The Limits of Eurocentricity: Imperial British Foreign and Defence Policy in the Early Twentieth Century 9781463225964

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The Limits of Eurocentricity

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

90

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

The Limits of Eurocentricity

Imperial British Foreign and Defence Policy in the Early Twentieth Century

Keith Wilson

1 gorbia* press

The Isis Press, Istanbul

2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 2006 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

ISBN 978-1-61719-143-5

Printed in the United States of America

Keith Wilson is Professor of the History of International Politics at the University of Leeds. The Limits of Eurocentricity completes a trilogy which began with The Policy of the Entente (1985) and was followed by Empire and Continent (1987). He has also written A Study in the History and Politics of the Morning Post 19051926 (1990), Channel, Tunnel Visions 1850-1950 (1994), and Problems and Possibilities: Exercises in Statesmanship 1814-1918 (2003).

CONTENTS

Introduction: The Limits of Eurocentricity — the case of the British Empire 1904-1914 1.

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Prologue to Policy-Making: Sir E. Grey and the National Review articles 1901-2 Found and Lost in Translation: Bertie, Cambon, Landsdowne, Delcasse and the Anglo-French 'alliance' of May 1905 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905 and the defending of India: the case of the worst-case scenario Creative Accounting: the place of loans to Persia in the commencent of the negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 Passing on the Straits: the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus in Anglo-Russian relations 1904-1907 Sir E. Crowe on the origins of the Crowe memorandum of 1 January 1907 The Anglo-French Entente re-visited, 1906-1914 Hankey's Appendix: inter-service rivalry during and after the Agadir crisis, 1911 Understanding the 'misunderstanding' of 1 August 1914 Curzon outwith India: a note on the lost committee on Persia, 1915-1916 General Wilson and the Channel Tunnel before and after the Great War

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Map: Persia as divided by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. ...

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2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

23 31 43

65 113 131 139 173 191 199

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Mr A J . Maxse and the West Sussex County Record Office for permission to print the appendixes to chapter 1.1 am indebted to the editors of the following learned journals where the original versions of certain chapters first appeared: Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History vol. 21 no. 2 (1993) for chapter 3, Middle Eastern Studies vol. 38 no. 2 (2002) for chapter 4; Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research lvi no. 134 (1983) for chapter 6; Canadian Journal of History xxxi no. 2 (1996) for chapter 7; War in History vol. i no. 1 (1994) for chapter 8; The Historical Journal vol. 37 no. 4 (1994) for chapter 9; Franco-British Studies no. 22 (1996) for chapter 11. The introductory chapter, and the piece from which the volume as a whole takes its title, was drafted in connection with an international conference convened at the University of Salford by Professor J.F.V. Keiger in the spring of 2004. Finally, I must thank the University of Leeds, and colleagues within the School of History there, for the periods of study-leave which helped to advance this project over recent years.

INTRODUCTION THE LIMITS OF EUROCENTRICITY: The Case of the British Empire 1904-14

Those who maintain that the Anglo-French agreements of April 1904 concerning Egypt, Morocco, the Gambia, the Newfoundland fisheries, and Siam marked a switch in focus on the part of Great Britain from world-wide imperial concerns to European issues mean, in effect, that British governments suddenly discovered or discerned a German bid for the hegemony of Europe, and that Great Britain adjusted, nay switched, her imperial and foreign priorities in order to deal with this perceived threat. This is a school of thought which has dominated the English secondary literature for most of the twentieth century. It has become entrenched to such an extent that the comfortable myths that it has purveyed have proven very hard to challenge, let alone dislodge and replace with less narrow-minded, less short-sighted, more accurate, more realistic and more soundly-based alternative interpretations. This school of thought has had its day, its 'place in the sun'. It is high-time that it be recognised as the historiographical phenomenon that it has undoubtedly been, and that it be now consigned to the dustbin of history. There are a number of things which the above school of thought has always ignored, or simply not registered in the first place. These include, over the last twenty months of the Lansdowne Foreign Secretaryship, that is to say from the signing of the Anglo-French Agreement, Lansdowne's intense reluctance to admit the necessity for a conference on the affairs of Morocco, a conference at which Britain would have had to give diplomatic support to France according to Article IX of the agreement of April 1904.1 They also include Lansdowne's response in July 1905 to the plea of Lister, of the Paris Embassy, that the scope of the understanding with France be extended, which was that, although 'we have been giving a great deal of thought to the question', the present moment was not a very opportune one 'for suggesting either to the Cabinet or the country an extension of the understanding already arrived at'. 2 Over the period of Sir Edward Grey's Foreign Secretaryship, the ' G . P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London, 1926-38) iii. no. 117. ^Lister to Lansdowne 30 June, Lansdowne to Lister 10 July 1905, Lansdowne MSS F.O. 800/127.

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things either ignored or not registered include the British rejection of the French overtures, disclosed only to a handful of ministers, for something more closely approaching an alliance, between 10 and 31 January 1906. They include Grey's own warnings to the French, at the end of January 1906, about the isolationist and indeed pacifist nature of the Liberal Cabinet: 'Some of those in the Cabinet who were most attached to peace were those also who were the best friends of France, but though I had no doubt about the good disposition of the Cabinet I did think there would be difficulties in putting such an undertaking as the French wanted in writing.' 1 This was correctly decoded by the French ambassador, Paul Cambon: 'an extension of the AngloFrench agreements would give rise to a discussion in the heart of the Cabinet which would have its awkwardnesses...'. 2 They include the statements of Prime Minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in a private interview with French premier Clemenceau in April 1907, that 'the sentiment of the English people would be totally averse to any troops being landed on the Continent under any circumstances', statements which so distressed Clemenceau that he regarded them, as he told Sir Alfred Milner, 'as undoing the whole result of the Entente Cordiale'. 3 Further warnings from Grey were not lost on the French ambassador, and were reinforced by Lord Esher, a permanent member of the Committee of Imperial Defence and someone who knew absolutely everyone, during the second Morocco crisis of November 1908. As Cambon wrote to Foreign Minister Pichon on 18 November 1908: 'Esher warns that we cannot rely on the firmness of the Cabinet. Grey has said this already...'. 4 To this list should be added the refusal of successive Liberal Governments to consider conscription, despite the pleas of Clemenceau, who was told in no uncertain terms by Grey in April 1908 that 'Russia ought to be looked to as a great counterpoise to Germany on land'. 5 The new Prime Minister, Asquith, agreed. In September 1908 he wrote to Grey that Clemenceau was 'ignorant', 'if he imagines we are going to keep here a standing army of one half to three quarters of a million men, ready to meet the Germans in Belgium if and when they are minded to adopt that route for the invasion of France. As you point out, he completely ignores the existence from a military point of view - of his Russian ally'. 6

^Grey to Bertie 31 January 1906, BD iii. no. 219. Cambon to Rouvier 31 January 1906, Documents Diplomatiques Français, Second Series ix (i) no. 106. 3 R.B. Jones, 'Anglo-French Negotiations, 1907: a memorandum by Sir Alfred Milner', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research xxxi (1958). Cambon to Pichon 18 November 1908, DDF Second Series xi no.558. 5 Memo by Grey 28 April 1908, Grey MSS F.0.800/92. 6 Asquith to Grey 7 September 1908, ibid./100. 2

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There is also Grey's ban on certain words that French Foreign Minister Cruppi wished to use in the Senate in April 1911 to describe Anglo-French relations. The words 'Quand la communauté des intérêts affirme ainsi entre deux nations sur des faits positifs on peut être certain qu'elles resteront amies et unies' were permitted; the words that followed: 1 en présence de toute éventualité et on peut s'en remettre à leurs Gouvernements respectifs du soin de donner le moment venu une forme précise à leur entente' were banned on the grounds that 'inconvenient demands for more precise explanation of their meaning' would follow 1 In addition, in the same year, there is Grey's policy of pressing France to make concessions to Germany throughout the Agadir crisis. The famous passage about the 'intolerable humiliation' that it would be for Britain to be 'treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations', inserted by Grey, Asquith and Churchill into Lloyd George's Mansion House speech of 21 July, does not contradict this argument, because that passage was devised in order to avoid acquiescing in French Premier Caillaux's demand that Britain support whatever stance France decided to adopt at any conference that might be held. Caillaux's demands had arrived in Bertie's telegram no. 106 at 8 a.m. on 21 July. The usually belligerent official Crowe was taken aback to the extent that he wrote, in a minute omitted by the editors of British Documents on the Origins of the War (an omission which, like many other such omissions, has over the years served the eurocentric cause), 'It is not pleasant to be reminded by the French Government of our treaty obligations'. Sir A. Nicolson, the Permanent Under Secretary, went so far as to advise that no reply, in terms, be sent, on the grounds that 'any discussions with France by telegraph as to the scope and interpretation of the 1904 agreement...might assume a controversial character'. Nicolson's advice was, in effect, taken. The specific French demands for support under Article ix of the Anglo-French Agreement of April 1904 were thus evaded by means of a public statement of a much vaguer nature and which also switched attention to Germany. 2 Amongst the concessions pressed upon the French in this crisis was that of an unfortified port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, a concession foreshadowed as early as February 1906, when Grey had recognised that this was something that the French would regard as 'pusillanimous and a poor result of the Entente', a reaction which he was nevertheless prepared to risk. 3

^Bertie to Grey 5 April, Grey to Bertie 6 April 1911, BD vii nos 200, 201. K.M. Wilson, 'The Agadir Crisis, the Mansion House Speech, and the Double-Edgedness of Agreements', Historical Journal xv no.3 (1972); Bertie to Grey no.106,20 July 1911 and minute by Crowe, F.O.371/1164/28529; minute by Nicolson 21 July 1911, BD vii no. 409. 3 memo by Grey 20 February 1906, BD iii no. 299; Tweedmouth to Grey 25 February, Grey to Tweedmouth 28 February 1906, Grey MSS F.0.800/87. 2

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Towards the end of 1911, moreover, there was the Cabinet revolt of November at the discovery, in the course of the Agadir crisis, that, without Cabinet authorisation or knowledge, military conversations had taken place with the French. This revolt produced two Cabinet resolutions, one to the effect that this kind of thing should never have happened, which Grey described as 'a little tight', the other declaring that 'no communications should take place...which can, directly or indirectly, commit this country to military or naval intervention'. It also produced Esher's comment of 24 November 1911: 'The Entente is decidedly imperilled'; and the remark of J.A. Pease, President of the Board of Education: 'Asquith, Grey, Haldane, Lloyd George, Churchill thought they could boss the rest, but were mistaken.' 1 The fifteen-strong 'rest' continued to resist being 'bossed' by the fivestrong minority thereafter. When in May 1912 Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, put forward a proposal to withdraw British naval forces from the Mediterranean, McKenna, his predecessor and then Home Secretary, told the Cabinet that in his view an alliance with France was the 'essential feature' of Churchill's strategy. McKenna reminded his colleagues that it was, 'Of course, for the Cabinet to decide' whether they should allow themselves to be forced into such a relationship. 2 He returned to the subject on 3 July: it was one thing to take into account the support which in the existing international situation might reasonably be expected from other Powers; it was 'quite another thing to enter into an alliance with its obligation to fight in a war not of our own making'. 3 His misgivings produced the following response from his most senior colleague, Morley: 'I have just been reading your latest Memo. Others will do as they think best. My own mind is quite made up. No alliance, with or without a mask.' 4 The diary of J.A. Pease reveals the nature and tone of the exchanges that took place shortly afterwards on the question of whether talks between the French naval attaché and the Admiralty should be resumed, as the French wished: Grey tried frame words to the effect: yes we would resume and naval or military experts might consider joint operations of the two Powers on a non-committal basis that we were not bound to support one another in the event of outbreak of war. Harcourt [Colonial Secretary] asked that words should be inserted to express the view, that this action should not lead to

Ij.A. Pease Diary 24 October and 15 November 1911, Gainford MSS, Nuffield College Oxford; Asquith to the King 16 November 1911, CAB 41/33/28; M.V. Brett and Esher, The Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher (London, 1934-38) iii.74. 2 m e m o by McKenna 24 June 1912, CAB 37/111/79. 3 memo by McKenna 3 July 1912, ibid./86. 4 S . McKenna, Reginald McKenna (London, 1948) p. 147; see also K.M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente (Cambridge, 1985) pp. 50-51.

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the expectation of help to one another. Grey urged this was tantamount to telling France we might contemplate a war with France... 1 ...Wording of reply to French government who want to know if naval attache might now resume position with new Admiralty Board. Our reply was agreed to (after 20 minutes twisting words to suit all views) as follows: yes, but it is clearly understood that anything that passes between the experts naval or military must not be taken as prejudicing the freedom of decision of either government so as to commit either government to come to the assistance of the other in time of war. The words underlined were inserted by the P.M. to meet Harcourt's and my view; Grey objecting in case they gave rise to suspicion as to why they were inserted at all. ^

All this bore out the prediction of Sir A. Nicolson, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, delivered in May 1912 to Austen Chamberlain of the Opposition Front Bench, that the Liberal government would not be able to hold together if they tried to formulate an alliance with France 3 , and lay behind the carefully crafted exchange of letters between Grey and Cambon at the end of November. This exchange asserted once again the supremacy of the Cabinet to decide, irrespective of whatever military or naval planning might have been done, whether or not to assist the French government by armed force. 4 Three days after the exchange took place the Director of Military Operations, General Sir Henry Wilson, was telling General Castelnau in Paris that he 'had come over, with the knowledge and approval of Grey, but, of course, without any power to commit H.M. Govt.'. 5 'Cabinet supremacy', which was regarded by 'the rest', and especially by Morley, as a safeguard against involvement in a continental war 6 , was also embodied in the exchanges of April and May 1914 with the Russian government relating to an Anglo-Russian naval convention. This matter was, like the matter of withdrawing naval units from the Mediterranean in 1912, carefully screened and supervised by the Cabinet as a whole. In April 1914 Sir A. Nicolson spelt out privately to the British ambassador in St. Petersburg what the position was as regards France:

1

Pease Diary 15 July 1912. ibid. 16 July 1912. In their edition A Liberal Chronicle: JA. Pease 1908-1910 (London, 1994), C. Hazlehurst and C. Woodland promised a further volume on the years during which Pease was a member of the Cabinet, namely 1911-1915. No such volume has appeared, and the publisher of part 1, The Historians' Press, appears to have disappeared. As a result, the only section of this most valuable source to have been published in full is K.M. Wilson (ed.), 'The Cabinet Diary of J.A. Pease, 24 July to 5 August 1914' in Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society xix part 3 (1983). 3 A. Chamberlain, Politics from Inside (London, 1936) p. 486. 4 Grey to Cambon 22 November 1912, BD x(ii) no. 416. -'Wilson Diary 26 November 1912, Imperial War Museum. ^Morley of Blackburn, Memorandum on Resignation (London, 1928) p. 18. 2

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What we have done with France goes very little further than an exchange of views between our military and naval staffs and those of France and indeed in respect to any military cooperation with France, matters are still in an undecided state. Moreover it has been carefully laid down and is thoroughly understood between the two governments that these exchanges of views in no way binds either government and it seems to me that they have little real practical value...I am afraid that should war break out on the continent the likelihood of our despatching any expeditionary force is extremely remote... 1

In this context, which should perhaps include the January 1914 hounding of Grey by Harcourt, who had taken over the leading role in this from Loreburn and Morley, over the Foreign Office's use of the 'terminological inexactitude' of the expression 'Triple Entente', on the grounds that 'no such thing has ever been considered or approved by the Cabinet' 2 , the wide-ranging contemporary recognition of the extent to which any interventionist continental policy was constrained is the easier to understand. The French ambassador stated, in the course of October 1912, whilst trying to devise terms that 'would not be compromising in the eyes of those in the Cabinet most hostile to acting abroad', that 'if his colleagues shared his views Grey would not be content with an exchange of letters; but, for the Cabinet, this exchange is an end and cannot lead anywhere except in the case of imminent danger...'. 3 The equally long-serving Russian ambassador, Count Benckendorff, was to observe in February 1914, of Grey, 'Que son parti et ses utopies le gênent est evident'. 4 In April 1914 Nicolson, in a letter already quoted, went on to predict that 'before long we shall find that this hesitating policy will lead to unfortunate results and that we shall find that we are being given up as untrustworthy and undecided friends'. 5 This catalogue, of items overlooked or disregarded by the eurocentrics, could go on. It could include the fact that Admiralty planning, under Fisher as First Sea Lord, only began in late 1906, and always consisted of two sets of plans for fighting an Anglo-German war - one set with France as an ally, the other with France as a neutral. 6 1 will end it here however on a personal note, with the fact of the British rejection of the Channel Tunnel scheme in 1914 as 1

Nicolson to Buchanan 7 April 1914, Carnock MSS F.0.800/373; see also Grey to Bertie 1 May 1914, BD x(ii) no. 541. 2 Harcourt to Grey 8, 9 January 1914, Grey MSS F.0.800/91; and see Wilson, The Policy of the Entente op. cit. p. 25. 3 Cambon to Poincaré 31 October 1912, DDF Third Series iv no. 301. ^Benckendorff to Sazonov 25 February 1914, cited in chapter 7 below, p. 150 fn. 2. 5 s e e fn. 1 p. 12; see also Nicolson to de Bunsen 27 April 1914, BD x(ii) no.540, where Nicolson revealed that he wanted the understandings with France and with Russia to be converted into alliances. 6 P. K. Kemp (ed.), The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, Navy Records Society vols CII, CVI (London, 1960-64).

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in 1906-7: a far from gratuitous fact, as that scheme was a paradigm of the British relationship with the continent of Europe, and of the British relationship with France in particular. 1 *

What the eurocentrics are left with constitutes a catalogue far less long, and also highly qualified. Lansdowne did tell the German ambassador, Count Metternich, on 28 June 1905, that he 'wished him to know that in the case where Germany seized light-heartedly the first excuse to unleash a war against France, it could not be foreseen to what extent public opinion in Britain would push the Government towards helping the French' , 2 Lansdowne did not, however, confide to the French the fact of his having made this coded threat. When at the beginning of January 1906 Grey was informed of Lansdowne's statement he took it, quite rightly, to have been delivered purely as a personal opinion. Grey did tell Metternich exactly the same thing,and went on to tell the French ambassador that he had done so; in both cases, however, he played down the significance of it: 'I said that I could only speak on such a matter as a private individual, my opinion being worth no more than that of Lord Lansdowne speaking in the same way, but the opinion was the same. It was not a question of the policy of the Government; what made a nation most likely to take part in war was not policy or interest, but sentiment, and if the circumstances arose, public feeling in England would be so strong that it would be impossible to be neutral.' 3 Within a few days of speaking to Metternich Grey was writing: 'I detest the idea of another war now and so does the whole of this country and so will the new House of Commons.' 4 This leaves the eurocentrics with the Permanent sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence set up in late July 1905 'to consider and prepare schemes for combined naval and military operations', whose first item of business was to consider 'What objective could be assigned to joint expeditions with a view to bring the maximum pressure to bear upon any Power or Powers war with which must be regarded as possible'. 5 Yet this was a committee that, as formally constituted, never met. General Wilson was unable to resuscitate it even in October 1910, when he took over as Director

' K.M. Wilson, Channel Tunnel Visions 1850-1945: dreams and nightmares (London, 1994). ^Metternich to Berlin 28 June 1905, in J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, F. Thimme (eds), Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914 (Berlin, 1922-27) xx (ii) no. 6860. 3 Grey to Lascelles 9 January 1906, BD iii no.229; Grey to Bertie 31 January 1906 ibid. no. 219. 4 Grey to Bertie 15 January 1906 ibid. no. 216. 5 76th and 77th meetings of CID, 20 and 26 July 1905, CAB 38/9/61, /65.

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of Military Operations.1 It leaves them with another CID sub-committee 'To consider the Military Needs of the Empire', which began with a row between Admiral Fisher on the one hand and Generals Nicholson and French on the other, and which continued in that vein. 2 The eventual conclusions of this sub-committee, dated July 1909, included the following: 'The Committee, in the first place, desire to observe that, in the event of an attack on France by Germany, the expediency of sending a military force abroad, or of relying on naval means only, is a matter of policy which can only be determined when the occasion arises by the Government of the day.' 3 That another conclusion encouraged the General Staff to work out a plan, should the government decide to assist France, was deliberately ignored by the Admiralty, which was simply not prepared to participate in transporting the Army to the Continent, as was discovered in August 1911. 4 It leaves them with the 114th meeting of the CID, at which this discovery was made, a meeting from which many noninterventionists on the Committee - Esher, Morley, and Harcourt - were deliberately excluded, and as a result of which the First Lord of the Admiralty, McKenna, was replaced; but it also leaves them with the problem of Asquith's note to Grey of 5 September 1911 about the possibility of British assistance to France: the French, wrote the Prime Minister, 'ought not to be encouraged in present circumstances to make their plans on any assumptions of this kind'. 5 There is, of course, what Grey told the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov at Balmoral in September 1912: 'If however Germany was led by her great, I might say unprecedented strength, to attempt to crush France, I did not think we should stand by and look on, but should do all we could to prevent France from being crushed.' 6 There is also what Haldane, then Lord Chancellor but no leader, as his predecessor Loreburn had been, of 'the peace at any price section' of the Cabinet 7 , told the German ambassador Prince Lichnowsky on 3 December 1912, which Kaiser Wilhelm II took as 'a hidden threat or declaration of war', namely that England would not tolerate a suppression of the French under any circumstances, that she could not and 1

Wilson to Ottley October 1910, WO 106/47A. Fisher to Crease 19 April 1919, in A.J. Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought (London, 1959) iii. 579. 3 CAB 16/5. 4 Esher to Balfour 24, 31 December 1909, 16 August 1910, Balfour MSS Add.MSS 49717; Hankey to McKenna 15 August 1911, Hankey MSS 7/3, printed in chapter 8 below. 5 Asquith to Grey 5 September 1911, Grey MSS F.0.800/100. On 22 July 1911 Asquith had told Scott of the Manchester Guardian, 'If you ask me whether, to put it brutally, it is worth our while to go to war about Agadir (i.e. its being made into a fortified port) I should say it is not.' C.P. Scott Diary Add.MSS 50901. 6 memo by Grey 24 September 1912, BD ix(i) no. 805. 7 s e e The Policy of the Entente op. cit. p. 23. 2

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would not want to see afterwards a unified continental group under the leadership of a single Power. 1 However, what Grey told Sazonov was recorded for the benefit and knowledge only of the King, Asquith, and Lord Crewe (Secretary of State for India); and only Grey himself knew what Haldane told Lichnowsky. Against both these items might be placed what Grey told Cambon on 4 December 1912 and did record for the benefit of the Cabinet, namely 'I did not think that public opinion could take things seriously unless Germany moved; and, if things did become serious, I thought that public opinion would first require an attempt to secure that Germany, France and England kept out of the trouble', and what Grey wrote to the King on 9 December 1912: 'Your Majesty's Government is not committed in the event of war...'. 2 *

To raise the horizon to encompass all that it really should encompass is to cease to be any kind of eurocentric. The limits of eurocentricity are reached as a result of an appreciation and integration of the extra-European and imperial dimensions of British policy. Lansdowne's motive for an AngloFrench agreement on imperial issues, for instance, was that it 'would not improbably be the precursor' of an Anglo-Russian agreement on imperial issues.3 Early in 1905 the Balfour government over-ruled the Government of India and on 21 March renewed the guarantee of Afghanistan with Habibullah Khan. 4 What lay behind Lansdowne's anxiety of April and May 1905 that discussions take place with the French in advance of actual contingencies arising was his concern that, otherwise, the French would make concessions to Germany at the expense of non-European British interests. This concern was voiced by Lansdowne as follows, in conversation with Cambon: I said that I had heard fears expressed that, in order to put an end to a state of things which could not fail to be highly inconvenient to them, the French Government might be induced to purchase the acquiescence of Germany by concessions of a kind which we were not likely to regard with favour in other parts of the world.-' ^K.M. Wilson, 'The British demarche of 3 and 4 December 1912: H.A. Gwynne's note on Britain, Russia and the First Balkan War', Slavonic and East European Review vol. 62 no.4 (1984) 552-559. Grey to Bertie 4 December 1912, BD ix (ii) no.328; Grey to George V 9 December 1912, ibicl.x (ii) no.453 (sent only to Asquith). 3 memo by Lansdowne 'Understanding between Great Britain and France', 10 September 1903, F.O.27/3765; see The Policy of the Entente, op. cit. pp. 71-2. 4 CAB 37/75/49, /63. ^Lansdowne to Bertie 17 May 1905, to Cambon 25 May 1905, BD iii nos 94, 95; see also Balfour to the King, 8 June 1905: the Cabinet had been warned that France could not be trusted 'not to yield to threats at the critical moment of negotiation'. CAB 41/30/21.

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Between April and August 1905 the British Government was as concerned with re-negotiating its alliance with Japan as with anything else, and in trying to extract from the Japanese a commitment to assemble 100,000 troops to be sent to defend the North-West Frontier of India against the Russians. Although in this latter effort Lansdowne failed, a possibility remained which allowed Grey, from February 1906 to April 1907, to indulge fantasies he had first expressed in March 1905 of having Japanese troops to assist Great Britain, 'say in India or Persia'. He was to be as disappointed as Lansdowne, in this respect, by the Japanese, but their refusal to play the Great Game only increased the pressure for a direct imperial understanding with the Russian Empire.1 The Committee of Imperial Defence, which was only just coming into its own as an established inter-departmental agency at the time of the making of the Anglo-French Agreement, is or should be a formidable reminder of the scale and extent, throughout the world, of British interests. These interests did not go away with the signing of the agreement with France. In an antiimperialist memorandum on 'British Military Needs' of mid-1908, a young Winston Churchill, then President of the Board of Trade, wrote: Upon proposals being made to reduce the numbers or the expense of the army, we are at once invited to contemplate appalling possibilities. We are to encounter Russia in Afghanistan, to stamp out the flames of 'a religious war' in India (and I gather simultaneously in Egypt too), and at the same time to be prepared with sufficient forces either to resist the German invader at home, or (perhaps even and) to co-operate effectually with some other great Power upon the continent.2

What Churchill here made fun of, whilst pressing for reductions in military expenditure, was no joke for those who were not of his then 'economist' persuasion. It is worth noting that there were three subcommittees of the Committee of Imperial Defence on 'The Military Needs of the Empire'. The first, set up in January 1907, was devoted to India. The second, set up in June 1907, was devoted to Egypt and the Sudan (which subjects were addressed again in March 1910). Only in October 1908 was the question of a possible role in a European war considered. The sub-committee of March 1910 on 'Overseas Transport of Reinforcements in Time of War' did not include within its terms of reference the subject of reinforcements to any Mallet to Sandars March 1905, Sandars MSS Eng.Hist c749 (Bodleian Library Oxford); minutes of 70th CID, 12 April 1905 CAB 38/9/32; Grey to Asquith 2 October 1905 Asquith MSS vol.10 f.149; minutes of 97th CID, 25 April 1907, CAB 38/13/19. See chapter 3 below. 2 m e m o by Churchill 'British Military Needs', 27 June 1908, CAB 37/94/89. The tone and purpose of this passage is completely misread by J. Siegel in Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia (London, 2002) p. 49.

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European theatre. Between the second and third sub-committees on the Military Needs of the Empire there was the March 1908 sub-committee on the Persian Gulf and Baghdad Railway. This sprang from Morley's letter of 30 December to Campbell-Bannerman: 'Grey and I have been discussing the problems likely to arise in Persia and the Persian Gulf in connection with the Baghdad Railway.' 1 Of the Baghdad Railway project Esher had noted in November 1907: 'This railway brings the frontier of India within four days of Europe.' 2 Another sub-committee on the Persian Gulf was set up in May 1911. Other non-European sub-committees were that of January 1913 on the Trans-Persian Railway, and that of April 1914 on 'Empire Wireless Communications'. If one discounts the enquiries into the possibility of an invasion of the British Isles of November 1907 and April 1914 on the grounds that they were in large part a product of both inter-service (Admiralty - War Office) and intra-Admiralty (Fisher - Beresford) rivalry, and on the additional ground that they followed from the fact that any German navy would be based at Heligoland and Kiel, something which had nothing to do with the AngloFrench relationship or the Agreement of April 1904, then the true focus of British policy and interests is revealed as being and remaining overwhelmingly extra-European.3 *

For the historian, it is a matter of trying to correctly establish the balance of opinion at the time in question, on the parts of those who most counted. It is a matter of determining both the quality and the width. On both scores, in my view, the eurocentrics do not measure up. There is no doubt as to where Sir Edward Grey stood. From the very outset of his Foreign Secretaryship he personally was prepared to support France if attacked by Germany with all the means at the disposal of the government of the day. His memorandum of 20 February 1906, which ended, 'The more I review the situation the more it appears to me that we cannot (keep out of war, if war breaks out between France and Germany) without losing our good name and our friends and wrecking our policy and position in the world' 4 testifies to this. So does his desperately convoluted effort of March ' Morlcy to Campbell-Bannerman 30 December 1907, Campbell-Bannerman MSS Add.MSS 41223. 2 Esher Diary 16 November 1907, Esher MSS 2/10. 3 see Public Record Handbook no.6, List of Papers of the Committee of Imperial Defence to 1914 (1964). This handbook is long overdue for re-printing and for the making of certain corrections, memo by Grey 20 February 1906, BD iii no. 299.

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1911 so to phrase an answer to a Parliamentary Question as 'not to convey that the engagement of 1904 might not under certain circumstances be construed to have larger consequences than its strict letter'. 1 So do his coded threats to resign in 1912, his permission for Haldane's démarche of 3 December 1912, and his actual playing of the resignation card at the beginning of August 1914. 2 Equally, there is no doubt as to why Grey stood where he did. For what testify to his standpoint all constitute a recognition on his part that a price had to be paid for what he regarded as 'repose' on the North-West Frontier and that that price meant standing up for France in Franco-German disputes, unless the French could be persuaded to back down (which Metternich once tried to persuade Lansdowne that they would, if the British did not stiffen their backs 3 .) They also reveal a determination on Grey's part to avoid a return to isolation and to all the problems that would follow from that - of dealing single-handedly with all the Powers, but especially France and Russia, as regards which problems Grey was personally imprinted as a result of his direct experiences under Rosebery in the 1890s. In April 1909, for instance, Grey minuted that during the time, before 1904, when Britain was supposed to have an entente with Germany, ' w e were kept on bad terms with France and Russia: we were sometimes on the brink of war with one or the other'. 4 In June 1909 he told Metternich that before 1904 we had constantly been on the brink of war with either France or Russia. For instance when I was at the Foreign Office in 1893, we had been thought to be on the brink of war with France about Siam; soon after that, there had been talk of war with Russia about Port Arthur, and there had been other instances...If... France and Russia were convinced that England was no use and they must abandon her and make friends with the Triple Alliance, the result would be a quintuple alliance which would leave England isolated.-5 The diary of J.A. Pease has an entry for 8 March 1911 where Grey is recorded as explaining that he wanted 'not to take any course which might make Russia and France suspicious, lest we lose every friend we possessed in Europe...'. 6 On the very same day on which Grey delivered his convoluted Parliamentary Answer to Jowett, M.P. (30 March 1911) Admiral Kerr reported ' Grey to Bertie 10 April 1911, ibid.vii no. 206. Grey's successive handwritten drafts of the answer itself show how difficult he found this particular exercise: see F.O.371/1117/9050. ^see K.M. Wilson, 'Grey' in K.M. Wilson (ed.), British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: from Crimean War to First World War (London, 1987); K.M. Wilson, 'Britain' in K.M. Wilson (ed.), Decisions for War, 1914 (London, 1995). ^Lansdowne to Lascelles 8 June 1905, BD iii no. 117. 4 minute by Grey on Goschen to Grey 16 April 1909, ibid.vi p. 266. 5 Grey to Goschen 9 June 1909, ibid. no. 182. 6 Pease Diary 8 March 1911.

INTRODUCTION

19

to him from the Mediterranean station Clemenceau's remark, which had been picked up by the Italians, that 'Now Germany can get at you, by attacking us...Thus the entente weakens both countries'. Grey minuted on this: 'The weakness he points out exists, but unless we had the entente we should be isolated and might have everybody against us which would be a still greater weakness.' 1 At the Committee of Imperial Defence on 26 May 1911, addressing the Dominion premiers, Grey repeated what he had said to Metternich and Goschen in 1909 of the period before the Anglo-French Agreement: It was not very comfortable, even so far as Germany was concerned; but as regards Russia and France, the situation was very much worse. The diplomatic atmosphere between ourselves and Russia and France in those years was such that the least incident in any part of the world, whether the Russian seizure of Port Arthur, the Russian action on the Pamirs on the Indian frontier, or French action in Siam - the least incident of that kind - at once excited the press of both countries, and there were rumours of wars more than once. 2

As Grey put it to the editor of the Manchester Guardian during the Agadir crisis, when the latter was trying to get at 'the more general and underlying ground' of Grey's policy: this was to give to France such support as would prevent her from falling under the virtual control of Germany and estrangement from us. This would mean the break-up of the triple entente as if France retired Russia would at once do the same and we should again be faced with the old troubles about the frontier of India.^ *

The trouble with counting too much upon Grey, which is what the eurocentrics do, is that he was in such a minority. Even those Cabinet ministers of his Liberal Imperialist persuasion never numbered more than five at any one time, and could fall out of the group as Lloyd George and perhaps even Haldane did in July-August 1914. 4 Whatever his motives, there is no doubt that Grey would have gone the same way as Delcasse had gone in June 1905 if he had pressed the case for intervention - certainly in early 1906 and in Campbell-Bannerman's time as Prime Minister, and probably in 1911 and ijninute by Grey on Kerr to Grey 30 March 1911, Grey MSS F.0.800/108. l l l t h CID, 26 May 1911, CAB 38/18/40. 3 C.P. Scott Diary 25 M y 1911, Scott MSS 50901. For the above paragraph as a whole see The Policy of the Entente op. cit.pp. 35-6, 92-4, 108-9. 4 scc chapter 9 below. 2

20

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1912 also; and in 1914, had it not been for Asquith's firm support and Lloyd George's failure of nerve as regards marshalling the overwhelming opposition in Cabinet and Party to full-scale participation in a continental war. 1 After the Anglo-French Agreement of April 1904, British foreign policy was just a little more focussed upon Europe than it might otherwise have been. It was just a little more attentive to certain European possibilities, especially a Franco-German war, on the occasions when crises over Morocco brought the Franco-German frontier if not into sharp focus at least into the viewfinder - bearing out Rosebery's prediction of August 1904 that the AngloFrench Agreement was 'much more likely to lead to complication than to peace'.2 But no more than this. And even this, for Grey, as already demonstrated, was for the sake of avoiding isolation for the sake of the preservation of the British Empire from the depradations primarily of Russia and France. Europe as such was not sharply focussed, as the metaphor implies that it was. The governments and official hierarchies of Great Britain continued to use a wide-angle lens. Esher, for one, never lost sight of the fact that what he called 'the uncertainty of the circumstances in Europe and elsewhere' might 'co-exist with a war on the North-West Frontier, or an Indian rising'. 3 Or as Grey put it to Paul Cambon six years later, in 1912, when successfully following Cabinet instructions to avoid being committed, as the French wanted, to implementing whatever military plans had been made, '...a European emergency might come when our troops were engaged in or required for trouble in Egypt, the Sudan, or India' . 4 It is worth pointing out, finally, that from early in 1912 the Asquith government was attempting to secure agreements with Germany over the future of the Portuguese colonies in Africa as well as over the Baghdad Railway (both of which efforts were obstructed by the French); was in 1913 engaged in bringing the various contending parties in the Balkans to settlements that would last; and was in 1914 seriously addressing, under pressure from St. Petersburg, a re-negotiation of the Anglo-Russian conventions on Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet in order to continue to enjoy 'repose' on the North-West Frontier. This latter, the most important item of all, entailed, as had article IX of the Anglo-French Agreement so far as France was concerned, accommodating Russian wishes for a stronger manifestation of triple entente solidarity with a view to deterring Germany as regards the Straits

'see Wilson in Decisions for War, 1914 op. cit. Lord Crewe, Lord Rosebery (London, 1931) ii. 581. 3 Esher to Balfour 3 October 1906, Balfour MSS Add. MSS 49719. 4 Grey to Bertie 21 November 1912, BD x (ii) no. 415. 2

I N T R O D U C T I O N

21

of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and combatting German influence at Constantinople and within what was left of Turkey in Europe. 1 This was another of the prices that had to be paid by Great Britain for retaining the position which early twentieth century governments had inherited and for remaining primarily a World and Imperial Power. When the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg discovered through secret intelligence what Grey had gone on to deny in Parliament, that an Anglo-Russian naval convention was being negotiated, he called this 'the last link in the chain of German encirclement' , 2 From the British point of view it was, pace the eurocentrics, nothing of the kind. Its being regarded in the way that it was regarded in Berlin fatally undermined Bethmann's will and ability to restrain the preventive warmongers at the head of the German General Staff and German Foreign Office. The eyes of the latter really were focussed on European matters at this time, and had been since the outcome of the first Balkan War in November 1912. The eyes of the British were not, and had not been, on the whole, throughout the previous decade. Their imperial dreams, of 'repose' on the North-West Frontier and of 'staying on', were of a far more exotic nature, and concerned, primarily, continents other than Europe, where the Franco-Russian Alliance was regarded as taking care of, or as constituting the balance against, the Central Powers and any ambitions they might develop.

^Buchanan to Grey 25 June 1914 ibid. no. 556. ^F. Stern, 'Bethmann-Hollweg and the War: the limits of responsibility' in F. Stern and L. Krieger (eds), The Responsibility of Power (New York, 1967) p. 263; Wilson, The Policy of the Entente op. cit. p. 58.

1 PROLOGUE TO POLICY-MAKING: Sir Edward Grey and the National Review articles 1901-2

In November 1901 the monthly National Review, edited by Leo Maxse, published an article entitled 'British Foreign Policy'. The authorship was concealed by the employment of the device 'A.B.C. ETC.'. Maxse followed this up in the December issue with another article over the same device, entitled 'Some Consequences of an Anglo-Russian Understanding'. The thrust of both articles was that it would be worthwhile for England and Russia to discuss their differences 'with the object of arriving at a working understanding, and, if possible, a comprehensive settlement'. 1 In draft, the title of the first article had been 'The Future British Policy'. 2 The draft was sent, for comment, to Lord Rosebery, former Liberal Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, to George Saunders, the Berlin correspondent of The Times, to Sir Charles Hardinge of the British Embassy in St. Petersburg, to William Tyrrell, private secretary to the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, to Edward Cook, editor of the Daily News, and to Sir Edward Grey, who had been Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from August 1892 to June 1895 and who remained a great admirer of his former Chief, Rosebery.3 Grey, whose subsequent Foreign Secretaryship was to include the diplomatic landmark of the Anglo-Russian Conventions of August 1907, commented at some length on Maxse's draft. These comments have not been picked up by either of his main biographers, G.M. Trevelyan and Keith Robbins, not did Grey mention this episode in his autobiography. 4 Writings on Maxse and the National Review have likewise not appreciated their importance, although a letter from Grey commenting on another article, published in January 1902, has been quoted in 1

National Review xxxviii no. 225 (November 1901) p. 351. Saunders to Maxse 14 October 1901, Maxse MSS 448. o J.A.Hutcheson, Leopold Maxse and the National Review 1893-1914: Right-Wing Politics and Journalism in the Edwardian Era (New York, 1989) p. 134. M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon (London, 1937); K. Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, a biography (London, 1971); Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916 (London, 1925). 2

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part. 1 Grey's comments are printed here in full for the first time because of what they add to the picture of the world-view that Grey was developing at the time, a world-view which, in due course, he was in a position to translate into policy. The only document that might rival his comments in importance is Grey's twelve page letter of 3 November 1911 to his cabinet colleague John Morley in defence of his policy thus far as Foreign Secretary, a document which may still exist, despite the instruction in Morley's will that all his correspondence should be destroyed.2 Grey's comments on the draft of Maxse's first article (Appendix A below) are not capable of being related directly to the text of the draft, because no copy of the latter has been found. All copies were no doubt returned to Maxse, who appears not to have retained any amongst his own papers. It is clear, however, that the article as published in November 1901 was substantially different from the draft. Grey's notes show, for instance, that the draft included a ten point agreement with Russia, and secret articles to that agreement; in the published version the secret articles have been dropped, as Grey advised, and the bases of agreement with Russia have been condensed into three broad sections relating to the Near East, Persia and Central Asia, and the Far East. Grey may therefore be considered one of the authors something which the German Embassy in London, which made extensive enquiries about the authorship of this article and its successor, never suspected. 3 Appendix B here is a letter from Grey to Maxse commenting on a proof of the first article. Appendix C is a letter from Grey to Maxse to do with the draft of another article, entitled 'A Plea for the Isolation of Germany', which was published in the January 1902 issue of the National Review,4 Shortly after the appearance of this article Grey spoke in the House of Commons on a motion raised by Joseph Walton M.P. in response to what the latter described as 'a succession of articles of a most astonishing character which had appeared recently in British reviews and newspapers'. Without mentioning the National Review by name or disclosing the extent to which Maxse's solicitation of his comments had prompted him to formulate and further define his own views, Grey made it clear to the House that he regarded the policy of perpetual resistance to Russian expansion everywhere in Asia as ' Hutcheson op. cit. pp. 134-5; A. J. A. Morris, 'Leo Maxse and the "German Peril": Scaremonger, Crank, or Patriot?' Moirae vol.4 (1979) 8-31; A. J. A. Morris, The Scaremongers: the advocacy of War and Re-armament 1896-1914 (London, 1984) pp. 37-46. 2 Morley to Burns 14 June 1916, Burns MSS B. L. Add. MSS 46283 f. 734. ^Metternich to Bulow 14 November, 3 December 1901, in J. Lepsius, A. MendelssohnBartholdy, F.Thimme (eds), Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914 (Berlin, 1922-27) xvii nos 5345, 5346. 4 National Review xxxviii no.227 pp. 703-715.

PROLOGUE

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25

'undesirable', that he regarded as 'desirable...very desirable' and as a policy which he wished to see put to the test 'that of an understanding between the two Governments which would result in a fair and frank interchange of views and adjustment of interests in Asia', and that he regarded as 'intolerable' a policy of 'drift'. 1 Appendix A (Maxse mss 448) Fallodon Chathill Northumberland Oct 9 1901 Dear Maxse, My notes will not repay you in kind for the interest I have had in reading the article, but such as they are I send them. I might add that I am glad you have put in a word about France towards the end. The French are one of the very few nations, if not the only one, which will make sacrifices & run risks for the sake of a friend & which is capable of sentimental attachment; it is a pity that the suspicion of instability always attaches to them. Yours sincerely, E. Grey enclosure 1.

2.

No doubt this is the explanation of von Biilow's utterances, but I gather that it is the Agrarian class, which is the most Anglophobe i.e. the class which does not suffer from British Commercial competition; and of all sections of Germans the trading classes (our competitors) are least hostile to us. This is borne out by the fact that it is precisely when von Btilow is most anxious to throw a fly over the Agrarians that his tone is most stiff with regard to us. When the telegram [to Kriiger, President of the Transvaal, in January 1896] was sent Germany was & had been for some years very officious about Delagoa Bay & kindred questions. Her change of attitude is attributed to the agreement, which has since been made with her & which is supposed to cover future contingencies respecting Portuguese possessions in Africa, though we do not

^Hansard 4th Series ci, cols 608-613, 22 January 1902.

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know the provisions of it. This agreement may have been on her part the result of disappointment at the attitude of France and Russia, when she sent her telegram, but I am inclined to think that Germany had been playing for some such agreement all along & not for an alliance against us, of which she could not foresee the end & which might open large questions elsewhere than in S. Africa, which Germany did not desire to raise. If so von Bulow's words were merely a debating retort upon France & Russia. What she may play for when she has her Navy is a different matter. 3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

I did not know of this; if true it was a most mismanaged business; the thing should have been discussed either at the F[oreign] Offfice] with the Russian Ambassador, or at St. Petersburg with the Russian Foreign Minister. This is the thin ice of the article & you skate very lightly over it, but you can't do otherwise. We may acquiesce in any settlement, which Russia and Japan make, but it will be very difficult for us to play the honest broker or intervene to compose their differences without mortally offending one of them. I should omit that; we might have to protect our trade rights in China proper or even a friendly Yangtze Viceroy by interference & pressure at Pekin. If Russia raised the point I think her interests at Pekin should be regarded as covered by article 2 of your agreement. You might, if 8 was omitted, tack 9 on to 7 as one article. I don't think the secret articles are worth having. All that is valuable in them to us would come as the result of the main Agreement; if it did not come in that way the secret agreement would not guarantee it in a crisis. And if our diplomacy is wise, it is just the fear of having Russia on her back, that will prevent Germany from quarrelling with us. If Russia is bound to be neutral in a war between us & Germany, you remove this fear from Germany. Article 4 is the thin ice again. If Russia pressed for this I should agree that articles 6 and 10 of the main agreement ought to content her & Japan. Suppose the Japanese got wind of Article 4 as they probably would!

I have made these notes as I read & put a number on the margin of the typescript to refer to them. Don't take them as committing me to anything except a great interest in the article. But I should say by all means have the article published; it is most interesting & must do good. I long to see an effort made to lift the cloud of suspicion which hangs over us & Russia, &

PROLOGUE

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27

defeat the German policy of keeping her opposed to us. There are difficulties, but it is the thing to be striven for & I do not believe a real effort has yet been made on our part. [Lord] Salisbury's "obiter dicta" & tentative & intermittent diplomacy hardly count. We get precious little except armed neutrality from Germany anyhow, and it is an axiom of the European situation that in a row between us & Russia we should get nothing from Germany. The idea, in face of the Franco-Russian alliance, of supporting ourselves against either Russia or France by an alliance with Germany is rotten but the German Emperor is very clever & got Chamberlain to entertain it apparently. Meanwhile, your article will do something to remove Russian suspicion. The main difficulty with Russia is, I suspect, not her bad will, but her lack of ability at the head - not her policy, but her want of policy.

Appendix B (Maxse mss 448) Fallodon Chathill Northumberland Oct. 22 1901 Private Dear Maxse, This all seems to hang together & work out & I have no further comments to make. I think it is a most valuable article & I hope it will attract as much attention as possible. It ought to stir people to think. We have lost the habit of thinking to any purpose about foreign affairs. I may be wronging men, who are responsible, & who therefore have to be reticent about their purposes, but it seems to me that Lord Salisbury, who thinks deeply, does so without purpose, and Chamberlain, who is full of purpose, doesn't think deep. They would be a formidable combination, but they don't combine, & so we suffer from the defects of both; and Lord Salisbury is too old for any change to be hoped for. The Opposition is of course still impossible and my only hope for the immediate future is to see the present Govt, resign and an entirely new one formed out of the best elements to be found on the present Treasury benches & behind them - but so re-formed as to be really a new Government.

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Yours sincerely E. Grey Appendix C (Maxse mss 448) Fallodon Chathill Northumberland Nov. 24 1901 My dear Maxse, Private I did not get home till late yesterday evening & I found this proof here - 1 didn't get one at Raith. The criticism, which will I think be made upon it, is that the anti-German bias is too apparent. Such a bias is the natural outcome of the violent attacks made upon us in Germany and I do not see why it should not find expression in organs of public opinion here, but it is more than any British Government or Opposition could yet admit. The first practical point is to establish confidence & direct relations with Russia & to eliminate in that quarter the German broker, who keeps England & Russia apart and levies a constant commission upon us, while preventing us from doing any business with Russia. But this will have to be done quietly and cautiously. Our weakest point used to be Egypt. Some years ago Lord Cromer could not have got along there unless the dead weight of the Triple Alliance had been on the side of keeping things quiet. I do not know now what the effect would be, if the German Government turned the screw against us in Egypt; and to provoke them to do so while France & Russia were not firm friends might be very awkward. On this point however no one's opinion can be given without consulting Lord Cromer. The paragraph about the effect in Italy may seem rather bold, but now that France has got Tunis outright & fortified Bizerta and Italian ambitions in Africa have contracted I do not see anything impossible in it. The article contemplates of course the complete break up of the Triple Alliance - we were never a party to it, but we used to count upon it to a certain extent, and before we abandon old ground we shall have to make sure of the firmness of the new ground. The upshot of which is, that so long as your articles are understood to be the expression of purely independent opinion, they should tend to create a situation of which a British Prime Minister & Foreign Minister might make a good deal; but I should not be

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29

surprised, if they found it necessary to repudiate some of the views expressed about Germany & by inference the Triple Alliance. I expect the plea of the German Government is that, though public opinion forces them to be rough & uncivil in the Reichstag & though they drive hard bargains where they have direct interests, yet where we are interested, as in Egypt, they have given us quiet backing or not molested us. There is some truth in this, but it is a position, which was never comfortable for us & is becoming daily less comfortable & secure; the business of the British Govt, is to bring about a better one & the first step is an understanding with Russia. Yours sincerely E. Grey I haven't written this for the purpose of suggesting any alterations in the article; I don't think you could do that without impairing its effect; the effect of the first one has evidently been very good, and if the second gets the ear of France it will add to it. E.G.

2 FOUND AND LOST IN TRANSLATION: Bertie, Cambon, Lansdowne, Delcasse and the AngloFrench 'alliance' of May 1905

In two despatches of 12 June 1905 the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir F. Lascelles, reported claims made to him by the German Chancellor, Count von Biilow, and by an official of the German Foreign Office, Herr von Holstein, that shortly before the departure of Delcasse as French Foreign Minister the British Government had offered to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with France against Germany. King Edward VII, of whom more later, was astounded at these claims: 'How badly informed he is!', he minuted against Biilow's remarks; 'This is nearly as absurd as it is false', he minuted against Holstein's contentions.1 The Foreign Office in London was also taken aback. The Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Thomas Sanderson, sought out a record made on 17 May of an interview between the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, and the French ambassador, Paul Cambon, and marked what he described as 'the passage as to mutual confidence'. Lansdowne then added, 'I suppose this was the origin of the offensive and defensive alliance'. The passage in question read as follows: I (Lansdowne) observed that the moral of all these incidents seemed to me to be that our two Governments should continue to treat one another with the utmost confidence, should keep one another fully informed of everything which came to their knowledge, and should, so far as possible, discuss in advance any contingencies by which they might in the course of events find themselves confronted. As an instance of our readiness to enter into such timely discussions, I reminded (Cambon) of the communication which had recently been made to the French Government by you [Sir F. Bertie] at a moment when an idea prevailed that Germany might be on the point of demanding the cession of a Moorish port.^

^Lascelles to Lansdowne 12 June 1905 nos 160, 161, and minutes by Edward VII, G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London 1926-38) iii, nos 97,98. ^Lansdowne to Bertie 17 May 1905, and minutes by Sanderson and Lansdowne, ibid. no. 94; Lansdowne to Lascelles 16 June 1905: 'With regard to the alleged offensive and defensive alliance, the offer of which was cited as a proof of our unfriendliness, I could scarcely believe that the assertion was seriously made, or that the story was worth contradicting. If, however, His Excellency thought that a contradiction from me would serve a useful purpose, I was glad to assure him that no offensive and defensive alliance had ever been offered or even discussed on either side.' Ibid. no. 99.

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At his final appearance as French Foreign Minister, at the Cabinet held on 6 June 1905, Del cassé had been quite categorical: according to Chaumié, the minister for Justice, 1 11 fait connaître que l'Angleterre a fait des ouvertures en vue d'une action commune avec la France contre l'Allemagne. Ces ouvertures ne se sont pas bornées à de simples pourparlers. Des notes écrites ont déjà été échangées. ' Delcassé read out to the French Cabinet the text of the latest of these notes which, he claimed, 'dit très nettement l'offre par l'Angleterre de cette action commune'} *

The departure of Delcassé from an office which he had occupied for seven years, since June 1898, was dramatic in the extreme. It has been described in the mémoires of his contemporaries - most particularly those of Maurice Paléologue, his special assistant for what were described as 'les affaires réservées'2 - and in secondary works, most particularly Christopher Andrew's Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale (London, 1968). Explanations for Delcassé's apparent confidence in the assertions he made on 6 June have encompassed such items as an inspection of the Franco-Belgian frontier by Major-General Grierson, the British Director of Military Operations, in March 19053; and conversations between King Edward VII and Delcassé in Paris between 29 April and 4 May 1905.4 What the explanations in the secondary literature have not thoroughly encompassed, despite a heavy hint dropped in an appendix to Keith Eubank's study of Cambon 5 , is the dimension of the actual language employed in the exchanges that took place between Lansdowne and Delcassé through the intermediaries of their respective ambassadors Sir F. Bertie and Paul Cambon, from the third week of April to the first week of June 1905. Not even Keith Hamilton, in his Bertie of Thame: Edwardian Ambassador (London, 1990), has explored as fully as it might be explored the question of what, on the British part, might have been lost, and what, on the French part, might have been found, in translation. *

' note by Chaumié 6 June 1905, Documents Diplomatiques Français, 2 nd Series vi, Annex I, p. 602. 2 M.Paléologue, Un Grand Tournant de la Politique Mondiale 1904-1906 (Paris, 1934). 3 C. Andrew p. 284. 4 ibid. p. 281. 5 K . Eubank, Paul Cambon, master diplomatist (Westport, 1960) Appendix B 'Cambon's Inability to Speak English' p. 209.

IN

TRANSLATION

33

The trouble, in this particular respect, started with a telegram sent by Lansdowne to Bertie late on 23 April. Earlier that day Lansdowne had telegraphed to the Prime Minister, A.J. Balfour: 'Germany may press France for a port on Moroccan coast. Admiralty think this fatal. May I advise French Govt, not to accede without giving us full opportunity conferring with them as to manner in which demand might be met.' 1 Lansdowne was in the process of providing the Prime Minister with the background to this request, including his feeling that many Frenchmen thought Delcassé had blundered and that France would have to 'atone' in some way, and that the cession of a Moroccan port was 'at least a conceivable form of atonement', when Balfour presented himself in person to the Foreign Secretary. 2 The wording of tel. no. 61 to Bertie, sent at 11.25 p.m. on that day, was clearly agreed between Lansdowne and Balfour. It read: It seems not unlikely that German Government may ask for a port on the Moorish coast. You are authorised to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that we should be prepared to join French Government in offering strong opposition to such a proposal and to beg that if question is raised French Government will afford us a full opportunity of conferring with them as to steps which might be taken in order to meet it. German attitude in this dispute seems to me most unreasonable having regard to M. Delcassé's attitude and we desire to give him all the support we can.-'

On 24 April Bertie translated this into French as an aide-memoire for Delcassé, to whom he handed it on the 25 . So far as the second half of the middle paragraph is concerned, Bertie's first draft had ...prier M. Delcassé dans le cas où la question surgirait, de donner au Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique toute occasion de conférer avec le Gouvernement français les mesures qui pourrait être prises pour aller à l'encontre de cette demande...'-, his second draft substituted discuter for conférer. His final version eliminated both conférer and discuter and adopted the word concerter,4 Having handed over what has long been recognised as a highly questionable representation of Lansdowne's instruction5, Bertie immediately 1

Lansdowne to Balfour 23 April 1905, Balfour MSS Add.MSS 49729. ibid. ^As printed in BD iii no.90 this is given the date of 22 April. The true date follows from the telegram and letter of Lansdowne to Balfour, given above, and on K. Hamilton's finding, in F027/3708, of a paraphrase, dated 23 April (tel.61P) which was sent separately to enable the recipient to check the correct deciphering of the original: Hamilton p. 80 fn.79. C. Andrew's dating of this telegram to 22 April is therefore twenty-four hours too early. The paraphrase of tel.no.61 ends: 'If the question [of a Moorish port] is raised we trust French Govt, will give us full opportunity of conferring with them as to steps to be taken in opposition to Germany.' 4 BD iii no.91; DDF 2 nd Series vi no.347. 5 E.N. Anderson, The Moroccan Crisis 1904-1906 (Chicago, 1930) pp. 210-211. 2

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telegraphed to Lansdowne as follows: 'His Excellency (Delcassé) promises to communicate with Y(our) L(ordship) if he receives any information and to consult with H.M. Govt, as to steps to be taken.' 1 Bertie followed up this telegram with a long letter in which the wording of the aide-memoire was correctly translated back into English as 'M. Delcassé would give full opportunity to H.M. Govt, to concert with the French Government...', and followed this passage with a repetition of the wording of his telegram no. 28 which had Delcassé promising to 'consult'. 2 One is inclined to conclude that the damage had already been done by Bertie's aide-memoire and his short telegram of 25 April: Lansdowne would regard the letter of 25 April, which was sent by post, as merely a longer version of information he had already received by telegram. If Lansdowne did read the letter, he certainly did not pick up the fact that the language had been changed, or that there was a considerable difference, in French, between 'discuss/confer' and 'concert'. The damage at the French end lay in that Delcassé had received, on paper, a communication from the British Foreign Secretary from which he felt able to draw extreme conclusions. He told Paléologue, immediately upon the latter's return on 26 April from a visit to Berlin: 'L'Angleterre me soutient à fond; elle aussi, elle irait jusqu'à la guerre [...] je vous répète, l'Angleterre nous soutiendrait à fond, et elle ne signerait pas la paix sans nous} That he was relying on the communication delivered by Bertie was made evident on the following day, 27 April, when according to Paléologue, ' Delcassé me montre ensuite la note que Sir Francis Bertie lui a remise, le 25 avril, et par laquelle le gouvernement britannique, estimant "déraisonnable" la politique de l'Allemagne, promet au gouvernement français son ferme appui'.4 So far as Barrère, the ambassador to Rome and of the same persuasion with regard to policy as Cambon and Paléologue, was concerned, Great Britain was prepared 'd'aller jusqu'au bout'}

1 Bertie to Lansdowne no.28, 25 April 1905, BD iii no. 92. My italics. ^Bertie to Lansdowne 25 April 1905, ibid. no. 93. ^Paléologue pp. 307-8. Paléologue had left Paris for Berlin late on 22 April, and had announced to Bihourd, the ambassador there, on his arrival, that '/e gouvernement britannique nous a déclaré nettement que le succès de l'Allemagne, dans la crise actuelle, n'équivaudrait à rien de moins qu'à la consécration de son hégémonie, et il est résolu à s'y opposer', ibid. p. 303. C. Andrew (p. 286) attributes these sentiments to Bertie, who visited Delcassé on 22 April, but admits there is no hard evidence for this, as the Bertie-Delcassé meeting was not recorded by either man.lt was (see Bertie to Lansdowne 22 April 1905, Bertie MSS, F0800/164); but Bertie's record contains nothing to back up Paléologue's words to Bihourd. The reference Andrew gives from the end of June about pressure on Rouvier from Bertie (Die Grosse Politik xx no.6752) is not convincing in itself, and can hardly be used retrospectively. See also Hamilton pp. 76-77. ^Paléologue p. 310. 5 Barrère to Delcassé 30 April 1905, Delcassé MSS 14.

