The Medieval Concept of Time: Studies on the Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy 9789004453197, 9004453199

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THE MEDIEVAL CONCEPT OF TIME

STUDlEN UND TEXTE ZUR GElSTESGESCHlCHTE DES MlTTELALTERS BEGRUN DET V ON

JOSEF KOCH WE ITERGEFUHRT VON

PAUL WILPERT und ALBERT ZIMMERMANN HERAUSGEGEBE N VON

JAN A. AERTSEN IN ZUSAMMENARB EIT MIT

TZOTCHO BOIADJIEV , KENT EMERY ,JR. , ANDREAS SPEER und WOUTER GORIS (MANAGING EDITOR) BAND LXXV PASQUALE PORRO (ED. )

T H E MEDIEVAL CO NCEPT OF TIME

THE MEDIEVAL CONCEPT OF TIME STUDIES ON THE SCHOLASTIC DEBATE AND ITS RECEPTION IN EARLY MODERN PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

PASQUALE PORRO

BRILL LEIDEN . BOSTON ' KOLN 2001

This book is printed on acid-free pap er.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The medieval concept of time : studies on the scholastic debate and its reception in early mod ern philosophy / edited by Pasqual e Porro . p. em. - (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, ISSN 0169-8125 ; Bd. 75) Includes bibliogr aphical references and indexes. ISBN 9004 122079 (hardcover: alk. paper) I. Time-History. 2. Scho lasticism. 3. Philosophy, Med ieval. 4. Philosophy , Modern. 1. Porro, Pasqua le. II. Series. B738 .T5 M4 3 200 1 115-dc2 1 00- 140134

eI P

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnalune The medieval concept of time : studies on the scholastic debate and its reception in early modern philosophy / ed. by Pasquale Porro. - Leiden ; Boston ; K61n :Brill, 200 I (Studien und T exte zur Gcistesgeschichte des Mittelaltcrs ; Bd. 75) ISBN 90- 04- 12207-9

ISSN 0 169-8 125 ISBN 9004 12207 9 © Copyright 2001 by Koninklijke Bn'llNY, Leiden, TIe Netherlands

All riglus reserved. No part if thispublication mqy bereproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, ortransmitted in anyform orby arry means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permissionfrom the publisher. Authoriration tophotocopy itemsfor intemal orpersonal use isgranted by Brillprovided that the appropriatefeesare paiddirectly to TIe Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Feesare subject tochange. PRINTED I:-l THE :-lETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

Foreword .

IX

THE LATE ANTIQUE LEGACY CARLOS STE EL

The Neoplatonic Doctrine of Time and Eternity and its Influence on Medieval Philosophy................................

3

MARlA BETrETINI

Measuring in Accordance with dimensiones certae: Augustine of Hippo and the Qyestion of Time

33

THE SCHOLASTIC DEBATE C ECILIA TRlFOGU

Averroes's Doctrine of Time and Its Reception in the Scholastic Debate

57

H ENRYK ANZULEWICZ

Aeternitas - aevum - tempus. The Concept of Time in the System of Albert the Great

83

PA SQUALE PORRO

Angelic Measures: Aevum and Discrete Time

131

OLIVIER BOULNOIS

Du temps cosmique a la duree ontologique? Duns Scot, le temps, l'aevum et l'etemite

161

G UIDO ALLI NEY

The Concept of Time in the First Scotistic School.....

189

CONTENTS

VI

NIKLAUS LARGIER

Time and Temporality in the 'German Dominican School'. Outlines of a Philosophical Debate between Nicolaus of Strasbourg, Dietrich of Freiberg, Eckhart of Hoheim and Ioannes Tauler

221

ALESSANDRO GHISALBERll

The Categories of Temporality in William Ockham andJohn Buridan

255

CHRISTIAN TRaITMANN

Guiral Ot : de l' eremite au temps et retour. Conjectures apartir du De muliformi oisione Dei.......

287

STEFANO CAR01l

Time and modi rerum in Nicole Oresme's Physics Commentary..............................

319

LATE SCHOLASTICISM MARIO S. DE CARVALHO

The Concept of Time According to the Coimbra Commentaries ..

353

COSTANTINO ESPOSITO

The Concept of Time in the Metaphysics of Suarez

383

JACOB SCHMUTZ

Juan Caramuel on the Year 2000: Time and Possible Worlds in Early Modern Scholasticism

TIME

AND

399

MEDICINE

THOMAS RICKLIN

Conceptions of Time in Twelfth Century Salernitan Medicine

437

CONTENTS

Vll

MAuRO DI GIANDOMENICO

Time in Modem Medicine.............. ........................................ 459

EARLY MODERN PHILOSOPHY MIGUEL ANGEL GRANADA

The Concept of Time in Giordano Bruno: Cosmic Times and Eternity

477

PAOLO PONZIO

Tempus, aevum, aeterniias in the Philosophy of Tommaso Campanella

507

MAURIZIO TORRINI

The Time of Men and the Time of Objects: Galileo and His Contemporaries

519

MARCELLO MONTANARI

The Cross and the Circle. Reflections on Pascal and the Notion of 'T ime' in the Modem Age

531

LUCA BlANCHI

Abiding Then: Eternity of God and Eternity of the World from Hobbes to the Enqdopedie

543

BIBLIOGRAPHY &INDICES Bibliography Index codicum........... Index nominum

563 573 575

FOREWORD

Time is, undoubtedly, one of the concepts which has consistently attracted the attention of scholars of medieval thought, starting with the pioneering research of Pierre Duhem, continuing with Augustin Mansion and Anneliese Maier, up to the recent works of Kurt Flasch, Udo Reinhold Jeck and many of the authors included in this volume. In the last two decades especially, the various general works on the subject have been complemented by numerous specific works focussing on individual authors or individual problematic aspects ; these have made it possible to achieve a more detailed reconstruction of the pattern of medieval debates on the nature of time and duration. Now is perhaps an appropriate moment to evaluate the progress made hitherto and to identify new directions for research. The aim of this volume is, thus, twofold: to provide a document on the current state of research for reference and consultation as well as a reliable starting point for further, more specialised studies. The perspective adopted for this collection of contributions is a long-term one, the intention being to trace a path through the most important milestones in the evolution of the concept of time from Late Antiquity up to the beginning of the Modem Age and to identify any persistence, either in a positive or negative sense, of medieval conceptions in the various currents of thought up to the 16th and 17th centuries (Late Scholasticism, Renaissance Naturalism, so-called Modem Science). This was the line followed by the International Colloquium held in Bari from l.Oth to 12th December 1998 (entitled Le trasformazioni del concetto di tempo tra Medioevo e Eta Moderna) which inspired this volume . For various reasons , however, not all the presentations from the Conference appear in this publication, while others have been added in order to give as detailed a picture as possible. The collection begins with an acknowledgement of the late antique sources (the Neo-Platonists and Augustine); considerable space is then devoted to examining certain particularly significant positions in the Scholastic debate of the 13th and 14th centuries (the reception of the Averroistic doctrine, Albert the Great, the German Dominican school, Duns Scotus and the Scotist school, Ockham and Buridan,

x

FOREWORD

Gerard of ado and Nicole Oresme). An attempt is also made to trace deviations from and continuity of medieval thought in certain Renaissance thinkers (C ampanella and Bruno), in the masters of Late Scholasticism (the Conimbricenses, Suarez, Caramuel), up to Galileo and Pascal and finally to the demolition, begun by Hobbes and completed by the Encyclopaedists , of the traditional medieval concept of eternity as an abiding 'now' outside time (nuncstans) . Also included are a consideration of the interrelation between time and medicine in two quite distinct contexts (the Salernitan school and the beginning of modem medicine) and a glance at the theories on duration elaborated by medieval theologians parallel with the traditional Aristotelian concept of time. It will hardly be necessary to point out that this attempt at a reconstruction makes no claim to be exhaustive; indeed, certain omissions are immediately apparent. While the Colloquium of Bari included papers on the doctrine of time in early medieval thought and in Thomas Aquinas, it has proved ultimately impossible to include them in this volume , even though there are many references to both throughout. On the other hand, it was considered inappropriate to include a contribution on the relationship between Descartes and the Scholastic sources on time because much excellent research on the subject has recently been published. Finally, there are no contributions on discussions of time in Arabic or Hebrew texts - a topic which obviously deserves to be dealt with separately and in depth. As already mentioned, this volume makes no claim to be the definitive work on time in the medieval period but aims rather to encourage further studies. It is in this, I hope , that its true value lies. It is my pleasant task to thank those friends and colleagues who have agreed to contribute to this volume. I would like to thank Ferruccio De Natale, at that time Head of the Dipartimento di Scienze Filosofiche at the University of Bari, for his support in organising the Conference in December 1998. ToJan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer I would like to express my gratitude for including this volume in their prestigious series. I wish to thank Anna Arezzo e Marialucrezia Leone for their collaboration in preparing the indices. And fmally, I am most grateful to Lisa Adams for her advice and help in revising the manuscripts.

Pasquale Porro

THE LATE ANTIQUE LEGACY

THE NEOPLATONIC DOCTRINE OF TIME AND ETERNITY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY Carlos Steel (Leuven)

1. THE IMPACT

OF NEOPLA1DNISM

In his commentary on the Physics, Albert the Great, after having analyzed Aristotle's arguments on time , devotes a long digression to eternity (aetemitas) and perpetuity (aevum) and how they differ from time. As he says, the Peripatetics have not discussed those subjects, at least not in the treatises that have come down to us. "There are no Peripatetic authors to be found who have treated of eternity in a scientific manner, although they made some rare references to it. This is surprising because they should have made a treatise about a matter they often dealt with. But perhaps their treatise about eternity has not come down to us, and therefore our own treatise about it is rather imperfect'". Albert considers his own treatise on eternity to be "imperfect" because he could not follow in this discussion an Aristotelian model and, thus , had to develop the subject in his own way. In fact, as we will see , his argument follows closely the Neoplatonic tradition on eternity and time. Why did the scholastic authors feel the need to go beyond the limitations of the Aristotelian doctrine of time, as they knew it from the Physics? It seems that Aristotle was only interested in explaining time in its relation to movement and space. His arguments are about processes in the physical world, not about the time that spiritual substances (such as souls and angels) experience. Further, he never discusses the relation between time and eternity, which for all Christian thinkers was of capital importance'. 1 "Non inveniuntur autem Peripatetici aliquid tractasse secundum certitudinem de aeternitatc, quamvis aliquam licet exiguam mentionem fecerint de ipsa, quod videtur mirum esse, quia de re, qua saepius utebantur, tractatum fecisse debuerant. Et forte tractatus eorum de ipsa ad nos non pervenit, et ideo noster tractatus de ipsa est imperfectior" (Albertus Magnus, Physica, I, tract. 4, c. 1, ed. Colon., p. 294,12-18). 2 On the limitations of the Aristotelian doctrine of time, see the introductory chapter of P. Porro in Forme e modelli di durata nelpensiero medievale. L aevum, if tempo

4

CARLOS STEEL

What, then, are the major features of the Neoplatonic doctrine of time that made it so attractive to scholastics? First is the fact that time is considered to be an image of eternity. When we modems talk about time, we understand it spontaneously as the opposite of eternity, what characterizes this finite, contingent world in contrast to the divine. This is not so for Plato and the Platonists, for whom the world itself is eternal in being temporal. Time is one of the gifts through which the Creator embellishes and perfects the newborn world. As is said in Timaeus, When the Father who had begotten the world, saw it set in motion and alive, a shrine brought into being for the everlasting gods, he rejoiced and being well pleased he thought to make it yet more like its pattern. [...] Now the nature of that Paradigm was eternal, and this character it was impossible to confer fully on the generated world. But the Demiurge thought to make, as it were, a moving likeness (ElKWV) of eternity, [...] an everlastinglikeness moving according to number - that to which we have given the name Time" . Time, then, is not primarily seen as a loss of eternity, the origin of corruption, decay, and mortality. It is a precious gift of the Demiurge alongside other gifts such as intelligence, life, motion, and harmony. Thanks to the uniform numerical order of time, this changeable world is made as much as possible to resemble its eternal paradigm. It is eternal in the modus of movement; that is, it is everlasting in an ordered manner, according to number, the circles of days, months, years. Hence time is not the opposite of eternity; rather, it is its everlasting eternal image. In contrast to Plato, however, the Neoplatonic authors will emphasize much more that time (and the whole transient world) is nothing but an image of eternity (and the eternal world), which is true reality. We have to escape from this temporal world to reach our eternal destination. If time is an image of eternity, the next question becomes why time has proceeded from the perfect immobility and unity of eternity. In the search for an answer, the soul comes to the foreground. In fact, the soul is, as we know from Plato, "the intermediary" between the indivisible eternal and the divisible temporal. For the Neopladiscrete, la categoria 'quando', Leuven 1996. In the preparation of my contribution I have been often inspired by this excellent book . 3 See Timaeus 37 CoD, translation adapted from F. Cornford (Plato's Cosmology, London 19564) .

