The Ottoman Army and the First World War 0367471779, 9780367471774

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The Ottoman Army and the First World War

This is a comprehensive new operational military history of the Ottoman Army during the First World War. Drawing from archives, official military histories, personal war narratives and sizeable Turkish secondary literature, it tells the incredible story of the Ottoman Army’s struggle from the mountains of the Caucasus to the deserts of Arabia and the bloody shores of Gallipoli. The Ottoman Army, by opening new fronts, diverted and kept sizeable units of British, Russian and French forces away from the main theatres and even sent reinforcements to Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. Against all odds, the Ottoman Army ultimately achieved some striking successes, not only on the battlefield but in their total mobilisation of the empire’s meagre human and economic resources. However, even by the standards of the First World War, these achievements came at a terrible price in casualties and, ultimately, loss of territory. Thus, instead of improving the integrity and security of the empire, the war effectively dismantled it and created situations and problems hitherto undreamt of by a besieged Ottoman leadership. In a unique account, Uyar revises our understanding of the war in the Middle East. Mesut Uyar is Professor of International Relations and Dean of the School of Business and Social Sciences at Antalya Bilim University, Turkey. Dr. Uyar is a retired Turkish Army colonel and former associate professor from the University of New South Wales, Australia and the Turkish Military Academy. He is the author or co-author of The Phaseline Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974 (2020); The Ottoman Defence Against the Anzac Landing 25 April 1915 (2015); A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk (2009); and numerous articles and book chapters.

Routledge Studies in First World War History Series Editor John Bourne The University of Birmingham, UK

The First World War is a subject of perennial interest to historians and is often regarded as a watershed event, marking the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the ‘modern’ industrial world. The sheer scale of the conflict and massive loss of life means that it is constantly being assessed and reassessed to examine its lasting military, political, sociological, industrial, cultural and economic impact. Reflecting the latest international scholarly research, the Routledge Studies in First World War History series provides a unique platform for the publication of monographs on all aspects of the Great War. Whilst the main thrust of the series is on the military aspects of the conflict, other related areas (including cultural, visual, literary, political and social) are also addressed. Books published are aimed primarily at a post-graduate academic audience, furthering exciting recent interpretations of the war, whilst still being accessible enough to appeal to a wider audience of educated lay readers. Also in this series Museums, History and the Intimate Experience of the Great War Love and Sorrow Edited by Joy Damousi, Deborah Tout-Smith and Bart Ziino Reflections on the Commemoration of the First World War Perspectives from the Former British Empire Edited by David Monger and Sarah Murray The Ottoman Army and the First World War Mesut Uyar Renegotiating First World War Memory The British and American Legions, 1938–1946 Ashley Garber For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/history/ series/WWI

The Ottoman Army and the First World War Mesut Uyar

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Mesut Uyar The right of Mesut Uyar to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Uyar, Mesut, author. Title: The Ottoman army and the First World War / Mesut Uyar. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, [2021] | Series: Routledge studies in First World War history | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020033309 (print) | LCCN 2020033310 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367471774 (hardback) | ISBN 9781003033967 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Turkey. Ordu—History—World War, 1914–1918. | World War, 1914–1918—Turkey. | Turkey—History, Military—20th century. | World War, 1914–1918—Campaigns. Classification: LCC D566 .U93 2021 (print) | LCC D566 (ebook) | DDC 940.4/1356—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020033309 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020033310 ISBN: 978-0-367-47177-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-03396-7 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To my wife İlkay Thank you for always believing in me

Contents

List of figuresviii List of mapsxii Prefacexiii A note on transliterationxix 1 Prelude to war

1

2 The decision to go to war

38

3 Opening moves

71

4 The year of uncertainty: 1915

106

5 The year of glory and disappointment: 1916

211

6 The dreams and realities: 1917

282

7 The year of disasters: 1918

357

Epilogue

417

Bibliography424 Index449

Figures

1.1 Ottoman officers proudly showing their armlets as a support to the constitution 1.2 Soldiers of the Army of Action positioning a Maxim MG99 gun on the Galata Bridge during the 31 March Incident 1.3 A field artillery battery armed with 75mm Krupp L/30 M1903 posing for the public after the end of a large military exercise in 1910 1.4 Libyan tribal warriors posing with their Ottoman commanders 1.5 Reserve soldiers celebrating the declaration of war against the Balkan states in İstanbul 1.6 An abandoned Ottoman 75mm Krupp field gun with a dead gunner and spent shell casings overlooking Manastır road 1.7 Members of the German military mission before their journey to İstanbul in December 1913. At the centre is head of the mission, Liman von Sanders (with peaked cap) 2.1 A German propaganda postcard dramatises the arrival of SMS Göben and SMS Breslau to İstanbul 2.2 Sevastopol harbour receiving the shells of armoured cruiser SMS Göben (recently rechristened as Yavuz) on 29 October 1914 2.3 After the Sevastopol raid, Admiral Souchon named ‘A’ Turret of Yavuz as ‘Sewastopol’ 2.4 Bronsart von Schellendorf with his aide-de-camp (ADCs) posing in the office of the Ottoman Chief of General Staff 2.5 Reserve officer candidates getting basic training during the first days of the mobilisation in August 1914. Due to the shortage of uniforms, some candidates were still wearing civilian clothes 2.6 The Ottoman declaration of Jihad on the cover of the German Illustrierte Zeitung magazine 3.1 Arab tribal warriors under the command of Ottoman officers 3.2 Ottoman reinforcements sailing the Tigris on local rafts. Notice the presence of tribal warriors

