The Concept of Philosophy

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THE CONCEPT OF. PHILOSOPHY

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NIKUNJA VIHARI BANERJEE Formerly Professor of Philosophy, University of Delhi

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Delivered in the University of Calcutta, \

December, 1964

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UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA 1968

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CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

LANGUAGE, MEAN ]I\"'G AI\D PERSONS

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The revered memory OF

THE LATE PROFESSOR K. C. BHATTACHAR‘i1’YA

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PREFACE

The following pages contain, in a more or less unaltered form, the K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Lectures, which I delivered in the University of Calcutta in December. 1964, at the invitation of the authorities of this University. In these lectures *I made an attempt to highlight the out-» standing originality of the late Professor K. C. Bhattacharyya in his conception of the nature and function of philosophy. At the same time I undertook the hazardous task of expressing rny differences from him in this regard, and making" a few suggestions as to how philosophy can hold its own against scientism and logicisrn on the one hand and the various species of speculative philosophy on the other. These suggestions have found a prominent place in my

LANGUAGE, srssmwo mo PERSGNS (Allen & Unwin, London ;l963) and have been systematically elaborated in my forthcoming work entitled ADVENTURES 0F THE HUMAN MIND. The delay in the publication of these lectures is regretted. But I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Sri S. Kanjilal for hisuacceding to my request for their publication without further delay. DELHI, January, 1968

NIKUNJA VIHARI BANER IEE

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CONTENTS

Preface _, __ I. Introduction .. .. II. Philosophy and Science .. .. HI. The Episternological Background .. IV. Empirical Thought and Philosophic Thought V. What Then is Philosophy ‘? . . __

A. Samkara .. B. Kant __ _, C. K. C. Bhattacharyya .. (i) Philosophy of the Object (ii) Logic and Metaphysics _, (iii) Philosophy of the Spirit .. (iv) The Super-personal Self and the Absolute Versus - Interpersonal Relations VI. Conclusion .. ,. Index

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INTRODUCTION

I are exceedingly grateful to the authorities of the University of Calcutta for the opportunity they have been kind enough to give me to ofl'er my humble tribute of respect to the memory of the late Professor K. C. Bhattacharyya who was conspicuous for the excellence of his personal qualities and especially for his exceptional originality as a thinker. And I deem it a great privilege to be called upon to try and elucidate, as far as it lies in my capacity, some aspects o_f the outstanding contribution which it went to the credit of Professor Bhattacharyya to have made to philosophic thought. Before I address myself to my appointed task I wish, however, to make a few observations for which I have to crave the indulgence and, perhaps, also the forgiveness of this learned audience. - Much of what has been passing for philosophical work in this country for quite a few decades seems to me to be amounting to a tribute of adoration to our ancient philo sophical heritage ; or else it is characterized by an uncritical adherence to some line of thought or other emanating from a foreign source. Thus the philosophical world in

this country has, in a sense, been dominated by the spirit of ancestor-worship on the one hand and helpless submission to the overwhelming influence of modernism on the other. " It is far from me to suggest, however, that a philosopher is in no need of learning from his confreres in his own country or elsewhere. What I mean is that

learning does not necessarily lead to maturation, and that learning without maturation is of no avail especially in the ease 7 of philosophical

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I have drawn your attention to this dismal feature of the philosophical situation in this country with no other object in view than to bring home to you the most heartening fact that the late Professor K. C. Bhattacharyya was one of those few Indian philosophers of recent times who proved exceptions to this situation and who not merely practised philosophy independently, but enriched philosophic thought so as to deserve to be remembered as a creative thinker. So it would be unfair to Professor Bhattacharyye to characterize him, as he has sometimes been characterized, as a Kantian or a Vedantist or as one whose philasophical work consisted in an attempt to bring about a synthesis of the Kantian and the Vedantist standpoillts To do any of these would be as unjust as would be construiflt Spinozism as amounting to the working out of the logical consequence of Cartesianism or the critical philosopllll if Kant as a mere attempt to reconcile the rival claims Oi the rationalist and the empiricist traditions in European philosophy. -True, Professor Bhattacharyya drew llii philosophical inspiration from Kant and the Vedanta. But he worked this twofold inspiration into a philosoplfififll outlook which was entirely his own. Be it borne in minds however, that greatness as a quality of mind is not purell‘ sin‘ generis, but is by and large an acquisition dependiflfl upon the exploitation of a_n appropriate ethos. A114 judged from this point of view, Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya was great as a philosopher. One other preliminary observation which I wish I0 make relates to one of the objections that are usualll’ levelled against philosophers.