THE NEOPLATONlC DOCTRINE OF TIME

5

tonists time is not primarily a physical phenomenon: it originates with the life of the soul, and only through the souls (and their movements) is it communicated to the physical world. This in fact is the major thesis of Plotinus (followed in this by Augustine). For Plotinus, eternity is the life of the Intellect, unchanging, complete, reposing in the One. The restless life of the soul, however, can only imitate this eternal life in a movement from one state to another, and with the descent of the soul from the Intellect, time is born. Just as the sensible universe moves in soul, so it receives its motion within the time of the soul. Soul thus functions as an intermediary between eternity and the physical time in the gradual procession of beings from the more perfect to the less perfect. The later Neoplatonists (i.e., after Iamblichus), however, refuse to place the origin of time in the life of the soul. If the soul is itself characterized by temporality, time as the measure of duration must be prior to the psychic activities. Therefore they tend to situate the absolute or whole time above both the psychic and corporeal time. Whatever their solutions were, all of the (Neo-)Platonists sought to understand the 'origin' or 'creation' of time, a problem absolutely alien to Aristotle's thought. Their various examinations of time and eternity entered the medieval discussion in the Latin world through direct and indirect channels, as outlined here: Plato's Timaeus through the translation and the commentary of Calcidius. Plotinus' Ennead III, 7 through his influence on Augustine, Confessiones, XI. Proclus' Elementaiio Theologica (props. 50-55; 106-107; 191-192). - Indirectlythrough his influence on Dionysius, Dediu. nominibus, X. - Also indirectly through the Liber de causis, props . 2 and 30-31. - Directly through the Latin translation made by William of Moerbeke in 1268. Boethius' De amsolatione philosophiae, V, 6 (indirectly influenced by Proclus via the Alexandrine tradition). Simplicius' In Categorias (about the category 'quando') and In De Caelo, translated by William of Moerbeke (the former had some limited influence, the latter scarcely any). In this particular study, I will concentrate on Proclus who, through the mediation of Dionysius and the Liber de causis, has been the most

6

CARLOSSTEEL

influential author in the transmission of the Neoplatonic doctrine of time and eternity".

2.

PROCLUS ON ETERNITY AND TIME

Proclus discusses eternity and time in the first part of his Elements if Theolo!!J, where he examines the general principles of reality". He begins by clarifying the meaning of 'eternal' and 'temporal'. As he shows, these two modes of duration correspond to two opposed ontological levels: being (ouotu), which for a Platonist is true or intelligible being, and coming-to-be (yEVEaLS). The temporal is the characteristic mode of existence of things in process: "Whatever is measured by time, is in a process of coming-to-be in that respect in which it is measured by time'{rrdv TO Xp6V41 j.lETp01Jj.lEVOV YEVEUlS EUTl mlnl;], f1 j.lETpElTaL KaTG. Xp6vov)6. For if time is a measure of movement according to before and after, anything measured by time must have a form of existence or activity in which a past and a future state can be distinguished. If, then, the states of "what a thing was" and "what it is now" and "what it will be" are really different from each other, a temporal thing solely becomes and never is, ever moving with the time measuring it. Existing in becoming, it never remains steadfast in its own being but continually receives now this, now that being. In fact, a temporal thing is never wholly and simultaneously what it is but it has an existence extended (EV TTapaTClun) in a process of before and after. Therefore, it has its being in non-being. For it can only become what it is not yet after having lost what it was (not quite!) before. In opposition to the temporal stands the eternal, which exists as a simultaneous whole (aj.la OAOV) and admits of no composition or change. "There is no part of it", writes Proclus , "which has already 4 In another article, which will be published by G. Kapriev and A. Speer in the proceedings of the Sofia-colloquium TheReception tfPseudo-Dionysius in the Middle Ages (April 1999), I will examine Proclus' influence in the Middle Ages through the mediation of Dionysius . .5 See propositions 53-55, in the edition and translation of E.R. Dodds, Oxford 1962. My exposition will be based only on the Elements, because this was the only text with influence on medieval thought. Note, however, that there is also an interesting discussion on time and eternity in book III of the Commentary on the Timaeus. fi El.Theo!., prop. 50, p. 48,16-17; all translations are adapted from E.R. Dodds .

TIiE NEOPLATONI C DOCTRINE OF TIME

7

subsisted and another that will subsist later, but as yet is not. All that it is capable of being, it already possesses in entirety without losing it or without accumulating" 7• There is no before and after to be distinguished in it. In fact the "eternal" (atwvLOV) means, as the word itself shows, "that which always is" (afL ov), as distinct from that which exists through time and in becoming. The eternal must, therefore, be as clearly distinguished from the temporal as being from becoming. In these preliminary propositions Proclus excellently formulates what are standard claims for all Platonic philosophers. Already Plotinus had expressed such views in the first paragraph of his famous treatise On Eternity and Time, where he explains how we spontaneously form the notions of eternity and time: We say that eternity and time are two different things, the one related to the nature which is everlasting (at8LOV) , the other to what is in the process of becoming (yEVECJLSO). We form those concepts as it were spontaneously and through an immediate intuition, and whenever we speak of them and use their names, we think that we have a clear notion of them in our souls. However, when we come to a closer inspection of them, we find that our thought runs into difficulries".

This passage inspired Augustine to write similarly in his Cmifessions, where he, too, refers to the puzzling fact that while we all seem to know what time is, when we start reflecting on it, we get in trouble" . We shall indeed get in trouble with this seemingly evident distinction of time and eternity. We have so far distinguished two realms having different modes of existence, that of eternal things and that of temporal things; however, this does not suffice to explicate what Eternity and Time are in themselves . If temporal things are extended in and measured by time, they cannot be time themselves. We must therefore distinguish the temporality of the things in process from the time by which they are measured. That is to say, temporal things participate in time, without being time. This brings us to the paradoxical Proclean proposition that "time exists prior (TTpOUeJ>EO"TTJKEV) to all things in See El. iu«, prop . 52, ed. Dodds , p. 50, sn. Plotinus, Enneades, III, 7 (45), 1; translation adapted from A.H . Armstrong, London 1967. 9 See Augustinus, Conflssiones, XI, 14, 17. 7

R See

8

CARLOS STEEL

time" 10. In his demonstration of this proposition, Proclus makes use of the distinction between participated and unparticipated Forms, which he had established earlier in the Elements": The unparticipated Form is the Form taken in its absolute transcendence or separateness, such asJustice in itself, which is nothing but justice. The participated Form is the Form as related to and present in a particular, such as the justice of a law. Finally there is the participant, the particular sharing in the Form; for instance, this particular law. The unparticipated Form is equally present everywhere and in all participants, while the participated Form only exists in the particulars which participate it. In a similar way we can distinguish absolute time, which is not participated and exists 'prior' to all temporal things, from participated time, or rather the many participated times. For there are many times, thus the time we humans now share on this earth, which is different from the times of the revolutions of the celestial bodies. Nevertheless all those 'times' are somehow within the absolute Time and are measured by it. The same distinctions must also be made regarding eternity. For Eternity precedes as cause and measure the multiple eternal beings that participate in it. Finally, Proclus considers time and eternity as measures. He writes: Every Eternity is a measure of things eternal, every Time of things in time; and these two are the only measures of life and movement in things!2.

On the one hand, to define time as the measure of movement is of course traditional. It goes back to Aristotle and is also included in the Platonic definitions. On the other hand, it is more difficult to understand how eternity itself can be considered a measure. For a measure can only be applied to what is measurable. But how could the eternal being, which exists simultaneously as a whole and is subject to no change or division in parts, be measured? To be sure, Proclus emphasizes that Eternity is not the same kind of measure of movement as time, which is extended with the process that it measures. For whereas time measures "piecemeal" in a sequence of moments, eternity measures "by the whole". Hence eternity is not a

See El. tu«, prop . 53. See El. tu«, props . 23-24. 12 Sec EI. Theol. , prop . 54 (ed. Dodds, p. 52,8-10). 10

11

TIlE NEOPLATONIC DOCTRINE OF TIME

9

measure of a change or process, but a measure of being. But again, how could being, which is as such without extension, be measured? The Neoplatonic commentator Simplicius, following his master Damascius, explains the matter as follows' ". Even if there is no real division or multiplicity in the intelligible realm, there appears nonetheless at that level a certain formal differentiation (8lclKplalS), because the unity of this realm is not absolute simplicity but a plurality of wholes and parts . Accordingly there must also be some measure of this differentiated unity "in order that what has departed from unity might not fall into indeterminacy'l'". Simplicius thus explains how we may fmd in the intelligible realm some prefiguration (TTpOVTTOypu¢i]) of the four measures we know from this corporeal world: number, size, place and time. He also indicates that eternity is within the intelligible world the measure corresponding to time. As he explains it, eternity is the proper measure of the duration of being of a certain entity. In fact, on the level of the intelligible Forms "the act of being (Elvm) has been differentiated from that which is (TO ov) and has become as it were an extended life of this being (OlOV ~LOS TlS TOU OVTOS YEVOIlEVOV TTUPUTETUIlEVOS) ". Nevertheless, this extended being remains unified thanks to the measurement of Eternity, which "brings its extension into the unchanging rest in the one being"!",

13 See Simplicius, In Physicam, ed. H. Diels, Berlin, 1882, pp. 773,19ff. (this exposition is certainly based upon Damascius' treatise On Number and Place and Time which is quoted at p. 774,30). 1-1 See Simplicius, In Phys., ed. Diels, p. 773,27: "Iva ~" TOU EVOS" EKuTavTa

TrpoS" aopluTtav UTrEVEXElfj. 15 See Simplicius, In Phys. p.773,32-774,5. I have freely used the translation of J.O.Urmson (Simplicius. Corollaries on Place and Time, London 1992) which unfortunately has many errors. Thus in this crucial passage (ETrEl8" 8E Ka\. TO ElVaL TOU OVTOS" wS" EV EKEtVOlS" 8lEKpt8r) oiov ~toS" nS" TOU OVTOS" YEv6~EVOV rmpursTa~EvoS") , the translator did not understand that TOU OVTOS" in line 773,34 is a genitive depending upon 8lEKptlh] (cf. 22-23 and 25-26). Urmson translates "But since the essence of the existent, parallel to the distinction among the unified, has become like an extended life of the existent ..." which is absolute nonsense. I translate as follows: "But since being has been differentiated from that which is, as is the case in those beings (i.e. on the level of the Forms), and has become as it were an extended life of this being" (on the rrcprirnotc KaTU TO ELVaL as a sort of life, see also In De Caelo, 94,17-18). In his notes L. Siorvanes speaks of "the meaning of this abstruse passage" (p. 85, n.2). But there is nothing 'abstruse' in this passage if the translation is corrected. The armotations of Siorvanes make it even worse. The verbe ELVaL , he writes, denotes "the essence" and the participle TO DV "the real-existence". However, it is evident from the context that Simplicius understands ELVaL as "the

10

CARLOS STEEL

It should be noted in this connection that the term TTapClTaaLS is often used to characterize the temporal extension of a being in change. Simplicius, however, applies the term here to the duration of an immobile eternal being. For as he explains, one might consider the act of being of such a being as its life which endures forever. In this sense eternity can be defined as the whole measure of the being and life of a thing that possesses its being simultaneously, whereas time measures the extension that a thing undergoes in its transition from a prior state to another'". Therefore time starts in the procession of reality on that level where the act of being is not only formally distinct, but really dissociated from the thing that is. Such a being only exists in so far as it continually moves from one state in time to another' ? To conclude, there are only two measures of the duration of things. First there is eternity, which measures at once the whole duration of a being. Second, there is time, which measures piecemeal the extension of a being that continually passes from one state to another. Eternity can be seen as the prefiguration of time; time as the image of eternity. Each of them governs a separate sphere of reality, eternity the intelligible being, time the temporal (corporeal and psychic) world of change.

