationship to the world’s major armed conflicts during this period. The list of peace operations is provided in Appendix A while the list of 139 major armed conflicts is provided in Appendix B. By “peace operations” we mean the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (troops, military observers/experts, and police), with or without a UN mandate, but with an explicit mandate to assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process; serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace.

14    Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams Although this handbook’s focus is UN-led operations, we have included non-UN missions in our analysis because it is only possible to gain a sophisticated understanding of trends in UN peacekeeping if these missions are situated in the broader international context which takes account of all forms of peace operations. For instance, what may seem like a major increase in UN operations might look different if peace operations overall grew at a significantly higher rate. Indeed, past failures to include non-UN missions in various studies have resulted in the emergence of several false assumptions (e.g. “the regionalization of peacekeeping is a post-Cold War phenomenon,” “the UN is becoming less central as a peacekeeping provider”) that have shaped academic and some policy debates. In compiling this dataset, we excluded operations that did not involve uniformed personnel (troops and other military personnel, military observers/experts, and police). This decision ruled out a large number of peacemaking, monitoring and/or peacebuilding missions carried out solely by civilians, including numerous examples conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union (EU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) among other organizations. We also excluded operations which only involved civilian police, such as the EU’s police training missions in Africa and the Balkans. Partly for this reason, we also excluded what the UN calls political or peacebuilding missions, most of which have been managed (since 1992)  by the UN’s Department of Political Affairs. Our dataset also excludes cases of “humanitarian military intervention” (i.e. the use of military force by external actors without host-state consent aimed at preventing or ending genocide and/or mass atrocities) (see c­ hapter 4). Hence the US, French, and UK no-fly zones established in Iraq (1991) as well as the NATO-led coalitions in Kosovo/Serbia (1999) and Libya (2011) are not included. Nor does our dataset include what we call “regime support operations.” These are missions that involve the deployment of foreign uniformed personnel to help the host-state authorities quell some form of insurrection and/or insurgency.1 In legal terms, their basis is a form of collective self-defense. We exclude them when they are not undertaken with an explicit mandate to support a peace process. Examples of such regime support operations include Operation Sovereign Legitimacy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Operation Boleas in Lesotho, both of which were conducted by factions within the Southern African Development Community in 1998. We have also excluded on these grounds the Multinational Force in Iraq (2004–13) and the Ethiopian military campaign to install Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu (2006–9). Finally, we also excluded expeditionary missions that deployed uniformed personnel for tasks such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, the evacuation of nationals, and maritime security tasks, including anti-piracy operations. Proposition 1: Since the end of the Cold War, peace operations have become increasingly common as a tool to manage armed conflict. However, there are significant regional variations with wars in Africa and Europe having the greatest likelihood of attracting peace operations. Of the 139 major armed conflicts listed in Appendix B, 71 (or 51 percent) saw peace operations deployed as part of the international response (see Table 1.1). Since the end of

Trends in Peace Operations, 1947–2013    15 Table 1.1  War onsets and peace operations (all types)2 Decade

War onsets

1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s

15 10 14 29 12 39 14 6

Total

139

New peace operation(s)

New peace operation(s) (100%)

6 (40%) 3 (33%) 4 (29%) 4 (14%) 2 (8%) 16 (41%) 9 (64%) 5 (83%)

71 (51%)

49 (35%)

the Cold War, peace operations have increasingly been used as a tool to manage armed conflict. This is not simply a quantitative increase caused by a growing number of armed conflicts ripe for resolution. Rather, there has been an increase in the proportion of armed conflicts that receive peacekeepers. During the Cold War, peacekeepers were deployed within five years of a conflict onset in a little less than a quarter (24 percent) of all cases. The proportion increased to a little over half (51 percent) in the post-Cold War period, with progressive increases in the 1990s (41 percent), 2000s (64 percent), and 2010s (83 percent), showing that the increase was not simply a function of the ending of the Cold War but was strengthened and sustained by factors that emerged after its end. On the demand side, the principal explanation is that peace operations have been increasingly recognized as effective tools for conflict management—something that has gone hand in hand with significant advances in the way that these operations are constituted, managed, and prepared for.3 The supply-side factors that encourage states to provide peacekeepers are more complex and involve a range of political/security, economic, institutional/bureaucratic, and normative factors.4 It is also important to recognize that the negative impact of the Cold War on international society’s willingness to conduct peace operations did not materialize overnight when the iron curtain fell across Europe. Instead, the constraining effects of the Cold War escalated over time between the late 1940s and the 1980s, a process briefly mitigated by détente in the 1970s. After the establishment of the UN in 1945, there was a period of more than two decades in which the world’s governments experimented with peace operations and other relatively new forms of conflict management. During the late 1940s, states and international organizations exhibited a strong willingness to utilize peace operations, with deployments almost as likely in the late 1940s as they were in the 1990s, though typical missions were much smaller and had narrower mandates in the 1940s than in the 1990s. This tendency declined only marginally in the 1950s during which one-third of all new major armed conflicts triggered the deployment of a peace operation. Significantly, all of these peace operations were UN-led, suggesting that the

16    Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams Table 1.2  Wars and peace operations in Europe

Decade

War onsets

Wars where peace operations deployed in response

Wars where peace operations deployed in response (