Isolating Qatar: The Gulf Rift, 2017-2021 9781955055482

Citation preview

IsolatIng

Qatar

IsolatIng

Qatar

the gulf rIft, 2017–2021

Edward A. Lynch

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2022 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Gray’s Inn House, 127 Clerkenwell Road, London EC1 5DB www.eurospanbookstore.com/rienner

„ 2022 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Lynch, Edward A., author. Title: Isolating Qatar : the Gulf rift, 2017–2021 / Edward A. Lynch. Description: Boulder, Colorado : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2022. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “Explores the trajectory and significance of the 2017–2021 dispute between Qatar, on one side, and Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE on the other”— Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2021058512 (print) | LCCN 2021058513 (ebook) | ISBN 9781955055154 (hardback) | ISBN 9781955055482 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Qatar—Foreign relations—Middle East. | Middle East—Foreign relations—Qatar. | Qatar—Foreign relations. Classification: LCC DS247.Q38 L95 2022 (print) | LCC DS247.Q38 (ebook) | DDC 953.63—dc23/eng/20220128 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021058512 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021058513

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Acknowledgments

1

2

3 4 5 6 7

8 9

vii

Introduction

Qatar and the Gulf Rift: Small States in the International System

1 3

The Making of Modern Qatar

17

Al Jazeera and Qatari Soft Power

55

The Emergence of a Regional Player The Boycott Begins Qatar Responds

35

75

93

The World Reacts

117

The End of the Rift

145

How Did Qatar Prevail?

167

Bibliography Index About the Book

175 185 191

v

Acknowledgments

I had a number of excellent assistants whose contributions to

this volume merit considerable praise. Allison Goguen, a student assistant in the social science division at Hollins University, helped to compile the tens of thousands of references necessary to provide the basic factual data on which my analysis is based. In this regard, the excellent staff at Hollins’s Wyndham Robertson Library, led by Luke Vilelle, provided guidance on the best use of their multiple databases and responded with great efficiency to my requests for interlibrary loans and article retrievals. Ms. Goguen and Deborah O’Dell transcribed hundreds of pages of my notes and helped me in the considerable task of keeping them organized. Averi Greenstreet assisted with proofreading. Any remaining errors are my responsibility. Hollins University provided major financial support for this project. During the course of my research for the book, I received a Cabell Grant, three special IMPACT grants, and several travel grants. I appreciate and acknowledge the efforts of my faculty colleagues who assessed my grant requests, along with many competing requests, and proceeded with the unenviable task of approving some grants and rejecting others. Much of the research took place during a sabbatical leave granted to me by Hollins University. Near the end of my sabbatical, I was named John P. Wheeler Professor of Political Science, an honor that brought additional financial support. The National Council for US-Arab Relations provided much of the impetus for the book by including me on a study trip to Qatar in 2018, while the Rift was still going on. Much of the information contained in these pages came from interviews in Qatar with government, military, and diplomatic officials and business leaders. Some of the material appeared

vii

viii

Acknowledgments

previously in papers that I presented to the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa, and I thank my fellow panelists for their suggestions. Finally, for her ongoing interest in the subject matter, unfailing support, and willingness to tolerate the stresses of living with a writer on a deadline, I thank my wife, Jacquie.

Introduction

In June 2017, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,

and Egypt stunned the world when they announced a comprehensive boycott of the small Gulf nation of Qatar. Trade and financial links were severed; diplomatic offices were emptied; airspace was closed. The boycotting nations expelled Qatari citizens and ordered their own citizens to leave Qatar. The action was ostensibly to punish Qatar for its alleged support for terrorism, its intervention in other Arab states’ internal affairs, and its sponsorship of the outspoken Al Jazeera news network. Given the huge discrepancy between Qatar and its antagonists in land area, population, arms, and other traditional measures of power, it seemed that disaster loomed for the small but fabulously rich nation. But the disaster for Qatar never came. Instead, the nation’s leaders deftly used its enormous wealth and extensive reserves of soft power to nullify the effects of what soon came to be called the Rift. In fact, by the time the Rift ended in January 2021, Qatar appeared to be stronger, more economically secure, more confident, and more assertive than it had been when the crisis began. The events of the Gulf Rift crisis call into question many cherished notions of international relations theorists, especially about the role of small states in the modern international system. The prominence of national interest as a guide to nation-states’ actions and the extent to which nation-states are willing to subordinate those interests to the goal of international organization also bear rethinking as a result of the Rift. In this volume I examine the events of the Rift and the challenges those events present to a proper understanding of the realities of international relations in the twenty-first century. I begin with an examination of existing theories about the place of small states in the global political system and

1

2

Isolating Qatar

the potential role of international organizations in that system. Chapter 2 then summarizes Qatar’s history both before and after independence, showing that defending its national interests—often by balancing its relations with more powerful states, but without making binding commitments—has been a hallmark of Qatari foreign policy for centuries. A sea change came to Qatari foreign policy with the ascension of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani in 1995. Chapter 3 chronicles Qatar’s rise to a position of global influence seemingly beyond its power. Hamad used an imaginative mix of foreign policy tactics to achieve security and promote Qatari soft power. Chapter 4 discusses a major part of Qatar’s rise to global prominence, which was the appearance of the Al Jazeera television network, which has also given rise to some of the most bitter recriminations directed at Qatar and Qataris. In Chapters 5 through 7, I discuss the years of the Rift itself. Chapter 5 examines the events of June 2017, when the Rift occurred and when the full extent of the effort to isolate Qatar became known. In this chapter I point out some glaring omissions in the Rift nations’ actions toward Qatar. Chapter 6 describes the actions that the Qatari government and people took to counter the effects of the Rift. Qatar’s enormous wealth plays a major role in the story, but the sedulous efforts of the government to promote Qatari nationalism, even among the country’s huge expatriate community, may have a more long-lasting effect. In Chapter 7 I turn to the global reaction to the crisis. Here I demonstrate that, far from embracing a global or regional focus, most nations saw the Rift as an opportunity to embrace and pursue their own interests. Not only did the Rift nations fail to convince potential partners of the truth of their accusations against Qatar, but they also failed to spur much effective action even among those nations sympathetic to the Rift nations’ goals. Chapter 8 tells the story of the end of the Rift, which came in January 2021. Since most of the principals involved in the negotiations ending the Rift cited the key role of the outgoing Donald Trump administration, efforts by US officials receive considerable attention. A concluding chapter returns to the questions raised at the start and assesses the long-term impact of the Rift on the region, the world, and the study of international relations.

1

Qatar and the Gulf Rift: Small States in the International System The great powers generally ignored [small states] and often treated them as vassals rather than as equals. —Amry Vandenbosch, president, Southern Political Science Association, 1963.1

In the early morning hours of June 5, 2017, the Gulf nation of Bahrain announced that it was cutting off all diplomatic, economic, and commercial ties with neighboring Qatar. Within hours, Bahrain was joined by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Egypt soon joined the Gulf nations in imposing sanctions on Qatar, and the Middle East faced one of its biggest crises in years. The break in relations, referred to locally as the Rift, lasted until January 2021. Besides withdrawing their diplomatic personnel and closing off their trade relationships, the four nations, often referred to as the Rift nations, closed their airspace to Qatari aircraft. The Rift nations (except Egypt) also demanded that Qataris leave their respective nations within fourteen days and required their citizens in Qatar to leave within the same span of time. The Rift nations accused the Qatari government of supporting terrorism, both by providing funds to terrorist organizations and by allowing representatives of terrorist organizations to take refuge in Qatar. Egypt’s primary stated reason for joining the Rift was the friendly reception Qatar offered to the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt’s military regime deemed a terrorist organization. The Rift nations also viewed Qatar’s reasonably friendly relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran with suspicion. In addition, Qatar was accused of using the Al Jazeera news network to spread false information about the governments of the Rift nations, even though

3

4

Isolating Qatar

both Qatari officials and executives at Al Jazeera insisted the network was independent of the Qatari government. Many observers believed that the deeper reason for the Rift was Qatar’s refusal to follow the lead of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in formulating its foreign policy. The crisis underlines some significant uncertainties about how best to understand international relations in the twenty-first century. Specifically, it calls into question some long-accepted assumptions about the proper place of small states in today’s international system. The episode also raises questions about the role that international organizations (IOs) play in the modern world. Thus, an understanding of the origins of the Rift, its surprising longevity, and the way in which it ended, which this book aims to provide, is important not just to students of the Middle East but also to anyone who wishes to understand how national interest motivates nation-states and how national power should be defined in our time.

New Roles for Small States in International Relations

The Rift was not a sudden or unprecedented event. Tensions between Qatar and its neighbors had been building for years. The emirate’s relationship with Saudi Arabia was most acrimonious, largely due to Qatar’s insistence on pursuing its national interests without regard to the wishes of its fellow GCC members. Most observers agree that the Saudi leadership viewed the GCC, at least in part, as a selfless effort by the Kingdom to protect the smaller and more vulnerable Gulf Arab states from Iranian aggression. This attitude includes the view that smaller states, such as Qatar, should defer to larger and more powerful states. Such is the price of weak states’ continued independence. For David Farnsworth, author of a widely used textbook on international relations, a powerful state is one that possesses strength according to eight different measures: population, geography, natural resources, economic strength, military strength, national morale, national leadership, and political system.2 Applying these measures to Qatar, signs of impressive international power are few. The country has fewer than three million people, nearly 90 percent of whom do not identify as Qataris. It is one of the smallest nations in not just the world but its region. Its military strength is not inconsiderable, but it is no match for either Saudi Arabia or Iran, let alone a larger outside power. In 2017, its political leadership and political system consisted of a relatively young emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, presiding over a government with a low level of institutionalization. On the other hand, Qatar entered the Rift crisis with the highest GDP per capita in the world. At the start of the Rift, it was the world’s largest exporter of liquid natural gas and had translated that resource into a reserve

Qatar and the Gulf Rift

5

fund, over and above its annual income, of over $330 billion. Its national morale was unknown and untested, largely because of its great wealth and the comfortable lifestyle thereby provided to most of its residents. In short, the balance sheet of national power did not seem to tilt in Qatar’s favor. Still, this small and seemingly weak nation not only survived the Rift but in many ways thrived during the crisis. When it ended, Qatar could declare victory, having made no concessions to the Rift nations. This denouement raises serious questions about such basic international relations issues as the role of small states and the definition of power. All theories of international relations differentiate among states. Realists often do so by ranking states according to their power, linking power with importance in global politics. For one realist author, “States depend on offensive power. Consequently, states seek to increase their power to ensure their existence in the chaotic international system.” 3 States can be superpowers, great powers, middle powers, or third- or fourth-class powers, with the final category consisting of states with little to no hope of ever being something other than the object of international relations. Global strategic theorist Nicholas Spykman contended that a small state “does not live because of its strength but because nobody wants its territory, or because its preservation as a buffer state or as a weight in the balance of power is of interest to a stronger nation. When the balance disappears, the small state usually disappears with it.”4 When small states convened and dominated the First and Second Hague Conferences, the London Times expressed the view of many realists by dismissing the conferences as a sham. “Everybody knows that all sovereign states are not equal. The differences between them in population, in territory, in wealth, in armed strength, [and] in their habits of thought . . . are among the most obvious and insistent of facts.”5 In treatments of international relations guided by the theory of realism, states that lack economic and military power play a role in world affairs, albeit a very narrow one. As one expert put it, “These states, in order to survive in an environment characterized by chaos and governed by the notions of self-interest and self-sufficiency, necessarily adopt one of two approaches: either the state comes under the wing of a great power in a bandwagoning relationship in order to protect itself against local threats; or it enters into alliances with other states to take on the threats posed by a stronger power, a strategy known as balancing.”6 Possibly the best historical example of bandwagoning is the alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union that allowed Fidel Castro to pursue an avowedly anti-American policy with virtual impunity. The third option, of course, is to experience annihilation by being conquered by a strong power. Since Qatar rejected all of these approaches, some experts have dismissed the country’s survival as a phenomenon that defies explanation.

6

Isolating Qatar

Small states have experienced their greatest security, at least in Europe, during historical periods when a rules-dominated regime governed international relations. During the century of the Concert of Europe (1815–1914), states like Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Switzerland, and others were often ignored by the great powers when decisions were made, but they had little fear of invasion or conquest. While some formerly independent states disappeared against their will during the consolidation of Italy and Germany and other states had to surrender territory, such as Denmark’s ceding of Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia, most of Europe’s small states spent the nineteenth century worrying less about their survival than in previous centuries and worrying considerably less about armed invasion. The “rules” of the Concert of Europe placed almost insurmountable obstacles on the use of force. A continent that had fought multiple continent-wide wars in the preceding 200 years saw no general European war for 99 years. The violent interruptions of the two world wars and the near-constant international tension of the Cold War saw many of the world’s small states facing the stark choices that realists insist are the international norm: subservience or conquest. The Americans and the Soviets used diplomatic pressure, economic blackmail, and occasionally overt force to compel small states to join their respective blocs. Qatar itself avoided many of these pressures, tilting toward the United States early on, cognizant that the Soviets had nothing of value to offer it. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, however, another rules-based regime emerged, and small states found their choices exponentially expanded.7 The United States emerged from the Cold War the world’s sole superpower, outwardly committed to international law in general and peaceable settlement of disputes in particular. Moreover, the United States lost the ability to threaten to leave small states defenseless before an aggressive Soviet Union and found itself in some ways with less power than when it had a global competitor. Thus, in 1991, Lithuania defied both superpowers and gained its independence. Ukraine later did the same after US President George H. W. Bush admonished it not to. US Secretary of State James Baker traveled to Yugoslavia in June specifically to warn Slovenia and Croatia against declaring their independence. Both did so anyway. The US-led Operation Desert Storm, in which dozens of nations joined in reversing Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait, was compelling evidence that aggressive military force was no longer an option for most states, at least under most circumstances. Since the realist view of power rests almost entirely on tangible forms of power as well as on the assumption of an anarchic international system, a basic rethinking of power and international relations was at hand. If the main element of tangible national power (i.e., military force) is taken off the table, then the strong are not much better off

Qatar and the Gulf Rift

7

than the weak. Supposedly weak states like Qatar, indeed, can no longer be considered weak if they have other elements of national power that are more useful than the giant militaries of the supposedly powerful states. This new reality prompted the development of the soft power theory of Joseph Nye and others.8 Qatar’s government has used multiple soft power strategies to enhance its security. This is not to say that the emirate relied solely on goodwill and a positive image. Qatar built a strong relationship with the United States, an action that would suggest bandwagoning. However, there are few if any indications that the United States dictates Qatari foreign policy. Qatar has ignored major US foreign policy preferences, especially with regard to Iran. The Qatari leadership has also undermined GCC unity. Since the GCC is an alliance formed for the specific purpose of providing collective security to Gulf Arab states facing a potentially hostile Iran, Qatar can hardly be said to be pursuing a classic policy of balancing. The state has thus rejected the two policy options that realists believe are open to it and is exploring uncharted theoretical territory.9 Qatar’s hard-nosed, go-it-alone foreign policy argues against the notion that small states can find security only in multinational groupings, necessitating an examination of the role of international organizations. The landscape of relations among the Gulf states saw some significant changes in the 2010s. US President Barack Obama expressed his desire to downgrade the American presence in the Middle East and “pivot” to a stronger focus on East Asia. To this end, Obama removed the last US combat troops from Iraq in 2011. The rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) followed almost immediately, prompting many observers to connect the two events.10 At the same time, the Obama administration was making increasingly serious overtures to the Islamic Republic of Iran, signaling a determination to use diplomacy and persuasion, rather than sanctions and threats of force, to deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The result of Obama’s efforts was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear deal, which promised substantial sanctions relief to Iran in return for supposedly verifiable promises not to build nuclear weapons. Both of these events created a strong sense of insecurity among the Arab Gulf states facing what they suspected would soon be a stronger and more assertive Islamic Republic. Saudi Arabia, fighting two proxy wars with Iran (in Yemen and Syria), was particularly concerned about augmented Iranian power. The events of the 2010–2011 Arab Spring did nothing to alleviate the Saudis’ sense of danger. The shocking gyrations of US policy in reaction to the Arab Spring, which included the abandonment of longtime allies in Tunisia and Egypt, underscored the impression that the Americans were eager to leave the Middle East to its own devices, regardless of the impact on

8

Isolating Qatar

US allies. At the same time, Qatari leaders saw in the Arab Spring a series of opportunities to play a role out of proportion to Qatar’s size and evident power. Qatar involved itself in almost all of the Arab Spring revolutions, usually with money but, in the case of Libya, with military force. The Al Jazeera news network played key roles in the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, a role that many saw as an arm of the Qatari foreign policy apparatus. In short, the epochal events of that decade saw Qatar and its neighbors move in opposite directions in their perception of the proper role of small states in international relations. This difference in perception would be a major cause of the Rift.

International Organizations and International Relations Theory

The proper role of international organizations was also in turmoil in the 2010s. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, enthusiasm for international organizations was at a historic high, and many academic experts assumed that IOs were an inescapable element of twentieth-century international relations. Such organizations would grow in number and in importance, eroding national sovereignty and enshrining an internationalist ethic in policymaking. Even decades after World War II, Inis Claude, although skeptical about the wisdom and efficiency of international organizations, wrote, “One recognizes international organization as a distinctive modern aspect of world politics, a relatively recent growth, but an established trend. Particular organizations may come and go, but international organization as a generic phenomenon is here to stay.”11 Some academic experts, such as Robert Keohane, saw the march of international organizations as not just inevitable but also desirable, if for no other reason than to rein in the power of the United States. In 2005, he wrote, “The United States especially needs to be held accountable [to global publics] because its internal democracy cannot be counted on to defend the interests of weak people whom US actions may harm.”12 He added in 2010 that “external epistemic actors” are needed because “democratic governments [tend] to disregard the interests and preferences of those outside their own publics.”13 Optimism about IOs was coupled with deep skepticism about the future of national sovereignty. As one author noted, The renewed faith in the power of international organization was clearly expressed by Mary K. Follett, an American political scientist, who wrote shortly after the United States entered the war against Germany that “the contribution of America to the Great War will be told as America’s taking her stand squarely and responsibly on the position that national particularism

Qatar and the Gulf Rift was, in 1917, dead.” Nations, she noted, “have fought for national rights” but these “are as obsolete as the individual rights of the last century.”14

9

Realists take issue with Follett, insisting on the primacy of national power and national sovereignty as the proper starting point for understanding international relations. Hans Morgenthau, in his seminal Politics Among Nations, averred that national leaders engage in the single-minded pursuit of “national interest defined in terms of power.” For Morgenthau, this meant international relations is an unrelenting struggle for power. This struggle emanates from human nature itself, which includes an inescapable will to dominate. He warned against the “illusory hopes” placed in the United Nations. Later editions would acknowledge the accomplishments of the UN, from peacekeeping to economic development, but these acknowledgments did not distract Morgenthau from his basic objection to IOs. For Morgenthau, national sovereignty is indivisible. It cannot be shared with an international organization. He wrote, “What is needed in order to save the world from self-destruction is not the limitation of the exercise of national sovereignty through international obligations and institutions, but the transference of the sovereignties of individual states to a world authority, which would be as sovereign over the individual nations as the individual nations are sovereign within their respective territories.”15 Intermediate IOs like the UN cannot produce the sort of cultural change that Morgenthau believed was necessary for such a world authority to come into being. Only decades of diplomacy could do that. The unprecedented scale of violence in World War II, and the equally unprecedented horrors of the Holocaust and atomic weapons, discredited realism among both academics and policymakers and seemed to make institutionalized international cooperation more urgent in 1945 than in 1919. Even after the UN found itself largely paralyzed by the US-Soviet Cold War rivalry, confidence in the potential significance of IOs remained high among some theorists. At the end of the Cold War, Robert Keohane warned, “Avoiding military conflict in Europe after the Cold War depends greatly on whether the next decade is characterized by a continuous pattern of institutional cooperation.”16 A common thread running through optimistic views about the potential for IOs to prevent the disasters associated with national sovereignty coalesced into the theory of “liberal institutionalism,” marked by confidence in institutional membership per se to restrain the violent impulses of national leaders. Theorists who placed primacy on national sovereignty and power, such as realists, stood at odds with liberal institutionalists, starting a debate that has continued unabated for seventy-five years. Liberal institutionalists break from realists in their view of how national leaders define their selfinterest. For realists, self-interest is always defined in terms of power and always applied to the perceived opportunities of the moment to increase (or

10

Isolating Qatar

at least protect) national power. For liberal institutionalists, however, national leaders are capable of seeing beyond the immediate and embracing long-term goals that are deemed favorable, even if the desirable long-term goal involves a short-term surrender of sovereignty. Institutionalists believe that the search for such cooperation will be habit-forming, allowing IOs to “affect the interests and values of states in ways that cannot be fully appreciated.”17

Advantages of International Organizations

Liberal institutionalists perceive definite advantages to systematized cooperation through IOs. In one view, “IOs allow for the centralization of collective activities through a concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive administrative apparatus.” They help states “reach specific agreements by reducing transaction costs, improving information and raising the costs of violations.” The same authors contend that “states consciously use IOs both to reduce transaction costs in the narrow sense and, more broadly . . . to legitimate or delegitimate particular ideas and practices; and to enhance their capabilities and power.”18 In this regard, IOs compare favorably to decentralized or ad hoc cooperation. The latter entails high transaction costs since each international agreement must be negotiated bilaterally. For weaker states like Qatar, IOs also perform some attractive functions. Perhaps the most commonly noted is the “seat at the table” function. Weaker states in fora like the UN General Assembly can compel powerful states to listen to their views in a way that would not be possible without the rules and structure of an international organization. IOs also provide a certain amount of protection for weak states since they make publicizing aggression easier. Lower transaction costs for diplomatic initiatives are another attraction of IOs for weaker and poorer nation-states.

Functionalism and the “Gulliver” Approach

Enthusiasts of international organizations tend to believe that the road to a more peaceful future is paved with more multilateral and fewer unilateral (national) decisions. Blocking that road is the lamentable tendency of national leaders to guard their autonomy jealously, almost to the point of paranoia. To overcome this possessiveness, the functionalist school argued that IOs could prove their usefulness, and eventually demonstrate their indispensability, by taking on (supposedly) nonpolitical, noncontroversial tasks, from air traffic control to meteorology. Such functional goals are important to the GCC. The efforts of some GCC members to expand economic coordination indicate a functionalist approach to strengthening the GCC. The theory behind functionalism is that increased international interdependence is an inescapable fact of life and that national leaders will welcome methods to increase the efficiency and predictability of the growing

Qatar and the Gulf Rift

11

number of interactions that national leaders must oversee and coordinate. As one study put it, “Functionalism emphasizes the importance of interaction between economics and politics. The essence of functionalism is the spillover effect of integration. This means that cooperation and integration in the economic area is likely to produce cooperation and integration in other areas because of the interdependency between those two areas. In short, economic integration will eventually lead to political integration.” Cooperation will lead to coordination, the latter overseen by an international functional organization, and become habit-forming. The study continues, quoting David Mitrany: “Cooperation is possible when it focuses on function, so cooperation can be achieved more effectively by collective action than an individual state. In this sense, an international organization plays a role of an institution that deepens cooperation.” 19 Citing examples from the Korean Peninsula, however, the authors of the study found that the crossover from economic to political cooperation is not automatic. Agreement between the two Koreas was relatively easy on economic issues since these were “less sensitive” to the North Koreans. Agreement on political and military issues, on the other hand, was almost impossible since these “are essential to the North Korean regime security.”20 Functionalists implicitly suggest the image of Gulliver in Lilliput as an analogy for their effort to create a web of functional organizations that will eventually place significant restraints on sovereignty. In the analogy, Gulliver represents leaders clinging to national sovereignty, the Lilliputians are the officials of functional organizations, and the threads are the advantages of institutionalized international coordination that will eventually immobilize sovereignty, just as Gulliver is immobilized. The analogy is flawed, however, in that it leaves out the salient fact that the Lilliputians are only able to bind Gulliver because he is unconscious, a condition unlikely to be repeated among national leaders bent on preserving their sovereignty.

International Organizations in Crisis

History provides numerous examples of states withdrawing from functional organizations when they have become injurious to national interests. The Jimmy Carter administration, for example, quit the International Labor Organization when it became a sounding board for Palestinian complaints against Israel. The succeeding Ronald Reagan administration did the same with the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Morocco withdrew from the African Union over the status of Western Sahara. Brexit is a dramatic recent example. In the case of the GCC, ambitious plans for a single currency foundered on arguments over where the central bank would be located. The Gulf Rift crisis took place against a backdrop of growing skepticism about the efficacy and desirability of international organizations. On

12

Isolating Qatar

June 23, 2016, voters in Great Britain voted to leave the European Union after a bitter campaign in which European Parliament member Nigel Farage, leading the effort for a “Leave” victory, complained, “In vast sways of our national life, our national governments effectively have become subordinate to the European system of lawmaking.”21 In November 2016, Donald Trump won an upset victory in the US presidential election after promising, among other things, to quit the Paris Climate Accord, the JCPOA, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Trump also promised to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement. As a candidate for president, the Republican nominee expressed skepticism about the usefulness of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations. Speaking to the latter body in September 2017, Trump informed the delegates, “In foreign affairs, we are renewing this founding principle of sovereignty. Our government’s first duty is to its people, to our citizens— to serve their needs, to ensure their safety, to preserve their rights, to defend their values. As President of the United States, I will always put America first, as the leaders of your countries will always, and should always, put your countries first.” He added later in the speech, “If this organization is to have any hope of successfully confronting the challenges before us, it will depend, as President Truman said some 70 years ago, on the ‘independent strength of its members.’ If we are to embrace the opportunities of the future and overcome the present dangers together, there can be no substitute for strong, sovereign, and independent nations.”22 Trump was not alone in challenging the UN’s claims to supranational authority. Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro addressed the General Assembly in 2019 and rebuked the organization bitterly for what he saw as its presumption in seeking to dictate Brazil’s agricultural, environmental, and social policies. Threats of sanctions and other actions to force Brazil to stop logging in the Amazon, among other things, Bolsonaro classified as “colonialist.” He said, “The United Nations Organization had a fundamental role in overcoming colonialism and cannot accept that this mentality returns to these rooms and halls under any pretext.” He asserted that those who sought to dictate to Brazil “questioned that which is most sacred to us: our sovereignty!” He embraced Trump’s earlier insistence on “respect for the freedom and sovereignty of each of us.”23 In Europe, political parties that openly rejected membership in and deference to the EU challenged what had looked like a continent-wide consensus on the necessary movement toward greater power for the organization. Marine Le Pen, head of the National Front party in France, came in a strong second in the first round of the country’s 2017 presidential election. Although soundly defeated in the second round, she set a new electoral record for her anti-EU party. So-called Euro-skeptic parties made strong gains elsewhere in Europe, including Italy, Poland, Hungary, the Nether-

Qatar and the Gulf Rift

13

lands, Sweden, and Denmark. Notably, no Brexit-like efforts have gained traction outside Great Britain. In the Middle East, the GCC appeared to be one of the more promising international organizations in the region. It was founded in 1981 as a mutual-defense arrangement among six Gulf nations. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman shared a fear that the revolutionary government of Iran would use subversion, propaganda, terrorism, and perhaps outright military force to overthrow the Sunni-dominated monarchies of the region and replace them with Shi’adominated revolutionary governments. By the twenty-first century, the GCC leadership had hopes of supplementing its collective security role with a path to establishing coordinated economic policies, a common market, and even a common currency. By the time of the Rift, however, the GCC was split into three different factions. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain were leading the effort to isolate Qatar. Qatar was resisting these efforts and seeking allies outside the region to bolster its opposition. Kuwait and Oman, for their part, were determined to stay neutral and perhaps mediate a settlement. The crisis in the GCC has implications far beyond the region. The council is a smaller regional organization whose members share a culture, a language, geographic proximity, the dominance of Sunni rather than Shi’a Islam,24 many economic interests, and the broad outlines of their respective foreign policies. As such, it seemed to offer better prospects for success than larger and more diverse international organizations. A crisis for the GCC, in other words, is a likely harbinger of crises for other international organizations and, in the time of Brexit, Trump, Le Pen, and others, perhaps of a general crisis for international organization itself.

Regional Organizations and Common Ground

If the limitations of large and ambitious IOs are becoming clearer, geographically proximate nations may have a better chance of succeeding in creating common goals and carrying out common projects than their global counterparts. The inevitable interdependence on which institutionalists place their hopes is more likely to bring together states with similar geographic and economic characteristics. Ideally, sharing elements of history and culture will smooth the path to institutionalized cooperation even more. The members of the GCC in many ways epitomize the commonality on which regional integration depends. In the abstract, it seems reasonable, both to realists and to liberal institutionalists, that common national characteristics and interests will facilitate international cooperation. Europe provides examples of successful regional IOs such as NATO and the European Union. In the former case, the threat of

14

Isolating Qatar

the Soviet Union after World War II served to bring nations in western Europe together less than half a decade after they had been trying to annihilate each other. It is worth noting that attempts by US officials to duplicate NATO in other regions (CENTO and SEATO) failed. Similarly, fear of permanent American economic dominance prompted the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, a forerunner to the infinitely more ambitious EU and perhaps the only example on record of functionalism actually working. The record of other regional organizations, however, is far less persuasive. The Organization of African Unity, later the African Union, has had years in which it could barely hold a summit conference, let alone induce its members to work together on the continent’s urgent needs. Given the enormous diversity of the African continent compared to Europe, this is not surprising. The much smaller Economic Community of West African States has had more success in its efforts in military intervention and peacekeeping, for which it was not designed, than in economic integration, for which it was designed. The Organization of American States has performed almost none of the functions listed in the preamble to its charter. Even the smaller Andean Community has had little success in bringing about the customs union and free trade area it promised when it was founded. The League of Arab States has perhaps a greater claim to common culture and history than the other regional organizations mentioned, but its recent divisions, especially given different reactions to the upheavals of the Arab Spring and different perceptions of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, underline once again the problematic nature of regional integration. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organizations, with far greater diversity among its members, has had considerably more success than more homogeneous groupings in carrying out its stated goals. The mixed record of regional organizations suggests that even relatively homogeneous groups like the GCC possess no guarantee of success.

Collective Security and Limiting Ambitions for IOs

If any type of regional IO has a stronger claim to likely success than others, it is an IO dedicated to collective security, since no matter is of higher importance to national leaders. The success of NATO makes the case for focusing the drive for international collective action on responses to a visible external threat and to further focus the development of IOs on a regional basis, where there is more likely to be agreement about the existence and nature of such a threat. This function is a major raison d’être for the GCC. Inis Claude notes that internationalists perceive collective security arrangements to be a desirable halfway point between international anarchy and world government, “far enough from anarchy to be useful and far enough from world government to be feasible.” Collective security is not as ambi-

Qatar and the Gulf Rift

15

tious as schemes to control all state actions. It also implicitly promises a relatively low price tag for stopping aggression since aggression will be recognized early and the aggressor confronted with a well-prepared and united front.25 However, collective security involves a single-mindedness in perceiving national interests that realists are likely to reject. At base, a collective security arrangement promises to thwart aggression. Unless the national leaders involved can all define aggression the same way, blanket opposition to aggression is nothing more than a commitment to the status quo. In addition, collective security requires a willingness to place overwhelming force under the control of an unpredictable collective, on the assumption that such force will be used only for defense. The policy assumes that aggression will be recognizable and prompt “a kind of spontaneous collective response.”26 While supporters of collective security point to the evident success of NATO, critics discount the applicability of NATO’s example to other situations. Claude rejects the notion that NATO is a collective security arrangement, calling it instead a “selective security” system. It is designed to deter aggression from a single, easily identifiable enemy, namely, the Soviet Union.27 While the NATO example is of limited applicability, it is relevant to the situation faced by members of the GCC. Like NATO, the GCC faces a potential aggressor in Iran, whose character as such is generally accepted (although member states differ on the seriousness of the threat it poses). Iran is to the GCC what the USSR was to NATO (whose members also had differences of opinion concerning the danger from the USSR). As with the situation in Europe during the Cold War, one side has a near monopoly on wealth and far better relations with the rest of the world. Iran, for its part, shares with the former Soviet Union a preponderance of raw military might, more than enough to overwhelm any individual member of the GCC (including Saudi Arabia). Iran, like the Soviet Union, is an international pariah, but with far fewer friends than the Soviets boasted. It has serious internal divisions, like the Soviets had. Iran has a leadership that combines a strident but edgy commitment to revolution with a xenophobia that borders on paranoia. Like the Soviet leadership, the Iranian leaders seek to project power through proxies, simultaneously claiming credit for the proxies’ successes and denying all connection to those proxies. Iran has copied the Soviet Union (and, for that matter, post-Soviet Russia under Vladimir Putin) in sedulously trying to split the alliance opposing it, in large part by offering attractive trade deals. Finally, Iran’s leaders have worked to convince their Gulf neighbors that regime change in Iran is a chimera and that accommodation is inevitable. Despite its regional scope and focus on the seemingly more achievable goal of enhancing regional security, the GCC has had almost none of NATO’s success in coordinating the defense and foreign policies of its members. A large part of the reason has been the prickly independence of

16

Isolating Qatar

Qatar, which has refused to coordinate (the Qatari leadership might say subordinate) its priorities. A small state with little in the way of tangible national power, Qatar has sometimes had the additional challenge of finding itself between powerful neighbors, as it finds itself today between Iran and Saudi Arabia. As such, theorists would expect to find Qatar accepting the theoretical role of the small state and using the traditional tools of a small state, including bandwagoning, balancing, and eagerly supporting IOs like the GCC. Qatar’s history, however, reveals a far more complex picture.

Notes

1. Vandenbosch, “The Small States in International Politics and Organization,” 293–312. 2. Farnsworth, International Relations, chap. 3. 3. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Powers. 4. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, 20. 5. “The Hague Fiasco,” The Times (UK), October 19, 1907. 6. Kabalan, “Actors, Structures and Qatari Foreign Policy,” 61. See also Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers. 7. Galal, “External Behavior of Small States in Light of Theories of International Relations,” 38–56. 8. Nye, Soft Power. 9. For more information on small-state theory, see Elman, “The Foreign Policies of Small States,” 171–217; Baehr, “Small States,” 456–466; Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas,” 291–310; Fox, “The Small States in the International System,” 751–764; Labs, “Do Weak States Bandwagon?,” 383–416. 10. See, for example, Lynch, The United States and the Arab Spring, chap. 9. 11. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, 6. 12. Keohane, “Abuse of Power,” 53. 13. Buchanan and Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,” 239. 14. Quoted in Iriye, Global Community, 20. 15. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 525. 16. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 6. 17. Abbott and Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” 25. 18. Ibid., 4–8. 19. Hwang and Kim, “Revisiting the Functionalist Approach to Korean Unification,” 44. 20. Ibid., 42. 21. Maertens, “Nigel Farage Pleads for a Europe of Sovereign Nation-States.” 22. Politico Staff, “Full Text.” 23. Bolsonaro, “Speech by Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro.” 24. Bahrain alone among GCC members has a majority Shi’a population but a Sunni-dominated government. 25. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, 246–247. 26. Ibid., 279. 27. Ibid., 266.

2

The Making of Modern Qatar

“Frailty of authority” (a term developed by Max Gluckman in his work on African chiefdoms) means the limitations imposed on a ruler’s authority by his subjects’ awareness that he does not live up to the ideals of leadership established by their culture.1

This ability to adapt to their environment is one of their strongest characteristics and one that allowed the present-day citizens of Qatar to cope with the overwhelming aspects of their recent wealth.2

At first glance, Qatar does not seem like the kind of place likely to command world attention. Small, sparsely populated, and made up mostly of desert, the thumb-shaped country seems almost destined to play the role of international backwater, receiving little attention and generating little controversy. For much of its history, this was exactly the status of this small segment of the Arabian Peninsula. However, during its long period of seeming irrelevance, the people of what would become modern Qatar established methods of operating, both within the peninsula and with their neighbors, that persist into the twenty-first century. In some cases, episodes from the past provide unusually precise parallels with the Rift crisis. The small size, hostile geography, and almost total isolation of the Qatari peninsula have compelled the people who live there to constantly seek a balance among their sometimes predatory neighbors. For virtually all Qatar’s history, its neighbors have been larger, more populous, and more powerful. As late as the nineteenth century, even Qatari architecture reflected uncertainty. Houses made of palm fronds, reeds, and mud predominated.3 Simple survival under such conditions has required unceasing

17

18

Isolating Qatar

attention to the assets, liabilities, and interests of neighboring power centers, along with unceasing and dexterous adjustments to Qatar’s foreign policy to exploit potential enemies’ weaknesses when these could be found and divert or thwart acquisitive designs on Qatari territory on the part of neighbors. As one expert put it, “A recurring theme in Qatar’s modern political history has been that of its leadership perennially seeking some form of balance in its regional international relationships, consistently and quickly switching alliances when necessary.”4 It is easy to overstate the influence of historical events and patterns on current policymaking in any country. In the case of Qatar, however, certain geographic realities have remained largely the same for centuries. For hundreds of years, Qatar has found itself between the world center of Sunni Islam and that of Shi’a Islam. Qatar also has long faced a seemingly perpetual geopolitical imbalance between a single large political unit (Saudi Arabia) and several small peripheral polities (the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar itself).5 Somewhat surprisingly, Qatar’s centuries-long struggle for an independent existence distinct from its neighbors has not been accompanied by a sense of Qatari national consciousness until relatively recently6 —this despite the fact that some of the country’s unique historical trends make it quite different from its neighbors. Qatar, for example, has never had a strong and influential clerical power center. With a small population that until recently was less urbanized than those of Bahrain or Kuwait, and with a royal family that sometimes played its own religious role, there was little opportunity for a religious class to emerge as a source of power in competition with the secular leadership.7 The country has never had a religious police force. Religious authorities have no influence over textbooks. Only recently has a class of religious scholars emerged, and the most influential of those scholars are not from Qatar.8 To this day, the country features a level of personal freedom the residents of many other Arab states would envy. At the same time, the Qatari royal family also does not have to compete with a merchant or business class, as many of the neighboring regimes do. Until the discovery of oil in the 1930s, Qatar relied mostly on camel raising and pearl diving for its income. Neither of these sources of wealth resulted in the emergence of a powerful merchant class. With the state in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries assuring itself of a monopoly on oil and gas, private merchants became dependent on the goodwill of the ruling family. This dependence brought substantial benefits in the form of commercial opportunities and protection from competition. Wealth from these two energy resources, however, is a recent phenomenon. The themes of overcoming a hostile environment, agile diplomacy to balance threats in the service of survival, the lack of competing internal

The Making of Modern Qatar

19

power centers that could undermine government authority, the slow development of a strong central government, and the equally slow development of a uniquely Qatari consciousness are intertwined throughout Qatari history, as the following summary will show.9 Starting with the prehistory of Qatar, the chapter traces the recorded history of the peninsula, its relations with the succeeding power centers in the Gulf region, its emergence as a fully independent state in 1971, and its navigation of the challenging geopolitical realities since then. This history bequeathed a skill set that would allow Qatar to derive maximum benefit from the almost unimaginable wealth that appeared in the late twentieth century. The chapter ends with the rise of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani in 1995. Hamad would take Qatar in a radically different direction, making the once-neglected peninsula into a player on the world stage.

The Coming of the Al Thani Dynasty

Qatar has a long human history but a short recorded history. Evidence of the extraordinary length of human habitation was found in 2007 when Danish archeologists found arrowheads dating back 700,000 years. Even discounting this find as an aberration, the peninsula was part of the Dilmun trading system by 2400 BC, serving as a link between the Indus valley and the Babylonian Empire. The appearance of ninth-century Tang pottery in Gulf waters and the wreck of an Arab dhow of the same vintage off the coast of Indonesia attests to the reach of Indian Ocean trading systems in the region’s prehistory.10 The economy of Qatar, largely based on subsistence agriculture and commercial camel breeding until the end of the eighth century, changed dramatically with the rise of the pearl industry. Oyster beds on both Qatari coasts were extensive and productive, providing a product in high demand as far away as China.11 Islam came to the peninsula in 629 AD when an emissary from Mohammed persuaded Qatari leader Al Mundhir bin Sawa al-Tamini to embrace the newly emerging religion. Having done so, Mundhir immediately established trade relations with the economic centers of western Arabia. Even at this early stage in Qatar’s history, its leaders understood that it lay between two more powerful neighbors, Bahrain and Oman. A link with a new power center provided options for survival and made sense both religiously and diplomatically. Still, Qatar’s strategic location and vulnerability had become threateningly obvious to any number of regional conquerors by this point. The peninsula became part of several Arab-Islamic empires. It was then part of the Portuguese Empire from 1517 to 1538. During the succeeding three centuries, Qatar was controlled by Persia three times, by Oman twice, by

20

Isolating Qatar

the Ottoman Empire twice, and by Bahrain twice.12 Yet these foreign claims of sovereignty evidently had little impact on the people of Qatar, who went about their business raising camels, diving for pearls, coaxing crops from the reluctant soil, and writing down very little of their experience. One expert noted that every culture “has a certain point in history beyond which the past is simply the past. . . . In most cultures, that point is located several centuries before the present: in Qatar more or less anything that happened before 1950 belongs to legend.”13

Early Recorded History

The emigration of the Bani Utba tribe from Kuwait in 1766 heralds the beginning of Qatar’s modern history. The newcomers, consisting of the Al Khalifa and Al Jalahma families, founded the city of Zubara, began pearl diving, and discovered even in these early moments of Qatari history that they were surrounded by more powerful tribes and thus “forced to be dexterous in their foreign dealings.” In 1783, the Al Khalifa clan left for Bahrain, which had better ports, more established towns, and more valuable pearls. Their departure left an opening for a new clan to extend its power, an opportunity seized by the Al Thani family. Zubara declined from this point, but the outpost would remain a bone of contention between Qatar and Bahrain.14 By the 1820s, Great Britain had come to see the area as an important link to India. The British concluded treaties of protection with the Al Khalifa on Bahrain, with the presumption that their territory included Qatar. However, the British presence in Qatar was so slight that Qataris did not know of the British-Bahraini understanding. When the British bombarded the city of Doha as punishment for an alleged treaty violation, the residents had no idea why their town was being attacked.15 The departure of the Al Khalifa to become the ruling family of Bahrain left those who remained in Qatar without a tradition of strong central government. Before oil funds enriched the government in the 1950s, Qatar’s hostile climate, limited economic opportunities, and strong tribes made the imposition of a powerful central government almost impossible. It was simply too easy for families, tribes, or even individuals who perceived themselves to be oppressed to leave. Even a single pearl merchant might take 100 pearl divers with him, causing substantial economic disruption.16 Governance in Qatar, therefore, was largely based on consent, which in turn was based on the perception that the sheikh was performing the proper duties of a sheikh. These included protection of ports, ships, pearl beds, and surrounding waters, first and foremost. Lacking a mandate of divine right and the means to use coercion, sheikhs had to keep order, improve infrastructure, provide jobs, and permit economic activity in order to rule peace-

The Making of Modern Qatar

21

fully. In addition, sheikhs had to balance factions within their own families, since primogeniture was not automatic. Succession could go to a second son, a cousin, a brother, a nephew, or even a more distant relative.17 Even at the time of the Rift, the Saudis and Emiratis tried to exploit divisions in the Qatari royal family. Sheikhs had an incentive to acquire military strength since this permitted them to protect more territory and enhance their status in regional politics. Armed might could also keep ambitious relatives at bay. However, the fact that, in the days before oil, Gulf rulers normally employed only a few hundred armed retainers shows that other methods, most notably stipends and salaries, were used more frequently to forestall intrafamily rebellions. A sheikh who dependably protected territory could rely on tribute payments from outlying tribes as a form of income.18 Since generosity was another expectation of a sheikh, collecting tolls, taxes on pearls, and tribute was vital to provide the wherewithal for that generosity. Just as later Qatari leaders had to balance the interests and intentions of more powerful neighbors, so sheikhs in the country’s early history had to balance challenges from family members, tribal leaders, merchants, and individual residents.19

The Al Thani Family

The resulting complexity of Qatari internal politics also held the British at bay since the local British authorities had little desire to navigate these complexities. The British preference for a single interlocutor helped spur the rise of the family that would come to rule Qatar to the present day. The Al Thanis had migrated to Qatar from the Najd (in modern Saudi Arabia) in the eighteenth century.20 They moved to Doha around 1847, but they were one family among many and in no position to assert dominance. To alter that situation, the Al Thani made alliances with neighboring tribes through commerce and marriage. Their efforts were successful enough to prevent Qatar from looking like the UAE, which is a “patchwork quilt, reflecting allegiances of non-contiguous tribal areas to various coastal ruling sheikhs.”21 The head of the family was Mohammed Al Thani, whose position was bolstered by a visit from Saudi leader Faisal bin Turki bin Abdullah Al Saud in 1851. This tacit recognition, as short-lived as it turned out to be, plus the cultivation of good relations with the British, allowed the Al Thanis space to consolidate local power. The Al Thani rise, however, did not go unnoticed in Bahrain, which still claimed the peninsula. In October 1867, Bahrainis launched a “remarkably treacherous and destructive attack” on Qatar’s major cities of Doha and Wakrah.22 Qatari forces under Al Thani counterattacked in 1868, leaving behind 1,000 dead Bahrainis and 600 destroyed ships.23 Great Britain, which had worked for decades to preserve a peaceful Gulf, signing treaties with

22

Isolating Qatar

Gulf states that forbade piracy and internecine strife, moved to put an end to what threatened to become a larger war between Qatar and Bahrain. Insofar as it provoked this British intervention, the Qatari counterattack had historic consequences. The British peace initiative included recognition of Qatar as a separate political entity from Bahrain. In September 1868, the British political resident, Sir Lewis Pelly, signed a treaty that acknowledged the position of Mohammed Al Thani as ruler of “all residing in the province of Qatar.”24

Changes Under Jassim

The British would soon have a rival for influence in the Gulf in the shape of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish colonizers arrived in 1871 and laid claim to many parts of the Arabian Peninsula, including Qatar. Qatar’s ruling sheikh at the time was Jassim bin Mohammed Al Thani,25 who accepted an Ottoman garrison in Qatar in return for recognition as the qaim maqam (governor) of Qatar. Thus, Jassim had de facto recognition from both competitors for Gulf power, the British and the Ottomans. Due to his success in balancing the demands and interests of these two more powerful nations, Jassim is seen as the architect of modern Qatari state formation. The imposition of Ottoman rule brought the first evidence of formal bureaucracy to Qatar. Ottoman rule was consequential in Qatar, but not lengthy. Sheikh Jassim defeated an Ottoman force at the Battle of Wajbah in 1893, putting an end to effective Ottoman suzerainty, although the Turkish authorities continued to claim the area. The reputation of Sheikh Jassim (r. 1878–1913) as the founder of modern Qatar is well earned. As with all successful Qatari rulers, balancing superior outside forces while advancing domestic reforms was the hallmark of his rule. Besides the British and the Ottomans, Jassim also faced a challenge from a growing and aggressive Saudi Wahhabi leader, Abdulaziz Al Saud, who “acted as if the Qatari peninsula was a natural part of his territory.”26 Jassim made repeated requests to the British government for a clearer guarantee of protection from the Saudis, even while trying not to grant the British too much control over his country.27 Jassim worked to pacify one frontier by ending the controversy with Bahrain over the Zubara trading post. At the start of his reign, he attacked Zubara and destroyed it. Although the Bahrainis would continue to press their claim, Jassim made no move to restore Zubara, making the Bahraini claims increasingly pointless. While fending off multiple threats, Jassim also used the authority he gained as Ottoman governor to increase the power of central authority in Qatar, even while substantial local autonomy remained. Noting that Indians largely controlled the all-important pearl trade, Jassim decided to move against them. Since the British considered these Indians to be British subjects, Jassim could not take immediate and overt action against them. Instead,

The Making of Modern Qatar

23

he used increasingly high taxes and harassment. By the 1880s, this harassment had the intended effect, and most Indians left of their own accord. The door was open for the Al Thanis to dominate the pearl trade. Innovation would continue under Jassim’s son Abdullah (r. 1913–1949). The new sheikh recognized the importance of internal balancing, just as his father had expertly managed external balancing. In fact, the young heir was reluctant to take power because of the ever-present threat of strife within the family. Abdullah appeased various factions of the Al Thani clan and other tribal leaders through careful management of the wealth derived from pearl trading. Concessions, monopolies, and favoritism allowed factions to profit sufficiently to dissuade potential rivals from subversive activity. The relatively long reigns of Jassim and Abdullah planted the seeds of Qatari national consciousness.28 Abdullah’s most far-reaching foreign policy reform came in 1916 with a new treaty with Great Britain. The coming of World War I forced the Ottomans to renounce their claim of sovereignty over Qatar. The British, for their part, desired to secure their position in the Gulf and, in so doing, secure safe passage to India. At the same time, the early twentieth century saw the rise of an expanding Saudi kingdom. In 1905, Ibn Saud sent letters to the sheikhs of emirates on the Arabian Peninsula, Qatar included, informing them of his intention to visit and “look into certain affairs.” The following year, Ibn Saud informed the British of his intention to conquer Hasa, which would bring his realm to the borders of Qatar and the sheikhdoms of the future UAE.29 For the British, the rise of Saudi power was an unacceptable threat to their control of the Gulf. To this end, they signed a number of treaties with Gulf sheikhdoms, trading British protection for nearly complete authority over the Gulf states’ foreign policies and a large degree of authority over their internal policies. The British had signed such treaties with what would be called the Trucial States (later the UAE) in 1835, Bahrain in 1861, Kuwait in 1899, and Qatar in 1916. For Qatar, the treaty brought de facto international recognition for Qatar and confirmation of the Al Thanis as rulers. Since Britain’s power projection rested with its navy, the British shied away from involvement in controversies or power struggles that might lure their officials too far away from the Gulf. The British insisted on dealing with a few powerful leaders, rather than a large group of competing tribal sheikhs. Indeed, close relations with Britain could help one tribal group impose its rule on others. On the other hand, useful as the British presence might be, Qatar and the other treaty signatories found themselves answerable to British “political residents,” who could veto policies and actions of which they disapproved. Qatar became part of a “Pax Britannica” that suppressed piracy and private warfare but also brought the constant threat of British intervention.30 This intervention, however, was intended to advance British interests, which might or might not coincide with the interests of the Gulf states.

24

Isolating Qatar

When Ibn Saud sent another threatening letter to Qatar in 1913, the British responded with their own letter linking friendly Saudi-British relations to Ibn Saud’s promise to leave the Gulf states alone. 31 Abdullah found, however, that the British would not assist either with Abdullah’s desire to bring some obstreperous coastal towns under his rule or with incremental encroachment from the Saudis. Calling the political resident’s attention to treaty clauses in which the British promised such assistance, Abdullah learned that all the British promised were “good offices” to resolve disputes. Put differently, British assistance would be limited to the diplomatic realm. Abdullah found some additional leverage in 1932 when the British were looking for an emergency landing site for airplanes crossing the Gulf region. Arguing that he could not very well provide a safe landing zone until his country was safe from Saudi encroachments, he demanded a promise of protection. Further, he demanded this promise from the British viceroy in India, insulting the political resident by saying his promises clearly carried no weight.32 Abdullah did not succeed immediately, but three years later Saudi king Abdulaziz Al Saud informed Abdullah that Qatar was part of his kingdom. This was an overt challenge to British influence in Qatar and finally resulted in a new treaty, which provided for British protection in the case of both internal and external attacks. The treaty also represented a renewal of Britain’s recognition of Qatar as a state separate from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The latter had made forays into Qatari territory, including at least one encroachment by oil company geologists, traveling with Saudi guards, looking for oil.33 Threats and occasional shows of force from the British served to persuade Ibn Saud that overt interference in Qatar would bring more opposition than he could handle. This realization left room for covert interference, however. Ibn Saud used divisions in the Al Thani family to exert pressure on Qatar’s ruling sheikhs (something the Saudis would try again in 2017). Since intraroyal family strife was an ongoing fact of life in Qatar, such pressure was difficult to detect and almost impossible for the British to stop. By 1930, Abdullah was acknowledging to the British that he was paying 100,000 rupees to Ibn Saud for what can only be called protection money.34 At the same time, tension with Bahrain resumed over Zubara. An armed confrontation over the now ruined outpost took place in 1937, resulting in a British agent telling the Bahraini leader that the British government had decided back in 1875 that Zubara was part of Qatar. In a foreshadowing of the 2017 crisis, Bahrain announced an embargo against Qatari products. Since most of the peninsula’s trade had gone through Manama, the embargo caused severe disruption and additional expense. Qatar had to redirect exports to Dubai, causing economic hardship and significant emigration of Qataris to other parts of the Gulf.

The Making of Modern Qatar

25

After another clash in 1944 and fruitless negotiation efforts, the dispute went into abeyance. Eventually, Bahrain stopped trying to regain Zubara but kept the embargo in place. The boycott exacerbated the “years of hunger” in Qatar, a term referring to the interlude between the collapse of the pearl market in 1929 and the coming of oil money after World War II.35 In another foreshadowing, the emir of Kuwait offered to mediate the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain. His son would make the same offer in 2017 during another economic and diplomatic crisis. As late as 1949, Saudi tribes were still extracting taxes from residents of oil-drilling camps.36 Then, in August of that year, the Saudi government announced a territorial claim of “breathtaking audacity” over much of the Gulf coast, demanding territory from the Trucial States, Oman, and Qatar. Once again, the British placed their forces on a war footing, working with local forces, and presented the Saudis with the near certainty of war if the Kingdom pressed its claims.37 Even years later, “the thorny issue of border disputes between the Gulf countries [was] a time bomb that could threaten the stability and security of the whole region.”38 The discovery of significant amounts of oil in Qatar made the delineation of the border urgent. The matter was not fully settled until 1965, when the Qatari crown prince and the Saudi petroleum affairs minister signed an agreement. The treaty “ran roughshod over existing understandings of the border.” Saudi Arabia received previously unclaimed land, breaking the link between Qatar and the Trucial States and giving the Kingdom access to the Gulf south of the Qatari peninsula. On the other hand, it also gave Qatar seventy-five square miles of land previously claimed by the Saudi oil company.