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At this point, or to be precise on 29 April, King Edward VII arrived in Paris. A dinner was held in his honour at the Elysée Palace on 30 April. Delcassé took advantage of the occasion of the visit to hold long conversations with the King on two successive days. Although according to Paléologue Delcassé said he was 'très satisfait' with what the King said to him, Paléologue nevertheless recorded that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was 'singulièrement sobre sur la nature et le détail de ces déclarations', and drew the conclusion that King Edward had recommended above all that France seek détente with Germany.1 Lansdowne had an opportunity to repair some of the damage when he had an interview with Paul Cambon on 3 May. He did not take this opportunity. Only in the final few lines of Lansdowne's record of this interview was any reference made to preceding assurances, when Lansdowne recorded that Cambon expressed great satisfaction at the 'intimation' made by Bertie to Delcassé in compliance with the instructions contained in Lansdowne's tel. no. 61 of 23 April. By contrast, Cambon's account for Delcassé of this interview gives pride of place to this, beginning with a reference to Bertie's aide-memoire on Lansdowne's part, and then going on to record Delcassé's appreciation of the communication, and to remind Lansdowne of lla volonté du Gouvernement britannique de se joindre à nous pour s'opposer fortement à une demande de concession de port sur l'Atlantique et sur son intention de se concerter avec le Gouvernement français pour les mesures à prendre '. 2 Although Lansdowne revealed on this occasion that the communication of 23 April had been approved by Balfour, he simply did not register the force of lse concerter'. A week later, on 10 May, Delcassé had a long interview with the French senator Jean Dupuy. Delcassé insisted that it was essential for France to resist German intimidation: ' - sinon l'Angleterre nous abandonnera ainsi que l'Italie - l'Allemagne ne fera rien, mais s'il y a guerre, nous aurons l'Angleterre avec nous,'3 He referred Dupuy to Cambon's despatch of 8 May, which addressed the repercussions of not standing up to Germany: À Londres on n'y a rien compris et si par malheur nous nous laissons aller à de fâcheux abandons, nous donnerions l'impression de gens trop peu sûrs pour pouvoir être fréquentés. L'Entente Cordiale succomberait à une pareille épreuve, l'Italie, virtuellement détachée de l'Allemagne, se hâterait de revenir à un allié paré d'un nouveau prestige, l'Espagne ne manquerait pas de nous témoigner son dédain et la Russie elle-même écouterait 1 Paléologue p. 315. ^Lansdowne to Bertie 3 May 1905, BD iii no. 86; Cambon to Delcassé 3 May 1905, DDF 2 nd Series vi no.390. 3 DDF 2 nd Series viii p. 557.

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p r o b a b l e m e n t l e s i n s i d i e u s e s p r o p o s i t i o n s d e s e s v o i s i n s de l ' E s t . Il importe plus que jamais de conserver une certaine tenue devant le m o n d e qui nous regarde.

Despite his assertion that 'nous avons l'Angleterre avec nous', Delcassé felt insecure enough to instruct Cambon, on 12 May, to ask Lansdowne, 'catégoriquement', the following question: Si l ' A l l e m a g n e , invoquant le prétexte d e l'affaire marocaine, attaque la France, p o u v o n s - n o u s compter que l'Angleterre nous appuiera de toutes ses forces

This instruction was not acted upon immediately. For on the morning of 15 May Delcassé, together with Cambon and Barrère, met with the Premier, Rouvier, and the President, Loubet, at the Élysée. At this meeting it was Cambon who brought up the communication from Lansdowne of 24 April, which he, and Barrère, and Georges Louis (Political Director at the Quai d'Orsay) and to some extent Paléologue 3 , all regarded as '/a carte anglais'.4 Although Rouvier expressed himself as being categorically opposed to the opening of Anglo-French negotiations on the grounds that if the Germans found out they would attack immediately 5 , Delcassé, feeling perhaps that he had not yet got quite enough in writing, proceeded to pursue the playing of his English card. Accordingly, Cambon returned to London and went to see Lansdowne on 17 May. *

The trouble, in respect of language and understanding, escalated even further from this point. According to Cambon, he had no need to raise matters to do with Anglo-French relations, because Lansdowne took the initiative by himself recalling the aide-memoire of 24 April, and saying, 'Nous vous avons promis notre appui au Maroc, et nous vous avons offert de nous concerter avec vous sur les mesures à prendre pour empêcher le

1 Cambon to Delcassé 8 May 1905, ibid.vi no.416 p. 493. The attitude displayed here by Cambon bears a remarkable resemblance to that displayed by Sir Edward Grey in his memo of 20 February 1906: BD iii no. 299. ^Paléologue p. 325. 3 A t lunch the same day with Barrère and Louis, Paléologue had noted that Lansdowne had sounded out (a presenti) Cambon 'sur la conclusion d'une entente générale entre la GrandeBretagne et la France pour parer à toutes les éventualités'. Ibid.p. 327. 4 lhid. p. 319; Eubank pp. 99-100; Barrère, 'La Chute de Delcassé' , Revue des Deux Mondes, 1 August 1932, pp. 614-17; P. Cambon to H. Cambon 13 May 1905, Paul Cambon: Correspondance 1870-1924 (Paris 1940) ii.194. ^Paléologue pp. 327-8.

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37

Gouvernement allemande de s'établir sur les côtes marocaines'. Again according to Cambon, Lansdowne went on to make a spontaneous proposition - 'dès à présent le Gouvernement britannique est tout prêt à s'entendre avec le Gouvernement français sur les mesures à prendre si la situation devenait inquiétante'. Cambon, according to Cambon, replied that it was dangerous to concert measures that might increase rather than decrease the excitement, but asked if he could write to Delcassé that if circumstances demanded, if for example France had serious reasons to believe in an unjustified aggression, the British Government would be ' tout prêt à se concerter avec le Gouvernement français sur les mesures à prendre'. According to Cambon, Lansdowne then said, ' Vous le pouvez, nous sommes tout prêts'} Lansdowne's account of this interview is far less full. The relevant passage, in which the emphasis is on 'discuss(ing) in advance any contingencies', on 'readiness to enter into such timely discussions', has already been quoted at footnote 2 on p. 31. Lansdowne's account completely omits any reference to his response to Cambon's suggestion that he (Cambon) write to Delcassé to confirm Lansdowne's readiness là se concerter'. Yet that Lansdowne did say something that could have been understood in this way is indubitably the case. For, otherwise, Cambon would have risked the most extreme of rebuffs in providing Lansdowne, as he did on 24 May, with a text of the 'déclaration importante' that he understood Lansdowne to have added on 17 May to the aide-memoire of 24 April.2 Between Cambon's reporting of the interview of 17 May to Delcassé on the 18 , and the step taken by Cambon on the 24 , a whole week elapsed. During this period, on 20 May, Paléologue pumped the marquise de Breteuil, an old friend of King Edward and a guest during the recent State visit, as to what exactly had been the sentiments of the King on that occasion. Paléologue put to Breteuil what he gathered was Delcassé's impression of what the King had said: 'M. Delcassé me paraît avoir emporté de sa conversation avec Edouard VII la certitude que, dans ce cas, toutes les forces britanniques viendraient à notre secours'-, Breteuil replied that he could hardly believe that the King would use language that only his ministers had the right to employ - 'Je l'ai toujours vu très soucieux de ne pas excéder son rôle constitutionnel'?1 It may very well be that Breteuil's cageyness about King Edward led to the realisation that Delcassé did not, even at this stage, have quite enough in writing from the British side with which to overcome the opposition from within the French Cabinet that he knew he would 1 Cambon to Delcassé 18 May 1905, DDF 2 nd Series vi no.443, pp. 522-3. Cambon to Delcassé 25 May 1905 and Annex (Cambon to Lansdowne 24 May), •^Paléologue pp. 329-330. 2

ibid.no.455.

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encounter. Confirmation, in terms, of what Cambon had attributed to Lansdowne on 17 May would fill this gap. It was on receipt of Cambon's letter of 24 May that Lansdowne began to realise that matters might be getting out of hand. His response, however, was to play into the hands of those eager to play 7 a carte anglaise'. Lansdowne's reply, dated 25 May, is worth quoting at length, because this is the document which Delcasse read to the French Cabinet on 6 June. 1 After referring to the attitude adopted by the German Government both as regards Morocco and other parts of the world, Lansdowne stated: I observed that the moral of all these incidents seemed to be that the French and British Govts should continue to treat one another with the most absolute confidence, that we should keep one another fully informed of everything which came to our knowledge, and so far as possible discuss any contingencies by which we might in the course of events find ourselves confronted, and I cited as showing our readiness to enter into such timely discussion the communication recently made to the French Govt, by Sir F. Bertie at a moment when the idea prevailed that Germany might be about to put pressure on France in order to obtain the cession of a Moorish port.

Manifesting a misunderstanding of his own, for Cambon had not called for discussions 'in consequence of some acts of unprovoked aggression' but rather for discussions should France have serious reason to believe there might be acts of aggression, Lansdowne ended: I do not know that this account differs from that which you have given to M. Delcasse, but I am not sure that I succeeded in making quite clear to you our desire that there should be full and confidential discussion between the two Govts, not so much in consequence of some acts of unprovoked aggression on the part of another Power, as in anticipation of any complications to be apprehended during the somewhat anxious period through which we are at present passing. 2

On 29 May Cambon sent Delcasse a copy of this, together with a translation. Cambon's translation was accurate in every detail. It had 'discuter par avance' and 'se livrer a une discussion'. Nevertheless, in his covering despatch, Cambon revealed that he had completely missed the main thrust of Lansdowne's words. What was on Lansdowne's part an effort to retrieve the situation, or at least to hold the line, was interpreted by Cambon as a great step forward along the path to a full-blown alliance. The misinterpretation resulted from Cambon's seizing on the inclusive nature ('any complications') of the final paragraph and, ironically, on the stress on talks 'in anticipation'. l

DDF 2nd Series vi p. 602.

2

£ D iii no. 95. My italics.

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He maintained that on 17 May Lansdowne had confined himself to proposing to concert only in the case where France had 'sérieuses raisons d'appréhender une aggression injustifiée'. Now, he thought, Lansdowne was going beyond that: lCe n'est plus à une entente en cas d'agression qu'il nous convie, c'est à une discussion immédiate et à un examen de la situation générale'} Delcassé had got what he wanted, and Cambon rather more, by his own interpretation at least, than he had expected. Ignoring Cambon's cautionary words as regards the unwillingness of the French Government as a whole to take things further, Delcassé ordered Paléologue to prepare a detailed note on He grave problème que pose, devant nous, l'initiative de Lord Lansdowne', for use in conversations with Rouvier and Loubet.2 A further private letter from Cambon, which arrived on 3 June and reminded Delcassé of Rouvier's final statement on 15 May, 'Surtout ne vous concertez pas', was also ignored, despite Paléologue's inclusion of it in the dossier he was compiling.3 *

Ironies abound in this episode in Anglo-French relations. Not least of these is that the document read out by Delcassé to the French Cabinet on 6 June, as one of the 'written notes that had already been exchanged', was the only one not to contain 'concerter', 'se concerter' , or 's'entendre', words which had done much damage already but which would certainly have strengthened his case, which he did not help by stating at one point that in London there were only three individuals who were in the know - the King, Balfour, and Lansdowne. 4 Other ironies were that Cambon, whose misunderstandings had done so much to advance Delcassé's confrontational cause, was, at least from 24 May, trying to restrain him; and that Bertie, whose choice of words on 24 April had set the ball rolling, was not kept in the picture after 17 May. The irony of ironies here, however, was that what Lansdowne was most at pains to secure, throughout, was not an alliance with France but that the French Government should not make terms with Germany which would be at variance with, or damage, extra-European British interests. The first form of French 'atonement' that Lansdowne conceived of was her

1 Cambon to Dclcasse 29 May 1905, DDF 2 nd Series vi, no. 465. Paleologue p. 342, 31 May 1905. 3 Ibid. p. 346; Cambon to Delcasse 1 June 1905, DDF 2 nd Series vi no. 480. 4 Paleologuc p. 352. This was, of course, one of the reasons why Delcasse could not put his case to the French Chamber, as some urged him to do. 2

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cession to Germany of a Moroccan port 1 , but he went on to conceive of other possible concessions on the part of France. This, from the beginning, is what lay behind his advice to Balfour that the French be told 'not to accede without giving us full opportunity of conferring with them' 2 , and his insistence that the French and British governments keep each other fully informed of any new developments. 3 This insistence was even stronger by mid-May than it had been in the last week of April. It was encoded in the final paragraph of Lansdowne's account of the interview of 17 May, but was lost on Cambon, who completely missed this, the main point. 4 For when Lansdowne said 'I had myself no such misgivings (that the French Government might be induced to purchase the acquiescence of Germany by concessions of a kind which we were not likely to regard with favour, in other parts of the world) and felt convinced that each side might continue to rely upon being treated with absolute frankness by the other' 5 , he meant exactly the opposite. This consideration, and Lansdowne's insistence, were further reinforced in his reply of 25 May on receipt of Cambon's version of what he had said on 17 May. This distinctly unflattering reading of the French was fostered to some extent by Bertie, and even more so by Lansdowne's Private Secretary, Mallet. Bertie wrote to Lansdowne on 1 May, for instance, 'If there are any points in Africa other than Morocco and Egypt where France might throw bones to the German watchdog to gnaw to our detriment you ought to indicate to Cambon I think what concessions which we know the Germans want we should particularly object to. Otherwise we may discover too late for remedy that our interests have been sacrificed.' 6 Two days earlier Cambon had mentioned to Bertie that there were 'contiguous frontiers between France and Germany in Africa where compensation might have been found for Germany'. 7 Mallet, on 16 May, was writing of his belief that 'the last thing the Frenchman thinks of is resisting the German demands'. 8 'see above fn. 2. p. 33. s e e above fn.l. p. 33. 3 Lansdowne to Bertie 3 May 1905, BD iii no. 86 p. 70. 4And not for the first, or the last, time. Hamilton provides an example from January 1905: p. 86 fn.107. In August 1911 Cambon was to misconstrue what Grey meant by 'Nothing should therefore be done at Agadir without being prepared for this possible reply [a mobilisation of the German army on the French frontier]...without being agreed beforehand as to what should be done if it happened'. This, an attempt by Grey to hold France back by reminding her of the dire consequences of certain actions, was taken by Cambon as Grey speaking of Great Britain 'as if, like Russia, she was allied to France; there is no doubt that H.M. Govt, would not throw off its obligation to us'. Grey to Bertie 16 August 1911, BD vii no.475; Cambon to Selves 16 August 2

1911, DDF 2 nd Series xiv no.184. ^Lansdowne to Bertie 17 May 1905, BD iii no. 94. 6 Bertie to Lansdowne 1 May 1905 Bertie MSS F0800/170. 7 Bertie to Lansdowne 30 April 1905, Bertie MSS Add.MSS 63017. ^Mallet to Spring-Rice 16 May 1905, Spring-Rice MSS 1/49.

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If one has to deal - and in diplomatic circles one does have to deal with people who mean the opposite of what they say to their opposite numbers, and say the opposite of what they mean, then perhaps accuracy in translation should be accorded a lower premium than it might otherwise have. Perhaps, if that is the case, Bertie should be forgiven for translating 'confer' into ' concerter', Lansdowne should be forgiven for not picking up the change in wording on one of the several occasions that were available to him, Cambon should be forgiven for missing the point, despite its repetition, and for adhering to his misinterpretation throughout the decade 1 , and Delcasse should be forgiven for not ascertaining in direct personal contact with Lansdowne that the words and sentiments attributed to him and the British government by Cambon had been properly understood. After all, the stakes were high. Either way, it all makes for something in the nature of a cautionary tale.

As Asquith put it as late as October 1912, when Cambon was still adhering to his version of these events, 'I am not sure that he and Lansdowne were quite ad idem, in their correspondence in May 1905'. Asquith to Grey 11 October 1912, BD x (ii) no. 412.

3 THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE OF 1905 AND THE DEFENDING OF INDIA: the case of the worst-case scenario

On Wednesday 29 May 1907 a conference opened at the offices of the Committee of Imperial Defence in London between representatives of the British and Japanese General Staffs. This conference, convened all of twentytwo months after the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of August 1905, was to concern itself with the subject-matter of Article VII, which ran as follows: The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully upon all questions of mutual interest. *

What transpired has, of course, been treated by Ian Nish in his pioneering and magisterial work on Anglo-Japanese relations between 1894 and 1907. In his chapter on the results of the alliance of 1905 there is a small sub-section dealing with military and naval aspects. 2 Amongst the conclusions he reached is that the conference witnessed a volte-face on the part of the British as regards asking the Japanese to send troops to co-operate in a campaign on the north-west frontier of India; as he put it, this idea was thrown out 'by a committee of advisers on military matters and, less forcibly, by the new administration in India'. 3 He went on to say that a CID recommendation that it should be ascertained whether the Japanese were prepared to render direct military assistance and whether they would prefer to act from the side of Persia 'was not treated as a formal British demand nor was it communicated to the Japanese in the memorandum of points for discussion'. 4

' g . P . Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London, 1926-38) iv pp. 167-8. I. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: the diplomacy of two Island Empires 1894-1907 (London, 1966) pp. 353-358. ibid. p. 355. ^ibid. p. 356.

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These conclusions, it seems to me, are at variance with the picture presented both by some of the source material available to Professor Nish and by some material not available to him. Points 2 and 3 of the British memorandum of points for discussion with the Japanese read: 2)

3)

The assistance which Japan might be willing to render in India in defence of British territorial rights and special interests should Great Britain be unable for a time to reinforce that country. This latter situation might conceivably arise in the event of European complications or a hostile combination of some other Power or Powers with Russia. How such assistance, if required, could be most usefully rendered, and whether under such circumstances Japan would be prepared to consider the possibility of operating upon the line Karachi-QuettaKandahar.1

The Japanese reply makes it quite clear that the Japanese representatives were given the above document on 29 May, as the conference formally convened. They dealt with the points seriatim: Article 2. For the reasons which are detailed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the original Japanese memorandum it is considered that a despatch of a portion of the Japanese forces to India would endanger the success of Japanese action in the Far East. The same consideration applies in the case of both the contingencies mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2 of the British Memorandum... Article 3. For the reasons stated in the replies to Articles 1 and 2 it is superfluous to consider the possibility of Japan operating on the line Karachi-Quetta-Kandahar...^

Moreover, the instructions of the Government of India, represented at the conference by Lt. General Sir O'Moore Creagh, the newly appointed Military Secretary at the India Office, make it clear that, whilst the Indian authorities preferred to find Japanese troops 'a sphere of action distant from our own and ... one which would not involve their landing in India', and believed these conditions 'would be fulfilled by a Japanese force which landed on the coast of Persia and worked its way northward towards Seistan or Meshed', they were prepared, in extremis, to accept the assistance of Japanese troops in India itself. Their statement of what was from their point of view the worst scenario of all, and their solution to it, was:

^Proposed subjects for discussion by the Military Representatives at the Anglo-Japanese Conference held on 29 May 1907, PRO W 0 1 0 6 / 4 8 f. 267. ^ Reply to the Memorandum of the British representatives handed to the Japanese representatives at the Military Conference 29 May 1907, ibid. ff. 272-4.

THE C A S E OF THE W O R S T - C A S E

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It is admitted that India does not and cannot maintain an army sufficiently numerous to defend her for more than a limited period against Russian aggression without reinforcement from England and if Russia should have the aid of other Powers in a war against England and Japan it is conceivable that the protection of her interests elsewhere might render it impossible for England, or even for the Colonies, to send us the help we should eventually require. In such circumstances, notwithstanding all the grave and undoubted drawbacks to such a course, it might become absolutely necessary to accept from Japan the local assistance that could not be obtained from elsewhere. In that case it would be necessary that the strength of the Japanese forces should be such as would enable them to take over in its entirety the Kandahar line of advance and thus set free the whole Army in India for use on the Kabul line. 1

These were matters of which, as we shall see, O'Moore Creagh was prepared to make an issue in the course of the conference. *

I trust that enough of a prima facie case has been made above to justify a re-examination of the question of what the British and Indian Governments wanted from the Japanese in terms of the implementation of the Alliance of August 1905. The answer will have a bearing not only on the place of that alliance in British and more particularly Liberal foreign policy, but also on the relationship between the Alliance and Anglo-Russian relations and between both of these and various aspects of the defence of India. *

Throughout the negotiation of the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance the Balfour government had made strenuous efforts to get the Japanese to commit themselves to sending a large force to help defend India. As Balfour put it to the King on the day before the presentation to the Japanese ambassador of the first British draft of a treaty, a balance had to be struck between two sets of considerations: On the question of the number of Japanese troops for India - there is a real danger that, if a Radical Government came into power, they would reduce our army below the limits of safety; and this danger will be greatly augmented if they think they can rely on an unlimited supply of men from Japan.

1

Indian Instructions, Simla, May 1907, India Office Library L/MIL/5/711.

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We think it inconsistent with the security or dignity of the Empire that the defence of any part of it should depend mainly on a foreign Power. So we have tried to frame Notes so as to make Japanese assistance in the defence of India bear a fixed relation to our efforts to send adequate forces to the front. 1

The 'Note' referred to stipulated that 'It is agreed that Japan will, in the event of war, provide and maintain a force which shall be equal to the force of British troops from time to time in India up to a limit of ,000' . 2 The Japanese eliminated this from their counterdraft of 23 June, only to see it reinstated in the second British draft of 1 July with only slight alterations.3 The Japanese ambassador pointed out that, if the terms H.M.Government wished to employ were adopted, 'Japan would henceforth be obliged so to organise her military forces in time of peace as to provide in time of war a suitable force for service in India'. Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, insisted that whilst the wording was capable of improvement, the British Government 'attached importance to making it perfectly clear that the military arrangements of Japan would henceforth provide for an expeditionary force available for service in India' . 4 The Japanese Government finally put its foot down in mid-July. General Terauchi, the War Minister, told the British ambassador on 13 July that it would be a waste of strength for Japan to maintain for service in India a force not less than that of the Indian army, and the Japanese ambassador in London was instructed to say that the nature of the assistance given by one party to the other must depend upon 'the character of the conflict', which could not be foreseen - any attempt therefore to define long in advance the extent of that assistance would be unwise, and would hamper rather than strengthen the alliance. 5 At this, Lansdowne conceded the point. In the agreed text of the Treaty of Alliance there was no commitment on the part of Japan to provide a specific number of troops for service in India. Although it was in a slightly different context that Lansdowne told the Japanese ambassador on 9 August 1905 that 'It must of course be clearly understood that it is the actual text of the Agreement which is binding upon the parties' 6 , the principle applied throughout. The fact that the British 1 Balfour to Edward VII 9 June 1905, Balfour MSS B.L. Add. MSS 49685. The point made in Balfour's first paragraph was well stated in H.O. Arnold-Foster's memorandum of 2 June 1905, CAB37/78/102. 2 Draft Treaty, 10 June 1905, BD iv p. 169, col.l Note (B). 3'It is agreed that Japan will, in the event of war, maintain a force available for service in India not less than the force of British troops maintained from time to time in that country.' ibid, fn flO). Lansdowne to MacDonald 1 July 1905, ibid. no. 130 p. 144. 5 MacDonald to Lansdowne 14 July 1905, F.O. 46/673; Lansdowne to MacDonald 14 July 1905 BD iv no. 134. ^Lansdowne to Hayashi 9 August 1905 ibid. p. 163.

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Government had lost this particular round meant that the responsibility for bringing the Japanese up to the mark devolved upon the British and Indian military authorities under the terms of Article VII. *

The first effort to establish what the mark was to be set at was made by the Indian section of the General Staff. On the day the Alliance was signed this group produced a memorandum dealing with the matter under the headings of war with Russia, France, and Germany respectively, and war against Russia combined with one or more Powers. So far as war with Russia was concerned, they recommended (para. 6) that Japan should not be asked to send troops to India, for two reasons: firstly because 'the number of men that can be employed across the north west frontier is limited by the means of transport and supply', secondly because 'to ask for assistance to ward off attack by a single adversary would not be consistent with either our dignity or selfrespect'. On the other hand, so far as concerned war against Russia and one or more of the other Powers, they wrote: 10. In this case the objections urged in paragraph 6 against the employment of Japanese troops in India would not apply to the same extent as in the case of war against Russia alone. Moreover the naval situation might be such as to prevent us from sending reinforcements across the sea within the time they are needed, while it might not interfere with the transport of Japanese troops. Consequently, it might be advantageous to us if Japan would undertake to reinforce the army in India should the situation at sea prove to be as just described, and an understanding that such reinforcements would be sent, if asked for, seems desirable. 1

This memorandum was circulated to members of the Committee of Imperial Defence in November 1905, at the same time that the views of the Admiralty were requested. The Prime Minister, who knew that the Japanese military attaché in India had been making a study of the defence of India 2 , suggested to Sir George Clarke, the Secretary of the CID, that the memorandum should be sent to Lord Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, with a view to eliciting his opinions on negotiations with the Japanese and his representation at any conference that was arranged. Clarke duly sent the memorandum to Kitchener on 17 November.3 Kitchener, who 1

Memorandum by the General Staff 12 August 1905, CAB38/10/79. Clarke to Balfour 17 September 1905 Balfour MSS Add.MSS 49702. The Russians, who searched him as he travelled from Simla to Japan, at first mistook these documents for a Japanese plan for the invasion of India. 3 Clarke to Kitchener 17 November 1905 Kitchener MSS PRO 30/57/34. 2

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had noted at the end of May that under the existing alliance Japan need not move a finger to support England in Central Asia, so long as the assailant was a single Power 1 , replied at some length. Having taken issue with the General Staff's contention that the recent war had shown that it was possible to bring Russia to terms solely by action directed against her in the Far East, on the grounds that Russia had not been able to put forth anything like her real strength against the Japanese, and was likely to put herself in a position to do so by doubling the Siberian railway line (work that some of his informants said had already begun) before tackling Japan again, he commented on the paragraph quoted above: I would point out that even if in the circumstances Japan found herself able to spare for us a considerable force for operations in the MiddleEastern theatre of war, it is doubtful whether, either on military or political grounds, it would be advisable to bring such Japanese contingent to India. During the first months of the war our communications, both by rail and road, would be such as to make it a matter of some difficulty to put and maintain in the field even the nine divisions of the Indian Army. By the time those communications had been sufficiently improved as to render the maintenance of a large force possible our reinforcements from home and from the Colonies would be arriving. Apart, therefore, from reasons of prestige and policy, I am of opinion that there would be serious obstacles to the active employment of a Japanese contingent in or via India. The point that Kitchener either missed, or evaded, here, was that in a war against Russia and another Power, reinforcements, whether from the U.K. or from the Colonies, might be unable to reach India because of the naval situation. Kitchener, however, did conclude as follows: I do not however wish it to be inferred that I would reject the offer of such a contingent. On the contrary I am of opinion that there are, or can be made available, other lines along which a Japanese contingent might be most usefully, and indeed decisively employed. It hardly seems necessary at this stage to go further into detail, but I would desire strongly to urge that, in any discussion and settlement with the Japanese military representatives, such as is alluded to in para. 11 of the General Staff's memorandum the Indian Army Headquarters Staff should be represented, and I will be prepared, when such discussion is imminent to lay before the conference my opinions as to the best methods for mutual cooperation in the field between the Japanese and ourselves.2

's. Gwynn (ed.), The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice (London, 1929) i. 460. 'Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1905', observations by Kitchener on CID Paper 68B of 12 August 1905, WO106/48 ff. 262-4. 2

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Kitchener's observations reached Clarke in January 1906. When he wrote, by way of acknowledgement, 'There seems to be no conflict of view between you and the G[eneral] S[taff]', he advertised the fact that he, on his part, had failed to register the fact that Kitchener had failed to register, or had evaded, the point made by the General Staff.1 *

By this time, Balfour's Conservative and Unionist administration had been replaced by the Liberal Government of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. The new Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had throughout 1905 manifested a positive attitude towards the maintenance of the connection with Japan. Lansdowne's Private Secretary had written to Balfour's Private Secretary in March 1905: 'He (Grey) is strongly in favour of renewing the Japanese Agreement anyhow, but would like the question considered of some arrangement by which the Japanese troops could be called on to assist us if attacked - say in India or Persia.' 2 There is some evidence that Grey was informed of the progress of the negotiations in the summer: his initials are to be found on MacDonald's no. 184 of 14 July 1905, reporting Terauchi's rejection of the idea that Japan should retain in her home islands for service in India a force as large as the British Army in India.3 On 2 October 1905 Grey himself had written to Asquith: If we are to run the risk of having to go to war on behalf of Japan in the Far East, there should be some corresponding risk undertaken by her on behalf of us. To make it quite clear that the alliance is defensive we must renounce any forward designs beyond the Indian frontier and our preexisting obligation to Afghanistan. I have never liked the latter, but it is an old story and we can't back out of it now. 4

On 1 February Grey told the Committee of Imperial Defence that he had been approached by the Japanese Government in regard to the arrangements for concerted naval or military action, arising out of Article VII. The meeting discussed the General Staff memorandum of August 1905, but not Kitchener's observations on it, which Clarke held back on the grounds that he was now dealing with 'new people who must be handled cautiously at

^Clarke to Kitchener 26 January 1906 Kitchener MSS PRO 30/57/34. Mallet to Sandars, March 1905, Sandars MSS, Bodleian Library Eng.Hist.c.749. ^MacDonald to Lansdowne 14 July 1905 F.O. 46/673. Grey might, of course, have seen this after becoming Foreign Secretary. 4 Grey to Asquith 2 October 1905 Asquith MSS vol. 10 f. 149. 2

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first' 1 , and an Admiralty memorandum on the same subject written in November 1905. Although the new Prime Minister, who was in the chair, concurred with the views of the General Staff as expressed in paragraph 6 of their memorandum, dealing with a war against Russia only, that 'we should not ask Japan to send troops to India', the meeting responded to a suggestion from the new Secretary of State for India, John Morley, that the Government of India should be consulted on the general question, and concluded that the Government of India should be asked by cable to express their views on the following questions: a) Is it desirable, from a military and political point of view, that the Japanese Government should be invited to send troops to India in certain eventualities? b) Can the Indian Government furnish a contingent to cooperate with the Japanese forces in the Far East? c) If the answer to (b) is in the affirmative, is the cooperation of Indian troops with the Japanese in the Far East free from political objections?2 Morley's telegram to the new Viceroy, Lord Minto, was not a model of clarity. Item (a) was sent as 'Expediency of ever asking Japan to send troops to India', and to this Minto, presumably drawing on Kitchener's familiarity with memorandum 68B, replied simply: 'The answer was in agreement with the views held by the General Staff'. To item (b), which was so phrased in the telegram that the Indian authorities took it for a repetition of item (a), both Morley and Clarke wanted a reply in the negative.3 Most of the discussion at the CID meeting on 15 February concerned this latter point: the reluctance of all except, as it transpired, Lyttelton, the Chief of the General Staff, to send British troops to cooperate with the Japanese in the Far East. Morley concentrated exclusively on this point in his letter to Minto after this meeting, saying: 'The projected conference at Tokio to settle terms of concerted military and naval operations...rather flags, to this extent at least that there are in fact no military operations to concert, for we have no troops to spare for the Far East...And you and K[itchener] have no desire to spare any of yours, much to my own satisfaction.' The conference at Tokio would become, he thought, 'a great consultation in London, pretty exclusively naval

1 Clarke to Kitchener 26 January 1906 Kitchener MSS PRO 30/57/34. ^Committee of Imperial Defence, 83rd meeting, 15 February 1906, CAB2/2/1. 3 Clarke to Kitchener 8 February 1906 Kitchener MSS PRO 30/57/34; Morley to Minto 9 February 1906 Morley MSS, IOL MSS Eur.D573/l.

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in its character', and Minto would not be asked to send a delegate. Morley did not mention that the CID had arrived at the conclusion that 'Japan should not be asked to send troops to India to cooperate with us in a campaign on the north-west frontier'. Nor did he mention the General Staff's reservation, as Esher did, noting on the day after the meeting: 'The General Staff, while objecting...to the employment of Japanese troops in India, except in the case of an attack by two or more Powers in combination...'. 1 At its 85th meeting on 9 March, the Committee of Imperial Defence formulated two questions, which Morley passed on in due course to Minto: '1. Whether in time of peace the present numbers of the British garrison in India are adequate or excessive. 2. What are the reasonable demands that India should make on Great Britain for military reinforcements during the first year a) of a war with Russia b) of a rising in India'. 2 The question of Japanese military assistance does not appear to have been raised on this occasion. It was raised, however, in mid-April, by the Military attaché in Russia, who wrote that 'the Anglo-Japanese alliance has introduced a new factor into Russia's strategical considerations, and, although for the purpose of attacking India the existing lines are sufficient, it has become a matter of the first importance for Russia to shorten as much as possible the communications between her Far Eastern and Central Asian forces, thereby tending to make it more difficult for Japan to spare troops for the defence of India and the Middle East', hence some recent movement on the question of a line joining Tashkent with the Siberian railway.3 This report reached the Foreign Office on 17 April. On 24 April the Japanese Foreign Minister informed the British ambassador that Japanese military officers could not be sent to London for a conference, as they were too busy on other duties, and that the Japanese Government would strongly prefer the military conference to be held at Tokio. Sir C. MacDonald then went to see the Ministers of War and of Marine, and unanimity was expressed that it would be best to postpone the conference until 1907. Grey told the CID on 25 May that, in view of this unanimity, he considered that the conference should be postponed. 4 The matter of mutual armed assistance had still not been resolved. *

1 Committee of Imperial Defence, 84th meeting, 15 February 1906, CAB2/2/1; note by Esher 16 February 1906 Esher MSS 4/1; Morley to Minto 16 February 1906 Morley MSS Eur. D 573/1. 2 Morley to Minto 30 March 1906 ibid. 3 Napier to Spring-Rice 11 April, in Spring-Rice to Grey 11 April 1906, F.O. 371/124.

^Committee of Imperial Defence, 88th meeting, 25 May 1906 CAB2/2/1.

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In the summer of 1906 the Viceroy let slip one remark that was to be consistent with his later attitude. Protesting to Morley about the possible consequences of an Anglo-Russian agreement, then under consideration in London, Minto wondered what the Japanese would say, and whether Britain would be justified in accepting an agreement with Russia which must seriously interfere with the value of the British position on Russia's flank should Japan and Russia again come to blows: 'The Japanese are practically our allies in the defence of India...'. 1 Morley was not an enthusiast for the Japanese Alliance. Following another outburst of imprecations against it by him in December 1906, 2 Clarke, still Secretary of the CID, undertook to educate the Secretary of State for India into viewing it in a favourable light, as a bargain far more favourable to Britain than to Japan. Having maintained in paragraph (d) that 'the fear of being involved in war in Manchuria and in Afghanistan at the same time should be a strong deterrent against Russian aggression in either region', he went on to maintain that, if Japan was involved in a war with Russia, two things were clear - that 'we could not operate against Russia in Central Asia', and that 'we could not give military assistance to Japan in "Eastern Asia"...'; 'The war on land would have to be carried on by the Japanese alone. The function of Great Britain would be to prevent any Naval Power joining Russia.' This lack of balance and of reciprocity was emphasised by paragraph (h), in which Clarke stated that 'if Russia undertook aggressive action against India, the Japanese would apparently have to wage war in Manchuria'. Clarke concluded by raising an issue that the Indian section of the General Staff had raised in August 1905. Their final paragraph had been: The General Staff observes that the Preamble of the Agreement refers only to "territorial rights" and "special interests" in India, no mention being made of Afghanistan. Presumably, however, it is intended that the Agreement should become operative in the event, say, of Russia repeating the Pandjeh incident or of attempting by some other means progressively to absorb parts of Afghanistan, although the Preamble, taken by itself, appears liable to a somewhat different interpretation.

Clarke concluded: It may be a point of doubt whether Article II would become operative if Russia invaded Afghanistan where we have technically no "territorial rights". It was, however, intended that the words "special interests" should cover this case, and this would doubtless be admitted by the Japanese. If we

1 2

Minto to Morley 12 June 1906 Morley MSS Eur.D573/8. G. Monger, The End of Isolation (London, 1963) p. 286.

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had a Treaty with Russia binding both parties to respect the integrity of Afghanistan, no ambiguity Would remain. 1

This issue was to agitate Clarke's mind up to and including the AngloJapanese Conference of May and June 1907. His next opportunity to raise the matter was provided by the Prime Minister's decision to appoint a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider the Military Requirements of the Empire regarding the Defence of India, under Morley's chairmanship. The first meeting of this subcommittee took place on 22 January 1907. In advance of this meeting Clarke, who was a member of the sub-committee, supplied Morley with a memorandum on 'Questions which require Consideration...'. In his view, certain political questions, which had an important bearing upon the probability of such a campaign as was contemplated by the Indian authorities, should be borne in mind; as these were necessarily matters which could only be decided by the Cabinet, Clarke thought they might therefore be excluded from the scope of the enquiry. Amongst the questions he listed were the following: 'Under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, would Japan be bound to take the field in the event of such Russian aggression in Afghanistan? If this is the case, would not the prospects of war with Great Britain and Japan be a most powerful deterrent to Russia?'. 2 Certainly in the remarks he made at the opening of the proceedings of the sub-committee Morley endeavoured to define its scope very narrowly, sticking closely to the word 'Requirements' in the Terms of Reference. Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, reinforced the position taken by Morley, saying: 'Well, Mr Chairman, that excludes, and, I think, rightly excludes, the question of whether we at home are in a position to furnish these reinforcements. That would be another question. You put first the problem of what India needs. And what we can supply elsewhere is a wholly separate thing, outside the scope of the enquiry of this Committee, and to be considered by us elsewhere.'3 The relevance of the Japanese Alliance, and the question of Japanese, as opposed to 'home' reinforcements for India, did not feature explicitly in the proceedings of the sub-committee. Lt. General Sir Beauchamp Duff, Chief of the Staff in India, sent over to represent the views of Kitchener, merely stated ^Note on the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1905, by Clarke, 15 December 1906, headed 'Sent to Mr Morley 15/12/06', CAB17/67 ff. 60-63. ^Questions which require consideration by the Sub-Committee appointed by the Prime Minister to report on the Military Requirements of India and the consequent demands on the mitttaty forces at home, memorandum by Clarke, undated 13 page typescript, Morley MSS Eur.D573/37. J Morley and Haldane at the first meeting of the CID sub-committee on the Military Requirements of the Empire, 22 January 1907, CAB16/2.

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that he assumed the Japanese Alliance would continue in force, but that 'It seems, however, quite certain that, in the event of war, India cannot look for any direct help from Japan'; the Japanese Alliance 'reduces on the one hand the chance of war, and on the other hand its possible duration. Nevertheless it leaves us to our own resources in Afghanistan. No Japanese troops can come to assist us there...'. 1 The only other mention of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the course of the proceedings was by Morley himself. At the fifth meeting, on 7 February, he repeated the contention made to him by Clarke: 'According to our second Japanese treaty, if the Russians provoked a war with us in Afghanistan the Japanese would be bound more or less to make trouble for Russia in Manchuria, and with the knowledge of this should be less able and less inclined to give us trouble in India.' 2 In a memorandum of 12 February the General Staff, envisaging a two phase campaign the first phase of which would consist of the occupation of Kabul and Kandahar by the Indian Army and of Herat and Afghan Turkestan by the Russians, stated that 'It is impossible to say at this stage what influence upon events might be exerted by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, what European complications might supervene, or how long Russia would take to mature her plans for her next forward step.' 3 It was left to General Sir John French, writing on the assumption that conditions existed 'which are as unfavourable as they can possibly be to the British Empire', to point out that if the Russians extended a railway to Termez, 'Here we have another possibility to take into consideration, namely, the establishment by Russia of a subsidiary line of advance through Persia and Seistan. This is not an impossible contingency should Persia throw in her lot with Russia'. The Commander-in-Chief designate of the British Expeditionary Force went on to recommend, amongst other things: The War Office at home to be given to understand that on the outbreak of such a war, one division at least will have to be despatched to India as soon as our sea supremacy is established along that route, and that in the event of the hostility of the Amir and the tribes another three divisions will be required in addition. This, of course, involves the necessity for a thorough overhauling of our military position at home. Are we prepared for this? The Indian Government to be informed that they may rely upon these reinforcements.^

' ßeauchamp Duff at ibid. ^Morley on 7 February 1907, ibid.p. 146, para.1093; see fn.l above, para.h. •^General Staff memorandum 12 February 1907, ibid. Appendix IV. ^Memorandum by French, 18 February 1907, ibid. Appendix VII.

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The last session of the sub-committee was held on 25 February, when the following exchange took place between General Ewart, the Director of Military Operations, and a recalled Beauchamp Duff: Ewart: In view of the limited size of our Army, I am sure you realise the importance of not committing all our strength in the way of reinforcements to India until the situation has developed, and until we are sure of the theatre in which they would be required? Duff: Of course that is so; it depends very much on what the whole military arrangements are at home. Ewart: You admit that it is an important point? Duff: It might be a very important point. Ewart: We may lay down a scale of reinforcements, but it is not for us to commit that strength to India and [ sic] until we definitely know that it will be required there. 1

The Indian authorities attached such importance to this exchange that they took a copy of it with them into the Anglo-Japanese Military Conference at the end of May. *

Before the report of the Morley sub-committee was finished, the Japanese announced that they would be sending naval and military representatives to England in the expectation that the long-delayed consideration of Article VII could take place at the end of May. This announcement caused the General Staff paper 68B of August 1905 to be reprinted for the Committee of Imperial Defence, and another one to be written. The bulk of the new memorandum addressed the question of whether Great Britain would be obliged to support Japan in a war with the United States, a subject the General Staff had been instructed not to discuss in 1905. The final paragraph, however, noted that if the conclusions arrived at in the 83rd and 84th meetings of the CID - viz. that Japanese troops were not to be invited to India, and that there were grave objections to sending a British contingent to Manchuria - were adhered to, the British military representatives would enter the conference with the Japanese 'with rather a negative programme as regards the possibilities of military cooperation'. This General Staff memorandum would appear to have been less than happy with such a 'negative programme', which if persisted in would 'confine the discussion to a suggestion that in the event of war with Russia we can best exhaust our

libid.

p. 180, paras 1364-1366; IOL MSS, L/MIL/5/711.

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enemy and bring her to terms by separate operations in the two theatres of Afghanistan and Manchuria'. 1 The Committee of Imperial Defence discussed the latest developments at its 97th meeting, on 25 April 1907. Ewart began by stating that he had heard privately from the Japanese military attaché that the Japanese wished to limit the forthcoming discussion to possible war with Russia in Asia. This statement did not deter Haldane, who said that he thought the Indian authorities 'had been premature in rejecting the idea that Japanese troops should be employed in India'. At this point Clarke, drawing an inference from Kitchener's observations of December 1905/January 1906 on paper 68B, observations with which only he, of those present, was familiar, remarked that 'Lord Kitchener had suggested that it might be advisable to employ Japanese troops, acting from an independent base in Southern Persia on the flank of a Russian advance against India'. Grey, who was chairing the meeting in the absence of both Campbell-Bannerman and Morley, supported Haldane. Adhering to the line he had first taken in March 1905, he thought 'that the door should be kept open for the employment of Japanese troops in Persia'. Haldane ended the meeting by saying that the necessary measures for sending troops from Japan to India and Southern Persia should be discussed at the forthcoming conference. The formal conclusion of this meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence was that, 'While, as recommended in Minute I of the 84th meeting, the Committee do not consider that any request for the cooperation of troops in the defence of India should be made to the Japanese, the possibility of such cooperation should not be excluded from discussion at the coming Conference. It should be ascertained whether the Japanese were prepared to render direct military assistance of this nature, and whether, in this case, they would prefer to act from the side of Persia.' 2 At this stage, Clarke sent to Ewart a copy of Kitchener's observations on paper 68B, with a word of advice not to bring it up officially 'as Mr Morley might be disgruntled'. 3 On 26 April Morley sent a telegram to Minto, informing him that the Anglo-Japanese Military Conference would take place in London towards the end of May, and asking if he wished to send an officer from India for the occasion. Minto replied that India was 'greatly interested in manner in which Japanese forces would be used in time of war with Russia', that he hoped to be informed of Japanese views and of those of the Conference before important issues were finally determined, and that General Creagh would be available. 1 General Staff memorandum 14 March 1907, CAB38/13/13. ^Committee of Imperial Defence, 97th meeting, 25 April 1907, CAB2/2/1. 3 Clarke to Ewart 25 April 1907, W0106/48.

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On 2 May Morley telegrammed: 'Among questions to be discussed is possibility of Japanese cooperation with Indian Army for defence of Northwest frontier, though not necessarily on the frontier, but, for example, in Persia.' Morley asked for the reasoned views of the Government of India to reach him by 11 May. Minto sent them in an official despatch on 9 May. 1 *

Morley's invitation gave Kitchener his opportunity to present in detail views which he had held for some time but only hinted at hitherto. So veiled had these hints been that General Grierson, then Director of Military operations, had been able to tell Lansdowne in June 1905 only that 'The Indian military authorities are believed to be in favour of receiving assistance from Japan , but it is not easy to see on what grounds they base their opinion'. 2 Some indication of the direction of Kitchener's thinking was given by a passage in a letter of 18 January 1906 to Clarke, who had asked how vital interests in Persia might be safeguarded. Kitchener had written: A further precaution and one that might eventually be of great military importance to us would be a concession for a road from Bunder Abbas to Regan. There is however not much use in obtaining this concession if the road is not constructed either by private enterprise or by subsidy from India. The latter would I think be difficult to obtain as many arguments might be urged against it and I am not sure whether I should support it myself; but if private enterprise would take this up the advantages of such a roadway are evident. It provides a practicable route through all hills and difficult country from the Gulf to Regan, and thence to Seistan is an open plain. Such a line would enable us to send a force independent of India in that direction in case of war and of any Russian advance on Seistan. It would also enable us to bring our troops on to the flank of any Russian line such as that projected by Rittich to Chakhbar, and therefore have the effect of checkmating that design. ^

Curzon may not have shared these views of Kitchener's. 4 It must be assumed, however, that Minto did. The views as expressed in the memorandum 'Indian Instructions' corresponded quite closely to those recently

1 Morley to Minto 26 April, 2 May; Minto to Morley 28 April, 9 May 1907, Morley MSS Eur.D573/28. Grierson to Sanderson 16 June 1905 F.O.46/673 para.8. Lansdowne's conclusions regarding this memorandum as a whole were as follows: '1. forgets that GB must expose a larger target than Japan. 2. forgets that if we protect Japan it is not only for her sake but for our own.' Note by Lansdowne pinned to his copy of Grierson's memo, Lansdowne MSS 4/13 (recently transferred from Bowood House to the British Library).

^Kitchener to Clarke 18 January 1906, Birdwood MSS IOL MSS, Eur.D686/47-50. ^Nish op. cit. p. 318.

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expressed by Grey and Haldane. The relevant sections of the Indian Instructions have been quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Suffice it to repeat here that whilst Minto and Kitchener preferred to avoid the presence of Japanese troops in India itself, they were prepared to accept them, if offered, in extremis. Persia was the place they really wanted the Japanese to be, en route to Seistan. This was the main 'other line' along which a Japanese contingent 'might be most usefully, and indeed decisively employed'. 1 There is nothing to indicate that, at the time when the 'Indian Instructions' were devised and sent, the authorities in India knew what the recommendations of the Morley sub-committee were. These recommendations, in the Report dated 1 May, pleased Kitchener when he eventually received them. 2 He had at one point been less than optimistic, and had tried, perhaps unsuccessfully, to bring pressure to bear on Ewart. 3 In the event, it was clear that the arguments of Duff and, later, of Lord Roberts, about the dangers to India, including Afghanistan, had prevailed, to the intense disgruntlement of Clarke, who refused to sign the Report. 4 For this recommended that the military organisation of Great Britain be framed so as to enable 100,000 men to be despatched to India during the first year of a war with Russia. Nevertheless, in the first week of May 1907, Kitchener had not been so blithe as not to consider the question which Morley's sub-committee had not set itself - namely, the case of the worst-case scenario, the question of what to do if the situation was such that the arrival, or even the sending, of British reinforcements could not be guaranteed. When the Anglo-Japanese Military Conference convened, this question was still open, and Kitchener's answer to it was on the table. *

Representing Great Britain were General Sir N.G. Lyttleton, Chief of the General Staff, General Sir W.G. Nicholson, Director of Military Intelligence, and General Sir O'Moore Creagh. General Baron Nishi represented Japan. Among those attending were Ewart and Clarke. 5 The delegations exchanged memoranda on 29 May. As already noted, the British memorandum embodied the desiderata of Grey and Haldane and, less explicitly, ' see p. 48 fn 2 above. ^Kitchener to Roberts 3 October 1907 Kitchener MSS PRO 30/57/29. Morley refused to send Kitchener a copy of the finished Report for some months, having taken offence at certain aspects of his conduct: Morley to Minto 31 May 1907 Morley MSS Eur.D573/2. •^Kitchener to Marker 28 February 1907, Kitchener-Marker MSS, B.L. Add. MSS52276A. ^Roberts had also been attempting to influence both Morley and Minto. See Roberts to Morley 7 November 1906, in Roberts to Minto 27 December 1906, Minto MSS 12776, no. 77. 5 Ewart Diary 29 May 1907, Ewart MSS RH4/84.

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of Kitchener and Minto. T h e Japanese position, as revealed in N i s h i ' s memorandum, was quite different: It would...be dangerous to divide either the Japanese or British forces for the purpose of providing Japanese troops to assist in the defence of India or of sending British troops to reinforce the Japanese Armies in Manchuria. Moreover the presence of a contingent of Japanese troops in the Indian theatre of war, or of British troops in Manchuria, owing to difference of armament, food, race and customs, would cause difficulty to the line of communications in the matter of supplies and in maintaining the contingent under different climatic conditions. It would be most desirable and effective for each ally to act in his own theatre of war, each taking such action as to cause a diversion and to prevent Russia from using too large a proportion of her forces against one or the other ally. The above proposal only contemplates action against Russia, and Russia alone and unsupported; it is possible, however, that she may have an ally or allies, or that action against an enemy or enemies other than Russia may become necessary. The combinations which may arise are difficult to foresee and enumerate, and the consideration of them, therefore, had better be left until they actually occur. 1 At this point Morley wrote to Minto: The Japanese conference proved to be a rather tame affair. As our men don't speak Japanese, and they are no great hands at English or French, and the interpreter is not a giant at his trade, the land was rather heavy ploughing. The upshot was that in case of an Imperial quarrel with Russia, Japan would do nothing for us on the Persian side, nor on the Kandahar line, nor in truth anywhere else except Siberia and Manchuria. That is to say, under the plea of rendering us aid under the Treaty, they would help themselves to another slice in the Far East. The Japs, like our American friends, are essentially "a practical people". 2 M o r l e y ' s opinions about the Japanese were shared by Clarke, w h o recorded the gist of the first session in a letter to Esher: ' W e could not elicit clearly whether they regarded China as a "special interest" under the terms of the Treaty; but they do so consider Korea, Manchuria, Formosa and apparently the Chinese coast-line opposite the last. On our side they d o not regard Persia as a special interest under the Treaty...My impression is that the Japanese want ships and railway plant and nothing more, and that they d o n ' t take us very seriously. T h e General talks no English and Shiba is not very fluent.' Noting that the British General Staff had produced another paper, and that this and the Japanese reply to the first British paper would be considered on the

^memorandum by Baron Nishi for the Anglo-Japanese Conference, 29 May 1907, W0106/48 ff. 268-70. 2 Morley to Minto 31 May 1907 Morley MSS Eur.D573/2.

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morning of Saturday 1 June, Clarke believed something could still be done to alleviate the worst-case scenario: I think that in the event of a naval combination against us sufficient to deter for a time the despatch of troops to the East, the Japanese, being on the spot, might be expected to supply troops for a temporary purpose (say) to garrison Hong Kong, Singapore. At least our arrangement with them should not exclude this idea. 1

On 30 May the Report of Morley's sub-committee was accepted by the Committee of Imperial Defence. The implications of one of its conclusions, 'that a Russian occupation of Herat or crossing of the Oxus be followed by a declaration of war against that power', provided Clarke and Ewart with further ammunition. Both scribbled notes for the British representatives at the Conference. Clarke wrote: 'The great point is would Russian aggression (say) at Herat bring the Treaty into operation? It is a delicate matter but I think we ought to be clear about it'. Ewart wrote: 'In the event of Russian aggression on Northern Afghanistan, which might take the form of an occupation of Herat, would the Treaty at once come into operation and would Japan create a diversion in Manchuria?' O'Moore Creagh, for his part, was very troubled about another aspect: 'The important question for India is if in event of England losing temporary command of the sea Japan will recognise its liability to furnish temporary reinforcements of such strength as to be able to occupy the Kandahar-Quetta line.' 2 Clarke made a seven-point draft of the outcome he wished to see. Points 1 to 4 were as follows: 1. It is agreed that, in the event of Great Britain and Japan becoming involved in hostilities with Russia only, the respective forces should operate each in its separate theatre of war. 2. If, however, the two allies were attacked by a combination of Powers, this condition might not be applicable and other arrangements might have to be made. 3. Japan on her side recognises Afghanistan and the protectorates on the northern frontier of India as territories in which Great Britain possesses "rights or special interests" under the terms of the Treaty. Great Britain reciprocally recognises the special interests of Japan in Korea and Manchuria.

^Clarke to Esher 29 May 1907 Esher MSS 10/40. notes by Clarke, Ewart, O'Moore Creagh, undated, in IOL MSS, L/MIL/5/711.

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It is understood that aggression directed against these territories will be opposed by the Allies in cooperation. 1

Clarke's draft was rejected by Nicholson, who also ignored the concerns expressed by Ewart and O ' M o o r e Creagh. Nicholson's submission to the next session of the Conference on 1 June concurred with the views originally expressed by Nishi. He began by stating that there was full agreement that in the event of war with Russia, Britain and Japan could best afford each other mutual support by operations conducted separately by each ally in his own theatre of war. He then stated that the British representatives 'wish to point out that, unless the Russians advance on India, the difficulties in attacking them in their own territory would be very great viewing the distance between the two frontiers, the nature of the country, and the uncertainty of A f g h a n cooperation'. 2 Clarke was so enraged that, on the day following this session, he wrote to Esher a letter that brought out the bearing of the meetings that had been held between the Admiralty and the Japanese Naval representatives on 29 and 30 May: The Japan Conference was horribly muddled. Ewart had originally proposed a general Conference Navy and Army with Sir E. Grey in the Chair to deal with general questions, followed by subsidiary consultations if necessary. This of course was sound, and I don't know why it was not carried out. The Japs' main object was to get help in obtaining 142,000 tonnes of transport in three weeks' time to complete their arrangements for a campaign in Manchuria. They met the Admiralty people, who most unnecessarily, but quite characteristically, took up the non possumus attitude. The amount of tonnage is not large. There is an immense amount in such ports as Hong Kong and Singapore, in India, and in Australia. It was perfectly easy to look into the matter and to undertake to facilitate the collection of the necessary ships. However, the Admiralty took the line I have indicated, which was politically most unwise and quite unnecessary. On the military side, the resolutions I drafted, which I will show you, were not accepted by the War Office. The War Office draft was I thought very bad, and one clause pointing out our difficulties in getting at the Russians in Afghanistan if they crossed the frontier was most unwise. It was not for us to say this. (Surely Nicholson cannot really be clever.) However the Japanese did not like this clause, in which we gave ourselves away. Ultimately nothing was settled except that in the event of war with Russia only, we should act quite independently. The Japanese, however, again pressed the transport question, which the Admiralty had practically rejected, and Lyttleton told them that it would be necessary to ask Haldane to see Lord Tweedmouth and get him to bring pressure to bear! Imagine ^typescript, undated, unsigned, marked 'Secret', in WG106/48 ff. 292-3. reply to memorandum of the Japanese representatives, ibid. ff. 279-80.

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telling the Japanese this. They must think we are all congenital idiots. I only hope that it does not really matter as there is not likely to be a Russian war during the period of the Treaty.'

