The Incarnate Word: Volume 8 9781442625921

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COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN

VOLUME 8 THE INCARNATE WORD

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GENERAL EDITORS Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran

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THE INCARNATE WORD



translated by Charles C. Hefling Jr.



edited by Robert M. Doran and Jeremy D. Wilkins



Published for Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto by University of Toronto Press Toronto  Buffalo  London

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©

The Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada 2016 Toronto  Buffalo  London www.utppublishing.com Printed in the U.S.A.

isbn 978-1-4426-3111-3 (cloth)   isbn 978-1-4426-2912-7 (paper) Printed on acid-free, 100% post-consumer recycled paper with vegetable-based inks. Requests for permission to quote from the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan should be addressed to University of Toronto Press



Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Lonergan, Bernard J.F. (Bernard Joseph Francis), 1904–1984 Collected works of Bernard Lonergan / edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: v. 8. The incarnate word / translated by Charles C. Hefling, Jr. ; edited by Robert M. Doran and Jeremy D. Wilkins. isbn 978-1-4426-3111-3 (v. 8 : bound).   isbn 978-1-4426-2912-7 (v. 8 : paperback) 1. Theology – 20th century.  2. Catholic Church.  i. Crowe, Frederick E. ii. Doran, Robert M., 1939–  iii. Hefling, Charles C.  iv. Wilkins, Jeremy D. v. Lonergan Research Institute  vi. Title. bx891.l595 1988   230   c880-933283



The Lonergan Research Institute gratefully acknowledges the generous contribution of The Malliner Charitable Foundation, which has made possible the production of this entire series.

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council, an agency of the Government of Ontario. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for its publishing activities.

Funded by the Financé par le Government gouvernement du Canada of Canada

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Contents



General Editors’ Preface, robert m. doran / xxv



ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Part One: The Teaching of the New Testament on the Hypostatic Union / 3

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Thesis 1: The teaching of the New Testament establishes that one and the same Jesus of Nazareth (1) is true man, (2) in many ways participates in what is divine, and (3) is true God. / 3 Terms / 3 The intention of the thesis / 5 Theological note of the thesis / 5 Direct opponents of the thesis / 5 Modern opponents of the thesis / 11 Suppositions / 31 Objection / 33 [Preliminary notes] / 35 Preliminary note 1: The New Testament notion of God / 35 Preliminary note 2: The progressive revelation of Christ’s divinity / 39 Preliminary note 3: Schematic patterns / 43 Preliminary note 4: Paul’s synthetic pattern / 53 Preliminary note 5: The nature of the argument / 65

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[The argument] / 67 Part 1: Jesus of Nazareth is true man. / 67 Part 2: The same Jesus in many ways participates in what is divine. / 71 Part 3: The same Jesus is true God. / 79 a  Names, titles, and honors / 81 i The proper name ‘Son’ / 81 ii Transference of the name ‘Lord’ / 91 iii The name which is above every name / 95 iv Transference of the name of God / 97 v Transference of other divine titles / 107 vi Transference of the glory of God / 109 b  Quasi-theological conceptions / 115 i Pauline conceptions / 115 ii The conception in the letter to the Hebrews at 1.2–4, 1.8 / 133 iii The conception of the Word in John / 137 iv The Son’s equality and unity with the Father / 159 Part Two: The Teaching of the Ecumenical Councils on the Hypostatic Union / 181

Thesis 2: The divine Word united to himself flesh animated by a rational soul. / 181 Terms / 181 Theological note of the thesis / 181 Opponents of the thesis / 183 1 Arians / 183 2 Apollinaris, Apollinarians / 185 The argument / 191



Thesis 3: Christ is not to be divided into ‘someone’ and ‘someone else’; one person must be acknowledged, and that one divine, to whom belong alike things human and things divine. / 197 Terms / 197 The question / 197 Conclusion from this / 199 [Preliminary notes] / 199 Preliminary note 1: Development of opinions / 199

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1 The real difficulty / 201 2 The terminological difficulty / 203 3 The schematic patterns ‘Word-Flesh,’ ‘Man-God’ / 205 4 Regional diversity / 209 Preliminary note 2: The Council of Ephesus / 211 Preliminary note 3: What was determined at Ephesus / 221 Preliminary note 4: The ‘Orientals’ / 227 Preliminary note 5: The manner of union / 231 1 Kinds of union / 231 2 The Neoplatonic union / 233 3 Is this Neoplatonic union sufficient? / 233 4 What is a union on the basis of hypostasis? / 235 Preliminary note 6: Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius / 241 1 Theodore of Mopsuestia / 241 2 Nestorius / 241 3 The Nestorians / 245 Opponents of the thesis / 245 Theological note of the thesis / 245 The argument / 245 Objections / 249

Thesis 4: Even after the Incarnation there are in Christ two natures, unconfused and unchanged, the properties of each being preserved. This distinction between the natures is a real distinction, although it is not a major but a minor real distinction, drawn by analogy. / 253 Terms / 253 The question / 255 Opinions / 257   i Monophysitism (in general) / 257  ii Severian monophysitism / 267 iii Controversies and sects arising from Severian monophysitism / 277 1 Theopaschitism / 277 2 Henoticists and acephaloi / 277 3 Gaianites / 279 4 Sergius the Grammarian / 281 5 Tritheists / 281 The problem / 281

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Theological note of the thesis / 289 [The argument] / 289 Part 1 / 289 Part 2 / 291 Objections / 295 Corollary 1: Hypostatic union / 299 Corollary 2: The ‘Interchange of Properties’ / 303 Corollary 3: Assumption of component parts / 305 Corollary 4: Natural passibility / 307 Corollary 5: Adoration of Christ / 309 Objections / 313

Thesis 5: There are in Christ two natural operations and two natural wills. / 315 Terms / 315 The meaning of the thesis / 315 The problem / 315 The empire / 319 Historical outline / 321 Opinions / 325 Opponents of the thesis / 335 The error of these opponents / 337 Theological note of the thesis / 341 Proof / 343 Part 1: The realities themselves / 343 Part 2: There are two natural operations, two natural wills. / 345 Part 3: To operate belongs to a person from his nature. / 347 Objections / 349 Scholion 1: Pope Honorius I / 353 Scholion 2: The dogmatic notion of ‘nature’ / 359 Scholion 3: The development of Christological dogma / 361 Scholion 4: Christ as God, Christ as man / 365

Part Three: Theological Conclusions regarding the Hypostatic Union / 369 Theses and assertions / 369 Notes / 371 Notions / 373

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1 Potency, form, act, mode / 373 2 Being, essence, act of existence, substance / 379 3 One, proper act of existence, proportionate act of existence / 385 4 Person / 387 Problem: Essentialism / 389 Analogy of form, analogy of substance, analogy of being / 395 Opinions / 405

Thesis 6: What the Word assumed from the Virgin – flesh animated by a rational soul – is neither a person, nor a real supposit, nor a subsistent, nor a being pure and simple, but only a real, individual human essence lacking a proportionate act of existence. / 413 Terms / 413 Opponents of the thesis / 415 The argument / 415 A second argument / 419 Objections / 419



Thesis 7: This is why the incarnate Word is one, purely and simply: because by his divine act of existence he is, not only as God, but also as human. This is to be understood, not on the analogy of finite, composite being, but on the analogy of what is contingently predicated of God. / 427 Terms / 427 Division of the thesis / 427 Part 1: The incarnate Word is one, purely and simply. / 427 Part 2: This is why the incarnate Word is one, purely and simply: because by his divine act of existence he is, not only as God, but also as human. / 429 Part 3: The doctrine of a single act of existence is not to be understood on the analogy of finite, composite being. / 433 Part 4: The doctrine of a single act of existence is to be understood on the analogy of what is contingently predicated of God. / 441



Assertion 8: Therefore, the principles of the hypostatic union are: (1) the blessed Trinity, as [the principle] from which the Word is human; (2) the person of the Word, as [the principle] which is God and human; (3) the Word’s divine act of existence, as [the principle] by

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which the incarnate Word is a being pure and simple and one, purely and simply; and (4) the divine and the human natures, as [the principles] by which he is both God and human. / 447 Terms / 447 The intention of the assertion / 449 Part 1: The Most Holy Trinity is the principle from which the Word is human. / 449 Part 2: The person of the Word is the principle which is God and human. / 451 Part 3: The Word’s divine act of existence is the principle by which the incarnate Word is a being pure and simple and is purely and simply one. / 451 Part 4: Through the divine nature the Word is God, and through the human nature the Word is human. / 451 Objection / 451

Assertion 9: From the completed hypostatic union there results, in the assumed nature, a substantial act, absolutely supernatural, which regards only the Word as the one who formally assumes. / 453 Terms / 453 Intention of the assertion / 455 The argument / 455 Objections / 459



Thesis 10: Christ’s Consciousness. There are in the incarnate Word two distinct consciousnesses, a divine and a human consciousness; by these two, nevertheless, one and the same divine person is present to himself in both a divine and a human way. / 465 Terms / 465 The question / 467 Bibliography / 467 Questions and opinions / 471 a Person and subject / 471 b Consciousness as perception or introspection (reflection) / 473 c [The position of the thesis] / 473 Notions / 475   1  Subject, act, object / 475

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  2  Presence, absence / 475   3  Three kinds of presence / 477   4  Consciousness, conscious / 477   5  The psychological subject / 479   6  Introspection / 479   7  Consciousness as experience / 481   8  Self-knowledge / 483   9  Consciousness as concomitant / 483 10  Some noteworthy points / 483 11  Consciousness of identity / 485 12  Consciousness as perception / 487 13  Phenomenology of consciousness / 491 14  Person and psychological subject / 493 15  Psychological subject and nature / 495 16  The ‘I’ / 499 Proof / 501 Part 1: There are two consciousnesses in the incarnate Word, a divine consciousness and a human consciousness. / 501 Arguments / 501 Part 2: The divine Word is present to himself in a divine way. / 503 Argument / 503 Part 3: The same divine Word, on the basis of his human nature, is also present to himself in a human way. / 507 Arguments / 507 Part 4: The same person, a divine person, is present to himself both in a divine and in a human way. / 509 Argument / 509 Corollaries and scholia / 513 1 The encyclical ‘Sempiternus Rex’ (db 2334, ds 3905) / 513 2 The person does not stand outside consciousness. / 513 3 The psychological subject is a person present to himself or herself. / 515 4 The psychological subject in Christ, God and man, is one. / 517 5 The person of the Word is the psychological subject of a human consciousness, not inasmuch as he influences his humanity by a divine operation, but inasmuch as he elicits

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or even produces, through his human nature, sensitive and intellectual human operations. / 517 6 This is why the person of the Word is present to himself in a human way through his sensitive and intellectual human operations: (1) because through the Incarnation itself he is everything that this man Jesus of Nazareth is, and (2) because this man, like any other who is like him in all things, is present to himself through his sensitive and intellectual operations. / 521 7 In Christ the man, that which is present to himself, and that to which the operations are present, is not the assumed nature, nor the human soul, nor the created intellect, nor the human consciousness, but the person of the Word himself subsisting in the assumed nature. / 527 8 Is the person of the Word, subsisting in a human nature, a composite person? Is he a composite psychological subject? / 529 9 The person of the Word subsisting in a human nature is conscious of himself, not as the object of introspection, of reflective perception, or of the beatific vision, but as the subject of all his psychological operations. / 531   10 In Christ, God and man, the two consciousnesses are not directly united between themselves but are united in the one psychological subject of both. / 531   11 Was the Son of God, through his human consciousness, conscious of himself, conscious of a divine person, conscious of his divinity? / 535 Part Four: What Belongs Properly to Christ / 541

Thesis 11: By habitual sanctifying grace, the human nature of Christ is adorned with virtues and gifts in singular fullness. / 541 Terms / 541 Theological note of the thesis / 543 Bibliography / 543 Preliminary note: The nature of the proof / 543 The argument / 549 a The grace of Christ in scripture / 549 b Theological conclusions / 553

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Scholion: Christ, even as man, is the natural – not adoptive – Son of God. / 565 Terms / 565 The question / 565 Opinions / 567 Theological note / 569 The argument / 569 Objections / 571

Thesis 12: Living on this earth, Christ had human knowledge both effable and ineffable, besides his divine knowledge. As a beholder, he immediately knew God by that ineffable knowledge which is also called beatific, and in the same act, though mediately, he also knew everything else that pertained to his work. As a pilgrim, however, he elicited by effable knowledge those natural and supernatural cognitional acts which constituted his human and historical life. / 573 Terms / 573 Documents of the magisterium / 597 Bibliography / 599 Development of the doctrine / 603 Summary of opinions / 607 The early tradition: Documents / 613 Division of the argument / 661 Part 1: Christ as God exercises divine knowledge. / 663 Part 2: Christ as man, living on this earth, exercised human knowledge. / 663 Part 3: Christ the man, living on this earth, knew God immediately. / 663 Additional notes / 671 Part 4: Christ the man knew everything that pertained to his work. / 677 Part 5: In the same act by which Christ the man knew God immediately, he knew, though mediately, everything that pertained to his work. / 685 Part 6: By his effable knowledge Christ the pilgrim elicited those natural and supernatural cognitional acts which constituted his human and historical life. / 691 Scholion 1: Christ’s infused and acquired knowledge / 709

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Scholion 2: The power of Christ the man / 715

Thesis 13: Christ as man not only did not sin but also was absolutely incapable of sin. / 715 The question / 715 Part 1: Christ the man did not sin. / 715 Part 2: Christ was not able to sin. / 717 Part 3: Christ the man was absolutely unable to sin. / 719 Part 4: Christ the man had not the spark of sin. / 723



Thesis 14: Christ the man enjoyed a free human will and freely accepted his suffering and death. / 727 Terms / 727 Theological note / 727 The argument / 727 Theologians’ views / 729 The problem of Christ’s freedom / 735



Appendix 1: End of § 6 in ‘Corollaries and Scholia’ in Thesis 10, 1960 Edition / 763



Appendix 2: 1960–1961 Versions of Thesis 12 / 767



Abbreviations / 813



Bibliography of Modern Authors / 815



Scriptural Passages / 827



Index / 843



LATIN TEXT

Pars Prima: Doctrina NT de Unione Hypostatica / 2

Thesis 1: Ex doctrina Novi Testamenti constat unum eundemque Iesum Nazarenum et (1) verum hominem esse, et (2) multipliciter divina participare, et (3) verum esse Deum. / 2

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Termini / 2 Intentio theseos / 4 Nota theseos / 4 Adversarii directi / 4 Adversarii recentiores / 10 Supposita / 32 Obiectio / 32 [Praenotamina] / 34 Praenotamen primum: De notione Dei in NT / 34 Praenotamen alterum: De progressiva revelatione divinitatis Christi / 38 Praenotamen tertium: De schematibus / 42 Praenotamen quartum: De schemata synthetico Paulino / 52 Praenotamen quintum: De natura argumenti / 64 [Argumentum] / 66 Pars 1: Iesus Nazarenus est verus homo. / 66 Pars 2: Idem Iesus divina multipliciter participat. / 70 Pars 3: Idemque Iesus est verus Deus. / 78 a  Ex nominibus, titulis, honoribus / 80 i Ex proprio nomini Filii / 80 ii Ex nomine Domini translato / 90 iii Ex nomine quod est super omne nomen / 94 iv Ex translato nomine Dei / 96 v Ex aliis divinis translatis / 106 vi Ex translata gloria Dei / 108 b Ex conceptionibus quasi theologicis / 114 i Ex conceptione Paulina / 114 ii Ex conceptione epistulae ad Hebraeos / 132 iii Ex conceptione Verbi apud Ioannem / 136 iv Ex aequalitate et unitate Filii cum Patre / 158 Pars Secunda: Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Doctrina de Unione Hypostatica / 180

Thesis 2: Verbum divinum sibi univit carnem anima rationali animatam. / 180 Termini / 180 Nota theologica / 180 Adversarii / 182

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Ariani / 182 Apollinaris, Apollinaristae / 184 Argumentum / 190

Thesis 3: Non in alium et alium dividendus est Christus, sed una agnoscenda est persona, eaque divina, cuius tam humana sunt quam divina. / 196 Termini / 196 Quaestio / 196 Unde concludes / 198 [Praenotamina] / 198 Praenotamen primum: De evolutione senteniarum / 198 1 De reali difficultate / 200 2 De difficultate terminologica / 202 3 De schematibus ‘Verbum-Caro,’ ‘Homo-Deus’ / 204 4 De diversitate regionali / 208 Praenotamen alterum: De Concilio Ephesino / 210 Praenotamen tertium: Quid Ephesi determinatum fuerit / 220 Praenotamen quartum: De ‘Orientalibus’ / 226 Praenotamen quintum: De modo unionis / 230 1 De divisione modorum / 230 2 De unione neoplatonicorum / 232 3 Utrum sufficiat haec unio neoplatonica / 232 4 Quaenam sit unio secundum hypostasin / 234 Praenotamen sextum: De Theodoro Mopsuesteno et Nestorio / 240 1 Theodorum Mopsuestenus / 240 2 Nestorius / 240 3 Nestoriani / 244 Adversarii / 244 Nota / 244 Argumentum / 244 Obicitur / 248



Thesis 4: Etiam post incarnationem duae sunt in Christo naturae, inconfusae et immutatae, salvisque utriusque proprietatibus; quae naturarum distinctio realis quidem est, non tamen maior, sed minor et analogice dicta. / 252 Termini / 252

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Quaestio / 254 Sententiae / 256   i Monophysismus (in genere) / 256  ii Monophysismus severianus / 266 iii Controversiae et sectae e monophysismo severiano ortae / 276 1 Theopaschitism / 276 2 Henotici et Acephali / 276 3 Gaianitae / 278 4 Sergius Grammaticus / 280 5 Tritheistae / 280 Problema / 280 Nota / 288 [Argumentum] / 288 Argumenti pars prima / 288 Argumenti pars altera / 290 Obicitur / 294 Corollarium i: Unio hypostatica / 298 Corollarium ii: Idiomatum communicatio / 302 Corollarium iii: Partium assumptio / 304 Corollarium iv: Naturalis passibilitas / 306 Corollarium v: De adoratione Christi / 308 Obicitur / 312

Thesis 5: Duae sunt in Christo naturales operationes et duae naturales voluntates. / 314 Termini / 314 Sensus theseos / 314 Problema / 314 De re imperiali / 318 Schemata historica / 320 Sententiae / 324 Adversarii / 334 Error adversariorum / 336 Nota / 340 Probatio / 342 Pars 1: De ipsis realitatibus / 342 Pars 2: Duae sunt naturales operationes, voluntates / 344 Pars 3: Operari est personae a natura / 346

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Obicitur / 340 Scholion i: De Honorio i, R.P. / 352 Scholion ii: De notione ‘naturae’ dogmaticae / 358 Scholion iii: De evolutione dogmatis christologici / 360 Scholion iv: Christus ut Deus, Christs ut homo / 364

Pars Tertia: De Unione Hypostatica Conclusiones Theologicae / 368 Theses et asserta / 368 Nota / 370 Notiones / 372 1 Potentia, forma, actus, modus / 372 2 Ens, essentia, esse, substantia / 378 3 Unum, esse proprium, esse proportionatum / 384 4 Persona / 386 Problema: Essentialismus / 388 Analogia formae, substantiae, entis / 394 Sententiae / 404

Thesis 6: Quam Verbum de Virgine assumpsit, caro per animam rationalem animata, neque persona est, neque suppositum reale, neque subsistens, neque ens simpliciter, sed tantummodo essentia humana individua et realis quae esse proportionato caret. / 412 Termini / 412 Adversarii / 414 Argumentum / 414 Alterum argumentum / 418 Obicitur / 418



Thesis 7: Ideo Verbum incarnatum est unum simpliciter, quia esse suo divino est non solum ut Deus sed etiam ut homo; quod quidem intelligitur, non secundum analogiam entis finiti et compositi, sed secundum analogiam eorum quae contingenter de Deo dicuntur. / 426 Termini / 426 Divisio / 426 Pars 1: Verbum incarnatum est unum simpliciter. / 426 Pars 2: Verbum incarnatum ideo est unum simpliciter quia per unum suum esse divinum est et ut Deus et ut homo. / 428

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Pars 3: Doctrina de unico esse non est intelligenda secundum analogiam entis finiti et compositi. / 432 Pars 4: Doctrina de unico esse est intelligenda secundum analogiam eorum quae contingenter de Deo dicuntur. / 440

Assertum 8: Unionis ergo hypostaticae principia sunt: (1) SS. Trinitas ut a quo Verbum est homo; (2) persona Verbi ut quod est Deus et homo; (3) esse Verbi divinum ut quo incarnatum Verbum est ens simpliciter et unum simpliciter; (4) naturae divina et humana ut quibus est tum Deus tum homo. / 446 Termini / 446 Asserti intentio / 448 Pars 1: SS. Trinitas est principium a quo Verbum est homo. / 448 Pars 2: Persona Verbi est principium quod est Deus et homo. / 450 Pars 3: Esse Verbi divinum est principium quo Verbum incarnatum est ens simpliciter et unum simpliciter. / 450 Pars 4: Per naturam divinam Verbum est Deus et per naturam humanam Verbum est homo. / 450 Obicitur / 450



Assertum 9: Ex peracta unione hypostatica, resultat in assumpta natura actus quidam substantialis, absolute supernaturalis, qui solum Verbum ut formaliter assumens respicit. / 452 Termini / 452 Intentio asserti / 454 Argumentum / 454 Obicitur / 458



Thesis 10: De conscientia Christi. In Verbo incarnato duae distinguuntur conscientiae, divina nempe et humana; quibus tamen una eademque divina persona tum modo divino tum modo humano sibi praesens est. / 464 Termini / 464 Quaestio / 466 Auctores / 466 Quaestiones et opiniones / 470 a Persona et subiectum / 470 b Conscientia ut perceptio vel introspectio (reflexio) / 472 c [Sententia theseos] / 472

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Notiones / 474   1  Subiectum, actus, obiectum / 474   2  Praesens, absens / 474   3  Triplex praesentia / 476   4  Conscientia, conscium / 476   5  Subiectum psychologicum / 478   6  Introspectio / 478   7  Conscientia ut experientia / 480   8  Cognitio sui / 482   9  Conscientia ut concomitans / 482 10  Notantur quaedam / 482 11  Conscientia identitatis / 484 12  Conscientia ut perceptio / 486 13  Phaenomenologia conscientiae / 490 14  Persona et subiectum psychologicum / 492 15  Subiectum psychologicum et natura / 494 16  Ego / 498 Probatio / 500 Pars 1: In Verbo incarnato duae sunt conscientiae, divina nempe et humana. / 500 Argumenta / 500 Pars 2: Verbum divinum modo divino sibi praesens est. / 502 Argumentum / 502 Pars 3: Idem Verbum divinum secundum naturam suam humanam etiam modo humano est sibi praesens. / 506 Argumenta / 506 Pars 4: Eadem persona eaque divina est sibi praesens tum modo divino tum modo humano. / 508 Argumentum / 508 Corollaria et Scholia / 512 1 db 2334 / 512 2 Persona non versatur extra conscientiam. / 512 3 Subiectum psychologicum est persona sibi praesens. / 514 4 In Christo Deo et homine unum est subiectum psychologicum. / 516 5 Persona Verbi est subiectum psychologicum conscientiae humanae, non quatenus operatione divina in humanitatem suam influit, sed quatenus per naturam suam humanam humanas operationes sensitivas et intellectuales vel elicit vel etiam producit. / 516

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6 Ideo persona Verbi est sibi praesens modo humano per operationes suas humanas sensitivas et intellectuales, quia (1) per ipsam incarnationem est omne quod est hic homo, Jesus Nazarenus et (2) hic homo, sicut et alius per omnia ei similis, est sibi praesens per operationes suas sensitivas et intellectuales. / 520 7 In Christo homine id quod est sibi praesens et cui operationes suae sunt praesentes est, non natura assumpta, non anima humana, non intellectus creatus, non conscientia humana, sed ipsa Verbi persona in assumpta natura subsistens. / 526 8 Utrum persona Verbi in natura humana subsistens sit persona composita vel subiectum psychologicum compositum. / 528 9 Persona Verbi in humana natura subsistens est sui conscia, non ut obiectum introspectionis, reflexae perceptionis, visionis beatae, sed ut subiectum omnis suae operationis psychologicae. / 530   10 Duae in Christo Deo et homine conscientiae uniuntur non directe inter se sed in uno earum subiecto psychologico. / 530   11 Utrum Filius Dei per suam conscientiam humanam conscius fuerit sui ipsius, personae divinae, suae divinitatis. / 534 Pars Quarta: De Iis Quae Christi Sunt / 540

Thesis 11: Natura humana Christi gratia sanctificante habituali cum virtutibus et donis ornatur et quidem cum singulari plenitudine. / 540 Termini / 540 Nota / 542 Auctores / 542 Praenotamen: De natura probationis / 542 Argumentum / 548 a Gratia Christi in scripturis / 548 b Conclusiones theologicae / 552 Scholion: Christus etiam ut homo est Filius Dei naturalis nequaquam adoptivus. / 564 Termini / 564 Quaestio / 564

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Sententiae / 566 Nota / 568 Argumentum / 568 Obicitur / 570



Thesis 12: Praeter scientiam divinam Christus his in terris degens humanam habuit scientiam, eamque tum ineffabilem tum effabilem; comprehensor enim scientia ineffabili, quae etiam beata dicitur, tum Deum immediate cognovit tum eodem actu sed mediate alia omnia quae ad munus suum pertinerent; viator autem scientia effabili eos elicuit actus cognoscitivos naturales et supernaturales qui vitam suam constituerunt humanam et historicam. / 572 Termini / 572 Magisterii documenta / 596 Scriptores quidam / 598 Doctrinae evolutio / 602 Sententiarum indiculus / 606 Documentis illustratur traditio prior. / 612 Argumenti divisio / 660 Argumenti pars prima: Christus qua Deus divinam scientiam exercet. / 662 Argumenti pars altera: Christus qua homo his in terris degens scientiam humanam exercebat. / 662 Argumenti pars tertia: ­Christus homo his in terris degens immediate Deum cognovit. / 662 Adnotantur / 670 Argumenti pars quarta: Christus homo omnia cognovit quae ad munus suum pertinerent. / 676 Argumenti pars quinta: Quo actu Christus homo immediate Deum cognoscit, eodem actu sed mediate omnia cognoscit quae ad munus suum pertineant. / 684 Argumenti pars sexta: Christus viator scientia effabili eos elicuit actus cognoscitivos naturales et supernaturales qui vitam suam constituerunt humanam et historicam. / 690 Scholion 1: De scientia Christi infusa et acquisita / 708 Scholion 2: De potentia Christi hominis / 714



Thesis 13: Christus ut homo non solum non peccavit sed etiam absolute impeccabilis fuit. / 714

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Quaestio / 714 Pars 1: Christus homo non peccavit. / 714 Pars 2: Christus peccare non potuit. / 716 Pars 3: Christus homo absolute non potuit peccare. / 718 Pars 4: Christus homo fomitem peccati non habuit. / 722

Thesis 14: Christus homo libera voluntate humana gavisus est ac libere passionem et mortem acceptavit. / 726 Termini / 726 Nota / 726 Argumentum / 726 Theologi / 728 Problema de libertate Christi / 734

Appendix I / 762 Appendix II / 766

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General Editors’ Preface

We present in this volume the first four of five parts in Bernard Lonergan’s De Verbo incarnato. The fifth part, which devotes three theses (15–17) to the theme of redemption, will be incorporated into volume 9, which will also include the complete text, with English translation, of a previously unpublished supplement to De Verbo incarnata, ‘De redemptione.’ In his ‘General Editors’ Preface’ to volume 7 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, Frederick E. Crowe wrote, ‘The full history of Lonergan’s work in Christology (courses, writings, occasional lectures) will be more appropriately given in the preface to volume 8 of the Collected Works.’ But the history of Lonergan’s engagement with Christology has since been much more amply documented in Crowe’s 2005 book Christ and History.1 We can happily now send readers to that book for the detailed history. The most relevant information for our present purposes has to do with Lonergan’s teaching. He taught courses on Christology many times: at the Jesuit Seminary in Toronto (now Regis College) in 1948–49 and 1952–53, at the Gregorian University in Rome in 1953–54, 1955–56, 1957–58, 1959–60, 1961–62, 1963–64, and 1964–65, and at the Divinity School, Harvard University, in 1971–72. He began a course in Christology at Regis College in



1 Frederick E. Crowe, s.j., Christ and History: The Christology of Bernard Lonergan from 1935 to 1982 (Ottawa: Novalis, 2005). Reprinted by University of Toronto Press, 2015.

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1972–73, but for health reasons was not able to complete it; Crowe completed the course for him. It is likely that Lonergan’s first Christological text in connection with his courses was ‘De conscientia Christi,’ an eight-page set of notes produced at Regis in 1952. It has been published in vol. 19 of the Collected Works, Early Latin Theology. Its content is very different from the treatment accorded the consciousness of Christ in De constitutione Christi and De Verbo incarnato. The contrast provides interesting data on his development. His next Christological work, ‘De ratione convenientiae eiusque radice …,’ consisted of twelve legal-size pages produced at the Gregorian in connection with his course of 1953–54. It also is now part of vol. 19 in the Collected Works. De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica, now available as the previously mentioned vol. 7 in the Collected Works, was issued at the Gregorian in 1956, with reprints in 1958, 1961, and 1964. And De Verbo incarnato was published at the Gregorian in 1960, with new editions in 1961 (in content almost identical with the 1960 volume) and 1964. The 1964 volume contains a completely new and revised thesis on the knowledge of Christ, arguably Lonergan’s greatest contribution to Christology. The present volume includes also the earlier version of this thesis in appendix 2. It was probably in 1958 that Lonergan drafted the bulk of another work, which he thought of as a supplement to De Verbo incarnato. It was never published, but as mentioned above it will appear in volume 9 of the Collected Works. His course at Harvard was recorded, as was the beginning of his course at Regis in 1973; the recordings are available on the website www.bernardlonergan.com. The four parts of the present volume treat, respectively, ‘The Teaching of the New Testament on the Hypostatic Union,’ ‘The Teaching of the Ecumenical Councils on the Hypostatic Union,’ ‘Theological Conclusions regarding the Hypostatic Union,’ and ‘What Belongs Properly to Christ.’ Some might justifiably regard the title of part 1 as anachronistic, but it is found as such in Lonergan’s text; ‘Biblical Bases of Christological Dogma’ would perhaps have been a more accurate title. Original suggestions and contributions can be found in each part: the notion of schematic patterns in part 1, part 2’s elegant presentation of an example of work in what would come to be called the functional specialty ‘Doctrines,’ part 3’s proposals regarding the secondary act of existence and especially regarding the consciousness of Christ, and part 4’s theses on the knowledge of Christ (thesis 12) and on Christ’s freedom (thesis 14). De-

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spite its obvious appearance and function as a textbook or even a manual, the volume contains some points that may well remain permanently valid theological contributions. I would claim this status in particular for the contributions on the consciousness and knowledge of Christ. The Collected Works edition has been eagerly awaited by many students of Lonergan, and we are happy to be able to make it available. The final product is the work of many hands, but as General Editor I take responsibility, for better or for worse, for adjudicating the various contributions. Five individual contributions demand attention, along with an institutional source of assistance. First, and above all, I wish to thank Charles Hefling for his extremely careful and precise translation of the text, as well as for his supreme patience as the slow process of publishing the Collected Works has gone forward and the editing of the present volume has proceeded Next, I owe a large debt of gratitude to Jeremy Wilkins for his scrupulously expert contributions to editing both the English and the Latin texts. This is a much better volume than it would have been had I been the sole editor. Third, Eric Mabry has done a great service by adding the Tanner references (dec) in the English text and by supplementing the Migne information with indications of critical texts where these are available. Fourth, the two official readers appointed by University of Toronto Press, whose identity I do not know, provided extraordinary assistance in tidying up what even a very long process of editing had unwittingly left in need of further work. And fifth, I wish to thank John St James for his extraordinary work as copy-editor, not only on this volume but also on most of the others in this series. No doubt this was one of the more difficult volumes to work on! The Lonergan Research Institute has, of course, supported the Collected Works project for nearly thirty years, and with this volume has in particular made possible the work of Professor Wilkins. I like to take the opportunity afforded by these General Editors’ Prefaces to give continued thanks to Marquette University for its support of the Marquette Lonergan Project and so for funding my work as editor not only on this volume but ever since 2006. Lonergan did not put any footnotes in his text, and so all footnotes in the present volume are editorial. Some of them simply give greater detail to items that Lonergan included in the body of the text. As has been our custom, we have used the New Revised Standard Version as the default translation of the Bible unless reason was found to supply

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an alternate translation. db and ds refer to the two versions of Denzinger’s Enchiridion that Lonergan employed in the 1964 version of the manuscript. In general the Oxford American Dictionary and the Chicago Manual of Style were relied on in their respective realms of authority, though not rigidly. May this work now take its long overdue part in the total corpus of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan. robert m. doran Marquette University

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THE INCARNATE WORD

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PARS PRIMA

Doctrina NT de Unione Hypostatica

Thesis 1 Ex doctrina Novi Testamenti constat unum eundemque Iesum Nazarenum et (1) verum hominem esse, et (2) multipliciter divina participare, et (3) verum esse Deum. Termini Ex doctrina nt constat: thesis non his verbis in nt declaratur, unde est conclusio quaedam; non tamen agitur de deductione ex veris nt ad aliud verum, sed de textu ipsius nt recte intelligendo. unus idemque: non alius est homo, et alius est Deus; qui homo est etiam Deus est, et qui Deus est etiam homo est factus; ponitur fundamentum contra Nestorianos. Iesus Nazarenus: de quo narrant evangelia. verus: sensu proprio, non metaphorico, non diminuto; Iesus non minus est homo quam nos, idemque non minus est Deus quam Pater. homo: nobis similis; qui communi iudicio vere iudicatur homo esse; non agitur de compositione hylemorphica ex anima et corpore probanda. divina participare: ea facere, dicere, esse quae quodammodo ad Deum pertinent; e.g., miracula passim facere, legem mosaicam corrigere, summum amorem erga se ipsum exigere, peccata mundi tollere, omnes hom-

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PART ONE



The Teaching of the New Testament on the Hypostatic Union

THESIS 1 The teaching of the New Testament establishes that one and the same Jesus of Nazareth (1) is true man, (2) in many ways participates in what is divine, and (3) is true God. Terms The teaching of the New Testament establishes: since the thesis is not stated in these words in the New Testament, it is a conclusion of sorts. It is arrived at, however, not by deducing any other truth from the truths of the New Testament, but by correctly understanding the text of the New Testament itself. one and the same: there is not someone who is a man and someone else who is God; he who is a man also is God, and he who is God also was made man. This is the fundamental point as against the Nestorians. Jesus of Nazareth: the one about whom the gospels tell. true: in the proper sense, not metaphorically or in some lesser sense; Jesus is no less man than we are, and the same Jesus is no less God than the Father is. man: someone like us; someone whom common sense would rightly judge to be a human being. It is not a matter of proving a hylomorphic composition out of body and soul. to participate in what is divine : to do or say or be that which pertains in any way to God; for example, to perform miracles on occasion, to revise the Mosaic Law, to call forth a supreme love towards himself, to take away the sins

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ines de aeterna singulorum sorte iudicare, de caelis iam nunc regnare super omnia, ante vitam terrestrem praeexstitissse, creationi interfuisse. Deus: Deus Abraham, Isaac, Iacob; rerum omnium principium et finis; prout in vt et nt concipitur et agnoscitur, salva tamen distinctione in nt facta inter Patrem et Filium.

Intentio theseos R.P. Pius xii: ‘nobilissimum theologiae munus illud esse, quod ostendat quomodo ab Ecclesia definita doctrina in fontibus contineatur … “eo ipso sensu, quo definita est”’ (‘Humani generis,’ db 2314, ds 3886). Quod munus includit determinationem quaestionis, quid quo sensu in fontibus contineatur. Quare, non solum ponuntur partes prima et tertia, quae dogma Chalcedonense (db 148, ds 301–302) declarant, sed etiam interponitur pars altera circa multiplicem divinorum participationem. Sic enim (1) praeparatur mens ad divinitatem agnoscendam, (2) quasi muneribus intermediis coniunguntur quae de Christo Deo et de Christo homine dicuntur, (3) modus loquendi et concipiendi nt proprius exhibetur, et (4) via ad difficultates vel Patrum intelligendas vel hodiernas solvendas aperitur.

Nota theseos Concilium Chalcedonense: ‘… unum eundemque … Iesum Christum … Deum verum et hominem verum …’ (db 148, ds 301–302). Decretum Sancti Officii ‘Lamentabili’: ‘Divinitas Iesu Christi ex evangeliis non probatur …’ (db 2027, cf. 2028–31; ds 3427, cf. 3428–31). Adversarii directi 1 Plene apud L. de Grandmaison, Jésus-Christ, ii, 130–210.1

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of the world, to pass eternal judgment upon all individually, to be even now reigning over all, to exist prior to his earthly life, to take part in creation. God: the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; the beginning and end of all things; God as he is conceived and acknowledged in the Old and New Testaments, provided the distinction between the Father and the Son, drawn in the New Testament, is maintained. The intention of the thesis According to Pius xii, ‘the most noble task of theology is this, to show how the teaching which has been defined by the church is contained in its sources … “in the same sense in which it was defined”’(‘Humani generis,’ db 2314, ds 3886). That task includes determining the question, What is it, in what sense, that is contained in the sources? Therefore, not only does the thesis set out, in parts 1 and 3 of the argument below, what is stated by the Chalcedonian decree (db 148, ds 301–302, [dec 1: 86–87]); between these there is another part which is concerned with many kinds of participation in what is divine. This procedure (1) prepares the mind for acknowledging the divinity of Jesus Christ; (2) builds a bridge, as it were, between what is said about Christ who is God and what is said about Christ the man; (3) lays out the style of thinking and conceiving which is proper to the New Testament; and (4) opens up a way of understanding the Fathers’ difficulties and of solving difficulties of the present time. Theological note of the thesis The Council of Chalcedon affirmed ‘one and the same … Jesus Christ … true God and true man’ (db 148, ds 301–302, [dec 1: 86–87]). The decree Lamentabili of the Holy Office condemned the proposition that ‘the divinity of Jesus Christ is not proved from the gospels’ (db 2027, ds 3427; see also db 2028–31, ds 3428–31). Direct opponents of the thesis 1 There is a full treatment in L. de Grandmaison, Jésus-Christ, vol. 2, 130– 210.1

1 Léonce de Grandmaison, Jésus Christ, sa personne, son message, ses preuves, vol. 2 (Paris: G. Beauchesnes, 1928); in English, Jesus Christ: His Person, His

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2 Pagani, Iudaei, Mahumetani. 3 Gnostici ex syncretismo orientali-hellenistico orti, doctrinam simul cosmogonicam et soteriologicam,2 sed multipliciter secundum diversos auctores et scholas conceptam diffundebant. Christum habebant aeonem de bono principio emanantem; ab eius incarnatione refugiebant dictitantes eius corpus vel mere apparens esse vel ad tempus assumptum et ante passionem relictum. Unde nomen Docetae. Contra Gnosticos egerunt Irenaeus, Tertullianus, Hippolytus. Eiusdem tendentiae dualisticae erant Marcionitae (cf. Tertullianum), Manichaei (cf. Augustinum), Priscillianistae (db 231-45, ds 451-64), Albigenses (db 428-30, ds 800-802). Litterae apud Altaner, Patrologie (1958) 111-16; expositio a L. Cerfaux, art. Gnose, dbs; plura opera P. Orbe.3 4 Ebionitae, secta iudaeo-christiana, legem mosaicam observabat, Paulum apostolum habuit apostatam a fide, Christi negavit tum divinitatem tum de Maria nativitatem. Utrum Ebionitae cum Qumrân connexi fuerint, vide J.A. Fitzmyer, Theol.

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2 Pagans, Jews, Muslims. 3 The Gnostics arose from an Oriental-Hellenistic syncretism. The doctrine they taught was at once cosmogonic and soteriological,2 but conceived in various ways by different authors and schools. Christ, they held, was an ‘aeon’ emanating from the principle of good; they got around his Incarnation by insisting either that his body was merely an appearance or else that he took it on for a time and put it aside before his passion. Hence the name ‘Docetists’ from the verb ‘to seem.’ There are works against the Gnostics by Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus. Of the same dualistic tendency were the Marcionites (see Tertullian), the Manicheans (see Augustine), the Priscillianists (db 231–45, ds 451–64), and the Albigensians (db 428–30, ds 800–802, [dec 1: 230–31]). For the literature, see Altaner, Patrologie (1958) 111–16; discussion by L. Cerfaux in his article on ‘Gnose,’ dbs; and in the many works of P. Orbe.3 4 The Ebionites, a Jewish-Christian sect, kept the Mosaic Law, held that Paul the apostle was an apostate from the faith, and denied both the divinity of Christ and that he was born of Mary. As to whether the Ebionites were connected with the Qumrân commu-

Message, His Credentials, vol. 2, trans. Dom Basil Whelan and Ada Lane (London: Sheed & Ward; New York: Macmillan, 1932) 237–322. 2 The 1960 edition has ‘doctrinam dualisticam (duae causae primae, alia bo­ norum, alia malorum) simul cosmogonicam …’ In 1961 and 1964 the words ‘dualisticam … malorum)’ are omitted; it is possible that Lonergan intended to keep them, since he refers to the good principle in the next paragraph and to the dualism two paragraphs later. 3 Berthold Altaner, Patrologie: Leben, Schriften und Lehre der Kirchenväter (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1958); in English: Patrology, trans. Hilda C. Graef (New York: Herder and Herder, 1961); the English pp. are 138–47; Lucien Cerfaux, ‘Gnose préchretienne et biblique,’ dbs, vol. 3, cols. 659–701; works of Antonio Orbe referred to elsewhere by Lonergan are: En los albores de la exégesis Iohannea (Ioh. 1, 3): Estudios Valentinianos, vol. 2 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1955); Hacia la primera teología de la procesíon del Verbo: Estudios Valentinianos, vols. i/1, i/2 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1958); Los primeros herejes ante la persecución: Estudio Valentinianos, vol. 5 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1956).

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Stud. 16 (1955) 336–45.4 De Iudaeo-christianis scripserunt H.J. Schoeps, J. Daniélou.5 5 Adoptionistae Christum merum hominem a Deo dilectum et adoptatum docuerunt. Ita Beryllus Bostrensis (Eusebius, he vi, 33; mg 20, 563), Theodotus (Epiphanius, Haer., 54, 1); Artemon.6 Quibus adiungi solet Paulus Samosatenus, ep. Antiochenus, in synodo Antiochena anno 268 damnatus; vide tamen litteras, Altaner 189–90.

6 Ariani docuerunt Logon esse supremam quandam creaturam quae loco animae humanae unita fuit carni humanae ut Christus constitueretur. Damnati concilio Nicaeno (db 54, ds 125–26), in diversas partes divisi, usque fere ad concilium Constantinopolitanum i (db 86, ds 150) gravissime ecclesiam vexaverunt. Vide Grillmeier, apud Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, 1 (1951) 68–77.7

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nity, see J.A. Fitzmyer, Theological Studies 16 (1955) 336–45.4 H.J. Schoeps and J. Daniélou have written on Jewish Christianity.5 5 The Adoptionists taught that Christ was a mere man whom God loved and adopted. Such were Beryllus of Bostra (see Eusebius, he vi, 33; mg 20, 593, [sc 41: 135–36; lcl 265: 86, 88]), Theodotus (Epiphanius, Haereses, 54, 1), and Artemas.6 Paul of Samosata, bishop of Antioch, who was condemned at the Synod of Antioch in 268, is usually grouped with the Adoptionists, but see the literature cited by Altaner 189–90 (English 241–42). 6 The Arians taught that the Logos was a kind of supreme creature, united with human flesh in the place of a human soul so as to constitute Christ. Condemned at the Council of Nicea (db 54, ds 125–26, [dec 1: 5]) and divided into various parties, they were a very serious thorn in the church’s side almost until the First Council of Constantinople (db 86, ds 150, [dec 1: 24]). See Grillmeier in Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, 1 (1951) 68–77.7







4 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, ‘The Qumrân Scrolls, the Ebionites and Their Literature,’ Theological Studies 16 (1955) 335–72. 5 H.J. Schoeps, Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums (Tübingen: Mohr, 1949); in English, Jewish Christianity: Factional Disputes in the Early Church, trans. Douglas R.A. Hare (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969). Jean Daniélou, Théologie du judéo-christianisme (Tournai-Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1958); in English, The Theology of Jewish Christianity, trans. and ed. John A. Baker (London: Darton, Longman & Todd; Chicago: Regnery, 1964). 6 In The Triune God: Doctrines, Lonergan writes, ‘Eusebius mentions a certain Artemas who taught that Christ was a mere man, and insisted that his doctrine was by no means a novelty but was the teaching of the apostles themselves and even of the Roman Pontiffs up to the time of Victor i, who died around 198.’ The reference is to Eusebius of Caesarea, he v, 28; mg 20, 511–14. See Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Doctrines, vol. 11 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 85. 7 Aloys Grillmeier and Heinrich Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichte und Gegenwart, vol. 1 (Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1951). There are three volumes to this work, dating from 1951 to 1954. References will be to GrillmeierBacht, with the volume number. Grillmeier wrote the first part of chapter 1 (pp. 5–202), ‘Die theologische und sprachliche Vorbereitung der christologischen Formel von Chalkedon.’ All subsequent references to this volume in this particular thesis are to this contribution by Grillmeier.

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7 Apollinaris, ep. Laodicaeae, ob. c. 390, divinitatem Verbi affirmavit, sed modum unionis concepit sicut Ariani, ut sit unio naturalis, substantialis inter Verbum et carnem humanam, exclusa anima intellectiva. Unde discipuli eius dicebantur synusiastae. Litterae, Altaner 280–81. Expositio, Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 102–20. Contra exaggerationem Apollinistarum exaggerate egisse censentur Diodorus Tarsensis et Theodorus Mopsuestenus. Vide Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 130–59. Circa Theodorum habetur opus P. Sullivan.8 8 Nestorius, ep. Constantinopolitanus, ita distinxit duas Christi naturas ut earum unionem non salvaret, unde Mariam matrem hominis, Iesu, Christi, affirmavit sed matrem Dei negavit; duce Cyrillo Alexandrino damnatus et depositus est a concilio Ephesino, a. 431. Litterae, Altaner 302–303. Expositio, Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 159–64.

9 Monophysitae verba potius quam mentem S. Cyrilli fidelissime sequentes, concluserunt Christum ex duabus naturis fieri sed in duabus naturis non esse. Damnati concilio Chalcedonensi (db 148, ds 301–302).

Adversarii recentiores Qui ultimis his saeculis Christi divinitatem impugnant et negant, longe profundius procedunt; ipsam enim dogmatis possibilitatem tollunt; imo ipsam possibilitatem iam pridem esse sublatam supponunt.9

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7 Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea (d. ca. 390), affirmed the divinity of the Word but conceived the manner of union as the Arians did: it was a natural, substantial union between the Word and human flesh that excluded an intellectual soul. Hence, his followers were called Synousians. For the literature, see Altaner 280–81 (English 363–65); discussion in GrillmeierBacht, 1, 102–20. Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia wrote one-sidedly to counter the one-sidedness of the Apollinarians. See Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 130–59. There is a study of Theodore by F.A. Sullivan.8 8 Nestorius, bishop of Constantinople, distinguished Christ’s two natures in a way that did not preserve their union. Hence, he affirmed that Mary was the mother of a man, the mother of Jesus, the mother of Christ, but denied that she was the mother of God. He was condemned and deposed by the Council of Ephesus, under Cyril of Alexandria, in 431. For the literature, see Altaner 302–303 (English 393–96); discussion in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 159–64. 9 The monophysites, loyally following the words of Cyril rather than his meaning, concluded that Christ came into being from two natures but that he is not in two natures. They were condemned at the Council of Chalcedon (db 148, ds 301–302, [dec 1: 86–87]). Modern opponents of the thesis In the last few centuries those who have opposed and denied the divinity of Christ have gone much further. They have removed the very possibility of dogma; indeed, they suppose that the possibility has long since been abolished.9



8 Francis A. Sullivan, s.j., The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia (Rome: Gregorian University Press, Analectica Gregoriana 82, 1956). 9 The issues treated under this heading are also discussed by Lonergan in ‘The Dehellenization of Dogma,’ in A Second Collection, ed. William F.J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) at 12–19; ‘The Origins of Christian Realism’ ibid. 239–61; and the talk by the same title in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958–1964, vol. 6 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 80–93.

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Concilium Vaticanum: fides est virtus supernaturalis ‘qua, Dei aspirante atque adiuvante gratia, ab eo revelata vera esse credimus, non propter intrinsicam rerum veritatem naturali rationis lumine perspectam, sed propter auctoritatem ipsius Dei …’ (db 1789, ds 3008). Quo decreto elucet fidem catholicam esse in verum; etiam elucet id quod a Deo revelatur esse verum;10 et quidem verum supernaturale. Caeterum, hoc constat ex tota traditione conciliari, ubi formula celeberrima est: Si quis dixerit … anathema sit. Nam concilia non egerunt de nominibus et verbis sed de rebus; et id quod coniungit nomina et verba cum rebus est verum. Quae cum ita sint, qui verum impugnat, dogma catholicum radicitus impugnat: nam sublato vero, dogma nihil aliud est quam formula quaedam verbalis quae valorem forte symbolicum habere potest sed absolutum veri valorem habere non potest. Quod modo concreto repetam. Dices te credere Iesum Nazarenum esse verum Deum. Sed quid dicis? Formulam verborum recitas. Praeter formulam verborum quid habes? Dicis te verum iudicium exprimere, verum formaliter in solo iudicio inveniri, veritatem consistere in adaequatione inter rem et intellectum. Sed superbe tibi respondebitur hanc esse antiquatam atque derelictam opinionem scholasticam. Inter modernos neminem sustinere talem sententiam.11 Theologum, qui indigentiis modernis subvenire velit, talem sententiam derelinquere oportere et alio quodam modo tam revelationem quam fidem concipere. Iam vero haec impugnatio multipliciter fit, primo et quodammodo magis directe a philosophis, deinde a theologis qui fidem cum mente moderna, i.e., cum philosophia erronea, reconciliare volunt, tertio ab historicis quorum conceptiones methodicae sub influxu philosophico et theologico deformatae sunt, et quarto a theologis qui, quamvis omnem philosophiam, omne praesuppositum, excludere velint, tamen inconscii et inviti placitis systematicis et erroneis quasi irretiti tenentur.

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According to the First Vatican Council, faith is a supernatural virtue. ‘By that faith, with the inspiration and help of God’s grace, we believe that what he has revealed is true – not because its intrinsic truth is seen by the natural light of reason but because of the authority of God himself …’ (db 1789, ds 3008, [dec 2: 807]). This decree makes it clear that Catholic faith is faith in truth; it is also clear that what is revealed by God is truth,10 and indeed supernatural truth. Besides, the whole tradition of the councils establishes the same point; the usual and well-known formula has been, If anyone says … let him be anathema. For the councils were not concerned with nouns and verbs but with realities, and what joins nouns and verbs with realities is truth. That being so, anyone who attacks truth is attacking Catholic dogma at its roots: once truth is abolished, dogma is nothing but a verbal formula which can perhaps have a symbolic value but cannot have the absolute value of truth. Let me repeat the point in concrete terms. You may say that you believe Jesus of Nazareth is true God. But what are you saying? You are reciting a verbal formula. Besides a verbal formula, what have you got? You are saying that you express a true judgment, that truth is found formally in judgment alone, that truth consists in a correspondence between reality and the mind. But the haughty reply you will get is that this is an old-fashioned Scholastic opinion, now abandoned; nobody holds such a view today.11 Any theologian who wants to meet modern needs has to leave such opinions behind and conceive both faith and revelation in some other way. Now this attack comes from several quarters. First, and in some sense most directly, it is made by philosophers; second, by theologians who want to reconcile faith with modern thinking, that is, with mistaken philosophy; third, by historians whose methodologies have been deformed under philosophical and theological influence; and fourth, by theologians who may well want to rule out all philosophy and every presupposition, but who nevertheless are caught, unconsciously and unwillingly, in the snares of systematically mistaken opinions.

10 The second clause has been restored from the 1961 edition; its omission from the 1964 edition is easily explainable by homoioteleuton. 11 The Latin sentence ‘Inter modernos neminem sustinere talem sententiam,’ present in 1960 and 1961, was omitted in 1964. It is here restored.

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Imprimis ergo de philosophis perpauca recoli oportet. Rationalistae religionem divinitus revelatam, sive catholicam sive protestanticam, originem atque fontem bellorum gravissimorum habuerunt. Qualem religionem ut excluderent, verum supernaturaliter notum negaverunt. Unde radicitus tollitur cum alio quolibet dogmate etiam dogma divinitatis Christi. Erravit tamen rationalismus non solum circa verum supernaturale sed etiam circa verum naturaliter notum. In deductivismo quodam conceptualistico consistebat. Parum perspiciebat (1) vim iudicii exsistentialis quo per verum iudicium cognoscitur exsistens et (2) nexum intrinsecum inter conceptus humanos et sensibilia (scilicet, obiectum proprium nostri intellectus esse intelligibile in ipsis sensibilibus perspectum; cf. Sum. theol., 1, q. 84, a. 7). Kant: duos errores rationalistarum retinuit sed tertium correxit. Negavit verum supernaturaliter notum. Non multo magis quam rationalistae perspexit vim iudicii exsistentialis. Sed intrinsecum nexum inter sensibilia et conceptus modo suo exponebat et defendebat. Quia vim iudicii exsistentialis parum perspexit, rationem puram reduxit ad munus mere regulativum. Sequebatur (1) sensibilia esse mera phaenomena, (2) intelligibilia restringi ad campum sensibilem informandum, (3) tolli possibilitatem cognitionis analogicae entium spiritualium, (4) exsistentiam Dei et immortalitatem animae intellectivae non esse nisi postulata rationis practicae. Sicut rationalistae, etiam Kant sustulit theologiam et dogmaticam et fundamentalem. Ulterius procedens, ipsam theologiam naturalem sustulit. Denique tandem viam aperuit ad theologiam liberalem ut distinguerentur (1) Iesus historicus scientifice cognitus qui merus homo fuit [et] (2) Christus qui est obiectum fidei et cultus, i.e., obiectum cuiusdam postulati practici, cuiusdam iudicii valoris, cuiusdam sentimenti religiosi. Hegel rationem puram ad pristinam gloriam quodammodo restituere voluit, non quod vim iudicii exsistentialis perspexerit, sed quia novum speculandi genus introducere voluit12 per logicam dialecticam, historicam,

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Accordingly the first step should be to review a few points about philosophers. Rationalists held that divinely revealed religion, whether Catholic or Protestant, was the source and origin of devastating wars. In order to eliminate this kind of religion, they denied that there is any truth that is supernaturally known. Hence, they radically undermined the dogma of Christ’s divinity along with any other dogma whatever. Rationalism was mistaken, however, not only about supernatural truth but also about truth that is naturally known. It consisted in a kind of conceptualistic deductivism. It lacked a grasp of (1) the force of existential judgment, by which we know that which is, and (2) the intrinsic link between human concepts and sensible data – which is to say, that the proper object of our intellect is the intelligible grasped in sensible data themselves. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 7. Kant took over two of the rationalists’ errors but corrected a third. He denied truth that is supernaturally known. His grasp of the force of existential judgment was not much better than that of the rationalists. But in his own way he did present and defend an intrinsic link between sensible data and concepts. Because he failed to perceive the force of existential judgment, Kant restricted pure reason to a merely regulative task. From this it followed (1) that sensible presentations are merely phenomena, (2) that the intelligible is restricted to structuring the field of sensible presentations, (3) that there is no possibility of knowing spiritual beings by means of analogy, and (4) that the existence of God and the immortality of the intellectual soul are only postulates of practical reason. Like the rationalists, Kant too undermined dogmatic and fundamental theology. Going one step further, he undermined natural theology itself. Then, finally, he opened the way to liberal theology, which would distinguish between (1) a scientifically known Jesus of history, who was only a man, and (2) a Christ who is the object of faith and worship, that is, the object of some practical postulate, some judgment of value, some religious feeling. Hegel’s aim was to restore pure reason to something of its pristine glory, not because he grasped the force of existential judgment, but because he wanted12 to introduce a new type of speculation through his dialectical,

12 Reading ‘voluit’ for ‘valuit,’ which appears in all three editions.

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syntheticam. At sublato iudicio exsistentiali sine limitibus et sine gubernaculo processit illa logica; omnia pariter tractavit, ut ipsa mysteria divinitus revelata intra campum philosophicum continerentur. Quo ex fonte idealistico oriuntur sententiae: (1) religionem esse apprehensionem potius sensitivam, imaginativam, affectivam eius quod nisi philosophice non proprie cognoscitur; (2) inter religiones eminere christianismum, quippe perfectiorem, puriorem, profundiorem, efficaciorem, immo veriorem (sensu tamen non scholastico sed Hegeliano, i.e., secundum stadia processus dialectici); (3) christianismum esse ideam quandam seu essentiam, quae minime dependet ex factis contingentibus et historicis, sed ex intima sua ratione atque perfectione perspicitur et mensuratur; (4) Dominum nostrum esse hominem eximium, maximum quoddam ingenium religiosum, incarnationem quandam ipsius spiritus obiectivi, qui spiritus13 historiam facit et constituit multasque et alias sui incarnationes habet. Positivismus ad ‘realitatem’ redit, ita tamen ut unice obiectivum, unice verum ducit, non quod ipso iudicio vero innotescit, sed quod sensibus subest et legibus scientifice determinatis tum obiective regitur tum mente cogitari potest. Sequitur neque verum neque obiectivum esse potest quod vel sensibus non subest vel legibus scientifice determinatis non regitur. Unde fit crisis radicalis scripturarum ut omne non verum (sensu positivistico), omne non obiectivum (sensu positivistico) a priori, sine discussione, sine haesitatione fraudibus, illusionibus, mentalitati mythicae attribuatur. Historia ‘scientifica,’ quaenam sit, sequentibus distinctis elucebit, nempe, (1) historia exsistentiali, (2) historia narrata, (3) historia critica, (4) historia methodica.14 Historia exsistentialis est ea rerum gestarum notitia quae necessario requiritur ut communitas qua communitas se cognoscat, ut deliberet, ut eligat, ut efficaciter agat. Sicut homo amnesia captus nescit quis sit, ubi habitet,

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historical, synthetic logic. Yet once judgments of existence have been abolished, that logic goes forward without let or hindrance; everything is treated in the same way, so that even divinely revealed mysteries fall within the ambit of philosophy. From this idealist source the following views arose. (1) Religion is a more palpable, imaginative, and affective apprehension of what is known properly only by philosophy. (2) Christianity stands highest among the religions, as being more perfect, purer, more profound and efficacious, and indeed truer – not in the Scholastic sense of ‘true,’ however, but in the Hegelian sense of a stage in the dialectical process. (3) Christianity is an idea or essence, which does not depend on contingent historical facts, but is perceived and measured by its own inner coherence and perfection. (4) Our Lord was an exceptional man, a supreme religious genius, an incarnation of that objective Spirit which makes and constitutes history and has many other incarnations.13 Positivism returns to ‘reality.’ The return, however, is such that for positivists what alone is objective, what alone is true, is not what is known through true judgment. It is instead that which lies within the range of the senses, that which is regulated objectively, and rendered mentally thinkable, by scientifically determined laws. It follows that nothing which does not lie within the range of the senses, and nothing which is not governed by scientifically determined laws, can be either objective or true. The result was a radical critique of the scriptures. Everything that was not ‘true’ (in the positivistic sense) and everything that was not ‘objective’ (in the positivistic sense) was written off in advance, without discussion or qualm, to fraud, illusion, or mythic mentality. ‘Scientific’ history: The following distinctions will shed light on what ‘scientific history’ is: (1)  existential history, (2)  narrative history, (3)  critical history, and (4) methodical history.14 Existential history is that knowledge of events which is necessary if a community is to know itself as a community and to deliberate, choose, and act effectively. Just as someone suffering from amnesia does not know who he is

13 The word ‘spiritus’ was added after ‘qui’ in the 1964 edition. Without it, ‘qui’ could be read as referring to ‘Dominum nostrum … hominem.’ 14 There is a parallel discussion, using the same categories in a later context, in Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 181–96. Compare also the remarks on scientific history in Lonergan, The Triune God: Doctrines 260–63.

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quid possideat, quid ei vel agendum vel faciendum sit, ita communitas, sui oblita, communitas esse desinit. Historia narrata colligit, seligit, ordinat, recitat ea quae (1) historia exsistentiali et etiam (2) aliis historiis narratis innotescunt. Notate (1) quo magis loco et tempore extenditur perdurans hominum societas, eo magis necessariam ei esse historiam narratam; (2) ad finem exsistentialem utique praeferenda esse vera, sed faciliora et efficaciora esse abbreviata, vivida, synthetica, neque fini exsistentiali obstare mythica, modo qua talia non cognoscuntur; (3)15 historiam narratam multa et diversa munera complecti; non enim nudam factorum enumerationem facit, sed etiam opus artisticum (seligendo, ordinando, describendo), opus ethicum (praeclare gesta laudando, mala reprehendendo), opus apologeticum (externorum mendacia refutando, forte etiam tacendo vel mitigando quae propriae nationi dedecori sunt), opus propheticum (res praeteritas ita interpretando ut tendentiis contemporaneis vel faveatur vel resistatur). Quas ob causas oritur historia critica. Historia critica pro fontibus habet quidquid ex praeterito iam exsistit olim ab hominibus factum; includuntur ergo non solum historiae narratae sed quaelibet alia scripta; accedunt monumenta, numismata, inscriptiones, et ea etiam quae in aliis scientiis sive naturalibus sive humanis concluduntur. Quae quidem omnia criticus sibi assumit, non ut omnibus credat, non ut credibilia ab incredibilibus discernat, sed tamquam phaenomena iam exsistentia et nunc explicanda. Non enim agitur de fide sed de scientia quae ex sensibilibus in sensibilium intelligentiam procedit. Sane experimenta facere non potest criticus, neque conclusiones universales attingere intendit; at, his differentiis agnitis, essentialiter eodem procedit modo ac in aliis scientiis positivis. Quasi ergo esset ‘detective’ qui inter testes veraces et mendaces, inter indicia facta et ficta, discernit et ex utrisque ad eventuum reconstructionem procedit, ita historicus criticus omnia amplectitur, omnia examinat, omnia probat, nulli simpliciter credit, donec denique tandem perspiciat, intelligat, quid re vera factum fuerit, ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen.’16

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or where he lives, what belongs to him or what he should do, so too a community that has forgotten itself ceases to be a community. Narrative history assembles, selects, arranges, and recounts the events known through (1) existential history and also (2) other narrative histories. Note the following points. (1)  The further an ongoing human society extends in space and time, the more it needs narrative history. (2) Where existential ends are concerned, truth is undoubtedly preferable, but what is short, vivid, and comprehensive is easier and more effective. Myth does not subvert existential purposes, provided it is not known as myth. (3)15 Narrative history combines a number of different functions. It is never just a narrative of bald facts. It is artistic, selecting, ordering, and describing. It is ethical, apportioning praise and blame. It is apologetic, refuting false accounts by outsiders, and perhaps also playing down or dropping out things that are shameful to its own nation. It is prophetic, interpreting the past so as to favor current tendencies or resist them. For these reasons, critical history takes its rise. Critical history has for its sources any extant human artifacts. These include not only narrative histories but any other writings, together with monuments, coins, inscriptions, as well as the conclusions of other natural and human sciences. The critical historian takes all these into account, not so as to believe them all, not so as to sift the credible from the incredible, but simply as existing data to be explained. For critical history is not a matter of belief but a science that proceeds from sensible data to an understanding of sensible data. Critical historians cannot perform experiments, of course; nor is it their aim to arrive at universal conclusions. Still, given these differences, they go about their task in essentially the same way that obtains in other positive sciences. Hence, like the detective who discerns between truthful and lying witnesses and between real and false clues but uses both to reconstruct the crime, critical historians take everything in, examine it, put it to the test, accepting nothing simply on trust, until at length they grasp and understand what in fact was going forward, wie es eigentlich gewesen, ‘just as it actually happened.’16

15 Compare the following with Lonergan, Method in Theology 185. The italics on the adjectives describing the functions of narrative history are editorial. 16 On the same page in Method in Theology, Lonergan refers to Ranke’s perpetually quoted phrase wie es eigentlich gewesen as expressing the concern of critical history.

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Et sicut scientiae naturales ad eum mundum cognoscendum perveniunt, quem exsistere ne suspicati quidem sunt homines olim culti, ita historici critici rerum gestarum seriem causasque reconstituunt, quas ignoraverunt ipsae historiae narratae, de quibus tamen facta, quasi lapides olim aliter positos, in novam domum faciendam desumunt. At critica haec historia unum praetermisit, nempe, ipsam historici mentem. Sicut historia vel mathematicae scientiae vel medicae nisi a mathematico vel medico conscribi non potest (nam ipsa res de qua agitur secus non intelligeretur), ita etiam rerum humanarum historia conscribi non potest nisi praeintelligitur quid sit homo. Et quo magis de intentionibus, de motivis, de valoribus, de rebus spiritualibus historice quaeritur, eo magis in reconstructionem criticam influit illa hominis praeintelligentia secundum quam historicus criticus omnia examinat, probat, iudicat. Quod ex ipsis historiis, iamiam critice factis elucet. Nam tot factae sunt historiae, quot erant tendentiae vel materialisticae vel idealisticae vel nationalisticae vel religiosae; et post quinquaginta centumve annos, mutatis conditionibus socio-culturalibus, politicis, philosophicis, valde antiquatae videntur historiae critice quidem sed iam pridem factae. Historia methodica ergo oritur, ubi historici compertum habent nullam inquisitionem humanam sine praesuppositis fieri. Sedulo duo distinguunt: aliud enim est intelligibile quod in ipsis datis quasi de se interconnexis elucet; aliud autem est intelligibile quod ex ipsius historici praeintelligentia, mentalitate, iudiciis, tendentiis, sympathiis procedit; illud sane minus et brevius est, neque in omnibus attingi potest, sed solide fundatur; hoc autem, forte alterius scientiae vel philosophiae obiectum est, sed ad historiam non eo sensu pertinet quod criteriis historicis iudicari potest.

Quantum historia critica scripturas sacras impugnaverit, quantum in hanc crisim influxerint vel idealismus, vel liberalismus placitis Kantianis inhaerens, vel positivismus, iam aliunde scitis. Quas impugnationes quodammodo tollit historia methodica, at modo ambiguo, in cuius intelligentiam quaedam de subiectivismo recentiori dicenda sunt. Subiectivismus (includit exsistentialismum sed latius patet) directe obiectivismo positivistico opponitur. Nam sine subiecto vidente, intelligente, explicante, nullum est obiectum. Ulterius, subiectum numquam est obiectum (sensu positivistico); non enim qua subiectum subiacet sensibus et, cum libere eligat, legibus scientifice determinatis non regitur. At quamvis obiectum numquam sit, quamvis ‘proprie’ cognosci non possit, tamen intime sibi

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And, just as the natural sciences arrive at knowledge of a world whose existence was once unsuspected even by educated people, so critical historians reconstitute a series of events and causes unknown to the narrative histories out of which it has been constructed, as though the stones once placed differently are taken to build a new house. Still, this critical history leaves one thing out: the mind of the historian. Just as a history of mathematics or medicine cannot be written except by a mathematician or a physician – otherwise there would be no understanding of what the history was about – so too a history of human affairs cannot be written without a prior understanding of what man is. And the more a historical inquiry concerns intentions, motivations, values, spirituality, the more the reconstruction is influenced by that preunderstanding of man by which the critical historian examines, tests, and judges everything. So much is clear from the critical history already written. There are as many histories as there have been materialistic or idealistic or nationalistic or religious tendencies, and after a hundred and fifty years of change in sociocultural, political, and philosophical conditions, the critical histories of days gone by seem thoroughly outdated. Methodical history arises, therefore, when historians realize that there is no human inquiry without presuppositions. They are careful to distinguish two things: one is the intelligible pattern that shines forth in data as though they were interconnected of themselves; the other is the intelligible pattern that proceeds from the historian’s own preunderstanding, mentality, judgments, tendencies, and sympathies. The first is the lesser and more restricted of the two. It cannot be reached in all cases, but its grounding is solid. The second, however, may be the object of other sciences or of philosophy, but does not pertain to history in the sense that it can be judged by historical criteria. The extent to which critical history attacked sacred scripture, and the extent to which this critique was influenced by idealism, by the liberalism inherent in Kant’s position, or by positivism, you already know. Methodical history counters these attacks in a way, but it is an ambivalent way, which may be understood through some comments on modern subjectivism. Subjectivism (which is broader than existentialism but includes it) is directly opposed to positivistic objectivism. For without the subject who sees, understands, and explains there is no object. Furthermore, the subject is not an object (in the positivist sense) at all. The subject as subject does not lie within the range of the senses, and the subject when freely choosing is not governed by scientifically determined laws. Still, though never an object

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praesens exsistit; se ipsum, mundum suum, situationem in qua se invenit, non sane scientifice explicat, et tamen quodammodo intelligit; quae intima sui suique mundi intelligentia, sicut scientifica non est, ita etiam ab ipsis subiecti dispositionibus et liberis electionibus dependet. ‘In der Geschichtlichkeit der Existenz hängen Verstehen und Entscheiden zusammen.’17 Quibus positis, ad nt interpretandum proceditur tripliciter.

1 Haec subiecti conscientia (Existenzerhellung, Innewerden) nullatenus ad rationem cognitionis pertingit. Scientifica et historica interpretatio nt fit criteriis positivisticis. Christianismus ergo dicitur, v.g., mythus gnosticus soteriologicus. Non solum facienda est Entmythologisierung a R. Bultmann proposita, sed etiam ipsa doctrina Bultmanniana a suo mytho est purganda, nempe, Deum per praedicationem evangelicam credenti sese revelare. Ita F. Buri, liberalismum renovans, et sententiis K. Jaspers inhaerens, praeter Entmythologisierung etiam Entkerygmatisierung exigit. Cf. H. Bartsch, Kerygma und Mythos, i.18

2 Ipse Bultmann quattuor distinguit munera: philosophi, historici, exegetae, et hominis exsistentis.19 Philosophus quidem revelat quotupliciter homo exsistere possit; ipsum tamen exsistere patet penes electionem personalem uniuscuiusque manere. Historicus20 compertum habet omnia in nt posita exprimere fidem, scilicet, electiones personales primaevae communitatis christianae; ideoque, ut perspiciat quid re vera factum fuerit, critice procedit et, quasi oves ab haedis discernens, solida facta colligit, caetera autem internis et exsistentialibus experientiis modo mythico expressis attribuit. Ita

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and not ‘properly’ knowable, the subject does exist as intimately present to himself. In some manner he understands himself, his world, the situation in which he finds himself, although certainly he does not explain these in a scientific way. As this inner understanding of oneself and one’s world is not scientific, so also it depends on the subject’s own orientations and free choices. ‘In the historicity of existence understanding and decision cohere.’17 On these grounds there are three approaches to the interpretation of the New Testament. 1 In no way does this consciousness of the subject (Existenzerhellung, Inne­ werden) fit the definition of knowing. Scientific and historical interpretation of the New Testament is carried out according to positivistic criteria. Christianity is therefore said to be, for example, a gnostic redeemer-myth. Not only should Bultmann’s program of ‘demythologization’ be carried out, but Bultmann’s teaching must itself be purged of its own myth, the myth that God reveals himself to the believer through the preaching of the gospel. Thus, Fritz Buri, restoring liberalism and adhering to the opinions of Karl Jaspers, has gone beyond demythologizing to call for ‘dekerygmatizing.’ See H. Bartsch, Kerygma und Mythos, vol. 1.18 2 ­Bultmann himself distinguished four tasks: those of the philosopher, of the historian, of the exegete, and of the human being as existing.19 The philosopher discloses how many ways it is possible for one to exist in. It is clear, however, that existence itself remains a matter of personal decision for one or another of these ways. The historian20 knows for himself that everything the New Testament says is an expression of faith, which means an expression of the personal decisions of the early Christian community. Thus, in order to perceive what was in fact going forward, he proceeds

17 Lonergan does not provide the precise source of this comment, but the themes appear in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and the hermeneutic theory of Rudolf Bultmann. 18 Hans Werner Bartsch, Der gegenwärtige Stand der Entmythologisierungsdebatte: Ein kritischer Bericht, in the series Kerygma und Mythos, vol. 1, part 2 (Hamburg-Volksdorf: H. Reich, 1955). 19 In the 1960 and 1961 texts, and in the discussion of Bultmann in the 1964 edition of De Deo trino: Pars dogmatica (The Triune God: Doctrines 266–67) there were three tasks, those of the philosopher, the exegete, and the existing human being. 20 In the texts of 1960 and 1961 this description is ascribed to the exegete.

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Iesum crucifixum et mortuum agnoscit factum historicum; sed Christi resurrectionem corporalem atque palpabilem habet expressionem interioris experientiae modo mythico declaratam atque elaboratam. Exegeta proinde per dictam interpretationem exsistentialem detegit et exponit sensum quendam interiorem et religiosum sub veste mythica celatum.21 At homo denique est ipse Bultmann, cui exsistendum est; eique praedicatum evangelium (kerygma) audienti (fides ex auditu), non minus quam primaevis christianis audientibus, datur efficax illa decisio exsistentialis, quae nominatur gratia, iustificatio, fides, cuique respondet Deus in Christo sese revelans. Credit ergo ipse Bultmann; a primaevis christianis ipse se discernit, non quasi illi fideles sed ipse infidelis esset, sed prout discernitur excultus et scientificus huius temporis ab hominibus parum cultis tempore Christi. Quam ob causam, suam fidem in categoriis philosophiae exsistentialis exprimit, et nt a vestibus mythicis denudatum vult, quo clarius appareat vera christianismi essentia atque natura.

3 Alii autem novum quoddam historiae genus agnitum volunt, quam salutis-historiam (Heilsgeschichte) nominant, non eo tantum sensu quod vt et nt de salute tractant et a credentibus sunt composita, sed etiam quia ipsa historiae notio atque methodus e criteriis positivisticis eripienda atque liberanda est. Nam criteriis positivisticis nihil cognoscitur nisi ‘obiectum.’ Sed historia humana eatenus sensum, eatenus intelligibilitatem habet, quatenus sunt subiecta exsistentia, sibi praesentia, intelligentia atque libere eligentia. Quae quidem omnia penitus ignota maneant necesse est, quamdiu criteria positivistica retinentur. Manifeste ergo exigitur nova conceptio scientiae historicae, nova methodus, nova criteria; et quae in genere de historia valent, multo magis de hermeneutica et de exegesi sunt affirmanda. Quod sane verissimum est. At novae methodi perspecta necessitas nisi votum non facit. Ut ipsa res attingatur, ultra placita tam subiectivistica quam positivistica procedendum est, neque in rationalismum, Kantianismum, idealismum relabendum. Menti modernae durus est hic sermo. Facilior in-

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critically. As though dividing sheep from goats, he gathers the solid facts and attributes everything else to inward, existential experiences expressed mythically. Hence, he acknowledges as historical facts the crucifixion and death of Jesus; the palpable, bodily resurrection of Christ, however, he takes to be an expression of interior experience, stated and elaborated in mythical fashion. The exegete, through this kind of existential interpretation, uncovers and expounds an inner, religious sense hidden underneath this mythical husk.21 But the human being is finally Bultmann himself, who has to exist. He is no less a hearer of the preached gospel, the kerygma, than the early Christians were (fides ex auditu, ‘faith comes by hearing’), and to him is given, no less than to them, that effective, existential decision which is called grace or justification or faith, to which the God who reveals himself in Christ responds. Bultmann himself does believe, then; he distinguishes himself from the early Christians, not as though they were believers and he an unbeliever, but in the way that a cultivated, scientific man of his own time differs from the far less cultivated people of the time of Christ. For that reason he expresses his own faith in the categories of existential philosophy, and would have the New Testament stripped of its mythical crust so that the true essence and nature of Christianity may appear more clearly. 3 Others, however, would recognize a new kind of history. They call it salvation history or Heilsgeschichte, not only in the sense that the Old and New Testaments are concerned with salvation and were written by believers, but also because the very notion of history and its method should be rescued and set free from positivistic criteria. For on positivistic criteria nothing is known except the ‘object.’ But human history has its sense and intelligibility insofar as there are existing subjects, present to themselves, who are understanding and freely choosing. All this will necessarily remain entirely unknown, so long as positivistic criteria are still in force. Clearly, then, there is need for a new conception of scientific history, a new method, new criteria; and what holds true for history in general should be affirmed all the more for hermeneutics and exegesis. Quite so. But perceiving the need for a new method only holds out a promise. In order to achieve the reality, both subjectivistic and positivistic views must be transcended, without sliding back into rationalism, Kantianism, or idealism. To the modern mind, this is a hard saying. What it finds

21 This sentence is added in the 1964 edition.

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venitur fideismus quidam protestanticus, ut omittantur quaestiones mere philosophicae, ut laudetur methodus proprie theologica, ut dogmatice procedantur. Ita fere K. Barth.22 Ita etiam simili quodam modo sed magis cauto, H. Diem, Dogmatik, Ihr Weg zwischen Historismus und Existentialismus (Münschen 1955, 1957, Edinburgh anglice 1959).23 Qui fideismus, in multis bene meritus, inter Scyllam et Charybdim navigare contendit. Ei obicitur ex parte Bultmanniana aliud esse et aliud posse esse; posse quidem esse quam affirmant salutis-historiam; eam autem actu esse caeco quodam animi motu affirmari non debere. Ex altera tamen parte, si responderent vere et realiter exsistere salutis-historiam, iam in campo absolute positae veritatis, iam in campo Catholicorum sese invenirent. Fideismo succederent theologia naturalis et theologia fundamentalis; non solum Deus revelaretur sed etiam vera a Deo revelarentur; quod si concederentur veritates a Deo revelatae, haud excluderentur veritates ab ecclesia definitae. Haec ergo quae de adversariis recentioribus diximus, nisi tendentias quasdam fundamentales non adumbrant. Ideo haec narravimus ut perspiciatur quemadmodum factum sit ut tam multi, qui se christianos et fideles profiteantur, nihilominus divinitatem Christi negent vel eam dubitent vel etiam se ignorare dicant quid per divinitatem Christi significari posset. Ideo etiam haec narravimus ut perspiciatur ubinam sistatur dissidium, ubinam certaminis acies collocetur: sunt enim qui decipiantur, qui ex maximis et eruditissimis voluminibus historicis et exegeticis concludant veram quaestionem esse historicam et exegeticam, cum re vera radicale problema eiusmodi non sit sed in praeviis quaestionibus methodicis et philosophicis. Ideo denique haec narravimus ut eorum delusio evitetur qui catholicam de revelatione sententiam agnitam arbitrentur ubi sermo fit de Deo sese re-velante; at si Deus se re-velat quin verbum doceat, non fundatur sed tollitur positio catholica, quae vera a Deo revelata et ab ecclesia definita fidei obiectum esse docet (db 1792, cf. 1789; ds 3011, cf. 3008). At murmurantes audire mihi videor. Sunt qui speculationibus philosophicis et methodicis aberrent. Sed maior pars eorum, qui divinitatem Christi

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easier is a Protestant fideism which disregards questions that are merely philosophical, praises a properly theological method, and proceeds dogmatically. Hence, roughly, Karl Barth.22 Hence too, in a similar way though more cautiously, H. Diem’s Dogmatik: Ihr Weg zwischen Historismus und Existentialismus (Munich, 1955, 1957; in English, Edinburgh, 1959).23 Such a fideism is in many respects quite praiseworthy, striving as it does to steer between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, there is the Bultmannian objection that being possible is not the same as actually being. Such a thing as salvation history is possible, but that there is such a thing ought not to be affirmed on blind impulse. On the other hand, however, if the reply to this is that salvation history really and truly exists, one finds oneself already in the field of absolutely posited truth, already on Catholic ground. Natural theology and fundamental theology take the place of fideism; not only has God been revealed, but truths have been revealed by God as well. And granted that there are truths revealed by God, one can scarcely rule out truths defined by the church. What we have said about modern opponents is only a sketch of their basic tendencies. There are three reasons for rehearsing them: first, to show how it is that so many who call themselves believers and Christians nevertheless deny the divinity of Christ or doubt it or say they do not know what the divinity of Christ can mean; second, to locate the disagreement and show where the battlefront lies, since the sheer bulk and erudition of exegetical and historical volumes has fooled some people into concluding that the real question is historical and exegetical, when in fact the roots of the problem lie elsewhere, in prior questions of philosophy and method; and finally, to avoid the mistaken judgment that talk about God ‘unveiling’ himself is always the accepted Catholic view of revelation, since if God ‘unveils’ himself without teaching a word, then the Catholic position, which teaches that truths revealed by God and defined by the church are the object of faith (db 1792, see 1789; ds 3011, see 3008; [dec 2: 807]), is not grounded but eliminated. But I seem to hear some murmuring. ‘Yes, some people have been led astray by methodological and philosophical speculation. But for the most

22 On Barth and fideism, compare The Triune God: Doctrines 266–69. 23 Hermann Diem, Dogmatik: Ihr Weg zwischen Historismus und Existentialismus (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1955; 2nd ed., 1957; in English, Dogmatics, trans. Harold Knight, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, and Philadelphia: Westminster, 1959).

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dubitant, eiusmodi speculationes vel parvi faciunt vel simpliciter ignorant. Quibus respondendum est maximam hominum partem, sicut et celeberrimus ille M. Jourdain,24 oratione soluta uti quin hoc ipsum umquam audiverint. Soli sane philosophi praesupposita sua philosophica cognoscunt et examinant; sed omnes homines, sive scientes et prudentes, sive ignorantes et inviti, praesupposita philosophica habent atque adhibent. Quod in nostra materia illustravit J.S. Lawton, Conflict in Christology (London: spck, 1947);25 ubi sententiae christologicae acatholicae paulatim in deterius mutatae inter annos 1889–1914 describuntur; quamvis enim in Britannia et usa omnes quaestiones concrete proponantur, quamvis nihil quaeratur nisi Christus vere unus, vere Deus, vere homo, tamen ex ipso solo defectu philosophiae, in qua ens per verum absolute positum cognoscitur, in divinitatem Christi dubitandam vel negandam gressibus quasi inevitabilibus processum est. Sicut enim cognoscimus Dei exsistentiam quia cognoscimus verum esse hoc assertum, Deus est (cf. Sum. theol., 1, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2m), ita etiam cognoscimus Christi divinitatem quia credimus verum esse hoc assertum, Christus est Deus. 4 Remanet ut perpauca addamus de erroribus catholicorum. Modernistae obiectum fidei posuerunt, non verum, sed ‘incognoscibile’;26 unde et dogmata opinati sunt, non vera, sed symbola esse transeunter utilia ad sensum religiosum stimulandum. Cf. db 2071–76, ds 3475–79. Nuperrime H. Duméry de philosophia religionis tractans, triplici reductioni Husserlianae addidit quartam, ut praeter reductionem eideticam ex sensibilibus in perspectam essentiam, praeter reductionem phaenomenologicam ex orientatione realismi nativi in intendens subiectum et obiectum mere intentum, praeter reductionem transcendentalem qua subiectum agnoscitur norma atque regula obiectivationis intentionalis, etiam agnoscatur reductio henologica qua attingitur Deus prout in theologia stricte negativa concipitur. Ponitur itaque Deus ultra omnem determinationem conceptualem. Omnis intelligibilitas ad ordinem creatum restringitur, ut

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part those who doubt Christ’s divinity have not cared much about speculating of this kind, or else they have been quite ignorant of it.’ The answer to this is that most people, like the famous M. Jourdain,24 speak in prose without ever hearing it called that. To be sure, it is only philosophers who are aware of their philosophical presuppositions and examine them; but everybody has philosophical presuppositions and uses them, either wisely and prudently or unwittingly and unwillingly. J.S. Lawton has illustrated this fact as it bears on the matter at hand in his Conflict in Christology (London: spck, 1947), which describes the gradual deterioration of non-Catholic views on Christology between 1889 and 1914.25 All the questions posed in Britain and the United States were posed concretely; what the inquirers sought was none other than a Christ who is truly one, truly God, and truly man; yet they lacked a philosophy in which being is known through truth unconditionally posited, and so were led gradually and almost inevitably to doubt or deny Christ’s divinity. For just as we know God exists because we know that the assertion ‘God is’ is true (see Summa theologiae, 1, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2m), so also we know Christ is divine because we believe the assertion ‘Christ is God’ is true. 4 We still have to add a few comments on the errors of Catholics. The Modernists posited as the object of faith, not what is true, but ‘the unknowable.’26 Hence, in their opinion, dogmas are not truths but symbols with a temporary usefulness in stirring up religious sensibility. See db 2071–76, ds 3475–79. More recently H. Duméry, writing on the philosophy of religion, has added a fourth reduction to Husserl’s three. Besides the eidetic reduction from sensible presentations to inspected essence, the phenomenological reduction from the orientation of naive realism to the subject as intending and the object simply as intended, and the transcendental reduction by which the subject is acknowledged to be the norm and rule of intentional objectification, Duméry also acknowledges a ‘henological’ reduction, through which one attains God as conceived by a strictly negative theology. He puts God beyond every conceptual determination. All intelligibility is tied to the

24 The main protagonist in Molière’s play Le Bourgeois gentilhomme. See act 2, scene 4. 25 John S. Lawton, Conflict in Christology: A Study of British and American Christology from 1889 to 1914 (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1947). 26 Compare the discussion of Modernism by Lawton, ibid. 262–65.

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mens divina ab ideis seu possibilium conceptibus prorsus liberetur. Subiectivitas quam maxime laudatur, et nulla agnoscitur obiectivitas praeter positivisticam. Cum denique theologia non sit proprie scientia, sed disciplina quaedam practica fini soteriologico intenta, proponitur atque incipitur critica religionis, imprimis catholicae, ut determinetur quanta convenientia, quanta efficacia, quali proportione ad finem soteriologicum intentum, adhibeantur illa schemata et illae categoriae quibus subiecta religiosa sese manifestent. E cuius operibus tria sunt in Indicem lib. prohib. relata; sed illud notate quod huic philosophiae, tam acute quam erudite elaboratae, unum deest, scilicet, illud verum absolute positum quo innotescit ens.27

Supposita In genere hac in thesi supponuntur quae iam alibi explicata sunt. In specie:

1 Quae in tractatu de Legato divino sunt probata de Christo Messia, de Filio hominis, de Filio Dei. Cf. E. Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu de se ipso.28

2 Quae in introductione in sacram scripturam et in tractatu de inspiratione probantur, scilicet, quae in Tridentino et in Vaticano de canone et de inspiratione habentur (db 783–84, 1785–86, ds 1501–1505, 3004–3007). Unde notatur quod non iam apologetice proceditur. Supposita inspiratione, omnes textus nt pariter probant. Supposito canone, eoque clauso, minime verendum est ne alia in aliis fontibus forte exsistant quae, si cogno-

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created order, so that the divine mind is completely set free from ideas or concepts of what is possible. Duméry has nothing but praise for subjectivity, and the only objectivity he acknowledges is positivistic. Lastly, since theology is not properly a science but a practical discipline that intends a soteriological end, Duméry proposes and initiates a critique of religion, especially Catholicism, in order to assess the schemes and categories by which religious subjects manifest themselves – how appropriate, how efficacious, and how proportionate to the intended soteriological end these schemes and categories are. Three of Duméry’s writings were put on the Index of Prohibited Books. But the point to note is that from his philosophy, so deftly and learnedly worked out, one thing is missing: the absolutely posited truth by which being comes to be known.27 Suppositions Generally speaking, this thesis assumes what has been explained elsewhere. Specifically: 1 We assume what the theological treatise on the divine Legate proves about Christ as Messiah, as Son of man, and as Son of God. See E. Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu de se ipso.28 2 We assume what the introduction to holy scripture and the treatise on inspiration prove, namely, the statements of the Council of Trent and the First Vatican Council on inspiration and the canon (db 783–84, 1785–86, ds 1501–1505, 3004–3007, [dec 2: 663–64, 810]). Hence, it should be noted that the procedure here is not going to be apologetic. Given that scripture is inspired, all the New Testament texts may equally be enlisted in proofs. Given the canon, and given that it is closed,

27 For a bit more on Lonergan’s view of Duméry and the issues raised by his work, see, for example, Bernard Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method 1, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, vol. 22 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) 342–43. 28 Édouard Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu de se ipso, 4th ed., aucta et emendata (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1963). Lonergan used an earlier edition; the editors have substituted the page numbers of the fourth edition, the only one available to them.

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scerentur, ita nova luce totam rem perfunderent, ut alia quaedam atque diversa interpretatio textuum esset accipienda. Quod tamen minime excludit in nt exhiberi processum quendam docendi et addiscendi, talem processum esse additivum, ideoque totum processum esse considerandum, ne dimidiata doctrina pro completa habeatur.

3 Quae in tractatibus de revelatione et de fide stabiliuntur, nempe, fidem esse assensum quo vera esse creduntur quae a Deo sunt revelata et ecclesiae tradita (db 1789, 1791–92, ds 3008, 3011–12). Quod verum manifestationem obiectivam et subiectivam minime excludit; manifestatur obiective per omnia quae facta sunt; manifestatur subiective et sensibiliter per auditum fidei, manifestatur subiective et intelligibili­ ter per fidei intelligentiam (db 1796, ds 3016), manifestatur subiective et rationaliter tum per fidei lumen tum per praeambula fidei; quibus tamen manifestationibus accedit, easque reassumit atque complet, assensus fidei quo verum creditur; et in hac veri agnitione attingitur quod absolute et ideo obiective esse affirmatur.

4 Supponitur denique quod mysterium in Deo absconditum tractamus (db 1795, ds 3015), quale mysterium nisi actu supernaturali cognoscere non possumus. Obiectio Si haec omnia supponuntur, inutilis videtur thesis; pariter enim ex catechismo iam certo credimus Christum esse verum Deum et verum hominem. Respondetur: idem potest diversis modis cognosci. Ita quod iam cognoscitur ex catechismo, potest exactius cognosci ex conciliis; quod cognoscitur ex catechismo et ex conciliis, potest ulterius cognosci ex nt. Praeterea, quamvis idem ex tribus cognoscitur, non eodem modo cognoscitur. Alius enim est modus concipiendi qui adhibetur in catechismo addiscendo; alius et plenior et magis technicus in formulis conciliaribus exarandis; alius et magis concretus et formulis technicis prior in nt invenitur.

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there need be no fear that in other sources there may exist something which, if known, would throw new light on the whole matter so that some other, different interpretation of these texts would have to be accepted. In no way, however, does this do away with the fact that the New Testament displays a process of teaching and learning, that this process was cumulative, and that the whole process must therefore be taken into account, lest half its teaching be taken for the completed whole. 3 We assume what the treatises on revelation and faith establish: faith is an assent by which one believes that what God has revealed, and the church has handed down, is true (db 1789, 1791–92, ds 3008, 3011–12, [dec 2: 807]). This truth in no way excludes objective and subjective manifestation. It is manifested objectively through everything that has been made. It is manifested subjectively and sensibly through the hearing of faith. It is manifested subjectively and intelligibly through the understanding of faith (db 1796, ds 3016, [dec 2: 808]). It is manifested subjectively and rationally both through the light of faith and through the ‘preambles to faith.’ But beyond these manifestations, subsuming and completing them, is the assent of faith by which truth is believed; and in this acknowledgment of truth one arrives at that which is absolutely, and therefore objectively, affirmed to be so. 4 Finally, we assume that we are dealing with a mystery hidden in God (db 1795, ds 3015, [dec 2: 808]), such a mystery as we are unable to know except through a supernatural act. Objection If all this is assumed, what good is the thesis? That Christ is true God and true man is something we already believe certainly just as much from the catechism. Reply: It is possible to know the same thing in different ways. From the councils comes a more exact knowledge of what we already know from the catechism, and from the New Testament we can have further knowledge of what we know from the catechism and the councils. Moreover, although what is known from these three sources is the same, it is not known in the same way. Learning the catechism involves one way of conceiving; another way, fuller and more technical, was hammered out in the formulations of the councils; yet another, more concrete and also prior to technical formulations, is found in the New Testament.

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Praeterea, in ipso nt non unus tantummodo est modus concipiendi adhibitus, sed plures sunt modi pedetentim evolventes; qui si ignorantur, facile in difficultates vel etiam in errores deducitur qui nt legit. Praeterea, nisi intelligitur ipsa nt doctrina secundum modos concipiendi ipsi nt proprios, non intelliguntur Patres, neque problemata in conciliis resoluta; quibus parum intellectis, facile argumenta theologica et ulteriora solido carent fundamento.

[Praenotamina] praenotamen primum: de notione dei in nt 1 Fundamentalis conceptio Dei in nt est illud notissimum: ‘Deus Abraham, Deus Isaac, Deus Iacob, Deus patrum nostrorum.’ Scilicet, est conceptus eventibus historicis evolutus et narratione traditionali transmissus. Deus est is qui cum Abraham, Isaac, Iacob, patribus nostris egit, is qui populum per Moysin ex Aegypto reduxit, is qui prophetis usus est ad populum docendum et corrigendum. Vide Exod 6.2–8, Act 7.2–53, 13.16–22. 2 Dicitur fundamentalis quia in nt non laboratur ad notionem unius veri Dei inculcandam sed potius haec notio omnibus Iudaeis manifesta supponitur. Iterum, dicitur fundamentalis quia fundamentum praebet ad ulteriorem evolutionem, quae quidem duplex est. 3 Prima evolutio (prima in ordine nostrae expositionis) facta est cum evangelium gentibus praedicaretur. Vide sermones Pauli ad Iudaeos (Act 13.16–22) et ad gentes (Act 14.15– 17, 17.24–28). Ubi transitus fit ex conceptione historice mediata ad conceptionem reflexione mediatam. Quamvis enim gentes neque memorias neque traditiones populi electi habuerint, tamen ad Deum omnium causam agnoscendum deduci poterant.

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Moreover, the New Testament itself does not make use of just one manner of conceiving but of many, and these unfold little by little. Ignoring these while reading the New Testament easily leads to difficulties, if not errors. Moreover, if the teaching of the New Testament is not understood according to its own conceptualities, there will be no understanding of the Fathers or the problems resolved at the councils; and if these are not well enough understood, it is easy for further theological arguments to lack solid foundations. [Preliminary Notes] preliminary note 1: the new testament notion of god 1 The basic conception of God in the New Testament is the well-known ‘the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, the God of our fathers.’ In other words, it is a conception that developed out of historical events and was handed on in traditional stories. God is the one who had dealings with Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and our fathers, the one who led forth the people from Egypt by the hand of Moses, the one who spoke by the prophets to teach and correct his people. See Exodus 6.2–8, Acts 7.2–53, 13.16–22. 2 This conception is basic in the sense that the New Testament makes no effort to teach a notion of the one true God. It assumes this notion is plain to all Jews. Again, it is basic because it lays down a basis for further development, which has two aspects. 3 The first development – first in the order of our discussion – took place when the gospel was preached to the Gentiles. See the sermons Paul addressed to Jews (Acts 13.16–22) and to Gentiles (Acts 14.15–17, 17.24–28). There is a transition here from a historically mediated conception to a conception mediated by reflection. For the Gentiles, although they had neither the memories nor the traditions of the chosen people, could nevertheless be led to acknowledge God as the cause of everything.

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Qua transitione peracta, via aperta est ad ulteriorem. Quae enim a Iudaeis de Deo dicebantur, etiam a gentibus dici poterant: scilicet, Deum esse unum (Deut 4.35, 6.4, Mc 12.29-30), bonum (Mc 10.18, Mt 19.17), viventem (Mt 16.16, 22.32, 26.63), potentem (Mt 3.9, 19.26), Dominum caeli et terrae (Mt 11.25), adorandum (Mt 4.10), etc. Attamen quae a Iudaeis dicebantur, non in concatenatione quadam logica, sed singillatim et data occasione, a gentibus aliter dici poterant. Sicut enim reflexione ad Deum agnoscendum sunt perducti, ita etiam ulteriori reflexione ad divina attributa concludenda procedere poterant. Quibus longe postea factis, orta est celebris illa distinctio inter Deum Abraham et Deum philosophorum. 4 Altera evolutio erat qua nomen Dei ex nomine personali Patris in nomen commune Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti transivit. In ipso nt secundum regulam generalem nomen, Deus, significat Deum Patrem, ideoque est, non nomen tribus commune, sed nomen Patri personale et proprium. Et secundum hanc regulam Pater dicitur Deus, Filius dicitur Dominus, e.g., 1 Cor 8.6, et passim apud Paulum. Vide K. Rahner, Schriften zur Theologie, i.29 At haec regula generalis etiam intra nt mutari incipit, et quidem dupliciter: primo, quatenus prima persona trinitaria dicitur, non Deus sine addito, sed Deus Pater, imo Pater sine addito; deinde, quatenus Filius interdum dicitur Deus. Quae sane evolutio in ipso nominum usu rem nostram proxime tangit. Ex unico Deo Iudeais noto transitur in Patrem et Filium. Qui dicebatur Deus, dici incipit Deus Pater quasi locum alteri praeparans et etiam Pater quasi locum alterius agnoscens. Qui autem dicebatur Filius hominis vel Filius Dei, dici incipit Filius sine addito ut etiam postea ei addatur nomen Deus.

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Once this transition had been made, the way was open to a further transition. For what Jews said about God could also be said by Gentiles, namely, that God is one (Deuteronomy 4.35, 6.4, Mark 12.29–30), good (Mark 10.18, Matthew 19.17), living (Matthew 16.16, 22.32, 26.63), and powerful (Matthew 3.9, 19.26), that he is Lord of heaven and earth (Matthew 11.25), that he is to be worshiped (Matthew 4.10), and so on. What the Jews said, however, they did not say in logically connected fashion. They said one thing at a time, as the occasion required. The Gentiles were able to say it otherwise. For just as reflection had led them to acknowledge God, so by further reflection they could go on to arrive at the attributes of God. It was long after this that there arose the famous distinction between the God of Abraham and the God of the philosophers. 4 Through a second development, the name of God went from being the personal name of the Father to being the name common to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In the New Testament itself the name ‘God’ refers as a general rule to God the Father. It is not a name common to three, then, but the Father’s own personal name. And by the same rule the Father is called God and the Son is called Lord, for example in 1 Corinthians 8.6 and elsewhere in Paul’s letters. See Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, 1.29 But even within the New Testament this general rule begins to change, and that in two ways: the first Person of the Trinity is spoken of, not simply as God, but as God the Father or as just the Father; and the Son is spoken of, now and then, as God. Now this development in the usage of names bears directly on the matter at hand. It is a transition from the one God known by the Jews, to Father and Son. He who had been called ‘God’ began to be called both ‘God the Father,’ as though to make room for another, and also ‘Father,’ as though to acknowledge the status of that other. But he who had been called ‘Son of man’ or ‘Son of God’ began to be called simply ‘Son,’ so that later on the name ‘God’ might be his in addition.

29 Karl Rahner, ‘Theos im NeuenTestament,’ in Schriften zur Theologie, vol. 1 (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1954) 91–167; in English, ‘Theos in the New Testament,’ in Theological Investigations, vol. 1: God, Christ, Mary and Grace, trans. Cornelius Ernst (Baltimore: Helican Press, 1961) 79–148.

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5 Quae evolutio in symbolis reflectitur. In symbolo enim apostolico solus Pater dicitur Deus. De secunda persona trinitaria recitamus: et in Iesum Christum, Filium eius unicum, Dominum nostrum, qui conceptus … In symbolo Nicaeno et Pater dicitur Deus et emphatice additur Filium esse Deum Patri consubstantialem (db 54, ds 125). Sed Spiritus sanctus tantummodo nominatur. In symbolo Constantinopolitano (db 86, ds 150) Spiritus sanctus dicitur simul adorari et conglorificari cum Patre et Filio, sed nomen Deus ei non expresse attribuitur. In symbolo ‘Quicumque’ (db 39, ds 75) iam factum est nomen, Deus, nomen tribus personis commune. praenotamen alterum: de progressiva revelatione divinitatis christi 1 Agitur de eo progressu qui in ipso nt exhibetur. Non ergo quaeritur quid Christus ut homo per scientiam beatam vel infusam cognoverit, quid apostoli divina illuminatione interius perspexerint, sed quid in scriptis nt pedetentim exponatur.

2 Qui progressus duplici stadio reali perficitur. Primo, enim, Christus docuit apostolos, discipulos, turbas; deinde, apostoli vel viva voce vel scriptis Iudaeos et Graecos evangelizaverunt. Quae tamen stadia realia nobis innotescunt per alia stadia litteraria. Tempore enim primae erant epistolae paulinae priores, et postea ex fontibus traditionalibus composita sunt evangelia. Unde complexum illud problema synopticum. 3 Exsistit hic progressus varias ob causas et variis modis exhibetur. (a) Prima causa erat necessaria evolutio religiosa. Christus enim non scholam sed religionem fundavit; et ipsa doctrina religiosa nisi per fidem non attingebatur; ideoque in primis ad homines convertendos attendendum erat. Aliis verbis, progressiva revelatio divinitatis Christi erat tantummodo pars in maiori evolutione qua homines in novam creaturam (2 Cor 5.17) transformandi erant.

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5­ This development is reflected in the creeds. In the Apostles’ Creed only the Father is called God. Of the second Person of the Trinity we say, ‘And in Jesus Christ his only Son, our Lord, who was conceived …’ The creed of the Council of Nicea refers to the Father as God and adds with emphasis that the Son is God, consubstantial with the Father (db 54, ds 125, [dec 1: 5]). But the Holy Spirit is only named. In the Constantinopolitan Creed (db 86, ds 150, [dec 1: 24]) the Holy Spirit is said to be worshiped and glorified together with the Father and the Son, but he is not expressly given the name ‘God.’ In the [‘Athanasian’ Creed] Quicumque vult (db 39, ds 75), the name ‘God’ has become a name common to all three Persons. preliminary note 2: the progressive revelation of christ’s divinity 1 Here we are concerned with the progression that the New Testament itself shows us. The question, therefore, does not concern what Christ as man knew by infused or beatific knowledge; nor does it concern what the apostles grasped inwardly by divine illumination. It concerns what slowly emerges in the New Testament writings. 2 This progression was completed in two real stages. For Christ first taught his apostles, his disciples, the multitude; then the apostles preached the gospel to Jew and Greek, either by word of mouth or through their writings. We come to know these real stages, however, through other stages, which are literary. In chronological order, the major Pauline letters come first; the gospels were written later, drawing on the sources of the tradition. Hence the complicated ‘Synoptic problem.’ 3 This progression had a variety of causes, and appears in a variety of ways. (a) One cause was a necessary religious development. Christ founded a religion, not a school. But religious doctrine is reached only through faith. In the first instance, therefore, attention had to be given to converting people. In other words, the progressive revelation of Christ’s divinity was only part of a larger development by which human beings were being transformed into a new creation (2 Corinthians 5.17).

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(b) Altera causa erat quod omnis processus docendi ex praeiacenti cognitione necessario incipit: unde aliter docentur parvuli, aliter pueri, aliter adolescentes, aliter adulti sed rudes, aliter adulti et exculti; qui diversi modi ulterius subdividuntur secundum generalem culturae humanae evolutionem eiusdemque in hac vel illa natione participationem. Quam ob causam, doctrina de Christo Iudaeis proposita doctrinae vt inhaerebat: unde momentum messianismi; unde etiam illud saepe repetitum ‘secundum scripturas.’ Quod sane fundamentum deerat ubi gentibus praedicabatur evangelium, ita tamen ut etiam ipsae gentes in haereditatem culturalem in vt contentam introducerentur. (c) Tertia causa iam exposita est, nempe, necessaria evolutio in notione Dei. Si quaeritur cur Christus non simpliciter dixerit, Ego sum Deus vere et proprie dictus, partialiter responderi potest: (1) nomen, Deus, significabat Deum Patrem, et Christus non est Pater; (2) expressio illa, ‘vere et proprie dictus,’ est scholastica; (3) requiritur evolutio philosophica ut intima relatio inter ‘vere dici’ et ‘esse’ clare perspiciatur et efficaciter acceptetur. (d) Quarta causa erat modus humanus addiscendi. Sicut enim cognitio nostra, ita etiam addiscentia ex sensibilibus incipit. Quare, incipiendum erat ab homine Iesu sensibiliter noto, et sic in evangeliis; et iterum postea incipiendum erat ab homine Iesu prout de eo narrabant et testimonium dederunt apostoli. (e) Quinta causa ex tertia et quarta colligitur. Quod enim ex sensibilibus addiscendum erat, intelligibile quidem fuit, sed (1) neque intellectui nostro proportionatum (cf. db 1796) ut in ipsis sensibilibus perspici possit, (2) neque a sensibilibus separandum, cum Christus non solum Deus sed etiam homo sit, (3) neque sine ullo intellectus actu apprehendendum. Tria ergo simul coniungi oportebat: (1) sensibilis quaedam sive imaginativa praesentatio, (2) assensus fidei in mysterium divinitus revelatum, (3) quaedam intelligentia quae ex sensibilibus in eos conceptus processit quibus utebatur fidei assensus.30

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(b) Another cause was the fact that every process of teaching necessarily begins from prior knowledge. That is why different ways of teaching are appropriate for infants, children, adolescents, simple folk, and well-educated adults. These different approaches may be further subdivided according to the general development of human culture and a given nation’s level of participation in that development. For that reason, the teaching about Christ presented to Jews kept close to Old Testament teaching: hence the importance of messianism and the frequently repeated phrase, ‘according to the scriptures.’ This foundation was lacking when the gospel was preached to Gentiles, even though the Gentiles themselves were also introduced to the cultural heritage contained in the Old Testament. (c) A third cause has already been discussed, namely, a necessary development in the notion of God. The question why Christ did not simply say, ‘I am truly and properly called God,’ can be answered in part as follows. (1) The name ‘God’ meant God the Father, and Christ is not the Father. (2) ‘Truly and properly called’ is a Scholastic expression. (3) Philosophical development is required for a clear grasp and effective acceptance of the close relation between ‘to be called truly’ and ‘to be.’ (d) A fourth cause was the way in which we learn. For our learning, like our knowing, starts from sensible data. Hence, it was necessary to begin with the man Jesus, experientially known, as you find in the gospels. Again, later on, it was necessary to begin with the man Jesus as the apostles told of him and bore their testimony to him. (e) A fifth cause follows from the third and fourth causes together. What there was to be learned from the sensible data was an intelligibility. But it was neither (1) proportionate to our intellect (see db 1796, ds 3016, [dec 2: 808]) and thus capable of being grasped in the sensible data themselves, nor (2) separate from what was sensible, since Christ is not only God but man also, nor (3) apprehended without any act of understanding. Accordingly, three things must be taken together: (1) a sensible or imaginative presentation, (2) the assent of faith to a mystery divinely revealed, (3) an understanding which moves from what is sensible to the concepts that the assent of faith makes use of.30 30 This paragraph is of some interest as anticipating (1) the functional specialty Research, (2) the functional specialty Foundations, and (3) the movement through the first five functional specialties of Method in Theology.

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(f) Sexta causa habetur cum secunda tertiae et quartae addatur. Quae enim homines per sensum simul et intellectum apprehendunt, ea nominibus exprimunt. Et quamvis privatus quilibet homo forte solo sensu et intellectu contentus esse posset (quod dubitari licet), saltem quae communiter a membris cuiusdam coetus vel societatis apprehenduntur, simul nominibus convenientibus exprimi debent. At nova erat doctrina christiana, et aliter nova Iudaeis, aliter gentibus. Diversa ergo nomina praeiacentia in novum sensum converti debebant; qui sensus ut stabiliatur, ut facile ab omnibus capiatur, non uno colloquio, non una expositione, sed repetitione atque consuetudine efficitur.

praenotamen tertium: de schematibus 1 Causas cur revelatio divinitatis Christi fuerit progressiva, enumeravimus sex. Sed ulterius considerandum est quemadmodum ipse progressus sit factus. Et hunc in finem introducimus notionem schematis.31 Schema ergo intelligimus determinatam quandam coniunctionem (1) nominis, (2) praesentationis sensibilis vel repraesentationis imaginativae, (3) actus intelligendi et consequentis conceptionis, (4) actus fidei assentientis. Unde concludes: cum schema quattuor elementis componatur, quolibet elemento essentialiter mutato mutatur et ipsum schema.

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(f) A sixth cause results from adding the second cause to the third and fourth. What we apprehend through sense and intelligence together, we express in words. And even if it were possible for a solitary individual to be content with sense and intelligence alone – which is doubtful – at least those things which are apprehended in common by the members of a group or society ought to be expressed through the use of appropriate words. But Christian doctrine was new, and new in different ways to Jews and Gentiles. Different words already in use therefore had to be adapted to a new sense, and it was not through one conversation or one explanation but through repetition and familiarity that this new sense was established and received by all. preliminary note 3: schematic patterns 1 We have listed six causes explaining why the revelation of Christ’s divinity was progressive. How the progression itself came about is a further matter. In order to consider it, we introduce the notion of schematic patterns.31 By a schematic pattern, then, we understand a determinate combination of (1) words or titles, (2) sensible presentations or imaginative representations, (3) acts of understanding and the resulting concepts, and (4) acts of the assent of faith. Hence, you will gather that since a schematic pattern comprises four elements, an essential change in any element also changes the pattern itself.

31 The Latin is ‘schemata.’ Lonergan’s English uses varied. In a 1964 lecture, he referred to the same New Testament patterns as ‘schemes or modes of apprehension’ (‘Theology as Christian Phenomenon,’ in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958–1964 247–50). In a 1975 lecture, he spoke of the same New Testament patterns, and also Grillmeier’s models, as ‘patterns or models or schemata,’ with a tendency to prefer ‘pattern’ (‘Christology Today: Methodological Reflections,’ in A Third Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe [(Mahwah, nj: Paulist Press, 1985] 89–90). In a 1979 lecture, he referred to them as ‘schemata’ and ‘models’ (‘Horizons and Transpositions,’ in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965–1980, vol. 17 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004] 432). In the present context what is at stake is not an ideal type, a possibly relevant heuristic model (on which see Lonergan, Method in Theology 227–28, 284–85, and Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965–1980 68, 333), but a discernible pattern in the New Testament presentation of Christ. The editors, accordingly, settled upon ‘schematic pattern.’

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Praeterea, in consideratione schematum maxime attenditur ad id quod facilius cognoscitur, ideoque in primis ad ipsum nomen, deinde autem ad imaginem annexam. Praeterea, cum ipsa revelatio sit progressiva, cum in eo consistat quod Dominus noster apostolos, discipulos, turbas docet et iterum quod apostoli neoconversos instruunt, cum omnis doctrina atque instructio pedetentim procedat neque omnia simul dicat sed elementum aliud et novum semper addat elementis prius inculcatis, etiam hic processus additivus atque progressivus in ipsis schematibus exhibetur. Quibus positis, iam ad diversa schemata in nt adhibita procedendum est, non sane ea intentione ut omnia quae de iis dici possit nunc dicatur, sed ut generalis quaedam notio concretis illustrationibus augeatur atque clarificetur. 2 Primo, consideratur schema prospectivum quod maxime in evangeliis synopticis detegitur. Ibi nomen erat ‘Filius hominis.’ Praesentatio sensibilis erat ipse Dominus vita sua terrestri vivens et cum discipulis vel turbis loquens. Cui sensibili praesentationi annectebatur etiam futurum, et quidem dupliciter: alio modo, de futura passione, morte, resurrectione; alio modo, de futuro adventu iudicis. Unde textus de Filio hominis in tres classes dividi solent, e.g., (1) de vida terrestri: Mt 8.20, 9.5–6, 11.19, 12.8, 12.32. 13.37; (2) de futura passione, morte, resurrectione: Mt 12.40, 17.9, 17.12, 17.22, 20.18, 20.28, 26.2, 26.24, 26.45; (3) de futuro adventu: Mt 10.23, 13.41, 16.27-28, 19.28, 24.27, 24.30. Circa Filium hominis ulteriora vide apud Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu de se ipso 86–124.

3 Deinde consideratur schema retrospectivum. Ibi nomen erat vel Dominus, vel Christus, vel Filius Dei in virtute (Rom 1.4, Act 13.33). Id quod imaginatione repraesentabatur erat Iesus resuscitatus sedens ad dexteram Patris actuque de caelis regnans. Quibus annecti potuit retrospectio ultra vitam terrestrem Domini ad eius praeexsistentiam, imo usque ad principium quando creationi interfuit. Exempla sint, 1 Cor 8.6: et unus Dominus Iesus Christus per quem omnia et nos per ipsum. Iterum, de Christo resuscitato agitur 1 Cor 15.20–28, 15.31; qui cum iterum cum Adamo comparatur, dicitur quidem homo, sed forte innuitur praeexsistentia per verba ‘secundus homo de caelo’ (1 Cor 15.47). Iterum, Col 1.13 loquitur de Filio in suo regno, et Col 1.15–16: ‘qui

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Further, in considering a schematic pattern the greatest attention is given to what is more easily known – to the title itself, in the first place, but then to the image connected with it. Further, revelation is progressive. It consists in what our Lord taught to the apostles, the disciples, the multitude, and, again, in the instruction the apostles gave to the newly converted. Now teaching and instruction proceed stepwise; not everything is said at once; instead, some new element is always being added to the elements already inculcated. And so this cumulative and progressive process too is exemplified in the schematic patterns. That being said, we now proceed to the different schematic patterns employed in the New Testament. The point is not, of course, to say everything that can be said about them, but to fill out and clarify the general notion with concrete illustrations. 2 Consider first the prospective pattern, found chiefly in the synoptic gospels. Here the title is ‘Son of man.’ The sensible presentation is the Lord himself, living his life on earth and talking with his disciples or with the multitudes. This sensible presentation is linked to the future, and that in two ways: one concerns the future passion, death, and resurrection; the other the future coming of a judge. Hence, texts referring to the Son of man are usually divided into three classes: (1) those regarding his earthly life, such as Matthew 8.20, 9.5–6, 11.19, 12.8, 12.32, 13.37; (2)  those regarding his future passion, death, and resurrection, such as Matthew 12.40, 17.9, 17.12, 17.22, 20.18, 20.28, 26.2, 26.24, 26.45; and (3) those regarding his coming again, such as Matthew 10.23, 13.41, 16.27–28, 19.28, 24.27, 24.30. For more on the Son of man, see Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu de se ipso 86–124. 3 Next there is the retrospective pattern. Here the title is either ‘Lord’ or ‘Christ’ or ‘Son of God in power’ (Romans 1.4, Acts 13.33). What is imaginatively represented is the risen Jesus, seated at the right hand of the Father and actually reigning from heaven. Coupled with this there could be retrospection beyond the Lord’s earthly life to his pre-existence, or even as far as the beginning, when he took part in creation. For example: ‘one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist’ (1 Corinthians 8.6). Again, 1 Corinthians 15.20–28, 15.31 is about the risen Christ; when he is compared with Adam, he is called a man, but his pre-existence may be hinted at in the words ‘the second man is from heaven’ (1 Corinthians 15.47). Again, Colossians 1.13 speaks of the Son in his kingdom, and Colossians 1.15–16 of one who ‘is the image of

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est imago Dei (cf. 2 Cor 4.4) invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae … omnia per ipsum et in ipso (eis auton) creata sunt.’ 4 Tertio consideratur schema retrospectivum inversum, ubi a praeexsistente incipitur ut ad hominem vel in terris degentem vel in caelis regnantem procedatur. Phil 2.6–7: in Christo Iesu, qui cum in forma Dei esset … semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens … Hebr 1.2–3: ubi ponuntur simul (1) Filius, (2) haeres universorum, (3) per quem fecit et saecula, (4) splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius, (5) portans omnia verbo virtutis suae, (6) purgationem peccatorum faciens, (7) sedet ad dexteram maiestatis in excelsis. Io 1.1–14: ubi habentur Verbum Deus apud Deum; pars in opere creationis; lux et vita; caro factus est. Rom 1.3–4: (1) de Filio suo, (2) ex semine David secundum carnem, (3) praedestinatus est Filius Dei in virtute secundum spiritum sanctificationis (cf. forte, spiritus vivificans, 1 Cor 15.45) ex resurrectione mortuorum (cf. Act 13.33). Gal 4.4–6: (1) Filium suum misit, (2) factum sub lege, ex muliere, (3) ut nos redimeret, (4) ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus, (5) misit Spiritum Filii sui in corda nostra. 5 Quae illustravimus schemata hoc commune habent quod diversa per successionem quandam temporalem coniungunt. Quod tamen minime necessarium est. Mox ponemus schema Paulinum in nexu similium fundatum. In evangelio Ioannis recurrere videtur schema quoddam generale, ut scilicet Iesus ita a facto quodam sensibili vel etiam a disputatione cum Iudeais inciperet, ad intelligentiam profundiorem auditores moveret, et denique ad mysterium eos conduceret. Extra nt in posteriori evolutione etiam schemata agnoscuntur, sed maioris amplitudinis et modo abbreviato per conceptus designata. Ita A. Grillmeier (Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, i) distinguit schemata quae nominat Logos-sarx (apud Arianos, Apollinaristas, S. Cyrillum Alexandrinum, Monophysitas) et Logos-anthroFpos (apud Diodorum Tarsensen, Theodorum Mopsuestenum, Nestorium, Antiochenos).32

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the invisible God (cf. 2 Corinthians 4.4), the first-born of all creation … all things were created through him and for him (eis auton).’ 4 Thirdly, there is the inverse retrospective pattern, which begins from preexistence and moves to the man, either living on earth or reigning in heaven. ‘Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God … emptied himself, taking the form of a servant’ (Philippians 2.6–7). Hebrews 1.2–3 brings together (1)  the Son, who is (2)  the heir of all things and (3) through whom God created the world, who (4) reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of his nature, (5) upholds the universe by his word of power, (6) makes purification for sins, and (7) sits at the right hand of the Majesty on high. In John 1.1–14 we find the Word who was God and was with God, who has a part in the work of creation, who is light and life, who became flesh. Romans 1.3–4 speaks of (1) God’s Son, who (2) was descended from David according to the flesh and (3) designated Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness (cf., perhaps, 1 Corinthians 15.45, ‘life-giving Spirit’) by his resurrection from the dead (see Acts 13.33). In Galatians 4.4–6, (1) God sent his Son, (2) born of woman, under the law, (3) in order to redeem us, (4) so that we might receive adoption as children, and (5) has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts. 5 The schematic patterns we have illustrated have this in common: they bring together different things through some temporal sequence. But this is by no means necessary. We shall shortly present a Pauline pattern based on linked similars. In the gospel of John there is a general pattern, which appears over and over as Jesus begins from some sensible fact or from an argument with the Jews, moves his hearers to a deeper understanding, and then leads them on towards mystery. Schematic patterns are also recognized in later developments outside the New Testament. These patterns have a wider scope, however, and concepts are used for naming them briefly. Thus, A. Grillmeier (Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, 1) distinguishes patterns which he calls Logos-sarx (the Arians, the Apollinarians, Cyril of Alexandria, and the monophysites) and Logos-anthroFpos (Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nestorius, and the Antiochenes).32 32 Grillmeier’s ‘patterns’ are discussed further below in thesis 3, Preliminary

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Ultra rationem schematis procedit quod post conc. Chalcedonense invaluit, nempe, ‘Filius qua Deus’ et ‘Filius qua homo,’ quod praecisionem ad modum philosophorum supponit et potius regulam seu legem circa formationem schematum est.33 Cave tamen ne confundas ‘Filius qua Deus’ et ‘Filius Dei’: illud sensum theologice determinatum habet; hoc autem in vt de angelis, regibus, populo Israelitico, iustis dicitur, et in nt de pacificis (Mt 5.9), de iis qui Spiritu Dei aguntur (Rom 8.14), de resurrecturis (Rom 8.19), de Christo resuscitato (Act 13.33, Rom 1.4).

Pariter cavendum est ne confundantur ‘Filius qua homo’ et ‘Filius hominis’: illud dicit personam divinam in natura humana; hoc philologice quidem dicit simpliciter hominem, usu apocalyptico tamen designare videtur ens quoddam supernum, de quo plura vide apud Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu 86–97. 6 Schematum momentum est multiplex. Inprimis historicitatem nt valde confirmant, cum processum quendam sat complexum exhibeant, in quo apostoli et deinde neo-conversi ex eventibus concretis pedetentim docentur et addiscunt. Deinde, doctrinam de una persona in duabus naturis continent. Ideo enim adhibetur schema ut plura uniantur. Et tria quae in nt distinximus schemata vel ex homine incipiunt ut ad divinitatem pertingant, vel ex praeexsistente procedunt ut humanitatem includant. Tertio, remedium continent efficax contra duplicem interpretantium scopulum: contra anachronismum, qui posteriora in prioribus videt; contra archaismum, qui ita ad priora in seipsis pertingit ut ad posteriora redire iam non possit.34 Ita anachronismus decretum Chalcedonense ubique videt

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‘The Son as God’ and ‘the Son as man,’ terms that came into use after the Council of Chalcedon, go beyond the definition of a schematic pattern. They presume a precision after the manner of the philosophers, and serve as a rule or law for the formation of schemata.33 ‘The Son as God’ must not however be confused with ‘Son of God.’ ‘The Son as God’ has a precise theological meaning, whereas the Old Testament calls angels, kings, the people Israel, and the righteous ‘sons of God,’ and in the New Testament the same designation is given to peacemakers (Matthew 5.9), to those who are led by the Spirit of God (Romans 8.14), to those whose resurrection is yet to come (Romans 8.19), and to Christ after his resurrection (Acts 13.33, Romans 1.4). Likewise, ‘the Son as man’ must not be confused with ‘Son of man.’ The former refers to a divine Person in a human nature; the latter, philologically speaking, refers simply to any man, although in apocalyptic usage it seems to designate a supernal being; the latter is discussed at greater length in Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu 86–97. 6 These schematic patterns are important in several ways. In the first place, they strongly confirm the historicity of the New Testament, since they illustrate the very complex process through which, little by little, the apostles and then the newly converted are taught and learn from the concrete events. In the second place, these patterns contain the doctrine of one Person in two natures. For the reason for using a schematic pattern is to bring many things together in one. And each of the three patterns we have distinguished in the New Testament either begins from the man so as to reach divinity, or else proceeds from pre-existence so as to include humanity. In the third place, these patterns offer an effective remedy against two dangers that beset interpreters. One is anachronism, which sees the later in the earlier; the other is archaism, which does reach the earlier in itself, but does so in a way that makes returning to what came later impossible.34 For

note 1, § 3, pp. xx–xx. In the English translation of his Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451), trans. John Bowden (rev. ed., Atlanta: Knox, 1975) these are called ‘frameworks.’ 33 Cf. ‘Christology Today’ 89–90. 34 For a fuller discussion of anachronism and archaism, see Lonergan, The Triune God: Doctrines 268–71.

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in nt, ut facillima sit divinitatis probatio, sed impossibilis reddatur vera difficultatum solutio. Unde incipit archaismus qui ita dictis nt inhaeret ut accidentalia reputentur essentialia et ipsa decreta conciliaria reprobentur. Sed utriusque est unus idemque error, videlicet, ut non perspiciatur eandem doctrinam decursu temporum diversis schematibus et evolventibus conceptibus convenienter exprimi posse.

Quarto, multum adiuvant schemata ad accuratam textus intelligentiam tum quia distinctiones claras introducunt et differentias bene determinant tum quia in distinctis et determinatis similitudinem, additionem, interconnexionem exhibent. Quae sane omnia maximi sunt momenti ubi intelligendus est processus docendi et addiscendi qui, ex ipsa natura rei, non omnia inde ab initio ponit sed pedetentim nova elementa aliis iam propositis adiungit.

7 Remanet ut perpauca dicamus de habitudine inter schemata et probandam Christi divinitatem. Primo, ergo, de se schemata ideo sunt utilia ut quid in ipsis fontibus contineatur exacte perspiciamus. Inserviant ergo ei scientiae pleniori quam desideravit Pius xii, scilicet, ut theologus ostendat quemadmodum definita ecclesiae doctrina in fontibus contineatur eo ipso sensu quo definita est (db 2314, ds 3886). Deinde, ipsa divinitas quasi in indivisibili stat et brevissime dicitur: Iesus est verus Deus. Quam conclusionem attingere quis potest ex uno vel alio textu rite intellecto, e.g., Mc 2.1-12. Aliud tamen est probationem instituere ex textu rite intellecto, et aliud est ad rectam illam intelligentiam pervenire. Hoc maioris laboris est, cum modo comprehensivo totus contextus intelligi debeat. Quod enim ex uno loco probari videtur, ex alio forte infirmari videtur; tertius invocatur in favorem prioris, et quartus in favorem posterioris; neque desinit haec altercatio donec per totum nt pervagetur. Quare, qui methodice procedere velit, potius quam dubias probationes et difficultates incertas colligere, per schemata non parum adiuvatur.

Tertio, in eo maxime consistit divinitatis ex nt probatio quod perspiciuntur duo motus in unum coniungi.

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the anachronist, who sees the Chalcedonian decree everywhere in the New Testament, proving Christ’s divinity is quite easy, but a true solution of difficulties is impossible. So there begins an archaism that clings to the wording of the New Testament so closely as to count incidental matters as essential, while marginalizing the conciliar decrees. Either way, however, the error is one and the same: failure to grasp that as time passes the same doctrine can be expressed appropriately through different patterns and developing concepts. In the fourth place, these patterns are a great help towards an accurate understanding of the texts, both because they introduce clear distinctions and define differences, and because they highlight the similarities, additions, and interconnections in what has been distinguished and defined. All this is extremely important when it comes to understanding a process of teaching and learning that does not, in the nature of things, set down everything right from the start but gradually joins new elements to others already stated. 7 We have yet to say something about the relationship of patterns to proving Christ’s divinity. In the first place, then, of themselves patterns are useful in perceiving exactly what is contained in the sources. Thus they may be of service to that fuller knowledge which Pius xii called for by urging that the theologian should show how the doctrine that the church has defined is contained in the sources in the same sense in which it has been defined (db 2314, ds 3886). In the second place, the divinity [of Christ] does not admit of degrees and is briefly stated: Jesus is true God. This conclusion can be arrived at from any of several texts, properly understood; Mark 2.1–12 is one example. But it is one thing to establish a proof from a text properly understood, and something else to achieve such a proper understanding. Achieving it is a major undertaking, since the whole context has to be understood in a comprehensive way. One passage may seem to prove what another seems to disprove; a third is brought in to support the first, and a fourth to support the second; the debate keeps up until the whole New Testament has been gone through. So, anyone who wants to proceed methodically, instead of collecting doubtful proofs and unresolved difficulties, will get no little help from schematic patterns. In the third place, proving [Christ’s] divinity from the New Testament consists largely in perceiving the conjunction of two movements into one.

