British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy 1945–2017 9780415792103, 9781315211961

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British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy

This book provides a long-term perspective on the opinions of the B ­ ritish public on foreign and defence policy in the post-war era. Thematically wide-ranging, it looks at the broader role of foreign and defence policy in British politics and elections, public opinion towards Britain’s key international relationships and alliances (the US, NATO, the EU and the Commonwealth) and public opinion towards the projection of ‘soft power’ (overseas aid) and ‘hard power’ (defence spending, nuclear weapons and military intervention). Assessing the main areas of change and continuity in the public’s views, it also pays close attention to the dividing lines in wider society over foreign and defence policy. Analysing an extensive range of surveys and opinion polls, the book situates the analysis in the wider context of Britain’s changing foreign policy role and priorities in the post-war era, and links public opinion with the politics of British external policy – the post-war consensus on Britain’s overseas role, historical and contemporary areas of inter-party debate and enduring intra-party divides. This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of British politics, European politics, foreign policy analysis, public opinion, defence and security studies, and more broadly of comparative politics and international relations. Ben Clements is Associate Professor in the School of History, Politics and International Relations at the University of Leicester, UK.

Routledge Studies in British Politics Series editors: Patrick Diamond and Tim Bale of Queen Mary University, London, UK.

This series aims to promote research excellence in political science, political history and public-policy making, whilst addressing a wide array of political dynamics, contexts, histories and ideas. It will retain a particular focus on British government, British Politics and public policy, while locating those issues within a European and global context. The Struggle for Labour’s Soul Understanding Labour’s Political Thought Since 1945 Edited by Matt Beech, Kevin Hickson, Raymond Plant Centralisation, Devolution and the Future of Local Government in England Steve Leach, John Stewart and George Jones The Struggle for Labour’s Soul Understanding Labour’s Political Thought since 1945, second edition Edited by Matt Beech, Kevin Hickson and Raymond Plant Neoliberalisms in British Politics Christopher Byrne British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy 1945–2017 Ben Clements

British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy 1945–2017

Ben Clements

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Ben Clements The right of Ben Clements to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-415-79210-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-21196-1 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

For Kyriaki and Erini

Contents

List of figures List of tables Acknowledgements 1 Introduction Aims and scope 4 Methodological approach and source material 6 Data sources 6 Outline of chapters 8

xi xiii xvii 1

2 Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics The importance of domestic and external issues 11 Party reputations on external issues 21 The role of external issues in general election campaigns 29 External issues and voting in general elections 33 Conclusion 46

11

3 The US and NATO Britain’s ‘three circles’: Europe, the US and the Commonwealth 48 The special relationship between Britain and the US 54 The US and its international role 63 A profile of contemporary public opinion 69 NATO 74 A profile of contemporary public opinion 81 Conclusion 83

47

4 European integration Public opinion before and during membership 86 Comparing public opinion in Britain and the EU 99 ‘Deepening’ and ‘widening’ 101

85

viii Contents The party-political basis of Euroscepticism 103 The socio-demographic basis of Euroscepticism 119 Voting in the 1975 and 2016 referendums 126 The 1975 EEC referendum 128 The 2016 EU referendum 131 Conclusion 133 5 Overseas aid 135 The party-political and policy context of overseas aid 136 Public opinion on overseas aid over time 142 Demographic groups 143 Party support, ideology and newspaper readership 145 The overseas aid debate and findings from recent opinion polling 147 A profile of contemporary public opinion 157 Conclusion 159 6 Defence spending and nuclear weapons Defence spending 161 Defence spending and domestic spending 171 Party supporters 173 Demographic groups 176 A profile of contemporary public opinion 177 Nuclear weapons 179 Britain’s development and possession of nuclear weapons 180 Party supporters 184 Demographic groups 189 The renewal of Trident 190 Demographic groups 195 Party supporters 199 A profile of contemporary public opinion 199 Conclusion 201

161

7 Military intervention Britain and overseas military intervention 204 The (second) Iraq War 205 The war in Afghanistan 219 Military intervention in Libya 230 The conflict against ISIS in Iraq and Syria 236 Conclusion 247

203

Contents  ix 8 Conclusion Foreign and defence policy as an issue area 250 Britain’s international relationships and alliances 251 ‘Soft power’ projection 252 ‘Hard power’ projection 253 Limitations of the study and areas for future research 255 Appendix 1: Voting in the 1975 EEC and 2016 EU referendums Bibliography List of opinion polls cited List of survey data sets used for secondary analysis Index

249

259 265 283 291 299

List of figures

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 6.1 6.2 6.3

Most important problem facing the country, 1960–64 15 Most urgent problem facing the country: external, 1970–2000 16 Most urgent problem facing the country: economic, 1966–2000 17 Most important issue: external, 1982–2016 18 Most important issue: economic, 1982–2016 19 Best party on defence, 1983–2017 27 Best party on Europe, 1977–2015 27 Public opinion towards Britain’s most important relationship, 1969–2017 51 Public opinion towards NATO and national security, 1967–91 76 Public opinion towards joining the Common Market, 1965–73 91 Public opinion towards membership of the EU, 1972–2000 93 Public opinion towards voting in a referendum on membership of the EU, 1977–2016 94 Voting in a referendum on EU membership, 1983–2015 95 Levels of Eurosceptic and pro-EU opinion, 1993–2015 96 The policy mood on the European issue, 1961–2016 98 Opposition to European integration in the UK and EU (net UK scores), 1973–2011 100 Opposition to deepening and widening in the UK and EU (net UK scores), 1993–2016 102 Net score on European integration by political party, 1945–2015 105 Per cent supporting Common Market membership by party, 1965–73 107 Net Conservative support for European integration, 1973–2000 113 Per cent saying EU membership is a good thing by left-right ideology, 1976–2011 115 Euroscepticism by party support, 1983–2015 116 Public opinion towards defence spending, 1961–95 165 Per cent supporting more spending on defence and health and education, 1983–91 169 Priority for extra government spending (combined highest 172 and next highest), 1983–2015

xii  List of figures 7.1 Public opinion towards military action against Iraq, 2003–15 208 7.2 Public opinion towards the war in Iraq, 2004–10 212 7.3 Approval of the war in Iraq by sex, 2004–10 214 7.4 Approval of the war in Iraq by party support, 2004–10 216 7.5 Evaluations of the war in Iraq (mean scores), 2004–09 217 7.6 Public opinion towards the withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan, 2007–13 223 7.7 Per cent saying British troops should not be withdrawn from Afghanistan by sex, 2009–13 227 7.8 Per cent saying British troops should not be withdrawn from Afghanistan by party support, 2009–13 227 7.9 Public opinion towards military action in Libya 233 7.10 Public opinion towards military action in Libya by sex 234 7.11 Public opinion towards military action in Libya by party support 235 7.12 Public opinion towards the RAF taking part in air strikes against ISIS in Iraq, 2014–15 238 7.13 Public opinion towards sending ground troops to Iraq to fight ISIS, 2014–15 239 7.14 Per cent approving of the RAF taking part in air strikes against ISIS in Iraq by sex, 2014–15 241 7.15 Per cent approving of the RAF taking part in air strikes against ISIS in Iraq by party support, 2014–15 241 7.16 Per cent approving of Britain and the US sending ground troops into Iraq to fight ISIS by sex, 2014–15 242 7.17 Per cent approving of Britain and the US sending ground 242 troops into Iraq to fight ISIS by party support, 2014–15

List of tables

2.1 Most urgent problem facing the government, 1953–59 12 2.2 Party best able to handle foreign policy and the H-bomb, 1953–66 22 2.3 Evaluations of parties on defence, 1959–2000 24 2.4 Evaluations of parties on the European issue, 1966–2000 26 2.5 Most important issue at general elections, 2001–15 39 2.6 Importance of issues to voting at next general election, 1995–2007 41 2.7 Important issues for deciding which party to vote for at next general election, 2001–17 42 2.8 Average importance of external and economic issues in the 4-month period prior to each general election month, 1983–2017 44 2.9 Average importance of external and economic issues in the 4-month period prior to each general election month, 1974–97 46 3.1 Public opinion towards the economic future of Britain by demographic group, 1965–71 50 3.2 Public opinion towards Britain’s most important relationship by demographic group, 2014 and 2017 53 3.3 Public opinion towards relations between Britain and the US, 2010–15 59 3.4 Public opinion towards relations between Britain and the US by party support, 2010–15 61 3.5 Public opinion towards the US by country, 1999–2017 66 3.6 Public opinion towards the US by country, 2002–14 67 3.7 Public opinion towards the US by demographic group 70 3.8 Per cent with a negative view of the US’s world role in issue areas, 2002–06 72 3.9 Per cent with a negative view towards the US’s world role in issue areas by demographic group 73 3.10 Per cent favourable towards NATO by country, 2009–17 78 3.11 Public opinion towards NATO and the EU-US security partnership by country, 2002–14 79 3.12 Public opinion towards NATO by demographic group 82

xiv  List of tables 4.1 Public opinion towards Common Market membership, 1961–75 88 4.2 Public opinion towards closer links with the EU, 1990–2015 93 4.3 Public opinion towards Common Market membership by party support, 1971–80 109 4.4 Support for the Common Market by demographic group, 1965–73 120 4.5 Public opinion towards renegotiating EEC membership by demographic group, 1974 and 1983 122 4.6 Public opinion towards EU membership by demographic group, 1987–2015 123 4.7 Public opinion on the European issue by demographic group 124 5.1 Public opinion towards giving more aid to poorer countries in Africa and Asia, 1974–97 143 5.2 Public opinion towards giving more aid to poorer countries in Africa and Asia by sex and age group, 1974–97 143 5.3 Public opinion towards giving more aid to poorer countries in Africa and Asia by education and social class, 1974–97 144 5.4 Public opinion towards giving more aid to poor countries in Africa and Asia by party support, 1974–97 145 5.5 Public opinion towards giving more aid to poor countries in Africa and Asia by newspaper readership, 1974–97 146 5.6 Public opinion on overseas aid by sex and social class, 2010–17 148 5.7 Public opinion on overseas aid by age group, 2010–17 151 5.8 Public opinion on overseas aid by party support, 2010–17 154 5.9 Public opinion towards the government spending less on overseas aid by demographic group 158 6.1 Public opinion towards government spending on the military and defence, 1985–2006 167 6.2 Public opinion towards reducing government spending on defence, 1983–91 168 6.3 Per cent supporting more public spending in different areas, 1985–2016 168 6.4 Public opinion towards the government spending less on defence, 1983–97 170 6.5 Public opinion towards government spending on defence, 2002–13 171 6.6 Per cent supporting less government spending on the 174 military and defence by demographic group, 1985–2006 6.7 Per cent opposed to reduced government spending on defence by demographic group, 1983–91 174 6.8 Per cent saying government should not spend less on 174 defence by demographic group, 1983–97 6.9 Public opinion towards Britain reducing its defence 178 spending by demographic group

List of tables  xv 6.10 Public opinion towards Britain keeping nuclear weapons, 1964–97 182 6.11 Public opinion towards Britain getting rid of its nuclear weapons, even if other countries keep theirs, 1981–2016 182 6.12 Public opinion towards Britain’s nuclear policy, 1983–90 183 6.13 Public opinion towards British and American nuclear missiles, 1983–94 183 6.14 Public opinion towards Britain having nuclear weapons by demographic group, 1964–97 186 6.15 Public opinion towards Britain’s nuclear policy by demographic group, 1983–90 188 6.16 Per cent saying British and American nuclear missiles make Britain safer by demographic group, 1983–94 189 6.17 Public opinion towards the renewal of Trident, 2013–17 194 6.18 Public opinion towards the renewal of Trident by demographic group, 2013–17 196 6.19 Public opinion towards Britain keeping submarines with nuclear weapons by demographic group 200 7.1 Public opinion towards the Iraq War, 2003–06 210 7.2 Public opinion towards military action against Iraq by sex, 2002–05 214 7.3 Per cent saying the US and Britain were right to take military action against Iraq by demographic group, 2007–15 218 7.4 Public opinion towards bringing British troops home from Afghanistan immediately 223 7.5 Public opinion towards Britain’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan, 2009–11 224 7.6 Public opinion towards the withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan by demographic group, 2009 and 2013 228 7.7 Public opinion towards sending ground troops into Syria to fight ISIS 239 7.8 Public opinion towards the RAF taking part in air strikes against ISIS in Syria 240 7.9 Public opinion towards British involvement in military action against ISIS by sex, 2014–15 244 7.10 Public opinion towards US-led military action against ISIS by demographic group 246

Appendix 1 4.1a Voting in the 1975 EEC referendum by demographic group and newspaper 259 4.2a Voting in the 1975 EEC referendum by party identification and left-right issues 260

xvi  List of tables 4.3a Voting in the 1975 EEC referendum by social issues 260 4.4a Voting in the 2016 EU referendum by demographic group 261 4.5a Voting in the 2016 EU referendum by newspaper and party identification 262 4.6a Voting in the 2016 EU referendum by left-right issues and self-placement scale 262 4.7a Voting in the 2016 EU referendum by libertarian-authoritarian and social equality issues 263

Acknowledgements

I would particularly like to thank Clive Field for providing valuable feedback on draft versions of many of the chapters contained in this book. I would like to thank Andrew Futter, Simon Lightfoot and Richard Whitaker for reading and commenting on individual chapters. I am very grateful to ­Sharon Bolton (Data Publishing and Curation Manager, United Kingdom Data Service (UKDS) and Vlad Gabriel Voina (formerly of the UKDS) for responding so helpfully to my many queries regarding studies in the UKDS catalogue and for all of their hard work in converting some of the data sets and user documentation to modern file formats. I remain, of course, solely responsible for all of the analyses undertaken on and interpretations of the extensive array of data sets used in the book. I would like to acknowledge the University of Leicester for granting a period of study leave which enabled me to work at length on the manuscript. The School of History, Politics and International Relations, at the ­University of Leicester, was a constructive and stimulating environment in which to work and undertake the research for the book. At Routledge, I would like to thank Andrew Taylor (Publisher, British and European Politics, Comparative Politics, Political Theory and Public Policy) for his encouragement and interest in the project from the beginning and Sophie Iddamalgoda (Senior Editorial Assistant, Politics and International Relations) for her assistance. I am also grateful to the series editors, Tim Bale and Patrick Diamond, for encouraging the development and publication of this book. Most of all, I would like to thank my wife, Kyriaki, for all her support and encouragement as I worked on the book. This book is dedicated to her and to our wonderful daughter, Erini. Ben Clements, May 2018

1 Introduction

In recent years there has been an important step change in the research on contemporary public opinion and foreign policy in Britain, with many articles recently published in scholarly journals. This research has provided a rich and growing body of scholarly knowledge about the foreign policy views of the British public, including in relation to war and military intervention (Clements 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b; Gribble et al. 2015; Johns and Davies 2012, 2014, 2016, 2017; Reifler et al. 2014), attitudes towards other countries (Scotto and Reifler 2017) and the nature and structure of these foreign policy attitudes (Jenkins et al. 2004; Reifler et al. 2011; Gravelle et al. 2017). There have also been recent analyses of public opinion across countries on foreign policy, including the British public, making use of cross-country survey series established in recent years (Nacos et al. 2000; Everts and Isernia 2001, 2015). However, no scholarly work has yet provided a detailed and comprehensive analysis of public opinion on foreign and defence policy in Britain, both over time and across issues. This book aims to do just that, and, in so doing, it offers a distinctive and rigorous contribution. Distinctive in that it offers a much broader piece of work that complements – whilst extending in significant ways – recent research analysing British opinion on a specific topic or case study, particularly by providing a longer term perspective. Rigorous as it is based on in-depth analysis of a wide range of survey and polling resources pertaining to British public opinion on foreign and defence policy issues. This book fills an important niche in terms of providing a more encompassing focus – both thematically and temporally – than is possible in journal articles – and by providing a sustained analysis of citizens’ views on foreign and defence policy. The breadth and depth of research contained within this book and the findings presented across issues and over time should therefore be of interest to scholars in political science with a more contemporary focus on public opinion and foreign policy, in Britain or elsewhere. The empirical research should also be of relevance to historians of post-1945 Britain, of both domestic politics and elections, and political parties and external relations.

2 Introduction In particular, the findings in this book will be of considerable relevance to two key areas of historical scholarship. First, the scholarly debate over a post-war consensus in British politics, from the late 1940s through the 1970s (Pimlott 1989; Kavanagh and Morris 1994; Seldon 1994; Owen 1996; Dutton 1997; Fraser 2000; Kerr 2001; Hickson 2004). Proponents of such a consensus, which involved both the style of governing and the substance of the policies pursued, have argued that it encompassed both domestic and external policy (Kavanagh 1992; Kavanagh and Morris 1994; Dutton 1997; Hickson 2004), though the former has received more detailed scholarly attention than the latter (Owen 1996: 157). Moreover, it was a consensus that solidified and endured at the level of political elites – across the party leaderships when in office and amongst senior civil servants (Kavanagh and Morris 1994: 13; Seldon 1994: 508). Kavanagh and Morris argued that, in foreign and defence policy, the mainstays were Atlanticism, maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent, the process of imperial disengagement (or decolonisation) and a reluctant Europeanism (1994: 13). In the areas of external relations, Hickson notes that there was a high level of agreement on foreign policy: Britain’s ‘three spheres of interest – North America, Europe and the Commonwealth – were often conflicting areas of interest, but neither party moved decisively away from, or towards, one of them when in government’ (2004: 148). Some of the general works on post-war British foreign and defence policy also emphasised the existence of a broad consensus – or bipartisan approach – amongst the two main parties (Frankel 1973; Self 2010). In the context of these scholarly debates, this book is informed by Seldon’s observation, made over two decades ago, that ‘much more empirical research needs to be carried out before one can pronounce definitively on  the existence of  a  popular consensus throughout postwar Britain’ (1994: 505). Moreover, Owen argues that consensus is a ‘contested concept’, identifying three core meanings: ‘consensus as policy settlement, consensus as partisan convergence and consensus as popular contentment’ (emphasis in original) (1996: 158). It is this third meaning which is of broad interest to this study – defined as follows: Consensus as popular contentment involves the relative absence of divisions in the electorate and those non-party bodies which sought to influence the public (rather than the ministerial, parliamentary or official) debate, and is best indicated (if not by unanimity) by the existence of a broad-based middle ground. (Owen 1996: 159) With this definition in mind, the book undertakes detailed empirical research into the views of the general public and of specific societal groups on a range of foreign and defence policy issues, post-1945, some of which

Introduction  3 are core elements in the external or overseas dimension of the post-war consensus. Second, the analyses and findings contained in this book, in particular the focus on the views of party supporters, are instructive in light of recent scholarship on how foreign and defence policy issues have featured in and been shaped by the intellectual traditions, policy agendas and internal debates within the major political parties. In the post-war era, it has been much remarked on that political conflict over foreign and defence policy tended to be more a feature of intra-party relations than inter-party competition (Kavanagh and Morris 1994: 91). Each of the two main parties have had distinctive and politically problematic areas of internal disagreement and dissent on particular issues, which were, to varying degrees, interlinked with broader factional conflict or diverging ideological tendencies within the ‘broad churches’ that are the Labour and Conservative parties. Much scholarly research has focussed on Labour’s thinking and policies on foreign policy, and the internal debates which have played out on different issues (Little and Wickham Jones 2000; Vickers 2004, 2011; Williams 2005; Callaghan 2007; Phythian 2007; Corthorn and Shaw Davis 2008; Daddow and Gaskarth 2011). As Vickers observes, ‘foreign policy has always been an area of contention within the Labour Party, providing the arena for some of its most intense tribal warfare’ (2004: 3). On issues of military intervention and national defence, the Conservative Party has tended to be more cohesive than Labour on key issues (Keohane 2003). Studies of the Conservative Party have, however, focussed on the party’s internal debates on foreign policy issues (Onslow 1997) as one key area of division internally in the early post-war era was the process of disengagement from the Empire and decolonisation (Kavanagh and Morris 1994). There has been much consideration of the European issue and Euroscepticism, given that this debate has been so internally divisive for the ­Conservative Party and raised significant problems of party management and external image for successive leaders over recent decades (Turner 2000; Crowson 2006; Patterson 2011). Finally, recent events – both at home and abroad, which may affect the aims and conduct of Britain’s external relations – make a detailed historical review of public opinion towards long-standing features of Britain’s post-war international role both timely and instructive. The 2016 European Union (EU) referendum delivered a public rejection of Britain’s membership, and so as the country transitions towards a future outside the EU there is increasing debate – and much uncertainty, too – over its future international role and how it might re-engage with the Commonwealth and forge economic links with countries in other parts of the world. The Trump presidency in the US has shaken some of the complacency surrounding the accepted ways of doing things in UK-US relations and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) more broadly as

4 Introduction he has advanced an ‘America First’ agenda and articulated – in a more combative way – recurring concerns surrounding levels of defence spending and the extent of military burden-sharing on the part of European allies. Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership of the Labour Party heralds a more leftwards shift on issues of defence, taking a more distinctive approach than the Conservatives, which has led to the reopening of internal debates over Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons and the appropriateness of the use of force. A prolonged period of austerity politics and retrenchment in public expenditure at home, in response to the global financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent economic downturn, has shaped debates over the merits of Britain’s commitments to overseas aid spending, the contributions it makes to the EU’s budget, the capabilities of and funding provided to its armed forces and the costs of renewing its nuclear weapons system. In this context, a careful and detailed review of the views of the British public – and of demographic and party-political groups within it – on these foreign and defence policy issues, in order to provide a historical perspective and a contemporary profile, is surely worthwhile.

Aims and scope This book provides the most detailed and wide-ranging analysis of public opinion in Britain on foreign and defence policy issues, covering the period from 1945 to 2017. It is thematically wide-ranging, looking at the role of foreign policy in British politics and elections, public opinion towards Britain’s key international relationships and alliances (the US, NATO, the Commonwealth and the EU) and public opinion towards particular areas issues (relating to the projection of ‘soft power’ – overseas aid – and ‘hard power’ – defence spending and nuclear weapons). The book assesses the main areas of change and continuity in the public’s aggregate views and pays close attention to where societal groups have differed in their views on Britain’s external relations. Given the elite-level nature of the post-war consensus on foreign and defence policy mentioned already (Kavanagh and Morris 1994; Seldon 1994; Hickson 2004), the research presented here pays close attention to the views of the party supporters of British-wide parties – Labour, Conservative, Liberal (Democrats) and, more recently, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) – within the general public. The main questions this book seeks to answer are on which issues have Labour or Conservative Party supporters held distinctive or opposing views? And have any inter-party divides at the mass level shifted over time? Have there been notable demographic divisions within the British public on specific foreign and defence issues based on gender, age group and socio-economic status? The book addresses these questions and by so doing reviews the nature and extent of the key dividing lines within the British public on foreign and defence policy.

Introduction  5 In scholarly research on public opinion and foreign policy in the US, Holsti’s monograph, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (1996, 2004), is a seminal work for the scholars working on this topic. It provides a detailed and empirically rich treatment of US public opinion on post-war foreign policy, across issues and over time. Focussing on British public opinion towards foreign and defence policy in the post-war era, this book has three broad similarities with Holsti’s (1996, 2004) approach. First, to examine the content of opinions on foreign policy, it adopts a pluralist approach to source material, using a range of different sources of survey and polling data, to provide a more robust and comprehensive assessment. As Holsti observes, One of the iron laws of survey research is that responses tend to be highly sensitive to the wording of the questions; a corollary to that law is that when differently worded questions about an issue yield essentially similar responses, the results are more likely to be robust (2011: 30) This pluralist approach to data collection and analysis to some extent makes a virtue out of necessity in the British case, given that there is no long-running foreign policy survey series like that which exists in the US (ICPSR: American Public Opinion and United States Foreign Policy ­Series, n/d). Moreover, the coverage given to foreign and defence policy issues on long-running social surveys in Britain – in particular, the British Election Study (BES) and British Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys – has varied considerably over time. Second, it examines how British public opinion in aggregate terms has changed over time and across different issue areas. Third, as Holsti (1996, 2004) does for the US public on foreign policy, the book pays attention to the social and political sources of foreign policy views in wider society. That is, it looks at whether and how debates over foreign and defence policy have divided different demographic and political groups. Noting which aspects fall within the parameters of this book also entails acknowledging at the outset which key areas of scholarly research are not engaged with or given substantive consideration. These are areas of substantive scholarly concern where the book differs from the aims and content of Holsti’s seminal text (1996, 2004). Three areas of divergence are highlighted here. First, this book does not engage with debates around, or evidence bearing upon, the structure and coherence of foreign policy attitudes within the British public. Several recent studies have, however, focussed on this specific aspect of the British public and advanced theoretical debates and empirical research in this regard (Jenkins et al. 2004; Reifler et al. 2011; Gravelle et al. 2017). Second, this book does not provide any substantive focus on the analysis of the foreign policy views of political elites or decision makers,

6 Introduction on their own merits and in comparison with the general public. The lack of available survey data for Britain, over time and with equivalent content, precludes this. Compared again to the richness of such data in the US context (ICPSR: American Public Opinion and United States Foreign Policy Series, n/d), such studies in Britain have been few and far between (Sanders and Edwards 1994). Third, this book does not analyse the role and influence (or lack thereof) of public opinion and other civil society actors – such as the media or pressure groups – in the making of British foreign and defence policy, an approach which requires careful and sustained attention to particular case studies of foreign-policymaking, which may necessitate archival research and securing interviews with those involved in decision-making (Holsti 2004). The next section discusses the methodological approach used and the key sources.

Methodological approach and source material As already stated, the focus of this book is wide-ranging in both thematic and temporal scope. It assesses different areas of foreign and defence policy, and in its extensive use of available data assesses the British public’s engagement with and thinking on these issues in the post-war period. Consequently, it should be acknowledged that this book has involved an extensive exercise in secondary data analysis, based on a vast array of opinion polls and surveys. In sum, it uses a plurality of recurrent social surveys and historical polling data to establish patterns and trends more robustly, discern areas of divergence and convergence, and map change and continuity in the British public’s views on foreign policy issues. The book is deliberately data rich for three reasons. First, each chapter focusses in detail on a particular foreign or defence policy issue. Second, each chapter examines the historical evidence pertaining to public opinion in Britain in the post-war era. Third, as already indicated, to provide a more robust and comprehensive treatment, it uses multiple sources to rigorously assess patterns and trends in the attitudes of the British public. Given this reliance on retrieving, assembling and analysing data across multiple sources, the major sources are now discussed in more detail. Data sources Usually, the data presented and discussed in this book will be based on surveys and opinion polls which are nationally representative of the general adult population in Great Britain (so excluding the population of Northern Ireland). In some cases, when making cross-national comparisons based on cross-country surveys, the UK is used (including Northern Ireland). In terms of the wide range of data used in this book, there are three main sets of sources used which together provide an extensive and wide-ranging – over time and across topics – set of data on the foreign and defence policy views

Introduction  7 of the British public. First, two long-running recurrent surveys in Britain: the BES, using data from 1963 to 2017, and the BSA, using data from 1983 to 2015. Second, cross-national survey series. This consists of the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys – running since the early 1970s – and the more globally focussed Pew Global Attitudes Project (Pew GAP; running since 2001) and Transatlantic Trends (TT; running between 2002 and 2014). Generally, because of the breadth of questions asked on various topics and their longevity as survey series, the BES and BSA are used most extensively for the analyses undertaken in this book. The EB surveys provide particularly detailed coverage, across recent decades, of public opinion on European integration, while the Pew GAP and TT series cover some other foreign policy issues, such as the international role of the US and its leadership, NATO, defence spending and military intervention. Much of the analysis involving these sources has been undertaken by the author, carrying out extensive secondary analysis of existing survey data sets (many of which have been obtained from the UK Data Service or survey-specific websites). Where applicable, the survey data sets have been appropriately weighted before the author’s analyses were undertaken. Of course, the analyses and interpretations of the data contained in this book are solely those of the author. A full bibliographic list of the survey data sets used for secondary analysis is provided after the main bibliography. Third, commercial opinion polling undertaken in Britain in the post-war decades is used extensively. For long-run historical data, this principally uses data from polls conducted by Gallup and National Opinion Polls (NOP) (Gallup 1976a, 1976b; King and Wybrow 2001). For compiling opinion data on more recent foreign policy and defence issues, YouGov, Ipsos MORI, ICM Research, ComRes and Populus polling have been particularly useful. Generally, data have been sourced from these companies’ websites. Where relevant data are available, opinion polls from other organisations are also discussed. Where such data have been taken from existing published sources or from polling websites and are not presented in tabular or figure format, in-text citations are provided, whereby specific sources can be followed up on in the main bibliography. In order to provide consistency of focus across the different issues looked at – within and across chapters – each chapter examines, over time, both the overall state of public opinion and across a core set of societal groups (usually sex, age group, socio-economic status – operationalised as level of educational attainment or social class – and party support). The measures of party support used in the chapters come in two varieties – a measure of party identification (generally used for the analyses of BSA and BES surveys) and a measure of vote intention (normally used in the analyses of EB, Pew GAP and TT surveys, and in the data taken from commercial opinion polls). As far as possible, similar classifications are used for socio-demographic groups analysed across the chapters (sex, age group and socio-economic status). Also, in each chapter and for each issue, there is a more detailed

8 Introduction assessment of the profile of contemporary British public opinion, looking at the patterning of opinion across a wider range of socio-demographic and political groups. These are usually based upon the author’s analyses of recent BES and Pew GAP surveys. Finally, for the reasons outlined earlier, extensive use is made of tables and figures in Chapters 2–7 to ensure that the presentation and analyses of evidence are as clear and accessible as possible, something that is obviously crucial when presenting and discussing time-series data often covering several decades. Figures have generally been used for the longer sets of time-­ series data, often based on a large number of datapoints across decades. Tables are generally used for time series with fewer datapoints covering a shorter period of time and always to present data pertaining to demographic and political groups within the wider British public. In all tables, values in the cells have been rounded to the nearest per cent. All tables and graphs have been produced by the author.

Outline of chapters Chapter 2 looks at foreign and defence policy as a broad issue area within post-war British party politics and elections. It first examines the relative salience of foreign and core domestic issues, such as economic management, for the British public over time. It then assesses public perceptions of the main parties’ relative ability to handle foreign policy and defence issues. Finally, it assesses the variable role that foreign and defence policy issues have played in the campaigns and parties’ agendas of post-war general elections and the extent of their influence on individual voters. Chapter 3 focusses on public opinion towards Britain’s role in the postwar transatlantic security system. It first looks at the public’s views towards Britain’s most important international relationship – the Commonwealth, the US or Europe. It then assesses public opinion towards the ‘transatlantic relationship’ over time before examining more general perceptions of the US and its president, including the basis of ‘anti-American’ sentiment – in terms of what America does and what America is (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007; Holsti 2008). This involves comparisons of public opinion in Britain and other Western European countries. Finally, it assesses over time the British public’s views towards their country’s membership of and the security role of NATO. It examines how views towards the US and NATO have varied across groups in British society. Chapter 4 looks in detail at public opinion towards the European integration process. It looks at public support for British membership prior to and after accession in 1973. It then focusses on British public opinion towards the ‘widening’ (enlargement) and ‘deepening’ (key political and economic initiatives) of the integration process. It provides an in-depth comparison of public opinion in Britain and across member states as a whole on issues

Introduction  9 including further enlargement, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a common foreign policy and a common security and defence policy. It also focusses on continuity and change in the social and political basis of Euroscepticism within British society and appraises patterns of voting – for and against membership – at the 1975 European Economic Community and 2016 EU referendums. Chapter 5 assesses public opinion towards Britain’s long-term role as a provider of overseas aid, an area where it projects ‘soft power’ as an international actor. This is an aspect of Britain’s overseas role that has become more politically salient in recent years, with considerable criticism of the country’s prioritisation of and increased spending on overseas aid. It assesses the bases of public support for more or less spending on overseas aid and in the context of public preferences for spending on domestic issues. It examines which demographic and political groups have, historically and more recently, tended to be more or less favourable to Britain’s role as a provider of overseas aid to developing countries. Chapters 6 and 7 separately assess Britain’s post-war projection of ‘hard power’. Chapter 6 is split into two sections, looking respectively at Britain’s conventional and unconventional forces. It first assesses public opinion in post-war Britain towards defence expenditure, including in the context of preferences concerning spending on domestic issue areas. Second, it examines public opinion towards Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons and towards approaches to disarmament – unilateral or multilateral – in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. It also profiles the British public’s views on the current issue of Trident renewal and the competing proposals advanced in current debates on the merits of a like-for-like replacement, a scaled-down (and less costly) version of the current system or a move towards complete abolition. Chapter 7 focusses in depth on public opinion towards Britain’s role in overseas military interventions undertaken in the post-9/11 era. The cases examined are Afghanistan (2001 onwards), Iraq (2003–09), Libya (2011) and  – most recently – action taken against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria since 2014 and 2015, respectively. These cases have differed in important respects: the rationale for intervention, the duration of the intervention, the scope of military action and Britain’s commitment to operations, and the degree of domestic political consensus at the elite and mass levels. It examines how public opinion in the aggregate changed over the course of each military intervention – as events ‘on the ground’ unfolded – and assesses the views of party supporters and men and women, the latter in order to investigate the nature and extent of a ‘gender gap’ in British public opinion on military force. Chapter 8 reviews the main findings which have emerged from the detailed analyses undertaken in Chapters 2–7, in terms of both areas of continuity and change in overall public opinion as well as the patterning of

10 Introduction group-related attitudes on specific issues. It situates the evidence from the British context within the major scholarly debates on public opinion and foreign policy, and shows how the analyses and findings presented in this book are of relevance for political scientists and historians of modern ­British politics. The chapter also acknowledges the limitations of the analyses undertaken and identifies areas for future research.

2 Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics

This chapter examines, in historical perspective, foreign policy as an issue area in British politics. The focus is broad to reflect the thematic approach taken in Chapters 3–7, which each examine a different aspect of Britain’s international role. Therefore, the scope of this chapter includes foreign policy and defence in general, as well as – more specifically – Europe and nuclear weapons. It does this by focussing on several core aspects of how foreign policy can play a role within and impact on domestic politics. First, it examines how salient foreign policy issues have been for the British public over successive decades and relative to ‘bread-and-butter’ domestic concerns. Second, it examines public perceptions of the parties’ handling of foreign and defence policy, establishing which parties have had more (or less) of a reputational advantage in this area and whose approach has been more closely aligned with public preferences. Third, it examines the role of foreign policy issues at general election campaigns – in terms of whether they have been seen by voters as relevant issues at the ballot box and their relative importance for the national situation. Fourth, it assesses whether and how foreign and defence issues have been consequential for voting behaviour at general elections.

The importance of domestic and external issues There is a considerable amount of polling and survey data bearing upon the British public’s perceptions of the most important issues facing their country. Table 2.1 reports the public’s perceptions of the most urgent problem facing the government, encompassing both foreign and domestic issues, compiled from Gallup polling covering 1953–59. The polls tend to show that both foreign affairs – either in general or specific situations or crises – and economic concerns were relatively prominent concerns in the public’s mind during the 1950s. At times, foreign policy issues were most salient as the area of perceived greatest concern for the government, while, on other occasions, the general economic situation, or more specific concerns, such as unemployment or prices, was uppermost in the public’s ranking of issues for the government to deal with. Other domestic issues, such as housing or rents,

Table 2.1  M  ost urgent problem facing the government, 1953–59 Issue

May 1953

Issue 

%

September Issue 1954

January 1955

%

%

Foreign policy/ affairs

36

Foreign policy

35

Cost of living

17

20

Housing

 9

Education

 4

Other replies Don’t know

19 15

Cost of living, high prices Old age pensions, social services Financial situation, export trade Other, no reply

Issue

November 1956

Issue

% Foreign policy, Suez, Hungary, Russia

71

Oil, fuel, petrol

 7

January 1956 %

 2

Foreign policy, international situation, avoiding war, keeping world peace, keeping friends with Russia/America Cost of living, high prices, making ends meet Old age pensions, Social Security Housing situation / policy

25

Other, other no reply

42

Social Services Others Don’t know

 3 11 15

October 1957

Issue

May 1958

Issue

October 1958

18

% Economic situation – bank rate, cost of living, inflation, prices, etc. Foreign affairs, preventing wars

Issue

25

Foreign policy/ Cyprus/ Middle East

32

18

Cost of living

26

 9

Balance of payment Housing

 8

 6

%

 5

%

50

Economic situation, prices, etc.

20

Cyprus

23

13

H-bomb, disarmament

19

Foreign affairs, war

23

Cost of living

 3

10

Strikes

14

 3

H-bomb, disarmament Housing, rents

Housing

 9

Foreign affairs, war

14

Balance of payments Others Don’t know

 1

Strikes

 8

Unemployment

 8  7

Unemployment Other Don’t know

 2  2  6

Issue

December 1958

Issue

January 1959

%

17

14

H-bomb, disarmament Economic situation, prices, etc. Unemployment

Housing, rents Other Don’t know

10  1  8

Housing, rents Strikes Other

 6  3  2

Issue

February 1959

Issue

March 1959

%

%

Cyprus

21

Unemployment

25

Unemployment

26

Unemployment

17

15

Foreign affairs, war

22

Foreign affairs, war

15

16

Economic situation, prices

13

Economic situation, prices, etc. H-bomb, disarmament Housing, rents Strikes

14

Foreign affairs, war Economic situation, prices H-bomb, disarmament

14

H-bomb, disarmament

12

10

Cyprus

13

Housing, rents

 8

 9  3

Housing, rents Strikes

 6  1

Cyprus Strikes, labour relations

 5  2

Other Don’t know

 4  7

Other Don’t know

 4  6

Other Don’t know

 4  8

12 10

% Foreign affairs, war Unemployment

28

Economic situation, prices, etc. H-bomb, disarmament

12

Nyasaland, Cyprus Housing, rents Strikes, labour relations Other Don’t know

 8

26

10

 6  2  2  6 (Continued)

Issue

Foreign affairs, war Unemployment

April 1959 Issue

May 1959

%

%

26 24

Economic 15 situation, prices, etc. H-bomb, 11 disarmament  6 Housing, rents Nyasaland, Cyprus   2 Strikes, labour relations Other Don’t know

 1  5 10

Issue

June 1959 %

Foreign affairs, war H-bomb, disarmament Unemployment

22

Foreign affairs, war

27

19

H-bomb, disarmament

19

18

Unemployment

13

Economic situation, prices, etc. Housing, rents Strikes, labour relations Nyasaland/ Cyprus Other Don’t know

15

Economic situation, prices

11

 7  4

Strikes Housing, rents

 6  5

 2

Nyasaland/Cyprus

 2 11

Other Don’t know

Source: Compiled from Gallup (1976a, 1976b).

Issue

August 1959 %

H-bomb, disarmament Foreign affairs, war Unemployment

21

12

 1

Economic situation, prices, etc. Strikes Nyasaland/ Cyprus Housing rents

 4 14

Other Don’t know

18 14

11  7  6  4  7

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  15 strikes or welfare provision, were generally less prominent in this period. The external issues featuring in this period included foreign affairs or war in general, as well as the H-bomb and disarmament – from 1957 onwards – and, to some extent, the situations in Cyprus and Nyasaland. Figure 2.1 shows the public’s perceptions of the most important national problem between 1960 and 1964, based on monthly polling data, for economic affairs, international affairs and defence. The data are based on the following question: ‘Which of these is the most important problem facing the country today?’ In this short period, there is no consistent trend for economic affairs to rank higher than external issues or vice versa. In 1960–61 it was often the case that international affairs and defence outranked the importance assigned by the public to economic affairs. However, economic affairs tended to increase in importance over time, particularly during 1962, and tended to outrank both foreign affairs and defence thereafter. International affairs and defence declined in importance to some extent. This is shown by averaging the monthly data per year for each issue. On this summary basis, the proportions citing economic affairs as the most urgent problem for the country were 13% for 1960, 21% in 1961, increasing markedly to 31% in 1962 and then 36% in 1963, before falling back to 19% in 1964. In some contrast, the yearly averages for international affairs and defence were 20% apiece in 1960; 19% and 14%, respectively, in 1961; 14% and 17%, respectively, in 1962; and declining to 7% and 9% in 1963. In 1964, international affairs increased to 13%, while defence fell further to 7%. During this period (not shown in Figure 2.1), the public ranked colonial affairs well

60 50 40 % 30 20 10 0 Sep-59 Mar-60 Oct-60 Apr-61 Nov-61 Jun-62 Dec-62 Jul-63 Economic affairs

International affairs

Jan-64 Aug-64 Feb-65

Defence

Figure 2.1  Most important problem facing the country, 1960–64. Source: Compiled from King and Wybrow (2001: 262–63).

16  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics below international affairs or defence. Averaged on a yearly basis, it registered 6% in 1960, 9% in 1961, falling to 3% in 1962 and 2% in 1963 and then rising to 3% in 1964. For selected external and economic issues, respectively, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 chart the Gallup data on the most urgent problem from 1970 through 2000, based on the following question: ‘What would you say is the most urgent problem facing the country at the present time?’ Figure 2.2 charts the proportions saying that defence, international affairs or the Common Market was the most urgent national problem. The data presented are based on the annual figure for each issue, averaged across all monthly polls per year. Figure 2.2 shows that, over several decades, the relative salience of external issues has clearly fluctuated on an annual basis, with sharp increases for international affairs and Europe. Overall, though, the salience of these issues has been at a relatively low level within public opinion, with the proportions nearly always under 10% and often well below that. Of course, it should be acknowledged that respondents could only choose one issue in response to this question. The Common Market issue was evidently relatively more of an urgent problem in the early-to-mid 1970s, at the beginning of the 1990s and then later on in the decade. The salience of international affairs has clearly peaked in response to British involvement in overseas military conflict – the Falklands War in 1982 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Defence as a consideration was more salient in the public’s mind during the 1980s. Figure 2.3 charts the proportions saying that either of two key economic issues – the cost of living and unemployment – was the most urgent problem facing the country. Again, the data are presented based on monthly figures

12 10 8 % 6 4 2 0 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Defence

International affairs

Common Market

Figure 2.2  Most urgent problem facing the country: external, 1970–2000. Source: Compiled from King and Wybrow (2001: 263–73).

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  17 90 80 70 60 %

50 40 30 20 10 0 1966 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Economic affairs / cost of living

Unemployment

Figure 2.3  Most urgent problem facing the country: economic, 1966–2000. Source: Compiled from King and Wybrow (2001: 263–73).

which have been averaged across each year. Again, there is considerable fluctuation over time in the relevant salience of core economic concerns, which presumably are partly responsive to shifting circumstances as the economy experiences the ‘good times’ and the ‘bad times’. Compared to the external issues presented in Figure 2.2, both the cost of living and unemployment have been much more prominent concerns in the public’s mind, registering much larger proportions – highest for unemployment in the 1980s. Concerns over the cost of living as national issues were much more prevalent in the 1970s, then settled down into a period of much lower salience. Indeed, when the cost of living has risen in salience, unemployment has tended to decline somewhat in relative importance and vice versa. When forced to select the most important national problem, the British public have been much more likely to choose the state of the domestic economy over foreign affairs, broadly put. This can be further demonstrated by examining the averages across each decade for these external and domestic issues. The decade averages are much higher for the economic issues: the proportions citing unemployment as the most urgent problem were 16% in the 1970s, 60% in the 1980s and 32% in the 1990s. For the cost of living, the equivalent proportions were 41%, 8% and 8%. For international affairs, the proportions citing it as the most urgent issues across the decades amounted to just 1% in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. For the Common Market, it was 3% in the 1970s, almost insignificant in the 1980s, increasing to 4% in the 1990s. The proportions citing defence as the most urgent problem in the 1980s averaged out at 2% but were insignificant in the preceding and subsequent decades.

18  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics Ipsos MORI data on the most important issue also allow for a longitudinal assessment of the relative importance of different concerns for the British public, based on combining responses to the following two questions: What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today? What do you see as other important issues facing Britain today? For the period 1982–2016, Figure 2.4 presents the time-series data for three external issues – defence and foreign affairs, Europe and nuclear weapons – while Figure 2.5 does the same for economic concerns, namely, the economy or economic situation, inflation or prices and unemployment and industry. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 therefore show, for each issue, the combined proportion saying that it was the most important issue or was an important issue facing Britain. Again, the data are based on the monthly polls being averaged per year. Figure 2.4 shows that, as was evident in the Gallup data on the most urgent problem, the salience of external issues has varied over time. The nuclear weapons issue was a relatively more salient concern for the British public in the 1980s, albeit it declined during that decade and from the 1990s onwards assumed a position of very low salience, consistently outranked by the importance of defence and foreign affairs and by Europe. In the 1980s, the average importance of nuclear weapons and disarmament was 20%, falling to just 1% in the 1990s and 2% in the 2000s, and averaging just

45 40 35 30 %

25 20 15 10 5 0

Defence / Foreign Affairs / International Terrorism Common Market / EU / Europe / Single European Currency Nuclear weapons / Nuclear War / Disarmament

Figure 2.4  Most important issue: external, 1982–2016. Source: Compiled from the Ipsos MORI website: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/ important-issues-facing-britain.

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  19 100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0

Economy / economic situation Inflation / prices Unemployment / factor closures / lack of industry

Figure 2.5  M  ost important issue: economic, 1982–2016. Source: Compiled from the Ipsos MORI website: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/ important-issues-facing-britain.

1% between 2010 and 2016. There have been clear peaks – based on sharp annual increases – in the perceived importance of both defence and foreign affairs and Britain’s relations with Europe. In terms of defence and foreign affairs, public salience clearly rose in response to Britain’s role in overseas conflict, including the 1990–91 Gulf War, the Kosovo intervention in 1999 and, most evidently, in response to the 9/11 attacks and the international war against terrorism prosecuted through wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Looking at recent decades, the average importance of defence and foreign affairs was higher in the 2000s (24%) and between 2010 and 2016 (12%) than in the 1980s (9%) and 1990s (7%). The perceived importance of Europe as an issue also shows sharp increases over time. The proportion saying Europe was the most or an important problem clearly increased during the 1990s, declined thereafter and then rose gradually in the years preceding the 2016 Brexit referendum, with a sharp spike in that year. Averaged across the decades, the proportions citing Europe were 4% in the 1980s, rising to 17% in the 1990s, declining to 9% in the 2000s and averaging 10% between 2010 and 2016. The annual figures for the most recent years show that the proportion citing Europe rose from 3% in 2010 to 4% in 2011, increasing further to 6% in 2012 and 7% in 2013 and rising to 9% in 2014 and 2015. In 2016 there was a dramatic rise to 30%; moreover, the average level from January to ­September 2017 was even higher, at 45%.

20  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics Issue importance data from recent YouGov polling also shows the rising salience of Europe amongst the British public (YouGov n/d-a). Public evaluations of the most important issues were elicited from responses to the following question: ‘Which of the following do you think are the most important issues facing the country at this time? Please tick up to three’. As before, the monthly polls were averaged for each year (based on the author’s own calculations). This shows that the average proportion citing Europe in 2010 was just 6%, which more than doubled to 14% in 2011 and increased further to 20% in 2012. In 2013, the year in which David Cameron pledged to hold a membership referendum, the average proportion was 16%, rising slightly to 17% in 2014 and then 18% in 2015. In this period, concerns about Europe generally ranked far behind the salience of the economy and health and, to a lesser extent, education. After the referendum held in June 2016, the issue of Britain leaving the European Union (EU) has been the public’s foremost concern, averaging 60% between July 2016 and December 2016 and 63% in 2017. In this short period of time, it has clearly outranked the salience of the economy, the National Health Service (NHS) and education, core ‘bread-and-butter’ issues of domestic political debate. Figure 2.5 shows that, as seen with the Gallup data over time for economic concerns, the salience of unemployment, inflation and the broader economic situation (available from 1987) for the British public has varied markedly since the early 1980s. Concerns over unemployment (and the state of industry more generally) were of very high salience during the 1980s, albeit declining significantly, before increasing to a high level again in the 1990s, then falling away again during the prolonged economic ‘good times’ in the 2000s before increasing to some extent during the most recent recession. Concern about prices – as the most important issue, or an important issue – has been a less salient economic issue for the British public over time, generally ranking well below unemployment; albeit its salience did increase during the economic ‘bad times’. Public salience regarding the economic ­situation has been responsive to wider economic conditions, with heightened salience during the early 1990s and then during the most recent recession, with concern being notably much higher than that seen for inflation and unemployment. Averaging across the decades, the proportions citing unemployment fell markedly from 69% in the 1980s to 45% in the 1990s, decreasing to just 11% in the 2000s, before rising to 26% between 2010 and 2016. The equivalent proportions for concern over prices and inflation were 16% in the 1980s, halving to 8% during the 1990s and declining further to 5% in the 2000s, with an increase to 6% between 2010 and 2016. For the wider economy, the average was 13% (between 1987 and 1989), increasing to 23% in the 1990s, falling to 18% in the 2000s and then more than doubling to 43% between 2010 and 2016. Compared to the public salience of external issues shown in Figure 2.4, economic concerns – both the general situation and specific aspects thereof – have tended to be accorded higher salience over time, as

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  21 the most important, or as an important, issue facing the country. However, based on these summary scores, during the 1980s the salience accorded to nuclear war was higher than that given to inflation and the wider economic situation but well below that given to unemployment. In the 2000s, moreover, post-9/11, the area of foreign affairs and defence was also accorded higher salience than these economic concerns, during a time of economic growth for the British economy.

Party reputations on external issues This section looks at the British public’s perceptions, in historical perspective, of the parties’ ability to handle foreign policy and defence issues. That is, the parties’ reputation for competence or otherwise in this issue area. Data from Gallup polling conducted in the 1950s–60s shed some light on the public’s evaluations of which of the two main parties was adjudged best able to handle foreign policy and the H-bomb. Table 2.2 shows that, for a period when the Conservatives were mostly in office (between 1951 and 1964, with Labour in power from 1964 onwards), they were consistently perceived as better able to manage these two issue areas, with the margin of difference generally higher for foreign policy. In each poll conducted between 1953 and 1966, the Conservatives had a clear lead over Labour in terms of their reputations on handling foreign policy. The gap had narrowed somewhat in 1966, when Labour had been in office for a couple of years. Most polls conducted between 1956 and 1966 also conveyed a reputational advantage for the Tories over Labour in handling Britain’s H-bomb. This is perhaps not unexpected given the visible internal fractures which opened up within the parliamentary Labour Party and the wider Labour Movement in the 1950s over the issue of nuclear weapons and disarmament (Vickers 2011). Indeed, Vickers observes that, in terms of the public’s less favourable assessment of Labour’s reputation on this issue, ‘It was the fighting within the party rather than the actual details of the defence policy that were [sic] causing the problem’ (2011: 48). The only exception to this pattern was in October 1959 and March 1966, when Labour and Conservatives were about equally ranked in terms of their ability to handle the H-bomb issue. The Liberal Party was selected by very small proportions, always less than 10%. Throughout this period, though, around a fifth to a quarter of the public – and usually higher for the H-bomb – did not know in relation to foreign affairs, and when the choice was offered to them, a small proportion said that there was nothing to choose between the parties. Other questions that Gallup asked in the 1950 and 1960s to gauge perceptions of the parties’ reputations on external affairs also tended to show the Conservatives’ relative advantage in this area. In September 1959, a majority thought that the Conservatives were best able to represent Britain at international summits (Gallup 1976a: 530); in September to October 1964, a plurality chose the Conservatives as the party best able to handle Britain’s reputation overseas

Table 2.2  P  arty best able to handle foreign policy and the H-bomb, 1953–66 September 1953

September 1954

September 1956

October 1957

September 1959

March September March 1964 to October 1966 1964

%

%

%

%

Party best able to handle foreign policy/foreign affairs

%

%

Con Lab Lib Other

47 26  4  1

Con Lab Lib Other

45 27  4  3

Don’t know

22

Don’t 21 know

Con Lab Lib Other

45 27  6  2

Con Lab Lib Other

39 26  8  2

Don’t 20 know

Don’t 25 know

Con Lab Lib Other

Con Lab Lib Other

Con Lab Lib Nothing to choose Don’t know

43 21  3 14 19

%

%

40 23  4 12

33 26  2 14

21

25

34 26  4  1

37 21  3 12

22 22  3 21

35

27

32

Con Lab Lib Nothing to choose Don’t know

Party best able to handle the H-bomb

 

 

 

 

Source: Compiled from Gallup (1976a, 1976b). Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib, Liberal.

35 24  4  2

Don’t 35 know

27 27  8  2

Don’t 36 know

Con Lab Lib Nothing to choose Don’t know

32 25  3 20 20

Con Lab Lib Nothing to choose Don’t know

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  23 (Gallup 1976a: 770). In May to June 1962, a plurality adjudged the Conservatives the party best able to maintain the country’s position in the world (Gallup 1976a: 636). In terms of keeping the peace or keeping the country out of a world war, though, polls undertaken in May to June 1962 and April 1965 showed that public opinion was more balanced in its party-political assessments (Gallup 1976a: 636; Gallup 1976b: 805). Longer-run Gallup data pertaining to the public’s evaluations of the parties’ handling of defence and Europe are shown, respectively, in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The responses compiled in Table 2.3 for defence are best on the following questions (asked across different periods of time): 1959–66: Which party do you think can best handle the problem, or isn’t there much to choose between them, on the issue of armaments and national defence? 1970–75: Which party do you think can best handle the problem of defence. 1989–90: I am going to read out a list of problems facing the country. Could you tell me for each of them which political party you personally think would handle the problem best? Defence. 1991–2000: I am going to read out a list of problems facing the country. Could you tell me for each of them which political party you personally think would handle the problem best? Britain’s defence. 1983–89: Which party do you think has the best policies to deal with Britain’s defence? In general, the British public has tended to rate the Conservatives as being best able to deal with Britain’s defence, with the party usually having a clear – and sometimes a slight – lead over Labour, although they were ranked more closely together in the mid-to-late 1990s. Across the decades, the Liberal Party (and then the Liberal Democrats) has elicited very small proportions rating them most favourably. In this period, therefore, the Conservatives tended to have a net lead over Labour but not always; the net lead ranged from lows of −3 and −4 in 1994 and 1998, respectively, to highs of +34 and +35 in 1991 and 1992, presumably partly reflecting the allied forces’ success in expelling Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait in the first Gulf War. Indeed, in polls conducted in autumn 1990, the Conservatives had a clear lead over Labour as the party rated best able to handle the unfolding crisis in the Arabian Gulf (King and Wybrow 2001: 109). Also, significant portions of the British public – sometimes amounting to a plurality share – have been unsure of the parties’ relative capabilities on this issue. The public’s evaluations in the 1980s clearly show that, in office under Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Party clearly out-performed Labour and the Liberals in its reputation on Britain’s defence. In each poll a plurality or majority of the public adjudged the Tories to have the best policies for Britain’s defence, compared to around a quarter or a fifth thinking this was

24  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics Table 2.3  E  valuations of parties on defence, 1959–2000 Con (%)

Lab (%)

Lib (Dem) (%)

Other response (%)

 2  4  2  1  2  2  9  5  3  6  6  7  7  7 11  8  8  7  4  4

42 33 45 32 34 39 36 36 34 16 18 18 19 21 26 28 25 21 19 17

Which party is best able to handle the issue 1959 1964 1966 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000

35 37 27 41 35 33 29 34 37 50 46 55 55 37 31 35 38 43 38 43

21 26 26 27 28 26 26 26 25 27 28 21 20 32 34 29 30 30 42 35

Which party has best policies to deal with the issue 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989

50 51 46 44 48 51

23 22 22 25 21 22

 9 10 13 13 14  7

21 17 19 20 16 20

Source: Gallup data taken from King and Wybrow (2001: 103–07). Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib, Liberal/Liberal Democrat.

the  case  for  Labour. From 1983 to 1989, the Conservative Party’s net lead over Labour ranged from +19 to +29. Much smaller proportions evaluated the Liberal Party as best on defence, and up to a fifth in each poll were unsure. Gallup polls from 1983 and 1987 reaffirmed the Conservative Party’s reputation on defence, with around three-fifths of the public on each occasion saying that it would best ensure Britain’s safe defence, compared to around a fifth or lower saying this for Labour (and around one in ten for the Liberals) ­ ybrow 2001: 105). Moreover, a question asked between 1987 and (King and W 1989 about which party would most likely provide an effective defence showed that a clear majority of the public backed the Conservatives, with less than a fifth supporting Labour (King and Wybrow 2001: 108). A plurality of public opinion also consistently perceived the Conservative Party as most able to

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  25 contribute to world peace, when asked in 1987–88. In 1992, 52% of the public said the Conservatives would be better able to handle foreign affairs, with just 12% choosing Labour and 35% opting for no difference or unsure (King and Whybrow 2001: 108–09). The following questions from Gallup were used to assess the party’s relative competence on the issue of Europe: 1966–67: Which party do you think can best handle the problems of Britain and the European Common Market? 1970–75: Which party do you think can best handle the problem of the Common Market? 1989–2000: I am going to read out a list of problems facing the country. Could you tell me for each of them which political party you personally think would handle the problem best? Britain’s relations with Europe. 1992–2000: I am going to read out a list of problems facing the country. Could you tell me for each of them which political party you personally think would handle the problem best? Europe. 1983–89: Which party do you think has the best policies to deal with the Common Market? On Britain’s relations with Europe, shown in Table 2.4, the ranking of the two main parties tended to be less one-sided over time than that seen for the issue of defence, where the Conservatives often had pronounced leads over Labour. On Europe, the net lead for the Conservatives over Labour ranged from highs of +27 and +26 – as with defence, registered in 1991 and 1992, respectively – to a low of −40 in 1998. Between 1994 and 2000, the Conservatives’ net score was consistently in negative territory. As seen with defence, the Liberal (and Liberal Democrats) tended to obtain the support of around a tenth or less of the British public. Also, over time significant proportions were unsure which party was best able to manage Britain’s relations with Europe. The additional assessment of the party’s policies on Europe in the 1980s shows that the Conservative Party consistently ­outranked Labour while in office in this period, being favoured by a clear plurality, with a net lead ranging from +10 to +18. Usually, around one-inten opted for the Liberal Party. On each occasion, though, between two-inten and three-in-ten were unsure. Ipsos MORI polling also sheds light on public evaluations of the parties’ policies towards defence (Figure 2.6, 1983–2017) and Europe (Figure 2.7, 1977–2015) over recent decades. These data are based on responses to the following question: ‘I am going to read out a list of problems facing Britain today. I would like you to tell me whether you think the Conservative party, the Labour party or the Liberal Democrats has the best policies on each problem’. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 chart the proportions saying that the Conservative, Labour or Liberal (Democrat) parties were best able to handle these issues.

26  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics Table 2.4  Evaluations of parties on the European issue, 1966–2000 Con (%)

Lab (%)

Lib (Dem) (%)

Other response (%)

5 4 2 2 3 2 12 7 4 8 7 9 10 12 11 8 8 8 6 6

29 30 38 37 28 30 34 27 27 19 22 18 18 22 24 31 26 21 10 15

Party best able to handle the issue 1966 1967 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000

36 31 36 39 37 41 26 35 39 39 38 50 49 38 29 28 29 33 22 30

30 35 24 21 32 27 28 31 30 34 34 23 23 27 36 34 38 37 62 49

Party which has best policies to deal with the issue 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989

41 43 37 34 36 39

29 25 23 24 20 21

8 10 12 11 12 6

23 23 28 31 32 32

Source: Gallup data taken from King and Wybrow (2001: 98–102). Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib, Liberal/Liberal Democrat.

Figure 2.6 shows that in the 1980s the Conservatives had a reputational lead on defence, well ahead of the Labour Party (with the Liberals a distant third). Data from the British Election Study (BES) 1983 and 1987 surveys confirm this distinction in public perceptions. Respectively, 60% and 61% said that the Conservative Party would best ensure the country was defended, compared to 15% and 19% choosing Labour in this regard. In 1983, also, the public were most likely to agree that the Conservative Party’s views on defence were closest to their own opinions (at 51%), compared to 19% who cited Labour and just 15% who chose the Alliance (Liberal Party and Social Democratic Party). Similarly, data from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) 1987 and 1988 surveys show a similar pattern: just over three-fifths on each occasion said that the Conservatives would be most likely to provide the country with an effective defence; less than a fifth thought this about the Labour Party. However, from the 1990s onwards and in the early years of the twenty-first

60 50 40 % 30 20 10 0 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Con

Lab

Lib Dem

Figure 2.6  B  est party on defence, 1983–2017. Source: Compiled from the Ipsos MORI website: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/ best-party-key-issues-defencedisarmamentnuclear-weapons.

50 45 40 35 30 % 25 20 15 10 5 0 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 Con

Lab

Lib Dem

Figure 2.7  B  est party on Europe, 1977–2015. Source: Compiled from the Ipsos MORI website: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/ best-party-key-issues-europecommon-market.

28  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics century, the parties were much closer together in the public’s estimation of their respective competence on defence. As Freedman has observed, Labour possessed a ‘credibility gap on defence because of past policies and practice’ (2001: 291), which featured during the long years in opposition after 1979 and which the modernisation of the party’s image and policy agenda in this area under Blair and his predecessors tried hard to rectify. Again, on defence, the Liberals and then Liberal Democrats trailed far behind the two main parties. Figure 2.7 shows that public perceptions of Europe and party competence share some commonality with the pattern seen in Figure 2.6. That is, the Conservatives were clearly ahead of Labour until the early 1990s. In the BES 1983 survey, 60% had adjudged that the Conservatives would best represent Britain’s national interests within the European Economic Community (EEC), compared to 15% for Labour (in 1979, however, it was much closer: 37% chose the Conservatives, and 34% chose Labour). Subsequently, in the 1990s, the parties’ reputations ran much closer together, with Labour sometimes ahead in the public’s estimation. Unlike defence, though, the Conservatives did not move above Labour on this issue when they were back in office in 2010. Another commonality is the consistently low ranking of the Liberals and then Liberal Democrats on this issue, usually well behind the two larger parties. More recent data from YouGov have further confirmed the Conservative Party’s reputational advantage on defence. A poll conducted in April 2015 showed that 29% would most trust the Conservative Party to handle defence, followed by 21% choosing Labour, with a combined 11% selecting either the Liberal Democrats or the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Nearly two-fifths said neither or did not know (19% apiece) (YouGov 2015a). Moreover, when the public were asked by Ipsos MORI about the parties’ reputations in the lead-up to the June 2017 general election – the Conservatives had a commanding lead over Labour: 52% selected the Conservative Party, compared to just 15% preferring Labour, with a further 5% opting for the Liberal Democrats. A ComRes poll from September 2015 found that, when asked which party was trusted more on defence, 54% of the British public choose the Conservatives, against 27% opting for Labour and 18% saying neither party (ComRes 2015a). Similarly, a ComRes poll conducted in May 2017, during the election campaign, showed that when asked to choose between the two main parties, 58% said the Conservatives would be best able to protect the country from external threats, against just 18% citing Labour, with 24% unsure (ComRes 2017a). YouGov polling from May to December 2017 has similarly shown that the Conservatives are more highly rated than Labour on defence and security, with the former’s lead over the latter ranging from +12 to +23. Other parties have seen very small proportions preferring their handling of the issue, while anything from one-fifth through to one-third have been unsure (­YouGov 2017a). When asked, ‘Which of these parties do you think has the attitude to UK defence policy most similar to yours?’, a plurality nearly

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  29 always said that the Conservative Party’s view on national defence was closest to their own. The net lead over Labour, from January 2016 to June 2017, ranged between +7 and +19 (YouGov 2017a). However, on each occasion a large share of public opinion said neither party or was not sure (YouGov 2017a). The Conservatives also had the advantage on nuclear weapons in the YouGov polling data. Asked in April 2015 which party was most trusted to decide policy on Trident, 32% said the Conservatives, 20% choose Labour and 5% apiece choose UKIP or the Liberal Democrats. Again, nearly twofifths did not opt for any of these parties (YouGov 2015a). In July 2016, 33% said they trusted the Conservatives most to decide on the renewal of Trident, compared to 13% saying Labour, 5% selecting the Liberal Democrats and 3% opting for UKIP; combined, 46% said none of the parties or were unsure (YouGov 2016a). Recent data on parties’ issue reputations are also available from YouGov polling, covering the period between 2012 and 2017 (YouGov n/d-b). The data are based on responses to the following question: ‘Here is a list of problems facing the country. Could you say for each of them which political party you think would handle the problem best? Europe / Britain’s exit from the EU’. Polling data were again averaged on a monthly basis – based on the author’s own calculations – where two or more polls featured this question. Between 2012 and 2015 the public’s perceptions of issue competence on Europe ranked the Conservatives and Labour as fairly close together. In keeping with the long-term data discussed already, only small proportions of the public viewed the Liberal Democrats as best able to manage this issue; they have again consistently ranked a distant third. However, since the June 2016 referendum, the Conservative Party – in office during this time – has been well ahead of Labour in the public’s evaluation of the party best able to manage ‘Britain’s exit from the EU’. From July 2016 through December 2017, the Conservatives’ net lead over Labour ranged from a low of +8 to a high of +27. The Liberal Democrats, as well as UKIP, were well behind both the Conservative Party. Indeed, UKIP’s low scores on this question sometimes matched or exceeded those of Labour. The proportions that were unsure ranged from around one-infive to three-in-ten. In April 2017, with Article 27 triggered by the British government and the Brexit negotiations formally underway, Ipsos MORI also queried the public about which party was best able to handle the country’s future relations with the EU. A near-majority preferred the Conservatives (48%), with just 17% opting for Labour and a further 12% selecting the ­Liberal Democrats.