This particular objection

consists in stating that philosophers are more i often than not prone to express their ideas in a manner that is rather strange and in a language that is hard to understand. A8 regards this objection, philosophers may be easily justified

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in ignoring it, if it is urged by those who do not belong I llill. to their fold. For a similar objection may be raised against rel he‘ scientists by those who are not scientists themselves. And, llflfllg. after all, every academic discipline, philosophy not excepted, lllllti has a technique and a vocabulary of its own, which are nu r distinct from, and incommensurable with, those of any pithhi other. But then, if the objection emanates from within re the region of philosophy itself, the situation completely not alters, and there arises the need for an explanation on :1 tie behalf of the philosopher or philosophers concerned. And O:-til this is relevant in the case of Professor Bhattacharyya a inasmuch as he expressed his ideas obscurely so much so ‘Ir

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-that, not to speak of ordinary students of philosophy, even mature philosophers may find it hard to comprehend his philosophical position.

It needs to be mentioned, however, that, in this respect,

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K. C. Bhattacharyya was no more to blame than Hegel, for example, had been in an earlier age or Martin Heidegger

and Ludwig Wittgenstein have been in our day. But, not to speak of these philosophers and others belonging to their class, whose thought and language are conspicuous for their obscurity, it can hardly be expected of any philo--' scpher to present his ideas with perfect clarity. The reason is that a philosopher, strictly speaking, is one whose main object is to solve in his own way the problems which concern himself and his place in the world in order that he can live at peace with himself. That being so, philoSephizing is comparable to a monologue rather than a

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dialogue. It does not‘ follow, however, that communication is irrelevant or inessential to philosophizing. But it seems certain that communication is of secondary importance in any scheme of serious philosophizing. It is, therefore, inc wonder that obscurity should be an unavoidable feature cf the presentation of philosophical decisions, although

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the possibility of diflerences in the degree of its obscurity

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is not necessarily precluded. The fulfilment of the need for communication between a philosopher and those who are philosophically-minded cannot be entirely dependent upon the philosopher concerned, but is a responsibility which devolves no more upon him than upon the latter. Of course, few are so equipped as to grasp new ideas ; nd, as Kant has said, " Owing to the general distaste for innovation, still fewer Mve the inclination to do so.“ But the fact remains that the communication of an innovation introduced by e philosopher demands not only the impartiality of a judge. but the sympathetic assistance of his fellow-workers. This indicates the spirit in which it is incumbent upon a student of philosophy to treat the ideas of an original thinker such as we had in the late K. C. Bhattacharyya. And it is in the spirit thus indicated that I wish to discharge my present responsibility. But then, I cannot forbear mentioning the "serious disadvantage from which I have to suffer in the performance-

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of the task that lies ahead. My object in doing this is not to seize upon an excuse for not doing what I ought to dc.

but only to express my fear that, in spite of my best efforts. I may not be able to do justice to the work of the greet philosopher, whom we have assembled here to commemorate. Professor Bhattacharyya’s philosophical standpoint, while being extremely original, is, as is admitted

on all hands, extremely difiicult. But, however difficult it may be, it must have presented itself to be less difliculh if not easily intelligible, to those who had the benefit of personal discussions with him. And judged from this point of view, I am at a disadvantage in comparison with some of my friends present here. _I am proud to say that I had the privilege of coming in contact with him. But

