The Ottomans, the Turks and World Power Politics: A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire 9781463230029

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The Ottomans, the Turks and World Power Politics

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

49

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

The Ottomans, the Turks and World Power Politics

A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire

Selim Deringil

The Isis Press, Istanbul

preSS 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 2000 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

ISBN 978-1-61143-130-8

Reprinted from the 2000 Istanbul edition.

Printed in the United States of America

Selim Deringil (b. 1951) look his Ph.D from the University of East Anglia in 1979. His thesis later appeared as a book, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War, (Cambridge UP 1989). His early work was mostly on foreign policy and diplomatic history of Turkey and the late Ottoman Empire. He has also more recently written on Ottoman Iranian relations, the symbolism of power in ceremonial in the Ottoman context, and Ottoman relations with the Islamic world in general. His recent book is entitled, The Well Protected Domains Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909, (I. B Tauris Publishers, Oxford & New York 1998). Selim Deringil is Professor of History at the History Department of Bogazi§i University.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword "The Ottoman Response to the Egyptian Crisis of 1881-82", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 24 No. 1 (Jan. 1988) pp. 3-24 "Ghazi Ahmed Mukhtar Pasha and the British Occupation of Egypt", Al-Abhath, Vol. 34 (1986) pp. 13-19 "Les Ottomans et le partage de l'Afrique 1880-1900", Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History, Vol . 5 (1990) pp. 121 -133 "The Struggle Against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter-Propaganda", Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 5 (1990) pp. 45-62 "The Ottoman Empire and Russian Muslims: brothers or rivals?", Central Asian Survey, Vol. 13 No. 3 (1994) pp. 409-416 "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: the Reign of AbdUlhamid II (1876-1909)", International Journal of Middle East Studies, V o l . 2 3 (1991) pp. 345-359 "'There Is No Compulsion in Religion' : On Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire: 1839-1856", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 42 No. 3 (2000) pp. 547-75 "An Ottoman View of Missionary Activity in Hawaii", The Hawaiian Journal of History, Vol. 27 (1993) pp. 119-126 "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 35 No. 1 (1993) pp. 3-29 "From Ottoman to Turk : Self-Image and Social Engineering in Turkey", in Making Majorities. Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States, D.C. Gladney (ed.), Stanford 1998 pp. 217-226 "The Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: Namik Kemal to Mustafa Kemal",European History, Vol. 23 No. 2 (April 1993) pp. 165-191 "Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdülhamid II and ismet inönii", International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 4 No. 1 (Summer 1987) pp. 39-54 "The Preservation of Turkey's Neutrality During the Second World War: 1 9 4 0 M i d d l e Eastern Studies, Vol. 18 No. 1 (Jan 1982) pp. 30-52 "Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atattirk", in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects, C. H. Dodd (ed.), Huntingdon 1992 pp. 1-8. ..

7

9 35 43

57 73

83

101 131

137

165

177

199

219 245

FOREWORD

It is with a certain trepidation and detachment that one contemplates the publication of a "collected works" volume. On the one hand it is flattering to find that someone thinks that your miscellaneous utterings are worth compiling. On the other hand it means y o u are getting old. A l s o , when you see your past mistakes, somewhat jejune comparisons, hasty conclusions, and that one piece which you really want everyone else to forget, you have second thoughts. But then again, there is the old piece of work that makes you say, "yes, I would not have done it otherwise today", and y o u regard it with a certain contentment. M a y b e it was all not for nothing after all... Y o u try not think about the statistics that claim that an average of about six people in the word will read one of your articles, and when y o u get angry with people for not citing y o u , you force yourself to remember the umpteen articles, books etc., that you "know about" but have not got around to reading. A t least my generation did not suffer the ravages of the "publish or perish" syndrome that is terrorising academia now. I flatter myself that I can usually spot the "tenure book". Some are excellent, but many are just that bit too hasty, just that bit too "politically correct", just that bit too "focused", A l s o there is

a new generation of y o u n g e r scholar w h o m one meets in

conferences and seminars whose main ambition is not to further his or her knowledge, but to score points off the "senior scholar" in public so that they can land that j o b in Chattanooga State. So, here it is. A sample of produce from my early Second World War days (not in terms of birth I am not that old) to when I retrained and retooled as an Ottomanist. I will never forget when I discovered that I could actually read the delicate squiggles that had always been decoration for me until then. I felt like Champollion. T o this day I o w e thanks to my dear friend Engin Akarli w h o pushed me, kicking and screaming, into learning Ottoman. Nor will I forget the reaction of my Grandmother when 1 first proudly told her thai: I was learning the Ottoman script. Expecting praise I was told "What do you want to do that for? Atatiirk saved us from all that!" But, being beyond redemption, I ploughed on in the Ottoman archives, that wonderfully rewarding and frustrating place. I remember being extremely jealous of the "old hands" w h o could read the script like newspaper and the extreme embarrassment with w h i c h y o u consulted them on a word which inevitably turned out to be insultingly simple when you were shown

how.

8

W () R I, D P O W E R

POLIT ICS

Yet, very soon the archives became a ritual, the Tuesday and Thursday boat ride down the Bosphorus, the tea and conversation with the "regulars", the walk up to the old reading room, and the slight shiver when you actually passed through the Sublime Porte itself, the cold reading room for which an American colleague had actually fashioned wool gloves with cut-off fingertips so she could takes notes. Also I remember likening the archives to an African water hole where the most unlikely creatures came to subsist side by side out of sheer necessity. The Ba§bakanlik Argivi reading room must be the only place in the world where an American graduate student and a Japanese graduate student speak Turkish as the only common language. I owe thanks to a great many people who helped me on my way. I have already mentioned Engin Akarli and together with him I must thank Sel§uk Esenbel who told me, "one document a day is not so bad, in a hundred days you will have read a hundred documents". Also I owe thanks to Mehmet Gen9 and other doyens of the archives such as Hayri Mutlucag, Idris Bostan and Halil Sahillioglu for their unfailing patience. I must also thank Ariel Salzmann and Caroline Finkel for their steady encouragement.

Rumelihisar 17 October 2000

THE OTTOMAN RESPONSE TO THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS OF 1881-82

The 1881-82 movement in Egypt led by Ahmed Urabi has been studied extensively from the Arab Egyptian and the British points of view. 1 However, surprisingly little has been written on the subject of how the Ottoman State reacted to this crisis in a land which was still nominally under its suzerainty. This study focuses on the events from the Ottoman point of view. The Yildiz Palace Archives of Sultan Abdiilhamid II contain a vast number of reports, draft telegrams and dispatches, minutes of the Ottoman Cabinet etc. relating to this subject. It has proved interesting to set these against British material found in the Public Record Office and in the British Library Department of Manuscripts. For the sake of analytical clarity Ottoman relations with the Urabists and the Khedive, and Ottoman relations with Britain will be taken as somewhat separate spheres of investigation. This does not, of course, imply that these are hard and fast categories, as the materials under review do overlap to a great extent. The Egyptian crisis, roughly spanning the period September 1881 to September 1882, is interesting in several respects. First, it provides important insights into Abdiilhamid II's attitude towards Pan-Islamism and more particularly "Arabism". Second, it serves to illustrate the increasing mutual distrust between the Sublime State and the Court of St. James. Third, it gives a clear indication that neither the British nor the Ottomans truly understood the social dynamic behind Urabi Pa§a. It is also worthwhile to point out that the "Egyptian Question" arose at a particularly bad time for the Ottomans. The Empire was still bogged down in the consequences of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Cyprus Convention and the Congress of Berlin. Much of Ottoman financial self control had been relinquished to the Ottoman Debt Commission in 1881. The Empire was also being pressured by Russia to pay a very heavy war indemnity. As a final result of the Berlin Congress the Ottoman State was compelled to give up two-fifths of its entire territory and one-fifth of its population. Also in May 1881 Tunisia had fallen to the

' S e e , Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt (London: Macmillan, 1911); A.M. Broadley, How We Defended Arabi (London: Chapman & Hall, 1884) P. Mansfield, The British in Egypt (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971); P. J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969); R. Robinson, J. Gallagher and A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians, (London, 1961); Alexander Scholch, Egypt for the Egyptians! (London: Ithaca Press, 1981). This is by no means an exhaustive bibliography and the above are only some of the most prominent works on the subject.

W 0 R I, D

10

P O W E R

P O L I

I 1C S

French. 1 Against this background the last thing Abdulhamid II needed was a potentially explosive issue which could wreak havoc in the Islamic "core" of his remaining domains.

OTTOMAN RELATIONS W l ' H T H E URABISTS AND THE KHEDIVE

Abdulhamid II was to come under heavy pressure from both the British and the Egyptian Khedive Tevfik Pa§a to send an Ottoman expeditionary force to Egypt. As sovereign ruler of Egypt and also the Caliph and Emir el-Muminin, the Sultan had to tread very carefully. As Ahmed Urabi gradually increased his power in Egypt during the autumn of 1881 and the winter of 1882 the situation became very delicate for Istanbul. Since 1878 Abdulhamid had made it a matter of policy to stress the Islamic element in Ottoman society as a new bid for unity against what he saw as an increasingly hostile Christian world. 2 The Sultan had also promoted his Arab subjects to posts of unprecedented seniority: 'Never ... since the establishment of the Ottoman Sultanate, had an Arab whomever his ancestors were put his forehead where they had put their feet The institution of the Caliphate received extreme emphasis during the reign of Abdulhamid: "None of the latter-day Ottoman Sultans had emphasized this title more or made use of it better than did Sultan Abdulhamid II". 4 Howe\e \ Abdulhamid was also wary of the cultural revival of Arabism proceeding in Syria, and the duty of 'state ideologues" such as Abulhuda seems to have been to counter the spread of Arabist sentiment by publishing a steady stream of literature underlining the legitimacy of the Caliph and the duty of obedience of all Muslims. However, for Abdulhamid "Pan Islamism" or "Islamism" were largely a means to an end — the preservation of the Empire: "Abdulhamid was an Ottoman Sultan before he was the Great Muslim Caliph. "State" (devlet) was far more important to him than "religion" (din)".5

' S t a n f o r d J. Shaw and Ezel Kuial Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge, 1977), Vol. 2, p. Wl. Michael Milgrim, "An overlooked problem in Turkish-Russian Relations: T h e 1878 W a r indemnity". Int. Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 9 (1978), pp. 519-37. The indemnity was to increase Ottoman indebtedness by one-sixth. ^Stephen Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia", Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 9 (1973), pp. 139-55. • ' b . A b u - M a n n e h , "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Ebulhuda Al-Sayyadi", Middle Studies, Vol. 15 (1979), pp. 131-53. Abu Manneh is quoting Muwailihi. 4

ibid„

Eastern

p. 143.

^Engin D. Akarli, "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics Under Abdulhamid 11" (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton, 1976), p. 61.

THE

EGYPTIAN

CRISIS

OF

1881-82

11

If the Urabists could feasibly be used to this end they were just tolerated, not more. As it soon became clear that they could not be directed at will, the Porte immediately wheeled in to support the Khedive, Tevfik Pa§a. Abdulhamid is often said to have "played off Urabi against Tevfik". 1 This is not strictly accurate. The Sultan had no special love for Tevfik, or for any of the Mehmet Ali family for that matter. But Urabi was potentially a much more serious threat, as a successful example of nationalism could spread to other parts of the Empire. Weak and imbecile though he may have been, Tevfik was the legitimate ruler, and representative of the Sultan. At first the Ottomans proceeded cautiously, indeed almost politely, with the newly appointed Mahmud Sami government which took office on 4 February 1882. Even when the Egyptian Chamber of Delegates demanded the right to supervise the budget, and an intense debate ensued around the Organic Law which was to set the limits of Egyptian "constitutionalism" the Porte's reaction was measured. 2 In response to the alarmist telegrams of the Khedive stating that the Chamber was insisting on the revision of international treaties and provoking foreign intervention, the Ottoman Cabinet advised the Sultan to order that he keep calm. The minutes of the Ottoman Cabinet dated 14 Rebiyulevvel 1299/4 February 1882 advised that the Khedive should be ordered to provide additional information. But his demand for a new Ottoman inspection commission should be refused, as this would only provide fuel for British and French propaganda which was already clamouring that the Ottomans were interfering in Egypt's internal affairs. 3 On the same day the Sultan was advised as to the specific demands of the Egyptian Chamber. 4 The matter was discussed again in the Cabinet of 16 Rebiyulevvel 1299/6 February 1882. The Ministers pointed out that the Khedive himself had called the Chamber as a local provincial assembly (meclis-i vilayet) and if they discussed matters of a purely local nature this should not be discouraged. The Egyptian notables should be ordered to stay off the subject of the supervision of the budget and the appointment of officials as this could set an undesirable precedent for other Ottoman provinces. But the Egyptians should not be provoked into precipitate action. 5 On the same day a telegram to the Khedive was approved by the Sultan stating that the 'strenuous measures" such as the

' Scholch, op. cit., p. 244. ^For an excellent account of these critical days see Scholch, op. cit., pp. 194-215. 3 Ba§bakanlik Ar§ivi, Yildiz Esas Evraki (hereafter referred to as. Y.E.E.) Kisim: 39/ Evrak: 84-1/Zarf: 84/Karton: 124/Enclosure: 1-17. Meclis-i Viikela Mazbatasi. The Ottomans had already sent an inspection commission to Egypt in October 1881, headed by Ali Nizami Pa§a. Although Abdulhamid jealously guarded any decision making and centred the business of state around himself, he did order the Cabinet to discuss and to advise. The subsequent decisions he made were influenced by this advice. The image of the "despot" and "paranoiac" who did not listen to anyone is incorrect.

^Ibid., enclosure: 1-15.

•>Ibid., enclosure: 1-3. The Ministers did however make distinctions between Egypt which was an "autonomous province" (Eyalel i miimtaze) and others.

12

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POWER

POLITICS

sending of a military force suggested by the Khedive, "were not quite in keeping with the need for m o d e r a t i o n and caution which is naturally d e s i r a b l e . . . " . It w a s , h o w e v e r , out of the question to discuss Egypt's international commitments. 1 It is interesting to note that this sensitivity towards implications for the Ottoman Arab provinces of political developments in bordering areas was to become a continuing theme in Ottoman statecraft. During the Mahdist uprising in the Sudan the Porte sent strict instructions to its officials in the Hijaz and Y e m e n to prevent at all costs the spread of the idea of "Arab g o v e r n m e n t " ( H u k i i m e t - i Arabiyye).2 A l s o when M a l e t , t h e British Consul-General in Egypt, was granted an interview with Abdiilhamid the latter told him that it was out of the question to grant Egypt a Constitution: "It was not possible for him to allow a Constitution in one province of his dominions and to withhold it f r o m others ...". 3 Nor was the Khedive T e v f i k Pa§a alone in clamouring that foreign intervention was imminenl as a result of provocation by the Urabists. Leading Urabists including Urabi himself had been in contact with Istanbul and made precisely the same accusations against T e v f i k . Urabi's letters to the Sultan expressing his devotion have been repeatedly referred to or published in the literature on the subject. 4 One petition of particular interest however seems to have escaped attention. In his ariza dated 7 Muharrem 1299/30 N o v e m b e r 1881 Urabi stated clearly that the Khedive was aiming to separate Egypt f r o m the Ottoman State and make it dependent on Britain, "like India", and to set himself up as its first governor. Tevfik's First Minister Riaz Pa§a, "has also been heard blasphemously claiming in public that "one day it is inevitable that our country will come under British protection" ...". In furtherance of this aim it was claimed they were attempting to dispose of the true patriots. 5 In a similar tone M a h m u d Sami Al-Barudi wrote the Sultan t w o petitions giving details of numerous plots allegedly hatched by the Khedive either to poison or otherwise dispose of the Urabists. In particularly flowery terms worthy of the poet that he w a s , Barudi went to some length to claim that, lying is like second nature to him [the Khedive], and that he had become, "as a toy for the foreigners and as a buffoon before his own people" (melabe-i ecanib ve suhre-i akarib).6 But both Urabi's and Barudi's appeals to the Sultan p r o v e d c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e as t h e y w e r e t a k e n as p r o o f of insubordination.

' / A i d . , enclosure: 1-5. "Arzu olunmasi tabii olan levazim-i itidal ve ihtiyata pek de m u v a f i k gelemiyecegi ... *foid„ enclosure. 111-17. Meclis-i Vukela Mazbatasi: 28 Muharrem 1301/30 November 1883. 3

F O . 78/3324. Pol. No. 246, Malet to Granville, 21 September 1881.

4

H . Adali, "Documents pertaining to the Egyptian Question in the Yildiz Collection of the Ba§bakanlik Ar§ivi, Istanbul" in P.M. Holt (ed). Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt (London: O x f o r d University Press. 1968). p. 52; Broadley, op. cit., pp. 165-78; Scholch, op. cit., p. 244. V . E . E . , 39/1208/131/116. E n d . V 3 . 6

Ibid„

encl. A - l and A-2: 5 and 7 Muharrem 1299./28 and 30 November 1881.

THE

EGYPTIAN

CRISIS

OF

1 8 8 1 - 8 2

13

Indeed it seems as though the Porte was already hardening its line t o w a r d s the Urabists by mid-April 1882. In the Cabinet meeting of 2 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1299/13 April 1882 the Ministers r e c o m m e n d e d that two warships be sent "to restore order". They also put forward that the Egyptian government had been acting in a manner, "contrary to their duty of obedience". The Ministers also felt that the "Urabists were using disrespectful language t o w a r d s the K h e d i v e " . T h e y concluded that it would be best to send an Ottoman official with the ships to find out the causes of the conflict and to advise the Egyptians to be obedient. "More forward measures" were also to be considered.' A month later on 2 4 Cemaziyelahir 1299/14 May 1882, acting on the Khedive's suggestion, the Porte drafted a telegram to the Egyptian Council of Ministers stating unequivocally that they should obey their Khedive and if they had any legitimate grievances they should refer them to "the seat of the Caliphate". Also it had been heard abroad that they dared to put about the story that they would oppose any Ottoman military expedition. The Egyptians were told to refrain f r o m "wilful and obstinate acts" (harekat-i hodserane).2

O T T O M A N R E L A T I O N S W I T H B R I T A I N D U R I N G T H E E G Y F H A N CRISIS

Ever since the Cyprus Convention of 1878 the close links between L o n d o n and the Porte had gradually but definitely given way to mutual suspicion and distrust. Abdtilhamid, although favourable to Britain in the early years of his reign, had come to consider Britain the bête noire of the Ottoman State and British intervention in the affairs of the Empire the primaiy threat to its survival. 3 Thus all entanglements in which Britain was involved were to be avoided and this b e c a m e a first priority: ". .. In the conditions that the Sublime State now finds itself it would be harmful to ally with England and to acquiesce in all its aims and desires ,.." 4 Nor were the "British" the monolithic body the n a m e implies. The Liberal government of the time (1880-85) was an uneasy amalgam of Whigs and Radicals, with Gladstone and Granville involved in a delicate balancing act. T h e Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were not properly informed on matters relating to foreign policy. 5 The fact that the Sultan centralized affairs of state on his own person and delegated very little real authority also meant that the old methods of manipulating the Porte through individual ministers

]

Y.E.E. 39/1745/131/116.

2

Y.E.E. 39/360/131/116.

3

Akarli, op. cit., pp. 40-44.

4

Y . E . E . : 8 / 2 6 0 9 / 7 7 / 3 , also: Uzuncar§ili, "Ikinci Abdulhamid'in Ingiliz siyasetine dair muhtiralari", Istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Fak. Tarih Dergisi, Vll, 1954, pp. 43-60. 5 John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, "The British Occupation of Egypt", Int. J. Middle East. Stud., 9 (1978), pp. 471-88.

14

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POLITICS

could not be relied upon. As a result the British men on the spot, the ambassadors and dragomans, found themselves shadow-boxing with an elusive and increasingly s u s p i c i o u s A b d i i l h a m i d . On 9 July 1882 the British A m b a s s a d o r at the Porte, the Earl of D u f f e r i n , c o m p l a i n e d extraordinary

impediments

which

affect diplomatic

of

negotiations

"the at

Constantinople". T h e A m b a s s a d o r claimed that Ministers themselves were unauthorized to negotiate and that they, "dared not tell the Sultan anything which might displease him". T h e Sultan communicated not through regular channels but through "three or four irresponsible y o u n g men" w h o m he disavowed when he found it convenient to do so: ... Even if an Ambassador endeavours to reach the Sultan by a written m e s s a g e through his own D r a g o m a n , no one at the Palace will undertake to deliver it if it contains phrases of a strenuous character, |if the Ambassador asks for an audience] ... the Sultan keeps him waiting with one excuse or another for w e e k s . . . 1 The Ambassador had some interesting observations to impart regarding the person of Abdulhamid: In considering any act or word which emanates from His Majesty w e have to take into account the complicated and even contradictory elements of his character. As I have already more than once described to your Lordship Abdul-Hamid is a man of great intelligence, astuteness and finesse. If he had merely to deal with Orientals and with men and questions with which he was familiar and forces which he had an opportunity of measuring he would probably be regarded as a ruler of great force of character and ability. Unfortunately the defects of his early education, his ignorance of the world and of the machinery ... of modern European politics introduce into many of his combinations a certain strain of childishness and folly. T h e suspiciousness of his nature is almost maniacal, he has no respect for the truth and his duplicity is unbounded.. . 2 Just before Dufferin left f o r Egypt as the British t r o u b l e - s h o o t e r , Abdulhamid was to return the compliment by telegraphing his agent in Cairo, Kadri Efendi: "Malet is to be replaced by Dufferin. You know that this man is

' F O . 78/3387. Draft no. 566 A. Dufferin to Granville. 9 July 1882. See also Feroze Y a s a m e e , "The Ottoman Empire and the European Great Powers: 1884-1887" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies 1984), p. 62: "Despite the apparent malleability of the Sultan's personal psychology, the corruptibility of many of his servants, and the weakness and disorganization of his administrative apparatus, the O t t o m a n Empire was not an Egypt or a Bokhara: its governing institutions could not be decisively penetrated and its ruler could not be bought out". 2

F O . 78/3385. Draft no. 436. Dufferin to Granville. 11 June 1882.

THK

HGYI'TIAN

CRISIS

OF

1 8 8 1- 8 2

15

much more experienced in intrigue than Malet". 1 The Anglo-French note delivered in Egypt on 8 January 1882 promising support for the Khedive against the Urabists had been an important part of this inauspicious background of mutual distrust. The Porte saw this as an infringement of its sovereign rights in Egypt. The Ottoman Cabinet advised on 20 Safer 1299/12 January 1882 that Britain and France should be told "there was nothing in Egypt which could justify such a guarantee from outside parties". London and Paris were to be told that any guarantee of support should come from the sovereign power. On 26 January Britain replied that the Joint Note was not an infraction of the Sultan's sovereign authority and "All England wanted was the well being and prosperity of the country and the maintenance of administrative independence..." 2 As it became known that an Anglo-French naval demonstration was being planned as a show of support for the Khedive against the Urabists, the Porte sent a circular telegram to its ambassadors. The Ottoman State, it was said, merely desired peace and the maintenance of the status quo in Egypt, and its policy there was very modest and cautious. The whole Egyptian business was merely a local affair involving a controversy over the dismissal of some officers. Any naval or military demonstration by a foreign power would be unacceptable. 3 The Ottoman ministers also stated on 25 Cemaziyelahir 1229/15 May 1882, that the sending of British and French fleets was an "illegal act", it was also unacceptable that the Powers should tell the Ottoman State to abstain from independent action. The situation was an act of aggression "reminiscent of the Austrian attitude towards Bosnia" before its occupation of that province. 4 This sense of historical precedent runs throughout the Ottoman documents. The Cabinet, in another set of deliberations in which they advised against the sending of a naval force to Egypt, recalled the escape of Firari Ahmed Pa§a and warned against the dangers of the recurrence of such an event: "If such a great force as the Imperial Navy were to fall into the hands of the Egyptians, it is clear that this would cause extreme danger and difficulty for the state". 5 Also the presence of such a force would only provoke the Europeans for as soon as the Ottomans ^ . E i . 39/2465/121/122, p. 203.2 November 1882. Y.E.E. 39/84-1/84/124. FO. 78/2277. Draft no. 42. Granville to Dufferin. 26 January 1882: The key words here were "securing administrative independence". During the visit of the Ali Nizami Pa^a and Ali Fuad Bey Mission to Egypt in October 1881, the then Prime Minister of Egypt §erif Pa§a, and the Khedive himself had asked the British to intercede with the Porte and bring aboul the recall of the Mission. Granville fully supported this idea and said: "The Government of England would run counter to the most cherished traditions of national history were it to diminish that liberty (of relative autonomy)" See: FO: 78/3320. Draft no. 214. Granville to Malet 4 November 1881. 2

3

Y.E.E. 39/360/131/116. 24 Cemaziyelahir 1299/14 May 1882. Y.E.E. 39/84-1/84/124, encl. 111.8. 5 Y.E.E. 39/2012/131/116. Firari (Runaway) Ahmed Pa§a was the Ottoman Admiral whe. defected to Egypt with the whole Ottoman fleet at the end of the Second Egyptian-Ottoman war. (1839). The above mazbata is undated but is likely to have been written in May 1882. Note that only shortly before the Ministers had advocated a naval "demonstration"; it seems that the Sultan intervened at this point. 4

16

W O h LI)

P O W E R

P O L I T I C S

assembled a f e w ships in .1 place like Crete the British and French could send a f o r c e t w o or three times its size. 1 But the crisis in Egypt w a s escalating and this brought on the mission of Dervi§ Pa§a.

T H E D E R V i § PAijA MISSION: QUESTIONS O F MILITARY INTERVENTION A N D CHANGE OF KHEDIVE

T h e Dervi§ Pa§a Mission w h i c h arrived in E g y p t on 7 J u n e 1882 had three m a i n duties assigned to it by A b d i i l h a m i d : 1, to prevent by any m e a n s the

military e n t a n g l e m e n t of O t t o m a n f o r c e s in E g y p t ; 2 , to r e m o v e Urabi

f r o m the s c e n e by inviting him to Istanbul; 3, to give support to the K h e d i v e T e v f i k Pa§a as the legitimate representative of the S u l t a n , and thus forestall any foreign intervention. 2 Yet one quite o f t e n c o m e s across statements in the literature on the s u b j e c t such as those m a d e by Vatikiotis on the p u r p o s e of t h e Dervi§ Pa§a M i s s i o n : " A c c o r d i n g to T u r k i s h s o u r c e s ... t h e Sultan ... aimed at using Orabi to abolish the K h e d i v a t e and restore O t t o m a n control". 3 T h o s e very "Turkish sources" indicate the e x a c t o p p o s i t e . T e v f i k w a s to be g i v e n all p o s s i b l e s u p p o r t . V a t i k i o t i s a l s o c l a i m s that t h e U r a b i s t s a n d n o t a b l e s "were f u r t h e r e n c o u r a g e d by t h e k n o w l e d g e that t h e Sultan w a s a n x i o u s to u n d e r m i n e K h t d i v i a l authority in E g y p t through t h e possible use of armed support of the mi. itary dissidents". 4 In his m o r e recent and otherwise w e l l - d o c u m e n t e d work Scholch also s e e m s to h a v e o v e r l o o k e d t h e issue of support for T e v f i k : "He | the Sultan] w a s quite d e t e r m i n e d to d e p o s e T e v f i k because of his ineptitude and appoint Halim as his successor". 5

T h e truth was that both a military l a n d i n g and a c h a n g e of K h e d i v e were considered e x t r e m e h undesirable last-resort measures, particularly as they w o u l d b e u n d e r t a k e n at the b e h e s t of f o r e i g n p o w e r s , w h i c h w o u l d b e d a m a g i n g to Ottoman prestige. As the ministers stated:

{

lbid.

2

Y . E . E . 39/2465/121/122: This is a collection of d o c u m e n t s compiled in a 270 page defter c o m p r i s i n g most of the telegraphic and postal c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n Dervi§ Pa§a a n d Istanbul. T h e instructions sent to Dervi§ Pa§a emanate in most cases directly f r o m the Sultan. Dervi§ Ibrahim Pa§a (1812-96) w a s a w e l l - k n o w n O t t o m a n trouble shooter (in m a n y cases literally) w h o had distinguished Himself in the Balkans during the turbulent 1870s; o n him see islam Ansiklopedisi (1st. 1945) Vol. 3. p. 552, and Meydan Larousse (1st. 1970), Vol. 3, p. 587. •Vatikiotis, op. cit. p. 466, n. 23. By "Turkish sources" here Vatikiotis does not indicate anything beyond the Memoirs of Kamil Pa ja. A lbid„ p. 146. 5

S c h o l c h , op. cit.: p. 245, also p. 246: "It was now known positively that the Sultan was only waiting f o r an opportunity to depose T e v f i k " . Halim Pa§a as direct descendant of M e h m e t Ali would have been eligible. He had been resident in Istanbul since his exile f r o m Egypt and was very active in promoting his canso.

THE

EGYPTIAN

CRISIS

OF

1881-82

17

If in the case of extreme necessity it became inevitable to change the Khedive, because this would be done as a result of the strength and influence of the foreigners, this would result, God Forbid, in a diminution of the influence of the Sublime State . J Also the Ottomans fully expected to be opposed militarily by the Egyptians and as a result knew that any expedition would be a full-scale military operation and not a "demonstration": "The sending of soldiers to Egypt can only be done with the intention of beating down Egypt. The sending of a force only for a demonstration would be both pointless and dangerous". 2 The sensitivity to historical precedent is also observable in the issue of the change of Khedive. The Sultan, emphasizing his unwillingness to undertake such action under Western pressure, was to write in a personal memorandum that in the event of the deposition of Ismail Pa§a in 1879 this was done under extreme Anglo-French pressure and against his will: "The French convinced the English to support them ... There were close ties and friendship between the French Prime Minister Gambetta and Halim Pa§a ..."? Nor does this mean that Abdülhamid had any particular affection for any of the Mehmet Ali family. Here again history was called as a witness when he stated in a memorandum dated 5 Cemaziyelahir 1305/19 February 1888 that they were all suspect. During the 1877-78 Russo Ottoman war Ismail had in fact proposed that he send Egyptian troops to garrison Istanbul so Turkish forces would be free to go to the front. Abdülhamid said that this was a "fiendish Egyptian plot" and that the evil intentions of the Mehmet Ali family "dated back to the Navarin affair". The memorandum continued: The Mehmet Ali Pa§a family have always been the enemies of the House of Osman and have always tried to conquer their position and have spent millions of akge towards this end ...4 A draft in Abdiilhamid's own hand noted that Tevfik Pa§a's telegrams contradicted one another. He seemed to be against the Urabists, yet he still did all they asked. The Sultan stated that in his view:

1 Y.E.E., 39/2012/131/116. Encl. A.40. Undated Cabinet minutes. Halim was known to be close to the French. Ibid. The term used here is: "Misir'i dogmek niyetiyle". ^Y.E.E. 8/1063/77/3. (undated): Scholch is also mistaken in stating: "Even at that time he had wanted to appoint Halim as Ismail's successor" (Scholch, op. cit. p. 247). Khedive Ismail had been deposed in June 1879 when his financial policies fell foul of Anglo-French interests. 4 Y.E.E. 31/1929/45/82. Memorandum initialed by the Sultan.

18

W O R L D

P O W E R

P O L I T I C S

... T e v f i k and Halim are the s a m e , whichever one proves his true loyalty to the S u b l i m e S t a t e , a n d d o e s not e n c o u r a g e t h e s e contemptible men (bu niakule adamlar) and does not incline towards England or Franco. it is he who will be preferred ... The Sultan then referred to the llrabists as "vermin" (ha^erat) and asked the Ministers to waste no time in finding a solution to the problem. 1 Indeed on the eve of the dispatch of the Dervi§ Pa§a Mission intense discussion seems to have taken place in the Ottoman Cabinet. In the minutes dated 14 Receb 1299/2 June 1882 the ministers stated that they had reviewed all the letters and telegrams received f r o m the Khedive, A h m e d Urabi and M a h m u d Sami Al-Barudi. The Ministers were of the view that the Urabists were "acting out of a feeling of national defence" ( m u h a f a i a - i kavmiyyet maneviyatiyla), and as a result the Khedive had been forced to seek the support of the foreigner. They advised against the replacement of Tevfik by Halim as Urabi wanted, because then the Khedivate would be in Urabi's gift, and there was no guarantee that if one day Halim fell out with him he too would not be deposed. The "accusations" of Mahmud Sami and Urabi were not to be believed for they were untrustworthy. All things considered, it w a s recommended that the Porte back up T e v f i k , of whose behaviour they had experience, rather than Halim w h o was an unknown factor, "because in a matter of such importance it is not advisable to replace the tried by the u n t r i e d . . . " (gayr-i miicerrebin mticerrebe terciimesi tarafina gidilemiyecegine ...). T h e ministers felt that as a result of the Sultan's support for Tevfik Pa§a the Egyptian notables had already started abandoning Urabi, and that this should be encouraged by an official declaration f r o m the Sultan to be published in Egypt by Dervi§ Pa§a, "whose primary duty should be the support of Tevfik Pa§a". 2 Accordingly Urabi was sent a telegram in A r a b i c on the next day emphasizing that close ties were required between Istanbul and Egypt and that if they became distanced the enemy would come between them. He was advised to obey the special commissioner w h o was being sent "to assure your sincere and total devotion". 3

The mission was also to include Sheikh Ahmed Esad, a close confidant of the Sultan and one of his "official A r a b s " . 4 This was not Esad's first trip to Egypt. He had spent time there during the critical months of spring 1882 when the fleets arrived in Alexandria harbour. It is interesting that Scholch assesses him as "the Sultan's special ambassador to Urabi" w h o was staying in 'y.E.E. 39/2012/131/116. Encl. A.-40. undated. Y.E.E. 39/1208/131/116. Encl. A-9 (see also Said Pa§a's Memoirs, p. 73, where he too indicates that the Sultan did not favour a change of Khedive). 2

^Ibid., encl. A-14. 4

Abu-Manneh, op. cit. p. 151, n. 75.

THE

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CRISIS

OF

188 1- 82

19

Cairo and giving moral support to Mahmud Sami and Urabi against Tevfik and the Powers". 1 The Dervi§ Pa§a Mission is usually said to have included two contradictory elements: the high-handed centralist Dervi§ Pa§a and the "Pan-Islamist", Esad, who was instructed to support Urabi. 2 The Ottoman documents indicate that such a clear-cut view is inaccurate. Ahmed Esad was to act in a very strange manner for one favourable to Urabi's cause and Dervi§, was in fact much more subtle and certainly had no instructions "to shoot |Urabi| if necessary with his own hand". 3 Nor was he to "prepare a Turkish intervention". His instructions were exactly the opposite. 4 In Esad's secret report to Istanbul it was stated that he had told Urabi personally: None of your views are acceptable to the Sultan. Give up these ideas and forsake this arrogance for you are not up to dealing with the Sublime State ... If his Imperial Majesty sees that you insist in your views he will send many soldiers led by able commanders. It is even probable that he will honour Egypt in person to put a stop to this disorderly and unseemly state of affairs. The report also includes an interesting interchange between Ubeyd Bey, a leading Urabist and Esad. Esad was approached confidentially by Ubeyd when he left the room to perform his ablutions. Ubeyd said that Urabi was personally determined to resist any Ottoman force and added, "but we won't obey him as he has some aims for which it is not yet time". 5 On the other hand the early proceedings of Dervi§ Pa§a were remarkably moderate for an "old soldier of the old energetic unscrupulous type". 6 Dervi§, first tried to bring about a reconciliation between the Urabists and the Khedive. 7 The Porte's answer to this suggestion, however, was categorically negative, and he was reminded of the written views of Mahmud Sami and Urabi in which they had spared no insult in referring to their superior the Khedive. 8 When the so-called "Alexandria massacres" occurred on 11 June the event was taken in Istanbul as the "fruition of the aims and desires of Urabi

'Scholch, up. cit., pp. 245,246. Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 156; Mansfield, op. cit. p. 38; Cromer, op. cit., p. 222. ^Wilfred Scaven Blunt, The Secret History of Egypt (London, 1907), p. 302. 4 Scholch, op. cit., p. 249. 5 Y.E.E. 39/1208/131/116. Encl. A 4; Of course all such reports must be approached with caution for it is impossible to discern to what extent the reporter might be telling the Sultan what he wouId like to hear. ¿Blunt, op. cit., p. 301. 2

7

Y.E.E. 39/2465/121/122 p.8: Dervi§ to Palace, 11 June 1882, tel. no. 4. /bid„ p. 9. Palace to Dervi§ 12 June 1882, tel. no. 5.

8

20

W O R L D

P O W E R

P O L I T I C S

Pa§a".' In the subsequen, d a y s , however, Dervi§, assured Istanbul that the regular army had done its duty in re-establishing and maintaining order in Alexandria. Urabi and his followers, he said, were the only force capable of maintaining order and resisting the Europeans, and as such they should not be a l i e n a t e d or p r e s s e d

into d e s p e r a t e a c t i o n . Rather Dervi§

counselled

reconciliation, a general pardon by the K h e d i v e , and the use of Urabi to maintain general order while his support was slowly melted away from under him, "then all measures against him will be possible". 2 These were Ottoman tactics at their best. The situation was indeed delicate. The popularity of Urabi was at its height, not only in Egypt but in Istanbul also. Dufferin was to report on 23 June that "The Sultan's position in the presence of the growing sympathy for Urabi Pa§a evinced by the M a h o m e t a n public opinion and the danger of general Arab revolt, is undoubtedly difficult

Of course, whether there was

in fact such a danger or Abdul ham id was deliberately exaggerating to avoid sending troops is a moot point. T h e issue of the projected Ottoman expeditionary force is a critical one as it serves to focus much of the Egyptian controversy. Abdiilhamid knew that the Ottoman State's military resources were extremely limited. T h e use of these already limited means in a conflict f r o m which he had precious little to gain and very much to lose was the last thing he desired. The prospect of the "Caliph's army" involved in hostilities against a "champion of Islam" such as Urabi would seriously damage Ottoman credibility in the A r a b provinces. The British were alive to these implications: On the one hand his prestige and popularity as the Head and Champion of Islam might be damaged both in Arabia and Africa, and on the other Arabi Bey ... might be tempted to revive the tradition of the A r a b Caliphate. 4 On 15 June Dervi^ was told in very strong language that it was out of the question to send Ottoman forces: "the fact that it is desired by those ill wishers against the State is proof enough of its dangerous and harmful nature". The Ottoman Commissioner was warned not to act against instructions by 'Ibid., p. 10. Palace to Dervi§. 1 i June 1882, tel. no. 6: T h e British, on the other hand, accused the O t t o m a n s . Granville told the Ottoman A m b a s s a d o r M u s u r u s Pa§a that "Ithe P o r t e | w a s responsible in the ultimate resort for the serious outrage in Alexandria"; see: FO. 78/3378. Draft no. 322. Granville to Dufferin. I " June 1882. 2 Ibid„ pp. 17-21. Dervi§ to P a l a a , 13 June 1882, tels. 1 1 , 1 3 , 1 5 . 3

F O . 78/3386. Draft no. 487, Dufferin to Granville, 23 June 1882; in another draft Dufferin said the Sultan first "stood to win on O e r v i j Pa§a", w h o failed and so he inclined to Urabi as a result of his appearing to be "champion of the rights of Islam". See FO. 7 8 / 3 3 8 6 . Draft no. 473; Dufferin to Granville, 19 June 1882. T h e assessment is of course incorrect. 4 F O . 78/3385. Draft no. 444. A Dufferin to Granville, 14 June 1882.

THE E G Y P T I A N C R I S I S OF 188 1- 8 2

21

demanding troops: "Do you not see the gravity and danger of the situation which would be created if |Ottoman] soldiers were to fight the Arabs?"' Dervi§ however, kept up his appeals. On 16 June he stated that although Urabi was successful in maintaining order it was not good for the Khedive's or the Porte's prestige "to have to present a smiling face" to Urabi and his followers. To put an end to this situation "twenty or thirty battalions" of soldiers would be needed. 2 The British, who were closely monitoring the situation, soon heard that Dervi§ was bragging "that two army corps are ready to be dispatched at once to Egypt should he give the signal for their departure". Dufferin apparently referred the matter to his local military expert, a Major Swain. The Major said in a report dated 12 June that he was "at a loss to know where these two army corps are" and went on to assess the possibility of mobilizing such a force: A Turkish army corps on a war footing represents 34,000 infantry, 45,000 cavalry and 96 guns. If this number is doubled it gives 79,000 men and 192 guns, or in other words it would comprise about two thirds of the present strength of the Imperial Army. The Major then gave a detailed breakdown of Ottoman troop strengths in the various provinces underlining the fact that a general discharge of troops was proceeding. Dervi§'s claim, he stated, would be impossible to fulfil in the present state of affairs, "without unnecessarily denuding the parts (of the Empire they would be drawn from) of troops". The report concluded that "there is no expeditionary force ready and massed for service in Egypt" ? Yet the Sultan constantly attempted to keep the British off balance by implying that there was such a force. On 16 June, just four days after Major Swain's dispatch, the Sultan requested the British government to supply him with troop transport ships. Dufferin said, "It was difficult to imagine the Sultan's motive" . 4 The Sultan's motive was definitely not the military solution. On 19 June Dervi§ was instructed to ask Urabi to resign in order not to force the Porte to send soldiers and "to prevent divisions among Muslims". He was to be told that the Sultan was not in any way angry with him and invited him to Istanbul where "he would be much in favour". Urabi was to be reminded of "the very great harm to result from such a course of action as the sending of

^Y.E.E. 2465/121/122. pp. 24,25. Letter from Palace to Dervi§, 15 June 1882. lbid„ pp. 37-40. Dervil to Palace, 16 June 1882, tel. no. 24. 3 F O . 78/3385. Draft no. 5, Major Swain to Dufferin, 12 June 1882. This extremely detailed and lengthy report is also interesting as it shows the extent to which British intelligence had up-to-the-minute information on the state of the Ottoman Army. 4 F O . 78/3386. Draft no. 454, Dufferin to Granville, 16 June 1882. 2

22

W O K I.D

I'OWHR

P 0 1.1 T 1 C S

Ottoman troops to Eg)pi by the intervention of European Powers". 1 T h e Palace also told Dervi§ that it was very much against the convening of an international conference in Istanbul to deal with the Egyptian crisis. Dervi§ was to pacify the c o u n t n , and anybody who would undertake such action as to provoke intervention "was a sinner against Allah". 2 It is interesting u

note that Dervi§, also reported on attempts by

European Consuls to heighten tension in Egypt by distributing handbills among the Christian population encouraging them to flee Egypt. This in turn, was reacting on the Muslim population who feared that once the Christians had left the fleets would bombard Alexandria. This fear then completed the vicious circle by increasing inter-communal tensions. This evidence helps to confirm Galbraith and Marsot's contention that "the disorders of 1882 were incited by the actions of the Europeans, not by Urabi Even in the last days of June, however, Istanbul was still working on the 'soft option" towards I tabi. On 2 4 June Dervi§ was told that Urabi was to be given the Mecidiye First Class and made a Pa§a. On the next day Dervi§ wrote that although Urabi was for the time being the only force capable of maintaining order, time must be gained and reforms instigated which would make it impossible for "a man like Urabi who does not know good f r o m evil" to c o n c e n t r a t e p o w e r in his h a n d s . 4 T h i s was nothing m o r e than the time-honoured Ottoman dcvice of "... Loading with honours and official duties men it (Istanbul] could not capture or discipline ...". 5 By the beginning of July, however, the Porte seemed to be in despair. Dervi§ was told on 1 July that the moderate policy followed so far had been unproductive: Urabi had not come to Istanbul. Upon Dervi§'s insistence Urabi had been decorated and a policy of reconciliation followed but this had not yielded results. Dervi§ was asked what the attitude of the local population would be to an Ottoman landing. 6 In a letter to Dervi§, dated 3 July the same tone of desperation was discernible. He was to summon Urabi and "behind closed doors" tell him thai the English and French had designs "to cause the killing of Muslim by Muslim" in Egypt. Did he want "Muslim blood to flow 'Y.E.E. 39/2465/121/122. p p . 4 2 43. Palace to Dervi§, 19 June 1882,tel. no. 12. 1

Ibid„

pp. 53-4. Palace to D e n i§ 21 June 1882.

3

Ibid., pp. 38-40. Dervi§ to Pala< e, 17 June 1882, and pp. 50-1. Dervi§ to Palace, 20 June 1882; Galbraith and Marsot; op. cit., p. 488. 4

Y.E.E. 2465/121/122. p.72. Palace to Dervi§, 24 June 1882, tel. no. 25; p.45. Dervi§ to Palace, 25 June 1882, tel. no. 45.

-'Allan Cunningham, "The Sick Man and the British Physician", Middle Eastern Studies, (1981), p. 159. When Dufferin asked him why the Sultan was decorating Urabi the Minister Said Pa§a "answered in a mysterious manner" that "in a little while I should applaud the circumstance". See FO. 78/3386. Draft no. 498, Dufferin to Granville, 1882. FY.E.E. 39/2465/121/122. pp. 95 7. Palace to Dervi§, 1 July 1882, tel. no. 34.

Vol. 17 Foreign heartily 26 June

THE

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188

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23

like the waves of the holy Nile?" (islam kamnin emvac-i Nil-i mubarek gibi akmasim ...). Did he want to turn Egypt into another Tunisia or India? He wanted Halim to be Khedive, but did he not see that Halim was the puppet of the French? 1 On the same day Dervi§ sent an important cable. The Khedive and his followers were insisting on the need for an Ottoman force. Urabi and his followers were spreading the rumour that the Ottomans would destroy Egypt and make it easier for the foreigners to invade. Dervi§ suggested that the Porte should spread the rumour that it would land a force in Port Said, "to protect the Canal against the British". At the same time a local assembly of notables and ulema would be called and the necessity for the landing explained to them. This would mean that public opinion would turn against Urabi and he would not be able to offer armed resistance. 2 Urabi, according to Dervi§, was implying that the Porte should leave him to his own devices to defend Egypt. 3 The Porte now directed Dervi§ to publish the declaration that the Sultan had given him. The text of the declaration was an appeal to the population of Egypt on behalf of the Sultan: O people of Egypt .. Let it be known that your Master the Caliph of all Muslims only wants the prosperity and happiness of his people. Perform your duty of obedience to the Sultan by obeying the Khedive ... There is no tribalism ( k a v m i y y e t ) or nationalism (•cinsiyyet) in Islam. Religion and nationality are as one. Recent acts against His Highness the Khedive are not acceptable to the Sultan ... Let there be no talk of tribalism and nationalism ... Beware on all occasions of any illegal activity or inhuman behaviour towards anyone, native or foreign ...4 The convening of the conference in Istanbul, and the rumours that it had been decided there to send Ottoman soldiers to Egypt brought tension to a peak. On 3 July Dervi§ reported that the newspaper El-Taif, "which is particularly the mouthpiece of Urabi" had published an article on 14 §aban 1299/2 July 1882 stating that an Ottoman force would "meet with even stronger resistance than an English or French force". The Commissioner further reported that the defences at Abukir were being reinforced against such an eventuality. 5 Reacting in horror to this news, Istanbul immediately demanded an official denial of the H-7a;/article. 6 Dervi§ replied that Urabi had

l

Ibid„ pp. 101-7. Palace to Dervi§, 3 July 1882. Ibid„ pp. 114,115,116. Dervi§ to ftilace, 3 July 1882, tel. no. 60. 3 Ibid„ pp. 121,122,123. Dervi§ to Palace, 3 July 1882, tel. no. 64. 4 Ibid„ pp. 62-4. Palace to Derviç, 22 June 1882, tel. no. 22. 5 Ibid„ pp. 124-26. Derviç to Palace, 3 July 1882, tel. no. 65. 6 Ibid„ pp. 128-29. Palace to Derviç, 4 July 1882, tel. no. 39,40. 2

24

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P O W H R

P O L I

T I C S

been obedient until news had leaked out of the conference that Ottoman troops were about to arrive, and that this had changed everything. It was no longer possible to influence IJrabi "through flattery". He was now demanding that Dervi§ Pa§a should leaxe Egypt. 1 Istanbul w a s particularly alive to the implications of the £ / - 7 a f / a r t i c l e for Islamic lands: It is a great corruption [that such things should be written), as the Padi§ah is the Caliph and Emir of Muslims everywhere. T o see such xvords used against the Imam of all Muslims will no doubt sadden the hearts of many believers ..? It is interesting thai the British were also inclined to touch a raw nerve in Abdiilhamid's Islamic sensibilities. During these very days the Dragoman of the Istanbul Embassy, Sandison, had an interviexv with the Sultan in which he attempted to scare him with talk in 'some of the most influential English newspapers", to the effect that his inactivity in Egypt was causing the press to push the G o v e r n m e n t to recognize "an independent A r a b G o v e r n m e n t in Cairo". Sandison rubbed salt into the wound by hinting that a rival Caliph in Egypt xvould not suit His Majesty". 3 Meanwhile all attempts to procure an official denial of the

El-Taif

article failed. Dervi§ Pa§a xvas told that the offending passage had been a quote f r o m a British paper and it xvas suggested that the Porte should d e m a n d an official denial from that source. 4 In these days of Admiral Seymour's ultimatum and the events leading up to the bombardment of Alexandria, Dervi§ seems to have made a last desperate attempt to bring IJrabi to I s t a n b u l . A c t i n g on instructions to "beseech him | U r a b i | in the name of humanity and Islam" to go to Istanbul, Dervi§ approached Urabi one last time on 8 July. However, the latter told him it was out of the question that he go anywhere because he would be cut off f r o m Egypt "by an arm) of 200,000", the local population would be greatly excited and this would lead to grave disturbances. 5 T o "beseech in the name of Islam" seems to be all that the Porte could envisage at this juncture. Military intervention was out, and the Sultan did not waver on this point. Derviij xvas told on 7 July that "even if the Porte were to

l

Ibid„

pp. 1 3 0 , 1 3 1 . Dervi§ to Palace, 4 July 1882, tel. n o . 6 7 .

2

Ibid„ pp. 132, 133, 134. Palace lo D e r v i § , 5 July 1 8 8 2 , tel. no. 6 8 . C o p y of telegram to K h e d i v e . T h e t e l e g r a m a l s o n o t e d thai the article w a s t h e w o r k o f A b d a l l a h - A l N e d i m w h o w a s r e n o w n e d for his c l o s e ties with IJrabi. 3

F O . 7 8 / 3 3 8 7 . Draft no. 5 4 7 , Dul'ferin t o Granville, 3 July 1 8 8 2 .

4

Y . E . E . 3 9 / 2 4 6 5 / 1 2 1 / 1 2 2 . pp. 139, 140. Dervi§ t o P a l a c e , 6 July 1 8 8 2 , tel. n o . 7 1 .

% / < / . , pp. 145. Dervi§, to Palace 8 July 1 8 8 2 , tel. no. 7 6 .

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1-82

25

send 100,000 soldiers to Egypt", England and France would do all in their power to make sure they failed. 1 Nor was Abdiilhamid mistaken. Dufferin told his minister on the very same day that he was determined that a Turkish expedition should not re-assert Turkish power in Egypt. Also he was "aware of the great aversion of the Sultan to the step we are anxious he should take". 2 In these hectic last hours before the British ships opened fire Abdiilhamid made desperate and hopeless attempts to prevent the inevitable. On 10 July Dervi§ was told to "order" Urabi to refrain from provoking Seymour. 3 On the same day the Sultan told Dufferin by way of the American minister that he would have a concrete proposal by "5 o'clock tomorrow" and asked for a postponement of the bombardment by 48 hours. Dufferin replied he could only grant this if the proposal justified the "additional risk which would be entailed" to the British ships from the Egyptian forts: The threatened bombardment is an act of self-defence which the military authorities in command ... can readily prevent. |The projected bombardment| ... is a local question of police which is not likely to affect the character of our friendly relations with the Porte. 4 To the Sultan, however, this "local question of police" was an infringement of his sovereign rights in Egypt. The Porte's Ambassador to London, Musurus Pa§a asked on 10 July that the ultimatum be lifted. He too was given the 'self-defence" line and was told all this was being done "in the well-understood interest of the Sultan ... whose orders had been disobeyed". 5 The day before he embarked to leave Egypt, Dervi§ placed the blame for the burning of Alexandria jointly on Urabi and Seymour. Urabi had provoked it by his "obstinacy and stupidity" but Seymour had made irresponsible use of violence. Also the behaviour of the British was inhuman: they had fired upon teams sent out to extinguish fires and bury the dead. 6 As British Marines were landed and a fully-fledged military confrontation developed in Egypt, Istanbul remained a forlorn onlooker. Scholch mentions that at the end of July Urabi received a telegram from the Foreign Minister Said Pa§a placing the entire ]

Ibid„ pp. 137. Palace to Dervij 7 July 1882, tel. no. 42. F O . 78/3387. Draft no. 561, Dufferin to Granville, 7 July 1882. 3 Y.E.E. 39/1465/121/122. pp. 146,147. Palace to Dervi§, 10 July 1882, tel. no. 45. 4 F O . 78/3387. Draft no. 566. B. Dufferin to Granville, 10 July 1882. For an excellent assessment of these critical few days see: Galbraith and Marsot, op. cit., pp. 484-7 and Scholch, op. cit., pp. 258-92. The issues leading up to the bombardment are dealt with here only in so far as they have a bearing on the policy of the Porte. However, the general gist of the Ottoman evidence tends to support the claim of Galbraith and Marsot as well as that of Scholch that the British intervention was not justified by local events and the Urabists were capable of maintaining order. 5 F O . 78/3378. Draft no. 390, Granville to Dufferin, 10 July 1882. 6 Y.E.E. 39/2465/121/122, pp. 165-8. Dervi§ to Palace, tel. no. 93,13 July 1882. 2

26

WOh LD

POWER

POLITICS

blame for the Egyptian crisis on his shoulders. 1 There is an undated draft in the Yildiz documents which could be the Turkish copy of this telegram. In the name of the Sultan, Urabi was told that he had misled the Muslims of Egypt with his lies about protecting the peace of Muslims". But his rebellion was motivated only by his personal ambition "which is to become Khedive of Egypt". The text is written in a very high-handed tone: You should know that you are a common man |ahad-i nasdan bir adam olub\ and have no superiority or nobility and have no authority to rebel in the name of the Prophet or the Emir el

Muminin..?

Scholch maintains that although some in Urabi's entourage such as Nedim were in favour of publicizing this breach with Istanbul, Urabi wanted it kept secret. Scholch also states that until the moment when Urabi was openly ostracized by the Sultan 'the ties with the Porte were never questioned". 3 There is, however, some evidence in Wilfred Blunt's correspondence with Gladstone which contradicts this position. Blunt wrote to Gladstone on 16 February 1882 giving his assessment of the Urabists' links with the Sultan: ... I have no reason to believe that any real conversion has taken place among them to the Sultan's Imperial ideas. I know them to be firm in their intention to submit to no interference from him in the affairs of Egypt. I believe they would resist him heartily in a r m s were he to attempt sending troops to support his authority here. Indeed Araby had told m e as much, though usually very cautious in his language about the Porte ... the loyalty displayed to Abd-ul-Hamid is lip service only. 4

THE ISTANBUL CONFERENCE T h e Istanbul Conference on Egypt bringing together the Ambassadors of the Powers convened on 3 June 1882. It was to become a sorry charade in which the British pressed Abdulhamid to send troops and he retaliated with stalling tactics until the last-minute declaration of Urabi as a rebel. T h e first thing that must be understood about this conference was that it was extremely undesirable to Abdulhamid. Although the proceedings began on 3 J u n e an Ottoman delegation did not join the sittings until 26 July. The Dervi§ Pa§a

' Scholch, op. cit., p. 286. 2

Y . E . E . 39/360/131/116. H o w e s e r , it must be noted that the document above is an extremely rough draft and there is no indication that it was actually sent. ^Scholch, op. cit., p. 313. ^British Library, Additional Manuscripts. 4110. Gladstone Papers Vol. X X V . Correspondence with Mr Blunt: One must however allow for the somewhat romantic character of Mr. Blunt's information, although seen in conjunction with the matter of the El-Taif article this letter at least deserves to be taken seriously

THE

EGYPTIAN

CRISIS

OF

1881

82

27

mission was largely a pre-emptive measure to avoid entanglement in this conference and the Commissioner was told as much before he left Istanbul. 1 The Porte's Ambassador to London, Musurus Pa§a, also made this clear when he told Granville on 20 June that the Sultan would never agree to a conference, "as conferences had always ended unfavourably to Turkey". Musurus also said that regarding the sending of troops the Porte did not want to appear "as the mandatory of Europe". 2 Here once again the Sultan's sensitivity to historical precedent played a decisive role in policy. Abdulhamid clearly recollected the manner in which the Ottoman delegation had been slighted in the Berlin Conference. Dufferin also came up against the same theme in an interview with the Foreign Minister Said Pa§a on 26 June. He told the minister he knew that Turkish Commissioners at conferences before did not have good memories but this was different: "All our interests are jeopardised". Dufferin could not resist adding: "Les absents ont toujours tort". 3 On 19 July 1882 the British gave the Porte what amounted to an ultimatum regarding the sending of troops to Egypt. But they placed little faith in the Sultan. Dufferin said it was "out of the question to place any reliance upon his stability of purpose or upon his good faith ...". The Ambassador seemed actually surprised that the Sultan would employ armed forces "only so far as these may be compatible with the Sultan's own aims, wishes, desires and dreams ...". 4 One is tempted to ask: for whose "aims, wishes and desires" was he supposed to act? From the very first day that they joined the conference the Ottoman delegation noticed that the British were the main exponents of sending an Ottoman force to Egypt, and that the French were lukewarm about the idea. Said Pa§a was to remark that the "general demeanour" of the French Ambassador did not match the ardour of his British colleague. 5 It is interesting that this information finds its shadow in British sources. Even before the Ottomans joined the conference Dufferin had reported on 26 June that the French Ambassador was very much against "even the suggestion" of Ottoman troops: "... he appeared to prefer any amount of delay or any solution rather than that ...", 6 A few days later he was to report that the conference was getting nowhere and that the Ambassadors of the Powers were only procrastinating. 7 The Ottoman delegation, of course, did not fail to make use

^Y.E.E. 39/1208/131/115. Encl. A-13. 2

F O . 78/3378. Draft no. 330, Granville to Dufferin, 20 June 1882.

3

F O . 78/3386. Draft no. 498, Dufferin to Granville, 26 June 1882.

4

F O . 78/3388. Draft no. 628, do., 21 July 1882. •^Y.E.E. 39/2469/121/122 p . l . This is a 60-page defter containing the negotiations in forma? sittings and private meetings. 6

F O . 78/3386. Draft no. 495, Dufferin to Granville, 26 June 1882.

1

lbid„

Draft no. 524, same to same, 30 June 1882.

28

WORLD

POWER

POLITICS

of this. In the second sitting the Ottoman delegation tried to preempt the British by proposing that as soon as an Ottoman force arrived in Egypt the British should w i t h d r a w .

This proposal took the British and

French

A m b a s s a d o r s by surprise and caused the G e r m a n , Austrian and Russian delegates to intercede with the Ottomans to withdraw their proposal since the British would never accept such a condition. But time was gained. It is also worth noting that all the Ambassadors soothed Ottoman worries by assuring them that the new situation in Egypt did not mean, "independent laws" would be made, "nor would a constitution be permitted". 1 The major issue during the negotiations for an Anglo-Ottoman military convention seems to h a v e been the official declaration by the Sultan denouncing Urabi as "a rebel and outlaw". The British were to apply extreme pressure for this declaration to be issued before any Ottoman landing. This suggests that even at this late date they were worried about the possibility that Ottoman troops would m a k e c o m m o n cause with the Urabists. D u f f e r i n actually told Said Pa§a on 7 August that if Ottoman soldiers arrived before Urabi's denunciation was made public, Admiral Seymour had orders to prevent their landing. 2 The British Ambassador proved particularly unyielding on this point. The Ottomans suggested that troops should first be landed and Urabi asked to surrender, if he persisted then the declaration would be issued. Dufferin categorically refused and threatened to walk out of the negotiations. 3 Abdiilhamid, on the other hand, seemed particularly reluctant to take this step. Telling Urabi privately what he thought of him was one thing, but publicly and openly to declare him a rebel was quite another, especially as this would be done with the prodding of a Christian power. Accordingly the Sultan sent word to the Conference on 27 August that the announcement of Urabi to be a rebel and outlaw before the arrival of Ottoman troops would serve only to intensify the resistance of the Urabists. They would "precipitate themselves" (muhaceme

ederek)

on to the Ottoman troops w h o would be much f e w e r in

n u m b e r . H o w e v e r , the Sultan was, as in the case of the b o m b a r d m e n t of Alexandria, attempting to prevent the inevitable and he could only stall for so long. By 6 September it was made clear by the British that this declaration was a sine qua non for any military convention. On this day the Ottoman Cabinet was to advise that

'Y.E.E. 39/2469/121/122, pp 2 - 9 . Second sitting of Conference, 12 Ramazan 1299/29 July 1882. Ibid„ pp. 13-16. Third sitting of Conference, 17 Ramazan 1299/3 August 1882, and Fourth Sitting of Conference, 21 Ramazan 1299/7 August 1882. ^Ibid., pp. 41-42. Private negotiations with British Ambassador, 9 §evval 1299/25 August 1882. 2

TH F

EGYPTIAN

CRISIS

OF

1 8 8 1- 8 2

29

Since he has disobeyed the orders of the Sublime State ... and attempted to further his personal interest ... thus provoking foreign military intervention he has brought down upon himself his declaration as a rebel and outlaw. 1 An irade was accordingly issued on the next day. It specified that the denunciatory declaration would be formulated in Turkish, and not in Arabic as the British wanted, "because the official language of the State is Turkish". If the British insisted, then an Arabic translation would be made and this given to the Embassy for proclamation in Egypt. The irade specified: ... To ensure that there to be no mistake in the translation into Arabic of the original Turkish version Abulhuda and Seyid Esad Efendi should approve it and seal it with their seals .. 2 It is particularly noteworthy that the two leading "Pan-Islamists" ir Abdtilhamid's entourage were asked officially to endorse the document. Again , the Sultan was acutely aware of the implications of his actions for the Arab world as Urabi had become something of a legend.

