The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics [1st ed.] 9783030456795, 9783030456801

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David Steinberg

The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics

The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics “Morality can be a conversation stopper. In The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics, David Steinberg expands the conversation. Drawing upon deep experience as a clinician and medical ethicist, Steinberg offers a rich interdisciplinary analysis of a topic that is easy to invoke yet difficult to define. To that end, Steinberg draws on philosophy, religion, evolutionary biology, psychology, anthropology and the law to paint a nuanced portrait of morality in both theory and practice. This is a beautiful book that will reward the thoughtful reader with its wisdom and erudition.” —Joseph J. Fins, M.D., M.A.C.P., F.R.C.P., is the E. William Davis, Jr., M.D., Professor of Medical Ethics and Chief of Medical Ethics at Weill Cornell Medical College and Solomon Center Distinguished Scholar in Medicine, Bioethics and the Law at Yale Law School. He is the author of Rights Come to Mind: Brain Injury, Ethics and the Struggle for Consciousness “David Steinberg begins his remarkable new book by quoting the philosopher who quipped, “If one starts by saying ‘morality is’…nothing one says afterward seems quite right.” This puzzle serves as both the theme and the motivation for his exploration of morality, taking the reader on a journey through a startling and contrasting variety of perspectives. Steinberg first explores morality through the eyes of evolutionary biologists. He then moves on to linguistic interpretations of morality, morality as seen through the powerful social constructs of culture, religion, and the law, and concludes with the insights of the great moral philosophers and how their work has influenced the practice of ethics in organizations, medicine, and healthcare. A true tour de force, and a fascinating read.” —Robert Truog, M.D., Frances Glessner Lee Professor of Medical Ethics, Harvard Medical School. Director, Center for Bioethics, Harvard Medical School

David Steinberg

The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics

123

David Steinberg Harvard Medical School Boston, MA, USA Lahey Hospital and Medical Center Emeritus Staff Burlington, MA, USA [email protected]

ISBN 978-3-030-45679-5 ISBN 978-3-030-45680-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1

(eBook)

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my Grandchildren, Ben, Emily, Alex, Sadie and Nora

Introduction

Most people intuitively understand the nature of morality; this tends to belie the fact that morality is more complex and more interesting than is generally appreciated. Although morality has been discussed for centuries, its essential nature is still debated. That is because morality is an abstract concept, an idea that is not itself amenable to empirical examination, but is susceptible to various interpretations. Despite having spent decades involved with both practical and theoretical ethics I found deciphering the essential nature of morality similar to solving an intriguing puzzle. Despite centuries of debate morality has not acquired a consensus definition and it encompasses many controversies: Should morality be known by reason or the passions? What should predominate rules and principles, the virtues, or the actual consequences of an action? Can morality yield objective truth? And, can these questions be answered? The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics is an exploration of morality from various perspectives. Each chapter concerns morality; that is the thread that ties everything together. My aim is to provide a comprehensive portrait of morality—a fascinating and challenging concept that, despite its uncertainties, has enormous influence on human behavior. The literature on morality is vast, forcing me to be selective and write about what would best contribute to a comprehensive portrait of morality. Chapters 1–8 include an introduction and an examination of morality from a variety of perspectives including evolution, psychology, culture, religion and the law. Chapter 3, Social Darwinism concerns misguided attempts to emulate evolution. Chapter 9 illustrates the vulnerability of morality as evidenced by the persistence of evil. Chapters 10–14 are devoted to moral theories and moral motivation. Chapters 15–16 include discussions of morality as practically applied. Chapter 17 contains concluding remarks.

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My primary intended readers are the many people who have joined a professional, governmental, or organizational ethics committee and people taking a fellowship or masters degree program in ethics. I have also written for the thoughtful general reader who wants to learn more about morality. I have tried to avoid the arcane language that often infiltrates philosophy books and have inserted historic examples and real-life ethical quandaries that testify to the enormous influence morality can exert on people’s lives.

Contents

Part I

The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality

1

Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Morality and Intrinsic Objective Truth . . . . . Moral Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Definition of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . Moral Skepticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Multidisciplinary Exploration of Morality . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Evolution and Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Morality as Biology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Tentative Definition of Morality . . . . . . Moral Capacities in Animals . . . . . . . . . . Respect for Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Caring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Incest Taboo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Monogamy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reciprocity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Thou Shalt not Steal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conflict Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rules, Justice and Aggression . . . . . . . . . The Limitation of Aggression . . . . . . . . . Moral Indignation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Is Human Morality Distinctive? . . . . . . . . Some Cynicism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Limitations of Evolutionary Morality .

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Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3

Social Darwinism Introduction . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . References . . . . . .

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Immoral-like Behavior in Animals . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Thomas Henry Huxley . . . . . . . . . . . . The Mechanism of Biological Morality Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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5

Moral Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Moral Psychology and the Brain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Free Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Distortion of Rational Moral Deliberation . . . . . . . . . . . . Reason, Emotion and Confabulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reason and Emotion in the Trolley and Footbridge Dilemmas . Extra-Moral Factors: The Power of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . Framing Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Incest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Embryo Donation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Terminal Sedation and Genetically Modified Organisms . . . Fetal Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other Extra-Moral Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Heuristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Moral Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Morality and Culture . . . . . . . The Definition of Culture . . . . . Culture and Evolution . . . . . . . . Stigma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Multiculturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . Moral Relativism . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural Practices . . . . . . . . . . . A Response to Moral Relativism Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Morality and Religion . . . . . . . . . . The Definition of Religion . . . . . . . Religion and Morality . . . . . . . . . . . Religion: Another Perspective . . . . . Jewish Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tzedakah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tikkun Olam—Repairing the World The Book of Proverbs . . . . . . . . . . . Ethical Ideas in the Talmud . . . . . . . The Golden Rule of Judaism . . . . . . Comments on Jewish Ethics . . . . . . Conflict with Secular Law . . . . . . . . Christian Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christian Fundamentalism . . . . . . . . Buddhist Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Islamic Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Islamic Fundamentalism . . . . . . . . . Confucian Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Virtues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comments on Confucian Ethics . . . . Hindu Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Caste System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8

Morality and the Law . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Political Anarchism . . . . . . . . . . . . Natural Law and Legal Naturalism Legal Positivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Immoral Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Obligation to Obey . . . . . . . . Nuanced Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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9

Evil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evil: Circumstances, Values and Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . God and Evil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evil: Obedience to Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Pathology of Imprisonment: The Stanford Prison Experiment “Ordinary” Germans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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My Lai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Doctor Mengele . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Roots of Evil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Situational Determinism Versus Individual Responsibility Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part II

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Moral Theories

10 Moral Theories and Moral Obligations . Moral Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Objective of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . Conflicting Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Uncertainty and Conceptual Confusion . . . Challenges to Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Morality and Self Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . Values and Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other Moral Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Moral Obligations and Moral Ideals . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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11 Moral Motivation . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amoralists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Antisocial Personality Disorders Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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12 The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, and Nietzsche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Moral Philosophers: Aristotle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Ultimate End of Human Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Virtue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Doctrine of the Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Practical Wisdom-Phronesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bad Decisions: Akrasia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Moral Philosophers: David Hume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Necessary Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Moral Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rationalism Versus Sentimentalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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The Moral Philosophers: Immanuel Kant . . . Immanuel Kant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kant’s Moral Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Categorical Imperative . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Universal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Moral Philosophers: John Stuart Mill . . John Stuart Mill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Moral Philosophers: Friedrich Nietzsche Friedrich Nietzsche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Psychological Nietzsche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nietzsche and Marx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nietzsche on the Nature of Morality . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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175 175 176 178 178 179 179 179 180 182 182 182 183

14 Common Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Critique of Common Morality . . Are Moral Rules Really Universal? The Objectives of Morality . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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13 Principlism . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . Conflicting Principles . . . The Value of Principlism Respect for Autonomy . . The Principles . . . . . . . . Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . John Rawls and Justice . . Beneficence . . . . . . . . . . Nonmaleficence . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . .

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Part III

Contents

Practical Ethics

15 Applied Ethics: Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Approach to Ethical Dilemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Professional Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Applied Ethics: Organizational Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Business Ethics: Data Breaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Engineering Ethics Case: The Challenger Disaster . . . . . . . . . . Pressure to Launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Fatal Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Ethics of the Challenger Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Psychiatric and Political Applied Ethics: The Goldwater Rule . . Hospital Ethics Policy: The Right to Refuse Blood Transfusion . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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16 Ethics Consultation: Biomedical Ethics . . . . . . . . Ethics Consultation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hospital Ethics Consultation Services . . . . . . . . . . Reasons for Biomedical Ethical Dilemmas? . . . . . . Conceptual Disagreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conflicting Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Scarce Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prognostic Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cultural Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reasons for Ethics Consultation . . . . . . . . . . . . . Challenging Ethics Consultations: Three Examples . A Lobe of Liver for Their Physician . . . . . . . . . The Case of the Unresponsive Hermit . . . . . . . . Request for Futile Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other Biomedical Ethics Consultations . . . . . . . . Moral Expertise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . American Society of Bioethics and Humanities . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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17 The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics: Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Moral Disagreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Nature of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evolution and Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Natural Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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What Is the Origin of Morality? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Part I

The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality

Chapter 1

Morality

Abstract Although morality is widely embraced, often as a sacrosanct entity, it is a complex and controversial concept. The moral philosopher Bernard Gert implied the complicated nature of morality when he said, “If one starts by saying ‘morality is’…nothing one says afterward seems quite right”. Morality is a human concept that cannot be empirically evaluated; in any case science is not the proper source of moral values. Morality has been variously defined by respected ethicists and there are conflicting moral theories which are based on differing fundamental arbitrary assumptions. Philosophers who are moral skeptics deny the existence of moral truths. The value of morality may lie in its usefulness rather than its truth. An exploration of morality will be done from a multidisciplinary perspective that includes the relationship of morality to biological evolution, moral psychology, anthropology, religion, and the law.

Morality and Intrinsic Objective Truth Morality, a term closely related to ethics, is widely embraced, often as a sacrosanct entity.1 It is our most important yardstick for judging people and ideas. Most well-intentioned thoughtful people view an immoral person as a bad person and an immoral idea as a bad idea. Moral considerations trump other notions of how we ought to behave; duly enacted laws are suspect if they are deemed immoral. Despite the strong emotions often elicited by moral controversies questions concerning the nature of morality and its intrinsic objective truth are more complex, problematic and controversial than is generally appreciated. The tightness of the relationship between the concepts we employ and empirically verifiable entities varies. The concept, water, corresponds to a substance with two hydrogen and one oxygen atom; these atoms can be observed and their existence in the physical world confirmed. Although the object of the concept, beautiful, be it a natural wonder, a painting or a musical composition may exist in the empirical world acquisition of the adjective beautiful requires the judgment of a human mind. A 1 Although

others might make a distinction, because of common usage, I use the term morality as synonymous with ethics. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_1

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glacier with a tree lined, azure lake at its base does not become a beautiful scene until a human mind makes that judgment. The link between beauty and empirical reality is more tenuous than that between our notion of water and its observable reference substance. Similarly, the notion of morality is a function of the human mind. The consequences of an action with moral content may subjectively be judged relative to our personal preferences; however, the intrinsic truth of morality eludes empiric confirmation and is susceptible to controversy. Philosophers have noted science, even if morality could be empirically examined, cannot establish the truth of morality. Science might describe the origins and nature of morality but cannot vouch for its intrinsic truth. David Hume noted what is, is not necessarily what ought to be. John Kemeny said “scientific statements in themselves cannot serve as a source of value judgments” (Kemeny 1959). G. E. Moore believed that no moral property could be the same as a natural property. The notion, for example, that what we observe in the world as pleasant or desirable, is what ought to be, has been referred to as the “naturalistic fallacy” (Moore 1903). Although empiric observations, such as those based on evolutionary theory, may demonstrate the results of certain moral decisions are preferable to alternative options, that is different than confirming the innate truth of morality. The concept, morality, lacks empirical content and even if that was not the case science should not tell us how we ought to behave. This does not prove skeptics of morality correct, only that science, despite its potential to help us understand the nature of morality, cannot validate the existence of moral truths. This does not establish that we shouldn’t be moral beings. If morality is a fiction that is believed, it may nonetheless serve a useful purpose, for example by influencing people to behave cooperatively.

Moral Knowledge Writings on morality have ranged the gamut from the evaluation of morality as a God given sacrosanct entity to skepticism, even denial of its intrinsic truth. Campbell makes the disconcerting statement that “moral disagreements often resist resolution, however intelligent, informed and respectful the disputants may be, because moral knowledge is impossible”. A different view allows the existence of moral knowledge but, because of the influence of social groups, claims there may be moral knowledge but “no moral truths are known universally”. (Campbell 2011). The moral philosopher Bernard Gert declared the hazy nature of morality when he said, “If one starts by saying ‘morality is’…nothing one says afterward seems quite right” (p. 3, Gert 1988). Although intimate involvement with a discipline typically leads to enhanced understanding, in the case of morality that wasn’t my experience. In the practice of medicine I encountered many clinical ethical dilemmas. More than 20 years ago ethics became a second profession. I founded and directed the ethics program at a major medical center where I performed ethics consultations, wrote hospital ethics

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policies, directed a program of ethics lectures and edited an ethics publication. I was for years immersed in both the theoretical and practical aspects of morality. Instead of an enhanced understanding of morality experience left me with nagging questions about its nature. If morality is a solid discipline with a substantial foundation why are there multiple, sometimes conflicting, ethical theories and other significant disagreements amongst ethicists? When I searched for a consensus definition of morality I found there was none. That something as important as morality could not be uniformly defined was puzzling. I also began to doubt people who claimed ethical expertise. Morality can be examined on at least three levels. There are specific ethical dilemmas; for example the wisdom of gene editing. There are multiple conflicting ethical theories that purport to provide moral guidance. Although I will address these issues my ultimate goal is the examination of morality itself.

The Definition of Morality Similar to a blind man palpating an elephant, respected ethicists have a different perspective of morality depending on where they stand. Peter Singer defines morality as being about how we ought to live and what our goals should be (Singer 1994) Robert M. Veatch defines morality as the analysis of choices; to pursue a particular choice is to decide it is better than available alternatives (Veatch 1989). Gert, despite his qualms about defining morality, ventures that morality is “a public system applying to all rational persons governing behavior that affects others and which has the minimization of evil as its end” (Gert 1988). Peterson offers a functional definition of morality- “to negotiate the inherent serious conflict between the self and others” and “enable inherently selfish individuals to live in social groups”. (p. 51, Peterson 2011). Ruse and Wilson define ethics as “the area of thought and action governed by a sense of obligation-a feeling that there are certain standards one ought to live up to” (p. 186, Ruse and Wilson 1986) and, according to Flack and de Waal, “that human morality is best understood as having arisen out of an implicit agreement among group members that enabled individuals to profit from the benefits of co-operative sociality” (pp. 1–29, Flack and de Waal 2000). The social anthropologist Christopher Boehm’s definition is that “morality involves common agreement as to which behaviors are acceptable and it also involves a group’s overall conception of a satisfactory quality of social and political life” (p. 80, Boehm 2000). Joyce attempts a more comprehensive definition of morality but can only dance around its characteristics. According to Joyce moral judgments include moral beliefs that are inescapable with “no opting out”; they tend to “transcend human conventions”. They “combat rampant individualism”. They imply notions of “desert and justice” (pp. 45–73, Joyce 2006). Joyce lists the properties of morality as including virtue, obligation, fairness, and “inescapable practical authority”. Joyce also says, morality consists of “prescriptions that are independent of one’s interests”

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and “To morally transgress is to violate the conception of ourselves that is most important to us” (pp. 179–219, Joyce 2006). Joyce, who can’t provide a precise definition, identifies certain universals in moral systems. These include: 1. a negative view of harming others. 2. values of reciprocity and fairness. 3. behaving in an appropriate manner relative to ones status in a social hierarchy. 4. regulations related to bodily purity. The first three items refer to interpersonal and societal relationships. Joyce makes it clear that it’s a struggle to define morality. He says,” much and perhaps all of morality can be disputed”, that morality is “vague around the edges and “almost anything specific one says on the subject will meet with howls of complaint” (pp. 45–73 and pp. 179–219, Joyce 2006). Many of us become indignant in the face of what we perceive as an immoral act yet when challenged to define morality thoughtful scholars face a dilemma similar to that of US Supreme Court Judge Potter Stewart who made the famous confession, “I can’t define pornography, but I know it when I see it” (Ohio 1964). For Sober and Wilson, “The social function of morality is to get people to do things that they would not otherwise be disposed to do, or to strengthen dispositions that people already have in weaker forms” They add, “moral principles have functioned as ideological weapons, allowing some individuals to prosper at the expense of others” (Sober and Wilson 2000). Leonard Katz begs the question when he says “I deliberately made no attempt to define morality more sharply than common language and understanding have left it, including our ordinary responses to right and wrong, but not all of the very diverse thinking about this and other practical concerns- and about what we should make of all these- that ethics encompasses” (p. xi, Katz 2000). In other words the best he can do is accept the common understanding of morality, whatever that is. Flack and de Waal allude to the confusion about morality when they say, defining morality “is not an easy task-nor is it a task to be taken lightly-as many definitions, conceptions and versions of morality exist”. They view “morality as a sense of right and wrong that is born out of group-wide systems of conflict management based on shared values that constrains individual behavior through a system of approval and disapproval” (pp. 67–77, Flack and de Waal 2000). Pinker comes close to a definition when he says, “Moralization is a psychological state that can be turned on and off like a switch, and when it is on, a distinctive mind-set commandeers our thinking” (Pinker 2008). The lack of a consensus definition of morality may be explained by its complexity with different ethicists focusing on a different one of its various dimensions. There may be a sense of mystery and confusion over the true nature of morality. Another reason for the inability of ethicists to agree on a definition is that ethics may only exist in the human mind. We cannot deny the total existence of ethics because it is a widely considered concept and is an entity of great concern to most people. The scholarship of morality has some semblance to the reverence of God. Both God and morality are extremely important concepts with huge implications. Yet some scholars have dared to question the existence of God as moral skeptics have questioned the existence of morality (Dawkins 2006; Hitchens 2007).

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Moral Skepticism Moral skepticism encompasses a complex collection of philosophical views that doubt or deny the existence of moral facts and moral truths. Moral skeptics “raise doubts about moral knowledge or justified moral beliefs” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011). Dogmatic skeptics believe “that nobody ever knows a substantive moral belief is true”. Pyrrhonian skeptics have so much doubt they cannot say whether morality is possible or impossible. They don’t deny or make claims about morality; they just raise doubts about whether moral beliefs are ever justified. Moral nihilists believe “there does not exist anything that is morally wrong. Epistemological moral skeptics deny there is ever an adequate reason for moral beliefs; practical moral skeptics deny a role to reason in morality and focus on action (SinnottArmstrong 2011). Some practical moral skeptics would allow that morality can be justified “in some way that is independent of truth”. If morality was a fiction that was generally believed the consequences of moral actions might be considered desirable despite the absence of moral truth. Pinker establishes the reality of morality-though admittedly a “diluted version of the idea” by examining its consequences. He says it is in the nature of things that people would be better off if they were unselfish and could abandon “an egocentric vantage point” and adopt an “interchangeability of perspectives” (Pinker 2008). That morality may have practical advantages over immorality is a testament to its pragmatic value but does not define its basic nature. Also, the value of morality could be balanced by the fact that people who behave in a manner generally considered immoral may prosper. Most people don’t read the arcane theoretical arguments I’ve just described, and believe there are moral truths and that, for example, killing or torturing an innocent person is unquestionably immoral. Emblematic of its epistemic fragility is that all moral systems given rational expression rest on the foundation of an arbitrary assumption. Utilitarian theory is based on the claim, that is best which brings the most net good. Kantian philosophy and other deontological theories define the essence of morality as adherence to certain rules and principles (pp. 336–343, Beauchamp and Childress 2009). Virtuous behavior and moral character are the basis of virtue ethics (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993). Theologically based ethics assumes a God-willed morality. Other ethical theories include: cultural relativism which does not allow for universal moral truths with moral facts being “relative to the social group in which moral sensibility is formed”; and moral reality as sui generis existing in a realm that is neither natural nor theological where “we intuit moral truth directly” (Campbell 2011). That moral theories rest on an arbitrary assumption suggests morality is a contingent form of truth. The locus of morality in man is the human brain where Darwinian forces have influenced human values. Street distinguishes moral truths from evolved tendencies that can bias our moral judgments. For example we can expect “overwhelming pressure in the direction of making those evaluative judgments which tended to promote

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reproductive success”. She says, “evaluative judgments are saturated with evolutionary influence” (Street 2006). In other words the search for moral truth is distorted by deeply ingrained evolutionary inclinations. The strong and interesting relationship between evolution and morality is the subject of the next chapter. Is all lost if we conclude, as moral skeptics claim, that moral truth is impossible. I don’t think so. Moral skeptics, if they are correct, leave us to judge the value of morality using parameters other than moral truth. The worth of morality may lie in its usefulness rather than in some presumed intrinsic truth; after all, scholarly moral skeptics do not typically behave immorally.

A Multidisciplinary Exploration of Morality Morality possesses a complexity and compelling vagueness that has seduced many disciplines to attempt an unraveling of its essential nature. I will discuss morality from the perspectives of biological evolution, moral psychology, anthropology, religion, and the law. Moral behavior may also be influenced by personal experience and education. Humans are rational beings but not perfectly rational beings. Revelations from the discipline of moral psychology document that our decisions may be irrational. In morally identical situations we may take different actions for morally irrelevant reasons. I will review and evaluate the major theories of morality and also discuss the writings of several venerated moral philosophers. I will conclude with chapters devoted to the practical application of morality. There is a sense of vast complexity about morality because it has been analyzed by numerous disciplines and not infrequently influences how we live our lives. Because it is impossible to cover all that can be said about morality in a single volume I have tried to select aspects of morality based on their importance and intellectual challenge. Moral beliefs are often are presented in a strident, dogmatic manner. An appreciation of the nature of morality should make the reader more discerning about what moral advice to accept and hopefully instill in the self-styled moralist a degree of humility. I hope my qualms about morality don’t discourage the reader because the mysteries of morality make for fascinating and intellectually challenging reading.

Conclusion There are stark differences in how morality is perceived. Most people consider morality extremely important; however, morality is a human concept that is not itself amenable to empiric verification and it is subject to the whims of the human mind. Because of its vagueness, there is no consensus definition of morality. For these reasons the objective truth of morality has been questioned.

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I am writing this book to study morality from a variety of perspectives with the goal of clarifying its nature. I’m inclined to agree that an objective proof of the truth of morality is lacking. However, I don’t consider myself an immoral person and would not jettison morality simply because it lacks objective truth. We can enjoy a beautiful painting in the absence of objective proof of its beauty. Similarly moral behavior can have advantages such as improvements in our quality of life in the absence of objective proof of its intrinsic truth.

References Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F. Childress. 2009. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boehm, Christopher. 2000. Conflict and the Evolution of Social Control. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): 79–101. Campbell, Richmond, 2011. Moral Epistemology. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ win2011/entries/moral-epistemology/. Accessed 15 Mar 2019. Dawkins, Richard. 2006. The God Delusion. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Flack, Jessica C, and de Waal, Frans B.M. 2000. Any Animal Whatever. Darwinian Building Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): 1–29. Gert, Bernard. 1988. Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hitchens, Christopher. 2007. God is Not Great. New York: The Hachette Book Group. Jacobellis, V. Ohio. 378 US184 1964. Joyce, Richard. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT. Katz, Leonard D. 2000. Toward Good and Evil Evolutionary Approaches to Human Morality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(No 1 and 2): xi. Kemeny, John G. 1959. A Philosopher Looks At Science D. Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand and Company. Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica Pantianos Classics. Pellegrino, Edmund, and Thomasma David. 1993. The Virtues in Medical Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peterson, Dale. 2011. The Moral Lives of Animals New York. Berlin, London, Sydney: Bloomsbury Press. Pinker, Steven. February 10, 2008. The Moral Instinct. New York Times Magazine. Ruse, Michael and Wilson Edward O. 1986. Moral Philosophy as Applied Science. Philosophy. 61: 186. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3750474 Accessed 15 Mar 2019. Singer, Peter. 1994. Ethics. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2011. Moral Skepticism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/. Accessed 15 Mar 2019. Sober, Elliott, and Wilson, David Sloan. 2000. Summary of Unto Others. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): 205. Street, Sharon. 2006. A Darwinian Dilemma For Realist Theories Of Value. Philosophic Studies 2006; 127 (1):109–166. Veatch, Robert M. 1989. Medical Ethics. Boston Portola Valley: Jones and Bartlett.

Chapter 2

Evolution and Ethics

Abstract Evolutionary biological antecedents have an important influence on our moral dispositions. Because of evolutionary adaptations we share moral behaviors with cooperative social primates such as chimpanzees. It’s been claimed that our genes have created an illusion of objectivity to morality. Ruse and Wilson, who have studied social primates, claim there is no objective morality and ethical standards are relative to what a particular society or culture believes are right or wrong; they provocatively add, “morality is a collective illusion foisted on us by our genes”. Moral capacities observed in animals have similarities to what is ordinarily considered moral behavior in humans. These behaviors include respect for authority, caring and cooperation, empathy, reciprocity, monogamy, conflict resolution, limitations on aggression, respect for the possessions of others, guilt, a sense of justice and moral indignation. We cannot fully understand human morality without being cognizant of its biological origins and the shape given by natural selection.

Morality as Biology Morality is generally held in high regard and for most people possesses a near, if not actual, divine quality. A moral person is regarded as a good person; an immoral person is judged to be bad. Morality rests on a lofty perch from which my instincts would only reluctantly relegate it, even partially, to the banal level of a biological fact. Nonetheless, the origins of morality and the capacities that facilitate moral behavior likely have evolutionary biological antecedents, though perhaps not as exclusively as some evolutionary biologists might argue. The locus of human morality is the brain; that is where decisions about what we ought or ought not to do are made. Ruse and Wilson note the brain has “a material base and originated during the evolution of the human genetic constitution and its interaction with the environment”; they add, “there appears to be no escape from the biological foundation of mind” (Ruse and Wilson 1986). de Waal who has interacted on a daily basis with monkeys and apes notes their similarity to humans. “They strive for power, enjoy sex, want security and affection, kill over territory, and value trust and cooperation”. He also notes that although the human brain is three times © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_2

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larger than a chimpanzee’s, it contains no new parts. These similarities to humans suggest our psychological make-up remains that of a social primate and that “even the posturing and deal-making among alpha males in Washington is nothing out of the ordinary” (de Waal 2010). Humans have certain natural tendencies that are laudable such as reciprocity relationships; but these co-exist with less admirable traits such as violence and cheating. Flack and de Waal believe “our moral systems rely on basic mental capacities and social tendencies that we share with cooperative primates, such as chimpanzees” (Flack and de Waal 2000). They call these “the continuities”. “We are born with powerful inclinations and emotions that bias our thinking and behavior”. In other words, the workings of the human brain is consistent with its evolution from the primate brain. It would be overly conceited, if not grossly inconsistent, to consider the human brain the only organ in the animal and plant world exempt from the force of evolution. Although our tendency to label certain actions as right or wrong seems natural this capacity warrants explanation. Why do we have intuitions associated with strong emotional reactions that inform us that certain actions are right and others wrong? Evolutionary biology does not explain all aspects of morality. Morality is also shaped by religious and secular culture, parental upbringing, the quirks of human psychology, education, experience and the ability to reason. But evolution has been an important, innate influence on the development of moral (and immoral) behavior. Greene notes, “Our most basic moral dispositions regarding others are considered evolutionary adaptations that arose in response to the demands and opportunities created by social life” (Greene 2007). Evolution, as primarily formulated by Charles Darwin (1809–1882) refers to the change in the inherited characteristics of biological populations over successive generations (Wikipedia 2019). These changes result from genetic mutations which represent inaccurate gene replication. Natural selection is the operational mechanism of evolution. The term “natural selection” stands in contrast to the artificial selection of selective breeding and eugenic maneuvers using reproductive and other technologies. Biologic characteristics become more or less common as a function of the reproductive success of their bearers. Or, as Dawkins called us, “robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes” (Dawkins 1976). Human behavioral traits that enhance survival and reproduction are selected and tend to persist. There is controversy over exactly where natural selection acts. Williams proposed that traits evolve because they promote the replication of genes (Williams 1966). Dawkins in his book, The Selfish Gene, first published in 1976, postulates natural selection occurs at the level of the replicating gene which he has perhaps unwisely cloaked with the anthropomorphic quality of being “ruthlessly selfish”; this is an unwarranted stretch of the imagination since genes do not possess consciousness (Dawkins 1976). Dawkins states, “I shall argue that the fundamental unit of selection, and therefore of self-interest, is not the species, nor the group, nor even, strictly, the individual. It is the gene, the unit of heredity” (Dawkins 1976). His selection of the gene as

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“the fundamental, independent agent of evolution” is because the gene is potentially immortal (“genes are forever”) while individuals and groups may die out. Dawkins admits qualification is needed because “the near immortality of the gene is in the form of copies”. Individuals may sacrifice to benefit their relatives who possess similar genes, a phenomenon called kin selection. The tendency for people and other species to preferentially aid their relatives promotes caring for one’s children which is critically important because infants are so dependent. If humans and other species did not help their infants they might become extinct; that is likely why kin selection has been favored by natural selection. An additional benefit is that mechanisms put in place to help one’s offspring can be utilized to help others (pp. 20–22, Joyce 2007). Although we might ascribe a more lofty purpose to our existence, Dawkins views creatures, including humans, as survival machines for genes. A peculiar example that might support Dawkins’ theory is sexual cannibalism which has been observed in arachnids and insects. Female spiders have been observed killing and eating their mate during copulation; this phenomenon is the source of the term, “black widow spider”. It is speculated that in sacrificing his life the male spider increases the total number of eggs fertilized by his sperm with increased propagation of his genes (Buskirk et al. 1984). The male spider’s genes are propagated at the cost of destruction of its body. The ability to preserve our genes in both relatives and other individuals has been referred to as, inclusive fitness. Inclusive fitness has been defined as the sum of the effect of (an) action on the actor’s own fitness and on the fitness of the recipient multiplied by the relatedness between actor and recipient. A phenomenon called eusociality, commonly seen in ants, bees, wasps and termites, is associated with a caste system in which some social insects reduce their reproductive potential to raise the offspring of others. Inclusive fitness purports to explain this behavior. Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson disagree and argue that inclusive fitness adds little to what can be explained by natural selection and question its theoretical value (Nowak et al. 2010). Sober and Wilson controversially argue that “group selection” has been important in human evolution and has made altruism possible (Sober and Wilson 2000; pp. 101– 131, Sober and Wilson 1998). The clarion call of an animal warning of an approaching predator may identify the animal’s location and make him a victim, but it may save others in the group who heed the warning. “Many small birds, when they see a flying predator such as a hawk, give a characteristic ‘alarm call’, upon which the whole flock takes appropriate evasive action. There is indirect evidence that the bird who gives the alarm call puts itself in special danger, because it attracts the predator’s attention particularly to itself” (Dawkins 1976). Another example that could be used to support group selection is, “The stinging behavior of worker bees is a very effective defense against honey robbers. But the bees who do the stinging are kamikaze fighters. In the act of stinging, vital internal organs are usually torn out of the body, and the bee dies soon afterwards. Her suicide mission may have saved the colony’s vital food stocks” (Dawkins 1976). Sober and Wilson note because groups compete against other groups traits that are good for the

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group but harmful to the individual support group selection as a locus of evolutionary selection and make altruism possible (pp. 185–206, Sober and Wilson 2000). An alternative mechanism is that natural selection acts at the level of the individual organism “individual selection” or “within group selection”) which would promote selfish behavior. Whether natural selection acts at the level of the gene, the individual, the group or at multiple levels with “different traits evolved because of different combinations of causes” (Sober and Wilson 2000) is an arcane and controversial discussion that need not overly concern us as long as we understand that certain phenotypes exist because in some manner they have provided a survival and reproductive advantage. Believers in morality as a gift from God in the form of the Ten Commandments or other religious revelations are likely to be offended by Ruse and Wilson’s claim that, “beliefs in extrasomatic moral truths and in an absolute is/ought barrier are wrong”, that ethical premises “with a claim to ideal, eternal truth” are also wrong and “the time has come to turn moral philosophy into an applied science”. By extrasomatic they mean morality that is “divinely placed within the brain or else outside the brain awaiting revelation” (Ruse and Wilson 1986). The is/ought statement relates to the naturalistic fallacy; the naturalistic fallacy denies that what exists in nature is good and ought to be. Ruse and Wilson’s views can be interpreted as a refutation of the naturalistic fallacy and a turn toward nature for moral guidance or at least moral understanding. As will be described with ample examples, it is troubling to say that what exists in nature is categorically morally good; perhaps that is why Ruse and Wilson hedge a bit and qualify their “is/ought barrier are wrong” with the word “absolute”. What exists in nature may help us understand the development and nature of morality, but cannot in itself reliably tell us what we should consider moral or immoral. Ruse and Wilson expand a perhaps cynical view of morality by saying, “human beings function better if they are deceived by their genes into thinking that there is a disinterested objective morality binding upon them which all should obey”. Individuals with certain biological traits survive and reproduce more successfully than others. Traits said to be favored by natural selection include those that help avoid predators, promote efficient breeding and improve cooperation with others. In short our sense of right and wrong is brought about by biological processes. These processes create the “illusion of objectivity to morality” and lead us to “actions which (unknown to us) ultimately serve our “genetic best interests” (pp. 173–190, Ruse and Wilson 1986). Ruse and Wilson assert morality is species related and that an alien intelligent species might develop rules repugnant to humans such as cannibalism, incest, parricide and the eating of feces if those behaviors were adaptive mechanisms for those species; their point is that “ethical premises are peculiar products of genetic history, and they can be understood solely as mechanisms that are adaptive for the species that posses them” (p. 186, Ruse and Wilson 1986). In other words there are no “objective, eternal verities” and no “ultimate truths”; therefore, “the ethical code of one species cannot be translated into that of another” (Ruse 1986).

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Ruse and Wilson confront the question of moral relativism, the view that if there are no ultimate moral rules and ethical standards are relative to what a particular society or culture believes are right or wrong. They state that the rules of mental development are only relevant to the species not the individual but admit to some variation between groups in different geographic regions. Some of these differences may be biological, such as the ability to metabolize alcohol. An example given is the Chinese and Japanese rapid conversion of ethanol to acetaldehyde which causes unpleasant symptoms and explains their preference for consumption of smaller amounts of alcohol than Caucasians who can sustain higher levels of drinking. “The interaction of varying genetic material and the environment (can) create cultural diversity”. In any case they claim, “the similarities between all humans appear to be far greater than any differences” (p. 190, Ruse and Wilson 1986). Ruse sums up his position as an evolutionary biologist by concluding, “morality is a collective illusion foisted on us by our genes” (Ruse and Wilson 1986). This can be taken as a challenge to those who believe there is something special about morality; that it transcends the narrow and mundane lens of biology.

A Tentative Definition of Morality My ultimate, perhaps Sisyphean goal, is an exploration of morality that achieves a multidimensional and clear understanding of its nature. There are many competing definitions of morality but no consensus definition. Nonetheless, when for the moment, I use the words moral and immoral I base those judgmental terms on our conventional, ordinary understanding of morality. This approximates what philosophers have referred to as the “common morality” (Turner 2003) (see Chap. 14).

Moral Capacities in Animals If morality is a product of evolution examples of moral or moral-like behavior, should be evident in animals. Because we cannot penetrate the consciousness of animals we don’t know definitively whether they have a conscious awareness of moral principles or moral rules and we cannot know if they have conscious intentions. We are limited to inferences based on observations of their behavior. Morality makes use of various capacities such as sympathy, empathy, gratitude and the ability to follow rules. Multiple examples of moral or moral-like behavior observed in animals are consistent with the evolution of capacities that over long periods of time have made possible human moral understanding and behavior. I will examine moral-like behavior in animals to understand how moral behaviors evolved, not for a prescription of how we should behave. As Flack and de Waal note “What we ought to do and how we decide this is a separate question from why and how moral systems arose” (Flack and de Waal 2000).