3. COMPLICATION: How 1D BE BOlli ETERNAL AND TEMPORAL Notwithstanding Simplicius' sharp distinction between the temporal and the eternal, there seems to be a realm that shares in both eterni-

act of being or the existence" distinguishing it formally from the entity (TO DV ) enjoying this being. If E1 val were 'essence' , one could not understand why Simplicius compares it to a 'life' and an 'activity'. The whole argum ent is lost if one understands ELVaL as essence, as do Siorvanes and Urmson, A similar distinction between 'esse' and "id quod est' is to be found in Boethius and in the Parmenidescommentary attributed to Porphyry. See P. Hadot, "La distinction de l'etre et de l'etant dans Ie 'De hebdomadibus' de Bocce", in DieMetaphysik im Miuelaltcr, ed. P. Wilpert, Berlin 1963 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 2), pp. 147-153, and Porphyre et Manus Vidorinus, Paris 1968, t. I, pp. 488-493; t. II, pp. 98-107. 16 See also Simplicius, In Caiegorias, ed. K. Kalbfleisch, Berlin 1907, p. 364,8-15 and In Physicam, ed. Diels, p. 641,3-5. 17 Simplicius explains how time proceeds from eternity in a most interesting digression in his Commentary on De Caelo, ed. 1. Heiberg, Berlin 1894, pp. 93,2594,24.

THE NEOPLATONIC DOCTRINE OF TIME

11

ty and time. For, as Proclus notes in a corollary to prop. 55, "of the things which exist in time, some have a perpetual duration". Thus the universe as a whole and the celestial spheres in it are both eternal and temporal. They are eternal because they never come to existence in time and never will cease to exist. But they are temporal because they possess their being only through a process of change in a sequence of moments. The same holds true for the psychic realm: all souls are immortal and indestructible; nevertheless, they are in a continuous transition. Therefore, as Proclus says, "perpetuity (lL8LOTT)5') is of two kinds, the one eternal (aLWVL05'), the other in time; the one having its being concentrated in a simultaneous whole, the other diffused and unfolded in temporal extension (rmprircotc): the one entire in itself, the other composed of parts each of which exists separately in a sequence of prior and posterior'i'", The distinction Proclus makes between two modes of eternity is clear. There is the absolutely eternal, which is the intelligible realm, and the everlasting though ever changing universe. But the question remains how there might be a reality that shares in both opposite determinations, time and eternity. What is it to exist as both eternal and temporal? How is it possible - and where? As so often, Proclus justifies the introduction of this intermediary ontological level by applying the principle of continuity that governs the procession of all things: "All procession is accomplished through a likeness of the secondary to the primary'i'". This principle states that a cause can never produce something which is entirely different from it; therefore , an intermediary term is needed which, by being both similar and dissimilar to the extreme terms, links them so that the continuity of the procession is preserved. By the same token, a thing that is entirely temporal can never directly originate from that which is entirely eternal. In order to bridge the distance between the two levels, there must exist a mean term which is eternal in one respect and measured by time in another. The status of this intermediary between the eternal and the temporal is further clarified in props. 105-107. Here, Proclus says that the intermediary must be something whose being is eternal, but which has its activities in time: "Intermediate between that which is wholly eternal (in respect both of existence and of activity) and that which has its existence in

18 19

Produs, El. tu«. prop . 55, ed. Dodds , pp. 52,30-54,3. Produs, El. Theol.; prop . 29, ed. Dodds , p. 34,3-4.

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time there is something eternal in one regard but in another measured by time"20. Such intermediaries are the celestial spheres, as we have seen, but also the intellective souls, as Proclus explains further on: "Every participated soul has an eternal existence, but a temporal activity"21; therefore, each exists as an intermediate between the indivisible and the divisible, between being and becoming. H ence we have the following sequence: what is beyond eternity, what is fully eternal, what shares in both time and eternity, what shares only in time. These teachings on the continuity of being and the need for intermediaries to bridge the gaps in "the chain of being" constitute the most important legacy of the Neoplatonic philosophers to the later medieval speculations about time and eternity. Even if they did not know Proclus , medieval thinkers could fmd his doctrine of the temporal-eternal mediator in Dionysius, De diu. Nom. X. and, above all, in one of the most quoted propositions of the Liber de causis, prop. 30 (31), which , as Thomas Aquinas observed, depended entirelyon Proclus , prop. 10622: Inter rem cuius substantia et actio sunt in momenta aeternitatis et inter rem cuius substantia et actio sunt in momento temporis existens est medium , et est illud cuius substantia est ex momenta aeternitatis et operatio ex momenta temporis.

One should notice, however, that although Proclus introduces an intermediary level between the temporal and the eternal, he acknowledges only two measures of duration: Eternity and Time. The former measures being, the latter becoming. This will lead to a further complication.

4. A F URTHER C OMPUCATION:

I N S EARCH OF AN I NTERMEDIATE M EASURE

The question how the generated universe, which undergoes a continuous change, could yet be 'everlasting' or 'perpetual' continues to Proclus, El. tu«. prop . 106, ed. Dodds , p. 94,21-23. Proclus, El. Theol., prop . 191, ed. Dodd s, p. 166,26-27. 22 See Thomas Aq., In De Causis, ed. HD. SafTrey, Fribourg - Louvain 1954, p. 141,4-9. The only major difference with Proclus is the use of the expression "in momento", which has given much difficulty to the medieval commentators. In the original Ara bic the term stands for "realm". See C. D'Ancona Cos ta, Tommaso d'Aquino. Commento al 'Libro delle cause', Milano 1986, p. 425, n. 1. 20 21

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13

fascinate the later Neoplatonists. This is evident from the remarkable Corollarium de tempore of Simplicius. According to Simplicius, his master Damascius was particularly interested in understanding what that "whole of time" is of which particular times are different portions, just as there is a whole of place comprehending all possible places that are occupied by particular bodies-", The whole of time must be that outside of which there is no time, and this must also be the everlasting time (0 aEl wv). But what is the meaning of "everlasting" here? Do we designate thus the time that is ever and ever becoming (anyEvES), the time that flows continually (Mwv Xp6vos)? But such an ever-flowing time could never exist as the whole time. For, even if it is everlasting and never ceases to be , it will never arrive at its being altogether nor exist as a whole all at once. That is to say, everlasting time is not really always, but rather never, because it is in a perpetual coming-to-be. Hence such a time, which exists always "for a time" (rrore) again and again, cannot really be the ever-existing time. Still, there must be such an everlasting total time, just as there is a total place. For it is absurd to admit that the particular time, however short it may be, should exist, but never the whole of time. Moreover, if the everlasting time does not exist, or does not exist forever, then neither the heavens nor the whole universe will remain numerically identical, but everything will "flow" perpetually. For all of these reasons, Damascius claims that the whole universe exists as a simultaneous whole, not by continually coming to be in a flowing time, but in a time that exists simultaneously as a whole: For if the everlasting does not exist or not for ever, then nothing of the things generated will be perpetual; so that the heavens nor the universe will be forever numerically identical, but everything will flow, since the everlasting will be in flux and will neither be nor become. For in each moment some particular time (nOTE) will come to be and not the everlasring-",

So there must be a time existing forever as a simultaneous whole, and this time is the absolute measure of all changes in the temporal sphere.

23 See Simplicius , In Phys., ed . Diels, p. 779,15 ff For the translation I make use of Simplidus. Corollaries on Place and Time, Translated by j.O.Urmson, London 1992, correcting it wh en necessary. 24 Simplicius , In Phys., ed. Diels, p. 782,28-32 (quotation from Damascius).

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Simplicius, with all respect for his master, cannot accept these views about the time that exists forever as a whole. In his estimation, this doctrine abolishes the radical difference between what is really eternal (i.e., the intelligible being, which exists as a simultaneous whole) and what is temporal. Even if the generated universe is everlasting and exists forever, its mode of duration is still fundamentally different from that of the true being which is eternal. Therefore, if one admits that this world exists as a simultaneous whole in an eternal time, it will no longer be possible to distinguish it from that which is really eternal, true being'". Simplicius even accuses Damascius of sophistical reasoning: he takes "that which ever becomea 'Tro cid 'Ylv6~EVOV) as identical with "th at which exists Iorever'{ro cid ov). Things that have their being in becoming cannot exist simultaneously as a whole, but only in a permanent flow. Simplicius gives the example of the dance, which never manifests itself as a simultaneous whole, but only as a continuous process'". All the same, Simplicius admits that Damascius was right to ask the question how the universe as a whole and the heavens in it could be forever identical if all time is just "flowing" and has no eternal duration. But he attempts to answer the question in his own way, applying again the principle of continuity in the procession of reality. As we have seen, the procession never goes directly from one extreme to another, but always passes through intermediaries that bridge the gap. We are here again confronted with two extremes. On the one hand, there is the eternal in the most proper and strict sense, the true being, which exists simultaneously as a whole. On the other hand, there are the purely temporal things whose being is in flux and which have at different times different states of being-". Between those two extremes, there are two intermediate levels, the psychic substances and the celestial bodies. They are eternal in their being, but in a continuous process of change. Because we have no appropriate names to designate this intermediate level (it is always easier to name the extremes) , we do so by mixing the names of the extremes. So we speak of the soul as "the middle between the indivisible and the divisible", even though it has its proper ontological constitution and is not merely the middle of the extreme terms, as is

See Simplicius, In Phys., ed . Diels, p. 783,3-6. See Simplicius , In Phys., ed . Diels, p. 782,20-26 . 27 See Simplicius, In Phys., ed. Diels, p. 783,lff.

25 26

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15

a mixture of elements. Plato and Aristotle only recognized two measures of duration, eternity and time, the one measuring being, the other movement. However, one can easily see that neither of these two measures is really appropriate to measure the duration of this intermediate realm. This is evident from the seemingly conflicting statements Plato and Aristotle make about the 'eternity of the world'. For Plato the soul and the whole of heaven are in time, since he says of the worldsoul that "it began a ceaseless and intelligent life through the whole of time"28. He also seems to accept a temporal origin of the world. Aristotle, on the contrary, placed both intermediates , the universe and the soul, in eternity. But, as Simplicius shows, the opposition between both philosophers on this point is only apparent: "Strictly speaking, the beings that are intermediate between the eternal and the temporal, should have an appropriate intermediate measure for their own mode of duration'F', It is through the search for a measure of this mode of existence, which is both being and becoming, eternal and temporal, that Damascius developed his view of time as a simultaneous whole. This absolute time is the proper measure of the duration of the whole universe, which is both eternal and changing. Simplicius acknowledges that his master was indeed looking for an appropriate measure for the duration of this intermediate being. Whether he was right in calling this measure 'time' is another matter. But let us not quarrel about words, he concludes. Certainly Damascius was not using the term 'time' in its ordinary common sense when he was talking about the time that exists as a simultaneous whole . For in its ordinary usage time refers to the flowing time, which is divided into past, present, and future . In this text, which the scholastics never read, Simplicius clearly argues that there must be an intermediate measure that is appropriate to the intermediary ontological status of souls and of the universe as a whole , including the celestial spheres. Since they are everlasting and yet still in change, they must have their proper measure of duration different from time and eternity in the proper sense. In fact, what he is looking for, without having a proper term for it, is the aeoum as a measure distinguished from both Eternity and Time. As

Timaeus, 36 E. Simplicius, In Phys., ed. Diels, pp . 783,17-784,2.

28 Plato, 29 See

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we shall see, the scholastics almost reinvented this doctrine in the 13th century, which again shows how Neoplatonic they are in spirit".