The role of external issues in general election campaigns A final area for examining foreign policy as an issue area within Britain politics is its role – or lack of – in general elections. Taking a historical perspective, Young has observed that:

30  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics Traditionally, of course, foreign and defence policy have had only a limited impact on British general elections, surprisingly perhaps given the size of the country’s Empire, the economy’s dependence on international trade and the proportion of national wealth dedicated to defence. The ‘Khaki election’ of 1900 during the Boer War, the 1918 election with its talk of ‘hanging the Kaiser’ and the 1935 election in which issues surrounding collective security loomed large, were exceptions to the rule. Even humiliation during the Suez crisis in 1956 did not prevent the Conservatives being re-elected with a healthy majority three years later (2007: 352) However, particular foreign or defence issues and Britain’s relations with Europe have clearly played a role in some general election campaigns in recent decades, even if the broader pattern shows their political and electoral salience varying or often minimal over the longer run. Of course, the presence of a particular foreign policy issue in parties’ campaign agendas and in related media coverage does not necessarily mean it will be a salient issue in relative terms for the electorate and thus serve to inform their views of parties and leaders and potentially influence their voting behaviour. The European issue has clearly been of fluctuating political importance for the British public in the run-up to election contests. Similarly, it has been an issue of variable importance in the parties’ own campaigns, partly reflecting the nature and the extent of positional divisions on Europe between the main parties. Research into issue voting has also shown that the European issue’s impact on vote choice at general elections between 1974 and 2005 has varied based on the extent of parties’ positional divergence: the impact has been greater when the parties have clearly been polarised and much reduced when they have converged (Clements and Bartle 2009). At the 1983 general election, on the EEC – as more broadly across domestic and external issues – there were significant differences between the two main parties’ positions (Butler and Kavanagh 1984; Ranney 1985). Based on analysis of the Labour and Conservative manifestos, Laver noted that the ‘ideological gap between them, thus measured, is treble the post-war norm’ (1984: 38). However, the EEC was relatively neglected during the campaign (Butler and Kavanagh 1984: 270). In other respects, also, the parties were sharply divided over Britain’s broader foreign policy orientation and defence posture, and aspects of post-war party-political consensus were seriously strained, as some of the distinctive commitments in the Labour Party manifesto exemplified. Defence as an issue had a major effect on voting at the 1983 general election – Crewe argues that ‘it did substantial damage to Labour’s vote, to the benefit of both the Conservatives and the Liberal/Social Democratic alliance’ (1985a: 24). Moreover, ‘Not since the war has defense played such a significant role in an election outcome’ (Crewe 1985a: 26). The 1987 general election campaign was described as possessing an ‘insular nature’, with the EEC, alongside other foreign policy issues, capturing

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  31 little attention (Butler and Kavanagh 1988: 221). In 1992, the two main parties’ positions on the EU had broadly converged in the years leading up to the general election, as Labour had moved on to clear pro-European territory, notwithstanding differences of opinion over the emerging ‘Social Europe’ dimension of the integration process. However, the 1992 election campaign was largely devoid of foreign policy matters: ‘Europe (which a few months earlier, in the days of Mrs Thatcher and Maastricht, had seemed so important) attracted little notice’ (Butler and Kavanagh 1992: 110). By the time of the 1997 general election, the parties had clearly diverged in their positions towards the EU (for more discussion of the parties’ shifting positions on the European issue over time, see Chapter 4). On issues such as the Social Chapter, there was clear ‘blue water’ between the positions of the Labour and Conservative Parties. The 1997 campaign was noticeable for debate on and extensive media coverage of aspects of Britain’s relations with the EU, following on from the Major government’s protracted divisions and disunity on the issue (Butler and Kavanagh 1997: 105; Norris 1998: 141). At the time of the 2001 general election, the major parties again exhibited major differences in their policies towards the EU, particularly the single currency. The Conservatives made opposition to participation in the single currency and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) a major part of their campaign agenda; partly as a result, Europe was the second-most frequently covered issue in the national media (Deacon and Wring 2005: 214). This core focus on Britain and the EU by one of the mainstream parties has been described by Smith as ‘one of the rare occasions’ when this has been the case (2012: 1286). Instead, mainstream parties have tended to ‘perceive Europe as a “shield” rather than a “sword” issue: one on which they might have to defend their position, but not one on which they would rationally opt to take a lead’ (Smith 2012: 1286). In the 2005 campaign, in clear contrast, the EU issue remained largely ‘unspoken’ (Kavanagh and Butler 2005: 62), not being a core issue for the major parties and so not featuring highly on the campaign agenda. In particular, Blair’s offer of a referendum on the EU constitutional treaty reduced its political resonance in the run-up to the election (Riddell 2005: 375). Accordingly, in terms of national media coverage – and in contrast to the previous contest – it was ‘marginalised as an issue’ (Deacon and Wring 2005: 214). External issues did clearly intrude into the 2005 election campaign – as they had done into British politics more widely in recent years – given the ongoing ‘war on terror’ and Britain’s major role in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the continued presence of its armed forces in the stabilisation and peace-making mission. Controversy over the war was prominent during the latter part of the 2005 election campaign (Whiteley et al. 2005: 811). Britain’s role in taking military action against Iraq had an adverse effect on the reputations of both Blair and the New Labour government, ‘calling into question their honesty and integrity’ (King 2006: 155). Partly because of this, Blair moved from being an electoral ‘asset’ at previous contests to that of

32  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics a ‘liability’ in 2005: ‘Blair’s decline in popularity lost the Labour Party votes and seats. It probably cost them more votes than anything else at this election’ (Evans and Andersen 2005: 833). Even if the Iraq War was not a particularly important issue for the public – either in terms of its importance for the country or its role in shaping voter choice – views on the Iraq War were strongly associated with evaluations of Blair and such views would have played a role, albeit minor and largely indirect – that is mainly mediated through leadership perceptions, in shaping voter choice in the context of the multitude of factors at play (Evans and Andersen 2005: 834). Similarly, another analysis of party choice at the 2005 general election found that the effects of views on Iraq – the negative impact on voting for Labour – mainly worked indirectly, by ‘driving down support for Blair’ (Clarke et al. 2009: 170). There is some evidence, then, that the mix of issue-related voting that prevailed at the 2005 contest included a contribution, albeit perhaps relatively minor, resulting from voters’ connections between the merits of the Iraq War and the conduct of Blair’s government in helping to initiate and prosecute the war. At the 2010 general election, given the wider economic conditions, foreign policy issues were not central to the parties’ agendas and the ‘campaign was marked by the low-key nature of the debate on foreign, security and defence policy’ (Whitman 2010: 847). Moreover, perhaps contributing to the lower salience of external issues, similarities rather than differences tended to characterise the foreign and defence policy pledges offered in the parties’ programmes, with a few notable exceptions (Whitman 2010: 846). The ongoing mission in Afghanistan had been underpinned by a broad party-political consensus since its outset in 2001. It had never featured the strong passions and wider political resonance engendered by the invasion of Iraq. Europe as an issue played a largely minor role in the 2010 election campaign, with the Conservatives trying to downplay it in order to provide a broader appeal to the electorate (Carey and Geddes 2010: 863–64). In keeping with 2010, the 2015 general election similarly featured a marginal role for foreign policy and defence issues (Gilmore 2015; Strong 2015a). The campaign was dominated by core domestic issues – in particular, the management of the economy, as well as taxation and public services. Based on rankings of the top issues by media coverage during the campaign, Europe came bottom based on TV coverage and eighth out of ten based on press coverage (Wring and Ward 2015: 226). At the 2017 general election, Britain’s relationship with Europe – or more specifically, the process of leaving the EU – was often perceived to be the paramount concern for parties and voters. Hence, it was quickly – and perhaps too readily – labelled as the ‘Brexit election’. It should be recognised, however, that the Brexit issue was wide ranging in the contours of the debate, encompassing the contested impact of Britain’s departure from the EU on economic prosperity, its international position and influence,

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  33 security and defence, immigration, as well as the running and funding of public services. Moreover, as research has shown, the election campaign also concentrated on domestic issues, contesting simplistic claims about a ‘Brexit’-focussed contest: The expectation early on was that Brexit would play a decisive role and favour the incumbent Conservatives who themselves had asked voters to ‘strengthen their hand’ for the Article 50 negotiations with the EU. But, as is often the case, the campaign ended up focusing on domestic issues such as pensions, social care and the National Health Service. Brexit was not totally absent but it was side-lined (Whiteley et al. 2017). Recently published analyses of voting at the individual and aggregate levels have provided empirical substance to claims of a contest where the Brexit issue was a significant factor. In their analysis of voting behaviour at the 2017 general election, Mellon et al. concluded that it was both a ‘“Brexit election” and a leadership campaign’ (2018: 17), based on their identification of two key phases of vote switching. First, between the 2015 election and prior to the commencement of the 2017 campaign, vote switching strengthened the association between preferences for leave and remain and supporting the Conservatives versus Labour: ‘with the Conservatives disproportionately attracting leave voters and Labour disproportionately attracting remain voters’ (Mellon et al. 2018: 2). Second, during the campaign itself, the vote switching that occurred predominantly benefitted Labour, with the party recruiting both leavers and remainers (Mellon et al. 2018: 3). Looking at constituency-level associations, Denver notes that there was a strong correlation between the proportion voting ‘leave’ in the 2016 referendum and improvement in the Conservative Party’s vote share between the 2015 and 2017 elections: ‘The more “Leave” voters there were, the better the Conservatives did. This also means that the more “Remain” voters the worse was the Conservative performance’ (2018: 22). Denver concludes that there is some basis for labelling the outcome as ‘the revenge of the Remainers’ (2018: 22). While the relative salience and electoral consequences of the Brexit issue in 2017 will no doubt be the subject of further scholarly debate and empirical analysis, it is clear that, in a broader view, the campaign tended to marginalise other foreign policy issues, despite attempts by the Labour Party to try to articulate a distinctive approach in some areas (Honeyman 2017: 84).

External issues and voting in general elections Questions featuring in opinion polls and social surveys have tended to focus either on the role that different issues may play in how individuals cast their vote at a general election, or on the issues that were perceived to be

34  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics particularly important for the country at the time of an election. Gallup polling asked the British public – in 1945, 1959 and 1974 – to assess which single issue, from a list of topics, they thought would be the subject of most discussion, or most relevant for how people would vote, at the next general election. The following questions were used: 1945: What question do you think will be most discussed in the general election? 1959: What do you think will be the most important issue at the next general election deciding which way people vote? 1964: Thinking just of yourself and your family, I want you to show me on this card how important each of these things is in deciding which party you will support at the general election? 1974: Here is a list of topics that might be discussed at the next general election. Which, if any, of them do you think should be concentrated on by the politicians? In 1945, 41% of those polled said housing, followed by 15% who thought it would be the issue of full employment (Gallup 1976a: 109). A range of other domestic and external issues were much less likely to be thought of as the key issue for discussion – in terms of foreign policy, this concerned international security (5%) and the occupation and treatment of Germany (3%) (Gallup 1976a: 109). On the home front, such matters included social security (7%) and the nationalisation of industry (6%) (Gallup 1976a: 109). In 1959, economic issues assumed considerably greater prominence, with full employment mentioned most often (33%), followed by the cost of living (13%), pensions (7%) and taxes (6%) (Gallup 1976a: 498). Foreign affairs as an issue area was cited by just 6% and the Cyprus issue by only 1% (Gallup 1976a: 498). Before the 1964 general election, in September to October, Gallup asked how important each of a range of issues would be when deciding which party to support. Domestic issues were rated the most salient: pensions and the welfare of old people (66%), prices and the cost of living (65%), full employment and short time working (61%), the NHS (56%), housing and rents (56%) and increasing production and prosperity (56%) (Gallup 1976a: 767). External matters ranked somewhat lower but were still cited by significant proportions: 38% cited armaments and national defence, 36% said Britain’s reputation abroad would be important, 35% stated this for the H-bomb and 32% said this for foreign affairs (Gallup 1976a: 767). In terms of international economic matters, 44% said increasing export trade would be important as did 41% for maintaining the value of Sterling (Gallup 1976a: 767). After the October 1964 general election, when asked how important various matters were when they decided how to vote and ranking each matter in turn, the British public rated external issues highly: 87% cited Britain’s position in the world as very important or important, while 65% said this about the country’s military strength (Gallup 1976a: 772–73). Next, 63% said their income had been important, 51%

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  35 apiece said this for their housing situation and their children’s future, 47% for their job and 45% for the interests of those living in their area (Gallup 1976a: 772–73). Least important were the interests of work colleagues (29%) and the interests of friends and neighbours (13%) (Gallup 1976a: 772–73). Both the pre- and post-election polling therefore demonstrated the prominence of external issues – broadly conceived – within the British electorate. As Young noted, the ‘mid-1960s were a significant point for the country’s global position’, due to the unsuccessful attempt to join the EEC, uncertainty over the Commonwealth’s significance for Britain and the weakening role of Sterling in the international economy (2007: 32). In 1974, it was the economic situation and domestic policies that the public thought should most occupy the minds of their politicians, in response to a question where multiple replies were possible. Of most concern was the cost of living and prices (74%), followed by inflation (59%), inflation (39%), unemployment and pensions (both obtaining 35%) and followed by law and order (32%) (Gallup 1976b: 1344). The Common Market – an issue of inter- and intra-party controversy in the period following Britain’s entry in January 1973 – garnered 28%, ahead of national unity (22%), the trade unions (17%) and nationalisation (12%) (Gallup 1976b: 1344). National Opinion Polls (NOP) asked the British public in 1963–1964 to choose which issues, from an extensive list of topics, they thought would be important at the next general election (held in October 1964). The question wording was, ‘Which of these issues do you think will be important at the next general election?’ In November 1963 and February 1964, the cost of living was cited as the most important issue, followed by housing, unemployment and pensions, with education accorded less importance. Defence and foreign affairs were adjudged to be of much less importance than most domestic issues, though both were broadly on a par with the public’s estimation of the electoral relevance of nationalisation. In the August 1964 poll, though, foreign and defence issues were accorded much higher salience. Defence (at 61%) and foreign affairs (at 44%) were the first and second highest-cited issues, followed by pensions (38%), economic policy (27%) and nationalisation (26%), with just 20% citing the cost of living. The latter was matched by the 20% selecting Britain’s nuclear deterrent. This time, just 12% chose housing and only 13% selected education. The BES 1966 survey asked respondents the following question: What issues do you yourself feel were most important in this election? Across the first, second, third and fourth issues mentioned, in each case the large majority referenced domestic issues (ranging between 64% and 74%). However, on each occasion a significant proportion opted for a foreign policy issue (26%–36%). The foreign policy issues most commonly mentioned were the Common Market and Rhodesia, with others concerned to a lesser extent about foreign trade and the balance of payments, defence and nuclear weapons, foreign policy in general and Britain’s prestige or relations with other countries. In terms of domestic issues, a variety of economic concerns were most widely cited as well as public services and welfare provision.

36  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics An NOP polls conducted in 1974 asked – unprompted – which single issue the public thought would be most important at the forthcoming ­February and October general elections. They were worded as follows: February 1974: Which issue do you think will be most important at the general election? October 1974: What one issue do you think will be most important at this general election? Unsurprisingly, given the wider state of the economy, economic concerns dominated the issues seen to be of most relevance. Three polls from February 1974 and a poll from October of that year showed that inflation and the cost of living was the most commonly cited issue, approaching or over half of those polled, followed by trade unions and strikes in the February polls only (which fell to just 5% in October), with the general economic situation cited by an additional 5%–6% in each poll. The Common Market was cited by very small proportions in each poll (between 2% and 5% in February and 8% in October). The BES surveys of February 1974, October 1974 and October 1979 all featured questions on the important issues for voting at general elections. The 1974 studies asked the following question: ‘Think about when you were deciding about voting. How important to you when you were deciding about voting was the issue of …. the most important single thing, fairly important, or not very important?’ While the full range of issues asked about varied in each election study, there was considerable overlap. In February 1974, when asked to evaluate the importance of each issue in turn, 32% said prices was the most important single thing, with 17% saying this about strikes, 14% stating this for wage controls and pensions, followed by 13% thinking this for devolution and 10% for Communists. Just 7% said this about the Common Market, the same as for social services, with taxation and nationalisation obtaining 8%. Half of respondents stated that the Common Market was fairly important to their vote decision, higher than the 41% adjudging it to have been not very important. Again, asked about the importance of each issue in turn, in October 1974, similarly 32% said prices were the most important issue, followed by 16% saying this for wage controls, and 13% apiece for strikes, unemployment and nationalisation. Only 9% said the Common Market was the most important concern, matched by that for housing and trailed by social services and North Sea oil. However, 59% stated that the Common Market was fairly important to their vote decision in October 1974, with 30% saying it was not very important. In 1979, the BES study similarly asked, ‘When you were deciding about voting, how important was … extremely important, fairly important, or not very important?’ Domestic issues ranked considerably higher than did Britain’s membership of the Common Market. When asked about each issue in turn, leading the way was rising prices (79% said it was extremely or fairly important), followed by law and order and taxes versus services (both at 78%), strikes (74%),

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  37 unemployment (71%) and social services (64%). For the Common Market (specifically about Britain’s stance on the Common Market’s economic policies), 52% said it was extremely or fairly important for their vote decision, higher than the 49% and 45% obtained for, respectively, nationalisation and race relations. The proportions stating an issue was not very important were highest for race relations (57%), nationalisation (47%) and then the Common Market (45%). The 1983 BES survey asked respondents how important a range of issues were to their voting decision: ‘Here is a list of six issues that were discussed during the election. When you were deciding about voting, how important was each of these issues to you? Was it extremely important, quite important or not very important to you in deciding about voting?’ For defence, 80% said it was very or quite important, with large or overwhelming majorities saying this was the case for core domestic issues – unemployment (94%), inflation (90%), health and social services (94%) and law and order (91%) – but higher than the 51% stating the same for nationalisation. Around half said that nationalisation was not very important, compared to just one-in-five stating this was the case for defence and just 6%–11% for the other domestic issues. Respondents were then asked follow-up questions: ‘Which one of the six issues on the card would you say was most important to you in deciding about voting?’ ‘And which one next?’ For the most important issue, 39% cited unemployment, followed by 18% saying defence (at an election where there were clear dividing lines in the defence policies advocated in the Conservative and Labour manifestos). Inflation and health/social services were cited by 13% each, followed by 11% stating law and order (just 3% chose nationalisation). The most commonly cited next most important issue for voting was health and social services (26%), closely followed by unemployment (22%). Defence and inflation both registered 15%, slightly below law and order (17%), with just 3% again selecting nationalisation. Separate questions also asked about the importance of the Common Market and the Falklands issue (Britain having gone to war with Argentina in spring 1982 after the latter’s invasion of the islands). In 1983, 51% said that the European issue had been of some importance for their voting decision, compared to 41% stating this for the government’s handling of the Falklands issue. About half and three-fifths, respectively, said Europe and the Falklands had not been very important in this regard. There has been a lively scholarly debate over whether and to what extent the Falklands War affected the changing political fortunes of Mrs Thatcher’s government and contributed to the outcome of the 1983 general election (see, e.g., Crewe 1985b; Norpeth 1987; Sanders et al. 1987; Clarke et al. 1990). The BES 1987 survey probed what respondent thought were the most important issues for the country and for them personally, based on the following questions: Thinking back to the election, which three of these issues would you say were the most important issues facing Britain? First tell me the most important, and then the second most important, and then the third.

38  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics And which three of these were the most important issues facing you and your family? Again start with the most important, and then the second and then the third. In terms of salient issues for the country, unemployment was the most important (chosen by 52%), followed by defence at 19% and then several other domestic issues (garnering between 2% and 11%). For them and their families, respondents chose health and social services as the most important issue (23%), with defence at 11%, ahead of crime, on a par with taxes and ranking below prices, unemployment and education. As for the second-most important issue for the country, 13% choose defence, on a par with crime and ahead of some domestic issues but trailing health and social services, unemployment and education. Defence was cited by 14% as the third-most important national concern, ranking below health and social services, education and crime but ahead of several other domestic issues. At a personal level, defence was least likely to be cited as the second-most important issue for respondents and their families (just 7%) and, along with unemployment, was joint lowest ranked as the third-most important issue (10%). In 1992, the BES study asked the following question: ‘When you were deciding about voting, how important was this issue to you?’ Respondents were asked to assess five issues, in turn, and domestic issues were perceived as the most salient. Overall, 85% said that the issue of unemployment and inflation was either extremely important or important for their vote choice, along with 86% saying the same for taxation and services. Much lower proportions thought this was the case for redistribution (57%) and for nationalisation versus privatisation (44%). Half said that the European Community had been either an extremely important or important issue for their vote decision (50%). Just 15% said that unemployment and taxation had not been very important or not at all important to their vote decision, with 16% stating this for taxation and services. In contrast, 43% stated this for redistribution, around half for the European Community (52%) and somewhat over half for the issue of public versus private ownership (55%). The BES surveys from 2001 onwards have asked voters about the most important issue at each general election, based on the following question wordings: 2001: In your opinion, what was the single most important issue in the general election? 2005–2015: Now, I’d like to ask you a few questions about the issues and problems facing Britain today. As far as you’re concerned, what is the single most important issue facing the country at the present time? Table 2.5 shows the breakdown for a range of domestic and external issues for the 2001–2015 general elections. It is immediately clear that domestic

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  39 Table 2.5  Most important issue at general elections, 2001–15

Domestic issues Education NHS Immigration/asylum seekers Law and order/crime State of the economy Unemployment External issues EU/EMU Iraq or Afghanistan/(war against) terrorism/war or national security

2001 (%)

2005 (%)

2010 (%)

2015 (%)

11 29  2  3  3  1

 6 15 21 12  6  2

 2  2 10  2 38  7

 1 10 35  1 13 12

 5

 6  7

 1  4

 2  4

Source: Analysis of BES post-election surveys. EU, European Union; EMU, Economic and Monetary Union; NHS, National Health Service.

‘bread-and-butter’ issues have dominated voters’ assessments at recent general elections. Of course, the prominence of domestic issues varies across contests – evident for education, the NHS, immigration, law and order and the economic situation – but external issues were generally accorded a very low importance by the British electorate. The prominence of education and the NHS declined over time, while general perceptions of the economic ­situation – and aspects of the economy – are very responsive to changing conditions. The constellation of issues of most concern to the public – and those promoted by the parties’ campaign agendas – varies across elections. That said, external security issues – most obviously, the Iraq War – played some role at the 2005 general election, as did Britain’s relations with Europe in 2001 and 2005. What about the issue concerns of voters at the 2017 election? Research from the BES study found that, when asked about the most important issue currently facing the country, more than one-in-three chose Brexit or the EU, while less than one-in-ten selected the NHS, and even fewer – one-in-twenty – chose the economy (Fieldhouse and Prosser 2017). Post-election polling undertaken on behalf of Lord Ashcroft showed that, when asked about the most important issue for deciding how to vote at the general election, 28% cited Brexit or the issue of Britain leaving the EU, with just 5% citing terrorism or security, a broad category which may have subsumed more specific foreign or defence policy concerns (Ashcroft Polls 2017a). Post-election polling after the 2015 contest showed that, when asked to select the most important issues facing the country, 18% cited defending Britain’s interests in Europe, compared to 13% mentioning this as an important concern for them and their family (Ashcroft Polls 2015a). A survey by YouGov, conducted towards the end of the campaign for the 2017 election, asked the public, first, about the single most important issue facing their local area and nationally, and, second,

40  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics about the single most important issue – at local and national levels – for deciding their general election vote. Brexit was seen as the most important issue facing the country and the national-level issue most important for influencing voters (YouGov 2017a). In terms of the first question, 31% cited Brexit as the most important issue for the country, followed by 18% saying defence or security concerns, 14% citing the NHS or social care and then 13% selecting immigration and asylum (just 8% stated the economy). At local level, the most commonly-­cited issue was the NHS and social care (21%), followed by housing (11%), immigration and asylum (8%), Brexit (8%) and crime (7%) (YouGov 2017a). In term of the most significant issue for voting, again the pattern of responses was different at the national and local levels. Nationally, Brexit was chosen by 33%, NHS and social care by 15%, immigration by 11% and the economy by 11%; defence and security was cited by 9%; at the local level, the NHS was perceived to be the most significant for vote choice (21%), followed by 11% citing housing, 9% selecting Brexit and 7% choosing transport and roads (YouGov 2017a). Ipsos MORI polling data also provide further evidence on the public’s issue priorities in relation to voting and elections. Table 2.6 shows the importance of issues to voting between 1995 and 2007, based on the following question: ‘Looking ahead to the next General Election, which, if any, of these issues do you think will be very important to you in helping you to decide which party to vote for?’ This formulation of the question invites respondents to pick as many issues as are personally relevant to them; it is not asking them to select their most important concern. Of the six areas shown in Table 2.6, the issues most germane to voting at future general elections concerned healthcare and education; generally, majorities selected these issues, which were of a larger magnitude for the NHS and healthcare. Beyond core public services, management of the economy was usually the next highest-ranking issue, always rated more highly than unemployment. The lowest-ranked issue tended to be defence, usually outranked by Europe (which saw levels not too different from those registered for unemployment). Clearly, then, domestic issues were perceived as much more germane to voting at general elections than were external issues. Table 2.7 presents another set of polling data from Ipsos MORI, based on the following question: ‘If the general election were held this Thursday, what, if any, issues would be very important to you in helping you decide which party to vote for?’ This covers the period from 2001 to 2017. For the period 2001–2015, a similar pattern presents itself to that found in Table 2.6. Overtime, public services – the NHS and education – and the economy are the most relevant issues to voting at the next general election. The salience of economic management in the public’s mind is clearly highly responsive to changing circumstances as it is perceived to be much more relevant from 2008 onwards when the country was experiencing a recession. Unemployment and Europe were relatively less germane to party choice, followed by the issue of defence.

Table 2.6  Importance of issues to voting at next general election, 1995–2007

July 21–24, 1995 March 22–25, 1996 July 23–28, 1996 February 21–24, 1997 April 8, 1997 May 21–24, 1998 July 23–26, 1999 January 20–25, 2000 July 20–24, 2000 February 15–20, 2001 March 29 to April 3, 2001 May 10–14, 2001 June 5, 2001 September 11–16, 2003 September 10–14, 2004 February 17–21, 2005 April 7–11, 2005 August 31 to September 6, 2006 September 20–26, 2007

Defence (%) Europe (%) Managing the economy (%)

Unemployment (%)

Healthcare (%)

Education (%)

10 16  9  8 12 12 12 13 10 13 10  9 11 20 24 15 19 20

17 24 19 26 22 26 30 24 26 29 18 18 26 22 21 19 19 13

30 38 26 29 30 34 28 28 29 27 24 29 31 27 24 23 35 28

24 30 17 19 22 23 21 18 15 16 19 18 21 20 19 20 27 22

61 68 60 63 68 66 61 71 67 65 59 61 73 62 54 57 67 54

52 66 51 56 61 62 52 55 52 52 50 53 62 53 47 46 61 45

16

11

24

22

47

39

Source: Compiled from Ipsos MORI website: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/importance-key-issues-voting.

Table 2.7  I mportant issues for deciding which party to vote for at next general election, 2001–17

April 30 to May 1, 2001 May 10–12, 2001 May 31 to June 2, 2001 August 15–17, 2008 September 25–27, 2009 March 19–22, 2010 September 6–9, 2014 January 11–13, 2015 February 8–10, 2015 March 8–11, 2015 April 12–15, 2015 April 21–25, 2017 May 15–17, 2017

Defence (%)

Europe (%)

Managing the economy (%)

Unemployment (%)

Healthcare (%)

Education (%)

1

 5

 9

 3

33

29

1 1

 7 14

 7  7

 3  3

40 50

35 39

4 6

 3  3

35 39

 5 13

22 20

22 17

 11  9  11  8  7 42 a 42a

32 31 33 32 31 35 18 16

 11 10  9 10  11  8  4  5

26 29 46 45 38 47 31 43

23 23 20 25 25 24 21 22

3 6 3 6 5 5 4

Source: Compiled from the Ipsos MORI website: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/importance-key-issues-voting. a Europe/EU/Brexit.

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  43 However, in the run-up to the June 2017 general election, 42% said that the issue of Britain’s relations with the EU, or ‘Brexit’, would be an important factor for their vote decision – compared to just 7%–8% citing Europe in two polls conducted before the May 2015 general election. Further evidence, alongside that seen from BES data, that this was partly a ‘Brexit’ election in terms of the public’s perceptions of important national issues and those shaping their own vote decisions. Just 4% mentioned foreign affairs in general, with a further 3% citing foreign aid. The very low prominence given to the issue of overseas aid by the British public is unsurprising and is a longterm feature of issue importance data – as Bose and Burnell observed: Nevertheless there can there can be few people who would seriously doubt that politicians are entitled to believe the following proposition: election to public office is not won or lost on the strength or weakness of the government’s performance on overseas aid. That performance simply does not figure among the issues which consistently compete most strongly for the attention of the largest number of voters (1991: 17) The proportion citing the economy declined from 31% and 35%, respectively, in the April and May 2015 polls, to 18% in April 2017. Similarly, the proportion citing the NHS also fell somewhat, from 38% and 47% in the 2015 polls, to 31% in April 2017. A subsequent poll in May 2017 again reaffirmed Brexit as a key issue for voting (at 42%), but it was just outranked by the NHS (which had increased to 43%). The Ipsos MORI time-series data on issue importance discussed earlier on can also be re-analysed to look at which issues – economic or external in focus – were politically prominent in the period leading up to and during campaigning for each general election between 1983 and 2017. To provide some indication of the relative importance of economic and external issues to the British public in the period leading up to each election, Table 2.8 shows, for each issue, the combined proportion of those citing it either as the most important issue or as an important issue facing the country (see question wordings earlier). The data have been averaged across the 4 consecutive months preceding the month in which the general election took place. Where data for 4 consecutive months were not available, it has usually been averaged across 3 – and, very occasionally, 2 – months. In terms of issues with an external focus, defence, foreign affairs and terrorism were clearly more of a prevalent concern for the public at more recent elections – especially so in 2005, when the political fallout from the Iraq War and occupation was still unfolding. Britain’s relations with Europe have been of most concern at the most recent, 2017, election – as the country’s political debate has been heavily focussed on the merits of leaving the EU and how to go about doing this to best serve the national interest. Europe was also a more heightened concern in the period leading up to the 1997 general election,

Table 2.8  Average importance of external and economic issues in the 4-month period prior to each general election month, 1983–2017  

Defence, foreign affairs, international terrorism (%)

Common Nuclear weapons, Economy, Inflation, Market, EU, Nuclear War, economic prices (%) Europe, Single Disarmament (%) situation (%) European currency (%)

Unemployment, factory closures, lack of industry (%)

June 1983 June 1987 April 1992 May 1997 June 2001 May 2005 May 2010 May 2015 June 2017

 9  9  5  2  3 28 15 15 12

 6  1 15 35 18  7  3  8 47

83 76 50 35 11  8 22 20 13

27 18  2  1  1  1  1  2  2

  6 36 19 10 11 53 32 20

23  5 10  4  2  2  9  7  6

Source: Analysis of Ipsos MORI data. Note: Where data from 4 months were not available, averages are usually based on 3 months’ data. EU, European Union.

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics  45 following on from the political troubles and destabilising divisions the Major government experienced over Britain’s relations with the EU, particularly the parliamentary ratification process for the Maastricht Treaty. In 2001, moreover, the issue of British membership of the single currency was the most politically resonant aspect of the broader European debate, and the Conservative Party put this issue at the forefront of their election campaign. Nuclear weapons were more of a public concern in the 1980s, in the prevailing political climate surrounding the 1983 and 1987 elections – where there were clear dividing lines in the major parties’ policy offerings on defence in general and nuclear weapons in particular, with Labour offering a unilateralist approach on the latter to the electorate in 1983 (Byrne 1987: 526) – but became largely quiescent as an issue in the post-Cold War period. It was not only foreign and defence issues, though, that fluctuated in their relative salience in the periods leading up to general elections – this has also clearly been the case for aspects of the domestic economy. Inflation and prices were of most concern in the run-up to the 1983 general election but declined in national importance thereafter. Concern with the general economic situation was highest in 1992, when the country had been suffering from a major recession, and then was of heightened importance again in 2010 and 2015, after another deep and prolonged recession and within a climate of ‘austerity politics’. It had declined somewhat at the 2017 general election, when the economic situation was more positive. Unemployment and related issues were a major national issue in the 1980s – before the 1983 and 1987 contests – and were still a significant concern in 1992 and 1997. Reflecting the economic ‘good times’ and healthy job creation, such concerns declined to much lower levels at the 2001 and 2005 elections but had increased to some extent by 2010 and 2015 – but well below the levels registered in earlier decades – reflecting the broader concern expressed over the country’s economic troubles. Repeating this analysis with the Gallup data (shown in Table 2.9), covering the 1974–97 general elections, it is clear that – in the run-up to each contest – external issues have generally been of little or no salience for the British electorate when they have been asked to choose the most urgent issue facing the country. In that sense, domestic ‘bread-and-butter’ issues have reliably trumped external issues in the mind of the British electorate. The obvious exception here is in 1997, when Britain’s relations with Europe were the most important issue for a section of the public, also an election year where the European issue was relatively more salient in the Ipsos MORI data. Very small proportions did cite defence in 1983 and 1987, when the parties offered clear dividing lines in this area. Economic issues have been perceived to be of great importance for the country in the run-up to elections, although again the magnitude of their significance has clearly varied over time and this shows broad correspondence with the evidence contained in the Ipsos MORI data. Economic affairs and the cost of living were highly relevant at the two elections in 1974 and to a much lesser extent in 1979 (and featured again in 1992). Unemployment was the overriding consideration for much of the electorate in the 1980s and – albeit to a considerably lesser extent – in the 1990s.

46  Foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics Table 2.9  A  verage importance of external and economic issues in the 4-month period prior to each general election month, 1974–97  

Defence International Common (%) affairs (%) Market (%)

Economic affairs/cost of living (%)

Unemployment (%)

February 1974 October 1974 May 1979 June 1983 June 1987 April 1992 May 1997

0

2

 1

56

 1

0

0

 2

63

 2

0 3 2 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

 0  0  0  0 12

22  4  2 15  2

12 79 72 41 23

Source: Analysis based on data compiled from King and Wybrow (2001: 263–73). Note: Where data from 4 months were not available, averages are usually based on 3 months’ data.

Conclusion This chapter has examined foreign policy in broad terms as an issue area in British politics by assessing – both in depth and over time – the British public’s views on the salience of domestic and external issues, their perceptions of the parties’ relative competence on foreign affairs and their evaluations of the importance of issues to general elections and voting behaviour. In terms of the salience of external and domestic issues – with the specific focus here on economic concerns – when compelled to choose the most urgent problem facing the country, the British public has been much more likely, over recent decades, to have perceived economic issues as more pressing for the nation. When asked to select the most important issues, the proportions seeing external affairs as salient have been higher, but – in general – economic issues have been ranked more highly by the British public over time. Of course, public opinion has been responsive to the unfolding of economic good times and bad times, as it has been to external crises and British action overseas. The evaluations of the parties’ management of and policies on foreign policy have shown that the Conservatives have tended to have a reputational advantage over Labour with the British public in this area, particularly in terms of their perceived ability to handle defence and nuclear weapons and represent British abroad. The evaluations of relative party competence on relations with Europe have varied more over time. The electoral prominence of external issues, which has varied across general elections, has also been generally eclipsed by the higher relevance of domestic issues – the ‘bread-and-butter’ concerns – for the electorate, shown clearly by the issue priorities on display at successive general elections between 2001 and 2015. Even at the 2017 contest, which was triggered because of the Brexit negotiations and at which Britain’s departure from the EU was widely seen to be the pivotal issue at stake, many voters still prioritised domestic issues, alongside or even above that of Europe.

3 The US and NATO

This chapter examines the British public’s views towards the UK-US special relationship and the transatlantic security alliance in the form of the country’s long-standing membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which have been integral parts of the post-war bipartisan consensus forged in foreign and defence policy (Kavanagh and Morris 1994). This is an apposite time to review longer-term British public opinion in these areas, given the significant political developments, at home and abroad, in recent years. These include the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU), made in the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum; subsequent to this, ongoing debates around Britain’s future trajectory and its global role, including renewing links with Commonwealth countries; and the election of a US president, in Donald Trump, who – promoting a strident agenda of ‘America First’ – ­appeared willing on the campaign trail to challenge and reorder traditional priorities and positions of US foreign policy, including the role of NATO and the US’s relations with its European allies and broader support for the postwar liberal world order. This chapter assesses the main aggregate trends in the British public’s views over time, as well as looking in more depth at which groups have tended to be more, or less, supportive of the UK-US special relationship, the international role of the US and British membership of NATO. This is important, given that other research has shown that the “special relationship” is not that special when it comes to public opinion. The British and American publics do broadly agree on many international issues. But they differ on the details involving fundamental foreign policy challenges (Stokes 2013) This chapter builds upon and extends earlier studies which have covered British public opinion towards the Cold War alliances and the transatlantic security architecture in the post-war era (Erskine 1969; Crewe 1985; Whiteley 1985; Eichenberg 1989, 2003; Everts 1998) as well as studies in the post-9/11 era looking more widely at cross-national public opinion towards the policies and conduct of the US in global politics (Fabbrini 2002; Judt and Lacorne

48  The US and NATO 2005; Isernia 2006; Katzenstein and Keohane 2006; Holsti 2008; Lawson and Hudson 2015). This chapter is structured as follows: it first examines the public’s views over time on Britain’s most important post-war international relationships – Churchill’s interlocking ‘three circles’, Europe, America and the Commonwealth – which have framed so much political debate over the country’s international role in the post-war era. It then focusses in depth on attitudes towards Britain’s relations with the US, including cross-national comparisons as well as profiling the bases of pro- and anti-American sentiment in wider British society. Finally, it takes a wider look at transatlantic relations in terms of the post-war European security architecture, looking at public opinion towards Britain’s membership of NATO and its role as a security guarantor for the Western alliance. Britain’s relations with the European integration process – specifically, the trends in public opinion before and after membership – are addressed in depth in Chapter 4.

Britain’s ‘three circles’: Europe, the US and the Commonwealth The three ‘interlocking circles’ that Churchill spoke of in his landmark speech in 1948, delivered at a Conservative Party conference in Llandudno, have defined the key international relationships framing and underpinning the conduct of Britain’s post-war foreign policy. First, its position in Europe. Second, the special relationship with the US. Third, its connections with the British Empire and the self-governing dominions (Australia, New  ­Zealand and South Africa). With the dismantling of the British Empire, through the processes of decolonisation which occurred in the early decades after the Second World War– the independence granted to India and Pakistan in  the late 1940s and then the ‘winds of change’ process affecting Africa and Asia more widely which began in the 1950s and continued in the 1960s – Britain’s relations with its former colonies crystallised on the international stage with the establishment of the Commonwealth. Churchill insisted in his speech that Britain – uniquely amongst countries – stood at the intersection of these three ‘circles’ and that national influence in each of the three circles was strengthened and legitimised by the continuation of its role in the others. The legacy of this speech and its core tenets regarding Britain’s place in the world has been enduring. Sanders and Houghton note that ‘nearly 70 years later, the three circles leitmotif continues to animate strategic thinking about Britain’s role in the world, both among scholars and policymakers’ (2016: 2). Over time, the three circles have been adapted – rather than abandoned, as the process of Britain’s relative decline unfolded – to the pursuit of national influence through interdependence (Marsh 2005). What, then, has been the opinion of the British public on these key international relationships in the post-war period? Have they expressed clear and consistent preferences over time, or have there been significant changes in popular opinion? Before looking at long-term polling data on these international relationships, a series of National Opinion Polls (NOP) conducted between 1965 and 1971 gauged public preferences regarding Europe, America

The US and NATO  49 and the Commonwealth. The question wording was as follows: ‘Where do you think the economic future of Britain mainly lies: with America, with Europe or with the Commonwealth?’ The data are reported in Table 3.1. In 1965, 40% of the public selected the Commonwealth, around twice as many as opted for Europe (21%), with America chosen by just 17% (and 23% giving some other response). At the end of the decade, in 1969, support for the Commonwealth had fallen to 30%, with 24% selecting Europe and 11% America (with the remainder unsure or saying none of them). In 1971, the proportion choosing Europe (28%) almost matched that selecting the Commonwealth (29%), with just 5% opting for America (again, a significant proportion selected none of them or were unsure). Across the three surveys, the relative prominence of the Commonwealth and America in terms of where Britain’s economic future lay clearly declined, and that of Europe rose, at a time when successive Labour and Conservative governments had pursued initiatives to join the European Economic Community (EEC). Gallup polls in the 1960 and 1970s asked the British public to make a choice between relations with the Common Market (or Europe) and the US. In ­September 1966, a strong majority (55%) said they preferred Britain joining with Europe to retain her place in the world; 29% chose the US and 16% were unsure (Gallup 1976b: 883–4). A further question, gauging whether respondents preferred a closer association with the Common Market or with ­A merica, found that on each occasion – in March 1963, December 1966 and April 1974 – a plurality or majority selected the Common Market over the US, although between two-in-ten and three-in-ten were unsure (Gallup 1976a: 673; Gallup 1976b: 900, 1319). However, when given the opportunity by Gallup in February and March 1969 to separately assess each international relationship’s value to Britain, very large majorities said it was very important or important for the country to have close relations with European countries, the Commonwealth and the US (Gallup 1976b: 1036–37, 1043–44). Views on where Britain’s economic future best lay varied across demographic groups and between party supporters, based on the NOP data. Several patterns are evident in the responses across surveys. Men were more likely than women to have selected Europe in each survey and the Commonwealth in two of the surveys. Women were more likely to have been unsure on this question. Across age groups (not shown in Table 3.1 because a different classification of age group categories was used in the June 1965 survey compared to the two later surveys), in general, younger people were consistently more likely to have selected Europe, while older people had a greater tendency to see the Commonwealth as where Britain’s economic future rested. Also, there was some difference in opinion based on socio-economic circumstances, with those in the AB social grade more likely to have chosen Europe and those in the DE grade least likely to have. In 1971, when their party in government led by Edward Heath was negotiating to join the EEC, Conservatives were more likely to have seen Europe as where the country’s economic future lay; but, in general, there were no clear-cut divisions of opinion between party supporters across surveys.

Table 3.1  P ublic opinion towards the economic future of Britain by demographic group, 1965–71 1965   All Sex

Male Female Social AB C1 grade C2 DE Con Party Lab support Lib Undecided or would not vote

1969

1971

America Europe Commonwealth Other Commonwealth America response 17 18 16 11 14 18 19 17 18 14 15

21 28 14 32 26 20 15 22 21 24 14

40 39 40 32 36 42 41 40 40 43 30

Source: Analysis of NOP. Note: Percentages sum across the rows per year. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib, Liberal.

23 15 30 24 24 20 25 21 21 19 41

30 35 26 29 33 28 30 34 30 31 21

 11 14  9  11 12 13  8 14  9 10 10

Europe

None

Don’t know

Commonwealth

America

Europe

None Don’t know

24 30 18 37 29 22 17 23 25 30 23

15 12 17 13 13 15 17 13 16 14 17

20 9 30 10 13 22 29 17 21 16 29

29 33 26 27 31 28 30 31 28 36 27

5 7 4 5 4 5 6 5 5 5 5

28 35 22 48 33 24 16 37 23 26 23

21 17 25 13 18 23 27 14 27 19 22

17  8 24  7 15 19 22 13 17 14 25

The US and NATO  51 Polling conducted in recent decades (except for the 1970s) shows which of these international relationships the British public and sections of wider society have perceived to be the most important. The following question has been asked of the British public since the 1960s: ‘Which of these – Europe, the Commonwealth or America – is the most important to Britain?’ Responses for the period 1969–2017 are shown in Figure 3.1. (In 1969 and 1991, the question was asked twice, in the former instance by Gallup, so responses have been averaged across polls.) When first asked in 1969, the British public were most likely to opt for either the Commonwealth (34%), with around a quarter selecting Europe and the US (respectively, 26% and 25%). In all subsequent surveys from the 1980s onwards, probably reflecting the fact of Britain’s EU membership, a plurality or a majority has selected Europe as the most important for Britain. In 1984 and 1986 it stood at 39%, and between 1989 and 2017 it was in the range of 45%–57%. Accordingly, lower, although somewhat fluctuating, proportions of the public have chosen either the Commonwealth or America (usually no higher than a quarter for the former and peaking at around threein-ten or a third for the latter). The proportions that did not know were usually around a tenth or lower. Between 2002 and 2017 the proportion selecting America clearly outranked support for the Commonwealth, which may be influenced by Britain’s close military and security relations with the US in the post-9/11 fight against terrorism. In 2017, after the Brexit referendum, the proportion choosing Europe was the same as in 2014, but the proportion selecting the Commonwealth fell, and that for America increased. Britain’s relations with America and the Commonwealth became renewed subjects of debate as attention turned to the nature and strength of Britain’s international role and a reassessment of its key relationships, once it leaves the EU. The British public has consistently chosen Europe as Britain’s most important international relationship over recent decades – but which groups 60 50 40 % 30 20 10 0 1969

1979

1989 Europe

Commonwealth

1999

2009

America

Figure 3.1  P  ublic opinion towards Britain’s most important relationship, 1969–2017. Source: Compiled from the Ipsos MORI website: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/ europe-still-seen-most-important-relationship-britain.

52  The US and NATO in wider society also prioritised relations with Europe over America and the ­Commonwealth? Data from the 2014 and 2017 surveys are reported in ­Table 3.2. In 2014, preferences were rather similar for both men and women, although the former were somewhat more likely to choose Europe (50% ­versus 44%). Those aged 18–34 were most likely to choose Europe (50%), while those aged 55 years and older were more likely to state the Commonwealth (31%) compared to those aged 18–34 (20%) and 35–54 (24%). In terms of social grade, those in the C2 group were least likely to have said Europe (33%), while over half of those in the AB and C1 grades did so, as did 41% of those in the DE group. Liberal Democrat supporters evaluated Europe as most important for Britain (66%), followed by about half of Labour and Conservative supporters; amongst those who favoured the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), it was 26%. Support for the Commonwealth was most common amongst UKIP supporters (44%), and perceptions of the US as most important for the country were lowest amongst Liberal Democrat supporters (12%). The 2014 survey also asked an additional question – ‘Which of these – Europe, the Commonwealth, China or America – is the most important to Britain?’ – which included China as an additional option. Europe was still perceived to be the most important relationship for Britain (39%), followed by America (26%), the Commonwealth (17%) and China (10%); 7% did not know. In response to this version of the question, men (44%), those aged 18–34 and 35–54 (both 43%) those in the ABC1 group (50%) and Liberal Democrat (45%) and Labour supporters (48%), were most likely to have chosen Europe. Support for America was highest amongst women (32%), those aged 55 and over (30%), those in the C2DE social grade (33%) and amongst UKIP supporters (48%). Support for China was highest amongst Conservative voters (17%) and much lower amongst backers of other parties. Labour backers (13%) and those in the ABC1 social grade (14%) were least supportive of the Commonwealth. Did public opinion change after the referendum on EU membership in 2016? The Brexit referendum campaign featured much debate over the implications for Britain’s foreign policy and its international standing of leaving the EU and the other ‘circles’ – in particular, Britain’s historically rooted links, political and economic, with the Commonwealth and the prospect of a major free trade deal with the US – were utilised to advance pro-Brexit arguments about Britain’s ability to play a global role outside the EU. Indeed, politicians within the ‘leave’ campaign made the case ‘that membership of the “protectionist” EU constrains the UK’s ability to make trade links with the wider world – and particularly with Britain’s apparently natural partners in the Commonwealth’ (MurrayEvans 2016). While there is no overall change in the proportion selecting Europe (47% in 2014 and 2017), the proportion selecting the Commonwealth declined from 25% to 19% and that for America increased from 20% to 29%. However, there has been some significant change across different groups, in the direction of a clear polarisation of opinion across age groups and more pronounced differences based on party allegiance. Perceptions of Britain’s most important relationship may have, to some extent, been brought into line with how social

Table 3.2  P  ublic opinion towards Britain’s most important relationship by demographic group, 2014 and 2017 2014   All Sex Age group Social grade Party support

Male Female 18–34 35–54 55+ AB C1 C2 DE Con Lab Lib Dem UKIP

2017

Europe (%)

Commonwealth America (%) (%)

Don’t know (%)

Europe (%)

Commonwealth America (%) (%)

Don’t know (%)

47 50 44 50 47 44 56 53 33 41 49 50 66 26

25 27 24 20 24 31 18 23 37 25 23 22 20 44

 7  5 10  7  7  9  4  6 15  7  8  5  2  11

47 49 46 55 53 35 61 47 48 31 34 62 70  11

19 20 19 12 16 28 16 18 19 24 29 13 10 31

5 4 6 4 5 7 3 6 4 7 2 4 5 7

20 18 23 23 22 17 21 19 16 26 20 23 12 19

29 28 29 30 26 30 20 29 29 38 35 21 14 51

Source: Compiled from the Ipsos MORI website: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/europe-still-seen-most-important-­relationshipbritain. Note: Percentages sum across the rows per year. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib Dem, Liberal Democrats.

54  The US and NATO groups voted – to leave or remain – in the 2016 Brexit referendum. Analysis of the voting patterns in the referendum has shown the sizable differences in the leave and remain camps across age groups and party supporters, as well as variation in opinion based on socio-economic status (Swales 2016). Much as younger people, Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters and those in higher socio-economic groups were more likely to have supported remaining in the EU in 2016 (Swales 2016), in 2017 they were clearly more predisposed to seeing Europe as most important for Britain relative to America or the Commonwealth. There is again little variation in responses between men and women. The age groups, though, show marked variation in relation to their preferences for Europe: at over half of those aged 18–34 and 35–55 but around a third of those aged 55 and over. Those in the AB social grade were also more likely to select Europe, at 61%, compared to just under half of those in the C1 and C2 social grades and lowest at 31% of those in the DE grouping. There were pronounced differences based on party support. Just 34% of Conservative supporters, who strongly backed Brexit, chose Europe, although that was three times as many as UKIP (11%), also supporters of leaving the EU by an overwhelming majority (Swales 2016: 20). Europe was the preference of large majorities of Labour (62%) and Liberal Democrat supporters (70%), both strong backers of remain in June 2016. In 2017, UKIP supporters were most likely to choose America (51%), and their support for the Commonwealth clearly declined from 2014 (at 31%), while the proportions of Conservative supporters choosing the Commonwealth or America had increased markedly. Data from the British Social Attitude (BSA) series covering a more limited period, 1984–95, reaffirm the primacy accorded to the European relationship by the British public over relations with the US. These data are based on the following question: ‘Do you think Britain’s interests are better served by … closer links with Western Europe or closer links with America?’ In every survey, a plurality or a majority of the public thought that Britain’s interests were better served by close links with Western Europe. Usually, around a fifth selected America and a similar proportion said they were best served by having closer links with both. In every survey, only a small or very small proportion thought that neither partner served Britain’s interests.

The special relationship between Britain and the US ‘Atlanticism’ has been one of the core components of the political consensus on British foreign policy in the post-war period (Kavanagh and Morris 1994), founded on the special relationship forged through Churchill’s close working relations with Roosevelt during the Second World War. The political and personal relationships between prime ministers and presidents have been extremely important for post-war British foreign policy. Indeed, the special relationship has assumed a much larger significance in British foreign and defence policy than it has in the foreign policy of the US, with Frankel arguing that the two partners held differing conceptualisations of their relationship, with it only really being special for the British (1975:

The US and NATO  55 203–8). Moreover, the post-war relationship has been one of asymmetry in terms of the strategic power and influence of each country on the world stage (Frankel 1975: 203–8). Gamble and Kearns identify three stages of the special relationship in the post-war period. First, in the period leading up the Suez crisis in 1956, ‘the UK saw the special relationship as a partnership, and played a considerable role with the US in establishing and designing the institutions of the new world order’ (2007: 119). Second, the post-Suez period saw a more independent foreign policy on the part of Britain, as it oriented itself towards its ­European role, joining the EEC, and relations with the US were ‘cooler’ overall. Suez had also put paid to any notions of an equal partnership (Gamble and Kearns 2007: 119–20). The third phase occurred during the Thatcher (1979–90) and Blair (1997–2007) premierships. During T ­ hatcher’s tenure, there was a renewal of the special relationship as Cold War tensions worsened and as she built close relations with Reagan based on their shared ideological leanings and more hawkish stances on foreign policy and defence (Gamble and Kearns 2007: 120). During Blair’s time in office, there was a very close alignment between US and British foreign policy, particularly over the response to the war against terrorism and the military interventions pursuant of this, and he developed close relations with Clinton and Bush (Gamble and Kearns 2007: 120). As Dumbrell has noted, ‘Personal ties can … help “rescue” the Special Relationship from periods of drift. Difficult leader relations can exacerbate pre-existing problems’ (2013: 97). Recent British prime ministers – Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Theresa May – have all reaffirmed the importance of the special relationship for Britain’s national interests and international role and testified to the deeprooted, shared values and cultural attributes. Brown claimed in 2009 that: Alliances can wither or be destroyed, but partnerships of purpose are indestructible. Friendships can be shaken, but our friendship is unshakeable. Treaties can be broken, but our partnership is unbreakable and I know there is no power on earth that can ever drive us apart (BBC News 2009). In a joint article written in 2012, the respective UK and US leaders, Cameron and Obama, wrote in similar vein that: The alliance between the United States and Great Britain is a partnership of the heart, bound by the history, traditions and values we share. But what makes our relationship special — a unique and essential ­asset — is that we join hands across so many endeavors. Put simply, we count on each other and the world counts on our alliance. (2012). Most recently, Theresa May was the first foreign leader to visit Donald Trump at the White House since his inauguration as president in January 2017, and she duly extolled the past and present links between the two countries (Piper 2017).

56  The US and NATO However, the special relationship comprises a much broader and deeper set of interconnections than relations between each country’s political leaders: Concentrating on personal relations, it might be argued, risks sentimentalising our understanding of the Special Relationship. It also risks over-­ simplifying a complex web of interests and multi-layered connections: what President John F Kennedy called the “coral reef” of transatlantic linkages. The Special Relationship is frequently, and helpfully, likened to a layer-cake, with personal leader relations at its apex, bureaucratic interweaving in the middle, and public-level cultural interaction at its base (Dumbrell 2013: 82). In accord with this ‘layer cake’ analogy, Frankel observed that the special relationship could be analysed at three distinct levels: first, that of the political leadership in both countries; second, that of officials; and third, that of the general public in Britain and the US (1975: 204). This section therefore focusses on the third level, reviewing the British public’s feelings towards and views of the special relationship. When asked in British Election Study (BES) surveys in the 1960s about Britain’s ties with America, overwhelming majorities in 1964 (80%) and 1966 (87%) wanted very close or close relations. Just 20% and 13%, respectively, preferred not very close relations. As discussed earlier, Gallup data from 1969 demonstrated that, as was also the case for links with European countries and the Commonwealth when assessed on their own merits, emphatic majorities of the British public supported a close relationship with the US. Other questions posed by Gallup during the 1950s and the 1970s shed further light on the public’s perceptions of the nature and value of UK-US relations. Often, the public seemed to have held views which showed, on the one hand, a reasonable appreciation of the limits of the relationship for the UK’s foreign policy interests and its essentially unequal – or asymmetrical (Frankel 1975) – basis and, on the other, an appreciation of the need for close cooperation in the areas of foreign and economic policy. In 1952 and 1963, around a fifth agreed that the two countries were natural allies and should always stick together, but the largest share of opinion supported a stance of both nations acting together on most things or where their policies were the same but Britain remaining otherwise independent. Very small proportions concurred that Britain’s relations with the US should be on the same basis as with other countries. In March 1963 a majority (54%) agreed that the UK and the US could cooperate closely, with just 21% arguing against (Gallup 1976a: 673). But in January to February of the same year, 45% argued that there were bound to be conflicts in the long run between the two countries, slightly ahead of the 43% stating they could cooperate closely (Gallup 1976a: 665). In 1962, 52% agreed that British foreign policy relied too much on the US, with another 13% concurring that this was partly true (Gallup 1976a: 662). Just 18% said they disagreed with the statement and 17% were unsure (Gallup 1976a: 662). Over a decade later, in April 1974, opinion was not so skewed. While 45% agreed that national foreign policy was too

The US and NATO  57 reliant on the US – saying it was true or partly true – 30% disagreed, with the remaining 25% unsure (Gallup 1976a: 1324). In the same Gallup poll, a majority (62%) agreed that Britain was not treated as an equal partner by the US in matters of common concern (Gallup 1976a: 1324). This balance of opinion was broadly similar to that elicited by earlier polls. In two polls conducted in November and December 1962, around three-fifths said that Britain was not treated as an equal partner in its dealings with the US (Gallup 1976a: 659, 662), which rose to 70% of the public in January to ­February of the following year (Gallup 1976a: 665). When asked, in the 1960s and 1970s, about the need to work more closely or not with the US in the areas of foreign and economic policy, the British public tended to opt for closer cooperation over less close collaboration. When asked in May 1966, March 1967 and November 1974, support for close cooperation on foreign affairs and economic policy was always the plurality view, ahead of the proportion in favour of less close collaboration (Gallup 1976b: 865, 919, 1370). Usually, around a quarter supported keeping the level of cooperation as it was, in both areas of policy. An exception to this pattern was found in a Gallup poll from May 1965, where 31% apiece of the public supported either closer or less close relations with the US in relation to political and military policies, and a fifth favoured no change (­Gallup 1976a: 812). Gamble and Kearns note that ‘special relationship has had such a hold on the UK political class’ because, first, ‘it has reflected both core and continuing UK interests’, and second, it has furnished ‘a strategy for the management of UK decline’ (2007: 117). A survey of the British foreign policy elite undertaken in the early 1990s found that 80% perceived there to be a special relationship; just 5% said Britain had never enjoyed such a relationship, with 91% saying the connection with the US was crucial or very important to the country’s international role and interests (Sanders and Edwards 1994: 417). The views of opinion-formers in British society have continued to be broadly positive towards the special relationship in recent years. YouGov polls conducted in 2008 and 2016 showed that a near majority (respectively, 49% and 46%) had a positive opinion of the US-UK relationship. In 2008, towards the end of the Bush presidency, 34% held a negative view, which had fallen to just 12% in 2016 at the end of Obama’s tenure. The proportion with a neutral position rose considerably over time, from 17% to 39% (Folwell 2016). As with the public, opinion-formers have recognised both the advantages and the limitations of the special relationship. A majority in both surveys (58%) thought that the UK would never be a full partner. However, 56% in both 2008 and 2016 perceived that it allowed the UK to play a more important world role than it otherwise could, and 51% in 2016 (up from 43% in 2008) adjudged the special relationship as crucial to the country’s long-term security. Other perceptions of the special relationship moved in a positive direction. In 2016, 44% thought it was beneficial for resolving major world issues compared to 29% in 2008. In 2008, 49% thought that the special relationship engendered resentment in other nations, which had slumped to just 14% in 2016. Generally, amongst opinion-formers, positive appraisals of the special relationship were more prevalent amongst Conservative voters than Labour voters (Folwell 2016).

58  The US and NATO What do more recent surveys tell us about the views of the British public towards their country’s relations with the US? A YouGov poll conducted in 2010 gauged the views of the British public towards the partnerships of post-war prime ministers and presidents over the most recent three decades. Based on the question – ‘Thinking back on the UK and US Prime Ministers and Presidents of the last 30 years, regardless of whether it was a good or a bad thing, which do you think had the closest relationship?’ – it found that the partnerships of Thatcher and Blair were rated the highest. Overall, 44% viewed the Thatcher-Reagan partnership as the closest, followed by Tony Blair and George W. Bush (22%), Blair and Bill Clinton (14%) and then Thatcher and George Bush (4%). Ranking even lower, all at just 1%, were the partnerships of Major and George Bush, Major and Clinton, and Brown and Obama. Last and very much least were relations between Brown and Bush (0%!). An Ipsos MORI poll of public opinion in the US and Britain in March to April 2016 found that views of the special relationship were stronger in the former than in the latter. Asked whether they agreed or disagreed if there was currently a special relationship, 52% of those in the US agreed compared to 43% of those in Britain. In Britain, 20% disagreed compared to just 7% in the US (Ipsos MORI 2016a). In both countries, large proportions neither agreed nor disagreed: 37% in Britain and 41% in the US (Ipsos MORI 2016a). Several YouGov opinion polls have probed the British public’s views towards the special relationship in recent years. Table 3.3 reports the question wordings and overall distributions of opinion within the British public (some response categories were combined for clarity of presentation). Overall, the picture is a rather mixed one of both negative and positive appraisals from the British public regarding the perceived importance and functioning of the special relationship. On the one hand, a majority of the public has held favourable views of the US; the public have usually been more likely to think that the relationship is to some degree close than not close; a majority has consistently said that the US is the country’s most important ally; and they have been more likely than not to think that the two countries’ leaders should have a close personal friendship. On the other hand, they have a dismal view of the influence that Britain can exert (just one-in-ten says it has some or a lot of influence); only a minority think the relationship should be stronger, as opposed to the remainder who think it should stay as it is or become weaker; large majorities think the US does not consider Britain’s interests; and they are broadly split over whether Britain’s economic success depends on good transatlantic relations. In other words, clear majorities perceive the US to be Britain’s strongest ally and the balance of opinion thinks it is a close partnership; at the same time, a strong majority thinks it does not properly consider the country’s interests, and an overwhelming proportion says Britain has little or no influence. This latter perception perhaps speaks to the robustly asymmetrical nature of UK-US relations in the post-war period (Frankel 1975). Does a clearer pattern emerge based on the views of party supporters? The data are presented in Table 3.4, which reports the proportion amongst

Table 3.3  P  ublic opinion towards relations between Britain and the US, 2010–15 Generally speaking, how favourable, if at all, would you say you feel towards the US?

05/10 06/10 07/10

Very or somewhat favourable

Not very or not at all favourable

Don’t know

66 54 52

30 40 41

3 6 7

Some people talk of a ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the US. How close do you think this relationship is?

06/10 07/10 05/11 03/12 01/15

Very or fairly close

Not very or not at all close

Don’t know

55 47 64 54 61

39 47 29 40 31

6 6 7 6 7

How much, if any, influence do you think Britain has on US policies?

05/10 07/10 03/12 01/15

A lot or some

Not a lot or none

Don’t know

11 10 11 10

85 84 83 83

4 5 6 7

Do you think that Britain should have a stronger relationship with the US, weaker relationship with the US or should it stay the same as it is now?

07/10 03/12

Stronger

Weaker

Stay the same

Don’t know

24 20

23 21

42 49

11 9

The US is Britain’s most important ally

05/10 06/10 07/10 03/12

Total agree

Total disagree

Neither

Don’t know

62 57 56 61

31 22 24 21

15 16 15 14

3 5 5 5 (Continued)

60  The US and NATO Generally, the US does not consider Britain’s interests

07/10 03/12

Total agree

Total disagree

Neither

Don’t know

66 63

19 21

10 10

5 6

The success of the British economy depends on good relations with the US

07/10 03/12

Total agree

Total disagree

Neither

Don’t know

37 34

32 35

23 25

7 7

It is important for the leaders of the US and Britain to have a close, personal friendship

05/10 06/10 07/10 03/12

Total agree

Total disagree

Neither

Don’t know

54 58 49 50

29 22 28 28

14 15 17 17

3 4 6 5

Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/. Note: Percentages sum across the rows.

Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters taking a supportive position or giving a positive assessment of UK-US relations. There are some moderate differences of view, although this is not the case for every question or indeed necessarily sustained across the iterations of each question. There is a tendency for Conservative supporters to be somewhat more positive in their appraisals and for Labour supporters to be less so. This is particularly the case for the closeness of the relationship, the US being the most important ally and the need for close personal relations between leaders. Separate data on UKIP supporters were only available in the 2015 YouGov poll. Their views were closer to that of Labour voters, so they lagged Conservative supporters in their support for the special relationship. In recent years, there has tended to be quite a lot of similarity in the broad pattern of opinion towards UK-US relations amongst other demographic groups. Using the same set of YouGov opinion polls as in Table 3.4, covering the period 2010–15, men and women tended to hold similar opinions, there were no consistent and pronounced differences across age groups, and there was little variation in view towards the special relationship based on social grade (comparing those in the ABC1 and C2DE groups). A ComRes poll undertaken in January 2015, asking if Britain’s relationship with the US should not be so close, found that disagreement with this proposition was highest amongst Conservative supporters (at 66%), compared to smaller majorities of other party groupings (Labour: 51%; Liberal Democrat: 50%; UKIP: 54%) (ComRes 2015b). Around a fifth of

Table 3.4  P  ublic opinion towards relations between Britain and the US by party support, 2010–15 Some people talk of a ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the US. How close do you think this relationship is? % Very or fairly close

07/10 05/11 03/12 01/15

Con

Lab

Lib Dem

52 73 73 77

46 58 49 57

50 68 49 80

How much, if any, influence do you think Britain has on US policies? % A lot or some.

07/10 03/12 01/15

Con

Lab

Lib Dem

11 18 15

12  8  9

13 10 16

Do you think that Britain should have a stronger relationship with the US, weaker relationship with the US or should it stay the same as it is now? % Stronger

07/10 03/12

Con

Lab

Lib Dem

29 30

26 19

19 18

The US is Britain’s most important ally. % Agree

07/10 03/12

Con

Lab

Lib Dem

67 78

55 54

52 63

Generally, the US does not consider Britain’s interests. % Agree

07/10 03/12

Con

Lab

Lib Dem

70 56

66 66

75 68

The success of the British economy depends on good relations with the US. % Agree

07/10 03/12

Con

Lab

Lib Dem

47 45

40 30

32 41

It is important for the leaders of the US and Britain to have a close, personal friendship. % Agree

07/10 03/12

Con

Lab

Lib Dem

61 68

50 45

53 52

Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib Dem, Liberal Democrats.

62  The US and NATO Conservative supporters agreed that relations were too close, rising to around a third amongst other party supporters (ComRes 2015b). Of course, these polls have been conducted during a period, 2010–15, when the Conservatives were the majority party in a coalition government and when their leader, David Cameron, was at the apex of the special relationship alongside President Obama. The election of Donald Trump as US president in November 2016, who campaigned on a platform of ‘America First’, heralded a more assertive and nationalistic approach to US foreign policy and relations with its allies, including the special relationship. Various polls have been undertaken to gauge the effect of Trump’s presidency on the British public’s views of UK-US relations. In general, the British public has tended to offer unfavourable views of Trump as a leader and the potential impact of his administration on US-UK relations and international politics more widely, revealing often widespread apprehension or opprobrium. ComRes polls conducted in August and December 2016 and in February 2017 showed that strong majorities held unfavourable views of Trump – respectively, 76%, 65% and 68% (ComRes 2016a, 2016c, 2017b). A ComRes poll from November 2016 showed that 63% thought that Trump had made the world less safe, with just 22% saying he had the made the world safer or had no impact (ComRes 2016b). The same poll showed that a majority thought that Trump would be a bad rather than a good president; a plurality said he would be bad for UK-US relations, and while views were broadly split, slightly more thought that Trump’s presidency would make it easier for the UK to strike a trade deal with the US (ComRes 2016b). In a more hard-headed assessment, in January 2017, 49% of the British public said Theresa May should pursue a close relationship with Trump because of the national interest; 31% supported the opposite strategy even if it harmed national interests (ComRes 2017c). An Ipsos MORI poll from October 2017 reaffirmed the British public’s negative evaluation of Trump’s presidency on world politics: 78% said his presidency had adversely impacted the US’s international standing, against 14% who said it had had no impact and just 6% who adjudged it had been enhanced (Ipsos MORI 2017a). A poll undertaken by Opinium in January 2017 also demonstrated a predominantly negative perception of Trump in Britain that was, to some extent, offset by recognition of the strong relevance of US-UK relations (Drummond 2017). Several YouGov polls tend to reinforce this predominantly negative impression in Britain formed in the lead-up to and in the early stages of Trump’s presidency. In several polls in 2017 and 2018, majorities of the British public adjudged that Trump would be – or has been – a poor or terrible president (YouGov 2017f, 2018a). Other assessments of his performance as president were similarly bleak. In polls conducted from January 2017 to January 2018, the majority opted for the view that they thought Trump would perform badly and has (YouGov 2017e, 2017f, 2018a). Set against this critical response, another YouGov question asked in 2017 and 2018 showed that a

The US and NATO  63 majority or plurality of opinion took the view that the British government needed to work with Trump’s administration, rather than distance themselves from it (YouGov 2017d, 2018a). More broadly, with a Trump administration in its early phase, a YouGov poll conducted in October 2017 showed that just 17% agreed that there was a special relationship between the two countries (YouGov 2017f). Nearly half (47%) thought that the countries shared a close relationship, but it was not special, and acknowledged that they both had close relations with other nations. A fifth (22%) said that they were no longer close allies, and 14% were unsure (YouGov 2017f).

The US and its international role Examining the nature and extent of cross-national opinion towards the US has become an area of keen scholarly inquiry in recent years, given a general upsurge in anti-US sentiment in the post-9/11 era. While there has been considerable debate over how to define and classify anti-Americanism and to what extent it is based on what America is (its values, society and culture) compared to what America does (the policies it pursues and its conduct in pursuit of them) (Keohane and Katzenstein 2006: 2), as well as work trying to delineate differing political manifestations across countries and regions and their causes and consequences. Much work has focussed on detailed analysis of the nature, extent and antecedents of public hostility towards the US – as a society and as a foreign policy actor – and this has included examining how public views may be rooted in aspects of domestic politics within European societies, with historical and contemporary manifestations of anti-Americanism evident on the broad left and right of the political spectrum (Fabbrini 2002). Holsti’s detailed study of cross-country public opinion on this topic concluded that the evidence tended to show that what America does – the policies it pursues in the international arena – was more important than what America is: ‘On balance, the evidence … suggests that for many publics abroad, their critical views of the United States may be bounded and perhaps transient rather than deeply embedded in core values’ (2008: 87). Moreover, party politics in Britain has witnessed strands of anti-American thought on both the right and left of the political spectrum, although, as Crewe observes, ‘Britain has not known a period in which attitudes to the United States were the touchstone of partisan allegiance’, which was the case in some West European countries (1985: 39). In the post-war era, with Atlanticism a key pillar of the bipartisan foreign policy consensus, there was a discernible strand of ‘latent anti-Americanism’ within the Labour Party (Kavanagh and Morris 1994: 99). In particular, it was a feature of the Labour left’s thinking on foreign policy issues. In the interwar period, views on the US and its world role were shaped by anti-capitalism and in the post-war period by anti-militarism (Jones 1997: 19). Certainly, opposing views on the US and its world role have intersected with other defence and foreign policy issues – such as nuclear weapons and military intervention – which

64  The US and NATO have often seriously divided the Labour left and right, particularly during long periods spent in opposition. Anti-Americanism in the Labour Party has both been constrained by the more pragmatic approach to foreign policy taken by the party leadership in office in the post-war period (Singh 2007), fortified by the strong pro-US tendency within the party’s right, but also to some extent galvanised by the perceived siding with the US on particular issues, such as Harold Wilson’s handling of US-UK relations concerning the Vietnam War. On the Vietnam War, Vickers notes that ‘Many on the left of the Labour Party saw Vietnam largely as a war of national liberation, whereas most of the party leaders regarded it as part of the global struggle against Communism’ (2008: 46). After recent ‘New Labour’ leaders – Brown and Blair – who were staunch supporters of US-UK relations in office, the current Labour leader in opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, has been described as tending to be more anti-American in his stances on a range of international issues (The Economist 2015). During his leadership, Corbyn has been strongly critical of the Trump administration and its policies, stating during his Chatham House speech on foreign policy during the 2017 general election that ‘Britain deserves better than simply outsourcing our country’s security and prosperity to the whims of the Trump White House’ (2017). More recently, in January 2018, Corbyn denied that the US was the most important relationship for the UK, arguing that it was one amongst a range of important global relationships involving other countries and international institutions (Buchan 2018). There was also a tradition of hostility to the US inside the Conservative Party rooted in ‘imperialist rhetoric from the nineteenth century’, in the postwar period voiced in particular by the right-wing Monday Club given its apprehension over the deleterious impact of US-led globalisation (Fleming 2016), as well as leading thinkers such as Enoch Powell (Singh 2007: 196), with concerns voiced over political sovereignty, economic power and national values and culture. Whereas ‘the Conservative Right today welcomes the USA’s leading global role and regards Britain as a partner in that endeavour’ (Fleming 2016). What have been the British public’s views towards the US, its people, president and its conduct in the international arena? In earlier research on British public opinion towards the US, focussing on the 1970s–80s, Crewe noted that the ‘general attitudes of liking and trust are positive’ but these became ‘lukewarm when directed to the performance and judgement of the United States government and of particular presidents’ (1985: 40). Is this broad distinction in opinion a feature of British public opinion in more recent decades? Cross-national survey series established in the post-9/11 era, such as the Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP) and Transatlantic Trends (TT), provide valuable data on this topic for Britain and other countries. The Pew GAP has asked the following questions: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States.