CONCEPTIONS O F URABI

Although Abdiilhamid feared "Htiktimet-i Arabiyye" above all else and once even told the British Ambassador, "any Arab government would be as fatal to the interests of England as those of Turkey", he did not truly understand the dynamic motivating Urabi. 3 The Ottomans, the British, the French, in short all the outside parties involved in the conflict did not see that Urabi was a local force, drawing his strength from the fact that he had become a "pater patriae": "There can be no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the population had given "Urabi moral support, had rallied in spirit under his banner". 4 Instead everyone looked for an eminence grise behind Urabi who was pulling his strings. Malet once reported that in a conversation with Abdiilhamid

1

Y.E.E. 36/2475/150/XVI. p.37. Defter entitled "Egyptian Affairs" (Misir ¡¡leri). 21 §evvai

1299/6 September 1882. It is also interesting that the commander of the Ottoman force which was supposedly to be sent was to be none other than Dervi§ Pa§a (see ibid., pp. 41 - 42). 2 Ibid„ irade dated 2 2 §evval 1299/7 September 1882. It is noteworthy that it w a s the "official Arabs" not the §eyhiilislam who was employed in this context. This might be due to the de-emphasizing of that office by Abdiilhamid. 3 F O . 78/3388. Draft no. 606, Dufferin to Granville, 16 July 1882. 4

I n his carefully researched study, Scholch does however point out that conscription and mobilization was not entirely voluntary and "did not begin from the bottom up" see: Scholch op cit. pp. 2 8 7 , 2 8 8 , 2 8 9 .

30

W () k L I)

P O W E R

P O L 1T I C S

His Majesty seemed to think that it was impossible that the Egyptian officers should have acted as they had unless they had been urged on by intrigue and he suspected the ex-Khedive and Prince Halim. 1 Indeed, we c o m e across the theme of "intrigue" or "conspiracy" throughout the Ottoman documents dealing with Urabi. On 10 June Dervi§ received a telegram telling him that "it is thought that Urabi Pa§a is working in concord with the British Consul". 2 Five days later Dervi§ was asked: "Is the Khedive appearing to be (zahiren) (batinen)

at odds with Urabi Pa§a while secretly

acting in league and in agreement with him in this intrigue?" 3 T h e

matter came up again on I July when Dervi§ was told: "The Khedive seems to be secretly allied with Urabi Pa§a". 4 This evidence combined with the fact that it was hoped to put an end to the troubles in Egypt by enticing Urabi to Istanbul with simple promises of royal favour indicates that the Sultan was at a loss as to what to do. Before, either local uprisings were crushed militarily (which was out of the question in this case) or their leaders were "bought". Neither method seemed to be applicable. The fact that as late as 10 July 1882, the day before the bombardment of Alexandria, Abdulhamid could feel that he could order Urabi to refrain from provoking Seymour is another indication of how far he was out of his depth. How did he hope to order the only viable popular leader in the country to refrain from defending himself? The British fared no better as far as understanding Urabi was concerned. Although at first both Malet and the British representative on the Dual Control, Auckland Colvin felt that "[Urabi's] movement though in its origin anti-Turk is in itself an Egyptian national m o v e m e n t . . . " , they both were soon to change their tune completely and speak of "military dictatorship" and "despotism". 5 Robinson and Gallager have also pointed out that the British ... did not understand the nature of the Egyptian revolution; nor was this altogether surprising since Arabi's movement was one of the first Oriental liberal-national revolutions against European control. 6

^ 0 . 7 8 / 3 3 2 4 . Pol. No. 246, M a i l t to Granville, 21 September 1881. 2

Y . E . E . 39/2465/121/122. p. 5. Palace to Dervi § , 10 June 1882, tel. n o . 4 .

3

Ibid., p.26. Palace to Dervi§, 15 June 1882, tel. no. 10. However in all fairness to the Ottomans it must be admitted that they were generous with their suspicions. They also suspected the Khedive Tevfik Pa§a of combinations with the British, (see ibid., pp. 34-6). 4 Ibid„ same to same, pp. 9 5 , 9 6 . " 7 , 1 July 1882, tel. no. 34. 5

F O . 78/3326. Draft no. 3 8 9 , 2 6 December 1881, and Scholch. op. cit.. pp. 194-225.

^ R o b i n s o n and Gallager, op. c,t„ p. 104; Scholch, however, has pointed out that the terms "liberal" "national" or "revolution" do not exactly fit the Urabist movement: see Scholch, op. cit., pp. 306-15.

THE E G Y P T I A N C R I S I S OF

1881-82

31

Galbraith and Marsot also indicate that the "men on the spot", Malet and Colvin, supplied "misleading, inaccurate, or false information" which "deluded their superiors". These authors also point to Malet and Colvin's "complete lack of understanding of currents agitating Egyptian society". 1 Nor did these superiors need much deluding. On 7 February 1882 the Ottoman Ambassador in London, Musurus Pa§a, reported that Granville had asked him point-blank whether Urabi was working for the ex-Khedive Ismail Pa§a. 2 It is interesting that this suspicion was also declared by Granville to Blunt who was to impress upon Gladstone the incredibility of the proposal: I cannot easily forget that the highest authority in the Foreign Office expressed to me ... in March his absolute knowledge of Arabi's corrupt complicity with Ismail in a design for that Prince's restoration ..? In effect it seems all outside parties thought at one time or another that Urabi must be someone's puppet. The Sultan himself wavered between putting him down as an agent of the British or Prince Halim. In a personal memorandum he stated: ... Urabi's correspondence with Halim Pa§a shows that he is acting with his encouragement. The desire of the British was in any case to start up something like this to enable them to go into Egypt. To prevent this the necessary precautions were taken and Dervi§ Pa§a and Seyyid Esad Efendi were sent to Egypt. Their counsels had no effect. Al that time the British fleet came to Egypt. Later the English asked the Sublime State to send no more than four thousand soldiers to Abukir, the place where Napoleon disembarked and where in the least stormy weather it is impossible to dock ... If the State had sent soldiers to Egypt, we had good information that Urabi's henchmen would brandish the Holy Book and would thus make it impossible for the Imperial Soldiery to fire upon them ... This too was with the encouragement of the British ... 4 Of course such "encouragement" existed only in the Sultan's head, but he was quite correct in his assessment of the Egyptians" will to resist. On the other hand the French feared that "Urabi's rising was part of a general pan Islamic movement directed by the Sultan" against French positions in North Africa, and because of this were against any idea of Ottoman troops being sent to Egypt at all . 5 ^Galbraith and Marsot, op. cit., pp. 472 and 474. The authors are using Scholch's term "men on the spot". See A. Scholch, "The 'Men on the Spot' and the English Occupation of Egypt in 1882", Historical Journal, 19,3 (1976), pp. 773-85. 2 Y.E.E. 39/84-1/84/124, enclosure 1,6. -'British Library, Additional Manuscripts Ms. 4110. Gladstone Papers, Vol. XXV May 17 1882, letter from Blunt to Gladstone. ^Y.E.E. 8/1063/77/3. The Sultan added that the Ottoman troops would be outnumbered and slaughtered. ^Robinson and Gallager, op. cit., p. 96. Broadley, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

32

W O k L D

P O W E R

P O L I T I C S

CONCLUSION

Seen from Istanbul, what was important was not so much whether IJrabi was a rebel or a patriot, but that he was seen as a rebel. Although no doubt some of the Ulema and Viziers felt sympathetic to Urabi, the Sultan had no such soft spot. The man had publicly insulted and opposed the legally constituted authority, his representative, the Khedive. The movement had overtones of parliamentarianism as well, and as such could constitute a dangerous example for the Ottoman Arab provinces which Abdulhamid saw as the heartland of the Empire together with Anatolia. Indeed parliamentarianism was a sore point in Istanbul proper. Even if, as Scholch

indicates,

Emir-el-Muminin

Urabi

frequently

protested

his

loyalty

to

the

and stressed that Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire,

what was critical from Istanbul's viewpoint was that he was not trusted.' Also there are indications that, although Urabi declared his loyalty officially, he was determined to resist Ottoman troops. "Arabism" or "Pan-Islamism" were political tools for Abdulhamid and were fine as long as he held the reins. "Official Arabs" such as Abulhuda and Seyyid Es'ad were useful as state ideologues but no independent "Arabism" could be tolerated. It was highly significant that these two "Official Arabs" affixed their seals to the declaration denouncing Urabi as a rebel. Later in a personal memorandum Abdulhamid would draw a comparison between the Sudanese Mahdi and IJrabi referring to the Mahdi as "a brigand worthy of the title — a second Urabi (Urabi-i Sani)".2 Urabi became in the Sultan's mind, something of an epithet for rebellion. In 1887 he was to draw yet another comparison this time between Urabi and Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, where the latter was said to be pretending loyalty to Istanbul while preparing to provoke Russian intervention: ... Just like Urabi who at the beginning of his uprising declared his obedience and loyalty to the Sublime State and his enmity to the English, later causing England to go into Egypt and is now living in peace and comfort on a British pension ..?

'Scholch, op. cit., pp. 310-15. Y.E.E. 9/2636/7214. 3 Ba§bakanlik Ar§ivi. Misir iradc, no. 745: 14 Zilhicce 1304 (2 September 1887). I am grateful to Dr Feroze Yasamee for this reference. It is worth mentioning that the Urabi episode was also to be used as an example of Arab nationalism by the Young Turks. Ziya Gokalp referred to Abdallah Nedim as "one of Urabi's followers" who espoused the slogan "abandon the Turk". 2

See: Ziya Gokalp, Tiirklesmek, Islamla^nak, Muasirla^mak (Ankara: Serdengecti Ne§riyati, 1963), p. 26.

THH

EGYPTIAN

CRISIS

OF

188

1-82

33

This increasing distrust of all things British would lead the Sultan into his policy of neutrality, the main aim of which w a s the distancing of the Empire from Britain. The Egyptian chapter in Ottoman history had come to an end. Although Britain formally recognized Ottoman suzerainty in Egypt until the Great War, British imperialism of a new subtle blend gradually established itself. T h e Ottoman Commissioner to Egypt, Gazi A h m e t Muhtar Pa§a who was ostensibly there to negotiate British evacuation, nicely s u m m e d up the situation: Even if the British were to end their military occupation today, their moral occupation (i§gal-i manevi) of all this country's institutions is so thorough that it will prove more effective than military occupation. 1 This was indeed a good assessment of that peculiarly Victorian f o r m of colonial government, the "Veiled Protectorate". 2

W.E.E. 39/2168/129/120. 21 Cemaziyelahir 1307 (15 February 1890). ^Mansfield, op. cit., p. 93: This policy was the brainchild of Sir Evelyn Baring (later Earl of Cromer) who outlined his attitude in an article entitled, "The Government of Subject Races". Baring, although nominally the British Consul General in Egypt, was the power in the land from 11 September 1883 to 6 May 1907.

GHAZI AHMED MUKHTAR PASHA AND THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT

The bombardment of Alexandria by British gunboats on 11 July 1882 and the defeat of the Nationalist forces of "Urabi at Tel-el-Kebir on 18 September mark a new chapter in the turbulent history of the Eastern Mediterranean. The fact of British invasion was to be followed by the "polite fiction" of eventual British evacuation of this territory which was still nominally under Ottoman suzerainty. The official line of British policy vis-à-vis Istanbul and the rest of Europe was that the British troops would be withdrawn as soon as a "fairly good, strong, and — above all things — stable government" was established in Cairo. 1 Thus the "Egyptian Question" as everyone except the Egyptians called it (no doubt the Egyptians themselves did not see themselves as a "Question") was a three-cornered issue. It involved the British in Egypt as well as in Westminster, the Porte, and the other Powers. The issue must therefore be seen as part of the global context of late 19th-century imperialism, its effects on an Islamic society under occupation, and its bearing on a decaying Islamic empire. This short paper will not attempt to disentangle this web of opportunism, helplessness and folly. It will rather try to highlight some of the aspects of how the problem presented itself to a senior Ottoman official who was given the hopeless task of procuring British evacuation through peaceful means. Ghazi Ahmed Mukhtar Pasha was officially appointed Ottoman Special Commissioner to Egypt in keeping with the stipulations of the Egyptian Convention signed at Istanbul on 24 October 1885. 2 The Convention provided

^Cromer, Modern Egypt (London. 1911), p. 904. Sir Evelyn Baring, later Earl of Cromer, was the British Consul in Egypt from 1883 to 1907. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1961), p. 258; and Cromer, op. cit. p. 751. Ghazi Ahmed Mukhtar Pasha was a distinguished Ottoman general. In 1871 he had stabilized the Asir and Yemen vilayets. In 1873 he served briefly as Minister of Works (.Nafia Naziri). 1874 found him as the commander of the 4th Army at Erzurum. In 1875 he was sent to Bosnia to quell the uprising there. During the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878 he again served as the commander of Erzurum. His numerous successes in the eastern front won him the title of Ghazi. In January 1878 he was recalled to the capital and given the task of defending it He was subsequently dismissed from his post as a result of disagreements with the Sultan over the preparations for the defence of the city. Despite this disagreement, he was appointed Chief of Staff in April 1878. It has been contended that his popularity plus his past controversy with the Sultan led to his appointment as Commissioner Extraordinary to Egypt in 1882. According to these views, his posting to Egypt was the work of a jealous Sultan who saw the Egyptian situation as a lost cause but saw the need for a prestigious representative there. See R. U9arol, Bir Osmanli Pa§asi ve donemi; Gazi Ahmet Muktar Paga (Istanbul, 1976), pp. 170-4. For general information on Mukhtar Pasha see Turk ve Dunya Unliileri Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1983), vol. 1, pp. 132-3.

36

WOK

LI)

P O W E R

P O L I T I C S

for a British and an Ottoman Commissioner w h o would review the situation in Egypt and present reports to their respective governments concerning projected reforms in the Kgyptian administration and army as well as measures to deal with the emergency in the Sudan where the Anglo-Egyptian forces were suffering serious reverses at the hands of the Mehdi. The document presented below is M u k h t a r P a s h a s assessment of his first f o u r years of Egyptian experience (the official reports mentioned in the Convention were never concluded). However, before attention is focused on the specific document, it is necessary to set the general context of the Egyptian issue as seen from London and Cairo. The most fundamental argument f o r the legitimation for the British occupation of Egypt was the security of the Suez Canal and the route to India. 1 The traditional bulwark against the Russian danger to this route had been the Ottoman E m p i r e . But a f t e r the s h i f t in policy instigated by Abdiilhamid II, the British found they had less and less hold over the Porte. 2 Although, "the Indian Empire needed defence at the Dardanelles as well as in Egypt," it seemed increasingly as though their presence in Egypt was an indispensable re-insurance against, "the decay of the Sultanate." 3 What was in fact decaying was the unquestioned supremacy that the British had hitherto e n j o y e d at the Porte. Given these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , it b e c a m e increasingly unlikely that the British would ever evacuate Egypt. However it was also difficult to annex Egypt outright as this would draw the combined wrath of the other Powers. Hence, the solution was to k e e p talking indefinitely about evacuation while in fact settling in for a rather long stay. In Cromer's terms: T h e Englishman fell back on procedure, which is endeared to him by habits of thought and national tradition... He would assert his native genius by w o r k i n g a system which according to every canon of political thought was unworkable. H e would not annex Egypt but he would do as much good to the country as if he had annexed it. He would not interfere in the liberty of action of the khedivial government, but in practice he would insist on the khedive and the Egyptian ministers conforming to his views. He would in theory be one of many P o w e r s exercising equal rights, but in practice he would wield a paramount influence.. , 4

' i t has been shown that the "security of the Canal" argument was a pretext f o r invasion. See, J. Galbraith and A . Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot: "The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View," Int. Jr. of Middle Eastern Studies, 9 (1978), pp. 471-8. ^Robinson and Gallagher, op. tit ., p. 255. 3

/ W d , pp. 261-2 and p. 273.

^Cromer, op. cit., p. 557.

THE

BRITISH

OCCUPATION

OF

EGYPT

37

Such was the «Veiled Protectorate». The Drummond Wolff convention signed by Britain and the Ottoman empire on 22 May 1887 was no more than a variation on the same theme. Article V of the Convention provided for a British right of re-entry into Egypt in the event of internal disorder or external threat. Although the terms of the document provided for British evacuation in three years, in practice it was to remain a dead letter because the approval of all the Powers was a necessary condition for its enforcement. Salisbury knew that this was extremely unlikely: Obviously an agreement with the Sultan about evacuation would be worthless unless accepted by the Powers, but it was no less apparent that the acceptance would not be forthcoming from the Triple Alliance and France at one and the same time... 1 This was precisely what happened: both France and Russia strenuously opposed the Convention and their joint pressure provided Abdiilhamid with the necessary excuse to back out of a hopeless situation. 2 The Sultan was no less cynical than the British over the issue of evacuation. Mukhtar Pasha's presence was largely symbolic and its only real value was to show the world that the Ottomans still held on to their legal status as the sovereign Power. As stated by a member of the Pasha's entourage: (The Ottoman delegation which) arrived in Egypt was expected to put an end to what was diplomatically termed occupation but was in fact invasion. It was expected to get the British out by talking... 3 In fact, since the very commencement of negotiations between Mukhtar Pasha and his opposite number, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, both states expected little from the talks. 4 At the outset of the negotiations, however, Wolff himself seems to have been optimistic:

'Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., p. 264. Ibid„ p. 265. 3 U?arol, op. cit., p. 175. 4 Ibid„ p. 187. Wolff arrived in Cairo on 29 October 1885. Mukhtar Pasha was delayed until 27 December 1885 by the hesitancy of the Sultan who seems to have had some last minute doubts about his suitability for the mission. 2

38

WORLD

POWER

POLITICS

The experience of the Sultan's Commissioner if wisely chosen, will be useful in the elaboration of institutions which must c o m b i n e both Eastern and Western elements... 1 Wolff also expected

that the p r e s e n c e

of the

Sultan-Caliph's

Commissioner would have beneficial effects on the events in the Sudan. T h e hard-line imperialist Evelyn S. Baring, on paper Her Majesty's Consul in Egypt but in fact the true power in the land, nourished no such illusions: "Powder and shot proved more effective than the authority of the Caliph". 2 Mukhtar Pasha's instructions dwelt largely on the need to tread carefully in the Sudan. Although the Mehdi's forces were falsely believed in Istanbul to be "worn out by the losses sustained as a result of their uprising and ready to be obedient," the uprising w a s not only on the u p s w i n g but was as anti-Ottoman as it was anti-British.

3

A s the negotiations proceeded, Mukhtar Pasha soon discovered that the British did not intend to go anywhere in the short term, if ever. He reported to Istanbul that the British were making their evacuation conditional on the restoration of order in the Sudan. But they were opposing any proposal the Ottoman side made regarding the re-organization of the Egyptian army which would make it possible to pacify the Sudan. This circular argument, the Pasha said, was making it possible for the British to indefinitely prolong their o c c u p a t i o n . 4 As the Pasha stated, it could clearly be seen that the British guarantee of evacuation upon the completion of reforms was not sincere. It seems that the Pasha was a competent diplomat. He kept track of the t w o c o n f l i c t i n g o p i n i o n s at W e s t m i n s t e r f o r and a g a i n s t the o u t r i g h t annexation of Egypt and pointed out to the Porte that the whole Egyptian a f f a i r w a s intricately enmeshed in British domestic politics. 5 T h e Ottoman Commissioner's emphasis was on reforms and evacuation, while Wolff tended to lump Egypt and the Sudan together in one inextricable tangle. A t one point Mukhtar Pasha told Wolff that world Islamic opinion was much injured by Britain's occupation of Egypt. A s Egypt was on the route to the hajj,

this

unfavourable view was spreading to the whole world by way of the pilgrims. 6

' C r o m e r , op. cit., p. 752. 2

Ibid.,

p. 753.

^Uçarol, op. cit., p. 178. 4

Ibid„ pp 188-90

5

lbid„ p. 192.

6

Ibid„ p. 197.

THE Towards

BRITISH the

end

of

OCCUPATION 1886

the

OF

British

EGYPT

proposed

39 to

shift

the

C o m m i s s i o n e r s ' negotiations to Istanbul. W h e n the O t t o m a n s refused, W o l f f left E g y p t . W o l f f having departed, the British now announced that they would not recognize the Ottoman C o m m i s s i o n e r . M u k h t a r Pasha promptly resigned but his resignation was not accepted by the Sultan. T h u s the P a s h a , who was not e v e n permitted by his S o v e r e i g n to g o to Istanbul on h o m e remained

a bitter o b s e r v e r as the B r i t i s h

whittled away

at

leave,

Ottoman

sovereignty. B y 1 8 9 0 he was convinced that British evacuation was a chimera and the best he could do was prevent full annexation by remaining in Egypt as the Sultan's representative. A s an old man posted guard o v e r a c l a i m which was b e c o m i n g hollower by the day, he penned the report below: T h e situation that I have witnessed in the four years that I have been in Egypt (leads me to think that) the British by constantly strengthening and r e i n f o r c i n g

their i n f l u e n c e

here a r e b e c o m i n g

increasingly

ambitious. Everyday under the name o f reform they try to reaffirm their political presence in E g y p t . Not only are the police and the gendarmerie e n t i r e l y in their h a n d s , but in addition to this t h e y h a v e placed counsellors ( m u s t e § a r ) and o f f i c i a l s in all government o f f i c e s without whose approval nothing can be done. 1 Only the Ministry o f the Interior and the Ministry o f State ( H a k a n i y e Nezareti)

had r e m a i n e d s a f e

R e c e n t l y they have even insinuated t h e m s e l v e s into the Ministry o f State. T h e y have appointed two British o f f i c i a l s to the court o f appeal and now there is talk o f a British counsellor at the Ministry. T h e only reason f o r their failure to penetrate the Ministry o f the Interior until now is the fact that this post is occupied by R i a z Pasha and the British feign respect f o r h i m , as he is also the Prime M i n i s t e r , 2 otherwise this Ministry too would have long since been occupied and lost. B u t in any c a s e , since the administration o f the police pertains to that M i n i s t r y and the B r i t i s h control the p o l i c e , they have also laid hands on this Ministry. It is said that they intend to appoint British so-called "assistants" to all the

mudirs

in

the

Egyptian

provinces.

In

sum, today

all

the

departments o f the Egyptian G o v e r n m e n t are under occupation as the capital itself is under military occupation. T h e a b o v e mentioned facts can b e s u m m e d up by saying that no power or strength remains in the Egyptian administration. But the administration o f E g y p t as determined by the Imperial Fermans

r e v o l v e s around the person o c c u p y i n g the

post of K h e d i v e . W h e n one inquires into the reasons f o r this state o f The control of the police was a particularly sensitive issue and had already caused the fall of Prime Minister Nubar Pasha in June 1888; see P. Mansfield, The British in Egypt (New York, 1971). p. 89. Mansfield traces how each successive Prime Minister after the British occupation fell as a result of increasing British control. ^Like Nubar, Riaz too fell foul of the British because he was not sufficiently docile. It was precisely over this issue of European supervision of the law courts that Riaz Pasha was to resign in May 1891; see Mansfield op. cit.. p. 90.

40

WOULD

POWKR

POLITICS

affairs which is not in keeping with the real duties of the local government, one receives the summary answer that the administration is being reformed. This situation does not represent an effort to reform the confused and unclear workings of the Egyptian Government, but amounts simply to the establishment of British rule and British government in Egypt. Although the British are proclaiming abroad through the press and other means that they will leave as soon as the local government is strong enough to maintain law and order, their actual practice here is nothing other than the establishment of British rule, and not the enlivening of local government. One does not look for even a superficial consistency between words and deeds. Even if the British were to lift their military occupation today, their moral occupation (ishgal-i manevi) of this country's institutions will perhaps prove even more efficient than military occupation. Military occupation violates the ruling rights (Hukuk-u Hukamrani) of His Imperial Majesty The Sultan as intervention in administration and government is an attack on the Imperial Fermans. In sum, as this business becomes more drawn out it will become hopeless and the authority of local government will go on declining. It looks as though British influence will easily become established and will doubtless increase in the eyes of the local population, the majority of whom are not of praiseworthy character' (asabiyet-i memdaha eshabindan olmayan). My humble

assessment

The convention which was drafted in Istanbul with the British Commissioner Drummond Wolff and which later failed to receive Caliphal approval gave the British the right to go back in (into Egypt) whenever they chose to by using any disorder or similar reason as a pretext. I trust that this danger has been averted in the tenth article of the recent Suez Canal Convention which confirms and protects the authority of the Sullan. But it can be discerned from the present state of affairs that as long as the British do not obtain a right which comes close to the right of re entry, they are not leaving Egypt. Therefore, although it would be natural to hold back on such a right at the beginning of negotiations, I am of the humble opinion that it might be affordable in the second or third instance to include a proviso such as the one in the draft convention that I enclose. As seen here (Britain is) put down solely as an ally of the State should it become necessary to defend Egypt. It seems that the Pasha's attitude to the native Egyptians was not without Ottoman prejudice. Interestingly this attitude r e s e m b l e d to s o m e extent the British view of the "natives": "Examination will bang out a somewhat unpleasant feature of the Egyptian character. For o n e of the main reasons why an Egyptian if he is in a position of authority is courteous is that he thinks it is in his interest to be so... he will not infrequently be harsh and tyrannical lo his inferiors." - Cromer, op. cit., p. 578.

THE

BRITISH

OCCUPATION

OF

EGYPT

41

Because the maintenance of a continuous association with the Sublime Porte is in k e e p i n g with British interests, it would seem that to struggle against their law breaking action in Egypt ( m u a m e l - i hukuk shikenane) by every possible opportunity must lead to a change in their behaviour. In order to avoid delay in the m a j o r enterprise the British are reckoned to be about to launch in Africa, in order to avoid struggling with F r a n c e at every step because of E g y p t and in consequence bowing to Germany, in order to set up a barrier against Italy which has now freed its hands f r o m Ethiopia and is turning its attention towards the Sudan, in order to gain the maximum freedom of action, and above all to avoid the forcing of the Sublime State into alliance with another Power, the British, albeit after some formalistic reticence, will be prepared to c o m e to an a g r e e m e n t . Such is my humble opinion. If after all this they still prove reticent and insist that they will not negotiate putting forward as a reason the disorder and weakness of the local government, they will have confessed that law and order have been disrupted in Egypt. This will mean that their seven or eight years of effort in the country have been fruitless and will sufficiently prove that they do not know how to carry out reforms in the East and that their power does not match their ambition. This uncertain and dark state of affairs on the other hand is beyond anything any sovereign power can accept for one of its territories. Thus for the Sublime Sultanate to claim at this juncture that reforms will f r o m now on be completed jointly and that the S u b l i m e State will militarily occupy Egypt would not be without advantage. In this and in all things the Ferman belongs to my Imperial Master.

Your humble servant, Ahmed Mukhtar 1

'Ba§bakanlik Ai^ivi, Yildiz Esas Evraki, Kisim 39 / Evrak 2168 / Zarf 129 / Karton 120. Fi-21 Cemaziyelahir 1307 ve fi- 30 Kanun-u Sani 1305 (15 February 1890).

LES OTTOMANS ET LE PARTAGE DE L'AFRIQUE 1880-1900

L'histoire du partage de l'Afrique a été étudiée en grande partie du point de vue d'abord des pays et des systèmes impérialistes, et ensuite du point de vue des pays et des peuples colonisés. Mais dans le domaine de l'étude de la présence ottomane en Afrique il y a une lacune presque complète. C'est sans doute parce que les Ottomans, aux yeux des Européens, n'appartenaient ni à un groupe ni à l'autre ; ils n'étaient pas un peuple colonisé au sens vrai du terme, mais d'autre part ils n'étaient pas les meneurs d'une machine impérialiste à l'échelle européenne. A u x yeux de leurs ex-sujets la période ottomane demeurait marquée comme une période de déclin et de dégénérescence. Pour les Turcs mêmes, avec quelques exceptions notables comme Abdurrahman Çayci, et Cengiz Orhonlu, l'Afrique ottomane ne reçut qu'une attention dérisoire et les chercheurs concentrent leurs efforts sur les Balkans, l'Anatolie, ou la péninsule arabe. La place dont nous disposons ne nous permet pas de présenter in extenso

la politique de l'État ottoman à l'égard du partage de l'Afrique. Ce

travail consiste donc en un essai qui tentera de décrire les grands axes de la pensée ottomane en ce domaine. Premièrement : Les hommes d'États ottomans étaient conscients du fait que les forces militaires à leur disposition étaient très limitées. Cela imposait une attitude très 'loyaliste' dans la conduite des relations avec les Grandes Puissances. Deuxièmement : Les arguments avancés par les Ottomans reposaient toujours sur deux principes de base; les droits émanant du 'passé' (ou les anciens titres), et le concept de 'précédent'. Dans tout contact avec les Grandes Puissance les hommes d'Étal ottomans s'efforçaient de prévenir l'établissement de précédents qui pouvaient fournir à leurs adversaires l'occasion de s'ingérer dans les affaires intérieurs de l'État. Inversement, ils cherchaient toujours des précédents qui leur offriraient l'occasion d'avancer l'argument de 'droits historiques' ou de 'titres anciens'. Tout cela exigeait une adresse considérable dans le domaine du Droit International. A ce sujet les conseillers juridiques de la Sublime Porte se montraient extrêmement habiles, et la Porte soulignait à chaque occasion qu'elle était membre du Concert Européen.

44

WORI

D

P O W E R

P O L I T I C S

Cet article se propose de présenter quelques cas qui résument l'application de la politique ottomane, d'après des documents récemment ouvert aux chercheurs dans les archives ottomanes d'Istanbul. La question sera traité en trois parties; la Tripolitaine, l'Afrique Centrale, et les côtes ouest de la Mer Rouge (ou autrement dit, l'Afrika-i Osmanî.

LA TR1POL1TA1NE O I T O M A N E E l ' LES RELATIONS T U R C O - E R A N Ç A i S E S

Après l'occupation par la France de l'Algérie en 1830, et surtout après son invasion de la Tunisie en 1881, suivi par l'occupation de l'Égypte par l'Angleterre en 1882, les Ottomans ont sérieusement repris en main leur politique concernant cette province lointaine. Leurs efforts visaient au rétablissement du pouvoir ottoman dans ce dernier territoire du Maghreb. Afin de reformer l'administration dans ce pays jusqu'alors négligé, l'État a entrepris des investissements considérables, malgré ses faibles ressources financières et humaines. En concurrence avec la France, qui cherchait à détourner les routes de commerce trans-sahariennes vers la Tunisie et l'Algérie, Tripoli cherchait à rétablir ses relations avec les trois centres de commerce sahariens : Marzuq, Ghudamis et Bornu. 1 D é j à , en 1875, le pouvoir ottoman se trouvait rétabli à Ghat, où répondant à l'appel des négociants du lieu, ce carrefour stratégique des caravanes se trouvait établi comme kaza ottoman. En plus, en 1877 le gouvernement interdisait tout voyage par les Européens au delà de Tripoli, sauf pour ceux qui étaient officiellement porteurs de laisser-passers ottomans. Parmi les trois centres du commerce transsaharien, Marzuq se trouvait en déclin mais Ghudamis prospérait grâce à son rôle d'intermédiaire indispensable sur les routes vers le Tchad, surtout pour le pèlerinage africain vers la Mecque. Mais entre ces trois lieux Bornu était de loin le plus important pour Istanbul. Les liens entre Bornu et l'empire ottoman étaient très ténus depuis qu'au seizième siècle, les Ottomans avaient encadré les troupes du Sultan de Bornu. 2 C o m m e les deux autres centres, Bornu était un lieu important pour le commerce d'esclaves, qui fut interdit par l'État ottoman en 1847. Les liens entre Bornu et Istanbul, quoique symboliques, étaient d'une longévité surprenante ; en 1890 les voyageurs dans la région rapportaient que le pavillon ottoman battait toujours sur les remparts du palais du Sultan de Bornu. 3 En effet en 1886 le Sultan de Bornu venait d'affirmer ses liens avec Tripoli dans une lettre remise au Pa§a de cette ville et adr essée au Sultan Abdülhamid 11.

'Michel L. Gall, Pashas Bedouins and Notables: Ottomans Administration in Tripoli and Benghazi 1881-1902 Princeton University, Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation 1986, pp. 117-124. 2 Cengiz Orhonlu, "Osmanli-Bornu Miinasebetine aid Belgeler", Istanbul Üniveraitesi Tarih Dergisi No. 23 (mars 1969), pp 111-130. 3 Le Gall, op. cit., p. 169.

LE

PARTAGE

DE

L'AFRIQUE

45

En s o m m e , les relations entre l'État ottoman et les centres commerciaux du Sahara dépendaient du passage libre des marchandises du bassin tchadien vers les ports de Tripoli et de Benghazi. C'est précisément sur ce plan que s'établit la concurrence franco-ottomane dans le Sahara. Quand le colonialisme français commença sa pénétration dans cette région il profita de l'expérience ottomane. C'était d'abord par simple détournement du commerce que la France comptait établir son influence. Ce ne fut que vers les années 1880 que des projets plus ambitieux seraient mis en chantier. Mais ni les Français ni les Ottomans n'ont pu imposer leurs volontés dans cette région gouvernée en fait par ses propres lois. En 1881 la mission du Colonel Flatters échouait spectaculairement, et les grands projets de liaison de l'Algérie française aux territoires français d'Afrique Centrale par le chemin de fer furent abandonnés. En février 1881, le Colonel Flatters et ses tirailleurs étaient massacrés par les Touaregs dans le plateau du Hoggar. Cinq ans plus tard la garnison ottomane de Ghat partageait le même sort et les Touaregs massacraient les troupes ottomanes, le 14 octobre 1886. Vers la fin des années 1880 les relations turco-françaises dans le Sahara étaient dans l'impasse et Istanbul avait fini par accepter que l'établissement définitif du pouvoir ottoman dans le désert n'était pas conforme aux réalités locales. En France la mauvaise publicité occasionnée par la catastrophe du Colonel Flatters avait ajourné sine die tout projet global concernant le Sahara. L'impasse turco-française ne sera rompue qu'après la délimitation des sphères d'influence respectives de l'Angleterre et de la France après la crise de Fashoda en 1898. 1

L'ÉMERGENCE DU DANGER ITALIEN DANS LA TRIPOLTTAINE

Dans la littérature contemporaine sur les prétentions italiennes dans la Tripolitaine on n'admet l'existence de desseins sérieux de la part de l'Italie qu'après le début du 20e siècle. Mais des documents inédits jusqu'à présent et récemment mis à la dispositions des chercheurs nous montrent que les soupçons ottomans vis-à-vis des Italiens datent de 1884 au moins. Un mémorandum provenant du vilayet de Tripoli et portant la date du 15 août 1884 notait que les adhérents à l'ordre religieux (tarikat) des Senoussis étaient toujours en train d'user de leurs influences en faveur de la Sublime Porte. En matière d'éducation ils exerçaient une influence civilisatrice sur les nomades, en leur conseillant d'obéir au Khalife et de ne pas s'entre-tuer. Certaines influences néfastes provenant des étrangers cherchaient à semer la ]

lbid, pp. 131-135; 159-163.

46

W O H L D

P O W E R

P O L I T I C S

discorde entre le tarikai et le pouvoir ottoman en calomniant les derviç et en les accusant d'intriguer contre les Ottomans. Le Vali soulignait que l'ordre demeurait loyal à l'État. La Sublime Porte répondait le 15 septembre 1884. Le Sultan avait décrété l'envoi de 1000 kuruç aux chefs du tarikat. La raison en était que ces chefs de tekkes avaient refusé les offres d'honneurs et des cadeaux émanant des Italiens. Le Ministre de l'Intérieur affirmait que leur attitude était d'autant plus louable que le cadeau porté jusqu'au Jaghbub, le centre du tarikat en plein désert, consistai! en un service à thé en porcelaine comprenant un grand nombre de pièces et valant plus de mille livres turques !' Le danger italien continua à préoccuper les hommes d'État ottomans. Un compte-rendu du Conseil des Ministres daté du 28 avril 1885 constatait que d'après les informations reçues du chargé d'affaires ottoman à Rome, les derniers préparatifs militaires italiens pourraient concerner une mobilisation pour l'invasion de la Tripolitaine. L'avis des ministres était que les actes de ce genre étaient en contravention directe avec les accords internationaux et le droit international. L'État ottoman devrait avertir les autres puissances. Mais les simples protestations ne valaient pas grand chose et pouvait même provoquer un fait accompli de la part de l'Italie. D o n c , le gouvernement devrait entreprendre les mesures sérieuses pour la défense de la Tripolitaine contre une agression italienne éventuelle. Sinon on risquait le fait accompli qui pourrait déchaîner "l'effet domino" en encourageant d'autres puissances à s'emparer des possessions ottomanes en Afrique. 2

LIN E X P L O R A T E U R O T T O M A N EN A F R I Q U E C E N T R A L E

Avec l'intensification de la concurrence des puissances pour les terres africaines dans la dernière décennie du siècle, les Ottomans entreprirent une politique de propagande pan-islamiste en Afrique. Mais cette propagande devait se garder de tout éclat afin de ne pas provoquer de représailles de la pari, des Grandes Puissances. A la mi-avril 1894, un aide de camp du Sultan Abdiilhamid II, Ibrahim Dervi§ Pa§a, attirait l'attention du Sultan sur les activités de certains 'ingénieurs' anglais qui faisaient des travaux cartographiques en A f r i q u e Centrale. Derviç Pa§a conseillait au Sultan d'envoyer des agents secrets ottomans aux mêmes territoires, et lui recommandait un certain Muhammad Ba§ala, négociant à T r i p o l i , c o m m e la p e r s o n n e la plus q u a l i f i é e p o u r entreprendre cette tâche. Ba§ala, très probablement un ancien marchand 'Baçbakanlik Arçivi (BA) Yildi/ Arçivi, Resmi Maruzat (Y.A. Res.) 25/14. Vilayet de Benghazi au ministre des Affaires intérieures, 2 Agustos 1300 (13 août 1884), Irade du 23 Zilkade 1301 (15 septembre 1884). *Y.A Res. 29/39 Compte-rendu nu Conseil des Ministres 12 §aban 1302, (28 mai 1885).

LE

PARTAGE

DE

L'AFRIQUE

47

d'esclaves, se trouvait à Istanbul et offrait ses services. Comme preuve de sa familiarité avec l'Afrique Centrale, Ba§ala avait rédigé un rapport détaillé d'un voyage qu'il avait entrepris entre 1878 et 1882 comme explorateur et propagandiste de l'État.1 Ba§ala commençait son récit en déclarant que les pays où il avait voyagé contenaient des millions de musulmans, qui vénéraient le Khalife ottoman et pouvaient donc être rassemblés sous son drapeau (le rapport abondait en déclarations optimistes visant sans doute à faire plaisir au Sultan). La première escale de Baçala était l'oasis de Kavvar, où il aurait eu de longs entretiens avec les notables de ce pays, tous les adhérents du tarikat Senoussi, et leur aurait expliqué longuement et sincèrement la générosité et la bienveillance de son Auguste Maître le Khalife... Ba§ala décrit aussi en détail le commerce du sel entre le Kawar et le Soudan. De là il traverse le désert jusqu'au grand carrefour du Sahara, Bornu. Ba§ala précise que Bornu était l'endroit le plus important qu'il avait visité pendant ses voyages : Parce que Bornu était l'endroit le plus important que j'ai visité pendant mes pérégrinations, j'ai remis le cadeau le plus important que j e portais à son souverain... Le Saint Étendard du Califat (Sancak-i §erij)... Celui-ci prit ce cadeau avec le plus profond respect et ordonna qu'on le hisse sur sa résidence tous les jours saints, et tous les vendredis... 2 Rappelons ici que les voyageurs européens avaient rapportés que le pavillon ottoman flottait toujours sur Bornu en 1890. 3 Pendant les quatre années que Ba§ala aurait vécu à Bornu, il serait entré en correspondance avec les souverains de Sokoto et de Kano (en Nigeria actuellement) en leur décrivant, 'la largesse et le pouvoir du Sultan'. Dans le cours de son voyage de retour Ba§ala croise une tribu de Touaregs du Hoggar : Je les ai trouvé très dévoués à notre Maître et ils m'ont fièrement racontés qu'ils tenaient toujours un ferman Impérial de la part du Sultan Selim. Us m'ont raconté d'une manière très bizarre que quelques temps auparavant ils avaient croisés des voyageurs français envoyés par leur gouvernement, mais qui ne portaient pas de ferman de passage du Califat, Donc, ils les ont tous tués et ont saisi leurs biens et leurs animaux... 4

J B A , Yildiz Esas Evrak (Y.E.E) 39/2128/129/118, Aide de Camp du Sultan au Secrétariat fmpéria/, 7 Çevval 1311 (14 avril 1894). 2 lbid. 3 L e Gall, op. cit. 4 BA,Y.E.E 39/2128/129/118.

W O l< L D P O W E R

48

POL1TICS

Les Touaregs auraient demandé à Ba§ala de porter 'la bonne nouvelle' au Sultan. Étant donné que Ba§ala a fait cette rencontre en 1882, et qu'il s'agissait des Touaregs du Hoggar et d'une mission française officielle, il est possible qu'il soit tombé sur les mêmes Touaregs qui avaient massacré la mission du Colonel Flatters en février 1881.' Quoique peint en couleurs plutôt vives, le rapport de Baçala demeure un document intéressant car il nous montre que l'État ottoman faisait un effort de garder le contact avec les musulmans de l'Afrique Centrale pendant la période la plus virulente de l'impérial isme. Bien que Ba§ala ait très probablement exagéré pour faire plaisir il donne des informations sur des territoires très peu connus même par les explorateurs européens à cette date.

LES OTTOMANS ET LA CONFÉRENCE DE BERLIN SUR L'AFRIQUE (15 NOVEMBRE 1884-26 FÉVRiER 1885) Il est assez courant de voir, dans la littérature sur des questions africaines des déclarations proclamant que l'élite ottomane ne s'intéressaient pas aux affaires africaines. Ces affirmations sont dénuées de tout f o n d e m e n t , et sont les produits d'un état d'esprit qui s'arroge le droit d'adopter sans critique le discours euro-centriste de "l'homme malade". L'allégation souvent faite selon laquelle les Ottomans se désintéressaient de la délimitation des bassins du Niger et du Congo est également erronée. Le délégué du Sultan à la Conférence de Berlin, Mehmed Said Pa§a, fait figure de parti actif et bien informé dans les délibérations. Quand les invitations à la C o n f é r e n c e furent e n v o y é e s , l'Empire ne figurait pas parmi les états invités. Les Ottomans qui virent que m ê m e des puissances de deuxième rang c o m m e les États-Unis et la Suède, qui n'avaient pas de possessions africaines, étaient invitées, interprétèrent cela c o m m e le comble des insultes. Le 10 novembre 1884, la Sublime Porte demanda l'avis à ses conseillers juridiques sur les questions suivantes : primo : la Sublime Porte, figure-t-elle c o m m e invitée dans toutes les c o n f é r e n c e s c o n v o q u é e s depuis la conclusion du Traité de Paris en 1856 ? secundo : Étant a d m i s c o m m e membre dans le Concert Européen, est-ce que la Sublime Porte ne dispose pas du droit d'être invitée à toutes les réunions de ces puissances ? Et lié à cette question : si l'État ottoman ne proteste pas de son exclusion auprès du gouvernement allemand est-ce que cela pourrait engendrer l'affaiblissement de ses droits acquis par le Traité de Paris ? En réponse, les conseillers juridiques ont constaté que l'État ottoman était invité à toutes les grandes conférences depuis 1856. 'Le Gall, op. cil.

Mais des conférences de plus petite envergure,

LE

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49

concernant plutôt des questions locales, s'étaient réunis sans la participation d'Istanbul. Les deux exemples avancés par les conseillers furent la conférence sur le Luxembourg réunie à Londres en 1867, et la Conférence de Madrid réunie pour régler l'affaire du Maroc en 1880. En conclusion, les conseillers étaient d'avis que la Sublime Porte devrait insister sur sa participation car il était fort probable que les actes de la Conférence de Berlin s'étendraient sur les questions touchant aux territoires ottomans en Afrique. Si l'Empire se tenait à l'écart il se trouverait en difficulté dans le futur car la conférence devrait régler des questions de principe en matière d'invasion et d'occupation. Étant donné aussi le grand nombre de pays participants, l'État ottoman pourrait se trouver isolé dans le futur. 1 Un compte-rendu du Conseil des Ministres datant du 13 novembre 1884, expliquait que la participation ottomane à la conférence était indispensable, malgré le fait que l'ordre du jour ne concernait que des territoires où l'État n'avait pas d'intérêts directs. Un délégué devrait se trouver présent dans le cas où les délégués des autres puissances excéderaient les limites de la conférence et entameraient des discussions sur les territoires faisant partie de la sphère d'intérêt de la Porte. 2 Le 2 décembre 1884 le Sultan Abdiilhamid II ordonna qu'un délégué ottoman soit présent à la Conférence de Berlin avec les instructions suivantes : 'défendre tous les droits de l'Empire dans le Continent Africain...' 3 Les rapports envoyés par Said Pa§a de Berlin nous montre un diplomate professionnel, suivant attentivement le déroulement de la conférence, et n'hésitant pas à intervenir quand les intérêts de la Sublime Porte semblaient être en cause. Les 4 et 9 décembre Said Pa§a envoya deux télégrammes contenant des informations sur la délimitation du bassin du Congo. Le délégué du Sultan rapporta même les moindres détails sur les tracés minutieux des frontières 'théoriques' de cette région que les Européens divisaient sans même l'avoir vue. Said Pa§a rapporta aussi les discussions d'un éventuel chemin de fer dans le Congo. 4 Le délégué d'Istanbul précisait également que la question sur laquelle tous les délégués étaient d'accord était l'adoption du principe du commerce libre dans le bassin du Congo et les territoires jusqu'à l'Océan Indien. Si l'État ottoman s'opposait à cette tendance générale il se trouverait isolé. Le 13 décembre Said Pa§a faisait un nouveau rapport sur l'insistance des puissances

W . A Res, 26/9 Aide-mémoire des conseillers juridiques de la Porte. 28 Te§rin-i Evvel 1884 (10 novembre 1884). 2

Y . A Res, 26/14 Compte rendu du Conseil des Ministres, 23 Muharrem 1302, (13 novembre 1884). Y . A Res, 26/7 Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à la Sublime Porte, 12 Sefer 1302 (2 décembre 1884). 3

^Ibid. Aide mémoire des Affaires Étrangères à la Sublime Porte, 14 Sefer 1302 (4 décembre 1884); télégramme de Said Paça au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 1 Kanun-u Evvel 1884 (9 décembre 1884).

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P O L IT I C S

sur la question du libre commerce. Il soulignait qu'une résistance inutile sur ce point pourrait obliger Istanbul à céder sur d'autres points plus importants c o m m e l'exclusion des sources du Nil du bassin congolais. L'ambassadeur affirmait que de s'obstiner sur ce principe ne servirait à rien, et que en tout cas les régions affectées contenaient une faible population musulmane. La perspective islamique d'ailleurs, fut un des critères les plus importants du point de vue ottoman. Quand le délégué italien proposa de formuler un protocole général mettant toutes les missions chrétiennes sous la protection de la Conférence, Said Pa§a s'y opposa vigoureusement. Dans ses efforts sur l'affaire des missionnaires il fut soutenu par le Prince Bismarck, qui fit savoir qu'il opposerait également à la proposition italienne, et que l'affaire ne reviendrait pas à l'ordre du jour. 1 Ce soutien du participant le plus influent fut interprété à Istanbul comme un vrai 'coup diplomatique'. Mais les membres du Conseil n'étaient pas du même avis que Said Pa§a sur la question du libre commerce. Un compte-rendu, après avoir évalué les télégrammes de Said Pa§a, concluait que la Sublime Porte devrait garder sa réserve sur ce point. 2 En somme, la Porte estimait qu'elle avait affirmé sa présence en Afrique par sa participation à la conférence.

LES OTTOMANS Kll,A 1XX TRINE DE L'HINTERLAND Un des problèmes principaux débattus par la Conférence de Berlin fut le Principe de l'Hinterland

Développé par Bismarck afin de prévenir les

affrontements entre les puissances, d'après ce principe tout pays s'établissant dans quelque région africaine que ce soit, devait en informer les autres puissances. En 1888 ce principe fut élargi par l'Institut de Droit International de Lausanne, et devint le principe de base de l'occupation de l'Afrique. 3 En 1890 la Sublime Porte adoptait le Principe de l'Hinterland ( H i n t e r l a n d Kaidesi) comme fondement juridique dans son différent avec la France sur le hinterland de la Tripolitaine. Le 30 octobre 1890 le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Porte envoya une note diplomatique au Quai d'Orsay. Il soulignait que les droits de l'Empire en Afrique, 'd'après les anciens titres et le Principe de l'Hinterland', devraient s'étendre jusqu'à la plupart des territoires du Tchad et le Nigeria du Nord. 4

hbid. lbid.

2

•^Le Gali, op. cit. p. 166. 4

Ibid, p. 168.

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Le gouvernement ottoman appuyait ses arguments sur les droits souverains du Sultan dans ces régions proclamés à la Conférence de Berlin cinq ans auparavant par le délégué ottoman et sur le fait qu'aucun des plénipotentiaires n'y avaient soulevé d'objection. L'interprétation du gouvernement ottoman du Principe de l'Hinterland dans les régions contestées fut basé sur les liens commerciaux qui existaient entre les territoires ottomans du Fezzan et de Marzuq qui servaient de base à toutes les caravanes parcourant le bassin tchadien. En plus, la population des région contestées était presque entièrement musulmane. Donc, les régions de Kanem, Waday et Bornu étaient le hinterland naturel du pouvoir ottoman. 1 Évidemment, la position ottomane f u t rejetée par le gouvernement f r a n ç a i s qui répondit que les régions en question étaient des terres 'non-appropriés' et donc ouvertes à la colonisation. 2 La Doctrine de l'Hinterland continua d'occuper les esprits des hommes d'État turcs. Le C o m m i s s a i r e ottoman en É g y p t e , (Misir

Fevkalade

Komiseri)

après

l'occupation anglaise de ce pays, Gazi A h m e d Muhtar Pa§a, était un des défenseurs des droits ottomans en Afrique. Les archives d'Istanbul contiennent les nombreux rapports qu'il rédigea conseillant le Sultan de s'opposer aux Anglais qui rongeaient petit à petit les intérêts ottomans en Égypte. Un de ses rapports daté du 24 avril 1894, expliquait longuement l'extension du pouvoir européen vers les sources du Nil. Le Pa§a conseillait le gouvernement d'intervenir dans le Soudan en se servant du Principe de l'Hinterland pour empêcher le partage du Haut Nil entre le Congo Belge et l'Angleterre. L'État ottoman devait d é f e n d r e ses intérêts en A f r i q u e Centrale contre les gouvernements c o n g o l a i s , anglais et allemand. Car, si les Européens arriveraient à séparer le Soudan de l'Égypte, les Ottomans se trouverait coupés du Soudan et seraient dépendants des informations européennes concernant l'intérieur de l ' A f r i q u e . La Sublime Porte devrait f o u r n i r les cartes géographiques prouvant d'anciens titres sur le Soudan de la part de l'Egypte, qui à son tour, était toujours symboliquement tributaire de l'Empire. Le rapport de Muhtar Pa§a est d'autant plus intéressant qu'il prévoit le barrage d'Aswan. Le Paça soulignait que l'éventuelle construction d'un barrage près des sources du Nil aurait un effet singulier sur l'écologie entière de la région. Une puissance possédant ce barrage pourrait priver l'Egypte de sa seule source de vie, les alluvions du Nil. 3

'ibid, p. 169 ¡bid, p. 171.

2

J B A , Mumtaze-i Misir SA 135 enclosure 25. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasa & Sublime Porte. (24 avril 1894).

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L'EMPIRE O T T O M A N ET I,'AFFAIRE D E LA

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I C

S

SOMALIE

Après l'invasion de la Tunisie et l'occupation de l'Égypte, le partage africain se trouvait accéléré. Les côtes de l'ouest de la Mer Rouge demeuraient, dans les années 1880, un des derniers morceaux du 'gâteau africain'. Cette région, indiqué c o m m e Afrika-i Osmani' (l'Afrique Ottomane) sur les atlas turcs, devenait une arène de la confrontation diplomatique et coloniale entre le pouvoir ottoman et les puissances e u r o p é e n n e s . La région intéressait les Ottomans car elle se trouvait aux approches du Hejaz, la base symbolique de la légitimité du Sultan c o m m e Khalife du monde musulman. Les documents inédits des archives d'Istanbul nous révèlent que les ' h o m m e s du Sultan' se sont e f f o r c é s de garder intact leurs droits dans la S o m a l i e mais qu'ils oni dû c é d e r , c o m m e a i l l e u r s , d e v a n t des f o r c e s supérieures. En 1882 Istanbul proposait q u e la Somalie soit a d m i n i s t r é directement par la Sublime Porte. Dans un entretien a v e c l'ambassadeur britannique à Istanbul, Lord Dufferin, le 24 avril 1882 le ministre des Affaires étrangères trouvait ce dernier f e r m e m e n t opposé à toute proposition de ce genre. En un style typique de la diplomatie anglaise, Dufferin indiqua que ce ne serait pas l'Angleterre qui s'opposerait à une telle mesure mais d'autres puissances européennes. L'ambassadeur indiqua que l'envoi éventuel de forces militaires ottomanes 'provoquerait l'excitation' parmi les puissances. Mais, si la Somalie était temporairement rattachée à l'Égypte qui l'administrerait au nom du Sultan, Londres n'aurait pas d'objection, en plus, 'cela serait un appui pour l'effort constant de l'Angleterre de protéger les droits du Sultan dans la région...' 1 Il faut noter que cette conversation eut lieu cinq mois avant l'occupation anglaise de l'Égypte en septembre 1882. Le diplomate anglais avait clairement énoncé que l'Angleterre reconnaissait les droits souverains du Sultan sur la Somalie. Mais trois ans plus tard, la même puissance trouvera les moyens de s'emparer du m ê m e territoire en rejetant systématiquement les mêmes droits qu'il avait reconnu trois ans auparavant. Le 2 6 janvier 1885, le Conseil des Ministres ottoman notait que le port de Berbera sur la côte somalienne venait d'être envahi par l'Angleterre. Les ministres avaient notés que cela constituait une violation flagrante des droits de souveraineté que l'Angleterre avait publiquement reconnus à plusieurs reprises. Le même compte-rendu résumait aussi les transgressions des autres puissances dans la région. L'Italie qui avait e n v o y é des colonisateurs à A s s a b dans la Corne de l ' A f r i q u e , douze ans auparavant, s'était maintenant décidée à occuper le port d'Assab et ses environs.

' B A . Y. A. Res. 15/36 Ministre des Affaires étrangères à la Sublime Porte. Numéro 65. 4. Cemaziyulahir 1299 (24 avril 1882); Y. A. Res. 27129 Compte-rendu du Conseil des Ministres. 8 Rebilahir 1302 (26 janvier 1885)

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L'ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte venait de télégraphier de Rome que mille soldats avaient été embarqués sur deux navires de guerre destinés à Assab. Les Ministres notaient que l'Italie, qui avait envahi Massawa sur la Mer Rouge en 1884, cherchait maintenant à relier ses diverses têtes de ponts. Le même document remarquait qu'une 'Société Bancaire de Marseilles' (Marsilya Hey'et-i Sarrafiyesi) avait entrepris l'achat de la région de Sheikh Said dans le Golfe d'Aden. L'Ambassade ottomane à Paris venait de rapporter qu'une corvette française portant des ingénieurs avait pris la mer en vue de réaliser des études sur la viabilité du projet. Les ministres avisait que l'État ottoman devrait avertir toutes les puissances de ses anciens titres dans la région, mais aussi des mesures militaires devraient être mises sur pied pour défendre les intérêts de la Porte. 1 Dans tous ces trois cas d'agression la Sublime Porte cherchait à mettre en valeur ses 'droits émanant du passé'. Mais comme toujours, elle vit que l'argumentation juridique ne valait rien sans la force militaire pour la mettre en pratique. Le 25 octobre 1884 deux aide-mémoires échangés entre le ministre des Affaires étrangères Asim Pa§a et le Grand Vezir Said Pa§a reflètent les mêmes préoccupations juridiques. Asim Pa§a notait que le ministre des Affaires étrangères britannique, Lord Granville, avait fait savoir à l'ambassadeur ottoman à Londres, Musurus Pa§a, que le gouvernement britannique ne reconnaissait pas les droits ottomans en Somalie, car l'État ottoman avait refusé d'approuver le traité de 1877 entre l'Égypte et l'Angleterre concernant la Somalie. Said Pa§a répondait que les vues de Lord Granville étaient absolument irréconciliables avec les droits clairs et nets du gouvernement ottoman. Si ce pays ne reconnaissait pas les droits de l'Empire dans ces territoires pourquoi avait-il demandé la sanction de la Sublime Porte au traité de 1877 ? Le Grand Vezir recommandait l'occupation de la côte de Zeyla à Massawa par les troupes du Vilayet du Yémen et, en même temps, la recherche d'une solution de droit avec l'Angleterre. Said Pa§a ajoutait que l'affaire était d'autant plus délicate que la conférence de Berlin était en cours. 2 Au sujet de la volte-face anglaise la Sublime Porte envoya des instructions très fermes à son ambassadeur à Londres. Musurus Pa§a devait faire savoir à Granville que les droits de souveraineté ottoman ne dépendaient pas d'un traité quelconque entre l'Angleterre et l'Égypte. Ces droits étaient beaucoup plus anciens, et se basaient sur le fait qu'en Somalie le sultan ottoman était vénéré au titre de Khalife par tous les musulmans depuis des

]lbid.

9

Y, A Res. 27/9 Aide-Mémoires échangés entre Asim Pa§a et Said Pasa 5 Muharrem 1302 (25 octobre 1884).

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siècles. En plus les Anglais avaient récemment encouragé la Porte à envoyer une force militaire dans cette région, donc reconnaissant eux-mêmes ces droits. La S u b l i m e P o r t e s o u l i g n a i t q u e ses droits s o u v e r a i n s n'étaient

pas

prescriptibles, et souhaitait que l'Angleterre revienne à sa politique antérieure. 1 Le 8 janvier 1886 un télégramme provenant de l'Égypte, et rédigé par le Khédive Tevfik Pa§a, relatait l'histoire de l'occupation de Ra's H a f u n sur la côte somalienne. Le K h é d i v e répondait aux questions du g o u v e r n e m e n t ottoman sur la continuité du pouvoir égyptien en S o m a l i e . Le pavillon ottoman fut érigé à Ra's H a f u n pour la première fois en 1867 et pour la deuxième fois en 1875. Mais le Khédive avouait que l'Égypte ne disposait pas des moyens militaires ou financiers pour tenir Ra's H a f u n , et que les troupes égyptiennes avaient dû être retirées. 2

CONCLUSION

Dans la littérature courante sur l'histoire diplomatique de l'Empire ottoman au 19e siècle l'attitude la plus fréquente est la suivante: 'Une histoire de la Turquie sans les Turcs 1 . Mais les O t t o m a n s n'étaient pas de simples observateurs indifférent à leurs sort, c o m m e les dépeint l'historiographie de type orientaliste. Ils j o u a i e n t un rôle actif d a n s les j e u x politiques du Moyen-Orient et du M a g h r e b . C a r , il ne faut j a m a i s oublier que l'Empire ottoman, aussi affaibli et corrompu qu'il soit, n'a j a m a i s été colonisé au sens propre du terme. Jusqu'à la fin de l'Empire en 1918, les h o m m e s d'État turcs sont responsables de leurs actes, de leurs décisions, et de leurs erreurs, car, quoique influencés par les Puissances, en fin de compte ils sont restés maîtres chez eux. Cependant, même dans les recherches entreprises r é c e m m e n t , nous observons la même attitude assez simpliste. On avance souvent, par exemple, que le Sultan Abdülhamid 11 poursuivait deux buts contradictoires : il voulait se faire accepter c o m m e membre dans le Concert Européen, mais à la fois, il cherchait à faire le pan I s l a m i s m e . La position du Sultan n'était point contradictoire, ni même exceptionnelle. Le Tsar avec le pan-Slavisme et le Kaiser avec son pan-Germanisme faisaient exactement la même chose. La dose de romantisme n'était pas plus prononcée dans le cas ottoman que dans celui des autres puissances.