5. THE SCHOLASTIC DOCfRINE OF THE THREE MEASURES

OF DURATION

In the early 13th century, the magistri at the University of Paris developed the doctrine of the three measures of duration: eternity, sempiternity, and time. The author of the Summa which is attributed to Alexander of Hales distinguishes the three modes of duration as follows: a being is eternal if it is without origin or end; it is perpetual if it has an origin but no end (e.g., the angels, the souls, and the celestial spheres); it is temporal if it has both a beginning and an end-". Albert, though strongly influenced by the Summa Halensis, saw this characterization of the three modes of duration as superficial. Suppose, he says, the world exists from all eternity and will never cease to exist. Even this eternal world will have a mode of duration different from the "all-togetherness" of true eternity, which is the sole privilege of God32• Thus, he attempts to explain the difference between aetemitas and aeuum through their intrinsic essential properties. Whereas eternity is pure actuality ("non est potentia sed totum actus"), the aeuum; though always actual and "simul totum", is the actuality of some potency: "potentia stans semper sub actu sine aliquo fluxu". It is the duration of those things whose being is stable, but still vary in their activities and thus experience their being through some extension. In many works Albert comes back to this demarcation between eternity and perpetuity, using different conceptual distinctions-". In

3D Boethius was an important channel in the transmission of these Neoplatonic teachings on eternity and perpetuity: see Porro, Forme e modelli.. ., pp. 83fT. See also the text quoted in n. 34. 31 See Alexander Halensis , Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum, I, dist. 9, ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Qyaracchi - Firenze 1951-57, pp. 116,5-117,9. 32 Albertus Magnus, Physica, IV, tract. 4, c. 4, ed. Colon., pp. 298,66-299,3. See also Super De divinis nominibus, X, ed. Colon ., p. 400,58-65: "quia sicut dicit Boetius in V De Consokuione philosophiae, etiam si mundus non haberet principium, adhuc differret ab aeterno , et similiter etiam si tempus semper esset, ut philosophi dixerunt, adhuc tria ilia diferrent . Unde patet, quod iliae sunt differentiae accidentales, alioquin non posset intelligi tempus non habens principium" . 33 See Albertus Magnus , In I Sent., dist. 9, A, art. 3, ed. Parisiensis (Borgnet), pp. 273-275; Summa de aeaturis, tract. 2, q. 6, artt . 2-3, ed. Paris., pp. 391-394 and Phys.,

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17

fact, it seems that Albert was well aware of the problematic character of this intermediate measure of duration, the aeuum. He knew that the discussion of three different measures of duration was only a recent development of the magistri. In one of his latest writings , his Summa theologiae, Albert observes that according to the ancient philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, there are in reality ("secundum rem") only two measures, namely eternity and time, and that an intermediate measure must not be accepted "secundum rem ", but only "secundum rationem participationis" of these two measures-", For the Platonic view, Albert refers in this context to proposition 54 of the Elements if Theology, which he recently came to know. But a similar doctrine is also found in the Aristotelian tradition, he believes, quoting from the Liber de Causis (which in his view is a Peripatetic treatise): "There is only one medium between a being whose substance and action are in eternity and a being whose substance and action are in time"35. This proposition seems to suggest that the intermediary level has no proper intermediate measure, but that it participates in both measures, that is, in eternity with respect to its substance, in time with respect to its actions. And yet , Albert also tries to justify the practice of the "recentiores", noting that "Si quis tamen subtiliter ista intuetur, distinguet. .. "36. As he says, a measure can be taken either as an extrinsic measure, as when we measure a wool cloth with a wooden cubit, or when we use a ruler to measure a piece of wood. The same measure can also be used for the measurement of a distance or of the length of an iron staff. The ancient philosophers understood measure in this sense; therefore, they could only recognize two measures , either the measure of being or the measure of becoming, without distinguishing between the various modes of being that are measured. Whatever is between being and becoming can be measured

N, tract. 4, c. 4, ed. Colon ., p. 349; Super De diu. nom., X, ed. Colon., pp. 400,65401,2-12 ; Summa theol., tract. 5, q. 23, c. 3, ed. Colon., p. 140,71-89. 3~ See Albertus Magnus , Summa theol., tract. 5, q. 23, art. 3, ed. Colon. , p. 140,713: "Dicendum quod in veritate secundum auctores antiquissimos, ut est Aristoteles et Plato, secundum rem non sunt nisi duae mensurae , scilicet aeternitas et tempus ; et medium mensurae non secundum rem, sed secundum rationem participationis proprietatum istarum duarum mensurarum accipitur". 35 See Albertus Magnus , Summa theol., tract . 5, q. 23, art. 3, ed . Colon., p. 140,15-26. One should notice however that Albert has modified the quotation from the De Causis. The words "non sit nisi unum medium " are his addition . 36 See Albertus Magnus, Summa theol., tract. 5, q. 23, art. 3, ed. Colon., p. 140,27fT.

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by time in so far as it is divisible and in change, by eternity in so far as it is being. We can, however, also consider measures as intrinsic to the things measured. Duration in fact is something intrinsic to a being that, as a form inherent in it, cannot be applied to other things. That is the perspective of the "magistri posteriores". They distinguish three modes of duration to which must correspond three different measures. For, as we have seen, there is not only a distinction between temporal and eternal beings, but also, within the eternal, between God, who alone is absolutely and per se eternal, and the perpetual beings, which attain their eternity and simultaneity ("totum simul esse") through participation. The most developed argumentation in favor of a threefold measure of duration is to be found in Giles of Rome's questions, De mensuris angelorum, composed around 1288-89. Giles develops four main arguments referring to Dionysius, Damascenus (who himself depends on Dionysius), Proclus, and Anselm'". All of his arguments are based upon the principle that there must be a correspondence between the types of measure and the degrees of duration. Apart from the divine being (which is permanent per se), all creatures are characterized by some deficiency in their being ("ex defectu creaturae"), by some mutability, by a distinction between what they are and the act of existence (for they have 'received' their being, and whatever is received is also 'limited'). Even if they are immutable and will never cease to be, such as angels, they can be thought to cease to exist. Hence, they have some sort of extension in which a distinction can be made between present, past, and future. Nevertheless, compared to the duration of the corruptible things , which by necessity begin, then cease to exist after some time, their duration is simultaneous. They receive their whole being at once and not through some process. Those eternal creatures have a participated and thus 'diminished' eternity, which is what is commonly called the aevum. Therefore, one could also say with James of Viterbo that 'eternal' is an analogical term denoting both the proper eternity, which is the privilege of God, and the participated eterniry'", 37 See Aegidius Romanus, De mensura angelorum, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1503, fT.37rb38ra: "Restat adducere rationes quare sit neeessitas ponendi hane mcnsuram mediam ...". 38 "Est igitur duplex aeternitas: una plena, alia diminuta, Utrique autem commune est aeternitatis nomen, non univoee nee omnino aequivoee , sed analogiee ;

THE NEOPLATONICDOCTRINE OF TIME

6. ANOTI-IER

19

COMPLICATION: DISCRETE AND CONTINUOUS TIME

However, there are not only two levels of eternity, aeternitas and aevum; one must also distinguish, says James, two modes of time, namely, the discrete and the continuous. He says that in time also there is a diversity. For one time is the measure of a continuous movement, and therefore belongs to the genus of the continuous, another time is the measure of changes or activities that succeed upon each other without continuity. This succession can somehow be called a movement, and therefore such a time belongs to the genus of the discrete. The first time measures the movements of bodies, the second of minds'". Both forms of time may be called times, but in an "analogical sense" only. In fact, time is essentially a number measuring succession, but it will be different depending on whether this succession is continuous or nor'", For a good Aristotelian, this understanding of time as indifferent to the continuous/discontinuous distinction is absolutely incomprehensible. For he knows how much Aristotle, in his reactions against the Eleatic views, insisted that time is a continuum related to the continuity of movement and space. However, as Augustine already said in De Genesi ad litteram, there may be forms of time not linked to space, as is the time wherein the angels operate!'. For, while incorporeal creatures are not situated in space, they nevertheless perform acts in a temporal sequence. For example, they may acquire a knowledge they had not before. Such spiritual creatures are situated between the Creator, who is beyond all time and space, and the corporeal things , which act in both time and space. sed incomparabiliter maiori analogia quam sit ilia quae invenitur in tempore" (Iacobus de Viterbio, fJEodlibet I, q. 9, ed. E. Ypma, Wiirzburg 1968, p. 131,108111). The first quodlibet ofJames dates around 1292-1293 . 39 "Nam in tempore diversitas quaedam est, quia quoddam tempus est mensura motus continui, et ideo est de genere continuorum, quoodam vero tempus est mensura mutationum, vel operationum sibi invicem sine continuitate succedentium, quae successio motus dici potest aliquo modo, et ideo huiusmodi tempus est de genere discretorum. Primum tempus mensurat motus corporurn, secundum vera motus spirituum. Et licet nomen temporis utrique mensurae conveniat, non tamen univoce, nee omnino aequivoce, sed analogice" (Iacobus de Viterbio, fJEodlibet I, q. 9, p. 130,72-80). JO "Tempus de se est numerus et accidit ei quod sit quod continuum." This phrase comes not from James, but from his confrere Giles of Rome (De mensuris angelorum, q. 8, f. 63ra) . u See Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram; VIII, 20, 39.

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These incidental remarks of Augustine have been for the scholastics the starting point for an elaboration of a concept of a non-spatial, spiritual time 42. For example, in his Summa theologiae, Albert refers to the views of some masters, such as Alexander of Hales, who distinguish two sorts of time : the physical time , which measures a transition from a first state to an ultimate state with a continuing medium ("cum continuante medio") , and the spiritual time, which measures a transition from one state to another without any continuariorr' ". To be sure, spiritual substances do not always remain in the same state of thought or volition. Their transition from one state to another is not a continuous process, however, but rather a oiassitudo, an alternation or a discontinuous leap from one state to another, as in counting one passes from one number to another. Therefore, the time that measures those spiritual changes must be discontinuous. In fact, when an angel now thinks this form and then another, he remains wholly in each of the intelligible objects in a perfect act wherein there is no change. In his earlier work, De IV coaequaeois, Albert accepted this view. "There is not just one time," he says, "but many, for there is some change that cannot be reduced to the motion of the heaven as its cause. Such is the change of the intellective and volitional power"44. In the Summa, however, written at the end of his career, Albert rejects this view. He quotes again the famous proposition of the Liber de Causis (30) and notices that only one intermediary is mentioned between time and eternity and no distinction is made in time itself. Besides this argument from tradition, he also gives an argument based upon natural philosophy. A philosopher cannot accept that time must vary "according to the variation of temporal things ". If time is the number by which we measure, not the "numerus numeratus", the distinction between spiritual and corporeal activities is

J2 As Pasquale Porro has shown, this is one of the most original contributions of the scholastics to the doctrine of time. See his survey in ch. Three of his Forme e modelli... B See Albertus Magnus, Summa theol., I, tract. 5, q. 23, art. 3, ed. Colon., p. 138,74-89 and arguments 'pro', pp. 137,89-138,53. This text is summarized by Berthold of Moosburg and integrated in his commentary on the Elements of Proclus, see ed. B. Faes de Mottoni, pp. 434,17-435,37. It is remarkable, however, that Berthold do es not mention the critical conclusion of Albert (who refuses this distinction of time!). JJ See Albertus Magnus , De IV coaeq., q. 5, art. 10, ed. Paris., t. 34, p. 384b: "plura sunt tempora ; est enim quaedam mutatio quae non potest reduci ad motum cadi tamquam ad causam, sicut est mutatio potentiae intellectivae et volitivae".