The US and NATO  65 Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Americans. Now I’m going to read a list of political leaders. For each, tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs - a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all. The TT surveys have featured the following questions: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States? How desirable is it that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very desirable, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable? Do you approve or disapprove of the way the President of the United States … is? Handling international policies. To provide a comparative focus, the opinions of the British public on these questions are reported alongside those for France, Germany and Spain. The Pew GAP data are shown in Table 3.5, and the data from the TT surveys are reported in Table 3.6. Based on the Pew GAP surveys, the proportions with favourable views of the US are shown between 1999–2000 and 2017. During the Bush presidency (2001–09), favourable opinions are clearly higher in the UK over time, albeit declining somewhat. But across all countries, there was a marked shift in favourability when Obama assumed the presidency. Between 2008 and 2009, positive views of the US increased from 53% to 69% in the UK, from 42% to 75% in France, from 31% to 64% in Germany and similarly rose from 33% to 58% in Spain. For France, Germany and Spain, evaluations during Obama’s presidency were clearly much higher than during Bush’s tenure. Whereas favourable views of the US were relatively higher in the UK during Bush’s time in office, but this was not the case during Obama’s presidency. In 2017, when Trump had just become president – being inaugurated in January – favourability ratings fell sharply in every country: from 61% to 50% in Britain, from 63% to 46% in France, from 57% to 35% in Germany and more than halving in Spain, declining from 69% to 31%. In every country, whereas a favourable view was the position of a comfortable majority in 2016, in 2017 it had fallen to half in Britain, less than half in France and declined to around a third in Germany and Spain. In terms of views of the American people – as expressed in Pew GAP data, also shown in Table 3.5 – large majorities of public opinion in the UK have held favourable opinions between 2002 and 2013, as have those in Germany. Favourable opinion registered at somewhat lower levels amongst the French and Spanish publics during the Bush presidency, although they increased during Obama’s time in office. The favourability ratings held up in most countries in 2017, when the question returned, though they receded

Table 3.5  P ublic opinion towards the US by country, 1999–2017 Year

1999–2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Per cent with a favourable view of the US

Per cent with a favourable view of the American people

UK

France Germany Spain

UK France

Germany Spain UK France

83

62

78

75 70 58 55 56 51 53 69 65 61 60 58 66 65 61 50

62 42 37 43 39 39 42 75 73 75 69 64 75 73 63 46

60 45 38 42 37 30 31 64 63 62 52 53 51 50 57 35

82 80 72 70 69 70 70 73 73 73 72 68

71 58 53 54 65 61 64 75 72 78 75 67

79 67 68 66 66 63 55 64 68 70 63 61

74

73

64

50 38 41 23 34 33 58 61 64 58 62 60 65 69 31

Per cent with confidence in US president Germany Spain

30

20

51

47

51

20

33

26

56 37 46 41 52 59 64 60 63

38 30 24 16 86 84 75 80 72 74 76 79 22

25 15 14 13 91 87 84 86 83 83 83 84 14

30 25 19 14 93 90 88 87 88 71 73 86 11

18 7 7 8 72 69 67 61 54 58 58 75 7

56

Source: Compiled from the Pew GAP Global Indicators Database: http://pewglobal.org/database/.

Table 3.6  P  ublic opinion towards the US by country, 2002–14 Year

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Per cent saying it is desirable for Per cent with a favourable opinion the US to exert strong leadership of the US in world affairs

Per cent approve of US president’s handling of international policies

UK

France

Germany Spain UK

France Germany Spain

UK France

Germany

Spain

72 55 54 53 48 50 48 64 74 66 62 65 65

48 27 24 28 30 28 28 52 46 48 56 53 52

68 45 37 40 44 38 39 65 59 60 57 63 60

74 75 58 81 77 73

30 35 27 32 20 17 17 82 73 74 67 64 63

36 16 12 15 12 13 12 92 87 81 80 76 57

10 12 10 10 12 85 74 68 69 57 55

18 22 19 18 18 42 44 35 38 31 39

73 76 78 76 67 67

70 71 72 70 68 58

74 77 70 72 62 66

21 15 12 13 12 12 11 88 82 76 81 73 69

Source: Compiled from the Transatlantic Trends website: http://www.gmfus.org/initiatives/transatlantic-trends-%E2%80%93public-opinion.

68  The US and NATO somewhat in Spain. Where there have been marked differences between the two series, positive views of the American people have, on the whole, tended to be higher than those registered for the US as a country. Favourability ratings from the TT surveys, covering the more recent period of 2009–14, are shown in Table 3.6. During the Obama years, again, positive opinion ran at very high levels in the UK, France, Germany and Spain, although it dipped somewhat in 2013–14. As with the Pew GAP data for this period, attitudes in the UK were not more favourable than those expressed in other countries. In terms of gauging cross-national views on the international role played by the US, Table 3.6 charts the proportions in the four European countries saying it is somewhat or very desirable for the US to exert strong global leadership. In general, favourable opinion has been highest amongst the UK public over time, followed by Germany, France and then Spain (where the time series began in 2004). Indeed, averaged over time, 60% of those in the UK have seen strong US world leadership as desirable to some extent, compared to 52% of the public in Germany, 40% in France and just 29% in Spain. Despite this consistent pattern, all countries again witnessed an increase in favourable opinion at the beginning of Obama’s presidency, moving sharply upwards between 2008 and 2009. Comparing public opinion during the Bush and Obama presidencies on this measure, it is generally at a higher level in each country during the latter’s tenure. Based on data collected in the Pew GAP surveys between 2001 and 2017, Table 3.5 also reports the proportion of the public in each of the four countries with a lot or some confidence in the President of the US. This period covers the entire duration of the Bush and Obama presidencies. During the Bush era, confidence was very low and tended to erode over time; the Obama-bounce from 2008 to 2009 is striking. The levels of confidence in 2008 and 2009 were, respectively, 16% and 86% in Britain, 13% and 91% in France, 14% and 93% in Germany and 8% and 72% in Spain. During the Bush presidency, confidence tended to be higher in Britain than in its European neighbours, but that has not been case during the Obama era. In the most recent survey (spring 2017), which coincides with the start of Donald Trump’s Republican presidency, confidence levels have fallen dramatically in European countries – a dramatic Trump slump. In Britain, confidence fell from 79% in 2016 to just 22% in 2017, underlining the predominantly negative perceptions of Trump held in Britain already discussed. This also happened in Germany (declining from 86% to 11%), France (from 84% to 14%) and Spain (from 75% to 7%). These levels are broadly akin to those seen in the last full year of Bush’s presidency, in 2008. This abrupt cross-national shift in opinion has also been confirmed in Gallup data. Amongst the UK public, 33% approved of the ‘job performance of the leadership of the United States’ in 2017 – a steep decline of 26 percentage points from the previous year – while 63% disapproved (Gallup World Poll 2018: 10). Across European countries, the median levels of approval and disapproval in 2017 were, respectively, 25% and 56%, compared

The US and NATO  69 to 44% and 35% in 2016 (Gallup World Poll 2018: 8). Strikingly contrasting appraisals of Obama and Trump were also registered in a cross-national poll undertaken by Ipsos MORI in January 2017. In Britain, 82% said that Obama has been, on balance, a good president and just 18% expressed the opposite view; on Trump, 80% expected that he would be a bad president and 20% said the opposite (Ipsos MORI 2017). This huge shift in favourable views – from Bush to Obama – is also present in responses to a TT question asking about how the president is handling international policies: as shown in Table 3.6, during the Bush presidency ratings were consistently poor, and the Obama-related shift, causing dramatic increases in public approval, occurred across European countries between 2008 and 2009. Since then approval has been much higher, but it has been on a declining trajectory up to 2014. Still, in every year between 2009 and 2014, a clear majority of opinion in each country approved of Obama’s handling of international affairs. Between 2003 and 2008, across countries, Bush’s approval ratings peaked at 35% in 2003 in the UK, at 21% in 2002 in France, at 36% in 2002 in Germany and at 12% in Spain in both 2005 and 2008. Overall, in the UK as in other European countries, presidential evaluations shifted considerably when Bush was replaced by Obama and then when Obama gave way to Trump. These changes also occurred alongside increased positive feelings towards the US as a country and its international role, although these shifts, while sizable, were not as dramatic as these seen for the shifting presidential appraisals. These rapid changes in public sentiment, which have accompanied changes in the occupant and party-political ownership of the Oval Office, shed some light on Holsti’s observation that, for public opinion overseas, ‘critical views of the United States may be bounded and perhaps transient rather than deeply embedded in core values’ (2008: 87). These findings in relation to changes of presidential administration similarly provide some support for Keohane and Katzenstein’s claim that ‘Negative views of the United States wax and wane with political events, in different rhythms, in different parts of the world, in countries with very different kinds of politics’ (2006: 6). Returning to the broad distinction in the British public’s views of the US made by Crewe (1985), the evidence from the Pew GAP and the TT surveys tends to confirm the much more positive views of the US and its people in general, which endure over time, while the public mood can be particularly warm or cold towards different presidents. A profile of contemporary public opinion Further insight into how sections of the UK public have viewed the US, its people and the president can be obtained by analysing the Pew GAP 2016 survey in more depth. Responses to these three questions across a range of socio-demographic groups are shown in Table 3.7 (for the UK sample only). Men were slightly more positive towards the US than women (64% versus 59%). In terms of age, favourable views were not too dissimilar across

70  The US and NATO Table 3.7  P ublic opinion towards the US by demographic group

Sex Age group

Education

Party support

Ideology

 

US: per cent favourable

American people: per cent favourable

US President: per cent has confidence

Male Female 18–29 30–44 45–64 65+ Degree level or higher Other qualifications None Con

64 59 62 59 62 64 63 62 48 76

73 65 71 66 71 68 76 66 70 70

73 83 88 76 77 77 87 78 51 84

Lab Lib Dem UKIP Other party Would not vote/don’t know Left Centre Right

57 64 58 48 60

72 68 71 68 65

90 84 51 70 78

51 62 71

66 71 67

77 83 61

Source: Analysis of Pew GAP 2013 and 2016 surveys; British sample. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib Dem, Liberal Democrats.

groups (though negative views were highest amongst those aged 30–44, at 32%). Positive views of the US were more prevalent amongst those with some level of qualification compared to those without qualifications (48%). Amongst those with no qualifications, 28% held a negative view. There are large differences in opinion across party support and ideology. Conservative supporters are most favourable towards the US (76%), followed by Liberal Democrat supporters (64%). Then there is a close clustering of Labour supporters, UKIP backers and those unsure or who would not vote (ranging between 57% and 60%). Around three-fifths of Labour supporters were favourable. Supporters of other parties were less enamoured of the US – just 48% held a favourable view, with 41% negatively inclined. Assessments were clearly divided based on ideological location: 71% of those on the right held positive assessments, ahead of those in the centre (62%) and lowest amongst those on the left (51%). Positive sentiment towards the US is most pronounced on the ideological and partisan right of the political spectrum.

The US and NATO  71 All groups registered clear majorities with a positive view of the American people. Even so, views were somewhat more favourable amongst men (73%) than women (65%). In terms of educational attainment, it was highest amongst those with a degree-level qualification (76%). The pronounced variation seen in views of the US and its president based on party affiliation and left-right ideology is much less marked in relation to opinions of the American people. Positive views are almost identical amongst those on the left and right (66% versus 67%) and differ little across supporters of the larger and smaller parties. Group-related views of Obama’s international leadership can also be seen in Table 3.7, reporting the proportions with confidence in his performance. The striking finding is that, across all demographic and political groups in Britain, generally strong or very strong majorities expressed confidence in Obama’s handling of international policies. The level of confidence is most emphatic amongst women (83%), those aged 18–29 (88%), those with a degree or higher (87%), Labour supporters (90%) and those in the ideological centre (83%). Lack of confidence in Obama’s performance was highest amongst men (26%), those aged 30–44 (24%), those supporting UKIP (46%), those with no qualifications (46%) and amongst those on the ideological right (38%). In relation to more recent polling concerning views of Trump and his administration, favourable evaluations have tended to be more common amongst UKIP supporters (Drummond 2017). This analysis of the Pew GAP and TT surveys has focussed on general evaluations of the US as a country and of its president. We can also profile cross-national opinion towards the US’s international role on specific issues – views on what America does – by using evidence from the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys, based on data collected in the period 2002–06. This encompasses a period of considerable tension in US-European relations, with the EU seriously divided over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, issues of torture and extraordinary rendition emerging from the broader war against terrorism and European disapproval of other policies pursued by the Bush administration, such as on climate change and economic protectionism. The EB surveys asked, ‘In your opinion would you say that the United States tends to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor negative role?’. The issue areas covered were world peace, the fight against terrorism, the fight against world poverty, protecting the world environment and growth of the world economy. The proportions of the British public giving a negative verdict on the US role in these areas are shown in Table 3.8, along with the average for the EU-15, consisting of those Western European countries that had been long-standing members. Looking at opinion in Britain, negative appraisals were highest over time for protecting the environment, with majorities returning unfavourable verdicts (61% averaged across surveys). In the other areas, lower proportions tended to hold negative evaluations, next highest for world peace and combating poverty (both 44% averaged across surveys), followed by fighting terrorism and the world economy (respectively, 32%

72  The US and NATO Table 3.8  Per cent with a negative view of the US’s world role in issue areas, 2002–06 2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

32 19 39 52

37 27 40 52

52 38 49 68

46 35 44 68

53 42 46 67

27

29

34

30

37

46 28 49 57

53 37 52 58

61 45 56 66

56 44 55 65

58 36 55 65

34

36

38

36

37

UK World peace Fight against terrorism Fight against world poverty Protecting the world environment Growth of world economy EU-15 World peace Fight against terrorism Fight against world poverty Protecting the world environment Growth of world economy Source: Analysis of EB surveys.

and 31%). A similar order is evident for public opinion across the EU-15 countries, with negative opinion ranking highest for the environment (62% averaged across surveys), followed by world peace and poverty at similar levels (55% and 53%, respectively) and lowest for the fight against terrorism and the global economy (38% and 36%, respectively). Negative opinion across the EU-15 was several percentage points higher than in the UK in five out of the six issue areas. Using the autumn 2006 EB survey, a profile of public opinion towards the international role of the US can be produced for demographic groups in Britain, classified by sex, age group, education and ideology, as shown in Table 3.9. Bearing in mind, again, that the survey was conducted in a period when there had been tensions in transatlantic relations and the Bush administration and its foreign policy agenda was relatively unpopular amongst European publics, we can see that men and women had similar levels of negative sentiment, apart from the environment, where a larger majority of men had a negative appraisal. There was a tendency for those who had completed their education at aged 19 and over to have more negative views across policy areas, though this was less apparent for views on the world economy. Negative sentiment was generally lower amongst those who completed education aged 17–18 and even lower amongst those who left at age 16 or under (except for views on the world economy). There was a clear divergence of opinion based on ideological orientation. Those on the left were much more likely to offer negative evaluations of the US’s international role,

The US and NATO  73 Table 3.9  Per cent with a negative view towards the US’s world role in issue areas by demographic group World Fighting Fighting Protecting Growth Consistently peace terrorism poverty environment of world negative economy Sex

Male Female

55 52

43 41

47 46

73 62

38 37

20 19

Age

15–29 years 30–44 years 45–64 years 65+

50

40

39

57

33

16

57

48

51

68

38

21

56

44

53

75

42

24

48

35

38

65

34

16

Age 16 and completed under education 17–18 19 and over Ideology Left Centre

47

36

41

61

36

17

59 65

43 57

51 57

72 80

36 41

18 26

68 52

58 41

66 43

76 68

49 37

35 18

46

31

48

68

26

10

 

Right

Source: Analysis of EB Autumn 2006 survey; UK sample.

and those on the centre and particularly the ideological right tended to have less negative views. Across the six issue areas, the average proportion with a negative appraisal was 64% amongst those on the left, 48% for those in the centre and 44% for those on the right. This ideological inflection of public views of the US’s efforts on international issues broadly corresponds with the less favourable views of the US as a country also seen amongst the ideological left. Unfortunately, equivalent data are not available for Obama’s time as US president. A summary measure of these groups’ views of the US can be constructed by looking at the proportions with negative views across all five policy areas. Lawson and Hudson used this ‘sustained opposition to American policies across five dimensions’ as a definition of anti-Americanism in their cross-national study of public opinion in EU member states (2015: 6). The final column in Table 3.9 reports, for each group, the proportion with an ‘anti-American’ stance (standing at 20% overall). Consistent opposition was almost identical for both men and women but was most prevalent amongst those aged 45–64 (24%) and those who had left education aged 19 and over (26%). The largest source of variation comes from ideological location: 35% of those on the left held anti-American views on these policy dimensions, compared to 18% of those in the centre and 10% of those on the right. In

74  The US and NATO other words, consistent policy-based opposition to the US was twice as likely for those on the left compared to those in the centre and more than three times as likely compared to those on the right.

NATO Britain was a founding member of NATO in 1949. NATO has been the security and military cornerstone of the transatlantic alliance during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, and this has clearly been a key plank of the bipartisan approach to foreign policy followed by successive Labour and ­Conservative governments in the post-war era (Kavanagh and Morris 1994). Public opinion towards NATO in its member countries has been given added topicality for several reasons. First, given the worsening relations between NATO countries and Russia due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and more general tensions over different aspects of international policy. Second, given the controversial pronouncements about the organisation made by President Donald Trump on the campaign trail and since taking office in January 2017, including labelling NATO as ‘obsolete’ – a view which he subsequently renounced (Johnson 2017), setting conditions for defending its members against offensive action (in apparent contradiction of the commitment enshrined in Article 5) and expressing trenchant views on the need for other member countries to increase their spending on defence (Birnbaum and ­Gibbons-Neff 2017). Third, at ­ abour Party in Sephome, the emergence of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the L tember 2015 gave rise to considerable scrutiny of his views on foreign and defence policy, including his previous utterances on the role of NATO, with his seeming refusal to endorse the collective defence of NATO marking him out from his predecessors (Strong 2015b; Kendall 2015). In 2011, Corbyn called NATO a ‘major problem’ and a ‘danger to world peace’ but seems to have revised his views somewhat since becoming leader (­ Cowburn 2017). Indeed, the Labour Party’s long-standing commitment to NATO was reaffirmed in its 2017 general election manifesto (Labour Party 2017). Has support for Britain’s NATO membership similarly been a consensual feature of public opinion and amongst supporters of the main political parties? Research in the US has found that, between 1973 and 2014, an average of 62% of Americans expressed a positive or supportive opinion towards NATO, in that they supported membership, wanted to retain their country’s commitment to it, or thought it was crucial for their national security (Eichenberg 2016a). However, in more recent years, there has some partisan divergence between Republican and Democratic supporters, with the former group clearly more supportive of a more independent approach to transatlantic security, that is they favoured a less close partnership with Europe (Eichenberg 2016a). Gallup data show that there has been consistent majority support for NATO in the US public between 1989 and 2017 but that party-political opinions have diverged over time, with Democrats more emphatic in their support (Smith 2017).

The US and NATO  75 What do the historical survey data tell us about the British public’s stance towards NATO? Surveys conducted by the US Information Agency in the 1950s and early 1960 asked Western European publics for their views on NATO’s role and effectiveness. They reveal a somewhat variegated patterning of opinion in Britain. Asked how much confidence they had in NATO as a defence organisation, between 1957 and 1961, in Britain, the plurality view was having a great deal or some confidence in NATO’s effectiveness (ranging from 36% to 45%), with the proportion having not very much confidence or none at all varying between 23% and 30% (Merritt and Puchala 1968: 350). Across surveys, around a one-fifth to one-quarter of the British public were unaware of NATO (Merritt and Puchala 1968: 350). Between 1956 and 1963, several surveys showed that, while around a quarter were unaware of NATO, the perception that it was in a healthy condition tended to be more prevalent than the opposite view that it was not in a healthy condition (although a significant proportion was also unsure) (Merritt and Puchala 1968: 349). Between 1955 and 1960, the British public were much more likely to evaluate NATO as having contributed a great deal or somewhat to Western European security than to say it had contributed very little, not at all, or had actually endangered security (Merritt and Puchala 1968: 348). Asked a more direct question about NATO’s existence, in December 1955, just 4% of the British public agreed it should be abolished in the present circumstances, compared to 42% who supported its retention (5% were unsure; 49% had already indicated that they were not aware of NATO) (Merritt and Puchala 1968: 348). In the same year, 30% of the British public adjudged NATO to have done well, 12% said not so well and just 2% said it had performed badly (31% had already reported that they were not aware of NATO) (Merritt and Puchala 1968: 347). In 1957, the most common view amongst the British public was that their confidence in NATO had stayed the same (33%), with negative assessments (it had gone down) to at 19% outranking positive evaluations (gone up) at 6%; only a very small proportion of the public (5%) had never had any confidence, while 11% were unsure (Merritt and Puchala 1968: 351). A long-running question has gauged British public opinion towards NATO’s role as a security alliance since the early 1960s: ‘Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country’s security. Others say NATO is no longer essential to our country’s security. Which view is closer to your own?’ Figure 3.2 charts the responses for Britain between 1967 and 1991. It shows that, consistent with NATO’s role as a key part of Britain’s post-war consensus during the Cold War, large majorities of the public consistently thought that NATO was essential for this purpose, lowest at 59% in 1967 and highest at 81% in 1971. The proportion taking the opposite view was highest in 1982 (25%) but otherwise registered at a lower level, ranging between 8% and 16% over time. The remainder of the public, a fluctuating minority, were unsure. Cross-nationally, support for NATO’s essential role in providing security was consistently higher in Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands

76  The US and NATO 90 80 70 60 %

50 40 30 20 10 0 1967

1970

1973

NATO is essential

1976

1979

1982

NATO is not essential

1985

1988

1991

Don't know

Figure 3.2  P  ublic opinion towards NATO and national security, 1967–91. Source: Compiled from Eichenberg (1989: 124) and Eurobarometer surveys.

compared to France, where support for NATO was always the plurality view, but significant proportions took the opposing view (Eichenberg 1989: 124–25). Averaged over time, 71% of those in Britain supported NATO, compared to 77% in West Germany and 72% in the Netherlands; in France, it was a much lower 43% (Eichenberg 1989: 124–25). When asked in 1984 and 1987 to choose between staying in NATO or leaving and becoming a neutral country, clear majorities of the British public opted for the former: 70% versus 22% in 1984 (9% unsure) and 72% compared to 11% in 1987 (11% did not know). The BSA surveys provide data on support for Britain’s NATO membership during most of the 1980s, based on the following question asked between 1983 and 1990: ‘Do you think Britain should continue to be a member of NATO – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – or should it withdraw?’ The results show, during the last decade of the Cold War era, that large and stable majorities of the British public favoured continuing membership, ranging between 74% and 81%, in accord with the historic survey data already discussed. Only very small proportions favoured withdrawal from NATO during the 1980s, between 10% and 15%. Generally, across surveys, around a tenth could not offer an opinion. A single question from the BSA 1987 survey similarly showed emphatic support for NATO membership, at 86%, with just 7% opposed. So large majorities of the British public have consistently affirmed their support for membership of NATO and its pivotal role in protecting national security, thereby

The US and NATO  77 undergirding the elite-level consensus on the intrinsic importance of British membership of NATO. More recent opinion polls also show consistent majorities in support of Britain’s NATO membership and its core aims. In 2014, a YouGov poll found that a majority of the British public (57%) backed their country retaining its commitments to defend a NATO ally (or allies) if they were attacked (YouGov 2014a) – NATO’s Article 5, enshrining the principle of collective defence amongst the member nations, where an attack on one country is treated as an attack on all countries. The proportion who rejected this commitment stood at 18%, exceeded by the 26% who were unsure (YouGov 2014a). A cross-country YouGov poll undertaken in January 2017 found that 73% of the British public supported membership of NATO (with 10% unsure and just 4% opposed), compared to 68% in Germany, 54% in France, 80% in Sweden and 75% in Norway (YouGov 2017c). Similarly, majorities in each country – including 68% in Britain, with just 5% holding the opposite view – said that NATO has an important role to play in defending Western countries (YouGov 2017c). The 2014 Chatham House survey, undertaken by YouGov, found that 36% of the public saw NATO as vital to the country’s security, with another 25% seeing it as important but perceiving other security institutions as more important. Just 14% said it was no longer relevant as an organisation, 3% said none of these, with the remaining 22% unsure (YouGov 2014b). A parallel survey of opinion-formers showed that 46% adjudged NATO as essential for national security, 32% viewed NATO as important but thought other international institutions were more so, 14% denied its relevance for the present day, with 6% giving some other response (YouGov 2015b). How have the British public’s views towards NATO compared with those in other member countries? A question on NATO has been asked in the Pew GAP surveys between 2009 and 2017 and is worded as follows: ‘Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of… NATO, that is, North Atlantic Treaty Organization’. The proportions with a favourable view in four European members of NATO – Britain, Germany, France and Spain – are shown in Table 3.10. Positive views of NATO have been broadly stable amongst the British public in recent years, in the range of 59%–63%, with opposition always below 20%; in fact, negative sentiment is consistently below the proportion that is unsure. Amongst the British public, then, positive views of NATO have been three times as common as negative opinions, based on the Pew GAP survey data. Net support for NATO has ranged from +43 to +46. Other European NATO member countries also register majority or plurality support for NATO. Averaged over time, positive sentiment was lower in Spain (51%), while it has been higher in Britain (61%), Germany (61%) and France (64%).

78  The US and NATO Table 3.10  P  er cent favourable towards NATO by country, 2009–17

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015 2016 2017

Britain

Germany

France

Spain

63 60 63 62 59 60 61 62

73 57 60 65 59 55 59 67

71 68 70 67 58 64 49 60

56 53 62 55 42 47 45 45

Source: Compiled from the Pew GAP Global Indicators Database: http://pewglobal.org/ database/. NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The TT surveys have asked a question on NATO and one on the state of the EU-US security relationship: Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country’s security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own? Do you think that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the US and the EU should become closer, remain about the same, or should the EU take a more independent approach? The NATO question was asked between 2002 and 2014, and the proportions (in the same European countries) saying it is essential for national security are shown in Table 3.11. In Britain, public opinion is similar in profile to that seen in the Pew GAP surveys – over time, clear majorities have believed that NATO is essential for national security, albeit the size of the majority fluctuates over time. The proportion disagreeing has ranged between 20% and 30%, and the proportions unsure have been lower still. Net support for NATO in the British public has ranged from a low of +32 to a peak of 56+. The levels of support seen more recently affirming NATO’s essential role for national security are, therefore, broadly in line with those expressed by the British public in earlier decades in response to a question focussing on NATO’s role for European security. In terms of Britain’s ­European allies – France, Germany and Spain – opinion, usually a majority, has consistently been more likely to think that NATO is still crucial for national security. Averaged over time, 69% of the British public has deemed NATO essential for security, falling to 61% in Germany, 59% in France – which withdrew from NATO’s military command in 1966 and rejoined in 2009 – and lowest at 55% in Spain. European publics, Britain included, clearly have perceived

The US and NATO  79 Table 3.11  P ublic opinion towards NATO and the EU-US security partnership by country, 2002–14 Per cent saying NATO is still essential Per cent saying take a more for national security independent approach Year

UK

Germany France Spain

2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

76 70 65 62 64 68 72 68 69 71 69 64

74 70 61 56 55 62 63 56 58 60 60 62

61 57 58 59 55 62 56 60 60 60 62 60

55 48 49 49 60 61 57 61 56 52 56

UK

Germany France

Spain

44 49 57

51 57 56

55 69 57

48 49 57

51 36 45 39 40 42 44

53 34 39 41 42 40 55

56 49 45 44 46 50 50

52 38 38 43 43 52 59

Source: Compiled from the Transatlantic Trends website: http://www.gmfus.org/initiatives/ transatlantic-trends-%E2%80%93-public-opinion. EU, European Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

the value of NATO membership and its enduring role as the security guarantor for their continent and continue to do so. Views on the EU-US security partnership, between 2004 and 2014, are also shown in Table 3.11. In all countries, support for a more independent approach to the US-EU partnership was higher during the years of the Bush presidency and lower during Obama’s tenure (2009 onwards). Although, apart from the UK, it increased in 2013–14. Averaged across surveys, support for an independent approach has been somewhat higher amongst the French public (48%), compared to 48% in Spain, 47% in ­Germany and 45% in the UK. Across the three options, the balance of opinion amongst the UK public has always been that a more independent approach is needed, albeit the proportion taking this view has fluctuated over time, with smaller proportions favouring either a closer partnership or maintaining the status quo. Averaged over time, 45% supported more autonomy in US-EU relations on security and diplomacy, 26% supported a closer working relationship and 25% supported keeping things as they are. Looked at another way, though, usually a slightly higher share of the public in the UK has eschewed a more independent approach – it certainly did during Obama’s presidency. Going beyond the long-standing consensus for NATO membership within the British public, have there been any clear socio-demographic or

80  The US and NATO party-political differences on this topic? The BSA survey data on NATO membership covering the 1980s show that Conservative supporters were the most emphatically supportive, with around nine-in-ten in favour across time, generally followed by supporters of the third party (Liberals and the Social Democratic Party (SDP)). Whilst always a majority position, support for NATO memberships tended to run at lower levels for supporters of Labour or those with no party affiliation. Previous research showed that Labour supporters were less positive towards NATO than were Conservative supporters (Eichenberg 1989: 146). Amongst Labour supporters, though, opposition never exceeded a quarter between 1983 and 1990, and was usually lower than that. In every group based on sex, age, and age that full-time education was completed, large majorities consistently favoured NATO membership, although this support was, in a relative sense, somewhat less emphatic amongst women and those who had finished their education aged 16 or under. This pattern of group-related views was broadly similar in the 1987 BES survey. The over time data from the Pew GAP surveys, covering 2009–16, show that majorities of men and women have consistently held favourable opinions of NATO, albeit that the level of support has tended to be somewhat higher amongst the former group. The proportion unfavourable towards NATO has not actually been higher amongst women, but they have been much more likely to be unsure on this question. The TT surveys also show that clear majorities of men and women have perceived NATO to be essential to Britain’s security. Anywhere from about a fifth to around a third of both groups have adjudged NATO to be no longer essential for national security. Again, women have been more likely to be unsure of their views. More recently, the YouGov survey from 2014 showed that Conservative supporters (71%) were most likely to support Britain upholding NATO’s collective defence commitments (YouGov 2014a). Less emphatic majorities of other party supporters held this view: 58% for Labour, 65% for Liberal Democrat and 55% for UKIP supporters (YouGov 2014a). As historical patterns of party support have shown (Eichenberg 1989: 146), so nowadays Labour supporters are less enamoured of NATO compared to Conservative supporters. A fifth of Labour supporters (20%) and a quarter of UKIP supporters (24%) took the view that Britain should not maintain this commitment. Amongst other socio-demographic groups, men showed greater endorsement than women did (69% versus 45%). In fact, the level of opposition was very similar for men (18%) and women (17%), but 38% of women were unsure compared to 13% of men. Support for the commitment was highest amongst those aged 60+ (64%) and aged 40–54 (59%) and lowest amongst those aged 18–24 (48%) and 25–39 (49%). Previous research did not find any clear generational differences within the British public (Eichenberg 1989: 146). The level of opposition ranged between 14% and 20% across age groups, but the proportion that was unsure was much higher amongst the

The US and NATO  81 younger age groups (39% for those 18–24 years old and 31% amongst those aged 25–39). Support for Britain upholding this collective defence commitment was also higher amongst the ABC1 social grade than the C2DE grade (62% versus 49%). In the 2014 Chatham House survey, 48% of Conservative supporters and 40% of UKIP backers saw NATO as vital to national security, compared to 37% of Labour and 32% of Liberal Democrat supporters (YouGov 2014b). Liberal Democrat supporters were most likely to say that other organisations were more important for providing security (38%) and UKIP supporters to express the view that NATO was no longer relevant today (20%) (YouGov 2014b). Men were much more likely than women to see NATO as vital for national security (44% compared to 28%), and women were much more likely to be unsure than men (32% compared to 12%) (YouGov 2014b). Believing NATO to be crucial for security was more prevalent amongst older age groups: highest at 49% of those aged 60 and over and lowest at 24% and 27%, respectively, of those aged 18–24 and 25–39 (YouGov 2014b). As seen in other surveys on this topic, being unsure was also more prevalent in the younger age groups. Based on social grade, 36% of those in both the ABC1 and C2DE groups saw NATO as vital to the UK’s security, while 27% of the former thought that other security organisations were more important compared to 22% of the latter (YouGov 2014b). A profile of contemporary public opinion Further evidence on group-related views on NATO can be analysed using the Pew GAP 2016 survey, using responses from the British sample to the question about NATO discussed earlier. Table 3.12 presents the distribution of responses based on sex, age group, educational attainment, party support and ideological orientation. Overall, three-fifths had a positive opinion on NATO, with the remainder being broadly split between having an unfavourable view and being unsure. Favourable views are more common amongst men than women (67% versus 56%), but again, rather than women having more negative opinions – in fact, this is not the case – they are more likely to be unsure of what they think of NATO (30% compared to 13% for men). The youngest age group (18–29) registered the lowest level of favourable views (50%) and the highest proportion who were unsure (31%). Amongst older age groups, identical proportions held favourable views of NATO (64–5%). Across all age groups, the proportions with an unfavourable view are very similar. Based on these data, it is hard to dissent from Crew’s earlier observation, based on polling data from the early 1980s, that there ‘is no generation gap to speak off’ in views of the Atlantic Alliance (1985: 52) – specifically, here, membership of NATO. Based on educational attainment (the highest qualification held), positive views of NATO were much more prevalent amongst those with degree-level or

82  The US and NATO Table 3.12  P ublic opinion towards NATO by demographic group

Sex Age group

Education Party support

Ideology

Male Female 18–29 30–44 45–64 65+ Degree level or higher Other qualifications None Con Lab Lib Dem UKIP Other party Would not vote/don’t know Left Centre Right

Very or somewhat favourable (%)

Somewhat or very unfavourable (%)

Don’t know (%)

67 56 50 64 65 64 69 61 35 71 64 67 55 55 48

20 14 19 18 17 14 15 17 25 9 16 10 23 26 21

13 30 31 19 19 22 17 22 40 20 21 22 21 19 31

52 66 68

34 15 17

14 19 15

Source: Analysis of Pew GAP 2016 survey; British sample. Note: Percentages sum across the rows. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib Dem, Liberal Democrats; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

other qualifications (respectively, 69% and 61%), compared to just 35% amongst those with no formal qualifications. The level of negative sentiment amongst this latter group stood at 25%, with the plurality unsure (40%). Based on party support, 71% of Conservative backers held positive views of NATO, followed by 67% of Liberal Democrat and 64% of Labour supporters. Positive appraisals were somewhat less common, but still the majority or plurality view, amongst UKIP backers (55%), minor party supporters (55%) and those who would not vote or did not know (48%). Favourable views of NATO were highest amongst those in the ideological centre (66%) and on the right (68%) compared to those on the left (52%). There was more variation in negative sentiment based on ideological location, with those on the left (34%) more critical than those in the centre or on the right. Indeed, those on the ideological left expressed the highest level of opposition across all groups.

The US and NATO  83 Further analysis of the TT 2014 survey shows that, based on a five-fold ideological classification (left-wing, centre-left, centre, centre-right and rightwing), there were some clear differences on these security issues. Those on the left were much more likely to favour an independent approach to the EU-US partnership (67%) compared to those in the other ideological groups (41%–43%). Just 6% of those on the left supported a closer partnership, much lower than the 20%–25% in the other groups. On the issue of whether NATO was essential for national security, 51% of those on the ideological left agreed and 40% disagreed. Amongst the other ideological groups, larger majorities agreed (66%–75%), and the proportions thinking NATO was no longer essential were correspondingly lower (centre-left: 22%; centre: 20%; centre-right: 31%; right: 25%).

Conclusion This chapter has provided a detailed account of public opinion towards Britain’s main international relationships – framed within Churchill’s interlocking three circles – in the post-war era, views of UK-US relations and the latter’s world role and of Britain’s long-standing role in the NATO alliance. The British public has across recent decades consistently perceived Europe as Britain’s most important international relationship, well ahead of the US and the Commonwealth, although popular perceptions may shift as the process of Brexit unfolds and as the country reassesses its relationships and alliances outside of the EU. In relation to the US specifically, the evidence reviewed here has tended to support an important distinction between, on the one hand, the durability over time of the British public’s generally positive views of the US and its people, and, on the other, a more changeable and perhaps event-driven public mood towards different presidents and their administrations. This was clearly demonstrated in the sudden year-on-year fluctuations in the public mood between 2008 and 2009 and then 2016 to 2017, reflecting the changes in the incumbency of the White House from, respectively, Bush to Obama and Obama to Trump. In recent years and historically, the British public has held somewhat mixed views on the value and functioning of the US-UK special r­ elationship  – a key pillar of the post-war consensus on foreign and defence ­policy – not only recognising the importance of this alliance for British foreign policy and desiring its continuation but also acutely aware of its limitations and the essentially asymmetrical nature of relations between the two countries (Frankel 1973). Across decades, in the realm of transatlantic security arrangements, the British public has been consistently supportive of involvement in NATO – also a key component of the post-war consensus – and has

84  The US and NATO strongly valued its core role as a security guarantor, both during the Cold War and after. Indeed, from the late 1960s through to the present day, consistently large majorities of the public have recognised the pivotal role NATO has played in their country’s security. Albeit the strength of support has varied somewhat, support for NATO has been the preponderant view amongst Conservative, Liberal (Democrat) and Labour supporters. The next chapter focusses on relations with the EU, looking at areas of change and continuity in British public opinion both before and during membership.

4 European integration

This chapter focusses on Britain’s relations with the European project, looking at the nature of public opinion before Britain joined the European Economic Community (EEC) and throughout its subsequent period of membership, culminating in the country voting to leave the EU in the June 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum. The latter development, which will eventually sever Britain’s membership after over 40 years, provides an opportune movement to reassess the historical landscape of public opinion on this topic. Britain, of course, did not join the EEC until 1973, although it had tried in vain on two previous occasions in the 1960s. Indeed, Kavanagh and Morris describe ‘a reluctant Europeanism’ as a pillar of the post-war consensus on British foreign policy (1994). Indeed, given that Britain stood aloof from the formative efforts at setting up supranational institutions in Western Europe in the 1950s–60s, given that its broad approach as a European Union (EU) member has been characterised as ‘conditional’ and ‘differential’ (Geddes 2013: 11) and given that British involvement – before and after joining – has engendered significant and politically consequential levels of anti-Market and Eurosceptic sentiment within the major parties and the wider public, this has clearly been the pillar with less sturdy foundations. The common labelling of Britain as an ‘awkward’ or ‘reluctant’ partner in its relations with the EU is partly influenced by the perception that British public opinion has, across recent decades, had a strong ‘Eurosceptic’ character relative to (most) other member countries. Euroscepticism can be seen, broadly, as reflecting ‘scepticism towards EU institutions and policies, as well as concerns over wider evolutions (such as economic globalisation and immigration), of which European integration is a catalyst’ (Leconte 2010: 162). It should be recognised though that more recently opposition to the European integration process ‘has become embedded and persistent, at both European and national levels’ (Usherwood and Startin 2013: 1). Indeed, as Hobolt notes regarding the impact of the 2016 referendum: ‘Whereas public and party political Euroscepticism is more pronounced in Britain than in the rest of the EU, the sentiments that led a majority of voters to opt for Brexit are gaining strength across the continent’ (2016: 1273). Moreover, across

86  European integration member states, this is a period where ‘the EU is an increasingly contested and politicized issue in the domestic political arena’ (Hobolt 2016: 1273) The main focus here is on discerning the main shifts and patterns in public opinion towards Britain’s prospective and actual membership, but – given the observation about the broader strengthening of E ­ uroscepticism across member states – there is also a comparative aspect. This involves comparing opinions in the UK and EU as a whole towards enlargement (­ ‘widening’) and policies which further integration (‘deepening’), the latter involving Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) – symbolised by the common currency, the Euro – and developing the EU’s defence and foreign policy capabilities, both encroaching into areas of ‘high politics’ of nation-states’ political sovereignty and decision-making capabilities. These are precisely the sorts of policies which may have contributed to increased negative sentiment amongst European publics and underpinned the formation, political persistence and electoral success of Eurosceptic parties. At a more granular level, the chapter also looks in detail at the views of different groups – socio-­ demographic, party-political and ideological – in British society, to identify areas of continuity and change on the basis of popular Euroscepticism. The chapter is structured as follows: it first examines overall trends in public opinion across the decades, both before and during membership. Second, it compares the views of the British public with those of the EU, in relation to the ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ of the integration process. Third, it examines the changing party-political basis of Eurosceptic opinion over time. Fourth, it examines the socio-demographic basis of Euroscepticism across the decades. Fifth, it assesses voting behaviour at the 1975 and 2016 referendums on Britain’s membership, identifying areas of continuity and change. Sixth, the main findings from the chapter are summarised.

Public opinion before and during membership Surveys gauging the British public’s views were undertaken in the early stages of the process of European integration, prior to and after the formation of the supranational institutions of Euratom, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the EEC. Cross-national surveys conducted by the US Information Agency in West European countries between 1951 and 1962 asked the following questions: 1952–54: Are you in general for or against making efforts towards uniting Western Europe? 1955–62: Are you in general for or against making efforts toward uniting Western Europe, including Great Britain? The results show that the British public were generally favourable disposed towards the unification of Western Europe. In 1952 and 1954, respectively, 58% and 78% favoured such efforts, with just 15% and 4% against; negative views were clearly outweighed by the proportions who did not know (27%

European integration  87 and 18% in each year) (Merritt and Puchala 1968: 283). In several surveys undertaken between 1955 and 1957, strong majorities backed unification involving Britain, ranging from 64% to 70% (Merritt and Puchala 1968: 284). In 1962, however – when the issue had become a live one in British party politics, because of the Macmillan government’s membership probe launched in 1961 – this had fallen to a plurality of 47%, though only 22% were opposed. In all of these surveys, negative sentiments (ranging from 10% to 22%, the latter in 1962) were outranked by the proportions that were unsure (19%–31%) (Merritt and Puchala 1968: 284). During the 1960s and 1970s, Sanders and Houghton argue that there was a ‘strategic turn’ towards Western Europe in British foreign policy, driven by several key changes in the regional and wider international context: the favourable industrial and economic performance of EEC countries as Britain underwent a prolonged period of relative economic decline; support for closer British-West European links from the US as Britain’s capacity for global reach as a military and defence actor was increasingly constricted by resource constraints; the decreasing political and economic importance of the Commonwealth; and structural shifts in trade relations, with the growing importance of British exports to and imports from Western Europe (2016: 141–7). This ‘Eurocentric’ shift in British foreign policy contributed to and was consolidated by three British membership applications – the first two unsuccessful – to join the West European ‘club’ (Sanders and Houghton 2016: 135). From the 1960s onwards, the merits of closer ties with Western Europe – and the impact on national sovereignty, the economy and Britain’s Commonwealth links – became increasingly subject to inter- and intra-party debate. Gallup polling in this and subsequent decades provides a rich source of data on British public opinion towards successive attempts to join the Common Market and then towards membership in the period after Britain’s eventual accession. During this period, the issue of British membership emerged within political debate, exposing intra-party and inter-party differences on the merits of membership and witnessed considerable volatility in the public mood, as successive bids to join were launched by the Macmillan, Wilson and Heath governments. Time-series data for four questions are presented in Table 4.1, showing the overall breakdown of public opinion towards prospective and then actual membership. The questions asked (and their temporal coverage) were as follows: 1961–1967: If the British government were to decide that Britain’s interest would best be served by joining the European Common Market, would you approve or disapprove? 1963–1969: If an opportunity occurs for Britain to apply to join the Common Market would you like to see us try or drop the idea altogether? 1971–1972: On the facts as you know them at present, are you for or against Britain joining the Common Market? 1973–1975: Do you think we were right or wrong to join the Common Market?

Table 4.1  P ublic opinion towards Common Market membership, 1961–75 If the British government were to decide that Britain’s interest would best be served by joining the European Common Market, would you approve or disapprove?

June 1961 July 1961 August 1961 September 1961 October 1961 November 1961 December 1961 February to March 1962 April 1962 May to June 1962 August 1962 September 1962 October 1962 November 1962 December 1962 January to February 1963 March 1965 March 1965 April 1965 May 1965 July 1965 September 1965 November 1965 December 1965 January 1966 February 1966 March 1966 April 1966 May 1966 July 1966 August 1966 September 1966 October 1966 November 1966 December 1966 January 1967 February 1967 March 1967 May 1967

Approve

Disapprove

Don’t know

46 38 48 52 48 52 53 47 47 42 39 46 41 42 37 50 59 65 60 55 56 55 54 60 66 60 59 68 70 61 71 70 67 65 67 65 61 57 43

20 22 20 18 18 19 19 22 27 25 29 30 26 31 29 36 19 14 19 21 22 15 18 17 15 15 18 14 10 16 12 12 13 14 17 18 20 27 30

34 40 32 30 34 29 28 31 26 33 32 24 33 27 34 14 22 21 21 24 22 30 28 23 19 25 23 18 20 23 17 18 20 21 16 17 19 16 27

If an opportunity occurs for Britain to apply to join the Common Market, would you like to see us try or drop the idea altogether

March 1963 June 1963 October 1963

Try to join Drop the idea

Don’t know

42 46 46

21 25 18

37 29 36

European integration  89 November 1963 December 1963 February 1964 March 1964 August 1964 November 1964 February 1965 March 1965 April 1965 May 1969 June 1969 September 1969

49 42 36 42 41 44 48 53 57 41 34 26

32 34 40 33 37 28 30 25 22 44 45 58

19 24 24 25 22 28 22 22 21 15 21 16

On the facts as you know them at present, are you for or against Britain joining the Common Market?

August 1971 October 1971 November 1971 December 1971 February 1972 April 1972 May 1972 July 1972 September 1972 October 1972 December 1972

For

Against

Don’t know

36 32 44 38 42 43 41 36 40 39 39

47 51 41 47 41 43 45 51 42 41 45

17 17 15 15 17 14 14 13 18 20 16

Do you think we were right or wrong to join the Common Market?

January 1973 April 1973 May 1973 July 1973 August 1973 September 1973 October 1973 November 1973 February 1974 April 1974 May 1974 July 1974 November 1974 February 1975 April 1975

Right

Wrong

Don’t know

38 40 36 39 32 35 34 34 28 33 32 37 34 31 43

36 42 45 44 52 49 49 48 58 51 53 50 46 50 38

26 18 19 17 16 16 17 18 14 16 15 13 20 19 17

Source: Compiled from Gallup (1976a, 1976b). Percentages sum across the rows.

The first Gallup question, asked during the 1960s, gauged approval and disapproval of Common Market membership if the government decided it was in the national interest to pursue it. Perhaps affected by the framing of the question, explicitly mentioning the government’s endorsement, public opinion was consistently supportive of such an approach. In every poll,

90  European integration either a plurality or majority of the British public backed membership. The majorities were clearly stronger in the later polls, affected by the declining proportions who were unsure and who could come down on one side of the debate. In some of early polls, around or more than three-in-ten could not take a position on the issue. In the later polls, the proportion that was unsure tended to be around one-in-five. In many polls, the proportion that was unsure was larger than the proportion opposed to membership. The second question from Gallup covers part of the same decade, asked between 1963 and 1965 and then in 1969. Some of the polls showed positive and negative views of membership running closely together, in contrast to the more one-sided results for the previous question, while others showed a strong lead for one side of the issue. In nearly every poll conducted from 1963 to 1965 the balance of opinion was positive towards membership, with the public favouring Britain joining. The remaining polls, all undertaken in 1969, showed public opinion opposed to membership. Most polls elicited a level of ‘don’t know’ responses of around one-fifth to one-quarter. Also, in contrast to the previous question, the proportions that were unsure were always lower than the proportions opposed to membership of the Common Market. Another question, asked only during 1972–73, gauged whether the British public, on the facts known to them, were for or against joining the Common Market. In some of these polls, taken during the negotiations and in the lead-up to Britain’s accession, public opinion was broadly divided on the issue. Only two polls registered a (bare) majority and both were against membership. The plurality responses were also more likely to be opposed to membership. The proportion that was unsure was usually well below onefifth. In relation to public opinion measured from when Britain formally joined in January 1973, in every poll except two – those conducted in January 1973 and April 1975 – negative sentiment outweighed positive views towards membership. In nearly every poll, then, a plurality or majority thought the country was wrong to have joined. The proportions answering ‘don’t know’ tended to be somewhat lower than those seen for the other Gallup questions. Clearly, in the early post-war era, the Common Market was a relatively new issue and somewhat remote for the British public. Butler and Stokes argued that the British electorate formed views to a ‘very limited degree’ on this issue (1974: 279). Moreover, the public exhibited ‘limited knowledge and interest in the Common Market’ (Tear and Spence 1973: 110). Shepherd also observes that during the 1950s and early-1960s, British public opinion displayed a ‘lack of strong feelings of positive affection’ towards existing members of the Common Market, such as France and Germany (Shepherd 1975: 85). The mood oscillated for and against membership, no doubt reflecting the wider political context of governments initiating efforts to seek membership, the rejections of those efforts by De Gaulle, the French president, on two occasions (1963 and 1967), Britain’s relative decline internationally and the broader state of the economy. Moreover, as King observed, the pace and extent of the shifts in the public mood on the Common Market issue in this period indicates that

European integration  91 supporters were, to some extent, following the cues of their parties, including when they changed position, most obviously the Labour Party (1977: 19–31). Furthermore, data from National Opinion Poll (NOP) provide useful evidence on the shifts in the British public’s views from the mid-1960s to ­Britain’s accession to the EEC in 1973, a period which covered an unsuccessful attempt to join by the Labour government under Harold Wilson (1964–70) and then a successful attempt by Edward Heath’s Conservative government between 1970 and 1974. Earlier on, in the early 1960s, the Conservative government of Harold Macmillan had launched the initial effort to try and join the EEC. Support or opposition to Britain joining the Common Market as gauged through NOP is shown in Figure 4.1. In the early years of Wilson’s government there was strong support for Britain trying to join the Common Market. Approval stood at 47% in February 1965, while in October of that year 55% supported a policy to make it easier to join the Common Market. Approval was 51% in January 1966, 54% in March 1966, 62% in July 1966 and 52% in October 1966. British Election Study (BES) data from 1964 to 1966 showed that opinion significantly moved in favour of Common Market membership. Whereas the British public were broadly split on the issue in 1963 (53% in favour of going in and 47% against) and 1964 (51% in favour of entering and 49% preferring to stay out), in 1966 an emphatic majority (76%) was in favour of Common Market membership, with just 24% opposed. In December 1967, after De Gaulle had vetoed Britain’s second attempt to join the previous month, 52% said that the Common Market application should be withdrawn, with 36% supporting a continuation. Pro-Common Market opinion fell dramatically and negative views became preponderant

70 60 50 %

40 30 20 10 0

Should / For

Should not / Against

Figure 4.1  P  ublic opinion towards joining the Common Market, 1965–73. Source: Analysis of NOP surveys.

92  European integration in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as also seen in the Gallup data in Table 4.1, even as the Heath government successfully pursued its aim to join. In April 1972, the British public were evenly split between approving and not approving, but subsequently negative opinion was again higher. Opinion in this period show considerable fluctuation, with approval commanding a clear majority between October 1965 and October 1966 but them declining significantly and usually trailing disapproval by a clear margin into the 1970s. A review of public opinion during the 1960s–70s summarised it as follows: British attitudes to involvement with Europe have been extraordinarily fickle. There have been a few consistent Euro-enthusiasts and a few consistent Empire men of little Englanders. But the great bulk of the population has changed sides, usually more than once, in the last 20 years. (Butler 1979: 151) The 1960s and early 1970s, then, witnessed considerable volatility in public opinion, with some dramatic shifts in relatively short periods of time in opinion, both in favour of and against EEC membership (Flickinger 1994: 199–200). During this period, Flickinger argues that a ‘leading’ rather than a ‘following’ model best accounts for this changing issue context and the interplay between parties and citizens: that is, public opinion tended to follow the lead of the governing party on EEC debates and there is little basis for concluding that the parties were instead following major shifts in public opinion and revising their positions accordingly (1994: 210). Polling data covering much of Britain’s membership of the EU from the 1970s onwards comes from Gallup and Ipsos MORI. The Gallup data encompass the period between 1972 and 2000, based on the following question: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that Britain’s membership of the Common Market / European Community / European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?’ The full set of responses is shown in Figure 4.2. It is again evident that negative and positive opinion of Britain’s membership has fluctuated considerably over time. During the mid-1970s, which encompasses the 1975 referendum on EEC membership, public opinion was ‘highly changeable, both at the individual and at the aggregate level’ (Sarlvik et al. 1976: 97). In broader terms, though, Flickinger has described British public opinion on the membership issue in the two decades after accession in 1973 as ‘confirming to a long wave pattern’, marked by less of the ‘short-run volatility’ which was a marked feature pre-accession during the membership bids (1994: 201–02). The Gallup data shown in Table 4.2 show three broad shifts in favourable views of membership. First, there was a decline in positive appraisals of membership during the course of the 1970s. Second, after an initial rise and then decline in the early 1980s, positive appraisals steadily increased during the remainder of the 1980s, peaking in 1990–91. Third, during the 1990s, positive appraisals once again declined. During the late 1980s and into the

European integration  93 60 50 40 % 30 20 10

Good

Bad

Neither

1999

2000

1998

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1976

1972

0

Don't know

Figure 4.2  P ublic opinion towards membership of the EU, 1972–2000. Source: Gallup data compiled from King and Wybrow (2001: 301–02)

Table 4.2  P ublic opinion towards closer links with the EU, 1990–2015 1990

1991

1993

1994

1995

1997

2014

2015

33 20 32 15

35 18 42 6

35 18 40 8

30 15 44 11

– – – –

29 12 56 4

Closer links with EU would make Britain economically … Stronger Weaker No difference Don’t know

43 8 37 12

44 13 31 13

33 22 32 13

40 20 29 10

32 20 39 9

Closer links with the EU would give Britain … in the world More influence Less influence No difference Don’t know

36 9 47 8

32 12 48 8

27 18 47 7

32 17 46 6

27 17 51 5

Source: Analysis of BSA surveys. EU, European Union.

1990s, the proportion saying membership was a good thing consistently exceeded the proportion holding the opposite view. During most of the late 1970s and for parts of the 1980s, negative views had outranked positive appraisals. The proportions with neutral views on membership were clearly more stable over time and were not subject to the ‘waves’ seen for pro- and anti-opinion.

94  European integration Ipsos MORI data cover 1977–2016 and are based on responses to a question asking about voting in a referendum on membership: ‘If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the European Union, how would you vote?’ The full set of responses is shown in Figure 4.3 and, unlike the Gallup question, this one did not offer a neutral response option. In the late 1970s and 1980s, support for getting out was generally higher than support for staying in, although – was seen with the Gallup series – opinion became more favourable in the late 1980s and into the 1990s, with positive views outranking negative opinions during the latter decade. Subsequently, negative and positive sentiments ran closer together in the early 2000s and then diverged, with support for remaining in the EU ahead in the most recent years (including in 2016, when the referendum delivered the opposite verdict). From the early 1980s onwards, the British Social Attitude (BSA) surveys have featured a question on membership, which was worded as follows: ‘Do you think Britain should continue to be a member of the European Union or should it withdraw?’ The overall responses, for the period 1983–2015, are shown in Figure 4.4. In general, this series shows positive views of membership clearly in the ascendency during the 1980s, with support for remaining peaking at three-quarters in 1990 and 1991. Flickinger argues that the ‘leading’ model – whereby the parties lead changes in public opinion – also best accounts for developments in the public mood during the 1980s, particularly the conversion of the Labour Party to a pro-European position in the latter

70 60 50 40 %

30 20 10

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1983 1984 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2007 2011 2012 2014 2015 2016

0

Stay in

Get out

Don't know

Figure 4.3  P  ublic opinion towards voting in a referendum on membership of the EU, 1977–2016. Source: Compiled from the Ipsos MORI website: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/ european-union-membership-trends.

European integration  95 90 80 70 60 %

50 40 30 20 10 0 1983

1984

1985

1986

Continue

1987

1989 Withdraw

1990

1991

1997

2014

2015

Don't know

Figure 4.4  V  oting in a referendum on EU membership, 1983–2015. Source: Analysis of BSA surveys.

half of the decade (1994: 210). Support for EU membership declined in 1997 before increasing somewhat in subsequent surveys, which were not until 2014 and 2015. Support for membership was therefore the majority view in every year (again, in contrast to the referendum result of 2016), apart from 1984 when it only narrowly exceeded opposition (48% versus 46%). Since 1993 the BSA surveys have featured another question on relations with the EU, going beyond a binary choice of stay or leave and asking in a more graduated way about preferences for long-term relations: ‘Do you think Britain’s long-term policy should be … to leave the European Union, to stay in the EU and try to reduce the EU’s powers, to leave things as they are, to stay in the EU and try to increase the EU’s powers, or to work for the formation of a single European government?’ This question allows for a careful analysis of support for both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of Euroscepticism within British public opinion. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) distinguished between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of Euroscepticism amongst political parties. Respectively, they are defined as: Hard Euroscepticism is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived. (2002: 7) Soft Euroscepticism is where there is not a principled objection to ­ uropean integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or E

96  European integration a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory. (2002: 7) Further, Fitzgibbon has observed that ‘civil society based Euroscepticism generally conforms to the hard/soft model of opposition to the EU, but that this Euroscepticism is drawn from a more mainstream societal base than its party equivalent’ (2013: 105). Based on the response options offered for this BSA question, ‘hard’ Euroscepticism represents a choice to leave the EU and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism a preference to remain but try and reduce the EU’s powers. Combining the proportions choosing these two options produces an overall level of ­Eurosceptic sentiment over time. The response of leaving things as they are, remaining and trying to increase the EU’s powers and working towards a European government were classified as pro-EU and were combined. ­Figure 4.5 charts the levels of Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic opinion between 1993 and 2015. Between 1993 and 1995, pro-EU sentiment was in the majority but in every subsequent year was a minority view. There was a sharp increase in overall Eurosceptic sentiment from 1995 to 1996 – a period covering the BSE crisis in British and European politics – from 37% to 58%, with pro-EU responses falling from 56% to 33%. Pro-EU sentiment increased to 80 70 60 50 % 40 30 20 10 0

Eurosceptic

Pro-EU

Don't know

Figure 4.5  Levels of Eurosceptic and pro-EU opinion, 1993–2015. Source: Analysis of BSA surveys.

European integration  97 41% in 1997, and between then and 2008 it was in the range of 35%–44%. Between 2012 and 2015, however, pro-EU opinion fell even lower, ranging between 28% and 32%. Eurosceptic opinion fell in 1997, to 46%, but then from 1998 onwards it was the majority view of the British public, ranging between 51% and 57% – except for 2003, when it was a plurality. Between 2012 and 2015 it was even higher, ranging between 62% and 67%. In terms of the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ varieties of Euroscepticism, in 1993 11% wanted Britain to leave, which had doubled to 22% by 2015 (although it had been higher between 2012 and 2014). Soft Euroscepticism stood at 27% in 1993 and 44% in 2015. The proportions choosing to leave the EU in response to this question were somewhat lower than those obtained from the BSA leave-withdraw question discussed already. It is clear that, although the balance shifted somewhat over time – in 1993, there were around 2.5 soft Eurosceptics for every hard Eurosceptic, while in 2015, the ratio was two to one – soft Euroscepticism was always more prevalent in public opinion than the hard variety. Aside from questions over membership and relations between Britain and the EU, the BSA surveys have also featured questions which have gauged the public’s views on how the EU affected Britain’s economy and international role, both of which have been enduring areas of domestic debate over Britain and Europe. The following questions were asked from 1990 onwards: Would closer links with the European Union make Britain … stronger economically, weaker economically, or would it make no difference? Do you think that closer links with the European Union would give Britain … more influence in the world, less influence in the world, or would it make no difference? The overall distributions of responses to these questions are reported in ­ able 4.2. Over time, a consistent plurality of opinion has taken the view T that closer links with the EU would strengthen Britain’s economy, at or over two-fifths in 1990, 1991 and 1994 (apart from 1993) but closer to around a third between 1995 and 2014. Except for 1990–91, about a fifth have perceived that closer links would weaken Britain’s economy. Aside from don’t knows, the remainder have said that closer links would make no difference, at around two-fifths in the most recent surveys (2014 and 2015). A larger proportion of the British public has thought that closer links with the EU would not make any differences to its influence in the world, which has been the majority or plurality view over time. Generally, around three-in-ten have said it would augment Britain’s influence, with smaller proportions – never reaching one-fifth – saying closer links would diminish the country’s influence on the world stage. Overall, the public have been somewhat more likely, across recent decades, to think closer links with the EU would benefit the

98  European integration economy than the country’s international role; they have also been of the view that closer links would be less likely to affect its world role in any way. Taking stock of the extensive public opinion data reviewed in this section, across time and taken from a variety of sources, Figure 4.6 shows the overall policy ‘mood’ (Erikson et al. 2002; Bartle et al. 2011; Bartle 2015) on the ­European issue within the British public between 1961 and 2016. This indicator is constructed from all the available survey items asking questions about the EU on two or more occasions, including some of the data series examined already. More specifically, as Bartle observes, The model is based on a macro-analytical approach, taking into account hundreds of questions from a range of different surveys and methods. This reduces dependence on a single method, questioning technique or survey organisation; and ensures that the results of a wide range of issues are incorporated. Aggregation over such a diverse range of sources reduces bias. (2015: 6) All survey measures were coded for positive and negative opinions towards the EU, dispensing with neutral or non-opinions, and the result provides an overall indicator of the public’s ‘mood’ towards Europe over time. (The author is very grateful to Professor John Bartle, University of Essex, for providing the ‘policy mood’ data.) In general, scores above 50 indicate an 70 60 50 40 30 20

0

1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

10

Figure 4.6  The policy mood on the European issue, 1961–2016. Source: Data kindly provided by Professor John Bartle, University of Essex. Note: Smoothed estimates. Values above 50 indicate a postive mood towards Europe and values lower than 50 indicate a negative mood.

European integration  99 overall positive mood towards the EU (or its predecessors), and a score below 50 indicates negative sentiment overall. It is the movement in the policy mood over time that is relevant here, rather than its absolute value at any point in time. As seen in the individual data series analysed already, ­Figure  4.6 indicates considerable volatility over time. During the period before accession, the public mood varied during the early-to-mid-1960s, with the most notable feature being the decline during the latter part of that decade. During the 1970s, after climbing in response to Britain’s accession to the EEC, the mood becomes less positive, falling away until it starts to climb during the 1980s. It then declined for a considerable period from the early 1990s onwards, though there was something of an uplift in recent years ­(excluding 2016).

Comparing public opinion in Britain and the EU The cross-national Eurobarometer (EB) surveys, undertaken since the early 1970s, enable comparisons of public opinion in the UK and the EU, shedding light on the common labelling of the UK as a traditionally Eurosceptic country and an ‘awkward’ or ‘reluctant’ partner. Three long-running questions from the EB surveys are used to provide a comparative focus on membership and unification. They are worded as follows: Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership of the European Union is…? Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR ­COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union? In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify western Europe? If ‘For’ are you very much for this, or only to some extent? If ‘against’ are you only to some extent against or very much against? Figure 4.7 shows, over time, the net UK opposition for each of the three indicators. Net UK scores are calculated by subtracting the EU percentage from the UK percentage for each time point, for the following indicators: (i) membership is a bad thing (1973–2011), (ii) country does not benefit from membership (1984–2011) and (iii) against efforts to unify Western Europe (1978–95). Positive net scores show that opposition is higher amongst the UK public, and negative net scores indicate it is higher within the EU as a whole. A clear pattern prevails over time, across all three indicators of public opinion. The net scores show that opposition has been consistently and often markedly higher within the UK. That is, over time, citizens in the UK have been much more likely to be negatively disposed to membership – more likely to think it is a bad thing and to think the country does not benefit – and

100  European integration 40 35 30 25 % 20 15 10 5 0

UK - Net not benefitted

UK - Net bad thing

UK - Net against

Figure 4.7  Opposition to European integration in the UK and EU (net UK scores), 1973–2011. Source: Compiled from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970–2002 and the Eurobaometer website: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/ index#p=1&instruments=STANDARD. Note: The net UK scores are calculated by subtracting the EU values from the UK values for each indicator.

to efforts to unify Western Europe, compared to citizens across all member states. The differences are most marked for thinking membership is a bad thing during the 1970s–80s. Even so, there is some commonality in the overall trajectory of citizens’ views in the UK and the EU, with public opinion becoming less negative during the 1980s and negative views then increasing during the 1990s. Still, for both of the longer-running indicators, higher negative opinion within the UK persisted until the questions on membership were last asked in 2011. Taking responses to these three questions together, they show that sceptical views of membership have been much more prevalent in the UK than in the EU and that this pattern has persisted across recent decades. These differences were present during the period of ‘permissive consensus’ which characterised public opinion towards the integration process in the decades leading up to the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and have persisted into the subsequent era of ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009). In this first period, elite consensus and a generally favourable, if shallow, reservoir of public support existed until the 1980s (­ Handley 1981; Slater 1983). In the second period, member states’ relations with the EU have become increasingly politically contentious in domestic politics, with a more prominent role for public opinion in the formulation of policy by political elites on the European issue (Hooghe and Marks

European integration  101 2006: 248). National referendums have produced outcomes verdicts unfavourable to the EU – as in June 2016 in Britain – and, moreover, contrary to the outcome desired by mainstream pro-European parties, while Eurosceptic parties have experienced greater political relevance and electoral success. As Hooghe and Marks observe, ‘Elites, that is, party leaders in positions of authority, must look over their shoulders when negotiating European issues’ (2009: 5). ‘Deepening’ and ‘widening’ As well as views on country membership of the EU, the EB surveys allow a detailed comparison, over time, of public opinion in the UK and in the EU towards the deepening and widening of integration. For deepening, public opinion can be analysed towards flagship EU policies, such as the single currency (economic and monetary union), a common foreign policy and a common defence and security policy, which were set in train by and consolidated after the Maastricht Treaty (1993). For widening, attitudes towards further enlargement – whereby EU membership has expanded across several waves of accession to 28 members – and the specific question of T ­ urkey’s accession to the EU can be assessed. UK and cross-national opinion towards common European policies are assessed based on responses to the following EB questions: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro. A common foreign policy of the 28 Member States of the EU. A common defence and security policy among EU Member States. Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years. Figure 4.8 shows the level of net UK opposition for each of these key EU policies. This is computed by subtracting the percentage ‘against’ in the EU from the percentage ‘against’ within the UK, thus producing a ‘net’ UK score, as was done for the indicators of membership and unification. Positive values therefore indicate greater opposition within the UK to EMU and a single currency, a common foreign policy, a common security and defence policy and further enlargement; negative values indicate greater opposition within the EU. Between 1993 and 2016, net opposition on the part of the UK has been highest for the single currency. It was always higher than in the EU, but the difference widened over time. Britain under John Major’s government in the early 1990s negotiated an opt-out from joining EMU from its inception and retained its own national currency, as have some other member states. Net UK opposition has ranged from +19 to +39 and was consistently higher

102  European integration 45 40 35 30 25 %

20 15 10

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

0 -5

1993

5

-10 Single currency / EMU

Common foreign policy

Common security and defence policy

Further enlargement

Figure 4.8  Opposition to deepening and widening in the UK and EU (net UK scores), 1993–2016. Source: Computed from the Eurobarometer website: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/ publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instruments=STANDARD. Note: Net UK score calculated by subtracting % ‘against’ for the EU from % ‘against’ for the UK.

than +30 between 2007 and 2016. Opposition in the UK has also been higher in the areas of a common foreign policy and a common security and defence policy (between 1993 and 2016). Even so, UK opposition to common policies in these areas has been much lower, over time, than it has towards the Euro and EMU. British governments have also played a more constructive and significant role in advancing integration in terms of foreign and defence policy compared to other areas. It was the Blair government that during the late 1990s played an instrumental role, along with France and Germany, in the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy, which was set up as ‘the civilian–military operational arm of the CFSP’ (Biscop 2012: 1300–01). Another way of looking at this is to note that, generally, majorities of UK public opinion have favoured common foreign and security and defence policies, whereas clear majorities have opposed the single currency. Even larger majorities across the EU have supported common policies in these areas. Finally, more recent EB surveys have gauged views towards a common army – a recurrent fear of Eurosceptics in Britain (Blitz 2016) – and – as with common foreign and security and defence policies – support for this proposal was much higher in the EU (53% in favour and 39% against) than in the UK (58% opposed and 34% supportive) (EB Autumn 2015 survey).

European integration  103 Some of the factors which have more broadly hindered the EU’s ability to develop fuller capabilities in the area of foreign and defence policy, and which have prevented the formulation of common positions and responses to external crises amongst member states could shape in a diffuse way the differing levels of public support seen across member states, including the generally higher levels of opposition in Britain towards these areas of political integration shown in the EB data. These include increased public ­Euroscepticism and integration-fatigue in recent years, debates over the relative merits of an Atlanticist approach versus greater European cohesion and autonomy – in particular the UK-US special relationship, the presence of historically rooted foreign policy traditions amongst member states, the lack of shared values and sense of belonging amongst European publics as well as a lack of agreement over the strategic aims and purpose of the EU as an external actor (Krotz 2009: 563–69). Where there is less difference between opinion in the UK and the EU is in relation to views on enlargement (with data shown between 2000 and 2016), an area where British governments – both Conservative and Labour – have traditionally been supportive of new countries joining. Here, net UK opposition has been of a smaller magnitude and has not been wholly consistent over time. In general, opposition to further enlargement has been somewhat or a little higher in the UK but not always; net UK opposition has ranged from −3 to +9. While the British public has been clearly less supportive of major initiatives aimed at deepening political and economic integration within the EU, its support for widening the EU has usually ran closer to that expressed across all member states. The EB surveys have also featured a question asking about Turkey joining the EU: ‘For each of the following countries, are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future? Turkey’. Between 1992 and 2010, net opposition to Turkish accession in the UK ranged from −4 to −15, so opposition has been consistently higher across the EU. ­Evidence from Transatlantic Trends surveys shows that negative views of Turkish membership have been lower in the UK than cross-nationally (averaged across nine countries: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and the UK). Between 2005 and 2013 (it stood at just 9% in the UK and 20% in the EU-9 in 2004), the proportion saying Turkish membership would be a bad thing has ranged between 29% and 35% in the EU-9 countries, compared to 20%–30% in the UK. In every survey, opposition was higher in the EU-9 than in the UK.