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Primus motus: qui regula quadam generali solus dicitur Deus, dici incipit Deus Pater, ut denique saepius dicatur Pater sine addito. Alius motus: qui homo est et ab omnibus homo esse iudicatur, divina tamen multipliciter participat: miracula passim facit, legem mosaicam corrigit, summum amorem erga se ipsum exigit, tollit peccata mundi, omnes homines de sorte aeterna iudicabit, resuscitatus de caelis super omnia iam regnat, ante vitam terrestrem exsistebat, ipsi creationi interfuit, ante mundi constitutionem claritate divina fulgebat, ipsius Dei imago est et character substantiae eius, imo Filius est et, salva origine ex Patre, Patri aequalis.

Duorum motuum coniunctio: ex conceptionibus et Dei unici et particularis hominis incipitur, sed desinitur ad conceptionem duorum, Patris et Filii, qui nomen divinum condividunt. praenotamen quartum: de schemate synthetico paulino 1 Consistit schema originaliter in nexu similium, in nexu dissimilium, in transitu ex dissimilitudine in similitudinem. Est schema quia omnia considerantur concrete. Est syntheticum quia includit Deum, Christum, christianos hac in vita, christianos in vita futura, Adam, peccatores, conversionem.

2 1 Thess 1.6: imitatores nostri facti estis et Domini. Cf. ibid. 2.14, 2 Thess 3.7, 3.9. 1 Cor 4.16, 11.1: Imitatores mei estote, sicut et ego Christi.

3 Imitatio Christi inculcatur (a) sub figura vestis induendae et (b) per expressiones formationis, conformationis, ubi radicale est ex vocabulo, morpheF. Gal 3.27: quicumque in Christo baptizati estis, Christum induisitis; Rom 13.14: induimini Dominum Iesum Christum. Gal 4.19: quod iterum parturio donec Christus formetur in vobis; Rom 8.29: praedestinavit conformes fieri imagini Filii sui (summorphous teFs eikonos).

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The first movement: He who, as a general rule, is referred to only as God begins to be referred to as God the Father, and then is more often referred to simply as the Father. The second movement: Someone whom everybody judges to be a man nevertheless participates in many ways in what is divine. He performs miracles, he revises the law of Moses, he calls forth the utmost love towards himself, he takes away the sins of the world, he will pass eternal judgment upon everyone individually. Risen, he now reigns from heaven over all; he existed prior to his earthly life; he takes part in creation itself; before the foundation of the world he reflected the splendor of God; he is the image of God and bears the very stamp of his nature. He is the Son indeed and, save only for having his origin from the Father, he is the Father’s equal. The conjunction of these two movements begins from conceptions of one God and of a particular man, but arrives at a conception of two, Father and Son, who share the name of God. preliminary note 4: paul’s synthetic pattern 1 This pattern consists from the start in a linking of similars, a linking of dissimilars, and a transition from dissimilarity to similarity. It is a schematic pattern inasmuch as everything is considered concretely. It is synthetic inasmuch as it brings together God, Christ, Christians in this present life, Christians in the life to come, Adam, sinners, and conversion. 2 1 Thessalonians 1.6: ‘You became imitators of us and of the Lord.’ Cf. 2.14 and 2 Thessalonians 3.7, 3.9. 1 Corinthians 4.16, 11.1: ‘Be imitators of me’; ‘be imitators of me as I am of Christ.’ 3 Imitation of Christ is taught (a) through the metaphor of putting on a garment, and (b) through expressions of ‘formation’ and ‘conformation,’ of which the etymological root is morpheF, ‘form.’ Galatians 3.27: ‘For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ.’ Romans 13.14: ‘But put on the Lord Jesus Christ.’ In Galatians 4.19 Paul speaks of those ‘with whom I am again in travail until Christ be formed in you!’ and in Romans 8.29 of those whom God ‘predestined to be conformed to the image (summorphous teFs eikonos) of his Son.’

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4 Iam vero Christus est imago Dei (2 Cor 4.4, Col 1.15), ut imitatio Christi sit imitatio Dei. Unde, Eph 5.1: Estote ergo imitatores Dei.

5 Sed Deo propria est gloria (doxa). Christus est in gloria Patris. Et nos aeternam gloriam speramus. Unde, 1 Cor 2.7–8: loquimur Dei sapientiam in mysterio, quae abscondita est, quam praedestinavit Deus ante saeculua in gloriam (doxan) nostram, quam nemo principum huius saeculi cognovit; si enim cognovissent, numquam Dominum gloriae (doxeFs) crucifixissent (cf. Iac 2.1). 2 Cor 4.4: deus huius saeculi excaecavit mentes infidelium, ut non fulgeat illis illuminatio evangelii gloriae (doxeFs) Christi, qui est imago Dei. 2 Cor 3.18: gloriam (doxan) Domini speculantes, in eandem imaginem (eikona) transformamur (metamorphoumetha) a claritate in claritatem (doxan). Phil 3.21: corpus humilitatis nostrae configuratum (summorphon) corpori claritatis (doxeFs) suae. 6 Iam vero oportuit Christum pati et ita intrare in gloriam suam (Lc 24.26). Quare, Rom 8.17: Si autem filii, et heredes; heredes quidem Dei, coheredes Christi; si tamen compatimur, ut et conglorificemur. Rom 6.3–11. Phil 3.10–11: configuratus (summorphizomenos) morti eius, si quo modo occurram ad resurrectionem quae est ex mortuis. 7 Duplex enim est imago quam homo imitari potest. 1 Cor 15.47–49: primus homo de terra terrenus, secundus homo de caelo (caelestis). Qualis terrenus, tales et terreni, et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes. Igitur sicut portavimus imaginem (eikona) terreni, portemus et imaginem caelestis. Rom 12.2: nolite conformari huic saeculo, sed reformamini in novitate sensus vestri. 8 Sicut duplex est imago, duplex est mediatio. 1 Cor 15.45: Factus est primus homo in animam viventem (Gen 2.7), novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem.

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4 Now, Christ is the image of God (2  Corinthians 4.4, Colossians 1.15), and so imitation of Christ is imitation of God. Hence, Ephesians 5.1 says, ‘Therefore be imitators of God.’ 5 But glory, doxa, belongs properly to God. Christ is in the glory of the Father. And we hope for eternal glory. Hence these passages: 1 Corinthians 2.7–8: ‘But we impart a secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God decreed before the ages for our glorification (eis doxan heFmoFn). None of the rulers of this age understood this; for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory (doxeFs)’ (cf. James 2.1). 2  Corinthians 4.4: ‘The god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them from seeing the light of the gospel of the glory (doxeFs) of Christ, who is the image of God.’ 2 Corinthians 3.18: ‘Beholding the glory (doxan) of the Lord, we are being changed (metamorphoumetha) into his image (eikona) from one degree of glory (doxan) to another.’ Philippians 3.21: Christ ‘will change our lowly body to be like (summorphon) his glorious body (soFmati teFs doxeFs).’ 6 Moreover, it behooved Christ to suffer and so enter into his glory (Luke 24.26). Accordingly, we find the following. Romans 8.17: ‘If we are children, then heirs, heirs of God and fellow heirs with Christ, provided we suffer with him in order that we may also be glorified with him.’ Romans 6.3–11. Philippians 3.10–11: ‘… becoming like him (summorphizomenos) in his death, that if possible I may attain the resurrection from the dead.’ 7 The image that humans can imitate is twofold. 1 Corinthians 15.47–49: ‘The first man was from the earth, a man of dust; the second man is from heaven. As was the man of dust, so are those who are of the dust; and as is the man of heaven, so are those who are of heaven. Just as we have borne the image (eikona) of the man of dust, let us also bear the image of the man of heaven.’ Romans 12.2: ‘Do not be conformed to this world but be transformed by the renewal of your mind.’ 8 As the image is twofold, so is the mediation. 1 Corinthians 15.45: ‘Thus it is written, “The first man Adam became a living being” [Genesis 2.7]; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit.’

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1 Cor 15.22: et sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Rom 5.12–21. 9 Cum tamen Adam creatus est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei (Gen 1.26–27), novus homo in Christo est secundum intentionem creatoris. Col 3.9–11: Nolite mentiri invicem, exspoliantes vos veterem hominem cum actibus suis et induentes novum, eum qui renovatur in agnitionem secundum imaginem eius qui creavit illum ubi non est gentilis et Iudaeus, circumcisio et praeputium, barbarus et Scytha, servus et liber, sed omnia in omnibus Christus. Eph 4.22–24: deponere vos secundum pristinam conversationem veterem hominem, qui corrumpitur secundum desideria erroris. Renovamini autem spiritu mentis vestrae et induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis. 10 Quibus facili gressu annectuntur quae de carne, peccato, morte-poena habentur, et iterum quae de morte-remedio, de Spiritu, de gratia et iustificatione. Ulterius, quia caro exterior est, sed Spiritus intus operatur, accedunt quae de homine interiori dicuntur.

11 Ulterius, ex nexu similium proceditur ad omnes; et omnes simul faciunt totum. Ita iam audivimus omnes in Adam mori, omnes in Christo vivificari. Sed omnes ex uno principio, Christo, procedentes et ad unam imaginem sese conformantes coniungunter per caritatem et Deo et Christo et inter se. Unde dicuntur corpus Christi (Gal 3.26–28, 1 Cor 12 et 13, Rom 12.4-5, Eph 1.23, 2.16, 4.4, 4.12, 4.16, 5.28, 5.30, Col 1.18, 1.22). Et sicut in corpore organico pars dirigens est caput, sicut in familia vir dicitur caput mulieris, ita Christus comparatur ad corpus suum ut caput (Eph 5.23; cf. 1 Cor 11.3). 12 Ulterius, illud totum quod est corpus Christi et ecclesia ad alios comparatur. Quatenus enim iudaizantes Moysin invocabant, Paulus ultra Moysin nominavit Abraham, cui factae sunt repromissiones, quae quidem in Chris-

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1 Corinthians 15.22: ‘For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive.’ Romans 5.12–21. 9 However, since Adam was created in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1.26–27), the new man in Christ follows the Creator’s intention. Colossians 3.9–11: ‘Do not lie to one another, seeing that you have put off the old nature with its practices and have put on the new nature, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator. Here there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free man, but Christ is all, and in all.’ Ephesians 4.22–24: ‘You were taught to put off your old nature which belongs to your former manner of life and is corrupt through deceitful lusts, and be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and put on the new nature, created after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness.’ 10 It is an easy step to put together with this what Paul has to say about the flesh, about sin, about death as penalty, and, on the other hand, about death as remedy, about the Spirit, about grace and justification. Further, since the flesh is external while the Spirit operates inwardly, what he says about the inward man can be included. 11 Further, he moves from linked similars to all; and together all make up a whole. Thus we have already heard that in Adam all die and that in Christ all are made alive. But those who are moving from one principle, Christ, and conforming themselves to one image, are all joined by love with God, with Christ, and with each other. Hence, they are referred to as the body of Christ (see Galatians 3.26–28, 1 Corinthians 12 and 13, Romans 12.4–5, Ephesians 1.23, 2.16, 4.4, 4.12, 4.16, 5.28, 5.30, Colossians 1.18, 1.22). And as in an organic body the head is the part that rules, as in a family the husband is called the head of the wife, so Christ is related to his body as its head (Ephesians 5.23; cf. 1 Corinthians 11.3). 12 Further, that whole which is the church and the body of Christ is related to others. Inasmuch as Moses was invoked by Judaizers, Paul’s appeal goes beyond Moses to Abraham, to whom were made the promises fulfilled in Christ and

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to et corpore suo adimpletae sunt (Gal, Rom 4). Unde habetur distinctio inter circumcisos carne et circumcisos in spiritu. Et ulterius ultra Moysin et Abraham Paulus nominavit Adam, ut Christus sit Adam novissimus. Unde et docuit duos (Iudaeos et gentes) in unum novum hominem condi et in uno corpore reconciliari (Eph 2.15–16). Quibus accedit gentes esse coheredes et concorporales et comparticipes promissionis (Eph 3.6; cf. 2.5–6). Denique, cum Colossis audirentur philosophia et inanis fallacia (Col 2.8), docuit Paulus Christum esse caput non solum ecclesiae sed etiam omnis principatus et potestatis (Col 2.10); in Christo condita esse universa in caelis et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso (eis auton) esse creata, et omnia in ipso constare (Col 1.16–17); sacramentum (musteFrion) enim divinae voluntatis esse instaurare omnia in Christo quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt in ipso (Eph 1.9-10). Quod mysterium (Rom 16.25, 1 Cor 2.7, Eph 1.9, 3.3, 3.9, 5.32, Col 1.26– 27, 2.2) est secretum consilium divinum (K. Prümm, ‘Mystères,’ dbs; E. Vogt, Biblica 37 (1956) 247–57).35 13 Ulterius, agit Christus caput in corpus suum. Ex Christo enim capite ‘totum corpus per nexus et coniunctiones subministratum et constructum crescit in augmentum Dei’ (Col 2.19; cf. Eph 2.21, 4.16). Qua in actione describenda adhibentur voces (1) implere, (2) impleri, (3) plenitudo, quae aliquam difficultatem faciunt. Nam ubi latine habentur vox activa et passiva, graece habentur vox activa, media, et passiva; unde quaesitum est utrum in vertendo Eph 1.23 non melius poneretur ‘adimplet sibi’ quam ‘adimpletur.’36 Ratio est quia apud Eph 4.10 Christus dicitur omnia implere, apud Col 2.10 et Eph 3.19 Christiani dicuntur impleti, repleti.

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his body (Galatians [3–4], Romans 4). Hence, there is a distinction between those who have been circumcised in the flesh and those circumcised in the spirit. But beyond both Moses and Abraham, Paul appeals to Adam, so that Christ is the Last Adam. Thus, the two – Jew and Gentile – are made one new man and reconciled in one body (Ephesians 2.15–16) and the Gentiles are ‘fellow heirs, members of the same body, and partakers of the promise’ (Ephesians 3.6; cf. 2.5–6). Finally, since the Colossians were resorting to philosophy and empty deceit (Colossians 2.8), Paul teaches that Christ is head not only of the church but also of all rule and authority (2.10); ‘for in him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or authorities – all things were created through him and for him (eis auton). He is before all things, and in him all things hold together’ (1.16–17); and the mystery (musteFrion) of God’s will is ‘to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth’ (Ephesians 1.9–10). This mystery (Romans 16.25, 1  Corinthians 2.7, Ephesians 1.9, 3.3, 3.9, 5.32, Colossians 1.26–27, 2.2) is the secret plan of God (K. Prümm, ‘Mystères,’ dbs; E. Vogt, Biblica 37 [1956] 247–57).35 13 Further, Christ the head acts on his body. For it is from Christ the head that ‘the whole body, nourished and knit together through its joints and ligaments, grows with a growth that is from God’ (Colossians 2.19; cf. Ephesians 2.21, 4.16). The words used to describe this activity are ‘to fill,’ ‘to be filled,’ and ‘fullness.’ These present certain difficulties. Whereas in Latin there are active and passive voices, Greek has active, passive, and middle. Hence, in translating Ephesians 1.23, where the Vulgate reads, literally, ‘the fullness of him who everywhere and in all things is full,’ there is some question whether it might not be better to read, ‘the fullness of him who fills all in all.’36 The reason is this. Ephesians 4.10 says 35 K. Prümm, ‘Mystères,’ dbs, vol. 6, cols. 1–225; cols. 173–225 treat ‘Le Mystère dans la Bible.’ E. Vogt, ‘“Mysteria” in Textibus Qumrân,’ Biblica 37 (1956) 247–57. On mystery in this sense, see also thesis 17, which (along with theses 15 and 16) has been moved from this volume to vol. 9, The Redemption, where they join a distinct and previously unpublished text on redemption. 36 English versions generally favor the latter reading; but see R.A. Knox’s version ad loc.

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Iterum, plenitudo, pleFroFma, dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, est id quod impletur, nempe, corpus Christi seu membra; alio modo, est plenitudo Dei, plenitudo divinitatis, quae in Christo est et qua corpus suum implet. Primo modo, Eph 1.23: to soFma autou, to pleFroFma tou ta panta en pasin pleFroumenou. Cf. Eph 4.10. Vulgata dicit ‘corpus et plenitudo,’ quod praetermittit simplicem appositionem textus graeci.

Alio modo, Col 2.9–10: in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter, et estis in illo repleti. Similiter: Eph 3.17–19: Christum habitare (katoikeFsai) per fidem in cordibus vestris … ut impleamini in omnem plenitudinem Dei (hina pleFroFtheFte eis pan to pleFroFma tou theou). Et probabilius similiter, Col 1.19: in ipso complacuit omnem plenitudinem inhabitare: pan to pleFroFma katoikeFsai. Quaeres quaenam sit illa Dei vel deitatis (theoteFtos) plenitudo, quae in Christo inhabitat et ad quam implentur christiani quatenus Christus in cordibus eorum per fidem inhabitat? Respondendum videtur illud idem multipliciter apprehendi seu repraesentari. Primo modo uti in signo, kaboFd Iahwe implevit et inhabitavit tum in tabernaculo (Exod 40.34–38) tum in templo (1 Reg 8.10–11). Alio modo, magis interius, dicuntur prophetae et sancti Spiritu Dei, Spiritu sancto, impleri et agi et inhabitari. Tertio modo, magis specifice, dicuntur divina sa­ pientia, caritas, potestas per Christum nobis communicari.

Quo tertio modo Ioannes dixit Unigenitum plenum gratiae et veritatis (Io 1.14); unde mox addidit: ‘Et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus et gratiam pro gratia’ (Io 1.16). Et similiter Paulus voluit Colossenses instructos ‘in caritate et in omnes divitias plenitudinis (pleFrophoria) intellectus, in agnitionem mysterii Dei Patris et Christi Iesu, in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi’ (Col 2.2). Et pariter in cordibus Ephesianorum voluit ‘Christum inhabitare per fidem … ut possitis comprehendere … et scire supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi, ut impleamini in omnem plenitudinem Dei’ (Eph 3.17–19).

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that Christ ascended ‘that he might fill all things’; according to Colossians 2.10, Christians ‘have come to fullness of life in him,’ and in Ephesians 3.19 they are ‘to be filled with all the fullness of God.’ Again, ‘fullness,’ pleFroFma, is used in two ways: first, to refer to that which is full or filled, namely, the body of Christ or his members; second, to refer to the fullness of God, the fullness of divinity which is in Christ and with which he fills his body. In Ephesians 1.23 the first usage appears: to soFma autou, to pleFroFma tou ta panta en pasin pleFroumenou, literally ‘his body, the fullness of the [one] filling all in all’ (cf. Ephesians 4.10). The Vulgate reads corpus et plenitudo, ‘body and fullness,’ which leaves out the simple apposition of the Greek text. In Colossians 2.9–10 the second usage appears: ‘For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily, and you have come to fullness of life in him.’ Ephesians 3.17–19 is similar: ‘that Christ may dwell (katoikeFsai) in your hearts through faith … that you may be filled with all the fullness of God (hina pleFroFtheFte eis pan to pleFroFma tou theou).’ And Colossians 1.19 is probably similar: ‘For God was pleased to have all fullness dwell in him.’  What, you may ask, is this fullness of God, or of deity (theoteFtos), which dwells in Christ and with which Christians are filled inasmuch as Christ dwells in their hearts by faith? The answer would seem to be that one and the same thing is apprehended or represented in different ways. First, it may be apprehended in a sign: the ‘glory of the Lord,’ kaboFd Yahweh, filled both the tabernacle (Exodus 40.34–38) and the temple (1 Kings 8.10–11) and dwelt there. A second way is more internal: the prophets and saints are said to have been filled, acted upon, inhabited by the Spirit of God or by the Holy Spirit. A third way is more specific: God’s wisdom, love, and power are said to be communicated to us by Christ. It is in this third way that the gospel of John says the Only-begotten was full of grace and truth (John 1.14). Thus, it goes on to say that ‘from his fullness have we all received, grace upon grace’ (John 1.16). Similarly, Paul wants the Colossians to be ‘encouraged as they are knit together in love, to have all the riches of full assurance (pleFrophoria) of understanding and the knowledge of God’s mystery, of Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge’ (Colossians 2.2). Likewise, he wants Christ to dwell in the hearts of the Ephesians by faith, that they ‘may have power to comprehend … and to know the love of Christ which surpasses knowl-

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14 Tangi videtur thema philosophicum, unum et omnia, hen kai panta, tum ubi agitur de corpore Christi, tum ubi omnia simpliciter ad Deum vel ad Christum referuntur (Rom 11.36, 1 Cor 8.6, Col 1.15–17, Eph 1.9–10, 4.6), tum denique in expressione singulari ut dicatur: idem vero Deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus (1 Cor 12.6), ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus (1 Cor 15.28), pleroma eius qui omnia in omnibus adimplet (Eph 1.23), ubi non est Iudaeus vel gentilis … sed omnia et omnibus Christus (Col 3.11); quamvis ipse Paulus de se ipso quodammodo similia dicat (1 Cor 9.19, 9.22, 10.33). Vide J. Dupont, Gnosis (1949) 329–66, 419–75.37 15 Iam vero ex simplicissima imitationis ratione ordientes, parvulis atque obviis gressibus procedentes, eo pervenimus ut schema syntheticum fere ad molem et dignitatem theologiae paulinae extenderetur. Sufficiebat enim homines concretos eosque multos cogitare, secundum conversionem, assimilationem, similitudinem eos ordinare, unientem omnes caritatem perspicere, ut unum corpus habeamus in uno Spiritu cum una spe, unum Dominum, unam fidem, unum baptisma, unum Patrem omnium qui est super omnia et per omnia et in omnibus (Eph 4.4–6). Sed quidquid recipitur, ad modum recipientis recipitur. Qui enim vera fide carent, naturalem quandam huius doctrinae originem quaerunt. Qui erroribus philosophicis irretiuntur, ipsam hominis naturam parum intelligunt. Nam intellectus humanus est participata quaedam similitudo luminis increati (Sum. theol., 1, q. 84, a. 5); in lumine intellectus agentis nobis est quodammodo omnis scientia originaliter indita (De ver., q. 10, a. 6 c.); neque naturale intellectus desiderium quietatur donec Deus per essentiam videatur (Sum. theol., 1-2, q. 3, a. 8). Quae hominis natura intellectualis tripliciter manifestatur, vel sub forma expressionis magis imaginitiva et affectiva, vel technice et philosophice, vel prout fide divina perficitur atque elevatur. Iam vero, qui placitis positivisticis cedant, haec omnia in

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edge,’ so that they may be ‘filled with all the fullness of God’ (Ephesians 3.17–19). 14 Paul seems to be touching on a philosophical theme, ‘the one and the all,’ hen kai panta, when discussing the body of Christ, or again when he refers all things whatever to God or to Christ (Romans 11.36, 1 Corinthians 8.6, Colossians 1.15–17, Ephesians 1.9–10, 4.6), or again in particular expressions which speak of ‘the same God who works all things in all’ (1 Corinthians 12.6), so that God may be all in all (1 Corinthians 15.28), and of ‘the fullness of him who fills all in all’ (Ephesians 1.23) or which say that there is neither Greek nor Jew ‘but Christ is all, and in all’ (Colossians 3.11). Paul does however use similar language about himself (1 Corinthians 9.19, 9.22, 10.33). See J. Dupont, Gnosis (1949) 329–66, 419–75.37 15 Having set out from a very simple understanding of imitation, we have arrived by small and fairly straightforward steps at a point where the synthetic model now embraces almost the whole majestic sweep of Pauline theology. For we had only to think of a multitude of concrete persons, arrange them in terms of conversion, assimilation, and likeness, and perceive the love uniting them all, in order to have one body in the one Spirit with one hope, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one Father of all, who is above all and through all and in all (Ephesians 4.4–6). But whatever is received is received according to the capacity of the receiver. Those who lack a true faith will endeavor to find some natural origin for this teaching. Those who are entangled in philosophical errors have too little understanding of human nature itself. For the human intellect is a participated likeness of uncreated light (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 5); in the light of agent intellect all knowledge is in some way originally imparted to us (De veritate, q. 10, a. 6 c.); but the natural desire of intellect is not stilled until God is seen by his essence (Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 8). This intellectual nature of ours is manifested in three ways: either in the form of more imaginative and affective expression, or technically and philosophically, or as perfected and elevated by divine faith. Now those

37 Jacques Dupont, Gnosis: La connaissance religieuse dans les Épîtres de Saint Paul (Louvain: E. Nauwaelerts, 1949).

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unum genus reducunt quod pro diverso stadio culturali sensu generalizato nominant vel mythicum vel gnosticum. Quibus suppositis, remanet ut eruditi similitudines quaerant inter documenta christiana et alia quaecumque unde phaenomenon religionis christianae naturalibus causis explicent.

At sunt qui veram fidem habent sed de re philosophica brevioribus doctrinis contenti sunt. Quibus manifestum est intellectum universalia a sensibilibus abstrahere et iterum abstracta universalia sensibilibus applicare. At eosdem fugit ipse intelligendi actus qui vel unitatem intelligibilem vel intelligibilem interdependentiam in ipsis sensibilibus, particularibus, concretis perspicit. Quo actu (‘insight’) neglecto, quod diximus schema syntheticum paulinum eis evadit fere incomprehensibile. Nam ipsum schema valde intelligibile est, sed simul concretissimum est; sed haec duo coniungi non possunt quamdiu sola habitudo inter intellectum et sensum in abstractione et applicatione universalis abstracti reponatur.

praenotamen quintum: de natura argumenti Notum erat axioma, intellectum seu intelligentiam esse de principiis, scientiam de conclusionibus.38 In praesenti thesi, non agitur de scientia, de conclusione demonstranda ex principiis, sed agitur de intellectu ipsius principii, nempe, de eo ipso quod in nt docetur de Domino Nostro Iesu Christo. Non enim volumus

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who give in to positivistic views collapse all these into a single class, which they name either mythical or gnostic, for different generalized stages of cultural development. On that supposition, all that is needed to explain the phenomenon of Christian religion through natural causes is for scholars to search out similarities between Christian texts and others, no matter what kind. At the same time, there are those who do hold the true faith but rest content with a smattering of philosophy. To them it is obvious that the intellect abstracts universals from sensible data, and that it applies abstract universals to what is sensible. What escapes them is the act of understanding itself, the act which grasps in particular, concrete, sensible data either an intelligible unity or an intelligible interdependence. Neglect of this act – insight – makes our discussion of Paul’s synthetic pattern just about incomprehensible. For the pattern itself is certainly intelligible yet at the same time thoroughly concrete; intelligibility and concreteness, however, cannot be joined so long as the only relationship between intellect and sense is located in abstraction and the application of abstract universals. preliminary note 5: the nature of the argument It is a well-known axiom that intellect or understanding regards principles while science or knowledge regards conclusions.38 The present thesis is not concerned with science, in the sense of a conclusion demonstratively proved from principles, but with an understanding of the principle itself, namely, what in fact the New Testament teaches about

38 Lonergan is referring to the three habits of speculative intellect, according to Aristotle: understanding, nous, regards principles; scientia, episteFmeF, regards conclusions; wisdom, sophia, regards the objective order of reality up to the highest causes (Aristotle, Ethics, vi, 7, 1141a 19). This triad became a Scholastic topos, hence ‘well-known’; see, for instance, Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 57, a. 2. Lonergan states his interpretation of Aquinas on the habits of speculative intellect in Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, vol. 2 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 79–82. An example of Lonergan’s own use of the triad may be found in The Triune God: Systematics, vol. 12 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 22–25.

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conclusionem quandam ex scripturis deducere, sed volumus ipsum verum in nt contentum et eo modo conceptum quo in nt concipitur. Iam vero principia in scientiis naturaliter notis saepe concipiuntur tamquam propositiones universales per se notae; sed principium huius tractatus est veritas particularis et contingens; nempe, secundam personam SS. Trinitatis esse incarnatam. Quia ergo arguitur non ad conclusionem sed ad principium manifestandum, quia arguitur non ad principium universale et necessarium sed particulare et contingens, ipsa argumenti natura, fini proprio adaptata, neque intelligitur neque iudicatur secundum normas quae argumenta in fines simpliciter diversos dirigunt. Quinam ergo nunc intenditur finis? Ille intenditur finis qui attingitur in textu nt recte intellecto. Quomodo in talem finem proceditur? Proceditur colligendo ea quae praesentem quaestionem respiciunt, clarificando quae in singulis obscura esse videntur, reconciliando quae sibi opponi videntur, e quibus exsurgit illa contextus intelligentia quae singulos textus comparat, ordinat, in unum dicendum reducit.

[Argumentum] pars 1: iesus nazarenus est verus homo. 1 Evangelia exhibent a prima infantia usque ad mortem hominem inter homines: qui conceptus est, natus, circumcisus, aetate crescebat, baptizatus, ieiunavit, tentatus est, regnum Dei annuntiavit, turbas docuit, discipulos formavit, itinera peregit, esuriit, sitivit, fatigatus est, auctoritatibus publicis damnatus est, passus, mortuus, sepultus.

2 Nomen a Iesu sibi applicatum, ‘Filius hominis,’ imprimis significat hominem. Cf. Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu de seipso 86–87, 108–10. Cullmann, Christologie des nt 139–54.39

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our Lord Jesus Christ. We do not want to deduce any conclusion from scripture; what we want is just that truth which is contained in the New Testament, conceived as it is in the New Testament. Moreover, the principles in naturally known sciences often are conceived as universal propositions, known per se. But the principle of this treatise is a particular and contingent truth, namely, that the second person of the Trinity became incarnate. Since we are not arguing in order to arrive at a conclusion but in order to manifest a principle, and since the argument does not move to a universal and necessary principle but to one that is particular and contingent, the nature of the argument itself, adapted to its proper end, is not to be understood or judged by standards which guide arguments towards goals that are altogether different. What then is our intended goal? It is to arrive at the correct understanding of the New Testament text. How shall we proceed towards such a goal? The procedure is to assemble what bears on the present question, clarify what seems to be obscure in particular items, reconcile what seem to be internal contradictions. This procedure gives rise to the contextual understanding that relates individual texts, orders them, and brings them together in one statement. [The argument] part 1: jesus of nazareth is true man. 1 What the gospels portray, from his first infancy to his death, is a man among men. He was conceived, born, and circumcised. He grew up and was baptized, fasted and was tempted. He preached the kingdom of God, taught the crowds, formed his disciples, traveled. He was hungry, thirsty, and tired. He was condemned by the public authorities, suffered, died, and was buried. 2 ‘Son of man,’ the title used by Jesus of himself, in the first instance signifies ‘a man.’ See Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu de seipso 86–87, 108–10; Cullmann, Christologie des Neuen Testament 139–54.39

39 Oscar Cullmann, Die Christologie des Neuen Testaments (Tübingen: Mohr, 1958); in English, The Christology of the New Testament, trans. Shirley C.

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3 Epistolae memorant eum natum de David secundum carnem (Rom 1.3), ex patribus esse (Rom 9.5), factum ex muliere (Gal 4.4), crucifixum et mortuum (passim), hominem mediatorem inter Deum et homines (1 Tim 2.5), qui peccata nostra in carne sua pertulit super lignum (1 Pet 2.24), qui debuit per omnia fratribus similari ut misericors fieret (Hebr 2.17), qui potuit compati infirmitatibus nostris, tentatus per omnia pro similitudine absque peccato (Hebr 4.15).

4 Contra gnosticos carnem negantes dirigi videntur: 2 Io 7, 1 Io 1.1, 4.2–3, 5.1. Veritas carnis in resuscitato affirmatur, Io 20.27.

5 Neque seria dubia movent quae interdum in nt dicuntur. Io 1.14: Verbum caro factum est. Nam ‘caro’ stat pro homine, uti Rom 3.20: non iustificabitur omnis caro coram illo (cf. Ps. 142.2).40 Rom 8.3: in similitudinem carnis peccati; Phil 2.7-8: in similitudinem hominum factus et habitu (skheFmati) inventus ut homo. De his breviter responderi potest affirmationem similitudinis et figurae humanae non statim probare vel dissimilitudinem vel substantiae humanae negationem. Accuratius tamen forte dicitur S. Paulus hominem modo concreto concepisse, ut homo vel caro magis significaret naturam humanam corruptam (Rom 1.20-3.20, Eph 2.3) quam naturam sive integram sive puram. Quare, cum Christus peccatum non noverit (2 Cor 5.21), magna hac differentia morali a nobis differt.

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3 The epistles mention that he was descended from David according to the flesh (Romans 1.3), of the race of the patriarchs (Romans 9.5), and born of woman (Galatians 4.4). That he was crucified and died is stated frequently. He was a man, the mediator between God and men (1 Timothy 2.5). He bore our sins in his body on the tree (1 Peter 2.24). He had to be made like his brethren in every respect so that he might become merciful (Hebrews 2.17), and he is able to sympathize with our weaknesses, having been tempted in every way as we are, yet without sinning (Hebrews 4.15). 4 Passages that seem to be directed against gnostics who denied his flesh include 2 John 7, 1 John 1.1, 4.2–3, 5.1. The reality of the Risen One’s flesh is affirmed in John 20.27. 5 Nor is any serious doubt provoked by what is said elsewhere in the New Testament. John 1.14: ‘The Word became flesh.’ Here ‘flesh’ stands for ‘man,’ as it does in Romans 3.20: ‘no flesh shall be justified in his sight’ (cf. Psalm 142.2 [evv 143.2]).40 Romans 8.3: God sent his Son ‘in the likeness of sinful flesh.’ Philippians 2.7–8: He was ‘born in the likeness of men’ and ‘found in fashion (skheFmati) as a man.’ To [arguments derived from] these two passages a brief reply is possible: The fact that they affirm [only] a human form and likeness does not without further ado prove either a dissimilarity or a negation of human substance. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that Paul conceived man in a concrete way, such that the reference of ‘man’ or ‘flesh’ is to fallen human nature (Romans 1.20–3.20, Ephesians 2.3) rather than to pure or unfallen nature. Since Christ knew no sin (2  Corinthians 5.21), he was of course greatly different from us in this specifically moral respect.

Guthrie and Charles A.M. Hall (London: SCM Press, 1959; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963). The corresponding pages in the English translation are 137–52. 40 Lonergan cites the Psalms according to the Vulgate numbering, which frequently differs from that of the Hebrew Bible. The numbers in square brackets, preceded by evv, are those of most English versions, including rsv.

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pars 2: idem iesus divina multipliciter participat. 1 Ille multipliciter divina participat, qui in regno Dei annuntiando plenam potestatem thaumaturgicam exercet, leges fert legi Moysaicae antitheticas, peccata remittit, amorem supremum erga se ipsum exigit;

2 qui ad regnum Dei constituendum patiendo et moriendo ‘factus est omnibus obtemperantibus sibi causa salutis aeternae’ (Hebr 5.9); 3 qui iterum venturus omnes homines de aeterna singulorum salute secundum opera eorum iudicabit; 4 qui resuscitatus iam cum Deo Patre regnum universale exercet tum super potestates in caelestibus et infernis tum super ecclesiam; 5 qui ante vitam suam terrestrem praeexsistebat et ipsi rerum omnium creationi interfuit. Atqui nt talia docet de Iesu Nazareno. Ergo.

Ad minorem 1 Cum singularibus privilegiis Iesus annuntiat regnum Dei. Regnum praeannuntiatum tum in vt tum a Ioanne Baptista (Mt 3.2) ab ipso Iesu annuntiatur (Mc 1.14–15, Mt 9.35) eiusque universalis praedicatio (Mt 24.14) et finalis possessio (Mt 25.34). Quam annuntiationem continuavit S. Paulus (Act 14.22, 19.8, 20.25, 28.23, 28.30–31; cf. 2.37–38, 8.12).

Quam annuntiationem concomitatur singularis potestas thaumaturgica (Mc 3.10, 6.56) ab ipso Iesu exercita (Mc 2.9, 3.1–6, 4.38–41, 5.13–14, 6.41, 6.56, 7.29, 7.35, 8.25, 10.52) ad fidem inculcandam (Mc 6.5, 9.24, 11.20–24); quae potestas electis apostolis a Iesu traditur (Mc 3.14–15, 6.7, 6.13); etiam post resurrectionem (Rom 15.18, 1 Cor 2.4–5, 4.18–20, 5.4, 2 Cor 12.12, Act 3.6, 5.5, 5.10, 5.12, 5.19, 6.6, 9.3, 12.7). Accedit singularis potestas legislativa (Mt 5.21, 5.27, 5.31, 5.38, 5.43, 6.2, 6.5, 6.7, 6.16, 7.24, 7.26, Mc 2.28) singularisque docendi auctoritas (Mc 1.22,

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part 2: the same jesus in many ways participates in what is divine. 1 He participates in many ways in what is divine, who in proclaiming the kingdom of God exercises the full power of healing, proposes laws that run counter to the law of Moses, forgives sins, and calls forth the utmost love towards himself; 2 who by suffering and dying for the establishment of the kingdom of God ‘became the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him’ (Hebrews 5.9); 3 who will come again to pass upon all, according to their works, a judgment regarding the eternal salvation of each individual; 4 who now, risen from the dead, exercises with God the Father a universal reign over the powers of heaven and hell, as well as over the church; and 5 who prior to his earthly life already existed and took part in the very creation of all things. But such is the New Testament’s teaching about Jesus of Nazareth. Therefore, the conclusion follows. Argument for the minor premise 1 Jesus announces the kingdom of God in a uniquely privileged manner. The kingdom already proclaimed both in the Old Testament and by John the Baptist (Matthew 3.2) is proclaimed by Jesus himself (Mark 1.14– 15, Matthew 9.35), and so is the preaching of this kingdom throughout the world (Matthew 24.14) and the final inheritance of the kingdom (Matthew 25.34). This proclamation Paul carried on (Acts 14.22, 19.8, 20.25, 28.23, 28.30–31; see 2.37–38, 8.12). Associated with this proclamation is the unique power of healing (Mark 3.10, 6.56) exercised by Jesus himself (Mark 2.9, 3.1–6, 4.38–41, 5.13–14, 6.41, 6.56, 7.29, 7.35, 8.25, 10.52) in order to bring about faith (Mark 6.5, 9.24, 11.20–24). This power Jesus hands on to the apostles he has chosen (Mark 3.14–15, 6.7, 6.13) and also after his resurrection (Romans 15.18, 1  Corinthians 2.4–5, 4.18–20, 5.4, 2  Corinthians 12.12, Acts 3.6, 5.5, 5.10, 5.12, 5.19, 6.6, 9.3, 12.7). His unique legislative power (Matthew 5.21, 5.27, 5.31, 5.38, 5.43, 6.2, 6.5, 6.7, 6.16, 7.24, 7.26, Mark 2.28) and the unique authority of his teaching

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Mt 7.29, Lc 4.32) unde recognosci potuit propheta a Moyse praedictus et sancitus (Act 3.22–23). Imo miraculum facit ut potestatem remittendi peccata demonstret (Mc 2.7, 2.9); mulieri peccatrici remittit peccata quia dilexit multum (Lc 7.47– 48). Et quamvis unus Dominus Deus Israel toto corde diligendus sit (Mc 12.29–30), singularem tamen exigit amorem erga se ipsum (Mt 25.34, 25.40, 25.45, 5.11), quem apostoli (Act 5.41), Paulus (Gal 2.20), fideles (Rom 8.35) praestiterunt et Paulus fidelibus praecepit (2 Cor 5.15).

2 Moriendo et resurgendo opus divinum supremum ipse perficit ut tollantur peccata mundi, donum iustificationis credentibus conferatur, et pignus aeternae haereditatis, ipse Spiritus sanctus, concedatur. De quibus fusius postea in thesibus de redemptione.41

3 At iterum venturus est (Mt 10.23, 13.41, 24.27, 24.37, 24.44) in gloria Patris sui (Mt 16.27), in regno suo (Mt 16.28), in sede maiestatis suae (Mt 19.28), in nubibus caeli cum virtute multa et maiestate (Mt 24.30), sedens a dextris virtutis Dei et veniens in nubibus caeli (Mt 26.64). Tunc reddet unicuique secundum opera eius (Mt 16.27, 25.31–46); omnes enim nos manifestari oportet ante tribunal Christi, ut referat unus­ quisque propria corporis, prout gessit sive bonum sive malum (2 Cor 5.10); neque enim Pater iudicat quemquam, sed omne iudicium dedit Filio (Io 5.22, 5.27). 4 Interim Dominus sedet ad dexteram Domini (Ps 109 [110].1, Mt 22.41–46, Mc 12.35–37, Lc 20.41–44, Act 2.29–36, 5.31, 10.36, Rom 1.3, 8.34, 14.8–9, Col 3.1, Phil 2.9–11, Hebr 1.3, 1.13, Apoc 3.21). In hoc enim Christus mortuus est et resurrexit ut et mortuorum et vivorum dominetur (Rom 14.9); omnia ei subiecta sunt (1 Cor 15.24–28, Eph 1.22, Hebr 2.8); constitutus est supra omnem principatum et potestatem et

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(Mark 1.22, Matthew 7.29, Luke 4.32) made it possible to recognize him as the prophet foretold and endorsed by Moses (Acts 3.22–23). He performs a miracle in order to display the power of forgiving sins (Mark 2.7, 2.9), and forgives the sins of a woman who was a sinner, because she loved much (Luke 7.47–48). And although it is the one Lord, the God of Israel, who is to be loved with all one’s heart (Mark 12.29–30), Jesus nevertheless calls forth a unique love towards himself (Matthew 25.34, 25.40, 25.45, 5.11), a love shown by the apostles (Acts 5.41), by Paul (Galatians 2.20), and by those who believe (Romans 8.35), and enjoined on believers by Paul (2 Corinthians 5.15). 2 By his dying and rising Jesus accomplishes a supremely divine work: the sins of the world are taken away, the gift of justification is granted to believers, and the pledge of an eternal inheritance, the Holy Spirit, is bestowed. There is a more extended treatment of this in theses 15–17 on Redemption.41 3 He will come again (Matthew 10.23, 13.41, 24.27, 24.37, 24.44), in the glory of his Father (Matthew 16.27), in his kingdom (Matthew 16.28), on his glorious throne (Matthew 19.28), on the clouds of heaven with power and great glory (Matthew 24.30), seated at the right hand of Power, and coming on the clouds of heaven (Matthew 26.64). Then he will repay everyone according to the works of each (Matthew 16.27, 25.31–46). ‘We must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each one may receive good or evil, according to what he has done in the body’ (2 Corinthians 5.10). ‘The Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son’ (John 5.22; see 5.27). 4 Meanwhile, he is seated as Lord at the right hand of the Father (Psalm 109.1 [evv 110.1], Matthew 22.41–46, Mark 12.35–37, Luke 20.41–44, Acts 2.29–36, 5.31, 10.36, Romans 1.3, 8.34, 14.8–9, Colossians 3.1, Philippians 2.9–11, Hebrews 1.3, 1.13, Revelation 3.21). ‘For to this end Christ died and lived again, that he might be Lord both of the dead and of the living’ (Romans 14.9). All things are subject to him (1 Corinthians 15.24–28, Ephesians 1.22, Hebrews 2.8); he has been made

41 See above, p. 59, note 35.

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virtutem et dominationem et omne nomen quod nominatur non solum in hoc saeculo sed etiam in futuro (Eph 1.20–21); subiectos habet angelos et potestates et virtutes (1 Pet 3.22); unde omne genu ei flectitur caelestium, terrestrium, et infernorum (Phil 2.10). Huic Domino data est omnis potestas in caelo et in terra (Mt 28.18), hunc (sub nomine Agni) in aeternum glorificabunt millia millium (Apoc 5.11–13), ab huius facie poenas aeternas dabunt iniqui (2 Thess 1.9).

Qui apostolos misit (Mt 28.18–20), idem Dominus divisiones ministrationum facit (1 Cor 12.5). Eius ministri sunt apostoli (1 Cor 3.5); Domini mandata docent (1 Cor 7.10, 7.12, 14.37); Domini virtutem exercent (1 Cor 4.19–21, 2 Cor 10.8, 13.10); Domini opus faciunt (1 Cor 15.58, 16.10); mortem Domini annuntiant donec veniat (1 Cor 11.26); prout Dominus vult, veniunt (1 Cor 4.19) et prout Dominus permittit, manent (1 Cor 16.7); Dominum orant (2 Cor 12.8); ad iudicium Domini spectant (1 Cor 4.4, 11.31). Dominum nisi in Spiritu sancto non agnoscunt homines (1 Cor 12.3). Dominum corde credunt et ore confitentur christiani (Rom 10.9-11), nam Domini nomen quicumque invocaverit salvus erit (Rom 10.13; cf. Act 2.21, 4.12, 9.14, 9.21, 22.16, 1 Cor 1.2). Domino serviunt (Rom 12.11, Col 3.23, 4.12, Eph 6.7) sicut et apostoli sunt servi (douloi) Christi Iesu (Rom 1.1, Phil 1.1,42 Iac 1.1, 2 Petr 1.1, Iud 1). Quia est idem Dominus omnium, non est distinctio Iudaei et Graeci (Rom 10.12; cf. Col 3.11). Qui in Domino vocatus est servus, libertus est Domini (1 Cor 7.22). In Domino gloriantes (2 Cor 10.17), in Domino laborantes (1 Cor 9.1–3), Dominum timentes (2 Cor 5.11) qui vindex est malorum (1 Thess 4.6), in Domino invicem salutant (Rom 16.12, 16.22) et suscipiunt (Rom 16.1–2). Virgines sollicitae sunt quae sunt Domini; viduae si velint nubant sed in Domino (1 Cor 7.32, 7.34, 7.39). Singuli, sicut subdivisit Dominus, sicut vocavit Deus, sic ambulent (1 Cor 7.17). Omnes a Domino peregrinantes (2 Cor 5.6) et Dominum

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to sit ‘far above all rule and authority and power and dominion, and above every name that is named, not only in this age but also in that which is to come’ (Ephesians 1.20–21); angels, authorities, and powers are subject to him (1 Peter 3.22). To him, then, ‘every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth’ (Philippians 2.10). It is to this Lord that all authority in heaven and on earth has been given (Matthew 28.18); it is he, represented by the Lamb, whom thousands of thousands glorify forever (Revelation 5.11–13); exclusion from his presence is the eternal punishment that will be given to the wicked (2 Thessalonians 1.9). This same Lord, who sent out his apostles (Matthew 28.18–20), gives varieties of service (1 Corinthians 12.5), and those who serve him are apostles (1 Corinthians 3.5). They teach the commands of the Lord (1 Corinthians 7.10, 7.12, 14.37), exercise the power and authority of the Lord (1 Corinthians 4.19–21, 2 Corinthians 10.8, 13.10), do the work of the Lord (1 Corinthians 15.58, 16.10), proclaim the Lord’s death until he comes (1 Corinthians 11.26), arrive as the Lord wills (1  Corinthians 4.19) and stay as the Lord permits (1 Corinthians 16.7), beseech the Lord (2 Corinthians 12.8), and look to the judgment of the Lord (1 Corinthians 4.4, 11.32). Only by the Holy Spirit does anyone acknowledge the Lord (1 Corinthians 12.3). Christians believe in the Lord with their heart and confess him with their lips (Romans 10.9–11), for everyone who calls upon the name of the Lord will be saved (Romans 10.13; cf. Acts 2.21, 4.12, 9.14, 9.21, 22.16, 1  Corinthians 1.2). They serve the Lord (Romans 12.11, Colossians 3.23, 4.12, Ephesians 6.7), just as the apostles also are servants (douloi) of Christ Jesus (Romans 1.1, Philippians 1.1,42 James 1.1, 2 Peter 1.1, Jude 1). Since he is Lord of all, there is no distinction of Jew and Greek (Romans 10.12; cf. Colossians 3.11). Anyone who is called in the Lord as a slave is a freedman of the Lord (1 Corinthians 7.22). Boasting of the Lord (2 Corinthians 10.17), laboring in the Lord (1 Corinthians 9.1–3), knowing the fear of the Lord (2 Corinthians 5.11) who is the avenger of wrongs (1 Thessalonians 4.6), they greet and receive each other in the Lord (Romans 16.12, 16.22, 16.1–2). The unmarried are anxious about the affairs of the Lord; widows

42 This reference, present in the 1960 and 1961 versions, was for some reason omitted in the 1964 text. It has been restored.

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exspec­tantes (1 Thess 4.15–18; cf. 1.9–10) orant Maranatha (1 Cor 16.22) seu ‘Veni, Domine Iesu’ (Apoc 22.20).

‘Cuius regni non erit finis’ uti ponitur in symbolo (db 86). Quod docetur ab Angelo (Lc 1.33) et in Apocalypsi (11.15; cf. Dan 2.44, 7.14, 7.27, Ps 10.1643), neque contradictorium asseritur in 1 Cor 15.24–28.

5 Qui nunc de caelis regnat, etiam ante suam vitam terrestrem exsistebat, imo ipsi creationi interfuit. Praeexsistentia vix probatur ex modo loquendi in synopticis adhibito, nempe, Iesum, Filium hominis, venisse in talem finem (Mt 8.29, 9.13, 10.34, 18.11, 20.28, Mc 10.45, Lc 9.56, 19.10). 1 Cor 8.6: nobis tamen unus Deus Pater, ex quo omnia et nos in illum, et unus Dominus Iesus Christus, per quem omnia et nos per ipsum. Phil 2.6–7: in Christo Iesu, qui cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo, sed semetipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens in similitudinem hominum factus … Col 1.15–16: Qui est imago Dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae, quoniam in ipso condita sunt universa in caelis et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia … omnia per ipsum et in ipso (eis auton) creata sunt, et ipse est ante omnes, et omnia in ipso constant. Cf. 2 Cor 4.4: Christi, qui est imago Dei. Hebr 1.2–3: Deus … locutus est nobis in Filio, quem constituit heredem universorum, per quem fecit et saecula; qui cum sit splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius portansque omnia verbo (rheFmati) virtutis suae … Io 1.3: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est. 1.14: Et Verbum caro factum est.

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may marry whom they will, but in the Lord (1 Corinthians 7.32, 7.34, 7.39). Everyone should lead the life which the Lord has assigned to him, and in which God has called him (1 Corinthians 7.17). All who are away from the Lord (2 Corinthians 5.6) and await the Lord (1 Thessalonians 4.15–18; cf. 1.9–10) pray, Maranatha (1 Corinthians 16.22), ‘Come, Lord Jesus’ (Revelation 22.20). His kingdom shall have no end, as the Creed puts it (db 86, ds 150, [dec 1: 24]). This was spoken by the angel to Mary (Luke 1.33) and stated in the book of Revelation (11.15; cf. Daniel 2.44, 7.14, 7.27; Psalm 10.1643), and 1 Corinthians 15.24–28 does not contradict it. 5 He who now reigns from heaven also existed before his earthly life, and indeed took part in creation. The way the synoptic gospels speak about Jesus as the Son of man who has come for certain specific purposes does not really prove his pre-existence (Matthew 8.29, 9.13, 10.34, 18.11, 20.28, Mark 10.45, Luke 9.56, 19.10). 1 Corinthians 8.6: ‘For us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist.’ Philippians 2.6–7: ‘Christ Jesus … though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in human likeness.’ Colossians 1.15–16: ‘He is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation; for in him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible … all things were created through him and for him (eis auton). He is before all things and in him all things hold together.’ Cf. what 2 Corinthians 4.4 says about Christ, who is the image of God. Hebrews 1.2–3: ‘God … has spoken to us by a Son, whom he appointed the heir of all things, through whom also he created the world; who, being the brightness of his glory and the very stamp of his nature, and upholding the universe by his word (rheFmati) of power …’ John 1.3: ‘All things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made.’ John 1.14: ‘And the Word became flesh.’

43 This is correct in the English but cannot be correct in the Latin; the Vulgate has no Ps 10.16. Because the Vulgate follows the lxx in combining Pss. 9–10 into one, the parallel verse is actually 9.37 in the Vulgate enumeration.

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Io 3.13: Et nemo ascendit in caelum, nisi qui descendit de caelo Filius hominis qui est in caelo. Io 6.61–62: Hoc vos scandalizat? Si ergo videritis Filium hominis ascendentem ubi erat prius? Io 8.42: Ego enim ex Deo processi et veni. Io 17.5: clarifica me … claritate quam habui prius quam mundus esset apud te. Ibid. 17.24: claritatem meam, quam dedisti mihi, quia dilexisti me ante constitutionem mundi. pars 3: idemque iesus est verus deus. Quae in nt proxime ipsam Christi divinitatem respiciunt in duo dividuntur genera, quorum aliud magis scripturisticum dici potest, aliud magis theologicum. Primum genus, quod magis scripturisticum nominavimus, notionibus maxime utitur quae in ambiente palaestinensi et religioso iam cognoscebantur et, debitis adhibitis adaptationibus, ad divinitatem Christi declarandam adhiberi potuerunt. Eiusmodi erant (1) nomen Filii, (2) nomen Domini, (3) nomen quod est super omne nomen, (4) nomen Dei, (5) alii tituli divini, et (6) gloria Dei (kaboFd Iahve). Alterum genus magis theologicum diximus, non quasi ad ipsam divinam revelationem non pertineat, sed quia similitudinem quandam exhibet cum labore theologico. Sicut enim theologi, verbis conc. Vaticani inhaerentes (db 1796), aliquam mysteriorum intelligentiam quaerunt tum ex analogia eorum quae naturaliter cognoscuntur, tum ex mysteriorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo, ita etiam intra ipsum campum verbi Dei revelati atque inspirati simili quodom modo processum esse videtur. Ita apud Paulum Christus dicitur Dei virtus et Dei sapientia, Dominus per quem omnia et nos in ipsum, spiritus vivificans, secundus homo de caelo, imago Dei, in forma Dei praeexsistens, per quem et in quem omnia creata sunt, in quo omnia condita sunt; in epistola ad Hebraeos similia dicuntur brevissime complexa; apud Ioannem Filius nominatur Logos, eius aequalitas cum Patre explicatur, eum esse unum cum Patre docetur.

Quibus perspectis, visum est materiam ita dividere ut primo considerentur nomina, tituli, honores divini Christo applicati, et deinde conceptiones

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John 3.13: ‘No one has ascended into heaven but he who descended from heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven.’ John 6.61–62: ‘Do you take offense at this? Then what if you were to see the Son of man ascending where he was before?’ John 8.42: ‘I proceeded and came forth from God.’ John 17.5: ‘Glorify me … with the glory which I had with you before the world was made.’ John 17.24: ‘My glory, which you have given me in your love for me before the foundation of the world.’ part 3: the same jesus is true god. The New Testament passages that bear closely on Christ’s divinity are of two kinds. One of these can be called the more scriptural, the other the more theological. The first kind, which we have termed ‘more scriptural,’ uses for the most part notions that were already known in Palestinian religious circles. Duly adapted, they could be applied to the divinity of Christ. Such were (1) the name ‘Son,’ (2) the name ‘Lord,’ (3) the ‘name that is above every name,’ (4) the name ‘God,’ (5) other divine titles, and (6) the glory of God (kaboFd Yahweh). We have called passages of the second kind ‘more theological,’ not as though they were not part of divine revelation, but because they show a certain similarity to the work of theology. Theologians, following the words of the First Vatican Council (db 1796, ds 3016, dec 2: 808), seek some understanding of mysteries, both through analogies with what is known naturally and through the connection of mysteries with one another and with our last end; so too a somewhat similar process also seems to be going on within the field of the revealed and inspired word of God. Thus, in Paul Christ is said to be the power of God and the wisdom of God, the Lord through whom are all things and we for him, a life-giving spirit, the second man who is from heaven, the image of God; he pre-existed in the form of God; through him and for him all things were created and in him all things hold together. In the letter to the Hebrews complex comparisons are stated with the greatest brevity. In the Gospel of John the Son is named ‘the Word,’ his equality with the Father is presented, and we learn that he is one with the Father. In light of all this, the matter seems to divide itself in such a way that consideration of the names, titles, and divine honors applied to Christ should

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quasi theologicae in epistolis et in quarto evangelio elaboratae. Quae tamen duo, etsi separatim ponantur (non enim omnia simul dici possunt), minime mente et intelligentia separari oportet. Quod enim per titulos asseritur, per conceptiones clarificatur; quod in conceptionibus ambi­guum forte videri potest, e titulis roboratur. Quod tamen brevius est dictum. Omnia enim mutuo se illuminant atque confortant. Sicut enim in orga­ nismo materiali singula organa nexibus fere innumeris inter se religantur, ita etiam in illo organismo spirituali, qui est doctrinae intelligentia, longe subtilior, longe locupletior, longe firmior est omnium interdependentia et quasi compenetratio.

a  ex nominibus, titulis, honoribus i Ex proprio nomine Filii 1 Dicitur in nt Iesus: Filius hominis, Filius Dei, et Filius sine addito. Probatur divinitas quatenus ‘Filius’ eo sensu intenditur quod Iesus ad Deum comparatur sicut Filius ad proprium suum Patrem; qualis enim est pater, talis est proprius eius filius. 2 Quod intentum non attingitur per solum nomen, Filius Dei. In vt filii Dei dicuntur: angeli, reges, populus Israeliticus, iusti. In nt filii Dei dicuntur: beati pacifici (Mt 5.9), iusti a Spiritu Dei acti (Rom 8.14), resurrecturi (Rom 8.19), fideles (Gal 3.26). Simili sensu dicuntur: filii Patris vestri (Mt 5.44–45), filii Altissimi (Lc 6.35), filii Dei vivi (Rom 9.26), simplices filii Dei (Phil 2.15); et ero vobis in patrem, et vos eritis mihi in filios et filias, dicit Dominus omnipotens (2 Cor 6.18).

Pratermittendum tamen non est nomen, Filius Dei, in numero singulari adhibitum, fere restringi ad designandum eum qui Deum in terris repraesentat, uti rex, vel Messias. 3 Technica distinctio inter filiationem Iesu et filiationem iustorum iam in ipso nt incepta est.

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be considered first, then the quasi-theological conceptions worked out in the epistles and in the fourth gospel. But even if these two are presented separately – everything cannot be said at once – they should by no means be understood or thought of as separate. What the titles assert, the conceptions clarify, and what might seem ambiguous in the conceptions is supported by the titles. But this may be said more briefly. Everything illuminates and confirms everything else. Just as individual organs in a material organism are bound to one another by almost uncountable links, so too in that spiritual organism which is the understanding of doctrine, everything is interwoven and interdependent in a manner far subtler, far richer, far firmer. a  names, titles, and honors i The proper name ‘Son’ 1 The New Testament refers to Jesus as Son of man, as Son of God, and as Son with no further additions. Divinity is proven insofar as ‘Son’ is meant in the sense that Jesus is related to God as a Son to his own Father: like father, like son.

2 This meaning is not reached solely on the basis of the name ‘Son of God.’ Angels, kings, the people Israel, and the righteous are all called sons of God in the Old Testament. In the New Testament, all the following are called sons of God: those who are blessed as peacemakers (Matthew 5.9), the righteous who are led by the Spirit of God (Romans 8.14), those whose resurrection is yet to come (Romans 8.19), and the faithful (Galatians 3.26). Referred to in a similar way are: sons of your Father (Matthew 5.44–45), sons of the Most High (Luke 6.35), sons of the living God (Romans 9.26), sons of God without blemish (Philippians 2.15); similarly, ‘I will be a father to you, and you shall be my sons and daughters, says the Lord Almighty’ (2 Corinthians 6.18). It should not be overlooked, however, that the name ‘Son of God,’ used in the singular, is almost entirely limited to designating a representative of God on earth – the king or the Messiah. 3 Already in the New Testament itself there are the beginnings of a technical distinction between Jesus’ sonship and the sonship of the righteous.

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Paulus loquitur de huiothesia, adoptione filiorum: Gal 4.5, Eph 1.5, Rom 8.15, 8.23, 9.4 ubi adest perspectiva vt. Ioannes regulam sibi fecisse videtur: iusti enim nominantur non huioi sed tekna theou (Io 1.12, 11.52); imo ubi continuatio citationis esset violatio regulae, citatio non continuatur; ita e Ps 81.6 citatur: ‘Ego dixi, dii estis,’ sed non continuatur ‘et filii Altissimi omnes’ (Io 10.34).

4 Si synoptici inter se comparantur, saepe videtur quod ‘Filius Dei’ significat messianitatem. Mt 16.16: Filius Dei vivi, sed Mt 16.20 praecipitur silentium de messianitate, et loc. par. ponunt Christum tantum (Mc 8.29, Lc 9.20). Coniecit Cullmann apud Mathaeum haberi fusionem duarum narrationum, quarum una tantum invenitur apud Mc et Lc. Christologie 287; Petrus (1952) 190–97.44

Lc 4.41: Filius Dei, et quasi de eodem,45 Christus. Mt 27.54 et Mc 15.39: Filius Dei; Lc 23.47: iustus. Mt 27.40: Filius Dei; Lc 23.35: Christus Dei electus. Act 9.20: Filius Dei; Act 9.22: Christus. Cf. Io 1.49: Rabbi, tu es Filius Dei, tu es rex Israel; quod anticlimacticum videretur, si de divinitate ageret.

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Paul speaks of huiothesia, adoption as sons, in Galatians 4.5, Ephesians 1.5, and Romans 8.15, 8.23; also in Romans 9.4, where he is speaking from an Old Testament perspective. John seems to make it a rule for himself that the righteous are named not huioi theou, ‘sons of God,’ but tekna theou, ‘children of God’ (John 1.12, 11.52). Indeed, where continuing a quotation would violate the rule, the quotation is not continued. Thus, John 10.34 quotes Psalm 81.6 [evv 82.6], ‘I said, you are gods,’ but without continuing, ‘and all of you sons of the Most High.’ 4 Comparing the synoptic gospels with each other often seems to show that ‘Son of God’ signifies messianic status. ‘The Christ, the Son of the living God’ appears in Matthew 16.16, but in Matthew 16.20 Jesus commands silence about his being Messiah, and the parallel passages, Mark 8.29 and Luke 9.20, have only ‘the Christ.’ Cullmann conjectures that the Matthean version fuses two narratives, only one of which appears in Mark and Luke. See his Christologie 287; Petrus (1952) 190–97.44 ‘Son of God’ and ‘Christ’ are used together, as though with the same meaning,45 in Luke 4.41. Where Matthew 27.54 and Mark 15.39 have ‘Son of God,’ Luke 23.47 has ‘a righteous man.’ Where Matthew 27.40 has ‘Son of God,’ Luke 23.35 has ‘the Christ of God, his Chosen One.’ Acts 9.20 has ‘Son of God’ and Acts 9.22 ‘Christ.’ Cf. John 1.49, where ‘Rabbi, you are the Son of God, you are the king of Israel’ would seem to be anticlimactic if divinity is involved. 44 Cullmann, Christologie 287, Christology 280–81; Oscar Cullmann, Petrus: JüngerApostel-Martyrer (Zürich: Verlag Zwingli, 1952) 190–97; in English, Peter: Disciple, Apostle, Martyr: A Historical and Theological Study (London: SCM Press, 1953; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1962) 184–91. 45 Some interpretation is involved here. The point of the present argument is that ‘Son of God’ is a messianic title, not that it was another title given to Jesus. It does not advance that argument to point out that the same Jesus was called both Son and Christ. Why, then, the ‘quasi’? Because both refer to him inasmuch as he is messiah. What advances that argument is to point out that ‘Son of God’ and ‘Christ’ were used of Jesus interchangeably as messianic titles. Hence, ‘quasi de eodem’ here is taken to mean not ‘of the same one [Jesus],’ but ‘in the same [messianic] sense.’ ‘Christ’ and ‘Son of God’ refer to the same reality because both are names for the Messiah.

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5 Aliud tamen est quod concluditur ex comparatione synopticorum, aliud autem est quod perspicitur si singuli synoptici leguntur secundum propriam intentionem. Apud Marcum dicitur ‘Filius Dei’ ab ipso Marco (1.1), a voce de caelo (1.11, 9.7), a spiritibus immundis (3.11), a demoniaco (5.7), a summo sa­ cerdote (14.61), a centurione (15.39). Quod singularem solemnitatem suggerit. A Mt et Lc adduntur quaestiones tentatoris (Mt 4.3, 4.6, Lc 4.3, 4.9); a Mt discipuli adorantes (14.33; cf. Mc 6.52), confessio Petri (16.16), blasphemantes (27.40, 27.42); a Lc etiam additur angelus (1.32, 1.35).

6 Post resurrectionem adhibebatur ‘Filius Dei’ ad significandum Dominum sedentem ad dexteram Patris actuque regnum Dei participantem atque exercentem. Ita Act 13.33; cf. Act 2.32–36; unde extenditur ambiguitas quaedam in Heb 1.5, 5.5. Implicite apud Paulum est distinctio inter Filium sine addito et Filium Dei in virtute (Rom 1.3–4): de Filio suo … qui praedestinatus est Filius Dei in virtute … ex resurrectione mortuorum.

7 Quibus perspectis, non leviter faciendum est argumentum, neque tamen ullatenus dubitandum, monente et contradicente Sacro Officio (db 2030, ds 3430).46 8 Ex condemnatione Iesu coram Synedrio: Mc 14.61, Mt 26.64, Lc 22.67–71. Argumentum luculenter evolutum habetis apud Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu 162–66.

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5 Conclusions drawn from comparing the synoptics are not, however, the same as what one grasps by reading each of them in accord with its own intention. In Mark, ‘Son of God’ is spoken by the evangelist himself (Mark 1.1), by a voice from heaven (1.11, 9.7), by an unclean spirit (3.11), a demoniac (5.7), the high priest (14.61), and the centurion (15.39). This would suggest a peculiar solemnity. In both Matthew and Luke the title is also used by the tempter in his questions (Matthew 4.3, 4.6, Luke 4.3, 4.9). In Matthew it is used in addition by the worshiping disciples (Matthew 14.33; cf. Mark 6.52), by Peter in his confession (16.16), and by the blasphemers (27.40, 27.42); in Luke an angel uses it as well (Luke 1.32, 1.35). 6 After the resurrection ‘Son of God’ is used to designate the Lord seated at the Father’s right hand, taking active part in the kingdom of God. Thus in Acts 13.33; cf. Acts 2.32–36. This extends the ambiguity found in Hebrews 1.5 and 5.5. Paul implicitly distinguishes between ‘Son,’ with no further additions, and ‘Son of God in power’: ‘the gospel concerning his Son, who was … designated Son of God in power … by his resurrection from the dead’ (Romans 1.3–4). 7 In light of all this, the argument that the Holy Office warned against and contradicted (db 2030, ds 3430) should not be made lightly, though the matter is not beyond all doubt.46 8 [An argument can be drawn] from Jesus’ condemnation before the Sanhedrin: Mark 14.61, Matthew 26.64, Luke 22.67–71. Such argument will be found lucidly developed in Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu 162–66.

46 What Lonergan cites is one of the 65 Modernist propositions condemned in 1907: ‘In all the gospel texts the name “Son of God” is merely equivalent to the name “Messiah” and in no way signifies that Christ is God’s true and natural Son.’ While points 4 and 5 of Lonergan’s own argument above hardly lead to so categorical a statement, his meaning in point 7 seems to be that it is not completely mistaken.

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9 Ex exclusiva et reciproca habitudine inter Patrem et Filium. Mt 11.27, Lc 10.22; cf. Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu 136–38. Habitudo est exclusiva: nemo … nemo …; nisi Pater ... nisi Filius …; est reciproca: tum Pater novit Filium, tum Filius Patrem.

Dices: etiam aliis revelatur Pater a Filio. Respondetur: hanc revelationem supponere et confirmare singularem habitudinem inter Patrem et Filium, conceditur; tollere singularem habitudinem, negatur. Agitur enim de revelatione et quidem voluntarie facta.

10 Haec singularis habitudo alibi non ignoratur. Mt 3.17, 17.5, Mc 1.11, 9.7, Lc 3.22, 2 Pet 1.17: dicunt, ho huios mou ho agapeFtos, quod unicum filium arguit; cf. Mc 12. 6, de unico filio vinitoris.

Quod clarius declaravit Ioannes, loquens de Filio unigenito: 1.14, 1.18, 3.16, 3.18, 1 Io 4.9. Eandem vocem, monogeneFs, invenies: Lc 7.12, 8.42, 9.38; ubi agitur de filio vel filia unica. Cf. Heb 11.17. Nota philologice monogeneFs dicere modum generationis, sicut eugeneFs, non originem generationis, sicut DiogeneFs.

11 Singularitatem habitudinis etiam probat usus Domini nostri in evangeliis: dicit enim ‘Pater meus’; dicit etiam ‘Pater vester’; sed non ita dicit ‘Pater noster’ ut se includat sed solummodo ut recitet quae a nobis dicenda sunt (Mt 6.9). 12 Singularitatem habitudinis etiam probat ille amor prorsus singularis quo Pater proprium suum Filium dedit ut nos redimeret. Rom 8.32: Qui etiam proprio Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum, quo modo non etiam cum illo omnia nobis donavit? Cf. Rom 5.8, ubi mors Christi commendat caritatem Patris erga nos. Io 3.16, 1 Io 4.9: Sic enim Deus dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum unigenitum daret.

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9 [An argument can be drawn] from the exclusive, reciprocal relationship between the Father and the Son. [The relevant texts are] Matthew 11.27, Luke 10.22; see Dhanis 136–38. It is an exclusive relationship: no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him. And it is reciprocal: not only does the Father know the Son but also the Son knows the Father. You might say that there are others to whom the Father is revealed by the Son. Reply: That this revelation presupposes and confirms a unique relationship between the Father and the Son, I grant; that it takes away a unique relationship, I deny. What is in question here is a revelation, and one that is made voluntarily. 10 This unique relationship is recognized in other passages. Matthew 3.17, 17.5, Mark 1.11, 9.7, Luke 3.22, 2  Peter 1.17 all speak of ho huios mou ho agapeFtos, [literally, ‘my Son, my (or the) Beloved,’] which argues for one Son only; cf. Mark 12.6, where the owner of the vineyard has but one son. John states this more clearly, speaking of the Son as ‘only-begotten’ (John 1.14, 1.18, 3.16, 3.18, 1 John 4.9). The same word, monogeneFs, will be found in Luke 7.12, 8.42, and 9.38, where the reference is to an only child. Cf. Hebrews 11.17. Note that from the standpoint of philology monogeneFs refers to the manner of begetting, as in eugeneFs, ‘well born,’ and not to the origin of the begetting, as in DiogeneFs, ‘son of Dis.’ 11 Our Lord’s own way of speaking in the gospels also proves the uniqueness of the relationship. For he says ‘my Father’; he also says ‘your Father’; but he does not say ‘our Father’ in such a way as to include himself, but only in teaching us what we should say (Matthew 6.9). 12 The uniqueness of the relationship is also proved by the utterly unique love with which the Father gave his own Son to redeem us. Romans 8.32: ‘He who did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all, will he not also give us all things with him?’ Cf. Romans 5.8, where Christ’s dying shows God’s love for us. John 3.16: ‘For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son.’ Cf. 1 John 4.9.

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13 Singularitatem habititudinis etiam probant (1) connumerationes trinitariae, (2) reconciliatio cum Patre per Filium, (3) donum Spiritus sancti quoniam per Filium facti sumus filii (Gal 4.4–7). Quae alibi exponuntur, scilicet, De Deo trino, De Redemptione, De Gratia.

14 Singularitatem habitudinis etiam probat diminutivum a parvulis adhibitum, Abba. Quod dictum est a Domino (Mc 14.36); clamatur a Spiritu Filii in cordibus nostris (Gal 4.6); clamatur a nobis in Spiritu (Rom 8.15).

15 Singularitatem habitudinis etiam probat mutatio usus per nt introducta in nominibus divinis, nempe, (1) ut ex ‘Filio hominis’ et ‘Filio Dei’ transeatur per ‘Filium Patris, eius, suum’ ad ‘Filium’ sine addito; (2) ut ex nomine personali unius, ‘Deus,’ transeatur per intermedium ‘Deus Pater’ ad ‘Pater’ sine addito. Quoad nomen Filii, in synopticis rarissime legitur ‘Filius’ sine addito: Mt 11.27 et loc. par. Lc 10.22; Mc 13.32 et forte loc. par. Mt 24.36; Mt 28.19. Sed apud Ioannem ‘Filius’ sine addito frequenter legitur: Io 3.17, 3.35–36, 5.19–23, 5.26, 6.40, 8.35–36, 14.13, 17.1. Apud Paulum: Pater sine addito, quater; Abba Pater, bis; Deus Pater, decies; Deus et Pater, bis; Deus et Pater Domini …, quinquies; Deus (et) Pater noster, ter et decies. Apud Matthaeum: Pater Domine, semel; Pater, quinquies; Pater meus, septies et decies; Pater (hominum), vigesies. Apud Ioannem: Pater (hominum), bis; Pater sine articulo, ter et decies; Pater cum articulo, quinquies et septuagesies; Pater meus, octies et vigesies. Notate (1) usum linguisticum nisi pedetentim non mutari, secus novus usus non intelligeretur; (2) in nt ideo converti nomen personale primae personae divinae ex ‘Deus’ in ‘Pater’ quia accedit alia persona divina revelata, Filius.

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13 The uniqueness of the relationship is also proved (1) by the Trinitarian formulas, (2) by our reconciliation with the Father through the Son, and (3) by the gift of the Holy Spirit inasmuch as we have become sons through the Son (Galatians 4.4–7). All this is expounded elsewhere, namely, in the theological treatises on the Triune God, on redemption, and on grace. 14 The uniqueness of the relationship is also proved by the diminutive form ‘Abba,’ used by children. The Lord makes use of this name (Mark 14.36), and it is what the Spirit of the Son cries in our hearts (Galatians 4.6), and what we cry in the Spirit (Romans 8.15). 15 The uniqueness of the relationship is also proved by the change which the New Testament introduces in the way divine titles are used. (1) There is a transition from ‘Son of man’ and ‘Son of God,’ through ‘Son of the Father,’ ‘his Son,’ ‘his own Son,’ to ‘Son’ without further additions. (2) There is a transition from ‘God’ as a personal name belonging to one alone, through the intermediate ‘God the Father,’ to ‘the Father’ without further additions. As for the title ‘Son,’ the synoptics very rarely use ‘Son’ with no additions; see Matthew 11.27 and the parallel, Luke 10.22; Mark 13.32 and perhaps the parallel, Matthew 24.36; also Matthew 28.19. In John, however, ‘Son’ is frequently used without additions: John 3.17, 3.35–36, 5.19–23, 5.26, 6.40, 8.35–36, 14.13, 17.1. In Paul, ‘the Father’ occurs four times without addition; ‘Abba, Father’ occurs twice; ‘God the Father’ ten times; ‘God and Father’ twice; ‘God and Father of our Lord …’ five times; ‘God (and) our Father’ thirteen times. Matthew uses ‘O Father, Lord’ once; ‘the Father’ five times; ‘my Father’ seventeen times; ‘Father,’ in relation to others besides Jesus, twenty times. In John, ‘Father’ is used twice in relation to others; ‘Father’ (with no definite article) thirteen times; ‘the Father’ seventy-five times; ‘my Father’ twenty-eight times. Note (1) that linguistic usage changes only gradually, since otherwise the new use would not be understood; and (2) that the reason why the personal name of the first divine person changes in the New Testament from ‘God’ to ‘Father’ is that revelation of another divine person, the Son, had now taken place.

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ii Ex nomine Domini translato 1 Huius nominis multiplex est usus profanus:47 ita dominus catellorum, pulli (Mt 15.27, Lc 19.33), dominus vineae (Mc 12.9), dominus servorum (Eph 6.5, 6.9, Col 3.22, 4.1), dominus iuridice constitutus ut Pilatus, Nero (Mt 27.62–63, Act 25.26), dominus dictus reverentiae vel urbanitatis causa (Act 16.30, Mc 7.28). Etiam adhibebatur ad deos deasque nominandos: cf. L. Cerfaux, ‘Kurios,’ dbs fasc. 24 (1950) 200–28; K. Prümm, Biblica 9 (1928) 3–25, 129–42, 289–301.48 Opinati sunt W. Bousset, W.W. Baudissin, E. Lohmeyer, e cultibus paganis a communitatibus hellenisticis Christo translatum esse nomen Domini; brevissime, spectato nostro fine, respondetur expressionem aramaicam, Maranatha (1 Cor 16.22; cf. Apoc 22.20), legi in epistola Pauli ad communitatem hellenisticam. Apud lxx adhibetur nomen kurios, tum proprie ut versio nominis divini hebraici Adon, Adonai, tum etiam ut versio nominis Iahwe (ita plus sexies millies). Qui usus e lxx in nt transivit, uti constat tum ex usu tum ex permultis vt citationibus: Mc 1.3, 12.10–11, 12.36, Lc 1.46, 1.68, 4.18, Io 12.38, Act 2.20, 2.25, 4.26, 13.10–11, 15.17, Rom 4.8, 9.28, 11.34, 15.11, 1 Cor 1.31, 3.20, 10.22, 10.26; etc. Unde nullum est dubium nomen ‘Dominus’ in nt posse significare ipsam divinitatem. Mc 12.29, Mt 11.25, Act 17.24, 1 Tim 6.15-16.

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ii Transference of the name ‘Lord’ 1 The secular uses of this title are many.47 Dogs and colts have masters (Matthew 15.27, Luke 19.33); there is the lord of the vineyard (Mark 12.9) and the lord of servants (Ephesians 6.5, 6.9, Colossians 3.22, 4.1); there are such juridically constituted lords as Pilate and Nero (Matthew 27.62–63, Acts 25.26); and ‘lord’ is used for the sake of reverence or good manners (Acts 16.30, Mark 7.28). ‘Lord’ is also used for addressing gods and goddesses; see L. Cerfaux, ‘Kyrios,’ dbs (1950) 200–28; K. Prümm, Biblica 9 (1928) 3–25, 129–42, 289– 301.48 In the opinion of W. Bousset, W.W. Baudissin, and E. Lohmeyer, Hellenistic communities imported this title from pagan religion and transferred it to Christ. For present purposes the shortest reply to this view is that maranatha, an Aramaic expression, may be found in a letter written by Paul to a Hellenistic community (1 Corinthians 16.22; cf. Revelation 22.20). In Septuagint usage, kyrios appears both as the accurate translation of Adon, Adonai, a divine name in Hebrew, and also (more than six thousand times) as the translation of the name ‘Yahweh.’ This usage made its way from the Septuagint to the New Testament. So much is clear both from the way kyrios is used and from a great many Old Testament quotations: Mark 1.3, 12.10–11, 12.36, Luke 1.46, 1.68, 4.18, John 12.38, Acts 2.20, 2.25, 4.26, 13.10–11, 15.17, Romans 4.8, 9.28, 11.34, 15.11, 1 Corinthians 1.31, 3.20, 10.22, 10.26; and so on. There is no doubt, then, that in the New Testament the name ‘Lord’ can signify divinity itself. See Mark 12.29, Matthew 11.25, Acts 17.24, 1 Timothy 6.15–16.

47 This variety is underscored by the fact that in the Greek New Testament, the word used in all of the passages referred to is kyrios, which is translated in the Vulgate as dominus, whereas English versions often make use of words other than ‘lord,’ such as ‘master’ or ‘sir,’ depending on the context. 48 Lucien Cerfaux, ‘Kyrios,’ dbs, vol. 5, cols. 200–28; K. Prümm, ‘Herrscherkult und Neues Testament,’ Biblica 9 (1928) 3–25, 129–42, 289–301. Lonergan does not provide references on Bousset, Baudisson, and Lohmeyer, but one obvious source would be Bousset’s Kyrios Christos: Geschichte des Christusglaubens von den Anfängen des Christentums bis Irenäus, which has been translated into English as Kyrios Christos: A History of the Belief in Christ from the Beginnings of Christianity to Irenaeus (Nashville: Abingdon, 1970).

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2 Christus post resurrectionem communiter nominatur Dominus (plus ducenties apud Paulum; frequenter in Mt et Lc; rarissime apud Mc). Quae nominatio facile intelligitur ex eo quod est Dominus (Ps 109.1) sedens ad dexteram Patris (Act 2.33–36). Sed multipliciter arguitur illud nomen non solum exaltationem Christi hominis declarare sed etiam excellentiam Christi Dei. Nam homines solummodo in Spiritu sancto confitentur Dominum Iesum (1 Cor 12.3). Quae confessio est conditio necessaria salutis (Rom 10.9; cf. Act 4.10, 4.12). Huic confessioni annectitur invocatio nominis Domini nostri Iesu Christi (Rom 10.13; 1 Cor 1.2, Act 9.14, Iac 2.7). Paulus ter Dominum oravit (2 Cor 12.8). Adoratio coniungitur confessioni: ut in nomine Iesu Christi omne genu flectatur caelestium, terrestrium, et infernorum et omnis lingua confiteatur quia Dominus Iesus Christus in gloriam Dei Patris49 (Phil 2.10–11; cf. Rom 14.11, Is 45.23).

3 His accedit usus nt applicandi loca vt (in quibus agitur de Domino Deo Israel) ad Dominum Iesum Christum. Qui quidem usus adeo multiplex est, adeo allusionibus implicatus, ut breviter pro sua amplitudine tractari non possit. Remittimus ad L. Cerfaux, ‘“Kurios” dans les citations pauliniennes de l’ancien testament,’ Eph. theol. Lovan. 20 (1943) 5–17. Vis argumenti, quod e paucis exemplis facimus, est nt non separasse exaltationem Christi hominis eiusque divinitatem. ‘Dies Domini’: Act 2.20 citat Ioel ubi agitur de die Dei; sed 1 Cor 1.8, 5.5, 2 Cor 1.14, 1 Thess 5.2, 2 Thess 2.2, 2 Pet 3.10 loquuntur de die adventus dnic, de die dnic, de die Domini. Unde quod erat ‘dies Dei’ facta est ‘dies dnic’ vel, quasi superflua esset distinctio, simpliciter dicitur ‘dies Domini.’

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2 After his resurrection Christ is commonly named ‘Lord’ (more than two hundred times in Paul; often in Matthew and Luke; very rarely in Mark). His being so named is easy to understand, given that he is the Lord (Psalm 109.1 [evv 110.1]) who sits at the right hand of the Father (Acts 2.33–36). But there are a number of arguments to the effect that ‘Lord’ says something not only about the exaltation of Christ the man but also about the excellence of Christ our God. For only in the Holy Spirit does anyone confess that Jesus is Lord (1 Co­ rinthians 12.3). Such a confession is a necessary condition of salvation (Romans 10.9; cf. Acts 4.10, 4.12). Calling upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ is linked with such confession (Romans 10.13, 1 Corinthians 1.2, Acts 9.14, James 2.7). Paul besought the Lord three times (2 Corinthians 12.8). Worship is associated with this confession: ‘at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father’49 (Philippians 2.10–11; cf. Romans 14.11 and Isaiah 45.23). 3 Besides the foregoing there is the New Testament practice of taking Old Testament texts about the Lord, the God of Israel, and applying them to the Lord Jesus Christ. This usage has so many aspects, and is so intricately bound up with allusions, that its full scope cannot be treated briefly. We refer to L. Cerfaux, ‘“Kurios” dans les citations pauliniennes de l’ancien testament,’ Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 20 (1943) 5–17. The point of this argument, which we shall illustrate with a few examples, is that the New Testament does not separate the exaltation of Christ the man from his divinity. ‘The Day of the Lord’: Acts 2.20 quotes a passage from Joel about the ‘day of God,’ but 1 Corinthians 1.8, 5.5, 2 Corinthians 1.14, 1 Thessalonians 5.2, 2  Thessalonians 2.2, and 2  Peter 3.10 speak of the day of our Lord Jesus Christ’s coming, the day of our Lord Jesus Christ, the day of the Lord. Thus, what had been ‘the day of God’ has become ‘the day of our Lord Jesus Christ’; or we find simply ‘the day of the Lord,’ as though a distinction were superfluous. 49 Lonergan’s Latin in this final clause follows the Greek text. He adds ‘ita codd. graeci.; vulg. in gloria est Dei Patris,’ that is, a parenthetic mention of the Vulgate’s somewhat different translation: ‘that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father.’

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Omnis qui invocaverit nomen Domini salvus erit: Ioel 3.5 citatur Act 2.16–21, ubi Dominus est Deus; sed christiani concipiuntur ii qui invocant nomen Domini nostri Iesu Christi (1 Cor 1.2; cf. Act 9.14, Iac 2.7); neque aliud nomen est sub caelo datum hominibus, in quo nos oporteat salvos fieri (Act 4.10, 4.12); et postquam Paulus dixit ore confitendum esse Dominum Iesum (Rom 10.9), mox subiunxit: omnis qui invocaverit nomen Domini salvus erit (10.13). Mc 1.3: Parate viam Domini. Cf Is 40.3–5, Mal 3.1. Sed Ioannes Baptista praeparavit viam Christi. iii  Ex nomine quod est super omne nomen 1 Quod posterius a philosophis multipliciter distinguitur, uti realitas, essentia, proprietas, potentia, operatio, auctoritas, mediatio, finalitas hoc confuse prius sub nomine intelligebatur. Ita in vt nomen stat pro persona: Ps 7.18, 9.11, 17.50, 67.5, 73.18, 85.12, 91.2; et nomen stat pro potentia personae: Ps 53.3, 88.25, 19.6, 43.6.

In nt: Filius Altissimi vocabitur (Lc 1.32); sanctificetur nomen tuum (Mt 6.9); clarifica nomen tuum (Io 12.28), manifestavi, notum feci, nomen tuum (Io 17.6, 17.26); serva eos in nomine tuo (Io 17.11–12); pro nomine tuo profecti sunt (3 Io 7); et vocatur nomen eius Verbum Dei (Apoc 19.13; cf. Io 1.1–2).

2 Phil 2.9–10: Propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum et donavit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen, ut in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur … Cf. Rom 14.11, Is 45.23. Eph 1.20–21: constituens ad dexteram suam in caelestibus supra omnem principatum … et omne nomen quod nominatur non solum in hoc saeculo sed etiam in futuro. Act 4.10, 4.12: in nomine Domini nostri Jesu Christi … nec enim aliud nomen est sub caelo datum hominibus, in quo oporteat nos salvos fieri. Cf. Mt 1.21.

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Acts 2.16–21 quotes Joel 3.5, ‘Everyone who calls upon the name of the Lord will be saved,’ where ‘the Lord’ is God. But Christians are conceived as those who call on the name of our Lord Jesus Christ (1 Corinthians 1.2; cf. Acts 9.14, James 2.7); ‘there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved’ (Acts 4.12; see 4.10); and just after Paul has said that the Lord Jesus should be confessed with the lips (Romans 10.9), he adds that ‘everyone who calls upon the name of the Lord will be saved’ (10.13). Mark 1.3 speaks of preparing the way of the Lord; see Isaiah 40.3–5 and Malachi 3.1. But it was the way of Christ that John the Baptist prepared. iii  The name which is above every name 1 What philosophers would later distinguish in many ways – reality, essence, property, power, operation, authority, mediation, finality – first came to be understood in an undifferentiated way as the name. So in the Old Testament ‘the name’ stands for the person in Psalm 7.18 [evv 7.17], 9.11 [evv 9.10], 17.50 [evv 18.49], 67.5 [evv 68.4], 73.18 [evv 74.18], 85.12 [evv 86.12], 91.2 [evv 92.1]; and it stands for the power of a person in Psalm 53.3 [evv 54.1], 88.25 [evv 89.24], 19.6 [evv 20.5], 43.6 [evv 44.5]. New Testament passages: ‘He … will be called the Son of the Most High’ (Luke 1.32); ‘hallowed be your name’ (Matthew 6.9); ‘glorify your name’ (John 12.28); ‘I have manifested your name’ (John 17.6) and ‘I have made known to them your name’ (John 17.26); ‘keep them in your name’ (John 17.11) and ‘I kept them in your name’ (John 17.12); ‘for his name’s sake they went forth’ (3  John 7); ‘and the name by which he is called is The Word of God’ (Revelation 19.13; cf. John 1.1–2). 2 Philippians 2.9–10: ‘Therefore God has highly exalted him and bestowed on him the name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow …’ Cf. Romans 14.11, Isaiah 45.23. Ephesians 1.20–21: God ‘made him sit at his right hand in the heavenly places, far above all rule and authority … and above every name that is named, not only in this age but also in that which is to come.’ Acts 4.10, 4.12: ‘The name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth … there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved.’ Cf. Matthew 1.21.

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3 Alii propter subiunctum nomen Iesu (Phil 2.10) opinantur nomen super omne nomen esse ‘Iesum’; alii, cum hoc iam infanti impositum fuerit, opinantur summum nomen esse ‘Kurios,’ seu ‘Dominus,’ quod in versione lxx stat pro Iahwe. Haec opinio in suum favorem habet factum: summum nomen, quod Iudaei ne pronuntiare quidem volebant, iam pridem fuisse Iahwe. Quod, si conceditur, concordat cum argumento iam posito, et confirmatur (1) per annexam adorationem (Phil 2.10), (2) per unicam mediationem Christi in opere salutis (Act 4.12), (3) per mediationem Christi in ipso opere creationis (1 Cor 8.6, Col 1.17).

4 Obici sane potest quod nomen stat pro realitate, quod realitas est exaltatio quae passionem consequitur, quod sicut nomen est datum, ita etiam realitas, quod divinitas est aeterna et ab aeterno possessa. Quae sane omnia suum valorem habent. Sed aliqualiter responderi potest. Schema quidem incipit ab homine exaltato; sed hoc non impedit quo­ minus ulterius progrediatur intentio Apostoli. Logice quidem non plus est dicendum quam quod contextus fundat et exigit; sed, de facto, concreta realitatis apprehensio saepe ulterius procedit, et maxime apud S. Paulum, e.g., 2 Cor 5.14; si unus pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt.50 iv  Ex translato nomine Dei 1 Hebr 1.8–9; habetur citatio ex Ps 44.7–8; versio graeca originali hebraico non correspondet; sed de intentione auctoris epistolae non dubitatur. Vide in hunc locum C. Spicq, L’Épître aux Hébreux, Paris 1952, 2 vol.51 Iam vero habentur et Deus ungens et Deus unctus; Deus unctus est Filius, ex introductione ad citationem; ergo nomen ‘Deus’ applicatur Filio.

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3 Some interpreters hold that ‘the name which is above every name’ is ‘Jesus,’ the name which follows in Philippians 2.10. Others hold that since this name had already been given him when he was born, the supreme name is Kyrios, ‘Lord,’ which in the Septuagint stands for ‘Yahweh.’ In favor of this latter opinion is the fact that the supreme name, which Jews would not pronounce, had long since been Yahweh. That the name is Kyrios, if granted, would fit with the argument already given, and would find confirmation (1) in the worship associated with the name (Philippians 2.10); (2) in Christ’s unique mediation in the work of salvation (Acts 4.12); and (3) in Christ’s mediation in the work of creation itself (1 Corinthians 8.6, Colossians 1.17). 4 No doubt it can be objected that names stands for realities, that the reality here is the exaltation which was the result of Christ’s passion, that as a name is given so too is the reality, or that divinity is eternal and belongs eternally to its possessor. All these objections have their validity. But a response of sorts is possible. The pattern does begin from the exalted man. But this does not rule it out that Paul’s intention may go further. Logically speaking, no more should be said than what the context grounds and calls for. In fact, however, concrete apprehension of reality often goes further, especially in Paul. His argument in 2 Corinthians 5.14, for instance, is that if one man has died for all, therefore all have died.50 iv  Transference of the name of God 1 In Hebrews 1.8–9 there is a quotation from Psalm 44.7–8 [evv 45.6–7]. The Greek text does not match the original Hebrew, but the intention of the author of the letter is not in doubt. See the commentary on this passage in C. Spicq, L’Épître aux Hébreux (2 vols., Paris, 1952).51 What we find here is God anointing and God being anointed. From the introduction to the quotation, we know that God anointed is the Son; therefore, the name ‘God’ is applied to the Son.

50 Lonergan’s point seems to be that the argument here is not strictly logical, the problem being the link between the first clause and the second. 51 Ceslas Spicq, L’Épître aux Hébreux, 2 vols. (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1952–53).

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2 Secundum regulas articuli graeci, ubi agitur de eodem, articulus non repetitur, ubi agitur de pluribus, articulus repetitur. 2 Pet 1.1: in iustitia Dei nostri et Salvatoris Iesu Christi. Articulus ponitur semel: tou theou; et parallela ex eadem epistola sunt (2 Pet 1.11, 2.20, 3.2, 3.18), ubi cum unico articulo legitur: Domini nostri et Salvatoris Iesu Christi. Similiter, Tit 2.13: exspectantes beatam spem et adventum (epiphaneia) gloriae magni Dei et Salvatoris nostri Iesu Christi. Haec non disputantur: concordant enim cum usu Ignatii Antiocheni qui frequentissime Iesum nominat Deum. 3 Secundum easdem regulas articuli, eodem modo sumi debet 2 Thess 1.12: secundum gratiam Dei nostri et Domini Iesu Christi, ubi unicus est articulus. Sed res aliter intelligi potest: regulariter apud Paulum Deus significat Patrem, Dominus significat Filium; articulus addi potuit ad primum et non ad secundum; valde similis est expressio (sine ullo articulo) apud 2 Cor 1.2.52

4 Rom 9.5: ex quibus est Christus secundum carnem, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Amen. Traditionaliter habetur hic locus ut solemnis doxologia Christi Dei. Critici voluerunt interpunctionem fortiorem, ut primum membrum sit de Christo, alterum de Deo Patre. Recentius L. Cerfaux concessit non impossibilem esse hanc opinionem (La Christologie de saint Paul 389–91),53 et

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2 In Greek the definite article is not repeated, as a rule, where one person or thing is being referred to. In the case of many persons or things, it is repeated. 2  Peter 1.1 speaks of ‘the righteousness of our God and Savior Jesus Christ.’ The article is used once only: tou theou. There are parallels in the same letter (2  Peter 1.11, 2.20, 3.2, 3.18), where ‘of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ’ appears with only one article. Similarly in Titus 2.13, ‘awaiting our blessed hope, the appearing (epiphaneia) of the glory of our great God and Savior Jesus Christ.’ This much is beyond cavil: such a reading is in harmony with the usage of Ignatius of Antioch, who quite frequently calls Jesus ‘God.’ 3 Following the same rules governing the definite article, 2 Thessalonians 1.12 ought to be taken in the same way, since there is only one article: ‘according to the grace of our God and Lord, Jesus Christ.’ But in this case a different understanding is possible. For Paul, ‘God’ regularly signifies the Father and ‘Lord’ signifies the Son. He could have added the definite article to ‘God’ but not to ‘Lord’; there is a very similar expression (in this case with no article) in 2 Corinthians 1.2.52 4 Romans 9.5: ‘From whom, according to the flesh, is Christ, who is over all, God blessed for ever. Amen.’ This passage has traditionally been taken as a solemn doxology to Christ as God. Critical scholars would introduce a stronger punctuation, such that the first phrase is about Christ and the second about God the Father: ‘from whom, according to the flesh, is Christ. God who is over all (be) blessed for ever! Amen.’ Recently L. Cerfaux has conceded that this view is not impossible (Le Christ dans la théologie de saint Paul 389–91),53 while on the other

52 The inference being that what 2 Thessalonians 1.12 means can be expressed in the way the rsv does express it, ‘according to the grace of our God and the Lord Jesus Christ,’ as in 2 Corinthians 1.2 the translation can only be ‘peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.’ 53 Lucien Cerfaux, Le Christ dans la théologie de saint Paul (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1951) 389–91; in English, Christ in the Theology of St. Paul, trans. Geoffrey Webb and Adrian Walker (New York: Herder and Herder, 1959) 517–20.

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vicissim O. Cullman non impossibilem iudicavit opinionem traditionalem (Christologie des NT 321).54 Notatur primo: non habetur benedictio in forma ordinaria; cf. 2 Cor 1.3, Eph 1.3: EulogeFtos ho theos kai pateFr … Notatur deinde: habetur benedictio interiecta apud Rom 1.25: servierunt creaturae potius quam Creatori, qui est benedictus in saecula. Amen. Quod differt a nostro loco (1) quatenus ‘qui est’ stat pro clausula relativa ‘hos estin,’55 (2) quatenus antecedens est ‘Creator.’ Notatur tertio: habetur alia benedictio interiecta apud 2 Cor 11.31: Deus et Pater Domini nostri Iesu Christi, qui est benedictus in saecula, scit quod non mentior. Quod simile est nostro loco, quatenus habetur clausula participialis, ho oFn, quod latine vertitur per clausulam relativam. Quibus positis, in favorem interpretationis traditionalis argui potest ex duobus. Expressio, ‘ex quibus est Christus secundum carnem,’ de se est incompleta. Nam illud ‘secundum carnem’ restringit originem Christi ex patribus; qua restrictione posita, exspectatur aliquid de alio aspectu originis Christi. Cui exspectationi satisfit quod dicitur, nempe, Christum sub alio aspectu esse summum Deum benedictum. Deinde, si fortior supponitur interpunctio, quaeritur utrum agatur de benedictione solemni et independenti an de benedictione interiecta et superaddita. Quorum neutrum convenienter dicitur. Nam non est benedictio solemnis et independens, sicut in prima nota illustratur, nam alius est ordo verborum. Neque est benedictio interiecta et superaddita, sicut in altera et tertia nota illustratur, quia apud Rom 1.25 habetur antecedens ‘Creator’ cui referatur ‘hos estin,’ et apud 2 Cor 11.31 habetur antecedens ‘Pater’ cui referatur ‘ho oFn.’ Contra interpretationem traditionalem argui potest. Regulariter in nt ‘theos’ est nomen Patris personale, et exceptio non

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hand O. Cullmann did not consider the traditional view impossible (Christologie des Neuen Testaments 321).54 Note 1: The passage in question is not a benediction in the ordinary form; see 2 Corinthians 1.3 and Ephesians 1.3: EulogeFtos ho theos kai pateFr …, ‘Blessed be the God and Father …’ Note 2: In Romans 1.25 there is an interjected benediction: ‘they served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever! Amen.’ This differs from the passage in question, (1) in that ‘who is’ stands for a relative clause, hos estin,55 and (2) in that its antecedent is ‘the Creator.’ Note 3: In 2 Corinthians 11.31 there is another interjected benediction: ‘The God and Father of the Lord Jesus, (he) who is blessed for ever, knows that I do not lie.’ In this case the construction is similar to that of the passage in question, inasmuch as a participial clause, ho oFn, is translated by the relative clause ‘who is …’ In light of all this, two arguments can be made in favor of the traditional interpretation. First, the expression ‘from whom, according to the flesh, is Christ’ is in itself incomplete. ‘According to the flesh’ is a restrictive phrase; it is according to the flesh that Christ had his origin from the patriarchs. Given this restriction, one would expect something more on some other aspect of Christ’s origin – an expectation satisfied by what comes next, namely, that from another viewpoint Christ is God, blessed, over all. Second, if we suppose the stronger punctuation to be correct, the question arises whether we are dealing with a solemn, independent benediction or one that is added and interjected. Neither really fits. It is not a solemn, independent benediction like the example given in note 1 above, since the order of the words is different. Nor is it an added, interjected benediction like the examples given in notes 2 and 3 above. In Romans 1.25 there is an antecedent, ‘Creator,’ to which hos estin refers, and in 2 Corinthians 11.31 there is an antecedent, ‘Father,’ to which ho oFn refers. It is possible to argue against the traditional interpretation [as follows]. As a rule, theos in the New Testament is the personal name of the Father, and exceptions to the rule should be allowed only when there is no room

54 In the English translation, Christology in the New Testament 312–13. 55 Whereas, at Romans 9.5 (the passage in question) both the Vulgate and English versions use a relative clause to translate what in the Greek is a participial clause: ‘the one being over all.’

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est ponenda nisi indubia sit, praesertim in priori epistola56 et modo adeo solemni. Conceditur regula, ut addatur indubie exsistere exceptiones, quae aliquando inceperunt. Sola quaestio est de facto,57 et hic seriae rationes non desunt.

5 1 Io 5.20: ut cognoscamus verum Deum et simus in vero Filio eius. Hic est verus Deus (ho aleFthinos theos) et vita aeterna.58 Quis est verus Deus? Non dicitur ‘ille’ (ekeinos) sed ‘hic’ (houtos). Cf. Io 1.1; 17.3 (ton monon aleFthinon theon).

6 Io 20.28: Dominus meus et Deus meus. 7 Act 20.28: … ecclesiam Dei, quam acquisivit sanguine suo. Notate tamen aliam exsistere lectionem, ecclesiam Domini (Kuriou).

8 Col 2.2: tou theou Khristou. Sed dubia est lectio. 9 Io 1.1: In principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum (ton theon), et Deus (theos) erat Verbum. Ubi manifeste Verbum dicitur esse Deus. Tamen obici solet propter articuli praesentiam (ton theon) et absentiam (theos), Ioannem distinxisse inter Deum proprie dictum et Deum improprie dictum, Patrem quidem esse Deum proprie dictum, sed Verbum non esse nisi Deum improprie dictum.

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for doubt, especially in an early epistle56 and where the style is especially solemn. We may grant the rule, while adding that exceptions undoubtedly exist and that they had to begin at some time or other. The only question is a question of fact,57 and there is no lack of weighty considerations [to be taken into account]. 5 1 John 5.20: ‘That we might know the true God, and be in his true Son. This is the true God (ho aleFthinos theos) and eternal life.’58 Who is this true God? The passage does not say ‘that’ or ‘the former’ (ekeinos) but ‘this’ or ‘the latter’ (houtos). Cf. John 1.1 and John 17.3 (ton monon aleFthinon theon). 6 John 20.28: ‘My Lord and my God.’ 7 Acts 20.28: ‘The church of God which he obtained with his own blood.’ Note however that there exists another reading: ‘the church of the Lord (Kyriou).’ 8 At Colossians 2.2, tou theou Christou, ‘of God Christ,’ is a doubtful reading. 9 ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God (ton theon), and the Word was God (theos)’ (John 1.1). Here the Word is plainly said to be God. Because the article is present in ton theon and absent from theon, however, it is often argued that John drew a distinction between God properly so called and God improperly so called, and that the Father is God properly so called while the Word is only improperly called God.

56 ‘Early’ is relative here not to other authentic Pauline epistles but to other New Testament writings. See above, pp. xx–xx, ‘tempore enim primae erant epistolae paulinae priores, et postea ex fontibus traditionalibus composita sunt evangelia’ (‘the major Pauline letters come first; the gospels were written later, drawing on the sources of the tradition’). 57 That is, whether Romans 9.5 is an exception or not. This text is treated by Raymond E. Brown, ‘Does the New Testament Call Jesus God?’ Theological Studies 26 (1965) 559–60, who maintains, ‘at most one may claim a certain probability that this passage refers to Jesus as God.’ 58 Thus according to the Vulgate.

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Quae obiectio confirmatur ex Philone Alexandrino, De somn., 1, 229–30, ubi similis distinctio invenitur inter Deum proprie dictum (ho theos) et Verbum Dei (theon).59 Respondetur, primo, Ioannem absolute potuisse scribere ho theos. Vide to phoFs (1.4, 1.8), ho Khristos (1.20), ubi pariter de praedicato agitur. Deinde, inconveniens fuisset scribere ho theos. Sic enim tolleretur distinctio inter Patrem (ho theos) et Filium (ho logos). Si enim diceretur: ho theos eFn ho logos, sensus esse videretur Deum fuisse in principio, Deum fuisse apud semetipsum, Deum esse Deum, Deum qua apud semetipsum nominari Logon. Tertio, nulla erat necessitas scribendi ho theos, ut significaretur verus Deus. Vide Ioannem 1.6, 1.12–13, 1.18, 3.2, 3.21, 6.45, 8.54, 9.16, 9.33, 10.33, 16.30, 19.7. Vide ipsum Philonem, De somn., 1, 244, 251, 252, 254, ubi deest articulus, et 249, 250, ubi adest. Alia exempla casu selecta: Leg. Alleg., 3, 42 bis, 43, 44, 46, 47 bis, 48; De plantat., 50 bis, 52, 59, 61.60 Quarto, in loco Philonis adducto, agitur de Gen 31.13: Ego sum Deus Bethel, ubi legebat Philo: ego sum Deus (ho theos) visus a te in loco Dei (theou)61 (De somn., 1, 227). Unde quaesivit Philo utrum duo sint dii: alius qui apparuit, et alius loci in quo apparuit (228). Cui quaestioni respondet cum distinctione: Deus proprie dictus est unus; dii improprie dicti sunt multi. Et hanc distinctionem in textu invenit: nam Deus proprie dictus, inquit, habet articulum, sed improprie dictus est sine articulo (229). Unde et ulteriorem addit glossam suam et propriam, nempe, Deum visum in loco Dei re vera esse Deum visum in logo, et logon esse deum improprie dictum (230).

Quinto, haec Philonis exegesis sua habet praesupposita, nempe, non esse duos deos, non in uno Deo esse Patrem et Filium, esse logon Dei, logon non esse Deum sed tantummodo ideam mundi a Deo conceptam, Deum a nobis

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This objection finds confirmation in Philo of Alexandria, De Somniis, 1, 229–30, where a similar distinction is drawn between God properly so called (ho theos) and the Word of God (theos).59 Reply: In the first place, to write ho theos was possible for John, in and of itself. See to phoFs in John 1.4, 1.8 and ho Christos in 1.20, which are also [like theos in John 1.1] predicate nouns. But, in the second place, to write ho theos would have been inappropriate. That would have removed the distinction between the Father (ho theos) and the Son (ho logos). Had John said ho theos eFn ho logos, the meaning would have seemed to be that God was in the beginning, that God was with himself, that God is God, that God as with himself is named the Word. In the third place, there was no need to write ho theos in order to refer to the true God. See John 1.6, 1.12–13, 1.18, 3.2, 3.21, 6.45, 8.54, 9.16, 9.33, 10.33, 16.30, 19.7. Philo himself omits the definite article in De Somniis, 1, 244, 251, 252, and 254, using it in 249 and 250. A few other examples: Legum Allegoriae, 3, 42 (twice), 43, 44, 46, 47 (twice), De Plantatione, 50 (twice), 52, 59, 61.60 In the fourth place, the passage from Philo brought in to confirm the objection is about Genesis 31.13, ‘I am the God of Bethel,’ where Philo’s text reads, ‘I am God (ho theos) seen by you in the place of God (theou)’61 (De Somniis, 1, 227). Hence, Philo raises the question whether there are two gods, one god who appears and another god of the place in which he appears (228). He answers this question with a distinction: God properly so called is one, but there are many gods improperly so called. This distinction he finds in the text itself: used in the proper sense, he says, ‘God’ has the article; improperly used, it has not (229). Hence, he also adds a further gloss of his own: the God seen ‘in the place of God’ is really God seen in the logos, and the logos is God improperly so called (230). In the fifth place, Philo’s exegesis here has its presuppositions: there are not two Gods; in the one God there are not Father and Son; there is a logos of God; the logos is not God but only an idea of the world conceived by God;

59 It is likely that Lonergan’s source for the Philo references was Philonis Alexandrini Opera Quae Supersunt, multiple editors (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1898–1926). De Somniis is found in vol. 3. The numbers refer to an editorial convention similar to that found in editions of Plato and Aristotle. 60 Legum Allegoriae is found in vol. 1 of the Philo volumes mentioned in note 59, De Plantatione in vol. 2. 61 This is the wording of the Septuagint.

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cognosci per logon tamquam per medium, valere exegesin allegoricam ut ‘locus Dei’ significet ‘logon Dei.’ Sexto, qui hanc Philonis exegesin ad interpretationem Io 1.1 applicat in duobus errare videtur. Nam primo supponit parallela esse loca, Gen 31.13 et Io 1.1; quod minime est per se evidens, nam sola quae deprehenditur similitudo est in nomine Dei quod bis ponitur, scilicet, cum articulo et sine articulo. Sed ulterius supponit sententias a Philone praesuppositas etiam a Ioanne supponi; quod nihil est quam petitio principii. Ioannes enim unum esse Deum ita docuit ut tamen exhiberet Dominum dicentem: Ego et Pater unum sumus (10.30). Neque apud Ioannem legitur Logon esse ideam mundi a Deo conceptam, sed legitur eum esse Unigenitum Filium (1.14, 1.18, 3.16) qui, sicut Pater, habet vitam in semetipso (5.26). Neque constat Ioannem eo modo nomen Dei adhibuisse quo modo Philo Moysin locutum esse finxit.

v  Ex aliis titulis divinis translatis 1 Apoc 17.14: et Agnus vincet illos, quoniam Dominus dominantium est et Rex regum. Cf. Apoc 19.16. Sed Dominus dominorum et Rex regum est titulus divinus (Deut 10.17, Dan 2.47, 1 Tim 6.15). 2 Apoc 22.13: Ego sum Alpha et Omega, primus et novissimus, principium et finis. Cf. Apoc 1.17, 2.8. Alibi haec de Patre dicuntur (Apoc. 1.8, 21.6), sed hoc in loco videtur loqui futurus iudex (22.12), ipse Iesus (22.16).

3 Apud Ioannem quadrupliciter adhibetur expressio ‘ego sum’: primo, cum praedicato explicito, et ita dicitur: ego sum panis vitae (6.35), lux mundi (8.12), ostium ovium (10.7), bonus pastor (10.11), etc. (4.26, 11.25, 14.6, 15.1); deinde, cum praedicato non explicito sed subaudito, quod facile e contextu suppletur, cf. 6.20, 9.9, 18.5–8; tertio, sine praedicato explicito vel implicito, sed sensu absoluto de exsistentia (8.58): antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum; quarto, sine praedicato explicito vel implicito, et sensu absoluto, ita tamen ut exsistentia sit obiectum fidei. Sic:

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God is known by us through the logos as through a means; an allegorical exegesis in which ‘the place of God’ means ‘the logos of God’ is valid. In the sixth place, those who would apply this exegesis of Philo’s to their interpretation of John 1.1 appear to be mistaken in two respects. For one thing, they suppose that Genesis 31.13 and John 1.1 are parallel passages. This in itself is not at all evident, since the only similarity to latch on to is that in each case the noun ‘God’ is used twice, once with the article and once without. But, for another thing, they suppose that John’s presuppositions were the same as Philo’s – which is just begging the question. John’s teaching that God is one is such that he nevertheless portrays the Lord saying, ‘I and the Father are one’ (John 10.30). We do not read in John that the Logos is an idea of the world, conceived by God; we read that he is the only begotten Son (1.14, 1.18, 3.16) who, like the Father, has life in himself (5.26). Nor is it clear that John used the name of God in the way Philo fancied Moses to have spoken. v  Transference of other divine titles 1 Revelation 17.14: ‘And the Lamb will conquer them, for he is Lord of lords and King of kings.’ See also Revelation 19.16. But ‘King of kings and Lord of lords’ is a divine title according to Deuteronomy 10.17, Daniel 2.47, and 1 Timothy 6.15. 2 Revelation 22.13: ‘I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end.’ Cf. Revelation 1.17, 2.8. Elsewhere this title refers to the Father (Revelation 1.8, 21.6). In this passage, however, the coming judge (v. 12), Jesus himself (v. 16), seems to be speaking. 3 In the gospel of John there are four ways in which the expression ‘I am’ is employed. First, it is used with an explicit predicate, as in ‘I am the bread of life’ (John 6.35), ‘I am the light of the world’ (8.12), ‘I am the door of the sheep’ (10.7), ‘I am the good shepherd’ (10.11), and so on (see 4.26, 11.25, 14.6, 15.1). Second, it is used with an ‘understood’ predicate, easily supplied from the context; see 6.20, 9.9, 18.5–8. Third, it is used, with no predicate, implicit or explicit, in the absolute sense of existence: ‘before Abraham was, I am’ (8.58). Fourth, it is used without any explicit or implicit predicate, in the absolute sense, but in such a way that existence is the object of faith, as in the following:

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8.24: si enim non credideritis quia ego sum, moriemini in peccato vestro. 8.28: cum exaltaveritis Filium hominis, tum cognoscetis quia ego sum. 13.19: Amodo dico vobis, priusquam fiat, ut cum factum fuerit credatis quia ego sum. His locis intelligendis subvenit Is 43.10: Vos testes mei, dicit Dominus, et servus meus quem elegi, ut sciatis et credatis mihi et intelligatis quia ego ipse sum (kî ’anî hû; lxx hoti egoF eimi): ante me non est formatus Deus et post me non erit. Circa usum expressionis, kî ’anî hû, inter Rabbinos, et expressionis, egoF eimi, apud lxx (Is 43.25, 45.12, 45.17–19, 52.6), vide C.H. Dodd, Fourth Gospel 94–96.62 4 Io 12.41: Haec dixit Isaias, quando vidit gloriam eius et locutus est de eo. Haec: Io 12.40 quae citantur ex Is 6.10. vidit gloriam eius: Is 6.1: … vidi gloriam Domini;63 6.3: Seraphim clamabant et dicebant: Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus, Dominus Deus exercituum: plena est omnis terra gloria eius. quando locutus est de eo: agitur de Is 6.9–10 seu Io 12.40. gloriam eius … de eo …: videtur agi de eodem. Unde concludendum esse videtur gloriam Domini ab Isaia visam esse, secundum Ioannem, gloriam Christi. vi  Ex translata gloria Dei 1 KaboFd Iahwe: super montem Sinai (Exod 24.15–18), phaenomenis physicis (Ps 28, Ps 96), in tabernaculo (Exod 40.34–38), in templo Salomonis (1 Reg 8.10–11), in visione Ezechielis (1.26–28, 43.1–764); alteri non dabo (Is 42.8,

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‘You will die in your sins unless you believe that I am’ (8.24). ‘When you have lifted up the Son of man, then you will know that I am’ (8.28). ‘I tell you this now, before it takes place, that when it does take place you may believe that I am’ (13.19). Isaiah 43.10 offers help in understanding these passages. ‘“You are my witnesses,” says the Lord, “and my servant whom I have chosen, that you may know and believe me and understand that I am he (kî ’anî hû; Septuagint, hoti egoF eimi). Before me no god was formed, nor shall there be any after me.”’ On the Rabbinic usage of kî ’anî hû and the Septuagint usage of egoF eimi (Isaiah 43.25, 45.12, 45.17–19, 52.6), see C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel 94–96.62 4 John 12.41: ‘Isaiah said this because he saw his glory and spoke of him.’ ‘This’ refers to John 12.40, a quotation from Isaiah 6.10. ‘Because he saw his glory’ refers to ‘I saw the Lord,’63 above whom the seraphim called one to another and said, ‘Holy, holy, holy is the Lord, the God of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory’ (Isaiah 6.1, 6.3). ‘Because he … spoke of him’ concerns Isaiah 6.10 or John 12.40. In the phrases ‘his glory’ and ‘of him,’ the pronouns would seem to have the same antecedent. Hence, it seems the conclusion should be that, according to John, the glory of the Lord which Isaiah saw was the glory of Christ. vi  Transference of the glory of God 1 The kaboFd Yahweh appears over Mount Sinai (Exodus 24.15–18), in natural phenomena (Psalm 28 [evv 29] and 96 [evv 97]), in the tabernacle (Exodus 40.34–38), in Solomon’s temple (1  Kings 8.10–11), and in the vision of Ezekiel (1.26–28, 43.1–764). ‘My glory I give to no other’ (Isaiah 42.8,

62 C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953). 63 Lonergan’s Latin here reads vidi gloriam Domini, ‘I saw the glory of the Lord.’ He may have been quoting from memory or ad sensum. At Isaiah 6.1 the Vulgate (following the Septuagint) has vidi Dominum, ‘I saw the Lord.’ 64 Lonergan’s text has ‘40.34ss.’, which surely is not correct. The change is editorial.

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48.11); laus Dei (Ps 23.8, 56.6, 56.12, 62.3, 65.2, 71.19, 78.9, 137.5, Is 6.3); eschatologice (Is 35.2, 40.5, 43.7, 66.18–21).

Omnes auctores nt adhibent voces graecas doxa, doxazoF, ad hanc Dei gloriam significandam, praeter usum graecum. Splendor, claritas lucis divinae: circumfulsit pastores et timuerunt timore magno (Lc 2.9), Moyses et Elias visi in maiestate (Lc 9.31), discipuli viderunt maiestatem eius et duos viros cum illo (Lc 9.32), voce delapsa a magnifica gloria (2 Pet 1.17), Paulus non vidit prae claritate luminis illius (Act 22.11), impletum est templum fumo a maiestate Dei (Apoc 15.8), civitas non eget sole neque luna, nam claritas Dei illuminavit eam, et lucerna eius est Agnus (Apoc 21.23). Unde Deus dicitur inhabitare lucem inaccessibilem et ideo nec videri nec posse videri (1 Tim 6.16).

Tenentur homines ad gloriam Deo dandam, sicut Abraham (Rom 4.20), quod non fecit Herodes (Act 12.23), neque impaenitentes (Apoc 16.9). Unde doxologiae: Lc 2.14, 19.38, Rom 11.36, 16.27, Eph 3.21, Phil 4.20, Apoc 4.9, 7.12; quibus dicitur gloriam esse Deo, uti Gal 1.5, 1 Pet 4.11.

2 Iam vero Filius hominis praedixit se venturum esse in gloria Patris sui (Mc 8.38) cum virtute multa et gloria (Mc 13.26), sessurum in sede maiestatis suae (Mt 19.28, 25.31). Resuscitatus est per gloriam Patris (Rom 6.4), assumptus in gloria (1 Tim 3.16). Stephanus vidit gloriam Dei et Iesum stantem a dextris Dei (Act 7.55). Nam post in Christo passiones, gloriae (1 Pet 1.11). Deus suscitavit eum et dedit ei gloriam (1 Pet 1.21). Quare, sicut dicebatur ‘Deus gloriae’ (Act 7.2), nunc dicitur ‘Dominus gloriae’ (1 Cor 2.8, Iac 2.1). Sicut fiebant doxologiae Deo, nunc fiunt Christo (1 Pet 4.11, Heb 13.21, Apoc 5.12–13). Sicut Dei gloriam vidit Isaias (Io 12.41, Is 6.1–3) gloriam quasi unigeniti a Patre vidit Ioannes (Io 1.14); quam gloriam suam manifestavit Iesus in Cana Galilaeae (Io 2.11); gloriam Dei manifestavit in resurrectione Lazari (Io

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48.11). It is mentioned in the context of praise in Psalm 23.8 [evv 24.8], 56.6 [evv 57.5], 56.12 [evv 57.11], 62.3 [evv 63.2], 65.2 [evv 66.2], 71.19 [evv  72.19], 78.9 [evv  79.9], 137.5 [evv  138.5] and Isaiah 6.3; and in an eschatological context in Isaiah 35.2, 40.5, 43.7, and 66.18–21. All the New Testament authors use the Greek words doxa and doxazoF to signify this glory of God, going beyond [classical] Greek usage. ‘Glory’ as the splendor and brightness of a divine light: glory shone around the shepherds, and they were filled with fear (Luke 2.9); Moses and Elijah appeared in glory (Luke 9.31); the disciples saw Jesus’ glory and the two men who stood with him (Luke 9.32); the voice was borne to Jesus by the Majestic Glory (2 Peter 1.17); Paul ‘could not see because of the brightness of that light’ (Acts 22.11); the heavenly temple is ‘filled with smoke from the glory of God’ (Revelation 15.8); the heavenly city ‘has no need of sun or moon to shine upon it, for the glory of God is its light, and its lamp is the Lamb’ (Revelation 21.23). Hence, it is said that God ‘dwells in unapproachable light,’ and thus he neither is seen nor can be seen (1 Timothy 6.16). Men are bound to give God the glory, as Abraham did (Romans 4.20). Herod did not (Acts 12.23), and those who did not repent did not (Revelation 16.9). Hence the doxologies in Luke 2.14, 19.38, Romans 11.36, 16.27, Ephesians 3.21, Philippians 4.20, Revelation 4.9, 7.12. These are saying that the glory is God’s, as in Galatians 1.5, 1 Peter 4.11. 2 Now the Son of man foretold that he would come again in the glory of his Father (Mark 8.38), with great power and glory (Mark 13.26), to take his seat on the throne of his glory (Matthew 19.28, 25.31). He was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father (Romans 6.4), and taken up in glory (1 Timothy 3.16). Stephen saw the glory of God and Jesus standing at the right hand of God (Acts 7.55). For glory follows the sufferings of Christ (1 Peter 1.11). God raised him from the dead and gave him glory (1 Peter 1.21). Thus, as ‘the God of glory’ was used [as a title] (Acts 7.2), so now ‘the Lord of glory’ is used (1 Corinthians 2.8, James 2.1). As doxologies were addressed to God, so now they are addressed to Christ (1 Peter 4.11, Hebrews 13.21, Revelation 5.12–13). As Isaiah saw the glory of God (John 12.41, Isaiah 6.1–3), John saw glory as of the only begotten of the Father (John 1.14). Jesus manifested this glory of his at Cana in Galilee (John 2.11); he manifested the glory of God at the

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11.4, 11.40); sed ipse Iesus nondum erat glorificatus (Io 7.39, 12.16); quam glorificationem oravit (Io 12.28) et promissam habuit (Io 12.23); ipse quae petimus faciet ut clarificetur Pater in Filio (Io 14.13); Spiritus eum clarificabit (Io 16.14). Mutua est Patris et Filii clarificatio (Io 17.1, 17.4): nam Pater clarificavit Filium prius quam mundus esset; Filius Patrem clarificat in terra; et Filius nunc petit ut clarificetur a Patre.

3 Quanta autem sit gloria Filii, ex gloria hominibus communicanda elucet. Quod enim seminatur in ignobilitate, surget in gloria (1 Cor 15.43); corpus humilitatis nostrae erit configuratum corpori claritatis suae (Phil 3.21); liberabitur a servitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei (Rom 8.21), tunc iusti fulgebunt sicut sol in regno Patris eorum (Mt 13.43); ideoque non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam quae revelabitur in nobis (Rom 8.18); et id quod est momentaneum et leve tribulationis nostrae super modum in sublimitate aeternum gloriae pondus operatur in nobis (2 Cor 4.17); gloriamur ergo in spe gloriae filiorum Dei65 (Rom 5.2). Deus enim quos praescivit, praedestinavit, vocavit, glorificavit (Rom 8.29–30); vocavit in aeternam suam gloriam in Christo Iesu (1 Pet 5.10) ad immarcescibilem gloriae coronam (1 Pet 5.4) in suum regnum et gloriam (1 Thess 2.12); et ideo cum Christus apparuerit vita vestra, apparebitis et vos cum ipso in gloria (Col 3.4); si tamen compatimur ut et conglorificemur (Rom 8.17); unde apostolus laborat ut et ipsi salutem consequantur quae est in Christo Iesu cum gloria caelesti (2 Tim 2.10). Quae gloria, per divinam sapientiam praedestinata (1 Cor 2.7), praeparatur per operationem Spiritus sancti (Eph 3.16, 1 Pet 4.14), per ministerium gloriae (2 Cor 3.7–11), nam Deus qui dixit de tenebris lucem splendescere, ipse illuxit in cordibus nostris ad illuminationem scientiae claritatis Dei in facie Christi Iesu (2 Cor 4.6).

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raising of Lazarus (John 11.4, 11.40). But Jesus himself had not yet been glorified (John 7.39, 12.16); he prayed for this glorification (John 12.28) and had the promise of it (John 12.23). Whatever we ask for he will do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son (John 14.13). The Spirit will glorify him (John 16.14). The Father and the Son glorify each other (John 17.1, 17.4), for the Father glorified the Son before the world was; the Son glorifies the Father on earth; and the Son now prays that he may be glorified by the Father. 3 The greatness of the Son’s glory is shown by the glory that is to be communicated to others. For what is sown in dishonor is raised in glory (1 Corinthians 15.43); our lowly body will be changed to be like his glorious body (Philippians 3.21). Freed from their bondage to decay, into the glorious liberty of the children of God (Romans 8.21), the righteous will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father (Matthew 13.43). Therefore the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed in us (Romans 8.18), and that which is our slight, momentary affliction is preparing us for an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison (2 Corinthians 4.17). We glory in our hope of sharing the glory of God65 (Romans 5.2). For those whom God foreknew he also predestined, called, and glorified (Romans 8.29–30); he called them to his eternal glory in Christ Jesus (1 Peter 5.10), to the unfading crown of glory (1 Peter 5.4), into his own kingdom and glory (1 Thessalonians 2.12); and so, when Christ who is our life appears, we too will appear with him in glory (Colossians 3.4), provided we suffer with him, in order that we may also be glorified with him (Romans 8.17). Hence, Paul endures everything so that others also may obtain the salvation which in Christ Jesus goes with eternal glory (2  Timothy 2.10). This glory, decreed by divine wisdom before the ages (1 Corinthians 2.7), is granted through the operation of the Holy Spirit (Ephesians 3.16, 1 Peter 4.14), through the dispensation of glory (2 Corinthians 3.7–11), for it is the God who said, ‘Let light shine out of darkness,’ who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ Jesus (2 Corinthians 4.6).

65 Following the Greek and most evv; the Latin text follows the Vulgate, ‘the hope of the glory of the children of God.’

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4 Ad vim argumenti percipiendam, notate: Lectoribus vt et nt non minus Deo propria erat gloria Dei, quam posterioribus theologis propria Deo erat Dei essentia. In hanc gloriam intravit Filius et per Filium intrabunt iusti. Distingui possunt (1) gloria Filii ante passionem petita et post passionem collata, et (2) gloria Filii priusquam mundus esset (Io 17.5, 7.24), qua unigenitus cognoscitur (Io 1.14), qua manifestatur discipulis (Lc 9.32, 2 Pet 1.17), Paulo (Act 22.11), imo pastoribus (Lc 2.9); haec gloria doxologiis agnoscitur; haec potestatem iudicandi omnes fundat.

Quae in vt et nt per modum signi externi, visionis propheticae, locutionis symbolicae apprehensa sunt, in proportione quadam se habent ad ea quae a theologis posteris distinguuntur; nempe, (1) ipsa essentia Dei Patris, (2) eadem numero essentia Filio per generationem aeternam communicata, (3) eadem numero essentia illapsa66 in intellectum Filii qua hominis ad visionem beatam, (4) eadem numero essentia illapsa in intellectus iustorum ad visionem beatam.

b  ex conceptionibus quasi theologicis i Ex conceptione Paulina 1 Iam notavimus Paulum in Actibus aliter ad Iudaeos et aliter ad gentes de Deo esse locutum. Act 13.16–22, 14.15–17, 17.22–31. 2 Athenis tractat (1) de Deo ignoto et (2) de viro, quem Deus a mortuis suscitavit, in quo iudicaturus est orbem terrae in aequitate.