2 4 7 10 16 19 33 45 48 49 54

61 65 73 81

Figures  ix 3.3 Group photo of a Mahsusa detachment during its deployment in Bursa 3.4 Ottoman infantry marching to the front 3.5 The Russians exhibiting captured Ottoman field and mountain guns in Tiflis 4.1 Indian deserters posing with their weapons and equipment in İstanbul 4.2 Hejaz Raider (Akıncı) Volunteer Camel Regiment 4.3 An Ottoman field artillery battery on the way to the Suez Canal 4.4 One of the few pontoons that crossed the canal and the dead bodies of Ottoman soldiers lying at the back 4.5 An Ottoman officer and Sanusi tribal fighters captured by the British during Agagir attack on 26 February 1916 4.6 Ottoman main barracks in Baghdad 4.7 Süleyman Askeri tried to command the Ottoman attack against the British fortified camp at Shaiba from his stretcher 4.8 Colonel Sakallı Nurettin (in the foreground with binoculars) and his troops in front of great arch of Ctesiphon before the battle 4.9 Field Marshal Colmar von der Goltz with his personal staff in İstanbul 4.10 Cevad [Çobanlı] Pasha and the Dardanelles Fortified Zone Command staff 4.11 Ottoman and German crew of a Krupp 240mm heavy gun 4.12 An Ottoman infantry battalion conducting an alarm exercise before the Allied landings 4.13 Colonel Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] 4.14 Esad [Bülkat] Pasha giving orders behind a Krupp 75mm mountain gun 4.15 Anzacs burying the dead Ottoman soldiers during the 24 May Truce 4.16 An Ottoman firstline trench 4.17 Cretan Greek volunteers wearing French uniforms marching on the island of Lemnos 4.18 An obsolete Krupp 75mm mountain gun firing in Suvla 4.19 The Ottoman 8th Infantry Division officers proudly posing after their successful counter-attack on 10 August 1915 4.20 A regimental colour guard (either the 47th or 48th Regiment) posing on Lone Pine after the Anzac evacuation 5.1 Austro-Hungarian troops marching up Mount Zion to conduct a religious ceremony shortly after their arrival in Jerusalem in 1916 5.2 Cemal Pasha transformed Beersheba into a major logistics base

87 96 98 111 114 122 124 128 130 133 142 145 148 156 162 164 168 177 179 186 188 193 196 214 216

x  Figures 5.3 A destitute family begging for food near a railway station 218 5.4 Ottoman infantry firing their obsolete Martini-Henry rifles in Katia Oasis 225 5.5 The British parading Ottoman prisoners of war on the streets of Alexandria 230 5.6 Ottoman garrison of a fortress in Hejaz 236 5.7 Fahreddin [Türkkan] Pasha and his staff in Medina 238 5.8 Ottoman troops marching under the sun in Yemen 242 5.9 Water tanks of Aden where vicious fighting took place 243 5.10 Ottoman soldiers eating their meal from a single large plate 247 5.11 Ottoman prisoners of war captured during Bait Isa and Es Sinn battles 256 5.12 Enver Pasha delivering a speech during the funeral of Colmar von der Goltz in İstanbul 258 5.13 Russian encampment somewhere in Eastern Anatolia 262 5.14 Russian soldiers proudly showing captured Ottoman colours most probably belonging to fortress artillery regiments 268 5.15 The new commanding general of the Third Army, Vehib [Kaçi] Pasha, with his staff 272 5.16 The soldiers of Second Army marching on mountain paths of Eastern Anatolia 277 6.1 Ottoman machine-gunners posing with their 7.65mm Maxim MG09 machine-gun 284 6.2 Kress von Kressenstein inspecting an Ottoman infantry regiment287 6.3 An Austro-Hungarian howitzer firing within cactus hedges in Gaza 289 6.4 Troopers of the Ottoman 3rd Cavalry Division resting after a combat action somewhere near Gaza 298 6.5 Ottoman soldiers and Arab tribal warriors at a train station in Palestine 302 6.6 Ottoman field bakery at Tel al-Sharia 306 6.7 Erich von Falkenhayn and Yıldırım Army Group staff officers 309 6.8 Enver Pasha awarding an officer with a medal in front of his unit; at the right is Mustafa Kemal Pasha 311 6.9 Soldiers of the Ottoman 16th Division in Hareira fortified position 317 6.10 British soldiers investigating the damage of a damaged water well and pump 322 6.11 British soldiers burying the dead bodies of the Ottoman storm troopers who were killed in action during a failed raid in Tell al Ful 326 6.12 Members of a labour battalion having a break during road construction328

Figures  xi 6.13 Construction of boats for the Yıldırım’s fanciful Baghdad expedition in a military workshop in Aleppo 6.14 Ottoman soldiers around a campfire near their bell tents 6.15 Ottoman ski-equipped reconnaissance unit conducting training with dogs 6.16 Yasin Hilmi (better known as Yasin al Hashimi) and the multinational staff of the Ottoman 20th Division in Galicia 6.17 Ottoman flame-thrower squad in Rohatyn training ground 6.18 Ottoman infantry digging trenches near a Romanian town 6.19 Ottoman, Bulgarian and German officers discussing the situation at a tactical command post somewhere in Western Thrace 7.1 Enver Pasha (second from right) and Hans von Seeckt (wearing spiked helmet) during a trip in Germany 7.2 Ottoman mule and camel drivers waiting for the arrival of a train 7.3 Ottoman crew of a Krupp 15cm short howitzer 7.4 German pilots and technicians in front of an Albatross fighter plane 7.5 British armoured cars outflanking and capturing Ottoman soldiers 7.6 An Ottoman mountain artillery battery in Gyumri