The party-political basis of Euroscepticism Amongst the long-standing member states of Western Europe, the European issue has been perhaps most controversial amongst mainstream parties in Britain than in any other country (Hertner and Keith 2017: 64). Smith has observed that ‘European integration is a crosscutting issue that has divided

104  European integration British political parties’ for much of the post-war period and the impact of EU membership can be summarised as one of division and fragmentation, twin themes which have run though party politics at the UK and European level since Britain’s accession in 1973. Divisions over ‘Europe’ have often been visceral, creating internal dissent, inter-party rivalry and occasional rupture. (2012: 1277) Moreover, since accession, ‘neither of the two main political parties have adopted a consistent stance on European integration’ (Geddes 2013: 218). Indeed, the Liberal Party and then the Liberal Democrats have alone pursued a generally pro-European approach. This shifting pattern of party competition on the issue is reflected in the systematic party manifesto data available for the post-war period. Data from the MARPOR project can be used (Volkens et al. 2016a), a continuation of the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). The MARPOR data set contains information on the content of party manifestos, containing more than 1000 parties from over 50 countries, from 1945 to the present day. Party manifestos provide the most direct and complete view of official positions on different issues. Users of the ­MARPOR data have argued that these advantages compensate for any issues of reliability identified in the literature (Benoit et al. 2009; Budge 2013). The MARPOR country data for Britain were used to produce measurements of the parties’ negative or positive positions on the European issue between 1945 and 2015. A net score of party positioning towards the European integration process was computed by subtracting the proportion of negative references on the issue in each general election manifesto from the proportion of positive references (for more information on the MARPOR coding schema for the European integration scale, see Volkens et al. 2016b: 11–12). As a result, for each of these parties, scores above zero indicate an overall positive stance and minus scores denote an overall negative position. The results are shown in Figure 4.9. After a series of net positive or neutral positions between 1945 and 1970, the Labour party moved to a net negative stance in February 1974, the first general election after Britain had joined the Common Market in 1973 and stayed there in October 1974, subsequently remaining in negative territory between 1979 and 1987. Reflecting its pro-European turn in the late 1980s and into the 1990s – Kassim labels 1984–94 as a period of Labour’s ‘growing commitment to the Community’ (2010: 86) – as part of its wider modernisation of policy and electoral strategy, it shifted to a net positive stance in 1992 and has remained there at all subsequent elections. As Smith observes, As the Conservatives lost enthusiasm for Europe in the late 1980s, so the Labour Party gradually shed its reluctance to engage with what it

European integration  105 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 Con

Lab

Lib (Dem)

Figure 4.9  Net score on European integration by political party, 1945–2015 Source: Analysis of MARPOR.

had perceived to be a European capitalist club and became a strong supporter of European integration following Delors’s attempts to create ‘social’ Europe. (2012: 1282) The Conservatives generally had a net positive stance towards European integration into the 1980s but in the 1987 election had shifted into negative territory, which was reversed at the 1992 contest, after John Major’s government had negotiated the Maastricht Treaty and secured some key derogations pursuant of national interests. In 1997, the balance was negative again, and this continued for all subsequent elections, up to 2015. In contrast to the shifting – and crossing – trajectories of the two main parties, the balance of the Liberal Party’s (and Liberal Democrats’) manifesto statements on this issue has been consistently positive. Over recent years, as the Conservative Party has consolidated its Eurosceptic approach and policies on the EU, both Labour and the Liberal Democrat have, in broad terms, been ‘soft’ Europhile parties (Hertner and Keith 2017: 84). That is, whereas ‘hard ­Europhilia’ is defined as very strong and unconditional support for integration, the EU’s institutions and policies and further transfers of power, ‘soft Europhilia’ consists of strong backing for the EU in general, advocacy of reform for particular EU policies or institutions and a more cautious approach to deepening integration (Hertner and Keith 2017: 66–7). As the European integration process has evolved, with both deepening and widening advancing over time, the political and ideological alignments underpinning the issue in British politics have shifted. Divisions on the

106  European integration European issue have often occurred within rather than between parties (Geddes 2013: 251), and the main locus of opposition to Britain’s involvement in the EU has shifted over time, from the left to the right of the political spectrum. As Gamble observed, The reason why the issue of Europe has been so persistent and so divisive is that there is a lot at stake. For the future of British politics there is no more important issue, involving as it does a reassessment of British identity, security and political economy, and a judgement about the relative priority to be given to Europe as opposed to other relationships, particularly those with America … It divides parties because it fuses together questions of sovereignty and identity with political economy in a novel and powerful way. (2003: 114–15) Specific policy disagreements and broader ideological debates involving Europe have exerted a significant impact on party politics in recent decades. Serious differences over policy towards Europe have been major contributory factors in destabilising the parties while in government or opposition, producing cabinet splits, high-level resignations and, on occasion, have influenced the formation of new parties (the Referendum Party and UKIP in the 1990s). Indeed, to borrow Dorey’s pithy phrase, during the 1990s, ‘European integration fuelled Conservative disintegration’ (2017: 28), as it had done for Labour in earlier decades. Given the shifting party-political landscape on the European issue in the post-war era, it is instructive to examine the views of party supporters over the longer term to identify shifts which have taken place. The broader study of public opinion towards European integration has demonstrated the importance of party-political affiliations in shaping citizens’ views: Studies have therefore focused on the role of parties and other intermediaries such as the media in shaping support for the European Union. The core argument is that European integration is too complex and remote from the daily lives of most citizens for them to have sufficient interest, awareness, or emotional attachment to base their attitudes on an evaluation of the implications of the integration process … Instead citizens rely on proxies or cues to overcome their information shortfalls. Such information shortcuts may take various forms, but given that citizens generally pay more attention to the national political arena than to European politics, it makes sense that they employ domestic cues to form opinions about European integration. (Hobolt and De Vries 2016: 421–22) It might be expected, then, that such ‘cues’ provided by parties and leaders would be particularly important for the British public in the 1960s–70s, when

European integration  107 the Common Market issue was a relatively new issue for party-­political debate and – as already discussed – public knowledge and awareness would be relatively low (Butler and Stokes 1974). The views of Conservative, Labour and Liberal supporters, based on evidence from NOP polling between 1965 and 1973, are charted in Figure 4.10, a period encompassing the second and third attempts to join the EEC under, respectively, Labour and Conservative governments. It shows the proportions within each group approving of the Common Market. Between 1965 and 1966, Conservative supporters were more favourable than Labour supporters to Britain joining the Common Market. However, in 1969, Conservative supporters’ level of approval fell below that of Labour supporters, no doubt reflecting the unsuccessful efforts of Wilson’s Labour government to join after being re-elected in 1966. In the early 1970s, as the Heath government pursued Britain’s third attempt to join and where a successful outcome was obtained, party-political preferences diverged much more clearly, with Conservative supporters more supportive than Liberals and with Labour supporters least favourable. BES data on the Common Market issue between 1963 and 1966 show that, in 1963 and 1964, supporters of Labour, Conservatives and the Liberals held similar views on the issue of Common Market membership, with around half in favour (ranging between 48% and 54%). By 1966, all three groups had moved heavily towards Britain joining, at 82% of Conservative, 72% of Labour and 76% of Liberal supporters. Other data also show the marked partisan shifts which took place in the 1960s, in response to different governments probing British entry to the EEC. In January 1963, under Macmillan’s government, 51% and 24% of Conservative voters approved and disapproved,

80 70 60 50 % 40 30 20 10 0

Con

Lab

Lib

Figure 4.10  P  er cent supporting Common Market membership by party, 1965–73 Source: Analysis of NOP surveys.

108  European integration respectively, of joining the Common Market, compared to 33% and 38% of Labour voters (Durant 1967: 233). Four years later, in March 1967 under Wilson’s government, 63% of Labour supporters backed trying to join, with just 18% expressing disapproval – a similar proportion of Conservative voters again backed entry (50%), but opposition had risen to 37% (Durant 1967: 233). As Durant observes, the marked shift in the views of Labour supporters was seemingly ‘due to the simple fact that the issue was no longer associated in the public mind with a Conservative government’ (1967: 234) Party support throughout the 1970s can be assessed based on the evidence presented in Table 4.3. Based on a range of polls conducted by different organisations between 1971 and 1980, the views of Conservative, Labour and Liberal supporters are shown, reporting the proportions with a positive view of Britain joining the Common Market (question wordings are also given). In general, with the first poll excepted, there was more clarity and consistency to the patterning of party responses in this period. In relative terms, Conservative supporters were most likely to have had favourable opinions towards the Common Market: to disagree that Britain would be better off out than in, to support staying in, to think it was right to have joined and to feel sorry if the Common Market was abolished. Across these different indicators of views on the Common Market issue and throughout the decade, Labour supporters were least likely to express positive views, with Liberal supporters usually some way above them in their pro-European views. King’s analysis of partisan views on the issue of Europe from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s also showed the generally higher levels of support – or lower levels of ­opposition – amongst Conservative as compared to Labour supporters (1977: 27). The views of supporters in wider society seem to broadly correspond to which of the two main parties was more pro-European (the Conservatives) and which was more hostile towards the Common Market (Labour, particularly its left-wing Members of Parliament [MPs] and activists at the local level). In the 1970s, opposition to the EEC developed into something akin to an article of faith for many on the left wing of the Labour Party (Bilski 1977). For some MPs, moreover, the EEC debate was viewed in terms of ‘a struggle between socialism and capitalism’ (Bartlett 1989: 120). Research during this period found that opposition to the EEC ‘tends to come from a type of old-fashioned working-class conservatism’ (Ray 1979: 220). Liberal supporters were certainly more positive than Labour but usually ranked behind the Conservatives’ support for Common Market membership. Data from the BES February and October 1974 surveys also show that anti-Common Market sentiment was higher amongst Labour supporters, whose party was respectively elected and re-elected in the February and October general elections, on a platform of renegotiating the country’s membership. In February and October 1974, majorities of Conservative (67% and 70%) and Liberal supporters (51% and 57%) favoured either remaining on the present terms or staying and trying to change the terms. In contrast, most Labour supporters backed either trying to change the terms or leave or getting out anyway

Table 4.3  P ublic opinion towards Common Market membership by party support, 1971–80 Date

February to March 1971 June to September 1973 February 1974

Question

Britain will be better off out of Common Market than in Britain will be better off out of Common Market than in It is sometimes said that Britain should try to change the terms of entry Into the Common Market and If this is not successful, get out. Which of the following statements on this card comes closest to what yourself feel should be done? If you haven’t a view, just say so. February About the Common 1974 Market – Do you think the next Government should: August 1974 If there were such a vote, would you vote for Britain to stay in the Common Market, get out of the Common Market, or wouldn’t you vote at all? October 1974 It is sometimes said that Britain should try to change the terms of entry Into the Common Market and If this is not successful, get out. Which of the following statements on this card comes closest to what yourself feel should be done? If you haven’t a view, just say so.

Response

Con Lab Lib Would not vote/ undecided

Total: % 29 Disagree

27

17

18

Total: % 58 Disagree

26

42

29

Total: % Stay in

67

35

51

44

Total: % Stay in

74

45

66

56

% Stay in

53

21

35

21

Total: % Stay in

70

41

57

50

(Continued)

Date

January to February 1975

Question

Taking all things into consideration, would you say that you are in favour or against the United Kingdom being a member of the Common Market or are you neither in favour nor against? February If there were such a to March vote, would you 1975 vote for Britain to stay in the Common Market, get out of the Common Market or wouldn’t you vote at all May 1975 Do you consider we were right or wrong to join the European Community (the Common Market)? May 1975 If the question in the referendum was ‘do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community (the Common Market)’ how would you vote? January 1977 Generally speaking, do you think that British membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad? January 1977 If you were told tomorrow that the Common Market had been scrapped, generally speaking would you feel pleased or sorry about it or would you not care either way? July 1977 If there was a referendum on membership of the Common Market today, how would you vote, in favour or against?

Response

Con Lab Lib Would not vote/ undecided

Total: % In 64 favour

33

49

28

% Stay in

54

32

45

31

% Right to 64 join

29

45

37

% Stay in

80

47

64

55

% A good thing

45

32

38

24

% Sorry

41

26

39

22

% In favour

46

28

35

26

European integration  111 August 1977

Take Britain out of the Common Market? October 1977 If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the Common Market, how would you vote? March 1980 If there were a referendum now on whether Britain should stay in or get out of the Common Market, how would you vote?

% Opposed 53

32

39

30

% Stay in

58

41

48

36

% Stay in

40

18

38

15

Source: Analysis of SCPR, Gallup, NOP, BES and MORI surveys. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib, Liberal.

(58% in February and 54% in October). Another question in the 1974 surveys, asking whether staying in the Common Market would make Britain better or worse off, also elicited differing views from party supporters. Amongst Conservatives, 42% and 39%, respectively, offered an optimistic appraisal for the country, compared to 33% and 30% amongst Liberal supporters, falling to 23% of Labour backers in both surveys. Data for the 1980s and subsequent decades are available from the BSA surveys, which – as noted already – have featured several long-running questions on Britain and Europe. A question on staying in or leaving the EU has been asked on various occasions between 1983 and 2015. The evidence from this question clearly demonstrates the shift that took place in terms of Labour supporters becoming more pro-EU during the 1980s and Conservative supporters becoming more hostile to European integration. Between 1983 and 1987, support for withdrawal was much higher amongst Labour than Conservative supporters. In 1983, 58% of Labour supporters backed withdrawal, compared to 29% of Conservatives; in 1987 the respective ­figures were 46% and 23%. However, by 1989 views had narrowed, with 23% of Conservative supporters in favour of leaving compared to 29% of Labour supporters. In 1990, 23% of Labour supporters favoured leaving, higher than the 14% of Conservatives. But in 1991 such views were held equally (at just 16%). In 1997, the positions had been reversed, with 35% of Conservatives opposed to continued membership, compared to 23% of Labour. The question was re-asked in 2014 and 2015, but again Labour supporters were much less likely to support withdrawal compared to Conservative supporters. By subtracting the per cent of Conservative supporters in favour of withdrawal from the per cent of Labour supporters, a net Labour support for withdrawal score is produced for every relevant year. The net scores were in positive territory until 1990 (+29 in 1983, +35 in 1984, +23 in 1985, +18 in 1986, +23 in 1987 and 1989 and +14 in 1990), indicating greater support for

112  European integration withdrawal amongst Labour supporters. The net score was negative from 1997 to 2015, showing that support for leaving the EU was stronger amongst Conservatives (−12 in 1997, −13 in 2014 and −16 in 2015). A question in the BSA surveys asking about closer or less close relations with the EU also shows growing scepticism on the part of Conservative supporters in the early-to-mid-1990s and a divergence between them and Labour supporters. In 1991, 11% of Conservative and 9% of Labour supporters preferred less close relations, which rose to 28% and 20%, respectively, in 1993. By 1994 it stood at 29% of Conservative supporters and was 17% amongst Labour supporters. In the subsequent year, it increased to 35% of Conservative supporters and amounted to 19% of Labour supporters. The BSA, as discussed earlier, has since the 1990s asked questions on whether closer links with EU would strengthen Britain’s economy or would increase its world influence. In 1990, 48% of Conservatives thought that closer links would strengthen the economy, with 43% of Labour supporters expressing those views. In 1991, 46% of Labour supporters agreed, slightly higher than the 43% of Conservative supporters. In 1993, the respective proportions were 36% and 33%; in 1994, they were 47% and 37%; and, in 1995, they were 37% and 28%. The gap had narrowed in 1997, at 36% for Labour and 34% for Conservatives, but, in later surveys, once again Labour supporters had more positive views in this regard (43% in 2014 and 2015) than Conservatives (35% in 2014 and 33% in 2015). In terms of Britain’s influence in the world, in 1990 37% of both Labour and Conservative supporters said that closer EU links would give the country more influence, with 33% of both groups saying this in 1991. In 1993, it stood at 30% of Labour and 27% of Conservative supporters, with the gap widening in subsequent years. In 1994, it was 40% of Labour and 28% of Conservative supporters, and in 1995 the respective proportions were 32% and 21%. This gap was still evident in the later survey: in 2015, 35% of Labour supporters said closer links would enhance Britain’s international influence, higher than the 26% of Conservative supporters. This shift in the views of party supporters – with Conservatives becoming more hostile to membership and Labour supporters becoming more ­receptive – is also borne out by data from the BES surveys between 1983 and 1997. In 1983 – asked whether they wanted Britain to remain in the Common ­Market, to stay if better terms could be agreed upon or to leave ­anyway  – ­support for leaving was stronger amongst Labour supporters (28%) compared to Conservatives (6%) or supporters of the Liberal-SDP Alliance (12%). Amongst Labour supporters, 67% wanted to stay regardless or remain if better terms could be agreed upon, which was lower than the corresponding 93% of Conservative supporters and 87% of Alliance supporters. Between 1987 and 1997 a question on support or withdrawal was asked. In 1987, support for withdrawal stood at 39% of Labour supporters, declining to 25% in 1992 and 26% in 1997 (with the majority favouring staying, at 56% in 1987, 67% in 1992 and 62% in 1997). Amongst Conservative supporters, 24% favoured withdrawal in 1987 and 21% in 1992, but this rose to 37% in 1997. Whereas around

European integration  113 three-quarters had supported continued membership in 1987 and 1992, this declined to 56% in 1997. There was less of a distinct shift over time amongst Alliance and Liberal Democrat supporters. In 1987, 71% supported membership, which rose to 76% in 1992 and fell to 65% in 1997. Opposition to membership was 26% in both 1987 and 1997 and 19% in 1992. This partisan shift on the European issue amongst Conservative and Labour supporters is further corroborated by data from the EB surveys (based on those living in Britain). Figure 4.11 charts two indicators of net Conservative support for membership in the EU, in terms of the proportions saying that membership is a good thing (between 1973 and 2000) and that the country has benefitted from membership (1984–2000). The net score is produced by subtracting the percentage of Labour supporters from the percentage of Conservative supporters. Positive net scores show that Conservative support was higher than that for Labour, while negative net scores show that Labour support was higher. During the 1970s and 1980s, net Conservative support was consistently higher than that for Labour. That is, Conservative supporters were much more likely to perceive membership as a good thing and to think that Britain benefitted from it. Even so, there was some fluctuation over time, with the net differential for membership being a good thing falling and rising in the 1970s and then steadily decreasing during the 1980s. However, at the turn of the decade and into the early 1990s, net Conservative support on this indicator moved closer to and then entered negative territory. During the 1990s, the pattern from the earlier decades was somewhat reversed, with Conservative support often lower than that of Labour supporters. In 1973, 40 30 20

0 -10

1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

10 %

-20 -30 Con - Net Benefitted

Con - Net Good thing

Figure 4.11  Net Conservative support for European integration, 1973–2000. Source: Computed from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970–2002. Note: Calculated by subtracting per cent Labour from per cent Conservative.

114  European integration 20% of Labour supporters said membership was a bad thing, compared to 53% of Conservative supporters; in 1997, the respective figures were 45% and 35%. In 1984, 25% of Labour supporters expressed the view that Britain did benefit from its membership, compared to 47% of Conservatives. In 1997, positive assessments were held at relatively similar levels (46% of Labour supporters and 42% of Conservative supporters). In terms of the specific shifts in opinion already seen during the late 1980s and into the 1990s in the BSA and BES survey data, the evidence from the EB surveys also provides some corroboration. The proportion of Labour supporters perceiving membership as a good thing increased during the 1980s: from 14% in 1980 and 13% in 1981, to 18% in 1982 and 23% in 1983, through to 29% in 1984 and 30% in 1985, to 33% in 1986 and 36% in 1987. From 35% in 1988, it increased dramatically to 55% 1989, staying at 55% in 1990 and rose to 65% in 1991. In the remainder of the period from 1992 to 2000, positive views ranged between 45% and 59%. The proportion of Labour supporters saying the country benefitted from membership also increased during the 1980s: from 25% in 1984, to 29% in 1985 and 33% in 1986, through to 43% in 1987 and 39% in 1988. As with Labour supporters’ views on membership being a good thing, perceptions of the benefits rose significantly between 1988 and 1989, climbing to 52% in 1989 and consolidated at 53% in 1990–91. Apart from 1993 (at 39%), positive views were in the range of 46%–56% between 1992 and 2000. Other long-running EB questions also show this significant year-on-year change between 1988 and 1989. Asked about efforts being made to unify Western Europe, the proportion of Labour supporters who were in favour rose from 69% in 1988 to 82% in 1989. And in terms of how they would feel if the Common Market had been scrapped, the proportion of Labour supporters who said they would feel sorry rose from 22% in 1988 to 32% in 1989. The data from these questions also show Conservative supporters becoming steadily more Eurosceptic during the 1990s. In 1991, 60% said membership was a good thing, falling to 51% in 1992 and at 55% in 1993. In 1994, it fell to 46% and to 44% in 1995 and further to 38% in 1996, 35% in 1997 and was 37% in 1998. It then slumped to 25% in 1999 and 20% in 2000. In terms of the proportion of Conservative supporters thinking Britain had benefitted from membership, this stood at 56% in 1991, falling to 42% in 1992 and 47% in 1993, at 48% in 1994, decreasing to 42% in 1995, 39% in 1996 and then was 42% in 1995. The proportion of Conservative supporters in favour of efforts to unify Western Europe was 75% in 1991, which fell to 67% in 1992 and 66% in 1993, decreasing to 63% in 1994 and 55% in 1995. There was also a decrease over time in the proportion saying they would be sorry to see the EC scrapped: at 34% in 1991, it declined to 27% in 1992 and 28% in 1993 and then fell to 25% in 1994 and 23% in 1995. As well as the shifting preferences of Labour and Conservative supporters, a similar change occurred based on left-right ideology. Figure 4.12

European integration  115 70 60 50 %

40 30 20 10 0

Left-wing

Centre

Right-wing

Figure 4.12  P  er cent saying EU membership is a good thing by left-right ideology, 1976–2011. Source: Computed from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970–2002 and G ­ ESIS ZACAT website (https://www.gesis.org/en/services/research/daten-recherchieren/zacat-onlinestudy-catalogue/).

charts the proportion thinking EU membership is a good thing amongst three groups – left-wing, centre and right-wing – between 1976 and 2011. These groups were created from a long-running EB measure asking respondents to locate themselves on an ideological scale ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the most left-wing position and 10 the most right-wing position. Values from 1 to 3 were combined into a ‘left-wing’ group; values from 4 to 7 were combined into a ‘centre’ grouping; and values from 8 to 10 were combined into a ‘right-wing’ group. The earliest data for left-right position, from 1973, show that just 20% of those on the left thought their country’s membership was a good thing, which increased to 39% of those in the ideological centre and rose further to a majority of those on the right (57%). Similarly, in the latter half of the 1970s and during most of the 1980s, those with a right-wing orientation were most supportive of membership, followed by those in the ideological centre, with support least prevalent amongst those on the ideological left. However, as happened with the changing views of Labour and Conservative supporters, similarly there was a realignment of opinion based on left-right ideology. That is, at the end of the 1980s, during the 1990s and in the subsequent decade, those on the left wing ideologically come to hold the most favourable views on membership and those on the right expressed the least support. In 1976, 24% of those on the left said membership was a good thing, compared to 41% of those in the centre and 55% of those on the right. In 2011, 34% of those on the left held this view, compared to

116  European integration 27% of those in the centre and just 21% of those on the right. Similarly, in 1984, just 24% of those who were left wing said the country benefitted from membership, much lower than the 37% of those in the ideological centre and 46% of those on the right. In 2011, 42% of those on the left and in the centre expressed this view compared to just 24% of those on the ideological right. In 1973, 10% of those on the left said they would be sorry if the EU were to be abolished, which stood at 34% in 2002. Amongst those on the right, the respective figures were 42% and 14%. A similar pattern was evident in terms of views on unifying Western Europe. In 1978, 79% of those on the right supported efforts to unify Western Europe, which stood at 50% in 1995. Amongst those on the left, the corresponding proportions were 56% and 70%. The increasing Euroscepticism distinguishing Conservative supporters from Labour (and Liberal Democrat) supporters during the 1990s is also evident from the BSA question asking about preferences for Britain’s long-term relations with the EU. The combined levels of (‘soft’ and ‘hard’) ­Eurosceptic responses by party are shown in Figure 4.13, between 1993 and 2015. Generally, Eurosceptic opinion has been at its highest amongst ­Conservative Party supporters and has increased over time. In 1993, 48% of Conservative supporters held soft or hard Eurosceptic views, which had risen to 80% by 2015. Although always at a much lower level, ­Eurosceptic views have also become more prevalent amongst Labour and Liberal ­Democrat supporters. In 1993, 29% of Labour supporters were Eurosceptic, which had nearly doubled to 56% in 2015. Amongst Liberal Democrat supporters, it had risen from 42% to 70%. Not surprisingly, Eurosceptic 100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0

Con

Lab

Lib Dem

Other party

Figure 4.13  E  uroscepticism by party support, 1983–2015. Source: Analysis of BSA surveys.

None

European integration  117 views were heavily predominant amongst UKIP supporters, at 86% in 2013, 93% in 2014 and 91% in 2015. Amongst Conservative supporters, in 1993, 11% were hard Eurosceptics who wanted to leave the EU, with 37% soft Eurosceptics who preferred to stay but reduce the EU’s powers. In 2015, the proportion of soft Eurosceptics amongst Conservative supporters had increased to 54%, whilst hard Euroscepticism amounted to 26%. In 1993, Conservative supporters were more than three times as likely to be soft Eurosceptics; in 2015, they were about twice as likely. This deepening and hardening of Eurosceptic sentiment amongst Conservative supporters occurred during the period when the parliamentary party was also becoming increasingly Eurosceptic. First, elite surveys of Conservative Party candidates and elected representatives (MPs and Members of European Parliament) show, in general terms, a Eurosceptic shift in opinion and a narrowing of the range of preferences held between 1994 and 2010 (Lynch and Whitaker 2013: 320). Second, the attitudinal composition of successive cohorts of Conservative MPs, returned at each general election, has moved in a clear direction – while 58% of Conservative MPs in the 1992 cohort were classified as Eurosceptic, this increased markedly to 85% of the 1997 cohort, holding steady at 90% and 91% in 2001 and 2005, respectively, but declining to 77% in 2010 (Heppell et al. 2017: 771). Amongst Labour supporters, 11% were hard Eurosceptics in 1993 and 19% were soft; the equivalent proportions in 2015 were 14% and 42%. In 1993, Labour supporters had been less than twice as likely to be soft as hard Eurosceptics. In 2015, soft Eurosceptic views were three times as common as hard Euroscepticism. Data from the BES surveys undertaken between 2001 and 2015 also confirm the higher levels of Euroscepticism amongst Conservative party supporters. Based on a question asking about approval or disapproval of EU membership, the proportion of Conservative supporters that disapproved was 50% in 2001, 46% in 2005 and 47% in 2010, declining to 33% in 2015. Disapproval ran at lower levels amongst Labour (highest at 30% in 2010) and Liberal Democrat supporters (highest at a quarter in 2001 and 2005). In 2015, Eurosceptic sentiment was highest amongst UKIP supporters at 66%. A question on voting in a referendum on EU membership asked in the BES 2015 survey similarly showed that Conservative supporters were more likely to state a preference for leaving (37%) compared to Labour (25%) and Liberal Democrat supporters (12%). Three-quarters of UKIP supporters supported withdrawal. Support for staying in was highest amongst Liberal Democrat supporters (at 69%), followed by Labour (55%), Conservatives (45%) and UKIP supporters (17%). These BES surveys also confirm the shifting ideological basis of support for the EU, which realigned to some extent during the 1980s and 1990s. In every BES survey between 1997 and 2015, those classified as left

118  European integration wing – based on a left-right self-placement scale – were much more likely want to continue, or approved of, EU membership than were those in the ideological centre and those on the right. In 1997, 76% of those on the left supported continued EU membership compared to 59% and 57%, respectively, of those in the centre and on the right. In 2015, 65% of those on the left supported membership compared to 47% and 43% of those in the centre and on the right. The BSA surveys of 2005 and 2014 also include left-right self-­placement scales. While in both surveys less than half of those on the left held (soft or hard) Eurosceptic views, this rose to over three-fifths of those in the ideological centre and at least three-quarters of those on the right. Taken together, the detailed evidence provided for party support and left-right ideology confirms the observation that ‘anti-European integration sentiment has evolved from the antimarketeers of the 1960s and 1970s into a distinct brand of (mainly) right-wing and Conservative euroscepticism since the 1990s’ (Geddes 2013: 257). Returning to the issue of parties ‘leading’ or ‘following’ public opinion on the European issue (Flickinger 1994), discussed in relation to earlier decades where the former approach was the more plausible account, research has argued that, since the party realignment on this issue, which emerged during the late 1980s and was consolidated during the 1990s, the party ‘leading’ the public perspective has been somewhat weakened. As Evans and Butt summarise, … in recent decades, the signals sent to the party faithful on the merits of European integration have gone through a state of flux. The significance of cues from parties to voters declined as the parties themselves changed the messages sent to their supporters, which in turn has increased the possibility that voters themselves also send ‘messages’ to parties – through opinion polls and their electoral behaviour. When combined with evidence of greater awareness of the EU and greater relevance to party choice, this indicates clear grounds for believing that the EU has now become an issue where voters can lead and politicians follow. We should not overstate the case, however. Partisanship still influences EU attitudes, but this has been joined by an increasing EU-influence on support for parties. The pattern of reciprocal influences between elite preferences and public opinion is now more balanced. (2004: 213) This completes the detailed discussion of change and continuity in party-political opinion towards the integration process and British membership across successive decades. The next section looks in depth at views towards membership within particular demographic segments of British society, identifying the main sources of popular Euroscepticism.

European integration  119

The socio-demographic basis of Euroscepticism The preceding analysis has shown how there was a clear and enduring party-political and ideological shift in the basis of popular Euroscepticism. Has this also been the case for socio-demographic groups in wider society, or have the social dividing lines tended to endure over time? A long-standing and central approach to studying the determinants of public opinion towards the EU is the ‘utilitarian explanation’ (Hobolt and De Vries 2016: 420): The basic idea in these studies is that European trade liberalization will favor citizens with higher levels of income and human capital (education and occupational skills) and that as a consequence such individuals will be more supportive of European integration … The removal of barriers to trade allows firms to shift production across borders and increases job insecurity for low-skilled workers, whereas high-skilled workers and those with capital can take advantage of the opportunities resulting from a liberalized European market. (Hobolt and De Vries 2016: 420) Economic integration – and the opportunities and insecurities engendered by major projects such as the Single Market and EMU – therefore has differential consequences for citizens in member states, leading to ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from membership. Studies of public attitudes towards the EU have demonstrated that citizens with higher levels of ‘human capital’ are more supportive of EU membership and key policies (Gabel 1998a, 1998b; McLaren 2006; Hooghe et al. 2007). Accordingly, as Leconte observes, Eurosceptic citizens are often those less able to benefit from the opportunities created by the EU’s single market (2010: 175). The data sources already analysed in relation to British public opinion in general can also be used to ascertain the views of groups within wider society, including – but not only-based on economic circumstances. The first assessment involves looking at how different socio-­demographic groups viewed the pursuit of Common Market membership by the ­Wilson and Heath governments, based on NOP data for 1965–73. Levels of approval over time are shown in Table 4.4. There are some clear patterns over time. Men were generally more supportive of Britain applying to join than were women. Also, those aged 65 and older were usually least supportive of joining the Common Market, while those aged 16–34 and sometimes those aged 35–44 were more receptive to this initiative. Based on social grade, there was a consistent pattern with those in the highest AB social grade (A: upper middle class – higher managerial, administrative or professional; B: middle class – intermediate managerial, administrative or professional) most supportive of joining the Common Market; those in the lowest DE social grades were usually

Table 4.4  S  upport for the Common Market by demographic group, 1965–73  

February January March July October July August September November 1965 1966 1966 1966 1966 1969 1969 1969 1969

June 1971

September April July September 1971 1972 1972 to October 1972

October November June 1973 1972 1972

Male Female Aged 16–34 Aged 35–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ AB C1 C2 DE

54 42 57

61 44 56

61 46 59

68 57 69

66 50 62

40 27 44

39 24 38

37 24 40

34 19 36

35 22 32

44 29 41

50 38 50

43 34 43

37 27 37

47 32 45

46 34 45

44 34 44

51

59

58

68

64

39

40

34

32

31

39

43

42

34

42

42

36

45

50

51

62

55

30

29

28

21

26

36

42

37

29

34

39

37

36 59 51 47 41

40 70 58 47 43

43 68 58 52 44

50 77 67 60 58

49 74 63 58 48

21 40 31 34 28

20 39 35 29 26

16 35 32 30 25

17 36 27 23 25

16 46 33 21 20

25 61 41 32 23

36 69 50 36 31

27 63 46 34 26

28 56 43 27 22

34 64 49 34 24

28 61 48 34 28

32 62 49 33 27

Source: Analysis of NOP surveys.

European integration  121 least favourable (D: working class  – ­s emi-skilled and unskilled manual workers; E: lowest level of subsistence – state pensioners or widows ((no other earner)), casual or ­lowest grade workers). Those in the C1 (lower middle class – supervisory or clerical, junior managerial, administrative or professional) and C2 (skilled working class – skilled manual workers) social grades were usually, if not always, located somewhere in between the AB and DE groups in their level of support. Somewhat in contrast to the patterns already discussed for party support during this period, in which there was considerable fluctuation in partisan support, there was more stability in the relative ordering of support across demographic groups. In relative terms, approval of the Common Market tended to be more common amongst men, younger people and those in more secure socio-economic circumstances. The BES survey data between 1963 and 1966 also show some variation in opinion based on age group and social grade. In each case, those aged 18–29 were the most supportive of Britain joining the Common Market, and those in the AB social grade were most positive about membership. These differences were apparent in 1963–64, when public opinion was broadly split and in 1966 when there was a large majority in favour of membership. There was no consistent difference between men and women. The BES surveys of (February and October) 1974 and 1983 provide some evidence regarding how demographic groups viewed the issue of renegotiating Britain’s membership of the Common Market (or the EEC). In the 1974 surveys, an identical question asked respondents if they wanted to stay in the EEC on the present terms, to stay but try to change the terms, to change the terms or leave, or to get out. In 1983, respondents could choose among the options of staying anyway, staying if better terms were agreed upon or, leaving. The combined proportions that supported Britain staying anyway or staying and changing the terms (1974) or staying anyway or remaining if better terms were agreed upon (1983) are reported in Table 4.5. Men were more likely than women to support either staying anyway or remaining but trying to change the terms of membership in 1974. Younger age groups were not notably more supportive of remaining. In 1974, those in the AB social grade were clearly most supportive of staying in, followed by those in the C1 group, with those in the C2 and DE groups least favourable towards remaining. In 1983, large majorities across all groups supported either staying in or obtaining more favourable terms and remaining. Support for either of these positions was clearly lower amongst those aged 45–54 and 65 and older and those in working-class occupations. In terms of perceptions of whether Common Market membership would make the country better or worse off, the group-related differences were in accord with those seen on the issue of renegotiation. Men were most likely to have positive assessments of the impact of Common Market membership in both 1974 surveys, as were those in the AB social grade. The view that Britain would be better off was, though, somewhat more common amongst the two older age groups.

122  European integration Table 4.5  P ublic opinion towards renegotiating EEC membership by demographic group, 1974 and 1983 Stay on present terms or stay and try to change

Stay anyway or stay if we get better terms

February 1974

October 1974

1983

Male Female Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ AB C1

55 42 44 51 50 47 71 53

58 49 49 57 56 53 75 55

C2

43

49

DE

38

46

Male Female Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ Salariat Routine nonmanual Petty bourgeois Supervisory Working class

83 79 83 86 81 74 92 82 87 87 71

Source: Analysis of BES surveys. EEC, European Economic Community.

Analysis of the BES surveys from 1987 onwards also shows some consistent differences in views on EU membership, based on age, education and social class. Table 4.6 shows the proportions in each group supportive of membership (1987–97 surveys) or approving of Britain’s membership (2001–15 surveys). Men and women did not differ much in their support for membership between 1987 and 1997. But there was some clear variation in opinion based on age group. Those aged 18–29 were generally more likely to express support for continued membership, followed by those aged 30–44 years old. Support for leaving was higher amongst those aged 45–64 and highest amongst those aged 65 and older. In terms of completing full-time education (bearing in mind that those completing their education at the youngest ages tend to be drawn preponderantly from the older generations within society), those who finished aged 16 or under were always least supportive of membership in the 1980s–90s, followed by those who finished aged 17–18; those who completed their education aged 19 or over expressed the highest level of support for membership in each survey. In terms of highest qualification held, another measure of educational attainment (only available for 1992 and 1997) 94% and 87% of those with a degree – respectively – supported membership, compared to 77% and 62% of those with other qualifications. This fell to 59% and 43% of those with no qualifications.

European integration  123 Table 4.6  P ublic opinion towards EU membership by demographic group, 1987–2015 % Continue

% Approve of membership

1987

1992 1997

2001 2005

2010 2015

Male Female Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ TEA: 19 and over TEA: 17–18 TEA: 16 and under Salariat Routine nonmanual Petty bourgeois

68 65 74 69 63 59 82

74 70 76 74 72 64 91

63 53 65 58 58 50 82

52 34 49 45 42 34 64

47 34 43 44 42 29 60

43 33 46 41 39 26 53

45 39 49 45 38 37 –

78 61

76 67

70 48

44 32

43 30

38 20

– –

82 70

85 74

72 56

58 37

52 34

– –

– –

66

69

56

36

44

–

–

Supervisory Working class

56 56

71 61

56 47

34 30

36 30

– –

– –

Male Female Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ TEA: 19 and over TEA: 17–18 TEA: 16 and under Salariat Routine nonmanual Petty bourgeois Supervisory Working class

Source: Analysis of BES surveys. EU: European Union.

There were clear differences based on social class in this period. Specifically, those in the salariat (in professional and managerial occupations) were most supportive of membership, whilst those in working-class employment were consistently least supportive. The other groups were usually positioned in between the salariat and the working class. Between 2001 and 2015, the levels of approval were higher amongst men than women. In every survey, following a familiar pattern, approval of EU membership increased with age. In 2015, 49% of those aged 18–29 and 45% of those aged 30–44 expressed approval, which decreased to 38% and 37%, respectively, of those aged 45–64 and 65 and older. Again, those who completed their education aged 19 and over were more likely to approve of EU membership, followed by those who finished aged 17–18, with those who completed at a younger age much less likely to have favourable views. Analysis of the highest qualification held shows, as before, that approval of membership was least common amongst those with no qualifications and highest amongst those with degree-level (or higher) qualifications; those with other qualifications were usually somewhere in between. In 2015, 29% of those without qualifications expressed approval, compared to 37% of those with other qualifications and 70% of those with at least a degree. The views of

124  European integration those in different occupational groups also followed a similar pattern to that seen in earlier surveys. In 2001 and 2005, approval of EU membership peaked amongst those in the salariat (a majority) and was lowest amongst those in working-class occupations (equivalent data are not available for 2010 and 2015). The BSA surveys, which have featured several questions on Britain’s relations with the EU across recent decades, enable an assessment of continuity and change in the views of socio-demographic groups. For four separate questions, Table 4.7 reports the proportions with (hard or soft) Eurosceptic views in 1993 and 2015, the proportions favouring withdrawal in 1985 and 2015 and the proportions saying that Britain would be stronger economically or have more world influence because of its links with the EU, in 1990 and 2015. The proportions with hard or soft Eurosceptic views were higher across the board in 2015 compared to 1993, reflecting the general increase in negative sentiment discussed already. Interestingly, men Table 4.7  P ublic opinion on the European issue by demographic group  

% Eurosceptic

% Withdraw % Stronger economically

% More world influence

 

1993

2015

1985

2015

1990

2015

1990

2015

Male Female Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ Degree-level qualification Other qualification No qualifications Professional and managerial/ Salariata Routine/Clerical Small petty bourgeois and farmers/Petty bourgeois Manual/Foreman and technicians Other manual/Working class

42 34 27 41 40 41 27

70 61 53 55 72 78 59

39 38 34 36 43 42 12

31 28 17 30 31 39 17

54 35 46 42 44 43 64

40 30 39 39 31 34 49

40 32 38 32 35 40 54

34 24 34 34 27 20 46

40 38 40

68 65 69

28 53 18

31 43 23

46 35 58

31 29 39

36 31 44

26 14 34

40 51

69 65

27 35

34 43

41 56

24 40

35 41

25 29

51

70

37

38

37

41

33

20

30

60

42

36

32

27

29

29

Source: Analysis of BSA surveys. Note: a Different but equivalent classifications of social class were used in the pre- and post-2000 BSA surveys.

European integration  125 were less ­Eurosceptic than women in 1993, but this position changed later. The age-related differential widened over time: in 1983, 27% of those aged 18–29 were Eurosceptic in some form compared to around two-fifths of the older age groups. In 2015, though, just over half of those aged 18–29 and 30–44 were Eurosceptic compared to 72% of those aged 45–64 and 78% of those aged 65 and older. In both years, those with a degree (or higher) qualification were least likely to hold a Eurosceptic opinion with Euroscepticism at similar levels amongst those with other qualifications or none. Support for withdrawal from the EU also shows a broadly similar patterning across groups. Although there was little difference in the views of men and women, those aged 18–29 were least supportive of leaving in both years (along with those aged 30–44 in 1985). Based on educational attainment, support for exiting the EU was least common in both years amongst those with degree-level qualifications and higher (or highest) amongst those with no qualifications. The other indicators of relations with Europe show that men had more positive views than women in both years, in relation to the economy and international influence. The age groups showed broadly similar views on whether Britain would be stronger economically because of its links with Europe. In terms of whether Britain would be enhanced on the world stage, this view was least common amongst those aged 65 and older (20%) in 2014, followed by those aged 45–64 (27%). Those with a degree-level (or higher) qualification were consistently more likely to have positive economic and foreign policy evaluations of links with ­Europe; such views were generally lowest amongst those with no formal qualifications. In terms of looking at views on these four indicators based on social class, it is clear that those in professional or managerial occupations – or the ‘salariat’ – have been least supportive of Britain leaving the EU when given a binary choice. Levels of Euroscepticism were least prevalent amongst those in other manual occupations (the working class) in both 1993 and 2015. It did not vary much across the other social classes in 2015. In both years, those in professional and managerial occupations and in the petty bourgeoisie were more likely to have positive appraisals of links with Europe for Britain’s economy, along with the foreman and technicians group in 2015 only. Those in the salariat also, by a small margin, had the most favourable views of European links for Britain’s world influence in both years. Focussing in depth on the views of social and political groups within the broader British public over time, some important areas of continuity and change were identified. How have these groups voted at the ballot box in the two national referendums focused on membership of the EEC (1975) and EU (2016), held around four decades apart?

126  European integration

Voting in the 1975 and 2016 referendums The British public have been able to vote on their country’s membership on two occasions: June 6, 1975 and June 23, 2016. These two key political events – with starkly contrasting outcomes – almost serve to bookend Britain’s membership of the European project. Recent research has examined areas of commonality and dissimilarity between the two referendums and also studied the 1975 vote – the campaign, implications resulting from the outcome and the wider political context – in greater depth (Saunders 2016a, 2018; Martin Gliddon 2018). In 1975, based on a turnout of 64.5%, twothirds voted to stay in the Common Market, cementing Britain’s place for the next four decades. In 2016, in a closely fought contest, 52% of the public voted to leave the EU – that is, they chose ‘Brexit – with 48% preferring to remain. The 1975 referendum, called by prime minister Harold Wilson after a renegotiation exercise concerning the terms of membership, had acted as a ‘life raft’ for the Labour Party – it was seriously internally divided over the European issue, which was assimilated within broader left-right factionalism over policy direction. The second recourse to a popular vote on ­Europe in the June 2016 referendum came under a Conservative government headed by David Cameron, whose party – as under his predecessors – was internally divided over the merits of membership, largely between soft and hard Eurosceptic MPs, and whose electoral prospects were troubled by the presence of the hard-right UKIP. Of course, the broader political implications of each referendum were very different in terms of the respective status of Wilson and Cameron. As Saunders notes: ‘Where Wilson had won the referendum, reimposed his authority and secured Britain’s place in the EEC, Cameron had presided over the disintegration of his government, the ruin of his career and the most significant policy reverse since decolonisation’ (2018: 382). In both referendums, collective ministerial responsibility was suspended, allowing for ministers to dissent from and argue against the government’s position (Saunders 2018: 381). In 1975, the Labour party was more seriously divided and the Conservative Party was generally more unified on the membership issue. In 2016, the parties’ images were largely reversed, although Labour’s leader, Jeremy Corbyn, campaigned in a rather lukewarm fashion and did not convince with his pro-EU credentials given his left-wing Eurosceptic tendencies on this issue. In 1975, senior Labour ministers could rail against the EEC as a ‘capitalist club’ and argue that socialist policies could only be properly implemented with Britain outside of the EEC. In 2016, senior Conservative ministers could dissent from their government’s position to stay in the EU and campaign against the regulation imposed by the EU and argue for a brighter future for free enterprise and free trade once the country had left. However, the prominence of Wilson and Cameron in their referendum campaigns differed markedly. In 1975,

European integration  127 Wilson ‘took a back seat in the campaign’ (Saunders 2018: 381). In 2016, in stark contrast, ‘Cameron had little choice but to run the Remain campaign himself’ (Saunders 2018: 382). The issue agendas in 1975 and 2016 shared some similarities but also exhibited some differing areas of concern. The key issues – dominating the campaign and media agenda – in the 2016 referendum campaign were the economy and immigration (Hobolt 2016: 1262). As Hobolt observes, From the outset of the campaign, the battle lines were starkly drawn up by the two sides: the economy versus immigration. The messages were clear: vote Remain to avoid the economic risk of a Brexit (‘A leap in the dark’) or vote Leave to regain control of British borders, British law-making and restrict immigration (‘Take back control’) … The Remain side was hopeful that the economic uncertainties associated with Brexit would ultimately persuade voters to choose the status quo option, since there was an overwhelming consensus among experts that a Brexit outcome would have negative economic consequences for Britain. In contrast, the Leave camp presented the referendum as a unique opportunity to regain control of British law-making, borders and restrict immigration. (2016: 1262) In terms of the most salient issues for voters, the most commonly cited were immigration, the economy and sovereignty (Swales 2016: 13; see also Prosser et al. 2016). In the 1975 referendum, in contrast, ‘Immigration was barely mentioned’ (Saunders 2016b). The three main campaign themes in 1975 were the implications – especially in relation to control over the economy – for national sovereignty from joining; how membership would impact prices in Britain, especially of food; and the merits of the renegotiated terms of membership (Sarklvik et al. 1976: 108). More generally, the anti-Common Market cause in British politics had been mobilised in particular by public concerns over pocketbook economics and political sovereignty: ‘fear of rising prices’ and ‘fear of domination or of a loss of self-determination’ (Shepherd 1975: 120). The context of the mainstream press on the EEC issue was also very different. In 1975, ‘there was a near-total dominance of editorial coverage for the pro-Community case’ (Wilkes and Wring 1998: 195). ‘Among national papers, the Morning Star, itself of very limited size and readership compared with the rest, fought a lone campaign for the anti-­Marketeers’ ­(Seymour-Ure 1976: 216). Daddow notes that the ‘permissive media consensus in support of the EEC in the 1970s almost entirely dissipated over the subsequent decades’ (2012: 1225). By the 1990s, there was a

128  European integration ‘widespread Euroscepticism in large sections of the press’ ­( Wilkes and Wring 1998: 185), particularly amongst tabloids and broadsheets broadly on the right of British politics. The 2016 EU referendum was conducted within and its manifestation was clearly reflective of, a changed media environment where ‘the proportion of UK readers consuming ­Eurosceptic-inclined coverage of EU affairs now vastly outweighs those taking in “neutral” or encouraging messages about the daily activities of the EU’ (Daddow 2012: 1227). Given the shifting party-political terrain on this issue detailed earlier and the differing political contexts within which the referendums took place, it is instructive to examine in more depth the patterns of voting within the British electorate. The 1975 EEC referendum Analysis of data from the BES 1974–75–79 panel study shows how different demographic groups and party supporters voted (excluding from the analysis those who said they did not turn out and vote, those who did not know, or could not remember how they voted). Data on voting at the referendum were taken from the post-referendum postal survey and for all other variables from the O ­ ctober 1974 cross-section wave. The full breakdown of voting across groups is presented in the Appendix to this book. Specifically, voting data are reported for socio-demographic factors and newspaper readership ­(Table 4.1a), party identification and left-right issues (Table 4.2a) and social issues (Table 4.3a). Based on demographic factors, shown in Table 4.1a, 71% of men voted to stay, just below the 73% of women. The pattern of voting for age groups was contrary to much of the evidence for age and Euroscepticism reviewed in the chapter so far: 80% of those aged 65 and older voted in favour of membership, compared to 73% and 72%, respectively, of those aged 45–64 and 30–44; it was lowest at 62% of those aged 18–29. Based on social class, those in the AB social grade were most supportive of staying (85%), followed by those in the C1 group (75%), the C2 grade (64%), and was lowest at 62% of those in the DE group. Those in the DE and C2 groups (37–8%) were more than twice as likely to vote to leave as those in the AB group (15%). Voting to stay in the Common Market was somewhat lower amongst union members (66%) than those who were not a member of a union (74%). Amongst those who finished their education at an older age, support was higher: 86% of those who completed aged 18 and older and 87% of those who left at aged 17. It was 77% amongst those who left aged 16 and was lowest amongst those who left aged 14 (69%) or aged 15 (64%) but rose to 79% of those who left aged 13 or under. Based on housing tenure, support for membership was highest amongst those who owned their property outright (82%) or who had a mortgage (76%), and lowest amongst those who

European integration  129 rented privately (66%) or from a public body (62%). Geographically, support for membership was lowest in Scotland (58%), highest in Wales (79%) and ranged from 69% to 75% in the English regions. In general, then, more secure socio-economic status was correlated with a greater propensity to vote in favour of EEC membership. Analysis of the spatial patterns of voting in the 1975 referendum showed that, across counties, the proportions voting to stay in the EEC were higher in wealthier areas, based on their social class composition (Collins 1976: 100). Based on newspaper readership (Table 4.1a), support for membership was lowest amongst those who read The Sun (60%) or The Mirror/Record (65%) and stood at 71% of those who read some other newspaper or did not read one. Support was higher amongst readers of the Daily Express (78%), The Guardian (77%), Daily Mail (84%) and the Daily Telegraph (89%). These papers had supported Britain staying in the EEC; of the national papers, only the Morning Star was opposed (Butler and Kitzinger 1976: 216). Based on views towards immigration – specifically, whether it was important or not for the government to repatriate immigrants – support for membership stood at 68% of those for whom this was important, 73% amongst those who were not sure and 74% of those who said it was not important. In terms of party support, Table 4.2a shows that 88% of Conservative supporters voted to stay in the Common Market, as did 77% of Liberal supporters. Support for remain was much lower amongst Labour supporters – although still a majority, at 57% – and just 49% amongst those supporting other parties, such as the Scottish and Welsh nationalists. Amongst those with no party affiliation, 70% supported EEC membership. Labour supporters were, therefore, more than three times as likely to vote to leave as Conservative supporters and nearly twice as likely as Liberal supporters. Labour Euroscepticism was rooted in concerns over the EEC being a capitalist club, that it betrayed Britain’s Commonwealth links, that it was bad for poorer countries and that it took money away from domestic priorities (Saunders 2016a: 318). During the campaign itself, it was observed that ‘the left wing of the Labour Party was the only cohesive political force campaigning against Europe’ (King 1977: 109). King argued that individuals were ‘disposed to take their cues on the Market from the political party they currently supported’ (King 1977: 30). Even so, the Labour Party had been ‘divided from top to bottom’ on the issue of EEC membership (Valen et al. 1983: 46), and this is reflected in its supporters’ being more divided on the issue (58% versus 42% for membership). Table 4.3 showed the generally consistent partisan differences on the issue in the early 1970s, in the years preceding the referendum. Valen et al. found that preferences in the 1975 referendum were also structured by left-right ideology: these beliefs were ‘engrained in the fabric of normal political conflict’ in Britain and, as such, were ‘capable of being mobilized with regard to issues that fit their terms’, of which

130  European integration membership of the EEC was one (1983: 61). Those with more left-wing orientations were much more likely to have voted against EEC membership than those with a right-wing disposition (Valen et al. 1983: 52–54). The BES data on left-right issues, shown in Table 4.2, shed light on how ideological conflict structured voting in the 1975 referendum. In terms of long-running policy debates central to the left-right axis of British ­p olitics – such as nationalisation, redistribution, the role of the trade unions and the provision of welfare and services – those favouring more leftwing solutions tended to be less likely to have supported staying in the Common Market. Based on views on the nationalisation-privatisation issue, those who backed a lot more (46%) or a few more companies (65%) being taken into state ownership were less emphatic in their backing for remaining than were those who favoured no further nationalisation (78%) or who preferred more private companies (79%). Amongst those who thought that government redistribution of wealth was important, 65% voted to stay, lower than the 74% support amongst those who were unsure on this issue and the 84% support amongst those who said that redistribution was not important. Pro-remain voting was also higher amongst those who supported social services being cut back a lot (73%) or a bit (78%), or who said they should stay as they are (73%), compared to those who said more were needed (64%). Amongst those who said that trade unions had too much power, 76% said they voted to stay in the Common Market, which fell to 53% of those who believed unions did not have too much power. On welfare benefits, those who thought things had gone too far were more likely to have voted to remain in the Common Market (80%), compared to 71% of those who said things were about right and 62% of those who said things had not gone far enough. In contrast to the generally consistent differences based on left-right issues, the findings are not clear-cut for voting on the EEC and social issues, as shown in Table 4.3a. These represented social changes pertaining to moral behaviour and social values, where respondents were asked if things had gone too far, were about right, or had not gone far enough. Overall, there is no consistent pattern, and, where differences exist, they are not of the order of magnitude seen for left-right issues. Those who said that pornography had gone too far or was about right, who said showing less respect towards authority had gone too far and who said abortion had gone too far were somewhat more likely to have voted in favour of EEC membership. There was less clear-cut variation based on views towards sex equality, racial equality and lawbreaking. Overall, then, opposition to EEC membership – as expressed by social groups at the 1975 referendum – was disproportionately found amongst those in the lower social grades, those who completed education at an earlier age (apart from those leaving at aged 13 or under), trade union members, younger people, readers of The Sun and the Daily Mirror, Labour

European integration  131 party supporters and those with more left-wing policy preferences. Whereas those with more left-wing opinions on socio-economic issues were clearly more likely to have supported Britain leaving the EEC in 1975, the same could not be said for those holding socially conservative or traditional moral views. The 2016 EU referendum The group-related patterns of voting at the 1975 EEC referendum can be compared with the breakdown of the vote at the 2016 Brexit referendum, to highlight areas of continuity and change. For this purpose, the British Election Study Internet Campaign Panel 2014–18 was analysed – specifically Wave 9 (the post-referendum wave, with fieldwork undertaken from June 24–July 4, 2016). To provide broader coverage of how voting varied by political attitudes, Wave 10 was also analysed (fieldwork was conducted between November 24 and December 12, 2016). Both waves were analysed on a cross-sectional basis with the core sample weighting applied. Again, excluded from the analysis are those who said they did not vote or those who could not remember. A detailed breakdown of voting patterns at the 2016 referendum is provided in the Appendix, based on socio-demographic characteristics (Table 4.4a), newspaper readership and party identification (Table 4.5a), left-right issues (Table 4.6a) and social issues (Table 4.7a). Based on socio-demographic characteristics (Table 4.4a), voting to leave was identical amongst men and women. There was pronounced variation based on age, with older people much more likely to have voted for Brexit (56% of those aged 45–64 and 59% of those aged 65 and over) compared to younger people (just 32% of those aged 18–29). Based on social class, support for Brexit was much higher amongst those in the C2 and DE groups (at, respectively, 59% and 58%) compared to those in the AB and C1 grades. The association between lower socio-economic status and voting for Brexit is also apparent based on housing tenure and indicators of educational attainment. Those renting from a local council or housing association were much more likely to have voted for Brexit compared to owner-occupiers (with those owning outright more supportive than those with a mortgage) and those renting in the private sector or with some other arrangement. Voting to leave the EU was much higher amongst those who finished their full-time education aged 16 and under; similarly, it was more pronounced amongst those with no qualifications or with only GCSEs. Newspaper readership shows some strong associations with backing remain or leave (Table 4.5a). Readers of the right-leaning tabloids – Daily Mail, Express and The Sun – were heavily supportive of Brexit. Readers of the left-leaning Daily Mirror, however, backed staying in the EU (56%). Readers of the Telegraph backed Brexit (55%), but readers of the Times

132  European integration strongly supported remaining in the EU (70%). Backing EU membership was the position of an overwhelming majority of readers of the left-­leaning Guardian and Independent. Support for staying in the EU also received majority support amongst readers of other publications (including Scottish newspapers) and those who did not read any paper. Party supporters varied considerably in their voting patterns (see Table 4.5a), in accordance with the partisan data on Euroscepticism over recent decades. The voting behaviour of Conservative and Labour supporters was almost a mirror image (63% of the former backed Brexit compared to 36% of the latter). Nearly all UKIP supporters voted to leave (at 97%). In contrast, clear majorities of Liberal Democrat, Green Party, SNP, Plaid Cymru – both nationalist parties had been anti-EEC at the 1975 referendum – and other party supporters backed Britain staying in the EU. A small majority of non-identifiers backed Brexit (52%). Table 4.6a shows the breakdown voting based on left-right issues (a set of well-established questions asked in the BES and BSA series) and self-placement on a left-right scale ranging from 0 to 10 (here classified into three groupings: left-wing – 0–3; centre – 4–6; right-wing – 7–10). Based on the five questions tapping into left-right beliefs – covering redistribution, the nature of big business, the share of national wealth, the law for rich and poor people, and management-employee relations – there is no consistent pattern for any ideological tendency to be associated with a greater propensity to oppose Brexit. Based on ideological self-placement, however, there was a very pronounced divide, with Brexit being supported by 72% of those on the right, 49% of those in the centre and just 19% of those on the left. There is considerable variation in support for remain or leave based on libertarian-authoritarian issues and views on social equality (presented in Table 4.7a). Consistently, authoritarian views on traditional values, capital punishment, obeying authority, censorship and stiffer sentences for lawbreaking are correlated with greater support for Brexit; libertarian positions correspond well with support for membership. Similarly, those with more socially conservative views on equality on grounds of sex, race and sexual orientation – agreeing it has gone too far  – were much more likely to have voted for Brexit. This is in clear contrast to 1975, when views on group equality did not really differentiate between supporters and opponents of EEC membership. The magnitudes of the differences based on libertarian-authoritarian orientations are much greater than that seen for left-right orientations (though not including ideological self-placement). This pattern broadly corroborates the observation of Swales that this ‘referendum this was less a traditional left-right battle and more about identity and values’ (2016: 27; see, also, Kaufmann 2016). Overall, comparing the detailed patterns of voting in the two referendums, it is clear that – in terms of areas of continuity – support for

European integration  133 membership in both votes was concentrated amongst those with higher socio-economic status. Accordingly, in 1975 and in 2016, the decision to leave was disproportionately favoured by the less well-off in wider society. In both referendums, there was no pronounced gap in the voting patterns of men and women. In 1975, pro-leave voting was more common amongst those in younger age groups; the opposite was the case in 2016, where support for leaving the EU was much more prevalent amongst older people. In 1975, those living in Scotland, Labour party supporters, trade unionists and those of a left-wing disposition were strong components of the anti-Common Market vote. In 2016, however, these groups were generally strong supporters of Britain staying in the EU. In 2016, the forces of the political right – whether based on party support for UKIP or the Conservatives, or social authoritarian ideological dispositions – were pivotal to the decision to leave. Moreover, while in 1975, readers of the broadly left-leaning tabloids were least in favour of the Common Market – and readers of right-leaning tabloids and broadsheets were generally highly supportive of membership – in 2016 readers of right-wing tabloids were the most emphatic ‘leavers’. Recent research into the referendum has shown that the vote to leave the EU was underpinned by a ‘broad-based coalition’, which consisted of three core groups: ‘affluent Eurosceptics, the older working class and a smaller group of economically disadvantaged, anti-immigration voters’ (Swales 2016: 25–27).

Conclusion This chapter has provided a detailed review of public opinion in Britain towards the European integration process, encompassing the period before membership and over four decades of membership up to the 2016 referendum. In general terms, there have been clear shifts in the British public’s views on relations with the EU (and its predecessor organisations), with the mood shifting in a warmer and colder direction during different periods. Compared to other member states, Britain has historically been more likely to exhibit negative sentiment towards membership as well as been more opposed to common policies which have served to advance political and economic integration over time – attitudes towards enlargement excepted. The shifting party-political terrain on the European issue over the decades has been reflected at the broader societal level, as some noticeable shifts have taken place in the pro- or anti-EU leanings of both Labour and Conservative supporters. The wearers of the ‘pro-European’ and ‘anti-­ European’ hats have swapped over time, both in terms of party elites and their broader partisan constituencies. In terms of other sections of society and their views on Britain’s relations with Europe, there have been more consistent tendencies over time, with younger age groups and those who are better off in society – based on education and occupation – being more pro-EU.

134  European integration Older people and those in less secure socio-economic circumstances have been reasonably consistent repositories of Eurosceptic views in British society. Some of the longer-term partisan and ideological shifts in public ­opinion – and thus the changing locus of political Euroscepticism – were well illustrated by the differing patterns of group voting at the 1975 and 2016 referendums.

5 Overseas aid

This chapter focusses on public opinion in Britain towards overseas aid. Britain has a long tradition of providing overseas aid to less developed countries in the post-war era. In terms of a ‘cosmopolitan’ perspective, Britain’s legacy of Empire and subsequent Commonwealth has left it with obligations to help countries develop while, more broadly, Britain is part of a global community that needs to respond to pressing issues of poverty and development (Gaskarth 2013: 115). Between 1958 and 1971, around four-fifths of aid took the form of bilateral transfers to Commonwealth countries, as the legacy of imperial ties as well as the need to maintain the sterling area shaped the aid programme’s core focus on these nations (Tomlinson 2003: 413). As Tomlinson observes: ‘In the 1950s and 1960s the Commonwealth evolved into a body of predominantly poor countries, and aid thus came to be seen as a major support to secure its continuation’ (2003: 428–9). In terms of contemporary aid-giving, of the 20 largest recipients of UK bilateral aid in 2016, eight were Asian or African countries which are current members of the Commonwealth (DFIF 2017: 4). In the top ten, this included Pakistan (the largest recipient), Nigeria (fourth largest), Tanzania (sixth largest) and Sierra Leone (ninth largest) (DFID 2017: 23). From a ‘communitarian’ perspective, overseas aid can support the pursuance of a country’s strategic and economic interests, as well as enhance its international standing (Gaskarth 2013: 115). But donor countries can face difficult and sometimes politically unpopular decisions when trying to balance or prioritise and needing to justify to a domestic audience, a needs-driven or interest-driven approach to overseas aid policy and practice. This policy dilemma is more acute when a country is experiencing difficult economic conditions, as was the case in Britain from 2008 – as the global economy deteriorated – and then from 2010 onwards with a protracted period of fiscal restraint in the funding of domestic services. The analysis of public opinion in this chapter encompasses a review of historical survey data on this issue as well as a detailed analysis of contemporary attitudes. There is a need, as Heppell and Lightfoot have observed, for a ‘comparable evaluation of the British electorates’ [sic] attitudes towards the expansion of international aid’ (2012: 137). Given the

136  Overseas aid predominant topic focus and question framing of the sources used here, the analysis necessarily focusses on public preferences for more or less spending on or an increased or reduced provision of overseas aid. This chapter builds on recent research into the nature and sources of opinion on overseas aid within the British public (van Heerde and Hudson 2010; Glennie et al. 2012; Henson and Lindstrom 2013; Scotto and Reifler 2014; Davies et al. 2015; Lightfoot et al. 2015; Scotto et al. 2017), as well as cross-national studies on this issue (Diven and Constantelos 2009; Paxton and Knack 2012). It focusses on the public’s general views, as well as looking in detail at the opinions of socio-demographic and political groups. In so doing, it contributes to this emerging strand of research which has shed light on the nature and structure of public opinion in Britain, thus redressing the deficiency in scholarly knowledge of popular attitudes on overseas aid in donor and recipient countries (Milner and Tingley 2013: 390). Given how overseas aid in Britain has been to some extent politicised in recent years – engendering critical reaction from the right of the political spectrum; given that cross-national research has demonstrated ‘the role of partisan cleavages in the formulation of foreign aid policies’ (Thérien and Noel 2000: 160); and given the partisan differences in public opinion found in many countries (Milner and Tingley 2013), it is particularly instructive to examine views on the subject in Britain across core indicators of political disposition, such as party support, left-right ideology and newspaper readership. This is undertaken both for the historical survey data and for the extensive recent polling on the subject. The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section sets out the wider political and policy context to Britain’s role as a significant provider of overseas aid. The second section reviews the historical evidence pertaining to the British public’s general views on overseas aid-giving. The third section examines the views of demographic groups over time, looking at how opinions varied based on sex, age group and socio-economic circumstances. The fourth section looks at opinions on overseas aid based on political groups and again reviews the evidence in historical perspective. The fifth section analyses recent opinion polling (2010–17) on the overseas aid debate. The sixth section provides a detailed profile of contemporary public opinion, looking at variation across groups in wider society. The final section concludes the analysis and sets out the noteworthy findings.