O'Moore Creagh was equally furious at the way things went on 1 June. He wrote a letter to Lyttleton which must also be quoted in full: At this stage in the Conference with our allies I would like to make a few observations for your consideration, as it seems to me that nothing has been done to ensure compliance with that part of my instructions, which reads as follows and on which the proposals put forward by us were based: "It is admitted that India does not and cannot maintain an army sufficiently numerous to defend her for more than a limited period against Russian aggression without reinforcement from England and if Russia should have the aid of other Powers in a war against England and Japan it is conceivable that the protection of her interests elsewhere might render it impossible for England, or even for the Colonies, to send us the help we should eventually require. In such circumstances, notwithstanding all the grave and undoubted drawbacks to such a course, it might become absolutely necessary to accept from Japan the local assistance that could not be obtained from elsewhere." Owing to the Japanese having in their 'proposals for discussion' (para. 5) suggested that the consideration of combinations which might arise, and of hostilities against Powers other than Russia alone, had better be left till they occur, as they are 'difficult to foresee and enumerate' it would seem from the Conference on Saturday 1 June - that we are prepared to forego, for no valid reason, an assurance which is - certainly in India - of great importance. The plans for the defence of India, complicated by our obligations to Afghanistan, are, as you are aware, based now on a clearly defined policy, which has been accepted by H.M.'s Government, and which includes the despatch to India within the first year of war of at least 100,000 men. These plans are also based on the belief that these reinforcements will begin to arrive as soon as hostilities are imminent, and that for political as well as other reasons a considerable force will have to be landed there within two months. But the Admiralty have never been over sanguine of such an overwhelming superiority against all possible naval combinations as to ensure the immediate and uninterrupted transport under all circumstances. And what is of greater consideration for us is the probable reluctance of H.M.'s Government to denude this country of troops before the situation in Europe has developed. Circumstances are conceivable when clouds in the western horizon and rumours of mobilisation in Germany might make it exceedingly desirable, if not absolutely necessary, to defer the despatch of troops to India. And this would be at the moment when Russia would choose to embarrass us, if she ever intends to do so, in Afghanistan. I am aware that in touching upon European possibilities I am travelling beyond my scope, but it is because I am impressed with the fact that the opening months of a great war in the middle or further East cannot but be

^Clarke to Esher 2 June 1907 Esher MSS 10/40.

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months of grave anxiety to us in Europe, and because the situation in India cannot be entirely disassociated from that in Europe, that I refer to it. And it is these considerations which lead me, speaking from the Indian point of view, to urge that the question of Japan reinforcing India, if it be necessary, is the point of vast importance which we should not, if possible, permit our allies to pass over on the pretext of being unable to 'foresee'. I do not think that we should now mention to them any definite line of operations, which may tend to arouse their suspicions, but I do think that they should be made to recognise the obligation, if only in general terms, still definitely, of the contingency I have mentioned. I am sorry to trouble you with this letter but I am anxious that you should have my views before any further proceedings take place as I had not an opportunity of explaining them to you before the proceedings of the last Conference were drawn up. This letter did not retrieve the situation for the Indian authorities. By the afternoon of 6 June, when the Conference convened for the last time, only the attitude of the Admiralty had changed, f r o m negative to positive, regarding the provision of transport, thus giving the Japanese, as Clarke put it, 'all they really cared about'. Clarke credited Esher with bringing pressure to bear. He credited himself with getting ' a little stiffening' into a part of the final text, but the final text so closely corresponded with Nishi's original desiderata, cited a b o v e 2 , that it is difficult to accept this claim. Easier to accept is Clarke's final verdict, which was: It is all very sad. The Japanese really gave themselves away, by showing too great keenness on the transport question. That point was our strength and we would have got a better military convention by using it. The Admiralty, however, gave us away by the attitude it took up at first. Now it has climbed down. The Japanese have got all they wished, and we have got practically nothing. ^ T h e British had certainly got n o consideration of their worst-case scenario. A s clause 1(b) of the final text put it, 'It is agreed that the consideration of situations due to a possible alliance of Russia with some other Power or Powers, or to hostile action by one or more Powers other than Russia, should be deferred until the occasion arises'. 4 *

'O'Moore Creagh to Lyttleton 2 June 1907IOL MSS L/MIL/5/711. see above p. 59, fn. 1. 3 Clarke to Esher 6 June 1907 Esher MSS 10/40. V o l 0 6 / 4 8 f. 258. 2

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The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 12 August 1905 was, in certain respects, a conjuring trick. On the whole, following Professor Nish, historians have tended to represent it much as Balfour did in a letter of September 1905, in which he said that 'Japan can depend upon our Fleet for defending Korea etc., and we can depend upon her Army to aid us on the North-West frontier if the security of India is imperilled in that quarter'. 1 Balfour's statement seemed to dispose of the matter, but when examined closely is far from clear. Did he mean that the Japanese Army would be on the North-West frontier, helping Great Britain, or that it would be helping Great Britain on the North-West frontier by acting elsewhere - and if the latter, where exactly would the Japanese Army be? For nearly two years nothing was done to establish exactly what would be done if the worst came to the worst. Grey, a believer in reciprocity, and Haldane, who had to fashion an army out of the shambles he had inherited, felt the lack of provision, and tried, with the help of Kitchener and Minto, to remedy it. They then discovered just how 'practical' a people the Japanese were. For just as, before August 1905, they had refused to be committed to the maintenance of a large expeditionary force for service in India, so in May-June 1907 they adamantly refused to operate militarily anywhere except in the very Far East, whilst insisting, successfully, that the British supply all the shipping necessary for such operations. Writing to Minto on 31 May 1907 Morley stated that the report of his sub-committee 'showed what a tremendous load of military charge and responsibility you have to carry if you won't come to terms diplomatically with Russia' . 2 The British relationship with Japan, both before and after the Conference of May-June 1907, served only to reinforce this conclusion.

Balfour to Cooper 11 September 1905, Balfour MSS Add.MSS 49747. The most recent subscriber to these views is K.Neilson, "'Greatly Exaggerated": The Myth of the Decline of Great Britain before 1914' International History Review xiii no. 4 (1991) p. 718. 2 Morley to Minto 31 May 1907 Morley MSS Eur.D573/2.

4 CREATIVE ACCOUNTING: the place of loans to Persia in the commencement of the negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907

Rogers Piatt Churchill's The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, published by the Torch Press at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in 1939, is the only monograph ever written on the actual negotiation of the agreements regarding Thibet, Afghanistan, and Persia which together constitute what is certainly one of the most important diplomatic developments of the first decade of the twentieth century. Subsequent writers have considered that the Anglo-Russian negotiations themselves, even those regarding Persia, which were the most important of the set, had been treated so adequately by Churchill that there was no need to go over the same ground in detail. Their relatively condensed versions follow his closely, adding little, but at the same time risking perpetuating any errors of interpretation or emphasis that he may have made.1 For it is worth noting that, so far as the British side of the negotiations over Persia is concerned, R.P. Churchill had at his disposal only the documents published by G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley in volume iv of the series British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914. As Gooch and Temperley had been unable to gain access to the records of the India Office or to those of the Government of India, 2 both of which played important roles, there was a deficiency in the available material. It is ailso worth noting that Gooch and Temperley chose not to organise their documents chronologically but, in a way that did less than justice to the unfolding of events, under thematic headings. Thus there is a section on 'Anglo-Russian Negotiations, 1906-7', and a much larger section on 'The Anglo-Russian ' G.W. Monger, The End of Isolation (London, 1963); F. Kazemdadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914 (New Haven, 1968); R.L. Greaves, 'Some Aspects of the Anglo-Russian Convention and its working in Persia, 1907-1914', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies xxxi (1968) 69-91, 289-308, and 'Siestan in British Indian Frontier Policy', ibid, xlix (1986) 90-102; Z.S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (London, 1977); D. McLean, Britain and her Buffer State: the collapse of the Persian Empire 1890-1914 (London, 1979); V. Martin, 'Hartwig and Russian Policy in Iran 1906-8', Middle Eastern Studies vol. 29 (1993) 1-21; K. Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia 1894-1917 (Oxford, 1995). see K.M. Wilson, 'The Imbalance in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914: Gooch, Temperley and the India Office', in Wilson (ed.), Forging the Collective Memory: governments and international historians through two world wars (Oxford and Providence, R.I., 1996) pp. 230-264.

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Rapprochement, 1906-7': seventeen documents are separated out into yet another section on 'The Persian Loan Question, 1906'. As a result of the gaps in British Documents, Churchill's primary sources, and the somewhat complacent attitude of later historians, a particular myth has become established. This is, as stated in a recent work, that 'Like the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, the Anglo-Russian convention was essentially a way of reducing defence costs in the face of a challenge by a third power, in this case Germany-1 What follows is an effort to challenge, and if possible to displace, this myth. *

It may seem that the Persian loan question was essentially incidental, not only in the British negotiations with Russia over Persia, but even more so in relation to the Anglo-Russian negotiations as a whole, because nothing came of it: no money, in the end, was lent. Such a view would be misleading. For the question of a joint Anglo-Russian advance to the heir to the Persian throne was seen, at the beginning of September 1906, both by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and by his Russian counterpart Alexandre Isvolsky, as a device for kick-starting major negotiations which otherwise might never get under way. It was, moreover, a device which worked. Not only this, but Grey's initial conditions for an advance embodied his blueprint of an eventual Anglo-Russian agreement, and were handled with the deliberate aim, in which Grey failed, of binding the Russian Government to a particular outcome of any such negotiations. Not only did Grey envisage binding the Russian Government to a particular outcome, he also had it in mind that should an advance or a loan be made, the terms on which it was made would so effectively secure British interests that it could be regarded as a viable substitute for an Anglo-Russian agreement, should the latter fail to follow. Finally, the whole issue was one that involved a major effort in the direction of what can only be described as the scapegoating of Germany. This was an element that Isvolsky directed at the British, that the British Foreign Secretary directed at the Secretary of State for India and at the Prime Minister, and that the Secretary of State for India then directed at the Government of India. The question of a joint advance to the heir to the Persian throne and/or an eventual joint loan to the Persian Government, then, concentrated many minds at the beginning of September 1906, and had the effect of cutting several knots that were regarded as assuming gordian proportions. The whole ' p. J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: (London, 1993) pp. 416-7, my italics.

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story, which involves all sorts of variations on two triangular relationships — the one between the British Foreign Office, the India Office, and the Government of India, the other between Persia, Russia, and Germany — began ten months earlier, in December 1905. In order fully to understand and appreciate the significance of the dénouement, it is necessary to follow some of the movements that took place from the beginning.

(i) Initial Positions, December 1905 to May 1906 On 1 December 1905 the British Minister in Tehran, Evelyn GrantDuff, had telegraphed to London that the Grand Vizier, Ain-ed-Dowleh, had asked for a loan of £800,000 and had maintained that if the British Government did not respond he would be forced to have recourse to the Russian Government which, he stated, was prepared to lend £1,000,000. Both Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary, and Sir Thomas Sanderson, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, regarded a loan on such a scale as quite out of the question; Sanderson regarded it as 'very questionable' that Russia would produce the amount stated. Both were of the opinion that the views of the India Office should be ascertained.1 Lansdowne may well have mentioned this matter to the incoming Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, at a meeting they had on 11 December.2 It was, at any rate, on Grey's desk at the very beginning of his Foreign Secretaryship, and one of the first things to which he addressed himself. By 18 December Grey had made himself familiar with the Persian situation through reading the relevant minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence. He then wrote a memorandum dealing with the matter in terms of the pros and cons of a loan. In every case the latter outweighed the former. Although a hold might be obtained on the southern ports of Persia, the customs receipts of those ports were already part of the securities for previous loans. Although railway rights in southern Persia might be obtained, such railways were undesirable on military grounds and it was doubtful if they would pay in commercial terms. Although trade might be improved, it seemed doubtful whether commercial advantages would outweigh other objections. The remaining reason for lending — to prevent Russia doing so on conditions advantageous to her but detrimental to Britain — was countered by Grey's belief that 'Russia is hardly in a position to lend money at present'. If Britain did lend, all that the money ^Grant-Duff to Lansdowne 1 December 1905, minutes by Sanderson and Lansdowne, Grey MSS F.0.800/70. ^Lansdowne to Hardinge 12 December 1905, Hardinge MSS vol. 9.

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lent could do would be to stave off a crisis in the present 'incapable and practically bankrupt' Persian Government; then another loan would be required; and then another. At this stage, Grey could see no point in making special efforts to defer the crisis in Persia. A large loan would not effectually bolster up the existing Persian Government. If given, Britain would before long have to go further and establish what would be in effect a protectorate over at least the southern part of Persia, and Grey did not consider justifiable such an extension of responsibility.1 Grey had no wish to take sole responsibility for the decision on the matter of a loan, and submitted his memorandum to the Secretary of State for India, John Morley. Morley, who only a few days before had briefly looked forward to being appointed Foreign Secretary himself, entirely shared Grey's approach, and embodied the pros and cons of the memorandum in a despatch to the Viceroy of India, Lord Minto, on 22 December. 2 He also placed the matter in the hands of his officials at the India Office and, because his full title was Secretary of State for India in Council, 3 brought it to the attention of the members of the Political Committee of the Council of India. Lord Minto, who had only just taken up his appointment as Viceroy, was the first to respond. On 28 December he telegraphed that the general feeling of his own Council was in favour of taking advantage of the present opportunity to obtain further concessions in southern Persia, 'especially with a view to political and strategical considerations affecting safety of India': 'It is argued that, notwithstanding present disorganisation in Persia and Russia, we cannot feel secure against secret concessions to Russia in south Persia in case of a Russian loan, and that even without a fresh loan Russia might obtain such concessions merely by remission of interest on former loans'. It was supremely important to keep the influence of all Powers out of Seistan and southern Persia in view of the enormous naval and military expenditure that would otherwise be required. Concessions of a general character in southern Persia secured now would preclude the chance of other Powers obtaining them. Only if the new government in London held to the policy enunciated by Lansdowne in the House of Lords on 6 May 1903, a policy understood in India to mean that any menace to British interests in Seistan and southern Persia would be resisted by force, could the present opportunity to secure concessions be allowed to slip by. 4

1

memorandum by Grey 18 December 1905, Grey MSS F.0.800/92. Morley to Minto 22 December 1905,1.O.L.MSS, Eur.D573/28. 3 A.P. Kaminsky, The India Office 1880-1910 (London, 1986) ch. 3. 4 Minto to Morley 28 December 1905, tel. I.O.L.MSS, Eur.D573/28, letter 573/7. 2

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The Government of India followed up this communication with a list of the four concessions they recommended should it be decided to grant a loan. Of the four, they made it clear that the first two were by far the most important. These were (i) a road from Bunder Abbas to Bam via Regan, a road which recent investigations had shown it would be practicable to convert into a railway 'if and when required'; (ii) 'an undertaking that the construction of roads, railways, canals and telegraphs in southern Persia be carried out, insofar as foreign assistance was required, under the auspices of the British Government; southern Persia to include the country south of the line Khanikin - Birjand'.1 In the meantime a range of views was emerging at the India Office. Of the Government of India's stipulation (ii), quoted above, Sir Arthur Godley, Permanent Under Secretary at the India Office, wrote: The provision that roads etc. in South Persia are to be carried out under the auspices of the British Government is in accordance with views which have already been accepted. But the geographical definition of South Persia seems to go too far and to suggest ideas of the partition of Persia into definite spheres of influence, with all the consequences involved in such ideas.^

Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, a member of the Council of India since 1897 and of its Political Committee since October 1905, shared Godley's apprehensions. On 30 December he had expressed his strong opposition 'to the idea of advancing money or taking any other step with a view to securing for ourselves, now or ultimately, a protectorate or any other position in respect of Southern Persia or Seistan, which we should have to defend on the spot when (if ever) the time of trouble arrived'.3 On the other hand Fitzpatrick's fellow Council-member Sir Hugh Barnes, who until May 1905 had been Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, was in favour of a loan to Persia. Barnes regarded the history of British loan negotiations with Persia as a history of lost opportunities: 'Whenever the question has reached the point of decision we have lacked the courage to advance large sums of money, though we have always regarded with anxiety and envy the increased power and influence in Persia, which have attended the bolder policy of our Russian rivals.' Although it was the case, as the Government of India's telegram of 28 December had recalled, that during Lansdowne's Foreign Secretaryship the British Government had threatened to

^Viceroy to Secretary of State 9 January 1906,1.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/10/9/245. ^note by Godley 10 January 1906, ibid. 3 note by Fitzpatrick 30 December 1905, Grey MSS F.0.800/92.

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use force to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf or in Southern Persia, in Barnes1 view 'Prevention is better than cure, and it is wiser to forestall the grant to Russia of political rights and advantages in Southern Persia, by monopolising them ourselves, than to allow matters to drift into a position from which we can only extricate ourselves at the risk of war'. He went on to say that Russia had never yet failed to find money for political purposes: She is in difficulties, but she will not be in this condition for ever, or even for long. Her recuperative power is enormous, and the Grand Vizier stated in December that she is prepared to lend a million and a half on conditions. The purpose in this case - to defeat, or to out-rival us - is one that Russia is not likely to neglect, and the injury to us that may result is, that she may be offered concessions in which it is impossible for us to acquiesce. If we irritate and embarrass Persia by refusing financial help, the risk of the grant to Russia of dangerous concessions is a serious one.

Barnes took it that Britain was already pledged to grant a loan of £150,000 in return for which, amongst other things, Persia had agreed to promise that all railway construction in Southern Persia, including Seistan, should, so far as foreign assistance was concerned, be carried out under the auspices of the British Government. He was afraid that if the larger sum now asked for were to be refused, Persia would refuse the loan already promised, and that the concessions obtained would be lost. Noting that there had in the past been repeated reports that Russia was attempting to obtain control of the Crown lands in Seistan, and the revenue of that province as security for a loan, Barnes advised forestalling her. He gave, as an additional reason for lending, this: A time may shortly come, after Russia is more at rest, when His Majesty's Government may wish to try and come to some understanding with that Power as regards our interests in the East. The possibility of such an entente has been discussed in the English and Russian press. When the time comes, the more we have in our hands to bargain with the better. The argument 'beati possidentes' is likely to be of much force in such a contingency, for any understanding will certainly in the main be based on the status quo. Should we not therefore endeavour to obtain all the concessions we can while we have the opportunity?

Barnes concluded that not only was there no financial risk, but that granting the loan was safer than refusing to do so: 'The former can only at the worst bring us into financial controversy with Persia, the latter may and almost certainly will bring us sooner or later into serious collision with Russia.' The opportunity of strengthening the British position was one that had not been seen for more than a generation, and one that might never come

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again. On receiving the Government of India's terms of 9 January, however, Barnes did add that it was unnecessary to add canals and roads to railway construction in Southern Persia and Seistan. 1 Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick tried to counter Barnes' arguments immediately, and produced a Further Note expanding on the position that both he and Grey had taken up against the making of moves which might lead to a British protectorate. In response to Barnes' proposal to get such a charge on the land revenues of Seistan as would prevent Russia or anyone else from getting a charge on them, he pointed out that it 'would probably, in the event of default, be found impossible to enforce our security by collecting the revenue, unless we were prepared to assume, to a considerable extent, the government of the country and to bring in troops to assist us in doing so'. He could not support that proposal 'unless it was distinctly placed on official record that it is not intended that we should exercise any right we might have to collect revenue in Seistan ourselves'. Without something of this kind on record, there was the risk that, 'if those who might come after us some years hence were anxious to get hold of Seistan, they would place officers supported by troops out there to collect the revenue, and say that in doing so they were only carrying out an arrangement made by us'.2 Despite this, three other members of the seven-member Political Committee favoured the granting of a loan. They were Sir John Edge, Lieutenant-General Sir A.R. Badcock, and Sir David Barr. Edge, who since November 1898 had been on the Judicial and Public Committee of the Council, introduced another element, and another Power, into the equation: I have said that it appears to me to be greatly to our advantage to prevent, if possible, the chance of Persia borrowing further at present from Russia. Time is everything to us. We could not by arms prevent Russia taking Persia, but, in the not distant future, I foresee that Germany will have interests in Persia which would be destroyed if Persia became practically a Russian province; and when the German trading interests in Persia have become developed Russia will have to deal with Germany as well as with us. In the Persian Gulf Germany could do practically nothing as against Russia without our assistance, and could do nothing as against us, but Germany could put such pressure on Russia in Europe as would prevent Russia annexing Persia. ^

note by Barnes, 'Question of a loan to Persia', 8 January 1906 and postscript of 10 January, I.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/18/C110. At the Foreign Office, Sanderson expressed the opinion that Barnes' best argument was the 'beati possidentes' one. Grey's riposte was: 'It is a good argument, if we have made up our minds that our interests require us to strengthen out hold upon Southern Persia. I do not believe they do.' Minutes by Sanderson and Grey, 9 January 1906, F.0.371/169/2940. ^'Further Note' by Fitzpatrick, 9 January 1906, I.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/18/C110. •'note by Sir J. Edge 11 January 1906, concurred in by Badcock and Barr 12 January, ibid.

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The only member of the Political Committee who had not pronounced an opinion was Sir W. Lee-Warner, who from 1895 to 1902 had been Secretary of the Political and Secret Department of the India Office. On 17 January he sided with Fitzpatrick and against the rest. In his view, loans had never been productive, and it had been a mistake to accept Lord Curzon's disposition of October 1901 to start making them. A Russian invasion of Afghanistan was one thing, and had to be opposed. A Russian invasion of Persia was quite another, and could be resisted only at a diplomatic level: 'If our advances to Persia were honestly applied to the improvement of its administration the case might be different, but they only add to the extravagance of the Court, and the additional financial fetters which they impose on Persia are not needed by us to justify our diplomatic resistance to Russian encroachment.'1 It required several meetings of the Political Committee in the course of January 1906 to resolve the differences between those who regarded this as a good occasion for getting a stronger grip upon Persia, or at least of preventing Russia from strengthening her grip, and those who preferred the approach of Sir E. Grey and the Foreign Office. Morley consulted Grey once again and then, as he recorded, Oil full consideration, and having some reasons for confidence that the application for a loan is not likely to be complied with, for a long time to come at any rate, in other quarters, I have decided to let the Government of India know that His Majesty's Government cannot agree to the proposed loan..

It is worth noting, given what is to follow, that both Grey and Morley meant, by the phrase 'other quarters', Russia. In the course of January Grey had received from the British Chargé d'Affaires in St. Petersburg, Cecil Spring-Rice, information that a Russian loan to Persia was being negotiated. This information derived from the Persian Minister there. Spring-Rice had commented that this would appear to be a somewhat remarkable step for Russia to take, in her present financial position, 'but', he had continued, 'the idea cannot be dismissed as incredible with regard to a government which, on the eve of the conclusion of peace with Japan, appointed a committee to consider the question of forest regulations in the Liaotung Peninsula'.3 Grey's thinking of 18 December had not been changed by this. Moreover there was, with Grey, another consideration, namely, as Morley put it to the Viceroy: 'We may or may not in the fullness of time find it desirable to come to a 'note by Lee-Warner 17 January 1906, ibid. minute by Morley 24 January 1906,I.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/10/9/2569. -^Spring-Rice to Grey 12 January 1906, cited in Kazemdadeh op. cit. pp. 474-5. 2

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general understanding with Russia. That object would certainly be retarded by a proceeding that would naturally look like taking advantage of Russia's hour of adversity, to push objects of our own.' 1 Within a week, however, Grey had decided to reinsure himself somewhat. He took a step that was both precautionary as regards Russia's disturbing the situation in Persia, and designed to be instrumental in advancing the policy of an entente with Russia which he had brought with him to the Foreign Secretaryship at the outset. 2 He informed Lamsdorff, the Russian Foreign Minister, of his rejection of the recent Persian overture, expressed the hope that the Russian Government would be animated by the same spirit as animated the British, and ended by saying that if the Russian Government did decide to respond positively to any overture from Persia that it might receive, and wished to consider this question in concert with the British Government, the latter would be ready to enter into discussion on the subject in a conciliatory frame of mind. 3 It was entirely in line with this that, when on 7 February the Persian Minister in London maintained that Lord Lansdowne, in July 1905, had promised a loan of £250,000, and asked if this offer still held good, Grey minuted: 'If we are pressed again I think we shall have to consider whether we give the Russian Government a chance of joining in this loan.' 4 Although under pressure from the Persians and others to depart from this position, which contained the embryo of what he was to attempt to bring into the world in September, Grey stood firm. He ignored a plea from Messrs Lynch and Company, otherwise known as the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, towards the end of February, which was very much along the lines recommended by Sir Hugh Barnes, to the effect that a great effort should be made to displace Russian influence at Tehran. 5 A former Minister to Tehran, Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff, had personally visited the Foreign Office at the beginning of February to say that a body of English 1

Morley to Minto 25 January 1906,1.O.L.MSS, Eur.D573/28. Grey to Spring-Rice 13 December 1905, B.D.iv no. 204. 3 Grey to Spring-Rice no.34, 2 February 1906, F.O.371/169/3845; Spring-Rice to Lamsdorff 5 February 1906, B. D.iv p. 379. 4 minute by Grey on note by Hardinge 7 February 1906, F.O.371/169/5241. When a few days later the Government of India expressed concern that the Russians would use indirect agencies such as the Banque des Prgts to loan to Persia, and urged upon Morley a reconsideration of the matter unless 'categorical promises' were given by Russia, Grey told Morley 'that if after what had passed the Russians lent money on terms which gave them a hold on Southern ports of Persia, we should notify them that if they interfered with any of these ports, we should occupy it'. Viceroy to Secretary of State 13 February 1906, minute by Grey, ibid.15491. 5 Ira Klein is quite wrong, in his article 'British Intervention in the Persian Revolution 1905-1909' in Historical Journal xv no.4 (1972) p. ,734, to describe this memorandum of 23 February as the work of Grey himself. The memorandum, entitled 'Persia' is in Grey MSS F.0.800/70. For some background on Lynch - see J.S. Galbraith, 'British Policy on Railways in Persia, 1870-1900', Middle Eastern Studies vol. 25 (1989) 480-505. 2

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financiers would be willing to advance £4 million, with the object of enabling the Persian Government to pay off their existing loans to Russia, as, otherwise, Persia would be compelled to go to Russia for further financial assistance. Drummond-Wolff's English financiers wanted to know what support the British government would give them. When he got round to dealing with this Grey simply wrote: 'If we wish to absorb Southern Persia this would be worth doing but not otherwise... I do not wish to entertain the scheme.' 1 Early in March another Persian request was rejected, despite the threat that if the British government were not prepared to lend the money the Persian Government would have to apply to Russia. 2 Grey was indirectly referring to this on 19 March when, trying to coax the Russian ambassador Count Benckendorff towards an Anglo-Russian entente, he said, 'At any rate, we had done our best to keep the door open for agreement, for we had lately been very much pressed to lend money to the Persian government, which we had declined, because we could not lend it without making conditions which would alter the situation in Persia'.3 The month of May contained several important developments. These included a stroke suffered by the Shah of Persia (reported by Grant-Duff on 15 May) which left him partially paralysed and brought closer the succession of the reputedly pro-Russian heir to the throne, the Valiahd; the resignation of Lamsdorff as Russian Foreign Minister; and a report of the imminence of a German loan to Persia. His handling of these events revealed that Grey had changed his mind, since December 1905, about the capacity of Russia to lend to Persia. They also gave him the opportunity, which he took, to advance somewhat the policy that he had only adumbrated hitherto. It was on 9 May that Grant-Duff telegraphed his information, given to him by the French Charge d'Affaires in Tehran Count d'Apchier le Maugin, that Germany, 'under cover of Belgian financiers', was about to lend 25m marks to Persia in return for a coaling station near the mouth of the Shatt-ulArab, a road concession from Khanikin to Kermanshah, and a college and hospital in Tehran managed by Germans. Grant-Duff's telegram produced the following exchange between Sir Charles Hardinge, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office in succession to Sanderson, and Sir Edward Grey: Hardinge: I do not think that there would be any harm in mentioning to Count Benckendorff the possibility of a German loan to Persia, without giving the conditions or mentioning the idea of a coaling station. The Russians would probably take immediate action to stop the loan. 1

minute by Grey 3 March on note by Fitzmaurice 2 February 1906, F.O. 371/169/7505. Grey to Grant-Duff 6 March 1906, B.D. iv no. 327. 3 Grey to Spring-Rice 19 March 1906, ibid. no. 212.

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Yes, but they would do it by lending themselves. I will see Benckendorff as soon as I can: I think I can suggest something to him.1

What Grey suggested to Benckendorff on the following day, 11 May, was a joint Anglo-Russian loan 'as a temporary expedient, simply to preserve things as they were till we could settle the whole question'.2 Although Morley had some misgivings, he swallowed them to the extent of informing the Government of India that it was proposed to draw on Indian revenues for the £50,000 which it was thought would suffice. The Government of India had no objection. Indeed it thought that 'in the event of the accession of the Valiahd, whose pro-Russian tendencies have always been reported to be strong, instructions should be sent to the Tehran Legation to utilise the authority given to advance to the new ruler the money sanctioned, in such a manner as to secure for the benefit of Indian interests in Persia the best possible conditions 1 . 3 On 23 May Isvolsky, the new Russian Foreign Minister, indicated that he quite agreed, in principle, with what Grey had suggested on the 11th; at the same time he noted that as the health of the Shah seemed to be improving, there was no present reason to take serious steps.4 The revelation of Grey's true motive for suggesting this joint loan - his fear that, otherwise, the Russians would lend by themselves - shows that what G.W. Monger wrote about this episode, based only on the Confidential Print, is quite wrong. 5 The real reason was a combination of what the India Office later stated: In view of the state of the Shah's health and of the complications likely to arise at his death, the Foreign Office in May 1906 proposed that a loan should be made to the Heir Apparent...to enable him to tide over the difficulties of his succession. The proposal was the outcome of an exchange of views with Russia, both governments being desirous to secure the peaceful accession of the Crown Prince, in the event of the Shah's death...6

1 minutes by Hardinge and Grey on Grant-Duffs no. 131 of 9 May 1906, F.0.371/109/15861; see also Graat-Duffto Grey 22 May 1906, F.O.416/27 no. 193. 2 Grey to Spring-Rice 11 May 1906, B.D. iv no.329; see also minutes by Hardinge and Grey 17, 18 May 1906, F.O.371/169/16982, /17134. 3 Morley to Government of India 22 May, Government of India to Morley 26 May 1906, F.O.416/27 no. 177. 4 Spring-Rice to Grey 24 May 1906, B.D. iv no. 218. ^Monger op. cit. p. 283, states that Grey was forestalling the Germans by means of an AngloRussian loan. 6 note by Godley, March 1908,1.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/l0/10/3022.

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and of the fact that, in mid-April, agents of French, British, American, Dutch and Russian banks had signed what was the largest foreign loan ever given to the Russian Government — a net sum of 845m roubles. Grey himself had encouraged Lord Revelstoke, of Baring Brothers, to participate. 1 If the Russians decided to lend by themselves to Persia, it was not outside the bounds of possibility that funds provided by financial institutions based in Britain might be used for this purpose, out of the money now at Russia's disposal. (ii) 'Defining in terms' Encouraging Baring Brothers to participate in a loan to Russia was an astute, perhaps the most astute, move made by Grey in the direction of securing a settlement of British differences with Russia. So far as the overall objective was concerned, Grey had to convince three parties of its merits: his cabinet colleagues, and especially Morley at the India Office; the Government of India; and the Russians. At the 85th meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, on 9 March 1906, Grey announced that within the last fortnight the Russian Government 'had expressed a wish to re-open negotiations with us with a view to an Agreement similar to that which we had concluded with France, in regard to the questions in which the two Governments are jointly interested'.2 This announcement was based only upon a letter from Spring-Rice reporting a conversation with Benckendorff in St. Petersburg at the end of January. From this it had emerged that Lamsdorff was, 'in principle', in favour of a general settlement of outstanding questions, and that Tsar Nicholas II was anxious that King Edward VII should visit him in Russia. Benckendorff had made the suggestion 'that negotiations or pourparlers could be begun in secret and that an entente, carefully framed in outline beforehand could be "clinched" during personal conversations between the Sovereigns'.3 B. Oppel, The Waning of a Traditional Alliance: Russia and Germany after the Portsmouth Peace Conference', Central European History vol. 5 (1972) pp. 318-329; O. Crisp, The Russian Liberals and the 1906 Anglo-French loan to Russia', Slavonic and East European Review vol. 39 (1960-61) pp. 497-511; Cambon to Bourgeois 7 April 1906, Documents Diplomatiques Français 1871-1914 (Paris, 1929-1962) 2nd Series ix no.626. In September 1905 Lansdowne had given similar encouragement, writing to Revelstoke on the 12th; 'It seems to me important that at this particular moment we should deal as considerately as possible with Russia, and we are doing what we can to prevent the new Japanese Agreement from leaving too nasty a taste in her mouth, which must be pretty sore. In these circumstances the issue of a Russian loan in London and Paris would I should say have a good effect.' Lansdowne MSS L(5)32 (seen at Bowood House; since transferred to the British Library). 2 aCAB 2/2/1. Spring-Rice to Grey 26 January 1906, B.D.iv no. 208; see also Spring-Rice to Grey 1 March 1906 ibid. no. 210.

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Benckendorff, having returned to London early in March, saw Grey on the 19th and delivered to him a message from Lamsdorff which Grey took as indicating that the Russian Government 'might perhaps wish...to have something in the nature of an entente, such as we had with France'. So far as the British side of any such arrangement was concerned, Grey stated that 'what we should expect would be that repose should be guaranteed on our Indian frontier'. 1 As Grey informed Spring-Rice, the difficulty was 'to define in terms what are the conditions which will guarantee repose'.2 'Defining in terms' was to prove a long drawn-out and difficult process. It had started with a report on Persia commissioned by Lansdowne from the outgoing Minister at Tehran, Sir Arthur Hardinge, especially for Grey's benefit, and received by Grey on 3 January. In a section called 'Probable attitude of Russia and England in the event of a dissolution of the Persian State', Hardinge had recapitulated the policy of the Conservative government, which was that the isolated action of Russia could not be acquiesced in, and that if on whatever pretext Russian troops were to enter Azerbaijan or Khorassan, a corresponding step should be taken by the government of India in Seistan, or in the Persian Gulf, or both: Inasmuch as one of the great objects of Russian policy is to penetrate to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean after gradually converting Persia into a Russian Egypt, it is obvious that a British occupation of either Seistan, lying as it does across the only route from Meshed to the Indian Seas, or of the principal ports of southern Persian, would defeat that object, and would compel the Russian Government to discuss the Persian question with England, and submit to its solution by some compromise acceptable to her.

Nevertheless, so far as a possible Anglo-Russian understanding was concerned, Hardinge was against spheres of influence for Britain and Russia in Persia: My own view has always been that the only basis on which such a settlement could be effected, would be not a partition of Persia into rival spheres of influence, which would mean sooner or later an English Protectorate over the South and the definite abandonment of Russia's aspirations to reach the open Ocean, and would therefore be unacceptable to her - but a suspension of the diplomatic conflict, which has so long raged between the two Powers at Tehran, and an understanding... that both should

^Grey to Spring-Rice 19 March 1906 ibid. no. 212. Grey to Spring-Rice 16 April 1906, S. Gwynn (ed.) The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice (London, 1929) ii. 71-2. 2

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combine to preserve the existence of Persia as a neutral State, by imposing on the Shah such a simple scheme of financial and administrative reform, as would avert or at least for the present delay the dissolution of the Persian Monarchy. 1

On 30 December Hardinge had informed Grey that this report was on its way, and offered to discuss it in person in the New Year. Grey was willing to see him, but could not fix a date because of the electoral campaigning he was about to embark on, and it is not known whether any meeting took place.2 Eventually, and after consulting, amongst other things, the Indian frontier papers of the military authorities in England,3 Grey decided to overrule the former Minister to Tehran. The instructions drafted for Sir Arthur Nicolson, who was to take up his appointment as Ambassador to St. Petersburg at the end of May, dealt, however vaguely and tentatively, in terms of vertical, or horizontal, or diagonal lines delineating possible spheres of influence in Persia. The British Government was prepared to see a Russian commercial outlet in the Persian Gulf, provided there was no question of the construction of the terminus of a future Russian railway at Bunder Abbas or at any point to the east of Bunder Abbas. The thing to which most importance was attached was 'the recognition of the province of Seistan and the provinces coterminous with the British frontier in Baluchistan as entirely within the British sphere of influence and outside the zone of future Russian railway enterprise1.4 These draft Foreign Office instructions encountered some opposition at the India Office, which saw them in late May and early June. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in particular made it clear that he was strongly against claiming a British sphere of influence in Persia or suggesting a division of Persia into Russian and British spheres of influence. His chief reason for taking this view was that, in a country falling to pieces as Persia is, 'spheres of influence' are bound to develop into protectorates - and protectorates of a very close and penetrating sort; and the result before long would be that we should find ourselves in virtual occupation e.g. of Seistan with the Russians in occupation of Khorassan and gradually closing up to the boundary of our 'sphere' with their military posts, railways, and so on. Then, if we fall out with Russia or she thought the time favourable for attacking us, see what the result would be. She would not only advance to Herat and Mazan-eShamf but she would also attack us in Seistan - indeed it is not unlikely that 1 Hardinge to Grey 23 December 1905, F.O. 371/102, partially printed in B.D. iv. no. 322. Hardinge to Grey 30 December 1905, and minute by Grey. Grey MSS F.O. 800/70. 3 see above, p. 80, fn 3. 4 I.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/10/122/3128 fl77; see also Minto to Morley 12 June 1906 Eur. D573/7. 2

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at the opening of the campaign Seistan would be the principal theatre of war. What then would become of our grand schemes of defence on the Indian side? Would our small army suffice for both fields of operations?

Another reason was that talk of spheres of influence would set the Persians against the British - 'nothing disgusts them so much as seeing us preparing to secure our share of the spoil'. In short, nothing would tend more to undermine the independence and integrity of Persia, to which it was said that His Majesty's Government attached the highest importance, than the division of Persia into spheres of influence between England and Russia. That would be 'the very opposite of "the joint co-operation of the two countries for the development and amelioration of Persia'".1 The Political Committee of the Council of India met on 19 June and it would appear that the Secretary of State for India carried the day. By early August Grey's own ideas had become more precise, to the extent that he advised Nicolson that, if the Russians proposed 'something inadmissible' as regards Persia, 'to put forward a diagonal line giving them access to the Gulf, but leaving the mouth of the Gulf on our side of the line'.2 (iii) Morley versus the Government of India3 Although Morley was able to carry the views of the Foreign Office through his Council of India relatively easily, he had much more difficulty in getting them accepted by the Government of India. It will be recalled that at the turn of the year the Government of India had wished to take advantage of what it regarded as the present opportunity to secure further concessions in southern Persia, and that it had defined southern Persia as 'the country south of the line Khanikin - Birjand'. 4 Writing to Minto on 16 January Morley began to take issue with the Government of India. He had noted 'one or two expressions about the Persian loan finding favour in some of your comments, that seem to imply the propriety of using Indian funds for expansive designs on the frontier. Of policy of that sort I am incurably jealous, and the Cabinet will assuredly sympathise in my jealousy, and so will the House of Commons even more loudly, if the occasion arises.'5 On 25 January Morley dealt with the points raised in Minto's letter of 28 December to the effect that 1

minute by Fitzpatrick 12 June 1906,1.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/10/122/3128. Grey to Nicolson 10 August 1906, B.D.iv. no. 227. 3 D.A. Hamer, John Morley, Liberal Intellectual in Politics (Oxford, 1968) barely glances at the issues dealt with in this section; S.E. Koss, John Morley at the India Office 1905-1910 (New Haven, 1969) completely ignores them. 4 s e e above, p. 69, fn 2. 5 Morley to Minto 16 January 1906, Eur.D573/28. 2

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certain proceedings on the part of Russia would constitute a casus belli: 'The acceptance of such a declaration is obviously a very great affair, and we must look about us a little.' 1 Minto tried to assure Morley that he was not 'afflicted with land hunger', and that the Government of India had no wish to obtain territory in southern Persia 'but only to obviate the establishment of Russian authority there and the possibility at some future date of Russian seaports on the Persian Gulf, which of necessity would entail great increase in naval expenditure'. 2 Beginning in March, Morley deployed other arguments. He expatiated on the importance of 'seeing the political and strategic necessities of the Empire as a whole', and indicated that what he wanted from the Government of India was 'a disposition to look at things from a wide and comprehensive point of view'. 3 On 11 April he sent a copy of Grey's despatch to Spring-Rice of 19 March embodying the Foreign Secretary's interview of that date with Benckendorff - this was 'explicit confirmation of the views that I have been hinting at for ever so many weeks in my letters to you. Let your Foreign Department drop the old fixed superstitions, and recognise - when they talk of Persian loans etc. - that they live in a world of many fluctuations, and that the international wind has changed its quarter for good or for evil'. 4 The Government of India, however, remained set in its provincial ways. One of its responses to Morley's list of new factors, which included the weakening of Russia, the coming into being of Japan, and the entente with France, Russia's ally, was to dig out letters written to Morley's predecessor, St. John Broderick, of February 1904 and August 1905. Part of the letter of August 1905 ran Though the checks which have recently been experienced by Russia in her policy of Asiatic expansion may be thought to have lessened the chances of an active programme of political or territorial advance in Persia, we can feel by no means certain that they may not have the opposite effect; while in the growing weakness and incapacity of the central Persian authority it is difficult not to observe the evidence of a disintegration that may at any time culminate in serious anarchy or disaster.-* The India Office forwarded this to the Foreign Office on 27 March, and it was agreed that it should be placed before the Committee of Imperial Defence. 1

Morley to Minto 25 January 1906, ibid.; and see above p. 58, fn 4. Minto to Morley 5 February 1906, Eur.D573/7. 3 Morley to Minto 15 March 1906, ibid. /28. 4 Morley to Minto 11 April 1906, ibid. "'Government of India to Broderick 17 August 1905, F.0.371/107/10766. 2

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On 23 March Morley had put the Cabinet's policy in a nutshell for Minto's benefit, and asked the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, Lord Kitchener, to address their minds to it: Suppose you were coming to some sort of understanding with Russia - a hypothesis which may be many hundreds of miles off realisation - and suppose even that we held the upper hand in the negotiation, what would be the terms that you would exact from Russia as essential to the bargain? I mean what, from military, strategic, and political points of view, are the things that she is to undertake to do or not to do... ' Minto's first reaction was dismissive: Let us leave out of account for the purpose, all the general considerations about the degree in which (Russia) is at present weakened or the number of years that she may take to recover; or the problem or otherwise of her keeping her word...What would Lord Kitchener say that the (reasonable or practicable) safety of India demands that Russia should promise to do or refrain from doing? 2 Minto produced a more considered response on 2 May, having consulted with his Foreign Department and with Kitchener. The views of the latter, as summarised for the Committee of Imperial Defence by the Secretary, Sir George Clarke, were: (a) (b) (c) (d)

That an understanding with Russia would be of no advantage to us That Russian railway construction has turned the balance heavily against us in regard to the defence of India That our main strategic object should be to prepare to 'seize and maintain our hold on the Kabul - Khandahar line' and That consequently our frontier railways should be pressed forward as rapidly and as far as possible.^

Like Kitchener, Minto thought the only basis for an agreement with Russia was that Russia should put 'a considerable restraint on herself' and be given nothing in return, except, possibly, the opening of the Dardanelles. He preferred, as a way of establishing closer relations with Russia, that she should be encouraged to participate in the section of the Baghdad Railway from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf, as a means of internationalising it. 4 Letters of 12 and 20 June only reinforced Minto's position: an Anglo-Russian

^Viscount Morley, Recollections (London, 1917) ii. 167-8. Minto to Morley 9 April 1906, Eur.D573/8. •^memorandum by Clarke 16 July 1906, 'Anglo-Russian relations as affecting the situation in India1, CAB 38/12/40. 4 Minto to Morley 2 May 1906, Eur.D573/8. 2

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rapprochement had 'no great attraction' for him; in fact, 'If we are to enter upon an entente with Russia, let us bargain with her elsewhere than in Central Asia or in Persia'. 1 By this time Morley had become very angry with the Government of India. His private secretary recorded on 4 July his own 'great difficulty in getting (Morley) to realise their position and...the tactical advantage of having consulted them, even if he overruled them'. 2 Morley was not to be deflected, however, from laying down the law to Minto. On 6 July he wrote a long letter, putting before the Viceroy what he euphemistically called some 'general observations': The first is this. You argue, and so to a certain degree, I think, does Lord Kitchener, as if the policy of entente with Russia were an open question. This is just what it is not. His Majesty's Government...have decided to make such attempts as Russian circumstances may permit, to arrange an entente. The grounds for this I have often referred to, when writing to you. Be they good or bad, be we right or wrong, that is our policy...An entente with Russia that should leave out Central Asia, would be a sorry trophy of our diplomacy indeed. Anyhow, His Majesty's Government have determined on their course, and it is for their agents and officers all over the world to accept it...

Morley claimed to be 'a little frightened' at Minto's statement that the Government of India should be fully consulted before the suggested agreement was entered into with Russia: Is Nicolson in his talks with Isvolski to pull himself up by thinking how this or that proposal would be taken not only at Whitehall but also at Simla?... The plain truth is...that this country cannot have two foreign policies. The Government of India in Curzon's day, and in days before Curzon, tried to have its own foreign policy. My nervous mind sees the same spectre lurking behind the phrase about 'full consultation'.

Morley noted a similar phrase in the letter he had received from Kitchener, namely 'a railway policy which we in common with H.M.'s Government have been consistently following'. This, to Morley, had 'a possible implication that "we" and H.M.'s Government are two independent though friendly Powers': Nothing but confusion, trouble, and danger attended the attempt to realise this sort of vision in Curzon's case, and so in my most deliberate opinion the same mischiefs always must attend the same dreams... 1 2

Minto to Morley 12,20 June 1906, ibid. Diary of Sir A. Hirtzel 4 July 1906,1.O.Photo Eur. 24.

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Y o u have set out your v i e w s with signal force. They do not convert us and so, like other Ministers w h o cannot carry their colleagues, y o u will make the best of it.'

Only on receipt of this constitutional mauling did Minto give any ground. He assured Morley that he was 'in entire accord... as to the necessity for direct Imperial control of our foreign relations by His Majesty's Government alone', and maintained that 'no one can be more opposed that I am to any assumption on the part of the Government of India that it is at liberty to claim a policy of its own'. 2 Minto's taste for humble pie, and his retreat, were more apparent than real. Throughout August the Government of India maintained its opposition to, and criticism of, the Foreign Office proposals, whilst delaying the delivery of the details of its own preferred position. That its position really did not change throughout the year is shown by a communication made to Morley on 3 September, in which was made the claim, completely at variance with the facts of Foreign Office thinking, that 'non-extension of active Russian influence south of line from Kain to Khanikin' had been 'recognised throughout discussions on our respective spheres in Persia'. 3 Indeed, what change there was on the Government of India's part was change for the worse, in that their line of September was more ambitious than their line of January, Kain being some seventy miles to the north of Birjand! In a similar way, when in late August it came to the attention of the Government of India that the Germans were expressing an interest in establishing a coaling station on the island of Halul in the Persian Gulf, the Indian authorities suggested preventative action on the lines either of a representation to the German Government or instructions to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, all of which the Foreign Office deplored as going far beyond any declarations ever made even by Lord Lansdowne.4

^Morley to Minto 6 July 1906, Eur.D573/l. Minto to Morley 25 July 1906, ibid.19. Morley had minuted on a communication from the viceroy of 12 July, before the latter had received his letter of 6 July: 'I shall have to write a despatch to the Government of India before long, calling attention to the absurdity of their pretensions to be an independent though not an unfriendly Power.' I.O.L.MSS,L/P&S/10/9/1290. ^Government of India to Morley 3 September 1906, F.O.416/28 no. 145; Hardinge to Nicolson 7 August, Grey to Nicolson 10 August 1906, B.D. iv nos. 226,227. "^Government of India to Morley 22 August 1906, F.O. 416/28 no.126; Foreign Office minutes, 26 August 1906, F.O.371/113/28834. 2

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(iv) The Germans in Persia The British fear of Russia's increasing her influence in Persia, in particular by granting a loan to the Persian Government, has already been demonstrated. This fear was not diminished by Isvolsky's taking over the Russian Foreign Ministry from Lamsdorff. Evidence of this is to be found in late July, for instance, and again at the beginning of September. When on 26 July Sir Arthur Hardinge, who was now the British Ambassador in Brussels, telegraphed that a M. Ampain, a well-known Belgian capitalist, had just received from M. Naus, the Belgian who was Administrator-General of the Persian Customs, an invitation to negotiate a loan of £2m to the Persian Government, a loan which would be secured with the authorisation and guarantee of the Russian Government, which Naus had said he could obtain on the customs, Grey responded by minuting: 'Some of the customs are collateral security for British loans; ought we not to put in a caveat against their being accepted as security elsewhere?'1 When Nicolson asked Isvolsky if there was any substance to this report, receiving an answer in the negative, he also garnered the rather disquieting information, which he confided to his diary, that the Russian financial problems had been solved, and that the Russian Government was in no need of money.2 Another manifestation of this fear of Russia lending emerged when Grant-Duff reported on 1 September that the Persians had handed over control of the telegraph at Meshed to the Russians. Grey minuted: 'The Persians may have done it of themselves without recent pressure from the Russians in order to predispose Russia to lend m o n e y . . . ' . 3 To these British fears of Russia's lending to Persia must be added a degree of British exasperation that Germany might be attempting to develop her own commercial and financial links with the Persian Government before an Anglo-Russian agreement could be concluded. On the same day (9 May) that Grant-Duff had telegraphed about the rumoured German loan to Persia, which Sir Charles Hardinge had regarded as 'another indication of the intention of the Germans to initiate an active policy in Persia', the British Consul in Hamburg, Wood, had informed the Foreign Office that the Hamburg-Amerika Steamship Company would start on 1 August a regular monthly service to the Persian Gulf. 4 (The first boat arrived at Muscat on 22 August, and German officers were immediately reported as making enquiries as to ports and *A. Hardinge to Grey 26 July 1906, minute by Grey, F.O.371/112/25651; see also Grey to Grant-Duff 31 July 1906, F.O.416/28 no. 79. 2 Nicolson to Grey 4 August 1906, ibid no. 103; Nicolson Diary 4 August 1906, PRO 30/81/13. •'minute by Grey on Grant-Duff to Grey 1 September 1906, B.D.iv no. 335. 4 Grant-Duff to Grey 9 May 1906, minute by Hardinge, F.O. 371/109/15861; Wood to Grey 9 May 1906, ibid J108.

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anchorages.)1 At the beginning of June H.A. Kirk, the Director-General of the Indo-European Telegraph Company, informed the India Office that the Persian Government had raised with the Company the question of the control of the telegraph line between Tehran and Khanikin. Kirk thought it highly improbable that the Persian authorities would have raised this question 'had they not been asked to do so by some agency that the present arrangement does not suit'. He drew the inference 'that the Germans, having obtained their Black Sea cable from Constanza to Constantinople, are contemplating extensions of telegraphs to the east as far as Tehran'. Kirk's communication was forwarded to the Foreign Office on 25 June. 2 On 10 July Arthur Hardinge in Brussels sent a despatch to London revealing that the First Secretary of the Persian Legation, Mirza Hassan Khan, had asked him whether Mr Darcy's oil concession gave Darcy a monopoly extending over the whole of Persia, and, if it did not, whether the British government would view with favour the grant of similar privileges to an English company, in so far as these privileges were consistent with the rights enjoyed by Mr Darcy. Mirza Hassan Khan said that he had been sounded by certain English capitalists on this subject. Hardinge was inclined to suspect that, 'if there is any truth whatever in his story', these capitalists 'may possibly be Germans'. 3 He repeated these suspicions on 14 July, modifying them only to the extent of writing, 'I would suspect that the Belgians are acting under German influence'. 4 On 19 July, having been asked to make further enquiries, Hardinge admitted that a number of items, including Mirza Hassan Khan's language, 'all combine to suggest an impression that the Persian Government is feeling its way to financial assistance from Germany, and that the position and Belgian relations of M. Naus, who has been at Constantinople in close touch with M. Stemrich [German Consul-General at Constantinople], may enable this assistance to be disguised as Belgian and therefore "non-political", and to be negotiated in Europe through Belgian agencies'. He speculated that a large advance, as opposed to a regular loan, might be made by Belgian or German capitalists in return for a concession, to be realised when the Russo-Persian Railway Agreement expired in three years' time, of an extension of the Baghdad Railway from Khanikin to Tehran, or for other monopolies or advantages in Persia: 'these might first be given to a Belgian syndicate, which would later on find it convenient to fuse its interests with those of the Baghdad Railway or the "Deutsche Bank", the owner of the petroleum monopoly in Irak Arabi.'5 These rumours were cleared away to ^Government of India to Morley 22 August 1906, F.O.416/28, enclosure in no. 126. F.0.416/27 no.214 and inclosure. 3 A . Hardinge to Grey 10 July (reed. 16 July) 1906, F.O.416/28 no. 42. Hardinge to Grey 14 July ibid. no. 39*. 5 A . Hardinge to Grey 19 July 1906, ibid no. 61.

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some extent on 26 and 27 July when Messrs Rothschild's agent in Brussels told Hardinge of the approach made by Naus to Ampain. 1 They were cleared away still further on 2 August, when Hardinge concluded that Mirza Hassan Khan's inquiries of 10 July were connected, at least primarily, with the transfer of certain oil concessions in Gilan and Mazenderan to an Amsterdam firm by the Persian Minister at Brussels.2 In the meantime, in a despatch of 18 July which reached the Foreign Office on 7 August, Grant-Duff had reported that the German Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran, Baron von Richthofen, had enquired of him whether it was the intention of any British company to apply for a concession to work the main road between Isfahan and Bushire, and that, if the answer was no, he intended to lay the matter before the German Government as a possible opening for German enterprise in Persia.3 It is not to be wondered at that the British became somewhat exasperated with the Germans. When an attack was reported on Ziegler's agent at Yezd, Grey showed this exasperation in a minute of 29 August: 'I suppose Ziegler & Co. is a German firm.' 4 A few days later, in the presence of Morley, Grey went on in the same vein, making a series of remarks which shed a rather interesting light on, amongst other things, his current conception of the purpose of the German navy: ...the key to German diplomacy is to prevent anything like a triple entente of England, France, Russia. Her policy is expanded commerce. Her triumphant rival in this field is England. To weaken England, she will use the Russian and the Turk wherever she can. She increases her fleet, to give courage to her merchants...^

When on 19 July Arthur Hardinge had speculated that the Persian Government was 'feeling its way to financial assistance from Germany', he had gone on to write: 'To what extent the German Government would be likely to fall in with such a scheme is another question, on which I am not of course qualified to speak.' 6 In fact, the Persian Government had made an approach to the German Government at the beginning of June. Hussein Khan, son and chef de cabinet of the Persian Foreign Minister, Mushir-ed-Dowleh, had spoken to Richthofen, the German Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran, of the *see above p. 84, fn 3; and A. Hardinge to Grey 27 July 1906, F.O.416/28 no. 75. A . Hardinge to Grey 2 August 1906, ibid no. 99. 3 Grant-Duff to Grey 18 July 1906, ibid. no. 92. V i n u t e by Grey 20 August 1906, F.O. 371/111/28247. "'Morley to Minto 29 August 1906, Eur.D573/l. Monger op. cit. (pp. 286-7) wrongly ascribes these remarks to Morley; in fact, Morley was reporting Grey's words. 6 see p. 86, fn 5. 2

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Persian Government's wish to see not only the establishment of a German bank in Persia but also the lending of money by such a bank to the Persian Government. It was clear to Richthofen that the Persians were not interested only in the commercial dimension: that they were rather more interested in involving Germany in the fate of Persia so that they could turn for support to Germany if an Anglo-Russian threat to occupy the country should threaten the sovereignty of the Shah. Richthofen reported all this to Btilow, the German Chancellor, and asked for instructions as to the rejection or acceptance of the overture. He ended his despatch with the draft of a note in the latter sense. 1 This arrived in Berlin on 16 June. Richthofen was authorised to respond to the Persian overture, and by the end of the month a German-Persian convention had been drafted, the text of which was identical to Richthofen's original note. This convention was signed on 1 July, but ante-dated to 25 May. It was agreed that its existence be kept secret for six months. 2 The attitude of Berlin emerged most clearly at the end of July, when the Foreign Minister, Tschirschky, informed the ambassador in St. Petersburg, Schoen, of what had transpired. Because the concession had to be kept secret until 1 January 1907, no contacts had been made with German banks and it was not known whether the German financial community would be prepared to exploit the concession. Tschirschky made it quite clear that German policy in Persia would not change - it would be concerned only with economic goals and not with political ones. He instructed Schoen to inform the Russians, in terms of the strictest confidence, both of this German policy and of the convention signed with the Persians. His hope was that, as a result, official Russian circles would not become suspicious that a change in German policy towards Persia was being contemplated. 3 On 31 July Biilow instructed Richthofen to act strictly as an observer. 4 By 11 September Tschirschky's misgivings had grown. He told Richthofen, who had protested against his instructions of 31 July when informing Berlin on 6 August that the German Legation expected a Persian approach for a loan before the end of the month,5 that if the Germans agreed to make the financial advances desired by the Persians, the Germans would be placed in a difficult position politically and would unite Britain and Russia against themselves. Such contacts as had now been made with German 1

Richthofen to Biilow 4 June 1906, in J. Lepsius, A Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, F. Thimme (eds.), Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914 (Berlin 1922-27) vol. 25, no. 8568. ^Richthofen to Ministry of Foreign Affairs 28 June 1906 ibid. no. 8570. ^Tschirschky 29 July 1906 ibid. no. 8572, see also Tschirschky to Marshall 24 August 1906, cited in Bradford G. Martin, German-Persian Diplomatic Relations 1873-1912 ('S-Gravenhage, 1959) p. 99 fn 25, and p. 107ff. "^Richthofen to Biilow 6 August 1906, DGP vol. 25 no. 8573. -'ibid.