'/ibid, épreuves des instructions envoyés à Musurus Pa§a du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, (sans date). ^Ihid, Khédive Tevfik Pa§a au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 20 Rebiy-ilevvel 1302 (8 janvier 1885).

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En plus, les hommes d'État ottoman ne se faisaient point d'illusions sur les limites de leurs pouvoir. Après l'invasion de Tunis en 1881, Arifi Pa§a, ministre des Affaires étrangères, constata que l'Empire ottoman avait des droits clairs et nets en Tunisie mais, 'Les droits n'existe que si on les utilise...' (.Hak isti'mal ile payidar olur).' Dans ce canevas de la politique ottomane en Afrique nous pouvons constater que ce qui manquait aux serviteurs du Sultan n'était pas la sophistication ou bien les arguments juridiques, mais la puissance matérielle. Étant donné cette réalité il est trop facile de juger inutiles, voire puériles leurs efforts d'établir les 'anciens titres' et leurs 'droits souverains dans le Congo'. Mais vus dans leur propre contexte les arguments de la Porte nous révèlent un État complètement dépassé sur le plan matériel mais gardant toujours son habileté politique. Les Ottomans dans leur politique africaine avaient affaire à une vraie 'tâche de Sisyphe', leurs arguments juridiques étant remis en cause à chaque crise.

' B A . Y.E.E 11/1128/12619 Aide-mémoire d'Arifi Pa$a 27 Cemaziyalahir 1298. (28 mai 1881).

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SHIISM IN HAMIDIAN IRAQ: A STUDY IN OTTOMAN COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

I. INTRODUCTION

Propaganda and counter-propaganda are essentially concepts which gained currency at the time of the two world wars and as such are quintessentially modern and Western concepts. Yet, the Ottoman state during the reign of Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909) had made great use of this weapon, particularly as part of its new emphasis on unity based on the claim of the Ottoman Sultan to universal Islamic leadership as the Caliph of Islam or Commander of the Faithful (Emir-el-Muminin). With the loss of most of its remaining Balkan possessions and their Christian populations as the result of the disastrous war with Russia in 1877-78, the Empire under Abdiilhamid II retrenched ideologically on the basis of its Islamic identity. 1 This, however, brought new problems, because now, any challenge to Ottoman legitimacy arising from an Islamic context acquired new immediacy.

n. THE OTTOMAN-IRANIAN RIVALRY FOR THE LOYALTY OF ARAB SUBJECTS

The claim of the Sultan to caesaropapist domination both as temporal ruler and religious leader was founded on Sunni legitimation through the Emir-el-Muminin's claim to being the rightful successor to the last Abbasid Caliph, who had allegedly transferred his office to Sultan Selim I after the Egyptian campaign of the latter (1517). The one major Islamic state which had never recognized this claim was Shiite Iran. Both Safavid and Qajar rulers stand out as unrelenting opponents of Ottoman legitimacy. As put by Lambton: In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the outbreak of conflict between the Safawids and Ottomans the Ottoman Sultan and the Safavid Shah each referred to himself as the sovereign of Islam. The conflict between them was expressed in terms of Shii-Sunni strife. Polemic raged between the two sides. 2

'Stephen Duguid, "The Hamidian Politics of Unity", Middle Eastern Studies, Voi. IX, No. 2 (May 1973), pp. 139-155. Ann K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam (Oxford University Press, 1981) pp.212-213.

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The bone of contention were the Arab lands where the Ottomans clearly established an early ascendancy. Yet in certain Shii-Sunni frontier zones and in enclaves where Shiis or Sunnis lived as minorities, the Iranian challenge continued. Salibi writes: The Ottoman Sultanate ... claimed legitimacy as the universal Sunnite Moslem State and was recognized as such in the area wherever Sunnite Islam predominated. The Persian monarchy ... was more of a Persian national state; nevertheless, it also happened to be the principal Shiite Moslem State in the world, and hence along with Shiites and other unorthodox Moslems in the region, challenged in principle the claim of the Ottoman State to universal Moslem dominion. 1 A m a j o r f r o n t i e r z o n e between

Sunni O t t o m a n

i n f l u e n c e and

Safavi/Qajar Shiism was Iraq. Traditionally the crucible of T w e l v e r Shiism f r o m the ninth century onwards, it was f r o m Iraq that Shah Ismail Safavi invited major Shiite ulema after he made Twelver Shiism the official state religion of Iran in 1501. As indicated by Arjomand: Shah Ismail invited Shaykh Ali al-Karaki al-'Amili ... to his empire to propagate Twelver Shi'ism. al-Karaki settled in A r a b Iraq and paid intermittent visits to the court of Ismail. He continued to supervise the conversion of Iran lo Shi'ism under Tahmasp. 2 With the increasing predominance of Twelver Shiism in Iran f r o m the 16th century onwards and the securing of Ottoman control over m a j o r Shii centres of learning such as B a g h d a d , N a j a f , Kerbela and K a z i m i y e , the Ottoman-Iranian political struggle came to be couched in religious t e r m s . 3 This struggle was at times as bitter as any struggle between the Ottomans and the Christians of the dar-ul-harb,

and the bitterness is reflected in the

religious legitimation of the actions of the respective rulers. Lambton points out that some polemicists in the Sunni Ottoman c a m p in the 16th century urged that it was more meritorious to kill heretics than Franks:

' K a m a l Salibi, "Middle Eastern Parallels: Syria-Iraq-Arabia in Ottoman times," Middle Studies 15 (1979), p. 72. 2

Eastern

S a i d A m i r A r j o m a n d , The Shawm of God and the Hidden Imam (University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 107. T h e O t t o m a n s c o n q u e r e d Bagdad in 1534 in the reign of Siileyman the M a g n i f i c e n t . Uzuncar§ili writes that after the conquest, Siileyman took pains to find and reactivate the shrine of A b u - H a n i f a (the founder of ¡he official O t t o m a n mezheb), but also made sure to visit the shrine of the Shii Imam Musa-el Kazim, "Thus making both Sunnis and Shiis happy ...". See: Ì. H. Uzun9ar§ili, Osmanli Tarihi. Vol. II, 2nd ed. (1964), p. 352. 3

A STUDY

IN O T T O M A N

COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

59

W a r with the Franks was war with those w h o had been infidels from the beginning, whereas war with the Safawids was war with those w h o had renewed unbelief in the lands o f Islam. 1 T h e S h i i s reciprocated with e x t e n s i v e persecution o f S u n n i s . In the mid-seventeenth century there were efforts on the part o f s o m e Shii ulema

to

extend the ritual cursing o f the three rightly guided caliphs ( l a ' n ) to A b u Hanifa. S i n c e he was the founder o f the official Ottoman mezheb,

loyalty to

A b u Hanifa w a s said to be "tantamount to loyalty to the O t t o m a n S u l t a n . " 2 T h i s undercurrent o f t e n s i o n c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h o u t the e i g h t e e n t h

and

nineteenth centuries. J . C o l e and M . M o m e n have admirably demonstrated h o w anti-Sunni or anti-Ottoman feeling was particularly strong in southern Iraq, and how it articulated itself through popular power structures. A c c o r d i n g to these authors, K e r b e l a , nominally an Ottoman sancak, was not really under effective Ottoman control in the early nineteenth century: Although it lay well within Iraq's borders, Karbala had the air o f a frontier t o w n . T h e population showed hostility to the Sunni government in B a g h d a d , which could seldom station its Sunni troops there without endless trouble . . . 3 Although Istanbul's power was greater from mid-century onwards as a result o f the T a n z i m a t reforms and increased centralization, the area a l w a y s remained a potential trouble spot.

III. DIFFERENCES IN SlINNI AND SHII VIEWS OF KINGSHIP AND CALIPHATE T h e m a j o r doctrinal cleavages between Sunni and Shii state theory are far too c o m p l e x to be discussed here. B u t for the purposes o f understanding the basis o f the legitimating ideology that informed Ottoman counter-propaganda it is useful to mention some o f the salient differences, particularly as these are often mentioned in the documents which will be referred to b e l o w . A t the very heart o f the understanding o f the position o f the supreme head o f S t a t e , the Caliph/Sultan o r the S h a h , lies the union o f political and religious authority in the former, and the divorce o f religious and temporal rule in the latter. A s put b y Arjomand:

^Lambron, op. cit., p. 213. ^Arjomand, op. cit., p. 166. 3 Juan

R. Cole and Moojan Momen, "Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq: The Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843," Past and Present, No. 112 (August 1986), p. 120.

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It was not unusual for Sunni rulers to claim legitimacy by styling themselves caliphs and imams. This was so because in Sunnism unlike Shi'ism, the de-facto depoliticization of the conception of imamate never occurred. 1 The result of this was that the position of the Sunni and Shii ulema in relation to the state also differed radically: In marked contrast to the Ottoman Empire, where the hierocracy was firmly incorporated into the caesaropapist state while religious domination over the masses rested largely with the Sufi shaykhs and dervishes, the Shi'ite hierocracy of Iran had somewhat tenuous and informal ties with a weak central government while it firmly dominated the masses by its exclusive religious authority. 2 Thus the Ottoman ulema,

even when in opposition to central

authority, generally remained a "loyal opposition" whereas Shii

miictehids

could and did pose a serious threat to central power. This was a fact which was often noted by Abdiilhamiu II's officials.

IV. THE HAMDIAN OFFICIALS AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SHIISM IN IRAQ Throughout the late 1890's and early 1900's we find repeated references in the Ottoman archival documentation to the spread of Shiism in Iraq. The emphasis on the importance of the danger posed by this development indicated that just as Abdiilhamid II was attempting to revitalize the credibility of his claim to supreme religious leadership in his dominions, he perceived a threat to the very basis of his rule. His officials clearly reflected this anxiety. In a report by the former §ehbender

(Consul) of Hoy and Selmas, Ali

Riza Bey, an extensive history of the rise of Shiism and its use by the Safavids served as an introduction to the proposed measures to counter the threat. T h e Consul stated that Shiism had become a barrier between the Caliphate and the Muslims of the Far East, thus causing them to fall into Christian hands. The Safavids and Qajars were said to have grafted pre-Islamic Persian practices onto Shiism and to have forcibly converted the Iranian people:

]

Ibid, p. 179. [bid„ p. 219.

2

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While the Sublime Sultanate worked to devastate and throw back the angry flood of Christianity, and always tried to attach the Muslims of India and China to the Supreme Caliphate, Shiism intervened like a vast uncrossable sea. This caused the Muslims of Khiva and Buhara to fall into Russian hands as it caused the Kashgar Muslims to come under the Chinese, and the Indian Muslims under the English yoke. Thus millions of Muslims are enslaved by the infidels. The memory of this treachery will endure as long as human kind ...' T h e root of the problem in Iraq was the ignorance of the local population of nomads and bedouins (urban-'i a$air ve bedeviye), w h o easily fell under the influence of Iranian ulema. The latter came to the sacred shrines of Najaf, Kerbela, Kazimiye, and Baghdad in such great numbers that Sunni ulema remained in the minority. Ali Riza Bey then proceeded to underline the prestige of the mullahs and their financial and institutional independence of the state: The easiest thing in Iran is to become rich by joining the ranks of the mullahs ... Once a poor man has joined the learned profession and performed the pilgrimage to the holy shrines on foot, there receiving a diploma (icazet), in a few years he will be the owner of villages and farms. 2 Where preventive measures were concerned, the writer stressed that because forty percent of Iraq was of the Shii persuasion it was impossible to use force as this would incur the odium of the world Islamic community. The one panacea therefore was education. The state should send specially trained teachers and ulema to Iraq and instil the virtues of Sunni Islam in primary schools. These instructors should be paid in full and should be graduates of the highest schools in Istanbul, as locals were not to be trusted. Instruction in the greatness of Islam and the great deeds of the three rightly guided Caliphs would eventually cause an erosion of the differences between Sunnism and Shiism. Thus, quietly and without drawing attention, "His Imperial Majesty will accomplish more by education than his illustrious ancestor Selim I did by the sword ..."•* Though full of historical inaccuracies and at times naive in the extreme, this report did define the difficulties facing the Ottoman administration in Iraq, as well as take note of Iran as the only competitor for universal Islamic leadership.

'Ba§bakanlik Ar§ivi, Yildiz Esas Evraki: Kisim 14/Evrak 212/Zarf 126/Karton 7 (hereaftei referred to as BBA. Y.E.E.), "A report by Major Ali Riza Bey. Officer attached to the Imperial General Staff and former Consul to Hoy and Selmas" (no date). (Hoy and Selmas were north Iranian towns.) 2

lbid. lbid.

3

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In another report (layiha) prepared by a former Shaikh-ul-Islam, Hiiseyin Hiisnii Efendi. the emphasis was on the crucial role of the Sunni medreses in Baghdad and the appointment of competent ulema to Iraq to debate with their Shii counterparts. These men would also be trained in the art of "explaining the doctrinal fragility of Shiism to the people. " Interestingly enough, however, they were to avoid getting drawn into polemic by the Shiis and "secretly report to the authorities those among them whose activities were harmful to the interests of the state." This was, according to Hiiseyin Hiisnii, the "moral duty of the ulema." who would under no circumstances disclose their official nature but pose as simple travellers. What seems to have been proposed, therefore, was a sort of religious secret service. The "moral duty of the ulema" also clearly indicates in this case the closely interwoven nature of state —ulema relations in this particular context. 1 By contrast, the independence of the Shii miictehid was the focal point of an unsigned and undated memorandum. This writer gave a remarkably accurate (and this time not at all naive) description of the strategic importance of the miictehid in Iranian society, stating: (Because) they seek no official appointment (mansab) and have no fear of dismissal (azl), [(they are difficult to control).] They have great influence among the people and as the common folk see them as the vice-regents of the Imam their influence is a thousand times greater than that of the Shah ... Within twenty-four hours and with their merest gesture they can cause the people to rise against the Shah ... 2 The Ottoman official was obviously well informed; in his recent work, Arjomand cites a French iraveller as saying that a powerful miictehid could "gather the people behind him like another Orpheus ..." 3 The anonymous author then went into great detail about how the Ottoman state should "turn" the influence exercised by these men, and how this should be possible as most of them were Arabs and Ottoman subjects. The other measures he proposed were the granting of munificent largesse to the holy shrines of Kerbela and Najaf, "as had been done in the time of Sultan Abdiilmecid. " 4 The Ottoman-Qajar struggle for credibility in the eyes of the Iraqi population was very evident in a report compiled by the Ottoman Ambassador to Tehran, Ali Galip Bey. dated 15 August 1894. The Ambassador proposed

' b . B A . , Y.E.E., 14/454/126/9 (no date): "Views on the preservation of Sunnism and forbidding of Shiism in Baghdad. By former Shaikh-ul-Islam Hiiseyin Hiisnii." 2 B . B . A . , Y.E.E., 14/88-1 l b / 8 8 / 1 ( n o date). •'Arjomand, op. cil., p. 186; Arjomand is citing from Rafael Du Mans, ed. Schefer (Paris, 1890). 4 B . B . A „ Y.E.E., 14/88-116/88'l i (no date).

Estai de la Perse en Ifi60,

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the following measures: First, the controlling of the movements of various Iranian pilgrims to the holy shrines and the prevention of their circulation among the population as well as the restriction of the time they should be allowed to spend in the holy places. Second, the appointment of official ulema to counter Shii propaganda by inculcating Sunnism and obedience to the Caliph. Third, the expulsion of Shii miictehids and students, ahunds, w h o spread seditious ideas. Fourth, the inculcation of the idea that it was owing to the Ottoman Caliph that Shii men of learning could come to the holy shrines of Najaf, Kerbela and Kazimiye and that Shii Ottoman subjects could flourish and prosper. Fifth, the making redundant of the Iranian middlemen w h o supposedly expedited the business of Shii merchants in Ottoman dominions by speeding up the bureaucratic process, thus undermining the credibility of Iranian propaganda which claimed that the Shah was the sole protector of Shii interests. 1 It is interesting that none of the documents dealing with measures to stop the spread of Shiism among the Iraqi population make any reference to military action. Together with the realisation that the necessary military muscle did not exist, the issue was seen clearly as one which was beyond simple police repression. This attitude is very evident in an extensive report prepared by a member of a well known Iraqi ulema family, Alusizade Ahmet §akir, and dated 26 August 1907. Ahmet §akir stressed that the Shii ahunds w h o circulated among the tribal population were financed by rich Iranians and the British, both of whom had an interest in the extension of their influence in Iraq, so the issue was "much more political than religious." Alusizade also called for the institution of mobile medreses consisting of trustworthy Sunni ulema who would travel with the Sunni nomads and preach the Sunni word, reporting to the authorities any untoward events that came to their attention. These mobile medreses should be reinforced with mobile primary and secondary schools, thus ensuring that the local population "would have the full benefit of the official belief at an early age." As to the settled population, the emphasis was again on the medreses. Specially selected Sunni pupils should be sent to the major medreses in Iraq; Imam-i A z a m , Seyyid Sultan Ali, Shaikh Sandal, and Munevvere-i Hatun should each receive twenty such pupils, "while the special importance of Necef-i E§ref and Kerbela-i Mualla made it necessary to send them each twenty five students." The upgrading of Sunni learning would increase the prestige of Sunnism in general among the population, "thus dealing a terrible blow to Shiism." Alusizade also stressed that the ban on Sunni-Shii marriage should be strictly enforced, and the Shii passion plays should be banned as they "heightened the excitement of the population." 2

1 2

B.BA.,Y.E.E., 14/1623/126/10.11 Safer 1312-15 August 1894. B.B.A„ Y.E.E., 14/257/126/8,13 August 1323/26 August 1907.

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Religious uniformity was thus seen as a means by which normative standards of behaviour could be imposed on the population. A particularly striking example of this line of thought is the document giving the views of Siileyman Hiisnii Pa§a, a distinguished exile in Baghdad. Siileyman Pa§a proposed that the state sponsor the writing of a "Book of Beliefs" (Kitab'-ul-Akaid) devoted specifically to the rebuttal of the "heretical sects" (firak-i dalle) of Islam. The ideas in this tract would then be used "to correct the beliefs of heretics" through a "missionary society" consisting of highly trained ulema who, after two to three years training, would be awarded the title dai-ul-hak-misyoner. This was especially necessary as those adhering to the approved Sunni Hanefi branch were in a minority even among the Sunnis of Iraq, and the population as a whole consisted of twenty mezhebs speaking one or more of four languages (Kurdish, Turkish, Arabic, and Armenian). Twelver Shiism was particularly rampant and the most influential miictehid was the miictehid of Samarra, Mirza Hasan, the chief miictehid of the Usuli, who according to the writer, "has more influence and power than the Shah of Iran ...." Siileyman Pa§a then went into great detail on Mirza Hasan's role in the abolition of the tobacco monopoly in Iran and likened his position to that of the Pope as a supra governmental authority: As these men see all governments as usurpers, the restriction of their influence is an inevitable necessity for the Sublime State. They are a barrier to progress and very dangerous... 1 Siileyman Papa's cure for the state's problems as regards religious unorthodoxy was, as with other writers, "proper" education. If primary and secondary schooling could be brought back into the Sunni Hanefi fold all would be saved: The spread of education will instil the love of religion {din), country (vatan), and nationality (milliyet), as well as strengthening the salutary allegiance of the people to our Master the Caliph of all Muslims. While the persistence of ignorance will only increase and intensify disunity and disintegration. 2 In the passage abo\e, one clearly hears a meshing of classical Islamic and novel ideas of loyalty. loyalty to the "country" and loyalty to the "Caliph" being mentioned in one breath. It is also worth noting that in an age when missionary activity was just another facet of political power, an Ottoman official clearly appreciated this potential. This was all the more remarkable as Islam does not proselytise, and Siileyman Pa§a's vision of a "missionary society" was clearly a borrowed concept.

1

2

B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/1188/126/9. 9 Ramazan 1309/8 April 1892.

Ibid.

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While Suleyman Pa§a was concerned with the ideological implications of the spread of S h i i s m . the d e f t e r d a r of B a g h d a d , M e h m e d Rifat Menemenlizade, was anxious to stress the administrative difficulties. His appraisal of how the spread of Shiism affected the Ottoman administrative apparatus in Iraq amounted to a description of how the Sublime State was having the rug pulled out from under its feet. Menemenlizade stated that the Iranian-inspired ahunds and mtictehids were very active among the ranks of the Ottoman Sixth Army and the police force, "among whom they spread the idea that it was condemnable by God to draw arms against the Shiis .... " Many members of these units had converted to Shiism, which made them unreliable. In fact, the behaviour of the converted Shii police force was "more like [that of) a gang of brigands" as they harassed and robbed the Sunni population; "the nomads fear the security forces more than they fear the brigands." Meanwhile the mtictehids and ahunds "work to further the darkest ignorance of the population in order to rob and milk them as is their custom, because (they know) that for the population to be enlightened means that they will obey no other than their rightful ruler ^ A s a result of all the Iranian money being poured into Najaf, Kerbela, Kazimiye and Samarra, these "had become virtually Iranian towns." As to preventive measures, Menemenlizade also placed the onus on education, particularly primary schooling. These had increasingly fallen into the hands of Shiis. This situation was to be amended by the appointment of teachers from Istanbul. Similarly, Sunni students in prestigious medreses like Kerbela should have their scholarships increased. Many Sunni mosques were without prayer leaders {imam) and Qur'an readers (va'iz) because of lack of funds. The necessary funding for these institutions was to come f r o m the tax levied on Shii burials at the holy places. This "funerary tax" (defniye rtisumu) should be left for local use to improve the condition of Sunni centres of learning. Also, a Sunni preacher should be attached to each battalion of the Sixth Army in order to work toward the return of Ottoman effectives to Sunnism. 2 The lack of concrete power to enforce policy is evident throughout the Ottoman documentation. The minutes of the Ottoman Cabinet meeting dated 1 June 1891 openly stated that it was impossible to use force to prevent the nomads f r o m drifting over to Iranian territory and that they should be encouraged to remain in Ottoman lands by just treatment. 3

' s . B A . trade Meclis-i Mahsus, No. 5537; Gurre-i Recep 1309/31 January 1892, Mehmed Rifal Menemenlizade to Palace Secretariat. 2

Ibid.

3

B . B A Irade Meclis-i Mahsus, 5441,22 §evval 1308/1 June 1891.

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Those ulema thai did get sent out to Iraq were afflicted with the classic complaint of the Hamidian official: non-payment of salaries. A m e m o r a n d u m by a f o r m e r Shaikh-ul-lslam, M e h m e d Cemaleddin E f e n d i , dated 3 A u g u s t 1905, gave a summary of the p e r f o r m a n c e of specially a p p o i n t e d Sunni teachers. Five such teachers had been sent out in 1905 f r o m Istanbul with monthly salaries of 2,000 kuru$. They had failed in their mission because they were not given the necessary support by local officials and had failed to receive their salaries regularly. T h e new teachers to be sent out should receive at least 5,000 kuru§ salary each, should speak fluent Arabic and be familiar with the customs and habits of the local population. Most importantly, they should be of a very high standard of learning as they would be expected to inspect schools and medreses

while s u b m i t t i n g their t e a c h e r s to e x a m i n a t i o n .

M e h m e d Cemaleddin implied throughout his m e m o that those previously sent had been thoroughly lacking on this score.' M o n e y , or lack of it, was the major obstacle to the proposed reforms in Iraq as elsewhere. T h e Ottoman centre was reluctant to relinquish its hold on the tax on Shii funerals, as this was f a r m e d out to tax f a r m e r s (miiltezim) and yielded revenue. The figure given in the Cabinet minutes of 1 June 1891 was 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 kuru§ yearly, after the cost of collection had been d e d u c t e d . 2 A telegram received directly at the Yildiz Palace on 10 N o v e m b e r 1891 spoke of a Seyyid M a h m u d f r o m N a j a f , w h o was o f f e r i n g to bid 1000 liras m o r e than the present rate for the right to collect this tax.-' On the other hand there seemed to be no shortage of money at the Shii end. T h e report of the Ottoman C o m m i s s i o n f o r the reform of Iraq dated 23 January 1907 stated that money sent f r o m Shiis in foreign lands to the holy shrines a n d religious institutions had m a d e t h e m rich while the Sunni equivalents languished in various states of disrepair. Pious donations f r o m foreign Shii sources were being spent lavishly on the local poor and on Shii students, of whom there were five to six thousand who were thus able to study in great material comfort. In contrast, the Sunni medreses

were full of evaders

of military service w h o had no interest in learning, and those w h o did have, n u m b e r e d no more than ivvo to three h u n d r e d . T h u s T w e l v e r Shiism had "spread to the point where one can talk of invasion." 4

' b . B A . Bab-i Ali Evrak O d a s i . 7 2 6 8 1 , 1 Cemaziyelahir 1323/3 August 1905; Bab-i Fetva, No. 56. 2

B . B . A . trade Meclis-i Mahsus. 5 4 4 1 , 2 2 §evval 1308/1 June 1891.

3

B . B . A . Irade Dahiliye, 98190. (< Rebiyulahir 1309/10 N o v e m b e r 1891; Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat, No. 1624. 4

B . B . A . Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi. 272681; Report of the Ottoman Commission for the reform of Iraq, 10 Kanun-1 Sam 1323/23 January 1907.

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The lack of financial support for Sunni students and institutions was also the central theme of a memorandum prepared by former Shaikh-ul-Islam Mehmed Cemaleddin, dated 4 February 1908. The writer stated that the reason for the dilapidation of Sunni medreses and primary schools was that the vakif revenues which were supposed to support them had been expropriated. Stipends paid to Sunni students were insufficient and forced them to seek work in order to pay for food, thus detracting time from study. 1

V. EXAMPLES OF PROPAGANDA AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

Apart from the examples above, which give the views of Ottoman officials, it is possible to infer from the documentation concrete events which give an idea of the Ottoman- Iranian tug-of war for credibility (or maybe even just visibility) in the eyes of the local population. An imperial irade dated 3 December 1891 noted that the leader of the Caf tribe, an Osman Bey, had been awarded a ceremonial sword by the Iranians. The vilayet of Mosul was asked for its views on this issue, and it replied that although the person in question was known as untrustworthy, there was no harm in his being allowed to accept the gift. 2 That such a small event should have been passed on directly to the Palace suggests that any encroachment by Iran, real or imagined, on the sympathies of the Ottoman population was being watched very closely. There were also instances where Sunnis from Iran took refuge in Ottoman dominions. An irade dated 2 October 1891 noted that two representatives of a Sunni village in Iran had secretly crossed over to Ottoman territory and had presented themselves to the mutasarrif of Hakkari. They complained that the Iranian government was interfering with their religious beliefs and requested to be allowed to settle in the vilayets of Bitlis or Diyarbekir. It is interesting that the governor of Van, who forwarded the request, recommended that they be accepted as they were sedentary farmers and Sunnis (presumably as opposed to nomadic Shiis, which would have made them less desirable). 3

hbid. Memorandum from former Shaikh-ul-Islam, Mehmed Cemaleddin Efendi lo grand-vizier, 23 Muharrem 1326/4 February 1908; Bab-i Fetva, Daire-i Me§ihat Mektubi Kalemi, aded 142. B.B.A. Irade Dahiliye, 98330, 29 Rebiyulahir 1309/3 December 1891; Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat, No. 2429. 3 B . B . A . Irade Dahiliye, 97596, 26 Safer 1309/2 October 1891; Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat, No. 460. 2

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The Ottomans were also careful to maintain the shrines of the leading Shii I m a m s . An trade daied 8 February 1890 noted that the shrine of Imam Hiiseyin in Kerbela was in need of repair as "the present state (of disrepair) is not in keeping with the glory and prestige of the Caliph ..."' Ottoman sensitivih regarding the defence of their claim to protect the holy centres of Shiism is observable in an event which was registered at the S u b l i m e Porte on 10 March 1907. T h e death of the Shah of Iran w a s a n n o u n c e d f r o m the minarets of the m o s q u e at the S h r i n e of

Imam

Musa-el-Kazim at Kazimiye by the Shii religious officials of the Ottoman State. T h e Ministry of the Interior took a very serious view of this and asked that they be severely punished. The Sultan, however, no doubt wisely ordered that "the matter be closed with a scolding." 2 T h e shrine of Musa-el-Kázim seems to have gotten more than its share of attention. It was reported in an trade dated 9 September 1893 that Yahya Nusret Pa§a, Imperial A D C and Chief Inspector of the Sixth A r m y , had forbidden the recital of ceremonial prayers to the Sultan at the Shrine of Musa-el-Kazim. T h e keeper of the keys of the Shrine (kiliddar) had reported the event to the Governor of Baghdad, recording his profound dismay, "as an Ottoman son of an Ottoman" ("Osmanli oglu Osmanli bulundugumuz if in ..."). T h e Governor of Baghdad, Hasan Refik Pa§a, protested Nusret Pa§a's behaviour, saying that this performance had "even offended the Iranians." The Governor also wrote to the kiliddar, pacifying and complimenting him while instructing him to continue the ceremonial prayers five times a day as was customary. The Imperial trade determined that Yahya Nusret Pa§a would be rebuked for his behaviour. A very clear example of the conception of education as propaganda is illustrated by the Sultan's move to bring Shii children to Istanbul. Although it is well known that Abdiilhamid aimed to assimilate the A r a b elite through education in his f a m o u s mekteb-i

afiret

or "tribal school", the a t t e m p t

mentioned below involves children of modest background. Thus, a letter f r o m the Governor of Baghdad dated 30 October 1891, stated that in keeping with the Sultan's instructions, ten Shii children were being sent to Istanbul f r o m

' b B.A. irade Meclis-i M a h s u s . 1 6 8 7 , 2 6 Cemaziyelahir 1307/8 February 1890. Examples of the granting of moneys for the repair of this or that Shii shrine occur frequently in t h e Ottoman documents. 2 B . B . A . Bab-i Ali Evrak O d a s i , 2 2 5 7 1 5 , 2 4 M u h a r r e m 1325/10 March 1907. Ministry of Interior, N o . 4886. See also Cole and M o m e n , "Mafia, M o b and Shiism in Iraq", p. 121: T h e authors point out that o n e of the reasons w h y Shii religious scholars f o u g h t against the establishment of Ottoman control in Karbala was their objection to the Ottoman Sultan's n a m e being mentioned in the Friday prayer. 3 B . B A . irade Hususi, 162, 26 Safer 1311/9 September 1893. This remains a puzzling episode; at the time of writing I had been unable as yet to determine why Nusret Pa§a acted as he did.

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Baghdad and Kerbela. Yet the Governor had seen fit to include two Sunni children, "to set the minds of the Shiis at rest and show that these children were going to Istanbul to study as the result of the Sultan's generosity..." As the families who volunteered were poor, six of the children had to have clothes made at the state's expense and the Sultan paid for their transport and the fees of their travel chaperones. The Sultan's view of the matter was: Since so much money has been spent [on these children] it is important that the necessary benefits be derived from their education. The training of those among them who are Shii should ensure that they abandon this sect and become Hanefi, in order to enable them to convert their countrymen to the Hanefi sect upon their return ... 1

VI. S O M E C O N C L U D I N G C O M M E N T S

Just as Ottoman officials were proposing the curtailing of Shii passion plays (tazieh) in Iraq, we read in a surprising source that they were being performed in the very heart of the Ottoman capital itself. What was in fact a guide book for the 19th-century traveller describes the ceremony in the typically lurid terms of the orientalist: On the 10th Muharrem the Persians at Constantinople commemorate the martyrdom of Hussein, the son of Ali. The ceremony takes place in the court of the Valideh Khan and commences soon after sunset. In the lurid glare of numberless torches pass by the mourners beating their breasts or chanting Persian dirges; the white robed martyrs; the white horse of Hussein with its blood spattered saddle, to which is attached a white dove, emblematic of the martyr's pure soul; and the fanatics who after the manner of the priests of Baal, shout and cut themselves until the blood runs down and stains their white shirts a crimson hue. It is a strange weird spectacle, not to be witnessed by those who have weak nerves, or dread heat and a crush ... A special enclosure is reserved for the Persian Ambassador who represents the Shah. 2 There was also a considerable Iranian community in Istanbul, consisting mostly of merchants whose newspaper the Ahtar was published in that city until its suspension by the Ottoman Government in 1895. 3

! B £ A . Irade Dahiliye, 98525,28 Cemaziyelevvel 1309/31 December 1891. The irade includes the list of names of the children. The two Sunnis are marked with a sm which appears above their names. See also BBA Irade Dahiliye 98993,19 Cemaziyelahir 1309/21 January 1891: The Sultan gave 200 liras out of his own purse to pay for their bedding when they got to Istanbul. He further allocated 5000 kuru$ monthly for their food, servants, and private tutors. ^Murray's Hand Book, Constantinople, Brusa and the Troad (John Murray, London, 1893), Section 1, p. 13. J

Hitoshi Suzuki, "Iranians in Istanbul and the Tobacco Protest," Journal of Asian and African Studies (1986), pp. 143-175.

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Thus it is difficult to talk in terms of Ottoman success in curtailing the activities of Shiis. But the whole issue of how the danger was perceived and how reaction to it was conceived does highlight certain aspects of late Ottoman state/society relations. As Professor Feroz Ahmad has rightly pointed out: The key to an understanding of the Ottoman state in the nineteenth century seems to be its lack of a social base and its determination to create one. 1 The conception of this 'social base" varied from time to time. The Tanzimat conception of "Osmanhlik" or the attempt to create Ottoman citizens, Christian as well as Muslim, differed markedly from the Hamidian conception of "Osmanhlik", which put the emphasis on Sunni Islam. The one continuous characteristic of Ottoman statecraft which ran straight through the Tanzimat, the Hamidian era, and the Young Turk period, however, was the emphasis on social engineering. This was what set 19th-century Ottoman statecraft off from what had gone before: Thus state intervention was no longer designed to merely regulate society as in the past, its purpose was now broadly speaking social engineering. 2 In the previous conception of state/society relations, what had been expected from the reaya was obedience. Now what seemed to be expected was an active subscribing to a normative standard of values. This normative standard was increasingh an amalgam of old notions of loyalty to the Caliph and new migrant notions of loyalty to the country (vatan) and/or nationality (milliyet), all of which were given as cures to the state's ills by Siileyman Pa§a. Also in the reference by an Ottoman religious functionary (a Shii at that) to himself as "an Ottoman son of an Ottoman," the ostensible recognition and acceptance of state legitimation was in evidence. 3 The vehicle for the propounding of the state's legitimating ideology and thus the chief tool for use in its social engineering was education. The striking recurrence in nearly all the documents mentioned above of the need to impose uniform religious values through primary and other education is the best illustration of this. It is also significant that nearly all the documents mentioned above also propose extensive economic reforms in Iraq to alleviate suffering and poverty, but in all of the documents found by this author, economic reform always takes second place after education. Nowhere is there any hint of repression through physical force. 'Feroz Ahmad, "The State and intervention in Turkey," Turcica XVI (1984), p. 56. 2

lbid„ p. 52.

3

S e e above, even if the functionary in question was trying to please his statement (even if insincere) illustrates that he knew what would be pleasing to the Ottoman authorities.

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What must be made clear, however, is that the educational process referred to above was really propaganda and counterpropaganda. The ulema sent out to Iraq were expected to educate the population about the ills of Shiism, and they were expected to report seditious Shii elements, which was seen as their "moral duty". The normative ideology as expressed in the "Book of Beliefs" was a far cry from the traditional Ottoman toleration of religious diversity. The "social base" that Feroz Ahmad mentions was expected to be created through education. After all, the Sultan himself openly declared as much over the issue of the Shii children who were to be "educated" in Istanbul. In the final instance, Ottoman attempts at social engineering were a failure. However they prepared the ground for the republican Turkish nation-building process, which succeeded. Indeed, the geopolitical reality of the Middle East today derives largely from its historical heritage of past concepts and conflicts. The Iran-Iraq war can be seen as a modern conflagration stemming from late 19th-century tensions which simmered beneath the surface. One cannot escape the feeling of déjà-vu as one reads the reports of Ottoman officials who seem to be conjuring up Imam Khomeini when they speak of the mtictehids who can mobilise the Iranian populace "with their merest gesture." The same feeling is experienced when we read in a modern Turkish newspaper that the Turkish Ministry of Education is taking great pains to select and train "reliable" teachers to be sent to educate Turkish children living in western Europe. These teachers receive instructions to report all "subversive elements" to their superiors, in haunting similarity to their ancestors in Iraq. 1 Even more strikingly, approximately three weeks after the completion of the first draft of this article, the bloody confrontation in the Kaaba occurred on 10 August 1987, pitting Sunni against Shii. The historical continuity of the Sunni-Shii conflict in Turkey emerged recently in a telling episode when the Vice President of the ruling Motherland Party (ANAP), Eyiip A§ik, revealed that he was a Nak§ibendi and declared: "The best guarantee against Khomeinism in Turkey are the tarikats. The tarikats are traditionally against Shiism." The same official also stated: "Our struggle against Khomeinism should be on the religious plane." 2

^Milliyet, 27 September 1987. Milliyet, 12 January 1988, Cumhuriyet, 12 January 1988. The tarikats are officially banned in Turkey. 2

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND RUSSIAN MUSLIMS: BROTHERS OR RIVALS?

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were periods of Russian expansion into the Muslim regions of the Crimea, the Caucasus and Central Asia. This expansion gathered momentum as the Crimea was definitively severed from the Ottoman sphere of influence in 1783, and the Caucasus finally fell after 25 years of bloody fighting between the Russian armies and "the legend of Daghestan", Sheikh Shamil, who surrendered in 1859.1 These conquests cleared the way for the march of Russian arms towards Khiva, Samarkand and Tashkent. The undeniable success of Russian arms in the region forced the Ottoman state to admit the superiority of its historic rival. The Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78 ended with the disastrous losses of most of Ottoman territory in the Balkans. 2 In 1885 Bulgaria declared her independence. After the Bulgarian crisis, given the policy of stabilization pursued by Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909), Turco-Russian relations entered a period of relative calm. Indeed, the two empires resembled each other. The tsars Alexander III and Nicholas II were no more lovers of democracy than was Abdulhamid II. In Russia, as in the Ottoman Empire, a small well-educated elite ruled a largely illiterate population and a dilapidated economic and political structure. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century multi-ethnic empires found themselves obliged to carry out a policy of defence against the separatist nationalist movements. In this struggle they often found themselves obliged to employ the methods of their adversaries. This Imperial rearguard action which Benedict Anderson has referred to as "official nationalism" demanded the integration and assimilation of conquered peoples by means of mass education , indoctrination and p r o p a g a n d a . 3 The policies of "Russification", "Ottomanism" or "Kaiserreicher Nationalismus" were all fired by the same need to, 'sidle towards a beckoning national identification". 4 Just as the French

' Lesley Blanch, The Sabres of Paradise, London, 1960. ^Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London, 1965, pp 161-162. ^Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins of the Spread of Nationalism, London, 1983, pp 80-103. 4 Ihid„ p. 82.

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Revolution began a process which Eugen Weber has described as turning "peasants into Frenchmen", the imperial legitimist dynasties of the late nineteenth century fought a rearguard action against nationalism hoping thus to create a proto-citizenn which could be relied upon to uphold their regimes. 1

P A N - I S L A M A S A P O L I C Y (>1 D E F E N C E

Ever since the eighteenth century Russia had proclaimed itself the protector of Christians living in the Ottoman Empire. T h e Armenian Archbishop at Echmia/.in declared himself the spiritual mentor of all Armenians living in Ottoman domains, and Moscow had long been declared to be the "Third Rome". 2 As a countermeasure, the Ottoman Sultans, through their titles of Caliph of all Muslims, declared themselves the protectors of Muslims living in the empires of Christian powers. 3 This claim had been much less emphasized in times when the Ottoman Empire had been strong, but now when the Sublime Porte was forced to fight for its life, the Caliphate's influence outside Ottoman d o m a i n s became a diplomatic bargaining lever. 4 Against the Russian Empire, with whom Abdiilhamid sought to normalize relations in the 1880s and 1890s, Pan-Islam was used as a covert policy hoping to counter policies of Russification and Pan-Slavism. In a dispatch dated 30 May 1886, the Ottoman Ambassador to St Petersburg reported that the debate between the Pan-slavists and their opponents had recently become enlivened. The Tsar himself was for peace but the Pan-Slav faction was again pushing for renewed Russian expansion. The Ambassador had seen the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and had told him, "His Imperial Majesty seeks lo efface the unhappy memories which his subjects still retain regarding the late war. He wants to consolidate the friendship between the Russian and Ottoman empires who are natural allies (muttefik-i tabi'Y . 5 This theme of natural allies" would be frequently evoked by the governments of Abdiilhamid. An elaborate diplomatic charade was played out yearly when the Russian royal family came to their summer palace in Livadya, in the Crimea. The Ottomans would always send an envoy, "to wish them welcome",as the Ottoman Empire still claimed that the Crimea was under ' E u g e n W e b e r , Peasants inti. Frenchmen. The Modernisation of Rural France 1870-1914, Stanford, 1976. ^Bernard Lewis, "The Middle Last in the nineteenth century", Middle Eastern Studies, ref. on Third R o m e . See also: Richard Wortmann, "Moscow and St Petersburg: the problem of political center in Csarist Russia, 1 8 8 M ' > 1 4 " . in Sean Wilentz (ed.) Kites of Power, Philadelphia, 1985, pp.244-275. % . Arnold, The Caliphate, London, 1965, pp. 129-133. ^This title was by no means uncontested. T h e legend of Selim I's investiture as Caliph by the last Abbasid Caliph in 1516, which formed the basis of the claim, is a matter of continuing debate. See, Arnold, The Caliphate, pp 130-158. 5

Baçbakanlik Arçivi (hereafter BBA) Yildiz Hususi Maruzat (Y A RES) 191/147 Sublime Porte N o 96. Ottoman Ambassador at St Petersburg to Sublime Porte.

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Ottoman sovereignty. 1 Nor was this simply an empty gesture. The meeting between the Ottoman envoy and the Tsar furnished the occasion for an exchange of views on vital topics. One such memorable occasion was when the Ottoman envoy, Turhan Pa§a, was to approach Nicholas II and his Foreign Minister Count Lamsdorf with the proposition that the Russian government abstain from settling Armenian refugees from Ottoman domains immediately on the Russo-Ottoman border, but that it should, 'settle them in Siberia where Your Imperial Majesty has vast empty lands". The Tsar countered by making a similar demand regarding the Kurds, who were raiding into Russian territory and taking refuge in Ottoman domains. 2 The Ottoman policy regarding the Turkic peoples in Russia was directed towards two aims. On the one hand the Ottoman consulates and secret agents in the area tried to maintain the cultural and religious ties of the people with the Ottoman Caliphate, and help them maintain their identity in the face of Russification. On the other hand, as Russian weight inevitably increased in the area, Istanbul was forced to accept that these people were becoming Russian subjects, just as the Muslims of India were British and the Muslims of Algeria were French, and as such they came to be treated as "foreigners".

T H E O T T O M A N E M P I R E A N D T H E POLICY O F RUSSIFICATION

Ottoman consulates closely followed the policy of Russification. On 18 March 1887, the Ottoman consul at Tiflis, Hasan Hasib Efendi, sent a report to the embassy in St Petersburg to the effect that: "The Russian Government is pursuing the policy of Russification with all its vigour. The aim of this policy is to win their souls". 3 Hasan Hasib Efendi further reported that a Huseyin Efendi Gayabov, the "Mufti of the Caucasus", had been collaborating with the Russians, and had been decorated with the Order of St Vladimir for his efforts. The Russian authorities were seducing the Muslim notables in the area "by giving them worthless decorations" and pressuring them to send their children to Russian schools, "where they become just like Russians except for their names". The rest of the children had been abandoned to a few community schools which were of poor quality and were, in any event, frequently closed down. The ulamas of the region were mostly collaborators like the Mufti mentioned in

Mlber Ortayli, imparatorlujjun en Uzun Yiizyili, Istanbul, 1983, p. 128. BBA Yildiz Esas Evraki 14/1359/126/10. 27 Tejrin-i Evvel 1316/10 November 1900. The mind boggles at what the current implications of these resettlements might have been. The "Armenian Yakutsk Republic"? 2

3

BBA Yildiz Hususi Maruzat (Y.A HUS) 203/20. Ottoman Embassy at St Petersburg to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Forwarding the dispatch of Ottoman Consul at Tiflis.

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the report. Orthodox missionaries were actively seeking to convert the M u s l i m population. T h e Consul proposed measures such as financial support f o r the T u r k i s h n e w s p a p e r in T i f l i s , the Ke$kul,

w h i c h could then be b r o u g h t to

publish articles favourable to the Ottomans. 1 Another report f r o m the O t t o m a n Embassy in St Petersburg dated 15 April 1887 gave details on the n e w b u i l d i n g r e g u l a t i o n s f o r m o s q u e s in M u s l i m regions. 2 Apparently Huseyin Efendi G a y a b o v w a s collaborating to the extent of actually helping the Russians e n f o r c e their policies regarding the m o s q u e s . T h e Russian regulations declared that "Muslims are f r e e to practice their religion on the condition that they do not harm the Orthodox faith". Only c o m m u n i t i e s with a m i n i m u m of three hundred souls could build their o w n mosques and these were to be maintained by their own m e a n s . M u s l i m s w h o lived w h e r e t h e r e w a s an O r t h o d o x c h u r c h had to ask the local priest's p e r m i s s i o n and he w o u l d direct t h e m as to w h e r e they could build. T h e O t t o m a n E m b a s s y had no illusions as to the a i m s of all this: "The Russian G o v e r n m e n t is doing everything in its p o w e r to assimilate the peoples under its power" , 3 T h e irony of this situation rested in the f a c t that the g o o d M u f t i G a y a b o v was basing his exhortations to obey the Russian authorities on the sura in the Quran which enjoins obedience of temporal authority even if that a u t h o r i t y is d e s p o t i c .

This w a s exactly t h e basis f o r O t t o m a n o - T u r k i s h

legitimation in the A r a b provinces. Immigration of M u s l i m s f r o m Russian lands to the O t t o m a n territories w e n t on surreptitiously and s o m e t i m e s with the c o n s e n t of t h e R u s s i a n a u t h o r i t i e s . O n 7 F e b r u a r y 1899, the O t t o m a n C o m m i s s i o n f o r R e f u g e e s reported that a group of K a z a k h s f r o m the K u b a n r e g i o n , n u m b e r i n g s o m e twenty t h o u s a n d , had received the Tsar's permission to immigrate to O t t o m a n soil. T h e

Russian

authorities

were doing their utmost

so t h a t

"the

immigration [of these p e o p l e | can be carried out in the m o s t orderly m a n n e r p o s s i b l e " , and had p r o v i d e d an a r m e d escort "given the large n u m b e r of immigrants".4 T h e dispatches of the O t t o m a n E m b a s s y at St P e t e r s b u r g s o m e t i m e s took on an extremely worried tone. On 28 D e c e m b e r 1890 it reported that the Russian Government was censoring certain suras of the Quran. This m e a s u r e ]

Ibid.

2 3

B B A Y A HUS 203/29 Embassy at St Petersburg to Foreign Ministry, N o 1628.

Ibid. It must be pointed out here that the Ottoman policy towards Christian communities in Ottoman domains was no different. 4 B B A Yildiz Mutenevvi M a r u z a t (Y.Mtv) 42/14: 25 Kanun-u Sani 1305/7 February 1899. Ottoman Commission for Refugees. Yildiz Palace. Chief of Commission Riza Pa$a.

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was provoking violent reactions among the Muslims in the Russian Empire. The Emir of Bukhara and the Khan of Khiva had petitioned the Tsar asking that he punish the censor responsible. 1 The latest developments in the policy of Russification were followed attentively in Istanbul. On 3 February 1894, the Embassy again had alarming news: the Russian authorities had started obligatory Russian language instruction at the madrasas of Khiva and Bukhara. 2 Russian policy towards the education of Muslims in their own languages became more moderate after the opening of the Duma in 1905. Under the direction of Tatar intellectuals several "new style" schools for the education of Muslim children were instituted at this time. The famous Tatar intellectuals Abdurre§id Ibrahim (Ibragimov) and Ismail Gaspirali (Gasprinski) were prominent in this movement. In the gubernia of Kazan, 1,088 schools started teaching in 1912,90% of these were tarzi cedid? Indeed, it seems that Turkic intellectuals like Yusuf Ak§ura (Akijurin), and Ahmed Agaoglu (Agayev), went on to benefit greatly from the Russian education system. Agaoglu and Ak§urin were among a disproportionately large number of Russian Turkic intellectuals who figured prominently in the Young Turk and Kemalist periods. 4 Recent research on the relationship between the Russian educated Turkic intelligentsia and the various Ottoman and Republican regimes has drawn attention to the fact that this relationship was not without tensions. 5 Having developed a liberal and oppositional stance, the "Russian Turks" were often at variance with the Ottomanist world view of Istanbul which was just as autocratic as that of St Petersburg. Prominent figures like Ismail Gaspirali, Yusuf A k f u r a , and Huseynzade Ali were imbued with a nationalism of a Turkic flavour strongly seasoned with French liberalism gleaned in Paris. 6 They were far from a monolithic group, some being more inclined to compromise with Ottoman autocracy, where others like Huseynzade Ali returned home to Russian Azerbaijan because they found the Hamidian regime suffocating. 7

] B B A Y A HUS 243/61 15 Kanun-u Sani 1306/28 December 1890 Sublime Porte Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No 520. 2

BBA Y .A HUS 290/83 Sublime Porte Ministry of Foreign Affairs No 57. Ay§e Azade Rorlich, The Volga Tatars. A Profile in National Resilience, Stanford, 1986, p. 93. ^François Georgeon, Aux Origines du Nationalisme Turc. Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), Recherches Sur les Grandes Civilisations. Synthèse No 2, Paris, 1980; also by the same author, "Ahmed Agaoglu, Un Intellectuel Turc Admirateur des Lumières et de la Revolution" REMMM. 52/53 1989 2/3 pp 187-197. 5 Bu§ra Erçanli-Behar, ¡ktidar ve Tarih. Türkiye'de 'Resmi Tarih' Tezinin Olufumu (1929-1937), (Power and History. The Development of 'Official History' in Turkey), Istanbul, 1992, pp 68-69. 6 /bid„ p. 70. 7 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 3

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Another such figure who was at variance with the Hamidian regime was the Siberian Tatar, Abdurresid Ibrahim. After the dissolution of the Duma in 1905, and his exile from Istanbul, Abdurresid Ibrahim travelled to Japan in 1908.' A remarkable man, he had contacts with statesmen of stature such as Count Matsuura and Prince Ito Hirobumi. 2 During his meetings with Ito Hirobumi Abdurrcsid stressed that the Tatars under the Russian yoke were a "great and numerous people" inhabiting a vast area. Abdurre§id also complained to the Japanese that the Russian censorate was making it difficult to publish the Quran. 3 Another salient issue at this time was the export of printing characters from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkic regions of Russia. In principle the Hamidian regime had made the export of these illegal. 4 On 16 August 1906 the Ministry for Internal Affairs was ordered to reconsider the export ban on printing characters. A representative of the cedid schools, a Muhammed Zahir §amil had recently presented himself in Istanbul with a demand to buy a large quantity of characters for use in Turkish language education. 5 §amil was pointing out that the books currently in use were being printed in the Ottoman Empire but they were not to meet the demand. He also made it clear that he was a man of some influence in Russia, as he was the specialist in Turkish language publications for the Lazarevski Institute, the School of Oriental Languages in Moscow. This created a lively debate in the Ottoman Council of Ministers with the Minister of Interior, Ha§im Pa§a, arguing that the ban could easily be circumvented anyway, as Turkish printing characters were readily available in Bulgaria and Egypt, and if anyone wanted to print material injurious to the Ottoman state all they had to do was buy them from these sources. 6

' A b d u r r e ç i d Ibrahim, Alem-i ¡•ilam veya Japonya'da inti^ar-i Islamiyet (The Islamic World or the Spread of Islam in Japan), Istanbul, 1911. This is a very interesting travelogue consisting of Abdurrejid's travels in China, India and Japan. 2

O n Count Matsuura and Ito Hirobumi see, Carol G l u c k , Japan's Modern Myths, Princeton, 1985, pp. 63, 8 1 , 104, 2 2 9 . 239. See also: François G e o r g e o n . " L ' E m p i r e O t t o m a n vu d'Extrême-Orient au début du XXème Siècle d'après le M o n d e de l'Islam d'Abdurreçid Ibrahim". Mélanges Offerts à Louis Bazin, Varia Turcica, Paris, 1992, pp. 299-303. 3 Abdurre§id Ibrahim, Alem-i Islam, p. 265. It must be remembered that just after the Japanese victory in the R u s s o - J a p a n e s e W a r J a p a n e s e prestige w a s e x t r e m e l y high a m o n g world Muslims, w h o hoped that they might be converted to Islam. 4 B B A Irade Hususi 95. 25 Rcbiyulahir 1315/24 S e p t e m b e r 1897. Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat N o 4 7 4 0 . 5 B B A Y A RES 138/27. 24 Cemaziyelahir 1324/16 August 1906. Ministry of Interior enclosing petition of Muhammed Zahir §amil.

Ibid.

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Another matter of concern for the Porte was the matter of University education for Muslims from Russia. On 21 February 1906, a Mehmed Vaiz Nevruzi Efendi from Kazan petitioned the Porte that he be permitted to study at Istanbul University (Dar ul-Funun)) The matter was referred to the Palace as "the regulations concerning the admission of foreign students was not clear". The Minister made it clear that as students from the Caucacus had been admitted to the University in the past there should be no problem about Mehmed Nevruzi Efendi. All the more reason to admit him was the fact that he was a teacher in the cedid schools. Mehmed Nevruzi was finally admitted as "auditor" rather than fully fledged student. 2

R U S S I A N M U S L I M S C O N S I D E R E D AS "FOREIGNERS"

As the Ottoman Empire bowed to the inevitability of Russian control over the Crimea, the Caucasus and Central Asia it accepted that to actively intervene in the region was out of the question. The Tsarist regime, on the other hand, sought to win the hearts of the Muslims by moderating its Russification policies with the Tsar's stance as protector of the Muslims or the self-styled "White Sultan" (Ak Padi§ah). The relative success of this policy among some Muslims led the Ottoman authorities to consider all Russian Muslims as foreigners. Just as the Indian Muslims were "British", or the Algerians were "French", the Muslims in the Russian Empire came to be considered as "Russian". The best indication of this attitude was the ban on the publication of Qurans by Russian subjects in Ottoman domains, and the ban on the import of Qurans from the Russian Empire. On 21 January 1897, a Russian subject from Kazan presented a petition to publish the Quran in Istanbul. The matter was discussed at some length in the Council of State and the petition was rejected on the following grounds: "[If we allow] the Quran to be published by any Muslim from Kazan, or India, or Algeria this can have serious consequences for the Sublime State ... particularly in these troubled times when the calumnies of the foreigners multiply". It was therefore decided to establish a "Council for the Inspection of Holy Texts" (Tedkik-i Mushcif i §erif Komisyonu) which would determine the "correct" editions. 3

]

BBA Y.A RES 135/13 25 ZiJhicce 1323/21 February 1906 Sublime Porte Ministry of Education. Ibid. 3 B B A Y.A RES 98/38 16 §aban 1314/21 January 1897. Minutes of the deliberations of the Council of State (§urayi Devlet). 2

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It must be remembered that this w a s the time when rumour on the matter of the British-inspired "Arab Caliphate" was rife in the Muslim world. This would have been the reason for the references to "the calumnious views of the foreigners". T h e British were particularly concerned to discredit the Ottoman Caliphate by undermining the legitimacy of Ottoman Caliphs who did not come from Qureishite stock. 1 Another matter of extreme sensitivity was the issue of the ban on the acquisition of property and real estate in the Hejaz by non-Ottoman Muslims. The question c a m e up in January 1882 over the acquisition of such property by a subject of Y a k u b Khan of Ka§gar. 2 T h e Ottoman Sultans, particularly Abdiilhamid, were extremely jealous of their position as the "Protector of the Harams", the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The Council of State summed up the position in the following terms: "If we show i n d i f f e r e n c e to the accumulation of properh in the Harams in the hands of foreigners, these latter, when the first opportunity presents itself, will proceed to m a k e the most preposterous of c l a i m s "

3

From the text it is very clear that the Ottoman

authorities considered non-Ottoman Muslims a very dangerous Fifth Column which could be brought to bear against them by the colonial powers. Like the British, Dutch and French, the Russians also sought to pose as the protector of "their" Muslims in Ottoman domains. On 18 May 1894, a certain Haci Mirza Muhammed arrived in Istanbul accompanying a large crate bearing presents from the Emir of Bukhara destined for the H e j a z . 4 Ottoman customs demanded to inspect the crate, thus provoking a minor diplomatic crisis. The Russian Embassy took it upon itself to intervene, unabashedly claiming that such an inspection would "break the hearts of the Muslims of B u k h a r a " . In the end the matter was resolved by the D r a g o m a n of the E m b a s s y , Monsieur M a k s i m o v , w h o pledged on his honour that the crate contained only precious cloths. 5 T h e shift in attitude on the part of Ottoman authorities, who c a m e to c o n s i d e r Russian M u s l i m s as " f o r e i g n e r s " , is born out by d o c u m e n t s emanating f r o m officials in the Hejaz. T h e f a m o u s Governor of the H e j a z , O s m a n Nuri Pa§a, when c o m p l a i n i n g of the d e p l o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n of educational establishments in the Harams, blamed the "foreigners": "We see everywhere these foreigners who live off the bounty of the Sublime State and

' O n the subject of the legitimacy of a Caliph w h o was not of Qureishite stock, see A n n K. S Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, Oxford, 1981, pp. 178-200. 2 B B A Y . A RES 15/38 2 4 Safer 1299/16 J a n u a r y 1882. M e m o r a n d u m prepared by the Administrative Council of the Vilayet of Hejaz. 3

lbid.

4

17 Cemaziyelevvel 1299/7 April 1882. Minutes of the Council of State.

5

B B A Y.A HUS 295/108 10Zilkade 1 3 1 1 / 1 6 M a y 1 8 9 4 S u b l i m e Porte N o 2968. Ibid.

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do not pay taxes. These are mostly Indian, Javanese and some Turks. The madrasas here only serve those who idle away their time accumulating riches. Also as a consequence we see that much of the property (in the Hejaz] passes into foreign hands". 1

CONCLUSION

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Ottoman and Russian Empires followed broadly parallel developments. Attempting to inculcate some sort of 'spirit of imperial nationality" in a largely agrarian and illiterate population, they were drawn to the methods of mass education and indoctrination used most effectively by nation-states. But given the religious nature of traditional Ottoman and Russian imperial legitimation, they sought to combine traditional and modern motifs. Faced with the policies of Russification, the Ottoman state realized that it did not have the practical means to intervene in Russian policy. On the other hand, as the Russian presence in the Caucacus and Central Asia became permanent, the Muslims of these regions came to be considered as "foreigners". Their movements in Ottoman dominions were restricted and even immigrants to the Dar ul-lslam were settled in precise locations and closely controlled. On the other hand in matters like the acquisition of property in the Hejaz, and the publication of the Quran by non-Ottoman Muslims etc., it became apparent that Islam was no longer enough of a criterion for acceptance in Ottoman dominions. Although the basis for loyalty, was expressed in terms of religious motifs such as the Caliphate, or the protection of the Harams, or that the Quran should be accorded the proper respect in its publication, the Ottoman policy makers were informed in their decision making by secular-rational criteria.