The party-political and policy context of overseas aid Overseas aid represents an important area of foreign policy whereby a country can project ‘soft power’ to build relations with other countries and enhance its international reputation more generally. The House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence argued in its recent report, ‘Persuasion and Power in the Modern World’:

Overseas aid  137 Where development assistance is effective, conditions in the recipient countries improve at the same time as the UK’s reputation, as the aid giver, increases. Thus, the promotion of British values through the funding of international development projects can yield significant soft power gains’. (2014: 73) Indeed, an index ranking the top 30 countries according to their soft power – which measures, amongst many other criteria, provision of overseas development aid – placed the UK at number one in 2015 and number two between 2016 and 2017 (The Soft Power 30). As Lightfoot et al. note: ‘The UK – primarily through the auspices of DFID – wields very considerable soft power in the international development realm’ (2017: 519). Under the 1970–74 and 1979–97 periods of Conservative government, the Ministry of Overseas Development set up each time by the predecessor Labour government was abolished and its main functions subsumed within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. As Heppell et al. note, these institutional changes ‘seemed to be symptomatic of the different importance attached to international aid’ by the Labour and Conservative parties (2017: 900). After entering office in 1997, New Labour established the Department for International Development (DFID), headed by a minister of cabinet rank, Clare Short. Short ‘became the longest-serving and, arguably, the most effective SofS [Secretary of State] for Overseas or International Development since 1964’ (Clarke 2018: 21). The greater prominence – the ‘mainstreaming’ – of development issues within government was underpinned by the passing of the International Development Act and the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act in, respectively, 2002 and 2006. The latter act stipulated that the reduction of poverty would be the primary aim of overseas aid as well as ensuing that it would not be given as ‘tied’ aid (Heppell et al. 2017: 900) DFID’s policy aims and claims on national resources were enhanced by its first secretary of state, Short, being a strong ministerial personality in office between 1997 and 2003 (before resigning over the invasion of Iraq), underpinned by her close working relationship with the chancellor, Gordon Brown. As Vickers notes, The function of DFID was to promote sustainable development and eliminate world poverty, and this was far more likely to happen with an independent department with its own minister who would hold influence within the Cabinet. (2011: 176) Overseas aid as a policy area and the general performance of DFID under New Labour between 1997 and 2010 is one area where there was some success in trying to develop and pursue a more ethical dimension to foreign

138  Overseas aid policy. A series of capability reviews of each ministry undertaken in 2007 judged DFID to be the top-rated department across Whitehall (Manning 2007: 561). As well as the role played by DFID and the secretary of state, Gordon Brown and Tony Blair also utilised their own networks within international forums to influence partners and advance Britain’s priorities and initiatives regarding overseas development (Manning 2007: 555). The New Labour government conducted a number of important initiatives with the aim of addressing global poverty and advancing sustainable development. These included playing an important role in agenda-setting and eventually making progress on debt relief, particularly for heavily indebted poor countries; a considerable increase in overseas aid spending; pursuing a more cooperative approach to development issues, including rejoining the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and working alongside international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and, finally, being engaged with development and poverty-related issues affecting African countries, much more so than the previous Conservative governments (Vickers 2011: 176–8). When the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition entered office in May 2010, DFID was retained as a stand-alone government department, signifying the high level of continuity in this policy area. The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, despite stressing the imperative of dealing with the public finances at home, asserted that ‘The Government believe that even in these difficult economic times, the UK has a moral responsibility to help the poorest people in the world’ (2010: 22). Before returning to office, aligning itself with the Labour government’s institutional and policy initiatives on overseas aid contributed to projecting a more modern and compassionate Conservative foreign policy under David Cameron’s leadership. Heppell and Lightfoot (2012) identify four main factors which shaped this repositioning on overseas aid. First, changing the party’s stance on overseas aid contributed to the broader aim of ‘brand contamination’, partly by neutralising a Labour-owned issue (2012: 133). Second, leading figures in the modernisation agenda, primarily Cameron and Osborne, were committed to this policy overhaul (2012: 133). Third, DFID was seen as a generally effective performer in Whitehall relative to other departments, and thus, there was an institutional ‘logic’ to retaining it as a separate ministry (2012: 134). Indeed, Manning observes that the outgoing government ‘left behind a radically strengthened UK voice in international development, backed by a very significant increase in public resources, and by institutional arrangements (notably energetic cabinet level leadership of the development agenda) that underpin that voice’ (2007: 569). Fourth, as with predecessor governments, overseas development policy was a way, within bounds, of promoting the country’s strategic and commercial concerns; what was moral could be linked with national self-interest (Heppell and Lightfoot: 2012: 135). In a policy document published by the Conservative Party in 2009, One World Conservatism, which committed the party to the 0.7% of gross

Overseas aid  139 national income (GNI) target, a more ‘hard-headed’ and ‘value-for-money’ approach was set out which would rebalance national interests with more altruistic motives for giving aid (Mawdsley 2015: 347). This repositioning under Cameron – Seldon and Snowden cite his ‘dogged commitment’ in this policy area (2015: 479) – and thus the cementing of a party-political consensus over Britain’s overseas aid role can be seen as a significant political achievement for the outgoing Labour government. As Vickers observes, One of the key successes of the New Labour years was that the British focus on international development increased to the extent that it then became untenable for a younger generation of Conservatives to consider undoing the work that their predecessors had done. (2015: 238). Britain’s role as a leading provider of overseas aid was consolidated under the coalition government between 2010 and 2015. It became the first G8 country in 2013 to meet the UN’s long-standing 0.7% of GNI target for overseas aid, and, in 2015, with the passing of the International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act, it became a legally binding commitment. Justine Greening, Secretary of State for International Development from 2012 to 2015, argued that Achieving our pledge of 0.7% is the right thing to do and the smart thing to do. It is in everyone’s interests for countries around the world to be stable and secure, to have educated and healthy populations, and to have growing economies. (Lunn and Booth 2016: 9) Data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) show the levels of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) given by Britain and a wider set of countries (known collectively as Development Assistance Countries) from 1960 to 2016. In the early decades, British overseas aid as a proportion of GNI fluctuated under post-war governments. It declined during the 1960s, increased to some extent in the late 1970s under Labour and then was reduced and kept at lower levels during the Conservative governments of the 1980s–90s. Averaged across decades, the UK’s ODA as a proportion of GNI increased and decreased as follows: 1960s: 0.49; 1970s: 0.42; 1980s: 0.34; 1990s: 0.29; 2000s: 0.39; 2010s: 0.64 (author’s analysis of data from OECD-DAC Development Finance Data website). Under the New Labour governments, ODA as a share of GNI increased, particularly from 2005 onwards, the year in which the G8 summit in Edinburgh was held, which had a core focus on poverty and development in Africa with various pledges agreed upon between the states involved. These higher levels were maintained in the early years of the coalition government, and the UK

140  Overseas aid has met the UN’s commitment in every year since 2013. From 2005 to 2010, the UK’s ODA nearly doubled from £7.4 billion to £13.6 billion (Krutikova and Warwick 2017). In recent years, the UK has more clearly diverged from the average level of ODA as a share of GNI across donor countries. In 2016, the most recent year for which evidence is available, the UK was jointly ranked in seventh place along with Germany (with a share of 0.7 of GNI) (author’s analysis of data from OECD-DAC Development Finance Data website). Above them were ranked several other European countries, including Norway (1.12), Luxembourg (1.00), Sweden (0.94) and Denmark (0.75), as well as Turkey (0.79) and, at the top, the United Arab Emirates (1.12). The cross-country average in 2016 was just 0.32 (author’s analysis of data from OECD-DAC Development Finance Data website). Despite broad continuity between recent governments and a policy consensus between the main parties on overseas aid, there was some refocussing of the aims of overseas aid-giving under the coalition and subsequent Conservative government. Mawdsley observes that ‘aid has increasingly been diverted and reworked to serve more openly (so-called) national interests’ (2017: 229). These interests, as articulated by Conservative prime ministers and secretaries of state for international development, centre on the promotion of Britain’s soft power, the pursuit of global public goods through ‘enlightened self-interest’, national economic interests and national security (Mawdsley 2017: 226–9). Of course, this increased focus on national interests has occurred more widely across the donor community, in the context of broader international changes (Mawdsley 2017). To pursue this refocussing, the Conservative government’s 2015 aid strategy ‘directed the aid budget away from DFID to other government departments and cross-government initiatives’ (Krutikova and Warwick 2017). DFID currently accounts for about four-fifths of spending in this area. This shift has raised concerns: first, that it will reduce focus on global poverty alleviation, identified as a necessary target of UK ODA in UK law; and second, that the current statutory framework is not sufficient to ensure that poverty alleviation remains an objective of all UK ODA spending – not just DFID’s. (Krutikova and Warwick 2017). While the key principles in this policy area may have been retained from New Labour, Clarke also notes significant changes in Britain’s development policy from 2010 onwards, in three areas: a relative shift from a focus on development to a greater focus on security, a shift from the primary focus on poverty to a greater emphasis on fragility and a move from the emphasis on the global common interest to a greater stress on the national interest (2018: 26). Even though there has been a mainstream party-political consensus behind Britain’s role as a major provider of overseas aid, opposition grew as Britain’s financial commitments increased. From 2010 onwards, the

Overseas aid  141 coalition government decided to support and increase funding for international development while implementing a wide-ranging programme of severe cuts to most areas of domestic expenditure (Vickers 2011: 238). Under the coalition government, there was a ‘trade-off’ between overseas aid and defence expenditure (Seldon and Snowdon 2015: 479), with the former area protected while the latter area had to enact major cuts (for further analysis of public preferences on spending in these areas, see Chapter 6). Within the overall period of 1997–2016, Clarke has argued that 2010–16 represented a period typified by more contentious politics and political fracturing on development policy, with the sources of contention located firmly on the right of British politics; in contrast, 1997–2003 had been a period of a clear political consensus and managed contention; the intermediate period, between 2003 and 2010, was characterised by transition and the emergence of political contention over development policy (2018: 19). This has occurred within a wider climate of increased political contestation of overseas aid-giving in recent years by populist parties and leaders in Britain, the US and other European countries (Mance 2017). Opposition amongst sections of the Conservative Party to increased spending on overseas aid and its increased prioritisation as a policy objective focussed on four prominent lines of argument (Heppell et al. 2017: 900–1). First, some Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs) argued that signing up to a political consensus would expose their party to UKIP’s critique of overseas aid spending which appealed to public sentiment; second, critics took issue with the increased prioritisation and greater spending because it was an issue that lacked resonance with the public in an era of tough economic conditions and because it syphoned off spending from other, more worthy areas of public expenditure; third, there was specific criticism of the core focus on the 0.7% of GNI target, contrasting whether this had any clear rationale with linking policy inputs and outputs; fourth, the situation ‘on the ground’ in recipient countries was often highlighted, in terms of stories regarding waste, corruption and inefficiency in the usage of overseas aid and management of related projects (Heppell et al. 2017: 900–1). UKIP were particularly critical of the legally binding commitment for spending on overseas aid, perceiving this to be an issue which symbolised the gulf in political priorities and preferences between the British public and the established parties, particularly in the climate of political austerity when significant cuts to public services were enacted. As Mark Reckless, UKIP MP for Rochester and Strood, argued in December 2014: ‘Right hon. and hon. Members would do well to realise that the extent of the disconnect between what they want to do and what their constituents want is nowhere greater than in the area of overseas aid’ (HC Deb December 5, 2014, vol. 589 col. 583). UKIP’s 2017 election manifesto pledged to abolish DFID, create a ministerial post within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and reduce spending to 0.2% of GNI (UKIP 2017). Similar pledges had featured in UKIP’s 2015 election manifesto (Clarke 2018: 27). In contrast, upholding

142  Overseas aid the mainstream consensus, the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties all pledged to retain the 0.7% of GNI commitments in their 2015 and 2017 general election manifestos. In the 2017 election campaign the Conservative prime minister, Theresa May, under pressure from her backbenchers and the right-leaning tabloids, pledged to retain the 0.7% of GNI commitment if her party was re-elected, although conceding that ‘we need to look at how the money is spent and make sure that whatever we spend is done in the most effective way’ (Parker 2017).

Public opinion on overseas aid over time Gallup polling in the early post-war decades asked the British public some questions on the provision of overseas aid, within the Cold War context. In October 1955, 44% of those polled said that Britain was doing enough to help countries with a lower standard of living, while 18% said it were doing too much (Gallup 1976a: 356). In contrast, just 16% thought the country was not doing enough in this regard, eclipsed by the 22% who were unsure (Gallup 1976a: 356). A question asked in November 1961 was framed more in Cold War terms, asking whether America and the West were providing sufficient help to underdeveloped countries in terms of the provision of financial and technical assistance. A plurality (45%) agreed that enough was already being done, with 30% disagreeing; the remaining 25% were unsure (Gallup 1976a: 612). A different Gallup question, asked in 1956, 1957 and 1962, asked the public whether the party they would support should back providing more aid to less developed countries. On each occasion, public opinion was split, with broadly similar proportions for and against the provision of more overseas aid. In 1956, 39% were opposed and 38% in favour (Gallup 1976a: 389); in 1957, positions were reversed, with 36% supportive and 35% opposed (Gallup 1976a: 424). In February to March 1962, those against further provision had the edge – 40% compared to 37% (Gallup 1976a: 623). The British Election Study provides important coverage of historical opinion on the overseas aid issue, based on two questions which together cover the period from 1974 to 1997. Both questions focussed on gauging views towards whether Britain should provide more aid to poorer countries: 1974–1979: Giving more aid to poorer countries in Africa and Asia? 1987–1997: Please say whether you agree or disagree with each of these statements, or say if you are not sure either way. The government should give more aid to poor countries in Africa and Asia. Table 5.1 shows the overall distribution of responses to these two questions. For the 1974 and 1979 British Election Study (BES) surveys, a plurality held a negative stance towards the provision of more aid to poorer countries, with 46% and 47%, respectively, saying it was fairly or very important that it should not be done. Around or near two-fifths broadly supported the

Overseas aid  143 Table 5.1  P ublic opinion towards giving more aid to poorer countries in Africa and Asia, 1974–97 1974 (%)

1979 (%)

1987 (%)

1992 (%)

1997 (%)

Very or fairly 39 important it should be done Does not matter 12

36

Strongly agree or agree

39

36

32

13

19

22

Fairly or very 46 important it should not be done Don’t know  3

47

Not sure either 18 way Disagree or 42 strongly disagree Don’t know  2

43

45

 1

 1

 4

Source: Analysis of BES surveys. Note: Percentages sum down the columns.

Table 5.2  P ublic opinion towards giving more aid to poorer countries in Africa and Asia by sex and age group, 1974–97 Men

Women

Aged 18–29

% Very or fairly important it should be done 1974 38 40 42 1979 36 36 41

Aged 30–44

Aged 45– 64

Aged 65+

39 36

39 36

36 31

39 39 35

35 34 29

35 33 27

% Strongly agree or agree 1987 1992 1997

39 36 33

39 36 32

48 39 39

Source: Analysis of BES surveys.

provision of overseas aid (at 39% and 36%), while somewhat over a tenth said it did not matter. Between 1987 and 1997, the modal response was disagreement with providing more overseas aid to poorer countries, with over two-fifths taking this view. The proportion agreeing with the provision of more overseas aid fell from 39% in 1987 to 32% in 1997. Neutral opinion was higher over this period, ranging from 18% to 22%. Overall, then, public opinion was rather split on the merits of providing more assistance to poorer countries, although a consistent plurality opposed higher aid spending. Demographic groups In what ways have the opinions of demographic groups in wider British society differed towards the provision of overseas aid? Table 5.2 reports the proportions supportive of increased provision of overseas aid, based on sex and age group. Views differed little between men and women. In terms of age group, support for increased overseas aid differed more clearly between

144  Overseas aid the oldest and youngest groups in 1979 (41% for those aged 18–29 and 31% for those aged 65 and over). Again, between 1987 and 1992 there are similar levels of agreement amongst men and women, and it was somewhat lower amongst those in the older age groups. In 1987, 48% of those aged 18–24 supported more aid to poorer countries compared to 35% of those aged 45–64 and 65 and older. In 1997, 39% of those aged 18–29 agreed compared to 29% of 45–64-year-olds and 27% of those aged 65 and older. Table 5.3 shows the proportions based on age completed full-time education and social class. In terms of the age completed education, support for more aid was least popular amongst those who finished aged 16 or under (disproportionately older people) and was the majority view of those who finished it at a later age, in 1974 and 1979. Agreement was always highest amongst those who completed their education aged 19 and over, being a majority view in each year. Using a different measure of education, the highest qualification held – available for 1992 and 1997 – it is clear that degree holders were most supportive of increased aid-giving to poorer countries, with 63% (1992) and 55% (1997) in agreement, with around a fifth disagreeing. Those with other qualifications (36% in 1992 and 31% in 1997) or with no formal qualifications were much less likely to agree in both years. In 1974 and 1979, those in the AB social grade were most likely to support more aid spending by the government (45%), followed by those in the C1 grade, with those in the C2 and DE social grades least supportive. Between 1987 and 1997, similarly, across all social classes those in the salariat – the professional and managerial occupations – were most supportive of increased aid-giving.

Table 5.3  P ublic opinion towards giving more aid to poorer countries in Africa and Asia by education and social class, 1974–97 TEA: TEA: TEA: AB 16 and 17–18 19 and under over

C1

C2

DE

36 29

34 34

% Important or very important it should be done 1974 37 1979 33

52 53

59 55

45 45

41 36

TEA: TEA: TEA: Salariat Routine 16 and 17–18 19 and nonmanual under over

Petty Foreman and Working bourgeois supervisory class

% Strongly agree or agree 1987 33 1992 31 1997 36

44 38 34

63 57 62

47 47 39

Source: Analysis of BES surveys.

39 33 31

30 26 27

31 30 20

34 31 29

Overseas aid  145 Party support, ideology and newspaper readership As well as examining the views of demographic segments of society, it is also instructive to examine whether opinion towards Britain as a provider of overseas aid has varied based on key indicators of political affiliation and attitude, including party support, ideological orientation and newspaper readership. Previous research has shown a clear linkage between the partisan complexion of governments and policies and expenditure on overseas aid. Specifically, a cross-national, time-series analysis of democracies showed ‘the primacy of welfare state socialist attributes and government social spending in the explanation of development assistance policies’ (Thérien and Noel 2000: 160). Parties and their partisan orientation matter for overseas aid – not directly and in the short term but indirectly and over the long run (Thérien and Noel 2000: 160). Moreover, partisan affiliation has been shown to be an important source of division within public opinion on overseas aid in a range of countries. In the US, recent polling has shown that while there are bipartisan majorities in support of specific forms of overseas aid, support amongst Republicans has fallen in recent years, whilst it has generally held up amongst Democrats (Wojtowicz 2017; see, also, Kull 2017). As Milner and Tingley note, When it comes to economic foreign aid, such as that used for development, there is a consistent divide between liberals and conservatives in many of the public opinion polls that we have looked at in donor countries. This makes sense. Foreign aid is government intervention into the (international) marketplace. (2013: 393) The historical data are again drawn from the BES surveys. The views of party supporters from 1979 to 1997 are given in Table 5.4. In the 1970s, Table 5.4  P  ublic opinion towards giving more aid to poor countries in Africa and Asia by party support, 1974–97  

Con

Lab

Lib (Dem)

None

% Important or very important it should be done 1974 1979

36 30

42 40

39 42

38 38

31 30 21

46 43 39

48 43 38

35 32 29

% Strongly agree or agree 1987 1992 1997

Source: Analysis of BES surveys. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib (Dem), Liberal/Liberal Democrats.

146  Overseas aid there was more variation in opinion in 1979, with 30% of Conservatives in agreement with extending overseas aid compared to around two-fifths of Labour supporters, Liberal supporters and those with no party affiliation. Between 1987 and 1997, support for more overseas aid was consistently higher amongst Labour and Liberal (Democrat) supporters. In 1987 and 1992, agreement was clearly lower amongst Conservative and non-affiliates, and in 1997 it fell to just 21% of Conservatives and 29% of non-affiliates. Attitudes towards overseas aid also differed on the basis of left-right ideology. Based on a core policy debate concerning the left-right axis of competition – whether government should redistribute income or not – those with left-wing preferences were consistently more likely to favour increased aid-giving compared to those with neutral or right-wing views. In 1974–79, those who thought it was important for income to be redistributed were more supportive; between 1987 and 1997, those who agreed with the need for income redistribution were also more favourable towards increased aid-giving. That is, those who supported a defining centre-left policy objective within domestic politics – the state redistributing income to poorer and more disadvantaged groups in society – have been notably more supportive of more generous aid-giving in the area of external policy. As Thérien has observed, more broadly, about debates on overseas aid in donor countries: ‘… the Left is generally more favourable than the Right to development assistance because it sees in such aid an effective instrument for promoting greater international equality’ (2002: 462). Finally, Table 5.5 presents opinion on overseas aid based on newspaper readership (apart from the 1979 BES survey, where no measure of readership Table 5.5  P  ublic opinion towards giving more aid to poor countries in Africa and Asia by newspaper readership, 1974–97

No paper Other paper

% Very or fairly important

% Strongly agree or agree

1974

1987

1992

1997

39 46

37 41

39 36

34 29

49 64 n/a 66

48 64 61 80

44 46 61 81

30 40 77 74

31 33 41 38

23 26 35 39

24 29 30 32

21 19 26 35

Broadsheet Telegraph Times Independent Guardian/Observer Tabloid Sun Express Mail Mirror

Source: Analysis of BES surveys.

Overseas aid  147 was available). Over time, broadsheet readers (The Guardian, Independent, Times and Telegraph) were generally more receptive to increased aid-giving to poorer countries than readers of the tabloids (Express, Mail, Sun and ­Mirror). Amongst broadsheet readers, support was usually lower amongst those who read The Telegraph, a right-leaning newspaper, compared to those who read typically left-liberal publications (Guardian and Independent). Readers of The Times were more distinct from the left-leaning broadsheet readers in 1992 and 1997. In terms of tabloid readership, there has not been clear and consistent variation in the views of those who took the left-leaning Mirror and those who read any of the right-leaning titles, although support for more overseas aid was lowest amongst readers of The Sun.

The overseas aid debate and findings from recent opinion polling Recent opinion polls also provide evidence on the public’s overall disposition on the issue of overseas aid during the coalition (2010–15) and Conservative governments (2015 onwards), as well as areas of similarity and difference in the views of demographic groups and party supporters. Indeed, there has been much more opinion polling on this issue since 2010, reflecting that overseas aid and development policy in this period have been more politically contentious compared to when New Labour were in office (Clarke 2018: 19). Results for a series of polls conducted by YouGov (including foreign policy surveys carried out for Chatham House/Royal Institute for International Affairs) between 2010 and 2017 are reported in Tables 5.6– 5.8. This enables a consistent classification of demographic characteristics across surveys. Table 5.6 shows the overall response to each question on overseas aid and the responses based on sex and social grade. Overall, the balance of public opinion has been negative towards or sceptical of overseas aid, and this holds across the different question framings and response options used in the surveys (holding YouGov’s methodology constant). That is, the British public have generally preferred foreign spending to be reduced or to think too much is being spent, have opposed the 0.7% of GNI commitment being made legally binding and have thought that a more hard-headed approach should be taken so that such spending focusses on the promotion of national interests overseas. This at a time when the mainstream parties have shown a broad consensus on Britain’s role as a leading aid donor. The pattern of responses for men and women is rather variegated (also shown in Table 5.6). Where there are clear differences in views, sometimes men are more negative on their views on overseas aid and sometimes women are more opposed. For some questions, also, responses are broadly similar. The results for social grade, comparing those in the ABC1 and C2DE groups, indicate that those in the latter category are somewhat more negatively disposed towards overseas aid. Table 5.7 shows a generally consistent pattern across age groups between 2010 and 2017. That is, older people tend to be more negative in their views of aid and are much more amenable to reduced spending on it; similarly, they expressed much higher levels of

Table 5.6  P  ublic opinion on overseas aid by sex and social class, 2010–17 Date

Question

Response

Overall

Male

Female

ABC1 C2DE

June to July 2010 June 2011

Which of the following statements comes closest to your view?

% Much development assistance is wasted and does little or nothing to promote British interests; it should be radically reduced % Too much

54

58

51

53

57

57

58

57

56

60

71

73

69

69

74

66

67

64

61

72

March 2012

March 2012

Do you think the UK government currently spends too much, the right amount or too little on each of the following items? % Should not British governments have in the past pledged to spend 0.7% of Britain’s GDP on overseas aid. The government has now proposed to put this target into law, so that the government must spend 0.7% of Britain’s GDP on overseas aid. Do you think the government should or should not pass a law forcing British governments to spend 0.7% of GDP on international aid? Thinking about the amount of money % Too much that Britain spends on overseas aid, do you think it spends too much, too little, or about the right amount?

June 2012

If you had to choose, which one of these do you think should be the priority for British spending on overseas aid?  June 2012 In general, how much overseas aid, if any, do you think the British government should give?  June 2012 And do you think the British government should give more, less or about the same amount as other wealthy countries? June 2012 In 2011, the British government spent around £8.5 billion on overseas aid. Do you think this amount is too little, too much or about right? June 2012 In 2011, the British government spent around 0.6% of Britain’s income on overseas aid. Do you think this amount is too little, too much or about right? September Would you support or oppose the to following policies? Ending ALL October overseas aid 2012 August Of its total budget of nearly 2014 £720 billion, the British Government currently allocates 1.6 percent—£11.3 billion—to overseas aid to poor countries. Do you think that the Government should increase or decrease the amount of money that it spends on overseas aid to poor countries?

% To promote British interests abroad

35

42

28

33

38

% Not very much or none at all

56

% Less than other wealthy countries

37

32

42

34

40

% Too much

61

65

56

59

62

% Too much

45

49

41

41

50

% Total: Support

52

56

47

47

58

% Decrease somewhat/decrease a great deal

51

55

47

47

56

Continued

Date

Question

Response

August 2014

In 2013, the UK overseas aid budget was 0.7% of national income. This meets the international target that the UK has committed to. Only five other countries have met this target. Which statement comes closest to your view? If you had to choose, which of these do you think should be the priority for British spending on overseas aid? Thinking about the amount of money that Britain spends on overseas aid, do you think it spends too much, too Do you think the government should or should not pass a law forcing British governments to spend 0.7% of GDP on international aid? Theresa May has confirmed that the Conservatives will retain David Cameron’s promise to spend at least 0.7% of Britain’s national income on overseas aid in their new manifesto. Do you think Theresa May was right to retain this promise, or should she have dropped it?

August 2014 December 2014 December 2014 April 2017

Overall

Male

Female

ABC1 C2DE

% The UK spends too much on aid. In difficult 54 economic times, we should spend more money at home

55

53

50

60

% To promote British interests abroad

31

38

25

29

35

% Too much

61

58

64

54

71

% Should not

67

66

68

65

69

% Should have dropped the promise

46

50

41

43

50

Source: Compiled from YouGov (https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/) and YouGov/Chatham House surveys (https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/ europe-programme/chatham-house-yougov-survey-project). GDP, gross domestic product.

Table 5.7  P ublic opinion on overseas aid by age group, 2010–17 Date

Question

Response

18–24 25–39 40–59 60+

June to July 2010 June 2011

Which of the following statements comes closest to your view?

% Much development assistance is wasted and does little or nothing to promote British interests; it should be radically reduced % Too much

30

46

59

67

32

41

62

79

% Should not

44

68

74

83

% Too much

47

56

70

77

% To promote British interests abroad

28

32

38

37

% Not very much or none at all

38

46

63

63

% Less than other wealthy countries

24

26

42

45

% Too much

46

49

67

69

March 2012

March 2012 June 2012 June 2012 June 2012 June 2012

Do you think the UK government currently spends too much, the right amount, or too little on each of the following items? British governments have in the past pledged to spend 0.7% of Britain’s GDP on overseas aid. The government has now proposed to put this target into law, so that the government must spend 0.7% of Britain’s GDP on overseas aid. Do you think the government should or should not pass a law forcing British governments to spend 0.7% of GDP on international aid? Thinking about the amount of money that Britain spends on overseas aid, do you think it spends too much, too little, or about the right amount? If you had to choose, which one of these do you think should be the priority for British spending on overseas aid?  In general, how much overseas aid, if any, do you think the British government should give?  And do you think the British government should give more, less or about the same amount as other wealthy countries? In 2011, the British government spent around £8.5 billion on overseas aid. Do you think this amount is too little, too much or about right?

Continued

Date

Question

June 2012

In 2011, the British government spent around 0.6% of Britain’s income on overseas aid. Do you think this amount is too little, too much or about right? September Would you support or oppose the following policies? to Ending ALL overseas aid October 2012 August Of its total budget of nearly £720 billion, the British 2014 Government currently allocates 1.6 percent—£11.3 billion—to overseas aid to poor countries. Do you think that the Government should increase or decrease the amount of money that it spends on overseas aid to poor countries? August In 2013, the UK overseas aid budget was 0.7% of 2014 national income. This meets the international target that the UK has committed to. Only five other countries have met this target. Which statement comes closest to your view? August If you had to choose, which of these do you think 2014 should be the priority for British spending on overseas aid? December Thinking about the amount of money that Britain 2014 spends on overseas aid, do you think it spends too much, too little, or about the right amount? December Do you think the government should or should not 2014 pass a law forcing British governments to spend 0.7% of GDP on international aid? April 2017 Theresa May has confirmed that the Conservatives will retain David Cameron’s promise to spend at least 0.7% of Britain’s national income on overseas aid in their new manifesto. Do you think Theresa May was right to retain this promise, or should she have dropped it?

Response

18–24 25–39 40–59 60+

5 Too much

28

32

49

57

% Total: Support

29

44

56

63

% Decrease somewhat/decrease a great deal

30

38

56

63

% The UK spends too much on aid. In difficult economic times, we should spend more money at home

28

43

59

69

% To promote British interests abroad

25

29

31

36

% Too much

27

52

67

77

% Should not

37

49

80

80

% Should have dropped the promise

19

38

58

60

Source: Compiled from YouGov (https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/) and YouGov/Chatham House surveys (https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/ structure/europe-programme/chatham-house-yougov-survey-project). GDP, gross domestic product.

Overseas aid  153 opposition to the enshrining of the 0.7% of GNI commitment into law. This broad pattern confirms what was seen in the BES data from earlier decades Table 5.8, showing the responses for party supporters, conveys clearly the much more sceptical views held by Conservative supporters towards overseas aid in recent years, compared to the opinions of Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters. This pattern holds across different question wordings and response options. The partisan differences on aid are generally clear-cut and pronounced, which was not necessarily the case with the historical survey data reviewed earlier on. Conservative supporters are more likely to have favoured lower levels of spending, to have disagreed with the passing of the 0.7% of GNI commitment into law, to think that development assistance tends to be wasted and to see promoting national interests abroad as a priority for overseas aid spending. In those polls where data are available separately for UKIP supporters (from 2014 onwards), their aid-scepticism exceeds that of Conservative supporters. This strong opposition on the part of UKIP supporters may have been influenced by the clear and consistent cues on the issue provided by UKIP’s leaders and its policy statements. Negative views on overseas aid have been clearly located within the social bases of support for parties on the right of the political spectrum. UKIP supporters have clearly been aligned with the distinctive and hostile stance on aid-spending taken by their party and its leaders, as articulated in their 2015 and 2017 general election manifestos. The larger share of Conservative supporters in the wider electorate have not held views in accord with settled party policy under Cameron (and now May since July 2016), though their dislike of and concerns surrounding increased overseas aid spending and its embedding into law has been voiced by many backbenchers within the parliamentary party. A survey of Tory party members in 2013 found that 63% opposed protecting the overseas aid budget, with just 18% in favour of this (Bale and Webb n/d). Evidence from other recent opinion polls also bears out the generally negative or sceptical stance of public opinion towards overseas aid seen in the YouGov polling. A ComRes poll in February 2014 asked whether, in the context of the winter floods, money spent on the international aid budget should be diverted towards dealing with the flooding situation: 73% agreed, and just 15% disagreed (ComRes 2014a). Another ComRes poll conducted in September 2014 found that 58% of the British public wanted the 0.7% commitment to be abolished and 69% supported the aid budget being spent on tackling poverty at home before going overseas (ComRes 2014b). In November 2015, a ComRes poll found that 64% supported cuts to foreign aid as a means of reducing the budget deficit, followed by 26% who backed cutting Trident (ComRes 2015c). Also in November 2015, ComRes found that 54% supported a proposal to reduce spending on aid (with 40% opposed) as a way of decreasing government ­expenditure – just 1%–3% backed reduced spending on the NHS, education

Table 5.8  P  ublic opinion on overseas aid by party support, 2010–17 Date

Question

Response

Con Lab Lib

June to July 2010 June 2011

Which of the following statements comes closest to your view?

% Much development assistance is wasted and does little or nothing to promote British interests–it should be radically reduced % Too much

68

44

48

71

51

37

% Should not

80

59

59

% Too much

80

55

47

% To promote British interests abroad

49

30

21

% Not very much or none at all

65

51

36

% Less than other wealthy countries

40

36

29

% Too much

76

53

42

% Too much

59

40

15

March 2012

March 2012 June 2012 June 2012 June 2012 June 2012 June 2012

Do you think the UK government currently spends too much, the right amount, or too little on each of the following items? British governments have in the past pledged to spend 0.7% of Britain’s GDP on overseas aid. The government has now proposed to put this target into law, so that the government must spend 0.7% of Britain’s GDP on overseas aid. Do you think the government should or should not pass a law forcing British governments to spend 0.7% of GDP on international aid? Thinking about the amount of money that Britain spends on overseas aid, do you think it spends too much, too little, or about the right amount? If you had to choose, which one of these do you think should be the priority for British spending on overseas aid?  In general, how much overseas aid, if any, do you think the British government should give?  And do you think the British government should give more, less or about the same amount as other wealthy countries? In 2011, the British government spent around £8.5 billion on overseas aid. Do you think this amount is too little, too much or about right? In 2011, the British government spent around 0.6% of Britain’s income on overseas aid. Do you think this amount is too little, too much or about right?

UKIP

August 2014

Of its total budget of nearly £720 billion, the British Government currently allocates 1.6 percent—£11.3 billion—to overseas aid to poor countries. Do you think that the Government should increase or decrease the amount of money that it spends on overseas aid to poor countries? August In 2013, the UK overseas aid budget was 0.7% of 2014 national income. This meets the international target that the UK has committed to. Only five other countries have met this target. Which statement comes closest to your view? August If you had to choose, which of these do you think 2014 should be the priority for British spending on overseas aid? December Thinking about the amount of money that Britain 2014 spends on overseas aid, do you think it spends too much, too little, or about the right amount? December Do you think the government should or should not pass 2014 a law forcing British governments to spend 0.7% of GDP on international aid? April 2017 Theresa May has confirmed that the Conservatives will retain David Cameron’s promise to spend at least 0.7% of Britain’s national income on overseas aid in their new manifesto. Do you think Theresa May was right to retain this promise, or should she have dropped it?

% Decrease somewhat/decrease a great deal

58

43

29

84

% The UK spends too much on aid. In difficult 62 economic times, we should spend more money at home

50

36

87

% To promote British interests abroad

44

26

13

55

% Too much

71

49

54

82

% Should not

79

48

75

84

% Should have dropped the promise

66

31

20

75

Source: Compiled from YouGov (https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/) and YouGov/Chatham House surveys (https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/ structure/europe-programme/chatham-house-yougov-survey-project). GDP, gross domestic product.

156  Overseas aid or the basic state pension (ComRes 2015d). Another ComRes poll, from November 2016, found that 59% agreed that the government should spend the international aid budget at home, compared to 28% agreeing that this money should be spent on humanitarian crises abroad (ComRes 2016e). A Populus poll carried out in April 2015, in the lead-up to the general election, found that 69% thought that public spending in the area of overseas aid should be reduced, with 29% supporting expenditure being kept at the current level and just 3% opting for increased spending (Populus 2015a). This clear majority support for reduced expenditure far exceeded the proportion supporting cuts in defence (at 21%, with 48% for the status quo and 32% favouring an increase) or in a range of domestic spending areas (such as education, the NHS, local councils or for different welfare benefits) (Populus 2015a). A panel study looking at the British public’s views on foreign policy issues found that, when asked in November 2011 and February 2013 whether the UK government should significantly increase aid spending, the respective proportions disagreeing were 81% and 74% (Scotto and Reifler 2014). Interestingly, 90% of those who disagreed on the first wave maintained that opposition on the second wave of the study (Scotto and Reifler 2014). YouGov polling during recent years provides further interesting evidence on the public’s ranking of the importance of overseas aid as a spending area relative to expenditure on domestic issues. In surveys conducted in March 2013, January 2014, March 2015 and November 2015, the public consistently ranked overseas aid as the issue it was least important to protect from cuts and consistently ranked it as the area where the government should cut spending the most. Specifically, when asked to select three out of ten issues (overseas aid, defence and a range of domestic spending areas) where the government should cut spending the most, between 66% and 71% of the public selected overseas aid (YouGov 2013a, 2014c, 2015b, 2015c). When asked to choose which three of the ten issues should be most protected, the proportions choosing overseas aid were just 2%–3% (YouGov 2013a, 2014c, 2015b, 2015c). In contrast, the respective proportions choosing to cut or protect defence ranged between 12%–21% and 17%–35% (YouGov 2013a, 2014c, 2015b, 2015c). Clearly, then, overseas aid was the area of government spending that the public deemed least worthy of protection during the recent period of significant retrenchment in the public finances and associated cuts to domestic expenditure (YouGov 2013a, 2014c, 2015b, 2015c). Most recently, in August 2016, an Opinion Research Business (ORB) opinion poll found that 57% supported the 0.7% of GNI commitment being abolished, with 24% supporting its retention (Riley-Smith 2016). A Survation poll from January 2017, asking respondents in which areas of spending would they accept cuts in order to increase NHS funding, found that 78% were willing to reduce spending on overseas aid compared to 16% who would not accept this (Survation 2017). This proportion was much higher

Overseas aid  157 than those found for defence (34%) and in a range of domestic policy areas (highest at 34% for courts and the legal system) (Survation 2017). A profile of contemporary public opinion This section provides a detailed profile of contemporary attitudes towards spending on overseas aid based on analysis of the BES 2017 post-election, in-person survey. It featured the following question: ‘Do you think the government should or should not do each of the following things or doesn’t it matter either way…: Spend less on foreign aid?’ The response options were definitely should, probably should, probably should not, definitely should not, doesn’t matter either way and don’t know. In line with the earlier analysis of recent polling results, the balance of opinion was supportive of less spending on international aid: 57% said the government should definitely or probably reduce it, compared to 11% with a neutral view and 28% stating it should probably or definitely not be reduced (4% could not say). The same question was asked in the BES 2015 in-person, post-election survey, with a very similar distribution of opinion overall: 54% supported reduce spending, 13% were neutral, 30% opposed any reduction and 4% did not know. Moreover, a question asked in the BES 2014–18 internal panel survey (on Wave 10, with fieldwork carried out during November to December 2016) found that the plurality, 42%, strongly agreed or agreed that the British government should cease all spending on overseas aid. The opposing view – that is, disagreeing or strongly disagreeing – was held by 33%; 20% held a neutral position and 6% did not know. Table 5.9 shows the full set of responses to the question on overseas aid, as asked in the BES 2017 in-person survey, across a range of demographic and political groups, combining responses into broader ‘should’ and ‘should not’ categories. The distribution of opinion is almost identical across men and women (with 58% and 57%, respectively, in favour of less spending and nearly three-in-ten opposed), a feature of the polling data reviewed earlier. There is considerable variation across age groups, which again was evident in the polling data and in the BES data: 46% of those aged 18–29 and 44% of those aged 30–44 support reduced spending, compared to 61% of those aged 55–64 and 73% of those aged 65 and over. In terms of educational attainment, whereas 61% of those with below degree-level qualifications and 65% of those with no qualifications support reduced spending, this compares to 47% of those with degree-level or higher qualifications. Amongst those with a degree, 39% oppose reduced expenditure, compared to 25% of those with other qualifications and 18% without any formal qualifications. There are pronounced differences of view based on party support – broadly consistent with the evidence reviewed so far – and left-right ideological location. In keeping with the evidence discussed already, UKIP

158  Overseas aid Table 5.9  P ublic opinion towards the government spending less on overseas aid by demographic group

Sex Age group

Education

Party support

Ideological location Newspaper

 

Definitely or probably should (%)

Doesn’t matter either way (%)

Probably or definitely should not (%)

Don’t know (%)

Male Female Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ Degree level or higher Other qualification None Con Lab Lib Dem UKIP Other party None Left Centre Right Daily Mail Sun Express Telegraph Times Guardian/Observer Independent Mirror Other paper No paper

58 57 46 44 61 73 47 61 65 71 48 44 82 46 56 38 59 72 79 74 84 72 56 27 38 58 46 58

13 10 13 15 11    7 11 10 13  8 14 13  2  8 11 10 13  7  6  9  0  8 13  9  8  4 10 14

27 29 37 36 26 19 39 25 18 20 34 43 13 44 24 49 25 20 16 17 16 20 29 62 54 29 42 23

 3  4  5  6  2  2  3  4  4  1  3  1  2  3  9  4  3  1  1  0  0  0  2  2  0 10  2  5

Source: Analysis of BES 2017 post-election cross-section survey. Note: Percentages sum across the rows. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib Dem, Liberal Democrats.

supporters were most supportive of reducing spending on aid: at 82% followed by 71% of Conservative supporters. About half of Labour (48%) and – somewhat fewer – Liberal Democrat (44%) supporters thought it should be decreased. Just 13% of UKIP supporters were opposed to reduced spending, compared to 20% of Conservatives, 34% of Labour and 43% of Liberal Democrat supporters. Amongst backers of other parties, opinions were broadly divided: 46% supported reduced spending and 44% were against. Of those not supporting a party, 56% agreed with decreased spending and

Overseas aid  159 24% were opposed. In ideological terms, 72% of those on the ideological right supported reduced spending on international aid, falling to 59% of those in the centre and 38% of those on the left. Around half of those on the left opposed a reduction in aid spending, compared to a quarter of those in the ideological centre and one-fifth of those on the right. The left-right ideological alignment on this issue tends to broadly correspond with the party-political patterning of opinion. Another area where it is instructive to look at variation in opinion on this issue is in relation to newspaper readership (specifically, the ­newspaper – if any – read most often for politics and current affairs). The tabloid press, particularly those on the political right such as the Daily Mail, Sun and Express, have provided some critical coverage of the level of spending on aid – particularly during the recent climate of austerity politics – as well as cases of alleged mismanagement or abuse of that money in recipient countries. In keeping with the frequently negative tone of coverage provided by these publications, tabloid readers are most supportive of reduced spending on overseas aid: 84% of Express readers, 79% of Daily Mail readers, 74% of Sun readers and 58% of Mirror readers (a left-leaning paper). In general, support for reduced spending on overseas aid is lower amongst readers of broadsheet newspapers, as was seen with the historical evidence presented earlier, although it also varies across publication: 72% of Telegraph readers, 56% of Times readers, 38% of Independent readers and 27% amongst those taking the Guardian/Observer. Amongst those reading another paper (including Scottish titles and those at a local or regional level), 46% favoured less spending, as did 58% of those who did not read a newspaper.

Conclusion This chapter has provided a detailed review of the historical and more recent evidence pertaining to the British public’s views on increased spending on or provision of overseas aid. This is an area of foreign policy where Britain’s ability to project ‘soft power’ has significantly grown in recent years, underpinned by a mainstream party-political consensus on the need to play a leading international role as a donor. While, historically, the British public were somewhat split over the case for increased spending on aid to poorer countries, although on balance it tended to be opposed to more generous provision, more recent polling indicates that there has been a stronger and more consistently negative disposition towards aid spending. Indeed, this area was highlighted by UKIP and the tabloids as a stark example of the ‘disconnect’ between the preferences of the British public and the policies and priorities pursued by the mainstream parties, in the context of tradeoffs between overseas aid and domestic spending in the era of austerity politics at home. Conservative supporters in the wider electorate have been starkly at odds with the settled approach to aid spending pursued under

160  Overseas aid Cameron and May. As an issue area, overseas aid has featured in recent times both the establishment and persistence of a mainstream party consensus on the fundamentals of Britain’s role as an aid donor but also increasing political contestation of that role – and the spending entailed – by forces on the political right. Does the evidence in relation to group-related attitudes shed any light on whether, in Britain, there are ‘consistent cleavages on foreign aid’ which might lend stability to public opinion on this issue (Milner and Tingley 2013: 393)? Both the historical and contemporary data indicate that there have been partisan and ideological differences on the provision of aid to poorer and developing countries. Those on the political and ideological left have tended to be more favourable to increased provision; those on the political and ideological right have tended to be opposed to the expansion of aid-­ giving overseas. Demographically, older people and the less well educated have also been more opposed to increased spending.

6 Defence spending and nuclear weapons

This chapter examines public opinion in Britain towards two key areas of defence policy involving the projection of ‘hard power’ within a country’s foreign affairs. Bartels (1994), in conceptualising public support for the cost of defence, observed that two important areas warrant investigation. First, the factors that affect public support towards defence spending (covered in this chapter) and, second, the factors affecting public support for war and military force (the subject of Chapter 7). As well as defence spending, this chapter also looks at another important facet of the cost of national defence in the post-war era in Britain, that of having an independent nuclear deterrent. In so doing, it builds upon earlier research which provided analysis of British public opinion – in the aggregate and across social groups – ­towards defence spending (Eichenberg 1989) or nuclear weapons (Berrington 1989). Using a range of survey sources, this chapter again identifies the key areas of change and continuity in overall opinion across time, looks at the views of party supporters and demographic groups in long-term perspective and provides a detailed assessment of contemporary public opinion. In so doing, it provides a detailed historical and contemporary profile of opinion towards defence spending and nuclear weapons in Britain, thereby contributing to a strand of research where, as has recently been noted in a comparative piece of research, ‘Most scholarship on public opinion on national security issues is focused on the United States’ (Eichenberg and Stoll 2017: 793). The in-depth historical focus on the micro-level survey data also provides a different perspective from aggregate, time-series analysis of defence spending and public preferences in Britain, which has been the subject of other research (Soroka and Wlezien 2005). Re-examining opinion on this topic in Britain, as in other democracies, is also worthwhile given that, post9/11, ‘the world has entered into a new security environment’ and so ‘public opinion on defense spending has likely changed since the end of the Cold War’ (Ecer and Veasey 2015: 75).

Defence spending A key area of ‘hard power’ projection where the public can express their support or opposition in the international arena is that of national defence

162  Defence spending and nuclear weapons expenditure. It is important to study both the overall levels of support for defence spending and how views are distributed across different groups in wider society. As Eichenberg and Stoll observe, Scholars of international relations have devoted particular attention to the sources of citizen support for defense spending. In so doing, they recognize that governments must attend not merely to external threats but also to public support for defense budgets that compete with domestic priorities. (2017: 789) Most of the available data analysed here, mainly drawn from recurrent opinion polling and academic survey series, are based on questions posed to the British public which have asked respondent to select their preferences on defence spending from a standard ‘increase or reduce’ choice set, as has been common in the US (Corman et al. 2015: 172). Britain’s defence expenditure levels have fallen significantly across recent decades, reflecting the changes in its post-war role and transformation from a global to a regional power. Data show that military spending in the UK as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) has declined over the postwar era. In 1949 it stood at 6.4% of GDP, increasing to a peak of 9.8% in 1953 (during the Korean War), declining steadily thereafter (SIPRI n/d). In 1960 the total was 6.3%, in 1970 it was 4.6% and in 1980 it was 4.5%. At the start of the post-Cold War era, in 1990, it amounted to 3.6% of GDP, had declined to 2.3% in 2000 and, most recently, in 2016 was 1.9% (SIPRI n/d). Britain’s extensive overseas military commitments entailed by the war on terrorism – in particular, the long-running operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and more recent involvement against ISIS in Iraq and Syria – have to some extent enlivened political debate over the funding and share of public resources allocated to the armed forces. The ‘guns and butter’ debates over the relative funding of defence and domestic policy areas have also assumed greater prominence in the recent climate of ‘austerity politics’ following the economic crisis, which entailed significant reductions in overall public expenditure. As Sanders and Houghton observe, While it is fair to say that the history of British defence policy since the end of World War II has been all about this struggle to make the military means match the political ends – a struggle which is becoming progressively difficult with the passing of each generation – there does not appear to be a ‘match’ between the expansive ends sought since 2010 and the increasingly meagre means provided. (2016: 251) An even broader issue is whether Britain should still be spending at such a high level on defence. The UK has the world’s fourth or fifth largest

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  163 defence budget relative to its gross national product, depending on how this is measured. Britain spent about 2 per cent of its GNP on defence in 2016. But the economy is not keeping up with this commitment. This raises a whole host of issues. (2016: 256) At the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Wales summit in 2014 the recommendation that member countries try to meet the 2% of GDP target for defence expenditure became a formal obligation (Béraud-Sudreau and Giegerich 2017). This came in the context of much chiding by the Obama administration over the lack of spending by European governments on their armed forces (Traynor 2011), concerns over ‘burden-sharing’ which presidents have been voicing since the 1970s (The Economist 2017). President Obama was reported to have warned Cameron in June 2015 that ‘you have to pay your fair share’. Continued failure to do so, Obama indicated, could affect the basis of the US-UK special relationship (Goldberg 2016). After the May 2015 general election, the UK government pledged, in its National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, to ‘Meet the NATO pledge to spend 2% of our GDP on defence in every year of this Parliament, [and] guarantee a real increase in the defence budget every year of this Parliament’ (2015: 11). In 2016, analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies found that, in addition to the US, only two NATO members met this target (Estonia and Greece), with the UK just short at 1.98% (Béraud-Sudreau and Giegerich 2017); fewer countries than had done so in 2015. However, there has been wider debate over whether the UK government has missed the target, albeit fractionally, in recent years (Stone 2017). The then UK defence secretary, Sir Michael Fallon, similarly voiced concerns in 2017 about the need for other NATO members to ‘raise their game’ and pledge year-on-year increases in defence spending if they were not meeting the 2% of GDP target (MacAskill 2017). In the context of the 2017 general election campaign, both the Conservatives and Labour (re)affirmed their commitment to the 2% of GDP target if elected (Elgot 2017). The Conservative government has committed to increase defence spending by 0.5% above inflation annually until 2021 with the total defence budget projected to increase from £34.3 billion in 2015–16 to £39.7 billion in 2020–21 (Ministry of Defence 2016). The Conservative Party has also resumed its attacks on the Labour Party and Corbyn as being weak on defence and foreign policy and thus not capable of looking after Britain’s national security interests, seemingly rehashing an election theme from the 1980s, encapsulated in the infamous poster from that decade with its slogan claiming Labour was ‘soft on arms’. What, then, have been the views of the British public towards increasing or decreasing defence spending – both on its own merits and when considered in the context of prioritising public expenditure across policy areas? There has not been a recent, detailed single-country focus on the changing

164  Defence spending and nuclear weapons views of the British public in this area, whereas there have been studies of views on defence spending amongst the US public (Torres-Reyna and Shapiro 2002; Stoll 2003; Corman et al. 2015). Gallup polling sheds light on public views in the early post-war period, both in relation to the merits of defence spending considered on its own and in context of other spending decisions and priorities. In August 1950, in the context of the Korean War, an emphatic 78% had agreed with the increased expenditure on defence; just 14% expressed the opposite view (Gallup 1976a: 224). In January 1951, 67% approved of proposed increased spending on rearmament, with only a quarter against (24%) (Gallup 1976a: 238). In September 1952, 36% agreed that Britain should not spend so much on armaments, outweighed by the 47% who opposed this view (Gallup 1976a: 276). Asked in April 1953, after the Korean War had ended, a majority of the public said they preferred less rather than more public spending on defence (54%); just 14% wanted the reverse (Gallup 1976a: 295). In polls conducted in 1956, September 1957 and February to March 1962, the balance of opinion – a near majority or m ­ ajority – wanted the party they intended to support backing proposals to cut defence spending (Gallup 1976a: 389, 424, 623). Around a third wanted their favoured party to oppose such a reduction (Gallup 1976a: 389, 424, 623). In August 1966, in the wider policy context of retrenchment in Britain’s world role, majorities supported reducing expenditure on military commitments east of Suez and on the cost of the British army based in Germany (Gallup 1976b: 978). Opinion was less clear cut in relation to cutting spending on defence generally (including atomic weapons), with 45% in favour and 39% opposed (Gallup 1976b: 978). In March 1967, 54% now backed decreased spending on defence and atomic weapons, and 65% favoured reduced expenditure on British forces in Germany (Gallup 1976b: 919). Gallup polling also gauged views on defence in the wider context of the public’s domestic spending priorities. In January 1952, when asked in which direction public spending should be reduced, 54% opted for rearmament, 27% chose health services, 16% food subsidies and 16% either chose some other area or were unsure (Gallup 1976a: 261). In March 1953, when asked what should be the first of six issues to be subject to cuts if the government had to reduce expenditure, the most common response was defence (35%) (Gallup 1976a: 290–1). Asked which should be the last area subject to cuts, 17% chose defence, ranking it third out of six issues (Gallup 1976a: 290–1). When a similar question was posed in September 1955, again defence featured at the top of the list of areas of preferred spending cuts, mentioned by 32%, well ahead of six domestic issues (Gallup 1976a: 355). In December 1963, asked if there was any area of policy where the government was spending too much, 29% opted for defence and armaments, with just 8% combined choosing health, education and economic affairs, 30% saying nothing should be affected, 13% choosing some other area and 20% unsure (Gallup 1976a: 719). In August 1967, several questions posed trade-offs between further cuts in defence versus some other policy option. In each scenario,

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  165 public opinion was much less favourable towards the maintenance of defence spending: 61% chose cuts in defence spending compared to 18% preferring the government raising taxes; 70% favoured cuts to defence, compared to just 14% backing reduced spending on education; similarly, 71% supported the government cutting defence with 15% preferring cuts to health services (Gallup 1976b: 941). Overall, in the 1950s–60s, the British public tended to back reduced, rather than increased, spending on defence – the Korean War period aside – as a policy option in the early post-war decades. In relation to their relative spending priorities, defence was often perceived as the area to be cut, being much less of a concern than areas of domestic spending. Gallup asked the following question from the 1960s to 1990s, which are the best available time-series data bearing on the British public’s views on defence spending in the post war era: ‘Do you think the government is spending too much, too little or about the right amount on: Armaments and defence’. Figure 6.1 charts the responses of the British public between 1961 and 1995. Support for decreasing defence expenditure declined during the late 1960s (it had peaked at 58% in 1967 and fell dramatically to 37% in 1968) and the fell further during the 1970s (lowest at 17% in 1978). Under Conservative governments with a more assertive posture on foreign and defence policy, it then increased to 28% in 1979, fell to 19% in 1980 and then increased and remained at much higher levels during the remainder of the 1980s. In the 1990s, at the start of the post-Cold War era, support fell from 56% in 1990 to 44% in 1991 and decreased further to 32% in 1995. This may partly be due to the ‘peace dividend’ that accrued from the end of the Cold

70 60 50 40 %

30 20 10 0

Too much

Too little

About right

Figure 6.1  P ublic opinion towards defence spending, 1961–95. Source: Compiled from King and Wybrow (2001: 240).

Don't know

166  Defence spending and nuclear weapons War and its spectre of military confrontation and nuclear stand-off – a similar downward trajectory was seen in US public opinion (Torres-Reyna and Shapiro 2002: 280). The proportions thinking that too little was being spent on defence were highest during 1976–82, a period during which tensions between the Cold War superpowers had increased. Evaluations that defence spending was about right did not see the levels of fluctuation over time witnessed for the proportions thinking that it was too high or too low and were usually within or near to the range of 25%–30%. A way of usefully summarising these Gallup data is to compute the balance of opinion on defence spending (Eichenberg 2016). This produces what can be termed ‘crystallized opinion’ – that is, the proportion taking ‘an active stand on the issue’ (Eichenberg and Stoll 2012: 337). Here, this shows support for increasing defence spending (the proportion saying there is too little) as a percentage of the total who want a change in spending (the proportion saying too much combined with the proportion saying too little). This calculation therefore excludes the proportion backing no change (saying it was about right). Recalculated this way, the balance of ‘crystallised opinion’ on this issue – the percentage of crystallised opinion that supported an increase in defence spending (Eichenberg and Stoll 2012: 337) – shows that support for increasing defence spending (as indicated by saying there was too little) was at its highest in the latter part of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, where it amounted to a near majority or a majority of opinion expressing a desire for change one way or another (from 47% to 60%). This marked change in the balance of opinion to some extent corresponds to the period  – often termed the ‘Second Cold War’ – when there was a marked worsening of political and diplomatic relations between the rival superpowers. In the aggregate, it seems that public preferences on defence spending have been changeable and – presumably, as has been highlighted in the literature (Eichenberg 1989; Torres-Reyna and Shapiro 2002) – were responsive to wider political and economic circumstance at home and developments abroad. In terms of trying to account for these trends, Eichenberg argued that, in Britain as in other European countries, ‘economic circumstances and government fiscal policy – rather than security considerations – are the driving forces underlying public opinion of the defense budget’ (1989: 163). In the 1970s, Eichenberg observes ‘European governments maintained a uniformly expansionist budgetary policy’ entailing ‘healthy real increases in both defense and civilian spending’ (1989: 163). This meant there was no trade-off between ‘guns and butter’, which was the case during harsh economic times of the early 1980s (Eichenberg 1989: 163). Research into aggregate shifts in public support for defence spending in the US in the post-war era has shown: … identifiable and understandable movements of U.S attitudes over time beginning in the late 1960s, as the public responds to international

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  167 events, threats to the nation’s security from the former Soviet Union or other foes, elite-level debates, actual government spending policies, or other actions. (Torres-Reyna and Shapiro 2002: 280) As well as Gallup data, the British Social Attitude (BSA) surveys have asked several questions on public spending in a range of issue areas, both domestic and external. Between 1985 and 2006 the following question gauged the public’s preferences towards increasing, maintaining or decreasing spending on eight areas including the military and defence: ‘About areas of government spending. Would you like to see more or less government spending on … ’. The overall distribution of responses for spending on the military and defence is shown in Table 6.1. In general, the British public have, in recent decades, been more receptive to reducing defence expenditure or to maintaining the status quo: combined, around four-fifths of the public (and sometimes higher) have favoured one of these options, but this fell to 68% in 2006. Only relatively small minorities have favoured spending more, highest at 29% in 2006 and lowest at 10% in 1990, when the post-Cold War era was just beginning. In comparative terms, the proportion in favour of more spending for each issue area is reported in Table 6.3. There is a consistent pattern to the public’s preferences in relative terms. Health, education and pensions have received the highest levels of support for more spending over the years, followed by law and order and the environment and then unemployment benefits. Ranked lower has been spending on military and defence spending, which itself has tended to register higher levels of support than expenditure for arts and culture, which has received the lowest levels of approval most of the time. A one-off question asked in 1986 – ‘Do you think the government should … spend less on defence?’ – found that a majority of the public thought the government should not spend more on defence (63%). The remainder (37%) Table 6.1  P ublic opinion towards government spending on the military and defence, 1985–2006  

1985 (%)

More or much more Same as now Less or much less Can’t choose

17 44 37 2

1990 (%)

1991 (%)

1993 (%)

1994 (%)

1996 (%)

2006 (%)

9

14

21

20

18

29

40 49 2

40 44 2

42 34 3

46 33 2

48 32 2

44 24 3

Source: Analysis of BSA surveys. Note: Percentages sum down the columns.

168  Defence spending and nuclear weapons Table 6.2  P ublic opinion towards reducing government spending on defence, 1983–91

Support Oppose Don’t know

1983 (%)

1984 (%)

1985 (%)

1986 (%)

1987 (%)

1989 (%)

1990 (%)

1991 (%)

44 53 3

52 45 3

54 42 4

55 41 4

52 45 4

56 41 4

65 32 3

56 42 2

Source: Analysis of BSA surveys. Percentages sum down the columns.

Table 6.3  Per cent supporting more public spending in different areas, 1985–2016

Environment Health Police and law enforcement Education Military and defence Old age pensions Unemployment benefits Culture and the arts

1985

1990

1991

1993

1994

1996

2006 2016

35 88 39

63 90 51

61 90 55

56 89 70

50 88 73

43 91 72

55 81 60

42 85 59

74 17 75 40 9

79 9 81 37 13

83 14 77 40 15

81 21 80 49 10

75 20 76 37 12

84 18 78 35 6

72 29 71 13 11

72 40 57 16 14

Source: Analysis of BSA surveys.

expressed the opposite view. This question did not offer a status quo option, though. Another question in the BSA series gauged views on public spending on two issue areas between 1983 and 1991 – defence and (combined) health and education. It was worded as follows: ‘Would you support or oppose a policy to … reducing government spending on …?’ The overall distribution of responses towards defence spending is given in Table 6.2. With this question, with no status quo option (maintaining current levels of spending) available, support for reducing spending tended to be higher over time (apart from 1983). It was highest in 1990 (65%), when the Cold War era and its associated long-running geopolitical tensions and ideological conflict had ended. A comparison of levels of opposition to reduced spending on defence and health and education is shown in Figure 6.2. There is a consistent and clear contrast in the public’s preferences concerning these two issue areas. While opposition to reduced spending on health and education was usually at or approaching 90%, it was considerably lower for defence. On some occasions, opposition to reduced spending on health and education was twice as high (or even higher) as that expressed for defence. Most recently, a question was asked in the BSA 2011, with the question wording providing some factual content for respondents: ‘In 2011, the UK government will allocate 9% of overall spending to the military and defence.

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  169 100 90 80 70 60 % 50 40 30 20 10 0 1983

1984

1985 Defence

1986

1987

1989

1990

1991

Health and education

Figure 6.2  Per cent supporting more spending on defence and health and education, 1983–91. Source: Analysis of BSA surveys.

Would you like to see more or less government spending on the military and defence?’ Interestingly, a different pattern of responses was evident. Around half supported more or much more spending (52%), with around a third favouring the status quo (35%). In contrast, just a tenth (11%) opted for reduced spending, much lower proportions than seen in Tables 6.1 and 6.3. Opinions may have been affected by the specific question wording used, as well as sentiment at that time generally being more receptive to better funding of the military in a climate of austerity politics and due to the perceived effects of Britain’s various overseas military commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. The question also featured as part of a wider set focussing on the British public’s views towards the military and their involvement in recent overseas conflicts (Gribble et al. 2012), so respondents’ more favourable views on the need for more spending on the armed forces may have been influenced by the responses given to prior questions on the subject. The British Election Study (BES) surveys also featured a question on defence spending between 1983 and 1997, though it did not encompass areas of domestic expenditure. It was worded as follows: ‘Do you think the government should or should not spend less on defence?’ The overall distribution of responses is reported in Table 6.4. The picture is somewhat at odds with the balance of opinion seen in the BSA data, in that a greater share of opinion was against reduced spending on defence. Between 1983 and 1992, a majority of the public did not favour a reduction in spending on defence (in the range of 50%–57%), with approaching or about two-fifths in favour. This position was reversed in 1997 – a year in which New Labour was elected to

170  Defence spending and nuclear weapons Table 6.4  P ublic opinion towards the government spending less on defence, 1983–97

Definitely or probably should Does not matter either way Probably or definitely should not Don’t know

1983 (%)

1987 (%)

1992 (%)

1997 (%)

36 3 57 5

39 7 50 3

41 6 51 2

55 12 31 2

Source: Analysis of BES surveys. Percentages sum down the columns.

office on a platform to better manage and substantially increase the funding of key public services – with 55% saying it should be reduced and considerably fewer, at 31%, against. Over time, only very small proportions said that it probably did not matter either way (highest at 12% in 1997). How does public opinion on defence spending in Britain compare with that of its allies within the Western European security alliance? Recent cross-national data from the Transatlantic Trends (TT) surveys shed further light, post-9/11, on public preferences concerning more, less, or the same level of defence spending, in the UK and other countries. Table 6.5 presents the full set of responses for the UK (not British) samples from several recent surveys, conducted between 2002 and 2013, encompassing questions with somewhat different wording and response options. These questions again used the standard ‘increase or reduce’ choice sets (Corman et al. 2015: 172). For the surveys between 2002 and 2008 the response options were ‘too much’, ‘too little’ and ‘about the right amount’. Between 2011 and 2013, the options refer to increasing defence spending, maintaining it at current levels and decreasing defence spending. In general, the majority or plurality response in UK public opinion has been to maintain current spending on defence, with broadly similar and relatively small proportions opting for spending more or less. The exception was 2008, when 50% thought too little was being spent on defence (and just a quarter supported the status quo), which may indicate that public sentiment was responsive to media coverage of and party-political debate over the perceived inadequacies of the funding for and supply of UK armed forces operating in Afghanistan and Iraq. The more recent question shows support for increasing defence spending outranking preferences for reducing it, although, once again, most people are supportive of the status quo (a plurality in 2011 and majorities in 2012–13). Compared to the average of the EU-7 group of countries (the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland and Portugal), public opinion in the UK was more supportive of increased defence spending between 2008 and 2013, though not in the earlier years when it was broadly similar. The cross-national Pew Global Attitudes survey (spring) 2016 asked about increasing, decreasing or maintaining current levels of defence expenditure in NATO member countries. Support in Britain was higher than in many of its European allies within NATO. Support for an increase was 43% in Britain (just ahead of support the status quo, at 41%, with just 14% opting for a

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  171 Table 6.5  P ublic opinion towards government spending on defence, 2002–13

2002 2003 2004 2008

2011 2012 2013

Too little (%)

Too much (%)

About the right amount (%)

Don’t know/ refused (%)

24 25 28 50

21 26 28 19

53 40 34 26

3 9 10 5

Increase defence spending (%)

Decrease defence spending (%)

Keep defence spending at current level (%)

Don’t know/ refused (%)

36 29 28

18 16 18

45 51 53

2 4 2

Source: Compiled from the Transatlantic Trends website: http://www.gmfus.org/initiatives/ transatlantic-trends-%E2%80%93-public-opinion. UK sample. Note: Percentages sum across the rows.

reduction), lower than the proportions in Poland (52%) and the Netherlands (49%) but higher than in the US (35%), Canada (31%) and various other European countries, including Germany (34%), France (32%), Hungary (31%), Greece (27%), Italy (26%) and Spain (14%) (Pew GAP 2016).

Defence spending and domestic spending Of course, these question wordings from the BES and BSA have asked in turn about support for increasing or decreasing spending on defence or other areas, so individuals can, if they so wish, express support for increased spending in every area. That is, they do not ask the public to explicitly select which particular areas across a wide spectrum of government activity are more or less deserving of greater expenditure. Questions gauging the public’s spending priorities and thus the relative value they place on defence spending relative to expenditure on domestic policy areas are particularly interesting, given the enduring ‘guns and butter’ debates which have featured in post-war democracies and which have been more salient during times of worsening economic conditions and budgetary constraints on the public purse (Eichenberg 1989: 156). As Sanders and Houghton observe, Defence does not produce quantifiable goods, and the larger the share of the budgetary pie that goes to it, the less is available to spend on domestic concerns like education and healthcare. Another issue is the question of whether defence spending not only ‘crowds out’ expenditure on worthy domestic causes, but might even erode the economic base on which an effective defence depends. (2016: 256)

172  Defence spending and nuclear weapons Post-war polling data from Gallup show that, when asked which spending programmes should be cut first in the 1950s–60s, the British public were much more likely to select defence over either health and social programmes and/or over education programmes (Eichenberg 1989: 165). Data from the early 1980s showed that, in 1980, the position was reversed (with greater support for reducing spending on health and social programmes), but the normal pattern – higher support for cutting defence than health or social care – resumed in surveys undertaken in 1983 (Eichenberg 1989: 165). Long-term data from the BSA series allow an examination of the relative priorities of the general public in terms of where notional additional expenditure should be allocated. The following questions have been asked in each BSA survey: About items of government spending. Which of these would be your highest priority for extra spending? About items of government spending. Which of these would be your second highest priority for extra spending? These questions allow respondents to select among ten different areas of spending, as well as to choose none of them. Figure 6.3 shows, for the period 1983–2015, the combined proportions stating that a particular area is the highest or second highest priority for extra spending. It reports the proportions citing defence and overseas aid, as well as several major areas of domestic spending: health, education and social security benefits.

90 80 70 60 %

50 40 30 20 10 0 1983 Education

1988

1993

Health

1998

Social security benefits

2003 Defence

2008

2013

Overseas aid

Figure 6.3  Priority for extra government spending (combined highest and next highest), 1983–2015. Source: Analysis of BSA surveys.

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  173 Health and education have been far and away the most important areas over recent decades for additional spending. In 1983, a combined 63% of the public ranked health and a combined 51% ranked education as the highest and second highest areas for extra spending. In contrast, 8% chose defence in 1983 and 12% did so in 2015. Below health and education, a series of areas of domestic spending have generally registered much lower levels of public support, including social security benefits. Of all ten areas, overseas aid has consistently been ranked the lowest priority for extra spending: at just 1% in 1983 and 2015. The BES 2015 survey featured a battery of questions (included as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project) about public spending – asking: ‘Thinking about public expenditure on … should there be much more than now, somewhat more than now, the same as now, somewhat less than now, or much less than now?’ Rather than having to select amongst different areas of spending, respondents were therefore asked to consider each area on its own merits. Support for more spending was highest for healthcare (75%), followed by education (62%), law and order (61%) and pensions (60%). Overseas aid was not asked about, but nearly half preferred more spending on defence (46%, with 31% supporting the status quo and just 20% supporting less spending), which was considerably higher than that registered for three other areas of domestic policy (unemployment benefits: 14%; business and industry: 30%; welfare benefits: 19%). Again, support for increased spending on defence ranks well below that of health, education and pensions and law and order but was higher than that seen for other areas of domestic expenditure. Party supporters In Tables 6.6–6.8, the views of party supporters towards reducing defence spending are reported. Polling data from the US shows that, in recent years, Republicans have been much more likely than Democrat supporters to take the view that too little is being spent on defence and that this gap has widened, with political independents broadly positioned in between these two groups (Newport 2018). Along with a partisan divide, based on ideological leanings within the US public, Conservatives have been more likely than Liberals to think that there has been too little spending on national defence (Jones 2012). Has there been a party-political divide on this issue in Britain? The longer time series (Table 6.6, covering 1985–2016) shows quite clearly that Conservatives have been in general less favourable to reduced defence expenditure. Labour and Liberal (Democrat) supporters have tended to be more favourable to such reductions. The more limited series covering 1983–91 (Table 6.7) shows that Conservative supporters have been more opposed to reduced defence spending, generally eliciting a majority against (apart from 1990). Opposition often registered at much lower levels amongst

Table 6.6  Per cent supporting less government spending on the military and defence by demographic group, 1985–2016  

1985

1990

1991

1993

1994

1996

2006

2016

Men Women Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ Conservative Labour Liberal (Democrat)/ Alliance None

41 34 46 40 34 22 20 49 41

56 44 54 5 48 40 41 55 58

49 44 49 47 40 38 32 57 57

43 27 44 35 32 24 32 34 43

38 28 41 38 28 18 26 38 31

38 28 39 31 35 24 24 38 36

25 23 21 28 23 21 19 25 36

41 34 46 40 34 22 10 28 26

42

40

32

31

34

28

21

18

Source: Analysis of BSA surveys.

Table 6.7  Per cent opposed to reduced government spending on defence by demographic group, 1983–91  

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1989

1990

1991

Men Women Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ Conservative Labour Liberal (Democrat)/ Alliance None

55 52 46 50 55 61 68 42 44

46 45 39 44 49 54 58 34 39

44 40 36 44 43 48 62 31 38

43 40 35 36 45 53 55 25 29

49 40 33 45 46 56 62 29 38

42 39 33 38 42 50 52 32 33

31 34 26 31 32 43 41 25 28

43 41 37 36 46 52 51 37 38

44

39

34

38

33

32

33

48

Source: Analysis of BSA surveys.

Table 6.8  Per cent saying government should not spend less on defence by demographic group, 1983–97  

1983

1987

1992

1997

Men Women Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ Conservative Labour Liberal (Democrat)/Alliance None

59 55 49 57 59 61 78 38 49 58

54 47 40 50 56 54 69 31 45 47

47 55 44 49 55 56 66 39 43 42

31 31 26 30 32 38 45 24 30 31

Source: Analysis of BES surveys.