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Respect for Authority Morality demands respect for rules and principles and the capacity to submit to their authority despite ones contrary instincts, desires or interests. Many animals display respect for authority though in most cases it is the authority of other animals or people rather than respect for rules or principles; what is relevant to morality is the ability to respect authority, a necessary condition for morality to function properly. That respect for authority, in non-humans, can be imagined as ultimately evolving to our respect for ethical rules and principles. Elephants form a “dominance hierarchy” and limit violence by establishing a system of authority. Elephants can be trained because they have the capacity to define and obey authority figures. (and sometimes, in the hands of humans, to avoid pain). That capacity is seen in many humans who accept the Ten Commandments, at least in part, because they came with the authority of a presumed powerful and perhaps jealous God (Peterson 2011). The teachings of perceived moral authority figures such as Jesus, Buddha, Moses, Kant, and Marx have played an important role in defining human morality. Chimpanzees who by a combination of strength and intelligence have achieved the status of “alpha male” are obeyed by chimpanzees lower in the hierarchy, often because of the fear of punishment. The “psychological inclination of obedience to proper authority”, which Peterson defines as a moral virtue, has its antecedent in traits observed in animals (p. 108, Peterson 2011).

Caring “Learned adjustment” which Flack and de Waal call the precursor to empathy and sympathy is common in primates who have the ability to change their behavior when they become familiar with the limitations and disabilities of others. Juvenile chimpanzees reduce their use of force when playing with younger chimpanzees or infants. Monkeys and apes will intervene on behalf of disabled individuals in danger. Primate infants who perceive distress in others may become distressed themselves suggesting the capacity for empathy (p. 17, Flack and de Waal 2000). Chimpanzees in zoos and laboratories are often socially perverted and psychologically damaged, but even under these circumstances there are examples of their capacity for caring. Jessie, a chimpanzee living in a half-acre compound in the southern United States was often seen going to the drinking fountain to fill her mouth with water, and then climbing to the top of a high structure where her friend lay waiting and pouring the drink into her friend’s mouth. Jessie may have sensed that her friend was thirsty and brought her a drink as an act of caring (O’Connell 1995; Peterson 2012). Other examples of caring behavior in chimpanzees include tickling, holding hands, kissing and embracing. Animals such as apes, monkeys and prosimians engage in mutual grooming (p. 207, Peterson 2012).

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Caring behavior is evident in chimpanzee adoptions. When a mother dies she may leave behind a helpless infant who is unable to survive. Adoptions often happen when an older sibling takes over the role of the deceased mother by providing protection, transportation, food, and steady emotional support. Pax, a chimpanzee at Jane Goodall’s research site in Tanzania was four years old when his mother died. “Tiny, trembling, depressed, and threatened by starvation”, Pax survived because his older sister and subsequently his brother took care of him: providing food, protecting him from older bullies, sleeping with him, and generally providing a mother’s support during the next few years” (Peterson 2012). “During an epidemic in early 1989, three-year-old chimpanzee Mel lost his mother and two older brothers. How did this tiny infant survive with no family left? Mel wandered by himself, dazed, unable to find food or comfort. He became ill and weak. His hair had started falling out by the time twelve-year-old Spindle, unrelated to Mel, began taking care of him. Spindle was “a wonderful caretaker.” He carried Mel around during the day in search of food. He shared food with the infant, and at night, Spindle brought Mel into the safety and comfort of the night nest. This relationship saved Mel’s life. The two accidentally lost contact. Mel again was forced to wander about helplessly until ten-year-old Pax took on the mothering role, piggybacking Mel about, finding food, carrying the infant into trees and sharing his nest at night” (Peterson 2012). “Spindle returned after a few weeks, and the original relationship with Mel was reinstated. After parting ways with Spindle, Mel was taken in by the childless older female Gigi, who already had one adopted infant. Gigi now passed her days in the forest with two youngsters in tow, neither of them her biological offspring, both cared for physically and emotionally until they were old enough to fend for themselves”(pp. 197–204, Goodall 1990). Some primates are capable of consolation by grooming or embracing individuals following a fight. Sometimes a juvenile chimpanzee will embrace and console an adult male who has been injured in a fight. At the Field Station of the Yerkes Regional Primate Center increased acts of consolation occurred after fights, mostly directed to the recipients of aggression than to the aggressors. Monkeys and apes appear to be capable of genuine concern for others (pp. 9–19, Flack and de Waal 2000).

Cooperation Cooperative behavior, a vital component of human morality, is widespread in the animal world. According to primatologist Jane Goodall chimpanzees, our closest genetic relative, “have a rich repertoire of behaviors-mutual grooming, kissing and hand holding- that serve to maintain or restore social harmony and produce cohesion among community members” (pp. 210–211 Goodall 1990). Peterson describes complex group cooperation when hunting amongst chimpanzees in the Taï Forest of the Ivory Coast, West Africa.

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“These creatures prey mostly on red colobus monkeys who, being much lighter than chimps, can escape into fragile branches of the high forest canopy. The apes compensate for that disadvantage with superior strength, intelligence, and cooperation. Upon spotting a troop of colobus monkeys in the trees, a hunting party of chimpanzees moves beneath the unsuspecting prey and one of the chimps climbs silently to a height of about five meters. The climbing ape, not intent on capturing a monkey, instead works as a driver who spooks the monkeys and gets them moving in a particular direction. Even before the monkeys notice the driver and begin to flee the other chimps on the ground are moving in anticipation of where the monkeys will go; the monkeys are alarmed and fleeing from the driver–climbing higher, rushing across branches, leaping between branches, diving from tree to tree–the chimpanzees on the ground strive to focus that movement. Some serve as blockers, anticipating possible escape routes and blocking such routes by climbing a tree and remaining in position. Others work as chasers, isolating smaller groups of monkeys or perhaps a slower-moving mother burdened by her clinging infant. The chasers might catch a monkey at this point, but it’s unlikely. The fleeing prey can stay in the high canopy, while gravity inevitably forces the much larger predators to remain lower in the three-dimensional maze. Still, the drivers, blockers, and chasers have managed to get the monkeys in motion, have isolated a vulnerable group from the larger troop, and have begun to direct the fleeing procession. Up ahead a final chimpanzee–the ambusher–has posted himself at a certain height in a certain tree. The ambusher is an older and very experienced hunter, and his critical role requires a finely-tuned sense of how monkeys behave in order for his double anticipation (where and how high) to succeed. When the monkeys arrive, the ambusher leaps out from his enveloping cloud of leaves and forces them, desperate now, to descend into lower and sturdier parts of the forest where the predators suddenly have an advantage over their prey. An unlucky monkey is at last agonizingly transformed into food for apes” (pp. 203–204, Peterson 2011). The Taï chimpanzees cooperate in their hunt with non-relatives, and they take on various positions and roles with no obvious expectation of a commensurate reward at the end. Meanwhile, the same males who cooperatively hunt also, at the end of the hunt, share their meat with females and males too young to hunt” (Boesch 2003). Spotted hyenas also hunt cooperatively; different prey are hunted differently. A single hyena can kill a wildebeest; it takes five or more to kill a zebra and even more to kill a rhinoceros (p. 194, Peterson 2011). Cheetahs also hunt cooperatively, for example, when trying to trap Thompson’s gazelles (pp. 198–199, Peterson 2011). Animals cooperate in many ways other than hunting: in sharing food; in forming defensive huddles against bad weather and by raising the alarm when there is danger (p. 195, Peterson 2011). Peony, a chimpanzee at the Yerkes Primate Center, had arthritis and trouble walking; an unrelated female chimpanzee would place both hands on her behind and help push her along. Inclinations of this type, according to de Waal, are best considered the natural building blocks of morality; he says that animal morality differs from human morality because it lacks “universal standards, combined with an elaborate

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system of justification, monitoring and punishment (de Waal 2010). Cooperation, typically considered a virtue in man, clearly has antecedents in animal behavior. Food sharing, has been observed in chimpanzees, bonobos, siamangs, orangutans, and capuchin monkeys, (p. 4, Flack and de Waal 2000). Explanations for food sharing include a desire by the possessor to avoid aggression, known as the “sharing under pressure hypothesis”. The “sharing to enhance status” hypothesis suggests that food sharing helps maintain status. For example when an alpha male chimpanzee’s status is challenged sharing food can help maintain the status quo. Food sharing has been viewed as a system of mutual obligations and reciprocity. A subordinate adult male chimpanzee will groom dominant males in return for an undisturbed mating session (de Waal 1982). Adult male bonobos exchange food with adolescent females in return for sex (de Waal 1982). Cooperation and sharing can benefit both parties. Flack and de Waal suggest, “human morality is best understood as having arisen out of an implicit agreement among group members that enabled individuals to profit from the benefits of co-operative sociality” (p. 20, Flack and de Waal 2000).

Incest Taboo Many animals will not mate with close relatives; they act as if they believed in the incest taboo, a moral transgression for humans. The biologic reason for avoiding incest is that brothers and sisters may share the same defective genes which each has inherited from the same parents. A child born of incest may inherit two similarly defective genes, one from each parent with devastating results. Behaviors that prevent incest and minimize genetic disasters have been favored by natural selection. Many cultures reject incest; Ruse and Wilson use this as an example of “the co-evolution of genes and culture” and the refutation of morality as purely a product of culture (p. 185, Ruse and Wilson 1986)”. Goodall notes that at Gombe Stream National Park no mature chimpanzee has been seen to mate his mother and mating between siblings occurs with very low frequency. When an adolescent female chimpanzee becomes sexually receptive she leaves home and goes to a neighboring community (pp. 50–62, Goodall 1982; p. 145, Peterson 2011). This eliminates the possibility of incestual mating. Amongst olive baboons at Gombe Stream National Park in Tanzania sexually active males emigrate (Peterson 2011); although the animals do not understand the genetic basis of their behavior, evolution has favored incest avoidance because it minimizes the possible serious genetic consequences of incest. The Finnish sociologist and philosopher Edward Westermarck said we develop an aversion to sexual relationships with people “by whom and with whom we are reared” because this avoids the genetic dangers of inbreeding. We detect kin by having been raised together. This works in environments where the people one is

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raised with are likely to be kin. Evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from Israel where children reared together typically do not choose a childhood associate as a sexual partner (Wolf 2007; Sheper 1971). Similar findings were noted in Chinese households (Wolf and Huang 1980).

Monogamy Gibbons are monogamous. A male Mentawai islands gibbon will threaten off another male who has ventured too close to their home tree. Similarly, females gibbons chase away intruding females. This is how they enforce pair bondings and disruption of their marriage (p. 143, Peterson 2011). These acts in essence enforce rules against adultery.

Reciprocity Altruism which is generally considered a moral value also has evolutionary roots visible in animals. It’s been observed that if Vampire bat A goes hungry Vampire bat B who secured an ample blood meal will feed Vampire bat A. On another occasion when the tables are turned Vampire bat A, now the one with an ample blood meal, will feed hungry Vampire bat B in a “tit for tat” exchange (Wright 1995). There are many other examples of food sharing. Trivers has called this phenomenon “reciprocal altruism” which he considers “a symbiosis, each partner helping the other while he helps himself” (Trivers 1971) The term reciprocal altruism is an oxymoron because altruistic behavior is generally considered behavior that anticipates no material reward (Steinberg 2010). Joyce has suggested as the more appropriate term, direct reciprocity (p. 24, Joyce 2007), but the term reciprocal altruism has, despite its technical inaccuracy, persisted. The emotions required for reciprocal altruism, empathy, sympathy and gratitude, have been conserved by natural selection and pave the way for purer forms of altruism as seen in man. Many species of smaller fish, called “cleaners” are known to clean ectoparasites off larger fish. They indicate their willingness to do this by a distinctive swimming pattern. The larger fish indicates a willingness to be cleaned by opening its gill plates. The larger fish reciprocate by not eating their smaller cleaners and by protecting them from predators (Trivers 1971). The anemone’s stinging tentacles inhibit predators of clown fish and the clown fish in turn chase away anemone eating butterfly fish (Peterson 2011; Porat and Chadwick-Furman 2004). Reciprocal relationships have also been observed in primates. Cimpanzee A’s grooming of Chimpanzee B correlated with Chimpanzee B’s sharing food with Chimpanzee A (p. 343 de Waal 1991). What has been called “moralistic aggression” is used to teach non-reciprocating primates the importance of reciprocal altruism. Chimpanzees have memory and, in a form of revenge may use aggression to enforce

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the rules of reciprocation. What Flack and de Waal called ‘calculated reciprocity’ is based on the capacity to keep mental notes of favors given and received (p. 8 Flack and de Waal 2000); this capacity is prerequisite to the emotion of gratitude, a calculation of the debt owed. Pinker sees in reciprocal altruism a resemblance to the human sense of fairness (Pinker 2008). At the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center reciprocity was found to have its complexities. Food exchanges were found to be balanced between individual A and B; however, if individual A shared his food with individual B, the following day individual B was not necessarily likely to share his food with individual A; however grooming appeared to be a more potent inducer of reciprocation. If B had groomed A that day, A was more likely to share food with individual B. Primates who were hesitant to share food had a greater chance of encountering aggression if they approached a food possessor (p. 7, Flack and de Waal 2000). Joyce describes indirect reciprocity. A creature may benefit by being helpful to others and earning a good reputation. That reputation in turn may lead to important benefits such as being chosen by others for participation in an important reciprocal relationship or being rewarded by society. Indirect reciprocity may provide an advantage in choosing a mate. Some Babbler birds who go out of their way to help others are chosen as more attractive mates. Behaviors that enhance reputation are selected when that good reputation ultimately imposes added reproductive fitness (pp. 32– 33, Joyce 2007), (Zhavi and Zhavi 1997). The opposite is also true; self-advancing behaviors that are punished may ultimately no longer be self-advancing (p. 33, Joyce 2007). Morality in humans is, of course, also influenced by the desire to have a good reputation.

Thou Shalt not Steal There are examples of animals recognizing ownership as if they were obeying the eighth commandment, “thou shalt not steal”. Dolphins have been observed playing with a fish they have just caught; other dolphins in proximity who would like the fish and could easily take it don’t touch it. They seem to recognize the fish belongs to another dolphin (pp. 156–157, Peterson 2011). Chimpanzees after killing an animal might claim ownership of the meat though they have to contend with both beggars and thieves (p. 169, Peterson 2011). de Waal found that primate aggression is directed at beggars for food which he interprets as respect of possession (p. 153, de Waal 2009). Goodall noted the respect for possession, at least for animal matter, when she noticed “the alpha male of the community failed to claim food possessed by others and actually had to beg for it” (p. 7, Flack and de Waal 2000). Animals may also lay claim to real estate and fight wars over territorial possessiveness.

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Conflict Resolution When societal conflicts arise, as they inevitably do, individuals have a personal interest in community harmony (pp. 9–16, Flack and de Waal 2000). Primates to varying degrees have methods of conflict resolution. One method is clear dominance relationships. Conflict intervention has been observed when alpha male chimpanzees stop fights before they get out of hand. Impartial interventions and protective interventions have been observed when females and infants interpose themselves between two fighting mountain gorillas (pp. 14–24, Sicotte 1995). de Waal provides a graphic example: “A huge knot of fighting, screaming apes rolled around in the sand, until Luit leapt in and literally beat them apart. He did not choose sides in the conflict, like the others; instead anyone who continued to fight received a blow from him”. de Waal describes post-conflict resolution after a confrontation in chimpanzees; if the proper tone is set these chimpanzees may reconcile, usually involving a mouth to mouth kiss (p. 345 de Waal 1991).

Rules, Justice and Aggression Flack and de Waal explain the evolution of community concern as coming from “having a stake in the quality of life within the group as a whole” (p. 14, Flack and de Waal 2000). The importance of cooperation in a society and the potential for conflict was summarized by Rawls who noted, “although a society is a cooperative venture, it is typically marked by conflict as well as by an identity of interests. There is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since persons are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits of their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share” (p. 4 Rawls 1971). de Waal suggests that the human sense of justice has its origins in “the partnerspecific relationships of animals capable of individual recognition and of evaluating entire histories of positive and negative interactions”. Chimpanzees and other primates have a sense of “social regularity” which de Waal defines as “a set of expectations about the way in which oneself (or others) should be treated and how resources should be divided” (p. 335 de Waal 1991). de Waal believes that “all species seem to act according to what they can (or have come to) expect from others”. What counts is “the creation of order, or a modus vivendi”; this may have been the starting point for the human sense of justice. Although non-human primates may not possess an awareness of the concept of morality there is the presence “of some of the emotions and capacities that we consider essential to this concept in our own species”. This supports the notion of morality as a product of evolution (pp. 335–349, de Waal 1991).

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Goodall describes how chimpanzees learn their proper role in society. Learning in infant chimpanzees is directed by the mother. When the infant chimpanzee leaves their mother’s protection “they learn by trial and error and by observing and imitating others”. As they get older they learn to be more cautious, to fear adult males and that submissive patterns may be required for their acceptance in society (pp. 50–62, Goodall 1982). Punishment is used to protect community interests and deter cheating and other anti-social behaviors. Another mechanism for the evolution of a well functioning community is selection of docile, individuals who have a disposition to commit to community values. de Waal also speculates that the fear of punishment by dominant members, those high in the group hierarchy, may also facilitate group functioning as well as represent “an early stage in the evolution of a moral sense” (p. 340, de Waal 1991). Male sexual competition is widespread amongst primates; Dominant males react violently to sexual contacts by subordinate males with females of the colony. As a result subordinate males suppress such activity or engage in it surreptitiously. de Waal notes, “the circumspect manner in which rules are violated provide the clearest indication of the animals awareness of them”. Chimpanzees may act as informants, calling attention to transgressions with “hooting and nodding head movements”. Dominant members of a hierarchy set limits for more subordinate members who may be motivated by the fear of punishment, “an early stage in the development of guilt” (p. 340, de Waal 1991). Deviation from social expectations evoke a negative reaction manifest as protest in subordinate individuals and punishment in dominant individuals. Protest can be manifest as temper tantrums and in the face of a “despotic dominant” silent acquiescence. The precursor to the more fully developed human sense of justice is the primate ability to recognize deviations from expectations and to react as appropriately as possible (p. 336, de Waal 1991).

The Limitation of Aggression Konrad Lorenz claimed that social animals possess “mechanisms designed to inhibit lethal aggression against conspecifics” and referred to the inhibitory systems that control aggression as “behavioral analogies to morality” (Lorenz 1966). These morallike inhibitory systems explain why intra- species cannabalism is limited. Even the Aztecs, infamous for human sacrifice and cannibalism, limited the scope of this practice. Social bonds would be difficult to maintain if an animal had to fear that in a vulnerable moment they would be killed and eaten by one of its own kind (pp. 114–117, Peterson 2011). Hall points out that baboons “have a highly articulated system of appropriate behavior patterns toward each other (and their) aggressive potential is rarely manifested”; “infringements of group norms are rare. When they do occur, they may be

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severely punished if the victim is caught”. Baboons have “a highly articulated system of appropriate behavior patterns” and as in many other species there is often no actual fighting but “ritualized displays and threat intention movements”. Although it helps maintain primate social order, uncontrolled aggression can be devastating (pp. 51–64, Hall 1964). Goodall notes that threatening gestures rather than physical fights are used to maintain social order amongst chimpanzees. She describes the “charging display”: the alpha male chimpanzee “hurtles along, throwing branches or rocks, swaying vegetation, making himself look more dangerous than he actually might be. It is a supreme example of “bluff” and as Goodall notes, in chimpanzee society might is almost always right (Goodall 1982). These non-violent reactions send a aggressive message without inflicting physical harm and are adaptive (pp. 51–64, Hall 1964; Bernstein and Gordon 1974). The introduction of a new member(s) to a group is a common cause of aggression in primates; even under these circumstances, compared to the damage that could be inflicted by the large canine teeth of old world monkeys the damage inflicted was not uninhibited (pp. 304–311, Bernstein and Gordon 1974). Kummer described a “ritualized neck bite” as the way hamadryas male baboons display aggression against a straying female. Damage done to the female is limited and the social order is maintained (p. 189, Kummer 1968). Similarly, a “fighting rule” is that male chimpanzees do not use their sharp canine teeth when fighting with females because they could inflict serious damage; use of their canine teeth against a female elicits strong negative reactions from the group (p. 340, de Waal 1991). Aggression against the violators of group norms, especially if not overly damaging, makes it possible for primates to live together in a group. Behavior that improves group cohesion improves group survival, would be favored by natural selection and as de Waal speculates that the fear of punishment by dominant members of the group may represent “an early stage in the evolution of a moral sense” (de Waal 1991). Certainly humans have devoted energy and resources to stigmatize and punish violators of social norms and laws. They have also tried to define appropriate gradations of punishment. There are many normative rules in primate societies. In some primate species dominant individuals take what they want and other primate societies are more egalitarian. This does not differ greatly from human societies where wealth and power is not uniformly distributed. In contrast to humans where behavioral expectations such as fairness, equal rights and various theories of justice are explicitly stated, expectations in primates though not philosophically expressed do exist. de Waal calls these “prescriptive rules” (de Waal 1991). de Waal notes that the circumspect way established rules are violated, for example, sexual contact in the presence of dominant males, indicates primates are aware of social rules. Observation of excessive nervousness in primates who have violated the rules might be either a sign of guilt or fear of punishment; either way de Waal suggests that, “Fear of disciplinary actions by dominant members of the group, although not the same as guilt, probably represents an early stage in the evolution of guilt”. de Waal also describes reciprocity, moral aggression, revenge and reconciliation in

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non-human primates which he views as “a strong parallel with the human sense of morality” (de Waal 1991). Adherence to their social code is so important that violation of the social code may be brought to the attention of the alpha male by acts such as hooting and nodding by subordinate primates. de Waal speculates that primates may have feelings of guilt when they break the rules. Lorenz described distress in domestic dogs who have violated one of their master’s taboos, suggesting the presence of a conscience. Of course, dogs, monkeys and chimpanzees cannot articulate, to humans, feelings of guilt (p. 339, de Waal 1991).

Moral Indignation Humans become incensed at what they deem immoral acts. For example, many people were outraged over the beheadings of an aid worker and other innocent people by Islamic radicals. What appears similar to moral indignation or moral aggression in man has been observed in primates. Trivers labeled reactions against violations of the moral code, “moralistic aggression” which increases the cost of non-cooperation and helps prevent cheating and maintains the stability of social systems. Moralistic aggression frightens the non-reciprocating individual “with immediate harm” (injury, death or exile) or with “the future harm of no more aid” (Trivers 1971). In one instance at the Arnheim Zoo a female chimpanzee supported male chimpanzee A who was attacked by male chimpanzee B. Subsequently male chimpanzee B threatened this female chimpanzee. She did not receive any help from male chimpanzee A whom she had previously helped. She displayed with furious barking her hostility to male chimpanzee A. Failure to reciprocate also meets a negative response in other settings; chimpanzees are less likely to share food with stingy individuals. Chimpanzees use aggression to reinforce a system of reciprocity (p. 345, de Waal 1991). which is sometimes manifest as getting revenge. de Waal describes “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” revenge in chimpanzees. Victims of a chimpanzee are likely to pay back the offending chimpanzee. If Chimpanzee A intervened against Chimpanzee B, Chimpanzee B was more likely to intervene against Chimpanzee A in the future (p. 8, Flack and de Waal 2000), unless an intervention was too risky. In “indirect revenge” recipients of aggression attack the younger and more vulnerable kin of their aggressors. Flack and de Waal call these acts of retributive behavior “a form of calculated reciprocity”. Prescriptive rules “are generated when members of a group learn to recognize the contingencies between their own behavior and the behavior of others”. Flack and de Waal speculate these prescriptive rules may reflect “a sense of social regularity and be a precursor to the human sense of justice (p. 9, Flack and de Waal 2000). de Waal does not suggest that primates understand the concept of justice; rather they are the evolutionary source of the emotions and capacities essential to the human sense of justice (p. 337, de Waal 1991). What counts most for natural selection is that these behavioral expectations create order and that

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order promotes survival and reproduction. Goodall has called this, Order Without Law. Based on the observations of behavior in animals we can reasonably conclude that human moral systems have biological roots with the building blocks, the raw material of a human moral system visible in animals. We cannot fully understand human morality without being cognizant of its biological origins and the shape given by natural selection (Flack and de Waal 2000).

Is Human Morality Distinctive? Kummer worries about “the application of terms coined for humans to monkeys and apes” and considers the interpretation of animal behavior as moral precursors speculative (Kummer 2000). Discussion of human morality as shaped by biologically based elements is not intended to lower morality from its lofty perch to the banal level of as biological fact. Morality is shaped by factors other than biology and there are distinctive features of human morality. Although animals exhibit behavior we recognize as moral or moral-like they almost surely lack the language required for moral concepts and moral discourse. Joyce notes non-human primates lack the capacity for cognitive formulation and the development of abstract rules. Language is required for the development of moral concepts such as autonomy, justice, beneficence and utilitarianism (p. 70, Joyce 2007). Non-human apes may have a sense of which behaviors are accepted by their peers and which elicit a negative reaction but in the absence of language lack the capacity needed “for the cognitive formulation and communication of abstract rules” Joyce grants apes the “building blocks” of morality but not “the real McCoy” (Kagan 2000); phrased differently, “no moral judgments for chimps” (pp. 77 and 84, Joyce 2007) or as Flack and de Waal put it, “Animals are no moral philosophers” (p. 23, Flack and de Waal 2000). Morality for Kagan is uniquely human. Kagan would weaken the cord that links morality and evolution by denying the “appropriate origin for human morality” is the behavior of infra human primates (Kagan 2000). He says we cannot assume similar biological origins for behaviors that resemble each other. It may be comforting to know that there is a natural foundation for humans to be “cooperative, fair and kind” or that human violence and other despicable acts are a “natural, evolutionary derivative of our primate ancestry”. But, he claims human morality is distinctive because it “is defined by intention, not by behavior”. Kagan says, apes do not have the essentials of human morality which include the intention to do good, the ability to suppress actions that might harm others, the capacity for empathy and the ability to set ideal goals. Kagan also notes animals lack additional pre-requisites for morality that include “internalized standards” “conscious intentions” and “guilt for past failures” (Katz 2000). Ways in which humans differ from primates include the possesion of language, a greater ability to adopt the

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perspective of others, a greater degree of rule internalization, and a unique capacity to debate the issues and communicate their rational. Although we are creatures of intellect, “it is also clear that we are born with powerful inclinations that bias our thinking and emotions”. These biologically based feelings have been called moral intuitions. Some of these intuitions such as sympathy and reciprocity are generally favorable; others such as in-group violence and cheating are not (Flack and de Waal 2000). Darwin wrote “animals would inevitably acquire a moral sense of conscience as soon as its intellectual powers had become as welldeveloped, or nearly as well developed, as in man” (Darwin 1871). Railton would distinguish between a modus vivendi “by means of which individuals can live together in a stable arrangement that provides mutual benefits and reduces certain kinds of costly conflict” from behaviors that are “distinctly moral in character” (Railton 2000). Those that are moral in character “embody a capacity for some measure of impartiality, fairness, and generalized benevolence”, to “put ones own preferences aside”. Railton distinguishes behavior which has as its end the capacity to live together from behavior that is truly moral. He also raises the possibility that natural selection may have selected the capacity for “moral illusion” as “a way of disguising from the self and others the opportunistic motivations underneath actual behavior”. Railton concedes evolution might have provided the building blocks of morality, capacities not exclusively directed to moral tasks,—language, memory, perception, choice, causal inference, self-control and empathy without “having to do the final or near final assembly itself” (Railton 2000). If we deny an evolutionary basis for human brain based morality we are in effect denying well-substantiated evolutionary theory.

Some Cynicism As previously noted morality can increase social stability which is advantageous to individual group members. Morality and its associated emotions of conscience and guilt provide a degree of individual protection. If it is considered immoral to kill an innocent person theoretically fewer innocent people will likely be killed because many people would prefer to avoid the resultant pangs of conscience, not to mention the legal consequences. Individuals accept the moral rules and proselytize others to do the same. Strictures against killing innocent people decrease the likelihood any individual will be killed. This notion is expressed in the Golden Rule, “Do to others as you would have them do to you.” Evolutionary theory has a cynical veneer because it postulates that laudatory moral behaviors are conserved because they provide the material benefit of increased fitness, survival or reproductive success.

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The Limitations of Evolutionary Morality Natural selection has bequeath us imperfect moral intuitions. Evolution did its work in a different environment; what was advantageous in the past may be of limited value or even detrimental now. Natural selection works at a glacial pace and may not have equipped us to tackle present day problems Sophisticated questions about the use of genetic information and the results of other modern technologies cannot be easily answered by a process molded by the exigencies of a more primitive environment. Natural selection did its major work when man did not travel far, leaving us less equipped to empathize with problems at a distance. We often are more troubled by the distress of a child in our home town than we are by the dire straits of thousands of people living far away. Evolution has primarily given us the ability to deal with short-term problems (Ruse and Wilson 1986). The solution to many short term problems can lead to long terms disasters. And, as I will soon discuss in greater detail our moral intuitions may paradoxically lead to behavior that by contemporary conventional moral standards is immoral.

Conclusion The field of evolutionary biology has contributed to our understanding of morality by documenting that animals display behaviors reminiscent of human moral behavior and these behaviors have likely served as the building blocks of human morality. Evolutionary biologists paint a less than glorious picture of morality by suggesting moral behavior may not always be strictly altruistic because it is often reciprocated and provides reproductive and survival advantages, This entails a detraction from the high esteem in which morality is generally held. Evolutionary theory is scientifically well-established though it is rejected by some people, for example, by creationists. I believe we can accept that at least some of our moral intuitions have biologically evolved. Humans are able to transcend animal behavior because of our higher cognitive function and ability to communicate at a high level of sophistication. Kagan is right that human morality is different from animal morality but evidence suggests that many of the building blocks of human morality are derived from our evolutionary past.

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References Bernstein, Irwin S., and Thomas P. Gordon. 1974 The Function of Aggression in Primate Societies. American Scientist 62(3): 304–311. Boesch, Christophe, 2003. Complex Cooperation Among Taï Chimpanzees. in Animal Social Complexity: Intelligence, Culture, and Individualized Societies, ed. Frans B. M. de Waal and Peter L. Tyack. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Buskirk, Ruth E, Frohlich, Cliff and Ross, Kenneth G. 1984. The Natural Selection of Sexual Cannibalism.The American Naturalist 123(5): 612–625. Darwin, Charles. 1871. The Descent of Man. London: John Murray. Dawkins, Richard. 1976. The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford University Press. Available at https:// archive.org/stream/TheSelfishGene/RichardDawkins-djvu.txt. Accessed 13 Apr 2015. de Waal, Frans. 2010. Morals Without God The Opinionator New York Times. October 17, 2010. Available at https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/morals-without-god/. Accessed 16 Mar 2019. deWaal, Frans B.M. 2009. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge Ma: Harvard University Press. de Waal, Frans B.M. 1991. The Chimpanzee’s Sense of Social Regularity and Its Relation to the Human Sense of Justice. American Behavioral Scientist 34: 335–349. de Waal F. B. M. 1982. Chimpanzee. Politics: Power and Sex among Apes. Baltimore. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. Flack, Jessica C. and de Waal, Frans B. M. 2000. Any Animal Whatever. Darwinian Building Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): 1–29. Goodall, Jane. 1990. Through A Window: My Thirty Years with the Chimpanzees of Gombe. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Goodall, Jane. 1982. Order Without Law. in Law, Biology and Culture: The Evolution of Law, ed. M. Gruter and P. Bohannan. San Diego: Ross-Erikson, Publishers, Inc. Greene, J. D. 2007. The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul. inMoral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Available at https://static.squarespace.com/static/ 54763f79e4b0c4e55ffb000c/t/5484abb5e4b0213f74375bce/1417980853923/the-secret-joke-ofkants-soul.pdf. Accessed 16 Mar 2019. Hall, K. R. L. 1964. Aggression in Monkey and Ape Societies in the Natural History of Aggression. London: Academic Press. Joyce, Richard. 2007. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge Ma and London: The MIT Press. Kagan, Jerome. 2000. Human Morality is Distinctive. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7: 46–48. Katz, Leonard. 2000. Toward Good and Evil: Evolutionary Approaches to Aspects of Human Morality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): xi. Kummer, Hans. 1968. Social Organization of Hamadryas Baboons. University of Chicago Press. Kummer, Hans. 2000. Ways Beyond Appearances. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): 48–51. Lorenz, Konrad. 1966. On Aggression trans. Margaret Kerr Wilson. New York: Harcourt. Nowak, Martin, A Tarnita, Corina E and Wilson E. O. 2010. The Evolution of Eusociality. Nature 466: 1057–1062. O’Connell, Sanjida M. 1995. Empathy in Chimpanzees: Evidence for Theory of Mind? Primates 36 (3): 297–410. Peterson, Dale. 2011. The Moral Lives of Animals New York. Berlin, London, Sydney: Bloomsbury Press. Peterson, Dale. 2012. Chimpanzee Morality. Lahey Clinic. Journal of Medical Ethics Fall Edition. Porat, D., and N.E. Chadwick-Furman. 2004. Effects of Anemone Fish on Giant Sea Anemones: Expansion Behavior, Growth, and Survival. Hydrobiologia 530: 513–520. Pinker, Steven. January 13, 2008. The Moral Instinct. New York Times. Railton, Peter. 2000. Darwinian Building Blocks. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 7(1–2): 55–62.

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Rawls, John A. 1971. Theory of Justice Cambridge. Massachusetts and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Ruse, Michael and Wilson, Edward O. 1986. Moral. Philosophy as Applied Science Philosophy 61: 173–192. Ruse, Michael. 1986. Taking Darwin Seriously. New York: Blackwell Publishers. Sober, Elliott and Wilson, David Sloan. 1998. Unto Others The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Boston: Harvard University Press. Sober, Elliott and Wilson, David Sloan. 2000. Summary of ‘Unto Others’. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(1–2): 185–206. Sheper, J. 1971. Mate Selection Among Second Generation Kibbutz Adolescents and Adults: Incest Avoidance and Negative Imprinting Archives of Sexual Behavior 1: 293–307. Sicotte, P. 1995. Interpositions in Conflicts Between Males in Bimale Groups of Mountain Gorillas. Folia Primatologica 65: 14–24. Steinberg, David. 2010. Altruism in Medicine: It’s Definition, Nature and Dilemmas The. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (2): 249–257. Trivers, Robert L. 1971. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism Quarterly Review of Biology. 46: 35–57. Turner, Leigh. 2003. Zones of Consensus and Zones of Conflict: Questioning the “Common Morality” Presumption in Bioethics. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13 (3): 193–218. Wikipedia Contributors. “Evolution,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/ w/index.php?title=Evolution&oldid=887758928. Accessed 16 Mar 2019. Williams, George C. 1966. Adaptation and Natural Selection. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wolf, Arthur P. 2007. Is This Incest? in Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach To Moral Issues In Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David. Lebanon. New Hampshire: University Press of New England. Wolf, Arthur P., and Chieh-shan Huang. 1980. Marriage and adoption in China, 1845–1945. Redwood City: Stanford University Press. Wright, Robert. 1995. The Moral Animal: Why We Are The Way We Are; The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology Vintage Books. Zhavi, Amotz and Zhavi, Avishag. 1997. A The Handicap Principle: A Missing Piece of Darwin’s Puzzle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 3

Social Darwinism

Abstract Social Darwinism is a largely discredited philosophy that based moral judgments on Darwin’s theory of evolution. Because natural selection, the operative mode of evolution, selected favorable variations and rejected injurious variations Social Darwinism advocated behavior that mimicked evolution. Social Darwinism advocates survival of the fittest and places the welfare of society over that of the individual. The British philosopher Herbert Spencer, whose name has been most prominently linked with Social Darwinism, believed evolutionary theory should be applied in various social fields including morality. Social Darwinists feared that wellintentioned interventional programs would lead to “the multiplication of the reckless and incompetent”. Social Darwinism has been largely discredited because it was, to varying degrees, used to justify unethical practices such as involuntary sterilizations, eugenics, and Nazi racism. Although science can provide information that contributes to the resolution of ethical dilemmas it should not be the source of our moral values.