The Rise of Oil

Limited Progress

By the early 1930s, Qatar’s neighbors were beginning to exploit abundant oil fields, and it seemed just a matter of time and exploration before the resource was discovered in Qatar. The government responded to this potentially destiny-changing development by creating Petroleum Development Qatar in 1935. The company would eventually become the Qatari Petroleum Company and later simply Qatar Petroleum. Oil drilling on a commercial scale started in 1938 but had barely gotten started when World War II caused Qatar’s sources of foreign investment in oil to dry up. Drilling went into abeyance until 1947. Sheikh Abdullah had been grooming his second (and favored) son, Hamad, for the throne, but these plans came to nothing when Hamad died in 1948. Abdullah’s eldest son, Ali, and Hamad’s son Khalifa began to compete

26

Isolating Qatar

for the succession, a growing crisis that Abdullah sought to avoid by abdicating the throne in 1949, paving the way for his son Ali to succeed him. However, Abdullah took a hefty portion of the national treasury with him when he left the country, leaving behind financial chaos and burgeoning family disputes both over the succession and the flow of oil revenues, which by 1949 were becoming substantial. The new Sheikh Ali managed to survive with help from the British and with the introduction of a modern financial accounting system. The latter permitted him to know how much money was coming from the sale of oil and to make effective use of his newfound wealth. As oil became a major revenue source in the 1950s, Ali faced the challenge of fending off demands for larger stipends from his relatives and satisfying the desire for social programs and infrastructure from the Qatari populace. Since placating the large royal family was a more urgent concern, involving more people who could threaten Ali directly, social spending took a backseat. Although new government buildings, an airport, and a telecommunications exchange all appeared in the 1950s, social spending was flat. The growth of industries related to oil, especially construction, brought an increase in the business class, but with no additional political power. Qatar saw the start of the “rentier’s bargain,” in which private businesses accept the dominance of government-owned enterprises in exchange for low taxes, extensive infrastructure, and guaranteed access to opportunities in businesses not owned by the government. Ali did pressure the oil companies to raise wages for their workers, a move that also planted the seeds of Qatari nationalism among those workers.39 This sense of Qatari consciousness would grow stronger as thousands of foreign workers appeared to take advantage of the oil boom. In 1960, Ali abdicated in favor of his son Ahmad. The succession immediately caused a family split, with the once-bypassed Khalifa insisting he was the rightful heir. Ahmad addressed the matter by naming Khalifa crown prince and deputy ruler. The decision turned out to be a good one. Khalifa proved himself a good manager and a more-than-competent leader. Under his aegis, Qatar added a cement factory, a fishing company, and other businesses not related to oil. He also advanced education. The country had only 240 students in school in 1951, a number that rose to almost 6,000 in 1960 and to 52,000 by 1985.40 The wherewithal came from oil revenues, especially after the industry was nationalized in 1972. Khalifa became prime minister in 1970 and appointed a Council of Ministers, reducing the power of the royal family. Ahmad, for his part, continued to use financial tools to buy off unhappy family members, usually in the form of state monopolies. These protected businesses sometimes pushed independent merchants out, but more often Ahmad proposed partnerships between businessmen and family members. The 1973–1974 OPEC boycott and price hike flooded Qatar with what would soon be called “petrodollars.” In 1971, the year of independence, oil

The Making of Modern Qatar

27

revenues had been $300 million. By 1973, they had doubled. One year later, revenues were over $2 billion, with almost no increase in production.41 The history of economic hardship and the constant need for Qataris to adapt to their harsh environment resulted in a culture of caution and cohesiveness that helped Qataris cope with the sudden oil wealth without the excesses and massive corruption that occurred elsewhere. The traditional presence of non-Qatari workers, long before oil, made the presence of expatriates easier to accept. Moreover, Qatar was already largely urbanized by the time oil money started flowing, preventing a disorienting rush of people to the cities in search of jobs. One expert concludes, “The forces of change, therefore, did not rapidly disturb the social cohesiveness or mobility of the Qatari population.”42 In addition, Qatar contracted with multiple international oil companies to do the drilling and processing, preventing the country from having to rely on a single company or a single nation to maintain production.43

Independence

On January 16, 1968, British prime minister Harold Wilson announced that Great Britain could no longer play the role of peacekeeper in the Gulf. In fact, he promised Britain would cease all colonial-style activities “east of Sinai” by the end of 1971. With the looming threat of Saudi Arabia suddenly unhindered by the restraint of Britain, the seven Trucial States proposed joining with Bahrain and Qatar to form the United Arab Emirates. Negotiations over the union caused a new rift between Bahrain and Qatar, with the latter resenting the Bahraini claim to predominance in the new union. As a result, Qatar rejected membership in the UAE and unilaterally announced its independence on September 3, 1971. (Bahrain had done so some weeks earlier.) The gaining of independence, however, highlighted the relatively low level of Qatari consciousness among the population, despite recent gains in this regard. The country had won its independence not because of a heroic anti-imperialist struggle or even because of a charismatic leader who had taken the cause of Qatari independence to the world stage but because of Britain’s abdication. Without such bonding experiences, what it meant to be a Qatari, as opposed to a Saudi, an Emirati, or even an Arab, was largely still to be determined. Almost immediately, some Al Thani family members set about having a hand in that determination, and their focus was on the past. Independence led to a desire to preserve a way of life that was already changing fast, thanks to oil money. The peninsula’s pre-oil past became idealized and researched with almost frantic haste. Al Thani family members founded museums and filled them with archeological finds as quickly as

28

Isolating Qatar

possible. While Western experts insisted, “There is no heritage in Qatar,” Qataris themselves moved to prove them wrong.44

Changes Under Sheikh Khalifa

The world is not in the habit of waiting for countries to “find themselves.” With the withdrawal of British protection, a fixed point in Qatari foreign policy for nearly 100 years, the country’s relations with its neighbors became more complicated just as finding peaceful solutions became more urgent. An ongoing dispute over the Hawar Islands, important because of the possibility of offshore oil and gas deposits, not settled until a decision by the International Court of Justice in 2000, complicated relations with Bahrain, but managing the giant to the west was of greater long-term importance. Continued divisions among the Al Thanis, combined with concern about Saudi encroachment, created a daunting series of challenges. These and other worries were clearly beyond the capacity of Ahmad, who spent increasing amounts of time out of the country. (He actually proclaimed his nation’s independence from a luxury hotel in Switzerland.) Ahmad’s cousin Khalifa had ample time and opportunity to both consolidate his power and gain experience in the use of it. As early as the 1950s, he had championed labor rights in the oil industry while helping to create a sense of Qatari identity among expatriate workers. He also positioned himself as a pan-Arabist, even while maintaining cordial relations with the British. In an early use of oil-money-based soft power, he saw to it that Qatar donated millions of dollars to causes likely to enhance Qatar’s international reputation, such as the Arab Peace Force in Lebanon. This would be the first of many Qatari efforts to use cash to secure a larger global presence. With the demands of an independent nation certain to be sterner than those of a British protectorate, Khalifa conspired with Saudi and British representatives to stage a coup against Ahmad in September 1972. As the new emir (the title of Qatar’s rulers since independence), he brought about significant change. He cut royal family benefits and diverted his own stipend to housing projects.45 Social spending in other areas also increased. To try to end the long history of division within the royal family and to create a mechanism for bypassing the royal family altogether, he made provisional changes to the constitution to create the majlis a-shura, a consultative assembly. Its appointed members included representatives of tribes, businessmen, educated elite members, and regional representatives. The majlis had the authority to review decrees, legislation, and budgetary matters coming from the emir. While its members had little power to change policy, the fact that policies had to be reviewed was a significant innovation.

The Making of Modern Qatar

29

Khalifa was emir during the 1973–1974 oil price rise and had to decide how to best use the flood of petrodollars coming to Qatar. He made dramatic improvements to the country’s economic and social infrastructure. To try to ensure that the improvements had longevity, he developed Qatar’s first hydrocarbon policy, introducing long-range planning and more effective tools against corruption. Even more importantly, Khalifa made one of the most momentous decisions of the twentieth century for Qatar in 1981 when he decided to invest in the gigantic North Field and set the stage for the country to get into the natural gas industry. Later, he would invest heavily in the infrastructure needed to export liquid natural gas. Trends in the 1980s accelerated the move toward gas. It became evident that Qatar’s oil wealth would not last forever and might not provide the economic cushion the Qatari leadership hoped for. The 1980s slump in oil prices hit the country hard. Qatar had a budget deficit in 1985 (something unthinkable only a few years before) and struggled to balance the national budget the rest of the decade. Shrinking oil revenues meant austerity budgets, with increased charges to Qataris for electricity, water, and health care. Per capita GDP dropped from $31,000 in 1984 to $15,000 ten years later.46 By 1992, austerity had led to political unrest, in the form of petitions from elites demanding an elected majlis and a permanent constitution. While both demands would eventually be met, Khalifa’s initial response was to arrest the petition signers, ban them from traveling outside the country, and threaten them with the loss of their Qatari citizenship.

A New Foreign Policy Direction

The absence of the British left Qatar in urgent need of a new international partner and protector. The 1978–1979 Islamic revolution in Iran only served to increase Qatar’s already obvious vulnerability, along with that of the other Arab Gulf states. The sense of threat from Iran’s revolutionary government increased when the new Iranian leader, Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, proclaimed that monarchical governments were “incompatible with the requirements of Islamic governance.” Qatar was an enthusiastic charter member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which came into being in 1981 as an economic union and collective-security coalition designed to facilitate economic coordination and to deter Iranian aggression. The revelation that Iran had backed an attempted coup in Bahrain did nothing to allay fears of Iranian aggression. But even the combined strength of the GCC members was insufficient to counter threats from Iran. It was also plain that Saudi Arabia was both a possible protector and a possible threat. Qatar had little choice but to bandwagon with a new protector. At the time, only the United States could serve in that capacity. No other nation had the power and the motivation to take

30

Isolating Qatar

on this task. At first the relationship was one-sided, since Qatar did not seem to be a terribly valuable ally. Not yet wealthy, it was vulnerable due to its geographical size, small and sparse population, and exposed location. The Qatari leadership sought to augment US protection by leaning on Saudi Arabia as well, albeit warily. However, the “tanker war” of the late 1980s, when the United States reflagged Gulf oil tankers to avoid attacks during the Iran-Iraq War, was disquieting evidence that for all its wealth, Saudi Arabia was a weak reed when it came to defending the Gulf. Qatar and the United States found new reasons to grow closer in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This crisis had an enormous impact on Qatari actions. Iraq’s brutal invasion pointed out all too clearly the dangers of being a small state, no matter how rich, and brought home to the Qatari leadership an uncomfortable awareness of their own vulnerability. At the same time, it highlighted even more starkly than the tanker war the inadequacy of depending on the Saudis for protection. Indeed, the Saudis looked more like Saddam Hussein’s next victim than a regional powerhouse. Qatar discovered the need for a new international protector at the very time the United States was looking for local allies. For the United States, having decided to overturn the invasion, the need for local bases of operation became obvious. Although the Saudis allowed their territory to be used for the bulk of US forces deployed in Operation Desert Storm, they did so reluctantly and with considerable restrictions. The Americans would clearly be well advised to seek alternatives. Qatar, with a far more welcoming attitude and wide-open spaces available for air and naval bases, was an obvious choice. Khalifa’s son Hamad, by then commander in chief of the Qatari armed forces, saw that closer relations with Washington were an absolute necessity, and he threw Qatar’s lot in thoroughly with the goals of Operation Desert Storm. Qatar was the first GCC country to condemn the invasion of Kuwait. It provided military forces, which took part in the January 1991 Battle of Khafiji, just across the border from Saudi Arabia. In June 1992 Qatar and the United States concluded a base agreement that allowed US access to Qatari bases and provided for the deployment of US supplies and matériel, as well as for combined military exercises.47 Qatar sought other guarantees for its security and economic health. It cast a wide net looking for trade deals, bilateral visits, and military cooperation agreements. It also opened discrete contacts with Israel. Trade offices were opened with Israel, and aviation pacts were signed. Qatar also augmented its relations with Iran, despite its burgeoning relationship with the United States. As it explored its natural gas potential, Qatar discovered it shared the North Field with Iran, making a diplomatic relationship with the Islamic Republic an absolute necessity that the Americans would sim-

The Making of Modern Qatar

31

ply have to tolerate. Besides working together to exploit natural gas, Qatar also discussed importing freshwater from Iran and enhancing relations in other areas. These good relations would eventually mean a major role for Iran as Qatar sought to cope with the 2017 Gulf boycott. Qatar’s complex relationship with Saudi Arabia came to light once again when Saudi troops attacked a Qatari border post on September 30, 1992. Two Qataris were killed, and a third was captured. Khalifa responded immediately, publicly canceling the country’s 1965 border agreement with Saudi Arabia and withdrawing the 200 Qatari soldiers from the GCC Peninsular Shield Force.48 Still, Qatar remained committed to regional defense. In October 1994, Saddam Hussein sent 70,000 troops toward the Kuwaiti border, prompting the United States to respond with 36,000 ground troops of its own. Qatar, along with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, pledged $270 million to help pay for the US deployment.49

Gas Changes the Future for Qatar

Central to Qatar’s twenty-first-century rise to its position as the nation with the highest per capita GDP in the world was the exploitation of gas in the last third of the twentieth century. Natural gas, a frequent by-product of oil production, was long considered of such little value that it was simply burned off. Qataris had developed plans to use the resource for domestic energy needs, establishing the Qatar Fertilizer Company in 1969, but with little practical result. In 1971, however, came the discovery of the largest nonassociated natural gas field on earth. As exploration continued, it became clear that gas, not oil, could be the country’s economic driver of the future, although natural gas was not in high demand at the time. A key figure in the successful switch from an oil-based to a gas-based economy was Abdullah bin Hamad Al Attiyah, a close friend of Qatari crown prince Hamad bin Khalifa. His efforts led to the efficient and remarkably corruption-free evolution of Qatar’s natural gas industry.50 The flow of gas money to Doha allowed for major social and economic changes. As had happened before when Qatar faced monumental change, it started with an unexpected change in leadership. While Khalifa was on vacation in Switzerland in June 1995, his son and heir apparent, Hamad, seized power, gaining the support of key figures in Doha, then informing his father that he was no longer in power and that his plane had been recalled to Doha. Hamad’s motive for taking power was his belief that his father was moving too slowly on needed reforms and thus threatening Qatar’s future. In another repeat of history, Hamad had to cope with Khalifa’s seizure of $3.5 billion in government funds. Unlike Ali’s similar seizure, Khalifa found himself the target of a lawsuit, which was eventually settled out of court.

32

Isolating Qatar

In fact, a coming transfer of power had been rumored for some time, and Hamad, heir apparent since 1977, had had clashes with his father over the use of the enormous funds available from gas. In the meantime, Hamad gathered more power into his own hands, becoming minister of defense, commander in chief of the armed forces, and head of the Supreme Planning Council. One author notes that his modern education and military training, including time at Sandhurst, allowed him to start improving a bureaucratic structure inherited from his predecessors that he would need to manage the gas wealth effectively. Hamad had a useful partner in Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabir Al Thani, who had become foreign minister in 1992.

Conclusion

Qatar’s current rise to wealth and its increasingly effective attempts to turn that wealth into power begin with the rise of Hamad, treated in detail in the next chapter. It is important to note here, however, that Hamad’s precursors left him with the tools he needed to create the future he wanted for his country. In the years between independence and the accession of Emir Hamad, the country had not seen the rise of a competing power center within the country, giving Hamad a free hand to make changes. Clerical influence over policy, even in areas such as marriage and education, was minimal. Business groups operated within unspoken but clear boundaries, and business leaders seemed content with the division of economic opportunities. The country’s largely expatriate labor force showed few signs of fomenting unrest, although some authors attribute this to the everpresent threat of deportation. Even here, however, work in Qatar had to be lucrative—and bearable—enough to make the mere threat of deportation sufficient to maintain labor peace.51 The creation of a majlis and other official councils had the intended effect of compelling the royal family to share power, but these institutions still permitted a highly centralized decisionmaking process in Qatar. Hamad could make domestic and foreign policy with only a small set of collaborators. In addition, the relatively small size of the national bureaucracy (compared to those of other Gulf nations) and relatively low level of governmental institutionalization meant he could be certain that decisions would be carried out faithfully and expeditiously. When changes in policy became necessary, the government of Qatar would be nimble enough to make them. This agility would be crucial to surviving the Rift when it came. Challenges loomed also. If Qatar started to play a larger role, regionally and internationally, its rise would upset existing diplomatic relations in the Gulf region. Most notably, Qatar would be able to challenge the seemingly permanent supremacy of Saudi Arabia in determining the foreign

The Making of Modern Qatar

33

policies of the smaller Gulf sheikhdoms. The Kingdom could not be expected to ignore such a challenge from upstart Qatar. At the same time, Qatar had to maintain good relations with both the United States and Iran, regardless of how strained relations between those countries became. Prior to his overthrow by the Americans in 2003, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein also loomed as a foreign policy challenge. On the other hand, by 1995 it was clear that Qatar would be a major exporter of liquid natural gas, perhaps the largest in the world. It was also clear that the sales of this resource would make Qatar wealthy beyond the dreams of avarice. But other countries had also experienced natural resource bonanzas. Textbooks on developing nations are filled with accounts of nations like Nigeria, for which oil brought many more headaches than hope. Indeed, the phrase “resource curse” came into vogue as a result of nations finding themselves awash not only in dollars but also in corruption, waste, inefficiency, nepotism, division, social unrest, and shattered dreams. For Qatar to follow a different route, one that led to global influence, prestige, and enormous amounts of soft power, its leaders would have to make use of the tools bequeathed by their predecessors and exercise visionary leadership.

Notes

1. Onley and Khalaf, “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-oil Gulf,” 191. 2. Said Zahlan, The Creation of Qatar, 94. 3. Fromherz, Qatar, 52. 4. Roberts, Qatar, 25. 5. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, 18. 6. As late as 2013, one author found “a noted shortage of contributions in the academic heritage literature that focus specifically on Qatar.” See Exell and Rico, “There Is No Heritage in Qatar,” 675. 7. Gray, Qatar, 21. 8. Baskan and Wright, “Seeds of Change,” 96–97. 9. More complete histories of Qatar include Fromherz, Qatar; Roberts, Qatar; Said Zahlan, The Creation of Qatar; Rahman, The Emergence of Qatar; among others. 10. Fromherz, Qatar, 43. 11. Rahman, The Emergence of Qatar, 2. 12. Gray, Qatar, 24. 13. Exell and Rico, “There Is No Heritage in Qatar,” 679. 14. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, 19. 15. Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 28. 16. Onley and Khalaf, “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-oil Gulf,” 197. 17. Ibid., 193–194. 18. Ibid., 195. 19. One expert referred to this scenario as “the chief’s dilemma.” See Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain, 85–108. 20. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 15. 21. Onley and Khalaf, “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-oil Gulf,” 196.

34

Isolating Qatar

22. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, 17. The bad feeling that remained would prevent full diplomatic relations between the two states until 1997, more than twenty years after both became independent. See ibid., 32. 23. Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 27–30. 24. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, 17. 25. His name is sometimes rendered as Qasim. 26. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, 29. 27. Wright, “Foreign Policies with International Reach,” 298. The British would include language underlining Qatari sovereignty in the 1927 Jeddah Treaty with the Saudis. 28. Said Zahlan, The Creation of Qatar, 94. 29. Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia, 66, 75. 30. Onley and Khalaf, “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-oil Gulf,” 202–204. 31. Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia, 89, 96. 32. Said Zahlan, The Creation of Qatar, 64. 33. Roberts, Qatar, 29. 34. Said Zahlan, The Creation of Qatar, 80–81. 35. The appearance of cultured pearls from Japan destroyed the Gulf pearl industry. 36. Roberts, Qatar, 30. 37. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, 23–24. 38. Wiegand, “Bahrain, Qatar, and the Hawar Islands,” 81. 39. Gray, Qatar, 32–34. Foreign oil companies produced the oil at the start. Nationalization would take place gradually, with Qatari Petroleum taking over by 1977. See Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 23. 40. Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 146. 41. Roberts, Qatar, 20. 42. Said Zahlan, The Creation of Qatar, 94–100. 43. Gray, Qatar, 44. 44. For details on this effort, see Exell and Rico, “There Is No Heritage in Qatar.” 45. Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, 156–157. 46. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 26. 47. Roberts, Qatar, 28. A new agreement with the Americans would come in 2003. 48. Ibid., 32. 49. Bronson, Thicker Than Oil, 218. 50. Roberts, Qatar, 21. 51. It is worth noting that in the immediate aftermath of the 2017 Rift, expatriates were offered the chance to go home, and virtually none did so, according to officials interviewed by the author in Doha in 2019.

3

The Emergence of a Regional Player

In early July 2017, the eminent Singaporean diplomat and former UN Security Council President, Kishore Mahbubani, penned a widely read article claiming that Qatar had, to some degree, brought the crisis on itself by too often ignoring the eternal rule of geopolitics: small states must behave like small states.1 In June, Qatar’s national colors lit up the Empire State Building, in which it owns a stake, a mark of its punchy ambition.2

There is a story told in Qatar that, soon after coming to power, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani saw a Lonely Planet travel guide that described Qatar as “the most boring country in the world.” At that moment, according to the story, he decided he would have to make major changes to the country. The story is almost certainly apocryphal, but it does underline the fact that when Hamad took power from his father in June 1995, his country was unknown and unnoticed outside the Gulf region. Had the global community been more attentive, it would have seen a country facing both a daunting set of challenges and a glittering array of opportunities to deal with them. The challenges included threats to the territorial integrity of Qatar from two directions. The revolutionary regime in Iran had already sponsored a coup in Bahrain, and its leader, Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, had proclaimed that monarchies were inconsistent with Islamic governance. On the other side, Saudi Arabia presented subtle threats even while posing as Qatar’s main international protector. Hamad decided early that Qatar would have to look out for its own safety.3 In this chapter, I examine the results of Hamad’s decision. From 1995 on, Qatar marshaled its considerable assets to pursue a set of domestic and

35

36

Isolating Qatar

foreign policies designed to increase the global footprint of the small state and to provide a level of freedom of action in its foreign relations that theorists of small-state behavior would likely have said was impossible. Under emirs Hamad (r. 1995–2013) and his son Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (r. 2013–), Qatar has become a global player, using a combination of the classic small-state techniques of balancing and bandwagoning, while creating and making use of soft power to an unprecedented degree. As I will show, Qatar’s success, and some of the steps it took along the way, induced some of its neighbors to react with envy, with anger, and, ultimately, with severe diplomatic and economic sanctions.

Hamad Comes to Power

While Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad (r. 1972–1995) had made significant changes in Qatar during his reign, he became increasingly unpredictable and detached. Starting around 1987, his son Hamad increased his share of power in Doha. In June 1995, Khalifa ignored warnings that he was becoming increasingly unpopular among members of Qatar’s elite and went ahead with a vacation to Switzerland. While he was out of the country, Hamad proclaimed himself emir and informed his father that his official airplane was being recalled. Hamad also moved to take legal action to regain the $3.5 billion that Khalifa had taken with him when he left for Switzerland.4 Hamad immediately received recognition from the United States, which had looked forward to assisting Qatar with the development of its natural gas resource without interference from Saudi Arabia. Iran also quickly recognized the new ruler, since the Islamic Republic was also eager to reduce Saudi influence in any Gulf state, including Qatar.5 Hamad’s coup came as Qatar was deciding how to cope with a momentous geopolitical event that destabilized relations among the Gulf states. If the rise of Qatar from backwater to global player has a single author, it is Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi dictator’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 sent shock waves through the Gulf region. A blatant cross-border invasion was destabilizing enough, but in addition, the reaction of Saudi Arabia undermined one of the long-standing foreign policy assumptions of the smaller Gulf states. For decades, they had placed their faith in the ability (and willingness) of their wealthy and giant neighbor to maintain peace and security in the Gulf region. Hussein’s almost effortless initial conquest of Kuwait, coupled with the near panic that seemed to grip the Saudi leadership, forced Qatar and its neighbors to accept that Saudi Arabia could not defend them. Indeed, leaders in Riyadh seemed convinced that they could not even defend themselves. They immediately called for troops from the United States to guard

The Emergence of a Regional Player

37

the common border between the Kingdom and Iraq. Even a weapons buying spree by Gulf monarchies did not allow the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members to muster a credible force to stop Hussein. Only the USled Operation Desert Storm liberated Kuwait. After the war, efforts by the GCC to include Egypt and Syria in the alliance to give it military credibility came to nothing. Diplomats in Doha noted a marked change in Qatari foreign policy from this point. With Saddam Hussein’s devastating defeat in Operation Desert Storm, Qatar’s concerns about national security again centered on Iran. While Iran and Qatar were careful not to interfere with each other’s exploitation of the huge natural gas field they share, Qatar could not ignore the fact that Iran is much larger and much more powerful. In addition, the radical Islamist regime in Teheran had already demonstrated its willingness to subvert smaller Gulf nations through its interference in Bahrain in 1981. Although that attempted coup was unsuccessful, and although Iran targeted Bahrain because of its majority Shi’a population, which Qatar does not share, the Qatari leadership could not ignore the latent threat just across the Gulf. During an earlier diplomatic dispute over contested islands in the Gulf, then Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani made the threat explicit: “The GCC would have to cross a sea of blood to reach the three islands in the Persian Gulf. The GCC should not repeat the same mistake as Saddam who tried to transform . . . Kuwait into an Iraqi province. Iran is stronger than you.”6 Iran, while not approaching Qatar in per capita income, outweighs it in many other ways. Iran is 140 times larger than Qatar, with a population nearly 30 times greater. Iran has one of the largest militaries in the world, supplemented by strong ties to violent groups like Hezbollah and Hamas and by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which straddles the line between a military and a terrorist organization. The sedulous efforts of the Barack Obama administration to sign a nuclear agreement with Iran and lift sanctions on the country made Saudi Arabia even warier of Qatar’s relations with Iran.7 Thus, unlike Saudi Arabia and some states close to it diplomatically, Qatar did not cut diplomatic ties with Teheran after the Saudi embassy was ransacked in the Iranian capital in 2016, although the emirate did recall its ambassador for twenty months following the incident. As a member of the UN Security Council in 2006, Qatar voted against a resolution calling on Iran to halt its nuclear fuel enrichment program. It also signed a bilateral counterterrorism treaty with Iran. Until the early 1990s, Qatar’s leaders had been content to rely on Saudi protection and to accept a high degree of subordination to Saudi foreign policy directives in return for that protection. The Saudis’ failure to protect Kuwait convinced the Qatari leadership that a new strategy was needed for

38

Isolating Qatar

national security. Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability to Iraq did nothing to lessen Qatar’s sense of threat from Saudi Arabia, however. In 1992, a clash on the Qatari-Saudi border resulted in the deaths of two Qatari border guards. The incident prompted a defense cooperation agreement between the United States and Qatar. In the same year that Hamad came to power, a 1974 border agreement came to light. Qatar had been forced to cede fifteen littoral miles and generally submit to being treated like a province of Saudi Arabia. The menace of Saudi power was revealed again in an attempted coup in February 1996. The Saudis conspired with ousted Sheikh Khalifa to return him to power, playing one side of the Al Thani family against another in blatant disregard of Qatar’s sovereignty. During the crisis, Saudi Arabia received support from the same countries that sanctioned Qatar in 2017: Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. Adroit action on Hamad’s part and the quick and vocal support he received from the British and the Americans thwarted the coup attempt.8

Tallying Assets

The coup, even as a failure, was more evidence of Qatar’s vulnerability and fuel for Hamad’s determination to chart a new foreign policy course that would enhance his country’s security. While small, sparsely populated, and almost defenseless in the traditional sense, Qatar was far from powerless. The possibility of a larger global role appeared at the same time as Qatar made a major move into the world natural gas market. (It had always been a relatively small exporter of oil, compared to neighboring OPEC states.) Harnessing the profits from natural gas and making the best use of them would be the first step in Hamad’s efforts to protect his country. Shell Oil discovered the North Field in 1971, but a genuine appreciation of the field’s potential did not happen immediately. A joint venture with several energy companies, led by British Petroleum (BP), opened in 1984 but showed little promise, prompting BP to opt out in 1992. Technological developments in the 1990s permitted the shipment of natural gas aboard ships as opposed to pipelines and vastly increased the world market for the resource. At the same time, Mobil Oil made major investments, bringing the North Field online.9 For Qatar, new technology also obviated the need for pipelines running through Saudi territory. The country’s economy expanded from $8 billion in 1995 to $210 billion in 2014.10 During the same period, Qatar topped the world in per capita income, an achievement all the more noteworthy when contrasted with the periodic famines and mass emigration that had existed only two generations before. Even before the 2017 Rift crisis forced the country to find new markets for its major export, Qatar sold liquid natural gas (LNG) to customers

The Emergence of a Regional Player

39

all over the globe. Its largest buyers are the United Kingdom, India, Japan, and countries in Southeast Asia. South Korea is also a major customer. While sharing the gas field with Iran, Qatar extracts more gas from it, due in part to investments in more sophisticated technology and to economic sanctions hindering Iran. By 2006, the emirate was the world’s largest exporter of LNG (a position the nation would retain until 2018, when Australia took over the top spot). Soon after coming to power, Hamad created the Supreme Council for the Investment of the Reserves of the State, a vehicle to decide how to invest the profits from LNG and from a companion resource, helium. (Qatar was and remains the largest global exporter of this important element.) The Supreme Council was directed to minimize corruption, make sure that the resource became an ongoing source of funds, and prevent the economy from becoming completely dependent on natural gas prices.11 Qatar’s position at the top of the natural gas pyramid would not last long. By the time of the Rift, Australia had surpassed the emirate in cubic tons produced, and the United States, thanks to accelerated drilling and processing, had started exporting natural gas, something unthinkable only a few years earlier.12 Even though the country’s supplies of natural gas, especially those contained in the North Field that Qatar shares with Iran, will probably last for over 100 years, there is no guarantee that the demand for natural gas will last that long. Thus, investments in diversification are vital. To fight corruption, Qatar passed laws against money laundering and defined a wide sweep of activities as illicit, including funds coming from “crimes of drugs, extortion and looting, forgery, counterfeiting and imitation of notes and coins, illegal trafficking in weapons, ammunition, and explosives, crimes related to environmental protection, [and] the crime of trafficking in women and children.” Criminalization of the same actions online would follow in 2014 with the passage of extensive cybercrimes legislation.13 As one expert put it, “Economic liberalization that allowed greater ownership and protection for foreign companies as well as greater strategic planning for developing the country’s natural resources helped set the stage, creating the necessary framework for an independent foreign policy.”14 In 2020, Qatar ranked thirtieth of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. In the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region, only the UAE ranked higher. Recognizing the economic vulnerability that inevitably accompanies dependence on a single export, even one as valuable as LNG, and the sordid history of corruption and waste that other hydrocarbon-rich countries have experienced, Qatar moved to diversify its economy, both by creating assets not directly related to gas and by seeking to ensure transparency and efficiency. Qatar established plans for a Doha stock exchange in June 1995 and opened the market in May 1997. By providing a legal and financial

40

Isolating Qatar

structure, Qatar hoped to attract foreign investors. Not only would outsiders demand predictable financial transactions, free from the uncertainties of corrupt officials, but they would also augment funds from natural gas and create new businesses, reducing Qatar’s dependence on one resource. To increase the number of people with a stake in Qatar’s peaceful and secure future, the emirate has opened itself to foreign direct investment to a greater extent than most of its neighbors. Qatar had created “a stable business and regulatory environment.”15 Outside investment is vital to laying a path to economic diversification that is not paved with corruption. If only wealthy Qataris can invest in their own country, and if those investments must be routed through a government agency, as had happened in other hydrocarbon-rich countries, the danger of corruption is great. Foreign investors, however, especially if they are numerous, are in a position to demand transparency and predictability in their dealings with government agencies. Quite simply, foreign investors can invest elsewhere. The combination of domestic and foreign investment allowed Qatar’s nonenergy economic sectors to grow at a double-digit pace between 2012 and 2014. During that same period, the share of the hydrocarbon sector in Qatar’s GDP fell from 59 to 51 percent.16 When Qatar had to redouble its efforts to attract foreign investors during the Rift, it drew on this experience. Qatar also created a sovereign wealth fund, managed by the Qatari Investment Authority (QIA). It would grow to become one of the richest and most visible sovereign wealth funds in the world, and its managers immediately bought large blocks of blue-chip stocks, taking large stakes in such instantly recognizable (and perennially profitable) companies as Volkswagen, Porsche, Harrods, and Shell.17 The QIA’s successes give Qatar a huge “rainy day” fund entirely separate from normal budgetary expenses. The Qatari government has been remarkably innovative in finding ways to spend its natural gas profits. The country has maintained a cautious approach to its annual budget, always creating it based on a conservative estimate of likely global prices for LNG.18 This policy has allowed the country to borrow money at low interest rates. Even with conservative budgeting, the country has an extensive public welfare system. Everything from medical care to university tuition is funded almost entirely by gas money. As one expert put it, Hamad spent lavishly on domestic stability, since it is a prerequisite for a more “muscular presence” on the world stage. Hamad believed Qatar had to have such a presence to boost its favorable image and thus boost its national security.19 Qatari leaders made changes in the emirate’s political institutions at the same time. In November 1997, Hamad announced that women could vote and stand for seats on the Central Municipal Council (CMC), the first time women had been offered such power anywhere in the Gulf. While CMC

The Emergence of a Regional Player

41

elections took two additional years to actually occur, they did include eight women among the 280 candidates vying for twenty-nine open seats. While no women were elected, 87 percent of eligible Qataris went to the polls.20 Another domestic innovation addressed the potential for cultural corrosion. The long-term effect of national affluence, whereby no Qataris had to worry about poverty and few Qataris had to do manual labor, could be the destruction of what had been a strong work ethic and the creation of a dangerous overreliance on expatriates to take on economically important tasks. At the same time, too much personal economic security could lead to an unwillingness on the part of Qataris to make the sacrifices necessary to ensure national security.21 To address both problems and help spread a sense of Qatari uniqueness, Hamad initiated a grandiose effort to promote Qatari culture and national consciousness. Part of this effort was a rush to construct museums and other physical spaces where Qataris would be encouraged to see their history as a series of efforts to overcome challenges. Characteristics like strength, stamina, hard work, resilience, risk taking, and entrepreneurship are on obvious display in Qatari museums, along with artifacts and documents that emphasize the long history of insecurity and challenge in Qatar. Financial assets allowed Qatar to contract with the British Library to digitize and translate documents from Qatari history going back centuries.22 To help secure Qatar’s place in the international art world, the government created the Qatar Museum Authority, which had become one of the biggest global buyers in the fine art market. The authority has used its considerable budget to bring international art shows to Doha, hosting exhibitions by globally renowned artists. As discussed later, bringing people to Doha, at government expense, has been an important part of Qatar’s soft power offensive since 1995. Even during the Rift, the leadership announced that 2018 would be the “Qatar-Russia Year of Culture.” Plans for the year included extensive art exchanges. Qatar has sent many of its artworks far and wide and provided free trips to Doha for artists from abroad, hoping to secure a good reputation among cultural elites all over the world.23

Balancing Security Threats

In political science literature, balancing refers to efforts by small states to keep potential enemies off balance, especially more powerful ones.24 Since the most promising way for a small state to fend off the encroachments and aggression of a more powerful state is to counter one powerful enemy with another powerful enemy, balancing is an apt description of this high-stakes and risky policy. In the case of Qatar, the local giants posing the greatest threats were Iran and Saudi Arabia.

42

Isolating Qatar

Since the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom have usually been bitter enemies since the former’s 1979 revolution, Qatar had to try to manage the regional rivalry. Its membership in the GCC alongside Saudi Arabia and its joint efforts with Iran to extract natural gas from the North Field gave both potential enemies reason to see cooperation with Qatar as an asset, as much as Qatar’s seemingly friendly relations with the other regional giant might rankle authorities in Riyadh or Teheran. From the start, the Saudis vehemently opposed any attempt by Qatar to broaden its international options and pursue a policy of greater independence from the Kingdom. The Saudis made their displeasure known by opposing pipelines designed to deliver Qatari natural gas to Kuwait and Bahrain, thus threatening Qatar’s major source of income.25 Under Hamad, Qatar added an activist foreign policy to its balancing efforts. It has involved itself in a number of regional conflicts, both to establish itself as an important and independent actor in regional politics and to increase its foreign policy options. Leaders from the Palestinian group Hamas have lived in Doha, off and on, for years with a clear welcome from the Qatari government. This policy not only gave Qatar an inside track to the Hamas leadership but also incentivized the Israeli and the American governments to use Qatar as an intermediary in communicating with the Hamas leaders, as much as both governments publicly condemn Qatar for harboring them. In 2012, Hamad sought to strengthen ties with the group by becoming the first international leader to visit Gaza since Hamas took over the Palestinian region five years earlier. Since then, Qatar has become a major donor to Hamas-dominated Gaza, spending about $300 million per year on various projects in the Gaza Strip, building new homes, repaving highways, paying salaries to Hamas members in government jobs, and shipping oil to the strip’s main power plant. While outwardly critical of the aid, saying it frees up funds for Hamas to buy weapons, Israeli leaders privately welcome it as a way of relieving suffering in the strip and postponing conflict.26 At the time of the Rift, the Qatari foreign minister justified the aid, saying, “We do not support Hamas. We support the Palestinian people.”27 By the time of the 2011 Arab Spring, Qatar’s leaders found opportunities to use targeted interventions to balance their potential enemies. As noted in the next chapter, the Doha-based Al Jazeera network played a crucial role in publicizing and legitimizing the initial uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Qatar’s open support for the Muslim Brotherhood was an important asset in the group’s rise to power after the overthrow of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. By the time of the Libyan uprising against Muammar Qaddafi, Qatar was ready to play a much more direct role, contributing warplanes and money to the US-led air campaign to overthrow that dictator. The effort won Qatar recognition by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a contributing nation.

The Emergence of a Regional Player

43

In the Syrian civil war, Saudi Arabia and Qatar seemingly had the same goals. The Saudis were the first regional power to condemn Bashar alAssad’s crackdown that sparked the civil war, followed closely by Qatar. The Saudis were also major financial contributors to the Syrian opposition. Qatar, for its part, also backed rebels in Syria, but with a decided preference for factions linked to either the Muslim Brotherhood or Salafist groups.28 Qatar has also been a major sponsor of the so-called Four Towns movement, in which civilians trapped under siege by government troops or by rebel forces have been bused to supposedly safe areas. While some have criticized the effort as thinly veiled forced displacement, others have seen it as the only way to protect civilians.29 Qatar was the only Arab state to grant full diplomatic recognition to the Syrian National Council, a move placing it squarely at odds with Iran, which supported Assad. Qatar offered to help pay for military action to destroy Assad’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. In Yemen, civil war broke out when the long-standing government of Abdullah Saleh fell, a casualty of the Arab Spring. The Qataris were no strangers to the intricacies of Yemeni politics. Between 2003 and 2009, Qatar was often called upon to mediate between the separatist Houthis and Saleh.30 Qatar offered on at least one occasion to underwrite many of the funds for reconstruction31 and supported the Saudi-led effort to prop up the Yemeni government while it was seriously challenged by Houthi rebels. In this conflict, Qatar has worked with the Saudis and opposed factions backed by Iran.32 In so doing, the emirate again demonstrated its foreign policy independence and balanced its potential enemies.

Bandwagoning

As the original promise of the Arab Spring faded, however, Qatar’s gambles on the insurgent groups no longer seemed as wise or as likely to contribute to Qatar’s global reputation. Even without the setbacks from the Arab Spring, Qatar’s leaders believed that balancing potential enemies from the Gulf neighborhood would not be enough to ensure the emirate’s security. For this reason, Hamad decided on a course of increased friendship and partnership with the United States. When the Saudis requested that the Americans close their Desert Storm–era military bases in the Kingdom, Qatar stepped in with an offer not only to host the American troops but also to expand the Al Udeid Air Base, built in the 1990s. An updated status of force agreement was signed in 2003. The result was the largest US military base in the region. It is home to almost 10,000 American military and civilian personnel and boasts the longest runways and best hangars in the region. It is an unmistakable symbol of the partnership between the United States and Qatar and of

44

Isolating Qatar

American commitment to Qatar’s national security. “The base gives them a sense of confidence,” according to the Center for American Progress. “It has made the Qataris feel as though they are integrated into a wider U.S. security posture in the region.” US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who has been a harsh critic of Qatar’s independent foreign policy, acknowledged the base’s importance. “It’s not just the facility,” Gates told a Washington audience. “It’s the freedom of operation. Qatar is the only country in the region that allows us to land B-52s and put B-52s at their base at Al Udeid.”33 It is also an attractive post for Americans stationed there. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar places almost no restrictions on the Americans living and working at the base, and they travel freely to Doha and back. Many American soldiers and civilian workers bring their families. Qatar has also cultivated improved relations with two regional players, Turkey and Israel. It has provided significant funds to Turkey, in the neighborhood of $15 billion in investments and credits. It committed an additional $15 billion in May 2020 when Turkey’s currency reserves suffered a sharp decline.34 Besides money, Qatar provided Turkey with a springboard for a permanent Turkish presence in the Gulf region. Under a 2014 agreement, Turkey opened a military base in the emirate. The stationing of Turkish forces, even if only 100, constituted the first Turkish deployment of troops to the region since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. After the 1993 peace deal between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Qatar was among the most forthcoming of Arab states in reaching out to Israel. The Jewish state opened a trade office in Doha in 1999, which closed at the time of the intifada in 2008. As noted, Israel grudgingly accepts the close relations between Qatar and Hamas, calculating that the benefits, such as weakening Iran’s influence in Gaza, outweigh the drawbacks.35 Qatar has also aided Israel by mediating prisoner of war exchange talks between Israel and Hamas. Qatar also invests in the West Bank and even in Arab parts of Israel proper. Qatar promises that Israeli athletes will be able to take part in the 2022 FIFA World Cup.36 In February 2018, Israeli endorsement of Qatar’s important role was underlined when the country’s minister for regional cooperation, Tzachi Hanegbi, met with the Qatari official in charge of reconstruction projects in the Gaza Strip. The meeting took place in Jerusalem.37 Hamad and later Tamim also made a major effort to work with NATO, even harboring hopes of joining the alliance as a full member. Qatar saw cooperation with NATO as a path to greater global visibility and influence. The country signed a security and defense cooperation agreement with France as early as 1994 and has added similar agreements with other global powers since. It was one of the first countries to sign NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Qatar contributed financially to the NATO campaign

The Emergence of a Regional Player

45

in Afghanistan. As noted, it contributed warplanes to the Libya campaign. Such efforts have received repeated (and, within Qatar, widely publicized) commendations from NATO leaders. Their military contributions have also helped Qatar build a reputation as a country active in preserving international peace and security.38

Using Soft Power

Soft power, as originally theorized by Joseph Nye, essentially consists of appeals to public opinion in nations deemed to be potential threats or possible allies. It is a series of efforts to create positive feelings about a nation. As such, soft power is most effective in the kind of rules-based international system that has existed since the end of the Cold War. Nations using soft power try to achieve their goals in the international arena through attraction or influence rather than coercion. Mehran Kamrava listed four key components of soft power: safety and security, prestige and reputation, recognition as a good global citizen, and financial influence through assets and investments.39 For states like Qatar, which have few assets allowing the use of hard power, soft power requires maximum use of the assets available. For Qatar, this means, first and foremost, the targeted use of money.

Building Cities

Qatar’s soft power strategy has included both domestic and overseas spending. To accommodate the needs of the country’s large expatriate community, Qatar built Religion City outside Doha, where non-Muslims can worship. The facility has dedicated bus lines serving it and houses of worship for Christians, Buddhists, and Hindus.40 The country built and funded facilities designed to attract potentially influential foreigners to the country. One such effort was the establishment of Education City outside Doha. The complex is home to several US and British overseas university campuses, with the operating costs covered by the Qatari government. Cornell University, Georgetown University, Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon, Northwestern, and Virginia Commonwealth University all have satellite campuses in Education City, where faculty and students make use of state-of-the-art classrooms and technology and where students from the United States and elsewhere can enjoy the benefits of a highly subsidized study-abroad experience. Qatar has supplemented the attractions of Education City with lavish grants to American universities. Education City is one of many sites in and around Doha where international conferences can take place. Indeed, the Qatari government has spent billions to boost Doha “as a center for the Meetings, Incentives,

46

Isolating Qatar

Conferences, and Exhibitions (MICE) industry.”41 To get visitors to these conferences and meetings, Qatar has also spent millions establishing Qatar Airways as a world-class airline. The carrier is heavily advertised in the United States and Europe, with most of that advertising targeting upscale audiences. Qatar Airways has emphasized not only its luxurious businessand first-class accommodations but also the convenience of Doha as a hub for travelers coming from Europe or North America and heading for destinations in Asia. Qatar coupled its investments in Qatar Airways with the ultramodern Hamad International Airport, which opened during the 2014 diplomatic crisis.

Investments as Soft Power

The emirate has also used the profits from LNG to buy large stakes in other international airlines. In 2016, the Qatari Investment Authority became the largest single shareholder in British Airways. Qatar failed, however, in a bid to acquire a similarly large stake in American Airlines. At the same time, the QIA agreed to purchase 100 Boeing jetliners, a deal worth a reported $20 billion. The authority has also made other major investments in Europe. The QIA owns more real estate in London than Queen Elizabeth II. In February 2015, it became the sole owner of Porta Nuova, a new business district in Milan. Soon after, Qatar signed a deal with Italy to spend €3.8 billion on Italian naval vessels.42 A major part of Qatar’s drive for global recognition and prestige has been its sponsorship of international sports teams. Most of this spending has been directed toward football (soccer) teams, since football is the most widely played and closely followed sport in the world. Perhaps its highestprofile sponsorship is of the Barcelona football team. (This connection prompted Saudi Arabia and the UAE to arrest people wearing T-shirts for this team at the time of the Rift.) Qatar Sports Investments also owns the Paris Saint-Germain team and spent $262 million to sign one of soccer’s biggest stars, Neymar da Silva Santos Júnior.43 In addition, golf and tennis teams have been the beneficiaries of Qatari largesse. Qatar’s most important effort in this regard was winning its bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup football tournament, a diplomatic victory followed by joyous celebrations in the streets of Qatar and the proclamation of a national holiday. The authority in charge of planning for the games is using stadium construction as another element of soft power. Eight new stadiums were needed for the tournament. Knowing that Qatar would not need so much stadium space after 2022, the arenas were constructed so that they could be taken apart again. The modules will be given to developing nations that have a passion for football but lack the money for new stadiums.

The Emergence of a Regional Player

47

Al Jazeera

No single effort has resulted in more international recognition, positive and negative, than Qatar’s establishment and ongoing sponsorship of the Al Jazeera television network. This development is important enough to merit its own chapter; suffice it to say here that Al Jazeera is a powerful example of filling a market need. Prior to the broadcast debut of the network, virtually everyone living in the Arabic-speaking world had little or no choice when it came to sources for news, features, and even entertainment. Thus, Al Jazeera’s spectacular early success was largely due to the almost complete absence of competitors. For such epochal events as the Gaza Uprising and the Arab Spring, Al Jazeera became the prime source of on-the-spot news for much of the world and the only source of news for much of the Arabic-speaking world. The network has become extremely controversial because of its determination to present different points of view, granting airtime to Osama bin Laden and the leaders of other terrorist groups. Egyptian authorities were incensed by Al Jazeera’s coverage of the Arab Spring uprising in that country, which was unabashedly biased in favor of the revolution. Al Jazeera would become a major bone of contention between Qatar and its neighbors. The demands made by the four Rift nations at the start of the crisis included the requirement that the network be shut down.

Providing Sanctuary

One of the more dangerous and provocative parts of Qatar’s soft power policy is its welcome to exiles and outcasts from across the MENA region. This policy has a long history. Qatar has played the role of safe haven since the nineteenth century, although for most of that time it was valued as such because it was remote from the centers of strife its guests had left. Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed Al Thani, often referred to as the founder of modern Qatar, liked to refer to the country as “the Kaaba of the Dispossessed.” 44 In modern times, one Egyptian exile said, “Qatar helps political groups from all over the world. If someone is oppressed, they are willing to help.”45 Qatar has also offered sanctuary to members of Saddam Hussein’s family, one of Osama bin Laden’s sons, a Chechen warlord, Egyptian sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and exiles from Syria, Libya, Sudan, and Lebanon. Qatar has used the presence of exiled and outcast leaders to make Doha the site for peace talks, most famously hosting representatives of the United States and the Afghan Taliban.46 Qatar’s welcome to leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood complicated relations with Egypt but brought Qatar more credibility with other Middle Eastern states. Still, the practice

48

Isolating Qatar

was more likely to make enemies of other Arab states than friends. Qatar’s perceived sponsorship of the exiles’ causes, based on favorable coverage on Al Jazeera, caused friction with all of the Rift nations.

Mediation

Qatar’s leaders have turned the country’s relative anonymity into an asset by presenting the country as a neutral and dispassionate arbitrator. When the almost bottomless pockets of the regime are added to this reputation, along with the attractive and sophisticated facilities in Doha for diplomatic summits, Qatar is left with a unique ability to insert itself into seemingly insoluble conflicts and occasionally to catalyze progress toward solutions. In Sudan, Qatar got involved in 2008 at the invitation of the country’s minister of state for foreign affairs. In 2011, the country successfully oversaw a peaceful settlement between the government of Sudan and Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement. The negotiations took place in Doha, and Qatari leaders played an active role in them.47 One observer noted, “It seemed like not a week could pass without a set of meetings taking place in one of Doha’s glittering hotels, overtly or in secret, bringing together adversaries from Palestine, Afghanistan or Lebanon, who were happy to have the opportunity for some rest and relaxation far from the battlefield, even if they made little progress in negotiating peace.”48 Qatari officials were active during Lebanon’s 2007–2008 political standoff over the choice of a president. Six days of negotiations among the various factions, mediated by Qataris, finally led to an agreement on a new president and a significant presence for Hezbollah in the Lebanese cabinet. By one account, Hamad called Syrian president Bashar al-Assad personally to complain bitterly about Syria’s role in making Hezbollah intransigent. The emir reminded Assad of the times Qatar had stood with him regardless of the costs to Qatar’s reputation. Within hours of the phone call, Hezbollah leaders signaled their agreement to a draft set of terms. The agreement was a major coup for Qatar, with both Lebanese and Qatari media calling it a historic achievement.49 These efforts at mediation enhanced Qatar’s global reputation and helped to make Doha a popular conference center and destination for travelers in the Middle East. The sedulous efforts at mediation also became an essential component of Qatar’s national security strategy. Being seen as an impartial mediator served to reduce the number of enemies Qatar might face. In Sudan, Qatar’s mediating role opened the door for the purchase of vast tracks of farmland that increased the emirate’s food security. These and similar efforts have raised Qatar’s international profile, resulting in a seat on the UN Security Council in 2006.

The Emergence of a Regional Player

49

Tamim Takes Over and Faces New Challenges

In June 2013, Hamad abdicated the throne voluntarily and passed the baton to his son, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. This handover of power was unprecedented in Qatari history. Unlike Sheikh Khalifa, Hamad did not leave the country or take a substantial portion of the state treasury with him. In fact, he remained in the country as Father Emir, a position from which he still wields considerable influence. Tamim was only thirty-three years old at the time of his ascension to power but already experienced in foreign policy. As early as 2007, his father had tasked him with improving relations with Saudi Arabia. As emir, he was in a position to move more quickly in this direction. Instead, he found himself almost immediately at the center of various conflicts with Qatar’s neighbors and with nations farther removed from the Gulf. In fact, all four of the nations that would eventually spearhead the Rift had serious diplomatic disagreements with Qatar at the time of Tamim’s rise to power.

Friction Before the Rift

Qatar’s relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain were all deteriorating in the years just before the 2017 crisis. In the case of Egypt, Qatar was an early and enthusiastic supporter of the Arab Spring revolution in Egypt and applauded the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. Moreover, the Qatari government also supported the Muslim Brotherhood–dominated government of Mohammed Morsi. When ousted by the military coup in 2013, Morsi was jailed by the new leadership for spying for Qatar, among other charges, and the staff of Al Jazeera was detained.50 Qatar had also provoked Egypt’s ire by mediating between rebels in Sudan’s Darfur region and the country’s government. Egypt had long seen itself as Sudan’s primary international patron.51 In the case of Bahrain, the two countries went for years without establishing full diplomatic relations. This delay was due to both long-standing historical disagreements, many of them described in the previous chapter, and irritants that had occurred since the independence of both nations. Not until the 1997 GCC summit did a breakthrough toward normal diplomatic relations take place. The two countries agreed to establish full diplomatic relations twenty-six years after both became independent. Even then, serious discussions only began three years later about building a causeway between Qatari and Bahraini territory, although those discussions did lead to an agreement that citizens of Qatar and Bahrain would only need identity cards for entry, as opposed to passports. The two countries exchanged ambassadors, finally, and Qatar Airways announced

50

Isolating Qatar

the beginning of daily flights between Doha and Manama. In 2002, economic relations between the two countries deepened with the resolution of a long-standing territorial dispute and an agreement under which Bahrain would buy substantial amounts of natural gas from the North Field. An international court decision on the ancient town of Zubara allowed the two countries to settle a disagreement that went back centuries.52 Similarly, the 2000s saw improved relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which seemed impossible during the previous decade. A summit conference in Jeddah in September 2007 saw Hamad and Saudi king Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud resolve many of their outstanding differences, marking what one observer called “a historic turning point in the Qatari-Saudi relationship.” Abdullah followed up on the progress of the summit by attending the December 2007 GCC summit in Doha. Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud followed up with a visit of his own in 2008.53 The good relations did not last. By the end of the 2000s, Qatar’s foreign policy had become far too independent for the liking of its fellow GCC members, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Both countries had serious reservations about Qatar’s active role as mediator, since that role prompted Qatari officials to allow representatives of warring factions to take up residence in Doha. Saudi impatience with Qatar’s increasing assertiveness, combined with growing displeasure over the reporting on Al Jazeera, led the Kingdom’s leadership to convene a conference with their Qatari counterparts in Riyadh in 2013. The two nations signed an agreement promising not to support “hostile media” or any group threatening the “security and stability of the GCC states.” The ink had hardly dried before Gulf nations were accusing Qatar of violations.54 In March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain had recalled their ambassadors, alleging Qatari support for terrorist groups. However, in that case, although the crisis lasted until November, it involved only the closing of embassies. Travel links stayed open, and no Qataris were expelled from the nations that broke relations. The 2014 crisis itself came from accusations that Qatar had violated the terms of a 2013 agreement, also the result of accusations of support for extremist groups. In that case, the specific flashpoint was Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which had recently been ousted from Egypt’s post–Arab Spring government. The 2013 agreement required Qatar to expel Brotherhood sympathizers. Several were expelled by the fall of 2014. After the 2014 crisis was settled in November, with seeming expressions of goodwill on all sides, the Qatari leadership realized that the situation could have been much worse. Moreover, they realized that such hostile actions by their larger and more powerful Gulf neighbors could happen again. Qatar accelerated actions designed to diversify its economy, which was (and is) almost completely dominated by natural gas exports. Even

The Emergence of a Regional Player

51

more consequentially, the country doubled its efforts to exercise soft power by cultivating varied international ties, increasing its international visibility, and reducing its vulnerability. Still, the actions the Rift nations took in 2017 were far more severe and comprehensive. Qatari foreign minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said that Qatar had “never experienced the same level of hostility, even from an enemy country.”55 As events moved toward the Rift, Saudi displeasure became more obvious and more dangerous to Qatar. The Saudis permitted a visit by Sheikh Abdullah Al Thani, a minor Qatari royal with close enough ties to the ruling family of Qatar to serve as an implicit threat by Saudi Arabia to undermine the Qatari ruler. The Saudis said the sheikh had come to discuss ways for Qataris to make the hajj, but Doha denied the man was a diplomatic representative.56 The controversy spurred Qatari memories of Saudi involvement in the attempted coup in Qatar in 1996. Qatar’s relations with the UAE are complicated by the two countries’ trade patterns. While Qatar’s trade with Iran was a source of friction with the Rift nations, Qatari officials are quick to point out that trade between Iran and Dubai is much greater than that between Iran and Qatar.57 At the same time, Qatar is a major supplier of natural gas to the Emirates. Qatar also gave sanctuary to leaders of the Afghan Taliban, who frequently traveled by road from Doha to the UAE, where they raised funds from Afghan communities in Sharjah and Dubai.58 Different visions for the future of international cooperation through the GCC underlie these specific grievances. At the same time that Qatar was emphasizing its national interests with a single-minded focus, the Saudis and Emiratis were working toward a more coordinated foreign policy, undergirded by much closer coordination in economic and fiscal policy. Qatar’s complex relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran are matched by its equally complex relations with its fellow GCC members. The group, founded as a collective security arrangement, has supposedly switched to largely economic goals in recent years. But it has made only disappointing progress in meeting such goals as a common currency and a common set of trade regulations.59 Capital flowed freely among the members before the Rift, but goods did not. Perhaps the most important joint investment project was the Dolphin pipeline that brought Qatari natural gas to the UAE and Oman. Not surprisingly for states that are all energy exporters, GCC nations conduct relatively little trade with one another. Of Qatar’s five fellow members, only the UAE is among its top five trading partners. The GCC, for all intents and purposes, has a common passport, since members of all GCC states could travel freely before the Rift. The region even developed a rudimentary sense of identity, with some GCC citizens referring to themselves as “Khaleejis,” or “people of the Gulf.”60 This new identity would clash with the Qatari national identity that Hamad and Tamim worked hard to establish.

