The Ottomans in Qatar: A History of Anglo-Ottoman Conflicts in the Persian Gulf 9781617191107, 1617191108

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The Ottomans in Qatar

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

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A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies are brought together in Analecta Isisiana. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

The Ottomans in Qatar

A History of Anglo-Ottoman Conflicts in the Persian Gulf

Zekeriya Kursun

The Isis Press, Istanbul

gOÎ^ÎaS pre** 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 2002 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

o

ISBN 978-1-61719-110-7

Printed in the United States of America

Prof. Dr. Zekeriya Kur§un holds a Ph.D. from the University of Marmara, Istanbul (1991) and teaches at the History Department of the same university. His published works include Yol Ayiriminda TürkArap ili§kileri (Istanbul 1992), and Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanli Hakimiyeti (Ankara 1998). He has contributed a number of articles to various journals and collective works.

TO MY MOTHER AND FATHER

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS PREFACE Abbreviations

9 11 13 Introduction

THE

GEOGRAPHY, TRADITIONAL SOCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF QATAR 1. Geography 2. Traditional Social and Administrative Structure 3. Economic Life

AND 15 15 22 26

Chapter One QATAR'S PLEDGING OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE OTTOMANS 1. The Expansion of the Ottoman State to the Persian Gulf and Basic Information on Qatar 2. Midhat Pasha's Hasa Campaign and the Foundation of the Kaza of Qatar 3. The Ottoman State and Relations Between the al-Thani Family 4. Some Local Problems and the Attitude Adopted by the Ottoman State a) The Banyanian Incident and Sheikh Jasim's Intention to Resign b) The Fuwairat and Wakrah Issues

31 31 49 63 67 67 71

Chapter Two NEW

DIMENSIONS IN THE ANGLO-OTTOMAN CONTROVERSIES OVER QATAR AND BAHRAIN 1. Efforts to Delineate the Areas of Influence of the British and the Ottomans in the Gulf 2. The Zubarah and Odeid Question: Attacks by the British on Zubarah 3. Ottoman Sovereignty Over the Persian Gulf Once Again on the Agenda 4. The Issues of Nejd, Qatar and Bahrain in the 1913 AngloOttoman Convention

83 83 103 116 124

8

THE OTTOMANS IN QATAR

Chapter Three THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN QATAR 1. Kaza Administration a) The Office of the Qaim-makam and Other Administrative Units b) Financial and Legal Matters c) Ottoman Troops in Qatar 2. The Security Issue of the Qatari Coast and Measures Taken Against Contraband Arms a) The Security of the Qatari Coast b) Arms Contraband on the Qatar Coast 3. Relations between the Qaim-makam of Qatar and Sheikhs in the Neighbourhood a) Relations with Bahrain and Oman b) Interfamily Dissensions in Kuwait and Jasim b. Thani's intention to intervene

139 139 139 148 150 152 152 155 161 161 164

Conclusion

171

BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDIX DOCUMENTS MAPS INDEX

173 177 183 221 231

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A great many contributors have assisted me in the preparation of the present work. In the first place, I acknowledge with gratitude the contribution made by my colleagues at the Faculty of Letters and Sciences of Marmara University who apprised me of the existence of a great number of documents on the subject. In deciphering these documents they have been of great help. Had it not been for the valuable contribution of Prof. Dr. Siileyman Beyoglu, Prof. Dr. Ali Akyildiz, Dr. Ufuk Giilsoy, Dr. Yiicel Dagli, Haluk Degirmenci and Gary Chambers the present work would not have seen the light of day. I am particularly grateful for the unstinting support of the personnel and directors of the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry. The Library of the Turkish History Association and the Atatiirk Library of the Greater Metropolitan Council of Istanbul provided me with a host of material. My thanks go to the staff of the aforementioned two libraries as well as to Prof. Dr. Yusuf Hala§oglu, President of the Association of Turkish History and to Dr. Ali Mazak, the Director of Municipal Libraries and Museums. Last but not least, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Mr. Samy Abu Shaikha, to His Excellency Dr. Abdalla al Muslemani and especially to His Highness Sheikh Hamad b. Khalif al-Thani, Emir of Qatar, a descendant of Jasim b. Thani, one of the heroes of the present book, who made possible my visit to the geographical area of my study. I am indebted to my wife Filiz, who exercised tolerance in dealing with my fits of temper during the preparation of this work and I appreciate the endurance of my children Ali Murat and Fikret Taha to whom I occasionally failed to show due attention.

PREFACE

The predicament confronting the Ottoman State in the 19th century was that it was faced with two concurrent conflicting situations; while the weak central government in power witnessed the loss of its territory and was oppressed by a shaky economy, it aspired, at the same time, to restore its former strength and power. However, the latter ambition was doomed to fail in finding favour with history and the Ottoman State was forced to depart from the stage of history before the end of the first quarter of the 20 th century. However, the struggle for the survival of the Ottoman State and for the restoration of its lost splendour has been a captivating field of research. The Ottoman State redoubled its efforts to counterbalance the decline in its supremacy in "Ottoman Europe" by trying its luck in the East, especially in the Persian Gulf. These efforts had the aim of making its existence felt in the region and also to consolidate its de facto presence. The Gulf has been the scene of many political stratagems which remain in the dark to this very day. The most important issue among the turn of events was doubtless the painstaking efforts made to thwart the British whose overwhelming presence in the Persian Gulf in the 19 th century was incontestable. The history of the Persian Gulf during the period which extended from the second half of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20 th is the history of Anglo-Ottoman conflicts which continued on and off both overtly and covertly. Another point of paramount interest is the role this contention played in the emergence of the modern Gulf countries. There is no end to the detailed research work which has been conducted on the history of this region. However, it should be noted that most of these studies are based on western sources and especially on British sources party to the cause. The natural consequence of this situation was a unilateral reflection of the British standpoint. I do not mean to say that Ottoman views were disregarded, but they were presented in a way that the British deemed appropriate, while some were based on sources of merely secondary importance. It has been our aim therefore to shed light on the Ottoman standpoint based on the available Ottoman sources. In other words, the present study passes in review over the modern history of the Gulf while examining the "Ottoman Gulf issue". Our style and language may suggest now and then a

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THE OTTOMANS IN QATAR

biased approach with regard to British diplomacy. This should not be judged as the author's opinion but ought to be acknowledged as the Ottoman approach. Indeed, the objective of the present study is not to find out who has right on his side. The intention is to point to the Ottoman claims on the region and to the eventual results. The present study forms at the same time a supplement to our study entitled Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanli Hakimiyeti (Ottoman Supremacy in Nejd and Hasa), Ankara 1998. The aforementioned study tried to elucidate the consequences of the influence that the Ottoman State had succeeded in restoring to the region and the Hasa military operations of the great reformist and statesman, Midhat Pasha. One particular outcome was the establishment of the Ottoman administration at Qatar, a point of some strategic importance. The original administrative organisation it had set up against the background of a British presence in Bahrain is one on which the Ottomans had pretensions. The "introduction" takes up the political geography of Qatar and the traditional social and administrative structure. The first section deals with Qatar's passing directly under Ottoman administration and the international issues that this state of affairs generated while the second section discusses the Anglo-Ottoman contention over Qatar and Bahrain within the framework of new tendencies in the international balance of power. The third section studies the efforts expended by the Ottomans, in establishing control over Qatar and imposing the administrative structure of the State. I hope that the present study, which is the outcome of a long and painstaking research, will be a modest contribution to the history of the region.

Zekeriya KUR§UN Istanbul

ABBREVIATIONS

A.DYN.MKL A.H. A.M A.MKT.UM A.MKT BEO BOA DH-KMS DH-MUI DH-§FR DH.SN.THR DUtT HH HR.HM§.i§. HR.MKT HR.SYS I. H u s ID iMM IUTY K.K.Ruus MD MV §D TOEM Y. A. H u s Y . A. R e s Y.MTV YEE

Divan-i Hiimayun Mukavelat Kalemi After Hejrah Sadaret Muteferrika Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Babiali Evrak Odasi Ba§bakanlik Osmanli Ar§ivi, Dahiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Mahsus Miidiriyeti. Dahiliye Nezareti Muhaberat-i Umumiye Dahiliye Nezareti §ifre Kalemi Dahiliye Nezareti Niifus Miidiriyeti Dosya Usulii trade. Hatt-i Hiimayun Hariciye Nezareti Hukuk Mu§avirligi Isti§are Odasi Hariciye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi Hariciye Siyasi Irade Hususi Irade Dahiliye Irade Meclis-i Mahsus Istanbul Universitesi Tarih Yazmalan Kamil Kepeci Ruus Defteri Muhimme Defteri Meclis-i Viikela Mazbatalan §ura-yi Devlet Evraki Tarih-i Osmani Enciimeni Mecmuasi Yildiz Sadaret Hususi Yildiz Sadaret Resmi Yildiz Mutenevvi Evraki Yildiz Esas Evraki

INTRODUCTION THE GEOGRAPHY, TRADITIONAL SOCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF QATAR

1. Geography We shall presently dwell on the geography of the region often referred to as "the Qatar Continent" or "the Qatar Peninsula" in Ottoman sources, a district of the mutasarnflik (governorship) of Nejd, which had once been a subdivision of the vilayet (province) of Baghdad which was later to become subordinated to Basrah. Qatar, often defined as the southernmost promontory of Nejd and Hasa is described in one of the most important Ottoman reference books, namely in the Kamus'ul-AHam as follows: "It is a peninsula on the north-eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula, south-east of the Persian Gulf, stretching to the north between the Gulf of Bahrain and Bahru'l-Benat"1 In an Ottoman source dating back to 1847, Qatar is described as being "subordinated to Hasa situated by the sea with an harbour and many villages and pastures" 2 , and in another text of a later date, it is said to have 40 villages 3 , 1000 houses, and 1000 vineyards 4 . In the same text, we read that Qatar has a population of 135 000 with a military force of 6500. These figures seem to be rather exaggerated though. So that this data which dates back to the period prior to Midhat Pasha's Hasa campaign must be treated with some scepticism. One of the most reliable and correct descriptions of the Qatar peninsula is the one provided by Major Omer Bey, battalion commandant, assigned by the sancak of Nejd to Qatar during the Hasa campaign towards the end of 1871. This description appeared in the January 23, 1872 issue of the Official Journal of the vilayet of Baghdad. Omer Bey describes the district where he had been despatched with his military unit, as follows: '§emseddin Sami, "Qatar", Kamus'ul-A'lam, Istanbul 1306, p. 3675. "BOA (Bagbakanlik Osmanli Argivi), ÌMM(ìrade Meclis-i Mahsus) 2067. 3 Takvim-i Vekayi, No 1382, 28 Rebiulahir 1288. 4 Takvim-i Vekayi No 1376, 14 Rebiulahir 1288.

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THE OTTOMANS

IN

QATAR

"The town of al-Bida' is the administrative centre. It has approximately 1000 houses and a population of 4000, in addition to a great number of villages, of which Wakrah lies at a distance of 3 hours from the town al-Bida'. It has about two hundred houses and a population of 400, with fifty ships. While al-Hawr (or Hur) to the north is at four hour distance from the centre of town and has about five hundred houses. A third region is Zubarah facing Bahrain..."1 Qatar, as presented in Ottoman sources looks very similar to the Qatar of today, although it differs as to settlement areas, population and the number of major towns and cities. However, to the best of our knowledge, we can safely say, that in the second half of the 19th century, the region called "Qatar" had more than 20 settlement areas and a settled population of more than 150002. The magnitude of the population and the size of the settlement areas indicate that it was one of the important settlement areas in the Persian Gulf. In the documents, we also come across the names of other small villages outside the boundaries of major settlement areas of the Ottomans, like al-Bida', Doha, Wakrah, Odeid and Zubarah, which were subordinated to Qatar. The kasaba (town) of al-Bida' was the administrative centre of Qatar district within the framework of the administrative organisation formed in the sancak of Nejd by the Ottoman State, towards the end of 1871. We read the following in the almanac of the vilayet of Baghdad of the year A.H. 1300/1883: "The Qatar district lies south-east of liva (the subdivision of a province) Hasa by the sea and is at a distance of sixty hours from it. The office of the qaim-makam is at al-Bida'"3 To be brief, "The Qatar Continent " or "The Qatar Peninsula" was exactly at the position marked at present, on the map as Qatar. Likewise, the appellation of the "Kasaba (town) of Qatar" meant the administrative centre alBida'. As a matter of fact, Ottoman officials who visited the region in 1893 spoke of Qatar in the following terms: "Qatar Continent is to the south-east of Basrah. The kasaba of Qatar (al-Bida') to the north-east of the said continent by the seaside is at a distance of 400 miles from Basrah and nine days from Hofuf, centre of administration of the sancak of Nejd" 4

*Zawra,

(Official journal of the vilayet of Baghdad) No 215, 11 Kanunisani 1287/21 January 1872. The said report published in Zawra is missing in our copy. This copy kept in the archives of the National Library of Baghdad could not be reached. 2while in a document dated H. 1277/1861 mention is made of some 25 small and big kasabas (boroughs) (BOA, A.MKT. (7M426/63), in the almanacs of the Ottoman State are mentioned 19 villages. On the other hand, in Kamus'ul 'Alam published in 1890 we read of thirty five settlement areas and a population of 100 thousand. 3 Salname-i Vilayet-i Bagdat 1300, IV. Defa, p. 311. These data are repeated in the almanacs of the vilayet of Basrah started to be published after 1308. 4 BOA YEE (Yildiz Esas Evraki) 250/14/126/8, p. 8.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

17

In the same report, we come across the following information about the administration centre of kaymakamlik (Office of a qaim-makam) called " K a t a r Kasabasi" by the Ottomans. "Qatar (kasabasi) has about 200 houses and is said to have a population 1 of 6000 and consists of two parts, namely of a western section inhabited by the al-Bu Kevarah and Sudan tribes, called al-Beda', and of an eastern section called Doha where other tribes live. " 2 In the Ottoman archives, we find description of the physical features of Qatar. In general terms, such features are said to consist of "a dry and arid land where coarse grass and stunted trees grow and where wells are deep and numerous. "Waters are of but poor quality and the irrigation of orchards is not so easy, which accounts for the poor quality of fruit obtained."3 In addition to these descriptions there is a detailed description of Qatar and it's environs in the work entitled "The Persian Gulf Guide"4 published in Istanbul in 1891 especially for seafarers. In this Guide, where ample information is provided about the coastline and the sea routes to be followed by navigators, while describing the space between Wakrah and Re's Rakin, we read the following: "al-Beda' is a rocky and elevated place. The soil contains gravel and marl everywhere. The northern part is a low terrain. Ât the outer edge, sand banks stretch in succession from Yasat Island to al-Bida'. The northern coast of al-Odeid is called Berr al-Qatar. However, the entire peninsula named "Qatar" and, is at present, governed by the equitable Ottoman administration. The inhabitants consist of Bedouin tribes."5

The figure referring to the population of the al-Bida' kasaba in the qaim-makam Omer Bey's report is four thousand; therefore the 6000 given in his document should be normal. The first report dates from 1872 while the latter dates from 1893. Considering the period of time that has elapsed in the meantime and the growth of new settlers in the district of a qaim-makam such an increase should be judged normal. 2 Ibid, p. 9 a §emseddin Sami, op. cit., p. 3675. ^Although there is no hint of it in the book, this must be a translation of the book entitled The Persian Gulf Pilot, The Gulf of Oman and the Makran Coast (London 1883). The information provided in it is exactly the same as that given in the Ottoman book. The only difference being that while in the English version the areas of sovereignty of states are delineated suiting the policy of Britain, in the Ottoman version the viewpoints of the Ottomans are reflected. Siileyman Nutki, Basra Korfezi Rehberi, Istanbul, 1317, pp. 198-199. The English version contains the following information which comes after a description of the region: "The coast north of al-Odaid is called Barr al-Qatar, which name applies to the whole of the peninsula. It is within the jurisdiction of the Sheikh of Bahrain. The towns of Qatar send 200 boats to the pearl fishery, chiefly from al-Bida'a and Wakrah." (The Persian Gulf Pilot, The Gulf of Uman; and the Makran Coast, Archive edition, London 1989, p. 119) Despite the emphasis by the British that the city of Bahrain was under the administration of Britain, which denies the Ottoman rule, in the Ottoman version, it is stated in the text as follows: " at present it is governed by the equitable Ottoman administration" thus reflecting the true state of affairs.

18

THE OTTOMANS IN QATAR Wakrah, a subdivision of Qatar, is described as follows: "... a newly built city. Wakrah, which has 12 towers is by the seaside and has a thriving economy. It has a population of 1000. It possesses a large fleet and is ruled by the Ottoman State.."1

In this book, in which the physical features of al-Beda' and Doha, the two big towns in proximity to each other, are described, it is said that "the sovereignty of the Ottomans over al-Beda' dispensed by a qaim-makam assigned by the state is extended also to two other towns" and that "the total population of the three towns, namely of Bida', Doha and Wakrah consisting of a variety of tribes reaches five thousand." 2 Moreover, there are detailed descriptions of uninhabited or inhabited places like Wakrah and Ra's al-Enf, Ra's al-Matbah, Fuwairat, al-Gharyyah, al-Rayat around the bay of al-Beda'.3 Chapter Six of the book deals with the southern coast of the Persian Gulf. The chapter contains some important information on the regions comprised between Re's Rakin and Ra's Tennurah. After a description of Dohat al-Adwan, we encounter the following information about the al-Hawar islands, almost contiguous with Doha: "A survey of the surface and area of the islands on the west of the entrance of the Gulf has not been exhaustively made yet. The largest of the said islands is the one called al-Hawar and has a length of ten miles. Fishermen are frequent visitors to the place."4 From such accounts, we deduce that there must have been many uninhabited islands and islets in the environs of Qatar Peninsula. However, as they were situated on shallow waters, of the navigation routes, they were not considered so important and were the sanctuary of fishermen. In a letter addressed to the Ministry of the Interior by the vilayet of Basrah, Qatar is briefly described as follows:

1Ibid p. 199. In the English version there is no mention of "Ottoman administration." The addition of this expression to the translated text shows the delicacy of the regional policy. ^Ibid, pp. 200-202. The English version reads : 'The Sheikh of Bida', who is under Bahrain, has some authority over the chiefs of the other two towns." (The Persian Gulf Pilot, The Gulf of Uman; and the Mkran Coast, Archive edition. London 1989, p. 121). Conflicting expressions between the English and Ottoman versions result from the controversy reigning at the time between the Ottomans and the British. As a matter of fact, the Ottoman State had established effective sovereignty over Qatar at the time. The Sheikh of Qatar had pledged allegiance to the Ottoman State; on the other hand the Sheikh of Bahrain had no claim to make vis-a-vis the Sheikh of Qatar qualified as the sheikh of Bida'. Therefore it is plain that the expressions in the English version reflect but the claims of the British over the region. 3 Ibid, pp. 205-207. 4 Ibid, p. 213.

INTRODUCTION

19

"It is situated between Oman and Bahrain; the country, which is of vital political and regional importance, is a rocky wasteland. The lack of water supply renders impossible the cultivation of land and the growing of vegetable and fruit like in the case of Hasa and Kateef; its population deals in pearl and nacre fishing, embarked on their sailing boats whose number exceed 600, and the total population is approximately 15 000.1,1 In Ottoman records, the region stretching from Kuwait to Muscat, which also includes Qatar and Bahrain, is called "the Nejd coastline", and the fact that the said region is Ottoman territory is stressed. However, when reference is to be made within a specific context, "Qatar" and other regions are mentioned separately. Therefore, it is advisable to define properly the "Nejd coastline" here. Upon being asked, Said Pasha, who had served for a long time as mutasarrif (governor) of Hasa, submitted a report to the state in which he delineated the boundaries of Nejd and of the region under its jurisdiction. In this report, Said Pasha stated that the Nejd coastline began from Kuwait and stretched to the west and to the east ending at Muscat, and drew the boundaries of Qatar in the following terms: "Qatar district is a tongue of land projecting seawards midway between Oman and Bahrain islands; its boundary which begins at Selva just below Ujair, Hasa's landstation, extends as far as Odeid, covering thus a distance of 3 hours along the sea coast. Some of the fifteen villages of Qatar whose names appear on the map 2 lie on the coast, while others are just near the sea. Of the said villages 'Zubarah', is a nahiye (township) of Qatar and lies at a distance of six hours by sea, from Bahrain. "3 Said Pasha, who described Qatar in these terms, reaches the following conclusion in his report: "Both Qatar and the villages under its jurisdiction, i.e. Zubarah, being situated on the coast of Hasa (Nejd) and standing apart from Bahrain, the sheikhs and the people are evidently Ottoman subjects."4

; l BOA, Y.A. Res. (Yildiz Sadaret Resmi Evrah) 94/10. '"Said Pasha must have submitted a map together with his said report. ^State Archive of Qatar, File No 9/5-8, p. 238. In the State Archive of Qatar there are Ottoman documents which were collected from the collections of the old Archive of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman State. The original number of the said documents could not be made available. 4 I b i d . We come across similar information in another Ottoman document. In the aforementioned document where all the settlement areas are described, we read: "...Qatar, situated at a hundred miles from the Ujair landstation by the sea is a continent projecting to the sea midway between Oman and Bahrain Island.. The administrative centre of this district is the kasaba of al-Bida'. It has 2500 houses made of stone and adobes.." BOA, YEE, Kamil Pa§a Evrakma Ek, 36/38-3790.

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THE OTTOMANS IN QATAR

No information could be found in any record we had the opportunity to consult about this island in close proximity to Doha and indicated by such appellations as "Jazirat Hawar", "Jazirat al-Doha" and "al-Hawar".1 This may probably be due to two reasons. Firstly, because the Hawar Island at the time was uninhabited and considered unimportant. Secondly the island was considered to be part of the "Nejd coastline", and, as it had never been a bone of contention, there is no correspondence which bears any mention of it anywhere. As a matter of fact, we observe, in various Ottoman records in which a description of the region is given, that all the territory including the islands and islets, from Ra's Tennurah to the Ormazd strait, is part of the Ottoman territorial waters according to the international maritime laws also adopted by European states.2 On the other hand, as an issue of sovereignty over these uninhabited islands in the territorial waters of Nejd, or, to be precise, of Qatar having never been on the agenda in the course of history, it follows that there must have been no reason for it. As a matter of fact, islands and islets of a lesser magnitude than al-Hawar on the sea route passing through the Nejd coastline had been on the agenda every now and then because of the buoys that the British had placed there for navigation purposes. In fact, relevant correspondence does exist about these. Likewise, Zubarah, which is often mentioned in Ottoman record as having been under the jurisdiction of Qatar, is encountered frequently in correspondence. In Ottoman maps, Qatar is drawn according to the above description; i.e. although al-Beda', centre of administration of Qatar district had now and then be referred to as "Qatar", the entire Qatar Peninsula was always indicated as "The Qatar Peninsula" or "The Qatar district" and the line which traced Ottoman boundaries was drawn in the colours and signs indicative of Ottoman territories. We must here underline an important point. As we shall be seeing further ahead, the Ottoman State always claimed that Bahrain was under its own sovereignty. This was explicit in its claim both in its policy vis-à-vis Bahrain, in its correspondence and in the maps delineating its boundaries in the ' Wc do not mean that there are no records at all. Considering that both in the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry and at ATASE and in the archives of the Naval Museum there are numerous documents which could not have been consulted, it is quite probable that relevant records do exist. 2 In a report submitted by the Naval Command of Basrah to the Minister of Marine the following passage is noteworthy: "More than ten thousand caiques spread over shallow waters from Re'sTennurah to the Ormazd strait fish nacre and pearls worth over a million lira. This region where pearl fishing is conducted is according to the laws of the countries surrounded by these waters and also sanctioned by European states is considered Ottoman territorial waters.." BOA, Y.A. Res. 27/19. This passage is repeated exactly in the same terms in a report prepared by the State Council. BOA §D 2158/10, Lef. 72.

INTRODUCTION

21

Persian Gulf. This is why Bahrain was always shown on maps together with Qatar as Ottoman territories. Whereas in maps which displayed pro-British tendencies, Qatar was shown within the confines of Ottoman boundaries while Bahrain was left out. Needless to say, the Ottoman State actually ruled over the Qatar Peninsula. Regardless of the frequent objections made by the British, this was generally accepted as such. The British, who could not bring themselves to acknowledge the presence of the Ottoman State at Qatar, now and then came up with allegations to the effect that the Ottomans had no rights of sovereignty except for over Doha. Even though this allegation was devoid of all foundations, if the geographical position and the social structure of the region are taken into consideration as a whole, supposing for a while that the claim was taken as a hypothesis, Doha's boundaries should also be demarcated from the sea. Therefore, the issue must be considered from the viewpoint of international law regarding "territorial waters" which is a rather recent concept. It is true that territorial waters in the Gulf had never been made a bone of contention, but if the concept of the Ottoman State with respect to territorial waters vis-a-vis this region is to be applied, the territorial waters of the Ottomans should be at least three miles from Bahrain, while the allegation of the British was of a distance at least three miles from Doha. Nevertheless, although the Ottoman State did not accept the concept of territorial waters in the Gulf, in practice, it complied with international customs. On the other hand, at the beginning of the twentieth century, there were no definitely demarcated boundaries for territorial waters adopted by countries, including Britain. According to the generally accepted opinion, every country should be free to determine her own territorial waters provided the distance foreseen remained within the range of gunshot. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the territorial waters of the Ottoman State were indicated both in the maritime customs regulations and in the coast guard regulations to be of five or six miles.1 For lack of an explicit rule adopted internationally with respect to territorial waters, the Ottomans seem to have had their own experts to consult on the issue by comparing their own territorial waters with those adopted by other countries. As one may deduce from the contents of a report prepared by the Improvements Department of the State Council, there was no unanimity concerning the distance from the coast of a country's territorial waters, and yet there was no objection to its being at least three miles.2 The essential question here was to fix the point where the measurement of the territorial waters in the Persian Gulf was to begin. For instance, Clause Two of the customs regulations states that "safety coast line for ships stretches up to ten kilometres from the coast". It follows that the territorial waters went a little farther than five miles. On the other hand Clause Thirty of the said regulations foresees that "'customs officials may approach the ships of a capacity less than two hundred tonnage and demand presentation of the manifest and the freight". BOA, BEO (Babialt Evrak Odasi) 318205. 2 BOA, BEO 318205.

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THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

2. Traditional Social and Administrative Structure The people living in Qatar and in the environs were, just like in Nejd and Hasa, urban dwellers and bedouins. The urban dwellers were sedentary people living in towns and communities which were founded near oases, surrounded by deserts, and in valleys close by springs, or, just like in Qatar, at places favourable for maritime trade. On the other hand, bedouins were people who led the life of nomads and who were usually engaged in breeding camels and sheep.1 These people were reluctant to take shelter under a roof as they preferred to live under tents which they themselves wove of camel hair. Most of their time was spent riding camels. They paid occasional visits to towns and communities to take in fresh supplies, and once they had done so, they immediately left for the vastness of the desert. They were not a community of agriculturalists as sedentary life seemed oppressive to them2, however, this dislike did not prevent them from making raids on fields during harvest times3. This led to ceaseless quarrels between the urban dwellers and the bedouins. The bedouins who migrated according to the season of the year and the rains, thought themselves free to encroach on other people's property laying waste to the orchards and vineyards on their way. Bedouins are described in Salname-i Vilayet-i Bagdat dating from A.H. 1300 (1882/1883) as follows: "..They pasture camels and sheep and launch expeditions against each other. The poorer of them deal in transportation of merchandise and wood which they sell"4. The settled population often used to give the bedouins a "brotherhood tax" as one may call it, under the designation of Uhuvve (also called "Huh", "Have" or "Ihave"), to protect themselves from their outrage. 5 To have recourse to military expeditions against these desert Arabs, whose livelihood depended mainly on the plundering they called "gazvah", would have been in vain. That is why the Ottoman State used to pay the sheikhs of the bedouin tribes a regular sum of money called a "bedouin allocation". Moreover, during the "musabele", season in which bedouins went down town to conduct trade

'BOA, YEE, 14/2256/126/1, p. 8. ^Hiiseyin Husnii, NecidKitasi'nin Ahval-i Umumiyesi, Konstantiniyye 1337, p. 37. •hn a record which dates back to H. 967 it is stated that "When it is harvest time in Lahsa and Kateef, a host of Arab tribes make raids and devastate the country", which shows that this tradition of Bedouin Arabs goes far back into history. BOA, MD (Miihimme Defteri) No. 3, hiiktim (decree) 1131. 4 Salname-i Vilayet-i Bagdat 1300, IV. Defa, p. 211. 5 B O A , / M M (irade Meclis-i Mahsus) 1561 Lef. 57; Muhammed b. Kamil Numan, Jezire alArab, (iUTY, No. 4432, Varak (Folio No) 11; Cevdet Paga, Ma'ruzat (Edited by: Yusuf Halagoglu) Istanbul 1980, pp. 192-193.

INTRODUCTION

23

based on barter with the settled population; they received gifts and grants in kind and in cash under such appellations as "ikramiye" (bonus)," it'amiyye" (meal allowance) or "iksa bedeli"(clothing allowance) from the revenue of the local administration. These gifts and grants were sometimes distributed by the prominent sheikhs of the locality. However, all these gifts and grants were no guarantee against the aggressive behaviour of bedouins, as these could not be interpreted as tokens of allegiance and loyalty; for, whenever they failed to get their usual allocation, they felt themselves free to engage in highway robbery and ransacking. It is also reported that the state required from those tribes receiving allowances a document in which they promised not to commit robberies.1 Although there is no end to such documents, the correspondence conducted in 1910 between the Ottoman State and the Nejd bedouins concerning the said allocation corroborate the above information. Upon an appeal by the vilayet of Basrah, in a letter addressed by the Ministry of the Interior dated January 18, 1910 to the Office of the Grand Vizier we read the following: "The bonus and the regular sums of money paid to sheikhs and prominent persons of the tribes to guarantee the safety and security of roads and to keep the peace and order in Nejd and the sum of 70.000 kurushes spent by the local municipality on eating and clothing allowances when they visit the administration centre twice a year can no longer be met as from this year by the local municipality due to a reduction in the revenue of the municipality. Therefore, the said money must hereafter be paid just as in such vilayets as Hedjaz and Yemen from the state treasury ... The abolition of this local tradition will likely create discontent and give rise to undesirable consequences. Under the circumstances, the issue must be debated at the meeting of the Council of Ministers so that a decision may be reached to include the amount in question in the budget of the Ministry of Finance to be payable henceforth from the extraordinary reserves account.."2 In the list appended to the aforementioned correspondence there is a breakdown of the sums of money paid to the sheikhs of the Nejd bedouins. We observe in this list that the yearly amount paid to the sheikhs of al-Ujman was 24375 kurushes, while the amount paid to the sheikhs of al-Murrah was 36075 kurushes; on the other hand, Shafi bin Salim, the sheikh of the Beni Hajir, a Qatar tribe, received annually 2925 kurushes and the prominent personalities of the al-Manasir tribe got 4875 kurushes. In the same list, we also observe that the said tribes had been paid a total sum of 26352 kurushes as bonus and eating allowances.3 ]

BOA, ID (trade Dahiliye) 37210. BOA, BEO (Babidli Evrak Odasi), 302151. 3 BOA, BEO 302151. 2

24

THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

In bedouin communities, the only social link was the tribal link of kinship. They were related to each other by blood relationship without differentiation regarding the closeness of kinship. There was strict solidarity between members of the community as everybody was everybody else's brother and was obliged to remain loyal to the tribe under any conditions. In other words, the tribe was the symbol of the political unity of the bedouins. In general, both the bedouin and sedentary Arab tribes were under the rule of a sheikh coming from a well-established stock. There were instances of lines of sheikhs whose ancestors went centuries back into the past. The sheikh derived his power from his noble ancestry and wealth. He had to occupy the position of primus inter pares among his people. His power originated from strictly followed tribal customs. In spite of the existence of a so called "advisory council", the sheikh made decisions unequivocally. He had thus absolute power over his tribesmen. However, this absolutism was a moderate one which duly observed the traditions. The sheikh had to be adamant towards his enemies but lenient and tolerant vis-a-vis the members of his own tribe. Certain sheikhs went by the name of "emir". A sheikh or emir might assign sheikhs or emirs to other tribes subordinated to him under the same name. 1 So far we have been concerned with the Peninsula, the reason being the coexistence of a plurality of tribes to be found there. We must note, however, that the geographical position of the land compelled the tribes that were settled in Qatar to live in some sort of a loose confederation rather than independently from each other. This was a natural consequence of sheikhdom. The chief sheikh or emir never interfered with the affairs of the sheikhs he assigned to the tribes in the neighbourhood or of the sheikhs who inherited their sheikhdom from their respective ancestors. Their joint action was restricted to the realisation of the will expressed by the particular authority on which they depended or to the cases of military expedition and defence. Chapters dealing with this situation in Palgrave's book Through Central and Eastern Arabia (London, 1865) relating the journeys he made to the region concerned in the 1860s were published in Takvim-i Vekayi, the official gazette of the Ottoman State, in 1879. Palgrave describes the situation in Qatar which he had visited in January 1863 as follows: "..The sovereign in the country is an individual by the name of Muhammad b. Thani, ... while Qatar is considered subordinated to Oman. However, the administrator whose seat is at al-Bada', has no authority over other villages which are ruled by local sheikhs. Ibn Thani has the authority of a tax collector for the villages subordinated to him. His main task is to collect annual taxes and the pearl tax. The internal order and the allies of the Qatar people are as they are expected to be." 2 ^Siileyman §efik Kemalf, Hicaz Seyahatnamesi, Daru'l-Hilafe 1308/1310, IUTY Nr 4199, p. 113; Jeziret al-Arab, Varak (Folio No) 11a, lib. Takvim-i Vekayi, Nr. 1367, 19 Rebiulewel 1288.

INTRODUCTION

25

These statements indicate that Qatar, before being comprised within the administrative chart of the sancak of Nejd, was governed as a loose confederation. Although we often see mentioned in Ottoman sources, the tribes living in the environs of Nejd, Hasa, Kateef, Bahrain and even of Oman, the areas under their subordination were not determined as they constantly changed places according to their whims and the seasons. According to the sources, different accounts are given about these tribes which continuously shift their habitations within the confines of a vast stretch of land and which have an intricately woven relationship among themselves. Indeed, the allegiance of bedouins who were hardly expected to show strict obedience to an authority other than to their own tribe was made light of by the central government. Clear data on the issue is provided but at a much later date when there was an increase in local problems and when the Ottoman State contemplated having the nomadic tribes settled for good. While the Beni Hajir, Na'im, al-Kabasa and certain other tribes were considered without any discrimination as subordinated to the sancak of Nejd in the beginning,1 at a later date, they were counted, in more realistic terms, among the Qatar tribes. According to a report of an Ottoman delegation, which conducted a survey in the year of 1893, the Qatar region and the tribes in the surroundings areas were classified as follows: "In the Qatar continent, first comes the Beni Hajir tribe. It consists of three groups which shuttle between Qatar, Kateef and Hofuf. Each of these groups has its own sheikh, while Jasim al-Thani has only one of these groups under his control. Second comes the tribe of al-Manasir of which one part is in Oman, while the other is in the environs of Qatar. The part in Oman is loyal to Sheikh Zayed residing in the kasaba (town) of Abu Dhabi while the part in Qatar, is under the control of Sheikh Jasim.2 The third one is the Na'im tribe. Although this tribe moves along the Qatar coast, i.e. between Qatar (Doha) and Zubarah, it may be counted among the Qatar tribes as they go to Bahrain during the date season, and as the sheikh of Bahrain gives them annually a certain quantity of dates, a predetermined amount of coffee, etc.

l

Salname-i Vilayet-i Bagdat, 1299 III. Defa, pp. 128-129; 1300 (IV. Defa), pp. 212-213. ^In a document of an earlier date we have the following information on the "Manasir Tribe": "The tribe Manasir is a crowded one. Its members are fierce fighters. They extended the boundaries of their land from Hasa to Oman by looting and ransacking. They acquired in this way a great number of camels and herds of sheep. During their raids, the shepherds of Qatar used to take shelter in towers 20-30 feet high. They closed the door of these towers and hoisted themselves up by means of a rope which they pulled up once they had been carried to the top. They had no other choice but to leave their sheep and chattels to the bedouin Arabs. Al-Manasir bedouins used to launch raids on villages as well. Similar towers were also built in villages fot the same purpose. The lower land in the eastern coast is inhabited by the tribe Beni Ya's. They are notorious as pirates. Places occupied by them are indicated on maps as Pirates Coast." (Takvim-i Vekayi, No. 1367, 9 Rebiulevvel 1288).

26

THE OTTOMANS IN QATAR

Now, in the kasaba of Qatar reside the tribes known as the Sudan, Musellem and Mutava'a. The sheikh of the Sudan tribe is Sheikh Khalid and his brother is Sheikh Sultan. The sheikh of the tribe Musallam is Hasan b. Buhait. In addition, although fewer in number, the other residents of Qatar are the tribes of Mahanne, Me'afid, al-Sava'id and alBu Kevare. Part of the al-Bu Kevare tribe lives in al-Da'in on the coast at a distance of three hours from Qatar (Beda'). Among the tribes previously mentioned, although the total population of the tribes ruled by Sheikh al-Thani is less than seven or eight thousand, almost all of them are equipped with British Martini rifles"1 The Ottoman Government had ordered the Sixth Army in Baghdad in 1909 to compile a chart concerning the tribes which occupied the land between Basrah and Mosul in which population size and certain other statistical information about the tribes living there were displayed. In the said chart the major Qatar tribes revealed the following profile:2 Tribe's name Benî Hajir al-Manasir al-Ka'bat Rayhat Na'îm al-Kabasa

Number of villages 2 1 1 -

Population 4.500 1.280 720 830 1.500 1.000

Likewise, in a report submitted to the Ottoman Parliament on January 30, 1911 by Rashid Nasser, representative of Ibn Rashid, Emir of Shammar, who knew the region well, and who happened to be in Istanbul, the following information was provided about the population and tribes of the region: "The city of Qatar ruled by Jasim al-Thani consists of five kasabas and has a population of 55000 which includes the people living in the surrounding region."3 If we take into account the fact that this figure includes both the nomads and the urban settlers, it must not be so exaggerated. 3. Economic Life On account of its geographic position, Qatar is not an agricultural land but a place whose economy depends on maritime trade. Whenever mention is made of Qatar's geography, we see that the people of Qatar are either seafarers or dealers in maritime trade. Thus, the social life of the Qatar people was quite ]

BOA, YEE, 14/2256/126/1, pp. 8-9. ^Istanbul Ûniversitesi Eski Eserler Kiitiiphanesi (Istanbul University Library) Harita No. 93667. 3 BOA, (DH-MUI IDahiliye Nezareti, Muhaberat-i Umûmiye) 18-2/2, Lef. 5.

INTRODUCTION

27

dissimilar to the lifestyle of the bedouins who were desert dwellers, as the formers' livelihood depended on pearl fishing and pearl trade. The Qatar coastline, which had made a name for itself in pearl fishery and fishing, had been a source of constant temptation for neighbouring countries. The English traveller whose journal had been published in Takvim-i Vekayi described vividly the relationship that the Qatar people had with the pearl: "...We left Muharrak for the town of Beda' in Qatar and arrived at our destination on January 28, 1863. Qatar presents a picture of arid hills in chain denuded of all sorts of vegetation. The local people have no proper habitations as they live in low-roofed huts and cubicles made of leaves of palm trees. One would be led to think that they were in abject poverty whereas they are actually wealthy people. For the pearl of Qatar is the best of its kind. Half of the people are pearl-divers, while the other half is engaged in trade and fishing. They have no time left for embellishing their dwellings. They build strong towers in which they keep their goods safe from the threats of robbers and thieves. In an interview I held one evening with Muhammad b. Thani, ruler of the country, he said to me: "The pearl is our master, both for the youngest and for the eldest of us". In point of fact, the only concern of the local people is the pearl. They have no time to think of fighting. The internal peace and order in Qatar is as it should be. However, they often become the target of raids by bedouins from the tribes al-Manasir and al-Murrah."1 In the almanac of the vilayet of Basrah dating from A.H. 1320/19011902, we find a detailed account of pearl fishing and the pearl trade that determined the social life of the region, corroborating the above data. "The pearl fishery comprises the territorial waters of Bahrain, Kateef, Qatar and Oman. The boats used in these waters by pearl-divers belong, in the first place, to Bahrain, secondly to Oman and Qatar, thirdly to Kateef and lastly to Kuwait. These boats leave for their destination every year during the season, from mid April until the end of September with their crew whose number varies according to the size and capacity of the vessel. A third of the crew consists of divers. Nearly all the fishermen are coast dwellers, members of various tribes. They live on what they get from shipowners who provide them their annual supply of food, clothing, etc. At the conclusion of the season the pearls which have been collected are valued. From the proceeds the cost of food and clothing supplied by the shipowners is deducted. The rest is shared between the shipowners, divers and other hands commensurably with their dues in conformity with the diving tradition of the region. However, there may be times when the proceeds of a given year fall short of meeting the necessaiy expenses. In such a case, divers and other l

Takvim-i Vekayi, No 1367, 19 Rebiulevvel 1288.

28

THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

hands ask to be supplied with enough food to last them for the rest of the year the cost whereof to be deducted by the creditors from the proceeds of the following year. Fishing sponsors and traders send the pearls they have bought from divers in the course of the diving season to India and other countries."1 The pearl of Qatar is mentioned in various sources as being the best of its kind. It is also said that the Qatar people are in possession of an infinite number of boats used by divers. We shall limit ourselves here to the statistical figures given by the deputy qaim-makam of Qatar about the economy of the region. In a report dated August 7, 1892 sent by the deputy qaim-makam of Qatar to the mutasarriflik of Nejd, which, in turn, was transmitted to the Ministry of the Interior by the vilayet of Basrah, the annual revenue of Qatar was indicated as follows: "... Revenue obtained during the pearl fishing season of the current year by the entire Qatar fleet amounted to 2.540.000 krans. On the other hand, taxes that Sheikh Jasim al-Thani receive under the designations of "kalita" and "rikabiye" from the crew and divers plus the tax "zebhiye" (payable per head of animal slaughtered) and the sheep tax reached the sum of 77.403 krans..."2 We have the following information about Qatar's population, the number of mosques and primary schools and concerning the pearl proceeds and taxes collected by Jasim: Total population Population of the town (kasaba) Population of villages Number of mosques in the town (kasaba) Number of mosques in the villages Number of primary schools

20.000 3 8.000 12.000 19 15 15

Except for the boats which came from Oman, Bahrain and Iran to the region during the pearl fishing season, the boats of the kasaba of Qatar and of its villages may be classified in three categories: namely, big, medium and small size boats.

'BOA, irade-Askeri, 1310 M 25. 2

Ibid. ^This figure must refer to the settled people. Those people who led a nomadic life and who continually roamed the country do not seem to have been included in it.

29

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Kalita (tax) paid by crew member (in kran) Total crew Crew per boat Number of boats

8 1.950 30 65

A breakdown of taxes collected from the pearl produce of divers was specified as follows: Produce of big boats and number of crew: Total income from pearl produce (in Kran) Pearl produce per boat (in Kran) Kalita (tax) total received from divers (in Kran)

1.040.000 16.753 16.087

Produce of medium size boats and number of crew : Total income from pearl produce (in Kran) 700.000 Pearl produce per boat (in Kran) 10.000 Kalita (tax) total received from divers (in Kran) 11.550 Kalita (tax) paid by crew member (in Kran) 8 Total crew 1.400 Crew per boat 20 Number of boats 70 Produce of small boats and number of crew: Total income from pearl produce (in Kran) Pearl produce per boat (in Kran) Kalita (tax) total received from divers (in Kran) Kalita (tax) paid by crew member (in Kran) Total crew Crew per boat Number of boats

800.000 4.000 16.500 8 2.000 10 200

According to the statistics given above, in the 1890s there existed in Qatar 200 small size, 70 medium size and 65 big size boats totalling 335, all engaged in pearl fishing.1 As a matter of fact, in other sources one may come across other figures representing the number of boats engaged in fishing and the pearl trade numbering as high a figure as three thousand. It seems that the figures given by the deputy qaim-makam of Qatar refer most probably to those 'At times we come across different figures with respect to the kind, number and size of the Qatar vessels. This is only too natural, since the number of boats varied according to the economic situation of the region. One should also take into consideration the fact that shipowners transplanted themselves to other shores now and then which may also account for the variation in the number of boats..

30

THE OTTOMANS

IN

QATAR

big size boats subject to tax. The same statistical figures indicate that the total number of crew was 5350. This demonstrates that almost every house in Qatar produced one fisherman or pearl-diver. Qatar, which imported its basic necessities like rice, wheat, barley, sugar, tobacco, butter, sheep and clothes from Kuwait, Bahrain, Kateef and Iran, brought in its timbers from India, and its wood for fuel from Iran.1 This necessitated Qatar's close relations with the aforementioned regions. Qatar was also a thriving trade centre because of the facilities offered by its harbour for ships who found there a safe haven and easy wharfage facilities. This enabled foreign traders to pay frequent visits to Qatar. In this connection special reference should be made to the Banian traders who came from India.2

'BOA, Irade-Askeri, 1310 M 25 Takvim-i Vekayi, No 1428, 21 §aban 1288.

2

Chapter One QATAR'S PLEDGING OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE OTTOMANS

1. The Expansion of the Ottoman State to the Persian Gulf and Basic Information on Qatar. Qatar and its environs which occupied an important position in the Persian Gulf happened to be on the route the Europeans had to follow on their way to the warm seas; the extension of India's trade route up to this part of the globe had already attracted the attention of the Netherlands in the 17th century, and of the British as of the 18th century.1 It was evident that the Ottoman State could not remain indifferent to this region which had been a persistent bone of contention throughout history. The general opinion is that the Ottomans came to settle along the coast of the Persian Gulf during the time of Selim I, (1519-1520) although their actual sovereignty over it was not established before Suleiman the Magnificent. Sources mention that Kateef and Bahrain had sent envoys to him during his campaign to Iraq in order to pledge their allegiance.2 The Portuguese, who had settled at Ormazd in 1507, reached Qurna (1529), the point where the Tigris and the Euphrates met. This coincided with the Ottomans' extension of their sovereignty over Baghdad and Basrah. The Ottoman State settled on the coast of the Persian Gulf with a view to barring the way to the Portuguese who were becoming a serious threat to the World of Islam and to prevent them from benefiting from the advantages offered by the Silk Road, which, arriving from Tabriz , continued via Erzurum and Tokat on to Bursa, and by the Spice Road which passed through Basrah, Baghdad and Aleppo.3 The Ottoman State, which by then, had taken over the caliphate, had easily coalesced with the Muslim communities in the region and obtained their favour. A Turkish historian from the beginning of this century gives a vivid account of this situation:

' Stcfanos Yerasimos, Milliyetler ve Simrlar, Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Orta-Doeu, Istanbul 1994 p. 122. Salname-i Vilayet-i Basra 1308, p. 163. ^Salih Ozbaran, "XVI. Yiizyilda Basra Korfezi Sahillerinde Osmanlilar. Basra Beylerbeyliginin Kurulu§u", Istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Fakultesi Dergisi, sayi 25, Istanbul 1971, pp. 53-57.

32

THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

"Following the holding of the title of caliph by the Ottoman Sultans and the expansion of the Ottoman State to Aden (Red Sea) and Basrah coast, the sheikhs, emirs and the Sultans who had suffered under the Portuguese most willingly pledged allegiance to this young and dynamic Muslim government."1 Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory information in any Ottoman chronicles on the settlement of the Ottoman State in the environs of Kateef, or of its doings on the coast of the Persian Gulf and the Bahrain Island, on its struggle for supremacy with the Portuguese and on its operations on the Ormazd coast. However, ample information is available both in the Ottoman archives and in other sources of a more recent date For instance, in the Takvim-i Vekayi newspaper dated November 5, 1871, reliable information is provided about Ottoman sovereignty over the Gulf coast, Qatar and the environs. The epitaph of a mosque built by the Ottomans in A.H. 962 at Hofuf, the administration centre of Hasa, is provided as evidence of the fact that sovereignty here went far back into history. The story runs as follows: "Upon a call for help by the Sultan of India, during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, the call was favourably received and 80 vessels rigged at Suez weighed anchor under the command of the naval captain Suleiman, with Hadim Suleiman Pasha, governor of Egypt, on board. However, before the arrival of these forces at their destination, the situation took a different turn. The cruelties displayed and the oppression of the Portuguese pirate ships which cruised along the Indian coast had to be suppressed. That is why Hadim Suleiman Pasha changed the course of the fleet and put the pirates to flight. Having thus demonstrated the strength of the Ottomans along the Indian coast, he repaired to the Persian Gulf coast. The Ottoman flag began to fly drawing a parallel to the said events at Kateef, Hasa, Qatar and other Nejd countries..."2 We observe that the administrative organisation of the Ottomans who settled along the coast of the Gulf had been established by 1550. As to how the Ottoman State demarcated the boundaries of Hasa whose administrative organisation had already been formed by them, we have but to conjecture. All that we can say reliably is that the Ottoman State which had, during the same period of time, taken Bahrain as an independent sancak under its control, left the administration to Murad Shah, its former ruler.

'Safvet, "Bahreyn'de Bir Vak'a" TO EM III/1142. Takvim-i Vekayi, No. 1428, 21 §aban 1288.