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4 In order to grasp the force of the argument, note the following. The glory of God, to readers of the Old Testament and the New Testament, was no less properly God’s own than was the essence of God to later theologians. Into this glory the Son has entered, and into it, through the Son, the righteous will enter. It is possible to distinguish (1) the glory of the Son for which he prayed before his passion and which became his afterwards, and (2) the glory of the Son before the world was made (John 17.5, 17.24), by which he is recognized as only begotten (John 1.14) and by which he was manifested to his disciples (Luke 9.32, 2 Peter 1.17), to Paul (Acts 22.11), and even to the shepherds (Luke 2.9). It is this latter glory that doxologies acknowledge, and on it rests the power to judge everyone. What is apprehended in the Old and New Testaments in a manner characterized by external signs, prophetic visions, and symbolic utterances, has a certain proportionality to what later theologians would distinguish, namely: (1) the very essence of God the Father; (2) the essence, numerically the same, communicated to the Son through his eternal generation; (3) the essence, numerically the same, which as the beatific vision slipped into66 the mind of the Son as man; and (4) the essence, numerically the same, which as the beatific vision slips into the minds of the justified. b  quasi-theological conceptions i  Pauline conceptions 1 We have already pointed out that in Acts Paul speaks of God to Jews and to Gentiles in different ways. See Acts 13.16–22, 14.15–17, 17.22–31. 2 Speaking to the Athenians, he first discusses an unknown God, and then a man whom God raised from the dead, by whom the world will be judged in righteousness.

66 Lonergan’s use of the verb illabor (to slip, glide, descend upon) in contexts to do with the beatific vision is traditional. Thomas Aquinas regularly uses this verb to distinguish the immediate operation of God interiorly upon the mind, from the mediated operation of creatures through the senses. See, e.g., Summa theologiae, 1 q. 56 a. 2; q. 89, a. 2; 3, q. 8 a. 8.

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De viro, cf. Act 2.22: virum approbatum a Deo. De Deo dicit: qui fecit mundum et omnia quae in eo sunt (17.24), qui dat omnibus vitam et inspirationem et omnia (17.25), qui fecit ex uno genus humanum habitare super universam faciem terrae (17.26), a quo genere quaeritur si forte attrectetur vel inveniatur, quamvis non longe sit ab unoquoque nostrum (17.27); in ipso enim vivimus et movemur et sumus (17.28); imo, genus Dei sumus (17.29); et ideo Divinum minime est simile auro vel argento vel lapidi sculpturae artis et cogitationis humanae (17.29).

3 Gal 4.8: Sed tunc quidem ignorantes Deum iis, qui natura (phusei) non sunt dii, serviebatis. Conceptio naturae apud Paulum videtur determinari ex analogia biologica: Rom 1.26–27, 11.21, Gal 2.15; unde Rom 2.14, 1 Cor 11.14.

4 1 Cor 8.4–6: De escis autem, quae idolis immolantur, scimus quia nihil est idolum in mundo, et quod nullus est Deus nisi unus. Nam etsi sunt qui dicantur dii sive in caelo sive in terra, siquidem sunt dii multi et domini multi, nobis tamen unus Deus Pater, ex quo omnia et nos in illum, et unus Dominus Iesus Christus, per quem omnia et nos per ipsum. Ubi contextus sat clare est hellenisticus. Explicite agnoscitur unicitas Dei. Attamen, quae alibi unit, hic dividit. Rom 11.36: Quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso (eis auton) sunt omnia: ipsi gloria in saecula. Amen. Ubi omnia tripliciter ad Deum referuntur: ex, per, in. Sed ad Corinthios dicit omnia ex Patri, nos in Patrem, et tam omnia quam nos per Dominum.67

Praeterea, secundum Iudaeos erat unus Dominus Deus (Mc 12.29, Deut 6.4); secundum paganos erant dii multi et domini multi; secundum Paulum est unus Deus et est unus Dominus.

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On this man, cf. Acts 2.22, ‘a man approved by God.’ Of God, Paul says: he made the world and everything in it (Acts 17.24); he gives to all life and breath and everything (17.25); he made from one every nation to live on all the face of the earth (17.26), and they are seeking him in the hope that they might feel after him and find him, although he is not far from each one of us (17.27), for in him we live and move and have our being (17.28); indeed, we are the offspring of God (17.29), and so we ought not to think that the Deity is like gold, or silver, or stone, a representation by human art and imagination (17.29). 3 Galatians 4.8: ‘Formerly, when you did not know God, you were in bondage to beings that by nature (phusei) are no gods.’ Biological analogy seems to have determined Paul’s conception of nature; see Romans 1.26–27, 11.21, Galatians 2.15, whence Romans 2.14 and 1 Corinthians 11.14. 4 1 Corinthians 8.4–6: ‘Hence, as to the eating of food offered to idols, we know that “an idol has no real existence,” and that “there is no God but one.” For although there may be so-called gods in heaven or on earth – as indeed there are many “gods” and many “lords” – yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and in whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist.’ Here the context is clearly Hellenistic. It is explicitly acknowledged that there is but one God. Yet in this passage Paul divides what elsewhere he unites. In Romans 11.36, he says that ‘from him and through him and in him (eis auton) are all things. To him be glory forever. Amen.’ Here ‘all things’ are referred in three ways – from, through, and in – to God. But to the Corinthians he says that all things are from the Father, that we exist in him, and that both we and all things are through the Lord.67 Further, for the Jews there was one Lord God (Mark 12.29, Deuteronomy 6.4); for pagans there were many gods and many lords; for Paul there is one God and there is one Lord.

67 In both the Greek New Testament and the Vulgate the same three prepositions are used in each passage; English translations do not always reflect this fact.

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5 1 Cor 15.44–47: Seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale (psukhikon, pneumatikon). Si est corpus animale, est et corpus spiritale sicut scriptum est: Factus est primus homo Adam in animam viventem (Gen 2.7), novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem. Sed non prius quod spiritale est, sed quod animale, deinde quod spiritale. Primus homo de terra terrenus (Gen 2.7), secundus homo de caelo (caelestis). Ubi dicitur Dominus (1) spiritus vivificans, (2) secundus homo de caelo. Spiritus vivificans est Christus resuscitatus novae vitae principium: 2 Cor 5.14–18, ubi de nova creatura in Christo, ubi Christus non iam cognoscitur secundum carnem; 2 Cor 3.7–18, ubi de ministratione Spiritus in gloria (3.8), ubi nexus parum clarus inter Dominum et Spiritum (3.16–18), clarissime tamen Gal 4.4–6, Rom 8.5–18. Secundus homo de caelo. Iam indicavimus schema syntheticum paulinum circa hominem. ‘De caelo’ potest significare Christum esse in caelis, vel Christum operari in nos de caelis, vel Christum habere corpus spiritale, caeleste, vel Christum habuisse originem caelestem ante vitam suam terrestrem. Quod agitur de corpore caelesti, favent (1) quod antea dicta sunt multa de corporibus animali et spiritali, (2) quod corpus Adami erat de limo terrae (Gen 2.7) et ideo Adam dicitur de terra terrenus, (3) quod asseritur corpus terrenum esse prius et deinde corpus spiritale. Quod adest allusio ad vitam caelestem ante vitam terrestrem, omnino approbari potest: cf. 1 Cor 8.6, Gal 4.4, Rom 1.3. Sed res ulterius urgetur. Nam titulus ‘Filius hominis’ apud Paulum siletur; huius tamen tituli et sensus et vera versio graeca est, non circumlocutio aramaica, ho huios tou anthroFpou, sed simpliciter, anthroFpos; quod minime deest apud Paulum, uti iam supra dictum est ubi de schemate synthetico paulino. Praeterea, Ioannes (3.13, 6.62) agnovit praeexsistentiam Filii hominis. Praeterea, Philo distinxit duas narrationes de creatione hominis: Gen 2.7 narrat de creatione hominis ex quo nos sumus; Gen 1.26–27 narrat de homine exemplari, idea, incorporali, incorruptibili, neque mare neque

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5 1 Corinthians 15.44–47: ‘It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body (psuchikon, pneumatikon). If there is a physical body, there is also a spiritual body. Thus it is written, “The first man Adam became a living being” (Genesis 2.7); the last Adam became a life-giving spirit. But it is not the spiritual which is first but the physical, and then the spiritual. The first man was from the earth, a man of dust (Genesis 2.7); the second man is from heaven.’ Here the Lord is said to be (1) a life-giving spirit and (2) the second man, from heaven. The life-giving spirit is the risen Christ, the principle of new life. See 2  Corinthians 5.14–18, on the new creation in Christ, where Christ is no longer known according to the flesh; 2 Corinthians 3.7–18, on the dispensation of the Spirit in glory (3.8). Here the connection between the Lord and the Spirit is rather unclear (3.16–18); but it is very clear in Galatians 4.4–6 and Romans 8.5–18. The second man is from heaven. We have already outlined Paul’s synthetic pattern as it regards this man. ‘From heaven’ could mean that Christ is in heaven, or that Christ operates in us from heaven, or that Christ has a spiritual or heavenly body, or that Christ had a heavenly origin before his earthly life. In favor of the third – that Christ has a heavenly body – are these facts: (1) Paul has already said much about animal and spiritual bodies. (2) It is because the body of Adam came from the dust of the earth (Genesis 2.7) that Adam is said to be ‘from the earth, a man of dust.’ (3) The passage states that the physical body is first, then the spiritual body. Certainly it can be maintained that there is an allusion here to a heavenly life of Christ before his earthly one; see 1  Corinthians 8.6, Galatians 4.4, Romans 1.3. But that is not the end of the matter. The title ‘Son of man’ never appears in Paul’s writings. The meaning of this title, however, and its true rendering in Greek, is not the Aramaic circumlocution, ho huios tou anthroFpou, but simply anthroFpos, a word Paul uses quite often, as we said earlier in connection with his synthetic pattern. Further, John acknowledges the pre-existence of the Son of man (John 3.13, 6.62). Further, Philo distinguished two stories of man’s creation. Genesis 2.7 tells of the creation of the man from whom we are descended; Genesis 1.26–27 tells of an exemplary man, an idea, incorporeal and incorruptible,

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femina, secundum imaginem Dei (kat’ eikona), ubi similitudo est secundum mentem (nous) (De opificio mundi, 69 et 134; Leg. alleg. 1, 31–32).68 Praeterea, concluditur valde diffusum fuisse mythum de homine divino, caelesti (cf. Dhanis 92–94), unde hypothesin emiserunt critici (Reitzenstein, Loisy, Bousset) de origine tum doctrinae evangelicae de Filio hominis tum doctrinae paulinae de homine.69 Respondetur fieri posse Paulum scripsisse anthroFpon ubi evangelistae scripserunt ton huion tou anthroFpou. Pariter fieri posse adesse allusionem ad praeexsistentiam quam explicite docuit Paulus, Phil 2.6. Quantum ad Philonem, vel ad similem quandam et vulgo diffusam sententiam, dicendum est Paulum clare docere prioritatem hominis terreni (1 Cor 15.46). Quantum ad mythum de homine caelesti, recolenda sunt quae in theologia fundamentali de divina origine religionis christianae probata sunt, quae supra de adversariis recentioribus et de schemate synthetico paulino diximus; quibus de praesenti accedit quod dictus de homine caelesti mythus non solum documentis sed etiam coniecturis et speculationibus fulcitur (cf. Dhanis 92–94).

6 2 Cor 4.4: … deus huius saeculi excaecavit mentes infidelium, ut non fulgeat illis illuminatio evangelii gloriae Christi, qui est imago Dei. Iudaeis erat prohibitum uti Dei imaginibus. Docetur Deum esse ultra similitudinem: Exod 15.11, Ps 88.7, Is 40.25. Homo creatus est ad imaginem Dei (Gen 1.26–27), sed etiam homo tentatur per similitudinem Dei; Gen 3.5: eritis sicut dii scientes bonum et malum. Peccatum angeli, Is 14.14: ascendam super altitudinem nubium, similis ero Altissimo.

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neither male nor female, made according to the image of God (kat’ eikona), where the similarity is one of mind (nous) (De opificio mundi, 69 and 134; Legum Allegoriae, 1, 31–32).68 Further, some have concluded that the myth of a ‘divine’ or ‘heavenly man’ was very widespread (see Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu 92–94). Some critics (Reitzenstein, Loisy, Bousset) have put forth the hypothesis as to the origin of what the gospel teaches about the Son of man and also of Paul’s teaching on man.69 In reply [to this hypothesis], there is the possibility that Paul wrote anthroFpos where the evangelists wrote ho huios tou anthroFpou. Likewise it is possible that Paul is alluding to the pre-existence that he explicitly teaches in Philippians 2.6. As for Philo, or any similar and popularly diffused opinion, the reply is that Paul clearly teaches the priority of the earthly man (1 Corinthians 15.46). As for the myth of the heavenly man, recall what was proved in fundamental theology about the divine origin of the Christian religion, and what was said above about the modern opponents of our thesis and about Paul’s synthetic schematic pattern. Add to this, for present purposes, that pronouncements about a ‘heavenly man’ myth rest not only on documentary evidence but also on conjecture and speculation (see Dhanis, Testimonium Iesu 92–94). 6 2 Corinthians 4.4: ‘The god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them from seeing the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God.’ Images of God were forbidden to the Jews. It was taught that God is beyond any likeness: Exodus 15.11, Psalm 88.7 [evv 89.6], Isaiah 40.25. Man was created in the image of God (Genesis 1.26–27), but similarity to God was also what tempted man: ‘You will be like God, knowing good and evil’ (Genesis 3.5). Such, according to Isaiah 14.14, was the sin of the angels: ‘I will ascend above the heights of the clouds, I will make myself like the Most High.’

68 De opificio mundi is found in vol. 1 in the series mentioned above, p. 105 n. 59 (as is Legum Allegoriae). 69 See above, p. 67, note 39.

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Nostro tamen in loco asseritur Christus esse imago Dei. Sensus asserti ex nexu similium habetur, vide supra. Similitudo, qualis sit, maxime ex notione gloriae colligitur: in nostro enim loco dicitur ‘gloriae Christi, qui est imago Dei’; et paulo ante, 2 Cor 3.18: gloriam Domini speculantes in eandem imaginem transformamur de claritate in claritatem. Vide quae supra collecta sunt de gloria Domini.

Notate apud Philonem logon dici imaginem (eikon), sed similitudo quae explicite ponitur est similitudo ad universum creandum per modum exemplaris (De opificio mundi, 15–16, 24–25).

7 Phil 2.6–11. Cf. 2 Cor 8.9. (a) Urgetur imitatio Christi ut deponantur contentio et inanis gloria, ut colantur caritas, unanimitas, humilitas. Phil 2.1–5. (b) In forma Dei. Sensus videtur similis ad ‘formam servi accipiens’ ubi additur ‘in similitudinem hominum factus et habitu (skheFmati) inventus ut homo’ (2.7–8). Haec tamen pertinent ad nexum similium: in forma alia (Mc 16.2); transformatur Iesus (Mt 17.2, Mc 9.2); skheFma, 1 Cor 4.6, 7.31, 2 Cor 11.13–14. Ulterius, coniunguntur metaskheFmatizein et summorphon (Phil 3.20), suskheFma­tizein et metamorphousthai (Rom 12.2), summorphon et eikoFn (Rom 8.29), doxa, metamorphousthai et eikoFn (2 Cor 3.18); et similiter nostro loco simul ponuntur morpheF, homoioFma, et skheFma. Quare, videtur quod ‘in forma Dei’ significat similitudinem ad Deum. Qualis autem sit ista similitudo? Behm (twnt, 4, 758–60) erudite arguit formam Dei esse gloriam Dei.70 Scilicet, forma alicuius est eius apparentia sensibilis characteristica (nulla

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The passage in question asserts however that Christ is the image of God. This statement takes its meaning from a linking of similars. See above [Preliminary note 4]. The kind of similarity involved draws chiefly on the notion of glory. The passage in question speaks of ‘the glory of Christ, who is the image of God’; a little earlier Paul writes: ‘we all … beholding the glory of the Lord, are being changed into his image from one degree of glory to another’ (2 Corinthians 3.18). See the passages on the glory of the Lord assembled above [pp. 109–15]. Note that although Philo says the Word is an image (eikon), he explicitly states that the similarity involved is a similarity to the universe that would be created through an exemplar (De opificio mundi, 15–16, 24–25). 7 Philippians 2.6–11: Cf. 2 Corinthians 8.9. (a) In Philippians 2.1–5 Paul urges his readers to imitate Christ so that strife may be put away along with empty glory, for the sake of cultivating love, accord, humility. (b) In the form of God: The meaning here seems to be similar to the meaning in ‘taking the form of a servant,’ which is followed by ‘being born in the likeness of men’ and ‘being found in fashion (skheFmati) as a man’ (2.7–8). The following, however, bear on the linking of similars: Jesus’ appearing ‘in a different form’ (Mark 16.12); his being ‘transformed’ (Matthew 17.2, Mark 9.2); and the use of skheFma in 1 Corinthians 4.6, 7.31, 2 Corinthians 11.13–14. Furthermore, the words metaskheFmatizein and symmorphon appear together in Philippians 3.20, as do syskhematizein and metamorphousthai in Romans 12.2, symmorphon and eikoFn in Romans 8.29, doxa, metamorphousthai, and eikoFn in 2 Corinthians 3.18. Similarly, in the passage in question, morpheF, homoi­ oFma, and skheFma are used together. Accordingly it would seem that ‘in the form of God’ designates a similarity to God. But what sort of similarity is it? Behm’s expert opinion (twnt, 4, 758–60) is that the form of God is the glory of God.70 The form of anything, this is to say, is its characteristic ap-

70 See Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament (twnt), vol. 4 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1932) 758–60; in English, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (tdnt), trans. and ed. Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids, mi: Eerdmans, 1967) 750–52.

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supposita oppositione philosophica inter apparentiam et realitatem); apparentiam Dei sensibilem characteristicam esse kaboFd Iahwe, gloriam, claritatem, lucis splendorem; ideoque qui in forma Dei exsistit est gloria Dei indutus. Concludit nostrum locum esse similem ad ‘Dominum gloriae’ (1 Cor 2.8), ‘claritate quam habui priusquam mundus esset apud te’ (Io 17.5). Addi potest ‘splendor gloriae,’ apaugasma teFs doxeFs (Heb 1.3). Distinguuntur tamen ‘forma Dei’ et ‘imago Dei’: Christus est imago Dei sed in forma Dei. (c) … non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo, sed semetipsum exinanivit ... Permultas interpretationes vide apud P. Henry, ‘Kenose,’ dbs (1950) 7–161.71 rapina: potest sumi vel ut res rapienda vel ut res retinenda. esse se aequalem Deo: stare in aequalitate ad Deum; to einai isa theoF, ex­pressio minus usitata. exinanivit, ekenoFsen: privari fine, fructu, usu proprio; cf. usum apud Rom 4.14, 1 Cor 1.17, 9.15, 2 Cor 9.3. Subaudiri videtur quaedam comparatio cum Adamo, qui cum in forma Dei non fuisset, per peccatum speravit assimilationem ad Deum secundum Gen 3.5. Sensus versiculi esse videtur: Christus cum in gloria Dei esset, hanc gloriam et aequalitatem cum Deo retinendam non aestimavit, sed eam deposuit ut fieret homo. (d) forma servi: allusio adesse videtur ad Is 53, Ebed-Iahwe. in similitudinem: cf. Gen 1.26–27; Rom 5.14, 8.3. habitu inventus ut homo: in textu graeco annectitur non antecedentibus sed subsequentibus. humiliavit: cf. supra Phil 2.3: in humilitate. obediens: Rom 5.19, Heb 5.7–8. exaltavit: huperupsoFsen, super-exaltavit; unde suggeritur doxazoF, secundum sensum non graecum sed lxx et nt.

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pearance to sense (no philosophical opposition between appearance and reality being supposed). But the characteristic sensible appearance of God is the kaboFd Yahweh, his glory or brightness or splendid light, and therefore he who exists in the form of God is clothed with the glory of God. Behm concludes that the phrase in Philippians 2 is similar to ‘the Lord of glory’ (1 Corinthians 2.8) and ‘the glory which I had with you before the world was made’ (John 17.5). To these can be added ‘the brightness of his glory,’ apaugasma teFs doxeFs (Hebrews 1.3). The ‘form of God,’ however, is distinct from ‘the image of God’: Christ is the image of God, but is in the form of God. (c) Did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself: There are a great many interpretations; see P. Henry, ‘Kenose,’ dbs (1950) 7–161.71 A thing to be grasped [harpagmon] can be taken either as something to be stolen or as something to be held on to or kept. Equality with God: being the equal of God, to einai isa theoF, an infrequently used expression. Emptied himself (ekenoFsen): was deprived of the goal or end, the fruit, the proper use; cf. the usage in Romans 4.14, 1 Corinthians 1.17, 9.15, 2 Corinthians 9.3. There seems to be an unstated comparison with Adam, who was not in the form of God but according to Genesis 3.5 sinfully hoped to become like God. The meaning of this part of the passage would seem to be that although Christ was in the glory of God he did not count equality with God a thing to be held onto or kept, but put it aside in order to become man. (d) The form of a servant appears to be an allusion to the ebed Yahweh of Isaiah 53. in the likeness: cf. Genesis 1.26–27, Romans 5.14, 8.3. being found in fashion as a man: in the Greek text this can only be taken with what follows, not with what precedes it. humbled himself: cf. Philippians 2.3, ‘in humility.’ obedient: see Romans 5.19, Hebrews 5.7-8. highly exalted: since the word is huperupsoFsen, ‘super-exalted,’ it suggests doxazoF, not in its [classical] Greek meaning but as used in the Septuagint and the New Testament [namely, in the sense of ‘glorify’; see above, § vi.1].

71 P. Henry, ‘Kénose,’ dbs, vol. 5, cols. 7–161.

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omne genu flectatur: dicitur de Deo, Rom 14.10–11, Is 45.23. caelestium, terrestrium, infernorum: cf. 1 Cor 15.24, Eph 1.10, 1.21–22, Col 1.16, 2.9–10, 1 Cor 12.3. in gloria est: graec.: Iesus est Dominus in gloriam Patris.72 (e) Ex hoc loco ultra dubium ponitur praeexsistentia Christi ad vitam suam terrestrem: sicut Ioannes primo ponit Verbum et deinde Verbum incarnatum (Io 1.1, 1.14), ita hic primo habetur Christus in forma Dei et deinde, post ratiocinium (arbitratus est), formam servi accipiens. Praeterea, multis indiciis73 docetur divinitas Christi, salvo monotheismo. Nam sicut essentia Dei se habet ad mentem humanam intellectualisticam, ita gloria Dei se habet ad totum hominem qui non solum intellectu sed etiam imaginibus et affectu apprehendit realitatem. Quare, sicut philosophi ex similibus ad formas (sensu philosophico) cognoscendas perveniunt, ita etiam theologi ex gloria Dei (in forma Dei) ad divinam essentiam, naturam, formam non sine fundamento ratiocinati sunt. Accedunt nomen super omne nomen, adoratio, applicatio textus ad Christum qui originaliter de Deo dictus est (Is 45.23, Rom 14.10–11). Dices: maius est in gloria Dei esse, in aequalitate cum Deo stare, quam subsequens glorificatio hominis obedientis, patientis, morientis. Quomodo ergo fit ut Paulus subsequentem glorificationem aestimaverit maiorem? Respondetur: Paulus maiorem emphasim in subsequenti glorificatione ponit, conceditur; plus aestimavit subsequentem glorificationem, non constat. Initio Christus est in forma Dei, seu in gloria Dei; terminus autem glorificationis est ad gloriam Patris, eis doxan theou Patros.

8 Col 1.15–17 Postquam de regnante Filio dilectionis paternae (1.13) dixit, eiusdem

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every knee should bow: this is said of God in Romans 14.10–11 [quoting] Isaiah 45.23. in heaven and on earth and under the earth: cf. 1 Corinthians 15.24, Ephe­ sians 1.10, 1.21–22, Colossians 1.16, 2.9–10, 1 Corinthians 12.3. to the glory: the Greek makes it clear that Jesus is Lord to the glory of the Father.72 (e) There is no doubt but that this passage sets out the pre-existence of Christ before his earthly life. As John first speaks of the Word and then of the Word made flesh (John 1.1, 1.14), so here we have, first, Christ in the form of God and then, following deliberation (‘did not count’), Christ taking the form of a servant. Further, there are several indications73 that the passage teaches Christ’s divinity while preserving monotheism. For, as the essence of God stands to the intellectual human mind, so the glory of God stands to the whole human being, who apprehends reality not only with the intellect but also through image and feeling. Consequently, as philosophers reach their knowledge of forms (in the philosophical sense) by starting from similars, so theologians have grounds for reasoning from the glory of God (‘in the form of God’) to the divine essence or nature or form. Supporting this opinion, we find the ‘name that is above every name,’ worship, and the application to Christ of a text originally concerning God (Isaiah 45.23, Romans 14.10–11). You might be saying that to be in the glory of God, to stand in equality with God, is something greater than the glorification, later on, of an obedient, patient, dying man. How is it that Paul reckons this later glorification the greater? Reply: That Paul puts more emphasis on the later glorification, I grant. But that he reckoned this later glorification the greater is unfounded. At the beginning Christ is in the form of God, or in the glory of God, but the end or purpose of his glorification is for the glory of the Father, eis doxan theou Patros. 8 Colossians 1.15–17 After speaking about the kingdom of the Father’s beloved Son (1.13), 72 Lonergan quotes the Vulgate, ‘in the glory,’ but notes that the Greek means ‘to the glory.’ See above, p. 93, at note 49. 73 Reading with the 1960 and 1961 editions ‘multis indiciis’ rather than the 1964 ‘multis iudiciis.’

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eminentiam dupliciter declarat: primo, eminentiam ponit universalem (1.15–17); deinde, eminentiam in opere redemptionis (1.18–20). De eminentia universali tractasse videtur propter errores circa elementa mundi quae ex philosophia, inani fallacia, traditione hominum provenerant (Col 2.8). Unde in contextu non desunt hellenistica, sicut in 1 Cor 8.6. Imago: opponitur umbrae (Hebr 10.1), more platonico; apud Paulum pertinet ad nexum similium: Rom 1.23, 8.29, 1 Cor 11.7, 15.49, 2 Cor 3.18, Col 3.10. Circa Col 2.17, cf. 1 Cor 10.6. Imago Dei: 2 Cor 4.4; cf. Hebr 1.3: splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius. Imago Dei invisibilis: 1 Tim 6.16: … lucem inhabitat inaccessibilem, quem nullus hominum vidit sed nec videre potest. Io 1.18, 1 Io 4.12, Mt 11.27, Lc 10.22. Sensus non est: non videtur divinitas sed videtur humanitas, quod praesupponit theologiam post evolutam. Potius subest repraesentatio Dei nimis lucidi ut conspici possit; et ‘imago’ magis dicit similitudinem ad Deum quam visibilitatem quoad nos. primogenitus: (1) primus generatus; (2) primatum habens, scilicet, iura, privilegia, dignitatem quae primogenito conveniunt. Primo modo sumitur, Lc 2.7. Alio modo sumitur, Col 1.18: primogenitus ex mortuis; Rom 8.29, uti videtur; Apoc 1.5. Absolute ponitur, Heb 1.6. Nostro in loco, si primo modo sumitur, sequitur oppositio inter generatum et creatum, nam dicitur ‘primogenitus omnis creaturae’; si altero modo sumitur, sequitur primatus vel inter omnes creaturas (genitivus partitivus) vel super omnes creaturas (genitivus comparationis: cf. Io 1.15, 1.30, 15.18). Quod primatus est inter creaturas, quatenus importat Christum esse creaturam, excluditur a subsequentibus ubi Christus ipsi creationi interfuisse dicitur. Cf. Michaelis, twnt, 6, 879.74

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the author declares the Son’s pre-eminence in two ways. First, there is his universal pre-eminence (1.15–17), then his pre-eminence in the work of redemption (1.18–20). The treatment of universal pre-eminence was apparently prompted by errors having to do with ‘elemental spirits’ and arising from philosophy, empty deceit, and human tradition (Colossians 2.8). Thus, the context has a Hellenistic aspect, as in 1 Corinthians 8.6. Image is used Platonistically, as the opposite of shadows, in Hebrews 10.1. In Paul, it pertains to a linking of similars: Romans 1.23, 8.29, 1 Corinthians 11.7, 15.49, 2 Corinthians 3.18, Colossians 3.10. As for Colossians 2.17, cf. 1 Corinthians 10.6. The image of God: 2 Corinthians 4.4; cf. Hebrews 1.3, ‘the brightness of his glory and the very stamp of his nature.’ The image of the invisible God: God ‘dwells in unapproachable light, whom no man has ever seen or can see’ (1 Timothy 6.16). Also John 1.18, 1 John 4.12, Matthew 11.27, Luke 10.22. The meaning is not that [the Son’s] humanity is seen but divinity is not; that presupposes a later theological development. The underlying notion is rather that of a representation of God so exceedingly clear that it can be seen. ‘Image’ denotes the similarity to God, rather than the visibility from our viewpoint. First-born can mean (1) the first one to be born, or (2) the one who is ranked first, who in other words has the rights and privileges and dignity which are proper to the first-born. ‘First-born’ takes on the first sense in Luke 2.7. It takes on the second in Colossians 1.18 (‘the first-born from the dead’), in Revelation 1.5, and, it seems, in Romans 8.29. Hebrews 1.6 uses it in an unqualified sense. As for the passage in question [Colossians 1.15], if ‘first-born’ is construed in the first sense, it implies a contrast between him who is born and that which is created, since the wording is ‘the first-born of all creation.’ Construed in the second sense, ‘first-born’ implies the first rank, either among all creatures (partitive genitive) or above all creatures (genitive of comparison; cf. John 1.15, 1.30, 15.18). First rank among creatures is ruled out, to the extent that it would mean Christ is a creature, by the verses that follow, which say that Christ took part in creation itself. See Michaelis, twnt, 6, 879.74

74 See also tdnt, 6, 878–79.

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omnia: additur enumeratio emphatica; cf. Col 2.10: caput omnis principatus et potestatis. in ipso: dicitur bis, v. 16 et v. 17. Primo, omnia condita seu creata sunt in Christo; deinde omnia constant, simul stant, systema (sun, histeFmi) faciunt in Christo. Sensus videtur idem esse ac illud: membra, corpus esse in Christo, in capite; sicut enim Christus est caput ecclesiae, ita etiam est caput omnis principatus et potestatis (Col 2.10); ideoque totum universum est in Christo sicut in capite, i.e., omnia ad unitatem reduci in ipso. Vide etiam Act 17.28: in ipso enim vivimus et movemur et sumus: sicut ibi in Deo, nunc etiam in Christo. omnia per ipsum et in ipso (eis auton) creata sunt: cf. Rom 11.36, ubi omnia sunt ex, per, in Deum; et 1 Cor 8.6, ubi omnia sunt ex Patre et in Patrem sed per Christum; nostro in loco ex tribus duo dicuntur de Christo, omnia per ipsum et omnia in ipsum (eis auton). ante omnes: forte ante omnia, pro pantoFn;75 ante, pro sensum localem potius quam temporalem habere potest. Quo in loco constat Christum non esse creaturam, si quidem omnia, emphatice asserta, sunt per ipsum et in ipsum. Quod tamen non seorsum ponitur sed una cum munere universali Christi et contra errores fallaciasque. 9 Col 2.9–10: quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter, et estis in illo repleti. Cf. Eph 3.17–19: Christum habitare per fidem in cordibus vestris … ut impleamini in omnem plenitudinem Dei. In utroque loco habentur: (1) habitatio, (2) plenitudo vel Dei vel deitatis (theoteFs, non theioteFs), (3) impletio Ephesenorum, repletio Colossensium. Sed differt inhabitandi modus: inhabitatio in cordibus est per fidem; inhabitatio in Christo est corporaliter, soFmatikoFs. soFmatikoFs: sensus videtur esse ‘realiter.’ Distinguebantur poenae datae argurikoFs (in denariis) et soFmatikoFs (in corpore). Vel forte est allusio ad corpus Christi: plenitudo deitatis in Christo, capite corporis, est ut corpus suum impleat.

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All creation is emphasized by the addition of a list [in 1.16]; cf. Colossians 2.10, ‘the head of all rule and authority.’ In him appears twice, in verses 16 and 17. In the former, all things are founded or created in Christ; in the latter, all things hold together [syne­ steFken], stand together, constitute a system (sun, histeFmi) in Christ. The meaning seems to be the same as this: in Christ, in the Head, the members are a body. For just as Christ is head of the church, so also he is the head of all rule and authority (Colossians 2.10), and thus the whole universe is in Christ as in its head. In him, that is, all things resolve into unity. See also Acts 17.28, ‘in him we live and move and have our being’: as there it is in God, so now also in Christ. all things were created through him and for him (eis auton): cf. Romans 11.36, where all things are from, through, and to (eis) God; and 1  Corinthians 8.6, where all things are from the Father and for [eis] the Father but through Christ. The passage in question applies two of these three to Christ: all things are through him and all things are for him (eis auton). before all: the meaning of pro pantoFn is perhaps ‘before all things’;75 ‘before,’ pro, can have the meaning of place rather than of time. The passage in question makes it clear that Christ is not a creature, since it asserts emphatically that all things are through him and for him. This is stated, however, not separately but together with the universal work of Christ, and against errors and fallacies. 9 Colossians 2.9–10: ‘For in him the whole fullness of Godhead dwells bodily, and you have come to fullness in him.’ Cf. Ephesians 3.17–19: ‘that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith … that you may be filled with all the fullness of God.’ In both passages we find: (1) dwelling, (2) fullness, either of God or of Godhead (theoteFs, not theioteFs), and (3) the Ephesians’ being fulfilled and the Colossians’ coming to fullness. But the manner of dwelling is different. The dwelling in hearts is a dwelling through faith, whereas in Christ the dwelling is bodily (soFmatikoFs). The meaning of soFmatikoFs would seem to be ‘in reality.’ A distinction was drawn between punishments suffered argyrikoFs (in the pocket, ‘penny-wise’) and punishments suffered soFmatikoFs, ‘in the body.’ Or there may be an allusion to the body of Christ: the fullness of Godhead in Christ, the Head of the body, is such as to fill his body.

75 Rather than ‘before all persons,’ ante omnes, as in the Vulgate translation.

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Plura vide supra, pp. 58–60, ubi de schemate synthetico paulino. Locus non directe probat divinitatem; sed data interpretatio excludit adoptionismum, scil. Christum non esse Deum sed templum in quo Deus inhabitat. Caeterum, adoptionismus excluditur per illud ‘unum eundemque’ quod tota expositione probatur. ii  Ex conceptione epistulae ad Hebraeos 1.2–4, 1.876 Vide C. Spicq, L’Épître aux Hébreux, 2 vol.77 In Filio. Opponitur ad prophetas. Cf. Mc 12.1–11. Filius per totam epistulam celebratur: 3.5-6 Moyses erat famulus fidelis in domo Dei, Christus Filius in domo sua; gravitas peccati contra Filium (6.6, 10.28–29); sacerdotes vt infirmi, pontifex nt est Filius Dei (4.14), Filius in aeternum perfectus (7.28), cui assimilatur Melchisedech patre, matre, genealogia carens (7.3).

Heres: qui legitime proprietatem accepit et possidet. Per quem fecit et saecula: i.e., omnia; Col 1.16, Io 1.3. Splendor gloriae: apaugasma teFs doxeFs; cf. Sap 7.25–26; emanatio sincera claritatis Dei omnipotentis et candor (apaugasma) lucis aeternae; ubi de sapientia agitur. Cf. 1 Cor 1.24, 1.30, 2.7, de Christo Dei sapientia. Unde Nicaenum; lumen de lumine (db 54).

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See further pp. 58–61 above on Paul’s synthetic pattern. This passage does not prove Christ’s divinity directly, but the interpretation just given rules out adoptionism – that Christ is not God but a temple in which God dwelt. Beyond that, adoptionism is ruled out by Christ’s being one and the same, which is proved in our whole discussion. ii  The conception in the letter to Hebrews at 1.2–4, 1.876 See C. Spicq, L’Épître aux Hébreux, 2 vols.77 By a Son is set in contrast with ‘by the prophets.’ Cf. Mark 12.1–11. The Son is praised throughout the letter. In Hebrews 3.5–6 Moses is said to have been faithful in all God’s house as a servant, while Christ was faithful as a son over his own house. The gravity of sins committed against the Son is stressed in 6.6 and 10.28–29. The priests of the Old Testament were weak, but according to 4.14 the high priest of the New Testament is the Son of God, and the Son has been made perfect for ever (7.28), resembling Melchizedek in that he is without father or mother or genealogy (7.3). An heir is one who legitimately receives and takes possession of property. Through whom also he created the world: that is, all things, as in Colossians 1.16 and John 1.3. The brightness of his glory (apaugasma teFs doxeFs): cf. Wisdom 7.25–26, which speaks of Wisdom as ‘a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty … the brightness (apaugasma) of eternal light.’ See also 1 Corinthians 1.24, 1.30, and 2.7 on Christ as the wisdom of God. Hence the phrase ‘light from light’ in the creed of the Council of Nicea (db 54, ds 125, [dec 1: 5]).

76 Lonergan’s discussion makes it necessary to depart slightly from the rsv translation of vv. 1–4, which in Greek as in the Vulgate form a single sentence. Thus: ‘In many and various ways God spoke of old to our fathers by the prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son, whom he appointed heir of all things, through whom also he created the world; who, being the brightness of his glory and the very stamp of his nature, and upholding the universe by his word of power, when he had made purification for sins, sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high, having become as much superior to angels as the name he has inherited is more excellent than theirs … of the Son he says, “Your throne, O God, is for ever and ever …”’ 77 See above, p. 97, note 51.

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Figura, kharakteFr: imago impressa ex ipsa re; cf. Io 14.9: qui videt me, videt et Patrem. Substantia: hypostasis, realitas, sicut db 54; non sicut db 148, ubi personam significat (ds 125, 301–302).

Portans omnia: ferens onus, responsabilitatem, omnia gubernandi. Verbo virtutis: Ps 32.9: Quoniam ipse dixit et facta sunt; ipse mandavit et creata sunt. Distinguuntur forte verbum creativum (rheFma), Heb 1.3, 11.3, et verbum revelativum (logos), Heb 4.2, 4.12. Faciens: poieFsamenos, cum fecisset.78 Sedet ad dexteram maiestatis: Ps 109.1, Act 2.24, Eph 1.20. Melior angelis: Col 1.16–17, 2.10, Eph 1.10, 1.21. Nomen haereditavit: nomen a Patre vi haereditatis; cf. Phil 2.9, Eph 1.21, Apoc 19.12–13. Iam supra, ubi de nomine Dei, egimus de v. 8,79 ubi clarissime nomen divinum Filio attribuitur. Ps 44.7: Thronus tuus erit in saeculum … Sed si pro Iod legitur Vau, oritur quod a textu graeco supponitur: Thronus tuus, Deus, in saeculum … Sane non fit argumentum ex Ps 44.7, sed fit ex manifestata intentione auctoris ad Hebraos.

(b) Auctor brevissime paulina comprehendit: diceres Heb 1.3 simul contractionem, clarificationem, expansionem esse eorum quae vidimus Phil 2.6-11. Confer sequentia: qui cum sit splendor gloriae | qui cum in forma Dei esset figura substantiae eius | imago Dei (2 Cor 4.4, Col 1.15)

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The very stamp: the word here is kharakteFr, an image impressed or stamped by the thing itself; cf. John 14.9, ‘he who sees me sees the Father.’ Of his nature: The word here is hypostasis, ‘reality,’ as in the creed of the Council of Nicea (db 54, ds 125, [dec 1: 5]) and not as in the Chalcedonian decree (db 148, ds 301–302, [dec 1: 86–87]), where hypostasis designates ‘person.’ Upholding the universe : bearing the burden or responsibility of governing all things. By his word of power: ‘For he spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created’ (Psalm 32.9 [evv 33.9]). There may be a distinction between the creative word (rheFma) in Hebrews 1.3, 11.3, and the revealing word (logos) in Hebrews 4.2, 4.12. When he had made: The word is poieFsamenos.78 He sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high. See Psalm 109.1 (evv 110:1), Acts 2.24, Ephesians 1.20. Superior to angels: see Colossians 1.16–17, 2.10, Ephesians 1.10, 1.21. The name he has inherited is the name that comes from the Father by heredity; cf. Philippians 2.9, Ephesians 1.21, Revelation 19.12–13. We have already dealt with verse 8 when considering the name of God;79 it very clearly attributes the divine name to the Son. Psalm 44.7 [evv 45.6; quoted in Hebrews 1.8] reads, ‘Your throne will be for ever …’ But if, instead of the Hebrew letter yod, we read the letter waw, the result is what the Greek text takes it to be: ‘Your throne, O God, (is) for ever …’ No argument can be drawn from the Psalm, of course, but one can be drawn from the obvious intention of the author of Hebrews. (b) That author embraces Pauline themes with the greatest brevity. You might say that Hebrews 1.3 is at once a contraction, a clarification, and an expansion of what we have already seen in Philippians 2.6–11. Compare the following: ‘Who, being the brightness of his glory’  || ‘who, though he was in the form of God’ ‘The very stamp of his nature’ || ‘the image of God’ (2 Corinthians 4.4, Colossians 1.15)

78 Lonergan here provides a gloss on the Vulgate’s translation, which has the present participle faciens, ‘making.’ The Greek, he suggests, might better be rendered by cum fecisset, ‘when he had made,’ as in the rsv. 79 See above, p. 97.

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portans omnia verbo virtutis suae | in ipso condita sunt universa, omnia in ipso constant (Col 1.16–17) purgationem peccatorum faciens | formam servi accipiens … humiliavit … factus obediens usque ad mortem … sedet ad dexteram | Deus exaltavit illum (c) Cum reputetur auctor optime opera Philonis cognovisse, notandum est eum non dixisse imaginem (eikoFn) sed figuram (kharakteFr) substantiae, quasi doctrinam philonianam circa verbum et imaginem (logon, eikona) evitasset.

iii  Ex conceptione Verbi apud Ioannem 1 In usu graeco et hellenistico Vocabula graeca: legoF, logos, rheFma, laleoF, lalia, distinxit Debrunner, twnt, 4, 71–76. Quotupliciter ‘logos’ a graecis et hellenistis dictus fuerit, exposuit Kleinknecht, ibid., 76–89.80 Fundamentalis sensus: colligere, numerare, calculare, narrare, explicare, rationem reddere. Culturalis sensus: verbum, sermo, inquantum exprimit, manifestat hominis intelligentiam, rationalitatem; sic ‘logos’ quasi symbolum fuit ipsius culturae graecae. Translatus sensus (causa pro effectu): id quod verbis, sermonibus, argumentis manifestatur, nempe, ipsa ratio intra hominem unde homo rationes postulat, quaerit, exprimit; unde graeca hominis definitio, zoFon logikon, animal rationale; cf. hominis definitio moderna, animal symbolicum. Metaphysicus sensus: id quod rebus inest, unde per rationem cognosci possunt; Stoici logon ipsis rebus immanentem posuerunt; Neoplatonici logon voluerunt mundo aspectabili transcendentem, nempe, mundum idearum, kosmon noeFton. Religiosus sensus: notis et antiquis divinitatibus, Hermi, Isidi, Thot, etc., accessit nova significatio, scilicet, cuiusdam principii cosmogonici; unde et logoi dicebantur. Philo Alexandrinus identificavit Neoplatonicorum mundum intelligibilem cum idea mundi in mente Dei creantis; quam ideam nominavit ton logon tou theou (De opif. mundi, 24–25).

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‘Upholding all things by the word of his power’ || ‘in him all things were created,’ ‘in him all things hold together’ (Colossians 1.16–17) ‘When he had made purification for sins’ || ‘taking the form of a servant … he humbled himself … and became obedient unto death’ ‘He sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high’ || ‘God highly exalted him.’ (c) Since it is thought that the author of Hebrews had an excellent knowledge of Philo’s works, it should be noted that he did not say ‘the image (eikoFn) of his nature,’ but ‘the very stamp (kharakteFr) of his nature,’ as though to avoid Philo’s doctrine of ‘word’ and ‘image’ (logos, eikoFn). iii  The conception of the Word in John 1 Greek and Hellenistic usage The Greek words legoF, logos, rheFma, laleoF, and lalia are distinguished by Debrunner in twnt, 4, 71–76. Kleinknecht discusses the different senses of logos in Greek and Hellenistic usage, twnt, 4, 76–89.80 Basic sense: to collect, enumerate, calculate, narrate, explain, give reasons. Cultural sense: word or saying, inasmuch as these express and manifest human intelligence and reasonableness. Logos was thus a kind of symbol for Greek culture itself. Transferred sense (taking cause for effect): what is manifested by words, discourse, or argument, namely, that reason within us whereby we seek, propose, and express reasons. Hence the Greek definition of man as zoFon logikon, the rational animal; cf. the modern definition of man as the symbolic animal. Metaphysical sense: that which is in things whereby they can be known by reason. The Stoics posited an immanent logos within things themselves; the Neoplatonists insisted on a logos transcending the world of appearance – a world of ideas, a kosmos noeFtos. Religious sense: As the old familiar deities, Hermes, Isis, Thoth, and the rest, took on the added significance of cosmogonic principles, they were also called logoi. Philo of Alexandria identified the intelligible world of the Neoplatonists with the idea of the world in the mind of the creating God, and this idea he named ho logos tou theou, ‘the word of God’ (De opificio mundi, 24–25).

80 See also tdnt, 4, 69–77 and 77–91.

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2 In usu scripturistico (twnt, 4, 89–100)81 eminent: Verbum creativum: Dixit Deus: Fiat lux. Et facta est lux (Gen 1). Verbo Domini caeli firmati sunt (Ps 32.6). Verbum propheticum: factum est verbum Domini ad Ezechielem filium Buzi (Ez 1.3; cf. Ier 1.4, Amos 3.1, Osee 1.1, Mich 1.1, Soph 1.1). Quod propheticum verbum ad culturam hebraicam se habuit sicut logos sophistarum, philosophorum, mathematicorum, etc., ad culturam graecam. Inter Hebraeos agebatur non de ratione humana sed de inspiratione divina (2 Sam 23.2: Spiritus Domini locutus est per me, et sermo eius per linguam meam). Verbum Dei personificatum: Is 55.10–11: Et quomodo descendit imber et nix de caelo et illud ultra non revertitur, sed inebriat terram et infundit eam et germinare eam facit et dat semen serenti et panem comedenti, sic erit verbum meum quod egredietur de ore meo: non revertetur ad me vacuum, sed faciet quaecumque volui et prosperabitur in his ad quae misi illud. Sap 18.14–16: Cum enim quietum silentium contineret omnia, et nox in suo cursu medium iter haberet, omnipotens sermo tuus de caelo de regalibus sedibus, durus debellator in mediam exterminii terram prosilivit, gladius acutus insimulatum imperium tuum portans, et stans replevit omnia morte, et usque ad caelum attingebat stans in terra. Sapientia personificata: Sap 7.22, 7.25, 7.27, omnium artifex, procedens de divina potentia et gloria, sanctificatrix; Prov 8.22-36: Erat apud Deum (possessa, creata?)82 antequam quidquam faceret; interfuit creationi; beati qui

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2 Prominent in scriptural usage (twnt, 4, 89–100)81 are the following: The creative word: ‘And God said, “Let there be light”; and there was light’ (Genesis 1.3). ‘By the word of the Lord were the heavens made’ (Psalm 32.6 [evv 33.6]). The prophetic word: ‘The word of the Lord came to Ezekiel the priest, the son of Buzi’ (Ezekiel 1.3; cf. Jeremiah 1.4, Amos 3.1, Hosea 1.1, Micah 1.1, Zephaniah 1.1). This prophetic word was to Hebrew culture what the logos of the sophists, philosophers, mathematicians, and the like, was to Greek culture. For the Hebrews, it was not a matter of human reason but of divine inspiration. ‘The Spirit of the Lord speaks by me, his word is upon my tongue’ (2 Samuel 23.2). The personified word of God: ‘For as the rain and the snow come down from heaven, and return not thither but water the earth, making it bring forth and sprout, giving seed to the sower and bread to the eater, so shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth; it shall not return to me empty, but it shall accomplish that which I purpose, and prosper in the thing for which I sent it’ (Isaiah 55.10–11). ‘For while gentle silence enveloped all things, and night in its swift course was now half gone, your all-powerful word leaped from heaven, from the royal throne, into the midst of the land that was doomed, a stern warrior, carrying the sharp sword of your authentic command, and stood and filled all things with death, and touched heaven while standing on the earth’ (Wisdom 18.14–15). Wisdom personified: Wisdom is spoken of as the fashioner of all things (Wisdom 7.22), as proceeding from God’s power and glory (7.25), as sanctifying (7.27). In the book of Proverbs (8.22–36) Wisdom, who takes part in creation, is with God (possessed or created?)82 at the beginning of his work; 81 See also tdnt, 4, 91–100. 82 At Proverbs 8.22 the Vulgate reads, Dominus possedit me, ‘the Lord possessed me,’ but Lonergan is asking if the meaning should be ‘the Lord created me.’ The meaning of Proverbs 8.22 was the subject of extensive controversy in the ancient church, especially during the Arian controversy of the fourth century. The Hebrew verb is qanah: to get, acquire, create, buy, possess. Elsewhere in Proverbs the same root is typically used in the sense of acquiring, e.g., wisdom, insight, knowledge (4.5, 7; 15.32; 16.16; 17.16; 18.15; 19.8; 23.23), and the Vulgate translates it in this sense. The lxx has ektisen, created. Important recent evv (e.g., rsv, nrsv, Jerusalem Bible) have ‘created.’ There are, however, exceptions: ‘begot’ (New American Bible, perhaps taking its cue from the verbs suggestive of parturition in vv. 24–25), ‘possessed’ (English Standard Version).

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custodiunt vias meas … Ecclus 24.5: Ego ex ore Altissimi prodivi, primogenita ante omnem creaturam … Lex in speculatione rabbinica erat facta ante constitutionem mundi, erat apud Deum, in sinu Dei, super genua Dei, erat instrumentum quo factus est mundus. Hanc speculationem censet C.H. Dodd originem antechristianam habuisse (The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel 85). Vide Ecclus 24.32; cf. lxx Sir 24.23. Verbum evangelicum: In nt dicere, audire, servire, docere, addiscere, praedicare verbum (ton logon) est idem ac dicere, etc., evangelium.

3 Logos adhibetur a Ioanne in prologo quater, sensu quodam speciali, qui differt ab usu in reliquo evangelio et in nt. Prologus ponit Christum in schemate retrospectivo-inverso, sicut Gal 4.4–6, Phil 2.6–11, Heb 1.1–4. Ubi alibi praeexsistens concipitur ut ‘in forma Dei,’ ‘imago Dei,’ ‘splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius,’ hic concipitur ut Logos. Praeterea, in prologo quam clarissime distinguitur inter praeexistentem Christum et Christum hominem; ponuntur primo Verbum et deinde Verbum caro factum; quae distinctio usque hodie manet. Praeterea, in prologo insinuatur oppositio inter aeternum et temporale per verba ‘esse’ et ‘fieri,’ ‘einai’ et ‘gignesthai,’ quae non solum saepius recurrunt sed etiam alternationem quandam faciunt, scilicet, 1.1: In principio erat Verbum … 1.6: Egeneto anthroFpos … 1.9: Erat lux vera … 1.14: Et Verbum caro factum est … 1.18: qui est (ho oFn) in sinu Patris … Cf. etiam 8.58: antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum. 4 Quemadmodum Ioannes Logon conceperit. (a) In principio Cf. Gen 1.1, ubi tamen statim de creatione narratur; Ioannes creationem ad v. 3 remittit. (b) Apud Deum, pros ton theon

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‘happy are those who keep my ways’ (Proverbs 8.32). ‘I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before all creation’ (Ecclesiasticus 24.5 Vulgate). The Law, in Rabbinic speculation, was made before the foundation of the world; it was with God, in the bosom of God, upon the knees of God; it was the instrument by which the world was made. C.H. Dodd considers that such speculation had pre-Christian origins (The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel 85). See Ecclesiasticus 24.32 Vulgate and cf. Sirach 24.23. The word of the gospel: In the New Testament, to speak, hear, serve, teach, learn, or preach the word (ho logos) is the same as to speak, hear, serve, teach, learn, or preach the gospel. 3 In the prologue of John, logos is used four times, in a special sense that differs from its use in the rest of the gospel and elsewhere in the New Testament. The prologue presents Christ in an inverse-retrospective pattern like that used in Galatians 4.4–6, Philippians 2.6–11, and Hebrews 1.1–4. In those passages, the one who pre-exists is conceived as being ‘in the form of God’ or ‘the image of God’ or ‘the brightness of his glory and the very stamp of his nature.’ Here he is conceived as Logos. Further, there is a very clear distinction in the prologue between the pre-existent Christ and Christ the man. The Word is presented first, then the Word made flesh. This distinction has been maintained down to the present time. Further, the prologue hints at a contrast between the eternal and the temporal through the verbs ‘to be’ and ‘to become,’ einai and gignesthai. These not only frequently recur but alternate: ‘In the beginning was (eFn) the Word’ (John 1.1); ‘There was (egeneto: came to be) a man sent from God’ (1.6); ‘That was (eFn) the true light’ (1.9); ‘And the word became (egeneto) flesh’ (1.14); ‘… who is (ho oFn) in the bosom of the Father’ (1.18). See also John 8.58, ‘before Abraham was (genesthai), I am (eimi).’ 4 How John conceived the Logos (a) In the beginning Cf. Genesis 1.1, which goes on at once, however, to tell the story of creation, whereas John reserves creation for verse 3. (b) With God (pros ton theon)

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1.18: Unigenitus Filius (Deus) qui est in sinu Patris. 1.14: gloriam quasi Unigeniti a Patre. 17.5: claritate quam habui prius quam mundus esset apud te (para soi). 17.24: quia dilexisti me ante constitutionem mundi. 5.26: sicut enim Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio habere vitam in semetipso. 1 Io 1.2: adnuntiamus vobis vitam aeternam, quae erat apud Patrem (pros ton patera) et apparuit nobis. (c) Deus Quod exacte distingues contra Apoc 19.13: et vocatur nomen eius Verbum Dei (ho logos tou theou). Aliud est Verbum-Deus, et aliud est Verbum-Dei. Hoc dici potest de revelatione, de scriptura, de verbo Dei scripto et tradito, de verbo vel creativo vel prophetico. Illud dicitur de Filio Unigenito qui claritate Patris fulget et dilectione Patris gaudet. (d) Hoc erat in principio apud Deum. Repetit Ioannes quod iam dixit, forte ut separaret quae dixisset a statim dicendis. Unde convenienter notantur quae intercedunt inter Logon Ioannis et verbum vel propheticum vel creativum. Verbum propheticum: et factum est (egeneto) verbum domini ad (pros) Ezechielem … Ubi triplex differentia deprehenditur. Logos Ioannis non factus est (egeneto) sed erat (eFn). Deinde, Logos non est Domini vel Dei sed Deus. Tertio, aliter et aliter dicitur praepositio pros: in verbo prophetico agitur de locutione facta alicui, de inspiratione ei data; sed Logos Ioannis non est locutio facta ad Deum, inspiratio Deo data; est apud Deum, sicut vita aeterna est apud Patrem, pros ton patera (1 Io 1.2), sicut Unigenitus Filius (vel Deus) est in sinu Patris (Io 1.18). Verbum creativum: verbo Domini caeli firmati sunt (Ps 32.6). Ubi ‘verbum’ est metaphora anthropomorphica. Philo modo spirituali concepit verbum quoddam creativum, nempe, ideam mundi in mente Dei creantis mundum; et convenienter quidem cum de interpretatione libri Geneseos agebatur (De opif. mundi, 24–25). Sed aliud est interpretari librum Geneseos, et aliud interpretari prologum Ioannis. Sane apud Ioannem Logos interfuit creationi (1.3); sed alia et priora etiam de eo dicuntur (Io 17.5, 17.24, 5.26, 1.1–2 collatis 1.18 et 1 Io 1.2).

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‘The only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father’ (1.18; some authorities read, ‘the only begotten God’). ‘Glory as of the only begotten of the Father’ (1.14): ‘the glory which I had with you (para soi) before the world was made’ (17.5); ‘in your love for me before the foundation of the world’ (17.24); ‘as the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life in himself’ (5.26). ‘We … proclaim to you the eternal life which was with the Father (pros ton patera) and was made manifest to us’ (1 John 1.2). (c) The Word was God. This should be carefully distinguished from Revelation 19.13, ‘and his name is called the Word of God (ho logos tou theou).’ God the Word is one thing and the Word of God is another. The latter can be used in reference to revelation, to scripture, to the word of God written and handed down, to the creative word or the prophetic word. The former refers to the only begotten Son who shines with the glory of the Father and rejoices in the Father’s love. (d) He was in the beginning with God. John repeats himself, perhaps in order to separate what he has said from what he is about to say. Hence it will be appropriate here to take note of what divides John’s Logos from the creative and the prophetic word. The prophetic word: ‘The word of the Lord came to (egeneto … pros) Ezekiel.’ Three differences are found here. John’s Logos did not come to be (egeneto); he was (eFn). Secondly, the Logos is not of the Lord or of God. He is God. Thirdly, the preposition pros is used differently. In the prophetic word, it is a matter of an utterance made to someone or an inspiration given to him. But John’s Logos is no utterance made to God, nor an inspiration given to God; he is with God, as eternal life is with the Father, pros ton patera (1 John 1.2) and as the only begotten Son (or God) is in the bosom of the Father (John 1.18). The creative word: ‘By the word of the Lord were the heavens made’ (Psalm 32.6 [evv 33.6]). Here ‘word’ is an anthropomorphic metaphor. Philo had a spiritual way of conceiving a creative word, namely, as an idea of the world in the mind of God while creating the world. This was appropriate, since Philo was concerned with interpreting the book of Genesis (De opificio mundi, 24–25). But it is one thing to interpret the book of Genesis and another to interpret the prologue of John. In John the Logos does take part in creation (1.3), but other assertions about him prior to creation are made in John 17.5, 17.24, 5.26, and 1.1–2 read together with 1.18 and 1 John 1.2.

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(e) Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est. Sic textus receptus: alii periodum ponunt post ‘nihil’ ut ad sequentia coniungant ‘quod factum est.’ De quibus vide exegetas. Cf. 1.10: et mundus per ipsum factus est. 1 Cor 8.6, Col 1.16, Hebr 1.2, quibus in locis eadem est doctrina. Sequitur Logon non esse factum, non esse creaturam, si quidem sine ipso factum est nihil. Sed sensu singulari tum in reliquo nt tum maxime apud Ioannem dicitur Filius, Filius Unigenitus. Unde concilium Nicaenum: natus non factus (db 54, ds 125). Notate v. 13, ubi textus receptus habet ‘qui … ex Deo nati sunt,’ ab aliquibus legi ‘qui … ex Deo natus est, generatus est, egenneFtheF.’ Et ita P. Mollat in Bible de Jérusalem.83 (f) In ipso vita erat. Supponendo textum receptum, in primis notatur Io 5.26: Sicut enim Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio habere vitam in semetipso. 1 Io 1.2: et adnuntiamus vobis vitam aeternam, quae erat apud Patrem et apparuit nobis. 1 Io 4.9: In hoc apparuit caritas Dei in nobis, quoniam Filium suum unigenitum misit Deus in mundum, ut vivamus per illum. 1 Io 5.11–12: … vitam aeternam dedit nobis Deus. Et haec vita in Filio eius est. Qui habet Filium, habet vitam; qui Filium non habet, vitam non habet. Cf. de vita, Io 3.15, 3.36, 4.14, 4.36, 5.24, 5.29, 5.39–40, 6.27, 6.35, 6.40, 6.47–48, 6.51, 6.53, 6.63, 8.12, 10.10, 10.28, 11.25, 12.25, 12.50, 14.6, 17.2–3, 20.31, 1 Io 1.1–2, 2.25, 3.14–15, 5.11–13, 5.16, 5.20. (g) et vita erat lux hominum. Cf. 1.9: Erat lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. Notate textum graecum verti posse: Erat lux vera … veniens vel ventura in hunc mundum. Cf. 1 Io 1.5: Deus lux est, et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae; 1 Io 2.8: tenebrae transierunt, et verum lumen iam lucet; Eph 5.14: Surge qui dormis … et illuminabit te Christus; 2 Cor 4.6, 1 Tim 6.16.

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(e) All things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made. This is the reading in the Textus Receptus; others insert a full stop that gives the reading: ‘… was not anything made. That which was made  …’ Consult the commentaries. Cf. John 1.10, ‘and the world was made through him’; also the same teaching in 1 Corinthians 8.6, Colossians 1.16, and Hebrews 1.2. It follows that the Logos was not made and that he is not a creature, since without him nothing was made. But in the rest of the New Testament, and most of all in John, there is a special sense in which the Son is referred to as the only begotten Son. Hence the Nicene decree’s phrase, ‘begotten, not made’ (db 54, ds 125, [dec 1: 5]). In verse 13, where the Textus Receptus has ‘who were born … of God,’ note that other sources have ‘who was born (egenneFtheF) … of God,’ the reading adopted by Mollat in the Bible de Jérusalem.83 (f) In him was life. Assuming the Textus Receptus reading, first note the following. ‘For as the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life in himself’ (John 5.26). Also: ‘We … proclaim to you the eternal life which was with the Father and was made manifest to us’ (1 John 1.2). ‘In this the love of God was made manifest among us, that God sent his only Son into the world, so that we might live through him’ (1 John 4.9). ‘God gave us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. He who has the Son has life; he who has not the Son has not life’ (1 John 5.11–12). On this theme of life, see also John 3.15, 3.36, 4.14, 4.36, 5.24, 5.29, 5.39– 40, 6.27, 6.35, 6.40, 6.47–48, 6.51, 6.53, 6.63, 8.12, 10.10, 10.28, 11.25, 12.25, 12.50, 14.6, 17.2–3, 20.31, 1 John 1.1–2, 2.25, 3.14–15, 5.11–13, 5.16, 5.20. (g) And the life was the light of men. Cf.: ‘That was the true light, which enlightens every man that comes into the world’ (John 1.9). Note that the Greek text can be translated: ‘The true light … was coming into the world.’ Cf.: ‘God is light, and in him is no darkness at all’ (1  John 1.5); ‘the darkness is passing away and the true light is already shining’ (1 John 2.8); ‘awake, O sleeper … and Christ shall give you light’ (Ephesians 5.14); also 2 Corinthians 4.6 and 1 Timothy 6.16.

83 La Sainte Bible. L’Évangile et les Épîtres de Saint Jean. L’Évangile traduit par D. Mollat, s.j. (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1953) 69.

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Cf. Io 8.12: Ego sum lux mundi (cf. 12.46); qui sequitur me non ambulat in tenebris, sed habebit lumen vitae. Notate inversionem: ubi 1.4 ponit vitam esse lucem, 8.12 ponit lucem esse lumen vitae. Hic cum posteris theologis distinguere potes duplicem illuminationem: aliam naturalem (illuminat omnem hominem); aliam gratis datam (Io 6.44: Nemo potest venire ad me nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum). Inquantum agnoscitur illuminatio naturalis, doctrina Ioannis de Logos et tangit doctrinam Stoicorum et ab eadem differt: tangit, inquantum Stoici agnoverunt logon singulis hominibus immanentem; differt, inquantum Logos apud Ioannem est fons et origo illius illuminationis quae in singulis hominibus est. (h) et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt. Cf. 1.10–11, 12.37–43. Notate duplicem nexum a Ioanne positum: (1) inter lucem et facere veritatem, facere bona opera; (2) inter tenebras et facere mala opera. Io 3.19–21, 1 Io 1.7, 2.8. Cf. Io 11.9–10, 12.35–36. (i) potestatem dedit eis filios Dei fieri … Cf. 1.14: plenum gratiae et veritatis. 1.16: Et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus et gratiam pro gratia. Vide supra de vita apud Ioannem; de plenitudine Dei vel deitatis, Eph 3.17–19, Col 2.9–10. (j) Quia lex per Moysin data est, gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est. Hic forte tangitur speculatio rabbinica de lege, quae Moysi attribuitur. Constat in illa speculatione legem, quamvis ante constitutionem mundi in sinu Dei fuerit, nihilominus esse a Deo factam, ideoque a Verbo Ioannis differre. Veritas apud Ioannem: 1.14, 1.17, 3.21, 4.23, 5.33, 8.32, 8.40, 8.44–46, 14.6, 14.17, 15.26, 16.7, 16.13, 17.17, 17.19, 18.37–38, 1 Io 1.6, 1.8, 2.4, 2.21, 3.18– 19, 4.6, 5.6, 2 Io 1–4, 3 Io 12. Verum apud Ioannem: 3.33,84 4.18, 5.31–32, 6.55, 7.18, 8.13–14, 8.17, 8.26, 10.41, 19.35, 21.24, 1 Io 2.27–28, 3 Io 12.

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Cf. John 8.12, ‘I am the light of the world (see 12.46); he who follows me will not walk in darkness, but will have the light of life.’ Notice the inversion: where John 1.4 states that the life was light, John 8.12 says that the light is the light of life. Here you might, with later theologians, distinguish two sorts of illumination. One is natural; it enlightens everyone. The other is a gift of grace: ‘No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him’ (John 6.44). Insofar as a natural illumination is acknowledged, John’s doctrine of the Logos both overlaps the Stoic doctrine and differs from it. There is overlap inasmuch as the Stoics acknowledged a logos immanent in individual men. The difference is that for John the Logos is the source and origin of the illumination which is in individuals. (h) The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it. Cf. John 1.10–11, 12.37–43. Notice the double link in John (1) between light and ‘doing the truth,’ doing good works, and (2) between darkness and doing evil. See John 3.19– 21, 1 John 1.7, 2.8, and compare John 11.9–10, 12.35–36. (i) He gave power to become children of God. Cf. John 1.14, ‘full of grace and truth,’ and 1.16, ‘from his fullness have we all received, grace upon grace.’ On ‘life’ in John, see above; on the fullness of God or of Godhead, see Ephesians 3.17–19 and Colossians 2.9–10. (j) For the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. There may be some connection here with rabbinic speculation on the Law, which was attributed to Moses. What is clear in these speculations is that the Law, although it was in God’s bosom before the foundation of the world, was none the less made by God. Thus, there is a difference from John’s Word. On ‘truth’ in John, see John 1.14, 1.17, 3.21, 4.23, 5.33, 8.32, 8.40, 8.44–46, 14.6, 14.17, 15.26, 16.7, 16.13, 17.17, 17.19, 18.37–38, 1  John 1.6, 1.8, 2.4, 2.21, 3.18–19, 4.6, 5.6, 2 John 1, 2 John 4, 3 John 12. On ‘true’ and ‘truly,’ see 3.33,84 4.18, 5.31–32, 6.55, 7.18, 8.13–14, 8.17, 8.26, 10.41, 19.35, 21.24, 1 John 2.27–28, 3 John 12.

84 An editorial guess: Lonergan had 3.23, which does not seem correct.

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AleFthinos: 1.9, 4.23, 4.37, 6.32, 7.28, 8.16, 15.1, 17.3, 19.35, 1 Io 5.20. (k) Deum nemo vidit umquam (cf. Io 6.46, 1 Io 4.12, 1 Tim 6.16): unigenitus Filius (Deus) qui est in sinu Patris ipse enarravit. Si distingues narratorem et narrationes, etiam habes distinctionem inter Logon, prout quater in Prologo dicitur, et logon, prout in reliquo evangelio ponitur. In reliquo enim evangelio, logos significat: (1) verba: 19.13: Pilatus autem cum audisset hos sermones (logoFn); (2) sententia, proverbium, sermo, testimonium: 2.22: et crediderunt scripturae et sermoni (logoF) quem dixit Iesus (cf. 2.19); 4.39: crediderunt … propter verbum (logon) mulieris testimonium perhibentis; 4.37: … verbum verum (logos aleFthinos), quia alius est qui seminat, et alius est qui metit; cf. 12.38, 15.25; (3) doctrina, praecepta; sensus collectivus verborum sub (2): 5.24: qui verbum meum audit et credit ei qui misit me, habet vitam aeternam; 15.3: iam vos mundi estis propter sermonem (logon) quem dixi vobis; per tota capita 14 et 15, idem est servare verbum (logon), servare verba (logous), servare mandata (entolas). Opponuntur lalia et logos (8.43); phoFne et logos (5.37–38); (4) ipsa veritas divina sermonibus revelata: 14.24: Et sermonem (logon) quem audistis non est meus sed eius qui misit me Patris; 17.14: Ego dedi eis sermonem (logon) tuum (cf. 17.8, ubi idem dicitur circa rheFmata); 17.17: sermo tuus veritas est (ho logos ho sos aleFtheia estin). Iam vero sicut ‘sermo tuus veritas est,’ ita etiam habetur 14.6: Ego sum via, veritas et vita; nemo venit ad Patrem nisi per me. 5 Logos apud Ioannem: summarium Logos erat in principio, apud Deum, Deus, Unigenitus Filius in sinu Patris, cum gloria Patris, vita et lux. Logos est principium (1) per quod omnia facta sunt, (2) quod illuminat omnem hominem, (3) quod dat potestatem filios Dei fieri, (4) quod caro factum est, (5) ex cuius plenitudine gratiae et veritatis omnes accepimus, (6) quod enarravit logon qui est revelata veritas Patris. Quia subsistit tum ut Deus tum ut homo, differt a non subsistentibus,

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On aleFthinos, see John 1.9, 4.23, 4.37, 6.32, 7.28, 8.16, 15.1, 17.3, 19.35, 1 John 5.20. (k) No one has ever seen God (cf. John 6.46, 1  John 4.12, 1  Timothy 6.16); the only begotten Son (or, God), who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known. Distinguish between a speaker and what is spoken, and you also have the distinction between the Logos referred to four times in the prologue, and logos as the rest of the gospel presents it. In the rest of the gospel, logos signifies: (1) words; ‘When Pilate heard these words (logoFn)’ (John 19.13); (2) an opinion, proverb, discourse, or testimony: ‘And they believed the scripture and the word (logoF) which Jesus had spoken’ (John 2.22; cf. 2.19); ‘Many Samaritans … believed in him because of the word (logon) of the woman bearing testimony’ (4.39); ‘The saying holds true (ho logos estin aleFthinos), “One sows and another reaps” ’ (4.37; cf. 12.38, 15.25); (3) teaching, doctrine, precepts – the collective sense of what comes under the preceding head: ‘He who hears my word and believes him who sent me, has eternal life’ (5.24); ‘You are already clean by the word which I have spoken to you’ (15.3); throughout chapters 14 and 15, it is the same thing to ‘keep my word (logon),’ to ‘keep my words (logous),’ and to ‘keep my commandments (entolas)’; logos is set alongside lalia, ‘speech’ or ‘what I say,’ in 8.43, and alongside phoFneF, ‘voice,’ in 5.37–38; (4) divine truth itself, revealed in words: ‘The word which you hear is not mine but the Father’s who sent me’ (John 14.24); ‘I have given them your word’ (17.14; cf. 17.8, where the same thing is said about rheFmata); ‘Your word is truth (ho logos ho sos aleFtheia estin)’ (17.17). Moreover, just as ‘your word is truth,’ so also we find ‘I am the way, the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by me’ (14.6). 5 Logos in John: a summary The Logos was in the beginning, with God; he is God, the only begotten Son in the bosom of the Father; his is the glory of the Father; he is life and light. The Logos is the principle (1) through which all things were made, (2) which enlightens everyone, (3) which gives power to become children of God, (4) which was made flesh, (5) from whose fullness of grace and truth we have all received, and (6) which makes known the logos that is the revealed truth of the Father. Since he subsists both as God and as man, he differs from what does not

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ideoque differt a metaphorico verbo creativo, a personificato verbo Dei, a personificata sapientia, ab idea mundi a Deo cogitata (logos Philonis). Per ipsum omnia facta sunt, et ideo differt a factis, e.g., a Lege speculationis rabbinicae quae facta est ante constitutionem mundi (secundum Ioannem data est per Moysin); a logoF Stoicorum quae est intelligibilitas rebus factis immanens. Ipse lux est quae illuminat omnem hominem, et ideo comparatur ad logon singulis hominibus immanentem sicut causa ad effectum. Ipse dat et mittit Spiritum sanctum (Io 14.16, 14.26, 15.26, 16.13–15), et ideo differt a verbo prophetico quod ex Spiritu sancto accepto a prophetis nuntiatur. Ipse enarravit, et ideo differt a verbo evangelico, sicut narrans a narrationibus. Quantum autem attinet sensum graecum et hellenisticum, Logos Ioannis comparatur ad sensum fundamentalem, sicut comparatur ad verbum evangelicum; comparatur ad sensum culturalem, sicut veritas dicens (14.6) vel veritatis plenitudo (1.14) ad veritatem dictam; comparatur ad sensum metaphysicum Stoicorum sicut causa ad effectum; comparatur ad sensum metaphysicum Neoplatonicorum sicut principium personale ad impersonale; comparatur ad sensum religiosum paganum, sicut verum ad falsum. Ubi enim dixit Paulus, sunt dii multi et domini multi, addere potuit Ioannes, etiam logoi multi; et ubi dixit Paulus, nobis tamen unus Deus Pater ex quo omnia et nos in illum, et unus Dominus Iesus Christus per quem omnia et nos per ipsum, ibi addere potuit Ioannes, Dominum Iesum Deum Unigenitum esse unum nostrum Logon.

6 Logos apud Philonem Alexandrinum (a) J. Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinité, i, 197–239.85 C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel 54–56, 276–77.86 Kleinknecht, twnt, iv, 86–88.87

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subsist, and so he differs from a metaphorical creative word of God, from the personified word of God, from personified Wisdom, and from an idea of the world, thought by God, such as the logos of Philo. Through him all things were made, and so he differs from made things: from the Law, for example, which in rabbinic speculation was made before the foundation of the world (but given, according to John, through Moses); and from the logos of the Stoics, which is the intelligibility immanent in things that are made. He is the light that enlightens everyone, and thus he is to the logos immanent in individuals what cause is to effect. He gives and sends the Holy Spirit (John 14.16, 14.26, 15.26, 16.13–15), and so he differs from the prophetic word announced by the Holy Spirit which the prophets received. He proclaims, and so he differs from the word of the gospel as the proclaimer does from the proclaimed. As regards the Greek and Hellenistic sense discussed above, John’s Logos is related to the basic sense in the same way he is related to the word of the gospel. He is related to the cultural sense as the Truth who speaks (John 14.6) or the fullness of truth (1.14) is related to the truth spoken. He is related to the metaphysical sense of the Stoics as cause is to effect, and to that of the Neoplatonists as a personal to an impersonal principle. He is related to the pagan religious sense as the true to the false. For where Paul says there are many ‘gods’ and many ‘lords’ [1 Corinthians 8.5], John could add that there are many logoi as well; and where Paul goes on to say that for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist [1 Corinthians 8.6], John could add that the Lord Jesus, the only begotten God, is our one Logos. 6 The logos in Philo of Alexandria (a) J. Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinité, 1, 197–239.85 C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel 54–56, 276–77.86 Kleinknecht, twnt, 4, 86–88 [tdnt, 4, 88–90].87

85 Jules Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinité: Des origines au Concile de Nicée, vol. 1 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1927). 86 See above, p. 109, note 62. 87 See above, p. 137 and note 80.

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H. Wolfson, Philo.88 (b) Bibliographia generalis circa logon, twnt, iv, 69–71 in nota. (c) Ea seligimus quae propius ad theologiam catholicam accedunt, eaque exponimus per comparationem ad mentem S. Thomae, quippe nobis magis notam. Sic maxime consulitur tum claritati tum exactitudini. Notandum est tamen nomen logos plus trecenties et millies apud Philonem usurpari, fere semper modo litterario dici, saepissime vel sensu translato adhiberi vel metaphoris ornari, subtilioribus applicationibus immisceri, ideoque in sensus vel valde diversos vel mere confusos vel abire vel ab interpretibus trahi posse. Hanc in silvam latebrosam atque densam non intramus.

(d) S. Thomas, De Ver., q. 3, a. 2, in mente artificis duplicem formam distinguit: alia est ars, habitus intellectivus practicus; alia est forma excogitata quae praeconcipit opus faciendum; haec altera forma, ex prima procedens, nominatur alibi verbum. Similem illustrationem adhibet Philo, De opif. mundi, 15–16, ad notionem mundi intelligibilis (kosmos noeFtos) declarandum. Sicut rex, urbem conditurus, architectum iubet excogitare quemadmodum moenia, viae, aedes, fora disponi et ordinari debeant, ita etiam Deus, universum creaturus, mundum intelligibilium seu platonicum quendam idearum locum cogitavit. Cf. Sum. theol., 1, q. 15, a. 2. (e) Quare, ho logos tou theou est mundus intelligibilis a Deo iam in actu creandi cogitatus (De opif. mundi, 24). Unde et dicitur divina imago (theia eikoFn) et archetypicum sigillum (arkhetupos sphragis; ibid. 25). Ad quam imaginem comparatur mundus aspectabilis (kosmos aistheFtos) tamquam imaginis imago (eikonos eikoFn; ibid). Et hoc dogma non suum dicit Philo sed Moysis, qui posuit hominem creatum ad imaginem Dei (Gen 1.26–27). Iam vero si homo est ad imaginem Dei, a pari totum universum est ad maiorem quandam imaginem (ibid). (f) Unde et distinxit hominem caelestem, Dei imaginem, immaterialem, incorruptibilem, neque marem neque feminam, de quo Gen 1.26–27, et

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H. Wolfson, Philo.88 (b) For a general bibliography on logos, see twnt, 4, 69–71, in the notes [tdnt, 4, 69–71]. (c) We shall single out the points that bear most directly on Catholic theology, and these we shall expound, with a view towards the greatest clarity and precision, by comparing them with something more familiar, the thought of Thomas Aquinas. It should be noted, however, that Philo makes use of the word logos more than thirteen hundred times. He is almost always speaking in a literary way; very often logos is used in a transferred sense or metaphorically embroidered, and it is mixed up with more subtle applications. Consequently it can wander off – or interpreters can lead it – into senses that are quite diverse or simply confused. Into so dense a forest, so full of pitfalls, we shall not venture. (d) In De veritate (q. 3, a. 2), Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between two forms in the mind of a craftsman. One is an art, a habit of practical intellect; the other is the thought-out form which conceives in advance what is going to be made. This second form, proceeding from the first, Thomas elsewhere names a ‘word.’ Philo uses a similar illustration in stating his notion of the intelligible world (kosmos noeFtos; De opificio mundi, 15–16). A king, about to found a city, commands his architect to plan how the walls, roads, houses, and marketplaces should be arranged and ordered, and in just this way God, about to create the universe, thinks out the world of intelligibles, a home for Platonic ideas. Cf. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 15, a. 2. (e) Thus, ho logos tou theou, the word of God, is the intelligible world thought out by God already in the act of creating (De opificio mundi, 24). Hence, it is also called a divine image (theia eikoFn) and archetypal seal (arkhetupos sphragis; De opificio mundi, 25). To this image, the world of experience (kosmos aistheFtos) is related as the image of an image (eikonis eikoFn; De opificio mundi, 25). And this, Philo says, is not his own dogma but that of Moses, who stated that man was created in the image of God (Genesis 1.26–27). Moreover, if man is in the image of God, then by the same token the whole universe is in a greater image (De opificio mundi, 25). (f) Hence, he also distinguishes a heavenly man, spoken of in Genesis 1.26–27, who is the image of God, immaterial, incorruptible, and neither

88 Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Cambridge, ma: Harvard, 1947).

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hominem ex quo sumus, de quo Gen 2.7 (Leg. Alleg., 1, 31–32; De opif. mundi, 69 et 134). Homo caelestis est logos tou aidiou (De conf., 41). Comparatur ad patrem omnium ut filius primogenitus (proFtogonos) et natu maximus (presbutatos) (De conf., 62, 63). Dicitur etiam verus homo, ho pros aleFtheian anthroFpos, et mens purissima, nous katharoFtatos (De fuga, 71).89 Cum autem nos mentem habeamus, etiam nominat Philo verum in nobis hominem, scilicet mentem, ton en heFmin pros aleFtheian anthroFpon, toutesti ton noun (De plantat., 42). (g) Age vero. A nobis Deus cognosci potest qualis sit, quatenus ex creaturis per similitudinem quandam ad notionem quandam Dei efformandam procedimus. At summopere attendendum est nos non tantum similitudine uti sed etiam analogia: puras enim perfectiones in creaturis quaerimus, easque ab omni limitatione remotas in attributa divina cogitanda adhibemus. Sed si omittitur analogia, si nondum evoluta fuit tota technica theologiae naturalis, si per meram similitudinem proceditur, nihil aliud de Deo cognosci posset nisi ille mundus intelligibilis quem Philo nominavit ton logon tou theou. Iam vero longe alius est ipse Deus, et alia prorsus est imago mundi a Deo concepta. Maxime ergo inter se differunt (1) ordinata possibilium conceptio, quae est mundus intelligibilis et logos philonianus, et (2) Verbum Dei apud Aquinatem quod cum ipsa divina substantia atque essentia realiter identificatur. (h) Unde sequitur theologia negativa Philonis. Cognosci potest de Deo quod est (huparxis, kata to einai), sed ultra hanc meram exsistentiam a creatura cognosci non potest (Quod Deus, 62; De praem., 40). Est enim Deus bono melior, monade senior, uno purior (De praem. ibid.). Ulterius, Deus est lux, imo omnis lucis archetypus, imo omni archetypo senior, purior, superior (De somn., 1, 75). Exsistentia Dei solaque exsistentia cognoscitur non solum ratione sed etiam modo perfectiori per visionem, in qua Deus per se ipsum videtur, sicut lux sua propria luce conspicitur (De praem., 43–45).

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male nor female, from the man in Genesis 2.7, the ancestor of us all (Legum allegoriae, 1, 31–32; De opificio mundi, 69, 134). The heavenly man is logos tou aidiou [the word of the Eternal One] (De confusione linguarum, 41). He stands to the father of all as firstborn son (proFtogonos) and eldest by birth (presbutatos) (De confusione linguarum, 62, 63). He is also called ‘true man,’ ho pros aleFtheian anthroFpos, and ‘purest mind,’ nous katharoFtatos (De fuga et inventione, 71).89 But since we too have minds, Philo also names him the ‘true man in us, that is, the mind,’ ton en heFmin pros aleFtheian anthroFpon, toutesti ton noun (De plantatione, 42). (g) Well now, it is possible for us to know what God is, inasmuch as we proceed from created things, through a similarity, to the formation of a notion of God. But above all keep in mind that what we use is not just any similarity but an analogy: we seek out pure perfections in creatures, and these, freed from all limitation, we employ in thinking about the divine attributes. But if analogy is left out, if the whole technique of natural theology has not yet evolved, if we have to proceed through mere similarity, nothing could be known of God except the intelligible world that Philo named ho logos tou theou. But God himself is one thing, and an image of the world, conceived by God, is something else entirely. There is an enormous difference, therefore, between (1) an ordered conception of what is possible, Philo’s logos or intelligible world, and (2) the Word of God in Aquinas, which is really identical with the divine substance and essence itself. (h) From this follows Philo’s negative theology. What it is possible to know about God is that he is (huparxis, kata to einai), but beyond his mere existence nothing can be known by creatures (Quod Deus immutabilis, 62; De praemiis et poenis, 40). For God is better than the good, prior to the monad, simpler than the one (De praemiis et poenis, 40). Further, God is light, indeed the archetype of all light, and indeed prior, higher, and superior to every archetype (De somniis, 1, 75). The existence and only the existence of God is known not only by reason but also, in a more perfect way, by vision, in which God is seen through himself, just as light is perceived by its own light (De praemiis et poenis, 43–45).

89 De confusione linguarum is found in vol. 2, De fuga et inventione in vol. 3, of the Philo works referred to at p. 105, note 59 above.

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(i) His annectitur doctrina de mediatione logou inter Deum et mundum. Logos enim est id quo Deus creat et gubernat mundum, id quo sua bona dispensat creaturis. Iterum, logos est id quo mundus in Deum redit: ita logos dicitur summus pontifex, supplex. Quae utrum metaphorice dicantur per quandam logou personificationem vel reificationem, an forte ponant logon tamquam ens quoddam extra Deum et inter Deum mundumque medium, non facile determinatur (De Cher., 36; Quod Deus, 57; De agr., 51; De mut., 114–16).90 (j) Mediatio specialis est in ipsa hominis cognitione. Logos dicitur Deus imperfectorum, perfectis autem et sapientibus Primum est Deus (Leg. alleg., 3, 207; De conf., 97). (k) Deus est ho theos. Logos dicitur theos, sine articulo (De somn., 1, 229–30). (l) Differt Philo a Platonicis, quatenus ideas ponit intra mentem Dei; summum Deum habet creatorem; neque huic mundo aspectabili denegat veram realitatem atque cognoscibilitatem. Differt a Stoicis quatenus, praeter logon mundo aspectibili immanentem, alius et superiorem, creationis instrumentum (De Cher., 127) agnovit. Viam aperuit philosophiae monotheisticae et christianae; ita tamen ut theologia sua negativa et sua de logo doctrina, si Verbo Dei applicatur, in subordinationismum statim conducat. (m) Differerunt logos Philonis et Verbum Dei apud Aquinatem, quatenus secundum Aquinatem Verbum Dei est divina Dei conceptio, intentio Dei intenta, et realiter cum divina essentia identificata, cum in Deo Deum cognoscente aliud non sit esse naturale et esse intelligibile seu intentionale; e contra secundum doctrinam Aquinatis, qui a Philone dicitur logos tou theou non est nisi obiectum quoddam secundarium divinae cognitionis intellectum a divino intelligere et dictum quasi implicite per divinum Verbum. Cf. Divinarum personarum 84–87.91

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(i) Joined with all this is a doctrine about the mediation of the logos between God and the world. By the logos God creates and governs the world, and by it he bestows his goodness on creatures. Again, it is by the logos that the world returns to God. Thus, the logos is referred to as the supreme pontiff and suppliant. It is not easy to decide whether Philo is speaking metaphorically, by reifying or personifying the logos; perhaps he is proposing instead that the logos is a being outside God, the medium between God and the world (De cherubim, 36; Quod Deus sit immutabilis, 57; De agricultura, 51; De mutatione nominum, 114–16).90 (j) There is a special mediation in human knowing itself. The logos is said to be the God of the imperfect; to the perfect and the wise, however, the First is God (Legum allegoriae, 3, 207; De confusione linguarum, 97). (k) God is ho theos. The logos is referred to as theos, without the article (De somniis, 1, 229–30). (l) To this extent Philo differs from the Platonists: for him the ideas are within the mind of God, the supreme God is the creator, and the world of experience does not lack true reality and knowability. To this extent he differs from the Stoics: besides the logos immanent in the world of experience, he acknowledges another, superior logos, the instrument of creation (De cherubim, 127). He paved the way for a monotheistic and Christian philosophy, but did it in such a way that his theology is negative and his doctrine of the logos, applied to the Word of God, quickly leads to subordinationism. (m) The logos of Philo differs from the Word of God according to Thom­ as, in that the Word of God is, for Thomas, God’s conception of God, the intended intention of God, and it is really identical with the divine essence, since in God knowing God the natural act of existence is nothing other than the intelligible or intentional act of existence. On the other hand, according to Aquinas, what Philo calls the logos tou theou is only a secondary object of divine knowing, understood by the divine act of intelligence and spoken, implicitly as it were, through the divine Word. See Divinarum personarum 84–87.91 90 De cherubim and De agricultura are fround in vol. 1, and De mutatione nominum in vol. 3 of the Philo works referred to above in note 59. 91 Bernard Lonergan, Divinarum personarum conceptio analogica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1957, 1959); see Bernard Lonergan, De Deo trino:

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(n) Si comparatur ad logon Philonis logos de quo Ioannes 1.1–14: (a′) per utrumque facta sunt omnia (Io 1.3, et Philo, De opif. mundi, 24–25, si quidem omnia in mundo aspectabili correspondent mundo intelligibili; (b′) Logos apud Ioannem subsistit, tum ut homo (Verbum caro factum est), tum ut Filius (sicut enim Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio habere vitam in semetipso, Io 5.26); sed logos apud Philonem non subsistit, non est nisi mundus a Deo cogitatus intra mentem divinam; (c′) Pater et Filius mutuo se includunt; Io 10.38: Pater in me est, et ego in Patre; sed quamvis logos Philonis in Deo sit, Deus tamen minime in logo est, secus non haberetur theologia negativa; (d′) si ad aliam conceptionem philonianam transitur, nempe, ad ens intermedium inter Deum et mundum aspectabilem, dicitur: (1) sic habetur forte logos subsistens; (2) de quo minus verificari potest ‘Pater in me’; (3) et minus etiam ‘habet vitam in semetipso’; (4) et nullo modo ‘Ego et Pater unum sumus’ (Io 10.30), si quidem logos intermedius est extra Deum; (5) utrum ens intermedium sit instrumentum creationis, difficile dicitur; cf. e.g. De Cher., 127. iv  Ex aequalitate et unitate Filii cum Patre 1 Praenotantur (a) Finis et intentio evangelii: 20.30–31: Multa quidem et alia signa fecit Iesus in conspectu discipu­ lorum suorum, quae non sunt scripta in libro hoc. Haec autem scripta sunt, ut credatis quia Iesus est Christus Filius Dei, et ut credentes vitam habeatis in nomine eius. (b) Factum incredulitatis: 5.18: Propterea ergo magis quaerebant eum Iudaei interficere quia non solum solvebat sabbatum, sed et patrem suum dicebat Deum, aequalem se faciens Deo.

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(n) Comparing the logos of Philo with the Logos of John 1.1–14, we find: (a′) through each, all things are made (John 1.3; Philo, De opificio mundi, 24–25), since all things in the world of experience correspond with the intelligible world; (b′) in John the Logos subsists, both as man (‘The Word became flesh’) and as Son (‘For as the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life in himself,’ John 5.26); but in Philo the logos does not subsist, being only the world that God thinks within the divine mind; (c′) the Father and the Son include each other; ‘the Father is in me and I am in the Father’ (John 10.38); but although the logos of Philo is in God, God is not in the logos at all; otherwise Philo’s would not be a negative theology; (d′) turning to another of Philo’s conceptions, an intermediate being between God and the world of experience, it can be said: (1) this might amount to a subsistent logos, (2) of whom it is less verifiable that ‘the Father is in me,’ (3) still less that he ‘has life in himself,’ (4) and not at all that ‘I and the Father are one’ (John 10.30), since an intermediate logos is outside God; and (5) it is difficult to say whether this intermediate being is the instrument of creation; see, for example, De cherubim, 127. iv  The Son’s equality and unity with the Father 1 Preliminary observations (a) The purpose and intention of the gospel: ‘Now Jesus did many other signs in the presence of the disciples, which are not written in this book; but these are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name’ (John 20.30–31). (b) The fact of disbelief: ‘This was why the Jews sought all the more to kill him, because he not only broke the sabbath but also called God his own Father, making himself equal with God’ (John 5.18).

Pars systematica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964) 107–109; see also Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 212–17.

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8.58: … antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum. Tulerunt ergo lapides Iudaei ut lapidarent eum. 10.30–31, 10.33: Ego et Pater unum sumus. Sustulerunt ergo lapides Iudaei ut lapidarent eum … De bono opere non lapidamus te sed de blasphemia; et quia homo cum sis, facis teipsum Deum. 19.7: Nos legem habemus et secundum legem debet mori quia Filium Dei se fecit. (c) Explicatio incredulitatis: 12.39: Propterea non poterant credere, quia iterum dixit Isaias: Excaecavit oculos eorum, et induravit cor eorum, ut non videant oculis et non intelligant corde et convertantur, et sanem eos (Is 6.9–10). Cf. Mt 13.14–15, Mc 4.12, Act 28.26, ubi eadem citatio ex Isaia. Thema de excaecatione saepius tangitur: Io 3.19–21, 5.42, 5.44, 7.45–52, 8.24, 8.43–47, 9.39–41. De discipulis dubitantibus: 6.61, 6.64, 6.66. De necessitate gratiae: 6.46, 6.65; cf. 14.6. (d) Modus procedendi in evangelio: Sequitur notum principium: per sensibilia manducimur in intelligibilia. Unde ponitur narratio, additur dialogus vel monologion, ut sensus narrationis manifestetur. Ita narratur de Nicodemo et sequitur colloquium; obviam fit Samaritanae et sequitur colloquium; sanatio infirmi post 38 annos, disputatio, monologion; multiplicatio panum et sermo de pane vitae; sanatio caeci nati et assertum de excaecatione; parabola boni pastoris et commenta. Quae cum ita sint, intentio auctoris attingitur inquantum quaeritur, Quid datur ad intelligendum, Quo tendit eventus et consequens disquisitio.

2 De aequalitate cum Deo (Io 5.16–30) (a) Tria distingue: fundamentum accusationis; ipsa accusatio; responsio a Iesu data. In omnibus tribus de quadam aequalitate agitur, sed vis argumenti deprehenditur in trium comparatione. Nam in antecedentibus fundatur quidem accusatio, sed multo magis fundaretur in iis quae Iesus ad accusationem respondet. (b) Quo sensu intenditur aequalitas ab evangelista? Non datur responsio exacta et technica, quae distinguit personam et naturam, naturam divinam et humanam; multo minus, explicatur notio con-

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‘“Truly, truly, I say to you, before Abraham was, I am.” So they took up stones to throw at him …’ (John 8.58). ‘“I and the Father are one.” The Jews took up stones again to stone him …’ ‘It is not for a good work that we stone you but for blasphemy; because you, being a man, make yourself God’ (John 10.30–31, 10.33). ‘We have a law, and by that law he ought to die, because he has made himself the Son of God’ (John 19.7). (c) This disbelief explained: ‘Therefore they could not believe. For Isaiah again said, “He has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, lest they should see with their eyes and perceive with their heart, and turn for me to heal them”’ (John 12.39, quoting Isaiah 6.9–10). Cf. Matthew 13.14–15, Mark 4.12, and Acts 28.26, where the same text from Isaiah is cited. In John the theme of blindness is frequently met with; see 3.19–21, 5.42, 5.44, 7.45–52, 8.24, 8.43–47, 9.39–41. On the disciples’ doubting, see 6.61, 6.64, 6.66. On the need for grace, see 6.46 and 6.65; cf. 14.6. (d) The procedure of the gospel: John follows a well-known principle: we are led through the sensible to the intelligible. A story is told, and there follows a dialogue or monologue that shows the meaning of the narrative. Thus, after the story of Nicodemus, a conversation; after the encounter with a Samaritan woman, a conversation; after the healing of a man who had been ill for thirty-eight years, an argument and a monologue; after the multiplication of bread, a discourse on the bread of life; after the healing of the man born blind, a statement about blindness; after the parable of the good shepherd, a commentary. That being so, one arrives at the author’s meaning insofar as one asks, What is given in order to be understood? Where is the sequence of event and discussion tending? 2 Equality with God (John 5.16–30) (a) Three things should be distinguished here: the ground of the accusation, the accusation itself, and the response Jesus gives. All three concern an equality, but the force of the argument depends on comparing them. For the accusation has its ground in preceding events, but much more in what Jesus says in response to it. (b) What did the evangelist mean by equality? We are not given a precise, technical answer that distinguishes person from nature and divine nature from human nature. Still less are we given

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substantialitatis et ea aequalitas asseritur vera quae tamen non est relatio realis realiter distincta a relationibus personalibus (Sum. theol., 1, q. 42, a. 1, ad 4m). Sed datur ad intelligendum aequalitas quae longe excedit illam quam prius obiciebant Iudaei. Intenta ergo aequalitas est notio quaedam aperta quae ulteriores determinationes (1) admittit, (2) postulat, (3) fundat. Imo, inquantum scriptura ab inspirante Spiritu procedit, praeparat et intendit illam dogmatum evolutionem quae neque contra neque praeter sed secundum divinam providentiam facta est. (c) Ipsa accusatio 5.18: Propterea ergo magis quaerebant Iudaei eum interficere, quia non solum solvebat sabbatum, sed et patrem suum dicebat Deum, aequalem se faciens Deo. (d) Accusationis fundamentum Remotum fundamentum erat sanatio infirmi die sabbati. Proximum autem fundamentum erat quod persequentibus respondit Iesus: Pater meus usque modo operatur et ego operor (Io 5.17). His subaudienda est opinio rabbinorum: quamvis Deus die septimo requievisse dicatur (Gen 2.2–3), nihilominus dicendum est eum continuo operari. Strack-Billerbeck, in h. 1.;92 cf. Dodd, Fourth Gospel 320, qui priora ex Philone etiam affert. Respondit ergo Iesus: sicut Deus semper operatur, etiam die sabbati, ita pariter ego. Unde duplex accusatio: nominavit Deum patrem suum; aequalitatem cum Deo sibi vindicavit ut scilicet sibi liceret quod Deo licet. (e) Responsionis primus aspectus Qui alium Deo aequalem asserit, unum esse Deum negare videtur. Quod dicere non voluit Iesus, et ideo totalem Filii dependentiam a Patre iterum iterumque inculcavit. Ita: non potest Filius a se facere quidquam (5.19); non possum a me ipso facere quidquam (5.30). Habet omne iudicium, sed a Patre sibi datum (5.22, 5.27).

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an explanation of the notion of consubstantiality or a statement of that true equality which nevertheless is not a real relation really distinct from the personal relations (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 42, a. 1, ad 4m). What is given to be understood is an equality far exceeding the equality to which the Jews had previously taken objection. The equality intended is therefore an open notion, which (1) admits of further determinations, (2) calls for them, and (3) grounds them. Indeed, inasmuch as scripture proceeds from the Spirit’s inspiration, it intends and prepares for that dogmatic development which takes place, not against or outside divine providence, but in accordance with it. (c) The accusation itself ‘This was why the Jews sought all the more to kill him, because he not only broke the sabbath but also called God his own Father, making himself equal with God’ (John 5.18). (d) The ground of the accusation The remote ground was the healing of a sick man on the sabbath. But the proximate ground was what Jesus said just afterwards: ‘My Father is working still, and I am working’ (John 5.17). Behind this, unstated, is a rabbinic opinion to the effect that even though God is said to have rested on the seventh day (Genesis 2.2–3), it should nonetheless be said that he works continually. See Strack-Billerbeck on this passage;92 also Dodd, Fourth Gospel 320, which also presents older material from Philo. Jesus’ response, then, was: as God is always working, even on the sabbath, so likewise am I. Hence the twofold accusation: he called God his father, and he claimed an equality with God, in that what was allowed to God was allowed to him. (e) The first aspect of the response To assert that someone else is God’s equal would seem to be to deny that God is one. This, Jesus did not wish to say. So, again and again, he insisted that the Son is altogether dependent on the Father. Thus, ‘the Son can do nothing of his own accord’ (5.19); ‘I can do nothing on my own authority’ (5.30). The Son has all judgment, but it is given to him by the Father (5.22, 5.27).

92 Hermann L. Strack and Paul Billerbeck, Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch (München: Beck, 1922–61), vol. 2, pp. 461–62.

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Qui non honorificat Filium, non honorificat Patrem qui misit illum (5.23). Filius habet vitam in semetipso, sed sibi a Patre datam (5.26). Non quaero voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius qui misit me (5.30). (f) Responsionis aspectus alter Longe maiorem aequalitatem cum Patre sibi attribuit quam quae continetur in licentia sanandi infirmos die sabbati. Primo, enim, celebrabat vt magna opera Dei; et hic legitur: quaecumque enim ille fecerit, haec et Filius similiter facit (5.19); Filius quidem non facit nisi quod videt Patrem facientem (5.19), sed Pater diligit Filium et omnia demonstrat ei quae ipse facit (5.20); cf. omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil (1.3). Deinde, vivificatio mortuorum habetur Deo propria; vide Ezech 37.1–14, ubi repetitur: et scietis quia ego Dominus (vv. 6, 13, 14). Sed hic legitur: Filius quos vult vivificat (5.21); mortui audient vocem Filii Dei et qui audierint vivent (5.25); omnes qui in monumentis sunt, audient vocem Filii Dei; et procedent qui bona egerunt in resurrectionem vitae, qui vero mala egerunt in resurrectionem iudicii (5.28–29). Tertio, Deus Iudaeorum erat Deus vivens et viventium. Sed hic legitur: sicut Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio habere vitam in semetipso (5.26). Quarto, apud Iudaeos supremum iudicium erat iudicium Dei: ipse iudicabit orbem terrae in aequitate, iudicabit populos in iustitia (Ps 9.9; cf. 95.13, 97.9). Sed hic legitur: Neque enim Pater iudicat quemquam, sed omne iudicium dedit Filio (5.22); potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere (5.27); sicut audio iudico, et iudicium meum iustum est (5.30). Quinto, Deus Iudaeorum erat solus et exclusivus, neque alios deos tolerabat. Sed hic legitur: ut omnes honorificent Filium, sicut honorificant Patrem (5.23). (g) Conclusio Primo, vv. 19–30 tractant de accusatione filiationis divinae et aequalitatis cum Deo. Ponitur accusatio v. 18; incipit v. 19: Respondit itaque Iesus. Praeterea, vv. 19-30 unitatem faciunt: nam tractant de variis aspectibus aequalitatis, et repetitur in v. 30 quod in v. 19 dictum est, Filium non posse facere quidquam a semetipso. Secundo, vv. 19–30, quamvis omne dubium de monotheismo excludere

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‘He who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him’ (5.23). The Son has life in himself, but it is given him by the Father (5.26). ‘I seek not my own will but the will of him who sent me’ (5.30). (f) The second aspect of the response Jesus attributes to himself a far greater equality with the Father than the equality implicit in being allowed to heal the sick on the sabbath. In the first place, the Old Testament had celebrated the mighty acts of God. But in John 5 we read that whatever God does, the Son does likewise (5.19), that the Son can do only what he sees the Father doing (5.19), and that the Father loves the Son, and shows him all that he himself is doing (5.20). Cf.: ‘all things were made through him, and without him was not anything made’ (1.3). In the second place, raising the dead belongs properly to God; see Ezekiel 37.1–14, with its repetition of ‘then you shall know that I am the Lord’ (vv. 6, 13, 14). But here we read that the Son gives life to whom he will (5.21); that the dead will hear the voice of the Son of God, and those who hear will live (5.25); and that all who are in the tombs will hear his voice and come forth, those who have done good to the resurrection of life, and those who have done evil to the resurrection of judgment (5.28–29). In the third place, the God of the Jews was the living God and the God of the living. But here we read that as the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life in himself (5.26). In the fourth place, for the Jews the final judgment was the judgment of God. ‘He judges the world with righteousness, he judges the peoples with equity’ (Psalm 9.9 [evv 9.8]; cf. Psalm 95.13 [evv 96.13], Psalm 97.9 [evv 98.9]). But here we read: ‘The Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son’ (5.22); he ‘has given him authority to execute judgment’ (5.27); ‘as I hear, I judge; and my judgment is just’ (5.30). In the fifth place, the God of the Jews was the only God; besides him there was no other, and he tolerated no other gods. But here we read: ‘that all may honor the Son, even as they honor the Father’ (5.23). (g) Conclusion First, John 5.19–30 is about an accusation regarding divine sonship and equality with God. The accusation is made in v. 18; v. 19 begins: ‘Jesus therefore answered them …’ Further, vv. 19–30 form a unity. They are concerned with various aspects of equality, and v. 30 repeats the statement in v. 19 that the Son can do nothing of his own accord. Second, John 5.19–30 makes every effort to rule out any doubt on the

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nitantur (vide e), adeo non auferunt accusationis fundamentum, ut id quam maxime augeant. Imo ea ipsa seligunt quae a Iudaeis Deo propria habebantur, et quoad singula ita exaltatur Filius ut (1) operetur quaecumque facit Pater, (2) vivificet mortuos sicut Pater, (3) eo modo sit vivens quo est Pater, (4) omnes iudicet loco Patris, (5) honorificetur sicut Pater. Quae quidem singula, ne dicam omnia, longe excedunt primum accusationis fundamentum, nempe, operari die sabbati sicut Pater.

Tertio, quamvis aequalitas Filii cum Patre non eo modo hic declaretur quo a posteris theologis declarari solet, tamen datur analogia quaedam proportionis, nempe, ita se habet aequalitas hic posita et intenta ad conceptionem Dei Iudaeis notam, sicut se habet aequalitas theologicis conceptibus evoluta ad evolutam conceptionem Dei inter theologos receptam. Quod aliter declaratur: qui vult obicere Ioannem non intendisse veram aequalitatem asserere, eatenus fallacias proponit quatenus mentem S. Thomae in saec. primo exigit, et eatenus argumenta seria promit quatenus ex iudaica Dei conceptione (vv. 17 et 18 illustrata) procedit. (h) Obicitur Agitur tantummodo de Filio hominis, uti v. 27 et ex lect. var. v. 19 constat. Respondetur: Videtur etiam agi de Filio Dei, uti vv. 25 et 27 textus recepti constat. Praeterea, illud ‘tantummodo’ ignorantiam sapit. Nam apud Ioannem Filius hominis praeexsistit (3.13, 6.62), et quidem non ut Verbum incarnatum (1.14) sed ut Verbum Deus (1.1). Instatur: agitur de Filio qua homine. Respondetur: peto probationem quod Ioannes reduplicative93 distinxit inter Filium qua Deum et Filium qua hominem. Nisi enim Ioannes haec duo inter se distinxisset, non potuit intendere ita de uno loqui ut de alio sileret. Instatur: ea quae dicuntur vv. 19–30 ita a nobis sunt intelligenda ut hominis privilegia et non Dei attributa asserantur. Quod sic probatur:

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score of monotheism (see point e above). Yet, far from removing the ground of the accusation, this makes it all the stronger. In fact, the very things that the Jews held were proper to God are singled out, and the Son is exalted with respect to each of them, so that (1) he does whatever the Father does, (2) he raises the dead as does the Father, (3) he has life in the way the Father has it, (4) he judges everyone in the Father’s place, and (5) he is honored just as the Father is. Any of these, to say nothing of all, would go far beyond the initial ground of the accusation, his working, like the Father, on the sabbath. Third, although these verses do not state the Son’s equality with the Father in the way later theologians would state it, still there is an analogy of proportion: the equality intended and set forth here stands to the familiar Jewish conception of God as the equality developed in theological concepts stands to the developed conception of God accepted by theologians. To put it another way, those who would object that John did not intend to assert a true equality are arguing fallaciously insofar as they call for the thinking of a Thomas in the first century, and they are mounting a serious argument insofar as they take as their starting point the Jewish conception of God illustrated in John 5.17–18. (h) Objections The passage concerns only the Son of man. This is clear from v. 27 and from a variant reading of v. 19. Reply: It would seem also to concern the Son of God, as vv. 25 and 27, following the Textus Receptus, make clear. Further, the objector’s ‘only’ smacks of ignorance. For in the gospel of John the Son of man pre-exists (3.13, 6.62), and does so not as the incarnate Word (1.14) but as the Word who is God (1.1). But again: The passage concerns the Son as man. Reply: I must have proof that John distinguished in a reduplicative way93 between the Son as God and the Son as man. For unless John did distinguish between these two, he could not have meant to speak of one while remaining silent about the other. But again: What is said in John 5.19–30 should be understood as asserting privileges granted to a man, not attributes of God. This is proved as follows.

93 For the meaning of ‘reduplicative’ as it applies to the distinction between Christ as God and Christ as man, see below, thesis 5, scholion 4, pp. 364–67.

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Opera de quibus agitur in vv. 19–20 sunt miracula ab homine facta, ut constat ex v. 20: maiora his demonstrabit ei opera ut vos miremini. Iudicium universale attribuitur Filio hominis communiter in synopticis et in epistolis. Filius quos vult vivificat; hoc non significat nisi libertatem Christi in mortuis suscitandis, uti in filio viduae, in filia Iairi, in Lazaro. Resurrectio omnium in die ultimo attribuitur Filio qua homini sicut et iudicium generale. Honor qui datur Filio est relativus; sicut enim hic dicitur: qui non honorificat Filium, non honorificat Patrem qui misit illum; ita etiam alibi legitur: qui vos audit, me audit (Lc 10.16) et similia multa. Respondetur obiectionem in multis peccare. Primo, non intelligitur argumentum supra propositum, quod non fit ex attributis divinis prout summa cura a theologis christianis et posteris elaborantur atque concipiuntur, sed fit ex iis quae secundum conceptionem iudaicam Deo propria habebantur. Sane vivificatio mortuorum manet Deo propria secundum Ezechielem 37.1–14,94 etiamsi Christus homo mortuos vivificat. Iudicium orbis terrae manet Deo proprium secundum Ps 9.9, etiamsi Christus homo iudicium universale exercebit. Honores divini Deo soli fiunt secundum vt, etiamsi christiani Christum hominem adorant. Quaesivimus utrum Iesus Iudaeos docuerit suam aequalitatem cum Patre. Non quaesivimus utrum hoc in loco exponatur scholastica conceptio aequalitatis divinarum personarum. Deinde, obiciens praetermittit v. 26. Tertio, obiciens praetermittit quod Filius facit quaecumque facit Pater (5.19); omnia sibi demonstrata habet a Patre (5.20). Quarto, conceditur quod habetur aliqua similitudo inter Lc 10.16 et Io 5.23b.

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The works mentioned in John 5.19–20 are miracles performed by a man, as is clear from v. 20: ‘greater works than these will he show him, that you may marvel.’ The universal judgment is commonly attributed to the Son of man in the synoptic gospels and the epistles. ‘The Son gives life to whom he will’ makes reference only to Christ’s freedom in raising the dead, as in the case of the widow’s son, the daughter of Jairus, and Lazarus. The resurrection of everyone at the last day, like the general judgment, is attributed to the Son as man. The honor given to the Son is relative. In the same way that ‘he who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him,’ so too we read elsewhere that ‘he who hears you hears me’ (Luke 10.16), and many similar statements abound. Reply: The objection involves several mistakes. First, the objector has not understood the argument we proposed above. It was not an argument based on the divine attributes as conceived and elaborated with utmost care by later Christian theologians; it was based on what belongs properly to God according to the Jewish conception. Certainly the raising of the dead remains proper to God, according to Ezekiel 37.1–14,94 even if it is Christ the man who raises the dead. Judging the world remains proper to God, according to Psalm 9.9 [evv 9.8], even if it is Christ the man who exercises universal judgment. Divine honor is rendered to God alone, according to the Old Testament, even if Christians worship Christ the man. Our question was whether Jesus taught the Jews his equality with the Father. We were not asking whether this passage expounds a Scholastic conception of the equality of the divine Persons. Second, the objector has overlooked v. 26. Third, the objector has overlooked the fact that the Son does whatever the Father does (5.19), and that the Father shows him all that he himself is doing (5.20). Fourth, I grant that there is some similarity between Luke 10.16 and the second half of John 5.23.

94 The 1960 and 1961 editions have Ezekiel 31.1–14, the 1964 edition 31.1–4. Neither is correct. 37.1–14 is almost certainly the text that Lonergan had in mind.

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Quinto, idem non videtur dicendum circa Io 5.23a, praesertim cum quaeratur quid per illa verba detur ad intelligendum intra contextum.

3 De unitate cum Patre (Io 10.22–39) (a) Iudaei dicebant se velle scire quis Iesus sit (10.24). Respondit Iesus remittendo ad iam dicta et ad iam facta (10.25); vos non creditis quia non estis ex ovibus meis (10.26); cf. quae supra de excaecatione posuimus. Addidit deinde oves vocem suam audire, eas se sequi, vitam aeternam recipere, rapi non posse de manu sua, quia rapi non possunt de manu Patris sui (10.27–29). Quem nexum explicat: Ego et Pater unum sumus (10.30). Iudaei eum blasphemiae reum habent: ‘quia tu homo cum sis, facis teipsum Deum’ (10.31–33). Iesus interponit argumentum: si licite dicitur ‘dii estis’ (Ps 81.6), licite Filius Dei dicitur quem Pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum (10.34–36). Denique subiungit: si opera mea non sunt Patris, nolite credere mihi; si sunt, credite operibus ‘ut cognoscatis et credatis quia Pater in me est et ego in Patre’ (10.37–38). Narratio concluditur: ‘Quaerebant ergo eum apprehendere, et exivit de manibus eorum’ (10.39). (b) Circa v. 29b, variae sunt lectiones. Brevi inter se comparantur apud Pirot-Clamer.95 Rem praecipuam non tangunt. (c) Iudaei intellexerunt ‘Ego et Pater unum sumus’ tamquam divinitatis affirmationem, uti constat expresse ex v. 33. Iudaei similiter intellexerunt ‘Pater in me est et ego in Patre,’ uti datur ad intelligendum ex v. 39. (d) Ioannes non credidit Iudaeos male intellexisse; concedit quidem eos non habere fidem (v. 27); quam ‘excaecationem’ saepius tangit (3.19–21, 5.42–44, 7.45–52, 8.24, 8.43–47, 9.39–41, et praecipue 12.37–43), eamque non intelligentiae defectum sed peccatum esse docet, tum cap. 3, 5, 7, 8, in locis citatis, tum magis proxime 9.41: Si caeci essetis, non haberetis pecca-

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Fifth, it would seem that the same cannot be said of the first half of verse 23, especially when the question is what these words, within their context, give us to understand. 3 Unity with the Father (John 10.22–39) (a) The Jews are saying they want to know who Jesus is (10.24). Jesus answers by drawing their attention to what he had already said and done (10.25); ‘but you do not believe, because you do not belong to my sheep’ (10.26). See our earlier discussion of blindness. Then he adds that his sheep hear his voice and follow him, that they are given eternal life, and that they cannot be snatched from his hand, since they cannot be snatched from the hand of his Father (10.27–29). This link he explains by saying, ‘I and the Father are one’ (10.30). The Jews charge him with blasphemy: ‘you, being a man, make yourself God’ (10.31–33). Jesus introduces this argument: if it may be said that ‘you are gods’ (Psalm 81.6 [evv 82.6]), then one whom the Father has consecrated and sent into the world may be called Son of God (10.34–36). If, he continues, my works are not the works of the Father, do not believe me, but if they are, believe the works, ‘that you may know and understand that the Father is in me and I am in the Father’ (10.37–38). The episode concludes: ‘Again they tried to arrest him, but he escaped from their hands’ (10.39). (b) There are some variant readings of the second half of v. 29, which are briefly compared in Pirot-Clamer.95 They have no bearing on the central issue. (c) That the Jews understood the words ‘I and the Father are one’ as an affirmation of divinity is made expressly clear in v. 33. They understood ‘the Father is in me and I am in the Father’ in a similar way, as we are given to understand in v. 39. (d) John did not believe the Jews had misunderstood. Although he grants that they had no faith (10.26), and mentions this ‘blindness’ frequently (John 3.19–21, 5.42–44, 7.45–52, 8.24, 8.43–47, 9.39–41, and especially 12.37–43), he teaches that it was a sin, not a lack of intelligence, both in the passages cited from chapters 3, 5, 7, and 8, and also, more directly, in

95 La sainte Bible: Texte français de l’édition commentée par L. Pirot et A. Clamer (Paris : Éditions Letouzey et Ané, 1951).

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tum, nunc vero dicitis: Quia videmus, peccatum vestrum manet. Cf. 15.22– 25. (e) Neque ex v. 34 concludi potest Iesum non intendisse divinitatis affirmationem in v. 30. Quamvis enim non statim divinitatem proprie dictam reaffirmet, tamen statim aliquam divinitatem affirmat et mox addit quod Pater in me est et ego in Patre, quod iterum a Iudaeis pro divinitatis affirmatione habetur. (f) Sed ulterius quaeritur quemadmodum in hoc evangelio concipiatur tum ‘Pater et ego unum sumus’ tum ‘Pater in me est et ego in Patre’; nam postea dicitur Filius orasse ‘ut omnes unum sint sicut tu, Pater, in me, et ego in te’ (Io 17.21); quod sane de corpore Christi in terris et de vita aeterna in caelis est intelligendum. (g) Respondetur in primis ideo Deum esse hominem factum ut homines ad participationem divinitatis perduceret. Quod enim antea de gloria Christi et de futura gloria iustorum vidimus, multipliciter in evangelio quarto declaratur ut ea quae de Christo vel de Patre et Filio dicuntur etiam de nobis simili quodam modo dicantur. Circa unum, 10.30 et 17.21; circa mutuum inesse, 10.38 et 17.21; circa gloriam, 17.5, 17.24, et 17.22; circa supernam originem, 8.23 et 17.14, 17.16; circa cognitionem, 10.15 et 10.14; circa vitam, 5.26 et 6.57; circa opera, 5.19 et 14.12.

(h) Quod autem de perfecta similitudine non agitur sed de remota qua­dam analogia, tum ex iis constat quae de Verbo et de aequalitate iam diximus, tum etiam ex sequentibus illustratur. Primo, aliud est esse, et aliud fieri. Ego et Pater unum sumus, 10.30; sed oratio fit ut omnes unum sint, 17.21. Quam distinctionem optime cognovit evangelista: antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum (8.58); eamque intellexerunt Iudaei, qui tulerunt lapides ut iacerent in eum (8.59). Deinde, inter Patrem et Filium omnia sunt communia; 16.15: omnia quaecumque habet Pater, mea sunt; 17.10: et mea omnia tua sunt, et tua mea sunt. Propter hanc communitatem non solum Pater sed etiam Filius mittit Spiritum sanctum (16.13–15); sed nos ut intremus in regnum caelorum, debemus renasci denuo ex aqua et Spiritu sancto (3.3, 3.5). Tertio, nos cognosci possumus quin cognoscatur Pater; sed qui cognoscit, videt Iesum, etiam cognoscit, videt Patrem: 8.19, 12.45, 14.7, 14.9; cuius ratio assignatur, nempe, ego in Patre et Pater in me est (14.10).

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9.41: ‘If you were blind, you would have no sin, but now that you say, “We see,” your sin remains.’ Cf. John 15.22–25. (e) It cannot be inferred from v. 34 that what Jesus intended in v. 30 was not an affirmation of divinity. Although he does not at once reaffirm divinity, properly speaking, he does affirm a sort of divinity at once and presently adds that ‘the Father is in me and I am in the Father,’ which the Jews again take to be an affirmation of divinity. (f) But it is a further question how the fourth gospel conceives ‘I and the Father are one’ and ‘the Father is in me and I am in the Father.’ For later on the Son is said to have prayed ‘that they may all be one; even as you, Father, are in me, and I in you’ (John 17.21), and these words are surely to be understood as referring to the body of Christ on earth and to eternal life in heaven. (g) The answer, in the first place, is that God became man in order to lead men to participation in divinity. For what we have already seen with regard to [the relation between] the glory of Christ and the future glory of the righteous, the fourth gospel states in several ways such that what is said about Christ, or about the Father and the Son, is said in some similar fashion about us as well. On unity, see John 10.30 and 17.21; on mutual indwelling, 10.38 and 17.21; on glory, 17.5, 17.24, and 17.22; on an origin not of this world, 8.23 and 17.14, 17.16; on knowledge, 10.15 and 10.14; on life, 5.26 and 6.57; on works, 5.19 and 14.12. (h) What is involved is not, however, a perfect likeness but a distant analogy. So much is clear from what we have already said about the Word and about equality, and also from the following examples. First, to be is not the same as to become. ‘I and the Father are one’ (John 10.30), but Jesus prays that all may become one (17.21). The evangelist was well aware of the distinction: ‘before Abraham was [genesthai, to become], I am’ (8.58); and it was understood by the Jews, who took up stones to throw at Jesus (8.59). Second, the Father and the Son have all things in common. ‘All that the Father has is mine’ (John 16.15); ‘all mine are yours, and yours are mine’ (17.10). Because of this commonality it is not the Father alone but the Son as well that sends the Holy Spirit (16.13–15), whereas we need to be born again by water and the Holy Spirit (3.3, 3.5) in order to enter the kingdom of heaven. Third, it is possible to know us without knowing the Father, whereas anyone who knows or sees Jesus also knows or sees the Father (John 8.19, 12.45, 14.7, 14.9). The reason for this is given, namely, that ‘I am in the Father and the Father in me’ (14.10).

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Quarto, saepius affirmavit Christus ipsa sua opera testimonium perhibere (5.36, 10.25), ipsis operibus esse credendum (10.37–38), propter opera ipsa credite (14.11); cuius verbi sensus profundus tandem denique aperitur: Pater autem in me manens, ipse facit opera (14.10). Quinto, sicut Pater et Filius unum sunt in operando, ita unum sunt in potentia: non peribunt (oves meae) in aeternum, et non rapiet eas quisquam de manu mea … nemo potest rapere de manu Patris mei. Ego et Pater unum sumus (10.28–30; cf. 3.35). Sexto, qui cum alio est unum, solus non est; quod etiam pluries declaravit Iesus; 8.16: Et si iudico ego, iudicium meum verum est, quia solus non sum; sed ego et qui misit me Pater; 8.29: Et qui me misit, mecum est et non reliquit me solum, quia ego quae placita sunt ei, facio semper; 16.32: Ecce venit hora … ut … me solum relinquatis; et non sum solus, quia Pater mecum est. Septimo, quod de operatione, de potentia, de iudicio iam recitavimus, etiam de doctrina dicendum est; 7.16: mea doctrina non est mea; 8.28: sicut docuit me Pater, haec loquor; 8.26: quae audivi ab eo, loquor in mundo; 8.38: quod vidi apud Patrem meum, loquor; 8.40: veritatem locutus sum vobis quam audivi a Deo; 12.44: qui credit in me, non credit in me, sed in eum qui misit me; 12.49: ego ex me ipso non sum locutus, sed qui misit me Pater, ipse mihi mandatum dedit quid dicam et quid loquar; 14.10: Non creditis quia ego in Patre et Pater in me est? Verba quae ego loquor vobis, a me ipso non loquor. Pater autem in me manens, ipse facit opera. 14.24: Et sermonem (logon) quem audistis non est meus sed eius qui misit me Patris. 1.18: Unigenitus Filius qui est in sinu Patris ipse enarravit.

Quae quidem, quamvis saepe de dependentia Filii qua hominis immediate dicantur, tamen sicut et opera habent sensum suum profundum in eo quod ‘Ego in Patre et Pater in me est’; et secundum hoc comparanda sunt cum iis quae de Spiritu sancto dicuntur; 16.13: non enim loquetur a semetipso; sed quaecumque audiet, loquetur … 14: Ille me clarificabit, quia de meo accipiet et annuntiabit vobis. 15: Omnia quaecumque habet Pater, mea sunt. Propterea dixi: quia de meo accipiet et annuntiabit vobis.

4 Obiectiones (a) Io 14.28: Pater maior me est. Cf. etiam 10.29 ubi lect. var.

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Fourth, Christ quite frequently states that his works bear witness (John 5.36, 10.25) and that the works themselves are to be believed (10.37–38), [and he says,] ‘believe me for the sake of the works themselves’ (14.11). Eventually the deeper meaning of these sayings appears: ‘the Father who dwells in me does his works’ (14.10). Fifth, as the Father and the Son are one in working, so too are they one in power: ‘My sheep … shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand … no one is able to snatch them out of the Father’s hand. I and the Father are one’ (John 10.28–30; cf. 3.35). Sixth, he who is one with someone else is not alone, and this too Jesus states several times. ‘Yet even if I do judge, my judgment is true, for it is not I alone that judge, but I and the Father who sent me’ (John 8.16). ‘And he who sent me is with me; he has not left me alone, for I always do what is pleasing to him’ (8.29). ‘The hour is coming … when you … will leave me alone; yet I am not alone, for the Father is with me’ (16.32). Seventh, what we have been rehearsing with regard to works, power, and judgment also holds for doctrine. ‘My teaching is not mine’ (John 7.16). ‘I … speak thus as the Father taught me’ (8.28). ‘I declare to the world what I have heard from him’ (8.26). ‘I speak of what I have seen with my Father’ (8.38). ‘[I have] told you the truth which I heard from God’ (8.40). ‘He who believes in me, believes not in me but in him who sent me’ (12.44). ‘I have not spoken on my own authority; the Father who sent me has himself given me commandment what to say and what to speak’ (12.49). ‘Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own authority; but the Father who dwells in me does his works’ (14.10). ‘The word (logos) which you hear is not mine but the Father’s who sent me’ (14.24). ‘The only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known’ (1.18). All this, though it often refers immediately to the dependency of the Son as man, nevertheless has its deeper meaning, as have his works, in that ‘I am in the Father and the Father in me.’ Accordingly, it may be compared with what is said about the Holy Spirit. ‘He will not speak on his own authority, but whatever he hears he will speak’ (John 16.13). ‘He will glorify me, for he will take what is mine and declare it to you’ (16.14). ‘All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you’ (16.15). 4 Objections (a) John 14.28: ‘The Father is greater than I.’ See also John 10.29, where there are variant readings.

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Respondetur scholastice: Pater maior est tum quia divinitas Patris est maior humanitate Filii tum quia dans divinitatem (Pater) est maior recipiente divinitatem (Filio); sed Pater non est maior hoc sensu, quod aliam et maiorem habet Pater, aliam et minorem habet Filius, nam sicut Deus, ita etiam divinitas est una. Respondetur ad mentem expressam ipsius Ioannis: Pater maior est quia Filius a semetipso non potest facere quidquam (5.19, 5.30), quia vitam, quam Filius habet in semetipso, a Patre datam accepit (5.26), quia doctrina Filii est a Patre accepta, quia ipse Pater operatur opera Filii in Filio manens, et similia quae iam vidimus. Quae tamen non tollunt vel probationem aequalitatis vel probationem unitatis iam factas. (b) Io 17.3: Haec est autem vita aeterna: ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum et quem misisti Iesum Christum. Unde arguitur: alius est solus verus Deus, et alius est Iesus Christus a vero Deo missus. Respondetur: alius est Pater, et alius est Filius, quos duos cognoscere est vita aeterna, conceditur; solus Pater est verus Deus, subdistinguitur; si nomen ‘Deus’ sumitur ut nomen personale Patris, uti communiter fit in nt, conceditur; si nomen ‘Deus’ non sumitur ut nomen personale Patris, uti interdum fit in nt, negatur. Vel etiam etsi subtilius dici potest: Ioannes affirmat Patrem esse solum verum Deum, conceditur; Ioannes affirmat solum Patrem esse verum Deum, negatur; dicit enim se ton monon aleFthinon theon; et non dicit monon se ton aleFthinon theon. (c) Nomen ‘Dominus’ non significat nisi hominem Iesum resurrectione exaltatum. E.g., Act 2.36: Dominum eum et Christum fecit Deus hunc Iesum quem vos crucifixistis. Nam Dominus in sense Iahwe non est factus. Respondetur: hoc sensu adhibetur nomen ‘Dominus’ in nt, distinguitur, etiam, conceditur, tantummodo, negatur. Argumentum fundatur in hoc vel similibus locis, negatur. (d) ‘Filius a Deo genitus’ non significat nisi hominem resurrectione exaltatum. E.g., Act 13.33; hanc (repromissionem) Deus adimplevit filiis nostris resuscitans Iesum, sicut et in Psalmo secundo scriptum est: Filius meus es tu; ego hodie genui te. Ubi ‘genitus Filius’ non significat nisi eum qui in potestatem regiam cooptatus est.