52

Isolating Qatar

Conclusion

Tamim has continued efforts to raise Qatar’s global profile as part of a policy to protect Qatari security. The country has generated opposition among its neighbors in the process and also confounded the theories of academics by acting in ways small states are not supposed to be able to act. Even more fundamentally, Qatar has angered its neighbors and perplexed academics by rejecting plans to subordinate its national interests to allow the GCC to become a more effective international organization with supranational authority. Instead, Qatar has moved more in the direction of the Brexit movement by insisting on its national interests and promoting a stronger and more self-conscious national identity. Tamim’s sedulous efforts to promote Qatari nationalism at the time of the Rift would not only bolster his personal popularity but also gain the favorable notice of US President Donald Trump, despite Trump’s initial support for the Rift. In the words of one expert, “From the late 1990s on, Qatari foreign policy is a combination of: ‘What can we do to get ourselves on the map?’ and ‘what can we do to annoy the Saudis?’”61 Changes in policy came with the rise of Hamad in 1995. He initiated not only radical changes in Qatar’s foreign policy but also sweeping social, political, economic, and media reforms at home. As part of its rise to global prominence, Qatar became a major player in global media by sponsoring the establishment of the Al Jazeera network, which is a constant irritant to Qatar’s Arab neighbors and was even condemned by a US president.

Notes

1. Miller, “Qatar, the Gulf Crisis and Small State Behavior in International Affairs,” 90. 2. Walsh, “Little Brother in an Arab Family Feud.” 3. Baabood, Qatar’s Resilience Strategy. 4. The matter would be settled out of court, and Khalifa returned to the country peacefully in 2004, taking on the role of “Father Emir.” Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 29. 5. Feiler and Zeev, Qatar. 6. Shayan, “Geopolitical Subjectivity in Iran-GCC Relations,” 654. 7. Fisher, “How the Saudi-Qatar Rivalry.” 8. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, 32. 9. Feiler and Zeev, Qatar, 12. 10. Fisher, “How the Saudi-Qatar Rivalry.” 11. Feiler and Zeev, Qatar, 20. 12. Heath, “Why Aren’t Oil Prices Spiking?” 13. Naheem, “The Dramatic Rift and Crisis,” 267. 14. Feiler and Zeev, Qatar, 20. 15. Ibid., 11. 16. Ibid., 14.

The Emergence of a Regional Player

53

17. Roberts, Qatar, 23. 18. Feiler and Zeev, Qatar, 13. 19. Ibid., 20. 20. Roberts, Qatar, 22. 21. Gray, Qatar, 45. 22. Exell and Rico, “There Is No Heritage in Qatar,” 679. 23. al-Horr, Tok, and Gagoshidze, “Rethinking Soft Power in the Post-blockade Times,” 341. 24. Kabalan, “Actors, Structures and Qatari Foreign Policy,” 61. 25. Ibid., 76. See also Feiler and Zeev, Qatar. 26. Guzansky and Kobi, “Israel’s Qatari Dilemma,” 19. 27. Carlstrom, “Hamas Looks to Iran.” 28. Kouskouvelis and Zarras, “Cairo and Riyadh,” 4. 29. Barnard and Kirkpatrick, “5 Arab Nations Move to Isolate Qatar.” 30. Kabalan, “Actors, Structures and Qatari Foreign Policy,” 77. 31. Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” 549. 32. “Push Against Iran May Be Stoking Mideast Instability,” Washington Post, June 8, 2017. For a summary of evidence linking Iran to the Houthi rebels, see “Middle East War,” Newsweek, December 16, 2017. 33. Gibbons-Neff, “For Qatar, a U.S. Airbase Is Best Defense Against Critics.” 34. Guzansky and Lindenstrauss, Report, 3. 35. Guzansky and Kobi, “Israel’s Qatari Dilemma,” 2. 36. Walsh, “Qatar’s Open-Door Approach.” 37. Guzansky and Kobi, “Israel’s Qatari Dilemma,” 1. 38. Baabood, Qatar’s Resilience Strategy, 9–10. 39. Kamrava, Qatar, 47–52. 40. Interviews by the author of religious leaders in Religion City, November 2018. 41. Roberts, Qatar, 23. 42. Feiler and Zeev, Qatar, 14. 43. Raghavan, “Two Months into Saudi-Led Boycott.” 44. Walsh, “Qatar’s Open-Door Approach.” 45. Abi Habib, “Gulf Allies Draw U.S. into Mideast Rift.” 46. While the UAE condemned Qatar for its support for “terrorism” in the years leading up to the Rift, leaked cables show that the Emirates tried to get the Taliban to locate its headquarters in the UAE instead of Qatar. See Kirkpatrick, “U.A.E. Competed with Qatar.” 47. Baabood, Qatar’s Resilience Strategy, 7. 48. Hilterman, “The Backlash Catches Up with Qatar.” 49. Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” 547–548. 50. Trofimov, “Qatar Crisis Turns into Proxy Battle.” 51. Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” 540. 52. Wiegand, “Bahrain, Qatar, and the Hawar Islands,” 96. 53. Wright, “Foreign Policies with International Reach,” 304. 54. Feiler and Zeev, Qatar, 21–22. 55. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 56. Parasie and Schwartz, “Qatar Risks More Saudi Ire.” 57. Interviews by the author of Qatari officials in Doha, November 2018. At the same time, the UAE is the only neighboring state among Qatar’s top-five trading partners. 58. Walsh, “Qatar’s Open-Door Approach.” 59. Shayan, “Geopolitical Subjectivity in Iran-GCC Relations,” 640. 60. Raghavan, “Showdown over Qatar Is Tearing Families Apart.” 61. Fisher, “How the Saudi-Qatar Rivalry.”

4

Al Jazeera and Qatari Soft Power

Al Jazeera was truly revolutionary. Never before had there been an Arab television news network as outspoken, outlandish, watched, or influential. —David B. Roberts1

All that noise from this little matchbox? —Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak after a 2001 visit to Al Jazeera2

Of all the innovations Qatar has made during the past thirty years to enhance its international presence and influence, none has been more ambitious than its effort to revolutionize the choices available to consumers of popular media in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region. No innovation has brought more complex effects than the launching of the Al Jazeera network. Given this ambiguous yet vitally important legacy and the complications the channel has generated for Qatar’s relations with other Arab states, the creation and progress of Al Jazeera merits a separate analysis. A full appreciation of the events and decisions leading up to the 2017– 2021 Gulf Rift crisis requires an understanding of its impact. In a remarkably short time, Al Jazeera has become one of the most important, most influential, and most feared and hated media creations of the past half century. It has been honored with some of the most prestigious media awards available, even while it has been censured by some of the most powerful political leaders in the world. One Arab leader condemned the network while simultaneously expressing a hope that Al Jazeera would interview him. Its existence challenges current conceptions of the role of soft power in international relations, and its impact presents an even larger

55

56

Isolating Qatar

challenge to classic conceptions of the place of small states in international politics. It can be compared to both David and Goliath in analogies to the biblical story. Tracing its ownership and management blurs the distinction between public and private media. If it is a tool of the Qatari government, as some of its critics suggest, it is one that brings great benefits and great headaches, the most pertinent of the latter being the demand that the Qatari government shut down Al Jazeera as the price of ending the Rift. As with most truly revolutionary developments, the emergence of Al Jazeera, in retrospect, seems almost inevitable. With over 350 million native speakers, Arabic comprises one of the largest language groups in the world and one of the most geographically compact. Any Arabic-language broadcast that originates in one country will have a potential audience in several countries. Perhaps most surprising about Al Jazeera is not its meteoric rise to prominence but that its appearance took so long. Fifty years into the television age and seventy-five years into the radio age, no one in the MENA region had come close to creating a popular broadcast medium with a multinational audience.

Precursors

Earlier attempts to reach Arabic speakers had been ineffective, short-lived, or overtly propagandistic. For example, Sawt al-Arab Radio (Voice of the Arabs) broadcast from Cairo in the 1950s and 1960s. It was an important part of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s attempt to spread his pan-Arabist message. As such, it made no pretense to objectivity or evenhandedness. It also broadcast nothing but news and commentary, with no attempt to add entertainment or to expand into areas like sports or children’s programming. Around the same time, the Israeli government, after the Six-Day War in 1967, launched an Arabic radio station, but the station mostly targeted Egyptians.3 The Israeli station had a difficult time competing with Sawt al-Arab. More recently, a London-based network, the Middle East Broadcasting Center, began broadcasting from Saudi Arabia, following a huge investment by Sheikh Walid Al Ibrahim, a brother-in-law of Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd. Other cross-border programming comes from state-owned operations such as the Egyptian Satellite Channel, operating from Cairo. Emirates Dubai Television, originating in the United Arab Emirates, is also state owned. Again, these broadcast efforts focus almost wholly on news and commentary, often slanted to support the desires of the sponsoring government.4 Attempts from outside the region to reach a broad Arabic-speaking audience also met with uneven success. Voice of America (VOA) launched an Arab station in 1950 and copied the model that had been successful elsewhere of providing balanced and reliable news along with sports and entertainment.

Al Jazeera and Qatari Soft Power

57

(VOA’s Arabic service was discontinued in 2002 and replaced by a mostly music station with short news clips.) In addition, quasi-government entities like the British Broadcasting Service (BBC) and Radio Monte Carlo–Middle East strove to provide comprehensive and nonpropagandistic news and information across the region.5 None of these efforts, however, did much to fill the yawning gap in compelling news for the Arabic-speaking broadcast market.

A New Voice Makes Waves

In February 1996, the emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, who had taken the throne the previous year with plans to bring major innovations to the Gulf nation, issued a decree establishing Al Jazeera, variously translated as “the island” or “the peninsula.” After its first transmission in November, its initial years were tentative and limited, with only six hours per day on the air. Still, the network was something almost completely new in the Arab world. It owed much of its uniqueness to Hamad’s decision to give Al Jazeera editorial autonomy and, even more radically, to lift the censorship laws in Qatar in 1995. In 1998, Hamad took the further step of abolishing the Ministry of Information and Culture, becoming the first Arabic-speaking nation without such a governing body.6 The founders of Al Jazeera had some extraordinarily good luck in the early years that provided for rapid advancement and expansion. The Saudi government had been working with the BBC to provide Arabic news to the Gulf region. The Saudi leadership believed that the success of the BBC’s radio broadcasts (BBC World Service Arabic) could be replicated on television, and BBC Arabic went on the air. In April 1996, however, BBC Arabic produced a documentary highly critical of the Saudi government. This disagreement over editorial independence prompted the Saudi government to withdraw its financial support and terminate the contract with the BBC less than two years after the deal was made. Dozens of BBC-experienced reporters, producers, technicians, and executives were suddenly unemployed and quickly hired by Al Jazeera. They brought an enormous wealth of technical expertise and, as important, a professional “editorial spirit, freedom, and style.”7 With a hefty subsidy from the Qatari government, 120 ex-BBC employees began working for Al Jazeera. Even with the additional professional staff, Al Jazeera struggled to increase its audience since it was limited to the range provided by a lowgrade transponder. An upgrade to a more expansive C-band transponder was blocked by the limited number of C-bands available. In July 1997, another piece of good luck accelerated the process when Canal France International (CFI), intending to broadcast a children’s educational show to North Africa, instead broadcast an uncensored version of a Portuguese pornographic movie.

58

Isolating Qatar

CFI instantly lost its C-band transponder, and Al Jazeera moved quickly to pick up the contract.8 The range of Al Jazeera exploded overnight.

Al Jazeera’s Rapid Rise

For decades, Arab viewers of government television had endured hours of coverage of visits by leaders to hospitals, school openings, and village council meetings and even shopping trips by their wives. The advent of an option that had more interesting news stories, lively talk shows, and uncensored controversy made the rapid growth of Al Jazeera’s audience almost inevitable. When Al Jazeera went to a twenty-four-hour on-air presence, it gained viewers and influence almost immediately. Given the anodyne and predictable programming coming from official television and the absence of an independent Arab media body, many Arabs had come to depend on European or other Western news sources. As early as 1998, many regarded Al Jazeera as the most influential media outlet in the region.9 A poll of Palestinians in 2001 showed that among those who said they had relatives who were refugees, 60 percent identified Al Jazeera as their first choice for news. Of those without refugee relatives, Israeli television was more popular.10 In 2000, a poll taken for a Palestinian newspaper showed that almost three-quarters of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza chose Al Jazeera as their first source for news, despite the network’s welcoming of Israeli commentators and guests.11 In part, the station’s popularity among Palestinians could be due to its uncensored depictions of the violence emerging from the 2000 intifada. In a harbinger of its later notoriety, Al Jazeera’s often graphic images helped to galvanize anti-Israeli sentiment throughout the Muslim world.12 Al Jazeera also benefited from Qatar’s lack of prominence during the channel’s early years. For many Arab leaders, anything coming from what had been arguably the most obscure Gulf nation of them all was hardly worth consideration. As one commentator stated, Al Jazeera’s satellite competitors “just could not accept the fact that a ‘country of goats [Qatar]’ could actually produce such a professional success.”13 In fact, the station’s early success as a news source prompted its expansion to almost twenty different channels, providing consumers with children’s programming, religious programming, music, and sports, as well as news, talk, and commentary. Al Jazeera has also expanded its linguistic range, with an English-language service starting in 2006 and another channel targeting Muslims in the Balkans in 2011.

Breakthrough Moment

Al Jazeera’s rise was quick but not instantaneous. It did not garner credibility and notoriety immediately. At its start in 1996, many dismissed the

Al Jazeera and Qatari Soft Power

59

channel as just another state-financed effort by a wealthy Gulf nation to increase its visibility. In December 1998, however, US President Bill Clinton ordered four days of bombing in Iraq, ostensibly in retaliation for violations of the cease-fire agreement that had ended the Persian Gulf War. Al Jazeera was the only television station on the ground in Iraq at the time. Its pictures and commentary during Operation Desert Fox were aired live. The network also sold the footage to other news organizations, placing the explosions on televisions around the world in a matter of minutes. The scoop made Al Jazeera a household name.14 The channel received more attention, in a negative way, when the Arab States Broadcasting Unit (ASBU) met in December 1998 and decided to expand to include private Arab radio and television broadcasting institutions. Every private channel in the Arabic-speaking world was invited to join, except Al Jazeera.15 The ASBU rejected Al Jazeera’s application, saying the station did not “conform to the code of honor of the Arab media, [which] promotes brotherhood between Arab nations.”16 Al Jazeera soon turned the rejection into a positive by emphasizing the difference between itself and the lackluster television news choices that had bored Arab audiences for decades. With its entrée into the Arab world secured, Al Jazeera went about honing its unique approach to information. Among its more popular programs was The Opposite Direction, a talk show that featured guests with diametrically opposed points of view and a host who did his best to emphasize those differences to provoke loud and forceful debate. The host of The Opposite Direction, Dr. Faisal al-Qasim, rapidly became one of the most famous faces in the Arab world.17 At first viewers were skeptical, as might be supposed in a region where free speech was scarce. Many believed that the callers to the program were secret police acting as provocateurs. But alQasim provoked strong feelings, on one occasion prompting a Jordanian columnist to declare, “This man’s tongue should be cut out.” After a 2000 program critical of then Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian government expelled the host’s thirteen-year-old brother, a popular singer who lived in Cairo.18 The no-holds-barred debate style epitomized Al Jazeera’s public motto: “The opinion, and the other opinion.” Al-Qasim’s program was effective enough to bring complications to Qatar’s foreign policy. On a March 1997 show, for example, the host insisted that it was time for Kuwait to reconcile with Saddam Hussein, leading Kuwaiti officials to file a protest with Qatar. On another occasion, a representative of the Jordanian Ministry of Information insisted that alQasim stop “spitting poison” at Jordan. The ministry threatened to revoke the accreditation of Al Jazeera’s staff in Jordan unless the station issued an apology. The apology was not forthcoming, and Al Jazeera remained closed in Jordan for six months. Undeterred, al-Qasim followed up in April with a

60

Isolating Qatar

debate over the proposition “The blockade on Iraq is an Arab conspiracy more than an American or Zionist one.”19 Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the more controversial and outspoken clerics in the region, hosted Religion and Life, another popular program. Al-Qaradawi lived in Qatar after his exile from his native Egypt, from which he had been expelled due to his alleged membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. His religious views are difficult to classify, since he has passionately argued for the inclusion of women in politics and also passionately embraced the cause of Palestinian suicide bombers. He provoked anger when he said on air in 2009, “Oh Allah, take this oppressive Jewish, Zionist band of people. Oh Allah, do not spare a single one of them. Oh Allah, count their numbers, and kill them, down to the very last one.”20 The management of Al Jazeera has distanced itself from many of his religious rulings but allowed him to host one of their most popular offerings.21

Wading into Controversy

Al Jazeera management green-lighted more provocative programming. In what was billed as an attempt to mend fences with the United States, Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi appeared on Al Jazeera in August 1998 and offered to provide President Clinton with a lawyer for the latter’s legal difficulties following his affair with a White House intern.22 In 1999, the Algerian government cut power to several major cities to prevent Algerians from watching a debate on Al Jazeera concerning the country’s bloody civil war. The following year Morocco recalled its ambassador to Qatar to protest Al Jazeera’s “leading a hostile campaign against its monarchy.” However, the controversies also meant more viewers and hence more influence. When Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh denounced Al Jazeera, he added that he could not wait to appear on one of its programs.23 Other Al Jazeera “scoops” followed. The station was the first to report the destruction of the ancient giant carvings of the Buddha in Bamiyan, Afghanistan, by the Taliban in March 2001. For all its growing notoriety in the Arabic-speaking world, Al Jazeera remained largely unknown in the West until after September 11, 2001. When the Americans began their retaliatory attack on the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which was harboring al-Qaeda, Al Jazeera aired a lengthy interview with Osama bin Laden, during which he proudly claimed responsibility for the attack on America. US officials presented a formal complaint to the Qatari government, saying that Al Jazeera was giving too much airtime to avowed enemies of the United States. Secretary of State Colin Powell asked the emir directly to “tone down” the antiAmerican rhetoric broadcast on Al Jazeera. One columnist for New York’s Daily News referred to Al Jazeera as bin Laden’s “favorite network.”24 Al

Al Jazeera and Qatari Soft Power

61

Jazeera officials, for their part, sidestepped the criticism that they were implicitly supporting terrorists, saying, “We leave security concerns to the security people.” As during Operation Desert Fox, Al Jazeera was the only international news service on the ground in Afghanistan during the initial phases of the war. Its often graphic depictions of the casualties in that war angered American officials. Al Jazeera did little to repair relations with the United States during the Iraq War that started in 2003. Suicide bombings directed at US troops were sometimes called “paradise operations” on Al Jazeera, and the war itself was called the War on Iraq instead of the War in Iraq.25 Additional controversies followed as the network covered violent events and saw its voice amplified by the lack of competition. No network in the world exceeded Al Jazeera’s coverage of the 2008 uprising in Gaza from ground level. The network had reporters and cameramen in Gaza, in the West Bank, in Israel, and in Egypt.26 The network had had a long relationship with Saddam Hussein and his regime, going back to 1997 when the Iraqi dictator had few friends in the world. Al Jazeera coupled favorable coverage of Hussein’s regime with vigorous condemnations of US-led air attacks on Iraq. The network also ran a number of documentaries on the plight of the Iraqi people under the international sanctions imposed on Iraq, raising many suspicions in the Arab world about the precise nature of the relationship between Al Jazeera and Hussein.27 These suspicions were only partially allayed by occasional interviews in which Iraqi officials were asked challenging questions. On one occasion, a senior Iraqi official was repeatedly challenged on his facts and credibility by anchor Jumana al-Namour, an attractive young woman who clearly intimidated her guest.28

Making Its Mark

Al Jazeera and the Arab Spring

By the time of the Arab Spring in 2011, Al Jazeera’s English station was broadcasting to 250 million households in 130 countries, an audience that rivaled those of the BBC and the American Cable News Network (CNN). Al Jazeera Arabic added seventy million households, mostly in the MENA region.29 When a Tunisian fruit vendor immolated himself in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, heralding the start of the region-wide political upheaval, Al Jazeera covered the story with great enthusiasm and with obvious sympathy for the demonstrators in Tunis and elsewhere. Future Tunisian president Rashid Ghannouchi, from the Islamist Ennahda party, had made numerous appearances on Al Jazeera, going back to 2000. The network experienced another

62

Isolating Qatar

breakthrough moment when it aired an interview with the vendor’s grieving mother at the site of her son’s suicide.30 When the revolution moved to Egypt, a strategically much more important country than Tunisia, Al Jazeera suspended its normal news and feature programs and began uninterrupted live coverage. This was the first time the network had devoted so much airtime to a single story since the 2003 Iraq War. The channel’s unparalleled coverage of the Arab Spring was made possible in part by the very efforts to censor the channel earlier. For years, state-run television stations had refused to share facilities or video with Al Jazeera, forcing it to develop the technology needed to instantly transfer and upload content from cell phone cameras or from YouTube.31 This ability rendered efforts by governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere to censor Al Jazeera almost meaningless. Al Jazeera rapidly became an unabashed cheerleader for the Egyptian revolution and for the Muslim Brotherhood–dominated government elected in 2012. Sponsoring the Muslim Brotherhood hurt the network’s credibility, however, especially after Egypt’s 2013 coup overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood. Al Jazeera’s reaction to the coup, which it called a “coup against legitimacy,” was so strong that its Cairo bureau chief was forcibly expelled from a news conference and became the subject of an arrest warrant on the charge of threatening public security by broadcasting inflammatory content.32 As the Arab Spring moved from North Africa to the Levant and the Gulf, however, Al Jazeera’s coverage drew considerably more criticism. The network took sides in the Syrian civil war, as it had in Egypt, and favored the same faction in that war to which the Qatari government was supplying arms and money. 33 Al Jazeera’s coverage took on a decidedly antigovernment slant after Qatar became the first Arab nation to suspend diplomatic relations with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad after a mob attacked the Qatari embassy to protest Al Jazeera’s “exaggerated and dishonest” reporting.34 Such favoritism tarnished the station’s carefully built reputation for evenhandedness. Some Middle Eastern leaders bitterly pointed out that, given the level of domestic tranquility in Qatar itself, based on the country’s enormous wealth, Qatar and Al Jazeera could stoke the fires of revolution elsewhere in the region without fear that those fires would erupt in Qatar. Yet, when the Arab Spring came to Bahrain, only a few dozen miles from Qatar, Al Jazeera became much more restrained in its coverage, devoting far less airtime to events in Manama than it had in Tunis, Cairo, Tripoli, and Damascus. An online search of Al Jazeera during the week of the Saudi-led intervention reveals only one article on the military action, on Al Jazeera English, and no mention on Al Jazeera’s Arabic channels.35 One observer said that Al Jazeera was “tongue-tied by the Saudi military inter-

Al Jazeera and Qatari Soft Power

63

vention.”36 Some of the criticism came from within. Al Jazeera’s Beirut bureau chief resigned in 2011, saying in his resignation letter, “The channel ended a dream of objectivity and professionalism after Al Jazeera stopped being a media source and became an operations room for incitement and mobilization.”37 Yet, for all this criticism, there was no evidence in the early 2010s that the network had lost a significant share of its audience.

The Impact of Al Jazeera

Al Jazeera’s support for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was perceived to have significantly affected the course of the Egyptian revolution. One Al Jazeera official said his “proudest moment” was when government sources told Al Jazeera reporters in Cairo that the presence of Al Jazeera in Tahrir Square prevented a massacre by camel-riding security forces.38 As such, it was not without cost. Long before the uprising in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi was a frequent guest on Al Jazeera. When Morsi was overthrown in 2013, Al Jazeera was affected also. Several of its journalists were put on trial in Egypt in December 2013. While the outcome was ambiguous, and Egypt’s new president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said he regretted the trial, it underlined both the impact of Al Jazeera and the dangers accompanying having such an impact. The Saudis took even greater exception to the Al Jazeera broadcasts, which one author called “one of Qatar’s most significant means of antagonizing Saudi Arabia.”39 The Kingdom was willing to take steps to retaliate, long before its 2017 demand that the channel be shut down. As early as the late 1990s, an official Saudi newspaper asserted, “The dangers posed by this channel [Al Jazeera] are far more serious than the dangers posed by Western satellite channels.”40 After September 11, 2001, when Al Jazeera aired the interview with Osama bin Laden, both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait made plain this was an unforgivable offense. The Saudi leadership did not confine their displeasure to the network itself or to the government of Qatar. They also threatened private firms that might be tempted to advertise on Al Jazeera. Since Saudi Arabia, with thirty-four million people, is the largest market in the Gulf region and its government is a major purchaser, its leaders are in a position to cause serious economic harm to a corporation that displeases them. In 1999, the Saudi government asked a large Saudi-based advertising firm not to place ads on the network. One author gave the hypothetical example of a German car dealership whose executives would have to wonder if advertising on Al Jazeera might jeopardize their chances of selling hundreds of vehicles to the Saudi police.41 Since the scaring away of potential advertisers made Al Jazeera all the more dependent on subsidies from the Qatari government, the Saudis could

64

Isolating Qatar

continue to link the two. Some evidence exists that the executives at Al Jazeera recognized a limit to the wisdom of provoking Saudi anger. In 2007, a Saudi court sentenced a woman who had been gang-raped to 200 lashes and six months in jail since she had been seen in public with a man who was not her husband. The victim was interviewed by American news channels, by the Associated Press, and by other news outlets, but the matter received no coverage on Al Jazeera’s Arabic station.42 Al Jazeera also caused friction for Qatar with other Gulf states. During a talk show aired in 1997, guests who had been discussing the Palestinian question started criticizing the Kuwaiti government for its continued endorsement of sanctions against Iraq. Soon after, the Kuwaiti information minister flew to Doha to submit an official complaint about the Al Jazeera program. The Qatari emir rebuffed him, saying that Al Jazeera was autonomous and he was not prepared to interfere with its editorial decisions. Two years later, a caller to another talk show criticized Kuwait and its emir at length, with no intervention by the host. In retaliation, Kuwait closed the Al Jazeera bureau and called the program an “unacceptable insult against the symbol of Kuwait.” Al Jazeera seemed to bend under pressure, suspending the program’s host, albeit insisting that this had nothing to do with the anti-Kuwait caller. Soon after, a new Kuwaiti information minister announced that the ban on Al Jazeera had been lifted.43 Among Al Jazeera’s more complex relationships was the one with Israel. Qatar had had a closer relationship with Israel than other Gulf states since at least 1993. Just after the peace accord between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization that year, Al Jazeera established a bureau in Jerusalem. Although the channel presented more pro-Israel views than any other media in the Arabic-speaking world, even hosting guests from the Israeli government, Al Jazeera managed to antagonize the Israelis as well. Representatives from Hamas appeared with some frequency, and these spokesmen invariably took the opportunity to make threats against Israel.44 Al Jazeera quickly gained a reputation for groundbreaking viewing options. The network broke one of the region’s most serious taboos by reporting directly from the Israeli Knesset. Arabic viewers got to see open debates in a democratic parliament, including sometimes harsh criticism of the Israeli government by opposition Knesset members, including Israeli Arabs. Al Jazeera executives brag almost continuously about their openness to Israeli guests, noting with pride that Al Jazeera is the only station on which Arabs can hear Israelis speaking Hebrew.45 On the other hand, one Israeli spokesman who has appeared a number of times on Al Jazeera insists that his appearances are more like interrogations than interviews. He added, “We’re never invited to long interview shows but always short interviews of three and a half minutes. They’re [Al Jazeera] unwilling to engage in real dialogue, but instead use Israelis as fig leaves.”46

Al Jazeera and Qatari Soft Power

65

Some months into the Rift, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu cracked down on the channel, removing its Jerusalem bureau chief from a seminar on freedom of speech. Netanyahu also ordered his press bureau to deny credentials to all Al Jazeera journalists working in Israel and to close their offices in Israel.47 The effort had little practical effect, however. Israeli law allows revocation of press passes only if the Israeli security services find a journalist to be a security risk, which those services refused to do in this case. In addition, Israelis who watch Al Jazeera do so through satellite dishes, over which the Israeli government has no control.48 The contretemps underlines both the strong feelings Al Jazeera generates and its ability to use technology to circumvent government opposition. On a deeper level, an extensive study of opinions and attitudes among Israeli Palestinians shows that pan-Arab stations, especially Al Jazeera, have weakened emotional ties between these Israeli citizens and the Israeli state and induced them to identify themselves more closely with “external ethnic, religious and political groups and transnational or regional identities and cultures.” The same study shows that Israeli Arabs rely far more heavily on Al Jazeera and other Arab satellite stations than on Israeli TV and find broadcasting from the Arab world to be “more highly respected, more appealing and more credible than Israeli broadcasts.”49 Al Jazeera’s broadcasts have had a significant impact on the United States. The appearances of bin Laden, the apparent sympathy for the resistance in Iraq, and the sponsorship of the Muslim Brotherhood have all caused consternation in Washington. Graphic images of dead Afghan children and the claim that they had been killed by American bombs further angered Washington. Secretary of State Colin Powell explicitly asked his Qatari counterpart to tone down the rhetoric during a meeting with the Qatari emir in October 2001. In his 2004 State of the Union address, George W. Bush alluded to Al Jazeera as a source of “hateful propaganda.”50 On two occasions, American bombs destroyed Al Jazeera facilities, first in Kabul in 2001 and then in Baghdad in 2003. The US military said the attacks were accidental.51 US President Donald Trump, for his part, said little about Al Jazeera while president but once told a campaign aide that he enjoyed watching the channel.52 US officials complain that the station’s anti-American guests often go unchallenged and are not balanced by pro-American voices. Al Jazeera officials, for their part, insist that the door is open to American officials who wish to appear. On one such appearance, however, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice was invited to discuss the war in Afghanistan but was peppered with questions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, her interview followed repeated promotions that highlighted her demands that Palestinians halt the violence within Israel, statements likely to upset Arab audiences. A veteran Egyptian TV anchor told the Associated

66

Isolating Qatar

Press, “America had already lost . . . before the whole interview was aired.”53 Al Jazeera would later intertwine the Palestinian issue with the war in Iraq, with the United States “playing the villain’s role in each.”54 Contrary to the assumptions of many American officials, Al Jazeera does not generate high levels of anti-American sentiment. In 2012, the Zogby polling firm found that young people in the Arabic-speaking world who have had access to satellite television, including Al Jazeera, are less anti-American than Arabs twenty years their senior. Among those who watch satellite TV, attitudes toward Americans are twenty-eight points higher than among those who do not in Egypt and eight points higher in Saudi Arabia.55 One of the best measures of success for any venture is the speed with which competitors appear and attempt to imitate its success. In the case of Al Jazeera, a number of would-be competitors appeared when the channel’s rise could no longer be ignored. As early as 2003, Qatar’s Gulf neighbors recognized the need for an alternative and created Al Arabiya, a satellite news broadcaster headquartered in Dubai. Al Arabiya is largely owned by Lebanon’s Hariri group and received seed money from Saudis and other Gulf state investors.56 If the goal of Al Arabiya was to replicate Al Jazeera’s reputation for evenhandedness, one extensive study showed that it failed to do so. Two media experts concluded that Al Jazeera was less opinion driven in its coverage of terrorist attacks than Al Arabiya. The same authors also noted that Al Jazeera made more extensive use of academic experts and eyewitnesses, with Al Arabiya depending more on official sources of information. Al Jazeera also provided more extensive coverage of parts of the world outside the MENA region.57 The American government, which had been harshly critical of Al Jazeera during the Bush administration, nevertheless strove to supplant Al Jazeera by creating its own Arabic-language competitor. Al Hurra went on the air in 2004, promising to provide a more objective and dispassionate view of events in the MENA region. Independently of this decision, Al Jazeera itself tried to enter the American news market. In 2013, the station purchased the remnants of former vice president Al Gore’s Current TV system, which had failed. The experiment lasted only three years. In 2016, after Al Jazeera America failed to gain the visibility, audience share, or agenda-setting influence its managers hoped for, the network announced its demise.58 The move came around the same time that Al Jazeera experienced a drop in government support and a downsizing of its workforce. While the American experiment failed, Al Jazeera English, launched in 2006, has been more successful. Multiple analysts have noted an enormous difference in the tone, story selection, and coverage when comparing Al Jazeera English with the parent Arabic channel.59 One analyst said that the English channel “is not even a remote likeness of its Arabic-speaking pro-

Al Jazeera and Qatari Soft Power

67

genitor.”60 For example, the Arabic station once presented, unchallenged, a report that Jewish New Yorkers had been tipped off not to report to work at the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, commentators repeatedly blamed Jews for the attack. None of these provocative reports were repeated on Al Jazeera English.61 A more recent study showed a close connection between the promotion of Qatar’s foreign policy interests and Al Jazeera’s Arabic coverage of events in Saudi Arabia but no correlation between the two on Al Jazeera English.62

Al Jazeera and Qatar

Al Jazeera’s role in the 2017 Rift comes from the unshakable perception on the part of the Saudis, Emiratis, Bahrainis, and Egyptians that the channel is, for all intents and purposes, an arm of the Qatari government and that protestations to the contrary are simply false. With the extensive and broad coverage that Al Jazeera provides, the question of its connection to Qatari leaders affects almost every country in the MENA region and many countries outside it. The extensiveness of that coverage also makes sifting evidence nearly impossible. With hundreds of thousands of reports, discussions, debates, and commentary, on multiple channels, it is all too easy to find not just single examples but dozens of examples of either the station’s independence of or its subservience to the Qatari government. Critics of the station can point to a 2005 incident when Lynne Cheney, wife of the US vice president, complained about an Al Jazeera editorial. The Qatari prime minister saw that the essay was removed from Al Jazeera’s website.63 Defenders can point to a November 1997 editorial that criticized Israeli participation in an Economic Summit Conference held in Doha, an implicit criticism of Qatari government policy.64 Such specific examples, however, do not add up to a solid case one way or the other. Al Jazeera undeniably gets the lion’s share of its operating budget from Qatar and would have to cease operations if that funding were to stop. Al Jazeera began with a $140 million pledge from Hamad in 1996, which was supposed to cover costs for five years, at the end of which it was to become self-sufficient, funded by advertising dollars. To this day, Al Jazeera has never been without a government subsidy, which has averaged $100 million per year.65 Station officials insist that funding is the “only” connection between the channel and the government and reject any notion that the government even tries to affect its editorial content.66 It is also true, however, that despite the hundreds of official protests that the Qatari government has received over Al Jazeera’s reports, that funding has never been cut off. Also, two emirs of Qatar, Hamad and Tamim, have consistently defended the station’s autonomy and denied any responsibility for what appears on it.67

68

Isolating Qatar

For example, critics of Al Jazeera note that it rarely broadcasts news of any kind from Qatar itself. Al Jazeera’s defenders respond that, as a relatively tranquil state with a small governing elite that is remarkably united, Qatar has few “newsworthy” events to report.68 Indeed, an official television station in Qatar would most likely repeat the anodyne, human-interest sort of news that bored Arabic audiences for years and made Al Jazeera possible in the first place. Still, one analyst noted that the station has never reported that satellite dishes are illegal in Qatar.69 According to international human rights watchdog Freedom House, “While Qatar’s flagship satellite television channel, Al Jazeera, is permitted to air critical reports on foreign countries and leaders, journalists are subject to prosecution for criticizing the Qatari government, the ruling family, or Islam.”70 The station’s coverage of Doha’s Villaggio shopping mall fire in May 2012 is an example of reticence when it comes to bad news from Qatar. Nineteen people were killed, including thirteen small children at a daycare center. The disaster received wide coverage outside Qatar, but Al Jazeera’s coverage “remained slow and uninformative. [Al Jazeera] finally dispatched a reporter to the scene in the evening as the scale of the disaster became tragically apparent.”71 One Qatari dissident concluded, “The network and Al-Jazeera.net calls itself a voice for the voiceless, but only with the notable exception of Qataris who want to speak their minds on issues affecting their country.”72 During the Arab Spring, dissidents from countries undergoing revolutionary ferment received a warm welcome at Al Jazeera. Here again, a connection between Qatari government interests and Al Jazeera broadcasting is much easier to assume than to prove. Al Jazeera reporters and producers, finding officials from the governments of Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere reluctant to appear on television or speak on the record, naturally interviewed the Egyptians, Syrians, Yemenis, and others who were willing to appear. These interviewees were, not surprisingly, sympathetic to the demonstrators. Critics make much of cables from the US Embassy in Qatar, revealed on Wikileaks, that purport to show Al Jazeera yielding to US pressure to tone down the implicit anti-Americanism in its news and commentary. Some of these cables also show US officials confirming that the Qatari government does indeed influence Al Jazeera’s editorial content.73 One cable, from the US ambassador, read in part, “Despite GOQ [Government of Qatar] protestations to the contrary, al-Jazeera [sic] remains one of Qatar’s most valuable political and diplomatic tools.”74 A close reading of the leaked cables, however, shows only that US officials were making the same assumption about Al Jazeera as the leaders of the Rift nations—that it is a secret arm of the Qatari government. The cables do not include hard evidence of a connection.

Al Jazeera and Qatari Soft Power

69

Pressed on this alleged connection and asked how often he received phone calls from the royal family, Al Jazeera’s managing director in 2011 said emphatically, “Never.” He added, “We are not a mouthpiece [for Qatar]; we are not a tool of public diplomacy.” The managing director also rejected the charge that Al Jazeera ignored the Bahraini uprising, insisting Al Jazeera had done “50-plus” stories on Bahrain, including an extensive documentary in May 2011 that included footage of the violent suppression of Bahrainis by Bahraini and Saudi forces.75 This was, of course, weeks after the rebellion in Bahrain had been put down and ceased to be a danger. More recently, an analysis of Al Jazeera Arabic showed a decided increase in negative stories about Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the Rift.76 Questions about the station’s independence grew more urgent with the resignation of Director General Wadah Khanfar in September 2011 and his replacement by Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim bin Mohammed Al Thani, a member of the Qatari royal family. Khanfar failed to give a specific reason for his departure after eight years with Al Jazeera, saying only that he had been discussing it with management for some time.77 Documents from Wikileaks that noted a meeting between Khanfar and US officials led to theories that he left the station after being exposed as a CIA asset.78 Observers had noted a decided change in Al Jazeera’s editorial tone when Khanfar took over Al Jazeera, in the direction of greater support for Islamist movements. This shift resulted in the resignation of Al Jazeera Arabic’s Washington bureau chief.79 Ahmed bin Jassim, for his part, remained at Al Jazeera for two years, departing after Tamim came to power in 2013 to become minister of economy and trade. Possibly the most damning, and the most accurate, assessment of the Al Jazeera–Qatari connection comes from an Al Jazeera senior correspondent, who told the Evening Standard (London) in 2017, “We’re only 85 percent independent. The other 15 percent of the time we are helping to gently make the case for Qatar’s view of the region and the wider world.” An editor for Al Jazeera added, “My job is to make sure we are independent enough to be credible journalistically while also pleasing our paymasters.”80 Media analysts agree that the convergence between Al Jazeera’s content and the desires of the Qatari government is closest when “crucial” Qatari interests are involved.81 Definitive proof that Al Jazeera takes orders from the Qatari government would require a written directive from the former with an explicit threat and an equally explicit set of directions for Al Jazeera’s news and commentary. It is probable that no such document exists. Such heavyhanded intervention would be more likely to come in verbal form, especially given the physical proximity of Al Jazeera’s headquarters to Qatari government offices. In effect, critics of Al Jazeera are left with trying to prove a counterfactual: that Al Jazeera broadcasts the content that it does

70

Isolating Qatar

because of government intervention and would not have covered stories the same way without it. However, as with many foreign policy decisions, including consequential decisions like those leading to the Rift, perception is at least as important as fact. For the Rift nations’ leaders, the connection between Al Jazeera and Qatar is clear enough.

Al Jazeera Covers the Rift

A search of Al Jazeera news stories from the week of the Rift reveals strong defenses of Qatar and its foreign policy independence. One commentary insisted, “Qatar’s original sin was in attempting to forge a path independent of Saudi’s traditional hegemony in the region.” The commentator, an associate professor of media and cultural studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, noted Qatar’s increased visibility and success as a mediator, supplanting the Saudis, and concluded that the Rift “appears to be more about crushing the last vestiges of hope for any independent political thought in the Middle East.”82 The station could not help but note that attacks on Al Jazeera were an important part of the Rift nations’ complaints. A few days into the crisis, the Saudi Commission for Tourism and National Heritage ordered all “tourist facilities” to remove channels from their satellite feeds that included “religious, political or moral violations, including Al-Jazeera Media Network.” The order read in part, “All tourist facilities must commit to choosing the appropriate TV channels in line with the official Saudi TV channels . . . and not to operate channels deviant to the Islamic religion or the state’s policies or morals.”83 Al Jazeera’s office in the Saudi capital was closed. The Saudi action earned the Kingdom a rebuke from Reporters Without Borders. Jordan imitated the Saudi action, revoking the channel’s license to operate in the country. Soon after, Al Jazeera itself said its media platforms had experienced a sustained cyberattack.84 Al Jazeera also provided reports on the stiff penalties Rift nations were imposing on their own citizens for showing sympathy for Qatar. Bahrain’s Information Affairs Ministry announced four days into the crisis that the country’s media outlets could not “publish or circulate anything that condones or justifies Qatari policies by any means.” Those who did so, the ministry said, would “be held responsible.” The channel also quoted a Gulf News report of a statement by the attorney general of the UAE: “Strict and firm action will be taken against anyone who shows sympathy or any form of bias towards Qatar, or against anyone who objects to the position of the United Arab Emirates, whether it be through the means of social media, or any type of written, visual or verbal form.”85 The Qatari government, for its part, urged its citizens, in statements duly reported by Al Jazeera, not to respond to the attacks in kind. Qatar

Al Jazeera and Qatari Soft Power

71

issued a decree stating, “Based on the principles of our true Islamic religion, our humanitarian values, and our authentic Qatari culture, we call on all those who live on this good land to rise and continue to avoid responding similarly to the abuses that spread in various means of mass communication. We also call upon you to show more responsibility, for which you are well known, and not to insult countries, their leaders or peoples.” Al Jazeera emphasized the positive in its reports about the Rift, noting that ninety-four diplomatic missions were still open and operating in Qatar. It added that thirty-four countries maintained their diplomatic representation with Qatar through a regional embassy. Positive spin was also the rule concerning the financial impact of the Rift. While noting the sharp drop in the Qatari stock exchange on the morning the Rift occurred, Al Jazeera’s reports included multiple reassurances that the drop was temporary and that much of it was recouped in a matter of days. Al Jazeera did not mention the multi-billion-dollar intervention by the Qatari government to shore up the market. It did broadcast a report minimizing other reports of bank runs, quoting “bank managers” who insisted nothing was out of the ordinary.86 The channel also downplayed a report that the Qatari military had been put on high alert along the southern border, fearing an invasion from Saudi Arabia. The Ministry of Defense communicated directly with Al Jazeera, sending a statement that was not entirely comforting: “The Ministry of Defense is always on alert to protect the borders of the state of Qatar.”87

Conclusion

The station’s support for the Arab Spring uprisings, especially its wholehearted support for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, its relative silence on Bahrain’s uprising, its welcoming of Islamist commentators, and the underpinning it gives to Qatar’s fiercely independent foreign policy, may or may not be the result of intervention by the Qatari ruling family. But Al Jazeera’s programs are, as the former US ambassador said, valuable political and diplomatic tools. With few exceptions, the tone and content of Al Jazeera do coincide with Qatari foreign policy aims. Undeniably, the Qatari government could shut down the station if it wanted to. Indeed, there is a glaring inconsistency in this regard in the demands of the Rift nations concerning Al Jazeera. While complaining that the station is the subject of more or less constant interference from the Qatari government, the Rift nations demanded that the Qatari government intervene forcefully and immediately with Al Jazeera to produce news acceptable to the Rift nations. If Al Jazeera is a tool of Qatari foreign policy, either it is a remarkably ineffective one, or it is evidence of a remarkably sophisticated Qatari foreign policy. It can be perceived as ineffective in that, long before the Rift,

72

Isolating Qatar

the channel’s broadcasts repeatedly caused diplomatic friction and complications for Qatar that would not have existed otherwise. Conversely, if Qatari authorities tolerate the friction and complications Al Jazeera brings as an acceptable price for the more incremental and long-term influence Qatar receives through Al Jazeera’s presence, with accompanying benefits for Qatar’s global image and status, then Qatar’s foreign policy is unusually far-sighted and multifaceted. The irony of the Rift nations’ obsession with Al Jazeera is that it comes at a time when Al Jazeera is becoming the victim of its own accomplishments. Its spectacular rise showed rival stations how to imitate its success. The formula, while radically new for the MENA region when Al Jazeera went on the air, is not complicated: present news without obvious propaganda intent, respond to audience demands and expectations rather than trying to dictate them, and include entertainment, sports, and children’s programming. It was just a matter of time before competitors appeared. Moreover, the very political liberalization that Al Jazeera sponsored in the Arab world has led to the emergence of free media in democratizing countries. As information became more available, censorship more difficult, and dissident voices more frequent, Al Jazeera could not avoid becoming less distinct. Al Jazeera also faces competition from the internet, especially among young people who, for the most part, get none of their news from television or radio. At the same time, the fall of the Morsi government in Egypt, which had a strong Muslim Brotherhood presence and had received such unvarnished backing from Al Jazeera, led to a decline in the station’s credibility. It is difficult for Al Jazeera to so visibly take sides and at the same time insist on its evenhandedness and neutrality.88 As the initial euphoria of the Arab Spring disappeared under the weight of tragedy in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, the station widely perceived to be a sponsor of the Arab Spring was bound to suffer—from audience fatigue if from nothing else. While facing these challenges, Al Jazeera also faced the prospect of declining financial support from Qatar as the latter coped with falling international prices for oil and natural gas. Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr, which focused on Egypt, was discontinued in 2014, both as a cost-cutting move and as part of the settlement ending that year’s diplomatic crisis. In 2016, the channel engaged in a wider reduction in operations and significant reductions in staff. Its managing director noted that the network was looking to “evolve its business model as it may not be able to continue to be heavily backed by its sponsor.”89 If Al Jazeera is not as important as it used to be, or even as important as its officials think it is, it would seem to follow that it should decline in importance to Qatar’s opponents in the Rift crisis. That its closure was a major demand of the Rift nations is a clear indicator that Saudi Arabia and others fear the continued influence of Al Jazeera, even in decline.

Al Jazeera and Qatari Soft Power

Notes

73

1. Roberts, Qatar, 93. 2. Philp, “Al Jazeera.” 3. Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes, 45. 4. el-Nawany and Iskandar, Al-Jazeera, 38. 5. Ibid., 39. 6. Wright, “Foreign Policies with International Reach,” 305. 7. Zayani, “Al Jazeera’s Complex Legacy,” 3555. 8. Roberts, Qatar, 94. 9. Wright, “Foreign Policies with International Reach,” 307. See also Feiler and Zeev, Qatar, 2017. 10. Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes, 50. 11. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 61–62. 12. el-Nawany and Iskandar, Al-Jazeera, 29. 13. Ibid., 33. 14. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 49, 62. 15. Ibid., 46–47. 16. el-Nawany and Iskandar, Al-Jazeera, 122. 17. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 41–42. 18. el-Nawany and Iskandar, Al-Jazeera, 129–130. 19. Lynch, Voice of the Arab Republic, 127. 20. Kessler, “The Two Faces of Al-Jazeera,” 54. 21. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 42–44. 22. Ibid., 48. 23. el-Nawany and Iskandar, Al-Jazeera, 114, 125. 24. Ibid., 175–179. 25. Kessler, “The Two Faces of Al-Jazeera,” 48. 26. Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes, 51. 27. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 48. See also Lynch, Voice of the Arab Republic, 134. 28. Lynch, Voice of the Arab Republic, 134–135. 29. Hassan, “Voice of the Arab Spring.” 30. Roberts, Qatar, 125, 131. 31. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 59. 32. Shane, “The Rise and Fall of Al Jazeera.” 33. Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes, 53. 34. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 131. 35. Search conducted by the author, November 2020. The single story that did run led with “Hundreds of Saudi troops have entered Bahrain to help protect government facilities there amid escalating protests against the government.” See “Saudi Soldiers Sent into Bahrain,” Al Jazeera English, March 14, 2011. 36. Stung by the criticism, Al Jazeera eventually aired a documentary on the Bahraini uprising on Al Jazeera English. See Kamrava, Qatar, 76–77. 37. Kessler, “The Two Faces of Al-Jazeera,” 55. 38. Hassan, “Voice of the Arab Spring.” 39. Roberts, Qatar, 99. 40. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 50. 41. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 64. 42. Samuel-Azran and Pecht, “Is There an Al-Jazeera-Qatari Nexus?” 228. 43. el-Nawany and Iskandar, Al-Jazeera, 119–120. 44. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 47. 45. Interviews by the author with Al Jazeera officials at the station’s headquarters in Doha, November 2018.

74

Isolating Qatar

46. Kessler, “The Two Faces of Al-Jazeera,” 51. 47. “Netanyahu Bars Al Jazeera’s Israel Chief from Government Press Seminar on Freedom of Speech,” Haaretz, September 7, 2017. 48. “Banning Al Jazeera in Israel Won’t Be So Easy. Here’s Why,” Haaretz, August 6, 2017. 49. Rinnawi, “Al-Jazeera Invades Israel,” 245–257. 50. Kessler, “The Two Faces of Al-Jazeera,” 48. 51. Philp, “Gulf Vows to Isolate Qatar for Years.” 52. Parker, “In a Reality Star’s Presidency.” 53. el-Nawany and Iskandar, Al-Jazeera, 185. 54. Lynch, Voice of the Arab Republic, 128. 55. Zogby, Arab Voices, 49. 56. Wright, “Foreign Policies with International Reach,” 306. 57. Li and Tahat, “Picturing Terrorism Through Arabic Lenses,” 433–448. 58. Zayani, “Al Jazeera’s Complex Legacy,” 3566. 59. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 49. 60. Kessler, “The Two Faces of Al-Jazeera,” 47. 61. Ibid., 54. 62. Samuel-Azran and Pecht, “Is There an Al-Jazeera-Qatari Nexus?” 228. 63. el-Nawany and Iskandar, p. 175. 64. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 60. 65. el-Nawany and Iskandar, Al-Jazeera, 33. 66. Interviews with Al Jazeera officials by the author in Doha, November 2018. 67. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 55. 68. Wright, “Foreign Policies with International Reach,” 306. 69. Miles, Al-Jazeera, 60. 70. Feiler and Zeev, Qatar, 27. 71. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 55. 72. Quoted in ibid., 161. 73. Zayani, “Al Jazeera’s Complex Legacy,” 3561. 74. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 50. 75. Hassan, “Voice of the Arab Spring.” 76. Samuel-Azran and Pecht, “Is There an Al-Jazeera-Qatari Nexus?” 218. 77. Hall, “Head of Al Jazeera TV Steps Down.” 78. Black, “Surprise Resignation of Al Jazeera Chief.” 79. Kessler, “The Two Faces of Al-Jazeera,” 52. 80. Aldridge, “Is This the End of Al Jazeera?” 81. Samuel-Azran and Pecht, “Is There an Al-Jazeera-Qatari Nexus?” 229. 82. “Analysis,” Al Jazeera English, June 7, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com /features/2017/6/7/analysis-qatar-gulf-crisis-who-are-the-terrorists. 83. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 84. “Qatar-Gulf Rift: Key Moments of the Ongoing Crisis,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 85. “UAE: Social Media Users Face Jail for Qatar Sympathy,” Al Jazeera, June 7, 2017, www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/07/uae-social-media-users-face-jail-for -qatar-sympathy. 86. “Economic Impact of Gulf Diplomatic Rift,” Al Jazeera, June 5, 2017, www.aljazeera.com/economy/2017/6/5/economic-impact-of-gulf-diplomatic-rift. 87. “The Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 88. Shane, “The Rise and Fall of Al Jazeera.” 89. Zayani, “Al Jazeera’s Complex Legacy,” 3563.

5

The Boycott Begins

This problem requires a diplomatic solution, but the decision to reach a diplomatic solution is on Qatar, it’s not on us. We are O.K. with the status quo if Qatar declines to accept the demands. —Yousef Al Otaiba, UAE Ambassador to the United States1

This list of demands confirms what Qatar has said from the beginning— the illegal blockade has nothing to do with combating terrorism, it is about limiting Qatar’s sovereignty, and outsourcing our foreign policy. Sheikh Saif bin Ahmed Al Thani, Director of Qatar Communications Office2

A sea change came to the politics of Qatar on June 5, 2017, while most of the nation slept. Bahrain made the announcement first, followed closely by the government-run Saudi Press Agency. At 5:50 a.m., on the tenth day of Ramadan, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia said they were cutting all diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar. At 6:20 a.m., the United Arab Emirates made a similar announcement. Besides recalling their ambassadors, the Gulf nations closed their airspace to Qatari planes and their ports to ships coming from or headed to Qatar. In addition, Saudi Arabia closed its land border with Qatar. Egypt followed suit, with some modifications, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) entered its worst crisis ever. Qatari emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who had taken the throne only four years earlier, faced his greatest challenge. The crisis resulted from some of the most ill-considered, off-the-cuff, and impromptu decisions by prominent and powerful political leaders in the early twenty-first century. Facile and unsupported conclusions about the

75

76

Isolating Qatar

policies of the relatively new Donald Trump administration in the United States, coupled with a nonexistent, or at least unheeded, decisionmaking process in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, plunged the Gulf region into crisis at a time when solidarity in the face of an emboldened Islamic Republic of Iran should have brought greater unity. Instead, the very existence of the GCC was called into question, and it was still in question years later. In this chapter, I will present evidence that the severing of relations in June 2017 was an impulsive decision devoid of the sort of forethought and planning that ought to precede major foreign policy initiatives. Minimally, the decision to isolate Qatar resulted from major failures on the part of the Saudi and Emirati intelligence services. Two leaders, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) in Saudi Arabia3 and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) in the UAE, ignited a crisis they had no idea how to manage, exploit, or end. The dramatic action followed a May 24 post on an official Qatari news site in which Tamim praised Iran and called Hamas a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, characterizations that enraged Qatar’s neighbors. (Qatar later said the website was hacked.) The four Rift nations cited their concern over Qatar’s alleged support for terrorism and purported meddling in the internal affairs of other GCC nations. Saudi Arabia expelled Qatari troops from the coalition fighting Iran-backed rebels in Yemen. At the same time, Saudi Arabia accused Qatar of assisting Yemen’s Houthi rebels, the very group that Qatari troops had been fighting. Bahrain, for its part, accused Qatar of financing “groups associated with Iran to subvert and spread chaos in Bahrain.”4 The Qatari government, for its part, responded instantly and forcefully to the Rift. The Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying there was “no legitimate justification” for the Rift nations’ actions and that their decisions were a “violation of [Qatari] sovereignty.” The statement went on to say the measures taken by the Rift nations were “unjustified and based on baseless and unfounded allegations.”5 Less than a week into the crisis, the Qatari foreign minister called the Rift nations’ actions “clear violations of international law and international humanitarian law.”6 The ministry added that the government would take steps to ensure that the Rift did not affect the citizens and residents of Qatar. In a letter to United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, Qatar’s UN ambassador said her country had been “a target of campaigns of fabricated accusations” and a “hidden agenda to cause [it] harm.”7 In the early hours and days of the crisis, it was not clear just what the Rift nations wanted from the Qatari government. Saudi and Emirati officials denied that they were aiming for regime change in Qatar but added that they were demanding “personnel changes” and changes in behavior.8 Still, the sanctions grew more severe. Qatari nationals in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE were given fourteen days to return home, the same amount of time allotted to nationals from the Rift nations living in Qatar

The Boycott Begins

77

to leave. The accusations leveled at Qatar also escalated, including the claim in a Saudi government newspaper that Qatar’s Interior Ministry had provided shelter for Osama bin Laden after the September 11 attacks in the United States. Even the additional attacks on Qatar had an improvised quality, given the seriousness of the crisis.