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bankers, moreover, revealed a reluctance to lend because of the lack of guarantees. Tschirschky told Richthofen to tell Mushir-ed-Dowleh, who had become Prime Minister at the beginning of August, that any sort of a loan was out of the question; on the other hand, an effort was to be made to hold the Persian Government to its willingness to see the establishment of a German bank.1 On 21 September the German Ambassador in London, Count Metternich, was instructed to tell Sir Charles Hardinge that a purely private bank, as opposed to une banque d'état, was to be established in Persia, and that it followed from this that there could be no question of German financiers according a loan to the Persian Government.2 So far as Berlin was concerned it would appear that Sir Edward Grey was correct to say of Germany that 'Her policy is expanded commerce'. 3 Tschirschky had been interested in a bank only from the point of view of German commercial interests and not with a view to setting up political interests in Persia. When in Berlin in October Isvolsky was told that it was Richthofen who should be blamed for having been 'trop avancé vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Persan en matière de banque et d'offres d'avances pécuniaires'.4 (v) Nicolson's August Word reached London on the morning of 23 July that the Russian Duma, or parliament, had been dissolved by the Tsar two days earlier. The British Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who was opening the Inter-Parliamentary Union at which all the parliaments of Europe were represented, concluded his address with the sentence, 'La Duma est morte, vive la Duma'. 5 These sentiments, however worthy, were to cause Sir Arthur Nicolson considerable difficulty in his dealings with the Russians in the course of the following month. Nicolson learned on 28 July that his own government was now inclined to mark time until it was clear that the government in Russia was securely established. This he regarded as a mistake. He urged Hardinge, and then Grey, that he be allowed to 'keep the ball rolling along gently' on the assumption that the Russian Government was stable. If the ball was not kept rolling the Russians would think their stability was doubted; later they might be more self-reliant, confident, and exacting; and in ^Tschirschky to Richthofen 11 September 1906 ibid. no. 8576. Pourtalès to Metternich 21 September 1906 ibid. no. 8578; see also Grey to Lascelles 25 September 1906, B.D.iv no 351; Grant-Duff to Grey 23 September 1906 F.O.416/28 no. 205Nicolson to Grey no. 642,21 September 1906 F.O.416/29 no. 29. 3 see above p. 88, fn 3. 4 Isvolsky to Benckendorff 7 November 1906, in A. Isvolsky, Au Service de la Russia: Correspondance Diplomatique 1906-1911 (Paris 1937-9) i. 393. 5 J.A. Spender, Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London, 1923) ii. 262-3. 2

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the meantime German policy might develop in Persia. Nicolson wanted to take up the question of Persia immediately, and attempt to arrive at an understanding before the Germans could establish a footing in Persia or the Russians could strengthen their existing position in Seistan - a matter to which the question of the control of the Meshed-Siestan telegraph was relevant. 1 On 4 August Nicolson discovered that a general strike was imminent. 2 Two days later he recorded that 'Isvolsky has cooled off and that he (Nicolson) had 'very little hope of an arrangement'. 3 On 11 August he noted the failure of Stolypin to form a ministry combining the political factions in Russia, and commented: 'Altogether the situation is becoming more and more confused.' 4 On 15 August he still found that the attitude of Isvolsky to the subject of negotiations 'has completely changed and his former eagerness has been replaced by silence and apparent indifference'. The main reasons, he believed, were Campbell-Bannerman's speech and the British press coverage generally of events in Russia. At any rate, 'the chances of an entente are diminishing'. 5 Ten days later Nicolson gathered that Grey believed that another revolution in Russia was inevitable. 6 On the following day (26 August) there was an attempt on the life of Stolypin. Had the Russian Prime Minister been at home, he would have been blown up along with his house. 7 In these circumstances, which were so little auspicious as entirely to rule out the possibility of a visit from King Edward to the Tsar, it was distinctly surprising that on 29 August Poklewski, who was First Secretary at the Russian Embassy in London, should call on Nicolson and try to 'pump' him as to what Britain could propose as regards Persia, telling him that Isvolsky was fully alive to German activity there and thought it would be well that Britain and Russia come to a mutual arrangement before Germany had gained too firm a footing. 8 What happened next delivered a much-needed and long overdue opportunity to solve and sort out a series of otherwise intractable problems.

1 Nicolson Diary 28 July 1906, PRO 30/81/13; Nicolson to Hardinge 29 July 1906, Hardinge MSS vol. 8; Nicolson to Grey 2 August 1906 Grey MSS F.0.800/72. ^Nicolson Diary 4 August 1906, PRO 30/81/13. 3 ibid. 6 August 1906. 4 ibid. 11 August 1906. 5 ibid. 15 August 1906. ^ibid. 25 August 1906. In mid-August, on an account of a conversation between Stolypin and Donald Mackenzie Wallace of The Times, Grey had minuted: 'very interesting, though it confirms the impression that no great personality is yet in evidence and that no forecast can be made of the future course of events.' F.O. 371/127/27544. 7 ibid. 26 August 1906. S ibid. 29 August 1906.

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(vi) Only Connect What happened next was that, on 31 August, Isvolsky informed Nicolson that the Persian Government was pressing Russia for a loan on any terms that Russia wanted, and threatening that if neither Russia nor Britain met their wishes they would be obliged to apply to Germany. Nicolson suggested the making of a joint advance 'to meet the most pressing necessities' of the Persian Government, for 'it would never do to let the Germans intervene'. Isvolsky agreed. 1 Nicolson immediately telegraphed to London, and followed up on 1 September with a despatch giving the details of the Persian demands on Russia: an immediate advance of £500,000 and a loan of £1,650,000.2 Nicolson's information was supplemented by a telegram from Grant-Duff in Tehran, sent on 2 September and received on 3 September. Grant-Duff's information was that the Persian Government had applied to St. Petersburg for a loan a fortnight before, and were still awaiting the Russian Government's reply. In a section marked 'Secret', Grant-Duff went on to say that M. Naus 'openly made a statement to the above effect not long ago, and it was confirmed by high officials of the Court'. He suggested that this information would account for the Grand Vizier's handing over of the MeshedSeistan telegraph line to the Russians.3 On 3 September Grey adopted Nicolson's suggestion that an advance in common be made; given the Shah's health and the consequent instability of the present Persian Government, he thought it would be best if a loan were deferred until the Valiahd succeeded to the throne, at which stage a loan 'might enable a better start to be made with a new government'. 4 At the same time, as the advancing of any money might involve a raid on Indian revenues, Grey spoke with Morley, and authorised the latter to consult with Hardinge. In his conversation with Morley, Grey used a particular argument, an argument encapsulated in Morley's sentence, 'I quite feel with you the awkwardness of seeing Russia joining hands with Germany'. 5 This was an argument that had seen the light of day on only one previous occasion. It had been embedded in one of the paragraphs of Sir A. Hardinge's despatch no. 108 of 19 July. Having begun this paragraph by wondering to what extent the German Government might respond to Persian overtures, the ambassador to Brussels had continued:

1 ibid. 31 August 1906. ^Nicolson to Grey 1 September 1906, B.D.iv. no. 336. ^Grant-Duff to Grey no. 229, 2 September 1906, F.O. 371/169/29699. 4 Grey to Nicolson 3 September 1906, B.D.iv no. 337. 5 Morley to Grey 4 September 1906, Grey MSS F.O. 800/98.

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Economically Persia is valueless to Germany; she is, however, valuable as a bone of contention between Russia and ourselves, and as a means of preventing an Anglo-Russian entente in Asia. I gather that a struggle is proceeding at St. Petersburg between progressive forces friendly to England and reactionary forces disposed to lean on Germany, that the latter have the sympathy of the Empress, of the military party, and to some extent of M. Isvolsky, and that the issue of the conflict is still doubtful. The question of Persia will certainly prove a factor of some importance in it. If Germany were to propose as part of a wider plan a Russo-German in lieu of a RussoEnglish entente about Persia, which would admit of a recognition of Russian influence on the shores of the Indian Ocean in return for a recognition of German influence in Mesopotamia, in Arabistan, and along the Euphrates as far as Mohammerah, and a common policy on these lines, in opposition to England, at Tehran, it appears to me conceivable that such an offer might present certain attractions to powerful Anglophobe elements in St. Petersburg, and might at least serve to obstruct that Anglo-Russian agreement respecting Asia which is naturally dreaded at Berlin. From this point of view the creating and assertion of some concrete German interest in Persia would be important. *

Hardinge's argument, however unrealistic in the context of the conspicuous snub delivered by the Germans as regards a loan in April, had one outstanding merit. It was eminently usable by the British Foreign Office on those less well informed than themselves. Having used it upon Morley, who had admitted to Grey that 'The loan does not smile to me',2 Grey was to use it upon Campbell-Bannerman a week later. It was also to be used by Morley upon a recalcitrant Government of India. It must be remembered here that on 3 September the Government of India had revealed how obdurate they remained as regards influence south of a line from Kain to Khanikin.3 Not surprisingly, on 4 September his private secretary found Morley 'firmly resolved that the government of India should not be regarded as an independent Power'.4 In these circumstances the argument that Grey borrowed from Sir Arthur Hardinge was grist to Morley's personal mill. The action that Grey had taken on 3 September — his falling in with Nicolson's suggestion for at least a joint Anglo-Russian advance to Persia, and his telling Nicolson that Grant-Duff had been instructed to 'ascertain in conjunction with his Russian colleague how much is required, and how we can secure that it should be applied to objects of real necessity' 5 — must also be remembered. For at this stage, and until late in the evening of 8 1 A. Hardinge to Grey no. 108, 19 M y 1906, F . 0 . 4 1 6 / 2 8 no. 61. Although Nicolson had written in his diary on 15 August, 'We are forcing Russia into the arms of Germany', he had not written to the Foreign Office to this effect: PRO 30/81/13. 2 s e e p. 91, fn. 3. 3 see p. 84, fn. 3. 4 Diary of Sir A. Hirtzel 4 September 1906,1.O. Photo Eur. 24. 5 Grey to Nicolson 3 September 1906, B.D.iv no. 337.

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September, it was, for the British Foreign Secretary, as it had been before, in January, in May and in July, more a matter of preventing Russia from acceding alone to Persian desires than of preventing the Germans from doing so: Persian threats to approach another 'quarter' were, after all, by this time, common currency - part of the Persian negotiating technique. Grey's resolve would not have been weakened by what he received on 4 September: from the India Office a copy of the Government of India's obdurate telegram of 3 September, and from Tehran Grant-Duff's no 230 secret to the effect that the next diplomatic bag would contain 'documentary proof that the Russian Minister in Persia had made use in the provinces of recent events at the British Legation 'for the furtherance of Russian interests'.1 Moreover, on 7 September the Government of India telegraphed once more, and ended with an effective reminder of Grant-Duff's news of 2 September to the effect that the question of a Russian loan might again become pressing. This reached the Foreign Office on 10 September.2 On 7 September there was a meeting of the Russian Crown Council. This meeting was told by Isvolsky that a choice had to be made between an agreement with Britain which would guarantee at least some Russian interests, and continued rivalry with her. The Minister of Finance, Kokovtsov, had already prepared a paper indicating his preference for the first of these alternatives. At the meeting he said ...we had to recognise that the political significance of Russia had declined, and that, by reason of this, it was necessary for us to change our view regarding Eastern policy generally, in which had been admitted the radical mistake that we had not measured up the resources at our disposal against our intended objective. In particular, with regard to Persia, the motive idea had lain in the striving towards an outlet to the Persian Gulf, which idea had included that of building railways in the south...

Kokovtsov thought that events had demonstrated the impossibility of Russia's squeezing other nations out of Persia and subjecting her entirely to Russian influence. He also thought that Russia should not attempt to penetrate too deeply into Persia: 'Our task was to look after the provinces adjacent to Russia and not to admit in them the influence of Britain or Germany.' The paper which he had prepared contained an attempt to define a boundary along the line Qasr-i-Shirin, Hamadan, Tehran, Meshed, Askabad. This boundary, if implemented,

^Grant-Duff to Grey 4 September 1906, F.O.371/113/30057. ^Government of India to Morley 7 September 1906, F.O.416/28 no. 160.

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closed to the Baghdad railway entrance to Persia, guarded the approaches to the Transcaucasian railway, and taking in the capital of the country drew a natural frontier of that sphere in which we had already succeeded in securing conditions and standing generally on a sure footing. We should limit ourselves to this line and resolve not to go further south. 1

On the evening of the following day, 8 September, Isvolsky called on Nicolson. This time, what Isvolsky had to announce was not, as on 31 August, a Persian approach to Russia, but a Persian approach to Germany, for a similar amount of money. 'Active pourparlers', he asserted, were in progress, according to his information. He presumed that the bank involved must be the Deutsche Bank. He suggested the blocking of this project through the making of a joint advance by the British and Russian Governments.2 Grey made no immediate response to this latest apparent development. By 12 September, however, he had decided upon what line to take. When writing to Grey on 4 September, the thrifty Morley had said: 'The loan would be less obnoxious if it were an item in a general deal. But as it is...?'. 3 This had developed, in Grey's mind, into the idea of connecting the matter of a joint Anglo-Russian advance to Persia with the opening of Anglo-Russian negotiations on Persia and, in particular, on the spheres of influence to be allocated there. Accordingly, on 12 September, Grey telegraphed to Nicolson that the British Government was willing to participate in a loan of £400,000 to the Persian Government. Referring to the conditions mentioned in a telegram from Grant-Duff on 9 September, Grey went on: I would propose to the Russian Government that, as security for our half of the loan, we should take, apart from the loan already held by us, an additional one upon the customs of the Gulf and southern ports, and that the Persian Government should also give us an undertaking not to grant any concessions to other Powers for the construction of roads, telegraphs, or railways in the district lying to the east of a line running to Bunder Abbas from Birjand. To the westward of this line Russia would thus be free to make her own terms respecting her security. If the question be raised by the Russian Government of themselves joining in the security of customs at Persian ports, we might give our consent to this being done at ports lying to the west of Bunder Abbas, and well within the mouth of the Persian Gulf, but such proposals must emanate from the Russian side, and before agreeing to it you should refer the matter for His Majesty's Government's consideration. 1 Krasny Archiv lvi, 60, as quoted in R.L. Greaves, 'Some Aspects of the Anglo-Russian Convention and its working in Persia 1907-1914', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies xxxi (1968) 73-4. ^Nicolson to Grey no.213, 8 September 1906, F.0.371/169/30469; Nicolson to Grey no.600, 8 September (received 17 September) 1906, F.O.416/28 no.179: Nicolson Diary 8 September 1906, PRO 30/81/13. 3 s e e p. 91, fn 3.

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He ended: You will see from this that we desire to make the joint loan something which shall in practice be a general settlement with Russia as regards Persia; otherwise I do not think that we should be disposed to entertain it.' Now that the die had been cast, Grey wrote to Campbell-Bannerman. He used the same argument that had worked on Morley, even though it played but a minor part in his own thinking: Isvolsky's direct request to Nicolson to join in a loan to Persia, lest Germany should complicate the Persian situation by lending herself on political conditions, raised a serious question. So I came to see Morley. My fear was that if we refused Isvolsky might, rather than let Germany lend alone, join with Germany in a loan. We should then find Germany and Russia partners against us in Persia and any chance of a future arrangement with Russia would be gone. So I thought we ought not to refuse, but have cut down the amount to the smallest sum possible, and suggested conditions which will test the sincerity of Russia's intentions to make an arrangement with us. If she agrees to our proposal the line of a division of spheres of interest between Russia and Britain in Persia will be laid down. We shall have left the north and west and upper part of the Persian Gulf open to her, but the mouth of the Persian Gulf, the south, and Seistan will be secured to us as our interest, which Russia will have agreed not to meddle with...if it goes through we shall have prepared the way for a satisfactory position in the future. *

The argument that Grey feared a Russo-German partnership had yet another victim to claim. This victim was the Government of India. On 19 September Lord Minto sent a long telegram, protesting about the policy decided upon, about which he had been informed on the 14th. A s this so comprehensively encapsulates the opposition of the Government of India to any agreement with Russia, and the reasons for this opposition, and as it was not placed in the Confidential Print and has never been published, it is printed here as an Appendix. Suffice it to say that it began by complaining that 'We now learn that a joint loan is contemplated as the basis of a general settlement of the Persian Question, and that instructions in regard to that settlement were

l Gxcy to Nicolson 12 September 1906,1.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/10/9/3460, my italics. As printed in the Confidential Print (F.O.416/28 no.167) the wording of the final paragraph is less categorical than in the original. The words 'something in the nature of a general settlement' are substituted for 'something which shall in practice be a general settlement'. Monger op. cit. p. 289 vised oaly the Confidential Print, and as a result did not register all the dimensions of Grey's policy. See also Grant-Duff to Grey 9 September 1906, F.O.416/28 no. 158. ^Grey to Campbell-Bannerman 13 September 1906, Campbell-Bannerman MSS, Add MSS 41218, my italics.

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sent to (Nicolson) on 12 September'; that it deplored the decision to recede from the line Khanikin-Birjand and argued that the line Mohammerah-Kain was far preferable to the line Bunder Abbas-Birjand; and that it ended: 'Against such a settlement as that indicated...we venture most respectfully but strongly to protest in the interests of India, and we trust in no case shall we be called on to provide funds for any advance or loan for such a measure, or to contribute towards the heavy naval and military expenditure which will inevitably hereafter be entailed thereby'.1 A letter from Kitchener was enclosed with this more or less unilateral declaration of independence. As regards a possible loan to Persia and its consequences, he stated: I look on the proposed negotiations with Russia as very dangerous to our interests in Persia as they would allow Russia, in my opinion, far more than she is in any way entitled to, or would probably ask for herself. I think that, in the present state of affairs in Russia, any general settlement in Persia would be very inopportune, and I fear that what is proposed could not be a permanent solution. Rather than the proposals of His Majesty's Government, I would prefer, in case of a loan, to leave things as they are, and allow Russia to make her own terms for security with Persia without any agreement on our part in them. Persia would, of course, be told that in any such arrangement with Russia our known interests must be safeguarded.2

At the same time, Minto sent a personal telegram to Morley which took a slightly more malleable line. Minto explained that the official telegram represented the views of the Government of India in accordance with long recognised policy in regard to Persia. 'Personally', however, 'reading between the lines of your private letters and Hardinge's despatches from Brussels, I suspect action of H.M. Government in respect of Russia and Persia is due to apprehension of German intrigues in Middle East, and necessity for good relations between ourselves, Russia, and France.' Minto asked, on the assumption that his assumption was correct, that any reply should authorise him to explain to his Council 'that entirely new position has arisen'. He

'Viceroy to Secretary of State 19 September 1906,1.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/10/9/1595. Asquith, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote to Grey on 23 September: '...now the Government of India are almost in hysterics over suggested delimitations of interests in Persia. I gather that their real objection is to conceding Russia any possible access to the sea, whether in the Gulf or further East.' Grey MSS F.0.800/101. The immediate reaction at the India Office is best captured in Hardinge's minute of 20 September: 'Ritchie writes: "The situation between him (the Viceroy) and Secretary of State is somewhat strained". F.O.371/169/31815. ^Kitchener to Morley 19 September 1906,1.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/10/9/1595.

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ended: 'Present proposals in respect to Persia are severe shock to traditional policy here, and if not explained will arouse much criticism.'1 This plea to be provided with an argument to be used against the Viceroy's Council was to put further mileage on the argument making Germany the scapegoat for it all. On the Viceroy's official telegram of 19 September Sir Edward Grey minuted: We do not want the Indian Government to hold the Bunder AbbasBirjand line as a frontier; my view has been that under no circumstances should we annex any part of Persia; it remains for us_by diplomacy to keep Russia away from the Seistan triangle. I believe we can do that by the proposals made as regards this loan, but not otherwise^ I differ as to the importance of Gulf ports inside the mouth; I do not believe in the danger of Russia having access to them nor is any settlement possible unless she has such access eventually. This agreement we have proposed is one which has a fair prospect of continuing if made. The proposal of the government of India of a line from Birjand to Khanikin if agreed to would never last. As a matter of fact it would never be agreed to, and what the Indian Government must have in view is the holding of this line eventually by force, which means the annexation of South Persia. ^

There was no concern about Germany, or about a German-Russian agreement, here, where one might have expected to find it, had there been any such concern. Morley, however, had the Viceroy's Council to consider. He first replied briefly to Minto's private telegram: 'Your explanation about certain intrigues quite correct', and claimed that his own view was 'against associating loan with general settlement', 3 which claim, if true, represented a change of mind from his position on 4 September. He next elaborated somewhat, maintaining that 'the key to the matter lies in the attempt of Germany to get her finger into the Persian pie - first as a step in the general World Policy; second, by way of complicating attempts at an entente between us and Russia'. He then dismissed Kitchener's pretensions: 'Lord Kitchener's telegram of 19 September does not impress me favourably. When he says that "in the present state of affairs in Russia, any general settlement of affairs in Persia Mill to to Morley 19 September 1906, Eur.D573/28 f.63. From this and from a letter expanding on this telegram it is clear that the Viceroy was receiving the Foreign Office Confidential Print, or at least selected parts of it, and that Morley also received that material, despite Monger's' assertions to the contrary: Minto to Morley 19 September 1906, Eur.D573/9; Monger op cit no 284, 307. 2 mmute by Grey on Government of India to Secretary of State 19 September 1906, copied personally by Grey to Morley, F.O.371/169/31815 and I.O.L.MSS L/P&S/10/9/3502, my italics. Morley to Minto 20 September 1906, Eur.D573/28 f.64.

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would be very inopportune" he is going beyond the soldier's province altogether.' 'Does he know', asked Morley rhetorically, 'more of the present state of Russia than we do? Does he know anything at all of the many German moves? "Opportuneness" in such a case is not a soldier's question at all.' 1 Morley then sat down, on 22 September, to compose personally a reply to the Viceroy's official telegram of the 19th. Morley's reply is printed in full in the Appendix. It was a complete refutation and rejection of the thinking of the Government of India. In touching on the political questions which it was for the British Government to decide on 'the broadest possible consideration of Imperial policy', Morley did say, 'His Majesty's Government have decided that the present state of affairs in Russia, the present state of affairs in Persia, and the possible attitude of at least one other European Power as to Persian questions, all make it eminently desirable to create or seize an opportunity of coming to terms with Russia...'. However, in the context of the present argument, what is most interesting is Morley's late addition of the sentence 'Further complications from new quarter seem close at hand1. This insertion was telegraphed by Morley, who had gone to Harrogate, to Sir R.T. Ritchie, the Secretary of the Political and Secret Department of the India Office, at 11.39 a.m. on 24 September. It is, in my view, a measure of the importance attached in London to the matter of a German loan that Morley originally forgot to mention it, and only brought it in as an afterthought. 2

(vii) Nicolson's September On 11 and 12 September Nicolson had found Isvolsky keeping him at arm's length in relation to all the areas - Thibet, Afghanistan, Persia - on which the former wished to make progress. 3 In all probability, Isvolsky's discouraging vagueness reflected the fact that the Russian Crown Council meeting of 7 September had not taken any firm or clear-cut decision as to what Russian policy was to be. On 13 September Nicolson embarked on the implementation of his new instructions, which were nothing short of an attempt by Grey to pre-empt the outcome of any negotiations that the Russians might eventually decide to participate in. Nicolson stuck very closely to his brief. He found the Russian Foreign Minister unable to give a reply offhand, and somewhat nervous as to the 1 Morley to Minto 20 September 1906, ibid.l 1. ^Secretary of State to Viceroy 24 September 1906,1.O.L.MSS L/P&S/10/9/1595. ^Nicolson Diary 11, 12 September 1906, PRO 30/81/13; Nicolson to Grey 12 September 1906, B.D.iv no.228.

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conditions to be imposed on Persia. Taking a distinctly odd view of German bankers, namely that they might lend money without any guarantees, Isvolsky professed to be afraid that if conditions of the nature described by Nicolson were imposed on the Persian Government, the latter would immediately close a deal with a delegate from a German bank who, he said, was due to arrive in Tehran towards the end of the month.1 On 17 September Isvolsky revealed that he was well aware of the game that Grey was playing. He told Nicolson that it would be more prudent 'not to connect a matter which would practically be the delimitation of spheres of influence in Persia with an advance'. An advance was 'a comparatively trifling affair'. Only when the question of 'a serious loan in common' was taken up would the moment have arrived to discuss spheres of influence. 2 Isvolsky was to maintain this line again on the 19th.3 For his part, Grey had decided to exert further pressure. On Nicolson's no. 224 of 17 September, in which Isvolsky had expressed the hope that the British would be content, as regards the advance, with a lien on the customs of the ports in the Persian Gulf and in Southern Persia, Sir Charles Hardinge had minuted: 'Agree to on understanding with Russia that we consider the triangle in question our indisputable sphere of influence upon which point no concession is possible.' On Nicolson's next telegram, no. 225, also of 17 September, the Permanent Under Secretary had suggested that 'if we take the Birjand-Bunder Abbas triangle as our sphere of influence we must not abandon the whole of the rest of Persia to the Russian sphere'. Taking up these points, Grey indicated on the 19th that the Russians should have a sphere in the west and north corresponding to that of Britain in the east and south, 'the middle portion being left equally open to general enterprise'; he was particularly insistent, however, on obtaining from the Russians, 'as the starting point of common action', recognition of the proposed line from Bunder Abbas to Birjand. 4 Nicolson initially resisted this pressure. On 21 September he did not press the point that Russian recognition of the Bundar Abbas-Birjand line should be obtained, as it was clear to him that Isvolsky was 'anxious not to associate the question of spheres with that of the first advance'. 5 Two days later, however, Nicolson was informed that both Isvolsky and Kokovtsov were prepared to accept the British line from Bunder Abbas to Birjand, and the north of Persia as a sphere for Russia. A large task remained — that of the necessity ^see above p. 95, fn 1; Nicolson to Grey 13 September 1906, F.O.416/28 no.183. ^Nicolson to Grey no.224, 17 September 1906, F.O.371/169/31582. %icolson to Grey 19 September 1906, F.O.416/28 no. 188. 4 minutes by Hardinge on Nicolson to Grey nos. 224, 225, 17 September 1906, F.O.371/169/31582, /31583; Grey to Nicolson 19 September 1906, F.O.416/28 no. 190. ^Nicolson to Grey 21 September 1906, ibid, no.196.

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of convincing the Tsar and the General Staff. Nevertheless, Nicolson took this chance to insist that it was of 'paramount importance' that Britain obtain the sphere of influence that she had proposed.1 On 24 September Grey informed King Edward of how things were going, taking a swipe at the Government of India in the process. 2 Three days later, no further progress having been made, Grey fully revealed his hand to Nicolson, telegraphing: Joint loan to the Persian Government. The desire of His Majesty's Government, in cooperating with Russia for this purpose, has been to obtain a general settlement of the relations between the two Powers. His Majesty's Government would, therefore, prefer that the Russian Government should at once, as the starting point of common action, consent to the immediate settlement of the Seistan telegraph difficulty and the delimitation of our sphere of influence in Eastern Persia by the recognition of the Bunder Abbas-Birjand line. This course would not be precluded by our acceptance of what appears to be M. Isvolsky's view - namely, that it would not be advisable to require any conditions from the Persian government in return for our advance. If, however, the immediate payment of the first moiety, before you have succeeded in arriving at an arrangement on the above terms, is rendered necessary by the exigencies of the present Persian situation, we will not object to making our contribution of £100,000. This step would have the merit of being the first towards an agreement between the two Powers. Unless, however, the Russian government recognise the Bunder AbbasBirjand line, and a settlement of the telegraph difficulty accordingly is reached, His Majesty's Government will be unable to contribute to the second moiety. You should make it quite clear to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3

When implemented, this attempt by Grey to turn the screw on Russia backfired. On the 27th Isvolsky sent Benckendorff a dossier covering the developments of the last fortnight. 'You will see in it', he wrote, 'that the Cabinet in London wishes to profit from the occasion of the advance to pose here and now a question of principle - that of the delimitation of spheres of interests.' Isvolsky had tried to demonstrate to Nicolson the inconveniences of such an approach, to persuade him that to take up such tough questions at this stage risked the making of the advance to Persia which it was important to

1 Nicolson to Grey no.243, 23 September 1906, F.0.371/169/32058. Writing to Grey on 24 September, Nicolson used the phrase 'of primordial importance': B.D. iv no.349 p. 394; Nicolson Diary 24 September 1906, PRO 30/81/13. 2 B.D.iv no.350. 3 Grey to Nicolson no.369, 27 September 1906, F.O.416/28 no. 218. This was an elaboration of Grey's minute on Nicolson's no.243 of 23 September: 'We should not advance the whole of the £400,000 in common with Russia till our Birjand-Bunder Abbas line is agreed to by Russia and the telegraph difficulty settled accordingly.' F.0.371/169/32058.

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give quickly, and for which Kokovtsov had found the money. 1 For Isvolsky, who expected considerable difficulties with the General Staff when it came to the fundamentals of the Persian question, the advance was merely 'un lever de rideau' - a curtain-raiser; it was not, as it had become with Grey, 'la vraie pièce'. Isvolsky had said that he did not know whether the London cabinet had deliberately ('à desseirì) been in a hurry to shove its iron into the fire and to indicate in which direction the solution was to be found. Any suspicions he had on this score were, in fact, quite correct. On 29 September, when implementing Grey's latest instructions, Nicolson put it to Isvolsky that it was most desirable, in the opinion of the British Government, that the British line from Birjand to Bunder Abbas should be recognised by the Russian Government before, at any rate, the second half of the advance to Persia was made. Isvolsky responded by stressing the difficulties he would have in inducing other Ministries to consent, and asked if the British government made the acceptance by Russia of the line in question a sine qua non to their joining in the second half of the advance. Nicolson said that 'to speak frankly, that was the case'. Isvolsky then made it clear that, if the second half of the advance was urgently required by the Persian Government, Russia, rather than be bound by the British conditions, would have to advance it herself. Having thus finessed the British, Isvolsky proceeded to deliver to Nicolson, and indirectly to Grey, a lesson in how to negotiate. As Nicolson reported it: M. Isvolsky begged me to submit to you most earnestly that we should not jeopardise a future arrangement by rushing matters. He was himself favourable to our line, but he would tell me quite frankly that he would have a hard fight to obtain it. He would far prefer to leave the question of spheres of interest alone for the moment, and to make the whole advance conjointly. He dwelt on his aim of eventually drawing up a Convention embracing all questions at issue in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet, and of arriving at an arrangement by which, humanly speaking, all danger of future rivalry and conflict would be removed. All the questions hung together; no one could be settled independently and apart. He thought that to divulge our cards prematurely would be most imprudent, not to one another or to the Persian Government, but to third parties, and we should be doing this if we arranged at once merely one part of the whole scheme.^

Nicolson, who believed the Russians would and could find the money, advised Grey to pull back: 'I would recommend joint action as to the whole of the advance, and that we should not insist on the acceptance of our line as an indispensable condition to our co-operation.' 1 Isvolsky to Benckendorff 27 September 1906, in Isvolsky op. cit. i. 377. ^Nicolson to Grey no.250,29 September 1906, F.O.416/28 no.224; also B.D.iv no. 352.

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Having tried, and failed, to 'bounce' the Russians in the way that he had, Grey gave credit where credit was due, and retreated in the face of Isvolsky's powerful points. He finally realised that, just as the British Foreign Office had to take into account other agencies in the determination of policy — in this case primarily the India Office and the Government of India, so had the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 1 On 2 October Grey telegraphed to Nicolson that the British Government no longer desired 'to press the Russian Government by insisting on complete political agreement as condition of joint advance to Persia'. He recognised 'that an arrangement concluded reluctantly under pressure probably would not last'. He was prepared to go ahead with the whole advance as Nicolson recommended. In order to meet the objections of the Government of India, however, he still insisted that the Russians abandon the control of the Meshed-Seistan telegraph line which the Persian Government had recently given them, and which in his view was an alteration in the status quo to the disadvantage of Great Britain. If this could be achieved, 'the joint advance will then be the beginning of common action between the two governments, which will be continued pending the discussion and, I trust, the conclusion eventually of a comprehensive and lasting agreement such as Isvolsky desires'.2 *

R.P. Churchill's work of 1939 stated that when the fear of interference on the part of outside Powers, namely Germany, diminished, the Persian loan question was promptly allowed to lag again. 3 Most historians have followed Churchill in this regard. Monger, for instance, stated that when the Germans told Isvolsky in October, when he visited Berlin, that they had no wish to establish a bank in Persia, 'Isvolsky and Grey were then able to drop their offer of a loan'. 4 The real reason why a loan to Persia was not given immediately, however, was that Russia had, in the person of Isvolsky, rejected the conditions that Great Britain, in the person of Grey, had attempted to attach to it. What it is important to note, in this particular connection, is that Grey's greatest pressure on Isvolsky, as embodied in the instructions sent to Nicolson on 27 September, came several days after the German Embassy in London had stated that Germany would refrain from entering into any question of a loan to Persia, and several days after Grey's minute of 24 September on ^see minute by Grey 16 October on Nicolson to Grey 29 September 1906, B.D.iv no. 353 p. 400. ¿Grey to Nicolson no.381,2 October 1906,1.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/10/9/3537. 3 R.P. Churchill op. cit. p. 239. ^Monger op. cit. p. 293.

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this that, 'if so, it makes the proposed Anglo-Russian loan less urgent1.1 It is also worth noting that German interest did not entirely disappear, as stated by Churchill and Monger. On the contrary, the German bank concession remained available, and throughout 1907 it was expected that it would be taken up; to most people banks remained indistinguishable from the granting of loans — certainly Benckendorff had always thought so.2 An advance to the Valiahd, moreover, would have been made, had not the Valiahd preferred, in the event, not to risk incurring the wrath of the liberals in Persia who wished to reform the system of government. On 3 October Morley had sanctioned an advance from Indian revenues of £100,000 and on 4 October £50,000 was sent to the Imperial Bank of Persia. On 14 December, at the request of the Foreign Office, the £50,000 sanctioned by Morley in June, following the Shah's stroke of May, was paid by the India Office for the purpose of an advance to the Valiahd. As Sir Arthur Godley of the India Office recalled, 'The immediate cause of this step was the receipt of a telegram from Spring-Rice on 13 December stating that the Shah was dying. Information had previously been received that the Valiahd had been supplied with money, arms, and ammunition by the Russians, and it was considered that if financial assistance was given exclusively by Russia, the position of great Britain might be compromised'.3 (viii) 'Painting the German devil on the wall' Of Muzaffer-ed-din Shah, who was to die on 8 January 1907, Sir Arthur Hardinge, on vacating his position at Tehran in December 1905, had written: ... he had lived for more than fifty years, before he came to the throne, in seclusion at Tabreez... He was often kept so short of money there that he had difficulty in paying the expenses of his household; and accordingly, when he ascended the throne, he hastened to recoup himself for these years of leanness by inconceivably reckless extravagance. In this course he was supported and encouraged by a gang of greedy and ignorant Turkish courtiers, who had long been waiting impatiently at Tabreez for his father's death, in order to build up out of the public revenues, to the plunder of

1 minute by Grey on note by Hardinge of conversation with German Chargé d'Affaires, 24 September 1906, F.O.371/114/32652. This was not the encounter of 18 September referred to in Grey to Lascelles 25 September (B.D. iv no. 351) but a subsequent one; see also minute by Hardinge on Nicolson to Grey no. 242, 23 September 1906, F.0.371/169/32057. 2 see B.G. Martin op. cit. pp. 113-122, 141-143; Nicolson to Grey 4 December 1906, B.D.iv no. 374 p. 418; Benckendorff to Isvolsky 29 May 1906, in Isvolsky op. cit. i. 298-9; F.O. 371/305. 3 note by Godley, March 1908,1.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/10/10/3022.

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which they looked forward, immense private fortunes for themselves. These men had no notion of politics, or of the rudiments of government; their one idea, whilst ministering to the weaknesses and vices of their sovereign, was to kill and cut up the goose with the golden eggs. It was as though Henry V, on ascending the throne of England, had handed over to Falstaff and Poins the control of the national Exchequer...1

Of Mushir-ed-Dowleh, who was Persian Foreign Minister from 1899 until August 1906, when he became Sadrazam, or Prime Minister, SpringRice, who became Hardinge's successor at Tehran, wrote in 1907: 'He used the Russian loan policy of the Amin-es-Sultan [Grand Vizier until September 1903] to further his own interests irrespective of those of his country. 1 Of Mushir-ul-Mulk, Spring-Rice wrote: 'Eldest son of Mushir-ed-Dowleh. Appointed Minister at St. Petersburg in 1902. Was in Tehran during the whole of 1906...' Of Ain-ed-Dowleh, he wrote: 'Was Grand Vizier...until dismissed, July 29th (1906) after holding office nearly three years. Unscrupulous and mendacious; hated Europeans. Whole object, apparently, to amass money...' 2 The Persian side of things is the side most neglected (though obviously not entirely - vide Kazemdadeh) in studies of developments in the relations between those of the Great Powers of Europe who were involved in this particular region. From certain Persian material which fell into the hands of Spring-Rice, however, there emerges at least the strong possibility of yet another twist in the creative accounting that was such a feature of the start of the Anglo-Russian negotiations of 1906-7. On 20 October 1906 Spring-Rice sent the following telegram (no. 294) from Tehran to Sir Edward Grey: The following communications have reached me from reliable sources:(A) 'M. Naus last spring proposed that a large Belgian loan, guaranteed by Russia, should be raised, the commercial advantages to fall to Belgium and the political to Russia. The Grand Vizier took alarm, and the scheme was shelved. The financial position at present is as follows: There is urgent need of a loan of 12 million tomans: 21/2 for current deficit, 71/2 to redeem floating debt, and 2 for expenses of the reorganisation of the taxation system. Either this money must be obtained or Persia must go bankrupt. The following are schemes by which the necessary amount might be obtained:Hardinge to Grey 23 December 1905, B.D.iv no.322 p. 375. ^General report on Persia 1906, enclosed in Spring-Rice to Grey 28 February 1907, extracts from section 32, Biographical Notes, printed in British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Reports and Papers from the F.O. Confidential Print, Part 1, Series B vol. 13, Persia, Britain and Russia 1886-1907 ed. D. Gillard (University Publications of America, 1985) Doc. 53.

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1. The scheme suggested by M. Naus, to which Germany might perhaps give financial assistance. 2. A joint Anglo-Russian loan with very severe conditions as to the immediate institution of reforms and control of expenditure. The first is practically equivalent to the sale, under Belgian auspices, of Persia to Russia. M. Naus has rendered no accounts of the Customs Administration for two years. He is anxious to be himself entrusted with the reorganisation of the finances of Persia, and he is in constant communication with the Russian Legation. In insisting on the repayment of the temporary advance, Russia's object is to force Persia to accept a bigger loan, and thus to revert to the original scheme. A joint Anglo-Russian loan is the only means by which this can be averted. The Mullahs can be bribed into acquiescence by the parties issuing the loan.' (B) 'You are deceived if you imagine that Russia will not make a loan without you or that she has refused to do so.' 1

At the Foreign Office, Hardinge was inclined to brush off this information as an attempt to make bad blood between England and Russia. By Christmas, however, Spring-Rice was to be vindicated and his views accepted. Following the news of 13 December that the Shah was dying, and the India Office's sanctioning on 14 December, of an advance of £50,000 to Valiahd, it became important to ensure that the British and Russian money was released simultaneously, and to the same institution, or personage. The situation was complicated by the opposition of certain elements in the Persian Assembly to any foreign loan whatsoever. 2 Nicolson was afraid that the Russian Minister in Tehran, Hartwig, might act on instructions he received before the British Government had a chance to say whether a formal demand from the Grand Vizier, irrespective of the assent of the Assembly, should be immediately accepted. He pressed Isvolsky to tell Hartwig to act strictly in harmony with Spring-Rice. 3 Spring-Rice, meanwhile, had ascertained that amongst the instructions that Hartwig had received were some which, as he telegraphed on 19 December, 'probably emanated from the Finance Department and were inspired by M. Grube, who is not in favour of joint Anglo-Russian action'.4

1

Spring-Rice to Grey 20 October 1906, minute by Hardinge, F.0.371/170/35499. see 'Memorandum of conversation between Sir C. Spring-Rice and Naser-ul-Mulk, Minister of Finance, 21 November 1906' , in Spring-Rice to Grey 7 December 1906 (Monthly summary of events in Persia 8 November to 6 December 1906) F.0.416/29 no. 309. ^Nicolson to Grey no.307, 15 December, and Nicolson to Grey no.821, 16 December 1906, ibid, nos 276,311. 2

4

Spring-Rice to Grey 18 December ibid. no. 284; Spring-Rice to Grey no.368, 19 December 1906, F.0.371/170/42569.

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The Foreign Office immediately recognised the bearing of this on the events of the first week of September. As one clerk put it, 'This explains the apparent change in the Russian attitude as the result of contradictory instructions from two different departments, which is common enough1.1 Thus by the time further revelations arrived from Spring-Rice, on 24 December, Grey was well prepared for them. Throughout November SpringRice had been making further investigations into the communications he had forwarded on 20 October.2 He did not divulge his secret sources, but insisted that they were independent and that he had carefully compared them. He began with a reminder that since early February, when Lamsdorff had been told that the British Government was desirous of abstaining from advancing any money to the Persian Government without the knowledge and concurrence of the Russian Government, the Persian Minister to St. Petersburg and son of the Foreign Minister, had been in Tehran 'in connection with loan negotiations with Russia'. Spring-Rice gathered, from the accounts which reached him 'from the highest sources', that the Russians had been willing to lend a considerable sum, but under conditions so onerous - the practical control of Persian foreign relations - that both the Shah and the Grand Vizier, Ain-edDowleh, judged it best to refuse. Spring-Rice ascribed the Ain-ed-Dowleh's expulsion from the office of Grand Vizier at the end of July, following 'summer meetings in the Shah's presence at which violent language was held', to arguments over the acceptability of the Russian terms. He noted that, immediately afterwards, Mushir-ed-Dowleh, the Foreign Minister who like his son the Persian Minister at St. Petersburg had been 'deeply engaged in the Russian loan negotiations', had become Prime Minister. Despite this elevation in rank, however, Mushir-ed-Dowleh's naturally timorous character had made him 'reluctant to bear the odium of concluding a loan at once'. Spring-Rice suggested that the Russian invitation to M. Naus of September 1906, to visit St. Petersburg with a view to discussing the Persian financial situation, an invitation disclosed to Nicolson by Isvolsky on 21 September, 3 was a continuation of these on-going Russo-Persian negotiations. He also suggested that the idea of an advance to meet pressing necessities, an advance which if from Russia alone would be open to objections on the score of popular sentiment, had come from Mushir-ed-Dowleh, and that the understanding was that 'subsequently, when occasion offered, the negotiations should be resumed for a large and permanent loan'. (In his Annual Report for 1906, Spring-Rice indicated that the Persian concession to Russia of the ^minute, 19 December, on Spring-Rice to Grey no. 368, 19 December 1906, ibid. see p. 105, fn 1. 3 Nicolson to Grey 21 September 1906, F.O.416/28 no. 197.

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Meshed Seistan telegraph line in August was a part of these negotiations, in response to a renewed Persian application, by Mushir-ed-Dowleh, in midAugust.) Spring-Rice was inclined to absolve Isvolsky f r o m any guilt in connection with all this. He ended: I venture to add that experience shows that the Russian Foreign Office was not kept informed of the previous loan negotiations which in 1900 and 1902 were carried on between the Russian Financial Department and the Persian Government... It would seem as if the Russian Foreign Office had been to some extent left in the dark as regards the recent negotiations. The presence of M. Grube [Director of the Russian Bank in Persia] in St. Petersburg (he arrived there in May) may account for the action which appears to have been taken by some Department of the Russian Government, doubtless without the knowledge of M. Isvolsky, who imagined that the informal agreement between the Russian and English Governments was in force, according to which neither Government was to make 'loans without the knowledge of the other'. ' Grey minuted this on the day on which it arrived, 24 December: M. Isvolsky has during the negotiations with us for the joint advance spoken of a large loan to come, and the explanation of Russian duplicity is probably the same as ever viz. that the Russian Foreign Ministry does not know what other Departments are doing: sometimes it has been the Russian War Office - now it is the Finance Department which gives the lie to the Russian Foreign Minister's assurances to us. It would evidently have been easy for us to cut the Russians out in Persia by lending money ourselves; but to have done this would have been to incur new obligations, which sooner or later it would have been burdensome to defend. *

Spring-Rice's thesis is not without support. T h e reason w h y the Persians wanted their convention with Germany of 1 July ante-dated to 25 May was, as they had told Richthofen, that shortly after that date (25 May) 'negotiations had commenced with the Russian government on the subject of a new loan'. 2 Moreover, Isvolsky had known since the end of July, Schoen having been instructed to tell him, of the Persian-German negotiations. 3 I s v o l s k y i n v o k e d with the B r i t i s h the p r o s p e c t of

Persian-German

negotiations, however, only on 8 September. It is certainly possible that, at

' Spring-Rice to Grey no.294 Secret, 6 December 1906, minute by Grey 2 4 December 1906, F.O. 371/170/42978. See also same to same, 29 January 1907, Doc . 52 in BDFA (see fn 138) pp. 412-3,418-23. Richthofen to Ministry for Foreign Affairs 28 June 1906, DGP vol.25 no. 8570. 3 Tschirschky to Schoen 2 9 July 1906 ibid. no. 8572.

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the Russian Crown Council meeting of 7 September, Isvolsky discovered something, most probably involving E.K. Grube, who attended that meeting, and Naus,1 of which he had previously been unaware, and that, embarrassed at the effect which this disclosure would have upon Anglo-Russian relations,2 he chose to promote Germany as the scapegoat. If so, Isvolsky's name should be added to the already long list of those who had indulged in more than a little creative accounting. The list includes Sir Arthur Hardinge (on Grey), Sir Charles Hardinge (on Benckendorff), 3 Sir Edward Grey (on Morley and Campbell-Bannerman), Morley on Minto, and Minto on the Government of India. All were engaged, whether inadvertently or deliberately, in what SpringRice described in the following year, when giving yet another example of it, as 'painting the German devil on the wall'.4

APPENDIX From Viceroy (Lord Minto) to Secretary of State for India (Morley), 19 September 1906,1.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/10/9/1595 Foreign Secret. Your telegrams of 12th September and 14th September. We respectfully would point out that before the receipt of Grant Duff's telegram on 9th September we had received no intimation whatever of the possible intention of His Majesty's Government to grant a joint loan with Russia to Persia, and our remarks about Bunder Abbas-Bam road were based upon report in Grant-Duff's telegram of 2nd September that a secret loan was being negotiated independently by Persia with Russia. We now learn that a joint loan is contemplated on basis of general settlement of Persian question, and that instructions in regard to that settlement were sent to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg on 12th September. Matter is one we ^ Martin op. cit. p. 140; Spring-Rice was to comment on Naus's 'pronounced Russian sympathies' in Spring-Rice to Grey 12 October 1906, Grey MSS F.0.800/70. 2 Back in February, Lamsdorff had told Spring-Rice that the Shah was in discussions with the (British) Imperial Bank of Persia for a loan of £150,000. Spring-Rice commented on this news: 'If true, it would put an end to all chances of an agreement with this country for some time to come.' (Spring-Rice to Grey 15 February 1906, ibid.l72) The news in September 1906 of a Russian loan would have had the same effect. •'it was from Hardinge that Benckendorff picked up what he reported to Isvolsky as to greater British concern that Germany establish herself in Persia than that Russia should do so: Benckendorff to Isvolsky 29 May, 5 September 1906, in Isvolsky op. cit., i. 298, 362. Hardinger's truer attitude might be gauged from his clear disposition, when confronted with news of a Persian attack on the British Consulate in Seistan, to avoid reacting in such a way as to cause the Russians 'to send in the Cossacks in the North where similar troubles are of frequent occurrence': minute by Hardinge 18 July 1906, F.O. 371/113/24475. 4 Spring-Rice to Chirol 21 June 1907, in S. Gwynn op. cit ii. 101.

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consider vitally affecting interests and safety of India, and though we may not fully have understood nature of proposals as necessarily set out in brief in your telegram, we venture with greatest respect to offer certain remarks on those proposals as indicated in your telegram of 14th September in hope that these may be considered before any arrangement is finally effected. In series of despatches and telegrams, extending from Despatch of 21st September 1899 from Lord Curzon's Government to Lord Minto's telegram of 9th January 1906, Government of India have consistently advised that Foreign Powers should be excluded from owning ports in Persian Guif and that line south of which no concessions for roads, railways, or telegraphs should be granted to any Power other than Great Britain was line from Khanikin to north of Birjand. That policy was practically endorsed by Lord Lansdowne's statement to the Shah on 21st August 1902 and his further declaration in the House of Lords on the 6th May 1903. Government of India therefore view with gravest apprehension drawing line of concessions as far east as Bunder Abbas, which will open up all the ports west of that place to Foreign Powers with possible concessions for railways leading down to such ports and fortification of naval bases. This must inevitably lead to necessity for maintaining strong naval force in Persian Gulf able to cope with foreign squadrons that may be stationed there with resultant serious charge on British revenues. In any case, useful though route may be as means of supporting Seistan, it would be difficult if not impossible to hold Bunder Abbas-Seistan line without large force if hostile port were to be made at Lingah, and if Kerman were to pass under control of strong military power and to be linked up by railway with Tehran. Further, we have it on record that expert Railway Officer reported, after careful local examination in 1903, that possible route for railway with grades not exceeding one in forty leads from Ahwaz to Shiraz and Kerman and then to Nushki. If Baghdad Railway is ever constructed this line will be of importance as direct commercial route to India, and it is desirable it should be in our sphere of concessions. Based as it would be on sea in West and with connecting line to Bunder Abbas it would give us strong commercial and political hold on Southern Persia. Proposed line would sacrifice this and would also expose our commerce in the Gulf, now over eighty per cent of total, to serious risk of prohibitive tariffs and obstruction in Persian ports. It would also so weaken our present predominant position in the Gulf as to render it impossible for us to exercise much influence on the outlet of the Baghdad Railway or even to hold our own on the Arabian coast, while our pledges to Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit would become incapable of execution. Finally, we venture to demur to proposal to allow Russian loan to be secured on customs of all principal ports in Gulf except Bunder Abbas, as

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these are already pledged as security for Indian loans. If His Majesty's Government, for reasons of which we have no knowledge, hold that we must recede from Khanikin-Birjand line and that limit of Russian or foreign concessions cannot be confined to north of that line, we would suggest as better settlement line from Mohammerah to Kain, which, while abandoning nearly all valuable portion of Persia, including both capitals, Tehran and Ispahan, would be free from gravest objections of the Bunder Abbas-Birjand line. It is understood that at present only a line of concessions is under consideration and not a line of occupation. We had, indeed, contemplated that if Russia should ultimately succeed in absorbing part of Persia, we might be obliged to concentrate upon Bunder Abbas-Birjand line as last parallel in Persia against Russian advance. But such absorption was not inevitable, and would in any case have been gradual process lasting perhaps 40 years, and retarded at every step by diplomatic action. We should then have had time to adapt our defence schemes to changed conditions. Present proposal will precipitate unopposed Russian advance, and may find our defensive preparations inadequate. Therefore, rather than accept Bunder Abbas-Birjand line now, we would prefer to make loan on former security merely to tide over present difficulty without further definite concessions, though an exchange of Meshed-Tehran for Meshed-Seistan telegraph might perhaps be arranged. Against such a settlement as that indicated in your telegram of 14th September, in the light of such information as we possess, we therefore venture most respectfully but strongly to protest in the interests of India, and we trust in no case shall we be called on to provide funds for any advance or loan for such a measure, or to contribute towards the heavy naval and military expenditure which will inevitably hereafter be entailed thereby. Lord Kitchener is on tour, and we have not obtained his opinion.

From Secretary of State for India (Morley) to Viceroy (Lord Minto), Foreign Department, 24 September 1906, I.O.L.MSS, L/P&S/10/9/1595 Foreign Secret. Persia. Your telegrams of 19th September 1906. The foundation of the case that you are good enough to offer for consideration, seems to be described in the Commander-in-Chiefs proposition that 'in the present state of affairs in Russia any general settlement in Persia would be very inopportune'. The point of opportuneness, however, is not a military, but a political question: and a political question to be decided by His

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Majesty's Government not exclusively on Indian grounds, but on the broadest consideration of Imperial policy. His Majesty's Government have decided that the present state of affairs in Russia, the state of affairs in Persia, and the possible attitude of at least one other European Power as to Persian questions, all make it eminently desirable to create or seize an opportunity of coming to terms with Russia, while vigilantly guarding the whole body of our own legitimate and solid interests, both Indian and British, both military and commercial. One paragraph in your telegram points to an alternative policy - a 'gradual process' of Russian absorption, 'lasting perhaps 40 years, and retarded at every step by diplomatic action' so giving us time 'to adapt our defence schemes to changed conditions'. When we talk of maintenance of the status quo for 40 years, let us realise what it means. Forty more years of consular rivalries, spurious plague-doctoring, telegraph contention, international machinations, endless fluctuating and extremely expensive strategical speculations in India, and finally a Persia deliberately and imperatively shut out from the benefits of modern civilisation by entanglements with Western Powers professing a civilising missing - this is a prospect not to be regarded with entire equanimity, and His Majesty's Government have decided to make a determined attempt to find a different course. Without discussing in detail the relative advantages to us of the Bunder Abbas-Birjand line and the Khanikin-Kain line, as divisions of interest between Great Britain and Russia, you will, I believe, agree that the proposal of the Khanikin line, which has been made by the Government of India before now, even if it were accepted, could hardly be expected to last. The line would eventually have to be held by force, and this would really mean the annexation of Southern Persia. The line suggested by His Majesty's Government is not to be held as a military frontier, and they are hostile to the annexation of any part of Persia. Among other objections you urge that the Bunder Abas line opens ports west of that place to foreign Powers and gives them opportunities of constructing railways and fortifications for naval bases. Reference is made to Lord Lansdowne's well-known statement of policy in the House of Lords. But Lord Lansdowne expressly disclaimed any desire to exclude the legitimate trade of other Powers from the Gulf. On the other hand, a naval base, or fortified port, he said, would be a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal. There is no departure from this position in the suggestions of His Majesty's Government in the present negotiations. You will not fail to observe that none of the conditions to be attached to the joint loan authorise either Great Britain or Russia to take any action

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inconsistent with the independence and integrity of Persia; this, both sides will be pledged to respect. No question therefore arises of military occupation or fortification. The same consideration furnishes the reply to your apprehensions as to the Bunder Abbas line leading to increased naval expenditure in the vicinity of the Gulf, and to the possible necessity of a large military force to hold the Bunder Abbas-Seistan line. As for the effect of surrendering influence west of the Bunder Abbas line upon our position in the Baghdad railway controversy, or upon our pledges to the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, these touch Imperial considerations, and only concern the Government of India secondarily and remotely, if at all. When the diplomatic situation has become clearer and more definite, I will state to you in fuller terms than is here possible the whole arguments in support of the policy of His Majesty's Government. Meanwhile I wish you to recognise the mischiefs of the subsisting case, Russia taking small steps forward, which Persia is powerless to resist, which we cannot reasonably treat as grounds for war, and which we cannot effectively and permanently counter by means short of war. Further complications from new quarters seem close at hand. Such an agreement as is contemplated by His Majesty's Government would relieve the perpetual strain with which we are compelled to watch this process, while it would impair no present or prospective interest, whether for trade or for Indian defence.

5 PASSING ON THE STRAITS: The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus in Anglo-Russian Relations 1904-1907

According to Article II of the Convention of 30 March 1856, which was attached to the Treaty of Paris of the same date, the Great Powers of Europe agreed that it was prohibited 'for the ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus; and that so long as the Porte is at peace His Majesty (the Sultan) will admit no foreign ships of war into the said Straits'. This rule was slightly modified by Article II of the Treaty of London of 13 March 1871, which emerged from a conference held in the aftermath of the unilateral denunciation by Russia of the clause in the Treaty of Paris which had stipulated that the Black Sea should be neutralised. Article II of the Treaty of London stated that the principle of the closing of the Straits was maintained, but added that, for the express and sole purpose of securing the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, the Sultan was empowered, should he judge it necessary, 'to open the said Straits in time of peace to the vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers'. Although this was the position confirmed by Article LXIII of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, the subsequent situation was confused by a declaration made at the 18th sitting of the Congress of Berlin by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury. Salisbury had declared, on behalf of the British Government, 'that the obligations of Her Majesty's Government relating to the closing of the Straits do not go further than an engagement with the Sultan to respect in this matter His Majesty's independent determinations, in conformity with the spirit of existing Treaties'. At the 19th sitting the Russian delegate, Count Shouvaloff, had countered this as diplomatically as possible by stating: The Plenipotentiaries of Russia, without being able exactly to appreciate the meaning of the proposition of the second Plenipotentiary of Great Britain respecting the closing of the Straits, restrict themselves to demanding, on their part, the insertion in the Protocol of the observation that, in their opinion, the principle of the closing of the Straits is an European principle, and that the stipulations concluded in this respect in 1841, 1856, and 1871, confirmed at present by the Treaty of Berlin, are binding on the part of all the Powers, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the existing Treaties, not only as regards the Sultan, but also as regards all the Powers signatory to these transactions.