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As will be evident even from a cursory glance at the contents of the two volumes of his works published under the able editorship of his son Professor Gopinath Bhatta-

charyya, Krishnachandra’s philosophical interest knew no limit, but covered a very vast field. There is hardly any branch of philosophy which did not attract his serious attention and to which he did not make some contribution of importance or other. Thus it went to his credit to contribute to the enrichment of philosophic thought in the rem'ons of epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics and, above

all, metaphysics. Even psychology, which has been struggling during the last one century or more to emancipate itself from the influence of philosophy, had no escape from his all-embracing philosophic concern. For, as he perhaps came to realize, there is a deeper side to human

experience which is impervious to the time-honoured -experimental study and recalcitrant to any technique of measurement, and which indeed holds the key to the solution of the problem or problems concerning man and his place in the world and, consequently, to the understanding of the ultimate significance of human existence. Two well marked stages are distinguishable in the career

of K. C. Bhattacharyya as a philosophical writer. At the earlier stage, he devoted himself to a critical study of Indian philosophy in some of its schools and in some of its aspects, Advaita Vedanta having proved to be the main centre of his attraction. Later his interest shifted to the

nvestigation of Western philosophy with Kant _ regarded

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THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

as its central figure ; and, what is more, he addressee himself assiduously and with unusual verve and zeal to the task of elaborating his own philosophical position, traces of which are, however, noticeable, whether vaguely or clearly, in his earlier writings. The outstanding feature of K. C. Bhattacharyya as a philosophical writer is that not to speak of those of his works which contain the views of his own, even the others that are devoted to the study of some of the extant philosophies and some of the earlier philosophers, whether Indian or Western, are not made up of mere impersonal discourses, but bear the unmistakable stamp of his own personality and are rich in the wealth of his own reflections. This goes to indicate that in writing as well as in thought Krishnachandra tried to realize the ultimate goal of philosophizing which is selfexpression otherwise called human autonomy—the very thing to which, not to speak of the common herd, even so-called philosophers are strangers. ' In view of the vastness of the field of philosophical investigations covered by his works and especially the unusual dificulty of some of the views he arrived at as a result of his subtle and penetrating analysis of the philo‘ sophical situation, it does not seem feasible for anyone to provide an account of Krishnachandra’s philosophy as a whole in the course of a few lectures. Besides, as far as I am personally concerned, I confess to my lack of the industry and ability which are in demand for the provision of such an account. I am, therefore, left with no option but to concentrate on a specific topic which I may have some facility to discuss, and the discussion of which met’

be of importance in the appraisal of K.rishnachandra'e philosophical position. T Accordingly the topic I have selected for discussion in these lectures is the Concept of Philosophy with reference to the views of K. Cr

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INTRODUCTION

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Bhattacharyya. I am fully conscious of the many and various dificulties to which this selection on my part exposes me. But I shall now proceed in the belief that Krishnachandrais own essay on the Concept of Philosophy, hcwever dificult it may be in itself, will be an invaluable

guide in the performance of my appointed task. .»I ,.l

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H PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

In a sense, philosophy _is as old as mankind. At any rate it had its beginning at‘ a comparatively remote stage in the history of the human race, and has since come to stay as an essential aspect of the adventure of the human mind and an inalienable feature of human civilization. So it seems strange at first sight that there should arise the need-and the need has actually arisen from time to time-for an enquiry into the nature of philosophy. B11’! this circumstance is not gratuitous. It has a rationale behind it, which consists in the fact that, as far as man is concerned, philosophy is necessary in idea or, in other words, the idea of philosophyr is irresistible, but that it is

hard for philosophy to come into its own in practice. It is precisely for this reason that philosophy has been conspicuous for its tendency to lead a sort of parasitioal career. Time was when philosophizing was but another name for, or at least indistinguishable from, n1yth-mal£iIlBWhen this early phase of philosophizing was over—althougl1 one may doubt if at all it has or ever will come to an end --philosophy entered upon a new career in ancient Greece, which, according to the historians of Western philosophls signified the birth of philosophy proper, but which, strititlll speaking, heralded the advent of science. True, scieflei has been struggling hard through the centuries to emailcipate itself from the influence of philosophy and its sepals‘