Introduction Darwin’s classic 1859 book on the Origins of Species by Means of Natural Selection focused on animals and nature; in later years he began to think about the evolution of man and society. The operating principle of evolution is natural selection which preserves favorable variations and rejects injurious variations. This was succinctly summarized by Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) when he coined the term “survival of the fittest”. Spencer, was the person most identified in the popular imagination with Social Darwinism because “many of the chief villains in the social Darwinist hall of fame, especially in the United States, were zealous followers of Spencer” (Levy and Pearl 2009). The application of evolutionary theory in various social fields, including morality, has been referred to as Social Darwinism. Social Darwinism is a complex and

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controversial topic which is “inspired by the view that human nature and social activity are driven by our biologic nature, especially as defined by the process of evolution” (Bowler 2016). What concerned Darwin and many of his contemporaries were medical and other societal programs that protected the biologically inferior. It was feared that “people who in the natural course of events would die before reproducing now survive and have offspring, offspring who are in turn handicapped. This absolutely encourages the multiplication of the reckless and incompetent by offering them an unfailing provision, and discourages the multiplication of the competent and provident” (Spencer quoted by Ruse 2009a, b). Darwin said “We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last moment. There is reason to believe that vaccination has preserved thousands, who from a weak constitution would formerly have succumbed to small-pox. Thus the weak members of civilised societies propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man. It is surprising how soon a want of care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the degeneration of a domestic race; but excepting in the case of man itself, hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed” (Darwin 1871). Social Darwinism provided evolutionary biology an important role in societal decisions and morality; however, because of unsavory practices justified in its name “today Social Darwinism functions as an omnibus term of abuse” (Leonard 2009a, b). Herbert Spencer, a British philosopher, evolutionist, and sociologist viewed the human species as “the apotheosis of the evolutionary process” and said of evolution, it “is progressive and hence tends to the good and the valuable” (pp. vii–xxiv, Ruse 2009a, b). He said “the supreme principle of morality must be to cherish the evolutionary process” and claimed that evolutionary theory could be the basis for social, economic and political philosophy. Spencer emphasized freedom and respect for the freedom of others and advocated limiting the role of government to “a relative paucity of restraints” (Ruse 2009a, b). His attitude regarding matters such as healthcare, poverty, and education was that it was not the responsibility of the state; for the state to intervene in these matters would encourage laziness and was contrary to evolution (Sweet 2019). Spencer’s name has become associated with the application of the principles of natural selection to the population with survival of the fittest being a worthy goal; Social Darwinists proposed that humanitarian efforts should not be allowed to interfere with nature’s laws, including the social struggle for existence. According to Barondess, Social Darwinism tended to shift concern “from the development of the individual to the welfare of society as a whole” (pp. 891–898, Barondess 1998). Spencer’s “laissez-faire” philosophy was, “every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man” (Sweet 2019). Dawkins does not agree with Spencer and notes the suffering due to natural selection; he says, “the force that has shaped the evolution of living creatures with

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all their beauty and elegance is a whole lot of rather unpleasant deaths”. Dawkins sites the political misuse of Social Darwinism by Hitler, Herbert Spencer and John D. Rockefeller. He says “that in our political and social life we are entitled to throw out Darwinism, to say we don’t want to live in a Darwinian world. We might want to live in say, a socialist world which is very un-Darwinian” (Lauriergracht 1997). Dawkins asks us to separate what exists in nature from one’s political beliefs. Eugenics, the “planned social control of human heredity”, with the goal of improving the genetic quality of the human population, was advocated by Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin (Leonard 2009a, b). The goal of eugenics was “to create better humans” and it focused on two dimensions of its philosophy: “to encourage people of good health to reproduce together to create good births (known as positive eugenics), and to end certain diseases and disabilities by discouraging or preventing others from reproducing known as negative eugenics (Goering 2014)”. Although the influence of negative eugenics would reach its most horrific zenith in Nazi Germany its philosophy and aims were manifest in other countries including the United States. Charles B. Davenport the founding director of the Station for Experimental Evolution at Cold Spring Harbor believed that heredity was the cause of conditions such as “insanity, epilepsy, alcoholism, criminality and pauperism” and that race determined behavior (Barondess 1998). These views ultimately led to a program of involuntary sterilization. In the United States about 60,000 people were subject to involuntary sterilization because they were criminals or “feebleminded” (Barondess 1998). In 1923 the American Eugenics Society (now called, The Society for Biodemography and Social Biology) was formed, “to further knowledge of the biological and socio-cultural forces affecting human populations and their evolution”. The United States Supreme Court in Buck versus Bell (Buck versus Bell 1927) upheld state sterilization laws. Carrie Bell was said to be “feebleminded” (an imprecisely defined condition) and both the daughter of a “feebleminded” woman and the mother of a “feebleminded” child. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said, “Three generations of imbeciles are enough”. Holmes noted, “We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for a crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind” (Buck versus Bell 1927). Social Darwinism reached its apogee and most grotesque aberration in Nazi Germany. Alfred Ploetz in 1895 espoused what came to be known as racial hygiene. He advocated the avoidance of “counterselective forces” such as medical care for the weak which would increase their reproduction, noting that the fit should be the primary survivors. Under Nazi rule Germany established “heredity health courts” which approved sterilization for a variety of disorders that included feeblemindedness, schizophrenia, hereditary blindness or deafness, severe physical deformity, epilepsy, alcoholism and other disorders (pp. 893–895, Barondess 1998). Thousands were sterilized without having given voluntary consent. It should be distressing to

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Americans that German scientists had come to the United States to learn eugenic methods (Goering 2014). Nazi Germany ultimately took an ignominious step beyond involuntary sterilization; based on the notion that there were certain “lives not worth living” Nazi Germany began a program of active euthanasia with racial overtones. Groups targeted for extinction included gypsies, homosexuals and, most prominently, Jews. The most horrific result of human attempts to mimic natural selection was the Holocaust. An important aspect of both eugenics and euthanasia was the facilitation of its popular acceptance by demonizing “the infirm, the disabled and the genetically blighted” who were “the polluter of the purity of German blood” (Barondess 1998). This demonization allowed the perpetrators of horrendous crimes against humanity to believe their nefarious actions were supported by a philosophy rooted in moral goodness. In 1978 Robert K. Graham, the wealthy inventor of shatterproof eye glasses and a eugenicist set up the Repository For Germinal Choice. In his 1971 book, The Future of Man, Graham claimed that natural selection had stopped working on humans because health and social welfare systems were preventing it from “purging the feeble and preserving the strong”. Graham believed when man learned to master the natural environment it allowed “retrograde humans” to reproduce (Plotz 2019). His plan was to reverse the genetic decay in society and offer the sperm of exceptional men to interested women to “stimulate (humanity’s) ascent to a new level of being” (Plotz 2019). Graham set up his sperm bank on his Southern California estate. When few Nobel Prize winners signed up (at one point his project was referred to as the Nobel Prize Sperm Bank) he obtained sperm from Olympic athletes, promising young scientists, and successful business men. Women had to be married with infertile husbands, well educated and financially secure. Nazism had put eugenics in ill repute and Graham was accused of trying to create a master race. Graham’s repository closed in 1999 after producing about 200 babies some of whom had characteristics of their sperm donors (Agar 2004). Despite tragedies perpetrated in its name, eugenic variants persist because the desire for a perfect or near perfect baby persists. Currently gametes from donors considered of high quality can fetch a high price. Successful young women in elite colleges are offered large sums of money for their “perfect” eggs (Kenney and McGowan 2014). Reproductive technologies, such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis with embryo selection and other techniques in various stages of development make it possible to select desirable embryos over diseased embryos, to select the sex of an embryo, and to insert genetic material such as mitochondria from a normal woman into a diseased embryo. A relatively recent technique called Crispr-Cas9 and referred to as “gene editing” holds the promise of repairing and enhancing genes to modify the DNA of human embryos with the dangled prospect of creating “designer babies” (Zehr 2019). Scientists working in the field have called for caution when making changes that could alter the germ line genome and affect future generations; until more studies are done they have called this technique an “enormous peril for mankind” (Wade 2015). Advocates of liberal eugenics contrast it with the discredited eugenics of the past which was

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mediated by the state and involuntary. Liberal eugenics is said to be voluntary, based on scientific standards, respectful of procreative liberty and its goal is the welfare of the child and family (Goering 2014; Agar 2004). Spencer and the Nazi’s both invoked the merits of evolution but differed in their analysis of its implications. Spencer’s passive approach advocated limited intervention by the state whereas the Nazis used the apparatus of the state for an active genocidal intervention of frightful proportions. History shows that a scientific premise, in this case, evolution, considered worthy of human emulation, can be twisted in different directions and that the identical premise can become a potent force for either good or evil. We obviously can learn from nature but should be reluctant to use what occurs in nature as the justification of morality. In fairness to Spencer, the term Social Darwinism was not widely used until well after his death and he would have strongly disapproved of many of the disturbing paths justified by applying the principles of evolution to the social sphere. Today the term Social Darwinism is an “omnibus term of abuse” that disparages biological justification in the social sphere. The use of evolution as a philosophical template for moral behavior is also suspect because there are evolved animal behaviors that are immoral.

Conclusion The concept morality cannot be empirically examined but the study of evolution includes a lot of scientific data. A relevant question is whether scientific information can be the sole foundation of a moral theory. Science often plays an important role in informing ethical discourse. However, I agree with philosophers who claim that what is, is not necessarily what ought to be. We can learn from science but science should not serve as the primary source of our values. The unfortunate consequences justified when evolutionary theory was used as the basis of a moral theory illustrate the dangers of this approach. Morality is a complicated matter that can’t simply be resolved by reliance on a scientific theory.

References Agar, Nicholas. 2004. Liberal Eugenics, in Defense of Human Enhancement. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. Barondess, Jeremiah A. 1998. Care of the Medical Ethos: Reflections on Social Darwinism. Bowler, Peter. 2016. Social Darwinism. Oxford Bibliographies. May 26, 2016. Buck v Bell. 1927 274US200. Darwin, Charles. 1871. The Descent of Man. London: John Murray. Goering, Sara. 2014. Eugenics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/eugenics/. Accessed 20 Mar 2019.

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Kenney, Nancy J., and McGowan, Michelle L. 2014. Egg donation compensation: Ethical and legal challenges. Dove Press (4): 15–24. Lauriergracht, Frans Roes. 1997. An Interview of Richard Dawkins. Human Ethology Bulletin 12 (1): 1–3. Leonard, Thomas C. 2009a. Origins of the myth of social Darwinism: The ambiguous legacy of Richard Hofstader’s social Darwinism. American Thought Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 71: 37–51. Leonard, Thomas C. 2009b. Origins of the myth of social Darwinism: The ambiguous legacy of Richard Hofstader’s social Darwinism in American thought. The Economist Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 71: 37–51. Levy, David M., and Pearl, Sandra J. 2009. Sympathy, evolution and The economist. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 71: 29–36. Plotz, David. 2019. The “Genius Babies” and How They Grew. Available at www.slate.com/articles/ life/seed/2001/02/the_genius_babies_and_how_they_grew.html. Accessed 20 Mar 2019. Racial Hygiene, and the Holocaust. Annals of Internal Medicine 129: 891–898. Ruse, Michael. 2009a. Introduction in Evolution and Ethics Princeton. Princeton University Press. Ruse, Michael. 2009b. Charles Darwin on human evolution. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 71 (1): 10–19. Sweet, William. 2019. Herbert Spencer. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. www.iep.utm.edu/ spencer/#H6. Accessed 20 Mar 2019. Wade, Nicholas. 2015. Scientists seek ban on method of editing the human genome. New York Times, 19 Mar 2015. Zehr, E. Paul. 2019. Human gene editing: great power, great responsibility. Scientific American, 16 Jan 2019.

Chapter 4

Immoral-like Behavior in Animals

Abstract Although there are numerous examples of moral-like behavior in animals, examination of the darker side of nature reveals creatures capable of deceit, dishonesty, violence and killing. Rape, cannibalism, infanticide, deception, within species killing, sexual intrigue, adultery, lethal violence, and wasteful predation have also been observed. Evolution appears responsible for both moral and despicable behavior. Natural selection is blind to our ordinary understanding of morality. Thomas Henry Huxley noted the “essential evil of the world” and found it difficult to reconcile that with sound ethical principles. He believed man should use reason and intelligence and refuse to be instruments of the evolutionary process. Evolution has provided the capacity to identify, protect and preserve important values; this capacity makes both moral and immoral behaviors possible. Hopefully, human reason will select moral values that counteract the immorality of nature.

Introduction I am hesitant to describe animal moral-like behavior in terms of human conventional standards because animal cognitive and communicative abilities are less developed and their existential exigencies are also different. What animals have in common with humans is that both are subject to natural selection; therefore, the study of animal moral-like and immoral-like behavior has implications for the nature of morality in man. Although there are numerous examples of moral-like behavior in animals, the relationship of evolution and morality is complicated because animals also display behaviors that by conventional human standards would be considered immoral. Flack and deWaal note, “Ironically, morality and immorality make use of the same capacities”. Empathy can be used to ameliorate suffering or to inflict cruelty (Flack and deWaal 2000). Examination of the darker side of nature, reveals creatures capable of deceit, dishonesty, violence and killing. George C. Williams wrote “the conscience of man

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must revolt against the gross immorality of nature” (p. 384, Williams 1988). He buttresses this point with examples in nature of what he calls immoral behavior. He also denigrates that which on its surface appears moral. In reciprocal altruism, he states, “Whatever is given up by the donor costs it less than some expected repayment”. Cooperation may ultimately be a matter of self-interest. As Williams puts it, “Two hyenas in a cooperative attack on a wildebeest defended by its mother are more than twice as likely to succeed as one acting alone. A cooperative hyena may therefore eat while a loner goes hungry” (p. 390, Williams 1988). Ruse similarly notes that moral behavior is derived from the biologic fact that “one can often get more out of life by helping rather than hurting” (Ruse 1988a, b). Williams takes these facts to mean, “we need all the help we can get to overcome billions of years of selfishness” (Williams 1988). Rape has been reported in birds and turtles and in geese and mallards (Williams 1988; Barash 1977). Cannibalism is common among fishes and other animals (Polis 1981). Stomachs of large walleye fish have been found to contain smaller ones which had been eaten and even smaller ones in those fish (Cuff 1980). Trivers demonstrated that natural selection favored off spring that try to get more than their fair share of resources from parents (Trivers 1974). Nearly half the litters in a prairie dog colony were the object of infanticide, sometimes inflicted by close relatives (Hoogland 1985). Many animal deaths are the result of fighting over females (Clutton-Brock et al. 1979). Williams finds in nature manipulation, deception, nepotism, within species killing, sexual intrigue, adultery, lethal violence, and wasteful predation in animals who kill more than they need for nutrition (Williams 1988). Williams said moral axioms should not be derived from nature. A male firefly of the species Photinus flashes a signal of sexual availability. A predatory, carnivorous female firefly of the species Photuria flashes signals deceitfully mimicking the female Photinus signal and then kills the approaching Photinus male firefly (Lloyd 1965). Chimpanzees can also be deceitful and for devious reasons distract others; they can also fake “an interest, an injury and an emotion” (p. 184, Peterson 2011). The killing of innocents is rampant in the natural world; typically the stronger species kill and consume the weaker. Birds eat worms. Lions kill and eat zebras. Chimpanzees kill and devour monkeys. Evolution has conserved the ability and desire to kill innocent creatures, typically, though not always, those of a different species. Though the act of killing an innocent creature can be deemed immoral in humans, animals who kill should not be judged immoral; they cannot go to the supermarket for food and must kill in order to survive. Also, animals typically possess neither the sophisticated language nor the mental capacity for the abstract thinking required to grasp the principles of morality and cannot appreciate that killing innocent creatures might be wrong. Nonetheless, the killing of innocents is a prominent result of evolution. Humans have during the course of history displayed their willingness to kill innocent people; for example, during World War Two multiple millions of innocent civilians were killed.

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Chimpanzees kill members of their own species. Chimpanzee war is largely fought by males against another social group of chimpanzees and can be vicious. Chimpanzee communities have territories defined by borders they patrol. Chimpanzee neighbors are often hated and viewed as dangerous. When encountered a lone neighboring chimpanzee may be attacked and killed. In an attack chimpanzees have been seen to “pummel him with their fists, kick him with their feet, bash him with a rock, bite, tear, lift and slam him down to the ground. The goal is to annihilate” (p. 123, Peterson 2011). Chimpanzee war was observed in the Gombe National Park in 1974 when one group of chimpanzees increased their territory by eventually annihilating another group. Human war is often supported by our presumed moral leaders, priests, ministers, rabbis, imams, and the like. Similarly, chimpanzee war, is an effort of “cooperative violence” and “like human war, is socially approved, or at least it certainly seems to be, judging from the positive communal excitement it provokes” (Peterson 2012). Chimpanzees, treat their soldiers as heroes and their wars as though they are morally justified. Chimpanzees who kill or exile their weaker neighbors increase the amount of territory they control and the availability of food. Because war, at least for the victorious, may improve the survival of individuals or a group, despite its cruelty and the infliction of harm and suffering, it has been conserved by natural selection. The biological basis of war merits attention because war has destructively and almost continuously punctuated human history; that may not be a coincidence because humans share about 99 percent of their DNA with chimpanzees (Gibbons 2012). With the exception of vegetarians and vegans humans kill and eat innocent animals and in some eyes are morally culpable because they have both other nutritional options and the capacity to understand the moral implications of killing. A review of history and attention to the daily news document numerous human wars, genocides, murders and other crimes. The persistence throughout human history of these killings as well as other atrocities confirms that evolution while preserving many behaviors that could be classified as morally worthy, also has a penchant for the preservation of what could reasonably be considered evil. The possessiveness of mother chimpanzees toward their infants is rarely challenged; nonetheless, Goodall has described at Gombe “criminal deviance” with examples of the biting into the forehead and killing of another chimpanzee’s infant. The dead chimpanzee infant may then be eaten. Goodall notes that in chimpanzee society “almost always, might is right”. The evidence is ample: natural selection is morally blind. There are no permanent pair bonds between males and female chimpanzees who are not related and any male theoretically can impregnate any female; Goodall suggests males protect infants because any infant might be their child. However, “if an infant gets in the way of a charging display, it may be used as a display object, picked up and flailed, dragged or thrown”. By the time a male chimpanzee is 13–15 years old he is able to dominate females. The only female he does not try to dominate is his mother whom he respects. A male will, without hesitation, take prey from a female. Goodall notes that “chimpanzee behavior patterns are so similar to our own”, and

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the need to constrain certain chimpanzee-like behaviors are reflected in our laws. She characterizes chimpanzee behavior as ‘order without law’ and says this suggests “evolutionary factors have molded human social behavior” (Goodall 1982). The evolution of aggressive behavior may entail some controls and limitations. Flack and deWaal noted that most chimpanzee aggression is directed, not at possessors of food, but at beggars for food, especially at those who had been reluctant to share their own food. Goodall and others ascribe this behavior to “respect for possession” which exists in other primates (Flack and deWaal 2000; Goodall 1971). Flack and deWaal, though they acknowledge “animals are no moral philosophers” note our moral systems “rely on basic mental capacities and social tendencies we share with other co-operative primates”. They also state that implicit social contracts noted in primates may be inadequate from a normative perspective because they are rough compromises that do not respect “worth, value or rights” (pp. 20–22, Flack and deWaal 2000). Nonetheless, primates appear to obey at least some rules that guide behavior and define expectations. These serve as constraints on aggression (deWaal 1991). Non-human creatures exhibit behaviors that we might judge moral-like and behaviors we might judge immoral-like. There also appear to be social restraints that limit aggressive behavior. For example, aggressive barking and squealing is often sufficient to prevent actual aggression. The similarities of animal behavior, especially that of primates, to our own behavior is a bit unnerving and undermining to the preferred image of humans as uniquely special. Humans should acknowledge that we are subject to the pressures of moral intuitions bequeath to us by natural selection, a process that ignores moral considerations. Evolution concerns itself with reproduction and survival of the fittest; it operates oblivious to morality. The distressing prospect of looking in the mirror and seeing a chimpanzee can be assuaged by the realization that humans are endowed with consciousness, language and rationality that potentially enable us to transcend our evolutionary heritage and create advanced moral systems.

Thomas Henry Huxley Thomas Henry Huxley, (1825–1895) an anatomist born in England in 1826, was a believer in evolution which he called “so perfect as a mechanism, so beautiful as a work of art” which attained “its highest level in man” who has fared best in the struggle for existence (Huxley 1893). Although Huxley accepted evolution he considered it indifferent to morality and felt there was “as much selection for the immoral sentiments” as for the moral. He found it hard “to bring the course of evolution into harmony with even the elementary requirements of the ethical ideal of the just and the good”. Huxley noted “the essential evil of the world” and “the ape and the tiger methods of the struggle for existence are not reconcilable with sound ethical principles”. For Huxley evolution was “the headquarters of the enemy of ethical nature” and “of moral purpose I see not a trace in nature” (pp. 1–41, Huxley 1893).

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Huxley in his famous essay, Evolution and Ethics, expressed the view that human nature is essentially evil and that morality is a “human invention to suppress the selfish and competitive tendencies” that are the result of evolution. Huxley advocated the origins of morality be sought outside of biology. He believed man must use reason and intelligence to “subdue nature to his higher ends” and “must refuse any longer to be the instruments of the evolutionary process, and withdraw from the struggle for existence” with its “ruthless and ferocious destructiveness” (pp. 4, 11 and 23, Huxley Evolution and Ethics 1893). He would replace survival of the fittest with survival “of those who are ethically the best”. Huxley believed that human “intelligence and will should be able to curb “the instincts of savagery in civilized men” and the “immeasurable miseries” of evolution”, though this change might take a very long time. Huxley essentially envisioned a struggle in opposition to the state of nature (pp. 12, 22, Huxley 1893). Williams echoed similar feelings and said that nature is propelled by the forces of kin selection that maximizes genetic selfishness and that matters of justice were settled on the basis of “might-makes-right” (p. 396, Williams 1988). He said morality is “an accidental capability produced, in its boundless stupidity, by a biologic process (natural selection) that is normally opposed to the expression of such a capability” (Flack and deWaal 2000). Williams, in sympathy with Huxley, concluded “nature is morally unacceptable” and we should “refuse any longer to be the instrument of the evolutionary process” (p. 403, Williams 1988). Ruse asks a difficult question that we will also need to confront: if Huxley believed ethics is not justified by evolution, how is ethics justified? Ruse adds there is “no generally accepted answer to this question” (Ruse 2009). I think Ruse is correct; but to attempt an answer now is getting ahead of ourselves. We have more to explore before we tackle that question. Huxley would use intelligence and reason to promote ethical behavior; for Huxley its justification would be avoidance of the pain and miseries of the essential evil of the world which he saw as largely the result of natural selection and evolution. Anyone aware of world events would know that despite millions of years of evolution what moral philosophers and most of us call evil persists. That can be explained because in many environments survival and reproduction, the goals of evolution, are most successfully met by resorting to what are evil methods. Huxley’s reservations about evolution as expressed in 1893 remain valid. In his discussion of morality in animals and humans Ruse makes a distinction between humans and some animals. He claims morality requires “a thinking, acting being- which I assume is what humans are, what the snake is probably not” and what “the chimpanzees probably are” (p. 415, Ruse 1988a, b). Ruse argues that if nature is evil, and our moral sense is derived from nature and biology then how do we know morality is not evil. He writes, “What right have we to say that our feeling of good and evil is other than a selfish adaptation which serves our ends no less than do the poison fangs of the snake?” Ruse notes the harms done by humans in the name of morality. Our options are to “argue that our moral sense

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lies outside the biological framework or we must allow that not everything evolution produces is morally worthless, and that some things indeed are positively good” (p. 415, Ruse 1988a, b).

The Mechanism of Biological Morality How has evolution shaped the brain to allow a spectrum of morally exalted to immorally heinous behaviors? How can the same evolutionary process account for altruistic behavior and genocide? This is a difficult question because the human brain is extremely complex, its circuits poorly understood, it is subject to various influences and is not always rational even in the absence of psychiatric illness. The moral philosopher Emmanuel Kant (1724–1804) saw the fundamental principles of morality as based on an autonomous rational will; that the fundamental principles of morality, which he referred to as “categorical imperatives” is derived from “self-governing reason” (Johnson 2016). Although we may agree with Kant’s moral imperatives we can’t ignore the role of biology. Flack and deWaal suggest an integrated perspective that acknowledges both the biological basis of morality and the role of cognition. They note, “many of the tendencies and cognitive abilities underlying human morality antedate our species appearance on the planet” (p. 24, Flack and deWaal 2000). This exploration of morality will reveal that the nature of morality is more enigmatic and complex than commonly believed. If we could accept that God gave Moses the Ten Commandments the origin of morality and moral principles would be easier to understand. But rather than rely on biblical history I will place an emphasis on what can be observed. If we arrive at doubt and confusion that may simply reflect the nature of morality. If morality has biological roots as evidence suggests, what brain based mechanism might explain the prevalence of both moral-like and immoral-like behavior in both animals and man? How has evolution shaped our brains to accommodate both moral and immoral propensities. The best answer to that question is that natural selection and evolution are blind to morality and morality and immorality were irrelevant to the processes that shaped the human brain. I will speculate that an additional evolutionary mechanism has made morality possible. Evolution has provided the capacity to sense or specifically identify certain behaviors and values as worthy of preservation and protection. Violation of these values will elicit a strong emotional reaction, often called “moral indignation“. We may be outraged if an innocent person or child is wantonly killed. We get upset if an elderly couple has been cheated of their life savings. In some instances behavior that violates important conserved values is punished, even at a cost to the punisher, a phenomenon called altruistic punishment. The process of natural selection favors behaviors that promote its goals; to accomplish this it must also favor the ability to recognize and preserve those behaviors. Animals who participate in beneficial activities such as cooperative hunting and

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reciprocal altruistic behaviors must remember and recognize the behaviors favored by natural selection. An animal’s brain must in some manner recognize that it will eat more and enhance its reproduction and survival if participates in cooperative hunting. A vampire bat must in some manner know that reciprocal altruism can enhance its survival. A cheetah must know it needs to work cooperatively if it wants to kill a gazelle. Natural selection must have endowed animals with a capacity to recognize and remember which behaviors are important. That capacity, the ability to recognize certain behaviors as important, is likely a precursor of human morality. From a biological perspective a reasonable definition of morality is the ability to identify certain behaviors as important and worthy of protection.

Conclusion The locus of moral decision-making is the brain which has been molded by the evolutionary process of natural selection. Behavior in animals has been observed to be both moral-like and immoral-like. Some scholars have claimed nature is immoral; we can, at the least, say that natural selection is blind to morality. Evolution has not designed us to be moral creatures. However, evolution has provided the capacity to recognize and remember which behaviors are worthy of protection and preservation. This capacity makes human moral behavior possible. Because humans-and perhaps some primates- are rational, theoretically, they can employ reason to counteract our evolutionary burden of selfishness. Whether reason will ultimately vanquish immorality remains to be seen.

References Barash, David P. 1977. Sociobiology of rape in Mallards: Responses of the mated male. Science 197: 788–789. Clutton-Brock, S.D. Albon, R.M. Gibson, and F.E. Guiness. 1979. The Logical Stag: Adaptive Aspects of Fighting in Red Deer Animal Behavior 27: 211–225. Cuff, Wilfred R. 1980. Behavioral Aspects of cannibalism in larval walleye. Canadian Journal of Zoology 58 (8): 1504–1507. de Waal, Frans B.M. 1991. The chimpanzee’s sense of social regularity and it’s relation to the human sense of justice. American Behavioral Scientist 34: 335–349. Flack, Jessica C, and Frans B.M. deWaal. 2000. Any animal whatever: Darwinian building blocks of morality in monkeys and apes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1, 2): 1–29. Gibbons, Ann. 2012. Bonobos join chimps as closest human relatives. Science Daily News, 13 June 2012. Goodall, Jane. 1971. In The Shadow of Man. New York: Houghton, Mifflin Harcourt. Goodall, Jane. 1982. Order without law in Gruter M and Bohannan, R law biology and culture. Santa Barbara Ca: Ross-Erickson.

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Hoogland, John L. 1985. Infanticide in prairie dogs affects forty-seven percent of litters. Science 230: 1037–1040. Huxley, Thomas Henry. 1893. Evolution and ethics, in The Romanes Lecture. Available at http:// www.aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE9/E-E.html. Accessed 21 Mar 2019. Johnson, Robert. 2016. Kant’s moral philosophy, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/ Accessed 21 Mar 2019. Lloyd, James E. 1965. Aggressive mimicry in photuris firefly femmes fatales. Science 149: 653–654. Peterson, Dale. 2011. The Moral Lives of Animals. New York Berlin London Sydney: Bloomsbury Press. Peterson, Dale. 2012. Chimpanzee morality. Lahey Clinic Journal of Medical Ethics 19 (3): 6–7. Polis, Gary A. 1981. The evolution and dynamics of intraspecific predation. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 12: 225–251. Ruse, Michael. 1988a. Response to Williams: Selfishness is not enough. Zygon 23 (4): 412–416. Ruse, Michael. 1988b. Response to Williams: Selfishness is not enough. Zygon 23 (4): 413–416. Ruse, Michael. 2009. Introduction in Thomas Henry Huxley in Evolution and Ethics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Trivers, Robert L. 1974. Parent-offspring conflict. American Zoologist 1974 (14): 249–264. Williams, George C. 1988. Huxley’s evolution and ethics in sociobiological perspective. Zygon 23 (4): 383–407.

Chapter 5

Moral Psychology

Abstract Moral psychology has been defined as “the study of human thought and behavior in ethical contexts”. The rational nature of morality has been questioned by some moral psychologists who believe emotions are the force behind morality; they claim we create rational justifications to explain what are essentially emotionally driven confabulations.

The human brain is susceptible to factors that distort rational moral deliberation. Though morally similar the trolley and footbridge dilemmas are represented differently in the brain and associated with different moral conclusions. Other “extramoral” factors that can lead to distortion of rational moral thinking include word framing effects, unhelpful heuristics, and the absence of consensus definitions of important concepts. Humans possess moral intuitions that can react to ethical dilemmas with “quick, involuntary and automatic responses” in the absence of explicit reasoning. These intuitions can be useful but they are inflexible and their speed doesn’t allow time for reasoned scrutiny. Examples of misguided moral intuitions include revulsion against homosexuality and hatred of foreigners. de Waal, an eminent scholar of primate behavior, regrets that philosophers have taken over the role of telling us how to behave from religious dogma or scriptures. Philosophers prefer principles, logic and reasoning rather than consistency with human psychology or as he might say, “primate behavior”. Although humans speak in terms of right and wrong, for animals morality is a matter of what is “acceptable” and what is “unacceptable”.

Moral Psychology and the Brain For simpler creatures such as ants and bees sociobiology “seeks to explain behavior by reference to innate biology”. Evolutionary psychology in its study of far more complex humans has focused on “the psychological mechanisms underlying behavior” (p. 5, Joyce 2007). Moral psychology has been defined as “the study of © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_5

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human thought and behavior in ethical contexts”. It is multidisciplinary because it employs terms and concepts from moral philosophy (Doris et al. 2017). Moral theories, principles and rules as devised by moral scholars typically aim to be rational and internally coherent; but, to be followed they must first encounter the human brain, a marvelous organ that is incompletely understood, can keep some of its work hidden from consciousness, and is subject to inconsistency and irrationality. Hauser, Young and Cushman speculate there is a moral faculty that, based on the causes and consequences of actions, makes moral judgments possible. They analogize this to Chomsky’s innate language faculty of universal grammar that provides a set of principles that allows the development of various languages. They state analogous faculties may be operative in mathematics, biology, music and, of relevant interest, morality (Hauser 2006). Their postulated moral faculty delivers verdicts based on principles that may be inaccessible to consciousness. Prinz takes a different position and denies the likelihood of an innate system dedicated to morality. He says “moral judgments may issue from general-purpose emotion systems and socially transmitted rules and be the result of other than moral capacities” (Prinz 2007). It is questionable whether evolution would create a specific structure or brain faculty dedicated to morality. Many moral behaviors contribute to survival and reproduction; however, in a world historically plagued by violence, wars and genocide, with the morally righteous often the victims, it’s questionable whether natural selection, a process that rewards survival and reproduction, would have selected an anatomic locus specifically dedicated to the promotion of ordinary moral behavior. There is an extensive literature on moral psychology; one moral psychology series of so far five volumes consists of about 2800 pages (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008). I will try to focus on those aspects of moral psychology of most interest and practical value. The study of moral psychology has led to disturbing evidence that rational moral decision-making can be influenced by irrelevant extra-moral factors and the irreverent suggestion that respected moral judgments are little more than moral confabulations. de Waal, an eminent scholar of primate behavior, regrets that philosophers have taken over the role of telling us how to behave from religious dogma or scriptures. Philosophers prefer principles, logic and reasoning rather than working with human psychology or as he might say, “primate behavior”. Although humans speak in terms of right and wrong, for animals morality is a matter of what is “acceptable” and what is “unacceptable”. Transgressions of what is expected likely will elicit a violent reaction. deWaal specifically criticizes moral philosophy for asking us to treat all human life equally when every mammal values its own kin and offspring above all others. His preference is for a philosophy more in tune with human inherited tendencies (deWaal et al. 2017). I have speculated the brain has neural circuits that allow us to identify highly important values worthy of preservation and protection. These values may not always be consistent with our common notions of morality. This explains why people who act contrary to ordinary moral standards might believe they are acting morally. Lenin, whose highest value was success of the Russian Revolution, probably thought he was

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acting morally when he said he would prefer the death of hundreds of innocents to the death of one revolutionary (Sebestyan 2017).

Free Will Free will has been interpreted as the ability to have done otherwise, that under identical circumstances we could have made an alternate choice. Free will is about the power of self-control and stands in contrast to the argument of determinists who claim that under identical circumstances no one can do otherwise than one actually does (O’Connor and Christopher 2019). If we adopt the latter perspective free will becomes an illusion. An implication of what has been a centuries long debate is that if a person cannot control their behavior and do otherwise, they cannot be held morally responsible. “Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism”. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, “compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism” (McKenna et al. 2018). According to Dennett neuroscience does a disservice if it claims all is determined because that will lessen our sense of moral responsibility and lead to undesirable behavior. Neuroscientists claim the problem cannot be solved by logical argumentation. Tse, a neuroscientist, claims the answer will come when we have a better understanding of how information-processing neural circuits function (Tse 2013). Dennett claims that “it simply doesn’t matter at all to moral responsibility whether the agent in question could have done otherwise”. He exempts the situations where it is obvious the agent could not do otherwise; for example, when a gun is at the head or when plagued with major mental illness. He quaintly calls these conditions, “local fatalism”. Dennett notes that in the real world we don’t exempt people from blame because they couldn’t do otherwise and no defense attorney has mustered expert testimony that a client committed a dreadful act because of determinism and could not have done otherwise. An experiment to prove whether an agent could have done otherwise would require replication of the identical physical, psychological and cognitive state which is probably impossible. For Dennett whether someone could do otherwise doesn’t matter (Dennett 1984). According to Dennett neuroscience does a disservice if it claims all is determined because that will lessen our sense of moral responsibility and lead to undesirable behavior. Neuroscientists claim the problem cannot be solved by logical argumentation. If we ask what provides our personal identity, it is our brain. It’s not our heart, liver or kidneys; if they are replaced with transplanted organs our personal identity remains unchanged. If our actions are determined by our brain; it is virtually determined by us because our brain largely provides our personal identity. Although the brain may

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act at a sub-conscious level it is likely to have been affected by our previous thoughts, experiences and actions. As a practical point, free will has been discussed since ancient times, without definitive resolution. There have been arguments over the definitions of the relevant concepts and long winded, headache inducing philosophic discussions (McKenna et al. 2018). Because at this time the answer is largely irrelevant to moral decisionmaking I advise the reader not to stay up at night struggling to resolve the weighty problem of free will. I believe that, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, we should hold people responsible for their actions.