334 336 341 345 346 349 354 362 364 371 381 387 408

Maps

2.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1

Army Corps recruitment zones The Ottoman fronts and railway lines Mesopotamia theatre of operations Sarıkamış Campaign Suez Canal Campaign The Ottoman defence of Dardanelles Strait The Ottoman Fifth Army defence on 24 April 1915 Caucasus and Persia theatres of operations Arabian Peninsula tribal zones of influence and the Hejaz railway line 6.1 The Ottoman Gaza–Beersheba defence line

59 72 77 93 117 151 159 203 234 292

Preface

The First World War brought unimaginable misery, death and destruction to all belligerent nations and even some neutral countries such as Iran. Rather than a short, decisive conflict, the warring nations faced a long, protracted conflagration. Some states and regions were more affected by the conflict than others and, without a doubt, the Ottoman Empire was among them. The words used to refer to the First World War in the former provinces of the empire (in Turkish, Harb-i Umumi [the Great War]; in Arabic, Safar Barlik [the mobilisation]) mean not only death and destruction on a grand scale but also the end of the old world and the beginning of a radical transformation. Not surprisingly, the war was regarded as a dark chapter in the national history which many later sought to forget. Indeed, veterans of the First World War found limited interest in their experiences in their hometowns. A sizeable percentage had spent time as prisoners of war and returned quietly with immense feelings of shame. Arab veterans in particular discovered to their dismay that, in order to find a place within the new states of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon under British or French mandates, their best option was to remain silent. While the successor states struggled to remain viable both politically and economically, their historians attempted to write tailor-made histories that accorded with new nationalist requirements. They needed to create a new national identity to replace imperial, religious and local identities and allegiances. For the governing elite of the new Turkish Republic, the history of the War of Independence (1919–1922) was far more significant in terms of establishing the legitimacy, credibility and popularity of the new nationalist and republican regime. A historical narrative of the nation and country that rejected the late Ottoman heritage and severed cultural and religious connections with the Muslim world was needed to meet the ideological and political requirements of the new nation. Indeed, multinationalism and the multi-religious state were major elements of the Ottoman identity which were now regarded as impediments to the new republic and future reforms. In short, the new country and the new political system required a new history which would differ in every respect from the age-old imperial history. Accordingly, the First World War demonstrated the failure of the multinational Ottoman imperial regime and, in its place, a completely new nation with strong links to Anatolia was born from the blood spilt in the War of Independence. Only

xiv  Preface after this sacrifice and victory was Turkish nationhood established in Anatolia – in similar fashion to the foundation narratives of many modern Western nations. For the Arab successor states, the task was easier. Their historians blithely labelled the four-century-long Ottoman rule a ‘dark age’ and the First World War a brutal and bloody end to the Ottoman yoke. These nationalistic interpretations of the Ottoman Empire as a whole, and the First World War in particular, have created a very simplistic and ideological understanding which ignores the historical evidence and shapes facts according to political needs. The Western historiography of the First World War, on the other hand has, for too long, ignored the so-called peripheral campaigns of the war. With all the attention devoted to the battles on the Western Front, too little has been said about other theatres of war. Moreover, what has been written about the war outside France is often dated and/or uncritical battle narrative. The Ottoman Empire has received merely sporadic attention, the chief exceptions being the Gallipoli Campaign and Lawrence of Arabia. Apart from these two hugely popular topics, the volumes of the British official military history, personal war narratives and contemporary journalistic publications have remained the only works available to serious readers.1 Admittedly, language difficulties and problems accessing Turkish archives have also played an important part in preventing interested historians engaging in serious research. Fortunately, the centenary of the First World War and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East (particularly the rise of militant radical Islam) have effectively ended the silence that has prevailed for so long. The number of popular and scholarly books with titles that refer to the First World War and the Middle East is increasing each year. Neglected battles and their forgotten warriors, previously shrouded in mystery and myth, are finally receiving well-deserved attention. Moreover, the centenary has inspired the popular imagination and provoked discussions not only of battles and generals, but also of individuals, family histories and, most importantly, the need to come to terms with the war and its legacy. Yet, while these are exciting developments, as late Sir Michael Howard points out, “the Ottoman Empire was a major actor on the European scene whose role we have not yet considered”.2 Unlike other armies of the war, even very basic information is not readily available and mistakes are common, such as confusing the three Cemal Pashas of Syria. Likewise, the war waged on the Ottoman fronts was not the series of humiliating defeats some modern scholars have suggested. It seems obvious that those who truly seek to understand the Ottoman Army should consult Turkish sources, including archives, personal war narratives, official military histories and other secondary publications. Yet most historians are happy to limit themselves to Western documents, official histories or period publications, using these uncritically, ignoring the fact that they were often written by

1 Maurice Larcher’s La Guerre Turk dans la Guerre Mondiale is the sole exception. 2 Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 43.