2

QATAR'S PLEDGING OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE OTTOMANS

33

In a decree addressed to the governor-general of Basrah dated A.H. 28 Zilhijje 966 mentioned in the Miihimme Defteri No 3, which is one of the most important sources of the period, we read :"...the ruler of Bahrain has always been my obedient servant and the province was entrusted to him as a sancak.." 1 In another decree bearing the same date and addressed to Murad Shah, ruler of Bahrain, he said : "... your country and vilayet having been granted to you as a gift, I have warned the governor-generals and other military and civil subjects of mine against encroaching on your country, vilayet and population..." 2 In other words, one observes that Bahrain which had close relations with Kateef in particular was conceived as being separate from the province of Hasa, while Qatar seemed to be an extension of Hasa. On the other hand, the oldest record regarding Qatar we have come across among the Ottoman sources dates from 1555. In the Ruus Defteri No 213 in which the Ottoman organisational structure is shown and appointments are recorded, Qatar is described as follows: "Qatar Arabs, who are seafarers without exception, possess about 1000 boats of all sizes. They have contributed to the prosperity of the country both with respect to shipping services and as merchant marine tradesmen. Their sheikh is Muhammad bin Sultan Beni Muslim (or Musellem). This personage has also landed property at Hasa with which he has close contacts."3 We understand from the above that Qatar had close relations with Hasa. On the other hand, it appears that despite its geographical proximity, Qatar had no administrative links with Bahrain, but was under the independent administration of a sheikh. The Ottoman State's attempts at establishing a first administrative organisation at Qatar took place four years after the date of the above document. Interesting data is supplied on the issue published in a document discovered and edited by the renowned historian Cengiz Orhonlu. An officer appointed by the Ottoman government to serve under the governor of a sancak, which was a subdivision of the province of Hasa, had recourse to the advice of Biyiklizade Mustafa Pasha, governor-general of Hasa, in order that the latter might explain the way that had led to the locality where he had been appointed. Mustafa Pasha gave him the following answer: "Well, It must be somewhere at the far at the end of the vilayet of Nejd". He added, however, that he was making preparations to launch a campaign against Bahrain, and that it would be easier for him to reach the sancak to which he had been appointed once Bahrain was captured4, and so saying he hindered him from proceeding on to take office. ' Safvet, op. cit., p. 1140. BOA, MD (Miihimme Defteri) No. 3, decree 364. 3 BOA, K.K. RUUS (Kamil Kepeci Ruus Defteri) 213, p. 18. 4 Cengiz Orhonlu, "1559 Bahreyn Seferine Aid Bir Rapor" IUEF, Tarih Dergisi, sayi 22, (Mart 1968), Istanbul 1968, p. 2. 2

34

THE OTTOMANS IN

QATAR

Cengiz Orhonlu concludes that the unidentified sancak which remained anonymous must have been the Qatar Peninsula, since it had been described as a place that could be reached only after the capture of Bahrain Island. The fact that the sancak, where he had been appointed was mentioned in the report drawn up by himself, had been described as at the far end of the province of Nejd 1 corroborates the probability of its being Qatar. One may deduce from the available source that in the year 1559 the direct appointment of a governor-general to Qatar was still pending. For, at the time in question, Mustafa Pasha, governor-general of Hasa, was making preparations to launch a campaign against Bahrain by taking along an officer appointed to take office at Qatar, without having to ask for permission from the Ottoman government. 2 Whereupon, Murad Shah, ruler of Bahrain, with the aid he had obtained from the Portuguese in Ormazd, had paralysed Mustafa Pasha's forces. Upon the death of Mustafa Pasha during the said campaign, the officer who had been hindered by him from proceeding on to the place of his appointment had been obliged to take over the command of the forces. Thus, he had to take care of the withdrawal of forces who were marooned on the island of Bahrain and was never able to reach the place of his appointment. In conclusion, one can say that Qatar was considered in the 1550s as part of the province of Hasa rather than a part of Bahrain and administration was handled through a local sheikh. It appears that this state of affairs continued for centuries. After the withdrawal of the Portuguese, the Persian Gulf became a bone of contention between the Ottoman State and Iran, although the results often were in favour of the Ottoman government, the Gulf coastline and the islands were ruled through the mediation of Baghdad and Basrah. The emergence of the British as a new power in the region as of the beginning of the 19th century in parallel with the decline of the Ottoman State shook the balance in the region during the classical period. We must also speak here of the administrative policies of the Ottoman State in the regions remote from the central government during the classical period. As is well known, the Ottoman State whose territories covered a large area of the globe used to govern the territories it annexed by adopting a moderate policy (despite its great power), by acting in conformity with local traditions. The Ottoman State did its best to carry on the current administrative system in territories it conquered during the classical period provided the name of the Sultan was mentioned during the sermon delivered after the Friday l

Ibid., p. 11.

2

BOA, MD, NO. 3, hukum (decree) 364.

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35

prayer and a tax was paid either to a central office or to somewhere else the latter would indicate, which meant the acceptance of its sovereignty. In regions which had pledged allegiance without entering into conflict hardly any intervention was contemplated as long as they complied with the above conditions. Hedjaz, Bahrain, Hasa and the surrounding environs were such places. As the mention of the name of the Sultan during the Friday sermon was considered to be a sufficient indication of allegiance, even the flying of the Ottoman flag was not deemed compulsory until the mid-19th century. In an article by Sayyid Fadl of Hadramawt a person familiar with the region dating from the 1880s the situation was described as follows: "Each one of the cities of Mecca, San'a, Damascus and Egypt (Cairo) is the centre of Arabia. The said cities having come under the sovereignty of the Ottomans, it follows that every part of the Arab country is under the same sovereignty. There is no sultan anywhere in the Arabian peninsula, and the Arab sheikhs see to it that the name of the Ottoman Sultan is pronounced during the sermon delivered on Friday prayer. This is known to all other countries. The said sheikhs depend either on the sultan's decrees or on orders issued by governors. Those who are well acquainted with the rules and regulations are aware of the fact that conflicts or disputes arising between peoples of different camps who owe allegiance to the same state or their establishing relations with a foreign nation do not deprive them from the citizenship of the state of which they are loyal subjects."1 The Ottoman State which was well aware of the difficulty of governing the territories which had pledged allegiance to it had adopted a lenient attitude istimaletnames2 towards the local sheikhs, emirs or other rulers and (Documents allowing the holder to benefit from certain advantages). As a matter of fact, during the periods in which the Ottoman State had annexed Hasa and its environs to its own territories, the Sultan had sent the following order to Murad Bey who had been appointed governor general of Hasa. "... As soon as my order reaches you, make the necessary preparations without delay and set off immediately to protect and govern Hasa. There, you will come across Arab sheikhs and tribes occupying the surrounding region who have pledged allegiance to our sovereign authority. See that you get along with them on friendly terms. Treat them well and do not interfere with those who are truly loyal to us."3

'«OA, YEE, KamilPasja Evrakina Ek 86/37-3782 Safvet, op. cit, p. 1145. 3 BOA, MD, NO 3, decree 367.

2

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OTTOMANS

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On the other hand, since these regions were not counted among the Ottoman State's sources of revenue, more often than not, a complaisant and indulgent policy was adopted vis-a-vis these regions which were exempted from compulsory tax payment, (as payment of taxes was left to the free choice of tax-payers). The Ottoman State, with due regard to private ownership, had taken action against certain unlawful acts of administrators perpetrated against landlords, and restored the rights of those who had been deprived. 1 Thus, the traditional rights of the tribal sheikhs were kept limited within the context of the same principle. During the times when the Ottoman Sate was powerful, the previously described system functioned well. However, when it began to lose authority, the system proved to be a weakness. Then, certain local powers, which had had the opportunity of strengthening themselves, sought ways to escape from Ottoman domination. This was particularly the case during the period when the Persian Gulf and Iraq had become a bone of contention between the Ottomans and Iran — under Shah Abbas (1587-1620) and under Nadir Shah (1736-1747) — the tension felt was even stronger. Although the Ottoman State considered the Persian Gulf as its own territory, because of Iran's actual presence in the region, there was a certain silent alliance between the two parties which was not based on any written record. In other words, given the fact that it was part of the Arabian peninsula, the western coast 2 was agreed to be an Ottoman territory, while the eastern coast was acknowledged to be Iranian territory. Although the Ottoman State viewed all the islands in the Gulf as belonging to itself, the de facto situation was as described above, and the islands, which were in the proximity of the western part of the Gulf, were acknowledged to belong to the Ottoman State, while those near the eastern bank were under the actual sovereignty of Iran.3

^For instance, Hiiseyin b. Abdullah had been receiving a rental fee from the people who cultivated orchards and vineyards. When the matter was brought to the attention of Istanbul an order addressed to the governor general of Hasa decreed: "Unless the orchards and vineyards of people are returned to their lawful owners people can no longer remain settled but will disperse" (MD No 3 decree 1122). Thus the orchards and the vineyards were ordered to be returned to their owners and this unlawful act had been remedied (MD, No 3 decree 1122). Likewise, upon the seizure by local administrators of the property of Cuma b. Remmal who resided in Bahrain but had his real estate in Kateef, the State intervened and redeemed the said property to its owner (MD. No 3, decree 1123). ^In an undated Ottoman document prepared by an individual who had once been governor general of Basrah the "Berru'l Arab" the land acknowledged to be Arab territory in the Gulf is described as follows: "... the coast referred to by the name of Berru'l Arab starts from the Fao strait where Shatt al-Arab flows into the Persian Gulf and stretches to the south-west to end at Muscat. The said places along the Oman coast stretches from Kuwait, Jaziratu'l Amair, Kateef, Hasin, Dahran, Ujair, Zubarah, Qatar and the place called Abu Dhabi which is contiguous with Qatar to Muscat." BOA, YEE, Kamil Pa§a Evrakina Ek, 36/38-3790. 3 BOA, YEE, Kamil Pa§a Evrakina Ek, 86/37-3782.

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After 1780 the region was ruled by Mameluk governors in Baghdad under the Ottoman State while the local powers which had emerged in the meantime were also governed by these governors. Certain new arrangements were made during the Mameluk reign which lasted for about half a century. While the regions called Basrah and Muntefik were given without any consideration to the sheikhs of Muntefik, and the region of Ammare to the tribes of Beni Lam and al-Bu Muhammad, the traditional structures at Nejd, Hasa and Qatar were kept intact, and were governed, by the family of Beni Khalid in behalf of the State. This lasted until the emergence of the Wahhabi movement which took control of Qatar and Bahrain (1799). Upon the occupation of Hasa by the Wahhabis, Majid and Muhammad, 1 the leaders of the Beni Khalid family had to take refuge in Baghdad. The Ottoman State put an end to the rule of Mameluk governors in Baghdad in the 1830s and began to directly appoint governors to the region. Although this new state of affairs was a consequence of the dawning concept of centralisation under the Ottoman administration, the search for a solution to the growing unrest in the region must have had a part to play also in this decision. As a matter of fact, the Wahhabi movement which had begun as a religious movement and assumed a political garb through the alliance formed in 1745, between Muhammad b. Sa'ud, leader of the Sa'ud family and Muhammad b. Abdulwahab, the founder of the Wahhabi sect, had undermined the prestige of the Ottomans by extending its sway from central Arabia to the Persian Gulf and even as far as the sacred lands of Mecca and Medina. Orders were issued by the Ottoman State to the Mameluk governors in Baghdad to forestall the expansion of Wahhabis, but they failed to do so. The Governor of Egypt Mehmed Ali Pasha was given the mission of crushing the Wahhabi movement, and as a result of the campaigns conducted by his sons Tosun and Ibrahim Pashas, the rule of Wahhabis in the Persian Gulf and in Arabia came to a close. (1811-1818). To reward Ibrahim Pasha for his victory over the Wahhabi movement, he was appointed governor of the provinces of Jeddah and Ethiopia. As of this date, Nejd, Hasa and its environs, as well as Bahrain were governed from this region, i.e. Jeddah and Ethiopia (Habe§). However, Ibrahim Pasha did not reside at Jeddah, the administrative centre of the province of Ethiopia, but in Cairo, therefore he governed from Egypt. At the time, there were military commanders in Nejd and Hasa appointed by Egypt, and emirs came to be assigned as of 1824 in Nejd in charge of the collection of annual taxes from Jeddah and Ethiopia. In such appointments, traditions were respected and a descendant of the Sa'ud family was appointed to rule over the newly-established city of Riyadh and over the surrounding region. At about this time, dissension among the members of the Sa'ud family and the inefficiency of the military men and commandants sent from Egypt to get 'Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet XI/15.

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along well with the people of the region led the sheikhs and emirs of Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, etc. in the Gulf to divest themselves of their reigning authority. 1 In 1824, Tiirki b. Abdullah from the Sa'ud family, succeeded in reassembling his former partisans into an alliance. And by 1830, Tiirki b. Abdullah, who had gathered around him almost all of his former sympathisers, extended his sway as far as Hasa, by taking advantage of the internal struggles of the BenT Khalid family, the rulers of Hasa. However, he did not fail to pay his annual tax to the treasury of the vilayet of Jeddah under the Ottomans. Tiirki b. Abdullah, who tried to annex Bahrain once more to his territory and collect the tax there, failed in his venture Quite the reverse had been the result, as the presence of Wahhabis in Bahrain remained exposed to threats. And the murder of Tiirki b. Abdullah in 1834 by Mishari b. Abdurrahman created a short period of chaos. During the efforts that Faisal b. Tiirki, who had replaced him exerted to impose his authority, disturbances erupted in the inner Nejd. Moreover, Faisal b. Tiirki's attempt at evading the payment of the tax he was bound to pay to the vilayet of Jeddah drew the attention of the governor of Egypt who despatched new forces under the command of Hurshid Pasha to have Faisal b. Tiirki arrested and brought to Cairo. In the meantime, Khalid b. Sa'ud, who lived in Egypt, was appointed in his place. 2 It appears that this appointment was approved by the Sublime Porte. However, because of his Egyptian background, Khalid b. Sa'ud failed to establish fruitful contacts with the bedouins in Nejd and the surrounding area. When the Ottoman State signed the London Protocol on July 15, 1840, Egyptian forces withdrew from Nejd, Hasa and the Gulf. From the ensuing lack of authority in the region, Khalid b. Sa'ud whose power derived partly from Egypt, found himself at a loss in the face of rising opposition. Under the circumstances, he had to abandon his mission and go back to Cairo (1841). Abdullah b. Thunayyan pledged allegiance to the Ottoman State and undertook to pay the tax that his predecessor had paid to the treasury of Jeddah. 3 Abdullah b. Thunayyan's rule continued until the release, at the beginning of 1843, of Faisal, who had been in jail in Cairo. However, Wahhabi administrators, lost their sway over the Gulf coast and especially over Bahrain and Qatar during the time that elapsed between the date of Faisal's imprisonment and release.

'in a document dated A.H. 9 Safer 1255, Hurshid Pasha who had conquered almost the entire Nejd in the name of Egypt, writes that the sheikh of Bahrain had dismissed the messenger by the name of Mehmed Efendi he had sent to Bahrain. BOA, HH.20525 A. ^Hicaz Seyahatnamesi, p. 341. 3 BOA, i.M. Muhimme 1798; Hicaz Seyahatnamesi, p. 242.

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Faisal b. Tiirki, who returned to Riyadh in mid 1843, was welcomed by his partisans and in a short time he took over the emirate once again. The Ottoman government, which could not fill the gap created by the withdrawal of Egyptian forces, failed to bring about effective solutions to these new developments. In October 1843, Osman Pasha, governor of Jeddah, warned the Sublime Porte, about the untoward effects of new developments in Nejd. 1 However, the Ottoman State, faced by many serious internal and external problems failed to send troops to the region in line with the suggestion made by Osman Pasha. Faisal b. Tiirki who took advantage of the inability of the Ottoman State to fill the gap of authority created in the region in the wake of the withdrawal from all other areas of Nejd, Hasa, and the Gulf, by the Egyptian forces, succeeded in extending the areas under his sway to include Nejd and the coastline thanks to the wise policies he followed. The first thing that Faisal b. Tiirki did, was to subdue the al-Manasir, al-Murrah, Ujman and Beni Hajir tribes in Hasa and on the coast thereof, who were reluctant to side with the Wahhabis. Thereafter, thanks to the base he had set up at Hofuf, he began to intimidate the Arab sheikhs in the Gulf and extorted from them a tax which he qualified "zekat" (religious tax). In point of fact, Muhammad b. Avn, in a report he sent to the Sublime Porte in October 14, 1846 warned that "Faisal whose jurisdictional area had extended from Medina to Basrah might be a threat in the future." 2 The governor of Basrah, in his report dated July 8, 1847 which was submitted to the Sublime Porte, speaks of the developments in the region as follows: "Although Muscat and its environs were countries that the Ottoman State had inherited from its ancestors, they became later independent governments for some reason or other... The towns (kasabas) named Kateef, Hofuf, Hasa, Mubarraz, Kut and Qatar which had been governed by the governors of Basrah were taken possession of by the Wahhabis." 3 The governor of Baghdad, who, in the same report, drew attention to the operations of the British in this region, speaks of their efforts in gaining Bahrain, Muscat and even Kuwait, on their side. 4

' BOA, Cevdet Dahiliye 1986. BOA, i.M. Muhimme 1880, Lef. 3.

2 3

4

BOA, /MM 2067, Lef. 2, 3.

Ibid.

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The fact that Faisal b. Tiirki, leader of the Sa'udi family, had extended his sovereignty over Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and as far as Oman, had made the local sheikhs restless; thus, it became easy for the British to establish relations with them. The Ottoman State which took into consideration the warnings which originated from the region and the operations of the British1, began to take steps towards the settlement of the problem. To this end it charged Muhammad b. Avn, emir of Mecca, with the mission of marching to Riyadh at the head of an army.2 Despite his independent actions, Faisal did not deny his loyalty to the Ottoman State. Moreover, having understood that he could not put up any resistance against the forces under the command of Muhammad b. Avn, he sent Abdullah, his brother and certain other sheikhs as envoys to the garrison of Muhammad b. Avn to make amends. As a result of talks, Faisal was rewarded with the kaymakamlik (office of a qaim-makam) of Nejd 3 provided he saw to it that the name of the Ottoman Sultan be mentioned in the sermon of the Friday prayer in mosques under his jurisdiction, that the tax to be levied from the people be collected and that the affairs of the state be run in accordance with the law, under his own supervision from his residence at Riyadh. Faisal's official appointment as qaim-makam did not restrict his power. As a matter of fact, he was given the chance of being judged more tolerantly with respect to his exploits in certain places in the Gulf which the Ottoman State considered as belonging to itself, but over which the central government had no influence. As he had been assigned to the office of qaimmakam, Faisal b. Tiirki had a tax revenue of 4000 riyals from Bahrain under the designation of zekat.4 Although the Ottoman government had been notified of this, the fact that it chose to make no intervention indicates that there was a silent accord about this matter. In other words, the Ottoman government considered this as part of the tasks of a qaim-makam. On the other hand, Faisal used to pay a tax to the vilayet of Jeddah amounting to 10.000 riyals which he had to collect from somewhere. However, it was a fact that Faisal b. Tiirki, partly based on the religious mission he had assumed, behaved like an independent government towards the areas over which he was responsible rather than like a qaim-makam. This state of affairs deeply affected the Ottoman officials in the area and led them to lodge 1 For instance, Abduljelil b. al-Sayyid Yasin al-Tabatabai who had gone to Kuwait on business purposes, in his report submitted to the Mutesellim (deputy lieutenant governor) of Basrah on May 24, 1847 speaks of the British who had gathered the Bahrain sheikhs including some other sheikhs in the Gulf, on the island of Tonb. BOA, AM. 418 2 BOA, HR-MKT18/55. 3 BOA, Cevdet Dahiliye 1537, 1735, ID 28250; i.M. Muhimme 1802; In another document addressed to the emir of Mecca, Faisal is reported to have been appointed administrator somewhere at Nejd. BOA, A.MKT 127/35. "^BOA, A.MKT 106/82

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frequent complaints with the Ottoman government. In particular, the emir of Mecca and the commander charged with the defence of Medina wanted to take over certain authorities vested with Faisal.1 The Sublime Porte remained impervious to these demands. Direct control of such places on the coastline, Qatar, Bahrain, and even Muscat ruled by Faisal involved a great financial and military burden, whereas, in this manner it was possible to make use of the traditional power and maintain sovereignty even though nominally. Faisal b. Turki, being a wise and perspicacious man, exerted pressure in areas where the Ottoman State could not exercise its authority to collect higher rates. In a letter dated August 25, 1860 addressed to the Sublime Porte by the emir of Mecca, relations between Faisal b. Turki and Bahrain were described as follows: "Bahrain Island facing the Kateef landstation to the east of Qatar of Nejd in the continent of Hedjaz has been lately under the sovereignty of the qaim-makam of Nejd and is being governed by al-Khalife, a prominent family in the Island. Due to a rivalry between the members of the said emir's family, some of them remained loyal to the qaimmakam of Nejd while some opted for independence. While those remaining loyal, tried to settle the issue by sending a delegation and military troops from the qaim-makam of Nejd, the other party who opted for independence appealed to the representative of Britain residing at Bushire and commissioned men to thwart and neutralise the arrangements that the qaim-makam of Nejd had in mind. No sooner had the men of the said British Consul left the Island than Iran was notified of this state of affairs, which then sent a delegate with a group of men to fly the Iranian flag on the Bahrain Island, thus violating the administrative measures of the Island. Whereupon, with a view to retaking control the former administration of Basrah sent five or ten people to Bahrain. On the other hand the qaim-makam sent a special delegation for mediation to achieve a final settlement of the issue. One incontestable fact was the deterrence of foreign aggression that threatened the region. While the audacity displayed by foreigners in sending delegations to a region of such great importance which the Ottomans had inherited from their ancestors would have detrimental effects over the Hedjaz region in terms of sovereignty and political concerns, the sending of delegations from Basrah, i.e. by the Ottoman government, to Bahrain in this manner, seemed to be a laudable action which was likely to deter the foreigners from realising their objectives. But, it was evident that such a problem could not be solved by a delegation of only a handful of men, and that leaving the issue in suspense would be inadvisable. However, as one did not know what 1

BOA, IMM1098, Lef. 1.

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sort of a delegation had been sent from Basrah, what exactly had been exchanged between the British government officials and the delegation sent from Basrah and the actual state of affairs, the governor of Baghdad was asked to make clarifications. Moreover, the experience showed that returning their former administrators to such critical offices by quiet measures has always been detrimental to the state. A satisfactory settlement of the issue by an effective handling of all its components is something to be grateful for. Nevertheless, if the time is not ripe yet for such a measure the matter may be postponed until more favourable conditions develop, by seeking ways of deterring foreign aggression through subtler means. The governor has already been advised of our plans and the qaim-makam of Nejd has replied that action will be taken according to the decree of the Sultan."1 As one may guess from the above account, the actual sovereignty of Faisal b. Tiirki over Bahrain was approved both by the Ottoman government and by Bahrain. However, both Iran and the British sought ways to interfere in Bahrain using mediation as a pretext for intervening in the quarrels that had erupted among the family members in Bahrain.2 Likewise, Faisal b. Tiirki, who had been faced with the probability of losing his control over the region, appealed to the Ottoman government and asked for help in the strengthening of his influence on Bahrain. Faisal b. Tiirki, qaim-makam of Nejd, in his letter dated September 2, 1860, addressed to the Office of the Grand Vizier, speaks as follows: "By God's grace your obedient servant has always been faithful and loyal to your glorious majesty (the Ottoman State) in due observance of the canonical law; we have duly served not only our central government but also the towns, the villages, the pulpits in the mosque and the places within our jurisdiction by carrying out there our services 1 BOA, A.MKT.UM 426/63. ^In a letter dated March 27, 1863 addressed to the Sublime Porte, the quarantine director of Basrah who reported these incidents summarised them as follows: 'The sheikh of Bahrain had sent a special envoy to the governor of Baghdad to give him an exact account of the situation in light of the claims and acts that the British had on Bahrain. As the sheikh of Bahrain who waited for a reply for some time failed to get an answer he had to report the case also to the state of Iran. Upon the sheikh's compulsory notification of events to Iran, an envoy came to the Island. Although the same envoy tried to learn the intentions of the sheikh of Bahrain, the Iranian delegation felt insulted upon being told that the sheikh of Bahrain would not produce an answer before the arrival in Baghdad of officials from the Ottoman state. They did their best in persuading the sheikhs of Bahrain to sign deeds promising to be naturalised Iranians. To this end they promised that they would give the sheikh of Bahrain the land below Bender Bushire which was under Iranian sovereignty. The Iranians who failed to realise their objectives dared to hoist their flags on the Island. It is expected that the delegation in charge sent from here (Basrah/Baghdad) will presently return having settled the matter. However, reliable sources have stated that the behaviour of Iranians was due to a traditional custom according to which a rosary of pearls was used to make a gift by the sheikhs of Bahrain for the shah of Iran. On the other hand the British are on their guard and watching these events from a corvette and meditate on the means to which their consul will have recourse to settle the matter." BOA, A.MKT.UM403/17.

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under God's guidance; we have cleared the highways of bedouin robbers to allow for a safe and comfortable journey of pilgrims and other travellers; we have arrested and punished the robbers who attacked people on their way to Mecca (Kaaba) and other travellers and we have suffered great tribulations and hardships for the sake of the Almighty and of the Glorious Majesty of the Ottoman State. I have never swerved from the principle of loyalty to my Sultan, to God Almighty and to his apostle, so that it is a universally acknowledged fact that the roads are now safe and no traveller has suffered since then in any way whatsoever. In light of the foregoing, the following is our wish : the island called 'Bahrain' happens to be subordinated to your obedient servant, it is governed by administrators appointed by myself and the said office is inherited from father to son, alternately, among the emirs called al-Khalife. It so happened that this year, despite my despatch of a delegation for the settlement of a dispute that had broken out among the family members to keep your loyal subjects and the poorer section of the population safe from the detrimental effects of such dissensions, the rebels would not hear of my admonitions, and some of them appealed to the British Consul residing at Bushire inviting him to the island. Whereupon, a ship was despatched to the Island by the British Consul to loiter there for some time before returning to her base. While others appealed to Iran and upon their invitation certain men, holders of testimonials, came over to hoist their flag on the Island. There were others who repaired to the mutesellim (deputy governor lieutenant general) of Basrah, who, in turn, sent men, holders of official papers, to the Island. Chaos now reigns among the population. The intention of Iran is to appropriate the Island while the intention of the mutesellim of Basrah is to include the place within his area of jurisdiction. Given the fact that your obedient servant has loyally served the Ottoman State from the very beginning and no imperfection has been observed in his services so far, I humbly request that the Island remain under my sovereignty, as the Ottoman State will never let such a place, which has been kept under control so far, come under the control of foreign powers; reiterating therefore that we shall ever abide under the protection and mighty sovereignty of the Ottoman State, I hereby dare submit this petition. A.H. 15 Safer [12] 77/ (2 September, 1860), your servant, emir of Nejd."1 The Emir of Mecca, in the face of the above developments, drew attention to the likelihood of a spread of the disturbances which had broken out in Bahrain to Qatar and therefore proposed that Bahrain be withdrawn from the hands of Faisal to be directly governed by the vilayet of Baghdad2 and reiterated this wish in a letter addressed to the Office of the Grand Vizier on September 9, I860.3 However, despite the correspondence exchanged, the Ottoman State J

BOA, A.MKT.UM, 426/63. Ibid. 3 Ibid. 2

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was not willing to change the status quo and seemed to be resolved in maintaining the actual situation. One element of corroborating evidence may be seen in the way they wanted to settle the problems that arose in mid-1862 when Faisal b. Tiirki attempted to raise the tax he used to receive by taking advantage of the new developments at Bahrain. As has already been mentioned, Faisal, qaim-makam of Nejd, used to receive an annual tax of four thousand rupees from Muhammad Khalife, sheikh of Bahrain. The former, however, desired to raise this tax. While the sheikh of Bahrain reluctant to comply with this wish, intimated that he might appeal to the British with whom he had been in close contact for a long time now. Whereupon, Faisal sent a delegate to Baghdad, expressing his wish to the Ottoman governor to change the sheikh on the grounds that he had appealed to the British, asking in this way a sort of permission. On the other hand, governor Namik Pasha, based on the intelligence he got, learned that Faisal had had the intention of dismissing the sheikh of Bahrain and replacing him with the latter's rival Abdullah, his cousin, with a view to raising the tax he had been receiving from there. In a letter he addressed to Istanbul, he make it known that the sheikh of Bahrain had been obliged to have recourse to the British because of this. Among other things, Namik Pasha notified the Sublime Porte of the fact that Faisal had to go on receiving the same amount of tax and that he would see to it that other problems are also settled.1 Following this correspondence, an envoy of Muhammad Khalife, sheikh of Bahrain visited Baghdad. The sheikh of Bahrain, in his letter addressed to the governor sent by a messenger, stated that he had always been an obedient servant of the Ottoman State 2 , that he had been reporting to Nejd, and that he had been regularly paying his annual tax to the said authority and complained of Faisal, to whom it had occurred to make new demands, and expressed the wish that henceforward they would prefer to pay the said annual tax to Baghdad. Namik Pasha, in his letter to the Sublime Porte, dated May 1862 expressed his opinion in the following manner: "Due to rivalry between the emirs of Bahrain and to the greed of Faisal, Muhammad Khalife had to appeal to foreigners. Whereupon, the British, on the one hand, and the Iranians on the other, wanting to have a finger in the pie, ventured to lay hands on the administration of the region concerned. Although it is a fact that this place is incontestably Ottoman territory, the fact that it has remained for some time now

^BOA, ID 33349, Lef. 1.

2

Ibid, Lef. 3-4.

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almost autonomous, its administration from Baghdad as suggested by the sheikh will likely generate new problems. Supposing that Bahrain did become a subdivision of Baghdad, the place will be exposed to outside attacks because of the inadequacy of the Basrah shipyard. As a matter of fact, severing Bahrain from Nejd and putting it under the control of Baghdad will be against traditional rules. Therefore, it would be advisable to persuade the sheikh of Bahrain to continue to pay to the qaim-makam of Nejd the tax he had been paying though with a slight rise.1 On the other hand, a delegate must be sent to see Faisal who will dissuade him from his intentions on Bahrain and reconcile the two parties."2 The aforementioned proposals of Namik Pasha were brought to the attention of the Sultan on July 7, 1862, and the very next day, a decree was issued to the effect that he had been given leave to take the suggested measures. 3 This is proof of the fact that the Ottoman Sultan was consenting to the continuation of the rule of Faisal b. Tiirki, over Bahrain. What is of note here is the fact that no mention was made of Qatar. It may have been due to the acceptance of Qatar as an extension of Hasa and to the fact that it was not related to Bahrain in any way. Although there is no information about the action taken by Namik Pasha thereafter, if one considers the fact that Bahrain remained subordinate to Nejd and at least continued to pay a tax, the above decision must have been implemented. As we may observe, the state itself had been instrumental in the confirmation of Faisal's sway over Bahrain. However, it should not be forgotten that Faisal, being a qaim-makam officially appointed by the Ottoman State, was in fact the state's authority. Moreover, by such a stratagem, Bahrain was not abandoned to its fate, and subordination was thus perpetuated even though nominally. As a matter of fact, Abdullah, the son of Faisal, in a letter he sent to the Khedive of Egypt, stated that the administration of Bahrain had been entrusted to them during a visit 4 of a British delegate named Pelly to Riyadh.5 On the other hand, Faisal's health, who had been leading a hectic life began to suffer, and he lost his eyesight. Therefore, the necessary administrative affairs were carried out by his son. Although he had undertaken to make certain ventures on his own, the Ottoman government now and then 1 Another document from 1870 indicates that the amount of tax paid by Bahrain to Nejd is 5000 riyals (BOA, / M M 1667, Lef. 9). It appears that Faisal was successful in his intention to raise the tax he had been receiving. 2

ibid, Lef. 1. ¡bid, Lef. 5. 4 r h i s visit took place in 1865. ^National Archives of Egypt, Mehaflz Berru Bahr. 19/3. 3

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warned him through the mediation of his officials at Jeddah and Mecca. Abdulllah, in his letter of April 1863, expressed that his wish was to remain loyal to Faisal. Moreover, it appears from the petitions jointly submitted to the Sublime Porte by Ahmed izzet Pasha, governor of Jeddah, and Abdullah Pasha, emir of Mecca, that Abdullah b. Faisal had stated that he would be acting in line with the orders that were to reach him.1 Towards the end of 1865, Abdullah b. Faisal, who remained free to dispose of everything as suited him best after his father's death, would be instrumental in the expansion of the control of the Ottoman State over the region thanks to his policy. Like his father, Abdullah wanted to carry on his operations in the Gulf, but he was to face fierce opposition from the British. He followed the traces left by his father and appealed to Namik Pasha, the governor of Baghdad, in the face of British opposition and asked for the intervention of the state in these affairs. In two letters that Abdullah addressed to Namik Pasha, who transmitted them on to Istanbul, he stressed that the area stretching from Oman to Yemen and from Nejd to Kuwait was Ottoman territory whose administration had been entrusted to the Sa'ud family, and asked that the hostile attitudes recently displayed by the British, particularly vis-a-vis Bahrain and Kateef be put to an end. 2 Namik Pasha, the governor of Baghdad, in his letter addressed to the Office of the Grand Vizier on October 3, 1866, made the following comment regarding the letters of Abdullah: "The Sheikh of Nejd's real objective intimated in these letters is to annex Oman and Kuwait to the qaim-makam of Nejd and extend his control inland and towards the coast of Yemen. The very fact that he refers to the boundaries in his letter is proof of this. Abdullah's final objective is to be able to have Kuwait and Muscat at his disposal. Kuwait is in fact subordinate to Basrah and its official links with the state are being gradually strengthened. By so doing, Abdullah wants to imitate his ancestors with the aim of enlarging his territory".3 What is especially of note here is his appeal to the State's approval to extend his territory to include Kuwait and Muscat over which he had not been able to exercise his authority. The fact that no mention has been made of Hasa, Kateef, Qatar and Bahrain is because the said regions are already within the scope of his control. As a matter of fact, the governor of Baghdad, in due consideration of this point advised the government that, in the warrant of privilege of the qaim-makam addressed to Abdulllah, who had replaced his father, no boundaries are mentioned, as politically speaking the mere quotation of the office of qaim-makam of Nejd would suffice.4 1

BOA, BOA, 3 BOA, ^BOA, 2

ID 34428, Lei. 1. IMM, 1381 Lef. 6. IMM 1381, Lef. 2. IMM 1381, Lef. 2.

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47

The Sublime Porte, rather than doing as suggested by Vecihi Pasha, the governor of Hedjaz 1 chose to appoint Abdullah b. Faisal qaim-makam under the same conditions as his father's. 2 However, the Ottoman government, which wanted to calm the opposition displayed by the surrounding vilayets did not send the warrant of the office of the qaim-makam to Abdullah until February 1867. Official approval of Abdulllah's office who actually was involved in Nejd affairs made Sa'ud, his brother, restless. As a matter of fact, dispute between the brothers had already begun during the lifetime of their father. For, Faisal b. Tlirki, the father, had wanted to be replaced by his son, Abdullah. Sa'ud who had been averse to this idea, expressed his opposition at every instance with a view to gaining hold of the emirate. The Ottoman State's appointment of Abdullah as qaim-makam, left Sa'ud in a difficult situation. But he was relentless. He gathered around him supporters and seized the region of Hasa and Kateef.3 Whereupon, he appealed to the sheikhs of Qatar and Bahrain for assistance, and benefiting from British influence over Bahrain, succeeded in gathering a considerable body of men.4 The active policy adopted by Abdullah b. Faisal vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf, and the support received by the Ottoman State had aroused the interest of the British who had been intensifying their activities for some time now. As a matter of fact, Midhat Pasha, the governor of Baghdad, who had submitted a report to the Sublime Porte on the region on February 1870 said: "Having persuaded Azzan, the emir of Muscat, to also take Muscat under their control, the British have been interfering in the affairs of Bahrain constituting part of Nejd. Some time ago the British Consul paid a visit to Bahrain and tried to convince Muhammad b. Khalife, the former sheikh of Bahrain and Muhammad b. Abdullah, to become British citizens, but failed in this attempt. Whereupon, he had them arrested and sent to Bombay, appointing in his place Sheikh Isa. On the other hand, the state's appointment of Abdullah b. Faisal as qaimmakam, between whom there was hostility already because of the emirate of Nejd, provoked a reaction from Sa'ud, his brother. He had formed an alliance with Azzan, the sheikh of Muscat known to be an enemy of Abdullah and pro-British. Abdullah took it into his head to take his revenge against both of them which led to the intervention of foreigners. As a matter of fact, Sa'ud and Azzan, supported by the British, made preparations for launching an attack on Abdullah, and six British warships were sent to the coast of Hasa."5

1 2

lbid, Lef. 2. BOA. Ayniyat Defteri 851, pp. 15-16; Ayniyat Defteri 871, pp. 23-24.

%>id. 4 5

BOA, ¡MM, 1667, Lef. 9. BOA, /MM, 1677, Lef. 6.

48

THE

OTTOMANS

IN

QATAR

The Ottoman government based on previous correspondence with the vilayet of Baghdad, had lodged a protest in London against the operations of the British in Bahrain. In a letter dated January 15, 1870 from the Ottoman embassy, the British government was quoted as having made a reply giving the necessary explanation desired, in which it was stated that Lord Clarendon, British Foreign Secretary, had not even had any notion of such a situation. It was also said that the reason for the presence of the British vessels in the said waters had been the recent increase of piracy in Bahrain; they added that they were aware of the claims made by Iran to the effect that they had no rights of sovereignty over the Bahrain islands. The Ottoman ambassador, to whom the British Foreign Secretary declared that he was hearing for the first time that these islands belonged to the Ottoman State, replied that Iran had never enjoyed rights of sovereignty over Arabia and that the Bahrain islands had always been subordinated to Basrah.1 As one can see from the foregoing, real chaos reigned in the region during the 1870s. The controversy between Abdullah b. Faisal and his brother Sa'ud had shaken the authority that the Wahhabis had exercised in the past. Sa'ud's capturing of the coasts of Hasa and Kateef and the intervention in the domestic affairs of Bahrain by the British had toppled the balance in the region. Qatar was seriously affected by this. For, Qatar, governed by the Wahhabis through Hasa and Kateef, came under the control of Sa'ud who had seized these places on the one hand, and on the other, by the British intervention through Bahrain. In the autumn of 1870, Midhat Pasha sent two officials disguised as merchants to Kateef, Bahrain, Qatar and Muscat to acquire information about the ongoing operations. The said officials talked with the local population and with the sheikhs trying to get information from them. The long report they submitted confirmed the truth of the news they had previously heard about the support of Sa'ud by the British and the intervention they had effected in Bahrain thus acquiring some new valuable knowledge. It was reported that because of British intervention fierce quarrels had broken out among the family members of the emir of Bahrain. Sheikh Muhammad had to take refuge in Kuwait while Sheikh Nasser al-Mubarak had to defect to places occupied by the Bent Hajir tribe at Nejd (although not mentioned in the text, the sources indicate that Nasser al-Mubarak had settled in Qatar). It was also reported that the British had warned the Sheikh of Bahrain not to pay the tax he used to pay to Abdullah b. Faisal, Qaim-makam of Nejd 2

^Babiali Hariciye Nezareti, Bahreyn Adalari Meselesi, Istanbul 1334, pp. 3-4. BOA, iMM, 1667, Lef. 9.

2

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49

The most important point in this report was the fact that the influence of the new sheikh of Bahrain supported both by the British and by themselves had not extended yet as far as Qatar. The fact that Nasser al-Mubarak1 and his partisans who fought the British but who had to give their fighting up as he understood that he could not defeat them and escape from the British to settle in Qatar is incontestable evidence of this.

2. Midhat Pasha's Hasa Campaign and the Foundation of the Kaza of Qatar Midhat Pasha who was appointed governor of Baghdad in 1869, in parallel with the improvement and construction work he had undertaken in the vilayet2 made great efforts in overcoming the lack of order created by the bedouin tribes in the surrounding region of Baghdad.3 Midhat Pasha's main objective was, however, to check British influence which was gaining ground in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian peninsula. Midhat Pasha, who believed that taking the Arabian peninsula under control, depended on Baghdad's gaining power in political and economic terms, had launched a campaign of reform. The first issue he tackled was Kuwait which had been on the agenda since 1866. Kuwait was to be subordinated to Basrah in 1869, thus becoming part of the Ottoman administrative organisation. This converted the nominal influence of the Ottoman State there into actual sovereignty. Behind all of this, his main objective was the desire to establish the State's direct authority over the entire Arabian peninsula, including Kuwait and Muscat in the Persian Gulf which had been neglected for so long due to various reasons. As a matter of fact, Midhat Pasha, in his report sent to the Sublime Porte on the Kuwait question 4 , referred to Kuwait's importance, saying that the British had intensified their influence over Bahrain and were heading now for the coastline of Hasa and Kateef between Bahrain and Kuwait, which, he noted, was to lead to the occupation of Kuwait. The administration to be established there was of paramount importance as this would secure the protection of Hasa and the recapturing of Bahrain5 Midhat Pasha summoned the A1 Sabah family in Kuwait and succeeded in convincing them about the importance of their pledging allegiance to the Ottoman State and appointed the sheikh of Kuwait as Qaim-makam. The Pasha who also had a grip over the Basrah shipyard convinced everybody that the State's absolute control which had been shaken for so long in Nejd, Hasa, Kateef and Qatar could be reinstated. ^As is mentioned in the document already referred to, the British destroyed the Ottoman flag flying at Nasser's house. 2 BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 851, pp. 68-69, 97-78. 3 BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 851, p. 72; Zawra, 1 4 , 2 1 , 2 7 Te§rinievvel 1285, Nos 30,31, 32. ^Babiâli Hariciye Nezareti, Kuveyt Meselesi, Dersaadet 1334, pp. 1-10. 5 BOA, DUir, (Dosya Usûlû tradeler Tasnifi) 69/2.

50

THE OTTOMANS IN QATAR

It is observable that the Sublime Porte had felt the necessity of revising its policy regarding the Arabian peninsula. Flying the Ottoman flag in government offices in Kuwait and ships in spite of British opposition was one sign which indicated a gradual change from the weakness which had been lingering in the regional policy of the Ottoman State. Furthermore, the opening of the Suez Canal had created new opportunities for the Ottomans to consolidate their sovereignty over the Arabian peninsula. We see this plainly in a letter which the Sublime Porte sent to the vilayet of Yemen in 1871. In this letter, it was stated that now that the Suez Canal was open, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea were within reach of the Ministry of Marine Affairs, and furthermore by the improvements to be made to the Basrah shipyard and by the establishment of ports and bases in the Red Sea, it could easily demonstrate its power on the coast. Thus, the links of the Arab sheikhs and chieftains with the state would be reinforced. 1 Midhat Pasha' seeing eye to eye with the Sublime Porte had created a background for the idea of the Hasa Campaign. As a matter of fact, this opportunity arose upon the aggravation of the conflict which had broken out between Abdullah b. Faisal previously appointed qaimmakam of Nejd 2 to replace his father and his brother Sa'ud b. Faisal. Midhat Pasha who took into consideration objections likely to originate from the British, contrived in the Nejd qaim-makam Abdullah b. Faisal's asking for assistance from the state, thus forming a legitimate ground for military operations. It is true that he had also considered that such a military campaign would provoke a strong reaction from the British. In his letter addressed to the Office of the Grand Vizier dated January 26, 1871 on this occasion, after having accounted for the necessity of military operations, he expressed his apprehensions as follows: "... One point requiring special attention is the likelihood of the emergence of problems that would lead to intervention by foreign powers. Considering that the British are already involved, no sooner would the troops be sent there than they will proceed to the spot and compel the Arab ships to fly British flags and try to create obstacles to the military operations. Even though they (the British) were to openly declare that they were the possessors of Kateef and Hasa, they would still be expected to have recourse to all sorts of measures to hinder these military operations on various pretexts. Therefore, the commandant to lead the forces must be someone able to apply the rules and his actions must be restricted to the special instructions he will receive... "3

'BOA, IMM, 1661 (Lef. 5). BOA, IMM 1381 (Lef. 2). 3 BOA, IMM 1667. 2

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51

Despite these worries expressed by Midhat Pasha, the Ottoman government was persuaded that the British would not react strongly against the military operations that the Ottoman government would conduct on the territories that the latter assumed to be their own. As a matter of fact, the Office of the Grand Vizier expressed the following points in a letter addressed to the Sultan on March 24, 1871, after having explained the grounds for the Hasa campaign: "... The thing requiring immediate attention seems to be the disbanding of Sa'ud's forces, an end to the spread of mischief and the reinstating of Abdullah in his former office. Other measures for the defence of Baghdad contemplated to involve military forces are sufficient to lead to the results expected from reforms. Even though the assistance by the British disclosed (to Sa'ud) are but rumours, their carrying it far enough to offer an efficient protection and disregarding international law and hindering the Ottoman States activities in its own territory is but a remote probability."1 Following the submission of the said letter by the Office of the Grand Vizier, on the very same day, the Sultan permitted Midhat Pasha to take such measures stated as the latter deemed necessary, including the launch of a military campaign. Midhat Pasha, who had obtained the stated permission for the campaign, in his letter to the Office of the Grand Vizier dated March 17, 1871 reported that the preparations for the campaign had been completed and that the march was to start soon under the command of the divisional general Nafiz Pasha. Midhat Pasha, in his letter defined the target of its campaign and its limits as follows: "... The basic instructions to be given to the commandant should involve clearing of Sa'ud and his men from the region, returning the compliment if they try to take up arms, refraining from launching an attack on Bahrain, and, upon the completion of the mission, Abdullah (b. Faisal)'s appointing an administrator to each of the districts of Kateef, Hasa and Qatar and leaving behind a warship and a battalion... "2 The condition of the Ottoman State in those days did not allow it the luxury of giving rise to new problems. That is why both Midhat Pasha and the Ottoman government behaved prudently. The British, who had got word of the military operations to take place in Hasa, Kateef, Qatar and in the environs thereof, were perplexed. They were kept informed of Midhat Pasha's movements through their consul in Baghdad, 'BOA, /MM 1667. hbid.

52

THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

while they tried to learn more about the essential idea behind these operations through their diplomatic activities in Istanbul, i.e. they were curious about the limits of the military campaign. As a matter of fact, Elliot, the British ambassador to Istanbul, had a talk at the beginning of April with Grand Vizier Ali Pasha and wanted to learn about the limits of these military operations. Ali Pasha told him that their objective was to suppress the rebellion by the brother of Abdullah who had been appointed as qaim-makam for Nejd, and added that Abdullah's request for assistance could not possibly be turned down. Ali Pasha saying that the government was not particularly intent on Abdullah, stressed that they aimed at settling the difference between the two brothers. The British alleged that during these talks the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha told them that the Ottoman government had no claims on Bahrain. However, there is no evidence or proof of this.1 It appears that verbal statements about the campaign's being limited to Hasa, Kateef and Qatar and not extended as far as Bahrain, had been interpreted as if the Ottoman government had no claims to make on Bahrain. It should not be forgotten, however, that the Ottoman government had always reiterated its claims on Bahrain whenever the Bahrain issue appeared on the agenda, either orally or in written form. 2 The Ottoman government, in line with Midhat Pasha's desire, had notified divisional general Nafiz Pasha to take command of the campaign3, and of the basic principles he had to observe both during the campaign and thereafter. In the said instructions, the following figured with respect to Bahrain and Qatar: "... As it has already been stated in the instructions previously given, in case Sa'ud (b. Faisal) flees in the direction of Bahrain, he shall be followed as far as the coast and no farther. Once the campaign is over, the title of qaim-makam of Abdullah will be transformed into Mutasarriflik. Abdullah shall appoint qaimmakams to Kateef, Qatar, and to smaller places, administrators. However, it should be seen to it that if such appointments are likely to cause unrest among the Arabs, they must be put off until later. Furthermore, canonical judges (naib) from the Hanbeli sect shall be appointed to Kateef, Hasa, and Qatar, and, if possible, to Riyadh and Qaseem... "4 In the same instructions, the measures to be taken during the campaign against the prevention of disturbances likely to occur among the people stemming from misunderstandings and purposeful propaganda are enumerated as follows:

'Babiali Hariciye Nezareti, Bahreyn Adalari Meselesi, p. 4. Ibid, p. 4. 3 BOA, Ayniyat Defieri 851. pp. 107-108. 4 BOA, ID 44002. Lef. 1. 2

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53

"The despatch of troops to the region may generate fierce reaction and agitation among the public resulting from their wild nature. Necessary measures must be taken in this regard. In similar situations, it is customary for the tribes to spread news about the requisitioning of people's property, the imposition of customs taxes and duties, the recruiting of soldiers... The sheikhs and chieftains must be persuaded that the State's objectives are not to extort money, but to protect the civil law of the Ottoman State and its loyal subjects. It must further be made clear and guaranteed that for the moment no customs taxes and duties or other taxes are to be levied, but that, in future, if the wealth and means of the population suffice, the canonical obligation of collecting zekat may take place and no other measure is to be imposed."1 In the same instructions, the desired policy to be pursued regarding Bahrain is once more stressed: "It appears from the present inclinations of the Bahrainis that once it becomes certain that troops will be positioned in the region (during the post-campaign period) they will pledge allegiance to the state and demonstrate their loyalty to it. However, as has been stressed, encroachment on the aforementioned place will likely generate problems. In case Sa'ud (b. Faisal) and his men take refuge there, an immediate amnesty shall be declared for him (Sa'ud) and a way shall be sought to evict him from his sanctuary in order to avoid any dissension among the Bahraini. In the meantime, one may have recourse to clandestine means to induce the peace loving indigent people to write a collective petition asking for protection of the Bahrain Island and to enable them to send a delegation (to the Ottoman military authorities) to this end. This matter must be left to the discretion of Hamdi Pasha, staff officer of the military unit, conversant with foreign policies. Measures to be taken in such a delicate matter must not incite any reaction from foreigners".2 As one can see from the foregoing text the Ottoman government, much as it wished to extend its operations to include Bahrain, thought it advisable to preserve the status quo under the prevailing conditions of the time. And yet, it did not hesitate from proceeding on as far as the coast of Bahrain in pursuit of Sa'ud. Therefore, it becomes evident that the target and limits of the campaign which excluded the Bahrain Island, comprised within its boundaries, Hasa, Kateef, Darein, Zakhnuniya and Qatar.

l

Ibid Ibid.