The Distortion of Rational Moral Deliberation A variety of factors can distort rational moral deliberation. These include moral intuitions, emotion, how language is employed, heuristics, and inappropriate moral intuitions. Moral psychology includes the study of moral intuitions which are “quick, involuntary and automatic responses” in the absence of explicit reasoning (Dellantonio and Remo 2012). Moral intuitions, which have also been called moral sentiments, stand in contrast to rational thought. Moral intuitions include sympathy, empathy, compassion, loyalty, contempt, disgust, guilt and conscience. Kahneman describes intuitions as automatic, efficient, largely unconscious rapid responses that comes from our “intuitive mind” (Kahneman 2011). Moral intuitions are evolutionary based “alarm” processes that with electrical speed tell us whether an action is right or wrong. Moral intuitions are often emotion laden reactions that explain why, without labored reflection, we might almost immediately determine an action is morally wrong. Moral intuitions have limitations; they are inflexible and their speed doesn’t allow time for reasoned scrutiny. Haidt and Pinker note that actions underpinned by moral intuitions can be either good or bad. Leon Kass controversially claimed that the emotion, repugnance, also referred to as an “appeal to disgust” was a sign of deep wisdom not necessarily explained by reason (Kass 1997). Sometimes our moral intuitions, including disgust, can be shown to be “indefensible gut reactions” that cannot be morally justified. Haidt and Pinker give as examples of indefensible intuitions “revulsion against homosexuality and racial mixing”, “callousness towards slaves”, and “hatred towards foreigners” (Haidt and Pinker 2016).

Reason, Emotion and Confabulation David Hume famously said, “Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (Hume 1739). He did not believe reason alone would motivate actions. Greene,

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apparently agrees and takes a subjective, “emotivist” position, that likely would make the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant turn over in his grave. Kant was a deontologist, which means he believed moral judgments should be based on rules, principles and conscious reasoning, not naked emotion. Greene turns the tables and says that “evolutionary based intuitions explain deontological ethics”. Although we may think we should not steal, lie or fail to keep promises because doing so violates a moral rule, our beliefs are propelled by ingrained moral intuitions and we subsequently “produce rational justifications for emotionally driven moral judgments”. Greene claims, that an “underlying psychology … is the hidden essence of deontological philosophy” (Greene 2008). We are creatures prone to rationalizations of our behavior and deontological philosophy “is a kind of moral confabulation” devised by “especially creative philosophers” who make up a “rationally appealing story”. Deontology is “a natural cognitive expression of our deepest moral emotions” but do not necessarily “reflect deep rationally discoverable moral truths”. Greene could be correct but his assertions are troubling to those who believe we depend on reason to make moral judgments, not on emotion. Greened waffles when he also says, “I don’t believe either approach is strictly emotional or “cognitive” or even that there is a sharp distinction between “cognition” and emotion” (Greene 2008). Despite these qualifications, Greene claims evolution has selected emotion as the primary enforcer of morality (Greene 2008). Kant’s categorical imperatives, according to Greene, are not cognitively based; they are a rationalization “driven largely by intuitive emotional responses”. “The brain fools us into thinking that our decisions are reasoned when they are beyond our control and emanate from what T. D. Wilson called our “adaptive unconscious” (Wilson 2002).” Our brains cleverly dupe us to think illusory entities are real (Evans 2010); the truth is that deontology is simply “a kind of (moral) confabulation” (Greene 2008). Haidt agrees and says, “When people don’t know why they are doing something they make up an explanation” (Haidt 2001). Although we may be inclined to think we should not kill an innocent person because that violates a moral rule, we act because of ingrained moral intuitions and “produce rational justifications for emotionally driven moral judgments”.

Reason and Emotion in the Trolley and Footbridge Dilemmas Greene is not exclusively committed to the role of emotion and admits there can be competition between emotional and cognitive processes; he uses as an example the trolley and footbridge dilemmas. In a fantasy experiment called, the trolley dilemma, a runaway trolley whose brakes have failed is headed toward five people who cannot get off the tracks in time and, if nothing is done, will be killed. The five people can be saved if the driver flips a switch that diverts the trolley to a side track where it will

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kill only one person (Thomson 1976). In this thought experiment most philosophers and people who have been tested experimentally believe it is morally acceptable to kill one person to save five lives. In the footbridge dilemma the situation is morally similar to the trolley dilemma except to kill one person in order to save five lives it is necessary to push a large stranger off a footbridge whose big body will alter the course of the train. This will kill the stranger but save five lives. The prevalent belief is that, in this situation, it is wrong to push the man off the bridge and kill one person to save five people (Greene 2008). These experiments illustrate apparent contradictory elements in our moral behavior. In the “trolley dilemma” there is a moral acceptance of flipping a switch that diverts a runaway trolley from one set of tracks where it would kill five people, to another set of tracks where it would kill only one person. In the morally similar “footbridge dilemma“, most people do not find it morally acceptable to push a large man off a bridge to divert the trolley and kill one person to save five (pp. 112–121, Hauser 2006). Greene explains the difference as, pushing someone to their death is “up close and personal” which triggers an emotional response, whereas flipping a switch is impersonal and associated with a lesser emotional response that doesn’t overwhelm consequentialism. In other words, in the footbridge dilemma the emotional element overwhelms the rational element. In the trolley dilemma cognitive reasoning is decisive (Greene 2008). Mikhail relates moral cognition to “computational theory”. The brain in an unconscious manner takes the input of moral actions and computes “representations of the deontic status of human acts and omissions that influence its moral output”. Permissibility judgments do not necessarily depend on the superficial properties of an action description, but on” how that action is mentally represented” in the brain. The trolley and footbridge dilemmas are morally similar and involve the death of one person to save five. Throwing a switch in the trolley dilemma and killing one person may be represented in the brain as a “subsequent and foreseen side effect” whereas in the footbridge dilemma throwing a man off a bridge to switch tracks may be represented in the brain as an “unacceptable act of battery” (pp. 81–91, Mikhail 2008). Despite the similar moral consequences of the two actions they may “trigger distinct mental representations” (pp. 105–117, Greene 2008a, b). Although Greene believes emotion predominates in the decision he allows for some competition between our affective emotional system and our rational cognitive system and says both can contribute to moral judgments. In the trolley dilemma a cognitive rational processes wins out; in the footbridge dilemma our emotional system prevails with the near immediate message, don’t do it! (Cushman et al. 2010).

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Distortions of moral thought have been observed when an action involves an identified victim versus an “indeterminate statistical” victim. We have a greater emotional reaction to the death of an identified person than to the deaths of many anonymous people in a far-away ferry boat disaster. Josef Stalin articulated this when allegedly he said, “The death of one man is a tragedy, the death of millions is a statistic”. The emotion not to kill an identified individual person may seem irrational in the footbridge dilemma because we accept that it is permissible to kill one to save five in the trolley dilemma; however, the general employment of this emotion not to kill “up front and personal” overall likely results in fewer people being killed. The emotional capacities that mediate morality such as empathy can also be employed for immoral ends. Flack and De Waal ironically note “that in order to be intentionally cruel one needs to understand the effects of one’s behavior on the other: That empathy can mediate cruelty illustrates that “morality and immorality make use of the same capacities” (Flack and deWaal 2000)”. Bleske-Rechek et al. found that moral decisions might be influenced by evolutionary factors. When they manipulated data from the trolley dilemma they discovered people were less likely to kill one to save five if the one person was young, a reproductively viable genetic relative, or a current mate. This has been interpreted to mean that people may act to preserve and perpetuate their genes, a finding at least consistent with Dawkin’s concept of the selfish gene and the notion of inclusive fitness. The authors of this study acknowledge their data are derived from hypothetical studies because obtaining information from real life incidents and manipulating the data is difficult (Bleske-Rechek et al. 2010). Kahneman describes a second mode of moral decision-making that is a slower, less efficient, more flexible and more deliberate cognitive process that emerges from our “reflective mind” (Kahneman 2011). This is best typified by utilitarian judgments which “are largely driven by cognitive processes” that take into account multiple factors and in an actuarial manner calculate and balance risk and benefit. Utilitarian philosophy seeks to maximize the good, however that is defined. This usually requires thought, reason and calculation and by necessity predominates over moral emotion (Greene 2008).

Extra-Moral Factors: The Power of Language Framing Effects The expression of moral thought requires words and concepts. Language is the indispensable medium of moral reasoning. We must be scrupulously careful in the use of language because how moral dilemmas are phrased, or to use the more technical term, “framed”, can bias moral thinking and decision-making and inappropriately influence moral discourse (Edwards et al. 2001). Language has power and its use warrants careful scrutiny; it should reveal the world as objectively as possible. That requirement is much easier said than achieved.

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Sinnott-Armstrong states a belief is subject to a “word framing effect“ when that belief depends on which words are used in its description (pp. 47–76, SinnottArmstrong 2008). Predictable shifts in preferences have been observed due to changes in the formulation of problems. Tversky and Kahneman analogize this to perceptual changes due to changes in perspective which can alter the apparent relative size of objects like mountains in the distance. “The relative attractiveness of options varies when the same decision problem is framed in different ways” (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Available evidence shows that the manner information is presented can have significant effects on decision-making (Edwards et al. 2001). In one study actions that would kill some and not others were presented to two groups with different wording. One group got a Kill wording,- that an action would kill some; the other group got a Save wording, that the same action would save some. The results for both groups were identical in terms of the number living and dying but moral decisions differed simply based on how the question was phrased. More people chose an action that would Save rather than Kill even though the outcome was the same with the only difference being the wording (Petrinovich and O’Neil 1966). In a similar experiment concerning a policy relevant to Asian flu, experimental subjects were either told without the policy 400 of 600 people would die; another group was told that without the policy 200 of the 600 people would be saved. The experiment revealed subjects found it worse for people to lose their lives than if people were not saved even though the outcome in both options was the same (pp. 424–425, Kamm 2007). In the Trolley dilemma if the case is presented as an unintended consequence of saving five lives rather than as a means to save five lives more people would be willing to sacrifice the lone person (Hauser 2006). When framing is used to influence moral decisions Tversky and Kahneman note that people might alter their preference if issues are framed differently; they also point out that people are normally unaware of alternate framing options. Extra-moral framing factors can introduce moral unreliability. How language is used can inappropriately influence moral decision-making. Tversky and Kahneman consider the purposeful alteration of framing to inappropriately affect moral decisions as being an ethically significant act (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).

Incest Moral decisions can also be affected by how options are presented (Petrinovich et al. 1993). Wolf, an anthropologist, describes a 42 year-old single woman who wants to have a genetic connection with her baby. She is using a donated egg for in vitro fertilization and asks whether she can request her father be the sperm donor; her concern is whether the use of her father’s sperm would constitute incest. The fertility clinic staff also wonders whether they would be violating the incest taboo and hesitated

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to proceed. The essence of incest is sexual relations between kin; the woman would not be engaging in incest because she is not having sexual relations with her father. Although Wolf believes this would not be biological incest he worries that the word “incest” is so emotionally charged and disapproving that its mere mention might discourage the woman from proceeding and perhaps stigmatize a child conceived in this manner. The inappropriate use of the word incest transformed an acceptable procedure into an irrelevant worrisome concern (pp. 67–70, Wolf 2007).

Embryo Donation Infertile couples who use in vitro fertilization to have children may create excess embryos that are frozen or may be given to other infertile couples. Brakman notes that the name given to the donation process has significant conceptual implications (Brakman 2007). She lists several candidate terms: embryo transfer, embryo donation, embryo rescue and embryo adoption. When embryo donation is called embryo adoption the word adoption creates the impression that the embryo is a child. Majumder quotes Caplan who calls this a “rear guard attack” on stem cell research (pp. 75–78, Majumder 2007).

Terminal Sedation and Genetically Modified Organisms Taylor illustrates the intrusive and manipulative potential of language when he suggests “terminal sedation” should more properly be called “palliative sedation” because the term “terminal sedation” suggests a form of euthanasia (Taylor 2007). In the 1990s the pejorative term, Frankenfood, which combines the word Frankenstein and the word food was created to refer to genetically modified organisms (plants and animals). The use of the term “Frankenfoods” in reference to genetically modified organisms is an example of damning, not with scientific data, but by the employment of emotionally charged language (Magnus 2007).

Fetal Research Chervenak and McCullough in their discussion of an ethical framework for considering fetal research explicitly acknowledge the power of language (Chervenak and McCullough 2007). They caution against using the words “mother”, “father” and “baby” because those words suggest moral relationships that they believe do not exist; instead, they advise the words “pregnant woman”, “husband”, “fetus” and “fetal patient”. Callahan calls their suggestion that only neutral language be used

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unrealistic because pregnant women considering fetal surgery do not think of themselves as carrying a “fetal patient”; they believe they are carrying a “baby” with a problem (Callahan 2007). Words have persuasive and manipulative connotations and we must be wary of their ability to subtly influence independent of facts and reason.

Definitions How words are defined can have an impact on moral decision-making. Youngner et al. have written a 339 page book, The Definition of Death, that examines numerous opinions of the meaning of death, (Youngner et al. 1999). Definitions include the cardiac/circulatory, whole brain and, higher brain versions. More recently, Veatch and Ross have written that death is a social construct with religious, philosophic and social elements (Veatch and Ross 2016). DeVita and Arnold claim the criteria for death are not simply matters of biologic fact but “value-laden propositions” (Devita and Arnold 2007). They regret the term, “nonheart-beating organ donation”, initially attached to their policy of declaring death using cardiopulmonary criteria prior to organ retrieval. In their discussions Bernat, DeVita and Arnold confront the distinction between language as a reflection of objective reality and language distorted by value-laden propositions. Their debate concerns language, but the consequences may not be trivial. At the opposite end of the spectrum that extends from birth to death there is significant and sometimes angry debate related to abortion and the definition of when life first begins. Philosophers have long understood that language can be problematic because conceptual definitions which purport to describe reality are human constructs and vulnerable to subjective interpretation. Skeptics can be forgiven their doubts about the value of a bioethics enterprise that cannot find unanimity on the nature of a state, being dead, that for centuries has been intuitively obvious. In defense of bioethics, the circumstances of modern medicine ask it not only to define established death but also—and here is the difficulty—the first moment of death. In the absence of a consensus definition moral discourse can become controversial and lead to significant practical problems; this has been especially relevant in the field of organ transplantation. Morality can be distorted when normative questions are presented as if they were matters of fact. In transplantation the Dead Donor Rule has been accused of being deceptive because a potential organ donor may be declared dead when the relevant criteria used to determine death are controversial. The notion of whole brain death has been accused of being a “legal fiction” used for expediency; a whole brain determination may be false, though probably in a minor way, because there may be some persistent brain activity, for example hypothalamic function. Technically, this means the whole brain is not dead. Bernat defends the concept of whole brain death, “an unfortunate and misleading term”, that refers to the use of neurological criteria to determine death (Bernat 2007). He rejects as a “contrived redefinition of death” a higher brain criterion

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that would declare death when consciousness and cognition were permanently lost. Bernat argues that failure to agree on a uniform criterion of death and allowing the removal of organs for transplantation as a justified form of killing would be bad public policy. Moral discourse depends on language which can influence discussion independent of relevant moral facts (Bernat 2007). Words are often used to generate emotions that support or undermine an argument. Veatch has contemplated the future widespread availability of a total artificial heart and asks whether its removal and the associated cessation of the heart-beats that have defined life would constitute murder (Veatch 2007). He recognizes “killing” and “murder” are words with a dubious reputation and that their use could damn an action he approves. To avoid the implication of direct intended killing Veatch proposes changing the definition of death to the loss of brain function, instead of cardiac function. Steinberg, says removal of an artificial heart resembles killing; however, instead of changing the definition of death he suggests changing the nature of the patient’s existence to “medically contingent life” (Steinberg 2007). At the same time he expresses caution about the use of manipulated language to help justify a medical intervention. Veatch and Steinberg agree that removal of a total artificial heart may be justified when that intervention is deemed inappropriately burdensome. Although changing the definition of death or the nature of a patient’s existence might help avoid the stigma of “killing”, it also alerts us that language can be used to by-pass or minimize moral discourse (Veatch 2007). Spack describes illness as susceptible to mislabeling when he argues that “gender dysphoria” has erroneously been called a psychiatric condition (Spack 2007). The Soviets were similarly guilty of mislabeling language when political dissidents were locked up under the pretext of a psychiatric diagnosis. Hughes criticizes the medical model used to classify individuals with gender dysphoria and advocates “morphological liberationism” (Hughes 2007). He objects to “passé binary assumptions” that linguistically divide gender into male and female and argues for recognition of various intermediate “ambiguous gender positions”. The concept of gender dysphoria, can therefore be defined as a psychiatric condition, a medical condition that merits treatment or the reflection of a sexual preference that merits respect. I’ve presented examples of linguistic issues to illustrate that rational moral deliberation can be distorted, sometimes subtly, by the manipulation of language.

Other Extra-Moral Influences “Psychological mechanisms productive of adaptive behavior in a prehistoric past may, when operating in creatures no longer living in such an environment, result in surprising and/or maladaptive behavior” (p. 9, Joyce 2007). Moral intuitions are shaped by culture, evolution and experience which can change over time with the persistence of intuitions that are no longer adaptive. Our brains evolved when our ancestors did not have contact with people in distant places leaving us without strong

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emotional ties to people not in proximity. That helps explain, at least in part, why Americans tend to be less upset about a bombing in Afghanistan than they would have been if San Francisco had been bombed (Greene 2008). Underlying beliefs can influence moral reasoning. Specialism was found to be a deep seated tendency with more people benefitting humans, even very old humans, over animals, even animals in danger of extinction. To a greater extent than men, women’s moral thinking is based on attachment and affection rather than concepts of justice. There are certain near universal moral beliefs such as a repugnant attitude toward cannibalism, incest and parricide, as well as attitudes that favor kin and members of the group to which one belongs (Petrinovich et al. 1993).

Heuristics Heuristics in morality can be both useful and problematic. Heuristics are a quick, practical approach to problem solving that can be understood as “rules of thumb”. In the moral sphere they avoid the difficult work of complex reasoning. Gigerenzer, who relates heuristics to a species of moral intention describes an incident in Poland in 1942 (Gigerenzer 2008). The older, “ordinary men” of Reserve Police Battalion 101 were awakened at dawn and taken to the outskirts of a small Polish Village where women, children and elderly Jews were to be shot. The police were given the option not to participate, yet of the 500 policemen who viewed the impending massacre of innocent Jews with horror only twelve refused to participate. Gigerenzer says the men participated in the killing because of a social heuristic, “Don’t break ranks”. The heuristic they followed was an example of the tremendous pressure of peer group norms. They killed to avoid breaking ranks (Browning 1993). Another problematic heuristic is the default rule: If there is a default, do nothing about it. In countries where potential organ donors are assumed to be donors unless they opt out, more organs are obtained because few actively opt out. In countries where it is necessary to opt in fewer people indicate a willingness to donate Moral heuristics are fast and avoid complicated decision making; they sometimes are morally appropriate, but not always (Gigerenzer 2008). The attachment of various metaphors to illness was criticized by Sontag in her classic work, Illness As Metaphor. She uses tuberculosis as one example. The disease has been called consumption; it was called a romantic disease, a disease of the soul, an edifying and refined disease, a disease emanating from love; deaths from tuberculosis have been called noble. The association of illness with psychological traits risks making victims feel their illness was due to their feelings (Sontag 2001).

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Moral Obligation I include moral obligation in the discussion of moral psychology because it is a concept that may cause a person to struggle over whether their values demand action. A moral obligation has been defined as, a duty which one owes and which he ought to perform, but which he is not legally bound to fulfill. A person asked to donate one of their kidneys or part of their liver to a relative may struggle over whether the donation is a moral obligation. The psychological consequences of failing to perform a moral obligation can be the pangs of a guilty conscience and the fear that you might be considered an immoral person. Beauchamp and Childress consider moral obligations as an aspect of the principle of beneficence (Beauchamp and Childress 1989). Gert, who doesn’t like the word obligation subsumes the concept of moral obligations under his moral rule, Do Your Duty. Gert uses the word duty in the context of professionals and others whose job entails specific defined obligations (Gert 1988). Philosophers have provided criteria that determine when a moral obligation exists. Gert’s three indications for a moral obligation are: 1. one is in physical proximity to someone in need of help to avoid a serious evil, usually death or serious injury. 2. One is in a unique or close to unique position to provide that help. 3. It would be relatively cost free for one to provide that help. Beauchamp and Childress agree with Gert’s three points and add the benefits the person at risk gains outweigh the harms or burdens to the rescuer. A danger with the concept of moral obligation is that the list of what constitutes a moral obligation can be expanded. Being accused of violating a moral obligation can be a cause of shame and guilt. The claim of a moral obligation should be justified. Singer did this in his 1971 article, Famine, Affluence and Morality (Singer 1972). His definition of a moral obligation is: “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally to do it”. If a child is drowning in a shallow pond we ought to pull the child out even if our shoes get muddy. Most people would agree with that. Singer’s 1971 article was a plea for the people in East Bengal dying of malnutrition. He noted the British government valued the development of the supersonic airplane, Concord, more than thirty times the lives of nine million refugees. Singer argues that we instinctively prefer to help those who are close to us but what we should do is ignore the factor of distance. Singer said that at least nine million destitute refugees were in danger of dying and the world did relatively little to help. Singer says we should help even if we are not in a unique position to help, even if millions of other people can help that does not eliminate our obligation to help. That decades have past and Singer’s suggestions have not had much impact illustrates both practical considerations and our moral intuitions. Also, if we keep giving to those less fortunate our own material state will ultimately decline. The statement that we have a moral obligation can be manipulative because failure to meet the obligation can cause guilt and shame. Moral obligations have been suggested that are less convincing, for example the obligation to participate in biomedical research (Schaefer et al. 2009) Singer asks, “ Where should we draw the line between

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conduct that is required and conduct that is good although not required”. Morally worthy actions that don’t meet the bar of an obligation have been referred to as moral ideals.

Conclusion Some moral psychologists endorse the counterintuitive claim that our emotions, not reason, are the ultimate arbiter in moral deliberation. Greene and other moral psychologists claim that after making a moral decision we conjure an explanation for our decision; however, our passions (emotions) subjugate reason. The respected philosopher David Hume in the eighteenth century, agreed and said reason ought to be the slave of the passions. Such thoughts are probably heresy to moral philosophers who prefer principles, logic and reasoning. The conflict over the primacy of reason or emotion in morality illustrates how much is not definitively known concerning the nature of morality. I suspect both reason and emotion play roles in moral deliberation. de Waal who has worked extensively with primates and is a renowned expert on primate behavior considers human psychology to be “primate behavior”. Based on how primates behave de Waal believes the terms, acceptable and unacceptable, are more appropriate moral judgments than right and wrong. This sounds like a rejection of reason and the acceptance of the moral behavior of chimpanzees; though I suspect de Waal is advocating morality as what other humans are willing to accept. It may be realistic to believe that valid moral ideas should be acceptable to people; however, it would be ludicrous to try to resolve a moral dilemma by asking whether a chimpanzee would accept a proposed solution. I doubt whether that is what deWaal had in mind. We have evolved from a primate brain and if primates behavior is determined by what they find acceptable, perhaps we should want our moral solutions to be acceptable. Morality is susceptible to non-moral influences. Many of these are linguistic. How we phrase moral dilemmas can, independent of legitimate moral concerns, influence outcomes. This has been referred to as word framing effects. Morality can also be traumatized by the lack of consensus definitions. Other non-moral interfering factors include heuristics and the imposition of moral obligations that affect our conscience and may get us to do things we might not otherwise do. We should be extremely cautious about the use of language in moral discourse because manipulated language can distort both meaning and moral discourse.

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Taylor, Robert M. 2007. Is terminal sedation really Euthanasia? In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach To Moral Issues In Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David, pp. 238–240. Hanover and Lebanon: University of New England Press. Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1976. Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem. The Monist 59 (2): 204–217. Tse, Peter. (2013). The Neural Basis of Free Will, pp. 1–10. Cambridge: MIT Press. Tversky, Amos, and Daniel, Kahneman. 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 211: 453–458. Veatch, Robert M. 2007. The total artificial heart: Is paying for it immoral and stopping it murder? In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David, pp. 58–62. Hanover and Lebanon: University of New England Press. Veatch, Robert M., and Laine Ross. 2016. Defining death: The case for choice. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Wilson, T.D. 2002. Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Wolf, Arthur P. 2007. Is this incest? In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed. Steinberg, David, pp. 67–69. Hanover and Lebanon: University of New England Press. Youngner, Stuart, Robert Arnold, and Renie Shapiro. 1999. The Definition of Death. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Chapter 6

Morality and Culture

Abstract Culture has been defined as “an integrated system of learned behaviors which are characteristic of the members of a society and which are not a result of biological inheritance”. Cultural norms are protected and preserved by the deeply discrediting process of the stigmatization and the punishment of those who violate cultural norms.

Moral relativism is the position that there are no objective moral truths and morality should be judged in the context of social and cultural customs. It has been claimed that all cultures have equal validity. This allows a moral judgment to be true in one culture and false in another. A variety of disturbing practices, such as honor killings and female genital mutilation, have been described in some cultures. Although we may not be able to objectively confirm the intrinsic truth of morality, that does not make morality irrelevant and necessarily subservient to cultural norms.

The Definition of Culture The term culture can be traced back to the Latin term cultura which referred to “the cultivation or rearing of a crop, an act of promoting growth in plants”. The German term kultur first used in 1914 referred to, “ideals of civilization as conceived by the Germans” (Online Etymology Dictionary 2019). Today there are various definitions of culture. Culture is a theoretical concept to explain a wide range of human behavior. Geertz emphasized the important influence of culture on our conception of man. He said, “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. I take culture to be one of those webs”. He also said, “we are unfinished animals who finish ourselves through culture and our ideas and our values are cultural products” (Geertz 1973). Kroeber and Kluckhohn collected an impressive 164 different definitions of culture. Culture was given its first modern definition by Tyler in 1871. He said, “culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_6

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and any other capabilities and habits, acquired by man as a member of society” (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952). Hofstede defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another”. SpencerOatey said culture is “a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioral conventions that are shared by a group of people, and that influence (but do not determine) each member’s behavior and his/her interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of other people’s behavior” (Spencer-Oatey 2008). Kluckhohn (1905–1960), a cultural anthropologist, kept his definitions of culture relatively simple: “the total way of life of a people, the social legacy the individual acquires from his group” and “that part of the environment that is the creation of man” (p. 17, Kluckhohn 1949). Hoebel describes culture as “an integrated system of learned behavior patterns which are characteristic of the members of a society and which are not a result of biological inheritance (Boroch 2013). Kluckhohn claims morality is a human universal as is language and that all cultures have moral systems. He provides a definitional list of the characteristics of culture. These qualities are learned in childhood and people judge themselves by how they conform to these standards. Kluckhohn’s cultural characteristics include: (1) the total life way of a people (2) the social legacy the individual acquires from his group (3) that part of the environment that is the creation of man (4) an abstraction derived from observed behavior (5) a way of thinking, feeling and believing (6) the distinctive ways of life in a group of people. Kluckhohn says, “culture is a theory that helps us understand a mass of otherwise chaotic facts” (pp. 17–44, Kluckhohn 1949). Fowers and Richardson define culture as “the set of shared meanings that make social life possible. They consist of meanings and assumptions that orient members of a culture and structure their lives through norms and standards of behavior” (Fowers and Richardson 1996). Shweder, a cultural anthropologist, proposed that on a world-wide basis there is “a big three of morality”. There is an ethics of autonomy based on moral concepts such as harms, rights and justice. There is an ethics of community with moral concepts such as duty, hierarchy and interdependence. And there is an ethics of divinity based on moral concepts such as natural order, sacred order, sanctity, sin and pollution With the exception of autonomy Shweder’s categories differ from the typical categorizations of moral philosophers. The content of these categories vary both within and across cultural groups (pp. 18–21, Schweder 2007). A complex society may include a variety of cultures and people can belong to more than one culture; for example, by religion and socio-economic status. A person may adhere to a culture related to their profession and a different culture related to their religion. A person’s cultures may conflict with each other; for example, living in a society accepting of abortion and belonging to a religion that prohibits abortion (pp. 3–4, Spencer-Oatey 2008). Culture may change over time. Tribes that once were head hunters have abandoned the practice. In the United States physicians once adopted a paternalistic attitude toward patients, often not informing them of important facts concerning their health

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and not discussing the various treatment options. That has changed and physicians now accept the need for informed patient consent and shared decision- making. Moral philosophers and cultural anthropologists are both interested in morality. Moral philosophers tend to focus on the rational foundations and universality of ethics, largely stripped of cultural influences. Their focus has been on what ought to be the case. Many moral philosophers would say that morality is universal and at most minimally influenced by culture; they are more interested in what should be the case, than what is the case. Cultural anthropologists believe culture is important in the shaping of morality.

Culture and Evolution It has been argued that natural selection works at both the level of the gene and the level of the group. When Darwin wrote his theory of evolution knowledge of the gene did not exist. Joyce notes that for cultural group selection to exist there must be some uniformity within groups and variability between groups. As an example, he postulates that groups that punish non-reciprocators will have a survival advantage. This is based on his presumption that groups that accept a degree of self-sacrifice for the welfare of group members will have a survival advantage. Joyce believes both genetic and cultural factors are subject to natural selection. The interaction of culture and genetics was described in West Africa where the cultivation of yams led to clearing of the rain forest. That in turn left more standing water for malarial mosquitoes to breed; the cultural preference for yams ultimately favored the sickle cell genetic allele which provides protection against malaria. The practices of a social group can have evolutionary consequences and interact with genetic evolution (pp. 40–44, Joyce 2007). Moral epistemologists have viewed “culture as taking off with its own units of heredity” (Dawkins 1976). Dawkins has called these units memes; they are cultural ideas that can change over time, replicate and be transmitted. In contrast to genes they don’t contain DNA but memes are involved in the struggle for existence. Dawkins says culture can change over time and be transmitted to future generations; “memes reproduce the content of their immediate predecessors, as modified by those particular intellectual novelties which were selected out” (Ruse 2009). Examples of memes include religion, the internet meme and cultural positions such as “everyone should be treated equally” and “don’t use contraception”. Memes can be adaptive or, like racism be harmful (Dawkins 1976; Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c). E. O. Wilson believes culture sits on top of our biology, the biology informing if not actually determining the culture. Wilson famously likened biology “as the twig and culture as something that can bend it somewhat but not too far or it would resist or snap” (Wilson 1978). Although culture plays an important role, both Darwin and Wilson favor the influence of biology over that of culture (Ruse 2009).

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Stigma Cultural norms are protected and preserved by stigmatizing those who violate them. Goffman defined stigma as “an attribute that is deeply discrediting”, with a stigmatized person reduced “from a whole and usual person to a tainted and discounted one”. Stigma marks a person or group as flawed. Deviation from expected behavior is associated with discomfort and withdrawal of love and protection, or worse. Stigmatized groups have included the mentally ill, people with HIV/AIDS and homosexuals. When a group is stigmatized there can be discriminatory cultural practices (Yang et al. 2007). Stigma in society is a moral issue because it damages a person’s self-esteem, mental health, and ability to achieve; it identifies a person as flawed, which limits their social prospects and increases the sense that life is uncertain and dangerous. Cross cultural studies identify stigma as a universal phenomenon. The stigmatized are often subject to unfavorable moral judgments, lowered moral standing and discredited. Stigma is a moral issue for Yang et al. because it threatens “what is most at stake” (Yang et al. 2007).

Multiculturalism The term multiculturalism refers to the challenge of cultural and religious diversity in societies. Multiculturalism has also been used as an umbrella term to reference marginalized groups such as women, African Americans and LGBT people (Song 2017). Rather than suggest members of a minority group assimilate into the “melting pot” of the dominant culture, multiculturalism tends to advocate that members of a minority groups should be able to maintain their distinctive identities and practices (Song 2017).

Moral Relativism Moral relativism has been interpreted as what determines right and wrong is the attitude of one’s culture; it is the belief that there are no objective moral truths and morality should be judged in the context of social and cultural customs. Moral relativism claims that members of different cultures can make rationally justified but opposing moral statements (Claes 1990). “Most often multiculturalism is associated with an empirical thesis that there are deep and widespread moral disagreements and a metaethical thesis that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to the moral standard of some person or group of persons”. Sometimes ‘moral relativism’ is also connected with a normative position about how we ought to think about or act towards those with

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whom we morally disagree, The most critical message of support for multiculturalism is that the truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons (Gowans 2018). The impetus for moral relativism came from early twentieth century cultural anthropologists. Ruth Benedict (1887–1948), a student of Franz Boas, who has been called the father of American anthropology, said cultures, like individuals, have a more or less persistent pattern of thought and action. She believed that each culture had its own moral imperatives and that it is wrong to disparage a culture different from one’s own. For Benedict morality was relative to the culture in which it operated and that all cultures have equal validity (Gowans 2018). Benedict said, “The purpose of anthropology is to make the world safe for human differences” (Wheeler 2017). Moral relativism implies a moral judgment may be true in one culture and false in another. Prinz provides a twenty-first century justification of moral relativism. He claims that conflicting moral beliefs can both be true and that moral relativism is a plausible doctrine. Although he acknowledges there are cross-cultural moral similarities, he notes various cultural beliefs across time that might be foreign to us. These include cannibalism, killing for pleasure as done by Roman gladiators, and cultures that engage in extreme forms of body modification, such as scarification. He also notes that for a thousand years foot binding, which involved excruciating crippling of young girls was practiced in China. He cites other practices including polygamy, arranged marriages and the marriage of young children that some of us might find unacceptable. Prinz contends, “With morals, unlike scientific knowledge, there is no well recognized standard that can be used to test, confirm or correct when disagreements arise”. He says reason and empirical observation do not explain moral variation. He believes, “all values, at bottom, are emotional attitudes”. For perspective he notes earlier cultures might look with superiority at our current grotesque acceptance of weapons of mass destruction and capitalistic exploitation. Prinz does not exclude a role for reason to tell us the facts of a case, but he claims reason cannot tell us what ought to be. An objective basis for morality could come from three sources, all denied by Prinz. They include a benevolent God, innate values built into human nature and rational principles that all rational people could accept. For Prinz morality has no objective basis. (pp. 167–189, Prinz 2013). Joyce criticizes Prinz’s moral relativism as emasculating the effectiveness of the role of objective morality in motivating behavior. He says that it is “the strong inescapable objective categoricity with which moral judgments are imbued that allows them to play this role effectively” (Joyce 2009). Using examples of different moral behaviors in different cultures Prinz says that morality is not innate in the brain and not totally determined by biology. He supports his claim that there is no universal morality with examples. Most cultures have a norm against killing the innocent. But this norm, like other commonly accepted norms, is often violated. The Yanomamo of the Amazon raid and kill the first man

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they encounter. The Ilongot of Luzon in the Philippines practiced headhunting. The rule against incestuous sexual relations may seem to be a universal but is violated in many cultures. The Thonga of South Africa are permitted to have sex with their daughters before a hippopotamus hunt. The Zoroastrians of ancient Iran encouraged parent-child and brother-sister incest (Prinz 2009). Prinz takes the variation in morality as products of “cultural evolution under the pressure of social and ecological conditions that may be specific to a particular group”. He believes these cultural differences cannot be resolved by reason and concludes “cross-cultural moral disputes cannot rationally be adjudicated”. He concludes “there is not a single true morality”, and there is no way to resolve moral disputes using reason. He concludes “moral convictions are cultivated by human societies” (Prinz 2009). The best Prinz argument for moral relativism is that by having no single true morality we can become more humble and tolerant of the values of others. He claims relativism is consistent with moral progress and says moral relativism doesn’t mean anything goes because, “values that are destructive cannot last”. Of note, he doesn’t say those destructive values are wrong because his moral relativism doesn’t permit criticism of other cultures. In response to whether relativism means we cannot criticize Hitler and the culture of Nazi Germany he claims Hitler’s actions were partly based on false pernicious beliefs. Prinz says “the problem with Hitler was not that his values were false and he seems unable to bring himself to call Hitler immoral”. To describe, arguably the most immoral man in history, who killed on an industrial scale millions of Jews, homosexuals, Romas, and innocent civilians and be unable to use the word immoral shows that a determined defense of a questionable theory can lead to dark places. Prinz’s position that we should accept and respect all cultural views because we can’t objectively define one true morality doesn’t make sense. Humans have not evolved to require scientific truth for all their beliefs and actions. Billions of people believe in God and their actions are influenced by that religious belief even though the existence of God cannot be empirically and objectively proven. Similarly, moral behavior does not depend on absolute truth. I will elaborate a justification of morality in a subsequent chapter. Some moral philosophers believe, contrary to Prinz and other moral relativists, there is a common morality that permeates all cultures. Gert describes moral rules that “are open to all rational persons in all societies at all times” Gert’s rules focus on the prevention of evil, and include don’t kill, don’t lie, and don’t steal (pp. 62–76, Gert 1966). Turner joins Prinz in denying the existence of a common morality. Turner says historical, sociological and anthropological evidence does not support the claim that common moral norms are shared by all rational and moral people. He denies “broad empirical support for a common morality through time and across different cultural settings” (see Chap. 14). Turner says “we underestimate plural moral traditions” and the powerful role of “religious and cultural norms”. He concludes ethics has its limits and we are better off recognizing that (pp. 42–47, Turner 2007). The most vexing question related to multiculturalism is whether we should respect the practices of a culture because we have an obligation to tolerate other cultures

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or whether we should subject them to independent ethical scrutiny. I will describe a variety of cultural practices; the reader can decide whether their cultural origin justifies tolerance.