Preface  xv biased authors under the conditions of war or in post-war eras with limited access to crucial sources. Surprisingly, important books (some of which are part of the official military history series) and articles written by the German veterans of the Ottoman fronts (known in German as Deutscher Asienkämpfer) have also shared the same fate of general neglect (apart from the readily accessible English translations of von Sanders and Kannengiesser). These Turkish and German sources have been largely ignored or mentioned only in passing. Some modern authors blithely write that they made use of Turkish sources when they have merely consulted a few Turkish documents or published works. One general excuse – in addition to problems of access to the Turkish military archives – is that the Ottomans did not leave behind written accounts. One of the most established stereotypes is that of the brave but illiterate Ottoman officers and soldiers. British military historian A.H. Burne, for example, voices the frustrations of many in his book on the Mesopotamia Campaign when he laments, “it is unfortunate that the Turks have left us so few records of a war which they have no reason to be ashamed, for us to study”.3 This view argues that Ottoman military personnel simply did not possess the tradition, culture and literary background to record their military experiences in war narratives such as diaries, journals and letters. The illiteracy of a large percentage of the Ottoman peasant soldiers may seem to reinforce the validity of this view, but the officer and professional non-­commissioned officer (NCO) corps was a different matter entirely. Surely these men were sufficiently literate to keep diaries or write some sort of personal narratives. In fact, in this respect, the Ottoman officers and NCOs had a significant advantage over their British and French counterparts. Instead of forbidding or discouraging them, Ottoman military authorities actively encouraged their men to record their combat experiences. The new infantry manual of 1909/1325 (Piyade Talimnamesi), the officers’ handbook of 1916/1332 (Zabitin Harb Çantası) and the infantry soldier’s handbook of 1913/1329 (Piyade Neferi) advised junior officers and NCOs to keep small journals (muhtıra) in their pockets and take notes on important events and orders. Most officers took this advice quite literally and noted their personal issues and feelings as an adjunct to recording these events. In addition to keeping small journals, a percentage of officers (particularly generals and field grade officers) made copies of important orders, messages and replies. Some of them even retained personal copies of official war diaries. Regrettably, a sizeable percentage of these personal war narratives and papers were lost during the final months of the war. Many officers and soldiers perished during a series of disastrous battles, while thousands of others were taken prisoner after the final rout. Most of their personal papers were either destroyed or ­captured – indeed, British and Russian military authorities destroyed almost all the documents they captured during or after the war.4 However, despite this calamity,

3 A.H. Burne, Mesopotamia: The Last Phase, 2nd edition, Gale & Polden, Aldershot, 1938, p. 111. 4 However, it is still possible to find some remnants, as a recent thesis clearly shows the merits of an extensive research. A graduate student recently found a diary of a junior Ottoman officer within the

xvi  Preface thousands of war narratives and personal papers survived the war and more than 300 of these have already been published. In fact, current research suggests that those Ottoman personal war narratives already published are merely the tip of the iceberg. There are still many narratives in private collections, archives and libraries waiting to be discovered or released for publication. However, most Western historians remain unaware of this substantial body of literature which therefore remains untapped, apart from a few well-known titles. Another important but underutilised source is the Turkish official military history series. Contrary to common perception, there exists not one but three military history series. The first series was commenced during the war when Enver Pasha assigned a small group of officers to write an official military history of the Gallipoli Campaign well prior to the Allied evacuation of the peninsula, so as to direct the discussion. The group began work in the heat of the war, producing the draft volume on the naval phase for internal use in 1916.5 During the Armistice and the War of Independence, more volumes were published as introductions or drafts for definitive works.6 Thanks to the efforts of the British official military historians, some of these titles have been translated into English and are accessible from the National Archives, Kew or the Imperial Military Museum collections. In 1925, the newly re-established Erkânı Harbiye-i Umumiye Tarih-i Harb Dairesi (Turkish General Staff War History Directorate) harnessed these early works by tasking selected veterans to write different parts of the official military history of the First World War. The Directorate’s aim was to blend personal war experiences with archival documents in a similar fashion to the German die Slachten des Weltkrieges series. At the same time, the Chief of the General Staff, Field Marshal Fevzi [Çakmak], encouraged officers – both serving and retired – to record their war experiences by providing various incentives and outlets for publication, including military presses and journals. The Askeri Mecmua (Military Journal) became the mainstay of official history writing and discussions through publication of official history volumes as an annex to its issues while also publishing a number of historical articles. Publication of these so-called Pink Series (named because of the colour of their covers) ended abruptly in 1946. During this brief period (just over 20 years), more than 100 books and hundreds of articles were published, although only one was translated into English.

holdings of Imperial War Museum. See Leo Gough, Fighting a Different War: An Ottoman Cavalry Officer’s Diary Captured in Mesopotamia in 1918, Oxford University Unpublished Thesis. 5 Hafız Cemil et.al., Harbi Umumide Osmanlı Tarihi Harbi: Çanakkale Muharebatı (Müsvedde Halindedir), Harbiye Nezareti, İstanbul, 1332 [1916]. 6 For some examples of this series see Süleymaniyeli Mehmed Emin, Cihan Harbinde Osmanlı Harekâtı Tarihçesi: Cüz 1 Çanakkale Muharebatı, Matbaa-i Askeriye, Dersaadet, 1338 [1922]; Selahaddin Adil, Harbi Umumi’de Çanakkale Muharebâtı Bahriyesi, Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, İstanbul, 1336 [1920]; İzzeddin Çalışlar, Burhaneddin, Harbi Umumi’de Çanakkale Muharebâtı Berriyesi Arıburnu Şimal Grubu Harekâtı, Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, İstanbul, 1336 [1920]; Celaleddin Germiyanoğlu, Harbi Umumi’de Çanakkale Muharebâtı Berriyesi Kumkale Muharebatı, Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, İstanbul, 1336 [1920].