A History of Assertive Independence

Through much of its history, Qatar’s vulnerable position between two much larger powers locked in an ongoing power struggle between themselves has dictated its foreign policy. As Saudi Arabia emerged as Iran’s most determined enemy, the Kingdom’s leadership became more insistent that the smaller Gulf nations, including Qatar, follow its foreign policy lead. As shown in Chapter 2, Qatar has a long history of fending off encroachments by the Saudis. From the 1990s onward, it has sought to emerge from the Saudi shadow by pursuing a more independent foreign policy. The Saudi leadership has been particularly frustrated by Qatar’s lack of enthusiasm for Saudi efforts to transform the GCC into a Gulf Union by tightening economic, political, diplomatic, and military coordination among its members, to better oppose potential Iranian aggression. For many observers, Qatar’s determination to act independently was the real cause of the 2017 Rift.9 Qatari officials, especially after the rise of Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani in 1995, have argued that they have little choice but to pursue a balanced foreign policy that seeks relationships with the country’s neighbors and constantly rethinks and adjusts its international relations. Thus, Qatar is host to a huge US military base and also maintains relatively close ties with Iran. It condemns terrorism and, as shall be shown later, has taken significant steps to clamp down on terrorist financing, while it provides support for movements that have been accused of terrorist acts. Qatar maintains contact with Israel, even while supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, whose leaders speak in exceptionally harsh terms about the Jewish republic. For the Saudis, what the Qataris call “balance” looks more like betrayal. Minimally, it appears to be an invitation for Saudi Arabia’s enemies, mostly Iran, to exploit apparent splits in the GCC. In its statement announcing the Rift, Saudi state media claimed Qatar had “spread the behaviors and plots of groups via its media on a constant basis, and supported the activities of terrorist groups backed by Iran in the Saudi province of Qatif and in Bahrain, and has funded, adopted and sheltered extremists who seek to shake the stability and unity of the nation at home and abroad and to use media outlets seeking to spread internal sedition at home.”10 As noted in Chapter 3, Egypt had its own ongoing quarrels with Qatar. Al Jazeera had been a major booster of the Egyptian revolution during the

78

Isolating Qatar

Arab Spring. Relations between Egypt and Qatar improved when a Muslim Brotherhood–dominated government was elected in 2012 but soured even more after the 2013 coup in Egypt that ousted the elected government. The new leader, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, began an intense campaign to cleanse Egypt of Brotherhood influence, an effort partly frustrated by Qatar’s willingness to provide sanctuary to Brotherhood leaders and sympathizers. Similarly, the UAE found multiple reasons for irritation with Qatar. Mohammed bin Zayed is also staunchly opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood and has advocated a forceful and coordinated offensive against Islamists in the Gulf region. Again, the UAE leaders treat Qatari aloofness toward the project with annoyance and suspicion. The Emirati government also opposes Qatar’s relatively friendly relations with Iran, although Qatari officials point out that Dubai engages in far more extensive trade with Iran than does Qatar. Such reminders cannot but poison relations.11 As tensions mounted in early June, Qatar said it had expelled senior members of the Palestinian group Hamas, marked as a terrorist organization by the Rift nations and the United States, and also repatriated a dissident wanted in Saudi Arabia. In the days just before the Rift, Qatar announced the expulsion of several members of Hamas’s military wing.12 These conciliatory moves were soon overshadowed, however, by a larger story. All of the Rift nations condemned Qatar for reportedly paying close to $1 billion in ransom for a hunting party of Qataris, including members of the royal family, captured in Iraq by one of the militias roaming the country. One report claimed that $700 million of the ransom had gone to militias backed by Iran and the other $300 million to al-Qaeda-linked groups. The Qatari emir insisted that no funds went to militias and that the payments were part of a coordinated effort with the Iraqi government to free the captives.13

Immediate Effects of the Rift Exports of Natural Gas

Since Qatar’s economy, despite recent efforts at diversification, is almost wholly dependent on sales of liquid natural gas (LNG), the Rift nations probably foresaw the greatest impact of their boycott happening there. The global impact could also have been significant, since Qatar exports about one-third of the total global supply of LNG, with major consumers in East Asia (especially Japan) and Europe.14 In the short term, this impact seemed significant. Other LNG tankers, originally headed for Qatar, changed course and headed for Dubai. Norsk Hydro, a Norwegian company in a joint aluminum-production venture with Qatar, said it was “re-evaluating its export channels” after the UAE prevented Qatari cargo ships from dock-

The Boycott Begins

79

ing.15 Since most of Qatar’s ports could not accommodate large vessels, a ban on the use of Emirati ports for transshipment looked ominous. But while shipments to Qatar were disrupted, actual exports of LNG were barely affected at all. Qatari officials averred that not a single LNG sales contract was broken after the Rift.16 Pakistan’s government announced almost immediately that it would continue to import Qatari LNG, having just signed a fifteen-year contract to do so the year before. ExxonMobil said its production and export of LNG from Qatar was not affected by the Rift.17 Initial confusion over just what vessels were being banned from UAE ports blunted the desired impact on LNG trade. Less than a week into the Rift, the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Ports Authority eased some restrictions on ships going to and from Qatar. It was not clear if all vessels touching in Qatar were banned or only Qatari vessels.18 That such a basic distinction was not delineated indicates a lack of adequate preparation on the part of the Rift nations. Qatar’s neighbors are almost all gas poor and rely on imports for their domestic energy needs. Qatar is a major natural gas supplier for the UAE via the Dolphin pipeline. Supplies to the UAE were not affected. Similarly, Bahrain is also nearly bereft of natural gas and had much to gain from a reliable supply of the resource from a close neighbor.19 There is evidence that Qatar might have done more to prepare for the Rift than the nations that imposed it, since Qatar lifted its moratorium on drilling for natural gas in the North Field, which it shares with Iran, only weeks before the Rift occurred. Qatar supplies a huge amount of LNG to Europe, a fact that should have given MBS and MBZ some pause. Qatar supplies Great Britain with half of its LNG needs (down from over 90 percent before the Rift), while France, Belgium, Italy, and Poland also buy significant amounts of Qatari gas.20 Qatar’s European LNG customers had initial concerns over their supplies since most of Qatar’s LNG destined for Europe transits the Suez Canal. With Egypt one of the Rift nations, there was a danger the canal would be closed to Qatari vessels. In the event, however, Egypt made it very clear that the canal would remain open to everyone, including Qatar. Looking ahead, the Rift nations might have done Qatar a favor by inducing the Qatari government to proceed full speed with efforts to diversify and open up the economy. Australia, the United States, and Russia are all increasing their exports of LNG. Australia has been particularly aggressive in crowding out Qatari sales to Japan, South Korea, and China. A British lobby group representing shale gas interests responded to the Rift by asserting “the UK needs to get on with developing the extensive gas resource beneath our feet.”21 In the short term, the Rift nations evidently did not anticipate, as they should have, that Qatar’s LNG customers would become Qatar’s diplomatic supporters.

80

Isolating Qatar

Impact on Air Travel

Closing their airspace to planes coming from or headed to Qatar was among the first actions taken by the Rift nations. Etihad Airways, a carrier owned by the government of Abu Dhabi, went further by announcing that all travelers holding Qatari passports were prohibited from traveling to or even transiting through the UAE, regardless of what airline they used. The UAE’s Al Arabiya television network went so far as to post a video animation of a Qatar Airways plane being intercepted and shot down by a fighter jet.22 The closure of such established air routes soon had ripple effects. Royal Air Maroc announced that it had to suspend flights via Doha to and from the UAE, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt due to the cancellation of flights from Qatar. For the most part, longer routes, such as flights to and from Europe and North America, were not canceled but did take considerably longer, since Qatari planes had to detour around forbidden airspace. For business travelers in particular, the difference between a six-hour flight and a nine-hour flight can make the latter prohibitive. Costs for such flights also increased due to the increased use of fuel.23 The impact of canceling regional flights was severe. Qatar Airways had made a substantial portion of its earnings shuttling passengers among neighboring Gulf nations. “As a hub carrier with a small domestic market, feed traffic is their bread and butter,” according to one airline consultant.24 Closing airspace to Qatari planes, however, was not without cost to the Rift nations. International travelers and shippers of air cargo could not help but frown on political disputes being used as a basis for air traffic policy. The Gulf region was a major transport hub for both passengers and freight largely because of its reputation for stability. The Qatari National Committee for Human Rights issued a statement condemning the restrictions: “Such decisions violate the private ownership rights since thousands in the GCC own residences, factories, and businesses within the GCC and the travel ban will prevent them from attending to their businesses.”25 Other international authorities condemned the Rift nations’ action almost immediately. The International Air Transport Association called for an end to the airspace boycott, with Director General Alexandre de Juniac adding, “Of course we accept that countries have the right to close their borders, but connectivity to Qatar must be restored as quickly as possible.”26 Modifications in the boycott followed. The UAE announced on June 14 that the air embargo applied to “all Qatari aviation companies and aircraft registered in the state of Qatar” but not to companies and aircraft from other countries wishing to use UAE airspace to travel to or from Qatar. Also, charter and private flights were allowed with prior permission. Less than two weeks into the Rift, it was Qatar’s enemies who had to make adjustments, another indication of poor preparation.

The Boycott Begins

81

The Qatari Stock Exchange

The Rift had the largest and most visible impact on the value of shares on the Doha stock exchange. Here, however, the impact was most short-lived. On the morning of June 5, Qatar’s stock exchange dropped by a seemingly catastrophic 9.7 percent. Real estate, transportation, and consumer goods were the biggest losers. More losses seemed imminent amid rumors that Saudi Arabia would exert pressure on multinational corporations to avoid doing business in Qatar. The continuing uncertainty frightened some business partners, with several London-based law firms shutting down their operations in Qatar. “Law firms shy away from even mild controversy,” said one London attorney. Clifford Chance LLP, a major London firm, pulled out, announcing, “It is clear there is no longer the same need for a presence on the ground in Doha.” Herbert Smith Freehills, another major player, followed suit.27 But the rebound on the stock exchange was almost immediate, with stocks having made up much of the deficit within a week. This quick recovery was largely due to Qatari government intervention, discussed in the next chapter. Moreover, the crisis had the effect of accelerating an already rapid move toward small-business investment and entrepreneurship in the country. Aysha Al Mudahka, CEO of the Qatar Business Incubation Center, acknowledged the negative impact of the Rift on stock prices but added that it served to separate strong businesses from weak ones, to identify local talent worthy of the center’s support, and to promote local entrepreneurial skills.28

Attacking Al Jazeera

As noted in the previous chapter, the freewheeling, uncensored, and often provocative reporting on Al Jazeera had been a bone of contention between Qatar and others in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region for decades. This history, and the skepticism on the part of Qatar’s neighbors that Al Jazeera was something other than a mouthpiece for the Qatari government, made demands involving Al Jazeera an inevitable part of the 2017 crisis. Days after the June 5 announcement, Al Jazeera’s websites were blocked in all four Rift nations, and the network said it had been the victim of a sustained cyberattack.29 As part of the actions launching the crisis, Al Jazeera bureaus were closed, their staffs expelled, and their licenses revoked. Bahrain and the UAE further took steps to muzzle their own media, including social media. The UAE attorney general announced, “Strict and firm action will be taken against anyone who shows sympathy or any form of bias towards Qatar, or against anyone who objects to the position of the United Arab Emirates,

82

Isolating Qatar

whether it be through the means of social media, or any type of written, visual, or verbal form.”30 Jail terms of up to fifteen years were threatened. The network responded to the crackdown with a highly self-congratulatory open letter linking the fate of Al Jazeera with that of free and independent journalism. A post on the network’s website read in part, “We remain resolute in carrying out our responsibility of providing reliable information, and giving those we cover a voice. . . . We are unwavering in our resolve to continue doing so, and we will proceed to tell the stories of the world from Kabul to Caracas and from Mosul to Sydney.”31 Qatar, for its part, responded by urging its citizens not to engage in insulting or hostile behavior on social media, a tolerant response almost certainly designed to provoke greater anger among the Rift nations and greater sympathy from the outside world.

World Cup Football Tournament

Besides Al Jazeera, perhaps the most important element of Qatar’s search for international fame and admiration is its anticipated hosting of the 2022 World Cup football competition. Qatari officials are proud of being the first MENA nation to do so and have an entire building dedicated to planning and publicizing the event. Offices of the planning agency include a floor housing a museum of Qatari sports achievements and the “bid book” the country put together for the Féderation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).32 The country’s preparations were already the subject of controversy. Rumors that large bribes had been paid to FIFA officials, along with allegations of mistreatment of foreign workers involved in the vast construction projects connected with the event, had already prompted calls for the competition to be moved elsewhere. The implicit threat of the Rift, particularly after it became plain that the crisis would not blow over quickly, was that the resulting uncertainty and inconvenience, especially regarding travel to and from Qatar, would reinforce existing calls to move the tournament. Unfortunately for the Rift nations, FIFA made no statement indicating that the existing plans were in jeopardy. Instead, the international body issued a short statement saying it remained “in regular contact with Qatar” and adding it had spoken with “the Qatar 2022 Local Organizing Committee and the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy handling matters relating to the 2022 FIFA World Cup.”33 While far short of a ringing endorsement of Qatar or a commitment not to move the games, it was also well short of what Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt were hoping for.

Forced Repatriation

None of the previous diplomatic dustups between Qatar and its neighbors had prepared anyone for the reaction to the orders separating families and

The Boycott Begins

83

causing untold personal disruptions. Given the lack of air travel available between the Rift nations and Qatar, the practical difficulties of compliance appeared immediately. In the event, Qatar Airways chartered planes from Oman Air and Kuwait Airlines to bring Qataris home from Saudi Arabia. The orders had the effect of splitting thousands of families since no provision was made to provide exceptions for Qataris married to citizens of the Rift nations. Al Jazeera and others were quick to broadcast scenes of spouses saying tearful good-byes and children being forced to choose with which parent they would live. A Qatari mother of a Bahraini child told an American newspaper, “It’s a shock for all of us in the Arab region. How can I be separated from my children? Me, as a mother, I’m thinking, ‘What shall I do?’”34 Twitter became a popular medium for stories of hardship.35 Such touching coverage immediately increased international sympathy for Qatar. At the same time, Ramadan is a time when many devout Muslims make their pilgrimage to Mecca, a required part of the Islamic faith that the self-proclaimed leader of that faith was making impossible. Again, Al Jazeera noted the dramatic possibilities, broadcasting images of Muslims stranded at the Qatari-Saudi border, juxtaposed with images of Shi’a Muslims from Iran traveling freely to the holy sites.36 Here again, the Rift nations had to backtrack from their original actions almost immediately. Bahrain relented first, saying on June 10 that Bahraini citizens could remain in Qatar. Egypt’s minister of immigration and expatriate affairs estimated that there were up to 300,000 Egyptians in Qatar and was quoted as saying, “We have job opportunities for those who want to come back.” This resulted in a stinging rebuke from a pro–Muslim Brotherhood Egyptian politician who suggested finding jobs for the six million unemployed Egyptians living in Egypt first.37 In the end, Egypt allowed all 300,000 of its nationals to remain in Qatar. Saudi Arabia followed with statements that it would not impede travel for the hajj, with authorities asserting that they would continue “providing assistance and facilitating the affairs of all Umrah pilgrims from around the world, including our brothers from Qatar.”38 The students and faculty from all over the world doing work under the auspices of the Qatar Foundation also received an exception. Soon after the crisis began, all nationals from the Rift nations received assurances from the foundation that none would be asked to leave Qatar.

Food Supply

With the announcement of the Rift on June 5, Qataris rushed to supermarkets to hoard food, nervously aware of the fact that 80 percent of the country’s food came from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with a substantial portion coming from Saudi Arabia over the land border. One-third of Qatar’s wheat supply comes from Russia, meaning Qatar’s food security requires

84

Isolating Qatar

open sea lines of communication starting in the Black Sea. Panic buying was followed by soothing statements from the Qatari government and pictures on Qatari media of people with full shopping carts and stocked shelves in food stores. By Tuesday afternoon, crowds at Doha’s supermarkets had thinned to normal, and perishable foods were no longer in short supply. In another sign that the blockade was not well thought out, the Saudi government initially offered to make an exception for food, only to have Qatar refuse the offer, insisting that all types of trade be allowed to take place across the Qatari-Saudi border. The blockade of foodstuffs resulted in an entirely predictable offer from Iran to make up the difference. The country’s chairman of the union of exporters of agricultural products announced that food shipments from Iran could reach Qatar in only twelve hours. Soon about 100 tons of food per day were leaving Iran for Qatar, according to official Iranian sources. Iran also said it was sending forty-five tons of dairy products every day. The Iranian government added its advice that the Arab nations find a peaceful solution. “Coercion is never the solution,” said Iranian foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif.39 Qatar initially refused the Iranian offer, saying it preferred to import supplies from Turkey. However, that soon changed. Iran initially flew six cargo planes filled with food to Doha, with Iran’s media saying that three dhows containing 350 tons of fruit were also on the way.40 Turkey, for its part, sent dairy products. Qatar also used some of its available cash to construct a dairy industry from scratch.41 Two days into the crisis, Qatar’s foreign minister was assuring Qataris, and the world, that the government could guarantee the supply of food and other supplies “forever.”42 Qatar also solicited and received immediate assistance from Azerbaijan. A Saudi representative was reduced to predicting that Qatar would have to accept the Rift nations’ demands, since “Qatar’s stomach will not be able to get used to Turkish and Iranian products,” a comment roundly ridiculed on social media.43 The assistance from Iran came even while Qatar was a strong supporter of anti-Iranian factions in the Syrian civil war and was an active participant in the military struggle against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. Clearly the Iranian government saw an opportunity to increase its presence and influence on the Arab side of the Gulf and valued the opportunity highly enough to ignore its ongoing disputes with Qatar. For its part, Qatar has only a small Shi’a minority that has shown no signs of restiveness under a Sunni government, so Qatar was able to accept an Iranian presence with no fears that it would spark internal strife. Qatar had had a long-standing “half competitive–half cooperative” relationship with Iran for years, with both countries exploiting the natural gas field that straddles their maritime border. It is next to impossible to believe that the Saudis, Emiratis, Bahrainis, and Egyptians thought for a moment Qatar

The Boycott Begins

85

would jeopardize its ready access to its primary source of wealth by downgrading its relations with Iran.

Predictable Outcomes

None of the Rift nations’ hostile actions had the intended effect. There is no better evidence for this than the lengthy duration of the Rift. It appears that the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, MBS and MBZ, who were the main architects of the action, expected Qatar to knuckle under almost immediately. Yet, how they could have expected any such thing is a great mystery. Qatar has too many LNG customers, in too many places around the world, for those customers to simply do without Qatari gas. LNG customers were even less likely to ignore their own energy needs to join in on punishing Qatar. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have virtually no influence over Qatar’s East Asian and European trade partners. MBS and MBZ must have known this. A stunning lack of forethought and planning is evident in many events of the Rift’s first week. It is not clear that the Egyptian government considered the consequences of recalling 300,000 of its nationals, most of them in well-paying professional positions in Qatar, to a bleakly uncertain future in Egypt. When this reality became obvious, Egypt had to backtrack. It also did not seem to consider the effects that selective closing of the Suez Canal would bring. Again, mature consideration led to a decision to keep the canal open, assuring continued LNG supplies to Europe and removing what might have been a major source of leverage. The fact that the UAE sought to impede Qatari gas exports by tanker, while not interrupting for a moment the UAE’s supply of natural gas via pipeline, suggests an almost risible lack of forethought. The Rift nations’ ordering their nationals home, while expelling Qatari nationals, with the resulting breakup of families, was a public relations nightmare for the Rift nations, especially given the priority Al Jazeera assigned to publicizing the families’ plight. The publicity led the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to condemn the orders. The Rift nations felt compelled to issue a statement affirming that “these measures are not aimed at the people of Qatar, with whom we have ties of brotherhood, closeness and conciliation.”44 Again, exceptions to these orders came almost immediately, with Saudi Arabia having to backtrack quickly to accommodate pilgrims making the hajj. If the leaders of Saudi Arabia had been able to anticipate anything, they should have foreseen problems over admitting pilgrims to the holy places. Emblematic of the impromptu nature of the blockade were pictures of thousands of camels starving at the QatariSaudi border. The animals were prevented from joining their owners in Qatar, and no provision was made for their upkeep in Saudi Arabia.

86

Isolating Qatar

Much of the failure resulted from the Rift nations’ neglect of the potential of Qatar’s vast reserve fund, valued at over $300 billion in June 2017. These funds allowed Qatar to subsidize Qatar Airways so that fares could remain constant even while fuel costs soared. The funds allowed the government to make major interventions in the Qatari stock exchange, stabilizing prices within days of the Rift and forestalling a crisis. Cash reserves permitted the establishment of a dairy industry in a matter of weeks and allowed Qatar to buy all the food it needed from nearby sources. In that regard, MBS and MBZ evidently did not anticipate that their actions would drive Qatar closer to Turkey and Iran, one regional rival and one regional sworn enemy.

The Rift Is Snubbed

For all of these reasons, few nations were inclined to take positive action against Qatar. A few nations followed the four Rift nations in cutting ties, but the Qatari Foreign Ministry was able to boast that ninety-four diplomatic missions remained open in Doha, along with thirty-four other countries maintaining part-time representation. One expert contends that the rise of MBS, coupled with his determination to purge the upper echelons of the Saudi government of rivals, led to a serious exodus of experienced and knowledgeable people from the Saudi government, including the Foreign Ministry. MBZ in the UAE showed a similar determination to discontinue the pragmatic foreign policy that had marked that country since its independence.45 MBS and MBZ evidently anticipated that most, if not all, of the other MENA nations would follow suit and sever diplomatic and economic relations with Qatar. Jordan’s government revoked Al Jazeera’s broadcasting license but did not sever diplomatic relations with Qatar. Rather, those relations were “downgraded.” Of two MENA nations with rival governments, one also joined the diplomatic boycott. Yemen’s internationally recognized government cut ties and announced that it supported Saudi Arabia’s decision to remove Qatar from the coalition fighting the movement determined to overthrow that government. Yemen’s president said the move was in response to Qatari support for “extremist groups in Yemen.”46 The Houthi rebels, for their part, “condemn[ed] the action targeting Qatar.” The head of the Houthis’ High Revolutionary Council tweeted, “We recommend rethinking the move to isolate Qatar.”47 Libya’s eastern-based government, affiliated with the country’s parliament, also severed diplomatic relations, with the foreign minister saying, “Qatar’s repeated and numerous attacks on the dignity of the Libyan people after the February 17 revolution have always angered large sections of the Libyan people.” The minister did not mention Qatar’s participation in the military campaign to remove former dictator Muammar Qaddafi.48 As for

The Boycott Begins

87

the rest of the Arab League, only Mauritania, Djibouti, and Comoros took action against Qatar. None had significant trade relations with Qatar. The Saudis and others were no more successful in persuading African nations to support the boycott. Niger recalled its ambassador, expressing its solidarity with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Senegal’s Foreign Ministry also announced a break in relations. Chad, Comoros, the Maldives, and Mauritania recalled their diplomats as well, as did one part of Somalia’s federal system. But Eritrea refused a request from Saudi Arabia to sever diplomatic relations, saying the country had “strong ties with the brother people of Qatar” and it was “impossible to cut ties.”49 Sudan also declined a similar request from the Saudis. In all, the Rift nations failed to attract support from any country whose hostility was likely to actually inconvenience Qatar. No additional support for the Rift appeared in Europe. Again, the question arises whether any advance word of the Rift had gone to any MENA or North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations, or if quiet diplomacy had sounded these nations out on the likelihood of their support for joint action against Qatar. The utter failure of the MENA region to support the Rift nations is strong evidence that no such diplomacy preceded the June 5 announcement. If true, this constitutes an administrative and foreign policy failure of the first order.

Attempts to Mediate the Crisis

Oman and Kuwait did not break diplomatic ties with Qatar and, in fact, tried to restore good relations between the contending parties. On the first day of the Rift, Kuwaiti emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah called the Qatari leader and “urged restraint and not to take any measure that could escalate” the situation in the Gulf.50 At one point, Tamim began to give a televised address to his people, only to have Al Jazeera cut off its coverage a few seconds into the broadcast. Moments later, the foreign minister appeared to say the emir’s speech had been postponed because the Kuwaiti emir was arriving in Saudi Arabia for talks on ending the impasse.51 The prime minister of Pakistan also traveled to Saudi Arabia to mediate. Later in June, after the Rift nations finally listed their demands, more mediation efforts took place. Kuwait’s emir held a series of telephone conversations with principals in the region, as well as with US secretary of state Rex Tillerson, UK foreign secretary Boris Johnson, German foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel, European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, and Turkish prime minister Melvut Cavusoglu.52 None of these efforts bore fruit, since neither side showed much inclination for compromise. Sanctions like those imposed by the Rift nations are usually accompanied by a list of demands or, at the very least, a list of points to be negotiated. In

88

Isolating Qatar

the case of the Rift, however, demands were slow in coming—more evidence of poor or nonexistent preparation. After UAE minister of state for foreign affairs Anwar Gargash threatened to expel Qatar from the GCC, there was no follow-up. Qatar’s expulsion would have meant more freedom of movement for the emirate, not less. In the early days of the crisis, the Saudi state news agency published a list of fifty-nine individuals and twelve organizations that the Rift nations considered terrorist related.53 The organizations included the Muslim Brotherhood and various Qatari organizations that the Qatari government insisted were charities. Also included were groups that had already been designated as terrorist by either the US government or the United Nations. Listed among the designated individuals was Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent Sunni Muslim cleric linked to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. AlQaradawi lived in Qatar and once had his own program on Al Jazeera. Notably, Al Jazeera itself was not among the blacklisted organizations. Beyond this list, which was not accompanied by any specific demands on Qatar, the Rift nations again underlined their lack of planning for the crisis by seeming nonplussed at the suggestion by a White House spokeswoman that Saudi Arabia and the others let the world—and Qatar—know what they expected in return for normal relations.54 Gargash posted a vague tweet calling for “a guaranteed roadmap to rebuild confidence after our covenants were broken.”55 The Saudi foreign minister referred only to the agreements Qatar had made in 2014. A list of thirteen demands finally appeared on June 22.56 They included severing all ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State (ISIS). In addition, the Rift nations required Qatar to close all diplomatic facilities in Iran, expel all members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, and limit their trade to nations complying with US-led sanctions on Iran. The Turkish military base would also have to be closed, along with Al Jazeera. The UAE foreign minister added that a stringent monitoring system would measure Qatar’s compliance. There would be monthly “compliance audits” during the first year of an agreement, followed by quarterly audits the second year and annual audits for the following ten years. Qatar was given ten days to respond or face a “parting of the ways” with its Gulf neighbors and Egypt. Acknowledging the extreme nature of the demands, the UAE foreign minister emphasized that the Rift nations were not seeking “regime change” in Qatar but did insist on “behavior change.” Qatar’s government responded with a mixture of anger and disdain, saying that the list was not “reasonable or actionable.” It denied having any ties to Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, ISIS, or the Syrian Nursa Front. The statement added that the “illegal blockade has nothing to do with combatting terrorism; it is about limiting Qatar’s sovereignty and outsourcing our foreign policy.”57 Still, Qatar emphasized its willingness to talk: “Qatar continues to call for dialogue despite the siege that is a clear aggression and an insult,”

The Boycott Begins

89

said the foreign minister.58 The Foreign Ministry said it was studying the demands and would respond through Kuwait, giving every indication that Qatar was in no particular hurry to do either. As Chapter 7 will show, world reaction was not supportive of the Rift nations. Secretary of State Tillerson said some of the demands would be “very difficult to meet.”59 UK foreign minister Johnson repeated his call for “reasonable” demands. A UN spokesman said that the world body had cooperated with Qatari charitable organizations and would continue to do so, implying a rejection of the Rift nations’ belief that such organizations were terrorist fronts. The UK-based Arab Organization for Human Rights said the Rift nations’ list of terrorist organizations “was clearly made up arbitrarily, to serve political agendas, without relying on any evidence.”60

Conclusion

Qatar’s quick reaction to the Rift ensured that the crisis would not have a swift conclusion. It soon became clear that Qatar had only to stand fast to survive. In fact, by mid-July, the Rift nations had abandoned their original list of thirteen demands and substituted a much vaguer list of “principles.” Some demands, such as shutting down Al Jazeera, vanished completely. All talk of deadlines and monitoring also disappeared. The obvious miscalculation on the part of the instigators of the Rift, especially MBS and MBZ, even though it was strongly provoked by a tweet from Donald Trump that seemed to support isolating Qatar, is still more evidence that their decision was impulsive and rash. Consultations with more experienced foreign policy experts in their own entourages almost certainly would have led to hesitation and the demand for confirmation before undertaking such a radical foreign policy departure.61 Either the foreign policy bureaucracy in all four Rift nations was completely wrong about US policy, which is unlikely, or MBS and MBZ simply neglected to consult with their own experts, which is more consistent with both leaders’ willingness to undertake risky foreign policy ventures. Some reports indicated division within the Saudi royal family over how to handle Qatar, reflecting the divisions that brought MBS to power. In being elevated to the status of heir to the throne, MBS engineered the ouster of his cousin, former crown prince Mohammed bin Nayefs, who wanted to resolve the Kingdom’s differences with Qatar peacefully.62 MBS has also advised the king to get more heavily involved in Yemen and played a personal role in both the arrests (and, reportedly, the torture) of prominent Saudis and the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The Rift nations’ leaders also miscalculated the role of small states in the twenty-first century. On the surface, Qatar looked extremely vulnerable

90

Isolating Qatar

in June 2017. The four Rift nations, after all, have a combined population 55 times that of Qatar, with territory 279 times larger, military spending 16 times greater, and a combined GDP 11 times greater. This stunning imbalance prompted Singaporean diplomat and former UN Security Council president Kishore Mahbubani to suggest that Qatar had brought the crisis on itself by ignoring what Mahbubani called “the eternal rule of geopolitics: small states must act like small states.”63 Qatar has succeeded in playing a role on the international stage well out of proportion to its size and military might. Career diplomats like Mahbubani focused on traditional elements of power and failed to take into account not only the impact of soft power but also the importance of hard power, in the form of a US and Turkish military presence in Qatar that made the country virtually invulnerable to a military invasion. Qatar’s antagonists also neglected the possibility that Qatar remembered the 2014 crisis and was more prepared for a future crisis than they were. The Rift leaders also failed to take into account the power of wealth in the hands of a government that could move nimbly and forcefully. But if the deficiencies of a small circle of foreign policy decisionmakers were demonstrated by the poor planning and clumsiness that the Rift exposed, the advantages of a small and determined decisionmaking circle would be demonstrated by Qatar’s response.

Notes

1. Schwartz, “U.S. Says Some Demands on Qatar Will Be Difficult to Meet.” 2. “Saudi-Led Demands Not ‘Reasonable or Actionable,’” Al Jazeera English, June 24, 2017. 3. Mohammed bin Salman would become crown prince sixteen days later. 4. Fahim and DeYoung, “Arab Nations Isolate Qatar.” 5. Stancati, “Five Things to Know About Qatar’s Diplomatic Breaks.” 6. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 7. DeYoung, “Trump Jumps into Dispute Between Qatar and Arab Bloc.” 8. Spencer, “Turkey Offers Support After Gulf State Is Cut Off.” 9. See, for example, Miller, “Qatar, the Gulf Crisis and Small State Behavior in International Affairs.” 10. “Saudi Arabia Justifies Move to Cut Qatar Ties,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 5, 2017. 11. Interviews by the author with Qatari officials in Doha, November 2018. Some officials also noted that UAE officials from Dubai are less hostile than those from Abu Dhabi. 12. Kobi and Guzansky, “Qatar Under Siege.” 13. “Meshal Bin Hamad Al Thani Weighs In on GCC-Qatar Crisis,” Al Jazeera English, June 7, 2017. 14. Hsu, “Qatar’s Rift with Saudi Arabia Could Turn Up Heat on Oil and Gas Prices.” 15. Stancati, “Qatar Calls for Talks to End Diplomatic Crisis in Persian Gulf.”

The Boycott Begins

91

16. Interviews by the author with Qatari officials in Doha, November 2018. 17. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 18. Lohade, “Dubai’s DP World Bans Vessels Carrying Qatar Flag.” 19. Wright, “The Gulf Crisis and the Gulf Gas Markets,” 125. 20. Ulrichsen, “How Qatar Weathered the Gulf Crisis.” 21. Godsen, “Britain ‘Urgently Needs to Develop Its Own Gas Supply.’” 22. “Beating Malicious Agendas,” The Peninsula, November 9, 2020. 23. Qatar Airways boasted the world’s longest direct flight, from Doha to Auckland (about 9,000 miles), and was faced with the problem of continuing that service with the extra miles needed to avoid Emirati airspace. See “Diplomatic Baggage,” The Economist, June 6, 2017. 24. Parasie and Wall, “Qatar’s Spat with Neighbors Threatens Its Vital Air Industry.” 25. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 15, 2017. 26. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 27. Ames, “Firms Getting Cold Feet in Qatari Heat.” 28. Tok, “Entrepreneurship in Qatar,” 45. 29. Fitch and Stancati, “Al Jazeera Says Websites, Digital Platforms Under Attempted Cyberattack.” 30. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 31. “An Open Letter from Al Jazeera,” Al Jazeera English, June 26, 2017. 32. Interviews with the planners by the author at the Doha headquarters, November 2018. 33. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 34. Stancati, “Qatar Crisis Takes Toll.” 35. Akdenizli, “Twitter as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” 148. 36. Kirkpatrick and Barnard, “Assaults Pour Gas on Saudi Arabia’s Rivalry with Iran and Qatar.” 37. “Fear over Fate of Egyptians Living in Qatar After Severed Ties,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 5, 2017. 38. “Saudi Refutes Reports on Blocking Qatari Pilgrims,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 12, 2017. 39. Barnard and Kirkpatrick, “5 Arab Nations Move to Isolate Qatar.” 40. Carlstrom, “Hamas Looks to Iran.” 41. Details in Chapter 6. 42. Stancati, “Qatar Crisis Takes Toll.” 43. Akdenizli, “Twitter as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” 149. 44. “Arab Quartet Condemns UN Qatar Rights Report—Statement,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 31, 2018. 45. Nonneman, “The Qatar Crisis Through the Lens of Foreign Policy Analysis,” 104. 46. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 47. “Arab World Watchlist for 6 June,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 6, 2017. 48. “Libya’s Eastern Government Cuts Diplomatic Ties with Qatar,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 5, 2017.

92

Isolating Qatar

49. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 50. Ibid. 51. “Arab World Watchlist for 6 June,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 6, 2017. 52. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 26, 2017. 53. For the full list of individuals and organizations, see “Arab Countries List 59 People as Qatar-Linked Terrorist Financiers,” Al Arabiya, June 8, 2017. One observer noted a close resemblance between the Rift nations’ list and organizations listed in a piece of US legislation supported by Israel. See “Israel, Saudi, UAE Team Up in Anti-Qatar Lobbying Move,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 54. Manson and Sevastopulo, “US Steps Up Pressure on Gulf Arab Leaders over Qatar.” Financial Times, June 20, 2017. 55. “UAE Demands Guarantees Before Mending Qatar Ties,” Agence France Presse, June 6, 2017. 56. A full list of the demands can be found at “What Are the 13 Demands Given to Qatar?” Gulf News, June 23, 2017, https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/qatar/what -are-the-13-demands-given-to-qatar-1.2048118. 57. “Arab States Issue Ultimatum to Qatar,” Reuters News, June 23, 2017. 58. “Qatar Lashes Back at Demands by Saudi-Led Group,” Wall Street Journal, July 5, 2017. 59. Morello, “Tillerson Criticizes Saudi Demands.” 60. “Qatar Rejects Saudi-Led Bloc’s ‘Terror’ List,” Qatar Tribune, June 9, 2017. 61. By contrast, members of Trump’s cabinet were quickly able to address the confusion from Trump’s tweets. 62. Said, Scheck, and Amon, “Saudi Shake-Up Aims to Launch Modern Era.” 63. Miller, “Qatar, the Gulf Crisis and Small State Behavior in International Affairs,” 90.

6

Qatar Responds

It’s the least that I can do for my country. I just translated my feelings through this artwork and I’m happy that people loved it. —Ahmed Almaadheed, artist who created the iconic image of Emir Tamim1

The imposition of a diplomatic, economic, financial, and trade boycott and blockade on Qatar by Egypt and three members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the early morning hours of June 5, 2017, represents one of the most thorough and comprehensive intelligence failures in the early twenty-first century. Long before the agreements of January 2021 brought the crisis to a close, any but the most biased observers could see that the Rift never had a chance of fundamentally altering Qatar’s foreign or domestic policies. A combination of systematic preparation by the Qatari government, that government’s streamlined and self-contained foreign policymaking process, its enormous financial assets, and flaws in the imposition of the blockade itself doomed the effort from the start. This chapter traces the response of the Qatari government to the challenges of the Rift, from its imposition in early June 2017 to the end of that calendar year. Numerous analysts have divided the Rift into three phases: the first few days, when it appeared an actual military invasion could take place; the first few months, when the four Rift nations sought to inflict maximum political and economic damage on Qatar; and the remainder of the crisis, which was a stalemate. 2 Since the third phase lasted from early 2018 to the end of 2020, and since little changed during that period, this chapter focuses on the steps Qatar took during the first two of these three phases.

93

94

Isolating Qatar

The analysis shows that the Qatari government, while taken by surprise by the actual imposition of the blockade, was fully prepared to take effective steps to mitigate its effects in the short term and to derive benefits from the crisis in the longer term. In the short term, the Qatari ruling elite used its assets in both hard power (mostly financial) and soft power (mostly public relations), built up over years of preparation, to alter the impact from that of an existential crisis to more of a temporary inconvenience. For the long term, Qatari emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani consciously fostered a sense of Qatari nationalism among both citizens and expatriates. By the end of the crisis, the GCC, not Qatar, was facing an existential crisis.

Preparing for a Crisis

As noted in an earlier chapter, the Rift of 2017 was not the first time that Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates had imposed sanctions on Qatar. The three nations had withdrawn their ambassadors over Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood three years earlier. While that crisis did not involve a trade blockade or the closing of airspace, it was enough to prompt Qatari emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, then only months into his reign, to start making preparations to withstand a similar (or more comprehensive) siege in the future. While the practical effects of this preparation would become obvious within the first weeks of the crisis, an almost studied calm on the part of government officials marked the first hours and days. Statements from the palace were reassuring, measured, practical, and lacking in any strong sense of crisis, probably to strike a contrast with the more inflammatory statements from the Rift nations. One early statement said little beyond the contention that the blockade had “no basis in fact” and was “unjustified.”3 The emir himself remained quiet, leaving most of the response to the Rift nations’ charges in the hands of Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, the foreign minister. Tamim did not give a major address on the crisis until the start of the third month. Qatar’s preparations for the crisis are in marked contrast to the apparent lack of preparation on the part of its two chief antagonists, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Most observers point to the influence of rising stars in each country’s complex political hierarchy to explain the advent of the Rift. In the UAE, credit (or blame) for the hard line on Qatar lay with Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), Abu Dhabi’s crown prince. Relatively young at fifty-six, bin Zayed had been consolidating power for some time and, by 2017, had become the leader of the UAE’s armed forces. He was prepared to make a show of that power. His counterpart in Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), had spent much of the two years prior to

Qatar Responds

95

the Rift leapfrogging his rivals for power inside the Saudi royal family. He is the likely author of the Kingdom’s armed intervention in Yemen. Days into the Rift, he was officially named crown prince and heir to the throne, although only thirty-one years of age and nearly two full generations younger than his father, King Salman. The intervention in Yemen was not entirely unprecedented. The Saudis and Emiratis had sent military forces into Bahrain in 2011 to defeat an Arab Spring uprising, but that was a small-scale and short-lived intervention.4 The Yemen intervention is larger and more dangerous. With it, MBS brought a new element of impulsiveness and assertiveness to Saudi foreign policy. For the preceding sixty years, during which time the nation had never been governed by someone under sixty, the Kingdom had been consistently risk averse. As one expert noted, “[The Saudi leaders] were prudent, cautious to a fault. Now they are prepared to throw their weight around.”5 That new assertiveness became more obvious as MBS gained control of defense and oil policy and, at the same time, adopted a harder line toward Iran. Some observers attribute this more hard-nosed attitude to the influence of MBZ. The two leaders shared a hunting trip in Saudi Arabia in 2016 and developed a close personal friendship, marked by a growing tendency to align their foreign policies, especially in the Gulf region.6 The two leaders planned to counter the danger from Iran by unifying the Gulf states into an anti-Iran coalition. Qatar’s reluctance to join such a coalition and its even more adamant refusal to accept Saudi leadership of such a grouping angered MBS and MBZ and increased their sense of threat. Given the outreach to Iran by the emir of Kuwait and the sultan of Oman earlier in 2017 (an approach that included inviting Iran’s leader, Hassan Rouhani, to their respective capitals), the Saudis may have regarded Qatar’s truculence as the last straw, even though Qatar was not involved in the Kuwait-Oman gesture. For one expert, Saudi Arabia’s increased aggressiveness toward Iran served two additional purposes. First, it allowed MBS to use Saudi “hypernationalism” as a way to push through social changes at home. Second, it appears that MBS believed that an ultrahard line against Iran would win favor with US President Donald Trump, inaugurated in January 2017. MBZ promoted his Saudi friend with officials of the incoming Trump administration and focused his efforts on Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.7

Laying the Groundwork: The Sovereign Wealth Fund

For all their attention to their places in the royal hierarchies of their respective governments, either MBS and MBZ were very badly served by their nations’ intelligence agencies, or those agencies were badly served by the two principals. Some of the ways in which Qatar built up its strength and potential staying power in the face of likely economic and financial threats

96

Isolating Qatar

should have been clear to anyone contemplating hostile actions against the small Gulf state. As early as 2005, the emirate had arranged for the immense wealth it gained from sales of natural gas to be channeled into a facility called the Sovereign Wealth Fund, to be administered by the Qatari Investment Authority (QIA). Its managers have made the QIA into a major global investor, with high-profile holdings such as Harrod’s, the Shard, and the Olympic Village in London. By June 2017, the Sovereign Wealth Fund amounted to over $330 billion, a staggering amount of money, much of it readily available. Among other advantages, it allowed Qatar to pay up to ten times the usual cost of medicines and food when the blockade closed regular routes for these essentials.8 Even weeks into the crisis, the QIA was able to announce that it did not have plans to significantly liquidate its global assets and was planning new investments.9 The potential uses of such a nest egg became clear when Qatar opened its Hamad Port facility (named for Tamim’s father, Hamad bin Khalifa) near Doha in 2015. Work had begun on the port ten years earlier, and accelerated at the onset of the 2014 crisis, as part of Qatar’s efforts to diversify its trade beyond natural gas. Tamim made a public show of “officially” opening the port on September 5, 2017, with much fanfare, including the singing of the national anthem, the unveiling of a giant gateway, and the placement of the official logo by Tamim.10 Prior to the Rift, it had never been used to full capacity, given existing contracts between shipping companies and ports in the UAE. Hamad Port, built at a cost of $7 billion, accommodates even the largest cargo vessels, allowing container ships to bypass the UAE’s Jebel Ali Port, where they had traditionally stopped to transfer cargo to smaller vessels. With three terminals, Hamad Port can process over seven million containers a year. In fact, in its first year of operation, the port gained a quarter share of trade through the region and had opened trade routes to China, India, and Pakistan. When the Rift occurred, the port authority lost little time in negotiating new trade routes to Malaysia and Taiwan.11 Hamad International Airport was also completing a massive upgrade at the time of the Rift. Such massive infrastructure projects and their implications for Qatar’s lack of vulnerability to economic pressure should have been obvious to Qatar’s antagonists.

Initial Steps by the Qatari Government Responding to the Charges

The Rift nations took weeks to come up with specific demands for the Qatari government to fulfill, but they made clear at the start that the three main areas of contention were Qatar’s sponsorship of Al Jazeera, its rela-

Qatar Responds

97

tionship with Iran, and its alleged support for terrorist organizations (such as Hamas in the Palestinian territories). Qatari officials again insisted that Al Jazeera was independent. Responding to charges of a too-close relationship with Iran, Qataris pointed to the massive natural gas field the country shares with the Islamic Republic. Qatar also pointed to the much more extensive trade between Iran and Dubai.12 Concerning its supposed sponsorship of terrorist organizations, Qatari government representatives pointed to support, usually unofficial, that Saudi citizens had given to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Those representatives reminded American audiences that most of the hijackers responsible for the 9/11 attacks were Saudis. Qatar defended its support for Hamas by insisting that it supported only economic development projects and other peaceful activities in the Gaza Strip. While acknowledging that it had contributed $500 million to projects in Gaza, Qatar averred that these were to rebuild what had been destroyed in the 2014 conflict with Israel.13 The money was earmarked for roads, hospitals, schools, and housing projects. The Qatari foreign minister asserted, “We do not support Hamas. We support the Palestinian people.”14 Critics of Qatar pointed out that while these projects are peaceful in and of themselves, Qatar’s support allowed Hamas to spend that much more on weapons.15 Qatari officials also pointed out that providing sanctuary for groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Taliban did not constitute support for their activities and only evidenced a determination to permit contacts with the groups in a controlled environment. Some US officials made it clear they preferred to have Hamas and the Taliban headquartered in Qatar, as opposed to in Iran.16 As noted in a previous chapter, Qatar had staked much of its prestige on establishing its reputation as a reliable mediator in the many conflicts plaguing the region. Such mediation, Qatari officials insisted, cannot occur without access to the warring sides.17 Again, American officials pointed to the access they had to Taliban representatives as the Trump administration tried to negotiate an end to the American presence in Afghanistan.18 The official response to the Rift nations’ action came on June 5 in the form of a lengthy statement from the Foreign Ministry. The response focused on protecting Qatari sovereignty. Releasing the statement, Qatar’s foreign minister said, “We are not ready to surrender, and will never be ready to surrender, the independence of our foreign policy.”19 The written statement was equally defiant, saying in part, “The State of Qatar has been subjected to a campaign of lies that have reached the point of complete fabrication. It reveals a hidden plan to undermine the State of Qatar.” It added, “[The Rift nations’] purpose is clearly the imposition of guardianship over Qatar, which is in itself a violation of its sovereignty, and is rejected outright.”20 In the meantime, Qatari statements claimed that the initial trigger for the Rift, posts on the country’s official news site quoting Tamim as critical

98

Isolating Qatar

of the United States and friendly to Iran, had been the result of a computer hack. They further contended that the hack had originated in the UAE, although the latter denied this and insisted that the Russians were behind it.21 Officials from the American Federal Bureau of Investigation said their investigation supported the Qatari version.

Early Financial Moves

The Qatari authorities had to move immediately to shore up the emirate’s finances. Weak energy prices and massive spending on preparations for the 2022 World Cup had already increased the country’s debt, so anything likely to drive up interest rates (such as a lack of confidence in Qatar’s ability to cope) was an urgent problem. While some deterioration in the country’s credit rating was inevitable, the government had to try to mitigate the extent to which international credit rating agencies would take such actions. Moody’s Investors Service downgraded the country’s credit rating early on, from “stable” to “negative.” Standard & Poor’s, for its part, did not present Qatar with a crippling downgrade, lowering the country’s rating only a single notch, from AA to AA–.22 Fitch Ratings followed with a similar downgrade almost immediately. Interest rates on Qatar’s debt rose, but not beyond the wealthy country’s ability to pay. The Qatari leadership also had to deal quickly with serious bank runs and stock declines. In the case of the former, the key decisionmaker was Ali Shareef Al Emadi, the finance minister, who later said blandly, “It is not a secret that we have injected liquidity into the system.”23 Such an injection would be urgently needed. Moody’s estimated that capital outflows in the early days of the crisis topped $30 billion.24 Withdrawals from accounts held by foreigners continued in July at a rate similar to June’s.25 The sudden and sizeable departure of deposits prompted one asset manager to predict a dark future: “Qatar’s financial position is eroding fast, as outflows in deposits and debt securities reveal, and this can only get worse if there’s no solution.”26 By the end of July, however, total deposits in Qatari banks had increased by 1.3 percent, thanks to massive infusions of capital from government accounts as the Qatari government moved money from foreign bank accounts to Qatari banks. Qatar injected as much as $40 billion into its own banks, an amount that represented just over one-tenth of its Sovereign Wealth Fund, leaving nearly $300 billion to deal with other aspects of the crisis. Qatar made no particular effort to keep this fund secret, so the Rift nations should have anticipated Qatar’s ability to use it strategically. Accompanying the mass withdrawals of bank funds was a decline in the value of the currency. By June 8, it took 3.6517 Qatari riyals to buy an American dollar, a record low.27 Even this did not produce anything close to panic on the part of government officials. A central bank representative

Qatar Responds

99

said simply that Doha had a “huge cushion of foreign currency to support the riyal if necessary.” That cushion was a foreign exchange reserve of $36 billion. By early July, the central bank was able to state, “The exchange rate of the Qatari riyal to the U.S. dollar is completely stable, and its conversion inside Qatar and abroad is guaranteed at any given point at the official price.”28 Qatar also made an accounting change to bolster its apparent hardcurrency assets. The country had not counted “other liquid assets in foreign currency” as part of the total, although it was consistent with International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidelines to do so. The change boosted announced hard-currency reserves from $19 billion to $39 billion.29 With the announcement of the blockade coming in the early morning hours, a full day of trading awaited the Qatari stock exchange, and the impact was immediate and serious. Tuesday, June 5, saw a drop of 9.7 percent. Its close that day was the lowest since January 2016.30 Two days later, the exchange had dropped below the closely watched level of 9,000, ending at 8,965.01.31 From that time, however, only days into the crisis, the rate of loss dropped almost to zero. A weeklong religious holiday halted trading during what might have been additional days of precipitous drops, but the first day of resumed trading saw another 2.3 percent drop.32 However, the drop did not continue in the days following. In the end, the impact of the Rift on stock prices lasted less than three weeks. The Rift nations certainly should have realized that a weeklong pause in trading would give Qatar time to mitigate the impact on its stock market. The negative economic impacts in the early days of the Rift prompted the Qatari government to postpone indefinitely a new value-added tax (VAT) that the GCC nations had agreed to start collecting in 2018, along with excise taxes on tobacco and sugary drinks.33 Since Saudi Arabia and the UAE had already imposed the new VAT, Qatar’s decision to break with the GCC on this issue gave the country a comparative advantage over its neighbors, which was certainly not what the Rift nations intended. Qatar also shelved a planned excise tax on alcohol in an effort to placate the expatriate community.34

Securing Trade Routes

The closing of Qatar’s only land border and of ports in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE compelled Qatar to look farther afield for basic supplies, as well as for more long-term trading partners. At the start of the crisis, 80 percent of Qatar’s food supplies came from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, half of that across the land border. In the first month, imports dropped 40 percent from the same month the previous year. Here again, however, the impact was temporary, and again, the unlikelihood of the blockade causing any permanent or even long-term damage should have been clear to the leaders of the Rift nations. Intra-GCC trade was minimal, accounting

100

Isolating Qatar

for only about 12 percent for any of the GCC nations.35 Moreover, Qatar’s enormous available wealth allowed it to establish new trade routes, even if this meant greater expense. Turkey and Iran, two countries with multiple reasons to thwart Saudi foreign policy initiatives, stepped in almost immediately with offers of food and other supplies in the short term and made clear their readiness to negotiate more permanent trading arrangements. At the same time, Oman remained neutral in the crisis and opened its ports to Qatari vessels that had been banned from Saudi and Emirati ports. On the issue of trade, solidarity among the Rift nations broke down. Egypt made it clear that the Suez Canal was still open to Qatari vessels. Egypt’s dependence on tolls for use of the canal actually provided Qatar with leverage. The emirate diverted some vessels headed toward the canal to the longer route around Africa, evidently to prove that Qatar could satisfy its European customers without the canal. Even some Saudi merchants found ways to get around the government restrictions. One account spoke of Saudi companies finalizing deals with Turkish logistics companies to transport cargoes to Qatar, not allowing political decisions by MBS to impede profits. According to one Turkish logistics expert, the only reason more Saudi goods were not making it to Qatar was a lack of boats and cargo planes.36 Qatar had been preparing to broaden the reach of its trade even before the Rift, involving itself in projects like Pakistan’s first floating liquid natural gas (LNG) terminal in Port Qasim, which became operational in 2015.37 As noted, new routes to India, China, Malaysia, and Taiwan were rushed into completion, even as Qatar’s new Hamad Port made ready to receive cargo ships that used to stop in the UAE. Panic buying lasted only a few days; by the end of a few weeks, most supermarkets were well stocked with the basics. The situation even prompted some sarcastic social media posts, such as one that lamented the lack of chives at the omelet bar.38

Replacing Dairy Products

There is probably no better illustration of the judicious and imaginative use of cash to address the Rift crisis than the story of Qatar’s milk supplies. Prior to June 5, virtually all of Qatar’s dairy products had come overland from Saudi Arabia, so the blockade meant an immediate and near-total disappearance of milk, yogurt, and similar products from Qatar. In the short term, the government purchased massive supplies from Turkey, while some products from the United Kingdom also found their way to Qatari supermarket shelves. Since Qataris did not like the taste of Turkish milk, this was not a permanent solution, although Turkey’s efforts did forestall a more serious crisis. The Turkish products caused confusion, since they were packaged using Turkish script instead of Arabic, but the government stepped in quickly with translation guides.39

Qatar Responds

101

The initiative to address the problem in a more long-term manner came not from the government but from a Qatari businessman, who announced just days into the crisis that he would import thousands of cows to create a dairy industry from scratch. In July cargo planes supplied by Qatar Airways flew the first cows in from Hungary. They arrived at Baladna farm, about thirty miles north of Doha. Baladna had been a sheep ranch, but its Qatari owner moved quickly to switch to dairy farming. (Such plans had begun before the crisis but were accelerated after June 5.) Massive sheds were constructed almost overnight, cooled by giant fans and water sprays to address the sweltering heat. Milking machines that could accommodate dozens of cows simultaneously also appeared, along with a viewing gallery for Qatari families to watch the process. To make the farm into an attractive day-trip destination, a petting zoo and playground were added, along with a museum, gift shop, mosque, and large cafeteria. In a matter of months, Qatar was able to supply its people with homegrown dairy products, probably eliminating the Saudi market in Qatar forever. Indeed, by mid-2018, Qatar had become a net milk exporter, undercutting the Saudi market in other parts of the Gulf region. Baladna also saw secondary benefits. With automatic scrapers removing and saving the cows’ waste, a Baladna manager could boast, “We are going to produce enough manure to turn Qatar green.”40 The farm also planned to produce enough beef to meet all the needs of the World Cup athletes. In all, over 14,000 cows were imported, mostly from Germany and the United States. The total cost of the enterprise was around $825 million.41 Qatar’s ambassador to Russia compared the effort to the 1948 Berlin Airlift. Qatar also took steps to ensure that food insecurity could not be used as a weapon in the future. In late 2017, it launched the Strategic Food Security Facilities at Umm Al Houl, near the Hamad Port. The project includes storage facilities, silos, reservoirs, and food-processing facilities. Working with partners from Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, Qatar constructed storehouses for a six-month supply of twenty-two different food items. Private investment allowed domestic food growing to increase fourfold in a matter of months. At the same time, efforts by government ministries resulted in eleven projects to produce thousands of tons of vegetables for the domestic market.

Coping with Airspace Restrictions

Since the late 1990s, Qatar Airways had grown from a four-plane, lowprofile start-up into one of the dominant air carriers in the world and a significant part of Qatar’s soft power initiative. The airline derived much of its income from short flights within the Gulf region. Thus, the closing of Bahraini, Saudi, and Emirati airspace represented a significant threat to

102

Isolating Qatar

the airline’s economic viability. At the same time, the restrictions forced flights to Europe, Asia, and North America to take circuitous routes that increased flight times and costs, giving the airline a comparative disadvantage with flights from rivals such as Etihad Airways, Emirates Airlines, and Fly Dubai.42 Again, Iran was the primary beneficiary, as the Islamic Republic immediately found a way to antagonize the Saudis while reaping large fees from Qatari airlines for the use of Iranian airspace. Soon after the crisis started, Iran’s air chief was able to announce that about 100 more flights per day were transiting over Iran.43 Qatar Airways, for its part, announced expansion into new markets, especially in Asia, to replace business lost in the Gulf region. Sponsorship of sporting events continued.44 Onboard facilities were upgraded to become among the most luxurious in the air. Hamad International Airport, which had opened in 2014 and represents another element of Qatar’s preparation for a potential crisis with its neighbors, expanded further and remained one of the world’s most important air hubs, at least until the 2020 Covid-19 crisis. The airline’s cargo division was instrumental in addressing shortages of foodstuffs and other supplies at the start of the crisis. While government subsidies were needed to keep airfares down, the crisis did not rein in Qatar Airways’ global ambitions. In June 2017, the company announced plans to buy a large stake in American Airlines Group Inc. While the effort was dropped sometime later, for reasons having more to do with the difficulty of dealing with American regulators than anything else, it demonstrated a high level of confidence and a firm purpose of defiance.45 In October 2017, CEO Akbar Al Baker announced an agreement to buy sixty new state-of-the-art Boeing aircraft, including the new 777X, Boeing’s largest twin-engine jetliner.