Cultural Practices It’s been suggested there probably are more similarities between cultures than differences. A series of practices and behaviors that deviate from ordinary moral norms follows. Consider whether these practices merit respect because of moral relativism or do some of these practices so egregiously violate moral rules they should be rejected? Practices that might make us uneasy include polygamy, suicide as a requirement of honor, severe punishment for blasphemy, and adultery Although we may have difficulty understanding the behavior of other peoples, the reverse is also true. In the United States and other countries monogamy, including serial monogamy, is the dominant practice. Women do not feel comfortable sharing their husband with another woman. A Koryak woman in Siberia would have trouble understanding why a woman would be so undesirous of female companionship that she would restrict her husband to one wife (Kluckhohn 1949). Some cultures prohibit sexual activity before marriage, whereas a Polynesian adolescent who was not sexually promiscuous would be abnormal. Homosexuality has been permitted in the Greco-Roman world and various primitive tribes but disapproved elsewhere. Cultures start with different moral assumptions. The Christian tradition starts with the assumption that sex is “inherently nasty as well as dangerous”. Other cultures assume that sex is natural and good (Kluckhohn 1949). Shweder, who spent time in India, notes that in India the category of bad acts includes a widow eating fish, a woman having a conversation with her husband’s older brother and parents refusing to sleep in the same bed as their children (Shweder 2007). In the Indonesian village of Lihokbani, in the East of Aceh district, a 25 year-old widow was gang raped by eight men simply because they found her with a married man in her house. The man was reportedly beaten and both the man and the woman were doused with sewage before being turned over to the Islamic police. The head of Islamic Sharia law in the district, Ibrahim Latief, recommended both of them be caned nine times simply for being in the same house together (New York Times 2014). In several countries physical displays of affection in public view violate Islamic tradition and Sharia law. Amnesty International reported on April 20, 2018 that in Aceh province in Indonesia men and women were caned in front of hundreds of spectators for showing affection in public. Amnesty International calls caning an inhuman form of torture (Amnesty International News 2018). In Dubai displays of affection between couples in public places does not fit local customs and culture and can be punished by imprisonment. A law in Nigeria prescribes ten years in prison for those who “directly or indirectly make a public show

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of same sex relationships” (Nossitter 2014). Rules also exist regarding acceptable styles of dress, swearing, dancing in public and other aspects of life. Farzana Parveen, a twenty-five year old pregnant Pakistani woman, was beaten to death because she had defied her family’s wishes that she marry a cousin chosen by her parents and instead married the man of her choice, Muhammad Iqbal, a widower from a neighboring village. To preserve the family’s honor her brother fired a gun at her, but missed; he then beat her on the head with bricks from a nearby construction site. A crowd of about 30 men, including her father reportedly witnessed the beating but did not intervene. This so-called “honor killing” took place in rural Pakistan and was attributed to deep rooted cultural norms and strong tribal traditions that are often precipitated by marrying without familial consent. In 2013 in Pakistan, 869 women were stabbed, shot, beaten or burned to death in honor killings, usually at the hands of family (Gillani and Walsh 2014). An honor killing has been defined as the homicide of a member of a family due to the perpetrator’s belief that the victim has brought shame or dishonor upon the family, often by refusing to accept an arranged marriage, being in a relationship not approved by the family, having sex outside marriage, being a rape victim, violating the principles of a community, having non-heterosexual relations or renouncing a faith (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c). The victim of an honor killing typically is a young woman; often honor killings are designed to control female sexual propriety, with men less often victims. The view of women as being under the authority of their male kin is deeply culturally rooted. Honor misconduct can bring shame to a family who kill to regain social status. Data on the incidence of honor killings is difficult to obtain because many honor killings go unreported. Honor killings are most likely to occur in lower economic class families, in rural and economically disadvantaged areas, and be associated with families who have limited formal education. The killer is usually the youngest brother of the victim or a male cousin. Honor killings are a lesson to others of the cost of deviating from the norm. In some parts of the world honor killings are distinguished from other murders, inadequately investigated by the police, and perpetrators receive lenient sentencing (Kulczycki and Winddle 2012). In her book, A Family Conspiracy, Phyllis Chester, comments on her observations about honor killing: “an honor killing is the cold blooded murder of girls and women simply because they are female….Every girl has to keep proving that she is not dishonoring her family; even so, an innocent girl can be falsely accused and killed on the spot”. She also says, “Her virginity belongs to the family and is a token of their honor. If she is not a virgin, the shame belongs to her family and they must cleanse themselves of it with blood; her blood”. From a tribal point of view this shame and honor code enforces social stability, but at the price of individual rights and personal freedom. Chester adds, “any family that fails to kill a disobedient girl or woman will find that no one will marry their other children or deal with them economically” (Chester 2008). In Afghanistan strict social traditions trump new laws and rights. Girls must remain covered and usually can go out only in the company of close male relatives. Zakia and Mohammed declared their love for each other without parental permission. That

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made them outcasts and marked for death “for dishonoring their families, especially hers”. A university professor said, “The story of true love in Afghanistan is the story of death” (Nordland 2014). In Swang Gulgulia Dhoura, a remote poor village in India, the head man has adjudicated disputes between neighbors. In 2014 a young man groped a married woman in her hut. The victim’s husband took the young man’s thirteen year old sister into the woods where he raped her. Although villagers heard the girl’s cry for help they did nothing. There have been other examples in India of sexual assault used as a form of “eye for an eye” village punishment (Barry 2014). A Ugandan newspaper, The Red Pepper tabloid, published a list of Uganda’s “200 top gays” a day after the country passed an anti-gay law which punishes gay sex with up to life in prison. The list included a Catholic priest. A similar list published by a tabloid in 2011 resulted in the killing of David Kato, a prominent gay activist The criminalization of homosexuality was denounced by John Kerry, then the United States Secretary of State as a violation of human rights (Associated Press in Kampala 2014). In Egypt, where widespread repudiation of homosexuality has been reported homosexuals are at risk of imprisonment (Londono 2014). Homosexuality is illegal in many countries and in some carry the death penalty. An op-ed in a major Nigerian newspaper asked, “Are gay people similar to Animals?” The President of Nigeria in justifying his government’s harsh anti-gay laws said, “Every culture has what they regard as sacrosanct or important to them” (Nossitter 2014). Female Genital Mutilation which is also known as female genital cutting and female circumcision refers to the cutting or removal of part or all of the external female genitalia. This includes the clitoris, the labia, and a procedure called infibulation in which a small hole is left for urine and menstrual flow. Female genital mutilation provides no health benefits, but is associated with many side effects that include chronic pain, recurrent infections, bleeding, sexual problems, childbirth complications and a number of other difficulties including emotional distress. Traditional cutters often use unsterile knives, razors, glass, scissors and sharp rocks; they may or may not use anesthesia (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c). It is often done on children using physical force. In 2016 the United Nations Children’s Fund estimated that 200 million women living in 30 countries have undergone the procedure. According to the United Nations, the local culture has resulted in 98% of women in Somalia and 96% in Guinea being cut (Turkewitz 2014). Other countries where female genital mutilation is prevalent include 27 African countries, Indonesia, Iraqi Kurdistan and Yemen (UN Children’s Fund 2016). Most female genital mutilation is performed by women. UNICEF calls the practice, “a self-enforcing social convention” done to avoid uncut daughters from facing social exclusion. There is also a widely prevalent belief it is a religious requirement though it appears to have no basis in Islamic law. Female genital mutilation has been described in antiquity and it antedates Christianity and Islam. A 2007 fatwa stated that female genital mutilation had no basis in Islamic (Sharia) Law and that it is a sinful action that should be avoided. The practice is in large part a tradition in the culture of an Islamic community (UNICEF 2013).

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Global migration has brought female genital mutilation to Europe, Australia, New Zealand and the United States and Canada (Perron et al. 2013). Although female genital cutting is illegal in the United States immigrant girls sent back to their ancestral homes have been subject to “vacation cutting” in the belief it will prevent promiscuity, prepare them for marriage or put them in tune with the ideals of their culture. In their book, “They took it”, Miriam Camara and Haddiejatou wrote, “I had my female cut from me, my sensations stolen and discarded, replaced with numbness and pain. My say in the matter? Negligible and disregarded. They mutilated me; they cut me with razor sharp non-sterilized blades, they sliced me” (Turkewitz 2014). In India there is a cultural preference for the birth of sons. Sons carry on the family name and provide economic protection for the family because there are fewer opportunities for women to earn money. When they marry families must provide a dowry for their daughters which makes girls a future financial burden (Huffington Post 2013). There have been reports of female infanticide and documentation of sex selective abortions which have resulted in greater male to female birth rates in at least some Indian states (Arnold et al. 2002). Although the law in India states prenatal sex scanning is a crime, antenatal amniocentesis and more commonly ultrasound are used which define the sex of a fetus. These and other practices confront us with the question of whether moral relativism should trump moral scrutiny.

A Response to Moral Relativism Rosaldo believes “culture is the stuff you learn after birth” and if we were born in a different culture we would adopt the values of that culture. He argues for dialogue between cultures to learn what the other person is thinking, but is against cultural imperialism. He says our imagination is limited by our own culture and by looking at what other people do we can challenge our own notions (Rosaldo 2000a, b). He tells the interesting story of his time with a Filipino hill tribe of headhunters called the Ilongots. He was horrified by their headhunting. The Ilongots told him during World War Two the tribe lost a third of its population and that they were horrified by modern warfare. This made Rosado realize that some things we accept, like modern warfare, seem horrific to other cultures (Rosaldo 2000a, b). Kluckhohn argues that all cultures have moral systems. I will argue that doesn’t mean all cultures are morally valid. If a doctrine of coexisting and equally valid cultures is accepted that would preclude criticism of any cultural practice, including criticism of Nazi genocide slavery or any other blatant evil. Theoretically moral relativism can be employed to subdue criticism of any cultural practice, however evil. Rosaldo has devised a solution for this problem by considering ethical relativity a special case of cultural relativity; he considers himself a cultural relativist but not an ethical relativist. He believes in the value of studying and learning from other cultures and that because another culture has a different of values does not necessarily make

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them stupid or evil. However, he says, just because you understand how something works in another culture doesn’t mean you have to agree with it. “To understand is not to forgive”. He wants to understand other cultures yet be free to criticize other cultures on ethical grounds (Rosaldo 2000a, b). Kluckhohn sees morality as a matter of cultural survival. He says that savage practices in one tribe does not mean that kind of behavior is warranted in other groups. Cultural relativity for him means how a practice fits with other group practices. He says, “having several wives makes sense for herders but not hunters”. He defines morality pragmatically. If surviving societies have all found it necessary to impose similar restrictions on behavior those aspects of the moral code are indispensable. Although he says, “anthropology does not as a matter of theory deny the existence of moral absolutes”, His view of morality appears to be that those cultural restrictions universally present in surviving societies define morality. Morality for Kluckhohn seems to be a matter of cultural survival rather than morality as a form of intrinsic truth. Phrased differently, he abdicates the definition of morality to natural selection at the level of the group. Optimistically, he notes that culture is made by man and can be changed.

Conclusion We should try to understand the reasons for the practices of other cultures; however, cultural differences should not automatically entail immunity from moral scrutiny. It is difficult to justify practices that result in significant harm. Social stability does not seem adequate justification for culturally rooted practices such as female genital mutilation or honor killings. More benign practices such as polygamy and arranged marriages might be easier to accept. We need to approach multiculturalism with a dose of humility because no culture, including our own, is an exemplar of moral perfection.

References Amnesty International News. 2018. Caning of Unmarried Couples for Showing Affection in Public an Act of Utmost Cruelty. Indonesia. Arnold, Fred, Sunita Kisher, and T.K. Roy. 2002. Sex Selective Abortions in India. Population and Development Review 28 (1): 759–785. Associated Press In Kampala. 2014. Ugandan Tabloid Prints List of ‘Top 200 Homosexuals’. The Guardian. Barry, Ellen. 2014. Indian Girl’s Rape Called Case of Eye-for-Eye Village Justice. New York Times. Boroch, Robert. 2013. A Formal Concept of Culture in the Classification of Alfred l. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn. Available at https://philarchive.org/archive/ROBAFC-5 (accessed March 30, 2019). Chester, Phyllis. 2008. A Family Conspiracy: Honor Killing. Nashville and London: New England Review Press.

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Claes, Tom. 1990. Culture and Morality Revisited. Cultural Dynamics 3 (4): 349–386. Dawkins, Richard. 1976. The Selfish Gene. Fowers, Blaine J., and Frank C. Richardson. 1996. Why is Multiculturalism Good? American Psychologist 51 (6): 609–621. Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Impact on the Concept of Culture On The Concept Of Man in The Interpretations of Culture New York: Basic Books. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture (accessed January 30, 2014). Gert, Bernard. 1966. Morality A New Justification of the Moral Rules. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gillani, Waqar, and Walsh, Declan. 2014. Pregnant Pakistani Woman Is Beaten To Death by Her Family. New York Times. Gowans, Chris. 2018. Moral Relativism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed., Edward N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/moral-relativism/ (accessed November 19, 2019). Huffington Post. 2013. Female Infanticide-India’s Unspoken Evil. Joyce, Richard. 2007. The Evolution of Morality Cambridge. Massachusetts: The MIT. Joyce, Richard. 2009. Moral Relativists Gone Wild. Mind 118 (470): 508–518 Available at http:// personal.victoria.ac.nz/richard_joyce/acrobat/joyce_2009_review.prinz.pdf (accessed March 30, 2019). Kluckhohn, Clyde. 1949. Mirror For Man. London and Toronto: McGraw Hill Book Company Inc. Kroeber, A.L., and Kluckhohn C. 1952. Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. The Museum Series Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University. Kulczycki, Andrzej, and Winddle, Sarah. 2012. Honor Killings in the Middle East and North Africa. A Systematic Review of the Literature Violence Against Women; 17 (11): 1442–1464. Londono, Ernesto. 2014. The Crackdown On Gay Men In Egypt. The New York Times. New York Times. 2014. Indonesia: Shariah Official Urges That Gang-Rape Victim Be Caned. Nordland, Rod. 2014. Star-Crossed Afghans Cling to Love, Even at Risk of Death. New York Times. Nossiter, Adam. 2014. Wielding Whip and a Hard New Law, Nigeria Tries to ‘Sanitize Itself of Gays. New York Times. Online Etymology Dictionary. 2019. Available at https://www.etymonline.com/word/culture (accessed November 18, 2019). Perron, L., V. Senikas, M. Burnett, et al. 2013. Female Genital Cutting. Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology Canada 35 (11): 1028–1045. Prinz, Jesse J. 2009. Against Moral Nativism in Stitch and His Critics, 167–189. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. Prinz, Jesse. 2013. Morality is a Culturally Conditioned Response. Philosophy Now. Rosaldo, Renato. 2000a. Separating Cultural and Ethical Relativism Issues in Ethics 11 (1): 22–6. Rosaldo, Renato. 2000b. Of Headhunters and Soldiers: Separating Cultural and Ethical Relativism Issues in Ethics 2000, vol. 11(1) pp. 2–6. Available at http://scu.edu/ethics-resources/ethicaldecision-making/of-headhunters-and-soldiers/ (accessed April 30, 2018). Ruse, Michael. 2009. Charles Darwin On Human Evolution. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (1): 10–19. Shweder, Richard. 2007. The Category of Bad Acts. In Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology, ed. David Steinberg. Hanover and London: UniversityPress of New England. Song, Sarah. 2017. Multiculturalism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed., Edward N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiculturalism/#ClalMul (accessed March 26, 2019). Spencer-Oatey, H. 2008. What is Culture? A Compilation of Quotations. Global/PAD Core at https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/al/globalpad/openhouse/interculturalskills/global_pad_-_what_ is_culture.pdf (accessed March 27, 2019). Turkewitz, Julie A. 2014. Fight as U.S. Girls Face Genital Cutting Abroad. New York Times.

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Turner, Leigh. 2007. Bioethics in Culturally Diverse Societies in Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and, Biology ed. David Steinberg: University Press of New England Hanover and London pages. UNICEF Data Monitoring the Situation of Children and Women 2013. United Nations Children’s Fund. 2016. Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting. A Global Concern. Wheeler, Ryan. 2017. Ruth Benedict and the Purpose of Anthropology. The Peabody. Wikipedia contributors. 2019a. Honor killing. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en. wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Honor_killing&oldid=889170834 (accessed March 29, 2019). Wikipedia Contributors. 2019b. Female Genital Mutilation. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Female_genital_mutilation&oldid=887045308 (accessed March 29, 2019). Wikipedia Contributors. 2019c. Meme. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Available at https:// en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Meme&oldid=924983091 (accessed November 20, 2019). Wilson E.O. 1978. On Human Nature. Harvard University Press. Yang, H.L., A. Kleinman, B.G. Link, J.C. Phelan, S. Lee, and B. Good. 2007. Culture and Stigma: Adding moral experience to stigma theory. Social Science and Medicine 64: 1524–1535.

Chapter 7

Morality and Religion

Abstract Religions provide moral guidance; because billions of people world-wide identify with a religion, religion has an enormous influence on moral behavior. Religion provides moral motivation and a community of believers. Although religions promote morality, they also have a darker side that has cluttered history with religiously related immoralities that include the Crusades, the Inquisition, numerous destructive wars and acts of cruelty. I review important aspects of the moral codes of the influential religions, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism and Hinduism.

The Definition of Religion Similar to other concepts that elude consensus definition because they describe entities that come in various shapes and forms, there is no consensus definition of religion. One definition of religion is, “it may be defined as a cultural system of designated behaviors and practices, world views, texts, sanctified places, prophecies, ethics, or organizations, that claims to relate humanity to supernatural, transcendental or spiritual elements” (Wikipedia Contributors 2019). Another definition of religion is the belief and worship of a superhuman controlling power, especially a personal god or gods, and a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature and purpose of the universe, especially when considered as the creation of a superhuman agency or agencies. Religion may be associated with sacred histories and narratives, spiritual elements, prophecies, prayers, faith, ritual observances and usually include a code of moral behavior. There are many religions; the largest worldwide by population are Christianity (2.38 billion), Islam (1.8 billion), and Hinduism (1.1 billion) (Hackett and McClendon 2017), Other important religions include Confucianism and Buddhism. Judaism is the oldest of the Abrahamic monotheistic religions that also include Christianity and Islam.

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Religion and Morality God gave the Ten Commandments to Moses and the Israelites on Mount Sinai (Exodus 20). The Ten Commandments contain moral rules such as, don’t murder, don’t steal, don’t give false testimony and don’t covet your neighbor’s property or wife. They also contain rules that are not strictly moral such as remember the Sabbath. The Ten Commandments do not mention going beyond its basic requirements and don’t mention what has been called, the moral ideals (pp. 166–178, Gert 1966). The belief that morality is given to us by God, that it comes from a higher authority, is important for morality which otherwise stands on less substantial ground. Theists who believe in a God (or multiple Gods) may have a substantial motive for moral behavior because God may reward those who led a morally praiseworthy life and punish those who led a morally flawed life. Religion has given us morally influential role models such as Moses, Christ, Buddha, Muhammad, and Confucius. Zoloth says religion provides an ingredient that is missing in secular ethics because it deals with ultimate meanings, goals and long term consequences that may be ignored in secular morality. She also believes religion increases moral awareness and provides a sense of humility often lacking in secular ethics. Other moral virtues of religious ethics include a powerful presence of the voice of the vulnerable and a search for meaning in the face of physical and existential suffering (pp. 29–32, Zoloth 2007). Callahan, an avowed atheist, admired religion for its historic contribution to ethics. He also believed religion can deal with problems in a coherent and sensitive manner better than secular ethics. He says, “on questions of human meaning and suffering” secular ethics tends to fall silent and he notes “reason is only part of human nature” (pp. 32–35, Callahan 2007). Sia acknowledges there can be a humanistic morality without God and says, “if we look around us, we will discover that there are countless individuals who, without any explicit religious beliefs, can be said to lead morally good lives”. But, he adds, “religious belief in a personal God can have a positive contribution to morality by way of vision and motivation”. Sia claims religion provides a vision, not shared by secularists, of what it means to be human. He also says, “The material content, what we ought to do, does not differ significantly from a non-religious one”; but “what motivates a Christian (and the same can probably be said of other theists) is not what motivates a secularist”. A religious belief in a personal God can contribute to morality by increasing the motivation to behave morally, which in turn increases our relationship with God. Morality based on belief in a personal God would enhance morality as a matter of obedience and would make wrong, “what is prohibited by God”. He also argues morality combined with religion can motivate a sense of community and the importance of the common good (Sia 2008). Most religions exist as a community with leaders and teachers who typically in their sermons exhort their congregations to live a noble life. To the extent that members of a religious community share common beliefs and have a sense of community they can reinforce each other’s commitment to their shared morality. The morality

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of a theistic religious community is invoked with the authority of an all powerful, all knowing God. There are prayers, music, singing, hallelujahs, and promises of paradise that recruit the emotions in the service of doing good. Religions can support their version of the ethical life with greater intensity than secular morality, its relatively sterile counterpart. Kuhse and Singer state that ethics and religion, are fundamentally independent and accord ethics priority. To say God is good requires prior knowledge of what good means and that comes from ethics (pp. 5–6, Kuhse and Singer 2006). Gert set limits on the notion of morality as God given when he said that God is “neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for moral rules” (p. 64, Gert 1966). Most religions urge their adherents to lead an ethical life; that is admirable, but doesn’t imply an atheist can’t be a moral person. Delfino defends religion against atheism and criticizes atheistic scientists like Richard Dawkins because they fail to provide an adequate foundation for objective moral values. Delfino speaks of evolution, which has been cited as the foundation of morality, as being without purpose and quotes Dawkins who, in his book, The Blind Watchmaker, says, “Natural selection, the blind, unconscious, automatic process which Darwin discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the existence and apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It has no mind and no mind’s eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind watchmaker”. Delfino says God provides “the only satisfactory metaphysical foundation for objective moral values”. Delfino’s argument rests on two assumptions: that objective moral values and God both exist (Delfino 2015). Dawkins, an outspoken atheist, calls religious faith a process of non-thinking and bemoans the replacement of reason and science by irrational, sometimes militant faith. He has said that the abandonment of our critical faculties has turned untested faith into perceived truth. He calls this dangerous and points to suicide bombers who kill because they believe that will gain them entrance to paradise. He also condemns religion that forbade the use of condoms in AIDS Africa (Dawkins 2013). Although most religions preach morality and are capable of promoting moral ideals such as “loving-kindness”, the opposite is also true. Because of the good advocated by a religion its adherents may fail to recognize when it strays from morality for its own particular reasons. Gert says, this can be “extraordinarily dangerous” (pp. 255–256, Gert 1966). Gert, who believes the only legitimate moral rules are those that can be advocated by all impartial rational persons warns against the dangers of religious ideals which have permitted “the infliction of an extraordinary amount of evil” (pp. 154–155, Gert 1966). James Veitch remarked, “When religion empowers political terrorism then the terrorism apparently has no limits and acknowledges no boundaries” (Pratt 2010).

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Religion: Another Perspective The relationship of religion to morality is ambivalent; religion has dual potential capacities: to foster morality and to promote evil. Religion has been associated with immorality. For example, the Bible speaks of how to properly treat slaves. Religion has divided people into different religious groups, or tribes, who have discriminated against each other and have fought and killed each other. In recent years the Rohingyas, a Muslim sect, has been subject to brutal human rights violations by Buddhists in Myanmar and many of them were forced to leave the country. Conflict exists between two branches of Islam, Shiites and Sunnis, who have fought wars in the Middle East. To further illustrate the darker side of religion I will list some of the religiously related disasters of the past. In 1095, at the Council of Clermont, Pope Urban II urged Europe’s warriors to free the Muslim held Holy Land. Prior to embarking on the First Crusade thousands of infidels were killed, including thousands of Jews. The First Crusade resulted in a rout of the Europeans with tens of thousands killed or enslaved. The Crusaders subsequently gained a foothold in four Crusader states that included Jerusalem. Saladin, who as sultan led Islamic forces, subsequently captured Jerusalem with many of his captured prisoners put to death. England’s King Richard I, the Lionheart, later defeated Saladin. The Crusades persisted as a series of military campaigns mostly by Western Christians against Muslim and other infidels in the Holy Land. The holy war of the Crusades lasted until about 1291 and are estimated to have killed from one to three million people (pp. 98–106, White 2012). The Inquisition was a powerful office established within the Catholic Church to root out heresy. It was established in the twelfth century and lasted a few hundred years. The Inquisition persecuted non-Catholics including Jews, Muslims, Protestants, and Jews who had converted but were suspected of secretly practicing their religion. Thousands of Jews were expelled from Spain because of the Inquisition. The methods of the Inquisition included torture and executions. Sentencing of the accused took place in public at the auto-da-fé (act of faith). Many heretics were burned alive at the stake, Joan of Arc being the most famous victim. One estimate is that during the Inquisition, from 1480 to 1808 almost 32,000 people were killed (p. 159, White 2012). Although it may be difficult to disentangle religion from other factors there have been numerous wars with the root cause of the conflict religious. White, whose book has the compelling though macabre title, The Great Big Book Of Horrible Things, lists: Thirty Years War (1618–48) Catholics versus Protestants 7.5 million dead; Partition of India (1947) Hindus versus Muslims 500,000 dead; Bosnia (1992– 1995) Bosnian Muslims versus Christian Serbs 200,000 dead; Lebanon (1975–1990) Christians versus Muslims 150,000 killed. Religion has led to death and discrimination for millions of people: The Holocaust (1933–1945) 6,000,000 Jews murdered; Aztecs’ Human Sacrifice (1440–1524) 1, 200,000 people killed; Russian (1919) pogroms in Ukraine during the Russian Civil

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War 115,000 Jews killed. The list of historical atrocities and wars rooted in religion is even longer (pp. 107–112, White 2012). Proponents of religion, taking a historical perspective, can at best, adopt an ambivalent position on the contribution of religion to the flourishing of moral behavior. I will review the ethics of five influential religions. These include Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. Much has been written and discussed about the ethics of each of these religions. I can only scratch the surface in the limited space available.

Jewish Ethics Judaism is a monotheistic religion based on the concept that there is a single God who gives commandments which constitute a moral law for all humanity. This divine moral law is embodied in the codes set out in the first five books of the Bible, known as the Torah, and expanded in a continuing flow of ethical and legal commentary, in the Talmud and other literature. The codes in the Torah set out 613 commandments (mitzvot), which include the Ten Commandments. Jewish ethics when viewed in its entirety is an impressive comprehensive, complex moral system that includes a variety of moral principles concerning justice, equality before the law, loving-kindness, social welfare, and the ideals of peace and political freedom. A few examples include: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” (Leviticus 19.17); “The meek shall inherit the earth and delight in the abundance of peace”. (Psalms 37:11); “Do not join your hand with the wicked to be a malicious witness”. “Do not follow a crowd to do evil; neither shall you testify in court to side with a multitude to pervert justice; neither shall you favor a poor man in his cause if it is not just” (Exodus 23; 4–13). Others include: “Do not deny justice to your poor people in their lawsuits”; “Keep far from a false charge”, and “don’t harm the innocent and righteous”; “Do not oppress a stranger, for you know the heart of a stranger, for once you were strangers in the land of Egypt”. Other ethical principles of Judaism include:

Tzedakah This is generally translated as “charity”. However in Hebrew the meaning is closer to righteousness and fairness. Indeed, the Hebrew root of the word ‘tzedakah‘ is ‘justice’. In Judaism, giving to those in need is simply an act of justice and the right thing to do. It is the performance of a duty prescribed in the Torah: “For the poor will never cease out of the land; therefore, I command you, You shall open wide your hand to your brother, to the needy and to the poor, in the land.” The highest forms of tzedakah are to give so that the recipient does not know the donor, and in such a manner as to assist the recipient to become self-reliant (Deuteronomy 15.11).

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The Torah also prescribes the equivalent of the modern concept of ‘social justice’. These include commandments not to harvest the corners of the field, or to pick the last fruit from the tree, so that the poor should have a right to “glean” the remaining produce (Leviticus 23:22).

Freedom The centrality of freedom in Jewish thought is expressed in: “The mountain fortress of Masada, where in 73CE over 900 Jews committed suicide to die in freedom rather than submit to slavery and worse under Roman rule”. Jews remind themselves, “Once we were slaves in Egypt, now we are free people.” “Do not oppress a stranger, for you know the heart of a stranger, for once you were strangers in the land of Egypt” (Exodus 23.9). And “if a stranger sojourn with you in your land, you shall not vex him. But the stranger that dwells with you shall be as one born among you, and you shall love him as thyself; I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 19; 33–34). Importantly, there is a distrust of autocratic government and an insistence that rulers must be subject to the law.

Tikkun Olam—Repairing the World The concepts of justice, righteousness and freedom come together in the vision of an ideal world articulated by the Prophets. This is expressed in the idea that each of us can make our contribution to making the world a better place. It is often evidenced by a strong Jewish involvement in advancing social justice and in protecting the rights of other minority groups.

The Book of Proverbs This Biblical collection of hundreds of moral sayings is ascribed to King Solomon. The central theme of the Book is the idea of wisdom and understanding as the highest human values. A few of the proverbs follow: Happy is the man who finds wisdom, and the man who gets understanding, for the gain from it is better than gain from silver and its profit better than gold. (3:13–14) Better is a dinner of herbs where love is than a fatted ox and hatred with it. (15:17)

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Do not rejoice when your enemy falls, and let not your heart be glad when he stumbles (24:17). Much is made of the devastating effects of sexual immorality. Here the Proverbs follow themes which appear throughout the Hebrew Bible, extolling sexual love, while fiercely denouncing promiscuity and adultery. The Book of Proverbs ends with a chapter of praise for the virtues of the “good wife”. In addition to teaching caring for others, Jewish sources tend to teach that humans are duty bound to preserve their lives. Other Jewish laws can be broken to save a life.

Ethical Ideas in the Talmud The Talmud contains the teachings and opinions of thousands of rabbis dating from before the Common Era on a variety of subjects, including Halakha (law), Jewish ethics, philosophy, customs, history, lore and many other topics. The Talmud is the basis for all codes of Jewish law, and is widely quoted in rabbinic literature. The Talmud is the central text of Rabbinic Judaism and the primary source of Jewish religious law and theology. Until the advent of modernity, in nearly all Jewish communities, the Talmud was the centerpiece of Jewish cultural life and was foundational to “all Jewish thought and aspirations”, serving also as “the guide for the daily life” of Jews. The term Talmud normally refers to the collection of writings named specifically the Babylonian Talmud although there is also an earlier collection known as the Jerusalem Talmud. The Talmud has two components; the Mishnah (about year 200 CE), a written compendium of Rabbinic Judaism’s Oral Torah; and the Gemara (circa year 500 CE), “Talmud“ translates literally as “instruction” in Hebrew, and the term may refer to either the Gemara alone, or the Mishnah and Gemara together. (Wikipedia Contributors 2019). The Talmud in standard print is over 6,200 pages long. It contains the teachings and opinions of thousands of rabbis on a variety of subjects, including Halakha (law), Jewish ethics, philosophy, customs, history, lore and many other topics.

The Golden Rule of Judaism Rabbi Hillel the Elder supposedly was once asked, “Teach me the entire Torah while I stand on one foot.” Rabbi Hillel responded: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow”. This is the entire Torah and the rest is commentary. Now go learn” (Israel and Judaic Studies 2019).

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Comments on Jewish Ethics The establishment over centuries of a detailed system of morality, an announcement to the world that the Jews intend to behave in a sensitive and ethical manner, does not necessarily come with a reciprocal response. Despite a well-developed detailed system of morality Jews have encountered centuries of pogroms and other antiSemitic acts, and suffered the most heinous crime in human history, the industrial killing of six million Jewish men, women, and children in the Holocaust. As with all religions, and secular ethics, there are disconnects between theory and reality. It says in Leviticus, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18). On April 9, 1948 two Jewish paramilitary groups, the Irgun and Lehi attacked the Arab village of Deir Yassin. During the attack of Deir Yassin Arab prisoners, men, women and children were reportedly killed. The brutality of the Jewish attack resulted in Palestinian flight from Arab villages (Wikipedia Contributors 2019). The details of this attack are disputed but the Jews who attacked Deir Yassin clearly did not show love toward their neighbors (Jewish Virtual Library 2019). Every major religion and secular moral theory can be cited for ethical violations by some of its adherents. It’s prudent to accept that ethical systems, even those promulgated in the name of a powerful God, are not always adhered to. Some members of a religion are likely over time to violate, intentionally or inadvertently, their own religion’s moral code. In some cases morality can be perverted to justify evil ends.

Conflict with Secular Law Judaism, similar to other religions, can conflict with secular laws. In the twelfth century the physician-scholar and rabbi Moses Maimonides argued that a decapitated person was immediately dead. Death using neurological criteria is widely accepted by most Jews and others in the Western world. For millennia Jewish law said that breathing was the essence of life. With the development of the respirator respiration can be maintained even when a patient meets the neurological criteria for death. Because air is still flowing some Orthodox and ultra Orthodox Jews will not accept neurologic death has occurred even though in most of the United States they are considered legally dead. An exception is the New Jersey law that states “the death of an individual shall not be declared upon the basis of neurological criteria… when the licensed physician authorized to declare death, has reason to believe, on the basis of information in the individual’s available medical records, or information provided by a member of the individual’s family or any other person knowledgeable about the individual’s personal religious beliefs that such a declaration would violate the personal religious beliefs of the individual”. Refusal to accept brain death is in practice limited to only the strictest Orthodox Jews (p. 267, Bernat 2008). This can lead to the confusing situation of a person alive in New Jersey who would be dead if in another state;

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it also illustrates that religious ethics may cause confusion and conflict when they deviate from prevailing secular law.