Preface  xvii Ten years later, the War History Directorate tasked retired Lieutenant General Fahri Belen to write a new concise official military history of the First World War in five volumes. Although largely forgotten, Belen’s volumes (published between 1964 and 1967) established a dominant narrative and style for the Turkish official military history of the First World War.7 While Belen’s final volumes were still in the military press on their way to publication, the War History Directorate launched its first major project – the official military history of the First World War. The narrative of the war, following the French example, was divided across ten tomes which dealt with the various battle fronts and services, and a large group of retired officers (most from the General Staff branch) who could read Ottoman script was assigned as authors or researchers. Each tome was divided into several parts and given to small groups of authors. The Directorate was reorganised as the Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüdler Başkanlığı (Military History and Strategy Directorate, commonly known by its acronym ATASE)8 in 1978. The final volumes of the Turkish official history of the First World War (known as the ‘White Series’ and consisting of 17 volumes in total) were published in 2002. Yet, in similar fashion to Turkish personal war narratives, most Western historians are aware only of the White Series and not the previous series. This book describes the operational military history of the Ottoman Army and its military effectiveness during the First World War, and is built on the huge Turkish war literature of official histories, personal war narratives and secondary works. I have also used Turkish and British archival sources, published document collections, Western official military histories (chiefly British but also German, French and Russian), personal war narratives and secondary works as a means of comparison. I have attempted as far as possible to simplify the enormous complexities of the campaigns and make them readily comprehensible while, at the same time, preserving the vibrant colours and diversity of a multinational empire fighting a global war. I  have paid special attention to the provision of essential information, dealt with persistent myths and mistakes, and thrown light on neglected topics. However, in an effort to control the size of this book, I have been compelled to summarise far more than I would personally have liked. The plan of the book is simple. Apart from the first two chapters and the last, each chapter is arranged chronologically and geographically. However, dividing the story of the war in this manner does impose some artificiality due to the simultaneous nature of events and the movement of units and key commanders from one front to another and, in case of Persia, for which responsibility frequently changed hands, between the Caucasus and Mesopotamia fronts. Moreover, unlike its allies, the Ottomans had to fight on multitude of fronts. Although the Ottoman Army was principally engaged on two fronts: in the east (Caucasus Front) against Russia and in the south against Britain (Palestine-Syria and Mesopotamia

7 Fahri Belen, Birinci Cihan Harbinde Türk Harbi, 5 vols, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1964–67. 8 Nurcan Fidan and Alev Keskin, Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt (ATASE) Başkanlığı Tarihi (1916–1998), Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1999, pp. 1–10.

xviii  Preface fronts), for nearly a year between March 1915 and January 1916, the Gallipoli Front became the most important war effort. Ottoman units also fought in Hejaz, Asir, Yemen and Iran. Despite the multitude of big and small fronts (eight fronts in the summer of 1915) and their overall immense pressure on the Ottoman war effort, the General Staff despatched three corps-size expeditionary forces to help its allies, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, in 1916. I found the writing of this book immensely self-educating but also a tiring and difficult journey. The University of New South Wales, Canberra, provided me wonderful working conditions and financial support for five years and I  would like to express my gratitude to the Rector, Professor Michael Frater, the former Head of School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Professor David Lovell and to the late Professor Jeffrey Grey. Jeff played an important role in recruiting me for this position and supported me all the time. It is pity that he did not live to see the publication of this book. Living in Australia created difficulties for me in accessing Turkish libraries and recent publications. My friends and family members provided enormous assistance in overcoming this considerable difficulty. I would like to thank them all, in particular Professors Gültekin Yıldız and Ahmet Özcan for answering my frequent requests for books and articles which went well above and beyond their obligations as friends. Dr. Barış Borlat and Utkan Emre Er skilfully drew the maps. I have had the wonderful opportunity to discuss various aspects of the Ottoman Army and its rivals with several distinguished scholars and I am extremely grateful to them all, particularly late Professor Stanford J. Shaw, Brigadier Chris Roberts (retd), Professors Hew Strachan, Edward J. Erickson and Peter Stanley. Cathy McCullagh deserves special mention for her valiant efforts in editing and correcting my written English. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my substantial debt to my wife İlkay and my daughter Dilara, who travelled to Australia with me and stoically shouldered the burden of an ever-absent husband/father. Without their support and encouragement, I do not think I could ever have finished writing this book. Naturally, any errors of fact or interpretation are entirely my own responsibility. I note that the help provided by these organisations and individuals does not mean they will necessarily agree with my conclusions.

A note on transliteration

As a general rule, modern Turkish spelling has been employed throughout the text for the sake of clarity and simplicity. Words that have well-known English forms such as ‘pasha’ and ‘sheikh’ are written accordingly. It is very difficult to be simple and consistent in the transliteration of place names because of frequent nationalist campaigns in which new names have been assigned by successor states and given the Western preference for using classical forms. I have preferred to refer to place names using their established Ottoman forms (generally giving the modern form in parentheses), although those familiar to Western readers have been given their English forms. Surnames, introduced in 1934, are provided in square brackets where considered necessary. The term ‘Ottoman’ is preferred over ‘Turk’, ‘Turkish’ or ‘Turkey’ since it more accurately encapsulates the multinational, multi-religious and multicultural empire that once ruled over such a vast area.