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To give a Scholastic reply, the Father is greater both because the divinity of the Father is greater than the humanity of the Son, and also because the giver of divinity (the Father) is greater than the one receiving it (the Son). But the Father is not greater in the sense that the Father has one divinity, a greater one, while the Son has another, lesser divinity, because divinity, like God, is one. To give a reply in terms of John’s own express thinking, the Father is greater because the Son can do nothing of himself (5.19, 5.30), because it is from the Father that the Son receives the life he has in himself (5.26), because the Son receives his teaching from the Father, because the Father who dwells in the Son does the Son’s works, and so forth, as we have already seen. None of this detracts from either the proof of equality or the proof of unity that we have already mounted. (b) John 17.3: ‘And this is eternal life, that they know you the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.’ From this verse it is sometimes argued that the only true God is someone other than Jesus Christ, sent by the true God. Reply: That the Father is someone, that the Son is someone else, and that to know both is eternal life, I grant. As for the Father’s being the only true God, I distinguish. That this is so if the name ‘God’ is taken in the way the New Testament commonly takes it, as a personal name of the Father, I grant; that it is so if, as sometimes happens in the New Testament, the name ‘God’ is not taken as a personal name of the Father, I deny. This can be put more subtly. That for John the Father is the only true God, I grant; that for John only the Father is true God, I deny, for what he says is se ton monon aleFthinon theon [you the only true God] and not monon se ton aleFthinon theon [you alone the true God]. (c) The name ‘Lord’ refers only to the man Jesus, exalted by his resurrection, as in Acts 2.36, for example: ‘God has made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you crucified.’ He was not made Lord in the sense of Yahweh. Reply: As to the New Testament’s use of the name ‘Lord’ in the former sense, I distinguish. That it is used in this sense among others, I grant; that it is used only in this sense, I deny. That the argument of the present thesis rests on Acts 2.36 or similar texts, I deny. (d) ‘Begotten Son of God’ refers only to a man exalted by his resurrection. In Acts 13.33, for example, God is said to have fulfilled his promise ‘by raising Jesus; as also it is written in the second psalm, “You are my Son, today I have begotten you.”’ Here the ‘begotten Son’ refers only to a man chosen to exercise power.

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Respondetur: haec est possibilis interpretatio huius loci, conceditur; est possibilis in locis ex quibus argumentum est factum, negatur. (e) Similiter argui potest e locis ubi ‘Filius Dei’ significare videtur vel ‘iustum’ vel ‘Christum-Messiam’; et similiter respondetur secundum indicationes datas ubi de nomine Filii. (f) Aequalitas Filii cum Patre negatur a S. Paulo, 1 Cor 15.24–28. Constitutus enim est Filius in regno exercendo tantummodo donec omnia ei subiciantur (v. 25). Quibus aliquando subiectis, ‘ipse Filius subiectus erit ei, qui subiecit sibi omnia, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus’ (v. 28). Respondetur: hoc in loco cogitatur Filius in schemato prospectivo (vide vv. 20–25); quod schema de se non includit explicitam cogitationem de divinitate; et multo minus de se includit explicitam cogitationem de aequalitate quam ipse Ioannes non expresse affirmat sed tantum dat ad intelligendum. Vide praenotamina de progressiva revelatione et de schematibus. Quantum ad sensum loci notate (1) Paulum nullibi docuisse Filium Patri insubordinatum, et ideo agi tantummodo de externa quadam manifestatione subordinationis, nempe, regni traditione (v. 24); (2) in contextu agi de Christo mortuo, resuscitato, regnante, et ideo per se subiectionem seu subordinationem esse Filii qua hominis. Quantum ad articulum symboli: cuius regni non erit finis, cf. Lc 1.33, Apoc 11.15, Dan 2.44, 7.14, 7.27, Ps 10.16. Positus est articulus contra Marcellum ep. Ancyrae; cf. frag. 112–14, Klostermann in gcs, Eusebii Caesareae, Ecclesiastica theologia.96

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Reply: That this is a possible interpretation of the passage quoted, I grant; that it is possible in the passages on which the argument here has been built, I deny. (e) It is possible to argue in similar fashion from passages where ‘Son of God’ seems to mean either ‘a righteous man’ or ‘Christ the Messiah.’ The reply would be similar, following the lines of our discussion of the title ‘Son’ above. (f) In 1 Corinthians 15.24–28 Paul denies the Son’s equality with the Father. For he is constituted Son in the exercise of his reign only until all things are subjected to him (15.25). When everything has been so subjected, ‘then the Son himself will also be subjected to him who put all things under him, that God may be all in all’ (15.28). Reply: In this passage the Son is thought of using a prospective schematic pattern; see vv. 20–25. In itself this pattern does not involve explicit thought about divinity; much less, in itself, does it involve explicit thought about the equality that John himself only gives us to understand without affirming it expressly. See the Preliminary Notes on progressive revelation and schematic patterns. As for the meaning of 1 Corinthians 15.24–28, note (1) that nowhere else does Paul teach that the Son is subordinate to the Father, and so the passage concerns only an external manifestation of subordination, namely, his delivery of the kingdom (v. 24); (2) that in its context the passage concerns Christ as dying, raised, and reigning, and so the subjection or subordination belongs to the Son as man. As for the article in the creed, ‘his kingdom shall have no end,’ see Luke 1.33, Revelation 11.15, Daniel 2.44, 7.14, 7.27, Psalm 10.16. This article was formulated against Marcellus, bishop of Ancyra; see fragments 112–14, Klostermann, [Eusebius’ Werke, vol. 4] gcs, Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastica theologia.96

96 Erich Klostermann, ed., Eusebius Werke, vol. 4, gcs (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1972). The fragments of Marcellus are found on pp. 186–215. Lonergan had written ‘frag. 212,’ which cannot be correct, since there are only 129 fragments. 112–14 are possible.

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PARS SECUNDA

Conciliorum oecumenicorum doctrina de unione hypostatica

Thesis 2 Verbum divinum sibi univit carnem anima rationali animatam. Termini Verbum divinum: de quo Io 1.1; concilium Nicaenum (db 54, ds 125). univit: agitur de unione non efficienter sed formaliter; quia in divinis una est trium essentia, ita etiam una est trium operatio; et ideo tota Trinitas incarnationem efficienter produxit; sed solus Filius factus est homo. caro: ponitur ex Io 1.14. anima rationalis: secundum quam intelligimus, iudicamus, volumus, eligimus. animata : asserit factum unionis inter corpus et animam sed modum non determinat utrum ad mentem Platonis, Aristotelis, Neoplatonicorum concipiendus sit. Aliis verbis, agitur de ea unione quae de facto exsistit in hominibus viventibus quae, qualis sit, hic non determinatur.

Nota theologica De fide divina et catholica. Nam thesis magis explicite idem ponit quod in scripturis continetur.

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PART TWO



The Teaching of the Ecumenical Councils on the Hypostatic Union

Thesis 2 The divine Word united to himself flesh animated by a rational soul. Terms The divine Word: see John 1.1 and the Council of Nicea (db 45, ds 125, [dec 1: 5]). united: the term concerns union not from an efficient but from a formal standpoint. For in God the essence of the three [persons] is one, and likewise the three have one operation. The whole Trinity, therefore, efficiently produces the Incarnation; but only the Son became a human being. flesh: the term used in John 1.14. rational soul: that by which we understand, judge, will, and choose. animated: the term asserts the fact of a union between body and soul, but does not determine whether the manner of this union is to be conceived following Plato or Aristotle or the Neoplatonists. In other words, we are concerned with that union which as a matter of fact exists in living human beings; what sort of union this may be is not settled here. Theological note of the thesis ‘Of divine and catholic faith.’ For the thesis states more explicitly the same thing that scripture contains.

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Verba theseos desumpta sunt ex epistola secunda Cyrilli Alexandrini ad Nestorium, quae in Ephesino approbata est (db 111a, ds 250). Concilium Constantinopolitanum i: ‘homo factus’ (db 86, ds 150). Concilium Romanum, anno 382 (db 65, ds 159).1 Concilium Chalcedonense: ‘… hominem verum, eundem ex anima rationali et corpore … consubstantialem nobis eundem secundum humanitatem, per omnia nobis similem absque peccato …’ (db 148, ds 301). Concilium Constantinopolitanum iii: eadem habet (db 290, ds 554).

Adversarii [ariani] 1­ Ariani tripliciter de Verbo incarnato erraverunt: (1) divinitatem negabant; (2) animam excludebant; (3) unionem ad modum coniunctionis animae cum corpore ponebant. Hic de secundo errore agitur. Arianos posuisse Verbum loco animae in Christo homine testantur: Epiphanius, Ancoratus 33 (mg 43, 77); Nemesius, De natura hominis (mg 40, 605 a); Theodorus Mopsuestenus, Homilia catechetica, v, 9 (ed. TonneauDevreesse, p. 110; Studi e Testi, 145);2 Cyrillus Alexandrinus, Ad Acacium (mg 77, 197). Excerpta apud Xiberta, Enchir. 100, §§ 49, 51, 53.3

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The words of the thesis have been borrowed from Cyril of Alexandria’s second letter to Nestorius, which was approved by the Council of Ephesus (db 111a, ds 250, [dec 1: 41]). The First Council of Constantinople: ‘and was made man’ (db 86, ds 150, [dec 1: 24]). The Council of Rome, 382 ad (db 65, ds 159).1 The Council of Chalcedon: ‘truly man, composed of body and rational soul … consubstantial with us in his humanity, like us in every respect except for sin …’ (db 148, ds 301, [dec 1: 86–87]). The Third Council of Constantinople says the same (db 290, ds 554, [dec 1: 127]). Opponents of the thesis [arians] 1 The Arians were guilty of three errors regarding the incarnate Word: (1) they denied his divinity; (2) they excluded his soul; and (3) they held that the union [of human and divine] was like the conjunction of soul and body. Here we are concerned with the second error. The Arians had it that the Word took the place of a soul in Christ the man, as the following writers testify: Epiphanius, Ancoratus 33 (mg 43, 77, [gcsnf 10/1: 42]); Nemesius, De natura hominis (mg 40, 605 a, [Morani, 43–44]); Theodore of Mopsuestia, Homilia catechetica, v, 9 (Tonneau-Devreesse ed., p. 110; Studi e Testi, 145);2 Cyril of Alexandria, Ad Acacium (mg 77, 197, [Wickham, 56]). Excerpts will be found in Xiberta, Enchiridion 100, §§ 49, 51, 53.3







1 The references to the First Council of Constantinople and the Council of Rome were not given in the 1960 edition. The 1961 edition gives the reference to the First Council of Constantinople but not that to the Council of Rome. 2 Theodore of Mopsuestia, Les homélies catéchétiques. Reproduction phototy­ pique du ms. Mingana Syr. 561 (Selly Oak Colleges’ Library, Birmingham). Traduction, introd., index, par Raymond Tonneau en collaboration avec Robert Devreesse (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, 1949). 3 References are to Bartholomaeus M. Xiberta, Enchiridion de Verbo incarnato: Fontes quos ad studia theologica collegit (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto ‘Francisco Suárez,’ 1957). ‘Wickham’ refers to the critical edition and English translation in Cyril of Alexandria: Select Letters, ed. Lionel R. Wickham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

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Aetius impugnavit Athanasium eo quod duas naturas in Filio posuit; docuit Filium naturaliter capacem compositionis et ideo a Patre differre. Xiberta, Enchir. 95–96, §§ 29, 32. Eudoxius ep. Constantinopolitanus (ob. 370) in professione fidei (a quibusdam spuria habita): Credimus … in unum Dominum … incarnatum et non inhumanatum (sarkoFthenta ouk enanthroF­peFsanta). Xiberta, Enchir. 97, § 40. Lucius ep. Alexandriae, ‘compositum est carni, non autem et animae …’ Xiberta, Enchir. 98, § 41. Vide Grillmeier, apud Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 68–77.4 2  apollinaris, apollinaristae (a) Apollinaris, ep. Laodicaeae, ob. c. 390. Altaner 280.5 Textus collegit: H. Lietzmann, Apollinaris v. Laod. u. seine Schule, Tübingen 1904.6 Alii notantur apud Altaner. Excerpta: Xiberta, Enchir. 109-20. Grillmeier, apud Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 102–20;7 De Riedmatten, ibid., 203–12; Dominican Stud. 1 (1948) 239–60; Stud. Patrist. 2 (1957) 208–34.

(b) E tribus Arianorum erroribus Apollinaris unum reiecit sed duos retinuit: affirmavit enim divinitatem Verbi; animam Christi intellectivam negavit; unionem Verbi et carnis ad analogiam unionis animae et corporis concepit. (c) Fraudibus disseminaverunt doctrinam magistri vel suam Apollinaristae; quod etiam antiquitus notum est, cf. Adversus Fraudes Apollinistarum, inter opera Leontii Byzantini (mg 86/2, 1947–76; opus probabiliter spurium,

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Aetius attacked Athanasius for saying there are two natures in the Son; he taught that the Son is by nature capable of [entering into] composition and for that reason different from the Father. Xiberta, Enchiridion 95–96, §§ 29, 32. Eudoxius, bishop of Constantinople (d. 370), declared in his profession of faith (held by some to be spurious): We believe … in one God … incarnate [enfleshed] not inhumanate [humanized] (sarkoFthenta ouk enanthroF­ peFsanta). Xiberta, Enchiridion 97, § 40. Lucius, bishop of Alexandria, held that Christ ‘was composed with flesh, but not with soul as well.’ Xiberta, Enchiridion 98, § 41. See Grillmeier, in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 68–77.4 2  apollinaris, the apollinarians (a) Apollinaris was bishop of Laodicea and died around 390. See Altaner 280.5 H. Lietzmann has assembled the texts in Apollinaris von Laodicaea und seine Schule: Texte und Untersuchungen, 1 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1904).6 Others are noted in Altaner. For excerpts, see Xiberta, Enchiridion 109–20. Grillmeier, in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 102–20;7 Henri de Riedmatten, ‘Les Fragments d’Apollinaire à l’“Éranistes,”’in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 203–12; ‘Some Neglected Aspects of Apollinarist Christology,’ Dominican Studies 1 (1948) 239–60; ‘La Christologie d’Apollinaire de Laodicée,’ Studia Patristica 2 (Texte und Untersuchungen, 64; Berlin, 1957) 208–34. (b) Apollinaris rejected one of the Arians’ three errors but retained the other two. He did affirm the divinity of the Word; he denied, however, that Christ had an intellectual soul; and he conceived the union of the Word and flesh on the analogy of the union of body and soul. (c) The Apollinarians published their master’s teachings and their own under false names. This was already known in ancient times; among the works of Leontius of Byzantium is one written ‘against the forgeries of the



4 For Grillmeier-Bacht, see above, p. 9, note 7. See the corresponding account in Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, 1 (see above, p. 49, note 32) 238–48. 5 For Altaner, see above, p. 7, note 3. 6 Reissued in 1970 (Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms Verlag). 7 See also Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 329–43.

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Altaner 474); sed magnum influxum habuerunt, cum Cyrillus Alexandrinus et Eutyches sint decepti (Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 161,8 267).

(d) Iisdem fraudibus debemus magnam partem operum quae supersunt. Fidei minutior expositio (HeF kata meros pistis) (mg 10, 1103–24); Lietzmann 167–84; inter opera Gregorii Thaumaturgi. De unione corporis cum divinitate (ml 8, 873–75); Lietzmann 185–93; ascriptum papae Iulio. Demonstratio divinae incarnationis ad similitudinem hominum. Opus impugnatum a Gregorio Nysseno (mg 45, 1123–1278), nuper editum a Jaeger, Leiden: 1958, Opera Greg. Nyss., 3, 1;9 Apollinaris fragmenta collegit Lietzmann 185–93. AnakephalaioFsis. Ps-Athanasii, Dialogus v de SS. Trin (mg 28, 1265–85); Lietzmann 208–32. De fide et incarnatione (ml 8, 875–76); Lietzmann 193–203; ascriptum papae Iulio. De Incarnatione Dei Verbi ad Iovianum (mg 28, 25–30); Lietzmann 250–53; Ps-Athanasii. Cf. Cyrillum, Oratio ad Dominas, aco i, 1, 5, p. 65, lin. 25 – p. 66, lin. 19 (mg 76, 1212 a). Ad Dionysium epist. i (ml 8, 929–38); Lietzmann 256–62; ascriptum papae Iulio. Contra Diodorum, Lietzmann 235–36; Mansi xi, 449.10

Incerti auctoris sunt sequentia ps-epigrapha: Ad Prosdocium, Lietzmann 283–86, ascriptum papae Iulio. Ps-Felicis Papae, De Incarnatione, Lietzmann 318. aco i, 1, 2, p. 41. Ps-Hippolyti (interdum ps-Iulii), Epist. ad Severianum, Lietzmann 321–22.

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Apollinarians’ (Adversus fraudes Apollinistarum, mg 86/2, 1947–76; according to Altaner 474, this is probably a spurious work). But these had a considerable influence, since Cyril of Alexandria and Eutyches were deceived by them (Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 161,8 267). (d) To these forgeries we owe the greater part of the works that survive. Fidei minutior expositio (HeF kata meros pistis), a ‘Detailed Confession of Faith’ (mg 10, 1103–24); Lietzmann 167–84. This is included among the works of Gregory Thaumaturgus. De unione corporis cum divinitate (mg 8, 873–75); Lietzmann 185–93. A work ascribed to Pope Julius. Demonstratio divinae incarnationis ad similitudinem hominum, a work attacked by Gregory of Nyssa (mg 45, 1123–1278; there is a new edition by Werner Jaeger in Gregory’s Opera, 3, 1, Leiden: E.J Brill, 1958);9 the fragments of Apollinaris’s writing are collected in Lietzmann 185–93. AnakephalaioFsis. Pseudo-Athanasius, Dialogus v de Sanctissima Trinitate (mg 28, 1265–85); Lietzmann 208–32. De fide et incarnatione, ascribed to Pope Julius (ml 8, 875–76); Lietzmann 193–203. De Incarnatione Dei Verbi ad Jovianum, purportedly by Athanasius (mg 28, 25–30); Lietzmann 250–53. See Cyril, Oratio ad Dominas, in aco, 1, 1, 5, p. 65, line 25 – p. 66, line 19; mg 76, 1212 a [Pusey, 7: 161–62]. Ad Dionysium epistola i, ascribed to Pope Julius (ml 8, 929–38); Lietzmann 256–62. Contra Diodorum, Lietzmann 235–36; Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio, 11, 449.10 The following pseudepigraphic works are of uncertain authorship: Ad Prosdocium, ascribed to Pope Julius; Lietzmann 283–86. De Incarnatione, purportedly by Pope Felix; Lietzmann 318; aco, 1, 2, p. 41. Epistola ad Severianum, purportedly by Hippolytus (or, in some sources, Julius); Lietzmann 321–22.



8 See also Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 452. 9 Gregory of Nyssa, Opera Auxilio Aliorum Virorum Doctorum Edenda Curavit Wernerus Jaeger, vol. 3, part 1: Gregorii Nysseni Opera Dogmatica Minora, ed. F. Mueller (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1958) 131–233. 10 J.D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (Florence: Expensis Antonii Zatta Vereti, 1759–98; reprint and continuation: Paris and Leipzig: H. Welter, 1901–27).

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Ps-Athanasii, De incarnatione Dei Verbi, mg 28, 89–96; Lietzmann 303–307.11 (e) Momentum Apollinarismi Tendentia speculativa, iam per Arianos in rationalismum vergentes introducta, multipliciter annectitur quaestionibus christologicis, et per scholam non-arianam diffunditur. Lucius, Arianus, quaesivit: ‘Nam quomodo unus Christus, nisi una persona, una composita natura, sicuti hominem qui ex anima et corpore exstat …’ Xiberta, Enchir. 98, § 41. Apollinaris insistit in illis paulinis: ‘in similitudinem hominum’ (titulus operis impugnati a Gregorio Nysseno); ‘ut homo’ (Lietzmann 214, 33; Xiberta, Enchir. 113, § 14); ‘homo caelestis’ (Lietzmann 243, 4; Xiberta, Enchir. 115, § 38). Vide Grillmeier, 1, 105–108: Der himmlische Mensch. Christus non est nobis consubstantialis secundum animam (Lietzmann 214, 23; Xiberta, Enchir. 113, § 14); non est Deo consubstantialis secundum carnem (Lietzmann 213, 19; Xiberta, Enchir. 113, § 13). Ponit principia circa possibilem unitatem: e duobus perfectis, non fit unum (Gregorius Nyssenus, Antirrheticus, ed. Jaeger, 3, 1: 194, 3; 199, 18; 216, 10; mg 45, 1212, 1220, 1244; Lietzmann 224, 228; Xiberta, Enchir. 114, §§ 25, 29). Negat Deum-in-homine, anthroFpon entheon12 (Lietzmann 208, 4; Xiberta, Enchir. 112, § 8); cf. ‘homo assumptus.’ Docet Beatissiman Virginem Dei genetricem (Lietzmann 198–99; Xiberta, Enchir. 119, § 67). Quod ex Verbo et carne compositum est, docet esse non duas personas neque duas naturas (Lietzmann 178–79, Xiberta, Enchir. 110, § 4) neque duos filios (Lietzmann 250–51; Xiberta, Enchir. 119, § 70), sed unam personam et unam hypostasin (Lietzmann 194; Xiberta, Enchir. 118, § 65), unius naturae ex utraque parte compositae (Lietzmann 187, 5; Xiberta, Enchir. 111, § 6), unam naturam, unam hypostasin, unam operationem (energeian), unam personam (Lietzmann 199, 6; Xiberta, Enchir. 119, § 67), ‘eumdem esse et Filium Dei et Deum secundum spiritum, filium hominis secundum carnem, non duas naturas esse unum Filium, aliam adorandam et aliam non adorandam, sed unam naturam Dei Verbi incarnatam et adoratam

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De incarnatione Dei Verbi, purportedly by Athanasius; mg 28, 89–96; Lietzmann 303–307.11 (e) The importance of Apollinarianism A tendency towards speculation, which had already been introduced by Arians who verged on rationalism, was in many ways connected with Christological questions, and it spread through the non-Arian party. Lucius, an Arian, asked: ‘How is Christ one, unless he is one person, one composite nature, just as a human being exists out of body and soul  …’ Xiberta, Enchiridion 98, § 41. Apollinaris pressed these Pauline phrases: ‘in the likeness of men’ (the title of the work attacked by Gregory of Nyssa), ‘as a man’ (Lietzmann 214, 33; Xiberta, Enchiridion 113, § 14), and ‘heavenly man’ (Lietzmann 243, 4; Xiberta, Enchiridion 115, § 38). See Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 105–108 [Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 330–33] on ‘The Heavenly Man.’ Christ is not consubstantial with us as regards soul (Lietzmann 214, 33; Xiberta, Enchiridion 113, § 14); he is not consubstantial with God as regards flesh (Lietzmann 213, 19; Xiberta, Enchiridion 113, § 13). Apollinaris laid down principles regarding possible unity: two complete entities cannot become one (Gregory of Nyssa, Antirrheticus, in the Jaeger edition of his Opera, 3, 1, p. 194, 3; 199, 18; 216, 10; mg 45, 1212, 1220, 1244; Lietzmann 224, 228; Xiberta, Enchiridion 114, §§ 25, 29). He denied any ‘God-in-man’ or ‘divinized man,’12 anthroFpos entheos (Lietzmann 208, 4; Xiberta, Enchiridion 112, § 8); cf. ‘assumed man.’ He taught that the Virgin Mary was the mother of God (Lietzmann 198– 99; Xiberta, Enchiridion 119, § 67). That which was composed of the Word and flesh, he taught, was not two persons or two natures (Lietzmann 178–79; Xiberta, Enchiridion 110, § 4) or two Sons (Lietzmann 250–51; Xiberta, Enchiridion 119, § 70). Rather was it one person and one hypostasis (Lietzmann 194; Xiberta, Enchiridion 118, § 65), of one nature composed from each of the two parts (Lietzmann 187, 5; Xiberta, Enchiridion 111, § 6), one nature, one hypostasis, one operation (energeia), one person (Lietzmann 199, 6; Xiberta, Enchiridion 119, § 67). ‘The same one is both Son of God and God, in terms of his spirit, and Son of man, in terms of his flesh; the one Son is not two natures, one of which is to be worshiped and the other not, but the one incarnate nature of God the

11 This item is not listed in the 1960 edition. 12 ‘God-in-man’ translates Lonergan’s Latin; Xiberta gives ‘divine man.’

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cum carne sua unica adoratione’ (Lietzmann 250–51; Xiberta, Enchir. 119, § 70; mg 28, 28 a).13 Minime tamen oportet exaggerare vim speculativam Apollinaris, cum unionem animae et corporis non ontologice sed magis dynamice concepisse videatur. Grillmeier, 1, 108–12.

Argumentum 1 Iam argumento generali in thesi prima vidimus Iesum esse verum hominem eundemque esse Deum. 2 Quem virum (Act 2.22, 17.31) legimus oravisse (Mc 1.35, 6.46, 14.35, 14.39, Mt 14.23, 26.42, 26.44, Lc 22.44), profecisse sapientia et aetate et gratia (Lc 2.52; cf. 2.40), obedivisse (Phil 2.8, Rom 5.19), didicisse ex iis quae passus est obedientiam (Heb 5.8), preces supplicationesque cum clamore valido et lacrimis obtulisse et exauditum esse (Heb 5.7). Quae operationes sunt hominis qui animam humanam intellectivam habet, et non sunt operationes divinae naturae humana carne indutae. 3 Tomus ad Antiochenos, anno 362, subsignatus ab Athanasio aliisque episcopis (mg 26, 808–809), professus est ‘non corpus inanimatum aut sensus expers aut mente carens Salvatorem habuisse’ (mg 26, 804 b).14 4 Anathemate damnantur Apollinarii in concilio Constantinopolitano i, anno 381 (db 85, ds 151); ipsa doctrina Apollinaristica exponitur et damnatur in concilio Romano, anno 382 (db 65, ds 159). 5 Contra Apollinaristas egerunt: (a) Epiphanius, Panarion haer. 77, adv. Apollinaristas (mg 42, 641–96). Excerpta, Xiberta, Enchir. 224–31, ubi alia adduntur ex haer. 69 adv. Arianos, ex appendice ad haer. 20 de Incarnatione, et ex alio Epiphanii opere, Ancoratus.

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Word is worshiped with his flesh in a single worship’ (Lietzmann 250–51; Xiberta, Enchiridion 119, § 70; mg 28: 28 a).13 It will not do at all, however, to exaggerate Apollinaris’s speculative power, since he apparently conceived the union of soul and body dynamically rather than ontologically. See Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 108–12 [see Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 333–36]. The argument 1 We have already seen, in the general argument of thesis 1, that Jesus is true man and that the same one is true God. 2 This man (Acts 2.22, 17.31), we read, prayed (Mark 1.35, 6.46, 14.35, 14.39, Matthew 14.23, 26.42, 26.44, Luke 22.44); he grew in wisdom and stature and favor (Luke 2.52; cf. 2.40); he was obedient (Philippians 2.8, Romans 5.19); he learned obedience from what he suffered (Hebrews 5.8); he offered up prayers and supplications, with loud cries and tears, and he was heard (Hebrews 5.7). These are operations of a man who has a human intellectual soul, and they are not the operations of a divine nature that has put on human flesh. 3 The synodical letter to the Antiochenes signed by Athanasius and other bishops (mg 26, 808–809) professes that ‘the Savior had not a body without a soul, or without sense or intelligence’ (mg 26, 804 b).14 4 In 381 Apollinarians were condemned in an anathema of the First Council of Constantinople (db 85, ds 151, [dec 1: 31]); in 382 Apollinarian teaching was discussed and condemned at the Council of Rome (db 65, ds 159). 5 Opponents of the Apollinarians: (a) Epiphanius, Panarion or ‘Refutation of all the Heresies,’ number 77 (against the Apollinarians, mg 42, 641–96; gcs 37: 416–51). Excerpts will be found in Xiberta, Enchiridion 224–31, which also includes excerpts from number 69 (against the Arians) and an appendix (on the Incarnation) to number 20, as well as from another work of Epiphanius, the Ancoratus. 13 This quotation differs at a number of points from the one in Xiberta. 14 See npnf, 2nd ser., ed. Philip Schaff et al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956–), vol. 4, Athanasius: Selected Writings and Letters 484.

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(b) Gregorius ep. Nyssenus, Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium, et Ad The­ ophilum adversus Apollinaristas (mg 45, 1124–1269, 1269–77); recentius, ed. Jaeger, 3, 1. (c) Diodorus ep. Tarsensis, Adversus Synousiastas, cuius operis fragmenta collegit Briere, RevOrChrét 30 (1946) 231–83.15 Diodorus factus est episcopus Tarsensis anno 378, mortuus ante 394, damnatus in synodo Constantinopolitano, 499. Fragmenta e 60 operibus relicta, mg 33, 1561–1628. Excerpta Xiberta, Enchir. 129–34. Quemadmodum hypostasin conceperit, M. Richard, MélScRel 2 (1945) 12–17.16 (d) Theodorus ep. Mopsuestenus, ob. 428, Altaner 285–87, mg 66. Excerpta, Xiberta, Enchir. 134–49, damnatus concilio Constantinopolitano ii, anno 553, db 224–25, ds 434–35, de qua damnatione recens litt. apud F. Sullivan, Anal. Greg.17 Conscripsit: De Incarnatione, Contra Apollinaristas, De Apollinari et eius haeresi. Fragmenta apud Facundum de Hermiane (ml 67). Excerpta, Xiberta, Enchir. 134–49 (e) Ps-Athanasius, De Incarnatione adv. Apollinarium (mg 26, 1094–1166).

6 Contra Apollinaristas Patres traditionale argumentum adaptaverunt, Quod non est assumptum non est sanatum. (a) Generali modo proponitur hoc argumentum: Athanasius, Ad Epictetum, 7, ad excludendam fictionem ab Incarnatione (mg 26, 1060, ep 794).18 Cyrillus Hierosolymitanus, Cat. 4, 9: si enim humanae naturae assumptio phantasma fuit, phantasma itidem fuerit salus (mg 33, 467, ep 817).19

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(b) Gregory, bishop of Nyssa, Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium and Ad Theophilum adversus Apollinaristas (mg 45, 1124–1269, 1269–77). More recent: Jaeger’s edition of Gregory’s Opera, 3, 1. (c) Diodore, bishop of Tarsus, Adversus Synousiastas. The fragments of this work have been collected by Brière in Revue de l’Orient Chrétien 30 (1946) 231–83.15 Diodore became bishop of Tarsus in 378, died before 394, and was condemned in 499 at a synod in Constantinople. The fragments of his sixty remaining works will be found in mg 33, 1561–1628. For excerpts see Xiberta, Enchiridion 129–34. On the way in which he conceived hypostasis, see M. Richard, Mélanges de Science Religieuse 2 (1945) 12–17.16 (d) Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia, died in 428. See Altaner 285–87; mg 66; excerpts in Xiberta, Enchiridion 134–49. Theodore was condemned by the Second Council of Constantinople in 553 (db 224–25, ds 434–35, [dec 1: 119–20]). For recent literature on his condemnation, see F. Sullivan in Analecta Gregoriana 82 (1956).17 Among his writings were treatises on the Incarnation, against the Apollinarians, and on Apollinaris and his heresy. Fragments preserved in the writings of Facundus, bishop of Hermiane (ml 67); excerpts in Xiberta, Enchiridion 134–49. (e) Pseudo-Athanasius, De Incarnatione adversus Apollinarium (mg 26, 1094–1166). 6 Against the Apollinarians, the Fathers adapted the traditional argument that ‘what has not been assumed has not been healed.’ (a) This argument is propounded in a general way by the following: Athanasius, Ad Epictetum (Letter 59), written to eliminate the view that the Incarnation was imaginary (mg 26, 1060; ep 794).18 Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses, 4, 9: ‘If the assumption [by the Son] of a human nature was a phantom, our salvation would likewise be a phantom’ (mg 33, 467; ep 817).19 15 M. Brière, ‘Fragments syriaques de Diodore de Tarse, réédits et traduits pour la première fois,’ Revue de l’Orient Chrétien 30 (1946) 231–83. 16 M. Richard, ‘L’Introduction du mot “hypostase” dans la théologie de l’Incarnation,’ Mélanges de Science Religieuse 2 (1945) 5–32, 243–70. See below, p. 203. 17 See above, p. 11, note 8. 18 See npnf, 2nd series, vol. 4, p. 572. 19 See npnf, 2nd series, vol. 7, Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory of Nazianzus, p. 21.

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Marius Victorinus, Adv. Arium, 3, 3, arguit omnia universalia in Christo fuisse (ml 8, 1101, ep 906). Basilius Magnus, Epist. 261: si enim aliud esset quod mortis imperio subiectum erat, aliud quod assumptum a Domino, non desiisset mors quae sua sunt operari (mg 32, 969, ep 928, ubi de adventu in carne agitur).20 (b) Ad praesentem quaestionem adaptatur: Gregorius Nazianzenus, Epist. 101 ad Cledonium, anno 382: Si quis in hominem mente carentem sperat, amens vere est, nec dignus cui salus omnino afferatur. Quod enim assumptum non est, sanari nequit; quod autem Deo unitum est, hoc quoque salvatur. Si dimidia tantum ex parte Adam lapsus esset, dimidiatum quoque esset et assumptum et sanatum; si autem totus peccavit, totus quoque Genito unitur et totus salvatur (mg 37, 181, ep 1018. Xiberta, Enchir. 200, § 13).21 Gregorius Nyssenus, Antirrheticus adv. Apollinarium, docet Christum surrexisse ‘ut, in utraque parte naturae suae proprietates exhibente manens, naturam corporum per corpus et naturam animarum per animam salvaret’ (mg 45, 1257. Ed. Jaeger, 3, 1, pp. 225-26, ep 1055). Ambrosius, Epist. 48 circa 390: si enim aliquid ei defuit, non totum redemit (ml 16, 1153 a, ep 1254. Xiberta, Enchir. 265, § 7). Hieronymus, Hom. de nativitate Domini: quidquid non assumpsit ex homine, non salvavit (Xiberta, Enchir. 284, § 69).

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Marius Victorinus (Victorinus Afer) argues in Adversus Arium, 3, 3 that all the universals were in Christ (ml 8, 1101; [sc 68: 448]; ep 906). Basil the Great, Letter 261, on Christ’s coming in the flesh: ‘If what was reigned over by death was not that which was assumed by the Lord, death would not have ceased working his own ends’ (mg 32, 969; [lcl 270: 76]; ep 928).20 (b) The argument is brought to bear on the question at hand by these: Gregory of Nazianzus, Letter 101 (to Cledonius, written in 382): ‘If anyone has put his trust in a man without a mind, he is really mindless and quite unworthy of salvation. For that which has not been assumed is not healed; but that which is united with Godhead is also saved. If only half Adam fell, then that which is assumed and saved may be half also; but if the whole of him fell, it is also the whole that is united with him who was begotten, and the whole that is saved’ (mg 37, 181; [sc 208: 50]; ep 1018; Xiberta, Enchiridion 200, § 13).21 Gregory of Nyssa teaches in his Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium that Christ rose ‘so that, continuing to display what is proper in both parts of his nature, he might save the nature of bodies through a body and the nature of souls through a soul’ (mg 45, 1257; Jaeger, ed., Opera, 3, 1 [see above, note 9], 225–26; ep 1055). Ambrose, Letter 48 (written around 390): ‘If anything was lacking in him, he did not redeem the whole’ (ml 16, 1153 a; [csel 82.1: 228]; ep 1254; Xiberta, Enchiridion 265, § 7). Jerome, Homilia de nativitate Domini: ‘Whatever he did not assume from man, he did not save’ (Xiberta, Enchiridion 284, § 69).

20 See npnf, 2nd series, vol. 8, Basil: Selected Works and Letters, p. 300. 21 See npnf, 2nd series, vol. 7, p. 440. There is a more recent translation by Lionel Wickham in On God and Christ: The Five Theological Orations and Two Letters to Cledonius (St Vladimir’s Seminary Press: Popular Patristics, 2002).

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Thesis 3 Non in alium et alium dividendus est Christus, sed una agnoscenda est persona, eaque divina, cuius tam humana sunt quam divina.

Termini alius et alius: duo scilicet quorum hic non est ille, uti Pater et Filius, Spiritus sanctus et Ioannes Baptista, Petrus et Paulus. dividendus: in thesi prima posuimus unum eundemque Iesum esse et Deum et hominem; iam proceditur contra eos qui hanc unitatem et identitatem in duos dividunt. una: non duae neque plures; unum definitur indivisum in se et divisum a quolibet alio. persona: substantia individua naturae rationalis (Boethius); subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali (Aquinas). n.b. Hae definitiones sunt posterioris temporis, et potius ex praesenti thesi concludendae quam ad eam probandam praesupponendae. Quare, de praesenti, declarandae sunt, non systematice sed communiter: non systematice, per explicationem notionis substantiae vel subsistentis, etc.; sed communiter, proponendo exempla, uti Petrum vel Paulum vel archangelum Michaelem vel Deum Patrem vel Filium. eaque divina: nempe, secunda e tribus personis SS. Trinitatis. humana: e.g., incarnari, hominem fieri, pati, mori, resurgere. divina: e.g., unigenitus, Patri consubstantialis, Deus ex Deo.

Quaestio Quaestio oritur ex symbolo Nicaeno1 (db 54, ds 125).

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Thesis 3 Christ is not to be divided into ‘someone’ and ‘someone else’; one person must be acknowledged, and that one divine, to whom belong alike things human and things divine. Terms ‘Someone’ and ‘someone else’: two, that is to say, of whom one is not the other; for instance, the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit and John the Baptist, Peter and Paul. divided: in thesis 1 we took the position that one and the same Jesus is both God and man; we now go on to counter those who divide this unity and identity into two. one: neither two nor many; ‘one’ is defined as that which is undivided in itself and divided from everything else. person: an individual substance of a rational nature (Boethius [lcl 76:84; Moreschini, 214]); a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature (Thomas Aquinas [in 1 Sent. 1, d. 23, q. 1, a. 4c (ed. Mandonnet, 1: 566)]). Note that these definitions belong to a later time, and they are conclusions that follow from the present thesis rather than presuppositions for proving it. For present purposes, accordingly, they should be stated not in a systematic but in a commonsense way: not in a systematic way, through explanations of the notion of substance or subsistence and the like, but in a commonsense way, by means of examples like Peter or Paul or the archangel Michael or God the Father or the Son. and that one divine: namely, the second of the three persons of the Holy Trinity. things human: for example, being incarnate, becoming man, suffering, dying, rising. things divine: for example, to be only-begotten, consubstantial with the Father, God from God. The question The question arises from the Nicene Creed1 (db 54, ds 125, [dec 1: 5]).



1 Here and elsewhere Lonergan means by ‘Nicene Creed’ the creed of the council of Nicea, ad 325, rather than the liturgically recited creed which

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Ibi enim dicitur aliquis esse unigenitus, Patri consubstantialis, Deus verus de Deo vero; qui sane divina attributa habet; et ideo est aeternus, incorporalis, impassibilis, immortalis, immutabilis. Sed ibi etiam dicitur aliquis esse incarnatus, homo factus, passus, tertia die resuscitatus; qui sane est temporalis, corporalis, passibilis, mortalis, mutabilis. Iam vero de eodem secundum idem non dicuntur contradictoria. Et contradictoria sunt: aeternum et temporale; incorporale et corporale; impassibile et passibile; immortale et mortale; immutabile et mutabile. Quaeritur ergo utrum haec dicantur (a) de alio et alio an (b) de eodem secundum diversa. Respondetur autem hac in thesi quod de eodem dicuntur, in proxima autem addetur quod de eodem dicuntur secundum duas naturas. Unde concludes Thesis directe agit de uno et indirecte tantummodo de modo unionis. Directe agit de uno: asserit enim eundem esse aeternum Patris Filium ac Iesum Nazarenum. Indirecte agit de modo unionis, nempe, eatenus tantum quatenus ex asserto directo concludi potest.2 [Praenotamina] praenotamen primum: de evolutione sententiarum Ut historia quaestionis intelligi possit, quaedam praemittenda sunt (1) de reali difficultate, (2) de difficultate terminologica, (3) de diversis schematibus, (4) de diversitate regionali. Quibus intellectis, tollitur illa fere indocta ignorantia quae asserit vel insinuat Patres doctrinam evangelicam

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In the Creed someone is said to be only-begotten, consubstantial with the Father, true God from true God. He plainly has divine attributes; therefore he is eternal, incorporeal, impassible, immortal, unchangeable. But the Creed also says that someone became incarnate, was made man, suffered, rose on the third day. This one plainly is temporal, corporeal, passible, mortal, changeable. Now, contradictory predicates are not applied in the same way to the same thing. And these are contradictory: eternal and temporal, incorporeal and corporeal, impassible and passible, immortal and mortal, unchangeable and changeable. Hence, the question arises whether these two sets of predicates refer (a) to someone and someone else, respectively, or (b) to the same one, but in different ways. The answer given in this thesis is that they refer to the same one; the next thesis will add that they refer to the same one on the basis of his two natures. Conclusion from this The thesis is directly concerned with what is one and only indirectly with the manner of union. It is directly concerned with what is one, for it states that the same one is the eternal Son of the Father and Jesus of Nazareth. It is indirectly concerned with the manner of union, just insofar as it is possible to draw conclusions from the direct statement.2 [Preliminary Notes] preliminary note 1: development of opinions In order to make possible an understanding of the history of the question, something should be said in advance about (1) the real difficulty, (2) the terminological difficulty, (3) different schematic patterns, and (4) regional diversity. Understanding these points does away with the uninstructed igno-

often goes by the same name, but which is more accurately called the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed. 2 On the manner of union, see below, Preliminary Note 5, pp. 230–41.

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dereliquisse ut vanas speculationes metaphysicas de persona et natura instituerent.

1 De reali difficultate Realis difficultas, quaenam fuerit, ex decreto Chalcedonensi facile concluditur. Ibi enim asseritur unam esse personam in duabus naturis. Quod assertum non habet sensum, nisi distinctio rationis ponitur inter personam et naturam. Idemque assertum ad rem nihil facit, nisi etiam ponitur realis quaedam distinctio inter personam et naturam. Si enim in re idem prorsus est persona quod natura, tunc posita una persona, sequitur necessario una natura et, positis duabus naturis, necessario sequuntur duae personae. At haec realis distinctio non potest esse distinctio realis maior, nempe, quae intercedit inter subsistentia, uti sunt Pater et Filius, Spiritus sanctus et Ioannes Baptista, Petrus et Paulus, homo et equus. Si enim ponitur realis distinctio maior inter personam et naturam, tunc illa natura sic distincta est aliud subsistens et, in casu, alia persona. Relinquitur ergo ut realis distinctio quae requiritur inter personam et naturam sit distinctio realis minor inadaequata, nempe, inter subsistens et partem suam non subsistentem.3 Aliis verbis, aeternus Patris Filius subsistit, sed natura humana assumpta non subsistit. Quam tamen distinctionem Patres saec. v non cogitaverunt nisi modo quodam incohaerenti. Vide epistolam Cyrilli 2am ad Succensum (aco, i, 1, 6, p. 162, 4–9; mg 77, 246 a). Cf. db 219: ‘intellectu tantummodo’; db 288: ‘sola contemplatione.’ Vide etiam Iustinianum, Confessio rectae fidei (mg 86, 1006 et 1011; Xiberta, Enchir. 563–64, §§ 52, 54).

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rance which claims or insinuates that the Fathers abandoned gospel teachings for the sake of building empty metaphysical speculations about person and nature. 1 The real difficulty The real difficulty, as it came to be, is easy to infer from the Chalcedonian decree, which states that there is one person in two natures. This statement is meaningless unless a conceptual distinction is drawn between person and nature. And the same statement states nothing real unless a real distinction between person and nature is drawn as well. For if in reality a person is exactly what a nature is, if there is one person it necessarily follows that there is one nature, and if there are two natures it necessarily follows that there are two persons. But this real distinction cannot be a major real distinction, the distinction between subsistents such as the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit and John the Baptist, Peter and Paul, a human being and a horse. For if there is a major real distinction between person and nature, then a nature distinguished in this way would be another subsistent, and in that case it would be another person. It remains, then, that between person and nature the real distinction required is an inadequate minor real distinction, that is, the distinction between a subsistent and a non-subsistent part of that subsistent.3 In other words, the eternal Son of the Father subsists, but the human nature he assumed does not subsist. This distinction, however, was thought about by the fifth-century fathers only in an incoherent fashion. See the second letter of Cyril to Succensus (aco, 1, 1, 6, p. 162, 4–9; mg 77, 246 a; [Wickham, 92]). See [the Second Council of Constantinople’s anathematization of the Three Chapters, which speaks of a difference that is] ‘only of the intellect’ (db 219, ds 428,



3 See Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, vol. 3 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M.. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 514: ‘Real distinctions are divided into major and minor … Minor real distinctions are between the elements or constituents of proportionate being … Again, real distinctions are divided into adequate and inadequate. There is an adequate real distinction between Peter and Paul, between Peter’s right hand and his left hand; but there is an inadequate real distinction between Peter and his hands.’

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2 De difficultate terminologica ­Ubi ipsa res non intelligitur, multo minus haberi potest clara atque exacta terminologia. Quatenus enim actu intelligimus, eatenus concipere possumus; et quatenus actu concipimus, verba exteriora accurate edere possumus. Sed distinctio realis minor non erat nota, ut supra habitum est. Quare, qui realem distinctionem inter naturas recte omnino vindicabant, iidem divisionem personae in duas personas haud evitare potuerunt. Et qui realem unitatem personae recte omnino asserebant, iidem realem naturarum distinctionem post unionem cohaerenter confiteri haud potuerunt. Quibus perspectis, ex reali difficultate ad difficultatem terminologicam fere a priori concluditur. Aderat sane distinctio quaedam inter personam (hupostasin) et essentiam (ousian), quae in synodo Constantinopolitano anno 382 agnita erat per formulam, mian ousian, treis hupostaseis. Vide Hefele-Leclercq, ii, 55;4 Mansi iii, 585;5 mg 82, 1216. At haec distinctio trinitaria est rationis tantum, cum in Deo simplici nulla est realis distinctio inter quod est et quo est. Vide ds 745, db nota ad 389.6 Caeterum, exstat studium positivum quo exhibetur quam parum inter personam et naturam, hupostasin et phusin, a Patribus ante c. Chalcedonense distinctum fuerit. Vide M. Richard, ‘L’Introduction du mot “hypostase” dans la théologie de l’Incarnation.’7 Ubi textus afferuntur ex Apollinari

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[dec 1: 117]); [the dogmatic epistle of the Council of Rome, ad 680, which speaks of a difference] ‘only to contemplation’ (db 288, ds 548). See also Justinian, Confessio rectae fidei (mg 86, 1006, 1011; [Schwartz, 140 (82), 144, 146 (86, 88)]; Xiberta, Enchiridion 563–64, §§ 52, 54). 2 The terminological difficulty When a reality is not itself understood, much less is it possible to have a clear and exact terminology. We can conceive only insofar as we actually understand, and we can bring forth outer words with accuracy only insofar as we actually conceive. But, as was said above, a minor real distinction was unfamiliar. Consequently those who, quite rightly, defended a real distinction between natures could hardly avoid dividing the person into two persons. And those who, quite rightly, asserted the unity of the person could hardly give a coherent account of the real distinction of the natures following their union. That being so, the real difficulty implies, almost a priori, a terminological difficulty. Certainly there was a distinction between person (hypostasis) and essence (ousia); that had been acknowledged in 382 at a synod in Constantinople in the formula mian ousian, treis hypostaseis. See Hefele-Leclercq, 2, 55;4 Mansi, 3, 585;5 mg 82, 1216. Yet this Trinitarian distinction is conceptual only, since in the one God there is no real distinction between that which is and that by which it is. See db 389 note, ds 745.6 Besides, historical studies have shown how little the Fathers prior to the Council of Chalcedon distinguished between person and nature, hyposta­ sis and physis. See M. Richard, ‘L’Introduction du mot “hypostase” dans la théologie de l’Incarnation.’7 This study presents texts from Apollinaris





4 The reference is to vol. 2 of Charles Joseph Hefele and Henri Leclercq, His­ toire des conciles d’après les documents originaux (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1907). 5 See above, p. 187, note 10. 6 In the 1960 and 1961 editions, Lonergan had db 389, 391 (rather than db 389 note), and added a reference to his Divinarum personarum, pp. 97, 104 (= De Deo trino, Pars systematica [see above, p. 157, note 91] 120–21, Assertion 5, the section on ‘What is it, in God, that subsists’; and p. 127, Assertion 7). The corresponding pages in The Triune God: Systematics (see above, p. 65, note 38) are 242–43 and 256–57. 7 See above, p. 193.

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(6–9), Epiphanio (9–12), Diodoro Tarsensi (12–17),8 Gregorio Nysseno (17–21), Theodoro Mopsuesteno (21–29), quibusdam apocryphis (29–32), Cyrillo Alexandrino (243–53), Theodoreto Cyrensi (253, 263), Andrea Samosateno (254), Nestorio (255–58), Proclo ep. Constantinopolitano (259– 63), Flaviano ep. Constantinopolitano (264). Sequentia fere concluduntur: (a) Secundum Theodorum Mopsuestenum: Verbum et homo-assumptus sunt duae naturae quae manent distinctae etiam post unionem; separatim considerata, utraque natura habet propriam suam hypostasin; attentione facta ad unionem, duae naturae non sunt nisi una persona et una hypostasis (25). (b) Secundum Cyrillum Alexandrinum: post unionem non sunt dividendae Christi hypostases (seu naturae) (245); idiomata (proprietates) Christi non sunt dividenda inter duas personas vel duas hypostases (vel duas naturas), sed omnia sunt attribuenda ad unicam personam, hypostasin (naturam) (247); Verbum carnem assumptam sibi univit secundum hypostasin (250). Circa doctrinam Cyrilli idem censet A. Grillmeier (1, 181–82, textus circa hypostasin et unam naturam indicavit, 1, 170, n. 15; vide etiam 1, 230, n. 78). (c) Nestorius ante controversiam cum Cyrillo de usu theologico nominis ‘hypostasis’ cogitasse non videtur (255); post 30.xi.430, affirmavit simpliciter duas esse hypostases in Christo post unionem; neque quemquam antea ita sine restrictione esse locutum cognoscit M. Richard (258). Ulteriora circa Nestorium, T. Camelot, apud Grillmeier, 1, 213, 219–29.9 (d) Incepta est quaedam distinctio nominalis inter hypostasin et naturam a Proclo et deinde Flaviano (264) paulo ante concilium Chalcedonense.

3 De schematibus ‘Verbum-Caro,’ ‘Homo-Deus’ (a) De notione schematis, vide thesin primam, praenotamina tertium et quartum.10

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(6–9), Epiphanius (9–12), Diodore of Tarsus (12–17),8 Gregory of Nyssa (17–21), Theodore of Mopsuestia (21–29), certain apocryphal writings (29– 32), Cyril of Alexandria (243–53), Theodoret of Cyrrhus (253, 263), Andrew of Samosata (254), Nestorius (255–58), Proclus, bishop of Constantinople (259–63) and Flavian, bishop of Constantinople (264). The conclusions are approximately the following: (a) According to Theodore of Mopsuestia, the Word and the assumed man are two natures which remain distinct even after their union. Considered on its own, each nature has its own hypostasis; from the standpoint of the union, the two natures are nothing else than one person and one hypostasis (25). (b) According to Cyril of Alexandria, the hypostases (or natures) of Christ after their union are not to be divided (245); the idiomata or properties of Christ are not to be divided between two persons or two hypostases (or two natures), but all things are to be attributed to a single person, hypostasis (nature) (247); the Word united assumed flesh to himself on the basis of hypostasis (250). A. Grillmeier holds the same view of Cyril’s teaching (Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 181–82 [Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 482–83]; he points to a text about hypostasis and one nature in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 170, n. 15; see also ibid. 230, n. 78). (c) Nestorius apparently gave no thought to the theological use of the word hypostasis before his controversy with Cyril [Richard, ‘L’Introduction’ 255]; after 30 November 430, he affirmed flatly that there were two hypos­ tases in Christ after the union; Richard finds no such unqualified expression earlier (258). For more on Nestorius see T. Camelot, in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 213, 219–29.9 (d) Some nominal distinction between hypostasis and nature was introduced by Proclus and later by Flavian (264) shortly before the council of Chalcedon. 3 The schematic patterns ‘Word-Flesh,’ ‘Man-God’ (a) On the notion of schematic patterns, see thesis 1, preliminary notes 3 and 4.10

8 See above, p. 47. 9 Thomas Camelot, o.p., ‘De Nestorius à Eutychès: L’opposition de deux christologies,’ in Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, vol. 1, 213–42. 10 See above, pp. 42–65.

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Schema ‘Verbum-caro’ correspondet schemati scripturistico inverso, quod ab aeterno Filio incipit ut ad vitam eiusdem terrestrem descendat. Deprehenditur ab A. Grillmeier apud Arianos (68–77), S. Athanasium (77– 102), Apollinarem (102–20), S. Cyrillum Alexandrinum (164–82). Unde transit ad Eutychen (134–42) et Monophysitas (423–580). Schema ‘Homo-Deus’ correspondet schemati scripturistico vel prospectivo vel retrospectivo, quod ab homine Iesu incipit ut ad divinitatem ascendat. Deprehenditur apud Eustathium Antiochenum (124–30), Eusebium Emesenum (130–35), Diodorum Tarsensem (135–44), Theodorum Mopsuestenum (144–55), Nestorium (213, 219–29), Andreas Samosatenus (191– 93), Proclus ep. Constantinopolitanus (193–95), et Flavianus (195–98).11 (b) Schema ‘Verbum-caro’ non dirigit attentionem ad animam, intellectum, voluntatem Christi humanam, sed quam maxime favet unitati reali. Iam vidimus Arianos et Apollinaristas, qui exsistentiam animae rationalis in Christo negabant et hominem caelestem Verbo et carne compositum praedicabant. Circa S. Athanasium monet Grillmeier non omnia iam in clara luce esse posita (99). Censet idem S. Athanasium animam Christi humanam agnovisse; quam tamen agnitionem magis ad physicam quam ad theologicam Christi considerationem pertinere; communiter S. Athanasium de Verbo et de carne locutum esse, operationes animae Christi praetermisisse; unde cum Verbum sit omnium operationum subiectum expresse agnitum, maxime elucere Christi unitatem (97–99). S. Cyrillus in operibus prioribus (Thesaurus, Dialogi) de cognitione Christi humana et de passionibus non carnis sed animae silet (167). Loco quodam celeberrimo (Orat. ad Dominas, aco, i, 1, 5, p. 65, 25–66, 20; mg 76, 1212–13) citat sub nomine S. Athanasii epistolam Apollinaris ad Iovianum (Lietz­mann, pp. 250–53), ubi fortiter negantur duo filii, duae naturae, duae adorationes, et praedicatur ‘una natura Dei Verbi incarnata,’ mia phusis tou theou logou sesarkoFmeneF.12 Quam formulam suam fecit (Grillmeier, 1, 169; cf. 230 n. 78). Contra hanc formulam obiectiones movit Succensus, ep. Dio-

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The ‘Word-flesh’ pattern corresponds to the New Testament’s ‘inverse’ pattern, which begins from the eternal Son and moves downwards to his earthly life. Grillmeier discerns it in the Arians (68–77), Athanasius (77– 102), Apollinaris (102–20), and Cyril of Alexandria (164–82). From them it passed to Eutyches (134–42) and the monophysites (423–580). The ‘man-God’ pattern corresponds to the ‘prospective’ or to the ‘retrospective’ pattern in the New Testament, which both begin from the man Jesus and move upwards to his divinity. It may be discerned in Eustathius of Antioch (124–30), Eusebius of Emesa (130–35), Diodore of Tarsus (135– 44), Theodore of Mopsuestia (144–55), Nestorius (213, 219–29), Andrew of Samosata (191–93), Proclus, bishop of Constantinople (193–95), and Flavian (195–98).11 (b) The ‘Word-flesh’ pattern does not concentrate on Christ’s human soul, intellect, will; rather, it stresses a real unity. We have already seen that the Arians and Apollinarians, who denied the existence of a rational soul in Christ, also presented [him as] a heavenly man composed of the Word and flesh. As for Athanasius, Grillmeier points out that not everything had yet been clarified (99 [Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 326–27]). In his estimation Athanasius did acknowledge a human soul in Christ, though more as a physical than as a theological factor. Athanasius commonly speaks about Word and flesh, and not about the operations of Christ’s soul; hence, because of his stated acknowledgment that the Word is the subject of all operations, it is mainly the unity of Christ that he elucidates (97–99). Cyril, in his earlier works (the Thesaurus and the Dialogues) has nothing to say about Christ’s human knowledge or about sufferings of his soul rather than his flesh (167 [Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 415–16]). In a famous passage (Oratio ad Dominas, aco, 1, 1, 5, p. 65, 25–66, 20; mg 76, 1212–13; [Pusey, 7: 161–63]) he quotes as the work of Athanasius a letter written by Apollinaris to Jovian (Lietzmann, 250–53) which strongly denies that there are two Sons, two natures, two worships, and declares the ‘one incarnate nature of God the Word,’ mia physis tou theou logou sesarkoFmeneF.12 This for-

11 In the 1960 and 1961 editions the sentence ‘Deprehenditur’ ends with Nestorius. Then there is a sentence added: ‘Quibus quodammodo accedunt Theodoretus Cyrensis (181–191), Andreas Samosatenus (191–93), Proclus ep. Constant. (193–95), et Flavianus (195–98).’ 12 See above, p. 189.

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caesareae Isauriae; cui respondit Cyrillus (a) affirmando animam Christi humanam (aco, i, 1, 6, pp. 157–59; mg 77, 237-41) sed (b) admittendo duas naturas ante incarnationem, et duas post incarnationem negando (aco, i, 1, 6, p. 162, 4–9; mg 77, 246 a).

(c) Qui autem schemate ‘Homo-Deus’ utebantur, tum veram Christi humanitatem tum realem distinctionem inter naturam humanam et divinam clarissime agnoverunt atque professi sunt. Neque fraudibus apollinistarum decipi poterant, cum ipsi hanc haeresim detegerunt atque fortiter impugnaverunt. Ubi Apollinaris nisi carnem humanam in Christo homine non agnovit, ipsi Christum hominem defendebant et ex scripturis multipliciter probaverunt. Ubi Apollinaris unam naturam, unam hypostasin, unam personam, unam operationem praedicabat, ipsi naturarum distinctionem realem in clara luce posuerunt. Ubi Apollinaris caelestis cuiusdam hominis unitatem volebat naturalem, ipsi duarum naturarum coniunctionem liberam et gratuitam affirmaverunt. Vide excerpta ex Diodoro Tarsensi et Theodoro Mopsuesteno apud Xiberta, Enchir. 129–49. 4 De diversitate regionali Schema ‘Verbum-caro’ erat Alexandrinorum: res quidem manifesta est circa Arium, Athanasium, Cyrillum; sed pater Apollinaris erat Alexandrinus, educationemque hellenisticam suo filio procuravit, uti narratur a Lietz­mann in praefatione operis, Apollinaris v. Laod. u. seine Schule, 1904.13 Schema ‘Homo-Deus’ erat Antiochenorum. Exceptio est Eusebius Emesenus (ob. ante 359) qui ad scholam Alexandrinam pertinebat, sed impassibilitatem Verbi contra Arianos defendebat (Grillmeier, 1, 131–35). Differentiae ergo mentis et scholae accessit quaedam locorum separatio, quae communicationem facilem et frequentem impediebat. Ex quo factum est ut in prioribus operibus scripserit Cyrillus quasi haeresis apollinaristica non exstitisset (Grillmeier, 1, 165–66), et in posterioribus formulae apollinaristicae legerentur quasi Athanasii vel RR. PP. fuissent. At eandem ob

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mula Cyril adopts (Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 169 [Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 473]; see 230, n. 78). Against the formula, Succensus, bishop of Diocaesarea in Isuaria raised objections to which Cyril responded by (a) affirming Christ’s human soul (aco, 1, 1, 6, pp. 157–59; mg 77, 237–41; [Wickham, 84, 86]) while (b) admitting there were two natures before the Incarnation but denying there were two afterwards (aco, 1, 1, 6, p. 162, 4–9; mg 77, 246 a; [Wickham, 92]). (c) On the other hand, those who made use of the ‘man-God’ pattern were quite clear when it came to acknowledging and professing the humanity of Christ and, as well, a real distinction between human and divine nature. They were not deceived by the Apollinarian forgeries, in which they detected heresy that came under their vigorous attack. Whereas all that Apollinaris had acknowledged in Christ was human flesh, they brought numerous proofs from scripture to the defense of Christ the man. Whereas Apollinaris had declared there was one nature, one hypostasis, one person, and one operation, they threw a clear light on the distinction of natures. Whereas Apollinaris insisted on his heavenly man’s natural unity, they affirmed a free and gratuitous conjunction of natures. See the excerpts from Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia in Xiberta, Enchiridion 129–49. 4 Regional diversity The ‘Word-flesh’ model was Alexandrian: so much is evident in the case of Arius, Athanasius, and Cyril. But, as Leitzmann shows in the preface of his Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule (1904),13 Apollinaris’s father was from Alexandria, and saw to it that his son got a Hellenistic education. The ‘man-God’ model was Antiochene. Eusebius of Emesa (d. before 359) is an exception; he belonged to the Alexandrian school, but upheld, against the Arians, the Word’s impassibility (Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 131–35 [Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 303–308]. Thus, geographical separation, which hindered easy and frequent communication, was added to the differences between schools of thought. As a result, Cyril could write his earlier works as though the Apollinarian heresy did not exist (Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 165–66) and in his later works use Apollinarian formulas as though they came from Athanasius or the popes. But

13 See above, p. 185 and note 6.

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causam etiam factum est ut Nestorius crederet Cyrillum errores Arii et Apollinaris renovare (aco, i, 1, 1, p. 31, 30; mg 77, 56 a; cf. Loofs, Nesto­ riana, Indicem, 396),14 et Ioannes Antiochenus aliique xlii episcopi, cum Ephesi in sua synodo Cyrillum et Menonem ep. Ephesinum deposuerint, impietates Apollinarii, Arii, et Eunomii meminerint (aco, i, 1, 5, p. 122, 22).

praenotamen alterum: de concilio ephesino Quo clarius efficiatur argumentum ex ipso concilio Ephesino, praemittenda sunt excerpta vel summaria triplicis generis, nempe: a Gesta a Concilio Ephesi; b Epistola Cyrilli iva, ad Nestorium iia; c Epistola Nestorii va, ad Cyrillum iia. A  Gesta a Concilio Ephesi, 22.vi.431 1 Documenta habentur: Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum (aco), ed. E. Schwartz, Berolini et Lipsiae 1914–. Remittimus ad paginas tomi primi, voluminis primi, partis secundae. Excerpta apud Xiberta, Enchir. 359–61. Descriptio apud Grillmeier, 1, 160–64.

2 Notandum est concilium symbolum fidei non emisisse (cf. ds 265, db 125), sed secundum symbolum Nicaenum inter S. Cyrillum et Nestorium iudicasse, modo sequenti:15 (a) lectum est symbolum Nicaenum (aco, p. 12); (b) lecta est epistola iva Cyrilli, ad Nestorium iia (p. 13); (c) a Patribus quaesivit Cyrillus utrum haec sua epistola symbolo Nicaeno fuerit conformis (p. 13);

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the same reasons explain why Nestorius believed that Cyril was reviving the errors of Arius and Apollinaris (aco, 1, 1, 1, p. 31, 30; mg 77, 56 a; see Loofs, Nestoriana, index, 396),14 and why John of Antioch mentioned the impious opinions of Apollinaris, Arius, and Eunomius when he and forty-two other bishops, at their own synod in Ephesus, deposed Cyril and Memnon, the bishop of Ephesus (aco, 1, 1, 5, p. 122, 22). preliminary note 2: the council of ephesus The argument based on the Council of Ephesus will be clearer if certain excerpts or summaries are presented first. They are of three kinds: a The acts of the Council of Ephesus; b Cyril’s Letter 4, the second of the letters he wrote to Nestorius; c Nestorius’s Letter 5, the second of the letters he wrote to Cyril. A  The acts of the Council of Ephesus, 22 June 431 1 The documents appear in Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum (aco), ed. E. Schwartz (Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter, 1914–); references below [indicated simply as aco] are to pages in Tome 1, vol. 1, part 2 [1930]. Excerpts in Xiberta, Enchiridion 359–61 [and npnf, 2nd ser., vol. 14: The Seven Ecumenical Councils, 197–242]. For a description, see Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 160–64 [Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 484–87]. 2 Note that the council did not issue a creed (see db 125, ds 265, [dec 1: 65]); it adjudicated between Cyril and Nestorius in light of the Nicene Creed, in the following way:15 (a) The Nicene Creed was read (aco, p. 12 [npnf, p. 197]). (b) Cyril’s second letter to Nestorius (Letter 4) was read (aco, p. 13 [npnf, pp. 197–98]). (c) Cyril asked the assembled fathers whether his letter was in conformity with the Nicene Creed (aco, p. 13 [npnf, p. 199]).

14 Friedrich Loofs, Nestoriana: Die Fragmente des Nestorius (Halle a. S.: M. Niemeyer, 1905). 15 With what follows, cf. the shorter discussion in Bernard Lonergan, ‘The Origins of Christian Realism,’ in A Second Collection, ed. Bernard J. Tyrrell and William F.J. Ryan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 255–57.

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(d) episcopi 125 singillatim, deinde caeteri simul uti videtur, affirmant epistolam Cyrilli conformem symbolo Nicaeno (pp. 13–31); (e) lecta est epistola va Nestorii, ad Cyrillum iia (p. 31); (f) a synodo quaesivit Cyrillus utrum haec epistola fuerit conformis symbolo Nicaeno (p. 31); (g) episcopi 35 singillatim respondent et negant; deinde caeteri contra Nestorium conclamant (pp. 31–35); (h) lecta est epistola Caelestini R. P. ad Nestorium (aco, i, 1, P. 1, pp. 77–83) et deposita est in actis (p. 36). Excerpta, Xiberta, Enchir. 356–59. (i) lecta est epistola Cyrilli xviia, ad Nestorium iiia (quae anathematismos, db 113–24, continet; prostat mg 77, 105; aco, i, 1, P. 1, pp. 33–42) et deposita est in regestis (p. 36); (j) post quosdam sermones, lecta sunt permulta ex Patribus (pp. 39–45) quorum quaedam brevia ex Apollinaristis sed papis Iulio et Felici adscripta (p. 41); (k) multa ex Nestorio leguntur (pp. 45–52); (l) sententia contra Nestorium (p. 54, ds 264); (m) sententia ab episcopis 197 subsignatur (pp. 54–64); (n) depositio Nestorii (p. 64). 3 Quibus perspectis, concluditur doctrinam concilii Ephesini praecipue in eo consistere in quo (a) epistola Cyrilli ad Nestorium iia cum symbolo Nicaeno concordat et (b) epistola Nestorii ad Cyrillum iia a symbolo Nicaeno recedit. Quodnam autem fuerit hoc concordiae et discordiae punctum, ex ipsis epistolis remanet determinandum. B  Epistola Cyrilli iva, ad Nestorium iia, a c. Ephesino approbata ut conformis symbolo Nicaeno 4 Invenitur: aco, i, 1, P. 1, pp. 25–28; mg 77, 44. Excerpta: db 111a, ds 250–51 (=aco, loc. cit., p. 26, 23 – p. 27, 5; p. 27, 12–15; p. 28, 15); Xiberta, Enchir. 410–11.

5 Addimus quae complent db 111a, ds 250–51.

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(d) First 125 bishops singly, then the rest of them, apparently as a group, pronounced in Cyril’s favor (aco, pp. 13–31). (e) Nestorius’s second letter to Cyril (Letter 5) was read (aco, p. 31). (f) Cyril asked the council whether this letter was in conformity with the Nicene Creed (aco, p. 31). (g) Thirty-five bishops responded singly in the negative; then the rest joined in decrying Nestorius (aco, pp. 31–35). (h) Pope Celestine’s letter to Nestorius was read (aco, 1, 1, pt. 1, pp. 77–83) and entered in the acts (aco, p. 36). For excerpts, see Xiberta, Enchiridion 356–59. (i) Cyril’s third letter to Nestorius (Letter 17), the letter with the ‘Twelve Anathemas’ – these are in db 113–24, ds 252–63, [dec 1: 59–61]; the whole letter is in mg 77, beginning col. 105; [dec 1: 50]; aco, 1, 1, pt. 1, pp. 33–42; [npnf, pp. 201–17] – was read and entered in the proceedings (aco, p. 36). (j) After certain reports, a number of passages from the fathers were read (aco, pp. 39–45), among them certain excerpts written by Apollinarians but attributed to Popes Julius and Felix (aco, p. 41). (k) Many extracts from Nestorius’s writings were read (aco, pp. 45–52). (l) Nestorius was condemned (aco, p. 54; ds 264 [npnf, p. 218]). (m) The condemnation was signed by 197 bishops (aco, pp. 54–64). (n) Nestorius was deposed (aco, p. 64). 3 It light of all this it may be inferred that the teaching of the Council of Ephesus consists chiefly in (a) the conformity with the Nicene Creed of Cyril’s second letter to Nestorius, and (b) the disparity between that creed and Nestorius’s second letter to Cyril. The point of this conformity and this disparity, however, must still be determined from the letters themselves. B  Cyril’s second letter to Nestorius, approved by the Council of Ephesus as conforming with the Nicene Creed 4 The text will be found in aco, 1, 1, pt. 1, pp. 25–28; mg 77, col. 44; [dec 1: 40]; [npnf, 2nd series, vol. 14, pp. 197–98; Richard A. Norris, Jr., ed., The Christological Controversy (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980) 131–35]. There are excerpts in db 111a, ds 250–51 (= aco, 1, 1, pt. 1, p. 26, line 23 – p. 27, line 5; p. 27, lines 12–15; p. 28, line 15) [dec 1: 41–42], and Xiberta, Enchiridion 410–11. 5 Here we add two passages that complement those given in db 111a, ds 250–51.

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6 Immediate ante ea quibus incipit db 111a, ds 250: ‘Dixit sancta et magna synodus (Nicaena) ipsum ex Deo Patre secundum naturam genitum Filium unigenitum, Deum verum ex Deo vero, lumen ex lumine, per quem omnia fecit Pater, descendisse, incarnatum esse, hominem esse factum, passum esse, tertia die resurrexisse, et in caelos ascendisse. Quae verba quaeque dogmata sequi debemus, intelligentes quid “incarnatum esse” et “hominem esse factum” manifestet Dei Verbum (ti to sarkoFtheFnai kai enanthroFpeFsai deFloi ton tou theou logon). Neque enim dicimus Verbi naturam …’ 7 Quae omittuntur inter ‘constituerint …’ et ‘Non enim primo …’ seu inter ds 250 et ds 251. ‘Ad hunc modum, qui ante omne saeculum exsistit, et ex Patre genitus fuit, secundum carnem ex muliere natus dicitur: non quod divina illa natura (phusis) exsistentiae suae initium in sacra Virgine sumpserit, aut quod post primam ex Patre, altera propter seipsam generatione necessario indiguerit (stultum est enim planeque ineptum asserere eum qui ante omnia saecula Patri coaeternus exsistit, altera denuo, quo exsistere queat, generatione indiguisse); sed quod propter nos et propter nostram salutem sibi humanum (to anthroFpinon) univit secundum hypostasin et ex muliere exivit; hinc est quod carnaliter generatus esse dicitur.’

8 Explicat proinde quemadmodum Verbum dicatur passum, mortuum, resuscitatum esse, scilicet: ‘… non ipsam divinam naturam esse passam, perforatam, cum divina natura sit impassibilis quippe quae incorporalis; sed, quod ei factum est proprium corpus, hoc esse passum; impassibilis enim in passibili corpore fuit;

‘… et Dei Verbum per naturam esse immortale et incorruptibile, sed proprium eius corpus mortem gustavit … ‘… similiter, resuscitata eius carne, eius dicitur resurrectio, non quasi ipse in corruptionem abiisset, sed quia corpus ipsius resuscitatum est.’ aco, loc. cit., p. 27, 15 – p. 28, 2.

9 Postea, ita unum Christum et Dominum profitetur, ut excludantur (a) co-adoratio, (b) duo filii, (c) personarum unio.

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6 Immediately before the text as it appears in db 111a and ds 250, Cyril wrote: ‘The holy and great Synod [of Nicea] therefore says that the only-begotten Son – begotten according to the nature of God the Father, true God from true God, Light from Light, by whom the Father made all things – came down and was incarnate and was made man, suffered, and rose again the third day, and ascended into heaven. These words and these decrees we ought to follow, considering what it means for the Word of God to “be incarnate” and to “be made man” (ti to sarkoFtheFnai kai enanthroFpeFsai deFloi ton tou theou logon). For we do not say the nature of the Word …’ [see dec 1: 41]. 7 And what has been omitted between the two excerpts, ds 250 and ds 251, is the following: ‘This is the sense in which it is said that he who existed before all ages, and was born of the Father before the ages, was also born of a woman according to the flesh: it is not that his divine nature (physis) received its beginning of existence in the holy Virgin, and not that he necessarily stood in need of a second birth from her in addition to his birth from the Father (for it is at once stupid and pointless to say that he who exists before all ages, coeternal with the Father, needed any second beginning of existence); but since the Word was born of a woman when he had, “for us and for our salvation,” hypostatically united to himself what is human (to anthroFpinon), he is accordingly said to have been born according to the flesh’ [see dec 1: 41–42]. 8 Cyril therefore explains the way in which the Word may be said to have suffered, died, and been raised: ‘It was not that the Word of God suffered in his own nature, being overcome by stripes or nail-piercing or any other injuries – for the divine nature is incapable of suffering, inasmuch as it is incorporeal – but that what had become his own body suffered in this way, since he who was impassible was in a passible body.’ ‘… and the Word of God is by nature immortal and incorruptible … but his flesh tasted death …’ ‘So also, when his flesh was raised, the resurrection is also said to be his, not as if he had fallen into corruption … but because his own body was raised’ (aco, 1, 1, pt. 1, p. 27, line 15 – p. 28, line 2 [npnf, p. 198; Norris 133–34]). 9 Cyril goes on to profess one Christ and Lord in a way that rules out (a) coworship, (b) two Sons, and (c) a union of persons.

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Non co-adoratur homo cum Verbo, sed adoratur unus idemque, quia a Verbo alienum non est corpus eius, quocum consedit ipsi Patri. Non consedent duo filii, sed unus secundum unionem cum propria carne. Si unionem secundum hypostasin (henoFsis kath’ hupostasin) dicere nolumus, eo conducimur ut filios dicamus duos. Ita enim necessario distinguuntur (a) homo qui filii nomine honoratur et (b) Verbum Dei quod et nomen filii et rem habet naturaliter. Nec quicquam prodest dicere unionem personarum (henoFsin prosoFpoFn). Non enim dicit scriptura quod Verbum sibi univit personam hominis, sed quod Verbum factum est caro (p. 28, 3–14). 10 ‘Verbum autem carnem esse factum nihil aliud dicit quam quod perinde ac nos carnis et sanguinis particeps factus est, quod proprium fecit corpus nostrum, quod ex muliere exivit homo; non quod Deum esse et ex Patre genitum esse desiisset, sed in ipsa carnis assumptione remansit quod erat. ‘Hoc exactioris fidei doctrina ubique praedicat; hoc sanctos Patres sensisse reperiemus; ita sacram Virginem Deiparam appellare non dubitaverunt; non quod Verbi natura, ipsiusve divinitas ortus sui principium ex sancta Virgine sumpserit, sed quod sacrum illud corpus anima intelligente perfectum ex eo traxerit, cui et Dei Verbum secundum hypostasin unitum secundum carnem natum dicitur’ (p. 28, 14–22).

C  Epistola v Nestorii, ad Cyrillum ii, Ephesi a concilio damnata

11 Invenitur: aco, i, 1, P. 1, pp. 29–32; Loofs, Nestoriana 173–80; mg 77, 49; Excerpta, Xiberta, Enchir. 363–64. Citatur secundum paginam et lineam in aco, loc. cit. 12 Ponuntur verba ex epistola Cyrilli ad Nestorium ii. ‘Sancta et magna docet synodus (Nicaena) ipsum ex Deo Patre naturaliter genitum, Filium unigenitum, Deum verum ex Deo vero, lumen ex lumine, per quem Pater omnia fecit, descendisse, carnem factum esse, hominem factum esse, passum esse, resuscitatum esse’ (p. 29, 12–14).

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It is not that a man is co-worshiped with the Word; one and the same is worshiped, because the body of the Word is not alien to him but accompanies him even as he is seated with his Father. Two Sons are not seated [with the Father] but one, on account of his union with his own flesh. If, however, we reject this personal or hypostatic union (henoFsis kath’ hypostasin), we fall into the error of speaking of two Sons, for it becomes necessary … to distinguish (a) a man dignified with the name of Son and (b) the Word of God, who has by nature both the name and the reality of Sonship. Nor is it any use to speak of a union of persons (henoFsis prosoFpoFn). For scripture has not said that the Word united to himself the person of a man, but that the Word became flesh (aco, 1, 1, pt. 1, p. 28, lines 3–14). 10 ‘That the Word became flesh, however, means nothing else but that he became a partaker in flesh and blood like ours [Hebrews 2.14]; that he made our body his own; that he came forth, man, from a woman – not that he cast off his being God or his being born of the Father: even in taking to himself flesh, he continued to be what he was. ‘This is what the teaching of the correct faith proclaims everywhere. This was the sentiment of the holy Fathers; thus, they boldly called the holy Virgin “Mother of God,” not because the nature of the Word or his divinity had its beginning from the holy Virgin, but because the holy body which was born of her, possessed as it was of a rational soul, and to which the Word was hypostatically united, is said to have had a fleshly birth’ (aco, 1, 1, pt. 1, p. 28, lines 14–22 [Norris 134–35]). C  The second letter of Nestorius to Cyril, condemned by the Council of Ephesus 11 The text will be found in aco, 1, 1, pt. 1, pp. 29–32; Loofs, Nestoriana 173– 80; mg 77, col. 49, [dec 1: 44]; [Norris 135–40]. There are excerpts in Xiberta, Enchiridion 363–64. Page and line numbers from aco are cited below. 12 Nestorius quotes from Cyril’s second letter to him: ‘The holy and great Synod [the Council of Nicea] therefore says that the only-begotten Son – begotten according to nature of God the Father, true God from true God, Light from Light, by whom the Father made all things – came down and was incarnate and was made man, suffered, and rose again’ (aco, p. 29, 12–14 [Norris 135]).

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13 Quae verba Cyrilli maxime admiratur Nestorius, nam synodus Nicaena non docuit vel coaeternum Patri Verbum passibile, vel divinitatem passibilem, vel Patri coaeternam generabilem, vel resuscitatam quae solutum templum resuscitavit (p. 29, 20–24).

14 Notat deinde Nestorius synodum tamquam fundamentum posuisse ‘Dominum Iesum Christum unigenitum Filium’ quae sunt communia divinitatis et humanitatis nomina, ne dividantur quae sunt filiationis et dominationis, neve quae naturarum sunt interemptioni confusionis exponantur (p. 29, 27–30). 15 Similiter docet Paulum praeposuisse ‘Christum Iesum’ cui attribuuntur tum ‘qui in forma Dei esset’ tum mors et exaltatio. Noluit enim Paulus significare Verbum Deum esse passibile, et ideo posuit nomen Christi, significativum impassibilis et passibilis essentiae in unica persona, ut tuto et impassibilis et passibilis diceretur Christus, impassibilis quidem divinitate, passibilis autem ex corporis natura (p. 30, 4–14).

16 Laudat proinde Nestorius Cyrillum quasi dixisset naturarum divisionem et earum in unius personae coniunctionem (sunapheia) (p. 30, 18–19). Cyrillum tamen sibi contradixisse iudicat: quem enim impassibilem dixerat et generationis incapacem, iam affirmat passibilem et nuper conditum (p. 30, 24–25). Quasi quae Deo Verbo per naturam competunt, ea corrumperentur per coniunctionem (sunapheia) cum templo impeccabili (p. 30, 26). At dixit Dominus: Solvite templum hoc et in tribus diebus excitabo illud (Io 2.19). Non dixit: Solvite divinitatem meam et in tribus diebus excitabitur (p. 30, 29–31).

17 E multis locis sacrae scripturae probat generationem et passionem non divinitatis Christi esse sed humanitatis ut accuratius dicatur Beata Virgo non theotokos sed khristotokos (p. 31, 1–3).

18 Affirmat corpus esse templum divinitatis Filii, templum secundum summam quandam et divinam unitum coniunctionem (sunapheia) (p. 31, 25– 26).

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13 Nestorius approves of these words of Cyril’s, since the Council of Nicea did not teach either that the Word, coeternal with the Father, is passible, or that divinity is passible, or that he who is coeternal with the Father has only just been born, or that he who raised up the temple which was destroyed has himself been raised (aco, p. 29, 20–24 [Norris 136]). 14 Then Nestorius points out what the council lays down as a foundation: ‘one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son’ – titles common to divinity and humanity. In this way the council avoids dividing what pertains to Sonship and Lordship, while that which pertains to either nature will not be discussed as though confused (aco, p. 29, 27–30). 15 Similarly, according to Nestorius, Paul begins with ‘Christ Jesus,’ to whom he attributes both ‘being in the form of God’ and also death and exaltation. Because he did not wish to imply that God the Word is passible, Paul ‘inserts the word “Christ,” which signifies the impassible and the passible essence in one unitary person, with the result that Christ is without risk called both impassible and passible – impassible in divinity yet passible from the nature of the body’ (aco, p. 30, 4–14; [Norris 136–37]). 16 Accordingly Nestorius praises Cyril for having spoken of a division of natures and their conjunction (synapheia) in one person (aco, p. 30, 18–19). Still, he considers that Cyril contradicted himself: how is it that Cyril introduces as passible and newly created one whom he had first proclaimed as impassible and incapable of a second birth (p. 30, 24–25)? It is as if the qualities that attach naturally to God the Word are corrupted by his conjunction (synapheia) with his impeccable temple (p. 30, 26). But what the Lord said was, ‘Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it’ (John 2.19); he did not say, ‘Destroy my divinity and in three days it will be raised’ (aco, p. 30, 29–31; [Norris 137]). 17 Nestorius shows from many scriptural passages that being born and suffering belong to Christ’s humanity, not his divinity, so that the blessed Virgin is more exactly referred to as Christotokos, ‘Mother of Christ,’ and not Theotokos, ‘Mother of God’ (aco, p. 31, 1–3). 18 He affirms that the body is the temple of the Son’s deity, a temple united to it by a complete and divine conjunction (synapheia) (aco, p. 31, 25–26; [Norris 138]).

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praenotamen tertium: quid ephesi determinatum fuerit Quaeritur de actione habita die 22a, mense iunio, anno 431, et arguitur ex iis in praenotamine altero supra positis. Ad quod praenotamen remittunt numeri inter sigla (…) positi.

1 Quod Ephesi conciliariter determinatum est, in symbolo Nicaeno iam continebatur. Sensus asserti: intelligi debet hoc assertum non exclusive sed affirmative; non exclusive, ut sensus non sit nihil determinari nisi quod iam ante determinatum fuerit; sed affirmative, ut sensus sit saltem principale iam ante esse determinatum quamvis forte modo implicito.

Probatio asserti: Symbolum Nicaenum in ipso concilio est praelectum (2, a); citatum est ad initium epistolae Cyrilli (6); haec Cyrilli citatio ad initium epistolae Nestorii repetitur (12). Approbata est epistola Cyrilli ut conformis symbol Nicaeno (2, d); et reprobata est epistola Nestorii ut difformis symbolo Nicaeno (2, g). Haec approbatio haecque reprobatio factae sunt modo solemni, singulis episcopis sententiam propriam pronuntiantibus, et quidem 125 in Cyrillo approbando, 35 in Nestorio reprobando, donec caeteri conclamarent (2, d, g). Quamvis alia et multa in actione lecta sint, modo solemni non iudicata sunt. 2 Quod in symbolo Nicaeno iam continebatur, quod praecipuum est in epistola Cyrilli, quod evitatur in epistola Nestorii, sic enuntiatur: Qui ante saecula est Deus Filius, idem ipse factus homo, natus, passus, mortuus, resuscitatus est. (a)16 Nam secundum obvium sensum ita docet symbolum Nicaenum. Ponit enim hoc symbolum: ‘unum Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum Filium Dei’;

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preliminary note 3: what was determined at ephesus The question regards the action taken on the twenty-second day of June in the year 431; an answer will be argued on the basis of what was set out above in preliminary note 2. In what follows, numbers and letters within parentheses – for example: (2, g) – refer to that preliminary note. 1 What was determined in council at Ephesus is already contained in the Nicene Creed. The meaning of this assertion: The assertion should be understood as affirmative but not as exclusive. It is not to be understood exclusively: its meaning is not that nothing was determined except what had already been determined. It is to be understood affirmatively: it means that at least the principal point had already been determined, although only in an implicit way. Proof of the assertion: The Nicene Creed was read out at this council (2, a); it is quoted at the beginning of Cyril’s letter (6); this quotation of Cyril’s is repeated at the beginning of Nestorius’s letter (12). Cyril’s letter was approved as conforming to the Nicene Creed (2, d); Nestorius’s letter was condemned as not conforming to it (2, g). This approval and this condemnation were arrived at solemnly, individual bishops pronouncing their own opinions, with 125 of them approving Cyril and 35 condemning Nestorius, until the rest joined the cry (2, d, g). Although many other documents were read as part of this action, they were not judged with the same solemnity. 2 What the Nicene Creed already contained, what is of special importance in Cyril’s letter, and what Nestorius’s letter steers away from, is this: He who was God the Son before the ages is the very same one who was made man, was born, suffered, died, and rose again. (a)16 For that is what the Nicene Creed, in its obvious sense, teaches. The Creed speaks of ‘our one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God’;

16 From here to the end of this preliminary note, Lonergan’s system of numbering in the 1964 edition has been altered to conform with that of the 1960 and 1961 editions.

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de quo uno praedicat divina: ‘natum ex Patre unigenitum … per quem omnia facta sunt quae in caelo et in terra’; de quo etiam praedicat humana: ‘qui propter nostram salutem descendit, incarnatus est, et homo factus est et passus est, et resurrexit tertia die …’ (db 54, ds 125). (b) Qui obvius sensus confirmatur per comparationem cum symbolo apostolico (db 6, ds 11-30); nam in symbolo apostolico sane non alius et alius sunt distinguendi in iis quae ponuntur articulis secundo ad septimum; differt autem symbolum Nicaenum praecipue quia inter articulum secundum et tertium symboli apostolici addidit quae maxima claritate divinitatem Filii affirmant. (c) Quod in obvio sensu symboli Nicaeni invenimus, idem in epistola Cyrilli habetur. (a′) Cyrillus enim suam conscripsit epistolam; in hac sua epistola symbolum Nicaenum citavit; intra ipsum concilium ipse a Patribus quaesivit utrum sua epistola symbolo Nicaeno fuerit conformis; et iterum intra ipsum concilium ipse a Patribus quaesivit utrum epistola Nestorii symbolo Nicaeno fuerit conformis. Similiter ex Nicaeno procedit Epist. xviia ad Nestorium iiia, aco, i, 1, 1, p. 35; mg 77, 109. (b′) Multipliciter epistola Cyrilli inculcat eundem esse et Dei Verbum et hominem passum, mortuum, resuscitatum. (a″) Sumit enim symbolum Nicaenum secundum sensum obvium (6); (b″) ‘asserimus Verbum … hominem factum et hominis Filium exstitisse’ (db 111a, ds 250); (c″) ‘divinitas et humanitas … in una persona unum nobis Iesum Christum et Filium constituerint’ (db 111a, ds 250); (d″) ‘qui ante omne saeculum exsistit … sibi humanum (to anthroFpinon) univit secundum hypostasin et ex muliere exivit’ (7); (e″) ‘non enim primo vulgaris quispiam homo ex Virgine ortus est, in quem Dei Verbum deinde se demiserit’ (db 111a, ds 251); (f″) ‘in ipsa carnis assumptione remansit quod erat’ (10). (c′) Quia eundem habuit aeternum Dei Filium et hominem Iesum, debuit salvare proprietates divinas; quod fecit, (g″) excludendo mutationem vel transformationem (db 111a, ds 250); (h″) negando differentiam naturarum per unionem tolli (db 111a, ds 250);

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to this one it applies divine predicates: ‘the only-begotten of the Father …; through him all things were made, those in heaven and those on earth as well’; to him it also applies human predicates: ‘For the sake of us men and for our salvation he came down, was made flesh and became man; he suffered, and on the third day arose …’ (db 54, ds 125). (b) This obvious sense is confirmed by a comparison with the Apostles’ Creed (db 6, ds 11–30). For in articles 2 to 7 of the Apostles’ Creed there certainly is no distinction between ‘someone’ and ‘someone else’; the Nicene Creed differs chiefly in that between articles 2 and 3 of the Apostles’ Creed it adds a very clear affirmation of the Son’s divinity. (c) What we have found in the Nicene Creed, taken in its obvious sense, also appears in Cyril’s letter. (a′) Cyril wrote his letter; in this letter of his he quotes the Nicene Creed; during the council he asked the fathers whether his letter conformed with the Nicene Creed; and later during the council he asked them whether the letter of Nestorius conformed with that creed. Similarly, Cyril’s third letter to Nestorius (Letter 17) takes the Nicene decree as its starting point (aco, 1, 1, pt. 1, p. 35; mg 77, 109). (b′) Cyril’s letter drives home in many ways that it is the same one who is the Word of God and the man who suffered, died, and rose again. (a″) For he takes the Nicene Creed in its obvious sense (6): (b″) ‘What we say … is that the Word … has become man … and the Son of man’ (db 111a, ds 250, [dec 1: 41]). (c″) ‘The divinity and the humanity … have constituted for us in one person the one Lord, Christ, Son.’ (d″) ‘He who exists before the ages … was born of a woman when he had … hypostatically united to himself what is human (to anthroFpinon)’ (7 above). (e″) ‘It was not that an ordinary human being was born of the holy Virgin, and then the Word descended upon that man’ (db 111a, ds 251, [dec 1: 42]). (f″) ‘Even in taking to himself flesh, he continued to be what he was’ (10 above). (c′) Since Cyril holds that the same one is the eternal Son of God and the man Jesus, the divine properties ought to be maintained; and this he does: (g″) by ruling out change or transformation (db 111a, ds 250, [dec 1: 41]); (h″) by denying that the union of natures took away their difference (db 111a, ds 250, [dec 1: 41]);

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(i″) negando divinam naturam initium ex Virgine sumpsisse, vel nova generatione indiguisse (7); (j″) explicando quo sensu impassibilis patiatur, immortalis moriatur, immutabilis resuscitetur (8). (d′) Quia unum agnovit, duos excludit negando co-adorationem, negando duos filios, negando personarum unionem (9). (e′) Quia unum agnovit Iesum et Deum Filium, argui potuit matrem Iesu esse matrem Dei (10). (d) Quod in symbolo Nicaeno et in episola Cyrilli invenimus, idem non affirmatur a Nestorio sed potius evitatur. (a′) Nestorius non simpliciter citat Nicaenum ut ex eo tamquam ex fundamento arguat; sed (b′) citat citationem Cyrilli et arguit Cyrillum male symbolum intellexisse (12, 13); (c′) contradictionem quam invenit in epistola Cyrilli (16), ipse symbolo Nicaeno imponere non vult; et ideo distinguit inter nomina communia divinitatis et humanitatis quae tum a Nicaeno symbolo tum a Paulo, Phil 2.6, praemittuntur (14, 15), et nomina propria vel divinitatis vel humanitatis quae inter se contradictionem important (15, 16); (d′) recte quidem tenet passionem fuisse non divinitatis sed humanitatis, nativitatem ex Maria fuisse non divinitatis sed humanitatis (17), quae tamen non docentur in Nicaeno, et evitant quaestionem, quis habuerit illam divinitatem et humanitatem; (e′) propriam euam sententiam trahit nominando coniunctionem, sunapheian (16, 18). 3 Iam ad conclusionem pervenitur. Stabilivimus enim supra (1) quod Ephesi conciliariter determinatum est, in symbolo Nicaeno iam continebatur, (2) quod in symbolo Nicaeno iam continebatur, quod in epistola Cyrilli praecipuum est, quod in epistola Nestorii evitatur, sic enuntiatur: Qui ante saecula est Dei Filius, idem ipse factus homo, passus, mortuus, resuscitatus est. Quibus positis, cum epistola Cyrilli approbata sit tamquam conformis symbolo Nicaeno, cum epistola Nestorii reprobata sit tamquam difformis a symbolo Nicaeno, omnino concludendum est conciliariter Ephesi habitum esse quod ipse idem, qui ante saecula iam est Deus Filius, ex tempore factus est homo.

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(i″) by denying that the divine nature took its beginning from the Virgin, or that it stood in need of being born anew (7 above); (j″) by explaining the sense in which one who was impassible suffered, one who was immortal died, one who was unchangeable was raised (8 above). (d′) Since he acknowledges one, he rules out two by denying co-worship, denying two sons, and denying a union of persons (9 above). (e′) Since he acknowledges this one to be Jesus and God the Son, he can argue that Jesus’ mother was the mother of God (10 above). (d) Nestorius does not affirm – rather, he avoids – what we have found in the Nicene Creed and in Cyril’s letter. (a′) Nestorius does not simply quote the Nicene decree in order to make it the basis of his argument; instead: (b′) He quotes Cyril’s quotation and argues that Cyril has wrongly understood the creed (12, 13 above). (c′) He is unwilling to impute to the Nicene Creed itself the contradiction he finds in Cyril’s letter (16 above). He therefore distinguishes between titles which are common to divinity and humanity alike and are placed first by both the Nicene Creed and Paul in Philippians 2.6 (14, 15 above), and titles which belong properly either to divinity or to humanity and which contradict each other (15, 16 above). (d′) He rightly holds that suffering belonged to the humanity, not the divinity, and that the same is true of birth from Mary (17 above). None of this, however, is taught in the Nicene Creed, and it burkes the question of who had that divinity and that humanity; (e′) he brings in his own opinion by speaking of a conjunction, synapheia (16, 18 above). 3 The conclusion has now been reached. For we have established: (1) that what was determined in council at Ephesus was already contained in the Nicene Creed; and (2) that what the Nicene Creed already contained, what Cyril’s letter has as its main point, and what Nestorius steers away from in his letter, is this: the same one who is Son of God before the ages, he, himself, was made man, suffered, died, and rose again. That being said, since Cyril’s letter was approved as conforming with the Nicene Creed, and since Nestorius’s letter was condemned as not conforming with the Nicene Creed, the conclusion is surely that what was determined in council at Ephesus is that the very same one who eternally is Son of God was at a certain time made man.

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praenotamen quartum: de ‘orientalibus’ 1 Rerum gestarum tramitem sat complexum vide apud G. Bardy (FlicheMartin, Histoire de 1’église, 4), qui narrat quae facta sunt ante concilium (163–77), in concilio (177–86), et post concilium usque ad reconciliationem anno 433 (186–97).17 Brevissime recolimus: (a) Sessio, 22 iun. 431, Cyrillo duce, epp. 197, ubi depositus est Nestorius. (b) Pervenerunt 24 iun. 431, Ioannes Antiochenus cum episcopis 42 (forte 52); ab ecclesiis exclusi et priorem sessionem Apollinarismo indulsisse credentes, propriam habent synodum et Cyrillum et Memnonem (ep. Ephesinum) deponent (aco, i, 1, 5, pp. 121–23). (c) Pervenerunt, 10 iulio 431, legati romani qui subsequenti die actionem sub Cyrillo habitam approbaverunt. (d) Initio augusti, pervenit legatus imperialis, Ioannes comes, cum litteris imperialibus quibus iubentur episcopi ad proprias redire dioeceses et approbantur depositiones non solum Nestorii sed etiam Cyrilli et Memnonis. (e) Qua occasione, facta est relatio ab Orientalibus (Ioanne Antiocheno et sociis) ad Imperatorem; adhuc credebant Cyrillum Apollinarismi reum (aco, i, 1, 7, p. 69, 30–36); propriae fidei formulam includebant (ibid. p. 70, 15–22) de qua infra. 2 Anno 433, reconciliantur Cyrillus et Ioannes Antiochenus, unde habetur ‘formula unionis’18 (db 5003, ds 272–73), de qua notate:

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preliminary note 4: the ‘orientals’ 1 For the rather complex course of events, see G. Bardy, ‘De l’Acte d’Union à la mort de Proclus’ (Fliche-Martin, Histoire de l’Église, 4, pp. 163–203), who describes what happened before the council (163–77), at the council (177–86), and after the council up to the reconciliation in 433 (186–97).17 We note the following very briefly. (a) There was a session on 22 June 431, with 197 bishops present and Cyril presiding, at which Nestorius was deposed. (b) On 24 June 431, John of Antioch arrived with 42 (or perhaps 52) bishops. Barred from the churches, and believing that the earlier session had yielded to Apollinarianism, they held their own synod and deposed both Cyril and Memnon, the bishop of Ephesus (aco, 1, 1, 5, pp. 121–23). (c) On 10 July 431, the Roman legates arrived; the following day they approved the action taken under Cyril’s presidency. (d) At the beginning of August, the imperial legate, Count John, arrived with letters from the emperor ordering the bishops to return to their dioceses and approving the deposition not only of Nestorius but also of Cyril and Memnon. (e) On this occasion a report was made by the Orientals (John of Antioch and his associates) to the emperor; they still believed Cyril guilty of Apollinarianism (aco, 1, 1, 7, p. 69, 30–36), and they included a formulation of their own faith (p. 70, 15–22), discussed below. 2 In 433, John of Antioch and Cyril were reconciled. About the resulting Formula of Reunion,18 note the following.

17 The reference is to Pierre Champagne de Labriolle, Gustave Bardy, Louis Bréhier, and G. de Plinval, De la mort de Théodose à l’élection de Grégoire le Grand, vol. 4 of Histoire de l’Église depuis les origines jusqu’à nos jours, publiée sous la direction de Augustin Fliche & Victor Martin (Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1948). 18 In the editions of 1960 and 1961, Lonergan included the text of the Formula: ‘We confess therefore our Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, perfect God and perfect man composed of rational soul and body, begotten before all ages from the Father as to his divinity, and the same in the latter days born of the Virgin Mary as to his humanity for us and for our salvation. The same is one in being with the Father as to the divinity and one in being with us as to the humanity, for a union of two natures has taken place. Hence we confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord. In accordance with this union without confusion, we profess the holy Virgin to be the

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(a) Exstat (1) in epistola Cyrilli ad Ioannem Antiochenum, aco, i, 1, 4, p. 17, 9–20; mg 77, 176–77 [et] (2) in epistola Ioannis Antiocheni ad Xystum Papam, aco, i, 1, 7, p. 159, 20–32. (b) Partim identica est cum formula fidei quam Orientales ad Imperatorem miserunt anno 431 (vide supra 1, e). Tantummodo fere additur sententia ultima, ‘Evangelicas autem et …’ (ds 273). (c) Magna ex parte recurrit in decreto Chalcedonensi (db 148, ds 301– 302). Vide de Urbina apud Grillmeier, 1, 399, cf. 389.19 (d) Auctor fuisse fertur Theodoretus Cyrensis (Grillmeier, 1, 186). (e) Pace inter Cyrillum et Ioannem facta, ab utroque duce non sine la­ bore neque cum fructu perfecto retinendi erant sequaces; vide Bardy 197– 203. 3 Theodoretus Cyrensis, 393–466 ad, mg 80–84, Altaner 304–306, G. Bardy, dtc xv (29) 299–325. M. Richard, ‘Notes sur 1’évolution doctrinale de Théodoret,’ RevScPhTh 25 (1936) 459–81. I. Montalverne, Theodoreti Cyren­ sis doctrina antiquior de Verbo ‘inhumanato’ (Romae: Antonianum, 1948); A. Grillmeier, 1, 183–91. Excerpta, Xiberta, Enchir. 389–403.

Aderat cum Ioanne Antiocheno Ephesi 431; Cyrillum Alexandrinum diligenter impugnavit; anno 435 formulam unionis subsignavit sed Nestorium non anathematizavit (Bardy 201); de mortuis Ioanne Antiocheno (441 ve1 442), Cyrillo (444), et Proclo ep. Constantinopolitano (446), Theodoretus ob eximiam sanctitatem, zelum, scripturarum scientiam, et culturam factus est primus inter episcopos orientales (Bardy 209–10), sed a latrocinio

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(a) It survives (1) in a letter of Cyril to John of Antioch (aco, 1, 1, 4, p. 17, 9–20; mg 77, 176–77; [dec 1: 69–70]) and (2) in a letter from John of Antioch to pope Sixtus (aco, 1, 1, 7, p. 159, 20–32). (b) In part it is identical with the formulation of the faith which the Orientals sent to the emperor in 431 (see 1, e above). Almost the only addition is the final sentence, ‘As for the words …’ (ds 273, [dec 1: 70]). (c) The better part of it is repeated in the Chalcedonian decree (db 148, ds 301–302, [dec 1: 86–87]). See de Urbina in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 399; cf. 389.19 (d) The author was most likely Theodoret of Cyrrhus (Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 186, [Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 491]). (e) Once peace had been made between Cyril and John, they kept their followers with some difficulty and without complete success; see Bardy, ‘De l’Acte d’Union à la mort de Proclus’ (Fliche-Martin, 4) 197–203. 3 On Theodoret of Cyrrhus (ad 393–466) see mg 80–84; Altaner 304–306; Bardy, ‘Théodoret,’ dtc xv (29) 299–325. Also M. Richard, ‘Notes sur l’évolution doctrinale de Théodoret,’ Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 25 (1936) 459–81; I. Montalverne, Theodoreti Cyrensis doctrina antiquior de Verbo ‘inhumato’ (Rome: Antonianum, 1948); A. Grillmeier, Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 183–91. Excerpts from Theodoret appear in Xiberta, Enchiridion 389–403. He was present with John of Antioch at Ephesus in 431 and attacked Cyril of Alexandria with vigor. In 435 he signed the Formula of Reunion, but did not anathematize Nestorius (Bardy 201). After the deaths of John of Antioch (in 441 or 442), Cyril (in 444), and Proclus, bishop of Constantinople (in 446), Theodoret came to rank first among the oriental bishops on account of his outstanding holiness, zeal, knowledge of scripture, and

God-bearer, for God the Word became flesh and was made man and from the moment of conception united to himself the temple he had taken from her. As for the words of the gospels and of the apostles concerning the Lord, we know that theologians have considered some as common because they are said of the one person, while they have distinguished others as applying to the two natures, reserving those which befit God to Christ in his divinity while assigning those which are lowly to Christ in his humanity’ (ds 272–73, nd 607–608, [dec 1: 69–70]). 19 Lonergan is referring to the paper in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 389-408, by Ignacio Ortiz de Urbina, s.j., ‘Der Symbol von Chalkedon: Sein Text, sein Werden, seine dogmatische Bedeutung thesin.’

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Ephesino depositus est, anno 449 (Bardy 223); cum Nestorium anathematizerit (aco, ii, 1, 368), a concilio Chalcedonensi est restitutus, anno 451 (Bardy 236); in concilio Constantinopolitano ii, anno 553, damnata sunt eius scripta contra Cyrillum vel in favorem Nestorii (db 226, ds 436). Circa hoc concilium, vide thesim 4m, Sententiae i, 8.20 Ad antiquam scholam, Homo-Deus, pertinebat; novas voces, hupostasis, phusis, in scripturis non inventas diu noluit; prosopon per 2 Cor 4.6 explicavit; unum Christum realem cum duabus naturis agnovit, sed parum perspexit hunc unum Christum esse identicum cum hypostasi Verbi divini; evolutio eius doctrinalis erat evolutio sui temporis; ad finem vitae hypostasin ex scripturis vindicavit.

praenotamen quintum: de modo unionis 1 De divisione modorum Concilium Constantinopolitanum ii, in canone 4 (db 216, ds 424), post anathema contra Nestorianos positum, tres praecipue distinxit modos quibus unitas intelligitur, nempe, primum secundum impietatem Apollinaris et Eutychis, alterum secundum sequaces Theodori (Mopsuesteni) et Nestorii, tertium secundum sanctam Dei ecclesiam. Primus modus est unio per confusionem, henoFsis kata sunkhusin, et conducit in interremptionem eorum quae convenerunt, aphanismos toFn sunel­ thontoFn. Alter modus est unio affectualis, henosis skheFtikeF (skhesis = relatio), et conducit in divisionem, diairesis. Qualis sit hic alter modus in prima parte eiusdem canonis dici videtur, nempe, secundum gratiam, operationem, dignitatem, aequalitatem honoris, auctoritatem, relationem, effectum, vel virtutem … secundum bonam voluntatem … homonymiam … per solam nominationem, honorem, dignitatem, adorationem …21

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culture (Bardy 209–210), but at the ‘Robber Council’ of Ephesus in 449 he was deposed (Bardy 223). In 451, having anathematized Nestorius, he was restored by the Council of Chalcedon (Bardy 236). At the Second Council of Constantinople in 553 what he had written against Cyril or in favor of Nestorius was condemned (db 226, ds 436, [dec 1: 121]). On this council, see thesis 4, point 8 of the section on opinions.20 Theodoret belonged to the old ‘man-God’ school. For a long time he refused the new terms, hypostasis and physis, which were not to be found in scripture, and he interpreted prosopon through 2  Corinthians 4.6. He acknowledged one real Christ with two natures, but did not thoroughly grasp that this one Christ is identical with the hypostasis of the divine Word. The development of his doctrine was the development of his time; at the end of his life he upheld hypostasis on scriptural grounds. preliminary note 5: the manner of union 1 Kinds of union The fourth canon of the Second Council of Constantinople (db 216, ds 424, [dec 1: 114–15]), after laying down an anathema against the Nestorians, distinguished three particular manners in which unity may be understood. One of these is in line with the impiety of Apollinaris and Eutyches; another, with the followers of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius; a third, with the holy church of God. The first manner is union through confusion, henoFsis kata synchusin, and leads to a rending apart of what has come together, aphanismos toFn synel­ thontoFn. The second manner is affective union, henoFsis scheFtikeF (schesis = relation), and leads to division, diairesis. The first part of the same canon seems to refer to this second kind of union: ‘only in respect of grace, or of principle of action, or of dignity, or in respect of equality of honor, or in respect of authority, or of some relation, or of some affection or power … or in respect of good will … or by homonymy … [one person] only in name, honor, dignity, or adoration …’21

20 See below, pp. 264–67. 21 The translation is adapted from The Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 1, ed. Norman P. Tanner (Washington, d.c.: Georgetown University Press, 1991) 114–15.

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Tertius modus est unio secundum compositionem, quod est per subsistentiam, henoFsis kata sunthesin, kath’ hupostasin. ­2 De unione neoplatonicorum Nemesius, De natura hominis, mg 40, 592–608 (Altaner 212). R. Arnou, ‘Nestorianisme et Néoplatonisme: L’unité du Christ et l’union des “Intelligibles,”’ Gregorianum 17 (1936) 116–31. Circa unionem animae et corporis in homine, Nemesio Emeseno (c. 400 ad) placuit neque sententia Platonis quippe insufficiens neque sententia Aristotelis tamquam materialistica. Neoplatonicis ergo Ammonio et Porphyrio inhaerens, aliam posuit theoriam ut ens intelligibile enti corporali uniatur relatione (skhesis), tendentia (rhopeF), dispositione (diathesis), religatione (dedesthai), sine confusione (asunkhutoFs); quam unionem habet secundum essentiam (kat’ousian). Hanc theoriam, secundum analogiam quandam, ulterius applicat ut secundum essentiam Verbum divinum uniatur corpori anima rationali animato. Et simul reicit sententiam Eunomianorum qui Verbum uniunt corpori et quidem secundum potentias non secundum essentiam (mg 40, 605); ulterius, forte ad Theodorum Mopsuestenum alludens, concedit quidem bonam Dei voluntatem (eudokia) unionem efficere, quam tamen negat proprietates unionis constituere (mg 40, 608). Pleniorem rei expositionem vide apud R. Arnou, loc. cit.

­3 Utrum sufficiat haec unio neoplatonica Videtur quod sufficit. Minime enim concilia vel Ephesinum vel Chalcedonense philosophiam neoplatonicam iudicare voluerunt. Sed secundum hanc philosophiam habetur unio secundum essentiam per relationem, tendentiam, dispositionem, religationem. Neque dici potest talis unio tollere distinctionem duarum naturarum quae uniuntur. Respondetur concilium Ephesinum et [concilium] Chalcedonense non tam de unione quam de uno tractasse, nempe, unum eundemque esse et aeternum Dei Filium et hominem Iesum; quo salvo, etiam hodie theologi catholici diversimode de theoriis unionis hypostaticae sentiunt. Quibus tamen concessis, circa theoriam neoplatonicam quaerendum est quis sit Christus. Si enim Christus dicitur quod ex essentia divina et essen-

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The third manner is union by composition, union on the basis of the subsistent, henoFsis kata synthesin, kath’ hypostasin. 2 The Neoplatonic union On the De natura hominis of Nemesius, mg 40, 592–608 [chapter 3, Morani, 38–44] (Altaner 212), see R. Arnou, ‘Nestorianisme et Néoplatonisme: L’unité du Christ et l’union des “Intelligibles,”’ Gregorianum 17 (1936) 116–31. Where the union of soul and body in man is concerned, Nemesius of Emesa (c. ad 400) was dissatisfied both with Plato’s view, as being insufficient, and with Aristotle’s, as being somewhat materialistic. Adhering, therefore, to the Neoplatonists Ammonius and Porphyry, he set out another theory: intelligible being is united with corporeal being by relation (schesis), tendency (rhopeF), disposition (diathesis), binding (dedesthai), without confusion (asynchutoFs). Such a union is a union on the basis of essence (kat’ousian). This theory, by analogy, he further applied so that the divine Word was united, on the basis of essence, with a body animated by a rational soul. At the same time he rejected the Eunomian view, in which the Word was united with a body on the basis not of essence but of powers [dunameis, vires] (mg 40, 605; [Morani, 43–44]). Further, alluding perhaps to Theodore of Mopsuestia, he allows that the good pleasure (eudokia) of God brings about the union, but denies that it constitutes the properties of the union (mg 40, 608; [Morani, 44]). For a fuller discussion of the matter, see Arnou’s article, cited above. 3 Is this Neoplatonic union sufficient? It would seem that it does suffice. For neither the Council of Ephesus nor the Council of Chalcedon wished to pass judgment on Neoplatonic philosophy. But through relation, tendency, disposition, binding, according to this philosophy, there is union on the basis of essence, and such a union cannot be said to remove the distinction between the two natures which are united. The reply to this is that the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon were not so much concerned with union as with what is one, that is, with one and the same who is the eternal Son of God and the man Jesus. While maintaining this, Catholic theologians even today hold diverse theoretical views on the hypostatic union. That granted, however, the question to ask regarding the Neoplatonic theory is, Who is Christ? For if Christ is said to be that which is composed

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tia humana componitur, sequitur Christum esse neque Deum neque hominem sed tertium quid unione quadam neoplatonica constitutum; quod si dicitur, cum Christus non sit Deus, non est aeternus Dei Filius; et cum Christus non sit homo, non est homo Iesus. Quae cum ita sint, iam perspici potest quantum intercedat inter unum et unionem. Qui de uno cogitat, dicit eum, qui ab aeterno est Deus etiam in tempore eundem fieri hominem. Qui de unione cogitat ut unum habeat, aliud unum habere non potest nisi quod ex unione resultat et unionem consequitur. Sed unio facta est in tempore. Ergo unum ex unione resultans et unionem consequens est temporale, recenter ortum, non aeternum, et ideo non aeternus Dei Filius. Neque quidquam adiuvat, si quis asserit illam unionem esse ontologicam, secundum essentiam, arctissimam, mysteriosam, etc. Internae enim proprietates, quae constitutionem unionis manifestant, facere non possunt quin unio sit ex tempore; et ideo facere non possunt quin unum ex unione resultans sit ex tempore.

4 Quaenam sit unio secundum hypostasin (a) Res facillime declaratur, supposita distinctione inter quod est (subsistens, hypostasis, persona) et quo est (essentia, natura) et ulterius supposita relatione inter quod est et quo est. Videlicet, in genere, hypostasis non est essentia vel natura, sed est habens essentiam, habens naturam. Quibus positis, unio secundum hypostasin est unio in qua unum idemque est habens sed diversae sunt quae habentur naturae seu essentiae. Si enim una eademque hypostasis habet et divinitatem et humanitatem, illa eadem hypostasis est et Deus (Deus = habens divinitatem) et homo (homo = habens humanitatem). Et supra diximus ‘in genere’ hypostasis non est natura, quia in Deo hypostasis et natura distinguuntur ratione tantum, sed in creaturis distinguuntur realiter, distinctione reali, minore, inadaequata. (b) Quae tamen sunt posterioris inventionis. Exprimunt sane mentem Cyrilli, uti ex praenotaminibus secundo et tertio satis elucet. Sed ut plenius mentem Cyrilli assequamur, unde monophysismum intelligere poterimus, ulterius inquirendum est. Quem in finem considerabimus quae in duabus epistolis Cyrilli ponuntur, nempe, 4a ad Nestorium 2a, quae in Ephesino

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of divine essence and human essence, it follows that Christ is neither God nor man but some third thing, constituted by the Neoplatonic union; and if that is said, then since Christ is not God he is not the eternal Son of God, and since Christ is not a human being he is not the man Jesus. All this being so, it now appears how far a union differs from what is one. Think of what is one, and you will say that he who is God from all eternity also became man in time. Think of union in order to get to what is one, and the only unity you can have will be the result and consequence of the union. But a union takes place in time. Therefore the one that results from union and follows upon a union is temporal, of recent origin, not eternal, and therefore not the eternal Son of God. Nor is it any use insisting that the union is ontological, that it is a union on the basis of essence, that it is a most intimate, a mysterious union, or the like. internal properties, which manifest the constitution of a union, cannot prevent the union’s being from time, and thus cannot prevent the one who results from the union being from time. 4 What is a union on the basis of hypostasis? (a) The matter is easily stated, on the supposition that there is a distinction between that which is (a subsistent, a hypostasis, a person) and that by which it is (an essence, a nature), and on the further supposition that there is a relation between that which is and that by which it is. This is to say, in general, that a hypostasis is not an essence or a nature; it is what has or possesses an essence, what has or possesses a nature. That being so, union on the basis of hypostasis is a union in which the possessor is one and the same while the natures or essences possessed are different. For if one and the same hypostasis has both divinity and humanity, that same hypostasis is both God (God = possessor of divinity) and man (man = possessor of humanity). And we said earlier that it is ‘in general’ that a hypostasis is not a nature, because in God hypostasis and nature are distinguished only notionally, while in creatures they are really distinct, by a real, minor, inadequate distinction. (b) But these are later discoveries. They express Cyril’s point, as preliminary notes 2 and 3 have made sufficiently clear. But in order to follow through on Cyril’s point, and from there to understand monophysitism, further inquiry is in order. For that purpose we shall consider the contents of two letters of Cyril’s, namely, the second he wrote to Nestorius (Letter 4),

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approbata est ut conformis Nicaeno symbolo, et 17a ad Nestorium 3a, cui annectuntur anathematismi (db 113–24, ds 252–63). Inveniuntur autem hae epistolae 4a ad Nestorium 2a: aco, i, 1, 1, pp. 25–28; mg 77, 44–49; 17a ad Nestorium 3a: aco, i, 1, 1, pp. 33–40; mg 77, 105–20.22 Remittemus tribus numeris (1) paginam aco, (2) lineam aco, (3) paginam mg.

(c) Exacte exprimitur unio secundum hypostasin: (a′) Seclusa unione secundum hypostasin, necessario ponuntur duo filii (28, 7; 48). (b′) Beata Virgo est Mater Dei (28, 18; 48; et 40, 3; 117). (c′) Quae in evangeliis a Salvatore nostro dicuntur, inter duas personas (prosoFpa) vel duas hypostases non dividimus (38, 4–5; 116). (d′) Post incarnationem Verbum remansit quod erat (28, 17; 48; et 35, 20; 109); non abiecit quod erat (35, 19; 109). (e′) Uni personae, uni hypostasi Verbi incarnati sunt omnes in evangeliis voces attribuendae (38, 21–22; 116). (d) Deest theoria completa et accurate formulata circa hypostasin et naturam; et ideo per expressiones magis concretas, non autem per speculativam analysim, interpretandae sunt expressiones quae sequuntur. (a′) Saepius dicitur unio, uniens, unitus secundum hypostasin (26, 27; 45; et 27, 10; 45; et 28, 7; 48; et 28, 21; 48; et 35, 26; 109; et 36, 24; 112; et 40, 3; 117). (b′) Sed eodem sensu, uti videtur, dicitur unitus secundum naturam (36, 11; 112); (c′) Et etiam adest expressio, unio naturalis, henoFsis phusikeF (36, 17–18; 112; et db 115, ds 254). (d′) Sed impugnatus circa assertam unionem naturalem, ter explicavit se nihil aliud significare quam unionem veram: ita, Explanatio xii Capitum (aco, i, 1, 5, p. 19, 2; mg 76, 300 c). Apologia xii Capitum contra Orientales (aco, i, 1, 7, p. 40, 20; mg 76, 332 b). Apologia xii Capitum contra Theodoretum (aco, i, 1, 6, p. 118, 22 et 24; mg 76, 405 b).

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which was approved at Ephesus as conforming with the Nicene Creed, and his third letter to Nestorius (Letter 17), which has the Twelve Anathemas attached (db 113–24, ds 252–63, [dec 1: 59–61]). For the text of the second letter to Nestorius, see aco, 1, 1, 1, pp. 25–28; mg 77, 44–49; [dec 1: 40–44]. For the text of the third letter to Nestorius, aco, 1, 1, 1, pp. 33–40; mg 77, 105–20 [dec 1: 50–59].22 The three numbers in citations below refer to (1) the page in aco, (2) the line of that page, and (3) [following a semicolon] the page in mg [the numbers in brackets will indicate the volume and page in dec]. (c) A union on the basis of hypostasis is exactly expressed in these ways: (a′) Excluding a union on the basis of hypostasis necessarily posits two sons (28, 7; 48 [1: 43]). (b′) The blessed Virgin is the Mother of God (28, 18; 48 [1: 48]; and 40, 3; 117 [1: 58]) (c′) What the gospels say about our Savior is not to be divided between two persons (prosoFpa) or two hypostases (38, 4–5; 116 [1: 55]). (d′) After the Incarnation the Word continued to be what he was (28, 17; 48 [1: 43]; and 35, 20; 109 [1:51]); he did not abandon what he was (35, 19; 109 [1: 51]). (e′) To one person, to the one hypostasis of the Word incarnate, should be attributed all the expressions in the gospels. (38, 21–22; 116 [1: 56]). (d) There is no complete and accurately formulated theory of hypostasis and nature; therefore, the expressions that follow should be interpreted by means of more concrete expressions, but not by speculative analysis. (a′) There are frequent references to ‘union,’ to the ‘what unites,’ and to the ‘what is united’ on the basis of hypostasis (26, 27; 45 [1: 41]; and 27, 10; 45 [1: 41]; and 28, 7; 48 [1: 43]; and 28, 21; 48 [1: 44]; and 35, 26; 109 [1: 51]; and 36, 24; 112 [1: 52]; and 40, 3; 117 [1: 57]). (b′) But ‘united on the basis of nature’ seems to be used in the same sense (36, 11; 112 [1: 52]). (c′) There is also the expression ‘natural union,’ henoFsis physikeF (36, 17– 18, and db 115, ds 254, [dec 1: 59]). (d′) But Cyril, who was attacked for having asserted a natural union, on three occasions made it plain that he meant nothing other than a true union: Explanatio xii Capitum (aco, 1, 1, 5, p. 19, 2; mg 76, 300 c; [Pusey, 6: 246]), Apologia xii Capitum contra Orientales (aco, 1, 1, 7, p. 40, 20; mg 76, 332

22 See the references to npnf and the Norris translations mentioned above, p. 213. Also Wickham 2–11 (second to Nestorius), 12–33 (third to Nestorius).

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(e′) Unde si quis mentem Cyrilli non concrete interpretatur sed synthesim speculativam ex verbis eius construit, reducit unionem secundum hypostasin ad unionem secundum naturam, unionem secundum naturam ad unionem naturalem, et unionem naturalem ad unionem veram. Quae quidem conclusio sat tenuis videtur. (f′) Arguit Cyrillus Christum esse unum et unicum, quamvis ex duabus rebus diversis in unitatem componatur, sicut etiam et homo, ex anima et corpore constitutus, non ideo duplex est sed unus ex duobus (38, 5–6; 116). Quae analogia non est premenda, cum unio animae et corporis sit compositio naturalis. Anima enim humana non unitur corpori secundum hypostasin, secus unus idemque esset et anima et corpus, et nullus esset homo. (g′) Cum Cyrillus obiectiones contra formulam ‘unam naturam Dei Verbi incarnatam’ solvere voluerit, (1) nullam intermediam distinctionem agnovit inter distinctionem realem et maiorem (uti inter Petrum et Paulum) et distinctionem quae solo intellectu, sola contemplatione, perficitur; (2) quam tamen distinctionem illustravit per distinctionem inter animam et corpus in homine; quamvis alia sit natura animae, et alia natura corporis, tamen in homine ex utraque composito non habetur nisi una natura; et distinctio quae post compositionem efficitur est solo intellectu, sola contemplatione; (3) et similiter in Christo ‘ex duabus naturis’ admittit, sed post incarnationem nisi unam naturam non vult. Vide ad Succensum epist. 2a (aco, i, 1, 6, p. 162, 2–11; mg 77, 245). Citatur infra, thesi 4a, problema, § 8.23 (h′) Secundum Cyrillum quae dicuntur de Verbo secundum naturam, secundum naturam suam, sunt divina. Vide 37, 11; 113; et 37, 13; 113; et 37, 29; 113; et 38, 11; 116; et 38, 17; 116; et 39, 25; 117; et 40, 9; 117. (i′) Quibus perspectis, elucet quemadmodum servilis quaedam ad Cyrillum fidelitas eo conducere potuit ut in Christo Deo et homine agnoscatur una tantum natura eaque divina, ut de Christo praedicentur divina secundum naturam, ut de eodem praedicentur humana secundum oeconomiam

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b; [Pusey, 6: 286, 288]), and Apologia xii Capitum contra Theodoretum (aco, 1, 1, 6, p. 118, 22 and 24; mg 76, 405 b; [Pusey, 6: 412]). (e′) Thus anyone who, instead of interpreting Cyril’s point concretely, builds a speculative synthesis out of his words is reducing ‘union on the basis of hypostasis’ to ‘union on the basis of nature,’ ‘union on the basis of nature’ to natural union, and natural union to true union – a conclusion that seems shaky enough. (f′) Cyril argues that Christ is one and unique, although composed of two diverse things in unity, just as a human being, constituted of body and soul, is not for that reason two, but one from two (38, 5–6; 116 [1: 55]). This analogy should not be pressed, since the union of soul and body is a natural composition. For the human soul is not united with a body on the basis of hypostasis; otherwise soul and body would be one and the same, and no one would be the human being. (g′) Cyril wished to counter objections against the formula ‘the one nature of the incarnate Word of God.’ For that reason: (1) He allowed no intermediate distinction between real, major distinctions (such as between Peter and Paul) and distinctions that are brought about only in the intellect or only in contemplation. (2) He nevertheless illustrated this [latter] distinction by using the distinction in man between soul and body in a human being: the nature of the soul is other than the nature of the body, yet in a human being, composed of both, there is only one nature, and the distinction that is made after the composition [of a man] is only in the intellect or only in contemplation. (3) He similarly admitted that Christ was ‘from two natures,’ but insisted there was only one nature after the Incarnation. See his second letter to Succensus (aco, 1, 1, 6, p. 162, 2–11; mg 77, 245; [Wickham, 92]), quoted below in thesis 4, under ‘The Problem,’ § 8.23 (h′) In Cyril’s view, all predicates that refer to the Word ‘on the basis of nature,’ ‘on the basis of his nature,’ are divine. See 37, 11; 113 [1: 53]; and  37, 13; 113 [1: 53]; and  37, 29; 113 [1: 54]; and  38, 11; 116 [1: 55]; and 38, 17; 116 [1: 55]; and 39, 25; 117 [1: 57]; and 40, 9; 117 [1: 58]. (i′) In light of all this it is clear how a slavish faithfulness to Cyril could lead to a position such that in Christ, God and man, only one nature is acknowledged, and that one a divine nature; and such that divine predicates apply to Christ on the basis of nature, while human predicates apply to him

23 See below, pp. 284–87.

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salutis. Ita in monophysismo severiano systematice evitatur agnitio duarum naturarum. (j′) Plura vide apud Grillmeier, 1, 170, 176–78, 425–580. Excerpta, Xiberta, Enchir. 340–56; 404–43. praenotamen sextum: de theodoro mopsuesteno et nestorio 1 Theodorus Mopsuestenus, ob. 428. mg 66. Altaner 285-87. Excerpta, Xi­ berta, Enchir. 134–49. E. Amann, dtc xv (29) 235–79. Condemnatus est in concilio Constantinopolitano ii, anno 553 (db 224– 25, ds 434–35). De quo concilio, vide thesin 4m, Sententiae, i, 8.24 De authentia quorundam excerptorum, nuperrime disputatum est; vide litteras apud F. Sullivan, Analecta Greg.25 R. Arnou, Gregorianum 17 (1936) 127–31.26 M. Richard, MélScRel 2 (1945) 21–29.27 A. Grillmeier, 1, 144–55. T. Camelot, ibid. 215–19. Arnou notavit Theodorum eodem modo loqui ac Nemesius (vide supra, praenotamen quartum, § 2), hac tamen exceptione quod Theodorus vocem ousian, quippe Apollinarismum sapientem, simpliciter noluit, eiusque loco unionem kat’eudokian docuit. Richard animadvertit antiochenos sine traditione speculativa haud potuisse aliter contra Apollinarem agere quam adaptando ipsum systema Apollinaristicum ad propriam doctrinam, nempe, unum omnino esse Christum et tamen verum Deum et verum hominem; quod sane eos reliquit sine clara et cohaerenti doctrina de unitate Christi, cum principium apollina­ risticum unionis naturalis reiecerint. Grillmeier inter alia notavit formulam Chalcedonensem de una persona et duabus naturis primo a Theodoro esse expressam. 2 Nestorius, nat. post 381, ob. post 451. Altaner 302–303. (a) G. Bardy (Fliche-Martin, 4) 163–96, 202–203. E. Amann, dtc xi (21) 76–157; MélScRel 2 (1945) 255–58. T. Camelot, Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 213–14,

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on the basis of the economy of salvation. Thus, Severian monophysitism systematically avoided any acknowledgment of two natures. (j′) For more on this, see Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 170, 176–79, 425–580. There are excerpts in Xiberta, Enchiridion 340–56, 404–43. preliminary note 6: theodore of mopsuestia and nestorius 1 On Theodore of Mopsuestia (d. 428) see Altaner, 285–87. mg 66. Excerpts in Xiberta, Enchiridion 134–39. É. Amann, ‘Théodore de Mopsueste,’ dtc xv (29) cols. 235–79. He was condemned at the Second Council of Constantinople in 553 (db 224–25, ds 434–35, [dec 1: 119–20]). On this council, see thesis 4, ‘Opinions,’ i, 8.24 Recently the authenticity of some of the excerpts has been debated; see the literature cited by F. Sullivan, Analecta Gregoriana 82 (1956);25 also R. Arnou, ‘Nestorianisme et Néoplatonisme’ 127–31;26 M. Richard, ‘L’Introduction du mot “hypostase” dans la théologie de l’Incarnation’ 21–29;27 A. Grillmeier, in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 144–55; T. Camelot, in ibid. 215–19. Arnou notes that Theodore’s language is the same as that of Nemesius (see preliminary note 4, point 2 above), except that Theodore simply refused to use the word ousia, which smacked of Apollinarianism, and instead spoke of a union kat’eudokian. Richard retorts that the Antiochenes, lacking a tradition of speculative thought, could hardly counter Apollinaris otherwise than by adapting the Apollinarian system to their own teaching, namely, that Christ is indeed one and yet both true God and true man. Having rejected the Apollinarian principle of a natural union, they were left without a clear and coherent doctrine of Christ’s unity. Grillmeier, among others, notes that it was Theodore who first used the Chalcedonian formula of one person and two natures. 2 On Nestorius (b. after 381, d. after 451), see Altaner, pp. 302–303. (a) G. Bardy, ‘De l’Acte d’Union à la mort de Proclus’ (Fliche-Martin, 4) 163–96, 202–203; É. Amann, ‘Nestorius,’ dtc xi (21) 76–157, and Richard,

24 See below, pp. 264–67. 25 See above, p. 11, note 8. 26 See above, p. 233. 27 See above, p. 193, note 16.

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219–29; L. Scipioni, ‘Ricerche sulla cristologia del “Libro di Eraclide” di Nestorio,’ Friburgo (Helv.) 1956.