BBA Yildiz Esas Evraki 141292112618. Memorandum by Osman Nuri Pa§a. Memoranda of Osman Nuri Pa§a compiled after his death. On Osman Nuri Pa?a's extended governorships in the Hejaz and his relationship with the Sharifs of Mecca see, Butrus Abu Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca, Asian and African Studies, Vol. 9,1973, pp. 1-21.

LEGITIMACY STRUCTURES IN THE OTTOMAN STATE: THE REIGN OF ABDULHAMID II (1876-1909)

For those w h o have, or o n c e had it, power holds a strange fascination. For that very reason it w a x e s men inventive. It is almost invariably surrounded by ideologies of legitimacy, which adduce tradition, divine grace, or the law in order to support the establishment of those at the top. T h e s e i d e o l o g i e s are, strictly speaking, instruments of mystification; yet they are permissible w e a p o n s as long as they do not prevent the other side from returning them in kind.

Ralf Dahrendorf 1 All states have recourse to ideologies to justify their existence both to other states and toward their own subjects. These ideologies are usually promulgated by a state elite that depends on them for its raison d'être. The Ottoman state was no exception to this rule. This article will attempt to show how these legitimating ideologies were reflected in policy during the rule of Abdiilhamid II, the ruler who represents the last true example of personal rule in the empire. Despite the inaccurate and loose use of terms such as "Oriental despotism" or "Eastern tyranny," the rule of this most "despotic" of sultans is by no means mysterious or unfathomable. The legitimating ideologies of the Hamidian era and of its elite were based on a set of clearly perceived policy aims, but especially on the preservation of the state. In the centuries when the Ottoman Empire had been powerful, its legitimating ideologies and propaganda had emphasized the strength and universal nature of the rule of the Ottoman Sultan. Sultan Siileyman the Magnificent, f o r example, commissioned a ceremonial helmet to match in design and ostentation a similar helmet belonging to the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V. 2 By the 19th century, however, the Ottoman ruling class found itself facing potentially fatal challenges both at home and abroad. As real power declined, symbolism and ritual acquired a new specificity. In the last quarter of the 19th century, European powers increased their emphasis on pomp to prop

Author's note: This article represents the first fruits of a broader study on historical legitimation in the Hamidian era. 1 would like to thank the Fullbright Commission and the Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, for their support in making this work possible. 'Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York, 1967), pp. 218-19. ^Giilrii Necipoglu, "Suleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context: of Ottoman-Hapsburg Rivalry", Art Bulletin, 71 (1989), pp. 409-19.

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up the increasing d e m a n d s they m a d e on their subjects. 1 T h o s e w h o s e material r e s o u r c e s l a g g e d b e h i n d , i n c l u d i n g the O t t o m a n a n d A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n e m p i r e s , f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s m o r e and m o r e on the d e f e n s i v e . A s h u m o r o u s l y expressed by John Elliot: "It is as if a f o r m of "Avis principle" operates in the world of political i m a g e r y and p r o p a g a n d a : those w h o a r e only s e c o n d try h a r d e r . " 2 It w a s this d e f e n s i v e n e s s that w a s to b e c o m e the h a l l m a r k of later p e r i o d s of O t t o m a n i d e o l o g y . In t h e T a n z i m a t era the O t t o m a n state m a d e u n p r e c e d e n t e d d e m a n d s on its s u b j e c t s as t h e p o w e r of t h e state w a s reconstituted after s o m e two centuries of disintegration, and in m a n y spheres of life it was constituted f o r the first t i m e . T h i s e n a b l e d state authority to p e r m e a t e levels of society that had h i t h e r t o been relatively a u t o n o m o u s , creating strains f o r the state in the f o r m of w h a t Jurgen H a b e r m a s has termed a " l e g i t i m a t i o n d e f i c i t . " 3 Until t h e n , the legitimation policies of t h e O t t o m a n sultans had been based on the religious j u s t i f i c a t i o n for O t t o m a n rule, which w a s in turn f o u n d e d on the c l a i m s of the h o u s e of O s m a n to the c a l i p h a t e . H o w e v e r , by the late 19th c e n t u r y , the desire of the state to a d m i n i s t e r a n d regulate with hitherto u n p r e c e d e n t e d intensity had led to a situation in w h i c h the role of state p o w e r had constantly to be redefined.

LEGITIMATION POLICIES I )IRECTED TOWARD OTTOMAN MUSLIM SUBJECTS W h e n dealing with his M u s l i m s u b j e c t s , Abdiilhamid e m p h a s i z e d his position as caliph of all M u s l i m s , a title O t t o m a n sultans had c l a i m e d since t h e c o n q u e s t of E g y p t by S e l i m I in 1 5 1 7 . A l t h o u g h in t h e b e g i n n i n g s o m e w h a t t e n u o u s , supported by an official m y t h that the last A b b a s i d caliph had b e s t o w e d his title on Selim I, the claim had by the 19th century acquired t h e historical weight that c a m e f r o m f o u r c e n t u r i e s of r u l e . 4 In the reign of Abdiilhamid II the role of caliph gained n e w i m p o r t a n c e as, a f t e r the 1877-78 R u s s o - O t t o m a n w a r , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e lost vast territories and m o s t of its n o n - M u s l i m population in t h e B a l k a n s , a l l o w i n g t h e sultan to stress t h e I s l a m i c religion as a n e w bid f o r unity against w h a t he saw as an increasingly h o s t i l e Christian world.^ He a l s o p r o m o t e d his A r a b s u b j e c t s to i m p o r t a n t positions. N o n e of the latter-day O t t o m a n sultans had e m p l o y e d A r a b s in the u p p e r m o s t ranks of the b u r e a u c r a c y . 6

' E r i c H o b s b a w m and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 1-14. J o h n Elliot, "Power and Propaganda in the Spain of Philip IV", in Riles of Rulers (Philadelphia, 1985), p. 151. ^Jürgen Habermas. Legitimation Crisis (Boston, 1973), p. 71. 2

4

0 n the debate concerning the Ottoman Caliphate, see T . W . Arnold, The Caliphate ( L o n d o n , 1965), pp. 129-58. For a more recent appraisal of this claim and its ramifications, see Cornell Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, N.J., 1986), pp. 283-86. 5 S t e p h e n Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," Middle Eastern Studies 9 (1973). pp. 139-55. 6

B u t r u s Abu Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi," Middle Studies 15 (1979), pp. 131-53.

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In the heyday of the Ottoman Empire the title of sultan-caliph had been given less emphasis. The continuous, indeed almost monotonous, acclamation of the sultan's caliphal title dates clearly to the period of decline, beginning at the end of the 18th century. Halil inalcik has pointed out that there is no mention of the transfer of the caliphate to Selim I prior to the 18th century .' Nonetheless, by the time of Abdiilhamid II, Hagia Sophia came to receive renewed emphasis as the seat of the caliphate and the scene of the alleged transfer of power from al-Mutawakkil to Selim I. 2 Ortayli has drawn attention to the "caesaro-papist" titles emphasized by the sultan to increase the prestige of a shaky state in the international arena. 3 The practical basis for the sultan's legitimating ideology was his position as defender of the holy places, the Hararn al-Haramayn, in Mecca and Medina. 4 The sultan took every opportunity to ensure that Ottoman officialdom understood the basis of its own rule. In a memorandum sent to his ministers in August 1901, the sultan reminded them of Re?id Pa§a's "four pillars of the state" (dort riikn-ii devlet). This "great statesman," he said, had always considered these to be first, Islam; second, the maintenance of the house of Osman; third, the protection of the Haram al-Haramayn; and fourth, the maintenance of Istanbul as the capital city. These should be the basic principles in all decision-making. 5 The circular then went on at length about the sorry state of Islamic schools and madrasas compared to the much greater number and superior condition of Christian churches and schools. 6 The decay of the madrasa system was seen as particularly serious by the sultan, as the propagation and maintenance of Islam depended on trained ulama, without which Islam "would be wounded in its essence." 7 The memorandum went on to order the reform of elementary school curricula, with religious instruction receiving primary emphasis. In rural areas, practical training in agricultural methods, and in towns and cities, artisanal skills, were to be taught. Contrary to popular wisdom, the sultan, despite his suspicion of the West, did not turn

' H a l i l Inalcik, "Osmanli Padi§ahi," Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi. 1 7 . 4 (1958), p. 70. Recent research, however, does point in the direction of a more self-conscious caliphate than inalcik would seem to admit; see Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual p. 284. See also Necdet Sakaoglu, "Padijahlik ve Sadrazamlik Kurumu," in Tanzimat'dan Cumhuriyete Tiirkiye Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1985), p. 1279. 2

G u l r u Necipoglu, "The Ottoman Hagia Sophia," paper delivered at the "Structure of Hagia Sophia" colloquium, 19 May 1990, Princeton University.

3

l l b e r Ortayli, Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Alman N'ufuzu (Istanbul, 1983), p. 54. T h e titles are Halije-i Muslimin, Zrllullah fi'l an., andZat-i Kudsiyet Tacidari respectively. 4

W i l l i a m O c h s e n w a l d , Religion Society and the State in Arabia: Control 1840-1908 (Columbus Ohio, 1984), p. 4 .

The Hijaz

under

Ottoman

5 B a § b a k a n l i k Ar§ivi (Prime Ministry Archives, Istanbul; hereafter B B A ) ; Yildiz Esas Evrak (Yiidiz P a l a c e C o l l e c t i o n ; h e r e a f t e r Y E E ) , 1 1 / 1 4 1 9 1 1 2 0 / 5 . T h e date is given as 1319 Cemaziyelevvel (August 1901). 6

lbid.

1

Ibid.

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his back on the Tanzimai reforms but rather attempted to mold them to his advantage. He also appreciated the accomplishments of the mastermind of the Tanzimat: "|Re§id Pa§a| had combined old administrative methods with our present civilization and given the state a new system of rule which produced many serious reforms." 1 Another reflection of the Ottoman use of religion as a unifying force is seen in a report by the vali of the Hijaz, Osman Nuri Pa§a. The pasha stated that the Bedouins, who "still live in a state of nomadism and savagery," had to be "civilized" by making them obey the laws of the shari'a and obliging them to have their disputes settled in religious courts rather than resorting to tribal j u s t i c e . This w a s to be d o n e by gradually settling the n o m a d s and by instructing them in Ottoman schools. 2 T h e official use of religion w a s , however, somewhat ambivalent. Sunni orthodoxy was stressed, but the sultan used Sufi shaykhs for propaganda purposes: since Sufism was neither orthodox nor mainstream, it was useful for acquiring grass-roots support and reinforcing legitimacy. 3 Shaykhs like Abulhuda al-Sayyadi became the sultan's official ideologues. A b u l h u d a , who belonged to the Rifa'i order, produced a steady stream of literature c o n f i r m i n g the position of Abdtilhamid as caliph and enjoining all Muslims to obey him as their God-given duty. 4 Abdulhuda's particular target was the Arabic nationalism in Syria, but Iraq presented another major challenge because Shi'ism was spreading there and the Shi'ite Iranian monarchy challenged in principle the claim of the Ottoman state to universal Muslim dominion. 5 T h e Ottoman archives yield many documents proposing measures to counter the spread of these rival ideologies, an unprecedented concern in a polity that had always been tolerant of religious diversity. Shi'ism was singled out as particularly dangerous because much of the population of B a g h d a d , Basra, and Mosul was Shi'-te. A report from the Porte's ambassador to T e h r a n , Ali Galip B e y , in response to instructions asking him to determine measures to stop the spread of Shi'ism f r o m Iran to Iraq, pointed to the key role played by the

miictehidin.

He stressed that it would be in the Ottoman interest to "turn" the influence

l

Ibid.

2

B B A ; Y E E , 141292112618,8 1 e m m u z 1301 (18 July 1895).

3

B u t r u s A b u Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda al-Sayyadi," Middle Eastern Studies 15 (1979), p. 138. ^Ibid., p. 140: A b u Manneh status that between 1880 and 1909, some 212 pamphlets and books attributed to Abulhuda circulated in the empire. ^Kamal Salibi, "Middle Eastern Parallels: Syria-Iraq-Arabia in Ottoman Times," Middle Studies, 15 (1979) p. 72.

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exercised by these men in Iran. This could be done by offering them honours and flattering them. The report gives a colourful account of how this was done in the Tehran embassy, and how the miictehid in question prayed for the long life and rule of the sultan, "after having freshened the palate of his loyalty" with "a la turca" stuffed lamb and Iranian gilav, finished off with halva. 1 Some of the nonculinary methods the ambassador proposed were, first, to restrict the mobility of Shi'is (particularly men of religion) from Iran to Mecca and Medina and to curtail their circulation, particularly in villages and among nomads where they could spread sedition among the populace. Second, he proposed gradually preventing Iranians of religious learning from coming and a ban on religious teaching by non-Ottomans, Third, he recommended the expulsion as "religious traitors" (hain-i din) of Shi'a elements f o u n d propounding "religious separatism." Finally, he urged the appointment from Istanbul of trained Sunni teachers who would instil the virtues of obedience to the caliph. 2 An order dated four years later provides for the payment of salaries to "five teachers assigned to Iraq to stop the spread of Shi'ism." 3 Another assessment of the strategic importance enjoyed by the miictehidin occurs in an undated and unsigned report, which deals at length with the influence of T w e l v e r Shi'ism. T h e writer declared that the miictehidin, who professed to be the sole interpreters of the teachings of the Twelve Imams, "have a thousand times more influence than the Shah among the population" because they functioned independently of the state, unlike most Sunni ulama. H o w e v e r , because most miictehidin were Ottoman subjects and Arabs, it would be possible for the Sublime Porte to turn them to account, as they "can make the Iranian government do anything they want by causing the people to rise up in 24 hours, and at their merest gesture." The writer of the report recommended that the Ottoman government should reconcile Shi'i and Sunni ulama because "now it is time for all Islamic peoples to perform their religious duty by uniting against the Christian powers." 4 Russia, the author of the report continued, had had to appease them because of the Shi'i population of Georgia. The Ottoman state had a far larger Shi'i population in Iraq, so the danger from these elements was even greater. "But if the miictehidin are taken in hand we will have avoided the greater danger of our Shi'i subjects inclining towards Iran." 5 >YEE, 14/162i/126/10,11 Safer 1312 (15 August 1894), Ali Galip Bey to Imperial Chamberlain Mehmet Arif Bey. 2

lbid.

3

B B A , Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi (BEO), no. 81245, 5 §evval 1315 (28 February 1898). The order was duly communicated to the Ministry of the Interior and the office of the Sheikh ul-lslam. ] owe thanks for this reference to Dr. Idris Bostan. 4 YEE, 14/88-116/88/12. S

lbid.

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Iraq was a particular problem for Ottoman legitimacy because of its multiethnic nature. A very interesting report compiled by Siileyman Hiisnii Pa§a, who had been sent into exile by the sultan and was living in Baghdad, expounded at length on the need to achieve religious uniformity. Among the twenty sects in Iraq found in the Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, and Jewish populations, mosi were opposed to the Ottoman state. The pasha pointed out further that the practices found in Europe to encourage national and linguistic uniformity were not permitted by the shari'a, and in any case the time was not yet ripe for them. 1 The pasha regarded nationality and religion as equally important for purposes of unification, but chose to emphasize religious uniformity: In order to bring the true Islamic belief to bear on the various sects it will be necessary to form a society of religious study comprising learned ulama from Istanbul, under the Shaikh-ul-lslam's protection, whose first duty would be to write a book correcting the beliefs of the heretical sects {firak-i dalle). To prepare this book it will be necessary first to undertake study of these unsound beliefs in order to refute them. 2 These "heretical sects" of Islam are then defined as Twelver Shi'ism, the Ahbari, Bektashi, Ali-ul-Allahi, Nuseyri, Zeyyidi, Ismaili, Babi, Vahabi, Abaziye, Durzi, Avdeti, and the Sufis. In addition, the writer warned against "a small group of heretics who have fallen under the influence of sceptical European philosophy and positivism" (felsefe-i cedide). A representative of the late-Ottoman world\ievv, he was already nervous about the growing influence of Western positivism and saw salvation in an "official version" of Islam. This official version of Islam, the pasha suggested, would take the form of a book called the "Book of Beliefs" (Kitab ul Akaid), and would be somewhat along the lines of national ideology tracts of a later age. It was to consist of fifteen chapters, each dealing with a sect. The pasha then made the surprising suggestion that it would be used to train "missionaries": "men of sound belief speaking the Turkish, Arabic, and Kurdish languages who, after three years training, will be given the title Dai ul-hak-misyoner and employed to correct the beliefs of deviant Islamic sects." 3 The efforts of this missionary society would be primarily directed toward Iraq and against the Shi'ite miictehidin who constituted the most serious threat to the Ottoman order.

' y E E , 14/1188/126/9,9 R a m a / a n 1309 (8 April 1892). Siileyman Hiisnii Pa§a was something of an illustrious exile. He had been insirumental in the deposition of Sultan Abdiilaziz in 1876; w r o t e a well-known tract proposing r e f o r m , the His-i inkilab; and is representative of the soldier- intellectual cadres that ran the empire. He was exiled to Baghdad by a suspicious Sultan Abdiilhamid, w h o made a policy of eliminating all the statesmen involved in the deposition affair. On Siileyman Hiisnii Pa^a. see Turk. Me$hurlan Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1943), p. 360. ^Ibid. The dictionary definition of "firak-i dalle" is given as "religious sects which have strayed from the true path"; see Ferit Develioglu, Osmanlica-Turkge Ansiklopedik Lugat ( A n k a r a , 1982), p. 196. 3

Ibid. 1

have found no indication that the book was ever written.

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The "Book of Beliefs" was to be very comprehensive: "If we create such a missionary society, the second part of the Book of Beliefs will deal with the Jewish and Christian faiths and the third with the idolatrous practices of Japan, China, Africa, Madagascar, Indo-China,and India." 1 This missionary society was to derive its legal basis by adapting the relevant regulations from the Ottoman codes dealing with European and American missionary societies. It was to be financed in part by donations from the faithful. This clearly suggests that it was being considered as a counterweight to Christian proselytizing as well as to the spread of Shi'ism. The measures proposed by the Ottoman government to halt the spread of Shi'ism stressed education as being as important as, if not more important than, police measures. A report by Alusizade Ahmed §akir, a member of the Higher Education Council, the state's highest authority on educational matters, illustrates the Ottoman tendency to use state-sponsored education to enforce uniformity. Alusizade also pointed out that the matter had a foreign dimension, as the British were using Shi'ite religious scholars to undermine the sultan's influence. 2 The writer proposed the following measures. First should be the institution of travelling madrasas staffed by specially trained Sunni ulama who would live with the nomads and report periodically to the Ottoman authorities. Second, he proposed choosing by examination the brightest Sunni pupils from among the local population and assigning them to madrasas located in major Shi'i centres like Najaf and Karbala. Third, he recommended instituting a three-year program to train these "official pupils" to refute Shi'ism, and then sending them in the summer months to dwell among the sedentary tribes and nomads where they would preach according to official instructions. Finally, he proposed examining these pupils annually using a commission composed of the highest local officials, and the granting of scholarships to those showing competence and promise: "The protection and sponsoring of religious learning in this fashion will strengthen the ties and increase the obedience of the local population to the caliphate. This will in turn put a stop to foreign intrigues and evoke the prayers and admiration of all Muslims in neighbouring states." 3 Alusizade concluded by urging that the Shi'i religious rites, particularly those performed on the 'Ashura (the 10th of Muharram), were also to be forbidden as they "spread excitement among the population." 4

llbid.

^YEE, 141257112618. Although the report itself is undated, it was prepared in accordance with imperial instructions sent on 26 August 1907.

3

lhid.

4 I b i d . In addition, Shi'ite pilgrims often had to pay a discriminatory higher rate for camel rental and "special fees as protection money" (Ochsenwald, Religion Society and the State pp. 63-64).

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Inspired by the "pan" m o v e m e n t s in E u r o p e in t h e late 19th c e n t u r y , s u c h as p a n - S l a v i s m , p a n - H e l l e n i s m , and p a n - G e r m a n i s m , t h e O t t o m a n sultans tried to d e v i s e their o w n "pan" i d e o l o g y , p a n - I s l a m i s m . T h i s study does not pretend to p r e s e n t any detailed analysis of the vexing question as to w h a t exactly p a n - l s l a m i s m w a s . W h a t will be a t t e m p t e d h e r e is m o r e an empirical s a m p l i n g of how A b d u l h a m i d II used his position as caliph as a defensive bargaining

l e v e r in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l

a r e n a , as a p o l i c y

of

destabilization against rival Christian p o w e r s w h o had M u s l i m s u b j e c t s . T h e use by O t t o m a n s u l t a n s of t h e c l a i m to be t h e p r o t e c t o r of M u s l i m s o u t s i d e O t t o m a n d o m i n i o n s g a i n e d c u r r e n c y a f t e r t h e T r e a t y of KU§Uk Kaynarca in 1774, which f o r the first time caused the a b a n d o n m e n t of a large M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n to R u s s i a n rule. 1 A l t h o u g h the O t t o m a n c l a i m to being the s u p r e m e authority in the Islamic world was by n o m e a n s universally a c k n o w l e d g e d a m o n g M u s l i m s , the status of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as the only i n d e p e n d e n t Islamic p o w e r of any c o n s e q u e n c e e n d o w e d it with u n d e n i a b l e prestige. 2 Historical conditions also w o r k e d in f a v o u r of the O t t o m a n claim as m o r e and m o r e Islamic peoples fell under the rule of Western imperialism. T h e French invasion of Algeria b e g i n n i n g in 1830, the Russian s u b j u g a t i o n of the khanates of Central A s i a in the last quarter of the 19th c e n t u r y , t h e a p p a r e n t invincibility of the British Raj a f t e r t h e Indian M u t i n y , and the i n c r e a s e d penetration of the D u t c h into I n d o n e s i a and M a l a y s i a in the 1890s meant that Islamic p e o p l e s looked to Istanbul f o r moral a n d , w h e r e p o s s i b l e , material assistance. 3 T h e e x t e n t of A b d i i l h a m i d ' s o w n i n v o l v e m e n t with p a n - I s l a m is a matter of s o m e d e b a t e , in w h i c h v i e w s r a n g e f r o m those w h o attribute n o m a j o r i m p o r t a n c e to p a n - l s l a m i s m to those w h o see it as the m a i n s p r i n g of his f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 4 It is unlikely that he actually plotted to o r g a n i z e a worldwide Islamic upheaval under his leadership. 5 H o w e v e r , it is inaccurate to say 'Bernard Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," Middle Eastern Studies I (April 1965), p. 291; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1973), pp. 317-19. 2 For a critical appraisal of the Ottoman caliphate, see Arnold, The Caliphate, pp. 139-55 This is a standard work which is now somewhat outdated. For more recent views on the subject, see Carter Findley, "The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East," Studia lslamica, 55 (1982), p. 155. Inalcik, "Osmanii Padi§ahi,' p. 71: see also liber Ortayli imparatorlugun En Uzun Yuzyili (Istanbul, 1983), p. 32; Nikki Keddie. "The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdulhamid II," Middle Eastern Studies, 3 (October 1966), p. 48. 4 F o r the most extreme vieu that pan-lslamism was a figment of the Western powers' imagination, see Orhan Kologlu. Ahdiilhamit Gerfegi (Ankara, 1987). For the opposite extreme, which argues that he actively promulgated pan-lslamism in the Muslim world, see Necip Fazil Kisakiirek, Ulu Hakan Ahdiiihamid Han (Istanbul, 1981); and Mustafa Muftuoglu, Her Yoniiyle Sultan Ikinci Abdulhamid (Istanbul, 1985). 5 Engin Akarli, "The Problems ot External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamid II. 1876-1909: Origins and Solutions," Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1976, pp. 60-61.

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91

that pan-Islamism occupied no more than a peripheral place in his conception of the empire's external relations. 1 Although the extent of his pan-Islamist activity will only become known when the full collection of consular reports is made available, even the piecemeal evidence suggests that he devoted more effort to the movement than has hitherto been supposed. In a circular proposal sent to the grand vizier, the Imperial Secretariat, and the Shaikh-ul-Islam, the Ottoman high commissioner to Bulgaria, Ali Ferruh Bey, suggested nothing less than the convening of an Islamic conference of rulers or the representatives from Islamic countries, declaring that the Christian powers were all in league to destroy the caliphate and prevent the union of all Muslims. He proposed that the 400th anniversary of the passing of the caliphate from Abbasid to Ottoman hands be made into something of an international event: "We seem to have somehow missed this sacred occasion three times, and if we let it go by again a hundred years will elapse before we get another chance. It must be celebrated with the greatest pomp and splendour." 2 The high commissioner suggested the invitation of "the Indian Nizams, the Islamic leaders of Asia, Australia, and Africa, the Shah of Iran, and the ruler of Morocco." 3 Obviously, since the Ottomans had not marked the earlier centennials, they had hitherto not felt the need for symbolic celebrations on those occasions. The first half of a detailed report dated 24 June 1886, and written by Ali Galip Bey, the Ottoman consul in the Dutch East Indies, reviewed Dutch colonial penetration into the islands of Java, Borneo, the Celebes, Molucca, Sumatra, and Papua. 4 In its second half, he dealt with Islam in the Dutch possessions. Approximately 8,000 East Indians were said to go on the hajj every year, he reported, but the Dutch keep close watch on Islamic activity and forbid the entry of Arab ulama into their dominions. Then he recounted how, when he was appointed consul to Batavia in the month of Ramazan of the year 1300 (1883), on the first Friday prayer he read a hutba to his holiness the caliph and afterward some of the congregation approached him and asked that they be made Ottoman subjects. 5 Ali Galip told them, "According to internationally accepted rules and regulations it is not possible for anyone to switch his allegiance at will " 6 Instead, he counselled them to go on the hajj

'Feroze Yasamee, "The Ottoman Empire and the European Great Powers, 1884-1887," Ph.D. diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, 1984, p. 29. 2 YEE, C,1/27-28/53/136.12 Ramazan 1321 (3 December 1903). •3 •'Ibid. It is unclear what Ali Ferruh meant by the "Islamic leaders of Australia" ("Avustralya ruisayi islamiyesi"). He could have meant Oceania, and the reference may have been to the leaders of Islamic Indonesia. 4 YEE, 14 253/126/8, 21 Ramazan 1303 (24 June 1886), "Report on the Dutch East Indiar, Colonies" (Felemenk Devleli Muslemlekatandan Cezayir-i Hindiye Hakkindadir). 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid.

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and remain in the holy places for five years, which would make them eligible for consideration. Ali Galip also read the hutba in several other mosques, and pointed out that this was the first time it had been done: "The congregation broke out in tears when they heard the Holy Name of the Caliph." 1 The Javanese connection appears in other documents as well. In 1898-99 a group of Javanese boys was brought to Istanbul to study at leading imperial schools. A document dated 11 June 1898 gave a list of the boys and described them as "children of leading notables of Java and Singapore." 2 About a year later, on 18 May 1899, the Ottoman consul at Batavia, M . Kamil Efendi, described how this policy of welcoming the children of Muslim notables had created "an excellent impression" among the leading Muslims of the area. These people, he said, were severely persecuted by the Dutch authorities and were prevented from sending their children to Dutch schools and even from "dressing them in a European manner." Kamil relayed details of how a wealthy Javanese merchant, one Sayyid Ali §ehab, had managed to enrol his children in a Dutch school only to be ridiculed in the local press for "forgetting himself" and "thinking he was European." The Ottoman consul wrote that the munificence of the sultan had been heard far and wide, and that some thirty notable families "from the Celebes, Singapore and Sumatra" were anxious to send their children to Istanbul. 3 The policy seems to have yielded dividends. On finishing their education, the boys returned home speaking fluent Turkish, sporting Turkish passports, and claiming the right to he treated as Europeans in Dutch possessions. 4 The strategic importance of the hajj as an opportunity to reconfirm Ottoman legitimacy figures very prominently in Ottoman documentation. A memorandum dated 23 November 1895 and prepared by the Council of State discussed at length the issue of the new passport regulations the administration had promulgated. 5 The British and Dutch embassies had complained that the fee charged for hajj visas for Indian and Dutch pilgrims was exorbitant. The British government of India had complained that the imposition of a passport on Indian Muslims "would enflame their fanaticism" and that therefore the measure should be introduced gradually. The Ottoman government seems

'Ibid. All such reports, howevci. have to be taken with a grain of salt as they were invariably written to please. Many Javanese did, however, stay in Mecca and Medina for extended periods (sec O c h s e n w a l d , Religion, Society and the State, p. 41: "The Javanese ... constituted a large part of the Meccan population"). ^ B B A , Bab-i Ali Kvrak Odasi B b O ) , 8 7 4 1 9 396/9/7, Maarif Giden, 18 Muharrem 1316 (11 June 1 898). % B A , B E O 5 Mayis 1315 (18 May 1899), Consul M . Kamil to the Foreign Ministry. 4

A n t h o n y Reid, "Nineteenth-Century Pan Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia," Journal of Asian Studies, 26 (1967), pp. 267-83. 5 B B A , Irade Dahiliye 30, 24. ( emaziyelevvel 1313 (23 N o v e m b e r 1895), §urayi Devlet no. 2317.

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eventually to have reduced the fee but kept the requirement of visas because "the main reason for the imposition of visas on Indian Muslims and pilgrims who come from other eastern lands is the political one of ensuring that they come into contact with the officials of the Exalted Caliphate." The Ottoman consulate at Bombay reported that the number of Indians making the pilgrimage every year was no less than 14,000, not counting Central Asian pilgrims who also came through Bombay. 1 Another critical issue was the acquisition of land and property in the Hijaz by non-Ottoman Muslims. On 7 April 1882 the Council of State prepared a memorandum in which it reiterated the ban on the acquisition of property by Indian, Algerian, and Russian Muslims. The reason stated was fear of potential fifth-column activities. 2 The issue can also be traced through the archives of the government of India. The British consul at Jeddah wrote on 7 May 1882 that the Ottoman ban was causing considerable discomfort among Britain's Indian subjects. The consul noted that this new state of affairs might well cause poorer Indians to take up Ottoman nationality, although "the better to do will probably be unwilling to sacrifice British protection, and considerable annoyance is caused among them." 3 The report of the consul specified the novel character of the exclusivist policy put into force by Abdiilhamid II: It is only since the accession of Abdul Hamid that ecclesiastical matters are invariably referred to the Sultan and the exclusiveness that His Majesty shows meets with no sympathy from Mussulmans in Mecca of any shade of orthodoxy on religious grounds; but as regards non-acquisition of property by foreigners they have some natural worldly satisfaction in being free from competition with the more wealthy Indians. 4 Even in the matter of charitable gifts to the holy places the sultan showed the same jealousy. The British consul at Jeddah further reported that a silver ladder for the door of the Ka'ba "worth 45,000 rupees" and sent by the Nawab of Rampur as well as 40,000 rupees in cash sent by another British Indian Muslim had been turned down because "the Sultan in this case objected to a foreign subject, and sent orders that no such a one should have the privilege." 5 The reflection of the issue in the Ottoman documentation leaves no doubt about the basis for the sultan's exclusivism: "All such gifts can only be made by the Exalted Personage of the Caliph who alone holds the august title of Protector of the Holy Places. No foreign ruler has the right to partake of this glory." 6 ' Ibid. BBA, Yildiz Resmi Maruzat 15/38,17 Cemaziyelevvel 1299 (7 April 1882), §urayi Devlet no 72. 2

3 India Office Political and Secret Home Correspondence, L/P&S/3/239, vol. 52, p. 937, Acting Consul Moncrieff to Lord Granville. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 B B A , irade Dahiliye 68044,15 Rebiyulahir 1299 (3 March 1882).

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It must, however, he remembered at this juncture that the sultan was not averse to seeking material help from non-Ottomans for one of the m a j o r touchstones of his pan-Islamic policy, the construction of the Hijaz Railway. This project was deliberately financed exclusively with Muslim capital,a large proportion of which was solicited abroad as pious donations through the efforts of Ottoman envoys and consuls. 1 It would seem that a brief of Hamidian men on the spot was to gather information about M u s l i m s around the world. O n e such special e n v o y (memur-u

mahsus)

sent to A f r i c a was M u h a m m a d Ba§ala, a notable of

Ottoman Tripoli w h o , having been "sent on several secret missions to Morocco and Bornu [Chad| had full knowledge of the area and of the nature of the population." He presented the ruler of each m a j o r tribe with a flag of the Ottoman Empire and gave information "on the power and glory of his Imperial Highness the Caliph." Ba§ala ranged as far afield as Sokoto (modern-day northern Nigeria), which he described as "a very vast land harbouring millions of Muslims of the Maliki sect." Everywhere he went, Ba§ala said he met with M u s l i m s w h o had great r e v e r e n c e f o r the caliph. In f a c t one tribe of "Tuvareks" (Touareg) recounted how they had killed a group of French officials who had failed to produce a ferman from Istanbul allowing them to travel in what the tribe considered to be the sultan's dominions. Ba§ala concluded his report: A s can be seen from the above, the population of most of the Sudan is Muslim and has a religious attachment and love f o r our Master, Allah's Shadow on Earth. Thus it is necessary for these lands to be incorporated into the imperial domains by the sending of special missions to advise and guide the local rulers. 2 Ba§ala also recommended that each ruler be awarded an Ottoman flag, robes of honour, an imperial f e r m a n , and a specially decorated copy of the Qur'an. In return, the rulers would have the hutba

read in the sultan's name

during Friday prayer. All these gifts were manifestations of the Ottomans' expression of sovereignty and expressed Central Asian Turkish as well as Islamic motifs. In fact, the standard of honour was a steppe custom and the robe of honour (hil'at) recalls the girding with ceremonial belts by the Central Asian Turks. On the other hand, the copy of the Holy Book and the reading of

' W i l l i a m Ochsenwald, The Hica:: Railroad 2

(Charlottesville, V a „ 1980), pp. 60-74.

Y E E , 3 9 / 2 1 2 8 / 1 2 9 / 1 1 8 , 7 §evval 1311 (14 April 1894). Assessment by Imperial A D C Mirliva Dervi§ of the person of Ba§ala arid the presentation of the latter's report.

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the hutba were Islamic symbols of hegemony. 1 Ottoman consuls in India closely monitored the local Muslim press and often published officially inspired articles ensuring the visibility of the caliph. 2 It would seem that as real power declines in pre-modern states, the needs of modernization make imperative the increase of central power because a "legitimacy crisis" is created as the state moves into areas it did not inhabit before. 3 Pomp and symbolism are employed with renewed vigour to legitimate new demands that can no longer be justified through the old matrix of power relations. This is all part of the effort "to mobilize formerly passive objects of history into citizens [which] requires a new attitude to power." 4 The Ottoman elite's efforts to project their legitimacy through their policies toward their own Islamic subjects and the Muslim world at large involved overlapping policies and strategies. Increased prestige abroad could be turned to good account at home. Victories near home could mean enhanced standing abroad, as was shown in the case of the Ottoman victory against the Greeks in 1897 and the resulting "stirrings and outbreaks among Muslims in India and the East Indies, Turkestan, Madagascar and Algeria." 5 However, as in all political systems that depend on something more than brute force to ensure their continuity, Ottoman legitimacy seems to have had uneven success. In a time when the world was changing rapidly, the Ottomans adjusted their state ideology to what they believed to be the new rules of the game in the spirit of what Hobsbawm has called "a tacit modification of the system of beliefs by 'stretching' the framework." 6 The Ottoman experience can be seen in this light. As Europe progressed in Ottoman eyes from the despised infidel to a legal and political equal and finally to the incontestable determinant of world trends, the "framework" of Ottoman legitimating ideology had to be "stretched" accordingly. The Ottoman dilemma was perhaps best expressed in the cynical words of Said Pa§a, who served nine times as grand vizier: "As the Sublime State finds itself stuck among Christian powers, even the most accomplished diplomacy will not be sufficient for our defence. All relations among states are based on animosity a n d m u t u a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t " (Duvel

ve Emaret-i

Hiristiyane

ifine

gakilub

kalmi§

oldugundan)?

1 Ibid.\ see also Halil tnalcik, "Osmanlilarda Saltanat Veraset Usulii ve Türk Hakimiyet telakkisiyle ilgisi," Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bileiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 13. 1 (1959) DD 69-94. 2

B B A , Yildiz Hususi Maruzat 214/63, 16 May 1888. Telegram from the Ottoman consul in Bombay to the Foreign Ministry. The Ottoman official, Ibrahim Efendi, gave details of a recent article unfavourable to the Ottoman caliphate, which was published in the Punjab Times. He promptly wrote a rebuttal and published it in the Advocate of India. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 72. ^Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations (Oxford, 1986), p. 156. ^Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 337. 6 E . J. Hobsbawm, "The Social Function of the Past," Past and Present, 55 (May 1972), p. 5. 7 Y E E , 31/1950 Miikerrer/45/83,22 Zilkade 1299 (6 October 1882).

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As far as legitimation toward its own Islamic subjects was concerned, by the time of Abdulhamid IPs reign, Ottoman policy was clearly a case of "a tacit modification of a system of belief." T h e classic Islamic concept of election of the caliph from among the elders of the Quraysh tribe had been abandoned well before Ottoman times. H o w e v e r , Islamic jurists had long recognized the need for a strong ruler, an imam who would be the holder of coercive power and the del ender of the shari'a and the holy places of Islam. The imam or caliph was necessary because human society was basically anarchic: "Since the power of lust and passion stimulates men to violence and discord, there must be a just man who will abate violence. There is need of a person singled out by divine support with power and authority and who will protect the laws of the Shari'a." 1 That was precisely the doctrine Abdiilhamid propagated among his Islamic subjects through ideologues like Abulhuda. 2 However, legitimacy had to be projected through the prism of international power politics. It was here that what Hobsbawm refers to as a "form of mythologized and perhaps ritualized history" came into its own. 3 The novel usage of the caliphate as a quasi-papal office with sway over the entire Islamic world must be seen in this context. For Ezra Suleiman, myths are the necessary apparatus with which the elite maintains its power as long as society accepts it: "An elite securely anchors itself in the society when the elements, mythical or not, that underline its power become the generally accepted norms of society." 4 The primary task, therefore, of Abdulhamid's propagandists was to assert that the way things stood was the way they had always been, the natural order of things. Seen in these terms, Hamidian policy was modestly successful in its pan-Islamic, and considerably more successful in its domestic, mold. 5 It kept what remained of the empire together for 30-odd years. Indeed, in the Hijaz, the heart of Ottoman legitimation, the legitimacy of the state was never seriously questioned. The long years of Ottoman rule, the quasi-autonomous position of the sharifs of Mecca, the financial support provided for religious authorities, and the military protection of the hajj routes all combined to the

' A n n K. S. Lambton, Stale and government in Medieval Islam: The Jurists, ch. 11, "The ImamSultan: Fadl Allah b. Ruzbihan Khunji" (Oxford, 1985). T h e quotation is from Fadl Allah's Suluk al-Muluk as quoted in Lambton. p. 182. 2

l n his m a j o r work, Dai al-Rashad, Abulhuda stated: "In time the Caliphate was transmitted to the Ottomans and reached Abdulhamid II. Already k n o w n for his virtue and devotion the Sultan after his ascendancy showed religious zeal, upheld the shari'a and worked f o r the protection of the umma. A s demanded by their faith, Muslims ought to be obedient to him". A b u M a n n e h , "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulbuda al-Sayyadi," Middle Eastern Studies, 15 (1979), p. 141. 3 H o b s b a w m , The Social Function of the Past, p. 6.

4

E z r a Suleiman, "Self-Image. Legitimacy, and the Stability of Elites: T h e C a s e of France," British Journal of Political Science, 7 (1977), p. 197, 5 E v e n the avowed enemies of Abdulhamid, the Young Turks, often capitulated and returned to the sultan's service. For a very striking example of the ambivalent attitude of the Young Turks towards Abdulhamid, see Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Amerika Hatiralar, (Istanbul, 1989), pp. 56-60.

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advantage of the Sublime State. Sheer historical experience also carried weight. As the centuries passed, it seemed inconceivable to the Hijazis that they could ever operate outside the Ottoman system of government. 1 As long as arbitration was needed between various parties or concrete interests were served, Hamidian legitimating policies seem to have been received at face value. The Hijaz was a bewildering and motley array of nomads and townsmen, locals and pilgrims, whose interests had to be reconciled. Even so, Hijazis tried to avoid sending their children to Ottoman schools and shunned service in the official Ottoman administration, suggesting that only part of the Ottoman mythology was accepted. 2 In the case of Ottoman Syria, however, the local elite of Damascus largely identified with the Ottoman system, and in the 1860-1908 period acquired a vested interest in its continuation. Its children attended Ottoman schools and leading Damascene families bought posts in the Ottoman bureaucracy. As argued by Khoury, the policy of Ottomanism, comprising both Turk and Arab, was widely accepted in Damascus. 3 The Damascene merchants came to be closely identified with the Ottoman order. When the local Bedouins of Karak "selectively" destroyed symbols of Ottoman sovereignty in the uprising of 1911, they deliberately sacked and pillaged the quarter of the Damascene merchants, leaving more obvious targets such as the Christian quarter unharmed. 4 Particularly after the Ottoman withdrawal from Syria and the establishment of the French mandate, the difference between the two regimes became apparent. No matter how hard the French tried, they could not present themselves as legitimate rulers: "There was a significant difference in the nature of the new imperial authority; it was illegitimate and thus unstable; France was not recognized to be a legitimate overlord as the sultan-caliph of the Ottoman Empire had been." 5

'Ochsenwald, Religion, Society and the State, p. 6; on the sometimes uneasy relationship between the sharifs and the Porte, see Butrus Abu Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)," African and Asian Studies, 9 (1973), pp. 1-21. 2 Ochsenwald, Religion, Society and the State, p. 78. 3 Philip S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism (Cambridge, 1983), p. 60. ^Eugene Rogan, "The al-Karak Revolt of 1910: Ottoman Order at Odds with Local Order,' paper presented in the panel, "New Order and Local Order: Continuity and Crisis in Everyday Life" at the annual MESA meeting, Toronto, November 16, 1989 (cited with permission of the author). ^Philip Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism (Princeton, N.J., 1987), p. 4.

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R e c e n t research Has shown that the relationship b e t w e e n

Arab

nationalism and Ottomanism as well as its successor ideology, "Turkism," was not as straightforward as had once been supposed. The hitherto accepted wisdom that intensive "'Turkification" occurred under the Y o u n g T u r k s has since been questioned: "At the end of 1913 the Unionist government w a s c o m m i t t e d to Islam as the pillar of its i d e o l o g y . A r a b s wishing

the

continuation of the Islamic empire under the Ottoman caliph embraced the idea enthusiastically." 1 Only under war conditions would the Islamist policy begin to come apart. However, here again interest seems to have been more operative than ideological. Izzat a l - A b d , o n e of the Arabs w h o had been o n e of Abdiilhamid's closest followers, fell out with the Young Turk regime, settled in Egypt, and went on the hajj together with the A r a b nationalist Rashid Rida to show solidarity with the rebel Sharif Husayn in 1916. 2 Even leading Islamic modernists such as M u h a m m a d A b d u h , although seriously disillusioned by the Ottoman order, felt that "the Ottoman Empire was what was left of the political independence of the umma, and if it vanished Muslims would lose everything and become as powerless as Jews." 3 Between 1901 and 1907, 167 Arabs studied in the Imperial Public Service School ( M e k t e b - i Mulkiye-i

§ahane).4

Many of the leading cadres

who were later to make up the intelligentsia of emerging Arab states were the product of Hamidian educational policies. What seems to have happened was that the Hamidian regime ultimately became the victim of its own rhetoric by falling into what would today be called the "credibility gap." Abdiilhamid, by his removal of the intermediary bodies such as parliament and ministers f r o m responsibility, his grand claims of universal caliphate, and his e x t r e m e centralization of power around his person, left himself open to the direct odium of the politically aware. The choice of support or opposition was put before the subject population who were increasingly being asked to perform as citizens even while they were still called and treated as subjects. Through the press and other publications, such as the circulating of ideological tracts, the Ottoman state was reduced to the human scale for the first time. This was the f o r u m that w a s ably exploited by the Y o u n g Turk opposition in satirical cartoons and broadsheets

1

' H a s a n Kayali, "Arabs and Young Turks: Turkish-Arab Relations in the Second Constitutional Period 1908-1918," Ph.D. diss.. Harvard University, 1988, p. 139. 1 lbid„ p. 199. 3 Albert Womam, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge, 1986), p. 269. ^Ilber Ortayh, "Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Arap Milliyet^iligi," Tanzimat'dan Cumhuriyete Turkiye Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul. 1985), pp. 1032-36. ^On the issue of the "credibility gap," see Elliot, "Power and Propaganda," p. 171. The picture that Elliot paints of late 17th-century Spain, when the state attempted to shore up its domestic prestige with universal religious pretensions, is an apt comparison in this context.

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99

At the level of the international credibility of the caliphate, we can see clearly that the India Office kept close watch over any contacts between the sultan's emissaries and Indian rulers. On at least one occasion when the Ottoman consul in Bombay attempted personally to deliver a decoration sent by Abdiilhamid to the Nawab of Rampur, "apparently an acknowledgement of the pecuniary aid afforded during the war with Russia," he was prevented from so doing. The British authorities told him they would deliver it. 1 Even after Abdiilhamid, the Young Turks were supported in the Muslim world during the Balkan Wars: an Indian medical mission arrived in Istanbul in December 1912 as a gesture of solidarity. 2 Pan-Islamic agitation was a real concern for the Allies during World War 1. In the little-known episode of the Singapore Mutiny in 1915, Muslim Indian troops rebelled when the rumour spread that they would be sent to the Turkish front. The Indians created considerable panic by responding to the Ottoman call for jihad by attacking the British population. 3 The clutching by Ottoman statesmen of such seemingly f l i m s y supports as the "power of the caliphate in Batavia" or the sending of a decoration to the Nawab of Rampur may appear futile viewed with the benefit of hindsight. To ask that Arab subjects support a universalistic state on the basis of religious solidarity in the age of nationalism might appear unrealistic at best or despotic at worst. However, seen in context, these developments do furnish clues as to the thinking of late Ottoman policy makers. As put by Mary Wright in her study of similar problems in a Chinese context: For the study of these problems of loyalty, dissidence and social cohesion, what men say is as important as what they do. A doctrine in which belief is widely and consistently professed is usually a surer key to the ethos of an age than a list of lapses from that doctrine. 4 Seen in this light, Ottoman legitimating policies did reflect the "ethos of an age." These policies were not hopelessly anachronistic applications of traditional patterns. In the world of late 19th-century "pan" movements, one might evince equal scepticism as to the feasibility of the union of all Slavs or all Germans as of all Muslims. In terms of the dosage of romanticism, one was as valid as the other.

'india Office L/P&S/3/229, vol. 42, p. 197; India Office Memorandum, 23 September 1880. Tiirkkaya Ataov, "Mevlana Azad ve Tiirkiye," Tarih ve Toplum, 14 (1990). pp. 31-34. ^William Harper and Harry Miller, Singapore Mutiny (Singapore, 1984), pp. 1-25. 4 Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, (Stanford, Calif., 1957), p. 204. 2

'THERE IS NO COMPULSION IN RELIGION' : ON CONVERSION AND APOSTASY IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPiRE: 1839-1856. 1

T h e r e is n o c o m p u l s i o n in r e l i g i o n . T h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n is h e n c e f o r t h distinct f r o m e r r o r . A n d he w h o rejecteth f a l s e deities a n d b e l i e v e t h in Allah hath grasped a f i r m h a n d h o l d which will n e v e r b r e a k . Allah is H e a r e r , K n o w e r . T h e H o l y K o r a n 11:256.

S O M E G E N E R A L QUESTIONS

This essay is a preliminary attempt to place nineteenth century Ottoman conversion policies in a comparative context in relation to both earlier Ottoman centuries and in relation to other imperial polities, viz.: the Spanish and Russian. The present study has three aims. First, to ask some practical questions about the fact and nature of the conversion process. Second, to try to ascertain whether there is some pattern to the various cases occurring in the archival documentation for the turbulent years between the declaration of the Tanzimat in 1839 and the Reform Edict of 1856. And third, to put the late Ottoman attitude toward conversion and apostasy into a broader comparative framework than has hitherto been attempted. 2 To convert is to change worlds. This can be done voluntarily or involuntarily. In the spectrum ranging from the proverbial "conversion at the point of the sword", to the completely sincere and intellectually committed act, the gradations of conviction and motivation are almost infinite. They range from the conscious act of a Polish aristocrat who took refuge in the Ottoman Empire and accepted Ottoman service in the 1830s, to those

'Many friends and colleagues have helped me in the formulation of this article. I would like to thank Marc Baer, Edhem Eldem, Seljuk Esenbel, Miige Go$ek, Daniel Goffman, Ariel Salzman, and Cemal Kafadar for reading earlier versions and for generously providing extremely useful criticism and comments. Many thanks go also to Caroline Finkel for proofreading the second draft and for her many suggestions regarding form and content. My thanks go to Giilen Akta§ for her help and patience with a computer-illiterate person. I would also like to thank the Kevorkian Institute and the Department of Near Eastern Studies at NYU, as well as the International Institute of the Michigan University for hosting me on various occasions. Finally, I would also like to express my gratitude to thank the editors of CSSH and the anonymous outside reader for their helpful comments. 2

This paper is the first fruit of a larger project that will examine conversion and apostasy in the late Ottoman Empire from the Tanzimat era through to the end of the Empire in 1918.

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Christians in Damascus who converted to save their lives during the riots of 1860. But there is also that grey area, the small insults of everyday life: being referred to as mtird rather than merhum

when you die, not being allowed to

wear certain colours or clothes, not being allowed to ride certain animals. These little barbs, endured on a daily basis, these must have been the basic reason for many a conversion to Islam. 1 There are also cases which verge on the comic, such as the French doctor who converted to escape his gambling debts. For the ruling elite, conversion to Islam was simply a way to qualify for a certain station in life: that of the ruling class. It would appear that for most of their the ruling class's history, the sincerity of the conversion did not unduly occupy the Ottomans. The Ottoman attitude was distinctly pragmatic, particularly when it was a matter of employing skilled technicians (gun founders, shipwrights, military men, etc.): "go through the motions and you are accepted." 2 What Richard Bulliet has contended for conversions in early Arabian Islam largely holds true for the Ottoman Empire: "[Thel initial decision to join the religious community of the rulers had more to do with the attainment or maintenance of status than it did with religious belief." 3 Despite what is often cited as "Ottoman tolerance" of non-Muslim creeds, there is no doubt that the Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were the ruling class. A s elegantly put by Maria Todorova: For all the objections to romanticised heartbreaking assessments of Christian plight under the infidel Turk, a tendency that has been long and rightly criticised, the Ottoman Empire was, first and foremost, an Islamic state with a strict religious hierarchy where the non-Muslims occupied, without any doubt, the back seats. The strict division on religious lines prevented integration of the population, except in cases of conversion. 4

' T h e definition of miird in Ihe Redhouse Turkish English Lexicon is: " D e a d , (Not said of Muslims)." §emseddin Sami's Kamus-u Tiirki is more outspoken: "Croaked, kicked the bucket, used for animals" (Gebermif, Hayvanat ifin kullamhr). Merhum is defined in Redhouse as "Deceased and admitted into Clod's mercy." M y thanks to Professor Michael Rogers for bringing this distinction to my attention. 2

K e m a l Karpat, An Inquiry into Ihe Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State, Woodrow Wilson School Research Monograph no. 39 (Princeton: 1973), 23-24: "Converts in the Ottoman state never carried a stigma like the mawali in early Islam. T h i s attitude must be attributed... not only to the Ottoman largesse d'esprit and tolerance but also to the need of the ruling bureaucratic order to allow capable elements to j o i n its ranks." ^Richard W Bulliet, "Conversion Stories in Early Islam," in Michael Gervers and Ramzi Jibran Bikhazi, eds., Conversion and Continuity. Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands. Eighth to Eighteenth Centuries H o r o n t o : 1990) 131. 4

Maria Todorova, "The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans," in Carl Brown, ed., Imperial The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East (New York: 1996), 47.

Legacy:

C O N V E R S I O N

AND

A P O S T A S Y

103

Also the conversion issue raises several basic questions. Is it easier for the higher classes to convert rather than the lower classes? The fact that the former group is so accustomed to command and be obeyed, as a vital way of life, may make conversion a price which one they can afford to pay. The fact of tax exemptions for converts, and the gradually decreasing number of Christian timar holders in the 16th century Balkans, may well have been the result of a desire to maintain a position of local wealth and power. 1 It is worth speculating that conversion may well have occurred among the lower aristocracy or the merchant strata, whose ambition may have been stronger than their religious conviction. Kemal Karpat's assertion is that once the uppermost strata of the Balkan ruling classes were wiped out, many of the relatively lower "feudal groups ... served the Sultan in order to keep their own socio-economic privileges. Many eventually converted to Islam." 2 One could also argue that people in the uppermost echelons of the Catholic or Orthodox nobility may have had closer, organic links (a younger brother as archbishop, etc.) with the church, making them resistant to conversion. Yet the reverse may also hold true, as pointed out by Victor Ménage, there was a tendency in the early Ottoman period for the Balkan aristocracy to hedge their bets by ensuring that one son converted to Islam: "an action which, whatever its motive, would have had the effect of helping to deprive (sic) the whole family from expropriation, from insults by neighbours, and from high-handed treatment by the local authorities." 3 The case of the elite Ottoman troops, the Janissary Corps, being based on a child levy from the Christian population is obviously one case of institutionalised forced conversion. 4 A recent study on Islam notes, quite correctly, that religion was for many people, "what is socially appropriate as well as what is transcendental]} true." Thus, a change of creed and ritual, grave as it was, was not necessarily a terribly intellectual or cerebral choice. 5 Factors of time and place must also be considered. Are people more likely to convert in times of transition and crisis, or does a stable and prosperous order hold more attractions for the potential convert? Research has shown that in the stable Balkans of the time of Suleyman the Magnificent (r. 1496-1566) the proportion of converts among the urban population was high, (seventy-six households out of a Muslim population of 231 households 'Geza David, "Administration in Ottoman Europe," in Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead, eds., Suleyman the Magnificent and His Age (New York: 1995), 77. ^Karpat, An Inquiry, 15. 3 Victor Ménage, "Islamization of Anatolia," in Nehemiah Levtzion, ed., Conversion to Islam (New York: 1979), 64. 4

0 n Jannisaries or the dev^lrme, see Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. Classical Age (London: 1973).

5

R. Stephen Humphreys, Islamic History. A Framework for Inquiry, rev. ed. (Princeton: 1991),

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in Tirnovo in 1500, or thirty-three percent, twenty-five percent of the Muslim population of Bitola in 1545).' Maria Todorova has pointed out that conversions in the Balkans began immediately after the arrival of the Ottomans and continued until the nineteenth century, with a crucial period in the seventeenth century. She asserts that although there were "obvious cases" of forced conversion, "[M]ost were non-enforced. These often euphemistically called "voluntary" were the result of e c o n o m i c and social, but not administrative pressure."' Halil inalcik's pioneering work on the spread of Islam in the Balkans draws attention to the fact that mass immediate forced conversion to Islam was hardly ever practised among the Albanian, Serbian, or Bulgarian aristocracies after the Ottoman conquest. Islamization was a gradual process among these classes, which lasted from the mid-fourteenth to the sixteenth century. Christian timar holders were common even during the reign of Beyazid II (r. 1481-1512). By the mid-sixteenth century, the Ottoman tahrir registers show hardly any Christian timar holders, as the leading Balkan families were assimilated into the Ottoman scheme of things. 3 However, among the population at large, inalcik has also pointed out that sustained pressure, exerted in forms such as the poll tax, was responsible for "mass conversions" in the Balkans in the later centuries. 4 Are frontier zones more likely settings for conversion, in the unsettled conditions of the marches? There are references in the literature to rather peculiar practices in Ottoman Algiers, where Christian converts were made to spit on the cross and then trample it. Also in Algiers, in the 1640s, if a Jew wanted to convert to Islam, he was first obliged to convert to Christianity: "Only then is he permitted to move into the ranks of the True Believers. A singular requirement this, which makes him twice over a renegade." 5 The

' G e z a David, "Administration ill Ottoman Europe," 76- 77. ^Todorova, "The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans," 49. 3 Halil inalcik, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest," Studia Islamica II (1954), 103- 29. T h e timar was the Ottoman military fief held by a member of the military class, the askeri, in return for military service on the part of the timar holder and a specified number of men-at-arms. Inalcik points out that many members of the Balkan aristocracy had been holders of similar positions (pronoia) in the Byzantine system. T h e tahrir registers were registers of taxable population and revenue in newly conquered territories, which were periodically updated. 4

H a l i l Inalcik, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, (Cambridge: 1994), 69. It is interesting to note that l.evtzion f u n d a m e n t a l l y diverges f r o m Inalcik and T o d o r o v a in arguing that the lack of nomadic insurgency in the Balkans in the earlier Ottoman period meant minimal Islamization and "Turkicization." See N. Levtzion, "Toward a C o m p a r a t i v e Study of Islamization," in Levtzion, ed.. (''inversion to Islam, 1-23.

^This practice of dishonouring the cross is mentioned specifically in two sources. See Houari Touati, Entre Dieu et les Hommes, lettrés, saints et sorciers au Maghreb (17e siècle) (Paris: 1994), 171: "Sometimes the convert would be obliged to perform a rite of execration like spitting on the cross or trampling it, to show the sincerity of his conversion" (my translation). Touati makes clear, however, that this practice is by no means doctrinally justified. O n the somewhat unorthodox practices of conversion in a corsair society, see Peter L a m b o r n W i l s o n , Pirate Utopias. Moorish Corsairs and European Renegadoes (New York: 1995), 90, 133, 138. Wilson does, however, point out that many of the Christian renegades and corsairs in Algiers and Salé w h o c o n v e r t e d , forcibly or voluntarily, b e c a m e loyal M u s l i m s . On the issue of J e w s first converting to Christianity, see. John K Cooley, Baal, Christ and Mohammed. Religion and Revolution in North Africa (New York, Chicago and San Francisco: 1965), 175.

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renegade society of North Africa is indeed singular, as it seems to represent the ultimate frontier zone where renegadoes could and did convert to Islam and rise to positions of supreme power. 1 In North Africa there are also claims or cases of apostasy from Islam to Christianity, such as the case of Sidi Mohammed, a corsair captain, who was captured by the Knights of Malta in 1654. Sidi Mohammed later became a priest, and in 1663, in Genoa, "converted hundreds of galley slaves to Christianity." 2 The question is: who was the "Ottoman?" Was he Sadik Pasha, born Michael Izador Czaykowski, a Polish count who entered Ottoman service in the 1830s, converted to Islam, and went on to pursue a distinguished military career? 3 Or was he Amir Bashir Shihab, a Christian Lebanese who in the early 1820s, "practiced Sunni Islam in public and Christianity in private, [and] allowed a Maronite priest to take charge of his spiritual life?" 4 Or was he the Druze and Alewi chieftain in the Lebanese mountains who practiced taqiyya, (dissimulation), while "by centuries old tradition" taking his disputes to Ottoman Sunni Shariat courts? 5 Or was he Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokollu (Sokolovic, 1505-1579), whose brother, the monk Makarios, who ruled as the Patriarch of the Serbian church at Pec? 6 Stephen Humphreys has claimed that, "Indeed, we might argue that the study of conversion to Islam is one of the most effective ways of reconstructing the specific characteristics of each of the constituent societies." 7 Another vital question is concerns the position of the forced convert in Islamic society. 8 Furthermore, conversion was not a one way street. Some converts to Islam could and did return to their original faiths by seeking and receiving Papal dispensations. 9

'wilson, Pirate Utopias, 35-62. Cooley ,Baal, Christ and Mohammed, 159. 3 Engin Akarli, The Long Peace. Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920, (Berkeley: 1993) 197. He renamed his sons Adam and Ladislas as Enver and Muzaffer, although they remained Roman Catholic. Sadik Pasha, after fighting in the Crimean War on the Ottoman side, returned to Poland and converted to Orthodox Christianity, 4 Ihid„ 21. ^Kais M. Firro, "The Attitude of the Druzes and Alawis vis-à-vis Islam and Nationalism in Syria and Lebanon"; also, Aharon Layish, "The Status of Islamic Law in the Druze family," both in Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele and Ahke Otter-Beaujeau, eds., Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East (Leiden: 1995), 90,144-45. 2

6 Kemal Karpat, An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State 39 71. n 'Humphreys, Islamic History, 275. 8 See Mercedes Garcia Arenal, "Conversion to Islam in the Mediterranean-Muslim World," in published working papers of Individual and Society in the Mediterranean Muslim World, Robert Ilbert (director) and Randi Deguilhem, (ed.) A research programme of the European Science Foundation (Paris: 1998), 15: "Forced conversion usually entails a stronger rejection and distrust of the convert group by the dominant society." 9 Jerry Bentley, Old World Encounters (Oxford: 1993), 171.