2

54

THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

The Ottoman military forces under the command of Nafiz Pasha, sent to Kateef and Hasa in mid-1871, took control of Kateef and its environs, which had been held for some time now by Sa'ud b. Faisal on June 5, and hoisted the Ottoman flag over the fort there. Nafiz Pasha, in his telegram addressed to Midhat Pasha on June 7, kept the authorities informed of the military operations and stated that everything had turned out as expected and proceeded to give the following information on Bahrain: "... Following the intelligence received about the infiltration of a spy from Bahrain who had come to know about the situation of the army and whether it had intentions to proceed on to Bahrain, the said individual was caught and questioned after having been given certain guarantees. According to his verbal statement, except for Sheikh Isa of Bahrain and some other chieftains, the entire population of Bahrain are willing to pledge allegiance to the Ottoman State but have to remain silent as they are afraid to express their opinion. As I am intending to win them over to our side in a proper way without endangering the political outlook, I shall speak of it later when the time comes..." 1 Midhat Pasha, relayed the latest news on the military operations to the Grand Vizier and stated at the outset there was the likelihood of an actual resistance by the British: "The British sent three warships to cast anchor between Kateef and Bahrain, these ships are under the command of Captain Pelly residing at Bender Bushire who is in charge of the affairs concerning the coast of Nejd, Muscat and Oman, in particular. In consideration of this, upon the Indian (British) government's asking for clarification and guarantee through the mediation of the consul here (Baghdad), they were given guarantee to a certain extent during the talks which were held. For, the pretext they are seeking will come to the surface when the tribes inhabiting Bahrain and Oman are attacked... " 2 Midhat Pasha said that the requested guarantee was given to ward off any apprehensions. Midhat Pasha, after these comments says that he had given the following instructions: "... If nothing is done on the Bahrain question either in the form of verbal statement or de facto, and there arise any complaints (from the people), (it must be seen to it that) the matter is put aside until the accord (that Isa has signed with the British) expires."3

'BOA, ZD 44196, Lef. 9. BOA, ID 44196, Lef. 1. 3 lbid.

2

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55

Nafiz Pasha, who had taken the necessary measures in Kateef and its environs, had started to make preparations to leave for Qatar and the surrounding region of Hasa, thus following two different directions. He wanted to inform Midhat Pasha, about it while wanting to know what he thought about Qatar. Midhat Pasha, who notified the Office of the Grand Vizier of the situation on July 2, summarised the latest developments as follows: "Letters from the divisional general (Nafiz) state that the region surrounding Hasa has been entirely taken under control and that he intends to proceed on to Qatar and wants to know our opinion. Despite the fact that Qatar is assumed to be subordinated to Nejd (Hasa), according to the intelligence received, foreigners (the British) will allege that, because of its proximity to Bahrain, Qatar should be subordinated either to the said place or be independent altogether. Therefore, instead of heading directly for Qatar, it would be more advisable to contact the people of Qatar and give them guarantees, and by winning over the former Bahrain sheikhs there, to persuade the Qatar people to appeal to the state before going there, so that no complaint may be lodged by opponents..." 1 Midhat Pasha added to this statement that he had instructed Nafiz Pasha to consider the previously referred points and not to make undue haste, and that, in view of the fact that once Qatar was seized, the local chieftains would evince the desire to launch attacks on Bahrain, he should wait until a favourable moment presented itself.2 The correspondence conducted with Istanbul indicated that these instructions had been strictly followed. Indeed, Nafiz Pasha who had been responsible for the preparations for marching on to Hasa, towards the end of June, made it known that the former Bahrain sheikhs who resided in Qatar as refugees had arrived in Kateef with his men to take part in the campaign.3 This is confirmed by correspondence conducted on July 24,1871 between the Office of the Grand Vizier and the vilayet of Basrah and it is stated that Muhammad b. Nasser, the former sheikh of Bahrain, went to Hasa with the troops.4 It might be worth while mentioning here an incident which shows how Midhat Pasha was justified in his apprehensions about the likelihood of opposition from the British. At the time when Nafiz Pasha's military operations were under way, probably at the beginning of July, an article which appeared in the Zawra newspaper stated that both the Bahrain Island and the l

lbid. Ibid. -'BOA, ID 44142, Lef. 2. This report of Nafiz Pasha was published in the Zawra dated July 4, 1871. 4 BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 851, p. 117. 2

newspaper

56

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regions, where certain Arab sheikhs with whom the British had concluded accords lived, were part of Nejd. This had attracted the attention of the British Government of India which asked the Ottoman foreign affairs for an explanation. Whereupon, in an order given to Midhat Pasha by the Sublime Porte, it was decreed that the Nejd military operations should not go beyond the limits set, and that nothing should appear in the Zawra newspaper other than the decrees and the objectives of the state. Midhat Pasha, in his report addressed to the Office of the Grand Vizier, made the following comments on Bahrain and on the targets of the military campaign: "Your Highness knows well that the Bahrain Island is among the places subordinated to Nejd. At a time when the Hasa, and Kateef regions were under the control of the state, the place called Bahrain was, along with Hasa and Qatar, under the same administration. As time went by, certain places of the Arabian peninsula came under the administration of certain sheikhs and chieftains who had assumed the name of 'Imam'. Bahrain was no exception to this rule. In the meantime, the sheikhs of Bahrain ventured to seek autonomy because of the cruelties inflicted on them by the Nejd sheikhs to whom they were subordinated, or chose to pledge allegiance to another authority. Thus, the administration of Bahrain assumed another aspect. According to the allegations of the British, two hundred years before, at the time when the coast of Muscat and Oman had been recovered from the Portuguese here (Bahrain) was periodically under Iranian domination, periodically independent. Bahrain which is sometimes under protection and sometimes quite independent happens not to be subordinated to any authority at present. The Iranians, on the other hand, allege that this place had been Iranian territories ever since the deluge, claim ownership over it. In brief, as the place has been a bone of contention and the issue has remained unsettled, matters have become now even more chaotic. When the despatch of troops had become necessary, the final objective both of the qaim-makam of Nejd and of the sheikhs of Qatar was to identify the subordination of the Bahrain Island. However, due to the unrest reigning there, to combine it with the Nejd issue would not be advisable. For, the mission of the troops sent there was merely to expel Sa'ud (b. Faisal) and his gang which had occupied Nejd, from Hasa, Kateef and other places subordinated to the said districts and to dominate these regions. Instructions from the Office of the Grand Vizier had these objectives in view. Nafiz Pasha, commander of the military troops, has been advised on repeated occasions not to encroach on places other than Nejd and Hasa, Kateef and Qatar subordinated to it, and particularly on Bahrain. He has so far obeyed the orders and his operations were restricted accordingly..."'

1

State Archive of Qatar, File No 9/5-8, p. 19.

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57

Having summarised the issue in these terms, Midhat Pasha's reactions to the behaviour of the British were as follows: "... The fact that the newspaper Zawra mentions Bahrain is subordinated to Nejd indeed suits our purpose and is in no way without foundation. For, Bahrain is ours, according to the Iranians, it is theirs, and according to the British, it belongs to the Imams with whom they have signed accords, and the matter remains thus unsettled. However, even supposing the statement made by the newspaper was wrong, as a vilayet newspaper cannot be taken to be the official gazette of the state (the aforementioned statement should be disregarded). On the other hand, in compliance with the order and instructions from the state, the British Consul here (in Baghdad) was given both oral or written guarantees to the effect that no attack was going to be launched outside the confines of the Nejd Continent and especially on Qatar. Verbal and written guarantees were given to the British Consul here (in Baghdad) to the effect that no attack was to be launched on Bahrain. Under the circumstances a newspaper report would not have any power to violate this promise of guarantee. This is enough to dispel any doubts that the embassy may entertain. Moreover, in one of the clauses of the instructions sent to us and of which a copy was delivered to Mr Pisani (chief translator of the British embassy in Istanbul) and another was forwarded to us, it is noted that, given the fact that the boundaries of Nejd have not been demarcated, any intervention in the affairs of the sheikhs and the bedouin Arab chieftains and the people would have its disadvantages. It appears that these opinions and thoughts are a consequence of the apprehensions felt about the exploits that Ottoman troops might engage in, once the administration of the surrounding area of Hasa and Qatar has been taken under control, the apprehensions that they might exceed their mission in subjugating the people. The author of these apprehensions is captain Pelly who has been in charge of the affairs of this region for sometime now. It so happens that the reverse is the case, i.e. when the people, the tribes and the bedouin chiefs outside the confines of Nejd who appeal on their own free will either in person or through messengers for assistance and protection no response is made — for the mere sake of not giving our opponents cause for complaints — let alone subjugating them. Despite the Omani people's appeal to the Ottoman State for help after having sent away Sa'ud's delegation, the fact that no response was made and that no troops were sent is proof of this."1 Midhat Pasha has the following to add about the extent of sacrifices not spared for the preservation of the status quo:

58

THE OTTOMANS IN QATAR

"I am a subject of a state well aware of the alliance and sincerity between the British and the Ottoman State for whose protection I am fervently devoted. I have already made a good many sacrifices let alone the avoidance of occurrences likely to cause objections from the British. It has been six months now since the time when our boat "Baghdad" and a ship belonging to the British company Lynch lay in anchor at the landstation and a general quarrel arose and the captain and crew of the Lynch vessel embarked on our boat and kidnapped our captain and crew. Despite the fact that this preposterous act was a serious crime, the matter was settled by demanding apologies from the British Consul who did so as asked, merely for the sake of covering up any misunderstanding between the British and us that the outside world might be curious to learn of. Likewise, during the call at Fao of the Nejd military troops who were leaving the place, as they were passing by the telegram office, a British officer rushed out and in the presence of high ranking officers and commandants, began to club the soldiers in procession all the while swearing at them. It was only with difficulty that the fury of the soldiers was tempered. Whereupon contact was established with the consulate and the Indian Administration and the matter was settled peacefully with the promise that no such event would occur henceforward. Moreover a British vessel had been hired for the transportation of cereals from Basrah to Nejd and ammunition as the capacity of our boats was not good enough for such a load. This said vessel whose papers had duly been prepared by the British consul in Basrah journeyed to Kateef and back. The ship carrying cereals, ammunitions and troops left for a second time in the company of a private aide-de-camp. However, as she reached Bender Bushire she was intercepted by British ships by order of Captain Pelly. Despite these acts against the grain of the Ottoman State which Britain also would have disapproved of, the issue was covered up in order not to offend the British civil servants and to avoid the spread of news about the occurrence of such a dispute between the government officials of both sides when the securing of the safe journey of the ship to Kateef was all that one wished..." After giving this account of events, Midhat Pasha made the following suggestions for moderation: "All these are proof of our temperate attitude vis-a-vis the British which may also be viewed as sacrifices. The opinions formed and actions resolved to be taken about Nejd must be notified to the Indian Administration in good will and honesty. On the other hand captain Pelly who has been in Basrah for some time now must be warned in proper terms to avoid any deliberate hostility against Ottoman government officials, subjects of a state on friendly terms with and a faithful ally of Britain, and to see to it that friendly relations are sustained to prevent all actions likely to be to the detriment of both

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sides interests. It is to be hoped that any events that are regretted afterwards will not occur and that no cause is given for complaints arising from certain considerations and ungrounded apprehensions."1 In this medium of cold war 2 raging between the British and Ottoman officials in the Persian Gulf, by mid-July, Ottoman troops had gained a hold upon the entire region comprising Ujair, Hofuf and the environs, and now Qatar remained the only target. In the meantime, by establishing contact with the sheikh of Qatar through the mediation of Abdullah al-Sabah, the qaimmakam of Kuwait, they contrived to invite the Army in. This incident is reported in the December 28,1871 issue of Zawra: "In his petition addressed to the Commandant of troops, Jasim b. Thani, sheikh of Qatar, (which formed a part of the Hasa Continent), expressed the wish to benefit from Ottoman justice. Whereupon, the said commandant sent four Ottoman flags to be hung at proper places in Qatar".3 Midhat Pasha, who went to Hasa to inspect the situation on the spot after the conclusion of the military operations, in his detailed report addressed to the Office of the Grand Vizier, gives an account of the hoisting of flags and of the despatch of troops in the following manner: "The place called 'Qatar', east of Hasa, is a tongue of land projected into the sea, midway between Oman and Bahrain. Although densely populated, it is deprived of arable land, as in Hasa and Kateef because of the rocky soil and scarcity of fresh water. Almost the entire population is engaged in fishing and pearl-diving, so that the number of caiques and boats used for this purpose is in excess of one thousand. Having seen that Qatar was part of those places subordinated to Hasa, instructions were given to the Commandant to seize and take it within the jurisdiction during the capture of Kateef and Hasa. Muhammad b. Thani, sheikh and ruler of Qatar, old by now, yielded his position to Jasim b. Thani, his son. Upon the desire evinced by these two men, the Commandant (Nafiz Pasha) sent four flags to be hung at the fort and official buildings and the said four flags were hung accordingly."4 Midhat Pasha describes the British reaction to the display of the Ottoman flag in the following terms:

l

Ibid. •'The Bahrain issue could certainly not be expected to be settled by such psychological warfare. The Ottoman state did its utmost to adopt a moderate attitude vis-a-vis the British during the operations at Nejd and kept aloof from any intervention in Bahrain. Nevertheless, the fact that "Bahrain was a part of Nejd" which was the official view of the state was more than once notified to the British authorities. Although notes were exchanged on this issue no positive results were obtained. Babiali Hariciye Nezareti, Bahreyn Adalari Meselesi, pp. 4-5. 3 'Zawra, 18 Kanunuevvel 1287 (December 28, 1871). 4 BOA, ID 44939.

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"British agents who have lately been appointed by the Indian Government, have tried to appropriate Bahrain which they considered independent and to establish a protectorate over it. They have succeeded in influencing the region of Muscat and Oman whose population has now almost the same inclination. Although they say nothing about Qatar which stands in the middle, the British, who have not failed to intervene in this place (previously), have been receiving for the last couple of years taxes amounting to 9000 riyals from Isa whom they appointed sheikh of Bahrain. Recently, a British ship sailed to Qatar to claim money from the sheikhs. However, as they retorted pointing to the Ottoman flag : 'We are under this flag and so long as it stands hoisted here, we shall recognise no other authority' 1 the British withdrew..." Midhat Pasha, in his account, draws attention to the fact that the British had appointed Sheikh Isa, Sheikh of Bahrain, thus taking advantage of the dissension among the members of the family in Bahrain. It appears that the reason why Abdullah, the qaim-makam of Nejd, had not been able to deal with Qatar and its environs was Sa'ud's obstruction of the roads that led to Qatar as a result of its conflict between the brothers. On the other hand, Sa'ud, thanks to the support he received from the British, connived at their free movement in these regions subordinated to Nejd. Thus, the British who took advantage of these developments prevented the payment that Bahrain paid to Nejd, and what is more, they levied tax by force from Qatar in the name of Bahrain. However, after the arrival of the Ottoman State in the region, Qatar's payment of tax to Bahrain came to an end. The attitude of the British following the display of the Ottoman flag in this region had caught the attention of Midhat Pasha as he demanded an official oral and written explanation from the British consul in Baghdad. The British Consul, after consulting with the Indian Administration, denied the so-called allegation saying that "the British agents' intervention in Qatar and their extortion of money" was not true.2 Midhat Pasha, stated that after this incident the British had severed all relations with Qatar, gives the following account of the despatch of troops to Qatar: "...The rebels who have taken arms against Sa'ud b. Faisal and the government are backed up by Bahrain which supplies them with food and ammunition. As the distance between Qatar and Bahrain is negligible, goods shipped from there are easily transhipped to the coast of Qatar. Sa'ud b. Faisal and the survivors of the recent conflict among the sheikhs of Ujman and al-Murrah, allies of the former, repaired to the environs of Qatar to obtain the supply of food, ammunition and hbid. Ibid.

2

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other necessities and to exercise pressure on the sheikhs who had pledged allegiance to the Ottoman government. These rebels seized by force those herds of livestock belonging to the Qatar people and cut off their supply of fresh water. It is true that people in Qatar are capable not only of retaliating but even taking Bahrain under their domination. But as there are families among the Qatar people who have matrimonial links with them, the inclination was compulsory. Under the circumstances, Jasim and Muhammad, his father, reiterated over and over again the necessity of despatching troops to Qatar. Whereupon a well equipped battalion positioned at Hasa was sent under the command of Major Omer Bey in addition to the corvette iskenderiyye' and the vessel 'Asur' that sailed to Qatar."1 As one can deduce from the foregoing account, once Hasa and its environs were seized, Sa'ud b. Faisal and some of his partisans from the alUjman and al-Murrah tribes who had this region under their control escaped to the environs of Qatar. In order to forestall any disturbances that these might engender in Qatar and in the neighbouring area, Midhat Pasha, upon the request of Jasim al-Thani and his father, despatched the second vanguard battalion under the command of Major Omer Bey to Qatar in addition to the corvette iskenderiyye' and the vessel 'Asur'. Thus, the first Ottoman soldier arrived in Qatar in December 1871. The first report of Omer Bey who arrived in the region was published in Zawra on January 23, 1872. The fact that Qatar is qualified in Omer Bey's report as a 'kaza'2 indicates that he had been given the mission of bringing in administrative reforms on top of the military measures he was supposed to take. Upon a successful conclusion of the military operations in Hasa, Kateef and Qatar, Midhat Pasha left Baghdad for Hasa, on October 28, 1871 Midhat Pasha who called at Kuwait, Ra's Tennurah, Kateef, Dammam and Ujair, landstation of Hasa, arrived in Hofuf, administrative centre of Hasa. Midhat Pasha who made many an innovation on his way, introduced administrative reforms once in Hofuf, over a region comprising Hasa, Kateef, Qatar and Nejd (Riyadh). To begin with, he combined Hasa, Kateef, Qatar and Nejd (Riyadh) into a single organisational structure under the designation of "Nejd Mutasarrifligi" (Nejd governorship). The Pasha, in his detailed report submitted to the Office of the Grand Vizier on January 3, 1872, gives an account of the arrangements he had made in the region. Each of the districts of Hofuf, Mubarraz, Kateef and Qatar was assumed to be a kaza and the entire region which these were grouped into was called the Sancak of Nejd (Hasa). The mutasarriflik (governorship) of the said sancak was entrusted to Nafiz Pasha. Midhat Pasha, who appointed officials to each kaza and administrative unit, described his arrangements in Qatar as follows: h'bid. 2

Zawra, 11 Kanunusani 1287 (January 23, 1872).

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THE OTTOMANS IN QATAR "As Qatar, which is one of the four kazas, has no revenue of its own, Jasim b. Thani, the ruling sheikh of Qatar was appointed qaimmakam without salary and the relevant order of appointment was duly sent."1

Midhat Pasha also prepared a list of instructions consisting of 10 clauses. The points that are related to Qatar were as follows: Clause one: The region comprising Hasa (Hofuf), Kateef and Qatar and Nejd (Riyadh, Qaseem, etc.) has been organised under the "Nejd Mutasarrifligi" (Nejd governorship). The town of Hofuf will be the administration centre of the mutasarriflik. An accountant under the designation of "Beytii'l-mal mudiiru" (Head Treasurer), an assistant mutasarrif, a naib (canonical judge), a president of the Administrative Council and a president of the Court of Appeal and secretaries and subordinates in sufficient number shall be appointed. The civil and financial administrations of the interior of Nejd shall be arranged afterwards. However, for the moment, qaim-makams have been appointed to each one of the districts of Hofuf, Qatar, Mubarraz and Kateef and to the places subordinated to them. In view of the fact that Hofuf is the administrative centre of the mutasarriflik, their respective staff shall be organised as above. The administration of Qatar shall be entrusted to its sheikh.2 Clause two: The revenues to originate from the places within the confines of the mutasarriflik are the canonical tithes usually received from the proceeds of real estate, orchards and farms of private owners, the zekat (canonically foreseen tax, levied on the herds of sheep and camels of both the urban settlers and the nomadic bedouins) and taxes from the proceeds of the real estate and land of the state, plus certain minor taxes. Except for these taxes no other money shall be collected in the name of the state.3 As one can see from the two clauses above, the Ottomans administrative organisation had been formed in Qatar by the end of the year 1871 and the ruling local sheikh Jasim b. Thani had been appointed qaimmakam. At about this time, a battalion was also despatched to Qatar. Moreover, a guarantee was given to the people that no tax other than the zekat would be collected on the grounds that Qatar had no revenue derived from agriculture. In the said instructions there are details regarding the lands and the revenues thereof in other parts of Nejd. On the other hand, Qatar, deprived of arable land, was exempted from all taxes except for zekat. This was in conformity with the previous instructions already given to the commandant at the head of the campaign.4

1

BOA, ZD 44930.

hbid. 3 Ibid. 4

r h i s was not particular to Qatar. The Ottoman State used to waive the collection of taxes, that it was supposed to levy, viewing it as duyun (public debts) or exempted people from paying them. For instance, the poll tax they had wanted to impose over the country was deferred and not levied within the confines of Nejd, as was the "Dividend" tax.

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The Ottoman State, in the meantime, did not hesitate to take certain measures in Bahrain, although it was aware that this was a delicate matter which might lead to differences with the British. Midhat Pasha intended to pay a visit to Bahrain during his visit to the region once the state held a tight grip over Hasa, Kateef and Qatar. But he had to give up this idea in view of the close monitoring of his activities by four warships under the command of Captain Pelly while taking also into consideration the sensitivity which needed to be shown by the state and sent instead Arif Bey, commandant of the naval forces in Basrah.1 The despatch of Arif Bey to stage demonstrations and conduct an inspection together with the corvettes 'Lebanon' and iskenderiyye' intimated to the British that Bahrain had not been given up. Although this visit by Arif Bey generated protests from the British, it had some positive results. The sheikh of Bahrain welcomed Arif Bey and his retinue and reserved a place for a coal depot to be erected for the Ottoman ships. Another important result of this visit was the declaration by Isa, Sheikh of Bahrain, that he would remain impartial on issues related to Nejd.

3. The Ottoman State and Relations Between the al-Thani Family As one can see from the above data, given the fact that Qatar was assumed to be on the Nejd coastline, the military campaign which was directed at Nejd could not leave Qatar out. The aged sheikh Muhammad b. Thani and his son Jasim b. Thani, well aware of this, acted wisely and invited the Ottoman military forces to Qatar. In this way, taking advantage of the absence of authority in the region, on the one hand, they had disposed of Bahrain which had started to exert pressure with the help of the British and succeeded in filling a place in the administrative chart that the Ottoman government was to draw up, proving thus they had been the traditional proprietors of Qatar. While in the other regions of Hasa direct appointments had been made, the al-Thani family was appointed as the representative of the state at Qatar. As a matter of fact, the actual situation required this. For, a sudden change of the traditional structure in a region which had no concept of government would have been troublesome. On the other hand Qatar could be controlled with a structure similar to the traditional structure that the British tried to maintain in Bahrain, in the proximity of Qatar. In other words, just like the exercise of power in Bahrain by the British through Isa b. Khalife, the Ottomans thought it advisable to exercise their authority in Qatar through the al-Thani family. Had the policy pursued been differently, Major Omer Bey, commandant of the battalion which arrived in the region at the end of 1871 might have been appointed qaim-makam. However, the Ottoman government thought that this 1

Midhat Pasha, Tebsira-i ibret, Istanbul 1325 p. 119.

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might not be a wise policy, so it appointed Jasim son of Muhammad b. Thani, who was too old to assume governmental duties. Despite occasional pamphlets against Jasim b. Thani by officials appointed to Basrah and Nejd after the aforemationed date and their claims, the central government, taking into consideration regional balance, decided to turn a blind eye to the doings of the family in every circumstance. It may be that Jasim b. Thani, who was well aware of the state's attitude, acted quite independently and did not hesitate in acting against the government's policies. On the other hand, those military forces which had completed the necessary reorganisational activities in the environs of Hasa and Qatar withdrew from the region at the beginning of 1874 1 and left behind a few gendarmerie detachments. So that Jasim may have benefited from this situation along with other local powers acting freely. The other arbitrary acts of Bazi' b.'Ara'ir appointed mutasarrif to Hasa and the attack launched on Hofuf, the administrative centre of Hasa, via Bahrain By Abdurrahman b. Sa'ud who was released from prison in Baghdad, once again unsettled the balance of the region. 2 On the other hand, Isa, Sheikh of Bahrain, wished to take advantage of the situation and relying on the support of the British wanted to seize Zubarah, which was subordinated to Qatar. These developments were related in detail in the January 24, 1875 issue of Zawra3 and are narrated in the report dated March 10, 1875 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed to the Office of the Grand Vizier: "The interventions of Great Britain on Jazirat al-Arab and the policy it pursues and the undertakings it has engaged are a daily event. With a view to realising its aim, it wants to derive much benefit from Bahrain whom it has taken under its protection. Therefore, it does not hesitate for a single instance in assisting the sheikh of Bahrain in every imaginable way either by encouragement or by provocation. The sheikh of Bahrain takes advantage of this assistance and in order to seize Qatar, subordinated to the mutasarriflik of Hasa, it has begun to succeed in winning over the Na'im tribe among (Qatar's) tribes, residing there. Thereupon he sent a group of people together with the sheikhs of Bahrain, Ahmad b. Gatem and Ahmad al-Khalifa to the place called Zubarah, subordinated to Qatar, to have a decrepit old fortress repaired and fortified and tried to have the Na'im tribe settle there. The idea behind this was to create sedition between the Qatari people and Qatari tribes and thereafter to acquire hold of the region utilizing this pretext. Upon refusal to act according to the request of the tax collector sent by the qaim-makam of Qatar to obtain the tax that the said Na'im tribes were obliged to pay, this state of affairs was notified to the 'BOA, /MM2052. BOA, §D 2149/40. 3 Zawra, 11 Kanunusani 1290 (January 24,1875).

2

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mutasarriflik of Hasa by the qaim-makam of Qatar. The tribe of Beni Hajir led by Emir Nasser (b. Jebr) 1 was sent to Qatar, to admonish the Na'im tribe and collect the taxes due. The tribe of Beni Hajir went directly to the said place (Zubarah). In the meantime Emir Nasser wrote a letter to the chieftains of the Na'im tribes which was sent by a special messenger. This messenger was beaten and put in jail while the latter was torn up, an event which the sheikhs of Bahrain were notified of. Whereupon, the sheikh of Bahrain supplied to the Indian government pieces of information without any truth in them alleging that the Beni Hajir tribe held the caiques of merchants in the environs of Oman and violated the safety of the sea. In the meantime, the captain of the British warship moored at Bahrain and on the watch for orders sent separate letters to the qaim-makam of Qatar and the mutasarriflik of Hasa, threatening that in the event of harassment by the Beni Hajir tribes they would be fired at by British warships, destroyed and prisoners sent to the gallows. Whereupon, the said ship, taking along Ahmad, brother of Isa sheikh of Bahrain and some ninety caiques from the Bahrainis approached the place occupied by the Beni Hajir tribe and held them under gunfire, exterminating innocent people. In the meantime, the Bahrainis left their caiques and went on land in pursuit of the Beni Hajir tribe for a period of six hours killing and wounding many of them. Upon this incident, the sheikh of Bahrain's brother went directly to Qatar and from there he sent a note to Jasim b. Thani, Qaimmakam of Qatar requesting him to come on board. The qaim-makam replied by word of mouth saying: 'Qatar and the places subordinated to it being Ottoman territory and myself an official representative of the Ottoman State, you (Ahmad) should know better than to come to m e ' , and upon this the said ship returned to Bahrain." 2 After this incident, the Ottoman State sent the corvette 'Lebanon' to the region to carry out a survey of the region while also entering a protest against Britain. Although the fact that the available evidence proved the truth of the incident, the British cabinet categorically refused to acknowledge this fact. Although the result had not been positive, this incident had made clear two points. In the first place, it demonstrated Bahrain's intentions on Zubarah, and in the second place, it established Jasim b. Thani's loyalty to the Ottoman State. In other words, this incident had enabled Jasim b. Thani to be successful in this test of loyalty and allowed him to gain the confidence of the state and induced the central government to approach him in a more friendly fashion in future developments. That is why the Ottoman State continued to see the alThani family as a balancing factor in order both to control the bedouin Arab

A report addressed to the Office of the Grand Vizier dated August 13, 1875 by Muhammad Javid, Need accountant, mentioned that Nasser b. Jebr was sent to lead the Beni Hajir tribe. In. the same report, the mutasarrif blames Bezi' Pasha in his address to the Administrative Council of Nejd that he had obtained this decision from the advisor. BOA, §D 2149/40. 2 State Archive of Qatar, File No 9/5-8 pp. 126-127.

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tribes in the region and as a check on Britain's desire to widen it's area of expansion. Despite all the untoward events that occurred between the Ottoman officials and the al-Thani family in the region and Jasim's occasional attempts at resignation, the al-Thani family proved every now and then its loyalty to the Ottoman State. We shall try to comment on certain incidents rather than going into specific details. The Ottoman State which had established itself in Qatar made efforts to exercise its authority over Bahrain at every instance. The British, on the other hand, spared nothing in creating obstacles. The British who viewed the presence of the Ottomans in Qatar as a threat to Bahrain, and using piracies in the region as a pretext made raids on the environs of Qatar, just as in the case of Zubarah. The real reason for these conflicts was the fact that certain of those tribes which had earned notoriety for their highway robberies and piracies and the fact that the Beni Hajir tribe was consumed with inexhaustible feelings of vengeance towards Bahrain were Qatar families, was not directly acknowledged by Jasim al-Thani, but the fact that he turned a blind eye to their raids on Bahrain and the environs was not a mystery either. This, of course, caused the British to react. A letter from Abdullah Pasha, governor of Basrah, dated April 10,1879, addressed to the mutasarriflik of Nejd (Hasa) draws attention to these points: "Upon receipt of a letter by the British Consulate about the attack by the Beni Hajir tribe on Bahraini ships and the plunder which ensued, the qaim-makam of Kateef and you yourself were notified to take necessary action. By duly investigating and examining such incidents, the return of the goods plundered and arrest and punishment of the perpetrators and aggressors are among the principal obligations of the Ottoman government. However, no answer has been received as yet; the incident must be looked into and action must be taken according to the results which come out. Every item that the letter contains, especially those which may engender objections from foreigners must be examined and any outcome should be immediately notified. Moreover all sorts of measures must be taken to secure the safety of the region against attacks from the sea and from the land."1 In total disregard to these cautious steps by the Ottoman government, the British Indian government did not hesitate to maintain its aggressive behaviour. While London, suggested ways of reconciliation, the British Indian government preferred to have recourse to compulsory measures. What is more, its warships had started to navigate the Nejd and Hasa coastline. However, thanks to the warnings issued from London, this was abandoned in May 1879. The reconciliatory attitude of the Ottoman government led the British to seek ^BOA, §D 2158/5, Lef. 27.

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common ground for coming to terms in Istanbul. The British proposed cooperation in the face of piracies against their ships in the Gulf and asked for permission to allow their warships to enter as close as three miles from Odeid. However, these requests came to naught. Whereupon the British made a unilateral declaration to the effect that its warships would take necessary action against piracies without any restriction. On the other hand, the Ottoman government sent corvettes to patrol the area against British warships which launched occasional attacks on the Qatar coast. In the meantime, in view of the importance of the region, the appointment of an assistant qaim-makam and establishment of a new organisation came on the agenda. It appears that the Sublime Porte let these propositions, which came from local administrations in the course of 1883, remain unanswered.

4. Some Local Problems and Attitude Adopted by the Ottoman State a) The Banianian Incident and Sheikh Jasim's Intention to Resign The insistence of the Ottoman officials appointed to the local government in Qatar and the authorities to which the aggrieved people of the region would have recourse caused the British to intervene in regional affairs. Britain which failed in these attempts because of the loyalty of the people to Islam, used to send travelling consuls to the region who had followed special courses in private learning establishments (East Indian Schools). At times, these were accompanied by officers disguised in the garb of Muslims whose mission it was to influence people and tell them that their prosperity and protection could be secured only if they became British subjects. Britain tried to protect eight to ten thousand people who came to the Nejd coast in caiques during the pearl-fishing season and staged demonstrations to this end. A few small British vessels kept sailing in the region trying to win the hearts and minds of the local people and induce them to receive documents proving their loyalty to Britain. In a report jointly prepared by the vilayet of Basrah and the Administrative Council submitted to the Ministry of the Interior we find the following information: "... The British want to conclude secret accords with the sheikhs and arrange the settlement of Indian immigrants called Banianians of suspicious beliefs with a view to developing their trade with the Arabs. They get these people to sign papers allowing them to act as their commercial agents, and taking advantage of insignificant incidents between the local people and the Banyanians, try to extort money from the people by reverting to threats and exerting pressure."1

^BOA, §D 2158/10, Lef. 72.

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The policy pursued in Bahrain as mentioned in the aforementioned document had also been put into practice in Qatar: "... The British had sent Banyanians to deal in the pearl trade. Later, by exploiting an insignificant misunderstanding over a matter, already within the knowledge of the qaim-makam of Qatar, between the local people and the Banyanians, they sent a warship called 'Arab' to Qatar to extort 8000 rupees from the people and obtained from Sheikh Jasim a draft..." 1 On the insistence of the British that they would not accept a draft which appears to have been submitted to the Ministry of Marine Affairs at the beginning of 1884, if it bore the heading of the Ottoman State, Sheikh Jasim affixed his signature to this draft in his capacity as the ruler of Qatar. Whereupon the Ottoman State despatched the corvette "Merih" to make a survey of the situation in the region and learned that the incident had indeed occurred as recounted above. In the meantime, Jasim b. Thani, who felt oppressed by the British and regretted the attitude of the government officials in Basrah and Nejd who had remained unaffected wrote a letter of resignation addressed to the Nejd (Hasa) governorship employing as an excuse his intention to go on pilgrimage. The Governor of Baghdad in his letter addressed to the Ministry of the Interior, dated May 12, 1884 wrote as follows: "... A copy of the letter received from the mutasarnf of Nejd and the translation of the letter of resignation in Arabic of Sheikh Jasim are enclosed. Should the resignation request fail to receive approval, it seems evident that he will remain in office. As has already been brought to your consideration, depriving Qatar of a qaim-makam duly appointed in view of its great importance would not be preposterous. Under the circumstances, pending your relevant order, appointment of a capable and efficient tabur agasi or sancak official, or of a reliable man among the prominent personalities of the locality, to be appointed as assistant qaim-makam to Qatar was deemed appropriate by decision of the Administrative Council of the (province) vilayet, and the mutasarriflik of Nejd (Hasa) was notified of the situation. We request your earliest response, order and permission to take action."2 On the other hand, the Administrative Council of Basrah, referring to the above draft stressed the probability of a secret accord between Jasim and Britain which would have resulted in his removal from office to be replaced by someone appointed from the central government in whose service there would be other staff also appointed by the aforementioned authority.3

xIbid. 2 3

BOA. §D 2155/24. Ibid.

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Upon learning of this event, the Ministry of the Interior, in its letter dated August 21, 1884 wanted to appoint Jasim's son in his father's place. It looked as if the Ottoman government was reluctant to remove the Jasim family altogether despite the desire to do so displayed by the local people. However, the refusal of Jasim's son to assume this office led the vilayet of Basrah to make a new application for the appointment of a qaim-makam by the central government in a letter dated October 16, 1884.1 As far as we could learn from our sources, although the reiteration by Jasim of his resignation constituted enough justification for the local government, i.e. the mutasarriflik of Nejd and the vilayet of Basrah who wanted to see him removed, it failed to obtain sanction from the central government. In a telegram addressed to the Ministry of the Interior by the governor of Basrah dated March 28, 1885 attention was drawn to the fact "that no response was received with reference to the approval of the letter of resignation of Sheikh Jasim despite the fact that the relevant correspondence was exchanged over one and a half years ago."2 At first glance one may think that this delay must have been due to the weakness of the central government. This was not true as quite the reverse was the case. Since the central government deemed it advantageous to procrastinate in these affairs for political reasons it wanted Jasim b. Thani remain in office. In the already mentioned report containing a description of developments in Basrah and its environs dated August 4, 1885, jointly submitted by the governorship and the Administrative Council of Basrah and in the reiterated letters on the issue3 the suggestion made with reference to the qaim-makam of Qatar was discussed at the State Council Commission. The result indicates the rationale of policies previously explained. As a matter of fact, in the report of the State Council dating from the beginning of 1886, the following observations were made regarding Jasim b. Thani:

1 2

Ibid. BOA, SD 2156/4.

Q

I n addition to the demands from the vilayet of Basrah, Baghdad also had the same requests. It is worth while to quote here the telegram on this issue dated August 9, 1885 from Nejd to Baghdad and the telegram dated August 24 from this place to the Ministry of the Interior: "The vilayet is informed of the fact that, in view of the importance of Qatar, leaving Qatar as it is with this qaim-makam whose wild behaviour has earned notoriety would be dangerous, of the extortion of eight thousand rupees last year by British warships which had arrived in connection with the incident that the Banyans had given rise to, of the necessity of appointing an assistant qaim-makam to Qatar and of the need for the permanent presence of an Ottoman corvette in the region and of the letter from the vilayet of April 20, 1883 containing suggestions on the issue. Seven letters in succession were written on the issue to the vilayet of Basrah. But, despite the passing of two years in the meantime no response has been received. Now the Banyans issue has cropped up again and a warship came over to Qatar and without applying to the sancak (of Nejd) obtained a paper from Jasim in which he promised to pay in instalments (the balance of) the eight thousand rupees he had already paid. There were apprehensions that this might be a stratagem. Moreover there has occurred a rift between Sheikh Zayed, sheikh of Oman and Jasim. As the former is intending to launch an attack on Qatar, Sheikh Jasim is demanding that a ship be immediately sent to Qatar. A letter has been written to the governor of Basrah in which the details of this intention are given and the immediate despatch of a corvette is requested." BOA, §D 2157/10, Lef. 1.

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"... As for Sheikh Jasim, the character of this individual was made the subject of a careful investigation and the necessity for the continuation of his services was requested for by the Department of the Interior in two reports. Based on the information supplied by people harbouring a grudge against him, the latest report submitted made note of these ungrounded allegations, 1 and as is indicated in the letter of Sheikh Jasim about the Banians to Said Pasha, former mutasarnf of Nejd, of which a copy was sent by the vilayet of Baghdad to the Ministry of the Interior and from there to the State Council, although the Banianians issue was notified (by Jasim) to the mutasarnf no answer was received. The British who took advantage of this used warships to exert pressure in order to establish their authority over Qatar. Sheikh Jasim, wanted to drive the British away by giving them the money they asked for, in token of his loyalty to the Ottoman State. The documents on the issue that were made available before and those kept at the departments of the State Council and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the correspondence held and the studies conducted were sufficient evidence for concluding that this act of the Sheikh should in no way be considered as an offence..." 2 The State Council Commission which reached the above conclusion following investigations and studies states that the ministry of the Interior, agrees with the viewpoint regarding Jasim's continuation in office. 3 However, the report indicates that if the central government insists on its viewpoint and that it promises to answer for the inconveniences it will likely give rise to in future, action may be taken accordingly. 4 The fact that the government removed the mutasarnf of Nejd and appointed in his place Nezih Bey is proof of the fact that the intentions mentioned above were put into practice. In other

I'fhis must be a reference to the allegation that Sheikh Jasim and the British conducted a correspondence. 2 BOA, §D 2158/10, Lef. 73. 3l n an undated draft produced by the same Commission we read the following: "Sheikh Jasim, severed Qatar from Bahrain and subordinated it to the sancak of Nejd. Sheikh Jasim introduced the Ottoman flag to the tribes there and annexed Zubarah to the region. He is a loyal subject who has served the state faithfully and on an honorary basis. If he had not been offended by the comments of the former governor and former traitor of a mutasarnf regarding his behaviour, the boundaries of the sancak of Nejd would now have reached Muscat. Those who have even an inkling of geography well know that the extremity of the coast of Jazirat-ul Arab is the Island of Oman. On the coastline that stretches to this place are numerous communities governed by sheikhs. Among these people are a good many scholars. They are well aware of the fact that they have to obey the Caliph of the Muslim people. Nevertheless, as government officials who approached them used the very treatment that the vilayet of Basrah alleged Jasim used to employ, they have been led to shun the Ottoman State and its officials. Therefore, a qualified administrator who has a perfect command of the Arabic language, who is familiar with the local customs, who knows how to come down to the level of the ordinary citizen, who has the gift of the gab and who is actually resolved to serve the state and the nation must be sent there. Such administrators must moreover be regularly checked. Otherwise the development and an established administration such as desired by the Ottoman State can not be realised. For, reports by officials who serve their own ends and decided to deceive the Ottoman state are full of exaggerations." BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 75. 4 BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 73.

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words, the Ottoman government had deemed it better to dismiss the officials who harassed Jasim and who made exaggerated reports rather than sending Jasim away. Jasim, who was well aware of the rumours about him, made an official appeal to the mutasarriflik in August 1885 in order to demonstrate to officials in Nejd and Basrah the prestige he enjoyed vis-a-vis the government and declared his wish to resign. This letter of resignation by Jasim is given here below in view of its importance: "As you may well know, although I had resigned my office of qaimmakam, I was obliged to comply with your order to stay for a few months more in my position, pending a decision taken after consultation with the vilayet. It has been a year since I asked to be excused from my office. Thinking that it would not be right to leave the people and the region thus at short notice, and that in consideration of the fact that I no longer have the energy to perform my duties as qaim-makam properly, I hereby declare that I have appointed Khalife, my son, to act on my behalf pending the return of the messenger I have sent to you. I kindly request that you either leave my son Khalife as qaim-makam of Qatar or send someone from your mutasarriflik that can be accepted by the people and elected by them. Should either of these alternatives prove not to be acceptable to your side, then, please appoint a qaim-makam who is an Arab or Turkish. If you disagree with me, I hereby declare that I will have to leave Qatar for good and go somewhere else, whether Bahrain, Oman, Iran or elsewhere. Having served the Ottoman State and taken care of Qatar's protection for the last fifteen years, I am begging now to be excused from my office." 1 It seems, however, this appeal from Jasim was not accepted as his continuation in the service of the state was subsequently insisted upon. b) The Fuwairat and Wakrah Issues Problems arose in the course of 1885 between Sheikh Jasim and the population of about 2000 who had most probably come to Fuwairat, subordinated to Qatar. The topics of discussions on the agenda during the second half of 1885 and in 1886 were almost entirely restricted to these issues. The cause of this seems to have been Muhammad b. Abdulwahab, member of the Administrative Council of the district of Qatar. The emergence of unrest in the region had made indispensable the continuous presence of an Ottoman corvette. There were conflicting pieces of news, most of which were based on the correspondence of Muhammad b. Abdulwahhab. However, essentially it all boiled down to the following: "Sheikh Jasim, qaim-makam of Qatar with his gang had attacked the village of al-Ghariyyah, and having killed seven men of Abdulwahab had stolen a great amount of cash and property." 2 This had naturally caused disturbances in the region which was duly reflected in correspondence with the Ottomans. ^BOA, §D 2155/25; 2158/10, Lef. 2. BOA, §D 2158/10, Lef. 28.

2

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As-Sayyid Muhammad Emin, newly appointed at the time as naib (canonical judge) of Qatar, in his report dated December 2, 1885, addressed to the mutasarrif of Nejd complained about his cool reception in the locality and expressed his impression saying that a group attached to Haji Seyyid, a scholar, residing at Wakrah had left because of the cruelties to which they had been subjected and immigrated to al-Ghariyyah, one league from Fuwairat. Moreover, intelligence was received that the people of Fuwairat and alGhariyyah had prepared a report addressed to the British Consul at Bushire appealing for protection. In this letter it was said that the commodore of the Ottoman corvette 'Zuhaf in the region had written to Basrah asking for the despatch of a civil qaim-makam and a battalion and it was reported that a short while ago the British Vice-Consul to Muscat had had a close talk with Jasim. 1 Ali Riza, the governor of Basrah, in his coded telegram dated December 12, 1885 addressed to the Ministry of the Interior referring to the previous correspondence held on the aforementioned subjects, quotes the information received from the commodore of the corvette in Qatar: "I have received a letter from the captain of the Ottoman ship on the (Qatar) coast. It is reported that two thousand people who had immigrated three years ago to Fuwairat, subordinated to Qatar are about to apply to become naturalised British subjects. It is stated that, previously, because of the treason of Sheikh Jasim, Shiraze Muhammad also has asked for British protection. This letter further makes it clear that there is a possibility that the people in Fuwairat will be appealing to the British representative at Bushire and there will be groups of people for the immediate despatch of a company of soldiers (in the letter of the canonical judge this is a battalion) in order that this may be forestalled." 2 At about this time, the mutasarrif of Nejd had been removed from office following certain allegations and Nezih Bey was appointed in his place. It appears that Nezih Bey in his new job was to deal especially with the affairs related to Qatar. In his letter addressed to the vilayet on December 12,1885, he had stated that once he had dealt with the arrears, he would personally conduct IbOA, §D 2158/5, Lef. 17. In the annex of the letter sent by the naib of Qatar there is the following information relating to the interview between Jasim and the British representative: "About a fortnight ago the British came together with Abu'l-Jasim their representative at Muscat on board a ship and had a talk with Jasim, sheikh of Qatar which lasted for a couple of hours. The exact account of their talk remains a mystery. However, according to Jasim, he was told: 'What has been your gain in having served the Ottoman state? Aren't you going to ask for the reimbursement of the 8000 rupees you gave of your own free will? You mustn't expect to get anything from the Banyans." The naib who said that during the same talk Jasim's conflict with Sheikh Zayed also had been on the agenda, speaks of the likelihood of the imminent entering of Fuwairat under British protection and of a great exodus from the region. BOA, §D 2158/5, Lef. 7. 2

BOA,§D 2158/10, Lef. 67.

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the necessary investigations in Qatar and referring to the correspondence he held with Qatar, stressed in the meantime the necessity for consideration of urgent developments in the region.1 As a matter of fact, one can see from the correspondence held between the vilayet of Basrah and the Sublime Porte, that he had prepared a report and submitted it to the government in order to make the necessary arrangements in Qatar to produce an order in this regard. These proposals must have been approved by the government since he was told to proceed. One of the proposals was the appointment of an assistant to the qaimmakam in Qatar.2 This was against the wishes of officials in the region. For they insisted at every opportunity on the removal of Sheikh Jasim from office. The new mutasarrif of Nejd also espoused this view. Indeed, we read the following in a letter from the mutasarrif of Nejd dated January 2, 1886 addressed to the vilayet of Basrah: "... The maintenance of peace and order in Qatar and the forestalling of internal or external untoward actions were the objectives. Both internally and externally safety and order reign in the district of Qatar (for the moment). But, as correspondence made with reference to the district remain without due response, peace and safety will presently disappear... "3 Nezih Bey refers to the recent developments in the region and sums up the news he got from Muhammad b. Abdulwahab in Bahrain.4 The Mutasarrif who draws attention to the incidents at al-Ghariyyah concludes: "According to our thorough investigative process we have reached the conclusion that Sheikh Jasim's remaining as qaim-makam should now be out of the question. So long as he remains, there will be no safety or order there."5 The mutasarrif who asked that a new qaim-makam be appointed to Qatar, and that, pending his arrival to assume office, a qualified person from the vilayet be sent, stressed that the case of Muhammad b. Abdulwahab was a case that called for an inquiry and a court trial and wanted to be given instructions.6 It appears that Muhammad b. Abdulwahab wanted to establish friendly relations with Nezih Bey, the newly appointed mutasarrif. On the other hand, Muhammad b. Abdulwahab who knew of the negative opinions about Jasim held by the Ottoman officials in the region, wanted to take advantage of this situation and increase his influence in Qatar. Muhammad b. !

BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 40. BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 27. 3 BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 29. "^BOA, SD 2158/10, Lef. 62. 5 BOA, §D 2158/10, Lef. 62. 2

6

Ibid.