(b) De reliquiis et authenticitate, Altaner, Amann 81–84. Loofs, Nestoria­ na, Halle 1905.28 Liber Heraclidis syriace Bedjan 1910, gallice Nau 1910, anglice Driver et Hodgson 1925; authentia non omni dubio maior. Etiam var­ ia apud aco, i, 1: epp. 1a et 2a ad Cyr. (P. 1, pp. 25, 29–32); excerpta Ephesi lecta (P. 2, pp. 45–52); relat. ad Imp. (P. 5, pp. 13–15); excerpta a Cyrillo, adv. Nest. (P. 6, pp. 3-13); ep. ad exarch. Antiochum (P. 7, p. 71). Indices s.v. Nestorius, aco, i, 1, 8, p. 39–40. Excerpta: Xiberta, Enchir. 362–79.

(c) Usque ad finem vitae se credidit orthodoxum; propriam doctrinam a Leone Magno (db 143–44, ds 290–95) propagatam aestimavit. Strenue negavit se duos filios docuisse, quod explicite fecisse non videtur. Non dicendus est antiquum adoptionismum simpliciter renovasse, nempe, Iesum merum hominem in quo Verbum inhabitavit; neque dici potest orthodoxam doctrinam habuisse. Quaenam fuerit ipsa sua positio intermedia, certo non dicitur donec qq. de authentia resolvantur. Videtur quod Theodorum Mopsuestenum secutus est; duae naturae fortiter distinguuntur; unio ponitur secundum beneplacitum divinum; kat’eudokian, et non kat’ousian uti in Apollinarismo vel uti aliter in Nemesio; si magis speculativa sunt authentica (Loofs 219, d; Amann 151), ob rationem speculativam (essentialisticam) negavit e duabus naturis fieri posse unum substantiale (en toF kat’ousian logoF phusei phusis oukh’ enoutai khoFris aphanismou).

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‘L’Introduction du mot “hypostase” dans la théologie de l’Incarnation,’ Mé­ langes de Science Religieuse 2 (1945) 255–58; T. Camelot in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 213–14, 219–29; L. Scipioni, Ricerche sulla cristologia del ‘Libro di Eraclide’ di Nestorio: La formulatione teologica e il suo (Friburg, Switzerland: Edizioni Universitarie, 1956). (b) On extant works and their authenticity: Altaner; Amann [dtc xi] 81–84. Collected texts in F. Loofs, Nestoriana.28 The Syriac text of Nestorius’s Liber Heraclidis, sometimes called the Bazaar, was edited for the first time by P. Bedjan (Paris, 1910); there is a French translation by F. Nau (Paris: Letouzy et Ané, 1910) and an English translation by G.R. Driver and L. Hodgson, The Bazaar of Heracleides (Oxford, 1925 [New York: AMS Press, 1965]); its authenticity is not beyond all doubt. There are also various texts in aco, 1, 1: the first and second letters to Cyril (pt. 1, pp. 25, 29–32); the excerpts read at the Council of Ephesus (pt. 2, pp. 45–52); the report to the emperor (pt. 5, pp. 13–15); extracts quoted by Cyril against Nestorius (pt. 6, pp. 3–13); letter to the exarch at Antioch (pt. 7, p. 71). See the index under ‘Nestorius,’ aco, 1, 1, pt. 8, pp. 39–40. Excerpts in Xiberta, Enchiridion 362–79. (c) To the end of his life Nestorius believed himself orthodox; his was the doctrine that, in his own judgment, was propagated by Leo the Great (db 143–44, ds 290–95, [dec 1: 77–82]). He strongly denied having taught that there were two sons, which he seems not to have done explicitly. It should not be said that he simply revived the old adoptionist view that Jesus was merely a man in whom the Word dwelt; nor can it be said that he held the orthodox teaching. Until questions of authenticity are resolved there is certainly no saying what his own intermediate position was in itself. He seems to have been a follower of Theodore of Mopsuestia. Two natures are sharply distinguished; there is posited a union ‘on the basis of the divine good pleasure’ – kat’eudokian – rather than kat’ousian [‘on the basis of essence’] as in Apollinarianism or, in a different way, in Nemesius. If certain more speculative writings are authentic (Loofs, 219, d; Amann [dtc xi] 151), Nestorius denied on speculative (essentialistic) grounds that a substantial unity can come about from two natures (en toFi kat’ousian logoFi physei physis oukh’ enoutai choFris aphanismou).

28 On Loofs, see above, p. 211, note 14.

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3 Nestoriani E. Tisserand, dtc xi (21) 157-323. W. de Vries, apud Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 603-35. Xiberta, Enchir. 513-18.

Adversarii Nestorius, damnatus et depositus in Ephesino; vide praenotamina 1 (2); 2 (a et c); 3 (2, d); 6 (2). Etiam, concilium Constantinopolitanum ii (db 215–18, ds 423–27). Theodorus Mopsuestenus, damnatus in concilio Constantinopolitano ii (db 224–25, ds 434–35). Cf. praenot., 1 (2); 6 (1). Theodoreti Cyrensis scripta contra Cyrillum vel in favorem Nestorii (db 226, ds 436). Ibae epistola ad Marin Persam (db 227, ds 437). De intentione Vigilii, R.P., in his capitulis approbandis29 (ml 69, 174–78, cap. xxvi–xxviii). Nota De fide divina et catholica, uti ex argumento statim patebit.

Argumentum 1 Ex sacra scriptura, uti in thesi 1a, ubi statutum est ‘unum eundemque esse

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3 The Nestorians See E. Tisserand, ‘L’Église Nestorienne,’ dtc xi (21) 157–323; W. de Vries, ‘Die syrisch-nestorianische Haltung zu Chalkedon,’ in GrillmeierBacht, 1, 603–35; Xiberta, Enchiridion 513–18. Opponents of the thesis Nestorius, condemned and deposed at the Council of Ephesus; see preliminary notes 1 (point 2), 3 (a and c), 3 (point 2, d) and 6 (point 2). Also the decree of the Second Council of Constantinople (db 215–18, ds 423–27, [dec 1: 114–17]). Theodore of Mopsuestia, condemned at the Second Council of Constantinople (db 224–25, ds 434–35, [dec 1: 119–20). See preliminary notes 1 (point 2) and 6 (point 1). The writings of Theodoret of Cyrrhus against Cyril or in support of Nestorius (db 226, ds 436, [dec 1: 121]). The letter of Ibas [bishop of Edessa] to Mari the Persian [bishop of Hardascir] (db 227, ds 437, [dec 1: 121–22]). By intention, Pope Vigilius, when he approved these Three Chapters29 (ml 69, 175–78; chapters 26–28). Theological note of the thesis ‘Of divine and catholic faith,’ as will at once be plain from the argument below. The Argument 1 There is an argument from scripture, as in thesis 1, where it was estab-

29 The ‘Three Chapters’ (kephalaia) were the last three listed above: the person and work of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret’s writings against Cyril, and the letter of Ibas. Strongly opposed by monophysites in Syria and Egypt, they were condemned by the emperor, Justinian, in 544. Vigilius initially resisted the condemnation as contrary to Chalcedon, but in a ‘Judgment’ of 548, he yielded to imperial pressure and condemned them. However, this verdict he later withdrew in a ‘Constitution’ of 553, to which, presumably, Lonergan refers here. Finally, in 554, he yielded to the inevitable and consented to the condemnation decreed by the Second Council of Constantinople.

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et verum hominem et verum Deum.’ Quamvis enim in nt adsint diversa schemata prospectivum, retrospectivum, et retrospectivum inversum, ideo tamen adsunt ut ex humanitate ad divinitatem eiusdem ascendatur vel ex divinitate ad humanitatem descendatur.

2 Ex symbolo apostolico (db 6, ds 11–12). Nam sensus non est alium esse Iesum Christum, Dominum nostrum, Filium eius unicum, et alium esse conceptum, natum, passum, etc. 3 Ex symbolo Nicaeno (db 54, ds 125), quod magis explicite declaravit divinitatem Filii unici contra Arianos, minime autem docuit alium esse Iesum hominem et alium Filium Patri consubstantialem, vel alium esse Verbum divinum et alium esse Christum.

4 Ex concilio Ephesino quod uti supra symbolum Nicaenum intellexit, et ideo epistolam Cyrilli huic symbolo Nicaeno conformem approbavit, epistolam autem Nestorii difformem damnavit. Vide praenotamina 2 et 3.

5 Ex formula unionis inter Cyrillum Alexandrinum et Ioannem Antiochenum. Vide supra praenotamen 5 (2); db 5003 (edit. 31), ds 272–73.

6 Ex formula Flaviani ep. Constantinopolitani, in synodo Constantinopolitano, anno 448, ubi damnatus est Eutyches (aco, ii, 1, p. 144, 8–10; Grillmeier, 1, 195–98). ‘Etenim ex duabus naturis confitemur Christum esse post incarnationem (enanthroFpeFsin), in una hypostasi et una persona confitentes unum Christum, unum Filium, unum Dominum.’ 7 Ex concilio Chalcedonensi, anno 451 (db 148, ds 301–302). Ibi enim docentur tum duae naturae tum una hypostasis unaque persona. Ibidem docetur unum eundemque Filium et dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, eundem perfectum in deitate et perfectum in humanitate, Deum

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lished that ‘one and the same is true God and true man.’ For while there are different schematic patterns – ‘prospective,’ ‘retrospective,’ and ‘inverse retrospective’ – in the New Testament, they are there either for the sake of moving from the humanity upwards to the divinity of the same one, or for the sake of moving from the divinity downwards to the humanity. 2 There is an argument from the Apostles’ Creed (db 6, ds 11–12). For its meaning is not that ‘Jesus Christ, his only Son, our Lord’ is someone while someone else was conceived, born, suffered, and so on. 3 There is an argument from the Nicene Creed (db 54, ds 125, [dec 1: 5]), which more explicitly states the divinity of the only Son against the Arians, but does not teach that the man Jesus was someone while the consubstantial Son of the Father is someone else, or that the divine Word is someone while Christ is someone else. 4 There is an argument from the Council of Ephesus, which understood the Nicene Creed in the sense just stated, and consequently approved Cyril’s letter as conforming with this creed but condemned Nestorius’s letter as not conforming. See preliminary notes 2 and 3. 5 There is an argument from the Formula of Reunion between Cyril of Alexandria and John of Antioch. See above preliminary note 5 (point 2), and db 5003 (31st edition), ds 272–73, [dec 1: 69–70]. 6 There is an argument from the formula used by Flavian, bishop of Constantinople, at a synod held in 448 at Constantinople, which excommunicated Eutyches (aco, 2, 1, p. 144, 8–10; Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 195–98 [Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 523–26]): ‘We acknowledge that Christ is from two natures after the Incarnation (enanthroFpeFsis [being made man]), in one hypostasis and one person confessing one Christ, one Son, one Lord.’ 7 There is an argument from the Council of Chalcedon, 451 (db 148, ds 301–302, [dec 1: 86–87]). The council teaches two natures, as well as one hypostasis and one person. The council teaches ‘one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the same truly God and

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verum et hominem verum, consubstantialem Patri secundum deitatem et consubstantialem nobis secundum humanitatem, ante saecula de Patre genitum, in novissimis diebus ex Maria virgine Dei genetrice secundum humanitatem … Sed manifeste sicut duae naturae sunt deitas et humanitas, ita una persona seu hypostasis est ille unus idemque de quo tam deitas quam humanitas affirmantur. Ergo in Christo una est agnoscenda persona cuius tam humana sunt quam divina. 8 Ex concilio Constantinopolitano iii, anno 681 (db 290, ds 554–55), ubi repetitur decretum Chalcedonense, sed additur ‘unum de sancta et consubstantiali et vitae originem praebente Trinitate.’ Unde manifeste concluditur illam unam in Christo personam esse personam divinam. 9 Ex Mariologia ubi fuse demonstratur Beata Virgo esse Dei Genetrix. Si enim Iesus non esset Deus, Mater Iesu non esset Mater Dei.

10 Ex duodecim capitulis Cyrilli contra Nestorium (db 113–24, ds 252–63). Quamvis enim haec a concilio Ephesino non sint definita (db p. 57, nota 2; cf. ds ante 250), et formula unionis ea silentio praeterierit, a subsequenti traditione suscepta sunt.

Obicitur 1 O. Cullmann, Christologie des nt, Tübingen 1957, saepius excludit considerationem personae vel naturae a Christologia; ita pp. 9, 198, 243, 273, 300, 304, 336–37.30 Respondetur: Concedimus eum iure suo uti inquantum ut exegeta exponit ipsos conceptus in nt adhibitos. Nam nt expresse de persona vel natura non locutum est, uti ex thesi 1a concludi potest.

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truly man … the same consubstantial with the Father as to the divinity and consubstantial with us as to the humanity, begotten from the Father before the ages as to the divinity and in the latter days … born as to his humanity from Mary the Virgin Mother of God …’ But, obviously, just as the two natures are divinity and humanity, so too the one person or hypostasis is that ‘one and the same’ of whom both divinity and humanity are affirmed. Therefore in Christ there is to be acknowledged one person, to whom belong both things human and things divine. 8 There is an argument from the Third Council of Constantinople, 681 ad (db 290, ds 554–55, [dec 1: 127–28]), which reiterated the Chalcedonian decree but added ‘one of the holy, consubstantial, and life-giving Trinity.’ From this the inference is obvious: the one person in Christ is a divine person. 9 There is an argument from Mariology, which argues in great detail that the Virgin Mary is the Mother of God. For if Jesus were not God, the Mother of Jesus would not be the Mother of God. 10 There is an argument from Cyril’s Twelve Anathemas against Nestorius (db 113–24, ds 252–63, [dec 1: 59–61]). For while these were not defined by the Council of Ephesus (db, p. 57, note 2; introduction to ds 250), and while the Formula of Reunion sets them silently aside, they were received by the subsequent tradition. Objections 1 In his Christologie des Neuen Testaments, Oscar Cullmann quite often excludes from Christology any consideration of person or nature; so, for example, pp. 9, 198, 243, 273, 300, 304, and 336–337.30 Reply: We concede to him in his judgment to the extent that, as an exegete, he is expounding the concepts used in the New Testament. For the New Testament does not speak explicitly of person or nature, as can be inferred from thesis 1.

30 See above, p. 67, note 39. The corresponding pages in the English translation are 9, 192, 235, 266, 293, 299, 326–27.

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2 Sed ulterius docet Christologiam nt esse functionalem, ideoque illegitimam esse evolutionem a Patribus factam. Respondetur: Christologia ‘functionalis’ diversimode intelligi potest. Si sensus est nt de Christo loqui tantummodo quatenus Christus ad nos refertur, sensus est obvie erroneus; nam in nt refertur Christus etiam ad Patrem; neque desunt attributa absoluta, uti Io 8.58: antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum. Si sensus est philosophicus, uti in opere E. Cassirer, Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, vide Insight 254.31 Si alio quodam sensu philosophico, quaeritur utrum illa philosophia momentum veri intelligat. Vide thesin 1m, adversarios recentiores. Quantum ad iudicium de evolutione patristica, quaeritur utrum Patres vel exegetae moderni illegitime adhibuerint vel adhibent principium contradictionis; nam uti ex hac thesi constat, quaestio de persona et naturis est quaestio de principio contradictionis applicando.

3 Saepissime Patres distinguunt Verbum et hominem in Christo; sed Verbum est persona secunda SS. Trinitatis; et homo pariter est persona; ergo in Christo non unam sed duas agnoverunt personas. Textus vide apud P. Galtier, De Incarnatione ac Redemptione, §§102–105, Paris 1947, pp. 80–83; ubi citantur Tertullianus, Methodius, Eustathius Antiochenus, Formula Sardicensis (anno 343), Hilarius, Gregorius Nyssenus, Gregorius Nazianzenus, Ambrosius, Damasus R. P., Hieronymus, Augustinus, Leporii libellus, Celestinus R. P., Leo Magnus, concilium Toletanum xim (db 285–86, ds 536–39). Cf. M. Richard, RevScPhTh 25 (1936) 459–81.32

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2 But Cullmann teaches further that New Testament Christology is functional, and therefore the Patristic development was illegitimate. Reply: ‘Functional’ Christology can be understood in different ways. If it means that the New Testament speaks of Christ only insofar as Christ is related to us, what is meant is obviously mistaken. In the New Testament Christ is also related to the Father, and absolute attributes are not absent; there is, for example, John 8.58, ‘Before Abraham was, I am.’ If the meaning is the philosophical one used by E. Cassirer in Substanz­ begriff und Funcktionsbegriff, see Insight 254 [= cwl 3, 279].31 If ‘functional’ has some other philosophical meaning, the question is whether the philosophy understands the importance of truth. See thesis 1, ‘Modern opponents of the thesis.’ As for Cullmann’s judgment on the patristic development, the question is whether the Fathers did, or modern exegetes do, use the principle of contradiction illegitimately. For as the present thesis has made clear, the question regarding person and nature is a question about applying the principle of contradiction. 3 The Fathers very often distinguished between Word and man in Christ. But the Word is the second person of the holy Trinity, while a man is likewise a person. Therefore, the Fathers acknowledge not one but two persons in Christ. For texts, see P. Galtier, De incarnatione ac redemptione (2nd ed., Paris: Beauchesne, 1947), §§ 102–105, pp. 80–83. There are quotations from Tertullian, Methodius, Eustathius of Antioch, the credal formula of the council of Sardica (ad 343), Hilary, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, Ambrose, Pope Damasus, Jerome, Augustine, the Libellus Emendationis of Leporius, Pope Celestine, Pope Leo the Great, and the Eleventh Council of Toledo (db 285–86, ds 536–39). See Richard, ‘Notes sur l’évolution doctrinale de Théodoret.’32

31 Lonergan, Insight 279: ‘Ernst Cassirer’s work Substance and Function contains a polemic against the notion of the thing. I would say that his strictures are valid against the notion of “body” but would claim his argument to be inefficacious against the notion of thing. It is true that the development of explanatory science tends to eliminate the notion of “body”; on the other hand, if explanatory science were to eliminate the notion of thing, it would cut its communications with the data in which it has to be discovered and verified.’ 32 See above, p. 229.

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Respondetur: Postquam doctrina christologica clare concepta atque expressa est, loqui non debemus de Verbo et homine in Christo sed de Verbo et humanitate assumpta, conceditur. Sum. theol., 3, q. 4, a. 3. Quo parum perspecto, erasse videtur D. de Basly; cf. Diepen, RevThom 1949, 428–92.33

Qui ante evolutionem factam, intellectam, applicatam locuti sunt, ii iudicari debent ex modo loquendi, negatur, ex sensu ab iis intento, conceditur. Quare, quod ab obiciente probandum est, non formula verborum, sed verborum est sensus, scilicet, utrum illi Patres supra memorati locuti sint de Verbo et homine tamquam de alio et alio, necne. Et multipliciter constat eos non de alio et alio sed de uno eodemque esse locutos. Cf. Galtier, § 108, pp. 84–85.

Thesis 4 Etiam post incarnationem duae sunt in Christo naturae, inconfusae et immutatae, salvisque utriusque proprietatibus; quae naturarum distinctio realis quidem est, non tamen maior, sed minor et analogice dicta.

Termini post incarnationem: quaeritur non de Verbo, non de homine, sed de Verbo incarnato, quot in eo sint naturae. duae: alia et alia quarum haec non est illa. natura: realitas concreta proprietatibus propriisque operationibus manifestata; non agitur de conceptibus, de universalibus, sed de realibus et particularibus. inconfusae : nulla habetur naturarum confusio. immutatae : divina natura remanet divina, et humana natura remanet humana. Non excluduntur dona specialia naturae humanae collata; asseruntur tamen naturae humanae ita donata ut maneat illa natura vere humana.

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Reply: Once Christological doctrine has been clearly conceived and expressed, I grant that we ought not to speak of the Word and a man in Christ, but of the Word and the assumed humanity (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 4, a. 3). From this limited viewpoint it would seem that D. de Basly has erred. See H. Diepen, ‘Un scotisme apocryphe: La christologie du P. Déodat de Basly, o.f.m.,’Revue Thomiste (1949) 428–92.33 That those who spoke before a development was brought about, understood, and applied ought to be judged by their mode of speaking, I deny; that they ought to be judged by the sense they intended, I grant. Accordingly, what the objector has to prove is not a verbal formula but the meaning of the words. The question is whether the Fathers mentioned above did or did not speak of the Word and the man as ‘someone’ and ‘someone else.’ And it is clear for many reasons that they did not speak of ‘someone’ and ‘someone else’ but of one and the same. See Galtier, De incarnatione et redemptione, § 108, pp. 84–85. Thesis 4 Even after the Incarnation there are in Christ two natures, unconfused and unchanged, the properties of each being preserved. This distinction between the natures is a real distinction, although it is not a major but a minor real distinction, drawn by analogy. Terms after the Incarnation: the question is not about the Word, nor about a man, but about the incarnate Word: how many were the natures in him? two: one and another, of which this one is not that one. nature: a concrete reality manifested in its properties and its proper operations; it is not a matter of concepts or universals, but of what is real and particular. unconfused : there is no confusion of the natures. unchanged: the divine nature remains divine, and the human nature remains human. This does not rule out special gifts bestowed on the human nature; what is asserted is that these are bestowed on the human nature in such a way that it continues to be a true human nature. 33 Lonergan is referring to de Basly’s ‘Theology of the Assumed Man.’ See Jean Galot, Who Is Christ? A Theology of the Incarnation (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981) 330.

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proprietates: sumuntur concrete ex exemplis traditionalibus sive ex scripturis sive ex reflectione super symbola. Vide Tomum Leonis (db 143–44): maiestas, humilitas; virtus, infirmitas; aeternitas, mortalitas; invisibilis, visibilis; incomprehensibilis, comprehendi voluit; Dominus, forma servilis; impassibilis, passibilis; altitudo, humilitas; dignatio, miseratio; Verbo operante quod Verbi est et carne exsequente quod carnis est. salvae: cf. supra, inconfusae et immutatae. distinctio: distincta sunt quorum unum non est aliud; cf. definitionem supra positum circa ‘duo.’ distinctio realis: realiter distincta sunt quorum realitas unius (unum qua reale) non est realitas alterius (aliud qua reale). maior: technice, ubi disincta sunt subsistentia; hac in thesi, res declaratur exemplis, ut maior sit distinctio inter Patrem et Filium, Spiritum sanctum et Ioannem Baptistam, Petrum et Paulum, Stephanum et equum suum.

minor: technice, ubi distincta sunt e quibus componitur vel constituitur unum idemque subsistens; in thesi, adhibetur exempla, v.g., duo oculi eiusdem hominis, anima et corpus eiusdem hominis. analogice dicta: nam agitur de mysterio et omne exemplum claudicat. E.g., in homine anima et corpus uniuntur naturaliter, ut ex duobus resultet una natura, unusque homo, unaque persona; sed in Verbo incarnato divinitas et humanitas remanent duae naturae et tamen una est persona, unaque hypostasis. Quaestio Quae in thesi tertia quaestio posita est iam continuatur, et quidem tam theoretice quam historice. Theoretice: in symbolo Nicaeno praedicantur tum divina tum humana; in thesi tertia statutum est haec dici non de alio et alio sed de una eademque persona, eaque divina; nunc in thesi quarta, sicut exigit non-contradictionis principium, dicimus haec praedicari de eodem quidem sed secundum aliam et aliam naturam, divinam nempe et humanam. Historice: Apollinaristae posuerunt unam personam, unam hypostasin, unam naturam, unam operationem. Contra quos egerunt Antiocheni seu Orientales demonstrando in Christo aliam esse divinam naturam et aliam

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properties : these are taken concretely, either from traditional examples, or from scripture, or from reflection on the creeds. See the ‘Tome’ of Leo (db 143–44, ds 293–95, [dec 1: 77–82]): majesty, lowliness; strength, weakness; eternity, mortality; invisible, visible; ungraspable, he willed to be grasped; Lord, in the form of a servant; impassible, subject to suffering; grandeur, lowliness; dignity, condescension; ‘the Word does what belongs to the Word and the flesh carries out what pertains to the flesh.’ preserved: see the explanations of unconfused and unchanged. distinction: those things are distinct of which one is not the other; see the definition of two above. real distinction: those things are really distinct of which the reality of one (the one as real) is not the reality of another (the other as real). major real distinction: technically, this distinction applies when there are distinct subsistents. In this thesis, the point is made by means of examples, so that there is a major distinction between the Father and the Son, between the Holy Spirit and John the Baptist, between Peter and Paul, or between Stephen and his horse. minor real distinction: technically, this distinction applies when there are distinct components of which one and the same subsistent is composed or constituted. In the thesis, examples are used, for instance, the two eyes of the same man, or his body and his soul. drawn by analogy : we are concerned with a mystery, and every example limps. For instance, in a human being body and soul are naturally united, so that from these two there results one nature, one human being, one person; but in the incarnate Word divinity and humanity continue to be two natures, and there is nevertheless one person, one hypostasis. The question The question posed in thesis 3 is brought forward, both theoretically and historically. Theoretically: The Nicene Creed applies both divine and human predicates, and in thesis 3 it was established that these do not refer to someone and someone else but to one and the same person, and that one a divine person. Now, in thesis 4, as the principle of non-contradiction demands, we say that these are predicated of this same one, but according to different natures, divine and human. Historically: The Apollinarians took the position that there is one person, one hypostasis, one nature, and one operation. The Antiochenes or Ori-

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esse humanam. Qui, cum S. Cyrillus unam personam unamque Christi naturam docuisset, primo quidem eum Apollinarismi esse reum suspicati sunt, sed brevi intellexerunt eum unitatem personae, salva naturarum differentia, praedicare et ideo formulam unionis subsignaverunt. Subortis autem novis controversiis, accusationibus, episcopis depositionibus, concilium Chalcedonense, anno 451, tam duas Christi naturas quam unicam eiusdem personam confitendas esse iussit.

Quo decreto Chalcedonensi, cum intrinseca naturae ratio non sit definita, omnis prorsus obscuritas non est sublata. At de his post sententias enumeratas sub nomine problematis mox tractabimus.

Sententiae Tribus partibus exponuntur: (i) de monophysismo in genere; (ii) de monophysismo severiano; (iii) de sectis et controversiis ex monophysismo severiano ortis. i  monophysismus (in genere) 1 Monophysismi auctores erant ariani et apollinaristae, de quibus vide thesin secundum. His proxime accedunt: (a) Erant qui Verbum in carnem mutatum putabant; cf. canonem 12m, primae synodi Sirmiensis (anno 351, ds 140 can. 11, Hahn, Bibl. d. Symb., § 160, p. 197).1 Qui canon ab Ambrosio ad Apollinaristas refertur (ml 16, 833). Jugie dtc v (10) 1603–1604.

(b) Timotheus, ep. Beryti, apollinarista docuit corpus Christi ante assumptionem seu naturaliter esse nostro corpori consubstantiale, sed post

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entals reacted by demonstrating that the divine nature in Christ is other than the human nature. Because Cyril taught one person and one nature of Christ, they suspected at first that he was guilty of Apollinarianism; but a little later they understood him to be declaring the unity of Christ’s person, the difference of natures being preserved, and hence they subscribed to the Formula of Reunion. Fresh controversies, fresh accusations, and fresh depositions of bishops sprang up, and in 451 the Council of Chalcedon decided that both the two natures of Christ and his one person were to be confessed. Since the Chalcedonian decree does not define what a nature intrinsically is, not all obscurity is altogether abolished. But we shall consider this, under the heading of ‘the problem,’ after [divergent] opinions have been enumerated. Opinions ­The exposition of opinions falls into three parts: (i) monophysitism in general, (ii) the monophysitism of Severus, and (iii) the sects and controversies arising from Severian monophysitism. i  monophysitism (in general) 1 The authors of monophysitism were the Arians and Apollinarians, on whom see thesis 2. Closely allied with them were the following. (a) There were some who claimed that the Word was changed into flesh; see the twelfth canon of the First Synod of Sirmia (351 ad; ds 140, canon 11; Hahn, Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche, § 160, p. 197).1 This canon is referred by Ambrose to the Apollinarians (ml 16, col. 833; [csel 79: 255]). See Jugie, ‘Eutychès et Eutychianisme,’ dtc v (10) 1603–1604. (b) Bishop Timothy of Berytus [Beirut], an Apollinarian, taught that if Christ’s body, prior to its being assumed, was naturally consubstantial with



1 August Hahn, Bibliothek des Symbole und Glaubensregeln der Alten Kirche, 3rd ed., ed. G. Ludwig Hahn with a Foreword by Adolf Harnack (Breslau: F. Morgenstern, 1897; reprint ed., Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1962). The text is cited by page and document numbers.

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assumptionem per unionem cum Verbo esse factum divinum. Lietzmann 277–78; Xiberta, Enchir. 124, § 82.2 2 Gregorius Nyssenus, defendens doctrinam catholicam contra imputationem duorum filiorum ab apollinaristis factam, comparavit humanitatem Christi a divinitate assumptam ad aquae guttam mari immissam. Antirrheti­ cus (mg 45, 1221 d, 1253). Ad Theophilum (mg 45, 1276 c). Ed. Jaeger, 3, 1, 201, 5–10; 223, 6–10; 126, 10–13. Vide T. Camelot, Grillmeier, 1, 235–36.

Quod minus caute dictum est. At alii sensu erroneo comparationibus gravioribus usi sunt. Nam in Libro Heraclidae describuntur: (a) qui docent humanitatem per divinitatem absorberi sicut ferrum per ignem, ut sit non solum una persona sed etiam una essentia (ousia). Nau 21,4 Jugie dtc v (10) 1602. (b) qui docent unam essentiam et Verbi et Verbi incarnati, sicut una essentia est aquae et glaciei. Nau 8–9, 11. Jugie 1604.

3 Cyrillus Alexandrinus, fraudibus apollinaristarum deceptus, adhibuit formulam ‘una natura Dei Verbi incarnata,’ eamque consequenter defendebat; post incarnationem non admisit duas esse naturas in Christo nisi sola contemplatione, solo intellectu; quod tamen eo sensu dixit ut excluderentur duae personae et ut realis divinitas cum reali carne per animam rationalem realem animata agnoscatur. Vide ad Succensum, epistola 2, aco, i, 1, 6, p. 162, 4–9. mg 77, 246 a. 4 Eutyches, ob. post 454. Monachus, archimandrita monasterii Constantinopolitani, magna auctoritate gaudens, plurimumque in re aulica pollens, ‘imperitus senex’ et similia a Leone Magno nominatus, ita doctrinae S. Cyrilli adhaesit et ita a fraudibus apollinistarum deceptus est, ut a Flaviano ep. Constantinopoli-

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our body, still after its being assumed through union with the Word it became divine. See Lietzmann 277–78; Xiberta, Enchiridion 124, § 82.2 2 Gregory of Nyssa, defending the Catholic doctrine against the Apollinarians’ claim that it involved two sons, compared Christ’s humanity, assumed by his divinity, with a drop of water immersed in the sea. See his Antirrhe­ ticus (mg 45, 1221 d – 1223 a, 1235) and Ad Theophilum (mg 45, 1276 c); in Jaeger’s edition, volume 3, 1, 201, 5–10; 223, 6–10; 126, 10–13.3 Also T. Camelot, ‘De Nestorius à Eutychès …,’ in Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, 1, 235–36. This was not putting the matter in a careful way. Others, however, used comparisons that were more serious, with erroneous meaning. The Liber Heraclidis describes the following groups: (a) those who taught that the humanity was absorbed by the divinity as iron is by fire, so that there is not only one person but also one essence (ousia). See Nau 21,4 and Jugie, ‘Eutychès et Eutychianisme,’ dtc 5 (10) 1602; (b) those who taught that both the Word and the incarnate Word have one essence, just as water and ice have one essence. Nau 8–9, 11; Jugie, ‘Eutychès …,’ dtc 5 (10) 1604. 3 Cyril of Alexandria, taken in by the Apollinarians’ forgeries, used the formula ‘one incarnate nature of God the Word’ and afterwards defended it. He did not admit two natures in Christ after the incarnation, except in contemplation only, only in the intellect. What he meant by this, however, was to rule out two persons and to acknowledge real divinity, with real flesh animated by a real rational soul. See his second letter to Succensus, aco, 1, 1, 6, p. 162, lines 4–9; mg 77, 246 a; [Wickham, 92]. 4 Eutyches (d. after 454) Eutyches was a monk and archimandrite of a monastery at Constantinople. He enjoyed great authority and was highly influential at court. Leo the Great called him ‘a silly old man’ and similar names. Eutyches so clung to Cyril’s teaching, and was so deceived by the Apollinarian forgeries, that on



2 For Lietzmann and Xiberta, see above, p. 185, note 6, and p. 183, note 3. 3 On the Jaeger edition of Gregory of Nyssa, see above, p. 187, note 9. 4 For Nau, see above, p. 243.

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tano in synodo Constantinopolitano, 22 novemb. 448, condemnaretur, quia errores Valentini et Apollinaris renovaverit eosque reicere noluerit. Mansi, vi, 748. aco, ii, 1, 1, p. 145, 10. M. Jugie, dtc v (10) 1582–89 (vita), 1589–95 (doctrina); A. Grillmeier, 1, 195–98 de synodo Constantinopolitano, anno 448; T. Camelot, apud Grillmeier, 1, 233–42, de doctrina; H. Bacht, ‘Die Rolle des orientalischen Mönchtums in den kirchen-politischen Auseinandersetzungen um Chalkedon (431–519),’ apud Grillmeier-Bacht, 2, 193–314; G. Bardy, Fliche-Martin, 4, 211–20.5

5 Dioscorus, episcopus Alexandrinus Fragilis pax in formula unionis fundata per condemnationem Eutychis disrupta est. Ipsa condemnatio, quamvis Romae a Leone Magno approbata, non acceptata est vel ab imperatore, Theodosio ii, vel a Dioscoro. Aliae aliis in locis factae sunt accusationes et depositiones. Ab imperatore indicitur concilium generale, Ephesi peragendum inde a 1 aug. 449, sub Dioscoro praeside. Quod concilium multipliciter irregulare nominatur Latrocinium Ephesinum. Eutyches restitutus est; Flavianus, ep. Constantinopolitanus, in exilium depulsus brevi mortuus est; Eusebius Dorylaeus Romam fugit; Ibas Edessenus, Irenaeus Tyrensis, Theodoretus Cyrensis, Domnus Antiochenus condemnati et depositi sunt. Bardy 217–24. Ipse Dioscorus errore apollinaristico infectus non videtur, sed verbis Cyrilli inhaesit, et duas naturas post unionem negavit; in concilio Chalcedonensi propter contumacem absentiam a sessione in qua iudicabatur, depositus est. Bardy 232; Jugie dtc x (20) 2220; aco, ii, 1, 224, 21 – 255, 20; 237, 33 – 238, 3.

6 Monophysismus severianus Etiam nominatur monophysismus syriacus (Lebon)6 et monophysismus verbalis exclusivus (Jugie). Severianus dici potest, uti a Jugie et olim a Leb-

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22 November 448 bishop Flavian of Constantinople condemned him at a synod for reviving the errors of Valentinus and Apollinaris and refusing to reject them. See Mansi, 6, 748; aco, 2, 1, 1, p. 145, line 10. Also: M. Jugie, ‘Eutychès …,’ dtc 5 (10) 1582–89 (for Eutyches’ life) and 1589–95 (his teaching); A. Grillmeier, 1, 195–98, on the synod of 448 at Constantinople; T. Camelot, ‘De Nestorius à Eutychès …,’ in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 233–42, on doctrine; H. Bacht, ‘Die Rolle des orientalischen Mönchtums in den kirchen-politischen Auseinandersetzungen um Chalkedon (431– 519),’ in Grillmeier-Bacht, 2, 193–314; G. Bardy, ‘De l’Acte d’Union à la mort de Proclus,’ in Fliche-Martin, 4, 211–20.5 5 Dioscorus, bishop of Alexandria The condemnation of Eutyches shattered the fragile peace that had rested on the Formula of Reunion. Although Leo the Great approved it at Rome, the condemnation was accepted neither by the emperor, Theodosius ii, nor by Dioscorus. Accusations and depositions were hurled back and forth. A general council was summoned by the emperor, to convene at Ephesus on 1 August 449 with Dioscorus presiding. This council, irregular in many respects, is called the Latrocinium or ‘Robber Council’ of Ephesus. Eutyches was reinstated; bishop Flavian of Constantinople was driven into exile and died soon afterwards; Eusebius of Dorylaeum fled to Rome; Ibas of Edessa, Irenaeus of Tyre, Theodoret of Cyrrhus, and Domnus of Antioch were condemned and deposed. See Bardy, ‘De l’Acte d’Union …’ 217–24. Dioscorus himself seems not to have been infected with Apollinarian error, but he clung to the words of Cyril and denied that there were two natures after the union. On account of his contumacious absence from the session of the Council of Chalcedon at which his case was tried, he was deposed. See Bardy, ‘De l’Acte d’Union …’ 232; Jugie, ‘Monophysisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2220; aco, 2, 1, pp. 224, line 21 – 225, line 20, 237, line 33 – 238, line 3. 6 Severian monophysitism This is also referred to as Syriac monophysitism (Lebon)6 and as exclusively verbal monophysitism (Jugie). It can be called Severian (as it is by



5 For Grillmeier-Bacht, 2, see above, p. 9, note 7; for Fliche-Martin, see above, p. 227, note 17. 6 See the reference two paragraphs below.

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on, ex doctore praecipuo, Severo Antiocheno, ob. 538. Excerpta, Xiberta, Enchir. 531–39. Reicit concilium Chalcedonense tamquam Nestorianum; formulam ‘in duabus naturis’ nullatenus admittit; christologiam in caeteris veram et orthodoxam profitetur, at modo satis contorto cum omnia naturae humanae Christi admittat praeter nomen naturae. Seorsum exponetur haec doctrina propter eius complexitatem atque propter numerum errorum qui inde sunt orti. Momentum huius doctrinae inde maxime apparet quod retinetur et docetur a quattuor ecclesiis dissidentibus: Armeniana gregoriana, dtc i (2) 1888–1968; Aethiopica, dtc v (10) 922–69; Coptica (Aegyptica), dtc x (20) 2251–2306; Syriaca Iacobita, dtc xiv (28) 3017–88. Exponitur: J. Lebon, ‘La christologie du monophysisme syrien,’ Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 425–580; M. Jugie dtc x (20) 2216–51.

7 Neochalcedonismus (a) M. Richard, ‘Le néo-chalcédonisme,’ MélScRel 3 (1946) 156– 61; C. Moeller, ‘Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme en Orient de 451 à la fin du vie siècle,’ Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 637–720; M. Jugie, dtc x (20) 2249– 50, sub nomine monophysismi orthodoxi. (b) Consistit in eo quod simul adhibentur et formulae concilii Chalcedonensis et nonnullae formulae S. Cyrilli verbaliter oppositae. Illustratur per canones (1) Confessionis rectae fidei, anno 551, a Iustiniano imperatore compositae, can. 7 et 9 (mg 86/1, 1015 cd; ml 69, 247 cd); circa hanc confessionem seu expositionem, L. Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 4, 468. Textus etiam habetur apud Mansi, ix, 537–82; analysis, Hefele-Leclercq, 3, 1, 44–56;7 (2) Concilium Constantinopolitanum ii (db 219–20, ds 428–29); Concilium Lateranense (db 258–59, ds 505–506).

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Jugie and, formerly, by Lebon) from the name of its chief teacher, Severus of Antioch (d. 538). For excerpts see Xiberta, Enchiridion 531–39. Severian monophysitism rejects the Council of Chalcedon and Nestorianism alike. In no sense does it admit the formula ‘in two natures.’ In other respects it avows a true and orthodox Christology, though in a rather roundabout way, since everything belonging to Christ’s human nature is admitted except the name ‘nature.’ In view of its complexity and the number of errors that arose from it, Severian monophysitism will be discussed in a separate section below. The importance of this doctrine is best shown by the fact that it is held and taught by four dissenting churches: the Gregorian Armenian church, L. Petit, ‘Arménie,’ dtc 1 (2), 1888–1968; the Ethiopian church, E. Coulbeaux, ‘Éthiope (Église d’),’ dtc 5 (10) 922–69; the Coptic or Egyptian church, M. Jugie, ‘Monophysite (Église Copte)’, dtc 10 (20) 2251–2306; and the Syrian Orthodox or ‘Jacobite’ church, I. Ziodé, ‘Syrienne,’ dtc 14 (28) 3017–88. For discussion see J. Lebon, ‘La christologie du monophysisme syrien,’ Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 425–580; M. Jugie, ‘Monophysisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2216–51. 7 Neochalcedonianism (a) Literature: M. Richard, ‘Le néo-chalcédonisme,’ Mélanges de Science Religieuse 3 (1946) 156–61; C. Moeller, ‘Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme en Orient de 451 à la fin du VIe siècle,’ Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, pp. 637–720; M. Jugie, ‘Monophysisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2249–50, where this is named ‘orthodox monophysitism.’ (b) Neochalcedonianism consists in using, at the same time, both the formula of the council of Chalcedon and some of the verbally opposed formulations of Cyril. Here are two illustrations. (1) Canons 7 and 9 of the Confessio rectae fidei of 551, composed by the emperor Justinian (mg 86/1, 1015 cd; [Schwartz, 150 (92)]; ml 69, 247 cd). On this confession or exposition of faith, see L. Bréhier, ‘Le Concile de Constantinople et la fin du règne de Justinien,’ in Fliche-Martin, 4, p. 468. The text also appears in Mansi, 9, 537–82; analysis in Hefele-Leclercq, Histoire des conciles d’après les documents originaux, 3, 1, 44– 56.7 (2) The canons of the Second Council of Constantinople (db 219–20, ds 428, [dec 1: 117]) and of the Lateran Council (db 258–59, ds 505–506).



7 For Hefele-Leclercq, see above, p. 203, note 4.

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Formula est doctrinae chalcedonensis ubi legitur ‘in duabus naturis’ (db 219, 259, ds 428, 506); formula autem est cyrilliana8 ubi legitur ‘ex duabus naturis,’ ‘unam naturam’ (db 220, 258, ds 429, 505). (c) Momentum theologicum est (1) ut habeatur recta intelligentia nonnullorum documentorum, praecipue concilii Constantinopolitani ii, concilii Lateranensis, et concilii Romani (db 213–28, 254–72, 288, ds 421–38, 500–22, 543, 548); et (2) ut habeatur recta intelligentia circa originem et confusiones quaestionis monotheleticae, de qua in thesi proxima. (d) Neochalcedonismus, uti supra est definitus, non parum ambiguus est. Nam intentio in formulis commiscendis esse potuit vel (1) politica et irenica imperatoris, qui pacem et concordiam in imperio orientali voluit, vel (2) theologica et parum orthodoxa, quasi doctrina chalcedonensis esset incompleta et minus accurata, vel (3) orthodoxa et perplexa quae modum loquendi a S. Cyrillo adhibitum non voluit affirmare antiquatum.

8 Concilium Constantinopolitanum ii (db 213–28, ds 421–38), anno 553 (a) Iustiniani imperatoris, Confessio rectae fidei (mg 86/1, 1014–15, ml 69, 246–47); ubi anno 551 iam fere praeexsistebant canones concilii. Vigilii Papae, Constitutum primum, 23 maio 553 (ml 69, 67–114); Constitutum secundum, 23 Febr. 554 (ml 69, 143–78). (b) Fliche-Martin, iv, 203–10 (Bardy), 437–83 (Bréhier); E. Amann, ‘Les trois chapitres,’ dtc xv (30) 1868–1924; C. Moeller, RevScPhTh 35 (1951) 413–23; Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 687–90. Quibus addi potest tota litteratura circa Theodorum Mopsuestenum, vide F. Sullivan, Anal. Greg.9

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Here the formulation is that of the Chalcedonian doctrine when it reads ‘in two natures’ (db 219, 259, ds 428, 506, [dec 1: 117]); it is Cyril’s,8 however, when it reads ‘from two natures’ and ‘one nature’ (db 220, 258, ds 429, 505, [dec 1: 117–18]). (c) Neochalcedonianism is theologically important (1) for the sake of properly understanding certain documents, especially those of the Second Council of Constantinople, the Lateran Council, and the Council of Rome (db 213–28, 254–72, 288, ds 421–38, [dec 1: 114–22], 500–22, 543, 548), and (2) for the sake of properly understanding the origin and the confusion of the monothelite question, with which the next thesis deals. (d) Neochalcedonianism, as defined above, is not without its ambiguities. For it is possible that the intention behind the mixing of formulations was either (1) the political and irenic intention of the emperor, who wanted peace and concord in the Eastern empire, or (2) a theological and scarcely orthodox intention, as though the Chalcedonian doctrine were incomplete or less than accurate, or (3) an orthodox and puzzled intention, unwilling to say that language used by Cyril was outdated. 8 The Second Council of Constantinople, 553 ad (db 213–28, ds 421–38, [dec 1: 114–22]) (a) The Confessio rectae fidei of the emperor Justinian (mg 86/1, 1014–15, [Schwartz, 148, 150 (90, 92)], ml 69, 246–47); here, in 551, the canons of the council already existed. Pope Vigilius, first constitutum, 23 May 553 (ml 69, 67–114, [csel 35/1: 230–320]); second constitutum, 23 February 554 (ml 69, 143–78). (b) Fliche-Martin, 4, pp. 203–10 (Bardy, ‘De l’Acte d’Union …’), 437–83 (Bréhier, ‘La politique religieuse de Justinien’ and ‘La Concile de Constantinople …’); É. Amann, ‘Les trois chapitres,’ dtc 15 (30) 1868–1924; C. Moeller, ‘Le cinquième concile oecuménique et le magistère ordinaire au vie siècle,’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 35 (1951) 413–23; ‘Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme …,’ Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 687–90. To these may be added the whole literature on Theodore of Mopsuestia; see F. Sullivan, Analecta Gregoriana 82 (1956).9



8 The 1960 and 1961 editions have ‘formula autem est monophysismi severiani’ (‘the formula is Severian monophysite’). 9 See above, p. 11, note 8.

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(c) Canones, db 213–28, ds 421–38, ut opus imperatoris, et ut opus sessionis a R.P. prohibitae, sunt nullius valoris. Constitutum Vigilii expresse non tractat nisi ultimos canones personales (db 224–27, ds 434–37). Traditionaliter omnes canones recipiuntur, sed recenter quaestiones multae et diversae moventur nonnullae satis speculativae, quae hic non sunt diudicandae. Concilium Constantinopolitanum, iii, oecumenicum vi, simpliciter accepit quinque concilia oecumenica (db 290, ds 554), ideoque concilium Constantinopolitanum ii. Cf. db 270, 1464, ds 444, 472, 517, 561, 2530. 9 Kenotici (a) Phil 2.7: ‘exinanivit semetipsum’; ekenoFsen heauton. Unde errores circa relictam naturam divinam fundamentum scripturisticum quaerunt. (b) Ubiquismus lutheranus: omnipraesentia divina attribuitur corpori humano. Vide d’Ales, De Verbo Incarnato, París 1930, p. 169.10 (c) Lutherani intellexerunt ‘formam servi’ non de natura humana assumpta sed de voluntaria privatione attributorum divinorum; unde ulterius docuerunt verum profectum Christi in sapientia et gratia (d’Ales, ibid., 170–71). (d) Saec. xix quibuscumque parum placuit doctrina Chalcedonensis, solutio quaedam in kenosi excogitanda videbatur. Inter anglicanos invocabatur variis modis ad unitatem psychologicam Christi intelligibilem reddendam (d’Ales 171–72; Lawton, Conflict in Christology 111–64). (e) Sub aspectu biblico, exegetico, historico, P. Henry, art. ‘Kenose,’ dbs.11 ii  monophysismus severianus. cf. i, 6 supra. 1 J. Lebon, Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 425–580; M. Jugie, dtc x (20) 2216–51. Ex-

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(c) The canons in db 213–28, ds 421–38, [dec 1: 114–22], as the work of the emperor and the work of a session prohibited by the pope, have no value. The constitutum of Vigilius expressly treats only the final, personal canons (db 224–27, ds 434–37, [dec 1: 119–22]). All the canons have traditionally been received, although lately a number of different questions, some of them quite speculative, have been raised which will not be decided here. The sixth ecumenical council, the Third Council of Constantinople, simply accepted five ecumenical councils (db 290, ds 554, [dec 1: 127]), and thus accepted the Second Council of Constantinople. See db 270, 1464, ds 444, 472, 517, 561, 2530. 9 Kenoticists (a) According to Philippians 2.7, Christ ‘emptied himself,’ heauton eke­ noFsen. In this text kenoticists have sought a scriptural basis for errors concerning the divine nature that was left behind. (b) The ‘ubiquitarianism’ of Luther and some of his followers attributes divine omnipresence to Christ’s human body. See d’Alès, De Verbo incarnato (Paris, 1930) 169.10 (c) The Lutherans understood ‘the form of a servant’ [in Philippians 2.7] as referring, not to the human nature that Christ assumed, but to his voluntary deprivation of divine attributes; hence they taught, further, that Christ truly grew in wisdom and grace (d’Alès 170–71). (d) In the nineteenth century, it seemed to those who were unhappy with the Chalcedonian doctrine that a solution could be thought out in terms of kenosis or ‘emptying.’ Among Anglicans, kenosis was invoked in various ways in order to restore to Christ an intelligible psychological unity. See d’Alès, De Verbo incarnato 171–72; J.S. Lawton, Conflict in Christology 111–64. (e) For the biblical, exegetical, and historical aspects see P. Henry, ‘Kenose,’ dbs.11 ii  severian monophysitism. cf. i, 6 above. 1 Literature: J. Lebon, ‘La Christologie du monophysisme syrien,’ in Grill-

10 Adhemar d’Alès, De Verbo incarnato (Paris: Beauchesne, 1930). 11 See above, p. 125, note 7.

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cerpta, Xiberta, Enchir. 521–25, 531–39.12 J. Lebon, ad quem remittemus paginas indicando, totam doctrinam in magnis quibusdam doctoribus esse contentam, ibique potius quam in posterioribus expositionibus minus completis examinandam esse censuit (425–27). Inter ipsos magnos distinguit: magis communiter scripserunt Timotheus Aelurus (ob. 477) et Philoxenus (Akhsenaya) de Mabboug (ob. 523); magis systematice Severus Antiochenus (ob. 538); quos tamen omnes iudicat eandem proposuisse doctrinam.

2 Quae quidem doctrina in eo est (1) ut fideliter conservetur traditio catholica, imo ipse modus cogitandi atque loquendi a S. Cyrillo Alexandrino adhibitus, (2) ut cohaerenter ad novas quaestiones solvendas evolvatur haec doctrina, et (3) ut reiciatur concilium Chalcedonense quod contra S. Cyrillum duas naturas post unionem in Christo agnovisse dicitur.

3 Theologia dividitur in sermonem de Essentia (De Deo Uno et Trino) et sermonem de Oeconomia (De Verbo Incarnato); scilicet, ubi nos de Christo ut Deo et de Christo ut homine loquimur, ii de Christo secundum naturam (i.e. divinam) et de Christo secundum oeconomiam locuti sunt.

4 Assumpta humanitas, quamvis alia et secunda natura nullatenus nominetur, et concipitur et declaratur perfecta, nostrae consubstantialis, ex anima et corpore composita (435). Agnoscuntur ergo ab iis duplex Filii generatio, duplex nativitas, duplex consubstantialitas; quarum prima generatio, etc., Filio est naturalis, altera autem non naturalis est sed voluntaria (438–39).

5 Termini ousia, hupostasis, huparxis, phusis, prosoFpon, dicunt realitatem concretam exsistentem;

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meier-Bacht, 1, 425–580; M. Jugie, ‘Monophysisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2216–51. Excerpts in Xiberta, Enchiridion 521–25, 531–39.12 J. Lebon (whose article, cited above, we refer to by page number in what follows) considers that the whole doctrine is contained in certain of its chief teachers, and that it should be examined in their expositions rather than in later, less complete ones (425–27). Among these chief teachers he distinguishes between, on the one hand, Timothy Aelurus (‘the Weasel’; d. 477) and Philoxenus (Akhsenaya) of Mabbug (d. 523), who wrote in a more commonsense manner, and on the other hand Severus of Antioch (d. 538), who was more systematic. In Lebon’s judgment, however, all three present the same doctrine. 2 That doctrine is put forth (1) so that Catholic tradition may be faithfully preserved, including especially the modes of thought and speech used by Cyril of Alexandria; (2) so that this doctrine might be developed in order to answer new questions in a coherent fashion; and (3) so that the Council of Chalcedon, which is said to have contradicted Cyril by acknowledging two natures in Christ after the union, may be rejected. 3 Theology is divided into discourse ‘on the Essence’ (taking in the treatises on God as One and God as Three) and discourse ‘on the Economy’ (The Incar­ nate Word). That is, where we speak of Christ as God and of Christ as man, the Severian monophysites speak of Christ according to his (divine) nature and of Christ according to the economy. 4 The assumed humanity, although in no way called another, second nature, is both conceived and stated to be perfect, consubstantial with us, and composed of body and soul (435). Therefore, the Severian monophysites acknowledge a twofold generation of the Son, a twofold birth, and a twofold consubstantiality; of these, the first generation, birth, and consubstantiality are natural, while the second generation, birth, and consubstantiality are not natural but voluntary (438–39). 5 The terms ousia, hypostasis, hyparxis, physis, and prosoFpon all denote concrete, existing reality. 12 An English translation of the correspondence between Sergius and Severus is now available in Christology after Chalcedon: Severus of Antioch and Sergius the Monophysite, ed. Iain R. Torrance (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1998).

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hupostasis, prosoFpon magis attendunt ad aspectum differentiae, individualitatis, proprii (eidos, hupokeimenon, idion); ousia magis attendit ad aspectum communem (genos); huparxis, phusis duplici modo adhibentur, vel ut ousia, vel ut hupostasis. Quae definitiones non ex schola philosophica neque ex proprio ingenio sed ex scripturis, Athanasio, Basilio per investigationem positivam determinantur et sedulo observantur (454–61). 6 Unde perfecte synonyma sunt phusis, hupostasis, prosoFpon; et ideo doctrina chalcedonensis necessario est, secundum eos, nestoriana; dicit et re vera intendit duas naturas; dicit sed modo nestoriano intelligit unam personam (461–65). Agnoscunt, explicite uti videtur, quod alia est terminologia trinitaria et alia christologica; in re trinitaria secundum Patres alio sensu dicitur hyposta­ sis et alio sensu dicitur ousia seu phusis; quod tamen in christologia non est admittendum (465). Tot adhibent terminos in eodem sensu quia adversariis resistendum est (465). 7 Affirmant unionem (henoFsis) esse hypostaticam, naturalem, secundum hypostasin, secundum naturam, secundum compositionem (sunthesin). Sensus est quod terminus unionis est una hypostasis atque una natura (467–73). Quae compositio (sunthesis, etiam sundromeF, sumbasis, sunodos) nullam prorsus confusionem vel commixtionem inducit; in eo enim consistit quod componentia exsistentiam propriam et separatam (idiosustatoFs) non habent (473, 475). 8 Docent ‘unam naturam Dei Verbi incarnatam.’ Ubi ‘una natura’ est ipsa Verbi divinitas (481), ubi ‘incarnata’ dicitur secundum oeconomiam (481–82). 9 Reiciunt ‘in duabus naturis’ tamquam Nestorianum (491–96), sed admittunt antiquos Patres ita locutos esse de duabus naturis post incarnationem, ut duae ‘sola contemplatione,’ ‘solo intellectu,’ ‘sola theoria,’ agnoscerentur (497–509). Similiter, affirmant ‘ex duabus naturis,’ ubi sensus est idem ac ‘duae na­ turae sola contemplatione’ (527).

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With hypostasis and prosoFpon there is greater emphasis on the aspect of difference, individuality, and property (eidos, hypokeimenon, idion). With ousia there is greater emphasis on the common aspect (genos). As for hyparxis and physis, there were two usages, one in line with ousia and the other in line with hypostasis. What determined these definitions, which were carefully observed, was neither a philosophical school nor their own originality; it was a studious investigation of scripture, Athanasius, and Basil (454–61). 6 Thus physis, hypostasis, and prosoFpon were completely synonymous. To the Severians, therefore, the Chalcedonian doctrine could only be Nestorian. It speaks of two natures and really means this; it speaks of one person but understands it in a Nestorian way (461–65). They acknowledge, explicitly it seems, that there is a difference between Trinitarian and Christological terminology; according to the Fathers, hy­ postasis is used differently, in regard to the Trinity, from ousia or physis; in Christology, however, this was not to be admitted (465). They used so many terms in the same sense as a way of resisting adversaries (465). 7 They affirmed the union (henoFsis) to be hypostatic, natural, on the basis of hypostasis, on the basis of nature, on the basis of composition (synthesis). The sense is that the term of the union is one hypostasis and one nature (467–73). This composition (synthesis, also syndromeF, symbasis, synodos) does not in any way bring about a confusion or mixture; it consists in this, that the components have no proper and separate (idiosystatoFs) existence (473, 475).

8 The Severians teach ‘one incarnate nature of God the Word.’ Here the ‘one nature’ is the very divinity of the Word (481), and ‘incarnate’ is used in an economic sense (481–82). 9 They reject the formula ‘in two natures’ as Nestorian (pp. 491–96), but admit that the older Fathers spoke in this way of two natures after the Incarnation, and so acknowledge two [natures] ‘in contemplation only,’ ‘in the intellect only,’ ‘in theory only’ (pp. 497–509). Likewise, they affirm the formula ‘from two natures,’ where the sense is the same as that of ‘two natures in contemplation only’ (527).

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10 Unio hypostatica: Verbum quod est simplex secundum naturam factum est compositum secundum oeconomiam; caro per animam rationalem animata non secundum se in propria hypostasi (kath eauteFn en idiai hupostasei) constituta est sed ad Verbum subsistit; simul caro et ad exsistentiam venit et cum ipsa subsistentia obtinuit unionem (533–34). 11 Proprietates (idion, idioteFs) Alio sensu admittunt, alio sensu negant duo genera proprietatum in Christo post incarnationem. Non admittunt alias esse proprietates quae ad divinam naturam referuntur et alias quae ad humanam naturam referuntur; ubi tamen ‘natura’ intelligitur quae propria exsistentia exsistat (idiosustatoFs); hoc enim sensu duas naturas recte negant, neque ullo alio sensu nomen naturae admittunt (535–36). Admittuntur tamen differri quae dicuntur idioteFs phusikeF, idioteFs heF kata phusin, idioteFs hoFs en poioteFti phusikeFi, diaphora hoFs en poioteFti phusikeFi; scilicet, proprietas physica, proprietas secundum naturam, proprietas ut in qualitate naturali, differentia ut in qualitate naturali; quae verba eodem sensu adhibetur (537–38). Quarum proprietatum definitio est ratio quemadmodum sit (ho logos tou poFs einai). Earum differentia docetur quia docetur Filius et vere consubstantialis Patri et vere consubstantialis nobis, quia differentia naturarum non tollitur, quia unio hypostatica seu naturalis non inducit ullam naturarum confusionem vel commixtionem, quia proprietates divinae manent divinae, humanae remanent humanae, neque mutuo sunt consubstantialia (homoou­ sia) sed specifice diversa (heteroeideF) (536–42). Ad opinionem Sergii Grammatici quod, sicut una asseritur natura ex duabus naturis, ita etiam una asserenda est proprietas ex duabus proprietatibus (548), Severus respondet non duas sed multas esse proprietates, neque quamquam ex proprietatibus componi (549–50). Sub nomine proprietatum intelliguntur non solum qualitates sed etiam attributa et facultates. Omnes admittuntur secundum singulorum differentias. Omnes ad unum subiectum referuntur; neque ullo modo licet eas inter duas naturas dividere et distribuere; e contra, proprietates carnis sunt dicendae de Verbo, et proprietates Verbi de carne, secundum communicationem idiomatum (550–52).

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10 As for a hypostatic union: the Word, which is simple by nature, became composite in the economy; the flesh animated by a rational soul was not constituted by itself, in its own hypostasis (kath’ heauteFn en idiai hypostasei), but subsists in the Word; at the same moment, the flesh came into existence and, with its very subsisting, obtained union (533–34). 11 Properties (idion, idioteFs) In one sense the Severians admit, while in another sense they deny, two sorts of properties in Christ after the Incarnation. They do not admit a difference between properties which refer to the divine nature and those which refer to the human nature. Here, however, ‘nature’ is understood as that which exists in its own existence (idiosustatoFs); in this sense they rightly deny two natures, and there was no other sense of the word ‘nature’ that they would admit (535–36). They did, however, admit that something different is denoted by idioteFs phusikeF (natural property), idioteFs heF kata phusin (property on the basis of nature), idioteFs hoFs en poioteFti phusikeFi (property as in natural quality), and diaphora hoFs poioteFti phusikeFi (difference as in natural quality). These terms are all used in the same sense (537–38). Such properties are defined as ‘the reason for how something is’ (ho logos tou poFs einai). They are held to be different because the Son is held to be truly consubstantial with the Father and truly consubstantial with us, because the difference of natures is not taken away, because a hypostatic or natural union does not entail any confusion or mixture of natures, and because the divine properties remain divine and the human properties human, these properties being specifically diverse (heteroeideF), not mutually consubstantial (homoousia) (536–42). Severus’s reply to the opinion of Sergius the Grammarian – which was that just as there is said to be one nature from two natures, so too it should be asserted that there is one property from two properties (548) – was that the properties are not two but many, and they are not composed of [other] properties (pp. 549–50). By the word ‘property’ the Severians understand not only qualities but also attributes and faculties. All are admitted as differing each from the others. All refer to one subject; in no way may they be divided and distributed between two natures; on the contrary, the properties of the flesh are to be referred to the Word, and the properties of the Word to the flesh, in keeping with the communicatio idiomatum or ‘interchange of propeties’ (550–52).

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12 Operatio Distinguuntur: operans (ho energoFn), operatio (energeia), operatum (ener­ geFthen). Operans est unus, nempe, una hypostasis et una natura. Operatio est motus operatorius (kineFsis energeFtikeF)13 qui concipitur tamquam intermedius inter operantem et operatum. Similiter intermedia est vis volendi (hormeF tou thelein). Sicut operans est unus, ita etiam operatio est una. Sicut operans est una natura (hupostasis) incarnata, composita, theandrica, ita etiam operatio dicitur una operatio incarnata, composita, theandrica (mia energeia ses­ arkoFmeneF, sunthetos, theandrikeF). Sicut poni non possunt duae operationes intermediae quin ponantur duo operantia, doctrina Tomi Leonis (db 143– 44, ds 293–95) reicitur ut Nestoriana. Aliis verbis, hi auctores agnoscunt unum ens-quod et unum principium-quod, sed cogitare non possunt vel ens-quo vel principium-quo, et ideo duo principia-quibus unde procedunt duae operationes cogitare non possunt.

At quamvis unus sit operans et una sit operatio, diversa sunt operata seu opera. Non divinitatis est ambulare, comedere, etc., sicut neque humanitatis est miracula patrare (553–58). Eadem de operationibus doctrina minus subtiliter ante Severum a Timotheo et Philoxeno proposita est (543–44). 13 Voluntas Ordinaria doctrina est unam esse voluntatem Christi. Ita Philoxenus anathematizavit eos qui dicunt vel duos filios, vel duas hypostases, vel duas voluntates, vel duas naturas, alium Deum et alium hominem (563). Severus

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12 Operation The following are distinguished: the operator (ho energon), the operation (energeia), and the operated (energeFthen). The operator is one – the one hypostasis and one nature. The operation is the operatory movement (kineFsis energeFtikeF),13 conceived as intermediary between the operator and the operated. Similarly intermediate is the ‘power of willing,’ hormeF tou thelein. As the operator is one, so too the operation is one. As the operator is one incarnate, composite, and theandric nature (hypostasis), so too the operation is said to be one incarnate, composite, theandric operation (mia energeia sesarkoFmeneF, synthetos, theandrikeF). As it cannot be held that there are two intermediate operations without positing two operators, the teaching of the ‘Tome’ of Leo (db 143–44, ds 293–95, [dec 1: 78–79]) is rejected as Nestorian. In other words, these authors acknowledge one being which [operates] and one principle which [operates], but they were unable to think either of a being by which [it operates] or of a principle by which [it operates]. Therefore, they could not think of two principles by which, whence proceed two operations. Yet while there is one operator and one operation, what is operated, the works, are different. Walking, eating, and the like do not belong to divinity, just as performing miracles does not belong to humanity (553–58). The same doctrine regarding operations was proposed less subtly before Severus by Timothy and Philoxenus (543–44). 13 Will The usual teaching [of the Severians] is that Christ has one will. Thus, Philoxenus anathematized those who taught either two sons, or two hypostases, or two wills, or two natures, one of them God and the other man 13 In his 1959 notes on ‘System and History’ Lonergan uses ‘operatorius’ and ‘operatoria’ in a sense that he explicitly distinguishes from ‘operativus’ in the Scholastic sense of ‘operative habit’ and also from ‘operational’ in the sense of individual ‘operations’ or, in Insight’s terms, conjugate acts. It is interesting that in all three versions of De Verbo incarnato (1960, 1961, and 1964) the word ‘operatorius’ appears here. The editors opt to translate it ‘operatory,’ as was done in translating the notes on ‘System and History.’ Lonergan is here anticipating the later doctrine of ‘two operations and two wills,’ where by ‘operations’ is not meant individual acts but ‘motus operatorii.’ See Bernard Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method 2, vol. 23 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013) 301 n. 75.

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ad Prosdokion tenet secundum patres unicam esse voluntatem Christi (563). At idem Severus agnoscit Patres esse locutos de duabus voluntatibus sicut et de duabus naturis et duabus operationibus; quem tamen modum loquendi censet propter Nestorianismi periculum iam esse omittendum (563). Imo, ipse agnoscit in Christo agonizante duos volendi actus, duo obiecta horum actuum, nempe, calicis acceptationem et reiectionem. Sed prorsus excludit sicut duos volentes ita etiam duo volendi principia. Unicum principium est principium quod, et ipsa carnis fragilitas est voluntaria et electa ab eodem subiecto quod fragilitatem patitur (563–65). iii  controversiae et sectae e monophysismo severiano ortae 1 Theopaschitismus. dtc x (20) 2237–41 (M. Jugie); xv (29) 505–12 ( É. Amann); Lebon, Grillmeier, 1, 569–75. Vere in carne humana passus est Christus qui est persona divina et naturam habet divinam (db 201, 222, ds 401, 432). Expressiones huius veritatis possunt esse vel adaequatae, vel non falsae sed ad errorem vergentes, vel simpliciter falsae (divina enim natura impassibilis est). Ubi non agnoscitur nisi una natura; ubi in veritate insistitur ad doctrinam monophysiticam modo singulari declarandam; facile oriuntur errores tum inter ipsos monophysitas minus doctos, tum in interpretatione a catholicis facta, tum in interpretatione posteriorum sive theologorum in historia parum peritorum sive historicorum in theologia parum peritorum.

2 Henotici et Acephali Encyclica a Basilisco imperatore anno 475 emissa est; ordinavit solam regulam fidei esse symbolum Nicaenum; etiam acceptari concilium Constantinopolitanum i et duo concilia Ephesina (431, 449) ; excludi tamen concilium Chalcedonense et Tomum Leonis. M. G. Bardy (Fliche-Martin, 4) 285;14 Evagrius, Hist. Eccl., iii, iv (mg 86/2, 2597–2607). Xiberta, Enchir. 518–19.

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(563). In a letter to Prosdokios, Severus holds that according to the Fathers Christ’s was a single will (563). Yet Severus at the same time admits that the Fathers did speak of two wills, as they spoke of two natures and two operations. Because of the danger of Nestorianism, however, he considers that this manner of speaking should be dropped (563). Indeed, he himself acknowledges two acts of willing in Christ’s agony, and two objects of those acts, namely, the acceptance and the rejection of the cup. But as he utterly rules out two wills, so too he rules out two principles of willing. The sole principle is the principle which, and the frailty of the flesh is itself voluntary, chosen by the same subject that suffers frailty (563–65). iii  controversies and sects arising from severian monophysitism 1 On theopaschitism, see dtc 10 (20) 2237–41 (M. Jugie, ‘Monophysisme’), 15 (29) 505–12 (É. Amann, ‘Théopaschite’); Lebon, ‘La Christologie du monophysisme syrien,’ in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 569–75. Christ, who is a divine person and has a divine nature, truly suffered in human flesh (db 201, 222, ds 401, 432, [dec 1: 118]). Expressions of this truth can be adequate; they can border on error without being false; or they can be simply false, since the divine nature is impassible. When only one nature is acknowledged and the truth is pursued along such lines as to frame the monophysite teaching in one particular way, errors easily arise. They arise among the less well schooled monophysites themselves; they arise in the interpretations made by Catholics; they arise in the later interpretations of theologians ill instructed in history and of historians ill instructed in theology. 2 Henoticists and acephaloi In the year 475 the emperor Basiliscus issued an encyclical ordering that the only rule of faith was to be the Nicene Creed. The First Council of Constantinople and the two Councils of Ephesus (431 and 449) were also accepted, but the Council of Chalcedon and the ‘Tome’ of Leo were ruled out. See M.G. Bardy, ‘Les luttes christologiques après le Concile de Chalcedon,’ (Fliche-Martin, 4) 285;14 Evagrius, Ecclesiastica Historia, iii, iv

14 Lonergan gave 475 as the page number, but 285 is correct.

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Henoticon, auctore Acacio patr. Constantinopolitano, a Zenone imperatore anno 482 emissa est; ordinavit solam regulam fidei esse symbolum Nicaenum; acceptari xii anathematismos Cyrilli Alexandrini; non acceptari vel concilium Chalcedonense vel aliud quodlibet concilium. Bardy, 290 ss. Evagrius, iii, xiv, mg 86/2, 2620–21. Xiberta, Enchir. 519–20. A Felice iii, P. R. in synodo romana, 77 epp., 28 iulio 484, depositus est Acacius; unde schisma Acacii, quod finitum est 28 martis 519 sub S. Hormisda, R. P. Vide L. Bréhier (Fliche-Martin, iv), p. 427–29. L. Salaville, dtc vi (12) 2153–78. Henotici erant monophysitae qui Henoticon acceptarunt; acephali autem erant monophysitae magis fanatici qui praeteritione c. Chalcedonensis non contenti etiam positivam et expressam eius damnationem exigebant; dicebantur acephali quia episcopi suas partes contra imperatorem non sustinerent. dtc x (20) 2241 (M. Jugie).

3 Gaianitae Sic nominantur a primo eorum episcopo, Gaiano; etiam dicuntur iulianistae quia Iulianus Halicarnassi eorum magnus erat theologus; aphthartodocetae et phantasiastae ab adversariis et aliis qui eorum doctrinam non intellexerunt; nagranitae ob causam ignotam.

Docuerunt Christum hominem in vita terrestri naturaliter esse impassibilem, incorruptibilem, immortalem, sed saepe per miraculum esse passum et de facto esse mortuum. Orti initio saeculi vi; scripsit Iulianus c. 518, et impugnatus est a Severo Antiocheno. dtc vi (11) 999–1023 (M. Jugie); viii (16) 1931–40 (R. Draguet); v (10) 1608 et x (20) 2242 (M. Jugie). Excerpta, Xiberta, Enchir. 528–30.

Aktistitae ulterius procedentes negaverunt corpus Christi esse creatum: dtc x (20) 2242 (M. Jugie). Agnoetae, quo clarius distinguerentur divina et humana, affirmaverunt ignorantiam in Christo homine durante vita mortali; orti circa annum 540 a

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(mg 86/2, 2597–2607, [Bidez-Parmentier, 100–101 (see Bibliography)]); Xiberta, Enchiridion 518–19. The Henoticon, written by Acacius, patriarch of Constantinople, was issued by the emperor Zeno in 482. It ordered that the only rule of faith was to be the Nicene Creed; it accepted Cyril of Alexandria’s Twelve Anathemas; it did not accept either the Council of Chalcedon or any other council whatever. See Bardy, ‘Les luttes …’ 290–92; Evagrius, 3, xiv (mg 86/2, 2620–21, [Bidez-Parmentier, 111–12]; Xiberta, Enchiridion 519–20. Acacius was deposed by Pope Felix iii at a synod attended by 77 bishops, held in Rome on 28 July 484. Hence arose the Acacian schism, which was brought to an end by pope Hormisdas on 28 March 519. See L. Bréhier, ‘Justin et la rétablissement de l’orthodoxie en Orient’ (Fliche-Martin, 4) 427–29; L. Salaville, ‘Hénotique,’ dtc 6 (12) 2153–78. The henoticists were those Monophysites who accepted the Henoticon. The acephaloi were the more extreme Monophysites who were not content with ignoring the Council of Chalcedon but demanded as well a positive and explicit condemnation of it. They were called acephaloi, ‘leaderless,’ because the bishops did not support their stand against the emperor. See M. Jugie, ‘Monophysisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2241. 3 Gaianites This party took its name from their first bishop, Gaianus; they were also called Julianists after Julian of Halicarnassus, their chief theologian. Their opponents, and others who did not understand their doctrine, called them aphthartodocetists, teachers of the incorruptibility of Christ’s body, and phan­ tasiastae, teachers of a merely apparent body of Christ; they were called Nagranitae for reasons unknown. Their teaching was that Christ the man in his earthly life was naturally impassible, incorruptible, and immortal, but that by a miracle he suffered and in fact died. They arose at the beginning of the sixth century; Julian wrote around 518, and was condemned by Severus of Antioch. See M. Jugie, ‘Gaianites,’ dtc 6 (11) 999–1023, R. Draguet, ‘Julien d’Halicarnasse,’ dtc 8 (16) 1931–40, M. Jugie, ‘Eutychès et Eutychianisme,’ dtc 5 (10) 1608 and ‘Monophysisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2242. For excerpts see Xiberta, Enchiridion 528–30. The aktistites went further, denying that Christ’s body was created. See dtc 10 (20) 2242 (M. Jugie, ‘Monophysisme’). The agnoetae, for whom the divine and the human were more clearly distinguished, affirmed ignorance on the part of Christ the man during his

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Themistio Alexandrino, diacono Theodosii patriarchi Alexandriae. Ibid., 2242–43. Xiberta, Enchir. 539. Neobitae, a Stephano Niobe nominati, c. annum 570, problema resol­ verunt negando differentiam naturarum post unionem. 4 Sergius Grammaticus (Xiberta, Enchir. 525–27) Sicut una natura ex duabus naturis dicebatur, ita etiam unam proprietatem e duabus proprietatibus dicendam esse censuit. Quam unam proprietatem voluit commixtam, divino-humanam, minime tamen confusam. Lebon, Grillmeier, 1, 474, 548; Jugie, dtc v (10) 1605–1606. Ita interdum loqui videtur Ps.-Dionysius de una quadam operatione theandrica, quem Jugie exculpat (ibid. 1606). 5 Tritheistae Negatio distinctionis inter ousian seu phusin et hupostasin transfertur ex christologia in doctrinam trinitariam; unde ortus est tritheismus quidam, uti videtur, verbalis. Scripsit Ioannes Philoponus et variae ortae sunt sectae. Excerpta, Xi­ berta, Enchir. 543–45. M. Jugie, dtc x (20) 2243–48, et 2248–51. G. Bardy, dtc viii (15) 831–39. Problema 1 Duplex erat problema: (1) circa realia, (2) circa distincta.

2 Circa realia non erat problema serium. Paucis enim exceptis, iisque minoris auctoritatis, omnino constabat unum eundemque esse Christum, perfectum Deum, et perfectum hominem ex anima rationali et corpore. Haec enim habebantur (1) reiecto apollinarismo, (2) reiecto nestorianismo, (3) acceptata formula unionis (db 5003, ds 272–73).

3 Circa distincta erat problema gravissimum, nam agebatur de distinctione quae tunc temporis non clare concipiebatur, nempe, de distinctione in thesi enuntiata, reali, minori, analogice dicta.

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mortal life. They were founded around the year 540 by Themistius of Alexandria, deacon to the patriarch Theodosius. See Jugie, ‘Monophysisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2242–43; Xiberta, Enchiridion 539. The Neobites, named for Stephen Niobis, solved the problem around the year 570 by denying a difference of natures after the union. 4 Sergius the Grammarian (Xiberta, Enchiridion 525–27). It was his view that just as there was said to be one nature from two natures, so also it should be said that there is one property from two properties. He would have it that this one property is mixed, divine-human, yet not at all confused. See Lebon in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 474, 548; Jugie, ‘Eutychès et Eutychianisme,’ dtc 5 (10) 1605–1606. Thus, on occasion Pseudo-Dionysius seems to speak of one theandric operation; Jugie exonerates him of this (ibid. 1606). 5 Tritheists The denial of a distinction between ousia or physis and hypostasis was taken over from Christology into Trinitarian doctrine, and as a result there arose a tritheism which seems to have been verbal. The writings of John Philoponos gave rise to various sects. For excerpts, see Xiberta, Enchiridion 543–45; M. Jugie, ‘Monophysisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2243–48 and 2248–51; G. Bardy, ‘Jean Philopon,’ dtc 8 (15) 831–39. The Problem 1 The problem was twofold: it concerned (1) what is real and (2) what is distinct. 2 With regard to what is real, the problem was not serious. With few exceptions, and those of no great authority, it was quite clearly maintained that one and the same was Christ, true God, and true man with body and rational soul. For that is what follows from (1) rejecting Apollinarianism, (2) rejecting Nestorianism, and (3) accepting the Formula of Reunion (db 5003, ds 272–73, [dec 1: 69–70]). 3 With regard to what is distinct, the problem was grave indeed, since what was at stake was a distinction that was not, at the time, clearly conceived – the real, minor, analogically drawn distinction set out in the present thesis.

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(a) In formula unionis legebatur ‘duarum enim naturarum unitas facta est’ (db 5003, ds 272). (b) Eutyches, Dioscorus, ep. Alexandrinus, et caeteri qui nomen S. Cyrilli invocabant dixerunt: Christus est ex duabus naturis, sed facta unione, non iam sunt duae sed una tantum; una est natura Dei Verbi incarnata. (c) Leo Magnus, caeteri orientales, censebant: una est persona in duabus naturis; facta enim unione, manent naturae inconfusae, immutatae; per unionem differentia naturarum non tollitur; post unionem, salvae manent proprietates utriusque naturae, ideoque post unionem manent duae naturae. 4 Haec positio Chalcedonensis vera quidem erat sed consequentiam implicabat quae eo tempore haud cognoscebatur. Si enim una persona est in duabus naturis, necessario habetur natura quin eo ipso habeatur persona eius naturae. Unde ulterius sequitur distinctio realis minor inter quod est (persona) et quo est (natura, phusis anupostaton). Quae quidem distinctio (1) involvit quaestiones dogmaticas in quaestionibus metaphysicis, (2) facta est saeculo sexto subsequenti, neque solummodo ab orthodoxis (cf. Confessionem rectae fidei, ab Iustiniano imperatore compositam, mg 86/1, 1011; Xiberta, Enchir. 564, § 54), sed etiam a monophysitis (vide Sententias, ii, 7 et 10), sed (3) tunc temporis non clare agnita fuisse videtur. 5 Unde sequuntur multa et diversa quae numeris subsequentibus seorsum exponemus. 6 Primo, quia dogma per quaestiones metaphysicas complicatum est, iam per se finitur aetas patristica et incipit aetas scholastica. Vide lamentationes C. Moeller circa scholasticismum byzantinum, Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 637– 720.15 Sed de facto ex hoc tempore magis magisque distinguuntur episcopi et theologi: episcopi dicunt, Est, Est, et Non, Non, secundum Mt 5.37; sed theologi investigant quaenam sit quaestio et quid sequeretur ex affirma-

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(a) The Formula of Reunion states that ‘a union of two natures has taken place’ (db 5003, ds 272–73, [dec 1: 69–70]). (b) Eutyches, bishop Dioscorus of Alexandria, and others who invoked Cyril’s name said: Christ is from two natures; but, the union having taken place, there are no longer two but only one; there is one incarnate nature of the Word of God. (c) Leo the Great and others of the Orientals held the following. There is one person in two natures; the union having taken place, the natures remain, unconfused and unchanged; the union does not take away the difference of natures; after the union, the properties of each nature are preserved, and therefore after the union two natures remain. 4 This was the true, Chalcedonian position, but it implies a consequence that was scarcely recognized at the time. For if there is one person in two natures, there must be a nature without the corresponding person. Hence there follows further the real minor distinction between that which is (a person) and that by which it is (a nature [without hypostasis], physis any­ postaton). Such a distinction (1) involves dogmatics in metaphysical questions. (2) It was drawn in the subsequent sixth century, and drawn not only by those who were orthodox (see the Confessio rectae fidei, written by the emperor Justinian, mg 86/1, 1011, [Schwartz, 146 (88)]; Xiberta, Enchiridion 564, § 54) but also by the monophysites (see ‘Opinions,’ ii, 7 and 10), although (3) it does not seem to have been clearly recognized at the time. 5 Hence there arose a number of different matters, treated separately in the following items. 6 In the first place, the complication of dogma owing to [its involvement in] metaphysical questions marks the end of the patristic era as such and the beginning of the Scholastic era. See C. Moeller’s complaints about Byzantine Scholasticism in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 637–720.15 But the fact is that from this period onwards bishops and theologians become more and more different. Bishops are saying ‘Yes, yes’ and ‘No, no,’ in keeping with Mat-

15 See above, p. 263.

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tione vel negatione. Unde scripsit Augustinus qua episcopus; sed Aquinas episcopus non erat et tamen Doctor communis habetur.

7 Deinde alius est ordo inventionis et alius est ordo doctrinae. Vide Divi­ narum personarum 20–27, De Deo trino, Pars systematica, pp. 33–41.16 In ordine inventionis habentur (1) assertio explicita divinitatis contra arianos, (2) assertio explicita animae humanae Christi contra apollinaristas, (3) assertio explicita unius personae eiusque divinae contra nestorianos, (4) assertio explicita duarum naturarum contra monophysitas, et (5) post centum annos initium explicationis quo sensu dici possunt duae naturae. Quo in ordine inventionis accumulantur vera et deinde fiunt explicationes; ita (1) – (4) sunt assertiones, sed (5) est explicatio. Qui quidem ordo inventionis etiam est ordo historicus evolutionis dogmaticae. At alius etiam est ordo qui doctrinae, explicationis, syntheseos dicitur. Qui quidem ordo tunc incipit quando explicationes iam sunt fere completae, uti in Summa theologiae S. Thomae. Quo in ordine inde ab initio solvuntur quaestiones speculativae de intrinseca ratione naturae, personae, etc. Quibus perspectis, valde ruditer iudicat qui credit S. Cyrillum defecisse quia minus bene notionem naturae conceperit; nam S. Cyrillus priora et vera determinare debuit, quibus determinatis posteri quaestiones ulteriores de intrinsecis rationibus agitare potuerunt. Quod enim primum est in ordine doctrinae, hoc ultimum esse solet in ordine inventionis et historiae. Neque tamen minus ruditer iudicat qui concludit theologum tuto posse praetermittere intrinsecas rerum rationes; si enim S. Cyrillus melius de natura tractavisset, defuissent quae per saecula scatebant controversiae atque haereses. 8 Tertio, in ipso quinto saeculo, antequam ad conclusionem de intrinseca naturae ratione perventum fuerit, contendere poterant monophysitae suam positionem esse magis cohaerentem.

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thew 5.37, while theologians are investigating what the question is and what follows from affirming or denying it. Thus, Augustine wrote as a bishop, and yet Aquinas, who was not a bishop, is regarded as doctor communis nonetheless. 7 In the second place, the order of discovery is one thing and the order of teaching is another. See Divinarum personarum 20–27, De Deo trino: Pars systematica 33–41.16 In the order of discovery, (1) [Christ’s] divinity is explicitly asserted against the Arians, (2) Christ’s human soul is explicitly asserted against the Apollinarians, (3)  one person, and that one divine, is explicitly asserted against the Nestorians, (4)  two natures are explicitly asserted against the monophysites, and (5) after a hundred years the sense in which it may be said that there are two natures begins to be explained. In this order of discovery, one truth is added to another; then come explanations. Thus, the first four items listed above are assertions, but the fifth is an explanation. In this case the order of discovery is also the historical order of dogmatic development. But there is also another order, called the order of teaching or explanation or synthesis. This order begins when explanations are already almost complete, as in the Summa theologiae of Thomas. Speculative questions about the intrinsic meaning of nature, person, and so forth are answered, in this order, from the very start. In light of the foregoing, it is quite a simplistic judgment to suppose that because Cyril’s notion of nature was less than well conceived, it was a failure. Cyril had to settle prior truths; those settled, a later generation could air further questions about intrinsic definition. For what is first in the order of teaching usually comes last in the order of discovery and history. Nor is it any less simplistic a judgment to conclude that a theologian can safely neglect the intrinsic definitions of things. For if Cyril’s had been a more satisfactory treatment of nature, there would have been none of the controversies and heresies that gushed forth for hundreds of years. 8 In the third place, it was possible in the fifth century itself, before any conclusion about the intrinsic definition of nature had been arrived at, for the monophysites to contend that theirs was the more coherent position.

16 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 58–77.

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Eodem enim sensu dicebant tum naturam tum personam; et ideo sicut unam personam, ita etiam unam naturam affirmabant. Praeterea, contra concilium Chalcedonense invocare poterant nomen S. Cyrilli qui scripserat:

… ignorant quaecumque non sola mentis consideratione distingui solent, ea prorsus etiam in diversitatem distinctam omnifariam ac privatim a se mutuo segregari. Sit rursus nobis in exemplum homo nostri similis. Duas namque in eo naturas intelligimus, unam animae, alteram corporis. Sed cum sola discreverimus intelligentia, et subtili contemplatione seu mentis imaginatione conceperimus; non tamen seorsum ponimus naturas, neque illis in totum per divisionem virtutem immittimus sed unius hominis esse intelligimus, ita ut illae duae non iam sint duo, sed utraque unum animal absolvatur (Ad Succensum, ii, mg 77, 246 a; aco, i, 1, 6, p. 162, lin 4–9.)17

Quo in loco Cyrillus defendit formulam: unam naturam Dei Verbi incarnatam. Re vera admittit distinctionem realem minorem inter animam et corpus. Quam tamen distinctionem nominat non realem et minorem sed ‘sola intelligentia,’ ‘subtili contemplatione,’ ‘mentis imaginatione.’ Unde et Cyrilli sequaces Christum ex duabus naturis admittebant sed post unionem nisi unam naturam non volebant. Unde et ulterius procedentes dicebant c. Chalcedonense, cum duas naturas post unionem posuerit, etiam duas personas re vera intendisse et unam personam sensu nestoriano dixisse. Neque videtur eo tempore, saeculo quinto, orthodoxos huic difficultati respondere potuisse.

9 Quarto, ad quaestionem quinam fuerit error monophysitarum, respon­ dendum est: (a) quosdam sane de divinitate, humanitate, vel ipsa unione erravisse, sed ita non errasse scholam principalem; vide Sententias, ii;

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For they used both nature and person in the same sense, and thus as they affirmed one person so also they affirmed one nature. Besides, they could quote Cyril against the Council of Chalcedon:



… they fail to recognize that it is only in the case of entities where the distinction to be drawn between them is not a matter of mental apprehension alone that there can be a complete separation of the one from the other into individual compartments on their own. For [in the case of a man] we understand two natures, one being that of the soul, the other that of the body. But although we do distinguish them through intelligence only, and by careful reflection or by the use of the mind’s imagination conceive them, nevertheless we do not put the natures apart by themselves or let them be totally sundered from each other. We understand that they belong to one man, so that the two are two no longer, but between them produce the one living being (Ad Succensum, 2; mg 77, col. 246 a; [Wickham, 92]; aco, 1, 1, 6, p. 162, lines 4–9).17

In this passage Cyril is defending the formula ‘one incarnate nature of God the Word.’ What in fact he admits is a real, minor distinction between body and soul. He does not call it real and minor, however, but speaks of it as pertaining to ‘intelligence only,’ ‘careful reflection,’ and ‘the mind’s imagination.’ Hence, Cyril’s followers too admitted that Christ is from two natures, but would allow only one nature after the union. Hence, they went further and said that when the Council of Chalcedon laid down that there are two natures after the union, what it really meant was that there are also two persons, and only in a Nestorian sense did it say there is one person. At the time, in the fifth century, the orthodox were apparently unable to answer this difficulty. 9 In the fourth place, what was the error of the monophysites? The answer is as follows. (a) There were some who erred in regard to divinity, humanity, or the union itself; but such was not the error of the principal school; see ‘Opinions,’ ii, [on Severian monophysitism].

17 [Translation adapted from Documents in Early Christian Thought, ed. M. Wiles and M. Santer (Cambridge University Press, 1975) 70–71.].

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(b) hanc scholam seu hos coetus imprimis schismatis esse reos, quia concilium oecumenicum reicerent; (c) eosdemque a rationalismo non esse exemptos; ante volebant cohaerentem terminorum explicationem quam dogma definitum acceptarint; (d) erronea praesumptione eosdem conclusisse concilium Chalcedonense necessario nestorianismum docuisse; doctrina Chalcedonensis fuisset nestoriana, si nulla poni posset distinctio realis inter personam et naturam; sed talis distinctio de facto postea est posita, et quidem non solum ab orthodoxis sed etiam ab ipsis monophysitis (vide supra, § 4); (e) eosdem studio partium indulsisse qui modum loquendi S. Cyrilli concilio oecumenico praeposuerunt; (f) eosdem doctrinam adeo complicatam evolvisse ut et multis et diversis erroribus faveret (vide Sententias, iii), et ulteriorem dogmatis et theologiae evolutionem haud fundare posset. Nota Prima pars ponit quae verbatim in decreto Chalcedonensi habentur (db 148, ds 301–302), ideoque est de fide definita. Altera pars secundum modum posteriorem compendiose exprimit quae aliter in decretis conciliaribus et symbolis dicuntur, uti ex argumento manifestabitur. [Argumentum] argumenti pars prima Ex concilio Chalcedonensi (db 148, ds 301–302). Analysin huius decreti secundum fontes fecit de Urbina, apud Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 389–90 et 398– 418.

1 Asseruntur duae naturae. Expresse: ‘in duabus naturis.’ Implicite: affirmantur perfectus in deitate, perfectus in humanitate; verus Deus, verus homo ex anima rationali et corpore; consubstantialis Patri, consubstantialis nobis, per omnia nobis similis absque peccato; genitus ante saecula et etiam ex Maria Virgine.

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(b) This school or these groups were guilty of schism, in the first place, since they rejected an ecumenical council. (c) They were not free of rationalism; before they would accept defined dogma they demanded a coherent explanation of its terms. (d) Through a mistaken presumption, they concluded that the Council of Chalcedon necessarily taught Nestorianism. The Chalcedonian doctrine was Nestorian, if no real distinction can be drawn between person and nature; but later such a distinction was in fact drawn, not only by the orthodox but also by the monophysites themselves. (e) They indulged in partisan zeal, preferring Cyril’s way of speaking over an ecumenical council. (f) They developed a doctrine so complex that it fostered a number of different errors (see ‘Opinions,’ iii) and could hardly serve as a basis for further development in dogma and theology. Theological note of the thesis The first part of the thesis is word for word what is stated in the Chalcedonian decree (db 148, ds 301–302, [dec 1: 86–87]). As such its note is ‘of defined faith.’ The second part is a compendious expression, using a later manner of speech, for what conciliar decrees and creeds say in other ways. This will be evident from the argument. [The Argument] part 1 The argument here is from the Council of Chalcedon (db 148, ds 301–302, [dec 1: 86–87]). An analysis of this decree based on the sources has been made by de Urbina, ‘Das Symbol von Chalkedon: Sein Text, sein Werden, sein dogmatische Bedeutung,’ in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 389–90 and 398–418. 1­ There are two natures. This is expressly stated: ‘in two natures.’ It is also implied: the council affirms one who is perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity; true God, true man composed of a rational soul and body; consubstantial with the Father, consubstantial with us, like us in all things apart from sin; born before all worlds and also born of the Virgin Mary.

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2 Asseruntur duae naturae post incarnationem. Dicitur ‘in duabus naturis.’ Qui in hoc concilio condemnati sunt, Eutyches et Dioscorus, admittebant ‘ex duabus naturis’ sed nolebant ‘in duabus naturis.’ Positum est ‘in duabus naturis’ ex interventu legatorum romanorum secundum Tomum Leonis (db 143–44, ds 293–94). Vide de Urbina, Grillmeier, 1, 396–97.

3 Inconfusae, immutatae Expresse: inconfuse, immutabiliter. Implicite: nusquam sublata differentia naturarum propter unitionem. Cf. db 111a , ds 250–51. Etiam, perfectus in deitate, perfectus in humanitate; verus Deus, verus homo ex anima et corpore; consubstantialis Patri, consubstantialis nobis, per omnia nobis similis absque peccato.

4 Salvis utriusque proprietatibus Expresse: salva proprietate utriusque naturae. Cf. db 143, ds 293–94. Implicite, ubi dicitur perfectus in deitate, humanitate; verus Deus, homo; consubstantialis Patri, nobis.

argumenti pars altera 1 Asseritur distinctio naturarum. Si duae sunt naturae, est naturarum distinctio. Vide terminos, ubi eodem modo definiuntur ‘duo’ et ‘distinctio.’ Atqui duae sunt naturae, uti supra in parte prima habitum est. Ergo est distinctio naturarum. 2 Asseritur realis distinctio naturarum. Sicut enim duo vel distincta sunt quorum unum non est aliud, ita etiam duo realia vel realiter distincta sunt quorum realitas unius non est realitas alterius. Sed duae quae in Christo asseruntur naturae, sunt naturae reales. Ergo. Ad minorem: decretum asserit realem deitatem et realem humanitatem, quae in vero Deo et in vero homine exsistunt, quibus Filius est et Patri con-

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2 There are two natures after the Incarnation. The council’s statement is ‘in two natures.’ Eutyches and Dioscorus, who were condemned at this council, allowed ‘from two natures’ but would not allow ‘in two natures.’ The phrase ‘in two natures’ was included through the intervention of the Roman legates, in accordance with the ‘Tome’ of Leo (db 143–44, ds 293–94, [dec 1: 78–79]). See de Urbina, ‘Das Symbol von Chalkedon …,’ Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 396–97. 3 The natures are unconfused and unchanged. This the council states explicitly: ‘without confusion, without change.’ It is also implied: the difference of natures is in no way removed by the union. See db 111a, ds 250–51, [dec 1: 41–42]. Again, Christ is perfect in divinity, perfect in humanity, true God and also true man from a body and soul, consubstantial with the Father, consubstantial with us, like us in all things apart from sin. 4 The properties of each nature are preserved. This the council states explicitly: ‘the properties of each nature being preserved.’ See db 143, ds 293–94, [dec 1: 78–79]. It is also implicit, where the decree speaks of Christ as perfect in divinity and in humanity, as true God and true man, as consubstantial with the Father and with us. part 2 1 There is a distinction between the natures. If there are two natures, there is a distinction of natures. See ‘Terms’ of the thesis above, where ‘two’ and ‘distinction’ were defined in the same way. But there are two natures, as was shown in part 1 above. Therefore there is a distinction of natures. 2 There is a real distinction of natures. For just as those [things] are two, or distinct, of which one is not the other, so also there are two realities or two that are really distinct where the reality of the one is not the reality of the other. But the two natures which there are in Christ are real natures. The conclusion follows. As for the minor premise: The decree asserts a real divinity and a real humanity, which exist in true God and in true man, by which the Son is both

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substantialis et nobis consubstantialis, in quibus Filius est genitus et ante saecula et novissimis diebus. 3 Realis quae asseritur distinctio non est maior. Maior non est distinctio, si non est inter alium et alium, inter duas personas, sicut inter Patrem et Filium, inter Spiritum sanctum et Ioannem Baptistam, inter Petrum et Paulum. Atqui distinctio non est inter alium et alium, inter duas personas, etc. Ergo. Ad minorem: (1) ‘indivise’ et ‘inseparabiliter’ excludunt divisionem inter alium et alium, inter eum qui est Deus et eum qui est homo; cf. thesin tertiam; (2) ‘… non in duas personas partitum aut divisum’ pariter excludit alium et alium, duas personas; (3) ponitur ‘unum eundemque’ et insuper quinquies additur ‘eundem’; quae quidem emphatice excludunt alium et alium, duas personas, sicut Spiritus sanctus et Ioannes Baptista. 4 Distinctio quae est realis sed non maior est minor. Si habetur distinctio realis, habentur duo realia quorum unum non est aliud. Quae duo aut sunt duae personae vel duae res, et tunc maior est distinctio, aut sunt duae partes, duo constitutiva unius personae vel unius rei, et tunc minor est distinctio. Quod confirmatur ex comparatione inter Christum et hominem adeo communi ut in symbolo ponatur: ‘Qui licet Deus sit et homo, non duo tamen sed unus est Christus, unus autem non conversione divinitatis in carnem, sed assumptione humanitatis in Deum, unus omnino non confusione substantiae, sed unitate personae. Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus’ (db 40, ds 76 [37]). Vide V. Grumel, ‘La comparaison de l’âme et du corps et l’union hypostatique chez Léonce de Byzance et saint Maxime,’ Echos d’Orient (1926) 393–406. Iam vero sicut distinctio inter animam rationalem et carnem unius hominis est distinctio minor, pariter distinctio inter divinitatem Christi et eiusdem humanitatem est minor. In utroque enim casu distinguuntur duo realia in una persona. Cf. concilium Lateranense (db 260, 261, ds 507, 508): et substantialem differentiam naturarum et substantialem unitionem naturarum confiteri debemus. Quod cohaerenter facere possumus si affirmamus distinctionem realem minorem et negamus distinctionem realem maiorem.

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consubstantial with the Father and consubstantial with us, in which the Son is born both before all worlds and also in these last days. 3 The r­eal distinction asserted is not a major distinction. The distinction is not a major distinction unless it is between someone and someone else, that is, between two persons, such as the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit and John the Baptist, or Peter and Paul. But the distinction is not between someone and someone else, between two persons, and so on. The conclusion follows. As for the minor premise: (1) The terms ‘without division’ and ‘without separation’ rule out division between someone and someone else, between him who is God and him who is man. See thesis 3. (2) Likewise, ‘not separated or divided into two persons’ rules out [there being] someone and someone else, two persons. (3) The decree speaks of ‘one and the same’ and moreover adds ‘the same’ five times. This emphatically rules out [there being] someone and someone else, two persons, such as the Holy Spirit and John the Baptist. 4 A distinction that is real but not major is a minor distinction. If there is a real distinction, there are two realities of which the one is not the other. Either the two are two persons or two things, in which case the distinction is major, or they are two parts, two constituents of one person or one thing, in which case the distinction is minor. This is supported by the comparison between Christ and a man quite commonly drawn as in the [‘Athanasian’] Creed: ‘Although he is God and man, yet he is not two but one Christ. And he is one, not because his divinity was changed into flesh, but because his humanity was assumed to God. He is altogether one, not in a confusion of substances, but in a unity of person. As a rational soul and flesh are one human being, so God and man are one Christ’ (db 40, ds 76: 37). See V. Grumel, ‘La comparaison de l’âme et du corps et l’union hypostatique chez Léonce de Byzance et saint Maxime,’ Echos d’Orient (1926) 393–406. Now, as the distinction between the rational soul and the flesh of one human being is a minor distinction, likewise the distinction between the divinity of Christ and his humanity is minor. In either case, two realities within one person are distinguished. Cf. the Lateran Council (db 260, 261, ds 507, 508). We are to confess both ‘the substantial difference of natures’ and ‘the substantial union of natures.’ This we can do coherently if we affirm a minor real distinction and deny a major real distinction.

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5 Quae distinctio realis minor est analogice dicta. (1) Nam Verbum incarnatum est mysterium stricte dictum (db 1669, 1462, ds 2851, 2528), sed unitas unius hominis est verum naturaliter notum. (2) Analogice dicuntur quae partim sunt similia et partim sunt diversa. Sed anima et corpus unius hominis uniuntur in unitatem non solum unius personae sed etiam unius naturae humanae; e contra, divinitas Christi et humanitas uniuntur quidem in unitatem personae sed non uniuntur in unitatem unius naturae. Quamvis enim in Christo una sit persona, duae tamen sunt naturae. 6 Nota theologica eorum quae in hac altera argumenti parte proponuntur est: quoad rem, de fide divina et catholica; quoad modum loquendi, theologice certum. Nam quoad rem, si negatur realis distinctio, negantur duae naturae; si affirmatur distinctio realis maior, habentur duae personae; si negatur distinctio realis minor, aut habentur duae personae aut habetur una tantummodo natura; si negatur analogia, tollitur mysterium. Quoad modum loquendi, non est de fide, cum addantur definitiones distinctionum quae naturaliter sunt notae; sed est certum, nam hae definitiones sunt et simplices et clarae et certae. Iam vero ubi una praemissa est de fide et alia est in se certa, conclusio dicitur theologice certa.

Obicitur 1 Non sunt in Christo post incarnationem duae naturae realiter inter se distinctae. Respondetur: Non distinguuntur duae naturae distinctione reali et maiore, conceditur; distinctione reali et minore, negatur.

2 Instatur: Ne minor quidem est distinctio realis. Nam tum concilium Constantinopolitanum ii tum concilium Romanum affirmant duas naturas post unionem ‘intellectu tantummodo’ (db 219, ds 428) et ‘sola contemplatione’ (db 288, ds 548) esse distinguendas. Respondetur: Illa verba ‘sola theoria,’ ‘sola contemplatione,’ ‘solo intellectu,’ et similia excludunt distinctionem realem maiorem, conceditur; significant distinctionem rationis tantum, negatur.

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5 This minor real distinction is analogically drawn. (1) For the incarnate Word is a mystery strictly so called (db 1669, 1462, ds 2851, 2528), whereas the unity of a man is a truth naturally known. (2) We speak analogically of things when they are partly similar and partly different. But the body and soul of a man are united in a unity not only of one person but also of one human nature; contrariwise, the divinity and humanity of Christ are united in a unity of person but not united in the unity of one nature. For although there is one person in Christ, there are nevertheless two natures. 6 The theological note of what has been set out in this second part of the argument is ‘of divine and catholic faith’ with regard to what it asserts. With regard to how this is asserted, to the manner of speaking, the note is ‘theologically certain.’ For, as to what is asserted, to deny a real distinction is to deny two natures. Assert a major real distinction, and there are two persons. Deny a minor real distinction, and either there are two persons or else there is only one nature. Deny analogy, and the mystery is taken away. As to how this is asserted, that is not a matter of faith, since the definitions of distinctions which the argument brings in are naturally known. It is, however, certain, since these definitions are simple, clear, and certain. Moreover, where one premise is a matter of faith and the other is certain in itself, the conclusion is said to be theologically certain. Objections 1 After the Incarnation there are not two natures in Christ that are really distinct from each other. Reply: That two natures are not distinguished by a distinction which is real and major, I grant; that they are not distinguished by a distinction which is real and minor, I deny. 2 The objection continues: There is not even a real minor distinction. For both the Second Council of Constantinople and the Council of Rome affirmed that after the union two natures are to be distinguished ‘only in the mind’ (db 219, ds 428, [dec 1: 117]) and ‘in contemplation only’ (db 288, ds 548). Reply: That a major real distinction is ruled out by the phrases ‘only in theory,’ ‘in contemplation only,’ ‘only in the mind,’ and the like, I grant; that these phrases denote only a distinction of reason, I deny.

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Eadem facta est distinctio non solum locis citatis (db 219, 288, ds 428, 548) sed etiam in canonibus Iustiniani imperatoris, Confessio rectae fidei, canon 8 (mg 86/1, 1015 d) , anno 551. Qua in confessione etiam explicatur eadem distinctio:

… dicentes non oportere numerum naturarum in Christo dicere, utpote numero divisionem introducente. Sciant igitur, quod numerus quando in diversis personis sive subsistentiis (hupostaseoFn) dicitur, rerum ipsarum per partes habet divisionem, sicut in duobus vel etiam pluralibus hominibus: quando autem in rebus unitis, tunc verbo (logoF) solo et intellectu (theoFriai), non tamen ipsarum rerum habet divisionem, sicut in una subsistentia hominis ex anima et corpore constituta. Duae enim et hic naturae intelliguntur, altera animae et altera corporis: et tamen non propter hoc in duos homines dividitur, sed unum scimus hominem esse et unam subsistentiam eius. Et in mysterio igitur Christi, facta unitione, licet diversa intelligantur quae unita sunt, sed non ipsa re et per partes a se invicem separantur ea, ex quibus dominus noster Iesus Christus compositus est, differentiam tamen considerantes et hanc significare volentes, numerum assumimus, et duas in Christo naturas dicimus: nec ideo unus Christus in duos christos vel in duos filios dividitur. (mg 86/1, 1006 bc)

Quo in loco, laborat imperator ad distinctionem realem et minorem dicendam. Eiusmodi enim est distinctio inter animam et corpus eiusdem hominis viventis, quae non est distinctio maior (duo homines, christi, filii) neque est distinctio rationis tantum (nam duae naturae dicuntur anima et corpus, et duae naturae in Christo dicuntur ad exprimendam diversitatem divinitatis et humanitatis). Et eodem modo eodemque exemplo animae et corporis, locutus erat Cyrillus Alexandrinus (Ad Succensum, ii, aco, i, 1, 6, p. 162 lin 4–9; mg 77, 246 a). Citatus est hic locus, supra, Problema, § 8. Quibus perspectis, ex contextu sive db 219, ds 428, sive db 288, ds 548, facile constat concilia Constantinopolitanum ii et Romanum minime docuisse nullam a parte rei esse differentiam inter divinitatem Christi et humanitatem post unionem, ideoque ea minime intendisse distinctionem rationis tantum.

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The same distinction is drawn not only in the passages cited (db 219, 288, ds 428, 548, [dec 1: 117]), but also in the canons of the emperor Justinian’s Confessio rectae fidei, canon 8 (mg 86/1, 1015 d, [Schwartz, 150 (92)]) of the year 551. The same distinction is also explained in that confession:

… saying it is not proper to speak of the number of natures in Christ, lest a numerical division be introduced. Let them know, therefore, that when number is referred to different persons or subsistents (hypostaseoFn), it is the things themselves that are divided into parts, as in the case of two men and of many men also; but when [number is referred] to unitary things, then there is only verbal (logoFi) and intellectual (theoFriai) division but the things themselves are not divided, as with the one subsistence of a man constituted of body and soul. For here there are understood to be two natures, one of the body and the other of the soul, and yet there is not on that account a division into two men, but we know the man is one and his subsistence is one. And therefore in the mystery of Christ, once the union had taken place, it is proper that those things which were united are understood to be different, but that those things from which our Lord Jesus Christ is composed are not really separated from one another as parts; taking the difference into account, and wishing to signify this, we adopt a number, and we say there are two natures in Christ – not, therefore, that the one Christ is divided into two christs or two sons. (mg 86/1, 1006 bc, [Schwartz, 140 (82)])

In this passage what the emperor is trying to put in words is a minor real distinction. For such is the distinction between the body and the soul of the same living man. It is not a major distinction (two men, two Christs, two sons), nor merely a distinction of reason (for body and soul are called two natures, and the difference between divinity and humanity is expressed by speaking of two natures in Christ). Cyril of Alexandria too speaks in the same way, using the same example of body and soul (Ad Succensum, 2, aco, 1, 1, 6, p. 126, lines 4–9; mg 77, 246 a; [Wickham, 92]; this passage is quoted above under ‘The Problem,’ § 8). Once this has been understood, it is easily shown from the context of either db 219, ds 428, [dec 1: 117] or db 288, ds 548 that the Second Council of Constantinople and the Council of Rome did not teach that there is no real difference between the divinity of Christ and his humanity after the union, and thus they did not mean a distinction of reason only.

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Unde et ulterius concluditur thesin, quatenus de distinctione reali, minori, analogice dicta tractat, minime aliena proferre a mente S. Cyrilli vel concilii Chalcedonensis, sed potius terminis posterioribus magisque accuratis usam esse ad eorum mentem declarandam.

3 Sed concilium Ephesinum expresse prohibuit ullam umquam fidem aliam componi (aco, i, 1, 7, p. 105, 20 – p. 106, 8). Quod decretum manifeste violaverunt patres chalcedonenses, uti obici solebant monophysitae. Respondetur: Concilium Ephesinum non prohibuit ne ulla umquam synodus oecumenica quaestiones de fide dirimeret. Nam (1) ex tenore decreti agi videtur de symbolis per minorem auctoritatem compositis, nam statuuntur poenae distinctae contra episcopos, clericos, laicos, non autem contra futuras synodos oecumenicas, (2) S. Cyrillus interfuit concilio Ephesino et tamen formulam unionis subsignavit, anno 433, et (3) ipsum concilium Chalcedonense optime novit decretum Ephesinum idque renovavit, aco, ii, 1, 2, p. 130 (326), lin. 4–11, sane non contra se ipsum.

corollarium i: unio hypostatica18 Unio facta est non in natura sed in persona. Sum. theol., 3, q, 2, aa. 1–3, 6. 1 Unio est facta in persona. Nam persona est habens naturam; et eatenus facta est unio, quatenus eadem est persona et habens naturam divinam et habens naturam humanam. 2 Unio non est facta in natura. (a) Nam facta est in habente naturas, i.e., in persona. (b) Si facta esset in natura, aut naturae confunderentur, aut mutarentur, aut earum differentia quodammodo tolleretur, aut non salvarentur omnes earum proprietates. Sed consequentia sunt falsa, quippe contra concilium Chalcedonense. Ergo antecedens est falsum.

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Hence, it is further concluded that the thesis, although it does treat of a distinction that is real, minor, and analogically drawn, presents nothing that is foreign to the meaning of Cyril or the Council of Chalcedon. What it does is to use stronger, later, and more accurate terms in order to state what they meant. 3 But the Council of Ephesus expressly forbids anyone to make up any other faith (aco, 1, 1, 7, p. 105, line 20 – p. 106, line 8). Clearly, the Chalcedonian Fathers violated this decree, as the monophysites often objected. Reply: The Council of Ephesus did not prohibit any ecumenical council from ever settling questions of faith. For (1) it seems from the drift of the decree that its concern is with creeds composed on lesser authority, since distinct punishments are laid down against bishops, clergy, and laity, but not against future ecumenical councils; (2) Cyril took part in the Council of Ephesus, yet he subscribed to the Formula of Reunion in 433; and (3) the Council of Chalcedon itself knew the decree of the Council of Ephesus quite well, and renewed it (aco, 2, 1, 2, p. 130 [326], lines 4–11) – not, of course, against itself. Corollary 1: Hypostatic union18 The union took place not in a nature but in a person. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 2, aa. 1–3, 6. 1 The union took place in a person. For a person is that which has a nature; and union has taken place just insofar as the same person who has a divine nature also has a human nature. 2 The union did not take place in a nature. (a) For it took place in that which has the natures, that is, in a person. (b) Had it taken place in a nature, either the natures would have been confused, or they would have been changed, or the difference between them would have been taken away, or all their properties would not have been preserved. But these consequences are false: they contradict the Council of Chalcedon. Therefore the antecedent is false.

18 The titles of the first four corollaries are not found in the text but are taken from Lonergan’s table of contents.

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(c) Si facta esset in natura, tota Trinitas incarnata esset. Sed solus Filius est incarnatus. Ergo non est facta in natura. Ad maiorem: nam natura divina pariter a tribus personis habetur, et ideo, si in natura esset unio facta, pariter tres personae essent incarnatae.

3 Dices: in divinis nulla est realis distinctio inter personam et naturam (Di­ vinarum personarum 96–99).19 Ergo nihil refert utrum unio sit in persona an in natura. Respondetur: quamvis in divinis persona et natura non realiter distinguantur, tamen distinguuntur distinctione rationis cum fundamento in re; quod fundamentum est realis distinctio inter personas. Iam vero maxime refert utrum una an tres personae incarnatae sint; unde et maxime refert utrum unio sit in persona an in natura. 4 Iterum obicies: unio est non in persona sed in natura; nam dicitur ‘unio naturalis,’ henoFsis phusikeF (db 115, ds 254); et praeterea Christus est per utramque naturam voluntarius et operator naturaliter idem (db 263, 264, ds 510, 511). Respondetur: Illam ‘unionem naturalem’ explicavit ipse S. Cyrillus esse ‘unionem veram’; vide praenot. quintum, tertiae theseos, 4, d, d′.20 Quantum autem ad ‘naturaliter idem’ attinet, simili quodam modo explicandum esse videtur. Nam Neochalcedonismus tum formulis concilii Chalcedonensis utebatur tum formulis S. Cyrilli; qui usus in hoc concilio Lateranensi est manifestus; cf. db 258 et 259, ds 505 et 506.

5 Obicitur denique21 ex db 40, ds 76 (37): ‘Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus.’ Sed ex anima et carne fit una natura hominis. Ergo ex Deo et homine fit una natura Christi.

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(c) Had it taken place in a nature, the whole Trinity would have been incarnate. But only the Son is incarnate. Therefore, the union did not take place in a nature. As for the major premise: The divine nature belongs equally to all three persons, and therefore, if the union had taken place in a nature, the three persons would equally have been incarnate. 3 Perhaps you will say that in God there is no real distinction between person and nature (Divinarum personarum 96–99).19 Therefore, it matters nothing whether the union was in a person or in a nature. Reply: Although person and nature are not really distinguished in God, they are nevertheless distinguished by a distinction grounded in reality, its ground being the real distinction between the persons. Now, it matters enormously whether one person has become incarnate or three, and so it matters enormously whether the union was in a person or in a nature. 4 Again, you might object that the union is not in a person but in a nature, since it is referred to as a ‘natural union,’ henoFsis physikeF (db 115, ds 254, [dec 1: 59]), and since, furthermore, [according to the Lateran Council of 649] Christ is by nature the same one who willed and accomplished [our salvation] through each of his natures (db 263, 264, ds 510, 511). Reply: Cyril himself explained that this ‘natural union’ is a ‘true union’; see thesis 3, preliminary note 5, point 4, d, d′.20 As for Christ’s being ‘by nature the same one,’ much the same sort of explanation would seem to be in order. For Neochalcedonianism made use both of the Council of Chalcedon’s formulations and of Cyril’s, and such usage is plain in this canon of the Lateran Council; compare db 258 and 259, ds 505 and 506. 5 Finally,21 there is an objection based on [the ‘Athanasian’ creed,] db 40, ds 76 verse 37, which states: ‘As a rational soul and flesh are one human being, so God and man are one Christ.’ But what comes to be from body and

19 Lonergan, De Deo trino: Pars systematica 119–22; The Triune God: Systematics 238–47. Here the 1960 and 1961 editions of De Verbo incarnato refer to db 389, 391. 20 See above, p. 236. 21 This fifth objection did not appear in the editions of 1960 and 1961.

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Respondetur: Homo est unus tum natura tum persona. Pariter ergo ex textu allato concludi potest Christum esse unum unitate personae seu hypostatica. Quaenam vero fuerit intentio symboli ex praecedente inciso (36) constat: ‘unus omnino, non confusione substantiae, sed unitate personae.’

corollarium ii: idiomatum communicatio Legitima agnoscenda est idiomatum communicatio. Vide Sum. theol., 3, q. 16; Galtier, De Incarn. 215–18. Boyer 233–38.22 Etc.

1 Communicatio : opponitur illi divisioni attributorum inter duas personas quae db 116, ds 255 reprehenditur. idiomata: proprietates, vide terminos theseos quartae. communicatio idiomatum : divina dicuntur de homine, et humana dicuntur de Deo. E.g., hic homo, Iesus, est Deus; unde Beata Virgo quia est Mater Iesu, ideo est Mater Dei (db 113, 148, etc., ds 252, 301). Unus de Sancta Trinitate est Iesus, qui crucifixus est carne (db 222, ds 432).

legitima: observatis legibus seu regulis quae sequuntur. (1) Non admittuntur abstractiones, reduplicationes, quia sic praescinditur a persona quae naturas unit. Falsum ergo est dicere: homo qua homo est Deus; Deus qua Deus est homo; Deus est humanitas. (2) Non qualificatur alia natura per aliam, ut dicatur ‘homo divinus,’ ‘homo dominicus,’23 ‘corpus omnipraesens,’ quae naturas confundunt.

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soul is the one nature of a human being. Therefore, what comes to be from God and man is the one nature of Christ. Reply: A human being is one both by his nature and by his person. Likewise, therefore, it would be possible to conclude from the text adduced that Christ is one by unity of person, or hypostatically one. That this is what the creed intended is established by the preceding verse 36: ‘He is altogether one, not in a confusion of substances, but in a unity of person.’ Corollary 2: The ‘Interchange of Properties’ The communicatio idiomatum or interchange of properties should be acknowledged as legitimate. See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 16; Galtier, De Incarnatione ac redemptione 215– 18; Boyer, De Verbo incarnato 233–38,22 and so on. 1 Interchange stands opposed to that division of attributes between two persons which is condemned in db 116, ds 255, [dec 1: 59]. properties : See ‘Terms of the thesis’ above. interchange of properties: What is divine is predicated of the man, and what is human is predicated of God. For example: This man, Jesus, is God; thus the blessed Virgin, since she is the Mother of Jesus, is therefore the Mother of God (db 113, 148, and the like; ds 252, 301; [dec 1: 59, 86]). One of the Blessed Trinity is Jesus, who was crucified in the flesh (db 222, ds 432, [dec 1: 118]). legitimate : provided the following laws or rules are observed. (1) Neither abstractions nor reduplications are allowed, since this prescinds from the person who unites the natures. It is therefore false to say that a man, as man, is God; or that God, as God, is a man; or that God is humanity. (2) Neither of the natures is to be qualified by the other, as would happen in speaking of ‘the divine man’ or ‘the dominical man’23 or ‘an omnipresent body.’ Such statements confuse the natures.

22 C. Boyer, De Verbo incarnato (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1948). 23 Everything about him is said to be dominical, lordly, on account of union with the Word. But Lonergan excludes this use as illicitly qualifying the humanity by the divinity and thereby confusing the natures. On ‘dominical man’ see Aloys Grillmeier, ‘Jesus Christ, the Kyriakos AnthroFpos,’ Theological Studies 38 (1977) 275–293.

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(3) Praedicationes negativae sunt evitandae ubi verae sunt secundum aliam naturam et falsae secundum aliam, e.g., Christus est naturaliter mortalis, creatura, etc. Tunc enim introducendae sunt reduplicationes, uti Christus qua homo, vel abstractiones, uti humanitas Christi.24

2 Fundamentum communicationis idiomatum nihil est aliud quam quod in thesi tertia et quarta iam est determinatum. Adeo tamen idiomatum communicatio doctrinae catholicae inhaeret, ut falso sensu ab haereticis adhibita est. Vide de Apollinaristis: M. Jugie, dtc v (10) 1607; de Nestorianis: É. Amann, dtc xi (21) 153; de Monophysitis: J. Lebon, Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 568–71. In quibus communicatio idiomatum fundamentum habet vel exaggeratum vel insufficiens.

corollarium iii: partium assumptio verbum assumpsit omnia quae pertinent ad naturam humanam, et partes quidem mediante toto; corpus autem mediante anima (Sum. Theol., 3, qq. 5 et 6). 1 Assumpsit omnia quae pertinent ad naturam humanam: perfectus in humanitate, verus homo, consubstantialis nobis, per omnia nobis similis absque peccato (db 148, [ds 310–11]). 2 Assumpsit partes mediante toto: nam Verbum factum est, non oculus, non pes, non corpus, non anima, non intellectus, etc., sed homo. Unio ergo hypostatica immediate terminatur ad hominem, mediate autem ad ea quibus homo componitur. Aliter, Christus est homo, sed habet animam, corpus, partes; et haec habet quia est homo.

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(3) Negative predicates are to be avoided if they are true with regard to one nature and false with regard to the other; for instance, ‘Christ is naturally mortal,’ ‘naturally a creature,’ and the like. In these cases reduplication, such as ‘Christ as man,’ or else abstraction, such as ‘the humanity of Christ,’ should be introduced.24 2 The foundation of this interchange of properties is precisely what has already been settled in theses 3 and 4. Even though the interchange of properties adheres to Catholic teaching, it has been employed in a false sense by heretics. On the Apollinarians, see M. Jugie, ‘Eutychès et Eutychianisme,’ dtc 5 (10) 1607; on the Nestorians, É. Amann, ‘Nestorius,’ dtc 11 (21) 153; on the monophysites, J. Lebon in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 568-71. In these cases the interchange of properties has either an exaggerated or an insufficient foundation. Corollary 3: Assumption of component parts The Word assumed everything that pertains to human nature, and assumed its component parts mediately by assuming the whole; while he assumed a body mediately by assuming a soul (Summa theologiae, 3, qq. 5–6). 1 He assumed everything that pertains to human nature: ‘perfect in humanity, true man, consubstantial with us, like us in all things apart from sin’ (db 148, [ds 301–302, dec 1: 86–87]). 2 He assumed the parts mediately by assuming the whole: for the Word did not become an eye, a foot, a body, a soul, an intellect, or the like; he became a man. Therefore the hypostatic union has a man as its immediate term; mediately, however, it has those things of which a man is composed. Otherwise stated, Christ is a man but has a soul, a body, component parts; and these he has because he is a man.

24 That is, it is true to say, ‘Christ as man is naturally mortal’ or that he is ‘naturally a creature,’ and the same predications are both true of Christ’s humanity as well. But the communicatio idiomatum, properly so called, is not involved in any of these statements.

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3 Assumpsit carnem mediante anima: nam assumpsit carnem humanam; et caro est humana inquantum per animam informatur. 4 Non prius assumpsit animam et deinde carnem: hic enim esset error origenistarum qui praeexsistentiam animarum docuerunt (db 204, 205, ds 404, 405). 5 Gregorius Magnus, anno 601, docuit simul carnem in utero concipi et a Verbo assumi, et simul fieri unctionem a Spiritu Sancto (db 250, ds 479).

corollarium iv: naturalis passibilitas Christus homo non solum corpore et anima passus est sed etiam naturaliter passibilis fuit. 1 Passus est corpore: famem (Mt 4.12); sitim (Io 19.28); defatigationem (Io 4.6); flagellationem (Mt 27.26); crucifixionem (Mt 27.35); mortem (Mt 27.50). Passus est anima: pavorem, taedium, tristitiam (Mc 14.33-34), zelum25 (Io 2.14, 2.17); didicit ex iis quae passus est obedientiam (Heb 5.8).

2 Unde symbola recitant eum sub Pontio Pilato passum (db 6, ds 10–14; cf. db 54, 222, ds 125, 432). Natura eius humana dicitur passibilis (db 143, ds 293); ipse carne passibilis (db 257, ds 504), passus vera carnis suae passione, mortuus vera corporis sui morte (db 422, ds 791). Idem implicite habetur: consubstantialis nobis, similis nobis per omnia absque peccato (db 148, 290, ds 301, 554). S. Thomas, Sum. theol., 3, qq. 14–15. 3 Adversantur docetae, qui veritatem corporis negaverunt; vide thesin primum.

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3 He assumed flesh mediately, by assuming a soul: for he assumed human flesh, and flesh is human insofar as a soul informs it. 4 He did not first assume a soul and then a body; that would be the error of the Origenists who taught the pre-existence of souls (db 204, 205, ds 404, 405). 5 In the year 601 Gregory the Great taught that [Christ’s] flesh was both conceived in the womb and at the same time also assumed by the Word, and that anointing by the Holy Spirit took place at the same time (db 250, ds 479). Corollary 4: Natural passibility Christ the man not only suffered in body and soul but was also naturally passible or capable of suffering. 1 He suffered in body – hunger (Matthew 4.12), thirst (John 19.28), weariness (John 4.6), scourging (Matthew 27.26), crucifixion (Matthew 27.35), death (Matthew 27.50). He suffered in soul – distress, trouble, and sorrow (Mark 14.33–34); zeal25 (John 2.14, 2.17). According to Hebrews 5.8, he learned obedience by the things he suffered. 2 Hence, we recite in the creeds that he suffered under Pontius Pilate (db 6, ds 10–14; cf. db 54, 222, ds 125, 432, [dec 1: 5, 118]). His human nature was capable of suffering (db 143, ds 293, [dec 1: 78); his flesh itself was capable of suffering (db 257, ds 504). The suffering of his flesh was truly suffering, and the death of his body a true death (db 422, ds 791). The same thing is implied by his being ‘consubstantial with us, like us in all things apart from sin’ (db 148, 290, ds 301, 554, [dec 1: 86–87, 127]). See Summa theologiae, 3, qq. 14–15. 3 This was opposed by the docetists, who denied the reality of [Christ’s] body. See thesis 1.