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  175 Labour, Liberals and those with no party affiliation. On both measures, then, ­Conservative supporters have been the most opposed to proposals to decrease spending on the military and defence. The 1986 BSA survey showed that 75% of Labour supporters and 70% of Liberal supporters thought that defence spending should be reduced, compared to 45% of Conservative supporters and 60% of those with no party affiliation. The BES data, presented in ­Table 6.8, also confirm the Conservative predisposition towards opposing cuts in defence expenditure. Between 1983 and 1992, they were consistently more likely to be against the government spending less in this area (with majority opposition between 66% and 78%), although all groups registered lower opposition in 1997. Opposition tended to be lowest amongst Labour supporters, followed by Liberal (Democrat) supporters and those with no affiliation. The BES data also show that views of defence spending varied based on left-right preferences. Asked whether they were in favour of the redistribution of wealth towards ordinary people, in 1983 opposition to reduced government spending on defence was much higher amongst those who disagreed with redistribution (72%) than those who supported it (46%) or who supported neither position (52%). In the 1987–97 BES surveys, a similar pattern was evident: compared to those who favoured redistribution or who were neutral, those who opposed government redistribution from the well-off to the less well-off always expressed a higher level of opposition to reduced spending on defence. The gap between left and right was narrower in the 1990s, though. The long-term BSA data on the highest priority areas for additional spending also indicate some differences in the relative priorities of party supporters. In 1983, 13% of Conservative supporters cited defence as theirmost urgent or second-most urgent priority, compared to 3% amongst ­Labour supporters, 4% amongst supporters of the Alliance and 6% of those with no affiliation. In the 2015 survey, 17% of Conservative supporters placed defence as their highest or next highest priority, which was only exceeded by 27% of United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) supporters. The equivalent proportion amongst Labour and Liberal ­Democrat supporters was 7% each, just below the 8% of those with no affiliation. Recent opinion polling has further indicated differences in opinion towards defence spending based on party support. In March 2015, a YouGov poll showed that 53% of the British public were in favour of committing 2% of GDP to defence spending, with 27% opposed and 20% unsure of their view. Across groups, support was higher amongst Conservative and UKIP supporters (YouGov 2015d). Moreover, the same poll showed that a plurality thought that cuts in defence spending had been too deep in recent years (47%), compared to 12% saying not deep enough, 21% saying the balance has been about right with the remainder unsure. Agreement was ­ emocrats highest amongst UKIP supporters (67%) and lowest for Liberal D (31%). Support did not, however, differ much between Conservative and

176  Defence spending and nuclear weapons Labour supporters (47% and 50%, respectively) (YouGov 2015d). A YouGov poll in September 2015 showed strong opposition to the reduction of defence spending when flagged up as a policy proposal favoured by Jeremy ­Corbyn in his early months as Labour leader. Specifically, 65% opposed a significant decrease in defence spending, with around a quarter in favour (23%) (YouGov 2015e). Majorities of all party supporters opposed such a reduction, highest amongst Conservative (81%) and UKIP supporters (79%) and lower at 56% of Labour and 60% of Liberal Democrat supporters ­( YouGov 2015e). Demographic groups Research conducted in the US has shown that, over time, there have been consistent differences in views towards defence spending based on sex, with men tending to be more supportive than women of increased spending (Eichenberg and Stoll 2012: 343). What does the over-time evidence show for the views of men and women in Britain? Tables 6.6–6.8 also report the over time views of men, women and of different age groups towards the reduction of defence spending in Britain, in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Table 6.6 shows that, where there are pronounced differences, then men have usually been less supportive of reduced government spending on the military and defence than women. Earlier research noted that women in Britain were less militaristic than men in their views on this issue in the early 1980s, being less likely to back increases in defence expenditure (Crewe 1985: 49). There is also evidence of an age-­ related pattern over time. Older age groups have tended to be less likely to favour reduced spending compared to younger age groups. Table 6.7, showing the proportions opposed to reduced government spending on defence during much of the 1980s, shows that the levels of disagreement were often broadly similar between men and women (cf. Crewe 1985: 49). In relation to age, however, opposition during this period was higher amongst older age groups than younger sections of the population. Evidence from the BES surveys for 1983–97, shown in Table 6.8, again confirms this variation in opinion across age groups, with those aged 18–29 least likely to have agreed that the government should not reduce expenditure on defence. Data from the TT surveys show that, in 2002, the most common view amongst men and women was to support a reduction in defence spending, while in 2004 there was a broad split across the three options (increase, maintain or reduce). In 2008, support for maintaining spending was clearly the modal viewpoint amongst both groups, with around a fifth favouring increased spending; around a quarter took the opposite position. In the later surveys – 2011 to 2013 – the plurality or majority view was again to protect the existing level of spending and backing for reduced spending had fallen to around a fifth or under. This pattern held for both men and women.

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  177 There are also some differences in view based on education, measured as age completed full-time education or highest qualification held (but not shown in Tables 6.6–6.8). The findings are generally consistent across the two classifications of education. That is, those who left education aged 19 and over, and those with a degree-level qualification, have been more likely to support, or less likely to oppose, reduced government spending on defence from the 1980s up to the present day. A profile of contemporary public opinion In order to analyse contemporary attitudes to defence spending in more depth, the BES 2017 in person, post-election survey can be used, which allows for a robust analysis of group variation in opinion on this topic. It asked the following question: ‘Do you think the government should or should not do each of the following things or doesn’t it matter either way: spend less on defence’. In general, 57% opposed reduced spending, 11% were neutral, 28% supported decreased spending and 4% were unsure. A similar pattern of opinion was evident in the BES 2015 post-election, in-person survey, based on the same question: 56% opposed decreased spending, 12% were indifferent, 28% were in favour and 5% were unsure. Data from the BES 2014–18 Internet Campaign Panel also show that there was little support for the government reducing defence spending (based on a question asking: ‘Do you think the government should spend more on defence, less on defence, or about the same?’). Analysed on a cross-sectional basis, data from Waves 4 (March 2015) and 7 (April–May 2016) show that 16% and 18%, respectively, favoured less spending (a lot or somewhat) on defence; 32% and 39% wanted about the same amount to be spent while 44% and 33% backed increased spending (somewhat more or a lot more). Based on the BES 2017 post-election, in-person survey, Table 6.9 shows the distribution of responses across a range of demographic groups, as well ­ ocussing on as based on party support and (left-right) ideological location. F opposition to spending less on defence (i.e., the combined proportion saying the government probably or definitely should not), it is clear that – there is marked variation based on age group, country of residence, party support and left-right ideological location. While recent cross-national research has demonstrated the presence of a ‘gender gap’ in views towards defence spending (Eichenberg and Stoll 2016), in contemporary British opinion opposition to decreased spending is almost identical amongst men and women (respectively, 56% and 57%). Similarly, amongst men and women, around three-in-ten back reduced defence spending. The evidence shows that older people are more likely to be against a reduction – 63% of those aged 65 and over and 59% of those aged 45–64, falling to 51% amongst the younger age groups. However, the youngest age group and the oldest age groups show a similar level of support for decreased spending (26%–27%), which is highest amongst those aged 30–44 (34%). There is not much difference in view

178  Defence spending and nuclear weapons Table 6.9  P ublic opinion towards Britain reducing its defence spending by demographic group

Sex Age group

Education

Party support

Ideology

 

Definitely or probably should (%)

Doesn’t matter either way (%)

Probably or definitely should not (%)

Don’t know (%)

Male Female Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ Degree level or higher Other qualification None Con Lab Lib Dem UKIP Other party None Left Centre Right

29 27 27 34 27 26 32

13 10 18 9 11 9 10

56 57 51 51 59 63 56

2 5 5 6 3 2 2

26 28 17 34 46 18 46 27 42 28 17

11 14 8 14 7 2 11 14 12 11 10

59 52 73 48 44 73 39 51 43 58 72

4 6 2 4 3 7 5 8 4 3 1

Source: Analysis of BES 2017 post-election in-person survey. Note: Percentages sum across the rows. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib Dem, Liberal Democrats.

based on education: 59% of those with other qualifications opposed reduced spending on defence, followed by 56% of those qualified to at least degree level and 52% of those with no formal qualifications. Party-political differences were a recurrent feature of the survey data, from the BSA and BES series, reviewed earlier. Research into public opinion in the US has also shown that party identification has been a key factor underpinning preferences on defence spending over time (Ecer and Veasey 2015). In the contemporary electorate, opposition is similarly much higher amongst those who affiliate with right-leaning parties: Conservative (73%) and UKIP (73%). Opposition runs at 48% of Labour and 44% of Liberal Democrat supporters and is lowest at 39% of other party supporters. Those with no party affiliation registered 51% opposition. The party-political split is in broad accordance with the ideological basis of opinion. That is, those who place themselves on the right are much more likely to oppose reduced defence spending (72%) than those on the ideological left (43%). In between these two groups are those in the ideological centre, with 58% opposed. In

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  179 broad terms, this accords with the pattern for left-right preferences shown in the BES 1983–97 surveys. In a recent cross-national analysis, the results for Western Europe showed that there were no significant differences between men and women in their likelihood of supporting increased defence spending (Eichenberg and Stoll 2015: 15–6). In Britain, those from a white ethnic background were significantly more likely than those from non-white ethnic groups to oppose decreased defence expenditure. Earlier analysis found that, across democracies, preferences over defence spending tended to be strongly associated with ideological beliefs (Inglehart 1977). Eichenberg and Stoll’s recent analysis of cross-national support for increased defence expenditure also found that right-wing ideological orientation was positively-­related to preferences for greater spending in Western Europe (2017: 803). In relation to those on the ideological left being less ­supportive of increased spending, they observe that ‘it may be that a person on the left of the ideological spectrum feels that war is sometimes a necessary action in world politics but who in any particular year fears that spending for defense might threaten more valued social programs’ (2017: 799). In contemporary British society, both party-political affiliation and ideological leanings correlate with preferences on defence spending. For the British public, then, the evidence tends to support a key finding from existing cross-­national research that contemporary views on defence are associated with core beliefs or values, including ideological identification (Eichenberg and Stoll 2017: 807–8).

Nuclear weapons Analyses undertaken in Chapter 2 of public evaluations of the most important issue facing the country showed that nuclear weapons were perceived to be relatively more salient in the 1980s. However, it declined in importance during that decade and since then has been a low salience issue in the public mind, consistently outranked by defence and foreign affairs in general and by relations with Europe. In this section, the views of the British public on the merits or otherwise of Britain’s post-war possession of nuclear weapons is discussed, focussing on both the overall state of opinion as well as attending to variation based on societal groups. This detailed analysis of public views has two main areas of focus. The first part of the analysis looks over time at the evidence from post-war polling and surveys on Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons. The second part focusses on public opinion data pertaining to the more recent debate, in the past decade, over the merits of renewing the Trident nuclear weapons system. The review of evidence for both parts reveals some clear commonalities in terms of the key patterns for overall and societal group opinion. In general, the public has tended to side more with the pro-nuclear weapons side of the argument – that is, supporting the retention of the status quo in some form. Out and out unilateralism

180  Defence spending and nuclear weapons has always been the view of small minorities, both during and after the Cold War. More specifically, there has been a clear party-political patterning to attitudes; while some demographic groups have, across time, tended to be more favourable to Britain’s nuclear deterrent.

Britain’s development and possession of nuclear weapons Gallup polling undertaken in the early post-war period, during the 1950s–60s, tended to show that the public were, on balance, broadly supportive of Britain developing and retaining nuclear weapons. Relatively limited minorities favoured Britain giving up her nuclear arms, in terms of a unilateralist approach. In 1952, 60% approved of Britain making the atom bomb, with 22% opposed (Gallup 1976a: 263). A poll from February 1955 showed that 53% approved and 31% disapproved, of the government’s decision to make the H-Bomb and be prepared to use them in the event of war between Russia and the West (Gallup 1976a: 345). A poll from March in the same year showed opinion more evenly divided, with 48% approving of Britain developing the H-Bomb and 43% holding the opposite viewpoint (Gallup 1976a: 346). In April, however, opinion was more clear-cut, as 54% supported the development of the H-Bomb and 32% were against (Gallup 1976a: 348). In the early 1960s, majorities of the public disapproved of Britain giving up H-bombs if other countries were not prepared to do so. Those approving ranged between 21% and 32% (Gallup 1976a: 604, 614, 635). Moreover, in response to a suggestion by an American official that Britain should give up her nuclear weapons and rely on the US for defence, 69% were against in June 1967, with 19% approving of this move (Gallup 1976b: 930). Several other polls asked more explicitly about what policy the British government should pursue in relation to nuclear weapons. In June 1959, given a set of options in relation to Britain’s manufacture of nuclear weapons, a majority – 61% – supported the country ceasing this only if the US, Russia and other countries did the same (Gallup 1976a: 515). Just 17% supported the option of stopping their manufacture irrespective of other countries possessing them, while 12% said Britain should cease making them and encourage countries like France to do likewise (Gallup 1976a: 515). In August of the same year, a near majority (49%) backed the proposal that Britain should stop making nuclear weapons if all countries agreed to stop making them and to accept inspection to enforce this (Gallup 1976a: 522). Just 11% supported a unilateralist position of Britain going ahead without waiting for other countries and trying to persuade them to follow, 9% supported forming a non-nuclear club with the superpowers left as the sole possessors of nuclear weapons, while 10% opposed outright any move towards an EastWest deal on nuclear weapons (Gallup 1976a: 522). In 1960–61, polls showed that majorities of the British public favoured the government’s policy being either to continue making nuclear weapons or pooling such weapons with

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  181 allies and mainly relying on American production (Gallup 1976a: 553, 554, 558, 562, 567, 589). The proportions supporting giving up nuclear weapons entirely ranged from one fifth to one third (Gallup 1976a: 553, 554, 558, 562, 567, 589). In October 1961, a majority disagreed with Britain giving up her H-Bombs if others did not do the same; 21% approved of this unilateralist course of action (Gallup 1976a: 604). In January–February 1963, 29% supported the government’s hypothetical policy being to abandon nuclear weapons completely, outranked by the 54% supporting continued reliance on them (Gallup 1976a: 668). In April of that year, 63% supported Britain and the west relying in some form on nuclear weapons, with just 24% favouring their complete abandonment (Gallup 1976a: 686). Polls undertaken in December 1962 and April 1963 similarly showed majority support for nuclear weapons, in the form – of decreasing popularity – of Britain continuing to make her own, setting up a European force, or relying on the US (Gallup 1976a: 663, 686). On each occasion, around a quarter favoured the country giving up nuclear weapons (Gallup 1976a: 663, 686). A series of NOP polls carried out in 1964 all showed that large majorities of the public were supportive of Britain retaining an independent nuclear deterrent – that is, they were not in favour of Britain giving up her own weapons and relying instead on the protection afforded to the Western alliance by the US’s nuclear arsenal. The proportions against Britain giving up her own independent deterrent were 73% and 71% in two March polls and 68% in a June–August poll and 73% in October. When asked in O ­ ctober 1964 if it was important (or not) for Britain to retain its own nuclear deterrent, again the large share of opinion thought this was very or quite important (73%) with around a quarter stating it was not very important or was unnecessary. In additional to the opinion polling in this issue, there are several data series which enable a long-term perspective on the British public’s views on the nuclear weapons debate, encompassing both the Cold War and postCold War eras. A long-running question is available from the BES surveys, first asked in 1963 and which last featured in 1997. It is worded as follows: Do you think Britain should keep her own nuclear weapons, independent of other countries? The responses for public opinion as a whole are shown in Table 6.10. Across time, generally small proportions adopted a unilateralist stance (believing that Britain should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons), although support for this option was much higher in 1997 (at a quarter) The large share of opinion had a pro-nuclear weapons stance: either believing that Britain should retain her own nuclear weapons or should only possess them within a Western European defence system. Support for the latter option generally ran well ahead of the former. Ipsos MORI have asked the following question over time: ‘Should Britain get rid of its nuclear weapons, even if other countries keep theirs?’ Responses

182  Defence spending and nuclear weapons Table 6.10  P ublic opinion towards Britain keeping nuclear weapons, 1964–97

Britain should keep her own nuclear weapons Britain should have nuclear weapons only in a West European defence system Britain should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons Don’t know

1963 (%)

1964 (%)

1966 (%)

1987 1992 (%) (%)

1997 (%)

36

43

36

32

32

27

48

47

52

46

46

45

16

10

13

16

15

25

–

–

–

7

7

3

Source: Analysis of BES surveys. Note: Percentages sum down the columns.

Table 6.11  P ublic opinion towards Britain getting rid of its nuclear weapons, even if other countries keep theirs, 1981–2016

Support Oppose Don’t know

1981 (%)

1983 (%)

1986 (%)

1987 (%)

2016 (%)

23 69 8

23 72 5

31 63 6

24 70 7

24 70 6

Source: Compiled from the Ipsos MORI website: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk. Note: Percentages sum down the columns.

are reported in Table 6.11, covering the period 1981–2016. They again show only minority support for a unilateralist position: usually about a quarter have supported this view. In contrast, around six in ten or seven in ten have usually opposed Britain getting rid of its nuclear weapons. Across three-and-a-half decades, therefore, there is little difference in view between 1981 and 2016. The BSA surveys asked the following question about disarmament between 1983 and 1990: About British nuclear policy. Which comes closest to your own opinion  … Britain should rid itself of nuclear weapons while persuading others to do the same OR Britain should keep its nuclear weapons until we persuade others to reduce theirs? Support for Britain getting rid of nuclear weapons unilaterally generally garnered the support of less than three-in-ten (shown in Table 6.12). Support for a multilateral approach was the view of large majorities – around or somewhat higher than seven-in-ten. Gallup data from 1980 to 1983 showed a broadly similar split in terms of a minority approving of and a majority eschewing, the idea of unilateral nuclear disarmament (Crewe 1985: 34). The question was also asked in the 1994 BSA survey, with an additional response option used (keep nuclear weapons). Just a quarter supported a unilateral

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  183 Table 6.12  P ublic opinion towards Britain’s nuclear policy, 1983–90

Unilateral disarmament Multilateral disarmament Neither Don’t know

1983 (%)

1984 (%)

1985 (%)

1986 (%)

1987 (%)

1989 (%)

1990 (%)

19

23

27

28

25

26

28

78

74

68

69

73

72

69

3 0

3 1

4 1

2 1

2 1

2 0

3 1

Source: Analysis of BSA surveys. Note: Percentages sum down the columns.

Table 6.13  P ublic opinion towards British and American nuclear missiles, 1983–94 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1994 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Own independent nuclear missiles Make Britain safer 61 Make Britain less safe 29 No difference – Don’t know 10

57 33 2 9

54 34 2 10

52 37 2 9

58 31 2 9

55 34 1 10

54 33 1 12

46 37 12 6

American nuclear missiles Make Britain safer Make Britain less safe No difference Don’t know

36 51 3 10

36 53 2 10

29 60 3 9

39 50 2 10

36 52 2 11

35 50 2 13

21 60 14 5

39 48 1 12

Source: Analysis of BSA surveys. Note: Percentages sum down the columns for each question.

stance, over half supported a multilateral approach and 15% wanted Britain to retain nuclear weapons. Two additional questions which featured in the BSA surveys between 1983 and 1994 asked about another aspect of the nuclear weapons debate: Do you think that having its own independent nuclear missiles makes Britain a safer or less safe place to live? Do you think that the siting of American nuclear missiles in Britain makes Britain a safer or a less safe place to live? Overall responses to these questions are given in Table 6.13. The public were much more likely to think that Britain having its own nuclear missiles was more likely to make their country safer compared to the effect of siting American missiles in Britain. Well over half thought this was the case during the 1980s (falling to less than half in 1994). On each occasion a minority perceived the opposite to be the case (they would make the country less safe). In terms of the siting of US nuclear missiles, the results are

184  Defence spending and nuclear weapons almost the mirror opposite: on nearly every occasion, a majority thought this would make living in Britain less safe and only a minority thought Britain would be safer. Party supporters The issue of nuclear weapons and Britain’s possession of them has been a particularly divisive issue and a long-running one at that, for the internal politics of the Labour Party. At certain periods in the post-war period, the nuclear weapons issue and Britain’s possession of them, has clearly differentiated the Conservative and Labour Parties. The Labour party experienced serious fractures over the nuclear weapons issue in the late 1950s and early 1960s under Gaitskell’s leadership, ‘with unilateral disarmament proving an ideological fault-line within the labour movement’ (Vickers 2011: 48). These became particularly potent again in the 1980s, with opposing stances on the issue tending to align with broader leftright fault-lines – factionalism – in the party that encompassed other areas of foreign, as well as much domestic, policy. As Scott observes: ‘These were occasions when a concatenation of internal Labour politics and international events led the party to embrace unilateral disarmament’ (2006: 700). Opposition to the development, possession and use of nuclear weapons can clearly be situated within the ‘anti-militarist’ principle that has historically formed part of the liberal internationalism, which has been the most important influence on the Labour Party’s thinking on international affairs (Vickers 2004, 2011). As Scott noted, ‘Out of office, the party was engulfed in fierce debate over nuclear weapons’ (2006: 685). More recently, entrenched left-right differences on foreign and defence policy have resurfaced and come to the fore under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, since summer 2015, as the party has embarked on a renewal of its policy programme while in opposition. Moderates within the parliamentary party have described the retention of Trident as a ‘fundamental red line’ for them (Riley-Smith 2016). Corbyn has been a longstanding member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), has occupied senior posts (he was previously vice-chair and a vice-president) and is a former chair of the parliamentary campaign group on the issue. In 2016 Corbyn attend the largest CND rally in a generation to support protests against the renewal of Britain’s Trident nuclear deterrent (Townsend 2016). More broadly, Byrne notes that in the post-war period, ‘CND has [had] an inextricable relationship with Labour’ but that ‘Concern over nuclear weapons was expressed within the party before CND existed’ (1998: 431). However, despite the fractious nature of the Labour Party’s internal debates on nuclear weapons, particularly during its spells in opposition, Labour governments have consistently supported Britain’s nuclear weapons capability (Scott 2006: 685). As Vickers notes, It was the Attlee government that decided to go ahead with the atom bomb, and Labour has retained the commitment to an independent

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  185 nuclear deterrent for all of the postwar period apart from the periods of 1960–61 and 1983–89. (2004: 196) This has been another longstanding pillar of the bipartisan consensus on foreign policy (Kavanagh and Morris 1994), whereby the leaderships of the two main parties have, in broad terms and certainly when in office, backed the retention and renewal of Britain’s nuclear weapons capability. Of course, the views of the parties’ supporters in the wider country on this issue is another matter and requires more detailed analysis here. The NOP polls from 1963 to 1964 discussed earlier showed that there was, to some extent, a party-political divide on this issue. Majorities of party supporters opposed Britain giving up its independent nuclear deterrent in three polls conducted in March 1964 and June–August 1964, but support was somewhat less emphatic amongst Labour and Liberal supporters. Conservative supporters were most in favour of retaining the independent deterrent and registered the lowest levels in agreement with giving it up. In October 1964, 59% of Labour supporters thought that Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent was very or quite important, compared with 88% of ­Conservative supporters and 79% of Liberal supporters. Labour supporters were, accordingly, more likely to perceive such a deterrent as not very important or essentially unnecessary (38% compared to 9% of Conservatives and 19% of Liberals). The long-running BES question on Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons reveals some interesting differences in the views of party supporters ­( Table 6.14). Over time, relative to other groups, Conservative supporters have been the most likely to favour Britain retaining her own nuclear weapons. Even so, usually a majority or plurality of Conservative supporters have preferred Britain possessing weapons within the Western European defence system. Very few have expressed supported for Britain having nothing to do with nuclear weapons. Labour supporters – usually a plurality – have consistently been more supportive of Britain having nuclear weapons within a wider defence system. The proportion supporting Britain having her own weapons declined over time. Labour supporters, ­ iberal ­( Democrats) on some occasions, have been more likely along with L to favour Britain having nothing to do with nuclear weapons (highest at 30% in 1987 and 1997; 28% for Liberal Democrats in 1997). A consistent majority of ­Liberal ­( Democrat) supporters have favoured Britain possessing nuclear weapons within a wider West European system. The pro­ ritain retaining portion of Liberal (Democrats) expressing support for B her own weapons fell over time. The BSA data also reveal a similar patterning of responses based on party affiliation. As shown in Table 6.15, Conservative supporters have been most emphatically supportive – at or approaching nine-in-ten – of a multilateral

Table 6.14  P ublic opinion towards Britain having nuclear weapons by demographic group, 1964–97 1963 (%) 1964 (%) 1966 (%) 1987 (%) 1992 (%) 1997 (%) Men Women Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ Con Lab Lib (Dem) None

Keep own nuclear weapons or only in West European Defence system Britain should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons Keep own nuclear weapons or only in West European Defence system Britain should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons Keep own nuclear weapons or only in West European Defence system Britain should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons Keep own nuclear weapons or only in West European Defence system Britain should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons Keep own nuclear weapons or only in West European Defence system Britain should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons Keep own nuclear weapons or only in West European Defence system Britain should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons Keep own nuclear weapons or only in West European Defence system Britain should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons Keep own nuclear weapons or only in West European Defence system Britain should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons Keep own nuclear weapons or only in West European Defence system Britain should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons Keep own nuclear weapons or only in West European Defence system Britain should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons

Source: Analysis of BES surveys. Note: Don’t knows not shown for 1987–97. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib (Dem), Liberal/Liberal Democrats.

87

90

86

81

84

79

13 81

10 89

14 85

15 75

12 77

20 68

19 87

12 92

15 82

16 73

14 76

28 69

13 86

9 91

18 89

21 76

19 82

27 71

14 84

10 88

11 87

17 82

14 84

28 77

14 74

10 87

11 78

17 79

14 78

28 75

25 90

13 95

21 92

13 92

12 89

20 87

10 80

5 85

8 82

3 63

7 70

11 77

20 85

15 89

19 85

30 80

22 80

30 70

15 76

12 84

15 84

15 66

14 72

28 65

24

15

16

17

15

27

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  187 approach to disarmament while Liberal (Democrat) and particularly Labour supporters were most open to unilateral disarmament. Even so, clear majorities of Labour and Liberal supporters preferred a multilateral approach between 1983 and 1990. The BES 1987 survey also asked about preferences for unilateral or multilateral disarmament. Labour supporters were much more favourable to the former approach, with 42% supportive of Britain getting rid of its weapons while persuading others to do the same, compared to just 5% of Conservative supporters and a fifth of supporters of the Alliance (SDP and Liberal parties). The questions of whether Britain having her own missiles or the siting of US missiles in Britain made the country safer also elicited some variation in opinion across party supporters – shown in Table 6.16 – although all groups showed more faith in Britain’s own missiles safeguarding the country more. Conservative supporters consistently registered the highest proportions perceiving that both scenarios would make Britain safer. The other groups all evinced less favourable views of the effects of having US missiles in Britain but more optimistic evaluations of Britain’s own nuclear missiles. Similar findings are evident from the BES 1983 and 1987 surveys, when these questions were also asked. Once again, Conservative supporters were much more favourable in their views regarding both scenarios; the other groups all being less favourable in their perceptions; and, across the board, perceptions of US missiles being sited in Britain were much less favourable compared to Britain’s own weapons. Did views on Britain possessing nuclear weapons vary based on left-right ideology? There is some evidence that those with left-leaning preferences were more likely to oppose nuclear weapons. In 1987, 22% of those who favoured government redistribution thought Britain should totally eschew nuclear weapons, compared to just 6% of those who were opposed to redistribution and 12% of those unsure. In response to another question in 1987, 30% of those who backed redistribution supported Britain getting rid of its nuclear weapons while trying to persuade other countries to do likewise; this fell to 19% of those with a neutral viewpoint and 9% of those who opposed redistribution. Similarly, in 1992 and 1997, although always a minority view, disavowal of nuclear weapons was highest amongst those who backed the redistribution of wealth. In 1983 and 1987, in comparison to those against redistribution, those who favoured the state redistributing wealth were less likely to agree that having nuclear missiles – whether British or American – on home soil made the country a safer place. During the 1980s and 1990s, the ideological basis of British public opinion towards nuclear weapons therefore was, in broad terms, aligned with its party-political basis. Survey research into the demographic and attitudinal profile of the membership of CND, conducted in the 1960s and 1980s, found that they were likely to support left-wing policies and tended to favour the Labour Party (Parkin 1968; Byrne 1988, 1998).

Table 6.15  P ublic opinion towards Britain’s nuclear policy by demographic group, 1983–90  

 

Men

Unilateral disarmament Multilateral disarmament Women Unilateral disarmament Multilateral disarmament Aged 18–29 Unilateral disarmament Multilateral disarmament Aged 30–44 Unilateral disarmament Multilateral disarmament Aged 45–64 Unilateral disarmament Multilateral disarmament Aged 65+ Unilateral disarmament Multilateral disarmament Conservative Unilateral disarmament Multilateral disarmament Labour Unilateral disarmament Multilateral disarmament Liberal/ Unilateral Alliance disarmament Multilateral disarmament None  Unilateral disarmament Multilateral disarmament

Source: Analysis of BSA surveys. Note: Don’t know responses not shown.

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 19

23

27

27

24

24

27

79

75

68

70

74

74

71

20

23

27

29

25

28

28

77

73

68

68

71

70

68

27

26

34

37

31

32

33

68

72

61

61

68

66

65

20

26

28

31

29

31

33

78

72

69

66

69

68

65

16

19

24

23

19

23

23

81

65

73

73

77

74

75

14

21

20

20

19

18

21

83

75

70

77

78

79

73

8

12

11

13

8

11

11

90

85

86

85

90

87

88

29

37

41

42

44

38

40

68

60

55

55

53

60

56

22

16

25

27

25

31

30

76

80

73

71

73

68

69

26

22

30

32

34

31

26

67

69

54

58

60

64

61

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  189 Table 6.16  Per cent saying British and American nuclear missiles make Britain safer by demographic group, 1983–94

British missiles Men Women Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ Conservative Labour Liberal (Democrats)/ Alliance None US missiles Men Women Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ Conservative Labour Liberal (Democrats)/ Alliance None

1983 1984

1985

1986

1987

1989

1990

1994

62 59 52 60 65 64 74 53 61

59 54 51 56 58 62 70 45 55

55 52 48 53 58 56 75 41 52

55 48 46 47 59 55 69 42 46

61 56 49 56 64 66 78 41 55

58 52 50 53 58 58 73 41 49

57 51 50 51 60 56 74 42 44

52 40 35 39 54 54 65 40 36

46

52

41

39

39

46

44

27

45 33 33 36 41 45 46 31 30

39 33 30 36 38 39 52 22 34

40 33 30 36 38 40 41 21 33

36 22 24 25 34 31 39 18 23

47 32 31 37 43 44 39 20 28

44 29 33 35 36 38 46 22 25

41 30 32 34 39 36 44 24 29

15 28 16 20 24 24 27 19 15

32

34

23

18

27

33

27

10

Source: Analysis of BSA surveys.

Demographic groups Assessing group-related attitudes in earlier decades, Berrington showed that women were more likely than men to be against nuclear weapons and older people were more supportive than younger people (1986). Tables 6.14–6.16 also report the views of men, women and different age groups. In general, there is not much variation in opinion towards Britain having nuclear weapons – either on its own or as part of a wider regional defence system – based on sex or age. Very large majorities supported Britain having nuclear weapons in some capacity from 1963 through to 1997. During the 1980s, also, the balance of support for unilateral versus multilateral disarmament did not differ consistently between men and women. Based on age, while unilateralism was always a minority view in each age group in this decade, it was somewhat less prevalent amongst those aged 50–64 and 65 and over. Asked about the protection afforded by British or US nuclear

190  Defence spending and nuclear weapons missiles, men tended to be more likely than women to adjudge that the latter’s presence made the country safer; in relation to the former, the differences were generally less pronounced. Based on age, older people tended to be more inclined to take the view that, in the 1980s and 1990s, the presence of British or US nuclear missiles made the country somewhat safer. Differences of opinion towards the possession and presence of nuclear weapons in Britain are also evident based on education. In the 1980s, support for a unilateralist position was somewhat more common – albeit always a minority view – amongst those who finished their education aged 19 and older and amongst those with a degree-level qualification (approaching or around two-in-five). Those with a degree-level qualification also tended to hold less favourable views of the supposed safety afforded by the presence of British or American nuclear missiles on home soil. This difference of opinion within the wider population based on educational attainment is, in broad terms, in accord with profiles of the membership of the anti-­nuclear pressure group CND. Byrne notes that, ‘all the surveys of its supporters from the 1960s and the 1980s reveal the same picture —approximately twothirds coming from the educated middle-class and concentrated in public-­ sector occupations such as education and welfare’ (1998: 429).

The renewal of Trident The nuclear issue in the last decade or so has re-emerged through consideration of the question of the renewal of Britain’s Trident (submarine-based) nuclear weapons system. CND has unsurprisingly been at the forefront of the opposition, with its campaign centring on arguments attacking the international legality, security irrelevance and the vast expense of nuclear weapons in general and Trident in particular (CND website: ‘No to Trident’). In the context of a government white paper on Trident renewal being published in late-2006, the then prime minister Tony Blair contended that the renewal of Britain’s nuclear deterrent would be ‘the ultimate insurance’, saying it would be ‘unwise and dangerous’ for the country to unilaterally give up its deterrent (Tempest 2006). A first parliamentary vote on renewal was held in March 2007 under the Labour government, with a large majority of MPs voting in favour: 409, with 161 voting against, which included 95 Labour MPs, representing the largest rebellion for the government on a domestic issue since 1997 (Wintour 2007). Labour and the Conservatives stood at the 2010 general election with manifesto commitments pledging the like-for-like renewal of Trident, while the Liberal Democrats were opposed to a like-for-like replacement. Because of these opposing positions, the Trident issue was an area where – at the outset – the coalition government had to tread carefully and, to some extent, agree to disagree. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review issued under the Coalition Government reaffirmed the UK’s decision to retain a continuous at-sea deterrent and to commence work on the development of

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  191 new submarines. Recognising the inter-party differences of view, the coalition government’s programme had, however, stated that the junior coalition partner would ‘continue to make the case for alternatives’ (Programme for Government 2010: 15). A key development was the publication of a Trident Alternatives Review in 2013, which concluded that a like-for-like replacement was the most effective policy in order to enable Britain to retain an independent nuclear deterrent and maintain close relations with the US (Williams 2016: 112). At the 2015 general election, the Conservatives pledged to replace Trident in its current form, Labour stated they would continue the continuous at-sea deterrent by ‘minimal credible means’, while the Liberal Democrats offered a scaled-back version of the current system, which would not provide a continuous deterrent (Wright 2015). The 2015 Strategic Security and Defence Review, issued after the Conservatives returned to single-party government in May of that year, further underlined the commitment to an independent nuclear deterrent (Williams 2016: 113). At the beginning of Theresa May’s premiership, in July 2016, another major parliamentary vote took place, again delivering an emphatic victory for Trident renewal. In terms of the division amongst MPs, 472 voted in favour or renewal and 117 against. Of those against, 47 were Labour MPs and 52 were SNP MPs (BBC News 2016). The emphatic show of opposition to Trident from the SNP should be placed in the context of Scotland being the location of the Faslane naval base which hosts the submarine-based nuclear deterrent. The second vote took place under very different political circumstances than the first, with Labour having been in opposition for several years and being led by Jeremy Corbyn, since July 2015, who had well-established anti-nuclear credentials, a stance which was in stark contrast to the staunchly pro-nuclear weapons views of his predecessors. This anti-nuclear weapons stance was part of a broader set of policies on foreign and defence policy espoused by Corbyn which were perceived to be outside of the mainstream of the established British approach (Strong 2015): Indeed, he is a member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and a longstanding supporter of a nuclear-free world. He objects to both the financial and the human cost of using nuclear weapons, and to the supposed instability their existence produces for international politics overall. Even so, support for renewal of the Trident deterrent has remained official party policy under Corbyn’s leadership, featuring in the 2017 general election manifesto (Labour Party 2017) (in keeping with its predecessor documents), but his strident views on this issue have put him at odds with a large section of the parliamentary party and with some prominent members of his shadow cabinet In a major speech on foreign and defence policy during the 2017 general election campaign, Corbyn was at pains to stress that he was

192  Defence spending and nuclear weapons not a ‘pacifist’ and further claimed that ‘Labour’s support for the renewal of the Trident submarine system does not preclude working for meaningful, multilateral steps to achieve reductions in nuclear arsenals’ (Corbyn 2017). Polling carried out amongst representatives of the political parties has shed light on the dividing lines on Trident renewal. In August–September 2013, 72% of Liberal Democrat councillors and 52% of Labour councillors were in favour of getting rid of Trident (ComRes 2013a, 2013b). In ­February–March 2015, there was near-unanimity amongst Green councillors on the issue, with 96% agreeing that not renewing Trident would make the country better off (ComRes 2015e). In January–February 2014, a poll of Labour prospective parliamentary candidates found that a bare majority, 51%, agreed that getting rid of Trident should be a manifesto commitment; 37% were opposed to such a pledge (ComRes 2014c). A poll carried out for CND amongst Labour’s parliamentary candidates in the run-up to the 2015 general election reported that three-quarters opposed the renewal of Britain’s nuclear deterrent (Bush, 2015). A poll of MPs taken in the period running up to the first parliamentary vote on Trident found that 94% of Conservative MPs supported the continuation of Trident for the foreseeable future, with much less emphatic support from Labour MPs (at 50%), with only a quarter of Liberal Democrat and MPs from other parties in agreement (ComRes 2006a). Have the British public showed clear and consistent backing for the renewal of Trident? A range of polls have been undertaken in recent years which have probed public opinion on the renewal of Trident debate. It should be acknowledged that polls have been undertaken by different market research organisations, have utilised different question wordings and have provided respondents with varying sets of response options. An Ipsos MORI survey from September 2005 used a split-sample format to gauge views on the renewal of Trident, with the second version of the question having an additional part to the preamble which explicitly referred to the opportunity cost of replacing Trident (‘The total cost of replacing “Trident” missiles, submarines and base facilities is likely to be around 16325 billion. This is the equivalent of building around 1,000 new schools at current prices’.) (Ipsos MORI 2005a). In response to the first version, opinion was almost evenly split, with 46% in favour of replacement and 44% opposed (Ipsos MORI 2005a). Responses to the second version showed a different pattern, with a majority against replacement (54%), 33% supporting renewal and 13% not sure (Ipsos MORI 2005a). A December 2006 poll showed that 52% supported renewal of Trident on the basis that Britain should possess such a deterrent if other countries had them (Populus 2006a). A fifth had previously backed a nuclear deterrent but opposed replacing Trident because of the changing nature of security threats; with 23% having a position of consistent opposition to the country having a nuclear deterrent (Populus 2006a). In February 2007, public opinion was divided over several options: 24% supported Trident renewal regardless of the cost attached to the project

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  193 (stipulated at £20 billion); 24% backed Britain retaining the current system but were against committing to developing a new system for two decades hence; 19% took the view that times had changed and Trident was no longer necessary; 29% were opposed to Britain having nuclear weapons at all (Populus 2007a). A YouGov poll conducted in March 2007, in the wake of the House of Commons vote on Trident renewal, found that 50% backed Britain’s continued possession of nuclear weapons, 32% were opposed with 14% unsure (YouGov 2007a) Asked in the context of the economic troubles in September 2009 about the government scrapping Trident given the state of the national finances, 58% of the British public agreed, with 35% taking the opposing view (ComRes 2009a). In September of following year, asked for their view on the renewal of the Trident nuclear submarine fleet, 50% opposed this, with just 24% in favour; 25% were unsure (ComRes 2010a). In ­January–February 2014, asked about options for Trident renewal, public opinion was broadly split: 24% said Trident should be disbanded and Britain should renounce nuclear weapons, 26% said it should be replaced but on a reduced scale and 29% backed a like-for-like renewal. (ComRes 2014d). Just 4% backed replacement with enhanced size and capacity, with 18% unsure (ComRes 2014d). A poll undertaken by YouGov in September 2015 and which elicited support or opposition for a series of policies espoused by Corbyn, found that 52% opposed the proposal to get rid of Britain’s Trident system and not replace it (with 28% in agreement) (YouGov 2015f). Indeed, this public rejection was a broader feature of their response to Corbyn’s proposals in relation to foreign and defence policies (YouGov 2015f). An Ipsos MORI poll in January 2016 used a split-sample format to deploy alternative question wordings on Trident. When asked, using the first form of wording, whether they agreed or disagreed with getting rid of all nuclear weapons in Britain even if other countries keep theirs (the wording used in Table 6.11), 70% were opposed, with 24% in favour (Ipsos MORI 2016b). The second form of wording asked about agreement or disagreement with getting rid of all nuclear weapons in Britain, in response to which 58% expressed opposition and 34% were supportive (Ipsos MORI 2016b). Another question in the same poll gauged views towards Jeremy Corbyn’s suggestion regarding keeping the submarines without nuclear weapons. Overall, 52% supported like-for-like renewal, 28% backed retaining submarines without nuclear weapons, 16% did not want the submarines to be constructed and so the Trident programme to be scrapped and 5% were unsure (Ipsos MORI 2016b). Another poll in January 2016, conducted by Orb, found that 51% supported full Trident renewal, 29% backed submarines without nuclear weapons and 20% opposed renewal altogether (Grice 2016). In the same month, a ComRes poll probed views on the Trident issue using four alternative questions wordings. In sum, the results were: 54% supported and 22% opposed renewal of the Trident nuclear weapons programme

194  Defence spending and nuclear weapons if other  countries possessed such weapons; 31% favoured and 35% disagreed with Britain leading the way in nuclear disarmament by not renewing Trident; 49% supported and 28% were against Britain having a nuclear weapon; 48% were opposed and 25% supported Britain giving up its nuclear weapons; the proportions who did not know ranged from 22% to 33% (ComRes 2016e). The variation in question framing and in the response options in the aforementioned polls makes it difficult to draw hard-and-fast conclusions about the British public’s views on Trident renewal. That said, the balance of the evidence has tended to show the British public more likely to support the maintenance of the status quo in some form and limited minority backing for disarmament. YouGov has asked a consistent question on this issue in recent years. Table 6.17 shows the distribution of responses to a question asked between 2013 and 2017, providing three substantive options for renewal of Trident. These are: a like-for-like replacement, retention of the system but a reduced one in terms of capability and costs, or getting rid Table 6.17  P ublic opinion towards the renewal of Trident, 2013–17 Response option

July January March 2013 (%) 2015 (%) 2015 (%)

April 2015 (%)

September April 2015 (%) 2017 (%)

Britain should replace Trident with an equally powerful nuclear missile system Britain should retain a nuclear missile system, but it should be less powerful and cost less than replacing Trident Britain should give up nuclear weapons completely Don’t know

26

25

31

38

39

38

35

31

29

28

27

26

24

25

24

19

19

18

14

18

16

15

15

18

Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/. Note: Percentages sum down the columns.

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  195 of nuclear weapons. Over time, none of these options has ever commanded majority support amongst the British public. However, there has been a discernible trend towards a hardening of support for Trident renewal on a like-for-like basis. Between January 2013 and March 2015, a plurality favoured retaining a nuclear missile system with reduced capability in two of the three polls and preferred a like-for-like replacement in the other. However, polls conducted between April 2015 and April 2017 show a consistent plurality of around two-fifths backing this view, somewhat over a quarter favouring replacement on a reduced scale and nearly a fifth supporting disarmament. More broadly, support for some form of Trident replacement has been the view of a clear majority of the British public in recent years (ranging from 56% to 66%), based on this question, with around a fifth or a quarter favouring Britain getting rid of its nuclear weapons; the proportion that was unsure ranged from 14% to 18%. The levels of support for disarmament are broadly similar to those seen in the survey data from earlier decades discussed already. YouGov has also asked other questions on the Trident issue or on Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons in general. In April 2013, opinion was almost evenly divided between the UK ordering four new submarines to maintain the nuclear weapons system (32%) and obtaining a less expensive system of nuclear weapons (34%) (YouGov 2013b), so around two-third backed the retention of nuclear weapons in some form. One fifth adopted a position favouring disarmament (20%), with 14% unsure (YouGov 2013b). The same poll found that, when asked to choose between retaining the current system or foregoing nuclear weapons altogether in a scenario where the government had decided no cheaper alternative was feasible, 56% supported Britain ordering four new submarines and 29% backed the country giving up nuclear weapons (YouGov 2013b). In April 2015, with a question focussing on number of submarines needed for the Trident system in the context of their cost, the plurality supported it being replaced like-withlike with four submarines (49%), 19% backed renewal with fewer submarines and 17% were clearly against Britain having or replacing Trident (YouGov 2015e). In July 2016, 52% of the public supported Britain having nuclear weapons in principle, with 30% against and 19% unsure (YouGov 2016b). That same month a plurality backed the replacement of Trident with a similar weapons system based on submarines (44%); 10% favoured replacing the submarines but without them being armed with nuclear missiles; and 22% supported the abandonment of the missiles and the submarines (YouGov 2016c). Demographic groups Table 6.18 reports the results from the same set of YouGov polls undertaken between 2013 and 2017, showing the distribution of opinion across demographic groups (based on sex, age group and social grade). It is evident

Table 6.18  P ublic opinion towards the renewal of Trident by demographic group, 2013–17 Date July 2013

Response option

Britain should replace Trident with an equally powerful nuclear missile system Britain should retain a nuclear missile system, but it should be less powerful and cost less than replacing Trident Britain should give up nuclear weapons completely January Don’t know Britain should 2015 replace Trident with an equally powerful nuclear missile system Britain should retain a nuclear missile system, but it should be less powerful and cost less than replacing Trident

Male (%)

Female (%)

18–24 (%)

25–39 (%)

40–59 (%)

60+ (%)

ABC1 (%)

C2DE (%)

Con (%)

Lab (%)

Lib Dem (%)

UKIP (%)

28

24

21

23

29

29

27

25

37

21

23

37

40

31

32

34

36

38

36

35

37

37

34

40

21

27

28

18

25

27

26

21

15

29

33

18

11 31

18 19

19 20

25 25

11 24

6 29

11 26

18 24

10 39

13 23

10 5

5 40

32

31

29

29

31

35

34

28

38

33

35

31

March 2015

April 2015

Britain should give up nuclear weapons completely Don’t know Britain should replace Trident with an equally powerful nuclear missile system Britain should retain a nuclear missile system, but it should be less powerful and cost less than replacing Trident Britain should give up nuclear weapons completely Don’t know Britain should replace Trident with an equally powerful nuclear missile system Britain should retain a nuclear missile system, but it should be less powerful and cost less than replacing Trident Britain should give up nuclear weapons completely Don’t know

26

25

27

24

29

22

26

24

10

29

50

15

11 37

25 25

23 24

22 29

16 32

15 35

14 32

24 30

13 46

15 24

15 20

15 49

30

28

23

22

30

36

31

27

34

29

42

28

26

22

30

27

24

19

26

22

12

30

35

15

7 46

24 29

23 19

21 35

15 38

10 47

12 38

22 37

8 58

16 29

4 23

8 58

28

29

29

23

30

31

29

28

27

34

40

25

18

20

22

19

20

17

21

16

6

22

22

9

8

22

30

22

13

6

12

19

8

14

15

8 (Continued)

Date

Response option

Male (%)

Female (%)

18–24 (%)

25–39 (%)

40–59 (%)

60+ (%)

ABC1 (%)

C2DE (%)

Con (%)

Lab (%)

Lib Dem (%)

UKIP (%)

April 2017

Britain should replace Trident with an equally powerful nuclear missile system Britain should retain a nuclear missile system, but it should be less powerful and cost less than replacing Trident Britain should give up nuclear weapons completely Don’t know

48

29

31

35

44

43

36

41

61

20

30

67

25

27

22

24

28

29

28

23

24

31

44

18

19

18

23

21

15

13

19

17

5

33

21

11

8

27

23

20

14

15

16

20

9

16

6

4

Source: Compiled from the YouGov polling archive: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/. Note: Percentages sum down the columns per survey date.

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  199 that men are generally more in favour than women of a like-for-like Trident renewal and – more broadly – stronger majorities of men have favoured retention in some form. However, there has been no clear pattern of women being more likely to support disarmament; they have been more likely to be unsure on the issue. The older age groups show some evidence of a greater willingness to support a like-for-like replacement for Trident. Younger age groups have been more unsure of their opinion on the issue. There have not been pronounced differences of view based on social grade – ­comparing those in the ABC1 and C2DE groups – although the latter have been more likely to be unsure of their view. Party supporters In general, there is a distinct patterning to the views of party supporters on the Trident debate, with relevant data from the YouGov polls also reported in Table 6.18. Most obviously, support for like-for-like renewal was generally considerably higher amongst Conservative supporters and UKIP supporters; and amounted to a majority viewpoint in the most recent polls. More broadly, very large majorities of Conservative and UKIP supporters have backed replacement in some form and there has been relatively little backing for disarmament. Support for disarmament has been higher on the part of Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters, for the former clearly in keeping with the historical data, albeit it has nearly always been a minority view in recent years. But majorities of these groups have usually backed renewal in some form and so endorsed Britain’s continued possession of a nuclear deterrent. A profile of contemporary public opinion To profile contemporary opinion in greater depth and across a wider range of sociopolitical groups, data from the BES 2014–18 Internet Panel Study – specifically a cross-sectional analysis of Wave 12, with fieldwork undertaken from May to June 2017 – can be used to focus on the public’s views on the renewal of Trident debate. The question asked was as follows: ‘How much do you agree or disagree with the following: Britain should keep its submarines with nuclear weapons?’ The same question was also asked on Waves 4 (March 2015) and 7 (April–May 2015) and the overall distributions of opinion are very similar. In each of the three waves, nearly a fifth disagreed with retaining nuclear-armed submarines, well over half held the opposite view, with around a quarter taking a neutral stance or not sure. Table 6.19 shows the distribution of opinion on this question across social and political groups, based on Wave 12, with ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ responses combined and ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ responses also combined. Men were more likely than women to agree that Britain should retain ­nuclear-armed submarines (63% versus 51%), although levels of disagreement

200  Defence spending and nuclear weapons Table 6.19  P ublic opinion towards Britain keeping submarines with nuclear weapons by demographic group

Sex Age group

Education

Party support

Ideology

 

Strongly agree or agree (%)

Neither (%)

Disagree Don’t or strongly know disagree (%) (%)

Male Female Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ Degree level or higher Other qualification None Con Lab Lib Dem UKIP Other party None Left Centre Right

63 51 38 52 64 72 53

13 18 19 17 14 12 16

18 16 23 17 15 12 22

6 16 20 14 7 5 9

59 62 82 45 52 77 25 51 30 64 82

16 15 9 20 17 11 15 18 19 16 9

14 10 5 25 23 7 53 15 43 14 5

12 13 5 10 8 5 7 16 8 6 4

Source: Analysis of BES 2014–18 Internet Panel Study, Wave 12 (May–June 2017). Note: Percentages sum across the rows. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib Dem, Liberal Democrats.

were similar – women were more likely to be unsure and to hold a neutral viewpoint. Analysing the British public’s views on nuclear weapons in the early-1980s, Crewe concluded that there was no ‘generation gap’ on this ­issue. In the contemporary debate over Trident renewal, there is a clear age-related pattern in levels of agreement, with older people much more likely to back the retention of nuclear-armed submarines. In fact, those aged 65 and over were nearly twice as likely to agree as those aged 18–29 years old (72% compared to 38%). Disagreement amounted to 23% of the latter group compared to 12% of the former group. Amongst those aged 45–64, 64% agreed, followed by 52% of those aged 30–44. Neutral views varied less across age groups; although younger people were more likely to be unsure. In fact, amongst those aged 18–29 and 30–44, the proportions unsure nearly equalled the proportions that disagreed with the retention of Trident. Based on educational qualifications, agreement was lowest (53%) and disagreement highest (22%) amongst those with a degree-level qualification. Support for retaining nuclear-armed submarines was highest amongst those living in England (60%), followed by those in Wales (55%) and amounted to less than a majority of those resident in Scotland (44%). Opposition in

Defence spending and nuclear weapons  201 Scotland was around double that that in England and Wales. Views on ­ uclear-armed submarines varied considerably based on party support and n left-right ideology – in a context in which, since 2015, Jeremy Corbyn has pursued a more leftwards agenda for Labour Party policy and with himself being a longstanding opponent of nuclear weapons. Agreement was very high amongst Conservative and UKIP supporters, at 82% and 77% and much lower amongst Labour, Liberal Democrats and those with no affiliation, ranging between 45% and 52%. However, only a quarter of other party supporters – including the SNP, Plaid and the Greens – backed the retention of nuclear-armed submarines. A majority of other party supporters opposed retention (53%), more than double the proportion amongst Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters. Support for keeping nuclear-armed submarines was the view of a very large majority of those who were on the ideological right (82%), followed by a clear majority of centrists (64%). In stark contrast, only 30% of those on the ideological left backed their retention, while the plurality of this group expressed the opposing viewpoint (43%). Just 5% and 14%, respectively, of those in the centre and on the right were against retaining nuclear-armed submarines. Some of the features of contemporary public opinion on the nuclear weapons debate have similarities with earlier research on this issue. Assessing group-related attitudes in earlier decades, Berrington showed that women were more likely than men to be against nuclear weapons, older people were more supportive than younger people and Conservative supporters were more favourable towards the possession of nuclear weapons (1989). These group-­related differences are clearly evident in the debate over the renewal of Trident.

Conclusion This chapter has provided a detailed assessment of the British public’s views towards two areas of a country’s hard power capabilities: spending on defence and the possession of nuclear weapon. As Bartels (1994) observes, defence spending – and, it could argued, nuclear weapons, for the small subset of countries possessing such a capability – together represent a key area of investigation when examining popular support for the cost of national defence. Some reasonably robust conclusions can be drawn regarding the patterning of public opinion and of the views of societal groups, towards defence spending and nuclear weapons Over time, the British public has tended to side with ‘butter’ – most obviously, in relation to health and education – over ‘guns’ when required to trade-off and prioritise spending on domestic or external issues. When considered on their own merits, support for increased spending has also tended to be higher for key public services, though defence has been ranked higher than some areas of domestic policy. The longitudinal data also show that preferences on defence spending are, to some extent, responsive to the wider political, economic

202  Defence spending and nuclear weapons and international climate. It should be noted that, at the aggregate level, time-series analysis has shown only a weak basis for the ‘guns versus butter’ debate in Britain when separate analyses were undertaken of the interdependency between, first, preferences on domestic and defence spending and, second, actual government spending on defence and domestic policy (Soroka and Wlezien 2005: 683). Over time, there has been a recurring difference in the preferences of party supporters towards defence spending, with Conservatives more likely than other partisan groups to approve of increased spending on Britain’s defences and more likely to disapprove of reductions. In terms of contemporary opinion, there are clear social and political correlates of opposing positions on this issue. In particular, Conservative opposition to reduced defence spending is supplemented by UKIP supporters and those not on the ideological left. In their views on nuclear weapons, the British public has tended, on the whole, to support Britain’s possession of them, both during and after the Cold War. Recent data on the Trident debate tend to support Berrington’s (1989) earlier characterisation of the British public as a ‘conservative electorate’ on this issue – tending to opt for the status quo, resistant to major changes in nuclear defence, including the country giving up the weapons it possesses or acquiring new types of weapons. Support for unilateralism, or for a unilateral approach to international disarmament, has generally been espoused by only a small section of the adult population. Across time, there have been enduring party-political differences on the subject, with Conservative supporters tending to be more supportive of Britain’s nuclear arsenal and thus holding more ‘hawkish views’. Labour supporters have traditionally been less inclined to favour Britain having nuclear weapons and have been a section of society where unilateralist sentiment has been more popular. Party-political differences at the grassroots level have also been evident on the Trident debate, where public opinion has tended to support – in some form – the retention of Britain’s nuclear defence system. Conservative and UKIP supporters, along with those on the right ideologically, have adopted a more ‘hawkish’ stance in their strong support for a like-for-like replacement. Supporters of the left-leaning parties and those on the ideological left have been more ‘dovish’, being more likely to oppose a like-for-like renewal and more supportive of a scaled-back and less costly replacement or even full abolition of a Britain’s nuclear weapons capability.

7 Military intervention

This chapter provides a detailed examination of public opinion in Britain towards the overseas military interventions its armed forces have participated in the post-9/11 era. It follows on from the previous chapter’s focus on the public’s views towards two important areas of a state’s ‘hard power’ projection: defence expenditure and the possession of nuclear weapons. This chapter focusses on the actual projection abroad of the country’s hard power capabilities – specifically, the public’s approval or disapproval of Britain’s conventional forces’ involvement in recent military interventions of varying duration, extent and, of course, significance and controversy for domestic politics. There has been a burgeoning strand of research, post-9/11, into the nature, structure and antecedents of the British public’s contemporary views on the use of military force, both in the abstract and in relation to specific cases (Lai and Reiter 2005; Clements 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b; Johns and Davies 2012, 2014, 2017; Reifler et al. 2014; Davies and Johns 2016; Kriner and Wilson 2016). This chapter provides a historical analysis of the British public’s views on overseas military conflicts, assessing, in turn, opinion towards Britain’s role in the long-running military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2011 Libyan intervention and the ongoing action against ISIS in the Middle East. In so doing, it builds on detailed studies of British public opinion towards military interventions in the 1980s and 1990s (Wybrow 1991, 2003; Rallings et al. 1992). It aims to identify noteworthy, recurring patterns within the rich set of data used here, as well as features which are more specific to particular conflicts. As with previous chapters, it encompasses analysis of the overall state of public opinion towards each case of overseas intervention, as well as examining the socio-demographic basis of opinion, paying close attention to evidence of a ‘gender gap’ in opinion and to the views of party supporters. The former is particularly germane given the well-established nature of this connection in public opinion across democracies (Eichenberg 2016c; 2017). The latter focus is important given the role of partisan loyalties in particular and political predispositions more broadly in informing the views of citizens on issues of war and peace (Holsti 2004). Party affiliation has been shown to be a ‘highly accessible’ heuristic for citizens’ view on

204  Military intervention policy issues (Baum and Nau 2009: 9). More broadly, examining the views of party supporters over time is instructive given that, on matters of military action abroad, ‘the Conservative Party has usually adopted a relatively united policy on force, while normally Labour has displayed considerable ambivalence and divisions on the issue’ (Keohane 2003: 29). This chapter is structured as follows. It first provides an overview of the key features of recent cases of military interventions involving British forces. Second, it provides a detailed assessment, in turn, of the views of the British public towards the military interventions in the post-9/11 era, looking in turn at Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and action against ISIS in the Middle East. Third, the chapter concludes with a summary of the noteworthy findings across these cases.

Britain and overseas military intervention Britain has undertaken a range of missions in the post-Cold War period. Under John Major’s government of 1990–97, these were the Gulf conflict (or the first Gulf War) of 1990–91 and enforcement of a no-fly zone over Iraq from 1991 onwards, a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, and then stabilisation operations from 1995 onwards. During Tony Blair’s time in office, between 1997 and 2007, the armed forces were involved in operations in Bosnia and Kosovo (1999), Sierra Leone (2000) and deployed for long periods in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the international response to terrorism post-9/11, the latter missions continuing under Gordon Brown’s premiership from 2007 onwards. Indeed, as Sanders and Houghton observe, the period between 1997 and 2010 is ‘the most intense period of military activism Britain has known since World War II’ (2016: 247). During David Cameron’s prime ministerial tenure from 2010 to 2016, along with its continuing mission in Afghanistan, British forces contributed to a multilateral intervention in Libya in 2011 under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government. In 2014 British forces joined efforts to combat ISIS in Iraq and, under a Conservative government, in late 2015, did the same in Syria (coming after a parliamentary vote on the latter issue in 2013 scotched any potential involvement of British forces), a mission which has continued under Theresa May’s premiership since summer 2016. The UK’s aim, in the post-war era, to keep ‘punching above its weight’ – a phrase coined by then Conservative foreign secretary Douglas Hurd in 1993 – and its willingness play an active role in international affairs has thus undergirded its involvement in multilateral military interventions in different regions of the world, particularly in the post-Cold War era: Post 1991, this has manifested itself in an attempt to retain full-spectrum military capabilities – the ability to fight at all levels of intensity, against a range of foes, with top-tier technology and training – linked closely to extensive diplomatic influence and developmental aid and expertise.

Military intervention  205 Underlying these capabilities has also been a heightened sense of responsibility: the willingness to play an active role in international affairs beyond a narrow definition of ‘the national interest’ (Johnson 2014: 2–3) Across the different instances of military intervention in the post-war era, points of debate between and within parties have included whether force should be used at all, whether there is international authority to facilitate military action, and the timing of military operations and their scope (­Keohane 2003: 38). While these instances of military intervention and the wider political context prevailing at the time have differed in particular respects, they can be categorised into three broad types: ‘force-for-good’ operations, ‘force-for-order’ operations and ‘force-for-change’ operations (Chalmers 2014: 90–93). Of the four cases of military intervention in the post9/11 era examined in depth here and considered within the timespan covered by Chalmers (2014), Libya is categorised as a ‘force-for-good’ operation, ‘launched in direct response to new or imminently anticipated atrocities’ (Chalmers 2014: 91). Iraq is considered to be a ‘force-for-change’ operation, in which category operations not are ‘responses to specific triggering events’ but instead are initiated as ‘preventative interventions’ (Chalmers 2014: 92). Britain’s protracted involvement in Afghanistan has comprised two of these operational types: ‘force-for-order’, between 2001 and 2006, a mission ‘launched with broad international support in response to new and substantial threats to international order’ (Chalmers 2014: 92) and, between 2006 and 2014, ‘force-for-change’ in order to try and effect ‘a process of transformation’ from a failed state to a modern and functioning one, which would help to prevent new threats to the international order from arising there (Chalmers 2014: 92). In terms of the broad outcome of these missions, the initial ‘force-for-order’ mission in Afghanistan was rated as a ‘strategic success’, while the subsequent ‘force-for-change’ mission in Afghanistan and its counterpart in Iraq were evaluated to be ‘strategic failures’ (Chalmers 2014: 90–93). It was too early to provide a full assessment of the outcome of the Libya intervention (Chalmers 2014: 90–93).

The (second) Iraq War Britain’s involvement in the Iraq invasion against the regime of Saddam Hussein was deeply controversial within domestic politics, both before and after the invasion in 2003. It commanded much less party-political and public support than the initial military action taken against Afghanistan post9/11. In contrast to the first Gulf War – where military action was launched to respond to a clear-cut act of aggression of the Iraqi regime in invading Kuwait, with the multilateral action having clear United Nations (UN) backing and the support of many countries in the region and more widely – the aims and legitimacy of the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of

206  Military intervention the country were bitterly contested. It caused political and diplomatic rifts within North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) – supposedly juxtaposing the countries of ‘old’ and ‘new Europe, in Donald Rumsfeld’s (in)famous distinction – and adversely affected broader transatlantic relations. On the home front, it was arguably the most divisive foreign policy issue since the Suez invasion of 1956. Indeed, there are some instructive parallels between the two cases: first, Nassar and Saddam Hussein were framed by Eden and Blair, respectively, as existential threats to British national security; second, the decision-making process leading up to military intervention relied on an inner circle of key figures, with cabinet having a much reduced role – the military timetable predominated over the diplomatic one; third, on the international stage, issues of legality and the role of the UN were crucial, with both leaders failing in this respect; and fourth, both cases engendered significant public opposition (Ashton 2016). Of course, there are also key areas of divergence between the two episodes, most notably the strikingly contrasting – but key – role played by the US, the diverging impact on prime ministerial tenure (Blair remaining in office until mid-2007) and the lack of an official post-mortem on how and why Suez happened and the lessons to be learned (Ashton 2016). British military action against Iraq – led by the US – had been authorised by a motion passed in Parliament in March 2003 – overall, 412 Members of Parliament (MPs) had voted in favour and 149 against. Those opposed included 139 Labour MPs, amounting to ‘the largest revolt against any government by its own backbenchers since the mid-nineteenth century’; even so, a narrow majority of Labour MPs supported the government (Quinn 2006: 4). This stark division amongst Labour MPs over the merits of taking military action against Iraq illustrates the differing interpretations of the party’s internationalist principles that could be brought to bear (Vickers 2011: 217). As Vickers has noted, ‘Internationalism is an impulse that can be used to prescribe non-intervention in the pursuit of peace, or intervention for military or humanitarian means’ (2011: 217). The anti-war position of some ­Labour Party MPs may have been underpinned by one of the key principles of Labour’s internationalist tradition, that of anti-militarism, which entails a suspicion of the use of force as a policy instrument (Vickers 2011: 21). For Blair, however, taking military action against the Iraqi regime was the internationalist course of action, and those opposed in his party were beholden to a narrow, isolationist view of the world; moreover, Blair argued that anti-­ war MPs were motivated by opposition to Bush and by anti-­A merican sentiments (Vickers 2011: 193). With the Labour and Conservative leaderships both in favour of the intervention, a dynamic absent from the debate over the Suez invasion, the Liberal Democrats became ‘identified as the anti-war party’ (Russell 2005: 748). In essence, the Iraq War was ‘a classic, and highly contentious, position issue’ (Whiteley et al. 2005: 811). Outside the parliamentary arena, huge demonstrations against military action against Iraq had taken place

Military intervention  207 in London and in many other cities around the globe in the period leading up to the invasion. Indeed, the anti-Iraq War demonstration in London in February 2003 was claimed to be the ‘largest public rally in British history’ (Jeffery 2003). Invoking a much used historical parallel at the time, the Liberal Democrat leader, Charles Kennedy, declared at the rally, ‘This is the riskiest moment for Britain since Suez’ (Syalm et al. 2003). The ramifications of the invasion against Iraq in February 2003 were an enduring feature of British politics for the remainder of Blair’s time as prime minister and, indeed, beyond. As King observes, The invasion of Iraq was undoubtedly of major importance. Whatever its rights and wrongs as an act of public policy, the decision to go to war in Iraq did the government and the Labour Party no good at all in electoral terms. (2006: 154) The war had a significant detrimental impact on Blair and his government. First, it generated serious splits within the parliamentary Labour Party and within the wider movement in the country (King 2006: 154–55). Second, as discussed already in Chapter 2, there was the adverse electoral impact for the incumbent government at the 2005 election, a contest that ‘was unusually influenced by foreign policy’ (Cameron 2005: 261). Many did not see this as a ‘just war’, as had been the case for some earlier cases of British military action overseas (cf. Worcester 1991) and the prime minister’s credibility and the government’s reputation suffered accordingly. Public perceptions of Blair’s handling of the Iraq issue clearly worsened over time. Ipsos MORI polling conducted between 2002 and 2007 showed the net approval rating (computed by subtracting the proportion who disapproved from the proportion who approved) was lowest at −9 in September 2002 and highest at −60 in May 2007; it was firmly in negative territory in every survey conducted in that period (Ipsos MORI 2007a). YouGov polling on the public’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with Blair as prime minister shows that, for the period from February 2003 through January 2007, on each occasion a majority were dissatisfied (YouGov 2005a, 2007b). Evaluations of Blair also declined between the 2001 and 2005 British Election Study (BES) surveys. In 2001, when asked to rate their like or dislike for Blair on a 0–10 scale (with 0 representing strongly dislike and 10 representing strongly like), the mean score was 5.6, which had fallen to 4.7 in 2005. Indeed, perceptions of Blair’s legacy as leader of the country for a decade were arguably inextricably linked with views on the rights and wrongs of the initial invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation, as well as – to a lesser extent – with Blair’s close and steadfast partnership with George Bush post-9/11. When asked in a poll conducted for The Observer in April 2007, after a decade as prime minister, what had been Blair’s biggest failure as prime minister, 58% cited Iraq, followed by the widening gap between rich

208  Military intervention and poor cited by just 10% (Sanders and Whiteley 2007). When asked about his greatest success, the Iraq War was selected by just 1% (with the same proportion opting for the intervention in Kosovo). The same poll found that 64% said Britain’s international reputation had deteriorated compared to a decade before, 69% thought that Britain had been too close to the US during Blair’s premiership, 68% thought Blair had (probably or definitely) not done the right thing by supporting the war in Iraq and, finally, 60% thought he was simply following the US’s lead in relation to the war in Iraq, compared to 30% saying he genuinely supported the war (Sanders and Whiteley 2007). YouGov polls conducted in 2007 and August to September 2010 found that participating in the US-led invasion of Iraq was ranked second on both occasions in a list of major failings of Blair’s time in office (with respondents asked to select three) (YouGov 2007b). In the 2010 poll, allowing British foreign policy to be in effect dictated by the US ranked as the third-most serious failure. Getting rid of Saddam Hussain’s regime ranked notably lower in the equivalent list of successes (YouGov 2010a). As Holsti has noted in relation to the US and more widely (2011: 1), a considerable number of polls were commissioned to gauge the British public’s views on the Iraq War – in the run-up, as the military campaign played out and then during the longer post-war occupation. This volume of data allows for an assessment of the main changes in public attitudes over time, as well as a more finely grained examination of which sections of society were more or less supportive on this politically divisive issue. YouGov polling data covering the period between 2003 and 2015 enables tracking the proportions who thought the war in Iraq was right or wrong (see Figure 7.1). The

70 60 50 %

40 30 20 10 0

Right

Wrong

Don't know

Figure 7.1  P ublic opinion towards military action against Iraq, 2003–15. Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/.