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Salisbury had given the distinct impression that Great Britain was out of step with all the other Great Powers as regards the Rule of the Straits, and that she would act on her own interpretation of this item of the public law of Europe if she believed it to be in her own interests so to do. *

In December 1903 Salisbury's nephew, and his successor both as Leader of the Conservative Party and as Prime Minister, A J . Balfour, wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne: 'There is I believe no British Government that would not gladly make a permanent arrangement with Russia in Central Asia and the Far East, and Russian statesmen desire to see some such arrangement carried into effect. Why then, with this goodwill, or at least the appearance of goodwill on both sides, has no such arrangement yet been found practicable?'1 This was a severe misreading, on Balfour's part, of the attitude of the Russian Government. It did produce, however, at the beginning of January 1904, a Cabinet paper from Lord Lansdowne entitled 'Proposed Agreement with Russia'. The areas covered by Lansdowne's paper were, in order of appearance: Afghanistan, Thibet, Persia, Seistan, Manchuria. No mention was made of the Turkish Straits.2 More than a little ironically, within two weeks, as the imminence of a Russo-Japanese conflict dawned upon him, Lansdowne was contemplating declaring war upon Russia. On 11 January 1904 Count Hayashi, the Japanese ambassador, raised with Lansdowne the prospect that the Russian Black Sea Fleet might well make its way, through the Straits, en route to the Far East. Lansdowne told Hayashi that the British Government would undoubtedly regard such a move 'as a grave violation of the Treaty engagements entered into with us and other Powers by Russia' . 3 Immediately after this interview Lansdowne produced a memorandum on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. He considered that in the face of what he called 'a serious exigency in the Far East' the Russian Government might ignore their international obligations regarding the Straits. He also considered that British public opinion would not allow the British Government to overlook 'so serious a disregard of our Treaty rights': 'There would be a general outburst of indignation if we were to sit still while the Treaty was torn up in our face for the deliberate purpose of

^Balfour to Lansdowne 21 December 1903, Balfour MSS B.L. Add.MSS 49728. C A B 37/68/1 (Public Record Office). •^Lansdowne to MacDonald 11 January 1904, in G.P. Gooch and H.W.V.Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London , 1926-38) ii no. 274. 2

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doing an injury to our ally (Japan).' He suggested that immediately after a declaration of war by either Japan or Russia the British Government should make it clear that British neutrality would be conditional on Russian observance of the Rule of the Straits.1 For Lord Selborne at the Admiralty (the first port of call for Lansdowne's sudden adoption of the Shouvaloff position) as for Lansdowne himself, it was the British alliance with Japan and the imagined reaction of British public opinion that were the complicating factors. Indeed, on a note from the Director of Naval Operations Lansdowne minuted: 'A breach of the Treaty we might, for reasons of expediency, tolerate; but a breach of the Treaty perpetrated in order to enable the Treaty breaker to take an unfair advantage of our ally we could not, in my opinion, tolerate, and I don't think public opinion would allow us to do so.' Balfour, on 18 January, suggested concentrating an adequate force in the eastern Mediterranean, and warning Russia, through a third party, against attempting to pass the Straits: the Sultan, for instance, could be told 'That we have every reason to believe that Russia fully intended to adhere to her Treaty engagements, but that, as war seemed imminent, we thought it well to remind the Porte that it was both its right and its duty to refuse the Straits to ships of war; and that any violation of Treaty obligations would be regarded by us in the most serious light'. On the following day Balfour added that the British ambassador in St. Petersburg ought to be fully primed as to how to proceed should the Black Sea Fleet prepare to move: 'On the first intimation that the Fleet is moving he should ask for explanations; and, if none are forthcoming, he should take a very serious tone, explaining that we could not view any breach of Treaty engagements with indifference. If, in spite of this, the Straits were forced, it is a question whether he ought not to leave St. Petersburg at once and break off formal relations, though, of course, without declaring war.' 2 Following these contributions, Lansdowne told Hayashi on 27 January that the Cabinet had now approved his statement of the 11th; it remained the case, however, that he 'could not undertake to say what action we might think it necessary to take by way of response', should the Black Sea Fleet pass through the Straits. 3 The British ambassador in St. Petersburg was told, in more than just a nod to Balfour: 'Although we have not said as much to the Japanese, it would clearly be impossible for us to permit any ships now in the Black Sea to take part in warlike operations, and it is very desirable that this 'CAB 37/68/11. o ibid. These exchanges are barely touched on in B.J.C. McKercher, 'Diplomatic Equipoise: the Lansdowne Foreign Office, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, and the Global Balance of Power' Canadian Journal of History xxiv (1989) 299-339. ^Lansdowne to MacDonald 30 January 1904, B.D. iv no. 40.

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should be clearly understood by the Russian Government in time to prevent them from committing themselves, in ignorance, to a policy which must be disastrous both for Great Britain and for Russia.' 1 The Russo-Japanese war broke out on 10 February 1904. At least until the end of the year, the question of an Anglo-Russian conflict as a result of a Russian attempt to pass the Straits, and beyond that, given that Russia was allied to France, an Anglo-French conflict, remained on the foreign political agenda, without ever rising as close to the top of that agenda as it had in January. In mid-February the House of Commons was told that the Government had not been approached by Russia with a request or suggestion that they should consent to the passage of Russian warships through the Straits, and that there was 'no reason whatever for supposing that the Russian Government contemplate a step which would involve a distinct violation of their treaty obligations to the European Powers'. 2 At the end of April, in case the Russians were not keeping up with Hansard, Lansdowne took the opportunity to state to the French ambassador that Britain would be unable to acquiesce in any attempt by Russia to send their Black Sea Fleet out into the Mediterranean - were such a move made, 'we should be driven to meet it by adequate measures which might render a collision inevitable'.3 Whilst the British Government was clearly disposed, both publicly and privately, to make an issue of the passage of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, it emerged that it was not disposed to make anything like so much of an issue of the passage of vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet. Between August and November 1904 at least seven of these, plus two belonging to the Russian Steam Navigation Company, were allowed through the Straits, somewhat to the alarm of the Japanese who realised, as did the British, that re-fitting and conversion into warships would probably follow in the Baltic. Lansdowne was relieved to be able to inform Hayashi on 16 November that the Russian Black Sea Fleet had been paid off. 4 *

Meanwhile, in April 1904 King Edward VII had made clear to the Russian Minister in Copenhagen, Isvolsky, his personal commitment to an Anglo-Russian agreement.5 A week later, on 22 April, both King Edward and 1 Lansdowne to Scott 30 January 1904, B.D. B.D. iv no.42,15 February 1904. ^Lansdowne to Monson 29 April 1904, B.D. Sbid. nos 44-45; see also K. Neilson, "'A Japanese War and British Policy' Journal of ^Sidney Lee, King Edward VII, a biography

ii no. 285.

2

iv no. 43. Dangerous Game of American Poker": the RussoStrategic Studies vol. 12 no. 1 (1989) 69-70. (London, 1927) ii. 285-7.

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Sir Charles Hardinge, who had just been appointed ambassador to St. Petersburg, agreed that 'there did not appear to be any reason for preventing the passage of the Dardanelles by Russian warships as we have endeavoured to do in the past'; they both thought that the concession of an unopposed passage 'might prove a very useful asset in the event of the general negotiations for an arrangement with Russia being resumed': 'It would be a useful quid pro quo to have in hand.' 1 Later in the year, in November, the Secretary of State for War, H.O. Arnold-Forster, who had been sent Lansdowne's memorandum of 11 January but had not commented upon it, told Balfour that Britain should stop constantly thwarting Russia: 'we cannot stop her getting to the sea, and ought to make up our minds to her doing so, on the Mediterranean for choice.' 2 In mid-January 1905 Sir George Clarke, a proactive Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, wrote to Sir Thomas Sanderson, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office: 'When the war is over it may be possible to give way on the Dardanelles question in return for a binding agreement with Russia as regards Afghanistan, which happily is an altogether valueless region.' 3 Sanderson passed Clarke's views on to Lansdowne, but received no response. Nor did Lansdowne respond when, towards the end of the re-negotiation and extension of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, his Private Secretary Mallet informed him of the 'earnest desire' of the Russian Prime Minister, Witte, to come to terms with Britain, and suggested that when the treaty with Japan was signed that would be the moment to approach Russia with the proposals drawn up before the outbreak of war. 4 The Russo-Japanese war ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth of 23 August 1905. Certain organs of the British press, and in particular the Spectator, immediately began to campaign for an Anglo-Russian agreement, rather as had Leo Maxse's National Review between November 1901 and March 1902. On 16 September the Spectator went so far as to say that 'we should tell the Russians plainly that we have ceased to consider the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire an essential British interest and that..we should not regard the presence of the Russians on the Bosphorus as injurious to us, nor resent the absorption of those portions of Asia Minor which naturally go with the possession of Constantinople'. The St. Petersburg Novoie Vremia responded to this by saying that Russia did not want or need Constantinople itself, but did desire a hbid .ii. 289-90. 2

Arnold-Forster Diary 21 November 1904, B.L.Add.MSS 50340. Clarke to Sanderson 17 January 1905, Lansdowne MSS F.0.800/116. 4 Mallet to Lansdowne 25 July 1905, Bowood MSS L(5)30. The Lansdowne papers from Bowood House have recently been transferred to the British Library. 3

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free passage through the Straits for her warships. 1 Sensing that his moment might have arrived, Sir George Clark tried to revive his ideas of the previous January. On 7 October he wrote to Balfour, suggesting that the time was propitious for an Anglo-Russian agreement about Central Asia and Persia. He added: 'I do not know whether the opening of the Dardanelles to ships of war would now be attractive to Russia; but we might safely concede it for a price as part of a general agreement.' 2 Balfour agreed that the moment was propitious and, accordingly, Clarke went ahead with drafting 'Proposed Terms of Agreement with Russia as regards Central Asia'. 3 Clarke's first draft, of 16 October, consisted of twenty-one clauses, the last of which read: 'Great Britain agrees to withdraw opposition to the opening of the Dardanelles to ships of war of all classes.' 4 On 20 October Clarke drew Balfour's attention to this clause, pointing out that it was included 'as bait', and in the belief that the Admiralty would have no objection. 5 Clarke followed up this piece of work with a private approach to the owner of The Times, John Walter. As Clarke put it, the anti-German campaign, or crusade, being waged in particular by The Times' correspondent in Berlin, George Saunders, 'stands in the way of what is now in reach of practical politics - an arrangement with Russia in Central Asia. It is difficult to make any approaches to Russia in view of the present clamour, without giving the appearance of being activated by hostility to Germany. This at least is the Russian view.' 6 This activity on the part of Clarke and of the Spectator was supplemented by information from other sources. On 17 October the British ambassador in Constantinople, Sir N. O'Conor, transmitted to Sanderson an account of an interview with his Russian counterpart and former head of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Zinoviev. Zinoviev, of whom Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff had a high opinion, had said that an understanding that would settle the many difficulties between Britain and Russia was quite possible, 'but only on condition that it included an In the March 1902 issue of the National Review (vol. 39 no. 229), under the title 'The Alliance with Japan', 'A.B.C.ETC.' had advocated abandoning the Dardanelles to Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm II described this as 'England cutting off its nose to spite its neighbour': Metternich to Bulow 14 March 1902 and note by Wilhelm II, in J.Lepsius, A.Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, F.Thimme (eds), Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914 (Berlin, 1922-27) vol.17 no. 5351. As regards 1905 see W. L. Langer, 'Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers 1904-8' English Historical Review vol. 44 (1929) p. 66. Langer's article was written before the publication of the relevant volume (vol. iv) of Gooch and Temperley. For a wider perspective see J. Headlam-Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History (London, 1930) chapter 8, 'The Black Sea, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles'. 2 Clarke to Balfour 7 October 1905 Balfour MSS Add.MSS 49702. ^Balfour to Clarke 11 October, Clarke to Balfour 14 October 1905 ibid. 4 CAB 17/60. 5 Clarke to Balfour 20 October 1905 Balfour MSS Add.MSS 49702. 6 Clarke to Walter 22 October 1905, Archives of The Times.

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understanding about this country (the Ottoman Empire)'. 1 A week later, Frederick Harrison, the distinguished lawyer, philosopher and historian, who sympathised with a campaign being run in the English Review on the same lines as that in the Spectator, wrote to Lord Fitzmaurice, Lansdowne's brother and a probable member of a Liberal Government which was universally regarded as certain to win the next general election, which had to be held within three months, to the effect that a Franco-German war might be prevented if Russia could be distanced from Germany: 'Of course Russia would want a big price. Offer her Constantinople and end the anti-Russian policy.' 2 There was clearly a body of opinion in Britain which was eager to see an Anglo-Russian agreement, and prepared to make certain concessions in order to achieve this. On the other hand, Lansdowne himself recorded on 8 October a conversation with Benckendorff, the Russian ambassador in London, who had said that Britain ought to be able to come to an agreement with Russia, 'although not immediately'. Lansdowne noted that Benckendorff meant 'a comparatively modest understanding' - he 'did not expect us to offer them Constantinople'.3 And on 9 October Lansdowne received a despatch from St. Petersburg stating that Count Witte was 'in a state of rabid irritation' over the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. According to Hardinge, Lamsdorff had fallen under Witte's influence, and had made it clear that the hostility manifested against the Anglo-Japanese treaty precluded the possibility at present of settling all questions pending between Britain and Russia. 4 Further despatches from Hardinge, containing the information that Lamsdorff and the Tsar were even contemplating an anti-English coalition, arrived on 14 and 18 October. 5 Another despatch, which arrived on 31 October, was marginally more promising, in that Witte's Germanophilia had somewhat diminished - he was now, apparently, 'in favour of a policy of friendly isolation of Russia while maintaining the best possible relations with all Foreign Powers and relying upon the French alliance as the corner-stone of Russian policy'. 6 Throughout October, moreover, reports of the disintegration of Russia into civil war were increasing. The pursuit of an agreement with Russia was, in these circumstances, not auspicious.7

^O'Conor to Sanderson 17 October 1905,0'Conor MSS 4/1/21, Churchill College, Cambridge. ^Harrison to Fitzmaurice 24 October 1905 Bowood MSS Ffm 22. ^Lansdowne to Bertie 8 October 1905 Lansdowne MSS F.0.800/127. ^Hardinge to Lansdowne 4 October 1905, B.D. iv no.195. %ardinge to Lansdowne 8, 14 October 1905 ibid, nos 197,198. ^Hardinge to Lansdowne 21 October 1905 ibid. no. 201. ^Sanderson to O'Conor 24 October 1905, o'Conor MSS 6/1/54; Lansdowne to Hardinge 17 October 1905 Lansdowne MSS F.0.800/141.

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Lansdowne resolved the dilemma facing him by having Sanderson tell Clarke, who had sent in another draft of possible terms of an agreement with Russia on 24 October, that 'the time is not ripe for discussing such details'. Sanderson nevertheless made 'a few general observations'. As regards the Dardanelles, he stated: The Russian Government are well aware that we should not object to the Straits being open to ships of war of all nations (the Turks, and probably the Austrians, would object). But the Russian Government greatly prefer the present regime; the only change which would be acceptable to them is that ingress into the Black Sea should be forbidden to all other countries, but that Russia should be free to go in and out as she pleases.' Clarke responded immediately to this criticism: If the opening of the Straits to ships of war of all nations would be regarded by the Russians with less favour than the status quo, this suggestion falls to the ground. I submit, however, the following thesis: a) At present we are interdicted from entry into the Black Sea in peace, and the Russians are prohibited from exit. b) If we wished to enter the Black Sea in time of war, I assume that our action would depend entirely on the attitude of Turkey. c) If we concede to Russia the exclusive right of passage in time of peace, our position as regards possible entry in time of war would be precisely as it now is. d) If this is so, I do not believe that the Admiralty would offer any objection to the concession (c) which the Russians desire. e) The whole point therefore appears to turn upon whether this concession would lead to the strengthening of the defence of the Dardanelles, and would tend to cause the Turks to be more inclined than now to oppose the entry of British ships in war. I do not see that the answers to these questions are necessarily in the affirmative.^ Hardinge, to whom Clarke had sent a copy of this, replied on 16 November: ... it seems evident to me that in order to arrive in the near future at a friendly agreement with Russia which is as necessary to her as it is to us we shall have to reconsider entirely the attitude which we have hitherto adopted towards Russia both in Persia and Afghanistan. Happily there is no immediate necessity for a decision on these points, thanks to our alliance (with Japan), and until we see a stable government once more established in St. Petersburg it would be useless to try to open up negotiations.^

^Sanderson to Clarke 10 November 1905, CAB 17/60, Sanderson's italics. ^Clarke, 'Note on Criticisms of Draft Agreement with Russia', 11 November 1905, CAB 17/94/58. ^Hardinge to Clarke 16 November 1905 CAB 17/60.

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That the time was not yet ripe to open negotiations with Russia, whether these included a concession regarding the Straits or not, was the official view in London as the Conservatives handed over to the Liberals in December 1905. In the New Year, however, the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was informed that both Lamsdorff and the Tsar were contemplating some sort of general settlement. The difficulty was, as the Tsar diplomatically put it, that 'after the great disasters of the war and the not too honourable peace by which it had been concluded, a treaty with England, settling all pending questions with her, might be regarded as a sign of weakness unless that treaty contained stipulations which were evidently advantageous to Russia'. Benckendorff, who was the bearer of this news, expressed as an ostensibly personal opinion that if England were to agree to a dual arrangement with Russia as to the Straits, an agreement on other pending questions would be popular in Russia. 1 More light was shed on the nature of the 'dual arrangement' contemplated by the Russians early in March. Both Benckendorff, who had been in Russia for two months, and Hartwig, the current head of the Asiatic Department, pointed out, quite correctly, that during the Russo-Japanese war the British interpretation of the Rule of the Straits had been that of Shouvaloff at the Congress of Berlin, i.e. that the relevant clause was part of the law of nations and therefore independent of the decisions of the Sultan. Evidently impressed with the restrictions thereby imposed upon the movements of their Black Sea Fleet, the Russians now wished that the interpretation put forward in 1878 by Lord Salisbury should obtain in future. As Sir C. Spring-Rice reported, 'The practical effect of our modifying the view taken by us during the Japanese war (that is, the view of Count Shouvaloff) would be that if the Sultan gave his permission for ships to pass the Straits we should have no objection'. Spring-Rice was impressed with the fact that Benckendorff and Hartwig used practically the same language, and he expected that a formal proposal in this sense would be made.2 Whilst the British Foreign Office awaited such a proposal, Colonel Robertson of the Directorate of Military Operations was instructed to prepare a memorandum on the military considerations involved as regards an entente cordiale between Britain and Russia. Concern about Persia, and above all about the Persian province of Seistan, caused Robertson to say that Britain must be prepared to make a valuable concession to Russia elsewhere, and that this 'might take the form of our promising to support her in obtaining complete freedom of passage through the Dardanelles'. He recalled that the 1

Spring-Rice to Grey 26 January 1906 B.D.iv no. 208. ^Spring-Rice to Grey 1 March 1906 ibid.no. 210.

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question as to what would be the effect of Russia's obtaining this freedom of egress had been considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1903, and that the unanimous opinion of that body had been that 'while Russia would no doubt obtain certain naval advantages from the changes it would not fundamentally alter the present strategic position in the Mediterranean...the maintenance of the status quo as regards Constantinople is not one of the primary naval or military interests of this country'. 1 Both the Director of Military Operations, General Grierson, and the Secretary of State for War, R.B. Haldane, were in agreement with Robertson's memorandum, and a copy of it was sent to Sir E. Grey before the end of March. The circle of Cabinet ministers being made aware of this particular possibility was further widened by a letter from the Viceroy of India, Lord Minto, to the Secretary of State for India, John Morley, on 2 May 1906. Minto had been impressed by a despatch from Spring-Rice to Grey of midFebruary in which Hartwig had pointed out how much transactions with Russia would be simplified if she received support in her wish to open the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Minto continued: If we could agree with Russia not to stand in her way as to the opening of the Dardanelles if she threw open her Black Sea ports we might have a considerably greater guarantee of her good behaviour in Central Asia and Persia. I have often thought of this question of the Dardanelles, and it has always seemed to me a strong order in dealing with a great nation like Russia to insist on closing her only outlet to the ocean on the south, whilst climatic reasons for a great part of the year greatly interfere with her outlet to the ocean on the north.

Minto appreciated that if Russia was conceded a free passage of the Dardanelles there would then be a Russian fleet in the Levant 'on our high road to India'. Such an apparent loss of power might, he thought, be cancelled by an increase in the garrison of Egypt: 'Turkey's present attitude might justify us in maintaining a considerable force there which, on Imperial grounds and considering the condition of Egyptian revenues, Egypt might pay for and relieve the pockets of people at home, whilst such a force might be useful for possible contingencies in India, to say nothing of the pressure we may be called upon to bring to bear on Turkey in the direction of the Hedjaz and Yemen.' 2 What Minto meant by 'the present attitude' of Turkey derived from a recent Turkish seizure of Egyptian territory, at Akaba, as a manifestation of displeasure at arrangements which the British Government wished to make 'memo by Robertson 20 March 1906, Grey MSS F.0.800/102; CAB 38/2/6. Minto to Morley 2 May 1906, India Office Library MSS Eur.D.573/8.

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with the Khedive as a result of the Anglo-French Agreement of April 1904. At the beginning of May 1906 Sir E. Grey had gone so far as to suggest to Lord Tweedmouth, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the landing of a force to take the Dardanelles forts in the rear. Neither Tweedmouth nor Admiral Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, thought this was feasible. 1 Sir George Clarke, continuing to keep Balfour informed, was able to write on 25 May as regards this matter that 'we have...reason to be thankful that the Sultan had a fit of nerves. Otherwise he could have placed us in a position of much difficulty.' 2 Nevertheless, the question of Anglo-Turkish relations, and of the use of British force against the Ottoman Empire should the latter repeat her action of the spring, rumbled on throughout the summer of 1906. Papers envisaging a Turco-German invasion of Egypt were discussed at the Committee of Imperial Defence in the course of July. It emerged that Lord Cromer, the former Consul-General of Egypt, Admiral Sir Charles Beresford, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, and Sir Charles Hardinge, now Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, were believers in the policy, and possibility, of forcing the Straits, and that General Sir John French, Admiral Fisher, and Lord Esher, a permanent member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, were not. 3 Fisher judged it necessary, in September, to commission a paper entitled 'The Forcing of the Dardanelles (The Naval Aspects of the Question)' to combat what he called the 'vapouring about that its child's play the English Fleet going past the Dardanelles etc.'. 4 Discussion re-started in November 1906 and continued until February 1907, when the full Committee of Imperial Defence reached the conclusion 'that the operation of landing an expeditionary force on or near the Gallipoli Peninsula would involve great risk and should not be undertaken if other means of bringing pressure on Turkey were available' , 5 *

^Tweedmouth to Grey 4 May, Fisher to Grey 13 May 1906, Grey MSS F.0.800/87. Clarke to Balfour 25 May 1906 Balfour MSS Add.MSS 49702. ^ memos by French, Cromer, Esher, CAB 38/12/42, /44, /45; minutes of 92nd meeting of Committee of Imperial Defence, 26 July 1906 CAB 38/12/46; Hardinge to Esher 26 July 1906, in M.V.Brett and Esher (eds), Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher (London, 193438) ii. 172; Fisher to Tweedmouth 27 July 1906 in A. J. Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought (London, 1959) ii.84-5. 4 memo by Sir C. Ottley, Director of Naval Intelligence, undated, Esher MSS 16/11, ChurchiU College Cambridge, referred to in Brett and Esher ii.181-2, Esher to Fisher 5 September 1906; Fisher to Esher 17 September 1906 Esher MSS 10/42. •'minutes of 93rd meeting of CID, 13 November 1906 CAB 38/12/55; minutes of 96th meeting 28 February 1907 CAB 38/13/12; Hankey MSS CAB 63/35. 2

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The 'formal proposal' on the Straits anticipated from Russia by Spring-Rice at the beginning of March 1906 had failed to materialise in the course of the summer and autumn. In November, in the hope that the negotiations which had commenced with agreement on a loan to Persia1 would not 'go to sleep', Grey instructed Hardinge to draw up a memorandum on the passage of Russian warships through the Straits. Hardinge completed this task on 16 November. He noted that 'previous to the outbreak of the RussoJapanese war the Russian Government had been fairly satisfied with the status quo of the Dardanelles...which they greatly preferred to the only other proposals hitherto made - viz the opening of the Straits to the warships of all Powers'. He went on: It is probable that the Russian Government will now desire a modification of the status quo, and if it is thought desirable to make some concession to Russia in return for other advantages to be obtained during the pending negotiations, and if this is a concession upon which they set store, it would be possible to promise to the Russian Government our support in obtaining the consent of the Powers to a modification of Article II of the Treaty of London in the sense of the declaration made by Lord Salisbury at the 18th sitting of the Berlin Congress. By a change in this sense the Russian fleet would, with the consent of the Sultan be able to freely navigate the Straits without hindrance; and although we and the other Powers would enjoy the same facility, the Russian Government would be in a better position than other Powers to exert pressure upon the Sultan to give their fleet the requisite permission, and to withhold it from the ships and fleets of other Powers.

Hardinge also recognised that it was possible that the Russian Government 'might demand a specific statement that the right of free navigation of the Straits should be conceded to their ships and denied to all others' ? Grey immediately forwarded this to Sir A. Nicolson, the new British ambassador in St. Petersburg, who was drawing up a draft treaty for consideration by the Russian Government. Grey's covering letter dwelt on the difficulties that Isvolsky, Lamsdorff's successor as Russian Foreign Minister, was likely to face from the opposition of the military party in Russia, and on quid pro quos with which that opposition might be overcome, or be portrayed to the Tsar as unreasonable. Grey insisted, however, that in these respects it was for Isvolsky to say what he wanted. Grey himself doubted 'whether any complete arrangement with Russia can be made unless it includes the Near East...It is the differences in the Near East that have been the original cause of 'see above, chapter 4. ^memo by Hardinge 16 November 1906, B.D.iv pp. 58-60, Hardinge's italics.

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the hostility and friction between Russia and us'. Although Grey said that he thought 'some change in the direction desired by Russia would be admissible', and that the British Government would be prepared to discuss the question if Russia introduced it, he repeated that 'it is not for us to propose changes with regard to the treaty conditions of the Dardanelles'. As Grey saw it, The difficulty is, of course, that the question of the Dardanelles concerns the other Powers of Europe. Our settlement with Russia, when completed, will have to be published, and so important a matter as a promise on our part to give diplomatic support in favour of any modification of a European treaty could not be introduced as a secret article. The fact that this is so makes it proper that M. Isvolsky, and not we, should be the first to mention the matter; it cannot be pursued without raising a European question, which it is Russia's interest and not ours to raise, though we might no longer object to seeing it re-opened as we should have objected a few years ago. *

The first to mention the matter, subsequent to this, was actually Poklewsky, the Russian Charge d'Affaires in London, who 'mentioned in particular the passage of the Dardanelles' when calling on Hardinge on 28 November. 2 Shortly thereafter Benckendorff pressed Isvolsky to regard the Dardanelles as one of the essential matters that pertained to Russia, a matter far more essential than anything to do with Seistan or lces malheureuses Indes, ou nous n'irons jamais', and a settlement of which would be welcomed by Russian public opinion. 3 Isvolsky did not respond. A Russian Ministerial Council which met on 1 February 1907 to discuss Anglo-Russian negotiations confined its attention to Persia and to the Russian attitude towards the Baghdad Railway. 4 Benckendorff, who had returned to St. Petersburg for this occasion, was able to tell Nicolson that the Russian General Staff was now ready to accept in principle the fact that an understanding between Britain and Russia was desirable, but that they wanted some concessions 'of a political nature'. He then alluded to the Dardanelles. Nicolson replied, quite correctly, that the Dardanelles was outside the scope of his current instructions, 'and, moreover, other Powers than Russia and Britain were interested in the question'. 5 Nicolson went on to predict to Grey that another Russian inter-departmental committee would 'leave out the Near East as that would bring in other Powers'. 6 ^Grey to Nicolson 16 November 1906 Grey MSS F.0.800/72. Hardinge to Nicolson 28 November 1906, B.D.iv no.241. o Benckendorff to Isvolsky 25 December 1906, in A. Isvolsky, Au Service de la Correspondance Diplomatique 1906-1911 (Paris, 1937-39) i.412. 4 B . de Siebert, Entente Diplomacy and the World (New York, 1921) pp. 474-77. ^Nicolson to Grey 10 February 1907, B.D.iv no. 250. ^Nicolson to Grey 13 February 1907, Grey MSS F.0.800/72. 2

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Upon his return to London Benckendorff took what was ostensibly an initiative of his own, although it may well have had the backing of Isvolsky.1 On 15 March he put it to Grey that the Straits should be opened to Russia, and only to Russia: Russia would rather that the Straits should remain closed altogether than that they should be opened in such a way as to allow other Powers than Russia access to the Black Sea. If any change was to be made, the entrance to the Black Sea should remain closed to other Powers, while Russia should have the right to make arrangements with Turkey for the passage of her own ships. Subject to this provision, the Dardanelles and the rest of the Straits as far as the entrance to the Black Sea might be available for other Powers on the same terms for all.

Benckendorff acknowledged that as other Powers were interested in the question, such an Anglo-Russian arrangement 'would be platonic only' - its effect on Russian public opinion, however, would be extremely beneficial, and would help the whole of the arrangements being discussed between the two Powers to be a success. Grey admitted that the question of the Straits had been at the root of the difficulties between Britain and Russia for many years. He also admitted that if in a few years time the question of the Straits was to be raised in Europe, all the good done by an agreement about 'Asiatic questions' now might be undone. Nevertheless, he went on to emphasise the difficulties in the way of meeting Benckendorff's desiderata. Grey professed himself nervous as regards both the domestic front and the foreign front. As regards the former, he thought that 'some important sections of public opinion would be very critical of a particular engagement on this question'. He preferred a proposal which secured general acceptance to one that might give rise to party feeling and have to be imposed by a majority in Parliament. In addition, he maintained that what Benckendorff wanted would be regarded as such a great concession to Russia that equivalent concessions from her would have to be demanded. As regards the foreign front, Grey informed Benckendorff that the German ambassador in London had recently enquired about Anglo-Russian negotiations, and that Grey had told him that these related only to the Indian frontier, did not therefore concern Germany, and were in no way directed against her. He went on to say that if the Anglo-Russian agreement was to include an article about the Straits it would be necessary to tell Germany beforehand that the original scope of the negotiations had been widened: 'otherwise I should be open to a charge of having mislead [sic] the German

^see D.M. McDonald, 'A.P. Isvolskii and Russian Foreign Policy under "United Government", 1906-10' in R. McKean (ed.), New Perspectives in Modern Russian History (London, 1992) p. 185.

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Ambassador intentionally'. More generally, 'The negotiations on their present lines, confined to Asiatic questions, would not arouse the susceptibilities of any other Powers. If they resulted in a pledge as to a particular settlement of the question of the Straits, other Powers might be provoked to say that we had attempted to settle the question behind their backs and they might take offence'.1 Grey was far more negative at this stage than his Permanent Under Secretary. Although Hardinge admitted that an arrangement about the Straits would give Germany and Austria-Hungary 'an opening to make themselves disagreeable', and although he said that Britain 'must have a quid pro quo for the shopwindow' and suggested that the Russian Government agree to support the actual status quo in the Persian Gulf, his basic position was that without an agreement on the Straits 'no agreement with Russia can be said to be complete or on a solid basis'. 2 Benckendorff justified his action on the grounds that the British could not understand lun silence complet sur une question qui a jouée un si grand role dans le passé', and that such silence might be wrongly interpreted. He told Isvolsky that, so far as the proposal made was concerned, Grey was, in his heart of hearts, against it ('Grey au fond du cœur est contre'), far more so than was apparent from the copy of Grey's despatch to Nicolson of 19 March which had been given to him. All he could hope for was that the eventual Anglo-Russian agreement might contain something to the effect that it was by common accord that the question of the Straits had not been addressed at this time.3 Isvolsky, Benckendorff, and Poklewsky nevertheless proceeded to make the most of what they had been told, and, to some extent, of what they had not been told. 4 Grey's communication was reciprocated on 14 April by Isvolsky. Nicolson considered Isvolsky's memorandum to be couched in very friendly terms, and raised no points upon it. On the other hand Fitzmaurice, now Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, thought the Russians were taking 'a most unfair advantage' of Grey's words of 15 March: 'An attempt is made to extract...an implied consent to Russian vessels of war having an exclusive right of exit, and to the denial of equal rights of entry to ' memo by Grey 15 March 1907, B.D.iv no. 257; Grey to Nicolson 19 March 1907 ibid. no. 258; Metternich to German Foreign Office 8 March 1907, Die Grosse Politik vol. 25 (i) no. 8524. 2 Hardinge to King Edward 16 March 1907, Hardinge MSS vol.9 (Cambridge University Library); Hardinge to Bertie 18 March 1907 Bertie MSS Add.MSS 63020; Hardinge to Nicolson 19 March 1907, Carnock MSS F.0.800/339. Benckendorff asked for the Persian Gulf suggestion to be withdrawn, as the promise of British support in obtaining a modification regarding the Straits might, through the opposition of other Powers, remain of a platonic nature, while a Russian engagement on the Gulf would become effective and might be said to be aimed at Germany. ^Benckendorff to Isvolsky 21 March 1907, Au Service de la Russie ii.21. ^Nicolson to Grey 27 March 1907, note by Hardinge 2 April 1907, B.D.iv nos 261, 263.

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the waters of the Black Sea to the ships of other Powers.' Fitzmaurice also thought he discerned a suggestion that 'we should enter into a sort of conspiracy of silence at the expense of other Powers, who have a right to be consulted: especially Austria-Hungary - in virtue of the Danube and Roumania'. He hoped 'a clear and emphatic caveat will be at once put in against the language of the Russian Foreign Office and their covert insinuations'. 1 This comment produced a memorandum from Grey himself which was handed to the Russians at the beginning of May. Grey maintained that Benckendorff's original proposal 'did not exclude a right of exit from the Black Sea and the Straits being allowed to other limitrophe Powers on the Black Sea', such as Roumania. He also pointed out that the original proposal 'contemplated the passage of the Dardanelles and the rest of the Straits being made available for other Powers as far as the entrance to the Black Sea on the same terms for all'. Grey was content to leave it at that, merely throwing out, as a sop, the view that if as a result of the Anglo-Russian negotiations as a whole the British and Russian Governments remained on good terms in Asia, the effect on British public opinion and on any British Government with regard to other questions, including this one, would be very great. 2 The Russian Government did not reply until 10 July 1907, and on this occasion no one at the Foreign Office could find fault. Grey merely took the opportunity to repeat that his recent communications 'had contemplated a friendly agreement about Asiatic questions, which should work well, as being a preliminary condition to any arrangement about the Straits'. 3 *

There was clearly a faction, within the Russian decision-making élite, which wished to see a modification of the Rule of the Straits as an integral part of any Anglo-Russian agreement. This faction certainly included Benckendorff and Poklewsky of the London Embassy, and Zinoviev, head of the Asiatic Department before becoming ambassador to Constantinople in 1898. In 1906 Zinoviev had regarded the prospect of the future control of Constantinople as the justification for Isvolsky's policy of agreement with Great Britain. 4 To the Council of Ministers scheduled for 27 April 1907 he sent in a memorandum in which he stated that

^Nicolson to Grey 14 April 1907 and minute by Fitzmaurice, ibid, nos 264, 265. Grey to Nicolson 1 May 1907 and enclosure, ibid. no. 268. 3 Nicolson to Grey 10 July 1907, Grey to O'Beirne 31 July 1907, ibid, nos 275, 276. 4 B.Williams, 'The Revolution of 1905 and Russian Foreign Policy' in C. Abramsky and B. Williams (eds), Essays in Honour ofE. H. Carr (London, 1974) p. 116. 2

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It has now become extremely desirable that our Black Sea fleet be cured of its impotency, and that access to the Mediterranean be secured for it. It appears possible to raise this question only on condition that we are able to establish sincere cooperation with England. All plans for attack upon India are untenable and must be relegated to the field of fantasy. Concessions could be made on our side regarding the Central Asia question if England is prepared to assist in solving the problem of the Straits. 1

By this time, of course, Grey had made it clear that the British Government did not wish a modification of the Rule of the Straits to be part of the current Anglo-Russian negotiations.2 Nevertheless the BenckendorffZinoviev faction had to be appeased, as had Russian public opinion, in the balancing that was taking place against the opposing faction of the Imperial General Staff. 3 Hence Isvolsky's handling of the latter stages of this matter: he could argue that Britain had committed herself to not opposing certain Russian initiatives which might be made in the future, once the AngloRussian agreement had proved itself. So far as the British side was concerned, it had been taken for granted since early 1906 that the Rule of the Straits would be included within any Anglo-Russian negotiations that took place. Between November 1906, when negotiations did begin, and March 1907, Sir Edward Grey executed a u-turn in regard to this matter, finally painting himself into a corner with his memorandum of 15 March. 4 What is more surprising than the u-turn is the original position itself. It is as if the lesson taught by Germany in 1905 about the lack of correspondence between the Madrid Convention of 1880 on Morocco, signed by all the Great Powers, and the clauses concerning Morocco of the merely Anglo-French Agreement of April 1904, had not been learned by London. Even more alarming is the British failure to consider the point of view of the Ottoman Empire, a state against which Britain had been considering going to war since the spring of 1906. It should not have taken a reminder from O'Conor, the ambassador to Constantinople, who wrote on 30 April 1907, 'I believe there is nothing the present Sultan would more dislike or would more strenuously oppose than the opening of the Straits of the Dardanelles to Foreign ships-of-war', to bring home the entirely predictable attitude of the Turks to an alteration by Britain and Russia of a state of affairs internationally agreed over fifty years ago, and a part of the Public Law of

A. Reisner (éd.), ' Anglo-russkaya konventsiya 1907g. i razdel Afganistana' Krasnyi Archiv vol.10 (1925) pp. 54-66; R.P. Churchill, The Anglo-Russian Convention of1907 (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1939) pp. 165-166. 2 Grey to Nicolson 1 April 1907, Grey MSS F.0.800/72. 3 see p. 126, fn 1. 4 s e e p. 127, fn 1.

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Europe ever since.1 This sort of consideration was not lost on Isvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister. Throughout the exploration of the possibilities of an agreement with Great Britain he had been alive to the susceptibilities of other Powers, and especially to those of Germany. He reminded the Russian Ministerial Council of 1 February 1907, for instance, that 'as events in Morocco have shown, Germany distrusts all agreements concluded without her knowledge and which might in any manner affect her position as a world Power' , 2 Although Grey graduated from vague and unspecified reservations on this score as expressed to Nicolson on 16 November 1906 to a fuller recognition of the international dimension in the end, he was for some time blinded by Britain's selfish imperial concerns, by the prospect, above all, of 'repose' on the Indian frontier.3

^O'Conor to Grey 30 April 1907 B.D.iv no.267; see aso Nicolson to Grey 22 May 1907 ibid. no. 273. 2 de Siebert op. cit. pp. 474-77. 3 Grey to Spring-Rice 16 April 1906, Spring-Rice MSS F.0.800/241.

6 SIR EYRE CROWE ON THE ORIGINS OF THE CROWE MEMORANDUM OF 1 JANUARY 1907

The Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, dated 1 January 1907, by Mr E.A. Crowe, since his promotion in February 1906 one of the Senior Clerks in the Foreign Office, is now well known, perhaps too well known. Since its publication in 1928 in the third volume of British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, edited by Gooch and Temperley, it has come to assume, through the use made of it by historians of early twentieth century British foreign policy, and the large extracts reprinted from it in collections of primary sources, almost the status of a State Paper. 1 Given its considerable length (it occupies 24 pages in Gooch and Temperley and is well over 15,000 words) the first questions customarily applied to it concern themselves with how long it took to read rather than with how long it took to write; with its impact on those who did read it rather than with its genesis. Some of the customary questions can be disposed of more successfully than others. The Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, appears to have found time to read it: he minuted on the printed copy that he saw that 'the part of our foreign policy with which it is concerned involves the greatest issues, and requires constant attention', and ordered that it should go to the Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman, Lord Ripon, Asquith, Morley, and Haldane. 2 Whether these colleagues of his actually read it is impossible to say. There is no indication that it was considered by the Cabinet as a whole: Public Record Office Handbook no. 4 is misleading where it suggests that all memoranda marked 'Printed for the Cabinet' were so marked that they might be collectively considered by that body. 3 Sir Thomas Sanderson, who had retired as Permanent Under Secretary in February 1906, certainly read the memorandum, and took issue with it at some length. 4 Sir Fairfax Cartwright, the Minister Resident at Munich, to whom Sanderson's 'e.g. JJoll (ed.), Britain and Europe: Pitt to Churchill 1793-1940 (Oxford 1967) pp. 204-6 ; K.Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England (Oxford, 1970) pp. 481-93. 2 minute by Grey, undated, Public Record Office, F.O.371/257/73. All documents cited in this article are in the P. R.O. 3 List of Cabinet Papers, 1880-1914 (Public Record Office Handbooks, iv, 1964) pp. vi, vii. 4 G.P. Gooch and H.W.V.Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 18981914 (London 1926-38) iii, Appendix B, pp. 420-31.

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successor Sir Charles Hardinge also supplied a copy, replied on 22 February 1907 that he had 'read it with great care'. 1 It might be presumed, from his contribution to what developed into a debate between Crowe and Sanderson, that Grey's Private Secretary Sir Louis Mallet was also familiar with its contents. 2 The only others who provided extant comments upon it were Lord Fitzmaurice, Grey's Parliamentary Private Secretary, and Sir Frank Lascelles the Ambassador to Berlin, both of whom were engaged, both before and after seeing the memorandum, in combatting what they called 'the anti-German current in the F.O.', and one of whom, Lascelles, was to be increasingly out of favour with Crowe on account of his failure to display any propensity to stand up to Germany, one of the main recommendations of the memorandum itself. 3 So far as the less customary questions concerning the genesis and production of the Crowe memorandum are concerned, it has hitherto been assumed that, since it shows no signs of having been commissioned, like some subsequent memoranda, by Sir Edward Grey, it was a product of the greater freedom to express their views enjoyed by the reformed Foreign Office which came into existence on 1 January 1906. Crowe himself, after all, had asked in January 1905: 'Is it too much to hope that at some future time we may see a number of young university men having such an historical training employed in our library charged with the duty of compiling histories of certain periods, events, or incidents of importance not for publication but for the information and guidance of the Secretary of State and of the Office as a whole?' 4 In a footnote in his recent work The Growth of the Anglo-German Antagonism, however, Paul Kennedy refers to a file from the fourth year of the Great War which, although it does not entirely eliminate an element in the production of the memorandum of 'setting the ball rolling', provides some evidence for answering these questions.5 In the course of the Great War the Foreign Office, and Crowe in particular, had to endure many aspersions cast upon their conduct and loyalties, both in the popular press and in Parliament. Following an attack on ^.0.371/257/5980. British Documents iii, 431-2. 3 ibid.p. 420; Lascelles to Hardinge 1 Feb. 1907, Lascelles MSS, F.0.800/19; Fitzmaurice to Lascelles 21 Sept. 1906, 8 May and 3 Nov. 1907, F.0.800/13; Lascelles to Fitzmaurice 28 Sept. 1906, F.0.800/19; British Documents vi nos 78,88,94. See also Z.S.Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge, 1969) p. 112n. 4 R.Jones, The nineteenth century Foreign Office: an administrative history (London, 1971) p. 129. 5 P. M.Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London, 1980) p. 540 n.73, where the components of the file number have been slightly transposed. The correct reference is F.O.371/2939/64992; and the parliamentary question was answered not on 28 March 1917 but on 22 March. 2

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Crowe in the Daily Mail in July 1915 Grey tried to invoke the power of the Censor. 1 He was unsuccessful, and the campaign of insinuations continued despite an attempt by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons to draw the fire onto himself. 2 On 21 March 1917 the Foreign Office, now headed by A J . Balfour, was informed that the Prime Minister wished that it should provide the answer to a Parliamentary Question laid by Mr Shaw, Liberal M.P. for Kilmarnock. The Question was: Whether, towards the close of 1905 or in the early weeks of 1906, a minute was drawn up by Sir Eyre Crowe, of the Foreign Office, in which the development and tendencies of German Foreign policy were traced; whether that minute touched upon the possibility of conflict between Great Britain and Germany; and whether, in view of the interest and importance of the subjects treated, he will cause a copy of the minute to be laid upon the Table of the House?

Whether or not Shaw had any idea of how lengthy a document he was asking for, one official, Laurence Oliphant, was prepared to provide him with it, doubting whether the capital that the Germans might make out of it for propaganda purposes would outweigh the advantages of publication. The bulk of opinion in the Foreign Office, however, was opposed to this course. Hardinge, once again Permanent Under Secretary, thought it would be fatal to create a precedent allowing M.P.s to call for secret memoranda. The reply delivered on 22 March was that drafted by Lord Robert Cecil, who had had occasion to defend Crowe in the past 3 ; it read: Yes Sir; an extremely able Memorandum was drawn up by Sir E. Crowe and submitted to the Secretary of State on 1st January 1907, dealing with German policy and the grave dangers with which it threatened this country. But I do not think it would be in the public interest to make a precedent for the publication of secret Departmental Memoranda by laying it on the Table. I say this with reluctance, because the publication of this very striking paper would set at rest for ever the baseless insinuations which have been made against the patriotism and character of one of the ablest of our public servants.4

Shaw's papers shed no light on the motivation behind his question, nor upon his source of information. After it had been used by the Foreign Office

^minutes by Grey and Montgomerie on Daily Mail, 20 July 1915, Grey MSS F.0.800/95. ^Hansard, Parliamentary Debates 5th Series, lxxiv, cols 510, 521-2, 22 Sept. 1915; ibid., lxxv, cols 1460-61,11 Nov. 1915. 3 ibid, lxxvi col. 1547,9 Dec.1915. 4 ibid. xci cols 2052-53, 22 Mar. 1917.

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to further rehabilitate Crowe, however, an observation from Balfour prompted Crowe to write yet another minute which gives his version of why the memorandum in question was written in the first place. Balfour wrote: I have not as yet had time to read Sir E. Crowe's paper. But I observe that he talks of King Edward's 'initiative' in connection with the 'Entente'.^ Kj n g Edward had no initiative on this -nor, so far as I am aware, on any other subject. Nor was it his business to have it. Crowe replied: With reference to Mr Balfour's minute, I should like to make the following explanation. In November or December 1905 I was instructed to prepare a short statement, on a few pages, explaining our relations with Germany, for submission to the King, who, I was told, had repeatedly expressed himself perturbed by what he thought was our persistently unfriendly attitude towards Germany contrasted with our eagerness to run after France and do everything the French asked. I said I felt unable to make such a statement in a few pages. But I would write in as brief a form as I thought the subject allowed, what my views on the matter were, for the Secretary of State, who would then be able to make use, if he thought fit, of any part of my paper, to make a submission to H.M. Eventually the memorandum was laid before the King as it stood; and I believe H.M. expressed satisfaction.^ According to the Keeper of the Royal Archives, they contain no copy of the Crowe memorandum; nor is there any correspondence on the subject between King Edward VII or Lord Knollys and the Foreign Office in either late 1905 or early 1907. A s the day books of Harrison and Sons, the Foreign Office printers, have not survived 3 , it is not possible to say when the memorandum was completed in manuscript, and sent to them for printing.

Postscript The above piece was published in the November 1983 issue of the Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research (vol. lvi no. 134). Ten years later, in 1993, Eyre Crowe's daughter, the historian Sybil Crowe, together with Edward Corp, published Our Ablest Civil Servant: Sir Eyre Crowe

1'I'his is to be found on the first page of the Crowe memorandum (British Documents iii.398). minutes by Balfour and Crowe 24 Mar.1917, F.O.371/2939/64992. Against the second paragraph of Crowe's minute Balfour noted: 'I don't know what K.Edward meant by this perhaps he was referring to an episode about Madeira to which the Memo does not allude'. For a similar assessment by Balfour of the influence of King Edward, see T.W.Legh, Baron Newton, Lord Lansdowne (London, 1929) p. 293. ^List of Cabinet Papers p. viii. 2

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1864-1925. In this volume there is an unreserved acceptance of the explanation put forward in March 1917 by Crowe himself for the origin of his memorandum of 1 January 1907. Accompanying this is the assertion that King Edward VII was 'a complete weathercock' in his views about German policy. 1 After heavy borrowings to this effect from G.W. Monger's The End of Isolation (London, 1963) Crowe and Corp write that the King supported the Anglo-French Entente and continued to support it throughout the Tangier Crisis of 1905 and the Algeciras Conference of 1906; and his minutes show that he endorsed Grey's policy of supporting France and had nothing to say against it. Yet at the end of 1905 he began to have doubts about this too and to question the advisability of such close cooperation with France; and this was the reason for his enquiry. ^

There are contradictions here. It is difficult to square the assertion that the King endorsed Grey's policy of supporting France at the Algeciras Conference of January to March 1906 — an assertion which can be demonstrated by the King's telling Rouvier, the French Premier, on 4 March, that 'he hoped that the French Government did not attach any credit to the reports industriously propagated by Parties interested in separating France from England that H.M.G. desired to bring about a war between France and Germany and that England was not a country to be relied on in an emergency' 3 — with the assertion that the King had, at the end of 1905, questioned the advisability 'of such close cooperation with France', an assertion for which the only contemporary, and distinctly flimsy, support ( and not mentioned by Crowe and Corp) are reports from the German Ambassador to London, Metternich, early in December 1905, that he knew 'from a reliable source that King Edward, probably feeling that he went too far towards the other side last summer, desires a settlement of personal and political differences'. On receipt of these reports of meetings held at the Lyceum Club and at Caxton Hall , Kaiser Wilhelm II identified Metternich's 'reliable source' as Lady Aberdeen, pointed out the absence from both gatherings of 'any prince, or friend, or representative whatsoever' of King Edward, refused to accept the compliments of Lord Avebury (who had convened the meeting at the Lyceum) unless the King himself formally associated himself with that meeting, and dubbed Metternich something of an optimist. It was, said the Kaiser, 'the king, his government, and his parliament who have to offer me the hand of England!

' Crowe and Corp p. 114. 2ibid. Bertie to Grey 5 March 1906, British Documents iii. no.327.

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And not Lady Aberdeen!I!' 1 . Questions are therefore raised. One is: is it likely that the King, who in mid-October had not concealed from Metternich his displeasure with the Kaiser on account of the latter's comments on the 'looseness' of English society and on Edward's relations with Mrs Keppel 2 , who at Christmas 1905 minuted on a despatch from Madrid which told of German objections to the Spanish Government's choice of representative at the forthcoming conference at Algeciras, 'A case of bullying as usual' 3 , would at the same time have required to be informed as to why England was eager 'to run after France and do everything the French asked', as Crowe put it in March 1917? Another question is: is it likely that a request from the King for information or for a memorandum would have been ignored for so long as, according to Crowe's 1917 account, it was ignored - given especially the fact that Sir Charles Hardinge, who took over as Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office in February 1906, had very close connections with the Palace? Finally, is it likely that a royal request for 'a short statement, on a few pages' would have been met with the presentation of a 15,000 word opus? Something on the lines of Lord Esher's three page memorandum for the King of 18 January 1906 on Wilhelm II's views on international relations as stated in an audience with Beit, the banker, would have been far more appropriate. 4 What Our Ablest Civil Servant does reveal, on the basis of Crowe's engagement diaries, is that Crowe, as a result of kidney trouble, had to stay away from the Foreign Office for the best part of a month in NovemberDecember 1906, that during that time he dictated his memorandum to his wife, and that he brought the manuscript into the Office on 27 December 1906. A fortnight later Crowe wrote to his colleague Sir F. Villiers, 'I have whilst laid up at home dictated a big memorandum on German policy for Sir Edward' . 5 It may be that Grey had asked for such a memorandum, although there is no record of his so doing. It is just as likely that the workaholic Crowe produced it of his own initiative, whilst house-bound, in order to make his convalescence more palatable and to advance his career by impressing the Foreign Secretary, as, following the implementation of the Foreign Office ' Bulovv to Wilhelm II 3 December 1905 and minutes, Metternich to German Foreign Office 4 December 1905, Bulow to Metternich 5 December 1905, in J.Lepsius, A.MendelssohnBartholdy, F.Thimme (eds), Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914 (Berlin 1922-27) vol.20 (ii) nos 6882, 6883, 6885; see Sir S. Lee, King Edward VII: a biography (London, 1927) ii.524, where the same optimistic interpretation as that delivered by Metternich is given. ^Prince von Bulow, Memoirs (London, 1931) ii.182. 3 minute by Edward VII on Nicolson to Grey 14 December 1905, British Documents iii no. 192. 4 M.V.Brett and Esher (eds), Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher (London, 1934) ii.136-139. 5 Crowe to Villiers 14 January 1907, F.0.800/23. Crowe and Corp give the date for this as 14 February: their fn 29 p. 131.

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reforms, he now had every right to do. There is also the outside possibility that, in his recollection of March 1917, Crowe got the dates wrong by a full twelve months, and that any inconsistency on the part of the King, who in June 1906 had delayed for three months, until such time as the Kaiser 'shows he is springing no new surprises upon us', a reply to a German suggestion that Wilhelm II be invited to Windsor 1 , coincided with his own illness of late 1906. For such royal inconsistency, however, there is only the speculation of the German ambassador in Paris, Radolin, that Clemenceau, the new French Premier, was perhaps not receiving from King Edward and Liberal ministers the encouragement that the preceding Conservative administration had accorded to Delcasse. 2 There is no support for royal inconsistency towards the end of 1906 in R.R. McLean, Royalty and Diplomacy in Europe, 1890-1914 (Cambridge, 2001), the most recent scholarly work to approach this topic. Moreover, whilst McLean does not address the issue of the origin of the Crowe memorandum, he demonstrates persuasively that Monger was wrong to find any inconsistency in the King's views of Germany after the spring of 1905. Wilhelm II's landing at Tangier, he shows, 'resulted in a breach...which was never healed satisfactorily before the King's death'. 3 The lack of faith in Wilhelm evinced by Edward in mid-April 1905 to Prince Louis of Battenberg 'He (Wilhelm II) is utterly false and the bitterest foe that England possesses' 4 - was only confirmed in mid-December 1905 by information from King Alfonso of Spain that Wilhelm had asked for Spanish troops to be stationed along the southern frontier of France in order to tie down units of the French army 5 , and Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace of The Times reported to the Palace on 14 January 1906 that he had assured President Loubet of France that the King was convinced of the necessity of maintaining the entente. 6 All these things considered, it looks increasing likely that Crowe, in 1917, was taking the name of King Edward in vain.

^Lee ii. 528. Radolin to Bulow 31 October 1906, Grosse Politik vol.xxi (ii) no. 7239. ^McLean p. 113. 4 ibid. p. 115. 5 ibid. p. 150. 6 ibid. p. 151. 2

7 THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE RE-VISITED, 1906-1914

(i) The Liberal Imperialist Entente The Liberal cabinet of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman inherited in December 1905 a commitment to France that was both specific and vague. This commitment was embodied in Article ix of the Anglo-French Agreement of April 1904. The text of Article ix was: 'The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.' Until November 1912 this was the only British obligation towards France. In November 1912 the Asquith cabinet authorised the Foreign Secretary to write to the French ambassador that 'if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatens the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common'. 1 This more general and wider-ranging commitment was the only additional commitment made until 2 August 1914, when the cabinet authorised the Foreign Secretary 'to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power' , 2 *

From December 1905 up to and including August 1914 only a small minority of ministers in the cabinets of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith were convinced that the gains to be derived from the entente with France outweighed the liabilities attached to it. The core of this minority consisted of ^Grey to Cambon 22 November 1912, in G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 (London, 1926-38) x (ii) no. 416. 2 B D xi no.487; J.A. Pease Diary 2 August 1914, Gainford MSS.

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R.B. Haldane, Sir E. Grey, and H.H. Asquith. It was to these individuals that Haldane was referring when he wrote to Asquith in 1922, when the latter was preparing a volume of memoirs: 'As Edward Grey always said amongst ourselves...'} Between mid-1909 and mid-1911 W.S. Churchill and D. Lloyd George began to share the outlook of this minority, the former rather more thoroughly and, after 1911, rather more consistently, than the latter. 2 From July 1912 to April 1914 the minority could count on J.E.B. Seely, Asquith's choice as Haldane's successor at the War Office. The original members of this minority were all Liberal Imperialists, a faction within the Liberal Party led until 1904 by the former Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Lord Rosebery. How tightly-knit this group was, how closely its members collaborated, and how committed it was to continuity of foreign policy and the policy of the entente with France, must first be demonstrated. It was Haldane, always the driving force within the group, who took the initiative, in the autumn of 1905, in a bid to ensure continuity of foreign policy. On 12 September he wrote to Lord Knollys, Private Secretary to King Edward VII: 'We believe that the Opposition cannot emerge from its present condition unless we can, with our friends and followers, to some extent shape policy. To do this implies that our group should form a sufficiently strong and important minority in the Cabinet.' Amongst the safeguards he wanted were the Leadership of the House of Commons and the Chancellorship of the Exchequer for Asquith, and either the Foreign Office or the Colonial Office for Grey. 3 At the beginning of October Haldane went to Balmoral to pursue the matter. Also present were the Prime Minister, A.J. Balfour, and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, together with the 'much consulted' Lord Esher. Haldane reported to Asquith that Esher had spoken to him 'of you and Edward Grey in a very friendly way and went on to War Office and India matters in a very suggestive fashion'. Haldane concluded that the result of the visit was that the Liberal Imperialists' plan was 'thoroughly approved in all its details' and that 'we have secured very cordial and powerful assistance'. 4 It was after a 'long talk' on 13 January 1906 with Haldane (appointed Secretary of State for War by Campbell-Bannerman) that Grey (appointed Foreign Secretary) authorised conversations between representatives of the British and French military and naval authorities, without consulting any other ministers, and without informing anyone else, except perhaps the King, * Haldane to Asquith 1 September 1922, Asquith MSS vol. 34, my italics. ^Murray Diary 7 January 1912, Elibank MSS 8814; Pease Diary 29 March 1912. 3 Haldane to Knollys 12 September 1905, Asquith MSS vol. 10. 4 Haldane to Asquith 6 October 1905, ibid.