Christian Ethics The concept of natural law has been most closely related to Catholicism and Thomas Acquinas. Natural law has been given to man by God as an act of divine providence and is the way man participates in the eternal law. God has brought into existence human beings who can act freely and use reason. The precepts of natural law, an expression of God’s will, are universally binding by nature, are knowable to all and direct us toward the good. Natural law is incompatible with atheism, moral relativism and skepticism about values (Murphy 2019). Natural law establishes morality as an act of God. The truth of natural law is ultimately faith based; its foundation rests on the belief that God exists and that God has endowed us the practical rational capacity to discern the good. Natural law favors the good over the right. There has been dispute over what constitutes the good. The good as noted by Aquinas include the preservation of life, procreation, social life, and rational conduct. Goods added by others include justice, friendship, health, aesthetic appreciation, pleasure and the avoidance of pain (Murphy 2019). Morality is a man made concept that cannot itself be empirically examined; the vagueness of its definition has made possible theories from morality as God given eternal truth to its characterization as devoid of objective truth. Ironically, morality exists because a morally blind process of natural selection has conferred the ability to recognize and protect behaviors deemed important for reproduction and survival. God, who is central to Christian theology, both commands us and loves us. Christian morality honors the Ten Commandments and finds in Jesus Christ a life without sin which we should imitate. Moral knowledge in Christianity comes from Scripture, especially the Bible, divine Revelation, reason, the teachings of Jesus and tradition. Tenets of Christian morality include: love thy neighbor as thyself; love thy enemies and those who hate us, love God with all ones heart and soul; don’t lust; don’t anger; and God forgives through Redemption. Christian morality is heavily focused on the virtues. Christianity is not a homogeneous entity and consists of Catholicism and various Protestant denominations. The subject of its moral philosophy is too broad and varied to discuss in detail; however, I will mention two atypical Christian groups of interest. Christian Science, founded by Mary Baker Eddy, claims a unique approach to healing that is said to have proven effective for generations of Christian Scientists. Many times after medicine indicated a condition was incurable Christian Science healing, which calls for Christian faith and an understanding of God as dependably good and to whom nothing is impossible, has been effective. Christian Science healing is based on the belief that sickness is a mental error best corrected by prayer. Christian

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Science healers are available to the sick as an alternate to traditional medicine. Modern medicine provides effective treatment for many conditions; I worry that some people with significant medical illness might suffer because prayer replaces effective medical treatment. Jehovah’s Witnesses doctrines are based on its interpretations of the Bible. They believe that the destruction of the present world system at Armageddon is imminent, and that the establishment of God’s kingdom over the earth is the only solution for the problems faced by humanity. Based on their interpretation of the statement in the Bible not to “eat blood” Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse blood transfusions, even if that refusal entails death. If a Jehovah Witness accepts a blood transfusion they may be shunned by other Jehovah Witnesses. I personally took cared for a 32 year-old Jehovah’s Witness who had aplastic anemia, a condition in which the bone marrow has been damaged and does not manufacture blood cells normally. She died of severe anemia because she steadfastly refused blood transfusions. This was a difficult experience for her caregivers, myself included, who had trouble accepting the loss of a young human life that could have been saved. Religious beliefs are comforting and important to billions of people but, at least from my perspective, can occasionally be dangerously misguided.

Christian Fundamentalism An emphasis on fundamentals may be seen in religions. The spread of philosophical skepticism toward literal interpretations of the Bible motivated Protestant Christians who called themselves fundamentalists to state their belief in the literal interpretation and infallibility of the Bible. This included a belief in creationism, which challenged the scientific theory of evolution. Christian fundamentalists gained notoriety in 1925 during the Scopes “Monkey” trial. The Scopes Trial, formally known as The State of Tennessee v. John Thomas Scopes is commonly referred to as the Scopes Monkey Trial (Wikipedia Contributors 2019). A substitute high school teacher, John T. Scopes, was accused of violating Tennessee’s Butler Act, which had made it unlawful to teach human evolution in any state-funded school. Scopes, who was represented by the famous lawyer, Clarence Darrow, was convicted, but the verdict was overturned on a technicality. (Wikipedia Contributors 2010). For religious ethicists, “professionally generated ethical codifications… are outside the bounds of moral insight” (Veatch 2012). Conflict may develop between adherents to religious ethics and adherents of secular philosophical ethics. This divide has already become apparent concerning abortion, contraception, assisted suicide, euthanasia, same sex marriage, the use of stem cells, the definition of death and other matters.

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Buddhist Ethics Ethics in Buddhism are traditionally based on the enlightened perspective of the Buddha, or other enlightened followers. The Buddha (originally named Siddhartha Gautama) was an ascetic and sage who had insight into transcendental truth. The Buddha’s moral instructions were handed down through tradition and later written in Buddhist scriptures. Buddhism tries to cultivate a calm and peaceful mind. Dharma refers to Buddhist doctrine and Vinaya to Buddhist discipline and rules. The foundation of Buddhist ethics for lay people is the Pancasila, the Five Precepts. These rules include: 1. no killing of any living being 2. no taking of anything unless it is intended for you; certainly no stealing 3. no lying or slander 4. no sexual misconduct or sensual over indulgence such as gluttony. 5 no intoxicants or substances that could be the cause of breaking the other four precepts. Buddhism aims to cultivate a calm and peaceful mind that avoids suffering, anxiety, remorse and guilt—a transcendent state in which the subject is released from the effects of karma, the belief that our actions effect us in the future including reincarnation. Karma effects all past and future lives in the cycle of death and rebirth. Buddhism seeks the final goal of Buddha, Nirvana. Buddhist monks and nuns, called Sangha, take hundreds of vows, up to 253 for men and up to 354 for women. These rules are contained in a collection of scriptures, the Vinaya. Buddhism does not advocate war; the Dalai Lama has never advocated armed conflict with the Communist Chinese who have occupied Tibet and caused the Dalai Lama to flee to India (BuddhaNet 2019). The Buddha also proposed other ethical codes inculcating positive virtues. The Mangala Sutta, for example, commends reverence, humility, contentment, gratitude, patience, learnedness, and generosity. Other discourses prescribe numerous family, social, and political duties establishing the well being of society. And behind all these duties lie the four attitudes called the “immeasurables”—loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity (O’Brien 2019). Buddhism has a welldeveloped system of ethics which, if universally followed, likely would lead to peace and harmony.

Islamic Ethics Islam is based on the Muslim understanding that man is able to know the reality of God’s existence and has a moral responsibility to abide God’s will as expressed in the Quran (Koran). Muslims believe that the Quran was verbally revealed by God to Muhammad through the angel Gabriel over a period of years beginning in 609 CE when Muhammad was 40 years old. Muslims regard the Quran as the most important miracle of Muhammad, a proof of his prophethood. Muslims have a moral responsibility to follow Islam as described in the Quran, the Sunnah (the body of traditional social and legal customs and practices

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of the Islamic community) and the sayings of Muhammad. The Quran and the Sunnah make up the two primary sources of Islamic theology and law. Absolute and perfect justice and goodness are attributes of the Divine. According to Muslim legal theory, the purpose of Islamic law is to seek the righteous path, to try to come as close as possible to it and in doing so, foster the welfare of the people. The duty to do good amounts to an obligation to adopt Godly virtues which are embedded in the very nature of human beings. It is the natural intuition (fit.rah) woven into the very fabric of human consciousness that aids people in differentiating between what is Godly and good (h.asan), and what is ungodly and bad (qab¯ıh.). The Quran describes the Divine as pure and unadulterated light, and says that those who deny God’s existence are spiritually blind. Muslims believe that Muhammad was sent by God to remind human beings of their responsibility to seek a moral life. Recognition of Divinity necessitates the recognition of the values that attach themselves to the Divine—values such as justice, fairness, compassion, mercy, honesty, and goodness. Muslim and non-Muslim writers often refer to Islamic law as Shariah. Shariah law controls public behavior, private behavior and private beliefs. Jurisprudentially, the Shariah is the revealed guidance of God—perfect, complete, incorruptible, immune, and immutable; the Shariah provides the moral norms of the Islamic legal system. Muslin morality includes piety and humility, A Muslim must be humble with God and with other people and avoid arrogance. Morality in Islam addresses every aspect of a Muslim’s life and is universal in its scope and in its applicability. Morality reigns in selfish desires, and bad habits. Muslims must not only refrain from evil and vice, they must also forbid them and must contribute to the moral health of society as a whole. Muslims must also be in control of their passions and selfish desires and not be vain or attached to the ephemeral pleasures of this world. They should speak justly, show moderation both when poor and when rich. They should reunite friendship with those who have broken off and silence should be occupied with thought. The good Muslim should avoid materialism and challenge those ideas in society which oppose submission to God. This challenge is directed against five main characteristics: 1. The division of Arabs into varying tribes (based upon blood and kinship) with the goal being a unified community based upon Islamic piety 2. The acceptance of the worship of a multitude of deities besides Allah, because Allah has no equal 3. The trait of manliness instead of humility and piety 4. The focus on achieving fame or establishing a legacy. (This was replaced by the concept that mankind would be called to account before God on the day of resurrection) 5. The reverence of and compliance with ancestral traditions, (This practice challenged by Islam which assigned primacy to submitting to God and following revelation) (Wikipedia Contributors 2019). According to Muslim legal theory, the purpose of Islamic law is to seek after the righteous path-to try to come as close as possible to it. The pursuit of justice, compassion, mercy and honesty, is supposed to translate into concrete and tangible benefits enjoyed by human beings. This has not always been the case because Islam has been associated with slavery and male dominance. The Shariah, Islamic law, is considered Divine because it emanates from God and it exists only through God.

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Shariah law can be harsh and favors corporal and capital punishment over incarceration. According to Shariah law criticism of fundamental Islamic beliefs can lead to drastic consequences. Criticizing or denying any part of the Quran is punishable by death. Criticizing Muhammad or denying that he is a prophet is punishable by death. Criticizing or denying Allah is punishable by death. A Muslim who becomes a non-Muslim is punishable by death. A non-Muslim who leads a Muslim away from Islam is punishable by death. A non-Muslim man who marries a Muslim woman is punishable by death. A woman or girl found guilty of adultery is punishable by death. A girl’s clitoris should be cut (Islamic Sharia Law 2018). Other examples of Shariah laws include the command to pray five times a day, fast during the month of Ramadan and the prohibitions against extra-marital sex, slander, or the consumption of alcohol and pork. Another example is the Quranic command that all contracts be consensual and free from coercion, fraud, deception or misrepresentation, and also that parties to a contract must in good faith make every effort to honor their promises. Muslim jurists have argued that laws clearly mandated by God such as these are stated in an unambiguous fashion in the text of the Quran in order to stress that the laws are in and of themselves ethical precepts that by their nature are not subject to contingency, context, or temporal variations. The so-called h.ud¯ud punishments which were mandated and fixed by God were for serious offenses that include: unlawful consensual sexual intercourse. “The woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication—flog each of them with a hundred stripes (lashings). Let not compassion move you in their case” (Qur’an 24:2); “As to the thief, male or female, cut off his or her hands: a punishment by way of example, from Allah, for their crime” (Qur’an 5:38); for civil disturbance against Islam: “The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter” (Qur’an 5:33). The h.ud¯ud punishments are in the modern age the most controversial aspect of Shariah law and for many non-Muslims are considered medieval, draconian, and barbaric. Furthermore, many non-Muslim and Muslim scholars and writers, who are poorly informed about Islamic jurisprudence, treat these laws as if they are the very heart and core of the Islamic legal system. Consequently, many have come to the conclusion that Shariah law is fundamentally incompatible with modern conceptions of human rights (pp. 7–28, El Fadi 2017).

Islamic Fundamentalism Islamic Fundamentalism is a movement of Muslims who seek to return to the fundamentals of their religion and live similarly to how the prophet Muhammad lived. Islamic fundamentalists favor “a literal and originalist interpretation” of the primary sources of Islam (the Quran and Sunnah), seek to eliminate “corrupting” non-Islamic

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influences from every part of their lives and return to the fundamentals of the religion. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines the term fundamentalism as “the strict maintenance of ancient or fundamental doctrines of any religion, especially Islam”. The word jihad has in recent years been used more frequently; juhad has various meanings from striving in the path of God to, in the age of Islamic terrorism, holy war. Much anti-Muslim sentiment is due to the acts committed by Islamic Fundamentalists who have used the term jihad to describe the most violent persons and movements of Islamic fundamentalists. The term jihad has been used by Islamic terrorists and can mean armed struggle against non-believers, though it also has more benign interpretations. Extreme Quranic interpretations ensure the ideological persistence of Islamic violence and terrorism as a religious effort to preserve Shariah and the will of God in an Islamic community (Venkatraman 2007). The Quran allows individual interpretations and Islamic terrorists have taken advantage of this to select extreme religious interpretations to describe what can be done to preserve the will of God. Jihadists refer to Quranic clauses that sanction the use of violent jihad as a method ordained by God to preserve Sharia law. They emphasize the Quran says preservation of the Shariat is “an obligation of every able bodied individual” and justifies violent jihadism saying, martial jihad refers to a method of jihad that can be used for internal, external, or inter-communal purposes to protect and to promote the integrity of Islam and to defend the community against hostile unbelievers. Religious terrorism is based on several essential principles (Venkatraman 2007). They are: the ends justify the means, holy war, blind obedience, and absolute truth claims the use of extremist religious doctrine like weapons so people see themselves as agents of God. The most consequential Islamic terrorist attack was the September 11, 2001 hijacking of large commercial air planes which crashed into the World Trade Center buildings in New York City and the Pentagon. These attacks killed about 3,000 people. There have been many Islamic suicide bombings directed against civilians, soldiers, and government officials. Suicide bombers have been called martyrs who believe they will earn a place in Paradise. Islamic terrorists have made extensive use of kidnappings and executions, often circulating videos of beheadings. The names of a few Islamic terrorist groups are: ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (Venkatraman 2007). Defenders of Islam note that many modern Muslims ignore the harsher aspects of Islam which are no longer considered ethical and are upset that Islamic Fundamentalism has come to be associated with a dogmatic, reactionary violent, brutal and anti-democracy movement that they believe is not representative of modern Islam.

Confucian Ethics It is believed that Confucius was born in 551 BCE. Confucius’ sayings, teachings and his conversations and exchanges with his disciples are recorded in the Analects (also referred to as Lunyu). Confucius claimed that he enjoyed a special and privileged

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relationship with Heaven and that, he had come to understand what Heaven had mandated for him and for mankind (Lunyu 2.4). His teachings focus on how a Chinese individual ideally should live their life and interact with others. Confucius believed that people live their lives within parameters firmly established by Heaven-heaven meaning both a Supreme Being and ‘nature’. He also believed men are responsible for their actions, especially for their treatment of others. Confucian ethics is largely a form of virtue ethics. Virtue is considered a form of moral power with three major associated concepts: dao. ren and junzi. Dao, which roughly translates as the path, refers to the way humans ought to live their lives. Ren has been variously translated with its essence being complete ethical virtue. Ren is the Confucian virtue denoting the good feeling of virtuous human experiences when being altruistic. Confucius taught that the practice of altruism was necessary for social cohesion and could be mastered only by those who have learned self-discipline. Learning self-restraint involves studying and mastering li, a Chinese concept often rendered as “ritual”. Junzi refers to a person whose humane conduct (ren) makes him a moral exemplar.

Virtues Virtue ethics is a system of ethics in which character is the primary emphasis for how an individual and society should guide their lives. Confucius conceived of virtue as a kind of moral power that allows one to win a following without recourse to physical force. Confucian ethics de-emphasizes legal coercion as a method for guiding people and instead puts the emphasis on moral exhortation and inspiration by way of example (most famously, 2.3 of the Analects, which emphasizes the necessity of a ruler’s guiding his people by instilling in them a sense of shame rather than by the threat of external punishment). Elsewhere in the Analects he suggests that the primary locus of virtue is to be found in how people treat each other in the fabric of everyday life and not in the dramatic moral dilemmas often discussed in contemporary Western moral philosophy. Confucius based his system of ethics on six virtues: xi, zhi, li, yi, wen, and ren. Each of these attributes has a different meaning and focus, allowing any person to easily focus on an area for improvement or meditation. Xi Xi is the attribute of learning. Someone who meditates on the concept of xi is one who has a natural capacity or desire to learn. This virtue is important due to the danger of ignorance. One who is ignorant or does not desire to learn, is in danger of leading a foolish existence and spreading folly among other people. The act of learning and living in wisdom brings with it virtue and a meaningful, impactful life. Confucius famously said, “He who learns but does not think is lost. He who thinks but does not learn is in great danger” (Lunyu 2.15).

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Zhi Zhi is the virtue of character. Confucius likens the project of cultivating one’s character to crafting something fine from raw material (Analects 1.15). The closest translation of zhi is the substance of which one is made or their basic makeup. This can refer to the physical construction of a person, but is more about the character of that person. Zhi states that a person is created neither good nor bad, but is free to choose how he or she will learn, grow, and progress. For example, someone might be born into a family of criminals, but it is up to them whether they will chose a path of immorality or morality. Li Li, which has been translated as rites or ritual, is about community and one’s interaction and responsibilities toward those around him. Li is mostly about how people behave toward each other and treat each other. This concept is closely related to fairness and justice in a community. The idea is that the more fair and just someone is, the more these virtues will spread and bring about a more fair and just society. Li, is often rendered as “ritual”, “proper conduct,” or “propriety.” Li includes filial and ancestral piety and respect for the performance of traditional forms of conduct. In the Analects ritual includes ceremonies of ancestor worship, the burial of parents, and the rules governing respectful and appropriate behavior between parents and children. The word eventually came to cover a broad range of customs and practices that spelled out courteous and respectful behavior of many different kinds. Engaging in ritual, learning to perform it properly and with the right attitudes of respect while performing it, is to engage in a kind of cutting, carving, polishing and grinding of the self. One of the most distinctive marks of Confucian ethics is the centrality of ritual performance in the ethical cultivation of character. Li was very important to Confucius. The centrality of filial piety is one of the most distinctive characteristics of Confucian ethics. In the Analects (2.6) Confucius says to give parents no cause for anxiety other than illness; it also emphasizes (2.7) the need for the material support of parents to be carried out in a respectful manner and says (2.8) that it is the expression on one’s face that is filial and not just taking on the burden of work or letting elders partake of the wine and food before others. Confucius says, “Do not disobey,” but when queried further as to his meaning, he explains obedience in terms of conformance to the rites for burying and sacrificing to deceased parents. Confucius says that when one disagrees with one’s parents, one should remonstrate with them gently. Most translations of what follows have Confucius concluding that if parents are not persuaded, one should not oppose them though it might very well fail to be of service to parents if following their wishes is to bring moral disgrace to them and the family. Yi Yi is usually translated as morality. But, there are many connotations that emerge from this simple definition, such as righteousness and duty. Yi basically comes down to the right action or the treatment of others in a right way. For example, if someone

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is in need and weak, the right action would be to help that person, not to oppress them for financial or personal gain. Virtue should take precedence over satisfaction of material desires. Wen Wen is about leisure and self development. Within any society, pursuits such as art, music, poetry, and other types of recreation or self improvement are important. Wen is the concept of spreading beauty and meaning through developmental pursuits. However, wen is not interested in these pursuits as mere self-aggrandizement, but as a way to affect other people and society as a whole in meaningful and significant way.

Comments on Confucian Ethics Confucian ethics is largely based, on how one should behave and in this regard provides a different understanding of morality. Instead of the approach of Western ethics which typically relies on abstract principles and rules its focus is on a society’s customs and practices and the character of its citizens. Confucian ethics is more deeply rooted in how one lives their life than in complex rationality. By claiming man can change his behavior Confucian ethics implies man has free will, a subject debated in Western philosophy. A secular ethical theory, virtue ethics, has similarities with Confucian ethics and shares a similar problem—the selection of which behaviors should be deemed virtues is ultimately arbitrary; also, in some situations virtues may conflict with each other. Confucian ethics provides a distinctive, almost pre-theoretical alternative to understanding the nature of the moral life that differs from the Western understanding that is primarily based on abstract rules and principles. Much of the substance of ethically significant attitudes such as respect, honesty and filial piety reflects cultural norms and practices. Learning Confucian morality involves learning these norms and practices; what Confucius taught is what he thought these norms and practices should be. For Confucius a society’s morality is to be found in its customs and practices and how people lead their lives. There is an aesthetic dimension to the Confucian notion of a fully human life. Such a life is lived as a beautiful and graceful coordinated interaction with others that expresses mutual respect and contextualized moral judgment. This aesthetic value of human interaction according to custom and tradition is missing in the colder, rational approach of Western ethics. A criticism of Confucian ethics is that humans are influenced by the situation in which they act which might overwhelm the force of their character; for this reason Confucian ethics advises a long and arduous program of ethical and ritual training (li) to inculcate the virtues. Virtue ethics may be imperfect but that is true of other moral theories.

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Confucian rituals help to express attitudes of respect and reverence for others that can exist independently of the rituals themselves, but rituals provide conventionally established, symbolic ways to express these attitudes toward others. Ritual forms, therefore, give participants manifold and regularly recurring ways to act on and therefore to strengthen the right attitudes and behavioral dispositions. Given the renewed appreciation in contemporary psychology for the power of emotions to influence attitude and behavior, the resource offered by ritual training should not be ignored by anyone concerned about the problem of how to resist inappropriate situational influence (Wong 2018; Riegel 2013).

Hindu Ethics Morality is part of the complex, difficult to define concept Hindus call Dharma which encompasses everything that is essential for people, the world and nature to exist and prosper together in harmony. The term “Dharma” does not have a synonym in the English language. It can mean justice, right, moral, good, and much more. Dharma is an important concept and is what distinguishes man from other creatures. Dharma incorporates the metaphysical and practical wisdom of the Hindus. The central philosophical and moral concepts of Hinduism are contained in ancient Indian Sanskrit scriptures called Vedas and Upanishads. Ethics in Hindu philosophy is something that cannot be imposed, but is realized and voluntarily lived up to by each individual. Man is understood to have four values in life: success (artha); passion and desire (kama); virtue (dharma) and self perfection (moksa). Hindu literature variously discusses morality in four contexts: (1) Gunas, that is inner tendencies of conduct found in every individual (psychology); (2) Purushartha, the proper aims of life for every individual for self-development and happiness; (3) Ashramas, ethics for an individual in different periods of one’s lifetime; and (4) Varnasramas, ethics and conduct for every individual in relation to society. Hindu ethics is concerned with self-realization and spiritual freedom and is intimately involved with how one lives their life; it also recognizes there are distinct periods of life. Virtuous behavior in Hindu ethics (Niyamas) includes: purity in body, speech and mind (Sanca), contentment, acceptance of circumstances with optimism; (Santosha); perseverance, meditation, austerity (Tapas); lifelong learning (Swadhyaya) and the right attitude, and contemplation (Pranidhan). Other Hindu virtues include courage, forgiveness, inner purity, wisdom, reflective prudence, freedom from anger. Hindus should avoid the five Yamas (ethical rules) of ancient Hindu ethics: violence, falsehoods, stealing, sexual intercourse if unmarried and cheating on one’s partner if married, and possessiveness. Also not killing, stealing nor hoarding up treasures. The Bhagavad Gita, a historic 700 verse Hindu discussion of virtues and an allegorical debate on what is right and what is wrong argues some virtues are not necessarily always absolute, but sometimes relational; for example, it explains an important

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virtue such as non-violence (Ahimsa) must be re-examined when one is faced with war or violence. Hinduism has a strong spiritual component. Hindu incorporates morality into the broader context of an individual’s material and spiritual life (Crawford 2018). The highest Hindu ideal is a state of liberation (moksa)-one without craving, one that is content, and one attained through knowledge and by abstaining from evil. The ultimate Hindu goal is a life, “absolute and transcendental”, similar to Buddha’s Nirvana. That mystical state reveals the essential nature of the soul as pure existence (sat), pure consciousness (cit) and pure bliss (dnanda) (Crawford 2018). Ethical behavior in Hindu theology comes with the ultimate reward of a transcendental state of being.

Caste System In ancient and medieval Indian society a caste system, called varna-dharma consisting of four castes was developed. There has been debate over the origins of the caste system. Controversy exists over whether its origin should primarily be attributed to the four varnas in the ancient law book, Manusmriti, or simply to socioeconomic factors. The highest in the caste system were the Brahmins who were priests and teachers and lived on an exalted plain of intellect and probity. The next level of importance included the Kshatriyas who were stereotypically virile warrior kings and men of action. In the third level were the Vaisyas who were traders and craftsmen. The lowest level included the Sudras who tended to be manual laborers. Outside the caste system were the “Untouchables”. Untouchables were too lowly for the caste system and were assigned menial and unpleasant jobs. Untouchables could not own land, could not use temples, could not use high caste wells, and had to live outside villages (Hoff and Pandey 2004). Scholars have claimed the caste system violates Hindu dharma where only virtue counts. When India became independent in 1947 its Constitution abrogated the caste system; however, discrimination by caste persisted. During British colonial rule a census of people and their caste was used to determine job suitability (Wikipedia Contributors 2019). The persistence of a caste system in India was an injustice that persisted for thousands of years despite Hindu morality that should have deemed it unethical.

Conclusion Amalgamated in most religions are rules that define appropriate behavior that essentially constitute a system of morality. Since billions of people adhere or have over the eons adhered to a religion, this suggests many humans are accepting of guidance on appropriate ethical behavior. Most religions either believe in a deity or an extremely authoritative figure—Moses, Christ, the Buddha, Muhammad, Confucious—which

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endows religious beliefs with an apparent authoritative basis lacking in secular ethics. Secular ethics probably lacks the spirituality, imagination, and richness of religious ethics which more deeply and specifically incorporates morality into the fabric of an individual’s material and spiritual life. This advantage over secular ethics is problematic to the extent that the actual existence of a deity, or a person or scripture capable of conveying a deity’s wishes, can be questioned. Religion has been misused to provide justification for troublesome or frankly immoral acts; for example, that innocent people should die for the cause of Islamic jihad and the persistence of a caste system in India for thousands of years despite its being contrary to Hindu morality. Religious morality is not always kind to the infidel and discrimination, hatred and violence (religious wars) between religions has been common. Religions have mandated severe and unusual punishments such as caning, stoning, and burning a person at the stake. Amputations for theft in Shariah law are not a humane form of justice. Religions can manipulate Biblical statements, for example, when they forbid life-saving blood transfusion that might have prevented the death of innocent believers. Religion has been used to question well-established science, such as evolution. Many religions have a long history and may have less flexibility in changing ethical standards that evolve over time. Despite these problems a significant portion of the population identifies with a religion. Religious ethics need to be both appropriately scrutinized and appropriately respected. Religions have promoted spirituality, devised systems of morality, provided comfort, and tried to guide its adherents toward an ethical and meaningful life. But religions have also spawned hatred, warred against each other with untold millions killed and maimed. Religion has imposed harsh punishments including canings, amputations, burnings at the stake, torture, beheadings and other forms of execution. Wars between religions have not been uncommon; religions have often acted in violation of their own moral rules. Secular moralities tend to be less violent, but their diversity of opinion has provoked moral debate, political disagreement, and in some of its plodding debates boredom and confusion. Because secular and religious ethics can both go astray, perhaps they should scrutinize each other.

References Bernat, James. 2008. Ethical Issues in Neurology, 3rd ed. Wolters Kluwer: Lippincott Williams and Wilkins. Buddha Dharma Education Association and BuddhaNet. 2019. Buddhist Ethics. https://buddhanet. net/e-learning/budethics.htm. Accessed 31 March 2019. Callahan, Daniel. 2007. Religion and Bioethics in Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology. University Press of New England. Crawford, S. Cromwell. 2018. Hindu Ethics Albany:SUNY Press. http://www.sunypress.edu/pdf/ 60778.pdf. Accessed 1 April 2019.

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Dawkins, Richard. 2013. The Root of Evil. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8nAos1M-_Ts. Accessed 31 March 2019. Delfino, Robert A. 2015. The Failure of New Atheism. Morality Studia Gilsoniana 4 (3): 229–240. El Fadi, Khaled Abou. 2017. Our’anic Ethics and Islamic Law. Journal of Islamic Ethics 1 (1–2): 7–28. Gert, Bernard. 1966. Morality. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hackett, Conrad and McClendon, David. Pew Research Center. 2007. Christians remain world’s largest religious group, but they are declining in Europe. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/ 2017/04/05/christians-remain-worlds-largest-religious-group-but-they-are-declining-in-europe/. Accessed 31 March 2019. Hoff, Karla and Pandey, Priyanka. 2004. Belief Systems and Durable Inequalities: An Experimental Investigation of Indian Caste. Policy Research Working Paper;No.3351. World Bank, Washington, D.C. Islamic Sharia Law. 2018. http://www.billionbibles.org/sharia/sharia-law.html Accessed 11 June 2018. Israel and Judaic Studies, Core Ethical Teachings of Judaism. www.ijs.org.au/Accessed. March 31, 2019. Jewish Virtual Library. 2019. The Israel War of Independence: The Capture of Deir Yassin. April 9, 1948. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-capture-of-deir-yassin. Accessed 1 April 2019. Kuhse, Helga, and Peter Singer. 2006. Introduction to Bioethics: An Anthology. Hoboken New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing. Murphy, Mark. 2019. The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/natural-lawethics/. Accessed 23 November 2019. O’Brien. 2019. The Four Divine States or Four Immeasurables:loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. https://www.thoughtco.com/brahma-vihara-the-four-divine-states449717. Accessed 31 March 2019. Pratt, Douglas. 2010. Religion and Terrorism: Christian Fundamentalism and Extremism. Terrorism and Political Violence 22 (3): 438–456. Riegel, Jeffrey. 2013. Confucious. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, Edward N. https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=confucius. Accessed 1 April 2019. Sia, Santiago. 2008. Ethics and Religion. New Blackfriars 89 (no. 1024): 702–09. http://www.jstor. org/stable/43251280. Accessed 31 March 2019. Veatch, Robert M. 2012. Religious Medical Ethics: Revealed and Natural Alternatives in Hippocratic, Religious and Secular Medical Ethics Washington DC: Georgetown University Press 2012. Venkatraman, Amritha. 2007. Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpretations. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (3): 229–248. White, Matthew. 2012. The Great Big Book of Horrible Things New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company. Wikipedia Contributors. “Talmud,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/ index.php?title=Talmud&oldid=889522711. Accessed 31 March 2019. Wikipedia Contributors. 2019. “Religion,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.wikipedia. org/w/index.php?title=Religion&oldid=889713770. Accessed 31 March 2019. Wikipedia Contributors. 2010. “Scopes Trial,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en. wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Scopes_Trial&oldid=890057834. Accessed 31 March 2019. Wikipedia Contributors. “Ethics in religion,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en. wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ethics_in_religion&oldid=884224442. Accessed 31 March 2019. Wikipedia Contributors. “Caste system in India,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en. wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Caste_system_in_India&oldid=890118325. Accessed 1 April 2019.

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Wong, David. 2018. Chinese Ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=ethics-chinese. Accessed 1 April 2019. Zoloth, Laurie Religion and the Public Discourse of Bioethics. 2007. In: Biomedical Ethics: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and Biology. University Press of New England.

Chapter 8

Morality and the Law

Abstract Several conflicting philosophic positions attempt to describe the appropriate relationship between morality and the law. Relevant legal theories include political anarchism, legal naturalism, and legal positivism. Political anarchism, which is grounded in moral claims of individual liberties, has its roots in the fear of an oppressive state; it advocates individual liberty and bases human flourishing on the ideal of a non-coercive consensus. Legal naturalism is derived by reason from the nature of man who is expressed as having been created by God. The introduction of religiously derived legal doctrine is problematic. Legal positivism, a reaction to legal naturalism seeks to avoid metaphysical and moral beliefs that are inaccessible to objective proof; it does not believe the law should be influenced by moral considerations. Three horrific laws that affected slaves, American Indians, and Jews illustrate the dangers of law when moral consideration is considered irrelevant.

Introduction Although peer pressure, moral persuasion, and a troubled conscience can motivate proper behavior, those influences are often dwarfed by the power of the law which can inflict punishment. The law in the United States may express itself from several “sources”; these include federal, state and municipal statutes, case law, judicial opinions, administrative regulations, and judicial interpretation of constitutional rights and responsibilities. The relationship between the law and morality is controversial. The philosophically relevant question is the role of morality in the construction and administration of the law itself; “is there a necessary connection between law and morality”? I will discuss three legal theories that purport to describe the proper relationship between law and morality. Political anarchism claims the law is itself immoral. Legal naturalism, accepts moral judgments based on natural law. Legal positivism holds the law should essentially rely on legal “sources” because morality has no place in the law.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_8

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Political Anarchism Political anarchism, which is grounded in moral claims of individual liberties, is skeptical of power and authority, especially the power of the state. Political anarchism advocates individual liberty and bases human flourishing on the ideal of a non-coercive consensus. Some political anarchists believe, “it is of the essence of law to have features which render it inconsistent with morality; hence the law is essentially immoral” (Fiala 2018). This provocative statement has been softened by some theorists to mean legal authorities do not have moral authority. Political anarchists claim the law demands obedience even when the law differs from an individual’s moral judgment and thus is inconsistent with a person’s moral autonomy which requires people to accept responsibility for their actions. Hobbes described the horrors of living in the anarchist state of nature; in contrast, anarchists fear the oppressive, violent and corrupt nature of the state (Gert 2010). The discussion of morality and the law has its nuances because all sides are able to make exceptions to their predominant position. Legal naturalists who believe the law can be morally good admit some laws are evil. Political anarchists could accept a particular law if they believed they should obey that law and were not being coerced. All positions admit the law can be corrupted and put to evil use (Raz 2003). It would be difficult to imagine a stable society with no laws; that may explain why political anarchism has not established firm roots.

Natural Law and Legal Naturalism Natural law is a prominent aspect of Catholic theology. It was most notably elaborated by Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274) who was influenced by the teachings of Aristotle who recognized the distinctiveness of human reason. Natural law in its religious formulation affirms the laws of nature were dictated by God and are superior to all else in obligation (See Chap. 7). The Bible says there are laws of nature that describe the way God normally accomplishes his will in the universe (Jeremiah 33:25). Natural law is a crucial obligation for believers because natural law originates with God. In recent years some writers have acknowledged the value of natural law without including its Godgiven status (Murphy 2019). Human practical reason is said to be capable of revealing God’s natural law concerning how we should act. Natural law followers claim Natural law theory allows moral propositions to be objectively judged as true or false (Himma 2019). A variety of values or “goods” have been considered consistent with natural law. Thomas Hobbes’ central natural law thesis is that the dominant human desire is to avoid violent death. His natural law theory is based on the value of self-preservation. The Aristotelian perspective on natural law values what is perfective or completing of man life. Other postulated “goods” of natural law include procreation, religion,

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knowledge for its own sake, friendship and sociability, the ability to reason correctly about what is best for yourself and act on those decisions, whatever man likes and desires, justice, avoidance of pain, being in harmony with other people and aesthetic experience. In Natural legalism the authority of legal standards derives from the moral merit of those and other similarly derived natural law “goods” (Finnis 2016; McCarthy 2015). Froude said, “Our human laws are but the copies, more or less imperfect, of the eternal laws”. These laws have been said to be derived from “the nature of humans and as abstracted from reason” (Kirk 1993). Law not grounded in these standards is “not really law”. The philosophical legacy of Thomas Aquinas, regards natural law as good in its nature (Raz 2003). No human laws have validity if they are contrary to natural law. In general, natural law legal theories consider the law authoritative in virtue of its moral content. The classical theory of Thomas Aquinas finds overlap between natural law morality and natural law legal theories. The idea that natural law morality and the law intersect in some way has been called the Overlap Thesis. Natural law legal theorists embrace the idea that the law and morality should be conjoined and morality should influence the law (Himma 2019). Definition of which values are derived from natural law can differ amongst people. Natural law opposes abortion, contraception, especially for unmarried couples; it has also opposed gay and LGBT rights, including same sex marriage. A concern is the use of natural law by judges (Murray 2014). Natural law incorporated in the legal system is problematic because laws affect everyone, including people who do not believe in natural law.