Military intervention  209 question asked was ‘Do you think the United States and Britain are / were right or wrong to take military action against Iraq?’ In the early stages of the invasion and during the first part of the country’s occupation, support for the war and British military involvement generally outweighed opposition. However, from spring 2004 onwards, there was a steady decline in support in the YouGov data and greater opposition came to characterise the stance of the British public. From May 2004 until June 2015, when the last polling was undertaken, opposition outranked support, often by large margins. Polling undertaken by Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP) in the first few years of the Iraq invasion and occupation found a clear increase in the proportion of the British public thinking it was wrong to go to war. In spring 2002, a Pew GAP survey showed the British public broadly split for (46%) and against (43%) the US and its allies taking military action against Iraq. Similarly, in autumn 2002, 47% of the public supported and 47% opposed Britain taking part in military action with its allies against Saddam Hussein’s regime. In spring 2003, views had shifted, though, with 39% in favour and 51% against. From 2003 to 2005, the proportion saying it was the right decision declined from 61% to 39%; in the same period, the proportion thinking it was the wrong decision increased from 34% to 53%. In spring 2007, 50% of the British public said that the US should remove its troops from Iraq as soon as possible; in contrast, 38% thought they should stay until the situation was more stable. Later, during Barack Obama’s tenure as US president, 85% of the British public approved in 2009 of his decision to withdraw US combat forces from Iraq by the end of 2011; just 8% disapproved. Polling from spring 2002 tended to show the British public sided against US military action against Iraq and British involvement: 51% disapproved in a March ICM Research survey (The Guardian 2002); 47%, a plurality, said the US should not take action in a Gallup poll conducted in March to April (Gallup 2002); and, in the same poll, 51% opposed British military support (Gallup 2002). An Ipsos MORI poll from March 2002 showed that 52% said it would be wrong for the US to step up military action against Iraq, with 35% in favour; further, 56% thought the British government would be mistaken to join America in any such action, with 34% in favour of joint action; and 40% adjudged the British government too supportive of the US, outweighed by the 52% saying it had gotten things about right (Ipsos MORI 2002a). Ipsos MORI data from the pre-invasion period show strong support amongst the British public for military action with UN approval – as had been the case for the multinational action taken against Iraq in 1991 – based on polls undertaken in September 2002 and January 2003 (Ipsos MORI 2007a). However, when asked in the same polls about action being taken without equivalent UN backing, the reverse was the case, with strong opposition to military action (Ipsos MORI 2007a). Two subsequent polls undertaken in February to March 2003 found that, when asked about their support for action in different circumstances, large majorities supported action if UN

210  Military intervention weapons inspectors found proof of Iraqi obstruction and the UN Security Council voted for military action; that opinion was more evenly divided if the first condition was met and the second was not or if the scenario was reversed; and strong majorities opposed military action if neither of these stipulations was met (­Ipsos MORI 2007). An Ipsos MORI poll undertaken in late March 2003, when military operations had been launched, found 56% in support of the action and 38% against (Ipsos MORI 2003). A broadly similar result was obtained in a July 2003 poll, with 50% supporting the action taken against Iraq and 41% against (Ipsos MORI 2003a). Pre- and post-invasion, then, the British public were clearly divided in their stance on the military invasion of Iraq, and the prevailing view on the merits of military action shifted over time. The strong and consistent public consensus over British involvement in the initial invasion of Afghanistan was notably absent from the domestic debate over Iraq. Additional opinion polling conducted before the invasion of Iraq and during the subsequent mission shows that there was clear fluctuation in public support. The overall proportions in favour or against military action are reported in Table 7.1, based on responses to the following questions asked by Populus and ICM Research: Populus: Thinking about the build-up to the war in Iraq and everything that has happened since, was taking military action the right thing to do, or the wrong thing to do? ICM Research: Do you approve or disapprove of a (the) military attack on Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein? From what you have seen or heard, do you think the war against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein was justified or unjustified? Table 7.1  P  ublic opinion towards the Iraq War, 2003–06 Date fieldwork ended

Right thing (%)

Wrong thing (%)

April 12, 2003 June 11, 2003 June 06, 2003 August 03, 2003 September 06, 2003 October 07, 2003 January 28, 2004 February 08, 2004 March 07, 2004 July 04, 2004 September 05, 2004 October 02, 2004 November 01, 2004 January 09, 2005 February 06, 2005 September 04, 2005 February 05, 2006

64 58 47 51 47 41 43 41 42 38 34 33 31 23 32 30 24

24 34 45 41 43 51 45 49 50 52 56 53 57 53 51 55 64

Military intervention  211 Date fieldwork ended

Approve/Justified (%)

Disapprove/Unjustified (%)

August 25, 2002 September 15, 2002 September 22, 2002 September 29, 2002 October 06, 2002 October 14, 2002 October 20, 2002 October 27, 2002 November 03, 2002 November 22, 2002 December 15, 2002 January 19, 2003 February 16, 2003 March 16, 2003 March 30, 2003 April 06, 2003 April 13, 2003 June 22, 2003 July 20, 2003 September 21, 2003 November 16, 2003 January 18, 2004 January 28, 2004 February 22, 2004 March 11, 2004 March 11, 2004 April 18, 2004 May 23, 2004 May 30, 2004 July 18, 2004 September 19, 2004 October 24, 2004 January 23, 2005 July 23, 2006

36 36 37 33 32 42 35 38 32 39 36 30 29 38 52 56 63 48 51 38 47 53 47 53 46 48 41 44 33 38 40 43 38 36

51 40 46 44 41 37 40 40 41 40 44 47 52 44 34 29 23 40 42 53 41 41 46 41 42 43 48 43 55 56 45 46 47 51

Source: Compiled from UK Polling Report website: http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/iraq.

The time-series data from the Populus polls – all undertaken during the post-invasion period – illustrate well the declining levels of support for military action amongst the public. During 2003, every poll except one – the final one conducted that year – showed that the balance of opinion thought that undertaking military action was the right thing to have done; however, in every poll from 2004 through 2006, the reverse is the case, with pluralities and then majorities saying it was the wrong thing to have done. The ICM polls were undertaken both pre-invasion and post-invasion. Those conducted in the second half of 2002 and in early 2003 (up to mid-March and just before military action began) showed that in every poll except one the balance of opinion disapproved of military action against Iraq. However, from late

212  Military intervention March 2003 until July 2003, majorities expressed approval – perhaps in part accounted for by a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect as British troops went into combat and as the initial military operations were prosecuted effectively. Moreover, even though some polls showed a more evenly divided public mood on the issue, through May 2004, the balance of opinion usually tended to express approval – thinking that the invasion was justified. From the end of May 2004 onwards, though, opinion shifted, with the most common response being that of thinking that military action had not been justified. Polling also focussed on the British public’s view on retention of troops in Iraq. Between 2004 and 2006, several polls asked whether British troops should remain in Iraq or be withdrawn. Those conducted in 2005 and 2006 registered large majorities in favour of British forces being withdrawn as soon as possible; in 2004, however, public opinion was more evenly split on this issue, albeit most polls showed a plurality or small majority supporting withdrawal (UK Polling Report n/d). Another set of time-series data bearing on views on the Iraq War comes from the academically led BES Continuous Monitoring Survey (CMS) for the period 2004–10. The CMS posed the following question: ‘Please tell me whether you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of Britain’s involvement in Iraq’. The overall picture for public opinion is shown in Figure 7.2, combining the proportions for ‘strongly approve’ and ‘approve’ and those for ‘disapprove’ and ‘strongly disapprove’. Consistently, public disapproval is higher than the level of approval and the gap widened over time. In every single survey, in fact, a majority disapproved, with the size of the majorities increasing over time (in the region of three-fifths to seven-in-ten in the later

80 70 60 50 % 40 30 20

Approve

Don't know

Figure 7.2  P ublic opinion towards the war in Iraq, 2004–10. Source: Analysis of CMS.

Jan-10

Jul-09

Oct-09

Jan-09

Apr-09

Oct-08

Jul-08

Jan-08

Apr-08

Jul-07

Disapprove

Oct-07

Jan-07

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10

Military intervention  213 surveys). Another question featuring in the CMS asked whether British participation in Iraq increased the risk of terrorism. Between July 2005 and April 2007, very large majorities of the public said that it made terrorism a little or a lot more likely (with the combined proportions ranging between 76% and 83%). That it had made no difference was always the view of a minority, with very few prepared to say that it had – to some extent – made terrorism less likely. The political divisions engendered by the invasion of Iraq, within and beyond the parliamentary arena, have been discussed already. The next task is to examine the survey data in more depth to ascertain which groups in wider society were more supportive of – or opposed to – the Iraq War. Earlier research has demonstrated that a ‘gender gap’ was evident in the B ­ ritish public’s views on military conflict in earlier decades. Based on opinion polling undertaken between 1955 and 1966, asking about approval for the potential use of force in different scenarios, there was a gap of 8 percentage points between the average levels of approval expressed by men (47%) and women (39%) (Brandes 1994: 107). Research into British public opinion towards the first Gulf War found that, based on six waves from a panel survey undertaken during the duration of the conflict, between January and March 1991, clear majorities of men and women backed military action. Men were consistently if narrowly more supportive than women of the allied military action. They were also more likely to think that the mission justified the loss of British service personnel, with the ‘gender gap’ larger for this second question (Rallings et al. 1992: 380–81). The differences between men and women in their respective levels of support for military action and thinking the liberation of Kuwait justified the loss of service personnel – averaged across the panel waves – were of a greater magnitude than those seen for age (comparing the 18–34 and 55 and over groups) and social grade (comparing the AB and DE categories) (Rallings et al. 1992: 380–81). We can also examine men’s and women’s view towards the war in Iraq using the BES CMS, shown in Figure 7.3. Over time, between 2004 and 2010, there was a consistent differential in the opinions of men and women, with the former always more likely to have approved of the Iraq War. Approval clearly declined over time, though, amongst both men and women. More evidence on the views of men and women, from the Pew GAP surveys and based on questions asked before and after the onset of military action against Iraq in March 2003, is presented in Table 7.2. The question wordings were as follows: Spring 2002: ‘Would you favor or oppose the US and its allies taking military action in Iraq to end Saddam Hussein’s rule as part of the war on terrorism?’ Autumn 2002 and March 2003: ‘Thinking about possible war with Iraq, would you favor or oppose (survey country’s) joining the US and other allies in military action in Iraq to end Saddam Hussein’s rule?’

214  Military intervention 60 50 40 % 30 20 10 0 Apr-04 Oct-04 Apr-05 Oct-05 Apr-06 Oct-06 Apr-07 Oct-07 Apr-08 Oct-08 Apr-09 Oct-09 Men

Women

Figure 7.3  Approval of the war in Iraq by sex, 2004–10. Source: Analysis of CMS.

Table 7.2  P  ublic opinion towards military action against Iraq by sex, 2002–05

Men

Support/right Oppose/ wrong Don’t know Women Support/right Oppose/ wrong Don’t know

Spring 2002

Autumn Spring 2002 2003

May 2003

Spring 2004

Spring 2005

47 46

55 41

49 44

65 31

45 49

47 49

7 45 40

4 41 53

7 31 59

4 58 36

7 42 46

4 32 58

15

6

10

6

13

10

Note: Percentages sum down the columns for men and women.

May 2003, Spring 2004 and Spring 2005: ‘On the subject of Iraq, did (survey country) make the right decision or the wrong decision to use military force against Iraq?’ Spring 2007: ‘Do you think the US should keep military troops in Iraq until the situation has stabilized, or do you think the US should remove its troops as soon as possible?’ Where there is marked variation in opinion, it was men who generally adopted more hawkish stances on the issue. When asked about the prospect of military action in the spring and autumn of 2002, the pattern of opinion was broadly similar in the former period (47% of men and 45% of women favoured military action), but in the latter period men were more in favour of Britain

Military intervention  215 joining the US and other allies in acting against Saddam Hussein’s regime (55% supported this option compared to 41% of women). Two surveys in the first half of 2003 also showed that men were somewhat more supportive of the decision to go to war against Iraq. In March 2003, 49% of men thought the war was the right course of action, compared to 31% of women. In May 2003, men were more supportive of the decision to go to war, though preferences were closer: 65% of men and 58% of women. In spring 2004, support for the decision to go to war was supported by 45% of men and 42% of women, with similar levels saying it had been the wrong choice. In spring 2005, a clear gap was evident, with 47% of men saying it had been the right decision, compared to 32% of women. Another question, which featured in the 2007 survey, asked whether the US should keep its troops in Iraq until the situation had stabilised or should remove them. Men were more supportive than women of maintaining US military forces in Iraq (48% and 29%), although they were closer in the proportions favouring withdrawal (respectively, 47% and 54%). In partisan terms, Iraq was the most divisive foreign policy issue in British politics since the Suez invasion of 1956. Back then, the main parties were divided over the issue, and this was broadly reflected in the patterning of attitudes in the wider country. The Labour Party had been highly critical of the Conservative government’s conduct over the Suez invasion and ‘vehemently condemned the resort to force for a multiplicity of reasons’; the Liberal Party, after some internal debate, adopted a similar position (­Keohane 2003: 39). Indeed, in contrast to its growing internal fissures over nuclear disarmament, the Labour Party was much more united in its response to the Suez crisis (Vickers 2011: 52). Moderate differences of view between party supporters on the merits of taking military action were clearly evident in August and September 1956, and subsequently, a ‘high degree of party polarization of opinion’ emerged in November and December 1956 after the Conservative government had used force at the end of October (Epstein 1964: 146). The proportion of Conservative supporters favouring the use of military action against Nasser’s regime was consistently higher than – and widened considerably over time, as their doubts about military action ­dwindled – that registered by Labour, Liberal and uncommitted voters (­Epstein 1964: 146–47). In contrast to the strong backing Conservative voters gave to the invasion, following the leadership of Eden as prime minister, ‘pro-Suez sentiment remained in a decided minority amongst Labour voters’ (Epstein 1964: 149). Figure 7.4 shows the clear party-political patterning to views on Iraq. Over time and particularly in the earlier period, Labour supporters were much more likely to approve of the Iraq War compared to both Conservative and Liberal Democrat supporters. In turn, Conservatives were more likely to support the war than were Liberal Democrats, whose grassroots reflected their party’s strong opposition to British involvement in the invasion of Iraq. Indeed, the Liberal Democrats’ 2005 general election manifesto had noted that ‘the conduct of Britain’s foreign affairs, particularly in relation to Iraq, goes right to the heart of the Labour Government’s credibility’ (2005: 26). The BES 2005 showed that 50% of Labour supporters expressed approval of the war in Iraq,

216  Military intervention 80 70 60 50 % 40 30 20 10 0 Apr-04 Oct-04 Apr-05 Oct-05 Apr-06 Oct-06 Apr-07 Oct-07 Apr-08 Oct-08 Apr-09 Oct-09 Con

Lab

Lib Dem

Figure 7.4  A  pproval of the war in Iraq by party support, 2004–10. Source: Analysis of CMS.

falling to 30% of Conservative supporters – whose own party had clearly backed the ­invasion – and just 19% of those who supported the Liberal Democrats. The CMS data show that support for the Iraq War declined over time and the differences between party supporters, although they persisted, narrowed considerably. The partisan differences which were so obvious over the decision to go to war are also present in evaluations of the progress of the intervention in Iraq. Time-series data from the CMS, for the period April 2004 to December 2009, show how perceptions of the situation on the ground varied across supporters of Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives. Based on the following question, ‘Using a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a complete success, and 0 means a complete failure, how would you rate the war against Iraq?’, the monthly mean scores are charted in Figure 7.5, both overall and for party supporters. Overall, the public appraisal was clearly negative with the average score never going above 3.7 (scale midpoint: 5) and falling as low as 2.4. Averaged over the entire period, the mean scale score was 3.05. Looking at the broader trend, evaluations of the Iraq intervention worsened over time, registering the most negative appraisals in late 2006 and early 2007, and then improved somewhat in the latter stage of the period. The BES 2005 also confirms that the partisan groups differed in their evaluations of the war: based on an identical 0–10 scale, for Labour supporters the mean score was 4.1, falling to an average of 3.3 amongst Conservative supporters and declining further to 2.7 for those who supported the Liberal Democrats.

Military intervention  217 6 5 4 3 2 1

Overall

Con

Oct-09

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Lib Dem

Figure 7.5  E  valuations of the war in Iraq (mean scores), 2004–09. Source: Analysis of CMS.

In line with their differing levels of approval towards the Iraq War, women held consistently more pessimistic evaluations of the situation on the ground relative to men (not shown in Figure 7.5). Averaged across the monthly CMS surveys, the mean scale score for men was 3.26 and for women it was 2.85, so both well below the scale midpoint. Both men’s and women’s perceptions of the war’s progress deteriorated over time before improving in the later stages of the period. Large majorities of men and women held negative assessments of how Britain’s role in the war in Iraq would impact terrorism: over time, the proportions saying it would increase terrorism – either a little or a lot – ranged from 73% to 84% amongst men and 77%–85% amongst women. Of course, there is also considerable variation in the mean scale scores registered over time by party supporters. Labour supporters were consist­­ ently less pessimistic in their appraisals of the situation on the ground, with their average scale score being 4.19. Conservative supporters were positioned between these two groups, although closer to the Liberal Democrat supporters, with an average score of 2.84. Labour and Conservative supporters show worsening evaluations over time and then a similar improvement in appraisals subsequently. In their evaluations of the impact on terrorism of British involvement in the war in Iraq, strong majorities of all partisan groups thought that it had made terrorism a little or a lot more likely (as opposed to less likely to some extent), with the proportions ranging between 75% and 90% for Conservatives, 66% and 80% amongst Labour backers and 86% and 97% amongst Liberal Democrat supporters. Public opinion in America was also characterised by strong partisan divisions over the Iraq War – in fact, Holsti described the gap between Republicans and Democrats as a ‘chasm’ (with political independents tending to be

218  Military intervention situated in between these opposing camps) and found strong and consistent partisan differences in the areas of values, facts and prescriptions (2011: 86): Republicans were stronger supporters of using force against Iraq and the post-Saddam policies of the administration, they were much more likely to interpret events on the ground in an optimistic light, and they were also less likely to favour any of the various proposals for withdrawal of US forces. (2011: 93) As in the US then also in Britain, party-political differences and debate on the Iraq issue would have played some part in structuring and informing the opinions of grassroots supporters, with party leaders and other senior figures providing ‘cues’ on the positions for partisans to adopt. Similarly, the positions taken on either side of the issue by Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters would have, to some extent, influenced their evaluations of the war’s progress and how it was being handled by those running the country. How did views on the Iraq War vary across a wider set of socio-­demographic groups? Table 7.3 shows the proportions saying that it was right to take military action against Iraq between 2007 and 2013, based on sex, age group, social class and party support. There is a clear and consistent difference between men and women, with the former more likely to have approved of military action. There is no consistent difference based on social class (ABC1 and C2DE), while, across age groups, again there is no uniform pattern over time. Given the party-political controversy over the decision to go to war, there is a tendency for Liberal Democrat supporters to have been less supportive in the later polls; approval tended to be higher amongst Conservative and Labour supporters. United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) supporters do not show a consistent pattern in their views. Table 7.3  P  er cent saying the US and Britain were right to take military action against Iraq by demographic group, 2007–15

Men Women Aged 18–24 Aged 25–39 Aged 40–59 Aged 60+ ABC1 C2DE Con Lab Lib Dem UKIP

June 2007

March 2013

June 2014

June 2014

January June 2015 2015

36 25 27 34 – – – – 29 40 18 –

32 23 28 29 29 24 26 29 37 26 31 –

30 17 23 30 23 19 24 23 29 25 26 25

25 16 16 21 24 17 21 19 23 26 17 22

29 22 15 28 28 24 24 28 29 28 21 34

30 23 20 26 31 24 26 27 32 27 22 24

Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib Dem, Liberal Democrats.

Military intervention  219 To mark a decade passing since the start of hostilities against Iraq in 2003, some polls gauged the retrospective views of the British public on the decision to go to war and asked about its wider impact. An Ipsos MORI poll conducted in March 2013 found that 52% thought that the Iraq War had an adverse impact on Britain’s international reputation (just 9% said it had improved it and 28% said it made no difference), while 39% thought that it had made the world a more dangerous place (compared to 12% who said safer and 46% who said it had made no difference). In terms of whether it had improved life for those living in Iraq, 32% said it had made things better, 27% thought the opposite and 28% thought it had made no difference (Ipsos MORI 2013a). In terms of the decision to go to war, at the time, 39% said they had supported the invasion and 55% reported opposing it. The balance had clearly shifted, with 70% now opposed and 24% still thinking it was the right thing to do (Ipsos MORI 2013a). In the 2011 British Social Attitude (BSA) survey, 58% agreed that Britain had been wrong to go to war in Iraq, 24% disagreed and 16% neither agreed nor disagreed (Gribble et al. 2012: 145). A ComRes poll from March 2013 found that 58% adjudged Britain wrong to have taken part in action against Iraq, with just 20% holding the opposite view. Although pluralities concurred that Iraq benefitted overall from the removal of Saddam Hussein and that Britain should be proud of the role it played in this, majorities agreed his removal did not justify the deaths of British troops, that the war could not be justified on humanitarian grounds because of the civilian casualties it entailed, that the war increased the domestic risk of a terrorist attack and that Blair lied over the threat from weapons of mass destruction; and a majority disagreed that it did not matter that weapons of mass destruction were not found (ComRes 2013h). Earlier polls also showed a tendency towards negative retrospective appraisals of the Iraq War and its effects. A ComRes poll in October 2006 found that 61% agreed that Britain’s experience in Iraq made them less predisposed to back future military interventions, with 32% taking the opposite view (ComRes 2006). Later on, in January 2010, 63% disagreed with the view that the Iraq War had been successful; just 29% agreed (ComRes 2010a). A recent YouGov poll, from May 2017, asked about the merits of various conflicts where British forces had been involved. Opposition was highest for the 2003 Iraq War, with 55% thinking Britain was wrong to have taken action; just 18% said it was right, with 28% unsure (YouGov 2017g). In relation to the 1991 Gulf conflict, opposition was much lower (35%) but still exceeded the proportion saying it had been the right course of action (30%) and was matched by the proportion that was unsure (YouGov 2017g).

The war in Afghanistan Britain was a major contributor to US-led military operations in Afghanistan since the invasion in October 2001, a response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan both predated and outlasted

220  Military intervention the duration of its mission in Iraq, though the deep-rooted and consequential political controversy generated by the invasion of Iraq may well have influenced public opinion towards Britain’s campaign in Afghanistan. The Labour government at the time had ‘positioned Britain at the forefront of the developing “war on terror” while Blair became the strongest international ally of President George Bush after the 9/11 attacks’ (Cameron 2005: 261); their close political alliance encapsulated in the former’s proclamation that ‘we therefore here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy and we like them will not rest until this evil is driven from our world’. In contrast to the divisive debates that would take place – both domestically and in international fora – over the justification for and necessity of using force against Iraq, the connection between the 9/11 attack and Afghanistan was evident, with the intervention receiving ‘widespread international support’ (Cameron 2005: 261). Domestically, Britain’s role in the mission in Afghanistan was underpinned by a mainstream party-political consensus. Elite political consensus was generally maintained over Britain’s role in Afghanistan; from the outset, there was elite dissensus over the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq (Faulkner Rogers and Eyal 2014: 172–73). As the issue of Iraq receded somewhat from the political agenda, so the strategic aims and operational effectiveness of Britain’s armed forces in Afghanistan came to the fore. The political prominence of Britain’s engagement increased as more troops were deployed and casualties mounted, military strategy was adjusted, alongside growing debate and public disquiet in other countries contributing to the NATO-led mission. Indeed, Britain’s role in Afghanistan turned into its longest military operation in the post-war era. As Self noted, what ‘began as a supposedly brief exercise in “liberal intervention” has thus turned into a running sore’ (2010: 248). As the British military committed more resources to the campaign in Afghanistan – labelled a ‘surge’ – and as fighting intensified, the fatalities increased. Whereas UK forces suffered only 5 deaths between 2002 and 2005, the military fatalities rose to 39 in 2006, 42 in 2007, 51 in 2008, peaking at 108 in 2009 and 103 in 2010, decreasing to 46 in 2011 and 44 in 2012, with a further 18 fatalities between 2013 and 2015 (BBC 2015). Public opinion polls undertaken at the outset of the invasion of ­A fghanistan demonstrated strong public backing for the intervention and for ­Britain’s military role within it. Pre-invasion, Ipsos MORI polls undertaken in September 2001 found that around three-quarters of the public backed British forces being used to support military action taken by the US, while clear majorities favoured US and British military action against states that assisted or sheltered terrorists (2001a). Post-invasion, in polling undertaken in October and November 2001, solid majorities supported the involvement of British troops and backed the action taken against ­A fghanistan by Britain and the US (Ipsos MORI 2001b). Opposition

Military intervention  221 usually amounted to between a fifth to a quarter (or slightly higher) (Ipsos MORI 2001b). The Ipsos MORI polls between September and N ­ ovember also registered large majorities of the British public approving of US President George Bush’s handling of the response to the 9/11 attacks. (Ipsos MORI 2002b). Further polls, in March and September 2002, showed approval of Bush’s handling declined to 50% and 35%, respectively (Ipsos MORI 2002b). An ICM Research poll in September 2001 found that a clear majority supported military action against the terrorist actors involved in the 9/11 attacks (66%) and a similar proportion backed British armed forces taking part (63%) (Travis 2001a). An ICM poll undertaken the following month also registered a large majority approving of the military action taken by the US and Britain (Travis 2001b). A cross-national Gallup poll conducted in the early days after the September 11 attacks found that 79% of the British public agreed that their country should take part in military action against the terrorists, with just 12% opposed (Gallup 2001). A cross-country Ipsos-Reid survey conducted in November to December 2001 showed that 65% of the British public supported US-led air strikes against Afghanistan, with 19% opposed (Ipsos-Reid 2001). A Pew GAP survey from spring 2002 also showed strong backing for the conflict: 73% of those polled in Britain approved of the US-led campaign in Afghanistan, with 18% disapproving. Across the months straddling the pre-invasion and post-invasion periods, the British public – evident in their responses to questions asked by various survey research agencies – was strongly and consistently supportive of Britain’s role in the military action taken against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the terrorist forces it was harbouring. However, over time as the mission seemed to lengthen, the public shifted from the strong backing for military action in Afghanistan evident at the outset. Ipsos MORI polls carried out in October 2001 and July 2009 showed a sharp fall in the proportion thinking the military campaign in Afghanistan was achieving its aims. In October 2001, 56% believed the aims were being achieved ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ effectively, with 33% saying ‘not very’ or ‘not at all effective’ (Ipsos MORI 2009a). In contrast, in 2009, 57% chose ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ effective with 38% responding ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ effective as to the aims being achieved (Ipsos MORI 2009a). Whitman observed that the ‘lack of substantive political and economic progress in Afghanistan during the period in which the UK has increased its military involvement has increased the public unpopularity of the UK’s participation’ (2010: 842). Polling data from ComRes, conducted between 2009 and 2014, convey well the disproportionately negative evaluations of the British public towards the mission in Afghanistan in its later stages and its ramifications for the country. Summarising across the polls, four particular features stand out. First, majorities of the public thought that the country’s troops should be withdrawn immediately or shortly (ComRes 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e,

222  Military intervention 2010c, 2010d, 2011c, 2014e). Second, the preponderant view was that the war in Afghanistan was not winnable (ComRes 2009b, 2009d, 2010c, 2010d, 2011c, 2014e). Third, a plurality or majority thought that the threat of terrorism at home was increased because of the continued role of British troops in Afghanistan (ComRes 2009e, 2011c, 2014e). Fourth, majorities disagreed that the presence of British forces there made the country safer (ComRes 2011c, 2014e). The relatively high unpopularity of the conflict was also evident in other polling data. A Populus poll from July 2009 found that 59% of the British public backed the withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan, with 36% holding the opposing view (Populus 2009a). In December of that year, 67% either backed an immediate withdrawal of British troops or supported a timetable for withdrawal within the next year or so; 27% endorsed an open-ended commitment until the Taliban were defeated and the country was stable (Populus 2009b). Data from Angus Reid polls, collected between 2009 and 2011, show an increase over time in negative opinions on Britain’s role in Afghanistan: with an increase from 53% to 60% in the proportion opposing UK military operations and from 53% to 57% in the proportion thinking it was wrong to send military forces (Angus Reid). The Pew GAP surveys also asked the following question between 2007 and 2011: ‘Do you think the US and NATO should keep military troops in Afghanistan until the situation has stabilized, or do you think the US and NATO should remove their troops as soon as possible?’ Responses show that the British public were broadly divided between keeping troops in Afghanistan (ranging between 38% and 49%) and supporting their withdrawal (varying between 42% and 54%). In terms of withdrawing British forces, there was majority support in autumn 2009 and 2011 (respectively, 54% and 51%) and a plurality in spring 2009 (48%). The BSA 2011 survey showed that agreement with the proposition that the UK was wrong to have sent its armed forces to Afghanistan stood at 48%, with 29% disagreeing and 20% neutral on the issue (Gribble et al. 2012: 145). YouGov data provide another opportunity to examine public opinion in the later stages of the military operations. Again, this can be done overall and for specific demographic groups. Figure 7.6 charts responses to the following question, asked between 2007 and 2013: ‘Should British troops be brought home from Afghanistan’. Respondents could answer ‘yes – i­ mmediately’, ‘yes – soon’, ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’. During the period in which this question was asked, a clear majority of the British public supported withdrawal – ­either immediately or in the near future. The size of this majority strengthened over time, with around three-quarters and then four-fifths combined tending to favour withdrawal in, respectively, 2011 and 2012. The proportion opposed to withdrawal – that is, in favour of British troops remaining in Afghanistan – which was always the position of a small minority, gradually declined over time, from levels approximating a quarter to a fifth or below and then to around one-in-ten or above.

Military intervention  223 60 50 40 % 30 20

0

August 9-10 2007 November 4-5 2009 June 13-14 2010 July 4-5 2010 August 15-16 2010 September 5-6 2010 October 3-4 2010 Oct 31 - Nov 1 2010 November 28-29 2010 January 8-10 2011 February 6-7 2011 March 6-7 2011 April 17-18 2011 June 12-13 2011 July 24-25 2011 August 21-22 2011 September 18-19 2011 October 16-17 2011 November 6-7 2011 November 27-28 2011 January 8-9 2012 January 22-23 2012 February 19-20 2012 March 8-9 2012 April 1-2 2012 April 22-23 2012 June 17-18 2012 July 15-16 2012 August 12-13 2012 September 16-17 2012 October 14-15 2012 November 11-12 2012 December 9-10 2012

10

Yes - immediately

Yes - soon

No

Don't know

Figure 7.6  P ublic opinion towards the withdrawal of British troops from ­A fghanistan, 2007–13. Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/.

Table 7.4  P ublic opinion towards bringing British troops home from Afghanistan immediately

Agree Neither Disagree Don’t know

May 2008 June 2008 July 2008 (%) (%) (%)

August 2008 (%)

September 2008 (%)

44 23 26 7

45 22 26 7

40 21 30 9

45 19 30 6

43 21 29 7

Source: Analysis of CMS. Note: Percentages sum down the columns.

Evidence from the CMS surveys covering the period 2008–11 also shows that large shares of the public disapproved of the war in Afghanistan and wanted British troops to be brought home. Results are shown in Table 7.4 for a question on bringing troops home and in Table 7.5 for two questions asking about approval of the war (one of which included a neutral option: ‘neither agree or disagree’). The questions were worded as follows: All British troops in Afghanistan should be brought home immediately. Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove or strongly disapprove of Britain’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan.

Table 7.5  P ublic opinion towards Britain’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan, 2009–11

Approve Neither Disapprove Don’t know

August September December February March April June 2009 2009 (%) 2009 (%) 2010 (%) 2010 2010 2010 (%) (%) (%) (%)

July August September October November December November February March April 2010 2010 2010 (%) 2010 2010 (%) 2010 (%) 2001 (%) 2011 2011 2011 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

21 16 54  9

22 19 56  4

21 18 55  6

Source: Analysis of CMS. Note: Percentages sum down the columns.

35

32

35

31

30

29

30

29

28

31

55 10

57 11

57  9

56 14

60 10

60 11

59 11

60 11

61 11

57 12

29 37 34

30 34 36

34 34 31

32 35 34

Military intervention  225 Please tell me whether you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of Britain’s involvement in the war against the ­Taliban in Afghanistan. It is clear that, during 2008, the British public took the view that British troops should be withdrawn from Afghanistan: a plurality agreed in every survey. Subsequently, in 2009–10, disapproval of British involvement in Afghanistan was the majority position, irrespective of whether a neutral option was offered or not. Approval was noticeably higher, though always a minority viewpoint, when no neutral option was available. In the later surveys, in 2011, the public were more evenly split between approval, neutrality and disapproval. Another question on the Afghanistan issue which featured in YouGov polling over the same period asked, ‘Do you think British troops are winning the war with the Taliban in Afghanistan, or not?’ This question is an attempt to gauge public evaluations of how the war was going, which could well be influenced by an individual’s pre-existing position on the merits of going to war in Iraq (Holsti 2004). The response options were ‘yes’, ‘no – but will eventually’, ‘no – not possible’ and ‘don’t know’. Apart from the single poll from 2007, in which the proportion saying British troops would win eventually slightly exceeded the proportion thinking it was not possible, every poll between 2009 and 2013 showed the largest share – usually a majority – agreeing that it was not possible for Britain troops to win the war against the Taliban (YouGov 2013c). Across time, the proportion thinking that British troops were currently winning the war was consistently small, ranging between 5% and 12% (YouGov 2013c). So, much as the larger share of public opinion took a negative view of Britain’s role in Afghanistan and desired withdrawal, the assessment of how the war was going was also predominantly pessimistic. The BES 2010 data also show that, across questions, negative views typified the public’s disposition towards Britain’s role in Afghanistan. Nearly two-thirds disapproved of Britain’s involvement (64%, with 23% approving and 12% neutral), while nearly three-quarters (74%) perceived the war to be going fairly or very badly (just 19% provided a positive assessment). Other questions elicited generally negative views regarding Britain’s participation in Afghanistan. Clear majorities disagreed or strongly disagreed with the suggestions that Britain would benefit in the long term from its involvement or that there was a strong moral case for taking part. A near majority agreed that the war was adversely affecting Britain’s global interests, though opinion was broadly divided over the issue of whether the war threatened the safety of them and their families. Finally, asked to describe their feelings about the conflict, negative terms were considerably more common than positive terms (uneasy: 42%; angry: 27%; disgusted: 23%; afraid: 15%; hopeful: 18%; proud: 6%; confident: 3%; happy: 1%).

226  Military intervention Finally, data from the Transatlantic Trends surveys also show that negative views of Britain’s role in Afghanistan predominated in the latter stages of the conflict, from 2009 onwards, while before then public opinion was more supportive of the international mission. In 2004, 50% approved of Britain’s military presence in Afghanistan, with 41% opposed. In 2007, a majority, at 51%, approved of British troops engaging in combat operations against the Taliban, with 69% approving of their deployment for international reconstruction efforts. In 2008, large or very large majorities approved of Britain being involved in proving security for economic reconstruction projects (81%), assisting with police and military training (80%), taking part in military operations against the Taliban (64%) and combating the production of narcotics (73%). From 2009 onwards, public opinion tended to be more negative in its views, albeit based on different questions asking about the Afghanistan issue. In relation to British troops contributing to the mission in Afghanistan, large majorities favoured either a reduction in their number or a complete withdrawal: amounting to 60% in 2009, 67% in 2010, 72% in 2011 and 78% in 2012. In 2009, 75% opposed an increase in Britain’s combat troops and thus to its military contribution; but much fewer, at 48%, disapproved of an increase in Britain’s civilian contribution to the mission, of which 49% approved. That same year, 52% said the intervention in Afghanistan had not been the right thing to do, with 42% offering the opposing view. This was on a par with the proportion retrospectively disapproving of the intervention in Iraq (51%, with 42% approving), while 50% backed the action in Libya during the previous year (with 40% saying it was the wrong course of action). In 2010, the public also expressed clear agreement with the aim of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan: 40% supporting troops being removed in 2011 – if conditions permitted – and 30% favouring an immediate start to withdrawal. In 2013, the British public were still generally supportive of Britain contributing to efforts to train the military and police forces in Afghanistan (58% approved and 40% disapproved). Assessments of the situation more generally were also negative. Between 2009 and 2012, around three-fifths or higher of the British public felt somewhat or very pessimistic about the prospects for stabilising the situation in Afghanistan. How did views on Britain’s role in Afghanistan vary across wider society? Based on the YouGov data discussed already, the proportions against the withdrawal of Britain’s troops from Afghanistan are shown for men and women in Figure 7.7 and for party supporters in Figure 7.8, for the period 2009–13. A familiar pattern is present for the views of men and women: in this instance, there is a sustained gap in the proportions against withdrawal, with men consistently more in favour than women. Even so, both men and women show a steady decline over time in the level of opposition to withdrawal. In just about every survey, apart from the first in the series (in October 2009), an anti-withdrawal stance is a minority view for both men and women and a gradually diminishing one at that. The equivalent data series for party supporters does not show such a distinctive pattern of opinion over time, as was seen for the major parties and

50 45 40 35 30 % 25 20 15 10 5 0

October 22-23 2009 June 13-14 2010 July 18-19 2010 August 15-16 2010 September 5-6 2010 October 3-4 2010 Oct 31 - Nov 1 2010 November 28-29 2010 January 8-10 2011 February 6-7 2011 March 6-7 2011 April 17-18 2011 June 12-13 2011 July 24-25 2011 August 21-22 2011 September 18-19 2011 October 16-17 2011 November 6-7 2011 November 27-28 2011 January 8-9 2012 January 22-23 2012 February 19-20 2012 March 8-9 2012 April 1-2 2012 April 22-23 2012 June 17-18 2012 July 15-16 2012 August 12-13 2012 September 16-17 2012 October 14-15 2012 November 11-12 2012 December 9-10 2012

Con Men

Lab

January 6-7 2013

November 11-12 2012

September 30 - October…

August 12-13 2012

July 1-2 2012

April 22-23 2012

March 18-19 2012

February 19-20 2012

January 15-16 2012

November 27-28 2011

October 30-31 2011

September 18-19 2011

August 7-8 2011

June 12-13 2011

March 20-21 2011

February 6-7 2011

December 12-13 2010

Oct 31 - Nov 1 2010

September 19-20 2010

August 15-16 2010

July 4-5 2010

October 22-23 2009

45 40 35 30 25 % 20 15 10 5 0

Women

Figure 7.7  Per cent saying British troops should not be withdrawn from Afghanistan by sex, 2009–13.

Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/.

Lib

Figure 7.8  P  er cent saying British troops should not be withdrawn from Afghanistan by party support, 2009–13.

Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/.

228  Military intervention the Iraq War, with opinion not so clearly divided. Early on, when their party was in its final months in office, anti-withdrawal sentiment was somewhat higher amongst Labour supporters. Subsequently, with their party part of a coalition administration, opposition to withdrawal was sometimes higher amongst Liberal Democrat supporters. Labour and Conservative supporters tended to show more of a decline over time. Data from two Pew GAP surveys conducted in the spring and autumn of 2009 show that, amongst supporters of the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, views on Britain’s role in Afghanistan were broadly split. In spring 2009, a majority or plurality of each group backed British troops staying to help stabilise the situation. By autumn 2009, support for the mission had fallen amongst Conservative and Labour supporters, but opinion within the latter group – as well as amongst Liberal Democrat supporters – still favoured the retention of British troops. To examine, more widely, group variation in opinion on Britain’s role in Afghanistan, Table 7.6 compares data from YouGov surveys undertaken in 2009 and 2013. Looking at the pattern of responses in the 2009 survey, it is evident that women were more likely to have supported the immediate or future withdrawal of British troops while men were more favourable towards their continued presence. Amongst party supporters, those favouring the Table 7.6  P ublic opinion towards the withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan by demographic group, 2009 and 2013 2009

2013

Total: No Don’t withdrawal (%) know (%) (%)

Total: withdrawal (%)

No Don’t (%) know (%)

80 78 81 73

12 14 10 14

9 8 9 13

69

14

17

82

13

5

88 77 82 83 80 70

8 15 9 12 12 23

3 9 9 6 7 7

Overall Men Women Aged 18–34 Aged 35–54 Aged 55+

62 51 72 55

29 42 18 32

9 8 10 13

62

29

9

67

27

6

ABC1 C2DE Con Lab Lib Dem

61 63 64 50 65

32 27 30 44 29

8 10 7 7 6

Overall Men Women Aged 18–24 Aged 25–39 Aged 40–59 Aged 60+ ABC1 C2DE Con Lab Lib Dem

Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/. Note: Percentages sum across the rows per year. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib Dem, Liberal Democrats.

Military intervention  229 Conservative and Liberal Democrats were more supportive of withdrawal, while Labour supporters – whose party was in government – were somewhat more disposed towards keeping troops in ­A fghanistan. Several years later public opinion was much less supportive of Britain’s role in A ­ fghanistan, as already discussed. The preferences of men and women were broadly similar in 2013 compared to 2009. The older age groups were somewhat more ­supportive of withdrawal, either immediately or soon. ­Liberal ­Democrat supporters, whose party was in coalition, were most likely to support troops staying in Afghanistan in 2013 (just 23%, though). Across all groups, the majorities supportive of withdrawal generally strengthened between 2009 and 2013. The Pew GAP surveys also allow for an analysis of the views of men and women towards the military intervention in Afghanistan. In 2002, there was strong support from both men and women for the US-led action against the Taliban, approved of by 78% of men and 68% of women (respectively, 15% and 21% held the opposite view). For the question asking about retaining troops in Afghanistan, featuring in Pew GAP surveys between 2007 and 2011, men were always more likely than women to favour keeping US and NATO forces there until the situation had stabilised. In every survey (except for autumn 2009), therefore, a plurality or majority of men favoured continuing with the campaign in Afghanistan. Amongst women, in every survey, the balance of opinion favoured withdrawing troops as soon as possible. Evidence from the BES CMS surveys also shows the relatively more favourable opinions that men held towards Britain’s involvement in ­Afghanistan during the conflict’s duration, when compared with the views of women. Asked in monthly surveys between May and September 2008 if all British troops should return home immediately, a majority or plurality of women expressed agreement, well ahead of the proportion which disagreed. Amongst men, though, opinion was more split, although disagreement with the proposition usually eclipsed agreement. Asked between September 2009 and April 2011 whether they approved or disapproved of Britain’s participation in the conflict in Afghanistan, women were consistently much less likely to approve than men, with disapproval usually the majority or plurality response for the former group. Amongst men, once again opinion was more divided, although disapproval generally ran higher than did approval of Britain’s involvement. The surveys undertaken in 2011 did, however, register much higher levels of neutral opinion amongst both men and women and smaller proportions within both groups expressed disapproval. The BES CMS data also corroborate the YouGov data in relation to party supporters’ views on Britain’s role in Afghanistan. Unlike the Iraq War data based on the CMS surveys, approval of Britain’s involvement and disagreement with bringing the country’s troops back home did not differ to such an extent across those backing the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. Approval of Britain’s role was somewhat less common

230  Military intervention amongst Liberal Democrat supporters and slightly more prevalent amongst Labour than Conservative supporters. More recent polls have gauged the British public’s retrospective views of the mission in Afghanistan and the efforts of its armed forces during its long campaign there. Broadly, the retrospective views tend to be quite unfavourable. A YouGov survey in April 2014 showed that 56% did not think British military involvement in Afghanistan had been worthwhile, while just 25% said it had been. An overwhelming majority thought it was right to withdraw British troops from Afghanistan (86% compared to just 5% disagreeing (YouGov 2014d)). In response to additional questions on the topic, a majority of the public perceived that the Afghan government would not be able to maintain security when Western forces had withdrawn and a majority thought that the Taliban would return to power post-­w ithdrawal (YouGov 2014d). A YouGov survey in October 2014 similarly found that 49% perceived Britain’s military intervention in Afghanistan as not worthwhile, compared to 29% who took the opposite view (YouGov 2014e). In the same poll, 75% said it was right for Britain to have withdrawn its forces, with combat operations having recently ended there (just 7% disagreed) (YouGov 2014e). A poll conducted by Populus in October 2014 also found that, on balance, the public held negative appraisals of Britain’s role in Afghanistan. In total, 68% thought that British involvement had not been worthwhile (with 25% taking the opposite view); 69% thought that the deployment of UK troops had made Afghanistan worse off or had made no difference; 81% said that the intervention made the UK less safe or made no difference; and 65% were not confident that Afghan forces could protect its own citizens without UK assistance (Populus 2014a). An Ipsos MORI poll in January 2015 used a split-sample format to gauge views on Britain’s role in Afghanistan. Irrespective of this, either majorities or pluralities thought that Britain’s military campaign had been ineffective in bringing security and stability to Afghanistan and that it had not been effective in preventing the country from being used as a base for terrorists to attack British interests (Ipsos MORI 2015a). Although, on the issue of whether Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan had been worthwhile, public opinion was more evenly divided, a slight plurality in both cases adjudged it not to have been worthwhile (Ipsos MORI 2015a). YouGov’s recent poll of the public’s views on the rights and wrongs of different conflicts showed that opposition clearly outweighed support for Afghanistan: 43% said it had been wrong (less than that expressed for Iraq), 25% said it was right, with 32% unsure (YouGov 2017g).

Military intervention in Libya The crisis in Libya in spring 2011 provided the coalition government, led by David Cameron, with its first major foreign policy test and the difficult and politically sensitive choice of whether to push for – and commit British

Military intervention  231 forces to – military action. Indeed, the divisive political legacy of the Iraq War specifically and the thinking behind and conduct of Blair’s ‘Liberal Interventionism’ more generally, clearly influenced the rethinking on foreign policy undertaken – as part of a wider modernisation process – under Cameron’s leadership in opposition from 2005 to 2010. This rethinking developed into a ‘liberal conservative’ approach to foreign policy. As Cameron declared in speech in 2006: I am a liberal conservative, rather than a neo-conservative. Liberal because I support the aim of spreading freedom and democracy, and support humanitarian intervention. Conservative - because I recognise the complexities of human nature, and am sceptical of grand schemes to remake the world. (2006) As well as rethinking the substance and language of foreign policy, the Conservative Party proposed that it ‘also needed to be overhauled in terms of policy-making, which under New Labour had become too informal and disjointed’ (Vickers 2011b: 124) – again, a key influence here was the ­decision-making process at the heart of government which had produced the decision to support and participate in the invasion of Iraq. In office, it has been argued that – in terms of policy substance, as well as in terms of the policy-making process – the Coalition government adopted a more cautious and pragmatic approach to foreign affairs, relying on a more collective and less personalised decision-making process (Daddow 2013). The approach taken by Cameron and the coalition government over the Libyan intervention demonstrated both the influence of a ‘liberal’ tradition on the merits of humanitarian intervention and the constraints of a more traditional, ‘realist’ Conservative approach to foreign policy (Beech and Oliver 2014). In the context of the unfolding situation in Libya in early 2011 and as arguments in favour of and opposed to intervention emerged, Iraq-­i nflected debate inevitably resurfaced over Britain’s relations with the US and its president and the need for ‘going the UN route’ to gain international legitimacy versus relying on issue-specific ‘coalitions of the willing’, with the latter approach being adopted in the case of the intervention in Iraq. ­Douglas Alexander, Labour’s shadow foreign secretary, observed at the 2011 Labour Party conference that the ‘The Iraq war still casts a long shadow’ ­(Mulholland 2011a) – a remark that many mainstream politicians would have agreed with. Pew GAP surveys conducted after the invasion of Iraq showed that, when asked about the need for UN approval before Britain can use force to deal with an international threat, majorities of the British public agreed (64% in 2004 and 68% in 2011), with minorities saying obtaining UN approval would make it too difficult to deal with such threats (2004: 30%; 2011: 25%).

232  Military intervention Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy, the French president, were prime movers behind Security Council Resolution 1973, which went further than imposing a ‘no-fly zone’ as some countries specifically desired and instead authorised ‘all necessary measures’ (Wintour and Watt 2011). The UN resolution gave backing for air strikes to protect civilians from attacks by Gaddafi’s forces, with action commencing on March 19, 2011. International backing underpinned the intervention, with the NATO-led action having the support of regional bodies, such as the Arab League. In contrast to the partisan alignments on the Iraq War, there was a broad party-political consensus underpinning Britain’s involvement in the Libyan intervention. When the issue was put to the vote in the House of Commons in March 2011, 557 MPs endorsed the government motion, with just 13 voting against (including 11 Labour MPs, one of whom was Jeremy Corbyn). Justifying British involvement and also keen to differentiate what was different from the approach taken by Blair’s government over the invasion of Iraq, Cameron argued that involvement in Libya was ‘not merely an outbreak of do-goodery, but also “hard-headed” … rooted in national interests, and limited in scope’, insisting that it was ‘necessary, legal and right’ (Mulholland 2011b). Ed Miliband, Labour leader, supported the intervention by stressing that ‘three key criteria for action exist: it is a just cause with a feasible mission and it has international support’ (Mulholland 2011b). Both the highly controversial Iraq invasion and the long-standing – and increasingly unpopular – involvement of British forces in Afghanistan coloured political and media debate over military action against Gaddafi’s regime in Libya. In a speech made early on during the Libyan intervention, Nick Clegg, Liberal Democrat leader and deputy prime minister, set out five clear points of difference between the cases of Iraq and Libya: action in the latter case was legal, had a humanitarian basis, was supported by Arab states, focussed on post-conflict reconstruction and the mission had strict objectives (Stratton 2011). The successful NATO-led campaign lasted for around 7 months before it being officially declared that action would end on October 31, 2011. The Libyan leader was captured and killed in October 2011 after rebel forces had attacked the remaining strongholds of the regime. Opinion polls tended to show that, at the outset and during the early stages of military action, the British public were divided over the merits of the intervention in Libya. Two ComRes polls undertaken in March 2011 showed that a plurality disagreed with military action, at 43% and 45%, with 35% on both occasions supporting the action (about a fifth could not offer an opinion either way) (­ ComRes 2011a, 2011b). It is also worth noting that, in one of these polls, 71% expressed the view that the intervention in Libya could entail Britain being embroiled in another protracted mission like that in Iraq. A cross-­national Harris poll conducted during late March and early April found 37% in ­Britain supportive of military action, with 36% opposed and 28% neither supportive nor opposed (Dinmore 2011). A cross-country poll conducted by

Military intervention  233 Ipsos MORI in April 2011 similarly found an almost even division of opinion in Britain: 50% supported military action in Libya and 49% opposed it (Ipsos MORI 2011a). Data from the BES CMS for March to May 2011 showed that the most common position in each monthly survey was to disapprove of the intervention (ranging between 43% and 50%), with smaller proportions in favour (23%–30%) or adopting a neutral stance (19%–22%). The public’s evaluations of the likelihood of success or failure in the mission ranged from 4.2 to 4.7 on a scale running from 0 to 10, so below the midpoint of 5. Other assessments over the same 3-month period showed that large majorities of the public disagreed with sending in ground troops if the air campaign was unsuccessful, while clear majorities agreed that Britain could not afford the mission while the country was experiencing economic difficulties. Pluralities tended to agree that the mission would adversely affect British interests around the world, and the balance of opinion was that Britain would not benefit from the action in the long run. Opinion was broadly split over whether there was a moral case for British participation in the intervention. To see how opinion changed over the full duration of the intervention, polling undertaken by YouGov from March to October 2011 provides a rich set of data. Public opinion is charted in Figure 7.9. The proportions believing that the intervention was right or wrong tended to run in near proximity during April to May 2011. During June and July 2011, though, levels of opposition exceeded levels of support. The opposite was the case from August, as the rebels steadily gained ground and took control of the capital, Tripoli. There was another uplift in support in October, no doubt

60 50 40 % 30 20

0

March 20-21 March 24-25 March 30-31 April 6-7 April 12-13 April 18-19 April 26-27 May 5-6 May 12-13 May 19-20 May 26-27 June 6-7 June 15-16 June 22-23 July 3-4 July 7-8 July 18-19 July 28-29 August 3-4 August 14-15 August 18-19 August 25-26 September 1-2 September 8-9 September 14-15 September 22-23 September 29-30 October 9-10 October 13-14 October 23-24

10

Right

Wrong

Don't know

Figure 7.9  P ublic opinion towards military action in Libya. Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/.

234  Military intervention influenced by the death of Gaddafi and anticipation of a resolution to the conflict. Retrospectively, the British public conveyed a more jaundiced view of the Libyan intervention: in May 2017, just 19% said it had been the right thing to do, with 44% saying it had been wrong and the remainder unsure (a sizable 36%) (YouGov 2017g). Figures 7.10 and 7.11 chart the levels of approval amongst, respectively, men and women and supporters of the main parties. Like the pattern noted already for previous cases, there is a clear and consistent difference in the views of men and women throughout the Libyan intervention. Men were much more likely to have viewed military action as the right thing to do. That said, the levels of approval tended to exhibit similar broad shifts in direction, falling away from the initial levels of support as the intervention progressed and then showing an upturn and higher support in the final months. Based on the CMS surveys from March to May 2011, men were more likely than women to approve of the Libyan intervention, ranging between 32%–39% and 14%–23%, respectively, and to think that there was a moral case for British involvement. Similarly, men tended to have more positive assessments of the likelihood of the mission’s success. However, in relation to Britain not being able to afford the mission while the country was experiencing economic difficulties, clear majorities of men and women agreed. Similarly, large majorities of both groups disagreed that if the air campaign was not effective, then ground forces should be deployed. Men were somewhat more likely than women to agree that the action would benefit Britain

70 60 50 %

40 30 20

0

March 20-21 March 28-29 April 4-5 April 10-11 April 14-15 April 20-21 April 28-29 May 10-11 May 16-17 May 23-24 June 1-2 June 8-9 June 20-21 June 29-30 July 5-6 July 14-15 July 21-22 August 1-2 August 10-11 August 16-17 August 23-24 August 30-31 September 6-7 September 12-13 September 19-20 September 27-28 October 5-6 October 11-12 October 19-20

10

Men

Women

Figure 7.10  P  ublic opinion towards military action in Libya by sex. Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/.

Military intervention  235 70 60 50 %

40 30 20 0

March 20-21 March 28-29 April 4-5 April 10-11 April 14-15 April 20-21 April 28-29 May 10-11 May 16-17 May 23-24 June 1-2 June 8-9 June 20-21 June 29-30 July 5-6 July 14-15 July 21-22 August 1-2 August 10-11 August 16-17 August 23-24 August 30-31 September 6-7 September 12-13 September 19-20 September 27-28 October 5-6 October 11-12 October 19-20

10

Con

Lab

Lib Dem

Figure 7.11  P  ublic opinion towards military action in Libya by party support. Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/.

in the longer term, albeit this was the view of small minorities; pluralities within each group disagreed. Amongst both men and women, the plurality view was that the Libyan intervention would damage Britain’s global interests. The level of approval amongst those supporting the main parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat) shows that support for military intervention was generally higher amongst those who favoured either of the parties in the coalition government and lower amongst those who supported the main opposition party. Supporters of all three parties registered a drop off in support as the intervention progressed and then a generally sustained uplift in the later stages of the mission. Data from the CMS, for March to May 2011, show that, in broad terms, there were not really pronounced partisan divides over the Libya intervention, and there were some clear similarities in the patterning of views amongst Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters. Large majorities of all partisan groups opposed the deployment of British troops if the air campaign was not successful, while a similar pattern was evident for agreement with the notion that Britain could not afford the mission because of its prevailing economic troubles. However, the data show that, where differences occurred in response to the other questions, views tended to be somewhat more positive amongst Conservative and Liberal Democrat supporters and somewhat less favourable amongst Labour supporters. Analysis of additional YouGov data collected during the Libya mission – which focussed on evaluations of the prime minister’s handling of the issue

236  Military intervention and of how the war was going in general – found evidence of differences in perceptions based on party support: Conservative supporters tended to have the most favourable ratings of the Prime Minister on this issue and more positive assessments of how the military action is going. Labour supporters were consistently likely to have less positive assessments on these two indicators. Liberal ­Democrat supporters occupied a broadly intermediate position on these two indicators, although their levels of support were closer to those expressed by Conservatives supporters than those held by Labour partisans. (Clements 2012: 129) In this instance, evaluation of a leader’s handling of a military intervention, as more widely with foreign policy issues or crises, is a ‘mediated’ issue question. This type of question ‘tend to invite opinions which will invariably, if not inevitably, be filtered through pre-existing partisan loyalties or beliefs – they will be politically conditioned’ (Fiorina 1981: 80–81).

The conflict against ISIS in Iraq and Syria In August 2013, a government motion over potential British involvement in the conflict in Syria was defeated by 272 votes to 285, with 30 Tory and 9 Liberal Democrat MPs (from the two parties in coalition) rebelling along with 224 Labour MPs, which dented the prime minister’s authority (Watt and Hopkins 2013). After the vote, Prime Minister Cameron, who had failed to secure the backing of the main opposition party and its leader, Ed Miliband, observed that ‘It is clear to me that the British parliament, reflecting the views of the British people, does not want to see British military action’ (The Economist 2013). Indeed, polling tended to show strong opposition to potential British involvement in military action (Helm 2013; Kellner 2013). As in the run-up to the intervention in Libya, the ‘shadow of Iraq’ was invoked by politicians and the media. As Alexander observed, The collapse in trust this caused means that Iraq has permanently raised the bar of public legitimacy for future interventions, whichever government puts them before Parliament. Today, the British public are more sceptical of the principle of committing British troops abroad, because they are more critical of the circumstances in which it could be justified. Whether for reasons of self-defence, compelling humanitarian emergency, or following authorisation by the UN Security ­Council, legal and public clarity around the rationale for any action is vital. But while the experience of Iraq should inform our foreign policy, it shouldn’t paralyse it. Neither neo-conservatism nor neo-isolationism is the right way forward (2013)

Military intervention  237 British forces had ceased military operations in Iraq in 2009 but several years later were to return to participate in a multinational effort to combat the new menace of ISIS (or Islamic State). In September 2014, MPs across the main parties had overwhelmingly authorised British involvement in action against ISIS in Iraq, with 524 voting for and just 43 against (including 23 Labour MPs). Cameron had secured the support of the Labour leader, Ed Miliband, for military action. The action was taken in response to a formal request for UK military assistance from the Iraqi prime minister, which, it was argued, gave the UK’s involvement a clear legal basis (Sparrow 2014). During the parliamentary proceedings, Cameron stated that he would like Britain to go further and join her allies in taking military action in Syria but recognised that there was not sufficient political backing for such a proposal (Sparrow 2014). The issue of Britain joining multinational military action against ISIS in Syria was eventually debated in Parliament in December 2015. The debate contained many passionate speeches, both for and against the action, that again referred to the legacy of the Iraq and other recent interventions. Prime Minister David Cameron emphasised that ‘This is not 2003. We must not use past mistakes as an excuse for indifference or inaction’ (Dearden 2015a). The Liberal Democrat leader, Tim Farron, who supported the action against ISIS, observed that ‘We are absolutely under the spectre of a shocking, illegal and counterproductive war in Iraq. It is a lesson from history that we must learn from’ (Sparrow and Perraudin 2015). Labour leader, ­Jeremy Corbyn, was strongly opposed to Britain joining the fight against ISIS. ­Corbyn’s election as party leader had betokened a more general leftwards shift in foreign and defence policy. He had a consistent record of opposing recent military interventions as a backbench MP, arguing in The Observer in January 2016 that ‘For more than a decade, Britain has been at the centre of a succession of disastrous wars that have increased, not diminished, the threats to our national security’ (2016). The House of Commons voted to authorise British action in Syria, with 397 MPs voting in favour and 223 voting against. This was another case of debate on overseas military action exposing serious divisions within the parliamentary Labour Party, while the Conservative Party were largely united behind the government’s stance. Labour MPs had been given a free vote on the issue by a reluctant Corbyn to stave off resignations: 66 voted in favour of air strikes, including the shadow foreign secretary, Hilary Benn, while 152 voted against. Just seven Conservative MPs ignored a three-line whip and voted against the government (Wintour 2015). During the debate in the House of Commons, Benn invoked Labour’s tradition of ‘internationalism’ in foreign affairs in support of British military engagement (Dearden 2015b). Extensive polling on British involvement in Iraq and Syria was undertaken by YouGov between 2014 and 2015, allowing an examination of general attitudes and the views of societal groups. YouGov’s polling asked separately about support for Britain involvement in air strikes in Iraq and towards British

238  Military intervention troops being committed to the battlefield in Iraq. Given the ‘legacy of Iraq’ referred to earlier it could be expected that there would be more public tolerance for the former than for the latter. Figure 7.12 charts the British public’s views towards the Royal Air Force (RAF) taking part in air strikes against ISIS, based on the following question: ‘And would you approve or disapprove of the RAF taking part in air strike operations against Islamic State/ISIS?’ When the polling began, levels of approval and disapproval were close. Subsequently, the level of approval gradually increased and outweighed the level of disapproval by a considerable margin (garnering majority support in every poll between September 4–5, 2014 and November 23–24, 2015), albeit support declined somewhat and opposition increased at the end of the series. A significant minority could not decide either way: don’t know responses consistently amounted to around a fifth of respondents (and a quarter in some of the earlier polls). Of interest given the ‘Iraq effect’ in British politics noted earlier are the levels of support and opposition on the issue of sending troops back into Iraq. YouGov gauged responses using the following question: ‘Would you approve or disapprove of Britain and the USA sending ground troops back into Iraq to help fight Islamic State/ISIS?’ The overall set of responses is shown in Figure 7.13. In stark contrast to the views on air strikes against ISIS in Iraq, for most of the period disapproval was the most common view of the British public, albeit it declined over time. Approval did increase over time, so that levels of support and opposition ran much more closely together in the latter part of the data series. Again, a significant minority expressed no clear view, usually amounting to a fifth or a quarter. In general, then, British public opinion wanted to restrict British involvement against ISIS in Iraq to air strikes; it was wary of or opposed to ground troops being committed.

70 60 50 40 % 30 20 10 0

Approve

Disapprove

Don't know

Figure 7.12  P  ublic opinion towards the RAF taking part in air strikes against ISIS in Iraq, 2014–15. Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/.

Military intervention  239 70 60 50 40 % 30 20 10 0

Approve

Disapprove

Don't know

Figure 7.13  P ublic opinion towards sending ground troops to Iraq to fight ISIS, 2014–15. Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/.

Table 7.7  P  ublic opinion towards sending ground troops into Syria to fight ISIS

July 2–3, 2015 November 16–17, 2015 November 23–24, 2015 November 30 to December 1, 2015 December 2–3, 2015

Approve (%)

Disapprove (%)

Don’t know (%)

40 42 41 39 39

38 37 34 38 39

23 21 25 23 22

Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/. Note: Percentages sum across the rows. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib Dem, Liberal Democrats.

A similar pattern of opinion is evident in the responses to YouGov questions on ground troops and air strikes being used against ISIS in Syria. The questions asked were as follows: Would you approve or disapprove of Britain and the USA sending ground troops into Syria to help fight Islamic State/ISIS? The RAF taking part in air strike operations against Islamic State/ISIS in Syria? These questions were asked over shorter periods of time (ground troops: July to December 2015; air strikes: August to October 2014). Table 7.7 shows

240  Military intervention the distribution of responses to the question on ground troops being sent to Syria. The public were either evenly split between approval or disapproval or a plurality disapproved. As with the questions regarding intervention in Iraq, around a fifth to a quarter did not express an opinion. In autumn 2014, opinion was more clear cut on the merits of the RAF taking part in combat operations (Table 7.8): except for the first survey in the series, a plurality or (usually) a majority supported air strikes against ISIS in Syria. A similar proportion, as before, could not decide either way. In keeping with the previous cases of military intervention, it is again instructive to look at the views of men and women and party supporters on British action against ISIS in the Middle East. Figures 7.14 and 7.15 display the levels of approval for air strikes amongst, respectively, men and women and supporters of the main parties. As has already been established with the Iraq War, there is a clear ‘gender gap’ in opinion, with men consistently more likely to be supportive than women. In every survey, a majority of men expressed approval. There is, though, a similar trajectory to the views of men and women over time, with a steady increase in support and then a dip towards the end, although the gap persists. The pattern based on party support is less distinct for much of the series. Across time, Conservative supporters are consistently more likely to have approved of RAF involvement in the fight against ISIS in Iraq; for much of the period, too, UKIP supporters rank below Conservatives in their support for air strikes. Approval ran at lower levels amongst Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters. Support for air strikes tailed off at the end of the period, declining to very low levels amongst Labour supporters (23% and 29% in late November and early December 2015, respectively). This analysis can be replicated for the question on sending ground troops to Iraq. Looking at the level of approval from men and women in ­Figure 7.16, whilst there was a similar upwards trend over time, men were always more supportive of ground troops than women, as was the case with air strikes. Approval based on party support, charted in Figure 7.17, shows that Table 7.8  P ublic opinion towards the RAF taking part in air strikes against ISIS in Syria

August 28–29, 2014 September 4–5, 2014 September 15–16, 2014 September 18–19, 2014 September 24–25, 2014 September 25–26, 2014 October 2–3, 2014 October 9–10, 2014

Approve (%)

Disapprove (%)

Don’t know (%)

37 48 52 51 51 53 52 54

37 26 27 26 26 24 27 25

26 26 21 23 23 23 20 21

Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/. Note: Percentages sum across the rows.

80 70 60 50 % 40 30 20 10 0

Approve - Men

Approve - Women

Figure 7.14  Per cent approving of the RAF taking part in air strikes against ISIS in Iraq by sex, 2014–15. Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/.

90 80 70 60 50 % 40 30 20 10 0

Con

Lab

Lib Dem

UKIP

Figure 7.15  P  er cent approving of the RAF taking part in air strikes against ISIS in Iraq by party support, 2014–15. Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/.

242  Military intervention 60 50 40 % 30 20 10 0

Men

Women

Figure 7.16  P  er cent approving of Britain and the US sending ground troops into Iraq to fight ISIS by sex, 2014–15. Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/. 60 50 40 % 30 20 10 0

Con

Lab

Lib Dem

UKIP

Figure 7.17  P  er cent approving of Britain and the US sending ground troops into Iraq to fight ISIS by party support, 2014–15. Source: Compiled from the YouGov website: https://yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/.

support was often lowest amongst Liberal Democrat supporters, followed by Labour supporters. In the latter part of the period, Conservative and UKIP supporters emerge as distinctly more approving of the use of ground troops. In contrast to the time-series data regarding the 2003 Iraq War, where ­Labour supporters – whose own party were in government – were

Military intervention  243 consistently the  most in favour, Conservative supporters, during a period when their party has been in office, have been more receptive to British action against ISIS in Iraq. Most of the time, Conservative and UKIP supporters were more supportive of British ground troops being sent to Syria, when asked between July and December 2015. Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters were, in general, less in favour of such a move. The same party-political patterning is a feature of public opinion on air strikes against ISIS in Syria. In most polls, Conservative and UKIP supporters are clustered together with the most hawkish views. Labour and Liberal Democrats supporters were less likely to approve of this course of action. Taken together, men were consistently more likely than women to support British action against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, whether using air strikes or sending in troops. Partisanship also gave rise to differing views: there was a tendency for Conservative and often UKIP supporters to be more hawkish on this issue – to be relatively more likely to favour air strikes and, to a lesser extent, ground troops. Results from other recent polls of the British adult population gauging views on military action against ISIS in the Middle East are presented in Table 7.9, both overall and for men and women. It is apparent that – whether the focus is on Iraq, Syria or more generally and across different questions wordings, response options, polling organisations – men are consistently more likely to favour military action than women when specifically asked about air strikes or the use of ground forces, or to adopt a more hawkish stance on the issue when asked about military action in a more general way. In contrast, women were more likely to think that military action will make Britain less safe and to not support Britain getting involved in Syria. Further recent data on military action against ISIS come from the cross-national 2016 Pew GAP survey, where the British sample can be analysed separately. The question asked was ‘Do you support or oppose the US military actions against the Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria known as ISIS?’ The overall distribution of opinion and for various socio-­ demographic groups is reported in Table 7.10. Overall, support for US military action against ISIS was over three times the level of opposition (71% versus 22%, with just 7% unsure). This level of support is higher than that recorded in 2015 (66%). Concern over ISIS as an international issue was very high in 2015: 87% were very or somewhat concerned. Moreover, in 2016, 79% perceived ISIS to be a major threat to Britain (and 16% said it was a minor threat). This perception of ISIS as a major threat fell to 70% in 2017, mainly accounted for by the increase to 22% in the proportion saying ISIS was a minor threat to Britain. Within the context of strong public backing for military action against ISIS, the main dividing lines within British public opinion included sex, party loyalties and ideological orientation. Looking at the variation in opinion across groups, support for military action was higher amongst men than women (78% versus 65%). Support

Table 7.9  P  ublic opinion towards British involvement in military action against ISIS by sex, 2014–15 Date

Question

August 2014 Do you support or oppose British military intervention in Iraq at the (ComRes) current time? August 2014 Would you support or oppose the British Government doing each of the (ComRes) following in Iraq, in response to Islamic State militants (formerly known as ISIS) attacking religious minorities? British fighter planes conducting airstrikes against Islamist militants. August 2014 Would you support or oppose the British Government doing each of the (ComRes) following in Iraq, in response to Islamic State militants (formerly known as ISIS) attacking religious minorities? British troops going into Iraq to fight the Islamist militants. August 2014 How do you think the British Government should respond to Islamic (ComRes) State, the militant group currently operating in Iraq and Syria (formerly known as ISIS)? In your answer, please take into account the level of military action needed to achieve each (i.e. using forces on the ground, airstrikes etc.)

August 2014 How do you think the British Government should respond to Islamic (ComRes) State, the militant group currently operating in Iraq and Syria (formerly known as ISIS)? In your answer, please take into account the level of military action needed to achieve each (i.e. using forces on the ground, airstrikes etc.)

October 2014 (MORI) December 2014 (MORI)

Please tell me which, if any, of the following statements comes closest to your view of the role the British military should play in response to the acts of ‘Islamic State’, also known as Isis or Isil? As you may know, Britain has recently launched airstrikes against the so-called Islamic State in Syria. Do you think these airstrikes will make Britain safer or less safe from terrorism, or will it make no difference?