25 To speak of someone as ‘suffering zeal’ sounds odd in English, but zeal is a passion, a passio, a suffering or undergoing rather than a doing.

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Etiam Gaianitae (vide Sententias, iii, huius theseos) qui dixerunt Christum habuisse naturam humanam impassibilem et incorruptibilem, eumque per miraculum de facto tantummodo esse passum et mortuum. Contra quos egerunt tum ipsi monophysitae tum etiam catholici; cf. Leontium Byzantinum, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, lib. 2, mg 86/1, 1316–58. Excerpta, Xiberta, Enchir. 556–59, §§ 35–44. 4 Difficultatem facit S. Hilarius qui saepe distinxit inter ‘vim poenae’ et ‘sensum poenae.’ Sententia Hilarii esse videtur ad mentem Stoicorum qui ‘sapientem’ laudabant quia ita animi motus dominabatur ut doloribus afflictus doloribus tamen non vinceretur. Quibus negari non videtur ipsa naturalis sensibilitas, sed potius affirmari possibilitas psychologica cuiusdam dominii partis superioris super ipsam sensibilitatem. X. Le Bachelet, dtc vi (12) 2438–49, textus collegit atque ordinavit, opiniones recitatas iudicavit; censuit S. Hilarium, quamvis notionem nimis abstractam perfectionis humanae habuerit, opinionibus Gaianitarum haud indulsisse. 5 Hac in re principium posuit S. Augustinus:

Nolite putare non fuisse tristem Dominum. Si enim haec dixerimus, quia non erat tristis, cum evangelium dicat, tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem, ergo et quando dicit evangelium, dormivit Iesus, non dormivit Iesus; et quando evangelium dicit, manducavit Iesus, non manducavit Iesus. Surrepit vermiculus putredinis et nihil sanum relinquet, quia et corpus non erat verum, et carnem veram non habuit. Quidquid ergo de illo scriptum est, fratres, factum est, verum est. Ergo tristis fuit? Prorsus tristis. (Enarr. in ps. 93, 19; ml 37, 1207–1208)

corollarium v: de adoratione christi 1 Adoratio Christo in scripturis exhibetur: Phil 2.10, Heb 1.6, Apoc 5.12, Io 5.22–23, 20.28. 2 Non co-adoratur assumptus homo cum Verbo Deo (db 120, ds 259); quam­vis duae sint naturae, non duae tamen sunt adorationes, sed una

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It was also opposed by the Gaianites; see ‘Opinions,’ iii, in the present thesis. They said that Christ had an impassible and incorruptible human nature, and that it was only by a miracle that he did in fact suffer and die. monophysites and Catholics alike held out against them; see Leontius of Byzantium, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, book 2, mg 86/1, 1316–58, excerpted in Xiberta, Enchiridion 556–59, §§ 35–44. 4 Hilary often distinguished between the ‘force of punishment’ and the ‘sense of punishment,’ thereby creating a difficulty. It would seem that Hilary’s opinion was in line with Stoic thought. The Stoics praised the ‘wise man,’ for whom the movements of the soul were dominated in such a way that although afflicted with sorrows he was not overcome by sorrows. They seem not to have denied natural sensibility itself, but rather to have affirmed the psychological possibility of a certain dominance exercised by higher levels over sensibility itself. The texts have been collected and arranged by X. Le Bachelet, ‘Hilaire (Saint),’ in dtc 6 (12) 2438–49, who assesses the views just rehearsed and considers that Hilary, although he had an exceedingly abstract notion of human perfections, hardly went so far as to share the views of the Gaianites. 5 Augustine laid down the principle that applies here:

Do not suppose the Lord was not sorrowful. For if we say he was not sorrowful when the gospel says, ‘my soul is sorrowful, even unto death,’ we will therefore say also that he did not sleep when the gospel says, ‘Jesus slept,’ and that he did not eat when it says, ‘Jesus ate.’ In creeps the worm of rottenness and it leaves nothing whole, for then neither was his body a true body nor had he true flesh. So, brethren, whatever is written about him happened and is true. Was he sorrowful then? Sorrowful indeed! (Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 93.19; ml 37, 1207–1208; [ccsl 39: 1321]).

Corollary 5: Adoration of Christ 1 Adoration of Christ appears in scripture in Philippians 2.10, Hebrews 1.6, Revelation 5.12, John 5.22–23, and John 20.28. 2 An assumed man is not co-adored with God the Word (db 120, ds 259, [dec 1: 60]). Although there are two natures, there are not two adorations;

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adoratione adorandus est Deus Verbum incarnatum cum propria carne (db 221, ds 431); adoratio humanitatis Christi vel carnis Christi vivificae (non quidem propter se et tamquam nuda caro, sed prout unita divinitati) est una eademque adoratio qua Verbum incarnatum cum propria ipsius carne adoratur (db 1561, ds 2661). 3 Ideoque distinguuntur adoratio absoluta et adoratio relativa. Relativa est adoratio quae fit mediante aliquo alio supposito, e.g. statua, imagine, etc. Absoluta est adoratio quae fit nullo alio mediante supposito. Iam vero in Christo homine vel in partibus eius nullum aliud est suppositum praeter personam divinam; et ideo eiusmodi adoratio dicitur absoluta. Sed in adoratione sanctae crucis, vel imaginis eius, vel aliarum Christi imaginum, intercedit aliud suppositum (nempe, imaginis) praeter personam divinam, et ideo eiusmodi adoratio est relativa tantum. Quae relativa adoratio contra iconoclastas defenditur Nicaeno ii (db 302, ds 600–601), contra protestantes concilio Tridentino (db 908, ds 1867).

4 Ulterius distinguuntur latria et dulia. Latria est adoratio soli Deo debita. Dulia est veneratio quae sanctissimae Virgini, angelis bonis, sanctis exhibetur. Aliter olim haec distinctio a S. Thoma intellecta esse videtur, qui Glossam citat: ‘Domine omnium per potentiam: cui debetur dulia. Deus omnium per creationem: cui debetur latria.’ Unde et ipse dixit: ‘ipsi Deo Patri debetur honor latriae propter divinitatem, et honor duliae propter dominium quo creaturas gubernat’( Sum. theol., 3, q. 25, a. 2 c.).

5 Principium fundamentale est: adoratio, latria, dulia, veneratio, cultus, etc., pertinent ad genus honoris, reverentiae expressae. Honor, reverentia, exhibentur non rebus sed personis, scil., subsistentibus in natura rationali.

6 Unde concludes: (a) Honor, reverentia, Christo exhibenda est latria, nam Christus est persona divina.

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God the Word incarnate with his own flesh is to be adored with one adoration (db 221, ds 431, [dec 1: 118]). Adoration of Christ’s humanity or Christ’s living flesh (not for its own sake, as bare flesh only, but as united with the divinity) is one and the same adoration by which the incarnate Word with his own flesh is adored (db 1561, ds 266, [dec 1: 65]). 3 There is thus a distinction between absolute and relative adoration. Relative adoration is adoration through the mediation of some other supposit, for instance a statue, an image, or the like. Absolute adoration is adoration without the mediation of any other supposit. Now there is no other supposit, either in Christ the man or in his component parts, besides his divine person; therefore, adoration of this sort is called absolute. But in the adoration of the holy cross, or an image of it, or other images of Christ, another supposit (namely, that of the image) besides the divine person intervenes, and therefore adoration of this sort is only relative. The Second Council of Nicea defended this relative adoration against the iconoclasts (db 302, ds 600–601, [dec 1: 135–36]), as did the Council of Trent against the Protestants (db 998, ds 1867, [dec 2: 775]). 4 There is a further distinction between latria and dulia. Latria is the adoration that is due to God alone. Dulia is the veneration showed to the blessed Virgin, the good angels, and the saints. At one time this distinction was apparently understood differently. Thomas Aquinas cites the Gloss: ‘Lord of all through power, to whom is due dulia. God of all through creation, to whom is due latria.’ Accordingly Thomas himself says: ‘to God the Father himself divine worship (latria) is due by reason of his divine nature, and the honor of dulia by reason of the government by which he rules the world’ (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 25, a. 2 c.). 5 The basic principle is this: adoration, latria, dulia, veneration, and the like pertain to the genus of honor, or of express reverence. Honor or reverence is shown not to things but to persons, that is, to those who subsist in a rational nature. 6 Hence, to conclude: (a) The honor or reverence to be shown to Christ is latria, for Christ is a divine person.

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(b) Honor, reverentia, erga humanitatem Christi vel partes eius (1) si praescindit a persona, non est honor, nam honor solis personis tribuitur, (2) si non praescindit a persona, debet esse latria, quia persona est divina, et quidem (3) est honor seu adoratio absoluta, quia nullum aliud est suppositum ibi praeter personam divinam. (c) Honor, reverentia, quae Christi imaginibus vel passionis reliquiis exhibetur (1) si praescindit a persona, non est honor quia honor solis personis exhibetur, (2) si non praescindit a persona, est adoratio latriae, quia persona est divina, sed (3) non est adoratio absoluta sed relativa tantum, quia intercedit aliud suppositum intermedium inter adorantem et adoratum. (d) Post consecrationem, cum conversa fuerit substantia panis in corpus Christi et substantia vini in sanguinem, non adest aliud suppositum praeter ipsam personam divinam; ideoque honor est latria, et adoratio est absoluta.

obicitur 1 Moyses prohibuit imagines Dei; ergo nulla admittenda est adoratio relativa. Respondetur: prohibitione quae in vt valet, conceditur, in nt negatur. Et additur ratio: ubi conscientia humana est parum differentiata, difficillime distinguitur inter imaginem et id quod imagine repraesentatur; unde et difficillime capitur ipsa notio adorationis relativae. Cf. psychologiam primitivorum, e.g., in praxi magica ubi imago a re imaginata non distinguitur nisi forte modo confuso.

2 S. Thomas affirmavit duliam esse exhibendam humanitati Christi. Respondetur: hoc simpliciter affirmavit, negatur; secundum aliquem sensum tunc receptum, conceditur. Sum. theol., 3, q. 25, aa. 1–4.

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(b) Honor or reverence paid to the humanity of Christ, or to his component parts (1) is not honor if it prescinds from his person, for honor is attributed only to persons; (2) ought to be latria, if it does not prescind from his person, for that person is divine; and (3) is absolute honor or adoration, since there is no other supposit besides a divine person. (c) The honor or reverence which is shown towards images of Christ or of his passion (1) is not honor, if it prescinds from his person, since honor is shown only to persons; (2) is the adoration of latria, if it does not prescind from his person, since the person is divine; and (3) is relative rather than absolute adoration, since another, intermediary supposit comes between adorer and adored. (d) After the consecration, since the substance of bread has been converted into the body of Christ, and the substance of wine into his blood, there is no other supposit besides the divine person himself; therefore the honor due is latria, and the adoration is absolute. objections 1 Images of God were prohibited by Moses; therefore no relative adoration should be allowed. Reply: That the prohibition is valid in the Old Testament, I grant; that it is valid in the New Testament, I deny. Here is the reason. When human consciousness is mostly undifferentiated, distinguishing between an image and what the image represents is extremely difficult; hence it is also extremely difficult to grasp the notion of relative adoration. Cf. the psychology of primitives, for example, in the practice of magic, where images are distinguished in a confused way, if at all, from what is imagined. 2 Thomas Aquinas states that dulia should be shown to the humanity of Christ. Reply: That Thomas states this in an unqualified way, I deny; that he states it in a sense accepted at the time, I grant. See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 25, aa. 1–4.

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Thesis 5 Duae sunt in Christo naturales operationes et duae naturales voluntates. Termini operatio: in thesi, eo sumitur sensu qui exemplis determinatur, uti intelligere, iudicare, velle, eligere, agere, facere, sentire, ambulare, manducare, etc. Sensus systematicus exponitur, Divinarum personarum 241–51.1 voluntas : appetitus rationalis, seu appetitus sequens intellectum. Etiam in thesi actum appetendi significat. naturalis: quae convenit naturae, secundum naturam subiecti operantis, volentis. Naturali operationi vel voluntati opponitur ea quae est contra vel praeter naturam. Inquantum operatio, voluntas, consideratur ut naturalis, praescinditur ab aliis differentiis quae ex potentiis, habitibus, obiectis, finibus, adiunctis petuntur. duae: duo vel distincta sunt quorum unum non est aliud; uti in thesi quarta agitur de distinctione reali quidem non tamen maiori sed minori et analogice dicta. Sensus theseos Sicut in Christo Deo et homine alia est natura divina et alia est natura humana, ita etiam in eodem alia est naturalis operatio divina et alia est naturalis operatio humana, et similiter alia est naturalis voluntas divina et alia est naturalis voluntas humana. Problema In thesibus tertia et quarta statutum est unam in Christo esse personam, eamque divinam; duas esse naturas quarum differentia propter unionem non tollitur; salvas denique post unionem esse utriusque naturae pro­ prietates.

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Thesis 5 There are in Christ two natural operations and two natural wills. Terms operation: in the thesis this term is taken in a sense defined by examples such as understanding, judging, willing, deciding, making, doing, sensing, walking, eating, and so on. The systematic sense of the term is set out in Divinarum personarum 241–51.1 will: rational appetite, or appetite that follows reason. In the thesis, this term also refers to the appetitive act. natural : that which conforms with nature, according to the nature of the operating, willing subject. Natural operation or will is contrasted to operation or will that is contrary to a nature or beyond a nature. Insofar as operation or will is considered as natural, the consideration prescinds from all the differences that result from capacities, habits, objects, ends, and circumstances. two: those [things] are two, or distinct, of which one is not the other. As in thesis 4, it is a case of a real distinction which is not, however, major but minor and analogically drawn. The meaning of the thesis As in Christ, God and man, the divine nature is other than the human nature, so also the divine natural operation in him is other than the human natural operation, and likewise the divine natural will is other than the human natural will. The problem In theses 3 and 4 it was established that in Christ there is one person, and that one divine; that there are two natures whose difference is not removed by their union; and finally that the properties of each nature are preserved after that union.



1 See Lonergan, De Deo trino: Pars systematica 261–70; The Triune God: Systematics 530–57.

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Quod si operationes et volitiones inter proprietates naturales enumerantur, statim sequi videtur quod hac in thesi asseritur, duas videlicet esse in Christo naturales operationes et duas pariter esse naturales voluntates. Sed ipsa haec conclusio inventionem quandam praesupponit. Non enim cogitatur operatio vel voluntas ut naturalis, nisi ab iis praescinditur quae magis sunt manifesta, nempe, motiva, obiecta, adiuncta, habitus, potentiae operandi et volendi. Praeterea, volitiones et operationes magis ad personam quam ad naturam referri videntur. Non enim sensus sentit sed homo per sensum, neque intellectus intelligit sed homo per intellectum; et similiter in omnibus aliis. Nam persona est principium quod operatur et vult: natura autem non est nisi principium quo persona operatur et vult. Praeterea, operationes et volitiones, quatenus sunt naturales, eatenus non sunt liberae et ideo ad ordinem perfectionis inferiorem pertinere videntur. Quatenus autem liberae sunt, eatenus non mere naturales sed potius personales nominari debent. Quod si admittendae sunt in Christo duae naturales operationes et duae naturales voluntates, multo magis praedicanda est una personalis operatio et una personalis volitio propter unitatem personae. Praeterea, sicut ipse Christus in alium et alium non est dividendus, ita etiam operationes et volitiones Christi ex uno operante et volente procedunt; neque tantummodo per unitatem principii-quod uniuntur, sed etiam inter se per potentiam divinae naturae et perfectam subordinationem naturae humanae unam quandam compositam operationem theandricam seu deivirilem facere videntur. Praeterea, etsi monophysitae unam Christi operationem et unam Christi voluntatem doceant (thesis quarta, Sententiae, ii, 12 et 13), non ideo tamen falsa est conclusio quia falsa est praemissa. Quod enim concludunt monophysitae ex erronea opinione de una Christi natura, illud idem concludi potest ex vera doctrina de una Christi persona, uti ex iam dictis manifestum videtur. Et ideo quod mente erronea a monophysitis docetur, illud idem vero sensu a catholicis doceri potest. Praeterea, quamvis in concilio Chalcedonensi determinatum sit unam esse Christi personam in duabus naturis, tamen in concilio Constantinopolitano ii magis ad sensum quam ad verba attendendum esse edocemur. Non enim ibi praecipitur ut duas dicamus naturas. Sed in canone septimo

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Now if operations and volitions are counted as natural properties, the assertion of this thesis follows at once, namely, that there are in Christ two natural operations and by the same token two natural wills. But this conclusion itself rests on a discovery. For thinking of operation and will only as natural depends on prescinding from what is more obvious – motive, object, circumstance, habit, and the capacities for operating and willing. Furthermore, volitions and operations would seem to pertain more to person than to nature. For it is not sense that senses; a human being senses through sense. Nor is it intellect that understands; a human being understands through intellect. And so for all the rest. For the person is the principle which operates and wills, while nature is only the principle by which a person operates and wills. Furthermore, insofar as operations and volitions are natural, they are not free and thus they would seem to pertain to a lower order of perfection. On the other hand, insofar as they are free, they ought not to be called merely natural but rather personal. If it is to be granted that in Christ there are two natural operations and two natural wills, much more should there be predicated one personal operation and one personal will, on account of the unity of his person. Furthermore, as Christ himself is not to be divided into ‘someone’ and ‘someone else,’ so also Christ’s operations and volitions proceed from a single one who operates and wills. It would seem that these are not united only through the unity of their principles-which, but that through the power of the divine nature and the perfect subordination of the human nature, they make between them one composite, theandric or divine-human operation, so to say. Furthermore, even if the monophysites taught one operation in Christ and one will in Christ (thesis 4, ‘Opinions,’ ii, points 12 and 13), still a conclusion need not be false just because its premises are false. What the monophysites concluded from an erroneous opinion concerning the one nature of Christ could also be concluded from the true doctrine concerning the one person of Christ, as seems obvious from what was said above. Thus, it is possible for Catholics to teach in a true sense the same thing that the monophysites taught erroneously. Furthermore, although it was determined at the Council of Chalcedon that in Christ there is one person in two natures, the Second Council of Constantinople instructs us to pay more attention to the meaning than to the words. For it does not require us to speak of two natures. Rather, in the

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habetur quod, si quis in duabus naturis dicit, hoc non debet intelligi sensu nestoriano (db 219, ds 428); et in canone octavo habetur quod, si quis ex duabus naturis dicit vel etiam si quis unam naturam Dei Verbi incarnatam dicit, hoc non debet intelligi sensu apollinaristico vel eutychiano (db 220, ds 429–30; cf. db 258, 259, ds 505, 506). Quam concilii oecumenici prudentiam imitantes, a quaestionibus subtilioribus forte praescindendum erit ut neque unam neque duas dicamus Christi operationes, vel saltem ut, omissa de operationibus quaestione, neque unam neque duas dicamus Christi voluntates. Neque denique tandem ipse concretus rerum status praetermitti debet qui saeculo septimo, quantum legitime fieri potuit, omnino suadebat ut favor monophysitarum captaretur. De re imperiali L. Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 4, 437–82; 5, 85–88, 111–24, 160–76, 183–92.2

Iustinianus, 483–565, imperator 527–65, modo magis systematico et magis absoluto quam quilibet e praedecessoribus in res ecclesiasticas atque doctrinales sese ingerebat (4, 439); neque umquam voluit monophysitas, praesertim severianos, eo tractare modo quo caeteros haereticos (4, 448), tum forte quia uxor atque imperatrix, Theodora, erat monophysita (4, 441–42), tum quia ipse credidit hanc haeresim magis e mentis confusione quam ex affectu haeretico subsistere; unde diu renitente Vigilio, secundum suam confessionem rectae fidei concilium Constantinopolitanum ii decernere iussit (4, 457–75).

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seventh canon we find that if anyone speaks in terms of two natures, this is not to be understood in a Nestorian sense (db 219, ds 428, [dec 1: 117]); and in the eighth canon we find that if anyone says ‘from two natures,’ or if anyone speaks of one nature of the Word of God, this ought not to be understood in an Apollinarian or Eutychian sense (db 220, ds 429–30 [dec 1: 117–18]; cf. db 258, 259, ds 505, 506). Following the prudent example of this ecumenical council, we should prescind entirely from such abstruse questions and speak neither of one nor of two operations of Christ, or else at least leave out the question as to operations and speak neither of one nor of two wills of Christ. Finally, there is the concrete seventh-century situation that made winning the favor of the monophysites, as far as that was legitimately possible, an urgent matter. The empire Sources are L. Bréhier, ‘Le politique religieuse de Justinien,’ in FlicheMartin, 4, 437–82; ‘Le crise de l’empire et le redressement d’Heraclius (611–632),’ Fliche-Martin, 5, 85–88; ‘La nouvelle crise religieuse: Juifs, monoénergisme, Islam (632–639),’ Fliche-Martin, 5, 111–24; ‘Le démembrement des Chrétientés orientales et le schisme monothélite (641–668),’ Fliche-Martin, 5, 160–76; and ‘Les derniers Héraclides: Rétablissement de la paix religieuse. Guerres civiles et invasions (668–715),’ Fliche-Martin, 5, 183–92.2 Justinian (483–565; emperor from 527) intruded himself into ecclesiastical and doctrinal matters in a more systematic and absolute way than any of his predecessors (Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 4, 439). He was never willing to treat the monophysites, Severian Monophysites especially, in the same way as other heretics, perhaps because his wife, the empress Theodora, was a monophysite (Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 4, 448), and because his own belief was that this heresy was rooted in confused thinking rather than heretical sympathies. Hence, at the Second Council of Constantinople he ordered Pope Vigilius, who had long resisted, to pronounce in favor of his own ‘confession of the right faith’ (Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 4, 457–75).

2 For Fliche-Martin, 4, see above, p. 227, note 17; Fliche-Martin, 5, is entitled Grégoire le Grand: Les états barbares et le conquête arabe (590–757). Subsequent references in this thesis to Bréhier’s contributions will give page numbers only.

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At saec. vii longe gravior erat imperii conditio. Ubi maior populi pars erat monophysitica, in Syria annis 611–29, in Aegypto annis 618–29, regnabant Persae. Anno 614, sub Chosroe ii, Ctesiphonte, habitum est conciliabulum de doctrinis christianorum, ex quo factum est ut ubique, urbe Hierosolymitana excepta, bene tractarentur monophysitae. Anno 616, Alexandriae, peracta est unio inter ecclesiam copticam et iacobitam (5, 88–90). Depulsis Persis (5, 97–98), minabatur potestas arabica, quae ante annum 641 omnem Mesopotamiam, omnem Syriam, fere totam obtinuit Aegyptum. Anno 642 ex urbe Alexandrina recessit potestas imperialis (5, 128–30, 152–54); eodem anno Cyrenaica, et anno sequenti Tripolitana ab Arabis sunt occupatae (5, 224); annis 655–57 occupatur Armenia; singulis annis 673–77 obsidetur urbs Constantinopolitana; ad finem saeculi septimi sub potestate arabica iacent et Armenia et tota Africa (5, 182, 203–205). Quibus in angustiis non defuerunt turbationes interiores, quarum imprimis memoranda est insubordinatio Olympii, exarchi Ravennatis, qui anno 649 iussus exercitum contra Romam, Martinum i, et concilium Lateranense conducere, Romam quidem venit sed concilium adeo non impedivit ut in Siciliam traiecerit amicitiam cum Arabis contra imperium initurus. Quam ob causam, praetextu proditionis Martinus i et Maximus Confessor postea martyria subierunt (5, 169–76).

Schemata historica 1 RR. PP.: Honorius i, 625–38; Severinus, 640; Ioannes iv, 640–42; Theodorus i, 642–49; Martinus i, 649–53; Eugenius i, 654–57; Vitalianus, 657–72; Adeodatus, 672–76; Donus, 676–78; Agatho, 678–81; Leo ii, 682–83. 2 Patriarchae Constantinopolitani: Sergius, 610–38; Pyrrhus, 638–42 et 655; Paulus, 642–54; Petrus, 655–67; Thomas, 667–69; Ioannes, 669–75; Constantinus, 675–77; Theodorus, 677–79; Georgius, 679–86.3

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But the condition of the empire was far graver in the seventh century. Syria and Egypt, where the greater part of the population was monophysite, were ruled by the Persians from 611–29 and from 618–29 respectively. Under Chosroes ii, an assembly concerning the Christians’ doctrines was held in 614 at [Seleucia‑] Ctesiphon; as a result the monophysites came to be treated well everywhere except in the city of Jerusalem. In 616 the Coptic and Jacobite churches were united at Alexandria (Bréhier, FlicheMartin, 5, 88–90). The Persians repelled, the empire was threatened by Arabian power, which by 641 held sway over all Mesopotamia and Syria and almost the whole of Egypt (Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 97–98). In 642 the imperial army withdrew from Alexandria (Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 128–30, 152–54); Cyrenaica was occupied by the Arabs in the same year, and Tripoli the year following; from 655 to 657 Armenia was occupied; the city of Constantinople was besieged each year from 673 to 677; by the end of the seventh century Armenia and the whole of Africa fell under Arabian rule (Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 182, 203–205). Even in these dire straits there was no lack of internal upheavals, of which the one most worth remembering is the insubordination of Olympius, exarch of Ravenna. Ordered to lead an army against Rome, Pope Martin i, and the Lateran Council, he arrived at Rome in 649; but, so far from disrupting the council, he crossed over to Sicily to forge an alliance with the Arabs against the empire. It was because of this that Martin i and Maximus the Confessor were later martyred on the pretext of treachery. Historical outline 1 Popes: Honorius i, 625–38; Severinus, 640; John iv, 640–42; Theodore i, 642–49, Martin i, 649–53; Eugenius i, 654–57; Vitalian, 657–72; Adeodatus, 672–76; Donus, 676–78; Agatho, 678–81; Leo ii, 682–83. 2 Patriarchs of Constantinople: Sergius, 610–38; Pyrrhus, 638-42 and 655; Paul, 642–54; Peter, 655–67; Thomas, 667–69; John, 669–75; Constantinus, 675–77; Theodore, 677–79; George, 679–86.3

3 Some of the names that appear in these two paragraphs are underlined in Lonergan’s text and others are not. The explanation would seem to be that those whose names are emphasized were more prominent than the others in the unfolding set of events.

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3 Monenergismus: ante 619 ad 634. Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 111–18; Jugie, dtc x (20) 2316–18; Grumel, Échos d’Orient 27 (1928) 6–16, 257–77; Cosma, De oeconomia incarnationis secundum S. Sophronium Hierosolymitanum (Romae: 1940) 37–61. Auctore Sergio, de unica Christi operatione consuluntur:4 Theodorus ep. Pharanitanus; Paulus cocles, primus inter acephalos5 in insula Cypro, anno 622; Cyrus, ep. Phasidensis, anno 626; Anathasius Camelarius,6 patriarcha monophysitus Antiochenus, anno 630. Eodem auctore fit propaganda in Armenia, Mesopotania, Syria, Persia; anno 631 vel 632 elevatur Cyrus in patr. Alexandrino; anno 633 fit unio cum monophysitis tum in Armenia tum Alexandriae.

4 Transitio, 634–38. Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 118–24; Jugie, dtc x (20) 2318–20; Grumel, Échos d’Orient 28 (1929) 19–34; 272–82; Cosma 61–80. Anno 634, Epistola synodica S. Sophronii, patriarcha Hierosolymitanus, ubi praecavetur periculum. Epistola Sergii ad Honorium; epistola prima Honorii ad Sergium. Scripsit quoque Honorius ad Cyrum et S. Sophronium, de quibus litteris Sergium certiorem fecit in epistola altera (Bréhier, 5, 123).7

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3 Monenergism: pre-619 to 634. Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 111–18; Jugie, ‘Monothélisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2316–18; V. Grumel, ‘Recherches sur l’histoire du monothélisme,’ Échos d’Orient 27 (1928) 6–16, 257–77; G. Cosma, De oecono­ mia incarnationis secundum S. Sophronium Hierosolymitanum (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Urbanianum, 1940) 37–61. On the authority of Sergius, the following were consulted about Christ’s single operation:4 Theodore, bishop of Pharan; Paul the One-eyed, chief of the acephali5 in the island of Cyprus, in 622; Cyrus, bishop of Phasis, in 626; and Athanasius Camelarius,6 monophysite patriarch of Antioch, in 630. On the same authority monenergism spread to Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Persia; in 631 or 632 Cyrus was elevated to the patriarchate of Alexandria; in 633 there was a union with the monophysites in Armenia and in Alexandria. 4 Transitional period, 634–38. Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 118–24; Jugie, ‘Monothélisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2318–20; Grumel, ‘Recherches sur l’histoire du monothélisme,’ Échos d’Orient 28 (1929) 19–34, 272–82; Cosma, De oecono­ miae incarnationis 61–80. In 634 the Synodical Letter of Sophronius, patriarch of Jerusalem, warned of the danger. Sergius wrote to Honorius, and Honorius wrote a first letter in reply to Sergius. Honorius also wrote to Cyrus and to Sophronius, informing Sergius of the fact in a second letter (Bréhier, 5, 123).7









4 Sergius in fact consulted even more widely, apparently canvassing for arguments in support of the monothelite position. Whether his motives were political (to make an overture to the monophysites) or theological (to undermine Chalcedon) is not clear. For a brief summary and discussion, see Andrew J. Ekonomou, Byzantine Rome and the Greek Popes (Lanham, md: Lexington, 2007) 85–87. 5 The acephali (‘headless’) were zealous monophysites who, for some three centuries, refused communion with the patriarchs of Alexandria after the latter had accepted the communion of Constantinople without exacting a formal repudiation of the Council of Chalcedon. They allied themselves with the Severian monophysites. 6 Lonergan’s Latin has ‘Anathasius,’ but the person meant is Athanasius i Camelarius (‘the Camel Driver’), patriarch of the ‘Jacobite’ (after a leading early bishop, Jacob Bardaeus) church, today the Syrian (Oriental) Orthodox Church. 7 Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh-Century Heresy: The Synodical Letter and Other Documents, ed. and trans. Pauline Allen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) provides a historical introduction and includes translations of

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5 Monothelismus, 638–48. Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 131–34, 141–45, 160–66; Jugie, dtc x (20) 2320; Grumel, Échos d’Orient 29 (1930) 16–28. Transitur ex quaestione generaliori circa unam vel duas operationes ad quaestionem particularem circa unam vel duas voluntates. Anno 638: editur Ecthesis Heraclii imperatoris; moriuntur tum Honorius i tum Sergius tum Sophronius. Anno 641: moritur Heraclius; breviter regnat Constantinus iii, monothelismo oppositus; coronatur Constans qui et doctrinam Chalcedonensem et monothelismum affirmavit (Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 162). RR. PP. Ecthesin respuunt. Anno 645: publica disputatio de voluntate Christi Carthagine habetur inter Pyrrhum, olim patriarcham Constantinopolitanam, et S. Maximum confessorem. Postea, Theodorus i, R. P., collectis sententiis episcoporum africanorum, a Paulo, patriarcho Constantinopolitano, adiurationem monothelismi exegit, quam tamen non obtinuit. 6 Stadium ultimum, 648–81. Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 165–76, 183–90. Anno 648: Typus Constantis. Anno 649: concilium Lateranense. Anno 653: Martinus i et Maximus confessor Constantinopolim trahuntur, iudicantur, exilio castigantur. Anno 657: reconciliatio aliqualis inter Vitalianum, Romanum Pontificem, et Constantem imperatorem. Anno 668: interficitur Constans; succedit Constatinus iv. Anno 677: Theodorus, patriarcha Constantinopolitanus, et Macarius, patriarcha Antiochenus, contra Romam uniuntur; quibus non consentit imperator et conferentiam theologicam inter orientales et occidentales instituere vult. Anno 680: concilium Romanum. Annis 680–81: concilium Constantinopolitanum iii. Sententiae 1 Apollinaristae unam operationem unamque voluntatem in Christo, homine caelesti, ex Verbo et carne composito, agnoverunt. Lietzmann8 198–99;

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­5 Monothelitism, 638–48. Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 131–34, 141–45, 160–66; Jugie, ‘Monothélisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2320; Grumel, ‘Recherches sur l’histoire du monothélisme,’ Échos d’Orient 29 (1930) 16–28. From the more general question of one operation or two operations, debate passed to the particular question of one will or two wills. In 638 the emperor Heraclius issued his Ekthesis or ‘statement of faith’; Honorius i, Sergius, and Sophronius died. In 641 Heraclius died; Constantine iii, an opponent of monothelitism, reigned briefly; Constans, who affirmed both monothelitism and the teaching of Chalcedon, was crowned (Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 162). Successive popes repudiated the Ekthesis. In 645 a public disputation on the will of Christ was held at Carthage between Pyrhhus, formerly patriarch of Constantinople, and Maximus the Confessor. Afterwards, Pope Theodore i, having gathered the opinions of the African bishops, demanded from Paul, patriarch of Constantinople, a disavowal of monothelitism – which he did not get. 6 The final stage, 648–81. Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 165–76, 183–90. In 648 Constans issued his Typos. In 649 the Lateran Council was held. In 653 [Pope] Martin i and Maximus the Confessor were brought to Constantinople, condemned, and exiled. In 657 Pope Vitalian and the emperor Constans were in some degree reconciled. In 668 Constans was killed; Constantine iv succeeded him. In 667 Theodore, patriarch of Constantinople, and Macarius, patriarch of Antioch, joined forces against Rome; the emperor withheld his consent and insisted on holding a theological conference between Easterns and Westerns. In 680 the Council of Rome was held and in 680–81 the Third Council of Constantinople. Opinions 1 The Apollinarians acknowledged one operation and one will in Christ, the heavenly man composed of the Word and flesh. See Lietzmann8 198–

the following documents pertinent to this section: (1) Cyrus, First Letter to Sergius; (2) Sergius, First Letter to Cyrus; (3) Cyrus, Announcement, Pact of Union, or Nine Articles of Faith; (4) Cyrus, Second Letter to Sergius; (5) Sergius, Second Letter to Cyrus; (6) Sergius, First Letter to Honorius; (7) Honorius, First Letter to Sergius; (8) Honorius, Second Letter to Sergius; (9) Ekthesis. 8 See above, p. 185, note 6.

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273; Xiberta 119, 121, §§ 67, 75. Circa Aetium, cf. V. Grumel, Échos d’Orient 28 (1929) 159–66. 2 Monophysitae severiani docuerunt unam operationem et unam voluntatem, non quia differentiam in qualitate naturali inter voluntatem divinam et humanam, inter operationem divinam et humanam, sustulerint, sed quia operationes et volitiones secundum duas naturas dividere noluerunt cum unam tantum naturam agnoscerent. Vide thesin quartam, Sententiae, ii, 12 et 13. 3 Theodorus ep. Pharanitanus (Pharan in peninsula sinaitica) Fragmenta servata inter acta concilii Constantinopolitani iii, actio 13a, Mansi, xi, 568–72. Xiberta, Enchir. 640–41. V. Grumel, Échos d’Orient 27 (1928) 259–65. É. Amann, dtc xv (29) 279– 82. W. Elert, Der Ausgang der altkirchlichen Christologie (Berlin, 1957). Opus posthumum acatholicum. Habebatur princeps theoriae monenergeticae. Ab Amann reputatur monophysita, ab aliis chalcedonensis. Differentiam operationum non tollit, sed operationes Verbi incarnati magis habet unitas quam operationes unius hominis; omnis operatio incipit a Verbo et perfecte per instrumentum humanitatis absolvitur; neque deest tendentia quaedam Gaianitana quasi Christus naturaliter super aquas ambulasset, fores pertransisset, etc.

4 Cyrus, patriarcha Alexandrinus Unio cum monophysitis alexandrinis, anno 633: Mansi, xi, 563–68. Xiberta, Enchir. 636–37.9 Christus in duabus naturis contemplatur. Unus Christus et Filius operatur divina et humana per unam deivirilem operationem. Sola contemplatione discernuntur ea e quibus facta est unitio naturalis et secundum hypostasin; quae tamen inconfusa et inconvertibilia manent.

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99; Xiberta, Enchiridion 119, 121, §§ 67, 75. On Aetius, see Grumel, ‘Les textes monothélites d’Aétius,’ Échos d’Orient 28 (1929) 159–66. 2 The Severian monophysites taught one operation and one will, not because they maintained a difference in natural quality between the divine and the human will, or between the divine and the human operation, but because they would not divide the operations and volitions according to the two natures, since they acknowledged only one nature. See thesis 4, ‘Opinions,’ ii, §§ 12 and 13. 3 Theodore, bishop of Pharan (on the Sinai peninsula). Fragments of his writings are preserved among the acts of the Third Council of Constantinople, 13; Mansi, 11, 568–72; Xiberta, Enchiridion 640– 41. Grumel, ‘Recherches sur l’histoire du monothélisme,’ Échos d’Orient 27 (1928) 259–65; É. Amann, ‘Théodore de Pharan,’ dtc 15 (29) 279–82. W. Elert, Der Ausgang der altkirchlichen Christologie (Berlin: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1957), the posthumous work of a non-Catholic. Theodore is held to be the principal theorist of monenergism. He is considered a monophysite by Amann, a Chalcedonian by others. He does not do away with the difference between the operations, but for him the incarnate Word’s operations have a greater unity than the operations of a single human being. Every operation begins from the Word and is perfectly carried out by the instrument of his humanity. A certain tendency to Gaianitism is present, as though Christ naturally walked on the water, passed through the door, and so on. 4 Cyrus, patriarch of Alexandria On the union with the Alexandrian monophysites in 633, see Mansi, 11, 563–68; Xiberta, Enchiridion 636–37.9 Christ is considered in his two natures. The one Christ and Son operates divine and human [works] through one theandric operation. Only in mental consideration are those things discriminated from which there has come about a natural uniting on the basis of hypostasis; but these nevertheless remain unconfused and unconvertible.

9 Cyrus’s announcement of the union, along with two letters to Sergius, are available in English translation in Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh-Century Heresy (see above, note 7).

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Adeo premi videtur neochalcedonismus ut negligatur decretum Chalcedonense. 5 S. Sophronius patriarcha Hierosolymitanus, ob. 638 Altaner10 483; Mansi, xi, 461–510; mg 87/3, 3147–4014; G. Bardy, dtc xiv (28) 2379–83; G. Cosma, De oeconomia incarnationis 61–80; Bréhier, FlicheMartin, 5, 120, 123; Xiberta, Enchir. 643–47, §§ 6, 7, 13, speciatim. Epistola eius synodica exponit doctrinam catholicam, nempe, unum operantem, duas naturas, per naturalem operationum differentiam innotescere duas naturas, quin doctrina nestoriana de duabus personis sequatur; agnoscere unam tantum operationem est agnoscere unam tantum naturam.

6 Sergius, patriarcha Constantinopolitanus, ob. 638 Epistola ad Honorium, anno 634. Mansi, xi, 529–38.11 Xiberta, Enchir. 637–39. Quaestionem quasi aliunde de una vel duabus operationibus ortam exponit; Cyrus, patriarcha Alexandrinus, ad veram fidem multos in haeresi languentes nuper reduxit; unum tamen manet capitulum, de quo censet Sophronius duas operationes esse dicendas, de quo autem ipse, spectata prudentia PP., neque unam neque duas dicere mallet in tanta animarum necessitate et periculo. Certo duas et contrarias in Christo voluntates agnoscere impium esset. Inconveniens videtur sive unam dicis operationem sive duas, ideoque confitendum ‘unigenitum Filium Dei, qui veraciter Deus simul et homo est, eundem operari divina et humana et ex eo uno eodemque incarnato Deo Verbo … inseparabiliter et indivise omnem divinam et humanam operationem procedere. Hoc namque nos Leo Dei portitor instruit manifeste perhibens: Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium habet.’ Mansi, xi, 537 a. Xiberta, Enchir. 639, § 19.

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Indeed, Cyrus seems to have pressed neo-Chalcedonianism to the point of neglecting the Chalcedonian decree. 5 Sophronius, patriarch of Jerusalem (died 638) Altaner10 438; Mansi, 11, 461–510; mg 87/3, 3147–4014; G. Bardy, ‘Sophrone de Jérusalem,’ dtc 14 (28) 2379–83; G. Cosma, De oeconomia incarna­ tionis 61–80; Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 120, 123; Xiberta, Enchiridion 643–47, specifically §§ 6, 7, and 13. The Synodical Letter of Sophronius sets forth the Catholic teaching, namely, that there is one who operates, that there are two natures, that two natures are known through the natural difference of operations, without following the Nestorian doctrine of two persons. To acknowledge only one operation is to acknowledge only one nature [see Allen (note 7 above), 66–156]. 6 Sergius, patriarch of Constantinople (died 638) For his letter of 634 to Honorius, see Mansi, 11, 529–38;11 Xiberta, Enchiridion 637–39. Sergius sets out the question of one or two operations as if it had arisen elsewhere. Cyrus, patriarch of Alexandria, had lately brought back to the true faith many who were languishing in heresy; there remains one issue, however, on which Sophronius considers ‘two operations’ the right way to speak, but on which he himself, with an eye to the prudence of the popes, would prefer – so great is the need and the danger to souls – to speak neither of one nor of two. Certainly it would be irreverent to acknowledge two contrary wills in Christ. It seems inappropriate to say either ‘one operation’ or ‘two,’ and so it should be confessed that ‘the only-begotten Son of God, who truly is at the same time God and man, operates what is divine and what is human equally, and from that one and the same incarnate God the Word … there proceeds, inseparably and undividedly, every divine and human operation. For this indeed is what Leo the messenger of God instructed us, asserting plainly: “For each form does in communion with the other what properly belongs to it.”’ Mansi, 11, 537 a; Xiberta, Enchiridion 639, § 19.

10 See above, p. 7, note 3. 11 Available in English in Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh-Century Heresy.

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7 Honorius i, ob. 638 db 251–52, ds 487–88; Hefele-Leclercq, iii/1, 347–65, 376–87, 515–38; E. Amann, dtc vii (13) 93–132; V. Grumel, Échos d’Orient 28 (1929) 272–82; M. Jugie, dtc x (20) 2318–19. Mansi, xi, 537–44, 579–82; Xiberta, Enchir. 616–17.12 Brevissime: Sergio consensit. Plura in Scholio i.

8 Ecthesis Heraclii, 641 Mansi, x, 991–98;13 Xiberta, Enchir. 634–36; Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 132; Grumel, Échos d’Orient 29 (1930) 16–28; Jugie, dtc x (20) 2308. Ut evitetur scandalum, excludit tum unam operationem tum duas. Unam voluntatem (hen theleFma) agnoscendam affirmat, si quidem Nestorius, qui duos docuit filios, duas tamen et contrarias voluntates asserere non est ausus. ‘Unde et sanctos patres in omnibus et in hoc sequentes, unam voluntatem Domini nostri Iesu Christi verissimi Dei confitemur, utpote in nullo tempore caro eius intellectualiter animata propriam physicam motionem produxit separatim et sua sponte contra nutum Dei Verbi hypostatice ei uniti.’ Mansi, x, 996 c; Xiberta, Enchir. 635, § 4.

9 S. Maximus Chrysopolitanus, confessor 580–662 Altaner 484–86; mg 90, 91; Xiberta, Enchir. 647–59; Grumel, dtc x (19) 448–50 (vita), 450–53 (opera), 453–60 (doctrina); Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 163, 173–75. Quaestionem maxime clarificavit. Distinxit: voluntas (theleFma), volitio (theleFsis), volitum (theleFton). Voluntas et volitio non semper distinguuntur; sed proprie voluntas dicit tendentiam in bonum, facultatem boni, potentiam auto-determinationis; volitio autem significat actum quendam determinatum.

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7 Honorius i (died 638) db 251–52, ds 487–88; Hefele-Leclercq, 3/1, 347–65, 376–87, 515–38; É. Amann, ‘Honorius i,’ dtc 7 (13) 93–132; V. Grumel, ‘Recherches sur l’histoire du monothélisme,’ Échos d’Orient 28 (1929) 272–82; M. Jugie, ‘Monothélisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2318–19; Mansi, 11, 537–44, 579–82; Xiberta, Enchiridion 616–17.12 To put it very briefly, Honorius agreed with Sergius. See further in scholion 1 [pp. 352–59]. 8 The Ekthesis of Heraclius, 641 Mansi, 10, 991–98;13 Xiberta, Enchiridion 634–36; Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 132; Grumel, ‘Recherches sur l’histoire du monothélisme,’ Échos d’Orient 29 (1930) 16–28; Jugie, ‘Monothélisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2308. In order to avoid scandal, the Ekthesis excludes one operation and two operations alike. It affirms that one will (hen theleFma) must be acknowledged, since [even] Nestorius, who taught that there are two sons, still did not dare to say there are two contrary wills. ‘Thus, following the holy Fathers both in this and in all things, we confess the one will of our Lord Jesus Christ the most true God, seeing that at no time did his flesh, intellectually animated, produce its own physical motion separately and of its own doing, contrary to the behest of the Word of God hypostatically united with it.’ Mansi, 10, 996 c; Xiberta, Enchiridion 635, § 4. 9 Maximus of Chrysopolis, ‘the Confessor,’ 580–662 Altaner 484–86; mg 90–91; Xiberta, Enchiridion 647–59; Grumel, dtc 10 (19) 448–50 (life), 450–53 (works), 453–60 (teaching); Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 163, 173–75. Maximus greatly clarified the question. He distinguished between [the capacity] will (theleFma), [the act] willing (theleFsis), and that which is willed (theleFton). Between will and willing a distinction is not always drawn. But, properly speaking, ‘will’ denotes a tendency towards good, a capacity for the good, the power of self-determination; ‘willing,’ however, refers to some determinate act.

12 His two letters to Sergius are reproduced in English translation in Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh-Century Heresy. 13 English translation in Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh-century Heresy.

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Ulterius distinxit: voluntatem naturalem (theleFma phusikon) et voluntatem gnomicam vel electivam (theleFma gnoFmikon, proairetikon). Voluntas naturalis tendit naturaliter in obiecta naturalia (ta kata phusin), et in omni ente invenitur. Quia in Christo duae sunt naturae, duae pariter sunt voluntates naturales. Voluntas gnomica vel electiva supponit ignorantiam et deliberationem; est non naturalis sed personalis (hupostatikeF); sicut in Christo defuit ignorantia, ita in eo defuit voluntas gnomica seu electiva. Libertas Christi est sicut beatorum in caelis; meritum Christi non tractatum est. Vide Grumel 456; excerpta apud Xiberta, Enchir.14 10 Paulus, Patriarcha Constantinopolitanus, ob. 653 Mansi, x, 1024, Xiberta Enchir. 654. Affirmat unam Christi voluntatem, ut excludat duos volentes, ut excludat adversitatem, oppositionem, duarum voluntatum, non ut sit confusio vel commixtio, neque ob peremptionem alterius voluntatis. 11 Typus Constantis ii, 648 Mansi, x, 1029–32; Xiberta, Enchir. 636; Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 166; Jugie, dtc x (20) 2308. Excludit omnem altercationem, contentionem, rixam, tum de una vo­ luntate, una operatione, tum de duabus voluntatibus, duabus operationibus. 12 Concilium Lateranense, Concilium Romanum, Concilium Constantinopolitanum iii (db 254–74, 288–93, ds 500–22, 548–63); Hefele-Leclercq, iii/1, 317–538. 13 Macarius, episcopus Antiochenus Mansi, xi, 349–60; Xiberta, Enchir. 641–43; Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 188. Depositus est in concilio Constantinopolitano iii, quia nisi unam voluntatem in Christo non confitebatur.

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He further distinguished between natural will (theleFma physikon) and ‘gnomic’ or elective will (theleFma gnoFmikon, proairetikon). Natural will tends naturally towards natural objects (ta kata physin), and is found in every being. Since in Christ there are two natures, there are likewise two natural wills. ‘Gnomic’ or elective will supposes ignorance and deliberation; it is not natural but personal (hypostatikeF). As there was no ignorance in Christ, so there was no ‘gnomic’ or elective will. Christ’s freedom is like that of the blessed in heaven; the merit of Christ is not treated. See Grumel 456; excerpts in Xiberta, Enchiridion.14 10 Paul, patriarch of Constantinople (died 654) Manxi, 10, 1024; Xiberta, Enchiridion 654. Paul affirms one will of Christ, so as to rule out two who are willing, so as to rule out discord or opposition of two wills, so as to have no confusion, no intermingling, no interference by another will. 11 The Typos of Constans ii, 648 Mansi, 10, 1029–32; Xiberta, Enchiridion 636; Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 166; Jugie, ‘Monothélisme,’ dtc 10 (20) 2308. This document rules out any debate, contention, or quarrel, whether about one will, one operation, or about two wills, two operations. 12 The Lateran Council, the Council of Rome, and the Third Council of Constantinople (db 254–74, 288–93, ds 500–22, 548–63, [dec 1: 124–30]); Hefele-Leclercq, 3/1, 317–538 [see above, note 6]. 13 Macarius, bishop of Antioch Mansi, 11, 349–60; Xiberta, Enchiridion 641–43; Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 188. Macarius was deposed at the Third Council of Constantinople because he would confess only one will in Christ.

14 A selection of Maximus’s writings against the monothelites is available in English translation in Maximus the Confessor and His Companions: Documents from Exile, ed., intro., trans., notes by Pauline Allen and Bronwen Neil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

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14 S. Ioannes Damascenus, ob. 749, certo ante 753 Altaner 488–92. mg 94–96. M. Jugie, dtc viii (15) 693–751 Systematice evolvit mentem S. Maximi tum circa voluntatem tum circa operationem. Linguae graecae divitias exhibet; vide Jugie, loc. cit., 713, 734, 735. Breviter: distinguenda sunt (1) energeia, potentia vel etiam actus, (2) to energein, actus, (3) to ti energein, actus determinatus, (4) to poFs energein, bene vel male, (5) to energeFton, to energeFma, operatum, (6) to energeFtikon, principium operandi, natura, (7) ho energoFn, operans. Ubi (1), (2), (5), (6) sunt naturalia et in Christo duo; ubi (3), (4), (7) sunt personalia et in Christo unum. Naturalia etiam sunt: to thelein, heF theleFsis, to theleFma phusikon, to theleFma, heF theleFtikeF dunamis, toF theleFtikon, et haec in Christo sunt duo.

Personalia autem sunt: to ti thelein = heF bouleFsis et respicit to telos = to boul­ eFton; to poFs thelein = bouleF, bouleusis, et respicit medium, to bouleuton; krisis, iudicium; gnoFmeF, iudicium approbativum; proairesis = theleFma proairetikon = theleFma gnoFmikon; hormeF pros praxin; ho theloFn; et haec in Christo sunt unum, cum unus fuerit Christus Deus et homo, neque aliud et aliud voluerit sed idem.

Adversarii In concilio Lateranensi (db 271–72, ds 518–20) nominatim condemnati sunt Theodorus Pharanitanus, Cyrus Alexandrinus, Sergius Constantinopolitanus, Sergii successores Pyrrhus et Paulus. Etiam ibidem condemnatur Ecthesis, cuius auctor fuit Sergius, Typus, cuius auctor fuit Paulus. Modo generali condemnatur quilibet similiter sentiens, quicumque fuerit, sive episcopus, aut presbyter, vel diaconus, aut monachus, vel laicus. In concilio Constantinopolitano iii, nominatim condemnantur iidem

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14 John of Damascus (died 749, or certainly before 753) Altaner 488–92; mg 94–96; M. Jugie, ‘Jean Damascène,’ dtc 8 (15) 693– 751. John systematically developed the thinking of Maximus on will and operation. His work displays the riches of the Greek language; see Jugie, ‘Jean Damascène,’ dtc 8 (15) 713, 734, 735. Briefly, the following are to be distinguished: (1) energeia, potency, also act; (2) to energein, act; (3) to ti energein, determinate act; (4) to poFs energein, the ‘how’ of acting well or badly; (5) to energeFton, to energeFma, that which is operated; (6) to energeFtikon, nature, the principle of operating; (7) ho ener­ goFn, operator, the one operating. Of these, (1), (2), (5), and (6) are natural and in Christ there are two of each, while (3), (4), and (7) are personal and in Christ there is one. Also natural are to thelein [desire], heF theleFsis [will, in the sense of the natural appetitive movement of the soul], to theleFma physikon [natural will], to theleFma [the faculty, will], heF theleFtikeF dynamis [the power of will], to theleFtikon [capacity for willing]. Of each of these, in Christ, there are two. The following, however, are personal. To ti thelein [that which is willed], which is equivalent to heF bouleFsis [rational desire for a determinate end] and regards to telos [the end], equivalent to to bouleFton [the object of desire]; to poFs thelein [the ‘how’ of willing], which is equivalent to bouleF, bouleusis [deliberation], and regards the means, to bouleuton; krisis, judgment [regarding appropriate means]; gnoFmeF, approving judgment; proairesis [choice, decision], equivalent to theleFma proairetikon [choosing will], equivalent in turn to theleFma gnoFmikon [approving will]; hormeF pros praxin [drive to action]; ho theloFn [the one who wills]. Of each of these, in Christ, there is one, since God and man were one Christ, and it was the same one, not different ones, who willed. Opponents of the thesis Condemned by name at the Lateran Council (db 271–72, ds 518–20) were Theodore of Pharan, Cyrus of Alexandria, Sergius of Constantinople, and Sergius’s successors Pyrrhus and Paul. The same council condemned the Ekthesis of Sergius and the Typos of Paul. There was a general condemnation of all who held similar opinions, whoever they might be, whether bishop or presbyter, deacon, monk, or layman. Those condemned by name at the Third Council of Constantinople were

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Theodorus, Cyrus, Sergius, Pyrrhus, Paulus; iis adiunguntur Petrus, patriarcha Constantinopolitanus, et Honorius, Romanus Pontifex, de quo separatim in scholio agemus (ds 550–52). Error adversariorum 1 In genere non erant monophysitae. Cyrus agnovit Christum in duabus naturis; neque obstat quod ‘sola contemplatione’ eas distinxit, cum similiter locuti sint orthodoxi (db 219, 288, ds 428, 548). Ecthesis confessa est Christum ex duabus naturis et in duabus naturis (Xiberta, Enchir. 635, § 2). Typus pariter agnovit duas naturas (Xiberta, Enchir. 636, § 5). Macarius ep. Antiochenus, qui ipsum concilium Constantinopolitanum iii acceptare noluit, Christum in duabus naturis confessus est. Mansi, xi, 354 b. Credit quidem É. Amann Theodorum ep. Pharanitanum fuisse monophysitam, sed alii huic iudicio adversantur. 2 Neque error in eo erat quod quoad rem negatae sunt duae naturales operationes vel duae naturales voluntates. Ne monophysitae quidem (severiani) ita senserunt. Omnibus obvium erat divinitatem non comedere, bibere, dormire, passionem refugere. 3 Neque erronee statuebatur perfecta subordinatio operationis vel volitionis humanae ad divinam. Sane in hac subordinatione insistebant monenergetae et monothelitae; vide Xiberta, Enchir. 635–41, §§ 4, 18, 23, 25, 27, 31. Et per hanc subordinationem perfectam habuerunt ‘unam’ operationem et ‘unam’ volitionem, nempe, unitam et ab una persona procedentem. Sane eandem subordinationem docuerunt monophysitae severiani; vide thesin quartam, Sententias, ii, 13. Imo, in hac subordinatione posuit ipsam haeresim J. Tixeront, Histoire des Dogmes, iii, 172–75, Paris 1912.15

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the same – Theodore, Cyrus, Sergius, Pyrrhus, and Paul – with the addition of Peter, patriarch of Constantinople, and Pope Honorius, whom we consider separately in a scholion below (ds 550–52). The error of these opponents 1 They were not, in general, monophysites. Cyrus acknowledged Christ in two natures; the fact that he distinguished these ‘only in mental consideration’ is not against this, since the orthodox spoke in a similar way (db 219, 288; ds 428, 548; [dec 1: 117]). The Ekthesis confesses that Christ is from two natures and in two natures (Xiberta, Enchiridion 635, § 2). The Typos likewise acknowledges two natures (Xiberta, Enchiridion 636, § 5). Macarius, bishop of Antioch, who would not accept the Third Council of Constantinople itself, did confess Christ in two natures (Mansi, 11, 354 b). É. Amann believes that Theodore, bishop of Pharan, was a monophysite, but others have contested this judgment. 2 Nor did their error lie in denying two natural operations or two natural wills as regards reality. Not even those monophysites known as Severians were of that opinion. It was plain to everyone that divinity does not eat, drink, sleep, or seek to avoid suffering. ­3 Nor was their error constituted by holding a perfect subordination of the human operation or volition to the divine. Indeed, the monenergists and monothelites insisted on this subordination; see Xiberta, Enchiridion 635–41, §§ 4, 18, 23, 25, 27, and 31. And this perfect subordination does lead to ‘one’ operation and ‘one’ volition, in that these are united and proceed from one person. Just such a subordination was taught by the Severian monophysites; see thesis 4, ‘Opinions,’ ii, point 13. J. Tixeront does locate the heresy in this subordination (Histoire des dog­ mes [Paris, 1912], 3, 172–75).15 15 Joseph Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes dans l’antiquité chrétienne, vol. 3, La fin de l’âge patristique (Paris: Librairie Victor LeCoffre, 1912). There is an English translation, The History of Dogmas, vol. 3, The End of the Patristic Age, trans. Henry L. Brianceau (St Louis: B. Herder, 1916); see pp. 163–67.

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Sed, uti demonstravit M. Jugie, eadem perfecta subordinatio erat doctrina S. Sophronii, S. Maximi, S. Ioannis Damasceni, S. Thomae Aquinati (dtc x [20], 2311–13). Imo, perfecta subordinatio docetur a concilio Constantinopolitano iii (db 291, ds 556).

4 Verum est adversarios noluisse de naturalibus operationibus, voluntatibus, loqui, vel naturales numerare. Pyrrhus, in dialogo cum S. Maximo (mg 91, 304 a, Xiberta, Enchir. 654, § 44): ‘Byzantini autem voluntatibus naturalibus adversantes …’ Idem confirmatur per totam sententiarum seriem: Theodorus unam operationem et unam voluntatem dicebat; Cyrus unam operationem affirmavit; Sergius neque unam operationem neque duas voluit sed unam tamen voluntatem; Ecthesis similiter; Typus pariter exclusit et unam et duas operationes et unam et duas voluntates. 5 Sed hoc ipsum facit difficultatem. Non enim solet ecclesia eos damnare qui modum loquendi evitant, quasi quaestio de solis verbis vel de mera terminologia esset. Et ideo res profundius considerari debet ut, scilicet, a verbis et terminis ad motiva et principia ascendamus.

6 Primo ergo notamus saec. septimo factam esse evolutionem dogmatis: in prioribus conciliis determinatum erat unam in Christo esse personam, duas autem esse naturas, salvis proprietatibus utriusque naturae; hoc autem saeculo determinatum est de operationibus et voluntatibus, nempe, eas esse duas secundum naturas et non16 unam secundum personam.

7 Principium deinde, quod evolutioni suberat, a S. Maximo, S. Damasceno, S. Thoma Aquinate sic enuntiatur: S. Maximus: ‘Omnis quippe homo, in quantum est aliquid secundum naturam, non in quantum est aliquis secundum hypostasin, naturalem habet facultatem operandi …’ (mg 90, 152 b); Xiberta, Enchir. 659, § 56.

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But, as M. Jugie has shown, this same perfect subordination was the teaching of Sophronius, Maximus, John of Damascus, and Thomas Aquinas (‘Monothélisme,’ dtc 10 [20] 2311–13). At the same time, the Third Council of Constantinople teaches a perfect subordination (db 291, ds 556, [dec 1: 128–29]). 4 It is true that the opponents [named above] were unwilling to speak of natural operations or wills, and to enumerate those things that are natural. Pyrrhus states in his dialogue with Maximus that ‘the Byzantines, however, are opposed to natural wills’ (mg 91, 304 a; Xiberta, Enchiridion 654, § 44). The whole series of opinions confirms this. Theodore spoke of one operation and one will; Cyrus affirmed one operation; Sergius would have neither one operation nor two, but only one will, and the same goes for the Ekthesis; the Typos rules out equally both one operation and two and also one will and two. 5 But that is what creates the difficulty. The church is not accustomed to condemning those who avoid a manner of speaking, as though the question were merely terminological, a matter of words only. And thus we ought to consider the matter more deeply, so as to get beyond words and terms to motives and principles. 6­ In the first place, then, we note a development of dogma took place in the seventh century. The earlier councils had determined that there is one person in Christ, but that there are two natures, the properties of each nature being preserved. In the seventh century what was determined had to do with operations and wills: namely, that they are two, in accordance with the two natures, and not16 one, in accordance with the one person. 7 In the second place, the principle behind this development is set out by Maximus, John of Damascus, and Thomas Aquinas as follows: Maximus: ‘Every man has a natural faculty of operating insofar as he is something on the basis of nature, and not insofar as he is someone on the basis of hypostasis’ (mg 90, 152 b; Xiberta, Enchiridion p. 659, § 56).

16 The edition of 1964 omits non, which is demanded by the context and which Lonergan had written in the 1960 and 1961 editions.

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S. Ioannes Damascenus: ‘Ast inquit: voluntas non naturae est sed personae. Quam vero dicitis voluntatem? Num vim eam qua volumus, ac velle simpliciter, ac naturale volitum; an modum utendi voluntate, hoc est, to sic velle atque quod pro nostro arbitratu et libidine volumus? Verum si vim voluntatis ac velle simpliciter ad personam dicatis pertinere, falsum decernitis …’ (mg 95, 165; Xiberta, Enchir. 675, § 108).17 S. Thomas: ‘… operari est personae a natura …’ Sum. theol., 3, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4m. 8 Quo intellecto principio, sequitur monophysitas unam naturam agnoscentes necessario et unam operationem et unam voluntatem naturalem concludere; e contra, chalcedonenses duas naturas ponentes necessario et duas naturales operationes et duas naturales voluntates concludere.

9 Quibus perspectis, elucet quinam fuerit error adversariorum. Inquantum enim unam operationem vel unam voluntatem defendebant, non ipsum monophysismum sed conclusionem monophysismi defendebant. Neque obstat quod quoad rem in hac conclusione asserenda non errabant;18 nam error monophysismi severiani non erat materialis sed formalis, neque in eo consistebat quod monophysitae falsa de Christo senserunt praeter hoc quod duas in eo naturas negabant. Inquantum autem duas operationes vel duas voluntates confiteri nolebant, conclusionem theologice certam ex concilio Chalcedonensi evitabant. Nota Quod Christus tum ut Deus tum ut homo et operatur et vult, de fide divina et catholica. Quod realiter distinguuntur operatio divina et operatio Christi humana, quod realiter pariter distinguuntur voluntas divina et voluntas Christi hu-

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John of Damascus: ‘Yet it is said, “Will belongs not to nature but to person.” But what do you mean by “will”? Do you mean that power by which we will, the act of willing pure and simple, what is willed by nature? Or do you mean the way we use the will, that is, the ‘how’ of willing, and what we will by our own choice and desire? Should you say that the power of will, the act of will pure and simple, pertains to the person, you judge falsely indeed …’ (mg 95, 165; [Kotter (see Bibliography, 4: 213]; Xiberta, Enchiridion 675, § 108).17 Thomas Aquinas: ‘To operate belongs to a person from his nature’ (Sum­ ma theologiae, 3, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4m). 8 Once this principle is understood, it follows that the monophysites, who acknowledged only one nature, necessarily concluded that there is one operation and one natural will; the Chalcedonians, on the contrary, held that there are two natures and necessarily concluded that there are two natural operations and two natural wills. 9 In light of all this, it is clear where the error of the opponents lay. To the extent that they defended one operation or one will, they defended, not monophysitism itself, but a conclusion that follows from monophysitism. Nor is this in conflict with the fact that they did not err as regards reality by asserting this conclusion.18 The error of the Severian monophysites was not material but formal; nor did the false opinions about Christ held by the monophysites consist in anything besides the fact that they denied there are two natures in him. However, to the extent that they were unwilling to confess two operations or two wills, the opponents named above evaded a theologically certain conclusion that follows from the decree of the council of Chalcedon. Theological note of the thesis That Christ operates and wills both as God and as man is of divine and catho­ lic faith. That the divine operation and Christ’s human operation are really distinct, that the divine will and Christ’s human will are likewise really distinct,

17 Lonergan made his own Latin translation directly from the Greek text in Migne, which the editors also consulted. 18 See § 2 above, p. 337.

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mana, et ideo in eodem Christo duae sunt naturales operationes et duae sunt naturales voluntates, de fide definita in concilio Constantinopolitano iii (db 291, 292, ds 556–58). Quoad principium quod subauditur, scilicet, operari et ideo velle est personae a natura, theologice certum ex definita doctrina tum trinitaria tum christologica. probatio pars 1: de ipsis realitatibus 1 Ex tractatibus de Deo uno et de Deo trino Deus est actus purus perfectione infinitus non solum essendi sed etiam intelligendi, amandi, operandi. Qui quidem actus est tribus personis communis. Quare, Deus Filius exercet operationem infinitam et volitionem infinitam. 2 Sed Deus Filius ut homo etiam exercuit actum volendi humanum, nam Deo Patri obedivit et propterea exaltatus est et multi constituti sunt iusti. Phil 2.8–9: … factus obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis. Propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum … Rom 5.19: Sicut enim per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per unius obeditionem iusti constituentur multi. Mc 14.36: Pater, omnia tibi possibilia sunt, transfer calicem hunc a me: sed non quod ego volo, sed quod tu. Ubi exhibentur (1) voluntas Patris quae eadem est ac voluntas Filii qua Dei, ubi dicitur ‘quod tu’; (2) voluntas Filii qua hominis quatenus voluntas est naturalis tendentia in bonum, ubi dicitur ‘transfer calicem hunc a me’ et ‘quod ego volo’; (3) voluntas Filii qua hominis quatenus voluntas dicit electionem et, hoc in casu, obedientiam, ubi dicitur ‘non quod ego volo sed quod tu’; nam ipsum hoc totum volitionem quandam exprimit, eamque non divinam sed humanam.

3 Multipliciter in evangeliis constat Christum operationes humanas exercuisse, uti cognoscere, docere, colloqui, manducare, bibere, dormire, itinera facere, deambulare.

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and that hence there are in the same Christ two natural wills and two natural operations is of defined faith, from the Third Council of Constantinople (db 291, 292, ds 556–58, [dec 1: 128–30]). As for the unstated principle – to operate, and therefore to will, belongs to a person from his nature – it is theologically certain, from defined doctrine, both Trinitarian and Christological. Proof part 1: the realities themselves 1 Argument from the treatises on the One God and on the Triune God God is pure act, infinite in perfection not only of being but also of understanding, loving, and operating. This act is common to the three persons. Hence, God the Son exercises an infinite operation and an infinite act of willing. 2 But God the Son, as man, also exercised a human act of willing, for he was obedient to God the Father; it was for that reason that he was exalted and that many have been made righteous. Philippians 2.8–9: He ‘became obedient even unto death, death on a cross. Therefore God has highly exalted him …’ Romans 5.19: ‘For as by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners, so by one man’s obedience many will be made righteous.’ Mark 14.36: ‘Father, all things are possible to you; remove this cup from me; yet not what I will, but what you will.’ In these verses we find (1) the will of the Father, which is the same as the will of the Son as God, in the words ‘what you will’; (2) the will of the Son as man, in the sense that will is a natural tendency towards the good, in the words ‘remove this cup from me’ and ‘what I will’; (3) the will of the Son as man, in the sense that will denotes choice and, in this case, obedience, in the words ‘not what I will, but what you will,’ for this whole complex of choice and obedience expresses a volition, and one that is not divine but human. 3 Many passages in the gospels make it clear that Christ exercised human operations such as knowing, teaching, conversing, eating, drinking, sleeping, journeying, walking.

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4 Ipsi monenergetae et monothelitae operationes et volitiones Christi hominis agnoverunt, neque eas cum operatione et volitione divina confundebant. Ita Theodorus ep. Pharanitanus differentiam operationum non sustulit. Cyrus patriarcha Alexandrinus unam deivirilem, non unam divinam operationem, agnovit; et addidit inconfusa et inconvertibilia esse ea e quibus componitur Verbum incarnatum. Sergius citavit Leonem Magnum, agit utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium habet. Ecthesis non negat Christum qua hominem propriam physicam motionem produxisse. Paulus, patriarcha Constantinopolitanus, negavit se velle confusionem, commixtionem, interemptionem alterius voluntatis. Vide supra, Sententiae, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10. pars 2: duae sunt naturales operationes, voluntates. 1 Concilium Constantinopolitanum iii (db 291, ds 557–58). Aperte affirmantur duae naturales operationes. Quae explicite distinguuntur, divina operatio, humana operatio. Ratio distinctionis assignatur: ‘Nec enim in quoquam unam dabimus naturalem operationem Dei et creaturae, ut neque quod creatum est in divinam educamus essentiam, neque quod eximium est divinae naturae ad competentem carnis locum deiciamus.’ Quae duae operationes cum sint et reales et vere duae, sunt realiter distinctae; ‘... tam miracula quamque passiones per omnem sui dispensativam conversationem19 non per phantasiam sed veraciter demonstravit ...’ ‘inconfuse,’ ‘inconfusum,’ ‘naturalis differentia.’ Quae realis distinctio non est maior: ‘indivise,’ ‘inseparabiliter,’ ‘indivisum,’ ‘in una subsistentia,’ ‘in eadem una subsistentia,’ ‘indivise.’

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4 The monenergists and monothelites themselves acknowledged the operations and volitions of Christ as man, without confusing these with the divine operation and volition. Thus Theodore, bishop of Pharan, did not reject the difference of operations. Cyrus, patriarch of Alexandria, acknowledged one operation that was theandric but not divine, adding that those things from which the incarnate Word was composed were unconfused and unconvertible. Sergius quoted Leo the Great: ‘For each form does in communion with the other what properly belongs to it.’ The Ekthesis did not deny that Christ as man produced his own physical motion. Paul, patriarch of Constantinople, denied holding any confusion, intermingling, or interference from another will. See above, ‘Opinions,’ points 3, 4, 6, 8, and 10. part 2: there are two natural operations, two natural wills. 1 The Third Council of Constantinople (db 291[–92], ds 557–58, [dec 1: 129–30]). The council openly affirms two natural operations. These are explicitly distinguished as divine operation and human operation. A reason for the distinction is assigned: ‘For we absolutely refuse to admit that there is but one natural operation of both God and creature; for thus we would either exalt what is created into the divine nature or else degrade to the level of creatures what is uniquely proper to the divine nature’ [ds 558, dec 1: 129]. These two operations, since they are real and are truly two, are really distinct: ‘Throughout the whole providential conduct of his life19 he gave evidence of both his miracles and his sufferings, not just in appearance but in actuality’; ‘unconfusedly,’ ‘unconfused’; ‘natural difference.’ This real distinction is not a major distinction: ‘undividedly,’ ‘inseparably,’ ‘undivided,’ ‘in one subsistence,’ ‘in one and the same subsistence,’ ‘undivided.’

19 oikonomkeFs anastpopheFs, i.e., his life among us in accordance with the divine economy of redemption.

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2 Concilium Constantinopolitanum iii (db 291, ds 556). Aperte affirmantur duae naturales voluntates. Praeter voluntatem divinam agnoscitur voluntas humana sequens, non resistens, non reluctans, subiecta; voluntas carnis mota, subiecta; naturalis carnis voluntas est propria Dei Verbi; propriam dicens voluntatem quae erat carnis eius; humana voluntas est deificata sed non perempta. Ubi constat duas voluntates esse reales et realiter distinctas sed unius indivisae personae; ideoque distinctio est realis, minor, analogice dicta.

3 Concilium Romanum (db 288, ds 548) ea repetit quae in decretis conciliorum Chalcedonensi, Constantinoplitani ii, et Lateranensis habentur. Explicite ponit duas naturales operationes et duas naturales voluntates (ad finem). 4 Concilium Lateranense affirmat naturales proprietates deitatis et humanitatis indiminute salvatas (db 262, ds 509), duas unius eiusdemque voluntates cohaerenter unitas (db 263, ds 510), duas unius eiusdemque operationes cohaerenter unitas (db 264, ds 511). Damnantur qui confitentur unam operationem et unam voluntatem (db 265, 266, ds 512, 513), qui respuunt tum unam tum duas operationes et voluntates (db 267, ds 514), qui suscipit deivirilem seu theandricam operationem ut unam et non ut duplicem utriusque unitivam (db 268, ds 515), qui duas voluntates et duas operationes non uni eidemque Christo attribuit (db 269, ds 516). Quod agitur de naturalibus operationibus, voluntatibus, constat ex repetitis verbis ‘divinam et humanam.’ Accedit can. 18, ubi ‘duas naturales voluntates, divinam et humanam’ ponitur expresse ut doctrina ecclesiae (db 271; praeteritur ds 519, sed vide 510, 511). pars 3: operari est personae a natura. 1 Agitur in hac tertia parte de fundamento controversiae. Ponitur ne quis indocte supponat rem esse mere terminologicam. Sicut enim controversiae monophysiticae suberat quaestio de distinctione reali, minori, analogice dicta, et tunc temporis nondum formulata, ita etiam controversiis monenergeticae et monothelitae suberat quaestio tunc communiter haud perspecta,

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2 The Third Council of Constantinople (db 291, ds 556, [dec 1: 128–29]). Here the council openly affirms two natural wills. Besides the divine will, the council acknowledges a human will which follows, which is not opposing or reluctant but compliant; there is a will of the flesh that is moved, compliant. The natural will of his flesh belongs properly to the Word of God; he ‘calls the will of his flesh his own will.’ The human will was divinized but not abolished. All this establishes that the two wills are real and really distinct yet belong to one undivided person; the distinction therefore is real, minor, and analogically drawn. 3 The Council of Rome (db 288, ds 548) repeats what is in the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon, the Second Council of Constantinople, and the Lateran Council. It states explicitly, towards the end, that there are two natural operations and two natural wills. 4 The Lateran Council affirms that the natural properties of divinity and humanity were preserved undiminished (db 262, ds 509), that the two wills of one and the same are coherently united (db 263, ds 510), and that the two operations of one and the same are coherently united (db 264, ds 511). The council condemns those who confess one operation and one will (db 265, 266; ds 512, 513), those who reject both one operation and will and also two operations and wills (db 267, ds 514), those who take theandric or divine-human operations as one instead of as two united to each other (db 268, ds 515), and those who do not attribute the two wills and two operations to one and the same Christ (db 269, ds 516). That natural wills and operations are at issue is clear from the repeated words ‘divine and human.’ Also, canon 18 states expressly that ‘two natural wills, divine and human’ is the doctrine of the church (db 271, omitted in ds 519, but see ds 510, 511). part 3: to operate belongs to a person from his nature. 1 Our concern in this third part is with the basis of the controversy. This part is included lest anyone should suppose the matter is merely one of terminology. For, just as the underlying question in the monophysite controversy was the question about a distinction, not yet formulated at the time, that is real, minor, analogically drawn, so also the underlying question in

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quae principo supra posito resolvitur. Vide supra de errore adversariorum, ubi etiam adducuntur S. Maximus, S. Damascenus, S. Thomas.

2 Probatur ex conciliis Constantinopolitano iii et Florentino. Operari est personae a natura, si (1) multiplicatis naturis pariter multiplicantur operationes et (2) multiplicatis personis non multiplicatur operationes. Atqui … Ergo. Ad minorem: ex christologia, ubi una persona et duae sunt naturae, duae sunt naturales operationes et duae sunt naturales voluntates (db 291–92, ds 556–58). Ex doctrina trinitaria, ubi tres sunt personae, sed una est operatio. db 704, ds 1331: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non tria principia creaturae sed unum principium; db 703, ds 1330: trium est una substantia, una essentia, una natura, una divinitas, una immensitas, una aeternitas, omniaque sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio; db 39, ds 75: non tres omnipotentes sed unus omnipotens; db 428, ds 800: unum principium; db 461, ds 851: una voluntas.

3 Probatur ex ratione theologica. Natura et proprietates maxime ex operationibus cognoscuntur. Ideoque nisi in Christo agnoscuntur duae naturales operationes, frustra ponitur in decreto Chalcedonensi duas esse naturas et utriusque proprietates esse salvatas. Vide Sententias, 5. Obicitur 1 Ex Mc 14.36, non probatur voluntas Christi humana. Nam haec voluntas oravit ut calix transferretur, et deponi debuit (‘non quod ego volo’). Sed voluntas Christi humana secundum concilium erat non contraria, non resistens, non reluctans, sed subiecta, mota, tota deificata (db 291, ds 556). Respondetur: Primo, apud Mc certo agitur de voluntate humana, nam divina voluntas non exprimitur per verba ‘non quod ego volo sed quod tu.’

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the monenergist and monothelite controversies was one which commonly went unnoticed at the time, and which is resolved by the principle set out above. See the section on ‘The error of these opponents’ above, [point 7,] where Maximus, John of Damascus, and Thomas Aquinas are quoted. 2 A proof from the Third Council of Constantinople and the Council of Florence: It is from his nature that operating belongs to a person, if (1) multiplication of natures multiplies operations, and (2) multiplication of persons does not multiply operations. But (1) and (2) are true; therefore the conclusion follows. For the minor premise there is an argument from Christology, where there is one person and two natures, two natural operations, and two natural wills (db 291–92, ds 556–58, [dec 1: 128–30]). There is an argument from Trinitarian doctrine, where there are three persons but one operation. db 704, ds 1331, [dec 1: 571]: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not three principles of a creature but its one principle. db 703, ds 1330, [dec 1: 570–71]: the three have one substance, one essence, one nature, one divinity, one immensity, one eternity, and all is one where there is no relational opposition. db 39, ds 75: there are not three Almighties but one Almighty. db 428, ds 800, [dec 1: 230]: one principle; db 461, ds 851: one will. 3 A proof from theological reasoning: Nature and properties are known chiefly from operations. Therefore, unless two natural operations are acknowledged in Christ, the Chalcedonian decree states in vain that there are two natures and that the properties of each are preserved. See ‘Opinions,’ point 5. Objections 1 Mark 14.36 does not prove Christ’s human will. For that will, which prayed that the cup might be taken away, had to be set aside (‘not what I will’). But, according to the council, Christ’s will was not opposing or contrary or reluctant, but was compliant, moved, wholly divinized (db 291, ds 556, [dec 1: 128–29]). Reply: In the first place, the passage from Mark certainly concerns a human will, since the divine will is not expressed in the words ‘not what I will but what you will.’

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Deinde, cum concilium perfectam concordiam definiverit, concludendum est voluntatem divinam decrevisse ut voluntas Christi humana eam naturalem repugnantiam experiretur quae per oratam translationem calicis et per verba ‘non quod ego volo’ exprimitur. Quod si voluntas divina ita decrevit, voluntas humana nullatenus erat contraria in iis experiendis quae voluit voluntas divina. Tertio, concilium non solum dicit voluntatem Christi humanam esse deificatam sed etiam dicit eam non esse peremptam. Quia erat tota deificata, Christus ut homo obedivit dicens, non quod ego volo sed quod tu; quia non erat perempta, Christus ut homo habuit unde dici poterat, quod ego volo. Quarto, illud ‘non quod ego volo’ non dicit contradictionem, quasi Christus simul idem eodem modo et vellet et non vellet. Distinguenda sunt cum S. Thoma (Sum. theol., 3, q. 18, aa. 2 et 3) haec tria: (1) voluntas sensualitatis, quae est actus in appetitu sensitivo; (2) voluntas naturalis vel voluntas ut natura, quae est actus in appetitu rationali et fertur spontanee in obiectum in se consideratum; (3) voluntas ut ratio, quae est actus in appetitu rationali et fertur libere in obiectum, non secundum se consideratum, sed secundum ordinem ad finem. Quibus positis, secundum voluntatem sensualitatis Iesus coepit pavere et taedere (Mc 14.33); secundum voluntatem ut naturam Christus habuit unde diceret ‘quod ego volo’; et secundum voluntatem ut rationem Christus libere elegit ‘non quod ego volo sed quod tu.’

2 Thesis pratermittit quae sunt maximi momenti, nempe, aspectum personalem voluntatis Christi humanae. Respondetur: Hic aspectus personalis multa et diversa supponit de gratia Christi, de cognitione Christi, de liberatate Christi, de mandato Patris; et ideo convenientius postea considerabitur.20 De praesenti sufficit ponere fundamentum, nempe exsistere in Christo voluntatem humanam.

3 Sicut concilium Constantinopolitanum ii non urgebat doctrinam de dua-

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In the second place, since the council defined a perfect concord [of wills], the conclusion to be drawn is that the divine will decreed that the human will of Christ should experience the natural repugnance which is expressed by the prayer that the cup might be taken away and by the words ‘not what I will.’ If the divine will so decreed this, the human will was in no way contrary in experiencing what the divine will willed. In the third place, the council says not only that Christ’s human will was divinized but also that it was not abolished. Because it was wholly divinized, Christ as man obeyed, saying, ‘not what I will but what you will’; because it was not taken away, the ability to say, ‘what I will,’ belonged to Christ as man. In the fourth place, there is no contradiction in the words ‘not what I will,’ as though Christ both willed and did not will the same thing in the same way. Following Thomas (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 18, aa. 2 and 3), these three should be distinguished: (1) sensual will, which is an act in the sensitive appetite; (2) natural will, or will as nature, which is an act in the rational appetite and bears spontaneously on an object considered in itself; and (3) will as reason, which is an act in the rational appetite and bears freely on an object, not as that object is considered in itself but according to its being ordered towards an end. Given these distinctions, it was in accord with his sensual will that Jesus ‘began to be greatly distressed and troubled’ (Mark 14.33); it was in accord with his will as nature that it belonged to Christ to say, ‘what I will’; and it was in accord with his will as reason that Christ freely chose ‘not what I will, but what you will.’ 2 The thesis overlooks something of great importance, namely, the personal aspect of Christ’s human will. Reply: This personal aspect presumes a number of different matters that have to do with the grace of Christ, his knowing, his freedom, and the Father’s command. Accordingly, it will be best to consider this aspect later.20 For the present it is enough to lay the foundation, which is that there exists in Christ a human will. 3 As the Second Council of Constantinople did not insist on the doctrine

20 See part 4, theses 11 through 14.

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bus naturis, concilium Constantinopolitanum iii non debuit definire duas naturales operationes et duas naturales voluntates. Respondetur: Concilium Constantinopolitanum ii non urgebat doctrinam de duabus naturis, distinguitur, explicavit sensum huius doctrinae, con­ ceditur, sustulit definitionem Chalcedonensem, negatur. Concilium Constantinopolitanum iii non debuit definire duas naturales operationes et duas naturales voluntates, negatur. Haec sane erat opinio Sergii, Ectheseos, Pauli, Typi; sed est opinio damnata.

Scholion i: De Honorio i, Romanus Pontifex 1 Videtur concilium Constantinopolitanum iii tum Honorii epistolam condemnasse tum ipsum Honorium anathematizasse. ds 550: (post alias nominatas epistolas) ‘… similiter et epistolam ab illo, id est, Honorio rescriptam ad eundem Sergium, hasque (scil., epistolas) invenientes omnino alienas exsistere ab apostolicis dogmatibus, et a definitionibus sanctorum conciliorum, et cunctorum probabilium patrum, sequi vero falsas doctrinas haereticorum, eas omnino abiicimus et tamquam animae noxias exsecramur …’ Cf. Hefele-Leclercq, iii/1, 501. ds 552: ‘Cum his vero simul proiici a sancta catholica Dei ecclesia simulque anathematizari praevidimus et Honorium, qui fuerat papa antique Romae, eo quod invenimus per scripta quae ab eo facta sunt ad Sergium, quia in omnibus eius mentem secutus est et impia dogmata confirmavit …’ Cf. Xiberta, Enchir. 625. Hefele-Leclercq, iii/1, 502. Circa dubia Baronii et aliorum de authentia tum huius condemnationis tum subsequentis epistolae Leonis ii, Hefele-Leclercq iii/1, 515–38.21

2 Videtur S. Leo ii, R.P., in epistola ad Constantinum imperatorem (ml 96, 399–412), in qua concilium Constantinopolitanum iii approbavit atque confirmavit (ds 561, 562), etiam Honorium anathematizasse.

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of two natures, so the Third Council of Constantinople ought not to have defined two natural operations and two natural wills. Reply: As to the Second Council of Constantinople’s not insisting on the doctrine of two natures, I distinguish as follows. That it explained the meaning of this doctrine, I grant; that it rejected the Chalcedonian definition, I deny. That the Third Council of Constantinople ought not to have defined two natural operations and two natural wills, I deny. Such was no doubt the opinion of Sergius, the Ekthesis, Paul, and the Typos; but it is an opinion that has been condemned. Scholion 1: Pope Honorius i 1 It would seem that the Third Council of Constantinople both condemned the letter of Honorius and anathematized Honorius himself. After naming other letters, ds 550 reads: ‘[we considered] as well the letter of the latter [that is, Honorius] to the same Sergius, [and] we find that these [letters] are quite foreign to the apostolic dogmas, to the declarations of the holy councils, and to all the accepted Fathers, and that they follow the false teachings of the heretics; therefore, we entirely reject them, and execrate them as hurtful to the soul.’ See Hefele-Leclercq, 3/1, 501 [npnf, 14: 342–43]. ds 552: ‘And with these we provide that Honorius shall be expelled from the holy catholic church of God and at the same time anathematized, him who was pope of elder Rome, because of what we found written by him to Sergius, namely, that in all respects he followed his thinking and confirmed his impious doctrines.’ See Xiberta, Enchiridion 625; Hefele-Leclercq, 3/1, 502. For the doubts of Baronius and others as to the authenticity of this condemnation, as well as that of the subsequent letter of Leo ii, see HefeleLeclercq, 3/1, 515–38.21 2 It would seem that Honorius is also anathematized in a letter from Pope Leo ii to the emperor Constantine (ml 96, 399–412) in which he approves and confirms the Third Council of Constantinople (ds 561, 562). 21 [According to Hefele, Cardinal Baronius’s contention – that both the letter of Honorius and the acts of the council have been corrupted – is indefensible.]

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ds 563: ‘Anathematizamus praeterea atque exsecramur omne haereses, omnesque earum auctores … Arium, Sabellium, … Pariter anathematizamus novi erroris inventores, id est, Theodorum Pharanitanum episcopum, … necnon et Honorium, qui hanc apostolicam Ecclesiam non apostolicae traditionis doctrina lustravit, sed persana proditione immaculatam fidem subvertere conatus est (al. immaculatam maculari permisit)’ (ml 96, 408 ab). Cf. Hefele-Leclercq, iii/1, 512–15. L. Bréhier, Fliche-Martin, 5, 190: ‘Ce qui est certain, c’est que la condemnation d’Honorius ne souleva aucune protestation, ni de la part des légats, ni de la part des papes.’

3 Circa mentem Leonis ii, vide etiam epistolas ad episcopos Hispaniae (ml 96, 411–15; Xiberta, Enchir. 637) et ad Ervigium regem Hispaniae (ml 96, 418–20; Xiberta, Enchir. 628). 4 Quae si conceduntur, aliquis error saltem in sensu obvio in scriptis Honorii agnosci debet. 5 Defendi potest, imo debet, quae habuit Honorius de una Christi voluntate. Vide db 251, ds 487. (a) Nam habetur interpretatio authentica a Ioanne iv (db 253, ds 496– 98), qui ipse docuit nullum fuisse in Christo homine peccatum, nullam oppositionem inter voluntatem mentis et voluntatem carnis, ideoque non duas in eo voluntates contrarias; quo sensu ‘decenter dicimus et veraciter confitemur unam voluntatem in sanctae ipsius dispensationis humanitate, non duas contrarias …’; et in hunc sensum verba Honorii interpretatus est; et praeterea exemplo Apostoli excusavit Honorium, quia de sola voluntate humana locutus erat dum de divina silebat. (b) Quae Ioannis iv interpretatio solide fundatur in ipsis Honorii verbis: ‘assumpta est nostra natura non culpa’; ‘illa profecto, quae ante peccatum creata est, non quae post praevaricationem vitiata’; ‘Christus … sine peccato conceptus … absque peccato partus … nullum experiens contagium vitiatae naturae …’; ‘lex alia in membris, aut voluntas diversa non fuit vel contrarias Salvatori, quia supra legem natus est humanae condicionis …’ (db 251, ds 487). 6 Circa ea vero quae habuit Honorius de una et duabus operationibus notate: (a) In prima epistola (db 251, ds 487), affirmat unam operatorem; im-

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ds 563: ‘Besides this we anathematize and execrate all heresies, and all the originators thereof  … Arius, Sabellius,  … Likewise we anathematize the inventors of the new error, that is: Theodore, bishop of Pharan, … and Honorius too, who did not illuminate this apostolic church with the teaching of apostolic tradition, but attempted by his thorough treachery to subvert the unsullied faith [or, in the Greek version, allowed the unsullied [faith] to be sullied]’ (ml 96, 408ab). See Hefele-Leclercq, 3/1, 512–15. According to Bréhier, ‘What is certain is that the condemnation of Honorius raised no protest, either on the part of the legates or on the part of the popes’ (Fliche-Martin, Histoire, 5, 190). 3­ On the thinking of Leo ii, see also his letters to the bishops of Spain (ml 96, 411–15; Xiberta, Enchiridion 627) and to King Ervigius of Spain (ml 96, 418–20; Xiberta, Enchiridion 628). 4 If we grant all this, then some error has to be acknowledged, at least in regard to the obvious sense of what Honorius wrote. 5 What Honorius has to say about the one will of Christ can, indeed should, be defended. See db 251, ds 487. (a) For there is an authentic interpretation by John iv (db 253, ds 496– 98), who himself taught that in Christ the man there was no sin, no conflict between the will of the mind and the will of the flesh, so that there were not two contrary wills; in that sense ‘we properly say and truly confess one will in the humanity of his holy dispensation, not two that are contrary …’ John interprets Honorius’s words in this sense, and furthermore excuses him with the example of the apostle Paul, who spoke only of the human will while remaining silent on the divine will. (b) This interpretation by John iv has solid grounds in the words of Ho­ norius himself: ‘our nature, not our fault, has been assumed’; ‘by the growth of those things which were created before sin, not those which were vitiated after the fall’; ‘Christ … was conceived without sin … born with no sin … knew nothing of the sickness of our fallen nature …’; ‘there was no other law in his members, nor any diverse will, contrary to the Savior, because he was born above the law of our human condition …’ (db 251, ds 487). 6 As to what Honorius held regarding one and two operations, note the following: (a) In his first letter (db 251, ds 487) he affirms one operator; he implic-

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plicite agnoscit duas naturas, divinitatem dicens et humanitatem; negat se percepisse doctrinam scripturisticam sive in favorem unius sive in favorem duarum operationum; hanc ergo quaestionem grammaticis reliquit. (b) In secunda autem epistola (db 252, ds 488, Mansi, xi, 579–82), agnoscit unum operatorem, duas naturas operantes et operatrices, divinam na­ turam operantem quae Dei sunt et humanam exsequentem quae carnis sunt; et sic quoad rem agnoscit duas naturales operationes. Attamen ‘propter simplicitatem hominum et ad amputandas inextricabiles quaestionum ambages … non unam vel duas operationes … confiteri debemus …’ Et praeterea loco duarum operationum confiteri debemus duas naturas, et loco unius operationis unum operatorem. (c) In eadem secunda epistola narrat Honorius se in hunc sensum scripsisse tum ad Cyrum patriarcham Alexandrinum tum ad Sophronium patriarcham Hierosolymitanum; et Sophronium statim rescripsisse se consensurum fuisse modo consentiret et Cyrus (Mansi, xi, 579 b, 582 bc). (d) Honorius hoc non definivit: neque unam neque duas operationes in Christo esse confitendas. Non enim definivit in prima epistola, ubi manifeste quaestionem detrectavit: ‘ad nos ista pertinere non debent,’ ‘relinquentes ea grammaticis,’ ‘non … sacris litteris percepimus.’ Neque definivit in altera epistola. Occurrunt quidem voces: ‘dogma ecclesiasticum,’ ‘definire,’ ‘definientes.’ Sed sensus est Honorium iudicasse definitionem non esse opportunam; nam dicit: ‘non unam vel duas operationes … definire … debemus …’; ‘non nos oportet unam vel duas operationes definientes praedicare …’ (e) Quamvis Ioannes iv mentem Honorii circa unam voluntatem explicaverit, non constat vel eum vel alium summum pontificem explicare voluisse ea quae de una et duabus operationibus pariter evitandis habuit Honorius. Imo, concilium Lateranense doctrinam oppositam determinavit (db 267, ds 514). 7 Obiecerit tamen quispiam: admisimus valorem defensionis Honorii a Ioanne iv factae; et ulterius admisimus Honorium quoad rem agnovisse duas naturales operationes (6, b); ergo nullus re vera fuit error Honorii, et ideo in Honorio damnando erravit concilium Constantinopolitanum iii a R.P. Leone ii approbatum. Respondetur: Vide quae supra de errore adversariorum posita sunt. Sicut enim monophysismus erat haeresis quamvis omnia vera de Christo

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itly acknowledges two natures, speaking of divinity and humanity; he denies that he perceives a scriptural doctrine either in favor of one or in favor of two operations; and he therefore leaves that question to the grammarians. (b) In his second letter (db 252, ds 488; Mansi, 11, 579–82) he acknowledges one operator, two natures that operate and are operating, a divine nature that operates what belongs to God and a human nature that accomplishes what belongs to the flesh. Thus, as regards reality, he acknowledges two natural operations. Yet ‘because of human simpleness, and in order to cut through the inextricable tangle of questions … we ought to confess … neither one operation nor two.’ And furthermore, instead of two operations we ought to confess two natures, and instead of one operation, one operator. (c) In this second letter Honorius tells how he wrote along these lines to Cyrus, patriarch of Alexandria, and to Sophronius, patriarch of Jerusalem, and how Sophronius at once wrote back that he agreed with this provided that Cyrus also agreed (Mansi, 11, 579 b, 580 bc). (d) Honorius did not define this: neither one operation in Christ nor two is to be confessed. For he did not define it in his first letter, where he clearly declines to consider the question: ‘such things should not concern us’; ‘leaving them to the grammarians’; ‘we do not perceive in holy writ.’ Nor did he define it in his second letter. Certain words do occur: ‘ecclesiastical dogma,’ ‘define,’ ‘defining.’ But the sense is that Honorius judged a definition inopportune, for he says: ‘we ought not to define one operation or two’ and ‘it would not be well for us to proclaim as defined either one operation or two.’ (e) Although John iv explained the thinking of Honorius as it concerns one will, it is not clear that he or any other pope wished to explain what Honorius held when it came to avoiding equally both one operation and two. Indeed, the Lateran Council determined the opposite teaching (db 267, ds 514). 7 Someone might object that we admit the value of John iv’s defense of Honorius, and we further admit that, as regards reality, Honorius acknowledged two natural operations (6, b). It follows that there really was no error on the part of Honorius, and therefore the Third Council of Constantinople, approved by pope Leo ii, erred in condemning Honorius. Reply: See what was stated earlier about the error of opponents. Monophysitism was a heresy although, apart from denying two natures,

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docuerit praeter hoc quod duas naturas negavit, ita etiam monenergismus et monothelismus erant haereses, non quia alia falsa docuerint, sed quia duas naturales operationes et duas naturales voluntates expresse confiteri noluerunt. Aliis verbis, sicut Honorius negavit duas voluntates contrarias et noluit determinare utrum una an duae sint operationes, ita etiam Sergius et Ecthe­ sis Heraclii negaverunt duas voluntates contrarias et noluerunt determinare utrum una an duae sint operationes. Quod sane non eo sensu est intelligendum quasi eadem erat mens et intentio Honorii quae erat Sergii et Ectheseos. Iam ante 619 Sergius quaerebat medium quo facilior rederretur reunio cum monophysitis, concordia, pax, defensio imperii. Honorius autem, quo tempore fiebat dogmatis evolutio, quo tempore iudicandum erat quemnam in finem ipsa evolutio esset dirigenda, scripturas consuluit (db 251, ds 487) et ‘scandalum novellae adinventionis’ auferendum decrevit (db 252, ds 488). Quam ob causam censuit S. Leo ii quod Honorius ‘fidem immaculatam maculari permisit’ (supra, 2). Scholion ii: De notione ‘naturae’ dogmatica 1 Dogmatica ‘naturae’ notio est ea quae ex definitionibus ecclesiae consequitur. 2 Ex thesi quarta habetur aliam esse naturam divinam et aliam humanam, utramque suas habere proprietates, quae quidem in concilio Lateranensi dicuntur naturales (db 262, ds 509). Ex thesi quinta ulterius habetur ex natura consequi non solum naturales proprietates sed etiam naturalem operationem et naturalem voluntatem. 3 Ex thesi quarta habetur quod inter naturam finitam et personam intercedit distinctio realis, non maior, sed minor. Ex thesi quinta habetur quod operari, et ideo velle, est personae a natura. 4 Quae quidem omnia componuntur ubi natura definitur: principium quo remotum operationum. Est principium, nam principium est ‘primum in aliquo ordine,’ et secundum naturam tamquam primum considerantur et dividuntur proprietates, operationes, volitiones.

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all that it taught about Christ was true; likewise, monenergism and monothelitism were heresies, not because the other things they taught were false, but because they expressly refused to confess two natural operations and two natural wills. In other words, just as Honorius denied two contrary wills and refused to determine whether the operations were one or two, so also Sergius and the Ekthesis of Heraclius denied two contrary wills and refused to determine whether there was one operation or two. Certainly this is not to be understood in a sense that would equate the mind and intention of Honorius with that of Sergius and the Ekthesis. Long before 619 Sergius was seeking a means of facilitating reunion with the monophysites, concord, peace, and the defense of the empire. Honorius, however, at a time dogma was developing, a time for judging what end that development ought to be directed towards, consulted scripture (db 251, ds 487) and decreed the removal of ‘a newly invented scandal.’ For that reason Leo ii considered that Honorius ‘allowed the unsullied faith to be sullied’ (above, point 2). Scholion 2: The dogmatic notion of ‘nature’ 1 The dogmatic notion of ‘nature’ is the one that follows from the church’s definitions. 2 Thesis 4 showed that the divine nature is not the same as a human nature, and that both natures have their own properties, which are referred to by the Lateran Council as natural properties (db 262, ds 509). Thesis 5 showed, further, that not only natural properties but also a natural operation and a natural will follow from a nature. 3 Thesis 4 showed that between finite nature and person there is a real distinction that is minor and not major. Thesis 5 showed that to operate, and therefore to will, belong to a person from his nature. 4 All of these come together when nature is defined as the remote principle-by-which of operations. Nature is a principle, for a principle is ‘what is first in any ordered series,’ and properties, operations, and volitions are considered and distinguished with respect to nature as ‘what is first.’

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Est principium quo, nam persona certo est principium quod habet proprie­ tates, operatur, vult; et finita natura a persona distinguitur distinctione reali, minori. Est principium quo remotum, nam proxima principia operationum sunt multa in eadem natura, v.g., principia sensitiva et rationalia, apprehendendi et appetendi.22 Scholion iii: De evolutione dogmatis christologici 1 Occasio evolutionis erat haeresis apollinaristica quae in Christo, homine caelesti, voluit unionem naturalem ut sit non solum una persona et una hypostasis sed etiam una natura et una operatio. Lietzmann 198–99; Xiberta, Enchir. 119, § 67. Plura in thesi secunda.

2 Terminus evolutionis erat ut affirmarentur in Christo una quidem hypostasis seu persona sed duae naturae et duae operationes naturales. 3 Gressus in evolutione per tria fere saecula extenduntur. (a) Primus erat Antiochenorum qui duas Christi naturas vindicabant. Quam tamen distinctionem ita premebant Diodorus Tarsensis et Theo­ dorus Mopsuestenus, ut ipsam unitatem personae non satis explicarent. Qui explicationis defectus quasi principium factus in haeresim Nestorianam conduxit. (b) Alter gressus erat S. Cyrilli qui identitatem personae qui et Deus est et homo factus est clarissime affirmavit. At formula apollinaristica usus est S. Cyrillus, quae formula quasi principium facta conduxit in monophysismum. (c) Tertius gressus erat Leonis i et Antiochenorum qui unam personam in duabus naturis determinaverunt. Qui quidem gressus implicavit distinctionem realem et minorem, quae tamen nisi saec. sexto non erat communiter concepta, neque tunc exacte expressa.

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Nature is principle-by-which, for certainly a person is the principle which has properties, operates, wills; and finite nature is distinguished from person by a real, minor distinction. It is remote principle-by-which, for within the same nature there are many proximate principles of operations; for example, the sensitive and rational principles, the apprehensive and appetitive principles.22 Scholion 3: The development of Christological dogma 1 The occasion for the development was the Apollinarian heresy, which insisted that in Christ, the ‘heavenly man,’ there is a natural union such that there is not only one person and one hypostasis but also one nature and one operation. Lietzmann 198–99; Xiberta, Enchiridion 119, § 67; more can be found in thesis 2. 2 The term of the development was the affirmation that in Christ there is one hypostasis or person, but two natures and two natural operations. 3 The steps in the development extended over almost three centuries. (a) The first was taken by the Antiochenes, who upheld Christ’s two natures. But Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia pressed this distinction so far that they could not give an adequate account of the unity of [Christ’s] person. The lack of such an account became the principle, as it were, leading to the Nestorian heresy. (b) A second step was taken by Cyril, who affirmed in the clearest manner the identity of the person who both is God and became man. Yet Cyril made use of Apollinarian formulations, which became the principle, as it were, leading to monophysitism. (c) A third step was taken by Leo i and the Antiochenes, who determined that there is one person in two natures. This step implies a real, minor distinction [between person and nature], which was not, however, commonly conceived before the sixth century, nor exactly expressed even then. 22 The following paragraph is added in 1960: ‘Est principium quo remotum operationum, nam si est operationum, etiam est principium proprietatum et volitionum’ (It is the remote principle by which of operations, for if it is principle of operations, it also is principle of properties and volitions).

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(d) Quartus gressus erat monenergetarum et monothelitarum, qui orthodoxos in duas naturales operationes et voluntates definiendas conduxit. 4 Tota evolutio ad hoc reducitur: quae in nt et in symbolis de Christo veraciter affirmantur, aut dicuntur de alio et alio aut de eodem, et, si de eodem, tunc quia contradictoria sunt, de eodem secundum aliud et aliud, nempe, secundum divinam vel humanam naturam, proprietatem, operationem, voluntatem.

5 Ipsa evolutio tamquam in causam primam reducitur in divinam providentiam quae quidem universum velle potuit in quo nullus esset error et nullum malum, quae tamen pro infinita sua sapientia atque bonitate universum elegit in quo errores et mala permittuntur ut per errores clarius et plenius cognoscatur verum et per mala fiant bona maiora. Quod quidem, cum in omnibus verum sit, eo magis in evolutione dogmatis agnoscendum est, dicente Domino, Ecce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem saeculi. 6 At agnita divina providentia in hac evolutione christologica, minime sequitur subsequentes evolutiones eodem modo fieri debere, ut nisi per confusiones trium saeculorum ad applicationem principii contradictionis non perveniatur. Deus scilicet vult ut homines ex experientia addiscant, ut distinguant revelatum et theologicum, ut perspiciant conceptionum implicationes non post elapsa saecula sed statim; unde evolutio dogmatis christologici maxime in evolutione theologiae contulit.

7 Praeterea, stabilita dogmatica naturae notione, per evolutionem christologicam parata est via ad theorema de naturali et supernaturali ponendum. Christus enim non solum naturam humanam habuit sed etiam naturae humanae suae contulit ea quae personae divinae conveniunt quatenus in natura humana exsistit. Quae quidem divinae personae convenientia ipsam naturam humanam absolute superant. Et ideo absolute supernaturalia sunt. Amplius, haec supernaturalia non suae humanitati eique soli contulit persona divina homo factus sed etiam ad earundem participationem tum

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(d) A fourth step was taken by the monenergists and monothelites, who led the orthodox to the definition of two natural operations and wills. 4 The whole development comes down to this. Those things which are truly affirmed about Christ in the New Testament and the creeds are said either about two ‘someones’ or else about the same one. If they are said about the same one, then, since they are contradictories, they are said about the same one in different manners, namely, according to his divine or his human nature, property, operation, will. 5 The development itself reduces, as to its first cause, to divine providence, which was able to will a universe in which there would be no error and no evil, but which, in its infinite wisdom and goodness chose a universe where errors and evils would be permitted, a universe where, through error, truth would be known more fully and clearly, and where, through evils, greater goods would come about. While this is true of everything, it should be acknowledged all the more in the development of dogma, by the Lord’s saying, ‘Behold, I am with you always, even to the end of the age.’ 6 Still, acknowledging divine providence in this Christological development by no means implies that subsequent developments have to unfold in the same way, so that it takes three hundred years of confusion to come around to applying the principle of non-contradiction. God, this is to say, wills that men should learn from experience, that they should distinguish between revealed truth and theology, that they should grasp the implications of their conceptions at once, not after centuries have passed. Thus, the development of Christological dogma contributed a very great deal to the development of theology. 7 Moreover, once the dogmatic notion of nature had been made firm, the way was paved through Christological development to a statement of the theorem of the natural and the supernatural. For not only had Christ a human nature; he also brought to that human nature those things which befit a divine person inasmuch as he is existing in a human nature. But things appropriate to a divine person absolutely surpass the human nature in itself. And thus they are absolutely supernatural. What is more, the divine person who became man did not bring these supernatural gifts to his own humanity and to that alone; he also invites us

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in vita futura tum etiam hac in vita nos invitat. Unde Christus factus est nobis mediator gratiae et gloriae, nobis impertiens quae sua sunt et nobis supernaturalia sunt. De quibus mox erit agendum. Scholion iv: Christus ut Deus, Christus ut homo 1 Iam in thesibus prima et tertia notavimus schemata tum scripturistica tum patristica quibus diversimode repraesentabatur Christus. Peracta autem evolutione dogmatica, etiam ultra schemata quodammodo processum est23 ut cogitatio fiat de Christo vel Filio vel secundum quod est et operatur per naturam suam divinam vel secundum quod est et operatur per naturam suam humanam. Quae duae considerationes breviter nominari solent: Christus ut Deus, Christus ut homo.

2 Quae ut intelligantur, notandum est eas dupliciter adhiberi, nempe, specificative et formaliter. Ubi specificative adhibentur, sensus est: Christus qui est Deus, Christus qui est homo. Ubi formaliter adhibentur, sensus est: Christus quia est Deus, Christus quia est homo. Exemplo sit: Christus ut homo est divina persona, Filius Dei naturalis, obediens, mortalis. Ubi omnia vera sunt, sed priora tantummodo si ‘ut homo’ sumitur non formaliter sed specificative tantum, nam Christus non est divina persona vel Filius Dei naturalis quia est homo, quamvis etiam in sua humanitate consideratus maneat persona divina et Patris Filius Unigenitus. 3 Quibus positis, valde quidem augetur nostrae cogitationis exactitudo, sed oriri solent ex ipsa hac exactitudine difficultates in scripturis et prioribus patribus interpretandis, utrum scilicet locuti sint auctores de Christo qua Deo an qua homine, et quidem utrum specificative an formaliter. In quarum difficultatum solutionem notate:

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to participate in them, both in the life to come and even in this present life. Thus has Christ become for us the mediator of grace and glory, bestowing on us what is his and is supernatural to us. More on this presently. Scholion 4: Christ as God, Christ as man 1 We have noted already in theses 1 and 3 the biblical and patristic schematic patterns through which Christ is variously represented. With the completion of the development of dogma, however, we have also progressed beyond schematic patterns.23 Christ, or the Son, comes to be thought of either according as he is and operates through his divine nature or according as he is and operates through his human nature. These two ways of considering him are usually referred to briefly in the phrases ‘Christ as God’ and ‘Christ as man.’ 2 In order to understand this, it should be noted that these phrases are used in two ways: specificatively and formally. Where they are used specificatively, the meaning is: Christ who is God, or Christ who is a man. When they are used formally, the meaning is: Christ because he is God, or Christ because he is a man. To take an example: Christ as man is a divine person, the natural Son of God, obedient, mortal. All this is true, but only if ‘as man’ has already been taken not in the formal but only in the specificative sense, for Christ is not a divine person or the natural Son of God because he is a man, although he remains a divine person and the Only-begotten Son of God even when considered in his humanity. 3 Once this has been stated, the exactness of our thinking is greatly enhanced. From this very exactness, though, difficulties often arise when it comes to interpreting scripture and the earlier Fathers. Were these authors speaking of Christ as God or as man, and were they speaking specificatively or formally? In solving these difficulties, note the following.

23 The manner in which Christological dogma goes beyond biblical and patristic patterns of apprehension is also discussed in ‘Christology Today,’ A Third Collection 89–90.

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(a) Scriptores priores non habuisse media technica quibus et tam breviter et tam accurate loqui possent; quare, non raro ipsa quaestio solutionem non habet. (b) Ubi tamen constat priores scriptores usos esse schemate vel prospectivo vel retrospectivo vel ‘Homo-Deus,’ longe etiam probabilius est eos esse locutos de Christo qua homine. Ubi, e contra, constat eos usos esse schemate retrospectivo inverso vel schemate ‘Verbum-caro,’ non statim sequitur eos esse locutos de Christo qua Deo ut praecisio fiat de natura humana assumpta.

4 Circa definitionem denique superius positam, scilicet, Christus ut Deus vel ut homo dicitur secundum quod est et operatur per naturam vel divinam vel humanam, vide S. Thomam, Sum. theol., 3, q. 19, a. l, ad 4m, ubi explicatur quod ‘esse et operari est personae a natura, aliter tamen et aliter’; esse enim pertinet ad ipsam personae constitutionem; sed operari consequitur personam constitutam.

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(a) The earlier writers had not the technical means that would have enabled them to speak both briefly and accurately. Not infrequently, therefore, the question admits of no solution. (b) However, where it is clear that earlier writers are using the prospective, the retrospective, or the ‘man-God’ pattern, it is far more likely that they are speaking of Christ as man. Where, on the other hand, it is clear that they are using the inverseretrospective pattern or the ‘Word-flesh’ pattern, it does not follow at once that they are speaking of Christ as God in such a way as to prescind from the human nature he assumed. 4 Finally, as for the definition set out above – namely, that Christ is spoken of ‘as God’ or ‘as man’ according as he is and operates through his divine or his human nature – see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4m, which explains that ‘to be and to operate belong to a person from his nature, but in different ways’; for to be pertains to the very constitution of a person, while to operate is consequent upon the person constituted.

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PARS TERTIA

De Unione Hypostatica Conclusiones Theologicae

Praemittuntur : Nota. Notiones: (1) potentia, forma, actus, modus; (2) ens, essentia, esse, substantia; (3) unum, esse proprium, esse proportionatum; (4) persona. Problema: essentialismus. Analogiae formae, substantiae, entis. Sententiae.1 Sequuntur theses et asserta: 6 Quam Verbum de Virgine assumpsit, caro per animam rationalem animata, neque persona erat, neque suppositum reale, neque subsistens, neque ens simpliciter, sed tantummodo essentia humana individua et realis quae esse proportionato caret. 7 Ideo Verbum incarnatum est unum simpliciter, quia esse suo divino est non solum ut Deus sed etiam ut homo; quod quidem intelligitur, non secundum analogiam entis finiti et compositi, sed secundum analogiam eorum quae contingenter de ente infinito dicuntur. 8 Unionis ergo hypostaticae principia sunt : (1) SS. Trinitas ut a quo Verbum est homo, (2) persona Verbi ut quod est Deus et homo, (3) esse Verbi

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PART THREE



Theological Conclusions regarding the Hypostatic Union

Preliminary matters : Notes. Notions: (1) potency, form, act, mode; (2) being, essence, act of existence, substance; (3) one, proper act of existence, proportionate act of existence; (4) person. Problem: essentialism. Analogies of form, of substance, of being. Opinions.1 There follow these theses and assertions: 6 What the Word assumed from the Virgin – flesh animated by a rational soul – was neither a person, nor a real supposit, nor a subsistent, nor a being pure and simple, but only a real, individual human essence with no proportionate act of existence. 7 This is why the incarnate Word is one, purely and simply: because by his divine act of existence he is, not only as God but also as a man. This is to be understood, not on the analogy of finite, composite being, but on the analogy of what is contingently predicated of infinite being. 8 Therefore, the principles of the hypostatic union are these: (1) the blessed Trinity, as the principle from which the Word is a man; (2) the person



1 The paragraph on preliminary matters is taken from the 1960 edition. It does not appear in 1961 or 1964. It lists the matters that are treated prior to the theses and assertions in the third part.

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divinum ut quo incarnatum Verbum est [ens simpliciter et]2 unum simpliciter, (4) natura divina et natura humana ut quibus est tum Deus tum homo.

9 Ex hac peracta unione3 resultat in assumpta natura actus quidam substantialis, absolute supernaturalis, qui solum Verbum ut formaliter assumens respicit. 10 In Christo Deo et homine duae sunt conscientiae, divina et humana; quibus tamen eadem persona, eaque divina, tum modo divino tum modo humano sibi praesens est. Nota E conclusionibus his theologicis theses sexta et septima et asserta octavum et nonum quaestionem de una persona in duabus naturis ulterius considerant; thesis autem decima de una persona conscia quae cum duabus naturalibus atque consciis operationibus agit. Prior quaestio ontologica est, (1) cur scilicet corpus anima rationali animatum a Verbo de Virgine assumptum veraciter atque realiter non fuerit hic homo, haec persona humana, et (2) quid faciat realitatem unius personae, ubi duae sunt naturae usquequaque perfectae cum omnibus suis proprietatibus cumque naturalibus operationibus voluntatibusque. Quae ontologica quaestio simul theologica atque philosophica est: theologica quidem quatenus de una persona Verbi incarnati tractat; philosophica autem quatenus inter personam humanam et corpus rationali anima animatum distinguit realiter; attamen historice spectata etiam haec philosophica quaestio non mere philosophica est, cum philosophia non christiana ultra rationem essentiae ad rationem entis non pervenerit, et ipsa christiana philosophia nisi occasione dogmatis et theologiae stimulo non perspexerit quid inter ens et essentiam intercedat.4

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of the Word, as that which is God and man; (3)  the Word’s divine act of existence, as the principle by which the incarnate Word is [a being pure and simple and]2 one purely and simply; and (4) the divine nature and a human nature, as the principles by which he is both God and man. 9 From this completed union3 there results, in the assumed nature, a substantial act, absolutely supernatural, which regards the Word alone as formally assuming. 10 There are in Christ, God and man, two consciousnesses, a divine and a human consciousness, by which, however, the same person, a divine person, is present to himself in both a divine and a human way. Notes Theses 6 and 7 and assertions 8 and 9 consider further, through these theological conclusions, the question of one person in two natures. Thesis 10, however, considers one conscious person who acts with two natural and conscious operations. There is a prior, ontological question, to wit: (1) why that body, animated by a rational soul, which was assumed by the Word from the Virgin, really and truly was not this man, this human person; and (2) what makes for the reality of one person where there are two natures, both perfect, with all their properties and with natural operations and wills. This ontological question is at once theological and philosophical: theological, inasmuch as it treats of the one person of the incarnate Word; philosophical, inasmuch as it draws a real distinction between a human person and a body animated by a rational soul. Nevertheless, from a historical standpoint even this philosophical question is not philosophical only, since non-Christian philosophy did not move beyond the standpoint of essence to reach the standpoint of being, and Christian philosophy itself perceived what differentiates being from essence only when prompted by dogma and spurred by theology.4

2 Lonergan includes the words ‘a being pure and simple and’ (‘ens simpliciter et’) in his statement at the beginning of Assertion 8. See below, pp. 446/447. 3 Lonergan’s statement at the beginning of Assertion 9 reads, ‘From the completed hypostatic union’ (‘Ex peracta unione hypostatica’). 4 On the meaning of ‘Christian philosophy,’ see Bernard Lonergan, ‘Method in Catholic Theology,’ in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958–1964 (cwl 6) 51–52.

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Cur autem theologus quaestiones eiusmodi aggrediatur, explicat concilium Vaticanum et duplici quidem ratione. Nam in primis ‘satis non est haereticam pravitatem devitare, nisi ii quoque errores diligenter fugiantur, qui ad illam plus minusve accedunt’ (db 1820); sed maxime ad haereticam pravitatem accedit nullam agnoscere realem distinctionem inter personam atque naturam, si quidem ex tali identificatione necessario sequitur aut nestorianismus aut monophysismus. Sed et ulterius docet Vaticanum per rationem fide illustratam aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentiam, eamque fructuosissimam, attingi, tum ex analogia eorum quae naturaliter cognoscuntur, tum ex nexu mysteriorum inter se et cum hominis fine ultimo (db 1796, ds 3016). Cf. Divinarum personarum 9–13, De Deo trino, ii, 9–13.5 Quam ob causam, post distinctionem elaboratam inter personam et naturam, ulterius quaeritur imperfecta illa intelligentia, quam solam hac in vita assequi possumus, circa veram atque realem personae unitatem in Verbo incarnato. Thesibus sextae et septimae et assertis octavo et nono communes notiones, commune problema, communem sententiarum catalogum praemisimus. Thesis decima de conscientia Christi tum dogmati de duabus naturalibus operationibus et voluntatibus, tum etiam quaestioni ontologicae arcte connectitur. Quamvis enim Patres de conscientia non expresse sint locuti, dubitari non potest eos minime cogitasse unam personam inconsciam inconscie volentem voluntate divina et inconscie volentem voluntate humana. At ulterius, quod quosdam fugere videtur, psychologicum et conscium non extra ens versatur (secus nihil esset) neque aliter ac ens cognoscitur, si quidem omnia, quae modo humano cognoscuntur, iudicio rationali atque vero cognoscuntur.

Notiones 1  potentia, forma, actus, modus (a) Potentia = potentia prima. Forma = actus primus = potentia secunda. Actus = actus secundus = esse vel operari. Cf. De Pot., q. 1, a. 1. In IX Met., lect. 5, §§ 1828–29. Quae notiones fundamentales nisi analogiis non innotescunt.

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The First Vatican Council explained why questions of this sort should be addressed by theologians. There are two reasons. In the first place, ‘it is not enough to shun the malice of heresy if those errors that more or less closely approach it are not also carefully avoided’ (db 1820, ds 3045, [dec 2: 811]). But it is getting very close to the malice of heresy not to acknowledge a real distinction between person and nature, given that what necessarily follows from such an identification of the two is either Nestorianism or monophysitism. But the First Vatican Council taught further that reason illumined by faith can by God’s gift attain a highly fruitful understanding of the mysteries both from the analogy of what it naturally knows and from the interconnections of the mysteries with one another and with our last end (db 1796, ds 3016, [dec 2: 808]); see Divinarum personarum 9–13, or De Deo trino: Pars systematica 9–13.5 For this reason, once the distinction between person and nature has been elaborated, what is sought is that imperfect understanding which is all we can arrive at in this life, with regard to the real, true unity of person in the incarnate Word. In theses 6 and 7 and assertions 8 and 9 we have set forth common notions, a common problem, and a common catalogue of opinions. Thesis 10, on the consciousness of Christ, is closely connected both with the dogma of two natural operations and wills, and also with the ontological question. For although the Fathers said nothing expressly about consciousness, it cannot be doubted that they were never thinking of one unconscious person, unconsciously willing with his divine will and unconsciously willing with his human will. But further – and this apparently escapes some people – the psychological and the conscious do not stand outside being, for apart from being there is nothing, and the way they are known is the same as the way being is known, since everything humanly known is known through reasonable and true judgments. Notions 1  potency, form, act, mode (a) Potency = first potency. Form = first act = second potency. Act = second act = to be or to operate. See De Potentia, q. 1, a. 1; In IX Metaphysicorum, lect. 5, §§ 1828–29. These basic notions are known only by analogy.



5 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 10–19.

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(b) Sicut comparatur oculus ad visum, auris ad auditum, intellectus possibilis ad habitum scientiae, voluntas ad habitum iustitiae, corpus organicum ad animam, ita comparatur potentia ad formam. Et eadem est proportio inter sensibilia et quod in ipsis sensibilibus perspicitur intelligibile (insight). (c) Sicut comparatur visus ad videndum, auditus ad audiendum, habitus scientiae ad intelligendum, habitus iustitiae ad iuste volendum, anima ad vivendum, ita comparatur forma ad actum. Et eadem est proportio inter intelligere et affirmare, seu inter inquisitionem (quid sit) et reflexionem (an sit). (d) Potentia, forma, et actus unum concretum efficiunt seu constituunt, si (1) una est trium definitio et (2) unum idemque per potentiam est perfectibile, per formam est et perfectum et perfectibile, per actum est perfectum. Exemplo sint videre, visus, oculus. Quorum non sunt definitiones tres, sed una tantum. Colorum enim apprehensio est per oculum in potentia prima, per visum in actu primo, per videre in actu secundo. (e) Praeterea, per hunc oculum, hunc visum, hoc videre, unum idemque animal est perfectibile per oculum (potentiam), perfectum et perfectibile per visum (formam), perfectum per videre (actum). Et idem perspici potest in caeteris exemplis, uti in aure, in intellectu possibili, in voluntate, in corpore organico. (f) Quae nuperrime illustravimus per compositionem ontologicam, etiam illustrantur per compositionem intentionalem. Quid enim sit cognoscere proprie humanum? An ille cognoscit qui sensibus vel conscientia experitur quod non intelligit? An ille cognoscit qui et experitur et intelligit et tamen neque affirmat neque negat sed dubitat? Iam vero idem est obiectum reale quod per experientiam in potentia prima cognoscitur, per intelligentiam in actu primo cognoscitur, per iudicium in actu secundo cognoscitur. Idem pariter est subiectum quod experiendo est perfectibile, intelligendo est et perfectum et perfectibile, iudicando est perfectum. Ideoque his tribus, nempe, experiri, intelligere, iudicare (quae ontologice sunt tres actus secundi, tria operari), constituitur unum intentionale, nempe, cognoscere proprie humanum, quod per experientiam est in potentia prima, per intelligentiam est in actu primo, per iudicium est in actu secundo.

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(b) As eye stands to sight, ear to hearing, the possible intellect to the habit of science, will to the habit of justice, organic body to soul, so also potency stands to form. And the same proportion holds between the sensible and the intelligible that is grasped in the sensible by insight. (c) As sight stands to actually seeing, the faculty of hearing to actually hearing, the habit of science to actually understanding, the habit of justice to actually willing justly, soul to actually living, so also form stands to act. And the same proportion holds between understanding and affirming, or between inquiry (What is it?) and reflection (Is it so?). (d) Potency, form, and act together effect or constitute one concrete thing if (1) the definition of these three is one, and (2) it is one and the same that is perfectible through potency, that is perfected and perfectible through form, and that is perfected through act. An example would be the act of seeing, sight, and eye. Of these there are not three definitions, but only one. For the apprehension of color is in first potency through the eye, in first act through sight, and in second act through seeing. (e) Moreover, through this eye, this sight, this act of seeing, one and the same animal is perfectible through the eye (potency), perfected and perfectible through sight (form), and perfected through seeing (act). And the same thing can be grasped in other examples, such as the ear, the possible intellect, the will, or an organic body. (f) The same thing we have just illustrated in terms of ontological composition can also be illustrated in terms of intentional composition. For what is properly human knowing? Are you knowing when you experience, through sense or consciousness, what you do not understand? Are you knowing when you both experience and understand and yet neither affirm nor deny but only doubt? Now, it is the same real object that is known in first potency through experience, known in first act through understanding, and known in second act through judgment. Likewise, it is the same subject who is perfectible in experiencing, perfected and perfectible in understanding, and perfected in judging. And so these three – to experience, to understand, and to judge (which, ontologically, are three second acts, three acts of operating) – constitute one intentional whole, a properly human knowing, which is in first potency through experience, in first act through understanding, and in second act through judgment.

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Haec analysis intentionalis, analysi ontologicae parallela, iterum recurrit ubi de conscientia Christi, thesi decima.6 (g) Modus est nihil praeter potentiam, formam, actum. Primo, modus est nihil praeter ista tria in obiecto proportionato nostrae cognitionis. Nam obiectum proportionatum est quidditas in materia corporali exsistens, ubi materia corporalis innotescit experiendo, quidditas innotescit intelligendo, exsistentia innotescit vere iudicando. Sed proportio quae definit potentiam et formam est eadem ac proportio inter materiam et quidditatem, inter experiri et intelligere; et proportio quae definit formam et actum est eadem ac proportio inter quidditatem et exsistentiam, inter intelligere et iudicare. Unde concludes: ubicumque cognoscimus experiendo, intelligendo, et iudicando, ibi in cognito distingui possunt potentia, forma, et actus. Et ulterius concludes: nisi in cognitione nostra alius et quartus gressus essentialis detegitur, aliud et quartum elementum, scilicet modus, in obiecto proportionato detegi non potest. Deinde, circa obiectum nostrae cognitionis non proportionatum sed adaequatum, scilicet, quod iacet intra ens: Obiectum adaequatum sed non proportionatum eatenus cognosci potest a nobis hac in vita quatenus analogice procedimus;7 ita apud S. Thomam angelus concipitur ut ex forma et actu compositus sine potentia substantiali (materia) et Deus concipitur ut actus purus. Unde concludes: nisi modus cognoscitur in obiecto proportionato, nihil per analogiam modi cognosci potest in obiecto adaequato; sed supra habitum est modum non cognosci in obiecto proportionato; ergo non cognoscitur in obiecto adaequato.8

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This intentionality analysis, which parallels an ontological analysis, will come up again in thesis 10 on Christ’s consciousness.6 (g) Mode is nothing other than potency, form, act. In the first place, mode is nothing other than these three in an object that is proportionate to our knowing. For the proportionate object [of human knowing] is a quiddity existing in corporeal matter, where corporeal matter is known through experiencing, quiddity is known through understanding, and existence is known through true judging. But the proportion that defines potency and form is the same as the proportion between matter and quiddity, between experiencing and understanding; and the proportion that defines form and act is the same as the proportion between quiddity and existence, between understanding and judging. So, as you will gather, wherever we know by experiencing, understanding, and judging, it is possible to distinguish in the known between potency, form, and act. You will also gather that unless another, fourth essential step should be detected in our knowing, it is impossible to detect another, fourth element – namely, mode – in a proportionate object. In the second place, concerning not the proper but the adequate object of our knowing, namely, whatever lies within being: An object that is adequate but not proportionate can be known by us in this life inasmuch as we proceed analogically.7 Thus, for Thomas angels are conceived as composed of form and act but without substantial potency (matter), and God is conceived as pure act. You will gather, then, that unless mode is known in a proportionate object, nothing can be known in an adequate object through an analogy of mode. But it was shown above that mode is not known in a proportionate object; therefore, it is not known in an adequate object.8





6 See below, pp. 464/465. 7 These terms – proportionate and adequate, and analogy – are discussed more fully in Bernard Lonergan, ‘The Natural Desire to See God,’ in Collection, vol. 4 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 82–84. 8 On the question of modes, see in more detail Bernard Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, vol. 7 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 56–59. The original is De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1956).