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that certain contacts had already taken place.1 Asquith was seen by Grey on 19 January and told of what had transpired, several days before the Prime Minister was fully acquainted with the facts. 2 Campbell-Bannerman, who wrote at the beginning of February that 'I do not like the stress laid upon joint preparations' 3 , had been presented, through the initiative and cohesion of his Liberal Imperialist colleagues, with a fait accompli. The French ambassador, for his part, appreciated that if Grey, Haldane and Asquith quit the cabinet, 'the foreign policy of the remainder might not be the same as with the late Government'. This appreciation worked its way, via the British ambassador in Paris and Lord Knollys, to King Edward.4 The first three months of the year 1906 saw the first of four crises when war, between Britain and France on the one hand, and Germany on the other, was most definitely in sight. During the next crisis, in November 1908, the same French ambassador, Paul Cambon, concluded from a conversation between his military attaché and Lord Esher, that 'nous avons pour nous...les Ministres les plus influents, le Premier Ministre (Asquith), ceux des Affaires étrangères, de la Guerre, le Premier Lord de l'Amirauté (McKenna, Asquith's appointment to replace Tweedmouth), c'est à dire tous ceux qui ont la responsabilité des intérêts extérieurs du pays'. Between 5 and 12 November, Esher established that Asquith, Grey and Haldane were all prepared to intervene by sending a force to the continent.5 At the beginning of the third crisis Churchill and Lloyd George, the new recruits to the Liberal Imperialist cause, dined with Haldane and Grey. Churchill recorded the outcome in a letter to his wife of 5 July 1911: 'We decided to use pretty plain language to Germany and to tell her that if she thinks Morocco can be divided up without John Bull, she is jolly well mistaken.' 6 Haldane spent the evening of 18 July with Grey; a cabinet was due to be held on the 19th. At it, Haldane raised the matter of relative forces on the Franco-German frontier. This was not well received by the majority of the cabinet. Asquith did not conceal from the King that a first-class row, or as

Haldane to his mother 13 January 1906, Haldane MSS 5975. Grey's letter of 10 January to the Prime Minister, received by him on the 13th (Cambell-Bannerman MSS Add. MSS 41218) did not include Cambon's statement that military and naval conversations had already started. 2 Grey to Campbell-Bannerman 19 January 1906, Campbell-Bannerman MSS Add. MSS 52514. 3 Campbell-Bannerman to Ripon 2 Februaiy 1906, in J.A. Spender, Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London, 1923) ii. 257. 4 Bertie to Knollys 31 January 1906, Bertie MSS F.0.800/174. •^Cambon to Pichon 18 November 1908, Documents Diplomatiques Francois 1871-1914 2nd Series xi p. 931; M.V. Brett and Esher, Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher (London, 1934-38) ii. 359 (12 November 1908). ^Churchill to his wife 5 July 1911, in R.S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, Companion vol. 2 Part 2 p. 1097 (London, 1969).

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he put it 'a long and animated discussion', had ensued. 1 On 21 July, the cabinet's decision having been less rigorous than required by the Liberal Imperialists, Lloyd George, Grey and Asquith composed a passage for a speech due to be delivered by Lloyd George that evening at the Mansion House. Cabinet clearance was not sought. 2 On 14 August, with the outcome of the continuing crisis still impossible to predict, Haldane arranged a dinner party of himself, Asquith, Grey and Churchill in order to tell them 'something of war'. According to the Clerk of the Privy Council, Almeric Fitzroy, Lloyd George was also present, and the decision was that 'anything practicable to accelerate a counter-stroke [should Germany attack France] must be done' . 3 One outcome of that dinner-party was that a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence was convened by Asquith for 23 August. Only the Liberal Imperialist ministers were invited; it was later described by Esher as 'a packed Defence Committee' and 'a small junta of Cabinet ministers'. 4 Another outcome of the dinner party was that on 16 August Grey favoured the French ambassador with what he called his ' impressions personelles ', claiming that he had not consulted his cabinet colleagues about the consequences of a rupture in the Franco-German negotiations that were taking place. The impression derived by Cambon from this interview was embodied in a despatch. Cambon wrote: Ce qu'il y a d'intéressant dans les paroles du principal Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères, c'est qu'il a parlé de l'Angleterre comme si elle était l'alliée de la France au même titre que la Russie, et qu'il n ' a pas semble un instant mettre en doute que son gouvernement ne se déroberait pas à l'obligation de nous soutenir.^

Also on 16 August Grey told the Russian ambassador: 'In the event of war between Germany and France, England would have to participate.' 6

1 Haldane to his mother 19 July 1911, Haldane MSS 5986; Pease Diary 19 July 1911; Asquith to the King 19 July 1911, CAB 41/33/22; Almeric Fitzroy, Memoirs (London, n.d.) ii. 466. 2 Note by Murray on a passage in his Master and Brother (London, 1945) in F.O.371/1160/30188; Murray Diary 17 January 1912, Elibank MSS 8814; T. Boyle, 'New Light on Lloyd George's Mansion House Speech' Historical Journal xxiii (1980) pp. 431-433. 3 According to the diary of General Sir H.H. Wilson for 15 August 1911, McKenna was also present; Fitzroy ii.461. 4 Brett and Esher iii.74 (24 November 1911); C.P. Scott Diary 4 May 1914, C.P. Scott MSS Add.MSS 50901. Esher was not invited: between December 1908 and March 1909, in the course of three meetings of the CID sub-committee on the Military Needs of the Empire, he had proved less than whole-hearted about a British military contribution to a continental war (CAB 16/5; Fisher to Esher 15 March 1909 in Lord Fisher, Memories, London 1919 pp. 188-9); Haldane was even more adamant about not extending an invitation to Fisher (Hankey to McKenna 15 August 1911, Hankey MSS 7/3); on the other hand, Haldane did want Kitchener to be present, but Kitchener declined. 5 Cambon to de Selves 16 August 1911, DDF 2nd Series xiv no 184. ^Benckendorff to Sazonov 16 August 1911, in B. de Siebert, Entente Diplomacy and the World (New York, 1921) p. 598.

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In the aftermath of this crisis (the Agadir crisis) Haldane dined with Grey, Asquith, Lloyd George and Churchill on 25 October and had 'a long and valuable discussion'. 1 What Churchill, who had just been transferred to the Admiralty, would accomplish there, particularly in terms of collaboration and coordination with the War Office, was certainly on the agenda. At the cabinet of 1 November 1911 the Liberal Imperialists were challenged in no uncertain terms about the expediency or otherwise of communications taking place between British and French military and naval representatives in regard to possible cooperation in the field, without the previous knowledge of the cabinet. Another 'long and animated discussion' ensued, and the matter was postponed by Asquith for a fortnight so that tempers might cool and the Liberal Imperialists could prepare a defence of their position. On 4 November Churchill encouraged Grey to take up 'a very strong position about military consultations with the French' at the next meeting. On 5 November he ended a letter to Asquith: 'I think you and Grey will have to make the Cabinet face the realities next Wednesday.' 2 On 13 November Haldane wrote to his sister: 'Morley is getting up the old row again for tomorrow's Cabinet. Asquith came in here late last night, and we concerted plans.' Immediately after the meeting he wrote: 'We had a fight yesterday in the Cabinet over the General Staff preparations. McKenna attacked me rather viciously. But the P.M. steered things through.' 3 On 21 November Haldane again played host to Grey late into the night, as they went over the speech which Grey was due to deliver in the House of Commons on the 27th. 4 In the crisis of July-August 1914 the Liberal Imperialists were just as inseparable. Asquith was with Haldane and Grey until 1 a.m. on the morning of 29 July. They arranged to meet together before the 11 a.m. cabinet of 1 August. They consulted together again during the night of 2 August. Haldane stayed with Grey from 31 July and throughout the crucial first days of August. 5 That Haldane, Asquith, Grey and Churchill were the only civilians present at the War Councils held on 5 and 6 August 1914 was entirely appropriate. It symbolised their pre-war cohesiveness and exclusivity. *

1

Haldane to his mother 26 October 1911, Haldane MSS 5986. R.S. Churchill op. tit.pp. 1370, 1323. %aldane to his sister 13 November 1911, Haldane MSS 6011. 4 Haldane to his mother 22 November 1911, ibid.5986. 5 Haldane to his mother 29, 31 July, 1 August 1914, ibid.5991, 5992; to his sister 31 July, 2 August 1914, ibid.6012; Murray op. a'f.pp. 122-3; Asquith to Stamfordham 30 July 1914, Royal Archives GV K2553(6)/55. But in this connection see also Chapter 9 below. 2

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The imperialism of the Liberal Imperialists took precedence over their liberalism, and great tension was generated as a result in the administrations of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith. Right-wing journalists such as H.A. Gwynne, in 1906 editor of The Standard, regarded Haldane, Grey and Asquith as 'pillars of Empire' 1 , and were correct in so doing. Early in 1908, for instance, when Haldane was encountering opposition to his Army reforms from the then radical and unreconstructed Lloyd George, he wrote to his sister: 'One appreciates the point of view of the Radical stalwarts but it is not one from which the affairs of the Empire can be conducted.' 2 He continued to try to devise a military system capable of sending the British Expeditionary Force to the continent at the same time as the U.K. itself was being invaded, and in November 1908 told Asquith that if Britain failed France he would not give ten years' purchase for the British Empire. 3 Early in 1909 the still unreconstructed Lloyd George complained to Asquith about the size of the Navy Estimates, saying: 'We must run the country on Liberal lines. If Tory extravagance on arms is exceeded Liberals who have nothing to hope from this Parliament in the way of redress of grievances will hardly think it worth their while to make any effort to keep in office a Liberal Ministry.' 4 Asquith took the opposing stance of Grey, Haldane, and, in this instance, McKenna, who were all prepared to resign on this matter. Immediately after the Mansion House speech of July 1911 John Morley, Secretary of State for India, complained bitterly of the new and Liberal Imperialist manifestations of Lloyd George, writing that 'Even men from whom we should have looked for better things are showing that they have but poor grasp of the Principles of Peace, and little comprehension of the foundations of national strength'. 5 In the summer of 1912 the former Lord Chancellor, Lord Loreburn, who since December 1905 had been the most consistent opponent in the cabinet of the Liberal Imperialist creed, wrote the following valedictory letter to Haldane: My differences with you have always been this, you have been an Imperialist 'au fond' and always in my opinion it is quite impossible to reconcile Imperialism with the Liberal creed which we professed, and on the force of which we received the support of the country. In this way we became hopelessly estranged on the greatest of all issues.**

^Gwynne to Marker 18 July, 23 August 1906, Marker MSS Add.MSS 52277B. ^Haldane to his sister 11 February 1908, Haldane MSS 6011. 3 W.O. 33/462: 'Appreciation of situation in the U.K. in the event of hostilities'; Brett and Esher ii. 359. 4 Lloyd George to Asquith 2 February 1909, Asquith MSS vol. 21. 5 Morley to Carnegie 23 July 1911, MS Film 569, Bodleian Library. 6 cited in R.F.V. Heuston, Lives of the Lord Chancellors (Oxford, 1964) p. 168.

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Haldane succeeded Loreburn as Lord Chancellor. His own successor as Secretary of State for War, Seely, delivered himself of the following opinion almost immediately: 'We believe at the War Office that personal sacrifice of patriotic citizens is essential for the safety of the Empire.' 1 *

In 1916 Haldane wrote to a former assistant of his at the War Office: The Expeditionary Force had a double purpose from the first. It was intended as a possible help to France if we made an agreement with Russia. But that was a state secret. The Cabinet hardly knew it. But down to 1914 there was little fear of a breach with Germany; it was only an emergency that we were providing against...^

The veil on Haldane's 'state secret' was lifted, and the policy which the Liberal Imperialists wished to pursue was revealed, in the course of the Agadir crisis of 1911. The veil was lifted slightly at the cabinet of 19 July, already referred to, when Haldane insisted on discussing military strength on the Franco-German frontier. It was lifted rather more when in the first week of August Morley heard that the War Office had enquired of the Privy Council Office as to whether it had ready for immediate submission the Proclamations necessary for calling out the Reserves. This discovery elicited from Morley the statement that 'The issue of any such Proclamations will be the signal of my leaving the Government'. 3 The veil was fully cast off between 23 August and the end of October, as McKenna told regular members of the Committee of Imperial Defence who had been deliberately omitted from the meeting of 23 August of what had transpired on that occasion. Fisher, the former First Sea Lord who like Esher had not been invited to the 23 August meeting, fuelled the fire by writing from the continent that he had picked up reports that General Sir John French, the Commander-in-Chief designate of the B.E.F., had landed in France and had been expatiating, on his way to French Army Headquarters, 'on the evident intention of joint military action'. 4 The cabinet meetings of 1 and 15 November were to reveal the extent to which the Liberal Imperialists were in a minority. The majority prepared well: Morley announced to Esher on 29 October that 'Some of us propose to 1 Wilson Diary 11 July 1912. ^Haldane to Harris 20 November 1916, in Heuston p. 206. Fitzroy ii.456, 461. The arrangements governing the issuing of such Proclamations were made more precise by a CID sub-committee in 1912: ibid .ii. 494-5. ^Fisher to Esher 26 August 1911, in A J . Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought: the correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone (London, 1952-9) ii. 382.

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make a demonstration in force as to certain proceedings in the C.I.D., with which you are acquainted.' J.A. Pease, the Minister for Education, had found McKenna on 24 October closeted with Loreburn and Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary. Harcourt explained that McKenna had been dismissed from the Admiralty because he had declined on 23 August to arrange for the fleet to convey troops to aid the French, without cabinet sanction. In the diary which he kept Pease wrote up the two cabinet meetings as one: Asquith was weak and thought no cabinet was necessary but later on he saw he had backed the wrong horse and on 15 November we won a great victory for a principle. Haldane had to climb down and agree to our terms. Asquith, Grey, Haldane, Lloyd George, Churchill thought they could boss the rest, but were mistaken.

On 1 November John Burns, President of the Local Government Board, had recorded: 'Cabinet today very interesting. Morley, McKenna, Harcourt, Pease and nearly all took a strong line about Cabinet supremacy over all other bodies in the matter of sea and land defence.' Esher was not exaggerating when he wrote on 24 November: 'There has been a serious crisis. Fifteen members of the Cabinet against five. The Entente is decidedly imperilled.' 1 *

The cabinets of 1 and 15 November 1911 marked a watershed in the history of the Entente. Despite what Haldane wrote to his sister on 16 November about having emerged 'unhampered in any material point' 2 , the Liberal Imperialists were to be much more strenuously supervised and monitored by their victors than had hitherto been the case. Harcourt had made a copy of the resolutions passed on 15 November, despite being told by the Prime Minister, on Churchill's prompting, that it was an unwritten rule that ministers should keep no record of cabinet proceedings. At the end of the month a three point note based on this record was drawn up by Harcourt and Loreburn, sent to Morley, and shown by the latter to Asquith, Haldane and Grey, who all accepted it as completely accurate. There is a copy of this note in the papers of John Burns. Dated 29 November 1911, it runs: 1. That at no time has the Cabinet decided whether or not to give either military or naval assistance to France in the event of her being at war with Germany. ^Morley to Esher 29 October 1911, Esher MSS 10/31; Pease Diary 24 October, 15 November 1911; Burns Diary 1 November 1911 Burns MSS Add.MSS 46333; Brett and Esher iii. 74. 2 Haldane to his sister 16 November 1911 Haldane MSS 6011.

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2. That at no time has the British Government given any promise of such assistance to France. 3. That the Cabinet was not informed till the end of October of any naval or military preparations being made to meet the contingency of war this summer or autumn, nor was any plan for a landing of troops on the Continent at any time communicated to or approved by the Cabinet.*

Loreburn, who was no more above a certain deviousness of method than the Liberal Imperialists had proved themselves to be, and who in July and September had leaked to left-wing journalists what Lloyd George at least regarded as cabinet secrets 2 , certainly did not regard this as the end of the matter. As Grey's Private Parliamentary Secretary recorded, the Chief Whip had found Loreburn 'incensed that Asquith, Grey, Lloyd George, Winston Churchill and Haldane, "five amateurs" as he called them, should have met together and without consulting their colleagues in the Cabinet, decided in the event of war to land 150,000 men in France'. 3 Loreburn was determined to extract from Grey a public statement to the effect that no obligation to give military support to France existed or had existed. He believed that Grey had promised to make such a statement, and drafted a reply to make in cabinet. The concluding words of this draft declared that Britain was not under any obligation direct or indirect, expressed or implied, to support France against Germany by force of arms. Loreburn contemplated moving this as a resolution in cabinet and resigning if, as was most unlikely at that time, it was rejected. Although he did not go through with this, he did go to see Grey in the New Year. He also wrote, once, and visited, twice, the Archbishop of Canterbury, to whom he insisted that 'Grey has done harm by his coldness and that Germany is reasonably alienated'. The Archbishop was sufficiently impressed to demand from both Asquith and Grey a public repudiation of a story circulating in Germany to the effect that there had been a plan for the British fleet to attack the Germans without notice. This was pressure that neither Prime Minister nor Foreign Secretary could ignore. Asquith dealt with it by assuring Davidson in a letter that 'the movements and operations of our Fleet this summer and autumn were perfectly normal'; Grey had to receive Davidson at the Foreign Office on 24 January 1912 only to be told in effect that his reticence and lack of frankness 'had gone rather too far' . 4

^Burns MSS Add.MSS 46308. 2

L l o y d George to Churchill 15 September 1911, in R.S. Churchill p. 1125; W.S. Blunt, My Diaries (London, 1920) ii. 373-4. •^Murray Diary 3 January 1912, Elibank MSS 8814. 4

C . P . Scott Diary 6, 7 January 1912 Add.MSS 50901; the exchange between the Archbishop of Canterbury and Asquith is printed in G.K.A. Bell, Randall Davidson (Oxford, 1952) pp. 656-7; Davidson to Winchester 3 January and m e m o by Davidson 5 January 1912 Davidson M S S 336; note by Davidson 2 4 January 1912 ibid. vol. 13.

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In the early summer of 1912 Loreburn left the government through illhealth. A few months later he wrote to Bryce, 'I certainly should have resigned over the German business had I not believed and been urged by colleagues to believe that I should serve the country best by staying and trying to get a sensible policy instead of what had been pursued'. As it was, he continued to press C.P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, to extract from Grey 'a definite statement as to the nature of our relations with France and the obligations implied in them'. 1 Of the colleagues he referred to, it was Harcourt who assumed Loreburn's mantle. Harcourt, whose 'power...of moulding opinion by the quietest and often unobserved methods' was remarked on by Morley 2 , was a worthy successor. In the summer of 1912 he resolutely opposed any changes in naval distribution, and any conversations between the British and French Admiralties, which could be interpreted as determining the future in the direction of alliance and ultimate naval and military cooperation.3 As a member of the CID sub-committee on Attack on the British Isles from Overseas, which sat for most of 1913, he made sure that due regard was shown to his and his friends' sensibilities. For example, he received the following from the Secretary of the CID on 12 December 1913: '...your letter arrived when I was engaged in drafting on the difficult and delicate question of the Expeditionary Force and its objects. I believe I have hit upon a way of bringing the question in which will meet your approval...'; Harcourt was next shown a draft proof, about which Hankey wrote: 'The part in which you are interested more particularly is paras 151 to 159. If they outrage your views so far that you think they ought not to be circulated even as a basis for discussion, I would be obliged if you would let me know at once.' 4 A form of words acceptable to Harcourt was found. But he also continued to harry Grey, reminding him early in 1914 that the cabinet did not admit the existence of any such entity as a triple entente.5 Harcourt was assisted in all this by McKenna, who was determined to pursue from his new position as Home Secretary the spoiling policy which he had formerly pursued at the Admiralty and who had, as Loreburn had predicted, ' Loreburn to Bryce 3 September 1912, Bryce MSS 123; C.P. Scott Diary 29 September 1912 Scott MSS Add.MSS 50901. ^Fitzroy op. cit. p. 486. 3

K.M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente (Cambridge, 1985) pp. 51,53. Hankey to Harcourt 12, 20 December 1913 Harcourt MSS 511 f.99, f.101. Harcourt had posed a similar problem for Hankey's predecessor in 1911. Ottley had received a draft paper for the Imperial Conference on 'The Desirability of such a General Uniformity of Organisation throughout the Military Forces of the Empire as may facilitate their enduring mutual support and assistance'. Ottley wrote to the DMO on 11 May 1911 that Harcourt wanted the words 'as for instance in N.W. Europe' deleted from the sentence 'When operations are being carried on close to the home shores, as for instance in N.W. Europe...'. W.0.106/43 Imperial Conference 10.

4

-'Harcourt to Grey 8, 9 January 1914 Grey MSS F.0.800/91.

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come out unmistakably into the camp of those opposed to the Liberal Imperialists. 1 Morley also contributed to the supervision of the Liberal Imperialists, helping in May 1912, for instance, to stop Asquith holding a CID meeting in the course of a Mediterranean cruise, something he described as 'a dangerous and provocative experiment'. 2 Almeric Fitzroy recorded what Morley said to him six months later, during the first Balkan War: He fully recognised our difficulty if in the last resort we failed to support Russia and France, though, to apply Bismarck's famous remark about the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier, he did not think the issue worth to us the body of one Territorial. He intimated that he at least would be no party to war arising out of such a situation..

(Here Morley remained absolutely true to sentiments he had expressed in a letter to Rosebery shortly after the Casablanca crisis of 1908: 'Clemenceau talked to me of our being ready as of old to send a force into the Low Countries. As if this would not delight the Kaiser, whose 4 millions would gobble up our 100,000 in quarter of an hour...' 4 ; a twelve page letter which Grey had written to him on 3 November 1911, at the height of the cabinet crisis, had failed to convince.5) The post-November 1911 supervision and monitoring by Loreburn, Harcourt, McKenna, Morley, and others certainly had an impact. The emphasis placed throughout the summer of 1912 on the non-committal nature of naval conversations by Churchill, for instance, was in deference to the role and influence of the opponents of the Liberal Imperialists; so was the first paragraph of Grey's letter to Cambon of 22 November 1912, which Harcourt, Morley and company regarded as another important document which safeguarded their position, as something upon which they could rely in a crisis, and use to supplement the sheer weight of numbers through which they had carried the day in November 1911; so was the stress laid upon the Director of Military Operations' visit to Paris in November 1912 'without power to commit H.M.G.'. 6 The impact can be demonstrated in another way. Almeric Fitzroy recounts an incident which occurred at a dinner at the Athenaeum in

1 Fitzroy pp. 467,485; Scott Diary 7 January 1912 Add.MSS 50901. ^Fitzroy pp. 485-6. ^ibid. p. 496 (11 November 1912). On 25 October 1912 Morley had written to Esher, 'We are nearing a real crisis in our foreign policy. Can we meet 1 November?'. He saw Esher on 9 November and again on 5 December: Esher MSS 10/31. 4 Morley to Rosebeiy 3 December 1908, Rosebery MSS 10047 f.193. 5 Morley to Burns 14 June 1916 Burns MSS Add.MSS 46283 f.734. 6 e.g. Churchill to Asquith and Grey 23 August 1912, R.S. Churchill Companion vol.2 Part 3 pp. 1638-9; see note 1 above; Morley of Blackburn, Memorandum on Resignation (London, 1928) p. 18; Wilson Diary 19, 26 November 1912.

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mid-1912, at which both Morley and Grey were present. One of the diners expressed the opinion that 'Political divisions in France, bitter as they were, had not the same effect in stunting national policy'. This was a statement that Grey received 'with studious reserve'. 1 Grey's 'studious reserve' on this occasion is the best possible tribute to the influence and impact of his opponents within the cabinet from November 1911. What produced that 'studious reserve' was still present in 1914: as the Russian ambassador observed of Grey, 'Que son parti et ses utopies le gênent est évident...'' ? *

What is ironie is that the period of lack of supervision of the Liberal Imperialists was also the period of lack of effective planning to support France, and that the period of monitoring of the Liberal Imperialist's activities which followed was also the period during which Anglo-French and War Office-Admiralty coordination of planning made such progress that by the end of July 1914, although only just, Britain was for the first time in a position to render effective military assistance to the French. On 16 April 1911 Grey had sent Asquith an account of the circumstances in which he and Haldane had authorised the holding of military conversations in 1906. This account ended: 'The military experts then conversed. What they settled, I never knew - the position being that the Government was quite free, but that the military people knew what to do, if the word was given.' 3 As Asquith already knew the genesis of the military conversations, this letter was probably designed to deceive Morley, to whom Grey asked Asquith to send it. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that what Grey implied, that he personally had had nothing to do with the progress of the talks after authorising them, was not true. In 1907 he had sanctioned further developments, and personally re-drafted instructions to General Lyttleton, the Chief of the General Staff; in November 1908, having been told by the French ambassador that naval cooperation had not been arranged, he undertook to speak to McKenna on the subject. 4 Following a memorandum from the Director of Military Operations to the CIGS in January 1911,

ÏRtzroy ii. 489 (1 July 1912). ^Benckendorff to Sazonov 25 February 1914 in R. Marchand (éd.), Un Livre Noir: diplomatie d'avant-guerre d'après les documents des archives russes (Paris, 1922-3) ii. 310. 3 Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916 (London, 1925) i. 94. ^memorandum by General Nicholson 6 November 1911, BD vii p. 627, written in defence of Haldane and Grey and for their use at the cabinet on 15 November 1911; Grey to Bertie 24 November 1908, BD vi no. 106.

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moreover, both Grey and Haldane had assented to the railway companies being consulted by the General Staff. 1 Just as Grey's interview of 24 November 1908 with Cambon revealed certain shortcomings, so did the memorandum of January 1911. For it pointed out 'the danger which existed owing to the entire absence up to date of those elemental measures necessary for the methodical mobilisation, entrainment and embarkation of the Expeditionary Force'. This was not all. In October 1910 the new DMO, General Sir Henry Wilson, requested the calling of the permanent sub-committee which the CID had set up in July 1905 to consider schemes for combined operations; he did so in terms which suggest that this sub-committee had not met for several years.2 In July 1911 Wilson discovered certain other shortcomings. At noon on 26 July he was asked by General Nicholson, the then CIGS, when the Expeditionary Force could be ready. Wilson had to say that he did not know, as 'the horse difficulty' had not been solved. He noted in his diary for that day, 'We are unfortunately caught at a time when the proposals which I put forward for acceleration of mobilisation are not yet completed. We must do the best we can. Our rail and ship arrangements are worked out on many new Tables but the personnel may not be ready'. On the next day it emerged, as he recorded, 'that we can only just make the Cav [airy] Division] , 4 Div[ ision] and A.T.s mobile. The 4th and 6th Division] s will have no horses, no ASC personnel, no M.T. or M.T. drivers, no medical units...'. The 28th of July was another day of 'semi-scare and hasty preparation and scramble'. Wilson found that 'some of our stores had no web equipment, and still worse that we could only fight our Howitzers as 4 gun batteries and then only with half the proper amount of ammunition. Ewart [Wilson's predecessor as DMO] has absolutely no medical arrangements made for the 4th and 6th Divisions'. He concluded: 'The scandal grows and I am keeping a diary so that I may write a minute on the whole situation.' 3 By 16 August Wilson could contain himself no longer. He wrote to General Nicholson as follows: There must be something radically wrong when a man in my position is forced to write, during a time of international strain, that he does not know when the Expeditionary Force can be made ready to take the field, nor even which of the larger units of that force could be made completely mobile, nor for how long the wastage of war can be made good; nor does he know if the Force will enter on the campaign with a serious deficiency in officers nor whether this deficiency will seriously increase. There must be something 1 memorandum by Major Gorton, 'The Progress of the scheme for the despatch of the Expeditionary Force, January to June 1911', sent to DMO 30 June 1911, W.O. 106/49C. 2 Wilson to Ottley, October 1910, W.0.106/47A. 3 Wilson Diary 26,27, 28 July 1911.

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wrong when the officer responsible to you for the fighting efficiency of the Expeditionary Force in so far as plans of operations for that Force are concerned, is unaware that certain essentials in mobilisation equipment are (or were) deficient; is unaware how long a time will elapse before the Force is fully equipped with a re-sighted rifle and new ammunition; was unaware that there was a serious shortage in S [mall] A[ rms] A[ mmunition] , or that the new howitzers would have to be fought in 4 gun batteries with a very inadequate supply of ammunition. ^

Wednesday 16 August 1911 was a bad day not only for the CIGS but for the French ambassador. Two days earlier Cambon had returned from the Foreign Office to his embassy to discover a telegram from Paris informing him that there was no understanding between the British and French Admiralties as to the role their fleets would play if engaged in a war against a common enemy, and asking him to do something to remedy the situation. Cambon, who believed the situation had already been remedied as a result of his talk with Grey in November 1908, was stunned: 1 Je ne m'explique pas ce télégramme.'' He insisted in reply that there was such an understanding, and a similar one between the two armies. On the 16th, the day of Wilson's minute to the CIGS and of Grey's assurance both to the Russian ambassador and to Cambon, the latter asked for this passage in his reply of 14 August to be destroyed. 2 Exactly a week later the proceedings of Asquith's packed meeting of the CID revealed to all present that the Admiralty, in the person of McKenna, had deliberately omitted to make arrangements to mobilise the Fleet simultaneously with the mobilisation of the Army, or to provide for the delivery of the Expeditionary Force to the continent. 3 The finding of something nasty in the woodshed was not the exclusive preserve of the ministerial opponents of the Liberal Imperialists in the second half of the year 1911. But that the core of Liberal Imperialist ministers either did not know that the highest possible degree of improvisation would have been entailed in giving any military assistance to France in 1911, over five years after military conversations were authorised, or did not care, is in itself, of course, a comment on the Entente Cordiale. 1 Wilson MSS 3/5/15a. d e Selves to Cambon 14 August, Cambon to de Selves 14 August 1911, DDF 2nd Series xiv nos 171,175, and annotation on p. 212. 3 C A B 2/2/1; Haldane wrote to Asquith on 28 September: '... you will see that when the C.I.D. met on August 23 we had good reason to believe that the Transport programme of the Admiralty was almost complete, and it was a surprise to us here to know that the principle was in doubt, and that we might not be able to get our troops across without delay.' (Haldane MSS 5909) Almeric Fitzroy noted in October: 'It is notorious that the naval authorities have hitherto resisted the invitation to adopt the plan of a General Staff whose business it is to evolve, elaborate, and fortify a theory or doctrine of war, providing by a detailed scheme for such eventualities as can be approximately foreseen, and the occasion seems to have been taken to expose unmercifully the deficiencies of the Admiralty in this respect, with the paralysis that might thereby ensue to the best-laid military plans.' Fitzroy ii. 466. 2

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(ii) From Peace to War: Liberal Imperialist Mechanisms Being in a small minority throughout, and being aware of this from the outset, how did the Liberal Imperialist group expect its policies to prevail? By what mechanisms did they hope and expect to implement them? 'Public opinion' was one element, and with regard to this element Grey gave a number of assurances to successive French governments. Some of these assurances were more qualified than others. The first, as registered by Cambon on 31 January 1906, was that public opinion would oblige the British government to support France. Grey took care, however, to repeat that this was 'une opinion personnelle' and could not be taken as binding the government as a whole. Having seen Cambon's written account of their conversation, Grey expanded on this matter for the benefit of CampbellBannerman and Lord Ripon: I said that I had used this expression to Count Metternich (the German ambassador) first, and not to (Cambon), because, supposing it appeared that I had over-estimated the strength of feeling of my countrymen, there could be no disappointment in Germany, but I could not express so decidedly my personal opinion to France because a personal opinion was not a thing upon which, in so serious a matter, a policy could be founded. In speaking to him, therefore, I must keep well within the mark. Much would depend as to the manner in which war broke out between Germany and France. I did not think people in England would be prepared to fight in order to put France in possession of Morocco...But if...it appeared that the war was forced upon France by Germany to break up the Anglo-French 'entente', public opinion would undoubtedly be very strong on the side of France. *

When war was next in sight, in November 1908, Cambon told Foreign Minister Pichon that Grey had already told him that France could not rely on the decision of the cabinet. But, he added, Grey 'a toujours ajouté que l'opinion publique se prononcerait en notre faveur et déterminerait la direction du Gouvernement' .2 In November 1911 Cambon collaborated with Sir Arthur Nicolson, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, in an effort to help Grey in the extremes of his struggle with the cabinet over 'cabinet supremacy'. Between them they produced a document on 2 November which was geared to stressing the role of public opinion. In this Note Cambon maintained that the language he had used in respect of the possible attitude of England in the event of a war between France and Germany was as follows: ^BD iii nos 219,220a, 220b; DDF 2nd Series ix no.106. Cambon to Pichon 18 November 1908, DDF 2nd Series xi no. 558.

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I told M. Caillaux and all the Ministers very clearly that it would be exceedingly difficult for any British Government to take any action which was not supported by British public opinion: that in the event of Germany attacking France or wilfully breaking off the negotiations British public opinion would side with France and enable the British Government to support France. British public opinion was impetuous and did not reason very deeply, but it had an instinctive sympathy with the party attacked and an instinctive mistrust and dislike of an aggressive and bullying Power. All British history proved this. But if France were to place herself in the wrong, and were to attack Germany or wilfully break off the negotiations, British public opinion, in any case at the outset, would not be on the side of France, and the British Government would not, therefore, be able to assist France at the commencement, whatever they might do later. As British aid would be required immediately and at the outset, the result would be that France would not be able to count on British support.

Grey read the whole of this to the cabinet on 15 November, in his bid to defend the Liberal Imperialist position, and then asked for it to be kept for reference.1 Exactly a year later Cambon passed on to Poincaré the position being maintained by Grey at that time, namely that 1 si quelque événement grave survenait, l'opinion publique obligerait le Gouvernement britannique quel qu'il fût à marcher avec la France'.2 In April 1914 Grey personally told his then opposite number, Doumergue, according to the latter's record: 'En ce qui concerne la France aucun Gouvernement anglais, je vous donne l'assurance, ne lui refuserait son aide militaire et navale si elle était injustement menacée et attaqué. Le Gouvernement qui hésiterait ne pourrait pas résister à la pression de l'opinion publique anglais. '3 From the Liberal Imperialist point of view, public opinion presented two problems. The first problem was that of ascertaining it. The second problem arrived when, once ascertained, public opinion turned out to have a point of view other than the Liberal Imperialist one. In fact, only on one occasion did Sir Edward Grey even contemplate attempting to ascertain what public opinion was. This was on 10 January 1906, when Cambon first asked him whether France could rely on British armed support if attacked by Germany. Recognising that to answer in the affirmative was 'a great step to take without Parliament', Grey said to his Private Secretary, Mallet, 'that if Parliament were sitting, you could find out opinion by consulting M.P.s in the Lobbies'. Mallet, who preferred th e fait accompli approach of first making ' note by Nicolson 2 November and minute by Grey 16 November 1911, BD vii no. 617. Cambon to Poincaré 31 October 1912, DDF 3rd Series iv no. 301. •'note by Doumergue 24 April 1914 ibid.x no.155 p. 269; according to Grey's own version, written a few days later, he merely said that 'If there were a really aggressive and menacing attack made by Germany upon France, it was possible that public feeling in Great Britain would justify the Government in helping France': Grey to Bertie 1 May 1914 BD x(ii) no. 541 p. 788. 2

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an alliance, then telling Parliament, and then if Parliament objected resigning as a government, going to the country, and being returned, skotched his chief's idea immediately.1 This was the nearest Grey ever came to the position later spelled out by Loreburn, which was that in order to avoid the danger of ministers shaping the national policy upon their own conjecture of what the public thought, they should ascertain it in a constitutional way from the representatives of the public, at the very least. Loreburn's suggestion of 1912 of a referendum on the subject would have been anathema to the Liberal Imperialists.2 Although on 8 January 1906 in a letter to Haldane Grey envisaged that 'a situation might arise presently in which popular feeling might compel the Government to go to the help of France', he did not, at that time, have the confidence that Mallet professed to have in the public. His true feelings crept into a postscript to a private letter to Bertie on 15 January: 'I detest the idea of another war now and so does the whole of this country and so will the new House of Commons.' 3 At the beginning of 1906, then, Grey was convinced that public opinion did not coincide with the wishes of the Liberal Imperialists. A year later Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman told Clemenceau 'that he did not think that English public opinion would allow of British troops being employed on the Continent of Europe'. Grey toned this down in an effort to assuage French grief, but even in the revised version the Prime Minister 'dwelt upon the reluctance of the British people to undertake obligations, which would commit them to a continental war'. 4 *

Campbell-Bannerman's warning, which was directed both at the French and the Liberal Imperialists, reinforced Grey's initial reservations. It made him even less inclined to establish what public opinion was, and even more inclined to exploit other mechanisms available to the Liberal Imperialists 1

Mallet to Bertie 11 January 1906, Bertie MSS F.0.800/164. Loreburn, How the War Came (London, 1920) p. 77; C.P. Scott Diary 7 January 1912, Add.MSS 50901. 3 Grey to Haldane 8 January 1906, Haldane MSS 5907; Grey to Bertie 15 January 1906, BD iii no. 216. The Consul-General in Antwerp, Hertslet, had reported on 4 January certain developments which he took as indicative of a war in the near future between France and Germany. The Foreign Office sent a copy of this to Bertie on 9 January (F.0.146/3877). Only on 18 January did the ambassador in Brussels pour cold water on Hertslet's information and speculation: Phipps to Grey no. 11,18 January 1906, F.O.123/448. D vi BOS 9, 10, 13. On the final version Lord Fitzmaurice, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, asked a question so embarrassing that it could only be answered verbally: 'Has the French Government through their general staff, or otherwise, got in their possession any record justifying, or which might seem to justify, M. Clemenceau's assertion about the employment of 115,000 troops in Belgium under certain eventualities in agreement with them?' ibid. p. 27. 2

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which might help to achieve what was, from their own point of view, the desired effect. During the crisis of November 1908 Esher gathered that what Grey proposed to do was 'to circularise Europe, and to say that so soon after the Hague Conference, war upon so trivial a pretext was a crime against humanity; that we proposed Arbitration to both Powers, and whichever refused should be considered to have outraged the moral sense of the civilised world, to be the enemy of the human race, and should be treated accordingly'. 1 On this occasion Esher disclosed to the French military attaché the role that Grey would play in relation to public opinion: [ Sir E. Grey] a, à l'heure actuelle, une autorité considérable, non seulement dans le Gouvernement mais encore dans le Parlement et dans le pays tout entier.L'avis qu'il émettra aura une influence décisive: ce sera sans doute celui qui sera adopté par le Gouvernement et ratifié par l'opinion publique.

Cambon somewhat improved on this in his own report, saying that Grey 'qui jouera dans ces circonstances un rôle décisif sait bien ce qu'il dit quand il parle de la poussée de l'opinion. Il parlera assez haut pour être entendu dans les trois royaumes, et il compte sur l'appui du sentiment public'?- In other words, by taking in public a particular line, and by speaking loudly enough (a combination of volume and high moral tone) Grey intended to create public opinion in his own image. The opinion thus created would force the government, ' bon gré mal gré', to march with the French. Giving a lead to the public was a device which the Liberal Imperialists tried to reserve to themselves; hence their resentment of pronouncements on foreign affairs by any of their colleagues.3 The device was employed in the form of the Mansion House speech in July 1911, when the speaking role was allocated to Lloyd George. When Grey spoke, in the House of Commons on 27 November 1911, the Clerk of the House noted how determined the Foreign Secretary was to have the first word. The way found to enable him to do so was to adopt the procedure followed in discussing the reports of the Committee on Public Accounts.4 The same Clerk of the House of Commons noted how, on 3 August 1914, Grey delivered 'the speech of an advocate' ; two days earlier, Grey's Private Secretary had been reminded by the editor of the

^Brett and Esher ii.359 (12 November 1908); see Grey to Nicolson 6 November 1908, BD vii no. 134. 2 DDF 2nd Series xi pp. 933, 931. 3 e.g. Grey to Asquith 22 August 1908, Grey MSS F.0.800/100. Albert Diary 27 November 1911.

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Morning Post of Grey's 'enormous power' in this respect: 'We have always expected to get a lead from Sir Edward' -1 *

Giving a lead in this way was inseparable from the use of another device - the manipulation of the Press. Grey had always been aware that a section of the Press needed little prompting. On 31 January 1906 he let slip to Cambon a remark on 'the strong feeling of the Press ...on the side of France'. Whether he was aware of what Cambon was then planning, together with Repington, the Military Correspondent of The Times, is not clear.2 But the sort of line that would have emanated from that quarter in 1906 may be gathered from Repington's version of his encounter with certain radicals in March: 'I explained to Ivor Guest and the like how indispensable it was to support France in order to preserve the liberties of Europe and the immortal principles of the French Revolution. This puts the extreme Radicals in a fearful quandary...'.3 Following the Agadir crisis, the French chargé d'Affaires recalled how, in July 1911, the Liberal Party Chief Whip, the Master of Elibank, ' indiquait aux journalistes que les paroles du Chancellier de l'Exchiquier avaient été approuvées par ses collègues du Cabinet'. In addition to this fiction, on the receiving end of which was the Daily News and other papers, Elibank had seen, at 12 Downing Street on 30 July, Sir Henry Dalziel, the M.P. and owner of Reynold's Newspaper, and told him that a large number of Radical M.P.s had 'volunteered the view that the speeches of the P.M. and Chancellor of the Exchequer had correctly represented Radical opinion in the country'. Elibank, so C.P. Ilbert gathered in August, was 'one of those who take a serious view about Morocco'. A statement by Elibank appeared in The Times on 31 July. Grey minuted that Elibank had done the right thing: 'There are people in this country...who have persistently held the view that there are two separate wings of opinion in the Cabinet and the Chief Whip's object was to

1 ibid. 3 August 1914; Gwynne to Tyrrell 1 August 1914, in K.M. Wilson (ed.), The Rasp of War (London, 1988) p. 19. BD iii no.219 p. 181; on 26 January Repington had written: 'I am preparing the devil's own bomb to throw at William II if he repeats in the press certain statements he is making in private conversation. Cambon is helping me.' (Marker MSS Add.MSS 52277) Repington also wrote to Grey during the Agadir crisis: BD vii no.637. See also Repington to Grey 3 January 1906, Grey MSS F.0.800/110. ^Repington to Marker 1 March 1906, Marker MSS Add.MSS 52277. The right-wing newspapers took a line very similar to this at the end of July 1914: see Ponsonby to Grey 29 July, Tyrrell to Ponsonby 31 July 1914, Ponsonby MSS, Eng.hist.c.660.

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express satisfaction at this idea being dispelled...'. 1 In November 1911 The Nation reminded its readership of the unusual prominence given to Lloyd George's speech by The Times of 22 July, and of a Times exclusive on 20 July which had described certain German demands upon the French relating solely to the Congo as such that, even if a French government were weak enough to consider them, no British government should tolerate them for a moment.2 The Daily Chronicle, edited by Robert Donald, a close journalistic friend of Lloyd George's, printed on 22 July only that part of the Mansion House speech devised by the Liberal Imperialists. On the eve of the speech, moreover, Lloyd George had attempted to nobble C.P. Scott, the editor of the Manchester Guardian, by urgently requesting as a personal matter that he write nothing about 'the German business' without seeing him. The following day, the speech having been delivered, Lloyd George breakfasted with Scott and tried to win him over, claiming that the cabinet was 'practically unanimous'. Shortly afterwards Asquith, Churchill, and Elibank saw Scott together. The latter noted that Elibank was particularly emphatic that the government was Radical rather than Liberal Imperialist.3 At the end of October Haldane attempted to mislead J.A. Spender, the editor of the Westminster Gazette, about the reasons for the dismissal of McKenna, claiming it was done by Asquith because 'the state of the higher command in the Navy was and is archaic and a peril to the public interest' - 'new blood' was therefore 'essential'. On 3 November 1911 Grey also attempted to win Scott over to his side, in an effort to gain a more sympathetic Liberal press in advance of his second passage at arms with his supposedly unanimous and supportive colleagues on 15 November.4 In the Agadir crisis neither the creation of public opinion nor the manipulation of the Press was successful. Lloyd George did not win over the Manchester Guardian in July, nor did Grey win it over in November. Elibank's inventions were to no avail. Cambon was quite wrong when he stated, a year later, that '/'an dernier, au moment de 1'incident d'Agadir, toute l'Angleterre se souleva contre V Allemagne...,} Le tout I'Angleterre did nothing of the sort. As Morley told Almeric Fitzroy on 6 November, in suitably coded language, 'the Cabinet, in reviewing the Morocco crisis, recorded the opinion that an exaggerated sense of the urgency of the occasion ' Daeschncr to de Selves 20 November 1911, DDF 3rd Series i no.160; The Times 30 July 1911; Ilbert to Brycc 12 August 1911 Bryce MSS 14; minute by Grey on note by Nicolson 31 July 1911, Grey MSS F.0.800/93; For the notification of the Daily News see W.S. Blunt ii.373-4. 2 The Nation 18,25 November 1911 pp. 297-8, 335-6. 3 Gretton to Scott 21 July 1911, Scott MSS misc.; Scott Diary 22 July 1911, Add.MSS 50901. 4 Haldane to Spender 30 October 1911, Haldane MSS 5909; Scott Diary 3 November 1911, Add.MSS 50901. 5 Cambon to Poincaré 31 October 1912 DDF 3rd Series iv no.301.

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had been entertained...'. This was a judgement shared by Fitzroy and Ilbert and expressed in Loreburn's letter to Grey of 26 August. 1 *

C.P. Ilbert noted of Grey's speech in the House of Commons on 27 November 1911 that 'it drew far more cheers from the Tories than from the Liberals'. The same applied to Grey's speech of 3 August 1914: 'It lasted for about an hour and a half and was loudly applauded by the Opposition but received by the Liberals with grim silence.' 2 The Tory Opposition constituted a support mechanism in itself for the Liberal Imperialists. For instance, in November 1908, at the time of the second war-in-sight crisis, Asquith, who was clearly in a state of extreme perturbation, asked Balfour to come and see him. Balfour recorded what transpired in an extremely important letter to Lansdowne, dated 6 November 1908. Asquith began by saying that the only explanation of German policy that fitted all the known facts was that they wanted war. Balfour observed that the excuse devised by the Germans on this occasion was so incredibly frivolous that the civilised world would be shocked beyond expression, and that it was difficult to see what Germany expected to gain by a war in which she would lose a great deal morally and was by no means certain to gain anything materially. Asquith offered, by way of explanation, the suggestion that the internal condition of Germany was so unsatisfactory that the Germans might be driven to the wildest adventures in order to divert national sentiment into a new channel. Balfour then said that, as he understood the matter, Britain would be involved under treaty obligations if Germany violated Belgian territory. Asquith agreed, and confirmed that the Franco-German frontier was now so strong that the temptation to Germany to invade Belgium might prove irresistible. What struck Balfour was the intensely pessimistic tone in which Asquith described the position. At the end of the interview Balfour told Asquith that he 'might count upon the Opposition in case of national difficulty'. 3 This was the assurance that Asquith had been seeking to obtain. In the next crisis, of 1911, C.P. Ilbert noticed how the Official Secrets Bill was run through all its stages (except the First Reading) and passed in one day, 'an unnecessary and improper proceeding', in his view. His explanation was that 'the War Office was obsessed with a German panic and had squared 1

Fitzroy ii.468; Loreburn to Grey 26 August 1911, Grey MSS F.0.800/99. Ilbert Diary 27 November 1911, 3 August 1914. ^Balfour to Lansdowne 6 November 1908, Lansdowne MSS L(5)13; Lansdowne to Balfour 11 November 1908, Balfour MSS Add.MSS 49729; Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne (London, 1929) pp. 371-2; Huguet to Picquart 9 November 1908, DDF 2nd Series xi p. 932. 2

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the front opposition bench, which is only too ready to be squared in a case of this kind'. 1 On 15 September 1911 Lloyd George wrote to Churchill from Balmoral: 'I had a long talk with Balfour...If there is war he will support us.' 2 Balfour was at Balmoral from 11 to 14 September; Lloyd George had taken Grey's place there on 13 September. On 23 November Grey's Private Secretary met Bonar Law, Balfour's successor as Leader of the Conservative Party, and Grey may well have done so on the following day. Certainly on the 25th Grey sent Bonar Law an outline of what he intended to say on the 27th. And on the 28th, in the House of Lords, Lansdowne tried to help Grey by stating that 'in a case of this kind, an undertaking to give diplomatic support may tend to bring about an obligation to give support of another kind'. 3 The French ambassador was greatly interested in the remarks of the Conservative leadership on this occasion; he was to help to mobilise them himself at the end of July 1914. Cambon's efforts then supplied the platform that Grey needed. For, as Grey told the Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office in 1922, 'On about Wednesday before the outbreak of war [ 29 July 1914] he had asked the Leader of the Conservatives what their view was and was told that the rank and file of the party were very doubtful about coming to the help of France apart from Belgium. It was not until Sunday [ 2 August ] that he got a statement from the leaders of the party...'. From Grey's memoirs it emerges that he was seeing Bonar Law daily throughout the last week of July 1914.4 Here it is not without interest that, at the time of the crisis of the outbreak of the first Balkan War in the autumn of 1912, the Director of Military Operations sought out Bonar Law and had 'a long talk' with him. As General Wilson recorded,: 'We discussed the present state of Europe which I told him of in detail telling him of the despatches received, of our action in the event of war, of the frontier positions and state and number of troops, of our Navy and so forth. On all these points he is with us.' Wilson went on to see Balfour on 4 December 1912, again to discuss the military situation of the country, a meeting which he considered 'something of a triumph'. 5 Four days later he was asked by General Sir John French 'to draft a letter for the Chief iflbert Diary 18 August 1911. ^R.S. Churchill, Companion vol.2 Part 2 p. 1125. Ilbert heard of Lloyd George's bellicosity on this occasion: 'There is a story that when he was at Balmoral the King opened a confidential telegram from Berlin which had just arrived and said to him "This will interest you. The Germans are climbing down". Lloyd George flushed and said, "I am sorry to hear it". This was said at lunch time and was heard by many of those present.' Ilbert Diary 22 November 1911. 3 K.M. Wilson, Empire and Continent (London, 1987) p. 117; Hansard 5th Series x (Lords) cols 390-1. 4 note by Headlam-Morley of interview with Grey 6 December 1922, F.0.370/194/L3894; Grey op. cit .i. 337; Grey and Churchill asked Bonar Law to dine with them on 1 August; he declined: R. Blake, Andrew Bonar Law, the Unknown Prime Minister (London, 1955) p. 221. ^Wilson Diary 10 November, 3, 4 December 1912.

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[the CIGS] to send to the newspapers when the crisis comes to say that the Expeditionary] F[orce] must be sent to Belgium, this being sound strategy and honourable action'. This Wilson did on 8 December, saying that 'our greatest danger was in Belgium and therefore all the EF must go to France at once'. On 9 December General French told him that the CIGS 'agreed to the draft letter...which he is to publish in the event of war breaking out'. 1 *

Asquith's agreement in November 1908 with Balfour's assumption that Britain would be involved under treaty obligations if Germany attacked France through Belgium has already been mentioned. Reliance upon an interpretation of the 1839 Treaty of London in order to provide a locus standi for intervention in a Franco-German war was another mechanism which the Liberal Imperialists hoped to exploit. With this in mind, a War Office paper entitled The Violation of the Neutrality of Belgium during a Franco-German War, written in September 1905, was ordered to be re-printed for the CID in November 1908.2 This is also why, at the same time, Grey asked one of his officials, Sir E.A. Crowe, to produce answers to two questions, namely 'How far would England's liability under the Treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium be affected if (i) Belgium acquiesced in a violation of her neutrality; (ii) if the other guaranteeing Powers or some of them acquiesced?'. 3 Immediately before asking Crowe to do this, Grey had received from the Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Charles Hardinge, a memorandum containing the following sentence: In the event of Germany provoking hostilities with France, the question of armed intervention by Great Britain is one which would have to be decided by the Cabinet; but the decision would be more easily arrived at if German aggression had entailed a violation of the neutrality of Belgium which Great Britain has guaranteed to maintain.^

The memorandum produced by Crowe on 15 November 1908 took the line that there was no escaping intervention: 'Great Britain is liable for the maintenance of Belgian neutrality whenever either Belgium or any of the guaranteeing Powers are in need of, and demand, assistance in opposing its violation.' 5 This memorandum in its turn was re-printed by the Foreign Office ' ibid. 1, 8, 9 December 1912. 2

CAB 38/14/12. B D viii no. 311. ^memorandum by Hardinge 11 November 1908, Grey MSS F.0.800/92. 5 B D viii no. 311. 3

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in September 1911, during the Agadir crisis, when it is clear that both Lloyd George and Churchill were convinced that a German attack on France would entail a violation of Belgian neutrality; it was also amongst the material prepared by the Liberal Imperialists to be placed before the cabinet in July 1914.1 *

Buckingham Palace had subscribed to the Liberal Imperialist plans outlined to it in September and October 1905, and played an active part in securing the Foreign Office for Grey and the War Office for Haldane. 2 King Edward VII, when shown by Tweedmouth Grey's letter to him of 16 January 1906 which stated that 'it is quite right that our naval and military authorities should discuss the question in this way with the French and be prepared to give an answer when they are asked...' wanted Grey to know that he approved of that letter, and added that the news reaching him was 'quite in accord' with Grey's judgement. 3 At the end of the month the King appeared to go even further. On 25 January, several days before the arrival at Windsor of Campbell-Bannerman to discuss these matters, Paul Cambon reported from there that the King was encouraging the French to take up with Grey talks that would lead to an agreement to deal with the case of a German aggression.4 In November 1908 the King's intermediary Esher told the French military attaché: ' L'influence du Roi s'exercera d'ailleurs très certainement' in the sense of intervention.5 Although members of the French embassy always assumed the support of the King 6 , whether the support even of Edward VII could be relied on by the Liberal Imperialists remains problematic. As Esher well knew by November 1908, the kind of intervention contemplated by Edward VII was naval rather than military. At the very beginning of 1909 Esher himself offered to the King something in the nature of a compromise between the preferences of the War Office, which were shared by the Liberal Imperialists, and those of the Admiralty, which were not. In a memorandum for the King

1 R.S. Churchill Companion vol.2 Part 2 pp. 1126, 1370; ADM 116/3486; K.M. Wilson, 'Great Britain' in Wilson (ed.), Decisions for War, 1914 (London, 1995) p. 188. 2 Knollys to Haldane 16 September 1905, Haldane MSS 5906; K.M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente p. 19. ^Tweedmouth to Grey 17 January 1906, Grey MSS F.0.800/87; Repington to Marker 26 January 1906, Marker MSS Add.MSS 52277. ^Cambon to Rouvier 25 January 1906 DDF 2nd Series ix no. 55. %uguet to Picquart 9 November 1908 ibid.xi pp. 932-35. 6 Daeschner to de Selves 20 November 1911 ibid. 3rd Series i no.160; Cambon to Fleuriau 3 April 1912 ibid, ii no. 295.

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he wrote: 'There is however an aspect of this question which cannot be neglected. However valuable our military assistance might be to France, it is conceivable that the British Government of the day might shrink from affording it, owing to the disinclination of the people or the military necessities of the Empire.' 1 Shortly afterwards, in the cabin of the royal yacht, Edward VII expressed views which Sir John Fisher, who was present, never tired of reminding Esher, who was also there, about: 'how he stamped on the idea (that then enthused the War Office mind) of England once more engaged in a great Continental war!' 2 On Edward VII Sir John Fisher and Lord Esher were all too likely to prevail, in the interests of the fighting of the kind of war that the Admiralty preferred. That George V also fell under the influence of Esher, to which he too was constantly exposed, is probable. Loreburn's speculation of September 1913 that the King might be regarded as something of a safeguard by the majority of the cabinet, that 'If a proposal were made to engage in a Continental War and land a force of 150,000 men the Sovereign might be perfectly justified in demanding a dissolution before this was done', might have met with the response he desired. 3 Certainly on 26 July 1914 George V assured Prince Henry of Prussia, who was visiting him in search of just such an assurance, that 'England would maintain neutrality in case war should break out between the Continental Powers'. George V's assurance produced a visit to him from Asquith, who demanded a retraction, thus revealing the line of conduct the Liberal Imperialists expected of the sovereign. 4 *

If the mechanisms, of 'public opinion', of the manipulation of the Press, of 'giving a lead', of the Conservative Party leadership, of treaty obligations to Belgium, all failed, or did not combine effectively, the Liberal Imperialists still had two final resorts. One was to replace any ministers who resigned with members of the Opposition front bench. On the list drawn up by Churchill, with Balfour's help, at the end of July 1914, were the names of Lord Lansdowne, the Duke of Devonshire, Sir Edward Carson, and Bonar Law. 5 The other was for the Liberal Imperialists to resign en bloc, thereby not only splitting the cabinet but raising the question of a complete change of ^memorandum by Esher for Edward VII 3 January 1909, Esher MSS 16/12. Fisher to Esher 26 August 1911, 25 April 1912, in Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought ii. 382, 454. note by C.P. Scott of conversation with Loreburn 17 September 1913, Scott MSS misc. 4 K . M. Wilson (ed.), Decisions for War, 1914 p. 187. 5 ibid. p. 178. 2

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government. On 2 August 1914, all else having failed - even the locus standi argument had proved counter-productive when on 29 July the cabinet as a whole had, whilst admitting the obligation of 1839, insisted that their policy would not be governed by it 1 - Grey began to play the resignation card. He coupled it with a massive misrepresentation of the content and consequences of the exchange of letters with Cambon in November 1912, a misrepresentation adumbrated by Lloyd George to a horrified C.P. Scott on 30 July. 2 Asquith made it clear that, if Grey resigned, so would he. There can be no doubt that, as Morley said, 'if Germany had delayed her violation of Belgian neutrality by 48 hours the Cabinet would have broken up and there would have been a coalition government'3 (iii) The Role of Russia On 20 February 1906, during the conference called at Algeciras to resolve the Franco-German differences over Morocco, Grey ended a memorandum in which he weighed the pros and cons of Liberal Imperialist policy with these words: ...I think we ought in our minds to face the question now, whether we can keep out of war, if it breaks out between France and Germany. The more I review the situation the more it appears to me that we cannot, without losing our good name and our friends and wrecking our policy and position in the world.^

In November 1908, as we have seen, Grey, Haldane and Asquith were all prepared to intervene on the side of France if it came to war between France and Germany during the Casablanca crisis. On 16 August 1911, during the Agadir crisis, Grey told the Russian ambassador: 'In the event of war between Germany and France, England would have to participate. If this war should involve Russia, Austria would be dragged in too ... Consequently, it would no longer be a duel between France and Germany — it would be a general war.' 5 1 Pease's diary entry for 29 July 1914 is redolent of the spirit of Morley: 'The Cabinet agreed we must do the best for our own interests and that the cause of Peace was the course to be promoted.' See K. M. Wilson (ed.), 'The Cabinet Diary of J. A. Pease, 24 July to 5 August 1914' in Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society xix Part iii (1983) p. 6. 2 Wilson, The Policy of the Entente pp. 143-145; Scott to Bryce 30 July 1914 Bryce MSS 131. 3 Scott Diary 5 December 1914, Scott MSS Add. MSS 50901. Loreburn was to make the following distinction: 'I must observe that Germany's ultimatum to Belgium was at 7 p. m. on 2 August and her invasion on 3 August. Now in the morning of 2 August Grey handed the naval undertaking of that date to France which if looked at was an act of war...It may have been right or wrong but it meant that the German fleet would be neutralised in the war or, rather, could not be used against France while the French fleet could be used against Germany.' Loreburn to Bryce 14 September 1917, Bryce MSS 123; see also Ilbert Diary 6 August 1914. "^memorandum by Grey 20 February 1906, BD iii no.299. 5 Grey to Nicolson 10 November 1908: 'I had always felt that if Germany fastened a quarrel upon France in connection with Morocco, the world would say that France was being attacked because she had made friends with us, and for us to fold our hands and look on would not be a very respectable part.' (BD v no. 441) Benckendorff to Neratoff 16 August 1911, in Siebert op. cit. p. 598.