Response

Overall Men

Women

% Support

31

37

24

% Support

45

57

33

% Support

18

21

15

% Should seek to defeat Islamic State in its entirety or Should seek to stop Islamic State making any further gains in Iraq, Syria or elsewhere % Should seek to defeat Islamic State in its entirety or Should seek to stop Islamic State making any further gains in Iraq, Syria or elsewhere % British forces should intervene abroad to fight Islamic State % Less safe

49

60

37

58

71

44

59

63

56

44

36

50

July 2015 Do you support or oppose the British Government taking each of the (ComRes) following actions in Syria against Islamic State (also known as ISIS)? British fighter planes conducting airstrikes in Syria against Islamic State.

% Support

56

65

47

July 2015 British troops going into Syria to fight Islamic State. (ComRes) July 2015 Britain not getting involved military in Syria and leaving the situation to (ComRes) run its course. July 2015 Which, if any, of the following do you think Britain and its allies should (ICM) do to try and defeat the threat presented by the Islamic State?

% Support

41

48

33

% Support

38

34

41

30 % Send in British and other countries’ ground troops to defeat the Islamic State in places like Syria and Iraq % Targeted air strikes 48 against Islamic State military operations % Disagree 52

36

24

58

39

60

44

% Agree

46

56

36

Do you agree or disagree with each of the following? Britain should take part in air strikes against ISIS (Da’esh) in Syria at the current time.

% Agree

47

56

39

British troops should take part in a ground war against ISIS (Da’esh) in Syria at the current time.

% Agree

25

29

22

There are no circumstances under which British troops should be sent to fight a ground war against ISIS.

% Disagree

42

50

33

Should Britain deploy ground combat troops in Syria and Iraq to defeat Islamic State?

% Yes

33

41

24

November 2015 (ComRes) November 2015 (ComRes) December 2015 (ComRes) December 2015 (ComRes) December 2015 (ComRes) December 2015 (BMG)

Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? There are no circumstances under which British troops should be sent to fight a ground war against ISIS. The UK should take part in air strikes against ISIS, even if they do not have UN approval.

Source: Compiled from polling organisations’ websites.

246  Military intervention Table 7.10  P ublic opinion towards US-led military action against ISIS by demographic group Support (%) Oppose (%) Sex Age group

Education Party support

Ideology

All Male Female 18–29 30–44 45–64 65+ Degree or above Other qualifications None Con Lab Lib Dem UKIP Other party Would not vote/don’t know Left Centre Right

Don’t know (%)

71 78 65 73 64 76 69 67 72 80 82 64 72 82 56 56

22 19 26 21 31 18 21 27 21 12 13 30 22 16 36 36

7 4 9 6 5 6 9 6 7 8 6 6 6 2 7 7

50 75 75

38 21 21

13 5 4

Source: Analysis of Pew GAP Survey 2016. British sample. Note: Percentages sum across the rows. Con, Conservative; Lab, Labour; Lib Dem, Liberal Democrats.

was higher amongst those aged 18–29 and those aged 45–64. Opposition was highest at 31% of those aged 30–44. There was variation in support based on educational attainment. Fully 80% of those with no qualifications backed military action, falling to 72% of those with other qualifications and declining further to 67% of those with a degree or higher qualification (where opposition reached 27%). Conservative and UKIP supporters were most in favour of military action, at 82%, followed by Liberal Democrat supporters at 72%. Support was lower amongst Labour supporters (64%) and lowest amongst minor party supporters and those with no affiliation (both 56%). The largest variation occurred on the basis of ideological location, however. Perhaps partly shaped by the distinctive position of Jeremy Corbyn on this issue, albeit the broader Labour Party was rather divided over the merits of action, just half of those on the ideological left supported military action (50%). Centrists and those on the right were equally supportive of military action against ISIS (75%).

Military intervention  247

Conclusion This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of British public opinion on recent military interventions, a classic example of ‘hard power’ projection in foreign policy, cases which have differed in the rationale for military forces engaging in action, in the duration and scope of the military commitment and in the degree of party-political agreement and public support. For those cases where time-series data were available, there is some evidence to suggest that based on the issue of going to war, as well as evaluations of how a campaign is going, public opinion does to some extent reflect the ‘situation on the ground’, as has been demonstrated in the US context (Holsti 2004, 2011). In Iraq and Afghanistan, it is evident is that public support for these interventions tended to decline the longer the mission went on, albeit the former was much more politically divisive from the outset. Both of these ‘forces-for change’ operations – in Afghanistan from 2006 onwards – met with large-scale insurgencies, which meant that the occupying countries had to deepen their military commitments, thus raising the costs of involvement, and ultimately failed to realise the objectives that had underpinned the missions (Chalmers 2014: 93). Earlier cases of British involvement in overseas conflict proceeded with a broad party-political consensus underpinning and in some cases stronger and more durable public backing for the aims of British military action. These include the Falklands War in 1982 (Ipsos MORI 1982), the first Gulf War of 1991 (Wybrow 1991: 276; Rallings et al. 1992: 378–79), the Bosnian interventions of the early-tomid 1990s (Faulkner Rogers and Eyal 2014: 164–5) and the 1999 mission in Kosovo (The Kosovo Conflict in the Polls n/d; Faulkner Rogers and Eyal 2014: 166–69) – military interventions of more limited duration compared to Iraq and Afghanistan. These interventions, which commanded strong public backing had – in some cases  – positive impacts on the ratings of prime ministers and governing parties in post-war Britain (Worcester 1991: 87). Exactly the opposite happened in the case of the 2003 Iraq War. The much-remarked ‘shadow of Iraq’ may have shaped the British public’s appetite for subsequent interventions, including those which were initiated with a clearer legal basis and stronger domestic and international backing. As Chalmers observes, ‘… political reality means that no intervention ever takes place in isolation from those that preceded it, irrespective of differences in context or feasibility’ (2014: 135). This may also have conditioned the public’s receptiveness for different types of military operations, with a general preference for a more restricted mandate, typically involving air strikes and special forces operations, rather than the large-scale deployment of conventional forces on the ground. In terms of group-related patterns, there was generally strong and consistent evidence across the different cases of military intervention in the post-9/11

248  Military intervention era for a ‘gender gap’ in British public opinion. In each case, the differences were generally clear and consistent, with men more supportive than women of military action. The ‘gender gap’ in relation to attitudes towards military force is well established in the broader literature (Nincic and Nincic 2002; Eichenberg 2003, 2007, 2016c, 2017; Burris 2008). Different theoretical perspectives have been used to explain the presence of this ‘gender gap’ (Brooks and Valentino 2011), but it is argued that women ‘are less supportive of the use of violence to resolve social conflicts and far more sensitive to the humanitarian and human costs of war’ (Eichenberg 2003: 137). Further, the findings from this chapter underline Eichenberg and Stoll’s observation ‘that it is rare to find scholarship in which gender differences on the question of using military force are not present’ (2012: 335). The party-political pattering of opinion has been more variegated across the different military interventions discussed here. This partly reflects which parties have been in government and which in opposition, the stance taken by their leaders and whether military action has been a divisive positional issue within and outside the parliamentary arena.

8 Conclusion

This book set out to assess in depth the British public’s engagement with foreign and defence policy in the period from 1945 to 2017. In so doing, it focussed on a range of different aspects of public opinion in this issue area in order to provide an extensive and wide-ranging analysis. Of course, no monograph by itself can provide a definitive treatment of the British public’s opinions on foreign and defence policy in historical perspective. But through compiling and analysing data from a rich set of source ­materials – long-running single-country and cross-national surveys, historical polling data, established polling websites and published volumes or compendia – a robust and detailed picture of aggregate trends and group-based patterns has been provided. The research undertaken here makes a strong and distinctive contribution to existing scholarship in three areas: research in political science concerning the nature and structure of contemporary British public opinion on foreign policy; scholarly research and debate over the post-war consensus and the external dimension; and research within political science and modern British history on political parties’ intellectual traditions, policies and record in government on international affairs. In terms of the first area, the book has taken the long view on issues which have been at the centre of research in political science, in particular military intervention and state projection of hard power. For the second area, the book has provided a detailed assessment of the British public’s views on key pillars of the post-war consensus, including close UK-US relations, membership of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a reluctant Europeanism and the possession of the nuclear deterrent. For the second and third areas, the book has paid close and sustained attention to the opinions of supporters of the main parties on long-running defence and foreign policy debates which have been the subject of both inter-party and intra-party contestation. This chapter is structured as follows: the first section assesses some of the key features of how the public has engaged with foreign and defence policy as an issue area, in terms of issue salience, party images and electoral competition. The second section then assesses, in turn, chapter findings bearing on the wider themes set out in the introduction and which have underpinned

250 Conclusion the detailed analyses: Britain’s key international relationships and alliances, its projection of soft power and its capabilities and use of hard power. In the last section, the chapter reflects on some of the limitations of the study and identifies pertinent areas for future scholarly research.

Foreign and defence policy as an issue area Chapter 2 examined public engagement with foreign and defence policy as an issue area in British politics, assessing the salience of external and domestic issues, perceptions of the parties’ relative competence on foreign and defence policy and the importance of these issues for general elections and voting behaviour. In terms of the salience of external and domestic issues, when compelled to choose the most urgent problem facing the country, the British public has been much more likely, across recent decades, to have perceived economic issues as more pressing for the nation. When asked to select the most important issues, the proportions seeing external affairs as salient have been higher, but – in general – economic issues have been ranked more highly by the British public over time. Bread-and-butter issues have, therefore, been considered of greater concern than have issues of external affairs. Of course, public opinion has been responsive to the unfolding of economic good times and bad times, as it has been to external crises and British military action overseas. The relative importance of external issues has risen and fallen – often sharply and suddenly – in response to external events – such as Britain’s role in military action overseas – and to the content of party-political debate, such as over defence issues in the early 1980s. The evaluations of the parties’ management of and policies on foreign and defence policy have shown that, compared to Labour, the Conservatives have tended to maintain a reputational advantage with the British public. They have been particularly advantaged in terms of their perceived ability to handle defence and nuclear weapons. Public evaluations of relative party competence on relations with Europe have tended to vary more over time, in keeping with the shifting party-political context of this issue and no doubt affected by the serious internal divisions experienced by first Labour and then the Conservatives. The prominence of external issues – for parties’ campaigns and for voters – has varied across general elections. They have generally been eclipsed by the greater relevance of domestic issues – bread-and-butter concerns – for the electorate, shown clearly by the relative priority placed on such issues at recent general elections, particularly concerning the state of the economy and public services. Foreign and defence policy issues, when they have been politically salient in the period leading up an election, have been sporadically prominent in electoral contests, whether as positional or valence concerns: in 1983, where competence on defence of the realm and positions on nuclear weapons were a key diving line; in 2005, where the Iraq War as an

Conclusion  251 issue had some impact on evaluations of Blair and the incumbent Labour government; in 2017, where Brexit was a key issue, amongst others.

Britain’s international relationships and alliances Chapters 3 and 4 provided a detailed assessment of the British public’s views of Britain’s main international relationships – framed within Churchill’s interlocking three circles – in the post-war era: the US and NATO, the Commonwealth and the European Union (EU). Chapter 3 showed that the British public has, in recent decades, consistently seen Europe as Britain’s most important international relationship, well ahead of the US and the Commonwealth. This may well have reflected the reality of EU membership since 1973 and its extensive and augmented decision-making authority across a range of policy areas, in which it can have exclusive or shared competences. This prioritisation of Europe as the key international relationship was still very much the case in 2017, as Britain started the process of withdrawal. In relation to the US, the evidence reviewed in Chapter 3 confirmed an important distinction between, on the one hand, the durability over time of the British public’s generally positive views of the US and its people – what America is – and, on the other, a more changeable and event-driven public mood towards different presidents and their administrations, whether Republican or Democrat – what American does, including its conduct in the international sphere. Chapter 3 also demonstrated that the British public has held a variegated set of views on the value and functioning of the US-UK special relationship. On the one hand, it has consistently recognised the importance of this alliance for British foreign and defence policy and desired its continuation. On the other, the British people have been acutely aware of the limitations of the partnership and its essentially asymmetrical nature, with Britain often perceived to be slavishly following the lead of the US in international affairs, a dilemma that has recurred for post-war prime ministers and continues to cause political controversy in the present day. In the broader realm of transatlantic security arrangements, closely bound up with US-UK relations, the British public has been consistently and strongly supportive of involvement in NATO, affirming its core role as a guarantor of security, both during the Cold War and after. This is an area where a generally strong and durable bipartisan consensus has been sustained amongst the general public, as amongst the political elite (Kavanagh and Morris 1994), throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Indeed, the public’s strong and enduring commitment to NATO is, across areas of foreign and defence policy, perhaps the most obvious example of consensus as ‘popular contentment’, featuring the absence of clear divisions and the presence of a ‘broad-based “middle ground”’ (Owen 1996: 159). Chapter 4 focussed on the European integration process, looking at areas of change and continuity in British public opinion both before and since it

252 Conclusion joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, a period in which economic and political integration has deepened – as bookmarked by key treaties – and the geographical scope of membership has widened. The longterm evidence bears out Britain’s ‘reluctant Europeanism’, which became part of the post-war consensus on foreign and defence policy (Kavanagh and Morris 1994). What the British public were often characterised as in the early post-war decades – before and in the run-up to joining – they can be similarly described as throughout the duration of their membership: ‘reluctant Europeans’. As the ‘policy mood’ evidence demonstrated, there have been significant shifts in the British public’s aggregate views on relations with the EU, with the mood shifting – at different periods of time – in both warmer and colder directions. Compared to other member states, Britain historically has been more likely to exhibit negative sentiment towards membership and the benefits it offers. Relatedly, the British public have also been more reluctant, relative to the EU as a whole, to support the development of common policies which have served to advance political and economic integration over time. The exception here has been opinion on further enlargement of the EU, an area where British governments, Labour and Conservative, have been able to demonstrate consistent support for a common aim, in contrast to often being wary of plans for deepening, such as over EMU. In relation to the broader questions raised in Chapter 1, Britain’s relations with Europe represent the most obvious issue where, within the public, there was a clear and sustained shift in the inter-party divide. The partisan wearers of the ‘pro-European’ and ‘anti-European’ hats swapped over time, both in terms of party elites and their broader social constituencies. In other words, over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, there was a realignment of opinion at the elite and mass levels on this issue. The political and ideological basis of anti-Market sentiment in the 1960s and 1970s was different in key respects from the equivalent basis of Euroscepticism from the 1990s onwards. The longer-term partisan and ideological shifts in public ­opinion – and thus the changing locus of political Euroscepticism – were well illustrated by the differing patterns of group voting at the 1975 and 2016 referendums, which act as ‘bookends’ to the beginning and end of British membership. Also relevant to the questions identified at the outset of this study, in terms of the demographic segments of society, there has been clear consistency over time, with younger age groups and those who are more socio-economically secure being more pro-EU. Older people and those in less secure socio-economic circumstances – in manual occupations, with no formal or lower-level qualifications – have been reasonably consistent repositories of Eurosceptic views.

‘Soft power’ projection Chapter 5 provided a detailed review of the historical and recent evidence pertaining to the British public’s views on overseas aid given to poorer and

Conclusion  253 developing nations, including those countries that were part of the British Empire and subsequently the Commonwealth. This is an area of foreign policy where Britain’s ability to project ‘soft power’ has significantly grown in recent years, underpinned by increased spending – to meet the UN’s 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) target – and a mainstream party-­political consensus on the need to play a leading international role as a donor. Overseas aid has in recent times seen the establishment of a mainstream party consensus on the fundamentals of Britain’s role as an aid donor and increasing political contestation of that role – and the increased spending entailed – by forces on the political right. Historically, the British public were somewhat split over the case for increased spending on aid to poorer countries, although on balance it tended to be opposed to more generous provision. A wealth of polling since 2010 indicates that there has been a stronger and more consistently negative disposition amongst the British public towards increased aid spending. Indeed, this area was highlighted by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the tabloids as a stark example of the ‘disconnect’ between the preferences of the British public and the policies and priorities pursued by the mainstream parties, in the context of trade-offs between overseas aid and domestic spending in the era of austerity politics at home. Conservative supporters in the wider electorate have been starkly at odds with the settled approach to aid spending – part of a broader consensus across mainstream parties – pursued under David ­Cameron and Theresa May, governing in coalition between 2010 and 2015, and as a single party since May 2015. Both the historical and contemporary data indicate that there have been enduring partisan and ideological differences on the provision of foreign aid to poorer and developing countries. In terms of the question posed in Chapter 1 on consistent inter-party divides on foreign policy issues, the evidence suggests that those on the political and ideological left have tended to be more favourable to increased provision, and those on the political and ideological right have tended to be opposed to the expansion of aid-giving overseas.

‘Hard power’ projection Chapters 6 and 7 provided a detailed assessment of the British public’s views towards areas of a country’s hard power capabilities: spending on defence, the possession of nuclear weapons and cases of overseas military intervention. Defence spending and nuclear weapons – for the small subset of countries possessing such a capability – represent key areas of investigation when examining popular support for the cost of national defence (Bartels 1994). Some reasonably robust conclusions can be drawn regarding the patterning of public opinion and of the views of societal groups towards defence spending and nuclear weapons. Over time, the British public has tended to side with ‘butter’ – most obviously, in relation to health and ­education – over ‘guns’ when required to trade-off and prioritise spending on domestic and

254 Conclusion external issues. When considered on their own merits, support for increased spending has also tended to be higher for key public services, though defence has been ranked higher than some areas of domestic policy. The historical data also show that preferences on defence spending are, to some extent, responsive to the wider political, economic and international climate. Over time, there has been a recurring difference in the preferences of party supporters towards defence spending, with Conservatives more likely than other partisan groups to approve of increased spending on Britain’s defences and more likely to disapprove of reductions. Conservative supporters have thus taken a more hawkish stance than have Labour and Liberal (Democrat) supporters. In their views on nuclear weapons, the public has tended, on the whole, to support Britain’s possession of them, both during and after the Cold War. Again, the balance of public opinion has tended to back retention of this aspect of the post-war consensus on foreign and defence policy (Kavanagh and Morris 1994). On the Trident debate, the evidence tends to support Berrington’s (1986) characterisation of the British public as a ‘conservative electorate’ on this issue – inclined towards the status quo, resistant to major changes in nuclear defence, including the country giving up the weapons it possesses or acquiring new types of weapons. Support for unilateralism, or for a unilateral approach to international disarmament, has generally been a view held by a minority of the general public. Across time, there have been enduring party-political differences on the subject, with Conservative supporters tending to be more supportive of Britain’s nuclear arsenal, again holding more ‘hawkish’ views. Labour supporters have traditionally been less inclined to favour Britain having nuclear weapons and more likely to hold unilateralist views. Party-political differences at the grassroots level have also been evident on the Trident debate, where public opinion has tended to support – in some form – the retention of Britain’s nuclear defence system. Conservative and UKIP supporters, along with those on the right ideologically, have adopted a more ‘hawkish’ stance in their strong support for a like-for-like replacement. Supporters of the left-leaning parties – and those on the ideological left – have been more ‘dovish’, being more likely to oppose a like-for-like renewal and more supportive of a scaled back and less costly replacement or even full abolition of Britain’s nuclear weapons capability. On the issues of nuclear weapons and defence expenditure, there has been a reasonably clear and consistent patterning of partisan views – ­thinking back to the broader questions identified in Chapter 1 – with Conservative Party supporters usually providing stronger backing for the projection of hard power – that is, for retaining Britain’s unconventional forces and maintaining spending commitments on conventional forces. The inter-party divide has, in broad terms, been sustained over time. Chapter 7 provided detailed analysis of British public opinion towards military interventions undertaken in the post-9/11 period, focussing on a classic example of ‘hard power’ projection in foreign policy. These cases

Conclusion  255 differed in the rationale for military forces engaging in action, in the ­duration and scope of the military commitment and in the degree of party-political agreement and public support. For those cases where time-series data were available during the conflicts, there is some evidence to suggest that views on the issue of going to war, as well as evaluations of how a campaign is going, to some extent reflect the ‘situation on the ground’, as has been demonstrated in the US context (Holsti 2004, 2011). In the protracted interventions undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan, public support for these interventions tended to decline over time, albeit the former was much more politically divisive from the outset. Other interventions, perceived as ‘just wars’, which commanded strong public backing, had positive impacts on the ratings of prime ministers and governing parties in post-war Britain (Worcester 1991: 87). Exactly the opposite happened in the case of the 2003 Iraq War, which was detrimental to the public’s evaluations of Blair and his government. The much-remarked ‘shadow of Iraq’ may have shaped the British public’s appetite for subsequent interventions, including those which were initiated with a clearer legal basis and stronger domestic and international backing. This may also have conditioned the public’s receptiveness for different types of military operations, with a general preference for a more restricted mandate, typically involving air strikes and special forces operations rather than the large-scale deployment of conventional forces on the ground. In terms of group-related patterns, there was generally strong and consistent evidence across the different cases of military intervention in the post-9/11 era for a ‘gender gap’ in British public opinion. In each case analysed, the differences in opinion were generally clear and consistent, with men more supportive than women of military action. The findings from this chapter underline the observation ‘that it is rare to find scholarship in which gender differences on the question of using military force are not present’ (Eichenberg and Stoll 2012: 335). Returning to the questions asked in ­Chapter 1, the use of military force overseas has featured a distinctive and enduring difference of opinion, with a demographic rather than a partisan basis. The party-political patterning of opinion has, however, been variegated across the different military interventions discussed here. This partly reflects features of the prevailing political context: which parties have been in government and opposition, the stance taken by their leaders and whether military action has been a divisive issue within and outside the parliamentary arena. For recent military interventions abroad which have been divisive back home, politics has clearly not ‘stopped at the water’s edge’ (Holsti 2011: 4). This is not an area where there has been a clear and consistent inter-party divide across each case of military intervention.

Limitations of the study and areas for future research The strong and distinctive contribution made by this study to several different areas of scholarship in political science and modern British history

256 Conclusion has been reiterated, but there are some limitations regarding the scope and nature of the analysis which is it worth highlighting here. These concern the extent of the subject matter analysed and the methodological scope. Not all of the substantive policy issues examined in Chapters 2–7 were equally well served in terms of the extant data available. The amount of coverage in historical survey and polling data of the Commonwealth and Britain’s relations with it was quite limited, when compared to that on UK-US relations and European integration, so this area was only afforded a modest amount of coverage in Chapter 3, when analysing the public’s perceptions of their country’s key international relationships. Relatedly, as Owen has observed, in terms of examining the public’s views on Britain’s process of imperial disengagement in the early post-war period, the ‘evidence from opinion polls is scanty and often too coarse to permit detailed conclusions to be drawn’ (1996: 174). Similarly, while more recently overseas aid has been the subject of much opinion polling, the historical data on this topic were quite limited. In terms of the methodological scope of the book, Chapters 2–7 have featured detailed presentation and discussion of an extensive array of survey and polling data used, involving analysis of time-series data on a range of issues on as well as consistent focus on bivariate analysis of the historical and contemporary opinions of segments of British society, both demographic and party-political. So, while some clear conclusions have been drawn about – sometimes enduring – group-related divisions on key debates in wider society, as Crewe cautions, are the distinctive attitudes of a particular social group held because of the distinctive attributes of that group? It is always tempting, but not always correct, to conclude that they are … It is not always clear, moreover, quite what the distinctive attributes of a social category are. For example, differences of attitude between age categories could denote a “life cycle” or a “generational” phenomenon (or both). In the first case, the attitudes of young respondents would be expected to change as they grew older; in the second case they might persist throughout their lifetime because they represent the outlook of a generation that shared the same formative experiences in youth. (1985: 48) A fruitful area for future scholarly research is therefore to undertake more in-depth analyses of British public opinion – both contemporary and over the long term – to assess the relative impact of particular demographic and political variables on the range of policy issues examined in Chapters 2–7 and to assess the explanatory leverage of differing explanations of age-­related variation in opinion. Relatedly, whilst this study has placed the content of and findings from the data within the wider political context of British foreign and defence policy, future research could usefully reanalyse the source materials used here when undertaking more thematically or temporally focussed

Conclusion  257 studies of particular case studies, issues or periods of government or prime ministerial tenure in the post-war era. A final reflection on future academic enquiry returns to an observation made in Chapter 1 when outlining the source materials used for this study, namely the absence of a long-running foreign policy survey tracking the British public’s views, as has existed in the US through the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations’ concurrent surveys of the American public and its foreign policy elites or opinion-makers, providing a regular barometer of attitudinal change and continuity, which was established in the 1970s (ICPSR: American Public Opinion and United States Foreign Policy Series, n/d). Establishing and maintaining such an initiative, which could encompass the main issues which featured in this study, would be of great benefit to political scientists working on contemporary British public opinion in this area and would – over the longer term – ultimately be an important resource for historians of British foreign and defence policy and of its political parties. It would also complement – but allow for a richer, more contextually informed focus than is currently provided by – cross-national surveys, such as the Pew Research Centre’s Global Attitudes Project (GAP).

Appendix 1

Voting in the 1975 EEC and 2016 EU referendums

Table 4.1a  Voting in the 1975 EEC referendum by demographic group and newspaper Variable

Category

Stay (%)

Leave (%)

Sex

Male Female Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ AB C1 C2 DE Union member Not a member TEA: 13 and under TEA: 14 TEA: 15 TEA: 16 TEA: 17 TEA: 18 and over Owned outright Mortgage Rents – privately Rents – local council None Daily Express Guardian Daily Mail Daily Mirror/Record Sun Daily Telegraph Other – national or regional

71 73 62 72 73 80 85 75 64 62 74 66 79 69 64 77 87 86 82 76 66 62 71 78 77 84 65 60 89 71

29 27 38 28 27 20 15 25 37 38 26 34 21 31 36 23 13 14 18 24 34 38 29 22 23 17 35 40 11 29

Age group

Social class

Trade union Age completed education

Tenure

Newspaper

Source: BES 1974-75-79 panel study (October 1974 cross section and post-referendum wave). Percentages sum across the columns.

260  Appendix 1 Table 4.2a  Voting in the 1975 EEC referendum by party identification and leftright issues Variable

Category

Stay (%)

Leave (%)

Party identification

Conservative Labour Liberal Other party None Important Not sure Not important A lot more A few more No more Some private companies Cut back a lot Cut back a bit Stay as they are More are needed Gone too far About right Not gone far enough Too much power Not too much power Too much power Not too much power

88 57 77 49 70 65 74 84 46 65 78 79 73 78 73 64 80 71 62 76 53 69 77

13 43 23 51 30 35 26 16 54 35 22 21 27 22 27 36 20 30 39 24 47 31 23

Redistribution Nationalisation

Social services

Welfarea Trade unions Big business

Source: BES 1974-75-79 panel study (October 1974 cross section and post-referendum wave). Percentages sum across the columns. a Combines ‘gone much too far’ and ‘gone too far’ and combines ‘not gone far enough’ and ‘not gone nearly far enough’.

Table 4.3a  Voting in the 1975 EEC referendum by social issues Variable

Category

Stay (%)

Leave (%)

Abortion

Gone too far About right Not gone far enough Gone too far About right Not gone far enough Gone too far About right Not gone far enough Gone too far About right Not gone far enough

74 73 63 75 68 65 71 74 70 69 75 71

26 27 37 25 32 35 29 26 30 32 25 29

Pornography Racial equality Sex equality

Appendix 1  261 Law-breaking Less respect for authority

Gone too far About right Not gone far enough Gone too far About right Not gone far enough

73 68 72 74 59 65

27 32 28 26 41 35

Source: BES 1974-75-79 panel study (October 1974 cross section and post-referendum wave). Percentages sum across the columns. Note: Combines ‘gone much too far’ and ‘gone too far’ and combines ‘not gone far enough’ and ‘not gone nearly far enough’.

Table 4.4a  Voting in the 2016 EU referendum by demographic group Variable

Category

Remain Leave (%) (%)

Sex

Male Female Aged 18–29 Aged 30–44 Aged 45–64 Aged 65+ AB C1 C2 DE TEA: 15 and under TEA: 16 TEA: 17–18 TEA: 19 TEA: 20 and over TEA: Still in education Owned outright Mortgage Rents – privately Rents – council or housing association Other No qualifications GCSE A-Level Undergraduate Postgraduate

51 51 68 52 44 41 59 56 41 42 31 34 48 49 66 76 45 53 60 38

49 49 32 49 56 59 41 44 59 58 70 66 52 51 34 24 55 47 40 62

63 28 36 54 63 74

38 72 64 47 37 26

Age group

Social class

Age completed education

Tenure

Educational level

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2014–18, Wave 9. Percentages sum across the columns.

262  Appendix 1 Table 4.5a  Voting in the 2016 EU referendum by newspaper and party identification Variable

Category

Remain (%)

Leave (%)

Newspaper readership

Daily Express Daily Mail Daily Mirror / Record Sun Daily Telegraph Guardian Independent The Times Other paper None Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat UKIP SNP Plaid Cymru Green Party Other party None

30 34 56 30 45 91 85 70 64 59 37 64 75 3 65 73 86 58 48

70 66 44 70 55 9 15 30 36 41 63 36 25 97 35 27 14 43 52

Party identification

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2014–18, Wave 9. Percentages sum across the columns.

Table 4.6a  Voting in the 2016 EU referendum by left-right issues and self-placement scale Variable Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off Big business takes advantage of ordinary people

Category

Agree Neither Disagree Agree Neither Disagree Ordinary working people do not get Agree their fair share of the nation’s wealth Neither Disagree There is one law for the rich and one for Agree Neither the poor Disagree Management will always try to get Agree Neither the better of employees if it gets the Disagree chance Left-right self-placement scale Left Centre Right

Remain (%) Leave (%) 55 45 42 49 47 54 51 45 50 49 48 55 47 52 57 81 51 28

45 55 58 51 53 46 50 55 50 51 52 45 53 48 43 19 49 72

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2014–18, Wave 10. Percentages sum across the columns. Note: Combines ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ and combines ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’.

Appendix 1  263 Table 4.7a  Voting in the 2016 EU referendum by libertarian-authoritarian and social equality issues Variable Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence Schools should teach children to obey authority

Category

Agree Neither Disagree Agree Neither Disagree Agree Neither Disagree Censorship of films and magazines Agree Neither is necessary to uphold moral Disagree standards People who break the law should Agree Neither be given stiffer sentences Disagree Racial equality Gone too far About right Not gone far enough Female equality Gone too far About right Not gone far enough Gay equality Gone too far About right Not gone far enough

Remain (%)

Leave (%)

38 65 85 32 50 75 41 63 78 41 48 65 39 66 85 72 56 77

63 36 16 68 50 25 59 37 22 60 52 35 61 34 15 28 44 23

34 46 62

66 54 38

31 52 70

69 48 30

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2014–18, Waves 9 and 10. Percentages sum across the columns. Note: Combines ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ and combines ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. Combines ‘gone much too far’ and ‘gone too far’ and combines ‘not gone far enough’ and ‘not gone nearly far enough’.

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List of opinion polls cited

Angus Reid The specific URLs for opinion polls on the war in Afghanistan are no longer working.

Ashcroft Polls Chapter 2 Ashcroft Polls (2015a), fieldwork: 6–9 June. Available at: https://lordash croftpolls.com/2017/06/result-happen-post-vote-survey/. Ashcroft Polls (2017a), fieldwork: 7 May. Available at: https://lordashcroftpolls. com/2015/05/why-did-people-vote-as-they-did-my-post-vote-poll/.

ComRes Chapter 2 ComRes (2015a), fieldwork: 25–28 September. Available at: http://www.­ comresglobal.com/polls/daily-mail-september-political-poll/. ComRes (2017a), fieldwork: 11 May. Available at: http://www.comresglobal. com/polls/daily-mirror-ge2017-poll/. Chapter 3 ComRes (2015b), fieldwork: 14–15 January 2015. Available at: http://www. comresglobal.com/polls/sunday-mirror-independent-on-sunday-january-­ 2015-political-poll/. ComRes (2016a), fieldwork: 10–12 August. Available at: http://www.comres global.com/polls/sunday-mirror-independent-political-poll-august2016/.

284  List of opinion polls cited ComRes (2016b), fieldwork: 9–10 November. Available at: http://www. comresglobal.com/polls/sunday-mirror-independent-november-2016-­ political-poll/. ComRes(2016c),fieldwork:7–8December.Availableat:http://www.comresglobal. com/polls/independent-sunday-mirror-political-poll-december-2016/. ComRes (2017b), fieldwork: 8–10 February. Available at: http://www.comres global.com/polls/independent-sunday-mirror-political-poll-­february-2017/. ComRes (2017c), fieldwork: 11–13 January. Available at: http://www. com resglobal.com /polls/sunday-m irror-independent-politicalpoll-jan-2017/. Chapter 5 ComRes (2014a), fieldwork: 7–9 February. Available at: http://www.comres global.com/polls/itv-news-index-74/. ComRes (2014b), fieldwork: 26–28 September. Available at: http://www. comresglobal.com/polls/whitehouse-consultancy-foreign-aid-poll/. ComRes (2015c), fieldwork: 13–15 November. Available at: http://www.comres global.com/polls/itv-news-tax-credits-survey/. ComRes (2015d), fieldwork: 20–22 November. Available at: http://www. comresglobal.com/polls/daily-mail-political-poll-november-2015/. ComRes (2016d), fieldwork: 16–17 November. Available at: http://www.comres global.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/United-Nations-Association-_UK-Values-Polling-_-Data-Tables.pdf. Chapter 6 ComRes (2006a), fieldwork: 13–29 November. Available at: http://www.comres global.com/polls/nuclear-deterrence-29th-november-2006/. ComRes (2009a), fieldwork: 4–6 September. Available at: http://www.comres global.com/polls/political-poll-for-the-independent-17/. ComRes (2010a), fieldwork: 14–16 September. Available at: http:// w w w.com resg lobal.com /polls/sunday-m ir ror-indep endent-onsunday-political-poll-2/. ComRes (2013a), fieldwork: 22 August–6 September. Available at: http:// www.comresglobal.com/polls/bbc-sunday-politics-liberal-democratcouncillors-survey/. ComRes (2013b), fieldwork: 22 August–6 September. Available at: http://www.comresglobal.com/polls/bbc-sunday-politics-labourcouncillors-survey/. ComRes (2014c), fieldwork: 1 August–16 September. Available at: http://www.comresglobal.com/polls/bbc-sunday-politics-labourcandidates-survey/. ComRes (2014d), fieldwork: 29 January–2 February. Available at: http://www. comresglobal.com/polls/wmd-awareness-nuclear-weapons-survey/. ComRes (2015e), fieldwork: 27 February–20 March. Available at: http://www. comresglobal.com/polls/bbc-sunday-politics-green-councillors-survey/.

List of opinion polls cited  285 ComRes (2016e), fieldwork: 13–15 January. Available at: http://www. comresglobal.com/polls/sunday-mirror-independent-on-sundayjanuary-2016-political-poll/. Chapter 7 ComRes (2009b), fieldwork: 15–16 July. Available at: http://www.comres global.com/wp-content/themes/comres/poll/Political_Poll_19_July_09. pdf. ComRes (2009c), fieldwork: 24–26 July. Available at: http://www.comres global.com/polls/afghanistan-poll-for-the-independent/. ComRes (2009d), fieldwork: 4–5 November. Available at: http://www.­ comresglobal.com/polls/afghanistan-poll-for-bbc-ones-politics-show/. ComRes (2009e), fieldwork: 10–11 November. Available at: http://www.­ comresglobal.com/polls/independent-on-sunday-poll-4/. ComRes (2010b), fieldwork: 29–31 January. Available at: http://www.comres ­g lobal.com/wp-content/themes/comres/poll/Iraq_Political_Poll_3_ February_2010.pdf. ComRes (2010c), fieldwork: 19–21 February. Available at: http://www.­ comresglobal.com/polls/bbc-newsnight-afghanistan-poll/. ComRes (2010d), fieldwork: 24–25 February. Available at: http://www.­ comresglobal.com/polls/bbc-east-afghanistan-poll/. ComRes (2011a), fieldwork: 18–20 March. Available at: http://www.comres global.com/polls/itv-news-cuts-index-libya-poll/. ComRes (2011b), fieldwork: 23–25 March. Available at: http://www.comres global.com/polls/itv-news-budget-week-cuts-index-libya-poll/. ComRes (2011c), fieldwork: 30 September–2 October. Available at: http:// www.comresglobal.com/polls/itv-news-afghanistan-anniversary-poll/. ComRes (2013c), fieldwork: 8–10 March. Available at: http://www.­ comresglobal.com/polls/itv-news-index-36/. ComRes (2014e), fieldwork: 24–26 October. Available at: http://www.com resglobal.com/polls/itv-news-index-eu-and-afghanistan/.

Ipsos MORI Chapter 3 Ipsos MORI (2016a), fieldwork: 25 March–8 April. Available at: https:// www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/americans-more-likely-britonssay-there-special-relationship. Ipsos MORI (2017a), fieldwork: 27 October–1 November. Available at: https:// www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/majority-britons-think-trumps-­ election-has-worsened-americas-standing-world. Chapter 6 Ipsos MORI (2005a), fieldwork: 8–13 September. Available at: https://www. ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/attitudes-nuclear-weapons.

286  List of opinion polls cited Ipsos MORI (2016b), fieldwork: 23–25 January. Available at: https://www.­ ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/conservatives-take-their-biggest-leadover-labour-party-best-team-leaders-and-most-clear-and-united. Chapter 7 Ipsos MORI (2001a), fieldwork: 14 September. Available at: https://ems.­ ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/1343/British-­ Reaction-To-Attacks-On-America.aspx. Ipsos MORI (2001b), fieldwork: various dates. Available at: https://www.­ ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/support-war-afghanistan-trends-2001. Ipsos MORI (2002a), fieldwork: 15–17 March. Available at: https://www. ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/time-poll-reveals-declining-britishsupport-war-against-terror. Ipsos MORI (2002b), fieldwork: various dates. Available at: https://ems. ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2373/Handlingthe-Response-to-the-September-11th-attacks-trends.aspx?view=wide. Ipsos MORI (2003a), fieldwork: 25–27 July. Available at: https://ems.­ipsosmori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/832/PostWar-IraqTrust-In-Blair-And-The-BBC.aspx. Ipsos MORI (2007a), fieldwork: various dates. Available at: https://www.­ ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/war-iraq-trends-2002-2007. Ipsos MORI (2009a), fieldwork: various dates. Available at: https://www.­ ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/attitudes-afghanistan-campaign. Ipsos MORI (2011a), fieldwork: 5–7 April. Available at: https://www.ipsos. com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/reutersipsos-mori-international-poll-libya. Ipsos MORI (2013a), fieldwork: 9–11 March. Available at: https://www.ipsos. com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/iraq-war-damaged-britains-reputation-world. Ipsos MORI (2015a), fieldwork: 11–13 January. Available at: https://www. ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/british-public-attitudes-afghanistan.

Populus Chapter 5 Populus (2015a), fieldwork: 17–19 April. Available at: https://www.populus. co.uk/polls/. Chapter 6 Populus (2006a), fieldwork: 8–10 December. Available at: https://www.­ populus.co.uk/polls/. Populus (2007a), fieldwork: 21–22 February. Available at: https://www.­ populus.co.uk/polls/. Chapter 7 Populus (2009a), fieldwork: 10–11 July. Available at: https://www.populus. co.uk/polls/.

List of opinion polls cited  287 Populus (2009b), fieldwork: 4–6 December. Available at: https://www.popu lus.co.uk/polls/. Populus (2014a), fieldwork: 24–26 October. Available at: https://www.popu lus.co.uk/polls/.

Survation Chapter 5 Survation (2017), fieldwork: 21–22 April. Available at: http://survation.com/ wp-content/uploads/2017/04/MOS-GE-Tables-I-2c0d7h2-2004SWCH.pdf.

YouGov Chapter 2 YouGov (n/d-a), ‘Tracker: Most Important Issues’. Available from: https:// yougov.co.uk/publicopinion/archive/?category=political-trackers. YouGov (n/d-b), ‘Tracker: Best Party on Issues’. Available from: https://yougov. co.uk/publicopinion/archive/?category=political-trackers. YouGov (2015a), fieldwork: 9–10 April. Available at: http://cdn.yougov. com/cumulus_uploads/document/sdrh6ri3on/InternalResults_150410_­ defence_Website.pdf. YouGov (2016a), fieldwork: 14–15 July. Available at: https://d25d2506s fb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/v6sx2kxrkf/Trident_­ Results_160715_Website.pdf. YouGov (2017a), fieldwork: various dates. Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/ news/2016/02/19/tracker-labour-v-tories-defence/. YouGov (2017b), fieldwork: 28–30 May. Available at: https://d25d2506sfb94s. cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/5dejcmcp1e/TanyaResults_ 170529_issues_website.pdf. Chapter 3 YouGov (2014a), fieldwork: 31 July–1 August. Available at: http://d25d2506s fb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/1hdxa38zho/Internal Results_140801_NATO_W.pdf. YouGov (2014b), fieldwork: 6–12 August. Available at: https://www.chatham house.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150129 YouGovGP.pdf. YouGov (2017c), fieldwork: 19–24 January. Available at: https://d25d2506s fb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/pfz9x79p4u/January_ Eurotrack_NATO_W.pdf. YouGov (2017d), fieldwork: 30–31 January. Available at: https://d25d2506s fb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/qpe8e6s0j9/Times Results_170131_Trump_W.pdf. YouGov (2017e), fieldwork: 13 October. Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/ opi/surveys/results#/survey/1a731f84-aff5-11e7-a7db-8553e85337f4.

288  List of opinion polls cited YouGov (2017f), fieldwork: 30 November–1 December. Available at: https:// d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/­6awichz3zu/ TrumpVisit_w.pdf. YouGov (2018a), fieldwork: 29–30 January. Available at: https://d25d2506 sf b94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/rd0ugibs92/Inter nalResults_180130_TrumpQs.pdf. Chapter 5 YouGov (2013a), fieldwork: 7–8 March. Available at: https://d25d2506sfb94s. cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/6ermykkegf/YG-­A rchivePol-Sunday-Times-results-08-100313.pdf. YouGov (2014bc), fieldwork: 9–10 January. Available at: http://cdn.yougov.­ com/cumulus_uploads/document/9zzdddu0no/YG-Archive-Pol-­ Sunday-Times-results-140110.pdf. YouGov (2015b), fieldwork: 12–13 March. Available at: http://cdn.yougov.­ com/cumulus_uploads/document/9owe37gg5d/YG-Archive-Pol-­ Sunday-Times-results-130315.pdf. YouGov (2015c), fieldwork: 23–24 November. Available at: https://d25d2506s f b94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus _uploads/document/qng2o5724u/­ InternalResults_151124_SpendingReview_Website.pdf. Chapter 6 YouGov (2007a), fieldwork: 15–16 March. Available at: https:// d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/today_uk_import/YG-Archives-polstimes-vi-070319.pdf. YouGov (2013b), fieldwork: 23–24 April. Available at: https://d25d2506s f b94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/dq60jrxc27/YGArchive-Public-Administration-Select-Committee-results-240413Trident-nuclear-weapons.pdf. YouGov (2015d), fieldwork: 12–13 March. Available at: http://cdn.you gov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/9owe37gg5d/YG-Archive-Pol-­ Sunday-Times-results-130315.pdf. YouGov (2015e), fieldwork: 10–11 April. Available at: https://d25d2506sfb94s. cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/oqslggwc4a/YG-ArchivePol-Sunday-Times-results-110415.pdf. YouGov (2015f), fieldwork: 23–24 September. Available: https://d25d ­2506sf b94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/evkrgnccss/ ProspectResults_150924_W.pdf. YouGov (2016b), fieldwork: 14–15 July. Available at: https://d25d2506s fb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/v6sx2kxrkf/Trident_­ Results_160715_Website.pdf. YouGov (2016c), fieldwork: 26–27 July. Available at: https://d25d2506sfb94s. cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/sdchc0pmmj/Internal Results_160727_Nukes_W.pdf.

List of opinion polls cited  289 Chapter 7 YouGov (2005a), fieldwork: various dates. Available at: https://d25d2506sfb94s. cloudfront.net/today_uk_import/YG-Archives-Pol-­Trackers-2003-2005. pdf. YouGov (2007b), fieldwork: various dates. Available at: https:// d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/today_uk_import/YG-Archives-Pol-­ Trackers-2005-2007.pdf. YouGov (2007c), fieldwork: 10–11 May. Available at: https://d25d2506sfb94s. cloudfront.net/today_uk_import/YG-Archives-pol-stimes-vi-070514. pdf. YouGov (2010a), fieldwork: 31 August–1 September. Available at: http://cdn. yougov.com/today_uk_import/YG-Archives-Pol-Sun-Blair-010910.pdf. YouGov (2013c), fieldwork: various dates. Available at: https://d25d2506s f b94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/8j5p7iqr7p/YG-­ Archives-Pol-Trackers-Afghanistan-080113.pdf. YouGov (2014d), fieldwork: 3–4 April. Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/ news/2014/04/04/afghanistan-final-verdict/. YouGov (2014e), fieldwork: 26–27 October. Available at: https://d25d2506s f b94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus _uploads/document/7fcy mwk7j2/­ RedBoxResults_141027_Afghanistan_Website.pdf. YouGov (2017g), fieldwork: 19–22 May. Available at: https://d25d2506sfb94s. cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/mtyn1swxhh/Internal Results_170520_War_W.pdf.

List of survey data sets used for secondary analysis

British Election Study Alt, J., Crewe, I.M. and Sarlvik, B., British Election Study, February 1974; Cross-­ Section Survey [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1976. SN: 359, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-359-1. Brand, J.A. and Mitchell, J.C., General Election in Scotland, 1992 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], March 1994. SN: 3171, http:// dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3171-1. Butler, D. and Stokes, D.E., Political Change in Britain, 1969–1970 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], January 1980. SN: 1093, http:// dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-1093-1. Butler, D. and Stokes, D.E., Political Change in Britain, 1963–1970; Merged File [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], January 1974. SN: 44, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-44-1. Clarke, H. et al., British Election Study, 2005: Face-to-Face Survey [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], November 2006. SN: 5494, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5494-1. Clarke, H. et al., British General Election Study, 2001; Cross-Section Survey [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], March 2003. SN: 4619, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4619-1. Crewe, I.M., Robertson, D.R. and Sarlvik, B., British Election Study, May 1979; Cross-Section Survey [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1981. SN: 1533, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-1533-1. Crewe, I.M., Robertson, D.R. and Sarlvik, B., British Election Study, February 1974, October 1974, June 1975, May 1979 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 1614, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-1614-1 Crewe, I.M., Robertson, D.R. and Sarlvik, B., British Election Study, October 1974; Cross-Section Survey [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1977. SN: 666, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-666-1. Heath, A. et al., British General Election Study, 1997; Cross-Section Survey [computer file]. 2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], May 1999. SN: 3887, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3887-1. Heath, A. et al., British General Election Study, 1992; Cross-Section Survey [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 1993. SN: 2981, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2981-1. Heath, A., Jowell, R. and Curtice, J.K., British General Election Study, 1983; Cross-Section Survey [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1983. SN: 2005, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2005-1.

292  List of survey data sets used for secondary analysis Heath, A., Jowell, R. and Curtice, J.K., British General Election Study, 1987; Cross-Section Survey [computer file]. 2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 1993. SN: 2568, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-2568-1. Fieldhouse, E., Green, J., Evans, G., Schmitt, H., van der Eijk, C., Mellon, J. and Prosser, C. (2016). British Election Study, 2015: Face-to-Face Post-Election Survey [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 7972, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-7972-1. Fieldhouse, E., Green, J., Evans, G., Schmitt, H., van der Eijk, C., Mellon, J. and Prosser, C. (2016). British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1–9. http://doi. org/10.15127/1.293723. Fieldhouse, E., Green, J., Evans, G., Schmitt, H., van der Eijk, C., Mellon, J. and Prosser, C. (2015). British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 10. http://doi. org/10.15127/1.293723.

British Social Attitudes National Centre for Social Research. (2017). British Social Attitudes Survey, 2015 [data collection]. 3rd Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 8116, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-8116-3. National Centre for Social Research. (2016). British Social Attitudes Survey, 2014 [data collection]. 2nd Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 7809, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-7809-2. National Centre for Social Research. (2014). British Social Attitudes Survey, 2013 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 7500, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-7500-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2012 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 2014. SN: 7476, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7476-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2011 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], March 2013. SN: 7237, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7237-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2010 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], February 2012. SN: 6969, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6969-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2009 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], February 2011. SN: 6695, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6695-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2008 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], March 2010. SN: 6390, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6390-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2007 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 2009. SN: 6240, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6240-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2006 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 2008. SN: 5823, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5823-1.

List of survey data sets used for secondary analysis  293 National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2005 [computer file]. 2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], October 2007. SN: 5618, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5618-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2004 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], February 2006. SN: 5329, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5329-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2003 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], September 2005. SN: 5235, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5235-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2002 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], March 2004. SN: 4838, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4838-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2001 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], February 2003. SN: 4615, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4615-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2000 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], March 2002. SN: 4486, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4486-1. National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1999 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], January 2001. SN: 4318, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4318-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1998 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], June 2000. SN: 4131, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4131-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1997 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], February 2000. SN: 4072, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4072-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1996 [computer file]. 2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], December 1999. SN: 3921, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3921-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1995 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], January 1998. SN: 3764, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3764-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1994 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1996. SN: 3572, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3572-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1993 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], November 1995. SN: 3439, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3439-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1991 [computer file]. 2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], October 1999. SN: 2952, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2952-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1990 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], November 1991. SN: 2840, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2840-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1989 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], November 1990. SN: 2723, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2723-1.

294  List of survey data sets used for secondary analysis Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1987 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], February 1989. SN: 2567, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2567-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1986 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], February 1988. SN: 2315, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2315-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1985 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], May 1986. SN: 2096, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2096-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1984 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1985. SN: 2035, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2035-1. Social and Community Planning Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 1983 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1984. SN: 1935, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-1935-1. Eurobarometer The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970–2002 [computer file]. GESIS Study ZA3521, 2nd Edition (2.01). Cologne, Germany. European Commission: Eurobarometer 66.1 (2006). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [producer]. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive. ZA4526 data file version 1.0.1, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10980. European Commission: Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [producer]. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive. ZA4414 data file version 1.1.0, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10970. European Commission: Eurobarometer 62.2 (2004). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [producer]. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive. ZA4231 data file version 1.1.0, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10964. European Commission: Eurobarometer 60.1 (2003). European Opinion Research Group, Brussels [producer]. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive. ZA3938 data file version 1.0.1, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10958. European Commission: Eurobarometer 58.1 (2002). European Opinion Research Group, Brussels [producer]. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive. ZA3693 data file version 1.0.1, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10953. National Opinion Polls NOP Market Research Limited. (2017). National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys, July 1977 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 1528, http://doi. org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-1528-1. NOP Market Research Limited. (2017). National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys: 25 February-2 March 1975 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 421, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-421-1. NOP Market Research Limited. (2017). National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys: 6–11 August, 1974 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 412, http:// doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-412-1. NOP Market Research Limited. Survey on the Common Market, January 1977 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 1102, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-1102-1.

List of survey data sets used for secondary analysis  295 NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys: 4–9 February, 1975 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 420, http://doi. org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-420-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 419, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-419-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 414, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-414-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys, 14–17 February 1974 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 81, http://doi. org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-81-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys, 19–24 June 1973 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 77, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-77-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys, 28 November-3 December 1972 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 69, http:// doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-69-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys, 14–19 November 1972 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 68, http://doi. org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-68-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys, 17–22 October 1972 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 67, http://doi. org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-67-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys, 26 September-1 October 1972 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 66, http:// doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-66-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys, 25–30 July 1972 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 64, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-64-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 63, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-63-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 71004, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-71004-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 71002, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-71002-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 69037, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-69037-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 69029, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-69029-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 69021, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-69021-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 67011, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-67011-1.

296  List of survey data sets used for secondary analysis NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 66029, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-66029-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 66020, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-66020-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 66017, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-66017-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 66013, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-66013-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 66007, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-66007-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 66006, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-66006-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 65020, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-65020-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys, March 1965 I [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 65011, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-65011-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys, February 1965 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 65010, http://doi. org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-65010-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 64018, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-64018-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 64012, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-64012-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Survey, March 1964 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 64006, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-64006-1. NOP Market Research Limited. National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 64005, http://doi.org/10.5255/ UKDA-SN-64005-1. Other survey data sets Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited. Gallup Poll, May 1975 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 1330, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-1330-1. Social and Community Planning Research. (1975). Britain in the Seventies, 1971 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 84, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-84-1. Social and Community Planning Research, Centre for Sample Surveys Ltd. Britain and the Seventies, 1973 [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 117, http://doi. org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-117-1.

List of survey data sets used for secondary analysis  297 Stelzenmueller, C., Isernia, P., and Eichenberg, R., Transatlantic Trends Survey, 2014. ICPSR36138-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2015-07-24, http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36138.v1. Worcester, R.M. and Gosschalk, B., MORI Attitudes to the Common Market Poll, 1980 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1981. SN: 1645. Worcester, R.M. and Gosschalk, B., MORI Voice of Britain Poll, October 1977 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1977. SN: 980. Worcester, R.M. and Gosschalk, B., MORI Party Conference Poll, 1977 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1977. SN: 790, http://dx. doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-790-1. British Election Study Continuous Monitoring Survey, Cumulative File April 2004 – December 2013. http://bes2009-10.org/cms-data.php. Pew Global Attitudes Survey Datasets, 2002–2016. http://www.pewglobal.org/ datasets/.

Index

Note: page numbers in bold indicate tables, italics indicate figures Afghanistan 9, 32, 204; Britain’s involvement in 219–20, 224–6; ‘forcefor-change’ mission 205; ‘force-fororder’ mission 205; military campaign in 221, 222; war in 219–30; withdrawal of British troops 223, 223, 227, 228 Alexander, Douglas 231, 236 America First 4, 47, 62 Angus Reid polls 222 anti-Americanism 8, 63–4, 73 anti-Common Market sentiment 108, 127 ‘anti-European’ 118, 133, 252 Ashcroft, Lord 39 Atlanticism 2, 54, 63 austerity politics 4, 45, 159, 162, 169 Bartels, L. M. 161, 201 Bartle, J. 98 Benn, H. 237 Berrington, H. 189, 201, 202, 254 BES survey see British Election Study (BES) survey Blair, Tony 138, 220; Iraq issue 206–8, 232; liberal interventionism 231; overseas military intervention 204; public’s evaluations of 251, 255; renewal of Trident 190; United StatesBritain relations 55, 58, 64 bread-and-butter issues 11, 20, 39, 45, 46, 250 Brexit election 32, 33, 40 Brexit referendum (2016) 19, 47, 52, 85, 126, 127, 131 Britain’s international relationships 8, 48, 83, 251–2 Britain’s ‘three circles’ 2, 48–54; see also Commonwealth; Europe; United States

British Election Study (BES) surveys 5, 7, 26, 36–8; on Common Market membership 91, 107; Continuous Monitoring Survey 212, 212–13, 229–30; defence spending and nuclear weapons 169–71, 173–9, 185, 187; on EU membership 122; on European integration 114; on Euroscepticism 117; left-right ideology 117–18, 130; military intervention 215–16, 225; overseas aid 142–3, 143, 157; on United States–Britain special relationship 56 British Empire, dismantling of 48 British government 63, 102, 103, 180, 209 British politics 4, 8; alliance 26; ‘bread-and-butter’ issues 39, 45; Conservatives vs. Labour party 33; core domestic issues 37; defence and foreign affairs 19, 35; economic affairs 15; foreign and domestic issues 11–21; general election campaigns 29–33; government, problem facing 12–14; Ipsos MORI data 18, 25, 40; living cost 16–17; nuclear weapons and disarmament 18; opinion polls and social surveys 33–46; parties, evaluations of 26; party reputations 21–9; post-war consensus in 2; against terrorism 19; time-series data 18; and unemployment 16–17 British Social Attitude (BSA) surveys 5, 7, 26, 54, 76; defence spending and nuclear weapons 167–9, 171, 172, 175, 178, 182, 183, 185; on EU membership 94–5, 95, 97; on European integration 112, 114; military intervention 219, 222; on NATO 80

300 Index Brown, Gordon 55, 57, 137, 138 BSA surveys see British Social Attitude (BSA) surveys Bush, George 58, 65, 68–9, 79, 207, 221 Butler, D. 90 Byrne, P. 190 Cameron, David 20, 55, 62, 138, 153, 160, 204, 236, 237, 253; military intervention in Libya 230–2; referendum campaigns 126–7; United States–Britain relations 55, 62 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) 184, 187, 190, 192 Chalmers, M. 205, 247 Chatham House survey (2014) 77, 81 Churchill, W. 48, 54, 83, 251 civil society actors 6 Clarke, G. 140, 141 Clegg, Nick 232 The Coalition: Our Programme for Government 138 Common Market membership 16, 35, 49; approval of 121; BES survey data 91, 107; by demographic groups 119, 120, 121; gallup polling data 87, 89–90; NOP survey data 91; partypolitical debate 107, 107–8, 109–11; public opinion towards 88–9, 91, 92; voting on 130 Commonwealth 2, 135, 251; in Britain’s economic future 48–54, 50, 51, 53 ComRes opinion poll 28, 60, 62; defence spending and nuclear weapons 193–4, 219, 221–2, 232, 244–5; overseas aid 153, 156 consensus concept 2 Conservative government 49, 91, 126, 140, 163, 165, 215 Conservative Party 3, 23, 25, 26, 29, 105, 117, 126; defence spending and nuclear weapons 163; Members of Parliament 117, 192, 237; military intervention 204, 231, 237; overseas aid 138–9, 141 Conservative Party conference (1948) 48 Conservative supporters 52, 54, 60, 62, 70, 80; on Common Market issue 107–8; for EEC membership 129; for European integration 111–14, 113; Euroscepticism 116, 116–17; leftright ideology 114–15, 115; voting behaviour of 132

Continuous Monitoring Survey (CMS): British Election Study 229–30; military intervention 212–13, 216, 217, 222–3, 233–5 Corbyn, Jeremy 64, 126, 184, 191–3, 201, 237; Labour Party leadership 4; on NATO 74 Crewe, I. 63, 200, 256 cross-country surveys 6–7, 86 Daddow, O. 127 Daily Express 129 Daily Mail 129, 131, 159 Daily Mirror 130, 131 Daily Telegraph 129 defence spending 161–73; contemporary public opinion 177–9; demographic groups 176–7, 178; party supporters 173–6 De Gaulle, Charles 90, 91 demographic groups, public opinion by 49; Britain’s economic future 50, 53; Common Market membership 119, 120, 121; domestic spending by 176–7, 178; EEC membership 122; EU membership 122, 123; European issue 124, 124; military and defence spending 174; NATO 82; overseas aid 143, 143–4, 144, 158; referendum campaigns 259–63; on United States 70, 72, 73 Denver, D. 33 Department for International Development (DFID) 137–8, 140, 141 domestic spending 171–3; demographic groups 176–7; party supporters 173–6; public opinions on 177–9 Dorey, P. 106 Dumbrell, J. 55 Durant, H. 108 EB surveys see Eurobarometer (EB) surveys Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 9, 31, 86, 101, 119 economic integration 119 EEC see European Economic Community (EEC) Eichenberg, R. C. 162, 166, 179 EMU see Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) Eurobarometer (EB) surveys 7, 71–2, 99–103, 113 Eurocentric shift, in British foreign policy 87

Index  301 Europe 2, 32; in Britain’s economic future 48–54, 50, 51, 53; policy disagreements 106; public perceptions of 28 European Common Market 87 European Economic Community (EEC) 28, 85, 252; Britain’s accession 91, 92, 99; as ‘capitalist club’ 126; media consensus 127; membership 122, 129; 1975 referendum 126–31, 259–61; opposition to 108, 130 European integration 8, 85, 103; Conservative supporters 111–14, 113; deepening and widening 101–3, 105; Labour supporters 111–14; left-right ideology 114–15, 115; opposition to 99, 100; by political party 104–5, 105; public opinion towards 106 European issue 3, 103; demographic groups 124, 124; divisions on 105–6; party-political landscape 106, 118; policy mood 98–9, 99 European Security and Defence Policy 102 European trade liberalization 119 European Union (EU) 3, 20, 31, 95, 206; Britain relationship with 85, 99–103; budget 4; defence and foreign policy 86; public opinion in 99–103; Turkey’s accession to 101, 103; 2016 referendum 126–8, 131–3, 261–3; UK’s withdrawal 47, 127 European Union membership: approval of 123–4; BES survey data 122; BSA survey data 94–5, 95, 97; by demographic group 122, 123; EB survey data 99–103; Gallup data 92–3, 93, 93; impact of 104; Ipsos MORI data 94, 94 European Union–United States partnership 79, 79 Eurosceptic citizens 119 Euroscepticism 3, 85–6, 252; hard and soft forms of 95–7; ideological shift in 117–18; party-political basis of 103–18; by party support 116, 116–17; press coverage 128; sociodemographics of 119–25 Eurosceptic opinion 96, 96–7 Eurosceptic parties 101 Falklands War (1982) 16 Fallon, Michael 163 Farron, Tim 237 Fitzgibbon, J. 96

Flickinger, R. S. 92, 94 ‘force-for-change’ mission 205 ‘force-for-order’ mission 205 Frankel, J. 54, 56 Gallup opinion poll 11, 16, 18, 20, 25, 34, 56–7, 87; on Common Market membership 87, 89–90; defence spending and nuclear weapons 164–7, 180; on EU membership 92–3, 93, 93; military intervention 209, 221; overseas aid 142 Gamble, A. 55, 57, 106 gender gap: defence spending and nuclear weapons 177; military intervention 213, 240, 248 Greening, Justin 139 The Guardian 129, 132 Gulf War (1990–1991) 19, 23 hard Europhilia 105 hard Euroscepticism 95, 96, 117 ‘hard power’ projection 161–2, 201, 203, 247, 253–5 H-bomb issue 15, 21, 22, 34, 180, 181 Heath, Edward 49, 91 Heppell, T. 135, 138 Hickson, K. 2 Hobolt, S. B. 85, 127 Holsti, O. R. 5, 208 Hooghe, L. 101 The House of Commons 193, 232, 237 Hudson, J. 73 human capital 119 Hurd, Douglas 204 Hussein, Saddam 23 ICM Research poll 7, 209–11, 221 Independent 132, 159 International Development Act 137, 139 Ipsos MORI opinion poll 18, 40, 43, 58; defence spending and nuclear weapons 181–2, 192, 193; on EU membership 94, 94; military intervention 207, 209, 210, 219–21, 230; parties’ policies towards defence 25, 27 Iraq, ISIS in 236–46 Iraq War 32, 39, 43, 229, 232, 255; military intervention 205–19 Kavanagh, D. 2, 85 Kearns, I. 55, 57 Kennedy, Charles 207 Kennedy, John F 56 King, A. 129

302 Index labour Euroscepticism 129 Labour government see New Labour government Labour Party 3, 21, 26, 104, 126; conversion of 94; Corbyn, Jeremy 64, 74; division of 129 Labour supporters 52, 54, 60, 70, 80; Common Market issue 107–8; EEC membership 129; for European integration 111–14; Euroscepticism 116, 116–17; left-right ideology 114–15, 115; voting behaviour of 132 Lawson, C. W. 73 Leconte, C. 119 left-right ideology 114–15, 115; BES data on 117–18, 130 Liberal Democrat supporters 25, 28–9, 52, 54, 81; defence spending and nuclear weapons 185, 190, 191, 201; Euroscepticism 116, 116; military intervention 204, 206–7, 215–18, 228–30, 235, 243; overseas aid 138 Liberal Party 23, 24, 105 Liberal supporters, on Common Market issue 107–8 libertarian-authoritarian issues 132 Libya military interventions 230–6 Lightfoot, S. 135, 138 Maastricht Treaty (1993) 45, 100, 105 Macmillan, Harold 87, 91, 107 macro-analytical approach 98 Major, John 101, 105 Marks, G. 101 MARPOR data set 104 May, Theresa 55, 62, 204, 253 Mellon, J. 33 Members of Parliament (MPs) 108; Conservative 117, 192, 237 Miliband, Ed 232, 236 military interventions: Britain and overseas 204–5; Iraq War 205–19; ISIS in Iraq and Syria 236–46; in Libya 230–6; war in Afghanistan 219–30 Milner, H. V. 145 Mirror 147 Morning Star 127, 129 Morris, P. 2, 85 National Health Service (NHS) 20 national interest 62, 96, 140, 205 nationalisation-privatisation issue 130 National Opinion Polls (NOP) data 7, 35, 36, 48–9, 91

national referendums 101 NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) New Labour government 91, 107, 137–9, 184, 220 New Labour leaders 64 newspaper readership 129, 131–2, 145–7 NHS see National Health Service (NHS) 9/11 attacks 19 1975 EEC referendum 126–31, 259–61 NOP data see National Opinion Polls (NOP) data North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 3, 8, 16, 47, 83–4; Article 5 of 77; Britain’s membership 74, 76–7; British public’s views 75–7; BSA survey data 80; Chatham House survey 77, 81; Corbyn’s views 74; defence spending and nuclear weapons 163, 170; military intervention 206, 232; and national security 75, 76, 78; Pew GAP survey data 77, 78, 80, 81; positive views of 77, 78, 81–2; public opinion towards 74, 76, 79, 82; TT survey data 78, 82; YouGov survey 77, 80 nuclear weapons 18, 21, 45, 179–84; see also Trident renewal (nuclear weapon system); demographic groups 189–90; party supporters 184–9 Obama, Barack 55, 65, 163, 209; level of confidence 71; presidency 65, 68–9 ODA see Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) OECD see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) One World Conservatism 138–9 opinion polls 6; see also specific polling types Opinion Research Business (ORB) 156–7 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 139–40 overseas aid 4; attitudes 146; contemporary public opinion 157–9; demographic groups 143, 143–4, 144; ideology and newspaper readership 145–7; negative views 153; opinion polls 147–59; overview 135–6; partypolitical and policy 136–42; party support 145–6 Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) 139–40

Index  303 overseas military intervention 204–5 Owen, N. 2 party manifestos 104, 105 party-political and policy, overseas aid 136–42 party politics 63 peace-making mission 31 Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP) 7; military intervention 209, 221, 222, 229, 231; on NATO 77, 78, 80, 81; public opinion towards US 64–5, 66, 68–9, 71 Populus poll 156, 210, 211, 222, 230 postwar Britain 1–3 Powell, Enoch 64 pro-European approach 104, 108, 133 pro-European parties 101, 108 pro-EU sentiment 96, 96–7 pro-leave voting 133 Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 5 Reckless, Mark 141 ‘reluctant Europeanism’ 2, 85 Royal Air Force (RAF) 238, 238–40, 240–1 Rumsfeld, Donald 206 Saddam Hussein 205, 208, 215, 219 Sanders, D. 162, 171 Sarkozy, Nicolas 232 Saunders, R. 126 Scotto, T. J. 184 Self, R. 220 Shepherd, R. 90 Short, Clare 137 single market 119 Smith, M. 103, 104 socio-demographics/social grades; see also demographic groups, public opinion by: Common Market membership 119, 120, 121; of Euroscepticism 86, 119–25 soft Europhilia 105 soft Euroscepticism 95–7, 117 ‘soft power’ projection 252–3 Stokes, D. 90 Stoll, R. J. 162, 179 Suez crisis (1956) 55 The Sun 129, 131, 147 Syria, ISIS in 236–46 Szczerbiak, A. 95

Taggart, P. 95 The Telegraph 131, 147 terrorism 19, 39 Thatcher, Margaret 23, 31, 37, 55 Thérien, J.-P. 146 The Times 147 Tingley, D. 145 Tomlinson, J. 135 transatlantic security alliance 47 Transatlantic Trends (TT) surveys 7; defence spending and nuclear weapons 170, 176; on NATO 78, 82; public opinion towards US 65, 67, 68–9, 71 Trident renewal (nuclear weapon system) 190–5; see also nuclear weapons; contemporary public opinion 199–201; demographic groups 195–9; party supporters 199 Trump, Donald 47, 55, 62–3; on NATO 74; presidency 3, 65, 68–9 TT surveys see Transatlantic Trends (TT) surveys Turkey’s EU accession 101, 103 2016 EU referendum 126–8, 131–3 UKIP supporters see United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) supporters unemployment 16, 17 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) supporters 28, 52, 54, 60, 81; defence spending and nuclear weapons 175–6, 199; Eurosceptic sentiment 117; military intervention 218, 240, 243, 246; overseas aid 141–2, 153, 157–8 United Kingdom-United States special relationship 47, 54, 64, 83; Britain’s political leaders and 55–6; British public’s views on 56; ComRes data 60, 62; Gallup data 56–7; Ipsos MORI data 58; ‘layer cake’ analogy 56; post-war period 55; public opinion towards 59–61; YouGov data 57–8, 60, 62 United States 2, 63, 83; in Britain’s economic future 48–54, 50, 51, 53; in British foreign policy 55–7; British public’s views on 64; group-related views of 69, 70; negative views 71–4, 72, 73; Pew GAP survey data 64–5, 66, 68–9; positive views 69–71; TT survey data 65, 67, 68–9

304 Index United States-European Union partnership 79, 79 United States Information Agency 75, 86 ‘utilitarian explanation’ 119 Vickers, R. 3, 64, 137, 139, 184–5, 206 Vietnam War 64 voting patterns: European issue’s impact 30; in general elections 33–46; issues 41; 1975 referendum 126–31; 2016 referendum 126–8, 131–3

Western Europe–Britain links 87 Whitman, R. 221 Wilson, Harold 64, 91, 126 YouGov opinion poll 20, 28, 29, 39; defence spending and nuclear weapons 175, 193–5, 199; military intervention 207–9, 222, 225, 228–30, 235–6; on NATO 77, 80; overseas aid 147, 153, 156; UK-US alliance 57–8, 60, 62