1 Prelude to war

Historical background When the Ottoman reformers – known by Europeans at that time as the ‘Young Turks’1 – forced Sultan Abdülhamid II to restore the constitution and reopen ­Parliament on 24 July 1908 or face a relentless campaign of military mutinies and unrest, Ottoman intellectuals and the general public believed they were ­witnessing the beginning of a new age of peace and prosperity.2 They were to be disappointed. The great powers of Europe and the countries that bordered the vast Ottoman Empire were not swept by the same optimism, regarding these developments as marking the prime time to advance their territorial and political aims, lest a reinvigorated Ottoman government pose a threat to their colonial empires.3 Writing at the time, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey observed that, if Turkey really establishes a constitution, and keeps it on its feet, and becomes strong herself, the consequences will reach further than any of us can yet foresee. The effects in Egypt will be tremendous and will itself be felt in India. . . . If there is a Turkish Constitution in good working order and things are going well in Turkey, and we are engaged in suppressing by force and shooting a rising in Egypt of people who demand a constitution too, the position will be very awkward.4

 1 For the history of the late Ottoman reform movements see Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908–14, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969; Ernest E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908, Khayats, Beirut, 1965.  2 Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution, pp. 273–278.  3 Joseph Heller, British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire, Frank Cass, London, 1983, pp. 9–16, 19–22, 29; L. Bruce Fulton, “France and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, in (ed.) Marian Kent, The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, Frank Cass, London, 1983, pp. 141, 156– 159, 166; R.J.B. Bosworth, “Italy and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, in (ed.) Marian Kent, The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 57–60; C. Jay Smith Jr., The Russian Struggle for Power 1914–1917: A Study of Russian Foreign Policy during the First World War, 2nd printing, Greenwood Press, New York, 1969, pp. 63–64.  4 Dispatch from Sir Edward Grey to Sir Gerard Lowther (British ambassador in Constantinople), 31 July 1908. G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War

2  Prelude to war

Figure 1.1 Ottoman officers proudly showing their armlets as a support to the constitution.

The search for a new era of peace and prosperity was not confined to Turkey, with the autonomous princedom of Bulgaria proclaiming independence on 5 October.5 However, the Austro-Hungarian Empire moved to curtail this spirit of independence, annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 October, thus formalising a supervisory role over the two provinces of the Ottoman Empire that had lasted almost 30 years.6 On 17 October, the island of Crete also appeared to dampen the flames of independence within its citizenry with its proclamation of union with Greece.7 Within the Ottoman Empire, the French constitutional formula of liberty, equality and fraternity inspired the populace into several months of joyful mass 1898–1914, vol. 5, His Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), London, 1928, [hereafter, British Documents], p. 2.  5 Hasan Ünal, “Ottoman Policy During the Bulgarian Independence Crisis, 1908–9: Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria at the Outset of the Young Turk Revolution”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 34, no. 4, October 1998, pp. 140–150.   6 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia, 1908–1909, England University Press, Cambridge, 1937, pp. 35–47.   7 Theodore P. Ion, “The Cretan Question”, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 4, no. 2, April 1910, pp. 278–284. The Ottoman attempts to gain the support of the Great Powers and some Balkan states failed miserably. See Ünal, “Ottoman Policy”, pp. 150–156, 162–167.

Prelude to war  3 demonstrations and public speeches of goodwill which presented colourful stories for digestion by the Western newspapers. Ultimately, however, the so-called grand revolution of the constitution served only to enlarge the fault lines and fractures between different ethnic, communal and religious groups inherent in such a vast empire.8 When the pace of progress did not meet inflated expectations, political radicalism and frustration took hold, exacerbating many of the existing problems of the empire.9 Civilian and military reformers had established a secret organisation, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP or İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti), as early as 1889. However, they did not consider it sufficiently mature and capable of governing the empire at this stage, ruling out a coup d’état in favour of retaining the status quo while attempting to influence the government from behind the scenes.10 The organisation continued to increase in strength and prominence until, by 1908, the CUP was sufficiently well known as a reformist organisation to be identified as a likely scapegoat for any expressions of discontent. The first serious unrest occurred on 13 April 1909 (better known as 31 March Incident due to the old Rumi calendar date) with a mutiny staged by several disgruntled military units. The 3rd and 4th Light Infantry (avcı) battalions, brought from Macedonia to İstanbul to protect the new regime, now mutinied against it, their ranks bolstered by the 2nd Battalion which joined the revolt later in the day.11 The mutiny took the government by surprise, the mutineers facing no more than token resistance from the local gendarmerie. Their success encouraged other dissidents, chief among them theology students (suhte) and recently purged rankers (alaylı). The soldiers opposed the imposition of wide-ranging military reforms and resented the growing political power of the academically trained young officers (mektebli). The rallying cry of the mutineers was the re-establishment of Islamic law (Sharia). They vowed loyalty to the sultan and lobbied for the government to be dismissed. The reigning party’s ineffectual and feeble response provided