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Abdullah who had gone to Bahrain at the time seems to have exchanged letters with Nezih Bey, in which he kept complaining about Jasim. In a letter he sent towards the end of December in which he stated that he had been receiving news about Jasim's intentions to resume his attacks on al-Ghariyyah, he asked the mutasarrif, to prevent Jasim from carrying out his ill-intentions by writing warning letters to the tribes that had gathered around Jasim. If one closely examines the related correspondence, it becomes clear that Muhammad b Abdulwahab deprived of the support of the tribes and clans who formed the most important power in the region, wanted to take advantage of the situation by trying to get the support of the state in order to fight Jasim who was backed by these very tribes and clans. Muhammad b. Abdulwahab, in his letter dated December 31, 1885 said the following: "... Now, you must write letters threatening prominent persons like Beni Teshrim, al-Murrah, Beni Shafi, Beni Hajir and al-Manasir and to Humeyd b. Mani, telling them not to attack the non-Moslem communities of the state and not to support Jasim's movements. They all come for shopping (musabele) at frequent intervals to Hasa. Under the circumstances your letters of threat will have influence over them..." 1 Muhammad b. Abdulwahab also brought another issue to the agenda. Ali b. Rashid, a well-known family of Qatar, had appealed to the mutasarrif of Nejd, complaining that Abdullah b. Jiran and the people subordinated to him had recently immigrated from Wakrah to al-Ghariyyah and not paid their tax due. Muhammad b. Abdullah who appears to have already corresponded on this issue with the mutasarrif had commented as follows: Ali b. Rashid, a relative of Jasim, was justified in his grievance. However, the people had run away not because they wanted to evade the payment of their arrears, but because they had had had enough of his cruelties and oppression. In this letter, in which it was alleged that Jasim had been informed about this issue, it was said that the oppression which had lately become still more intense was in fact due to the news which was spreading of the forthcoming departure of the corvette "Zuhaf" which was then in Qatar. Muhammad b. Abdulwahab stated that the value of the property that Abdullah b Jiran and the people subordinated to him had abandoned in Wakrah amounted to 80.000 rupees, while the tax due by Wakrah was about 100 rupees, of which the portion that fell to the share of the immigrants was not more than ten to fifteen rupees, and that this insignificant amount of money could not possibly be the reason for such an exodus. Muhammad b. Abdulwahab, who claims that Ali b. Rashid's aim was to humiliate the people by lies and stratagems vis-a-vis the state, adds that by glancing at the tax books held by the mutasarriflik, the true state of affairs can

^BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 39

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plainly be understood.1 It is a fact that this amount might not have been the real reason. However, according to the allegations stated again in the same letter, Ali b. Jabir exacted huge sums of money every year from the public without paying any portion of such revenue to the state. Although there is no mention in the documents as to the authority in whose name this collection was made by Ali b. Jabir, if one takes into consideration his close links with Jasim b. Thani, one can conclude that he must have been commissioned by him to collect on his behalf the annual zekat and other taxes. Although there is no clear evidence about the amount paid to the local administration from their collection, one should remember that, as had already been mentioned, this region had been exempted from tax except for zekat. Nevertheless, the state seems to have turned a blind eye to Jasim's collecting certain conventional taxes in his own name. In point of fact, this must have had its rationale in Jasim's political preference. For, the idea may well have been the consideration, that when, in the future, a more centralist government would be established, the people accustomed to paying tax would be reluctant to give it when demanded commensurably. Looked at from another angle, the village of al-Ghariyyah where Muhammad b. Abdulwahab resided was becoming a centre of opposition. Indeed, Muhammad b. Abdulwahab had tried to win over Nasser b. Mubarak, the former sheikh of Bahrain, and carried on correspondence with other governmental authorities in Basrah, Baghdad and in the capital for over a year.2 The impressions that Muhammad b. Abdulwahab had of Jasim and which he tried to spread around must have affected the authorities in the surrounding area since they had been suggesting that a new qaim-makam should be appointed to Qatar. Those concerned did not remain mere onlookers at these incidents. But, as has already been mentioned, Nafiz Bey, mutasarrif of Nejd, considered this issue as a disciplinary case despite any exaggerated accounts and reached the conclusion that the case had to be studied and resolved legally. This is plain from the letter of the naib dated January 10, 1886 whom the latter had commissioned to study the case. As-Sayyid Muhammad Emin, (naib) judge of Qatar, stated in his report after having summarised the above events:

1 BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 31 ^For instance, in his letter that reached the Ministry of the Interior, in January 1886 Muhammad b. Abdulwahab states the following: "While I had been residing in safety and security under the shadow of the Sultan together with my tribe in al-Ghariyya subordinated to Qatar, a subdivision of the sancak of Nejd, Jasim al-Thani, Qaim-makam of Qatar incited certain tribes to launch an attack on us and as the people of my tribe lived dispersed their property had been ransacked and our assets consisting of pearl, gold, effects and arms of a value of thirty thousand lira were taken by force. Although I have notified the mutasarrif of the sancak and to the vilayet I could not get a response. Jasim's bad treatment and disregard of the orders of the state are kno\™ to everybody. If no order is issued for the recuperation of our plundered goods and the punishment of the perpetrators, I shall have to appeal to foreign powers so that I beg your justice and grace." BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 38.

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"... I was astounded to hear news of these incidents. Given the fact that the reason for the incidents and the manner in which they took place was not known here, the mutasarriflik which notified us by private messenger sent on January 5, 1886 wanted the necessary investigation to be conducted and legal action taken. According to the reliable information I have received, Sheikh Jasim is reported to have been planning during these last three or four years to attack and ransack the village of Fuwairat..."' He is said to have spoken about it to the commodore of the Ottoman corvette which called at the Qatar port, asking for permission, though without any avail. Sheikh Jasim had a habit of retiring every year to the desert with his next of kin and retinue to sojourn there for a few months. This year, he acted as if he were going to do the same together with his next of kin and relatives and the tribes that came along with him, but launched an attack on the village of Fuwairat. Given the resistance shown by the population of villagers, Jasim suffered a defeat and had to withdraw. The very next day he attacked the al-Bu Ghaz tribe who had immigrated from Wakrah and settled on the heights of the Fuwairat village.2 As one can see, the first official assessment of the incidents confirmed these allegations and found Jasim guilty of them. Nevertheless, all the tribes could not be removed. This was the reason why the government had decided to despatch a vessel to the Qatar coast while also thinking it advisable to appoint an assistant to the qaim-makam of Qatar who would take Qatar under control. In a letter from the vilayet of Basrah addressed to the state council dated January 12, it is stated that in line with the orders of the government "the locating and recovery of the plundered articles will be taken care of, a corvette in the meantime having already set off" and attention is drawn to the delicate situation of Qatar and to Jasim's behaviour and acts.3 In the meantime, the Sublime Porte had reconfirmed by writing to the vilayet of Basrah on December 3, 1885 the instructions related to the appointment of an assistant qaim-makam to Qatar. It furthermore inquired from the vilayet of Basrah whether Nezih Bey who had just been appointed mutasarrif of Nejd, had contributed in any way to the development of the region.4 This correspondence between the vilayet of Basrah and the 'in another document related to Sheikh Jasim's hostility to the people of Fuwairat we read "Said Pasha, former mutasarrif of Nejd, on good terms with Sheikh Jasim, went to Qatar to get some pearls and money from him. But he acted badly and impudently to Sheikh Muhammad Said Abu Kevare, Jasim's next of kin and rival. Whereupon, Sheikh Muhammad took along his tribe which consisted of about half of Qatar's township from al-Bida' and immigrated to Fuwairat.." BOA, §D 2158/12. 2 BOA, §D 2158/10, Lef. 54. 3 BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 37. 4 BOA,£Z) 2158/10 Lef. 27.

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government had reached such dimensions as to pester the local government which wanted Jasim to be removed from office to secure control in the region, while the government seemed to be entertaining the opposite idea that without Jasim no order and discipline could be restored to Qatar. The deputy governor who wrote a letter to the Ministry of the Interior on January 20 1886 while giving attention to the previous correspondence wanted a decision to be reached on the Qatar issue as soon as possible since the matter was gaining ever greater importance. 1 As has been described above, the mutasarrif of Nejd conducted an investigation and even contacted Jasim b. Thani who happened to be in the desert at the time. Likewise, the commodore of the corvette "Merih" sent from Basrah to Qatar at the beginning of December contacted Jasim b. Thani who viewed the behaviour of the mutasarrif and of the commodore of "Merih" as pressure being exerted upon him, did not leave the desert, nor did he answer the inquiries, and he even went so far as to declare that he had resigned his office. As-Sayyed Muhammad Asir, commodore of the corvette 'Merih' who wrote to the mutasarrif on February 25, 1886 asked what he was supposed to do as the three month commission was about to come to an end.2 It appears that Muhammad b. Abdulwahab was also busy then. Muhammad b. Abdulwahab who had gone to the environs of Bahrain was trying to win over certain tribes who were known to be pro-Jasim. He was told by the mutasarrif to abandon his activities and come back to Qatar. But he would not hear of these instructions indicating the former developments as grounds for the justification of his viewpoint. Muhammad b. Abdulwahab invited also a prominent member of the Bent Hajir tribe who had previously attacked the village, giving him gifts and succeeded in persuading him to forget about the hostile feelings they once entertained. In the meantime, with a view to enlarging the boundaries of his alliance he held interviews with the sheikh of Bahrain and tried through him to convince the al-Ujman and al-Muhammad tribes to join the alliance/According to the intelligence received, his objective was to launch an attack on Qatar with the forces he would be able to gather in this way. Jasim, who happened to be in the desert at the time, had understood what was going on and led his tribes to the vicinity of al-Ghariyyah. He himself declared that he was going back to Qatar, to show in this way that he had no involvement in these

' B O A , §D 2 1 5 8 / 1 0 Lef. 34.

^As-Sayyed Muhammad Asir speaks as follows: "We know that Sheikh Jasim al-Thani, qaimmakam of Qatar is still in the desert. Although we asked him for answers on certain important matters, he has not reacted. On the other hand whenever he writes a letter he speaks of his intention to resign and constantly changes his opinion." BOA, §D 2158/10, Lef. 21,23.

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events. 1 Indeed, Jasim b. Thani who had come back to the Beda', showed the latest developments as a pretext for having had to write his letter of resignation addressed to the mutasarriflik on February 25, 1886. Jasim b. Thani, in his letter, said that the sheikh of Bahrain used the people of alGhariyyah and Fuwairat and the tribe Na'im against Qatar and complained of the recent ill-intentions of Muhammad b. Abdulwahab towards him. Jasim claimed that Muhammad b. Abdulwahab had joined forces with the ruler of Bahrain, the chief of the Na'im tribe and Salim b. Shafi, the Beni Hajir sheikhs and were making preparations for marching on Qatar. 2 Jasim went on complaining of the fact that Mutasarrif Nezih Bey and other officials in the region had sided with his opponents towards whom they behaved kindly. Jasim who said that he had served the State for the last fifteen years in every way of his means and that he had established safety on land and at sea and had achieved the security on roads, declared that he would not be liable for any events likely to occur in Qatar and its environs. 3 This last letter of resignation from Jasim, who tried to convince the other officials in the region of his own importance had driven Nezih Bey mad, the self same Nezih Bey, mutasarrif of Nejd, who had been dealing fruitlessly with this issue. Whereupon he wrote the following letter addressed to the vilayet of Basrah on March 8, 1886 to be transmitted to the Ministry of the Interior and reported in the following kind of uncouth language hardly to be expected from a provincial civil servant, (which in itself reflects the dejected mood he happened to be in): "... Jasim, who considers himself to be somebody in the service of the State, has been bothering both the mutasarrif and your supreme authority every now and then threatening that he is going to resign his office. He has recently shown again the same intention. If a kaza in which no means of communication exist such as Qatar can be considered part of Ottoman territory, the Sultan's will must appoint a governmental delegation since 'a country without a government would be like a house without an owner'. If the place in question is considered a useless piece of land and no attention is paid it as to whether it passes into alien hands or not, the spending made for paying the salaries of the naib and the gendarmes which amounts yearly to 120.000 kurushes should be considered a burden on the treasury. Under the circumstances it would be better to remove the naib from office and send the gendarmes back to their garrison. So that, if no definitive order is issued and addressed to the undersigned as soon as possible, after having

'BOA, §D 2158/10, Lef. 20 BOA, §D 2158/10, Lef. 20 3 1bid.

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opted for either one of the aforesaid alternatives the kaza is eventually abandoned to its destiny, I repeat once again, that I shall not be to blame for the consequences. As has already been pointed out, if one considers that the al-Ghariyyah incident between Jasim and Abdulwahab happened one day after the departure of the corvette 'Zuhaf' from Qatar, and the roaming around of Muhammad b. Sa'ud 1 , the Ottoman corvette 'Merih' should be present in Qatar upon your order."2 It is clearly not possible that Nezih Bey who had been in Hasa since 1871 was not kept informed of the efforts for the establishment of a fullyfledged governmental organisation including a postal service for official communication. However, the stress created due to the impossibility of suddenly setting up a fully-fledged organisation in the modern sense of the term and also to the sorrow he felt because of the appointment to a region where so much was expected from him must have contributed to the above style of his writing. As a matter of fact, before Nezih Bey wrote this letter, the Sublime Porte, based on former correspondence had referred the case to the State Council on March 3, 1886 and asked for a discussion of the developments to be made in the region. On the other hand, in compliance with the wish of the mutasarrif, pending a conclusion of the discussions, an order was given to the commodore of the corvette in Qatar to remain there for the time being.3 In the meantime, nothing had resulted from the discussions which took place in Istanbul. For, in the letter addressed to the vilayet of Basrah which was to be transmitted to the mutasarrif of Nejd, we read the following about the qaim-makam of Qatar in addition to the instructions according to which Nezih Bey had to comply with relevant standing regulations: "Action should be taken according to the results of the investigations to be conducted instead of any sudden removal of Sheikh Jasim in Qatar and the necessary opinion should be notified to Istanbul."4 We see once again the emergence of a conflict between the central government and the periphery; the conclusion reached by the central government was to keep Jasim in office. This cannot be purely coincidental. Reaching the same conclusion on repeated occasions may have been the result of a secret covert policy. Despite the fact that Jasim's presence was not so advantageous in terms of internal stability and was perhaps even detrimental to it, he had to remain as the state's appointed qaim-makam in the capacity as an external balancing factor. ^ According to the information supplied by the commodore of the corvette 'Merih', Muhammad b. Sa'ud had paid a visit to Jasim in the desert, and had received from him certain gifts before proceeding on to al-Ghariyya and to Bahrain from there. 2 BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 13 3 BOA,£Z> 2158/10, Lef. 9. 4 BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 15

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As a matter of fact, Jasim b. Thani and Muhammad b. Abdulwahab were eventually reconciled. Indeed, letters which were received in the autumn of 1886, from Muhammad b. Abdulwahab and Jasim stated that they were pleased to have renewed their friendship.1 The Ottoman State took another step forward and appointed Muhammad b. Abdulwahab sheikh of Darein in the vicinity of Kateef. Thus Jasim's path had been cleared and a new settlement was reclaimed. Here we should stress one point though. Jasim, who had been convinced that he had gained the trust of the state, did not hesitate to periodically harass Bahrain, Oman and even Kuwait. The Ottoman government which took care to protect Jasim's rights had not been instrumental in his exploits and this was the reason for his oft repeated resignation attempts. The Ottoman State was well aware of the fact that Jasim was a balancing factor against the British who had established an effective superiority especially in Bahrain. That is why it aimed at increasing his sway over the Qatar peninsula rather than subduing it. On the other hand, the British who considered the strengthening of Jasim as an impediment to their regional policy, tried to exert pressure on him especially with regard to commercial relations. Jasim was one of the biggest pearl dealers of the region. He had close links with Bahrain and the Indian Banian traders of British nationality. The British took advantage of this, and, by confiscating Jasim's property and money outside Qatar, they punished him for his loyalty to the Ottomans. Jasim's following letter addressed to the mutasarriflik of Nejd dated November 3,1887 makes clear the pressures which had been exerted on him . "Wishing you all the best, I hereby submit to your consideration the fact that God Almighty and the entire Moslem community can bear witness that your most loyal subject has always been amongst the obedient servants of the Ottoman State and far removed from all worldly grudges. The foreigners [The British] feel restless in the face of my loyalty and every now and then they display their animosity; just to give you an instance of this, the British recently extorted from me 8000 rupees. This money has not been returned yet. Now my property has been seized and 6000 rupees have been exacted. I have run up an additional loss of 5000 rupees due to the said attachment and for having had to wait [which caused the interruption of my business]. Such are the injustices to which I am subjected. All these are because I am an Ottoman citizen and protected by the Ottoman State, which seems to be against the British. These events are obviously contrary to the interests of the Ottoman State. Considering that the Ottoman State cannot possibly connive at this situation, I should like to suggest that, with a

^BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 2; 11.

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view to having my rights protected, the plaintiffs should henceforth have recourse to Ottoman courts of justice and act according to the judgements that are to be pronounced therein. Moreover, I beg your Grace to intervene in the recovery of my property forfeited for no reason at all. May the Ottoman State prosper for ever."1 The governor of Basrah who forwarded the above letter from Jasim, qaim-makam of the district of Qatar to the ministry of the Interior had attached to it a report which would further clarify the matter. In this report dated December 1, 1887 Jasim's complaints mentioned in his letter were summarised and the reasons for the scurrilous behaviour of the British towards Jasim were enumerated as follows: "... This cruel treatment of Sheikh Jasim is due to the Sheikh's loyalty to and affection for the Ottoman State and to the unrewarded excellent services he has rendered as qaim-makam of Qatar ever since the capture of Nejd. Sheikh Jasim is being deterred from serving the Ottoman State by harsh treatments in order that he may pledge allegiance to the British. This is unbearable. Jasim is an Ottoman citizen and a government official. All disputes should be settled by Ottoman courts of justice. Even in grievances related to cases of default, the courts dispensing justice should be the aforementioned ones. Under the circumstances, resorting every now and then to cruelties and extortions from British officials instead of referring the cases to the appropriate authorities is not compatible, nor is it reconcilable with international laws and treaties."2 The governor of Basrah, in his letter, had also mentioned the necessity of taking the necessary measures required for the protection of Sheikh Jasim's rights. However, he had no other chance than to stage a protest against the British. Nevertheless, the governor could resort to certain remedies with a view to preventing Jasim from giving in when faced with British pressures and sustaining his loyalty to the state. The best way to do this was to reward the Sheikh. In the meantime, Nafiz Pasha, governor of Basrah, in his capacity as the highest civil authority in the region, was ordered to make a visit to the environs of Qatar so that he might survey the problems on the spot and furnish evidence of the State's authority over the region. Nafiz Pasha, governor of Basrah, after the above correspondence, in his telegram to the Office of the Grand Vizier dated January 12, 1888, had proposed, before his visit to Qatar, that Sheikh Jasim qaim-makam of Qatar, be awared with the title of

' BOA, §D 2159/36. BOA, §D 2159/36.

2

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Kapucibagi "Head of the Palace Doorkeepers"1 for his services and unswerving loyalty to the state despite British pressure. As a matter of fact the matter was brought to the attention of the Sultan and by a decree dated February 29, 1888 a resolution was made to award Sheikh Jasim with the title of Kapucibagi for his services and loyalty.2

^During the classical period, the persons who had been in charge of the safety, cleaning and kitchen work of the palace were called "kapici" (doorkeeper.) The superintendent of the said kapici was named Kapiciba§i. This appellation, from the 19th century, became an honorary title given to provincial officials and notables. Midhat Sertoglu, Osmanh Tarihi Lugati, Istanbul 1986, p. 173. BOA, ID 83926.

Chapter Two NEW DIMENSIONS IN THE ANGLO-OTTOMAN CONTROVERSIES OVER QATAR AND BAHRAIN

1. Efforts to Delineate the Areas of Influence of the British and the Ottomans in the Gulf The Anglo-Ottoman areas of influence in the Gulf had become a subject of discussion on various occasions in the wake of the Nejd/Hasa military operations which came to an end towards the close of 1871 but without any tangible conclusion. For, the Ottoman State had afforded proof of its sovereignty over Qatar by subordinating it to the sanjak of Nejd. On the other hand great efforts were made to prevent the British from transforming their de facto superiority in Bahrain into actual sovereignty and from widening their influence over other areas of the region. The British were for political ends using regional disturbance and sea piracy as pretexts for involvement. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the year 1887, after an incident during which the goods of two British subjects had been stolen in the Qatar market, British pirate ships had come to the region.1 This development and similar events had incited the Ottoman government to decide on making certain arrangements regarding Nejd and the coastline, in May, 1887.2 Britain, on the other hand, naturally tried to oppose all sorts of arrangements which she viewed as threats to its de facto superiority over Bahrain. The British were loath to see the Bahrainis treated as Ottoman citizens in the Ottoman provinces of Nejd, Basrah, etc. The approach of the Ottoman State which refused the intervention of the British consuls in litigation between the Bahrainis, on the one hand, and Ottoman citizens, on the other, based on the grounds that both sides were Ottoman subjects had caused the British to assume a defiant attitude.3 As a matter of fact the reply of the British consul to Basrah at the beginning of the year 1888 to the effect that Bahrain was not part of Hasa and that in conformity with an accord Bahrain had signed with the British, Britain enjoyed the right of disposition there, had occasioned the resumption of discussions by the Ottoman government on the issue. As a result of discussions by the Ottoman cabinet which took place on February 3

BOA, BEO Basra TelgrafGiden 969, p. 12. BOA, MV19, p. 71. % O A , MV 25, p. 48 (October 25, 1887).

2

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1888, it was decided, in consideration of the fact that the statement of the British consul to Basrah was but of secondary importance, that the gist of the matter lay in the administration of Nejd and Hasa (and of its natural kaza, i.e. Qatar) without giving rise to foreign intervention. Whereupon a special commission was established to study the matter.1 The order to inspect this region, as mentioned in Chapter One, was probably given to Nafiz Pasha accordingly. The governor of Basrah who had completed his tour on the Nejd coastline, as he was commissioned to do, presented a detailed report both to the Office of the Grand Vizier and to the Sultan himself on March 11, 1888. However, we shall have to limit ourselves to only a part of the aforementioned report which is related to Qatar and Bahrain. A global view of the report gives us the impression that the basic idea behind this inspection was to gather intelligence about British activities in the region, interpreting them and seeking measures to be taken. As a matter of fact, the British who had an inkling of this commission had sent six ships from Bombay to the Gulf and caused two of these to cast anchor at Bahrain with a view to being able to closely follow up Nafiz Pasha's visit to the region.2 Nafiz Pasha, who reached Qatar at the beginning of March 1888, had rewarded Jasim al-Thani for his efforts in securing security and order in the region and wished that he continued his endeavours. In the meantime a steamboat which had been repaired at the Basrah shipyard was sent to Qatar for patrolling the area. Nafiz Pasha did his best to repair the ruined fortress which had been reserved to quarter the company of regular soldiers who had come to reinforce the gendarme forces at Qatar. Moreover, the mutasarrif of Nejd, the highest civil authority in the region, was given instructions to have ready twenty five regular cavalrymen in addition to the troops which were deployed at the desert side of Qatar in view of the fact those were places populated by wild tribesmen.3 One other important point of note in the report submitted by Nafiz Pasha after his return from visiting Qatar was the fact that Zubarah for the first time became the subject of correspondence after the 1875 crisis. Nafiz Pasha states in his report that Zubarah had once been a haven for cargo ships and for the important landstation at Nejd and the local population which had been dispersed over the entire region. He stressed the point that the goods destined for Nejd had to be brought in to Bahrain first in order to be transhipped after clearing formalities. And Bahrain derived considerable gain from this. Nafiz 'Zekeriya Kur§un, Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanli Häkimiyeti, Ankara 1998, pp. 152-153. BOA, Y.MTV 31/31 Lef. 1. 3 Ibid. Lef. 2.

2

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Pasha contended that in case necessary improvements were to be introduced to Zubarah and if the place was to be transformed into a settlement area not only would the treasury of the state derive a revenue, but peace and order would reign in the region as well. Nafiz Pasha, governor of Basrah, made recommendations to the mutasarrif of Nejd on this issue. He, furthermore, had the qaim-makam of Qatar promise to see to it that some of the neighbouring tribes came to settle there once dwellings were prepared in Zubarah.1 Nafiz Pasha reserved a large part of the report that he submitted to the Sultan dated March 11, 1888 to his journey, to Bahrain and the British there. Nafiz Pasha had intended to go to Bahrain. But the intelligence he received informed him that the British had exerted pressure on the Sheikh of Bahrain not to talk with him and emphasised that on no account should he be inclined to say anything about the relations of the Bahrainis with the British. Nafiz Pasha was thus dissuaded from his intention.2 Nafiz Pasha, who touched on the activities of the British in Bahrain in his report, remarked that the latter's interest in Bahrain was due not only to the geographical position of the place but also to its commercial importance. It is stated in the report that Nasser alMubarak, a relative of Sheikh Isa who had been deported from Bahrain some time before now lived at Hasa on the salary allocated to him by the Ottoman State and that the British had recently taken steps to deport him back. Nafiz Pasha, who made a note of the fact that the attack on Jasim's property was a consequence of his aloofness from the British, contends that Britain's objective was the annexation of Bahrain just like Aden. In the section of the report reserved to suggestions, the necessity for the Ottoman State to make new arrangements to enable the presence of fast ships to be stationed there on a permanent basis in the face of British activities is also stated.3 The Sublime Porte waited for about a year for the results of the arrangements suggested by Nafiz Pasha, the governor of Basrah, which had been initiated right after this, before forming a new commission headed by Miinir Pasha, the Interior Minister, to make a survey of the Bahrain coast, Nejd and Hasa. In all probability, this commission was formed upon intelligence received from Jasim b. Thani about Zayed, sheikh of Oman, who, instigated by the British, made preparations to launch an attack on Qatar. As a matter of fact, in a telegram sent to the vilayet of Basrah by the Ministry of the Interior at the beginning of April 1889, Jasim b. Thani had appealed to the Sublime Porte, notifying it that Sheikh Zayed intended to attack with approximately twenty thousand soldiers while the number of the Qatar tribesmen hardly attained four thousand.4

l

1bid.

2

BOA, r.MTV3{ß[ Lef. 1.

3 4

Ibid. BOA, BEO Basra TelgrafGiden 969, p. 30.

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As a result of the work conducted by the commission formed at the Sublime Porte, a telegram was sent to the vilayet of Basrah on April 6, 1889 instructing Akif Pasha, mutasarrif of Nejd, to take the necessary measures in the region and keep Istanbul informed thereof.1 The government discussed the appeal of Jasim b. Thani on April 13, 1889. In the aforementioned discussions, the intelligence which had been supplied was thought to be of an exaggerated nature. However, it was decided to give orders to Akif Pasha, mutasarrif of Nejd, to station on board the ships due to sail for Qatar a battalion of five hundred soldiers to provide for the protection of Qatar.2 As a matter of fact, some time after these events, the Ottoman government had authorised the local civil authorities to despatch troops without having to obtain permission from the central government in order not to lose time in taking action regarding such incidents.3 Based on the instructions he received from Istanbul, Akif Pasha took steps for the despatch of troops while preparing at the same time a memorandum about the points to be considered for a reinforcement of the administrative links on the Nejd and Hasa coastline. Akif Pasha submitted this memorandum to the vilayet of Basrah so that it could to be transmitted to the Ministry of the Interior in June 1889. But, Hidayet Pasha, who had only recently been appointed governor of Basrah, seems to have desired to discuss the matter directly with Akif Pasha. That is why he transmitted this memorandum to the Ministry of the Interior only after having discussed it with Akif Pasha who came over to Basrah and reached a consensus of opinions with him in August 1889.4 Although the reform program of Akif Pasha was related to Nejd and Hasa, in particular, one observes that quite a large part of it was reserved for Bahrain and Qatar. This program, prepared on the instructions of the Ottoman government, indicates the degree of importance that it gave to the Bahrain and Qatar affairs. Akif Pasha reserved items two, four and five of the program to the Bahrain issue and made proposals among others to replace, if need be, the present sheikh with Nasser b. Mubarak who lived in Hasa and thus forestalling the intervention of Britain on that issue. The greater part of item three was allotted to reforms which should be made in Qatar and its environs. Akif Pasha's recommendations about Qatar and its environs stipulated the following : "The appointment to Zubarah, west of Qatar, of an able administrator conversant with the region to receive a salary of one thousand kurushes, under whose command there shall be some forty or fifty cavaliymen and infantry gendarmes. The appointment of an ^BOA, /MM 4699. BOA, MV 42, p. 34. 3 BOA, MV45, p. 59 (July 1889). 4 BOA, ÍMM 4699 Lef. 1. 2

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administrator conversant with the region, with a salary of seven hundred and fifty kurushes, who will reside at Odeid on the demarcation line separating Oman and Qatar, south of Qatar under whose command there shall be a gendarmerie unit. The appointment of a harbour master conversant with the Arabic language, from the maritime arsenal for the control of ships carrying foreign passengers and Ottoman subjects and entering the large Qatar harbour and responsible for seeing that the harbour regulations are complied with. The appointment of an assistant to Jasim al-Thani, qaim-makam of Qatar, conversant with the Arabic language and political affairs with a salary of two thousand kurushes — for the moment — able to sustain the established order and the routine work within the context of regional status and geographical situation. Except for Jasim al-Thani, the entire population of Qatar is in poverty. Some are involved in fishing while others earn a living from pearldiving. Such people can hardly perform the function of kaza council membership, therefore, in consideration of the geographical position and conditions of the region, these people, the elected administrative council members of Qatar, must regularly receive a minimum payment of two hundred and fifty kurushes on a monthly basis. The appointment of a correspondence clerk with a monthly salary of five hundred kurushes conversant with the Turkish and Arabic languages and with the correspondence forms and styles of both languages to take care of Qatar's correspondence, and the assignment of an assistant with a monthly salary of three hundred kurushes. These arrangements are sine qua non in view of the geopolitical situation in the region. Once these conditions are satisfied — by the Sultan's grace — the security of Qatar both from land and the sea will have been secured and a proper administration achieved. By our Sultan's grace again, two villages will be formed in no time in Zubarah and Odeid thanks to which commercial affairs and the pearl trade will thrive both at the said place and in Qatar. Thus, it will be possible in the future to realise an annual revenue of two thousand and five hundred liras derived from the ihtisap tax (market tax) like that which exists in Qatar and Ujair in addition to the harbour tax which is to be levied. The positive impact of these steps, which will create security and order both in here and along the other coasts of the Arabian peninsula, and will evidently discourage foreign intrusions."1 Akif Pasha, in his memorandum, added that the modest cost of these steps for "the protection of the state's sovereignty over the coast" were not to be spared in view of the eventual interests expected to be derived in view of the prevailing status of the treasury.

BOA, IMM 4699. Osman Zeki Soyyigit, Arfiy Belgeleri I§igi Altinda Qatar'da Osmanli hâkimiyeti, Unpublished dissertation (Marmara Ûniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstittisti) Istanbul 1990, pp. 169-170.

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Akif Pasha's proposals were discussed by the authorities in Istanbul before they were transmitted to the Office of the Grand Vizier on October 9, 1889 for ratification. It seems that the Interior Minister had sent the memorandum of Akif Pasha almost without any comment to the Office of the Grand Vizier and then to be passed on to the Sultan. The commission in Istanbul, based on the intelligence of Akif Pasha, thought inadvisable the removal of the Sheikh of Bahrain from office who had been previously deemed ripe for dismissal because of his pro-British tendencies. However, in the face of British demonstrations staged in the region during military exercises which included gunfire and caique manoeuvres, the necessity of conducting naval manoeuvres in the region was discussed to demonstrate our naval strength and dispel all doubts about the inexistence of naval forces by the Ottomans.1 This correspondence and discussions showed that all these arrangements of a rather political nature aimed at a display of Ottoman sovereignty over the region and were not merely administrative steps. As a matter of fact, the introduction and the conclusion of the letter submitted to the Office of the Grand Vizier by the Interior Minister make the situation clear. Miinir Pasha, the Interior Minister, in the introduction of his letter, makes the following statement: "On feeling the necessity for reinforcing the administrative staff on the Bahrain coast, Nejd and Hasa, in the face of tendencies displayed by the British, a report was submitted and delivered by a commission chaired by myself and composed of such members as the Minister of Justice etc., to decide on the administrative system and the measures to be taken in connection with the securing of loyalty from the people."2 The style suggests that the real motive behind all these was to dampen the interest of the British. As a matter of fact, the Interior Minister, after this introduction, summarises Akif Pasha's above mentioned proposals and concludes his letter as follows: "The aforementioned points aim at the protection of the Bahraini coastline, and the region of Nejd and Hasa from the ill-intentions of the British and — by our Sultan's grace — has the objective of introducing a proper administration of the people; their purpose is to fend off foreign attacks and overcome the difficulties arising from mismanagement as well as from the oppressive behaviour of the powerful; the special commission which was formed to study the matter has formulated these ideas and opinions which are in perfect harmony with the instructions given on this issue."3 'BOA, ¡MM 4699, Lef. 2. Ibid. 3 Ibid. BOA, Y. MTV40/37. 2

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These proposals, prepared by the mutasarnf of Nejd and discussed by the commission concerned were submitted to the Office of the Grand Vizier, and then were referred to the Council of Ministers to be converted into a government decree. The subject was discussed on December 26,1889 and duly approved1 and the necessary orders were issued for its implementation. During these discussions, one view emerged, according to which the points related to Bahrain, Oman and even the Riyadh region should be realised on the basis of a time schedule, which was adopted, while the points that concerned Qatar and especially Zubarah and Odeid were designated for immediate implementation. The decision of the Council of Ministers was submitted to the Sultan, on January 13, 1890. Sultan Abdülhamid II, ratified the bill drafted by the Council of Ministers on February 2, 1890.2 The available documents testify that the decision for reform on the Bahraini coast and Nejd and Hasa reached by the Council of Ministers and ratified by the Sultan did not remain on paper but was put into practice. As a matter of fact, as it had already been decided to increase the number of gendarmes in the region and to empower the local command to despatch troops when need be, the decision in question was immediately implemented. On the other hand, points requiring time for implementation like the continued presence of packet steamers in the Gulf and Red Sea and the extension of cable lines in the region had been delegated to the concerned authorities.3 The Ministry of the Interior gave necessary instructions to the vilayet of Basrah for the implementation of the reform decisions which had been reached, and the following year, the vilayet of Basrah was asked by a letter dated December 19, 1891, how much progress had been achieved in the implementation of the points communicated. However, it should be noted that the realisation of these points were notified to Istanbul piecemeal and even relevant decrees were obtained. For instance, on the basis of correspondence exchanged between the governor of Basrah and the Office of the Grand Vizier on January 18/19,1891 we understand that "New administrators had been appointed to Zubarah and Odeid, one to each, within the confines of the kaza of Qatar".4 As a matter of fact, in a reply from the vilayet of Basrah dated January 13, 1892 to a new inquiry by the Ministry of the Interior, it was said that this had been realised among the reformist decisions taken in the beginning of 1890.

*BOA, MV49, p. 20. %50A, ÍMM 4699 Lef. 3. 3 BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 1620, p. 41. 4 BOA, /MM 4699, Lef. 4.

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Along with the arrangements, in other regions a deputy qaim-makam1 and correspondence clerks had been appointed to Qatar, and nahiye administrators to Zubarah and Odeid, one to each respectively. On the other hand, the contemplated appointment of a harbour master to Qatar was abandoned. This appointment was decided to be channelled to Kateef, which was duly executed. A sufficient number of gendarmes were assigned for the protection of the fortresses of Ula and Bureyman on the Nejd coastline, and their repair was due to be executed the following March. Every three and four months one of the vessels in Basrah weighed anchor on the Nejd coastline. Considering the insufficiency of the gendarme forces at Nejd (Hasa), means were sought by order of the Ministry of the Interior to allot five hundred mounted dromedary and two companies of mule mounted cavalrymen to be added to the gendarme forces of Nejd. But only two hundred cavalry soldiers could be recruited.2 The governor of Basrah, after describing these activities, drew attention to the insufficiency of the available forces in the sanjak of Nejd in view of its strategic importance, and asked for two battalions to be sent to Kateef and Qatar respectively each consisting of two hundred regular soldiers. The governor of Basrah, who also stated the necessity for building barracks at Darein in the neighbourhood of Kateef, contended that the reason for the inability to form a proper administrative organisation in Qatar was the insufficiency of the military forces there and Jasim al-Thani's covert opposition. 3 The governor was of the idea that in order for a proper administrative organisation to be established at Qatar a government building must be erected in the kaza centre and barracks should be built to accommodate fifty cavalrymen and similar buildings must be constructed at Odeid and Zubarah, each to accommodate thirty gendarmes respectively. 4 The administrators appointed to Zubarah and Odeid had to reside in the centre of Qatar due to a lack of accommodation and the absence of the military to protect them. This was not compatible with the results expected to be obtained from the appointment of administrators to these places.5 ^Decision dated March 22, 1891 of the Council of Ministers foresaw the appointment of a deputy Qaim-makam with a salary of 2000 kurushes. BOA, MV 63, p. 77. 2 BOA. Y.A. Res. 60/12 Lef. 11. 3jhe governor must have reached this conclusion on the basis of the letter that the mutasarnf of Nejd sent him in November 1891. As a matter of fact the mutasarnf of Nejd wrote as follows while he submitted a statistical table related to Qatar that the deputy qaim-makam of Qatar had sent: "... Due to Jasim al-Thani's wretched, wild and bedouin nature, injunctions and admonitions from my predecessors and myself which were suited to temporal and spatial conditions and expressed softly and in proper language were in vain and no good was derived from him except for his importunate occupation of the government. Nothing of note should be expected from him. This man is bound to remain adamant unless recourse is made to force, nor will he cease his annoying exploits. It is evident that he will not resign his office as qaimmakam. The only thing to do should be to resort to persuasion until his last breath. If this is not possible, then the government should directly perform the tasks ahead without having to think much of the good or the bad sides involved.." BOA, Irade Askeri 1310116. 4 Ibid. BOA, irade Askeri 1310 M/16. 5 BOA, Y.A. Res 60/12.

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All these attempts were indicative of the resoluteness of the Ottoman State in the policy which it had been sustaining in the Gulf since 1871. The Sublime Porte which tried not to create trouble with the British in the region, made efforts to limit the latter's area of influence. In other words, the Ottoman government, which wanted to have the Bahrain coastline and the Qatar peninsula under its control and sovereignty, prepared the administrative and political infrastructure required for this, and avoided all actions likely to undermine its activities. For instance, the British Consul visited Basrah in mid August 1892 to lodge a complaint about the concerted action planned by Jasim al-Thani and Nasser al-Mubarak who planned to launch an attack on Bahrain. The governor of Basrah who reported the case to the Sublime Porte states that he had given necessary instructions to ship captains along the coast of Nejd, to the Ministry of the Marine Affairs and to the mutasarrif of Nejd to avoid all aggressions at sea and that he had warned the sheikhs concerned about the subject. The matter was brought to the attention of Abdiilhamid II who gave orders to the effect that stringent measures should be taken to bring peace to the region where disturbances were reported.1 This shows the seriousness of the policy adopted at the time. As we may see from this instance, while the Ottoman State did its best to forestall the widening of British influence, it tried to prevent the administrators, the sheikhs and the public from doing things which might give rise to British interventions. One other point must be noted here: the activities of the British in Bahrain with reference to sea piracies which acted as an impediment for maritime navigation, were meant to protect her own commercial interests. The Ottoman State had a different purpose in mind. Its objective was to maintain peace and order in the region. To this end, it deemed it sufficient to have there the presence of patrol boats. On the other hand, Britain exerted pressure on the Ottoman State to prevent piracies. The Ottoman State, tactfully tried to counter these acts, while it did not fail to take the necessary measures required for the maintenance of order and peace in the region and on land, in particular. As a matter of fact, while verbal measures against the activities of Jasim and Nasser al-Mubarak who threatened maritime security had been taken, it is notable that at about the same time they had recourse to concrete measures against the desert Arabs who ransacked trade caravans on their way from Ujair to Hasa. According to a decree of the Council of Ministers dated August 17, 1892, it was stated that the reform measures, which had been going on since 1890, should continue, and that, as a provisional measure, a battalion under the command of the Basrah governor himself, be despatched to the region for the maintenance of peace and order and for the recovery of the goods of those Hasa traders who had been robbed. Pursuant to the Sultan's order of the same date, Hafiz Mehmed Pasha, the governor of Basrah, was given the necessary instructions for the execution of this order.2 BOA i.Hus. 1310M/168. BOA, Y.A. Res 60/12, Lef. 1,6; MV7], p. 38.

1 2

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THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

Hafiz Mehmed Pasha, the governor of Basrah, left for Nejd (Hasa), in mid October 1892, at the head of the eleventh "Marksmen" battalion which consisted of two hundred troops "with a view to putting an end to the robberies at Nejd (Hasa) and the surrounding area and to restoring peace and order." The governor, who arrived at the centre of the sanjak of Nejd, as a result of the measures he took quickly stopped the inter-tribal disputes and restored safety to the roads that stretched from Ujair to Hofuf. 1 However, this visit from the governor, was to give rise in 1893 to the turn of events referred to as the "Qatar incidents" in Ottoman records. These incidents were reported to have taken place in the manner described in a memorandum dated September 23, 1893, by the Survey Commission sent to the region. Hafiz Pasha, the governor of Basrah, who had restored peace and order to Nejd and the surrounding area, saw Jasim as the real instigator and abettor of the tribes who were responsible for creating turmoil in the region.2 News was spread about certain events which had taken place in the region in addition to the incidents already described above, and this had increased the apprehension of the governor. According to the governor, those acts which had caused the British to intervene and led to the disturbances on the Nejd coastline, stemmed from an accord between them and Jasim. It was alleged that an agreement signed between the British Consul to Bushire some two and a half years before containing provisions that had foreseen possibilities for the British to create dissension which would give them plausible reasons to exert political pressure and make interventions. It was also reported by Ahmad al-Kebabi, translator to the British Consul at Bushire and Muhammad Abdulwahab, Sheikh of Darein, (opponent of Jasim who formerly resided at Qatar), that the tribes subordinated to Jasim, were being armed and prepared for a rebellion. The allegations directed at Sheikh Jasim who was reported to have been appropriating for the last few years all the taxes and commercial gains of Qatar, and to have a tight hold over Hofuf with the tribes he had gathered around him a couple of years before and who had defied the government officials which had been sent to organise the administration of Qatar and who had been delaying 3 the development of the said organisation, led the governor of Basrah to take action. The allegations directed at Jasim were nothing new. The central administration was well informed of Jasim's status and relations with others, but the policy pursued in the region was a conciliatory one. It has already been ^Kurjun, op. cit., p. 160. BOA, YEE. 14/250/126/8, p. 1.

2

3

Ibid.

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mentioned that Sheikh Jasim in his conflict with Zayed, the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, had asked the Ottoman State for help. However, as the extent of the help provided had not been judged satisfactory by him, the distance, which had separated him from the British whom he thought to be the abettors of Sheikh Zayed, narrowed. W e have to note here, however, that under no conditions would Jasmin have accepted British protection; this fact, well known to Istanbul, was well appreciated. The arming of tribesmen was not new. As a matter of fact, the persons involved in this affair were those who organised arms smuggling in the region. On the other hand, Jasim was well aware of the fact that the Ottoman State was reluctant to establish an administration in Qatar without him. This was not particular to this particular region. As a matter of fact, during the formation of the sanjak of Muntefik, militant sheikhs and the Sa'dunis in the lead, had gradually been neutralised in a sense. We can multiply these instances. In other words, the approach of the Ottoman government which was accustomed to this sort of event, had been one of an openness for discussion which did not allow Jasim to be directly accused of anything in particular, and which refrained from sending troops. Mehmed Hafiz, the governor of Basrah, who paid no regard to the above considerations, reached Qatar with the troops under his command in February 1893, with a view to restoring peace and order in the region.1 Sheikh Jasim, together with the al-Manasir tribe and a unit from the tribe of Beni Hajir and some four or five hundred men he had gathered from among other tribes, had withdrawn into the desert. Mehmed Hafiz Pasha who had arrived in Qatar, dispersed the tribesmen that surrounded Sheikh Jasim and sent word and advice to come and pledge obedience. But Sheikh Jasim, through the mediation of Sheikh Khalid, one of his men, sent a letter addressed to the governor in which he stated that he was loyal to the state and added that he would not accept the invitation, and were the governor to withdraw his troops, he would fulfil his wishes in addition to the payment of ten thousand liras. Mehmed Hafiz Pasha refused the offer saying "that all he wanted was to see Jasim come and pledge obedience after having dismissed his tribesmen" and he added that, in his capacity as a qaim-makam of the state, he would show up without having to fear, anything to prove his loyalty.2 Sheikh Jasim believed that Mehmed Hafiz Pasha's intention was to "get him dead or alive". That is why not only did he not react positively to his invitations, but also intercepted for the period of one month, which elapsed in the meantime, the post between Qatar to Hasa, seizing all official correspondence. Moreover, he positioned part of his men at Salwa and deployed his forces ready for war with a view to waylaying the men of Mubarak al-Sabah who had left Kuwait and were marching to come to the aid of the governor.3

1Ibid. hbid. 3 Ibid, p. 3.

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Under the prevailing circumstances, the governor of Basrah, made up his mind to punish Jasim and started to make preparations on March 25. The governor detained a number of Qatari sheikhs on the ground that they had a part to play in his plans and having deliberated the matter with the officers under his command he decided to take military action. Thirty privates from the battalion consisting of two hundred and fifty soldiers quartered at Qatar added to the "marksmen" battalion, one hundred mounted gendarmes unit and forty Ukail cavalrymen and a gun of three (fonts) and some marines, left Doha on March 26 for the fortress of Wajabah where Jasim was staying. The aim was to destroy this fortress and seize arms. After two hours' march, the troops reached a fortress called Shebaka where they stopped for a rest. The gendarmes and the Ukail cavalry which had been ordered to reconnoitre the area surrounding Wajabah were met with fire from some three to four thousand infantry and cavalry men equipped with Martini guns that Sheikh Jasim had provided and the gendarmes and the Ukail cavalry had to retreat. Whereupon, major Yusuf Efendi positioned a part of the forces under his command on the hills which overlooked the fortress of Shebaka. During the fight that ensued, although the attackers were successful, they eventually had to withdraw in the face of the superior numbers of enemy forces; the hunger and thirst of the soldiers added to their fatigue. During this retreat, the attackers were followed by the enemy and despite the aid that had arrived from the Qatar barracks, the number of those who fell in action was 118 with a further 55 wounded. Furthermore, one hundred and fifty rifles and the artillery piece which had been transported from the corvette "Merih" were seized by the bedouins. Mehmed Hafiz Pasha, the governor of Basrah, who deliberated on the situation during the night aboard the vessel, concluded that they could not carry on with military operations under the circumstances and embarked a greater part of the soldiers who had landed in Qatar aboard the vessels "Merih" and "Miijde Resan". About hundred privates and one officer remained in barracks in Qatar.1 However, neither the governor, nor Sheikh Jasim had expected such developments, as was to be understood from the ensuing events. The governor's idea seems to have been the display of military power that would force Jasim to surrender. In return, Jasim was compelled to retaliate in order to keep his prestige which might have paved the way to his destruction but showed he could no longer master the situation. As a matter of fact, Jasim al-Thani who wrote on March 27, 1893, a letter to the Office of the Grand Vizier and signed it as the qaim-makam of Qatar, described the situation as follows:

*Kur§un, op. cit., pp. 161-162.

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"Despite unswerving loyalty and obedience to our Sultan, Hafiz Pasha, the governor of Basrah, attacked us from land and sea, with the forces of the Imperial Ottoman army, without rhyme or reason. In return, we delivered the country along with its nahiyes to his hands and avoided all encounters. Upon his invitation, I sent him my brother. But he sent him along with other prominent members of this country to jail. This attitude caused hatred among the people and the tribes. I sent him word to the effect that even a governor of the state could not act against the orders of the state. Having disregarded our appeal, he wanted us to fulfil certain acts, which we did not fail to do. On the sixth day of the holy month of Ramadan, while we were in the desert, we were taken unawares. Certain tribes suffered losses, even women and children were not spared. In the face of all these events, the tribes had no other choice but to unite their forces to put up a defence. The Governor, having left his soldiers in the midst of the tribesmen in the company of Tahir Bey took flight and boarded a vessel which went away. This unaccountable action cost a great number of lives. Amongst those who fell in the field along with the prisoners who had been kept on board was my own brother. It is a plain fact that such evil actions perpetrated against its loyal subjects shall not be connived at by the state. Under the circumstances, I humbly beg that an official be sent here to investigate the cruelties and oppression to which the people were subjected. The entirety of Qatar's population are loyal and obedient subjects of the Ottoman State. Former governors and mutasarrifs may be consulted on this issue. The official to be appointed for this purpose will reveal our innocence. We implore your government not to incriminate us in any way whatsoever in matters of justice, righteousness and moderation. We are under the protection of the state. It was Hafiz Pasha who compelled us to commit things we did not wish to happen and to retaliate. God forbid, if we fail in our duties towards the state of which we are obedient servants. To cut a long story short, the inspector who will investigate the matter will reveal the truth of our statement. Should we prove to be in the wrong at the conclusion of the said investigations, we are ready to suffer any punishment to be meted out."1 It appears that the above letter was written while Hafiz Pasha was still on the Qatar coast. For, while Jasim who thought that the sheikhs the governor had detained and his brother had been executed, uses exaggerated language about the developments of the action, he does not fail to repeat at every instance his and his men's loyalty to the state. In other words, he makes a point of stressing the fact that the way he had acted had not been against the state but against the behaviour of the governor of Basrah.

' BOA, V.A. HUS. 273/156.

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The news of these events arrived in Istanbul after a lapse of two weeks and caused anxiety. Sultan Abdülhamid II who had initiated policies that aimed at friendship with Germany was especially upset by this.1 For, the British might take advantage of this and venture to intervene. As a matter of fact, later developments were to justify these worries. Having been notified of these happenings, London ordered her consul at Bushire to proceed to Qatar. The government which carefully followed these developments, taking into consideration the appeals of Hafiz Pasha 2 , the governor of Basrah, initiated a series of actions for the adoption of political measures against prospective intervention from the British and for the eventual despatch of new troops to Qatar. The aftereffects of these events were felt in Istanbul and the belief that the troops were still in a state of siege at Qatar had made the despatch of new troops indispensable. As a result of the correspondence conducted by the Ministry of War, it was concluded that six battalions from Mosul and Baghdad might be sent to prevent the spread of incidents elsewhere and especially to forestall the realisation of ill-intentions held by the British.3 While these discussions were being carried on in Istanbul, Said Efendi, Nákib al-Ashraf of Basrah (representative of the descendants of the Prophet and of the nobles) who enjoyed remarkable prestige in the region, went to see the Sultan and expressed his opinion about a possible reconciliation, suggesting that he would go to Qatar and talk with Jasim and other tribal chiefs. Whereupon, the Sultan asked for the point of view of the Ministry of War as to whether the step to which he gave his consent on April 11, 1893 would be advisable. The Ministry of War, expressed its opinion the very next day as follows: "... Said Efendi's visit all by himself to Qatar may well be interpreted by those who cherish ill intentions against the well-being of the state as if the government was incapable of taking concrete measures and has no other choice but to palliate the situation by admonitions. The despatch of troops and staging a show of force will doubtless stress in the eyes of the people the military strength of the state against the ill-intentions of the British and prove to the tribesmen and bedouins the state's ability to react swiftly to suppress any incidents likely to occur. Although the visit of Said Efendi has been viewed as advisable by the Sultan, we are of the opinion that he should go there in the company of the military and carry out his mission backed up by military forces."4 l BOA, trade Hususi 1310, N/62. 2 According to a letter that the Grand Vizier submitted to the Sultan on April 9, 1893, Hafiz Pasha, the governor of Basrah, had sent a telegram while he was still at the Qatar harbour, in which he had described the situation and asked that an order be given for the despatch of troops from Basrah to Qatar. BOA, Y.A. Hus 272/95. 3 BOA, Y.MTV. 76/125. 4 BOA. Y. MTV. 76/133.