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THE ISSUE O F APOSTAS\ IR O M ISLAM

The issue of apostasy from Islam (irtidad)

is a particularly thorny one.

The commonly accepted belief among Muslims is that the apostate (miirtedi) is liable to execution according to the shariaThe

highly

respected

§eyhiilislam of the sixteenth century, Ebu's Su'ud Efendi, was unequivocal in his fetva

on this matter

"Question: What is the §er'i

ruling for a dhimmi

who reverts to infidelity after having accepted Islam? Answer: He is recalled to Islam, if he does not return he is killed." 2 A major recent study on Ebu's Su'ud has also drawn the picture in rather stark lines: "The penalty f o r the male apostate is death. B e f o r e the execution ... jurists grant a three day delay. If, during this period, the apostate repents and accepts Islam he is reprieved ... .An apostate, in fact lives in a legal twilight. If he migrates and a j u d g e rules that he has reached the realm of war, he becomes legally dead." 3 This ruling is also the basis of what some authors have called, "neo-martyrdom." The "neomartyrs" are men and women who "turned Turk" for various reasons, but then repented and publicly declared themselves Christians. "The Turkish law was explicit and their d o o m , if they persisted, was certain." 4 The degree of persistence, in some cases mentioned by Michel Bali vet, was really exceptional, particularly in the cases of men who actively sought martyrdom. Such was the case of the m o n k Damascinos at the end of the eighteenth century, w h o . after apostatising and becoming a monk on Mount A t h o s , was brought before the local kadi to allow him the opportunity to repent: "[The kadi| offered him coffee which he proceeded to throw into the official's f a c e and started declaiming against Islam as a false religion. H e seemed to want to attract I he worst punishments the Turks could inflict upon him. But he was taken for a madman and simply given a severe beating." Yet he kept trying, and only after publicly insulting Islam three times in front of

' Y e t apostasy was very c o m m o n in the early days of Islamic expansion. Some Islamic sources actually claimed that the Moroccan Berber tribesmen apostatised twelve times before finally settling into Islam. On this, see Lcvtzion, "Toward a Comparative Study of Islamization," 1-23. Ertugrul Diizdag, Ebussud l.fendi Fetvalan / j i g t n d a 16. Asir Turk Hayati (Istanbul: 1972), 90. 3

C o l i n Imber, Ebu's Su'ud. The Islamic Legal Tradition (Stanford: 1997), 7 0 - 71 T h i s work is now accepted as the modern standard a m o n g Ottomanists. H o w e v e r , there are also references to Ebu's Su'ud as a moderate jurist. Sec f o r example: J. H . Kramers, "Shaikh al Islam," in The Encyclopaedia of Islam (London: 1934), 277: "The decline of the O t t o m a n Empire has sometimes been attributed to the reactionary spirit of the Shaikh al-Islamat; it should be noted, however that in many cases the muftis have shown themselves less reactionary than the majority of the clergy and through their intervention they w e r e able to prevent fanatical a n d arbitrary acts, (e.g., Ebu's Su'ud's opposition to the forced conversion of all Christians)." 4 W i l l i a m Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans (Oxford: 1929), 453-54.

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Turkish soldiers was he executed. 1 It has been pointed out often that this is the reason for the paucity of Muslim converts to Christianity: "If it were as easy and safe to revert from Islam as from Protestantism, we should doubtless find fewer Moslems in Turkey at the present day." 2 Surprisingly late in history, in October 1843, we come across the last case of a formal, official, execution of an apostate in Istanbul. The American missionary, Cyrus Hamlin, noted in his memoirs that the issue caused severe divisions in Ottoman ruling circles: "The old Mussulman party had triumphed in the most disgraceful manner. The act divided Turkish sentiment and feeling; the old Turks commending it, the young Turkish party, already forming, cursing it as a needless insult to Europe and a supreme folly of old fools." 3 In fact, in the years leading up to and immediately after the Reform Edict of 1856 it became state policy to look the other way when Muslims who claimed to be crypto-Christians openly declared loyalty to their old faith. 4 ¡Iber Ortayli has actually pointed out that when it came to some crypto-Christians and other heterodox groups, "the State pretended not to know their beliefs." 5 Just as conversion to Islam can be seen as a sort of litmus test of specific historical conditions, we might stand the question on its head, and enquire if the issue of apostasy from Islam, is also a window into the soul of a particular people in time and place. What determined the attitude of the power holders to those who left the fold? Although the accepted belief was that execution was religiously permitted, indeed ordained, the historical record shows that this dictum was very often deliberately disregarded. Was it simply a matter of the degree of effectiveness of state power? Did the Ottomans after 1856 systematically try to avoid the execution of apostates because they were wary' of the reaction of the Great Powers? Or was there an increasingly prevalent notion that "this was not the done thing anymore?"

1 Michel Balivet, Romanie Byzantine et Pays de Rum Turc. Histoire d'un espace d'imbrication greco-turque (Istanbul: 1994), 187. Balivet mentions a similar case at the end of the seventeethseventeenth century when the apostate, Ged6on of Karakallou, (again a monk from Mount Athos, ) went about Istanbul where he proceeded, in public places, to exhort the population to reject Islam. He was not taken seriously and treated as a madman, until finally, after having been sent off several times with a beating, he got his wish and was beheaded. Iri both these cases it would be fairly safe to assume that the apostates were either recent converts or perhaps forced converts.

^Ibid., 155. For the views of a committed evangelist, see Samuel Zwemer, The Law of Apostasy in Islam. Answering the Question why there are so few Moslem Converts, and giving examples of their Moral Courage and Martyrdom, (London: 1924). 3 Cyrus Hamlin, Among the Turks, (New York: 1878), 80- 81. 4 Ilber Ortayli, "Tanzimat Doneminde Tanassur ve din degi§tirme olaylan," in Tanzimaf in 150. yildonumii uluslararasi Sempozyomu (Ankara: 1989), 481- 87. 5

i l b e r Ortayli, "Les Groupes Heteredoxes et l'Administration Ottomane," in Religious Communities, 205-11.

Syncretistic

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CONVERSION IN THE O IK )MAN EMPIRE: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW The Ottoman attitude to conversion is nowhere near as clear as that of the Spanish and Portuguese in South A m e r i c a , or the Russians in their expansion southwards into the Don-Volga region. The "saving of souls" was not an integral part of Ottoman Imperial policy, as it was in the Christian empires. The very basis of the Spanish reconquista was to expel Islam from the Iberian peninsula, and there was to be no formal Spanish equivalent of dhimmi (non-Muslim subjects) status for the conquered Muslims. Although the terms of the surrender of Granada in 1491 specified that the Moors would not be forcibly converted, after the arrival on the scene in 1499 of the zealot Archbishop Cisneros of Toledo, there ensued a policy of forcible baptism and forced conversion. 1 For Spain, expansion and conquest of the "New World" came to be synonymous with the "conquest of souls" of the native American population: "fifteenth and sixteenth century Spain, which had come to conquer, colonise, and evangelise the recently discovered continent, felt that it was elected by Providence for this mission." 2 The reconquista of Granada was transformed into a motivating motif for the conquista of Indian souls in village festivals in the 1550s: "Village fiestas included dance-dramas such as the one known as "Moors and Christians" which re-enacts the Spanish conquest of the Moors in Granada in 1491. The Indians reinterpreted this Spanish drama as a portrayal of the conquest of Mexico and added Hernán Cortes to its cast of characters." 3 The emphasis on religious conversion could even take precedence over the economic considerations of Spanish colonialism, as shown in the case of the Spanish conquest of the Philippine islands. Although his officials told Philip II that the Philippines was were not economically worth the vast expense, "it was the religious motive of retaining the islands for the Catholic faith that influenced Philip II." 4 It must be noted, however, that among some of the Spanish clergy, mercy and charity were the preferred methods of conversion. A particularly distinguished example was Bartolomé de Las Casas (1474-1566), a Dominican friar who later became Bishop of Chiapas in Guatemala. Las Casas became a fervent champion of the Indians, and he is best remembered for his Brief Report On the Destruction of the Indians, or (Tears of the Indians). In this

1

John Elliot, Imperial Spain 1469-17!6

(Middlesex: 1972), 49-52.

2

E v a A l e x a n d r a U c h m a n y , "Religious C h a n g e s in the C o n q u e s t of M e x i c o , " in D a v i d Lorenzen, ed., Religious Change and Cultural Domination (Mexico City: 1981), 80-81, 88, 9293. ^William Madsen, "Religious Syncretism," in Religious Change and Cultural Domination, 134. 4

R o s a r i o Mendoza Cortes, "The Philippine Experience Under Spain," in Religious Cultural Domination, 112.

Change

and

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work Las Casas argued that the "IGospelj should be preached with enticements, gentleness, and all meekness, and pagans to be led to the truth not by armed forces but by holy examples, Christian conduct and the word of G o d . . . Y e t even Las Casas was in no way questioning the basic requirement of conversion, and in many instances he met with strong opposition from within the clergy for preaching lenience towards the Indians. The theologian Juan Gines de Sepulveda, "for whom the Aristotelian doctrine of natural slavery was entirely applicable to the Indians on the grounds of their inferiority," was to be one of his most fervent critics. 2 Russia was a relative late-comer to state-supported conversion policies, and it was only after Peter the Great that converting non-Christians became a matter of state policy. 3 Although Russian conversion campaigns were as much targeted against pagans as Muslims, the post-Petrine state acquired something of a crusading character as it expanded into the Tatar and other Muslim zones. This trend reached its peak with the creation of The Agency of Convert Affairs, which functioned from 1740 to 1760. The intense policy of forcible conversion carried out by this agency was, however a failure: "The excessive force used by the Agency of Convert Affairs, the mutual complaints of the church officials and the converts, and the large but nominal character of conversion made it clear that missionary work in Russia in the middle of the eighteenth century was flawed." 4 The official conversion policy was also very brutal, particularly after the appointment of Archbishop Luka Konasevic in 1738: "Methods of extreme brutality were brought to bear: massive destruction of mosques, the kidnapping of Muslim children baptised by force and shut up in schools for converts, even the forced baptism of adults ... the death penalty for Muslim missionaries."From this time onwards, there was to be a large crypto-muslim Muslim population in the Volga region. When state pressure lifted, these people would periodically apostasize and return to Islam. In periods of relative liberalism, such as that of Catherine the Great, emphasis on voluntary conversion became the state policy. However the period of relative liberalism under Catherine was followed by a new crack down in the nineteenth century In 1827, several thousands of converted Tatars petitioned the Tsar to allow them to return to Islam in what was "the first massive wave of apostasy." 6 James E. Keifer, "Bartolomé De Las Casas, Missionary, Priest, Defender of the Oppressed,' Biographical Sketches of Memorable Christians of the Past, http :// justus.anglican.org/resources/bio/203.html John Elliot, Imperial Spain, 73. Also, Las Casas remains a controversial character for sparing the Indians but encouraging the import of African slaves in their stead. See Bartolomé de Las Casas: A Tragic Hero, http://www.uhhp.com/hc6.html. ^Michael Khodarkovsky, "Not by Word Alone. Missionary Policies and Religious Conversion in Early Modern Russia," Comparative Studies in Society and History 38 (1996): 267-93. A Ibid„ 287. ^Chantai Lemercier Quelquejay, "Les Missions Orthodoxes en Pays Musulmans de Moyenne et Basse Volga 1552-1865," Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique 8 (1967): 369-403. Mv translation. t'Ibid., 397. In fact the term krjaseny (convert) became synonymous with crypto-Muslim.

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It is instructive to c o m p a r e the R u s s i a n and Ottoman c a s e s b e c a u s e in s o m e ways the m e t h o d s used by the two r e g i m e s are tantalisingly f a m i l i a r , yet there are striking d i f f e r e n c e s . In both polities, at various d a t e s , c o n v e r s i o n could lead to an amnesty for previous "crimes." In b o t h , the "carrot m e t h o d " included e x e m p t i o n f r o m taxation and military service, and gifts of m o n e y and c l o t h i n g . In both politics the physical d i s p l a c e m e n t of the n e w c o n v e r t s w a s practiced as a m e a n s of distancing t h e m f r o m their previous c o m m u n i t i e s . In both R u s s i a a n d in t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e t h e c o n v e r s i o n of the p r e v i o u s aristocracies was a gradual process, which took place o v e r several generations. In R u s s i a , a wide r a n g e of nobles, including "Chinggisid princes f r o m Siberia to the C r i m e a , n o n - C h i n g g i s i d T a t a r n o b l e s of the Kazan r e g i o n , K a b a r d i a n n o b l e s a n d the I m e r i t i a n ruling d y n a s t y f r o m the C a u c a s u s , N o g a y a n d K a l m y k chiefs f r o m the Volga steppes—all at d i f f e r e n t times and f o r d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s — c h o s e to convert to Christianity ... Assimilation w a s c o m p l e t e w h e n a dynasty entered the Genealogical B o o k of t h e Russian nobility." 1 T h u s , both polities showed a remarkable capacity f o r integrating previous elites in which " c o n v e r s i o n m e a n t a fast track t o a s s i m i l a t i o n . " 2 In R u s s i a , t h e s p r e a d of O r t h o d o x y r e m a i n e d a state project: " T h e s i n g l e m o s t striking f e a t u r e of R u s s i a n m i s s i o n a r y a c t i v i t y r e m a i n s the u n u s u a l d e g r e e of g o v e r n m e n t i n v o l v e m e n t . In a country in which the church w a s f i r m l y w e d d e d to the state, religious c o n v e r s i o n w a s seen and used by the g o v e r n m e n t as a tool of state colonial policies." 3 In both post-Petrine R u s s i a , with the creation of the Saint H o l y S y n o d in 1721, and the post M a h m u d i a n O t t o m a n E m p i r e ( f r o m 1839 o n w a r d s ) with the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the !jeyhulislam into t h e g o v e r n m e n t m a c h i n e r y , (this position e v e n t u a l l y b e c o m i n g a C a b i n e t post,) — t h e h i g h e s t of religious o f f i c e s b e c a m e entirely s u b o r d i n a t e to t e m p o r a l p o w e r . 4 In both p o l i t i e s , t h e r e f o r e , it is possible to refer to an "institutionalising [ o f | piety." 5 Y e t it is here that the m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e c o m e s out. In matters of c o n v e r s i o n , (forced or voluntary), m a s s conversion w a s never an official policy of the O t t o m a n state f o r the population at large. Although large-scale Islamization did take place in s o m e areas in of the Balkans in the centuries f o l l o w i n g the O t t o m a n c o n q u e s t , it p r o c e e d e d s l o w l y , and until the t i g h t e n i n g of the b o r d e r s b e t w e e n the millets—

d u e to the i n f l u e n c e of n a t i o n a l i s m in the nineteenth century , —

the convert o f t e n kept contact with his/her previous c o m m u n i t y . A s Michel

'Khodarkovsky "Not by Word Alone," 275. 2

lbid. Ibid., 291.

3 4

On the office of the §eyhiilislam see "Shaikh al Islam," The Encyclopaedia of Islam, (London: 1934), 275-79. ^Gregory L. Freeze, "Institutionalising Piety: The Church and Popular Religion 1750-1850," in Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel, eds., Imperial Russia. New Histories for the Empire (Bloomington, IN: 1998), 210-49

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Balivet succinctly put it by Michel Balivet: "As to Islamization "a la ottomane", it is certainly not a case of religious or even cultural uniformity, most of the converts kept a part of their past heritage." 1 The recent major study by Ahmet Ya§ar Ocak on heresy in the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries is also very clear on this point: "The Ottoman Empire never considered the official religion as a belief that was to be imposed on its non-Muslim subjects, and it never carried out any activity in this regard."2 In other words, the Ottoman Empire never had a "Propaganda Fide," or an "Agency for Convert Affairs," nor did it have any press which was used by the Propaganda Fide to such good effect. It is only late in the Hamidian period (1876-1909) and the subsequent Young Turk period that this picture begins to change. 3

C O N V E R S I O N IN T H E EARLY O T T O M A N PERIOD

Cemal Kafadar's recent work has cast new light on the hitherto-accepted wisdom about the gazi, "the Muslim warrior for the faith," which held that part of his job description was to convert infidels. Even in the case of the legendary companion-in-arms of Sultan Osman I, Kose Mihal (Mikhalis the Beardless), who is supposed to be one of the first Greek converts and a notable early gazi, it appears that not only did he convert rather later than thought, but that he took part in early Ottoman raids and took his share of the booty as a Christian. 4 Kafadar also points out that many things that was were written about the gazi obligation to convert Christians were later additions, made by writers bemoaning the passing of the gazi tradition. Even the famous dervishchronicler, A§ikpa§azade, in his panegyric relating the exploits of Sultan Murat II (r. 1421-1451), was indulging in nostalgia and venturing an indirect criticism of Mehmed II's (1451-1481) more settled policies, which seemed to undermine the gazi tradition. 5

'Balivet, Romanie Byzantine, 190-91. ^Ahmet Ya§ar Ocak, Osmanli Toplumunda Zmdiklar ve Miilhidler (Istanbul: 1998), 94. 3 O n the Hamidian conversion policy, see Selim Deringil, The Well Protected Domains, esp. Chapter 2. ^Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley: 1995) 127. ^Ibid., 56-57, 146. A§ikpa§azade particularly criticised M e h m e d ' s discontinuation of the practice of the Sultan rising when he heard martial music as a sign of his readiness for ghaza. Compare this with, A§ikpa§azade Ahmed A§iki, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, Nihal Atsiz, ed. (Istanbul: 1947), 173: [When Salonica was conquered by the Ottomans] the great warrior for the faith. Sultan Murad Khan said onto the ghazis: " 0 ghazis! This is the greatest of blessings! Beloved are those ghazis who raid the fortress and force these infidels into Islam. I now love these ghazis dearly. God Willing from now on I will join them in their ghaza.

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Consideration of the gaii tradition in early Ottoman times raises another critical issue in the conversion process generally. Who was more concerned to impose the "true" religion, the centralised or centralising state, or the heterodox elements in the marches? Who was more likely to be successful in proselytising, the heterodox Sufi who had lived all his life among Christians and other non-Muslims, or the member of the cerebral high ulema, who sat in his medrese in urban centres. Kafadar seems to incline towards the former: "It was rarely if e\ er the ulema and the courtiers of Bagdad and Konya who set themselves the task of actively gaining converts. It was rather the largely unorthodox dervishes of the marches in south-western Asia and southern Europe who did so." Legendary gazis were often dervishes who were reputed to, "speak seventy two languages," who were, "holy figures trained for such cross-cultural exercises." 1 Speros Vryonis in his classic work on the Islamization of Greek Anatolia also notes, "Others were prepared for assimilation by the preaching of dervishes and ulemas, and by the religious syncretism that tended to equate Islamic practices and saints with those of the Christians." 2 Omer Liitfii Barkan, in one of his seminal articles on early Ottoman settlement in the Balkans drew a very detailed picture of the role of "colonising dervishes" in this process. The picture he presents is a somewhat stylised image, in which dervishes sporting exemplary pious devotion, "spiritually conquered the [infidel] in campaigns even preceding the arrival of the conquering armies" (kar$i tarafi daha evvel manen fethetmif)? Moreover, Barkan's point is that most of the converts made were the servants of the dervish lodges, and "could not but come under the spell of the mysterious and intense religious rituals practiced therein." So the "colonising" nature of the "colonising dervishes" is mostly confined to providing hospitality and security in "remote empty places." As to mass conversion, Barkan is unequivocal: "In truth in Ottoman history, until the conquest of Istanbul we cannot speak of mass Islamization or the cosmopoliticization of the state." 4 Therefore, even in his article specifically dealing with "colonising dervishes" the main emphasis is on their function as builders of hospices and providers of security on the roads. Their function as Isiamicizers is clearly secondary, and they proceed to convert through good example and intensity of faith, rather than through a

l

Ibid.,l\,13.

2

S p e r o s Vryonis, The Declim of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the P r o c e s s of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Berkeley: 1986), 359. ^ O m e r Liitfii Barkan, "Osmanli imparatorlugunda bir iskan ve kolonizasyon metodu olarak Vakiflar ve Temlikler I: Istila Devrinin Kolonizator T u r k Dervifleri ve Vakfiyeler," Vakiflar Dergisi 2 (1942): 2 8 3 , 2 8 4 , 3 0 3 . 304. 4 Ibid., 282. It must however be noted that Barkan has an axe to grind, in that the major point on his agenda is to "prove" that the Ottoman state was "essentially Turkish" and not made up of Islamized Christians, as claimed by s o m e historians, such as Herbert A . Gibbons in his The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire (Oxford: 1916).

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militant c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the i n d i g e n o u s f a i t h , as in the case of the Franciscan Friars. In other words, the "colonising dervishes" are also "bridge people" in the early years of Ottoman expansion, as seen in Vryonis' treatment of the Bekta§is.' Nor is this process confined to the early period of Ottoman expansion. William Hasluck, writing at the turn of the nineteenth century, claimed that some villages in the Albanian in the region of Koritza, "are said to have been converted within the last hundred years to Islam, or rather to Bektashism." 2 Heroes of epics such as the Dani^mendname century), Saltukname

(1480) and the Book ofDede

(late 13th thirteenth Korkut all incline towards

latitudinarianism and syncretism. The attitude is by no m e a n s necessarily "Islam or the sword," but a gradual insinuation into the lives of the "others," in which an important element is empathy with Christianity, together with an invitation to be included in the advantages of belonging to Islam. T h u s , the legendary Sari Saltuk could fight the Byzantines, but could also bring tears to their eyes by reciting the Bible at the altar. Nor was this empathy necessarily cynical and calculating. There may well have been genuine affection on both sides. 3 T h e obsession with Sunni orthodoxy did not arise until the emergence of Sunni Ottoman rivalry with the Shi'ite Safavids of Iran in the sixteenth century, "which was essentially a political, not a religious struggle." 4 Colin Imber draws attention to the same point: "The Sultan's role as defender of the faith obliged his government to identify and eliminate heretics. This task was not easy since the variety of beliefs and practices in the Ottoman Empire was as heterogeneous as the Muslim population itself." 5 T h e question that comes to mind at this point is the following. : was the story of O t t o m a n Islam that of a dialectic b e t w e e n tolerance/ latitudinarianism/syncretism on the one hand, and the imposition or a desired imposition of orthodoxy on the other? Even in nineteenth century documents the term is daire-i Islamiyete davet': to be invited into the fold of Islam. Yet, this co-exists with phrases such as the "correction of their beliefs" (tashih-i T h e Bekta§i were one of the earliest dervish lodges to settle and spread in Anatolia. They were renowned for their syncretism, which enabled them to relate much easier to Christians. The seminal work on the B e k t a j i order is J. K Birge, The Bektashi Order of Dervishes (London: 1937). Hasluck, Christianity and Islam Under the Sultans, 436. On the aspects of the Bekta^i order which m o s t appealed to Christians, see what is still the seminal study: J o h n K . Birge, The Bektashi Order of Dervishes (London: 1937). 3 K a f a d a r , Between Two Worlds, 7 1 , 7 2 , 7 3 . ^ A h m e t Ya^ar Ocak, Osmanh 5

Toplumunda

Zindtklar

ve Mulhidler,

102.

C o l i n Imber, Ebu's Su' ud, 92. A h m e t Ya§ar Ocak has drawn attention to the same problem: see his "XVI. Yiizyil Osmanli A n a d o l u s u n d a Mesianik hareketlerin bir tahlil denemesi," V: Milletlerarasi Tiirkiye Sosyal ve iktisat Tarihi Kongresi (Istanbul: 21-25 August 1989).

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akaid) and the fight against dalalet, or heresy. 1 My contention in this study is that conversion to Islam in the Ottoman Empire was always a much more ad hoc, a more pragmatic than dogmatic/canonical process than it was in Christian empires, and that it only acquired full state rigour and official backing in the nineteenth century as a reaction to foreign pressure, and the official recognition that apostasy from Islam was now legally possible.

F R O M T H E T A N Z I M A T T O T H E R E F O R M E D I C T : F O R E I G N I N T E R V E N T I O N IN RELIGIOUS MATTERS

The Tanzimat Edict of 1839 was intended to guarantee equality before the law to all subjects of the Ottoman Empire, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. 2 The Reform Edict of 1856 was designed to carry out the promises made in the Tanzimat Edict. The Reform Edict is much more detailed and much longer, as well as being more specific about religious freedom, stating that "As all forms of religion are and shall be freely professed in my dominions, no subject of my empire shall be hindered in the exercise of the religion that he professes, nor shall he be in any way annoyed on this account. No one shall be compelled to change their religion." 3 Although the belief among some of the contemporary observers was that the 1856 Edict specifically abolished the law ordaining the execution of apostates, there is no specific mention of apostasy anywhere in that d o c u m e n t . 4 Given that the 1856 Edict was so detailed regarding the position of non-Muslims, it is actually possible to see it as the outcome of a period of religious restlessness that followed the Edict of 1839. Indeed, in the years leading up to the Edict of 1856, we come across a certain "liveliness" in the religious scene life of the Empire. There appears to be a shifting of the sands, not only from Christianity to Islam and vice-versa, but also among the other religions of Ottoman society. 5 The official position

' See Deringil, The Well Protei l< d Domains,

esp. Chapter 3.

2

Diistur. (Register of Ottoman 1 .aws) Tertib-i Evvel (Istanbul Matbaa-i Amire: 1329), 4 - 7 . T h e actual wording states: "As there is nothing more precious in the world than security of life and honour, even a person w h o m a ; not be naturally inclined towards sedition will doubtless seek other w a y s if these are threatened" (my translation). For the standard English translation of the Tanzimat Edict, see J. C. Hure» itz. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. 1 (Toronto: 1956), 113-16. % u r e w i t z , Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 151. ^ M . M . A . Ubicini, Etat present de I'Empire Ottoman (Paris: 1876), 5-6: "Among the provisions of the Edict relating to religious matters one must note the abolition of the l a w , very rarely brought to bear, it is true, of the execution of apostates" (my translation). 5 F o r the case of nineteenth century Nablus, see Beshara D o u m a n i , Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900 (Berkeley: 1995), 23: "[In Nablus in the early nineteenth century] most of the Christians w e r e G r e e k O r t h o d o x . T h e rest b e c a m e Protestants around the mid-nineieethnineteenth century in response to the evangelical activities o f — t h e Church Missionary Society." Another major aspect of conversion was conversion within I s l a m , f r o m Shia to Sunni or vice-versa. T h a t aspect of the c o n v e r s i o n p r o c e s s is being deliberately excluded here. On that issue, see Selim Deringil, "The Struggle against Shi'ism in Hamidian Iraq," Die Welt des Isl-ims 30 (1990): 45-62.

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was always the same: that the state would not tolerate the use of force or any sort of compulsion in the matter of conversion to Islam, and that the legal execution of apostates from Islam was not allowed. Yet, there is also an unmistakable undercurrent. The gist and feel of the documentation leads one to the impression that there was continuous pressure on non-Muslims to convert, and a continuing danger that apostates would be put to death. The sheer repetition of the order that compulsion was not to be permitted, hints very strongly that a great deal of compulsion was being brought into play. How much of this was local and how much was stateapproved is a moot point. What is clear is that for the Ottoman ruling elite, "freedom of religion" meant "freedom to defend their religion." Indeed, the wording of the Reform Edict is entirely open to this interpretation. 1 The Ottoman Ambassador to London was instructed to ask Earl Russell the following questions: Can it be supposed that whilst condemning religious persecutions, the Sublime Porte has consented to permit offence and insult to any creed whatever? That at the same time she was proclaiming liberty to all non-Mussulman creeds, she had given them arms against Islamism? That she had, in fine, destroyed at the same stroke the guarantees with which she surrounded the liberty of religious convictions? 2 During the years leading up to the Reform Edict, there is a rising tide of documentation which implies ever-increasing sensitivity to this issue. Sensitivity to outside pressure, as well as to domestic reaction, meant that Istanbul had to walk a tightrope of reiterated orders to the provinces, repeatedly assuring the foreign envoys that it was keeping its house in order, and, by clear implication, that it did not need their help. This was precisely the gist of a conversation between the Ottoman Ambassador to London, Ahmed Muhtar Pa§a, and the "Great Elchi," the longtime British Ambassador to the Sublime Porte, Sir Stratford Canning, who was on leave in London. In a conversation over dinner at the Ottoman Embassy, which the Ottoman Ambassador reported on 31 January 1844, the matter of conversion and apostasy came up. Canning brought up the matter of "the recent events in Bilecik where an apostate was executed, this causing very See Dustur, 10. Also see Ismail Hakki Danismend, ìzahli Osmanli Tarihi Kronolojisi, Vol. 4 (Ankara: 1955), 175. In fact the Edict of 1856 was received by the Christian communities with mixed feelings because it brought mixed blessings, such as military service for non-Muslims, the payment of regular salaries to religious functionaries, making it illegal f o r them t o "milk" their c o m m u n i t i e s , the presence of l a y m e n on millet councils, and so on. O n this aspect, see Dani§mend, tzahli Osmanli Tarihi Kronolojisi, 176. ^Jeremy Salt, Imperialism,

Evangelism

and the Ottoman Armenians,

¡878-1896

(London: 1993),

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strong feelings among the Powers." 1 Canning then went on at some length about the promises made by the Porte in this regard. At this point Ahmed Muhtar Pa§a replied: I explained to His Excelleney in the calmest manner the religious obligations incumbent on all Muslims in these cases (bir mecburiyet-i diniyye keyfiyeti). 1 also pointed out that the fact that commitments had been made in Istanbul did not mean that such events would not take place in some locality. All we could hope to accomplish would be to try to prevent the oc currence of conditions which would bring into force such obligations. 2 The Ottoman Ambassador further pointed out to Canning that, "our religious obligations like our nationally established laws are very clear or this matter." He went on: "l ike Britain and France, the Sublime State and its subjects are most desirous of being quit of this vexing question." 3 The message behind the diplomatic wording was very clear: do not push us too far in a direction we want to go in a n y w a y . N o n e t h e l e s s , the O t t o m a n Ambassador made a point of telling Canning that there were "religious obligations" to execute apostates, which the Porte was doing its best to circumvent. Another very cleat indication that the Sublime State did not need outside interference in matters relating to the religious freedom of its subjects, is the official declaration made in 1851 that the privileges granted to nonMuslim subjects in 1453 by Mehmet the Conqueror, the conqueror of Istanbul, were still in force. It was clearly stated in the 1851 declaration that such a confirmation was going to be officially issued as an Imperial Edict (.Hat-i Hiimayun) to the (Jreek and Armenian Patriarchates, as well as the Chief Rabbi and the head of the Protestant community: "The full application of such privileges is a manifestation of the Sublime State's great affection for its subjects, and its determination not to admit any interference or meddling by any other party." 4 It is interesting that the Porte should have hit upon the stratagem of using some four hundred-year-old historical precedent to ward off outside pressure, and indeed the Hat of 1856 specifically mentioned Fatih

Ba§bakanlik Ar§ivi (Prime Ministry Archives), Istanbul. Hereafter cited as (BBA). Hariciye Mektubi. Foreign Ministry Correspondence (hereafter HR.MKT), 1/53 10 Muharrem 1260/31 January 1844. The archival citations and abbreviations used are the official catalogue entries as published in the Archive Catalogue, the Baçbakanhk Osmanh Argivi Kilavuzu. Because of the nature of the archival catalogues (lack of indexing, etc.) it is difficult to give precise figures on the number of cases dealing with conversion and/or apostasy in the late nineteenth century. My feeling is that they run into the hundreds. It will become more possible to give figures as the research progresses. 2 lbid. 3 Ibid. 4 BBA HR.MKT 49/95. The only date is 1268 (1851).

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Sultan Mehmed by name. 1 This is all the more remarkable as there has always been some doubt about the veracity of the granting of these privileges. 2 Halil inalcik has confirmed that although Sultan Mehmet II did indeed grant the Greek Patriarch Gennadius a berat, or letter of patent, no actual document has ever been found.-' A most striking case very evocatively illustrating the problems of foreign involvement, comes up on 27 January 1852, in the sancak of Lazistan, on the eastern Black Sea coast bordering Russia. The local Ottoman authorities reported that "recently some three or four Georgian children about thirteen to fourteen years of age, have presented themselves at the frontier post at Qiriiksu, and have immediately converted to Islam of their own free will. 4 When the representative of the Georgian headman (Tavat) came to see them in the barracks where they were being kept, and attempted to dissuade them, they reportedly told him, "we came here with the desire to become Muslims, we will on no account go back". The sancak officials pointed out that the usual procedure in these matters called for the presence of a consular official if the converts were Russian subjects. On the other hand, if they were Ottoman subjects, the officials said, then procedure simply called for the presence of the local Metropolitan or his representative, the kocaba§i. It was also determined by international agreement that to and fro movement of peoples across the border was to be regulated by passports, but the Georgian children had no passports. Thus, it was implied, the Russian Consul could not claim them. Another interesting sideline was the statement at the beginning of the report that "because the sancak of Lazistan is adjacent to the Russian border there has never been any shortage of people who come over and claim to become Muslim or people who cross over to the other side and accept other religions." 5 Another distinct possibility is that the children in question were either kidnapped or otherwise enslaved. The enslavement of Georgians and Circassians was widespread during these years in this frontier zone, and was a major bone of contention between the Porte and Stratford Canning. 6

1

Diistur, 8-9. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds. Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire Vol 1 (New York: 1982). Halil Inalcik, "The Status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch under the Ottomans," Turcica (1991): 409,415,416. Inalcik leaves no doubt however, that "The Ottomans favoured the Greek Orthodox Church," and "recognised it as part of the Ottoman state" (415,416). 4 B B A HR.MKT 42/7; 4 Rebiyuiahir 1268/ 27 January 1852. Mutasarrif of the sancak of Lazistan Abdullatif Bey to Sublime Porte. The gender of the children is not specified, the chances are [hat they were boys. ^Ibid. In fact, they made reference to an incident in the past when some one hundred people from the town of Arhavi had crossed over to Russia and not returned. On just how porous the porosity of borders in the region were, see Thomas M. Barret, "Lines of Uncertainty: The Frontiers of the Northern Caucasus," in Burbank and Ransel, eds., Imperial Russia, 148-73. 6 See Hakan Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, ¡800-1909 (London: 1996), esp. 102-7: "Measures against the White Slave Trade in the Black Sea, 1854-1857."

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Foreign interference seems to have been very much the order of the day, with many Ottoman non-Muslims claiming to be protected by some foreign power. 1 On 13 Septembei 1852 the Governor of loannina (in Epirus, Greece) was ordered to look into ihe death of the servant of a high ranking Ottoman official. The official, the Defterdar, or Head Accountant, a certain Gato Anendiri, had reported that his servant had died soon after converting to Islam. However, the death had occurred in somewhat suspicious circumstances and the Austrian Embassy had intervened, claiming that the deceased had been an Austrian subject. The Embassy was claiming that, according to established practice, an Austrian official had to be present when an Austrian subject converted to. No such official had been present at this conversion, however: therefore the deceased had died an Austrian subject. Moreover, the circumstances of the death were such that foul play was suspected. The implication from the Austrian side was that the convert had been beaten or otherwise abused while being pressured to convert. It was therefore duly arranged that a team of doctors from the Ottoman and Austrian sides should be present as the body was exhumed and an autopsy performed. 2 Many of the cases in the Balkans in the years leading up to the Reform Edict of 1856 involved the protection of so-called "Austrian subjects." In 1853 it was reported from i§kodra (Scutari) in Albania, that a certain George, and his cousin, a young girl named Antonia, had been pressured into accepting Islam. George had escaped from the fortress where he was being kept prisoner and had swum the across river to the Austrian side. Antonia, it was reported, was being held in the house of a certain Be§ir Galib, "in chains and under the most terrible pressure." George had told the Austrians that he wanted to return, but also wanted a guarantee that he would not be pressured to accept Islam. The Porte wrote to the Mutasarrif of Scutari that, "no Christian subject is ever to be pressured or forced in any way to accept Islam." It is worth noting that the Porte added, "such events will have a very bad effect in that area these days." The local authorities were told that they were to secure the safe conduct of both of the victims. 3 The thread running through the documentation is that the Ottomans constantly felt that the consulates and embassies were looking over their shoulder in matters relating to conversion. Such was the story of Katerina, a Greek woman who was orphaned and left in the care of a certain Talip Agha in loannina, who, "virtually imprisoned her and applied all manner of threats and promises for her to convert." The British Consul in Preveza then became ' O n the issue of Ottoman subjects claiming foreigner status in the pre-1839 period, see Ali thsan Bagi§, Osmanh TicaretinJi Gayri Muslimler (Ankara: 1983). 2 BBA HR.MKT 49/36; 13 Eyltil 1852/28 Zilkade 1268. Ministry of Interior to Vali of loannina. 3 BBA HR.MKT 54/42; 30 Rebivulevvel 1269/12 January 1853. Sublime Porte to the Mutasarrif of I§kodra

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involved, claiming Katerina as a British subject, and therefore demanding that a British official should be present at the moment of conversion. The Ottoman government instructed the governor of Ioannina to ascertain whether Katerina had converted voluntarily, and if whether she was in fact a British subject. It was clearly stated that no consular representative was needed if she was not. 1 As in the cases above of persons claiming Austrian protection, there seems to have been a recognised procedure, whereby foreign representatives were to witness that a conversion was indeed voluntary. A measure of how strongly the Ottomans felt about this is the fact that after the 1860 anti-Christian riots in Damascus, the Ottoman authorities demanded that the five hundred or so Christians who had been forced to embrace Islam be obliged to return to their original faith. 2

CASES O F C O N V E R S I O N A N D APOSTASY

In the documentation of the period one finds frequent references to cases of conversion and subsequent apostasy. The orders from the centre are always in the same vein: no force or compulsion is admissible in matters of conversion. Although this author has been unable to find such a document as a "Regulation for Conversions," there is frequent reference to conversion being carried out "according to the proper procedure" (usul ve niiamma tevfiken). According to these regulations, the highest-ranking religious authority available in the community of the convert had to be present at the conversion. Together with him, the convert's parents or next of kin should be in attendance. The documents testifying to the act of legitimate conversion were to be signed and sealed by Muslim and Christian officials alike. The procedure should not be hurried, and if a few days delay was required for the priest or the next of kin to arrive, the conversion was to be postponed. Only those children who had reached the age of puberty were allowed to convert. Also, in the case of girls who came to the ceremony veiled, the veil had to be lifted to ascertain identity. 3 This emphasis on bureaucratic regularity is also very evident in a study of cases of conversion in the Ottoman province of Bursa. In post-Tanzimat Bursa, the registers of the religious courts, (the sicils,) show that the procedure involved numerous stages. First, the convert or intended convert had 'BBA HR.MKT 47/81; 26 §evval 1268/13 August 1852. Sublime Porte to the Vali of Yanina. Leila Fawaz, Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in the Lebanon and Damascus in I860 (Berkeley: 1994), 152. 3 BBA DabiJiye Nezareti Hukuk MU§avirli|i (DH-HMS) 13/47; 23 Haziran 1320/6 July 1904. General no: 244. File Number 62570. (Ministry of the Interior. Legal Advisors Bureau). In the catalogue of the documents of the Ministry of the Interior Legal Advisors Bureau there is a special category entitled ihtida (conversion). Although the regulations cited above date from 1904, they are the updated formulations of earlier practices. 2

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to make their desire known to the local administrative council of the province (.Meclis-i idare-i

Vilayet)

Second, the administrative council carried out the

"official questioning" of the person, ascertaining their religion, community affiliation, and the fact that they were "free, sane, and adult" (htir,akil balig).

ve

At this point the 'candidate" was asked if he/she had been "tricked,

forced or coerced" ( c e b r , igfal, tergib) into conversion. Next, the person was asked by the council to repeat the sacred formula in the presence of the council and the governor or his representative. At this point representatives of the former community of the convert were to be present as well as representatives of the foreign powers, in the case of a convert claiming protected status. Third, the case was then referred to the kadi court, where the s a m e procedure was carried out again. At the end of all this the convert was accepted as a Muslim and registered as such, being given a "certificate of conversion"(ihtida Harm)} This sticking for procedure did not escape the notice of the betterinformed foreign observers: "The whole procedure that is prescribed in cases of conversion to M o h a m m e d a n i s m f r o m any f o r m of religion is j u d i c i o u s , moderate, and calculated to distinguish between real and forced conversion, and to give the f o r m e r co-religionists of the convert e v e r y opportunity of satisfying themselves that the conversion is voluntary." 2 On 5 May 1844. a case was reported f r o m A k k a (Acre) whereby a young Christian girl purportedly converted to Islam, but the conversion was challenged by her parents and relatives. When summoned before the Shar'ia court she recanted, saying that she had been forced into the act. The court duly ordered that as she was a minor she should be given back to her parents. 3 The orders state in no uncertain terms that: "No subject of the Sublime State shall be forced by anyone to convert to Islam against their wishes." It had come to the Foreign Ministry's attention that: There are many cases reported where the said person is a child w h o been importuned by an insistence to accept Islam....In no way is to be admitted as it is entirely in contravention of current laws regulations as set down in the letters of patent ( b e r a t ) given to various Archbishoprics. 4

has this and the

' O s m a n ( v 'etin, Sicillere Gfin Rursa'da Ihtida Hareketleri ve Sosyat Sonu^lari 1472- 1909 (Ankara: 1994), 3-5. R. M . Ramsay, Impressions of Turkey During Twelve Years' Wanderings (London: 1897), 163. 3

B B A HR .MKT 3/65; 16 Rebiyiilahir 1260/ 5 May 1840. Foreign Ministry to Commanders of Akka and Sayda. ^Ibid. The phrase used is arz-i Is'amiyet' le ibram ve ilhah.

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The pattern is usually the same. A Christian converts to Islam, the community intervenes, claiming some irregularity in the conversion process, the victim is called before the Kadi's court, and the court, no doubt under instructions from Istanbul, finds some sort of face-saving solution. All this is a far cry from officially sanctioned execution of apostates. At least in one instance, the official policy of the state was stated very clearly in terms which can only be described as, "you are instructed to look the other way." On 30 October the Mii§ir of the Army of Rumelia, Re§id Pa§a, was given instructions regarding his request for instructions on what to do with the apostates in the region of Noveberde. He was told in no uncertain terms that: "In offensive matters (madde-i mekruhe) such as these, [the offenders] should be sent to Istanbul, without being officially referred to the local Kadi court." It was deemed essential that the apostates be removed from their locality with the minimum of fanfare as, "if the case is announced in the court, then they are shipped off to Istanbul, the matter will still come to the attention of the foreign embassies and cause useless loose talk." Therefore, "the above mentioned (apostates) should be put in prison, and then after some time, when the affair had quieted down, they should be made to appear to have escaped from jail and speedily sent on their way" (habishaneden firar edmiscesine hakimane deflerine). As a second option they were to set out on their exile to Istanbul under escort, but "be made to appear to have escaped during the journey" (esnayi rahda bir tarafa savu§turulmak)}

When the case of conversion involved a priest, matters could become even more entangled. On 31 October 1852 it was reported that an Armenian priest had converted to Islam in a village near Van in eastern Anatolia. Not only had he converted, but he had set about demolishing the village church, "in an act of wanton enmity against the local population." Understandably, this had "caused much suffering and discomfort for the population." Acting on a complaint from the Armenian Patriarchate, the Porte ordered that since there were no other Muslims in the village the priest should be warned to behave himself, but if he persisted he would be removed to a nearby Muslim village. 2 Here, as in the cases above, pragmatism and expediency seems to have determined the official response, rather than doctrinal rigour. Yet here, too, the questions of why the priest converted in the first place, and why he felt so strongly about his new faith remain unanswered.

'BBA irade Dahiliye4627 17 §evval 1260/30 October ¡844. BBA HR:MKT 53/7; Selh-i Muharrem 1269/31 October 1852. Enclosing letter from Armenian Patriarch.

2

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Another thorny anil ambivalent issue was the question of what defined voluntary or forced conversion. In all the documents claiming that the victim had been forced, the turn of phrase is invariably: "although nothing can be said against those who genuinely accept Islam, the use of f o r c e is against the Sultan's wishes and against the rulings of the Sharia." In August 1844 a Christian girl was abducted by a Muslim Albanian while working in a field in the region of Leskofca near Ni§. The man intended to rape her; in order to sa\ e her life and honour, the girl declared that she was willing to convert. Later, upon being questioned by the Kadi's

court, she

recanted and told the court that she had only converted to save her life and honour, and she was still a Christian. She was then kept in confinemenl in a Muslim household, while her parents complained to the Metropolitan at Ni§, and he who in turn forwarded the complaint to the Orthodox Archbishop in Istanbul. The parents of the girl continued to complain that she was being pressured in the Muslim household where she was confined. The Porte dealt with the matter and ordered the Kaimakam to determine whether the conversion was forced or sincere. 1 A similar case was reported in Thessaloniki in the same y e a r . A t e n - y e a r year-old A r m e n i a n girl, having secured her f a t h e r ' s permission, was taken to the local bathhouse by a Muslim w o m a n . When she did not return home at the appointed hour, her parents went to the Muslim home, only to be told that their daughter had converted to Islam and that they should go away. The girl's parents, after failing to secure justice locally, had arrived in Istanbul to lodge a formal complaint with the Patriarchate stating that the girl was underage and that duress was used. T h e Porte, using the formula above, "although nothing can be said e t c . . . " , ordered that the local authorities determine the sincerity of the conversion, the age of the girl, and stated very clearly that: "if the illegal use of force has occurred, this is very damaging for the confidence of the population and can cause disruption of the order of the state..." (insilab-i emniyet-i memleketi

miistevcib).2

reayayi

mucib

ve ihlal-i

nizam-i

On 16 July 1853, it was reported that in the small

town of Bandirma in the Marmara region, a Greek girl named Despina had announced that she had converted to Islam. She did so "as a fully conscious adult person and not as the result of threats or fear of anybody." This she freely declared in the administrative council of the kaza

of B a n d i r m a . T h e

c o m m u n i t y had then warned her family that she was about to be sent to Istanbul, and somehow arranged for her mother to smuggle her out of the Muslim household where she was being kept. T h e representative of the local Metropolitan was summoned, and the "town was searched high and low" with no result. T w o things stand out here. First, the Christian population could

' B B A HR .MKT 6/48; 6 Çaban 1260/2] August 1844. Instructions to the Kaimakam 2

of Nig.

B B A HR .MKT; 4/10; Gurre-i ( emaziyelahir 1260/18 June 1844. Sublime Porte to the Mii}ir of Thessaloniki.

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openly appeal to justice and claim that the conversion had been carried out in contravention of the accepted norms. Second, as in the cases above, the person in question is somehow "disappears," thus ceasing to be a problem for all concerned. 1 A case occurring in the kaza of Golos in Albania is very interesting, as it gives us some rare insights into the actual process and procedure of conversion, and indeed apostasy. A report signed by all of the members of the administrative council of Golos (Kaza idare Meclisi) and dated 23 June 1852 dealt with a miner named Aleksi, who had converted to Islam about one year previously. The conversion, it was stated, "had been carried out according to the proper procedure, the convert appeared before the council where all the leaders of the religious communities (ruesayi millet) were present. The council then delayed deliberations and he was asked repeatedly if he was acting of his own free will." Aleksi replied in the affirmative and took the name of A h m e d . 2 One year later, Ahmed/Aleksi once again appeared before the Council, declaring that he had reverted to Christianity. When questioned by the Council he declared, "I had then become a Muslim, but I remained hungry and naked, and could find no bread, now I want to go back to my old religion." The Council repeatedly tried to convince him that what he was doing was a bad idea: We tried several times to convince him, but he insisted I am Christian not Muslim. The ruling of the Sharia for such cases is well known. However, in order to avoid loose talk, the Imperial order of 16 §evval has specified that all those Christians converting to Islam should be questioned first in their localities and then by the kaza councils. We beg to be informed if there is a similar regulation dealing with those who first accept Islam then become apostates. 3 Several points stand out. First, Aleksi hoped to improve his lot in life by converting, and was disillusioned, deciding that if he were to be poor he would prefer to be a poor Christian. Second, the Council admitted that the Sharia ruled in favour of execution, but were was also aware that this was not really feasible or desirable, hence the call for instructions which could provide a way out of their dilemma. Third, the document specified that the conversion procedure was to be carried out in accordance with specific government regulations. Fourth, the reference to "loose talk," or more specifically "the wagging of tongues" (kil-u kal), refers almost certainly to meddling foreigners.

^BBA HR.MKT 63/96; 9 §evval 1269/17 July 1853. Memorandum of the Administrative Council of the Kaza of Bandirma. 2 B B A HR.MKT 41/93; 5 Ramazan 1268/23 June 1852. Administrative Council of the kaza of Golos to Sublime Porte. 3

Ibid.

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Sometimes people converted f r o m somewhat pedestrian motivations. This was the case for a certain French doctor, Monsieur Merlot, who converted and took the name of Murad Bfendi in 1852. Having incurred rather large gambling debts while serving as an Ottoman government doctor in Erzurum in eastern Anatolia, he presented himself in Istanbul, declaring that he had become a Muslim. The Porte was somewhat embarrassed because his creditors, w h o were French citizens, were a p p l y i n g pressure through the French Embassy. In the end it was decided that Monsieur Merlot be accepted as a Muslim and given another posting, the caveat being that a certain percentage of his salary w a s to be withheld at source and handed over to the French consulate in Erzurum. 1 A similar case was that of A g o b , an Armenian medical student who expressed the desire to convert. The directorate of the Imperial Medical School was directed to ascertain whether Agob had any debts. 2 Straightforward material gain is given as the motive for conversion of a J e w , a certain Hidayet, who appears in the memoirs of a well well-known Young Turk, E§ref Ku§cuba§i. Ku§cuba§i met Hidayet when he was a prisoner of war in Egypt in 1917. His account of the encounter is worth quoting at length: According to my detailed investigations, this truant from the synagogue [havra kaggini] was originally a Gelibolu Jew who entered the service of someone from the Palace and converted at the age of fifteen or sixteen. He then studied at the veterinary school in Istanbul. Meanwhile F r e e d o m was d e c l a r e d . [This is a r e f e r e n c e to the Y o u n g T u r k Revolution of 1908—S. D.). At this point Hidayet interpreted national freedom as religious freedom and unsuccessfully tried to reconvert back to Judaism. At some point Hidayet decided that his conversion was sincere. N o doubt bearing in mind the possibilities of promotion and profit, but maybe also as a result of his uneasy conscience over his treachery to Moses as well as his treason to M u h a m m e d , (Hz. Musa'ya kanciklik ve Hz- Muhammed'e kahpelik) as well as a desire for G o d ' s forgiveness, or e \ e n simply a desire to clean up his filth before the public, he went on the haj, ascended Ararat and prayed at the Prophet's tomb. But even in the Holy Places he w a s unable to repress his true n a t u r e , b u y i n g rugs and o t h e r g o o d s f r o m needy p i l g r i m s at scandalously low prices. 3

' B B A H R . M K T 49/70; 2 Cemaziyelahir 1268/ 2 4 M a r c h 1852. Va\i of E r z u r u m t o Sublime Porte. H R . M K T 54/86; 6 R a m a / a n 1269/17 January 1853. Sublime Porte to Vali of Erzurum. 2 B B A H R . M K T 54/56; 30 Rehiyulevvel 1269/12 January 1853. Sublime Porte to Director of Imperial Medical School. 3 E§ref Ku§cuba§i, Hayber'de Turk Cengi (Istanbul: 1997). E§ref Ku§cuba§i was a notorious hit man of the Committee of Union and Progress (fedayi), and one of the founders of the Y o u n g Turk Intelligence Organisation, the Te^kilati Mahsusa. His account strongly reflects very much the anti-Semitic prejudices c o m m o n a m o n g s o m e of these m e n . H i d a y e t is a n a m e o f t e n indicating that the person is a convert, meaning "the right way or the way to Islam."

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Just what was the procedure involved in the process of conversion and in the event of apostasy? We derive some idea of the details from a case in Edremid, on the Anatolian Aegean coast. A certain "Kirman son of Yanko," actually from an inhabitant of the island of Mytilini who was a guest in the town of Edremit, claimed to have converted to Islam: When questioned in the Kadi's court the said convert pronounced the sacred formula and declared, "yes I am leaving the false religion (din-i batil) and accepting (he True Faith, amen." He was given the name of Mehmed. However, some eight days later he appeared again before us declaring, "yes I had then pronounced those words, but I spoke them in jest as a joke ( l a t i f e ve ma'^ukaten)." He was given ample opportunity to repent, but insisted in his apostasy. The court pointed out that, "in accordance with the rulings of the Sharia, the above mentioned apostate was imprisoned, and sent off to Istanbul." 1 What is worth noting in this case is the pronouncement "I spoke in jest," which, together with a plea of temporary insanity, was a standard formula employed when apostates strove to escape the consequences of their act, together with pleas of temporary insanity. The other interesting aspect of this episode is that the Sharia court's ruling ordered nothing worse than the imprisonment of the culprit. The court also pointed out that they had been ordered to send the offender to Istanbul. As in other similar cases by this date, the chances are that Kirman would "get lost" or "escape" somewhere along the line. In some of the cases it seems that a veritable "tug-of-war" took place over the religious loyalties of converts/apostates. On 8 March 1853 it was reported from the kaza of Tekirdag in Thrace that a certain young woman named Agasi had accepted Islam and had been taken into the household of the Kadi's, deputy (naib). The woman's husband, together with other Christians, contested the conversion and had Agasi brought before the local council, where she denied having converted, claiming she was abducted. She was then given into the charge of the representative of the Greek Metropolitan, and for some, twenty days she was kept in the house of the local Greek headman (kocaba^i). This time, however, the Muslim population abducted her from this place and placed her with a Muslim household. The matter went up as high as the Patriarchate in Istanbul, who requested that the girl be brought to Istanbul for questioning. 2 ' b B A H R . M K T 50/63; 8 Zilhicce 1269/12 September 1853. M e m o r a n d u m f r o m Kadi Court of Edremid, signed and sealed by all those present. 2

B B A H R . M K T 56/65; 2 6 C e m a z i y e l e v v e l 1269/8 M a r c h 1853. Request f r o m the G r e e k Patriarchate.

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CONCLUSION

Nehemiah

Levi/ion

has

stated,

that

"Success

was

Islam's

advertisement." The peaceful incentive for conversion in various societies was that Islam appeared as the religion of the p o w e r f u l , the warrior, prosperous trader, or numinous divine. 1 In A f r i c a , as Robin Horton has n o t e d , Islam served as a "catalyst" for changes which "were in the air anyway," and once people appeared to go through the motions, Islam was quite happy to accept its role as a "catalyst" and "not nag excessively at those who lie toward the pagan end of the continuum." 2 The same can be said to be true f o r Ottoman Islam in the heyday of Ottoman power. But what happened when Ottoman Islam was manifestly unsuccessful, such as in the nineteenth century, when Islam was on the defensive, and Muslims feared losses in their ranks? W e may posit that as a context in which shifting internal religious balances, foreign pressure, and a sincere desire to "catch up with the world" caused the subsequent transformation in late Ottoman society. On the one hand, the state sincerely sought to prevent the killing of apostates, yet on the other, it was desperate to safeguard its f l o c k against foreign (missionary/diplomatic) incursions. 3 This became manifest when the Porte cracked down on Protestant missionary work in 1864: "The Ottoman authorities, in typical f o r m , struck with f o r c e that which they had left unchecked." Many of the fifty or so Turkish converts were seized, others disappeared, the books of the Bible Society were confiscated and missionaries were put out of their dwellings. "The Turkish Government demonstrated that, regardless of its firmans, conversion from Islam was not permitted." 4 It may well be the case also that the centre sent mixed messages to the provinces, on the one hand telling them to prevent forced conversions and subsequent apostasy, but on the other, urging them to stand f i r m against foreign pressure, as certainly happened in the subsequent Hamidian period. 5 A s Vryonis has very aptly put it in reference to an earlier period: "With the collapse or w e a k e n i n g o f . . . centralised states or at t i m e s w h e n

they

felt threatened by the real or potential power of Christians (either internally or

' L e v t z i o n , Conversion 2

to Islam.

2.

R o b i n Horton, "African Conversion," Africa XL1 (1971): 85-108.

3 O n the tension between the Porte and the Protestant missionaries, see Salt, Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians. 4 L y l e L. Vander W e r f f , Christian Missions to Muslims. The Record. Anglican and Reformed Approaches in India and the Near East, 1800 1938 (New York: 1942), 162-63. Similarly, Cyrus Hamlin w a s to bemoan the fact that "England's f l a g of religious liberty in Turkey had been struck, and her influence since then has been weak and wavering." See Among the Turks, 92. 5 Deringil, The Well Protected D< mains. 112-34.

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A N D

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127

externally) then the legal status and protection of the non-Muslims lapsed in some form or another." 1 Particularly after the Reform Edict of 1856, fear mounted among the Muslims. The general ambiance even found its way into contemporary fiction. Edwin Pears cites a novel published in 1864, when in which the protagonist, a Muslim Turk f r o m Salonica, arrives in D a m a s c u s and witnesses two Christians being physically and verbally abused in the market place and asks a shopkeeper: But have you not always had Christians among you? What have they done lately to excite your anger? [The shopkeeper screamed screams | What have they done? They have year by year been invading our privileges. When I was a boy they were humble rayahs; no Christian durst mount a horse, or take the wall of a M o s l e m , or dress in handsome clothes; now they are richer than ourselves and seek protection of foreign consuls...I have even seen one or two bear arms. May God Curse them. Wait until the firman comes to Damascus, and we will make short work of it. The hero then protests that this is wrong and inhuman, only to be accused of being an infidel kafir: "He calls himself a Moslem and talks like a Christian. What is he? A l urk s u r e l y . . . N a ' a m , yes indeed, he is one of the Stamboulis who come to govern us." 2 The cases cited in the archival material above are representative of the general pattern in these matters and the examples can be multiplied. The fact that something fundamental had changed in the relationship between the state and its non-Muslim subjects is brought out by the phrases like, "damaging for the confidence of the population," "no-one shall be importuned by pressure to accept Islam," or "the prevention of loose talk." It was becoming increasingly taken for granted, by the rulers and the ruled, that the populace was not a faceless mass of infinitely reducible particles, but an aggregate of individuals, who could, and did, demand justice. The documentation shows also that people became traceable. If an apostate were to be killed or otherwise disappear in transit while being displaced, the chances are that his or her family could and did demand an explanation. Moreover, perhaps unlike earlier periods in

' S p e r o s V r y o n i s , "The E x p e r i e n c e of C h r i s t i a n s under Seljuk and O t t o m a n D o m i n a t i o n , Eleventh to Sixteenth Century," in Michael Gervers and Jibran Bikhazi, eds., Conversion and Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies (Toronto: 1990), 185-216. Although Vryonis is speaking of a much earlier phenomenon, the basic principle is applicable in the nineteenth century. 2

E d w i n Pears, Turkey and Its People (London: 1911), 370-71. It should be noted that Sir Edwin Pears was no lover of Turkey or Turks, and the novel he is citing is The Hakim Bashi, written by a Dr. Humphry Sandwith. Nonetheless it is illustrative, as it appears in a section in Pears' book called "Signs of Improvement in Turkey," and the hero is projected as a positive figure.

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Ottoman history, access to "proper channels" for the seeking of such justice was, at least ostensibly, more easily available to non-Muslims. Also, it may well be the case that, as the empire b e c a m e more centralised, the state permeated levels of socien which it had not reached before. This would mean that disputes over religious affiliation, citizenship and the like would be treated publicly, as opposed to being informally resolved at the community level. 1 Yet, even in what are official documents, with their "proper" guarded wording, one senses an undercurrent, of distrust and fear. O n e thing that immediately stands out in all of the cases is the oft-repeated f o r m u l a in instructions f r o m the centre: "force should not be used in a case of conversion." Yet the fact that the order is repeated in so many cases leads one to think that coercion was indeed prevalent. The emphasis on bureaucratic regularity, and the desire to prove, time and again, to the foreign powers that a conversion was voluntary, points in the same direction. This does in fact lead one to speculate whether, in the days between the Tanzimat Edict of 1839 and the R e f o r m Edict of 1856, the new atmosphere of religious f r e e d o m for Christians caused a panic a m o n g M u s l i m s , who felt that their hitherto d o m i n a n t position was t h r e a t e n e d , m a k i n g them m o r e prone to f o r c e Christians to convert. The obvious difficulty for the local authorities in such cases was that they were being told to pass j u d g e m e n t over something that was so relative as to be nearly impossible to quantify, that is, sincerity. Another matter which should be taken into consideration is that of communication between the centre and the provinces. It must be remembered that at the time of the eases mentioned above, the telegraph had not yet reached the provinces: the first limited network of cables being was put up only in 1854. 2 The room for manoeuvre, allowed by the vagaries of communication with the provinces was to be considerably constrained after the arrival of the telegraph. The gist of all of these documents is the emphasis that justice had to be seen to be done. More often than not, the concern was to find some sort of face-saving solution that would satisfy all sides. H o w e v e r , this w a s very difficult, as the decision had to satisfy the Porte, the foreign p o w e r s , the Christian non-Muslim community, and the local population. Y e t , this is not to buy into the Eastern Question notion that "The Turks are only setting up a smoke screen" of promised reforms. The desire and the perceived need for reform were genuine enough, it was just that for the "Turks" saving face was a vital matter — one that the foreigners chose to ignore. ' l am grateful to Dr. Miige Goçek for bringing this latter possibility to my attention. ^Stanford Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. 2, (Cambridge, U K : 1997) 120. T h e installation of the telegraph lines began during the Crimean war. T h e furthest extent of telegraphic service was to be in the 1890s, when there was a widespread network of cables. M y thanks to the anonymous outside reader for drawing my attention to this, and f o r reminding me that the telegraph spread over much of North America at the same time.