Legal Positivism Legal positivism is a philosophy of law that addresses the question of what criteria make a law legally valid. Phrased more specifically it also asks “is there a necessary connection between law and morality?” Legal positivism is in opposition to natural law legal theory because legal positivists believe morality should not be a criteria of legal validity. This does not mean legal positivists are indifferent to morality or are tolerant of immoral laws. The relevant question is whether morality should shape the law and guide its functioning. Legal positivists believe law belongs in its own domain because law is a social fact with validity based on its establishment by some socially recognized legal authority (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c). “According to legal positivism, law is a matter of what has been posited, ordered, decided, practiced, or tolerated”. Legal positivism is the view that the law is a complex social practice. “The validity of a legal norm depends, not on the moral value attached thereto, but from its sources as determined by a social community’s rules and conventions” (Green 2018). The “normatively inert” position of legal positivism might suggest an indifference to morality. Legal positivists do not claim morality is not important; they are saying

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morality should not be used as a criteria for legal validity. Because morality can be contentious, controversial and immune to empirical proof it’s understandable that legal positivists might want to keep the law free of potentially destabilizing moral convictions. According to legal positivism, law is a matter of what has been posited, ordered, decided, practiced, and tolerated. Legal positivists believe that intellectual clarity is best achieved by leaving contentious moral questions to a separate investigation. However, the relationship between morality and the law is complicated. Legal positivists would prefer a wall that separates morality and the law but in many ways the two are intertwined (Green 2018). The thesis of legal positivism has been summarized in three theoretical commitments: The Social Fact Thesis asserts legal validity is ultimately a function of certain social facts, such as the promulgations of a legislature. The Conventionality Thesis emphasizes law’s validity is the result of a social convention; the social facts giving rise to legal validity are authoritative in virtue of a social convention such as an agreement among officials or an agreement to follow a constitution. The Separability Thesis claims there is no conceptual overlap between the notions of law and morality. The Separability Thesis is “just the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws satisfy the demands of morality though they often do so (Himma 2019). The position of legal positivists is the legal system should be a closed system in which appropriate legal decisions can be deduced from predetermined legal sources without reference to morality. The validity of a legal norm depends on its legal source as determined by a social community’s rules, conventions, and the actions of judges. Legal positivists value empirical evidence and recognize morality as metaphysical and inaccessible to objective proof. Moral judgments, unlike factual statements, cannot be proven valid. Legal positivists prefer addressing the “merits” of a law as a separate issue; it may be a “bad law” but if it was added to the system by a legitimate authority, it is still a law. For legal positivists the authority of a law is based on its legal ancestry, not its morality (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c). An important reason for denying a connection between law and morality takes into account the variability of ethical beliefs. If judges and other agents of the law were left to decide which laws were unjust there might be chaos given the diversity of moral opinions. A county jailer should not let a prisoner go free simply because he thinks the prisoner is a victim of an immoral law. Legal positivists prefer the “merits” of a law be treated as a separate issue. Similar consideration would hold for religious beliefs. Religiously based moral teachings such as prohibitions against artificial contraception and abortion, have been advocated for legalization. This has created controversy, societal division and impassioned debate. Morality as expressed in sacred texts such as the Bible, the Torah and the Koran would not be considered by legal positivists to be a sufficient basis for legal validity. Finnis claims law cannot solely be based on social facts and that some norms are required (Finnis 2016).

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Immoral Laws There have been many immoral laws, both in the United States and elsewhere. I will briefly summarize three examples. These cases should provoke some uneasiness over the legal positivist position that there should be no connection between law and morality. The Fugitive Slave Act was passed by the United States Congress on September 18, 1850, as part of the Compromise of 1850 between Southern slave-holding interests and Northern Free-Soilers; the Free Soil party rejected slavery. The act required that all escaped slaves, upon capture, be returned to their masters and that officials and citizens of free states had to cooperate. Abolitionists nicknamed it the “Bloodhound Law”, for the dogs that were used to track down runaway slaves (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c). Andrew Jackson had long been an advocate of what he called “Indian removal.” As an Army general, he had spent years leading brutal campaigns against the Creeks in Georgia and Alabama and the Seminoles in Florida—campaigns that resulted in the transfer of hundreds of thousands of acres of land from Indian nations to white farmers. As President, he continued this crusade. In 1830, he signed the Indian Removal Act, which gave the federal government the power to exchange Native held land east of the Mississippi for land to the west. President Jackson and his government frequently ignored the letter of the law and forced Native Americans to vacate lands they had lived on for generations. In the winter of 1831, under threat of invasion by the U.S. Army, the Choctaw became the first nation to be expelled from its land altogether. They made the journey to Indian territory on foot without adequate food, supplies or other help from the government. Thousands of people died along the way. It was, one Choctaw leader said, a “trail of tears and death” (History.com Editors 2018). The Nuremberg Laws were anti-Semitic racial laws passed in Nazi Germany by the Reichstag on September 15, 1935. There were two laws: the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour, which forbade marriages and extramarital intercourse between Jews and Germans and forbad employment of German females under 45 in Jewish households. The second law, the Reich Citizenship Law, declared that only those of German or related blood were eligible to be Reich citizens; the remainder were classified as state subjects, without citizenship rights. Persons convicted of violating the marriage laws were imprisoned, and upon completing their sentences were re-arrested by the Gestapo and sent to Nazi concentration camps (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c). In defense of legal positivism these cases were influenced by factors other than the absence of moral considerations. These include ignoring the letter of the law (Indian Removal Act), political considerations (Fugitive Slave Act) and a virulently anti-Semitic dictatorship (Nuremberg Laws). Legal positivists hold that morality should not be used to establish legal validity and that an immoral law was, nonetheless, “a law”. A criticism of legal positivism is that it over emphasizes the rules and makes too great a separation between legal and

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moral judgments (Greenawalt 2012). Cases of the type just described should elicit caution before advocating the complete separation of law and morality. Legal positivists are aware that laws can be oppressive, even evil yet they accept the separation of law and morality.

The Obligation to Obey Joseph Raz, a legal, moral and political philosopher is a legal positivist. He says “the general virtues and moral properties of legal systems as a whole justify a general obligation to obey them; the obligation to be obedient comes from the main systemic features of the law”. He recognizes the great value of human societies and a moral need for those societies to be governed by authority. A general duty to obey the law does not rely on the moral quality of every standard. Raz acknowledges there can be morally degenerate and radically evil laws and acknowledges that morally bad laws can be laws. Raz deals with the problem of immoral laws using the concept of legitimate authority. Those who control power must show they have legitimate authority for there to be an obligation to obey their laws. Raz’s requirements for obedience include: 1. The authority does its job successfully. 2. Laws must not exceed a government’s authority by straying into areas not in its relevant domain. 3. A government must be a just legal system that facilitates conforming with reason (Raz 2003). Raz is trying to resolve the problem of bad laws for a philosophy that denies the relevance of moral considerations. He does this by denying legitimacy to authorities who promulgate inappropriate laws. Instead of a direct focus on immoral laws, the need to make morality relevant is avoided by identifying the problem as due to its origin in the illegitimate legal system from which it emanated. Raz says there is no obligation to obey an illegitimate law. Raz’s main focus is not on the immoral nature of a law but on the legitimacy of the promulgating legal authority. This amounts to a philosophical sleight of hand. It also creates a public burden because refusing to obey an illegitimate law can have adverse consequences; it would be simpler and preferable if a law’s morality was considered prior to its enactment. Green says, “the laws of a legal system may be quite unjust, and the state may be quite illegitimate. As a result, there may be no obligation to obey them (Green 2018). The limitation of this argument is that there are unjust laws that people are not free to disobey. The Indians of Andrew Jackson’s day could either accept removal from their lands or face the power of the American army. Fugitive slaves were returned to slavery. The Jews of Nazi Germany were annihilated in the Holocaust. Legal positivists can present the option of disobeying an unjust law but cannot guarantee protection from its possible severe, even deadly, consequences.

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Nuanced Morality Although legal positivists have argued against incorporation of morality in the legal system, moral elements have been described that are intrinsic to the law. The law is a morally valuable system by its nature because it can be used for moral ends. People prosper in human societies; the law’s virtue is to place a legitimate moral authority over its subjects. “The law can be a constitutive component of valuable social groups”. Intrinsic features of law have been said to have moral dimensions. The law generally has rules so issues can be resolved uniformly. It advocates its rules be understandable and rules people are expected to observe be made publically available. The law usually does not mandate rules incapable of being followed. The legal positivist H.L.A. Hart acknowledges that a minimum of justice is required when behavior is controlled. The position that the nature of law has a moral component because it aims to serve the common good has been qualified by the contention that the “typical use of law is to maintain power and privilege and to oppress” (Greenawalt 2012). Hart, the legal positivist, acknowledged that any society’s moral and legal systems would by necessity overlap. For example, the killing of innocent people and theft would connect the law and morality. Positivists would have to overlook examples of this type to maintain the view that no connection exists between law and morality. Dworkin maintains that judges dealing with difficult cases must rely on principles that have a mixed legal and moral status. Judges have discretion and must decide which decision best fits the legal material; in making this judgment a judge might make a choice that takes account of moral concerns. Thus, perhaps to the chagrin of legal positivists, there is an internal morality to the law which intertwines legal and moral judgments (Greenawalt 2012). Raz, argued that the validity of a law can never depend on its morality. However, Raz has come to accept that law may depend upon morality in certain circumstances (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c). Judges have discretion and must decide which decision best fits the legal material; in making this judgment a judge might make a choice that takes account of moral concerns. For example, a judge who decides whether a punishment is cruel and unusual must make some kind of moral judgment (Greenawalt 2012). An example noted by Ronald Dworkin of the interaction of law and morality is the Court of Appeals of New York case, Riggs v. Palmer (Riggs 1889). Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Preston sought to invalidate the will of their father Francis E. Palmer. Mr. Palmer’s will left the bulk of his estate to his grandson Elmer. The will was legally valid. According to New York State law Elmer was entitled to inherit. What complicated this case was that Elmer, fearful his grandfather might change his will, used poison to murder him. Elmer was convicted of his grandfather’s murder and imprisoned (Leiter 2009). The legislators who wrote the statute relevant to wills probably would not have intended for a murderer to benefit from his crime. Elmer was not awarded his inheritance because the court decided it could make an exception to avoid an unjust and

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absurd result. The court employed the moral principle, “one cannot benefit from one’s own wrong doing” in reaching its decision (Wikipedia Contributors 2019a, b, c). Although legal positivism rejects the intrusion of morality in a legal system, at times circumstances make that difficult because there are principles intrinsic to law that have a moral dimension (Leiter 2009). Ronald Dworkin, a critic of legal positivism, notes the Riggs case is an example of how the law and morality can interact. Dworkin has claimed legal positivism does not account for theoretical disagreement. In the Rigg’s case controversy existed over whether a valid legal statute or an equitable moral principle should take precedence. Dworkin claims that in addition to rules and statutes equitable principles may be required to adjudicate legal cases. This may entail, contrary to legal positivism theory, the introduction in a legal case of a connection between law and morality (Beehler 1990).

Conclusion The position of legal anarchists is difficult to accept because lawlessness can lead to chaos, violent crime, robbery, vigilante hunts for alleged criminals, rebellion, and undemocratic and tyrannical responses to the unlawfulness. Although anarchists may make a valid theoretical point, the absence of law, can have painful undesirable consequences and cannot be enthusiastically embraced. Natural law is originally derived from a theological doctrine; in a religiously diverse society, especially one that explicitly advocates the separation of church and state, its implementation is unsettling. Legal positivism rejects a relationship between morality and the law and struggles because the two are not so readily separable.

References Beehler, Rodger. 1990. Legal Positivism, Social Rules, and Riggs v. Palmer. Law and Philosophy 9: 265–293. Fiala, Andrew. 2018. Anarchism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/anarchism/. Finnis, John. 2016. Natural Law Theories. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/naturallaw-theories/. Accessed November 30, 2019. Gert, Bernard. 2010. Hobbes. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press. Green, Leslie. 2019. Legal Positivism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/legalpositivism/. Accessed 18 Jan 2019. Greenawalt, Kent. 2012. Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features of Legal Positivism in The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism. ed. Robert P. George. Oxford Scholarship Online. Available at http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198253457.001. 0001/acprof-9780198253457-chapter-1. Accessed 22 Jan 2019.

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Himma, Kenneth Einar. Natural Law. 2019. Naturalistic Epistemology. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002, https://www.iep.utm.edu/. Accessed 17 Jan 2019. History.com Editors. 2018. Trail of Tears. Available at https://www.history.com/topics/nativeamerican-history/trail-of-tears. Kirk, Russell. 1993. The Case For and Against Natural Law. The Heritage Foundation. July 15, 1993. Available at https://www.heritage.org/political-process/report/the-case-and-against-natural-law. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Leiter, Brian. 2009. Explaining Theoretical Disagreement. Chicago Law Review Chicago Unbound, 76: 1215–1231. Available at https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol76/iss3/5/ Accessed 24 Jan 2019. McCarthy, Hugh. 2015. ASC Blog. A Summary of John Finniss Theory of Natural Law. Available at https://hughmccarthylawscienceasc.wordpress.com/2015/01/03/a-summaryof-john-finniss-theory-of-natural-law/. Accessed 30 Nov 2019. Murphy, Mark. 2019. The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/ entries/natural-law-ethics/. Murray, Anthony. 2014. When Judges Believe in ‘Natural Law’. The Atlantic. 27 Jan 2014. Available at https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/01/when-judges-believe-in-naturallaw/283311/. Accessed 1 Dec 2019. Raz, Joseph. 2003. About Morality and the Nature of Law. The American Journal of Jurisprudence 48 (1): 1–16. Riggs v. Palmer 115 N.Y. 506 (1889). Wikipedia Contributors. 2019a. Legal Positivism. Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. https://en. wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Legal_positivism&oldid=869079462. Accessed 18 Jan 2019. Wikipedia Contributors. 2019b. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Fugitive_Slave_Act_of_1850&oldid=878571943. Accessed 25 Jan 2019. Wikipedia contributors. 2019c. Nuremberg Laws. Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. https://en. wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Nuremberg_Laws&oldid=879322790. Accessed 25 Jan 2019.

Chapter 9

Evil

Abstract The existence of immoral behavior and evil expose the vulnerability of morality; both persist despite centuries of moral discourse. The existence of evil has been a vexing problem for believers in an all knowing, omnipotent and beneficent God. The study of atrocities such as the Holocaust, the My Lai massacre, the Armenian genocide, killings by the Khymer Rouge, and the “disappearances” in Argentina have helped define some of the causes of evil. Responsibility for evil acts can often be traced to individual personality factors and the action of individuals, especially those in a position of power. Human behavior can be difficult to predict. Individuals previously considered ordinary have participated in evil acts. Under identical circumstances some individuals can behave admirably while others do not. A human tendency to place obedience to authority over moral concerns and the capacity to accept killing as not extraordinary foster the persistence of evil. Social situational variables can contribute to the emergence of evil behavior. Prevailing circumstances, such as extreme social disorganization, economic distress and major political divisions, have facilitated evil acts. Malicious ideology and propaganda with the dehumanization of out groups can inflame passions and has played a significant role in genocide; for example the virulent anti-Semitism that preceded the Holocaust.

Introduction The Oxford English Dictionary defines evil as, “profoundly immoral and wicked”. Studies that seek a deeper exploration of evil admit, “which experiences justify when the word evil is to be used as a descriptor is no easy matter”. Staub, a psychologist, says, evil is not a scientific concept with an agreed meaning but, “The essence of evil is the destruction of human beings” (p. 25, Staub 1989). Gert has defined evil as “what all rational persons desire to avoid for themselves personally” (pp. 50–51, Gert 1988). He lists the consequences of evil—death, pain, disability, loss of freedom and loss of pleasure—but otherwise doesn’t define evil. Zimbardo believes, “human beings are both good and evil beings at the same time” and evil refers to “behaving in ways that harm, abuse, demean, dehumanize, or destroy innocent others” (p. 5, Flescher 2013). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 D. Steinberg, The Multidisciplinary Nature of Morality and Applied Ethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45680-1_9

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I have included a chapter on evil in a book on morality because evil represents the gross suppression of morality; the existence of evil is an alert to the vulnerability of morality. An understanding of the genesis of evil might help prevent it.

Evil: Circumstances, Values and Beliefs A person’s only option might be theft to pay for a son’s life saving surgery. We might consider theft immoral; however, for the involved parent, in the hierarchy of values, saving his son’s life is justifiably paramount. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has barbarically beheaded innocent aid workers, burned a captured pilot alive and murdered prisoners of war. These acts are immoral acts. However, if we could penetrate the mind of the ISIS members who committed these atrocities we might find that they did not consider their actions unethical. For them the highest order value might be the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East. If in their minds the heinous acts they commit are considered necessary to bring that about their priority value they can act in the false belief their behavior, if its motivation was understood, would be judged moral. Values can promote evil behavior; of course, believing you are acting morally does not make evil acts moral. Evil can be the result of a false belief. Innocent women have been hanged because of the mistaken belief they were “witches” practicing witchcraft. Ruse questions whether our sense of morality is not yet another selfish adaptation and as cynics have argued “humans have done more harm in the name of morality than have any number of snakes, poisonous or otherwise” (Ruse 1988). Flack and deWaal note, “Ironically, morality and immorality make use of the same capacities” (Flack and deWaal 2000). Empathy can be used to ameliorate suffering or to inflict cruelty. Natural selection is morally blind. It has provided the capacity to identify and protect values; it has given us the capacity for moral indignation when we believe our values have been violated. Misguided values can lead to evil acts.

God and Evil Evil has almost hypnotically commanded the attention of both religious and secular scholars as well as the general public. The Devil (Satan) serves as an avatar of evil. Religions that embrace an all knowing, all powerful and beneficent God have struggled with the pervasive evil and suffering on earth. After centuries of writings on moral philosophy and erudite explanations of how we ought to behave, the twentieth century was the bloodiest in human history and the current century, has experienced the killings of hundreds of thousands of innocent people. Both religious and secular efforts have failed to substantially suppress evil. There are different kinds of evil. Natural evil includes earthquakes, volcanoes and tornadoes to the extent they are not due to human activity or incompetence. Evil acts

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due to mental illness (“innocent by reason of insanity”) have a different genesis and are not considered here. Another form of evil is moral evil which is the subject of this discussion. Moral evil has been a problem for religion. If God is omniscient, omnipotent and beneficent he would not have permitted the extensive moral evil we have witnessed throughout history. Theodicy, is an answer to this conundrum and views evil as tantamount to the good in disguise or the good as unknowable. The word theodicy is a combination of the Greek words for God and justice and were linked by Gottfried Leibnitz (1646–1716) to mean “the justification of God” (pp. 79–79, Fleischer 1989). The challenge of theodicy is to reconcile the notion of God with the existence of evil. It has been defined as the vindication of divine goodness and providence in view of the existence of both evil and the “incongruity of merit and fate”. One thesis of theodicy is we emerge stronger having been tested by evil; evil makes the human experience meaningful and allows us to show fortitude and have genuine accountability. God allows us to suffer so we will know joy better. Evil ultimately serves as an agent for the good (Green 2018). The simultaneous existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and beneficent God and the Holocaust seems contradictory. One of the several explanations of evil is the Manichean model which sees a dichotomy between good and evil; the latter is symbolized by the devil (Satan) whose function is to tempt humans to sin. “The devil can score points against God by appealing to humanity’s base material nature and by corrupting human souls” (pp. 23–33, Flescher 2013). This leaves God less than all powerful- a point some have taken as heresy- but does not exclude his existence. Another explanation is because humans have been given free will they, not God, must take personal responsibility for their actions. Yet another explanation of evil is that unjust suffering on earth will be more than compensated in a future life (eschatological theodicy). The Holocaust has provoked considerable theological discussion and controversy (Wikipedia Contributors 2018a, b). Of course, the problem of God and evil becomes irrelevant if one does not believe in the existence of God or accepts God may not have the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence and beneficence. Another defense of God’s existence in the face of evil involves a minority and radical perspective on the nature of morality. Subjectivism is presented as “the view that the existence of every describable thing depends on an individual’s awareness and filtering of that thing through language and culture … and that no objective underlying reality exists” (pp. 120–121, Flescher 2013). That perspective limits evil to a sensory experience. David Hume (pp. 468–469, Hume 1738–1740) wrote that willful murder or any other action deemed vicious “creates a sentiment of disapprobation which arises in you…, not in the object”. “No thing that has meaning in the world is ever discovered; it is always created (p. 121, Flescher 2013)”. “Our sentiments, our preferences and passions … tell us what we should and should not do”. Subjectivism says our passions, not some universal reality determine our thoughts and we should be skeptical of concepts such as good and evil. Hume famously said, “reason is the slave of the passions”. If we accept that our moral principles are ultimately subjective the existence of an all knowing, all powerful and beneficent God is salvaged because evil is demoted to simply a creation of our minds (pp. 120–124, Flescher 2013).

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The radical philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, expressed in his book, Beyond Good and Evil, and other writings, is an extension of a subjectivism that supports the notion of evil as a human invention. Nietzsche expressed skepticism about conventional moral ideas. According to Nietzsche what motivates every idea or maxim is a self-interested struggle for power. For Nietzsche rational discourse is a fraud and in reality a struggle for power; there are no standard norms. Virtues are not to be regarded as intrinsically valuable, but judged from where their being considered intrinsically valuable gets us. Actions should be avoided because of their impact on our goals, not because of any intrinsic immorality; the feeling of guilt is the result of exploitation. Our moral norms reflect our strong moral preferences and our faith in them. Nietzsche (See Chapter 12) in his critique of moral and religious values says it is our passions that determine our norms which have to be considered in the historical context of their evolution. We should ask what was the end for which a character trait was cultivated by those in power. He views morality as an impediment on the self for the benefit of others. Nietzsche would undo the timeless quality we attach to what we consider moral to our understanding of good and evil and to our support of universal moral norms. Nietzsche’s nihilism denies the validity of our concepts of good and evil and says philosophy cannot tell us what kind of person we should become because there are no moral truths (pp. 124–130, Flescher 2013). Flescher has used Nietzsche’s philosophy to salvage God. If there is no true evil there is no need to reconcile God’s beneficent nature with the existence of evil.

Evil: Obedience to Authority Milgram in the introduction to his famous experiment, Behavioral Study of Obedience, notes that obedience to authority serves numerous productive functions; however, he also notes, the inhumane policies of the Nazi Third Reich, though perhaps originating in the mind of a single individual, succeeded on a massive scale because “a very large number of persons obeyed orders”. The aim of Milgram’s experiment was to determine whether “obedience may be a deeply ingrained behavior tendency … overriding training in ethics, sympathy and moral conduct” (Milgram 1963). The study took place at a respectable location, Yale University. Subjects were 40 males from a variety of occupations that included postal clerks, salesmen, high school teachers and engineers. Subjects were (falsely) told the study was being performed to determine the effect of punishment on learning. The experiment included a teacher and a learner; the naive subject was always the teacher. The learner was a likable Irish-American who was supposedly strapped into an “electric chair apparatus”. After being read a series of word pairs, the subject (“the teacher”) read the first word of one of the pairs along with four words. The learner was asked which of the four words was originally paired with the first word. The “learner” was placed in an “electric chair” and the teacher given the option of administering an electric shock whenever the learner gave a wrong response or

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no response. Shocks ranged from 15 to 450 V. Subjects were told that although the shocks might be “extremely painful” they caused no permanent tissue damage. Shock switches included labeling from Slight Shock to Extreme Intensity Shock to Danger: Severe Shock. An experimenter instructed subjects to increase the shock by one level every time the learner gave a wrong answer. When the level reached 300 V the learner started pounding to let the subject know he was suffering. Learners were not suffering because they were part of the experiment and no electricity was administered; but subjects thought they were administering painful shocks. Reluctant subjects were prodded to continue the shocking “to bring the subject in line”. Subjects displayed significant tension while administering the shocks with sweating, groaning and trembling and what was described as seizures in three subjects. Of the 40 subjects, 26(65%) obeyed the experimenters and punished the learner with shocks beyond the designation, “Danger: Severe Shock”. Milgram concluded that obedient tendencies were strong, especially since the experimenters had no power to enforce their commands and were able to get subjects to act against their own values. C. P. Snow said, “When you think of the long and gloomy history of man, you will find more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience than have ever been committed in the name of rebellion. If you doubt that, read William Shirer’s “Rise and Fall of the Third Reich” (Shirer 1960). The German Officer Corps “were brought up in the most rigorous code of obedience… in the name of obedience they were party to, and assisted in, the most wicked large scale actions in the history of the world” (Snow 1961).

The Pathology of Imprisonment: The Stanford Prison Experiment In an unusual experiment Philip Zimbardo selected subjects from a group of homogeneous, stable, mature, normal, intelligent college students from middle class homes. Half of them were designated prisoners by flip of a coin, the other half were designated prison guards. The designated prisoners were unexpectedly picked up at their homes by city policemen in a squad car, searched, handcuffed, fingerprinted and booked at the Palo Alto station house. They were then blindfolded and taken to their jail where they were strip searched, deloused and put into a cell with two other prisoners. The jail was realistically constructed in the Stanford psychology Department. After only six days the experiment had to be terminated because of frightening findings. Prisoners and guards adopted their roles and lost the sense of their true self. In less than a week the “ugliest, most base, pathological side of human nature surfaced”. One third of prison guards became tyrannical and treated prisoners as if they were despicable animals, taking pleasure in their cruelty while the prisoners became dehumanized, servile, and developed hatred for the guards. Three prisoners had to be released because they were crying hysterically and became severely depressed;

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guards used their power to made prisoners feel worthless. There were some good guards but they did not do anything to interfere with the bad prison guards. The early solidarity of prisoners deteriorated into every man for himself (Zimbardo 1972). Zimbardo concludes, “Individual behavior is largely under the control of social forces and environmental contingencies rather than personality traits”. Zimbardo speculates that perhaps the majority of people can be made to do almost anything regardless of their morals and values. He says “ordinary good men and women are induced into behaving in evil ways by turning on or off one or another social situational variable” (Zimbardo 2004). Zimbardo identifies situational factors that facilitate evil. These include the use of ideology, for example acting in the name of national security; also giving participants a meaningful role to play that carries with it positive values. For example, in the Milgram experiments subjects were told they would act as teachers when, in fact, they were simply asking them to administer painful electric shocks. Altering semantics to make an unethical behavior sound ethical as was done in Milgram’s experiments with shocking presented as facilitating learning. Presenting basic rules to follow that justify mindless compliance can also be used to promote immoral behavior. Zimbardo explains how good people can be transformed into perpetrators. Diffusing responsibility so others might be held responsible makes it easier to engage in unethical behavior. Starting the pathway to evil with a small first step and increasing the level of aggression in gradual steps that may go unnoticed can perpetuate unethical behavior. A similar approach is gradually shifting the nature of an authority figure from reasonable and just, to unreasonable and irrational. Other effective methods for promoting unethical or evil behavior include prohibiting dissent, maintaining the anonymity of perpetrators, attributing blame to the victim and labeling an enemy an aggressor, an atheist, or a dehumanized animal.

“Ordinary” Germans Goldhagen confirms that in real life, non-experimental situations, ordinary people can become torturers and killers. During the Holocaust Nazi police battalions played a significant role. These battalions consisted of men who were haphazardly chosen, typically older than army soldiers and had relatively limited training and limited armaments. They were frequently unfit for military service. Their selection did not involve any ideological screening. Their police training consisted of limited Nazi indoctrination. During the war these battalions had functions in addition to traditional policing that included fighting partisans in occupied countries, transferring populations, fighting alongside the army when needed and, though not mentioned in official reports, killing civilians, which essentially meant killing Jews. When he examined other aspects of their life Goldhagen concluded members of these police battalions were “ordinary” Germans (p. 191, Goldhagen 1996). Police battalions participated in large scale killing following the German attack on the Soviet Union. Bialystok, a Polish city, was given to the Soviet Union as part of the

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German- Soviet Pact of 1939. After the Germans attacked the Soviet Union they took control of Bialystok. On June 27, 1941 German members of Police Battalion 309 rounded up male Jews in Bialystok as ordered. Although their orders were limited to rounding up the Jews, many Jews were beaten, shot and suffered other brutalities. Battalion police told some elder Jews to dance; because they were not pleased by the dancing, the police mocked them and then set their beards on fire. Police battalion 309 also searched the local hospital and killed all the Jews they could find. They took hundreds of Jews from the marketplace and shot them. Because so many more Jews were being rounded up the men of Police Battalion 309 herded them into the main synagogue of Bialystok and set it on fire. Members of the police battalion surrounded the synagogue to prevent anyone from escaping. The members of Battalion 309, when given a free hand, killed 2000–3000 innocent Jews in Bialystok that day, many by burning them alive (pp. 181–202, Goldhagen 1996; Holocaust Encyclopedia 2018). Other German police battalions behaved in a similar fashion. After the war Goldhagen searched for an explanation of the perpetrators murderous actions. He identified as a predominant factor the long history of anti-Semitism in Germany and the existence of a “Jewish Problem”. This combined with the war which gave Germany access to millions of Jews in eastern Europe and Hitler’s extermination plans set the stage for the Holocaust. Features of the behavior of Germans included killing Jews when they had no order to do so, enthusiastically following a superior’s orders to kill Jews, the torturing of Jews and other acts of gratuitous suffering and cruelty. The perpetrators were apparently at little risk if they refused to kill Jews; there is little evidence that any German soldier or police was punished for refusing to kill Jews (pp. 375–415, Goldhagen). Goldhagen dismisses a slavish tendency to follow orders as the basis for the torture and killing of Jews because the same Germans previously rebelled against actions of the Weimar Republic. He calls obeying orders “a moral alibi that should be exposed and discarded”. He also dismisses peer pressure as a major motivating factor in the Holocaust. Goldhagen refutes conventional explanations and concludes the German cruelty and killing of the Jews emanated from a set of beliefs that resulted in profound hatred and vicious anti-Semitism. The Jews were bad and deserved to be annihilated (pp. 389–415, Goldhagen).

My Lai The immoral behavior at My Lai on March 16, 1968 revealed that situational factors can induce immoral behavior in some individuals and moral behavior in others under similar circumstances. At My Lai hundreds of South Vietnamese civilians, mostly women and children, who showed no signs of hostility, were massacred by American troops. Lieutenant William L. Calley was court marshaled and initially convicted of murder. Evidence suggests Calley was not the only killer. It’s easy to conclude the impetus for the killing was situational and inevitable. Had there not been a Vietnam War and had Calley and his comrades not been sent to Vietnam this atrocity would

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not have occurred. The troops had suffered losses in the war and the Vietnamese had been portrayed as dehumanized beings. These situational factors may help explain the killings but they do not exonerate individuals. At the time of the My Lai massacre it is said that three soldiers tried to protect the civilians. One of them, Hugh C. Thompson, Jr., then Warrant Officer One, United States Army was awarded the Soldier’s Medal thirty years later (March 6, 1998), for being one of the soldiers who tried to save the civilians at My Lai. His situation may have been slightly different than Calleys; but whereas Calley and other soldiers were killing civilians, Thompson’s response was to save them. His medal read: “For heroism above and beyond the call of duty on 16 March 1968, while saving the lives of at least 10 Vietnamese civilians during the unlawful massacre of noncombatants by American forces at My Lai, Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnam. Warrant Officer Thompson landed his helicopter in the line of fire between fleeing Vietnamese civilians and pursuing American ground troops to prevent their murder. He then personally confronted the leader of the American ground troops and was prepared to open fire on those American troops should they fire upon the civilians. Warrant Officer Thompson, at the risk of his own personal safety, went forward of the American lines and coaxed the Vietnamese civilians out of the bunker to enable their evacuation. Leaving the area after requesting and overseeing the civilians’ air evacuation, his crew spotted movement in a ditch filled with bodies south of My Lai. Warrant Officer Thompson again landed his helicopter and covered his crew as they retrieved a wounded child from the pile of bodies. He then flew the child to the safety of a hospital at Quang Ngai” (United States Naval Academy Soldiers Medal 2018). The opportunity to kill Vietnamese civilians evoked opposite reactions in Calley and Thompson.

Doctor Mengele Evil can be due to a combination of personal and situational factors. Robert Jay Lifton’s book, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing And The Psychology of Genocide, confirms the unsettling truth that ordinary people can be “socialized to killing” and “adapt to existing genocidal institutions”. Nazi doctors at the Auschwitz concentration camp were ordinary practitioners who previously had never intentionally killed anyone; nonetheless, they became involved in every aspect of the killing at Auschwitz. They selected who would be immediately killed when trains arrived at the concentration camp, supervised the mass killing by poison gas, injected phenol to kill debilitated prisoners, determined when victims were dead, and falsified death certificates (Lifton 2000). The Holocaust followed a long history of anti-Semitism in Germany. Jews were called “destroyers of culture”, agents of “racial pollution”, “parasites”, and “eternal bloodsuckers”. Acts against Jews were justified on the basis of national and racial healing. There was a deadly racial disease and the cure had to be the killing of all Jews. A Nazi doctor, Fritz Klein, said, “Out of respect for human life I would remove

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a gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is the gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind” (pp. 3–18, Lifton 2000). Mass killing was done in the name of healing, a medicalization of killing. Lifton in a chapter devoted to the most infamous of Nazi doctors, Josef Mengele, illustrates what can happen when a situation ripe with evil exists for a person with immoral inclinations. Mengele, the son of a well-to-do Bavarian industrialist was wounded while serving on the Russian front. He returned to Germany in January 1943, and began work at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Genetics, and Eugenics, which was directed by his former mentor, Professor Otmar Freiherr von Verschuer. Mengele was a physician and an ardent Nazi whose studies at the Frankfurt University Institute of Hereditary Biology and Racial Hygiene were focused on physical anthropology and genetics. He requested a transfer to the Auschwitz concentration camp because he thought there he could best use science to help Nazi Germany. On May 30, 1943 he was transferred to Auschwitz where he served as a Waffen SS (a major paramilitary organization under Hitler and the Nazi party) medical officer. Mengele was thirty-two years old when he arrived at Auschwitz. He participated in all aspects of the killing at Auschwitz where more than a million people, mostly Jews, were murdered. When trains with prisoners arrived at Auschwitz he played a significant role in selecting who would go directly to the gas chamber and crematory ovens and who was sufficiently fit to join the prisoner work force. Mengele is associated more closely with this “selection duty” than any other medical officer at Auschwitz, although by most accounts he performed this task no more often than any of his colleagues. The ubiquitous image of Mengele at the train arrival ramp in so many survivors’ accounts is because Mengele often appeared there when he was “off-duty” searching for twins. Mengele had a passion for cleanliness and sent anyone with blemishes, wounds or scars to the gas chamber. In one instance a teenager was directed in a different direction than her mother; the mother did not want to be separated from her child and protested. Mengele shot dead both the mother and child and directed all the people in that transport, even the ones selected for work, to the gas chambers. Observers who survived Auschwitz described a cynical and sadistic component to Mengele’s personality. Mengele was observed with what appeared to be appropriate medical demeanor injecting deadly phenol into prisoners. He did this with detachment and efficiency. He was also reported to have thrown new born babies into the crematorium or open fires. Mengele’s favorite research interest was the study of twins, especially identical twins. The prisoner anthropologist who worked with Mengele estimated that in the summer of 1944 Mengele collected 250 individual twins. By keeping some twins alive for his experiments he probably saved them from the gas chambers. When examining naked twins he was methodical and never rude. There was a puzzling aspect to his personality. Mengele was described as having a dual personality of affection and violence. He talked to children “as gentle as a father”, but at a later date had no compunction about killing them.