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After this statement which reflected determination on the issue, the Ministry of War added that the Sultan had a decisive say in the matter and that the action would be taken according to the decree he would edict. The decree of the Sultan dated April 12 proved to be in line with the suggestion of the Ministry of War, i.e. the contemplated visit to Qatar of Said Efendi should take place in the company of the military.1 In the meantime, on April 13, 1893, Abdiilhamid II inquired about the details of the problem and wanted to know upon what grounds, by whose order and on whose instructions had Hafiz Pasha, governor of Basrah, gone to Qatar. Abdiilhamid II had since 1882 been on the alert for British threats against the Ottoman State. The British might well act as they had acted in the case of Egypt which they had invaded in 1882 using the 'Urabi Pasha incidents as a pretext. It appears that Abdiilhamid II, who made great sacrifices in order that internal peace might be maintained in the region, was overwhelmed. That is why he had been trying to identify the persons responsible for giving rise to this. The Grand Vizier, in his memorandum addressed to the Sultan, dated April 13, 1893, informed him that Hafiz Pasha, the governor of Basrah, following an appeal by thirty-six people one month previously, had marched on Nejd, with the knowledge of the government, to castigate the Beni Hajir and al-Manasir tribes which had run riot in the region killing people and committing robberies and plunder. 2 The Sultan who evaluated the data available on the subject made the following remarks in his special memorandum dated April 15, 1893 which he sent to the Office of the Grand Vizier: "From a study of documents brought to our attention concerning the rebellious acts that Jasim al-Thani, the qaim-makam of Qatar subordinated to Nejd dared to commit, we have observed great divergences between those reported by the governor of Basrah3and those reported to Said Efendi, a descendant of the Prophet, by the Sheikh of Qatar. 4 The governor, instead of resorting to suitable remedies which would have been more in line with the circumstances had he paid due hbid. BOA, Y.A. Hus. 272/126. a Hafiz Pasha, the governor of Basrah, in his telegram dated March 27, 1893 addressed to the Office of the Grand Vizier, summarising the events and the armed conflict between Jasim and himself, concludes that "Jasim's intention is to obtain autonomy of the said kaza and seize Hasa and the neighbourhood by means of desert brigands. His implications are that he will gather around him the bedouin tribes and get a hold over Hasa." BOA Y.A. Hus. 272/95 4ft appears that Jasim al-Thani corresponded with Said Efendi of Basrah describing to Mm the details of the subject matter and asked him to mediate. Therefore, both the letter of Jasim to which we have referred and other investigations conducted do not seem to square with the aforementioned allegations of the governor of Basrah. 2

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attention to the given characteristics of Qatar, seems to have preferred to act audaciously in the belief that he was faced with a situation such as in the case of other kazas, thus intimidating the tribes. Whereas Jasim should have come over to speak with the governor appointed by the Sultan during his visit to Qatar, his withdrawal from localities and towns as if the troops of a foreign nation were marching on him based on false pretexts created an atmosphere of insecurity which rendered an armed conflict indispensable. Even though one assumes that the governor has failed in certain respects, the chastisement of these insolent renegades is only too natural as the disgrace brought upon the honour of our army by this bloody encounter should be mended. Jasim had expressed his wish to be appointed qaim-makam of Qatar upon its capture in 1871 and has not since then shown any mutinous behaviour. The British had claims of protectorate over the Oman tribes in the environs of Qatar, the Muscat Imamate and the Bahrain sheikhdom. Their intention to extend the scope of these aspirations as far as Qatar should not be a far fetched conjecture. Under the circumstances in chastising the instigators of those incidents which took place in Qatar, a more judicious and moderate action would have been more pertinent. Consequently, instead of despatching troops to punish them as the governor of Basrah seems to suggest, it behoves us to clarify the matter in the first place and unravel the motives for the dispute. Political and military investigations must be conducted in the region, and according to the results obtained, the people and the prominent personalities there must be enlightened about the evil consequences here and hereafter of acts perpetrated against the state, and the Caliphate it represents. Under the circumstances, a committee of inspectors composed of Colonel Rasim Bey, Nakib al-Ashraf Said Efendi and Muhammad al-Sabah, the qaim-makam of Kuwait or his brother Mubarak al-Sabah should immediately be sent to Qatar to admonish and make recommendations. A special committee headed by Dervish Pasha, aide-de-camp to the Sultan, has proposed removal of the governor from office since in remedying the disgrace suffered by the army as a consequence of attacks perpetrated against the soldiers the governor had to assume responsibility for all that happened and this proposal was approved by the Sultan. The Sultan has thus decreed that this committee be immediately sent to Qatar to carry out investigations and make admonitions, and following the removal of the governor from office, the appointment of somebody from the local administration staff pending the assignment of a new governor."1 As one can see from the Sultan's Decree, military measures would have to be sacrificed for political considerations. There were probably two main reasons for this. In the first place, the despatch of troops would have taken

^BOA, Y.A. Hus. 272/95; ¡.Has. 1310 N/68.

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some time1, and, in the second place there was the likelihood that the British might have been taking counter-measures for fear of a new military attack. In point of fact, at about same time, this issue was on the agenda in London and a British political agent in Bushire, on instructions he had received, proceeded to Qatar aboard a corvette and informed the governor of Basrah that he would be willing to intercede.2 The governor refused the offer having in mind to forestall as of now any prospective intervention on the part of the British in the future and barred the entrance of the vessel into the harbour.3 The British Consul who failed in his attempt went to meet Jasim at Wakrah and offered him Britain's protection but was refused.4 In the meantime, Jasim al-Thani, upon the intercession of Abdullah Thunayyan Pasha, member of the Council of Ministers in Istanbul, corresponded with the Office of the Grand Vizier, reiterating his loyalty and begged that the governor of Basrah should not meddle with the affairs of the region pending the arrival of the aforementioned investigative committee. 5 A s a matter of fact, a telegram was sent to the governor of Basrah asking him to come immediately to Istanbul via Bushire.6 The attitude adopted by the British had already been anticipated by the Ottoman government. For this reason while it had initiated the necessary preparations for the visit of the investigation committee due in Qatar7, it had dismissed from office the governor who was assumed to have been the cause of the incidents and appointed Hamdi Pasha in his place.8 In the meantime, the British ambassador who paid a visit to the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs on April 22, 1893, informed the Ministry that in view of the developments taking place at Qatar he had sent a British political agent residing in Bushire to proceed to Qatar on board a warship for the purpose of mediation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that in view of the fact that this region was Ottoman territory there was no need for the despatch there of a British agent and advised him to abandon this attempt.9 Immediately after this interview, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent the following letter to Sir Clare Ford, British ambassador in Istanbul, to which was attached the telegram received from Jasim al-Thani and the people of Qatar in which a pledge of their allegiance was contained.

•BOA, Y.MTV. 76/158. Y.A.HUS. 273/156. 3 BOA, YEE14/250/126/8, p. 4. 4ibid, p. 4,6. 5 BOA, trade Hususi 1310 L/26. 6 BOA, Y.A. Hus. 273/20. 7 BOA, trade Hususi, 1310 N/75. 8 BOA, trade Hususi 1310 L/7. 9 BOA, Y.A. Hus. 273/34. 2 BOA,

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"With reference to our conversation of today you will find attached a copy of a telegram addressed to our state by Jasim, the qaim-makam of Qatar and the Qatar people. As you will readily see for yourself, the signatories thereof appeal to their Sultan, in the capacity of His loyal subjects, so that He may not spare His grace and compassion. It is evident that we shall act in due observance of principles of equity and justice. We thought it necessary to keep you informed thereof." Attached to the same letter was the following note: "I see no reason why a British agent should come to visit. Your examination of the letter will convince you beyond doubt of our rightfulness."1 The reply received from the British embassy the following day gave notice of their intention to transmit the above letter and the text of the telegram to Lord Roseberry, the British Foreign Secretary.2 The fact that the measures which had been resorted to were in line with Jasim's wishes and were not due to the state's weakness towards him, but to apprehension of a likelihood that the British might get hold of him. Although events calmed down it was believed that the British were still active. Despite the fact that he was removed from the office of governor, Hafiz Pasha carried on his correspondence with the Office of the Grand Vizier which confirmed this state of affairs. Although a decision had already been made concerning the despatch of an investigative committee to Qatar, it had not gone as yet, and instead rumours had been spread by British agents to the effect that they carried out investigations in the region on behalf of the Ottoman government which were reported to have created restlessness among the tribes.3 Abdiilhamid II who was kept informed of these developments on a daily basis ordered the immediate despatch of a committee headed by Said Efendi, Nakib al-Ashraf of Basrah, to Qatar to implement as soon as possible measures for the protection of the sacred law of the Ottoman State and the appointment of a new governor. 4 The investigative committee which went to Qatar and after concluding its investigations returned to report its impressions to the Office of the Grand Vizier. The latter transmitted the data received to the Sultan on July 3, 1893.

Following the pardon and amnesty announced in the report of the investigative committee back from Qatar, Jasim al-Thani and all the tribes under him immediately pledged allegiance and displayed their loyalty. People

^BOA, FJW7V 76/133. BOA, Y.A.HUS. 273/34. 3 BOA, Y.A. Hus. 273/156. 4 BOA, bade Hususi, 1310 L/l 18. 2

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who had abandoned their homes during the incidents in questions repaired piecemeal to their homes and were thankful to have done so. The gun which was lost as soon as it had been landed from the corvette "Merih" was delivered on board the vessel "Sahir". It was furthermore decided that the 152 Martini rifles in possession of the people should be returned and delivered within five months either without any consideration in return or against payment of two and a half lira each. A deed was obtained from Jasim in which he undertook to collect the tax arrears as recorded for the Qatar district and if he failed to do so to indicate the locations where the said taxes were to be collected. Thanks to these palliative measures security and order on land and at sea in Qatar were achieved. Although the British Consul to Bushire offered Jasim British protection he refused it proving his resoluteness in his loyalty to the state. The report, which stressed the fact that a resort to violence in total disregard of regional conditions had paved the way for the eruption of the aforementioned events, stated that the originals of those vouchers received for arms and tax arrears, had been forwarded to Istanbul. The report also mentioned that it enclosed two letters of allegiance from the people addressed to the Sultan. 1 This report which confirmed the accomplishments achieved in the areas of security and order in Qatar and the sincere loyalty of the people to the Caliphate also included suggestions for additional measures to be taken in the maintenance of the status quo. It was pointed out that although the replacement of the troops in Qatar with fresh troops and the availability of a fast moving vessel in Qatar were among the requirements, this was not sufficient to achieve the overall safety of the Nejd coastline. On the other hand, the fact that Qatar was somewhat remote from the Nejd (Hasa), which was the administrative centre of the mutasarriflik, communications could not be properly realised and this situation created a major drawback to the functioning of an administrative organisation. Overland communication took 20-25 days and were frequently subject to attack on the road by tribesmen. Thus it was suggested that easier sea transportation had to be accomplished which would be less time consuming. In this way the state would be in a position to benefit from the advantages of the maritime trade which had been monopolised by foreigners. Given the fact that the British who had offered protection to Jasim would relentlessly pursue their policy, strengthening of the links with the region and the realisation of safer communication routes depended on taking maritime measures.2 From a reading of this report one is inclined to infer that Jasim who was advanced in years intended to resign his post. The committee of investigation was of the opinion that it would be advisable to appoint in his place Ahmad, his brother. 1 2

BOA, Y. /WYV79/ 113.

Ibid.

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Moreover, it was also pointed out that since the barracks in Qatar used during the winter was an old clay fortress on the point of collapse, the construction of a new fortress would be suitable and reflect the glory of the state.1 As a matter of fact, thanks to the positive impression left by both the investigative committee and to the measures which had been adopted, Qatar returned to normal towards the end of May 1893 and the persons who had served this cause were rewarded.2 However the government, not content with all of these, sent a new investigative committee composed of Ahmed Muzaffer and Ismail Beys in office in Basrah and had the situation re-evaluated. Upon their return, the said gentlemen submitted a detailed report in which they not only described the Qatar incidents but also gave a detailed description of Qatar and its environs, making suggestions for further means to reinforce the safety of the region.3 We understand from the aforementioned report that not only did Jasim disclose his intention to resign his post but also handed them a letter of resignation to be submitted to Abdtilhamid II. 4 It appears that Jasim whose resignation had not been approved was eventually persuaded to remain in office. Moreover, the majority of those arms which were in possession of the tribes were collected as promised by Jasim and delivered to Major Hiiseyin Rami Efendi, battalion commander of Qatar5 and were sent from there on board the "Miijde-Resan" to Basrah.6

l

Ibid. ^Among those rewarded was Abdurrahman b, Faisal. The Sultan's decree dated June 21, 1893 about Abdurrahman b. Faisal who had to quit Nejd because of his conflict with Ibn Rashid read as follows :'The Sultan decreed to allow Abdurrahman b. Faisal to reside at the kasaba of Zubeir in the neighbourhood of Basrah or in Kuwait and pay him on a monthly basis two thousand five hundred kurushes and to his retinue one hundred kurushes each for services rendered to the state." BOA, trade Hususi 1310 Z/16. 3 BOA, YEE 14/250/126/8; Idris Bostan, "The Uprising in Qatar and Sheikh A1 Sani's Letter to Abdiilhamid II", Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations, II, pp. 81-89, Istanbul 1987. ^*The aforementioned letter from Jasim is dated July 30, 1893. This means that he had already written it before the arrival of the committee. After the usual laudatory formula addressed to the Sultan, Jasim writes as follows: "I have been your obedient servant for the last 24 years. I was forty when I pledged allegiance, and now I am 65. I was already wealthy and I had made my fortune through trade. I put at the disposal of the glorious state all my belongings I have given my youth and wealth in the service of the state. I neither have an annuity nor a revenue from anywhere, I cannot get even a single rupee from the vilayet. I no longer have the zeal and effort, my property is ruined and I am too exhausted to carry on in the office of Qaim-makam. Under the circumstances I implore God and beg the head of the believers to be excused from office. I shall be happy and satisfied in this situation and continue to be at your obedient service. I have already mentioned my intention. I am yours to command." We see that his resignation was not accepted and he was persuaded to continue in his office. 5 BOA, Y.A. Hus. 298/70. 6 BOA, Y.A. Hus. 306/72.

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2. The Zubarah and Odeid Question: British on Zubarah

Attacks by

the

Said Pasha, former Mutasarrif of Nejd, gives the following information about Zubarah, a part of the Qatar peninsula to be found within the jurisdiction of Qatar. A Bahrain sheikh, Muhammad b. Khalifa, ancestor of Nasser al-Mubarak, Ahmad al-Nasser, Samed al-Abdullah and Ali al-Nasser was the man who had restored for the first time the fort of Zubarah, resided at Hasa, and was on the payroll of the Ottoman Government and had at the same time a 50% share in the entire property of the sheikhs of Bahrain. Upon the latter's demise, Sheikh Ahmad al-Khalifa, his son, took over the sheikhdom and three years later, captured the Bahrain Island, which was considered an integral part of Nejd. Leaving behind his next of kin in Zubarah, Ahmad alKhalifa settled in Bahrain Island where he established orchards and some fifteen villages. Later, during the Egyptian campaigns on Nejd (1811-1818)1 Zubarah was destroyed, and only three or four villages and the fort remained.2 Data relative to the history of the region available in the Ottoman records call for further study. However, as far as we know, Anglo-Ottoman controversies began a short time after the establishment of Qatar as a kaza. The Ottoman State wanted to organise Zubarah as a unit subordinated to its political and administrative control, to which the British were opposed without any juridical grounds. Efforts at improving Zubarah which made the place prosperous and successful, threatened the British presence in Bahrain. Nevertheless, the British, opposed to the Ottoman activities here, never made a claim on Zubarah in terms of supremacy or protection like the one made on Bahrain. Their intention was to create de facto recognition. As a matter of fact, the British had launched an attack on Zubarah from the sea in 1875. Not long after the situation had returned to normal, the Qatar tribes began roaming on land, and at sea, and pearl-divers continued their trade and paying their taxes. Ottoman officials had not been appointed to Zubarah, because at the time of Qatar's transformation into a kaza Zubarah was not inhabited. In the 1890s the Ottoman State decided to form a nahiye there and appoint an administrator to realise this goal. However, as there was no government office in the locality and no barracks available to accommodate the soldiers, the person appointed as administrator had had to reside in Qatar's administration centre. The British protested against the Ottoman's appointing an administrator

The Ottoman state had appointed Mehmed Ali Pasha, Governor of Egypt, to quash the Wahabi movement which had broken out at Nejd. As a result of a series of regular attacks he launched on the region between the years 1811-1818, he took the Nejd and Hasa coastline under his control which was to continue until 1840. 2 State Archive of Qatar File No 9/5, p. 238.

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to Zubarah and undertaking settlement activities.1 Britain, which heard of the appointments of administrators to Zubarah and Odeid, appealed to the Ottoman Government through her ambassador to Istanbul on December 1890, and desired to know if what they had heard was true. As the Ottoman government left the inquiry unanswered, Britain sent a diplomatic note dated March 22, 1891 informing that they would not connive at the occupation of the places in questions by the Ottomans. The diplomatic note from Britain delivered by the British ambassador to Istanbul read as follows: "No answer has so far been received to the official note sent about the truth of the rumoured occupation of Odeid and Zubarah. The sheikh of Abu Dhabi is one of the signatories of a maritime treaty signed with Britain. Therefore, my government will not connive at the occupation of a spot deemed to be under him by the Ottoman government. I have been instructed to communicate this to His Excellency."2 The Sublime Porte, in its reply of July 11, 1891, stated that the places concerned were within the jurisdiction of the province of Basrah and that they had always been under the administration of qaim-makams and administrators. It was furthermore made plain that the alleged treaty signed with the sheikh of Abu Dhabi was unknown to the Ottoman government and that such a treaty would not have any official validity in any case. Whereupon, Britain, in her reply dated August 26, 1891, repeated her former claims and appended the text of the agreement signed on May 4, 1853 with certain local sheikhs in the Persian Gulf.3 The Ottoman government provided a reply to this British memorandum in January 1892, in which it repeated that Zubarah and Odeid were within Basrah's area of jurisdiction. It furthermore stressed the fact that in view of the Ottoman sovereignty over the places where the sheikhs (signatories of accord) had been residing, the British political agents should avoid all intercessions between various sheikhs in this region without the consent of the Sublime Porte, and that accords so far signed would not affect in the least the rights of sovereignty belonging to the Ottoman Sultan. The Sublime Porte argued that the said accords were but agreements signed between certain sheikhs and had nothing to do with the issue of occupation of Odeid and Zubarah by the Ottoman government.4 h hc fact that the administrators officially appointed to Zubarah avoided going there was partly due to the protests of the British. For, while the Ottoman state formed a nahiye there to prove its sovereignty, it preferred on the other hand, to accommodate the administrator at the administrative centre of Qatar until an opportune moment presented itself in order not to give rise to a new crisis with the British. ^Babiali Hariciye Nezareti, al- Qatar Sahilleri Meselesi, Istanbul 1334, p. 2. 3 Ibid, p. 3. 4 Ibid, p. 4.

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105

As a matter of fact, an examination of the so called "Maritime Treaty" showed that it was related to those pirates of which the objective was the prevention of maritime trade in pearl diving. In other words, these accords, which had no binding effect in terms of international law, had been concluded with the sheikhs merely for the sake of the safety of the British merchant navy and had no relevance with regard to the sea. They did not relate to the integral parts of the Qatar peninsula like Zubarah and Odeid. As a matter of fact, the resolute policy of the Ottoman State, and its well grounded reasons, repressed for a period of time at least the allegations of the British and forestalled all de facto attempts until 1895. It was a known fact that the British had established control over the sheikhs along the coastline by benefiting from the disputes between them. With mediation from their Consul to Bushire, they took side with one of the sheikhs, at the same time exerting pressure on his adversary, thus exercising control over both of them. The developments which took place in Bahrain in the autumn of the year 1895 had given another such opportunity to the British. Sultan b. Muhammad Sallame, sheikh of the Al-i b. Ali tribe who had fled from the atrocities of Isa, Sheikh of Bahrain, went together with his two thousand men to settle at Zubarah in the kaza of Qatar. The British Consul to Bushire took immediate action and sent warships to the Qatar coast and Zubarah to force these tribesmen to return to Bahrain.1 On Sheikh Sultan b. Muhammad Sallame's rejection of this, Zubarah was subjected to bombardment. During the bombardment, which lasted for four days and nights, the supply of rations was cut off, the pearl trade was halted and about 1000 boats belonging to the local people and a ship lay besieged. During this gunfire, the number of casualties was high, a great many ships were burnt and Zubarah was destroyed.2 In the meantime, the British Consul caused the Na'im tribe, and the ships which survived the onslaught together with the tribe of Ali b. Ali, along with their ships, goods and pearls to be transported to Bahrain and seized the ships and property of the Qatar people.3 Despite all these events and the forced return of the greater part of his tribe, Sheikh Sultan b. Muhammad, resisted the pressure exerted by the British Consul and settled with his family of fifty members among the Zubarah ruins.4 The Mutasarnf of Nejd, who wrote a report on this issue to the province on October 28, 1895, expressed his wish to show due attention and kindness to Sheikh Sultan who had set off for the province of Basrah and to pay him and his tribesmen a salary.5

1

BOA, BEO 59642. In the report submitted to the Sublime Porte on this issue we read the following: "The gunfire killed more than one thousand people, the Ottoman flag, the government office and numerous houses and mosques were burned down." Ibid. 3 Ibid\ BOA, §D 2158, Lef. 76. 4 BOA, §D 2158/10 Lef. 76; 2170/7, Lef. 1. -'Ibid.

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THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

Sheikh Sultan departed aboard a vessel bound for Basrah but had to drop anchor due to bad weather when he arrived at Ra's-Tennurah. The letter, dated January 1896, from the Governor of Basrah, stated that Sheikh Sultan, while waiting in at Ra's-Tennurah, was attacked and killed by the sons of Majid b. Muhammad al-Dayayeh, one of the Amamire sheikhs, Muhammad, Ahmad and Rashid at the order of Isa, Sheikh of Bahrain.1 Following this event, the Mutasarnf of Nejd continued to correspond with the government and demanded that a salary of 750 kurushes be paid to Ali b. Sultan Sallame, son of the sheikh who had taken refuge with the Sultan together with his family. 2 Although there is no document to prove that this request was satisfied, we should not doubt that the answer was a positive one considering what the Ottoman State's past practices had been at this time. On the other hand, the British Consul continued to exert pressure on Jasim, the qaim-makam of Qatar, after the Zubarah raid.3 The British Consul to Bushire, in his letter addressed to Jasim on February 1896, said "that the real author of dissensions in Bahrain was he himself", and stated that a fine of 30,000 rupees was exacted so that his case would be an example to deter others. However, the British Consul was certainly not in a position to exact such a penalty. Nevertheless, as one can see from the development of the issue towards the end of the letter, the Consul had demanded the payment of this money as a ransom against the pearling fleet and goods of Qatar which had been confiscated in the Zubarah harbour. The Consul stated in his aforementioned letter that the boats seized would be destroyed in case the money asked for was not paid within thirty days, adding that he would be visiting Wakrah on February 17 for the collection of this money. Jasim, who turned a deaf ear to these challenges, not only spoke with the Consul, who had come to Wakrah for an audience, but notified the Mutasarnf of Nejd about the incidents asking assistance from the state.4 It appears from the correspondence that the real motive behind the bombardment of Zubarah was the settlement areas which were being developed and were likely to threaten Bahrain, in other words, a fear that the interests of 1 BOA, §D 2170/7, Lef. 3. 2'fhe letter dated January 30, 1896 of the Mutasarnf of Nejd reads as follows: It is a natural consequence of our Sultan's infinite compassion to supply provisions for the sustenance of the kith and kin of Sheikh Sultan who has proved more than once his loyalty and faithfulness to the Sultan and Caliph of the Ottoman by putting up a fierce resistance against foreign iniquities and insidious provocations. Therefore, I beg that a salary of 750 kurushes be allocated and paid as mentioned." Ibid, Lef. 2 , 5 , 6 .

^In point of fact the object of such pressures was not merely directed to Sheikh Jasim. According to the contents of certain correspondence dating from mid June 1896 Sheikh Zayed, Sheikh of Oman who had had enough of British oppression informed through the mediation of the Sheikh of Muscat, the French government of his wish to become a French subject. The sources indicate that the French promised that they would protect Sheikh Zayed against British aggressions. Deniz Miizesi Argivi (Naval Museum Archives), MKT 84. 4 BOA. BEO 59642.

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107

the British were in danger. Although the British Consul to Bushire at times exceeded his authority in terms of his country's policies, the fact that he never said a word about British protection or supremacy proves that the real gist of this matter lay in the protection of real British supremacy in Bahrain. On the other hand, the Ottoman State while, claiming that it enjoyed rights of sovereignty over Bahrain, seems to have concentrated its efforts on the organisation of Zubarah and its environs in an administrative context, and in providing security measures along the coast, so that it did not find the moment propitious to actualise its claims. In May 1896, the British still had in their possession the pearling fleet and ships which had been seized. Now that the season for pearl-diving was approaching, there were rumours that the boats would be given back provided that the inhabitants of two villages subordinated to Qatar accepted the idea of a British protectorate. However, further investigations showed that the British burned the ships they had seized in Bahrain. 1 The Sultan, who took into account the possible ill-effects of such rumours, ordered that a corvette be despatched to the Qatari coast at great haste in order to cruise in the area and restore order.2 This matter was deliberated by the Council of Ministers on May 27, 1896. According to information obtained from the Ministry of Marine Affairs, the Council of Ministers' decision was to the effect that as one of the ships which lay in anchor at Basrah had already been commissioned to go to the Qatar coast, the Government would take any necessary measures in case an attack occurred.3 It appears that the Ottoman government, while trying to take measures necessary to securing order and peace on the Qatari coast, made contacts with the British government in order to ask for an explanation of the incidents they had given rise to. As a matter of fact, the subject was put on the agenda during a session of the Council of Ministers held on July 1, 1896, and the Government reached the following resolution: "We have been informed that Zubarah was subject to gunfire and the boats used in pearl-diving were seized in order to be sent to Bahrain. The return of these boats was offered against a ransom of thirty thousand rupees. Thereafter, intelligence was received to the effect that the boats which had been burned at Bahrain, caused great losses to the people. We understand, based on the incoming information, that people cannot go out to sea to engage in pearl-diving, which is their only *Deniz Müzesi Argivi, MKT. 1032/80. BOA, trade Hususi 1313 Zilhicce/11. 3 B O A , M V 8 7 , p. 42. 2

108

THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

source of income, for fear of being attacked. The British government already asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to contact our Embassy in London to demand an explanation for these incidents. It was decided therefore to write to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to learn whether an answer had been received, in principle, details thereof to be discussed later on, and in case no reaction had been obtained, to reiterate our demand and inform the undersigned of the results as soon as possible."1 As a matter of fact, the Ottoman government, in its contacts with the British government through its Embassy in London, made it clear that Zubarah belonged to them and that the law of the Ottoman State should be respected there. The British government, in reply to this, made the following statement in an official note which was signed and sent to the Ottoman Embassy in London: "The measures adopted in this region originate from the rightful defence of the Bahrain islands under the protection of Britain. On the other hand, the British government does not agree to the fact that Zubarah is under Ottoman sovereignty."2 In the correspondence which had been exchanged between the Ottoman government and Britain since 1890, Britain kept denying Ottoman sovereignty over the region although refraining from mentioning the authority which actually held sway over the area. In other words, they neither alleged that Zubarah was under their dominion or under Bahrain's sovereignty. Nevertheless, they did not conceal the fact that the interest they showed in Zubarah was due to the likely threat posed from there to Bahrain. Therefore, they interpreted all activities deployed by the Ottoman State in Zubarah, Odeid and such regions as challenges directed at them. The topic on the agenda most frequently discussed between the Ottoman State and the British in the Persian Gulf was that of Kuwait rather than the Qatari coast and Bahrain. Dissensions among family members stirred up in Kuwait, which had been viewed as a qaim-makam's district of the Ottoman State since 1869, diverted the attentions of both states in the aforementioned direction. Thus, the issue of Qatar and its coast was suspended, even though only provisionally. The Ottoman State was circumspect in its approach, and in order not to give rise to further developments of civil strife, it had to accept the de facto situation unwillingly. On the other hand, a strong antagonism was aroused among the family members and a fierce opposition was put up by such leaders as Ibn Rashid of Shammar and Jasim b. Thani for various reasons against Mubarak al-Sabah who had seized the Sheikhdom of Kuwait. Britain 1

B O A , M V 8 8 , p. 35 2Qatar Sahilleri Meselesi, p. 5.

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109

which took advantage of this, signed a secret accord in 1899 with Mubarak, the Sheikh of Kuwait. This accord was similar to the ones Britain had signed at the beginning of the 19th century with others sheikhs in the region. According to this accord, the Sheikh of Kuwait would not allow any state except Britain to have administrators on this soil without permission from Britain. The provisions of this accord would also apply to territories assumed to belong to the Sheikh of Kuwait under the occupation of another government. 1 According to this, Britain assumed Kuwait to be independent, and considered the activities conducted by the Ottoman State in this region as the activities of a foreign state. Moreover, the expression "territories under occupation belonging to the Sheikh" alluded to Bubian and Warbahh island. As a result of this, after the previously mentioned date, Britain's sole preoccupation was to see to it that Ottoman outposts on the Bubian island were removed. The Ottoman State was obliged to sign with the British an agreement for the "preservation of the status quo" in the region in the face of such a fait accompli at Kuwait, which it considered as a qaim-makam's district subordinated to the province of Basrah. However, both parties had different conceptions of the expression "status quo". Thus, the issue was deferred at least provisionally.2 The Kuwait issue, which had been a bone of contention for such a long time, had excluded from the agenda other issues pertaining to the Persian Gulf. However, this had not interrupted the exploration, control and maritime research activities of the British in the Persian Gulf.3 As a matter of fact, in the wake of the provisional settlement of the Kuwait question towards the end of 1901, problems which had to do with other parts of the Gulf started to rise on the agenda. We understand from correspondence conducted in March 1902 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman State, that the British had recently planted poles at certain spots on the Ujair coastline and despatched a ship to the Qatar coast. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman State immediately contacted London demanding a removal of these poles. The Ottoman State was furious to hear from the British Foreign Office that the said poles were believed to have been planted there simply for sounding purposes and that they would examine the matter and provide a formal answer afterwards. This answer had been interpreted as procrastination aimed at excluding the topic from the agenda. Indeed, in a letter dated March 18, 1902 addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Office of the Grand

1 Babiall Hariciye Nezareti, Bagdad Hattt ve Basra Korfezine Muteallik ingiltere Hakkindaki Layiha ve Merbutati, p. 14. 2 BOA, BEO 192674. ^BabiSli Hariciye Nezareti, Bagdad Hath..p. 23.

Metalibati

110

THE OTTOMANS

IN

QATAR

Vizier, the urgency of the matter, which did not allow any postponement, was made clear, and both the Ottoman Ambassador to London and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were told to display all their assiduity in the settlement of this question and in the removal of the poles.1 The despatch of a British ship to the region was severely criticised and an order was given to the Ministry of Marine Affairs for the despatch of a sufficient number of ships to the region in question. 2 Whereupon, at the beginning of April, two howitzers and a battalion of regular troops were sent to Kateef on board the corvette "Zuhaf". One of the companies making up the said battalion and a howitzer were reserved for the defence of the Ujair port, the remaining three companies and one howitzer were positioned at the Anej fort located at half an hour's distance from Kateef. In the meantime, according to the intelligence received, the poles planted at a distance of two hours from the Ujair harbour by the British had been toppled over either because of strong winds or by animals. Intelligence was received at this time that the British had planted five poles on the Zubarah and Odeid Coast of the kaza of Qatar which had given rise to disturbances and restlessness among local tribes. Under these circumstances, the Ottoman State needed to make great efforts in securing the safety of the land and the coastline.3 One such effort was the appointment of an administrator to Jazirat'ul Amair which stood between Wakrah and Kateef on the one hand, and Kuwait on the other, along with the appointments of administrators to Zubarah and Odeid. As was already explained above, administrators had already been appointed in 1891 to Zubarah and Odeid. However, due to the resumption of the Qatar coastline issue, the appointment of an administrator to Jazirat'ul Amair was once more on the agenda because of its proximity to Wakrah and Kuwait. The Ottoman government appointed Arab Efendi to the nahiye of Zubarah and Abdulkerim Vefik Efendi as administrator to the nahiye of Odeid and started preparations to do the same for two other regions. Arab Efendi arrived in the administrative centre of sanjak in Nejd on March 1903, on his way to take up office. Talib Pasha, Mutasarrif of Nejd, in his letter addressed to the province of Basrah, mentioned the arrival of Arab Efendi, adding to the difficulties involved in having an official at Zubarah. He stated that there were disadvantages to having an administrator of the nahiye all by himself at Zubarah which was a den of marauders, and where there was no hut, let alone a house to accommodate him, and commented that barracks should be erected and at least a company of soldiers had to be stationed there. In his letter he suggested that appointment of one of the local tribal chiefs would be appropriate pending the completion of the suggested constructions, the deployment of soldiers and the encouragement of people to go and settle there.4

^BOA, BEO 135914. BOA, BEO 136057. 3 BOA, BEO 162189.

2

4

BOA, BEO 162189.

THE ANGLO-OTTOMAN CONTROVERSIES OVER QATAR AND BAHRAIN

111

In the meantime, Abdiilkerim Vefik, a former Public Debts official of Kateef, who had been appointed administrator to Odeid, in this letter dated April 1, 1903, addressed to the sanjak of Nejd, mentioned the name of a Monsieur Cosigin, British Vice-Consul to Bahrain. The British packet ship that Abdiilkerim Vefik had boarded on his way to the place where he was appointed had dropped anchor at Bushire. This gentleman came to have a talk with him. The latter having mentioned that administrators had been appointed to Wakrah, Zubarah and Odeid, said that Yusuf Efendi, the administrator of Wakrah, and Arab Efendi, the administrator of Zubarah had recently passed by there, and asked Abdiilkerim whether he was the administrator appointed to Odeid. During the interview between Abdiilkerim and Cosigin, the latter declared that the British would on no account allow an administrator to reside at Odeid and reminded him menacingly of the Zubarah incidents in 1895.1 We understand from Ottoman documents that at the time considerable correspondence had been exchanged between the Mutasarrif of Nejd, the province of Basrah and the Ministry of the Interior, and among the subjects they dealt with were settlement plans in addition to the appointment of administrators. As a matter of fact, these administrators, who were appointed to localities where there were no facilities and no safety, received their salaries while remaining at their residence at the kaza. Talib Pasha, Mutasarrif of Nejd, who drew attention, in his letter addressed to the Province of Basrah on April 8, 1903, provides information on Odeid, Zubarah, Wakrah and Jazirat'ul Amair. Talib Pasha, who suggests that the office of administrator at Odeid, south-east of Qatar, might be an attractive one given the fact that it had a revenue of its own, states that provided safety and order were established there, the people of the island of Delme subordinated to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi would soon come to settle in the region. This was likely to undermine the interest of those who shared a common interest with the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. Likewise, if order and safety were to be restored in Zubarah, the Bahrainis would not delay in coming over and settling here. Thus, settlements in Zubarah and Odeid would lead to a withdrawal from Bahrain, which, in turn, would decrease the influence and interests of the Sheikh of Bahrain. Under the circumstances, the region would be constantly at the mercy of robbers and the sheikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi. 2 The Mutasarrif of Nejd, who drew attention to the above facts, accounted for the recent navigation of British ships in the region arguing that this was due to the intelligence they had received about the appointment of an administrator. Moreover, he proposed the suspension of any despatch of an administrators to the region until the erection of forts, one each at Odeid and Zubarah, after a survey by engineers and the accommodation of military units in Odeid and Zubarah, namely one of 80 contingents in the former and 60 in the latter.3

J

BOA, BEO 162189.

2 3

Ibid. Ibid.

112

THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

The first reaction by the British to these initiatives by the Ottoman State involved staging demonstrations of influence in the region with a show of vessels and positioning markers in certain parts of the sea.1 They also voiced protests to the Sublime Porte. The Ottoman press had already mentioned the intention of appointing administrators to Zubarah, Wakrah and Odeid. The British Ambassador who had appealed to the Sublime Porte after having read of this news, expressed his government's viewpoint and demanded guarantees for a stop to such intentions. The Sublime Porte denied the truth of the news published in the press and made promises to this effect. However, these promises by the Sublime Porte were meant to divert attention as it had proceeded on with its intention. Whereupon, the British Foreign Office gave a diplomatic note on April 30, 1903 to the Sublime Porte, mentioning its uneasiness 2 and warned that all initiatives against the promises made would engender serious consequences. The Sublime Porte, which had adopted a policy of appeasement, had to retrace its steps in the face of this reaction and notified Britain of the fact that it had refrained from making such appointments.3 However, as we have already said, during the pursuit of this policy, some of the administrators had already left for their destination. It appears that Abdiilkerim Efendi, who had been appointed to Wakrah, refrained from proceeding on to his place of appointment for reasons unknown (as a result of the threats previously expressed by Monsieur Cosigin) and Yusuf Efendi replaced him. The latter went on to take over the office thanks to the assistance of Sheikh Ahmad (probably the same Ahmad b. Thani, brother to Jasim). Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary who had heard of the situation through Campbell, their representative at Bushire, summoned the Ottoman Ambassador to London, telling him that he had received this news with much concern despite the promises made and that he would not acquiesce in it.4 The Sublime Porte, in the face of such a reaction, cancelled the appointment of Yusuf Efendi and summoned him back and appointed instead Abdurrahman al-Thani, a local sheikh. Britain considered this new appointment to be against the decision of "the preservation of status quo" contending that the status quo had to be maintained as it existed.5 Despite the fact that the Sublime Porte argued that the British had no right of intervention in its rights and authorities in those regions over which it enjoyed sovereignty, it recoiled from a possible confrontation like the one during the Zubarah incident. For, in case the administrators appointed had to be removed from office by force, a new political issue would arise which would be of a ' Ibid. For the French original of this note, see: Babidli Hariciye Nezareti, al-Qatar Sevahili Istanbul 1334, pp. 14-16. 3 BOA, BEO 162189; Babiali Hariciye Nezareti, Bagdat Hatti.., p. 33. 4 BOA, BEO 162189. -'Ibid. 2

Meselesi,

THE ANGLO-OTTOMAN CONTROVERSIES OVER QATAR A N D BAHRAIN

113

scale difficult to cope with. On the other hand, the governorship of Basrah, in view of the seriousness of the issue, had appealed to the government desiring to know the policy to be pursued in case of a prospective aggression by the British. Whereupon, the Sublime Porte found an interim way out. It decided to appoint among the local tribe chiefs those deemed to be fit for the job, instead of appointing administrators from outside. The Sublime Porte which knew that their employment in the capacity of administrators would also be met with protest, passed a resolution on September 3, 1903, according to which persons to be appointed from among the local people would have the title of a sheikh. As a matter of fact, to avoid possible protests, it was decided that Abdurrahman b. Thani was to receive his salary not in the capacity of an administrator but as a sheikh and the appointment of an administrator was deferred until a later date.1 The Sublime Porte had not abandoned its argument but postponed the affair until an opportune moment came along. In the meantime, Istanbul had learned that Lord Curzon, the Governor of India was to pay a visit to the Persian Gulf and have talks with the local sheikhs. It was reported that Lord Curzon, in the company of Atkinson, commander of the British fleet in India, would, escorted by six warships, call respectively at Bushire, Bahrain and Kuwait and from there proceed to Muhammarah. 2 It appears that for the Ottoman government this visit was no surprise. The Ottoman State,3 which interpreted this trip as a display of force staged to impress the local Arab sheikhs and to induce them to sign secret accords with Britain, ordered its officials in the region to try to learn the secret intentions which lay behind this trip. It was learned that the itinerary had comprised Karachi, Muscat, Bahrain and Kuwait.4 However, Lord Curzon left Karachi on October 16, 1903 and arrived in Muscat on October 21 and ended his trip after having talks with the local sheikhs there.5 The British Governor General's visit had stressed once again the persistence of their policy in the region. Nevertheless, a point to consider was the fact that, although the itinerary of Lord Curzon had included Kuwait whose statute had been the subject of discussion only recently and Bahrain then under British protection, there was no mention of Qatar. This shows that the British were not as insistent about Qatar as they had been with the other region. The Ottoman State must have been aware of this and had been particular about having a warship present at Qatar in 1904.6

' Ibid, Babiäli Hariciye Nezareti, Bagdat Haiti...; 2

B O A , trade Hususi

1321 L 7 / 9 3 .

-Ibid. 4

Ibid.

5

B O A . Y.A.HUS. 486/69.

6

BOA, BEO 183900.

p. 33.

114

THE O T T O M A N S

IN

QATAR

In the spring of 1905, the British occupied Manama, the administrative centre of Bahrain, using as a pretext the dispute which had arisen between a European citizen and the son of the brother of Isa, Sheikh of Bahrain. The British, who had until that day spoke sometimes of Bahrain's independence and sometimes of its protection, now achieved de facto administration of the island. While they let the houses and property of the inhabitants they considered as offenders be looted in total disregard of Isa, Sheikh of Bahrain, they seized the taxes which had been collected and the pearling revenue of the region. It was rumoured that Sheikh Isa, who had until then claimed to be independent had now started claiming to be a subject of the Ottoman government. 1 Although Sheikh Isa was not sincere in this attitude, he was considered to be in line with the policy pursued by the Ottoman State. Therefore, the Sublime Porte decided to investigate the matter and take action vis-a-vis Britain. The principal concern of the Ottoman government was the risk of this issue escalating. As a matter of fact, Mubarak al-Sabah, the Sheikh of Kuwait, who saw danger in the face of a defection to Kuwait by certain traders in Bahrain, had attempted to close the British consulate in Kuwait. Whereupon, the British had sent warships to Kuwait and threatened Mubarak al-Sabah. 2 Following the development of this state of affairs the Council of Ministers which met on May 7, 1905 deliberated the matter. The Council of Ministers took up the recent incidents which had occurred in Bahrain and Kuwait and decided on making a study as to the ways of defending the sovereignty rights of the Ottomans and the protection of the Basrah and Nejd coastline. To this end, the Council of Ministers commissioned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to find remedies for the problems in question 3 and the Ministry of Marine Affairs to send ships and repair those available there and order the Ministry of Internal Affairs to achieve a consolidation of the administration in the region of Nejd and for the reinforcement of the tribes with ties of loyalty to the Ottoman State. 4 In the meantime, a reply to the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came with a diplomatic note dated May 20, 1905. Britain categorically stated that Bahrain Island was under its own protection and that it would on no account negotiate on the matter with the Ottoman State and it would disregard henceforward all new arguments put forward by the Ottoman government. 5 Tevfik Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, upon the order of the Government, made a new study of events in the Persian Gulf and submitted on a report to the Office of the Grand Vizier on May 15 1905. The Minister of

^BOA, BEO 1898113. BOA, Y.MTV 272/137. 3 BOA, BEO 19674. 4 BOA,MVlll,p. 33/1. 5 BOA, BEO 189813. 2

THE ANGLO-OTTOMAN CONTROVERSIES OVER QATAR AND BAHRAIN 115

Foreign Affairs, who made a point of the fact that the disputes over the Persian Gulf between the Ottoman State and Britain were focused on the Bahrain Island, Kuwait and the sanjak of Nejd, gave a detailed account of his studies on these three subjects. We shall avoid here entering into a detailed discussion on the matter and content ourselves to dwell on the conclusions which were reached. The Minister of Foreign Affairs conclusion was as follows: "..There is no doubt that with the conquest of the region of Iraq, Bahrain had automatically come under the sovereignty of the Ottomans. However, failure to give perpetuity to this dependence, gave rise to claims by the Muscat Imamate and Iran over the Island. The fact that at a later date the British made warships available in the Persian Gulf and that Bahrain accepted British protection, whose history went back to a period no longer than forty years before, has made it impossible to change the status quo of Bahrain by peaceful means. There is no way out other than to merely disapprove of this state of affairs and the consequences of the protection resulting from accords."1 Thus, the Ottoman State, which had tacitly accepted the status of Bahrain out of helplessness, continued to defend her rights of sovereignty knowing all the while that in fact nothing would eventually change. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed the fact that because of the accords which had been previously signed, the Ottoman government was not in a position to adopt measures to widen her influence over Kuwait and the only thing to do was "to see to it that Britain did not establish an official protectorate in Kuwait and did not settle there."2 The Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his report, makes the following statement about the Nejd region, a bone of contention, between the Ottoman State and Britain. "Alleging that Nejd had entered under the administrative control of the Ottoman State following the Paris Accord, Britain expressed her inclination to regard Nejd as outside the framework of the principle of the protection of Ottoman territorial integrity which had been secured by the said accord and to maintain thus its freedom of movement. However, so far, it has not displayed any aggressive behaviour.3 It 'BOA, BEO 192674. Ibid. o - Britain well knew the Ottoman State was sovereign over Nejd (Hasa) prior to the Paris accord of 1856. But she used this as a political manoeuvre. On the other hand what was meant but "display of aggressive behaviour" was the non-occurrence of incidents like those which had taken place in Bahrain and Kuwait. As is often mentioned, above Britain acted against the Ottoman's lawful rights on many an occasion. 2

116

THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

simply objects to the appointment of qaim-makams and administrators at the Zubarah and Odeid ports subordinated to Qatar, south of Nejd and opposite the Bahrain Island. Britain considers these lands as a country ruled by a sheikh who accepted protection, and left the settlement of the issue to her government within the context of the Maritime Peace Agreement dated May 4, 1853 signed with the Oman sheikhs. Therefore, one must act cautiously with respect to this region of Nejd. We think that securing the protection of this big and important sanjak forming the coastline of the said inland stretching from Kuwait to Qatar of the Arabian peninsula under the rule of Ibn Rashid and Ibn Sa'ud is possible and of huge importance."1 In the following part of his report, the Minister of Foreign Affairs dwells on the military and political measures which needed to be taken for the protection of Nejd and of its coast in particular. Indeed, the ensuing efforts of the Ottoman Government followed along this line.

3. Ottoman Sovereignty Again on the Agenda

Over

the

Persian

Gulf

Once

The Anglo-Ottoman dispute over the Persian Gulf had become almost a habitual contention. News about the activities of the British in the Persian Gulf was a daily concern for the Ottoman government. According to the information that reached Istanbul at the beginning of the year 1906, the British Consul to Muscat had, in the company of Sayyid Faisal, Imam of Muscat, visited the sheikhs in the neighbouring area, sheikhs such as those who ruled over Debi, Sharja and Ajman and proposed that the British flag be hoisted there. However, with Sheikh Zayed, at the forefront, no one accepted this proposal. It goes without saying that the Ottoman government could do nothing in these regions remaining outside the area of its influence, vis-a-vis the activities of the British. However, the Ottoman officials around these regions had been warned to act wisely in winning the sheikhs over and not permitting the possible, transportation of arms which might penetrate Nejd and Basrah.2 News arrived in Istanbul about the plantation of poles by the British on an island near the Ujair port; it was also reported that Mubarak al-Sabah had blocked the road leading from Basrah to Nejd and that there was the likelihood of an attack by certain tribes on Qatar. The office of the Grand Vizier asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 18, 1906 to lodge a protest with the British Embassy contending that the plantation of poles and the acts on 'BOA, BEO 192674. BOA, BEO 208506.

2

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117

Mubarak al-Sabah were against agreements regarding the preservation of the status quo in the region.1 This problem, which was resolved at the beginning of 1906 in a conciliatory way, re-emerged in another place towards the end of the same year. The British, after disembarking from a ship which had arrived in the Kateef harbour towards the end of November 1906, made surveys in the environs of the Dammam fort for two days. Thereafter, they planted a pole of 10 meters and hoisted a British flag on the island of Najway which had length of 151 meters and width of 37 meters and was located at a distance of one and a half hours from Kateef harbour. The Ottoman government reacted without delay and demanded an explanation from London while drawing the attention of the British Consul at Basrah to the issue. Sir Edward Grey, to whom the Ottoman Ambassador reverted, stated that he was not aware of this incident and that he would investigate the matter and let the result be known.2 On the other hand, the British Consul to Basrah said that the poles must have been erected in all probability to indicate the shallow waters and the rocks beneath the surface and suggested that they might be removed to be replaced with other markers which might be provided by the Ottomans.3 As a matter of fact, upon the order received from the British Foreign Office on January 1, 1907, the said Consul provided an official written statement in which he declared that no flag had been hoisted over Najway island and no survey of any sort had been made; only a small pole had been planted with a piece of cloth of no consequence for sounding purposes and to ensure safety of navigation. 4 Whereupon, the government took immediate steps to replace the said poles and it sent two warships and a few gunboats to guarantee safety. 5 Moreover, as Hasan, the governor of Basrah, said in one of his letters, the Ottoman government, which took into consideration "the perpetual activities on land and at sea of the British Consul of Bushiree and the British political agent at Kuwait", followed the political developments at places outside its sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf and made contacts with local sheikhs to see whether consulates could be established.6 Almost every single incident that assumed an official character in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar gave rise to diplomatic strife between the Ottoman State and Britain. In fact, certain incidents that happened in Wakrah with reference to Qatar towards the end of 1908, put the issue of the legality of any such presence in Qatar once again on the agenda. A dispute had erupted because of Jasim's certain personal preferences between him and Abu Uneyn Abdullah and his friends, residents of the nahiye of Wakrah. The people of Wakrah L

BOA ,BEO BOA, BEO 3 BOA, BEO 4 Jbid. S lbid. 6 BOA, BEO 2

134581. 223247. 222464.