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AND

A P O S T A S Y

129

Even more strikingly, it becomes apparent from the gist of most of the documentation, that what was at issue was not religion at all, but sovereignty. The Greek man claiming Austrian protection, the Georgians being claimed by the Russians, the Greek woman being claimed by the British consul at Preveze, the Jew converting to Protestantism and claiming British protection, even the dead body of a convert, have all became areas of contestation between rival claims of sovereignty. Why should the Austrian Empire become involved in the death of an obscure servant? Why should as senior a statesman as Sir Stratford Canning take it upon himself to personally pursue the cases of obscure converts and/or apostates? One can only surmise that the issue was not the apostates themselves but national prestige, in an age when prestige was everything. One recalls drawings in the illustrated British press like the one of a lone, apparently unarmed "white man" being carried on the shoulders of "native bearers," as he nonchalantly reads his newspaper in a street thronged by "natives." The caption reads: "By prestige alone." 1 The convert or apostate became the bone of contention in an international prestige war, in which the Great Powers sought to impose their will on the last remaining non-Christian Great Power, that aberration which ruled millions of Christians as a Muslim empire. In a world context where Britain was emerging as the leading world power, followed by others also imbued with their versions of the mission civilisatrice, conversion to Islam seemed the a refusal of the very norms of civilisation. For Western Orientalists and statesmen alike, conversion to Islam was seen as "somewhat aberrant behaviour, a business of exchanging a patently superior creed (i.e., Christianity or Judaism) for one which was both alien and relatively primitive," 2 whereas conversion back to Christianity seemed a re-affirmation of their Western superiority. The Ottoman fallback position in all these cases was to argue that the concern was first and foremost their concern. If there was something untoward surrounding the death of a person, it was, "part of the justice seeking nature of the Sublime State" to order an autopsy. If there were privileges of non-Muslims which needed protecting, why, it had always been the historic tradition to do precisely that. For both the Ottomans and the Western Powers the issue of prestige was nothing less than a matter of contested sovereignty.

Sema Goksel, Imperial Visions and Narrations: British Imperialism in India and its Reflections in Literature. M.A. thesis., Department of History, Bogaziçi University (Istanbul: 1997), 54. The drawing is taken from the Graphic. S. Humphreys, Islamic History, 274.

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It has been the contention of this study that mass conversion of nonMuslims was never official policy in the Ottoman Empire, as it was in the case of the Spanish and Russian empires. Only when confronted with a massive missionary incursion in the nineteenth century, and after it became legal for a Muslim to change his/her religion, did the Ottoman authorities seek ways to protect their Muslim population. Whether or not this protection included complicity of the centre with radical measures taken against apostates in the provinces is a moot point. Ahmet Ya§ar Ocak has stated unequivocally: "The Ottoman centre never used Islam as a weapon for the conversion of rionMuslims, in fact it deliberately avoided doing so. [However] Sunni Islam was used, as an ideology of suppression, in the most unremitting fashion, against deviants or heretics that sprang from among their own ranks." 1 Therefore, in earlier periods official Islam and its enforcers were much more concerned with "deviant" belief systems such as Shi'ism or other forms of Islamic religious syncretism, rather than with enforcing mass conversion among non-Muslims. It is thus at the level of official state involvement in the conversion process that the Ottoman position across the centuries remains ambivalent. In earlier periods such as the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries, when the borders between orthodoxy and heresy were somewhat vague, particularly in frontier zones such as Anatolia, the religious borderlines, so to speak, remained vague and fluid. In the later periods, particularly as the state expanded and modernised after the Tanzimat, it became necessary to define who belonged and who did not. This concern was to overlap with the new legal infrastructure, such as exemplified by the Nationality Regulation (Tabiyet Nizamnamesi) passed in 1869. 2 In the late nineteenth century, when the empire was very much on the defensive, indeed, was fighting for its life, it became a matter of vital interest that there should be no defection from its ranks.

'Ahmet Ya§ar Ocak, Osmanli imparatorlugu'iida Zindiklar ve Miilhidler (Istanbul: 1997), 95. This is a path-breaking work which stands to become the seminal reference work volume on this issue. 2

Dustur, l.Tertip, 16-18.

A N OTTOMAN VIEW OF MISSIONARY ACTIVITY IN HAWAII

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the Ottoman Empire, the only non-Christian great power of Europe, was involved in a losing competition with the Christian great powers. As its territory spanning Europe and Asia steadily dwindled, and European powers such as Great Britain, Russia, and France claimed the right to protect various Christian minorities, one of the most grievous threats to the integrity of the empire seemed to come from missionary activity. Missionaries had long been active in the Ottoman Empire, but in the last quarter of the nineteenth century missionary work acquired an unprecedented momentum as part of the "White Man's Burden" to civilize the world. 1 From around the middle of the century a new factor was added to the complications surrounding the Ottoman state's fight for survival: American Protestant missionary activity. 2 Although a small group of men at first, by the turn of the century they had acquired considerable presence in Ottoman domains, particularly through their educational activities. With the accession to the throne of Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909) the Islamic aspect of the state ideology acquired renewed emphasis. Rapidly missionaries became something of a bête noire for the sultan, who saw them as an extremely dangerous fifth column steadily increasing their influence in his already threatened domains. 3 The document translated below is located in the Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul. It was written by the Ottoman consul general in New York, Munci Bey, who served in that position from 1894 to 1897. The fact that an Ottoman diplomat in New York should have taken the trouble to report on more than one occasion (the letter refers to other communications that I have not seen) on missionary activity in a place as remote as the Hawaiian Islands gives an idea of how seriously the Ottomans took this threat. The document also suggests that the official in question had been briefed by his superiors to keep tabs on missionary' activity in the United States.

' e . J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875-19! I (New York: Pantheon Books 1987) 76 On American missionary activity in Turkey, see Frank Andrews Stone, Academies for Anatolia (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984). Jeremy Salt, "A Precarious Symbiosis: Ottoman Christians and Foreign Missionaries in the Nineteenth Century," International Journal of Turkish Studies 3 (1985-86): 53-67

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LETTER FROM THE OTTOMAN CONSULATE IN NEW YORK TO THE SUBLIME PORTE DATED 21 AUGUST I8971 The islands generally referred to by the name of the Hawaiian Isles are eight in number and are situated in the Pacific Ocean. 2 Until about 60 years a g o their people lived a happy life according to their tribal customs, not having any religion or any modern law. Then an extreme misfortune befell them and they somehow became the headquarters of the A m e r i c a n Protestant m i s s i o n a r i e s . A s is well k n o w n , these missionaries are an infamous band who use religion to achieve political power and advance their material interest. When they first arrived on these isles, whose mild climate is very suitable for the growth of rare and beautiful plants, and whose people are of a soft and accommodating disposition, it was as if they had fallen upon a free banquet the likes of which they had never seen before. A s is their w o n t , they set about using religion as a front for their vicious aggression and soon they had converted the Hawaiians to the Lutheran faith. By sinking their talons right into the very conscience of the people, they made their rulers bow down b e f o r e the cross and forced t h e m to accept all m a n n e r of humiliation in its name. Even though the local custom f o r b a d e the acquisition of property by foreigners, they convinced the rulers that they had to have a base for their religious work and thus tricked them into granting them this privilege. N o w they were ready to reveal their true intentions and secret plans. They returned briefly to the United States and began to hold meetings in churches and meeting halls. In these meetings they announced that they had discovered the Hawaiian people, who had been heathen before their arrival and were now Protestant; these same had been savages but had now achieved moral fortitude. They recounted all this with such conviction and sincerity of purpose that they soon were able to collect great s u m s of m o n e y f r o m t h e A m e r i c a n s , w h o , like p e o p l e everywhere, have a great weakness for religion. All this m o n e y was collected in the name of religious fervour in circumstances that are worth describing in detail. When the men and women at these meetings hear about the victories of Christianity they are overcome with j o y . In a state of mind thai approaches a trance, they strip off their rings, necklaces, gold watches and chains and throw them into the collection box. Some hand over all the money in their pockets or sign checks worth several thousand dollars. Others immediately make out deeds of gift for valuable property, or even donate their own dwellings. N o n e of this is exaggerated; in order to ascertain its truth please refer to my

'Ba§bakanlik Ar§ivi Yildiz Arfivi Hususi Maruzat 376/68; Letter f r o m Ottoman Consul in New York to Ottoman Foreign Ministry 21 A u g . 1897. 2

I t might prove interesting to compare the rendition of events given by the Ottoman consul with an authoritative work on Hawaiian history such as Gavan D a w s , Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

MISSIONARY

ACTIVITY

IN

HAWAII

133

previous communication dated 13 August 1897 in which 1 enclosed a clipping from the New York Herald. In short, all these millions of dollars thus collected were gathered in the name of civilizing the Hawaiians and bringing them religious faith. However, the missionaries completely misappropriated these funds and used them to buy property for themselves. Because land [in Hawaii] was very cheap in those days, these millions were able to buy up a large proportion of the islands. T h e missionaries now combined preaching with planting and acquired large estates, which they gave over to sugar cane cultivation, using the local population as agricultural labour. These poor people thus became servants where they had once been masters, and what was more, were not even aware of this fact. Because their eyes were blinded by ignorance and the veil of lies pulled over them by the missionaries, they believed their privations to be a sign of divine providence and godly favour. Yet, before long they became aware of the deception. Even though the missionaries controlled the land, they knew that as long as the population remained Hawaiian, they would one day throw off the fetters of slavery and force the priests to leave the islands. Again, religion and civilization were called to the rescue as the priests convinced the local rulers to throw open the islands to immigration, thus allowing them to bring in new settlers from America, Japan, and other places. This solved the immediate problem [of having to rely on a Hawaiian labour force], yet it was not enough for these people whose nature does not allow them to rest until they have committed the most vile of misdeeds. Thus in order to break up the native population they put about the story that the Hawaiian climate was beneficial for those suffering from contagious diseases. There then flooded in immigrants with syphilis, mange, and all manner of like diseases. These people had soon infected the local population with incurable ailments. Although the afflicted natives now realized what had been done to them, alas, what can one who is about to surrender his soul to death do to wrest his rights from his undoer? What was even more bizarre was the fact that the priests, not fearing the j u d g e m e n t of history, nor having any conscience, now put about the tale that the queen was responsible for the misfortunes that had befallen the islands as she had allowed in the immigrants. Thus they provoked the local population both against their legitimate ruler and against the foreigners. This string of deceptions and intrigues led to widespread turmoil; much blood was spilled and many hearths extinguished. In the end, those afflicted with contagion were shipped off to a remote island, the queen was dethroned and sent to Washington, where she became the laughingstock of polite society, and the islands were turned into a republic. A certain Mr. Dole, a descendant

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of the missionaries, was appointed head of state. 1 Thus the aggressors managed to do away with all the dangers along their path and achieve political control as well as economic power. From missionaries they became millionaires, and f r o m subjects they were transformed into rulers. Yet, an event was to occur at this point which seriously affected the political fate of the islands. A s is known to your Excellency, the defeat of the Democratic Party in the American elections and its replacement in the government by the Republicans led to the application of the protective tariff. As the United States does not grow enough sugar cane to satisfy its needs, it has always imported c a n e f r o m C u b a , the Philippines, and Hawaii. T h e political turmoil in the first two has meant that the A m e r i c a n s h a v e had to rely on H a w a i i a n sugar. Therefore j u s t as the missionaries were about to profit greatly from this opportunity, they have had to abide by the tariff because of their status as a foreign country. T h e y therefore started to c a m p a i g n f o r the annexation of Hawaii to the United States. Y e t , at first glance, the f a m o u s law that decrees that the United States may not annex any land that does not adjoin its present territory appeared a serious handicap. But it is quite clear that for these men who had managed to swindle a people out of their country, it was but a small matter to invent a suitable ruse to convince their own people to add a new land to their previous holdings. In effect they have in the past several months been reverting to the old methods that destroyed the Hawaiians; now the churches and meeting houses again resound to their fine rhetoric. They are now arguing that when the Hawaiian people are left to their own devices they have a natural inclination to revert to their old licentious ways which have ended up spreading disease a m o n g them. T h e only way this can be prevented |they argue] is f o r them to be taken in hand by a strong and determined government; therefore it is a Christian duty to prevail upon the government of the United States to annex the islands. In America the masses of the population are quite simpleminded and are easily influenced by a good speech. T h e y have no powers of judgement and comparison. Thus they are unable to see the contradictions between what the missionaries were saying before and what they say now . The lofty ideals evoked in the name of religion once again provoke the American people to fervour, and, as before, they are taken in by the lies of the missionaries. This fervour has yielded the results desired by the disciples of Satan posing as the envoys of Jesus; the United States has recently announced the annexation of the islands.

'Here the consul's information seems accurate enough. See Gavan Daws, Holy Man, Father Damien of Molokai ( N e w York: Harper & Row, 1973) 232: "The chief executive of the Hawaiian government after monarchy fell was Sanford Ballard D o l e , son of a Protestant missionary, one of the best of the 'mission boys.'"

M I S S I O N A R Y

Although living on informed will soon

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IN

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135

the Japanese government, which has some 15,000 nationals the islands, has protested this d e v e l o p m e n t , the press and circles here are saying that the fait accompli thus established be recognized by the Japanese as well.

I have taken the liberty of giving your Excellency such a detailed review of the history of the Hawaiian islands f o r the following three reasons. First, I wanted to stress that the law which stipulates that the United States may not annex territory that does not adjoin its already existing holdings is not inviolable. Second, I wanted to illustrate that the influence of the missionaries on public opinion is such that they may even force the government to disregard one of its own laws. Third, as t h e s e m i s s i o n a r i e s are a l s o a c t i v e in our A u g u s t M a s t e r ' s well-protected domains, and their malicious works are observable daily, I judged it advisable to give an example of what manner of evil they are capable of. I remain your obedient servant etc." Although some of the views expressed in the document are extremely naive and display all the bias one might expect from the representative of a power that felt itself to be under mortal threat, others are closer to the mark. Particularly the observations on the fund-raising "mania" as described by the consul bring to mind the similar m a n u f a c t u r e d f r e n z y of the television evangelists. The other point worthy of note is the fact that the Ottoman diplomat mentioned the bypassing of the law on territorial contiguity as the most important e l e m e n t in his report. O b v i o u s l y , given the presence of American missionaries on Ottoman soil, the official was careful to stress that the Hawaiian e x a m p l e could now be a m o d u l a r example which could be transported overseas, and the United States could join the other great powers as a major headache for Turkish policy makers. T h e fact that an Ottoman official should have followed the developments in Hawaii so closely points in the direction of a world that was becoming smaller.

THE INVENTION OF TRADITION AS PUBLIC IMAGE IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1808 TO 1908

The nineteenth century, a time when world history seemed to accelerate, was the epoch of the Risorgimento and the Unification of Germany. It was also an epoch which saw the last efforts of dynastic ancien régime empires (Habsburg, Romanov, Ottoman) to shore up their political systems with methods often borrowed from their adversaries, the nationalist liberals. Eric Hobsbawm's inspiring recent study has pointed out that, in the world after the French Revolution, it was no longer enough for monarchies to claim divine right; additional ideological reinforcement was required: "The need to provide a new, or at least a supplementary, "national" foundation for this institution was felt in states as secure from revolution as George Ill's Britain and Nicholas I's Russia." 1 This meant, first and foremost, the securing of the monarchies' grip on what was coming more and more to be considered an extremely volatile and — combustible entity—the people. Police measures and naked coercion were no longer sufficient by themselves, even if the means to enforce them were available, which often they were not. The monarchies increasingly needed what Anthony Smith has referred to as the "mobilization" and "inclusion" of a broader strata: By acculturating middle and lower urban strata at least, the aristocratic ethnie broadens its base and prolongs its social life and its mores, together with the myths, symbols, values and memories that the aristocracy have cultivated over the generations and — which now are fed into the heritage of an enlarged proto-nation. 2 Although the Romanov, Ottoman, or Habsburg houses could hardly be expected to create citizenry outright, they certainly prepared the ground for the growth of that very idea. As aptly put by Benedict Anderson, "because of the rapidly rising prestige all over Europe of the national idea, there was a discernible tendency among the Euro-Mediterranean monarchies to sidle towards a beckoning national identification." 3 This increasingly brought to the fore what can only be called "the public image of the state," which then formed the basis for the state's claimed legitimation.

'fine Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism (Cambridge, 1990), 84 ^Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford, 1986), 106. 3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Orinn Nationalism (London. 1983), 82.

and Spread

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This political and intellectual atmosphere had a profound effect on the ruling elite of the Ottoman state, which, from the Sultan down, began to look for a new basis for defining what was increasingly coming to be considered an "Ottoman citizenry." Verj disparate elements in Ottoman society, ranging from the bureaucratic elite and the Young Ottoman intelligentsia to the humble popular ulama, felt that a new social base was needed if the empire was to survive. From this new social base they hoped to confront the ideological challenges of the era. As §erif Mardin put it in what is still the seminal work on the subject: "There occurred an ingathering of hitherto centrifugal forces. The common focus was the desire to free the Ottoman Empire of its inferior position in its relations with western powers."1 The Ottoman elite rose to these challenges largely by reaffirming what they claimed to be the basis of legitimacy of the Islamic and secular institutions of the state. Despite their policies, which appealed theoretically to "tradition," this was done in a fashion which was, in fact, quite novel and in many ways "invented tradition" in Hobsbawm's sense that "it would be desirable to see a study of the attempts by some authentically legitimist dynasties, such as the Habsburg and the Romanov, not merely to command the obedience of their subjects, but to rally their loyalty as potential citizens. 2 This study will attempt to do just that for the late Ottomans.3 The aim of this essay is to suggest answers to the following questions. What aspects of the pre-existing methods of statecraft and popular traditions were adapted to novel needs? In other words, what were the elements in the protonationalism of the Ottoman, Turkish, and Islamic empires which were employed in the effort to create something approaching an "Ottoman citizenry"?4 Were there any equivalent pre-existing notions, such as the "Holy Russian land" or the "icons of Holy Russia" for which Cherniavsky's and Hobsbawm's Cossacks died? 5 What were the "linkages between religion and national consciousness"? 6 How were the messages of the new exigencies of the state communicated to the target population? How did the Ottomans set about creating the "citizen mobilizing and citizen-influencing state"?7 The developments in the Ottoman Empire clearly parallel similar trends in other imperial systems. Anderson accurately points to the phenomenon of "Russification" and "official nationalism," the policies of standardization and

'§erif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, 1962), 60. 2

E r i c H o b s b a w m and Terrance Ranger, eds.. The Invention

of Tradition

(Cambridge, 1983).

-'This article is part of a larger project which aims at the understanding of the transformation of the Ottoman self-image in the nineteenth century. ^ H o b s b a w m , Nations and Nationalism, 5

Ibid.,

6

Ibid„

7

49. 67.

Ibid., 110.

45-79.

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u n i f o r m i t y pursued through education and attempted imposition of the imperial language on the subject peoples. 1 This concept of national monarchy was precisely what the Ottoman ruling elite was aiming f o r with its policy of Ottomanism, a concept meant to unite all peoples living in Ottoman domains, Muslim and non-Muslim, Turkish and Greek, Armenian and Jewish, Kurd and A r a b . A s such, it w a s a fine example of Anderson's definition of official nationalism because it was "an anticipatory strategy adopted by dominant groups who are threatened with marginalization or exclusion f r o m an emerging nationally i m a g i n e d c o m m u n i t y . " 2 This policy began with the Imperial Rescript of the Rose Chamber of 1839 (Hat-i §erif-i Giilhane), which declared the equality before the law of all Ottomans, Muslim and non M u s l i m . T h e Ottomanism of AbdUlhamid II (r. 1876-1909) took on a much more Islamic character, although it did not reverse many of the administrative trends of the Tanzimat reforms. The concept of national monarchy was very much behind Abdiilhamid's I s l a m i s m . Although it is unclear how m u c h of his decision making was informed by Turkism (he did declare on numerous occasions that the language of state was Turkish, yet he promoted Arabs to unprecedented heights in the b u r e a u c r a c y ) , his brand of O t t o m a n i s m w a s definitely an integrationist policy based on Islam, but an Islam which was becoming less and less ecumenical. What was happening, h o w e v e r , w a s very much what Anderson refers to as "stretching the short tight skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire." 3 This was to be taken to its ultimate extent by the Young Turks, but its ideological ancestry was found in the Hamidian era, although the two epochs are usually taken to be antipodal. In the Russian, Ottoman, and Austrian cases, official nationalism meant that the person of the monarch c a m e to be directly identified with state power, but this also had its risks because now the monarch became directly responsible for the failures of the s y s t e m . T h i s is w h a t happened to the h o u s e s of the R o m a n o v s , Hohenzollerns, Habsburgs, and the Ottomans, which literally c a m e tumbling down to human scale. The Ottoman Caliphate was abolished by something as banal as an act of parliament in 1924, largely because what w a s left of its mystique had been carried away by defeat in the Great War. In this article I suggest that the evidence indicates that one derives the impression that Ottoman nationality was beginning to be envisioned in more and more secular terms despite the religious language in which it was couched. In other words, although the state spoke the political language of Islam, it was in fact implementing the concrete policy of a rational secular programme. In the course of the applying this programme the Ottomans often had recourse to invented traditions. In the f o l l o w i n g pages I attempt, f i r s t , to provide a background to the increasing preoccupation of the Ottomans with their public image a n d , second, to focus on specific policies of the Hamidian era which illustrate the Ottoman version of official nationalism.

'Anderson, Imagined Communities, 82-103. 2

Ibid„ 82. Ibid., 87.

3

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THE BACKGROUND TO THE OTTOMAN INVENTION OF TRADITION AS PUBLIC IMAGE: SYMBOLISM AND ITS USES (1808 - 1908) As nineteenth-century imperialism reached its peak, the Ottoman state, the only non-Christian Great Power in Europe, began to feel constant pressure to stake its claim in the world arena. The Ottomans were aware to the point of self-consciousness that they were the "only major empire of the pre-modern Islamic world to survive with institutional continuity and a degree of sovereignty into the era of modernization." 1 Yet, their very uniqueness meant that their sovereignty had to be constantly reconfirmed as being based in tradition. Although the empire had always stressed tradition, the nineteenth century context demanded its modernization or even its invention. The contributors to the volume, The Invention of Tradition, draw attention in several instances to the great increase of "neo-traditions" in the nineteenth century. 2 They point to the increased effort expended by the great powers to appear more imperial and more majestic through elaborate ceremonial and the additional pomp and circumstance of the state. Although ceremony had never been lacking in the Ottoman context from the time of Mahmud II (r. 1808-39) through the Tanzimat (1839-76) and afterwards, there was a clear desire to keep up with the Romanovs as the Ottoman ruling house tried to hold its own in the increasingly competitive augmentation of ceremonial throughout the world. 3 One of the most notable symbols of the renewed emphasis on royal power and ceremonial in the late nineteenth century was heraldry. The Sublime State (Devlet-i Aliyye) was symbolized by the coat of arms of the House of Osman (Arma-i Osmani). The design had been commissioned from an Italian artist by Mahmud II. By the time Abdulhamid II came to sit on the Ottoman throne (r. 1876-1909), it was such a well-established part of Ottoman official tradition that when the sultan asked for a detailed description of its contents in 1905, the bureaucracy was momentarily embarrassed because no official authorized version seemed to be readily available. Finally, it was dug up, and the contents described. 4 In a detailed memorandum the sultan was informed that the Ottoman coat of arms consisted of both old and new, Turkish and Islamic motifs, such as armaments and other symbolic objects. The central motif in the shield was "the exalted crown of the Sultans," topped by the seal ^Carter Findley, "The Advent ol Ideology in the Islamic Middle East," Studia Islamica, (1982), 171. Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, particularly 1 - 1 4 , 1 0 1 - 6 2 , 2 6 3 - 3 0 7 .

I.VI

3 David C a n n a d i n e , "The British Monarchy c.1820-1977," in H o b s b a w m and R a n g e r , The Invention of Tradition, 126. 4 B a § b a k a n l i k Argivi Yildiz Re>;mi Maruzat 135/22. Prime Ministerial A r c h i v e s (Istanbul) [ h e r e a f t e r , B B A ] , O f f i c i a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between Y i l d i z P a l a c e a n d the Ministries [hereafter, Y . A R E S Y.AHUS1.

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or tugra of the regnant ruler. This was flanked by two heavy tomes, one symbolizing the Islamic law, §eriat, and the other modern law codes (ahkam-i §er'iyye ve nizamiye'yi

cami kitab). Under these appeared a set of scales

representing justice. The central motif was surrounded and flanked by symbolic armaments, the old balancing the new: an arrow and quiver and an infantry rifle and bayonet, an old-style muzzle loading cannon and a modern field artillery piece, a traditional scimitar and a modern cavalry sabre, and so forth. The coat of arms also included traditional Islamic-Ottoman symbols, such as a vase full of blossoming roses and incense, which represented the magnanimity of the state. The total design was flanked on the right side by a cluster of red banners and on the left by a cluster of green banners symbolizing the Sultanic Ottoman and the universal Islamic nature of the Caliphate. Set under the entire design were the whole array of Ottoman decorations. The central themes of the Ottoman coat of arms revolved around the continuity of the old and the new, the traditional and the modern; yet, it was an invented tradition stemming from the need the Ottomans felt to emphasize that they were a great power like all the others. The fact that the Imperial coat of arms bristled with weaponry is of course indicative of the actual weakness of the state relative to its peers. 1 The symbol of the Ottoman Empire can therefore be seen to represent "the use of ancient materials to construct invented traditions of a novel type for quite novel purposes." 2 It was also a very succinct expression of the Ottoman state s "myth-symbol complex." 3 Just as the Ottomans tried to emphasize pre-existing traditions by including them in the symbol of the state, they also attempted to curtail the circulation of what were considered "rival symbols." Correspondence between the Chancery of the Grand Vizier and the Palace dated 8 June 1892 dealt with the issue of the importation of goods whose packaging bore the coat of arms of rival powers. The sultan wanted to forbid the entry of such packages, but the Grand Vizier had to point out that there was no legal way for the Ottoman customs to keep them out. 4

Ibid. See also David C a n n a d i n e , "The British M o n a r c h y , " 121: "As the real power of the M o n a r c h y w a n e d , the way w a s open for it to b e c o m e the centre of grand ceremonial o n c e more." Similarly, as real p o w e r declined in the O t t o m a n Empire, the e m p h a s i s shifted to claiming legitimacy through pomp and ceremonial. ^ H o b s b a w m , "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in The Invention 3 4

S m i t h , Ethnic Origins of Nations,

B B A Y.A H U S 261/91 m a t t e r d e v e l o p e d over r e m e m b e r e d that these Ottoman-Greek War of

of Tradition,

6.

1 -5.

Imperial Chancery to Yildiz Palace. 11 Zilkade 1309/ 8 June 1892. The a crate of mirrors b e i n g sent f r o m G r e e c e t o C r e t e . It m u s t be w e r e turbulent years leading up to the a u t o n o m y of Crete and the 1897.

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T h e visual c o n f i r m a t i o n of s o v e r e i g n t y

was also extended

to

non-Muslim places of worship. On 2 4 October 1885, the Grand Vizier Kamil Pa§a reported that the Armenian Catholic church in Biiyiikdere, a village on the Bosphorus on the outskirts of Istanbul, had erected a c o m m e m o r a t i v e plaque stating that the c hurch had been constructed "during the j u s t and glorious reign of AbdUlhamid II." The initiative seems to have come f r o m the Armenian Archbishop, w h o declared that "this was being done for the first time in a Christian temple." In fact the sultan was rather unsure about how a p p r o p r i a t e this w h o l e b u s i n e s s was and ordered that "it be secretly investigated as to what the exact wording on the plaque consisted of," too prominent a display "might be offensive to Muslim opinion." Kamil Pa§a reported back that it was a harmless display of loyalty and in any case the plaque was displayed in an inner courtyard, where few Muslim eyes would see it. 1 AbdUlhamid apparently soon overcame his shyness, and the erection of official iconography on non-Muslim official buildings became commonplace. An order dated 16 March 1894 declared that the request of the Catholic Archbishop of Uskiib (Scopje) to display a plaque bearing the Imperial monogram, the tugra, on the Archbishop's residence was to be granted. The decision was based on the precedeni that "various Archbishoprics of other confessions have in the past been thus honoured with the August Symbol." 2 Official coats of arms and decorations were ubiquitous in the nineteenth century. The Ottoman state: was as preoccupied with them as the rest of the world. On 20 June 1892, ihe Vilayet of Konya reported that certain Greek notables in the town of Isparta had been wearing their official decorations and uniforms to church during the Easter service. The Governor proudly reported that he had put a stop to "this inappropriate practice." He was (no doubt much to his surprise) promptly reprimanded and told that "these people are wearing their decorations as a gesture of pride and loyalty and should not be interfered with." 3 Another clear example of invented tradition in an Ottoman context is the "traditionally oriental" h e a d g e a r , the f e s , seen by Westerners as the ultimate symbol of T u r k i s h n e s s . Apparently of Moroccan origin, the f e s was declared in 1832 to be ihe official head covering of all the subjects of the

^ B B A Y . A H U S 184/65 Grand Vizier Kamil Pasa to Yildiz Palace. 14 M u h a r r e m 1303/ 2 4 October 1885. 2 B B A Y.A HUS 306/46. Grand \ izier Cevad Pa?a. Sublime Porte Receivers O f f i c e no: 5 8 9 12 Safer 1312/ 16 March 1894. T o this day, non-Muslim places of worship display the Turkish f l a g (very prominently), yet one never sees a mosque displaying the national colours. 3 B B A Y.A H U S 261/141 Grand Vizier Cevad P a p to Vilayet of Konya. 2 3 Zilkade 1309/ 20 June 1892.

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empire by Sultan M a h m u d II. It was to be worn by Muslim and non-Muslim alike to abolish external distinctions between c o m m u n i t i e s . M a h m u d had abolished the Janissary Corps in 1826, and a new form of headgear was thus needed for the new army he was attempting to build up. T h u s , the ubiquitous symbol of the Turk in the nineteenth century was only a relatively recent creation and an imported one at that. 1 A sphere of invented tradition in the Ottoman Empire which paralleled European developments is that of official music represented by the national a n t h e m , being very much part of the iconography of neo-traditions. 2 T h e Ottoman Empire took its first steps in that direction when M a h m u d II and his successor, Abdulmecid 1, employed Guiseppe Donizetti as the court musician f r o m 1828 until he died in 1856. Donizetti composed the M a h m u d i y e march, which established a pattern. Donizetti then composed the Mecidiye march and trained a band of palace musicians selected from among the children of leading n o t a b l e s , a venture enthusiastically supported by the sultan. 3 N o less a p e r s o n a g e than F r a n z Liszt then c o m p o s e d a p a r a p h r a s e to Donizetti's M a h m u d i y e march in 1 8 4 7 . 4 H e was followed by J o h a n n Strauss, w h o dedicated a composition to Abdulmecid in 1849 and was rewarded with a gift of a ring. 5 A f t e r Donizetti's death, Calisto Guatelli became court musician in 1856 and composed the Aziziye march for Sultan Abdiilaziz. Guatelli served well into the reign of Abdiilhamid and was known for his "Oriental Overture" and "Ottoman March." It is likely, though unclear, that he was also responsible for the Hamidiye march. Both Donizetti and Guatelli held the highest of Ottoman ranks, that of Pa§a. 6 By the time of Abdiilhamid the second generation of official musicians had been trained. Gazimihal points out that the

For concise information on the fes, see E. J. Brill, Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden, 1987), 96; see also Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Highland Tradition of Scotland," in H o b s b a w m and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, 15-41. T h e fes and the kilt seem to share certain characteristics. Both were the result of an imported idea. T h e kilt was the product of the pragmatic imagination of an English Q u a k e r entrepreneur, and the fes, the headgear of North Africa. Both became symbols of their respective societies to the point of total assimilation into the local culture. Just as the foreign tourists today buy kilts when they visit Scotland, they are often seen in the tourist traps of Istanbul sporting the fes as a "traditional" aspect of the city. Both the kilt and the fes therefore retain largely fancy dress value. Indeed, when M u s t a f a Kemal Atatiirk set out to ban the latter as a symbol of Ottoman decadence, he condemned it as "the head covering of Greeks," hoping thus to direct the popular odium of the recent war against the Greek invasion of Anatolia against it and replace it with the modern cloth cap or hat. See Nilufer Gole, Modern Mahrem (Istanbul 1991), 52. 2

H o b s b a w m and Ranger, Invention,

7, 1 1 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 7 .

% t e m Ungor, Turk Marfan (Turkish Marches) Turk Kultiirunu Ara§tirma EnstitusU. seri IV sayi A . 3 (Ankara, 1965), 87. This is a very interesting book which gives the complete scores of all the major examples of official music. See also M a h m u t R. Gazimihal, Turk Askeri Muzikalari Tarihi (The History of Turkish Military Bands) (Istanbul, 1955), 8 4 . 1 thank Dr. Cem Behar for both these references. 4 U n g o r , Turk Marfan, 90-115. 5

Ibid.,

6

74.

Tanzimat'dan Cumhuriyefe Tiirkiye Ansiklopedisi (The Encyclopedia of Turkey f r o m the Tanzimat to the Republic) (Istanbul, 1985), 1 2 1 6 , 1 2 2 0 .

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Sultan felt a "need for a much tighter discipline in order to be able to compete with Europe."' By the time of Abdiilhamid's reign it became quite commonplace to compose marches as a means of seeking favour. In 1893 a Mademoiselle Laurette Rosette composed the "Chant Turc: Vive Le Sultan." This was followed by Dicran Thohadjian's "Grande Marche," which was dedicated to the Sultan in 1895.2 As in music, a leature of nineteenth-century commemorative iconography was the commemorative medallion. Perhaps the most interesting among the Ottoman examples of this genre, as a bid for modernity combined with time honoured historical legitimation, is the medallion struck in 1850 during the reign of Abdiilmecid I (r. 1839-61). An admirable document of the late Ottoman state of mind, it is emblazoned with the slogan, "Cet État subsistera parce que Dieu le veut." On one side it features a fortress in a smoky cloud over which flies the Ottoman banner. On the rim are found such slogans as "Justice égale pour tous," "Protection des faibles," "L'État relève." On the reverse, the motifs include the Central Asian Turkish cap, and, engraved in various places, "Mahomet II" (Mehmed II, the Conqueror of Istanbul in 1453), "Solyman 1" (Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent r. 1520-1566), "Reshid" (Grand Vizier Mustafa Re§id Pa§a, Grand Vizier at the time and the major figure behind the Tanzimat reforms), "Aali" (Mehmed Emin Âli Pa§a, together with Re§id, a major figure in the reform movement), and "Coprulu" (Mehmed Kopriilii and his son Ahmet Kopriilii, the architects of revived Ottoman power in the second half of the sixteenth century). 3 Another case of modern usage of an ancient form was the inclusion of the Ottoman genealogical lineage in the state almanacs ( s a l n a m e ) . The almanac for 1885 traces the roots of the Ottoman family back to Adam and Eve via Noah. The official dynastic myth of how the Selçuk Sultan Aladdin Keykubad protected Osman, the founder of the dynasty, is duly recounted. It claims that the House of Osman is "according to the research of experts one of the oldest in the world, and will last forever." 4 It is interesting that such manifest official fiction, an ancient tradition in Islamic court literature, would be featured in a state almanac created by bureaucratic modernization and featuring such mundane data as the names of the various ministers.

'Gazimihal,

TùrkAskeri Muzikuturi Tarihi, 84.

^ S u p p l é m e n t du journal Malumat 1311. M a r c h e c o m p o s é e par Mlle Laurette Rosette; Dicran T c h o h a d j i a n , "Grande Marche très humblement dédiée à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan Abdul H a m i d H a n . E m p e r e u r des O t t o m a n s . C o m p o s é e spécialement pour le j o u r n a l Malumat à l'occasion de l'Année 1313 de l'Hégire." Both marches and their scores are part of the C e m Behar collection. •^Personal collection of Dr. Edheni Eldem. 1 o w e thanks to Dr. Eldem for bringing this medallion to my attention. The medallion is in bronze and was struck in Brussels. 4

Salname-i Vilayet-i Hudavendi^ar

10-33.

(Almanac for the Vilayet of Bursa), year 1303/1885, pp. 1

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14.5

The same adaptation of old motifs for new usages was observable in the very document that symbolized the Tanzimat, the Imperial Rescript of the Rose Chamber, (Hat-i §erif-i Gulhane). Even while setting out the reasons for the new laws, the declaration based itself quite deliberately on religious dogma, stating that "it is evident that countries not governed by the laws of the §erlat cannot prevail." 1 Yet, what it decreed was very much against the Serial, that is, the legal equality of Muslim and non-Muslim. In the same vein, the document declared that tax assessment and collection would be carried out according to rational methods, on an equitable basis. This appeal to modernity was, however, couched in the language of the classic Islamic image of the "Circle of Equity": Just laws make for prosperous subjects, prosperous subjects pay their taxes, taxes pay for soldiers, soldiers protect the taxpayers, and so on. 2 Thus, although it heralded nothing less than the beginnings of a modern secular state, the language used was that of Islam— and with good reason. The measure of legal equality was clearly unpopular among Muslim subjects, who felt that their assured place of superiority in the empire was lost. 3 In some ways what Abdtilhamid II felt was this very pulse of "despondency" among his Muslim subjects: The old Sultan had certainly a difficult problem to face in the earlier years of his reign. In 1880 to 1882 a hopeless despondency about the f u t u r e of the country reigned everywhere in Turkish society ... Abd-ul-Hamid had to create a feeling of hope among his Moslem subjects ... Abd-ul-Hamid introduced the new religious idea: he revived the idea of the khalifate ... [as a scheme for] strengthening Mohammedan feeling and making Turkey the center of Mohammedan revival. 4 In furthering this aim, the person of the sultan was made to acquire a certain "aura of sacrality." This stretched to the extent that the hair and fingernails of the august person were saved, washed in silver containers by specifically appointed servants, and sent to the Hicaz every year, as part of the ceremonial caravan, the surre alayi, which bore the annual gifts to the Holy Places. 5

Diistur (Register of Ottoman Laws) I. Tertip Istanbul Matbaa-i A m i r e 1289. (Istanbul Imperial Press 1289/1872), p. 4. See also J. C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and Africa in World Politics (New Haven, 1975), 269-71. My version differs slightly f r o m that of Hurewitz, in that I have preferred to use "prevail," w h e r e H u r e w i t z uses "survive" (payidar). F o r a good overall description of the Ottoman reform process known as the Tanzimat, or re-ordering, see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1971). 2

Diistur, 5. a M o s h e Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine (Oxford, 1968), 23. Ma'oz states that differing versions were circulated in the A r a b provinces. These were not quite as explicit in their declarations of equality. On the disturbances in the provinces, see §erif Mardin, T h e Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, 1962). 4

W i l I i a m R a m s a y Mitchell, "The Intermixture of Races in Asia Minor," P r o c e e d i n g s of the British A c a d e m y 1915-16, pp. 359-422. 1 o w e thanks to P r o f e s s o r §erif M a r d i n for this reference. 5

S i n a Ak§in, Tiirkiye Tarihi II (Istanbul, 1988), 8.

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Yet, as in the cases above, this accompanied the effort to be like other modern rulers. Friday pra>er had always been an important ceremonial occasion in Islamic and Ottoman practice, for it was when the ruler participated in public worship and showed himself to the people. In the nineteenth century, Friday prayer acquired ceremonial trappings inspired from European examples. Despite his mortal fear of assassination (well founded as it turned out, because of the attempt in 1905), Abdiilhamid made the effort to show himself to the population once a week. The royal procession would leave the Yildiz Palace with great p o m p , the Imperial landau flanked by mounted Albanian House Guards in livery, and make its way to the Yildiz mosque (admittedly not very far away). After the service special officials would circulate among the throng and collect petitions which would then be f o r w a r d e d to a branch of the bureaucracy which dealt specifically with petitions received on these occasions. 1 A physical manifestation of this c h a n g e towards a modern public persona of the monarch was seen in m o s q u e architecture in the nineteenth century. The classical Ottoman mosque was altered to suit the ceremonial protocol of European usage, so an additional two-story structure was added to the main building to serve as "ceremonial public space," giving a more "worldly" character to the buildings. 2

' M e h m e t tp§irli, "Osmanlilarda C u m a Selamligi. Halk Hiikiimdar Miinasebetleri A ? i s i n d a n O n e m i " ( T h e Institution of Friday Prayer in the O t t o m a n State. Its I m p o r t a n c e f o r the Relationship of the Ruler and the People), in Prof. Bekir Kutukoglu'na Armagan (Istanbul, 1991), 4 5 9 - 7 1 . T h e official department in question w a s called the Maruzat-i Rikabiye Dairesi (The Bureau of Petitions of the Stirrup). Dr. Ip§irli has d o n e a detailed analysis of the content of these petitions and points out that in most cases they were acted upon. A f i f e Batur, "Batila§ma D o n e m i n d e O s m a n l i Mimarligi" (Ottoman Architecture during the Period of Westernization), Tanzmmt'dan Cumhuriyet'e Turkiye Ansiklopedisi, pp. 1060-1.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE STATE IN THE HAMJDIAN PERIOD; IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES ( 1 8 7 6 - 1 9 0 8 )

After the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78 and the consequent loss of most of the Balkan Christian provinces, the official nationalism of the Porte became more Islamic in flavour and style. Abdtilhamid II, a convinced autocrat and a ruler who had no time for experimentation with democracy, recast the myth symbol complex of his state in a different mould. Where the Tanzimat had stressed the equality of all subjects, Abdiilhamid realigned the basis of the state on a more Islamic foundation. 1 However, here one has to be careful. The Islamism of Abdiilhamid was in many ways a new creation. Although the motifs and the style of state ideology were Islamic, much of his policy stemmed from secular considerations aimed at the secular ends of retrenchment and last-ditch defence. Nor did the sultan attempt to turn the clock back. He continued many of the dominant trends of the Tanzimat period, most noticeably the emphasis on centralization and the spread of education. The underlying motive force behind all these considerations was that the Ottoman Empire felt threatened both morally and physically. The Sublime State saw that it was constantly losing manoeuvring space in a ever-shrinking world. Just as it was attempting to improve its public image both towards its own subjects and towards the outside world, the challenges mounted. Perhaps the most dangerous of these challenges was missionary activity. The Ottomans realized very early that there was an organic link between nineteenth-century imperialism and missionary zeal. Everywhere the missionary appeared as the representative of a superior civilization and culture, the primary vehicle for the realization of the White Man's Burden. Not only did the missionaries undermine the efforts the Ottomans were making to legitimize the basis of their rule at home, but they also proved influential in creating adverse conditions for the Ottomans abroad by feeding the Western press with anti-Ottoman sentiment: "Many missionaries and western journalists proceeded upon the confident assumption that the Terrible Turk belonged to a retrograde race of Devil worshippers." 2

' Stephen Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," Middle Studies, vol. 9 (1973), 139-55. 2

Eastern

J e a n H a y t h o r n e B r a d e n , T h e Eagle and the Crescent: A m e r i c a n Interests in the O t t o m a n Empire. 1861-1870 (Ph.D. Disser., Ohio State University, 1973), 13.

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Particularly in the reign of Abdiilhamid II, missionary activity picked up m o m e n t u m during the 1880s and 1890s, with British, French, Russian, and A m e r i c a n missionaries parcelling out spheres of activity within the empire. This led to a situation where, as Jeremy Salt argues, "the relationship that developed between the missionaries and the Ottoman government was one of mutual suspicion and mutual dislike." 1 Indeed, by the 1880s the Sultan came to regard the missionaries as "the most dangerous enemies to the social order" among all the foreigners living in his domains. 2 Diplomats, merchants, soldiers, all had to do wilh the here and now; the missionaries, through their schools, had to do with the future. In this respect the missionary issue, far too complicated to be dealt with exhaustively in this study, forms one of the key issues f o r understanding w h a t was b e c o m i n g increasingly an O t t o m a n obsession with their public image. There is ample evidence, in the Ottoman archival sources, that the Ottoman ruling elite feared infiltration, not only of its Christian minorities but also of its Muslim population, as well as other marginal groups, such as the Nusayris and the Yezidi Kurds. Moreover, it was precisely these marginal elements which were coming to the fore as the state felt that it had to squeeze the last sources for untapped manpower. T h e Ottoman response was a desperate attempt at social engineering which found its main expression in an effort to shore up the Sunni Hanefi mezheb as the basis of official religiosity, as the official belief ( m e z h e b - i resmiye). This policy furnished a good example of what Smith calls "the process of turning a largely aristocratic and lateral ethnie and former polity into a full political nation ... |through] a conscious p r o g r a m m e of mass education and propaganda. Although the Hanefi school of jurisprudence had always enjoyed official endorsement in the Ottoman Empire, strict imposition of orthodoxy was not stressed in the more cosmopolitan atmosphere of earlier p e r i o d s . 4 This new e m p h a s i s on o r t h o d o x y , one sphere in which the O t t o m a n s had recourse to invented traditions, was a good e x a m p l e of "adaptation [taking] place for old uses in new conditions and by using old m o d e l s for n e w p u r p o s e s . " 5 In f u r t h e r i n g this a i m , the Sublime State embarked on a hitherto unprecedented programme of what can only be called c o u n t e r - p r o p a g a n d a . This e f f o r t involved the active e n c o u r a g e m e n t of conversion to the Hanefi sect, and for the first time, the Ottomans envisioned using missionary zeal to fight missionary zeal.

' j e r e m y Salt, "A Precarious Symbiosis: Ottoman Christians and the Foreign Missionaries in the Nineteenth Century," International Journal of Turkish Studies, 3:3 (1985-86), 56. Ibid„ 65. ^Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nationalism, 142. Smith talks about how this programme was tried in both Habsburg Austria and Romanov Russia but yielded the opposite result to the desired result. T h e parallels with the Ottoman case are striking here. 4 O n the Hanefi Mezheb, see The Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden and London, 1965), 162-4, s. v. "The Hanafiyya." % o b s b a w m , "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in Hobsbawn and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, 5. 2

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The focus of most missionary activity was Eastern Anatolia and the Arab provinces (vilayet). Particularly Syria and the notoriously heterodox Iraqi vilayets of Basra, Mosul, and Bagdad saw increased activity in the 1 890s. The increase in British influence in Iran in the last quarter of the nineteenth century paralleled the increase of Protestant (American and British) activity in the frontier zone between the Ottoman heartlands and Iran. One example among others, an Imperial Decree (Irade) dated 26 January 1892, stated that "English priests" had been seen in the vicinity of Kevar, on the Ottoman-Iranian border. These priests, it was reported, were distributing books and pamphlets among the local Nestorian population. One had been a p p r e h e n d e d , and an investigation had been launched. The sultan decreed that they be "chased away in the firmest manner" (suret-i hakimanede oralardan defleri).' These Imperial decrees are particularly interesting because they highlight the fact that the sultan had a fairly clear notion of the ambivalent relationship between the Bible Societies and the Western governments. This is illustrated in the lines that he dictated to his private secretary: In England, Russia and France there exist Bible Societies which become exceedingly rich through the donations of wealthy and fanatical Christians who bequeath all their wealth to them in their wills ... although the English, Russian, and French governments seem not to be directly involved in their activities, they secretly aid and abet them in sending missionaries even into darkest Africa. In this way they spread their beliefs among the local population. By increasing the numbers of their followers this religious influence is then transformed into political leverage ... Recently they have been reported in Mosul, and their books and pamphlets have even appeared in Istanbul. Although it is obviously desirable to take firm measures against them, if open opposition is brought to bear, the Sublime Porte will suffer the vexing intervention of the three powers' ambassadors. Thus, the only way to fight against them is to increase the Islamic population and spread the belief in the Holiest of Faiths. 2 Given that such concern was evinced at the highest level, it is not surprising to find numerous instances in the Ottoman records of local officials in the field reacting to missionary subversion. One method of dealing with the problem was a systematic programme of conversion to Sunni Hanefi orthodoxy, which was applied particularly among the marginal elements, such as the Shi'ites, the Nusayri, and the Yezidi Kurds.

B B A Irade D a h i l i y e ( I m p e r i a l E d i c t ) 9 9 0 1 3 Y i l d i z P a l a c e I m p e r i a l S e c r e t a r i a t 2 4 Cemaziyelahir 1309/26 January 1892. T h e Imperial Edicts cover all spheres of state activity. They are separate collections, such as Dahiliye (Internal A f f a i r s ) , H a r i c i y e (Foreign A f f a i r s ) , and Maarif (Education). 2 B B A Irade Dahiliye 100258 Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat No. 6 9 7 5 2 7 Sevval 1309/26 May 1892.

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In one such instance, Muhammed Hassa, the Mutasarrif of Lazkiye (Latakia) in Syria, wrote to Istanbul on 26 June 1890, to report that the Nusayri of Sahyun district had expressed a collective desire to be converted to the Hanefi mezheb. This event had been preceded by the conversion of the Nusayris of Markab and Cebele in the same region. The Nusayri leaders of Sahyun, the official reported, had signed a petition requesting that the state provide them with schools and mosques ( m e s c i d s ) and teachers to instruct them in the Hanefi belief. Fifteen schools and ten mescid were needed for the district of Sahyun. The matter was one of utmost urgency because missionaries were active ainong the Nusayri population: If the Sublime Stale finds itself unable to make the necessary sacrifices in terms of resources to grant the requests of these people, and abandons them to their forlorn state of ignorance, this can only have grievous consequences. This will only butter the bread of the foreigners w h o have already gone so far as to pay regular salaries to the Nusayri leaders. [If their request is not granted] the foreigners will be able to tell them, "see, your government is unable to take care of you" and this will lead to an increase of their already present influence. 1 The Vali of Beirui added to this report on 27 June 1890 that the schools and mosques had to be complemented by barracks for Imperial regulars which would be stationed in Sahyun. The official confidently stated that "if this is done the intrigues of the Christian priests will be countered." The classic triangle for inculcating and maintaining orthodoxy—the school, mosque, and barracks—was thus established. 2 The Vilayet of Syria continued to report intense missionary activity. The Vali of the province, Osman Nuri Pa§a, wrote to Istanbul on 21 January 1892 that in keeping with the orders emanating f r o m the capital, he had compiled a list of unlicensed, newly constituted churches and schools. He estimated that there were 159 of these schools, which "had been c onstructed in an underhand manner" by converting dwellings into school houses. The Jesuits and Protestants had been very active to the point of subsidizing ihe families of the students:

' B B A Irade Meclis-i Mahsus 4687 Mutasarrif M u h a m m e d Hassa to the S u b l i m e Porte. Telegram 13 Haziran 1306/26 June 1891. T h e Ottoman administrative units of the time w e r e broken d o w n into provinces (Vilayet), administered by a Governor or Vali, districts (Sancak) administered by a Mutasarrif. and the c o m m u n e s ( K a z a ) administered by a Kaimakam. The model w a s the Code N a p o l é o n , and the major reorganization of the provincial administration took shape under the Law of Provincial Administration {Vilayet Kannunamesi) of 1869. See liber Ortayli, Tanzimattan Soma Mahalli idareler 1840-1878 (Provincial Administration in the Ottoman Empire) (Ankara, 19741. 2 Ibid. T e l e g r a m from Governor of Beirut, Aziz Pa§a, to Sublime Porte. 14 Haziran 1306/27 June 1891.

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According to my investigations, the Jesuits and Protestants not only admit non-Muslim children into their schools free of charge and pay for their food and clothing, but also pay subsidies to their parents. This has a very detrimental effect on the simple folk who cannot tell good from evil. The continuation of this state of affairs can only have very serious consequences in the future.' The implication was, however, that the activity of the missionaries was also having its effect on the Muslim population. Osman Nuri Pa§a suggested that in order for these latter to be preserved from the "intrigues and subversion" of the "priests," and as the holy month of Ramadan was approaching, specially appointed ulama should be sent to the areas in question. These teachers were to "secretly impart to the Muslim population the ills that will accrue to them if they sent their children to Christian schools." The appropriate Irade was in fact issued on 1 March 1892 determining that seven local ulama should be assigned to the districts in question. 2 The interesting aspect of this communication was its emphasis on secrecy. It is fairly clear that any opposition to the missionaries which was too blatant would draw the wrath of the Powers' consuls. The Ottomans were clearly aware that the extreme constraints on their resources were creating a vacuum in the educational sendees being filled by the missionary schools. An Imperial decree dated 26 June 1892 ordered that Muslim children should be removed from all non-Muslim schools and educated by village imams. Yet the same document openly stated that Istanbul could not send any more money to Syria, even though only a fairly modest sum was needed to print reading primers for primary schools. 3 As can be seen from the above, education was perceived as a defensive weapon against what was emerging as an insidious threat to the integrity of the empire. Forced to squeeze his empire for its last reserves of manpower, Abdiilhamid II cast about for untapped resources. One such possible source were the Yezidi Kurds, a war-like mountain people who inhabited the Seyhan area in the vastness of northern Iraq. 4 A "heretical sect," as far as Sunni orthodoxy was concerned, the Yezidi Kurds could be turned to account through "Hanefization." As put by John Guest, "the Yezidis— Kurds but not

^ B B A i r a d e Dahiliye 9 9 6 4 9 Governor of Syria to Sublime Porte, No. 32 19 Cemaziyelahir 1309/21 January 1892.

2

lbid.

3

B B A irade Dahiliye 100687 Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat N o . 8185 29 Zilkade 1309/26 June 1892. 4

J o h n Guest, The Yezidis. A Study in Survival (London and New York, 1987).

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M u s l i m s . . . represented an anomaly in the mind o f the pious S u l t a n . " 1 T h u s , f r o m 1 8 8 5 o n w a r d s , they were put on c o n s c r i p t i o n lists and required to perform military s e r v i c e . A m e m o r a n d u m prepared by Grand V i z i e r Cevad Pa§a, dated 2 5 O c t o b e r 1891 and summarizing the deliberations o f the Ottoman Council o f Ministers on the matter, dwelled at length on this issue. In order to "correct the ignorance and heresy o f these people," the Porte had ordered an advisory c o m m i s s i o n to Mosul to bring the Y e z i d i s into line, so that they would be useful for military service. T h e mission had only further alienated the Y e z i d i s by inordinately violent measures, "thus further increasing their f a n a t i c i s m and bigotry." C e v a d Pa§a suggested that the mission be recalled and replaced by competent persons who would be informed about the "peculiarities o f the sect" and use persuasion and education rather than f o r c e . 2 T h e irade

e n d o r s i n g the M i n i s t e r ' s s u g g e s t i o n s , issued s o m e ten d a y s

previously, stated that 1 3 , 0 0 0 kuru§ had already been spent on a m o s q u e and an e n d o w m e n t f o r t h o s e Y e z i d i s w h o had "already converted to the T r u e F a i t h . " 3 T h i s pressure from the central government caused the Y e z i d i s to turn to the A m e r i c a n m i s s i o n a r i e s a c t i v e a m o n g them a f t e r the late particularly the A m e r i c a n

Board mission

in M a r d i n , w h i c h had

1880s, made

expeditionary a p p r o a c h e s to the Y e z i d i s a f t e r r e c e i v i n g support f r o m an "unnamed English L a d y [who) sent a small sum for a tentative effort a m o n g them."4 In the s u m m e r o f 1 8 9 2 , the Ottoman g o v e r n m e n t mounted its m o s t c o n c e n t r a t e d c a m p a i g n o f c o n v e r s i o n a m o n g the Y e z i d i s . A strong-willed general, O m e r V e h b i Pa§a, was given the title, C o m m a n d e r o f the F o r c e s o f R e f o r m (Firka-i

Islahiye

kumandani),

and was sent to M o s u l to deal with the

p r o b l e m . 5 Using quite brutal methods and systematic repression, he succeeded in forcing the conversion of some Y e z i d i s to Hanefi I s l a m . 6 On 2 0 August 1 8 9 2 , O m e r V e h b i Pa§a sent Istanbul a detailed telegram giving a colourful account of his success:

^Ihid., 126. For information Books and Traditions of the California, 1972). 2 B B A Irade Dahiliye 97741 1891. 3 B B A Irade Dahiliye 97741 1891. 4

on the Yezidi faith see Isya Joseph, Devil Worship. The Sacred Yezidis (London, 1919; reprint, the Health Research Institute of Sublime Porte to Yildiz Palace 20 Rebiyulevvcl 1309/25 October Sublime Porte to Yildiz Palace 20 Rebiyulevvel 1309/25 October

Guest, The Yezidis, 128.

B B A Irade Dahiliye 53 7 Agustos 1308/20 August 1892. This material is located in the trade Dahiliye catalogue for the year H 1310 (1893). 6 Guest, The Yezidis, 129-30. 5

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After repeated unsuccessful attempts through the centuries to bring them back to the true path, eighty villages of the Yezidis and thirty villages of the Shi'a have acceded to the honour of the True Faith. Yesterday their leaders, with total freedom of conscience, accepted my invitation to come to Mosul and become Muslim. This morning, as the military band played the Hamidiye march, and ranks upon ranks of the ulema intoned the holiest of prayers proclaiming the One True God, a great crowd of notables and military personnel gathered around the municipality offices. As a guard of honour stood to military salute, the Mtiftii asked each one if he accepted Islam of his own free will. Upon each confirmation the crowd shouted, "Long Live the Sultan!" (Padi§ahim Qok Ya$a)) Of course, the degree of consensus involved here has to be treated very sceptically, but the point is that the general was saying what he thought his superiors would like to hear. The aspect of invented tradition is striking in the elaborate ceremonial, the guard of honour, the Hamidiye march played by the military band, and the acclamation wishing long life to the Sultan. Another reference to mass conversion occurred in the northern Iraqi village of Alku§. The Vilayet of Mosul reported on 5 February 1903 that an instance of forcible conversion occurred in the village when a certain sheikh, Muhammad Nur, forcibly drove some of the Christians into Mosul and there effected their forcible conversion. When the story got out, it led to an uprising by the local population, which protested that "the proper procedure had not been carried out" by the Vali and the religious officials. The proper procedure required that a priest attend the proceedings to strike the Christians off his lists. Because no such priest was present, the population felt that the conversions were not valid. The affair provoked a major riot, and the Vali reported he feared for his life. 2 A third reference to conversion in a slightly more sensational vein occurred in the town of Savu?bulak on the Iranian border. This incident appears in the Ottoman records on 2 October 1891, when an English girl, a "Miss Kranfel" was "abducted" by a Kurd and was reported to have converted to Islam. The matter was made no simpler by the girl's assertion that she had voluntarily espoused Islam and that she had no regrets about having done so. The couple had taken refuge with the Ottoman Consul in Savu$bulak, an Armenian named Toma Efendi. The matter caused no end of complications after the girl's family, the British government, the Iranian government, as well as the local population became involved. Although the documentary evidence

'BBA Irade Dahiliye 53, Telegram from Omer Vehbi Pasa to Sublime Porte 7 Agustos 1307/20 August 1892. 2

B B A Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi (Chancellery of the Sublime Porte BEO) 149343 6 Zilkade 1320/ 8 February 1903; BEO 149900 16 Zilkade 1320/15 February 1903.