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irrelevant for the definition of time. There is only one time measuring all movements, and the first movement measured is that of the heaven. Even if the movements of the soul are not causally related to the movement of the heaven (as are all processes in the sublunary realm), they are measured with reference to the movement of heaven as a principle of number: "ad motum caeli, non ut ad causam, sed ut ad numerum'l'". It is again Giles of Rome who offers in his questions, De mensura angelorum, the most substantial elaboration of this doctrinc'", Giles first argues that the operations of angels must occur in a temporal sequence, though their substance and mode of being is measured by the aevum and not by time . In fact, since angels cannot think all forms in act at once, there must be a transition from one form to another. Hence we have to accept even in the operations of the intellect a certain 'su ccession ' and thus time. However, an angel can 'stay' as long in one act of thought as he likes without changing F. Therefore, the time that measures the angelic activities cannot be similar to the physical time which is continually flowing, but must be composed out of discrete instants, each having a certain duration. As Giles formulates it: "the instant by which the angelic thought is measured is not of the same kind with the now-moment of our time, since this now is always in flow, whereas that instant stays as long as one thought".!8. So the angelic time is somehow an Eleatic time whereby the angel skips from one moment to another, each moment having a certain duration and density, each being as it were a "simul totum", and not just a transient passage . Giles' colleague Henry of

-15 See Albertus Magnus, Summa theol., tract. 5, q. 23, c. 3, ed. Colon., p. 139,1923: "dicendum quod non est nisi unum tempus ct quod transitus per aflecta vel concepta spiritualis creaturae ordinatur ad motum caeli, not ut ad causam, sed ut ad numerum, quo nos mensuramus et numeramus ipsurn". In his Physica Albert also defends that there is only one time. But he does not discuss there the possibility of a spiritual time. See IV, tract. 3, c. 17. -1 6 For a comprehensive study of Giles' doctrine on time, see C. Trifogli, "La dottrina del tempo in Egidio Romano", Documenti e studisulfa tradizionefilostfica medicvale 1 (1990), pp. 247-276. -l7 See Aegidius Romanus, De mensuris angelorum, q. 8, ed. Venetiis 1503, f.65rb "angelus tamdiu stat in una intellectione quamdiu sibi placet". -18 See Aegidius Romanus, De mensuris angelorum, q. 8, ed. Venetiis 1503, f. 66ra : "mud instans quo mensuratur intellectio angelica non est eiusdem rationis cum ipso nunc temporis nostri, quia tale nunc semper est in fluxu, sed instans illud tamdiu stat quamdiu stat intellectio una".

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Ghent expresses a similar view in his 0:Jadlibet XIII, q. 7: "The thoughts of angels", he argues, "are perfect and simple acts which exist whole at once (tatae simul existentes) and remain during a period (mora) in comparison with our time". For there is no thought or volition in an angel without a space of time . And those acts, which remain permanent during a period, are measured in their succession by a "time composed of discrete instants that are whole at once"-l9. This attempt to fmd a characteristic of eternity (a duration experienced as a simul tatum) even in the temporal succession is again typical of the Neoplatonic view of time and eternity. The spiritual time which moves discontinuously from one mora to another standing still in each, is much closer to eternity than the physical time, which is everflowing and has no permanency nor totality at once. Actually, we fmd a similar distinction between a physical continuous time and a psychic discontinuous time in the N eoplatonic Commentary on the De Anima, wrongly attributed to Simplicius-". As the author remarks, the rational soul cannot think all intelligible objects in one indivisible act, as does the divine intellect, which thinks all objects at once in one "now" that is not passing away, but "stands" (Ka8' EV EaTws) and "indivisibly comprehends the whole temporal infinitude'P' . The soul, on the contrary, is forced to think discursively (IJ.ETa~aTLKws) and in temporal extension (EV napaTciaEL), and it must pass from one intelligible object to another, recognizing separately subject and predicates, putting them together in propositions, construing syllogisms. In this discursive process of thought the soul manifests its divisible character. However, notwithstanding their discursivity and divisibility, all rational souls share somehow in the indivisibility of the intellect. For, as our commentator shows , their thinking activity is not a continuous (aUVEXrlS) process, as is all physical motion or change. Thinking, he says, is a ~9 See Henricus de Gandavo, O!!odlibet xm , q. 7, ed.J. Decorte, Leuven 1985, p. 43,22-25 ; 32-37: "Intellectiones et volitiones angelicae sum actiones perfecti secundum quod perfectum est, simplices, totae simul existentes per moram comparatione nostri temporis permanentes"; "Habent tempus compositurn ex instantibus indivisibilibus quae sunt tota simul cum discretis et permanentibus in mora , sicut moram habent et pennanentiam ipsae actiones mensuratae et discretionem . Non est enim in angelo intellectio aut volitio sine mora, sed immediatam sine mora media habent ad invicem succesionem". 50 On the authorship of this commentary, see my introductory essay in the translation 'Simplicius', On Aristotle. On the Soul 2.5-12, London 1997, pp. 105-140. 51 See Pseudo -Simplicius, In De Anima, ed. M . Hayduck, Berlin 1882, p. 47,8-9.

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discontinuous process, a jumping, as it were, from one indivisible act to another, as if it were composed out of discrete monads. In fact, in each act of knowledge, the soul somehow stands still at the object in which terminates its cognitive act. Those objects are the terms (OpOl) which determine each cognitive act as an indivisible single unity; for instance, thinking what is an 'animal', what is 'rational', what is 'mortal', grasping the definition of a 'human being'. Even when the soul passes (~ETa~a( VEl) from one term to another, the act of thought is not itself EV ~ETa~GaEl, but always stands still at each term (fl KaTcl TO yvWaTOV Tf]s yvt:xJEWS' aTGaLs-). This "resting (aTGaLs-) of the knowledge upon the known object (for this is an indivisible union of both) and its transition from one term to another (~ETG~aaLS-) and its collection into one after its transition part by part" manifests its participation in indivisibility-", Hence acts of thought never have a continuous extension, "but it is rather as those who count and pass from one unity to another, so that the activity is undivided at each stage, since each thought is known undivided and as a whole"53. As he says further, "The pure and perfect activities of the soul, which always advance according to terms, are in a time which is composed out of now-moments as monads, but not such a time as physical time which is a continuum. For judgment is not divisible, but a perfect act, and whole at once in the now"54. The commentary on the De Anima was never translated into Latin in the Middle Ages. Thus, it cannot have influenced our scholastic discussions. Nevertheless, it is remarkable how the scholastic authors arrived at very similar conclusions in their discussions about the angelic time. The "discrete time composed of discrete moments" of Giles corresponds remarkably to this time "composed out of nowmoments as monads" of Pseudo-Simplicius. There is, however, an important difference . The medieval authors never admit that the discrete time is also applicable to the cognitive activities of the human souls. In their view those souls share in their activities the same measure of duration as all the physical events in the sublunary

52 See Pseudo-Simplicius, In De Anima, ed. Hayduck, p. 11,31-33. For the meaning of the expression Ka8 'opovS' ~alvELv, see my introduction to the translation, pp. 113 and 121-123. 53 See Pseudo-Simplicius, In De Anima, ed. Hayduck, p. 42,16-18. 54 See Pseudo-Simplicius, In De Anima, ed. Hayduck, p. 198,2-7 with a reference to a lost commentary on the Physics. For the interpretation of this passage, see again my introduction, pp. 121-123.

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realm. However, even Giles was aware that the activities of our soul have more analogy with the angelic operations than with physical processes. Therefore, we can start from an analysis of what happens in our mind when thinking and passing from one term to another "to investigate about the angelic time": "per ea quae videmus in mente nostra [... ] habemus magnam viam ad investigandum de tempore ilio angelico"55. In fact, there is in our mind a similar discrete succession from one state to another, as we first think the subject, then the predicate, and then we compose a proposition. The attempt to discover a kind of time that is different from both the physical world and the eternity-aevum is another application of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the continuity of the universe. For the introduction of a discrete time as the appropriate measure for spiritual activities reduces even more the opposition between eternity and time. Giles of Rome has well understood the relevance of the doctrine of discrete time for the general doctrine of the "continuity in the universe". When raising the question in his De mensuris angelorum whether eternal beings such as angels can have activities measured by time (question 8), he replies by referring to "the saints and the philosophers" who all admitted this because of the principle of continuity in the universe: One should know that the saints and the philosophers and the masters in general base their argument upon this foundation, namely that there is no procession from what is very remote to what is very remote unless through some intermediary. Therefore they admitted that the activities of the angels are measured by a successive measure. For the universe is connected and the intermediaries participate in some respect in the conditions of the extremes. Therefore, the angels, who are intermediary between God and these corporeal or sensible things, participate in some respect in the conditions of both. For these sensible things are only measured by a successive measure . Therefore, time or the instant of time measures everything in them. God however is only measured by a permanent measure. The angels then will hold a middle position. In some respect, they will be measured by a permanent measure, namely with respect to their substance and being; in another respect they will be measured by time, namely with respect to their activities. And in this way the universe is bound and glued together [conglutinatum], because the

55

74bv.

SeeAegidius Romanus, De mensura angelarum, q. 10, ed. Venetiis 1503, f. 74ra-

THE NEOPLATONIC DOCTRINE OF TIME

25

intermediaries always connect the extremes by participating in their respective conditions'" ,

Giles gives a most interesting survey of the views on time and eternity of those "sancti et doctores." Among the saints he quotes Dionysius and Augustine; among the philosophers, the author of the Liber de causis and Proc1us. We find again here the familiar Neoplatonic entourage! We are already acquainted with Augustine's views in De Genesi ad litteram: between God, who is beyond space and time, and the corporeal things, which move and change in space and time, there are the spiritual creatures, which only move in time, not in space . The other saint, Dionysius, introduces the intermediaries in his discussion of time and eternity in chapter X of De divinis nominibus, which heavily depends on Proclus, as does the author of the De causis. After an extensive discussion of the views of all those authorities, Giles concludes that they all accept an intermediary between time and eternity because of the principle of continuity. This principle, Giles observes, is not a minor argument ("modicum argumentum") in the discussion. For it is due to this principle that there is harmony and indissoluble beauty in the universe: "Ex hoc enim est in universo armonia et pulchritudo indissolubilis et concordia's".

7.

THEODORIC OF FREIBERG :

DE MENSURIS

The consequent application of the principle of continuity could lead to the introduction of ever more intermediaries, for always there is a

56 "Sciendum quod sancti et philosophi et doctores super hoc fundamento se generaliter fundant quod quia non est processus a valde distanti ad valde distans nisi per medium , ideo operationes angelorum mensurantur mensura successiva. Est enim universum connexum et media secundum aliquid participant conditiones extremorum. Angeli ergo, qui sunt medii inter deum et ista corporalia sive sensibilia, quantum ad aliquid participant conditiones utriusque . Nam haec sensibilia non mensurantur nisi mensura successiva. Totum ergo quod est in eis mensuratur vel tempore vel instanti temporis. Deus autem non mensuratur nisi mensura permanente. Angeli autem tenebunt medium , et quantum ad aliquid mensurabuntur mensura permannente, ut quantum ad corum substantiam et corum esse, et quantum ad aliquid mensurabuntur tempore, ut quantum ad corum operationes. Et hoc modo universum est connexum et conglutinatum, quia semper media connectunt extrema participando corum conditiones" (Aegid ius Romanus, De mensuris angelorum, q. 8, cd. Venetiis 1503, f.63rb). 57 See Aegidius Romanus, De mensuris angelorum, q. 10, cd. Venetiis 1503, f. 74ra.