225454.

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appealed to the governorship of Basrah asking for justice. Whereupon, the Governor of Basrah wrote an official letter to Jasim demanding settlement of the dispute while suggesting to those who had appealed that they try to get along well with Jasim. The British Consul to Basrah, who learned of this, had recourse to the province of Basrah claiming that Britain did not recognise the Ottoman State's rights of sovereignty over Qatar, making clear that it would not connive at such an intervention. The Consul drew attention to the incidents which had occurred during the establishment of the office of administration at Wakrah and warned the governor to prevent all intervention by the Wakrah people. Muharrem, the Governor of Basrah, after notifying the Consul that the nahiye of Wakrah was subordinated to Qatar and that the people were Ottoman subjects, wrote immediately to the Ministry of the Interior on December 5, 1908 desiring to know about the action to be taken.1 The Ministry of the Interior submitted its "urgent" report on the subject on December 24,1908 which also drew attention to the previous incidents that had happened in Zubarah, Odeid and Wakrah. The report of the Ministry of the Interior read: "Britain keeps filing objections against the sovereignty rights of the Ottoman State over this region, alleging that it is under her own protection. It behoves us therefore to gather evidence to prove that the said region form an integral part of Ottoman territories and to defend and protect our rights. Under the circumstances, it will be advisable to send a diplomatic note to the British Consul to Basrah through the British embassy in order that he refrain from intervening in such political issues, which should, in principle, involve negotiations by the states concerned. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must therefore contact the Ministry of War and come to a decision on the issue."2 The Office of the Grand Vizier sent this letter from the Ministry of the Interior on December 29, 1908 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War asking for their opinion on the subject.3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after having had the matter studied by the Legal Consultancy Department, replied as follows to the Office of the Grand Vizier in its letters respectively dated February 1, and 11. "The subject has been referred to the Legal Consultancy Department. The actions taken in connection with the places, the subject of dispute, and the contents of accords signed between the sheikhs on the coast of the Persian ^BOA, BEO 259756. Ibid. hbid.

2

THE ANGLO-OTTOMAN CONTROVERSIES OVER QATAR AND BAHRAIN 119

Gulf and Britain, were reviewed. Although the Ottoman Government has objections to the rights under these accords, their existence is undeniable. The state of affairs which have been reported and the correspondence held so far seem to indicate that as the Ottoman State undertakes to do things directed at the reinforcement or expansion of its sovereignty there, Britain extends her sphere of influence in the region to a similar extent."1 Although this answer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs summarises the actual situation, it lacks vigour in expressing well enough the efforts made until then to secure the protection of the sovereignty rights of the Ottomans in Qatar and its environs. This situation may be the consequence of a heedlessness or boredom in the face of problems experienced until then, or a wish to conclude once and for all an agreement by making certain sacrifices. However, at any rate, the attitude of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not reflect the final opinion of the Ottoman Government. As a matter of fact, the reply received on July 25, 1909 from the Ministry of War's answer to the inquiry of the Office of the Grand Vizier, reflects a different aspect to the matter. The Ministry of War, in its "extremely urgent" report made the following statement. "... Ottoman sovereignty over the Qatar peninsula definitely exists. Jasim b. Thani, a Qatar citizen, who in his official capacity as qaimmakam appointed by the Sublime Porte, is in charge of the administration of tribes and of ensuring safety and order in the place. He, together with the naib (canonical judge), his deputy, along with the administrators at Zubarah and Odeid and other nahiyes, are on the payroll of the Ottoman State. Jasim affixes his signature on official papers in his official capacity of qaim-makam of Qatar. A flawless civil administration and the presence of a military power consisting of a battalion and two artillery units in Qatar are sound evidence of Ottoman sovereignty. Abdurrahman Efendi, son of Jasim, appointed administrator to the nahiye of Wakrah by decision of the administrative council, is now discharging his duty."2 The Ministry of War which conducted a serious study regarding Qatar's subjection to Ottoman sovereignty and the latter's establishment there of an administrative organisation supplied the following information directly related to its own Ministry: ".. In a telegram from the Sixth Army dated September 12, 1887, the presence in Qatar of Ottoman marines and gendarme soldiers is acknowledged, but emphasis is made of the need for the despatch to 1

State Archive of Qatar, File, No 9/5, p. 247. State Archive of Qatar, File No 9/5, p. 40.

2

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Qatar and Kateef of four companies of soldiers, two to each respectively. Military records indicate that as of 1888 Ottoman military forces were stationed in Qatar.1 These facts should be proof enough against Britain's denial of the Ottoman's sovereignty rights over the Qatar peninsula. Zubarah, situated between the administrative centre of the kaza of Qatar and Ujair which was incontestably under Ottoman rule is only too natural to be considered part of Ottoman territories. The nahiyes of Wakrah and Odeid are on the Qatar peninsula and the kaza of Qatar consists of the Qatar peninsula and the signing of an accord by the British and any person from among the population of the peninsula cannot possibly invalidate the sovereignty rights of the Ottoman State over the region.."2 Likewise, claims on Bahrain by the Ottoman State and the grounds for such claims were appended to the report, and the following conclusion was reached: "... It is reported that British officials frequently disembark on islands in the Persian Gulf and plant flagpoles to allege after a while that these lands are under their protection. Such islands close to the coast — unless abandoned to another State by a separate agreement — should belong to the state dominating the land and the coastline. Britain should be advised of the fact that she should refrain from making allegations about the enjoyment of disposition rights by planting flagpoles on the islands... " 3 W e must not be surprised to observe that the Ministry of War was more resolute and determined in its approach compared to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Naturally, the people who were directly involved in the Persian Gulf were military staff rather than civil servants. Indeed, the great majority of civil servants in the region were in fact of military origin in view of the strategic importance of the region. W e witness that from time to time military command and civil authority were united under a single hand. Thus, while the Ministry of War was directly involved in the problem, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was caught up in theories. W e must mention here two events which occurred in the Persian Gulf during the spring of 1909 and the autumn of 1910, whose aim it was to change the status quo. A s we know, almost all the places, which were party to controversy on the coastline of the Nejd and Qatar, were uninhabited places or places where tribes came to sojourn for short periods. Therefore, in the

1'I'he fact that even before this date regular soldiers were stationed in this region is mentioned on various occasions in the present study. 2State Archive of Qatar, File N o 9/5, p. 40. hbid.

THE ANGLO-OTTOMAN CONTROVERSIES OVER QATAR AND BAHRAIN 121

problems encountered in this area, the tribes were not of primary importance after all. What mattered here were controversial issues between two states arising from their strategic inclination. It seems that the Ottoman State was determined not to let go of the region in question but preferred to settle the problems if possible through diplomatic means to avoid their assuming any serious political dimensions. As has already been said, the state had appointed administrators to Zubarah, Odeid, and Wakrah; but, taking into consideration the fact that neither of the first two places was inhabited and also the objections of the British it had accommodated the civil servants in the sanjak or at the administrative centre of the kaza. This resolute attitude by the Ottoman State pushed the British to seek other political solutions. One such solution was to incite the tribes to settle at uninhabited areas on the Nejd coastline in some of those areas that came under their sphere of influence. In such a way, they would be able to extend their sphere of influence. The first of the two above mentioned events happened in 1909. Certain families from the Dewasir tribe had settled on the island of Zakhnuniya. 1 The Ottoman government, which treated the people of Bahrain as Ottoman subjects, had nothing to say against the frequent shifts of the tribes in the region and the settlement of the Devasir tribe at Zakhnuniya. But, it had to take into consideration the other aspect of the Ottoman Government and its probable consequences. As a matter of fact, Mehmed Fazil Pasha, the deputy army commander of the Sixth Army in Baghdad, in his telegram dated May 25, 1909 had drawn the attention of the Government in Istanbul to this issue. Mehmed Fazil Pasha stated that: "... In order to refute all arguments likely to be presented by foreigners about the subordination of the Island to Bahrain at some future date, using as a pretext the settlement of the 36 households from Dewasir subordinated to the sheikh of the village al-Beda of Bahrain residing at the island of Zakhnuniya near Ujair, the Ottoman coat of arms must be placed on the stone square castle at a height of 500 metres high so that any future unjustified claims can be contested. It was learned that the British flag which had been hoisted by a British patrol ship in connection with the settlement of Bahrain two or three years ago had been removed by bedouins. The truth of this piece of information was inquired of from the administrator at Odeid and an affirmative answer was received. This subject was brought to the attention of the mutasarrif of Nejd and a necessary order was given to •BOA, BEO 266902.

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this administration to hoist the Ottoman banner. Thus, with the assistance of prominent personalities in Bahrain the banner of the Ottoman State was hoisted over the old castle, and instructions were given to the administrator at Ujair, the military commander and other persons in charge to ensure its preservation. This communiqué was received with pride and the banner was unfurled at the said place."1 Correspondence exchanged between ministers indicate that these developments were met with great satisfaction in Istanbul.2 As had been made clear by the views expressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, every act meant to consolidate the other state's influence in the region was followed by a British manoeuvre. Indeed, immediately after the unfurling of the Ottoman banner on the island Zakhnuniya, the British Consul to Bahrain paid a visit to Jasim, proposing to hoist the British flag at Qatar, but this offer was rejected.3 The correspondence exchanged in the autumn of 1909 between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the province of Basrah indicate that feasibility studies had been initiated regarding the construction of government offices at Zubarah and Odeid and of military barracks in order that people could come to settle there.4 Probably, after the British heard the news, the second event took place. The news reached Istanbul that the British Consul had proposed to Jasim, who happened to be visiting Bahrain toward the end of 1909, that he settle people under their protection on the Qatar coast.5 The Minister of War, who reported the latest regional developments in a letter addressed to the Office of the Grand Vizier on January 6, 1910, drew attention to this situation and made the following comment: "... As already mentioned, the British Consul to Bahrain made unacceptable offers to Jasim b. Thani for the settlement of British citizens at two important points, namely at Zubarah and Odeid on the Qatar peninsula and for the unfurling there of the British flag. Jasim may eventually yield to British offers sooner or later in connection with pearling or heritage issues. If another state gets hold of a few of the important places of the Qatar peninsula having them under its direct control or influence, Ottoman sovereignty on the western coast of the Persian Gulf is sure to come to an end. Therefore, due importance must be given to the region."6

^BOA, BEO 266902. BOA, BEO 266331; 266902. 3 BOA, BEO 268914. 4 BOA, DH.MUI 34-2/11. 5 BOA, DH.KMS 17-4. 6Ibid. 2

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The Minister of War specified certain measures which he suggested, should be implemented. The Ottoman government, taking into consideration these developments, began to initiate certain arrangements likely to avert foreign intervention on the Nejd and the coast thereof and in Qatar; in particular, during 1910. Mentioning here the coded telegram sent to the Ministry of the Interior from the province of Basrah on October 27, 1910 would be relevant. In this telegram, which answered a letter dated October 25, 1910 from the Ministry of the Interior, the following information is provided about the Qatar coast: "... The nahiye of Odeid lies at 21 degree of latitude and 53 degree east longitude according to the Greenwich meridian while Wakrah is to the north of Odeid, on the coast of the Qatar peninsula. Odeid is juxtaposed with the Oman country. The nahiyes of Odeid and Zubarah were established in 1901, subordinated to the kaza of Qatar. So far four administrators were appointed to Zubarah and six to Odeid. Wakrah was established in 1902/1903 and two administrators have served there so far. Odeid and Wakrah have beautiful harbours. The fact that these nahiyes are an integral part of Ottoman territories is incontestable. Claims by Britain and the Dutch Government on these lands are quite irrelevant, and so are their initiatives to make them independent regions. In terms of law, Odeid and Izmit (in the proximity of Istanbul) are alike. The aim of the British is to delineate the status quo on the Nejd coast based on such absurd pretences and by sowing dissensions among Muslims, to shatter regional safety. She occupies this coast by alleging that her economic and commercial interests are at risk. Once the coastline stretching from Fao to Odeid comes under the control of Britain nothing advantageous can any longer be expected from Nejd and the south of Iraq. The Odeid and Zubarah administrators are now at the administrative centre of the sanjak. To refrain from sending them to their places of appointment and turning these regions into independent regions is not advisable. It is as if, under the circumstances we had surrendered unto them our rights by our own hand."1 This telegram from the governor of Basrah summarises the events which took place in the second half of the 19th century. Such an attitude by the Ottoman government, more resolute than in the past, incited the British to seek new ways of persuading Jasim to agree with them. In a telegram sent from the province of Basrah on November 14, 1911, the British Consul to Bahrain proposed to settle some Bahrainis in Zubarah and offered Jasim an annuity of 10 000 rupees if he would ever agreed to this. Jasim b. Thani rejected the offer saying that the permission of the province of Basrah and of the Sublime Porte would be required for such a development. Zayed, son of the Abu Dhabi Sheikh appealed at about the same date to Jasim to establish 1

State Archive of Qatar, File No 9/5, p. 138.

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a settlement at Odeid for pearling purposes.1 Jasim, who was suspicious about what lay behind this British incentive rejected any such idea.2 The settlement of certain Bahrainis on the Qatar coast was seen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman State as a British initiative to extend their sphere of influence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs which thought that this could not be connived at suggested to the government on November 30, 1911, that contact be made with the British government.3 As preliminary discussions were under way for drafting a comprehensive agreement which comprised in its scope all the controversial issues between the Ottoman State and Britain, this subject was not put on the agenda as a separate item. On the other hand, in the same year, the Dewasir tribe on Bahrain Island requested permission from the Ottoman government, to settle at Kateef. The government had this request studied by the legal consultant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Office of the Legal Consultant, in its report dated July 21, 1912 expressed the view that this immigration might have a positive impact on the economical and social life of the region, but added that the probable political consequences which this might engender between Britain and the Ottoman State should also be taken into consideration.4 4. The Issues of Nejd, Qatar and Bahrain in the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention In order to be able to understand the convention signed between Britain and the Ottoman State, it is necessary to analyse properly the range of developments which had taken place until that time. As we know, the Baghdad Railway concession had been granted in 1903 to Anadolu Demiryolu §irketi, (the Anatolian Railway Company) a company formed by German capitalists. Britain deemed this concession to be against her interests in the Persian Gulf and was apprehensive that it might also engender risks with regard to her position in India. These misgiving on the part of Britain had been apparent in her attitudes adopted vis-a-vis the Ottoman State, and, especially, in the steps she took in the Persian Gulf, as already mentioned. When these discussions were under way, the government asked for information from local officials. In letters received from the mutasarnf of Nejd and the Governor of Basrah, historical and geographical data were provided. Some of this data has already been outlined. However, in this correspondence room was made for new data and arguments. For instance, Hasan Riza, the Governor of Basrah had the following to say in his letter March 7, 1912. "Investigations have shown that Zubarah and Odeid had always been subordinated to Qatar and that they had not been linked in any way whatsoever to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. The fact that the British appeal to Jasim al Thani, qaim-makam of Qatar for the establishment of a settlement by the sheikh of Abu Dhabi of the Bahrainis to Zubarah and Odeid is proof of this." (BOA, HR. SYS 108/28). While in the letter of the Mutasarnf of Nejd dated April 11, 1912 the expression somewhat differs: "Formerly, the Beni Yas branch of the al-Kabisat tribe subordinated to Zayed, the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi was in conflict and made improvement work at Odeid and settled therein A.H 1300/1882-83 the Beni Yas branch reconciled with Sheikh Zayed and returned to their former places. At present Odeid is in ruins. (State Archive of Qatar, File No 9/5, p.102). 2 State Archive of Qatar, File No 9/5, p. 132. 3 BOA, HR.SYS, 96/4 ''BOA, HR HM§, I§0 39/2-2.

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125

Britain thought that German trade and politics would start competing with her own interests through the development of the Baghdad Railway, to such an extent that she might well expect to be challenged by German military power. Therefore, Britain, interpreted this as a basis for her political approach vis-a-vis the east, especially from 1903 onwards, and tried to prevent the execution of the Baghdad Railway Deal which closely concerned the situation in the Persian Gulf or to turn to her best advantage as much as possible the provisions foreseen therein. On the other hand, the Ottoman State was faced with difficult economic conditions. The Sublime Porte was seeking remedies to free itself from the yoke of obligations engendered by territorial capitulations and resultant treaties. The Ottoman State always received negative answers whenever she applied to London for prizes in tariffs determined by international agreements and the levying of a patent tax. As a matter of fact, Britain had stipulated that the Ottoman State should be granted a concession, in parallel with the Baghdad Railway concession, related to the construction work to be carried out by the Germans, which would also involve the construction of a separate railway in Iraq. However, the British who failed to get what they wanted, brought forth the Kuwait issue in addition to old problems related to the Persian Gulf, thus disclosing a new aspect to her oriental policies.1 In the face of such an uncompromising attitude by the British, the Ottoman State took steps to revise certain clauses of the Baghdad Railway Deal in favour of the British, after deliberating with the Germans about the issue. The Sublime Porte, which had, towards the end of 1909, established contacts with London, desired to know the exact claims of Britain in order to put them on the agenda of discussions already initiated with the Germans. In this way, the first steps had been taken for drafting the convention which was to be completed in 1913. Behind all these steps lay a search for a solution to the severe economic hardships which faced the Ottoman State. However, the ongoing discussions took a different turn, and along with the economic problems of the day, the perennial political issues of the Persian Gulf returned to the agenda. In other words, Britain made a solution of economic problems contingent upon the solution of political issues. These issues involved, as we know, a settlement of the political claims made by the British and the establishment of the rights of suzerainty of the Ottomans over Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. The Sublime Porte gave instructions to Tevfik Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador to London, to initiate negotiations with Britain on the aforementioned subjects. Moreover, Ahmed Rashid Bey, consultant to the 'ßabiäli Hariciye Nezareti, Bagdad Hatti, p. 4.

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Legal Consultancy Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was commissioned to investigate the legal aspect of the political differences between Britain and the Ottoman State. Ahmed Rashid Bey, in a detailed report1 dated February 5, 1912, that was submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tried to establish the claims of the British and the attitude of the Ottoman State vis-a-vis these claims. A close study of this report shows that the Ottoman State seems to have adopted, since the second half of the 19th century, an attitude at variance with her current arguments related to the Persian Gulf. One of the major reasons for this was the lack of any freedom of movement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman State compared to the Government's self-determination. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman State seemed to make her recovery from the isolationism she had been experiencing contingent upon the winning over of Britain's friendship, even though this would engender certain sacrifices on her part. According to a widespread conviction held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at this time, the salvation of the Ottoman State, which was in a state of disintegration, lay in coming to an understanding with the British in order to free herself as much as possible from the heavy burden of the treaty stipulations engendered by capitulations, and in averting de facto solutions to bones of contention with other states. It was believed that by pursuing such a policy, the detrimental effects of Anglo-German rivalry would be fended off. As a matter of fact, in a letter that Tevfik Pasha, Ambassador to London, who had been instructed to initiate negotiations with Britain, had sent on March 15, 1911, prior to the above mentioned report which seemed to totally disregard the efforts spent until then, there were ideas which corroborated our viewpoint. Tevfik Pasha, having stressed the fact that everything had to be done to preserve the places in our possession and to make improvements there, recommended that care was needed not to engender any disputes with foreign governments and to sustain the status quo. Tevfik Pasha, Ambassador to London, whose foregoing considerations were reasonable enough, dwelt on the influence of the British over the route to India and the region extending from Aden to Kuwait. Tevfik Pasha made a point of the fact that even Russia and France, which had been coveting advantages in the regions under the control of the British -outside the confines of the sanjak of Nejd which was under actual Ottoman suzerainty- had to come to terms with the British without deriving any benefit therefrom. 2 These formulations by our Ambassador to London intimated that in what France and Russia could not achieve, the Ottoman State was surely doomed to failure. Tevfik Pashas concluded as follows:

l

Ibid, p. 37. Ibid, p. 18.

2

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"I believe that we would not have acted amiss were we to pursue a conciliatory and firm policy with Britain who expresses her pleasure to witness at every opportunity our resolution in the strengthening of constitutional government in our country at every opportunity. We do not deny, however, that Britain is likely to reap benefits in our country as with the other states, but we must confess that the derivation of advantages is something reciprocal."1 Britain, which had evaluated positively the inclination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to get along well with her, had intimated that negotiations might be initiated for the settlement of the problems already mentioned. However, Britain appeared to set certain pre-conditions before the start of negotiations. In fact, Istanbul was notified of these pre-conditions before the negotiations officially began. According to these pre-conditions, the British government did not recognise the Ottoman State rights of suzerainty over the land extending below Ujair, which was a port of call in the sanjak of Nejd. She based this on the socalled guarantee alleged to have been given in December 1871 to the British Consul by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman State to the effect that the Ottoman State had no intention of establishing supremacy over Bahrain, Muscat or over the independent tribes settled along the coast of the Persian Gulf. However, as was already discussed previously, the Ottoman State established the offices of qaim-makam and appointed administrators after the aforementioned date in the land below Ujair and took steps to show indications of the other rights of suzerainty. This action on the part of the Ottomans was protested by the British government which made a point of carrying on her relationship with the tribes in the said places. Britain argued that she had been sustaining relations with Bahrain which she had established since 1805 and had signed many an accord since 1820.2 Britain succeeded in deriving certain advantages in Muscat and the Trucial lands by secret dealings. Based on the aforementioned arguments, Britain set a pre-condition for the accord she would sign with the Ottoman State, according to which the latter was to renounce her claims over Bahrain and contiguous islands and even, (Beda' included), the Qatar peninsula.3 Britain which had established a de l r 18. p. '"The British Government was notified every now and then that the Sublime Porte did not recognise the accords that the British Government might have signed with sheikhs in the Persian Gulf as the Ottoman Government considered them null and void. Britain had obtained the following advantages from such accords: the sheikhs in the Persian Gulf were not to have any political relations with states other then Britain, in the first place; and, in the second place, they would not allow foreign officials to reside in the said regions unless by permission from Britain-, in the third place they would not let any land of theirs to be occupied by any state except Britain and would not sell any land of their own to another government. 3 Ibid, p. 8.

oIbid,

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facto supremacy over Bahrain had already reached agreement with the Ottoman State for the preservation of the status quo in Kuwait. Thus, behind their next claims lay turning to their own advantage the position of the Qatar peninsula benefiting from the weakness of the Ottoman government. As a matter of fact, in the letter dated February 29,1912 by Tevfik Pasha, Ambassador to London, allusions are made to the resolute attitude of the British vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf. According to Tevfik Pasha, nothing could be done by the Ottoman State to ameliorate the situation, and should the status quo be sustained, the situation of the places in actual possession of the Ottoman State along the Nejd coastline, would be precarious. In other words, if the dispute were to linger on, even these places would face perdition. Tevfik Pasha had the impression that the British had no intention of bringing forth any new claims in addition to the places along the Nejd coastline over which they would be willing to acknowledge Ottoman sovereignty. Tevfik Pasha argued that there were two alternatives for the government. The first of these alternatives was to accept the proposals of the British, thus averting any problem likely to crop up in the future; and the second was to leave the matter in abeyance claiming that the Ottoman States was the possessor and the ruler of the coast that stretched till the Muscat Imamate. 1 Arguments and counter arguments continued throughout 1912 without any tangible results from the perspective of the Ottoman claims. In full awareness of the aforementioned pre-conditions of Britain, the Ottoman government sent Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier, to London in the beginning of 1913 to officially enter into negotiations. This reconciliatory attitude by the Ottoman government strengthened the British position enabled them to stick to their arguments. We observe that Ibrahim Hakki Pasha who went to London and started negotiating with Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, gave emphasis to economic issues in particular. The British however gave weight to political issues. Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, who went to London at the beginning of February, immediately notified Istanbul on February 17&20 of the delay of the results of talks 2 he had held with concerned parties from the British government. The Council of Ministers, which met to evaluate "the AngloOttoman negotiations on the Persian Gulf" on February 28, deliberated upon the proposals made by the British. During this meeting, the subject of discussion was the attitudes that the Ottoman government had to adopt with respect to the Baghdad Railway issue and the abolition of tariffs. In the meantime the British proposals about Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain were discussed. The results of this sitting was of particular importance, as it was the first of such meetings, in which the subject matter discussed, presented a unity of opinion by the Ottoman government prior to the 1913 Convention. The Council of Ministers reached the following decision after having discussed the British proposals: ' BOA, MR.SYS 96/4. Yusuf HikmetBayur, Turk inkilap Tarihi, Ankara 1983, Vol. Ill, p. 334.

2

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"The actual sovereignty of the Ottoman State over the Qatar peninsula has a long past. Britain, however, objects to the maintenance of the Ottoman administration along certain parts of the Qatar coastline. This objection by the British is utterly groundless and rests on no documentary evidence. One must see to it that Britain ceases to lodge claims on Qatar and give up all intervention."1 The Ottoman government proved to be adamant in her former policies in which proved to be contradictory with the attitudes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been displaying recently with respect to the Qatar question. However, she acted differently in the case of Bahrain and agreed to yield to a solution of the Bahrain issue favoured by Britain in return for the recognition of her rights with respect to Qatar. The decision made by the Council of Ministers on Bahrain was as follows: "Defence of the rights of sovereignty alleged by the Ottoman government over the Bahrain Islands is neither possible nor justifiable. The British Government has a reconciliatory attitude in general to the solution of matters under discussion. If these bones of contention between the two states are satisfactorily settled, the Ottoman government should relinquish her claims over the Bahrain Islands." However, the Ottoman government had made the relinquishment of her claims on Bahrain contingent upon the following conditions: "Britain shall not demand concessions on Ottoman territories for the people of Bahrain. The tax collected by the Sheikh of Bahrain on pearls and shells that the Ottoman citizens fish in the waters of Bahrain shall be cancelled, and should this prove to be not feasible, it shall be seen that the said tax remains constant and not increased. Britain shall unconditionally accept the fact that the Island of Zakhnuniya in the proximity of the port of call Ujair is subordinated to the sanjak of Nejd."2 The decision of the council of Ministers on Kuwait was as follows: "Britain alleges that the boundary of Kuwait includes also the places where our troops are found. Under the circumstances, it behoves us to explain to the British upon documentary evidence the actual boundary of Kuwait. Particular attention must be paid to the preservation of Ottoman suzerainty over the islands of Bubian and Warbah as well as over the other islands in the Persian Gulf. Given the Anglo-Ottoman Convention related to the absence of protection rights by the British ^BOA, MV162, p. 39/1-3. hbid.

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over Kuwait, the accords signed by Sheikh Mubarak b. Sabah with Britain carry no validity. Therefore, accords signed between Sheikh Mubarak and Britain must be considered null and void. The settlement of disputes which would not be detrimental to the rights of suzerainty of the Ottomans and to the interests of Britain must be made directly by the Sublime Porte and Britain."1 The Ottoman Council of Ministers decided to conduct the discussions which were to take place in London within the framework of the above principles and to be regularly informed of the results by the delegates there. Information received in the meantime intimated that London seemed to be inclined to reconciliatory attitude in the discussions held in London with regard to all matters except the Qatari issue, but was adamant as to her claim which stipulated that the Ottoman State relinquish her rights over the Qatar peninsula. This issue was among the topics on the agenda during the meeting of the Council of Ministers on March 11, 1913. In this meeting, the reports of Tevfik Pasha, Ambassador to London and Ibrahim Hakki Pasha were read and discussed. In view of the opinions of Tevfik Pasha and Ibrahim Hakki Pasha to the effect that no positive results could be achieved in the face of British persistence, it seems that the Ottoman government had to retrace her steps thus relinquishing her former decision on Qatar. In the decision reached during the same meeting, the efforts displayed until then in establishing Ottoman suzerainty over Qatar and its coastline and British opposition were explained and the following conclusion was reached. "Britain persists in refraining from approving the rights of suzerainty of the Ottoman State over the coastline below the Ujair port of call and also her demand for the Ottoman State's relinquishing its rights on the Qatar peninsula. Therefore it becomes indispensable to give up any vain efforts in consolidating our sovereignty over Qatar and in establishing any administrative organisation, thus settling the issue."2 Relinquishment of the Qatar peninsula by the Ottoman government would be contingent upon a start to demarcate the boundary from the most indented part in the gulf opposite the Bahrain island, and should this prove not acceptable, then from a point opposite the Island of Zakhnuniya to the south of Ujair. This new policy of the Ottoman State on Bahrain and the Qatar peninsula was welcomed by the British who intimated that the relevant economic issues could now be settled. But then, they put the issue of Kuwait on the agenda and opened a discussion on the details of the boundaries [ 2

Ibid. BOA, MV175, p. 25.

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131

although they agreed to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Ottomans. The Council of Ministers decided thus to send Ibrahim Hakki Pasha instructions to the effect that the Kuwait boundaries had been demarcated so that the accord could be concluded.1 Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, who had been holding interviews in London started to send to the Sublime Porte piecemeal information about the results he had obtained. In his telegram dated April 16,1913 addressed to the Sublime Porte, he provided information of the latest agreement reached with Britain regarding the demarcation of the boundaries on the coast of the Persian Gulf. According to this, if one thousand pounds were to be paid to the Sheikh of Bahrain in return for his relinquishment of all the rights he held on the island of Zakhnuniya, Britain would give its assent to the subordination of the island of Zakhnuniya to the sanjak of Nejd. Moreover, Britain would agree to the drawing of the southern boundary of the sanjak of Nejd starting from the most indented part of the gulf facing the island of Zakhnuniya and stretching to the south. The decision of the Council of Ministers on these proposals was as follows: "The island of Zakhnuniya is politically important due to its position facing Ujair the main entry and exit outlets on the coast to the sanjak of Nejd and because of its geographical connection with the land with which it is almost contiguous. Foreigners' claims and interests in the Island must be averted and in the accord drafted between Britain and the Ottoman government it must be seen that the political situation of the island of Zakhnuniya is to be determined solely by the Ottoman government. As the amount requested by the Sheikh of Bahrain is not so important the proposal of the British government must be accepted as suggested by Ibrahim Hakki Pasha."2 The proposal according to which the interior of the Gulf was to be the starting point of demarcation, (which was said to constitute the beginning point of the southern border of the sanjak of Nejd from the coast), was one of the counter-proposals of the Ottoman State. It seems that Britain agreed to this. But this boundary's intention was to separate Qatar from the sanjak of Nejd. Therefore, the fact that the exact line through which the said boundary was to pass should be determined by a special commission and had to receive the approval of the British. Ibrahim Hakki Pasha had been warned of this development. The long discussions which ensued came to a head and an addendum which covered almost all the important items on which Britain dwelt upon was initialed in London.

] 2

BOA, MV175, p. 42. BOA, MV 176, p. 40.

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IN QATAR

Ibrahim Hakki Pasha notified the Sublime Porte of the details related to the Convention he had initialed in a detailed report on May 15. However, Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, who was conscious of the fact that the results were far from suiting the ends of the Ottomans, felt the need to explain the position of the Ottoman State with respect to the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf in the introduction of his report. The pasha contended that this accord was drafted in a way not likely to give any further misunderstanding between the Ottoman State and Britain regarding their respective areas of influence. The pasha who went on to speak about certain sacrifices that the Ottoman State might have thought about claiming was quite different from the actual state of affairs. According to the Pasha, the Ottoman fleet had not appeared since the times of Suleiman the Magnificent in the Persian Gulf and the coastline had been left deprived of Ottoman influence. Whereas, Britain had not, for the last two centuries, failed to make available warships in the Persian Gulf securing thus the safety of Indian trade routes. The pasha, who explained the efforts made to hinder the organisational attempts by the Ottoman State in the region after 1871, claimed that the Ottoman State had troops under the command of Sheikh Jasim, adding however that these forces remained concealed from sight whenever British ships paid a visit to the region. Ibrahim Hakki Pasha gives the following account of the details he mentions as they may be considered signs of nonchalance and despair but were actually mere pretexts to justify the ends attained: "The reason why I give you these details is to reflect on the true aspect of the problems encountered in the Gulf, and to allude to the failure to observe the transformations that the state had been undergoing for the last three or four centuries and the pointlessness of remaining content with the reminiscences about old conquests. The waiving of our rights on Bahrain and Qatar and the approval of Kuwait's independence on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Britain's failure to annex Bahrain or to establish official protection over Qatar and Kuwait and her having to approve the fact that Kuwait is an Ottoman possession and that Nejd is an Ottoman sanjak, are obviously sacrifices of equal rank. Both sides tried their best to approach each other with such conflicting viewpoints and ended up by drafting the present Convention."1 Ibrahim Hakki Pasha picked up on each one of the clauses of the Convention initialed explaining those which reflect the exact viewpoint of the instructions of the Government and those to which changes had to be made.

1

BOA, A.DVN.KML 55/8.

TOE ANGLO-OTTOMAN CONTROVERSIES OVER QA TAR AND BAHRAIN 133

The first part of the Convention dealt with the Kuwait issue in which the status of Kuwait and the boundaries were delineated.1 The second part of the Convention was devoted to Qatar. However, it must be noted that Qatar's boundaries were not demarcated. Qatar was defined as follows in Clause eleven of the Convention. "The northern boundary will terminate in the bay to the south of the sanjak of Nejd (of the Ottoman State) indicated by a line as described in clause seven hereunder and facing the Island of al-Zakhnuniya. A boundary line which begins from the extremity of the aforementioned bay will directly reach Rub' al-Khali and separate Nejd from the Qatar peninsula. The boundary of Nejd is shown by a blue line on the map annexed hereto (map No 6). Given the fact that the Ottoman State has forgone all her rights on the Qatar peninsula, it was jointly decided by the two governments to leave the administration of the said peninsula to Sheikh Jasim b. Thani and his successors as in the past. The British government hereby declares that she shall not allow the Sheikh of Bahrain to interfere with the internal affairs of Qatar and its administrative autonomy or to annex it to his own country."2 Ibrahim Hakki Pasha in his evaluation of this clause contends that the demarcated boundary line was in conformity with the instructions he had received. Moreover, as it was impossible to determine exactly the extremity of the line which would extend from the end of the bay facing the island Zakhnuniya to the south, he stated that an indication of this would be its stretching as far as Rub' al-Hali, i.e. the largest desert of the Arabian peninsula, and this would be the proper thing to do. Ibrahim Hakki Pasha ends the chapter relating to this by simply mentioning that to the east of the boundary were the peninsula of Qatar and the Oman tribes and the Muscat Imamate which were not connected to the Ottoman State.3

According to the accord the boundaries of Kuwait were drawn exactly as Britain had wished, but she had to acknowledge that Kuwait was an autonomous unit under the administration of a qaim-makam subordinated to the Ottoman State and that she would not declare the place to be under her protection. (1913 The Anglo-Ottoman Accord, Clause 1-10), BOA, Muahedename ve Mukavelenameler Kismi, 242/17. 9 BOA, Muahedename ve Mukavelenameler Kismi, 242/17. The relative clause read: "The Ottoman sanjak of Nejd, the northern limit of which is indicated by the demarcation line defined in Article 7 of this convention, ends in the south at the gulf facing the island of al-Zakhnuniya, which belongs to the aforementioned sancak. A line beginning at the extreme end of that gulf will go directly south up to the Rub'-al-Khali and will separate the Nejd from the peninsula of alQatar. The limits of the Nejd are indicated by a blue line on the map annexed to the present Convention (annex Va). The Ottoman Imperial Government having renounced all its claims to the peninsula of al-Qatar, it is understood by the two governments that the peninsula will be governed as in the past by sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani and his successors. The Government of His Britannic Majesty declares that it will not allow the interference of the sheikh of Bahrain in the internal affairs of al-Qatar, his endangering of the autonomy of that area or his annexing it. 3 BOA, A.DVN.MKL 55/8.

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THE OTTOMANS IN QATAR

The fact that the status of Qatar's peninsula was left ambiguous despite the fact that details of the boundaries had been given in the convention seems interesting. It may well be that the Ottoman delegate members were interested in the boundary of the sanjak of Nejd where the British had acknowledged Ottoman sovereignty rather than in the boundary of the place she had had to forego. Likewise, Britain had taken Kuwait and Bahrain under control against a prospective deployment by the Ottomans'. In the meantime, Qatar was defined "as an area whose boundary started from the Nejd border to be delineated by the boundaries of the Oman sheikhdom." As it may readily be seen all these arrangements referred to the land boundaries and no mention was made to territorial waters. This shows that, with reference to the Qatar peninsula which formed a promontory projecting towards the sea, that its territorial waters with respect to Bahrain were not delineated in any way but were left intact. The only positive result that the Ottoman State could derive from this Convention had been the protection of the rights of Jasim, the former qaimmakam of Qatar and his successors. For, the above clause meant the recognition by Britain of Ottoman sovereignty over Nejd in return for the latter's relinquishment of all her rights over Qatar. The conclusion of the negotiations which had been conducted in camera until then were now disclosed and the draft Convention was initialed and these events were the subject of much comment by the press of the day. The Istanbul press had a favourable opinion of the Convention as it believed that as a result of this Convention the necessary economic results had been obtained and that Anglo-German rivalry had been forestalled. The British press, on the other hand, qualified this Convention as a success achieved by the British Cabinet.1 It seems that the province of Basrah and Qatar, in particular, seemed take a suspicious view of this Convention. According to their interpretation, the Ottoman State had abandoned Qatar to the British which had created a negative impression on the Sheikh of Qatar, in the first place, and on his people as well as on other Arab emirs. So much so in fact that it was rumoured that one day before the initialing of the Convention, Ibn Sa'ud had rushed to occupy Hasa, the administrative centre of the sanjak of Nejd, to save it from being left to a destiny like Qatar's.2

' Tasvir-i Efkar, No 7 6 1 , 1 9 May 1913; No 7 6 2 , 2 0 May 1913. B O A , DH-KMS 2-2/2, Lef. 244-245. It was also alleged that it was the British who had encouraged Ibn Sa'ud to occupy Hasa. Ibid. Lef. 242.

2

THE ANGLO-OTTOMAN CONTROVERSIES OVER QATAR AND BAHRAIN

135

All these reactions and hearsay made no change in the final analysis as the Ottoman Council of Ministers empowered Ibrahim Hakki Pasha to sign the initialed Convention 1 and the accord was duly signed on 29 July 1913. According to a protocol appended to the Convention, the text of the Convention was to be exchanged within three months. However, the exchange process did not take place within the prescribed period of time as it had to be extended on three repeated occasions. In the meantime the First World War had broken out and the text ratified by the Ottoman Sultan could not be despatched to Britain.2 We have to assess the legal aspect of the Convention which remained unexchanged. As we may well know, the Convention was not restricted to the Persian Gulf and its environs. It had a larger scope. As a matter of fact, the Council of Ministers, based on the drafts initialed on May 6, had empowered Ibrahim Hakki Pasha to approve and exchange the Convention in question. During the meeting of 11 February 1914 held by the Council of Ministers, it was said that the Convention signed by Ibrahim Hakki Pasha on the one hand and Edward Grey on the other hand, which the signature of Mehmed Re§ad, the Ottoman Sultan was also affixed, consisted of five sections. Namely, the formation of a committee for ameliorating the conditions at Shatt al-Arab, an accords which related to the Persian Gulf and the surrounding lands, the raising of tariffs, the abolition of British postal services and of the privileges enjoyed by foreigners. 3 As was already stated, the Ottoman State had concluded this Convention and made all the previously mentioned sacrifices in the Persian Gulf with a view to obtaining the advantages outlined above. However, it seems that the parties to the Convention were somehow not satisfied as to its results which may have been due to hesitations that emerged after the initialing of the accord (since exchange thereof did not take place). During the days on which news appeared about the exchange there were allegations that the Convention had not met the ends expected which ran counter to the press releases in May. 4 Nor were France, Germany and Russia satisfied with the Convention. This point was of consequence as well. As a matter of fact, Germany and Russia had lodged objections against the contents of Clauses seven and eight of the accord related to "Maritime Affairs in Shatt al-Arab". This was followed by the exchange of a series of diplomatic notes between Britain and the said states though without any tangible results. Under the circumstances, it was decided by Ibrahim Hakki Pasha and Sir Edward Grey that the exchange of the

l BOA,MV2?,\,o.2l5. 2 "'BOA, Muahedenameler Q

ve Mukaveleler Kismi 366/2.

BOA, Muahedenameler ve Mukaveleler Kismi 242/3. ikdam, No 6098, 13 February 1914., p. 3.

4

136

THE OTTOMANS IN QATAR

convention would be postponed until the finalization of the negotiations under way regarding the Baghdad Railway between the Sublime Porte and Germany.1 Naturally, the Accord relating to Qatar, Bahrain and other regions was left unexchanged. One is inclined to ask whether the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 satisfied the legal procedure required in order to make it valid on an international scale. One may answer this question either with a "yes" or a "no". For, the Convention was signed both by the King of Britain and the Ottoman Sultan. As a matter of fact, the section of the Convention which dealt with the lands in the Persian Gulf was ratified by the King of Britain and sent to Istanbul. Therefore, but for a technical missing point, one might well assume this business to have been accomplished. However, the Convention approved by the Ottoman Sultan was made contingent on the passing into law of a provisional law enacted by the Council of Ministers that was to be tabled as a bill to be ratified during the re-opening of the Parliament (which was in recess at the time). This indicates that the procedure had not been entirely accomplished as of that time. Nevertheless, in Clause three of another convention concluded on 9 March 1914 and exchanged between the Ottoman State and Britain, reference was made to the Convention and the boundary line delineating the border between Nejd and Qatar was also mentioned therein.2 This shows that both sides were of the view that the 1913 Convention had taken effect despite certain missing technical points. Yet, despite all these points, the Ottoman Government seemed to act cautiously while fulfilling certain obligations foreseen by the Convention. For instance, in the wake of the death of Jasim b. Thani on August 1913, the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah as qaim-makam of Qatar was considered. Both the province of Basrah and the Minister of War had applied to the Government to appoint Sheikh Abdullah as qaim-makam.3 The Ottoman government took a cautious approach to the issue within the framework of the Convention initialed recently, and made a point of not giving rise to any reaction on the part of the British, and decided that Ibrahim Hakkr Pasha should contact the British government regarding the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah whose ability and capacity had been approved of both by the province and the military. In the spring of the year 1914, the evacuation of soldiers stationed in Qatar had come on the agenda in accordance with the ^Babiâlî Hariciye Nazin, El-Qatar Sevahili Meselesi, p. 9. In the Anglo-Ottoman Accord dated 9 March 1914 we read: "Clause 3. The boundary line of the places under the rule of the Ottomans shall start at Lekemet'ul Shab and go in northern direction with an inclination of 45 degree attaining thus the desert Rub' al-hali. The said line will, be in conformity with clause 11 of the Convention between Britain and the Ottoman State, follow its course towards 20 degree latitude southwards within Rub' al-Khali which begins from a point on the south coast of the Ujair bay and divides the sanjak of Nejd under Ottoman rule and the Qatar territory divided." BOA, Muahedename ve Mukaveleler Kismi, 243. 3 BOA, BEO 315857. 2

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137

provisions of the Convention. Following the exchange of the Convention, although such an evacuation had been stipulated, the Government had authorised the province of Basrah to maintain military measures in the region and not withdraw the troops until the Convention was eventually ratified in its entirety. 1 This eventual outlook reflects also the opinion of the Ottoman Government concerning the Convention. Major Omer Fevzi Bey, probably a member of the Special Organisation (Te§kilat-i Mahsusa) who had gone to have talks with the sheikhs in the region on behalf of Enver Pasha, the Chief of the Ottoman General Staff, in his letter dated April 14, 1914 addressed to the Ministry of War, speaks of the negative impressions held by the Qatari people because of the Ottoman decision to abandon Qatar despite their loyalty to the State. He suggests that troops might be evacuated from Qatar only after having organised a local militia able to resist the British at a future date.2 There is some interesting information presented in a report dated 25 April 1914 by the battalion Commander in Qatar who was awaiting the order for the evacuation of troops as foreseen to the Convention. In this report it was said that British political agents had organised a meeting at Ujair with Ibn Sa'ud. Upon their return, they had made an address to the people of Bushire saying that Qatar and the Nejd coast were henceforth under the protection of Britain so that under the circumstances if they also pledged allegiance to the Britain all their wishes would be realised. The British seemed to be trying to give the impression that the Ottoman State had withdrawn from the region leaving there the British as the only sovereign power. This was against the statute covered by the Convention with reference to Qatar. This was one of the points which had led the Ottoman government to remain hesitant in remaining faithful to the Convention. It was learned that Jasim b. Thani, who had died after the initialing of the Convention, had ordered his sons to see to it that Ottoman troops remained in Qatar. According to the battalion commander the cause of Jasim's death was the annoyance he had felt at the threat directed towards him by Ibn Sa'ud who had occupied Hasa in anticipation of the evacuation of the Ottoman troops from Qatar. As a matter of fact Jasim had promised to pay Ibn Sa'ud 30 000 rupees in order to abandon this plan. Intelligence was received after Jasim's death that his sons had increased this sum to 50 000 rupees which they took to Ibn Sa'ud in person.3 This information requires further investigation but is important in that it reflect at least the situation of Qatar and its environs. However, these developments indicate that the results of the said Convention are debatable.

'BOA, DH-§FR 39/85; 40/106. BOA, DH KMS 212-2.

2

3

Ibid.

Chapter Three THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN QATAR

1. Kaza Administration a) The Office of the Qaim-makam and Other Administrative Units As has already been mentioned in the foregoing chapters, the Ottoman administration in the Qatar peninsula, was, in the modern sense of the word, established towards the end of 1871, during the organisation of the governorship (mutasarriflik) of Nejd. Midhat Pasha, Governor of Baghdad, had made a series of reforms on the Nejd (Hasa) coast which he had visited towards the end of 1871 and organised the district of Qatar as one of the four kazas subordinated to the Governorship (mutasarriflik) of Nejd. Sheikh Jasim, a local sheikh, was appointed qaim-makam of Qatar. The administrative structure of Qatar, which was not an accomplished organisational whole at its inception, was expected to develop in time and reach the status of kaza, one of the administrative organisational units of the Ottoman State. Therefore, it is important to describe here the organisational structure of the kaza as an administrative unit. With the reforms brought in during the second half of the 19th century, the former administrative structure was abandoned and the Ottoman lands were administratively divided into provinces (eyalet/vilayet) which, in turn, were divided into sanjaks, the latter being subdivided into kazas and kazas into nahiyes and villages (/coy).1 In Articles 43-53 of the "Provincial Regulations" detailed information is provided about the organisational structure of the kaza and the administrative officers therein, as well as about their respective functions. These Regulations foresaw the appointment to the kaza subordinated to the sanjak of a qaim-makam in charge of civil and financial affairs and the security of the state. The qaim-makam was under the mutasarrif of sanjak. He was to see to it that all orders of the state and instructions of the province (eyalet/vilayet) and sanjak were duly executed, and that the internal affairs of the kaza were run in due observance of these Regulations. These Regulations furthermore charged the qaim-makam with a duty to take care of the financial l

Düstur, I. Tertip, Istanbul 1289,1/625.

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affairs of the kaza, the collection of state revenues, of the expenditure to be made, as well as with the remittance of the remaining balance to the sanjaks (Art. 43-45). In the succeeding articles, there is mention of the administrative council of the kaza, of judges, secretaries and other staff of lesser rank, and attention is drawn to the fact that the gendarmerie stationed in the kaza is under the qaim-makam. By a law passed on 20 January 1871, the duties, powers and responsibilities of the qaim-makam and other officials in charge were described.1 In the instructions of Midhat Pasha related to the organisation of the mutasarriflik of Nejd mentioned in Chapter One, one has the impression that his intention had been for the kaza units to be organised under the said law, although he did not make this explicit. In Article One of the instructions, he enjoined that each one of the districts called "Hofuf, Mubarraz, Kateef" and Qatar, along with the places subordinated to it be transformed into kazas. In a sequel to the article in question, while it is advised that the office of the qaim-makam of Qatar is entrusted with its sheikh, the appointment of the administrative officers mentioned in the above referred law to other regions is ordered.2 Midhat Pasha's instructions indicate that the mutasarriflik of Nejd was essentially organised, in conformity with the Provincial Regulations, but was complicated by the financial dimension of the issue since a perfect administrative organisation necessitated huge sums of money. If the local revenue of the region that was to be transformed into a kaza was insufficient, then the money would have to be provided directly from the state budget. Therefore, the law concerning the provinces, which had taken effect recently, could not be put into practice because of the economic difficulties facing the state in many regions of the Ottoman State, let alone in Qatar. The general solution proved to be the appointment, on an honorary basis, of certain individuals chosen from among the prominent personalities of the locality. As a matter of fact, during the establishment of the mutasarriflik of Nejd, while the officials of other kazas and nahiyes had been put on the payroll, Jasim b. Thani was appointed honorary qaim-makam of Qatar. Midhat Pasha describes the situation as follows in his letter of 3 January 1872 addressed to the Office of the Grand Vizier. "... Ali Bey, the former qaim-makam of Samarra was appointed qaimmakam of Kateef with a salary of five thousand kurashes; Haydar Efendi, the former judge of Ammare was appointed as judge to Kateef; Talib Efendi, l

Ibid, 1/635.

2

BOA, ID 44930.