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Mengele also studied dwarfs and people with other abnormalities such as one eye colored differently than the other (heterochromia). In one experiment Mengele injected methylene blue into the eye of a twin in an attempt to change eye color; this painful experiment was unsuccessful. The sinister side of Mengele’s twin research was the pathological examination of the twins’ corpses. Dr. Miklos Nyiszli, Mengele’s prisoner pathologist testified that Mengele directly murdered some twins. Sometimes twins were killed simply to resolve a dispute over their diagnosis. The doomed twin was undressed and put on the dissecting table, Mengele administered a sedative and then a lethal dose of chloroform given intravenously. During one night Mengele reportedly killed fourteen twins. His scientific activity was described as being done with “murderous scientific fanaticism”. Although twins were killed many were kept alive so that Mengele could continue his various experiments. Lifton says, “the twins became aware that, unlike most prisoners, their lives had existential value”. Mengele sent patholgical specimens to Professor von Verschuer at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology and Human Heredity and Eugenics in BerlinDahlem. A prisoner assistant was once given a box by Mengele to move to another part of the concentration camp; she opened the box and was shaken to find the box filled with glass bottles containing human eyes (pp. 337–383, Lifton 2000). A prison doctor described how Mengele once brought in “two heads” for bacteriological examination. Mengele had academic ambitions and saw himself as a potentially great racial scientist. His examinations were highly detailed with measurement of multiple bones and the characteristics of various body parts. He wanted to demonstrate German racial superiority. Comments about Mengele from those who observed him thought he felt it would be a sin not to take advantage of the permissive opportunities for twin research available at Auschwitz, because there would never be another chance like it. Mengele embraced the idea of genetic determinism and had an obsession with Jewish abnormality. He was thought to believe that among Jews there was “greater hereditary of bad qualities” compared to other races. After their liberation, camp inmates said they were afraid of Mengele because he might find something in them that interested him. Mengele killed for science. Mengele was also a collector. He collected fetuses and beautiful gallstones. One prison doctor said Mengele thought of prison inmates the same way “he thought of mice and rabbits”. Strangely Mengele treated Jewish doctors differently and much better than Jewish inmates; at times he could have a collegial relationship with them and on other occasions he called them “dogs and pigs”. A prison doctor said Mengele’s personality was “unfathomable”. He could show human feelings, such as pity, but could also be brutally sadistic. “Mengele exemplifies the Nazi biological revolution”; he was a Nazi ideologue and believed this ideological mission “justified everything”. He treated Jews like laboratory animals and believed the “the annihilation of the Jews was a provision for recovery of the world and Germany”.

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Several factors enabled Mengele’s evil activities. Nazi ideology that characterized Jews as sub-human and corrosive to society provided a pathetic lie to excuse the killings of millions of innocent men, women and children. Killing at Auschwitz was not only permitted, it was its raison d’etre. Nazi genetic determinism provided the impetus for Mengele’s diabolical experiments. Nazi society made Mengele possible. A prison doctor who knew him said that if Mengele hadn’t been at Auschwitz he probably would have been a “slightly sadistic German professor”. Mengele’s personality, which people found difficult to understand, probably influenced his behavior. He was called schizoid. A schizoid personality disorder was defined by a lack of interest in social relationships, a tendency towards a solitary or sheltered lifestyle, secretiveness, emotional coldness, detachment, and apathy. Affected individuals may be unable to form intimate attachments to others and simultaneously demonstrate a rich, elaborate, and exclusively internal fantasy world (Wikipedia Contributors 2018a, b). In the case of Mengele we see evil as the result of a combination of individual and situational factors. Mengele escaped to South America after the war and lived in several countries He was never brought to justice. He is believed to have died on February 7, 1979 of a heart attack or a stroke while swimming at a vacation resort near Bertioga, Brazil. He was buried in a suburb of Sao Pãolo under the fictitious name, “Wolfgang Gerhard.” In 1985, German police, working on evidence they had recently confiscated from a Mengele family friend in Günzburg, located Mengele’s grave and exhumed his corpse. Brazilian forensic experts thereafter positively identified the remains as Josef Mengele. In 1992, DNA evidence confirmed this conclusion. Mengele eluded his captors for 34 years (Holocaust Encyclopedia 2018). His victims had hoped for healing by witnessing his trial for the atrocities he committed; that trial never happened. Lifton asks the intriguing question of how doctors who have taken an oath to do no harm can change from healers to killers. In the chapter titled, The Psychology of Genocide, he identifies factors sufficiently potent to transform physicians from their previous selves into what Lifton calls their “Auschwitz Self”. The critical role of racial hygiene ideology and the need to preserve the best of humanity made killing an element essential to healing. Hitler spoke “of the nothingness… of the individual human being and of his continued existence in the visible immortality of the nation”. The goal of biological renewal and national rejuvenation was “nothing but applied biology”. The world will be healed by removing lesser biological beings. Hitler used a perverse logic. The Jews were evil and a threat and must be destroyed. “This mission was the moral equivalent of war; in war one must kill the enemy to preserve one’s people. To do otherwise would make one a traitor. As moral philosophers use logic to promote the good, the Nazis used a perverted form of logic to achieve their aims”. The Nazis took advantage of the power of ritual to augment the mythic significance of the Third Reich which Hitler said would last a thousand years. Lifton viewed the selection of arriving prisoners as a ritual which could give participants “a feeling of truth” and the sense they were making “an exact medical judgment”. The Nazis acknowledged killing as a necessary but difficult personal ordeal, an “ordeal of sacrifice” shared by others. This killing was describes as heroic. Initially Jews were

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shot which was difficult for some of the shooters who saw their victims face to face. The use of the gas chambers made victims anonymous and eased this so-called ordeal. Lifton speculates the Nazi doctors (and I suspect other Nazis) to do their murderous work depended on diminished feeling and numbing oneself to avoid feelings of guilt for their killing. Lifton also speculates they viewed Auschwitz as a separate reality and “anything that happened there simply did not count” (pp. 418–465, Lifton).

The Roots of Evil It’s important to understand the complex etiology of immorality and evil if we want to diminish its likelihood in the future. The Nazi experience reveals a sophisticated, theoretical methodology that was successful in its promotion of massive evil; its perverted employment of theoretical biology and logic was thoughtfully considered for effectiveness. Although religious and secular moral philosophies have made valuable contributions in the name of morality, immorality and evil have not been eradicated. Numerous moral writings, such as the Ten Commandments, have stated it is wrong to harm innocent people; yet these moral treatises have not prevented torture, mass killings and other evils. The prevalence of immoral and evil behavior is a challenge to morality. Both situational factors and individual personality can contribute to immorality. An artwork by M. C. Escher, Circle Limit IV, depicts the nebulous outlines of devils and angels that constitute our being and symbolizes that “humans are both good and evil entities at the same time” (p. 5, Flescher 2013). The challenge for morality is to strengthen individual resolve against the forces arrayed against it and avoid situations that provide the soil where immorality and evil can flourish. Staub has examined examples of the destruction of large human ethnic or national groups (genocide) (Staub 1989). The Armenian genocide (1915–1916) was committed by Turkey, which still denies it was genocide, and claims it was the deportation of an enemy in time of war. Armenian leaders and Armenian soldiers who served in the Turkish army were tortured and killed and many other Armenians were either killed or died of starvation. It is estimated that this genocide resulted in at least 800,000 Armenian deaths. When the Khymer Rouge under its leader Pol Pot prevailed after a long civil war it evacuated Cambodian cities and killed “potential enemies”; victims were of the same social and ethnic group as the perpetrators (“autogenocide”) and were killed for political reasons. It is estimated two million Cambodians died from execution or starvation (1975–1979). In Argentina after the Army took power in a coup it is estimated anywhere from 9,000 to 30,000 people were killed or “disappeared”. Victims were killed because they were considered left leaning or Communists and felt to be threats to the state. It is known that some of them were drugged and thrown from helicopters into the

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ocean where they drowned. Children of victims were taken away without informing their relatives (Staub 1989). Staub focuses on the psychological factors that cause genocide. He identifies the hardships of life and rapid social disorganization due to extreme economic problems, political or criminal violence, war and rapid social changes as the starting point for mass killings. People in a distressed society seek to protect themselves, their families and their values. A subgroup in the society may be made a scapegoat and new ideologies may evolve with diminished inhibition toward harming others. Perpetrators become more aggressive and believe their actions are justified. A progression of harmful acts typically precedes mass killings. This progression is facilitated when bystanders and other nations remain passive (Staub 1989). Groups of people, such as nations, have more power to inflict cruelty because they allow a diffusion of responsibility. Straub concludes from his study of genocides that “tragically human beings have the capacity to come to experience the killing of other people as nothing extraordinary”. There can be, especially if a society has a sense of superiority, “a reversal of morality” that allows killing of devalued others to be seen as good (Staub 1989). Other causal factors include the ability to conceive of us and them; the ability to devalue those in the out group; hoping for a better society; making others (not us) scapegoats which can unify us. Staub speaks of “a continuum of destruction”. Factors associated with genocide include “deeply engrained negative stereotypes” of out groups, a cultural sense of superiority, nationalism, a desire for purity and cleansing, a strong respect for authority and a strong sense of obedience. Straub points to a long history of anti-Semitism in Germany, difficult life conditions, and a long authoritarian tradition as etiologic factors in the Holocaust (pp. 19–21, Staub). Staub has been criticized for his focus on individual psychology and ignoring the role of government in the perpetration of evil. The force of the tendency to obedience can facilitate government sponsored evil. Hobbes, believed that in a society of sufficient size people will be strangers to each other and there will be a reversion to the state of nature with, “all against all”. In such circumstances one cannot count on mutual good will to sustain stability. In Hobbes’ time (1588–1679) there were ferocious religious wars between people of different religions. Hobbes’ advocated a Sovereign of “almost unlimited power” to maintain stability and prevent evil (pp. 28– 29 and 59, Gert 2010). A government or a strong national leader can potentially prevent evil or conversely encourage it.

Situational Determinism Versus Individual Responsibility Milgram and Zimbardo emphasize the importance of situational factors in the genesis of evil. Milgram defines the conflict in his experiments as between the competing demands of two persons: the experimenter and the victim; two deeply ingrained behavioral dispositions are in opposition: not to harm other people and the tendency to obey whom we perceive as legitimate authorities (Milgram 1963). A person entering

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an authority system sees themselves as no longer acting for their own purposes but as an agent carrying out another person’s wishes (pp. 212–213, Flescher 2013). Although situational factors play an important role in the genesis of evil 14 of Milgrams 40 subjects (35%) reached a point where they refused to administer additional shocks. In Zimbardo’s prisoner study only a third of the guards became tyrannical and there were good guards (pp. 4–8, Zimbardo 1972). In My Lai there were soldiers who killed civilians and soldiers who tried to save them. During the Holocaust there were people who turned in Jews and people who protected them. Yad Vashem in Israel honors non-Jews who risked their lives, liberty, or positions to save Jews during the Holocaust. People differ in their moral behavior. Despite Milgram and Zimbardo’s situational determinism both personal and situational factors must be considered as relevant to moral behavior.

Conclusion Evil has been a part of human history for a long time and will not be leaving us any time soon. Part of the reason for this gloomy assessment lies in the nature of man. We were sculpted by natural selection, a process that favors the fittest and is blind to morality. Human nature and various circumstances allow humans to cause suffering and death to other humans, especially those of a different group. Although religion, laws and individual conscience may control many of our evil impulses, over past centuries their power has not vanquished evil. It’s frustrating that for centuries philosophers have been writing about how man should behave; yet evil remains with us. It’s important to recognize morality is vulnerable to immorality and evil. We should continue to analyze the causes of evil; as noted in this chapter there are many of them and that alone makes for a gloomy assessment. We should take comfort in the fact that many, if not most people, try to live a morally valuable life. We should continue to analyze the nature and etiology of evil and try to develop ways to limit it.

References Flack, Jessica C., and deWaal, Frans B.M. 2000. ‘Any Animal Whatever’: Darwinian Building Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2000; 7 (No. 1 and 2): 1–29. Flescher, Andrew Michael. 2013. Moral Evil. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Gert, Bernard. 1988. Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Gert, Bernard. 2010. Hobbes, 28–29 and 59. Cambridge, England and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press.

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Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. 1996. Police Battalions: Agents of Genocide in Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Green, Ronald M. 1987. Theodicy. Encyclopedia of Religion. https://www.encyclopedia.com/ environment/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/theodicy. Accessed 10 Aug 2018. Holocaust Encyclopedia. 2018. Josef Mengele. United States Holocaust Museum. https://www. ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007060. Accessed 16 July 2018. Hume, David. 1738–1740. Treatise of Human Nature, book III. Lifton, Robert Jay. 2000. The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide The Psychology of Genocide. New York: Basic Books. Milgram, Stanley. 1963. Behavioral Study of Obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67: 371–378. Ruse, Michael. 1988. Response to Williams: Selfishness Is Not Enough. Zygon 23 (4): 413–416. Shirer, William L. 1960. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Simon and Schuster. Snow, C.P. 1961. Either Or. The Progressive 25 (2): 24–25. Staub, Ervin. 1989. The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. United States Naval Academy. 2018. Hugh Thompson. Available at https://www.usna.edu/Ethics/_ files/documents/ThompsonPg1-28_Final.pdf Accessed 10 Aug 2018. Wikipedia Contributors. 2018. Holocaust Theology. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holocaust_ theology. Accessed 10 Aug 2018. Wikipedia Contributors. 2018. Schizoid Personality Disorder. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Schizoid_personality_disorder. Accessed 10 Aug 2018. Zimbardo, Philip G. 1972. The Pathology of Imprisonment. Society 9 (6): 4–8. Zimbardo, Philip A. 2004. Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators. In The Social Psychology of Good and Evil: Understanding Our Capacity for Kindness and Cruelty, ed. Arthur Miller. New York City: Guilford Press.

Part II

Moral Theories

Chapter 10

Moral Theories and Moral Obligations

Abstract A moral theory is a set of concepts, rules and principles that serve as guides to the resolution of ethical dilemmas; they also purport to tell us how we ought to behave. Various objectives have been ascribed to the purpose of morality. These include the minimization of evil, the maximization of the good, fidelity to moral principles, and the minimization of the harms caused by flawed human nature. A major problem with moral theories is that in specific circumstances we may believe in two moral principles, but to honor one of the principles we are forced to violate the other. This conundrum has been said to cause “irresolvable perplexity”. Topics addressed include the objective of morality, whether objective moral truth exists, the origins of altruism, the distinction between a moral obligation and a moral ideal and other issues that complicate moral deliberation.

Moral Theories A moral theory, which can be complex and expressed in arcane language, is a set of concepts, principles and rules that serve as a foundation for moral decision-making. Moral rules tend to be specific and relatively limited in scope. Moral principles are more general and serve as the basis for moral rules. Normative (as in “norms”) ethics is the branch of ethical theory that defines which actions are right and which actions are wrong; it is the branch of ethics that tells us how we ought to behave. The application of rules and principles to resolve moral dilemmas must be mindful of the relevant facts. When there is disagreement values often have to be weighed against each other in context. This process often involves subjective judgments that may leave ethical deliberation embroiled in controversy. The requirements of a moral theory have been said to include clarity, simplicity, internal consistency and coherence. A rule or principle in a moral theory should not contradict another of its rules and principles. A moral theory ideally should be comprehensive and account for the whole range of moral experience (Beauchamp and Childress 1989). Universality, that a moral standard should apply to every person in

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relevantly similar circumstances, is an important consideration. A moral judgment in one situation should be applied to other relevantly similar circumstances. Gert advocated a moral theory be publically known and universally applied to all rational persons (Gert1988).

The Objective of Morality A reasonable question is, what is the ultimate goal of morality; what is morality designed to achieve? From a biological perspective some behaviors that appear moral by our ordinary standards increase a species’ fitness for survival. Examples include cooperation and altruism which are generally considered important moral values. By cooperating a group of chimpanzees are more likely to capture and kill a monkey and obtain the food needed for survival. Cooperating within a group may benefit individual members. The practical value of altruism, which evolved as a reciprocal phenomenon, is supported by empirical observations. It has been observed that, if Vampire Bat A goes hungry, Vampire Bat B, who secured an ample blood meal, will feed Vampire Bat A. On another occasion when the tables are turned Vampire Bat A, now the one with an ample blood meal, will feed hungry Vampire Bat B in what has been called a “tit for tat” exchange (Wright 1995). Many species of smaller fish, called “cleaners,” remove ectoparasites from larger fish. The larger fish reciprocate by not eating their smaller cleaners and by protecting them from predators. Trivers has named this phenomenon “reciprocal altruism,” which he considers “a symbiosis, each partner helping the other while he helps himself”. Trivers said, “the natural selection of reciprocally altruistic behavior can readily explain the function of human altruistic behavior” (Trivers 1971). Other examples of reciprocal altruism in man include sharing food and implements and helping in times of danger. Evolution has not conserved altruism; what has been selected are the emotions that are a prerequisite for altruism, sympathy and empathy. Animal and human societies with social controls that support mutual assistance fare better than those dominated by self-interest. Although some of ordinary morality is a by-product of evolution, morality is not the aim of evolution because natural selection does not operate with conscious goals, and is morally blind and purposeless (Steinberg 2010). Normative ethics provides a code of conduct with the purpose of telling us how we ought to behave. Moral theories differ in their vision of the goal of morality. For Gert the primary goal of morality is the minimization of evil (Gert 1988). John Stuart Mill wrote morality should be based on the principle of utility, or what has been called “the greatest happiness principle”. Mill holds that actions are right to the extent they promote happiness and wrong as they produce the opposite. Happiness is described as pleasure and the absence of pain; unhappiness is characterized by pain, and the loss of pleasure. Mill is a “utilitarian” whose philosophy focuses on the consequences of our actions. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant was a

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“deontologist” whose philosophy promoted fidelity to moral duty and obligation as more significant than consequences. Warnock, similar to Hobbes rooted his moral philosophy on his perception of human nature. He is conscious of “the ills inherent in the human predicament” which he calls “limited sympathies”. We are predominantly concerned with our own wants, interests and needs and those of some limited group, such as family, tribe or country whose interests and ends we are disposed to sympathize. This leaves us prone to act in a damaging manner to the detriment of persons outside our limited group or fail to act beneficently to others in need. Warnock’s list of detrimental acts includes maleficence (inflicting harm), non-beneficence (not aiding those in need), unfairness and deception. The goal of Warnock’s morality is “to countervail the deleterious liabilities inherent in (our) “limited sympathies”; this leads him to advise four corrective “good dispositions” which he calls, “moral standards” or moral principles”. They include non-maleficence (don’t harm others), fairness, beneficence (aid others) and nondeception. Morality for Warnock entails correction of our flawed human nature. He admits an affinity with the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (15881679), calling his own views, “quassi-Hobbesian”. Warnock claims the contention of Plato and others that morality is about how we should live our lives is a “senseless question that has no sensible answer” because our goals in life depend on our interests and talents; morality is the “propounding principles to which by and large our conduct should conform in pursuit of our ends” (Warnock 1971).

Conflicting Principles There is no objective method that can define which philosophical moral theory should be preferred. There is wide agreement we shouldn’t harm innocent others, that consequences matter and that there are moral principles we should try not to violate. When dealing with specific ethical dilemmas we have to use our judgment to decide which ethical considerations merit the greatest weight. If a decision violates a moral principle but the consequences of deciding otherwise are worse we might focus on those consequences. If you were hiding Ann Frank during the Nazi occupation of Amsterdam and the Gestapo knocked on the door you would be justified in lying about her hiding in your apartment because your lie might save the life of an innocent teen age girl. In that instance the value to tell the truth conflicts with possibly saving an innocent life. We may believe in two principles but in specific circumstances we may be unable to honor one without violating the other. Madison Powers in addressing this problem said it is incoherent to imagine “that there exists a quantitative way to assess the qualitatively incommensurable”. We can’t calculate the net benefit (or harm) comparing a pregnant woman’s right to autonomously choose what is done to her body against the harms of destroying a fetus. The two are incommensurate and their assigned metrics would differ. We

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can compare the treatment response rate of two different drugs in a specific disease because their metrics are the same, response rate. We can’t apply similar metrics to qualitatively dissimilar parameters and mathematically select the morally preferable option. Powers notes this as a limitation of ethics. Extremely difficult to resolve problems may shift from the arena of morality to matters of public policy. The solution of the abortion question, a legitimate moral problem, is now treated as a political matter of public policy. Powers concludes there is a “limit to moral expertise” because multiple morally acceptable options” exist and “below the surface of ethical debate is an inherently political contest” (Powers 2005). Warnock similarly notes the conflict of valid moral principles can result in “irresolvable perplexity” (Warnock 1971).

Uncertainty and Conceptual Confusion Ethical deliberation may also be difficult because of uncertainty. In the practice of medicine, for example, a new treatment or medical device, or a promising but untried genetic technique may come with the uncertain prospects of major benefit or serious harm. It can be difficult to achieve consensus in the face of decisions when the relevant facts are unknown. Medical decisions are often clouded with uncertainty because a patient’s prognosis may be debatable. If we knew a person was inevitably doomed we would not inflict the possible side effects of an ineffective treatment; the problem is, essential information may not be known. Yet another problem impeding the resolution of moral dilemmas is disagreement over the meaning of important and relevant concepts. An example is the definition of death. Arguments over the definition of death, an issue that for centuries eluded controversy, now involve proponents who advocate standard cardiopulmonary criteria, whole brain criteria and higher brain criteria (Youngner and Shapiro 1999). Attempts to resolve ethical dilemmas can be intellectually interesting but also challenging and frustrating with a consensus resolution not always possible.

Challenges to Morality Moral realism is defined as the belief that at least some moral claims properly understood, are actually true. Moral realists admit some moral claims serve the emotions, attitudes, and interests; nonetheless, they believe some moral claims are true. Those who reject moral realism deny that any moral claims are true. The debate is also complicated because it can be difficult to determine which claims count as moral (Sayre-McCord 2017). Several arguments have been made against moral realism. One argument is that moral claims are our way of expressing emotions or attitudes and controlling others’ behavior; another is that moral claims report facts but those facts are not true.

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Morality and Self Interest Implied in the concept of morality is that it applies to all rational beings. Warnock asks the interesting and provocative question: could a rational being “just reject morality, without necessarily evidencing thereby any defect of rationality?” Warnock believes most moral philosophers would answer his question, No. Warnock is inclined to disagree. His reason is worth noting. He points out that some people are “inherently, immutably, and exclusively selfinterested, and so simply not capable of that disinterested appraisal of reasons” and the “unegoistic concern for others” that morality demands. From this perspective morality could be viewed as a form of psychological expression and self -interest rather than a system of reasoning; if that’s true morality as traditionally understood, is a fraud; what supposedly is good for everybody is promoted by others for their own self-interest. Warnock acknowledges a rational person might conclude the application of morality might be distorted to advance the interests of those dominant in a society and that morality can be used as a smoke screen concealing that we are being exploited by others. (Warnock 1971). In many instances deceptive or diversionary moral reasons are used to conceal the truth of an underlying self or special group interest. A tax reduction bill explained as being helpful to the poor may be a moral diversion when in fact the bill will ultimately help the rich. Immoral behavior is often ignored by people who benefit from that immoral behavior. If the leader of a political party or a country fosters a person’s financial or political goals that person may be reluctant to criticize the leader’s immoral behavior. The misuse of morality may cause some people to become cynical, but they are wrong to reject credible morality simply because its use can be immorally perverted.

Values and Morality I suspect the genesis of immoral behavior has similarities with the genesis of moral behavior. There is a significant amount of immoral behavior. A television show, American Greed (CNBC), documents numerous stories of people who believe they deserve more out of life and resort to schemes that defraud other people, often of their life savings. Bernard Madoff, a stock broker and financial advisor, damaged many lives by running the largest Ponzi scheme in history. Innumerable examples of immoral behavior are recorded almost daily in the media. Morality involves the selection of important values considered worthy of preservation. Immorality also involves the selection of important values considered worthy of preservation. The two are largely differentiated by the nature of the selected values. The immoral person may have selected as their predominant value the desire to become rich, or perhaps the desire to obtain power. Immoral behavior may become necessary to honor values of this type.

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Warnock acknowledges the role of self-interest as a challenge to morality and says a person who rejects morality because it is based on self-interest is not irrational, but may be wrong. Because the use of morality can be distorted does not invalidate the benefits of its proper application. Warnock concludes that without the constraints of morality and its goal “of peace, of justice, of cooperative harmony” things would be worse.

Other Moral Theories Descriptive moral theories, also known as comparative ethics, describe how moral behavior is manifest in different peoples and cultures; it is the study of what people think is morally correct. Descriptive ethics is an empirical field, though one with philosophical implications, that is typically the scholarly domain of social scientists such as evolutionary biologists, sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists. Descriptive ethics studies the values that influence moral behavior in various cultures and how they change over time. It tries to understand the basis for people’s moral beliefs and matters such as what various societies consider virtuous (Wikipedia Contributors 2019). Schweder, a cultural anthropologist, describes cross-cultural variability in moral judgments. In places in India where he has done research some of the acts people categorize as “bad acts” seem bizarre moral judgments. Acts considered bad include a widow eating fish, a woman having a conversation with her husband’s older brother and parents refusing to sleep in the same bed with their children. Schweder proposes that on a world wide scale there is a big three of morality. There is an “ethics of autonomy” based on moral concepts such as rights and justice that is designed to protect individuals in pursuit of gratification of their desires; there is an “ethics of community” based on moral concepts such as duty and interdependency that aims to help individuals find dignity by virtue of their role in society; there is also an “ethics of divinity” based on moral concepts such as sanctity and sin which aims to maintain the spiritual side of human nature (Schweder 2007). Meta-ethics is the study of morality itself; it does not deal directly with normative decisions but seeks to understand the nature of ethical language, concepts, definitions, judgments, reasoning, and objectives. Meta-ethics scrutinizes the substance of ethics. Singer says of meta-ethics, “we are not taking part in the practice of ethics itself, but are reflecting on that practice as if from a different level”. He also notes, “In arguing about the nature and basis of ethics, we are asking questions about ethics, not arguing within ethics. For example, at the level of meta-ethics, we might ask whether there could possibly be a true or correct answer to these questions within ethics” (Singer 1994a, b). Moral theories can have arbitrary and confusing elements; their greatest value is to provide a framework for thinking about ethical problems. All of us will encounter ethical dilemmas. If your elderly mother is very sick you might be asked to decide whether to continue treatment. A relative or friend, even a stranger, with kidney

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failure might ask you to donate one of your kidneys. You may have to ponder whether a business practice is ethical. Although I’ve written about war, genocide and other major evils, in everyday life less monumental ethical dilemmas may arise. These have been referred to as applied ethics. Examples of applied ethics include biomedical ethics, legal ethics, business ethics and military ethics. More about applied ethics later. The thinking of important moral scholars, even if there are arbitrary elements or other problems, can provide a helpful framework as we evolve our own way of analyzing and implementing moral decisions. It is important to recognize that moral scholars give you their opinion on how you should behave; you have to decide whether to take their advice.

Moral Obligations and Moral Ideals We accumulate obligations for a variety of reasons. We are obliged to obey the law; we are obligated to pay taxes to the government. We have job and professional related obligations. We incur obligations because we have signed a contract to make monthly mortgage payments. We have obligations because we have made promises. We have obligations to family such as caring for our children. We can incur obligations after losing a law suit. The list of possible obligations is long and some of these obligations may be burdensome. A point of contention is what obligations should be derived from the dictates of morality as “moral obligations”. Gert and Singer disagree. This controversy is significant because failure to perform a moral obligation implies immoral behavior. Gert’s position is at the permissive end of the spectrum of opinions. His moral rules which include don’t cause death and don’t cause pain focus on avoiding harms to others. Gert does not put obligations to help others at the core of his moral system. He categorizes obligations such as helping the hungry and the poor as moral ideals, not obligations. One of Gert’s moral rules is do your duty; professionals such as physicians, dentists and others who have role related beneficent obligations are expected to honor these obligations For Gert role specific duties are moral obligations, not moral ideals. Gert summarizes his notion of the moral ideals as, “Do those things that lessen or are likely to lessen the amount of evil suffered by anyone”. Where his moral rules state don’t kill, his moral ideals state prevent killing. Where his moral rules say don’t cause evil, his moral ideal says prevent evil. Inflicting harm is a violation of a moral rule; preventing harm is a praiseworthy moral ideal. Those who work to prevent war are following the moral ideals. Although Gert says you must always obey the moral rules, he only encourages people to “act on the moral ideals as much as they can” (Gert 1988). Beauchamp and Childress define two types of morality. Their first level consists of moral standards that bind everyone. Their second level is “a morality of aspiration” with ideals that do not bind everyone. Those who honor these ideals are praiseworthy while those who fall short cannot be blamed and should not be coerced. This level of

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morality corresponds to Gert’s moral ideals. They also use the term supererogatory to refer to actions taken for the welfare of others that are beyond what a moral obligation requires; they use the terms heroic and saintly for some of these supererogatory acts (Beauchamp and Childress 1989). Although concepts such as moral obligation and moral ideals (supererogatory acts) are useful in our ethical reasoning, morality has a hazy quality and when it comes to specific cases the distinction between a moral obligation and a moral ideal is not always clear. Singer argues “Suppose that on my way to give a lecture I pass a shallow ornamental pond, and notice that a small child has fallen in and is in danger of drowning. Would anyone deny that I ought to wade in and pull the child out? This will mean getting my clothes muddy, ruining my shoes, and either cancelling my lecture or delaying it until I can find something dry to change into; but compared with the avoidable death of a child none of these things are significant”. It’s hard to argue with Singer that in the described instance a moral obligation exists (Singer 1972). Singer uses this example to derive the principle, “if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we ought to do it”. Singer says his principle applies to other situations including aid to those in absolute poverty. He says absolute poverty is bad because it is associated with hunger, malnutrition, disease, high infant mortality and low life expectancy. He says the affluent can reduce some poverty without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance and doing that is not just optional and praiseworthy; it is something “everyone ought to do”. By anything of comparable moral significance he means by doing something that is itself wrong, or causes something that is comparably bad or fails to promote some other good of comparable importance. He suggests that a percentage of one’s income, to aid those in poverty would be reasonable. The funds to help the poor would come from eliminating non- essential items such as luxurious cars and fashionable clothes. Singer has been accused of setting an unduly high standard. His high standard of obligation has been considered unrealistic because the more demanding an individual’s obligation of beneficence the less likely people will comply with its demands. Singer has suggested that it might be more productive to publicly advocate a lower standard and argued we should strive for donations of a percentage of income, such as ten per cent, which amounts to more than a token donation and not so high as to make people miserable. Singer’s position, which has been referred to as “obligatory beneficence” raises several concerns. The prospect of being accused of immoral behavior might serve as a cudgel to pressure some people into doing what they perceive as not in their best interest. Imposing an obligation on individuals limits their liberty and violates another ethical principle, the principle of autonomy. Beauchamp and Childress and others have given a general formulation of when there is a moral obligation to rescue that also takes account of relative burdens and benefits. Their general position for situations in which Y is in danger is that Y’s potential loss must be significant, such as death or dismemberment. X, the actor, must with high probability be able to perform the necessary rescue. No one at the

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time should be better positioned than X to perform the rescue (such as a lifeguard in the case of a drowning). X’s actions should be associated with minimal or no risk or burden to X. The benefit to Y should outweigh any harms or burdens to X. When these criteria are satisfied Y has a moral obligation to help X. They acknowledge, “the line between a moral obligation and a moral ideal is often unclear” (Beauchamp 2019). Gert limits moral obligations to avoiding harms; Singer extends moral obligations to assisting others. Ethicists often disagree with each other which makes it difficult to call their pronouncements authoritative; nonetheless, the opinion of ethicists can be valuable because they are typically good at garnering the relevant facts of an issue and they are trained to rationally analyze ethical dilemmas. However, ethicists—for the moment leaving aside the definition of an ethicist-are ultimately not authoritative. A physician who has studied empirical data can most often advise on matters of health more accurately than the rest of us. If a person has studied an issue, understands the relevant facts and is rational their authority may be comparable to that of an ethicist. When I was doing hospital ethics consultations we started every consultation by stating that we would try to help but our opinions were not necessarily authoritative. A case example from the field of organ transplantation illustrates the problem of distinguishing a moral obligation from a moral ideal. A variety of organ exchange programs increase the number of live donor kidney transplants. In its basic form two donor-intended recipient pairs (subsequently called pairs) that each have a donor who is incompatible with their intended recipient simultaneously exchange kidneys. For example, the donor in pair one who is blood type A donates a kidney to the recipient in pair 2 who is blood type A and the donor in pair 2 who is blood type B donates a kidney to the recipient in pair 1 who is blood type B. In this type of exchange although neither donor is immunologically compatible with their intended recipient, both pairs benefit because each intended recipient obtains a kidney. In a different type of kidney exchange, a pair in which donor and intended recipient are compatible can, by participating in an exchange that is unnecessary for them, make transplantation possible for another pair in which donor and intended recipient are incompatible. For example, the donor in pair 1 is blood type O and can donate a kidney to their intended recipient who is blood type A. In pair 2 the donor is blood type A and the intended recipient blood type O; in pair 2 the donor and intended recipient are immunologically incompatible. In the absence of an exchange only the intended recipient in pair 1 will obtain a kidney. However, if the donor in pair 1 gives their blood type O kidney to the intended recipient in pair 2 who is blood type O and the donor in pair 2 who is blood type A gives a kidney to the intended recipient in pair 1 who is also blood type A both intended recipients obtain a kidney. What distinguishes this type of paired exchange is that the donor and intended recipient in pair 1 are compatible and do not need to participate in an exchange. The provision of blood type O kidneys is significant because patients with blood type O ordinarily can receive a kidney only from a blood type O donor and can be considered the worst off because they linger longest on the transplant waiting list. The O donor in pair one does not have to donate a kidney;

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however, if the O kidney is donated to pair 2 two patients with kidney disease will benefit. These, “compatible-incompatible kidney exchanges” may encounter logistical problems. There may be a delay in time to transplantation for the compatible couple. Surgeries may be performed at separate hospitals and the donors and recipients might find themselves in unfamiliar clinical settings. The originally intended donor and recipient may be separated making it difficult for families to visit both of their relatives. Might we think differently if it was important to the compatible blood type O donor to know that his kidney resided in his wife, not some stranger? Another objection to “compatible-incompatible kidney exchanges” is that the request to participate might be “too manipulative” and coercive. Ross and Woodle object to “compatible-incompatible kidney exchanges” because of the potential for coercion the donor may experience as the result of “psychological pressure” to “participate in the exchange to maximize the number of organs available”. Despite these concerns a “compatible-incompatible kidney exchange” appears to satisfy the criteria for a moral obligation. The incompatible recipient is at risk for the significant loss of good health associated with kidney failure and dialysis. The pair 1 compatible donor’s kidney is necessary to prevent this loss and has a high probability of rescuing the incompatible recipient in pair 2. Blood type O kidneys are in short supply; although a stranger with blood type O might donate a kidney we can assume none is readily available and the blood type O donor in pair 1 is best positioned to perform the rescue. The compatible donor, who has already committed to donating a kidney, accepts no additional medical or surgical risk and we can assume the compatible recipient gets a kidney as good or better than the one they would have otherwise received. The added burden to the compatible pair is minimal and certainly minimal relative to the great benefit to the incompatible recipient. Taking account of the general criteria proposed for a moral obligation the compatible couple could reasonably be told they have a moral obligation to participate in the proposed kidney exchange (Ross and Woodle 2000). Application of the “veil of ignorance” paradigm of the philosopher John Rawls is a reasonable way of considering the allocation of resources (Freeman 2019). Rational people who do not know whether they are destined to need a kidney or who want to obtain a kidney for a loved one, and also do not know whether they will be compatible with their intended donor or recipient, would opt for a compatible-incompatible live donor kidney exchange because it would increase their odds of success. But there are additional considerations. If pair 1 does not proceed with the exchange the serious verdict might be they have, in their decision, acted immorally. A constant irritant in ethical thinking is the existence of too many respected principles that not infrequently conflict with each other. Justice Cardoza famously highlighted the principle of autonomy when he said, “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body” (Cardoza 1914). In this case the principle of autonomy which protects an individual’s decision-making liberty conflicts with the utilitarian principle to maximize the good. I would view the described compatible-

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incompatible exchange as a moral ideal that should be encouraged, but others might disagree.

Conclusion Morality is confusing. The definition of morality has been disputed. Various differing moral theories have been proposed. There may be disagreement over the meaning of important concepts. In specific instances valid ethical principles conflict with each other. Respected ethicists debate whether moral truth exists and for certain moral issues there is exuberant disagreement. Despite the difficulties we have no choice because ethical dilemmas cannot be avoided. In specific circumstances we have to gather the relevant facts, take into account our values, rationally consider the various ethical theories and options and use our best judgment to come to a conclusion. I have written this book to clarify the nature of morality and hopefully make the process of ethical deliberation, if not easier, more understandable.

References Beauchamp, Tom. 2019. The principle of beneficence in applied ethics. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Available at