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tion from philosophy is already an accomplished faciBut, perhaps, it is _not true to say that philosophy has willie into its own as a result of its separation from science. 011

the contrary, philosophy in the West has remained imbued

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with the scientific outlook till this day except on" occasion when crises in the human situation have overwhelmed the thinking mind so as to shake its faith in science and its achievements. This is testified to by Russell’s strongest recommendation of the introduction of the scientific ‘outit

-look into philosophical investigations and the treatment of ' philosophy as at best ancillary to science by logical

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on behalf ' of- philosophy is to attempt an explication of the very concept of- philosophy, instead of discussing any

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specific problem that one may regard as philosophical. This task he has himself undertaken most seriously, and with his characteristic philosophical insight he ‘has per-

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To start with the negative result of his analysis of the concept of philosophy, we may consider his most welcome view that the task of philosophy cannot be said to be afiliated to that of science ; nor should philosophy try to turn any scientific ‘concept to account, lest it should

run the risk of losing its identity. In view of this he holds that the problem of piecing together the results of the sciences into a world-view, with which speculative philosophy has concerned itself through the ages, is wrongly taken to be philosophical. It is not that this problem is not genuine.

But, as Krishnachandra says, it would be

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“ a presumptuous folly ‘ on the part of philosophy to undertake to solve it independently of ‘ the "distinctive leehnique and methods of science‘ .' If the synthesis of

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about, is supposed to yield a more comprehensive lav,

as distinguished from a " loose descriptive concept ', then the synthesis concerned should be credited to the responsibility of science, instead of to the responsibility of philosophy. For philosophy, obviously, has no means of discovering a law, whether of limited or unlimited generality. If it be still insisted that this responsibility belongste

philosophy, then, as Professor Bhattacharyya has pointed out, there would be no escape from the absurd suggestion that ‘ philosophy might well take in hand the entire work of science '. On the other hand, the world-view yielded by an attempted synthesis of the primary laws of science.

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being unconcerned with, if not recalcitrant to, the scientific methods of observation and experiment, “ would be not only not actual knowledge ’, but not even a ‘ hypothesis’ intended to have or capable of having any bearing upon knowledge. And, fmther, er priori certitude, whether logical or metaphysical, is ex hypothesi out of the question in the case of such a world-view. What is especially important to note here is, however, that a world-view of this kind, being, like any product of artistic creation, aesthetic in character, can only be enjoyed, but can have no claim to be believed, or rather is such that the question of its being believed or not believed would be irrelevantBut since, as Krishnachandra holds, nothing can be e philosophical content which cannot be at least theoretically believed, the world-view derivable from the synthesis of the laws of science must be foreign to philosophyThis conclusion seems to me to be of far-reaching philo-5 sophical importance. And I am also in agreement with K. C. Bhattacharyya"s view that such a world-view has at best a suggestive value for science in view of the consideration that the discovery of laws characterized by the

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of science. i But it seems rather surprising that, in spite of warning philosophers against the admission of the so-called philosophical world-view, he should hold that such a worldview has illustrative sigificance for philosophy. In this

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physical object otherwise called the pure object or " object in general ’ is, unlike the world-view concerned,‘ is a genuine philosophical content ; and thereupon he brings

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in a content which is ex hypothesi non-philosophical, namely, the world-view under consideration. This, how-

ever, is a minor dificulty which does not in the least detract

eharyya’s view that it is no part of the business of philosophy to construct a world-view on the basis of the laws

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Another way of construing the task of philosophy as affiliated to that of science lies in the treatment of ‘ the formulation of the postulates or structural concepts of science ' as a philosophical problem. The conception of this problem as philosophical, as ‘is well known to every

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student of philosophy, has, in recent times, led to the