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Quantum denique attinet ad ratiocinia solvenda quibus modus concluditur, vide De constitutione Christi 32, § 27.9 2  ens, essentia, esse, substantia (a) Ens dicitur dupliciter: ens simpliciter et ens secundum quid. Ens simpliciter est id quod est. Idem etiam nominatur ens (sine addito), subsistens, esse habens, essentiam habens. Ens secundum quid ipsum non est sed quodammodo ad esse refertur. (b) Entia secundum quid sunt quattuor: (1) accidentia, quae non sunt sed insunt; (2) principia entis intrinseca et constitutiva (materia, forma; essentia, esse; etc.), quae ipsa non sunt sed iis aliquid est; (3) possibilia, quae non sunt sed esse possunt; et (4) entia rationis, quae non sunt sed cogitantur.10

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Finally, as to a refutation of the reasoning by which one concludes to modes, see De Constitutione Christi 32, § 27.9 2  being, essence, act of existence, substance (a) ‘Being’ is said in two ways: a being pure and simple, and a being qualified in some sense. A being pure and simple is that which is. It is also named a being (without qualification), a subsistent, what has an act of existence, what has an essence. A being in a qualified sense does not exist of itself, but is referred in some way to an act of existence. (b) Of beings in some qualified sense there are four: (1) accidents, which do not exist, but exist in; (2)  intrinsic and constitutive principles of being (matter, form; essence, act of existence, and so on), which exist not of themselves, but are principles by which something exists; (3) possibles, which do not exist but could exist; and (4) beings of reason, which do not exist but are thought about.10 9 See ibid. 53–59. 10 Here, Lonergan assigns his own meaning to accepted Scholastic terminology. If the Latin is compared to the terminology developed in Insight, note the following:   (1) A ‘being pure and simple’ (ens simpliciter) is a ‘thing’ in the technical sense of Insight (cwl 3): an intelligible unity, identity, whole (271), what is identical through change (272; 461); but analogically, because there are no data on angels or God. (Note that Lonergan did not use ‘thing’ exclusively in a technical sense, and neither does this translation.)   (2) ‘Substantial’ potency, form, and act here are called ‘central’ potency, form, and act in Insight. ‘Accidents’ here must be the ‘conjugates’ of Insight, where conjugate forms are restricted to explanatory correlations implicitly defined by intelligible mutual relations; ‘accident’ here can only be understood as a concession (see 462; for more on the difference between Lonergan’s metaphysical elements and Aristotle’s, see 458–60).   (3) ‘Accordingly, existence stands to the thing, as event or occurrence stands to the conjugate’ (273), and again, ‘central act is existence, for what exists is the intelligible unity. Conjugate act is occurrence, for what occurs is defined explanatorily by appealing to conjugate form’ (462). It is this English usage that suggested ‘exist’ and ‘existence’ for the translation of ‘est’ and ‘esse’ in certain places (see also 274).   Similarly, central form is concrete intelligible unity, while conjugate form is explanatory correlation. Central potency is the ‘individuality of the empirical residue,’ while conjugate potency refers to the ‘continua, conjunctions, and successions’ that also pertain to the empirical residue. (462).

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(c) Entia simpliciter sunt Deus, angeli, et creaturae materiales. Deus est ens ut actus simplex et illimitatus. Angelus est ens ut compositum ex forma et actu. Creatura materialis est ens ut compositum ex potentia (materia) et forma et actu. (d) Unde et essentia dicitur tripliciter: nam in Deo essentia est ipse actus purus; in angelo essentia est forma; in creatura materiali essentia componitur ex potentia et forma. (e) Essentia etiam dividitur in essentiam simpliciter et essentiam secundum quid. Essentia simpliciter est essentia entis simpliciter. Essentia secundum quid est essentia alicuius quod ad ens simpliciter pertinet; unde in ratione seu definitione essentiae huiusmodi necessario ponitur ‘in alio’; e.g., definiri non potest simitas nisi additur ‘in naso,’ neque circulus nisi additur ‘in superficie plana,’11 et similiter in aliis. (f) Esse est actus entis, actus essendi, actus essentiae. In Deo esse est ipse actus purus; in angelo est actus limitatus per formam; in creatura materiali est actus limitatus per essentiam compositam ex materia et forma. Esse est exsistere si per ‘exsistere’ intenditur illud quod innotescit quatenus affirmative (Est, Sic) respondetur ad quaestionem, An res sit. Esse non est exsistere si per ‘exsistere’ intenditur omne reale, omne quod est extra causas.12 Nam non solum ‘esse’ sed etiam formae, potentiae,

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(c) God, the angels, and material creatures are beings without qualification. God is being as simple and unrestricted act. An angel is a being as composed of form and act. A material creature is a being as composed of potency (matter), form, and act. (d) Hence, essence too is said in three ways. In God essence is pure act itself; in an angel essence is form; in a material creature essence is composed of potency and form. (e) Essence is also divided into essences pure and simple, and essences qualified in some sense. An essence pure and simple is the essence of a being pure and simple. An essence in a qualified sense is the essence of anything that pertains to a being pure and simple. Thus, the words ‘in another’ are necessary to the meaning or definition of this sort of essence; snubness, for example, cannot be defined without adding ‘in a nose,’ nor can a circle be defined without adding ‘in a plane surface,’11 and likewise in other cases. (f) To be is the act of a being, the act of being, the act of essence. In God, to be (the act of existence) is pure act itself; in an angel it is an act limited by form; in a material creature it is an act limited by essence composed of matter and form. To be is to exist if by ‘to exist’ what is intended is that which is known inasmuch as the answer to the question whether something is, is, ‘Yes, it is.’ To be is not to exist if by ‘to exist’ what is intended is everything real, everything that is outside [its] causes.12 For not only the act of existence

  (4) Thus ‘beings in a qualified sense’ do not ‘exist’ but are ‘referred in some way to an act of existence,’ either because they define events (‘accidents,’ i.e., conjugates) ‘centered’ on things, or because they are intrinsic principles of being, or because they can, or can be thought, to exist or occur.   In sum, then, a ‘being pure and simple’ (ens simpliciter) is a thing as opposed to an event; in act it is existence rather than occurrence, in form it is intelligible concrete unity rather than explanatory correlation, in potency it is individuality rather than continua, conjunctions, successions. 11 Snubness is a curvature in the nose; a circle is a locus, in a plane surface, of points equidistant from a center. 12 ‘Extra causas,’ a Scholastic expression apparently derived from the etymology of ‘ex-sistere,’ to stand forth, i.e., from its causes. What is actual or real is said to exist ‘outside its causes,’ whereas what is merely possible, virtual,

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essentiae sunt reales et extra causas, quamvis non sine reali habitudine ad esse. Esse non est exsistere si per ‘exsistere’ intenditur id quod innotescit experiendo sive externe (videndo, tangendo, etc.) sive interne (per conscientiam proprie dictam). (g) Datur realis distinctio minor adaequata inter essentiam finitam et esse contingens. De constitutione Christi 30. (h) Datur realis distinctio minor inadaequata inter ens finitum et suam essentiam.13 Scilicet, id quod est non est essentia finita sed est ens ex essentia et esse compositum. (i) Quare in Deo haec tria sunt idem: ens, essentia, esse. Sed in creatura ens simpliciter quidem est id quod est; essentia autem et esse sunt ea quibus ens est, ideoque entia secundum quid, nempe, principia entis constitutiva. (j) Substantia dupliciter et, ulterius, multipliciter intelligitur. Substantia est prima vel secunda. Aristoteles, Categoriae, 1. Secunda est abstractio quaedam, uti, homo, bos; et de abstractionibus nullatenus agimus. Substantia prima est concreta realitas, ut hic homo, hic bos. Sed sumitur dupliciter: primo modo, tamquam accidentia includens; alio modo, tamquam ab accidentibus praescindens. E.g., cogitari potest hic bos uti cum vel sine dimensionibus, figura, pondere, iracundia, fortitudine, potentia, virtute, actionibus, passionibus, loco, tempore, situ, cornibus, ungulis, cauda. Ulterius, substantia prima sine accidentibus concipi potest ut (1) ex potentia, forma, et actu compositum, et sic est ens simpliciter quoad substan-

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(esse, to be) but also forms, potencies, and essences are real and outside of causes, although not without a real relationship to the act of existence. To be is not to exist if by ‘to exist’ what is intended is that which is known by experiencing, whether external (by seeing, touching, and the like) or internal (by consciousness properly so called). (g) There is a real, adequate, minor distinction between finite essence and contingent act of existence. See De constitutione Christi 30 [The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 52–55]. (h) There is a real, inadequate, minor distinction between a finite being and its essence.13 That which is, in other words, is not a finite essence but a being composed of essence and act of existence. (i) In God, accordingly, being, essence, and act of existence are the same. But in a creature, that which is is indeed a being pure and simple; but a being is by essence and act of existence, and they [essence and act of existence] are therefore beings in a qualified sense, namely, constitutive principles of being. (j) Substance is said in two ways and, moreover, understood in many different ways. Substance is either first or second substance. See Aristotle, Categories, 1. Second substance is an abstraction, such as human being or cow, and abstractions do not concern us here at all. First substance is a concrete reality such as this human being or this cow. But this may be taken in two ways: first, as including accidents; second, as prescinding from accidents. For example, it is possible to think of this cow either with or without dimensions, shape, weight, nasty temper, courage, power, strength, actions, passions, place, time, situation, horns, hoofs, tail. Further, first substance can be conceived without accidents, (1) as composed of potency, form, and act, in which case it is, as far as substance, a

or potential is ‘inside its causes.’ The present point is that ‘esse,’ the act of existence, is not all that is real, since a finite act of existence is contradistinguished from the potencies, forms, and essences it actuates, all of which, concretely, are also real through their relationship to the act of existence. See too Lonergan, Insight 396: ‘It is in and through essences that being has existence. Hence, being apart from essence is being apart from the possibility of existence; it is being that cannot exist; but what cannot exist is nothing, and so the notion of being apart from essence is the notion of nothing.’ 13 See above p. 201, note 3, on real, inadequate, minor distinction.

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tiam, vel (2) ex potentia et forma compositum, et sic non est ens simpliciter sed essentia simpliciter. 3  unum, esse proprium, esse proportionatum (a) Unum est indivisum in se et divisum a quolibet alio. Ubi ‘divisio’ nihil significat nisi negationem veram. Quare, divisum ab alio quolibet est quod non est aliud quodlibet; et indivisum in se est quod ipsum se non negat. Ideoque, ens et unum differunt ratione, quatenus unum super ens addit negationes. Sed realiter ens et unum non differunt, cum negationes nihil ponant a parte rei. Unde dicitur ens et unum inter se converti. Unde ulterius quot sunt divisiones entis, tot etiam sunt divisiones unius; et quot sunt causae entis, tot etiam sunt causae unius. Quare, esse, sicut facit ens simpliciter, ita etiam facit unum simpliciter; forma naturalis facit unum naturale, et forma artificialis facit unum artificiale; denique materia signata facit unum praedicamentale seu individuum materiale. Quae sunt maioris momenti, cum Christus Deus et homo sit unum simpliciter sed duo secundum duas naturas.14 (b) Ulterius, in unum coeunt non quaelibet potentia, forma, actus, sed ea tantummodo (1) quorum una est definitio et (2) quibus idem per potentiam est perfectibile, per formam est et perfectum et perfectibile, et per actum est perfectum.15 Quae conditiones, si implentur circa essentiam et esse eiusdem, faciunt unum ens simpliciter. Quo in casu esse est proprium illius entis simpliciter et16 proportionatum essentiae in qua recipitur. E.g., si idem Socrates est per-

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being pure and simple; or (2) as composed of potency and form, in which case it is not a being pure and simple but an essence pure and simple. 3  one, proper act of existence, proportionate act of existence (a) What is one is undivided in itself and is divided from everything else. Here ‘division’ denotes only a true negation. Thus, what is divided from everything else is that which is not anything else, and what is undivided in itself is that which does not negate itself. Being and one, therefore, differ conceptually inasmuch as one adds negations to being. But being and one do not differ really, since negations posit nothing on the side of the object. Hence being and one are said to be convertible. Hence too there are as many divisions of one as there are divisions of being; and there are as many causes of one as there are causes of being. Therefore, as it is the act of existence that makes anything a being pure and simple, so does the act of existence make it one pure and simple. Natural form makes it one naturally, and artificial form makes it one artificially. And finally, assigned matter makes it one predicamentally or a material individual. These are very important considerations, since Christ, God and man, is purely and simply one, but two because of his two natures.14 (b) Further, it is not just any potency, form, and act that coalesce into a unity, but only (1) those which share a single definition, and (2) by which the same is perfectible through the potency, perfected and perfectible through the form, and perfected through the act.15 If these conditions are fulfilled as regards the essence and the act of existence of the same thing, they constitute one being pure and simple. In that case, the act of existence is proper to that being pure and simple, and16 it is pro-

14 This paragraph does not appear in the editions of 1960 and 1961. 15 This paragraph is the same in the 1960 and 1964 editions but in the 1961 edition reads as follows:   1961: ‘(b) Iam diximus potentiam, formam, et actum efficere unum si (1) una est trium definitio et (2) idem per potentiam est perfectibile, per formam est perfectum et perfectibile, per actum est perfectum (1, d).’ In English: ‘(b) We have already said that potency, form, and act constitute a unity, if (1) all three share a single definition and (2) it is the same thing which is perfectible through potency, perfected and perfectible through form, and perfected through act (1, d).’ 16 In 1960 ‘sed,’ ‘but.’

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fectibilis per essentiam humanam et perfectus per esse in illa essentia receptum, tunc illud esse est proprium Socrati et proportionatum essentiae humanae Socratis. Ubi autem eaedem conditiones non implentur, deest esse proprium et proportionatum. Ita in Verbo incarnato non impletur prima conditio quia, sicut duae sunt naturae seu essentiae, ita duae sunt definitiones essentiales. Neque simpliciter impletur conditio altera: quamvis enim unum simpliciter sit Verbum incarnatum, tamen per hanc essentiam humanam secundum propriam suam proportionem in potentia est merus homo, et solummodo ultra hanc proportionem per omnipotentiam divinam in potentia est eiusdem naturae assumptio a Verbo divino.17

4  persona (a) Persona est (1) individua substantia naturae rationalis (Boethius, Liber de persona et duabus naturis, ml 64, 1343 cd), vel (2) subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali (S. Thomas18). Quae definitiones realiter idem dicunt sed terminologice differunt. (b) Circa evolutionem notionis personae, vide Divinarum personarum 131–39, De Deo trino, ii, 153–61.19 (c) Natura intellectualis est quae refertur ad totum ens seu omnia entia. Notate naturam intellectualem dici, non quasi specifice de divina, angelica, humana, sed quasi generice de qualibet earum.

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portionate to the essence in which it is received. For instance, if the identical Socrates is perfectible through his human essence and perfected through an act of existence received in that essence, then that act of existence is proper to Socrates and proportionate to Socrates’ human essence. Where these same conditions are not fulfilled, however, a proper and proportionate act of existence is lacking. Thus, the first condition is not fulfilled in the incarnate Word, because, as there are two natures or essences, so also there are two essential definitions. Nor is the second condition fulfilled without qualification. The incarnate Word is one pure and simple. Nevertheless, through a particular human essence, in accordance with its own proportion, what is in potency is just a man. And only beyond this proportion, through divine omnipotence, is what is in potency the assumption of this same nature by the divine Word.17 4  person (a) A person is (1) an individual substance of a rational nature (Boethius, Liber de persona et duabus naturis, ml 64, 1343 cd [lcl 74: 84; Moreschini, 214]), or (2) a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature (Thomas Aquinas).18 These definitions really denote the same thing but differ terminologically. (b) On the development of the notion of person, see Divinarum personarum 131–39 or De Deo trino: Pars systematica 153–61.19 (c) An intellectual nature is one that has reference to the whole of being or to all beings. Note that ‘intellectual nature’ is used, not as though specifically, as though speaking of divine or angelic or human [nature], but as though generically, as though speaking of any of these. 17 In 1960, this paragraph reads: ‘Ubi autem aliud est perfectibile per essentiam et aliud est perfectum per esse, patet quod non efficitur ens simpliciter vel unum simpliciter; et eo ipso consequitur illud esse non esse proprium alicuius neque essentiae esse proportionatum.’ In English: ‘But where one thing is perfectible through essence and another perfected through act of existence, clearly there is not effected a being purely and simply or one purely and simply; and it follows from this that that act of existence is not anyone’s proper act of existence, nor an act of existence proportionate to essence.’ 18 Thomas Aquinas, Super I Sententiarum, d. 23, q. 1, a. 4 c (ed. Mandonnet, 1: 566), and De potentia, q. 9, a. 4 c. 19 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 308–24.

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Notate ulterius naturam poni non in recto sed in obliquo, quia scilicet persona non est natura quaedam sed naturam habens; similiter, persona non est essentia quaedam sed essentiam habens; non enim in Deo sunt tres essentiae vel tres naturae, neque in Christo sunt duae personae; quae tamen haereses sequerentur si natura vel essentia identificaretur cum persona. (d) Distincta sunt quorum unum non est aliud. Ratione sunt distincta quorum ratio unius non est ratio alterius. Realiter sunt distincta quorum realitas unius non est realitas alterius. Notate ‘reale’ significare idem quod ens, ideoque tot esse divisiones tou realis quot sunt entis. Notate carnem in utero Virginis anima rationali animatam fuisse (1) in natura intellectuali propter animam rationalem et (2) distinctam ab omni alia. Remanet ergo quod non fuit persona, homo, quia non subsistebat. (e) Subsistens est id quod est = ens simpliciter = esse habens = ens (sine addito). Quod tamen ab auctoribus essentialismo infectis non admittitur. Eorum sententiae mox recitabuntur. (f) Suppositum reale est subsistens distinctum. Ita in Deo sunt tria supposita realia, tria subsistentia distincta; sed ipse Deus est unum subsistens (indistincte). Cf. Divinarum personarum 143, De Deo trino, ii, 164.20 (g) Hypostasis est idem ac suppositum reale. Problema: Essentialismus 1 Essentialismus docet omnia creata reduci ad essentias. Quare, docet in rebus creatis ‘id quod est’ esse vel essentiam vel saltem essentiale. Ulterius, aut negat realem distinctionem inter essentiam finitam et esse contingens, aut, posita reali distinctione, negat tamen ‘id quod est’ componi ex essentia et esse.21

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Note further that nature is set out not directly but indirectly. That is because a person is not a nature but what has a nature; likewise, a person is not an essence but what has an essence. For in God there are not three essences or three natures, and in Christ there are not two persons – heresies that follow from identifying nature or essence with person. (d) Those things are distinct of which one is not the other. They are conceptually distinct where the concept of one is not the concept of the other. They are really distinct where the reality of one is not the reality of the other. Note that ‘real’ denotes the same thing as ‘being,’ and so there are as many divisions of the real as there are of being. Note that in the womb of the Virgin the flesh animated by a rational soul was (1) in an intellectual nature because of the rational soul, and (2) distinct from everything else. It remains then that it was not a person, a man, because it did not subsist. (e) A subsistent is that which is = a being pure and simple = that which has an act of existence = a being (without qualification). Authors tainted by essentialism do not, however, admit this. About their views more will be said presently. (f) A real supposit is a distinct subsistent. Thus, in God there are three real supposits, three distinct subsistents; but God himself is one (indistinct) subsistent. See Divinarum personarum 143 or De Deo trino: Pars systematica 164.20 (g) A hypostasis is the same as a real supposit. Problem: Essentialism 1 Essentialism teaches that all created things may be reduced to essences. Accordingly, it teaches that in created things ‘that which is’ is either an essence or at least in the order of essence. Further, essentialism either denies the real distinction between finite essence and contingent act of existence, or else posits this real distinction while denying that ‘that which is’ is composed of essence and act of existence.21

20 Ibid. 330–31. 21 For more on essentialism in the context of Scholastic thought, see Lonergan, Verbum 115.

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2 Inter scholasticos fons essentialismi est Aristoteles, qui de reali distinctione non cogitavit (De Raeymaeker, Metaphysica generalis, ii, 265)22 et ideo posuit hunc hominem ex hoc corpore et hac anima rationali componi, hanc rem materialem ex hac materia et hac forma componi. Quae doctrina ontologica per theoriam de iudicio munitur. Iudicium enim concipitur ut compositio vel divisio conceptuum, non ut absoluta veri positio. Unde iudicium reducitur ad experientiam et intelligentiam, sicut et esse reducitur ad materiam et formam.23 Posita autem tali theoria de iudicio, efficaciter dici non potest quid significetur per ‘esse’ praeter ipsam realitatem essentiae.

3 Sed ulterius homines communiter aestimant iam multum attingi quando realiter distinguuntur corpus et anima, materia et forma; et nimium esse arbitrantur huic distinctioni aliam eamque fere incredibilem addere inter essentiam et esse. Praeterea, homines communiter, quando de cognitione cogitare incipiunt, omnia per analogiam sensus concipiunt. Iis ergo intellectus est oculus quidam spiritualis qui universalia inspicit; et quando inter intelligentiam et iudicium urgetur essentialis differentia, cum alter oculus spiritualis ad esse inspiciendum vix fingi possit, iudicium affirmant esse meram terminorum compositionem, nexus apprehensionem.

4 Ulterius, S. Thomas modum loquendi aristotelicum saepe adhibet.24 Ita communiter loquitur de iudicio tamquam de compositione vel divisione. Et communiter identificat id quod est cum essentia finita: C. Gent., 2, 54; Sum. theol., 1, q. 3, a. 3; q. 50, a. 2, ad 3m; q. 75, a. 2 c., ad 1m, ad 2m. 5 Attamen ex thesi secunda habetur quod Verbum sibi univit carnem anima rationali animatam.

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2 Among the Scholastics the source of essentialism is Aristotle, who did not consider the real distinction (De Raeymaeker, Metaphysica generalis 2, 265)22 and who therefore stated that this man is composed of this body and this rational soul, and that this material thing is composed of this matter and this form. This ontological doctrine is reinforced by a theory about judgment. For judgment is conceived as the composition or division of concepts, not as an absolute positing of what is true. Hence, judgment is reduced to experiencing plus understanding, just as the act of existence is reduced to matter plus form.23 Where such a theory of judgment holds the field, it is impossible to say effectively what is signified by ‘act of existence,’ beyond the very reality of an essence. 3 But furthermore it is common to suppose that a great deal has been achieved once body and soul, matter and form, have been really distinguished; and adding to this distinction another, almost incredible distinction between essence and act of existence – that is commonly thought to be going just too far. Besides this, commonly when people start to think about knowing, they conceive everything by analogy with sense. To them, therefore, the intellect is a kind of spiritual eye that inspects universals. It may be pointed out that there is an essential difference between understanding and judgment, but it is difficult to imagine a second spiritual eye, this one for inspecting the act of existence. Hence, they claim that judgment is simply a combining of terms or the apprehension of a link. 4 Further, Thomas often uses Aristotelian language.24 Thus, he commonly speaks of judgment as composition or division. And he commonly identifies that which is with finite essence; see Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 54; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 3, a. 3; q. 50, a. 2, ad 3m; q. 75, a. 2 c., ad 1m, ad 2m. 5 Nevertheless, it was shown in thesis 2 that the Word united with himself flesh animated by a rational soul.

22 Louis de Raeymaeker, Metaphysica generalis, 3rd ed. (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1952) 265. 23 For more on ‘composition and division’ in the Scholastic context, see Lonergan, Verbum 61–71. 24 See Lonergan, Verbum 61–62.

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Sed caro in utero Virginis erat individua et realis; et per animam rationalem individuam et realem animabatur; ergo certo certius habebatur haec essentia individua et realis. Si autem acceptatur doctrina essentialistica, non solum aderat essentia humana, sed etiam ens simpliciter, subsistens, id quod est, et ideo persona humana habebatur. At contra est thesis tertia quae negavit Christum in alium et alium dividi, Verbum sibi assumpsisse vel hominem vel personam humanam.

6 Quibus positis, elucet quale sit nostrum problema. Generice est problema philosophiae christianae, scilicet, agitur de evolutione in ipso campo philosophico peragenda, cuius tamen occasio est dogma catholicum. Vide M. Nédoncelle, Existe-t-il une philosophie chrétienne? (Paris 1956).25 Specifice autem problema est de ente simpliciter (subsistente), de essentia (vel essentialibus), et de esse. Consuli possunt: E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto, Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949); L’être et l’essence (Paris, 1948); edit. gall.26 verius narrat de Aristotele; auctor videtur negare quod ‘esse’ concipitur; quod est exaggeratum. Quod verum est, sic enuntiatur: cognitio tou esse non est merus conceptus; sed cogitatio tou esse est merus conceptus. C. Fabro, ‘L’obscurcissement de l’esse dans l’école thomiste,’ Revue thomiste (1958) 443–72. D. Foucher, ‘La notion de personne d’après Capréolus et Billot,’ Revue thomiste (1956) 659–87; cf. diss. dact. pug, 2367; typ. imp., 1091.27

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But in the womb of the Virgin the flesh was individual and real; and it was animated by an individual and real rational soul; therefore, it is altogether certain that there was an individual and real essence. Accept the essentialist doctrine, however, and not only was there a human essence but also a being pure and simple, a subsistent, that which is; and therefore there was a human person. But this goes against thesis 3, which denied that Christ is divided into ‘someone’ and ‘someone else,’ and that the Word assumed to himself either a man or a human person. 6 With that, the sort of problem we are dealing with will be clear. Generically, it is the problem of a Christian philosophy. That is to say, it concerns a development going forward in the field of philosophy itself, but occasioned by Catholic dogma. See M. Nédoncelle, Existe-t-il une philosophie chrétienne? (Paris, 1956).25 Specifically, however, it is a problem that concerns being pure and simple (the subsistent), essences (or what is in the order of essence), and act of existence. The following can be consulted: É. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949); L’être et l’essence (Paris: Vrin, 1948). The French edition26 renders Aristotle more accurately. Gilson seems to deny that the act of existence is conceived, which is an exaggeration. What is true may be put as follows: knowing the act of existence is not a mere concept, but thinking about the act of existence is a mere concept. C. Fabro, ‘L’obscurcissement de l’esse dans l’école thomiste,’ Revue thomiste 58 (1958) 443–72. D. Foucher, ‘La notion de personne d’après Capréolus et Billot,’ Revue thomiste 56 (1956) 659–87.27

25 Maurice Nédoncelle, Existe-t-il une philosophie chrétienne? (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1956); in English, Is There a Christian Philosophy? trans. Dom Illtyd Trethowan (London: Burns & Oates, 1960). 26 In one of his reviews of Being and Some Philosophers, Lonergan refers to L’être et l’essence as ‘somewhat similar’ to Being and Some Philosophers. See Bernard Lonergan, Shorter Papers, vol. 20 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken, Robert M. Doran, and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 183. 27 Lonergan also mentioned a dissertation by Foucher done at the Gregorian University. It is Personne et existence chez le Père Billot, Dissertation 2367 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1955).

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J.H. Newman, Grammar of Assent (London 1870), bene exponit actum assentiendi (iudicium) qua inconditionaliter positum.28 B. Lonergan, Insight, cc. 9–11. O. Schweizer, Person und hypostatische Union bei Thomas von Aquin, Freiburg (Helv.) 1957.29 Analogiae formae, substantiae, entis 1 Analogia formae est platonica, substantiae aristotelica, entis thomistica; quae quales sint breviter indicantur ut quaestio de essentialismo aliqualiter intelligi possit.

2 Formae (ta eideF) platonicae sunt aeternae, immutabiles, subsistentes, immateriales, intelligibiles, non intelligentes. Ponuntur secundum analogiam conceptuum universalium et propter validitatem scientiae universalis et aeternae. 3 Substantiae aristotelicae (ousiai) sunt vel materiales (ex materia et forma compositae, Met. H) vel immateriales seu a materia separatae (Met. Lambda). Forma aristotelica non correspondet conceptui; in rebus materialibus est intelligibile quod in ipsis sensibilibus perspicitur, e.g., anima in corpore humano qua sensibili. Nominatur eidos (forma, species), to ti eFn einai (quod quid erat esse), aition tou einai (causa essendi), ousia (substantia, sic in Met. Z, non in H). In immaterialibus ousia seu substantia est et intelligens et intellectum et quidem identice; in his quae sunt sine materia idem est intelligens (to nooun) et intellectum (to noumenon); De Anima, iii, 4, 430a 3. In mundo30 aristotelico substantiae separatae ponuntur tamquam motores immoti caelorum, et quidem sunt vel 47 vel 55 (In XII Met., lect. 10 §§ 2382–83).

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J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (London: 1870) gives a good account of the act of assent (judgment) as unconditionally posited.28 Bernard Lonergan, Insight, chapters 9–11. O. Schweizer, Person und hypostatische Union bei Thomas von Aquin (Fribourg [Switzerland]: Universitätsverlag, 1957).29 Analogy of form, analogy of substance, analogy of being 1 The analogy of form is Platonic, the analogy of substance Aristotelian, and the analogy of being Thomist. A brief characterization of the three will make possible a somewhat better understanding of the question of essentialism. 2 The Platonic Forms (ta eideF) are eternal, immutable, subsistent, immaterial, intelligible, but not intelligent. They are posited on the analogy of universal concepts, to account for the validity of universal and eternal knowledge. 3 The Aristotelian substances (ousiai) are either material (composed of form and matter (Metaphysics H [8]) or else they are immaterial or separate from matter (Metaphysics Lambda [12]). Form in the Aristotelian sense does not correspond to concept; in material things it is the intelligible that is grasped in the sensible itself, as soul is grasped in a human body considered as sensible. It is named eidos (form, species), to ti eFn einai (what it is to be this or that), aition tou einai (cause of being), ousia (substance; so Metaphysics Z [7] but not in book H). In that which is immaterial, ousia or substance is both what understands and what is understood, and indeed identically; in those things which are without matter, understanding (to nooun) and what is understood (to nooumenon) are the same (De Anima, iii, 4, 430a 3). In the Aristotelian cosmos30 separated substances are posited as the unmoved movers of the heavens; there are forty-seven or fifty-five of them (In XII Metaphysicorum, lect. 10, §§ 2382–83).

28 John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, first published London, 1870; currently available in an edition with an introduction by Nicholas Lash (Notre Dame, in: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979). 29 This item was added in the 1964 edition. 30 The 1960 edition has ‘cosmo’ rather than ‘mundo.’

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4 Analogia aristotelica Met., Z, 17 concludit librum qui de ousia investigat. Ibi quaeritur quid significet ‘quid sit.’ Respondetur eandem esse quaestionem, quid, et quaestionem, propter quid: e.g., quaerere quid sit eclipsis nihil est aliud quam quaerere cur, propter quid, luna vel sol sic obscuretur; nam utrique quaestioni idem respondetur; et responsum habetur quatenus quis in ipsis sensibilibus causam obscurationis intelligit. Ulterius procedens, quaesivit Aristoteles quemadmodum quaestio, quid sit homo, quid sit domus, in quaestionem, propter quid, transponatur. Respondit quaestionem transponi quatenus quaeritur propter quid haec materialia vel haec sensibilia sint hoc aliquid, e.g., propter quid hoc corpus organicum sit homo. Cui quaestioni respondetur, propter animam, propter causam formalem. Haec ergo causa intrinseca est eidos, to ti eFn einai, aition tou einai (causa essendi hoc aliquid), ousia. Unde et ulterius procedens quaesivit utrum simili modo substantiae separatae cognoscere vel cognosci possint; et negative respondit. Cuius responsi ratio est quod substantiae separatae non habent sensus, et ideo non possunt cognoscere quaerendo propter quid de sensibilibus; et, praeterea, substantiae separatae non sunt sensibiles, et ideo cognosci non possunt quaerendo de sensibilibus propter quid. Ubi notas analogiam aristotelicam ad substantias separatas concipiendas procedere circa intelligentem et intelligibile: alius nempe est intellectus humanus qui ad intelligendum movetur mediantibus sensibilibus et ideo ad intelligentiam rerum sensibilium (quasi proprii obiecti) procedit, et alius est intellectus separatus, qui non movetur ab alio sed immobilis est, in quo idem est per identitatem et intelligens et intellectum (id quod intelligitur).31

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4 The Aristotelian analogy Metaphysics Z, 17, comes at the end of the book in which ousia is investigated. Here the question is what is meant by ‘What is it?’ The answer is that the question ‘What?’ is the same as the question ‘Why?’ To ask what an eclipse is, for example, is the same as to ask why, because of what, the moon or the sun has been thus darkened; for to either question the answer is the same, and there is an answer inasmuch as one understands, in the sensible data themselves, the cause of the darkening. Going further, Aristotle asks how the question, ‘What is a man?’ or ‘What is a house?’ is to be transposed into the question, ‘Why?’ His answer was that the question is transposed inasmuch as one asks, ‘Why, because of what, are these material things or these sensible things this thing?’ Because of what, for example, is this organic body a man? To this question his answer is, ‘Because of a soul, the formal cause.’ Therefore, this intrinsic cause is the eidos, to ti eFn einai, aition tou einai (the cause of its being this thing), ousia. Going further still, he asked whether it is possible for separated substances to know or to be known in a similar manner, and his answer was negative. The reason for this answer is that separated substances have no senses, and therefore cannot know by asking of sensible things, ‘Why?’ Furthermore, separated substances are not sensible things, and therefore they cannot be known by asking of sensible things, ‘Why?’ Notice here that the Aristotelian analogy for conceiving separated substances proceeds by considering the intelligent and the intelligible. Human intellect, which is moved to understand by the mediation of sensible data and thus proceeds to an understanding of sensible things as its proper objects, is not the same as an intellect separate [from matter], which is not moved by another but is immovable, and in which the understanding is, by identity, the same as the understood.31

31 In 1960 the paragraph begins as follows: ‘Ubi notas analogiam aristotelicam ad substantias separatas concipiendas non esse analogiam quidditatis seu essentiae, cum circa eas quaestio quid sit sensu et significato caret. Analogia aristotelica versatur circa intelligentem et intelligibile, nempe, alius est intellectus humanus …’ In English: ‘Notice here that the Aristotelian analogy for conceiving separated substances is not an analogy of quiddity or of essence, since concerning these substances the question “quid sit” is meaningless and without a referent. The Aristotelian analogy turns on the intelligent and the intelligible, namely, the human intellect, which …’

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5 Apud S. Thomam obiectum intellectus est ens, i.e., omnia, i.e., ad nullum prorsus genus vel speciem restringitur quod intelligitur. Sum. theol., 1, q. 79, a. 7. C. Gent., 2, 98, § 9.32 Quare, intellectus est in actu vel potentia secundum comparationem ad ens universale. Sequitur nullum intellectum praeter divinum esse in actu simpliciter, quia nullus intellectus creatus est principium totius entis, ens infinitum (Sum. theol., 1, q. 79, a. 2; cf. q. 14, aa. 2, 4–6; q. 15, a. 2). Intellectus autem angelicus est quidem semper in actu, sed secundum quaedam tantum intelligibilia (ibid., q. 79, a. 2; q. 54, aa. 1–3; q. 56, aa. 1–3). Intellectus denique humanus est mera potentia in genere intelligibilium, initio comparatur tabulae rasae, et etiam post acceptas species nihil in actu intelligit sine phantasmate (ibid., q. 79, a. 2; q. 84, a. 7; etc.). Quae tamen ordinem rerum naturalem narrant. Finis enim angelorum et hominum est supernaturalis, et in communicatione quadam operationis intellectualis divinae consistit (ibid., q. 12, aa. 1, 4, 5; q. 62; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; q. 5, a. 5; C. Gent., 3, 25–63). 6 Quod systema ita doctrinam aristotelicam includit ut tamen eam trans­ formet. Sicut Aristoteles, ita etiam Aquinas de rebus materialibus et de substantiis separatis (angelis) tractat, et quidem cum iisdem prorsus theorematibus circa intelligere, quidditatem, motum, materiam, etc. Nihilominus apud Aquinatem praeter materiam et formam in materialibus habetur esse, praeter formam seu substantiam a materia separatam etiam habetur esse, et ultra omnes finitas substantias a materia separatas habetur ipsum esse subsistens, actus purus, Deus infinitus. Cuius differentiae radix sane est doctrina hebraica et christiana de Deo; sed apud Aquinatem Deus non est per se notus quoad nos; et ideo radix systematica doctrinae thomisticae alibi est ponenda, neque inventu difficile est. Nihil enim aliud est quam assertum quod obiectum intellectus est ens, omnia, illimitatum. Hoc enim posito non solum quaerendum est quid sit haec vel illa res materialis, uti faciunt scientifici moderni; non solum quae­ rendum est quid (analogice) sit substantia separata cuius exsistentia ex motu caeli concluditur, uti fecit Aristoteles; sed universaliter quaerendum est quid (analogice) sit esse, ens, id quod est.

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5 For Thomas, the object of intellect is being, that is, everything; in other words, what is understood is precisely not confined to any genus or species (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 7; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 98, § 9).32 Accordingly, intellect is in act or in potency depending on its relation to universal being. It follows that no intellect except God’s is purely and simply in act, since no created intellect is infinite being, the principle of the whole of being (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 2; cf. q. 14, aa. 2, 4–6, and q. 15, a. 2). An angelic intellect, however, is indeed always in act, but only with respect to certain intelligibles (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 2; q. 54, aa. 1–3; q. 56, aa. 1–3). Finally, human intellect is merely a potency in the genus of the intelligible, comparable at the outset to a blank slate; and even after it has received a species, without a phantasm it understands nothing in act (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 2; q. 84, a. 7, and so on). This, however, accounts only for the natural order of things. For the end of angels and of human beings is a supernatural end, and consists in a communication of the divine intellectual operation (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, aa. 1, 4, 5; q. 62; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; q. 5, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, 25–63). 6 This system includes the Aristotelian doctrine, but in such a way as to transform it. Like Aristotle, Aquinas discusses material things and separate substances (angels), using just the same theorems on understanding, quiddity, motion, matter, and so on. Nevertheless for Aquinas there is in material things, besides matter and form, the act of existence; besides form or substance separate from matter there is again the act of existence; and beyond all finite substances separate from matter there is the subsistent act of existence itself, pure act, the infinite God. At the root of this difference, to be sure, is Hebrew and Christian teaching about God. But for Thomas God is not known to us in himself. The systematic root of the Thomist doctrine therefore lies elsewhere; nor is it difficult to find. It is nothing other than the assertion that the object of intellect is unrestricted, being, everything. Once this is established, what we have to ask is not only, ‘What is this or that material thing?’ as modern scientists do. Nor is it only the question, ‘What, analogically speaking, is a separated substance, the existence of which is inferred from the motion of the heavens?’ as Aristotle did. No, what has to be asked universally is, ‘What, analogically speaking, is the act of existence, being, that which is?’

32 The Thomist position recounted in these two paragraphs is outlined more fully in Lonergan, Verbum 96–98.

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Cui quaestioni respondetur quod ens non solum dicitur dupliciter (ens simpliciter, ens secundum quid, cf. Notiones, 2), sed etiam est dupliciter (ens per essentiam, ens per participationem) atque cognoscitur dupliciter (ens quidditative cognitum, et ens analogice cognitum), ubi ens per essentiam est per identitatem et ipsum esse et ipsum intelligere, ens quidditative cognitum est quod innotescit per divinam entis intelligentiam et per huius intelligentiae participationem supernaturalem in beatis, ens per participationem est cuius quid sit non est esse sed tantummodo essentia vel angelica vel humana vel animalis vel plantae, etc., et ens analogice cognitum est quod innotescit per illam analogicam entis cognitionem quae ex entibus per participationem incipit ut imperfectam quandam totius entis intelligentiam per analogiam assequatur.

7 Iam vero patere videtur systema thomisticum simpliciter transcendere essentialismum aristotelicum; quamvis enim doctrinam aristotelicam includat, alia et simpliciter nova addit et quidem non per accidens sed systematice. Attamen haec systematica additio atque transformatio eatenus est possibilis, quatenus, intra campum obiecti proportionati intellectus humani, ens non dicit idem quod essentia vel essentiale. Si enim idem dicit, tunc cum Aristotele quaeritur quid sit ens materiale et quid sit ens immateriale, et cum Aristotele respondetur per scientias rerum materialium et per scientiam substantiarum separatarum. Nam si ens idem dicit quod essentiale, quaestio ‘quid sit ens’ nihil est aliud quam quaestio quid sit haec et illa et tertia essentia. Solummodo si ens addit super essentialia, quaestio quid sit ens ulteriorem habet sensum; et solummodo tunc respondetur per divisionem entis in ens per essentiam, scilicet, ens cuius essentia est esse, et ens per participationem, scilicet, ens cuius essentia non est esse et ideo modo quodam limitato esse participat.

8 Dixerit tamen quispiam valde obscurum videri quidnam ens re vera super essentiam addat. Sicut enim supra contra modum arguitur (Notiones, 1, g), ita etiam argui potest contra esse. Nam quidquid cognoscimus aut experiendo aut intelligendo cognoscimus. Iudicium enim non novum quoddam et ulterius cognitionis elemen-

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To this question the answer is that being is not only said in two ways (being pure and simple and being qualified in some sense, as in point 2 under ‘Notions’ above); being also is twofold (being by essence, being by participation) and is known in a twofold way (being, quidditatively known; being, analogically known). Here being by essence is both the act of existence itself and, by identity, understanding itself; being quidditatively known is what is known through the divine understanding of being and through supernatural participation, on the part of the blessed, in this understanding; being by participation is that whose ‘what it is’ is not simply to be, the act of existence; it is only an essence, either angelic or human or animal or vegetable or the like; and being analogically known is what is known through that analogical knowledge of being that takes its start from beings-by-participation and arrives through analogy at some imperfect understanding of the whole of being. 7 Now, it seems clear that the Thomist system simply and utterly transcends Aristotelian essentialism. For while it includes the Aristotelian doctrine it adds to that doctrine another which is simply and utterly new, and adds it not just now and then but in systematic fashion. However, such a systematic addition and transformation is possible to the extent that, within the field of the proportionate object of human intellect, ‘being’ does not denote the same thing as ‘essence’ or ‘what pertains to essence.’ For if these denote the same thing one will join with Aristotle to ask what material being is and what immaterial being is, and answer with Aristotle through sciences of material things and a science of separated substances. For if ‘being’ and ‘what pertains to essence’ have the same denotation, the question, ‘What is being?’ is none other than the question of what this, that, or the other essence is. Only if being adds something above and beyond what pertains to essence does the question of what being is have further meaning; and only then is this question answered by dividing being into being by essence (that is, the being whose essence is to be) and being by participation (that is, being whose essence is not to be, and which therefore participates in the act of existence in a limited way). 8 You may be saying that what being really adds to essence seems quite obscure. Just as an argument against mode was presented above (‘Notions,’ point 1, g), so too it is possible to argue against the act of existence. For, whatever we know, we know by experience or understanding; judgment adds no new and further element of knowing, but only acknowledges

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tum addit, sed tantummodo agnoscit quae iam sunt cognita, eaque ut cognita approbat. Et similiter esse, quod iudicio correspondet, non aliquid in rebus praeter essentiam est, sed ipsam essentiae realitatem dici. Respondetur: Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur, et ideo aliter ab aliis de ratione cognitionis iudicatur. Qui enim sunt sensibilibus immersi, ii nihil cognosci arbitrantur nisi id ipsum quod experiendo innotescit. Alii autem summo intelligendi gaudio delectantes experientiae addunt intelligentiam, ut cognitio humana duabus his componatur; et cum intelligentia humana numquam ita sit perfecta ut melior intelligentia eiusdem rei haberi non possit, ipsam cognitionis rationem in perpetuo quodam profectu ponunt, ut vel relativismum profiteantur, vel idealismum quendam absolutum statuant, vel critice scientifica a practicis postulatis separent, vel ad se ipsos reversi de modo existendi humano disserant. Alii denique tertiam de cognitione tuentur sententiam. Qui quidem experientiam esse cognitionem ultro admittunt; tamen non humanam esse cognitionem sed animalium asserunt. Proinde ita relativistis, idealistis, criticis, exsistentialistis concedunt intelligentiam experientiae esse addendam, ut tamen ipsam hanc additionem atque compositionem ad rationem cognitionis humanae attingere negent. Humana enim cognitio, inquiunt, tribus componitur, ut experientia non sit cognitio humana nisi in potentia prima, ut experientia per intelligentiam illuminata non cognitionem humanam sed cogitationem faciat, ut solummodo dubiis resolutis omnibus et iudicio posito certo ex meris cogitationibus ad cognitionem proprie humanam procedatur. Quibus suppositis, obicienti respondetur argumentum suum valde esse ambiguum. Eadem enim vox, cognitio, aliam habet significationem secundum diversas philosophorum scholas. Et quidem, si supponitur sententia materialistica vel relativistica vel alia quaedam similis de ratione cognitionis, tunc argumentum suum valet sed falsum praesupponit. Si autem quae­ ritur, non de cognitione animali (nam animalia per solam experientiam vere cognoscunt), non de cognitione humana cum animali modo quodam confuso admixta (uti fieri solet ubi critice non proceditur), sed de cognitione proprie humana, tunc (1) falsum est nos experiendo et intelligendo cognoscere omnia quae cognoscimus, neque nos aliud per iudicia facere quam approbare atque acceptare quae iam aliunde sint cognita; (2) verum est experta qua talia et intellecta qua talia ad rationem cognitionis (proprie humanae) non attingere;

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those that are already known, and approves them as known. In the things known, likewise, the act of existence, which corresponds to judgment, is nothing beyond essence; it denotes the reality of an essence. Reply: ‘Whatever is received is received according to the capacity of the receiver,’ and so different people arrive at different judgments on what it is to know. Those who are sunk in the sensible decide that nothing is known except what is known by experience. Others, however, relish understanding with supreme joy. They add understanding to experience, so that human knowing is a compound of the two; and since human understanding is never so perfect that it is impossible to have better understanding of the same thing, they propose that perpetual advance is what knowing is. Thus, they profess relativism, or take their stand on some absolute idealism, or critically sever science from practical postulates, or turn inward on themselves and discuss the human mode of existing. Still others, finally, hold a third view of knowing. They are quite ready to grant that experience is knowing; they insist, however, that it is not human but just animal knowing. Equally, they grant to relativists, absolute idealists, critical idealists, and existentialists that understanding should be added to experience; they deny, however, that this addition and compounding reaches what human knowing is. For they say that human knowing is a threefold compound. Experience is human knowing only in first potency; experience illumined by intelligence yields not human knowing but only thinking; and one moves from mere thoughts to properly human knowing only when every doubt has been resolved and certain judgment posited. On this basis we reply that the argument presented in the objection is very vague. The same word, knowing, has different meanings for the various philosophical schools. If the objection presumes a materialist, a relativist, or any other such view of what it is to know, then the argument is valid but its presuppositions are false. If, on the other hand, the question is not about animal knowing (for through experience alone animals do truly know), nor about human knowing mixed with some confused animal mode (as usually happens unless one proceeds critically), but about properly human knowing, then: (1) It is not true that everything we know, we know through experiencing and understanding. Nor is it true that all we do by judging is to approve and accept what we already know otherwise. (2) It is true that the experienced, as such, and the understood, as such, do not reach as far as what properly human knowing is.

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(3) verum est experta et intellecta per verum iudicium ad rationem cognitionis promoveri; (4) verum est ipsum iudicium, quod alia ad rationem cognitionis promoveat, in se et principaliter rationem cognitionis habere; (5) verum est hanc iudicii principalitatem esse prorsus manifestam, cum circa singulas res et singulos earum aspectus eatenus cognoscamus quatenus ea iudicamus vere esse vel non esse; (6) unde et similiter in ipsis rebus unumquodque dicitur et est ens vel reale, non secundum essentialem quandam rationem, sed secundum quod esse proprium habet vel quodammodo ad esse refertur.

Sententiae Nota: In sequentibus sub nomine substantiae aristotelicae (humanae) intelligitur haec caro individualis et realis per hanc animam individualem et realem animata, scilicet, id quod a Verbo de Virgine assumptum est. Omnes sententiae quae recitantur respondent huic quaestioni, cur substantia aristotelica non sit persona, homo. Bibliographia: Grillmeier-Bacht, 2, 791–837 (Grillmeier); 873–922 (L. Ott); 923–39 (I. Backes); quae origines tractant.33 Posteriora: Garrigou-Lagrange (dtc xv [29], 925–28 (Caietani sent.); Galtier, 160–213 (Tiphani);34 Billot, 1927 (editio septima) 54–174;35 Bertetto, 150–72;36 etc. 1 Prima sententia: Christus ut homo non est aliquid (db 393, ds 750). P. Lombardus, Lib. III Sent., d. 10; cf. d. 6.

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(3) It is true that the experienced and the understood are promoted by true judgment to the status of knowing. (4) It is true that what knowing is belongs principally to judgment itself, which promotes these other elements to the status of knowing. (5) It is true that this primacy of judgment is manifested precisely in that what we know about single things and their single aspects, we know insofar as we judge truly that they are or are not. (6) Likewise, then, whatever exists or occurs is called, and in fact is, real or being not on the basis of an essential definition but on the basis either of having its own act of existence, or of being referred in some way to the act of existence. Opinions Note that in what follows the phrase ‘(human) Aristotelian substance’ is understood to mean this real and individual flesh animated by this real and individual soul; that is, what was assumed by the Word from the Virgin Mary. All the opinions discussed answer this question: Why was the Aristotelian substance not a person, not a man? Bibliography: Grillmeier-Bacht, 2, 791–837 (Grillmeier); 873–922 (L. Ott); and 923–39 (I. Backes).33 These authors treat the origins [of the question]. On later writers, see Garrigou-Lagrange, ‘Thomisme,’ dtc 15 (29) 925–28 (the opinion of Cajetan); Galtier 160–213 (on Tiphanus);34 Billot (7th ed., 1927) 54–174;35 Bertetto 150–72;36 and the like. 1 First opinion: Christ as man is not something. See db 393, ds 750; Peter Lombard, Sentences, 3, d. 10 [c. 1 (sb 5: 72–74] (cf. d. 6 [cc. 4–6 (sb 5: 55–59)]).

33 The titles: Aloys Grillmeier, ‘Vorbereitung des Mittelalters’; Ludwig Ott, ‘Das Konzil von Chalkedon in der Frühscholastik’; Ignaz Backes, ‘Die christologische Problematik der Hochscholastik und ihre Beziehung zu Chalkedon.’ 34 Galtier, De incarnatione ac redemptione (see above, p. 251). 35 L. Billot, De Verbo incarnato: Commentarius in tertiam partem S. Thomae, 7th ed. (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1927). At least two further editions were published (1942 and 1949). The 9th edition (1949) was available to the editors; here the most relevant pages would seem to be 47–138. 36 Domenico Bertetto, Gesù Redentore (Florence: Libreria editrice fiorentina, 1958).

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Sensus fuit (1) Verbum assumpsisse corpus et animam quae tamen non erant inter se unitae, nam (2) si unirentur, haberetur hoc aliquid in natura rationali seu persona. Evidens est conflictus inter dogma et Aristotelismum. Unitae enim erant caro et anima, si quidem caro erat animata per animam (db 111a, ds 250).

2 Altera sententia: Christus est una persona sed duo supposita, vel Christus est unus (masculine) sed duo (neutraliter). P. Lombardus, Lib. III Sent., d. 6; S. Thomas, Super III Sent., d. 6, q. 1; Sum. theol., 3, q. 17, a. 1. Iterum evidens est essentialismus: si habentur caro et anima, habetur id quod est, suppositum; sed non habetur is qui est, persona; quae solutio, quasi mere verbalis, iam pridem derelicta est. 3 Tertia et vera sententia: substantia aristotelica est non quod est (ens simpliciter) sed quo est (ens secundum quid); et transitur ex substantia aristotelica in quod est quatenus additur esse, quod ad constitutionem personae pertinet. Sum. theol., 3, q. 17, a. 2, ad 4m: ‘… si intelligitur corpus perfectum per animam absque hypostasi habente utrumque, hoc totum compositum ex anima et corpore, prout significatur nomine “humanitatis,” non significatur ut quod est sed ut quo aliquid est.’ Cf. ibid., a. 1, ad 7m. Sum. theol., 3, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4m: ‘… esse et operari est personae a natura, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam esse pertinet ad ipsam constitutionem personae …’ Cf. De Raeymaeker, Metaphysica generalis, ii, 360–81. L. Billot, De Verbo incarnato 57 ss. Fatendum est S. Thomam non habere terminologiam generalem quae cum locis supra citatis cohaereat (cf. supra, Essentialismus, § 4, p. 390). In cuius rei intelligentiam multum iuvat illud a Newman dictum: magna quidem ingenia de vero intelligibili, posteriora autem et minora de terminologia perpolienda cogitare. Grammar of Assent (1870) 374. 4 Quarta sententia Scoti est et Scotistarum: persona addit super substantiam aristotelicam negationes, scilicet, (1) negationem actualis dependentiae ad aliam personam et (2) negationem aptitudinalis dependentiae realis ad quoddam substantiale principium. Propter defectum primae negationis, quod a Verbo assumptum est, persona non erat. Propter defectum alterius

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The sense here was (1) the Word assumed a body and a soul that were not, however, united to each other, since (2) had they been united there would have been something in a rational nature – a person. Conflict between dogma and Aristotelianism is evident here. For flesh and soul were united if [as the council of Ephesus declared] that flesh was animated by a soul (db 111a, ds 250, [dec 1: 41]). 2 Second opinion: Christ is one person but two supposits, or Christ is one someone but two somethings. Peter Lombard, Sentences, 3, d. 6 [c. 2 (sb 5: 50–52)]; Thomas Aquinas, Super III Sententiarum, d. 6, q. 1; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 17, a. 1. Essentialism is evident here too: if there is flesh and a soul, there is a supposit, a that which is, something; yet there is not a person, a he who is, someone. This solution has long been dropped as merely verbal. 3 Third, true opinion: The Aristotelian substance is not what is, a being pure and simple, but that by which [something] is, being in a qualified sense. It passes from the status of Aristotelian substance to that of what is insofar as the act of existence, which pertains to the constitution of a person, is added. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 17, a. 2, ad 4m: ‘If we understand a body completed by a soul yet with no hypostasis having both of these, then this whole, composed of body and soul, which is meant by the term humanity, is not a being meant as what is but as that by which something is’; cf. a. 1, ad 7m. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4m: ‘To be and to operate belong to a person from his nature, but in different ways. For the act of existence (to be) pertains to the very constitution of a person …’ See De Raeymaeker, Metaphysica generalis, 2, 360–81; L. Billot, De Verbo incarnato beginning on p. 57. [In the 9th edition, see 54–60.] It must be said that Thomas did not have a general terminology coherent with the passages cited above (see under ‘Essentialism’ above, § 4, p. 391). What Newman said is helpful in understanding the matter: to think about intelligible truth takes great genius; later and lesser talents polish up the terminology (Grammar of Assent, 1870, p. 374). 4 A fourth opinion is that of Scotus and the Scotists. To the Aristotelian substance, the person adds these negations: (1) a negation of actual dependence on another person, and (2) a negation of real aptitudinal dependence on some substantial principle. Because it lacks the first of these negations, what the Word assumed was not a person. Because it lacks the second nega-

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negationis, anima separata non reputatur persona; non enim est ens completum. Duns Scotus, In III Sent. (Ox.), d. 3, q. 1, § 9 and § 11, ad 3 (t. 7, pp. 15–16, ed. Wadding). Manifestus est essentialismus, et etiam manifesta est insufficientia huius opinionis. Si enim quod habet negationem actualis dependentiae, illud est persona, omnino sequitur idem cum relatione actualis dependentiae esse personam dependentem. Scotus ergo verbis negat sed rebus docet personam esse assumptam. 5 Quinta sententia sit Tiphani (ob. 1641), Declaratio ac defensio scholastica doctrinae … de hypostasi et persona (Mussiponti 1634, Parisiis 1881).

Idem ac Scotus docuit sed alio modo. Persona formaliter est realitas substantiae completa, tota in se, et ideo alteri non communicatur. Iam vero secundum hanc sententiam idem realiter ponitur dupliciter, vel (1) ut non inclusum in toto quodam maiori, et sic est persona, vel (2) ut inclusum in toto quodam maiori, et sic verbis negatur esse persona, sed rebus manifeste est persona inclusa intra totum maius.

6 Sexta sit sententia Suarezii: modaliter distinguuntur subsistens et substantia aristotelica, scilicet, subsistens addit modum super substantiam aristotelicam, qui quidem modus concipitur a parte rei. De Incarnatione, disp. 11, sect. 3, § 10 (Vivès, t. 17, p. 443b, Parisiis 1866). Quae sententia essentialismum eatenus evitat quatenus ille modus (1) non est accidens et (2) est realis. Sed communiter obicitur: quod advenit enti completo, advenit accidentaliter; nam Suarez non admittit realem distinctionem inter essentiam finitam et esse contingens; ergo ille modus est accidens.37 Sed subsistens non constituitur per accidens quoddam. Ergo.

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tion, a separated soul is not regarded as a person, for it is not a complete being. See Duns Scotus, In III Sent. (Ox.), d. 3, q. 1, § 9 and § 11, ad 3 (in the Wadding edition, vol. 7, pp. 15–16). Essentialism is obvious here, and the insufficiency of this opinion is obvious too. For if what has a negation of actual dependence is a person, it follows that the same thing with a relation of actual dependence is a dependent person. Verbally, then, Scotus denies, but in point of fact he teaches, that a person was assumed. 5 A fifth opinion is that of Tiphanus (d. 1641) in his Declaratio ac defensio scholastica doctrinae sanctorum patrum doctorisque angelici de hypostasi et persona ad augustissima Sanctisimae Trinitatis et stupendae Incarnationis mysteria (Mussipontus, 1634; Paris: Berche et Tralin, 1881). ­­He taught the same thing Scotus did, but in a different way. Formally, a person is the complete reality of a substance, whole in itself, and therefore not communicated to another. Now, according to this opinion there are two ways really to posit the same thing, either (1) as not included in a greater whole, in which case it is a person, or (2) as included in some greater whole, in which case its being a person is denied verbally, though in fact it is, obviously, a person, included within a greater whole. 6 A sixth opinion is that of Suárez. There is a ‘modal’ distinction between a subsistent and an Aristotelian substance. To an Aristotelian substance, that is, the subsistent adds a mode, which Suárez conceived as being on the side of the object. De Incarnatione, disp. 11, section 3, § 10 (in the Vivès edition [Paris, 1866], t. 17, p. 443b). This opinion avoids essentialism to the extent that a ‘mode’ (1) is not an accident and (2) is real. The common objection is this. What comes to a complete being comes accidentally; Suárez does not admit a real distinction between finite essence and contingent act of existence [and thus his finite essence is already a complete being]; therefore his ‘mode’ is an accident.37 But a subsistent is not constituted by any accident. Therefore …

37 The logic is compressed. The bracketed expansion fills it out a bit. Because Suárez does not admit a real distinction between finite essence and contingent act of existence, his finite essence is already a complete being. He claims that subsistence adds a mode to a complete being. But what is added to a complete being is added accidentally.

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Ulterius, supra diximus modos esse nihil, Notiones, 1, g. Cf. pp. 376–78. Ulterius, haec sententia non est nisi hypothesis quaedam ad hoc inventa. Retinetur essentialismus tamquam verus de rebus; evitatur evolutio philosophiae christianae; et salvatur dogma per modum. Manet tamen haec sententia praeferenda sententiis Scoti et Tiphani, qui verbis negant sed rebus docent personam, hominem, esse assumptum.

7 Septima sit sententia Capreoli secundum interpretationem Capreoli essentialisticam. Vide Capreolum, In III Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 3, § 2 (ed. Pegues-Paban, t. 5, p. 105); Degl’Innocenti, Divus Thomas, Placentia (1940) 27–40, (1950) 321–38; Muniz, Ciencia tomista (1945) 5–89, (1946) 201–93; D. Foucher, Revue thomiste (1956) 657–87.38

Secundum hanc interpretationem, eadem realis essentia humana est (1) quod est quando habet esse suum sed (2) quo est quando non habet esse suum. (Supponitur realis distinctio.) Secundum D. Foucher, mens Capreoli non est haec septima sententia sed uti in tertia sententia supra dictum est. 8 Octava sit sententia Caietani, In IIIm, q. 4, a. 2, iv–x (ed. Leonina S. Thomae, xi, 75–76). Ponitur distinctio realis inter essentiam finitam et esse contingens. Essentia finita semper est quo et numquam est quod est. Habetur quod est quatenus modus essentialis additur essentiae finitae (substantiae aristotelicae). Esse non pertinet ad constitutionem personae, sed consequitur personam constitutam. Septimae et octavae sententiae sunt essentialisticae. Quamvis enim admittant realem distinctionem inter essentiam finitam et esse contingens,

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Moreover, we have said that modes are nothing. See above, ‘Notions,’ point 1, g (p. 377). Furthermore, this opinion is only a hypothesis invented ad hoc. Essentialism is retained as really true; the development of Christian philosophy is avoided; and dogma is preserved by means of the ‘mode.’ Yet it remains that this opinion is preferable to those of Scotus and Tiphanus, who deny in words, but teach in point of fact, that a person, a human being, was assumed by the Word. 7 A seventh opinion was held by Capreolus, on an essentialist interpretation of Capreolus. See Capreolus, In III Sententiarum, d. 5, q. 3, a. 3, § 2 (in the Pegues-Paban edition, vol. 5, p. 105); P. Umberto Degl’Innocenti, ‘Il Capreolo e la questione sulla personalità,’ Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 43 (1940) 27–40, and ‘De nova quadam ratione exponendi sententiam Capreoli de constitutione ontologica personae,’ Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 53 (1950) 321–38; Francisco P. Muñiz, ‘El constitutivo formal de la persona creada en la tradición tomista,’ La Ciencia tomista 68 (1945) 5–89, 70 (1946) 201–93; D. Foucher, ‘La notion de personne d’après Capreolus et Billot’ 657–87.38 On this interpretation, it is the same real human essence which is (1) what is, when it has its own act of existence, but (2) that by which it is, when it has no act of existence. (A real distinction [between essence and act of existence] is presumed.) According to D. Foucher, Capreolus’s thought does not belong to this seventh opinion, but to the third one above. 8 An eighth opinion was that of Cajetan, In IIIm, q. 4, a. 2, iv–x (ed. Leon. S. Thomae, 11, 75–76). Cajetan posited a real distinction between finite essence and contingent act of existence. A finite essence is always that by which and never what is. You have what is insofar as an essential mode is added to a finite essence (Aristotelian substance). The act of existence does not pertain to the constitution of a person, but follows from the person constituted. The seventh and eighth opinions are essentialist. For although they do admit a real distinction between finite essence and contingent act of exist-

38 On Foucher, see above, p. 393.

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tamen ponunt essentiam (septima) vel essentiam cum modo essentiali (octava) tamquam id quod est. Ratio quae proferri solet est: esse non est de ratione cuiuslibet creaturae; sed personae humanae et angelicae sunt creaturae; ergo esse non est de ratione personae humanae vel angelicae. Quae obiectio supponit essentialismum, nempe, nullam esse rationem nisi essentialem. Vide solutiones ad obiectiones, infra pp 420–22. Caeterum, septima sententia manifeste est incohaerens; eadem enim est realitas quae vel habet vel non habet esse suum; et haec eadem realitas aut est quo est aut quod est. Octava autem sententia supponit modum non esse nihil; quod sustineri non posse censemus. 9 Nona est sententia Tiphani prout recenter a Dom Diepen proponitur; vide De constitutione Christi 38–40; 65–66.39 Adde Diepen, Revue thomiste (1958) 197–213.

10 Decima est sententia Ioannis Baconthorp a B. Xiberta recenter resuscitata, vide De constitutione Christi 40–41, 66–67.40 THESIS 6 Quam Verbum de Virgine assumpsit, caro per animam rationalem animata, neque persona est, neque suppositum reale, neque subsistens, neque ens simpliciter, sed tantummodo essentia humana individua et realis quae esse proportionato caret. Termini caro quam Verbum de Virgine assumpsit: db 6, 54, ds 10, 125; Lc 1.30–38.

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ence, they nevertheless posit either the essence (the seventh opinion), or else the essence with an essential mode (the eighth opinion), as that which is. The reason usually given is this. To be (the act of existence) does not belong to the definition of any creature; but human persons and angelic persons are creatures; therefore, the definition of person, human or angelic, does not include the act of existence. This objection presupposes essentialism, namely, that a definition regards nothing but essence. See the solutions to objections, pp. 420–23 below. Besides this, the seventh opinion is plainly incoherent. For it is the same reality which has or has not its own act of existence, and this same reality either is that by which or else it is what is. The eighth opinion, on the other hand, assumes that a mode is not nothing – an assumption which we hold is impossible to maintain. 9 A ninth opinion is that of Tiphanus as expounded recently by Dom Die­ pen; see De constitutione Christi 38–40 and 65–66.39 Also Diepen, ‘L’existence humaine du Christ en métaphysique thomiste,’ Revue thomiste 58 (1958) 197–213. 10 A tenth opinion is that of John Baconthorp, recently revived by B. Xi­ berta; see De constitutione Christi 40–41 and 66–67.40 Thesis 6 What the Word assumed from the Virgin – flesh animated by a rational soul – is neither a person, nor a real supposit, nor a subsistent, nor a being pure and simple, but only a real, individual human essence lacking a proportionate act of existence. Terms flesh that the Word assumed from the Virgin: see db 6, 54, ds 10, 125; Luke 1.30–38.

39 Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 68–73 and 120–25. 40 Ibid. 72–75 and 124–31.

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caro per animam rationalem animata: db 111a, 148, ds 250, 301. Unde excluditur sententia prima; cf. etiam db 393, ds 750. Caro enim et anima uniuntur, si caro per animam animatur. persona: subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali. suppositum reale : subsistens distinctum. subsistens: id quod est. ens simpliciter: id quod est. essentia: quo aliquid est id quod est. humana: pertinens ad animal rationale. individua: haec. realis: ‘in rerum natura,’ a parte rei, extra causas. esse : actus entis, actus essendi, actus essentiae; quod ad essentiam substantialem comparatur tamquam actus ad potentiam; quod ad ens completum comparatur tamquam quo est ad quod est. esse proportionatum: quod determinatur per essentiam in qua recipitur, per quam limitatur, quacum facit ens simpliciter et unum simpliciter. Vide Notiones, 3, b (pp. 384–86). caret: non habet. Adversarii ­ ide sententias superius recitatas praeter tertiam; quarum prima damnata V est (db 393); altera a theologis derelicta, et iure quidem cum hypostasis in Christo sit una (db 148, 290, ds 302, 555), neque distinguatur hypostasis a supposito reali; caeterae autem libere propugnantur.

Argumentum 1 Assumpta natura humana non erat subsistens. Nam non erat persona, cum in Christo Deo et homine una tantum sit persona eaque divina. Thesis tertia. Sed persona est subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali; et manifeste assumpta natura erat distincta et in natura intellectuali; relinquitur erat quod assumpta non erat subsistens. Ad hanc minorem: assumpta natura erat distincta. Distincta enim sunt quorum realitas unius non est realitas alterius; sed caro assumpta non erat

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flesh animated by a rational soul: see db 111a, 148, ds 250, 301, [dec 1: 41, 86–87]. The first opinion discussed above is thus ruled out; see also db 393, ds 750. For flesh and soul are united if the flesh is animated by a soul. person: a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature. real supposit: a distinct subsistent. subsistent: that which is. a being pure and simple: that which is. essence: that by which something is what it is. human: pertaining to a rational animal. individual : this. real: ‘in the nature of things,’ on the side of the object, outside of causes. act of existence: the act of a being, the act of being, the act of an essence; that which stands to substantial essence as act stands to potency; that which stands to a completed being as that by which it is stands to what is. proportionate act of existence: what is determined by the essence in which it is received, by which it is limited, and together with which it constitutes a being pure and simple and a unity or one pure and simple. See ‘Notions,’ point 3, b (pp. 384–87 above). ­­lacking: without, not having. Opponents of the thesis See the opinions discussed above (pp. 404–13), except the third. The first of these has been condemned (db 393); the second has been abandoned by theologians, and rightly, since in Christ there is one hypostasis (db 148, 290, ds 302, 555, [dec 1: 86–87, 127–28]) and hypostasis is not distinguished from real supposit. The rest of the opinions, however, may be defended freely. The argument 1 The assumed human nature was not a subsistent. For it was not a person, since in Christ, God and man, there is only one person, a divine person; see thesis 3. But a person is a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature; and clearly, the assumed nature was distinct and was in an intellectual nature; it remains that what was assumed was not a subsistent. As for the minor premise: First, the assumed nature was distinct. Those things are distinct of which the reality of the one is not the reality of the

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caro ullius alterius; et anima assumpta non erat anima ullius alterius. Ulterius, assumpta natura erat in natura intellectuali, nam habuit animam rationalem. 2 Assumpta natura non erat suppositum reale. Ex antecessis statim habetur: quod enim non est subsistens, non est subsistens distinctum; sed suppositum reale est subsistens distinctum. Notate tamen assumptam naturam esse suppositum logicum, scilicet, de ea loquimur, praedicationes facimus. 3 Assumpta natura non erat ens simpliciter. Nam ens est aut (1) id quod est aut (2) quod ipsum non est et tamen ad esse quodammodo refertur, uti accidens, principia entis intrinseca et constitutiva, possibilia, entia rationis. Vide Notiones, 2, a, b, c (pp. 378–80).

Sed subsistens certo est id quod est, uti ex personis divinis, angelis, et hominibus manifestum est. Et assumpta natura non erat subsistens, uti supra habitum est. Relinquitur ergo ut assumpta natura non fuerit id quod est et ideo neque ens simpliciter (= id quod est). 4 Assumpta natura erat essentia humana individua et realis. Nam natura est essentia cum ordine ad operationes; et natura Christi humana erat perfecta (db 148, ds 301): perfectus in humanitate; ergo aderat essentia humana perfecta. Neque, uti patet, ex utero Virginis assumptum est vel non individuum vel non reale.

5 Assumpta natura non habuit esse proportionatum. Si enim habuisset, fuisset ens simpliciter, subsistens, hic homo, persona humana. Vide Notiones, 3, b (pp. 384–86). Demonstrationem realis distinctionis inter esse contingens et essentiam finitam invenies vel in manualibus consuetis vel De constitutione Christi 30.41 Ex narratis sententiis Scoti et Tiphani iam elucet eorum insufficientia. Circa modos vel Suarezii vel Caietani vide Notiones, 1, g, p. 376. Septima au-

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other; but the flesh assumed was nobody else’s flesh, and the soul assumed was nobody else’s soul. Then, further, the assumed nature was in an intellectual nature, for it had a rational soul. 2 The assumed nature was not a real supposit. This follows at once from the foregoing. For what is not a subsistent is not a distinct subsistent; but a real supposit is a distinct subsistent. Note, however, that the assumed nature is a logical supposit; that is, we talk about it and make predications with regard to it. 3 The assumed nature was not a being pure and simple. For a being is either (1) that which exists, or else (2) that which exists not of itself, but which is, however, referred in some way to the act of existence; such are accidents, intrinsic and constitutive principles of being, possible beings, and beings of reason. See ‘Notions,’ point 2, a, b, and c (pp. 378–81 above). But a subsistent certainly is a that which is, as divine persons, angels, and men show clearly. And the assumed nature was not a subsistent, as was shown above. What is left, therefore, is that the assumed nature was not a that which is, and so neither was it a being pure and simple (= that which is). 4 The assumed nature was a real, individual human essence. ­­For a nature is an essence ordered to its operations, and the human nature of Christ was perfect (‘perfect in his humanity,’ db 148, ds 301, [dec 1: 86–87]); there was therefore a perfect human essence. And clearly it was not the case that what was assumed from the Virgin’s womb was either not individual or not real. 5­ The assumed nature had no proportionate act of existence. For if it had [a proportionate act of existence], the assumed nature would have been a being pure and simple, a subsistent, this man, a human person. See ‘Notions,’ point 3, b (pp. 384–87 above). The demonstration of a real distinction between contingent act of existence and finite essence will be found either in the usual manuals or in De constitutione Christi 30.41 The insufficiency of the opinions of Scotus and Tiphanus is already clear from the account given above. As for ‘modes,’

41 See Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 52–55.

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tem sententia non defendi videtur nisi ut tota schola thomistica potius cum Caietano (sent. octava) quam cum Billot (sent. tertia) stare videatur.

Alterum argumentum Dogma catholicum exigit progressum philosophiae ultra ordinem mere essentialem. Atqui sententiae contrariae talem progressum non faciunt. Ergo exigentiis dogmatis non satisfaciunt. Ad maiorem: dogma est: unum eundemque, qui est una persona et una hypostasis, esse Deum et hominem, in duabus naturis perfectis et ideo cum duabus proprietatibus, operationibus, voluntatibus naturalibus. Iam vero omnia quae ad ordinem essentialem pertinent etiam intra ordinem naturae perfectae inveniuntur. Et ideo nisi realitas unius eiusdemque, qui est Deus et homo, realitas unius personae, realitas unius hypostasis extra ordinem essentialem invenitur, necessario sequitur in Christo duas esse personas sicut et duas naturas perfectas. Ad minorem: constat ex ipsis sententiis. Prima enim supponit per corpus et animam inter se unitas haberi aliquid, ens simpliciter. Altera supponit per animam et corpus haberi suppositum. Quarta supponit per animam et corpus haberi personam, modo desit actualis dependentia ab alia persona. Quinta supponit per animam et corpus haberi personam, modo desit inclusio in toto quodam maiori. Sexta intelligit problema, sed progressum philosophiae christianae evitat per inventionem modi. Septima et octava pariter problema intelligunt sed septima per modum loquendi et octava per modum essentialem evitant hanc conclusionem, essentialismo adversam, nempe, id quod est neque essentia est neque essentia cum modo essentiali, sed ordinem essentialem excedit.

Obicitur 1 Essentia sine esse proportionato est nihil.

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those of Suárez and those of Cajetan, see ‘Notions,’ point 1, g (p. 377 above). And the seventh opinion seems to be defended only so that the whole Thomistic school might appear to stand with Cajetan (the eighth opinion) rather than with Billot (the third opinion). A second argument Catholic dogma demands that philosophy should progress beyond the merely essential order. But opinions contrary to the thesis make no such progress. Therefore, they do not satisfy the demands of dogma. As to the major premise: The dogma is to the effect that one and the same, who is one person and one hypostasis, is God and man, in two perfect natures and so with two properties, two operations, two natural wills. However, everything that pertains to the order of the essential will also be found within the order of perfected nature. Therefore, unless it is outside the order of what pertains to essence that one finds the reality of one and the same who is God and man, the reality of his one person, the reality of his one hypostasis, it necessarily follows that in Christ there are two persons, just as there are two perfect natures. As to the minor premise, it is clear from the opinions themselves. The first of these opinions supposes that through body and soul, united with each other, there is a ‘something,’ a being pure and simple. The second supposes that through body and soul there is a supposit. The fourth supposes that through body and soul there is a person, provided there is no dependence on another person. The fifth supposes that through body and soul there is a person, provided there is no inclusion within some larger whole. The sixth understands the problem, but avoids any progress in Christian philosophy by inventing modes. The seventh and eighth likewise understand the problem, but the seventh, through a manner of speaking, and the eighth, through an ‘essential mode,’ avoid this conclusion, which runs against essentialism: That which is, is neither an essence nor an essence with an essential mode, but exceeds the order of what pertains to essence. Objections 1 Without a proportionate act of existence, an essence is nothing.

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Respondetur: Essentia sine esse proportionato, modo adsit quaedam ordinatio ad quoddam esse, est ens secundum quid; et etiam cum esse proportionato, essentia est ens secundum quid, nempe, quod ipsum non est et tamen quodammodo ad esse refertur. Vide Notiones, 2, pp. 380–82, ubi explicatur ‘esse’ non dicere idem quod ‘reale’ vel ‘extra causas’ vel ‘experiendo notum.’ Ulterius, notate compositionem essentiae et esse compositionem esse duorum realium, quorum neutrum est ens quod et quorum utrumque est ens quo, seu ens secundum quid. Mox autem dicetur quemadmodum essentia assumpta referatur ad esse divinum Verbi. 2 Sola cogitatio, sicut sola conceptio, a vero et falso, ab esse et non-esse, praescindit. Sed omnia quae pertinent ad personam humanam cogitari possunt. Ergo ratio personae praescindit ab esse et non-esse. Respondetur: Distinguitur maior: sola cogitatio praescindit ab esse cognito, conceditur, ab esse cogitato, subdistinguitur, si cogitatio est de solis essentialibus, conceditur, si est de entibus, negatur.

Conceditur minor et pariter distinguitur conclusio. Cogitata ratio personae praescindit ab esse cognito, conceditur, praescindit ab esse cogitato, subdistinguitur, ubi excogitatur ratio personae essentialistica, conceditur, ubi excogitatur ratio personae vera, negatur.

Et notatur: esse cogitatur et non cognoscitur quando quaeritur an res sit; nisi enim esse cogitaretur, quaestio sensu careret; et si esse iam cognosceretur, quaestio fine careret. 3 Personae humanae et angelicae sunt creaturae; sed esse non pertinet ad rationem cuiuslibet creaturae; ergo esse non pertinet ad rationem omnis personae.

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Reply: An essence without a proportionate act of existence, provided there is some ordination to an act of existence, is a being in a qualified sense; and even with a proportionate act of existence, an essence is a being in a qualified sense – that which does not have existence of itself but is, however, referred in some way to an act of existence. See ‘Notions,’ point 2 (p. 381 above), where it is explained that to be, the act of existence, has not the same denotation as ‘real’ or ‘outside of causes’ or ‘known by experience.’ Further, note that the compound of essence and act of existence is a compound of two realities, neither of them a being which and each of them a being by which or a being in a qualified sense. Presently it will be said how the assumed essence is referred to the divine Word’s act of existence. 2 Thought by itself, like conception by itself, prescinds from true and false, to be and not to be. But it is possible to think about everything that pertains to a human person. Therefore the definition of person prescinds from to be and not to be. Reply: A distinction is to be drawn in the major premise. That thinking by itself prescinds from a known act of existence, I grant. As for whether it prescinds from an act of existence which is thought of, a further distinction is to be drawn. That it so prescinds if the thinking is about what pertains to essence alone, I grant; that it does if the thinking is about beings, I deny. The minor premise I grant, and the conclusion I distinguish in the same way [as I distinguished the major]. That the thinking of the definition of a person prescinds from a known act of existence, I grant. As for whether it prescinds from thinking of an act of existence, a further distinction is to be drawn. That this is so when an essentialist definition of person is being thought out, I grant; that it is so when the true definition of person is being thought out, I deny. And note this: The act of existence is thought of and not known when one asks whether something is so. For unless the act of existence were being thought of, the question would be senseless, and if the act of existence were already known, the question would be pointless. 3 Human and angelic persons are creatures. But to be, the act of existence, does not pertain to the definition (ratio) of any creature whatever. Therefore, the act of existence does not pertain to the definition of every person.

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Respondetur: Conceditur maior et distinguitur minor. Esse non pertinet ad essentiam cuiuslibet creaturae, conceditur; esse non pertinet ad analogicam declarationem cuiuslibet entis creati, negatur. Et pariter distinguitur conclusio: esse non pertinet ad essentiam personae crea­tae, conceditur; esse non pertinet ad analogicam declarationem entium creatorum quae in natura intellectuali subsistunt, negatur.

Quod esse pertinet ad analogicam declarationem entis, manifestum est, si quidem ens ab esse dicitur, et analogia ponitur quatenus essentia A se habet ad suum esse sicut essentia B se habet ad suum esse. Praeterea, persona est ens non essentia. Quando dogma affirmat unam personam in duabus naturis, sensus non est quod una essentia est in duabus naturis, sed sensus est quod unus idemque habet duas naturas et pariter habet duas essentias. Praeterea, quae communiter agnoscitur personae definitio, ‘subsistens scilicet distinctum in natura intellectuali,’ non est definitio cuiusdam essentiae sed est definitio cuiusdam entis. Nisi enim in obliquo non ponitur essentia, et tunc ponitur indeterminate, si quidem intellectualis natura est aut divina aut angelica aut humana. Quod autem in recto ponitur, nempe, subsistens distinctum, non est essentia sed habens essentiam, imo in Verbo incarnato est habens essentias. 4 Sed S. Thomas aperte docet essentiam esse id quod est, vide loca indicata superius, Sententiae, 3, p. 406 [vel Essentialismus, 4, p. 390]. Respondetur: Concedimus S. Thomam communiter loqui et forte cogitare ad modum Aristotelis. Sed apertum est eum explicitis verbis, ubi de incarnatione tractavit, essentiam ut quo est habuisse. Vide loca citata ibidem, Sententiae, 3. Credimus vero eos ad mentem S. Thomae parum penetrare qui eius doctrinam essentialisticam fuisse affirment. 5 Secundum hanc ergo thesin constitutivum formale personae est esse. Respondetur: Ita videtur essentialistis, conceditur; vide R. Garrigou-Lagrange, dtc xv (29) 927 § 5. Ita res se habet, negatur. Personae humanae constitutivum materiale est hoc corpus; constitutivum formale est haec anima rationalis; constitutivum actuale est esse.

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Reply: I grant the major premise; in the minor premise I distinguish. That the act of existence does not pertain to the essence of any creature whatever, I grant. That the act of existence does not pertain to an analogical account of any created being, I deny. A similar distinction applies to the conclusion. That the act of existence does not pertain to the essence of any created person, I grant; that the act of existence does not pertain to an analogical account of created beings that subsist in an intellectual nature, I deny. That the act of existence does pertain to an analogical account of being is obvious, since being is so called from to be, the act of existence, and there is an analogy insofar as essence A stands to its act of existence as essence B stands to its act of existence. Further, a person is a being, not an essence. When the dogma affirms one person in two natures, the meaning is not that one essence is in two natures; the meaning is that one and the same has two natures and likewise has two essences. Further, the commonly acknowledged definition of person as ‘a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature’ is not the definition of some essence; it is the definition of some being. For essence is posited in the definition only indirectly, and posited even then in an indeterminate way, since an intellectual nature is either divine or angelic or human. What is directly posited, namely, a distinct subsistent, is not an essence but what has an essence; indeed, in the case of the incarnate Word, it is what has essences. 4 But Thomas Aquinas plainly teaches that essence is that which is; see the passages cited above under ‘Opinions,’ 3, p. 407 [see too p. 391]. Reply: We grant that Thomas commonly expressed himself, and that perhaps he thought, in the way Aristotle did. But it is plain that when discussing the Incarnation he holds explicitly that essence is that by which a being is. See the passages cited above under ‘Opinions,’ 3. And we believe that those who say his teaching is essentialist have not penetrated deeply enough into Thomas’s thinking. 5 According to this thesis, then, the formal constitutive of a person is the act of existence. Reply: That so it seems to essentialists, I grant. See Garrigou-Lagrange, ‘Thomisme,’ dtc 15 (29) 927 § 5. That it is in fact the case, I deny. The material constitutive element of a human person is a particular body; the formal constitutive element is a particular rational soul; the actual constitutive element is an act of existence.

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Essentialistae constitutivum actuale praetermittunt, quia omnia materialia secundum Aristotelem ex materia et forma constituuntur, et ipsi plus Aristotele sapere nolunt. Secundum S. Thomam ‘esse pertinet ad ipsam constitutionem personae’ (Sum. theol., 3, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4m). Ergo secundum hunc saltem textum esse est quoddam constitutivum personae; sed esse non est constitutivum essentiale personae, nam essentia quam persona habet non ponitur in definitione personae nisi in obliquo, ‘in natura intellectuali’; porro, quod non est constitutivum essentiale, non est constitutivum vel materiale vel formale, cum haec sint essentialia; relinquitur ergo ut esse dicatur constitutivum actuale, et hac de causa ponitur subsistens seu ens simpliciter in recto quando persona definitur, scilicet, ‘subsistens distinctum.’

Ad instantiam autem quod id quod est in definitione alicuius est essentiale, respondendum est dupliciter dici essentiale: uno modo, tamquam id quod ad intrinsicam rei intelligibilitatem pertinet, alio modo, tamquam id quod requiritur et sufficit ut res sit, sive intrinsece in ipsa re intelligitur sive extrinsece tantum in causa efficiente et finali intelligi potest. Primo modo non definitur persona nisi ab essentialistis et tunc erronee; alio modo definitur persona et quidem non per essentiam (naturam intellectualem) nisi in obliquo.

6 Haec thesis mere philosophica est, et ideo ad theologiam non pertinet. Respondetur: Obiciens confundit distinctionem et separationem scientiarum. Logica, mathesis, physica, chimia, biologia distinguuntur sed minime separantur. Circa connexionem inter philosophiam et theologiam in hac quaestione, vide notam ante notiones, problema, sententias positam [pp. 370–72]. Ad obiectionem, haec quaestio non pertinet ad theologiam, distinguitur; si theologia concipitur secundum decreta Vaticana (db 1796, 1820, ds 3016, 3045) et secundum praeceptum CIC ut theologus principia, doctrinam, rationem S. Thomae sequatur, negatur; si aliter concipitur theologia, transeat.

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Essentialists overlook the actual constitutive element because, according to Aristotle, everything material is constituted by matter and form, and because they are unwilling to be wiser than Aristotle. According to Thomas, ‘the act of existence pertains to the very constitution of a person’ (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4m). According to at least this text, therefore, the act of existence is a constitutive element of a person. But the act of existence is not an essential constitutive element of a person, for the essence a person has is posited in the definition of person only indirectly (‘in an intellectual nature’). But what is not an essential constitutive element is neither a material nor a formal constitutive element, since these pertain to essence. What remains, therefore, is that the act of existence is equated with the actual constitutive element, and for this reason a subsistent, a being pure and simple, is directly posited when a person is defined as ‘a distinct subsistent.’ Should the objector continue, however, that in any definition that which is pertains to essence, the reply is that ‘pertains to essence’ is used in two senses: first, in the sense of what pertains to the intrinsic intelligibility of a thing, and second, in the sense of what is requisite and sufficient for a thing to be, whether this is understood intrinsically, in the thing itself, or can only be understood extrinsically, in efficient and final cause. A person is not defined the first way, except by essentialists, and then erroneously; a person is defined the second way, and then not by its essence (an intellectual nature), except indirectly. 6 This thesis is just philosophy. It is irrelevant to theology. Reply: The objector confuses distinguishing the sciences with separating them. Logic, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology are distinct but not separate at all. As for the connection between philosophy and theology on this question, see the note that precedes the discussion of notions, the problem, and opinions [pp. 370–73 above]. As for the objection that this question is irrelevant to theology, I distinguish. If theology is conceived in accordance with the First Vatican Council’s decrees (db 1796, 1820, ds 3016, 3045, [dec 2: 808, 811]) and with the precept of the [1917] Code of Canon Law, that the theologian should follow the principles, the teaching, and the reasoning of Thomas, then I deny that this question is irrelevant to theology. If theology is being conceived in some other way, I ignore the objection.

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Thesis 7 Ideo Verbum incarnatum est unum simpliciter, quia esse suo divino est non solum ut Deus sed etiam ut homo; quod quidem intelligitur, non secundum analogiam entis finiti et compositi, sed secundum analogiam eorum quae contingenter de Deo dicuntur. Termini unum: indivisum in se et divisum a quolibet alio. Vide Notiones, 3, a, p. 384. unum simpliciter: unum ens simpliciter, unum subsistens; non excludit distinctiones reales minores, sed excludit omnem distinctionem realem maiorem, scilicet, quae est inter subsistentia. esse divinum: ipsum esse subsistens. suum: per unum esse divinum sunt Pater, Filius, et Spiritus; in thesi consideratur hoc esse qua Filii. est: vide diversos sensus quibus dicitur ‘exsistere,’ Notiones, 2, f, p. 380. Agitur de illo quod innotescit per ipsam veram iudicii positionem. ut Deus, ut homo: sensus est quod Filius est et Deus et homo per idem esse suum aeternum; additur ‘ut’ ne quis concludat Filium non esse Deum per divinam essentiam vel non esse hominem per humanam essentiam. analogia: illa scilicet de qua Vaticanum (db 1796, ds 3016). Circa ipsas analogias, vide infra, partem 3m et 4m.

Divisio Quattuor sunt theseos partes: (1) Verbum incarnatum est unum simpli­ citer, (2) per esse suum divinum, (3) non secundum analogiam entis finiti et compositi, (4) sed secundum analogiam eorum quae contingenter de Deo dicuntur. Pars 1: Verbum incarnatum est unum simpliciter. 1 Haec pars non est nisi declaratio mysterii. 2 Verbum incarnatum est una persona; sed persona est subsistens, et ideo

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Thesis 7 This is why the incarnate Word is one, purely and simply: because by his divine act of existence he is, not only as God, but also as human. This is to be understood, not on the analogy of finite, composite being, but on the analogy of what is contingently predicated of God. Terms one: undivided in itself and divided from everything else. See ‘Notions,’ above, item 3, a, p. 385. one, purely and simply : one being, pure and simple; one subsistent. Minor real distinctions are not ruled out, but every major real distinction – the distinction between subsistents – is ruled out. divine act of existence : the subsistent act of existence itself. his: through one divine act of existence, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are; in the thesis, this act of existence is considered as the act of existence of the Son. is: see the various senses in which ‘to exist’ is used, under ‘Notions,’ item 2, f, pp. 380–83. It concerns that which is known by the true positing itself of a judgment. as God, as human: the sense here is that the Son is both God and human through his selfsame, eternal act of existence; ‘as’ is added to prevent the conclusion that the Son is not God through the divine essence or that he is not human through a human essence. analogy: namely, what the First Vatican Council speaks of [in Dei Filius] (db 1796, ds 3016, [dec 2: 808]). On these analogies, see parts 3 and 4 below. Division of the thesis The thesis has four parts: (1) the incarnate Word is one, purely and simply, (2) by his divine act of existence, (3) not on the analogy of finite, composite being, (4) but on the analogy of what is contingently predicated of God. part 1: the incarnate word is one, purely and simply. 1 This part is only a statement of the mystery. 2 The incarnate Word is one person. But a person is a subsistent, and so the

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Verbum incarnatum est unum subsistens; ulterius, subsistens est ens simpliciter, ideoque Verbum incarnatum est unum ens simpliciter; ulterius, unum et ens convertuntur, ideoque Verbum incarnatum est unum simpliciter. 3 Quod iam saepius dictum est: Christus enim non dividitur in alium et alium (thesi tertia), sed una est persona, eaque divina; unus idemque est Deus et homo, et quamvis duae naturae distinguantur distinctione reali minori (inconfuse, immutabiliter), non tamen distinguuntur distinctione reali maiori (indivise, inseparabiliter).

Pars 2: Verbum incarnatum ideo est unum simpliciter quia per unum suum esse divinum est et ut Deus et ut homo. 1 Quod in prima parte positum est verum, eius hac in altera parte quaeritur intelligentia aliqua, imperfecta, analogica, secundum db 1796, ds 3016. 2 Proposita sententia est S. Thomae: Sum. theol., 3, q. 17, a. 2; In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; Quodl. ix, q. 2, a. 3; Comp. theol., c. 212; Q. D. de unione Verbi incarnati, a. 4. Quibus in locis manifestum est S. Thomam docuisse unum esse personale, suppositale, principale in Verbo incarnato. Quod quid significet in varias trahitur partes.

3 Sensus maxime ex ipso argumento perspicitur, quod duobus gressibus procedit, sic: (a) Unumquodque est unum simpliciter per suum esse quo est. Quo aliquid est ens simpliciter, eo est unum simpliciter. Atqui aliquid est ens simpliciter per esse suum quo est. Ergo aliquid est unum simpliciter per esse suum quo est. Maior: quia unum non addit super ens nisi negationes (quae a parte rei sunt nihil), causa entis eo ipso est causa unius, seu quo aliquid est ens, eo est unum.

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incarnate Word is one subsistent. Further, a subsistent is a being pure and simple, and so the incarnate Word is purely and simply one being. Further, one and being are interchangeable, and so the incarnate Word is one, purely and simply. 3 This has already been stated frequently. For Christ is not divided into ‘someone’ and ‘someone else’ (thesis 3), but is one person, a divine person; it is one and the same who is God and man, and although two natures are distinguished by a minor real distinction (‘without confusion, without change’), still they are not distinguished by a major real distinction (‘without division, without separation’). Part 2: This is why the incarnate Word is one, purely and simply: because by his divine act of existence he is, not only as God, but also as human. 1 Following Vatican i (db 1796, ds 3016, [dec 2: 808]), this second part seeks some imperfect, analogical understanding of the truth set out in part 1. 2 The opinion proposed here is that of Thomas Aquinas: Summa theologiae, 3, q. 17, a. 2; In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 3; Compendium theologiae, c. 212; Quaestio disputata de unione Verbi incarnati, a. 4. In these passages it is clear that Thomas taught one personal, supposital, principal act of existence in the incarnate Word. What this amounts to will be brought out one part at a time. 3 The meaning is most clearly grasped in the following two-step argument. (a) It is through its act of existence, by which it is, that anything is purely and simply one. That by which something is one, purely and simply, is that by which it is a being pure and simple. But something is a being pure and simple through its act of existence, by which it is. Therefore it is through its act of existence, by which it is, that something is purely and simply one. As to the major premise: because ‘one’ adds nothing to ‘being’ except negations (which, on the side of the object, are nothing), the cause of a being is, as such, the cause of its being one. That by which anything is a being, in other words, is that by which it is one.

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Praeterea, quod verum est de ente et uno, etiam verum est de ente simpliciter et uno simpliciter. Nam unum simpliciter non addit super ens simpliciter nisi negationes, quae a parte rei sunt nihil; et ideo causa entis simpliciter eo ipso est causa unius simpliciter seu, uti in maiori positum est, quo aliquid est ens simpliciter, eo est unum simpliciter.

Minor: ens ab esse dicitur, et ideo unumquodque eo modo est ens, quo se habet ad esse; si non habet esse suum quo ipsum est, tunc ipsum non est quamvis ad esse referatur vel ad modum accidentis, vel ad modum principii intrinseci entis, vel ad modum possibilis, vel ad modum entis rationis. E contra, si habet esse suum quo est, tunc ipsum est, et nominatur ens simpliciter. Vide Notiones, 2, a–c, pp. 378–80.

(b) Unicum est esse quo aliquid est ens simpliciter et unum simpliciter. Hoc statim sequitur ex noto axiomate: Propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis. Cuius sensus est: Illud (propter quod unumquodque est tale) multo magis est tale. Aliis verbis, causa unitatis debet ipsa esse una; positis enim duabus causis unitatis habentur duae unitates. Idem etiam habetur ex thesi sexta, ubi statutum est quod, si natura assumpta proportionato esse non careret haberetur subsistens, suppositum reale, persona. 4 Quo ex argumento elucet sensus asserti: ideo Verbum incarnatum est unum simpliciter, quia per esse suum divinum est et ut Deus et ut homo. Nam ex uno simpliciter concluditur ad unum esse quo illud unum est; quod unum esse in Verbo incarnato necessario est esse divinum; et ideo per unum suum esse divinum Verbum est quidem Deus sed etiam est homo.

Quod sane obscurum videri potest, et de hac obscuritate mitiganda mox agemus. Sed statim illud notandum est: doctrina de unico esse assignat aliquam realitatem unam secundum quam vere et realiter Christus est unus in duabus naturis. Scimus duas esse naturas, duas esse naturales proprietates, duas esse naturales operationes, duas esse naturales voluntates. Quid ergo

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Further, what is true of ‘being’ and of ‘one’ is also true of ‘being pure and simple’ and of ‘one pure and simple.’ For ‘one pure and simple’ adds nothing to ‘being pure and simple’ except negations, which, on the side of the object, are nothing; and so the cause of a being pure and simple is, as such, the cause of what is purely and simply one – or, as the major premise states it, that by which something is one, purely and simply, is that by which it is a being pure and simple. As to the minor premise: being is so called from ‘to be,’ act of existence, and so the way anything is related to the act of existence is the way in which it is said to be a being. If it has no act of existence of its own, by which it is, then it does not exist of itself, although it is related to the act of existence, either as an accident, or as an intrinsic principle of being, or as a possible being, or as a being in the mind. If, on the other hand, it has an act of existence of its own, by which it is, then it does exist of itself, and it is called a being pure and simple. See ‘Notions’ above, 2, a through c, pp. 378–81. (b) It is a single act of existence by which something is a being pure and simple and one pure and simple. This follows at once from a well-known axiom: That on account of which a thing is such, itself is more such. The meaning of this is: That which causes a certain perfection in another possesses that perfection all the more. In other words, the cause of unity ought itself to be one; if there were two causes of unity there would be two unities. The same thing follows from thesis 6, where it was established that if the assumed nature [of Christ] had not lacked a proportionate act of existence, it would have been a subsistent, a real supposit, a person. 4 This argument clarifies the meaning of our assertion: ‘This is why the incarnate Word is one, purely and simply: because by his divine act of existence he is, not only as God, but also as a man.’ From what is purely and simply one, we conclude to one act of existence by which that one is one; in the incarnate Word, this one act of existence is necessarily the divine act of existence; and so, through his one divine act of existence the Word is indeed God but he also is a man. No doubt this may seem obscure. Presently we shall do something to clear up the obscurity. Just now, however, what should be noted is this: the doctrine of a single act of existence assigns some one reality on the basis of which Christ really and truly is one in two natures. We know there are two natures, two natural properties, two natural operations, two natural wills. What then is one? The answer is, what is one is the act of existence by which

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unum? Respondetur: unum est esse quo est et in deitate et in humanitate.1 Qualis responsio clara atque simplex in caeteris opinionibus deest. Pars 3: Doctrina de unico esse non est intelligenda secundum analogiam entis finiti et compositi. 1 In Verbo incarnato uniuntur et esse Verbi divinum et natura humana assumpta. Quae quidem unio statim in mentem revocat unitatem2 entis finiti ex essentia et esse compositi. Quaeritur ergo utrum sit aliqua similitudo inter unionem Verbi incarnati et unionem entis finiti ex esse et essentia compositi. Et sensus quaestionis est, non utrum sit similitudo iam dicta, nempe, essentia, esse, et unum, quae tria tam in Verbo incarnato quam in ente composito inveniuntur, sed utrum sit ulterior quaedam similitudo ut de analogia sermo esse possit.

2 Cui quaestioni auctores quidam affirmative respondent sed modo valde cauto. Vide Billot, De Verbo incarnato, 1927, 140 ss. Caietanus, In Sum. theol., 3, q. 17, a. 2, xvii–xix. Ed. Leon., xi, 227–28. Multos citat D’Alès, De Verbo incarnato 200 ss.; Dict. Apol., iv, 1697–1713;3 Galtier 193–213.

Ubi autem auctores sunt valde cauti, brevi compendio non accurate exponuntur; et ideo sententiis omissis, de ipsa re sequentia notamus.

3 Ubi componuntur essentia et esse proportionatum, esse recipitur in essentia et per essentiam limitatur. Sed esse divinum non recipitur in assumpta essentia neque per eam limitatur. Quod communiter conceditur.

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he is, in his deity and in his humanity.1 There is no such clear and simple answer in the other opinions. Part 3: The doctrine of a single act of existence is not to be understood on the analogy of finite, composite being. 1 United in the incarnate Word are both the Word’s divine act of existence and an assumed human nature. At once this union calls to mind the unity2 of a finite being that is composed of essence and act of existence. Thus, the question arises whether there is any similarity between the union in the incarnate Word and the union in a finite being composed of essence and act of existence. And the sense of the question is not whether there is a similarity of the kind already referred to – essence, act of existence, and one, all three of which are found in the incarnate Word as well as in composite being; the question is whether there is a further similarity such that we can speak of an analogy. 2 Some authors have answered this question affirmatively, albeit very cautiously. See Billot, De Verbo incarnato, 1927, beginning on p. 140; Cajetan, In Sum. theol., 3, q. 17, a. 2, xvii–xix (ed. Leon., 11, 227–28). There are numerous citations in d’Alès, De Verbo incarnato, beginning on p. 200; d’Alès, Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique, 4, 1697–1713;3 Galtier, De incarnatione ac redemptione 193–213. When authors are very cautious, however, their answers cannot be expounded briefly. Therefore, omitting these opinions, we note the following with regard to the matter itself. 3 In a compound of essence and proportionate act of existence, the act of existence is received in the essence and is limited by the essence. But the divine act of existence is neither received in the assumed essence, nor limited by it. This is commonly granted.



1 The 1960 edition has ‘quo est et Deus et homo’ (by which he is both God and man). 2 The 1960 edition has ‘unionem’ (union). 3 The reference is to vol. 4 of Adhémar d’Alès, Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique, contenant les preuves de la vérité de la religion et les réponses aux objections tirées des sciences humaines (Paris: Beauchesne, 1921–22).

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4 Ubi componuntur essentia et esse proportionatum, unum idemque est in potentia per essentiam et in actu per esse; ita per essentiam humanam merus homo est in potentia, et per receptum et limitatum esse idem merus homo est in actu. Sed in unione Verbi incarnati, per essentiam assumendam merus homo est in potentia, et per esse divinum merus homo non est in actu. Nec quis­ quam hoc negaret. 5 Dicitur tamen esse divinum supplere vices tou esse proportionati in assumpta essentia. Quod diversimode intelligi potest.

6 Si sensus est quod esse divinum facit ut assumpta essentia sit realis, sensus est falsus. Nam assumptio non est nihili. Praeterea, humanitas Christi est creata (db 292, ds 557: to poieFthen, quod creatum est; Sum. theol., 3, q. 2, a. 7); et quamvis creatio sit ex nihilo tamen non est nihili. Praeterea, compositio essentiae et esse est realis et realium; essentia enim et esse, quamvis non sint entia simpliciter, vere et realiter sunt entia secundum quid, scilicet principia intrinseca et realia quibus aliquid est.

7 Si sensus est quod esse divinum facit ut assumpta essentia sit, sensus iterum est falsus. Secundum opinionem essentialisticam quidem, essentia finita est id quod est, et esse est id quo est. Sed reiecta opinione essentialistica, et posito quod non essentia sed ens est, necessario negatur esse divinum facere ut assumpta essentia sit. Quod enim non fit, id esse divinum non facit.

Sicut enim non mea essentia sed ego sum et quidem per meam essentiam sum homo, similiter essentia assumpta non est sed Verbum per essentiam assumptam est homo. 8 Si sensus est quod esse divinum facit ut assumpta essentia exsistat, quae­ ritur quid per exsistere intelligitur; si per exsistere intelligitur reale, re­

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4 In a compound of essence and proportionate act of existence, it is one and the same which is in potency through the essence and in act through the act of existence. Thus, through a human essence a mere human being is in potency; and through an act of existence received and limited [by that essence] a mere human being is in act. But in the union of the incarnate Word a mere human being is in potency through the essence to be assumed, and through the divine act of existence a mere human being is not in act. Nobody denies this either. 5 Nevertheless it has been said that the divine act of existence takes the place of a proportionate act of existence in the assumed essence. This can be understood in different ways. 6 If it means that the divine act of existence makes the assumed essence be real, it is false. For the assumption was not an assumption of nothing. Further, the humanity of Christ is created (db 292, ds 557, [dec 1: 129]: to poieFthen, ‘that which is created’; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 2, a. 7). And while creation is from nothing it is not of nothing. Further, the compound of essence and act of existence is real, and is [a compound] of what is real; for although essence and act of existence are not beings pure and simple, they really and truly are beings in a qualified sense, namely, real intrinsic principles by which something is. 7 If the meaning [of the statement in § 5 above] is that the divine act of existence makes the assumed essence be, it is again false. According to the essentialist opinion, to be sure, a finite essence is that which exists, and an act of existence is that by which it is. Rejecting the essentialist opinion, however, and holding that it is not an essence but a being that exists, we must necessarily deny that the divine act of existence makes the assumed essence exist. For that which does not happen [namely, the existence of an essence] is not made to happen by the divine act of existence. Just as it is not my essence, but I, who exist, and through my essence am a human being, likewise it is not the assumed essence that exists, but the Word who through the assumed essence is human. 8 If the meaning [of the statement in § 5 above] is that the divine act of existence makes the assumed essence exist, the question is what is understood by ‘exist.’ If by existence the real is understood, the response is the same

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spondetur uti supra sub § 6; si per exsistere intelligitur esse, respondetur uti supra sub § 7. 9 Si sensus est quod esse divinum implet conditionem extrinsecam quae requiritur ut habeatur ens secundum quid, tunc sensus est verus, sed evanescit analogia.4 Scilicet, ens dicitur ab esse; et ens simpliciter ita dicitur ab esse ut habeat esse suum quo est; ens autem secundum quid ita dicitur ab esse ut quodammodo ad esse referatur seu ordinetur, vel sicut accidens, vel sicut principium entis intrinsecum, vel sicut possibile, vel sicut ens rationis.

Iam vero assumpta essentia est ens secundum quid et quidem ad modum principii intrinseci et constitutivi. Quod ens ut rationem entis habeat, exigit aliquod esse ad quod referatur atque ordinetur. Quod esse per assumptionem est ipsum esse divinum. Et hoc sensu verum est quod esse divinum quasi terminative supplet vices tou esse proportionati.

10 Quibus perspectis, concludendum esse videtur nullam esse veram analogiam inter unionem Verbi incarnati et compositionem entis finiti. Esse enim divinum non recipitur et non limitatur (supra, 3), neque facit in actu quod per essentiam humanam est in potentia (supra, 4), neque facit ut assumpta essentia sit realis (supra, 6), neque facit ut assumpta essentia sit vel exsistat (supra, 7, 8), neque eo modo, quo esse finitum et receptum, implet conditionem requisitam ut essentia humana habeat rationem entis (supra, 9). 11 Alio tamen modo exponitur haec analogia a M. de la Taille (RechScRel 1928, 260–68) ut distinguantur actus infinitus et actuatio finita.5

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as that given under § 6 above; if by existence is understood to be, the act of existence, then the response is the same as that given under § 7. 9 If the meaning [of the statement in § 5 above] is that the divine act of existence fulfills an extrinsic condition required in order to have a being in some qualified sense, then the statement is true but the analogy vanishes.4 Otherwise stated: being is so called from to be, the act of existence. A being pure and simple is so called from to be, the act of existence, in this way: it has an act of existence of its own, by which it is. A being in the qualified sense, however, is so called from to be, the act of existence, in this way: it is related or ordered somehow to an act of existence, either as an accident, or as an intrinsic principle of being, or as a possible being, or as a being in the mind. Moreover, the assumed essence is a being in a qualified sense, and it is such [a being] in the manner of an intrinsic, constitutive principle. In order for this being to have the definition, the ratio, of a being, some act of existence is required, to which it is related and ordered. This act of existence, in virtue of the assumption, is the divine act of existence itself. And in that sense it is true that the divine act of existence takes the place, in a quasi-terminative way, of a proportionate act of existence. 10 In light of all this, the conclusion would seem to be that there is no true analogy between the incarnate Word’s union and a finite being’s composition. For the divine act of existence is neither received nor limited (§ 3 above). Nor does it make actual what through the human essence is in potency (§ 4). Nor does it make the assumed human essence real (§ 6). Nor does it make the assumed human essence to be or to exist (§§ 7 and 8). Nor does it fulfill a condition required for a human essence to have what it means to be a being, in the way that a finite, received act of existence fulfills it (§ 9). 11 M. de la Taille, however, expounds another version of this analogy (Recherches de science religieuse, 1928, 260–68), by distinguishing between infinite act and finite actuation.5

4 In the 1960 and 1961 editions the words ‘sed evanescit analogia’ do not appear. 5 Maurice de la Taille, ‘Actuation créée par acte incréé,’ Recherches de science religieuse 18 (1928) 260–68.

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Sicut enim clarissimus auctor distinguit corpus, animam, et corporis animationem, ita etiam distinguit essentiam finitam, actum infinitum seu esse divinum Verbi, et consequentem actuationem essentiae assumptae. Cuius sententiae sunt merita duo. Primo, posita actuatione finita et recepta in essentia assumpta, ponitur id quod speciali modo ad Verbum realiter refertur ut obiective et a parte rei habeatur aliquid quo verum sit non Patrem, non Spiritum sanctum, non tres personas divinas, sed solum Filium esse incarnatum. Quod meritum in caeteris opinionibus deest. Deinde, posita actuatione finita ad intelligentiam Incarnationis, clarissimus auctor simili modo procedit ad intelligentiam doni increati Spiritus sancti et ipsius essentiae divinae in intellectibus beatorum illapsae. Sicut enim habetur ex actu infinito actuatio finita substantialis in Verbo incarnato, ita etiam habetur ex actu infinito actuatio finita accidentalis (gratia sanctificans) ex dono increato Spiritus sancti, et similiter habetur ex actu infinito actuatio finita accidentalis (lumen gloriae) in visione beata. Quamvis autem merita huius opinionis nobis maxima videantur et quantum fieri potest etiam salvanda, tamen duo sunt defectus non celandi. Primus autem defectus est quod unio hypostatica, sicut non est facta in natura, ita etiam non est facta in aliquo intermedio inter naturas (Sum. theol., 3, q. 2, a. 10), sed est facta in persona Filii Dei qui est et Deus et homo, scilicet, principium quod unionis est id quod et Deus et homo est. Sed sententia P. de la Taille videtur quodammodo constituere ipsam unionem per actuationem finitam. Alter vero est defectus quod fundamentum huius opinionis nihil aliud est quam fallacia. Idem enim est argumentum quo distinguuntur corpus, anima, et animatio, ac illa quibus distinguuntur potentia, actus, et potentia qua actuata, vel accidens, substantia, et accidens qua actualiter inhaerens. Quae argumenta sunt fallaciae quibus ad modos concludi solet a Scotistis et Suarezianis. Quod enim est in potentia per corpus et in actu per animam, idem eo ipso est animatum et corpus animatum habet. Vide De Constitutione Christi 32, § 27.6

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As he distinguishes between body, soul, and the animation of a body, so too he distinguishes between finite essence, the Word’s infinite act or divine act of existence, and the consequent actuation of the assumed essence. This opinion has two merits. In the first place, given a finite actuation received in the assumed essence, there is something which in a special way is really related to the Word, so that objectively and on the side of the object there is something by which it is true that it is not the Father, not the Holy Spirit, and not the three divine persons, but only the Son who is incarnate. This merit is lacking in the other opinions. In the second place, having applied finite actuation to an understanding of the Incarnation, de la Taille proceeds in like manner to an understanding of the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit and an understanding of the divine essence itself slipping into the minds of the blessed. For just as by infinite act there is a substantial finite actuation in the incarnate Word, so too there is by infinite act an accidental finite actuation (sanctifying grace) by the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, and likewise there is by infinite act an accidental finite actuation (the light of glory) in the beatific vision. However, while in our view this opinion has merits of the highest kind, which should be maintained insofar as possible, it still has two drawbacks that should not be overlooked. The first drawback is this. As the hypostatic union did not take place in a nature, so too it did not take place in anything intermediate between the natures (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 2, a. 10). It took place in the person of the Son of God who is both God and man. That is, the principle which of the union is that which is both God and man. But de la Taille’s opinion seems somehow to constitute the union itself through a finite actuation. The second drawback is that the basis of this opinion is just a fallacy. For the argument by which body, soul, and animation are distinguished is the same as the argument for distinguishing potency, act, and potency as actuated, or for distinguishing accident, substance, and accident as actually inhering. These arguments are the fallacies that Scotists and Suarezians use in arguing for modes. For what is in potency through the body and in act through soul is also, by that very fact, animated and has an animated body. See De constitutione Christi 32, § 27.6



6 See Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 57–59.

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Quibus defectibus quasi propriis, accedit tertius et magis communis, nempe hanc opinionem supponere, quod iam exclusimus, aliquam esse analogiam inter unionem Verbi incarnati et compositionem entis finiti.

Pars 4: Doctrina de unico esse est intelligenda secundum analogiam eorum quae contingenter de Deo dicuntur. 1 Adhuc ergo quaeritur quonam sensu non solum dici sed etiam quodammodo intelligi possit quod Verbum per esse suum divinum sit et ut Deus et ut homo. 2 Iam vero, exclusa analogia entis finiti, remanet ut analogia ipsius entis infiniti paullulum consideretur. Et in primis illud est manifestum quod, ubi adest principium infinitum, prorsus superfluit omne aliud principium. Sed esse Verbum divinum est principium infinitum. Ergo prorsus superfluit omne aliud principium.

3 Ex theologia naturali, deinde, adducimus notam conclusionem, nempe, Deum esse entitative eundum prorsus, sive creat sive non creat, sive vult creare sive non vult creare, sive scit creaturas exsistere sive scit creaturas non exsistere. Tota enim entitativa differentia invenitur, non in Deo immutabili, sed in terminis ad extra exsistentibus. Quibus suppositis, additur tamen Deum per suam scientiam scire, per suam volitionem velle, per suam omnipotentiam creare, conservare, gubernare. Neque terminum ad extra quicquam facere ut Deus sciat, ut Deus velit, ut Deus creet, conservet, gubernet. Non enim res sunt causae divinae scientiae, sed divina scientia est causa rerum. Et similiter in aliis. Quam conclusionem theologiae naturalis non dico esse quoad nos valde intelligibilem, sed dico esse omnino certam et praeterea modo quodam valde claro exhibere quale sit principium infinitum.

4 Proinde, quod naturaliter cognoscimus, illud analogiam praebet ad intelligentiam quandam mysteriorum assequendam (db 1796, ds 3016). Quod ergo de Deo naturaliter scimus, idem analogice ad personas divinas exten-

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Added to these drawbacks, which might be called de la Taille’s own, there is a third and more general one: His opinion assumes what we have already ruled out, namely, that there is an analogy between the union of the incarnate Word and the composition of a finite being. Part 4: The doctrine of a single act of existence is to be understood on the analogy of what is contingently predicated of God. 1 To this point the question has been, in what sense it is possible, not only to say, but also in some way to understand, that through his divine act of existence the Word is both as God and as man. 2 Now since an analogy from finite being has been ruled out, what remains to be considered, all too briefly, is an analogy from infinite being itself. And it is plain, in the first place, that where there is an infinite principle every other principle is utterly superfluous. But the Word’s divine act of existence is an infinite principle. Therefore, every other principle is utterly superfluous. 3 Next, we draw from natural theology the well-known conclusion that God is entitatively just the same whether he creates or does not create, whether he wills to create or does not will to create, whether he knows that creatures exist or knows that creatures do not exist. For the whole entitative difference lies, not in the immutable God, but in terms existing externally. That being assumed, however, it is also the case that God knows through his act of knowing, wills through his act of willing, and creates, conserves, and governs through his omnipotence. No external term makes God know, or makes God will, or makes God create, conserve, or govern. For things are not the cause of divine knowing; rather, divine knowing is the cause of things. And it is the same in the other cases (willing and so on). I do not say that this conclusion of natural theology is completely intelligible, so far as we ourselves are concerned, but I do say that it is entirely certain, and moreover that in some way it shows very clearly what sort of principle an infinite principle is. 4 So, then, what we naturally know offers us an analogy for arriving at some understanding of the mysteries (db 1796, ds 3016, [dec 2: 808]). What we naturally know about God we can therefore extend, by analogy, to the divine

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dere possumus. Sicut ergo Deus prorsus immutatus per ipsam suam scientiam scit, per ipsam suam volitionem vult, per ipsam suam omnipotentiam facit, sive ut creaturae sint sive ut non sint, simili quodam modo divina persona per ipsum suum esse necessario quidem est Deus et per idem esse immutatum potest vel esse vel non esse homo. Analogia ergo eorum quae contingenter de Deo dicuntur, haec est: sicut per scire divinum entitative idem, Deus vel scit contingentia non esse (si non sunt) vel scit contingentia esse (si sunt), sicut per velle divinum entitative idem, Deus vel vult contingentia non esse (si non sunt) vel vult contingentia esse (si sunt), sicut per omnipotentiam divinam entitative eandem, Deus vel non facit ut contingentia sint (si non sunt) vel facit ut contingentia sint (si sunt), ita etiam persona divina per suum esse entitative idem vel non est homo (si non est) vel est homo (si est), et similiter persona divina per se ipsam entitative eandem vel non datur creaturis (si non iustificantur) vel datur creaturis (si iustificantur), et similiter essentia divina per se ipsam entitative eandem vel non illabitur intellectibus creatis (si non beatificantur) vel iisdem illabitur (si beatificantur); quibus in omnibus idem recurrit, nempe, principium perfectione infinitum de se esse principium prorsus sufficiens, et quidem idem principium immutatum esse sufficiens ad contradictoria (salva tamen differentia in termino consequente ad extra). 5 Quibus positis, habetur aliqua intelligentia unici esse tum ex analogia eorum quae naturaliter cognoscuntur tum etiam ex nexu mysteriorum inter se et cum fine hominis ultimo (db 1796, ds 3016). Quae enim naturaliter cognoscuntur ex naturali theologia desumpsimus; haec autem cum triplici mysterio simili quodam modo applicentur, elucet nexus quidam inter mysteria ipsa (Incarnationem et increatum donum Spiritus) et ultimum hominis finem (visionem beatam).

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persons. Thus, without any change whatsoever God knows by his knowledge itself, wills by his volition itself, and effects by his omnipotence itself, either that creatures are or that they are not. And, in a similar way, a divine person necessarily is God through his act of existence itself, and through the same unchanged act of existence can either be or not be human. This, then, is the analogy of what is contingently predicated of God: just as God, through a divine act of knowing which is entitatively the same, either knows that contingent things are not (if they are not) or knows that contingent things are (if they are), just as God, through a divine act of willing which is entitatively the same, either wills contingent things not to be (if they are not) or wills contingent things to be (if they are), just as God, through divine omnipotence which is entitatively the same, either does not bring it about that contingent things are (if they are not) or does bring it about that contingent things are (if they are), so too a divine person, through his act of existence which is entitatively the same, either is not human (if he is not) or is human (if he is), and likewise a divine person, through himself which is entitatively the same, either is not given to creatures (if they are not justified) or is given to creatures (if they are), and likewise the divine essence, through itself which is entitatively the same, either will not slip into created intellects (if they are not beatified) or will slip into them (if they are). In every case the same point is repeated: A principle that is infinite in perfection is in itself an utterly sufficient principle, and the same principle without change suffices [to account] for contradictories, provided there remains a difference in the consequent external term. 5 On the basis of the foregoing, we now have some understanding of the single act of existence [in Christ], both from an analogy with what is naturally known and also from an interrelationship of mysteries with one another and with the final end of human beings (db 1796, ds 3016, [dec 2: 808]). The naturally known [truths] we have taken from natural theology; but when these are applied in similar fashion to a threefold mystery they illuminate an interrelationship between mysteries themselves (the Incarnation and the gift of the Spirit) and the final end of human beings (the beatific vision).

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Plura videsis: De constitutione Christi 49–56, 59–60, 69–71; Divinarum personarum 197–202, 206–12; De Deo trino, ii, 217–22, 226–32.7 Brevissimo verbo, quaerenti quemadmodum fieri possit ut per esse divinum Verbum ut homo exsistat, respondetur Verbum iam habere principium essendi infinitum, cui quippe infinito nihil in linea tou esse deest. Cae­terum, neminem vere et realiter esse quidquam nisi per proprium suum esse. 6 Obicit 8 tamen F. Malmberg (Über den Gottmenschen, Freiburg i. B. 1960, p. 37) analogiam entis infiniti fere nihil dicere si quidem ‘… durch ein und denselben Seinsakt ist Gott Er selbst und ist das Geschöpf es selbst.’ Respondetur: per eundem actum infinitum est Deus et est creatura, dist., si ‘per’ sumitur univoce pro causalitate constitutiva, negatur, si ‘per’ sumitur aequivoce ut per esse infinitum Deus constituatur et creatura producatur, transeat; per aequivocationem enim minime destruitur vis analogiae quae repetitur ex sola causalitate constitutiva.

Instatur ipsam analogiam aequivocatione laborare. Nam ubi dicitur per eundem essendi actum Filius esse et Deus et homo, ibi ‘per’ primo significat identitatem Filii cum esse divino, deinde autem idem ‘per’ significat relationem inter esse divinum et naturam assumptam realiter distinctam.

Respondetur: in utroque casu ‘per’ significat causalitatem constitutivam; in utroque idem est subiectum constitutum, nempe, Filius; in utroque eadem est causa constitutiva, nempe, esse divinum qua Filii; praeterea, quamvis prima constitutio sit necessaria et altera contingens, quamvis haec ter-

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For more on the topic, see De constitutione Christi 49–56, 59–60, and 69–71; and either Divinarum personarum 197–202, 206–12, or De Deo trino, 2, 217–22, 226–32.7 To put it in the briefest terms, if the question is asked how it can be that through the divine act of existence the Word exists as human, the answer is that the Word already has an infinite principle of being, which lacks nothing in the line of to be, the act of existence. Besides, nobody really and truly is anything except through his own act of existence. 6 An objection,8 however, is raised by F. Malmberg in Über den Gottmenschen (Freiburg im Breslau: Herder, 1960) 37: The analogy of infinite being says next to nothing if ‘through one and the same act of existence God himself is and the creature itself is …’ Reply: The statement, that through the same infinite act God is and a creature is, I distinguish. That this is through the same infinite act, if ‘through’ is taken univocally, as standing for constitutive causality, I deny. That it is through the same infinite act, if ‘through’ is taken equivocally, such that through the infinite act of existence God is constituted and a creature is produced, I pass, since the equivocation in no way detracts from the force of the analogy [set out above], which takes its stand on constitutive causality alone. But again: The analogy itself labors under an equivocation. For when it is said that through the same act of being the Son is both God and human, ‘through’ signifies, in the first instance, the Son’s identity with the divine act of existence, but in the second instance the same ‘through’ signifies a relation between the divine act of existence and the really distinct assumed nature. Reply: In each case, ‘through’ signifies constitutive causality; in each case the subject constituted is the same, namely, the Son; in each case the constitutive cause is the same, namely, the divine act of existence as belonging to the Son. Furthermore, although the first constitution is necessary while



7 See Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 91–99, 111–13, and 131–35; and Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 439–49, 455–67. 8 This discussion does not appear in the 1960 edition. Reference is rather made to the objections the followed thesis 6 (‘Obiectiones videsis post thesin sextam’).

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minum ad extra convenientem et consequentem exigat, manet tamen idem causalitatis genus, idem subiectum, et eadem causa.9 Instatur: saltem manent obiectiones contra Caietanum prolatae. Respondetur: obiectiones laudatae nisi solubilia argumenta esse non videntur. Exemplo sit: ‘Wirklich Menschsein, wirklich als Mensch existieren, wirklich eine menschliche Existenz führen, ohne auch ein formell menschliches Daseinsprinzip zu haben, ist ebenso unmöglich wie denken ohne verstand’ (p. 29). Conceditur sane neminem esse hominem sine essentia humana, sed negatur neminem esse hominem sine esse huic essentiae naturaliter proportionato. ASSERTUM 81 Unionis ergo hypostaticae principia sunt: (1) SS. Trinitas ut a quo Verbum est homo; (2) persona Verbi ut quod est Deus et homo; (3) esse Verbi divinum ut quo incarnatum Verbum est ens simpliciter et unum simpliciter; (4) naturae divina et humana ut quibus est tum Deus tum homo.

Termini unio: relatio unitorum; quae relatio rationis est in Verbo divino, sed relatio realis est in natura assumpta; Sum. theol., 3, q. 2, a. 7 c.

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the second is contingent, and although the latter calls for an appropriate and consequent external term, nevertheless the same type of causality, the same subject, and the same cause all remain.9 But again: At least there are still the objections brought against Cajetan. Reply: The objections commended here would seem to be no more than solvable arguments. For example: ‘Actually being a man, actually to exist as a man, actually to lead a human existence, yet without having a formal human principle of being, is as impossible as it is to think without having a mind’ (Malmberg 29). I grant, certainly, that nobody is human without a human essence, but I deny that nobody is human without the act of existence that is naturally proportionate to this essence. ASSERTION 81 Therefore, the principles of the hypostatic union are: (1) the blessed Trinity, as [the principle] from which the Word is human; (2) the person of the Word, as [the principle] which is God and human; (3) the Word’s divine act of existence, as [the principle] by which the incarnate Word is a being pure and simple and one, purely and simply; and (4) the divine and the human natures, as [the principles] by which he is both God and human. Terms union: the relation of things united. This is a conceptual relation in the divine Word, but a real relation in the assumed nature; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 2, a. 7 c.

9 This seems to contradict the ‘I deny’ above, where Lonergan denies that God is and a creature is by the same infinite act, taken in the sense of constitutive causality. The point is that what ‘is’ is a being in the strict sense, and there is only one here, the selfsame Word, who by one and the same act is all that he is. In other words, it is incorrect to say that ‘a creature is’; rather, the selfsame Word is, as God and as man.



1 Unlike the other headings in this volume, which state ‘theses’ to be proved, headings 8 and 9 announce ‘assertions.’ The distinction between theses and assertions is common enough in later Scholastic authors, but it is not always easy to discern a standard rationale. In The Triune God: Systematics, the material is distributed into assertions and questions. The assertions there seem to function equivalently to the theses here. The present significance of making an ‘assertion’ rather than proposing a ‘thesis’ seems to be this: the assertions are intended not as new steps in the argument, but rather as a summary of or corollary to the points already established here or in other treatises.

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unita: duo vel plura e quibus unum hypostatica: in persona et secundum personam; non in natura neque secundum naturam principium: primum in aliquo ordine a quo: ut causa extrinseca et efficiens quod: idem nempe est quod est Deus ac quod est homo; et idem est quod operatur divina ac quod operatur humana. quo: principium intrinsecum et constitutivum, cuiusmodi tria considerantur, nempe, esse Verbi divinum ut quo Verbum incarnatum est ens simpliciter et unum simpliciter, natura divina ut qua Deus est, et natura humana ut qua homo est.