26

CARLOS STEEL

gap to bridge. One of the most elaborate developments of the scholastic-Neoplatonic doctrine on time and eternity is to be found in the treatise De mensuris of the Dominican Theodoric of Freiberg composed in Cologne at the end of the 13th century 58. Theodoric defmes measure as the determination of a thing in its "mode of being" insofar as it has a quantitative aspecr'". Qyantity, however, can be extensive (for instance, the mass of a body) or intensive (as when we talk about gradations of power or qualities). It is only when we take it in this general sense that we can apply it to all levels of reality. In fact, to the different modes or manieres of being correspond different "measures". In the line of Albert, Theodoric rejects the views of those who explain the difference between the modes of duration through consideration of only 'accidental' or 'extrinsic' features; for example, having or not having a beginning point of duration. A proper understanding of the measures of duration requires that we always consider together with the measures "the proper and absolute modes of the beings that are measured and their substantial perfections'f". Thus the measure of the eternal duration of the heavens must be different from the measure of God's eternal life because God's mode of being and his substantial perfection are entirely different. Therefore, for the right determination of the different measures of duration, we must investigate the question from four perspectives. First, what is the "mode of being" or "substantial perfection" of the thing measured? Second, does it have any 'variation' or change in its substance? Third, what are the initial or final terms of its duration? Fourth, what is the mode of presence (praesentiolitas) of the being? Applying these four criteria, Theodoric comes to distinguish five measures of duration, which correspond to five levels of reality: 1. God comprehends in his infinite substance the perfections of all things, without any variation and without any termination. God's

S8 The treatise has been published by R. Relm in Dietrich vonFreiberg, Schrjften zur Naturphilosophie undMetaphysik, Hamburg 1983, pp. 213-239. One may regret that the editor has not attempted to identify the non explicit sources of Theodoric, for instance Albert whom the Dominican often follows. S9 "Importat autem mensura determinationem rei quantum ad aliquem essendi mdoom secundum quod in ipso modo essendi quantum ad modum significandi importatur aliqua ratio seu proprietas quantitatis" (Theodoricus de Freiberg, De mensuris, ed. Relm, p. 215,21-24). 60 "Igitur simul cum terminis durationis attendendum est rerum mensurabilium proprios et absolutos modos et perfectiones subsrantiales" (Theodoricus de Freiberg, De mensuns, ed. Relm, p. 217, 84-86).

THE NEOPLATONIC DOCTRINE OF TIME

27

eternal presence also indivisibly comprehends the duration of all things without any succession from a past to a future state. The appropriate measure of the divine being is not eternity, but something above it: superaetcmitas. 2. Aetemiias in the proper sense is the measure of the being of the divine intelligences that are posited by the philosophers. "If such beings exist. ..", they must also have their whole being in an eternal presence without limitations and comprehend the perfections of all things. This is the true level of eternity whereas the first cause is even beyond it and also cause of it, as is said in the Liber de causis, prop. 2. 3. The spiritual substances, or angels, form the third order. They are already individually limited perfections. Further, they are subject to variation, not in their substance , but in some of their accidental dispositions. They also have a beginning of existence (together with all creation). Finally, they do not possess their whole existence in the present nor do they coexist with all things, as is the case with God and the intelligences. For them, some things happen before, others after, and their thoughts reach from the past to the future. In fact, because they are specified beings ("determinantur in hanc essentiam"), their duration is also specified and determinate ("haec duratio"). The specific measure of these everlasting angelic beings is not eternity, but aeuum. 4. The fourth grade is that of the celestial bodies. Insofar as they are bodies, they are inferior in perfection to the spiritual substances. Although having an origin of existence, they cannot cease to exist because there is no principle of corruption in their being. They have movement, but only in a local sense. As the angels, they exist in an eternal praesentialiias but with some connotation of past and present. However, their existence in the now is much more determined and limited than that of the spiritual substances. In fact, the celestial body passes in its movement through different states of being moved (mutata esse) and the temporal "now" which is the measure of the things in movement passes through all the moments of a continuous time. The measure of their duration is aeuiternuas "quasi cadens a simplicitate aevi". 5. The ultimate level is the sublunary where things come to be and pass away. Those substances are only of limited perfection and only have existence in a limited period of time. Further, they have their existence in a transition from past to future, without ever being really 'present'. Only those beings are properly measured by time.

28

CARLOS STEEL

Thus a proper measure has been established for each of the five classes of substances according to the properties and modalities of the being of each class'".

Besides those five, which measure the duration of being, there is also a measure of what exists in a transmutation and succession, that is, movement. Aristotle defined time as the measure of movement according to prior and posterior. But here again, we must distinguish. Besides the measure of physical spatial movement (which is the continuous time) , there is also a time measuring the perfect motions, that is, intellectual activities such as thinking. The latter must be a discrete time, as we have seen before: "For, although in this spiritual transformation the different states according to which there is variation succeed upon each other, nevertheless the essence of each of them is not extended in a continuous flux, but each of them has its simple essence simultaneously in its entirety ("simul totum")62. In fact, each of the dispositions or forms according to which there is change is simple and indivisible in its essence and whole at once according to the act of its present existence ("secundum actum praesentialis existentiae'Y". For the measurement of the change of those spiritual substances according to these accidental dispositions (as are acts of thought), we must designate another type of measure. Since we have no proper term for it, we call it in a descriptive manner "the time that consists of indivisible moments". Thus, we have differentiated five types of measures for the duration of being, and two types for the measurement. Of those seven measures, Aristotle (in Physics IV) only discusses time as measure of the physical movement.

61 "Est igitur uniuscuiusque dictarum quinque generum substantiarum determi nata propria mensura secundum proprietatem et modum substantiae cuiuslibet genrum" (Theodoricus de Freiberg, De mensuris, ed. Rehn, p. 222,243-245). 62 "Qy amvis enim attcndatur transmutatio seu variatio, partes tamen huius spiritualis transmutationis seu formae et dispositiones, secundum quas fit variatio, quamvis sibi invicem succedere possint et succedant, essentia tamen uniuscuiusque earum non extenditur in aliquem fluxum continuum, sed unaquaeque earum habet suam simplicem essentiam totam simul" (Theodoricus de Freiberg, De mensuris, ed. Rehn, pp. 223,291-224,296). 63 " .. . quoniam qualibet dispositionum seu formarum , secundum quas fit transmutratio, simplex est et indivisibilis in sua essentia et tota simul secundum actum praesentialis existentiae" (T heodoricus de Freiberg, De mensuris, ed. Rehn, p. 225,332-335).

TIlE NEOPLATONIC DOCTRINE OF TIME

8.

CONCLUSION:

A RETURN TO

29

PROCLUS WITH BERTIIOLD OF MOOSBURG

In the middle of the 14th century, Bertholdus of Moosburg wrote in Cologne a vast commentary on Proclus' Elements if Theology. At the end of this investigation, one may be curious to know how this Platonizing Dominican interpreted the propositions on time and eternity (props. 49-54). Reading his long exposition is, however, a frustrating experience. In fact, as his editor, Barbara Faes de Mottoni, writes in her preface, the text of Proclus often functions as an occasion to introduce the arguments on time and eternity of Albert and of Theodoric of Freiberg"... In fact, Berthold quotes extensively from the Summa theologiae of Albert and from the treatises De tempore and De mensuris of Theodoric, but without mentioning explicitly his sources. The originality of the author often consists in the cutting and mixing of his sources so as to make them say what they originally did not. This is particularly evident in the exposition of the famous proposition 54 on time and eternity as measures of duration. The third section of this exposition is devoted to the question of the "precisa assignatio mensurarum". Berthold first presents at length the views of some "moderni sapientes et subtiliores" who used to distinguish seven kinds of measures of duration'v. In fact, what follows is a rather fair summary of the doctrine of mar Theodoric in his De mensuris with the sequence of supereternity, eternity, perpetuity, sempiternity, and time, both discrete and continuous. Having summarized those "modem views" without ever mentioning Theodoric, Berthold concludes: "Although all that has been said seems quite reasonable, nevertheless, with all respect for those people, according to the Platonists there are in reality only two measures, eternity and time, and there are in reality no intermediate measures, but only according to the ratio of participation of those two measures'P", 6" See B. Faes de Mottoni, "Il commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg all' Elemenuuio theologica di Prodo", StudiMedievali 12 (1972), pp. 417-461. See preface, p. 426: "Per quando riguarda il problema del tempo e dell'eternita, va notato che il testa di Prodo serve per 10 piu a Bertoldo come punto di partenza per introdurre il pensiero di Alberto Magno e di Teodorico di Freiberg". 6" "De primo notandum quod moderni sapientes et subtiliores advertentes ea quattuor ad assignandum rebus proprias mensuras requiruntur, ... tales inquam soliti sunt septem mensurarum differentias assignare" (Bertholdus de Moosburg, Super El. Theol., ed. Faes de Mottoni, p. 458,95-98; the addition is mine). 66 "Advertendum quod , licet ea que iam dicta sunt rationabiliter dicta videan tur , tamen, salva gratia eorum, in veritate secundum Platonicos, secundum rem

30

CARLOS STEEL

Berthold here seems to reject all he has first summarized from Theodoric and to return to the position of Proc1us, as Albert had explained it. In fact, the following section, wherein he justifies his return to Proc1us' position , is nothing but another literal quotation from Albert's Summa Theologiae, a text we quoted earlier". That Berthold quotes again from Albert is not so surprising. However, when we compare Albert's own argument and the use Berthold makes of it, we notice that the latter only quotes the first section of Albert's commentary wherein a justification is given of the Platonic position about eternity and time as the only measures of duration. As we have seen, however, Albert emphasizes that the "ancients" considered only extrinsic measures, whereas the position of the "moderni" is more subtle because they understand the measure as something intrinsic to the different beings. Therefore they had to introduce a measure appropriate for the beings between the purely eternal and the purely temporal. Nothing of this argument remains in Berthold. Though he accepts in his exposition the different levels of being within the procession of beings from the first One until the last degree, he does not think that it is necessary to distinguish as many measures of being. As he says, "some beings are only measured in an improper sense, thus the first One, the henads of all things, Infinity and Being itself. Only life and motion can be measured in a proper sense because both imply an "extension" and are transmutations of some kind "68. And further: "For life also can be considered as motion: it is in fact a perfect motion of a perfect being. Whenever there is life in the proper sense, being simultaneously present as a whole, there is eternity as its measure. Eternity is indeed, as Boethius said, the simultaneous whole possession of an endless life"69. Wherever there non sunt nisi due mensure, eternitas videlicet et tempu s, et medie mensure non accipiuntur secundu m rem, sed secundum ration em par ticipationis proprietatum istarum duarum mensurarum" (Bertholdu s de Moosburg, Super El. Theol.; ed. Faes de Mottoni, p. 460,166-171). 67 See above n. 34. This dependence on Albert has not been noticed by the editor of Berthold. 68 "Quibus diligenter consideratis, invenimus quasdam res improprie mensurari .. ..; solam autem vitam et motum sive transmutationem esse proprie mensurabilia, ut statim infra 54° elemento ostendetur" (Bertholdus de Moosbur g, Super El. tu«, ed. Faes de Mottoni, p. 450,186-189). See also p. 460,188-190: "Ratio mensuran di in omnibus mensurabilibus, secundum quod hie de mensuris loquimur, accipitur a duobus tantum, scilicet vita et motu seu varia tione". 69 See the classic definition of Boethius in De consol.phi!., V, pro 6: "aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio".

TIlE NEOPLATONIC DOCTRINE OF TIME

31

is motion as a transition from one state to another, as "fluxus" and becoming where not everything is "totum simul", time is the appropriate measurement. Therefore Proclus only accepted two measures of duration, eternity as the whole measure of life, time as the piecemeal measure of movement. Of course, there are different forms of participation in the eternal life, but this is no reason to differentiate further the measures of duration. With his rejection of the doctrine of the three (or five) measures of duration, Berthold is not an exception in the fourteenth cenmry, a period in which the doctrine of the aevum was "eclipsed'?". Most authors believed that there were no good arguments to demarcate the aevum as a measure of a "third kind". As usual, William of Ockham deftly cuts away all unnecessary ontological entities. Ockham wants to abolish all the intermediaries between God and creation. For him, eternity is the exclusive privilege of God, the omnipotent creator. All that is created, both the spiritual and the corporeal, is in time. Furthermore, there is no need for a special measure for the duration of angels 71. Moreover, as he rightly observes, all arguments for the aevum as a third measure are based upon the argument that the measures must correspond to the modes of being that are measured. But this premise itself must be rejected as false: "Qyando dicit 'triplex est esse, igimr triplex mensura', nego consequenriam'V". There may be a hundred different beings, but that is no reason to multiply the measures accordingly. In fact, there is only one measure of duration, time, which is characteristic of the created world, whether spiritual or physical. Even talking about eternity as a measure of God is improper language . This critique by Ockham, along with his rejection of the aevum as an intermediary, is a serious blow to the idea of the continuous universe with its great chain of being, which is one of the most important legacies of Neoplatonism in European thought.