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is incomplete and fragmented, the matter was clearly much more of an embarrassment rather than a religious triumph for the Porte 1 In all the cases mentioned above, the emphasis is on conversion according to "proper channels" and a positive discouragement of conversion through arbitrary, irregular, or accidental occurrences. The new emphasis on Hanefi orthodoxy also ran counter to the official line of the Tanzimat Edict, which declared that all religions in the empire were equal. A document dated 4 November 1891 refers to a petition sent by ten signatories f r o m Antakya (Antioch), who complained bitterly that although they wanted to become Muslim, the officials in Antioch had "denied them this blessing." The decree issuing on this information ordered that "because there is freedom of religion" (edyan serbest oldugundan), an inquiry should be launched to discover what confession the petitioners belonged to and all procedures relating to them should conform to long-prevailing practices (usul) and regulation (nizarn)? When the Western powers criticized the efforts to prevent proselytizing, the Ottoman officials answered that all religions were equal and everyone had the right to believe what they wanted, but this also meant that they had the right to protect their religion. 3 The other remarkable feature of this period is the growing awareness among the ruling circles that new methods were needed to suit this new orthodoxy. A striking example of this new mentality can be observed in a memorandum of 8 April 1892 written by Siileyman Hiisnii Pa§a, a leading figure in the deposition of Sultan Abdtilaziz in 1876. In this extremely long and detailed piece, Siileyman Hiisnii Pa§a, exiled as Governor to Bagdad, wrote the sultan, to propose measures for countering both Islamic heresy and Christian missionary activity. The report stressed that those adhering to the "official religion of the slate" were actually a minority in the provinces of Bagdad, Mosul, and Basra. Shi'ism was singled out as the greatest danger, but his report also dealt with other rival "heretical sects" (firak-i dalle), in which he included Nestorians, Chaldeans, Armenian Catholics and Protestants, and Jews. The surest method of dealing with the problem, said Siileyman Pasa, was for the state to sponsor the writing of a "Book of Beliefs" (Kitab-ul Akaid). This learned work would be a compilation of the writings of famous Islamic scholars and would consist of fifteen chapters, each refuting one or another of the fractious beliefs. He gave specific references to scholars of good repute, "such as the work of the Indian alim, Rahmetullah Efendi called

! B B A Irade Dahiliye 97552 Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat, N o . 4 5 8 , 26 S a f e r 1309/12 October 1891; Irade Hariciye 2 0 9 1 8 17 Rebiyulahir 1309/22 October 1891. 2 B B A i r a d e Dahiliye 9 7 9 6 3 Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat N o . 1492 30 Rebiyulevvel 1309/4 November 1891. 3

A n Eastern Statesman, Contemporary vol. 37 [18801,334-43.

Review,

"Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey,"

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Izhar u! Hak which is a very convincing rebuttal of the Christian and Jewish faiths." The most remarkable element in the Pa§a's report was the suggestion that the book be used to train specially selected ulama who after two or three years training would be given the title, Dai-ul-Hak-Misyoner. Thus would be created a Missionary Society (Datler Cemiyeti), which would fight missionary zeal with missionary zeal. Therefore,although orthodox Islam does not involve active proselytizing in the Christian sense of "saving souls," what Siileyman Hiisnii Pa§a was proposing here was the institution of a neo-tradition in combatting what he saw as subversive activity. 1 A c t i v e proselytizing did become a regular feature, particularly in the heavily Shiite provinces of Iraq. The Ottoman archives abound with reports, salary payment orders to specially appointed ulama sent there to fight heresy, and other o f f i c i a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e d e a l i n g w i t h this a s p e c t of O t t o m a n counter-propaganda } Although the Ottoman state faced what it regarded as subversive insurgency at home, it also took care to reaffirm that it was a great power among others, a state of affairs which the other great powers were obliged to recognize, if only by courtesy. A case in point was the effort made to formalize relations with the Papacy. On 30 March 1898 the Ottoman State decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican for the first time. 3 An Imperial decree which followed some three weeks later determined that Asim Bey, former Ambassador to Athens, would be appointed as the first ambassador to the Holy See "because other states have sent ambassadors to the Papacy and the request from His Holiness the Pope that His Imperial Majesty should follow suit." 4 The decree further stated that establishing such a post was necessary "in order to deal directly in matters pertaining to the affairs of Catholics who are Ottoman s u b j e c t s . C l e a r l y , it was hoped that by dealing with the papacy directly, some measure of control would be established over the activities of the Catholic missionaries. One might also surmise that the sultan, as the Caliph of all Muslims, wanted to reaffirm his position by recognizing his opposite number.

' B B A Yildiz Esas Evraki ( Y E E ) Original collection of all Sultan Abdiilhamid H's archives. 14/1188/126/9 Bagdad 9 Ramazan 1309/ 8 April 1892. Siileyman Hiisnii Pa§a had a distinguished career in the Ottoman army and was typical of the Ottoman officer w h o w a s something of an intellectual. He is k n o w n as the author of the His-i inkilab (Will to Revolution), a tract outlining the necessary reforms to save the empire from ruin, which he presented to Sultan Abdiilaziz. He remained anathema in the eyes of the suspicious Abdiilhamid. T h e sultan used the defeat in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78 to magnify his share in the failure and exile him to Bagdad, where he died soon after he wrote the above report. On him, see Turk Me$hurlan Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopedia of F a m o u s Turks) (Istanbul, 1943), 360. Selim Deringil, "Ottoman Counter-Propaganda against Shi'ism in Hamidian Iraq 1880-1900 " Die Well des Mams, vol. 30 (1990), 45-62. 3

B B A Irade Hususi 16 Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat no: 13509 6 Zilkade 1315/ 30 March 1898. Signed by the Private Secretary to the Sultan, Tahsin Pa§a. This indicates that the sultan took a personal interest in the matter. 4

B B A Irade Hususi 111 23 Zilkade 1315/ 22 April 1898 Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat no: 14212.

5

B B A irade Hususi 96 6 §evval 1315/ 2 9 February 1898 Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat no: 12249; also irade Hususi 16 6 §evval 1315.

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O T T O M A N ISLAM VERSUS W O R L D ISLAM: T H E SIGNIFICANCE O F T H E HICAZ: THE OTTOMAN ATTEMPT TO MONOPOLIZE THE SACRED

T h e position of the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph of Islam was central to the whole network of Ottoman invented traditions. Indeed, in the heyday of Ottoman power, the title of Caliph, the spiritual head of all believers, received much less emphasis. The continuous, almost monotonous, underlining of the spiritual aspect of the sultan's title can be traced directly to the period of decline, gaining m o m e n t u m at the end of the eighteenth century. There is, m o r e o v e r , something specific in the Hamidian version of this e m p h a s i s . Sultan Abdiilhamid II promoted his A r a b subjects to posts of hitherto unprecedented seniority in an effort to forge Islamic solidarity around the office of the Caliphate. Yet, here too, in this most traditional of institutions, a novel element becomes discernible from the 1880s onwards. In order to extend the charisma of the Caliphate to the grass roots of society, Abdiilhamid, the upholder of orthodoxy, used the influential Sufi Sheikhs as propagandists. Sheikh Ebulhuda Al-Sayyadi, a leading m e m b e r of the Kadiri order, became very influential through hundreds of tracts published at official expense which expounded the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate. Similarly, Sheikh Zafir, a prominent Shadiliyya from North Africa, was instrumental in Abdiilhamid's effort to secure the loyalty of the Senusi dervish lodges throughout Saharan Africa. 1 A very important part of Abdiilhamid's policy was ensuring the visibility of the Ottoman Caliphate. In this context, the Hicaz naturally occupied a central position in the Ottoman elite's redefinition of its place in the world. By the time of Abdiilhamid II's rule, the empire consisted mainly of areas peopled by Muslims because the Ottomans had lost most of their Balkan provinces. T h u s , the sultan based his state ideology on his position as "Protector of the Faithful' ( E m i r el-Muminin) and "Protector of the Holy Places" ( H a d i m - u l Haremeyn-i §erifeyn). This role, along with H a n e f i t e orthodoxy, was becoming redefined on an increasingly more narrow basis and represents a fundamental shift in the Ottoman self-view. 2

'Butrus Abu Manneh, "Sultan Abdiilhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 15 (1979), 131-53: Michel L. Le Gall, Pashas Bedouins and Notables (Ph.D disser., Princeton University, 1986), 226-7: M u h a m m a d Zafir B. H a m z a al-Madani( 1829-1903) met Abdiilhamid in 1871 while the latter was still an insignificant prince unlikely ever to rule. He gradually became a close confidante of the sultan. In 1888 Abdulhamid established a Madani lodge ( z a v i y e ) near the Yildiz. Palace. Although Le Gall states that Zafir's relations with the Senusis were not brilliant, he was always regarded as the liaison man between the Palace and North African Muslims. See also Tanzimat'dan Cumhuriyete Tiirkiye Ansiklopedisi, p. 1087. After his death in 1903, the sultan had an elaborate shrine/mausoleum constructed for Sheikh Zafir in ornate art nouveau by his court architect, Raimondo d A r o n c o . It still stands as a relic of late Ottoman folly architecture. 2 D u g u i d , "The Politics of Unity". 139.

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One way by which Ottoman ideology was adjusted focused on a policy of exclusivism regarding property owning in the Hicaz. On 7 April 1882, the Ottoman Council of State (§urayi Devlet) prepared a memorandum concerning the ban on the acquisition of property in the Hicaz by all non-Ottoman Muslims. T h e document, which has an extremely strict tone, refers repeatedly to the explicit exemption of the Hicaz from the new land law of the Tanzimat (1867) allowing foreigners to o w n land in the Ottoman Empire: "That the Hicaz is formally and explicitly exempted from this law is very clear. The law also applies to the Muslim subjects of foreign powers.... If such elements conceal their nationality and thus illegally acquire property, as soon as their subterfuge is discovered their property shall be forfeit." 1 The document used unusually explicit and direct language to state unequivocally: If w e remain indifferent to the accumulation of property by devious means in the hands of foreign M u s l i m s , with the passage of time we may find that much of the Holy Lands have been acquired by subjects of foreign powers. T h e n , the foreigners, as is their wont, after lying in waiting f o r s o m e t i m e , will suddenly be upon us at the slightest o p p o r t u n i t y and e x c u s e , and will p r o c e e d to m a k e the m o s t preposterous claims.W h a t is striking here is clearly the reference to "foreign M u s l i m s . " 3 T h e officials who prepared the memorandum clearly stated that one could not emphasize enough the degree of vigilance required because the Hicaz was "The Jewel in the Crown of the Caliphate" (Cevher-i iklil-i Hilafet-i Seniyye) 4 which is exactly the same formulation used by the British Raj for India, which was called "The Jewel in the Crown" of the Victorian Empire. The title in the British case w a s borrowed f r o m Mughal I n d i a . 5 It might be interesting to speculate on the origins of the terminology in an Ottoman context. Possibly the term had p r e - l s l a m i c , Central A s i a n a n t e c e d e n t s . It m i g h t a l s o be instructive to determine when the Ottomans started using this imagery in

B B A Y.A RES. 15/38 M e m o r a n d u m of the Council of State 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1299/ 7 April 1882 no: 72 T h e actual wording of the law is significant because it carries a certain "worried" tone not usually found in a dry legal document. The preamble to the "Law permitting foreigners to buy property in Ottoman dominions" reads as follows: " In order to prevent malpractices and dispel doubts about the purchase of property in Ottoman domains by foreigners ... and in order to secure the orderly execution of regulations pertaining to this exceptionally important matter it has been decreed that...." Article One then reads: "Apart f r o m the territory of the Hicaz ... [foreigners are permitted to purchase propertyl in all the territories of the state", See, D'ustur (Register of Ottoman Laws) I. Tertip (1289). T h e law is dated Gurre-i Cemaziyelevvel 1284/ (31 August 1867). BBA Y .ARES 15/38. •i J A n interesting parallel in this context might be drawn with the Dutch colonialists concept of "foreign Orientals," as opposed to "Dutch orientals," that is, subjects of the Dutch East Indian colonies; see Anderson, Imagined Communities, 112. 4 B B A Y.A RES 15/38. 5 B e r n a r d C o h n , "Representing Authority in Victorian India," in H o b s b a w m a n d R a n g e r , Invented Traditions, 174.

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relation t o the H i c a z b e c a u s e this is a c a s e in w h i c h t h e r e are d e f i n i t e r e s e m b l a n c e s to "the H o l y L a n d T y r o l " or t h e "Holy R u s s i a n L a n d " in H o b s b a w m ' s e x a m p l e . 1 As with the Hicaz, there a r e f r e q u e n t references in the O t t o m a n d o c u m e n t s t o the " H o l y n a m e of t h e S u b l i m e S t a t e " Mukaddes-i

Devlet-i

Aliyve).

(Ism-i

W h e n o n e c o n s i d e r s that a c c o r d i n g to classical

Islamic j u r i s p r u d e n c e , any believer had t h e right to a c q u i r e p r o p e r t y in the Holy L a n d s of I s l a m , this exclusionist a p p r o a c h is all the m o r e striking. T h e s a m e exclusionism and the attempt to m o n o p o l i z e sacrality is seen in the issue of t h e printing of the Holy Q u ' r a n . O n 16 S e p t e m b e r 1 8 9 7 , the Minister for E d u c a t i o n , Zuhdii Pa§a, sent a m e m o r a n d u m to the o f f i c e of the § e y h t i l i s l a m , r e p o r t i n g that M u s l i m s u b j e c t s of Iran and R u s s i a had m a d e official applications for the printing and sale of the holy b o o k . 2 T h e M i n i s t e r reiterated that the law of 1276 (1859-60) expressly f o r b a d e the importation and sale of Q u ' r a n s c o m i n g f r o m Iran: "It is well k n o w n that the I r a n i a n s h a v e been bringing in copies of the Holy Qu'ran into Ottoman d o m i n i o n s , particularly the Seat of the C a l i p h a t e , Istanbul ( D a r ul-Hilafet-i

Aliyye).

H e r e they

secretly print t h e m and circulate t h e m . It is quite unnecessary to r e m i n d you that this practice is strictly f o r b i d d e n . " A l t h o u g h it might be u n d e r s t a n d a b l e that the Sunni O t t o m a n state should be w a r y of Qu'rans p r o d u c e d by Shiite h a n d s , the s a m e interdict applied to Qu'rans e m a n a t i n g f r o m Sunni K a z a n , and even the land of the A1 A z h a r , Egypt: "The importation of Qu'rans ... c o m i n g f r o m E g y p t is likewise f o r b i d d e n a c c o r d i n g to state regulations ( k a v a i d ) , and practices ( u s u l ) s t e m m i n g f r o m olden times . . . " ( m i n el-kadim)?

Of c o u r s e ,

by the "practice s t e m m i n g from olden times," ZiihdU Pasa w a s thinking b a c k no f u r t h e r than 1859. T h e historically s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r of t h e O t t o m a n practice c o m e s out very clearly f u r t h e r on in the m e m o : A l t h o u g h it seems inauspicious to forbid the printing of Q u ' r a n s to o n e w h o is of the S u n n a , if w e open this d o o r it will m e a n that we will be o p e n i n g it to any M u s l i m f r o m K a z a n or India or Algeria . . . . T h i s will mean unforeseeable dangers for the Holy Word which has survived untarnished for some thirteen hundred years. Particularly since these are troubled times in which the foreigners' c a l u m n i o u s views r e g a r d i n g the Holy W o r d multiply. .. T h e matter may go well b e y o n d the printing of Q u ' r a n s a n d , G o d f o r b i d , c r e a t e untold c o m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e S u b l i m e State.4

'Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 49. BBA Y.A RES 93/38 Memorandum by Minister of Education. Ziihdii Pa§a to the office of the Seyhiilislam. 20 Receb 1315/16 December 1897. * Ibid.

2

4

Ibid.

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In referring to "non-Ottoman M u s l i m s , " the Minister was clearly stating a feeling which runs through this period—that the Caliphate of the H o u s e of O s m a n was in d a n g e r — a n d to a considerable extent the threat emanated f r o m Muslims living under Christian rule who could be manipulated to challenge Ottoman legitimacy. It would be appropriate to recall at this juncture that this document was prepared at approximately the same time that talk of the A r a b Caliphate was gaining currency in Western orientalist thought. The reference to "troubled times" and loose talk about Islam are almost certainly reflective of anxiety caused by these stirrings of ominous portent with which the Ottomans were only too familiar. This led the Porte to try to control the printing and sale of the Qu'ran and other religious texts. T h e answer was found in making the printing of Qu'rans a state m o n o p o l y , maintaining that "politically and religiously it is necessary to keep this affair in the monopoly of the state." The procedure was set up whereby any person wishing to publish an edition of the Qu'ran would first present his manuscript to a Commission f o r the Inspection of Qu'rans (Tedkik

i Mushaf-i

§erif

Komisyonu)

s t a f f e d b y ulama

chosen by

the

§eyhiilislam's office. The candidate was expected to specify whose hand it had been written in, how many copies he proposed to print, and why he wanted to do this in the first place. This was designed to ensure that there would be no falsification in the sacred text and to catch possible accretions which might be injurious to state interests. If his application was approved, he would then be granted permission to have his manuscript published at the press approved by the state. The reason provided to the press for the state monopoly was that this was necessary in order to "ensure that the Holy Book is handled with due care and respect and not defiled by Christian hands." 1 Just as the Ottoman state was becoming more meticulous about the printed word of the holy text, it also became much m o r e fastidious as to whom it regarded as "properly Ottoman." Thus the conception of the Caliphate accordingly b e c a m e much more political than religious. It w a s no longer enough to be Muslim or even a Sunni. Nothing illustrates this better than the case of the Algerians seeking asylum in Ottoman dominions after the invasion of Algeria by the French in 1830. T h e issue which caused the O t t o m a n s considerable headache was the status of the Algerians who had immigrated to ^Ibid., and memorandum by Council of State 16 Çaban 1314/ 21 January 1897 no: 3119. Also see enclosure, Minutes of the Council of Ministers of the Sublime Porte, no: 294. The intention of the measure is being discussed here. Clearly, unauthorized copies of the Qu'ran and other religious publications must have continued to come into Ottoman lands because police measures to stop them were extremely limited. Yet there was discussion of what to do with copies of unauthorized Qu'rans which had been seized, because destroying even faulty copies was objectionable. The Commission for the Inspection of Qu'rans became the Superintendency for the Printing of Qu'rans and Legal Works after 1909 and was subsumed by the Young Turk administration under the Bab-i Fetva, the Ministry of Religious Affairs. See "Shaikh al-lslam" i n E. J. Brill, First Encyclopedia of Islam, 276.277,278.

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the province of Syria, ostensibly to escape from the Dar ul-Harb. Some of them wanted to live in Ottoman dominions while conserving their French passports, thus benefiting from the special privileges of French subjects. On 22 November 1889, the Porte issued a decree stating that such refugees would be required to choose, within two years of their arrival, whether to remain French citizens and leave or to be automatically considered as Ottoman subjects and stay. The Algerians of French allegiance would be forbidden to marry Ottoman women, and any Algerian contravening this regulation "would be treated according to regulations pertaining to Iranians" and would be forced to leave Ottoman soil. 1 In order to heighten his profile in the Hicaz, the sultan also made use of modern propaganda that were becoming available to the state. In an Imperial Edict of 2 January 1894, the sultan ordered that the newspapers give extensive coverage to the pious endowments he was supporting in the Hicaz. Hostels and hospitals, for example, were to be clearly stressed as they demonstrated the royal munificence by the Protector of the Holy Places. On one occasion the office of the state censor was severely rebuked for not making sure that the press had given adequate publicity to the surre alayi, the yearly ceremonial departure of the caravan bearing the sultan's gifts for Mecca and Medina. Evidently the Sultan-Caliph did not feel that he had been given enough headline space. 2 The project which v\ as perhaps the most spectacular effort to combine practical benefits with propaganda value was, of course, the Hicaz Railway, which was a Herculean effort to link Aleppo and the Syrian coast with the Holy Cities. Abdulhamid II made full use of its spiritual aspect. Donations were welcomed from non Ottoman Muslims (their money was evidently welcome as long as they did not come to stay), and the opening of each successive stage of the railroad was ceremonially publicized: "The opening dates were made to coincide with the sultan's accession anniversary. By this means they gained a symbolic importance and were linked to the ruler personally.... This news was relayed to the Muslims of the world by Ottoman, Indian and Egyptian newspapers." 3

I f j B A Irade Meclis-i Mahsus 4625 26 Rebiyulevvel 1307/ 22 November 1889. T h i s exclusivist tone is apparent in the very "Law on Ottoman Nationality" (Tabiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunu 19 January 1869), which states in Article Eight: "The children of one w h o has died or abandoned Ottoman nationality, even if they are minors, are not considered to be the same as their father and continue to be regarded as Ottoman subjects. ( H o w e v e r ) the children of a f o r e i g n e r w h o has taken O t t o m a n nationality, even if they are m i n o r s , will not be considered the s a m e nationality as their father and will be considered as foreigners." See Dustur 1. Tertip, p. 16-18. 2 B B A Irade Hususi 102 Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat 2 3 Cemaziyelahir 1311/ 2 January 1894 no: 4642. ^William Ochsenwald, The Hicaz Railroad (Charlottesville, N C 1980), 76-77.

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The Ottoman sensitivity to public relations ranged f r o m huge projects, such as the Hicaz Railway, to the smallest details of symbolism. On 4 August 1893, the Palace decreed that 5,000 gold pieces were to be paid to a certain François Pirinyan, evidently an Armenian French subject, w h o was offering for sale what he claimed was a specimen of calligraphy in the hand of the Caliph Ali. The order stated in somewhat euphemistic language that "although its originality cannot be discerned to any degree of certainty, because it has achieved renown as the calligraphy of the exalted Caliph, its place is in the Imperial Treasury, where all such sacred relics belong." 1 What was being said here was, in plain language, that it is probably a fake but buy it all the same because it is thought to be real. The preoccupation of the Ottoman state with what can only be called its public image meant that a prestigious item such as the handwriting of one of the early Islamic leaders, even of dubious authenticity, was deemed desirable as part of an effort to bolster the claim to world Islamic leadership. T h e importance of "making a good showing," specifically in the Hicaz, the seat of Ottoman legitimacy, received constant emphasis. Particularly embarrassing were c o m p l a i n t s f r o m Christian c o n s u l a t e s and e m b a s s i e s relating to mistreatment or cheating of their subjects undertaking the Islamic pilgrimage, the haj. A public declaration dated 30 January 1896, sent to the officials in the Hicaz in order that they publicize it a m o n g the pilgrims, declared that "the pilgrims both from within and without the Imperial Domains are our honoured guests." In addition to this public statement, the local officials were ordered to ensure that the pilgrims were not cheated over such matters as hiring camels and guides. 2 Of course, this was a rather vain hope, given the rapacity of the locals for revenue, which they primarily obtained by fleecing pilgrims. 3 The same preoccupation with public image is discernible in a discussion dated 27 April 1890 on whether or not the Sublime State should decorate the French President, Sadi Carnot. He had gained the sultan's favour by agreeing to ban a play in Paris deemed injurious to the honour of the Prophet M u h a m m a d . 4 In all of these examples, f r o m the property rights in the Hicaz to the question of the decoration of the French President, there is a c o m m o n thread, the desire to bolster the basis of the state's legitimacy. This was done by the creation or invention of traditions, sometimes enforced by law, in an effort to consolidate a new basis for state solidarity within Ottoman society, while maintaining the public presence of the Ottoman state as a Great Power.

' B B A Irade Hususi 62 Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat 2 0 Muharrem 1 3 1 1 / 4 A u g u s t 1893 no: 450. 2

B B A Irade Dahiliye 2 7 13 ,§aban 1313/30 January 1896. This particular complaint w a s instigated by the Dutch Consul in Cidde.

3

O n the issue of mistreatment of pilgrims, see W . Ochsenwald, Religion and the State in Arabia. The Hicaz under Ottoman Control 1840-1908 (Columbus, Ohio, 1984), particularly 20 113-4 122. 4

B B A Y E E Kamil Pa§a Evrakina Ek (Additional Collections of the Private Papers Belonging to Grand Vizier Kamil Pa§a), 8 6 - 3 / 2 6 4 . 6 Ramazan 1307/ 2 7 April 1890.

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CONCLUSION

A s the nineteenth century drew to its close, the Ottomans found that they were facing not only external threats to their existence but also numerous potential fifth columns. Indeed, in many instances these two overlapped. The sultan stated as much when he referred to interference by the great powers whenever he acted too directly with the missionaries. Thus the Ottoman elite retrenched behind an increasingly self-conscious attempt to stake a claim to existence in a world becoming smaller and ever more hostile. This dilemma finds expression in the cynical words of Said Pa§a, who served nine times as the Grand Vizier of Abdulhamid II: "As the Sublime State finds itself stuck among Christian powers, even the most accomplished diplomacy will not suffice for our defence.... All relations a m o n g states are based on animosity and self-interest." The Pa§a then referred to the Risorgimento

and the

unification of Germany as examples which could be emulated by the Ottoman state but "the time and conditions are not yet ripe." 1 T h e pressure on the Ottoman Empire, the only non-western European Great Power, was not only military and strategic but also moral. This moral pressure is discernible in the words of the Protestant missionary and traveller, Sir William Muir. In virtue of Mutawakkil's cession of his title, the Osmanly Sultans make pretensions not only to the sovereignty of the Moslem world, but also to the Caliphate itself—that is the spiritual as well as political power held by the successors of the Prophet. Were there no other bar, the Tatar blood which f l o w s in their veins would m a k e the claim untenable. Even if their pedigree by s o m e flattering fiction could be traced up to Coreishite stock, the claim would be a fond anachronism. The Caliphate ended with the fall of Bagdad. The illusory resuscitation by the Mamelukes w a s a lifeless s h o w ; the O s m a n l y Caliphate a dream. 2 The Ottomans attempted to counter this moral pressure by ideological retrenchment through the inculcation of obedience to a narrowly defined official faith. This faith, a new interpretation of the H a n e f i m e z h e b , w a s supposed to instill normative obedience in a population which w a s to be educated along the path to becoming an Ottoman citizenry. All this involved the invention of new traditions which would make a rear-guard action possible while a new basis for solidarity was first construed then constructed. From the documentary evidence one derives the impression that Ottoman nationality was

' b B A Y E E 31/1950 Mukerrer/4583 22 Zilkade 1299/ 6 October 1882 (emphasis mine). 2

S i r William Muir, T h e Caliphate: Its Rise Decline and Fall. (From Original Sources) (London: T h e Religious Tract society, 189 lì, 590.

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beginning to be envisioned in increasingly secular terms despite the religious language. In the case of the Algerians mentioned above, the decisive criterion for allowing them to remain or forcing them to leave w a s whether they accepted Ottoman nationality or not, even though they were Sunni Maliki Muslims. Similarly, over the issue of property ownership in the Hicaz, the specific exclusion of non-Ottoman Muslims from this privilege, which was in fact a right f r o m the standpoint of Islamic jurisprudence, points in the same direction. T h e fact that the attempt was m a d e to create and reinforce an Ottoman state m o n o p o l y f o r the printing and sale of the Qu'ran, which specifically forbade this activity for the subjects of rival powers, is a variation on the s a m e t h e m e . The Commission for the Inspection of Qu'rans was a combination of European etatisme with Islamic motifs. It is also indicative of the new mentality that even Qu'rans coming from E g y p t , the seat of the A1 A z h a r , one of the most prestigious schools of Sunni learning in the world, were forbidden entry and sale, as Egypt was now (since 1882) under British control. T h e new attitude to conversion was also indicative of the s a m e mentality. Conversion to the Hanefi mezheb was specifically encouraged to the point of forcibly converting marginal elements, such as the Yezidis. Here, too, we observe invented tradition at work in the "ceremony of conversion," c o m p l e t e with military band playing the H a m i d i y e m a r c h , the religious official representing the state performing the c e r e m o n y , and the assembled population shouting, "Long Live the Sultan"! In the other examples mentioned above, the emphasis was clearly on conversion through the "deliberate method and procedure" usually backed by the educational a p p a r a t u s of the state. E d u c a t i o n , particularly primary education, received a great deal of attention in the Hamidian reign. Smith's reference to the nineteenth-century "educator states" would also apply to the Ottoman case. 1 T h e distribution of primary schools across the empire was greatly improved when the importance of primary schooling as a major factor in m a k i n g "mass p r o d u c i n g traditions" through the "captive audiences available f o r indoctrination in the educational system" b e c a m e central to schemes of Ottoman social engineering. 2

'See Smith, Ethnic Roots of Nationalism, 134: "In fact, the state only came into its educator role in the latter half of the 19th century, when mass compulsory primary education became the norm in Western countries." Although it would be inaccurate to speak of mass or compulsory education in the Ottoman context, throughout the Tanzimat and the Hamidian periods there was a concerted effort to spread schooling even into the remoter parts of the empire. In this sense the Ottomans were not behind Europe in appreciating the importance of education in forging a citizenry. On the educational reforms in the Hamidian era see, Bayram Kodaman, Abdulhamit Donemi Egitim Sistemi (Istanbul, 1983). 2

Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass Producing Traditions: Europe 1870-1914," in Hobsbawm and Ranger The Invention of Tradition, 264,277,282.

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In the context of the material cited a b o v e , I contend that the late-nineteenth century Ottoman polity was very much a part of world trends. It clearly walked down a very similar path to, say, imperial Russia, when Abdiilhamid II's contemporary, Alexander III, followed a very similar policy of using pre-existing elements of sacrality to buttress T s a r d o m . 1 In a similar vein, the Japanese Emperor cult, which took shape in approximately the same period, focused on "elemenis drawn from the recent or the ageless past (which) were cast into moulds which were newly formed in the Meiji years to suit the needs of the time." 2 Much closer to h o m e , the Austrian Habsburgs made something of a f a m i l y business out of the glorification of the dynasty as a reaction to encroaching nationalism.'' It was no longer a question of mere obedience. What was being sought was, in Weberian terms, "the transition f r o m the merely unreflexive formation of a habit to the conscious acceptance of the maxim that action should be in accordance with a norm." 4 What the Ottoman elite, like their counterparts in other imperial systems, were trying to foster from the mid-century onwards was just this transition from passive obedience to active and conscious subscription to a new normative order.

'Richard Wortman, "Moscow and Petersburg: The Problem of Political Center in Tsarist Russia 1881-1914," in Sean Wilentz, ed.. Rites of Power (Philadelphia, 1985), 244-75. Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths (Princeton, 1985), 39. ^Istvan Deak, "The Habsburg Monarchy: The Strengths and Weaknesses of a Complex Patrimony." (Monarchies Symposium, Columbia University, October 26-27,1990). 4 M a x Weber, Economy and Society (New York, 1968), 327. 2

FROM OTTOMAN TO TURK: SELF-IMAGE AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING IN TURKEY

The aim of this chapter is to trace a general outline of the story of how the Ottomans became "Turks" and to situate this development in a majority minority discourse. The term "minority" (ekalliyet) would have meant nothing to the Ottomans of the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. It was only after the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 that the term acquired the meaning it has today (Sonyel 1975: 67-68,97-98). First,

I

will

trace

the

development

of

Ottoman/Turkish

"protonationalist" themes in a small sampling of primary sources and contemporary accounts. 1 Second, as a case study, I will focus on the attempts to incorporate the Kurds into the population on whom the Ottoman Empire could rely through their inclusion in the Hamidiye irregular cavalry in the 1890s

FROM OTTOMANISM TO TURKISM

The standard jargon of Turkish official historiography is that Turks were always seen as inferior, churlish types by the practitioners of the Ottoman high culture (Berkes 1964). According to Bernard Lewis (1961: 1), "the ethnic term Turk was little used, and then chiefly in a derogatory sense to designate ... ignorant peasants." The new nationalist elite felt that they needed to distance themselves from their "dissolute and degenerate past" and from their predecessors, the Ottoman ruling elite. If the old elite could be shown to have looked down on the "true Turks," the new elite's credibility would be proportionately increased. This value judgement was then transmitted to subsequent generations via the work of leading Turkish and foreign scholars (see Deringil 1993). Recent research is beginning to show quite convincingly, however, that even in the "Golden A g e " of the empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the ruling elite had a clear notion of their Turco-Central Asian heritage and were very proud of it (Fleischer 1986: 286-90).

' i am using "protonationalism" in the sense in which it is used by Eric Hobsbawm (1992).

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A s the empire shrank, particularly after the loss of the Balkans in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Anatolia began to receive emphasis as the "heartland of the Turks " This went hand in hand with efforts to legitimize the rule of the Ottoman dynasty and reinforced the universal Islamic legitimation of the sultan as the caliph of all M u s l i m s (Deringil

1991). A

geographical encyclopaedia published in 1889 stated under the title "Anatolia": It can be said that Anatolia is entirely a land of Turks, and the majority of its population arc Muslims. Even most of the Christians are ethnic T u r k s \Hiristiyanlarin kism-i azami dahi yine Turk cinsine mensubdurlar|. In the a f o r e s a i d A n a t o l i a n p e n i n s u l a , with the exception of a few Christians in the ports, the only difference between the Muslim Turks and their Christian compatriots \vatanda§lari\ is religion. It would t h e r e f o r e be quite correct to call these latter "Christian Turks." (Sami A.H. 1306 | A . D . 18961: 396-97) It was an additional irony that the writer of these lines was an Albanian by the name of §emseddin Sami. Sami was also well known in late Ottoman cultural circles as a distinguished lexicographer of the Turkish language. His Kamus-u

Tiirkt is still the standard reference work for students of Ottoman

Turkish. Sami's Kamus-u

Alam

is interesting testimony to the intellectual

atmosphere of the time. Ev idently a translation of a French encyclopaedic dictionary, with additional materials for the Ottoman domains, it remains mostly a rather stolid publication liven on subjects on which we might expect a more personal approach, such as Sami's native land of Albania, the tone is very anodyne. T h e extremely polemical tone of the Anatolian section is therefore all the more striking. For instance, Sami's views on how the Greek and Armenian "Turks" had "betrayed their origins" is very interesting: "It is therefore deplorable that |these Christian Turks) have become subject to the Christian and Armenian c h u r c h e s , forgetting that they had no previous connection with these whatever. They have thus taken up the unfortunate cause of the Greeks and Armenians, writing their mother tongue, which is Turkish, in the Greek and Armenian alphabets." Sami heavily hinted at foreign provocation in these matters: "Recently in these past few years, with the encouragement of so-called scientific societies they [the Christians! have been abandoning the official language of state, and have begun learning Greek and Armenian. This has led to the strange spectacle of fathers who do not speak a word of Greek or Armenian but who have sons who do not understand a word of Turkish!" (Sami 1306/1896).

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A British publication that appeared at almost the same time noted that the reign of Abdiilhamid II ( 1 8 7 6 - 1 9 0 9 ) was a particular landmark in the achievement o f a relatively integrated population in the empire:

"He

deliberately and consciously worked toward the end o f creating a uniform empire, peopled by Muslims, who should as far as possible be similar in character and aims, and united in their loyalty to the Sultan as Khalif" (Ramsay 1890: 51). The answer of the Hamidian Empire to this dilemma was to lay increasing stress on the official religion of the state, which was the Hanefi school of Islamic jurisprudence ( m e z h e b ) . Whereas other, more heterodox branches of Islam had received relatively more tolerant treatment in earlier centuries, the shrinking of the empire's resources in the late 1880s meant the enforcement of a new orthodoxy. Siileyman Hiisnii Pa§a, a major figure in Ottoman politics in the 1870s, had interesting views on the subject. He is a good example of the type of bureaucrat/soldier/intellectual who ran the empire. Something of an illustrious exile, he was banished to Baghdad by a suspicious Abdiilhamid for his central role in the deposition of Sultan Abdiilaziz in May 1876 (see Me§hurlari

Ansiklopedisi).

Turk

From his political exile in Iraq he penned an

extremely detailed memorandum, dated April 8 , 1 8 9 2 , relating to measures to be undertaken by the state to ensure the integration of heterodox and heretical elements into the official beliefs. Displaying an intricate knowledge of what would today be called ethnography, the pasha gave a rather sophisticated and detailed breakdown of the ethnic mosaic of Iraq, covering Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Chaldeans, Nestorians, and Armenians, distributed across various sects and subsects of Islam and Christianity, as well as Jews. He commented, "As can be seen from the above the elements belonging to the official faith and language o f the state are in a clear minority whereas the majority falls to the hordes of the opposition" ( B B A Y E E 14/1188/16/9). 1 This situation was to be remedied by systematic propaganda and the "correction of the beliefs" (tashih-i akaid) of the "heretics" or "deviants" {firak-h dalle). In order to accomplish this, the Ottoman state should sponsor the writing of a "book of beliefs" (Kitab-ul Akaid), which should consist of some fifteen chapters, each dealing with one unorthodox element. The correction of the beliefs was to be accomplished largely through the efforts of Ottoman missionaries, who were to be modelled on their Protestant contemporaries. The pasha was quite generous in his wisdom, and the projected chapters to be included ranged from obvious targets such as Shiism through Christianity and Judaism to "the pagan practices o f

' T h e Hicaz had a special status and considerable autonomy. One of its privileges was that its population was exempted from military service.

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I n d o - C h i n a . " 1 It is also significant that one of the heretical beliefs he mentioned was positivism, referred to as "the new philosophy" (felsefe-i cedide)\ hence he maintained that the book should also be translated into French. This is a clear reference to what some a m o n g the Hamidian Islamicconservative Ottoman elite saw as the secularizing, subversive influence of positivism (Taneri 1963). 2 This trend was to be reversed in the Young Turk period, when a younger generation of relative upstarts was to stress French positivism. Leading Young Turks such as A h m e t Riza and Abdullah Cevdet, having come under the influence of thinkers such as Auguste C o m t e and Gustave Lebon, were to lead the field in this regard (Hanioglu 1986). A n o t h e r example of the genre of what can be called "intellectual mobilization literature" was a long memorandum by Osman Nuri Pa§a, one of the most controversial vali (governors) of the Hicaz in Abdiilhamid's reign and something of an unknown soldier in late Ottoman history. A good example of the diligent provincial administrator, he expressed views representative of the late Ottoman world view. His July 18, 1885, memorandum dwelled at length on reform measures to be taken in the Hicaz and other A r a b provinces. The pasha stated that the majority of the armies stationed in the Hicaz, Bingazi, and Yemen were made up of "the fundamental elements" (unsur-u asli) of the empire, namely, w h o were "the Turks and Anatolian peoples"; it was they w h o paid "the blood tax," that is, fought in the armies. It w a s therefore imperative that the Hicazbe annexed as a regular province of the empire and its population be made to contribute to its defence. 3 Osman Nuri Pa§a was clearly imbued with the "mobilizational" ethic of the nineteenth century that informed so much of late Ottoman statecraft: Although it is possible to transform all of the Muslim population into a fundamental element, events have shown that the time is not yet ripe. Even if it were possible today to blend all the M u s l i m tribes and nations together by causing them to lose their special characteristics through the application of rigorous policies, they would still be n o more than the boughs and branches of the tree whose trunk would still be constituted by the Turks. (BBA Y E E 14/292/126/8) T h u s , to Osman Nuri Pa§a, the Turks were to be the foundation of the M u s l i m Ottoman nation, while the "other Muslims," that is, A r a b s , Kurds, Albanians, and so forth, were to be supporting, auxiliary elements.

^ T h e B B A in the P r i m e Ministry Archives in Istanbul. This chapter uses the f o l l o w i n g abbreviations for collections of documents in these archives: Y . A . Res. (Yildiz Ar^ivi R e s m i Maruzat); Y E E (Yildiz Esas Evraki); Y. Mtv. (Yildiz Ar§ivi Miitenevvi Malumat). 2 I t is worth noting here that Suleyman Hiisnu Pa§a had written a world history (Tarih-i Alem) dealing with matters ranging f r o m the "big bang" to the sequence of Chinese dynasties. See Taneri (1963). 3 I t is also worth noting that the man whom Siileyman Hiisnii Pa§a r e c o m m e n d e d to write the chapter on Christianity, Moulvi Rahmetullah, is referred to by Snouck Hurgronje (1931) as "the highly revered assailant of Christianity, Rahmat Ullah, an exile f r o m British India (living in the Hicaz)."

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The major aim of the late Ottoman centre was therefore the creation of a reliable core population who would be duly imbued with the "correct" ideology. This was to be done primarily through education. The emphasis on mass primary education dates from the Hamidian period. Although literacy levels in the late Ottoman Empire remained very low by European standards, by the turn of the century there had been a significant increase (Findley 1989: 52, 86, 139). A report on educational reform dated May 6, 1899, pointed out that the aim of establishing "primary schools in each village" was "the preservation of the morals and language of our people," particularly against the threat of missionary schools. It specified that by competing with the missionary schools in improving the quality of education, and making sure that the language of instruction would be Turkish, the aims of a national education policy would be served. One of its main points was "It is of the utmost importance that no foreign teachers be employed in these schools; particularly, the employment of Rumanian, Serbian, or Greek teachers is to be strictly avoided." In terms of the "national character" of the educational program, the report was very outspoken: The fact that states are spending a great deal of money on education, and even small states such as Rumania, Serbia, and Greece spend as much as 10 percent of their revenue on education, should be instructive for us. Particularly the fact that even Bulgaria is spending 6 percent of its revenue on education, while the Ottoman State spends only one and a half percent, should show the need for educational reform. (BBA Y.A. Res. 101/39, 25 Zilhicce 1316/6 May 1899, Report by Special Commission on Educational Reforms) This last point suggests a perception of competition with countries that had formerly been Ottoman domains. Together with education, military service was seen as a formative process for the creation of the reliable majority. It is to this that we now turn.

THE KURDISH ISSUE In a panel discussion on Turkish television in November 1993, a group of "loyal" Kurdish tribal leaders were invited to comment on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). They were extremely virulent in their attacks on the PKK, referring to its members as "not Kurds but Armenians." They actually told an audience of millions that many of the PKK killed had been found to be uncircumcised. The tragic irony of this situation only becomes apparent when one goes back to the Ottoman Empire in the 1890s. The chances are that the Kurdish chiefs on television are the descendants of the Hamidiye irregular cavalry forces formed during the reign of Abdiilhamid II. These regiments,

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consisting of Kurdish light cavalry c o m m a n d e d by Turkish officers, were primarily involved in the Armenian massacres of the 1890s and the mass deportations of 1915, in w hich hundreds of thousands of Armenians perished. The original idea of the Hamidiye included not only the Kurds but also the Arab tribesmen of Ottoman Libya and the Turcoman nomads, Turkic peoples whose n o m a d i c lifestyle had retained m a n y of their early central Asian practices. The Kurds themselves had traditionally been a volatile element in eastern Anatolia. The last major Kurdish sheikh, §eyh Ubaydallah, has been seen by some historians as the leader of an independence movement under the guise of his short-lived Kurdish League in the early 1880s (Olson 1989: 5-7). The creation of the Hamidiye irregular cavalry regiments out of the Kurdish tribes was a double-ended policy, intended both to pacify the Kurds and assimilate them into the reliable Islamic population, and to use them as a weapon against the Armenian independence m o v e m e n t . The choices open to the Ottoman government were much the same ones that are available to the Turkish government today: "The Kurds were a potentially dangerous element in the region which needed to be either totally suppressed—an unreasonable policy given the character of the times and the government—or pampered and appeased while kept under loose supervision" (Duguid 1973: 146). The Hamidiye regiments were conceived of as an irregular force on the Russian Cossack model. Ottoman officers were actually sent to St. Petersburg in order to "learn Cossack style drill," which they would then practice in training the Hamidiye (BBA Y. Mtv. 5 7 / 3 8 , 1 5 Cemaziyelevvel 1309/17 Dec. 1891, Ottoman Chief of General Staff Riza Pa§a to Sublime Porte). Several cavalry captains returned in 1896, "having c o m p l e t e d their training in Petersburg in Cossack sty le tactics," which they were now to impart to the H a m i d i y e units in the Ottoman Fourth and Fifth A r m i e s ( B B A Y. M t v . 138/9Z, 7 §evval 1313/Z3 Mar. 1896, Imperial General Staff, General in Charge of Cavalry Forces Osman Ferid Pa§a).' It was specifically stated that these units would be deployed "against Armenian brigands" ( B B A Y . Mtv. 186/8Z, 30 Kanun-u Sani 1314/11 Feb. 1898, Chief of Staff Riza Pa§a to Sublime Porte). Therefore Armenian historians have been right in pointing out the anti-Armenian priority of the Hamidiye regiments: "Though the Kurds had been much more a threat to Ottoman unity than the A r m e n i a n s in the years p a s t , the sultan backed these f e l l o w M u s l i m s a g a i n s t C h r i s t i a n Armenians whom he saw as a disruptive element linked to his enemies abroad" (Suny 1993: 105). h t is interesting to note that a recent work on the topic, like all other works to date, only guesses that the Hamidiye w e r e designed on the cossack m o d e l , because of obvious similarities. See Karaca (1993: 173). It is now clear from the evidence that the government took the cossack example literally, to the point of sending officiers to be trained in Russia.

S E L F -1 M A G Eì A N D S O C I A L

ENGINEERING

17!

The Hamidiye regiments were also designed as a vehicle for social engineering; the tribes selected would have special primary schools established in their regions (BBA Y. Mtv. 87/133, 19 Cemaziyelevvel 1311/Z8 Nov. 1893). The leading chiefs' sons would also be brought to Istanbul, where they would be trained in Turkish language and manners in the famous "Tribal School" (.Mekteb-i A^iret). This school was intended to have a long-term "civilizing influence" on the Kurds, and it particularly aimed to socialize the children of the Kurdish elite as good Ottomans. It also admitted the sons of leading Arab sheikhs as well as those of Albanian notables. In this sense, the logic behind this experiment was very like Thomas Babington Macaulay's aim in British India to "create a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, morals and intellect" (Kodaman 1983: 110-19; Anderson 1991: 91). In this respect, the raj was much more successful than the Ottomans. Another privilege of the Hamidiye was tax exemption. For the duration of their service, Hamidiye tribesmen and their families were exempted from taxation on their herds and other resources (BBA Meclis-i Vtikela Mazbatalari ¡Minutes of the Ottoman Cabinet] 72/82, 6 Kanun-u Evvel 1308/19 Dec. 1892). These privileges are similar to the present-day advantages granted to Kurdish elements in eastern Anatolia, which are armed by the state and expected to contribute to the fight against the PKK as "local defence units" (kolcu). Very soon after the formation of the first Hamidiye regiments, it became apparent that the degree of state control over them was to be problematic. As early as 1887, reports began to come in of unruly behaviour among the tribes armed by the state (BBA Y. Mtv. 165/2, 3 Agustos 1313/16 Aug. 1887, telegram from the governor of Erzurum). Yet the scheme went forward. By 1892 tribes were being recruited in the areas of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Ottoman Armies—north-eastern Anatolia, northern Syria, and northcentral Iraq, respectively (BBA Y. Mtv. 67/1, telegram from Mehmed Zeki Pa§a, imperial commissioner for the constitution of the Hamidiye regiments). It is important to realize that these regiments were to comprise not only Kurds, but also Arab Bedouin and Turcoman nomads (BBA Y. Mtv. 68/2:, telegram from imperial ADC §akir Pa§a, commissioner in charge of reform in the eastern provinces). The Commission for the Establishment of the Hamidiye Regiments reported regularly during this period that the "bold warriors who have never seen a city or a town and remain in a state of savagery" had given elaborate feasts to honour the envoys of the sultan and to celebrate their inclusion "in this singular honour" (BBA Y. Mtv. 68/z8, telegram from Hakki Pa§a, chief of the Commission for the Establishment of Hamidiye Regiments in Urfa). By mid-1892 it had been established that the number of regiments should be

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increased to one hundred and that these should include the desert-dwelling Bedouin ( B B A Y. Mtv. 67/1, 25 Agustos /25 A u g . 1892, §akir Pa§a to Yildiz Palace). Another aspect of what would today be called the socialization of these tribes was their periodic rotation to Istanbul to serve as the sultan's imperial guard for one year. It was hoped that this period of service would "improve the demeanour and general conduct" of the tribes ( B B A Y . Mtv. 7 3 / 4 6 , 1 3 Kanun-u Evvel/26 Dec. 1892. General Directives on the Rotation of the Hamidiye Regiments lo Istanbul). T h e tribesmen in Istanbul would be given special dress uniforms, and each regiment would be given an elaborately embroidered banner to symbolize its attachment to the state. By the end of 1892 it was reported that 52 regiments had been formed and 21 were in the process of formation (BBA Y. Mtv. 73/69, 17 Kanun-u Evvel/30 Dec. 1892, Imperial A D C §akir Pa§a to Yildiz Palace). Although Istanbul thought that it could ultimately control these units, as the century drew to a close it became painfully apparent that this was not the case. Not only did the Hamidiye prey on defenceless Armenian villagers, they also ceaselessly fought other Kurds, particularly the Alewis, w h o were mostly Shiite, whereas most Hamidiye units were Sunni (Suny 993: 105, 106; Olson 1989: 14) Increasingly, the reports from the field dealt with their transgressions. On January 16, 1898, three Hamidiye officers in the Diyarbekir region were reported to be illegally "collecting taxes, going astray, and oppressing the local population." Orders were sent out for their arrest and court-martial in Diyarbekir ( B B A Y . Mtv. 171/85, 22 §aban 1315/16 J a n . 1898, Imperial Chief of Staff Riza Pa§a to Palace). Practically all the eastern vilayets reported untoward activity by the Hamidiye. On March 2, 1899, it w a s reported f r o m Erzurum that three Hamidi>e officers had been involved in plundering villages and killing peasants (BBA Y. Mtv. 187/46, 19 §evval 1316/2 M a r . 1899, Imperial Chief of Staff Ri/.a Pa§a to Sublime Porte). On March 30, it w a s reported f r o m Erciyes thai a H a m i d i y e captain, Abdul A g a , w a s actively involved in plunder (BBA Y. Mtv. 188/88, 18 Zilkade 1316/30 M a r . 1899, Imperial Chief of Staff Ri/.a Pa§a to Sublime Porte). Almost all the cases reported dealt with transgressions against Muslims. This leads one to suspect that infringements against Christians were not reported or not considered transgressions. One of the rare cases where the British E m b a s s y b e c a m e involved (the British were the self-appointed protectors of the O t t o m a n non-Muslims) probably involved Armenians. A Hamidiye lieutenant colonel, Haci Bey, from the Artus tribe, was reported to "have indulged in brigandage and shed much blood which has gone unpunished." The vilayet of Mosul was ordered to arrest him "and punish him in an exemplary fashion." T h e people who had been wronged were told that they could bring their complaints to the courts of Cizre and Mardin (BBA Y. Mtv. 1 9 0 / 4 3 , 7 Muharrem 1317/18 May 1899, Imperial Chief of Slaff Riza Pa§a to Sublime Porte).

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As the century neared its end, Istanbul became increasingly concerned that the Hamidiye command was proving more of a liability than an asset. The imperial chief of staff continued to report that various Hamidiye tribal commanders "did not show the necessary characteristics of command and responsibility." Some had registered as Hamidiye commanders despite the fact that "they were too old to mount a horse"; others had been found to be wanting in morals and responsibility. Even more serious was that the regular officers and troops who had been attached to the Hamidiye units had taken up their bad habits. It was ordered that a register be compiled of "those who had been seen to be of objectionable behaviour" and that these be brought before courts martial in administrative centres such as Van and Erzurum (BBA Y. Mtv. 191/155, 23 Safer 1317/6 July 1899, Chief of Staff Receiver's Office no. 421). Another aspect of the state's policy in the eastern Anatolian provinces was to conduct a census of the population in order to "standardize" it. The Kurdish tribes to be included in the Hamidiye regiments were to be provided with Ottoman identity cards {niifus tezkeresi) noting the name, religious affiliation, and abode of the bearer, and births and deaths were to be recorded systematically. The first identity cards began to be issued in the urban areas after the 1885 census (Duben and Behar 1991: 19). Although this sounded fine on paper, it was very difficult to put into practice, given the "state of savagery of most of the tribes" (BBA Y.A. Res. 110/69, Selh-i §aban 1318/22 Dec. 1900, Council of State memorandum no. 2,390). As the twentieth century dawned, Istanbul came to realize that the Hamidiye were truly getting out of hand. Complaints continued to come in, often involving the Porte in disputes with foreign powers, such as that dealing with the "excesses of a Hamidiye commander against Russian subjects in Erzurum." The military authorities were increasingly concluding that "those regiments which are not immediately useful should be discharged" (BBA Y. Mtv. 253/111, 21 Te§rin-i Sani 1319/4 Dec. 1903, Yildiz Palace Imperial Secretariat). Yet the Armenian crisis continued to keep eastern Anatolia boiling. By the end of 1903, the Porte shifted to the more flexible policy of summoning the Hamidiye regiments to points of trouble only when they were needed and then discharging them (BBA Y. Mtv. 252/363,21 §aban 1321/12 Nov. 1903). The Hamidiye were also counterproductive in their tendency to recreate the old system of tribal consolidation. The policy of co-opting the tribes against the elevation of powerful local leaders was basic to the whole Hamidiye project. Now this danger seemed to be worse than ever, because the tribes were now armed and, to some extent, trained by the state (Duguid 1973152).

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Yet the Young Turks, who deposed Abdiilhamid in 1909, continued his Kurdish policies in much the same vein. The name of the Kurdish troops was changed f r o m Hamidiye Alaylari to A§iret Alaylari, Tribal Regiments, and they continued to grow in the period leading up to the Great W a r . It is a sublime irony that the military strongman of the Committee of Union and Progress, M a h m u t §evket Pa§a, considered changing their name to O g u z Alaylari, after the legendary Oguz tribe, the semi-mythical stem tribe of the first Turks (Olson 1989: 10). T h e Hamidiye policy is usually seen as a failure, and a costly one at that. Most of the Hamidiye were Sunni Muslims, and their protection by the state often provided the opportunity for them to oppress and kill their Shiite brethren, the Zaza Kurds, as well as the Alewis. Yet some recent research has pointed o u t , "The H a m i d i y e Regiments w e r e an important stage in the emergence of Kurdish nationalism from 1891 to 1914, serving as a fulcrum of Kurdish power for over two decades" (Olson 1989: 12). It is clear f r o m the evidence that apart f r o m using these regiments as irregular cavalry, the Ottoman centre hoped to mobilize them as a reliable population of Muslims, loyal Ottoman protocitizens. Yet, paradoxically, just as Abdiilhamid's Islamist policies served as the crucible of Kurdish nationalism, just as they did for Turkish nationalism. Some of the Hamidiye regiments were later to fight in the Balkan wars and the First World War. They would experience at first hand the challenge to Turkish power in the Balkans, and many would actually empathize with their Turkish fellow o f f i c e r s . A s expressed by a recent historian of Kurdish nationalism, "The Hamidiye gave an opportunity for the Kurds to experience and attempt to fathom the wider world" (Olson 1989: 12).

SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS W h y d o m e m b e r s of minorities s o m e t i m e s b e c o m e ideologues of m a j o r i t y v i e w s ? A good e x a m p l e is Z i y a G o k a l p , one of the l e a d i n g ideologues of the young Turkish republic, w h o grew up in Diyarbekir during the H a m i d i y e era. G o k a l p b e c a m e a militant opponent of the H a m i d i y e policies, which he saw as an extension of despotism. Yet this did not make him a Kurdish nationalist. Quite the contrary, he became an ardent supporter of the Young Turks as well as a committed Kemalist (Eri§irgil 1984: 55-58). An instructive episode f r o m the early days of the Y o u n g Turk era is G o k a l p ' s c o n f r o n t a t i o n with Sati A l - H u s r i , a prominent p e d a g o g u e and thinker, who was assimilated to the extent that many of his Turkish contemporaries f o r g o t , or chose to f o r g e t , that he w a s Syrian. T h e f a m o u s controversy was over education. Sati Bey contested the idea of a national curriculum, which Gokalp adamantly defended. When asked by a colleague

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why he had used strong language against Sati Bey, Gôkalp replied, "Sati Bey is an Arab, I am Turkish" (Eri§irgil 1984: 147-48). Like §emseddin Sami, the Albanian who was a convinced Ottomanist, Gôkalp pushed for a purified Turkish content in school curricula. The main difference between the Ottoman and the republican approaches to the "minorities question" is that the republic had infinitely more bargaining power vis-à-vis the outside world and the material means to attempt to ethnically homogenize its population. What the Kemalists did was to take the Ottoman policies to their logical conclusion. In Turkey today, whether it was worth the cost is an open question.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson Benedict, 1991. Imagined Communities. London : Verso. Berkes, Niyazi, 1964. The Development of Secularism in Turkey. Montreal: McGill University Press. Deringil, Selim, 1991, "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State : The Reign of Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909)." International Journal of Middle East Studies 23 (3): 345-59. — 1993, "The Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: Namik Kemal to Mustafa Kemal." European Quartely 23 (2): 165-91. Duben, Alan, and Cem Behar, 1991. Istanbul Households. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Duguid, Stephen, 1973. "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia." Middle Eastern Studies 9 (2) 139-55. Eri§irgil, Mehmet Emin, 1984. Ziya Gôkalp, Istanbul: Alan Publishers. Findley, Carter, 1989. Ottoman Civil Officialdom. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Fleischer, Cornell H. 1986. Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541-1600), Princeton, N.J : Princeton University Press. Hanioglu §ukrii, 1986. Osmanh Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jôn TiirklUk. Istanbul, ileti§im Publishers. Hobshawn, Eric, 1992. Nations and Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nurgronje, Snouck, 1931. Mekka in the Latter Part of the Nineteenth Century. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Karaca, Ali, 1993. Anadolu Islahati ve Ahmet §akir Pa$a, 1838-1899. Istanbul: Eren Publishers. Kodaman, Bayram, 1983. Sultan II. Abdulhamid'in Dogu Anadolu Politikasi. Istanbul: Ôtiiken Publishers.

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Lewis, Bernard, 1961. Thi Emergence

POLITICS

of Modem

Turkey.

London: Oxford

University Press. Olson, Robert, 1989. The Emergence Said Rebellion,

1880-1925.

of Kurdish

Nationalism

and the

Sheikh

Austin: University of Texas Press.

Ramsay, William M . 1890 The Historical

Geography

of Asia Minor.

Royal

Geographical Society, Supplementary Papers, London. S a m i , § e m s e d d i n , 1306. A.D. 1896. Kamus-u Lugatini

ve

Dictionnaire

ashale-i

Universel

Bey Fraschery. — 1 8 9 7 . Kamus-u

Tabir-i

Alem,

kaffe-i

d'Histoire

esma-i

Tarih

ve

Cografya

hassayi

et de Géographie

camidir.

par Ch.

Samy

Istanbul. Ttirki

( T u r k i s h - T u r k i s h l e x i c o n ) , Istanbul:

Îleçitim

Yayinlan. Sonyel, Salahi R a m s d a n . 1975. Turkish Kemal and the Turkish National Suny, Ronald Grigor, 199?. Looking History.

Diplomacy,

Movement. Toward

1918-1923:

Mustafa

London: Sage.

Ararat:

Armenia

in

Modern

Hayati

ve

Eserleri

Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Taneri, Kemal Ziilfii, 1963. Stileyman

Hiisnii

Paça'nin

(The biography and work of Hiisnii Pa§a). Ankara: Sevil Publishers. Ttirk

Meçhurlari Istanbul.

Ansiktopedisi

( E n c y c l o p e d i a of f a m o u s T u r k s ) , 1993.

THE OTTOMAN ORIGINS OF KEMALIST NATIONALISM: NAMIK KEMAL TO MUSTAFA KEMAL

The French Revolution has been called "the first great movement of ideas in Western Christendom to have any real effect on the world of Islam". 1 The K e m a l i s t Republic of Turkey is in many ways the epitome of this ideological transplantation. Here we have a Muslim leader proclaiming in 1923, in the heartland of what was still the remnants of the Ottoman Caliphate, that "Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation". Although the emergence of the Turkish Republic evoked some interest in the heyday of the Cold War, it is now a subject of some obscurity. Turkey only makes the world headlines if it has a military coup (until recently every ten years) or a major earthquake. Yet in several respects the transition from a polyglot empire to a (theoretically) homogeneous nation state represents a useful case study of political transformation—particularly in the present-day context, a fact that did not escape the attention of the writer of a recent editorial in the New

Yorker}

The received wisdom is that the Turkish Republic was almost some form of immaculate conception, a phoenix rising from the ashes of a decrepit empire which it immediately took extreme pains to disown. Hitherto the emphasis of Turkish historiography has been on the immediate harbingers of the Kemalist movement, i.e. figures such as Yusuf Ak§ura and Ziya Gokalp. The aim of this article will be to attempt to take one step further back and demonstrate the intellectual linkages between the Kemalist cadres of the early republic and their Ottoman past. These linkages will be approached on two levels: that of the political actors themselves and that of an examination of their ideology and policies. Although the position taken by this writer is one which has a methodological affinity to the "revisionist school", I nevertheless feel that recently there has been a shade too much of "revision for revision's s a k e " . This in turn breeds a new sort of provincialism, the antidote for which is to shy away from Turkish history as "area study" and f o c u s on a comparative perspective, thus aiming at contributing to the universality of historical debate.

'Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London 1961), 40. The New Yorker, 29 January 1990, "The Talk of the Town". The writer points out that the recent events in Transcaucasia and the Balkans involve the "legacy of the break-up of the Ottoman Empire". 2

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OTTOMANISM TO TURK ISM. LATE-OTTOMAN AND EARLY TURKISH HISTORIOGRAPHY In his study of the ethnic roots of nation states A n t h o n y Smith contends that the road to the nation state could take t w o variants: the "state-to-nation" model or that of "nation-to-state". 1 T h e Ottoman Empire started its unwitting voyage towards the nation state on the basis of the "state-to-nation" model, but after its demise the successor states continued their journey through history on the basis of the "state-to-nation" concept. This view, however, could be seen as a prime case of tunnel vision. Did the Ottoman Empire set out to create a nation state? Would this not have been suicidal for a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual e m p i r e ? Y e t , this proposition acquires perspective when one considers the actual policies that the ruling elite tried to implement. Ever since the virtual attempted reconstruction of the state early in the nineteenth century during the reign (1808-38) of M a h m u d II, through the times of great reforming bureaucrats like Re§id Pa§a, Ali Pa§a and Midhad Pa§a (also called the Tanzimat, or "reordering"), and even into the reign (1876-1909) of the so-called despot Abdulhamid II, the leading concern of the Ottoman had been "the saving of the State". 2 The concept of "society", much less "civil society", did not really come into their f r a m e of reference. The thread linking Mahmud II with Kemal Atatiirk is precisely this obsession with the state. Just as pluralism would have been anathema to M a h m u d , so it was for Kemal. Yet this is not to imply that the empire was static, or that it was the stagnant "oriental despotism" which was once so fashionable a view. T h e pre-history of Turkish nationalism can be seen in the process of the spread of education down to more modest strata as the state's need for qualified personnel increased. In both the civilian and the military spheres an increasingly more vocal stratum of "state intellectual" developed. Even though the state power attempted to curtail this group's access to such potentially subversive literature as that of the writers of the Enlightenment, this proved to be impossible and with every day that passed more young minds became fired by Voltaire and R o u s s e a u . This process continued even during the reign of the "Islamic" Abdulhamid II who was famed for his strict censorship. The whole generation of leaders who would control Turkey's fate in the early years of the republic were the products of the educational establishment which had been greatly e x p a n d e d during A b d u l h a m i d ' s reign. 3 A s liber Ortayli has put it, "The Empire bestowed on the young Republic such traditions and institutions as a ' A n t h o n y Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations (Oxford 1986), 136-42. 2

O n the Ottoman reform process beginning with the declaration of intent in the Imperial Rescript of the Rose Chamber (1839), see Lewis, Emergence, 73-125. ^Bayram Kodaman, Abdulhamid Era) (Istanbul 1983).

Dönemi Egitim Sistemi (The Education System in the Hamidian

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KEMAL

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parliament, parliamentarians, political parties and the press. T h e Republic's doctors, scientists, lawyers, historians and philologists all emerged f r o m among the intellectual cadres of the Ottoman Empire." 1 Well before the term "Turkish Nationalism" became a household word in the days of the republic, Ottoman statesmen-historians had prepared the ideological ground. A s stated in a work specifically concerned with the historian as the ideologue of nation building: "Historians as craftsmen in the task of nation building have had much success. One suspects, however, that their success has more often been that of men who followed the prevailing political climate rather than as pioneers." 2 In the era of the T a n z i m a t and in the subsequent Hamidian period, leading statesmen had begun to think in terms of T u r k i s m even if they couched their discourse in Ottomanist language. A good e x a m p l e of the species of "intellectual bureaucrat" is A h m e d V e f i k Pa§a ( 1 8 2 3 - 9 1 ) , a high-ranking official who has gone down in the annals of Turkish history as the Governor of Bursa w h o translated Molière into T u r k i s h — a n d m a d e it obligatory that the population go to the theatre to "enjoy" his work. 3 He was also known f o r his historiographical work and particularly for stressing the need to view Turkish history separately f r o m Ottoman history, a theme which would be taken up in the early years of the republic. 4 As Halil Berktay puts it: "The process whereby the Empire w a s transformed into a Republic and the Imperial

subject

population

into a

Nation

is e x a c t l y

reflected

in

[Ottoman/Republican] historiography." 5 Another example of the same process is seen in Mustafa Celaleddin Pa§a (1828-75), whose f a m o u s work Les Tures Anciens

et Modernes,

published in 1869, argued that Turkish was a main

root language which had influenced ancient Greek and Latin. 6 In article 18 of the first Ottoman constitution of 1876, Turkish was declared to be the official language of state. 7

^Ilber Ortayli, imparatorlugun 1983), 183. 2

En Uzun Yiizyili (The Longest Century of the Empire) (Istanbul

D e n i s Deletant and Harry Hanak, eds, Historians

as Nation Builders (London 1988), xiii.

3

§ e r i f M a r d i n , " A y d m l a r " ( T h e Intellectuals), in Tanzimat'dan Cumhuriyet'e Turkiye Ansiklopedisi (The Encyclopaedia of Turkey from the Tanzimat to the Republic), Vol. 1, 51-2. T h i s is a very useful w o r k as it includes signed articles by leading Turkish and non-Turkish contributors, and represents in many ways the revisionist perspective that is now emerging in Turkish historical studies. 4 H a l i l Berktay, "Tarih Cali§malan" (Historiography), in Tanzimat'dan Cumhuriyet'e, Vol. 9 2456. S

Ibid.

^ E n v e r Ziya Karal, "Tanzimat'dan Cumhuriyette Turk Dil Sorunu" (The Question of the Turkish Language f r o m the Tanzimat to the Republic), in Tanzimat'dan Cumhuriyet'e, Vol. 2 , 3 1 5 . 7 Ibid., 317.

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The transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic is symbolized by the work of two leading thinkers, Yusuf Ak?ura and Ziya Gokalp. Already in 1904 Yusuf Akijura (1876-1935) declared in his article "Uf Tarzi Siyaset" (Three Styles of Politics) that the Turkish nation should be defined according to "ethnic elements". After the Young Turk revolution of 1908, he was active in the founding of publications such as the Turk Yurdu (Turkish Fatherland) and the Halka Dogru (Towards the People). Akijura was also a m a j o r contributor to the maximalist "National History Thesis" as it evolved after 1931, which argued that practically the whole of European civilization had Turkic roots. 1 The giant of Turkish historiography is Fuat KoprtilU. Although he reached the apogee of his career at the height of the nationalist wave in Turkish historiography, Koprtilii was able to keep his distance from the more vulgar variants of the line that argued for the direct continuity of Turkish domination in Anatolia since the Hittites. 2

KEMALIST NATIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Although it is far beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a detailed comparative study of nationalism (its aim being rather to point to certain specific themes in Turkish nationalism), it is useful to recognize where Kemalism fits in relation to some of its contemporaries. First, clearly, Kemalism is a middle-class phenomenon, and its leaders were almost all drawn from the stratum of a Muslim bourgeoisie that was emerging from the late nineteenth century onwards. 3 In this sense Kemalist nationalists fit rather neatlx into Hobsbawm's telling category of "classes that stood or fell" according to the fate of the regime they wanted to create. 4 Yet there was nothing democratic about the Ankara regime, and it was in many

' F r a n ç o i s G e o r g e o n , Aux Origines 1980). 2

du Nationalisme

Turc:

Yusuf Akçura,

1876-1935

(Paris

Halil Berktay, Cumhuriyet ideolojisi ve Fuat Kôprulii (Fuat Koprtilii and Republican Ideology) (Istanbul 1983). Berktay's work is particularly important as it shows that Kôpriilu was the first Turkish historian to adopt the methodology of modern history and to set Turkish/Ottoman history in a universal comparative framework. See particularly 57-63 and 63-80. •'There is c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t a m o n g T u r k i s h h i s t o r i a n s on the i s s u e of the Ottoman/Turkish middle class. For a view that maintains that a real "capitalist" class did not emerge in the Turkish context until very late in the day, see Çaglar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development (London 1987). For a study that sees the beginnings of a local Muslim commercial 'national bourgeoisie' during the period leading up to the Great W a r , see Z a f e r T o p r a k , Tiirkiye'de 'Milli Iktisat' (The 'National E c o n o m y ' in Turkey) (Istanbul 1983). 4 E r i c H o b s b a w m , Nations and Nationalism (Cambridge 1990), 117.

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respects as 'statist" and undemocratic as its Ottoman predecessor. 1 In this regard it has much in common with contemporary m o v e m e n t s and regimes such as those of the Kuomintang in China; Sun Yat-sen led a movement very similar to the Kemalist one in the sense that "It was confined to the socially mobilized but unassimilated intelligentsia and the small middle c l a s s e s . . . " 2 Also, as in China, Kemalism was only able to mobilize mass support in the immediate shadow of a foreign invasion; the Japanese were the Greeks of China. 3 In its m i d d l e - c l a s s origins K e m a l i s m also r e s e m b l e s the Indian Congress. Like the early Kemalist cadres, the Muslim contingent within the C o n g r e s s was always strong, and its m e m b e r s h i p c a m e mostly f r o m the educated Indian Muslim and Hindi middle classes who had grown disillusioned with the British Raj. Indeed, the K e m a l i s t s were a very real source of inspiration for Indian nationalists—and not just Muslims—until the Kemalist abolition of the Caliphate. 4 A r a b nationalism as it developed in the early twentieth century was largely reactive to centuries of "degeneration" under Turkish rule, and focused on the times of gloiy in the pre-Ottoman A r a b past. 5 Only very recently has a more objective evaluation of the Ottoman centuries arrived on the a g e n d a . 6 T h e actual leaders of the p o s t - O t t o m a n A r a b nationalist i n d e p e n d e n c e movements against the mandate powers were, like the Kemalists, members of the Ottoman administrative middle and upper classes. 7 Many of the A r a b leaders were in fact graduates of the same schools, for example the Ottoman War College (Mekteb-i Harbiye), or the School of Civil Administration (.Mekteb-i

Miilkiye).8

! O n the issue of democracy and Kemalist politics, see Levent Kôker, Modernle§me Kemaliyn ve Demokrasi (Istanbul 1990). This author points to the fallibility of the modernization paradigm in the context of Kemalism.

C h a l m e r s A . J o h n s o n , Peasant Nationalism and Revolutionary China 1937-1945 (Stanford 1967), 23.

Communist

Power.

The Emergence

of

3

Ibid., 2: "The politically illiterate masses of China w e r e awakened by the Japanese invasion and its aftermath; wartime conditions made them receptive to a new kind of political appeal — namely, the defence of the fatherland." 4

W i l f r e d Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India (London 1946), 213-15. This is an interesting work as it represents a very pro-Indian perspective immediately before the Partition, and was marked "This book may not be imported into India".

5 R . A b o u El-Haj, "The Social Uses of the Past: Recent A r a b Historiography of Ottoman Rule ' International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 14 (1982), 185-201. 6

Y o u s s e f M . C h o u e i r i , Arab History and the Nation State. A Study in Modern Arab Historiography (London 1989), 197: "Unless the Ottoman option is restored to its centrality in the A r a b World, a confusion of overlapping phases is bound to arise." 7 P h i l i p Khoury, Syria and The French Mandate and Laboring Classes in Iraq (Princeton 1982).

(Princeton 1987). Hanna Batatu, Ruling

Classes

^Elisabeth Picard, "Les Nationalistes Arabes de Syrie et d'Iraq et le Kémalisme: Convergences, Occultations, et Influence", Cahiers du Getc. G r o u p e d'études sur la Turquie contemporaine. N u m é r o spécial Kémalisme et Monde Musulman, 40-59.

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Yet, if one had to identify a case of extreme similarity to the Turkish nationalist experience in the m a n n e r of a society's handling of its past, it would be that of Greece. It is ironic that two peoples casting themselves in the role of historic rivals should have such parallel approaches to their national historiography. According to Richard C l o g g , "In no country in the Balkans does the incubus of the past weigh so heavily as in Greece." 1 Turkey would bid fair to equal this. The nationalist elites in both Greece and Turkey were small. They both started out by rejecting their Byzantine and Ottoman pasts and harkened back to a "purer" national identity linked respectively with Attic Greece and the Central Asian steppe. In both countries the emphasis on "politically correct" history, or what Romilly Jenkins has eloquently called "ethnic truth", has laid a heavy and not altogether salubrious hand on modern historical studies and t e a c h i n g . 2 The A d a m a n t i o s K o r a e s Chair at the University of London was created soon after the First World W a r in order "to engage in sophisticated academic propaganda on behalf of Greece and her national aspirations". 3 The current efforts at establishing "Kemal Atatiirk" Chairs, endowed by the Turkish government in prestigious universities such as Cambridge, Princeton, Columbia, etc., is in much the same spirit. 4

NAMIK KEMAL A N D ZIYA GOKALP

T h e s e two thinkers are the direct parents of Turkish nationalism. Namik Kemal (1840-88) represents a m o r e "Ottomanist" perspective and straddles the space between Pan-Islamism and Turkish nationalism. 5 Ziya Gokalp (1876-1935) is much more directly linked with the credos of Turkish nationalism, and his corporatist approach has recently been the subject of an excellent study. 6 Although considerable attention has been drawn to the 'Richard C l o g g , "The Greeks and their Past", in Deletant and Hanak, op. cit., 15. 2

Ibid. C l o g g is quoting Jenkins in The Dilessi Murders (London 1961), 9 - 1 1 7 . The case of the Greek schoolteacher w h o was d i s m i s s e d for wavering from the true path on the Cyprus issue rings loud bells in Turkish ears regarding such matters as the "Armenian question". 3

S e e ibid., 2 8 - 9 , for the debate over Arnold T o y n b e e ' s dismissal from the tenure of the Adamantios Koraes Chair of Modern Greek and Byzantine History. This occurred because the subscribers to the chair endowment objected to Toynbee's The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, which took too objective a v i e w of both the Turkish and Greek atrocities during the Anatolian war of 1919-22. 4 I n all fairness it must be said that a government-endowed chair of history need not necessarily indulge in propaganda. ^There is a veritable "Namik Kemal library" in Turkish literature. A s a nationalist s y m b o l and hero he has been re-evaluated by each generation. The best work, h o w e v e r , still remains §erif Mardin's The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton 1962). A sampling of s o m e of the more recent works: Kazim Y e t i j , Namik Kemal'in Turk Dili ve Edebiyati uzerine Goril§leri ve Yazdari (Namik Kemal's V i e w s and Writings on Turkish Language and Letters) (Istanbul 1989); Namik Kemal, Intibah, annotated edition prepared by M e h m e t Kaplan, Turkish Ministry of Culture (Ankara 1 9 8 4 ) ; Omer I'aruk Akiin, Namik Kemal'in Mektuplari (Namik Kemal's Letters) (Istanbul 1972). ^Taha Parla, Ziya Gokalp, Kemalizm ve Tiirkiye'de Korporatizm (Istanbul 1989). S e e also Taha Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gokalp (Leiden 1985).

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connection of Gokalp's thought with the Kemalist movement, much less critical scholarship has been focused on the influence of Namik Kemal on the leaders of the Turkish republicans. This short study will attempt to remedy that somewhat by tracing the "shadow of Namik Kemal in the utterances and policies of the early republican cadres. The main Turkish sources used in this enterprise will be the Secret Minutes of the First National Assembly (GNA) in the sessions 1920-4, and Atatiirk's famous Nutuk, his marathon thirtysix-hour speech vindicating his policies. 1 In many ways this "shadow of Namik Kemal" is also the shadow of the Ottoman past, and by reading between the lines in the above sources one can derive a fair idea of how the republican cadres saw their relationship to the ancient regime, and of what this relationship was in reality. This in turn demands that we look carefully at the relationship between the Kemalist nationalist movement and its immediate Ottoman predecessor, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the political organ of the Young Turk movement.

T H E "UNIONIST F A C T O R " 2

Until the appearance of Eric Ziircher's recent work the critical role of the CUP as the bridge between the Ottoman and the Kemalist eras was sadly neglected. 3 This stemmed largely from the fact that Turkish (and, surprisingly, non-Turkish) historians were too prepared to accept at face value the official version of early republican historiography. Also the view that "great men make history" is still alive and well in present-day Turkey. 4 The official wisdom is that Mustafa Kemal was one of the founders and leaders of the CUP, but that he had been the victim of intrigues on the part of the leading lights of the day such as Enver, Talat and Cemal Pa§as. The story goes on to emphasize that the C U P was largely instrumental in getting the Ottoman Empire into a disastrous war, at the end of which Turkey faced dismemberment and ruin. So far the story is partly true. But the schoolboy history of the Republic (from which more "academic" histories do not differ to any l Tiirkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi (TBMM) Gizli Celse Zabitlan, 24 Nisan 1336 (7 May 1920)-25 Te^rin-i Emel (7 December) 1934 (Secret Minutes of the Closed Sessions of the Grand National Assembly), Bankasi Kiiltiir Yayinlari (Ankara 1985), hereafter referred to as TBMM; Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, Nutuk, Maarif Basimevi (Istanbul 1960); Ismet Pasa'mn Siya\i ve ictimai Nutuklan 1920-30 (Ankara 1933). Eric Jan Ziircher, The Unionist Factor. The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926 (Leiden 1984). This is an extremely competent work and the only one throwing light on this very important topic. 3

T h e notable exception has been the seminal work of Feroz Ahmad, namely his The Young Turks. The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914 (Oxford 1969), and the recent collection of his works in Turkish translation, ittihatfihkdan Kemalizme (From Unionism to Kemalism) (Istanbul 1986). 4

Since this article was written a good attempt at "deconstructing" Atatiirk's marathon speech has been made. See Taha Parla, Turkiye'de Siyasal Kiiltiir Resmi Kaynaklari. Atatiirk'un Nutuk u (The Official Origins of Political Culture in Turkey. The Speech of Atatiirk) (Istanbul 1991).

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noticeablc degree) goes on to state that the Nationalist movement was "born" in Anatolia purely as the brainchild of Mustafa Kemal and as the result of the labours of the great man and a few close followers. These were the men who galvanized the Turkish masses for a struggle of national survival. We are handed the image of a national resistance which somehow just sprang up in the Anatolian steppe without any previous preparation; the Republic started out tabula rasa and represented a clean break with the Ottoman past. These are a collection of half-truths. 1 Ziircher very convincingly illustrates the organic links between the C U P and the Kemalists. In fact virtually all Kemalists, including Mustafa Kemal himself, were members of the CUP. Nor is this surprising, given how widespread C U P membership was among the younger Ottoman intelligentsia: " The C U P had been the first modern political mass movement in the Ottoman Empire and its widespread organization had been the basis on which Mustafa Kemal built his organization in 1919." 2 Ziircher also points out that the C U P had long since been making plans to continue the war from Anatolia. In fact such contingency plans had been prepared since 1915 when it was feared that the Allies might well break through the Dardanelles: "This plan was worked out in detail and emergency instructions were sent to a number of officers to start regional defence organizations in different parts of Anatolia in case of occupation." 3 The C U P also organized arms caches and Enver Pa§a had deliberately reinforced the Ninth Army in Eastern Anatolia as the potential core of a resistance movement. 4 Indeed, the leading Kemalists, including Mustafa Kemal himself, never denied that they had been members of the C U P inner circle. "There certainly was no clear break between the C U P regime (and the World War) on the one hand and the start of the national resistance movement on the other." 5 It is also interesting to note that even as late as 1938 the British ambassador to Ankara, Sir Percy Loraine, was to remark on the same continuity: "The Sick Man |of Europe| is dead but he has left behind many lusty children." 6

' i n this context I fully join Paschalis M. Kitromilides,' "Imagined Communities" and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans", European History Quarterly, Vol. 19 (1989), 149-94.1 thank Dr Mark Mazower for bringing this reference to my attention. 2

Ziircher, op. tit., 160. What is interesting about ZUrcher's work is that he does not use any new undiscovered sources. Most of his sources consist of m e m o i r s written by leading Kemalists which have been available since the 1950s and 1960s. What he has d o n e is to undertake a critical comparative reading of these materials, something which had never been systematically approached. Of course this involves all the risks of running into national taboos w h i c h Halil Berktay has termed 'the difficulties of writing Republican history f r o m the firing line': see Berktay, T a r i h ¿ a l i ^ m a l a n ' , 2473 4. ^Zürcher, op. tit., 104. ^Ibid., 95. Although the leading Unionists Enver, Cemal and Talat had fled the country in 1918, Enver at any rate planned definitely to return. 5 Ibid., 105. ^Public Record O f f i c e , London, FO 371/E 2 1 7 0 / 1 3 5 / 4 4 , Loraine to Foreign O f f i c e , 1 April 1938. See also Selim Deringil, 'Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdülhamid II and Ismet inönii', International Journal of Turkish Studies Vol. 4 , No. 1 (Summer 1987).

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The "Shadow of Namik Kemal" and the Ottoman Image in the First Grand National Assembly In the following section I shall begin by outlining some of the dominant motifs in Namik Kemal's thought and then go on to trace the various references to the Ottoman past which occur in the speech of the early republican worthies. What is remarkable in these statements is their consistency. In the declarations of the nationalist credo the continuous reference point is the Ottoman past. The dominant theme follows a "they-were-like-that-but-we-are-like-this" format. But first to Namik Kemal. In what is still the best work on the subject, §erif Mardin illustrates the attempt made by Namik Kemal to reconcile West and East in his thought: "More philosophically inclined than his colleagues, Namik Kemal concentrated on the discussion of fundamental theoretical issues and thus produced a body of political philosophy which is the only one worthy of that name among the writings of his time." 1 Kemal is best known in Turkey for his reputation as the "poet of the Fatherland" (Vatan §airi). Indeed, the concept of the "fatherland" was to be something of a leitmotif in the discussions of the GNA. In his opposition to the statesmen of the Tanzimat Namik Kemal advocated a return to the essence of Islamic law, the $eriat. This was nevertheless to be reconciled with French Revolutionary ideology as expressed in Rousseau and Voltaire. Central to Kemal's thinking was the concept of me§veret, or consultation, which he along with other Young Ottoman thinkers saw to be a notion correspondent to "representative government". 2 But in one way above all others the GNA appears to be Namik Kemal's ideology come to life: "The right of sovereignty belongs to all". 3 This finds a distinct echo in Mustafa Kemal's oft-repeated declaration that "Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation" ( H a k i m i y e t bila kaydu §art milletindir). Also, the mechanics of power as appreciated by Namik Kemal are in many respects the ideological forefathers of the nationalist parliament. The GNA ascribed legitimacy to itself because it represented that amorphous entity, the nation. Thus it was in one way the incarnation of Namik Kemal's idea of legitimate government consisting of a group of 'specialists" who would be assigned the task of ruling in the name of the "people" according to the precepts of "an absolute normative force". 4 The critical difference, of course, was that for Namik Kemal the absolute normative force was the §eriat, while for the nationalists it would become the secular principles proclaimed in the Law of Fundamental Association (Te§kilati Esasiye Kanunu) of 20 January 1921. 'Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, 286. lbid„ 308. 3 Ibid., 293. 4 Ibid., 290-1. 2

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On the issue of the r e p u b l i c the nationalists w o u l d e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y support N a m i k Retrial's statement: " W h a t d o e s it m e a n to state that o n c e the right of the people's sovereignty has been a f f i r m e d , it should also be admitted that t h e p e o p l e can create a r e p u b l i c ? W h o c a n d e n y this r i g h t ? " 1 But they would probably delete the r e m a i n d e r of the s a m e quotation: "That a republic would c a u s e our [Turkey's] d o w n f a l l is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r that n o b o d y will d e n y , and the idea would not occur to a n y b o d y in our country .. . 2 In f a c t , H o c a Vehbi E f e n d i , the Minister f o r Religion ( § e r i y e Vekili) w a s to sail fairly close to the wind when he declared in the G N A on 1 D e c e m b e r : " G e n t l e m e n , Islam d o e s n o t a l l o w f o r d e s p o t i c g o v e r n m e n t . I s l a m i c g o v e r n m e n t is e n t i r e l y constitutional. But this constitutionality is c o n t i n g e n t on its application of t h e §eriat...

"3

O n 23 April 1920 the nationalist r e s i s t a n c e constituted itself as the Grand National A s s e m b l y in A n k a r a . 4 It should be e m p h a s i z e d that this first parliament was by no m e a n s a h o m o g e n e o u s b o d y . ZUrcher has quite correctly drawn attention to the existence of the so-called "Second G r o u p " , consisting of delegates w h o were o p p o s e d to the personal dictatorship of M u s t a f a K e m a l . 5 T h e a c r i m o n i o u s n e s s of the d e b a t e s e v e n in d o s e d s e s s i o n i n d i c a t e d t h e e x i s t e n c e of a very real o p p o s i t i o n . P a r t i c u l a r l y o v e r t h e i s s u e s of t h e Sultanate and the Caliphate no quarter w a s asked and none given. D u r i n g t h e session of 8 O c t o b e r 1 9 2 0 , a l e a d i n g m e m b e r of t h e K e m a l i s t inner circle, T u n a h H i l m i , m e m b e r f o r B o l u , declared that a Caliph w h o w o u l d send troops against o t h e r M u s l i m s w a s not w o r t h y of the title. T h e title itself, he said, was open to dispute: "Since the time of Caliph O s m a n this matter has caused no end of bloodshed and s u f f e r i n g . . . " . Hilmi w e n t on to q u o t e T a f t a z a n i , an e m i n e n t f o u r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y j u r i s t , as proof that the o f f i c e of t h e C a l i p h a f t e r the first f o u r " R i g h t l y G u i d e d C a l i p h s " w a s r e f u t e d (.merdud).

T h i s type of theological-historical d e b a t e w e n t on right u p to the

abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. 6 T u n a h H i l m i w a s , in f a c t , also e c h o i n g N a m i k K e m a l ' s w o r d s w h e n he q u o t e d T a f t a z a n i as d e c l a r i n g that w h e n a Caliph's rule is invalidated, "The I m a m a t e is the right of the c o m m u n i t y " . 7

1

Ibid., 297. lbid.

2

^TBMM Yiiz Kirkinci tn'ikat (One hundred and fortieth session), 1052. Z e k i S a n h a n , Kurtulu$ Sava^i (¡un/iigu (Diary of the War of Liberation) (Ankara 1986), Vol. 3,9. 5 Zurcher, op. cit., 1 1 8 , 1 2 9 , 1 3 1 . 32. / * "TBMM, Vol. 1 Yetmi§ ikinci In'ikat (Seventy-second session), 132-3. On Tunali Hilmi, see Turk Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 3 1 , 2 9 2 - 3 .

4

^ C o m p a r e Mardin quoting Namik Kemal in Genesis, 294, and Tunali Hilmi's views iri the previous note. The Imamate is being used here to mean executive power.

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It is interesting to note that at this stage of the proceedings, Mustafa Kemal does not appear as a radical. In the same session he mentioned thai Turkey needed the support of the "world Muslim community" and went on to affirm that "our loyalty to the Caliph is beyond question... and our first task is to rescue him... our most trusted supporters in this quarter are our Muslim brethren." Although Mustafa Kemal went on to insist that it was necessary to differentiate between the man and the office, the present holder of which was a "traitor", he added "because this nation is so used to obeying the Caliph let us keep him in the palm of our hand and have him do our bidding." 1 This same pragmatism, bordering on cynicism, is to be noted in a statement made by Mustafa Kemal in the same session in response to a criticism of the Soviet alliance: "The weak are always the victims of the strong. Even in matters of friendship and morality this has to be taken into consideration. Humanity, justice, all principles and rules are of secondary importance ... power comes first." 2 Here the intellectual bows before the Fecial mentality. 3 On 6 January 1922 the GNA had a momentous event on its agenda. A letter of congratulation had been received from the crown prince Abdiilmecid. Mustafa Kemal told the Assembly that Abdiilmecid had previously sent him a personal letter. He had been duly corrected and told that he should not write to private persons but address himself to the "representatives of the people". He was now recognizing the GNA, referring to it as "The Great National Assembly" (Meclis-i Kehir i Milli) and as "our Assembly". When the text of the letter was read out in parliament the delegates burst into spontaneous applause, ilyas Sami Efendi, deputy for Mu§, immediately declared that the crown princes ought to be invited to Ankara, "to prove that they are true descendants of the House of Osman". 4 He was immediately contradicted by Besim Atalay, member for Kiitahya:

TBMM, Vol. 1, 135, 136, 137. Mustafa Kemal had a point here. Even non Muslim peoples of what would today be called the "Third World" felt sympathy for the Turkish resistance. On 5 May 1919 Mahatma Gandhi offered solidarity at a passive resistance rally held in Bombay where he declared that the Hindus must help the Muslims to protect the "Holy Places in Turkev". The Indian leader might well have been referring to the defence of Medina, where the Ottoman forces held out until January 1920. See Sarihan, Kurtulu§ Savap Giinlugii, 246; Elie Kedourie, "The Surrender of Medina", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 13 (1977), 124-43. 2 TBMM, Vol. 1,138-9. In March 1921 the Turkish nationalists had established friendly relations with the Bolsheviks, much to the world's alarm. o J O n the "hit men" of the CUP called the Fedai, see Ziircher, op. cit., 50: "These were people who had enlisted in special volunteer units of the CUP who were used in dangerous missions, especially political murders". There is, however, no indication that Mustafa Kemal actually belonged to this group. 4

TBMM, Vol. 2, Yiiz On^iincu In'ikat (One hundred and third Session), 24 Kanun-u Evvel 1337 (6 January 1922), 522. Abdiilmecid was the son of Sultan Abdiilaziz who had been deposed in 1876.

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T h e people of this country have a l w a y s pinned their hopes of salvation on a change of ruler. In Abdiilhamid's time the hope of the people were the crown p r i n c e s . . . . T h e c o m m o n folk are always like this. T h e nation m u s t look to its salvation not in a c h a n g e of ruler but in its o w n will and determination So far N a m i k Kemal would approve. But the sequel probably m a d e him turn in his g r a v e . B e s i m A t a l a y w e n t on to settle his a c c o u n t s with the Ottoman dynasty: "None of them [the sultans] gave a thought to the country, even the C o n q u e r o r [Mehmed II, the c o n q u e r o r of Constantinople]. With the e x c e p t i o n of Selim III they all s a w it as their property ( g i f t l i k ) . " W h e n reminded f r o m the floor, s o m e w h a t incongruously, that he "should have faith in A l l a h " , Atalay reiterated: "Now that they have seen that we are successful they r e m e m b e r us; this is all a ruse." 2 O s m a n B e y , m e m b e r f o r L a z i s t a n , declared: "I cannot agree with the applause I heard a m o m e n t ago. So when w e c o n t i n u e to be s u c c e s s f u l , w e will then get a telegram f r o m M e h m e d VI IVahdettin, the reigning Sultan] h i m s e l f . Will w e applaud that too?" §eref B e y , ( £ a v u § o g l u ) m e m b e r f o r E d i r n e , then took up the a r g u m e n t to remind those present that the s a m e person now congratulating them had m a d e a point of visiting British military hospitals. H e then w e n t into a very interesting aside on the Ottoman dynasty: Y e s , Gentlemen, this was the very dynasty that produced the Fatihs, the Y a v u z e s and the Y i l d i r i m s , and the very s a m e that b r o u g h t the Caliphate to this n a t i o n . . . . But let us pause there ... if w e say that our A s s e m b l y is in possession of the national will, if the nation has taken charge of its f a t e ... w h y , w e h a v e been spilling o u r blood f o r t w o y e a r s n o w and only n o w they r e m e m b e r us! O n c e again this p o o r nation is going to be expected to yield u p its bread and milk to save t h e m . I apologize, Gentlemen, when my father died I cried, I put him in the ground and I cried, I came h o m e , I ate, drank, and cried, but I forgot about him and carried on with life. 3 It is worth noticing at this point that the same loose usage of the term "nation" that one encounters in N a m i k K e m a l is present here. Kemal would interchangeably

u s e ummet

( I s l a m i c c o m m u n i t y ) and millet

(nation).

In the passage quoted abov e the sultans brought the Caliphate to the Ottoman

X

Ibid. Ibid„ 523. 3 ¡bid., 524. §eref Cavu§oglu was a former member of the CUP's underground organisation, the Karakol. On him see Ziircher, op. cit., 112. The sultans he was referring to were Fatih (Mehmed II) Yildinm Beyazit and Yavuz Selim I. This debate, particularly the discussion of the question of "national will" and the "nation taking charge of its own fate", are indeed haunting echoes of very similar debates that took place in the Constituent Assembly of Paris in June-September 1789. See Dictionnaire Critique de la Révolution Française (Paris 1988), particularly the sections entitled "Constitution" and "Gouvernement Révolutionnaire". 2

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"nation" (when it was in fact an empire), yet the "nation" was now disenchanted with them. 1 The session then degenerated somewhat with one Hoca indulging in a dose of "folk wisdom" by putting forward his view that the crown prince must not be treated too brusquely; "We must neither give the girl away nor drive her suitors into despair" (Ne kiz vermelidir ne geleni kustiirmelidir). Another religiously minded deputy then recalled everybody to their proper stations by reading a lengthy sura from the Quran, and concluded: "Someone has sent us greetings ... this is a very straightforward matter. In keeping with the spirit of populism, when one sends greetings to a people's government in a populist mentality (halkgilik zihniyetiyle) ... we return their greeting ... that is all." 2 Mustafa Kemal intended at this point to state that an unnecessary amount of fuss was being made over the letter: "Gentlemen, your first reaction was ... to applaud the letter. No doubt your constituents would have done the same." Kemal therefore proposed that the letter be simply delivered to the Speaker of the House who would reply to it through proper channels. It was clear that by this uncharacteristically bureaucratic approach Kemal simply wanted to kill the issue. 3 This very matter achieved crisis proportions when the Assembly was informed in an emergency session on 1 December 1923 that the sultan, Mehmed Vahdettin, had fled on a British warship. The atmosphere pervading the minutes is one of near-panic. Interestingly, the first thought of the deputies was to save the Sacred Relics of the Prophet Muhammad, lest they fall into British hands or leave with the sultan. In his first telegram to Refet Pa§a, the Kemalist representative in Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal instructed that the British must at all costs be kept away from the relics. The British, he insisted, "must be forced to use arms and spill blood before they remove the relics." 4

C o m p a r e M a r d i n , Genesis, 327. §erif Mardin points out that Namik Kemal w a s not entirely clear about his usage of terms like "fatherland" ( v a t a n ) , "nation", ummel or "Ottoman", and would use them interchangeably. ^TBMM, 3

Ibid.,

4

Selam ve aleykumselam

mesele bundan ibarettir

vesselam,

524.

525.

Ibid., Vol. 3, Yiiz kirkinci inti'at (One hundred and fortieth session) 18 Te^rin-i sani 1338 (1 December 1923), 1043. T h e Sacred Relics consist of personal effects purportedly belonging to the Prophet M u h a m m a d such as his mantle, etc. Other items among them have an icon-like sacrality for Muslims: his footprint, a f e w threads of his hair, etc. It is significant that Kemal, w h o was by no means religious, should have accorded so m u c h importance to these symbols! which were seen as a rallying point f o r the Muslim population of the country as well as having significance f o r world Muslim opinion. T h e y are still kept in a special chamber at the Topkapi Palace M u s e u m in Istanbul, called "The C h a m b e r of the Sacred M a n t l e " . See Tanzimat'dan Cumhuriyet'e Tarih Sozliigii (Historical Dictionary of Terms from the Tanzimat to the Republic),

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Mustafa Kemal went on to say that the appointment of another caliph must be undertaken forthwith, but it w a s important that the successor be installed with minimum pomp. Thus began the question which became known as the "Caliphate Question" after the Kemalists abolished the office in 1924.

THE ABOLITION OF THE Sill TANATH A N D CALIPHATE

The official line ol the Kemalist nationalists since the beginning of their struggle had been that they were fighting to free the Sultanate and Caliphate f r o m captivity at the hands of the Christian i n v a d e r s . It is interesting that in this issue too they approached the position taken by Namik Kemal w h o proclaimed that the Sultan, as the legitimate wielder of power, was the prisoner of his ministers.' M u s t a f a Kemal referred in his f a m o u s speech to the decision taken in the first Assembly which stated specifically that "to assume that our present exceptional status would be permanent [would seem) to give p e r m a n e n c y to an exceptional situation. T h i s would be unacceptable, we will occupy this position until the sacred aims of freedom for the Caliphate, the Sultanate, and the nation are realized." 2 It was only after the victory over the Greek forces in August-September 1922 had enormously strengthened Kemal's hand that he was ready to make his m o v e . Even then he f a c e d serious opposition over the abolition of the Sultanate. Ziirchcr has pointed out that not only the opposition but also Kemal's own followers had strong feelings about this issue, which they suspected w a s a first move towards the abolition of the Caliphate. 3 W h e n the British invited both the Ankara and the Istanbul governments to the peace c o n f e r e n c e at L a u s a n n e . Kemal chose his m o m e n t and the Sultanate was abolished by the Assembly on 1 November 1922. 4 Indeed, the whole period f r o m the abolition of the Sultanate to the proclamation of the Republic (23 April 1923), extending to the actual abolition of the Caliphate on 3 March 1924, can be seen as a period of preparation during which Kemal was involved in preparing opinion both within and outside the Assembly. Halil Inalcik has pointed out how the "Caliphate question" became a symbolic issue in the power struggle between Kemal and his o p p o n e n t s , both of them using r e l i g i o u s a r g u m e n t s . 5 As a means of discrediting the H o u s e of O s m a n , M u s t a f a Kemal embarked on a systematic campaign of vilification. H e reminded the people how the Sultan-Caliph had organized the "armies of the Caliphate" against the national m o v e m e n t and used Greek aircraft to drop fetwas on the nationalist forces, condemning their leaders as rebels. 6

'Mardin, Genesis, 313. ^Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, Maarif Basimevi, 564. ^Zürcher, op. cit., 132. ^Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Turkey, 512-13. 5 Halil Inalcik, "The Caliphate and Atatürk's Inkilab", Belleten CXLVI (April 1982), 353-65 6 Ibid„ 360.

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It is at this point that what I have referred to as "Ottoman imagery" gained considerably in momentum. At one point Kemal told the G N A : In the last days of Byzantium when Fatih invited the last R o m a n Emperor to surrender he received the reply, "God has placed this state in my charge; I will surrender only to him." T h e representative of the dynasty which is the inheritor of such a state |as Byzantium] is now asking a nation which is fighting against enslavement to lay down its arms.' Kemal's irony, which he turned on "Ottoman-style laxity", is at times quite biting. When he referred to the request by A h m e t Pasa, the last Grand Vizier of the Ottoman state, that the nationalists not attack French positions because this was "having a negative effect on French public opinion", he gave full vent to his sarcasm: "Would Your Excellency not be better advised to ask those invaders of our country whose public opinion is being disturbed, why they are disturbing the public opinion of this country by invading it?" 2 The situation was made all the more delicate by the fact that even some of the staunchest Kemalists felt a strong loyalty to the Ottoman Sultanate. This is b o m e out by Kemal's account of a conversation he had had with Rauf Orbay on the issue: "I asked him what he thought about the matters of the Caliphate and the Sultanate. H e replied, "My father grew up on the Sultan's bread and as long as that blood flows in my veins I cannot be ungrateful ," 3 When Kemal referred to the congratulatory telegram sent by T e v f i k Pa§a after the victories of 1922, he a s s u m e d a deprecating attitude: "Of course ... now that the struggle had been won they saw no contradiction in maintaining unity. Tevfik Pa§a and the likes of him who saw their salvation in grasping at the legs of a decrepit and rotten throne... those Tevfik Pa§as typical of Ottoman times." 4 Historical precedent played a great part in Kemalist arguments in favour of abolition. Kemal told the Assembly that when the Mongol ruler Hulagu executed Caliph Muttasim the Caliphate had ended. "I told them that if Yavuz when he conquered Egypt in 1517 had not given so much importance to a simple refugee (miiltecA), the matter would have ended there and then." 5 l

Nutuk, Vol. 2,575-6. Ibid.,514. J Ibid., 684. It must be noted, however, that Kemal is mentioning this in his speech, which was a vindication of his actions, particularly the purges of 1926 when many leading Kemalists were politically discredited. Rauf Orbay was one of them. In this instance loyalty to the dynasty is being cited as an incriminating attitude. See Zurcher, op. cil., 142-3. 4 Ibid„ 688. 5 Ibid. Kemal was referring to the bringing back to Istanbul of the last Abbasid Caliph in 1517, after which he purportedly handed the title over to Yavuz Sultan Selim in an elaborate' ceremonial held at the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul. This was an important component of the official Ottoman myth which gave absolute religious as well as temporal power to the Ottoman sultans. Whether the actual transfer of power took place at all is a matter of historical dispute. See Thomas Arnold, The Caliphate (London 1965), 129-58. 2

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In fact it is interesting to note that a veritable "negotiation" s e e m s to have taken place between Kemal and Abdtilmecid o v e r the conditions of the latter's a p p o i n t m e n t as C a l i p h . Abdtilmecid w a s told by the G N A (in fact by K e m a l ) to d i s o w n publicly the actions of V a h d e t t i n . H e w a s not to use t h e title "Halife-i Resullulah" ( S u c c e s s o r to t h e P r o p h e t ) but would be permitted to retain the title "Halife-i Miislimin H a d i m - u l H a r e m e y n - i § e r i f e y n " (Caliph of all M u s l i m s and Servant of the Holy P l a c e s ) . H e w a s specifically b a n n e d f r o m w e a r i n g any "Fatih-like" turban or to a d o p t a style of dress too obviously reminiscent of the Ottoman Sultanate at his accession c e r e m o n y , w h i c h w a s to be kept a m o d e s t affair: "A redingote or s t a m b o u l i n e would be appropriate, a military uniform w a s quite out of the question." 1 T h e selective use of s y m b o l s here is w o r t h y of n o t e . "Halife-i R e s u l l u l a h " w o u l d h a v e i m p l i e d d i r e c t continuity with the P r o p h e t , s o m e t h i n g the Kemalists had taken specific pains to d e n y . T h e wearing of O t t o m a n garb w h i c h w o u l d too evocatively recall the past glory of a system the) were out to discredit w o u l d not d o either. In f a c t , A b d u l m e c i d did not c o m p l y with all these r e q u i r e m e n t s . H e did use the title "Halife-i R e s u l l u l a h " and c h o s e not to c o n d e m n V a h d e t t i n by n a m e , f a c t s which were held against him when the o f f i c e w a s abolished and all m e m b e r s of the dynasty were exiled. 2 T h e discussion of the matter in the Secret M i n u t e s shows that although the o f f i c e of the Caliphate could still e v o k e l o y a l t y , the Sultanate w a s q u i t e discredited by its recent past. A m e m b e r of the G N A , a g e n t l e m a n of quite orthodox d e m e a n o u r , and a Haci by the n a m e of Haci M u s t a f a E f e n d i , w a s to tell M u s t a f a Kemal: "I told his Excellency the Pa§a [Mustafa K e m a l ] that [the British) w e r e up to s o m e t h i n g . . . I actually said they will take the f e l l o w and go. T h e Pa§a told m e not to worry.... N o w it has h a p p e n e d . . . shall I still n o t w o r r y ? " 3 T h e familiar use of the term "fellow" is striking h e r e , all the m o r e s o as the w o r d used in T u r k i s h , herif, is in f a c t quite rude. A n o t h e r issue which caused c o n s i d e r a b l e d e b a t e w a s t h e question of w h e t h e r o r not the C a l i p h s h o u l d b e m a d e t o r e s i d e in A n k a r a . S o m e m e m b e r s , e v e n the h a r d - l i n e K e m a l i s t T u n a l i H i l m i , w e r e in f a v o u r of bringing the C a l i p h a t e to A n k a r a . Hilmi m a i n t a i n e d that the C a l i p h a t e n o t only had to be rescued "but had to be seen to be rescued." 4 A n o t h e r m e m b e r , 'Nutuk,

Vol. 2 , 6 9 6 - 7 . The stambouline was an Ottoman adaptation of the frock coat.

^There is a considerable element of irony in Kemal's treatment of the royal family. He had been a very keen candidate for the hand of one of the princesses, Sabiha Sultan, and the relationship which he developed with Vahdettin, when he served as the latter's A D C on his trip to G e r m a n y , was one of mutual respect. The evidence w h i c h has been emerging recently paints a rather different picture to that of Kinross's classic biography. See Lord Kinross, Ataturk. A Biography

of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey (London 1964), 128: "Mustafa Kemal . . . had always poured scorn on the palace and all that it stood for." 3

T B M M , Vol. 3, Bunlar boyle tdecek ve hu herifi alip gidecekler ve belki hir iakim §eyler karacaklar dedim, 1046. 4 Ibid„ 1049.

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Yusuf Ziya Bey, member for Bitlis, declared that Ankara was the natural seat for the Caliphate, and declared, "we are not copying the Vatican". This is all the m o r e interesting because inalcik has pointed out that "The Caliph's position in the Islamic community was interpreted in quite an unusual way. It was presented as a purely spiritual dignity as in Christendom. And those w h o tried to support Kemal in the press actually c o m p a r e d the Caliph to the Pope." 1 Between the abolition of the Sultanate and that of the Caliphate about one year was to elapse, a year which held m a n y uncertainties. This was a delicate time, as Vahdettin had never renounced his position as Caliph. It was thought that in British hands he might get up to mischief. That was why the "puppet Caliph" was useful to Kemal until he felt ready to do away with what he increasingly saw as a redundant office. Meanwhile attention was also given to how the affair should be presented to the world Islamic community. In the course of 1923, when Kemal was preparing the ground in T u r k e y for his coming move, the G N A issued an official statement aimed at the M u s l i m world c o m m u n i t y , j u s t i f y i n g its actions and attempting to alleviate worry about the future of the Caliphate. The declaration stated that the Caliphate was not being abolished, but was reverting back to its original f o r m . 2 The whole affair was very deliberately played down and de-emphasised. The declaration stated that this was a simple administrative matter and was not even a theological issue, "N'ayant rien de c o m m u n avec la théologie, ce n'est par c o n s é q u e n t pas une question théologique p r o p r e m e n t parler". 3 T h e d o c u m e n t went on to state that the matter was a purely "political" and "temporal" affair and that the Prophet had not really stipulated any conditions for the choosing of his successors. "II ressort de ceci que la question du califat n'est pas, c o m m e on le croit à la base de la religion." 4 T h e other interesting feature of this d o c u m e n t (which runs to some eighty pages) is that it uses Islamic jurisprudence to make its case; very often the arguments put forward are the very same as w e read in the Secret Minutes. It specifically repeats the arguments that Tunali Hilmi had put forward using Taftazani, in his assertion that the Caliphate should really be determined by the people. Hanefi fikh is

]

Ibid„ 1049-51; Inalcik, op. cil., 354.

^Unsigned declaration entitled "Califat et Souveraineté Nationale", Revue du Monde Musulman No. 59 (1925). This number of the journal is very interesting as it is a special issue dealing with the "Caliphate question". The first "article" is the document cited above. Subsequent articles deal with how the matter was being received in Egypt. The one after that concerns the implications for Islam in Russian Central Asia. There is also an appraisal of the situation by the Indian radical, Barakatallah, which consists of a small excerpt from his work, The Khiiafet (London, Zurich and Paris 1924), where he stated that now the Caliphate could be reborn in its true formsee Revue, 314. o 3 Ibid., 5. The document was originally written in Arabic, but was translated by the Revue wilh occasional annotations. 4 Ibid.,l.

194

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P O L I T I C S

called to witness and t h e n are repeated r e f e r e n c e s to f a m o u s H a n e f i t e

alims

including Abu H a n i f a himself w h o is cited as never having legitimated the rule of the O m m a y a d and A b b a s i d Caliphs. 1 T h e O t t o m a n Sultans w e r e only given this title "par suite d'une s i m p l e h a b i t u d e " . 2 A n o t h e r notable f e a t u r e is the relative b r e v i t y of t h e section d e a l i n g with t h e O t t o m a n C a l i p h a t e . It is s i m p l y a c c e p t e d that the O t t o m a n s i n h e r i t e d a s y s t e m that w a s a l r e a d y illegitimate. T h i s again bears a r e m a r k a b l e similarity to the statements m a d e by M u s t a f a Kemal on the status of the A b b a s i d Caliph as a " r e f u g e e " , etc. T h e very e x a m p l e s used are the s a m e , H u l a g u and M u t t a s i m being m e n t i o n e d in one b r e a t h . 3 T h e f a m o u s legal expert and historian, D a w w a n i , is also cited as an authority f o r the case that the C a l i p h a t e w a s i l l e g i t i m a t e . 4 T h e s u b l i m e irony of all this w a s the f a c t that H a n a f i t e fikh had been used f o r centuries as the official c r e d o of the O t t o m a n C a l i p h a t e , p r o v i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y of t h e T u r k i s h rule o v e r Islam even b e f o r e the c o m i n g of the O t t o m a n s . 5 T h e G N A denied that it was abolishing the Caliphate and creating a "sort of P o p e " . Islam did not allow f o r religious interpretation as Christianity d i d . T h e C a l i p h a t e w a s a purely temporal authority, " c o m m e un President de R é p u b l i q u e " . T h e s e d e c l a r a t i o n s lead o n e to s u s p e c t that t h e m y s t i q u e of the o f f i c e w a s being deliberately played d o w n in preparation f o r its abolition. 6 In e f f e c t , the position of the last Caliph, A b d i i l m e c i d , b e c a m e m o r e a n d m o r e difficult, inonii writes in his m e m o i r s that in February 1924 t h e o f f i c e of the C a l i p h a t e c o m p l a i n e d that it w a s not being given e n o u g h m o n e y . Inonii duly f o r w a r d e d the information to K e m a l w h o was in Izmir. T h e a n s w e r w a s a veritable tirade:

Ibid., 55, 56. T h e four basic schools of Islamic jurisprudence, or fikh, are the Hanafi, Hanbeli, Shafi, and Maliki. T h e central controversy surrounding the Ottoman leadership of Islam w a s that they were not from the tribe of Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet himself. T h e Hanafi school w a s to provide the ideological underpinning for the exigencies of history, and w a s to be interpreted as ordaining that a strong ruler, even if not a member of the Q u r a y s h , could be obeyed as the leader, the imam. It must be noted, however, that the founder of the school, Abu Hanifa himself, insisted that the imam should be f r o m the Quraysh. See Ann K . S. L a m b t o n , State and Government in Medieval Islam (Oxford 1981), 4 , 9 , 3 3 , 2 1 7 . 2 Revue, 57. 3

Ibid.,

63.

4

Ibid., 62. It is worth noting that people as varied as Namik Kemal and the nineteenth-century historian Cevdet Pa§a (in his codification of Ottoman laws) used Celal Dawwani as precedent. See Mardin, Genesis, 8 2 , 9 5 , 9 8 . 198.

5 O s m a n T u r a n , "The Turkish Myth of World Domination", Studia Islamica (1955), 77-90. For a m o r e recent c o m p e t e n t study o n the issue of the O t t o m a n C a l i p h a t e d e b a t e , see Cornell Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire. The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541-1600) (Princeton 1986), particularly 286-90. 6 Revue, 1 2 , 1 6 . It must be admitted that Kemal's tactics led to some gloating in rather bad taste on the part of militant missionary circles. See, for example, the statements of the indefatigable D. S. Margoliouth, "The Latest Developments of the Caliphate Question", The Moslem World, Vol. 15 (1924), 337: "Since where Islam has held undisputed sway civilisation has not advanced a step, it is a reasonable supposition that a necessary condition of advance is emancipation f r o m Islam".

NAMIK

KKMAL

TO

MUSTAFA

195

KEMAL

T h e point is not to return to the empty s h o w s of grandeur of the past ... what is it that the Caliph wants? I do not understand the reference to "the treasury of the Caliphate". T h e Caliphate has n o treasury and cannot have a treasury.... If he has some means at his disposal that he has inherited, these must be officially and clearly declared to the government. It is rumoured that the royal household is selling valuables ... this should be looked into.... While the French, a hundred-something years after their revolution, still do not allow their kings to return to France, w e cannot sacrifice the Republic's interest simply to be polite to someone who prays every day that the sun of the Sultanate shall rise once more. 1 Abdulmecid must have seen the writing on the wall.

SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS It is important to stress that the somewhat "rough and ready" abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate was not the work of one m a n , Mustafa Kemal; at the risk of stating the obvious, it must be pointed out that it was the result of a long historical process. In tracing the Ottoman origins of Kemalist nationalism, it is nevertheless very difficult not to fall into the teleological trap of "the inevitability of the nation state". Yet Mustafa Kemal was no accident of history, and it is accordingly necessary to account historically both for him and for the movement he led. It is with this aim that 1 have chosen to stress their i d e o l o g i c a l l i n k a g e s w i t h N a m i k K e m a l and the

Young

O t t o m a n s — r a t h e r t h a n , s a y , with Z i y a G o k a l p , w h o w a s , a f t e r all, a contemporary. Consciously and even, perhaps, unconsciously, the generation which took Turkey into the twentieth century cut its ideological teeth on a certain corpus of intellectual raw material. §erif M a r d i n , in his recent work on the Islamist activist and thinker, Said Nursi, points out that even in the remote eastern Anatolian town of Van in the 1890s, an inquisitive mind could have access to publications on a wide range of subjects: "In the 1890s Said could have studied through books and brochures (or textbooks meant for the higher schools): l o g a r i t h m s

... the t e l e p h o n e

... c o s m o g r a p h y

...

industrial

chemistry ... geometry ... the formation of the universe ... zoo technology". 2

Ismet inonii, Hatiralar (Memoirs) (Ankara 1987), Vol. 2, 187. The royal family were in fact expelled after the abolition and none of them were allowed to return to Turkey until the 1930s. Male members of the dynasty have only been able to return since the 1980s. 2 §erif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey. The Case of Bediiizzaman Said Nursi (Albany Press 1989), 76.

196

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POWER

POLITICS

Edward Shils has very elegantly drawn attention to the importance of "tacit k n o w l e d g e " , to the importance of the "unconscious", the intimate relationship between the "articulated" and the "unarticulated". As Shils notes in this connection: T h e mind of the recipient is f o r m e d by his reception of both the articulated and the unarticulated. The presentation of the formed and reasoned gives shape to the intellectual possession of the unformed recipient; it arouses and shapes his own unshaped power of reason; he is then placed in a position to acquire the unformed and unarticulated.' If a Hoca in the G N A can talk about accepting the greetings of the Caliph-to-be because these were o f f e r e d "to a populist g o v e r n m e n t in a populist [Halkçi] m e n t a l i t y " , this filtering through of

"narodnik-style"

populism has to be explained. 2 If a member of the same assembly, a founding father of the Republic, Tunali Hilmi, whose name currently graces one of the major boulevards of Ankara, uses Taftazani to assert the ultimately secular origin of the Caliphate, that also has to be explained. The interpénétration of two worlds, Western and Eastern, since the late eighteenth century, and, since the Tanzimat reforms, secular and religious, had produced a society where the religious could express itself in secular terms, j u s t as the secular could use religious motifs. Namik Kemal was in many ways the personification of this cross-civilizational synthesis. §erif Mardin, in a recent article, points out that one of the essential contributions of Namik Kemal to the "style" of Ottoman statecraft was his legitimization of "passion" in politics as a result of his c o m i n g under the influence of European Romanticism: "The Ottoman statesman-intellectual tries to solve problems nol through passion but through intelligence. Yet, in Namik Kemal we see a passion "to be useful to the state". 3 This political style is clearly discernible in the political style of the nationalists, and particularly in that of Mustafa Kemal himself. T h e element of passion which was largely the legacy of European Romanticism came d o w n through the influence of figures such as Namik Kemal. In many ways Mustafa Kemal set himself up as the romantic hero who galvanizes the population into an act of national resistance. The passion "to be useful to the state" is still one of the characteristics of the Turkish intelligentsia. 4 ' E d w a r d Shils, Tradition (Chicago 1890), 22. 2

I n addition to formal schooling. "A somewhat more subtle process w h i c h w o r k e d through a more indirect trickle e f f e c t . . ." can be observed here. See Mardin, Religion, 38. ^Mardin, "Aydinlar", 49. 4

It must be said that one of the unexpected side-effects of the 1980 military c o u p was the distancing of the self-appointed "state intellectual" f r o m the state. Even a m o n g the Right the ultimate fixation with the state underwent some sort of culture shock, because the military regime also imprisoned and marginalized major figures such as the present Prime Minister, S u l e y m a n D e m i r e l , w h o has recently become an outspoken advocate of the "state f o r the people".

NAMIK

KEMAL

TO

MUSTAFA

KEMAL

197

What is now needed is a study of the way in which Young Ottoman and Young Turk concepts such as "freedom", "fatherland", etc. were transposed into the republican era. T o name just two of the examples, we could focus on the following. The whole concept of "buying Turkish" was transposed in toto f r o m the turn-of-the-century Y o u n g Turk boycott strategy to a symbol of national solidarity still in use through the 1950s and 1960s, the "Turkish Goods Week" (Yerli Mallar Haftasi). Similarly, Mardin comments that in the second half of the nineteenth century we witness the birth of the whole "idea of youth as the guardian of Turkey's f a t e " , and the transferring onto the s h o u l d e r s of the y o u n g the responsibility traditionally b o r n e by the " g r e y b e a r d s " . 1 Kemal Atatiirk's f a m o u s "Declaration to Youth" ( G e n g l i g e Hitabe),

in which he entrusted the slate to the future generations, has been

taken literally by Turkish youth, for some at the cost of their lives. T h e Y o u n g Ottomans set a trend, a trend of couching secular aims (even u n c o n s c i o u s l y ) in religious t e r m i n o l o g y in o r d e r to ensure their legitimacy. In this sense, they were no different f r o m their opponents, the reforming bureaucracy. This tendency was even continued under Abdtilhamid II, despite the much m o r e self-consciously Islamic nature of his official policy. 2 In the proceedings of the first republican parliament, we see the final form assumed by the off icial line of carrying on the struggle in the name of the Caliph who was being held prisoner. T h e debate over the separation of Sultanate and Caliphate, and the abolition of the latter, is also enlightening in this r e g a r d . T h e story a p p e a r s to c o m e full circle with the j u d i c i a l hair-splitting over whether the Caliph should be appointed, whether he should be brought to Ankara or stay in Istanbul, and above all what his relationship was to be with the G N A , which saw itself as the personification of the will of the people. In some ways Namik Kemal and Mustafa Kemal appear as the result of the same synthesis. Both ultimately sought "to be useful to the state". Namik Kemal saw the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen as the "dawning of truth". 3 T h e whole obsession with "Progress" c a m e down to the Republic via the bridge of the C o m m i t t e e of Union and Progress. N a m i k Kemal's belief in the "innate ability of man to progress" was very much a theme of republican ideology. Similarly, the need to look for talent in Anatolia, the Turkish heartland, is part of this legacy. 4

'Mardin, Religion, 120. S e l i m Deringil, "invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire", in Comparative Studies in Society and History. ^Mardin, Genesis, 3 2 ] . 2

4

Ibid„

322,323.

W O R L D

198

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P O L I T I C S

Where Namik Kennal entangled himself in contradictions w a s in his idea that the force which had regulated the first stages of association (of man in communities) was the same as that which had been obtained in the second stage, i.e. after government came into being. In the second stage this force was the §eriat It could be posited that the Republicans became involved in the same contradiction. The force which regulated "the first stage of association", i.e. the establishment of the secular republic, had been the G N A . N o w , however, this "absolute normative force" became transmogrified into not the §eriat but the "six arrows of Kemalism". 2 The Kemalist "specialists" felt that they had the legitimate monopoly on all power in their newly defined state. A n k a r a therefore took only half of Namik Kemal's offering. The Islamic part was clearly left out. In his Nutuk,

Mustafa Kemal made the point very clear: The

term "the rulings of the §eriat" means nothing more beyond "the rule of law", and cannot mean anything else.... "No other interpretation is possible in the context of modern law.' 3 T h e conflation of the terms §eriat

and secular law ( k a n u n ) in this

instance is highly significant. The same Enlightenment ideology guided both m e n , but one was actually harkening back to a purer form of rule while the other saw it as a secular blueprint of the future, a legitimizing mechanism for a previously determined course of action.

l

Ibid„

2

291.

T h e s y m b o l i c "Six A r r o w s " which still constitute the basis c r e d o of K e m a l i s m are: Republicanism (CumhuriyetcUik). Nationalism ( V l u s c u l u k ) , Populism ( H a l k c i l i k ) , Etatism (Devletfilik), Secularism (Laiklih), and Revolutionism (Devrimcilik). In 1937 these principles were made part of the Turkish Constitution. On the issue of the identification of the Republican Peoples' Party with the state, which occurred during the single party regime, see Mete Tuncay, "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1923-1950" in Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 7 (Istanbul 1983), 2019-24. On the formulation of the "Six Arrows", see Hikmet Bila, Sosyal Demokrat Sure