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tratable at all, may find an illustration in this world-view. But manted that the so-called metaphysical object is a genuine philosophical content, I am not sure whether it can by any stretch of lom'c or imagination be said to be illustrated

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foundation of a distinct philosophical discipline known as philosophy of science. Some of the philosophers of recent times such as Collingwood have also attached meat philosophical significance to this problem. Moreover, the bulk of philosophical speculations characterized by Professor K. C. Bhattacharyya as ' romantic ", which has

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centred round Einstein’s theory of relativity, is primarily -an attempt to deal with the problem under consideration. But the pioneer of the movement of thought heralding "the advent of philosophy of science was Kant in so far as he, as a result of his enquiry into the possibility of science, arrived at the view that the structural concepts of science -or, in other words, the fundamental principles of scientific knowledge are subject to the necessity of an a priori deduction, a task which, according to him, belongs not to science as such, but to philosophy under the title of transcendental logic. ' ' Thus the idea of the afliliation of the task of philosophy to that of science has acquired a prestige which one

may find hard to challenge or dispute. But even then, it would be worthwhile to raise a question, not the question -whether the problem of the formulation of the postulates or structural concepts of science is genuine or not, but "the question whether or not this problem is philosophical. Now the view that the formulation of the postulates of -science is the task of philosophy is, from the nature of the

-case, in need of being established, instead of being merely -stated. And in order that one may establish it, one must shoulder the onus of proving that the formulation of them cannot he the work of science itself. But this proof is by no means available. For the sole importance of a postulate of science lies in its capacity to organize empirical facts into .a system, and what postulate has this capacity and whether -a certain postulate has this capacity or not are matters which it is obviously mven to science, and science alone "to decide. And this goes to indicate that the postulates of science, as Krishnachandra observes, are hypotheses of n kind, and that a postulate thus regarded may have a stronger rival or rivals, with the result that it may bfi

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empirical facts, but on the mound that it is ‘ clumsier and less expeditious to work with ’ than its rival or rivals. Hence it is evident that the postulates of science are not a priori, characterized by universality and necessity, so that Kautis admission of the possibility of metaphysics of nature as a branch of philosophy is based on a misconception of the nature of scientific postulates. In fact, no postulate of science, not even the one couocrning the conception of space as four-dimensional, which science has found to be exceptionally rewarding, can be said to be characterized by necessity. The reason is that it is no part of the function of the postulates of science to convey information about what things are independently of our experience, about what Kant calls things-in-themselves. Strictly speaking, the postulates of science are intended to be mere tools for the use of science in its attempt to organize facts of experience into a system. So not only their value and importance should lie wholly within the domain of science, but their formulation should belong to the responsibility of science—-with this proviso, however, that in formulating them science is dependent on outside help from mathematics or rather metamathematics as it is now-a-days called, and from no other academic discipline. But if even then the formulation of the postulates of science be regarded as a philosophical concern, this would obviously amount to confusing science with philosophy and, would, as Krishnachandra holds, also amount to ignoring the impassable gulf between the realm of fact and the realm of the self-subsistent. And from these two considerations and especially from the latter it would not only follow that philosophy is unconcerned with the formulation of

the postulates of science, but also that there is no passage from science to that species of philosophy which may be called metaphysics.

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in the spiritualistic interpretation of evolution and to Karl Marx's attempt to mod_=ify"the older way of the materialistic interpretation of evolution by having recourse to the Hegelian dialectic. ' But, "of whichever type it may be, evolutionary philosophy, as K. C. Bhattacharyya observes, is essentially an attempt to construct a world-view in the manner of a generalized account of the world comprising matter, life and mind. So in dealing with evolutionary philosophy, one is required to enquire into the worth of a world-view of this kind. To this end it would be worthwhile first to consider the nature of the science of life on the one hand and of the metaphysical treatment of the concept of life on the other. As regards the science of life, its primary aim is to provide an account of the evolution of life on the basis of researches in the field of general biology such as those that have been conducted by Darwin and others. And its peculiarity consists in framing hypotheses regarding the development of life from a lower to a higher stage-— hypotheses built up with due consideration of relevant data