See Porro, Forme e modelli..., pp. 260ff.: "L'inizio dell'eclissi". See Guilehnus de Ockham, In II Sent. (Reportatio), q. 11 ("U trum tempus sit mensura angelorum "), which contains an extensive discussion of the arguments of Giles of Rome for the necessity of the aevum. 72 See Guilelmus de Ockham, In II Sent. , q. 11, ed. G. Gil - R. Wood, St. Bonaventure - New York 1981, p. 246,14-15. 70 71

MEASURING IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIMENSIONES CERTAE: AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO AND THE QUESTION OF TIME

Maria Bettetini (Venezia)

The issue of time in St Augustine has been discussed in many ways. One could give an analytical account of all the passages that concern the matter, from the De immortalitate animae to the De civitate Dei; or examine the direct and indirect sources not only in Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, but also Porphyry and Apuleius, not to mention Cicero ; or at most give an outline of the endless history of influences that the Augustinian doctrine of time has had from the Condemnations of Etienne Tempier to the bitter criticisms of Martin Heidegger up to J -F. Lyotard's flighty reading of passages from the Conflssiones 1• But, if we follow the advice of Conflssiones, XII, 32, 43, out of all these interpretive approaches , we must eligere unum aliquid. In the present essay, our choice is to examine the famous passages of Corfessiones, XI on time in the light of St Augustine's treatises on the liberal arts as well as other parts of the Conflssiones. And we postulate that the question is set as a problem, that it dissolves into the great theme of mensura/modus, but that it does not itself have a solution. St 1 SeeJ. -F. Lyotard , La Corfession d'Augustin, Paris 1998, but also "Conventus", in Triennale di Milano. Ideniita e djfJerenze. I racconti dell'abitare. Un seminario, una mostra, Milano 1994, pp. 127-135; on Heidegger's interpretation of Augustine see Gesarntausgabe (GA), Bd. 60, Frankfurt a. M. 1995, which contains the course of 1921 (AUgttstlilUS und der Neuplatonismusi; GA Bd. 63, Frankfurt a. M. 1988; Sein undZeit, § 9, Tiibin gen 1927, 1977J.l; the two lectures: Des hi. Augustinus Betrachtungen iiber die Zeit (Beuron, Erzabtei St. Martin, 26th of November 1930), still unpublished , and Der Begri.ff der Zeit (Marburg, July 1924), published in Tiibingen 1989, where we can find the point of contact and at the same time of disagreement between Heidegger and Augustine: the measure of time begins with the ajfictio, translated by Heidegger with Bifindlichkeit (the Dasein that knows his situation of being limited, situated), which is very different from the ajJi:ctio of Augustine, which is the first step towards memoria, and then adtentio and expectatio, and through the abissus mentis to the contact with the infinite God . See the classicF-W. von Herrmarm, Augustinus unddie phiinomenologische Frage nach der Zeit, Frankfurt a. M. 1992, and also C . Esposito, "Martin Heidegger. La memoria e il tempo", in Esistenza e Iiberta. Agostino nellafiloscfia delNouecento/L, ed. L. Alici - R. Piccolomini - A. Pieretti, Roma 2000, pp. 87-124 (note the bibliography at pp. 95-96).

34

MARIA BETrETINI

Augustine announces and attacks the great theme of time in a specific context and with specific weapons. But he never takes himself to arrived at the fmal word on the matter simply because it is, in a certain respect, not relevant to the aims of his writings .

1. TEXT AND

CONTEXT

As we proceed, we shall try to accommodate also the relations between the Augustinian doctrine of time and its main sources as well as the most important interpretations that have been given of it. Among these latter, we shall pay most attention to the view that the subjective experience of time determines its objective status in the world. Against this view, we propose the recently revived account that says that, when St Augustine speaks of time as the distentio animi, he meant to refer to the World Soul and not to the soul of any individuaF. This offers a Platonic and Neoplatonic solution to the Aristotelian dilemma of who or what is the psyche or the nous that numbers movement in respect of before and after 3 • It may not be St Augustine's solution. Among those who have read the Augustinian discussion in ways favourable to the subjectivism that was condemned by Etienne Tempier we may name Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger and Ricoeur, each of whom may have been hampered by the narrow range of texts taken into account'. Which leads us to the first substantive claim of this essay : that a correct reading of a given text depends on its place within a context''. For, it is one thing to read Confissiones XI, 14, 17 - 29, 39 as a freestanding unit , and quite another to read this passage as part of the thirteen books of the Confissiones taken as a whole. When compared with St Augustine's other writings, the Cmifessiones is a peculiar work. No-one now thinks that it is any sort of autobiography, nor yet a kind of diary, a passionate and intimate letting 2 See K. Flasch, Was ist In Ethicorum, ed. Andrade, Lisboa 1957, p. 170; see Porro , Forme.. ., p. 388.

374

MARIOS. DE CARVALHO

very senous (gravissima) philosophical problem about the nature of "quando" is discussed, that we can confirm our interpretation'". Faced with the two solutions that were said to be in dispute - the form of "quando" as an extrinsic'? or an intrinsic denomination of beings in movement - Couto adheres (amplectenda est) to the latter, whereby duration is defined as the permanence in existence of a created being98. While attributable to existence, perseverence and permanence are also useful terms in speaking of duration as distinct from existence. The idea of Creation is therefore at the core of this problem, and with it there is also the correlative idea of conservation. Since no-one doubts that a being can survive by the extrinsic duration which is God's conservation, from the point of view of being placed outside God's first causality, duration is nothing but the internal form of a being in its permanence'". Further, what explains the variability of time in people's lives is not the external time of the prime movement, nor even imaginary time, but something which is intrinsic to their own lives, internal or intrinsic duration. Therefore, different intrinsic durations have to be the cause or form of what exists in an extrinsic (or common) time 100.

96 Porro, Forme.,., pp. 459-461. 97 In Dialedicam. In Praed., c. 9, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Koln 1607, col. 528: "Prima [sententia] constituit formalem rationem quando in extrinseca denominatione a tempore primi mobilis". 98 In Dialedicam. In Praed., c. 9, q. 3, art . 1, ed. Koln 1607, col. 528: "Secunda sententia est formam praedicamenti quando esse durationem cuilibet rei creatae intrinsecam, quae in hoc distinguitur ab existentia, quod existere solum dicit rem esse extra suas causas. Durare vero ulterius includit perseverantiam in acceptione existentiae, sive ea perseverantia sit penes totum esse per productionem receptum , quo pacta durant angelus, homo, ceteraque permanentia, sive penes alias et alias partes, ut durant successiva, quae ideo persistere dicuntur, quia prioribus partibus, quae labuntur, continuo succedunt aliae. Quamobrem duratio sic defmiri solet: duratio est permansio rei in existentia". 99 In Dialedicam. In Praed., c. 9, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Koln 1607, col. 529: "Probatur, seclusa quacunque duratione extrinseca potest quaelibet res si a Deo conservetur, in suo esse perseverare, ut per se manifestum est; ergo duratio, cuius formalis effectus est in esse permanere, est forma interna ". 100 In Dialedicam. In Praed., c. 9, q. 3, art. 1, ed. K6ln 1607, col. 529: "Deinde quaedam entia respondent maiori durationi extrinsecae, quaedam minori [oo .] sed hoc non provenit ab ipso tempore externo primi mobilis, vel alio imaginario, neutrum quippe realem affectionem causat in re durante, ergo aliquid internum est in ipsis entibus, cuius interventu maiorem aut minorem aequant durationem externam , quod non est aliud quam interna duratio. Denique , ut ratio assistendi loco externo est ubi rei internurn, ita causa existendi ternpori extrinseco debet esse intrinseca duratio. Secundum in hac sententia probandum erat, hanc durationem

375

TIME ACCORDING TO THE COIMBRA COMMENTARIES

3.3. Other 1jpes 0/Duration By now it is clear that the study of the other types of duration involves ontological decisions (there is even a rule according to which measure and measured must be of similar nature'?'}. The question on eternity, eviternity and other types of duration thus embraces all realities. As we shall see, in this paragraph the Coimbrans will cover that wide range between eternity and (the nature of) instants among permanent realities. First, between God, whose continuing existence is unlimited, and those beings who are incapable of survival there are two intermediate levels, those of a supernatural and those of a natural order 102 • The clearer division of types of duration is the one made by Sebastiao do Couto 103 : ~aeternitas

~ permanens .»: duratio ~ . \

participata

supernaturalis

~ modus aeternitatis aevum

naturalis~ ~modus aevi

successiva

According to the scheme there are two general levels of duration, "perm anent" and "successive'l'?", Permanent duration is, then, dividesse huius praedicamenti formam . Id vera perspicuum est primo ex comparatione ubi, secundo quia denominatio sumpta a duratione est realis, et habet caeteras conditiones ad praedicamentum requisitas, nec apparet aliud, in quo reponatur". 101 In Physicorum, IV, q. 3, art . 1, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 551: "... quia oportet mensuram rei mensuratae accomodatam et congeneam esse."; In Physicorum, IV, q. 3, art . 2, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 552: "Etenim tanta distinctionis latitudo, quanta inter res corporeas et immateriales; et inter res divini, et naturalis ordinis intercedit, non potest non aliam durationem, diversamque sui esse mensuram vindicare". 102 In Physicorum, IV, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 550: "Inter Deum , qui non potest non in suo esse persistere et ea quae nequeunt in suo perseverare mediae quaedam res sunt, quae possunt a suo esse aliquo modo cadere, et in eo aliquandiu permanere, quarum duo sunt generales ac communes gradus" . 103 In Dialedicam. In Praed., c. 9, q. 3, art . 1, ed. Koln 1607, coll. 529-530. 10-1 In Dialedicam. In Praed., c. 9, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Koln 1607, coll. 529-530: "Series durationis haec constitui solet. Duratio alia dicitur permanens, alia successiva; haec (si ulla per se datur) eodem pacta ac tempus subdividenda est. IDa distribuitur in supematuralem ct naturalem. Supematuralis est, qua durant res supematurales, ut

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MARIO S. DE CARVALHO

ed into "supernatural" and "natural", the former being further divided into "participated eternity" and "mode of eternity", the latter into "evitemity" and "mode of eviternity". Absolute eternity, that is the infinite duration of God, does not enter into this division'I". We should characterize in more detail each one of these divisions and list the correspondent beings within each order. This will be done mainly using the slightly different parallel text of Manuel de G6is. The difference between both authors may be explained by their different methods of approach: Couto departs from the various orders of duration to the division of being, whereas in G6is the hierarchy of beings provides the reason for dividing the various types of durations. The difference between supernatural and natural permanent duration is obvious, one is possessed by supernatural realities, the other by natural realities. Although uncommon, there is also another obvious distinction, between two different orders of eternity and two orders of eviternity. By participated eternity is meant the duration of supernatural things almost of a divine order (duratio esse rei supematuralis et quasi divini ordinis), realities which share most of the divine being, such as beatific vision, the light of Glory and of Grace or, as we read in the Commentary on Physics, intuitive cognition of the divine nature, the beatific love of the Blessed and the light of GloryI06. In Couto's text the permanent supernatural duration of states (habitus) or acts such

habitus per se infusi ; quod rursum tribuitur in aeternitatem participatam et in modum aetemitatis . Aeternitas participata est duratio illarum rerum, quae magis participant divinum esse, ut visionis beatificae, luminis gloriae et iuxta nonnullos, gratiae. Modus aeternitatis est duratio reliquorum habituum, et actuum supernaturalium, ut fidei, spei, charitatis. Non facimus mentionem aetemitas simpliciter, quia haec est infmita Dei duratio nullo ordine inclusa. Duratio pennanens naturalis est, qua durant res naturales, quae pari modo dividitur in aevum, et modum aevi ; aevum est duratio rei incorruptibilis, ut Angeli, animae nostrae, materiae primae et caeli. Modus est duratio rei corruptibilis, veluti hominis, lapidis et aliarum rerum , quae tametsi ultimo intereunt, dum persistunt, partium successione carent". 105 In Dialedicam. In Praed., c. 9, q. 3, art. 1, ed. K6ln 1607, col. 530: "Non facimus mentionem aeternitatis simpliciter, quia haec est infmita Dei duratio nullo ordine inclusa". On a different (Boethian) defmition of eternity as well as imutable and independent duration see also In Physicorum IV, q. 3, art. 3, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 550. 106 In Physuorum, IV, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 551: "Res vero ordinis supernaturalis, quae in altero propositae subdivisionis membro continebantur, sunt v.c. intuitiva cognitio divinae naturae, beatifica dilectio cuiusque beati, et lumen gloriae. Haec vero aliam sui esse mensuram fortiuntur, nimirum aeternitatem, uti vocant , participatam, quae eo differt ab aevo, quod haec sit duratio esse rei supernaturalis, et quasi divini ordinis". On participated eternity see C . J. Peter,