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141

former Kateef public treasury officer was appointed as qaim-makam of Mubarraz with a salary of two thousand five hundred kurushes... considering that Qatar had no revenue of her own Jasim b. Thani, the ruling Sheikh of Qatar, was appointed to the office without any salary."1 Among the places mentioned, Qatar, was, in fact, the one with the lowest income. On the other hand, the special position of Qatar was not favourable for an extemporaneous appointment of an officer from outside. In the first place, the Sheikh of Qatar had himself, during Midhat Pasha's Hasa campaign, appealed to the state for the despatch of troops to Qatar. This was evidence of his allegiance to the state. The Ottoman State, which generally took local conditions into consideration, preferred not to meddle in the actions of influential leaders who had pledged allegiance to the state. Such persons were granted the title of a government functionary representing thus the state in the exercise of the power entrusted to them. There are many instances of this. For example, the Hedjaz region had been under the administration of officers who were descendants of the Hashimi dynasty. Likewise, the sanjak of Muntefik in Basrah was entrusted with the Sa'dunis and the office of qaimmakam of Kuwait was entrusted in 1869 with the al-Sabah family, the traditional administrators of Kuwait. Jasim b. Thani, who had been appointed qaim-makam of Qatar had no need of a salary from the state. He was involved in the pearl trade and was one of the wealthiest persons in the region. And yet, he was allocated a portion of the dates gathered in the vicinity of Basrah, i.e. 20.500 kgs annually. Consequently, Jasim had become a salaried qaim-makam and was divested from his honorary title. However, it seems that this perk of office was withheld at times by the Public Debts Department. However, whenever this was the case, the sum of 17.250 kurushes, which was the equivalent to the yearly ration of dates, was credited to Jasim's account payable at a future date. Even though this amount may have remained outstanding now and then, the fact that it was entered in the accounting records indicates that his office was remunerative and not an honorary one. 2 On the other hand, the subject was put on the agenda of the Council of Ministers on 22 March 1891 and a decision was made to settle the said amount or to pay it along with the arrears from the budget of the Ministry of the Interior. 3 During the deliberations at the Sublime Porte regarding the office of the deputy qaim-makam instituted in 1891, it was pointed out that the yearly ration of dates was payment against services rendered by the qaim-makam.4

1

Ibid.

2BOA,IMM

3

5117.

BOA, MV63, p. 77. 4 BOA,/MM5117.

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THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

The documents indicate that an honorary kaza administrative council was indeed formed—albeit not a functional one. As a matter of fact, Muhammad b. Abdulwahab, a Qatar citizen, in his correspondence with the mutasarrif of Nejd and the Governor of Basrah affixed his signature as a 'Member of Administrative Council of the Kaza of Qatar'.1 Although the names of other council members cannot be ascertained now, the fact that the mutasarrif of Nejd asked the Government2 to pay a salary of 250 kurushes to the members in question in order to enable them to perform their duties properly, clearly indicates that they held office. We observe that upon the completion of the administrative organisation of the mutasarriflik of Nejd, local authority employees had begun to be recruited for Qatar (these officials were to be financed from the State Treasury). Following the appointment of a qaim-makam and formation of an administrative council, where troops had also been stationed, the first civil servant to be appointed on the state payroll was a postman. Towards the end of 1875, it was decided to appoint a postman to Qatar with a salary of 400 kurushes.3 As it has already been mentioned in Chapters One and Two of the present work, it was necessary to restore stability also in administrative affairs in a region of such political and strategic importance as Qatar. The local administrators in the Province of Basrah in particular, wanted administrative restructuring, thereby ignoring the presence of Jasim b. Thani. The Sublime Porte took no notice of such appeals, as it considered them irrelevant politically although it was willing to implement other suggestions aimed at the completion of the kaza organisation. High-ranking officials in Basrah and Nejd had been insisting on the appointment of a deputy qaim-makam from outside Qatar when they saw that the Ottoman government was resolved on Jasim's remaining in office. They believed Jasim could be taken under control in this way. In the Law concerning the kaza organisation both a qaim-makam and a deputy qaim-makam were mentioned. The Sublime Porte must have adopted this resolution in view of the political importance of the region, since from 1891 onwards a deputy qaim-makam had been appointed with a salary of 2000 kurushes. 4 According to our estimate, the Government appointed five persons to this office from the said date until 1914, some remaining longer in office than others/While deciding on the identity of the deputy qaim-makam special attention was paid to finding a person who could fit in with the conditions prevalent in the region and who could easily cope with the needs of

^BOA, §D 2158/10, Lef. 39. BOA, Y.MTV40/37. 3 BOA, ID 49988. 4 BOA,MV63, p. 77. 2

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143

the local people. Deputy qaim-makams who failed to display the expected merit after they took office were withdrawn. A relevant instance of this was the dismissal of Suleiman Efendi who had caused turmoil between the people and the military because of certain undesirable incidents in which he was involved at the beginning of 1899 and the appointment in his place of Habib Efendi who was familiar with the character of the tribesmen.1 After 1891, not only a deputy qaim-makam was appointed to Qatar but also a number of nahiye administrative officers amongst others to Zubarah, Odeid and Wakrah as well as an official and a correspondence clerk acquainted with the Turkish and Arabic languages. Nevertheless, most of the time, these two duties were assumed by one single person. 2 In the meantime, it was decided to appoint a harbour master for Qatar harbour, and the appointment in question was indeed effected. Afterwards, however, the aforementioned official was sent to Kateef instead of Qatar for certain reasons.3 We can assert that within the framework of the administrative arrangements carried out to suit the political conditions and needs of the day, various officials were appointed to the kaza of Qatar. For instance, according to our records, the last civil position designated for Qatar was the registry of births (which was decided upon in mid1912).4 This shows that all the internal developments of the Ottoman State found repercussions in Qatar which benefited thereof. Jasim performed the office of qaim-makam until 1891 at his own residence. However, the appointment of the above mentioned officials and the requirement of premises for the administrative council made a new Government Office indispensable. Therefore, as from February 1891 a place was rented at a monthly rental of 48 kurushes in which the Government Office was housed.5 The names of the staff appointed to Qatar began to appear as of 1875 in the state annals (Salnâmes), and after 1896 the kaza of Qatar was ranked as a "First Class" kaza.6 Likewise, in 1889 we see in the annals that 19 villages were subordinated to Qatar. Odeid and Zubarah are shown as nahiyes from 1891 onwards7 in the annals for 1909, in addition to Zubarah, Odeid and Wakrah also Debi and Jubaile are mentioned as nahiyes subordinated to Qatar.8 We understand from correspondence between the Province of Basrah and the Ministry of the Interior, that four administrative officers had been appointed to

'BOA, ID 1317 CA/26. BOA, IMM 4699. :, BOA, Y.A.Res. 60/12. 4 BOA, DH.SN.THR. 45/2. 5 BOA, §D 2163/8, Lef. 1, 2, 3. (:, See for instance: Salname-i Vilayet-i Bagdat 1292, p. 125; Salname-i Vilayet-i Basrah 1314 p. 284. Salname-i Vilayet-i Basra 1308, p. 351. ^Salname-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye 1327, p. 575. 2

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the nahiye of Odeid between 1902-1910. 1 Likewise, we observe in the accounting records that other nahiye administrators were also salaried. 2 Administrative officers appointed to Zubarah and Odeid remained more often than not in the administrative centre as the aforementioned places were practically uninhabitable. In 1910 the construction of premises to accommodate administrative officers and gendarmes had been put on the agenda in these two nahiyes. As a result of the feasibility studies conducted by the Province of Basrah, permission was asked from the Sublime Porte concerning the allocation of 20000 kurushes to construct a Government Office. 3 Although the appointment of a deputy qaim-makam to Qatar would seem to point to a joint administration, it appears that the deputy qaim-makam was influential only as long as he got along well with Jasim. As from the date of the appointment of a deputy qaim-makam we observe for the first time the inflow of detailed information based on statistical data. Therefore, we can say that both the central government and the Province of Basrah had started to take a larger interest in the administration of Qatar. This caused the Province of Basrah to exert greater pressure on Jasim and prompted them to ask for his retirement. However, the Sublime Porte never took any notice of Jasim's applications to this end, and merely asked other officials to get along well with him. The events that the Basrah Governor had given rise to in 1893 as he attempted to exert pressure on Jasim have already been described. However, we must mention here also another event which occurred in 1894. Mustafa Efendi, the deputy qaim-makam of Qatar and his wife were murdered by men who had broken into their residence on the night of 23 March 1894.4 The subsequent inquest revealed that the perpetrators had not touched any object in the house, which showed that the crime had not been committed for theft. Further investigations revealed that the murder had been the work of Sheikh Ahmad, Jasim's brother, Abbas Efendi, correspondence clerk and Selnan and a sheikh from a Sudanese tribe. According to the information supplied by Major Hiiseyin Rami from the Qatar battalion, Jasim the qaim-makam himself joined the group looking for the murderers. Nevertheless, according to the Major, Jasim himself was involved in this affair. For, one day prior to the incident, Jasim, in his capacity of qaim-makam, had held elections for administrative council members. Mustafa Efendi, deputy qaim-makam had forestalled Jasim's intervention in the said elections in which Selnan, who was alleged to have been an accomplice to the crime, had taken part. It was generally held that this act had caused his downfall. 5 Abbas Efendi, one of the accused, was taken to

1

State Archives of Qatar File No, 9/5-8, p. 134,136. BOA, IMM 4699. 3 BOA, DH.MUI 34-2/11. "•BOA, Y.A.HUS. 294/80. 5 HOA, BEO 29528. 2

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Basrah to stand trial. Although it was alleged that Jasim had a part to play during the latter's cross-examination in Basrah, this was never proven. One can see that occasional attempts at restricting Jasim's powers were brought to naught, and, in his capacity as an Ottoman qaim-makam, he remained the sole ruler of Qatar. On the other hand, the Sublime Porte refrained from all serious attempts at devising stratagems in disregard of the administrative reforms underway in the region. The Ottoman government always sided with Jasim in internal antagonisms directed towards Jasim and tried to dampen any opposition to his rule. However, as Jasim grew older, he chose to stand aloof f rom attending to daily affairs which caused the people and even other officials in Qatar to opt for Ahmad, his brother. As already mentioned, Sheikh Jasim, had on repeated occasions tendered his resignation, wishing that either his sons or his brother Sheikh Ahmad 1 or somebody else from outside be appointed. Jasim, whose resignation was turned down, and who was each time persuaded to remain in office, especially in the wake of the 1893 incidents, had delegated his brother Ahmad to manage the greater part of the qaim-makam's routine work. Sheikh Ahmad b. Thani, who was an intelligent and active person, established his influence over the public, the tribes and the nahiyes. The people were divided into two groups, one group siding with Sheikh Ahmad, the other with Jasim. Likewise, a group of officials in Qatar were on close terms with Ahmad, while another group was against him. For instance, navy lieutenant Ahmed Ali, Commander of the corvette "Zuhaf" took the latter's side during the arms smuggling affair on the Qatar coast. In a letter he wrote to the Nejd Command on 23 January 1901, he spoke about Sheikh Ahmad in the following terms: "... Sedition and mischief are Sheikh Ahmad's sole concerns. The people are poor and submissive. They are keen to see the creation of a governmental administration as soon as possible, although they are scared of Sheikh Ahmad. If Sheikh Ahmad the intriguer, the mischiefmaker, the fiend is not done away with, neither the local people can rest secure nor can governmental authority be exercised. He is execrable to such an extent that his removal from earth would be indispensable for the well-being of the Mohammadan community. Should it be your command, I will most willingly dispose of the Sheikh by having him arrested and exiled to such a place as Kateef or Basrah."2 This dissension between the people and governmental officials had generated hostility between brethren. Sheikh Jasim felt insecure about the ever widening influence of his brother which had begun to obstruct Sheikh Ahmad's exploits especially in the tribes and villages through the mediation of ' BOA, §D 2155/24. BOA, BEO 236246.

2

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his sons and grandsons. On the other hand, Sheikh Ahmad, who had established good contacts with those in authority in Qatar and managed to facilitate the supply of military rations, seemed to feel annoyed at the fact that his success was attributed not to him but to Sheikh Jasim who wielded his power as qaim-makam. Major Nimet from the Qatar battalion, in a letter to the Sixth Army Command on 3 July 1905 mentions this concern of Sheikh Ahmad's. During the interview that took place between Sheikh Ahmad and the major, the former alluding to the British manoeuvres whose effects were observed among the tribes in the environs of the district of Qatar, said that he was capable of taking action necessary to preventing them and that he had the will and strength needed for this. He said that he was conscious of the fact that this was his duty as a faithful liege man, but that he feared that his actions might be hindered by the British and other agents as he had not held any official capacity. Major Nimet expressed his opinion that Sheikh Ahmad was justified in his concern. Stressing that he was well aware of the fact that the latter's appointment to the position held by Sheikh Jasim would not find favour with the Government, he suggested that Sheikh Ahmad should at least be rewarded with an official title of some sort.1 A new report sent to the Sixth Army Command two weeks after the above correspondence described the dimensions of the rivalry between Jasim, qaim-makam of Qatar and his brother. According to this report, the conflicts which arose between Ibn Rashid and Ibn Sa'ud inland of Nejd had caused repercussions in Qatar which added further fuel to the fire of rivalry between brethren. It appears that Sheikh Jasim supported Ibn Sa'ud who had taken up arms against Ibn Rashid who had for a long time now been in control of the inland of Nejd, while Sheikh Ahmad, sided with Ibn Rashid who was supported by the Ottoman government. This state of affairs had intensified the feud between the two brothers. They had gone so far as to take measures against each other which had never been witnessed till then. 2 In point of fact, Qatar had served as a bridge in the arming of Ibn Rashid and the tribes loyal to him. Arms which were imported from the environs of Bombay were transited via Qatar to Ibn Rashid and this activity was within the knowledge of the Ottoman Government. 3 Both Jasim and Sheikh Ahmad who benefited from the contraband arms were on good terms with Ibn Rashid. But each party tried to extract benefits from this relationship on his own account. Sheikh Jasim tried to use Ibn Sa'ud who had emerged in Nejd as a new power and had become in no time a nightmare for the tribes to dampen the growing influence of his

'BOA, BEO 198475.

2

Ibid.

3

BOA, Y.MTV 231/120.

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brother. Likewise, Sheikh Ahmad and his men supported Ibn Rashid, who, in turn, was supported by the Ottoman government against Ibn Sa'ud, thus gaining favour with the Government. Sheikh Ahmad openly revealed his apprehension that Sheikh Jasim would eliminate his own influence by making use of Ibn Sa'ud sent word through his supporters in the Government that reinforcements should be despatched to Qatar. In return, he promised he would be instrumental in the collection of all the outstanding taxes Qatar was due to pay as well as many other yearly arrears which had accrued. 1 What Sheikh Ahmad feared was to happen as soon as intelligence was received that Ibn Sa'ud was marching to Qatar. It is generally believed that Sheikh Jasim invited Ibn Sa'ud to Qatar in order to take revenge on him. But this proved to be to Sheikh Ahmad's advantage rather than to Sheikh Jasim's. For, even the tribes known till then to be on Sheikh Jasim's side showed pro-Sheikh Ahmad tendencies out of fear of the potential cruelty of Ibn Sa'ud. 2 Even the military had to inquire from the Sixth Army command whether they were to obey the orders of Sheikh Jasim in his capacity of Qaim-makam of Qatar if Ibn Sa'ud approached the region. Upon these developments, Sheikh Ahmad established closer contacts with the Ottoman Government and his suggestions began to find favour. 3 Measures he put forward concerning the administration of Qatar appeared on the agenda towards the end of November 1905. However, before deliberations on these suggestions came to a head, news reached Istanbul of the murder of Sheikh Ahmad on 13 December 1905 by somebody from the Beni Hajir tribe known to be loyal to Sheikh Jasim. 4 News of Sheikh Ahmad's murder was a shock to the Qatar tribes and produced disturbances. Whereupon Sheikh Jasim's sons and the allies of the victim went in search of the murderer, but having failed to find him, they merely proceeded to murder a number of tribesmen. The Ottoman government which conducted investigations into this affair reached the conclusion that the abettor to this crime was none other than Sheikh Jasim but had to hush this up on the grounds that any legal proceedings would be politically inadvisable. 5 Although the matter remained in suspense, the likelihood that Sheikh Jasim was behind the events that had led to the murder of the deputy qaimmakam and Sheikh Ahmad, is an indication of the extent to which he was loath to see his authority challenged. On the other hand, the insistence of the Sublime Porte on Sheikh Jasim's remaining in office reinforced the latter's power over Qatar and the neighbouring region.

]

BOA, BEO 198475.

2 3

lbid.

BOA, BEO 203212. 4 BOA, BEO 205906. 5 BOA, BEO 206307.

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b) Financial and Legal Matters According to the Provincial Regulations of 1864 one of the duties of a qaim-makam of a kaza was responsibility for taking care of financial affairs, i.e. collection of the State's revenues and supervision of its spending as well as the creation of other financial organisations.1 It goes without saying that the realisation of these duties depended on the establishment of an administrative unit to take care of the financial affairs of the kaza. However, as has been mentioned on various occasions, in the formation of the mutasarriflik of Nejd, in general, and of the kaza of Qatar in particular, these regions had been granted certain tax exemptions. That is why no administrative unit had been set up in Qatar to deal with financial matters. While it had been promised that no tax would be collected other than alms (zekat) and tithe (d§ur) in the neighbourhood of Nejd, during those times in which order and stability were restored in the region, tax and customs offices were set up and the state's direct tax collection was put on the agenda. This project became the subject of discussions as of 1875, the date when Basrah had been transformed into a province and the establishment of tax offices at places subordinated to Basrah was debated and implemented at certain places. As uniformity could not be achieved in practice, the people reacted and the matter was brought before the State Council at the beginning of 1877. The final resolution was to the effect that only goods arriving from the sea in the environs of Nejd were to be taxed, and, to this end, it was decided for the moment to establish tax offices at the ports of Ujair, Kateef and Hasa. Despite the disadvantages involved in commercial goods arriving by sea and landed to Qatar and Kuwait where there were no customs houses, and their distribution by land routes which were well known, the establishment of tax offices here like elsewhere were delayed until a later date.2 The subject of establishing Customs houses at the Qatari ports was often on the agenda from 1889 in particular.3 Nejd and its environs were kept exempt from certain taxes imposed at a later date by the government in accordance with past practices.4 Although under the Second Constitution exemptions had been maintained in Qatar on a country scale within the framework of new financial restructuring, certain arrangements had been made. Although this subject deserves further study, we notice that in the state archives for 1914 there is mention of the establishment of a customs house at Doha and the appointment of a customs officer and a custom official, a secretary and two customs guards in the Wakrah port, whose dates of appointment we do not know. 5

1

Dustur, I. Tertib, Istanbul 1289,1/625. BOA,A.MKT.§D. 333/9. 3 BOA, YMTV40/37; YA.Res. 60/12. 4 See BOA, BEO 212368 for the application of the poll tax. ^Rusumat Salnamesi, Istanbul 1330, p. 94-96. 2

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Nevertheless, based on the fact that Qatar had been granted certain financial privileges and that there was no tax office in the proper sense of the word, we should not infer that no tax at all was collected. For there are many documents proving that Sheikh Jasim, the qaim-makam of Qatari, did levy considerable taxes on the pearl fishing along the Qatar coast in addition to certain conventional taxes like zekat and o§iir. It is reported that Jasim collected these taxes not only based on his traditional power but also using the influence and means of the state right after the establishment of the kaza and exacted fines from those who failed to pay their taxes. However, it was an established fact that these taxes never reached their destination. This must be the reason for our occasional encounter with tax arrears in the Ottoman d o c u m e n t s . 1 During an inspection in 1893, it was observed that the aforementioned taxes had been entered in the accounts, although not remitted to the sanjak. These developments indicated that although Sheikh Jasim had promised to pay the said taxes, the state was not particularly insistent on this matter and failed to follow this matter up. 2 In tribal societies like Qatar, traditions always had the upper hand, and judicial cases were handled in general by persons called "arife" who had been in charge of this function for many years or by tribal chiefs themselves. 3 During the organisation of the mutasarriflik of Nejd, the Ottoman government tried to set up modern courts of justice here as well. However, this predicament provoked a strong reaction from the people and courts of first instances (bidayet mahkemeleri) set up at Nejd and its environs were established and instead Deavi and Temyiz Meclisleri (Enforcement and Appeal Councils), independent from other administrative units were in fact established in these regions and canonical judges appointed. We have no knowledge whether a Deavi and Temyiz Meclisi (Enforcement and Appeal Councils) was established in Qatar. Nevertheless, we observe that canonical judges were appointed here to handle legal affairs in Qatar. Although a separate study would be required to find out the extent to which the judges appointed to Qatar handled the legal cases by exceeding their conventional functions; the most important governmental official next to the military commandant and whose presence was required on a permanent basis seems to have been the judge. Although it looks as if there had been times when this post remained vacant, we encounter the names of nine individuals who served in Qatar at different periods, some of whom were re-appointed several times to the same position.4

!

BOA, BEO 198475.

2

BOA,

Y.MTVimi'i.

% . Kamil b. Numan, Jezirat'ul Arab, IUTY no 4432, Vr. 12b, 13a. names of the Qatar judges can be found in the annals (Salnames) of the Basrah Province and the State as of A.H. 1292.

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c) Ottoman Military Troops in Qatar We have already mentioned that the kaza of Qatar had been established as a consequence of military operations. Thus the Ottoman army officers who reached Qatar had necessarily become administrators there. In other words, the arrival of Ottoman troops in Qatar took place towards the end of 1871 and there they remained until the evacuation of Qatar during the First World War. The first military personnel sent to Qatar under the command of Major Omer were regular (nizamiye) soldiers but they were followed afterwards by gendarmes who were to be stationed there as a standing force. The Ottoman government intended to station a battalion under the command of a major on a permanent basis in Qatar. There are varying accounts about the number of men in this battalion under the command of the Sixth Army whose headquarters were in Baghdad. While the normal contingency was 200-250 men, we cannot say for sure that this number remained constant. We can see from the records that there had been times when this number was reduced by half and sometimes by an even greater proportion. However, regardless of the exact number of troops, the essential point was the presence there of a battalion. When, at times, the Qatar battalion, whose essential function was to demonstrate the fact that Qatar was an Ottoman territory and to restore order and peace, fell short of its task, it was reinforced by other troops sent from Baghdad or Basrah.1 As a matter of fact, Qatar was not a military base. The military presence there had a purely symbolic character. Moreover, if Sheikh Jasim, the qaim-makam of Qatar had so wished, he could recruit a whole army consisting of thousands of tribesmen loyal to him. So that, the position of the Ottoman military whose contingency was limited was to be matched with power supported by tribesmen; therefore, the battalion was bound to remain symbolic. Although, legally speaking, the qaim-makam of the kaza was the commanding officer of the gendarmerie there, Sheikh Jasim never meddled in the affairs of the battalion, and whenever he felt the need for military forces, he mobilised his own tribesman. The battalion commander was often put out by being ignored thus and interpreted this lack of due regard as evidence that their presence was unwanted. On the other hand, Sheikh Jasim saw the presence of the Ottoman military troops in Qatar as evidence of Qatar's dependence on the Ottoman State, and he was loath to see them in operation outside his authority and initiative. Most probably as a result of the attitude he had adopted, the Qatar battalion remained idle at the Qatar fort and in the administrative centre of the kaza. At any rate, the presence of the military here prevented foreign powers and especially the British from intervening. When, in 1909, the question of sovereignty over Qatar came under discussion between the Ottoman government and Britain, the Ottoman Ministry of War stated that the presence of the military troops there was the strongest proof of Ottoman ^BOA, y.M7V 76/125.

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sovereignty. 1 Likewise, the fact that Sheikh Jasim's last words to his sons to the effect that he wished the Ottoman troops should remain in Qatar indicated that both sides considered the presence of the military here as a symbol of Ottoman sovereignty. In point of fact, had it not been for Jasim's viewpoint, the Qatar battalion could have easily been removed from here by Sheikh Jasim's tribal forces. The troops sent to Qatar were positioned in the old fort at Qatar. Following the collapse of this fort, in 1886, the construction of new barracks appropriate to the conditions of the region and the lifestyle of the soldiers became the subject of consideration. The Province of Basrah, thanks to its repeated appeals to the Sublime Porte, succeeded in obtaining permission to spend 24 670 kurushes for this purpose. 2 It appears however, that instead of spending these funds on the construction of new barracks, only repairs to the old fort were made. Whereupon, the Governorship of Basrah made a new formal request in 1893 for 60 000 liras for the setting up of new headquarters becoming to the glory of the state and capable of demonstrating the authority of the Ottoman State.3 One of the major difficulties facing the troops in Qatar was the lack of barracks capable of accommodating the troops both in the winter and in the summer. Therefore, nearly all the correspondence reffered to this situation. However, due to financial difficulties, only transitory measures could be taken and no definitive solution could be achieved. Likewise, no more troops were sent, as no suitable premises could be found to accommodate them, although this had been planned, as Zubarah and Odeid had been transformed into nahiyes. One of the major difficulties the Ottoman troops faced in Qatar was the frequent failure in the supply of rations. 4 However, this problem was solved mostly by local merchants. Sheikh Ahmad was of great help. Supplies brought by land were often looted by tribesmen and the lack of regular transportation services made the supply of food by sea impractical. 5 However, the Sublime Porte was particular about this issue and time and again brought the matter to the notice of those concerned in Basrah. In return, local administrations also expressed the need for regular packet steamers services along the Nejd coast in their correspondence, albeit without result. 6 Naturally, the mood of soldiers living under such severe conditions was not of the best 1

State Archives of Qatar, File No, 9/5-8, p. 40. BOA, ID 79724. •'BOA, Y.MTV79/113. ^BOA, BEO 2099749. 5 BOA, Y.MTV 291/3. 6 BOA, YA.Res. 60/2. 2

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order. While the convention was to rotate them every six months as a result of severe climatic reasons, they stayed on; which created at times disputes between them and the people. Despite all this, there had been no significant reaction on the part of the people and the tribes in Qatar during a 40 years period to the presence of the Ottoman troops there. And there had indeed been times when the people and the military grew closer to each other and the people asked them to fire the gun at the fort during holidays. This had been interpreted as evidence of the Qatar people's sympathy with the military and permission was asked from the commanding officer to comply with their request.1

2. The Security Issue of the Qatar Coast and Measures Taken Against Contraband Arms a) The Security of Qatari Coast The term often encountered in the Ottoman records is the "Nejd coast", rather than the "Qatari coast". This makes it difficult to achieve a delineation of the boundaries of the Qatari coast. The Ottoman State assumed that the region extending from the Gulf of Oman to Fao (including the coast of the Qatar peninsula and Bahrain) was under its own domination or administration and called it the "Nejd coast". Therefore, barring certain exceptional cases, in making assessments and establishing administrative organisations related to the region in question, the aforementioned land was considered as a whole and sometimes the boundaries were extended even further to include the entire coastline of the Arabian peninsula.2 As a matter of fact, Midhat Pasha, the dynamic governor of Baghdad, drew attention to the following points in his letter dated May 1870 addressed to the Sublime Porte: "The fact that, after settling in India, the British went across to occupy Aden and coveted Muscat and Bahrain was a consequence of the interruption that had taken place in the Ottoman State's maritime connections." 3 Pursuing this line of thought, Midhat Pasha suggested certain urgent measures for the protection of the Basrah, Yemen and Jeddah coastline without any discrimination. As a matter of fact, the first measure he proposed to take, which was also approved by the Government was the improvement of the Basrah shipyard for development into a base for the protection of the said coastline.

1

State Archives of Qatar, File No 9/5-8 p. 85. BOA, BEG 59642. ^Kurgun, op. cit., p. 83.

2

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On the other hand, at a time when the above considerations were being deliberated, the opening of the Suez Canal had offered the Ottoman State vast possibilities for engaging in more active work on the coast of the Arabian peninsula. The Ottoman State, which had acquired easier access to regions it had long neglected, wanted to exercise its authority over the people and the sheikhs, the inhabitants of the coast, by replenishing the Basrah shipyard and establishing ports and naval bases on the Red Sea. In 1871 the despatch of a fleet, composed of light vessels, to the region became the subject of discussions. 1 In the background to the Hasa campaign launched in 1871 lay such concerns. In other words, at the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman State was eager to recover the former prestige which had been lost, for quite some time now, in the Persian Gulf, and on the Nejd coastline, in particular. Bearing this in mind, the first thing they understood which needed to be done was the refurbishment of the Basrah shipyard. New facilities, barracks and docks were constructed and infrastructural facilities were restored to allow for the repair and maintenance of ships. In the meantime, the corvettes "Bursa" and "Izmir" were ordered to sail back to Istanbul to be replaced with new vessels that were capable of navigating in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Local authorities were allowed to provide supplies to ships plying between Kuwait, Kateef, Bahrain, Qatar and Muscat in the Persian Gulf. 2 The entire stretch of the Nejd coastline which the Ottoman State was planning to protect extended for five hundred miles.3 But, despite the State's wish and intention to provide perpetual control and surveillance over the said coast and the actions taken to this end, only five vessels could be despatched to the region. 4 Although this number should not be underestimated, some of them were used as cargo ships carrying military equipment and some were to remain in dock. This situation thwarted a complete and sustained execution of the surveillance mission which was to have been assumed by the five vessels. Thus, those threats which were usually made came from the sea could be fended off not by naval forces but by land forces. The standing forces in the region were not capable of handling this. That is why although the despatch to the region of new troops was often on the agenda, the matter remained in abeyance for various reasons.5

]

BOA, Ayniyat Defieri 874/1. BOA,/MM1611. 3 BOA, BEO 136350. 4 Deniz Miizesi Argivi, MKT 773, Lef. 2. 5 BOA, Y.MTV 31/31, Lef. 2. 2

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The Qatari coast had begun to gain importance and the British intensified their efforts by allowing a ship to patrol the Persian Gulf on a weekly or bi-monthly basis, whereupon Nafiz Pasha arranged a steam boat patrol in the spring of 1888 along the Qatari coast. Instead of the occasional despatch of a ship to the region, it was decided to see to it that a vessel was based there permanently. It was also decided to run a regular shuttle service between the various ports in the Persian Gulf which could also carry freight in addition to passengers. However, this plan could not be implemented properly due do a lack of such vessels and a failure to pay on time the cost of coal and other supplies. As a matter of fact, local administrators were loath to see the regular sailing of British vessels along the Nejd coast while the Ottoman ships failed to follow suit. The Ottoman State was conscious of the fact that the security of the Nejd coast and of the Qatar coast, in particular, could not be realised only by land forces. 1 Therefore, despite multifarious financial shortcomings it did its best to make available a marine corps and those vessels it could afford. One instance of this was the corvette "Merih" (which could carry three hundred and fifty to four hundred men and was equipped with three twelve centimetre Krupp guns), which was sent from Basrah to the Qatar coast. 2 A point worth considering here was the fact that the Ottoman State cared not so much about the threats that were likely to be directed from the sea, it also had political concerns since it had no permanent fleet there. The British merchant ships -probably to escape customs control- preferred to call at the Muscat port where the Ottomans had no claim of sovereignty and even at Bahrain and Kuwait ports where it might have such claims. Therefore threats and risks directed at these regions did not inconvenience the Ottoman State. However, the fact that at least a part of the sea pirates belonged to the tribes of the Nejd coast under Ottoman sovereignty, caused the British to file protests and generated diplomatic wrangles. A pertinent instance of this was the following: in view of the failure to catch Ahmad b. Suleiman who was involved in piracy incidents in the environs of Bahrain, the British had sent their vessel "Sphinx", to the coast of Kateef and Qatar towards the end of 1905 on the pretext of protecting the boats engaged in pearling and helping the Ottoman officials. The Ottoman government which had lodged a protest with London had to cope with the diplomatic repercussions of this situation which it interpreted as intervention in its rights of sovereignty (starting from the end of 1905 and going through 1906.3)

^BOA, BEO 136350. BOA, YEE 14/250/126/8, p. 16. 3 BOA, BEO 205990; 189813.

2

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b) Contraband Arms on the Qatar Coast One of the major threats directed at the Ottoman Coasts from the sea was the intensive illicit arms trade going on in the region. The fact that the desert bedouins, whose lifestyle was based on reciprocal theft, were in possession of modern arms had become a nightmare for the inhabitants and merchants of the region. Those arms which reached the Nejd coastline by the means of traders, mainly British subjects, but comprising also Frenchmen albeit of a limited number, were distributed to the tribes through various ways. The absence of a harbour administration and the involvement of Sheikh Jasim and his brother Sheikh Ahmad in the arms traffic had transformed the Qatar coastline into an important centre for contraband arms. The basic mission of the vessels despatched by the Ottoman government to the region had been the prevention of contraband arms. Ample correspondence is available on this subject in Ottoman records. Those arms that were discharged at the Bushire or Muhammadan ports, and then introduced inland to Nejd, were transported far into the interior of the desert via Bahrain and sometimes through Kuwait and Qatar. In this trade which was particularly intense in the region after the 1890s, such important people as Ahmad Kebabi, a Persian, Hodja Francis a British subject and Muhammad Rahim from Moha but residing in Bahrain were all involved. For instance, according to the intelligence received from the region, in May 1893, Ahmad Kebabi, had sent to Bahrain twenty chests of Martini rifles and ammunition to be taken to Jasim b. Thani. 1 In point of fact, arms for bedouins were like accessories to their clothing. Therefore, no measures could ever prevent them from equipping themselves with arms. However, there was a big difference between the bedouins arming themselves individually and collectively. Therefore, the Ottoman government had begun looking to new measures, which might be taken trying all the while not to arouse suspicion in the mind of Sheikh Jasim who made huge sums of money from this trade. The Governor of Basrah who wrote to the Ministry of the Interior on 18 September 1893 summarised the situation in the region and the measures which had to be taken in the following way: "The majority of arms and ammunition introduced in the Arabian peninsula pass through the Bahrain Island. As the prominent personalities and tradesmen of Bahrain enjoy absolute freedom of movement, the after-effects of their actions are reflected on the Nejd" coast where they cause continuous turmoil." On the other hand, the ship which had to be in the Qatar port on a permanent basis according to the Sultan's order had not arrived in the port as yet. Under the circumstances trading in contraband arms in the region was intensified. The Governor of Basrah, who made a point of the fact that the continuous presence of a single 'BOA,

Y.A.HUS.

273/156.

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THE OTTOMANS

IN

QATAR

ship in the port would not suffice in preventing this contraband, wanted the despatch of two more ships capable of cruising in shallow waters to secure the safety of the eastern port of Bahrain extending from Kateef to Ra's Tennurah and of the western part of Bahrain, namely from the aforementioned place as far as Ujair, port of call of Hasa. It was pointed out that except for the corvette "iskenderiye", two other ships should be bought by the Ottoman Maritime Company ( U m m a n - i Osmani §irketi) so that they might be used both in the realisation of security and military transportation.1 The search for such remedies continued and new measures were suggested every now and then by the relevant authorities in Basrah and Istanbul to bring about the prevention of arms smuggling. For example, we should note here the suggestions in a report dated September 1893 by the Investigative Committee in the region. The investigations which were carried out showed that ships could not approach any part of the coastline that stretched from Fao to Oman; the large vessels called at the ports of Kuwait, Re's Tennurah, Bahrain, Zubarah and Qatar because of the shallowness of the coastal waters and rocky sea bed. Thus, smugglers easily penetrated the recesses on the coast which escaped surveillance, by using their small boats and sailing boats. There were two ways to prevent this: one was the stationing of military troops at every strategic point on the land which remained outside the control of big vessels by building up fortifications and outposts; this would have taken a long time and cost a great deal; the other was the acquiring of ships that could approach the coast where the waters were shallow and the sea bed rocky. As a matter of fact, the report of the Investigative Committee had displayed a wish to expand the Basrah fleet by four more vessels which would be smaller than "Merih", "Sahir", "Alus" and " A k k a " which were already in Basrah.2 Although the Ottoman State was conscious of the gravity of the situation, the fact that it failed to apply the measures suggested in their entirety and that it had to spread the process over a longer period of time could not prevent arms smuggling. As a matter of fact, reports coming from the region towards the end of 1895 and the beginning of 1896, said that about half the population living in the mountains in eastern Yemen were in possession of forbidden weapons.3 If we consider that there had been no changes in the demands of local administrators by the same date and that they continued to demand the implementation of measures previously suggested, it becomes evident that not much could have been accomplished in the meantime.

'BOA, Y.A.Hus. 281/74; BEO 22157. BOA, YEE14/250/126/8, p. 17. 3 BOA, BEO 59642.

2

THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN QATAR

157

Following Britain's actions on the Nejd coast and especially subsequent to its destructive attempts directed at Zubarah in Qatar, the security of the Qatar coastline and prevention of contraband arms appeared once more on the agenda. The Sublime Porte, which deliberated the matter in mid-1896, instead of generating new measures, decided on the implementation of the measures which had been considered but left unrealised for lack of financial means. It was furthermore thought that some of the twelve small and fast vessels under construction in the Istanbul shipyard should be made ready as soon as possible in order to be sent to the Nejd coast.1 Furthermore, instructions were given to strictly apply the rule according to which a ship was to cruise on a permanent basis along the Qatar coast.2 Investigations carried out in the meantime had revealed that the ship "Miijde Resan" had been cruising along the Nejd and Qatar coast for the last nine months; it was furthermore learned that the gunboat "Seyyad-i Derya" had been on patrol at irregular intervals. But it had become clear that the contraband arms were landed at indented places where the waters were shallow and the sea bed rocky.3 As one can see, although the Sublime Porte displayed sufficient interest in this issue, the unresponsive behaviour of certain soldiers and civil officials who were in charge of the security of the Nejd coastline thwarted or delayed the execution of some of those measures which had been foreseen. For instance, in the spring of 1897, despite the fact that the commodore of the gunboat "Seyyad-i Derya" (which had to sail to the Qatar coast to take over the patrol mission of the "Miijde Resan") had received the allocation required from the Province of Basrah, he had failed to do so and this made the subject of many a complaint and the frequent theme of correspondence.4 In the autumn of 1899, in a letter addressed from the Office of the Grand Vizier to the Ministry of Marine Affairs, an order was issued according to which the Ministry was to arrange the permanent presence of ships in Qatar and along the coast and it should use its emergency reserves to cover such expenses to be set off from the revenue of Istanbul.5 Thanks to the particular attention of the Ottoman government and a wish to offer assistance in a time of need for ships in the Persian Gulf 6 a permanent naval patrol -even though not as many as one would have wishedwas realised by way of a regular rotation of available ships along the coast of Nejd. Although there was no end to the demand expressed by the province of Basrah for an increase in the number of vessels navigating in the region, the V

Deniz Muzesi Ar$ivi, MKT 1032/87.

"BOA, MV87, p. 42. 3

BOA, BOA, 5 BOA, 6 BOA,

4

BEO BEO BEO BEO

76522. 75613. 96065. 138721.

158

THE OTTOMANS

IN

QATAR

corvette "Zuhaf, which had almost never left the Qatar coast throughout the year 1900, had proved to be instrumental in the prevention of contraband and brought about positive benefits for the Qatari people. 1 These efficient measures along the Qatari coast reduced the quantity of arms smuggled in, although the trade grew in the environs of Kuwait and Bahrain which had remained outside their control according to the accord concluded a short time previously between the Ottoman and the British. As the arms trade generated commercial transactions with the tribes in many other fields almost all the businessmen doing business in the region had had a finger in the pie. There was however a keen rivalry between British and French merchants. Events that took place in the autumn of 1900 are one instance of this situation. The Sheikh of Bahrain had seized a great quantity of Martini rifles and ammunition which had been unloaded in Bahrain by a French vessel at the wishes of British officials. Thereafter, within the framework of an accord reached with a French trader, the said arms had been released and put on sale in Bahrain. The French trader not being content with the arms he had acquired in the wake of the seizure in question, had imported other arms from Europe and caused a fall in prices. 2 Because of the checks in the environs of Qatar, a considerable part of the arms brought into Bahrain was transhipped to Kuwait by Persian merchants to be sold in the neighbourhood of Ammare and Beni Lam. According to intelligence provided by Ottoman officials in the region, a part of the these arms penetrated Qatar, even though in a comparatively reduced quantity, and were transhipped to Nejd and Hasa. 3 As one can see, efficient control along the Qatar coast had changed the arms trade. Reports dating from the beginning of 1901 bring clarification to this issue. Ships flying foreign flags unloaded their loads at Muhammarah and Abu'l-Hasip to be transhipped by boats to the regions inhabited by tribes. The fact that the right bank of the Tigris, namely the route linking Qurna to Zubair, had turned into marshes rendering the river unnavigable had made it impossible for larger vessels from the Basrah fleet to perform checks. On the other hand, by using a navigational route from Havr Abdullah between Fao and Kuwait to Zubair the easy penetration of arms far into the interior of Kuwait was made possible. 4 On board a ship due for Zubair via this route in the course of the last three months of 1900, Jabir, son of Mubarak, the Sheikh of Kuwait had got hold of some 180 rifles. A Russian vessel that had been passing by had stopped a vessel which had been shuttling between Lincah and Bushire and seized 500 rifles and some 60-100 revolvers; additionally, the British corvette which happened to be there had seized a boat entering the 1

BOA, BEO BOA ,BEO 3 BOA ,BEO 4 BOA, BEO 2

109258,120426. 11772. 119919. 120426.

THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN QATAR

159

Bushire port and confiscated some 1200 weapons of various kinds. If one takes into consideration the number of arms smuggled in through the Ormazd strait, the scale of contraband arms in the Persian Gulf can only be imagined. On the other hand, upon changing the direction of the arms trade, we may observe the penetration of arms by land, albeit on a minor scale.1 The Ottoman government on taking into consideration these recent developments had decided to despatch to the region two ships, namely the corvette "Kilid Bahr" and the gunboat "Seyyad-i Derya", the first to secure the safety of the coast stretching from Fao-Muhammarahh to the river Asher, the other to secure the safety of the Qatari, Kuwaiti and Fao coastline and prevent the flow of contraband arms. A letter addressed by the Office of the Grand Vizier to the Ministry of the Marine Affairs dated 12 January 1901 stipulated an immediate execution of this order,2 while, in another letter it was ordered that the financial aspect of this matter be needed to be settled.3 Despite the Ottoman government's particular attention to the subject a nd the measures it took, it seems that the smuggling of arms into Nejd, Hasa and Qatar could not be totally prevented. The reason was not only the lack of control over this coastline, but also the involvement in the arms trade of Sheikh Jasim, qaim-makam of Qatar and his brother Ahmad, as well as certain governmental authorities in Qatar and Hasa, or at the very least their connivance, in such activities. During a routine inspection carried out on a ship coming from Bahrain in the Doha Port on 18 January 1901 by the corvette "Zuhaf, 251 Martini rifles -which were later proved to belong to a Persian trader- as well as 23000 cartridges and 5 ingots of bullets were found. These intercepted arms were loaded on board the "Hudeyde" which had arrived there to ship the soldiers stationed in Qatar at the time to Basrah. Whereupon, Sheikh Ahmad al-Thani appealed to the naval lieutenant, commodore of the corvette " Z u h a f and Major Hiiseyin Hiisnii, commander of the Qatar battalion, and demanded a return of weapons to the owners as there was the likelihood of a popular insurrection. Those involved stated that the Government had made it clear that the Sultan categorically prohibited the illegal introduction of arms into the country but that his wish could not be realised. In the meantime, Major Hiiseyin Hiisnii, provided a guarantee about the possible release of the seized vessel in order to calm Sheikh Ahmad. Sheikh Ahmad, who was involved in the confiscation of the arms, was not convinced, and issued a challenge saying that he intended to tie the more than 400 boats in Doha port to the side of the Ottoman corvette J

BOA, BEO 236246. BOA, BEO 120209; 121253. 3 BOA, BEO 121416; 121253. 2

160

THE OTTOMANS

IN

QATAR

and burn them. Sheikh Ahmad who saw that this threat would not avail, intervened with the supplier and contractor of water and rations to soldiers in Qatar. However thanks to the sagacity and resolution of the military personnel in Qatar and colonel Abdiilhamid, the commandant of Nejd, the arms in question were not returned but sent first to Basrah and then to Baghdad, the headquarters of the Sixth Army.1 As these events were taking place, in addition to the attitudes adopted by Sheikh Jasim and Sheikh Ahmad, the behaviour of certain civil officials in the region attracted attention. Said Pasha, the mutasarrif of Nejd and Habib Efendi, deputy qaim-makam of Qatar, who failed to show the sensitivity employed by military personnel, were dismissed from office and replaced with others.2 As a matter of fact, after his dismissal from office, Said Pasha was to face the following allegations during his trial: "The irresponsible attitude adopted against contraband, arms the appointment of Sheikh Ahmad as deputy qaimmakam and connivance at the movement of tribesmen equipped with arms."3 Another interesting point is the wish expressed by Sheikh Jasim, qaimmakam, to resign following the dismissal of the mutasarrif of Nejd with whom he was in close contact. The office of the Grand Vizier, in a letter it addressed to the Ministry of War on 2 March 1901, had drawn attention to this fact and wanted the actions of Sheikh Jasim to be closely followed by the Governor of Basrah pending the appointment of a new mutasarrif to Nejd. 4 The attitudes of Jasim b. Thani adopted during the last episode caused a violent reaction from the Governor of Basrah, and, in his letter addressed to the Ministry of the Interior dated 16 September 1901, he said that the irresponsible acts of Jasim could no longer be tolerated, and he suggested a restructuring of the entire administrative organisation in the Qatar district. Mehmed Muhsin, the Governor of Basrah, was convinced that this process could only be carried out by the despatch of troops and argued that this was the only way to exercise the legal rights of the state.5 However, the Ottoman government took no steps with respect to the dismissal of Jasim, but tried to reinforce the military forces at Nejd and Hasa and saw to it that the corvette "Zuhaf continued to carry her patrolling mission between Kateef and Qatar throughout 1901.6 All these efforts in the protection of the Nejd coast came to fruition but without attaining the ultimate ends expected. The greater part of the complaints which continued to emerge from the Province of Basrah in 1902 and the following years was based on the impossibility of securing the ' BOA, BEO 236246; 121531. BOA, trade Dahiliye, 1319 B/42. 3 BOA, Sicill-i Ahval Defteri, 26/123-124; 80/135. 4 BOA, BEO 121884. 5 BOA, BEO 236246. 6 BOA, BEO 134061; 138721. 2

THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN QATAR

161

protection of the coast of the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the Ottoman government which continuously warned the ministries of Marine Affairs and of Finances wanted the warnings from Basrah be taken into consideration, but because of financial difficulties no measures could be put into effect as they required great spending, so that the complaints simply continued year in, year out. The fact that the letter from the Office of the Grand Vizier addressed to the Ministry of Marine Affairs dated 17 January 1907 whose subject was the protection of the coast and prevention of contraband arms and the letter dated 7 June 1907 which concerned nearly the same subject reflects the situation that faced the government.1

3. Relations between the Sheikhs in the Neighbourhood

Qaim-makam

of

Qatar

and

a) Relations with Bahrain and Oman In general, the main factors which had an impact on relations, in regions like Qatar where bedouin culture was particularly strong, were the traditions and struggle for supremacy between the tribes, and the economic links between the tribes and the regions. When viewed from this angle, we can hardly say that the relations between Kuwait and Bahrain, Oman and Nejd maintained a steady course. For, these places were under the control of certain families supported by the tribes. The attitude, the policy and the behaviour of the sheikhs and heads of families determined the intertribal relations wherein power was supreme. In other words, at a period when there were no outside interventions intertribal relations were governed by the traditional rules according to which "the final word was the winner's". However, the activities of the Ottoman State which made efforts to establish a modern organisation of the state, by reinstating its sway over the coast of the Persian Gulf, and, on the other hand, of other nations, and of Britain, in particular, which tried to establish political and economic supremacy in the region, transformed the nature of intertribal relations. The factors which determined the relations between, on the one hand, the tribes which had pledged allegiance with the Ottoman State, and, on the other hand, the tribes which had concluded protection accords with Britain, were changed in that they had become international relations rather than traditional ones. The fact that nations strove to protect their rights based either on accords or on claims of suzerainty over the region, brought a new dimension to traditional intertribal relations.

'BOA, BEO 223717; 230417.

162

THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

Qatar was certainly not among the powerful sheikhdoms. Therefore, it found itself in difficulty when faced by other sheikhdoms and especially with those that had signed an accord with Britain. Nevertheless, the position of Sheikh Jasim, who had been instrumental in positioning troops at Qatar and in establishing a civil administration at the same time had undergone transformation. Jasim, who felt safe and secure against imminent attacks either by the British or other sheikhdoms, had begun to operate more freely. The Ottoman State, which took special care not to impair the status quo established in the region and not to generate international problems, wanted Jasim to act not as a tribal chief but as a qaim-makam of the state. Sheikh Jasim who disliked such restrictions, felt abandoned in the face of his enemies. The relations of Sheikh Jasim with the people of Qatar were bitter from the very start. The Ottoman government, fully conscious of this situation warned every now and then both Jasim in Basrah and Nejd to see to it that this resentment was not transformed into an actual conflict. For instance, the plan to launch an attack on Bahrain concocted in July 1892 by Sheikh Jasim and Nasser al-Mubarak, an old chief, had been forestalled by giving a warning to the province of Basrah. 1 Likewise, the Ottoman government, during the Zubarah incidents when Qatari and Bahraini relations had been tense in 1895, had assessed the issue within the framework of Anglo-Ottoman relations and prevented the further enlargement of the issue and its transformation into a Bahraini and Qatari issue. Sheikh Jasim was uneasy about witnessing the passive approach of the Ottoman State and its listlessness since it did nothing but simply file protests against Britain and did not take measures beyond diplomatic means. As a matter of fact, Jasim, in much of his correspondence, had expressed his uneasiness but was forced to comply with the state's policy. One of the important points that determined Qatar-Bahrain relations after 1871 was the taking refuge in Qatar by some family members in the wake of conflicts among the members of the al-Khalife family who ruled in Bahrain and their forming a threat to Bahrain. It seems that the Ottoman Government allowed this. For instance, Nasser el-Mubarak who had defected from Bahrain to Qatar was not permitted to stay there for long, but was accommodated at the administrative centre of sanjak and put on the government payroll. The government itself chose to follow up the property which had remained in Bahrain of Hamad b. Muhammad al-Khalife2 from the al-Khalife family who had taken refuge with Qatar and of Ali Ahmad, 3 and saw to it that Sheikh Jasim had no involvement. Another point that had an impact on the relations between Bahrain and Qatar was the whereabouts of certain tribes who led a nomadic life in the region (as has already been briefly touched upon in the previous chapters). The Na'im tribe which shuttled between the administrative centre of Qatar and Zubarah was one such tribe.