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and intended to be duly verified. Hence it is evident that the science of evolution is a body of knowledge, so that neither its legitimacy nor its fruitfulness can be called in

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question. . In its treatment of the concept of life, metaphysics, on the other hand, is not interested in the consideration of life on its own account, but, as Krishnachandra holds,

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makes an attempt to understand the nature of life in relation to matter and mind, which, according to him, is divergent from any attempt to construct a world-view. That being fie, metaphysics in this context is not required to undertake the arduous task of piecing together the results of the sciences, but has only to take into account available data. And data are available, matter, life and mind, as K. C.

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"rt-rs concert or PHILOSOPHY

Bhattacharyya points out, ‘ being presented in the knowledge of oneself as in the body‘. Provided with the required data as it thus is, metaphysics finds itself in a position to deal with the concept of life by interpreting life materialistically in terms of matter or spiritualistically in terms of mind or in any other possible manner. What is especially worth noticing about the metaphysic of life, however, is as follows. The metaphysical interpretation of life, be it materialistic or spiritualistic or other, provides no knowledge. For, while it is a fact that matter, life and mind are each knowable and are actually known individually and separately, we can have no means of knowing life as matter or as mind or, for that matter, as anything else. Nor can any of the metaphysical interpretations of life be regarded as a hypothesis with an unmistakable bearing upon knowledge.

comparable to the hypotheses of which the science of life can boast. Nevertheless, as Krishnachandra suggests, these interpretations are hypotheses of a kind, which are at least theoretically believable and, what is more, admit of actual belief ; so that the metaphysic of life has a worth of its own and does not deserve to be condemned as a product

of fantasy. But evolutionary philosophy, according to Professor Bhattacharyya, is in a class apart from the science of life on the one hand, and from the metaphysic of life on the other. Unlike the science of life, evolutionary philosophy has no data to consider. Nor does the theory it seeks to propound need or admit of verification .with reference to any kind of data. So it is not given to evolutionary philo-

sophy to provide knowledge or a hypothesis having, cifllvl‘ actually or even theoretically, a bearing on knowledgeEvolutionary philosophy, then, is unable to yield even that which the metaphysic of life is capable of yielding, namely belief without knowledge. What it succeeds in achievinfi H.

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cannot be known as a fact, it may, according to Professor

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Bhattacharyya, still be the object of a mere hypothesis as distinguished from a scientific hypothesis, and so may be ‘ believed as self-subsisting ’. But the idea of a single

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cosmic life. For although such a thing as cosmic life

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‘ the significant story of cosmic evolution ’, which evolutiouary philosophy is apt to present, is ‘ only a species of imaginative literature ’. I am not sure whether I have succeeded in providing a faithful account of K. C. Bhattacharyya’s treatment of

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evolutionary philosophy in all its details. But I have no doubt that he admits the science of life, the metaphysic of life and evolutionary philosophy and treats them as

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history of cosmic life, which is essential to evolutionary philosophy, can not only not be scientific, but cannot even he philosophical. For the construction of such a history

left by science ’, which cannot be brought about by philosophy, far less by science. The fulfilment of this demand can be credited to the responsibility of imagination, and imagination alone. So, as Krishnachandra concludes,

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life. But I do not quite see how the distinction between the two can be said to consist in that the metaphysic of life is concerned with the understanding of life in relation

to matter and mind, whereas the sole concern of the science of life is with life on its own account. Since there can be I10 such thing as disembodied life nor any such thing as 2-21 75B