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as Faith, Hope and Charity is called "mode of eternity" imodus aetemitatis)I07 but in G6is's the measure of these theological virtues, as well as of infused divine gifts, is called "mode of participated eternity" (modus aeternitatis participate) 108. Angels and their faculties, as well as other similar natures, constitute eviterniry'P''. We are now in the order of permanent natural duration, to which also belong, according to Couto, human souls, prime matter and the SkylIO. Eviternity is defined by G6is as the duration of incorruptible natures, or the duration or measure of the stable , perennial and natural created being (aevum est duratio seu mensura esse creati naturalis, stahiliter acperenniter sese habentis). The definition is explained in the following manner: it is said that it is created to remove eternity; natural, because it cannot measure supernatural natures; stable or permanent in its being, because it does not measure succession, either time or instants; finally, it is perennial because it does not apply to corruptible substances'!", On the distinction between eviternity and mode of eviternity, by the latter Couto means the duration of corruptible things such as man, stones and things sharing a certain persistence and therefore exempt from succession'V. Participated Eternity in the Vision qf God. A Study qf the opinion ofThomas Aquinas andHis Commentators on the Duration ofthe Acts tf Clory, Roma 1964. 107 In Dialedicam. In Praed., c. 9, q. 3, art . 1, ed. K6ln 1607, col. 530: "Modus aeternitatis est duratio reliquorum habituum et actuum supematuralium, ut fidei, spei, charitatis ", 108 In Physicorum, IV, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Coimbra, p. 552: "Vel sunt ordinis supematuralis, ut gratia, fides, charitas, aliaeque virtutes, et dona divinitus infusa. Atque haec aliam vendicant mensuram, quae modus aeternitatis participate dici potesr". 109 In Physicorum, IV, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 550 : "Ordinis naturalis, ut Angeli, et eorum nativae facultates, itemque species eis congenitae. Praeterea animae rationis participes, et earum immateriales potentiae; itemque coelestia corpora, et materia prima; quae omnia mensurantur aevo ", 110 In Dialedicam. In Praed., c. 9, q. 3, art. 1, ed . K6ln 1607, col. 530 : "Duratio permanens naturalis est, quae durant res naturales, quae pari modo dividitur in aevum et modum aevi . Aevum est duratio rei incorruptibilis, ut angeli , animae nostrae, materiae primae et caeli", 111 In Physicorum, IV, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 551 : "Dicitur, esse creati, ad removendam aeternitatem. Naturalis, ad removendam mensuram rerum supernaturalium. Stabiliter, seu permanenter sese habentis, ad excludendas mensuras rerum successivarum, et quae raptim fluunt , ut tempus, quod mensurat motum; et instantia, quae mensurant mutata esse. Perenniter, ad excludendas mensuras rerum permanentium, quae interitui subiacent, cuiusmodi est duratio substantiarum corruptibilium ". 112 In Dialeaicam. In Praed., c. 9, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Koln 1607, col. 530: "Modus est duratio rei corruptibilis, veluti hominis, lapidis et aliarum rerum, quae tametsi ultimo intereunt, dum persistunt, partium successione carent" .

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Following now G6is's fuller text, in his view there are three varieties of substances whose corruptible nature is capable of some permanence. First, one may take those substances whose changes drive them to destruction but whose own being may eventually endure; since they all are subject to corruption, they must be measured by time, nan per sesedex acddente'P, There are others which are not measured by time but by another measure different from time and from eviternity, called by Henry of Ghent "mode of eviternity'v!'. In spite of explicitly quoting Henry of Ghent's OlJodlibet V, q. 13 (in which the ontological structure of all realities is divided into three modi essendi: eternity, eviternity and time)115, G6is does not seem to realise that the second Ghentian sense "mensura quantitatis essendi sive mora in essendo secundo modo aevum dicitur" is not the same as to say" .. .modum aevi appelat". Notwithstanding, when speaking of mode of eviternity G6is is aware of entering into a conflict of interpretations. He says that there is no problem among theologians (such as Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus , Durandus or Capreolus) in saying that some particular realities are not measured by successive time, even if these authors do not (nequaquam) agree as to the kind of measure that must be attributed to them11 6. Naturally, the problem discussed by Henry of Ghent's alluded question was the one about the existential permanence of certain beings117. Since he is dealing with Physics, for G6is the issue here is first to distinguish between those permanent (esse queunt) forms necessarily depending upon movements (he speaks of qualitative and

113 In Physuorum, IV, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 551: "Nam quaedam subiectae sunt mutationibus ad interitum ducentibus, et tamen ipsae quoad suum proprium esse aliquandiu perseverant, ut substantiae, qu ae ort um, et occasum subeunt. Hae vero si spectentur quatenus aliqua eiusmodi mutationum afficiuntur ; mensurantur tempore ; non per se, sed ex accidente". lJ.l In Physicorum, IV, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 551: "Si autem sumantur quoad suum esse duntaxat, tunc non tempore mensurantur, sed alia quadam mensura a tempore, et ab aevo distincta, et inter haec media, quam Henricus Gandavensis fJEodlibeto 5, q. 13 modum aevi appellat". 115 Henricus de Gandavo, fJEodlihet V, q. 13 , ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 171vB-I72rD. 116 In Physuorum, IV, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 551: "Nam quod tempore, ut quidam putant, non mensurentur, communis est theologorum sententia [... ] licet hi in assignanda praedictarum substantiarum mensura nequaquam inter se conveniant. [... ] Qyare cum substantia rerum corruptibilium ita sumpta non sit quidpiam successivum, con sequens est, ut tempore, quod successivum est, non mensuretur" . 117 Porro, Forme... , p. 116.

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quantitative alterations), and those that depend upon a sudden change imutatione aliqua momentanea). When we enter into the realm of permanent forms actualised by a sudden change, much more than with the supernatural orders (such as Grace, Faith, Charity and other virtues infused by God), G6is is concerned with natural orders such as thoughts, concepts, states of sciences or of virtues. When the former are measured by the mode of participated eternity (which is the same as to say "mode of eternity" according to Couto's scheme) the latter reveal a stress on anthropological dimensions, which seems to be unproblematic in Couto's list118• The last article dedicated to the study of time in the Commentary an Physics deals very briefly with continuous spiritual time, with discrete time and with instants of nature. The first dimension comes from the following enquiry: since spiritual forms do not only acquire their being by a sudden change (marnento) but may have a successive existence (successiva amiinuationq, is there a need for another kind of measurement for that particular existence? The author allows for a kind of successive, continuous and spiritual duration, and therefore an appropriate time different from the one studied in the Physics : an infused divine movement at the origin of such a theological sphere must have its appropriate time119•

us In Pbysicorum, IV, q. 3, art. 1, ed. Coimbra 1592, pp. 551-552: "U t vera caeteras mensuras persequamur: quaedam formae sunt quae suaptae natura per motum acquiri solent; sed enim postea quam comparatae fuerunt, permanere in suo integro esse queunt, cuiusmodi sunt qualitates, in quibus per se alteratio versatur; et quantitas ad quam per se tendit accrecio. Et hae quidem si quoad illud esse permanens, ac fixurn considerentur, mensurantur modo aevi, sicuti generabiles, caducaeque substantiae. Alia denique sunt entia, quae non neccessario per motum comparantur, sed plerumque mutatione aliqua momentanea; et ramen possunt in suo esse manere. Haec vera aut naturalis ordinis sunt, ut intellectiones, conceptus, itemque habitus scientiarum, et virtu tum, aliaque hiusmodi. Qyae omnia quatenus in suo esse indivisibiliter consistunt, mensurantur etiam modo aevi. Vel sunt ordinis supematuralis, ut gratia, fides, charitas, aliaeque virtutes et dona divinitus infusa. Atque haec aliam vendicant mensuram, quae modus aeternitatis partecipate dici potest". 119 In Physicorum, IV, q. 3, art. 2, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 552: "... oportet enim eis attribui durationem successivam continuam , et spiritalem; ac proinde tempus quoddam diversae rationis ab eo, quo motus Physici mensurantur. Qyin vera si de supernaturalis, et divini ordinis formis sermo sit; et eae, quod fIeri potest, per continuam successionem, atque adeo per rnotum divinitus infundantur, concedendum erit dari adhuc tempus aliud, quod eum motum dimetiatur. Etenim tanta distinctionis latitudo, quanta inter res corporeas et imrnateriales, et inter res divini, et naturalis ordinis intercedit, non potest non aliam durationem, diversamque sui esse mensuram vindicare".

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As far as discrete angelic time, G6is again adopts the method of explaining his matter word by word. The point of departure is that angels have thoughts and acts of will that may succed one another, and which we may consider in two senses, together or separately. The former is discrete time 120 : it is called time on account of particular duration, viz., before and after, and it is called discrete on account of the distinction of those acts. Considered separately, the succession is constituted by instants of discrete time 121• He then lists the difference between discrete time and continuous time. The former is composed of instants, it measures discrete actions, and its instants are sometimes divisable and sometimes not (angels have the faculty of interrupting their thoughts or of prolonging them), whereas the latter is composed of continuous parts, measures continuous movement, and its instants do not have any parts, given the flux of the beings measured by continuous time 122 • G6is ends his survey by distinguishing between instants of time and instants of nature. Instants of nature, he repeats after Durandus, are not a measure of duration, and therefore they indicate (signa) the possibility of several instants or divisions by nature existing in one instant of time 123 • In a way previous (antegressiones) to the indivisible instants of time, instants of nature are therefore indications of a cer-

120 In Physicorum, N, q. 3, art . 2, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 552: "Sed illud praeterea adv ertendum est; plure s intelligendi seu volendi actus eiusdem Angeli, quorum unus alteri succedit, dupliciter spectari posse: vel ita ut una aliqua ipsorum collectio sumatur; vel ut singuli per se, ac seorsim expendantur. Igitur duratio totius collectionis appellatur tempus discretum ". 121 In Physicorum, N , q. 3, art. 2, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 552: "Tempus, quia cernitur in ea prius et posterius, quatenus ex huiusmodi actibus alii praeeunt, alii subsequuntur: discretum , quia praedicti actus non continue, sed discrete sibi invicem succedunt. Si vera singulatim considerentur, duratio uniuscuiusque dicitur instans temporis discreti, sive momentanea sit, sive non , modo haecsit uniformis ". 122 In Physicorum, N, q. 3, art. 2, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 553: "mud enim ex solis constat instantibus ; hoc etiam ex partibus continue fluentibus; illud metitur actiones discretas; hoc continuum motum; illius instantia interdum insectilia sunt , interdum non, siquidem potest Angelus eum intelligendi actum, quem in hoc instanti elicuit, vel immediate post inhibere, vel tota hora continuare ; at instantia temporis continui carent omnino partibus, quia raptim fluunt, ct immediate post evanescunt, ut mutata esse, quorum sunt mensurae ". 123 In Physicorum, N , q. 3, art. 2, ed. Coimbra 1592, p. 553: ".. .ex instantibus naturae non recte arguitur existere unum sine alia; cum eiusmodi instantia non sint mensurae durationum, sed potius signa auaedam indicantia non pendere unum ab altera , posse unum praeconcipi sine altera , ut substantiam sine corpore, corpus sine vivente, particeps rationis sine Socrate".

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tain priority or ontological superiority (since nature is before properties) among what may happen to whatever in an instant of time. In the same instant of time several instants of nature may occur, which allows us to say that in the very same instant of time when a man is created there may coincide all the forms that constitute a rational animal'