International Legal Challenges

Qatar also brought numerous legal actions against the Rift nations in international fora and called upon its diplomatic assets to address the crisis. The country presented documents to the UN secretary-general accusing the Rift nations of violating the UN Charter and other international agreements by imposing the blockade. With families being separated by the demand that Rift nationals leave Qatar, the emirate filed paperwork alleging violations of various human rights treaties.46 In addition, Qatar filed complaints with the UN Security Council, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In every case, Qatar insisted that the Rift nations were in serious violation of international law and asked the international organizations to intervene. The WTO complaint cited “coercive attempts at

Qatar Responds

103

economic isolation.”47 Referring to the closing of airspace, Qatar Airways CEO al-Baker said, “It is an absolutely gross violation of international law.”48 In mid-June, the ICAO brought together transport officials from the Rift nations to try to resolve the dispute. Saudi representatives made clear that no quick resolution was possible when they accused Qatar of violating Article 4 of the Chicago Convention, which calls on signatories “not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the aims” of the agreement.49 The Saudis later insisted they had opened “emergency air corridors,” a claim immediately challenged by Qatar.50 With slow procedures and limited enforcement authority, the ICAO was unable to reopen airspace to Qatari planes by the time the crisis ended.

Finding New Partners

Two of the main beneficiaries of the Rift have been Turkey and Iran. Both nations see themselves as rivals of Saudi Arabia for leadership in the Muslim world, so both were delighted at the opportunity to disrupt the Kingdom’s plans for Qatar and advance their diplomatic causes at the same time. Turkey, for its part, rushed through needed legislation authorizing the deployment of up to 5,000 Turkish troops in Qatar. Anwar Gargash, UAE minister of state for foreign affairs, deplored the move, saying Qatar’s request for help from Turkey “could be a new tragic and comic chapter.” The Turkish troops, along with the 10,000 or so Americans at the Al Udeid Air Base, provided nearly failsafe security for Qatar from the sort of quick military intervention the Saudis and Emiratis had used in Bahrain in 2011. Turkey also sent cargo planes full of milk, yogurt, and poultry in less than forty-eight hours.51 Eggs and chickens followed.

Looking to the Long Term

Maintaining the Natural Gas Lifeline

With or without a serious dispute with its neighbors, Qatar depends on sales of natural gas to survive. Thus, a crucial part of the response to the Rift had to be protecting the income derived from gas. Until 2018, when it was overtaken by Australia, Qatar was the world’s largest producer of LNG. Most of its customers are in East Asia, but the country sells a significant amount of the resource to Europe. The Rift nations may have anticipated a serious interruption in Qatar’s LNG-based income, forcing the emirate to give in. Nothing of the sort occurred, raising more questions about the preparation and intelligence gathering that preceded the announcement of the Rift.

104

Isolating Qatar

One of the more surprising elements of the crisis was the LNG-based relationship between Qatar and two of the four Rift nations. Egypt found itself in a double bind. It imports about 60 percent of its LNG from Qatar, and it also cannot do without the transit fees it derives from LNG tankers using the Suez Canal.52 In addition, closing the canal to Qatari ships would mean disrupting gas supplies to Europe, whose leaders would be certain to blame Egypt. Dubai depended on Qatar for more than 40 percent of its gas imports, much of that natural gas coming through the Dolphin pipeline. In both cases, the Qatari government made clear that any disruptions in gas deliveries to the two states would not be Qatar’s doing. Dubai authorities, for their part, insisted that imports from Qatar had stopped but referred only to LNG arriving by ship. International markets seemed to share Qatar’s confidence in their ability to conduct business as usual; spot LNG prices only took seventeen days to recover to pre-Rift levels. Qatar Gas, in fact, signed a five-year deal with Dutch Shell amid the crisis. Not all of Qatar’s gas-related anxieties stemmed from the Rift crisis. The country is facing increased competition on the world market from the United States, Australia, and Russia, along with an increasing determination on the part of some countries to eventually eliminate their use of carbon fuels. Nevertheless, in July 2017, Qatar announced plans to increase the output of the massive natural gas field that it shares with Iran, raising its annual output from 77 million tons to 100 million. Qatar had been observing a moratorium on additional drilling in the North Field since 2005.53 The announcement, coming on the same day that the Rift nations demanded a response to a list of thirteen demands, was clearly intended as an expression of defiance. It was an expensive message, since the additional drilling could only worsen a global glut of natural gas and lower prices in the long term.

Impeding Terrorism Financing

Qatar probably made its greatest efforts to refute the charge that it was involved in providing financial support for terrorist organizations. This accusation, central to the position of the Rift nations, was prompted in part by reports that Qatar had paid close to $1 billion in ransom for members of the royal family who had been kidnapped during a hunting trip in Iraq.54 Qatari officials strenuously denied the allegations and spoke proudly of the “thankyou notes” they received for their counterterrorism efforts during their stint on the UN Security Council.55 At the start of the crisis, US State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert stated, “We recognize that Qatar continues to make efforts to stop the financing of terrorist groups, including prosecuting suspected financiers, freezing assets, [and] introducing stringent controls into its banking system. They have made progress . . . but we recognize there is

Qatar Responds

105

more work to be done.”56 A different administration official, however, said, “There is a belief among the Gulf states, and within the United States, that Qatar has been the least helpful in fighting terrorism financing.”57 Barely a month into the crisis, Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the United States agreeing to disable terror financing flows, increase surveillance of bank accounts suspected of laundering money for terrorists, and intensify counterterrorism efforts. Qatar made much of the MoU, with the emir featuring it prominently in a speech at the opening of Qatar’s Advisory Council. Qatari officials boasted that they were the first Gulf nation to sign such an agreement with the Americans and suggested it might serve as a model for others. The MoU calls for Qatar to define terrorism, freeze funding, and establish national terrorism lists. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said at a press conference following the signing, “I applaud the leadership of His Highness, the emir of Qatar, for being the first to respond to President Trump’s challenge at the Riyadh summit to stop the funding of terrorism.”58 The initial reaction of the Rift nations was support for the move, with the UAE’s foreign minister stating, “The Qatari decree to amend the antiterrorism laws is a positive step to deal seriously with the terrorists. . . . The pressure of the [Rift] crisis has started to bear fruits.”59 Soon afterward, however, the Rift nations added eighteen more organizations to a list of fifty-nine supposed terrorist organizations and blasted the MoU as woefully insufficient. Sheikh Saif bin Ahmed Al Thani, director of Qatar’s Government Communications Office, told Reuters, “[The new list] comes as a disappointing surprise that the blockading countries are still pursuing this story as part of their smear campaign against Qatar.”60

Extending Permanent Residency

Qataris are a small minority in their own country, comprising only about 10 percent of the population. Like many countries, Qatar makes it almost impossible for an immigrant to gain citizenship. Thus, it was logical for the Rift nations to think that driving a wedge between Qataris and the millions of expatriates who inhabit the country was a good political strategy. It is also logical, however, to anticipate that the Qataris were already aware of their vulnerability and ready to take steps to mitigate it. Qatari officials made clear that no one, including nationals from the Rift nations, had to leave the country. Later, officials would boast that virtually none of the expats left during the Rift.61 Instead, Qatari officials made the country’s diverse population an integral part of the nation’s identity and the regime’s political legitimacy. Speaking to the UN General Assembly in September 2017, Tamim took special care to praise the contributions of expats: “Allow me, on this

106

Isolating Qatar

occasion and from this podium, to express my pride in my Qatari people, along with the multinational and multicultural residents in Qatar.” This quotation soon appeared in newspaper articles and on commercial websites and roadside billboards. It was even featured, in classical Arabic script, at art exhibits in the country.62 The regime followed with a special exhibit of the contributions of expats at the new Qatar National Museum. It also enacted stronger labor protections (prompted in part by negative publicity surrounding the working conditions at World Cup sites) and more opportunities for investment and entrepreneurship for foreigners. Nor was the boosting of expats limited to government officials. Academic experts who interviewed ordinary Qataris more than a year into the Rift found that Qataris’ personal view of expats had improved as a result of the crisis. Qataris used words like “love, pride, loyalty, gratitude and happiness” when speaking of the expat community.63 Some two months into the crisis, Qatar approved a draft law granting permanent residency to certain noncitizens, the first law of its kind in the Gulf region. Permanent residency was extended to children born of Qatari mothers, even if the father was not a Qatari citizen, discontinuing a lex sanguinis standard that had existed since independence. The new status was also made available to those who “provide outstanding services” to the state. Permanent residency made its recipients eligible for numerous and valuable benefits, including free education through the university level, free health care, and preferential hiring, along with the right to own property and start a business without a Qatari partner.64 Far from driving expats out of the country, Qatar was actively seeking new residents. The new law, however, seemed certain to drive a wedge between skilled and unskilled workers in Qatar. The millions of expats in blue-collar jobs, mainly from South Asia, would not be eligible for permanent residency. Nevertheless, the immediate reaction of expats to the Rift was an obvious and widespread show of support for the regime. Expats evidently rallied around the government and the emir as quickly and as ardently as Qatari citizens. The authenticity of expressions of national pride among expats, however, is almost impossible to measure.65 Qatar’s government is fully capable of harsh actions, even against citizens, as it showed in 2005 when it rescinded the citizenship of 5,000 members of the Ghafran branch of the Al Murrah tribe for alleged involvement in a 1996 coup attempt.66 Still, evidence gathered on the ground in Doha and elsewhere strongly indicates that the patriotic fervor was genuine.67

Mitigating the Rift’s Effect on Families

Qatar’s ostentatious and orchestrated welcome to foreigners was probably intended, at least in part, as a contrast with the harrowing stories of separated

Qatar Responds

107

families that accompanied the announcement of the Rift. In Qatar, 6,500 mixed families faced a prolonged, perhaps permanent, separation. Al Jazeera and other news outlets were filled with stories of tearful good-byes, shattered careers, interrupted studies, and other hardships. “If we are made to go to Bahrain, what are we going to do there?” asked one university student.68 The Rift nations were clearly stung by the sympathy such stories engendered, although they certainly should not have been surprised. Egypt broke ranks immediately, which was also not surprising, given the huge number of Egyptians working in Qatar. Saudi Arabia found itself having to make arrangements for Qataris making the hajj. The other Rift nations created “hotlines” for their nationals to call to receive clarifications, instructions, and advice. Amnesty International called the measures “vague and insufficient.” Some affected families worried that the hotlines were merely a device for gathering data on those who complained, a worry that seemed justified when the UAE and Bahrain imposed stiff penalties for any expression of sympathy toward Qatar or Qataris.69 By contrast, the Qatari Ministry of the Interior released a statement announcing there was no change in policy toward the nationals of “brotherly and friendly countries which cut or reduced diplomatic relations following the malicious and hostile campaigns against Qatar.”70

Expanding the Advisory Council

As will be detailed later, the imposition of the blockade resulted in a huge outpouring of support for the Qatari government and for Tamim personally. Given the transactional nature of support for governments in rentier states, it was easy to anticipate that Qataris would want something in return for their loyalty in a time of crisis. Since the government essentially asked Qataris for greater participation in the country’s future, it was also reasonable to expect that people would desire such participation on an ongoing basis. Thus, the Qatari regime directed its efforts toward the country’s Advisory Council. Traditionally, this is a collection of men, all appointed by the emir, who are supposed to represent all facets of life in Qatar and advise the emir on public policy. While having little coercive power, the council must approve the national budget before the emir can accept it. The council also discusses draft laws and decrees referred to it by the cabinet.71 After the Rift, Tamim expanded its membership with twenty-eight new members. The new appointees included four women. This was the first time women were included. Tamim also promised to move toward including elected representatives, telling the council, “The government is currently preparing for the Advisory Council elections, including drafting legislative measures necessary to ensure that these elections are conducted perfectly well.”72 In fact,

108

Isolating Qatar

provision for elected council members was included in Qatar’s 2003 constitution, but the enabling legislation was never enacted. Elections for thirty of the council’s forty-five members took place in October 2021.73

Protecting the World Cup

The December 2010 announcement that Qatar would host the 2022 World Cup football tournament sent the country into paroxysms of joy, with spontaneous street celebrations, fireworks displays, and a national holiday. The country invested huge sums in a successful event that will, it is hoped, expand Qatar’s international prestige and soft power immensely. Qatari officials played down any threat to the 2022 tournament. In fact, officials predicted that the World Cup provided a near-unbreakable deadline for the Rift nations to patch things up, since their own citizens would demand the opportunity to attend.74 An impressive public relations headquarters was set up in downtown Doha, complete with holograms, models of the eight stadiums, recordings of the celebrations, and lofty promises of excellence in all aspects of the games. The Rift nations may have thought that the trade blockade would cut off the supply of building materials for the numerous construction projects and thus compel Qatar to reach a settlement. In yet another intelligence failure, however, the Rift nations were evidently unaware that Qatar had stockpiled huge amounts of construction materials and equipment and had hired hundreds of engineers and other experts to see to their use. Steel ordered from Saudi Arabia was replaced by Malaysian steel, which was routed through Omani ports rather than the UAE.75 As was the case with other potential negative impacts of the Rift, the Qatari government responded with aggressive new initiatives rather than retrenchment. Just after the Rift began, Qatar announced that it had spent $262 million to bring Brazilian football star Neymar da Silva Santos Júnior (known simply as Neymar) to the Paris Saint-Germain football club.76 The club is owned by Qatar Sports Investments, a subsidiary of the Qatari Investment Authority. The Qataris also burnished their image with the United States by promising that Israel would be allowed to participate in the games. When the Rift took place, the Féderation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) released a bland statement that the body “remains in regular contact with Qatar,” adding that FIFA officials had spoken with “the Qatar 2022 Local Organizing Committee and the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy about handling matters relating to the 2022 FIFA World Cup.” The phrase “regular contact” indicated that the international sports body did not anticipate any threat to the tournament and, in fact, did not consider the Rift an impediment to the tournament’s success.77

Qatar Responds

109

Strengthening the Navy

Qatar also took steps to protect its territorial waters. The country confirmed a contract signed with the Italian shipbuilding firm Fincantieri for seven naval vessels: four 100-meter corvettes, two patrol boats, and an amphibious warfare ship. The larger ships would be a first for the Qatari navy. The Italian navy was also part of the €5 billion deal, agreeing to train Qatari sailors in Italy to use the new equipment. The deal was announced at a press conference in Doha with the foreign ministers of Qatar and Italy.78 The specific purchases indicate that Qatar’s government is thinking about threats from both Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Islamic Republic often uses fast attack boats for hit-and-run attacks in the Gulf, and countering such threats is a task for which the corvettes would be well suited. While the Qatari navy is still tiny compared to that of Saudi Arabia, the additional ships are intended as a deterrent, preventing the Kingdom from securing a fast and easy victory. In December, Qatar shored up its air force by negotiating the purchase of twelve French-made Rafael fighters during a visit by French president Emmanuel Macron.79 Qatar took care not to allow the Rift to disrupt friendly relations with the United States. Despite President Donald Trump’s initial, off-the-cuff statements of support for the blockade, it soon became clear that the Americans were not eager to jeopardize good relations with Qatar or the status of the largest US military base in the region. In an obvious show of support, US Navy vessels arrived in Doha in mid-June to take part in a joint exercise with the Qatari fleet.80 The United Kingdom made a similar show of support in July when its naval vessels came to Doha for more joint exercises.81 The Americans also went ahead with a $12 billion sale of F-15 fighter jets to Qatar.

Rise of Qatari Nationalism

After it became clear in the early days of the crisis that there would be no quick capitulation from Qatar, the Rift nations hit upon the strategy of undermining the Qatari regime and especially undermining the legitimacy of Qatar’s young emir. The UAE sponsored the promotion of a rival member of the royal family. However, the effort to replace Tamim with Sheikh Abdullah, a distant relative, never had much chance of success. In promoting Abdullah, the UAE was reviving a succession debate from fifty years earlier that had little resonance with modern Qataris. Moreover, a video that showed Abdullah to be an unwilling usurper and almost a prisoner in Abu Dhabi killed what little chance remained for the tactic to succeed.82 Qataris responded to these attacks with a visible outpouring of support, both for the emir and for his policy of resistance to the blockade.

110

Isolating Qatar

Tamim followed in his father’s footsteps, quite literally, by continuing the tradition of walking in the Qatar National Day parade along the corniche in Doha. Promoting Qatari national identity through traditional heritage symbols had been official policy since the 1990s, established at the same time that Qatar adopted a foreign policy independent of that of Saudi Arabia.83 One change brought by the Rift was the addition of military equipment to the parade, with advanced battle tanks, rocket launchers, and antiaircraft guns on the corniche and coast guard patrol boats, antipirate frigates, and interceptors offshore.84 Days after the Rift took place, thousands of decals with the emir’s likeness began appearing all over Doha. They adorned the rear windows of cars, the sides of buildings, and other prominent places. The image used most frequently was a line drawing by a Qatari artist titled “Tamim al Majid” (Tamim the Glorious). Initially displayed on a giant billboard in Doha, the image became a rallying point, with Qataris and expats gathering each evening and waiting in long lines to sign the image and write messages of support.85 At one point, hundreds of women came to Aspire Dome in Doha to create a human formation of the now iconic image.86 The artist, Ahmed bin Majed Almaadheed, received a visit and a seal of approval for his work from the emir’s sister, Sheikha Al-Mayassa bint Hamad, who is internationally recognized as the country’s leading patron of the arts. The artist also received an offer of $5 million for the original drawing, which he refused.87 Tamim also appeared on decals with his parents, with the Qatari flag, or with other world leaders (those supporting Qatar). Some of the images included classic Arabic script. Often the slogan “Expect glory and prosperity” accompanied the visual images. The decals appeared so suddenly and spread so rapidly that many observers suspected the fad might have been a government operation. People living in Doha at the time insist that this was not the case and that it was a genuinely spontaneous expression of support (although the Qatari post office started issuing stamps with the image). The images were popular with both Qatari citizens and expats, with one notable distinction. It became the unwritten rule that only Qatari citizens could have large see-through displays on car rear windows, whereas expats should limit themselves to smaller decals. The large displays became so common that the state eventually ordered full-window displays removed for safety reasons. The emir’s stylized image also dominated social media posts during the Rift. In the early days of the crisis, while Ramadan was still going on, it became a tradition for families to break the fast at sunset on the corniche and to upload photos of themselves doing so to Instagram and other platforms, often with a Qatari flag. 88 Twitter hashtags also proliferated, with names like “Our Tribe Is Qatar,” “Qatar’s People in Tamim’s Heart,”

Qatar Responds

111

“We Are All Qatar,” and “We Are All Tamim bin Hamad.”89 In interviews with academic researchers, Qataris said the decals and signs were an expression of support for the policy of resistance, with some noting that, given the country’s closed political system, a decal was almost the only way to show support. Expats, for their part, said the images were a symbol of their gratitude to be living in a country that seemed to appreciate their contributions. In the end, the best efforts of the Rift nations to weaken support for the regime caused barely a ripple in statistical measurements of Qataris’ perceptions of their government’s awareness of and responsiveness to their needs.90 The efforts of the government represented an overt promotion of nationalism in Qatar. Traditionally defined, nationalism is “a national sense of community, a dynamic understanding of belonging that changes according to events and experiences that affect [the nation’s] members.”91 Nationalism is also defined as “an imagined political community in which most of the members do not know each other, yet in the minds of each lives the image of a communion.”92 The sedulous attempts to extend the definition of what it means to be a Qatari beyond ethnic Qataris meant that Qatar was encouraging civic nationalism, a brand of nationalism that permits people to choose to be part of a nation. The high level of support for the government from expats at the start of the Rift is strong evidence that the effort was working. The burgeoning sense of Qatari nationalism came at the expense of an internationalist Gulf identity that had been promoted in some circles since the Gulf nations became independent. People from the region often referred to themselves as “Khaleejis,” the people of the Gulf.93 Travel among the six Gulf states was easy and comparatively informal. According to a survey undertaken by Qatar University, by May 2018 the “sense of belonging to the GCC” had dropped to 53 percent, from 94 percent in June 2016. During the same period, the belief that the GCC “threatened Qatar” rose from 18 to 62 percent.94 Rising Qatari nationalism may have been a reason for Donald Trump’s change of heart on the Rift. The American president initially took the side of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but his administration soon expressed its strong support for Qatar. In large part, this was based on the ongoing strategic realities, such as the importance of the Al Udeid Air Base and many US allies’ dependence on Qatari natural gas. But it is also true that Trump brought to the presidency a deep skepticism about international organizations and a strong belief that national leaders should pursue their countries’ national interests and expect other leaders to do the same. Intentionally or not, Qatar’s nationalistic response to the Rift and the regime’s obvious intention to encourage that nationalism to meet future crises placed the emirate in the same anti-internationalist camp as President Trump.

112

Isolating Qatar

Conclusion

In retrospect, failures always seem inevitable. But the wholly predictable failure of the Rift to significantly alter the foreign or domestic policies of Qatar, at least in the ways the Rift nations wanted them altered, should have been clear from the start to all concerned, especially to the Rift’s chief authors, MBS and MBZ. The academic literature on blockades and embargoes is extensive, and the preconditions for the success of such actions are not a secret. Most experts agree that a blockade is nearly certain to fail if it targets a country with (1) a small population, (2) a large reserve of resources to draw on, especially financial resources, (3) no dependence on the embargoing nations for essential goods and services that cannot be acquired elsewhere, (4) access to seaborne trade, and (5) significant time to prepare.95 If these general tenets were not illuminating enough, MBS and MBZ might have looked at their failed effort to prevail in Yemen with a blockade. That action had been going on for two years at the time of the Rift, directed against a nation with a small fraction of Qatar’s resources and already weakened by prolonged political and military strife, and had brought no tangible results. Many of the responses from Qatar to the challenges of the Rift were utterly predictable and should have been considered before the blockade was announced. As noted in an earlier chapter, MBS and MBZ evidently did not make overtures to other nations to orchestrate a cascade of boycotting nations, which would have at least given the impression of a more serious crisis. The Rift nations’ leaders ignored other evidence of Qatar’s resilience that most experts would have regarded as undeniable. The Hamad Port had been under construction for close to a decade, and Saudi agents should have determined its capabilities long before June 2017. They also should have known of the increased cargo capacity of the Hamad International Airport. In addition, research (overt or covert) would have revealed that Qatar had been stockpiling construction materials, blunting another expected hardship of the Rift. The fact that intra-Gulf trade amounted to less than one-seventh of Qatar’s total trade also was not a secret. The Egyptian leaders should have known they were not going to forego the fees from Qatar’s use of the Suez Canal, not going to cut themselves off from the source of over half their natural gas supplies, and not going to recall the hundreds of thousands of Egyptians living in Qatar. Dubai evidently made no provision for the possibility of having to do without the natural gas coming through the Dolphin pipeline. While MBS and MBZ cannot be faulted for failing to anticipate the creation and success of the Baladna dairy farm, they certainly should have foreseen that dairy products would be available from sources other than

Qatar Responds

113

Saudi Arabia and that Qatar had the money to fly such goods in when the land border was closed. Similarly, it is shocking that the Saudis in particular seemingly did not consider the opportunities the Rift provided for Iran and Turkey to draw Qatar closer to them while at the same time thwarting the Saudis and gaining goodwill elsewhere in the world, not to mention needed cash from additional overflight fees. Qatar closed some important international deals in the first weeks of the crisis, so negotiations on those deals must have begun before June 5 and should have been known to Rift nations’ intelligence services, or at least suspected. The July MoU with the United States on stopping terrorism funding and a major purchase of naval vessels from one of the largest shipbuilding companies in the world could not have been entirely secret before they were announced. In addition, the significant global condemnation of the demand that nationals return home, which resulted in heartrending stories of split families, was entirely predictable. Finally, no one had the right to be surprised that Qatar is a wealthy nation, with a huge reserve fund, and a knowledge of how best to use that wealth to mitigate the hardships of the Rift. In the event, Qatar had to spend between $30 billion and $40 billion to shore up its banks. Even had the Rift leaders assumed that the damage would be twice as bad, they also should have known that an $80 billion price tag was well within Qatar’s means. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE has huge intelligence services, but what assets they do have should have been tasked differently or attended to more closely. It seems likely that MBZ and MBS acted largely on their own. But if the failure of the Rift nations’ leaders to anticipate the difficulties they would face is evidence of the drawbacks of a small, tight-knit decisionmaking group, the success of Qatar in dealing with the Rift shows the advantages of a small bureaucracy. Most of the important leaders in Qatar are closely related members of the same Al Thani family. The emir and his father are the country’s most powerful decisionmakers. The emir’s sister has the reputation of being a power behind the scenes. The foreign minister, the minister of economy and commerce, the interior minister, the director of the Government Communications Office, the UN ambassador, the ambassador to the United States, the chief of the Qatar Investment Authority, and the director of Qatar’s delegation to the World Trade Organization all have the surname Al Thani. With no compelling evidence of current intrafamily squabbles, it is reasonable to think that decisions for action, once made, would be implemented with a minimum of bureaucratic delay. Just weeks into the crisis, the Rift nations were forced to reduce their original list of thirteen demands to a vaguer list of six “principles.” The Qatari regime showed no more inclination to agree to the six principles than it had to the previous thirteen demands. Intransigence on the part of Qatar required both sides to seek support from outside the country.

114

Notes

Isolating Qatar

1. “Almaadheed’s ‘Tamim Al Majd’ Creates Huge Impact,” The Peninsula (Doha), July 10, 2017. 2. See, for example, Gengler and Al-Khelaifi, “Crisis, State Legitimacy, and Political Participation,” 401. 3. Barnard and Kirkpatrick, “5 Arab Nations Move to Isolate Qatar.” 4. Lynch, The Arab Spring, chap. 7. 5. “New Assertive Generation of Gulf Leaders at Heart of Qatar Rift,” Reuters News, June 19, 2017. 6. Stancati, “Saudi Crown Prince and U.A.E. Heir Forge Pivotal Ties.” 7. Hubbard and Kirkpatrick, “An Audacious Saudi Prince Has Many Looking Over Their Shoulder.” 8. Das Augustine, “Economic and Fiscal Impact of Sanctions on Qatar Turns Acute.” 9. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, September 6, 2017. 10. “Emir Patronises Inauguration of Hamad Port,” Gulf Times, September 5, 2017. 11. Parasie, “Qatar Opens Port to Ease Blockade.” 12. Interviews with Qatari officials in Doha, November 2018. 13. Zafirov, “The Qatar Crisis,” 8. 14. “Qatari FM Insists Hamas ‘a Legitimate Resistance Movement,’” Times of Israel, June 10, 2017. 15. Bashir, “Suspected Islamic State Suicide Bomber in Gaza Kills Hamas Security Guard.” 16. Walsh, “Qatar’s Open-Door Approach.” 17. Interviews with Qatari officials in Doha, November 2018. 18. Kirkpatrick, “U.A.E. Competed with Qatar.” 19. “Qatar ‘Not Prepared to Change Its Foreign Policy,’” Al Jazeera, June 8, 2017. 20. “Gulf Diplomatic Crisis: Qatar’s Reaction in Full,” Al Jazeera, June 5, 2017. 21. DeYoung, “UAE Tied to Hack Targeting Qatar.” 22. Das Augustine, “Capital Flight from Qatar Aggravates Increase in Funding Costs.” 23. Wintour, “Land of Milk and Money.” 24. Das Augustine, “Economic and Fiscal Impact of Sanctions on Qatar Turns Acute.” 25. Lohade, “Banking and Finance.” 26. “Qatar’s Finances ‘Eroding Fast’, Says Eaton Vance,” Dow Jones Institutional News, August 8, 2017. 27. Mayenkar, “Traders Bet on More Weakness in Qatari Riyal.” 28. Parasie, “Qatar, Defying Deadline.” 29. Wirz, “Qatar Makes Sudden Change Ahead of Bond Sale.” 30. Whittall and Banerji, “U.S. Stocks Fall as Apple Shares Decline.” 31. Mayenkar, “Traders Bet on More Weakness in Qatari Riyal.” 32. Parasie, “Qatar, Defying Deadline.” 33. “Qatar May Cut Capital Spending Because of Sanctions,” Reuters News, August 28, 2017. 34. Mitchell, “Why Did Qatar Just Change Its Residency Laws?” 35. Platt, “Economy Resilient Despite Blockade,” 67. 36. Candemir, “Saudi Firms Use Turkey for Qatar-Bound Shipments.” 37. Guo, “Emerging Markets Pick Up the Slack as Bigger Players’ Demand for LNG Eases.”

Qatar Responds

115

38. Sanchez, “Flying Cows and Friends in Iran.” 39. “Qatar Crisis: How the Tiny Arab Nation Is Circumventing the Blockade, with Money Power,” Indian Express, July 13, 2017. 40. Wintour, “Land of Milk and Money.” 41. “Uncowed Qatar to Meet Milk Needs in 2018 Amid Crisis,” Daily Star, November 28, 2017. By December 2017, Baladna was ready for an initial public offering. See “Qatari Dairy Company Battling Arab Boycott to Go Public Next Year—Sources,” Reuters News, December 16, 2017. 42. Barnard and Kirkpatrick, “5 Arab Nations Move to Isolate Qatar.” 43. Eqbali, “Iran Sent Food to Qatar amid Middle East Rift.” 44. The Rift nations responded by banning the wearing of T-shirts for football teams sponsored by Qatar. 45. Wall and Carey, “Qatar Airways Won’t Take a Stake in American Airlines.” 46. Gladstone. “Qatar Criticizes Move by Antagonists.” 47. “Qatar Launches Wide-Ranging WTO Complaint Against Trade Boycott,” Reuters News, July 31, 2017. 48. Wall, “Qatar to Homeland Security.” 49. “Saudi: Gulf Rift Bigger Than Air Rights; Can’t Be Resolved at ICAO,” Reuters News, June 15, 2017. 50. “Arab States Say They Will Allow Some Qatari Flights, Doha Denies It,” Reuters News, July 30, 2017. 51. “How Turkey Stood by Qatar Amid the Gulf Crisis,” Al Jazeera English, November 14, 2017. 52. Kumar, “Surrender or Dig In.” 53. Said, “Qatar Launches Plan to Increase LNG Output amid Arab Dispute.” 54. “Qatar Vows No Surrender in Gulf Crisis as U.S., Kuwait Seek Solution,” Reuters News, June 8, 2017. 55. Interviews with Qatari officials in Doha, November 2018. 56. DeYoung, “Trump Jumps into Dispute Between Qatar and Arab Bloc.” 57. Schwartz, “Trump Sides with Saudis.” 58. Harris, “Tillerson Tries His Hand at Shuttle Diplomacy.” 59. “UAE Welcomes Qatari Decision to Amend Anti-terrorism Laws,” Reuters News, July 21, 2017. 60. “Qatar Says New Terror List Is ‘Disappointing Surprise,’” Reuters News, July 26, 2017. 61. Interviews with Qatari officials in Doha, November 2018. 62. Mitchell and Allagui, “Car Decals, Civic Rituals,” 1370. 63. Ibid., 1381, 1384. 64. “Qatar to Approve Permanent Residency for Some Expats,” Al Jazeera English, August 3, 2017. 65. Expats’ overall welfare, however, is measured on a regular basis by Qatar University’s Social and Economic Survey Research Institute. See, for example, “QU Presents Results of Guest Workers’ Welfare Index,” Qatar University, May 2, 2019. http://www.qu.edu.qa/newsroom/sesri/QU-present-results-of-Guest-Workers%E2 %80%99-Welfare-Index. 66. Gengler and Al-Khelaifi, “Crisis, State Legitimacy, and Political Participation,” 404. 67. Holmey, “Qatari Finance Finds Its New Normal.” 68. Raghavan, “Showdown over Qatar Is Tearing Families Apart.” 69. Stancati, “World News.” 70. “Gulf Diplomatic Crisis.” 71. Interviews with Qatari officials in Doha, November 2018.

116

Isolating Qatar

72. “Qatar Moving Ahead Irrespective of Blockade: Emir,” Gulf Times (Doha), November 15, 2017. 73. Previously Qataris could only vote for local officials. Political parties remain banned. 74. Interviews with Qatari officials in Doha, November 2018. 75. Platt, “Economy Resilient Despite Blockade,” 67. 76. Raghavan, “Two Months into Saudi-Led Boycott.” 77. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 11, 2017. 78. “Qatar Announces 5bn Euro Order for Warships from Italy,” Agence France Presse, August 2, 2017. 79. “Commentary: Macron Steers France to a New Mideast Role,” Reuters News, December 20, 2017. 80. “US and Qatar Seal $12bn Deal for F-15 Fighter Jets,” Al Jazeera English, June 15, 2017. 81. “Emiri Naval Forces Hold Joint Exercise with British Navy,” Gulf Times, July 17, 2017. 82. Gengler and Al-Khelaifi, “Crisis, State Legitimacy, and Political Participation,” 402. 83. Oruc, “Hashtag Unity,” 43. 84. “National Day Parade Showcases Qatar’s Military Might, Heritage,” Gulf Times (Doha), December 18, 2017. 85. “Iconic ‘Tamim Al Majd’ Image Becomes Immortal,” The Peninsula (Doha), July 17, 2017. 86. “People Turn Up to Form Tamim Al Majd Image,” The Peninsula (Doha), July 21, 2017. 87. Walsh, “Qatar’s Riches Soften Blow of Blockade.” 88. Mitchell and Allagui, “Car Decals, Civic Rituals,” 1380. 89. Oruc, “Hashtag Unity,” 53. 90. Gengler and Al-Khelaifi, “Crisis, State Legitimacy, and Political Participation,” 412. 91. Mitchell and Allagui, “Car Decals, Civic Rituals,” 1369. 92. Oruc, “Hashtag Unity,” 45. 93. Raghavan, “Showdown over Qatar Is Tearing Families Apart.” 94. Gengler and Al-Khelaifi, “Crisis, State Legitimacy, and Political Participation,” 408. 95. Collins, “Anti-Qatar Embargo Grinds Toward Strategic Failure,” 1.

7

The World Reacts

The nation of Qatar unfortunately has historically been a funder of terrorism at a very high level. —President Donald Trump, June 20171 It’s a great honor to work with a friend. [Qataris] are investing very heavily in our country. They’re creating lots of jobs. They’re buying tremendous amounts of military equipment, including planes. —President Donald Trump, July 20192

Any chance for the four Rift nations (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt) to succeed in forcing Qatar to accede to their demands depended upon the reaction from the wider world. This was especially true after the first weeks of the Rift, when it became clear that the Arab world would not follow the Rift nations’ lead and act en masse to isolate Qatar. Unfortunately for the success of the Rift, the global reaction was no more encouraging than the regional reaction. Potentially influential nations, like the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Turkey, took a neutral position or came to support Qatar. This lack of support may have come as a surprise to the Rift nations since they believed that isolating Qatar was part of a global effort to fight terrorism. Knowingly or not, the four Rift nations were trying to overturn a basic principle of the international system by asking nations to ignore their immediate self-interest in favor of a more long-term global interest. This chapter shows that the almost unvarying reaction of national leaders to the Rift was to try to exploit the crisis to pursue their own national interests. Like the regional reaction, the global reaction illustrates the continued dominance of national interests in the making of foreign policy.

117

118

Isolating Qatar

The Gulf Region Reacts

The Rift Nations Double Down

Of the four nations imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions on Qatar, the UAE was the source of the harshest and most unyielding rhetoric. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), the de facto ruler of the Emirates, has long been an enemy of the Muslim Brotherhood and has long advocated a region-wide crackdown on the movement. Qatar’s offer of a safe haven for the Brotherhood has prompted some of MBZ’s fiercest rhetoric. When the Rift nations issued their list of thirteen “nonnegotiable” demands, an official UAE news source asserted, “The leadership of Qatar should be under no illusion. The anti-terror quartet is united in making sure Doha’s support to organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its malicious work in Egypt ends once and for all.”3 On a visit to India in August 2017, UAE minister of state for foreign affairs Anwar Gargash said bluntly, “Qatar should either mend its ways or look for a life without being part of the Gulf Cooperation Council and its common market.”4 The UAE foreign minister equated support for the Muslim Brotherhood with support for “al-Qaeda type organizations” in Somalia, Syria, and Libya.5 Yet, at the same time, the UAE was most vulnerable to retaliation from Qatar. Most of the UAE’s natural gas needs are met by the 225-mile Dolphin pipeline from Qatar’s North Field offshore gas reservoir, which provides the UAE with fifty-six million cubic meters of natural gas every day. A shutdown of the pipeline would cause some inconvenience for Qatar but major disruptions to the energy needs of the UAE. Had the leaders of the UAE wanted to set an example of selfless foreign policy, they might have decided to forego their gas supplies from Qatar or at least cut back on them. Even while expecting other nations to make such sacrifices in their national interest, the UAE’s leaders never seriously considered doing so themselves. Fortunately for the Emirates, Qatar announced early in the crisis that it would not retaliate for the sanctions by cutting off gas supplies. The Saudis were also ineffective in following up on their initial antiQatar actions. Their efforts with the UAE to promote internal strife in Qatar by promoting a rival to the throne became an object of derision in Doha, with even a Saudi source admitting that there was no likelihood of internal revolt in Qatar. The source insisted, somewhat hollowly, that even so, “Qatar’s journey of being an oversized regional and international player will come to an end.”6 The Kingdom was also vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy, since it demanded compliance based on its leadership of the Islamic world, a claim resting on the presence of Mecca and Medina in its territory. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to allow Qataris to travel to these cities for the hajj was a manifest inconsistency. Even as late as January 2018, Saudi

The World Reacts

119

authorities deported a group of twenty Qatari pilgrims. The Saudis also faced the charge of hypocrisy after expelling Qatar from the war in Yemen, which the Kingdom also portrayed as a fight against terrorism. The Saudis probably would have been quite content with Qatar as “an oversized regional player” had the Qatari leadership shared the absolute priority the Saudis gave to countering and weakening the regime in Iran. To demand Qatar do so, in the face of the latter’s manifest interest in maintaining reasonably cordial relations with the Islamic Republic, was to demand that Qatar simply abandon a central national interest in the name of regional solidarity. Put differently, it was a demand that Qatar equate its sovereign national interests with those of its Arab neighbors or permit limitations on its sovereignty by its neighbors.

Iran Sees Opportunities in the Rift

As noted previously, the Rift gave Qatar incentive to pursue even closer relations with Iran, the opposite of the intended effect. The leaders of the Islamic Republic, for their part, immediately saw opportunities in the Rift crisis. Iran responded immediately with food aid to the embattled emirate and followed up by offering its airspace to Qatar. In the latter case, the crisis also provided Iran with a welcome source of hard currency, in the neighborhood of $180 million per year for overflight rights. Iran’s fees were high enough that the Qataris eventually sought compensation from the Rift nations in a case brought to the International Court of Justice. Four months into the crisis, Mohammed Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, met with the emir of Qatar for talks on extending and strengthening relations.7 Oman and Kuwait were the only members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that remained neutral in the crisis. Iran saw the Rift as an opportunity to gain influence with these two Gulf states. In part, the large shipments of food from Iran to Qatar were made in order to attract favorable notice from Kuwait and Oman. Oman’s foreign minister visited Teheran in July 2017 to boost bilateral ties. Iranian president Hassan Rouhani noted, “Iran and Oman have for years had fraternal relations and the best must be made of these good relations to reinforce them.”8 Zarif traveled to Muscat to meet with Omani officials, including Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said. The Islamic Republic also had two of its warships pay a port call to Oman on their way to Yemen, a move that could be interpreted as both a goodwill visit and a veiled threat. As the Iranian leaders ostensibly tried to mediate the dispute, they were careful to stay in touch with possible allies and keep them apprised of any progress. After one fruitless offer to serve as a go-between, Zarif made calls to his counterpart in Oman to discuss “the latest regional developments.” He also called the foreign ministers of Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Turkey,

120

Isolating Qatar

Lebanon, Malaysia, and Tunisia. His message was straightforward: “Neighbors are permanent; geography can’t be changed. Coercion is never the solution. Dialogue is imperative.”9 Iran backed up that sentiment by sending multiple delegations to Qatar in an effort to establish permanent links to the Qatari market.

Regional Mediation Efforts

Kuwait and Oman share misgivings about a Gulf region dominated by Saudi Arabia or, worse, by open war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both Kuwait and Oman perceived the Rift to be rooted in the regional ambitions of the Kingdom and the latter’s intolerance for foreign policies among GCC members that were not in lockstep with Riyadh’s priorities. Both had reason to fear that if the Rift nations succeeded in forcing Qatar to alter its policies, they could become the next targets. Both the Kuwaiti and Omani leaderships remembered the example of Bahrain, where the Saudis and Emiratis had intervened militarily in 2011 to prevent a change in regime. Thus Kuwait and Oman offered both practical assistance to Qatar to mitigate the effects of the Rift and mediation to bring the crisis to an end. Early on, Oman sent its foreign minister to Doha to meet with Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani to discuss ways to defuse the crisis. Almost immediately after Qatar officially opened its new Hamad Port, the Qatari port authority announced the establishment of a direct shipping route between it and Sohar Port in Oman. The arrangement allowed Qatar to conveniently reroute cargo that had previously gone to ports in the UAE. Oman also offered its airspace to Qatari airplanes, cutting travel time to destinations in Asia. In addition, Oman allowed Qatar to use its ports for the return of hundreds of Qatari-owned camels that had been stranded in the UAE and could not return to Qatar overland due to the closed Saudi-Qatari border.10 Kuwait was more active on the diplomatic front. Its elderly leader, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, made numerous trips to Gulf capitals, carrying oral messages, delivering letters, and seeking common ground. Sabah emphasized what he saw as the essential unity of the Gulf region. “What we have in common is we will never be affected by a dispute. We see it as temporary, however long it takes.”11 Sabah had been instrumental in resolving the 2014 diplomatic rift between Qatar and its neighbors and had credibility with all the parties to the Rift. Even after a December 2017 GCC summit was widely perceived as a failure, Sabah was upbeat. He noted that the summit was the first meeting of high-level representatives of all six GCC members since the start of the crisis six months earlier. At a later meeting of GCC legislators, Sabah lamented the “deteriorating circumstances” in the Gulf, which he said represented “a challenge to all of us.” He added, “We all understand the problems facing our GCC, and

The World Reacts

121

these problems require meetings and consultations on all levels. We will never be able to face these challenges individually.”12 Sabah’s efforts won praise from US president Donald Trump, who met the Kuwaiti emir at the White House in September 2017 and received a briefing from him on the status of the Gulf crisis. US secretary of state Rex Tillerson recognized Sabah’s importance by stopping in Kuwait first before traveling elsewhere in the region to try to resolve the dispute. Sabah welcomed the participation of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan while the former was visiting Riyadh for talks with Saudi king Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. On another occasion, Qatar’s foreign minister flew to Kuwait City to deliver Qatar’s official response to the demands of the Rift nations. In August 2017, Sabah sent a letter to Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi urging “unity and cooperation” among the Arab countries and praising Egypt’s “pivotal role in the common Arab work, as it is the base of stability and security in the Arab region.”13 Speaking at the United Nations headquarters in New York, Qatar’s permanent representative thanked Sabah for his efforts and reaffirmed Qatar’s commitment to a negotiated solution. More tangible thanks arrived in January 2018, when fifty-five Qatari businessmen made a two-day visit to Kuwait to explore expanded commercial ties between the two countries. The trip was led by Qatar Chamber chairman Sheikh Khalifa bin Jassim Al Thani, a member of the royal family. He said the visit “reflects the deep and robust relations between both countries [and] aims to review and enhance cooperation among businessmen.” He added that Qatari businessmen “have a strong desire to build partnerships and alliances with their Kuwaiti peers.”14 It is difficult to see what impact Sabah’s indefatigable letter writing and traveling had. While his efforts might have kept the crisis from escalating out of control, their visible fruits were minimal. When Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE threatened to boycott the twenty-third Arabian Football Gulf Cup tournament, Sabah did get Qatar to agree to move the games to Kuwait, but this goodwill gesture did not lead to anything more substantive. When the Rift nations presented their list of thirteen demands and gave Qatar a ten-day deadline to comply, Sabah managed to secure a forty-eight-hour extension but failed to get the Rift nations to mitigate their demands or Qatar to show any flexibility in addressing them. In the end, the delay only succeeded in delaying Qatar’s emphatic rejection.

The Greater Middle East Reacts

The crisis involving Qatar and its neighbors came as every nation in North Africa except Morocco was trying to cope with the lingering aftereffects of

122

Isolating Qatar

the Arab Spring revolutions. In the case of Libya, the Arab Spring caused unbridled havoc and unprecedented bloodshed. In 2017, the country had two governments, one centered in the western capital of Tripoli, backed by Qatar and most Western governments, and one in Benghazi in the east. This government was supported by Russia, the Saudis, and the Emiratis. If this split did not make Libya’s relationship to the Rift complicated enough, the country was also trying to stabilize its income by becoming a major exporter of natural gas. Thus, the Benghazi-based faction had a double reason for wanting to see Qatar’s economy suffer since serious economic disruption in Qatar would cause a spike in global gas prices. At the same time, Libya ignored OPEC production caps on oil exports, boosting its output to a million barrels per day in June 2017, a level not seen in four years.15

Morocco Offers Its Good Offices

With the stablest government in North Africa, Morocco had no reason to fear the ripple effects of the Rift and could focus on finding ways to exploit the crisis to advance its national interests, specifically the use of soft power. Its initial reaction was to announce shipments of food to Qatar, presenting the shipments as fulfillment of its Islamic duty to provide charity during Ramadan. While Morocco’s King Mohammed VI made repeated offers to mediate the dispute, his Saudi counterpart embarrassed him by inviting Qatari sheikh Abdullah Al Thani to visit him in Tangier. The sheikh is from a branch of the Al Thanis that lost a 1972 power struggle, and Salman’s invitation was a threat to undermine the emir of Qatar. Mohammed’s offers to mediate gained some additional weight when he reiterated them during a state visit by French president Emmanuel Macron in June 2017. Macron made common cause with King Mohammed, saying, “The king shares our concern. France would like to see the [Gulf] countries talking again and for the Gulf to remain stable, not least because these states are stakeholders in the crises in Syria and Libya.” Macron added, “The king of Morocco has met with several of those involved.”16 Qatar responded by adding Morocco to the list of countries whose nationals no longer needed a visa to visit Qatar.

Algeria Reacts to the Gulf Crisis

Algeria’s role in dealing with the Rift is emblematic of how difficult it was for even relatively remote nations to stay out of the controversy completely. It is also evidence of the resilience of national interest as a guide to policy. An Algeria-Qatar meeting took place in October 2018 during the Interna-

The World Reacts

123

tional Exhibition for Homeland Security and Civil Defense in Doha. The two countries’ ministers of the interior discussed the implementation of a security cooperation agreement, signed in 2016. The ministers sought ways to extend cooperation in combating terrorism, stopping cross-border crime, and improving police and civil protection.17 Qatari officials, for their part, emphasized the opportunities for effective business partnerships between Algeria and Qatar and especially expanding cooperation on maritime and air transport. Algerian officials must have realized immediately that such cooperation necessarily entailed supporting Qatar’s side and that the Qataris were appealing to Algeria’s national interests to provide incentives for that support. Qatar sought other areas of cooperation with Algeria. Qatar’s Ministry of National Defense invited the chief of staff of the Algerian armed forces to Doha for a three-day meeting to discuss military cooperation.18 In September 2018, Algeria’s minister of mines announced the pending completion of a steel complex in Bellara, 225 miles east of Algiers. The plant is a joint project designed to meet all of Algeria’s steel needs, with some left over for export. Qatar’s minister of industry and mines pointed out that the complex is “an incentive” for further partnerships with Qatar.19 In early 2020, while anticipating a visit by Tamim, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune said he would welcome the emir as a “brother” and quickly added, “We expect no quid pro quo from the Qatari, Emirati, Saudi, Egyptian or even other friendly countries.”20 Without revealing any details of the contents of their talks, Tebboune said of his meeting, “There is a total understanding between Algeria and Qatar on different regional and international issues.”21

The GCC Is Undermined

While Qatar was encouraging even seemingly uninvolved nations like Algeria to actively pursue their national interest, the Gulf’s most important international organization was facing serious threats to its future. As the enmity between Saudi Arabia and Iran grew worse, the Kingdom’s leadership increasingly sought to use the GCC as an instrument of its own foreign policy and became increasingly indifferent to the national interests of the other GCC members. Saudi officials were dismissive of Qatar’s need to work with Iran to exploit their shared natural gas field. Even before the Rift, Kuwait and Oman opposed the idea of a closer union. In the former case, the emir of Kuwait worried that the relatively open and responsive Kuwaiti political system would come under pressure in a Saudi-dominated union. Oman, for its part, has long adhered to the foreign policy principle “Friend to all, enemy to none,” which the Saudis’ likely demands for antiIran actions would seriously undermine.22

124

Isolating Qatar

With the advent of the Rift, Saudi Arabia and the UAE drew closer together and could usually count on Bahrain’s support, while the organization’s apparent drift from its original purposes further alienated the other GCC members. Early in the crisis, the emir of Kuwait understood that a prolonged crisis along these lines would probably mean the development of two blocs within the GCC. Two GCCs would effectively mean no GCC at all. A Washington-based expert opined, “There are many analysts who believe that a potential break-up of the GCC has to be considered right now.”23 The organization’s uncertain future was highlighted during the GCC’s annual summit in December 2017, six months into the Rift. Tamim and the emir of Kuwait were the only two heads of state who attended the meeting, held in Kuwait City. The other members were represented by foreign ministers. In the case of Bahrain, its government specifically acknowledged it would not attend because Qatar would be represented. Still, Tamim and Sabah gave the summit great significance, with the Qatari leader stating, “I am full of hope that the summit will lead to results that will maintain the security of the Gulf and its stability.” Al Jazeera also promoted the summit, broadcasting the view that “the mere fact that it convened is major progress, especially in the absence of true progress bridging the gap between Qatar and, on the other hand, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain.”24 But as Qatari and Kuwaiti officials played up the summit, Saudi Arabia and the UAE undermined the GCC itself. On the eve of the summit, the two nations announced the formation of a “joint cooperation committee” to deepen cooperation on security issues. While the announcement did not specify if other GCC members would be invited to join, the Emiratis and Saudis made plain they could strike out on their own if they so chose. Kuwaiti and Qatari officials, however, insisted that their nations were still committed to a successful GCC. Kuwait’s government said it was determined to support the GCC and added that the emir’s reconciliation efforts would continue despite the lack of progress at the December summit. A Kuwaiti official said the work of the organization would “not be frozen or disrupted.”25 Sabah said at the close of the summit that the GCC would continue to carry out its duties despite the “spat.” 26 The Speaker of Qatar’s Advisory Council confirmed that Qatar would “remain loyal to the GCC, committed to its principles and keen to achieve its goals.” 27 Some months later, however, Qatar announced that it was leaving OPEC, an international organization that provided many more tangible benefits than the GCC. Although not a major oil exporter, Qatar had been a longtime member of OPEC, and its departure could not help but signal its willingness to manage its foreign affairs without deference to international organizations.

The World Reacts

125

Reactions Beyond the Arab World Turkey and Israel

The two non-Arab regional powers also saw the Rift as a chance to advance their specific national interests. From the very start of the crisis, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proclaimed his support for Qatar, recalling Qatari support for him when he faced an attempted coup in 2016. He said, “We disapprove of the sanctions against Qatar. This development, coming at a time when we need solidarity and cooperation more than ever, does not benefit any country in the region.”28 An expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations analyzed Erdoğan’s thinking this way: “Whatever Qatar is accused of, Turkey can also be accused of, and Erdoğan is aware of that. There is a sense in the Turkish leadership that [the Rift nations] are aiming at Qatar but really trying to target us.”29 Like the leaders of Kuwait and Oman, Erdoğan worried that if Qatar’s autonomy could be crushed, international pressure would increase on all nations to conform to the interests of regional organizations, even at the expense of national interests. Erdoğan’s early stance on the Rift was that of an honest broker. He hoped to use his good relations with the Saudi king as an opening to mediate. Erdoğan spoke by phone with Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Kuwaiti emir, the Saudi king, and Tamim, emphasizing “the importance of regional peace and stability . . . as well as the importance of focusing on the path of diplomacy and dialogue to lower the current tension.”30 His public message to the Saudi king was simultaneously deferential and condescending: “You [Saudi Arabia] are the largest and most powerful state in the Gulf. We call you the Custodian of the Holy Places. You especially should work for brotherhood and not animosity. You have to work for bringing brothers together. This is what we expect from Saudi, the Custodian of the Holy Mosques.”31 But after the Rift nations demanded that Turkey close its Qatari military base, Erdoğan’s stance gave way to rhetorical and concrete support for Qatar. Turkey opened its air corridors to Qatari planes and announced that it would not discuss any change in its bilateral military agreement with Qatar. In fact, Erdoğan pushed Turkey’s parliament to meet in special session to authorize the stationing of 5,000 Turkish troops at a base near Doha that had been constructed as part of a 2014 defense treaty with Qatar. The special action by the parliament also provided for Turkish soldiers to step up the training of their Qatari counterparts. The additional Turkish troops began arriving later in June. Turkish businesses immediately found opportunities to support the country’s national interest while making profits. With the eager cooperation of Saudi businesses, Turkish logistical companies made significant fortunes transporting Saudi goods through Turkey to Qatar, seriously undercutting the boycott.32

126

Isolating Qatar

Qatar found concrete ways to return the favors from Turkey. In August 2018, for example, a timely promise of $15 billion in Qatari investments in Turkey helped stop a run on the Turkish lira. In keeping with the position of the Qatari government, the Turkish state-dominated media portrayed Qatar’s fight with its fellow Arab states as a nationalist cause. “We consider these demands [of the Rift nations] are against international law,” Erdoğan said. “[The Rift] is a breach of Qatar’s sovereignty rights.”33 In keeping with his own country’s national interest, Erdoğan also used his reaction to the Rift as a way of reminding the European Union that, should the organization continue to stall Turkey’s membership, Erdoğan had other options for international cooperation.34 The state of Israel, for its part, had been a longtime critic of Qatar’s foreign policies and saw the Rift as a way to highlight what it perceived to be Qatar’s ongoing support for terrorism. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office called the Rift “a new line in the Middle Eastern sand,” adding, “No longer Israel against Arabs, but Israel and Arabs against Qatar-financed terror.”35 The country’s defense minister added that the Rift “opens many possibilities of cooperation in the struggle against terror” by showing “that even in the Arab states they understand that the danger is not Zionism, but terrorism.”36 Qatar’s support for Hamas in Gaza and its friendly relations with the Muslim Brotherhood were particularly troubling for Israel. In addition, Qatar had permitted Yusuf al-Qaradawi to take up residence in the 1960s, despite his frequent advocacy of suicide bombings in Israel.37 Qatar has provided financial support for Hamas for years. Much of the aid was devoted to infrastructure in Gaza, but reports also said Qatar provided funding for weapons, including rockets fired into Israel. Qatar’s ambassador to the United States defended the support, telling Al Jazeera, “Our engagement with Hamas is an engagement in the context of the peace process. That’s very important to clarify. In order to start negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, first, we need to have reconciliation between the Palestinians themselves.”38 Israeli officials also worried that absent Qatari support for Hamas projects in Gaza, the economic situation there would worsen and lead to more violence against Israel. Hamas’s leadership responded to the Rift by strengthening its ties with Iran, receiving in return limited financial support for its military wing. Complicating the picture even more, the UAE saw the Rift as an opportunity to advance its national interests by pushing Qatar out of Gaza by replacing Qatari funding with its own. However, the Emirates provided only a fraction of what Gaza had been accustomed to receiving (and was still receiving even during the Rift) from Qatar. Egypt also saw an opportunity to extend its influence over Hamas but, like the UAE, was unable to match Qatari largesse. Qatar once again was able to back up its promotion of potential friends’ national interests with tangible, concrete rewards for pursuing those interests.