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Given the political lengths to which the Liberal Imperialists were prepared to go in all these crises, their lack of interest in and failure closely to monitor both Anglo-French planning and Admiralty-War Office co-ordination until October 1911 is, at first sight, all the more mysterious. Indeed, after lunching on 9 August 1911 with Haldane, who had forbidden the C-in-C designate of the British Expeditionary Force to attend the French army manoeuvres in 19101, and with Grey, the Director of Military Operations was quite staggered. He wrote: I was profoundly dissatisfied with the grasp of the situation possessed by Grey and Haldane, Grey being much the most ignorant and careless of the two. He not only had no idea of what war means but he struck me as not wanting to know, although he admitted...that it was quite possible the present situation might at any moment develop into war...a man who knew nothing of policy and strategy going hand in hand...2

A year later, after a CID meeting in July 1912, General Wilson was still complaining that 'the outstanding feature of the meeting was the way in which Grey entirely and obstinately ignored the military problem'. 3 Nor was he impressed with what he knew of the War Office's latest mobilisation plans. The defeat of the Turkish armies in October 1912 caused him to comment: 'It must be a warning for fools like Haldane with the 6 months preparation after declaration of war!' 4 At this, the wheel had come full circle. For on 19 January 1906, when telling Grey that he had instructed the then Director of Military Operations to communicate with the French military attaché, Haldane had continued: 'We shall be able to despatch two Army Corps, four cavalry brigades and six battalions of infantry - we should be able to begin at once, and complete the landing of the entirety within the year - most of it much earlier. The entirety would amount to about 105,000 men and 336 guns.' He concluded, nonchalantly, 'This is satisfactory'. The amount, and the time-scale, do suggest a certain lack of seriousness and of immediacy. When Grey wrote to Bertie at the same time, 'All this is sheer precaution', it cannot be said that his 'All this' amounted to very much. As he more rightly said, 'I am told that 80,000 men with good guns is all we can put into the field in Europe to meet

* Pease Diary 8 March 1911. Wilson Diary 9 August 1911. 3 ibid, 11 July 1912. 4 ibid. 1 November 1912. 2

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first-class troops; that won't save France unless she can save herself'. 1 Haldane's and Grey's ideas of what was 'satisfactory', their interpretation of 'precaution', suggest that both the spirit and the flesh were weak. The British could not save the French. This was an attitude made the more easy of adoption by the Liberal Imperialists as a result of their appreciation that it was really for Russia, France's ally since the early 1890s, to do the job. On 12 February 1906 Grey noted that Germany seemed 'a little Morocco sick'; he also noted that time, in the shape of Russia, was on the side of France: the recovery of Russia from the ravages of the revolution that followed the Russo-Japanese war would change the situation in Europe to the advantage of France, and it was the situation in Europe that would in the long run decide the positions of France and Germany in Morocco. Sir Charles Hardinge reduced the time-scale immediately. In a minute on Grey's memorandum of 20 February, the new Permanent Under Secretary wrote: 'If France takes action in Morocco to protect herself which Germany might resent it is not certain that Germany would declare war and attack France in Europe since such action would at once present a "casus foederis" and bring Russia into line with France.'2 Towards the end of the Algeciras Conference Grey himself wrote: ... If France would only go quietly and trust us now she would in two or three years be in the strongest position she has been in for several generations. Russia will recover presently; we are on better terms with Russia now than for a long time past and shall probably get on better terms with her still; then the peace of Europe will be assured (certainly not at the expense of France) and we shall all be able to be civil to everybody, even to Germany, who will be civil to France and us.^

In effect, Grey had taken Hardinge's point even before it was made; nothing could be done to check Germany without Russia. In the spring of 1908 Grey made it clear that it was the Russian army, not the British, which should be regarded as 'the great counterpoise to Germany on land'. Asquith took the same line in September 1908, having had to combat Clemenceau's wish that the British adopt conscription. He wrote to Grey that Clemenceau was ignorant, 'if he imagines we are going to keep here a standing army of one-half to three quarters of a million men, ready to meet the Germans in Belgium if and when they are minded to adopt that route for ^Haldane to Grey 19 January 1906, Grey MSS F. O. 800/102; Grey to Bertie 15 January 1906, BD iii no. 216. 2 Grey to Nicolson 12 February 1906, ibid. no. 278; minute by Hardinge 23 February 1906, ibid. p. 267, my italics. ^Grey to Bertie 15 March 1906 Bertie MSS Add. MSS 63019. This passage was omitted by the editors from BD iii no. 353.

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the invasion of France. As you point out, he completely ignores the existence — from a military point of view — of his Russian ally'. 1 During the Casablanca crisis, which coincided with an Austro-Russian dispute, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, asked by the Russian Foreign Minister what England would do if Germany picked a quarrel with France, replied that it would be folly for Germany to force a quarrel 'against France and Russia and possibly England'. The 'possibly' was significant. The Russian ambassador in London asked Grey what England would do if Germany took the part of Austria over the Balkan issue. Grey, who had already reminded him that France and Russia had an ally each, 'namely, each other', countered by asking what Russia would have done had Morocco produced a Franco-German war. Benckendorff was more forthcoming than Grey. He replied to the reassuring effect that he knew the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance were 'very wide'. On the next day, Hardinge wrote that he 'presumed that France would be able to count on the armed support of her ally Russia' . 2 So it went on. At lunch on 9 August 1911 with Haldane and General Wilson, Grey 'advanced the theory that Russia was a governing factor'. Wilson believed that he 'shattered rather rudely' this theory, by telling Grey that the divisions Russia could produce in twenty-eight days would be outnumbered by those of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and that Russia could not therefore relieve the pressure on the French. 3 Grey's conviction, however, survived Wilson's assault. Grey asked Benckendorff that very day what Russia would do if the Germans gave 'a brusque and unfavourable turn to the situation'. Benckendorff's reply was that 'Owing to the terms of the Russian alliance with France, he thought it was pretty clear what Russia would do. As a matter of fact, in one of the first conversations between the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs [Neratoff ] and the German ambassador in St. Petersburg the former had told the ambassador that Germany must remember that France and Russia were allies'. 4 This information and assurance made Grey's lunch with Wilson digestible. On 16 August Grey again asked Benckendorff what the Russians would do 'in case of complications'. This time, as Benckendorff reported to Neratoff, 'I told Sir Edward I had not the right to give an official answer; the Treaty Alliance between France and Russia existed in its full compass; war would certainly be a great misfortune for Russia; personally however, I had not the slightest doubt but that the terms of the Treaty would 1 memorandum by Grey 28 April 1908, Grey MSS F. O. 800/92; minute by Grey 29 May 1908, F. O. 371/455/18454; Asquith to Grey 7 September 1908, Grey MSS F. O. 800/100. 2 Nicolson to Grey 5 November 1908 Grey MSS F. O. 800/73; Grey to Nicolson 10 November 1908 BD v no. 441; memorandum by Hardinge 11 November 1908 Grey MSS F. O. 800/92. 3 Wilson Diary 9 August 1911. 4 Grey to Buchanan 9 August 1911, BD vii no. 494; CAB 37/107/103.

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be strictly carried out'. An official view, to the same effect, was delivered by Cambon on the same day. Cambon's information was that Isvolsky, the Russian ambassador in Paris, had been 'instructed to say officially that if owing to a check on the negotiations between France and Germany there was a conflict, Russia would give not only diplomatic but military support against Germany'. Grey made it quite clear to Cambon on this occasion that, as a British disembarkation at Agadir might lead to a German mobilisation on the French frontier, no such move could be made in advance of deliberation between the governments of Russia, France, and Britain. From Paris, Bertie confirmed Cambon's information about Isvolsky's instructions on 18 August. 1 Thus when Grey attended the Committee of Imperial Defence on 23 August 1911, when the DMO elaborated the line dismissive of Russia that he had taken in private on the 9th, Grey faced it with equanimity. At the meeting, Grey was quite as belligerent as Wilson. All his comments and questions were designed to lead the meeting to conclude that the B.E.F. must be sent to France immediately. Only his basic premises differed from those of the DMO. Whereas Wilson thought that Russia would not fight or make a crucial contribution, Grey was sure that she would. Grey's conviction would not have been diminished by Buchanan's telegram of 24 August from St. Petersburg to the same effect as the information already received from Cambon and Bertie.2 Nevertheless, to such an extent did Grey rely upon Russian assistance for France that he lost no opportunity to remind them of their alliance obligations. Hearing that Buchanan was due to see the Tsar at the end of August, Grey telegraphed that Nicholas II should be told 'that we are very anxious to see the Franco-German negotiations succeed and think the possible consequences of their failure may be very serious'. Buchanan reported that Russia would do her duty as France's ally if there was a rupture between France and Germany, that the French ambassador in Russia was confident of this, and that the French and Russian Chiefs of Staff had been engaged in a consultation as to a plan of campaign in case of war. Grey therefore ignored the DMO's opinion, reiterated early in September, that the Russian army was not yet able to render much help to France, and maintained the pressure on Russia to fulfil the role assigned to her by the Liberal Imperialists. He was rewarded when Benckendorff told the King, in Lloyd George's presence, on 15 September, that if Germany attacked France 'Russia would certainly throw herself into the conflict. Of that he had no 1 Benckendorff to Neratoff 16 August 1911, in Siebert p. 598; Grey to Bertie 16 August 1911, Bertie MSS F. O. 800/176; Cambon to de Selves 16 August 1911, DDF 2nd Series xiv no. 184 pp. 224; Bertie to Grey 18 August 1911, Bertie MSS Add. MSS 63027. Buchanan to Grey 24 August 1911, BD vii no. 496.

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doubt'. A report from the military attaché in Russia, Colonel Knox, sent in October, was to support Grey's line rather than that of General Wilson. 1 Two years later, at the 16th meeting of a CID sub-committee on Attack on the British Isles from Overseas, Haldane declared that Russia was 'the crux' in relation to the scenario of a war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.2 It was security in the conviction that Russia would do the fighting necessary to save France that accounts for the impression Grey gave Wilson, of 'not knowing and not wanting to know'. Indeed, from the point of view of the Liberal Imperialists, the more 'general' any war, the better. Allowing and encouraging France to believe that Britain would come to her rescue was, essentially, the foreign politics of gesture. Letting Russia do the great bulk of the fighting for France was almost the only point where the minds of the Liberal Imperialists and of their Radical opponents met. On one occasion Loreburn broke the radical ranks and briefly contemplated the equipping of Britain with a large enough army to make a viable contribution to a European scale war. He did this only as a debating point, in an effort to inject some sense into what, so far as he was concerned, was a perfectly senseless situation. It gave him, temporarily, something in common with that advocate of conscription, General Wilson. 3 *

Whilst counting on Russia in this way, and to this extent, the Liberal Imperialists deemed it necessary to make the gestures that they did make as regards France because they did not wish to be in the position they would occupy if they lost the French and Russian connections. They did not wish to be alone in the world. This consideration affected even Lord Ripon, one of the two ministers who were not Liberal Imperialists to be told about the staff talks. On 11 January 1906 he wrote: 'If... we decline, as I think we ought to decline, to go further than diplomacy will reach, I cannot but fear a cry of "perfide Albion" and a destruction of the present friendship between the two ^Grey to Buchanan 30 August 1911, Grey MSS F. O. 800/74; Buchanan to Grey 3 September, minute by Parker 4 September 1911, F. O. 371/1164/34653; Grey to Buchanan 4 September 1911, CAB 37/107/106; Lloyd George to Churchill 15 September 1911, R. S. Churchill Companion vol. 2 Part 2 p. 1125; report from Knox 17 October 1911, F. O. 371/1218; on Knox see K. Neilson, 'Watching the "Steamroller"; British Observers and the Russian Army before 1914' Journal of Strategic Studies vol. 8 no. 2 (1985) pp. 211-212. 2 C A B 16/28A p. 236, 12 November 1913; see also Haldane's interest in Russia's military progress as reported in Benckendori'f to Isvolsky 24 September, 2 October 1909: A. [svolsky,At< Service de la Russie: Correspondence Diplomatique 1906-1911 (Paris, 1937-39) ii 247,249. 3 Scott Diary 22 January 1912, 9 October 1914, Scott MSS Add. MSS 50901; pamphlet by Wilson 1 January 1913 'Policy and the Army', Wilson MSS 3/7/1; see also memos by Esher 17 June, 6 November 1913, O. A. 43 and 53 in Proceedings of CID sub-committee, CAB 16/28A.

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nations.' 1 The Liberal Imperialists' fear was so much more acute that their determination was the opposite of Ripon's. Like his Private Secretary in January 1906, and like the ambassador in Paris, and for the same reasons as they gave, Grey was prepared to involve the country in war in order to preserve 'our friends...and position in the world'. 2 The mood and outlook of the Liberal Imperialists was best caught by Esher in November 1908, when he told the French military attaché: Si nous nous abstenons, il s'élèvera certainement en France un cri de haine et de réprobation contre la politique anglaise, qui sera accusée d'avoir été la cause directe ou indirecte d'une guerre où elle aura abandonnée la France après l'y avoir entraînée. La duplicité et l'égoïsme britannique seront à nouveau exploités. Il en résultera un tel ressentiment dans toute la nation française que, tot ou tard, elle prêtera voluntiers l'oreille aux propositions que l'Allemagne ne manquera pas de lui adresser pour former une coalition contre l'Angleterre. Ce serait pour nous le plus terrible danger que nous puissions courir.

To the Liberal Imperialists, war with Germany was far preferable to isolation. Far better that a conflict with Germany 'se produise aujourd'hui en restant fidèles à notre politique que de chercher à en retarder l'échéance, de nous aliéner ainsi la France et de nous préparer peut-être des représailles terribles '?

The fear that the French, unless offered some gesture of support, might enter the German orbit, was frequently voiced at the Foreign Office. In April 1909, for instance, Hardinge wrote that he had always felt about the French 'that it would not be difficult for Germany to stampede them'. 4 In fact, a large portion of the French body politic, recognising British military weakness and the political minority that their British partisans were in, and believing that French interests would be better served by an association with Germany, was

'see L. Wolf, Life of Lord Ripon (London, 1921) ii. 292-3. O n 11 January 1906 Mallet wrote to Bertie: 'If we refuse..., we lose at once all that the entente has given us - be looked upon as traitors by the French and needs be despised by the Germans - 1 pity the task of a Foreign Minister after a refusal'; he asked Bertie to write ' a very strong personal letter' to Grey, which Bertie did on 15 January, saying: 'I consider it my duty to warn H. M. G. that, in the event of the answer to be given to the enquiries of the French ambassador not assuring to France more than a continuance of diplomatic support, or of neutrality in the event of a war provoked by Germany, there is serious danger of a complete reversal of feeling on the part of the French Government and of public opinion in France. The Government would consider that they had been deserted and might, in order to avoid the risks of a war without an ally, deem it advisable to make great concessions to Germany outside Morocco in order to obtain liberty of action in that country.' Bertie MSS F. O. 800/164; BD iii p. 176. 3 see p. 162 fn. 5. ^Hardinge to Villiers 1 April 1909, Hardinge MSS vol. 17; minute by Grey on Nicolson to Grey 21 October 1907, BD iv no. 544 p. 606.

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always prepared voluntarily to enter the German orbit. 1 This fact of French life, however, only reinforced the Liberal Imperialist fear. On 30 March 1911, the very day on which Grey tried, with an eye to some future crisis, to lead the unwitting House of Commons beyond the text of the Anglo-French Agreement of April 1904, he acknowledged elsewhere that the closeness of Anglo-French relations enabled Germany to put pressure on Britain through France, but reminded himself automatically that 'unless we had the entente we should be isolated and might have everyone against us which would be a still greater weakness'. 2 As Hardinge's successor Nicolson put it in July 1911, 'France would never forgive us for having failed her, and the whole Triple Entente would be broken up. This would mean that we should have a triumphant Germany, and an unfriendly France and Russia...Our naval position in the Mediterranean and elsewhere would be quite altered, necessitating increased naval estimates, while the cessation of our intimate relations with Russia would render our position in Central Asia unstable and insecure...'. In July 1914 both the Russians and the French blackmailed the British in precisely these terms, with devastating effect. 3 *

The determination of the small nucleus of Liberal Imperialist ministers that the British Empire should not be exposed brought the country to the verge of war in 1906, in 1908, and in 1911, in what the vast majority of their

'see E. W. Edwards, 'The Franco-German Agreement on Morocco, 1909', English Historical Review lxxviii (1963) 483-513; J. F. V. Keiger, 'Jules Cambon and Franco-German détente 1907-1914' Historical Journal vol. 26 (1983) 641-659; K. A. Hamilton, 'The "Wild Talk" of Joseph Caillaux: a sequel to the Agadir crisis' International History Review ix (1987) 195-226. 2 minute by Grey on Kerr to Grey 1 March 1911, Grey MSS F. O. 800/108. In the House of Commons Grey said, 'The extent of the obligation to which Britain was committed was that expressed or implied in the Anglo-French Convention laid before Parliament. There was no other engagement bearing on the subject'. BD vii no. 197. As he told Bertie, he had 'purposely worded the answer so as not to convey that the engagement of 1904 might not under certain circumstances be construed to have larger consequences than its strict letter', ibid. no. 206. For the drafting of this, which Grey found very difficult, see F. O. 371/1117/9050. One of Grey's drafts began, 'The country was not committed...'. This was struck out. The French Foreign Minister Cruppi was disappointed even with the parliamentary answer as given, and wished to state in the Senate that the two nations would remain 'amies et unies en présence de toute éventualité et on peut s'en remettre à leurs Gouvernements respectifs du soin de donner le moment venu une forme précise à leur entente'. When Grey forbade the use of these words, Cruppi was all the more pessimistic, for as he told Bertie, 'He knew what had passed between the Departments of the two Governments for he had seen the dossier'. BD vii nos 200, 201, 205. Grey's less than straightforward attitude caused one French senator to ask the Premier, Ribot, on 6 April: 'in view of the vague affirmations of the MFA and the formal denials of the English F. O., what was the precise value of the "entente cordiale" from the point of view of a defensive military Agreement on land and sea?' F. O. 371/1118/13219. ^minute by Nicolson 21 July 1911, BD vii no. 409; K. M. Wilson, Empire and Continent pp. 161-2.

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colleagues could legitimately consider as 'a purely French quarrel'. 1 It brought the country to the verge of war again late in 1912, as the Secretary of State for War, Seely, sent for General Wilson on 8 November and asked him if France would go to war about the Balkans, receiving an answer in the affirmative; and as, twelve days later, in the company of Seely, Churchill, Repington and the editor of The Times, Dawson, Lloyd George 'talked quite complacently about the rousing of English national spirit for a war about the Balkans'. 2 It also conjured up a direct breach between England and Germany. When the German ambassador demanded an explanation of Lloyd George's Mansion House speech of 21 July 1911, Grey refused to give one. Of this incident the Russian ambassador in London wrote: '...there is no use concealing the fact - one step further, and a war between England and Germany would have broken out as a result of the Franco-German dispute, although independent of it.' 3 Such was what Daeschner of the French embassy in London described as 'le mécanisme délicat' of the Liberal Imperialist entente,4 Such was the Liberal Imperialist view of what British interests were and of what their protection entailed.

^Loreburn to Grey 26 August 1911, Grey MSS F. O. 800/99. Wilson Diary 8 November 1912; Dawson Diary 20 November 1912 MS Dawson 18 f. 167; see also Fitzroy ii 493-6, and Nicolson to Rodd 30 November 1912, Carnock MSS F. O. 800/360. 3 Benckendorff to Sazonov 1 August 1911, in Siebert p. 595. 4 Daeschner to de Selves 24 November 1911 DDF 3rd Series i no. 210 p. 190. 2

8 HANKEY'S APPENDIX: inter-service rivalry during and after the Agadir crisis, 1911

In the summer of 1911, when the German Government sent a gunboat to Agadir, a port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, and produced a crisis in the relations between Germany and France, Captain Maurice Pascal Alers Hankey was Naval Assistant Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence. Hankey was to become one of the most important and influential British public servants of the twentieth century. Appointed Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1912, he went on during the First World War to act as Secretary to the War Council, to the Dardanelles Committee, and to the War Committee. When Lloyd George became Prime Minister and established the War Cabinet Secretariat he placed Hankey in charge of designing and developing the organisation and ethos of that body. Hankey remained Secretary to the Cabinet until 1938, combining that position with the secretaryship of the Committee of Imperial Defence and, from 1923, the clerkship of the Privy Council. He was created first Baron Hankey in 1939, and served Neville Chamberlain as Minister without Portfolio and Winston Churchill as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and as Paymaster-General, until dismissed in March 1942. He wrote several books which drew upon his life as an official. Of these works, which given their authorship tended to be regarded almost as primary sources, the most significant was undoubtedly The Supreme Command 1914-1918. This was published in 1961, after a long and hard struggle against several Prime Ministers and Cabinet Secretaries who tried to suppress it. The two volumes appeared, however, without the appendixes which Hankey had originally intended to include. These were removed by Hankey in January 1959, in a successful effort to meet the demands of his publisher for a shorter work 1 , but at the expense of the views he had held at the time. It is my purpose here to print one of the missing appendixes, together with two other documents from the Hankey papers which are clearly connected with that appendix, and which are not mentioned or taken into account in the ' note by Hankey on proposed cuts, January 1959, Hankey MSS 25/7, Churchill College, Cambridge.

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published text of The Supreme Command. Hankey's letter of 15 August 1911 to McKenna, the First Lord of the Admiralty, was written as the Service Departments, and others, prepared for a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence summoned for 23 August in view of the tense international situation and the possibility that, if Franco-German negotiations for a settlement of their dispute broke down, Great Britain would be called upon by France to go to war with her against Germany. Hankey's letter of 24 August 1911 to the former First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, gives Hankey's immediate, and erroneous, impression of the outcome of that meeting of the CID. The memorandum of November 1911, entitled 'The case against sending the Expeditionary Force to France' is part of the Admiralty's contribution to the material produced when some of the issues raised at and by that CID meeting were discussed in cabinet later that year. The letter to Fisher, and the memorandum itself, both give the lie to the impression given by The Supreme Command, namely that Hankey 'was...driven to admit...that the Senior Service on this occasion had sustained a severe defeat', and that 'From that time onward there was never any doubt what would be the Grand Strategy in the event of our being drawn into a continental war in support of France'. 1 The deficiencies of The Supreme Command in this particular respect are by no means remedied by Hankey's biographer. Professor Roskill quotes only a few lines of the memorandum, and does not record the extent to which Fisher and Hankey were in touch with each other; and his partial quotation of the letter to McKenna is misleading in the sense that it fails to indicate the lengths to which Hankey was prepared to go in order that the Senior Service might win this latest round of inter-service rivalry. (Fisher, for his part, threatened to go even further, writing to Hankey at the end of September: 'As you acutely observe it's really an excellent thing all that has occurred in its making the soldiers more ready to be embarked but where they shall be landed will not be for them to decide when the time comes - because believe me - 1 don't care who may be our rulers at the time - the Army will only be employed as the Navy wants - and be subsidiary to it.' 2 ) Roskill states, moreover, that the warnings and suggestions made by Hankey in his letter to McKenna, 'went unheeded'. 3 They certainly did not go unheeded by McKenna. The summary by Hankey, in the third paragraph of his letter, of the conclusion of the 1908-9 sub-committee of the CID, was employed by McKenna as an Introductory Note which he attached to the 1 Hankey.77ie Supreme Command 1914-1918 (London, 1961) i. 81-2. Fisher to Hankey 29 September 1911, Hankey MSS 5/2A. 3 S. Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets, 1877-1918 (London, 1970) p.102.

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Admiralty's reply of 21 August to the General Staff's memorandum 'The Military Aspect of the Continental Problem', which had been printed for circulation on 15 August. 1 Hankey's suggestion, towards the end of his letter, that a paragraph of CID Report 116B could be deployed as embodying an 'accepted principle', was resorted to by McKenna early in the proceedings of 23 August, when he stated 'that the Admiralty had actually recorded in a CID Paper their inability to guarantee the transport of troops upon the outbreak of war'. 2 (This piece of sharp practice was deemed by the Prime Minister, Asquith, who was chairing the meeting, as having no reference to the present case, as indeed it did not. For CID Paper 116B was the Report of the standing sub-committee appointed in March 1910 to enquire into the question of Overseas Transport of Reinforcements in Time of War: its terms of reference did not include, nor did it discuss, the question of the sending of the Expeditionary Force to the continent.3) In The Supreme Command Hankey described what the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir A.K. Wilson, presented to the Committee of Imperial Defence on 23 August 1911 as a 'half-baked naval plan', savouring of having been 'cooked-up in the dinner hour'. 4 Admiral Wilson's paper (CID 131B) was printed in E.E. Bradford's biography, published in 1923.5 Whilst it is clear that Wilson's thinking had not changed a great deal since May 1907, when he had produced a plan for 'make-believe floating armies' 6 , what is also clear is that Hankey's memorandum of November 1911 bears a distinct family resemblance to it. This resemblance is the less surprising given Hankey's involvement in Admiralty war planning since 1908. Hankey had helped Sir John Fisher, as he then was, in October 1908 in the composition of a memorandum on 'The Organisation of an Expeditionary Force'. 7 This was called for in connection with meetings of a CID sub-committee on the ' CAB38/18/47, /48. minutes of 114th meeting of Committee of Imperial Defence, CAB2/2/2 p.3. 3 CAB38/16/9. ^The Supreme Command pp.81-2 has 'cocked up', surely a printer's error. 5 E.E. Bradford, Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir A.K. Wilson (London, 1923) pp. 235-238. ^memorandum by A.K. Wilson, 'War between Germany and France and England combined', May 1907: 'The only way in which we could give serious assistance to France would be by a floating army, making raids on different parts of the German coast and so diverting troops from the main theatre of war...A very large number of transports should be at once prepared, say sufficient to carry at least 200,000 men. Half of these should be sent to Cherbourg and Havre, or other French ports, ostensibly to embark French troops. Whether any actually embark or not depends on circumstances, but in any case the greatest secrecy should be observed and every effort made to induce the enemy to believe that they are either actually embarked or ready to be at a moment's notice. In the same way as many transports as possible should be used for embarking our own available troops, and every effort should be made to lead the enemy to think that the number is much larger than it really is. This great force of transports, partly filled with troops and partly make-believe, should be used to make feints in many different directions, and serious attacks when the conditions permit.' ADM 116/3486. ^memorandum by Hankey and Crease, October 1908, CAB63/1. 2

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Military Needs of the Empire, which began in December 1908.1 A few days before the first meeting, Fisher had told Admiral Slade, the Director of Naval Intelligence, that the Admiralty had better not say anything at all about direct support of the French Army. 2 At the end of August 1911 Fisher was to credit Hankey with having been 'the real bulwark in getting up the logic of the case' presented by the Admiralty on 23 August 1911.3 Hankey's memorandum of November 1911 complements and in a sense completes that of October 1908. Both are achievements as much of the heart as of the head. Attached to Hankey's copy of the October 1908 memorandum is a cover note of 12 November 1914 which reveals his continuing loyalty to Fisher's schemes. Roskill's contention, that he never showed any enthusiasm for them 4 , is quite impossible to sustain in the face of the material printed here. That cover note also reveals that Hankey sent his memorandum of November 1911 to the new First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, early in 1912. In so doing, Hankey was attempting to take advantage of a certain mutual admiration that seemed to have developed between Churchill and Fisher, who thought it not at all out of the question that, when he returned to England in mid-1912, he would be invited to resume as First Sea Lord. Hankey was also trying to exploit a setback to the General Staff's cause of a continental commitment. Apparently victorious over the Admiralty's opposing views in August 1911, as symbolised by Asquith's translation of McKenna from the Admiralty to the Home Office, at the insistence of Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, the continental commitment had been challenged at two cabinet meetings in November 1911. The issue was formally raised on 1 November, and resumed on 15 November. In the interim Field Marshal Sir W.G. Nicholson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, produced a memorandum, 'Action taken by the General Staff since 1906 in preparing a plan for rendering military assistance to France in the event of an unprovoked attack on that Power by Germany'. 5 This attempt to justify and icABie/s. 2

R.F. Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford, 1973) p.405. See memorandum by Slade, 'Great Britain, France and Russia versus the Triple Alliance', 3 December 1908; this confines itself to naval actions, except to say: 'So far as regards military action of France and Great Britain, this will probably be mainly defensive. Russia might assume the offensive. This is a question which must be decided between the Governments of the Allies, and it does not really affect the broad lines of the Naval problem. The eventual decision will affect the details of this problem, since the Naval policy, if it is to exercise its fullest effect, must be co-ordinated with the Military policy.' Fisher MSS 1/7, Churchill College, Cambridge. Fisher to Hankey 29 August 1911, Hankey MSS 5/2A. 4 Roskill p.152; and see Fisher to Hankey 19 February 1918, in A.J. Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought (London, 1959) iii. 511-512. Sprinted in G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London, 1926-38) vii no. 639.

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perpetuate the Army's approach, and the continental commitment it espoused, failed to carry the day for Haldane and for the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. Those ministers who were of the General Staff's persuasion were outvoted on 15 November by 15 to 5 in formal resolutions of the Cabinet. McKenna, who had been behind this challenge, and who had written to Fisher on 5 November, 'I am hard at the attack on joint operations and have the Cabinet with me so far', had gauged the situation correctly. 1 In all probability, Hankey's memorandum was prepared at the same time as that of Nicholson, in order to counter the views and arguments of the General Staff. Whether it did play any active role in helping McKenna to his victory of 15 November must remain speculation. Even so, it is an important addition to the material available on Hankey himself, on inter-service rivalry, on navalist attitudes and plans, and makes a substantial contribution to the debate about British conduct in and contribution to a future European war. It is worth making, in this context, two remarks. One is that, in 1911, the British Expeditionary Force could not have been sent to the continent except in the most highly improvised fashion. Planning with the French was in an embryonic stage, and the Expeditionary Force was short of much of the equipment that it required. The Director of Military Operations, General Sir Henry Wilson, was to tell the Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the end of the year: 'Last summer we came so near a great war that we got frightened and, in a hasty and improvised manner, we tried to get our troops ready to take the field. It is the bare truth to say that when the crisis came on us last JulySeptember it found us unprepared for war...We are still unprepared.' 2 The second remark is that the Hankey Papers were not available to S.R. Williamson when producing The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France prepare for war 1904-1914 (Harvard, 1969). They were available to Roskill, of course, whose biography appeared in the following year. As has been demonstrated, however, availability is not everything. They do not appear to have been deployed in at least one recent publication on a related aspect of the subject and episode dealt with here. 3

McKenna to Fisher 5 November 1911, Fisher MSS 1/10/539; M.V. Brett and Esher (eds), Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher (London, 1934-38) iii.74 (24 November 1911). 2 H.H. Wilson Diary 26, 27, 28 July 1911; Wilson to Nicholson 16 August, 26 December 1911, Wilson MSS 3/5/15a, 3/5/21, Imperial War Museum. o P. M. Hayes, 'Britain, Germany, and the Admiralty's Plans for attacking German, territory 1906-1915' in L. Freedman, P. Hayes, R. O'Neill (eds), War, Strategy and International Politics: essays in honour of Sir Michael Howard (Oxford, 1992) pp.95-116. By contrast, A. Offer, The First World War: an agrarian interpretation (Oxford, 1989) p.295 quotes paragraphs 18 to 21 of the Hankey memorandum.

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(A) Hankey to McKenna, 15 August 1911 (Hankey MSS 7/3) By this time you will have received a notice of a C.I.D. Meeting to be held on Wednesday the 23rd, at which the question of military intervention on the Continent of Europe in certain eventualities is to be discussed. As representative of the Admiralty on this Secretariat I think I am not exceeding my duty in drawing your attention to the attitude which the Admiralty adopted towards this question when the general policy was discussed in 1908. You will remember that at that time there existed a considerable difference of opinion between the naval and military members. The latter were strongly in favour of military action in support of France. The former, and especially Lord Fisher held that to send troops would be a great mistake, and that we ought to rely on commercial pressure alone. Lord Fisher held the view that our relatively small army could not make the difference between success and failure to France; to send it would give Germany the opportunity (which she at present lacks owing to our preponderant sea-power) to strike a blow at us; Germany would, he contended, spare no effort to 'contain' the French army, and hurl an overwhelming force on to the British wing, utterly defeating it and marching the remnant to Berlin; in fact to send an army at all would, he maintained, be to put our head into the lion's mouth. The Admiralty held, in fact, that in view of our maritime ascendancy our proper way of rendering assistance to France was to put such severe economic pressure on Germany that she could not continue the war. Even if Germany succeeded in effecting a military occupation of France this pressure would not be diminished, for then we should close the ports of France (and probably of Holland and Belgium also) and our grip would be tightened. The upshot of the controversy was, as you remember, a conclusion that 'in the event of an attack on France by Germany, the expediency of sending a military force abroad, or of relying on naval means only, is a matter of policy which can only be determined when the occasion arises by the Government of the day'. I gather from Sir Charles Ottley1 that the Government consider that the possibility of the emergency arising in the near future cannot be ignored, and that the War Office want a definite decision as to whether in the event of the emergency arising they would be called on to send the troops. My principal reason for writing to you now is that Lord Fisher and Lord Esher, who took the principal part in opposing the policy of sending an army to France, have not received notices of the meeting. (I gather that Lord ' Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Ottley, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

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Haldane particularly did not desire Lord Fisher's presence.) Of course it is possible that circumstances have occurred to modify the Admiralty's views on this question, or it is conceivable that your present advisers may not agree with Lord Fisher: anyhow I thought it desirable, particularly in the absence of Lord Fisher and Lord Esher, to remind you of the former Admiralty attitude. It is of course notorious that the D. M. O., General Wilson, who has brought this question to the front, has a perfect obsession for military operations on the Continent. He spends his holidays bicycling up and down the Franco-German frontier; he has preached this gospel at the Staff College for years; has packed the War Office with staff officers who share his views. He holds the view, not only that military action is indispensable in order to preserve the balance of power in Europe, but that we require a conscript army for the purpose. If he can get a decision at this juncture in favour of military action he will endeavour to commit us up to the hilt: and in a few months time he will prove that with our existing forces we could not have rendered France proper assistance, and will seek to show that without conscription we cannot fulfil our obligations.1 If the Admiralty are still averse to a military expedition they can, of course, easily render these manouevres nugatory. They can say that the emergency has not arisen and that a decision is therefore impossible at the present stage; or they can quote the accepted principle that 'the movement of troops by sea in the early stages of a maritime war is an operation attended with serious risk, and the Admiralty cannot guarantee to protect the transports so employed' (para. 4 of CID Report 116-B) and can very properly decline before war to say how long it will be before the transport of troops will be feasible; or else they can stick to the line they took up in 1908 that the policy of sending an expedition is altogether a wrong one. I fear that this has been a very long letter, but I felt bound to bring these considerations to your attention, and Sir Charles Ottley concurs that it is quite a proper course for me to take. I shall be on leave at home until the end of this week, but if you want me to further search the CID records in this connection, or to take any other action I can come up and shall be entirely at your disposal. P.S. I think I ought to warn you that since the 1909 inquiry the War Office (DMO) have attempted to collect evidence to prove that the power of the Navy to put economic pressure on Germany is non-existent. They addressed a cunningly devised set of questions to the Board of Trade some time

' l h c fullest exposition of Wilson's views is to be found in a memorandum that he wrote for private circulation, 'Policy and the Army', 1 January 1913, Wilson MSS 3/7/1.

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ago 1 , which they may attempt to bring up if the Admiralty still maintain that naval means are sufficient. The Board of Trade replies came into my hand a few days ago in connection with another inquiry. In reality the Board of Trade paper is inconclusive, as the War Office in their questionnaire omitted many important questions.

(B) Hankey to Lord Fisher, 24 August 1911 (Fisher MSS l/10/530a) A tremendous battle was fought in yesterday's packed meeting. Crewe and Harcourt and Morley, who might be expected to take the naval view were excluded. Winston [Churchill] and Lloyd George, who are more or less converts to the military view were present. The P.M., it was obvious from the outset, had been squared. After a battle which raged from 11.30 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. no decision was arrived at. No further meeting will be held in the CID, and, if discussed again it will be in the Cabinet, where the forces will be more evenly balanced. A.K.W[ilson ] put up a rare fight - considering that the thing had been sprung on him almost at a moment's notice, with his DNI on leave - but, as you know, he is no dialectician and I don't think he made a good impression. He allowed himself to be drawn too much about his naval intentions, a subject on which you always declined to be drawn. McKenna was altogether admirable and redressed the balance of argument. Old Nick [General Nicholson] lost his temper hopelessly of course. The Snake [Haldane] was more oily than ever, and had many sharp passages with McKenna, who admirably converted one of his principal arguments into a 'boomerang'. The great thing is that we are safe. The P.M. began by being pro-military, but possibly this was a 'bluff', just as he appeared pro-Beresford in the Naval Inquiry at first, for afterwards he veered considerably. Grey was entirely judicial. The great point is that no decision was arrived at - this means, in my opinion, defeat of our opponents. So you can keep your trump card for next time...

*see W.O. 106/47A, E2/7.

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(C) The case against sending the Expeditionary Force to France (Hankey MSS 7/3) 1 It is proposed in this Memorandum to set forth the naval and military reasons against the employment of a British military force on the Continent of Europe to assist France in the deplorable event of an outbreak of war between Germany on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other. The case for military action 2. First the advantages claimed for the employment of the British army in this manner must be considered. It is urged by the advocates of this policy that in respect to the forces which France and Germany can place in the first line at the outset of a Franco-German war France is in a position of slight inferiority. Germany, it is estimated, can dispose of 72 divisions; France of 68. 2 It is apprehended that this will enable Germany, by moving through the portion of Belgium south of the Meuse, to turn the north flank of the French army. It is always assumed that Belgium would not oppose such a movement, so long as the German forces did not cross the Meuse, but in any case no great importance is attached to the action of the Belgian army. 3. To remedy this weakness it is proposed that the British army should be employed to support the French left. It is pointed out that the numerical strength of the British expeditionary force (6 divisions) would 3 redress the numerical disadvantage under which France suffers. It is claimed that the moral effect of the presence of British troops in the first shock of contact would be calculated enormously to enhearten the French army, and correspondingly to dismay the Germans. In fact the utmost stress has always been laid on this moral factor. 4. Further, it is claimed by the advocates of this policy that, without the assistance of the British army the French resistance must collapse; Germany will therefore have France at her mercy, will demand the cession of the northern part of France bordering the Channel; and will exact from France compensation for any damage to German commerce inflicted by the exercise of sea-power by Great Britain. Unless therefore France feels assured that England

The text given below is that of the original, handwritten, memorandum. At the head of the typescript version Hankey added this title, under the heading 'Appendix III'. At a later stage he wrote, against this, the words 'Cut out'. 2 In the typescript these figures are changed to 84 and 'only 66' respectively. 3 The word 'partially' is written here on the typescript.

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will support her actively with military force on land, she will take the view that the 'entente cordiale' holds out insufficient advantages to her, and will seek for an understanding with Germany, the ultimate object of which will be the partition of the choicest portions of the British Empire between France and Germany. The circumstances under which the British Army could assist France 5. In replying to the case summarised above it is necessary first to consider whether there is a reasonable probability that the addition of a British force of 4 or 6 divisions is likely to make the difference between success and failure to the French armies. In war one side or the other usually shows a marked superiority over the other, due either to leadership, to superior equipment and materiel, and even more often to superior physical and moral qualities in the troops. Until submitted to the supreme test of war no man can forecast what the capacities of the leaders or the qualities of the troops will be. If the German army is markedly superior to the French army (as in 1870) the addition of 6 divisions of British troops - a mere drop in the ocean - can not possibly save the latter. If, on the other hand, the French army proves itself markedly superior to the German the British troops will not be required. It is only on the somewhat unlikely assumption that the two armies are nearly equal in leadership, and in other respects, that any case at all can be made out for the employment of a British force. The need for prompt action on the outbreak of war 6. The next point is that, unless the British expeditionary force can be placed at the right place and at the right time it will not be of much value. It is calculated by the General Staff that it will take both the French and German armies approximately 13 days to mobilise and concentrate. It is indispensable, therefore, that the British army, in order to participate in the all important first actions of the war, should be in position within 13 days 1 of the outbreak of hostilities. It is necessary to point out that this leaves a very narrow margin for any unforeseen hitch - such as objections in the Cabinet or in Parliament, delays due to disturbance in other parts of the Empire, a persistent bout of stormy or foggy weather, strikes, a railway breakdown, or any of these events which cannot be foreseen. ^Changed to 15 in the typescript.

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7. It is not proposed to dwell at length on the difficulties due to 1 the fact that French ammunition will not fit British guns and rifles, necessitating an entirely separate line of communications - a difficulty much accentuated if, as may happen, the enemy succeeds in interposing himself between the British army and the port originally selected as a base. These difficulties, though acute, are not insurmountable. 8. From the foregoing remarks it is possible to form a rough estimate of the advantages to be gained from military action, if the calculations of the General Staff regarding the time required for the German army to mobilise are correct; if the Germans do not upset these calculations by a secret mobilisation or by some ruse or stratagem; if the British army can reach the French frontier with [sic] 13 days2 without a hitch; if it can be maintained there without inestimable confusion with the French lines of communication, depriving it of ammunition; and finally if the French and German forces are equal in leadership and other respects - if all these conditions are fulfilled we may succeed in averting a disaster to the French army, and in infusing an enthusiasm into the French forces which apparently patriotism, and the desire to defend their mother country, their hearths, and their homes is unable to inspire. The action of the enemy 9. Now let us consider the action of the enemy. Is it not probable that the German army, instead of being dismayed, would welcome the opportunity of getting to grips with these islanders, whom they could not reach by any other means, who had seized their ships and shattered their commerce, and brought infinite suffering in every home in the fatherland? Would they spare any effort to drive a wedge between the British army and its allies, to surround it with overwhelming force, to cut it off from the sea and from its line of communications and even to bring about a British Sedan and to march the army to Berlin? It is needless to dwell on the appalling effect that such a disaster would have on the British Empire!3 Once the expeditionary force is committed to a continental campaign our power of exerting military effort elsewhere ceases 10. Assuming, however, that all went well with the British army in France it is necessary to examine the effect elsewhere of the committal of the 1'divided leadership and the difference in language, and' is added here in the typescript. ^Changed to 15 in the typescript. 3 The exclamation mark was eliminated in the typescript.

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whole of our expeditionary force at the very outset of the war to operations in aid of the French armies. In the first place it must be pointed out that i deprives us of all power of military effort outside the United Kingdom, since the 'expeditionary force' is the only force at our disposal which is capable of such employment, the Special Reserve being merely an organisation for replacing the wastage of war in the expeditionary force, and the Territorial Army being enlisted for home defence only. 11. Hence should trouble arise elsewhere, once our expeditionary force had been committed to action on the Continent, we should be in a parlous condition. Yet it is by no means impossible that the forces of disorder in India or Egypt might take advantage of our hands being full to cause trouble. It is conceivable that Turkey might be incited by Germany to cross the Sinai Peninsula, thus cutting the jugular vein of our Far Eastern trade, and actively to assert her now nominal position as suzerain of Egypt. Then there are all the chances of war. The enemy may seize British possessions overseas; Austria, if engaged in the war, might seize Malta by a coup-de-main, necessitating recapture; St. Helena, now without a garrison, might be captured before the war garrison arrived, depriving our cruisers and merchant ships of a coaling station and port of refuge. In fact any number of contingencies that cannot be foreseen may occur, calling for military force. By far the most likely of these is that a military force may be required by the Navy to assist in the operations of the fleet. Possible naval demands for military force 12. The blockade of the German coast is an operation which, though highly important to the exercise of British sea-power, presents exceptional difficulties under modern conditions. It has to be remembered that in the face of active flotillas of torpedo craft and submarines a blockade by large vessels is impossible, the danger being too great; like force must be employed against like and it is indispensable to utilise a superior force of destroyers and submarines to control the action of the enemy's vessels of these classes. To maintain these light craft off the German coast, however, is a matter of some difficulty. In the first place their coal capacity is limited, and if they have to return to a British port some 300 miles away, every time they coal, half the force would always be absent from its war station. It is necessary, in fact, to make some arrangement for them to coal near the enemy's ports, and, as the use of neutral ports is not permissible, and coaling at sea impracticable, there is no alternative but to occupy some anchorage where vessels employed in the blockade can coal, water, provision, and rest their crews after the wearing work

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of a close blockadc off a coast where the sea is generally rough. But in order to ensure the safety of the ships using this advanced base it is necessary to occupy all adjacent land, from which fire could be brought to bear by an enemy on the anchorage, and to improvise defences (booms, guns, and searchlights) against a raid by the enemy's torpedo craft. Such a base was established by the Japanese at the Elliott Islands when blockading Port Arthur in 1904, at the Blonde Islands in 1894, and by the Americans at Guantanamo when blockading Santiago da Cuba in 1898, and in more remote times at Maddalena by Nelson when blockading Toulon. 13. There is the strongest ground for believing that the Navy will require such a base in the event of war with Germany. Until the naval plans have been worked out more fully than at present it is impossible to say what military force will be required. There is some reason to believe, however, that the establishment of a naval base in the Frisian Islands may call for the employment of a much larger force than has ever been anticipated. 14. Later in the war, after the main German fleet has been disposed of, there is little doubt that the Navy will wish to advance into the Baltic, and to establish a close blockade of the German littoral in that sea. Here again the need for the cooperation of a military force to hold one or more advanced bases is by no means improbable. 15. Yet one more employment of military force to cooperate in the action of the Navy should be mentioned. It is not improbable that our enemy may seek to create a diversion by despatching squadrons of cruisers to join his ships normally stationed in distant seas in order to prey upon our commerce. Sooner or later the careers of these commerce destroyers will be brought to a close by the action of our own ships, either by their destruction, or else by their being driven into port. In the latter contingency it is by no means improbable that several German cruisers might eventually take refuge in some German colonial harbour such as Kiao-Chau. In order to end once and for all their activities, to free British cruisers from the arduous and difficult task of a blockade and to ensure that British maritime commerce shall continue without molestation, it may become indispensable to despatch a military force to 'dig them out' and encompass their destruction. (Compare Shafter's expedition to Santiago to 'dig out' Cevera's ill-fated squadron in 1898, and the Japanese expedition to Wei-hai-wei in 1894 to 'dig out' the Chinese fleet.) Possible calls on the British army summarised 16. To sum up this portion of the Memorandum British forces may be required to aid the naval blockade in the North Sea or the Baltic, or to end the

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career of an enemy's commerce destroyers which have taken refuge in a Colonial port; they may also be imperatively needed to proceed to India or Egypt or to the recapture of some important coaling station. But if the British army is already committed to a desperate struggle in the heart of the continent it will be impossible either to withdraw it, or to find the necessary force elsewhere. Hence the naval operations will suffer, and we shall run the risk of losing India and Egypt, and of having our main line of maritime communication to the Far East interrupted. 17. These risks might be run if some paramount and vital British interest was at stake, or if some tremendous prize, such as the capture of Berlin, was to be hoped for from military action. But this is not the case. As has been shown already the utmost we can hope to gain by action on the continent is that under certain highly problematical conditions we might save France from defeat. Under these conditions to launch our army on to the continent would not be even a gambler's throw. It is to stake much with the prospect of gaining little. What deters Germany from attacking France 18. What, it may be asked, is the real deterrent to Germany from attacking France, when she knows that England is behind the latter country? Is it the fear of four or six divisions of British troops, or is it the consciousness that the commercial prosperity which Germany has built up since 1870, and on which she has concentrated every effort, will be shattered? Surely the latter! Germany knows that her mercantile marine will be at the mercy of Great Britain once war breaks out. Some 900 German merchant ships outside the Straits of Dover, with their cargoes, will be captured inevitably, or have to lie up in neutral ports. Nearly 20% of her commerce, normally carried on with the British Empire will cease. Her ports will be blockaded and her commerce even with neutrals will be carried on only through the ports and communications of adjacent neutral countries, which will soon become congested if the traffic is considerable. No German ships will be available to carry her trade to and from these neutral ports; British ships will not be permitted to do so; and the remaining portion of the world's shipping will only be sufficient to carry a portion of her trade at exorbitant freights. Handicapped by lack of raw materials, shortage of labour owing to the mobilisation, the heavy cost of land transport through neutral countries, and high rates of freight German manufacturers will be unable to compete in the world's markets and will have to close down. Prices will rise on all imported articles at the time when many of the bread-winners are absent at the front, and

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employment bad. In short, most tremendous economic pressure must be anticipated.1 19. It is the knowledge of this which deters Germany from war, and it is her knowledge of this which renders the entente cordiale of enormous value to France. In comparison to this the assistance which we could render by military means is insignificant. Our proper policy is by a study of German commercial and financial conditions to organise ourselves to support the action of the Navy in bringing economic pressure to bear on Germany by every means - a policy which is now being exhaustively worked out in 2 the Committee of Imperial Defence, much progress having already been made in this direction. Conscription the underlying motive of the case for continental action 20. It is believed, however, that the true motive of those military officers who have pressed the need for military action so ably is to bring about conscription in this country. 21. The first attempt in this direction was to raise a scare about Invasion and to frighten the British people into military conscription. This was frustrated. 22. What is now being attempted is to get a decision out of the Committee of Imperial Defence or the Cabinet in support of the theory that the employment of British military force on the continent of Europe is essential to the preservation of the balance of power. The next step is not far to seek. 'Even a Liberal Government', they will say, 'admitted the necessity of this action. But if a military force is to be employed at all let it be a sufficient one! This absurd force of 6 divisions is a mere drop in the ocean! 3 To carry our policy to its logical conclusion we need a conscript army trained on continental lines.' Before long this argument will gain great force from the fact that the German population is gaining faster than the French, and in a decade the numerical superiority of the German armies over those of France will be much more marked than at present. Even if, today, 4 or 6 divisions of British troops are sufficient to produce an equality, assuredly this will not be the case in a few years time. 4 ' Here Hankey wrote, and then crossed out, 'Grass will grow in the streets of Hamburg'. These were the very words used by Ottley in a letter of 5 December 1908 to McKenna: see A.J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow (Oxford, 1961) i. 379. by' in the typescript. Even at the present time the French army is greatly inferior to the German.' is added in the typescript. This sentence was re-cast in the typescript to read: 'If, even today, 4 or 6 divisions are insufficient to produce an equality, assuredly the position will be worse in a few years time.'

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23. Such, at any rate, is the general view held by officers on the General Staff of the War Office and especially among those who have come under the influence of the dominant personality who until recently presided at the Staff College.1 From the Staff it has spread to the regimental officers, and through them to the whole class of society from which our officers are drawn. 24. Whether the military officers who are pressing for a decision in favour of military action on the continent regard it merely as a step in the direction of conscription or not, sufficient grounds have been adduced in the preceding pages to prove that such action would be a military blunder of the first magnitude. Great risks would be run for the chance of doubtful advantages, and the exercise of our sea-power might be severely handicapped. It would be equally a mistake to give any encouragement to France to count on the assistance of an army which may, when the psychological moment arrives, be required elsewhere. If any assurances must be given to France should they not be limited to a promise that the whole of our Sea Power will, if necessary, be exerted in her favour; should it not be stated explicitly that no military assistance of any kind can be promised at the outset of war? It is, of course, conceivable that at a later stage of the war it might be found desirable to send the army to the Continent. If the French army were beaten it is conceivable that a diversion comparable to Moore's raid and retreat to Corunna might be useful in order to draw off a portion of the enemy and give France time to recuperate her energies. Or it might be necessary to support the Belgian army in the assertion of Belgian independence; or to assist the Danish army in the event of Germany endeavouring to seize the gates of the Baltic; or, in case of the initial actions between the French and German armies resulting in 'stale-mate' the addition of 6 divisions of fresh troops might be invaluable. But if the army has been committed to the centre of the campaign at the outset of war, all possibility of influencing the war in one of the manners suggested — a manner which sea-power alone renders possible — disappears, and the advantage of sea-power is to a great extent thrown away. The objection to the despatch of a military force to the Continent on the ground that the country would be exposed to invasion has not been referred to above, as it is believed that the Territorial Army would be fully competent to deal with such insignificant raiding forces as could elude the vigilance of our fleet. Though the actual danger on this account is probably small it would be unwise to ignore the effect on public confidence. There would unquestionably be an outcry if the country were denuded of nearly all the regular troops.

''Sir Henry Wilson', footnote by Hankey.

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The possibility that troops might be required at home for the maintenance of order, in the event of riots due to economic disturbances consequent on the war is also not considered of sufficient importance to deserve more than mere mention. November, 1911

M.P.A.H.

9 UNDERSTANDING THE 'MISUNDERSTANDING' OF 1 AUGUST 1914

During the evening of Saturday 1 August 1914 King George V sent the following telegram to Kaiser Wilhelm II: In answer to your telegram just received I think there must be some misunderstanding as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon when they were discussing how actual fighting between German and French armies might be avoided while there is still a chance of some agreement between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will arrange to see Prince Lichnowsky early tomorrow to ascertain whether there is a misunderstanding on his part. * Despite the existing literature on it 2 , this episode has not been satisfactorily or fully explained. In particular, the relationship to it of a rift within the Liberal Imperialist group of British ministers has not yet been appreciated. According to the telegram (sent at 7.02 p.m.) to which George V was replying, W i l h e l m II had received i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m the British government 'offering French neutrality under guarantee of Great Britain'. 3 This information was embodied in L i c h n o w s k y ' s telegram no. 205 sent at 11.14 a.m.: Sir Edward Grey has just had me informed through Sir W. Tyrrell that he hopes, as the result of a Ministerial Council now in session, to be able to give me this afternoon some facts which may prove useful for the avoidance of the great catastrophe. Judging from Sir William's hints, this would appear to mean that in case we did not attack France, England would remain neutral and would guarantee France's neutrality. I shall learn more this afternoon. Sir Edward Grey has just called me on the telephone and asked me if I thought I could assure him that in case France should remain neutral in a ^George V to Wilhelm II, 1 August 1914, in M. Montelgas and W. Schucking (eds), Outbreak of the World War, German Documents collected by Karl Kautsky (New York, 1924) no. 612; cited below as DD. 2 H.F. Young, 'The Misunderstanding of 1 August 1914' Journal of Modern History 48 (1976) 644-665; S.J. Valone, 'There must be some misunderstanding: Sir Edwaid Grey's diplomacy of August 1, 1914' Journal of British Studies 27 (1988) 405-424; E.T. Corp, 'Sir William Tyrrell: the eminence grise of the British Foreign Office, 1912-1915' Historical Journal 25 (1982) p. 705. Wilhelm II to George V, 1 August 1914, DD no. 575.