 8 “Turkey: Joyful Demonstrations”, The Scotsman, 28 July 1908, p. 7; “New Year in Turkey: Remarkable Outburst of Pro-British Feeling”, The Manchester Guardian, 28 July 1908, p. 7.  9 G.F. Abbott, Turkey in Transition, Edward Arnold, London, 1909, pp. 77–103, 177–199. 10 Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution, pp. 279–284; M. Naim Turfan, Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse, I.B. Tauris, London, 2000, pp. 146–151; Handan Nezir Akmeşe, The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I, I.B. Tauris, London, 2005, pp. 57–60, 87–89. 11 The avcı battalions were founded following the Macedonian revolt of Ilinden in 1903 to conduct counter-insurgency operations. All members of the battalions were specially selected based on their physical and mental capability and their loyalty to the regime. As counter-insurgency troops, they achieved remarkable results in a very short time, but also became a refuge for military opposition to the Abdülhamid regime. Not surprisingly, they played a crucial role during the constitution mutinies. See Kazım Karabekir, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti 1896–1909, Türdav Ofset, İstanbul, 1982, pp. 202, 448–449; Mustafa Turan, Taşkışla’da 31 Mart, Aykurt Neşriyat, İstanbul, 1964, pp. 59–68.

4  Prelude to war

Figure 1.2 Soldiers of the Army of Action positioning a Maxim MG99 gun on the Galata Bridge during the 31 March Incident.

further encouragement,12 and some of the provincial garrisons in Anatolia also joined the uprising.13 Mobs attacked Armenians in Adana and the Cilicia region, sparking bloody inter-communal fighting.14 12 Dispatch from Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, 20 April 1909, British Documents, vol. 5, pp. 313–318; Victor R. Swenson, “The Military Rising in Istanbul 1909”, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 5, no. 4, 1970, pp. 172–180; David Farhi, “The Şeriat as a Political Slogan: Or the Incident of the 31st Mart”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 7, no. 3, October 1971, pp. 275–277, 280–289; Karabekir, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, pp. 425–444; W.M. Ramsay, The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey: A Diary, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1909, pp. 60–61, 106–112; Abbott, Turkey in Transition, pp. 200–210; Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdım: Milli Mücadele’ye Gidiş, vol. 1, Baha Matbaası, İstanbul, 1965, pp. 141–154, 164–166. 13 Ziya Yergök, Harbiye’den Dersim’e, (ed.) Sami Önal, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2006, pp. 210– 222; Behiç Erkin, Hatırat 1876–1958, (ed.) Ali Birinci, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 2010, pp. 86–87; Bayar, Ben de Yazdım, vol. 1, pp. 159–163. 14 Meltem Toksöz, “Adana Ermenileri ve 1909 İğtişaşı”, in İmparatorluğun Çöküş Döneminde Osmanlı Ermenileri: Bilimsel Sorumluluk ve Demokrasi Sorunları, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011, pp. 155–161; Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia 1914–1923, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 2010, pp. 40–49; Bedross Der Matossian, “From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody Counterrevolution: The Massacres of 1909”, Genocide Studies and Prevention, vol. 6, no. 2, Summer 2011, pp. 156–164.

Prelude to war  5 The CUP leadership reacted decisively to the unrest by mobilising loyal military units in Macedonia. The ‘Army of Action’ (Hareket Ordusu), which consisted of two reserve divisions and hordes of volunteers (ranging from Macedonian revolutionaries to Albanian bandits), suppressed the counter-revolutionary uprising in İstanbul on 24 April, then moved to the provinces to quash any overt expressions of dissent.15 The decisive response to the uprisings energised and to a certain extent radicalised the CUP leadership, particularly the young officers who increasingly regarded themselves as a form of Praetorian Guard. While they hankered to unseat the political old guard that filled the ranks of the government, they lacked a powerful central figure who could provide charismatic leadership at this time of fluctuating circumstance. Fate was to mock them with the emergence of Mahmud Şevket Pasha.16 Mahmud Şevket Pasha had never been a member of the CUP, but had managed to gain the support of the party’s military wing. He attracted a popular following and quickly began to exert his own form of charismatic dominance over the government. Paradoxically, while attempting to keep the army out of politics, he also created the necessary base for a military dictatorship. The first victim of this policy change was Abdülhamid II, who was forced to abdicate and replaced by a very complaint and weak sultan, Mehmed V.17 For the first time in decades, the military leadership found itself free from interference by the sultan and his court which traditionally dabbled in military affairs. However, the Ministry of War was crippled by political instability characterised by a continual succession of ministers each serving for short periods of time. At the same time, the military was enjoying a period of uncharacteristic stability with the unbroken tenure of Ahmed İzzet [Furgaç] Pasha, who remained chief of the General Staff during the turbulent period from 1908–1914. As a consequence, the General Staff became the sole authority on military affairs, willingly assuming most of the duties of the Ministry. In doing so it also ensured its independence from political control. Ahmed İzzet Pasha further extended the reach of the General Staff by improving its efficiency and streamlining its bureaucracy. Its complex structure was simplified, the number of departments and bureaus consolidated into five new functional departments (training,

15 Swenson, “The Military Rising in Istanbul”, pp. 180–183; Farhi, “The Şeriat as a Political Slogan”, pp. 289–291; Karabekir, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, pp. 444–463; Ramsay, The Revolution in Constantinople, pp. 136, 138, 174–175, 206–208; Abbott, Turkey in Transition, pp. 211–277; Bayar, Ben de Yazdım, vol. 1, pp. 204–264; Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdım: Milli Mücadele’ye Gidiş, vol. 2, Baha Matbaası, İstanbul, 1966, pp. 329–346, 359–363; Zekeriya Türkmen, Harekat Ordusu ve Kurmay Yüzbaşı Mustafa Kemal, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1999, pp. 9–44. 16 Turfan, Rise of the Young Turks, pp. 163, 167; Abbott, Turkey in Transition, pp. 285–294. 17 Fatih Tetik, Meşrutiyet Sarayı’nın Çelebi Padişahı Sultan V. Mehmed Reşad’ın Hayatı, TBMM Basımevi, Ankara, 2017, pp. 25–36; Swenson, “The Military Rising in Istanbul”, pp. 183–184; Farhi, “The Şeriat as a Political Slogan”, pp. 290–294; Ramsay, The Revolution in Constantinople, pp. 120–126, 133–137; Akmeşe, The Birth of Modern Turkey, pp. 93–94.