The World Reacts

127

The Israeli government also deplored what it saw as the excessively tolerant attitude of Al Jazeera toward the Muslim Brotherhood and other suspect organizations. At the start of the Rift, Israel imitated the Rift nations by closing Al Jazeera’s offices in Israel and canceling the press credentials of Al Jazeera journalists. When Israeli communications minister Ayoub Kara announced steps against the Qatari-based network, Prime Minister Netanyahu praised him and said the steps would counter “Al Jazeera’s incitement against Israel.” While having some value as a statement of purpose, the moves against Al Jazeera had little practical effect. As noted in Chapter 4, most of the network’s viewers used satellite dishes, over which Israel’s government has no control. Israel’s relations with Qatar were complex, as they were with other Gulf states. The Jewish state maintained a trade office in Doha and quietly worked with Qatar on a number of projects. But both countries found it convenient to maintain a low profile in their cooperation, almost to the point of deniability. Israel’s priority in the Gulf, like that of Saudi Arabia, is containing the ambitions of Iran. Thus Israel’s national interest will never completely align with Qatar’s, but the two countries have enough interests in common to permit some level of collaboration. Given Israel’s prevailing interests in the Gulf region, the Rift nations might have thought that by punishing Qatar, they could improve their relations with Israel and draw benefits in the form of technical assistance from the Israelis and strong approval from the avidly pro-Israel Trump administration. Minimally, the Rift seemed to demonstrate that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain took the threat of terrorist support seriously and were willing to sacrifice some national interests to force Qatar to cut off that support. Such a policy aligned very clearly with Israeli (and American) priorities in the Gulf. The link was confirmed by Israeli defense minister Avigdor Lieberman, who said the diplomatic rift between Qatar and fellow Arab countries in the region “opens up opportunities for cooperation in the fight against terrorism.”39 If hopes for closer ties with Israel were a motivation for isolating Qatar, the effort bore fruit in late 2020 when both the UAE and Bahrain signed “Abraham Accords” with Israel, normalizing diplomatic relations with the Jewish state.40

The Americans Respond

Hasty Words and Enduring Interests

Some weeks before the Rift, President Trump, making his first trip overseas as president, attended a summit of Arab nations in Riyadh. His strong words against terrorism and against nations supporting it made a deep impression on the four Rift nation leaders. Egyptian president el-Sisi, for

128

Isolating Qatar

example, praised Trump for his role in forming “a united front to combat terrorism.”41 Abu Dhabi’s ambassador to the United States added, “The U.A.E. welcomes President Trump’s leadership in challenging Qatar’s troubling support for extremism.”42 At the same time, Trump held his first meeting with the Qatari emir in May 2017 during Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia. The meeting was cordial. Referring to Tamim, Trump said, “We are friends. We’ve been friends for a long time. . . . One of the things we will discuss is the [Qatari] purchase of lots of beautiful military equipment.”43 Yet, when the Rift was announced on June 5, 2017, Trump tweeted his support for the move and even took credit for it. He attributed the Rift to the efforts he had made the month before at the Riyadh summit to combat terrorism and to cut off terrorist financing. His most oft-repeated tweet said, “During my recent trip to the Middle East I stated that there can no longer be funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar—look!” He added, at a Rose Garden ceremony, “The nation of Qatar, unfortunately, has historically been a funder of terrorism at a very high level.” But the president’s tweet contrasted sharply with much more conciliatory statements from Secretary of State Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis. Tillerson immediately called for an easing of the sanctions, saying they were impeding the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) and causing unintended humanitarian harm, even while he was critical of Qatar’s record in the antiterrorist fight. The White House itself soon issued a clarifying statement: “The president emphasized the importance of all countries in the region working together to prevent the financing of terrorist organizations and stop the promotion of extremist ideology. The president reiterated that a united GCC and a strong United States–GCC partnership are critical to defeating terrorism and promoting regional stability. The president offered to help the parties resolve their differences, including through a meeting at the White House if necessary.”44 While news outlets in the United States made much of Trump’s apparent support for the Rift, there is no evidence that his tweet caused much more than a ripple of concern in Qatar. An expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies predicted that Qatar would make the Americans’ use of the military base less convenient.45 Nothing of the sort occurred. A former Barack Obama aide at the Brookings Institution said, “The Saudis played Donald Trump like a fiddle,” predicting that the United States would have to join the anti-Qatar coalition. Again, the prediction proved a false one.46 Numerous commentators insist that Trump’s off-the-cuff remarks caused widespread confusion and consternation in the Gulf region. The more supportive statements from senior US officials, combined with strong assertions that there would be no change in the military relationship between the United States and Qatar and equally strong denials

The World Reacts

129

that the US military had any plans for reducing the activities at Al Udeid, made it easy for the Qatari leadership to conclude that official policy statements and actions spoke louder than off-the-cuff remarks by Trump. Tamim told Al Jazeera, “I think the cooperation with the United States is longstanding, and it speaks for itself.”47 American support for Qatar against the Rift nations was almost immediate and, once stated, unswerving. As the Rift neared its end, Qatar’s defense minister said that the Rift nations had erred by assuming that Trump could make policy all by himself, a mistake repeated by many journalists and analysts. The United States, he said, is a nation of institutions, a strategic ally, with whom Qatar has deep, abiding, and multifaceted ties.48 In fact, Qatar had for a long time pursued policies at odds with some of Washington’s preferences, while being supportive of others. Qatari officials are unusually frank in describing their seemingly contradictory policies as simply the single-minded pursuit of Qatar’s national interest. Officials also insist that Qataris understand the pursuit of national interest and know how to distinguish between apparent changes to American priorities and real ones.49 It seems clear that officials in Saudi Arabia and the UAE made much more of Trump’s comments than their counterparts in Qatar. Saudi and Emirati officials, in particular, seemed to conclude that Trump was a reliable ally who would bring the United States unquestioningly into line with the Arab states’ foreign policy goals. King Salman in Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Zayed in the UAE focused on Trump’s words selectively, forgetting his repeated calls for Sunni unity against Shi’a Iran.50 Trump’s initial comments notwithstanding, the United States had a clear interest in ending the Rift and promoting greater cooperation among the Gulf Arab nations. The fight against ISIS, which Trump had promised to conduct with greater vigor than President Obama, required unity among the Gulf Arab nations, as did Trump’s determination to weaken Iran. Thus administration officials steered a carefully neutral course and even backed Qatar in its desire for a clear list of the Rift nations’ demands. The United States had considerable freedom of movement in making policy for the Gulf region thanks to America’s new status as an oil- and gas-exporting country. A massive increase in drilling in the United States had made the country energy independent by the end of Trump’s presidency, and progress toward that goal was evident even in June 2017. Like Qatar itself, the United States had made major investments in liquid natural gas (LNG) technology, with 60 percent of all new LNG export capacity being built in the United States. The growing US export market coincided with rapid (if ultimately temporary) growth in the global desire for LNG, the same growing market that had allowed Qatar to boast the largest per capita income in the world. By 2017, the number of countries importing

130

Isolating Qatar

LNG had tripled over 2005, and countries from the Philippines to Uruguay were building import terminals capable of handling LNG.51 The large US presence in the global gas market also meant a change in the way LNG was bought and sold. Previously, long-term contracts had been the norm, with LNG prices tied to oil prices. The Americans, however, offered more flexibility on price and length of contract, making LNG more attractive to customers like India and China.52 At the same time, US oil exports were also increasing dramatically at the time of the Rift. By 2017, America was producing twice the oil it had in 2010, allowing the country to reduce its purchases from the Gulf region to less than one million barrels per day.53 By June 2019, US energy security was strong enough that even attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf failed to affect prices in the United States. Thus, while the United States had crucial interests in the Gulf, as evidenced by the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, one of the largest US military bases in the world, both Barack Obama and Donald Trump were committed to reducing the American presence in the Middle East. Trump, for his part, wanted the US military to focus more on potential threats from Russia and China while maintaining a large enough presence to address Trump’s determination to isolate and contain Iran. Secretary of Defense Mattis underlined the base’s importance by stopping there in October 2017 after a visit to Afghanistan. During the two-hour stopover, Tamim arrived for an unscheduled visit, making his own statement about the priority of good relations with the Americans.54 Qatari-US relations are also affected by Qatari soft power, such as wide advertising of Qatar Airways as an attractive choice for American travelers and Qatari support for American universities. Education City, near Doha, is home to programs linked to Georgetown University, Virginia Commonwealth University, Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon, and Northwestern. In each case, the operating costs for the Qatar campuses are covered by Qatar.55 Qatari support over the 2008–2017 decade amounted to $1.4 billion, spread among twenty-eight institutions. The funds made Qatar the largest foreign contributor to higher education in the United States.56 The Qatari government also spends heavily on public relations in the United States and increased that spending after the Rift ended.57

America and Qatar Draw Closer

If part of Trump’s motivation in his original attacks on Qatar was to spur action from the emirate on fighting terrorism, his attack was singularly misguided. Even before the Rift, during meetings with Tamim at the Arab summit in May, Trump was “very heartened by the emir’s commitment to formally joining the terrorist financing targeting center and showing their commitment to this issue,” according to White House spokesman Sean

The World Reacts

131

Spicer.58 Qatari officials confirmed that complaints from Trump about alleged Qatari financing for terrorism also came up at the meeting. Dana Shell Smith, the US ambassador to Qatar, tweeted that Qatar had made “real progress” in curbing financial support for terrorists. The emirate placed stringent controls on banks, froze assets, and arrested people suspected of involvement in terrorist financing. The State Department emphasized that Qatar still had a long way to go and expressed its ongoing concern about Qatari ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.59 The US Treasury Department echoed this assessment, complimenting Qatar on some of its actions but insisting that the emirate could do more.60 In fact, Qatar’s efforts against terrorist financing were more than a decade old when the Rift broke out. In 2002, the country had established the National Anti-Money Laundering Committee, giving officials on the committee judicial power. That same year, Qatar criminalized money laundering and made the link between the practice and terrorism explicit the following year. In 2014, Qatar enacted cybercrimes legislation that advised the creation of an independent regulatory body for supervising charities. The Qatar Authority for Charitable Works was established soon after. The country also sent fourteen members of its law enforcement establishment to train with the American FBI. The Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index lists Qatar as the best performer in the GCC; Saudi Arabia ranks second. The US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 2017 noted that Qatar is “no longer regarded as a jurisdiction of primary concern.”61 By January 2018, Trump was praising Qatar as “a partner in the fight against terrorism.” The Qatari government moved quickly to address some American concerns by signing, barely a month into the Rift, a memorandum of understanding with the United States on combating terrorist financing. The two countries collaborated with others in the region to establish the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center, plans for which had been announced in May 2017 during Trump’s visit to Riyadh. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and the Kingdom itself were all members of the group. The Trump administration also saw Qatar as an important contributor to an initiative officially called the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) but often referred to (sometimes derisively) as the Arab NATO. Like its European counterpart, the Arab NATO was envisioned as a collective security organization, with each member committing to assist the others in the case of aggression. Besides the United States and Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Egypt, and Jordan were expected to participate. US officials first promoted the idea in May 2017. In November 2018, forces from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan took part in two weeks of joint maneuvers with US forces. The exercises, codenamed Arab Shield, took place in western Egypt. Morocco and Lebanon took part as observers.62 Significantly, Qatar did not take part.

132

Isolating Qatar

Qatar, for its part, responded to the MESA plans with skepticism. The country saw nothing but complications in joining a military alliance with the same countries responsible for the Rift. Evading the question of the Arab NATO’s feasibility, the Qatari foreign minister said simply that such an alliance should be based on existing institutions and questioned how this could be done with the Rift still in place. Still, by early 2018 Qatar’s emir was working to build what Qatar called “a security pact for the Middle East comparable to the European Union.” During a visit to Belgium, Tamim said that the proposed pact would “ensure that no blockade is ever imposed against another country.” The pact would also create a platform for conflict resolution in the region. It would also be open to membership by European Union members and the United States.63 The proposal not only embraced the spirit of the Arab NATO proposal but also seriously undercut the credibility of the GCC. MESA’s formation was severely impeded by the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman was widely believed to have ordered Khashoggi’s killing (and subsequent dismembering). A summit conference to sign documents formally launching MESA was scheduled for January 2018 but repeatedly postponed. The idea lost considerable momentum when Egypt signaled its withdrawal in April 2019.64 The failure of MESA notwithstanding, the efforts by the Trump administration to include Qatar demonstrated clearly the importance the Americans attached to close military cooperation with the emirate, despite the Rift. American officials also noted Qatar’s willingness to align its operating procedures with those of NATO. Mattis singled out the importance of Qatar to the US war in Afghanistan.65 In January 2018, then CIA director Mike Pompeo signed a memorandum of understanding with Qatar providing for the expansion of the Al Udeid base. He took the opportunity to deplore the Rift: “Disputes between countries that have shared objectives are never helpful.”66 Qatari officials, in the meantime, emphasized the country’s contribution to American forces in Afghanistan and noted that Qatar was among the first to join the US-led anti-ISIS coalition. The United States was also eager to work with Qatar on a series of meetings collectively called the US-Qatar Strategic Dialogue. One such meeting, held in Doha in January 2019, took note of the expanding naval partnership between Qatar and the United States, which could not help but concern Bahrain, since the Americans were signaling that the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet had options other than the large naval base in Bahrain. The Qatari foreign minister pointed out that Qatar was making the largest maritime contribution to a thirty-three-nation Combined Maritime Force led by the US Fifth Fleet.

The World Reacts

133

The Strategic Dialogue meeting also underlined the antiterrorism assistance training that had started the previous November. The effort consisted of thirty-three courses over four years to provide the Qatari Ministry of the Interior and Internal Security Forces with “enhanced skills and abilities to detect and defeat threats from transnational terrorist and criminal organizations.” The dialogue also produced a letter of intent on cybersecurity, efforts on aviation security, and a memorandum of understanding on fighting human trafficking.67 Qatar followed up on the Strategic Dialogue agreements to enhance its relationship with NATO. The latter acknowledged in March 2018 that Qatar is “a strategic partner in the fight against terrorism and in the consolidation of security and peace in the Middle East.” Tamim visited NATO headquarters in Belgium and signed agreements establishing cooperation on military and security issues. A semiofficial Qatari news source made much of the thanks Qatar received from NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg for the country’s efforts in the fight against terrorism. Qatari officials made clear that Qatar hoped to be admitted to NATO as a full member and offered “to host one of NATO’s units or one of its specialized centers.”68

US-Led Mediation Efforts

Before the Rift was many days old, Secretary of State Tillerson was making urgent offers to mediate the dispute. While praising the efforts of Kuwaiti emir Sabah in September 2017, Trump himself added, “I would be willing to be the mediator. If I can help mediate between Qatar and, in particular, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, I would be willing to do so.”69 Qatar’s response, at least on the surface, was supportive of these efforts, but they were met with a cold shoulder by the Rift nations, which had assumed Trump would be on their side. Tillerson made veiled criticisms of Saudi Arabia’s role in the crisis, saying in December 2017, “We would encourage them to be a bit more measured, a bit more thoughtful, in those actions, to fully consider the consequences.”70 The Trump administration underlined the importance it attached to ending the Rift by appointing retired general Anthony Zinni as a special mediator in August 2017. Zinni, a former commander of US forces in the Middle East, was well liked and well respected by all the region’s leaders. He traveled to the region in August 2017 with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Arabian Gulf Affairs Timothy Lenderking. Tillerson endorsed the effort, telling reporters, “I’m going to dispatch Tim back to the area. . . . And I have also asked Zinni to be with him so that we can maintain a constant pressure on the ground. . . . We are committed to see this disagreement resolved, restore Gulf unity, because we think it is important to the long-term effort to defeat terrorism in the region.”71

134

Isolating Qatar

The two met with leaders in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt to express their support for Kuwait’s mediation efforts and lend weight to American efforts at the same time. “We’ve been pressing,” Zinni said. “We’ve been trying to tell them we’re here.” By late 2018, the United States had taken a harder line, drafting a document that warned all the nations involved, “The status quo is untenable and . . . the United States will not continue to invest in Middle East security if they do not resolve their disputes.”72 Despite additional meetings with the principals, Zinni’s mission had little effect, except for an agreement with the UAE that Qatari flights could enter its airspace in an emergency. Frustrated, Zinni resigned in January 2019. Trump’s efforts would not bear fruit until the very end of his term. In July 2019, his initial anti-Qatar tweets forgotten, Trump hosted Tamim at the White House and declared it was “a great honor” to do so. Trump described Tamim as “a highly respected man, a real leader,” and noted the large Qatari investments in the American economy, including large-scale arms purchases. Tamim, for his part, told reporters after the meeting that Qatar would double its economic investments in the United States. Qatari officials signed commercial contracts with five major US companies during the meeting with Trump.73 In the event, the Rift did not disrupt cooperation between the United States and Qatar. Eight days after Trump’s anti-Qatar tweet, Qatar confirmed a deal to purchase $12 billion in American weaponry. Soon after that, two US Navy vessels arrived in Doha to take part in scheduled joint exercises with the Qatari navy. In July, Qatar became the first Gulf nation to sign a memorandum of understanding with the United States on counterterrorism. Six months into the Rift, the US-Qatari Strategic Dialogue was inaugurated. The Rift had virtually no impact on operations against ISIS. A Pentagon spokesman said days into the Rift, “While current operations at Al Udeid Air Base have not been interrupted or curtailed, the evolving situation is hindering our ability to plan for longer-term military operations.” Another Defense spokesman said operations out of the base for missions to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria were continuing without interruption. He also confirmed that the Rift had not prompted any plans to change US deployment at the air base. 74 By November 2018, officials at the base were telling visitors that operations were proceeding without hindrance, again belying dire predictions from US pundits. Indeed, there was no evidence that the Rift impeded cooperation between the US air wing in Qatar and the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain. Just as the Rift was announced, anti-ISIS forces backed by the United States began an all-out assault on Raqqa in northern Syria, the self-proclaimed capital of the ISIS caliphate.

The World Reacts

135

European Reactions to the Rift The United Kingdom

The initial reaction from UK prime minister Theresa May was supportive of the Qatari position. She defended Qatar’s record in fighting terrorism and made a round of phone calls with the monarchs of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar to urge an end to the blockade. Shortly before the Rift, May had signed a memorandum of understanding with Qatar to “deepen the cooperation between our governments and our businesses across a wide range of vital areas.”75 Despite temporary friction over the role of Qatar in a 2008 scandal involving Barclays Bank, Britain had significant national interests tied up in its relations with Qatar. The emirate is a major purchaser of British warplanes, and in December 2017 Qatar announced that it would purchase twenty-four combat jets from British weapons manufacturer BAE Systems, which makes Typhoon fighter-bombers. The deal breathed new life into BAE, with thousands of jobs saved and an obvious political bonus for May. May also faced domestic political pressure over what her opponents perceived to be a too-tolerant attitude toward Saudi Arabia. In July 2017, May’s government acknowledged that it was withholding a study on the Saudi role in fostering extremism in Britain, prompting her detractors to accuse the prime minister of pandering to the Saudis to protect trade deals. A British government spokeswoman averred that the report was being withheld for “security reasons.” This did not appease May’s opponents. “We hear regularly about the Saudi arms deals or ministers going to Riyadh to kowtow before their royal family, but yet our government won’t release a report that will clearly criticize Saudi Arabia,” Timothy Farron, leader of the Liberal Democrats, said in a statement.76 With this in mind, support for Qatar may have been a way of demonstrating May’s willingness to oppose the Saudis, at least in part. British foreign secretary Boris Johnson made repeated efforts to mediate the dispute. In his first trip to the region after the Rift took place, Johnson described the blockade as “unwelcome.” He said in a statement, “I call on all states to take immediate steps to deescalate the situation and to find a rapid resolution through mediation.”77 He compromised his neutrality, however, by responding to the Rift nations’ thirteen demands by saying Gulf unity could only be restored when all countries involved were willing to discuss “measured and realistic” terms.78 He later referred to Qatar as an “important partner.” When the Rift nations gave Qatar an additional forty-eight hours to accept the list of thirteen demands, Johnson called the extension “an important step in building confidence between the parties.”79 Johnson’s efforts drew praise from Secretary of State Tillerson, but like other efforts, they did not bring results. One British commentator lampooned Johnson’s shuttle diplomacy by calling him “the ‘Where’s Wally?’ of international diplomacy.”80

136

Isolating Qatar

France

Great Britain was not the only European nation to try to find advantages in the Rift crisis. The French had major military equipment arrangements with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt. Near the start of the crisis, French president Emmanuel Macron was in Qatar, ostensibly to try to mediate the dispute but taking time to announce a $1.3 billion deal for twelve fighter jets, with an option for thirty-six more. The Qataris also agreed to buy 490 armored vehicles from Nexter, a weapons manufacturer owned by the French government. The vehicles cost €1.5 billion.81 Besides the deals for military hardware, France also had significant private business links with Qatar. Total, a French energy company, announced in July 2017 that it had signed a contract with Qatari authorities to run an offshore oil field with Qatar Petroleum.82 At the time of Macron’s visit, Qatar Airways announced a €5.5 billion deal to buy fifty Airbus passenger planes. While closing deals for Qatari purchases of French goods, Macron was also trying to mediate the dispute, knowing that a weakened or impoverished Qatar would mean crippling losses for well-connected French firms. He took the opportunity during a state visit to Morocco to praise King Mohammed’s mediation attempts and to offer himself as a comediator. Just before a trip by Macron to the Gulf region, the Élysée Palace announced, “President Macron has spoken with all the heads of state in the region and called for appeasement [sic]. These efforts could converge with the mediation Morocco wants to attempt.”83 A possible follow-up visit by Tamim to Paris was also announced, and Macron promised to raise the issue with Trump when the two met at the G20 summit. For all his face-to-face meetings and phone calls (which would eventually include talks with Erdoğan and the prime minister of Lebanon), what Macron had to offer any of the Gulf states in return for ending the Rift was not clear.

Germany

At one time, Germany had depended largely on nuclear power for its domestic energy needs. The country was moving away from nuclear power in the twenty-first century, however. Many environmentally concerned Germans preferred natural gas, but Germany’s main source for the resource was Russia. Since Russian president Vladimir Putin had repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to use gas supplies as a weapon, Germany had an obvious national interest in securing gas from other sources. Perhaps to deflect attention from such a self-serving motivation for desiring a quick end to the Rift, Angela Merkel’s government reacted to the crisis by focusing on the baleful effects of the Rift on the fight against ISIS.

The World Reacts

137

At the onset of the Rift, German foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel warned, “I am already alarmed about the escalation of the situation and possible consequences for the entire region. A conflict among neighbors on the Arab Peninsula, carried out with all available means, is the last thing we need given the many crises and conflicts in the Near and Middle East.”84 He worried aloud that the situation in the Gulf could lead to open war.85 He reiterated the concern with ISIS in a meeting with the Saudi foreign minister in Berlin. He urged his Saudi counterpart to defuse the crisis, saying, “Cooperation is necessary to fight the Islamic State.”86 Gabriel added, “We made it clear that we in Germany and in Europe have a great interest for the situation in the Gulf region not to escalate. It’s clear that we can only win the fight against Islamic State when we stand side by side in the anti-IS coalition. . . . We are convinced that a dispute among partners and neighbors will in the end only make the wrong ones stronger.” Like Macron, Gabriel suggested an equivalence between the two sides, calling both Saudi Arabia and Qatar countries “whose practices in the past have worried Germany.” He added, “We have therefore a great interest for everyone in the anti-IS coalition to agree that there mustn’t be any kind of financing of terrorist organizations.”87 At some points in the dispute, Gabriel seemed to tilt toward the SaudiEmirati position. After a visit to the UAE and Qatar, the foreign minister said Germany supported the UAE’s efforts at confronting those who fund extremists but also urged the GCC to find common ground. After a meeting with the Saudi foreign minister, Gabriel told reporters the two agreed on the need to end any support for extremist organizations and said he hoped the demands made by Saudi Arabia and other countries that cut ties with Qatar would focus on ending terror financing and incitement.88 Asked about the demand that Al Jazeera be shut down, Gabriel said only, “It’s necessary to come to the table and then negotiate.” Speaking of the Rift nations’ thirteen demands, the German foreign minister would only say they were “very provocative.” Gabriel also voiced support for mediation efforts by Kuwait and the United States but, unlike Johnson and Macron, did not offer to mediate himself. Instead, he insisted that the GCC was the logical place for talks, calling the organization “the guarantor of stability and security in the [Gulf] region.”89 Rejecting the focus on national interest that more clearly motivated his European neighbors, Gabriel denounced the US focus on national interest. He told a German newspaper, “Such a Trumpification of relations with one another is particularly dangerous in a region that is already rife with crises.”90 Gabriel pursued German interests, though, by trying to get Iran involved in any possible solution to the crisis, saying he expected Teheran to play a constructive role in the Qatar crisis and that he was working closely with German banks to make sure business deals could be completed with Iran.91

138

Isolating Qatar

Like Macron, Gabriel and Merkel had little beyond exhortations to offer the Gulf nations as an incentive to find a compromise. Gabriel did make the symbolic gesture of offering his Qatari counterpart a small piece of the Berlin Wall, saying Germany’s postwar history was proof it was possible to overcome deep divisions such as those plaguing the Gulf region. He added, “Especially in politically troubled times in which dialogue has sometimes slipped into the background, it is all the more important to build bridges to emphasize the things that unite us and to help remove walls.”92

Other Global Reactions Russia

As one of the world’s major exporters of natural gas, with an economy heavily dependent on sales of gas and oil, Russia had a strong incentive to exacerbate the crisis, since any major disruption in the flow of oil and gas from the Gulf region would cause global energy prices to skyrocket and provide a bonanza to the ailing Russian economy. Moreover, any weakening of Saudi Arabia would benefit Iran, whose government had close ties to Russia. Additionally, threats to Qatar meant threats to the US air base at Al Udeid and a threat to the American military posture in the region. Nevertheless, Putin played a surprisingly restrained role in the crisis. Like other interested national leaders, he placed phone calls to leaders from the Gulf region and called for face-to-face talks among those leaders to settle the Rift. Russia sold arms to Qatar, but in smaller quantities and with less fanfare than the purchases from Britain or France. Putin held talks with King Salman of Saudi Arabia that touched on the Rift but mainly concerned energy cooperation at a time when oil prices were falling due to increased production in North America. Putin linked the Rift crisis with the war in Syria. The “aggravated situation . . . does not help consolidate joint efforts in resolving the conflict in Syria and fighting the terrorist threat,” according to a Kremlin statement.93 Putin could not avoid the realization that increased gas production from Qatar, combined with new gas sources like the United States and Australia, would all but destroy his ability to use gas supplies as a weapon, but short of the kind of direct intervention that would provoke a serious backlash, he could not avoid the conclusion that he could do little to affect the course of events. He settled for taking on the image of a leader interested in peace.

People’s Republic of China

For China, the situation in the Gulf was an opportunity to build relationships that could eventually provide openings for the country’s Belt and

The World Reacts

139

Road initiative, a mammoth effort on China’s part to promote its trade and foreign policy priorities from one end of the Eurasian landmass to the other. China’s interest in the Gulf region is largely centered on the Asian giant’s enormous (and growing) need for oil and gas. China is the world’s largest single importer of oil—about nine million barrels per day. Much of that oil comes from Iran, giving China an ongoing interest in the Gulf region. The Belt and Road policy blurred the already hazy lines between government agencies and private businesses in China, as evidenced by the alleged role of a “mysterious” Chinese oil company known as CEFC. According to New York court filings, officials and businessmen discussed using CEFC as a cover for selling arms to Chad, Libya, and Qatar. A former Hong Kong official allegedly received an email from someone at CEFC offering an inventory of available weapons and noting that Qatar “also urgently needs a list of toys [sic] from us.” In the same email, the CEFC official wrote, “For the same reason we had for Libya, we cannot sell directly to them. Is there a way you could act as an intermediary in both cases [Libya and Qatar]?” The Hong Kong official confirmed Qatar’s need for “toys” and added, “Their chief is coming to China and we hope to give them a piece of good news. Please confirm soonest.”94 China has a strong environmental incentive to invest heavily in natural gas, given the terrible air pollution produced by the country’s dependence on coal. At the time of the Rift, China saw Russia as its primary gas supplier, with the latter building a pipeline to China and starting gas projects in the Arctic Ocean.95 Imports of natural gas by China rose by over 40 percent in 2017. China’s dependence on Russia for gas opened other Asian markets for Qatari LNG. Thus China stood to lose no matter how the Rift played out. If Qatar’s economy were severely weakened and its customers for LNG went elsewhere, this would have the double effect of increasing China’s reliance on Russia while raising the global price of the desperately needed resource. If Qatar emerged unscathed, or if the Gulf nations resumed reasonably friendly relations, divisions that the Chinese might exacerbate and exploit would be healed. Opportunities to extend the Belt and Road initiative to the Gulf region would fade. Since the Rift could not bring any benefit to China and served only to uncover its weaknesses, China unsurprisingly played almost no public role in the crisis.

Other Asian Reactions

Most Asian nations saw the Rift through the lens of natural gas supplies. For India, the added complication was the presence of millions of Indian citizens in the nations of the Gulf. Thus, the travel ban imposed as part of the Rift was of most immediate concern to officials in New Delhi and Indians in the Gulf. India’s economy relies heavily on remittances from expats in the Gulf, to the tune of about $4 billion per year. Reporting that there

140

Isolating Qatar

was “no panic” in the expatriate community, Air India and Jet Airways were careful to point out that extra flights arranged to bring Indians home for a holiday season were “absolutely” not part of an evacuation. “They are only to help to address the increased demand during the Eid holiday season as a result of the cancellation of many flights via the United Arab Emirates,” according to an Indian government source.96 Qatar, for its part, sent its foreign minister to New Delhi to assure Indian authorities of the safety of the 6.3 million Indians in Qatar. At the same time, Qatar is the largest supplier of LNG to India, accounting for over 65 percent of India’s total gas imports, representing 15 percent of Qatar’s LNG exports. The issue was important enough to India that the UAE’s minister of state for foreign affairs made a trip to India to reassure officials there that, despite India’s deep energy and defense ties to Qatar, the South Asian nation had “nothing to worry about.” Asked whether he wanted India to cut gas imports from Qatar, Gargash told a reporter, “What India does with Qatar is its sovereign decision.”97 For Japan, national energy security was the priority, and Japanese officials kept a close watch on events in the Gulf. The country gets about 15 percent of its gas from Qatar.98 The Japanese economy is extraordinarily sensitive to changes in the market prices for oil and gas, so even incidents like the attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia caused great concern. The failure of such events to have much impact on global prices brought some sense of security to Japan, but the possibility of military intervention against Qatar and a resultant interruption in gas deliveries raised a nightmare scenario. After the first few days of the Rift, when the threat of open war faded, Japan’s government contented itself with calling for talks to end the crisis.

Conclusion

Most striking about the global reaction to the Rift crisis is the unvarying preoccupation of the various national leaders with finding ways to use the situation to advance their own national interests. The Qatari government was openly sympathetic to such efforts. While the Rift nations and wellmeaning would-be mediators offered exhortations about international cooperation and lectures on the dangers of prioritizing national interests, Qatari officials, time after time, countered with tangible incentives and rewards for either taking its side or staying carefully neutral. This is one reason that Qatar was able to retain the support of the United States and induce other powerful countries to stay neutral, while the Rift nations were only able to gain support from smaller nations like the Maldives, Comoros, and Senegal.

The World Reacts

141

Qatar’s success in preventing the Rift nations from assembling a more threatening global coalition challenges the notion that small states cannot play an active and effective role in international relations. Qatar maintained its sovereign independence during the Rift in large part through naked appeals to states to keep their respective national interests in the forefront of policymaking. In a number of cases, Qatar backed up its appeals with lucrative incentives such as major arms purchases or the promise of expanded business investment. The Rift crisis gave national leaders from around the world the opportunity to bolster an important international organization, the GCC, and to make a strong stand against alleged support for terrorists and Islamic extremists. The Rift nations presented their dispute with Qatar as part of a larger global effort to curb the influence of Iran, stop the “incitement” of the Al Jazeera network, starve the Gazan leadership of funds, remove a major source of support for the Muslim Brotherhood, and halt the funding of allegedly terrorist individuals and organizations. Instead, nations inside and outside the Middle East/North Africa region saw nothing but opportunities to advance their national interests. National interest is a persistent driver of nations’ foreign policies. The end of the Rift would demonstrate this ongoing truth even more clearly.

Notes

1. Holland and Torbati, “Trump Scolds Qatar as Tillerson Seeks to Ease Crisis.” 2. “Trump Gives Qatari Emir Warm Welcome,” Al Jazeera English, July 10, 2019. 3. “UAE Press: Qatar Cannot Deceive the World Any Longer,” Emirates News Agency, January 12, 2018. 4. Jacob, “Aware of India’s Interest in Qatar.” 5. “Kuwait Emir Meets with Qatari Leader amid Diplomatic Fissure,” Business Mirror (Manila), June 9, 2017. Even in Tunisia, MBZ has tried to undermine a fragile postrevolution government led by the moderate Islamist Ennahda party. See Hilterman, “The Backlash Catches Up with Qatar.” 6. “Saudi Blockade Backfires as Qataris Hail ‘Hero’ Emir,” The Times (UK), July 11, 2017. 7. “Iran’s Javad Zarif and Sheikh Tamim Hold Talks in Doha,” Al Jazeera English, October 3, 2017. 8. “Iran and Oman Agree to Boost Ties Amid Gulf Crisis,” Al Jazeera English, July 12, 2017. 9. Timberlake and Harding, “Arab States Cut Qatar Ties in Major Diplomatic Crisis.” 10. “Weary Camels Sent Back to Qatar amid GCC Rift,” Al Jazeera English, September 26, 2017. 11. “Kuwait Emir Calls for Gulf State Unity as Saudi, Qatar Freeze Continues,” Sputnik News, January 8, 2018. 12. “Kuwait’s Emir Urges GCC Nations to Settle Differences,” Al Jazeera English, January 8, 2018.

142

Isolating Qatar

13. El-Said, “Al-Sisi Receives Letter from Al-Sabah Regarding Qatar Crisis.” 14. “55 Qatar Businessmen to Visit Kuwait to Boost Trade Ties,” Gulf Times (Doha), January 20, 2018. 15. Krauss, “Libya’s Increased Oil Production Thwarts OPEC’s Reduction Plans.” 16. “Macron in Morocco to Discuss Libya, Qatar Crisis,” Agence France Presse, June 14, 2017. 17. “Bedoui, Qatari Counterpart Assess Implementation of Bilateral Security Agreement,” Algeria Press Service, October 29, 2018. 18. “QBA Chairman Calls for Effective Partnership Between Algeria, Qatar,” Algeria Press Service, November 19, 2018. 19. “Bellara Steel Complex, ‘Incentive for Further Partnerships with Qatar,’” Algeria Press Service, September 24, 2018. 20. “President Tebboune: Algeria Seeks to Tighten Ties with Russia, Bring Them Up to Level of Political Understanding,” Algeria Press Service, February 22, 2020. 21. “Total Understanding Between Algeria, Qatar on Regional, International Issues,” Algeria Press Service, February 25, 2020. 22. Interviews by the author with Omani officials in Muscat, August 2015. See also “The GCC’s Worst Summit,” Al Jazeera English, December 9, 2017. 23. “Qatar Says Kuwait Trying to Solve Diplomatic Rift,” Al Jazeera English, June 6, 2017. 24. “GCC Structure May Have to Change: Kuwait’s Sheikh Sabah,” Al Jazeera English, December 5, 2017. 25. “Kuwait Says GCC to Keep Operating Despite Qatar Crisis,” Reuters News, December 27, 2017. 26. “Call for Unity,” The Peninsula (Doha), January 9, 2018. 27. “Emir of Kuwait Calls for Cooperation,” The Peninsula (Doha), January 9, 2018. 28. Thomas and Stancati, “Qatar Rift May Boost Extremism.” 29. Trofimov, “Turkey Sees Itself as Target in Saudi-Led Move Against Qatar.” 30. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 31. “Erdoğan Vows to Stand by ‘Qatari Brothers’ amid Crisis,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 32. Candemir, “Saudi Firms Use Turkey for Qatar-Bound Shipments.” 33. Schwartz, “U.S. Says Some Demands on Qatar Will Be Difficult to Meet.” 34. Candemir, “Saudi Firms Use Turkey for Qatar-Bound Shipments.” 35. Fitch and Parasie. “Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Bahrain and Egypt Cut Diplomatic Ties.” 36. “How the World Reacted to the GCC Diplomatic Rift,” Al Jazeera English, June 5, 2017. 37. Raghavan and Warrick, “Who Is a Terrorist?” 38. “Meshal Bin Hamad Al Thani Weighs In on GCC-Qatar Crisis.” 39. “Qatar Crisis Opens Up Opportunities for Israel, Lieberman Says,” Haaretz, June 5, 2017. 40. See Lynch, “Bypassing the Professionals.” 41. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 42. Schwartz and Solomon, “Trump Administration Sends Mixed Signals on Qatar Crisis.” 43. DeYoung, “Trump Jumps into Dispute Between Qatar and Arab Bloc.”

The World Reacts

143

44. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2017. 45. Schwartz, “Trump Sides with Saudis.” 46. Lander, “Trump Treads into Feud Between Qatar and Saudis.” 47. “Meshal Bin Hamad Al Thani Weighs In on GCC-Qatar Crisis.” 48. Mohammed, “Qatar’s Resilience Tackled Blockade Impact.” 49. Interviews by the author with Qatari officials in Doha, November 2018. 50. “Gulf Apart,” The Times (London), June 6, 2017. 51. Krauss, “American L.N.G. Shakes Up Energy World.” 52. Reed, “On Future of Energy.” 53. Heath, “Why Aren’t Oil Prices Spiking?” 54. One analyst speculated that the Saudis might have entertained hopes that the Rift would force the United States to close Al Udeid and move its air operations back to Saudi Arabia. See Jaffe and DeYoung, “Push Against Iran May Be Stoking Mideast Instability.” 55. Interviews by the author with officials at Education City, November 2018. 56. Binkley, “While Trump Praises Qatar.” 57. Banares, “Qatar Adds U.S. Lobbying Muscle After Saudi Rift.” 58. Schwartz, “Trump Sides with Saudis.” 59. “Picking Sides, Not Diplomacy, in the Gulf,” New York Times, June 6, 2017. 60. DeYoung, “Bahrain Criminalizes ‘Sympathy or Favoritism’ for Qatar.” 61. Naheem, “The Dramatic Rift and Crisis.” 62. “Exclusive: Egypt Withdraws from U.S.-Led Anti-Iran Security Initiative,” Reuters News, April 11, 2019. 63. “Emir Aims to Build Mideast Security Pact,” The Peninsula (Doha), March 9, 2018. 64. “Exclusive: Egypt Withdraws.” 65. “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Mattis at an Enhanced Honor Cordon Welcoming Qatar Minister of State for Defense Affairs Al-Attiyah to the Pentagon,” Department of Defense, April 18, 2018. 66. “U.S., Qatar Sign MoU on Al-Udeid Air Base Expansion,” Xinhua News Agency, January 13, 2019. Pompeo would become US secretary of state in April 2018. 67. “Collected Department Releases: Remarks at the High Level Opening Session of the Inaugural U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue,” ForeignAffairs.co.nz, January 30, 2018. 68. “Qatar Eyes Full NATO Membership: Defense Minister,” The Peninsula (Doha), June 5, 2018. 69. Stokols, “Donald Trump Offers to Mediate Dispute Between Qatar and Arab Neighbors.” 70. Byrne and Leroux. “Leave Lebanon Alone.” 71. “US Dispatching Team to Work on Qatar Dispute,” Arab News, August 7, 2017. 72. “Exclusive: Khashoggi Murder Further Complicates ‘Arab NATO’ Plan,” Reuters News, November 8, 2018. 73. DeYoung, “Trump Touts Ties with Another Gulf Monarchy.” 74. Fitch and Parasie, “Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Bahrain and Egypt Cut Diplomatic Ties.” 75. Emanuel, “May Calls on Gulf States.” 76. Kirkpatrick, “Britain Debates Saudis’ Ties to Extremism.” 77. Emanuel, “May Calls on Gulf States.” 78. “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: All the Latest Updates,” Al Jazeera English, June 26, 2017.

144

Isolating Qatar

79. Philp, “Gulf Nations Give Qatar 48 Hours to Meet Ultimatum.” 80. Sylvester, “Our Foreign Secretary Is an International Joke.” 81. Harding, “Qatar, France Sign Billion-Dollar Fighter Jet Deal amid Gulf Crisis.” 82. Spencer, “Saudi Blockade Dealt Another Blow as Tillerson Backs Qatar.” 83. “Macron in Morocco to Discuss Libya.” 84. Weiland, “By Pulling Away, U.S. ‘Does the Most Damage to Itself.’” 85. “Germany’s Gabriel Warns Qatar Crisis Could Lead to War—Newspaper,” Reuters News, June 10, 2017. 86. Solomon and Schwartz, “Arab States Drawing Up List of Demands for Qatar.” 87. Thomas and Stancati, “Qatar Rift May Boost Extremism.” 88. Hyde and Gambrell, “Qatar Crisis Deadline Extended by 2 Days as Nation Responds.” 89. Gambrell, “UAE Foreign Minister.” 90. Kirkpatrick and Harris, “Saudis and Emiratis List Dozens Linked to Qatar as Aiding Terrorism.” 91. “Germany, Iran Must Strengthen Financial Ties, says Iranian Foreign Minister,” Reuters News, June 27, 2017. 92. “Germany, Citing Own History, Urges Work to Bridge Gulf Divisions,” Reuters News, November 21, 2017. 93. “Saudis Insist No Blockade on Qatar as Gulf Crisis Simmers,” Agence France Presse, June 13, 2017. 94. Stevenson and Goldstein, “U.S. Says Chinese Firm Pursued Arms Deals.” 95. Patterson and Marson, “Glencore, Qatar Sell Rosneft Stake to Chinese Firm.” 96. Laskar, “India to Operate Additional Flights to Qatar for Eid Holiday Season.” 97. Jacob, “Aware of India’s Interest in Qatar.” 98. Hsu, “Qatar’s Rift with Saudi Arabia Could Turn Up Heat on Oil and Gas Prices.”

8

The End of the Rift

A top Emirati diplomat [Anwar Gargash] said Wednesday, “there’s nothing to negotiate,” with Qatar over a growing diplomatic dispute. —Associated Press, June 7, 20171

The 13 demands at the time were what I would consider a maximalist negotiating position. —Anwar Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, January 6, 20212

By January 2021, it had long been clear that the diplomatic, economic, financial, travel, and transport boycott of Qatar was not working. Even had the four Rift nations (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt) succeeded in convincing the world of the validity of their accusations, the tangible and often lucrative incentives and rewards the Qatari government offered for nations’ support of Qatar’s position would likely have prevented the boycott from becoming a worldwide movement. At the same time, the successful promotion of Qatari nationalism by the government of Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani forestalled the sort of internal strife that could have given the Rift the momentum needed to change Qatari policies. This chapter chronicles the failure of the Rift to create conditions that would have made Qatar’s compliance likely. From there it describes the events, starting in 2019, that led to the announcement on January 5, 2021, of the opening of Saudi airspace to Qatari planes effective immediately. The following day, the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) met in Saudi Arabia and signed documents formally bringing the 1,310-day crisis to an end. The chapter concludes with some speculation about the lasting impact of the Rift.

145

146

Isolating Qatar

A Thwarted Boycott

The goal of any boycott is to create enough pain and inconvenience to bring about capitulation. From the start, such pain did not materialize. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, there was little chance that the Rift would ever cause sufficient pain. For example, one of Qatar’s supposed weak points that would make it accede to the Rift nations’ demands was its commitment to host the 2022 World Cup football tournament. The Rift nations probably believed that the boycott would cause unacceptable delays in the needed construction. In the event, the emirate was far more concerned about delays related to the possible spread of the Covid-19 virus among the construction workers than it was about boycott-related delays.3 In June 2020, Qatar’s Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy reported that all eight stadiums would be completed well ahead of schedule.

Qatari Trade Relations

As noted in the previous chapter, most of the nations of the world reacted to the attempted isolation of Qatar with a marked reluctance to jeopardize their own national interests by joining the boycott. Most continued their own trade and economic relationships with Qatar without interruption, even while sometimes paying lip service to the goals of the blockading nations. In fact, Qatar was able to expand its trade relationships during the Rift, buoyed by the increasing global demand for liquid natural gas (LNG). For example, in late 2020, Qatar signed agreements with South Korean shipbuilding firms to reserve LNG ship construction to meet Qatar’s growing need for specialized ships to keep up with the demand. Nations like Turkey that opposed the blockade and assisted Qatar at the start of the Rift reaped benefits in the form of expanding trade. At the start of 2020, the Turkish ambassador announced that Turkey-Qatari trade had risen by 6 percent in 2019, reaching $1.6 billion. He added, “Qatari companies are among the largest investors in the field of construction in Turkish markets. In return, Turkish companies obtained contracts worth $1.5 billion in 2019 to implement projects in the State of Qatar.”4 New trade deals prompted Qatari Petroleum to create QP Trading and charge the new entity with “build[ing] a globally diversified portfolio of third party and equity LNG.” Far from contracting its trading relations, Qatar was expanding them. By the end of 2019, the Qatar Development Bank (QDB) announced that the country was set to exceed the value of its preblockade, nonoil exports. From 2017 to 2018, according to the Qatari Chamber, nonoil exports increased from QR18.05 billion to QR24.4 billion. The QDB official said, “After the blockade, we lost three markets around us and this decreased our exports. But now, with the opening of

The End of the Rift

147

new foreign markets and the opening of different factories in Qatar, exports have increased.”5 Symbolic of the country’s robust trade relations was the continued health of Qatar Airways. The airline kept flying during the initial months of the Covid-19 crisis and was well positioned to benefit from the reopening of global travel. In 2019, Qatar Airways won the title of World’s Best Airline at the World Airlines Awards. It was the fifth time the airline had been so recognized. Qatar Airways also won for Best Airport. Qatar Airways Cargo also expanded during the Rift. At the same awards ceremony, the cargo division won Global Air Cargo Airline of the Year. Airline executives announced, “Qatar Airways Cargo is now the world’s largest cargo carrier, flying a young and modern fleet of 28 freighters to more than 60 cargo destinations.”6 The CEO of QDB noted, “We . . . have access to a market size of over 500 million people within 6–7 [air] hours away that we can serve from Doha.”7

Qatar’s Fiscal Health

The impact of the Rift in its first year was severe enough to cause Qatar to run a budget deficit. However, the country achieved a budget surplus the following three years. It was the only Gulf country to do so, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even with the economic chaos of the pandemic, the IMF predicted that, while its economy would certainly contract, Qatar would have the smallest contraction of any Gulf nation, the rest of which were dealing with both lower oil prices and Covid-19.8 Qatari foreign minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani told the New York Times in December 2018 that the country had stopped spending its reserves to cope with the Rift. In an additional show of fiscal strength, the country purchased the former US Embassy in London’s Grosvenor Square when the Americans vacated the complex in favor of a larger compound. The country proceeded with projects that visibly highlighted its continued economic health. In March 2019, it opened a visually striking National Museum, shaped like a series of intersecting disks. In May, the Doha Metro officially opened. This was part of a larger expansion of Qatar Rail to secure the country’s supply chain. International ratings firms confirmed the emirate’s growing financial security, with Moody’s Investors Service rating the country Aa2 (very low risk) with a stable outlook. Moody’s said, “Qatar’s credit profile reflects the government’s strong balance sheet, vast hydrocarbon reserves, and exceptionally high per capita income. These factors provide significant shockabsorption capacity.” The report added that neither “regional political tensions” nor the Covid-19 pandemic would likely have a significant impact on Qatar’s creditworthiness.9

148

Isolating Qatar

Qatar also made sedulous efforts to attract potential business partners to the country, holding a large number of business fora during the three and a half years of the Rift. The 2019 Doha Forum was a chance for the government to fly in hundreds of businesspeople, researchers, journalists, and officials from Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Conference attendees listened to presentations, including presentations from the president of Ecuador and the foreign minister of Iran.10 The Qatar Free Zones Authority used the forum to finalize agreements with seven foreign corporations, which joined the fifty foreign firms already doing business in Qatar’s free trade zones. In August 2020, the country launched incubator and accelerator programs to assess applications for government support for “innovative business ideas.”11 Altogether, more than 250 foreign trade delegations came to Doha, convincing evidence of the blockade’s failure to isolate the country economically. Doha became such an attractive place to visit that even the Saudi government had little choice but to look the other way when its citizens visited the emirate, including entire soccer teams.12 In addition, Qatar sponsored visits to the United States by 500 Qataris to take part in programs on disaster preparedness, women in civil society, and combatting money laundering. In late 2018, the Qatari embassy in Washington, DC, sponsored a Discover America Week, bringing more than 150 American and Qatari companies together to promote bilateral trade.13 Following the Qatar-US Strategic Dialogue meetings in September 2020, interest in doing business in Qatar among American firms rose noticeably. Indian businesspeople and officials also got invitations to Doha, where they stayed at the luxury Sheraton Grand Doha and met with the head of the Qatar Chamber (of Commerce) and the Qatari Businessmen Association. A delegation from South Korea included government officials who signed nine memoranda of understanding on issues like smart agriculture, aquaculture, transportation, security, and education.

Food Security

The Rift nations almost certainly expected their action to cause major food shortages in Qatar, a country with limited groundwater and no surface water to speak of. However, projects like the Baladna dairy farm and others permitted the minister for municipality and environment to announce in 2020 that Qatar had reached self-sufficiency in milk (106 percent of its needs) and fresh poultry (124 percent). Plans in place addressed the goal of self-sufficiency in vegetables, fodder, red meat, and eggs. The government projected that Qatar would be able to provide 70 percent of its vegetable needs by 2023. The country was even able to quickly restock store shelves with hand sanitizer at the start of the Covid-19 crisis.

The End of the Rift

149

In 2017, Qatar launched the Strategic Food Security Facilities project at the new Hamad Port. It consists of silos, storage facilities, reservoirs, and facilities for processing and manufacturing rice, sugar, and edible oils. Altogether, dedicated storage facilities for twenty-two different foods appeared, with the ability to store food and nonfood items (such as medicines) for at least six months and up to several years. A related investment facility acquired shares in major international food businesses, with the profits going to central markets, integrated marketing platforms, and new and existing local food-related businesses. One government minister said that public-private partnerships were an important part of the government’s food security policy. Such obvious signs that no retrenchment was going on helped Qatar rise four spots in the Sustainable Development Solutions Network’s World Happiness Index, ending up at spot 32 of 195 countries.

A Continuing Diplomatic Presence

Besides extending its reach into business and economic relationships during the Rift, Qatar continued to involve itself in some of the region’s most difficult international controversies. Starting in 2015, the emirate had offered its services to try to bring about an agreement between the United States and the Taliban that would permit the former to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. This and similar efforts helped precipitate the Rift, since it involved allowing Taliban representatives to live openly in Doha. The Donald Trump administration was able to announce an agreement in principle in February 2019 that would trade withdrawal of the 14,000 US troops from Afghanistan for a promise from the Taliban not to allow terrorists to use the country. The Joe Biden administration altered the conditions-based agreement with the Taliban for the US withdrawal. Qatar also played a key role in the future of the Palestinian territories. When the leadership of the Palestinians split, with Mahmood Abbas and Fatah taking charge of the West Bank and Hamas becoming dominant in Gaza, Israel cut off electricity and other supplies to the strip in retaliation for attacks on Israel staged from there. Israel also stopped payments to Hamas, leaving government officials without salaries. Qatar supplied Hamas with tens of millions of dollars to keep power stations fueled and civil servants paid. The Qataris did so with the tacit approval of the Israelis, generating more opposition from Abbas than from Israeli authorities. At one point, the Israelis permitted delivery to Hamas authorities of suitcases containing $15 million in cash.14 In 2020, as the coronavirus spread rapidly through Gaza, Qatar was instrumental in persuading Hamas to stop attacks on Israel. In return, Israel allowed more Qatari money to flow to Hamas. Sources said the payments were over $25 million.15 On another occasion, Qatar worked with Egypt

150

Isolating Qatar

and the United Nations to bring about another Hamas-Israel cease-fire. A Hamas spokesman said the deal became possible when Qatar promised to underwrite projects “to serve our people in the Gaza Strip and contribute to mitigating” difficult living conditions. Emir Tamim also stepped in with $2 million in compensation after ten Palestinians were killed in a fire that broke out in a busy market.16 Qatar also experienced no pause in its use of soft power, the main elements of which were described in detail in earlier chapters. After an attack in Mogadishu in December 2019, Qatar airlifted dozens of badly injured victims.17 At the start of the coronavirus crisis, Qatari officials received praise from the Vietnamese embassy for their efforts to repatriate Vietnamese citizens as global air travel was collapsing. Vietnam’s ambassador also noted the many visits of Vietnamese officials to Doha. Qatar used the maiden flight of a Qatar Airways plane to Accra to strengthen its ties to Ghana. During the Rift, Qatar made no move to expel the many students from Rift nations who were studying at Qatar University. A spokeswoman told a Qatari newspaper, “We also provided the necessary assistance to the students of the blockading countries and dealt with them with humanity and concern for their future, as we did for the future of our students.”18 Doha also contributed $100 million to a group of least-developed countries, landlocked countries, and small-island developing nations and announced a conference of these countries in Doha in 2022. Qatari news sources are filled with reports of friendly visits to Doha by delegations from trade partners. Each report relates words of praise by the visitors for Qatari generosity and willingness to enter into bilateral agreements. The ambassador from Argentina expressed gratification, coupled with some surprise, that Qatar Petroleum was making major efforts to help the South American nation develop its considerable shale oil and gas reserves.19 On another occasion, Qatari officials noted their involvement in construction projects in North and East Africa, where the emirate was also exporting manufactured food products.20 Qatar deepened its cooperation with Turkey by holding the QatarTurkey Supreme Strategic Committee meetings each year. By the end of 2019, the two countries had signed sixty agreements on various types of interaction and coordination in fields like economy, culture, trade, education, Islamic and family affairs, and water management.21 The emirate’s enormous wealth allowed such soft power efforts to continue. It also allowed Qatar to overcome the airspace restrictions placed on it by the Rift nations. The Islamic Republic, while expressing its solidarity with Qatar during the Rift by opening its airspace, also charged premium rates, to the tune of $180 million per year.22 The arrangement provided Iran with an influx of hard currency that President Trump was eager to stop as part of his efforts to strangle the Iranian economy.23 The Trump administra-

The End of the Rift

151

tion also worried that the many US officials who traveled to Qatar also had to enter Iranian airspace, opening them to potential risk.24 As 2020 opened, Iran’s economy was showing the effects of strong sanctions while also suffering disproportionately from Covid-19. Determined to tighten the screws even more, the administration redoubled its efforts to end the Rift and thus cut off Iran’s airspace bonanza.

Cracks in the Blockade

Legal and Military Maneuvers

After his initial statements on Twitter seeming to support the Rift, Donald Trump quickly turned his attention to trying to end the dispute between the five US regional partners. As early as September 2017, Trump arranged a phone call between Tamim and Saudi Arabia’s crown prince (and, some said, de facto ruler) Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). While the call proceeded well and seemed to presage an early end to the controversy, the two leaders began to argue about who had initiated the call and who had made concessions first. The slender hope for a settlement disappeared.25 Quieter efforts from the US administration continued without progress until a key decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On July 14, 2020, the World Court found in favor of Qatar in a case in which the emirate argued that the airspace restrictions were discriminatory and a violation of international law. Moreover, the Court agreed with Qatar that jurisdiction over the dispute rested with the International Civil Aviation Organization, which usually rules against politically based restrictions on national airspace.26 The unanimous ICJ ruling breathed life into Qatar’s demand for $5 billion in compensation for the added expenses caused by the airspace boycott. Qatar also brought an action in a British court against the Al Arabiya news station, headquartered in Dubai, for a video the station aired showing a Qatar Airways jet seemingly shot down for violating the airspace ban. In the winter of 2019, the Rift nations themselves moderated the total isolation they had sought to impose. A Qatari military contingent arrived in Saudi Arabia for a series of military exercises code-named Peninsular Shield. The drills, held every year, bring together as many as twenty-five countries for a series of land, sea, and air maneuvers. Qatar also expanded its relationship with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, signing documents on partnership and cooperation in May 2018.27 Qatar also held military exercises with Turkey and permitted that country to maintain a sizeable military presence in the emirate. Turkish authorities facilitated joint maneuvers with Azerbaijan also. Qatar opened discussions

152

Isolating Qatar

with Sudan on aspects of military cooperation, consistent with the emirate’s efforts to explore all avenues to enlarge its global presence. Talks with US officials resulted in a commitment by Qatar to expand the Al Udeid military base, while at the same time Qatar negotiated the purchase of Russian S-400 air-defense missile systems.28 In May 2018, ships of the British Royal Navy came to the port of Doha to take part in military exercises with the Qatari navy. At the same time, port authorities in Abu Dhabi received new directives from the UAE government allowing the loading and unloading of ships going to or coming from Qatar. Qatari-flagged vessels were still excluded, but the new “authority circular” represented a hopeful crack in the blockade.29 Another crack appeared in late 2019 when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE reversed an earlier decision to boycott a regional football tournament in Qatar. Teams from all three Rift nations competed, with the Bahraini team winning on December 8, 2019.