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Russo-German war, we would not attack the French. I assured him that I could take the responsibility for such a guaranty, and he is to use this assurance at today's Cabinet session. P.S. Sir W. Tyrrell urgently begged me to use my influence to insure that our troops did not cross the French border. Everything would depend upon that. The French troops had retired after one border crossing that had occurred.1

The Ministerial Council mentioned in Lichnowsky's first paragraph had convened at 10.30 a.m. It consisted of the Prime Minister, Asquith, the Foreign Secretary, Grey, and the former Secretary of State for War and present Lord Chancellor, Haldane.2 The presence of Haldane at this gathering, and an understanding of his view of current events, is the key to the origin of this particular episode. Haldane had spent the previous night, that of 31 July, under Grey's roof, in St. Ann's Gate. Before the meeting at 10.30 a.m. on 1 August, he wrote to his mother: 'Things look black - but it is possible, though not probable, that the struggle may be limited and short.' 3 Writing not long after the meeting of the Cabinet, which finished at 1.30 p.m., Asquith described Haldane as 'diffuse and nebulous'. 4 At 5 p.m., in another letter to his mother, Haldane wrote: 'I shall not give up hope till war breaks out. I trust that we shall not be dragged in. It is fearfully difficult to steer...' 5 Before the Cabinet met again on the morning of Sunday 2 August Haldane wrote at greater length to his sister: It feels as though one had passed from an old peaceful beautiful world to one of horrors. We have done all in our power. But war is now on Europe. Shall we be able to keep out? No one can say for certain. The ideas that on the one hand we can wholly disinterest ourselves, and on the other that we ought to rush in are both wrong. And the real course, that of being ready to intervene if at a decisive moment we are called on, is difficult to formulate in clear terms. Yet I think this is what we must attempt. Today's will be a serious Cabinet. The least step may be fatal. We shall try all we can to keep clear, but can we! I do not know. I would give much if it had not fallen to me to hold a position in which I have to give a voice and vote... 6

Asquith's description of Haldane on 1 August was an accurate one. It would appear that, at this stage of the crisis, he took up an intermediate position between Asquith and Grey on the one hand (the latter of whom had been described by French ambassador Cambon in a telegram sent at 8.40 p.m. ' Lichnowsky to German Foreign Office, 1 August 1914, ibid. no. 562. Haldane to his mother, 1 August 1914, Haldane MSS 5992. ibid. 4 M . and E. Brock (eds), H.H. Asquith - Letters to Venetia Stanley (Oxford, 1985) p. 140. 5 Haldane to his mother, 1 August 1914, Haldane MSS 5992. ^Haldane to his sister, 2 August 1914, ibid. 6012. 2

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on 31 July as 'partisan de 1'intervention immediateand Morley and Simon on the other, who wanted an immediate announcement that in no circumstances would Britain take part in a war. 2 What Haldane wanted was that any British intervention be delayed as long as possible. This interpretation is supported by what the German Councellor of Embassy in 1914, Kuhlmann, told the historian G.P. Gooch in an interview of February 1929: I was recalled from my leave in Germany at the end of July, 1914. On reaching London I went to Haldane's house on the afternoon of Sunday, August 2. I advised England to stand out at first, and then, after the first shock of arms, to dictate peace by a threat of intervention...Haldane was interested, seemed to sympathise with the idea, and said he would bring it before the Cabinet for discussion...I was surprised by the picture of Haldane as warlike in Morley's Memorandum on Resignation. His talk on August 2 with me was quite the reversed

The interpretation is further supported by Balfour's record of a talk with Haldane on 4 August, from which the former Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party derived the impression that Haldane wished to keep the British Expeditionary Force in the United Kingdom until it could be built up into a more formidable army which would then be of greater assistance to France and more likely to survive in battle. Balfour's comment, that Haldane displayed 'a certain wooliness of thought and indecision of purpose', mirrors that of Asquith on 1 August. 4 Haldane had been a founder-member of the Liberal Imperialist group, which had consisted, fundamentally, of himself, Grey, and Asquith. As Secretary of State for War from December 1905 to June 1912 he had been the architect of the British Expeditionary Force. When Asquith dismissed McKenna from the Admiralty in September 1911, partly on Haldane's prompting, Haldane initially wanted to take over there in order to complement his achievements with the Army. Throughout his ministerial career he had been not only a close colleague of Grey and Asquith, but an exceptionally intimate and personal friend of the Foreign Secretary. It would not be going too far to say that, in certain respects, he was Grey's mentor. Therefore it must have been a cause of acute distress for both Grey and Asquith, but especially for Grey, to discover that their Liberal Imperialist colleague was not

' Cam bon to Viviani, 31 July 1914, Documents Diplomatiques Français 1871-1914 (Paris, 192962) 3rd Series xi no. 445. 2 Brock op.cit. p. 140. G.P. Gooch, Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft (London, 1929) p. 83. 4 S.E. Koss, Lord Haldane, Scapegoat for Liberalism (New York, 1969) pp. 117-118.

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of one mind with them as to the right policy to pursue at the end of July 1914. It was primarily with a view to winning over this most important and valued member of the Liberal Imperialist group, and thereby avoiding a split within that group (which now included Churchill, but not Lloyd George) that Grey raised with Lichnowsky the question of French neutrality. Grey knew this was a high fence to ride at. He had been told categorically by Cambon on 29 July that France 'was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked'. 1 For Haldane's sake, however, and with a view to putting himself in a position from which he would be able to demonstrate, should it prove necessary, that he had left no stone unturned, no avenue unexplored, in searching for a peaceful outcome, he made the approach to Lichnowsky just before the Cabinet was due to meet on 1 August. Having secured Lichnowsky's assurance, for whatever that was worth, Grey did not make any use of it at the Cabinet meeting. At least half of the time of that meeting, according to Asquith, was occupied by Churchill. 2 Instead, Grey made it clear that, 'if an out-and-out and uncompromising policy of non-intervention at all costs' was adopted, he would resign. 3 The hopes of Haldane, however, were not entirely dashed. 'At 2 p.m.', he wrote, 'there was just a chance of peace - a bare chance...'. 4 The Cabinet had ended at 1.30 p.m. Grey had then lunched with Haldane, Runciman, and Burns. Haldane and Runciman left first, and Grey stayed on to speak with Burns. 5 What produced Haldane's optimism of 2 p.m. is not at all clear. It is unlikely to have been information about German intentions, as Lichnowsky's telegram no. 205 did not reach Berlin until 4.23 p.m. Whatever it was, it was this which produced the real misunderstanding of 1 August 1914. For at 2.10 p.m. Lichnowsky telegraphed to Berlin: 'In addition to tel. 205 Sir William Tyrrell has just called on me to tell me that Sir Edward Grey wanted to make proposals to me this afternoon regarding England's neutrality, even in the event that we should have war with France as well as Russia. I am to see Sir Edward Grey at 3.30 and will report at once.' 6 The contemplation of British neutrality whilst France and Russia were at war with Germany would have been a complete volte-face on the part of Grey. Not only would it have contradicted everything that Grey had said to ^Grey to Bertie, 29 July 1914, in G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London, 1926-38) xi no. 283; cited below as BD. ^Brock op.cit. p. 140. 3

ibid. Haldane to his mother, 1 August 1914,5 p.m., Haldane MSS 5992. 5 Burns Diary 1 August 1914, Burns MSS B.L. Add. MSS 46336. ^Lichnowsky to German Foreign Office, 1 August 1914, DD no. 570.

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Lichnowsky in a series of interviews beginning on 27 July 1 ; it would also have contradicted his resignation threat of the morning of 1 August, and everything that he had stood for throughout his Foreign Secretaryship. It is in the highest degree unlikely that Grey would have authorised Tyrrell to make such a statement. It is also possible that Lichnowsky, on this occasion, misunderstood whatever Tyrrell said. After finishing his conversation with Burns, Grey saw the French ambassador. The closest Grey came to trying to ascertain whether French neutrality was possible was the statement he made, according to his own record of the conversation: 'Now, the position was that Germany would agree not to attack France if France remained neutral in the event of war between Russia and Germany. If France could not take advantage of this position, it was because she was bound by an alliance to which we were not parties, and of which we did not know the terms.' 2 If Grey did say this, for it is not present in his later account of that day's transactions3, it was more a statement than a question, and Cambon took it as such and made no comment. In the interview that followed with Lichnowsky at 3.30 p.m., the German ambassador had to ask outright whether Grey was in a position to say whether France would agree not to take up arms in the event of a German-Russian war. Grey's reply, that he 'would inform himself, strongly suggests that he had not pressed Cambon on this matter, and Lichnowsky's view of the interview as a whole was that it cancelled the possibility that had been raised before 11 a.m. that day. 4 All that Grey did to 'inform himself' was to telegraph Bertie in Paris at 5.25 p.m.: German Ambassador seemed to think it not impossible, when I suggested it, that after mobilisation on western frontier French and German armies should remain, neither crossing the frontier so long as the other did not do so. I cannot say whether this would be consistent with French obligations under her alliance. If it were so consistent, I suppose French

ibid, nos 236, 258, 265, 357, 368; BD xi no. 176. See also Austro-Hungarian ambassador Mensdorff s report of an interview with Tyrrell on 29 July: '...should it affect a vital interest of France's or what is more a question of France as a Power, no English Government would be capable of preventing a participation of Great Britain on the side of France.' I. Geiss (ed.), July 1914, The Outbreak of the First World War: selected documents (New York, 1974) no. 122. 2 Grey to Bertie 1 August 1914, BD xi no. 426. 3 Grey to Bertie 1 August 1914, ibid. no. 447. ^Lichnowsky to German Foreign Office, 1 August 1914, DD nos 596, 603. As LichnoYisW-j emerged from his 3.30 p.m. interview with Grey, he encountered the editor of the Daily Express in St. James's Park, and said to him: 'I am afraid we can do no more. I have just seen Sir Edward Grey, and you are likely to take sides with the French.' R.D. Blumenfeld, R.D. B.'s Diary 1887-1914 (London, 1930) p. 248.

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Government would not object to our engaging to be neutral so long as German army remained on frontier on the defensive. *

Bertie pursued the matter even less enthusiastically than Grey had been pursuing it. He took no action at all with the French. Unable to believe what his eyes were telling him were his instructions, and seeing his sojourn in Paris as within measurable distance of abrupt termination if he implemented them, Bertie bought time with a recapitulatory reply of breathtaking impertinence: Do you desire me to state to French Government that after mobilisation of French and German troops on Franco-German frontier we propose to remain neutral so long as German troops remain on the defensive and do not cross French frontier, and French abstain from crossing German frontier? I cannot imagine that in the event of Russia being at war with Austria and being attacked by Germany it would be consistent with French obligations towards Russia for France to remain quiescent. If France undertook to remain so, the Germans would first attack Russians and, if they defeated them, they would then turn round on the French. Am I to enquire precisely what are the obligations of the French under Franco-Russian Alliance?2

Grey's 'informing himself' by telegraphing Bertie at 5.25 p.m. was really only a matter of courtesy to Lichnowsky. In this limited respect, Grey was keeping his word. There was no question, however, of a thorough-going effort on his part for Haldane's sake. Grey had had second thoughts about this, as a result of the first interview of the afternoon, the one with Cambon. At this, Grey had committed himself to raising two questions with the Cabinet at its next meeting. He had undertaken to seek authorisation to declare in the House of Commons on Monday 3 August that Britain would not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality; he had also undertaken to propose to his colleagues that Britain resist any attempt by the German fleet either to enter the Channel or, if it had already done so, to attack the coasts of France.3 These undertakings were incompatible with pressing France so to re-interpret her alliance obligations to Russia as to allow her to mobilise but to remain inactive. Grey's effort to accommodate Haldane, whose propensity to believe that 'there is hope so long as the frontiers are not crossed' 4 had rubbed off on Grey at earlier stages of the July crisis 5 , caught up with him in the night of 1 'Grey to Bertie 1 August 1914, BD xi no. 419. Bertie to Grey 2 August 1914, ibid, no.453. There is no mention of this episode in Hamilton, Bertie of Thame (London, 1990). 3 Cambon to Viviani 1 August 1914, DDF 3rd Series xi no. 532. ^Haldane to his mother 31 July 1914, Haldane MSS 5992. 5 see for example Grey to Rumbold 25 July 1914, BD xi no. 116. 2

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August, when he was summoned to Buckingham Palace to explain the telegram from Wilhelm II received there. That 'there must be some misunderstanding' was the form of words devised to get himself off the hook of friendship, respect, and loyalty. For Grey, it had been both a characteristic and an uncharacteristic episode.

10 CURZON OUTWITH INDIA: a note on the lost committee on Persia, 1915-1916

The Anglo-Russian Convention of August 1907 had divided Persia into three zones. The v-shaped Russian zone ran from Kasr-el-Sfaerin on Persia's western frontier with the Ottoman Empire south-east to Yezd and then northeast to Zulficar on the frontier with Afghanistan. The British zone covered south-eastern Persia from near Gazih on the Afghan frontier, through Birjand and Kerman to Bunder Abbas on the coast. The neutral zone occupied the area between the Russian and British zones. The operation of the Convention of August 1907 dominated Anglo-Russian relations until the entry of Turkey into the Great War in November 1914.1 In rather ill-tempered exchanges of views between the British and Russian governments in the early summer of 1914 it had emerged that Russia wished to see the abolition of the neutral zone, into which she had been making considerable incursions, which in turn had produced vehement British protests. It had also emerged that the Government of India, headed as Viceroy by Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, who as Sir Charles Hardinge had been Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office during the negotiation and conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention, objected to what Russia wanted. 2 Sir George Clerk, the Foreign Office official charged by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, with the job of attempting to resolve this problem, attempted a compromise. In a memorandum entitled 'Anglo-Russian Relations in Persia', finished two days before the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July 1914, Clerk argued for the supplementation of the 1907 Convention with a convention which would recognise the boundaries of the economic spheres of Britain and Russia respectively in Persia. He suggested that the 1907 boundary of the Russian zone as from Kasr-el-Sherin to Ispahan be retained, ^R.L. Greaves, 'Some Aspects of the Anglo-Russian Convention and its working in Persia, 1907-1914', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies xxxi (1968) 69-91, 290-308; F. Kazemdadeh, Russia and Great Britain in Persia 1864-1914 (New Haven, 1968); I.Klein, 'The Anglo-Russian Convention and the Problem of Central Asia 1907-1914' Journal of British Studies xi no.l (1971) 126-147; D. McLean, Britain and her Buffer-State: the collapse of the Persian Empire 1890-1914 (London, 1979). 2 G.P.Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War 18981914 (London, 1926-38) x(ii) pp. 774-820.

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but then that a line parallel to but south of the 1907 boundary be adopted — through Dehbid, Anar, Naiband, Kain, and thence to the Afghan frontier — increasing, as it were, the decolletage of the dress that Persia presented to cartographers. Clerk also recommended the 'definite sacrifice' of certain British interests within the neutral zone of 1907 'which we can hardly expect to claim the whole of for ourselves', in the shape of northern oil-fields and northern portions of the Kerman mining concessions. These recommendations, based on the premise that 'if we do not make relatively small sacrifices, and alter our policy, in Persia now, we shall both endanger our friendship with Russia and find in a comparatively near future that we have sacrificed our whole position in the Persian Gulf, and are faced in consequence with a situation where our very existence as an Empire will be at stake', were accepted by Clerk's immediate superiors, the Permanent Under Secretary Sir Arthur Nicolson and Assistant Under Secretary Sir Eyre Crowe.1 On both the British and the Russian sides this pre-war outlook of an imminent resumption, or escalation, of imperial rivalry over Persia was dissipated in November 1914. The prospect of Russia in possession of Constantinople made all the difference. An aide-memoire, handed over by the British Embassy in St. Petersburg to Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, on 14 November, contained the following statement: However, in so far as Russia and Great Britain ought not to limit themselves to defence, in their operations against Turkey, right up to a favourable conclusion of the struggle with Germany (on which all else depends) Sir E. Grey believes that the conduct of the Turkish government has made inevitable a solution of the Turkish question in all its aspects, including the problem of the Straits and Constantinople, in agreement with Russia. 2

Sazonov took this a stage further, as a declaration 'that in the event of Germany's defeat the fate of the Straits and Constantinople cannot be settled otherwise than in accordance with our wishes'. 3 He allowed its impact to be felt immediately in the Russian reaction to the British announcement of their intention to annex Egypt, stating that 'in view of the agreement on England's part to the settlement of the question of the Straits and Constantinople, it gives me particular pleasure to declare the agreement of the Imperial 'memo by Clerk 21 July 1914, F.0.371/2076/33484, printed in full in K.Wilson, 'The Struggle for Persia: Sir G. Clerk's memorandum of 21 July 1914 on Anglo-Russian Relations in Persia', Proceedings of 1988 Conference of British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (Oxford, 1988) pp. 290-334. E.A. Adamov (ed.), Konstantinopol i Prolivy po sekretyn dokumentam byvshevo ministerstva inostrannykh ¿«/.(Moscow, 1925-6) no. 23. •^Sazonov to Benckendorff 16 November 1914 ¿Wd.no.24; see also W.W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War (London, 1957) p. 70.

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government to the proposed annexation of Egypt by England'. 1 This was the first fruit. The second fruit was Russian agreement, in March 1915, to the British demand for a revision of the 1907 Convention on Persia which would recognise the existing neutral zone as within the British zone. As the British ambassador put it to Tsar Nicholas II, the incorporation of the neutral zone in the British one 'would mark a great step towards a final and friendly settlement of the Persian question, and I was sure that His Majesty would admit that Constantinople [described by Grey as 'the greatest prize of the whole war' 2 ] was well worth this small sacrifice on Russia's part'. 3 The Tsar enjoyed this plaisanterie; Sazonov had already, whilst agreeing to the inclusion of the neutral zone within the sphere of British influence, declared that the districts around Ispahan and Yedz should be secured by Russia, and also that part of the neutral zone which cut a wedge between the Russian and Afghan frontiers and went up to the Russian frontier at Zulficar should be included in the Russian zone.4 *

Between the end of March and the beginning of June 1915 the Secretary of State for India, Lord Crewe, sounded out the Government of India as regards an eventual partition of Persia. On 29 March, for instance, he asked for two lines to be prepared, one including Ispahan, the other excluding Ispahan. On 19 April the Government of India reluctantly complied, whilst making it clear that partition and spheres of influence were two entirely different propositions, and sincerely trusting that the former would be avoided. The exchange between the India Office and the Government of India sprang from the apprehension that, at some stage, Persia might depart from neutrality and participate in the war on the side of the Central Powers. 5 Not until 30 April did Sir E. Grey send across to the India Office the paragraphs of the Russian memoranda of March relating to desiderata in Persia; Crewe then sent them by mail to the Government of India.6 By 12 June the latter had incorporated the prospect of

^Sazonov to Benckendorff 18 November, to Buchanan 20 November 1914, Adamov nos 25, 27. Grey to Buchanan 11 March 1915, CAB37/126/3. •^Buchanan to Grey 13 March 1915, ibid./5; British aide-mémoire 12 March 1915, in F.A. Golder, Documents of Russian History 1914-1917 {London, 1927) pp.60-62; Gottlieb p. 97. ^Buchanan to Grey 4 March 1915, CAB37/125/19. 2

-'Government of India to Crewe 23 March, Crewe to Government of India 29 March, Government of India to Crewe 19 April 1915, F.O. 371/2449/83731; see also W.J. Olson, AngloIranian Relations during World War I (London, 1984). 6 Crewe to Government of India 8 May 1915, F.O. 371/2449/83731; India Office Library MSS, L/P&S/10/455/P1666.

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concessions to Russia as regards Constantinople and the Straits into its thinking, which was embodied in a long telegram from Hardinge. Hardinge took the line that the above concessions to Russia were by no means balanced by any advantages so far as India was concerned. He recommended the concession to Russia of the portion of the Zulficar salient that lay outside the province of Kain; as regards Ispahan and Yezd, he considered that both places should be included in the British sphere, and suggested balancing this claim against the concession on the Zulficar front. If it proved impossible to secure both Ispahan and Yezd, he preferred the relinquishment by Russia of Ispahan. He ended by saying: Finally, we are of opinion that the moment has come to impress upon Russian Government that a change in their attitude towards British interests in Asia is very desirable; and that while India, standing side by side with Great Britain and her Colonies is supporting the Franco-Russian Alliance in five theatres of war to the very utmost of her strength and resources, and is even assisting to obtain Russian predominance in Constantinople and the Dardanelles, she has the right to expect Indian interests in Asia to be fairly and even generously treated, and without creating needless difficulties in Afghanistan, Tibet and elsewhere. For it can only be upon a basis of equity and confidence with a due regard to neutral interests of each, that the future peace of Asia can be securely maintained and controlled by British and Russian Governments. *

On this final section of the telegram Austen Chamberlain minuted: I entirely agree and consider that this view should be impressed as strongly as possible on the F.O. We ought to get a very real and large quid pro quo in Asia for our help and assent at Constantinople, where we are reversing the secular policy of Great Britain to please Russia. F.O. always gives too much and asks too little. We want a little more of the Dutchman there! 2

Austen Chamberlain had been Secretary of State for India for less than two weeks, having replaced Lord Crewe on 27 May. Sir Thomas Holderness, the Permanent Under Secretary at the India Office, who had been a member of a committee set up on 8 April under the chairmanship of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the terms of reference of which had been to consider the nature of British desiderata in Turkey in Asia in the event of a successful conclusion of the war, now suggested that the Foreign Office 'might usefully appoint a similar Committee to examine our desiderata as

1 Viceroy to Secretary of State 12 June 1915, ibid. 12163. minute by Chamberlain (his italics), ibid.

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regards Persia and Afghanistan'. 1 Chamberlain agreed, and approached Sir E. Grey, who also agreed. It was decided, on the grounds that de Bunsen was 'too weak', to offer the chairmanship of this inter-departmental committee on Persia to Lord Curzon. On 5 August Curzon accepted, writing to Chamberlain that he and Grey 'may of course rely upon my willingness to render you any assistance in my power, either as chairman of the proposed Inter-Departmental Committee on Persia or otherwise'. Chamberlain asked Grey to take the further steps necessary to get the committee appointed by the Prime Minister; he nominated Sir Arthus Hirtzel, the head of the India O f f i c e Political Department, and Holderness, as the India Office representatives, and stressed that the terms of reference 'must be wide enough to embrace Russian-Afghan questions and Russia's pretensions in Tibet'. The Prime Minister, Asquith, suggested there be two Foreign Office representatives on the committee, and one each from the War Office, Admiralty, and Board of Trade. Lancelot Oliphant, a junior clerk who had served in Tehran f r o m March 1909 to October 1911, and Beilby Alston, a senior clerk whose expertise was entirely to do with the Far East, were nominated as the representatives of the Foreign Office. 2 *

By mid-August 1915 Hirtzel had completed a memorandum, 'Revision of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907', for presentation to Curzon's committee. Hirtzel began by debating some general considerations. It was difficult to judge how much Britain might with reason expect Russia to give in Persia and elsewhere until it was known how much Russia would want and be going to get elsewhere, in addition to Constantinople, and this would not be clear for some time. Would Russia be at her most amenable when the main issue of the European war was still uncertain and her own military and other weaknesses palpable and when large deals in the territory of third parties were under discussion, or after the war, 'when she is once more secure, when past services are forgotten, and when, if it is necessary to buy her off, we shall have to do so at our own expense, and may be hard put to it to find a quid pro quo'? Hirtzel believed that the more advantageous course would be 'to agree with our adversary while we are in the way with him, and to make a clean

^minute by Holderness 21 June 1915, ibid. The Report of the de Bunsen Committee, 30 June 1915, is at CAB42/3/12.

fy

^Curzon to Chamberlain 5 August, Drummond (Private Secretary to Grey) to Bonham-Carter (Private Secretary to Asquith) 6 August 1915; note by Asquith, undated, F.O. 371/ 2723/170303; Chamberlain to Grey 8 August, Curzon to Nicolson 18 August 1915 IOL MSS L/P&S/l0/455/2696.

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sweep of the Anglo-Russian agreement at once', but there were arguments on the other side. Much depended on the kind of Russia that emerged from the war - a Russia which acted in a new spirit, or the old familiar Russia of the tchinovnicks? Was it better for Britain to revise her agreement with 'the Russian Government as we know it', or to keep things going as they were and try to 'tide over' until a better Russian government appeared? Hirtzel was perceptive enough to acknowledge that there might be a different kind of British government after the war, as well as a 'new India', and changes in the conduct of British foreign policy 'in the direction of more effective Parliamentary control, the tendency of which may be to weaken our hands in dealing with Russia in matters...the vital importance of which is not easily recognisable'. On balance, whilst Hirtzel on this occasion was tempted to adopt a policy of putting off the evil day - a policy which, he said, was 'nearly always wrong' - he thought the Russians would object, and insist on action sooner rather than later. Turning to Persia, he recalled that his predecessor as Political Secretary during the negotiation of the 1907 Convention, Sir Richmond Ritchie, had described it as an 'abdication'. Hirtzel opposed the desire of the Government of India, as he understood it, to secure Yezd, Ispahan, and Kermanshah - 'We made a present of these to Russia in 1907; with what eyes will she regard a request for their restoration in 1915?'. He thought that whilst all three places might be asked for at the outset of a negotiation, only Yezd plus Tun and Tabas should be insisted upon. Also to be insisted upon was a definite recognition of British predominance in projected railways between Ispahan and Shiraz, Ispahan and Ahwaz, Ispahan and Khorremabad, Yezd and Shiraz, and Yezd and Kerman; and agreement to an extension to Hamadan of the projected British railway from Mohammera to Khorremabad. Hirtzel took it for granted that, when Russia was free to do as she wished in her own sphere, she would build a railway from Astrabad to Meshed, which would connect Meshed with the trans-Caspian system. To this he was reconciled, but thought it worthwhile to seek an agreement that Russia discuss with Britain beforehand 'any undertaking contemplated in her sphere within a given distance of the Afghan frontier'. In return, some joint arrangement might be made regarding any portion of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession which was within the Russian sphere. Finally, on the grounds that the Russian sphere was already, in effect, a Russian province, and that it was idle to talk of the revival of Persia, Hirtzel recommended a scheme for the joint control of the Persian administration, probably in the shape of Inspectors-General in the Russian and British spheres respectively.1 ^memorandum by Hirtzel 9 August 1915, L/P&S/18, C142.

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The Foreign Office supplemented this with a 'Memorandum respecting the Revision of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907' at the end of August 1915. This memorandum shared the outlook of Hirtzel to a considerable extent: The genesis of the present discussion does not lie in any new suggestion by Russia that the two Powers should allocate afresh the whole of Persia into two spheres, to be assigned to one or other of them. On the contrary, it is to be found in an invitation made by the Russian Government to enter into possession of practically the whole of the neutral sphere. To accept this offer and in the same breath to ask for a considerable area of the present Russian sphere can scarcely be held likely to facilitate our negotiations. It is accordingly submitted that the line of demarcation now advocated by the Government of India should be abandoned at the outset, and that, so far as the inclusion of territory in the new British sphere is concerned, our efforts should be concentrated on the towns of Ispahan and Yezd, or, in the last resort, on Yezd alone. *

An annex to this Foreign Office memorandum consisted of notes made by Charles Marling, the British Minister at Tehran, who had recently had an interview with Sazonov whilst passing through St. Petersburg. Marling had been struck by Sazonov's insistence on obtaining a modification of the present limits of the Russian zone so as to include the district of Ispahan as well as the town. Marling had also gathered, from the Russian Legation in Tehran, that Kumisheh, some forty-five miles away from Ispahan on the road to Shiraz, would be included, and this made it look 'as though a very considerable tract may be contemplated'. Marling regarded the reasons given by Sazonov - to do with the protection of Russian trade in the Russian sphere from British competition - as 'incredible'. In his view, the real reason for this Russian demand, which in his view would create an open sore in Russia's relations with Britain in this part of the world, were as follows: It is useless to blink the fact that from the abolition of the neutral zone and the recognition of the "free hand" the step to partition is short, and when partition comes about, all possibility of British competition in the Russian sphere will be set at rest by the erection of the Russian tariff wall. Thus, whatever the value of M. Sazonov's adduced reasons, they at most hold good for a limited period. The sore created by the division of the Bakhtiari tribe would however still remain ... It may, perhaps, be permitted to call attention to the fact that M. Sazonov is now ready to violate a principle which, during the Turco-Persian frontier negotiations of 1913, was to be held in special respect, viz that that frontier should not be so traced as to place one part of a tribe in Persian territory and the other part in that of Turkey. ^Foreign Office memorandum 31 August 1915, ibid. C154.

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Marling considered it vital that the whole of the Bakhtiari tribe be within the British sphere, and suggested a modification of the demarcation line at the expense of the Russian sphere designed to achieve this. He also recommended further study into 'how the possession by Russia of so large and important a centre as Ispahan must be regarded in relation to our large and ever-increasing interests in the oilfields of Bakhtiaristan and to our future position in Mesopotamia'. 1 *

George Nathaniel Curzon had first come to prominence by travelling across Persia in the 1880s and publishing his account of the journey, Persia and the Persian Question, in 1892. From 1899 to 1905 he had served as Viceroy of India. In February 1908 he had returned to public life in England with an elegant attack, in the House of Lords, upon the Anglo-Russian Conventions as concluded in 1907. He had maintained that this bargain was 'doubtful in respect of Afghanistan, bad in respect of Tibet, and worse in respect of Persia'. As regards Persia, he had maintained that the Russian sphere contained 'all that is best in Persia, all the principal centres of trade, all the main centres of trade, all the main sources of political or commercial influence, and in the whole of this sphere, so long as the Treaty continues, we are debarred from seeking to procure political or commercial concessions'. He had regretted that the Russian sphere had been brought down 'to the heart of the country'. That, he said, is where the British sphere should have begun: 'Every argument that could be used for bringing the Russian sphere down to Kasr-i-Shirin, or Ispahan, or Yezd could equally and even more strongly be adduced for bringing the British sphere up to those points.' Whatever might be the ultimate effects of an agreement with Russia, he concluded, 'we have thrown away to a large extent the efforts of our diplomacy and of our trade for more than a century; and I do not feel at all sure that this Treaty, in its Persian aspect, will conduce either to the security of India, to the independence of Persia, or to the peace of Asia' . 2 He was clearly a soulmate of Sir Richmond Ritchie. Curzon went on to contribute to several debates touching upon the affairs of Persia, and called for several others. In December 1911, for instance, he extracted from the Secretary of State for India a declaration to the effect that the Russian government had given assurances that military measures it had taken in Persian territory were of a purely provisional nature and that it had no 1 ibidAnnex. ^Hansard 4th Series, vol.183 cols 999-1024,6 February 1908.

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intention of infringing the principles of the 1907 Convention. On 15 July 1912 he warned that an announcement by the British government that it was favourable to the principle of a Trans-Persian Railway represented a large change from the position announced in Parliament in March 1911 and involved 'a more fundamental change in British policy towards India and the defence of India than any event that has taken place in the history of India since the days of Lord Clive'. He hoped that the Government would think 'not once, or twice, or twenty times, but a hundred times' before becoming a party to breaching the defences of India, which 'ought to be surrounded for the purpose of safety by a belt, be it of mountains or be it of desert, which it would be difficult to cross'. On 24 July 1912 he pointed out that the number of Russian troops in Persia had risen considerably, that anarchy prevailed throughout southern Persia, and that the independence and autonomy of Persia was being rapidly eroded. In July 1913 he returned to these charges, urged that British support be given to the authority of the Persian Government 'not merely in one portion or corner of the neutral sphere but over the whole of that sphere', and remarked that any reserve hitherto expressed by the British Government as regards the Trans-Persian Railway had now given way 'to a very active support'. 1 Curzon had returned to government as Lord Privy Seal in Asquith's coalition of May 1915. The chairmanship of the Persia committee offered him an opportunity to indulge and advance an enduring interest and a frequently proclaimed expertise. On 18 August 1915 he wrote to the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, Nicolson: 'Just at present I am sitting on two committees which meet twice daily. So that I have no time for anything else. I think therefore that Alston and Oliphant had better take their holiday now and that we should postpone the meetings of my committee for another three weeks.' 2 *

Almost a year later, on 26 July 1916, Sir Arthur Nicolson's son Harold, a junior clerk in the Foreign Office, minuted: 'This will amount to a revision of the 1907 Agreement, and I submit that this revision, which has become inevitable, should now be undertaken.' What he was referring to was 1 Hansard. 5th Series, vol.xii cols 454-471, 15 July 1912; ibid, cols 688-695, 24 July 1912; ibid. vol. xiv cols 1406-142, 28 July 1913. On the Trans-Persian Railway see D. Spring, 'The TransPersian Railway Project and Anglo-Russian relations 1909-1914', Slavonic and East European Review liv (1976) 60-82; K.Wilson, 'Imperial interests in the British decision for war, 1914: the defence of India in Central Asia' in K.Wilson, Empire and Continent: Studies in British Foreign Policy from the 1880s to the First World War (London, 1987) pp. 149-168. 2 Curzon to Nicolson 18 August 1915, L/P&S/10/455/2696.

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the advice, contained in Marling's tel. no. 474, that Britain should allow Russia a free hand in the Russian zone of Persia, and operate on the same principle herself in the rest of the country. As Marling's no. 474 made its way up the Foreign Office hierarchy it reached Sir George Clerk, who added: 'An inter-departmental conference would be useful.' Lord Hardinge, now back from India and Permanent Under Secretary once more, wanted first to obtain the views of the India Office, Board of Trade, War Office, and Admiralty, to all of which departments copies of Marling's telegram were sent. 1 On 3 August Austen Chamberlain, still Secretary of State for India, suggested to Sir E. Grey an inter-departmental committee and expressed the hope that Hardinge would preside over it. On 27 August Asquith, still Prime Minister, initialled the document containing the terms of reference and membership of this committee. The terms of reference were that it should meet to consider '(a) The question of the revision of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 (b) The question of future railway construction in Persia'. Hardinge was appointed chairman, and the membership consisted of representatives of the Foreign Office, India Office, War Office, Admiralty, Board of Trade, and Lt. Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey of the Committee of Imperial Defence. 2 At some point in September Hardinge changed his mind, and handed the question of Persia to Sir Louis Mallet, a former ambassador to Turkey, who on 8 August had been appointed chairman of a committee with a wide remit, namely to consider British policy towards German colonies and the possibility of territorial exchanges among the colonial possessions of the allies.3 In the first week of October Curzon encountered Mallet and was, as the latter wrote to Hardinge, 'open-mouthed with astonishment' when Mallet innocently informed him that he (Mallet) was chairman of the Persia committee. The unfortunate Mallet, who was immediately supplied with the letters of August 1915 which proved Curzon's case that he (Curzon) was chairman, expressed himself as perfectly happy to defer to Curzon on this: 'in the circumstances, it would seem out of the question to shunt him in my favour.' Hardinge agreed. Hardinge was however furious with the India Office, whose forgetfulness he held responsible for the muddle.4 He might with equal justification have been just as furious with Sir E. Grey and with Asquith. Asquith bore the brunt of the fury of Hankey, not only for forgetting the

^minutes by H. Nicolson, Clerk, and Hardinge on Marling to Grey 24 July 1916, F.O. 371/ 2723/145157. 2 F.O. 371/2723/170303. 3 Foreign Office to Board of Trade 8 August 1916, CAB16/36; see V. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1971) p. 39. 4 Mallet to Hardinge 13, 17 October, minute by Hardinge 16 October 1916, F.O. 371/ 2723/170303.

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existence of the original committee on Persia, but also for having concealed its existence from the Committee of Imperial Defence. Hankey wrote the Prime Minister a personal letter to this effect: 'Is it not desirable that we should be in possession of some information in regard to the constitution, functions, and scope of Lord Curzon's committee?...The question of Persia can hardly be regarded as a thing entirely apart...It is submitted that it is not sound that various sub-committees should prepare for the Government what we might call "watertight compartment reports".' 1 Hardinge himself may be excused, as he was Viceroy of India when the 1915 committee was set up, and did not return until April 1916, to find little sign of forward planning as regards war aims or peace desiderata. 2 On the other hand, he himself had overlooked a minute by Oliphant on Marling's no. 474 which referred to the setting-up, in 1915, of the committee under Curzon, and which had gone on to say, 'But eventually we did not sit, as the situation became so critical in Persia that a decision appeared premature' , 3 Some responsibility for the muddle must attach to Curzon himself. Having been awarded the chair in August 1915 he had hardly 'professed his subject', as we academics like to say, in our collegiate way. In October 1916 he claimed, to Mallet, to have been writing memoranda on various subjects connected with Persia up to and including August that year. In fact, he had produced only two, and both of these only in August 1916 - one on the TransPersian Railway, the other on the Bunder Abbas-Kerman Railway. 4 This was not very much to show for a whole year in charge, and he had so lowered the profile of his own committee that Sir Thomas Holderness, on receiving copies of these two memoranda, minuted on 12 September 1916, 'The question of railways in Persia will come before the committee which the Foreign Office propose to constitute', which suggests that even this high India Office official had forgotten the existence of Curzon's original committee, a committee which Holderness himself had been the first to suggest.5 *

In a letter to Mallet of 10 October 1916 Oliphant expanded on the minute he had attached on 26 July to Marling's no. 474. He explained the inactivity of Curzon's committee as follows:

* Hankey to Asquith 10 November 1916, CAB17/181; Rothwell p. 53. Rothwell p. 39 fn. 96. 3 minute by Oliphant 26 July 1916, F.O. 371/2723/145157. ^memoranda by Curzon, 22 and 24 August 1916, F.O. 371/2723/18115, /173526. 5 minute by Holderness 12 September 1916, L/P&S/10/417/3407. 2

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The sittings were to be held around September of that year [1915], but one day Lord Curzon remarked to me that he thought, in view of the situation in Persia, that it would be decidedly premature to discuss the matters at that moment, and would look very much like selling the bear's skin before the brute was shot. I agreed, and nobody else taking any action in the matter, the question slumbered and in a measure might be regarded as having fizzled out.1

In September 1915 the situation in Persia was, to say the least, fluid. On 2 September Marling had telegraphed from Tehran that the Chief Priest of Ispahan had declared a Holy War of defence against England and Russia with a view to the expulsion of Allied troops from Persia, and that the Germans were particularly strong in Ispahan, and very active everywhere.2 On 7 September he had telegraphed that the Germans were strengthening their position there every day. On 16 September the entire British and Russian colonies were compelled to leave Ispahan. On 30 September Marling telegraphed that Kermanshah was 'virtually in the possession of the Germans', and on 1 October that a considerable Turkish force had been brought there surreptitiously and that the German Vice Consul 'is said to have also some 1,100 tribesmen in his pay'. At the same time the British Consul and colony at Shiraz were arrested by local tribesmen at the instigation of a German agent. On 15 November a Russian force under General Baratoff managed to drive the enemy Legations out of Tehran. But on 23 November Hamadan had to be abandoned to the enemy, and on 18 December the Germans forced the withdrawal of the British Consul and colony from Kerman, which passed into German hands. So it went on, with the Russians occupying Kermanshah in February 1916, and thus cutting the Turco-German line of communication between Persia and the outside world, something which had been a major motive for the authorisation in October 1915 of the advance on Baghdad of Indian Expeditionary Force (D).3 It could certainly be argued that such fluidity was not conductive to a re-negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. It must be pointed out, however, that such fluidity had prevailed throughout 1915. Turkish forces ^Oliphant to Mallet 10 October 1916, F.O. 371/2723/170303. L/P&S/10/486/3174. ^Statement by the Political Secretary, India Office (Hirtzel) 30 August 1916, in P. Tuson (ed.), British Policy in Asia, India Office Memoranda vol.i The Middle East 1856-1947 (London, 1980, microfiche) B236. At the beginning of October 1915 Marling had described the route from Baghdad into Persia as 'the sole door of communication with the outer world, and the one by which (the Germans) introduce arms, ammunition, money etc.'. Taking this up, Hirtzel had said that 'the advantage which we should gain by cutting off this line of communication needs no demonstration, and affords a strong argument, on political grounds, in favour of an advance to Baghdad'. For Austen Chamberlain, it was all 'a question of power - the desirability of doing it, if strong enough to do it successfully, being clear'. Minutes by Hirtzel and Chamberlain on Marling's no. 373 of 1 October 1915, L/P&S/10/486/8625. 2

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had occupied Tabriz in January 1915. The British had arrested the German Consul and other Germans at Bushire in March, and intelligence intercepts had indicated a scheme of revolt being planned to involve the whole of Persia in the spring. On 15 April the British Consul at Kermanshah had had to retreat to Hamadan as Turkish forces advanced. In May Marling had telegraphed that the Germans were 'completely masters of the situation at Tehran' — a situation saved by the approach of a Russian force from the north — and then that German intrigues continued in the interior of the country. In July Marling revealed that the officers of the Swedish gendarmerie (set up in 1912), and especially the Commandant at Tehran, were exhibiting 'marked pro-German bias'. Parties of Germans were reported as arriving in Ispahan via Kermanshah, and the attitude of the Bakhtiari at Ispahan was said to be 'exceedingly dubious'. 1 None of this had prevented the setting up of the August 1915 committee. Nor did the fact that in August 1916 the Turks' forcing the Russians back from Kermanshah and putting themselves in a position to threaten Tehran, from which the British and Russian Legations were authorised to withdraw to a place of greater safety 2 , prevent the setting up of the committee of August 1916. It could also be that, in September 1915, Curzon was impressed with Hirtzel's musings about the nature of post-war Russia, post-war Britain, and post-war India; or with Marling's speculations as regards the true motives behind Sazonov's new-found determination to enlarge the Russian zone at the expense of Ispahan; or with the reservations of the Government of India and others about partition and its consequences, the defence of a hugely increased area. Though his committee never met to discuss and debate these matters, it may be that Curzon did acquaint himself with the India Office and Foreign Office memoranda, and that they strengthened his pre-war resolve to keep the Persian buffer in one piece if at all possible. It may equally well be that Curzon was simply determined to keep everyone except himself as far away as possible from a subject which he regarded as his personal property. What can be said is that, in saying that it would be 'decidedly premature...and would look very much like selling the bear's skin before the brute was shot', Curzon revealed himself as having an outlook utterly at variance with that of Hirtzel, whose position was that 'the policy of putting off the evil day is nearly always wrong' , 3

1

ibid. ibid. ^see p. 204 fn. 1. Curzon's thoroughly negative attitude to what became the Sykes-Picot Agreement respecting Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia was also based on his reluctance to be 'premature': see Curzon to Grey 3 February 1916, Grey MSS FO 800/106. For Cur/Ws, subsequent contributions see J. Fisher, Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East 191619 (London, 1999). For subsequent developments within Persia see F. Stanwood, 'Revolution and the "Old Reactionary Policy": Britain in Persia, 1917', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History vi (1978) 144-165. 2

11 GENERAL WILSON AND THE CHANNEL TUNNEL before and after the Great War

In August 1911, during the Agadir crisis, General Sir Henry Wilson, then Director of Military Operations, confided to his diary a devastating criticism of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey: Grey seemed to me to be an ignorant, vain, and weak man quite unfit to be the Foreign Minister of any country larger than Portugal. A man who knew nothing of policy and strategy going hand in hand, a man who was incapable of understanding the German and French position and their respective points of view. 1

What Wilson meant by 'policy and strategy going hand in hand' most clearly emerges from his comments upon the Channel Tunnel project. These comments were made, in the first instance, between mid-May 1913 and midJuly 1914; and, in the second instance, between March 1919 and February 1920. The consistent attitude displayed is all the more worthy of delineation as, by the time the second set of comments was made, Wilson had become Chief of the Imperial General Staff and a member of the inner circle of advisers to the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. *

Following a statement in the House of Commons by the then Prime Minister, H.H. Asquith, on 24 April 1913 to the effect that the Channel Tunnel question was being considered by the relevant departments, Sir E. Grey had asked for the views of the Admiralty and the Army Council. The line taken by Wilson, as Director of Military Operations, was that the Army could not deliver an opinion until such time as the Foreign Office informed it as to what the policy of the government was. He expatiated on this, writing: If our troops are not to be employed on the Continent of Europe then the project has a very different military aspect to what it would have if they were to be employed. Again, the value of an Entente is probably quite * Wilson Diary, 9 August 1911, Imperial War Museum.

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different to that of an Alliance. Any military opinion, on so large and complex a subject, must be based, if it is to be of any practical value, on the Policy of the country as determined by H.M.'s Government, and therefore until this Policy is defined we are not, I am afraid, in a position to help the

F.O.I

The Secretary of State for War, Colonel J.E.B. Seely, said that he agreed with Wilson's remarks. The Foreign Office said nothing. The next extant contribution made by General Wilson came at the 125th meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which had taken until 3 March 1914 to work its way round to discussing the Channel Tunnel question. According to his diary, Wilson said: 'if we are going to take part in European wars, the more tunnels we have the better, if not, then the fewer we have the better.' 2 That meeting was inconclusive. It ended with Asquith saying that he wished the War Office to produce a paper embodying its views for consideration at the next meeting. In response, Wilson produced his first long memorandum on this subject. He maintained that when the matter was last investigated by the Committee of Imperial Defence, in 1907, one of the 'new factors' that were then taken into account was the entente with France and the possibility of British military cooperation being required on the Continent. 'This', he said, 'for the first time provided a military argument in favour of the Scheme.' In 1907, he went on, it was hardly too much to say that the rapid and complete mobilisation of even four divisions of the Expeditionary Force was 'an impossibility', so that at that time the advantages afforded by a tunnel could not have been turned to account. In 1914, on the other hand, 'we are justified in saying that our troops can be mobilised sooner than the transports will be ready to receive them'. Nevertheless, he wanted it clearly understood that it was only the existence of the entente with France that justified the re-opening of the debate in 1914 - 'and then only in so far as it may be the intention of H.M. Government to employ the Expeditionary Force on the continent of Europe in support of France'. The reasons that would prompt such a decision were matters of high policy, and not for him to decide. What he could legitimately say, however, within the scope of his own enquiry, was that Under certain conditions the existence of the tunnel might so far increase the rapidity, precision and secrecy with which the Expeditionary Force could be concentrated overseas as to enhance materially the prospects of its successful employment in such a theatre. From the military point of view therefore the operation would have so much the more to recommend it.

1 minute by Wilson 15 May 1913, W032/5300. Wilson Diary, 3 March 1914.

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He reverted to this position in summarising the conclusions at which he had arrived. There was a case for enquiry 'only on the assumption that it is proposed to employ the Expeditionary Force on the Continent'. If certain precautions and safeguards were taken and made then 'from the purely military point of view the advantages offered would outweigh the risks entailed'. It was, however, 'impossible to ignore the fact that the existence of a tunnel would tend to drive us more and more into the continental orbit and force us to take sides in Continental quarrels whether we wished to or not'. This was the reason why the final decision resolved itself into one of 'National policy'. As Wilson put it: If this country is in a position and can in the future maintain a position of complete independence with regard to the various groups on the Continent and is prepared, if need be, to make head against a hostile combination of Naval Powers, then the construction of a Channel Tunnel is to be deprecated. But, should circumstances compel us to abandon such an attitude and to range ourselves definitely on the side of France then the existence of a tunnel would contribute materially to the chances of success of our arms. '

At the height of the Agadir crisis Wilson had given the following advice to Grey and to Haldane, Seely's predecessor: First that we must join the French. Second that we must mobilise the same day as the French. Third that we must send the whole six Divisions. 2

There could be no doubt as to where he stood on that occasion. Equally, there was no doubt in his mind that, although his advice had been accepted, it had been accepted 'with no great heartiness'. Throughout 1912 he had encouraged his closest contacts within the Foreign Office, Permanent Under Secretary Sir Arthur Nicolson and Assistant Under Secretary Sir E.A. Crowe, both of whom he knew to be sympathetic to his own point of view, to press for the conversion of the entente with France into an alliance, in order to put an end to what he called Grey's 'sitting on the fence'. 3 In 1914 Wilson's position had not changed. What he feared was that the lack of heartiness displayed by the politicians in 1911 still persisted. Seely, after all, had stated on 3 March, at the 125th CID, that 'only if it could be assumed that (Britain and France) were on such intimate terms that, in the event of war they could be regarded as one nation, would there be a sound reason for making the

^memorandum by Wilson, March 1914, W032/5300, Wilson's italics. Wilson Diary, 9 August 1911, Wilson's italics. 3 Wilson Diary, 4, 8, 9, 10, 17, 18 May, 19 October, 21 November 1912.

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tunnel'. 1 Wilson's fears were justified. Seely instructed him to modify his memorandum, and to play up the disadvantages of a tunnel in terms of costs and anxieties. In doing so, Wilson nevertheless could not resist the temptation to state, before concluding with Seely's remark already quoted: These disadvantages, serious as they are, may be outweighed by the fact of the increased facilities gained by the transport of our troops and stores to the Continent of Europe if HMG has such an operation in view. In short, from a purely military point of view, if our troops were to become engaged in a European war fighting alongside the French the more tunnels we possess the better, if on the other hand no such operations are in contemplation then we want no tunnels at all. 2

In writing in this way, the Director of Military Operations was attempting to use the Channel Tunnel issue as a lever in support of a continental commitment hitherto not forthcoming from either the Foreign Office or the Government. At the meetings of the CID on 14 May and 14 July 1914 Wilson said nothing, and allowed Field Marshal Sir John French, the designated commander of the Expeditionary Force 3 , to make the case for a tunnel. French was unsuccessful in this. All both he and Wilson could console themselves with was the fact that at least they had managed, during these same months, to resist attempts to reduce the Expeditionary Force in size.4 *

The Great War broke out less than three weeks after the CID's decision of 14 July against the Channel Tunnel project. At the peacemaking in 1919 Wilson, now a Field Marshal himself and Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was provided with another opportunity to connect strategy with policy. The opportunity was provided by Lloyd George at Fontainebleau, during the weekend of 22-23 March. Following a debate in which Wilson presented the French point of view, a list of objectives was made with which Wilson professed himself to be 'delighted'. Objective 12 was 'Refuse France any more than the Saar Valley but make Great Britain and America promise immediate support if Germany attempts to invade France. Build Channel Tunnel to help in this guarantee'. 5 A week later, at the Council of Four, Wilson was asked ^minutes of 125th meeting of Committee of Imperial Defence, 3 March 1914, CAB2/3. ^memorandum and minute by Wilson, 8 April 1914, W032/5300. 3 Wilson Diary, 3 April 1914. 4ibid. 20 April, 6,13 May 1914. 5ibid. 23 March 1919.

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by Lloyd George to clarify an apparent reservation on the part of Marshal Foch. Wilson stated: 'I believe that Marshal Foch sees the tunnel as an alternative to transport by sea. Obviously everything would be changed if one were added to the other.' The prospect that the speed of the transportation of any British Expeditionary Force could be doubled was being held out, as Lloyd George recognised.1 Lloyd George's enthusiasm for the Channel Tunnel lasted at least until the end of the year. In November he raised the matter in Cabinet in such a way as to mobilise the production of the views of all the departments of state. This gave Wilson another opportunity. The stance he took, in two memoranda dated 16 and 23 December 1919, should be seen against the background of three developments which had taken place since the spring. The first of these was the information Wilson had derived from General Tasker H. Bliss of the United States Army, of the opposition to and extreme unlikelihood of any American guarantee to France 2 ; the second was the realisation that there would in all probability be no departure from the voluntary principle (of recruitment) on the part of any British government; the third was the promulgation, by the War Cabinet, on 15 August, with Wilson present, of the Ten Year Rule, which stated that the War Office, Admiralty, and Air Ministry should work out their estimates on the basis of the assumption 'that the British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years, and that no Expeditionary Force is required for this purpose' , 3 Wilson's first memorandum, 'Notes on the Military Advantages and Disadvantages of the Channel Tunnel', began with two paragraphs under what was for him the all-important heading of 'Policy'. He wrote: It has been truly said that 'War is an instrument of policy', and the first essential is therefore to define the nature of our political obligations on the Continent, and to estimate the extent to which these obligations may involve us in a military sense. It is understood that our present policy binds us to defending the integrity of France and Belgium, and thus introduces an entirely new element into the military problem as it existed before the war. It is true that prior to 1914 there existed a tacit understanding that we would come to the assistance of the French Army, but our liability was limited to a force of six divisions and one cavalry division, which at that time was considered sufficient to turn the scale. In spite of the successful outcome of the war, it is clear that nothing short of our maximum effort will be sufficient in future, since, for a long time to come, the collapse of Russia will leave Germany free to concentrate her whole weight on her Western Frontier. The first and 'A.S. Link (ed.), The Papers ofWoodrow Wilson Ivi (Princeton, 1987) pp. 455-6. Wilson Diary, 31 March 1919; on Bliss, see L.E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition (Cambridge, 1987) p. 106. 3 War Cabinet 616A, 15 August 1919, CAB23/15. 2

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most important question, then, is for His Majesty's Government to decide whether they will adhere to their agreement to come to the assistance of France, even should the United States of America withdraw from the compact, and it is on this supposition that this paper is written.1

Under the heading 'Military requirements' Wilson went on to state that the value of British intervention depended on two factors, namely 'the force with which it is made, and the time required to bring our strength to bear'. It was 'of supreme importance', firstly that the British Army should be capable of mobilising on a scale and with a rapidity commensurate with that of the enemy, and secondly that means of transport should be equally good. Under the heading 'Advantages of the Channel Tunnel (a) Military', he took up the concern of Foch in March 1919 which he had tried to clarify in the Council of Four: It is calculated that by the use of a double line under the Channel 20 British divisions could be deployed behind the Meuse in from 30 to 40 days. If four lines were available this time would be reduced to from 20 to 30 days. To deploy a similar force, using sea transport across the Channel, would probably require about 80 days...Provided that the troops were available, the time gained by all-rail movement would undoubtedly have a far-reaching effect on the course of the campaign, since it would ensure a junction with the French Army in a position sufficiently far forward to cover the vital industrial areas... In 1914, delay in taking the decision to mobilise cost us considerably more than 48 hours, and similar hesitation on a future occasion would entirely nullify any advantages to be gained from a tunnel in the early stages of a campaign.2

The conclusions at which he arrived emphasised that the effort in which he was engaged was an effort to get the government to comment categorically upon his assertion that 'our present policy binds us to defending the integrity of France and Belgium'; beyond that, if the assertion was accepted, it was a matter of matching means to ends. The alternatives were starkly put. On the one hand, 'If our policy is irrevocably bound to the defence of France and Belgium (the tunnel) is essential on military grounds'; on the other hand, 'Unless we are prepared to intervene on the Continent on a continental scale the military advantages of the Tunnel do not outweigh the military disadvantages; that is to say that for an offensive war on the Continent we want the Tunnel, but for a defensive war in England we do not' . 3 Wilson's second memorandum, of 23 December 1919, was entitled 'The Probable Effect which the Channel Tunnel would have had on the recent ^memorandum by Wilson, 16 December 1919, CAB3/3. 2ibid. 3

ibid.

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war'. Taking this together with the first memorandum, the impression that Wilson was challenging the government to make a choice, to declare that choice, and then to make policy and strategy go hand in hand, is further strengthened. For even though in the memorandum of 23 December he allowed himself to employ some rather dark and pessimistic language in connection with some of the scenarios that might have occurred, he nevertheless made it clear that 'had the Channel Tunnel existed, it may be assumed that our obligation to France would have been of a more definite nature, and one which would have exerted a stabilising effect on the attitude of Belgium'. With a prescience which earlier in the year had been a feature of much of what Lloyd George and Clemenceau had said in the Council of Four, he stated that, on the assumption that Germany recovered far more quickly than Russia, 'a period will come when, free from anxiety as to her Eastern front, she will be in a position to throw her full weight against France. In such conditions, it will be necessary for England to exert her whole strength from the earliest moment'. 1 Wilson's fundamental point about policy and strategy was lost on Churchill, now Secretary of State for War, and still as much in favour of the Channel Tunnel as when First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914. Wilson attempted to spell out his message in words of one syllable, writing: I am so sorry that my conclusions are not clear and yet on reading them over they seem to me to admit of no doubts. They amount to this:If France is our friend If our policy is the defence of France and Belgium If we are prepared to engage in a Continental war on a continental scale Then with all necessary mechanical and other precautions I am wholly in favour of the Tunnel but If France is unfriendly If it is not our policy to defend France and Belgium If we are only prepared to intervene on a small scale Then I am wholly opposed to the Tunnel. 2 When Churchill protested that he could not give definite assurances on any of these points — 'The disposition of France, the policy of Britain may change as the years pass by' — Wilson made his final statement on the 1

memorandum by Wilson, 23 December 1919, CAB3/3, printed in full in K.M. Wilson, Channel Tunnel Visions 1850-1945 (London, 1994) Appendix iv. 2 minute by Wilson, 4 February 1920, W032/5302.

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Channel Tunnel question: 'Then if a consistent and well-defined foreign policy of friendship for France, of determination to defend France and Belgium from German aggression and of a plan for fighting on the Continent on a continental scale is impossible then I am opposed to the Tunnel.' 1 *

The Great War had made no difference to Henry Wilson. Before 1914, as Director of Military Operations, he had advocated alliance with France, a conscripted British Army, and improved means of communication, including a tunnel, to transfer that army to the continent and thereby to meet what he regarded as British commitments. Just as, before the war, he failed to make any headway in these regards 2 , so at the end of the war he failed to overturn the concept of the Ten Year Rule. What he wrote in December 1919 was, ironically, counter-productive: Austen Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for one, picked out the darker passages of Wilson's second memorandum, and built upon them a powerful case for opposing the Channel Tunnel. In Chamberlain's view, the requirements of Wilson, when added to other considerations, 'make the tunnel so completely master of both our military and political future that they seem...conclusive against its construction' , 3 Equally, the Great War had made no difference to British governments. Apart from the hiccup produced by Lloyd George in the spring of 1919, the position in the spring of 1920 was the same as in the springs of 1914, 1911, 1908, 1906, 1904, and 1900: whilst it was not clear what H.M. Government's policy was, what it was not was clear. In effect, policy and strategy did go hand in hand, and continued to do so, but down a road other than the one Henry Wilson wished it to travel. Instead of being committed to the grand tour of Europe, British policy and strategy rode off into an imperial sunset.

^minutes by Churchill 4 February and by Wilson 6 February 1920, ibid. There is no contradiction between this and Wilson's call on 17 March 1920 for alliance with France and Belgium. A. Sharp's 'Standard bearers in a tangle: British perceptions of France after the First World War', in D. Dutton (ed.), Statecraft and Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (Liverpool, 1995) p.65, rather takes this out of context: Wilson called for an alliance, on that occasion, only 'if we decide to remain on the Rhine'. 2 His friend Sir A. Nicolson, for instance, wrote to a fellow diplomatist on 7 April 1914: 'I am afraid that should war break out on the continent the likelihood of our despatching any expeditionary force is extremely remote...': Nicolson to Buchanan 7 April 1914, Carnock MSS F.0.800/373. ^memorandum by Chamberlain, 26 February 1920, CAB3/3.