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THE concern‘ oF PI-HLOSDPHY

mind in abstraction from life as well as body, no enquiry into the nature of life, whether scientific or other, can do without making reference, in some manner or other, to matter and mind. Of course, even then the distinction between the science of life and the metaphysic of life must hold good. But that distinction would be one between the scientific and the metaphysical approach to life in relation to matter and mind, it being understood that, among other things, in priori reductionism, which metaphysics is apt to employ in understanding life in terms of matter or mind or, for that matter, anything else, is strictly speaking, unacceptable to the science of life. And Iam inclined to feel that Krishnachandra, perhaps, had precisely this in view in distinguishing between the science and the metaphysic of life. Another difficulty which I have come to feel relates to

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the distinction between evolutionary philosophy and the metaphysic of life on which K. C. Bhattacharyya is I10 less insistent than he is on the distinction between era-

lutionary philosophy and the science of life. Let us grant that, despite the fact that it seeks to interpret life in term'§_ of matter or in terms of mind or in any other manner.

the metaphysic of life treats life itself as central, whereas in the case of evolutionary philosophy none of the three concepts of matter, life and mind is treated as central, but

l gqijfi-E€‘§£%'fl.% all of them are regarded equally as elements in a singlfl history of cosmic life. But that can make no secret of the _ lei

fact that the metaphysic of life, in effect, yields, at least indirectly or by implication, a world-view no less fantastifi than that which evolutionary philosophy is apt to presentIf the difference of the metaphysic of life from esclutionary philosophy be argued on the ground that in; the Era~"'- §-w-a case of the former, unlike in the case of the. latter, date are available in and through matter, life and mind, the all

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PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

19

argument seems unavoidably to fall through in view of the fact that these data are equally available in the case

of evolutionary philosophy. Further, granted, as one must grant, that there may be such a thing as mere belief, belief without knowledge as distinguished from knowledge as such, one may wonder why a metaphysical interpretation

of life, be it materialistic, spiritualistic or other, should be believable and a world-view presented by evolutionary philosophy should, on the other hand, be purely fantastic, instead of being believable--and this in spite of the fact -that both are equally arbitrarily n priori and equally unverifiable so as to be foreign to knowledge. It seems that both should be equally believable or else equally fantastic —-of course, the latter alternative being, from the nature

of the case, preferable to the former. These are some of the difficulties with which I am

confronted. But it may well be that in struggling with the difliculties as I am doing, I am only fighting with a

shadow. In any case, the fact remains that Krishnachandra has displayed unusually acute philosophical insight in his estimate of evolutionary philosophy in terms of his view that a philosophy of this kind is as far removed from philosophy in its strict sense as it is from science, and

that, in the final analysis, it is but a fortuitous offspring of imagination. But even then, as the adage goes, every cloud has a silver lining. Evolutionary philosophy as well as the two otherkinds of so-called philosophy, which we have already had occasion to bring under review, are,

it is hardly necessary to reiterate, afiliated to science in -one ' sense or another. And since science, as Krishnachandra observes, is conspicuous for its ‘ predatory ’ attitude—the attitude which begets ‘ the belief that the object is knowable and usable as of right ’ or, as we should rather say, as of necessity, these so-called philosophies are,

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THE concarr or Pnuosopny

by implication, wedded to this attitude

It is ultimately

for this reason rhat neither ' ' philosophy, . ¢VOlI.llI10I1&l'_Y amphilosophy regarded as an attempt to construct a world view on the basis of the primary laws of science nor a .4 the kind of philosophy that is devoted to the thsk Of fiat mulating the postulates of science is strictly philoso hiciiii And yet none of them is scientific either. This Ea-5 ta indicate that they are, in their respective ways attegrn tsbut necessarily unsuccessful fltI€II1pt5--at the lundoinp 0; the effect of the predatory attitude of science which ifthe least that may be demanded of philosophy. iSo these sccalled philosophies point to the need for an enquiry into the situation in which philosophy may be autonomous with a subject-matter of its own. And this brings us to the positive part of K. C. Bhattacharyya’s analysis of the concept of philosophy. "

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THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