More US Involvement

Beginning in early 2019, White House advisor (and Trump son-in-law) Jared Kushner began making a series of trips to the Gulf region to seek an end to the Rift crisis. He would become the chief facilitator and catalyst of the eventual end of the Rift. Kushner had struck up a close friendship with the Saudi crown prince. In the fall of 2019, Qatar’s foreign minister made a secret trip to Riyadh, reportedly to offer a deal to restrain the anti-Saudi coverage on Al Jazeera in return for a restoration of relations. The deal fell through, however, when the station continued to run news and commentary hostile to Saudi Arabia.30 In February 2020, Qatar’s foreign minister announced that talks had been suspended. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who took over from Rex Tillerson in April 2018, made his first overseas trip to the Gulf region in response to reports that Saudi Arabia was making plans to dig a moat along Qatar’s only land border and create a nuclear waste dump nearby. Pompeo’s message, according to State Department sources, was simple: enough is enough.31 Kushner continued his efforts as well, meeting at the White House with the Kuwaiti foreign minister, who was actively trying to mediate. Published reports indicated that Kushner was focused on opening Saudi airspace as a vital first step in healing the dispute. It was also the step most likely to hurt Iran, a Trump administration priority. By mid-2020, Kushner was making more trips to the region, and optimism surfaced as the year drew to a close—albeit cautious optimism, since similar hopes in late 2019 had come to nothing. By September, talks to end the Rift had become serious. Also in late 2020, rhetoric from the Rift nations began to soften. Saudi Arabia’s UN ambassador told an interviewer in December, “There is no justification for a permanent break” with Qatar. He added, “There is no fate-

The End of the Rift

153

changing or existential disagreement between us and Qatar. We are one people and one country, and the Qatari brothers are an extension of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an extension of them.” However, he maintained the Kingdom’s central accusation that Doha was supporting terrorists.32 Saudi Arabia also began to deny it had punished people for expressing sympathy for Qatar: “Regarding the alleged criminalization of sympathy for Qatar, including the fact that the Kingdom imposed penalties of up to five years in prison and a fine of up to three million rials in the case of sympathy for Qatar, this is not true, as the Kingdom’s laws guarantee freedom of opinion and expression for every human being unless there is a violation of public order.”33 Speaking at the Mediterranean Dialogues conference in December 2020, Qatari foreign minister Sheikh Mohammed averred, “This needless crisis needs to come to an end.” He added, “There are some movements that we hope will put an end to this crisis. We believe actually that Gulf unity is very important for the security of the region.”34 Even Anwar Gargash, who once said there was “nothing to negotiate” with Qatar, said as the crisis drew to a close, “Well, again, you know, my—my view and this is something we have always said that the 13 demands at the time were considered what I would call a maximalist negotiating position.”35 At a virtual diplomatic conference in December, Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud said he was “optimistic” that a breakthrough was possible. He added that Saudi Arabia and Qatar had made significant progress, “thanks to the continuing efforts of Kuwait but also thanks to strong support from President Trump and the U.S. administration towards bringing all parties closer.” On December 4, Faisal said a “final agreement looks within reach.”36 The final moves to end the crisis took place against two crucial backdrops. On the one hand, the Saudi economy was showing signs of strain by the end of 2020. Thanks in large part to more drilling in North America and also to the economic slowdown brought by the reaction to Covid-19, oil prices remained below the $68-per-barrel threshold that Saudi Arabia needed to balance its budget. Nevertheless, the Saudi government announced in January 2021 that it was voluntarily cutting production to allow Russia and Kazakhstan to increase their output. Saudi authorities said the move was to keep prices steady in the wake of the pandemic. In any event, lower prices took a severe toll on the Kingdom’s economy. A stalling economy also meant Saudi Arabia was less attractive to expatriates, prompting one visitor to note, “Saudis already check in hotel guests, sell perfume at Riyadh malls, and welcome restaurant diners, occupations foreigners dominated a few years ago.”37 At the same time, the Trump administration would boast several breakthroughs in Middle East diplomacy at the end of 2020. The Abraham Accords

154

Isolating Qatar

were a series of agreements by Arab states to normalize their relations with Israel. The UAE led the way in August, followed in short order by Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. After forty years, during which only two Arab nations (Egypt and Jordan) had recognized Israel, that number trebled in a matter of weeks. The accords were largely the work of Jared Kushner. A top UAE official told Kushner that rapprochement with Israel “is something we see as an inevitability.”38 When representatives from the UAE and two other Arab nations attended a US-sponsored conference in Bahrain on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, hope for improved relations grew, and that growth accelerated when the Arab diplomats saw there was no domestic reaction to their participation in diplomatic moves that would isolate the Palestinian leadership. Kushner, for his part, was determined to end his father-in-law’s term with a series of foreign policy successes and to cap off those successes with an end to the Gulf Rift crisis. Rumors that Qatar was next on the list of nations preparing to recognize Israel, however, proved unfounded.39

Moving Toward Endgame

The expanding series of diplomatic contacts designed to bring an end to the Rift took on a noticeably greater sense of urgency as 2020 closed. Despite repeated attempts to delay certification of the results, it was becoming clear that Donald Trump would be leaving the White House and former vice president Joe Biden would replace him. Biden was a wholehearted supporter of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear deal. The prospect of an end to the sanctions regime that was causing serious damage to Iran’s economy and generating serious internal opposition, followed by a resurgent Iran seeking to expand its regional and global power, was a daunting one to all the Arab Gulf states, including Qatar. The necessity of presenting a united front to Iran, and to the incoming Biden administration, brought a flurry of activity in late December and early January. Jared Kushner made repeated visits to the region as 2020 ended. Some accounts credit him with convincing MBS that the Gulf states would be better off presenting Biden with a united bloc and forestalling efforts on the new president’s part to play off some of them against the others.40 Even as rumors of an imminent breakthrough spread, Kushner was reportedly working the phones to overcome last-minute glitches that threatened the settlement.41 His importance to the rapprochement was acknowledged with an invitation to the GCC summit in Saudi Arabia where the Rift officially ended. On the evening of January 4, 2021, the new emir of Kuwait, Nawaf alAhmed al-Jaber (Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah had died in September

The End of the Rift

155

2020), announced that Saudi Arabia would be opening its airspace to Qatari planes.42 Kuwait’s foreign minister went on television to announce, “Based on Sheikh Nawaf’s proposal, it was agreed to open the airspace and land and sea borders between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Qatar starting from this evening.”43 Qatar Airways started rerouting its aircraft almost immediately. The first commercial airliner to take advantage of the newly opened airspace was Qatar Airways Flight 1365, bound for Johannesburg, South Africa. At the same time, senior Trump administration officials predicted that the airspace announcement was merely a prelude to a comprehensive settlement. In addition, Saudi Arabia announced the opening of the land border between itself and Qatar. For more than three years, the only Qataris to cross that border were pilgrims with permission to make the hajj. While the border posts remained quiet for some hours while procedures for health and passport checks could be established, the Abu Samra crossing soon saw traffic increase, although numbers did not match pre-Rift numbers, largely due to Covid-19. The reaction from Qatar was immediate and positive. Qataris driving toward the border post were seen waving their arms and sounding their car horns.

The GCC Summit at Al-Ula

The formal ending of the Rift took place at the annual Gulf Cooperation Council summit, held in the town of Al-Ula in northwestern Saudi Arabia. The sudden announcement in Qatar that the emir would attend in person foreshadowed major events at the summit. In short order, the UAE announced that the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, would attend, and Bahrain announced that the country’s crown prince, Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, was on his way to Al-Ula. The effusive greeting Tamim received from MBS at the airport also indicated heightened meaning. The two leaders embraced, laughed through their masks, and embarked on a widely televised tour of the area’s archeological sites. In a further sign of reconciliation, Egyptian foreign minister Sameh Shoukry was invited to the summit to sign the agreement as well. The country announced that “it had signed the Al-Ula Declaration for Arab reconciliation, as part of Egypt’s constant keenness on solidarity between the Arab quartet countries, and toward joining ranks and removing any strains in relations between Arab countries.”44 The ceremonial signing of the agreement ending the Rift took place in the impressive Maraya Concert Hall, the holder of the Guinness world record for the world’s largest mirrored building. The setting and other elements of the summit were heavy with symbolic meaning. The summit itself was named for Kuwaiti emir Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber and Omani sultan

156

Isolating Qatar

Qaboos bin Said, both of whom had reigned over their respective nations for decades and both of whom had died within months of the summit. A musical performance by a group of Iranian musicians banned from performing in their own country preceded the signing. Their inclusion sent a clear signal that the danger of Iran was never far from the minds of the summit attendees. The summit organizers also commissioned a local artist to create a mural that incorporated the logo of the GCC into images of AlUla’s ancient sites, a signal that the Saudis were eager to use the end of the Rift as an opportunity to revive the GCC. As details of the agreement leaked out, it became clear that Qatar had made no significant concessions to end the boycott. The country agreed to lift the lawsuits it had filed against the Rift nations, including a suit seeking $5 billion in damages, knowing full well that international courts were likely to declare the actions moot anyway. The text of the agreement contained vague language about signatories refraining from interfering in each other’s internal affairs, just enough to allow a minimal amount of face-saving on the part of the Rift nations. The original set of demands included an intrusive and lengthy verification regime, not a sign of which appeared in leaked portions of the final agreement. The tone of Al Jazeera’s reporting about Saudi Arabia and the UAE softened immediately, but there is no evidence that the final settlement mentioned the network. Initial statements from Saudi officials were celebratory. Prince Faisal said of the agreement, “We are extremely pleased with having been able to achieve this very important breakthrough that we believe will contribute very much to the stability and security of all our nations in the region. We are at a place where everybody is satisfied and happy. . . . The returning of diplomatic relations, flights, etc., all of that will now go back to normal.”45 MBS, for his part, focused on the need for unity in the face of perceived threats from Iran: “We urgently need to unite our efforts to . . . confront the challenges that surround us, particularly the threats posed by the Iranian regime’s nuclear program, its ballistic missile program, and the destructive projects adopted by its proxies through terrorist and sectarian activities to destabilize the security and stability of the region.”46 Yet some Saudi statements had a decidedly defensive tone. Al Arabiya, for example, insisted, “The rift between several Arab countries and Qatar is purely political and not ideological, therefore portraying the recent reconciliation as a retreat or defeat is completely unjustified, nor does reconciliation mean that the boycott was wrong.” The statement opined that “Qatar has fulfilled most of what was expected of it,” stating, “We no longer hear about the payment of ransoms, nor the financing of groups within the boycotting countries, and Qatar has transferred most of its media operations from Doha to other countries. This demonstrates Qatar’s considerable efforts in reconciling with the four countries behind the boycott.” 47

The End of the Rift

157

While the summit was taking place, an otherwise routine event occurred in Egypt. Qatari finance minister Ali Sherif Al Emadi attended the opening of the St. Regis Hotel in Cairo. Qatari Diar (a real estate investment company) had largely financed the hotel, and the presence of the finance minister, who flew over Saudi and Egyptian airspace to get to the ceremony, was further evidence of the Rift nations’ desire to reestablish friendly relations with Qatar. It was the first visit to Egypt by a senior Qatari official since the crisis started. In a further sign of US approval of the diplomatic progress, US Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin was also present. Some commentators wondered if all four of the Rift nations were equally committed to better relations with Qatar. As the Saudis were announcing the reopening of borders, a pro-government television host in Egypt predicted angrily, “We will not reconcile with the Qatari regime.”48 The day after the summit, Emirati news sites and newspapers led with photos from the summit and positive commentary, but Qatari news websites, including Al Jazeera, were still blocked. Gargash was cautious, tweeting that the agreement would help restore Gulf unity but that “more work lies ahead.”49 His lack of enthusiasm prompted some to note that Kushner’s party did not stop in the UAE on their way to the summit. One American network reported that even at the last minute, UAE officials were asking the Saudis to withdraw their support.50 An Egyptian spokesman emphasized that Egypt had its own set of conditions for ending the Rift, connected to Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood.51 There is some evidence that the Americans may have greased the skids toward an agreement by approving large arms sales to some of the Rift nations. While Kushner was working toward a solution at the end of 2020, the Trump administration approved the sale of more than $760 million in arms to Saudi Arabia and gave final approval to $100 million in arms sales to Egypt. US officials insisted, however, that the sales were not related to the agreements ending the Rift.52 Such diplomatic details were seemingly of little concern to thousands of Gulf residents who were able to reunite with their families. In one video, broadcast on Al Arabiya, a young Qatari boy, in tears and jumping up and down, is speaking on the phone to his father, with whom the boy would soon be reunited.53 One woman told a Saudi news site, “I was awakened by my husband late last night with the news of the reopening of borders. Words fail me. It is so hard to put my feelings into words. I had been trying for a long time to find an easy way to go back to Jeddah where my parental family resides.”54

Taking Credit and Getting Credit

As soon as the deal to end the Rift was announced, some American experts moved rapidly to deny that any of the credit for the breakthrough should go

158

Isolating Qatar

to President Trump. Barbara Leaf, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that lifting the airspace restriction would be “a win for Doha,” but she quickly added, “If that is all the administration can deliver on the blockade, it should not be considered a major diplomatic feat.” Barbara Slavin, a scholar at the Atlantic Council, said, “This is a gesture to the incoming Biden administration by Saudi Arabia, which expects an increase in tension with the United States over human rights, Yemen, and Iran.” Amjad Ahmad, another Atlantic Council fellow, added, “The driving force for ending the feud may be political and aimed to appease the incoming Biden administration as it plans to ramp up pressure on Saudi Arabia regarding human rights and potentially revisit the Iran deal.”55 Those actually involved in the negotiations, however, gave much or all of the credit to the outgoing American president, or to his son-in-law. As early as December 4, Kuwaiti foreign minister Sheikh Ahmed Nasser al-Sabah thanked Kushner for his recent efforts.56 The Kuwaiti emir himself thanked President Trump for his support for the final agreement.57 Qatar’s emir added his thanks, both to Trump and to Kushner. MBS, for his part, thanked the Kuwaitis and added, “We also hail the endeavors of the United States of America.”58 Prince Faisal noted the significant progress and praised Trump by name. A Saudi newspaper editorialized, “Tuesday’s event is yet another triumph for the foreign policy approach of President Trump and his administration, which includes patience, perseverance, respect for those who are involved in the issues they are concerned about, as well as not preaching or dictating an outcome that the region is unwilling to accept or embrace.”59 One report said that Trump had called Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to press him to join the Gulf nations in ending the Rift.60 Qatar’s foreign minister praised the ongoing efforts of the Trump administration, saying, “We have been discussing this [crisis] with President Trump’s administration since the blockade started.” He added, “We have also seen very strong and significant moments by President Trump and his administration in order to reach a resolution of the crisis.”61 Some observers believe that MBS and others wanted to give Trump one more Middle East diplomatic triumph before he left office, to build on the Abraham Accords.62 For his part, Trump certainly wanted to deny Iran Qatari overflight cash and more generally strike one last blow against the Islamic Republic. In fact, Kushner’s efforts began with talks over opening Saudi airspace as a stand-alone issue, not necessarily part of a larger resolution. It is also certain the Trump administration desired a united Arab front to counter threats from Iran. In some cases, Gulf leaders shared the accolades with the Kuwaiti emir, who certainly played a major role in the breakthrough, making dozens of phone calls to the principals. His contribution was large enough to per-

The End of the Rift

159

mit Kuwait to be the first to announce the reopening of Saudi airspace and the coming comprehensive settlement. An Egyptian spokesman singled out Kuwait’s ongoing efforts over the years of the crisis. Emir Tamim, for his part, also thanked “the brotherly state of Kuwait for its valued efforts.”63 His foreign minister followed suit the day the settlement was announced. By the beginning of January, all but Trump’s most die-hard supporters could see that he would not be continuing as president after January 20. It is thus difficult to perceive a rational ulterior motive in the effort to praise Trump for his role in the settlement. Indeed, in 2018, Gargash made clear that intervention by the Americans would be unwelcome. “I sincerely advised Qatar that there will not be any mediation from outside the Gulf. No pressure will work, media campaigns will not alter your fate, your crisis is ongoing. Be wise and negotiate with your neighbors who have real concerns.”64 The Saudis added around the same time, “The dispute with Qatar is best resolved through the mediation process led by Kuwait. And that will be our message in Washington.”65 If anything, the leaders in the region had a strong motive to curry favor with the incoming Biden administration. They had no discernible reason to maintain good relations with a soon-to-be ex-president. Insofar as Biden was given a role by the people in the region, however, it was a negative one, in the sense that both Qatar and the Rift nations expressed their concern that Biden would end US sanctions on Iran, seek to rehabilitate its leaders, and bring about a resurgence in Iranian power and influence. During the campaign, Biden had repeatedly stated his willingness to reenter the Iran nuclear deal. Once elected, he nominated Antony Blinken, a strong supporter of the nuclear deal, as secretary of state. He had also stated his intention to treat Riyadh “like the pariah they are” and to react more strongly to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.66 The Saudis and Emiratis worried that a Biden administration would ignore their fears about Iran in favor of a quick return to the JCPOA. One commentator opined that the Saudis also feared that Biden would draw down the US military presence, making intra-Gulf division a luxury the Arab states could no longer afford.67 One commentator expressed the hope that the impending change in Washington would induce Iran to “behave better, to renounce their commitment to destabilizing the region and to join the rest of us in recognizing, with the signing of the Abraham accords between Israel and a number of Arab states, a genuine opportunity for peace and prosperity.”68 Iran itself congratulated Qatar on the settlement and added, “Iran is neither an enemy nor a threat.”69 The Iranian regime, however, stoked the fears of the Gulf nations at the very time they were negotiating a reconciliation. One Iranian news agency warned, “Iran will not differentiate between US military bases in the region and the Arab countries hosting American troops if a war breaks out.” General

160

Isolating Qatar

Amir Ali Hajizadeh added, “Naturally, the very same Arab countries in the region will bear the brunt [of an attack],” a clear reference to the US naval base in Bahrain and the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. He added that Iran’s allies had advanced nuclear technology. “Instead of giving a fish or teaching to catch a fish, we taught our allies and friends how to make a hook.”70 Iran also seized a Korean ship and twenty crew members at the time of the negotiations, supposedly in retaliation for South Korean support for US-led sanctions. The incident occurred despite strong economic ties between South Korea and Iran.

International Reactions

Qatar and the Rift nations did not have to wait long for praise and congratulations—or in some cases for other global leaders to give themselves a share of the credit. Pakistan was among the nations to give Kuwaiti emir Nawaf the lion’s share of the credit. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres singled out the late emir of Kuwait and the late sultan of Oman in his reaction to the settlement.71 The Italian Foreign Ministry said, “We express our appreciation for Kuwait’s uninterrupted mediation efforts, the impetus provided by the United States, and the constructive commitment of the parties to resolve the dispute.”72 The NATO secretariat also praised Kuwait’s efforts, as did the German government and the chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the Arab Peninsula. Russia also deferred to Kuwait, saying that the agreement reflected the goodwill of the GCC countries and came about due to the mediation efforts of Kuwait.73 Turkey’s Foreign Ministry reacted to the airspace announcement by saying it welcomed the move, which it called an important step toward resolving the dispute. Turkey, which had supported Qatar throughout the crisis, added, “Our hope is that this dispute reaches a comprehensive and lasting resolution based on mutual respect for the countries’ sovereignty and that other sanctions against the people of Qatar are lifted as soon as possible.”74 India’s Ministry of External Affairs welcomed the “reconciliation and rapprochement between countries in the region.” Morocco expressed the hope that the summit would “constitute the beginning for the reunification and the establishment of mutual trust as well as for overcoming this crisis in order to consolidate the unity within the Gulf family.” The European Union, through a spokesman, averred that the body “has always been supporting an intra-Gulf solution, a negotiated solution to this crisis by engaging with all the main stakeholders and by continuously calling for dialogue.”75 Germany also claimed a share of the credit, saying that with its EU partners, “The Federal Government also made repeated efforts to help bring about a solution to the crisis.”76

The End of the Rift

161

Japan’s Foreign Ministry press secretary said in a statement, “We welcome these positive developments and highly appreciate the mediation efforts by those including Kuwait and the United States for the settlement of the issue.”77 South Korea added its approval: “The Republic of Korea has welcomed the Gulf Cooperation Council for Arab Countries’ outcomes represented in the Al-Ula Declaration aimed at strengthening Gulf and Arab solidarity and cooperation.”78

Outcomes and Effects

The end of the three-and-a-half-year crisis had far-reaching effects. Some observers noted a softening in the tone of Al Jazeera’s broadcasts involving the four Rift nations, although the network’s executives deny any such effort on their part.79 As noted in Chapter 4, Al Jazeera’s uniqueness is rapidly disappearing, and its influence is not nearly what it was at the time of the Arab Spring. Still, the Doha-based channel can claim to have withstood the efforts of four nations to silence it and continue to present itself as a media David taking on the Goliaths of the international community. Qatar’s foreign minister said the issue of Al Jazeera was not raised during the final negotiations. UAE ambassador to the United States Yousef Al Otaiba said of the network, “They’re really not as important as they think they are.”80 The Rift had a significant impact on Qatar’s internal politics. The boycott compelled the Qatari government to depend on the willingness of its citizens to make sacrifices. In no other way could the disruptions of the blockade be managed or overcome. In return, Tamim and his advisors believed they had to promise a greater say in government for those citizens. The substance of this promise was the prospect of elections for the Shura Council. At the opening of the council’s 2020 session, Tamim told the body, all of whose members were appointed, that elections would take place in October 2021. Such elections had been promised for over a decade, and Tamim’s long-awaited movement on the matter can almost certainly be traced to the impact of the Rift. As many analysts have stated, the Gulf monarchies depend for their legitimacy on an implicit deal in which the people get economic benefits in return for stifling demands for popular participation. Since the Rift put those benefits in doubt, Tamim had little choice but to seek a new form of legitimacy, which Tamim referred to as “a wider participation of citizens.”81 The Qatari government also had to come out of the Rift crisis with its plans for economic diversification intact, especially given the commitment to sell more natural gas. This necessity meant paying attention to potential revenues from tourism and from the coming World Cup. Qatari officials

162

Isolating Qatar

were quick to point out that the opening of the border meant tourists from Saudi Arabia were welcome again. (Saudis had often visited Qatar, as they did Bahrain, to take advantage of the much more lenient interpretations of Islam’s sharia law.) The Fitch ratings agency raised the country’s credit rating almost immediately as the Rift ended. Among other reasons, the agency noted the likelihood of a revival of tourism. Qatari officials had always believed that the World Cup would prompt the Rift nations, all of whose populations love football, to find a way to discontinue the travel restrictions. Those travel restrictions may have helped Qatar to cope with the impact of Covid-19. A semiofficial Qatari news source boasted that the country’s infection rate was low and that the government had taken effective steps both to stop the spread of the virus and to support those hurt economically by the severe lockdown Qatar imposed. Resilience, patience, resourcefulness, and solidarity were valuable to all countries dealing with the Covid19 crisis, and the Rift promoted all these values in Qatar. On a practical level, the rapid growth of Qatari manufacturing meant that there were few shortages of hand sanitizer. The commodity started appearing almost immediately on store shelves in bottles clearly marked “Made in Qatar.” The most far-reaching impact of the long crisis, however, was a surge in Qatari nationalism and a rejection of the sense of community among the Gulf nations. Much of the opposition to the Rift within Qatar centered on the emir himself. The young ruler was seen as a “firm, steady, wise and mature hand at the wheel.” He benefited from promoting a sense of being Qatari, even at the expense of the regional attachment that the GCC tried to promote. Resilience became an integral part of Qatari patriotism. His government took many steps to make Qatar self-sufficient, removing a key incentive to working with any international organization. One account noted, “For signs of how Qatar has adapted to the blockade imposed by its neighbors, you need go no further than the Al-Meera grocery in a strip mall across from a mosque, in a residential part of the capital. Shelves where local products were once rare now hold Qatari milk, Qatari tissues and Qatari cucumbers.”82 A Qatari entrepreneur said the injustice of the Rift drew Qataris together, both citizens and expats: “We were able to quickly come together as a unified community because we all recognized how unjustifiable the actions of the blockading nations were.” He added, “The blockade made us realize that there was now an opportunity and imperative to utilize Qatar’s amazing resources, infrastructure, and human potential to create solutions that catered to Qatar’s market specifically.”83 Qatari Chamber chair Sheikh Khalifa bin Jassim Al Thani noted that hundreds of new Qatari industrial establishments appeared during the Rift, along with 293 new factories and 47,000 new enterprises overall.

The End of the Rift

163

While how long this nationalistic feeling will last remains to be seen, the threat to the GCC was clear enough to Saudi and Emirati officials that they emphasized the need to revive the GCC on numerous occasions as the Rift was ending. Gargash said he hoped the Al-Ula Declaration would “heal a rift within the [GCC], within the same group of countries that share history, share a lot of familial relationships, . . . economies, and so on and so forth.”84 The GCC secretary-general, for his part, stressed, “The people of the GCC countries are proud of this step, and are looking to the future with all hopes, aspirations, and opportunities towards a coherent and compact Gulf entity that moves ahead on the wheel of development, progress, security, and stability.”85 Standing with the secretary-general, a ranking Saudi official said the summit’s final communiqué “signals the start of a new era in pan-Gulf relations.” He added, “The wisdom of GCC leaders is able to overcome all these differences, and steer the region, its states, and peoples to safety.”86 Kuwait’s foreign minister hailed the settlement as “once again prov[ing] that the GCC embodies a deep-rooted partnership that consistently overcomes challenges while advancing the interests of the GCC people, thanks to the leadership and wisdom of its leaders.”87 Egypt, while not a member of the GCC, said its signature on the agreement “confirms the strengthening of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the GCC states.” Gulf state officials expressed the hope that the GCC would finally be able to proceed with longpostponed plans for a customs union and common market, as well as further military integration.88 The secretary-general of the Arab League also looked forward to a revived GCC as a stepping-stone to “collective Arab unity.”89 Even officials from outside the region underlined their hopes for a stronger GCC, with Britain’s foreign secretary reacting to the reconciliation by saying, “Yesterday’s GCC summit announcement is a significant development on the path to restoring Gulf unity.”90 A US State Department spokesperson issued a statement saying in part, “A resolution of the wider three-year dispute between the [Rift nations] and Qatar is in the interest of all Gulf Cooperation Council members as well as the interests of the United States.”91 Such good wishes for the GCC notwithstanding, a study by Qatar University suggested that the international organization had substantial ground to recover with Qataris. According to the study, a “sense of belonging to the GCC” dropped from 94 to 53 percent from June 2016 to May 2018. At the same time, Qataris who believed that the GCC was a threat to Qatar rose from 18 to 62 percent. By mid-2018, less than one-third of Qataris had a positive perception of the GCC.92 The Qatari foreign minister also called the settlement a victory for the GCC, although without a clear commitment to defer to the organization in the future. Lack of faith in international institutions is likely to be a long-term result of the failed boycott.

164

Notes

Isolating Qatar

1. Gambrell, “Emirati Diplomat to AP.” 2. Batrawy, “Qatar Emerges from Gulf Spat Resolute and Largely Unscathed.” 3. Hubbard, “Virus Worsens Suffering of Gulf’s Migrant Labor.” 4. Bukhari, “Qatar and Turkey to Sign Several New Pacts.” 5. Rose, “Qatari Non-oil Exports Set to Exceed Pre-blockade Levels.” 6. “Qatar Airways Becomes Largest Passenger, Cargo Airline Globally Despite Illegal Blockade,” The Peninsula (Doha), June 5, 2020. 7. Shoeb, “Qatar’s GDP Quadrupled in Two Decades.” 8. Barbuscia and Ashar, “Gulf Economy Gets a Boost from Healing of SaudiQatar Rift.” 9. Kanady, “Moody’s Assigns Aa3 Rating to Qatar.” 10. Hubbard, “Qatar Adapts to Blockade a Retooled Economy.” 11. Shoeb, “Qatar’s GDP Quadrupled in Two Decades.” 12. Walsh, “Saudis Turning to Direct Talks with Enemies.” 13. “US Embassy’s National Day Celebrates Enduring American-Qatari Partnership,” The Peninsula (Doha), April 10, 2019. 14. Eglash, “Botched Israeli Operation Sparks Surge of Violence.” 15. Halbfinger, “Israel and Hamas Agree on Fuel and Cash Deal to Quell Hostilities in Gaza.” 16. “At Least 10 Palestinians Killed in Gaza Market Fire,” Associated Press Newswires, March 5, 2020. 17. Dahir, “We Have to Rely on Ourselves.” 18. “Qatar University: March Towards Educational Excellence Continues Despite Blockade,” The Peninsula (Doha), June 5, 2020. 19. “Trade with Qatar Has Increased Three Times: Outgoing Argentine Ambassador,” Gulf Times (Doha), October 28, 2020. 20. Rose, “Qatari Non-oil Exports Set to Exceed Pre-blockade Levels.” 21. Bukhari, “Qatar and Turkey to Sign Several New Pacts.” 22. Hudson, “Two Years After Death of Khashoggi.” 23. Yee and Specia, “Gulf States Pledge to Ease Yearslong Qatar Blockade.” 24. Ulrichsen, “Why US Can’t End the Saudi, UAE-Led Blockade on Qatar.” 25. “Trump’s Attempt to End the Saudi-Qatar Stalemate Ends in Recriminations,” New York Times, September 10, 2017. 26. “World Court Hands Qatar Legal Win in Air Blockade Row with Gulf States,” Reuters News, July 14, 2020. 27. “Turkey, Nato Stress Qatar’s Crucial Role in Alliance’s Future,” Gulf Times (Doha), July 12, 2018. 28. Falvey, “Qatar Crisis.” 29. “UAE Eases Qatar Shipping Ban amid Continuing Dispute,” Reuters News, February 20, 2019. 30. Nissenbaum and Said, “Qatar, Saudi Arabia Set to End Feud.” 31. Harris, “Pompeo Is Said to Tell Saudis to Drop Tiff with Qatar.” 32. Jakes, “A U.S. Effort to Ease a Mideast Rivalry (and Hurt Iran).” 33. “Saudi Humanitarian Measure, Efforts During Qatari Crisis Announced,” Bahrain News Agency, September 7, 2019. 34. Gambrell, “Saudi Arabia Says End to Yearslong Qatar Boycott ‘in Reach.’” 35. Batrawy, “Qatar Emerges from Gulf Spat Resolute and Largely Unscathed.” 36. Holland, “Breakthrough Reached in Gulf Dispute with Qatar.” See also Naar, “Saudi Arabia Appreciates Kuwaiti Efforts Regarding Gulf Crisis: FM.” 37. Yee, “Wealthy States Are Forced to Reckon with Migrant Labor.”

The End of the Rift

165

38. Halbfinger and Bergman, “New Realities in Mideast Pull 2 Rivals Closer.” 39. Bousmid, “Sommet des pays du Golfe.” 40. Nissenbaum and Said, “Qatar y Arabia Saudita firman acuerdo.” 41. Yee and Specia, “Gulf States Pledge to Ease Yearslong Qatar Blockade.” 42. Throughout the Rift, commentators used the term airspace to designate what is technically referred to as a “flight information region” (FIR). This is the space controlled by the air traffic controllers of a particular country. FIRs are negotiated diplomatically and overseen by the ICAO. 43. Naar, “Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince.” 44. “Egypt Signs Al-Ula Declaration for Arab Reconciliation,” Kuwait News Agency, January 5, 2021. 45. Batrawy and Nabil, “Gulf Arab Leaders Sign Declaration to Ease Rift with Qatar.” 46. Donnelly, “US Air Traffic Control Receive Threat Vowing Revenge.” 47. “Reconciliation with Qatar,” Al Arabiya, January 6, 2021. Qatar did announce the rearrest of Abd al-Rahman al-Nuaymi, a former professor and financier whom the United States considered a terrorist. He had been tried secretly in Qatar in 2015 and acquitted. A Qatari prosecutor said there was new evidence in the case. 48. Kalin, “Qatar’s Neighbors Pledge to End Embargo.” 49. Holland, “Breakthrough Reached in Gulf Dispute with Qatar.” 50. Ulrichsen, “Why US Can’t End the Saudi, UAE-Led Blockade on Qatar.” 51. Abueish, “Egypt Says It Will Open Its Airspace with Qatar.” 52. Nissenbaum and Said, “Qatar y Arabia Saudita firman acuerdo.” 53. Abueish, “Qataris Celebrate Saudi Arabia Borders Reopening.” 54. Radwan, “Families Rejoice.” 55. “Experts React: The US Brokers Another Deal to End the Gulf Rift,” Atlantic Council, January 4, 2021, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource /experts-react-the-us-brokers-another-deal-to-end-the-gulf-rift/#AhmadGulfRift. 56. Salem, “Saudi Arabia Says ‘Significant Progress’ Made.” 57. Nissenbaum and Said, “Saudi Arabia, Qatar Near Deal to End Gulf Dispute.” 58. Naar, “Transcript.” 59. Greenblatt, “Now Is a Promising Time to Begin to Heal Gulf Rift.” 60. Nissenbaum and Said, “Saudi Arabia, Qatar Near Deal to End Gulf Dispute.” 61. Bukhari, “When Gulf Crisis Ends All of Us Will Be Winners.” 62. Yee and Specia, “Gulf States Pledge to Ease Yearslong Qatar Blockade.” 63. “Amir, FM Tweet on Summit,” Gulf Times (Doha), January 5, 2021. 64. Sly, “Deep Family Feuds Divide Qatar from Its Neighbors.” 65. Stancati, “Saudi Crown Prince Will Seek to Solidify Anti-Iran Stance.” 66. “The Gulf Monarchies Draw Closer,” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2021. See also Gambrell, “Saudi Arabia Says End to Yearslong Qatar Boycott ‘in Reach.” 67. Batrawy and Nabil, “Gulf Arab Leaders Sign Declaration to Ease Rift with Qatar.” 68. Abbas, “2021.” 69. Batrawy and Nabil, “Gulf Arab Leaders Sign Declaration to Ease Rift with Qatar.” 70. Khalid, “IRGC.” 71. Kossaify, “UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres Hails AlUla Declaration.” 72. “Italian Embassy in Kuwait Acclaims GCC Summit Outcome,” Kuwait News Agency, January 6, 2021. 73. “Russia Welcomes Outcome of GCC Summit,” Kuwait News Agency, January 6, 2021. 74. Holland, “Breakthrough Reached in Gulf Dispute with Qatar.”

166

Isolating Qatar

75. “Overflight Above Gulf Nations Set to Resume for Qatari Jets,” Gulf Times (Doha), January 6, 2021. 76. “Germany Welcomes Joint Declaration at GCC Meet,” Gulf Times (Doha), January 7, 2021. 77. “Japan Lauds Kuwait’s Mediation Efforts for GCC Reconciliation,” Kuwait News Agency, January 6, 2021. 78. “Republic of Korea Welcomes Al-Ula Declaration,” Saudi News Agency, January 6, 2021. 79. Yee and Specia, “Gulf States Pledge to Ease Yearslong Qatar Blockade.” 80. Tracy and Jakes, “U.S. Casts Al Jazeera Affiliate as Foreign Agent.” 81. Debre, “Qatar’s Emir Promises Shura Council Election Next Year.” 82. Hubbard, “Qatar Adapts to Blockade a Retooled Economy.” 83. “Qatar Is Now a Self-Sufficient Nation in Different Sectors,” Gulf Times (Doha), June 3, 2020. 84. “Georgia’s Republican Senate Candidates Backing Trump’s Effort,” CNN Newsroom, January 5, 2021. 85. “HE Secretary-General of GCC Welcomes Opening of Qatari-Saudi Airspace, Land and Sea Borders,” Gulf Times (Doha), January 5, 2021. 86. “Saudi FM Stresses Kuwait’s Role in Healing Gulf Rift,” Kuwait News Agency, January 5, 2021. 87. Abueish, “GCC Secretary-General Says Saudi-Qatari Borders Reopening.” 88. Khalid, “Full Transcript of AlUla Summit Declaration.” 89. “Nations Welcome New Chapter in Gulf Relations,” Gulf Times (Doha), January 5, 2021. 90. “Historic Gulf Accord at Al-Ula Seen as Path to Peace, Progress, Stability,” Gulf Times (Doha), January 6, 2021. 91. “Nations Welcome New Chapter in Gulf Relations.” 92. Gengler and Al-Khelaifi, “Crisis, State Legitimacy, and Political Participation.”

9

How Did Qatar Prevail?

You could say Qatar has won. . . . The cost of fighting was too high— there is a realisation now that this is the black sheep of the family and we just have to put up with it. —Dr. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, Emirati political scientist1

Can sovereign nation-states be coerced to take or refrain from certain actions, or forced to adopt or abandon certain policies, by means short of war? For thousands of years, powerful nations have taken for granted not only their ability but also their right to do so. In the famous Melian Dialogue from The Peloponnesian Wars, the Melians are threatened by the far more powerful Athenians, who assert that their demands for subservience are part of the natural order of international relations. The Athenian representatives tell their intended victims, “You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”2 Compared to the four nations most committed to isolating it, Qatar must be regarded as weak. Its population is equal to barely 2 percent of the combined population of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt. The Rift nations’ combined land area is 279 times greater than Qatar’s. While the Qatari military is strong enough to protect the country from pirates and occasional raiding parties, it could not hope to win against the combined forces of the four Rift nations. During the first days of the Rift, Qatari officials feared an outright military intervention, highlighting this vulnerability. Even Qatar’s greatest strength, its enormous wealth, does not compare with the combined economic might of the Rift nations. According to the classic measures of power, Qatar, if weighed in a theoretical balance, would be found wanting.

167

168

Isolating Qatar

The fact that Qatar not only survived the three-and-a-half-year diplomatic, economic, financial, and transportation boycott, but also thrived and came out of the crisis with political assets superior to those it had at the start, means that the classic measures of power are inadequate. In the twenty-first century, a far more expansive and complex understanding of power must supplement such traditional measures as numbers of soldiers, tanks, warplanes, or bombs. Growing international interdependence, the inescapable need to respond, at least in some fashion, to the wishes of national publics, the instantaneous spread of information and images, and the vastly increased destructive power of modern weaponry have all made recourse to war a last resort, even for powerful nations, except under the rarest of circumstances. Even an economic boycott such as that imposed in Qatar, while relatively easy to institute and maintain (compared to waging war), does not offer a guarantee that the targeted nation will act as the boycotting nations hope. Specific circumstances have to be in place for such economic weaponry to function effectively. First, the targeted nation must be economically vulnerable. Second, it must not have alternative sources for the goods it requires or alternative markets for the goods it wishes to sell. This means the boycott must be supported by enough nations to make alternatives expensive or inconvenient enough to render the desired concessions more palatable than withstanding the boycott. Third, the economies of the targeted nation and the boycotting nation(s) must be integrated enough that the boycott will impose real pain on the targeted nation with an acceptable amount of pain for the boycotting nations. Fourth, the targeted government must feel strong pressures from within to alter its course to relieve the suffering brought about by the boycott. If the targeted government has a large repressive apparatus, an economic boycott may deny that government the funds needed to maintain that apparatus. If the targeted government is democratic, public pressure over economic distress must be forestalled, redirected, or suppressed, which a broad economic boycott may make difficult to impossible. Fifth, the possibility of further punitive action by the boycotting nations, including force, must be credible, even if somewhat remote. None of these conditions existed with regard to Qatar in June 2017. Far from being economically vulnerable, Qatar entered the Rift era as the wealthiest nation on earth, measured by GDP per capita. Moreover, successive Qatari governments had used conservative budget estimates to avoid overspending and, in fact, had built up a reserve fund of $330 billion by the start of the Rift. A couple of illustrations make clear the expansive possibilities of such a fund. First, the Qatari government liquidated $30 billion in overseas assets and deposited the cash in Qatari banks to deal with the run on those banks in the early days of the Rift. This accounted for less than one-tenth of the reserve fund, leaving hundreds of billions for other expenses.

How Did Qatar Prevail?

169

A second statistic must have been even more daunting to the Rift nations. During the Rift, Qatar sponsored over 250 foreign trade delegation visits to the country. Each visit, during which Qatari officials and business leaders touted the opportunities for trade with Qatar, made it less likely that the boycott would spread beyond the four Rift instigators. Assuming that each delegation consisted of twenty individuals at a cost of $20,000 a head (for flights, hotels, meals, incidentals) and that the Qatari government paid 100 percent of the expenses involved, the maximum cost of these delegation visits comes to $100 million. That accounts for less than one-third of 1 percent of the reserve fund available. If the $825 million to create a homegrown dairy industry is added, along with the bank bailout, that still left Qatar with 90 percent of its reserves available for other projects. Concerning alternative markets for supplies and sales, Qatar was also virtually invulnerable. Although its economy is largely dependent on a single product, that product was in increasing demand at the time of the Rift. Moreover, the country had invested heavily in the infrastructure and specialized shipping necessary to expand its liquid natural gas (LNG) exports and meet demand. Qatar may have left itself vulnerable to a drop in its LNG market in the future, due to competing exporters of the resource, and the Rift nations might have benefited from this eventuality, but such a downturn in Qatar’s fortunes would have taken many more years. At the same time, Qatar could rely on more than just neighboring nations’ economic interests to blunt the impact of the Rift. Iran and Turkey had their own reasons to thwart the foreign policy designs of Saudi Arabia. They welcomed the opportunity to step in with needed supplies for Qatar at the start of the Rift. Both opened their airspace to Qatari planes, making the airspace boycott from the Rift nations into little more than an inconvenience. Both welcomed Qatari products and moved to increase their trade with the embattled emirate, exactly the opposite of what the Rift nations desired and expected. Farther afield, to extend the number of boycotting nations, the Rift nations had to successfully portray Qatar as a dangerous supporter of international terror. Multiple nations had to see its relations with such entities as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the Taliban, along with its friendly relations with Iran, as unacceptable. Despite US president Donald Trump’s early statements of support for the Rift, accompanied by accusations that Qatar funded terrorism, the Rift nations never succeeded in establishing Qatar’s reputation as a supporter of terrorism. Qatar refuted the charge at every opportunity and had the global reach of Al Jazeera to ensure that billions of people heard its refutations. Moreover, the Qatari government pointed out, also at every opportunity, that Dubai had more extensive trade relations with Iran than Qatar. It also noted that the US government acquiesced to its harboring of representatives

170

Isolating Qatar

from various terrorist groups, since this made communication with those groups possible. With these arguments providing cover for governments that were never eager to join the boycott, the chances of enough nations joining to truly damage Qatar’s economy were remote. None of the Gulf nations have extensive trade relations with any of the others. Intraregional trade accounts for only about 10 to 15 percent of the total trade value for any of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Thus, the three Gulf Rift nations, plus Egypt, never had a chance of severely affecting Qatar’s economy simply through a boycott. They would have had to impose a naval blockade and threaten to attack cargo or LNG vessels headed toward or coming from Qatari ports. Such a policy would almost certainly have led to violence, since Iran’s leaders might have seen an opportunity to engage Saudi or Emirati forces with fast attack boats. The United States would not likely have acquiesced to a blockade of Qatar just for this reason. With the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquartered in Bahrain, the Americans would have been in a position to escort Qatari vessels or even reflag them, as occurred during the Iran-Iraq War. The Qatari government made enormous efforts to secure the loyalty of the Qatari people during the Rift. The promotion of the image of Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the rapid movement to replace foodstuffs and other products whose supply chains were disrupted, and the embrace of the country’s huge expatriate community all forestalled the kind of internal strife that might have pressured the government to give in to the Rift nations’ demands. Indeed, Qatar’s efforts left it well prepared to deal with the Covid-19 crisis. Investments in local manufacturing meant, among other advantages, that stocks of hand sanitizer were replaced more quickly in Qatar than in many parts of the United States. While it is true that the government’s greater dependence on public support meant promising to move toward a more open political system, with unpredictable results, the changes will all take place after the Rift, meaning that the Qatari government will be able to move at its own pace. Finally, the threat of more punitive action, including the use of military force, if it existed at all, existed only in the first days of the Rift. US officials warned the Saudis and Emiratis against any military move against Qatar. The 10,000 US military personnel at the Al Udeid base made these warnings impossible to ignore. With the deployment of additional Turkish troops to the country, the Rift nations had only a tiny window in which they might have pulled off a quick military intervention without huge international complications. Once that window closed in the early days of the crisis, it became plain that Qatar was already seeing the worst of its antagonists’ punitive actions. The Qataris had only to wait, continue their soft power efforts, and assess the various proposals made by mediators.

How Did Qatar Prevail?

Coping Strategies

171

It is easy to conclude that Qatar was able to withstand the pressures of the Rift nations solely due to its wealth. Such a deduction leaves out some important factors, however. Qatar’s wealth is almost wholly dependent on its ability not only to supply customers with LNG but also to do so reliably. This means that the drilling, initial refining, processing, liquefying, and shipping all have to be minimally affected by hostile action from outside Qatar. The Rift nations could have created considerably more uncertainty and devastated the Qatari economy by either announcing a naval blockade or even using targeted military force. Even a pinprick attack on the Ras Laffan port facility, to say nothing of the much larger Hamad Port, would have sent Qatar’s LNG customers scrambling for new sources. As noted, US officials warned against military action, but this does not tell the whole story. American officials were loath to see the crisis get worse, Trump’s initial statements notwithstanding, because Qatari officials had spent years cultivating a close relationship with the US government and military. In addition, Qatar built relationships with major US universities. This investment all but assured a negative reaction to drastic moves against Qatar and even raised the possibility of poor publicity for the US government if it failed to forestall them. While Qatar spent billions on the US base at Al Udeid and on its links with American universities, it combined wealth with the astute use of that wealth. Qatar used the classic coping strategies of small states. Among these are balancing or establishing friendly relations with competing states to prevent any one state from believing it can act with impunity in confronting a small state. Put differently, Qatar found ways to raise the costs of confrontation while also raising the level of uncertainty. Since the Saudis and others could not be certain how the Americans, the Turks, or the Iranians might react to more forceful actions against Qatar, a normal foreign policy cost-benefit analysis could only result in caution, possibly to the point of paralysis. In retrospect, the hundreds of millions Qatar paid to Iran for airspace rights can be seen as balancing the United States and Iran. Certainly, the flow of hard currency to Teheran gave President Trump an additional incentive to end the Rift. Small states also use bandwagoning to protect themselves. For Qatar, this meant a close relationship with the United States at the time of the Rift, but this was far from the first time Qatar had used this strategy. At different times in its history, Qatar has “bandwagoned” with the Saudis, the Omanis, the Bahrainis, the Turks, the British, and, finally, with the Americans. Since today’s partner might turn into tomorrow’s enemy, Qatar has followed a foreign policy that is supremely flexible in its choices of friends, partners, and actions, implemented by officials who are unusually forthright in their determination to pursue Qatar’s specific national interests.

172

Isolating Qatar

It must be noted that Qatar was extremely fortunate in its enemies. As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, the main instigators of the Rift, Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Zayed in the UAE, were unprepared to follow up in any meaningful way when the initial imposition of sanctions failed to produce capitulation on Qatar’s part. Moreover, the Rift followed one of the most ineffectual intelligence-gathering efforts of the twenty-first century. Neither bin Salman nor bin Zayed seemed aware of such basic information as how much construction material for the World Cup football stadiums had been stockpiled, the funds available in Qatar’s reserve fund, or the readiness level of Hamad Port. The two also seemingly neglected such basic diplomatic groundwork as sounding out Qatar’s partners and natural gas customers before proceeding with the boycott. Responses from Turkey and Iran seemed complete surprises. None of the Rift nations appeared prepared to cope with the public relations nightmare of separated families. While some blame the two leaders’ confusion on the mixed signals of the Trump administration, such a major foreign policy decision should have come only after clear assurances from US officials that the United States would be prepared to help.

Whither International Organizations?

If the Rift crisis undercuts the classic realist view, first expressed by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War, that weak states can be forced to yield to the wishes of strong states, it also raises doubts about a cherished idealist goal, which is the eventual dominance of international organizations (IOs) in the international system. If a small state like Qatar can successfully ignore pressures to conform to an international grouping like the GCC, this does not bode well for the future of international organizations. The GCC has advantages that should have made it one of the more successful and powerful regional IOs. Its membership is small enough to permit rapid consultation and consensus building. Its stated goal, collective security against possible aggression from Iran, is both clear and visibly necessary enough to impede the centrifugal forces that tend to weaken IOs. Moreover, its members have much in common with each other, including a common language, culture, religion, and history. They also share many basic economic policies and priorities. Yet a lasting result of the Rift is likely to be “a strident nationalism [that] has displaced the old talk of ‘brotherly’ ties between the [Gulf] nations.”3 If the GCC cannot remain united and impose its will on one of its weaker members, what hope exists for larger, more diverse, and more ambitious IOs? The GCC may be a poor choice as harbinger, given the outsized role played by Saudi Arabia and the consequent ease with which the GCC can be

How Did Qatar Prevail?

173

dismissed as more an extension of Saudi power than a bona fide international organization. Pessimism about the future of IOs, however, seems appropriate in the context in which the Rift took place, which included Brexit, the rise of Donald Trump, and the declining international role of organizations such as the League of Arab States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.4 As one expert put it, “Incentives to form international regimes depend most fundamentally on the existence of shared interests.”5 Such shared interests must be both obvious and valuable enough to overcome nation-states’ historic tendency to see to their own national interest. Evidence from the Rift and from the reactions of nations around the globe argues powerfully that national interest is a more durable reality than many expected.

The Future: Will the Reconciliation Last?

Only the boldest government spokespersons from the four Rift nations were willing to declare victory when the Rift ended. One Emirati commentator insisted that the crisis had forced Qatar to reduce its support for organizations deemed terrorist by the Rift nations. But for the most part, officials from the Rift nations contented themselves with expressing relief that the crisis was over and voicing their hopes for better relations with Qatar in the future. Signs of lasting change are difficult to perceive, however, either in intra-GCC relations or in the political and strategic situation in the Gulf region. Not even the most historic and majestic of settings for the GCC summit that officially ended the Rift can reduce the threat from Iran; nor can they bring about greater cohesion within the GCC. The paeans of praise for the organization, given the prevailing realities, seemed forced and hollow. The threat of a revived and increasingly aggressive Iran is enough to make any of the Gulf Arab states develop serious concern about the future. Add the prospect of a US administration committed to lightening the burden of sanctions on the Islamic Republic, and the need for unity is seemingly quite obvious. There is no reason to believe, however, that either the Qatari government or Qatari citizens are going to be any more likely to blindly follow the lead of Saudi Arabia going forward than they have been at any time since 1995. In this regard, the Al-Ula settlement, as welcome as it was to all concerned, does not address the long-standing issues that separated Qatar from its Gulf Arab neighbors. Qatar still shares the world’s largest natural gas field with Iran, and it is no more likely to jeopardize its exploitation of that gas field since the Rift than it was before. Qatar is still a small but fabulously wealthy country that requires good relations with stronger neighbors, including Iran, to survive. Given the ruinous Saudi military intervention in Yemen, Qatari officials are no more likely to have absolute faith in Saudi

174

Isolating Qatar

Arabia’s ability to defend the Gulf militarily against Iran than they were just after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Given the enormous strides the Qatari economy has taken toward selfsufficiency, it is unlikely that Qatar will be eager to link its fiscal future to the policies of its neighbors, which is what closer economic integration within the GCC would require. Given the successful efforts the emirate made to expand and diversify its trade relations, its leaders are entirely justified in thinking that the country had multiple options for economic partnerships outside the GCC. As Qatar’s deputy prime minister said at a conference sponsored by Georgetown University’s campus in Education City, “There is no longer in today’s world the concept of small states. . . . Small countries can become a force by using many other axes such as the economic side and soft power.”6 Qatar will certainly continue its efforts to mediate international disputes, even if this means granting residency to groups like the Taliban, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar and its Gulf neighbors continue to support opposite sides in Libya’s ongoing civil war. Its new and closer relationship with Turkey, including the stationing of Turkish troops in Qatar, will certainly continue. In short, Qatar was no more likely to feel compelled to accede to any of the original thirteen demands of the Rift nations in 2021 than it was in 2017. Moreover, if contemporary accounts are accurate, it did not agree to any of these demands in the Al-Ula Declaration. As one expert put it, the agreements at the GCC summit “were confidence-building mechanisms more than they were a full reconciliation.”7 A ranking official from Bahrain acknowledged the future was impossible to predict: “Everyone is waiting to see if Qatar does what it says it is going to do.”8 Put differently, Qatar came out of the Rift with its future largely in its own hands.

Notes

1. Kerr, “Saudi Arabia and Allies to Restore Ties with Qatar.” 2. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 402. 3. Walsh, “Little Brother in an Arab Family Feud.” 4. While the succeeding Biden-Harris administration undid some of Trump’s “America First” initiatives, the 2020 campaign in the United States was almost wholly about COVID-19 and cannot be read as a rejection of Trump’s foreign policy, especially given the fact that Republicans gained seats in the House of Representatives. 5 Keohane, After Hegemony, 79. 6. Mohammed, “Qatar’s Resilience Tackled Blockade Impact.” 7. Batrawy and Nabil, “Gulf Arab Leaders Sign Declaration to Ease Rift with Qatar.” 8. Nissenbaum and Said, “Qatar y Arabia Saudita firman acuerdo.”

Bibliography

Abbas, Faisal J. “2021: Things Can Only Get Better.” Arab News. January 6, 2021. Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, 1 (February 1998): 3–32. Abi Habib, Maria. “Gulf Allies Draw U.S. into Mideast Rift.” Wall Street Journal. June 16, 2017. Abueish, Tamara. “Egypt Says It Will Open Its Airspace with Qatar Pending Fulfillment of Demands.” Al Arabiya. January 5, 2021. ———. “GCC Secretary-General Says Saudi-Qatari Borders Reopening Reflects ‘Deep-Rooted’ Ties.” Al Arabiya. January 6, 2021. ———. “Qataris Celebrate Saudi Arabia Borders Reopening After Three-Year Closure.” Al Arabiya. January 5, 2021. Akdenizli, Banu. “Twitter as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: Qatar and the GCC.” In The Gulf Crisis: The View from Qatar, ed. Rory Miller, 147–156. Doha: Hamad bin Khalifa University Press, 2018. Aldridge, John. “Is This the End of Al Jazeera?” Evening Standard (London). June 22, 2017. Ames, Jonathan. “Firms Getting Cold Feet in Qatari Heat.” The Times (UK). June 8, 2017. Baabood, Abdullah. Qatar’s Resilience Strategy and Implications for State-Society Relations. Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali, 2017. Baehr, Peter R. “Small States: A Tool for Analysis?” World Politics 27, no. 3 (1975): 456–466. Banares, Ilya. “Qatar Adds U.S. Lobbying Muscle After Saudi Rift, Trump Snub.” Bloomberg.com. April 27, 2021. www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04 -27/qatar-adds-u-s-lobbying-muscle-after-saudi-rift-trump-s-snub. Barbuscia, Davide, and Saeed Ashar. “Gulf Economy Gets a Boost from Healing of Saudi-Qatar Rift.” Reuters News. January 5, 2021. Barnard, Anne, and David D. Kirkpatrick. “5 Arab Nations Move to Isolate Qatar, Putting the U.S. in a Bind.” New York Times. June 5, 2017. Bashir, Abu Bakr. “Suspected Islamic State Suicide Bomber in Gaza Kills Hamas Security Guard.” Wall Street Journal. August 17, 2017.