1

BOA, irade-i Hususi 1310 M/168. BOA, BEO 300662. 3 BOA, Y.A.HUS. 495/11.

2

THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN QATAR

163

Likewise, certain tribes which shuttled between Oman and Qatar and belonged to the al-Manaser1 tribes formed a bone of contention between Oman and Qatar. In point of fact, the issue of citizenship for these tribes was economic rather than political. These tribes sided with the party which would serve their purposes, while their protectors conferred on them military power through the zekdt and certain other traditional taxes they levied. The protection of the bedouin tribes 2 whose lifestyle was based on pillage often gave difficulties to the protectors. For example, the behaviour of the tribe of Beni Hajir that Jasim protected and which had earned notoriety for its pillage had often put Jasim in difficulty. The contests over Odeid, one of the pearling centres, between the Sheikh of Qatar and Zayed, Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, subordinated to Oman, in the vicinity, formed the background to relations between Qatar and Oman. However, as in the Zubarah affair, Odeid ceased to be the bone of contention between the two sheikhs and become a point of discord between the Ottoman State and Britain. Therefore, the Ottoman government organised Odeid as a nahiye like Zubarah under its own dominion subordinated to Qatar, despite a strong reaction from the British as has already been discussed above. The Ottoman government refrained from restricting Jasim's traditional power, and merely tried to prevent him from signing accords with other states which might engender political problems. On the other hand, Sheikh Jasim, who wielded tremendous power in Qatar, had realised that he could not indulge in any activity likely to generate political consequences and began to pass the greater part of his time among the tribes in the desert. In point of fact, what he had really been aiming at was an extension, under the protection of the Ottoman State, of his field of influence beyond the boundaries of Qatar, and ways of taking advantage of the opportunities presented by becoming a qaimmakam or acquiring a rank superior to that of a sheikh's. This is why, while he made approaches and signed accords with Ibn Rashid with whom he intended to collaborate in trade and with the Sa'ud family with whom he sympathised since he was of the same religious denomination, he did not refrain from expressing his hostility on an occasional basis towards Sheikh Zayed in Abu Dhabi and al-Khalife in Bahrain. As we have extensively discussed this issue before, we shall abstain from repeating again the same stories but dwell on an incident, which is more interesting, related to Sheikh Jasim's activities outside Qatar and the attitude of the Ottoman government.

In a telegram sent on July 6, 1909 by the province of Basrah to the Ministry of the Interior the disorder reigning in the sandjak on the Qatar coast was reported as follows: "A great majority of the bandits are from the al-Manaser tribe. This tribe is a branch of the Abu Dhabi Sheikhdom in Oman under British protection to the east at a distance of 5-6 days from the nahiye of Odeid." BOA, BEO 268914. 2 BOA, iMM 4699.

164

THE OTTOMANS

IN

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b) Interfamily Dissensions in Kuwait and Jasim b. Thani's Intention to Intervene Direct contact between Qatar and Kuwait and especially the absence of a problem of partitioning, brought no obstruction to their relations. These events were caused by certain tribes which shuttled between the two regions and also by some refugees. They had come to Kuwait from Qatar and created the backbone of relations between Qatar and Kuwait. In general, nothing serious had happened since 1896 between the two parties, and the Sheikh of Kuwait acted as a middleman from time to time in certain disputes between Sheikh Jasim and the Ottoman government. However, the fact that at the beginning of 1896 Mubarak b. Sabah had his brother, the sheikh and qaimmakam of Kuwait murdered and seized power, caused serious incidents between Qatar and Kuwait. Mubarak's murder of his brother and the ensuing events caused a great deal of trouble in the province of Basrah and the Government and Sheikh Jasim's joining the alliance that the lawful heirs of Muhammad and their uncle Yusuf Ibrahim had formed against Mubarak only incited new unrest in the region.1 Mubarak, using the property of his brother, (of whose murder he was accused), tried to persuade the Province of Basrah that he, like his brother should be appointed qaim-makam of Kuwait. On the other hand, the heirs of the victims appealed to the Province of Basrah for the reinstatement of their lost. However, it appears that Hamdi Pasha, the Governor of Basrah, had consented to the appointment of Mubarak as qaimmakam and made contacts with the Government which removed Hamdi Pasha from office and appointed instead Arif Pasha as governor in order to calm the supporters of Mubarak whose activities in the region had gathered momentum, and to forestall any incriminations directed against the Governor of Basrah. Nevertheless, the new governor, instead of punishing Mubarak with a large scale military operation, yielded to the status quo, and his nomination as qaimmakam led to the continuation of the incidents throughout 1897. Yusuf Ibrahim, was unable to get what he had anticipated and had engaged in activities first in Bombay and then in the environs of Iran with a view to regaining the usurped rights of the heirs of the victims. Muhammad al-Sabah and Jarrah, sought an alliance with Sheikh Jasim. This fitted well the tribal custom of providing protection for refugees and was in line with Jasim's intentions to gain a hold over regional affairs. As a matter of fact, according to the news that reached Istanbul in the autumn of 1897, Jasim, in alliance with Yusuf Ibrahim, had displayed evidence of making preparations for an intervention in Kuwait.2 Naturally, Jasim's unilateral action worried both the 1 Frederick F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf, the Création of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, New York 1997, pp. 94-99. 2 BOA, BEO 77765.

THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN QATAR

165

Sublime Porte and Abdiilhamid II who attached great importance to the Kuwait issue. Arif Pasha, the Governor of Basrah, on receiving an order, contacted Jasim through the mediation of the mutasarrif of Nejd and wanted him to refrain from engaging in such an action which would be of concern to the State itself. In an answer dated 1897 Jasim said his intention was not to create factions, and that in his capacity as of an official of the Ottoman State, he had taken action to redeem the rights of those heirs of the victims who had appealed to him. Jasim, who furthermore promised that he would never cause any harm to Hasa and its surroundings, declared that he would give up putting into practice this intention on the receipt of an order from the Sublime Porte.1 In the meantime, the Sublime Porte did more than hold correspondence with the Sixth Army and the Province of Basrah as it decided to commission Muhsin Pasha, Chief of the General Staff from the Sixth Army to study the matter on the spot and immediately to send a corvette to the Qatar coast. Abdiilhamid II, who drew attention to the fact that these developments would affect the Anglo-Ottoman conflict which was going on in the Persian Gulf ordered the governor with a decree dated 15 November to take the necessary measures needed to remain on continuous watch and to keep everything under control.2 Detailed information had reached Istanbul about the preparations for an attack on Kuwait by Jasim b. Thani and Yusuf Ibrahim. According to this information, Yusuf Ibrahim and Jasim had engaged in arming the Beni Hajir tribes and the people.3 Jasim had their town criers announce to the portion of the Qatar people who had no arms and animals that they should do everything possible to procure both as he claimed that they were obliged to collaborate. In the meantime, Yusuf Ibrahim ordered 400 camels to be supplied and had his men sell them to the Qatar people who had no camels and who were to take part in the campaign. On the other hand, the Province of Basrah sent two tribesmen from the tribes loyal to the state to Qatar with a view to gathering intelligence about the date of the campaign and details thereof and to act as observers. We understand from a telegram dated November 17, 1897 by Arif Pasha, the Governor of Basrah, that Sheikh Falah, from the tribe Ujman who had sojourned for a while in the vicinity of Hasa to do seasonal shopping and certain other tribesmen with him, had provided the Mutasarrif with information that in case Jasim were to march on Kuwait, they would, by order of the Government, intercept them and forestall any imminent attack on Kuwait.4 Moreover, despite some delays, the preparations for the departure of the corvette "Zuhaf", which was formally to be despatched from Basrah to Qatar, were accomplished, and so she weighed anchor for the region on 19 November.5 l

BOA, BOA, 3 BOA, 4 BOA, 5 Ibid. 2

BEO 78127. Y MTV 169/59. BEO 78010. BEO 78052; 78127.

166

THE OTTOMANS

IN QATAR

On the other hand, Divisional General Muhsin Pasha who had been sent by the government to examine the Kuwait issue on the spot and the attitudes and behaviour of the officials in Basrah prepared a report and submitted it to the Ministry of War. A commission formed in the Ministry of War discussed the contents of the report from Divisional General Muhsin Pasha and deliberated his proposals and reported the results to the Sultan on 26 November 1897. According to General Muhsin Pasha, the reason behind the activities of Jasim and Yusuf Ibrahim, was the acceptance by the governor of Basrah and other staff of money and gifts both from Mubarak al-Sabah and from his opponent Yusuf Ibrahim. It appears that in order to perpetuate the inflow of wealth they had deemed it best to engage in duplicity. This was the reason why Muhsin Pasha suggested the immediate removal of the governor of Basrah. Muhsin Pasha who drew attention to the fact that once a fair resolution of the heritage issue was accomplished, the claims of Jasim b. Thani and Yusuf Ibrahim would cease and thus order would be restored. Muhsin Pasha advised that a military force be deployed to fend off any attack directed at Kuwait, as he pointed to the completion of preparations for attack on Kuwait by Jasim and Yusuf Ibrahim. On the other hand, Mubarak, although accused of having caused the death of Muhammad al-Sabah, seems to have strengthened his position in the course of the one and a half year period that had passed in the meantime by establishing good relations with the people and the Kuwaiti tribes. It is noteworthy that he had not failed in his loyalty to the Caliphate. Muhsin Pasha, taking into consideration Mubarak's state and the likelihood of foreign intervention in the affairs of Kuwait, suggested that, were he to be exempted from any trial for the offence of which he was accused, his appointment to Kuwait as honorary qaim-makam would be advisable. It appears that the military commission formed at the Ministry of War approved of Muhsin Pasha's suggestion. Indeed, it deemed it advisable to submit this to the approval of the Sultan without any change being made to it. Moreover, the military commission also prepared the appointment of Muhsin Pasha as Governor in view of his insight into the affairs of the region, in lieu of the Governor of Basrah who was to be removed, 1 Abdiilhamid II, who approved the measures suggested by the Committee, demanded that the Council of Ministers discuss the despatch to the region of a military force consisting of light battalions under the command of able officers. 2 However, despite approval by the Sultan, the government does not seem to have adopted the suggestions except for the aforementioned despatch of troops. The destination of the troops to be despatched would be Basrah instead of Qatar.3 The reason for this procrastination in the despatch of any troops presented during the meetings held on 3&6 December was Jasim's appeal to the above mentioned governor. 'BOA,

2

K.iW'/y 170/4.

Ibid; irade Hususi 1315 B/67.

3

B O A , Y.A.Res. 90/30.

THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN QATAR

167

The Council of Ministers seems to have interpreted Jasim's action in spite of the government's view as the defence of a legitimate right. It was decided to seek remedies for removing the causes that generated the previously discussed incidents instead of despatching troops to Qatar.1 The government sought ways to forestall the expected action of Jasim while it deployed troops to Basrah without recourse to force. 2 However, it seems that the divisional general wrangled with Arif Pasha, Governor of Basrah, against whom he had brought the accusation. Upon Muhsin Pasha's appeal to the Government for the restitution of his office, it was agreed to send Hiiseyin Hilmi, a former Governor of Adana, to the region 3 but upon the latter's request to be excused, the aforementioned mission was entrusted to Hasan Pasha, a member of the Ministry of the Interior in the Council of Ministers. Jasim, in the meantime, left Mukaynis with the forces he had gathered at Qatar and reached Ureij. During the meeting arranged by the President of the State Council held on 18 December 1897 under the chairmanship of the Grand Vizier, in which the ministries of commerce, public works, interior, foreign affairs, and justice, all participated an assessment was made according to which Jasim would give up his attempt were the rights of Muhammad al-Sabah redeemed, and it was pointed out that the issue had to be dealt with lest it should cause repercussions in foreign embassies. Moreover, considering that the examination to be conducted personally by Hasan Pasha in the region would take three to four months, immediate action had to be taken. The Council of Ministers seems to have been obliged to revert to the measures which had initially been advised by the Ministry of War and disapproved of by the Sultan. However, this time, contrary to what had been considered previously, the idea was to draft the order as if the troops to be sent were to march against Jasim, while actually they were to be sent to Kuwait and the necessary legal proceedings would then be instituted against Mubarak. According to the Council of Ministers, Mubarak would be thus punished and Jasim would be sent back to Qatar by force if he still insisted on his planned attack against Kuwait. 4 Immediately after these considerations, within the framework of correspondence conducted among those concerned, six battalions and one artillery unit were sent to Basrah at the beginning of 1898.5 This despatch of troops was the most significant one, subsequent to Midhat Pasha's Hasa campaign. This showed the importance that the Government and Abdiilhamid II attached to the Kuwait issue, it was also a sign of their determination not to allow Jasim to freely engage in ventures outside Qatar.

l

Ibid. BOA, BEO 79049. 3 ROA, trade Hususi 1315 B/68. 4 BOA, YA.Res. 90/30. 5 BOA, BEO 79049. 2

168

THE

OTTOMANS

IN

QATAR

One of the most conspicuous characteristics of Abdiilhamid II's reign, was the direct intervention of the sovereign in issues to which the Government remained at a loss. As a matter of fact, Abdiilhamid II who remained uneasy over any delay of the Kuwait issue felt it necessary to intervene in person. On the other hand Britain's intention to send warships to the region had become evident. Abdiilhamid II was swift in his reaction to Sheikh Jasim's actions in Qatar with a view to forestalling a foreign intervention. Jasim, who anticipated such a move, in the wake of his interview with Rejeb Efendi, refrained from marching on to Kuwait and relieved the people in Qatar by lifting the state of emergency. Rejeb Efendi, who sent a telegram on 17 January 1898 to the private apartments of the palace, reported that life in Qatar had returned to normal and that Jasim had promised that he would not engage in any hostile act against Mubarak al-Sabah without an order by the Sultan.1 The same day, Jasim despatched a messenger to the Fao post office to wire the following telegram signed 'Qaim-makam of Qatar' to the Sultan. "Sayyid Rejeb Efendi, chief of the descendants of the Prophet at Basrah, came to communicate to us the order of our Sultan, the Emir of the believers, and the Imam of the Muslims, that we were henceforth to avoid all sorts of acts against Mubarak al-Sabah. Moreover, Rejeb Efendi advised us that we dismiss the men we had recruited and that a public announcement be made about the peace and tranquillity that has returned. The orders of our Caliph were duly obeyed. To make one point clear though, our recent move was motivated as a consequence of the refuge of the children of late Muhammad al-Sabah and Jarrah alSabah, his brother, whom Mubarak al-Sabah had murdered in cold blood and stolen their rights. However, it appears from the decree of our Sultan that his will is to see the abandonment of all such actions. It is only too natural that our compassionate Sultan will protect the goods and properly of the widowed and the orphaned better than anybody else. We are under the wings of his justice and mercy. To this end, we immediately set out to dismiss the men recruited from among the tribes and had town-criers make their rounds announcing that order and comfort had been restored. We enjoined the public to pray for the continuation of our Sultan's victories and power and prosperity and the enjoyment of a long life. I humbly beg for pardon from my Sultan."2 A settlement of this issue without bloodshed greatly pleased Abdiilhamid II. He evaluated this as a success of the caliphate policy he had been pursuing. In his decree of January 19, having expressed his joy and making use of the influence of the caliphate title ordered that the above telegram be read out in the meeting of the Council of Ministers. 3 Abdiilhamid's intervention was to display his personal achievement to the cabinet. 'BOA, iradeHususi 1315 §/88. BOA, irade Hususi 1315 §/88. 3 Ibid.

2

THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN QATAR

169

Although Jasim b. Thani promised not to engage in any untoward action against Kuwait, it seems that he had not changed his convictions about Mubarak al-Sabah. As a matter of fact, in a telegram sent to the Grand Vizier on February 1898, he reiterated his former beliefs, stressing the fact that the redress of injustice perpetrated against the victim's heirs could be done only by a despatch to Kuwait of military forces. Jasim, in his telegram, accused the Commandant of the Sixth Army of taking bribes from Mubarak.1 Jasim, in this telegram stated that he had given up marching on to Kuwait only out of loyalty to his Sultan. The British, following the despatch of troops from Baghdad to Basrah by the Ottoman government, which consisted of a land force of one hundred and fifty men, sent three warships to the Muscat territorial waters. The British contended that this move was motivated by the alleged murder of a British telegraph operator in the Jassic region on the Iranian border, the aim being to stage a demonstration of military strength. The Ottoman government interpreted this as a movement not against Iran, but as an intervention in Kuwait affairs. It seemed that Britain was moved at the instigation of Sheikh Muhammad b. Ali b. Ibrahim, the Bombay representative of Mubarak's opponents. In other words, the British sought ways to establish control over Kuwait by supporting Mubarak's opponents. This subject was on the agenda in the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 2 March 1898. In their decision it was stressed that the issue of heritage had to be resolved as this had been the cause of the incidents. It was planned to summon Mubarak al-Sabah to Basrah and to assign Rejeb Efendi to this mission.2 Rejeb Efendi had been suggesting ever since 1896 that Mubarak be appointed qaim-makam like the other officials in Basrah. On the other hand, the likelihood of support from the British of these opponents, strengthened Mubarak's situation in the eyes of the Ottoman government eventually leading to his appointment as qaim-makam. Although Jasim was not pleased at this, he refrained from engaging in any action as he had promised. On the other hand, Mubarak began against all contingencies to arm the Kuwaiti tribes and exerted pressure on the Kuwait tribes.3 Jasim who was restless about this development had to give this issue an official cover. Upon an inquiry by the Ottoman government into the issue, the authorities in Basrah stated that this situation had come about because of ordinary conflicts between the tribes and also from a desire to capture Yusuf Ibrahim who continued to reside in Qatar.4 This correspondence continued throughout April-May but without result. In the meantime, Jasim who took advantage of the appointment of Enis Pasha as Governor of Basrah, sent him a telegram written in sombre style, expressing his wish to resign the office of qaim-makam. Jasim, in his telegram to Enis Pasha said:

•ROA, YA.Res. 91/29. Ibid. 3 BOA, YA.Res. 92/69. 4 Ibid. 2

170

THE O T T O M A N S IN

QATAR

"There is more than one reason for my wish to resign. The first and foremost of these is the one already known to you; next comes the emergence of the Zubarah issue. The Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah incident crowned all of these matters. The members of his family have constantly been appealing to the official authorities complaining about their grievance as a consequence of the murder of their father and the usurpation of the property they had inherited. By bringing to the knowledge of our State their plight, we tried to contribute to their relief. W e succeeded in reaching the Sublime Porte by sea and wrote about the Mubarak al-Sabah incident. Our sole concern was to convey the matter to the attention of the Sublime Porte. The treason of state officials (by this was meant officials in the Province of Basrah) and their doing business by open bribery, changed the course of events. The relevant representative of the state was misinformed and the official view and opinion of the government was thus adulterated. This led to the despatch of troops and indulging in expenses. They aimed thus to cover up their situation and treason while men like us prefer to preserve our honour and do not collaborate with those in love with money and their own interests. Therefore, our position must be filled by someone who might be of some use to you..."1 Jasim, declared his resignation and suggested that he be replaced by a suitable person while suggesting the appointment of Ahmad, his brother as qaim-makam of Qatar. These paradoxical statements suggest that Jasim was not so sincere after all in his intention to resign. A s he knew that his resignation would be turned down by the Sultan, he wanted to stress his influence vis-a-vis the new Governor in the eyes of the Sultan. In point of fact, the Governor had immediately informed the government of this fact and suggested the appointment of Ahmad. However, this offer was not accepted by the Sultan. Qatar's relations with the neighbouring sheikhdom were certainly not restricted to this situation. W e have tried here to show that despite all the power and influence enjoyed over the tribes, Jasim did not act completely independently. In other words, while the Ottoman government allowed Jasim to exercise his power in Qatar and on the coast thereof, it also banned all actions which might lead to any intervention by a foreign state and which would cause the state's rights of suzerainty to be debated. Jasim who had acknowledged the sovereignty of the Ottomans, and staged incidents at time which went beyond his intention, knew how to bridle his passions when warned by the state to be a loyal subject of the Ottoman State.

^BOA, Y.A.Res. 94/10.

CONCLUSION

An extremely rich body of historical materials has come down to us from the Ottomans who had once occupied vast expanses of land. Excluding military records and documents in public libraries, about one hundred million documents have been handed down by the Ottomans, who traditionally documented everything. However, only one third of these documents could be classified and made available for study and research. Among those documents that we had the opportunity to consult we have located thousands of records related to the Persian Gulf. Some of these had a direct bearing on the Gulf, while a good many others were related to Nejd, Hasa, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. The number of documents vary according to the political, strategic and economic importance of the regions under consideration. For instance, the number of documents related to Kateef is quite large, because it was one of the economically outstanding regions at the time, while the number of those related to the port of Ujair is relatively modest. Likewise, while there is a large number of documents concerning Qatar in view of its political prominence, records about Bahrain are far fewer. Thus, we can summarise the research and study we have conducted so far as follows: 1- In the Ottoman sources we examined, we have come across diverse geographical definitions of Bahrain and Qatar. However, considering that there had been no fixing of boundaries in the Gulf, in these definitions, islands and small islands were generally not included. The interpretations we had to make have led us to infer that the word "Bahrain" meant more often than not the Bahrain Island formed of two parts. And "Qatar" seemed to signify the tongue of land jutting out into the sea between Oman and Bahrain. Although uninhabited islands and small islands like the Hawar, between Bahrain and Qatar are indicated on Ottoman maps, there is hardly any information relating to them. 2- The available Ottoman records have led us to believe that, even though there had been occasional interruptions in the exercise of its sovereignty over the territories concerned, the Ottoman State was convinced that Bahrain and Qatar had been under her control as of the 16th century. Therefore, although no demarcation line had been drawn between them, Qatar and Bahrain had been considered as two distinct administrative units.

172

THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

3- Although, during the classical period, the boundaries of Bahrain and Qatar were not considered as being of much importance, in the 19th century, due to their forming a bone of contention between Britain and the Ottomans, the aforementioned boundaries became of great consequence. Indeed, the Ottoman State which desired to have the entire region in its grip in 1871 had brought the boundary issue onto the agenda during the military campaign headed by Midhat Pasha and dwelt on the areas over which the state had exercised influence both in Qatar and Bahrain. There are clear indications in the records that in the instructions that set the targets for the military campaign which had started to march on to Nejd, Qatar had been included. However, in order to avoid problems with the British who flaunted their influence over Bahrain the Ottomans took care to leave Bahrain out. So much so in fact that they had emphasised to the British more than once that Bahrain had been left out of the campaign which actually was directed at Kateef, Hasa, and Qatar. From the correspondence conducted on the issue of the military campaign of Nejd it seems clear that although the Ottoman military forces were permitted to go as far as the Bahrain coast, they were instructed not to trespass on the island. As a matter of fact, during the Nejd (Hasa) military campaign Qatar was taken under Ottoman control and made into a kaza while Bahrain was left intact, remaining a bone of contention, however, between the Ottomans and the British. On the other hand, although the British had been given guarantees that Bahrain would be left outside the objectives of the military campaign, the fact that in the instructions there was assent for the military to go as far as the Bahrain coast indicated that this guarantee was restricted to Bahrain Island itself. In other words, what the Ottomans understood from 'Bahrain' was the large island of Bahrain. 4- Although there had been no serious contention about the integrity of Qatar until the 1890s, after this date, we observe that cross-purposes did not fail to occur, originating from various pretexts. The Ottoman State appointed administrators to Zubarah and Odeid thus taking these places periodically within its administrative jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Britain which interpreted this as a threat against its interests and especially to its presence in Bahrain lodged a protest. 5- From the documents, books and maps in Turkish which have been accessible to us, it can safely be inferred that Qatar had actually been under the sovereignty of the Ottoman State, despite the objections made by the British, which cannot be accepted as party to the cause. Likewise although it was true that the British had effective supremacy over Bahrain, the Ottomans claimed that they had always had effective control over Bahrain. As a matter of fact, while on certain European maps, Bahrain is indicated as belonging to the British, and Qatar to the Ottomans, in the Ottoman maps both are indicated within the confines of Ottoman boundaries.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished Sources A- Archival

Sources

I- Bagbakanlik Osmanli Argivi, (Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive) Istanbul, Turkey. a.) Babiäli Evrak Odasi Sadaret Evraki - Divan-i Hümayün Kalemi Mukavele (A.DVN. MKL) - Sadaret Muteferrika (A.M) - Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi (A.MKT) - Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi (A.MKT. UM) b) Cevdet Dahiliye c) Dahiliye Nezareti - Dahiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Mahsus Müdiriyeti (DH-KMS) - Dahiliye Nezareti Muhaberat-I Umumiye (DH-MUÌ) - Dahiliye Nezareti Nüfüs Müdiriyeti (DH. SN. THR) - Dahiliye Nezareti §ifre Kalemi (DH-§FR) - Dosya Usülü irade (DUlT) d) Hariciye Nezareti - Hariciye Nezareti Hukuk Mü§avirligi Istigare Odasi (HR. HM§. ì§0) - Hariciye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi (HR.MKT) - Hariciye Siyasi (HR. SYS) e) Hatt-i Hümayün (HH) f) Iradeler - trade Askeri - trade Dahiliye - Irade Hususi (I.Hus) - Irade Meclis-i Mahsus (iMM) - Irade Mesäil-i Mühimme g) Meclis-i Vükela Mazbatalan (MV) h) Muahedenämeler ve Mukaveleler i) §ura-yi Devlet Evraki (§D) j) Yildiz Evraki - Yildiz Esas Evraki (YEE) - YEE, Kamil Pa§a Evrakina Ek - Yildiz Mütenevvi Evraki (Y.MTV) - Yildiz Sadaret Hususi (Y. A. Hus) - YiJdiz Sadaret Resmi (Y. A. Res) k) Defterler - Ayniyat Defterleri

174

THE OTTOMANS IN QATAR

- Babiali Evrak Odasi (BEO) Nezaretler Gelen-Giden. - Babiali Evrak Odasi (BEO), Basra Telgraf Giden - Kamil Kepeci Ruus Defteri (K.K. Ruus) - Miihimme Defteri (MD) - Sicill-i Ahval Defterleri II- Deniz Miizesi Argivi (Naval Museum Archive), Istanbul, Turkey. - Bahriye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi (MKT) HI- State Archive of Qatar, Doha, Qatar. File 5/9. IV- National Archive of Egypt, Cairo, Egypt. - Mahafiz Berru Bahr 19/3 B- Manuscripts Muhammad b. Kamil Numan, Jeziretu'l-Arab, Istanbul University Library, iUTY Nr. 4432. Siileyman §efik Kemali, Hicaz Seyahatnamesi, , Daru'l-Hilafe 1308/1310, , Istanbul University Library, lUTY Nr. 4199. Published Sources Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet, Istanbul 1308, Vol. XI. Anscombe, Frederic F., The Ottoman Gulf and the Creation of Kuwait, Sa'udi Arabia and Qatar, New York 1997. Babiali Hariciye Nezareti (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Bagdat Hatti ve Basra Korfezine Miiteallik ingiltere Metalibati Hakkinda Layiha ve Merbutati, Istanbul 1327. Babiali Hariciye Nezareti (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Al-Katar Sahilleri Meselesi, Istanbul 1334. Babiali Hariciye Nezareti, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Bahreyn Adalari Meselesi, Istanbul 1334. Babiali Hariciye Nezareti. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Kuveyt Meselesi, Dersaadet 1334. Bostan, Idris, "The Uprising in Qatar and Sheikh A1 Sani's Letter to Abdiilhamid II", Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations, II, pp. 81-89., Istanbul 1987. Cevdet Pa§a,Ma'rumt, (Ed: Yusuf Halacoglu), Istanbul 1990. Hiiseyin Hiisnu, Necid Kitasinin Ahval-i Umumiyesi, Kostantiniyye 1337. Kur§un, Zekeriya, Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanli Hakimiyeti, Vehhabi Hareketi ve Suud Devleti'nin Ortaya Qki§i, Ankara 1998. Midhat Pa§a, Tebsira-i Ibret, Istanbul 1325. Orhunlu, Cengiz, "1559 Bahreyn Seferine Aid Bir Rapor", Istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Fakiiltesi Tarih Dergisi, sayi 22, (Mart 1968), Istanbul 1968. Ozbaran, Salih, "XVI. Yiizyilda Basra Korfezi Sahillerinde Osmanlilar, Basra Beylerbeyliginin Kurulu§u", Istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Fakiiltesi Tarih Dergisi, sayi 25, Istanbul 1971, pp. 53-57.

THE O T T O M A N S IN QATAR

175

Safvet, "Bahreyn'de Bir Vak'a", TOEMIII/1142. Sertoglu, Midhat, Osmanli Tarihi Lugati, Istanbul 1986. Soyyigit, Osman Zeki, Ar§iv Belgeleri Igigi Altinda Katar'da Osmanli Hakimiyeti, Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Marmara University, Istanbul 1990. Siileyman Nutki, Basra Korfezi Rehberi, Istanbul 1317. §emseddin Sami, Kamus'ul-Alam, Istanbul 1306. The Persian Gulf Pilot, The Gulf of Oman andMakran Coast, (London 1883) Reprinted by Archive edition, London 1989. Yerasimos, Stefanos, Milletler ve Sinirlar, Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Orta-Dogu, Istanbul 1994. Periodicals Dtistur, I. Tertip, Istanbul, Vol. I, 1289. ikdam, Istanbul. Rusumat Salnamesi, Istanbul 1330. Salnàme-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye 1327. Salname-i Vilayet-i Bagdad, 1292-1300. Salname-i Vilayet-i Basra, 1308-1320. Takvim-i Vekayi', Istanbul Tasvir-i Eflcar, Istanbul. Zawrà, Baghdad.

APPENDIX

A P P E N D I X

179

QAZA OF QATAR ACCORDINO TO YEAR BOOKS OF OTTOMAN STATE (1292-1334 A.H.)

Year Prov.

Sanjak Qaza

Name of Officials

1292 Bagdat Nejd

Qatar

Qaim-makam Muhammed Thani Judge Es-Seyyid Abdiillatif Efendi

1295 Bagdat Nejd

Qatar

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani

1299 Bagdat Nejd

Qatar

Rank

Number Nahiyes of Villages

Efendi

Judge... Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani

Efendi

Judge Osman Efendi 1300 Bagdat Nejd

Qatar

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani

Efendi

Judge Muhammed Nasif Efendi 1306 Basra

Nejd

Qatar

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani

Efendi

19

Efendi

19

Efendi

19

Efendi

19

Judge... 1307 Basra

Nejd

Qatar

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Judge Muhammed Emin Efendi

1308 Basra

Nejd

Qatar

1309 Basra

Nejd

Qatar

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Vice Qaim-makam Mehmed Beg Judge Muhammed Emin Efendi Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Vice Qaim-makam Mehmed Beg Judge Haci Izzet Efendi

Zubara (Adm. Muham med Ali Ef.) Udeid (Adm. Halef Ef.

1310 Basra

Nejd

Qatar

1311 Basra

Nejd

Qatar

1312 Basra

Nejd

Qatar

1313 Basra

Nejd

Qatar

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Vice Qaim-makam Mehmed Beg Judge Haci ìzzet Efendi / Abdullah Efendi Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Vice Qaim-makam ... Scribe Hasan Beg Judge Ahmed Nazif Efendi Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Vice Qaim-makam ... Judge Ahmed Nazif Efendi Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Vice Qaim-makam ... Judge ...

Efendi

19

Efendi

19

Kapici ba§i

19

Kapici ba§i

19

180

THE OTTOMANS

Year

Prov. Sanjak

Qaza

1314

Basra Nejd

Qatar first class

IN

QATAR

Name of Officials

Rank

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapiciba§i

V umber Nahiyes of Villages 19

Vice Qaim-makam Habib Efendi Scribe Bekir Sitki Bey Judge Ali Efendi

1315

Basra Nejd

Qatar first class

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapiciba§i

19

Vice Qaim-makam ... Scribe ... Judge Hiiseyin Hiisnii Efendi

1316

Basra Nejd

Qatar first class

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapiciba§i

19

Vice Qaim-makam ... Scribe ... Judge...

1317

Basra Nejd

Qatar first class

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapiciba§i

19

Vice Qaim-makam Habib Efendi Scribe... Judge Ali Efendi

1318

Basra Nejd

Qatar first class

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapicibasi

19

Vice Qaim-makam ... Scribe ... Judge Ali Efendi

1319

Basra Nejd

Qatar first class

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapiciba§i

19

Vice Qaim-makam ... Scribe... Judge Ali Efendi

1320

Basra Nejd

Qatar first class

1321

Basra Nejd

Qatar first class

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapiciba§i Vice Qaim-makam Rabia Siileyman Efendi Scribe Tahir Efendi Judge Hiiseyin Hiisnii Efendi Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapiciba§i Vice Qaim-makam ... Scribe... Judge Ali Efendi

19

19

181

A P P E N D I X

Year Prov. Sanjak Qaza 1322 Basra Nejd

Rank

Number Nahiyes of Villages

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapicibasi Vice Qaim-makam ... Scribe ... Judge...

19

Qatar

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapicibagi

19

first class

Vice Qaim-makam Sadik Efendi

Qatar first class

1323 Basra Nejd

Name of Officials

Rabia

Scribe... Judge... 1324 Basra Nejd

Qatar

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapicibagi

first class

Vice Qaim-makam Sadik Efendi

19

Rabia

Scribe... Judge... 1325 Basra Nejd

Qatar

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapicibagi

first class

Vice Qaim-makam Sadik Efendi

19

Rabia

Scribe ... Judge... 1326 Basra Nejd

Qatar

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapiciba§i

first class

Vice Qaim-makam Sadik Efendi

19

Rabia

Scribe... Judge... 1327 Basra Nejd

Qatar

Qaim-makam Jasim al Thani Kapiciba§i Vice Qaim-makam ... Scribe ... Judge Seyyid Taha Efendi

19

1333 Basra

Qatar

Qaim-makam Vice Qaim-makam ... Judge... Miifti... Administrator of PTT...

19

1334

Kapiciba§i

Debi Zubara (first class) Udeid (second class) Wakra (second class) Jübeyle (second class)

182

THE OTTOMANS

IN

QATAR

SOURCES Year

Source

1292

Bagdat Vilayeti Salnámesi (Year Book of Baghdat Province 1292) p. 125

1295

Bagdat Vilayeti Salnámesi (Year Book of Baghdat Province 1295) p. 413

1299

Salnáme-i Viláyet-i Bagdat (Year Book of Baghdat Province 1299) p. 122

1300

Salnáme-i Viláyet-i Bagdat (Year Book of Baghdat Province 1300) p. 207

1306

Diván Amiri nr. 373

1307

Diván Amiri nr. 373

1308

Basra Vilayeti Salnámesi (Year Book of Basrah Province 1308) p. 136

1309

Basra Vilayeti Salnámesi (Year Book of Basrah Province 1309) p. 351

1310

Salnáme-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye (Year Book of Ottoman State 1310) p. 486

1311

Basra Vilayeti Salnámesi (Year Book of Basrah Province 1311) p. 187

1312

Diván Amiri nr. 373

1313

Diván Amiri nr. 373

1314

Salnáme-i Viláyet-i Basra (Year Book of Basrah Province 1314) p. 284

1315

Diván Amiri nr. 374

1316

Diván Amiri nr. 374

1317

Diván Amiri nr. 374

1318

Salnáme-i Viláyet-i Basra (Year Book of Basrah Province 1318) p. 238

1319

Diván Amiri nr. 374

1320 1321

Salnáme-i Viláyet-i Basra (Year Book of Basrah Province 1320) p. 149 Diván Amiri nr. 374

1322

Diván Amiri nr. 374

1323

Diván Amiri nr. 374

1324

Diván Amiri nr. 375

1325

Diván Amiri nr. 375 Salnáme-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye (Year Book of Ottoman State 1326) p. 714

1326 1327

Salnáme-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye (Year Book of Ottoman State 1327) p. 575

1333-1334

Salnáme-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye (Year Book of Ottoman State 13331334) p. 560

DOCUMENTS

184

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T H E O T T O M A N S IN Q A T A R

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APPENDIX

185

TRANSLATION

I. Dahiliye 83926

Sublime Porte Office of the Grand Vizier The receiver general of the unofficial correspondence addressed to the Office of the Grand Vizier The telegram from the Basra governorship regarding the decoration for past services and loyalty of Casim al-Thani, honorary Qatar Qaim-makam, a prominent personality in Basra has been submitted in the attached enclosure. Upon the Sultan's declaration that he should be granted the order of the chief doorkeeper of the palace, the necessary action will be taken. 15 §ubat 303 [28 February 1888], Kamil Grand Vizier Grand Vizier, The note and the annex sent from the office of the Grand Vizier have been seen and approved of by the Sultan. Please see to it that the necessary action is taken. Sultan's Chief Secretary Siireyya

186

T H E O T T O M A N S IN Q A T A R

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APPENDIX

187

TRANSLATION

I.MM 5117 The report submitted in the annex by the Council of Ministers from the Internal Department of the State Council regarding the continuation of whether the custom of giving sixteen thousand kiyye (one kiyye=1300 gr) of dates to Jasim al-Thani appointed as honorary Qaim-makam of Katar, subdivision of the sancak of Nejd is to be carried over to the account of the Ministry of the Interior has been submitted. The action to be taken depends on the intention of the Sultan. 24 Mart 307 [7 April 1891],

Kamil Grand Vizier

Grand Vizier, The letter that has reached us and which is of unparalleled worth has been by the Sultan and approved. Please act accordingly. March 25, 1307 Sultan's Chief Secretary Siireyya

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Naval Museum Archives MKT 1032/85 To the Sublime Porte. The captains of the two British Edizo (?) ships sailing on the Oman coastline have exerted pressure in Zubarrah, on Zaid, the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, and had twelve Negroes who were born there and who had parents, detained by force alleging them to be slaves and only after paying 4000 rupees as a fine from Sheikh Zaid they were released. In order to evade such troubles Sheikh Zaid was nationalized French through the mediation of the sheikh of Muscat. In the letter from the Kateef harbourmaster it is said that according to information received from reliable sources the French Consul at Muscat granted Sheikh Zaid the right to unfurl the French flag and promised him that French vessels would be sailing at all times along the Oman coast with a view to protecting him against British attacks. The said information formed the contents of the letter dated May 1, 1302 from the Basra Naval Command. 6 Haziran 312 [18 June 1896]

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MV 88/35 Minutes of the Council of Ministers 18 Haziran 1312 [1 July 1896] Summary The report of the Ottoman Battalion at Qatar which contains the statements of the Qatari people concerning the losses they have suffered at al-Zubarah and the abstention from taking action by Jasim al-Thani upon the suggestion of the British Consul and the redressal of their situation with respect to diving for pearls together with the petition of the people and copies of the letter of the Nejd Governorship, as well as the memorandum dated 6 Muharrem 314 [June 17, 1896] from the Ministry of the Interior mentioning the despatch of the letters received from the Vilayet of Basra and the action that must be taken and the memorandum dated June 19, 1896 of the Ministry of the Interior containing certain remarks on the issue were read. Decision It was reported that al-Zubarah had been subject to gunfire and the caiques used in pearl diving had been seized and taken to Bahrain. The return of these caiques to their owners depended on the realisation of the stipulation that an indemnity of 30 000 be paid. Intelligence was received afterwards that the British had set fire to the said caiques causing great damage to their owners which aroused new suspicions as to the likelihood of an attack during the diving for pearls, now that the season for diving had come, so that it was deemed advisable to write to the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs inquiring, in the first place, whether any answer had been received to the letter of the London Embassy addressed to Britain about the destruction of al-Zubarah, details thereof to be notified later and if no such answer has been received to ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send a reminder and notify us of the result.

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Naval Museum Archives MKT 1032/80 To the Sublime Porte The letter from the Kateef harbourmaster intimates that the entire fleet of caiques sent to Bahrain after being seized at Zubarah upon the order given by the British captains in the Persian Gulf were burnt through the mediation of Bahrain sheikh. This state of affairs is described in a letter dated May 1, 312 received from the Basra Naval Command. Please be kindly advised thereof. 6 Haziran 312 [18 June 1896],

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Naval Museum Archives, MKT 1032/87 To the Sublime Porte. The report and your letter No 109 dated June 18, 1896 about the letter of Ibrahim Pasha, ex Nejd governor relating to Britain's prospects and actions on the Nejd coastline, and to the forestalling of these prospects and actions and to the requisitioning of prohibited arms in the hands of tribesmen and the restoration of peace and order in Bahrain, Qatar and Muscat, and the measures that ought to be taken for the strengthening of the links between the tribes and the Ottoman government, on which subjects I was asked to give my opinion to the extent these had relevance to naval matters, have been examined. In the section on measures that must be taken of the said report 10 sailboats are required. These sailboats must be considered as absolute since no country having territorial waters ever uses them any more; therefore, should the Ottoman State venture to use them, people will look askance and difficulties will ensure. Any benefit that can one derive from these boats, if at all, will be but limited. There are some five or six such boats in Basra. On the other hand the Navy Department is convinced that the Ottoman coastline need small but fast vessels. Some such vessels have already been constructed thanks to the auspices of our Sultan and 12 others are under construction in our shipyard and are expected to be launched soon. Some of these will be sent to Nejd. As is mentioned in the above stated report in order that Nejd may be protected against aggression from the sea the integration of these ships with the existing fleet will increase two-fold our capacity, and if political and civil measures are to be added to this our expectations will certainly come true. 10 Haziran 312 [22 June 1896]

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TRANSLATION Sublime Porte Office of the Grand Vizier Coded telegram sent by the Vilayet of Basrah. URGENT Mubarak Al-Sabah informs us by his letter of 16 Cemaziyelahir 315 [November 12 1897] that he had intelligence to the effect that Yusuf AlIbrahim who is reported to have previously contacted Jasim Al-Thani, Kaimakam of Qatar, intends to arm the tribes Manaseer and Beni Hajer and incite the people of Qatar to engage in seditious activities from Hasa to Kuwait. The Nejd Mutasarnflik has been instructed to take measures necessary to forestall such activities and the Naval Command was notified to dispatch the corvette for which there is need. The Field Marshal of the Sixth Army Command must be instructed accordingly. 4 Te§rin-i Sani 1313 [17 November 1897] Vali of Basrah Arif

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Y . A . Res 90/56 Yildiz Royal Palace Chief Secretary Coded telegram from Basra Jasim, the Qaim-makam of Qatar having set out from the locality of Qatar called Mukeynes marching to Kuwait with his force arrived in Ureye, at a distance of 25 hours from Qatar and which is within its confines. According to Casim's account he seems to be insistent on his ideas about Kuwait, the reasons behind his act was the appeal by the heirs of the murdered Muhammad Pasha and of Jerrah, his brother, for meting out justice as the complaints and vociferations of the said heirs failed to find listeners. His swearing to Ujman, one of the regional tribes and other tribes who wanted to hinder him from such an act, that he had no fear or apprehension and that he would give up going to Kuwait if the rights of the heirs of Muhammad Pasha are restituted or if the Sublime Porte gave him explicit orders in this effect. Moreover, Jasim expressed his wish that he be permitted to purchase the food and the cattle from Hasa since otherwise he would be obliged to buy them elsewhere. The letter from the governorship of Nejd wanted to know what should be done to avoid future difficulties and disorders which might be engendered by Jasim's unstable and wicked attitudes. Mubarak's appointment as Qaim-makam to Kuwait, the restitution of the rights of the heirs of Muhammad Pasha and the settlement of this affair as soon as possible and the despatch of the aforementioned battalions to Qatar having been permitted by the Khalife, it would be advisable to make Jasim's understand clearly as soon as possible what will happen if he continues to stick to his wicked ways and then to report the result to the governor of Basra. 4 Kanun-i evvel 313 [16 December 1897] Arif Governor of Basra Divisional General Muhsin Basra Commandant

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previously, there would be no need to despatch soldiers to Qatar so that if the Sultan made admonitions and recommendations, the matter would be easily settled without any need for the despatch of troops, to which the governor of Basra sent a telegram in answer which was read together with the letter from the Ministry of the Interior by our Committee. In the said telegram, in the letters which answered the notes and recommendations addressed to the Nejd governorship and Jasim al-Thani it was stated that Jasim had obeyed the Sultan's order and that he would not henceforth act against the will of the Sultan and that his brother Ahmad Thani would follow suit so that the office of the Qaim-makam should be entrusted to his brother Ahmad. On the other hand, in the ministry's letter, it was stated that Jasim al-Thani's resignation was due to the Zubarah and Mubarak elSabah affairs and that his resignation should be approved and that the governor of Basra be instructed to appoint another person to fill his office. With reference to this, in a telegram received from the governor of Basra the following information was given; namely, the present population of Qatar which occupies a politically important geographical situation between Oman and Bahrain is about 15000 and their livelihood is based on the revenue they derive from the pearl and nacre trade; therefore the greater part of the population are indebted to Jasim who has an overwhelming influence over them; some 1500 tribesmen from Nejd and Oman tribes are loyal to him and as he is one of the prominent personalities of Qatar and the richest man there, unless Qatar is taken under effective control, a Qaim-makam who would be sent to replace him could do nothing and the risks that such a venture could involve were many; the conclusion drawn was to the effect that once Qatar is taken under effective control and that Jasim's relations with it have been a Qaim-makam capable of sustaining the actual situation of Qatar should be appointed and the new nominee should be approved again by Jasim himself. Under the circumstances, taking into consideration the regionally critical position of Qatar the resignation of Jasim al-Thani should be secured. Ahmad es-Thani, who is said by the government of Basra, to be superior in qualifications to his brother Jasim would satisfy the requirements of the region. The said telegram and letters were sent attached, if the Sultan approves it, the matter will be referred to the ministry concerned. As in all other matters, the authority belongs to you. 15 Temmuz 314 [27 July 1898] Sheikhulislam Grand Vizier The Minister of Justice The Minister of Marine The Minister of War Other signatures

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TRANSLATION BEO 236246 Letter addressed by the Minister of the Interior, to the Office of the Grand Vizier. Your letter no 241 dated 29 March 317 [April 11, 1901] intimated that smuggled arms and ammunition had been seized in a sailboat which came from Bahrain to Qatar, that necessary instructions had been given to the concerned to check any ship arousing suspicion carrying such a load, that another letter had been sent to the Minister of Marine Affairs for the despatch of vessels meant for the Nejd coast and that the Payment Office had been notified thereof. Your letter dated May 30, 1901 which reached me enclosing the letter by the Nejd Command with annexes concerning certain measures to be taken for the prevention of arms smuggled in. Measures and stricter controls had been notified to the Vilayet of Basra together with the relevant documents. In an answer received from the governor of Basra, it is reported that the administration of the district of Qatar has been entrusted to a local sheikh by the name of Jasim al-Thani holding the position of an honorary Qaim-makam and that the government has appointed a deputy Qaim-makam and a judge and that no other government official and executive staff exists there. Given the circumstances, it is reported that Jasim al-Thani behaves as it suits him best and obtains great amounts of money from the revenue of pearl sales and other sources which, in principle, should belong to the State, and that he is furthermore engaged in smuggling arms and ammunition from foreign countries and distributing them among the tribes with a view to widening his sphere of influence. It is said that he went so far as to demand officially the return of confiscated arms and inflammable materials. It is high time now that Jasim al-Thani be chastised by the despatch of sufficient military forces, that a proper district administration be formed and the income source be created for the state. Therefore, unless the safety of the coastline of Nejd is secured, the benefit to be derived from any land operation is bound to remain restricted. The letter of the vilayet of Basra has reiterated the necessity for the immediate despatch of vessels for which the Sultan has already issued a decree. The indispensability of the presence of vessels along the coastline of a special importance like Nejd has once again been stressed in the letter of the governor. Instructions to be given to the Minister of Marine require your order. The aforementioned letters are attached. 21 Te§rinisani 317 [4 December 1901] Minister of the Interior

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Ottoman Embassy, London General No. 283 Item No. 182 Re: British activities aimed at extending their influence over the Gulf of Basrah To the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Copies of letters addressed from the Vilayet of Basrah to the Minister of the Interior concerning the offer made to Jasim Al-Thani Sheikh of Qatar, by the British Agent, for settling part of the Bahrain population in Zubarah, a subdivision of Qatar, which had been transmitted to you and of papers containing the viewpoint of the Adviser's Office, have been examined together with the enclosures of your letter No. 77 dated 25 §ubat [February] 1912. The designs of Britain on the western coast of the Gulf of Basrah are well known. Now, we have been informed of the proposal concerning the Baghdad-Basrah railway made explicit in her proposal. No matter how we plead our cause, we are doomed to suffer defeat in the end. On the other hand, our experience has shown that places under our administration on the coast of Nejd at present will gradually be lost forever as events occur and that our intervention for the good will produce adverse reaction. As I informed you many times, and as is still fresh in our memories, Sir N. O'Connor, the late British Ambassador to Istanbul, during the discussion of the question of Kuwait, stated, in accordance with his Government's instructions, that, since Nejd was not under Ottoman sovereignty at the time of the signing of the Paris and Berlin treaties, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Ottoman State, Britain would not be acting against the treaties were she to declare that the Nejd coastline was not under Ottoman sovereignty. It is evident that they would not consider any proposal to do with the Nejd coast other than those which suit their purposes. Under the circumstances, the State has two alternatives: it will either agree to Britain's latest proposal and thus avert the likelihood of a dispute, or come forth with the declaration to the effect that the coastline which stretches up to the Muscat Imamate belongs to us, and leave the matter as it is to its destiny. You are the authority to decide on the alternative to be chosen. 29 §ubat [February] 1912. Ambassador to London, Tewfik Pasha

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