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It is partly out of respect for the traditional Indian method of philosophical investigations and partly for the sake of my personal convenience that I started with the discussion of Krishnachandra’s conception of the relation between philosophy and science instead of his conception of philosophy itself, with a view to showing what, according to him, philosophy is not. And I, perhaps, devoted more time to this initial discussion than I ought to have done. But my reason for having done that consists in my personal belief that philosophy, whatever else it may be, is not, as Krishnachandra also believed, affiliated to science in any manner whatsoever, and that this needs to be shown -as well as possible in order that the ground may be prepared for philosophy’s coming into its own. And once philosophy is restored to a state of autonomy, it does not matter how it is practised or whether it is practised in one way -or another. For, after all, the idea of the homogeneity or uniformity of philosophic thought is illusory, and it is

this illusory idea which, among other things, has misled Illflny a philosopher into certain ways of philosophizing which have proved detrimental to the autonomy of philosophy. Now in dealing with the question as to what philosophy, -strictly speaking, is, Krishnachandra has felt, as many philosophers since and even before the time of Kant have also felt, the need for a prior enquiry into what is usually -called the epistemologcal problem. But then, this problem has presented itself to him in a new orientation, not exactly in the form in which philosophers have ordinarily

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THE corvcsrr or PHILOSOPHY

raised it. He seems to me not to be directly in terested in the problem of the possibility of knowledge, comprising an entire gamut of questions concerning the nature, conditions and limits of knowledge, which philosophers have from time to time taken pains to answer is their respective ways. As far as knowledge is concerned, he, perhaps, preferred to treat it-and rightly too-—as an ultimate datum regarding which the task of epistemology would be to determine its various uses, so that it may be distinguished from any other ultimate datum or data that there may be for epistemology to deal with. And besides knowledge, Krishnachandra admits one other ultimate epistemological datum, which, according to him, is thought. This is clearly evident from his conception of the epistemo-

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lomcal problem as entirely that ‘ of the meaning of thought

and knowledge ’. Now the manner of Krishnachandra’s approach to epistemology briefly outlined above conveys a suggestion of far-reaching philosophical importance-the suggestion towards the replacement of epistemology in its usual narrow sense by a critique of the inventory of the activities of the human mind, both theoretical and practical, but practical

in the widest sense, having reference to aesthetic, moral and religious experiences.

This suggestion needs to he

carried out completely and in a systematic ‘manner in order that philosophy may come to hold its own as an inde pendent academic discipline. Judged from this point of view, it would not be enough for the purpose of philo . sophical investigations to hold an enquiry into knowledge

and thought alone. Besides, what may strike one as all obvious omission on Krishnachandra’s part is his exclusion

of imagination from the list of the items which, according to him, are in need of epistemologcal investigation. Of course, he has his own reason for allowing tl_1i$

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appear to be in conflict with each other. That being so, it is incumbent upon philosophy to suggest tl1e remedy for, or rather to account for the resolution of, the apparent conflict. And it is in this connection that the importance of imagination regarded as a new dimension of the activity

of the human mind may be particularly in evidence. But let me come nearer home, instead of straying far afield and creating confusions by introducing ideas of

my own which I have at present no means of elucidating and which, after all, may be of doubtful philosophical value. Returning to Krishnachandra“'s treatment of the so-called epistemological problem, I wish to observe that, in the name of explaining the meaning of thought and knowledge, he has tried to do what a philosopher like Wittgenstein would do in this regard, namely, to describe and analyse the uses of the words ‘ knowledge ‘ and ‘ thought ‘. My object in mentioning this is not merely to show respect to Wittgenstein who has in recent times drawn the special attention of philosophers to the need for the substitution of the concept of ‘ use ’ for the concept of ‘ meaning ‘, but to indicate that Krishnachandra was one of those philosophers who anticipated this innovation of Wittgenstein. It is hardly necessary to point out, however, that it is, as a result of his analysis of the uses of

the words “ knowledge ’

and " thought ’, that he has

arrived at the distinction between knowing and knowing

without thinking on the one hand and lzetvreen literal thinking, .s3Ir.l'.-olizing thinking and logical 1.hir.l