175

176

Bibliography

Baskan, Birol, and Steven Wright. “Seeds of Change: Comparing State-Religion Relations in Qatar and Saudi Arabia.” Arab Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (spring 2011): 96–111. Batrawy, Aya. “Qatar Emerges from Gulf Spat Resolute and Largely Unscathed.” Associated Press News. January 6, 2021. Batrawy, Aya, and Amir Nabil. “Gulf Arab Leaders Sign Declaration to Ease Rift with Qatar.” Associated Press News. January 5, 2021. Binkley, Collin. “While Trump Praises Qatar, Education Officials Seek Scrutiny.” Associated Press Newswires. July 10, 2019. Black, Ian. “Surprise Resignation of Al Jazeera Chief Raises Fears for Channel’s Independence.” The Guardian (UK). September 21, 2011. Bolsonaro, Jair. “Speech by Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro at the Opening of the 74th United Nations General Assembly.” New York. September 24, 2019. https:// www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/president -of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil/speeches/speech-by-brazil-s-president-jair -bolsonaro-at-the-opening-of-the-74th-united-nations-general-assembly-new -york-september-24-2019-photo-alan-santos-pr. Bousmid, Rym. “Sommet des pays du Golfe: vers une normalization Qatar-Israël?” Le Desk (Casablanca). January 5, 2021. Bronson, Rachel. Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Buchanan, Allen, and Robert O. Keohane. “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions.” In World Governance: Do We Need It, Is It Possible, What Could It (All) Mean? ed. Jovan Babic and Petar Bojanic, 405–437. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010. Bukhari, Irfan. “Qatar and Turkey to Sign Several New Pacts: Envoy.” The Peninsula (Doha). November 25, 2020. ———. “When Gulf Crisis Ends All of Us Will Be Winners.” The Peninsula (Doha). November 17, 2020. Byrne, Claire, and Valérie Leroux. “Leave Lebanon Alone, World Powers Tell Saudi, Iran.” Agence France Presse. December 8, 2017. Candemir, Yeliz. “Saudi Firms Use Turkey for Qatar-Bound Shipments.” Wall Street Journal. June 22, 2017. Carlstrom, Greg. “Hamas Looks to Iran as Blockade Isolates Qatar.” The Times (UK). June 12, 2017. Claude, Inis. Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. New York: Random House, 1971. Collins, Gabriel. “Anti-Qatar Embargo Grinds Toward Strategic Failure.” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy Issue Brief. January 22, 2018. Crystal, Jill. Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Dahir, Abdi Latif. “‘We Have to Rely on Ourselves’: Volunteers Step in to Save Somalia.” New York Times. February 17, 2020. Das Augustine, Babu. “Capital Flight from Qatar Aggravates Increase in Funding Costs.” Gulf News (Dubai). September 18, 2017. ———. “Economic and Fiscal Impact of Sanctions on Qatar Turns Acute.” Gulf News (Dubai). September 14, 2017. Debre, Isabel. “Qatar’s Emir Promises Shura Council Election Next Year.” Associated Press Newswires. November 3, 2020. DeYoung, Karen. “Bahrain Criminalizes ‘Sympathy or Favoritism’ for Qatar.” Washington Post. June 9, 2017.

Bibliography

177

———. “Trump Jumps into Dispute Between Qatar and Arab Bloc.” Washington Post. June 7, 2017. ———. “Trump Touts Ties with Another Gulf Monarchy.” Washington Post. July 10, 2019. ———. “UAE Tied to Hack Targeting Qatar.” Washington Post. July 17, 2017. Donnelly, Peter. “US Air Traffic Control Receive Threat Vowing Revenge for Qassem Soleimani Killing.” Al Arabiya. January 6, 2021. Eglash, Ruth. “Botched Israeli Operation Sparks Surge of Violence.” Washington Post. November 13, 2018. Elman, Miriam Fendius. “The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard.” British Journal of Political Science 25, no. 2 (April 1995): 171–217. Emanuel, Louis. “May Calls on Gulf States to End Qatar Blockade.” The Times (UK). June 16, 2017. Eqbali, Aresu. “Iran Sent Food to Qatar amid Middle East Rift.” Wall Street Journal. June 11, 2017. Exell, Karen, and Trinidad Rico. “‘There Is No Heritage in Qatar’: Orientalism, Colonialism and Other Problematic Histories.” World Archeology 45, no. 4 (2013): 670–685. Fahim, Kareem, and Karen DeYoung. “Arab Nations Isolate Qatar.” Washington Post. June 6, 2017. Falvey, Dan. “Qatar Crisis: Trump’s ‘Big Plan’ for ‘Permanent’ Military Presence in Middle East Deal.” Express (UK). January 29, 2018. Farnsworth, David N. International Relations: An Introduction. 2nd ed. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1992. Feiler, Gil, and Hayim Zeev. Qatar: The Limits of Nouveau Riche Diplomacy. Ramat Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2017. Fisher, Max. “How the Saudi-Qatar Rivalry, Now Combusting, Reshaped the Middle East.” New York Times. June 13, 2017. Fitch, Asa, and Nicolas Parasie. “Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Bahrain and Egypt Cut Diplomatic Ties with Qatar.” Wall Street Journal. June 5, 2017. Fitch, Asa, and Margherita Stancati. “Al Jazeera Says Websites, Digital Platforms Under Attempted Cyberattack.” Wall Street Journal. June 8, 2017. Fox, Annette Baer. “The Small States in the International System, 1919–1969.” International Journal 24 (1969): 751–764. Fromherz, Allen J. Qatar: A Modern History. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017. Galal, Abdelraouf Mostafa. “External Behavior of Small States in Light of Theories of International Relations.” Review of Economics and Political Science 5, no. 1 (2020): 38–56. Gambrell, Jon. “Emirati Diplomat to AP: ‘Nothing to Negotiate’ with Qatar.” Associated Press News. June 7, 2017. ———. “Saudi Arabia Says End to Yearslong Qatar Boycott ‘in Reach.’” Associated Press Newswires. December 4, 2020. ———. “UAE Foreign Minister: No Word on Qatari Response to Demands.” Associated Press Newswires. July 4, 2017. Gengler, Justin, and Buthaina Al-Khelaifi. “Crisis, State Legitimacy, and Political Participation in a Non-democracy: How Qatar Withstood the 2017 Blockade.” Middle East Journal 73, no. 3 (autumn 2019). Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. “For Qatar, a U.S. Airbase Is Best Defense Against Critics.” Washington Post. June 7, 2017.

178

Bibliography

Gladstone, Rick. “Qatar Criticizes Move by Antagonists.” New York Times. July 20, 2017. Godsen, Emily. “Britain ‘Urgently Needs to Develop Its Own Gas Supply,’” The Times (UK). June 6, 2017. Goldberg, Jacob. The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: The Formative Years, 1902– 1918. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986. Gray, Matthew. Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013. Greenblatt, Jason D. “Now Is a Promising Time to Begin to Heal Gulf Rift.” Arab News. January 5, 2021. Guo, Demi. “Emerging Markets Pick Up the Slack as Bigger Players’ Demand for LNG Eases.” Wall Street Journal. August 30, 2017. Guzansky, Yoel, and Michael Kobi. “Israel’s Qatari Dilemma.” INSS Insight No. 1034. Institute for National Security Studies. March 14, 2018. Guzansky, Yoel, and Gallia Lindenstrauss. Report. Institute for National Security Studies. 2020. p. 3. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-sunni-world-conflicts/. Halbfinger, David M. “Israel and Hamas Agree on Fuel and Cash Deal to Quell Hostilities in Gaza.” New York Times. September 1, 2020. Halbfinger, David M., and Ronen Bergman. “Shifting Dynamics of the Mideast Pushed Israel and U.A.E. Together.” New York Times. August 16, 2020. Hall, Camilla. “Head of Al Jazeera TV Steps Down.” Financial Times. September 20, 2011. Harding, David. “Qatar, France Sign Billion-Dollar Fighter Jet Deal amid Gulf Crisis.” Agence France Presse. December 7, 2017. Harris, Gardiner. “Pompeo Is Said to Tell Saudis to Drop Tiff with Qatar.” New York Times. April 29, 2018. ———. “Tillerson Tries His Hand at Shuttle Diplomacy.” New York Times. July 12, 2017. Hassan, Mehdi. “Voice of the Arab Spring.” New Statesman. December 5, 2011. Heath, Thomas. “Why Aren’t Oil Prices Spiking?” Washington Post. June 16, 2019. Hilterman, Joost. “The Backlash Catches Up with Qatar.” New York Times. June 19, 2017. Holland, Steve. “Breakthrough Reached in Gulf Dispute with Qatar—Senior Trump Official.” Reuters News. January 4, 2021. Holland, Steve, and Yeganeh Torbati. “Trump Scolds Qatar as Tillerson Seeks to Ease Crisis.” Reuters News. June 9, 2017. Holmey, Olivier. “Qatari Finance Finds Its New Normal.” euromoney.com. September 28, 2017. al-Horr, Abdulaziz M., M. Evren Tok, and Tekla Gagoshidze. “Rethinking Soft Power in the Post-blockade Times: The Case of Qatar.” Digest of Middle East Studies 28, no. 2 (2019): 329–350. Hsu, Jenny W. “Qatar’s Rift with Saudi Arabia Could Turn Up Heat on Oil and Gas Prices.” Wall Street Journal. June 5, 2017. Hubbard, Ben. “Qatar Adapts to Blockade a Retooled Economy.” New York Times. December 20, 2018. ———. “Virus Worsens Suffering of Gulf’s Migrant Labor.” New York Times. April 14, 2020. Hubbard, Ben, and David D. Kirkpatrick. “An Audacious Saudi Prince Has Many Looking over Their Shoulder.” New York Times. November 15, 2017. Hudson, John. “Two Years After Death of Khashoggi, Trump Has Little to Show from Saudi Ties.” Washington Post. October 4, 2020.

Bibliography

179

Hwang, Jihwan, and Sung-han Kim. “Revisiting the Functionalist Approach to Korean Unification: The Role of International Organizations and NGOs.” Journal of International and Area Studies 22, no. 1 (2015): 41–55. Hyde, Maggie, and Jon Gambrell. “Qatar Crisis Deadline Extended by 2 Days as Nation Responds.” Associated Press Newswires. July 3, 2017. Iriye, Akira. Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Jacob, Jayanth. “Aware of India’s Interest in Qatar.” Hindustan Times. August 11, 2017. Jaffe, Greg, and Karen DeYoung. “Push Against Iran May Be Stoking Mideast Instability.” Washington Post. June 8, 2017. Jakes, Lara. “A U.S. Effort to Ease a Mideast Rivalry (and Hurt Iran).” New York Times. December 3, 2020. Kabalan, Marwan. “Actors, Structures and Qatari Foreign Policy.” Al-Muntaqa 2, no. 2 (October–November 2019): 61–82. Kalin, Stephen. “Qatar’s Neighbors Pledge to End Embargo, but Uncertainty Lingers.” Wall Street Journal. January 5, 2021. Kamrava, Mehran. “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy.” Middle East Journal 64, no. 4 (autumn 2011): 539–556. ———. Qatar: Small State, Big Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013. Kanady, Satish. “Moody’s Assigns Aa3 Rating to Qatar; Outlook Stable.” The Peninsula (Doha). April 14, 2020. Keohane, Robert O. “Abuse of Power: Assessing Accountability in World Politics.” Harvard International Review 27, no. 2 (2005): 53. ———. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. ———. “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics.” International Organization 23, no. 2 (spring 1969): 291–310. Kerr, Simeon. “Saudi Arabia and Allies to Restore Ties with Qatar.” Financial Times. January 5, 2021. Kessler, Oren. “The Two Faces of Al-Jazeera.” Middle East Quarterly 19, no. 1 (winter 2012): 47–56. Khalid, Tuqa. “Full Transcript of AlUla Summit Declaration.” Al Arabiya. January 6, 2021. ———. “IRGC: Iran Will Not Distinguish Between US Bases, Arab Host Countries in Case of War.” Al Arabiya. January 2, 2021. Khuri, Fuad. Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Kirkpatrick, David D. “Britain Debates Saudis’ Ties to Extremism.” New York Times. July 6, 2017. ———. “U.A.E. Competed with Qatar to Host Taliban Embassy, Leaked Emails Show.” New York Times. August 1, 2017. Kirkpatrick, David D., and Anne Barnard. “Assaults Pour Gas on Saudi Arabia’s Rivalry with Iran and Qatar.” New York Times. June 9, 2017. Kirkpatrick, David D., and Gardiner Harris. “Saudis and Emiratis List Dozens Linked to Qatar as Aiding Terrorism.” New York Times. June 10, 2017. Kobi, Michael, and Yoel Guzansky. “Qatar Under Siege: Regional Implications and Ramifications for the Palestinian Arena.” INSS Insight No. 935. Institute for National Security Studies. June 12, 2017. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08649. Accessed September 28, 2020.

180

Bibliography

Kossaify, Ephrem. “UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres Hails AlUla Declaration.” Arab News. January 6, 2021. Kouskouvelis, Ilias, and Konstantinos Zarras. “Cairo and Riyadh: Vying for Leadership.” Middle East Quarterly 26, no. 2 (spring 2019): 1–8. Krauss, Clifford. “American L.N.G. Shakes Up Energy World.” New York Times. October 17, 2017. ———. “Libya’s Increased Oil Production Thwarts OPEC’s Reduction Plans.” New York Times. June 201, 2017. Kumar, Chandan. “Surrender or Dig In.” Day After (India). June 16, 2017. Labs, Eric J. “Do Weak States Bandwagon?” Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992): 383–416. Lander, Mark. “Trump Treads into Feud Between Qatar and Saudis.” New York Times. June 7, 2017. Laskar, Rezaul H. “India to Operate Additional Flights to Qatar for Eid Holiday Season.” Hindustan Times. June 21, 2017. Li Zeng and Khalaf Tahat. “Picturing Terrorism Through Arabic Lenses: A Comparative Analysis of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya.” Asian Journal of Communications 22, no. 5 (October 2012): 433–448. Lohade, Nikhil. “Banking and Finance: Qatar Banks Under Strain.” Wall Street Journal. August 22, 2017. ———. “Dubai’s DP World Bans Vessels Carrying Qatar Flag at Its U.A.E. Terminals.” Wall Street Journal. June 6, 2017. Lynch, Edward A. “Bypassing the Professionals: The Abraham Accords and the Gulf Rift Crisis.” Paper delivered to the 14th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA). Washington, DC. November 2021. ———. The Arab Spring: The Failure of the Obama Doctrine. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2021. Lynch, Marc. Voice of the Arab Republic: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and the Middle East. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Maertens, Yoeri. “Nigel Farage Pleads for a Europe of Sovereign Nation-States.” Vocal Europe. December 10, 2018. www.vocaleurope.eu/nigel-farage-pleads-for -a-europe-of-sovereign-nation-states. Manson, Katrina, and Demetri Sevastopulo. “US Steps Up Pressure on Gulf Arab Leaders over Qatar.” Financial Times. June 20, 2017. Mayenkar, Siddesh Suresh. “Traders Bet on More Weakness in Qatari Riyal.” Gulf News (Dubai). June 8, 2017. Mearsheimer, John J. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19, no. 3 (1995). ———. The Tragedy of Great Powers. New York: Norton, 2001. Miles, Hugh. Al-Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel That Is Challenging the West. New York: Grove Press, 2005. Miller, Rory. “Qatar, the Gulf Crisis and Small State Behavior in International Affairs.” In The Gulf Crisis: The View from Qatar, edited by Rory Miller, 89– 97. Doha: Hamad bin Khalifa University Press, 2018. Mitchell, Jocelyn Sage. “Why Did Qatar Just Change Its Residency Laws?” Washington Post. August 9, 2017. Mitchell, Jocelyn Sage, and Ilhem Allagui. “Car Decals, Civic Rituals, and Changing Conceptions of Nationalism.” International Journal of Communication 13 (2019): 1368–1388. Mohammed, Sidi. “Qatar’s Resilience Tackled Blockade Impact.” The Peninsula (Doha). February 26, 2020. Morello, Carol. “Tillerson Criticizes Saudi Demands.” Washington Post. June 26, 2017.

Bibliography

181

Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 6th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. Naar, Ismaeel. “Saudi Arabia Appreciates Kuwaiti Efforts Regarding Gulf Crisis: FM.” Al Arabiya. December 4, 2020. ———. “Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince: AlUla GCC Summit to Promote Unified Path.” Al Arabiya. January 4, 2021. ———. “Transcript: Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince’s Full Speech at AlUla GCC Summit.” Al Arabiya. January 5, 2021. Naheem, Mohammed Ahmad. “The Dramatic Rift and Crisis Between Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) of June 2017.” International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 14 (2017): 265–277. el-Nawany, Mohammed, and Adel Iskandar. Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab News Network Scooped the World and Changed the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002. Nissenbaum, Dion, and Summer Said. “Qatar y Arabia Saudita firman acuerdo para terminar disputa que obstaculizó los intereses de EE.UU.” La Tercera (Santiago). January 6, 2021. ———. “Qatar, Saudi Arabia Set to End Feud That Hampered U.S. Interests.” Wall Street Journal. January 4, 2021. ———. “Saudi Arabia, Qatar Near Deal to End Gulf Dispute, Officials Say.” Wall Street Journal. December 4, 2020. Nonneman, Gerd. “The Qatar Crisis Through the Lens of Foreign Policy Analysis.” In The Gulf Crisis: The View from Qatar, ed. Rory Miller, 98–108. Doha: Hamad bin Khalifa University Press, 2018. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2005. Onley, James, and Sulayman Khalaf. “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-oil Gulf: An Historical-Anthropological Study.” History and Anthropology 17, no. 3 (September 2006): 189–208. Oruc, Nurgul. “Hashtag Unity: Qatar’s Digital Nationalism in the Gulf Crisis.” Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 12, no. 1 (2019): 43–64. Parasie, Nicolas. “Qatar, Defying Deadline, Faces New Threats by Neighbors.” Wall Street Journal. July 2, 2017. ———. “Qatar Opens Port to Ease Blockade.” Wall Street Journal. September 6, 2017. Parasie, Nicolas, and Felicia Schwartz. “Qatar Risks More Saudi Ire by Returning Ambassador to Iran.” Wall Street Journal. August 24, 2017. Parasie, Nicolas, and Robert Wall. “Qatar’s Spat with Neighbors Threatens Its Vital Air Industry.” Wall Street Journal. June 5, 2017. Parker, Ashley. “In a Reality Star’s Presidency, Cable TV Is the Guiding Light.” Washington Post. April 24, 2017. Patterson, Scott, and James Marson. “Glencore, Qatar Sell Rosneft Stake to Chinese Firm in $9 Billion Deal.” Wall Street Journal. September 8, 2017. Philp, Catherine. “Al Jazeera: A Minnow That Snapped at the Big Fish.” The Times (UK). June 6, 2017. ———. “Gulf Nations Give Qatar 48 Hours to Meet Ultimatum.” The Times (UK). July 3, 2017. ———. “Gulf Vows to Isolate Qatar for Years.” The Times (UK). June 10, 2017. Platt, Gordon. “Economy Resilient Despite Blockade.” Global Finance. December 2017. www.gfmag.com/magazine/december-2017/qatar-economy-resilient-despite -blockade.

182

Bibliography

Politico Staff. “Full Text: Trump’s 2017 UN Speech Transcript.” Politico. September 9, 2017. www.politico.com/story/2017/09/19/trump-un-speech-2017-full-text -transcript-242879. Radwan, Rawan. “Families Rejoice as GCC Summit Cements the Ties that Bind Gulf Countries.” Arab News. January 5, 2021. Rahman, Habibur. The Emergence of Qatar: The Turbulent Years, 1627–1916. New York: Routledge, 2006. Reed, Stanley. “On Future of Energy, from U.S. ‘Renaissance’ to the Rise of Renewables.” New York Times. November 14, 2017. Rinnawi, Khalil. “Al-Jazeera Invades Israel: Is Satellite TV Challenging the Sovereignty of the Nation-State?” Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 5, no. 1 (2012): 245–257. Roberts, David B., guest ed. “The GCC Crisis: Qatar and Its Neighbors.” CIRS special issue of Journal of Arabian Studies 10, no. 2 (December 2020). ———. Qatar: Securing the Global Ambitions of a City-State. London: Hurst and Company, 2017. Rose, Lani. “Qatari Non-oil Exports Set to Exceed Pre-blockade Levels: QDB official.” The Peninsula (Doha). January 9, 2020. Rothstein, Robert Lewis. Alliances and Small Powers. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Raghavan, Sudarsan. “Showdown Over Qatar Is Tearing Families Apart.” Washington Post. June 13, 2017. ———. “Two Months into Saudi-Led Boycott, Qatar Takes Offensive.” Washington Post. August 10, 2017. Raghavan, Sudarsan, and Jody Warrick. “Who Is a Terrorist? Gulf States Disagree.” Washington Post. June 28, 2017. El-Said, Mohammed. “Al-Sisi Receives Letter from Al-Sabah Regarding Qatar Crisis.” Daily News (Cairo). August 8, 2017. Said, Summer. “Qatar Launches Plan to Increase LNG Output amid Arab Dispute.” Wall Street Journal. July 4, 2017. Said, Summer, Justin Scheck, and Michael Amon. “Saudi Shake-Up Aims to Launch Modern Era.” Wall Street Journal. June 22, 2017. Said Zahlan, Rosemarie. The Creation of Qatar. New York: Harper & Row, 1979. Salem, Mustafa. “Saudi Arabia Says ‘Significant Progress’ Made Toward Resolving Qatar Dispute.” CNN Wire. December 4, 2020. Samuel-Azran, Tal, and Naama Pecht. “Is There an Al-Jazeera-Qatari Nexus? A Study of Al-Jazeera’s Online Reporting Throughout the Qatari-Saudi Conflict.” Media, War and Conflict 7, no. 2 (2014): 218–232. Sanchez, Raf. “Flying Cows and Friends in Iran: How Qatar Is Feeding Itself Under the Saudi Blockade.” The Telegraph. July 9, 2017. Schwartz, Felicia. “Trump Sides with Saudis, Gulf States in Rift with Qatar.” Wall Street Journal. June 6, 2017. ———. “U.S. Says Some Demands on Qatar Will Be Difficult to Meet.” Wall Street Journal. June 25, 2017. Schwartz, Felicia, and Jay Solomon. “Trump Administration Sends Mixed Signals on Qatar Crisis.” Wall Street Journal. June 9, 2017. Shane, Daniel. “The Rise and Fall of Al Jazeera.” Arabian Business. July 27, 2013. Shayan, Fatemeh. “Geopolitical Subjectivity in Iran-GCC Relations: The Three Islands Issue Since 1979.” Geopolitics 18, no. 3 (July 2013). Shoeb, Mohammed. “Qatar’s GDP Quadrupled in Two Decades.” The Peninsula (Doha). October 28, 2020. Sly, Liz. “Deep Family Feuds Divide Qatar from Its Neighbors.” Washington Post. May 14, 2018.

Bibliography

183

Solomon, Jay, and Felicia Schwartz. “Arab States Drawing Up List of Demands for Qatar.” Wall Street Journal. June 8, 2017. Spencer, Richard. “Saudi Blockade Dealt Another Blow as Tillerson Backs Qatar.” The Times (UK). July 11, 2017. ———. “Turkey Offers Support After Gulf State Is Cut Off.” The Times (UK). June 8, 2017. Spykman, Nicholas. America’s Strategy in World Politics. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1942. Stancati, Margherita. “Five Things to Know About Qatar’s Diplomatic Breaks.” Wall Street Journal. June 5, 2017. ———. “Qatar Calls for Talks to End Diplomatic Crisis in Persian Gulf.” Wall Street Journal. June 6, 2017. ———. “Qatar Crisis Takes Toll on Families Caught Between Countries.” Wall Street Journal. June 8, 2017. ———. “Saudi Crown Prince and U.A.E. Heir Forge Pivotal Ties.” Wall Street Journal. August 6, 2017. ———. “Saudi Crown Prince Will Seek to Solidify Anti-Iran Stance with Trump White House.” Wall Street Journal. March 19, 2018. ———. “World News: Gulf Rift Takes Toll on Mixed Families.” Wall Street Journal. June 9, 2017. Stevenson, Alexandra, and Matthew Goldstein. “U.S. Says Chinese Firm Pursued Arms Deals.” New York Times. October 5, 2018. Stokols, Eli. “Donald Trump Offers to Mediate Dispute Between Qatar and Arab Neighbors.” Wall Street Journal. September 7, 2017. Sylvester, Rachel. “Our Foreign Secretary Is an International Joke.” The Times (UK). August 28, 2017. Telhami, Shibley. The World Through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East. New York: Basic Books, 2013. Thomas, Andrea, and Margherita Stancati. “Qatar Rift May Boost Extremism, Germany Warns.” Wall Street Journal. June 7, 2017. Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. New York: Penguin, 1954. Timberlake, Ian, and David Harding. “Arab States Cut Qatar Ties in Major Diplomatic Crisis.” Agence France Presse. June 5, 2017. Tok, M. Evren. “Entrepreneurship in Qatar: Is the Blockade a Golden Opportunity?” In The Gulf Crisis: The View from Qatar, ed. Rory Miller, 39–48. Doha: Hamad bin Khalifa University Press, 2018. Tracy, Marc, and Lara Jakes. “U.S. Casts Al Jazeera Affiliate as Foreign Agent.” New York Times. September 16, 2020. Trofimov, Yaroslav. “Qatar Crisis Turns into Proxy Battle of Mideast Rivals,” Wall Street Journal, June 8, 2017. ———. “Turkey Sees Itself as Target in Saudi-Led Move Against Qatar.” Wall Street Journal. June 15, 2017. Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. “How Qatar Weathered the Gulf Crisis.” Foreign Affairs. June 11, 2018. ———. Qatar and the Arab Spring. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. ———. Qatar and the Gulf Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. ———. “Why US Can’t End the Saudi, UAE-Led Blockade on Qatar.” Gulf Times (Doha). July 11, 2020. Vandenbosch, Amry. “The Small States in International Politics and Organization.” Presidential Address. Southern Political Science Association. Journal of Politics 26, no. 164 (1963): 293–312. Wall, Robert. “Qatar to Homeland Security: Come Audit Our Airport and Lift Electronics Ban.” Wall Street Journal. June 19, 2017.

184

Bibliography

Wall, Robert, and Susan Carey. “Qatar Airways Won’t Take a Stake in American Airlines.” Wall Street Journal. August 3, 2017. Walsh, Declan. “Little Brother in an Arab Family Feud.” New York Times. January 22, 2018. ———. “Qatar’s Open-Door Approach Enrages Powerful Neighbors.” New York Times. July 17, 2017. ———. “Qatar’s Riches Soften Blow of Blockade, for Now,” New York Times, July 3, 2017. ———. “Saudis Turning to Direct Talks with Enemies.” New York Times. December 27, 2019. Weiland, Severin. “By Pulling Away. U.S. ‘Does the Most Damage to Itself.’” Spiegel Online International. June 8, 2017. Whittall, Christopher, and Gurjan Banerji. “U.S. Stocks Fall as Apple Shares Decline.” Wall Street Journal. June 5, 2017. Wiegand, Krista E. “Bahrain, Qatar, and the Hawar Islands: Resolution of a Gulf Territorial Dispute.” Middle East Journal 66, no. 1 (winter 2012): 79–96. Wintour, Patrick. “Land of Milk and Money: Qatar Looks to Farms to Beat the Gulf Boycott.” The Guardian. October 20, 2017. Wirz, Matt. “Qatar Makes Sudden Change Ahead of Bond Sale.” Wall Street Journal. October 21, 2017. Wright, Steven. “Foreign Policies with International Reach: The Case of Qatar.” In The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order, ed. David Held and Kristian Ulrichsen, 312–328. Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2012. ———. “The Gulf Crisis and the Gulf Gas Markets: The Qatari Perspective.” In The Gulf Crisis: The View from Qatar, ed. Rory Miller, 119–126. Doha: Hamad bin Khalifa University Press, 2018. Yee, Vivian. “Wealthy States Are Forced to Reckon with Migrant Labor.” New York Times. May 10, 2020. Yee, Vivian, and Megan Specia. “Gulf States Pledge to Ease Yearslong Qatar Blockade.” New York Times. January 6, 2021. Zafirov, Miroslav. “The Qatar Crisis: Why the Blockade Failed.” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 11, no. 2 (2017): 1–11. Zayani, Mohamed. “Al Jazeera’s Complex Legacy: Thresholds for an Unconventional Media Player from the Global South.” International Journal of Communication 10 (2016): 3554–3569. Zogby, James. Arab Voices: What They Are Saying to Us and Why It Matters. New York: Palgrave, 2012.

Index

Abbas, Mahmood, 149 Abu Dhabi Petroleum Ports Authority, 79 Afghanistan, 45, 48, 60–61, 65, 97, 130, 132, 134, 149 Afghan Taliban, 47, 51, 60, 97, 149, 169, 174 African Union, 11 Ahmad, Amjad, 158 Al Arabiya, 66, 80, 151, 156, 157 Al Attiyah, Abdullah bin Hamad, 31 Algeria, 60, 119, 122–123 Al Hurra, 66 Al Jazeera, 47, 55–74; advertising, 63–64; English, 66–67; covers Arab Spring, 8, 42, 47, 49–50, 61–63, 72, 77–78, 161; covers Rift, 85, 86, 88, 89, 96–97, 107, 137, 156, 157, 161, 169; creation, 57–58, 72; impact, 63–71; Mubasher Misr, 72; Open Letter, 82; precursors, 56–57, 66, 72; Qatari support for, 47, 52, 63, 67–70, 70–72, 82, 126–127, 156, 167 Andean Community, 14 al-Qaeda, 60, 78, 88, 97, 118 Al Udeid Air Base, 43–44, 103, 111, 128–129, 130, 132, 134, 138, 152, 160, 170, 171 Al-Ula Summit, 154–157, 163, 173, 174 American Airlines, 46, 102 Amnesty International, 107 APEC, See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Arab League, 87, 163 “Arab NATO.” See Middle East Strategic Alliance Arab Organization for Human Rights, 89 Arab Peace Force, 28 Arab Spring (2010–2011), 7–8, 14, 42–43, 49, 95, 121–122; Al Jazeera covers, 47, 61– 63, 68–69, 71–72, 77–78, 161; US reaction, 7–8, 42

Argentina, 150 Al Assad, Bashir, 43, 48, 49, 62 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 14 Atlantic Council, 158 Australia, 39, 79, 103, 104, 138 Azerbaijan, 84, 151

Bahrain, 18, 27–29, 38, 42, 94, 131, 174; 2014 crisis, 50; Al Jazeera covers, 62, 67, 69, 70, 71, 81, 83, 107; Arab Spring, 62, 69, 70, 71; causeway, 49; GCC membership, 13; Manama, 25, 50, 62; relations with Iran, 35, 37; relations with Qatar, 19–25, 49–50, 77, 79; relations with UAE, 81, 103, 107, 120, 124, 127; role in Rift, 3, 13, 70, 75–76, 79, 81, 83, 107, 117, 124, 134, 145, 152, 155, 174; Saudi-led intervention in, 95, 103, 120; signs Abraham Accords, 154; US Navy base, 132, 160, 170 Al Baker, Akbar, 102, 103 Baker, James, 6 Barclays Bank, 135 Basel Anti–Money Laundering Index, 131 BBC World Service Arabic, 57, 61 Belgium, 6, 79, 132, 133 Belt and Road Initiative (China), 138–139 Biden, Joseph R., 149, 154, 158, 159 bin Laden, Osama, 47, 60, 63, 65, 77 Blinken, Anthony, 159 Boeing, 46, 102 Bolsonaro, Jair, 12 Brazil, 12, 108 Brexit, 11, 13, 52, 173 British Petroleum, 38 Brookings Institution, 128 Buddhism. 45, 60 Bush, George H. W., 6, 66

185

186

Index

Cable News Network (CNN), 61 Carnegie Mellon, 45, 130 Carter, Jimmy, 11 Castro, Fidel, 5 Center for American Progress, 44 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 128 Chad, 87, 139 Cheney, Lynne, 67 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, 102–103, 151 China, People’s Republic of, 19, 79, 96, 100, 130, 138–139, Christianity, 45 Claude, Inis, 8, 14–15 Clinton, William J., 59, 60 CNN See Cable News Network Cold War, 6, 9, 15, 45 Combined Maritime Force, 132 Comoros, 87, 140 Cornell University, 45 Covid-19, 102, 146–151, 153, 155, 162, 170 Croatia, 6 Cuba, 5 Denmark, 6, 13 Dilmun, 19 Djibouti, 67 Doha Metro, 147 Dolphin pipeline, 51, 79, 104, 112, 118

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 14 ECOWAS, See Economic Community of West African States Ecuador, 148 Egypt, 37, 38, 75, 121, 126, 157, 163; Al Jazeera covers, 8, 47, 61, 62–63, 67, 68, 71, 72, 77–78; Arab Spring revolution, 7– 8, 42, 47, 62–63, 68, 71, 72; MESA, 131–132; Muslim Brotherhood, 3, 42, 71; relations with Qatar, 49, 77–78, 79, 83, 85, 100, 104, 107, 112, 157; role in Rift, 3, 38, 49, 75, 83, 85, 100, 104, 107, 112, 121, 155 Emirates Airlines, 102 Ennahda Party (Tunisia), 61 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 121, 125–126, 136 Eritrea, 87 Etihad Airways, 80, 102 Exxon-Mobil, 79 European Coal and Steel Community, 14 European Council on Foreign Relations, 125 European Union, 12, 13, 14, 87, 126, 132, 160

Farage, Nigel, 12 Farnsworth, David, 4 Farron, Timothy, 135 Federal Bureau of Investigation (US), 98, 131

Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), 82, 108 FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022, 44, 46, 82, 98, 101, 106, 108, 146, 161–162, 172 Fifth Fleet (US Navy), 132, 134, 160, 170 Fitch Ratings, 98 Fly Dubai, 102 Food supply (Qatari), 83–85, 96, 100–101, 112–113, 119, 122, 148–149, 150 Forced repatriation, 82–83, 106, 113 France, 12, 44, 57, 79, 117, 122, 136, 139; Canal France International, 57; National Front party, 12; Paris Saint-Germain, 46; reacts to Rift, 122, 136 Freedom House, 68 Functionalism, 10–11, 14

Gabriel, Sigmar, 87, 137 Gargash, Anwar, 88, 103, 118, 140, 153, 157, 159, 136 Gates, Robert, 44 Gaza, 42, 44, 47, 58, 61, 97, 126–127, 149–150 GCC. See Gulf Cooperation Council Georgetown University, 45, 130, 174 Germany, 6, 101, 117, 136–138, 160 Ghafran clan. 106 Ghana, 150 Ghannouchi, Rashid, 61 Gore, Albert, 66 Great Britain, 45, 79, 85, 117, 136, 138, 171; in the Gulf region, 20–21, 23, 24, 27, 38, 135; reacts to the Rift, 79, 81, 100, 109, 135, 138; relations with Bahrain, 20, 22, 23–24; relations with India, 20; relations with Qatar, 21–24, 26, 28, 29, 135, 163; relations with Saudi Arabia, 22, 23, 25, 135 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 10, 11, 13, 14, 50, 94, 99–100, 111, 120, 137, 174; collective security, 7, 13, 14–15, 50, 51, 111, 128, 137, 172; coordinated policy, 15, 29, 37, 51, 52, 76, 77, 120, 123–124, 163, 170, 173; deters Iranian aggression, 4, 15, 29, 37, 76, 77, 119, 172–173; members, 4, 13, 29, 42, 123, 124, 145, 170; Peninsular Shield force, 31; regional identity, 11, 13, 111, 124, 162, 163; summit at Al-Ula, 145, 155–157, 163, 174; VAT, 99; relations with Qatar, 4, 7, 29, 42, 76, 132; relations with US, 128 Guterres, Antonio, 76, 160

Hague Conferences, 5 Hajizadeh, Amir Ali, 160 bint Hamad, Al-Mayassa, 110 Hamad International Airport, 46, 96, 102, 112 Hamad Port, 96, 100, 101, 112, 120, 149, 171, 172; Hamas, 37, 42, 44, 64, 76, 78, 97, 126, 149– 150, 169, 174 Hanegbi, Tzachi, 44

Index Harrods, 40, 96 Hawar Islands, 28 Helium, 39 Hezbollah, 37, 48, 88, 97 Hinduism, 45 History of the Peloponnesian War, 167, 172 Holocaust, 9 Houthis, 43, 76, 84, 86 Hungary, 12, 101 Hussein, Saddam, 30, 31, 33, 36–37, 59, 61

Ibn Saud, Abdul Aziz, 23–24 Al Ibrahim, Walid, 56 ICAO. See International Civil Aviation Organization ICJ. See International Court of Justice ILO. See International Labor Organization IMF. See International Monetary Fund India, 20, 22–23, 24, 38–39, 97, 100, 118, 130, 139–140, 148, 160 Indian Ocean, 19 Indonesia, 19, 119 International Air Transport Association, 80 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 102–103 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 28, 119, 151 International Exhibition for Homeland Security and Civil Defense, 123 International Labor Organization (ILO), 11 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 99, 147 International Organizations, 1–2, 4, 7, 8–13, 111, 172–173 Intifada, 44, 58 Iran, Islamic Republic of, 16, 29, 37, 42, 78, 83, 95, 123, 137, 138, 171; internal divisions, 15; North Field, 30, 37, 39, 42, 51, 79, 104, 123, 173; reacts to Rift, 76, 84–85, 89, 100, 102, 119–120, 150–151, 154, 169, 171; relations with Bahrain, 29, 35, 37; relations with GCC, 4, 13, 15, 29, 95, 119, 173–174; relations with Qatar, 3, 7, 30–31, 33, 36, 37, 42, 43, 76, 77, 78, 84–85, 97, 169, 173; relations with UAE, 51, 78, 95; relations with US, 7, 33, 129, 150, 154, 158–160 Iran Nuclear Deal: See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG), 89 Iraq, 6, 7, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 119, 170, invasion of Kuwait (1990), 30, 36–37, 38, 62, 174; Qatari hunters captured, 78, 104 IRCG. See Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ISIS. See Islamic State Islamic State (ISIS), 7, 88, 97, 128–129, 134, 136–137 Israel, 30, 56, 97, 154, 159; Abraham Accords, 127, 153–154, 158, 159; Al Jazeera covers, 58, 64–66, 67; Fatah, 149; Knesset, 64; media, 56, 58, 61; relations with Qatar, 42, 44, 77, 108, 126–127, 149–

187

150; reacts to Rift, 126–127; Six Day War, 56; West Bank, 44, 58, 61, 149 Islam: hajj, 51, 83, 85, 107, 118–119, 169, 221; Mohammed, 19; Ramadan, 75, 83, 110, 122; Sunni/Shi’a divide, 13, 18, 37, 84, 129; Italy, 6, 12, 46, 79, 101, 109

Japan, 39, 78, 79, 140, 161 Johnson, Boris, 87, 89, 135, 137 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 7, 37, 154, 158, 159 Jordan, 59, 70, 86, 131, 154 de Juniac, Alexandre, 80

Kamrava, Mehran, 45 Kara, Ayoub, 127 Kazakhstan 153 Keohane, Robert, 8, 9 Khanfar, Wadah, 69 Khashoggi, Jamal, 98, 132, 159 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruholla, 29, 35 Kushner, Jared, 95, 152, 154, 157–158 Kuwait, 6, 18, 23, 25, 31, 42, 119, 123, 124, 131, 154–155; Al Jazeera covers, 64; Iraqi invasion (1990), 6, 30, 36–37, 59; mediation offers, 13, 25, 87–89, 120, 121, 134, 137, 152, 158–159, 160; relations with Iran, 59, 95, 123; relations with US, 31, 131, 158, 160 Kuwait Airlines, 83

Leaf, Barbara, 158 League of Arab States, 14, 173 Lebanon, 28, 47, 48, 66, 120, 131, 136 Lenderking, Timothy, 133 Le Pen, Marine, 12, 13 Levant, 62 Libya, 8, 42, 44–45, 47, 72, 86–87, 118, 122, 139, 174 Lieberman, Avigdor, 127 Liquid natural gas (LNG): North Field, 29, 30, 31, 37, 38–39, 42, 50, 79, 84, 97, 104, 118, 123, 173; pipelines, 39, 42, 51, 79, 85, 112, 118, 139; Qatari success, 40, 46, 50, 51, 72, 78–79, 85, 95–96, 103, 140, 146–148, 169, 170, 171; rise to global prominence, 31, 36, 38–39, 79, 100, 129–130, 136, 138, 146–148, 169; shipment disruptions, 78–79 Lithuania, 6 LNG. See Liquid Natural Gas Lonely Planet, 35 Luxembourg, 6

Macron, Emmanuel, 109, 122, 136, 137, 138 Majlis-al-Shura Council (Qatar), 28, 29, 32, 161 Mahbubani, Kishore, 90 Malaysia, 96, 100, 119–120 Maldives, 87, 140 Mattis, James, 128, 130, 132

188

Index

Mauritania, 87 May, Theresa, 135 MBS. see “bin-Salman, Mohammed” MBZ. see “bin-Zayed, Mohammed” Mediation, 48, 120–121, 122, 125, 160, 161; by Kuwait and Oman, 13, 25, 119, 120– 121, 159; by US, 133–134, 152; during Rift, 87–89, 135, 136–137, 149 Mediterranean Dialogues, 153 Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, and Exhibitions (MICE), 45–46 Merkel, Angela, 136–138 MICE. See Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, and Exhibitions. Middle East Broadcasting Center MBC, 56 Middle East Strategic Alliance, 131–132 Mitrany, David, 11 Mnuchin, Stephen, 157 Mobil Oil, 38 Mogherini, Federica, 87 Mohammed VI, 122, 136 Moody’s Investors Service, 98, 147 Morgenthau, Hans, 9 Morocco, 11, 60, 80, 121, 122, 131, 136, 154, 160 Morsi, Mohammed, 49, 63, 72 Mubarak, Hosni, 42, 49, 59 Al Mudahka, Aysha, 81 Muslim Brotherhood, 60, 72, 78, 83, 88, 118, 141, 169; promoted by Al Jazeera, 60, 62, 63, 65, 71, 73, 77, 127; Qatar supports, 3, 42, 43, 47, 49, 50, 77, 94, 118, 126, 131, 157, 169, 174

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 56 National Anti-Money Laundering Committee (Qatar), 131 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization bin Nayefs, Mohammed, 89 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 65, 126, 127 Netherlands, the, 12–13 Neymar da Silva Santos Júnior, 46, 108 Niger, 87 Nigeria, 33 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 12, 13–15, 42, 44–45, 132, 133, 151, 160; collective security, 13–15; Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, 44; Qatar’s potential membership, 44–45, 133 North Korea, 11, Northwestern University, 45, 130 Norway, 78 Norsk Hydro, 78 Nye, Joseph, 7, 45

OAS. See Organization of American States Obama, Barack, 7, 37, 128, 129, 130 Oil, 18, 21, 24–30, 33, 38, 42, 72, 95, 122, 124, 129, 130, 136, 138–140, 147, 150, 153

Oman, 18, 19, 25, 95, 123, 125, 131, 160, 171; relations with Iran, 13, 95, 119, 123; relations with Qatar, 51; reacts to Rift, 87, 100, 119–120 Oman Air, 83 OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Operation Desert Fox, 59, 61 Operation Desert Storm, 6, 30, 37, 43 Organization of American States (OAS), 14 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 26, 38, 122, 124 Al Otaiba, Yousef, 161 Ottoman Empire. See Turkey Pakistan, 79, 88, 96, 100, 160 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 44, 64 PLO. See Palestinian Liberation Organization Port Qasim, 100 Paris Climate Accord, 12 Pelly, Lewis, 22 Persia, 19 Persian Gulf War, 37, 59 Philippines, 130 Poland, 12–13, 79 Politics Among Nations, 9 Pompeo, Mike, 132, 152 Porsche, 40 Portugal, 6, 19 Powell, Colin, 60, 65 Prussia, 6 Putin, Vladimir, 15, 125, 136, 138

Qaddafi, Muammar, 42, 60, 86 Al Qaradawi, Yusuf, 47, 60, 88, 126 Al Qasim, Faisal, 59 Qatar: Advisory Council, 105, 107–108, 124; Aspire Dome, 110; balancing, 41–43; bandwagoning, 5, 7, 29, 43–45, 171; Central Municipal Council, 40–41; dairy industry, 84, 86, 100–101, 112–113, 148, 169; development and diversification, 39– 40, 50–51, 96, 100–101; Doha, 20, 21, 47, 48, 80, 84, 91fn, 106, 110, 127, 161; Education City, 45, 130, 174; expatriates, 2, 27, 28, 41, 82, 99, 105–107, 110, 150; Foreign Ministry, 76, 86, 89, 97; foreign policy, 7, 42, 49–51, 52, 59, 70, 77–78, 97, 148, 171–172; geography, 17–20, 37, 90, 167; Ghafran clan, 106; independence, 15– 16, 27–28, 110; Interior Ministry, 77, 107, 123, 133; investments, 46; land border, 23, 25, 30, 31, 36, 38, 56, 71, 75, 80, 83–85, 99, 112–113, 120, 152, 155, 157, 161–162; mediation, 48, 50, 149, 174; military, 109, 110, 126, 131, 132; Ministry of Information and Culture, 57; Ministry of National Defense, 123; nationalism, 18, 23,

Index 26, 27, 41, 51, 94, 105–108, 109–111, 161, 162; policy on terrorism, 47, 48, 50, 62, 76, 77, 86–87, 88, 97, 104–105, 118, 126–128, 130–131, 133, 135, 137,149, 153, 169, 173; reacts to Arab Spring, 7–8, 62; relations with Britain, 20, 21–23, 24; relations with US, 30, 36–37, 47, 97–98, 101, 127–134, 148, 152, 157; Religion City, 18, 45; sanctuary, 47–48; social spending, 26, 28, 40; soft power, 28, 45– 48, 50–51, 101, 108, 123, 130, 171, 174; sovereignty, 76, 97, 125, 126; Sovereign Wealth Fund, 40, 95–96, 98; sports, 46, 82, 108, 152, 161–162; stock exchange, 39, 71, 81, 86, 98, 99; Umm al Houl, 101; wealth, 18–19, 40, 62, 67, 71, 72, 81, 86, 90, 95– 96, 98, 112, 119, 126, 134, 136, 141 Qatar 2022 Local Organizing Committee, 82, 108 Qatar Airways, 46, 49–50, 80, 83, 86, 101– 103, 130, 136, 147, 150, 151, 155 Qatar Authority for Charitable Works, 131 Qatar Businessmen Association, 148 Qatar Business Incubation Center, 81 Qatar Chamber, 146, 148 Qatari Development Bank, 146 Qatar Foundation, 83 Qatar Free Zones Authority, 148 Qatar Gas/Qatar Petroleum, 25, 104, 136, 150 Qatari Investment Authority, 40, 46, 96, 108, 113 Qatar Museum Authority, 27–28, 41, 106, 147 Qatari National Committee for Human Rights, 80 Qatar National Day, 110 Qatar Rail, 143 Qatar-Turkey Supreme Strategic Committee, 150 Qatar University, 111, 150, 163

Radio Monte Carlo–Middle East (RMC–ME), 57 bin Rashid, Mohammed, 155 Ras Laffan Port, 171 Reagan, Ronald, 11 Rice, Condoleezza, 65 RMC–ME. See Radio Monte Carlo–Middle East Rouhani, Hassan, 95, 119 Royal Navy (UK), 152 Russia, 79, 114, 122; 138, 139, 153; relations with Qatar, 41, 83–84, 98, 101, 138–139, 152, 160; relations with the United States, 130

Al Sabah, Nawaf al-Ahmad Al Jaber, 154– 155, 160 Al Sabah, Sabah Al Ahman Al Jaber, 87, 120– 121, 154, 155, 158 bin Said, Qaboos, 119 Saleh, Ali Abdullah, 43, 60

189

bin-Salman, Mohammed (MBS), 76, 79, 85, 86, 89, 94–95, 100, 112, 113, 121, 122, 129, 132, 138, 151, 154, 155, 156, 158, 172 Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy at, 32 Al Saud, Faisal bin Turki bin Abdullah, 21 Al Saud, Faisal bin Farhan, 153, 156, 158 Al Saud, Salman bin Abdullaziz, 22, 24, 50, 121 Saudi Arabia: 1972 Qatari coup, 28, 38, 122; 1996 attempted Qatari coup, 38, 51, 106; 2014 crisis, 120; Al Jazeera covers, 62–63, 69, 156; Al-Ula, 155–157; border with Qatar, 23, 25, 30, 31, 36, 38, 56, 71, 75, 80, 83–85, 99, 112–113, 120, 152, 155, 157, 161–162; Jeddah, 50, 157; Maraya Concert Hall, 155; military, 109, 131, 138, 151, 152, 167, 170; Najd, 21; relations with Qatar, 22, 24–25, 29, 50–51; relations with Iran, 37, 77; relations with US, 128–130, 133; Riyadh, 36, 42, 50, 105, 120, 121, 127, 128, 131, 135, 152, 153, 159; Saudi Press Agency, 75; territorial claims, 24 Sawt al-Arab Radio, 56 Senegal, 87, 140 SFSF. See Strategic Food Security Facilities Shard, 96 Shell Oil/Dutch Shell, 38, 40, 104 Shi’a Islam. See Islam Shoukry, Sameh, 155 el-Sisi, Abdel Fattah, 63, 78, 121, 127, 158 Slavin, Barbara, 158 Slovenia, 6 Small state behavior, 4–7, 8, 16, 30, 36, 41, 52, 55–56, 89 Smith, Dana Shell, 131 Somalia, 87, 118, 150 South Africa, 155 South Korea, 11, 39, 79, 146, 148, 160, 161 Spicer, Sean, 131 Spykman, Nicholas, 5 Standard and Poor, 98 Status of Force Agreement, 43 Stoltenberg, Jens, 133 Strategic Food Security Facilities (SFSF), 101, 149 Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy, 82, 108, 146 Sudan, 47, 48, 49, 87, 151–152, 154 Suez Canal, 79, 85, 100, 104112 Sunni Islam. See Islam Supreme Council for the Investment of the Reserves of the State, 39 Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 149 Sweden, 12–13 Switzerland, 6, 28, 31, 36, 101 Syria, 7, 37, 43, 47, 48, 62, 68, 72, 84, 88, 118, 122, 134, 138; civil war, 43, 62, 84 Syrian National Council, 43 Syrian Nursa Front, 88

190

Index

Taiwan, 96, 100 Al Tamini, Al Mundhir bin Sawa, 19 Tebboune, Abdelmadjid, 123 Terrorist Financing Targeting Center, 130–131 Texas A&M, 45, 130 Al Thani, Abdullah bin Nasser bin Abdullah Al Ahmed, 51, 122 Al Thani, Ahmad bin Ali, 26, 28 Al Thani, Ahmed bin Jassim bin Mohammed, 22, 47, 69 Al Thani, Ali bin Abdullah, 26 Al Thani, Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabir, 32 Al Thani, Hamad bin Khalifa, 19, 35–36, 40, 41, 51, 57, 96; abdicates, 49; Al Jazeera support, 58, 67; comes to power, 30–32; 35–37, 38; develops economy, 39; Father Emir, 49; raises Qatar’s profile, 42, 48, 50, 52, 77; relations with US, 43 Al Thani, Jassim bin Mohammed, 47, 69 Al Thani, Khalifa bin Hamad, 25–26, 28–29, 36, 38 Al Thani, Khalifa bin Jassim, 121, 162 Al Thani, Mohammed, 21, 22 Al Thani, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman, 51, 94, 147 Al Thani, Saif bin Ahmed, 105 Al Thani, Tamim bin Hamad, 4, 36, 69, 75, 96, 97, 107, 133, 150, 170; Al Jazeera support, 67; at Al Ula summit, 155, 159; comes to power, 49; during Rift, 76, 87, 120; NATO aspirations, 44; prepares for Rift, 94; promotes Qatari nationalism, 52, 109–111, 145, 161; relations with Algeria, 123; relations with France, 136; relations with GCC, 124; relations with Great Britain, 135; relations with Turkey, 125; relations with US, 105, 128–134, 151 Tillerson, Rex, 87, 89, 105, 121, 128, 133, 135, 152 Truman, Harry, 12 Trump, Donald, 13, 52, 65, 76, 95, 97, 111, 127, 130–131, 132, 149, 150, 173; condemns Qatar, 89, 109, 128, 129, 169, 171, 172; efforts to end Rift, 2, 121, 133, 136, 151, 152–159; praises Qatar, 105, 134; promotes US national interests, 12 Tunisia, 7, 8, 42, 61–62, 120 Turkey, 117, 119, 151, 160, 169; reacts to Rift, 84, 100, 125–126, 172; relations with Qatar, 44, 86, 113, 146; troops in Qatar, 103, 174 Twitter, 83, 110, 151

Ukraine, 6 United Arab Emirates, 24, 51, 66, 78, 97, 104, 112, 151, 155, 169; 2014 crisis, 120;

Dubai Television, 56; Relations with Qatar, 49, 50, 51, 78, 105, 109, 152; Role in Rift, 75–80, 81, 83–84, 85–88, 99–101, 107, 118–119, 121, 124, 127, 129, 131, 134, 137, 140, 145, 152, 154, 156, 161, 170–172; relations with US, 129, 133, 133, 154, 157, 159 United Kingdom. See Great Britain United Nations, 9, 10, 12, 76, 89, 105, 150, 160; small states, 10; reacts to Rift, 102, 121 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 11 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 85 UN Security Council (UNSC), 48, 102, 104, 105, 113; Qatar membership, 37, 48 104 UNSC. See United Nations Security Council United States: Al Jazeera covers, 60, 65–67, 68; defense cooperation agreement with Qatar, 38, 44; and education in Qatar, 45, 130, 171; LNG, 79, 104, 129, 138; military, 43–44, 77, 88, 103, 128–129, 132, 134, 138, 159, 170–171; policy on terrorism, 6, 42, 60, 97, 104, 127–128, 133, 149; reacts to Arab Spring, 7, 42; reacts to Rift, 108, 109, 128–130, 157–159, 163, 169–171; US-Qatar Strategic Dialogue, 132–134, 148; Treasury Department, 131 Uruguay, 129–130 Vietnam, 150 Villaggio mall fire, 68 Virginia Commonwealth University, 45, 130 Voice of America, 56

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 158 Western Sahara, 11 Wikileaks, 68–69 Wilson, Harold, 27 World Cup. See FIFA World Cup Qatar World Trade Organization (WTO), 102–103, 113 World War I, 23 World War II, 8, 9, 14, 23, 25 WTO. See World Trade Organization Yemen, 7, 43, 60, 68, 72, 76, 80, 84, 86, 89, 95, 112, 119, 158, 173–174; Houthi in, 43, 76, 84, 86 Yugoslavia, 6

Zarif, Mohammed Javad, 84, 119 bin-Zayed, Mohammed (MBZ), 76, 94, 95, 112, 113, 118, 129; failure to see effects of Rift, 78, 79, 85, 86, 89, 172 Zinni, Anthony, 133–134 Zubara, 20, 22, 24–25, 50

About the Book

In June 2017, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE announced

a comprehensive boycott of Qatar. Diplomatic ties were severed, trade was banned, and airspace was closed. Qatari nationals were expelled from all four countries. It seemed that disaster loomed for this small Gulf nation. But not so. Instead, in an unexpected turn of events, the Qatari government deftly used its enormous wealth and extensive reserves of soft power to nullify most of the effects of what came to be known as the Rift. Edward Lynch tells the story of the Gulf Rift from start to finish. Exploring the historical and contemporary causes of the dispute, the reactions to it both regionally and globally, and the surprising end to the crisis, his work serves also to highlight the often unrecognized role of small states in international relations. Edward A. Lynch is professor of political science at Hollins University.

191