6  Prelude to war intelligence, mobilisation, topography and correspondence) and staff specialisation encouraged.18 The military reorganisation of 1909–1910 was the brainchild of Ahmed İzzet Pasha. Under his reform programme, the general unit structure changed ­significantly to embrace a new triangular division concept. This concept involved replacing the square divisional structure (two brigades each with two regiments) with a division comprising three regiments each with three battalions, which eliminated both brigade headquarters and a regiment. While the number of regiments in each division was reduced, combat strength was preserved because command and ­control was more effective. This was an innovative concept born of German-Ottoman military cooperation. The Ottoman military would be the first to incorporate this novel concept into its organisation,19 and its advantages would be clearly demonstrated throughout the First World War.20 The introduction of triangular divisions initiated a chain reaction, and army corps headquarters were established (also triangular and each with three divisions and additional support units) on 8 January 1911. Previously the term ‘army corps’ had been used for two or three divisional groups without a permanent corps staff. There was little need for large field army headquarters, which were unwieldy and already obsolete. Instead, field army inspectorates, which were leaner and focused only on operational issues, were created. However, neither Ahmed İzzet Pasha nor his fellow General Staff officers paid sufficient attention to the personnel, doctrinal and technical issues related to these drastic reforms. Problems such as the manning of new staff positions, the introduction of combat support and combat service support systems, the writing of new operational and tactical doctrines, the creation of lines of communication and the assignment of responsibilities were all but ignored.21 The reorganisation also initiated a broad-ranging and systematic purge of officers.22 The CUP and the General Staff decided to rid the army of the unruly alaylı officers and the protégés of the former regime. While political priorities and loyalties were certainly instrumental in this decision, in military terms, it was the realisation of a decade-long discussion over how to create a homogeneous and

18 Ahmet İzzet, Feryadım, vol. 1, Nehir Yayınları, İstanbul, 1992, pp. 44–48; İhsan Hün, Osmanlı Ordusunda Genelkurmayın Ne Suretle Teşekkül Ettiği ve Geçirdiği Safhalar, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Basımevi, İstanbul, 1952, p. 87. 19 İzzet, Feryadım, vol. 1, p. 49; Edward J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913, Praeger, Westport, 2003, p. 27. 20 Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1985, pp. 9–13, 40–42. 21 “Annual Report on Turkey for the Year 1911”, in David Gillard (ed.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part 1, Series B, vol. 20, University Publications of America, Frederick, 1985, pp. 323–324; İzzet, Feryadım, vol. 1, pp. 49–59; Erickson, Defeat in Detail, pp. 25–33; Selahattin Karatamu, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi (1908–1920), vol. 3, Section 6, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1971, pp. 139–144, 146–159. 22 A parallel operation was carried out within the civilian bureaucracy. Reorganisation committees (tenkisat komisyonları) conducted merciless purges and effected enormous reductions in staff.

Prelude to war  7

Figure 1.3 A field artillery battery armed with 75mm Krupp L/30 M1903 posing for the public after the end of a large military exercise in 1910.

capable officer corps. Initially, tens – and later, hundreds – of alaylıs were purged on the basis of their role in counter-revolutionary uprisings, and the enormous benefits of the alaylı system were lost.23 However military education flourished as a result of this purge. New military schools were opened and the curriculum was substantially modernised. Cadets spent more time in the application of theoretical lessons and, for the first time, formations above battalion level began to conduct realistic field manoeuvres and firing exercises using modern tactics. The rank and file soldiers were overjoyed to finally use the modern weapons and equipment that had been locked in depots for years by the paranoid Abdülhamid. Command post exercises and staff rides became the most important duties of the divisional and corps staffs.24 The administration and the General Staff sought not only to enlarge the pool of manpower, but also to use compulsory military service as an instrument of integration. As a consequence, on 7 August 1909, non-Muslim male citizens officially lost their exemption from conscription. Other exemptions based on geography

23 “Berri ve Bahri Erkân ve Zabitanın Tekaüdü için Tayin Olunan Sinleri Hakkında Kanun”, 13 Haziran 1325 (1909); “Tasfiye-i Rütbe-i Askeriye Kanunu”, 25 Temmuz 1325 (1909), Düstur, vol. 1, Matbuat-ı Osmaniye, Dersaadet, 1329, pp.  324, 421–427; Karatamu, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, pp. 185–192. 24 Karatamu, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, pp. 387–422; Erkin, Hatırat, pp. 82–84.

8  Prelude to war and profession were also abolished. While most of the non-Muslim parliamentarians supported this reform, their communities were far less appreciative. They were unhappy at the loss of what they regarded as a traditional exemption and most (with the notable exception of the Jews) believed that the new regulations undermined their ethnic loyalties. Most Christian communities tried to prevent or resist the census and consequent registration for military service. Hundreds fled to foreign coun