Asserti intentio Nihil intenditur nisi breve compendium eorum quae vel iam considerata sunt vel quae ex alio tractatu hic revocanda sunt. Pars prima: SS. Trinitas est principium a quo Verbum est homo. ­ x tractatu de Deo trino habetur Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum sanctum esse E unum principium omnis creaturae (db 704, ds 1331; Sum. theol., 1, q. 45, a. 6 c.).2 Sed in Verbo incarnato habentur non solum divinum perfectione infinitum sed etiam finitum atque creatum (db 292, ds 557; Sum. theol., 3, q. 2, a. 7); cuius finiti atque creati causa extrinseca efficiens est SS. Trinitas. Quare, quae Christus ut Deus est, eadem omnia (Filii ratione excepta) Pater et Spiritus sunt, uti omnipotens, aeternus, etc. Quae autem Christus ut homo est, cum solus Filius sit incarnatus, eadem neque Pater est, neque Spiritus. Circa autem operationes non solum distinguendae sunt operationes

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things united: two or more from which there is one. hypostatic: in a person and on the basis of a person; not in a nature or on the basis of a nature. principle: what is first in some order. principle from which: as extrinsic efficient cause. principle which: that which is God is the same as that which is human; and that which operates what is divine is the same as that which operates what is human. principle by which: an intrinsic, constitutive principle. Three of these principles are taken into consideration: the Word’s divine act of existence, as the principle by which the incarnate Word is a being pure and simple and is purely and simply one; the divine nature, as the principle by which he is God; and the human nature, as the principle by which he is human. The intention of the assertion Nothing is intended beyond a brief compendium of what either has already been considered or will be recalled here from other theological treatises. Part 1: The Most Holy Trinity is the principle from which the Word is human. The treatise on the triune God shows that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the one principle of every creature (db 704, ds 1331, [dec 1: 571]; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 45, a. 6 c.).2 But in the incarnate Word there is not only that which is divine and infinite in perfection, but also that which is finite and created (db 292, ds 557, [dec 1: 129]; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 2, a. 7). Of the latter  – that which is finite and created – the extrinsic efficient cause is the Trinity. Thus, everything that Christ is as God is the same as what the Father and the Spirit are – omnipotent, eternal, and so on – except for what it means to be Son. But, since only the Son has become incarnate, everything that Christ is as man, the Father is not, and neither is the Spirit. As regards operations, however, a distinction should be drawn, not only



2 In the editions of 1960 and 1961, before giving this reference to Summa theologiae Lonergan writes: ‘their operation is one, whose act of existence is one’ (‘quorum enim unum est esse, eorum una est operatio’). It may be that he intended this to appear as well in 1964.

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naturales divinae et operationes naturales humanae sed etiam operationes immanentes et operationes transeuntes. Et operationes quidem divinae sive immanentes sive transeuntes, modo a processionibus intraneis praescindatur, non solius Filii ut Dei sunt sed communes Patri, Filio, et Spiritui. Operationes autem humanae et transeuntes sunt a Christo ut homine tamquam a causa secunda, sed a tota Trinitate ut a causa prima. Operationes denique humanae et immanentes sunt solius Christi hominis, cum neque Pater neque Filius ut Deus neque Spiritus habeant sensus, intellectum finitum, voluntatem finitam. Pars secunda: Persona Verbi est principium quod est Deus et homo. Vide db 148, 290–92, ds 301–302, 553–58. Unde constat unum eundemque esse perfectum in deitate et perfectum in humanitate, verum Deum et verum hominem, consubstantialem Patri et consubstantialem nobis, genitum ante saecula et novissimis diebus, operari divina et operari humana, velle divina et velle humana, quem eundem esse unum de SS. Trinitate, Dei Filium. Pars tertia: Esse Verbi divinum est principium quo Verbum incarnatum est ens simpliciter et unum simpliciter. Vide thesin septimum. Pars quarta: Per naturam divinam Verbum est Deus et per naturam humanam Verbum est homo. Christus enim est in duabus naturis, unde habet duas naturales pro­ prietates, duas naturales operationes, duas naturales voluntates, quae duae distinguuntur distinctione reali non maiori (indivise, inseparabiliter) sed minori (inconfuse, immutabiliter, differentia naturarum non sublata, salva utriusque proprietate) et analogice dicta. Vide theses quartam et quintam.

Obicitur Si Christus ut homo est tantummodo causa secunda operationum transeuntium, etiam est tantummodo causa secunda operationum immanentium.

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between natural divine operations and natural human operations, but also between immanent operations and transitive operations. And provided that we prescind from processions within God, the divine operations, whether immanent or transitive, do not belong solely to the Son as God but are common to Father, Son, and Spirit. The transitive human operations, however, have as their secondary cause Christ as man, but they have the whole Trinity as their first cause. Immanent human operations, finally, belong solely to Christ as man, since neither the Father, nor the Son as God, nor the Spirit has senses, a finite intellect, or a finite will. Part 2: The person of the Word is the principle which is God and human. See db 148, 290–92, ds 301–302, 553–58, [dec 1: 86–87, 126–30]. These establish that one and the same is perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, true God and true man, consubstantial with the Father and consubstantial with us, born before all ages and also in these last days; that he operates what is divine and operates what is human, wills what is divine and wills what is human; and that this same one is one of the holy Trinity, the Son of God. Part 3: The Word’s divine act of existence is the principle by which the incarnate Word is a being pure and simple and is purely and simply one. See Thesis 7. Part 4: Through the divine nature the Word is God, and through his human nature the Word is human. Christ is in two natures; hence, he has two natural properties, two natural operations, two natural wills, and these are distinguished by a real distinction that is not major (without division, without separation) but minor (without confusion, without change, without taking away the difference of natures, preserving the properties of each) and analogically drawn. See theses 4 and 5. Objection If Christ as man is just the secondary cause of transitive operations, he is also just the secondary cause of immanent operations. But part 1 has it that

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Sed in parte prima habitum est quod Christus ut homo sit causa secunda non immanentium sed tantum transeuntium operationum. Respondetur: Obiciens supponit falsum, nempe, immanenter operari esse quoddam causare. Uti tamen patet ex Aristotele et S. Thoma, operari immanenter est pati quoddam. Vide Divinarum personarum 241–52, De Deo trino, ii, 261–72.3 Aliud est producere actum intelligendi et aliud est intelligere. Actus intelligendi producitur a Deo, a magistro, ab intellectu agente, a phantasmate. Intelligere autem est, non actio sed actus, receptus in intellectu possibili; et per hunc actum non intelligit Deus, magister, intellectus agens, phantasma, sed ego ut quod et intellectus possibilis ut quo.

ASSERTUM 9 Ex peracta unione hypostatica, resultat in assumpta natura actus quidam substantialis, absolute supernaturalis, qui solum Verbum ut formaliter assumens respicit. Termini unio: unitorum relatio hypostatica: in persona et secundum personam peracta: id est peractum cuius principia omnia sunt posita assumere: quasi ad se sumere; unde differunt unio et assumptio; tam Verbum unitur naturae humanae quam natura humana unitur Verbo; sed Verbum assumit et non assumitur, natura autem humana assumitur et non assumit. formaliter assumere: est idem ac assumere, sed ponitur ne quis credat vocem activam verbi ‘assumere’ significare exercitium causalitatis efficientis; solus Filius assumit naturam humanam, sed tota Trinitas producit illam naturam. resultat: quod non est antecedens sed consequens, non principium sed principiatum, non ut aliquid fiat vel sit, sed quia aliquid factum est. actus: vide Notiones, 1, pp. 372–74.

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Christ as man is the secondary cause, not of immanent operations, but only of transitive operations. Reply: What the objection assumes is false, namely, that to operate immanently is a kind of causing. As is clear from Aristotle and Thomas, however, to operate immanently is a suffering or being acted upon. See Divinarum personarum 241–52, or De Deo trino, 2, 261–72.3 It is one thing to produce an act of understanding, and another to understand. The act of understanding is produced by God, by a teacher, by agent intellect, by a phantasm. To understand, however, is not an action but an act, received in the possible intellect. And through this act it is not God who understands, nor the teacher, nor the agent intellect, nor the phantasm; I am the principle which understands, and the possible intellect is the principle by which [I understand]. ASSERTION 9 From the completed hypostatic union there results, in the assumed nature, a substantial act, absolutely supernatural, which regards only the Word as the one who formally assumes. Terms union: the relation of things united. hypostatic: in the person and on the basis of the person. completed: that has been completed whose principles are all in place. to assume: to take, as it were, to oneself. Hence, union is different from assumption; the Word is as much united with a human nature as a human nature is united with the Word, but the Word assumes and is not assumed, whereas the human nature is assumed and does not assume. formally to assume: the same as to assume, but ‘formally’ is added lest it be thought that the active voice of the verb ‘to assume’ signifies an exercise of efficient causality. Only the Son assumes a human nature, but the whole Trinity produces that nature. results: what results is not an antecedent but a consequent; it is not a principle but what is derived from a principle; it is, not in order that something may be or happen, but because something has happened. act: see ‘Notions’ above, § 1, pp. 372–75.



3 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 531–57.

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substantialis: in ordine essentiae simpliciter, vide Notiones, 2, e, p. 380; non accidentalis. supernaturalis: excedens proportionem naturae absolute: excedens proportionem cuiuslibet naturae finitae (essentiae finitae substantialis) respicit: fundat realem relationem ad solum Verbum ut assumens.

Intentio asserti Ex thesi septima deducitur corollarium necessarium, cuius sensus ipsa argumentatione manifestatur satis. Argumentum 1 Quae contingenter de Deo dicuntur, exigunt terminum ad extra contingentem et convenientem. (a) Exigunt: nam veritas exigit adaequationem inter intellectum et rem. (b) Exigunt terminum contingentem: nam non datur adaequatio inter verum contingens et rem divinam simpliciter necessariam. (c) Exigunt terminum ad extra contingentem: nam quod est contingens, illud ipsum non est Deus; et quod non est Deus est extra Deum. (d) Exigunt terminum convenientem: nisi enim terminus sit conveniens, adaequatio veritatis non salvatur. E.g., si verum est quod Deus facit ut nubes pluant, terminus conveniens est in nubibus pluentibus, et similiter in aliis.

2 Qui terminus nullatenus est causa, principium, antecedens, origo, sed totaliter est effectus, principiatum, consequens, terminus. Nam contingenter de Deo dicitur quod hunc mundum esse scit, vult, facit; cuius dictionis veritas exigit, ut terminum ad extra contingentem et convenientem, hunc mundum exsistentem. Sed ipsa veritas respicit Deum per suam scientiam scientem, per suam volitionem volentem, per suam omnipotentiam facientem. Et mundus hic exsistens nullatenus est causa, principium, antecedens, origo eius quod Deus scit, vult, facit; sed totaliter est effectus, principiatum, consequens, terminus eius quod Deus per solam suam scientiam scit, per solam suam volitionem vult, per solam suam omnipotentiam facit.

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substantial: in the order of essence pure and simple (see above, p. 381, ‘Notions,’ § 2, e); not accidental. supernatural: beyond the proportion of a nature. absolutely: beyond the proportion of any finite nature whatever (any finite substantial essence). regards: grounds a real relation solely to the Word as the one who assumes. Intention of the assertion From thesis 7 a necessary corollary is deduced, the sense of which will be clear enough from the argument itself. The argument 1 What is contingently predicated of God demands an appropriate, contingent, external term. (a) Such contingent predications demand this: for truth demands a correspondence between the mind and the real. (b) They demand a contingent term: for there is no correspondence between a contingent truth and the divine reality, which as such is simply necessary. (c) They demand an external contingent term: for what is contingent is not God, and what is not God is external to God. (d) They demand an appropriate term: for unless the term is appropriate the correspondence of truth is not preserved. For instance, if it is true that God makes the clouds pour down rain, the appropriate term is in the pouring clouds, and similarly in other cases. 2 This term is in no way a cause, a principle, an antecedent, an origin; it is totally an effect, something derived, a consequent, a term. For it is a contingent predication of God that he knows, wills, and effects this world. The truth of this predication demands, as its contingent and appropriate external term, this existing world. But this truth is a truth about God knowing through his knowledge, willing through his volition, and effecting through his omnipotence. And this existing world is in no way a cause, a principle, an antecedent, an origin of what God knows, wills, and effects; it is totally an effect, something derived, a consequent, a term of the fact that God knows by his knowledge alone, wills by his volition alone, and effects by his omnipotence alone.

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3 Contingenter de Verbo dicitur quod incarnatum est. Incarnatio enim non fuit necessaria ex natura ipsius Verbi, neque fuit necessaria quia aliter genus humanum salvari non potuit; sed eo sensu dicitur necessaria, quod sic melius et convenientius genus humanum salvatur, sicut dicitur equus necessarius ad iter. Sum. theol., 3, q. 1, a. 2. Ulterius, nihil finitum et creatum est simpliciter necessarium; et suppositis omnibus finitis et naturalibus, nulla inde habetur necessitas vel exigentia ordinis absolute supernaturalis; sed incarnatio Verbi dicit tum finitum et creatum tum absolute supernaturale; ergo dupliciter non necessaria fuit Verbi incarnatio.

4 Ex praecedentibus, 1, 2, 3, necessario sequitur quod (1) incarnatio Verbi exigit terminum ad extra contingentem et convenientem, et (2) hic terminus nullatenus est causa, principium, antecedens, origo, sed totaliter est effectus, principiatum, consequens, terminus. 5 Qui quidem terminus non est natura assumenda, scilicet, haec caro realis per hanc animam realem animata. Admittitur talis terminus esse ad extra et contingens, sed negatur esse conveniens. Nam quaeritur terminus non possibilis assumptionis sed actualis assumptionis: sed propositus terminus non dicit nisi id quod assumi potest. Praeterea, quaeritur terminus actualis assumptionis a solo Filio; sed pro­ positus terminus non magis dicit Filium quam Patrem vel Spiritum vel duas quaslibet divinas personas vel omnes tres. Quod urgetur: contra Scotistas et Tiphani sequaces obicitur quod verbis negant et rebus docent personam assumptam; at eiusmodi obiectio fieri non debet a theologis qui verbis asserunt solum Filium incarnatum sed rebus ponunt neque actualem assumptionem neque actualem assumptionem a solo Filio.

6 Praeter naturam assumendam ergo terminus conveniens saltem exigit relationem realem quae solum Verbum ut formaliter assumens respicit. Quod communiter conceditur.

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3 It is contingently predicated of the Word that he has become incarnate. For the Incarnation was not necessary because of the nature of the Word himself; nor was it necessary because without it the human race could not be saved; it is, however, said to be necessary in the sense that this was a better and more appropriate way for the human race to be saved – much as a horse is said to be necessary for a journey. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 1, a. 2. Further, nothing finite and created is purely and simply necessary. And even if we suppose everything that is finite and natural, there is still no necessity and no demand for an absolutely supernatural order. But to speak of the Incarnation of the Word is to speak both of what is finite and created and of what is absolutely supernatural, and so there are two senses in which the Incarnation of the Word was not necessary. 4 From the three preceding points, it necessarily follows (1) that the Incarnation of the Word demands an appropriate and contingent external term, and (2) that this term is in no way a cause, a principle, an antecedent, an origin, but totally an effect, something derived, a consequent, a term. 5 This term is not the nature to be assumed; not, that is, this real flesh animated by this real soul. Admittedly, such a term is external and contingent. But it is not appropriate. For the term we seek is not the term of a possible assumption but the term of an actual assumption. The term proposed, however, refers only to what could possibly be assumed. Besides this, what we are seeking is the term of an actual assumption on the part of the Son alone. The proposed term, however, no more refers to the Son than to the Father or the Spirit or any two divine persons or all three. To press the point: Against Scotists and followers of Tiphanus it is objected that they deny verbally, but teach in point of fact, an assumed person. But an objection of this kind ought not to be raised by theologians who themselves assert verbally that only the Son is incarnate, but in point of fact posit neither an actual assumption nor an actual assumption on the part of the Word alone. 6 Beyond the nature to be assumed, therefore, an appropriate term demands at least a real relation to the Word alone as formally assuming. This is commonly granted.

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At realis relatio sine reali fundamento est mera fictio; et ideo non sola realis relatio sed etiam reale relationis fundamentum est agnoscendum.

7 Quod reale fundamentum non est accidens, et ideo ad ordinem substantialem pertinet. Si enim accidens fuisset, sequeretur quod unio Verbi incarnati non substantialis est sed accidentalis, ut in dono increato Spiritus sancti per gratiam sanctificantem, vel uti in illapsa intellectibus beatorum divina essentia.

8 Quod reale fundamentum substantiale est actus. Aut enim actus, aut forma, aut potentia (vide Notiones, 1, pp. 372–76). Sed non forma substantialis, quae in homine est anima; neque potentia substantialis, quae in homine est corpus; secus in omni homine haberetur incarnatio. Neque est superaddita quaedam forma vel potentia non humana, quia Christus habet naturam humanam per omnia nobis similem.

9 Qui actus est absolute supernaturalis. Nam unio hypostatica excedit proportionem cuiuslibet naturae finitae (cuiuslibet essentiae substantialis); et ideo quod immediate ex ipsa unione hypostatica resultat, id etiam absolute supernaturale dicendum est.

10 Qui actus excedit proportionem naturae assumptae, nam natura assumpta est finita, et ille actus est supernaturalis. 11 Qui actus actuat potentiam naturae assumptae non naturalem sed obedientialem; nam potentia naturalis actuatur per actum naturae proportionatum, et sola potentia obedientialis actuatur per actum qui proportionem naturae excedit. Obicitur 1 Actus substantialis non potest esse absolute supernaturalis; nam absolute supernaturale excedit proportionem cuiuslibet substantiae finitae. Respondetur: Primo, obiciens confundit substantiam finitam et actum sub-

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But a real relation without a real base is just a fiction. Not only a real relation, therefore, but also the base of the real relation has to be acknowledged. 7 This real base is not an accident, and thus it pertains to the substantial order. If it were an accident, it would follow that the incarnate Word’s union is not substantial but accidental, as with the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit through sanctifying grace, or the slipping of the divine essence into the minds of the blessed. 8 This real, substantial base is an act. For it is either act, or form, or potency. See ‘Notions’ above, § 1, pp. 372–77. But it is not a substantial form, which in man is the soul, nor a substantial potency, which in man is the body; if these were the base, there would be an incarnation in everyone. Nor is it some superadded form or potency that is not human, because Christ has a human nature that is like ours in all respects. 9 This act is absolutely supernatural. For the hypostatic union exceeds the proportion of any finite nature (any substantial essence) whatever. Therefore, that which results immediately from the hypostatic union itself must likewise be reckoned absolutely supernatural. 10 This act exceeds the proportion of the assumed nature, for the assumed nature is finite, whereas the act is supernatural. 11 This act actuates, not the natural potency, but the obediential potency of the assumed nature; for natural potency is actuated by an act proportionate to the nature, and only obediential potency is actuated by an act that exceeds the proportion of nature. Objections 1 It is impossible for a substantial act to be absolutely supernatural, since the absolutely supernatural exceeds the proportion of any finite substance. Reply: In the first place, the objector confuses finite substance with sub-

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stantialem. Actus substantialis in asserto positus non est substantia finita, neque in sensu quo hic homo, hic bos, dicitur substantia finita, neque in sensu quo essentia simpliciter dicitur substantia finita. Praeterea, obiciens non videtur intelligere definitionem ordinis absolute supernaturalis. In illa enim definitione loco ‘substantiae’ poni potest ‘essentia simpliciter’ et idem prorsus est sensus. Quod enim determinat proportionem quam supernaturale excedit est essentia substantialis finita; et hoc est manifestum si quidem actus essentiae de se non limitatur et ideo de se nullam proportionem determinat. 2 Quod advenit enti completo, advenit accidentaliter. Sed dictus actus substantialis advenit enti completo. Ergo non est substantialis sed accidentalis. Respondetur: Maior est falsa circa ens infinitum; nam Verbum aeternum est ens completum, cui advenit natura humana non accidentaliter sed substantialiter. Ad minorem: natura assumpta non est ens completum sed tantummodo essentia; Verbum incarnatum utique est ens completum, sed antequam resultet ille actus substantialis, nondum verum est Verbum et non Patrem incarnari; et sine vero, non habetur praemissa unde argui potest.

3 Unio hypostatica facta est, non in natura, non in aliquo intermedio inter naturas, sed in persona. Sed actus substantialis in asserto positus est tale quoddam intermedium, quod a S. Thoma reprobatur (Sum. theol., 3, q. 6 , a. 6; cf. q. 2 , a. 10). Respondetur: Quod facit unionem hypostaticam, ut principium quod, est persona Verbi, et ut principium quo, est esse Verbi divinum; et secundum hoc dicitur quod unio facta est in persona et non in naturis neque in intermedio quodam coniungente naturas. Actus autem substantialis in asserto positus nullatenus est principium vel causa unionis vel coniungens naturas sive ut intermedium sive alio quolibet modo; sed totaliter se habet ex parte effectus, consequentis, principiati, termini. Sicut enim creaturae non faciunt Deum scire, neque faciunt Deum velle, neque faciunt Deum creare, similiter dictus actus substantialis non facit Verbum esse hominem sed ita resultat ex eo quod Verbum est homo ut, nisi resultaret, verum non esset, Verbum esse hominem.

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stantial act. The substantial act posited in our assertion is not a finite substance, either in the sense in which this man or this cow is termed a finite substance, or in the sense in which an essence pure and simple is termed a finite substance. Moreover, the objector does not seem to understand the definition of the absolutely supernatural order. In that definition, ‘substance’ can be replaced with ‘essence pure and simple,’ and the meaning is precisely the same. For what determines the proportion exceeded by the supernatural is a finite substantial essence; this is plain since, of itself, the act of an essence is not limited, and therefore, of itself, it determines no proportion. 2 That which enters into a complete being enters accidentally. But the substantial act asserted enters into a complete being. Therefore, it is not substantial but accidental. Reply: The major premise is false so far as infinite being is concerned. For into the eternal Word, who is a complete being, a human nature entered, not accidentally but substantially. As to the minor premise: The assumed nature is not a complete being but only an essence. The incarnate Word is indeed a complete being; but until the substantial act resulted, it was not yet true that the Word and not the Father had become incarnate; and without truth there is no premise from which to argue. 3 The hypostatic union happened, not in a nature, and not in anything intermediate between natures, but in a person. But the substantial act posited in the assertion is just such an intermediate thing, which Thomas argues against in Summa theologiae, 3, q. 6, a. 6; see also q. 2, a. 10. Reply: That which brings about the hypostatic union, as its principle which, is the person of the Word; that which brings it about as its principle by which is the Word’s divine act of existence. It is on this basis that we say the union happened in the person and not in the natures or in some intermediate that joins the natures. The substantial act posited in the assertion, however, is in no way a principle or a cause of the union; it is not something that joins the natures, either as an intermediate or in any other way at all. It stands wholly on the side of an effect, a consequence, a derivative, a term. For just as creatures do not make God know, nor make God will, nor make God create, so likewise the substantial act asserted does not make the Word be human; instead, it results from the fact that the Word is human, in such a way that if this act did not so result, it would not be true that the Word is human.

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Quantum autem ad textum S. Thomae, ibi excluditur gratia habitualis accidentalis. 4 Dictus actus substantialis est quoddam esse; sed in Verbo incarnato unicum est esse, ut in thesi septima habitum est, et S. Thomas manifeste docet. Respondetur: Dictus actus substantialis est quoddam esse, transeat, est quoddam esse quo Verbum est vel Deus vel homo, negatur; nam quod in thesi septima habitum est non quodlibet esse excludit, sed aliud esse praeter divinum quo Verbum est Deus et quo est homo. Quod vero manifeste docet S. Thomas est unicum esse personale (Sum. theol., 3, q. 17, a. 2 c.); cae­ terum, in Q.D. de Unione Verbi Incarnati, a. 4, haec habuit: ‘… [Christus] habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi. Est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non in quantum est aeternum, sed in quantum est temporaliter homo factum. Quod esse, etsi non sit esse accidentale – quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra (a. 1) habitum est – non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium. Si autem in Christo essent duo supposita, tunc utrumque suppositum haberet proprium esse sibi principale …’ Et mox addidit: ‘Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae. Nec tamen simpliciter dicendum est quod Christus sit duo secundum esse; quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque esse suppositum aeternum.’

Notate authentiam huius Q.D. olim negatam esse, hodie admitti; quando composita fuerit hodie disputatur; P.A. Walz eam ponit ultimam inter QQ. DD. conscriptas inter 1269–72, dtc xv (29) 637. Cf. etiam De Raeymaeker, Met. gen., ii, 368–74.

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As for the text cited, what Thomas is ruling out there is [that there is a union by means of] accidental habitual grace. 4 The substantial act asserted is an act of existence. But in the incarnate Word there is a single act of existence, as thesis 7 has shown and as Thomas clearly teaches. Reply: That the substantial act asserted is an act of existence, I pass. That it is an act of existence by which the Word is either God or human, I deny. What thesis 7 ruled out was not any other act of existence whatever; it was any act of existence, other than the divine one, by which the Word is God and by which he is human. What Thomas plainly teaches is a single personal act of existence (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 17, a. 2 c.). Besides, in the Quaestio disputata de Unione Verbi Incarnati, a. 4, he writes that Christ ‘has one act of existence, pure and simple, on account of the one eternal act of existence of the eternal supposit. But there is also another act of existence belonging to this supposit, not insofar as he is eternal but insofar as he has become human in time. This act of existence, although it is not an accidental act of existence – because “man” is not an accidental predicate of the Son of God, as was shown in article 1 above – nevertheless is not the principal act of existence of his supposit, but a secondary one. If, however, there were two supposits in Christ, then each supposit would have its own principal act of existence …’ And he goes on to add: ‘The answer to the first objection, then, is that the human nature’s act of existence is not the divine nature’s act of existence. Nevertheless it should not be said without qualification that Christ is two on the basis of act of existence, because the eternal supposit does not regard each act of existence on equal terms.’ Note that the authenticity of this disputed question, which was at one time denied, is accepted at the present time; what is now under debate is when it was written. P.A. Walz places it last among the disputed questions written between 1269 and 1272; see ‘Thomas d’Aquin. Écrits,’ dtc 15 (29) 637. See also De Raeymaeker, Metaphysica generalis, 2, 368–74.1



1 The date and status of Thomas Aquinas’s disputed question De unione Verbi incarnati have been contended for centuries. The twentieth-century debates are chronicled by Jean-Pierre Torrell, ‘Le thomisme dans le débat christologique contemporain,’ in Saint Thomas au XXe siècle: Colloque du centenaire de la ‘Revue thomiste’ (1893–1992), Toulouse, 25–28 mars 1993, ed. SergeThomas Bonino (Paris: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1994).   The work of the Leonine Commission confirms the authenticity of the question beyond reasonable doubt. Opinions on the dating still vary widely,

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5 Dictus actus substantialis in essentia humana receptus facit ex illa essentia hominem, ens simpliciter, unum simpliciter, subsistens, suppositum reale, personam; quae omnia in thesi sexta negantur. Respondetur: Si attentius legitur, thesis sexta excludit esse proportionatum; hoc autem assertum ponit actum absolute supernaturalem ideoque excedentem proportionem cuiuslibet essentiae substantialis et finitae. Quantum autem ad id quod obiciens supponit, simpliciter falsum est. Non enim fit ens simpliciter vel unum simpliciter nisi idem est in potentia per essentiam et in actu per esse. Quod in casu non habetur. Per naturam humanam enim merus homo est in potentia; sed per actum absolute supernaturalem non merus homo est in actu; ille enim actus signat naturam assumptam qua actualiter a Verbo eoque solo assumptam.

Thesis 10 De conscientia Christi. In Verbo incarnato duae distinguuntur conscientiae, divina nempe et humana; quibus tamen una eademque divina persona tum modo divino tum modo humano sibi praesens est.

Termini Verbum incarnatum: Io 1.14. duo, distincta: sunt quorum unum non est aliud

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5 The substantial act asserted, received in a human essence, makes of that essence a man, a being pure and simple, purely and simply one, a subsistent, a real supposit, and a person – all denied in thesis 6. Reply: Thesis 6, on a more attentive reading, rules out a proportionate act of existence. The present assertion, however, posits an absolutely supernatural act which, as such, exceeds the proportion of any finite, substantial essence. As for what the objector presupposes, however, that is simply false. For there is no being pure and simple, purely and simply one, unless that which is in potency by its essence is the same as that which is in act by its act of existence. That is not so in the present case. Through a human nature a mere man is in potency; but through the absolutely supernatural act no mere man is in act, for that act designates the assumed nature as actually assumed by the Word and by him alone. Thesis 10 Christ’s Consciousness: There are in the incarnate Word two distinct consciousnesses, a divine and a human consciousness; by these two, nevertheless, one and the same divine person is present to himself in both a divine and a human way. Terms the incarnate Word: as in John 1.14 two, distinct: of which one is not the other

but recent historical scholarship has tended to assign a relatively late date, around 1270–72, which is to say, just prior to, or perhaps contemporaneous with, the composition of the parellel articles in the Summa theologiae. Torrell (Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1993; rev. ed., 2002]; in English, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work [Washington, dc: Catholic University of America Press, 1996]) proposes April or May 1272, just after the redaction of Summa theologiae, 3, q. 2. Marie-Hélène Deloffre (Question disputée: L’union du Verbe incarné [De unione Verbi incarnati] [Paris: Vrin, 2000]) offers a detailed discussion of the textual evidence in favour of Torrell’s dating (cf. pages 24–25 of her commentary). Klaus Obenauer (Thomas von Aquin: Quaestio disputata ‘De unione Verbi incarnati’ [Stuttgart: Frommann-holzboog, 2011]) suggests that a slightly earlier scenario of 1270 could also be likely, but in any case excludes any dating that would separate the De unione widely from the parallel matter of the Summa theologiae.

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praesens: dicitur tripliciter; uno modo, praeter cognitionem, uti localiter, physice, ontologice praesens; alio modo, praesens ut obiectum, e.g., colores videnti, soni audienti, callidum tangenti, intelligibile intelligenti, definitio concipienti, verum iudicanti, etc.; tertio modo, praesens ut subiectum, e.g., eo ipso quod quis videt (audit, tangit, intelligit, iudicat, etc.), ipse sibi est praesens qua videns (audiens, tangens, intelligens, iudicans, etc.); vide Notiones, 1–3 [infra].

conscientia: id quo subiectum est sibi praesens et actus subiecti subiecto sunt praesentes (praesentia tertia). modo divino: secundum conscientiam divinam modo humano: secundum conscientiam humanam Quaestio Ipsa quaestio in se facillima est. Cum tamen totam theologiam de unione hypostatica praesupponat, et ulterius magnas partes metaphysicae, psychologiae, epistemologiae addat, occasiones errandi abundant neque omnes breviter praecluduntur. Quare, qui prima vice hanc materiam considerat, forte utilius a probatione incipiat1 ut, orta obscuritate, ad notiones expositas recurrat.

Auctores Déodat de Basly, La Christiade française, 2 vol., Paris 1927. Inopérantes offensives contre l’Assumptus Homo, Paris 1935. P. Galtier, L’unité du Christ, Paris 1939. De Incarnatione, Paris ed. 2a 1947. Bull. litt. eccl. 42 (1941) 161–75, 216–32; Gregorianum 32 (1951) 525–68; 34 (1953) 427–31; 35 (1954) 225–46.

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present: the term is used in three ways. The first way, as in local or physical or ontological presence, is apart from knowing. A second way regards what is present as object; for example, colors are present to someone seeing, sounds to someone hearing, warmth to someone touching, the intelligible to someone understanding, a definition to someone conceiving, the true to someone judging, and so on. A third way regards what is present as subject; for example, by the very fact that someone sees (hears, touches, understands, judges, and so on), she is present to herself as the one who is seeing (hearing, touching, understanding, judging, and so on). See below, pp. 474–77, ‘Notions,’ §§ 1–3. consciousness: that by which the subject is present to himself or herself and the acts of the subject are present to the subject (presence in the third sense) in a divine way: through his divine consciousness in a human way: through his human consciousness The question The question itself is quite straightforward. It does, however, presuppose the whole theology of the hypostatic union, and moreover adds large parts of metaphysics, psychology, and epistemology, so that there is abundant opportunity for mistakes, which cannot all be prevented briefly. Accordingly, readers who are considering this matter for the first time might do well to begin with the proof.1 When something obscure comes up, they may return to the ‘Notions’ explained below. Bibliography Joseph-Léon-Victor Marie Déodat de Basly, La Christiade française (2 vols.; Paris: Havre-Eclair, 1927); Inopérantes offensives contra l’Assumptus Homo (Paris: La France Franciscaine, 1935). P. Galtier, L’unité du Christ (Paris: Beauchesne, 1939); De incarnatione ac redemptione (2nd ed., Paris: Beauchesne, 1947); ‘Unité ontologique et unité psychologique dans le Christ,’ Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique 42 (1941) 161–75, 216–32; ‘La conscience humaine du Christ, à propos de quelques publications récentes,’ Gregorianum 32 (1951) 525–68; ‘Nestorius mal



1 See below, p. 501.

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L. Seiller, Franz. Stud. 31 (1949) 49–76, 146–74. Idem seorsum, La psychologie humaine du Christ et unicité de personne, Rennes et Paris, 1949. Index librorum prohibitorum, 12-vii-1951. P. Parente, L’Io di Cristo, Brescia 1951, 1955. Euntes docete 5 (1952) 337–401; 6 (1953) 312–22.

H. Diepen, Rev. thom. 49 (1949) 428–92; 50 (1950) 515–62; 53 (1953) 28–80; Les trois chapitres au concile de Chalcedoine, Ousterhout 1953, ubi bibliographia. De ipso libro, RechScRel 43 (1955) 595–97.

J. Ternus, apud Grillmeier-Bacht iii, 81–237.

B. Xiberta, El Yo de Jesucristo, Barcelona 1954. Multi auctores citantur. A. Perego, Divus Thomas (Piac) 58 (1955) 90–110, 296–307; bibliogr. 307–10; Divinitas 2 (1958) 409–24. R. Haubst, Theologische Revue 52 (1956) 145–62. J. Galot, Nouv. rev. theol. 80 (1958) 352–58; 82 (1960) 113–31.

D. Bertetto, Gesu Redentore, Firenze 1958, 378–96; multi citantur. E. Gutwenger, Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi, Innsbruck 1960. B. Lonergan, De constit. Christi, Roma 1956, 1958, 1961; Gregorianum 40 (1959) 242–70; Insight, cc. 11, 18.

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compris, mal traduit,’ Gregorianum 34 (1953) 427–31; ‘La conscience humaine du Christ: Epilogue,’ Gregorianum 35 (1954) 225–46. L. Seiller, ‘La psychologie humaine du Christ et l’unité de personne,’ Franziskanische Studien 31 (1949) 49–76, 246–74. A separate treatment of the same, La psychologie humaine du Christ et unicité de personne (Paris: Vrin, 1949), added to the Index of Prohibited Books, 12 July 1951. P. Parente, L’Io di Cristo (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1951, 1955); ‘Unità ontologica e psicologica dell’Uomo-Dio,’ Euntes docete 5 (1952) 337–401; ‘Echi della controversia sull’unità ontologica e psicologica di Cristo,’ 6 (1953) 312–22. H. Diepen, ‘Un scotisme apocryphe: La christologie du P. Déodat de Basly, o.f.m.,’ Revue Thomiste 49 (1949) 428–92; ‘La psychologie humaine du Christ selon saint Thomas d’Aquin,’ ibid. 50 (1950) 515–62; ‘L’unique Seigneur Jésus-Christ,’ ibid. 53 (1953) 28–80; Les trois chapitres au concile de Chalcédoine: Une étude de la christologie de l’Anatolie ancienne (Ousterhout: Éditions de Saint Michel, 1953), with bibliography. On the book itself, see the review by Jean Daniélou, Recherches de science religieuse 43 (1955) 595–97. J. Ternus, ‘Die Seelen- und Bewusstseinsleben Jesu: Problemgeschichtlichsystematische Untersuchung,’ in Grillmeier-Bacht (see above, p. 9, note 7), 3, 81–237. B. Xiberta, El Yo de Jesucristo (Barcelona: Herder, 1954), which cites a large number of authors. A. Perego, ‘Il “Lumen Gloriae” e l’unità psicologica di Cristo,’ Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 58 (1955) 90–110, 296–307, bibliography, 307–10; ‘Una nuova opinione sull-unità psicologica di Cristo,’ Divinitas 2 (1958) 409–24. R. Haubst, ‘Probleme der jüngsten Christologie,’ Theologische Revue (1956) 145–62. J. Galot, ‘La psychologie du Christ,’ Nouvelle revue théologique 80 (1958) 352– 58; ‘Science et conscience de Jésus,’ Nouvelle revue théologique 82 (1960) 113–31. D. Bertetto, Gesù Redentore (Florence: Libreria editrice fiorentina, 1958) 378–96; many authors are cited. E. Gutwenger, Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi: Eine dogmatische Studie (Innsbruck: Verlag Felizian Rauch, 1960). Bernard Lonergan, De constitutione Christi (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1956, 1958, 1961) [now Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 7, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: Univer-

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C. Molari, ‘Aspetti metafisici e funzionali della coscienza umana di Cristo,’ Divinitas 4 (1960) 261–88. F. Malmberg, Über den Gottmenschen, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1960. Fr. Philippe de la Trinité, ‘A propos de la conscience du Christ: Un faux problème théologique,’ Ephem. Carmel. 11 (1960) 1–52.2 Quaestiones et sententiae Cum auctores nisi recentissimi de conscientia Christi non tractaverint, haud mirari potest quod non solum solutionibus sed etiam in ipsa quaestione concipienda inter se discrepent. Quare non solum sententias enumeramus sed etiam quaestiones distinguimus. (a)  persona et subiectum 1 Agnoscuntur duo subiecta neque satis evitatur conclusio duarum personarum. L. Seiller, op. cit., p. 17: ‘Dieu le Verbe est, en effet, sujet adoré et non point sujet adorant … sujet prié et non point sujet priant.’ Et non pauca similia, in quibus auctor communicationem idiomatum male intelligere videtur. Hoc opusculum in Indicem est relatum, et intendi videtur a litt. encycl. Sempiternus Rex (db 2334, ds 3905).

2 Persona extra campum conscientiae versari affimatur et ideo praeter personam divinam agnoscitur in Christo subiectum psychologicum humanum, quod per visionem beatam divinam suam personam cognoscit.

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sity of Toronto Press, 2002)]; ‘Christ as Subject: A Reply,’ Gregorianum 40 (1959) 242–70 [reprinted in Collection, vol. 4 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 153–84]; Insight [see above, p. 201, note 3], chapters 11 and 18. C. Molari, ‘Aspetti metafisici e funzionali della conscienza umana di Cristo,’ Divinitas 4 (1960) 261–88. F. Malmberg, Über den Gottmenschen (Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1960). Philippe de la Trinité, ‘À propos de la conscience du Christ: Un faux problème théologique,’ Ephemerides Carmeliticae 11 (1960) 1–52.2 Questions and opinions Only very recently have authors treated Christ’s consciousness, and so it is no surprise to find that they disagree not only on solutions but even when it comes to conceiving the question itself. Accordingly, we shall not only list opinions but also distinguish the questions. (a)  person and subject 1 Two subjects have been acknowledged without adequately avoiding the conclusion that there are two persons. L. Seiller writes that ‘God the Word is the subject worshiped and not at all the subject who worships, the subject who is prayed to and not at all the subject who prays’ (La psychologie humaine du Christ 17). There are quite a few similar statements, in which the author appears to have a poor understanding of the ‘interchange of properties.’ This brief work has been placed on the Index, and seems to be referred to in the encyclical Sempiternus Rex (db 2334, ds 3905). 2 It has been held that the person does not lie within the field of consciousness. This opinion therefore acknowledges in Christ, besides a divine person, a human psychological subject, who knows his divine person through the beatific vision.



2 The last three items are not listed in the 1960 edition.

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Ita P. Galtier; vide De constitut. Christi 138–40.

3 Visio beata est cognitio obiecti, et sic cognosci potest ‘tu’ vel ‘ille’ sed non ‘ego.’ Persona cum subiecto psychologico identificatur. In Christo ponitur persona quodammodo composita et similiter sub­ iectum quodammodo compositum. Ubi Christus in evangeliis dicit ‘ego,’ personam divinam significat, cuius personae habetur conscientia quaedam immediata a naturali illo uno humano quod centrum psychologicum in Christo homine erat. Ita E. Gutwenger, op. cit., 47–78. (b)  conscientia ut perceptio vel introspectio (reflexio) Negatur visio beata esse conscientia proprie dicta; identificatur subiectum psychologicum cum persona; quaeritur quemadmodum conscientia humana, anima humana, intellectus Christi creatus attingat personam divinam ut subiectum. Alii aliter respondent. Exc. D. Parente invocat influxum a Verbo exercitum in conscientiam humanam. B. Xiberta attendit ad supernaturalem elevationem animae humanae ut non solum per visionem beatam sed etiam alio modo magis subiectivo ipsam realitatem Verbi divini ut perceptam possideat. A. Perego lumini gloriae duplex attribuit munus: obiectivum ad divinam essentiam intuendam; reflexivum ad Verbum tamquam subiectum videns percipiendum. H. Diepen docet actus humanos Christi esse conscios tamquam alicuius ignoti, qui quis sit per visionem beatam cognoscitur. De Constit. Christi 141–44.

(c)  [sententia theseos] Persona cum subiecto psychologico identificatur (Notiones, 14); sicut persona a natura, ita etiam qui sibi praesens est distinguitur a modo quo sibi praesens est (Notiones, 15); reicitur conscientia ut perceptio (Notiones, 12); distinguitur conscientia tum ab introspectione (Notiones, 6) tum a cognitione sui (Notiones, 8). Unde docemus unum idemque Dei Verbum esse sibi praesens duobus modis diversis et distinctis.

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Thus P. Galtier. See Lonergan, De constitutione Christi 138–40 [The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 270–75]. 3 The beatific vision is a knowing of an object, and so a thou or a he can be known in this way but not an I. Here person is identified with psychological subject. This opinion posits in Christ a person that is somehow composite, and likewise a subject that is somehow composite. In the gospels, when Christ says ‘I,’ this signifies the divine person, and there is an immediate consciousness of this person on the part of that natural human one which was the psychological center in Christ the man. Thus E. Gutwenger in Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi 47–78. (b)  consciousness as perception or introspection (reflection) It is denied that the beatific vision is consciousness properly so called; person and psychological subject are identified. The question is, How does the human consciousness, the human soul, the created intellect of Christ attain to the divine person as subject? There are different answers. Parente invokes an influence exercised by the Word on the human consciousness. Xiberta focuses on a supernatural elevation of the human soul such that it possesses the very reality as perceived of the divine Word, not only through the beatific vision but also in another, more subjective way. Perego ascribes to the light of glory a twofold task: an objective intuiting of the divine essence, and a reflexive perceiving of the Word as the seeing subject. Diepen teaches that Christ’s human acts are conscious as the acts of someone unknown, and that through the beatific vision it is known who this someone is. See De constitutione Christi 141–44 [The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 276–83]. (c)  [the position of the thesis] Person is identified with psychological subject (‘Notions,’ 14). As person is distinguished from nature, so too the one who is present to himself is distinguished from the way in which he is present to himself (‘Notions,’ 15). Consciousness as perception is rejected (‘Notions,’ 12); consciousness is distinguished both from introspection (‘Notions,’ 6) and from knowledge of oneself (‘Notions,’ 8). Hence, we teach that one and the same Word of God is present to himself in two different and distinct ways.

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Notiones 1  subiectum, actus, obiectum Actus sunt: somniare, videre, audire, olfacere, gustare, tangere, imaginare, inquirere, intelligere, concipere, considerare, definire, reflectere, evidentiam ponderare, iudicare, appetere, delectari, pati, desiderare, timere, gaudere, contristari, velle, consiliari, deliberare, eligere, agere, facere. Obiecta sunt: somnia, visa, audita, olfacta, gustata, tacta, imaginata, investigata, intellecta, concepta, considerata, definita, etc. Subiectum est: somnians, videns, audiens, olfaciens, gustans, tangens, imaginans, inquirens, intelligens, concipiens, considerans, definiens, etc. 2  praesens, absens ­S. Augustinus, De Trin. (x, ix, 12; ml 42, 980): ‘non ita dicitur menti “cognosce te ipsum,” sicut dicitur “cognosce Cherubim et Seraphim”; de absentibus enim illis credimus quod caelestes quaedam potestates esse praedicantur. ‘Neque sicut dicitur “cognosce voluntatem illius hominis,” quae nobis nec ad sentiendum ullo modo nec ad intelligendum praesto est, nisi corporalibus signis editis; et hoc ita ut magis credamus quam intelligamus. ‘Neque ita ut dicitur homini “vide faciem tuam,” quod nisi in speculo fieri non potest; nam et ipsa nostra facies absens ab aspectu nostro est, quia non ibi est quo ille dirigi potest. ‘Sed cum menti dicitur “cognosce te ipsam,” eo ictu quo intelligit quod dictum est, “te ipsam,” cognoscit se ipsam; nec ob aliud quam eo quod sibi praesens est.’3

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Notions 1  subject, act, object There are acts of dreaming, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, imagining, inquiring, understanding, conceiving, considering, defining, reflecting, weighing the evidence, judging, yearning for, delighting in, suffering, desiring, fearing, rejoicing, sorrowing, willing, taking into account, deliberating, choosing, doing, acting. Their objects are what is dreamed, seen, heard, smelled, tasted, touched, imagined, investigated, understood, conceived, considered, defined, and so on. Their subject is the one who dreams, sees, hears, smells, tastes, touches, imagines, inquires, understands, conceives, considers, defines, and so on. 2  presence, absence Augustine writes in De Trinitate (10, ix, 12; ml 42, 980 [ccsl 50: 325–26]): ‘For it is not said to the mind: “Know thyself,” as it is said, “Know the cherubim and seraphim.” For they are absent, and we believe what we have been taught concerning them, that they are certain heavenly powers. ‘Nor [is this said] in the way it is said: “Know the will of that man.” In no way is that present to our sense or our understanding unless it is declared by corporeal signs, and even then we believe rather than understand. ‘Nor [is this said] in the way it is said to someone, “Look at your face.” This can only be done by means of a mirror. For even our face is absent from our view, because it is not in a place to which our eye can be directed. ‘But when it is said to the mind: “Know yourself,” then it knows itself in the very act in which it understands the word “yourself”; and it knows itself for no other reason than that it is present to itself.’3



3 See also the translation in Augustine, On the Trinity, trans. Arthur West Haddan and W.G.T. Shedd, in vol. 3 of npnf, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids, mi: Eerdmans, 1980) 140; this translation is cited in Bernard Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method 1, vol. 22 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) 46–47, notes 14–17. In Lonergan’s lecture at this point in cwl 22, he is commenting on this passage.

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3  triplex praesentia Alia enim localis est praesentia, uti unicuique est facies sua; alia enim est praesentia obiecti, uti propria facies in speculo visa, vel quodcumque aliud obiectum visum, auditum, etc. (cf. supra 1); tertia denique est praesentia sibi. Haec tertia praesentia deest in eo qui alto sopore dormit; incipit tamen si forte somniat; valde augetur quando vigilat; novam qualitatem induit intellectualem cum circa obiecta sensibilia inquirit, investigat, intelligit, concipit, definit, hypotheses sibi proponit; ulteriorem qualitatem eamque rationalem accipit, ubi de intellectis reflectitur, an res ita se habeat quaerit, evidentiam ponderat, iudicat; ultimam denique perfectionem acquirit, ubi ex vero in bonum transit, vult, consiliatur, modo morali deliberat, libere eligit, responsabiliter agit, opera humana facit.

4  conscientia, conscium Conscientia humana est illa tertia praesentia. Sicut lux lumine suo videtur, ita etiam conscientia per conscientiam innotescit. Non enim per aliam quandam praesentiam fit ut haec tertia praesentia cognoscatur, sed ipsa iam in se quaedam notitia est. Quare, sensum eorum, quae iam sunt dicta vel quae mox sunt dicenda, eatenus capies quatenus ad te tibi praesentem attendes. Conscium dicitur quod per conscientiam innotescit, i.e., quod per tertiam praesentiam praesens est. Conscium-quod est subiectum; seu subiectum est id quod est conscium. Conscii-quibus sunt actus; seu actus sunt quibus subiectum est conscium.4 Ubi enim actus desunt, uti in dormiente, ibi etiam deest conscientia. Pro perfectione autem actuum, conscientia dicitur inchoata (in somniante), empirica (in vigilante), intellectualis (in inquirente), rationalis (in iudicante), et denique conscientia sui vel autoconscientia (in volente, moraliter deliberante, libere eligente, et responsabiliter agente).

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3  three kinds of presence There is local presence, as in the case of the presence of one’s face to oneself. This is different from the presence of an object, such as the presence of one’s own face seen in a mirror, or of some other object seen or heard and so on (see § 1 above). Thirdly there is presence to oneself. This third kind of presence is lacking in one who is deeply and dreamlessly asleep. It begins, however, if he should begin to dream. It is enhanced greatly when he wakes up. It takes on a new intellectual quality when he inquires about sensible objects, investigates them, understands, conceives, defines, and proposes for himself hypotheses about them. It takes on a further, rational quality when he reflects on what he has understood, asks whether that is how things are, weighs the evidence, judges. Finally it acquires its ultimate perfection when he passes from the true to the good, when he wills, takes counsel, deliberates in a moral way, chooses freely, acts responsibly, performs human deeds. 4  consciousness, conscious Human consciousness is this third kind of presence. As light is seen in its own light, so too consciousness is aware by consciousness. For it is not some other presence that makes this third kind of presence aware; it is already a kind of awareness in itself. Accordingly, you will grasp the sense of what has been said already and of what is going to be said, to the same extent that you attend to yourself, present to yourself. What is aware through consciousness – that is, what is present through the third kind of presence – is said to be conscious. That which is conscious is the subject. It is by acts which are conscious that the subject is conscious.4 Without such acts, as in the case of dreamless sleep, there is no consciousness. And depending on how perfect or complete these acts are, consciousness is named inchoate in one who is dreaming, empirical in one who is awake, intellectual in one who is inquiring, rational in one who is judging, and finally consciousness of self or self-consciousness in one who is willing, deliberating morally, choosing freely, and acting responsibly.

4 More literally: ‘[Those] conscious [things] by which [the subject] is conscious are acts; otherwise stated, acts are [those things] by which the subject is conscious.’

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Obiecta denique sunt non conscia sed somniata, visa, audita, imaginata, intellecta, concepta, etc. Obiectorum enim praesentia non tertia est sed secunda; quae secunda praesentia sine tertia non habetur; me enim mihi absente et dormiente, nihil in ratione obiecti mihi est praesens.

5  subiectum psychologicum ­ ubiectum psychologicum est subiectum de quo supra. S Dicitur psychologicum (1) quatenus per tertiam praesentiam eamque solam innotescit, (2) ut distinguatur a subiecto grammatico, quod est nomen, pronomen, etc., a subiecto scientiae, uti Deus in theologia, a subiecto metaphysico, uti materia est subiectum formae, substantia accidentium.

Hac in thesi ubi subiectum nominatur, nisi aliud constat, de subiecto psychologico agitur. Subiectum (psychologicum) in potentia est hic homo; subiectum autem in actu est homo sibi praesens; et uti iam dictum est, habetur haec praesentia quando habentur actus iam supra (Notiones, 1) enumerati.

6  introspectio ­ upposita tertia praesentia seu conscientia, in eam intelligendam, conciS piendam, definiendam, theoretice elaborandam inquiritur; et ulterius super intellecta, concepta, definita, propositas theorias reflectitur, dubitatur, iudicatur.

Quae quidem operationes secundum se non differunt a qualibet alia inquisitione (quid sit) et reflexione (an sit); sed differunt secundum materiam subiectam, nam in inquisitione directa de sensibilibus quaerimus sed hac5 in inquisitione introspectiva de ipsis per conscientiam praesentibus quaerimus.

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Objects, finally, are not conscious: they are what is dreamed, seen, heard, imagined, understood, conceived, and so on. For the presence of objects is not the third kind of presence but the second; there is no presence of this second kind without the third; when I am asleep and absent from myself, there is nothing present to me that would count as an object. 5  the psychological subject The psychological subject is the subject discussed above. It is termed ‘psychological’ (1) inasmuch as it is aware through the third kind of presence and through that alone, (2) as distinguished from the grammatical subject, which is a noun, a pronoun, or the like; from the subject of a science, in the way God is the subject in theology; from the metaphysical subject, in the way that matter is the subject of form and substance is the subject of accidents. When the name ‘subject’ is used in this thesis, it is the psychological subject, unless some other meaning is made clear. The (psychological) subject in potency is this man, but the subject in act is a man present to himself; and as has already been said, there is such a presence insofar as there are acts such as those listed above under ‘Notions,’ 1. 6  introspection Granted that there is presence of the third kind, or consciousness, there may be an inquiry aimed at understanding, conceiving, and defining it, and at elaborating it theoretically. Furthermore, what has been understood, what has been conceived and defined, theories that have been proposed may be reflected upon; difficulties may be raised with regard to them; and judgment may be passed on them. These operations do not differ in themselves from those involved in other inquiries (What is it?) and reflections (Is it so?). They do differ with respect to the subject matter, however, for in a direct inquiry we raise questions about sensible data, whereas in this5 introspective inquiry we raise questions about what is itself present through consciousness.

5 The words ‘nam in inquisitione directa de sensibilibus quaerimus sed hac’ have been restored from the 1961 edition. Their omission from the 1964 edition is easily explained by homoioteleuton.

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Ulterius, sicut directa de sensibilibus inquisitio modo vulgari et communi fieri potest (Insight, cc. 6, 7) et etiam modo methodico et scientifico (ibid., cc. 2–4), ita etiam inquisitio introspectiva sive modo vulgari et communi sive modo methodico et scientifico peragitur; e.g., introspectione vulgari dicis ‘ego geometriam intelligo,’ sed sine introspectione methodica iudicare non poteris utrum hae notiones de conscientia sint verae. n.b. Quam nominamus introspectionem, multi reflexionem dicunt; ipsi malumus iudicandi processum reflexionem nominare. Cf. Insight, c. 10.

7  conscientia ut experientia Iam supra diximus cognitionem humanam proprie dictam triplici perfici gressu, nempe, experiendo, intelligendo, et iudicando (vide ante thesin 6m, Notiones 1, f, pp. 374–76, et analogia formae, substantiae, entis, § 8, pp. 400–404). Quae si recoluntur, statim elucet conscientiam se habere ad inquisitionem introspectivam sicut obiecta sensibilia ad inquisitionem directam. Quam ob causam, sicut sensibiliter nota attribuuntur experientiae externae, ita quae per conscientiam sunt praesentia attribuuntur experientiae internae. Sicut experientia externa praecedit inquisitionem directam, ita experientia interna praecedit inquisitionem introspectivam. Sicut experientia externa est cognitio humana proprie dicta, non in actu secundo, non in actu primo, sed tantum in prima potentia, ita etiam experientia interna est cognitio humana proprie dicta, non in actu secundo, non in actu primo, sed tantum in prima potentia. Unde conscientia (qua cognitio humana) definitur experientia stricte dicta atque interna sui suorumque actuum. Experientia late dicta est cognitio vulgaris, sed stricte dicta est cognitio humana in prima potentia, seu notitia quaedam praevia et informis quae ab inquisitione intellectuali praesupponitur et per eam completur. Quae experientia stricte dicta in externam et internam dividitur secundum quod ab inquisitione intellectuali directa vel introspectiva praesupponitur et completur. Denique per experientiam stricte dictam et internam innotescunt subiectum et subiecti actus.

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Furthermore, as direct inquiry about sensible data can be carried out in a commonsense manner (Insight, chapters 6 and 7) and also in a methodical and scientific manner (chapters 2 through 4), so too an introspective inquiry proceeds either in a commonsense way or in a methodical and scientific way. Through commonsense introspection, for example, you may say, ‘I understand geometry,’ but without a methodical introspection you will not be able to judge whether these notions about consciousness are true. Note that what we have termed ‘introspection’ many would call reflection; we prefer to give the name ‘reflection’ to the process of judging. See Insight, chapter 10. 7  consciousness as experience As we have already said above, human knowing properly so called reaches its completion in three steps: experiencing, understanding, and judging. See the ‘Notions’ prior to thesis 6, 1, f, pp. 374–77 above, and the analogy of form, of substance, and of being, § 8, pp. 400–405 above. Once these points have been recalled, it becomes clear at once that consciousness stands to introspective inquiry as sensible objects stand to direct inquiry. For that reason, just as what is known sensibly is attributed to external experience, so what is present through consciousness is attributed to interior experience. As outer experience is prior to direct inquiry, so inner experience is prior to introspective inquiry. As outer experience is not, properly speaking, human knowing in second act or first act but only in first potency, so too inner experience is not, properly speaking, human knowing in second act or in first act but only in first potency. Hence, consciousness (as human knowing) is defined as inner experience, strictly so called, of oneself and one’s acts. Experience in the broad sense is everyday knowing, but experience in the strict sense is human knowing in first potency, or a certain prior and unstructured awareness that is presupposed and completed by intellectual inquiry. This experience, strictly so called, is divided into outer and inner according to whether it is presupposed and completed by direct or by introspective intellectual inquiry. Finally, through inner experience, strictly so called, the subject and the subject’s acts come into awareness.

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8  cognitio sui Cognitio sui omne includit quod quis de se cognoscit. Includit ergo omnia quae quis de se per experientiam internam et inquisitionem introspectivam cognoscit. Sed etiam includit omne quod quis de se per experientiam externam et inquisitionem directam cognoscit. Et ulterius includit omne quod quis de se per aliam scientiam praeter humanam et naturalem cognoscit. 9  conscientia ut concomitans Conscientia dicitur concomitans secundum actus quibus habetur. Qui actus quinam sint iam § 1 sunt enumerati. Ideo autem dicitur concomitans quia eodem actu praesens praesentia secunda est obiectum et praesens praesentia tertia est subiectum agens actu tali. E.g., non alio actu praesentes sunt colores visi; et alio actu praesens est subiectum sibi; et tertio actu praesens est videre quo subiectum colores videt; sed unico actu efficiuntur tum praesentia secunda obiecti et praesentia tertia subiecti et actus sui.

Quod noto axiomate elucet: sensibile enim in actu est sensus in actu et intelligibile in act est intellectus in actu. Sed per sensibile vel intelligibile in actu habetur praesentia secunda obiecti; per sensum autem vel intellectum in actu habetur praesentia tertia ipsius subiecti et actus sui.

10  notantur quaedam (a) Experientia externa ad operationes sensitivas restringitur, sed experientia interna concomitatur non solum operationes sensitivas sed etiam intellectuales, neque solum apprehensivas sed etiam appetitivas. Quam ob causam, iam distinximus conscientiam inchoatam (in somniante), empiricam (in vigilante), intellectualem (in intelligente), rationalem (in iudicante), et denique autoconscientiam vel sui conscientiam ubi subiectum rationaliter conscium se ipsum ad bonum ordinat et de se ipso disponit.

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8  self-knowledge Self-knowledge includes everything one knows about oneself. It therefore includes everything one knows about oneself through inner experience and introspective inquiry. But it also includes everything one knows about oneself through outer experience and direct inquiry. And it includes, furthermore, everything one knows about oneself through another science besides human and natural sciences. 9  consciousness as concomitant Consciousness is said to be concomitant on the basis of the acts by which one is conscious – acts of the kind that have already been listed under § 1. It is said to be concomitant, however, for this reason: by one and the same act an object is present in the second sense of presence, and the subject performing such an act is present in the third sense of presence. It is not, for example, that colors being seen are present by one act, while the subject is present to himself by another act, and the seeing, by which the subject sees the colors, is present by yet a third act. Rather it is a single act that effects both the presence (in the second sense) of the object and the presence (in the third sense) of the subject and his acts. A well-known axiom makes this clear: The sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intelligence in act. But through the sensible in act, or the intelligible in act, an object is present, in the second sense of presence; through sense in act, or intelligence in act, the subject himself and the subject’s acts are present, in the third sense of presence. 10  some noteworthy points (a) Outer experience is restricted to sensitive operations, but interior experience accompanies not only sensitive operations but also intellectual operations, and not only apprehensive but also appetitive operations. For that reason, we have already distinguished between the inchoate consciousness of the dreamer, the empirical consciousness of one who is wide awake, the intellectual consciousness of one who is understanding, the rational consciousness of one who is judging, and finally self-consciousness, consciousness of oneself, where the rationally conscious subject directs himself to the good and thus disposes of himself.

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(b) Experientia interna non solum concomitatur omnes operationes quae pertinent ad inquisitionem directam de sensibilibus sed etiam omnes operationes quae pertinent ad inquisitionem introspectivam. Quam ob causam, in inquisitione introspectiva conscientia sub alio aspectu est prae­ via et sub alio aspectu est concomitans; praevia est inquantum materiam praebet circa quam inquiritur, in qua intelligible perspicitur, per quam, ut fundamentum empiricum, iudicia introspectiva confirmantur; quod tamen minime impedit quominus ipsa inquisitio introspectiva etiam conscia sit. Sicut enim omnes operationes inquisitionis directae, ita etiam omnes operationes inquisitionis introspectivae fiunt a subiecto sibi praesente per actus subiecto praesentes. Neve dicaris idem non posse esse et concomitans et praevium. Nam prae­ sens psychologicum non est punctum mathematicum; et ideo subiectum idem, per praevios actus conscium, supplet materiam inquisitionis, et per actos subsequentes idem subiectum semper conscium inquisitionem facit.

11  conscientia identitatis ­ on agitur de cognitione identitatis (vide cognitionem sui, § 8) quod incluN dit cognoscere proprium nomen, statum, parentes, et similia. Non agitur de introspectione identitatis (vide introspectionem, § 6); quamvis enim talem introspectionem nunc facimus, illud tamen quaerimus quod introspectionem antecedit. Sed agitur de praevia quadam et informi sui notitia, quam per introspectionem dicimus esse notitiam sui qua identici, qua eiusdem, non obstante temporum differentia. Dicimus, primo, conscientiam identitatis esse factum quoddam, quod communiter certo habetur, quod non inquirendo invenitur vel addiscitur, sed iam per ipsam suam sibi praesentiam habetur. Quod quid significet, forte repetendum est. Non ergo significat omnes iudicare se esse eosdem hodie, heri, et iam pridem per multos annos; conscientia enim non est obiecti quod per actum iudicandi innotescit. Neque significat omnes definire posse conscientiam identitatis tamquam notitiam quandam praeviam et informem sui qua eiusdem, non obstante temporum differentia; conscientia enim non est obiecti quod per actum definiendi innotescit. Non significat omnes intelligere quid per talem definitionem significetur; nam conscientia non est obiecti quod per actum intelligendi innotescit. Sed significat omnes communiter habere unde possint talem definitionem

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(b) Inner experience accompanies not only all the operations that pertain to direct inquiry about sensible data, but also all the operations that pertain to introspective inquiry. In introspective inquiry, for that reason, consciousness in one aspect is prior and in another aspect accompanies. It is prior in that it provides the material about which one inquires, in which one grasps an intelligibility, and through which, as the experiential basis, one confirms an introspective judgment. In no way, however, does this make the introspective inquiry itself any less conscious. For, like all the operations of direct inquiry, all the operations of introspective inquiry are performed by the subject who is present to himself through acts that are present to the subject. Do not say that the same thing cannot both accompany and be prior. The psychological present is not a mathematical point. Therefore, the same subject, conscious through prior acts, supplies the material for inquiry, and through subsequent acts the same subject, ever conscious, carries out the inquiry. 11  consciousness of identity This is not a matter of knowing identity (see § 8, ‘Self-knowledge,’ above), which involves knowing one’s own name, situation, parents, and the like. It is not a matter of an introspection of identity (see § 6, ‘Introspection,’ above). Although we are now engaged in such an introspection, what we are seeking is what precedes introspection. It is, rather, a matter of a certain prior and unstructured awareness of oneself. Through introspection, we say it is an awareness of oneself as identical, as the same, despite differences with regard to time. We say, in the first place, that consciousness of identity is a fact, a fact commonly held for certain, a fact not discovered or learned by inquiring, but already had through one’s very presence to oneself. What this means should perhaps be repeated. It does not mean, then, that all of us judge that we are the same today, and yesterday, and for many years past; for consciousness is not of an object that comes into awareness through an act of judging. Nor does it mean that all of us can define consciousness of identity as a prior and unstructured awareness of oneself as the same despite differences with regard to time; for consciousness is not of an object that comes into awareness through an act of defining. And it does not mean that everyone understands what is meant by such a definition; for consciousness is not of an object that comes into awareness through an act of understand-

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intelligere et tali iudicio assentiri, sicut omnes non caeci habent unde possunt colores intelligere et colores exsistere affirmare.

Dicimus, secundo, omnem huius facti explicationem esse per inquisitionem et intelligentiam et conceptionem, quae quidem non solum introspectiva est sed etiam quaestiones alias et ontologicas de subiecto, de actibus, et de tempore tangit. Dicimus, tertio, aeternitatem esse nunc subiecti immutati, et tempus esse nunc subiecti aliter et aliter se habentis. In IV Phys., lect. 18. edit. Pirotta, §§ 1120–21. Quam ob causam, tempus non dicit successionem simpliciter diversorum sed successionem diversorum in eodem. Dicimus, quarto, illud per conscientiam esse praesens quod est. Sed quod est, idem est subiectum cum diversis sibi succedentibus actibus. Ergo quod est praesens per conscientiam est idem subiectum (unde habetur conscientia identitatis) cum diversis sibi succedentibus actibus (unde habetur conscientia temporis). 12  conscientia ut perceptio Exsistit inter theologos conceptio conscientiae quae quam maxime ab ea supra exposita differt. Quam conceptionem nominamus conscientiam-perceptionem. Sub § 1 per longas enumerationes diximus quid per subiectum, per actus, per obiecta intelligendum sit. Sed brevius quis procedere potest sic: subiectum est id quod cognoscit; actus est cognoscere; obiectum est id quod cognoscitur. Quae definitiones per ipsas nostras enumerationes confirmantur: omnia enim exempla subiecti ut somnians, videns, etc., uno vocabulo dicunt ‘cognoscens’; omnia exempla actus uno vocabulo dicunt ‘cognoscere’; omnia exempla obiecti uno vocabulo dicunt ‘cognitum.’ Sed qui scientifice procedit non multa exempla enumerat sed rei essentiam uno vocabulo dicit. Ergo. Praeterea, non casu accidit ut grammatica scientia atque psychologica pari passu procedunt; grammatica enim non est nisi manifestatio quaedam atque expressio animae. Quare, ubi verbum ‘cognoscere’ in voce activa adhibetur, subiectum grammaticum nominat subiectum psychologicum, et obiectum grammaticum nominat obiectum psychologicum. Unde iterum concluditur subiectum esse cognoscens et obiectum esse cognitum.

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ing. It means, rather, that all of us commonly have that from which we are able to understand such a definition and assent to such a judgment, just as everyone who is not blind has that from which it is possible to understand colors and affirm that colors exist. We say, in the second place, that every explanation of this fact comes by way of inquiry and understanding and conception, and that it is not only introspective but also touches on other, ontological questions about the subject, about acts, and about time. We say, in the third place, that eternity is the now of an unchanging subject, and that time is the now of a subject that undergoes change. See Thomas Aquinas, In IV Physicorum, lect. 18; in the Pirotta edition, §§ 1120–21. For this reason, time refers, not simply to a succession of differences, but to a succession of differences in the same thing. We say, in the fourth place, that what is present through consciousness is what is. What is, however, is the same subject with different acts that succeed one another. What is present through consciousness, then, is the same subject (thus there is consciousness of identity) with different acts that succeed one another (thus there is consciousness of time). 12  consciousness as perception Among theologians there is a conception of consciousness that is as different as can be from the one presented above. This conception we shall call consciousness-perception. In § 1 above, we used long lists of examples to say what is to be understood by the subject, by acts, and by objects. But it would be possible for someone to proceed more expeditiously, as follows. ‘The subject is a knower; the act is knowing; the object is what is known. These definitions are confirmed by the enumerations given above. All the examples of the subject as one who dreams, one who sees, and so forth all denote, in a single word, “knower”; all the examples of acts denote, in a single word, “knowing”; all the examples of objects denote, in a single word, “known.” But it is not scientific procedure to list examples; one should denote, in a single word, the essence of the matter. Therefore … ‘Again, it is no accident that grammar and psychology go hand in hand, for grammar is nothing other than a manifestation and expression of the soul. Accordingly, when the verb to know is used in the active voice, its grammatical subject names the psychological subject, while the grammatical object names the psychological object. Once more, then, the conclusion is that a subject is a knower and an object is what is known.

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Praeterea, hae definitiones subiecti, actus, et obiecti in ipsa intrinseca atque necessaria cognitionis ratione fundantur. Cognitio enim nihil aliud est quam quidam intuitus seu inspectio seu confrontatio sui generis, in qua alius terminus est cognoscens, alius autem terminus est cognitum, et intermedium est actus cognoscendi. Quibus perspectis, necessario concluditur conscientiam esse quandam perceptionem, subiectum esse percipiens, obiectum autem esse perceptum; unde et ulterius concluditur conscientiam ab alia cognitione non differre nisi per hoc quod in conscientia idem ontologice est cognoscens et cognitum, percipiens et perceptum. Sed in contrarium dici potest: Primo, tutius adhibentur longae enumerationes donec omnes casus considerentur; secus in praematuram quandam atque erroneam generalizationem ruitur. Et sic procedere videtur primum argumentum. Quamvis enim subiectum sit cognoscens, actus sit cognoscere, et obiectum sit cognitum, hoc tamen tertium non convertitur ut solum obiectum sit cognitum et omne cognitum sit obiectum. Nam in omni actu triplex habetur cognitum sed unicum est obiectum: ubi enim videns videt colores, non solum colores cognoscuntur sed etiam ipsum subiectum seu videns est sibi praesens, neque actu quodam videndi inconscio videt sed per praesens sibi videre videt. Et cum simile sit in omnibus aliis, sequitur dictam generalizationem ipsum conscientiae factum a priori excludere.

Deinde, splendida illa harmonia inter grammaticam et psychologiam satis servatur si communiter, non tamen universaliter, cognoscens est sub­ iectum et cognitum est obiectum. Nam regulae grammaticae quasi de natura sua exceptiones pati solent. Tertio, illa intrinseca cognitionis ratio, quam obiciens exponit, utique est ratio cognitionis apud Platonem, Scotum, multosque alios. Sed secundum Aristotelem et S. Thomam ratio cognitionis ponitur, non in mira quadam duorum confrontatione, sed in identitate, nempe, sensum in actu esse sensibile in actu, et intellectum in actu esse intelligibile in actu. Quarto, actus per obiecta specificantur, et ideo obiectum actus correspondet speciei per quam fit actus. Sed quatenus subiectum est sibi praesens per conscientiam, non abstrahitur ulla animae species neque a sensibilibus neque ab ipsa anima (De veritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad 5m et ad 9m, 2ae ser.). Et ideo illa praesentia non est cognitio cuiusdam obiecti.

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‘Again, these definitions of subject, act, and object have their ground in what intrinsically and necessarily it is to know. For knowing is nothing other than an intuition, an inspection, a special kind of confrontation, in which one term is the knower, the other term is the known, and the intermediary is the act of knowing. ‘In light of all this, it must be concluded that consciousness is a kind of perception, that the subject is the perceiver, and that the object is the perceived. Hence, the further conclusion is that consciousness differs from other knowing only in that, in consciousness, knower and known, perceiver and perceived, are ontologically the same.’ On the other hand, there is this to be said against the foregoing. In the first place, until all cases have been considered, it is safer to make use of long enumerations; otherwise one falls into premature and mistaken generalization. That is how the first argument above seems to be proceeding. For although it is true that the subject is a knower, that the act is a knowing, and that the object is a known, the third of these is not convertible, such that only the object is known and every known is an object. For in every [conscious] act there is a threefold known [i.e., the subject, the act, and the object], but only one [of these] is the object: when someone who is seeing sees colors, not only the colors are known but also the subject himself or herself, the one who sees, is self-present; nor does one see by an unconscious act of seeing, but rather by an act of seeing that is present to one. And since every other [conscious act] is similar, it follows that the proposed generalization rules out in advance the very fact of consciousness. In the second place, the splendid harmony between grammar and psychology is safe enough so long as it is commonly, though not universally, the case that a knower is a subject and the known is an object. For rules of grammar, by nature as it were, usually admit of exceptions. In the third place, ‘what intrinsically and necessarily it is to know,’ as presented by the objector, is no doubt what it is to know according to Plato, Scotus, and many others. But according to Aristotle and Thomas, what it is to know does not lie in some marvelous confrontation of two things, but in an identity: Sense in act is the sensible in act, and intelligence in act is the intelligible in act. In the fourth place, acts are specified by their objects, and so the object of an act corresponds to the species through which the act occurs. But insofar as the subject is present to himself by consciousness, there is no abstraction of any species of the soul, either from sensible data or from the soul itself (De veritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad 5m and ad 9m, 2ae ser.). And so this presence is not knowledge of any object.

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Quinto, cognitio obiecti non mutat obiectum realiter. Si ergo conscientia est quaedam perceptio obiecti, obiectum non mutat. Sed homo sine tali perceptione esset inconscius, et ideo adveniente illa perceptione, perciperet non conscium sed inconscium.6

13  phaenomenologia conscientiae Phaenomenologia dupliciter considerari potest, primo ut methodus quaedam scientifica, deinde ut praecisio a quaestionibus philosophicis. Ut methodus quaedam scientifica, phaenomenologia exhibet data experientiae immediata secundum immediatam quandam et quasi necessariam eorum intelligibilitatem. Quod bene facit: sunt enim data, et sunt intelligenda. Ut praecisio a quaestionibus philosophicis, phaenomenologia caeteras scientias empiricas imitatur. Quod tamen non pari spontaneitate et facilitate facere potest, tum quia data experientiae internae ad quaestiones philosophicas proxime accedunt, tum quia origines phaenomenologiae, programmate philosophico husserliano inspiratae, alias introducunt complicationes. Quibus praemissis, notandum est ad nostram quaestionem non sufficere conscientiae phaenomenologiam. Nostra enim quaestio de conscientia Christi tractari non potest, nisi statuitur habitudo inter data conscientiae immediata et, alia ex parte, notiones philosophicas et theologicas de subsistente, de persona, et quidem de divina persona. Quae sane habitudo statui non potest, nisi in unam quandam theoriam simul ponuntur tum pure psychologica tum philosophica et theologica. Quem in finem gressus essentialis habetur in notione experientiae stricte dictae, quatenus experientia eiusmodi asseritur non ‘cognitio humana proprie dicta’ sed pars quaedam atque, in compositione quadam intentionali, quasi potentia prima cognitionis humanae proprie dictae (vide supra § 7, ubi ulterius ad notiones ante thesin sextam, 1, f, et ad analogias formae, substantiae, entis, § 8, refertur).

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In the fifth place, knowing an object does not really change it. So, if consciousness is perception of an object, it does not change that object. But without such perception a man would be unconscious, and so with the advent of that perception what he would perceive would be unconscious and not conscious.6 13  phenomenology of consciousness Phenomenology can be considered in two ways, on the one hand as a scientific method and on the other as a prescinding from philosophical questions. As a scientific method, phenomenology lays out the immediate data of experience according to their immediate and, as it were, necessary intelligibility. This is all to the good, for there are indeed data, and they are to be understood. As a prescinding from philosophical questions, phenomenology imitates other empirical sciences. This it cannot, however, do with the same ease and spontaneity. One reason is that the data of inner experience are at the doorstep of philosophical questions; another is that the origins of phenomenology, which took their inspiration from Husserl’s philosophical program, bring in further complications. Against this background, it should be noted that a phenomenology of consciousness is not enough to answer our question. For our question about the consciousness of Christ cannot be treated without establishing the relationship between the immediate data of consciousness and, on the other hand, philosophical and theological notions about subsistence, about the person, and indeed about a divine person. Certainly no such relationship can be established without setting out in one theory both what is purely psychological and also what is philosophical and theological. An essential step towards this goal lies in the notion of experience, strictly so called, insofar as experience of this kind is not what is meant by ‘human knowing properly so called’ but a part of it, taking its place within an intentional composition or structure as the first potency of human knowing properly so called. (See § 7 above, which refers further to the notions preceding thesis 6, § 1, f, and § 8, the analogies of form, of substance, and of being.)

6 There is a less telegraphic exposition of this fifth point in Lonergan, ‘Christ as Subject: A Reply,’ Collection 164–65.

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Quae quidem compositio est theoria quaedam philosophica, ut scilicet idem per experientiam in potentia prima, per intelligentiam et conceptionem in actu primo, per reflexionem (an sit) et iudicium in actu secundo cognoscatur. Qua ex theoria sequitur idem diverso modo cognosci tum per conscientiam immediatam tum per conceptus et iudicia etiam metaphysica. Ita ‘ego’ phaenomenologice est quoddam centrum multorum actuum; ‘ego’ autem philosophice est ‘hoc subsistens,’ ubi ‘hoc’ significat, non uti solet quod sensibus subest, sed quod immediate in conscientia datur. Quae quidem duo primo aspectu valde differunt, nam ‘centrum multorum actuum’ describit datum immediatum conscientiae, sed ‘hoc subsistens’ nisi a philosopho non concipitur. Attamen, si res propius examinatur, patet non magis descriptionem phaenomenologicam quam conceptionem philosophicam esse quoddam datum conscientiae immediatum; et supposita theoria de compositione intentionali, ulterius elucet tam per descriptionem phaenomenologicam quam per conceptionem philosophicam in actu primo cognosci id ipsum quod in prima potentia est datum conscientiae immediatum.

Quorum momentum in nostra de Christo quaestione est sequens. Si quis ad descriptiones conscientiae humanae attendit, in iis non legit vel Scoti vel Tiphani vel Suarezii vel Caietani vel Capreoli sententiam de persona. Unde forte et concluderet personam non esse datum immediatum conscientiae; quod si de persona humana valeret, multo magis de persona divina in natura humana valere dicendum esset. At haec conclusio erronea est: quamvis enim persona per conscientiam neque in actu primo neque in actu secundo cognoscitur, tamen per conscientiam in prima potentia cognoscitur, si quidem idem in prima potentia per experientiam, in actu primo per intelligentiam et conceptionem, in actu secundo per iudicium cognoscitur.

14  persona et subiectum psychologicum Conscientia humana est naturaliter una. Quamvis enim multi et diversi sint actus, apprehensivi, appetitivi, exsecutivi, sive sensitivi sive intellectuales, omnes tamen in unitatem quandam naturalem integrantur. Appetibilia enim apprehensa movent appetitus; et actus appetitivi movent hominem. Iterum circa sensibilia apprehensa inquirit intellectus, in iis intelligibile perspicit, ab iis universalia abstrahit, unde et reflectens dubitat, evidentiam

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This intentional composition is a philosophical theory, namely, that it is the same thing that through experience is known in first potency, that through understanding and conception is known in first act, and that through reflection (Is it so?) and judgment is known in second act. From this theory it follows that the same thing is known in different ways, both through immediate consciousness and through concepts and judgments, even metaphysical ones. Thus, phenomenologically speaking, the ‘I’ is a center of many acts; philosophically speaking, however, the ‘I’ is ‘this subsistent,’ where ‘this’ does not mean, as it usually does, what underlies sensible data, but what is immediately given in consciousness. At first sight these two are quite different, since ‘center of many acts’ describes an immediate datum of consciousness, while only a philosopher conceives ‘this subsistent.’ Nevertheless, on closer examination, it is clear that the phenomenological description is no more an immediate datum of consciousness than the philosophical conception is. And if we suppose a theory of intentional composition, it furthermore becomes clear that through phenomenological description, just as much as through philosophical conception, what is known, in first act, is the very thing which, in first potency, is an immediate datum of consciousness. The bearing all this has on our question about Christ is as follows. Anyone who reads descriptions of human consciousness will not find there the opinions of Scotus or Tiphanus, Suárez or Cajetan or Capreolus about person. The conclusion, then, might be that the person is not an immediate datum of consciousness; and this, if it holds good in the case of the human person, would hold all the more in the case of a divine person in a human nature. But this conclusion is mistaken: Although through consciousness the person is not known either in first act or in second act, nevertheless through consciousness the person is known in first potency, if it is indeed the same which is known in first potency by experience, known in first act by understanding and conception, and known in second act by judgment. 14  person and psychological subject Human consciousness is one naturally. Even though there are many acts of different kinds, apprehensive, appetitive, and executive, which are either sensitive or intellectual, nevertheless they are all integrated into a kind of natural unity. For apprehended appetibles move the appetites, and appetitive acts move the man. Again, intelligence inquires about apprehended sensibles, grasps in them the intelligible, abstracts from them the universal,

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tam sensibilem quam intellectualem ponderat, et ex utraque iudicat. Unde et sequuntur volitiones, consilia, deliberationes, electiones, imperia intellectus,7 actiones, factiones. Ulterius, praeter hanc intelligibilem atque naturalem unitatem, quae actus inter se connectit, ordinat, unit, conscientia etiam est unius qui per sensus sentit, per intellectum intelligit et iudicat, per voluntatem vult et eligit, per alios etiam appetitus praeter voluntatem delectatur et dolet, desiderat et timet, gaudet et contristatur. Porro, hoc unum est persona, i.e., subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali. Est in natura intellectuali, nam intelligit, iudicat, vult, eligit. Est distinctum, nam omnia data conscientiae sunt individua, et maxime illud unum. Est subsistens, nam est id quod operatur (sentit, intelligit, iudicat, vult, eligit, etc.); et id quod operatur etiam est id quod est; et id quod est nihil est aliud quam ens simpliciter, subsistens, uti supra (thesi sexta) habitum est. Praeterea, idem unum non solum persona est sed etiam subiectum psychologicum; ubi enim sentit, intelligit, iudicat, vult, eligit, etc., tunc sibi praesens est; et quod sibi est praesens est subiectum psychologicum in actu; ubi autem dormit et ne somniat quidem, tunc sane ipsum idem potest somniare, vigilare, sentire, intelligere, iudicare, velle, etc.; ergo ipsum sibi praesens esse potest, et tunc est subiectum psychologicum in potentia. Ita ergo identificantur persona et subiectum psychologicum ut idem sit tam persona quam subiectum psychologicum. Ita autem distinguuntur persona et subiectum psychologicum ut persona semper sit subiectum psychologicum saltem in potentia et quandoque subiectum psychologicum in actu.

15  subiectum psychologicum et natura Cum persona et subiectum psychologicum realiter identificentur (§ 14), necessario ponitur distinctio quaedam realis quidem sed minor inter subiectum psychologicum et naturam. Secus, vel modo monophysitico, propter

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goes on to raise questions for reflection, weighs both the sensible and the intellectual evidence and, on the basis of both, passes judgment. From this follow acts of volition, counsel, deliberation, choice, command of the intellect,7 actions, deeds. Furthermore, besides this intelligible and natural unity, which links acts with each other, orders them, and unites them, consciousness is also of one who senses through sense, understands and judges through intelligence, wills and chooses through will, and, through other appetites besides the will, delights and sorrows, desires and fears, rejoices and grieves. Next, this one is a person, that is, a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature. It is in an intellectual nature, for it understands, judges, wills, chooses. It is distinct, for all the data of consciousness are individual, and above all this [conscious] one [is individual]. It is a subsistent, for it is that which operates (senses, understands, judges, wills, chooses, and so on); and that which operates is also that which is; and that which is, as thesis 6 showed, is nothing other than a being pure and simple – a subsistent. Moreover, this same one is not only a person but also a psychological subject. For when he is sensing, understanding, judging, willing, choosing, and so on, he is present to himself, and what is present to self is a psychological subject in act. But when he is in a dreamless sleep, then of course the same one is able to dream, to wake up, to sense, to understand, judge, will, and so on; hence, he is able to be present to himself, and so he is a psychological subject in potency. Thus, person and psychological subject are identified in such a way that it is the same who is both person and psychological subject. Person and psychological subject are distinguished, however, in such a way that a person is always a psychological subject at least in potency and at times is a psychological subject in act. 15  psychological subject and nature Since person and psychological subject are really identical (§ 14), a real but minor distinction must be drawn between psychological subject and nature. Otherwise, on account of his one person, a truly human consciousness



7 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 73, 38. The idea seems to be that the intellect commands the formation of a phantasm as a kind of exemplar for exterior action.

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unam personam, in Christo ut homine tollitur conscientia vere humana et ponitur conscientia fere divina; vel modo nestoriano, propter duas naturas, ponuntur duo subiecta psychologica, aliud divinum et aliud humanum. Hic ergo recurrunt omnes quaestiones a thesi tertia ad nonam consideratae; quas unusquisque pro suis necessitatibus iterum nunc legere potest. At illud quod novum est breviter considerari debet, nempe, quemadmodum inter se comparentur quae psychologice concipiuntur (subiectum psychologicum) et quae ontologice concipiuntur (natura, principium quo remotum operationum). In primis ergo recolendum est non solum mineralia, plantas, et animalia dormientia esse ontologica, sed etiam homines vigilantes, angelos, Deum, secundum totam eorum perfectionem in ordine ontologico collocari. Quid­quid enim quocumque modo est, ens est; et quod ens est, etiam ontologicum est. Psychologicum ergo nihil aliud dicit quam ontologicum in tali gradu perfectionis ontologicae. Deinde autem agnoscendum est naturam, prout in homine est, dicere psychologicum non in actu sed in potentia; et ideo natura, humanam dico, secundum se psychologicam descriptionem non admittit. Tertio, quamvis natura (humana) secundum se psychologicam descriptionem non admittat, tamen in iis quae psychologice describuntur distingui potest inter ea quae naturam consequuntur atque manifestant et ea quae sunt personae a natura. Quibus positis principiis, ad distinctionem subiecti et naturae proceditur. Subiectum ergo est id quod sibi praesens est vel, si mavis, is qui sibi praesens est. Natura autem est per quam determinatur modus quo sibi praesens est. Quia ergo natura humana est composita ex corpore et anima, modus quo homo sibi praesens est magnam quandam complexitatem exhibet. Unde et distinximus conscientiam inchoatam in somniis, empiricam in vigilantibus, intellectualem in inquirentibus, rationalem in dubitantibus et iudicantibus, et denique autoconscientiam in volentibus, consiliantibus, deliberantibus, eligentibus, agentibus, facientibus. Sed et praeterea diximus quemadmodum omnes hi conscientiae humanae gradus unitate quadam naturali colligentur, quemadmodum denique ad centrum quoddam unum omnes referantur operationes tamquam ad principium quoddam ex quo quodammodo procedunt.

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would be withheld and an almost divine consciousness posited in Christ as man, in monophysite fashion; or else, on account of his two natures, two psychological subjects, one human and one divine, would be posited, in Nestorian fashion. At this point, then, all the questions considered in theses 3 to 9 come up again. These can now be read over again, as needed. Here, a brief consideration of what is new will be in order: How is the psychological subject, which is conceived psychologically, related to nature, the remote principle by which of operations, which is conceived ontologically? In the first place, recall that it is not just minerals, plants, and sleeping animals that are ontological; people who are wide awake, the angels, and God are also arranged in an ontological order according to their total perfection. For whatever is in whatever manner, is a being; and what is a being also is ontological. The ‘psychological,’ therefore, denotes nothing other than the ontological at a certain level of ontological perfection. In the second place, however, it should be acknowledged that nature, as it is in man, refers to what is psychological not in act but in potency. Hence nature, by which I mean human nature, does not in itself allow of being described psychologically. In the third place, although (human) nature in itself does not allow of being described psychologically, nonetheless in what are described psychologically it is possible to distinguish between what results from nature and manifests it, and those things which belong to a person from his nature. Having stated these principles, we move on to the distinction between subject and nature. The subject, then, is that which is present to itself or, if you prefer, the one who is present to himself or herself. Nature, however, is that by which the way one is present to oneself is determined. Therefore, since a human nature is composed of soul and body, the way one is present to oneself displays great complexity. Hence, we have also distinguished the inchoate consciousness of dreamers, the empirical consciousness of those who are awake, the intellectual consciousness of inquirers, the rational consciousness of those who are reflecting and judging, and finally self-consciousness in those who are willing, taking counsel, deliberating, choosing, acting, doing. But besides these we have also said how all these levels of human consciousness are brought together in a natural unity, and finally how all the [conscious] operations are referred to one center as to a principle from which in a certain way they proceed.

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At in eadem humana conscientia etiam agnoscitur vel agnosci debet id quod est sibi praesens sive modo inchoato in somniis sive modo empirico in vigilantibus sive modo intellectuali in inquirentibus sive modo rationali in iudicantibus sive modo ulteriori et perfectiori in autoconscientia plena. In uno enim homine non alius somniat et alius vigilat, alius sitit et bibit, et alius inquirit et intelligit, quintus iudicat, sextus eligit, et septimus facit; sed unus idemque haec omnia agit, neque sibi absens sed praesens sibi, ut idem diversa diversis operationibus operetur. Imo alium conscientiae modum induere potest ut contemplatione mystica gaudeat, unde ad nos restitutus narrat quam ineffabilia fuerint quae ipse expertus sit. Vel etiam, si insanit et deinde ad sanam mentem restauratur, dicere potest quam reales tunc ei viderentur quas nunc vanas imagines fuisse certo scit.

Claram ergo atque certam reputamus hanc distinctionem inter eum qui sibi praesens est et modum quo sibi praesens efficitur. Obici tamen potest quod magnae auctoritates distinguunt je et moi, SeinsIch et Erlebnis-Ich, Trieb-Ich, Sinnes-Ich, Geist-Ich, Natur-Ich, Person-Ich, SozialIch, etc. Responderi potest eiusmodi distinctiones suam utilitatem intra campum psychologicum habere posse, eas fundari quatenus idem diversis modis sibi praesens est, minime autem probare multas et diversas personas vel sub­ iecta eidem homini inhabitare. At ulterius obici potest distinctionem quam diximus claram atque certam non esse datum quoddam conscientiae immediatum. Respondetur distinctiones sicut et conceptus ex actu intelligendi procedere, certitudinem autem ad actum iudicandi pertinere. Quare ultro concedimus claram distinctionem per intelligentiam introspectivam et certitudinem per iudicium introspectivum haberi. At simul tenemus ea ipsa, quae in actu primo per intelligentiam et in actu secundo per iudicium cognoscuntur, iam in prima potentia per conscientiam innotescere. Et ideo concludimus ipsam claritatem atque certitudinem quodammodo per conscientiam haberi. 16  ego Distingui possunt: ego dicens, ego quod significatur, ego quo significatur, et ego quatenus conclusio.

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Yet in the same human consciousness there is, or ought to be, acknowledged that which is present to itself either inchoately in those who are dreaming or empirically in those who are awake or intellectually in inquirers or rationally in those who are judging or in a further and more complete way in full self-consciousness. For in one man there is not someone who dreams and someone else who is awake, someone else who eats and drinks, someone else who inquires and understands, a fifth someone who judges, a sixth who chooses, and a seventh who acts. No, it is one and the same who does all these and who in doing them is not absent from himself but present to himself, so that the same one operates differently by different operations. Indeed, one can shift to another kind of consciousness so as to enjoy mystical contemplation, and hence on one’s return to us may tell how ineffable were those things which she herself experienced. Or again, if one should go mad and then be restored to his right mind, one can say how real to him, at the time, those things seemed which he now knows for certain were empty imaginings. We regard as clear and certain, then, this distinction between the one who is present to oneself and the way in which one is made present to oneself. It is possible to object, however, that great authorities distinguish je and moi, the Seins-Ich and the Erlebnis-Ich, Trieb-Ich, Sinnes-Ich, Geist-Ich, Natur-Ich, Person-Ich, Sozial-Ich, and so forth. It can be answered that distinctions of this sort may be useful within the field of psychology, that they have a basis insofar as the same one is present to himself in different ways, but that in no way do they prove that many different persons or subjects inhabit the same man. Yet it is possible to object, further, that the distinction we have called clear and certain is not an immediate datum of consciousness. The answer is that distinctions, like concepts, proceed from an act of understanding, while certitude pertains to the act of judging. Accordingly, we grant that clear distinction comes from introspective understanding and certitude from introspective judgment. But at the same time, we hold that the very things which are known in first act by understanding, and known in second act by judgment, already come to awareness in first potency through consciousness. And we therefore conclude that clarity and certitude themselves come in a way through consciousness. 16  the ‘i’ The following can all be distinguished: the I that is speaking, the I that is meant, the I by which we mean, and the I inasmuch as it is a conclusion.

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Ego dicens est subiectum psychologicum. Qui enim dicit, est subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali, et quidem non dormiens sed psycho­ logice operans. Ego quod significatur est persona identica cum subiecto psychologico et dicente. Quae quidem identitas ad ipsum sensum pronominis personalis primi pertinet. At ipsa haec identitas non eo extenditur ut significentur non solum persona sed etiam persona psychologice operans (subiectum psychologicum, persona sibi praesens); nam bene dico ‘ego dormiebam,’ ‘ego inconscius fui.’ Ego quo significatur est (a) conceptus tantum (b) conceptus in iudicio affirmatus vel negatus, (c) verbalis enuntiatio conceptus vel iudicii. Circa conceptum notari potest (a) quod est singularis seu particularis, (b) quod rerum materialium singularitatem cognoscimus, non intelligendo et hanc intelligibilitatem concipiendo, sed per quandam quasi reflexionem super phantasma (Sum. theol., 1, q. 86, a. 1), (c) quod, ubi dicitur ‘ego’ vel aliud per conscientiam notum, illa ‘quaedam quasi reflexio’ non in phantasmate sistitur ut est sensibilium repraesentatio, sed ulterius pergit in eum cui fit repraesentatio, scilicet, in ipsa data conscientiae immediata. Ego denique, quatenus conclusio est, ad investigationem psychologicam pertinet. Multi enim sunt gradus perfectionis quibus quis sibi praesens esse potest; et sicut psychologus hos gradus distinguit, ita etiam concludere potest, ex modo quo quis ‘ego’ dicit, quonam in gradu versetur. Si enim e dormiente vocem ‘ego’ audis, concludis eum somniare et conscientiam quandam inchoatam habere. Si evangelium legis ubi dicitur ‘non sicut ego volo sed sicut tu,’ ad autoconscientiam in situatione interpersonali concludis, etc. Probatio pars 1: in verbo incarnato duae sunt conscientiae, divina nempe et humana. nota: Theologice certa, ex conciliis Chalcedonensi et Constantinopolitano iii. argumenta 1 Qui habet duas naturas intellectuales, habet duas conscientias.

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The I that is speaking is the psychological subject. For the one who speaks is a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, precisely not as sleeping but as operating psychologically. The I that is meant is a person identical with the psychological subject who is speaking. This identity belongs to the very meaning of the first-person pronoun. Yet the identity does not extend so far that what is meant is not only the person but also the person operating psychologically (the psychological subject, the person present to himself), for I can very well say, ‘I was sleeping,’ ‘I was unconscious.’ The I by which we mean is (a) just a concept, (b) a concept affirmed or denied in a judgment, or (c) a verbal expression of the concept or the judgment. As for the concept, it can be noted (a) that it is singular or particular, (b) that we know the singularity of material things not by understanding and by conceiving this intelligibility, but through some kind of reflection on phantasm (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 86, a. 1), and (c) that, when the I or anything else known through consciousness is spoken of, this ‘some kind of reflection’ does not come to rest in a phantasm representing sensible data, but passes on to that of which it is a representation, that is, to the immediate data of consciousness themselves. The I inasmuch as it is a conclusion, finally, pertains to psychological investigation. For there are many levels of perfection at which one can be present to oneself; and just as the psychologist distinguishes these levels so too he can infer, from the way someone is using the word I, which level is involved. If you hear someone who is asleep saying ‘I,’ you infer that he is dreaming and that he has an inchoate consciousness. If you read in the gospel, ‘Not what I will but what you will,’ you conclude that there is selfconsciousness in an interpersonal situation. And so on. Proof part 1: There are two consciousnesses in the incarnate word, a divine consciousness and a human consciousness. Theological note: ‘Theologically certain,’ on the authority of the Council of Chalcedon and the Third Council of Constantinople. Arguments 1 One who has two intellectual natures has two consciousnesses.

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Atqui Christus habet duas naturas intellectuas (db 148). Ergo habet duas conscientias. Maior: nam alia sunt conscia et alia non conscia, quia alia et alia est eorum natura; ita mineralia et plantae non sunt conscia; animalia autem et homines, angeli, Deus, pro perfectione eorum naturarum sunt sibi praesentes. 2 Qui habet duas operationes naturales et intellectuales habet duas conscientias. Atqui Christus habet duas operationes naturales et intellectuales, infinitam et finitam, inconfuse, immutabiliter (db 292, ds 557). Ergo Christus habet duas conscientias. Maior: nam unumquodque est conscium secundum quod operatur; ita homo dormiens et non somnians neque aliter psychologice operans, non est conscius; quando autem somniat, vigilat, sentit, intelligit, pro perfectione operationis eo plenius fit conscius seu sibi praesens.

3 Qui habet duas volitiones, infinitam et finitam, habet duas conscientias. Atqui Christus habet duas volitiones, infinitam et finitam, inconfuse et immutabiliter (db 291, ds 556). Ergo Christus habet duas conscientias. Maior: qui enim secundum voluntatem intellectualem operatur, ad perfectissimum conscientiae gradum pertingit. Vide Notiones, 3. pars 2: verbum divinum modo divino sibi praesens est. nota: Praesentia seu conscientia ex argumentis 1–3 est certa; ulterior determinatio ex argumento 4 est probabilior.

argumentum 1 Verbum divinum non est sibi absens, quasi lapis, planta, animal dormiens, sed magis sibi praesens quam homo vigilans vel angelus beatus, nam realiter identificatur cum actu intelligendi infinito. Sum. theol., 1, q. 14, aa. 2 et 4.

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But Christ has two intellectual natures (db 148 [ds 302, dec 1: 86–87]). Therefore, he has two consciousnesses. As to the major premise: What is conscious differs from what is not conscious, because their natures are different. Thus, minerals and plants are not conscious, whereas animals, human beings, the angels, and God are present to themselves, each according to the perfection of their natures. 2 One who has two natural, intellectual operations has two consciousnesses. But Christ has two natural, intellectual operations, one finite and the other infinite, without confusion and without change (db 292, ds 557, [dec 1: 129]). Therefore, Christ has two consciousnesses. As to the major premise: Anything is conscious according as it operates. Thus, someone in a dreamless sleep, or not otherwise psychologically operating, is not conscious. But when he dreams, wakes up, senses, understands, he is ever more conscious, more present to himself, as the operations become more perfect. 3 One who has two volitions or wills, finite and infinite, has two consciousnesses. But Christ has two volitions or wills, finite and infinite, without confusion and without change (db 291, ds 556, [dec 1: 128–29]). Therefore, Christ has two consciousnesses. As to the major premise: One who operates in accordance with his intellectual will reaches the most perfect level of consciousness. See ‘Notions,’ 3. part 2: the divine word is present to himself in a divine way. Theological note: Such presence or consciousness, on the basis of arguments 1 through 3, has the note ‘certain.’ The further determination of it, from argument 4, has the note ‘more probable.’ Argument 1 The divine Word is not absent from himself, as a stone, a plant, or a sleeping animal would be; he is more present to himself than a wakeful man or a blessed angel, for he is really identical with an infinite act of understanding (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, aa. 2 and 4).

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n.b. Haec sibi praesentia tripliciter considerari potest: (a) secundum divinam Dei cognitionem, (b) secundum divinam cognitionem obiecti secundarii, (c) secundum processiones trinitarias. Quae tria tribus sequentibus argumentis exponuntur. 2 Secundum divinam Dei cognitionem Verbum est sibi praesens, non tantum secunda praesentia (obiecti) neque tantum tertia praesentia (subiecti) sed modo eminentiori secundum identitatem subiecti et obiecti, secundum illud: ‘In his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intelligens et intellectum’ (De Anima, iii, 4, 430a 3; Sum. theol., 1, q. 14, aa. 2 et 4).

Quae quidem eminentior praesentia sibi est perfectissima, ut scilicet idem sit obiectum quod subiectum, et actus sit ipsum intelligere quod per identitatem est ipsum esse.

3 Secundum divinam cognitionem obiecti secundarii (i.e., omnium possibilium et actualium), cum haec sit per eundem infinitum intelligendi actum, non solum est Verbum divinum sibi praesens modo perfectissimo (uti supra, 2, habitum est) sed etiam distinguitur ab obiecto. Unde, secundum hunc aspectum divinae cognitionis, non quidem maior est praesentia sibi, sed maior est similitudo ad nostram conscientiam in qua alia et tertia est praesentia subiecti et alia et secunda est praesentia obiecti (vel subiecti qua obiecti).

4 Secundum divinas processiones (quae fundant relationes divinas reales; quae relationes sunt distinctae, subsistentes, et ipsae divinae personae) Filius procedit a Patre ut Verbum, et Spiritus Sanctus procedit ab utroque ut Amor, uti in tractatu de Deo Trino probatur. Cf. Divinarum personarum 57–61; De Deo trino, ii, 92–96.8 Sed eiusmodi processiones sunt ad analogiam conscientiae perfectissimae, uti in iudicante verum et diligente bonum; unde tres personae divinae

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Note that his presence to himself can be considered in three ways: (a) on the basis of God’s divine knowledge, (b) on the basis of God’s knowing of a secondary object, and (c) on the basis of the Trinitarian processions. These three will be expounded in the three arguments that follow. 2 Considered on the basis of God’s divine knowing, the Word is present to himself, not only in the second sense of presence (the presence of an object), nor only in the third sense (the presence of the subject), but in a more eminent manner that accords with the identity of subject and object, in line with the statement that ‘in immaterial things, [the one who is] understanding and [that which is] understood are the same’ (De Anima, iii, 4, 430a 3; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, aa. 2 and 4). This more eminent presence to self is utterly perfect, which is to say that subject and object are the same, and that the act is the act of understanding itself, ipsum intelligere, which by identity is the act of existence itself, ipsum esse. 3 Considered on the basis of God’s knowing of a secondary object (that is, of everything possible and everything actual), since this knowing is through the same infinite act of understanding, the divine Word is not only present to himself in an utterly perfect way (as was shown in § 2 above) but also is distinguished from an object. Hence, his presence to himself is no greater on the basis of this aspect of divine knowledge [than on the one considered previously], but there is a greater likeness to our consciousness, in which the presence of the subject (the third sense of presence) is different from the presence of an object, or of the subject as object (presence in the second sense). 4 The divine processions ground the real divine relations, which are distinct and subsistent and which are the divine persons themselves. Considered on the basis of these divine processions, the Son proceeds as Word from the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love from both. Proving this belongs to the treatise on the Triune God. See Divinarum personarum 57–61, 69–73 or De Deo trino: Pars systematica 70–74, 92–96.8 But processions of this kind are conceived by analogy to a consciousness utterly perfect, as in someone judging the true and loving the good. Hence,



8 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 134–43, 180–89.

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per unam conscientiam sunt tria subiecta conscia (Divinarum personarum 165–72; vel De Deo trino, ii, 186–93).9 Verbum ergo divinum non solum qua Deus sed etiam qua Verbum modo divino est sibi praesens. pars 3: idem verbum divinum secundum naturam suam humanam etiam modo humano est sibi praesens. nota: theologice certa.­ argumenta 1 Qui est verus homo, perfectus in humanitate, per omnia nobis similis absque peccato, operationem et voluntatem naturalem et humanam habet, etiam modo humano est sibi praesens. Atqui Dominus noster Iesus Christus, verus Deus noster, unus de sancta et consubstantiali et vitam praebente Trinitate, perfectus in deitate, idem etiam est perfectus in humanitate, verus homo, per omnia similis nobis absque peccato (db 290, cf. 148; ds 554–55, cf. 301–302) et tum naturalem operationem humanam tum naturalem voluntatem humanam habet (db 291, 292, ds 556–57). Ergo etiam modo humano est sibi praesens. Maior: negata enim conscientia humana seu praesentia sibi modo humano habita, tollitur vera humanitas, perfectio in humanitate, totalis similitudo ad nos, operatio prout homini est naturalis, volitio prout homini est naturalis. 2 Passionem Domini nostri narrant evangelia et confitentur symbola atque decreta (db 2, 13, 33, 54, 72, 86, 143–44, 255, 344, 422, 480, 709; ds 10–11, 42, 125, 150, 166, 203, 293–94, 502, 681, 791, 900, 1338). Atqui haec passio non erat vera sed mere apparens nisi Dominus noster modo humano sibi praesens fuit. Ergo modo humano sibi praesens fuit.

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the three divine persons are, through one consciousness, three conscious subjects (Divinarum personarum 165–72 or De Deo trino: Pars systematica 186– 93).9 Therefore, the divine Word is present to himself in a divine way, not only as God but also as Word. part 3: the same divine word, on the basis of his human nature, is also present to himself in a human way. Theological note: Theologically certain. Arguments 1 One who is truly man, perfect in humanity, and like us in all things apart from sin, and who has a natural, human operation and will, also is present to himself in a human way. But our Lord Jesus Christ, our true God, one of the holy, consubstantial, and life-giving Trinity, who is perfect in deity, is also perfect in humanity, true man, like us in all things apart from sin (db 290, see 148; ds 554–55, see 301–302; [dec 1: 127–28, 86–87]), and has both a natural human operation and a natural human will (db 291–92, ds 556–57, [dec 1: 128–29]). Therefore, he is present to himself in a human way also. As to the major premise: To deny his human consciousness, his presence to self in a human way, is to take away his true humanity, his perfection in humanity, his entire likeness to us, his operation as the natural operation of a man, and his volition as the natural volition of a man. 2 The suffering of our Lord is narrated in the gospels and confessed in the creeds and decrees (db 2, 13, 33, 54, 72, 86, 143–44, 255, 344, 422, 480, 709; ds 10–11, 42, 125, 150, 166, 203, 293–94, 502, 681, 791, 900, 1338; [dec 1: 5, 24, 78–79, 369, 573]). But this was not a true suffering, it was merely apparent, unless our Lord was present to himself in a human way. Therefore, he was present to himself in a human way.



9 See ibid. 376–91.

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Minor: catholice dici non potest vel Christum esse passum in divinitate (db 72, ds 166), vel Christum ita esse passum in humanitate ut ipse nihil sentiret (docetarum haeresis). Iam vero nisi Christus modo humano sibi praesens seu conscius fuisset, ipse in sua passione nihil sensisset. Ergo Christus modo humano sibi praesens fuit. Haec minor: evidens est omnibus, maxime hodie ubi communiter fiunt interventiones chirurgicae in patiente inconscio. pars 4: eadem persona eaque divina est sibi praesens tum modo divino tum modo humano. nota: Videtur theologice certa, ex concilio Chalcedonensi db 148, ds 301, ubi idem asseritur et perfectus in deitate et perfectus in humanitate. Cf. db 290, ds 554: ‘unum de sancta Trinitate.’

argumentum 1 Est per se notum solam divinam personam modo divino esse sibi praesentem. 2 Qui dicit ‘ego’ dicit personam sibi identicam atque nunc sibi praesentem. Atqui in evangeliis Christus homo dicit ‘ego’ et significat personam divinam. Ergo in evangeliis Christus homo significat personam divinam sibi identicam et nunc sibi praesentem. Maior: est per se evidens; vide Notiones, 16. Minor: Io 8.58, 10.30, 10.38, 14.10, 14.11, 14.20, 14.23, 14.31, 15.26, 16.28, 17.21. Quibus in locis Christus homo dicit ‘ego’; qui ‘ego’ ab homine significatus est aeternus, unum cum Patre, ita Patri inest ut Pater ei insit, Patrem amat, a Patre mittit Spiritum sanctum, ex Patre venit, et mundum relinquit ut ad Patrem redeat. Plura videsis apud Gutwenger, Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi 50–54. 3 Voces sive ab ipso Christo de se ipso dictae sive ab apostolis, evangelistis,

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As to the minor premise: No Catholic can say either that Christ suffered in his divinity (db 72, ds 166) or that Christ suffered in his humanity in such a way that he himself felt nothing (the docetic heresy). Now unless Christ was, in a human way, conscious or present to himself, he himself felt nothing in his suffering. Therefore, Christ was present to himself in a human way. Here the minor premise is obvious to all, especially today when surgical operations on unconscious patients are common. part 4: the same person, a divine person, is present to himself both in a divine and in a human way. Theological note: This part would seem to have the note ‘theologically certain,’ on the authority of the Council of Chalcedon (db 148, ds 301, [dec 1: 86–87]), which states that it is the same one who is perfect in deity and perfect in humanity. See db 290, ds 554, [dec 1: 127], ‘one of the holy … Trinity.’ Argument 1 It is self-evident that only a divine person is present to himself in a divine way. 2 One who says ‘I’ means a person identical with himself and now present to himself. But in the gospels Christ the man says ‘I,’ and means a divine person. Therefore, in the gospels Christ the man means a divine person identical with himself and now present to himself. The major premise is self-evident; see ‘Notions,’ 16. As to the minor premise, see John 8.58, 10.30, 10.38, 14.10, 14.11, 14.20, 14.23, 14.31, 15.26, 16.28, 17.21. In these passages Christ the man says ‘I.’ This ‘I’ which is meant by a man is eternal, one with the Father, in the Father as the Father is in him; he loves the Father, sends the Holy Spirit from the Father, comes from the Father, and leaves the world so that he might return to the Father. You will find more in Gutwenger, Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi 50–54. 3 Words spoken about Christ, either by Christ himself or by the apostles,

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sanctis de Christo, non sunt dividendae ut aliae homini et aliae Verbo deputentur (db 116). Et ideo ubicumque Christus dicit ‘ego’ vel alii dicunt sive ‘tu’ sive ‘ille’ de Christo, semper agitur de persona divina. Idem habes ex thesi tertia: Non dividendus est Christus in alium et alium, sed una agnoscenda est persona eaque divina.

4 ‘Esse sibi praesentem seu conscium’ non addit super ‘perfectum in deitate’ et non addit super ‘perfectum in humanitate.’ Sed unus de Sanctissima Trinitate, Deus Filius, persona divina, est et perfectus in deitate et perfectus in humanitate (db 290, ds 554). Ergo eadem divina persona est sibi praesens tum modo divino tum modo humano. Obicitur tamen:10 ‘Il n’y a aucune raison d’affirmer, de postuler que la personne divine du Verbe soit consciente d’elle-même par sa conscience humaine.’ Ita Fr. Philippe de la Trinité, Ephemerides Carmeliticae 11 (1960) 50. Respondetur salva fide negari haud potest personam divinam Verbi esse sui consciam per conscientiam suam humanam. Nam hic homo Iesus Nazarenus est sui conscius per conscientiam suam humanam, secus non esset nobis similis per omnia absque peccato (db 148); neque in Iesu Nazareno adest alia persona praeter personam divinam Verbi. Instatur: ‘Per operationes eiusmodi (i.e., humanas et psychologicas) Verbum Dei conscium est naturae suae assumptae, non vero suae personalitatis, quae divina est.’ Ibid. 48. Respondetur: eatenus per conscientiam humanam innotescunt operationes ut subiecti, quatenus innotescit ipsum subiectum. Neve dicas in Christo Deo et homine sufficere ut subiectum innotescat per conscientiam divinam et personalem, uti idem auctor vult (pp. 37, 47). Vix enim dici potest Iesum Christum, Dominum nostrum, Filium Dei unicum vel sine ulla sui conscientia vel per conscientiam sui divinam et impassibilem esse passum sub Pontio Pilato, quod tamen in symbolico apostolico recitamus atque credimus.

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the evangelists, or the saints, should not be categorized so as to assign some of them to a man and others to the Word (db 116, [dec 1: 59]). And therefore, whenever Christ says ‘I,’ or others use the words ‘you’ or ‘he’ of Christ, this always concerns his divine person. The same thing was shown in thesis 3: Christ is not to be divided into ‘someone’ and ‘someone else’; one person, a divine person, is to be acknowledged. 4 ‘To be conscious, that is, present to oneself,’ adds nothing to ‘perfect in deity,’ and it adds nothing to ‘perfect in humanity.’ But one of the most holy Trinity, God the Son, a divine person, is both perfect in deity and perfect in humanity (db 290, ds 554, [dec 1: 127]). Therefore, the same divine person is present to himself both in a divine way and in a human way. Still, there is this objection:10 ‘There is no reason to affirm, to postulate that the divine person of the Word was conscious of himself through his human consciousness.’ Thus Philippe de la Trinité, ‘À propos de la conscience du Christ: Un faux problème théologique’ 50. The reply to this is that one can hardly preserve the faith while denying that the divine Word is conscious of himself through his human consciousness. For this man, Jesus of Nazareth, is conscious of himself through his human consciousness; otherwise, he would not be like us in all things apart from sin (db 148, [dec 1: 86–87]). But in Jesus of Nazareth there is no other person besides the divine person of the Word. But again: ‘Through operations of this kind [that is, human psychological operations] the Word of God is conscious of his assumed nature, certainly not of his personality, which is divine’ (ibid. 48). Reply: To the extent that operations come into awareness through human consciousness as operations of the subject, to that extent the subject himself comes into awareness. Beware of saying that in Christ, God and man, it is enough that the subject be aware through divine, personal consciousness, as the same author insists (pp. 37, 47). For surely we cannot say that it was without any consciousness of himself, or that it was through his divine, impassible consciousness, that Jesus Christ, our Lord, the only Son of God, suffered under Pontius Pilate, as we believe and recite in the Apostles’ Creed.

10 This discussion does not appear in the 1960 edition.

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Corollaria et Scholia ­1 db 2334, ds 3905: ‘chalcedonense concilium … vetatque duo in christo poni individua, ita ut aliquis homo assumptus integrae autonomiae compos penes verbum collocetur.’ circa ‘assumptum hominem’ vide db 120, ds 259; Galtier, De Incarn. 79–83, §§ 101–108; M. Richard, ‘Notes sur l’évolution doctrinale de Théodoret,’ RevScPhTh 25 (1936) 459–81. Recentius defenditur a Déodat de Basly, Seiller, quos impugnavit Diepen, op. cit., supra inter Auctores.

2 persona non versatur extra conscientiam. contrarium defendit P. Galtier, De Incarn. 267–68, § 341. Ita sensit propter opinionem Tiphani de subsistente; et quidem si aliquid ideo subsisteret quia in toto quodam maiori non includeretur, et si haec inclusio esset ordinis ontologici sed non psychologici, sequeretur personam extra conscientiam versari. Sed contra est quod supra e S. Augustino recitavimus, Notiones, 2. Ibi enim ‘tu’ manifeste est persona; et dicitur sibi praesens; ergo persona non versatur extra conscientiam. Praeterea, omnes homines dicunt ‘ego’; de quo praedicant ea quae totaliter intra conscientiam fiunt, uti ego video, ego intelligo, ego aliter iudico, ego nolo, ego timeo; quod ‘ego’ subsistit (nam est id quod operatur, et id quod operatur est id quod est seu subsistit), est distinctum ab omnibus aliis, et in natura intellectuali est. Vide Notiones, 16. Obicitur : ‘persona’ prout communiter concipitur versatur intra conscientiam, sed ‘persona’ prout theologice de ea disputatur non est datum immediatum conscientiae. Respondetur: neque vulgaris neque disputata conceptio qua talis est datum immediatum conscientiae. Omnis enim conceptio praesupponit actum quendam intelligendi qui per conceptum exprimitur; et omnis actus humanae intelligentiae praesupponit praeviam quandam experientiam sive externam sive internam, de qua inquiritur, quid sit, in qua intelligibile perspicitur, per quam habetur fundamentum empiricum iudicii. Data im-

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Corollaries and Scholia 1 The encyclical ‘sempiternus rex’ (db 2334, ds 3905): ‘the council of chalcedon … forbids positing two individuals in christ so that some “assumed man” possessed of complete autonomy would be located within the word.’ On this ‘assumed man,’ see db 120, ds 259, [dec 1: 60]; Galtier, De Incarnatione ac redemptione 79–83, §§ 101–108; M. Richard, ‘Notes sur l’évolution doctrinale de Théodoret,’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 25 (1936) 459–81. It has been defended of late by Déodat de Basly and by Seiller, both of whom Diepen attacks; see the works cited in the bibliography above. 2 the person does not lie outside consciousness. P. Galtier has defended the contrary in De Incarnatione ac redemptione 267– 68, § 341. He takes this view owing to Tiphanus’s opinion on what subsists; and indeed, if anything would subsist were it not included in some larger whole, and were this inclusion of an ontological but not a psychological order, then it would follow that the person lies outside consciousness. Against this view, however, is what we have quoted from Augustine in § 2 under ‘Notions.’ For the ‘you’ in that quotation is clearly a person; he is said to be present to himself; therefore, the person does not lie outside consciousness. Besides this, everyone says ‘I.’ Of this ‘I,’ we predicate what happens entirely within consciousness, as for example in saying, ‘I see,’ ‘I understand,’ ‘I judge this to be otherwise,’ ‘I am unwilling,’ ‘I fear.’ This ‘I’ subsists (for it is that which operates, and that which operates is that which is or subsists); it is distinct from everything else; and it is in an intellectual nature. See above, ‘Notions,’ § 16. Objection: ‘Person,’ as commonly conceived, may lie within consciousness, but ‘person’ as it comes up in theological debate is not an immediate datum of consciousness. Reply: Neither the commonsense nor the debated conception is, as such, an immediate datum of consciousness. Every conception presupposes an act of understanding that is expressed in the concept; and every act of human understanding presupposes prior experience, inner or outer. About this experience, the question ‘What is it?’ is asked; in it, the intelligible is grasped; through it, there are empirical grounds for judgment. The im-

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mediata conscientiae sunt per illam praeviam experientiam internam; et quae sic prima potentia cognoscuntur, eadem in actu primo per intelligentiam cognoscuntur; nec quidquam refert utrum illa intelligentia sit vulgaris an scientifica; sed sola quaestio est de veritate sive vulgaris sive scientificae intelligentiae. Cf. Notiones, 13. Quod autem quosdam hac in re decipere videtur, confusio quaedam est analyseos logicae et analyseos psychologicae. Logice cognitiones humanae dividuntur in immediatas (quae non deducuntur ex aliis) et mediatas (quae deducuntur); et cum intelligentia scientifica magis ratiociniis utatur quam vulgaris, inde concluditur vulgarem intelligentiam non esse intelligentiam sed datum immediatum conscientiae, scientificam autem intelligentiam non esse datum immediatum conscientiae, neque intelligentiam, sed logicam quandam conclusionem. Quod quam sit ineptum, vix dici potest. Circa analysim psychologicam, vide pp. 374–76.

3 subiectum psychologicum est persona sibi praesens. quae definitio non legitur apud phaenomenologos vel psychologos, tum quia terminos philosophicos et theologicos non adhibent, tum quia ad eos non pertinet distinguere inter subiectum psychologicum (1) humanum, (2) mere humanum, et (3) qua tale. Quos si theologus caece sequitur, vel conscientiam vere humanam in Christo homine negat, vel duo quodammodo subiecta psychologica Christo attribuit. Quam ob causam, sicut olim theologi propriam de persona definitionem excogitaverunt, ut illud dicerent quod communiter personis divinis et humanis proprium est, ita etiam hodierni theologi propriam quandam de subiecto psychologico definitionem formare debent, ne christologia perpetuis confusionibus obscuretur. Dicimus ergo omne subiectum psychologicum humanum esse personam sibi praesentem: nam est id quod psychologice operatur (sentit, intelligit, etc.) et ideo id quod est seu subsistens; est distinctum; est in natura intellectuali; et est sibi praesens. Dicimus deinde personas divinas esse sibi praesentes (vide argumenti partem secundam) ideoque analogice subiecta psychologica. Et de angelis facile concluditur idem. Unde colligimus omne subiectum psychologicum esse personam sibi praesentem.

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mediate data of consciousness are given through that prior and interior experience, and what thus is known in first potency is the same as what is known in first act through understanding. It does not matter whether that understanding is commonsense or scientific understanding; the only question is about the truth of a commonsense or scientific understanding. See ‘Notions,’ § 13. What seems to deceive some people in this matter is a confusion of logical analysis with psychological analysis. Logically speaking, there is a division of human knowing into immediate (knowledge that is not deduced from anything else) and mediate (deduced knowledge). And since scientific understanding makes a greater use of reasoning than common sense does, the conclusion is drawn that commonsense understanding is not understanding at all but an immediate datum of consciousness, whereas scientific understanding is neither an immediate datum of consciousness, nor understanding, but a logical conclusion. This is too silly for words. On psychological analysis, see above, pp. 374–77. 3 the psychological subject is a person present to himself or herself. No such definition will be found in the works of phenomenologists and psychologists. For one thing, they do not make use of philosophical and theological terminology, and for another it is not for them to distinguish between the psychological subject (1) as human, (2) as merely human, and (3) as psychological subject. Theologians who blindly follow their lead will deny that there is a truly human consciousness in Christ the man, or else they will in some fashion attribute to Christ two psychological subjects. For that reason, just as theologians once worked out their own definition of person in order to name that which divine and human persons properly have in common, so also, if Christology today is not going to be shrouded in perpetual confusion, theologians need to form their own definition of the psychological subject. We say, then, that every human psychological subject is a person present to himself or herself. For the psychological subject is that which operates psychologically (senses, understands, and so on) and therefore that which is or subsists; it is distinct; it is in an intellectual nature; and it is present to self. We say, in the second place, that divine persons are present to themselves (see part 2 of the argument), and therefore that they are psychological subjects by analogy. The same conclusion is easily drawn for the angels. Thus, we gather that every psychological subject is a person present to himself.

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Quantum autem ad ea quae a phaenomenologis et psychologis recitantur, e.g., subiectum psychologicum esse centrum quoddam conscium de quo conscie procedunt actus conscii, dicimus eiusmodi descriptiones non solum subiectum psychologicum exhibere sed etiam modum quo tale subiectum per conscientiam humanam sibi praesens sit. Obicitur : si subiectum psychologicum definitur persona sibi praesens, et de definitione omittitur modus quo persona humana sibi est praesens, periculum est ne in Christo homine omittatur conscientia vere humana. Respondetur: hoc periculum aliter evitari potest, e.g., per definitionem conscientiae humanae tamquam id quo quis modo humano est sibi praesens. Obicitur : proposita definitio supponit particularem quandam theoriam de persona. Respondetur: proposita definitio supponit non particularem sed generalem personae notionem, scilicet, subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali; et pariter ‘id quod est’ dicit id quod ab omnibus in omni subsistente agnoscitur. Particulares notiones sunt eorum qui plus exigunt, e.g., negationem dependentiae, negationem inclusionis, vel modum quendam.

4 in christo deo et homine unum est subiectum psychologicum. nam in thesi demonstratum est unam personam, eamque divinam, esse sibi praesentem tum modo divino tum modo humano. Et nuperrime conclusimus subiectum psychologicum dici debere personam sibi praesentem. Ubi ergo una est persona sibi praesens, unum est subiectum psychologicum. Quod directe contra L. Seiller, minus directe contra P. Galtier ponitur. Vide sententias, a, supra recitatas. 5 persona verbi est subiectum psychologicum conscientiae humanae, non quatenus operatione divina in humanitatem suam influit, sed quatenus per naturam suam humanam humanas operationes sensitivas et intellectuales vel elicit vel etiam producit. (a) Non quatenus operatione divina in humanitatem suam influit.

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As far as the statements of phenomenologists and psychologists are concerned – for instance, the statement that the psychological subject is a conscious center from which conscious acts proceed – we say that descriptions of this sort display not only the psychological subject but also the way in which such a subject is present to himself or herself through human consciousness. Objection: If the psychological subject is defined as a person present to himself or herself, omitting from the definition that way in which a human person is present to himself or herself, there is a danger that a truly human consciousness will be left out of Christ the man. Reply: There are other ways of avoiding this danger, for instance, by a definition of human consciousness as that by which someone is present to himself or herself in a human way. Objection: The proposed definition assumes a particular theory of the person. Reply: What the proposed definition assumes is not a particular but a general notion of person: the notion of a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature. Likewise, ‘that which is’ denotes what everyone acknowledges in every subsistent. Particular notions belong to those who demand more – a negation of dependence, for example, or a negation of inclusion, or a ‘mode.’ 4 the psychological subject in christ, god and man, is one. It was demonstrated in the thesis that one person, a divine person, is present to himself both in a divine and in a human way. And we have just now concluded that ‘psychological subject’ ought to denote a person present to himself or herself. Where there is one person present to himself or herself, therefore, there is one psychological subject. This statement is aimed directly against L. Seiller, and less directly against P. Galtier. See ‘Opinions,’ section a, above. 5 the person of the word is the psychological subject of a human consciousness, not inasmuch as he influences his humanity by a divine operation, but inasmuch as he elicits or even produces, through his human nature, sensitive and intellectual human operations. (a) [It is] not inasmuch as he influences his human nature by a divine operation [that the person of the Word is the psychological subject of a human consciousness]. For the divine operation is common to all three persons. If it were

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erationem divinam persona Verbi esset subiectum conscientiae humanae, pariter dicendum esset Patrem et Spiritum sanctum etiam esse subiecta eiusdem conscientiae humanae. Quod falsum est. Praeterea, aliud est formaliter esse tale, et aliud est efficienter producere tale. Per operationem divinam tres personae divinae producunt efficienter tum ipsam incarnationem tum omnia quae eam consequuntur. Sed sola divina Verbi persona est incarnata et de sola Verbi persona ea formaliter dicuntur quae ad personam incarnatam pertinent. Iam vero esse subiectum psychologicum conscientiae humanae de Verbo dicitur formaliter. Et ideo praeter quaestionem est invocare operationem divinam. (b) Sed quatenus per naturam suam humanam humanas operationes sensitivas et intellectuales vel elicit vel etiam producit. Nam Dei Filius, homo factus, est per omnia nobis similis absque peccato (db 148, 290, ds 301, 554). Sed nos sumus nobis praesentes et subiecta psychologica actu, quatenus sensitive et intellectualiter operamur. Ergo etiam Dei Filius est sibi praesens modo humano et subiectum psychologicum conscientiae humanae, quatenus ipse per naturam assumptam sensitive et intellectualiter operatur. Quae quidem operationes sunt et immanentes (video, intelligo, volo) et effectivae (aperiendo oculos efficio visionem meam actualem; per intellectum agentem efficio actum intelligendi in intellectu possibili; per volitionem finis et consilium efficio volitionem medii). Et elicimus quidem immanentes operationes (quae sunt quoddam pati secundum Aristotelem et S. Thomam); per effectivas autem tum immanentes operationes tum etiam alia producimus. Et cum Christus sit per omnia nobis similis, idem de eo ut homine dicendum est.11 De operatione vitali, cf. Divinarum personarum 247–50, De Deo trino: Pars systematica 257–60.12

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through the divine operation that the person of the Word is the subject of a human consciousness, it would likewise have to be said that the Father and the Holy Spirit too are subjects of this same human consciousness, which is false. Furthermore, it is one thing formally to be such and such, and something else efficiently to produce such and such. Through the divine operation, the three divine persons efficiently produce both the incarnation itself and all its consequences. But only the divine person of the Word has become incarnate, and only of the person of the Word are those things formally said which pertain to an incarnate person. Now, it is formally said of the Word that he is the psychological subject of a human consciousness. And therefore it is beside the point to bring in a divine operation. (b) [It is,] rather, insofar as he elicits or even produces, through his human nature, sensitive and intellectual human operations [that the person of the Word is the psychological subject of a human consciousness]. The Son of God, made man, is like us in all things apart from sin (db 148, 290, ds 301, 554, [dec 1: 86–87, 127]). But we are present to ourselves, psychological subjects in act, inasmuch as we operate sensitively and intellectually. Therefore, the Son of God too is present to himself in a human way and is the psychological subject of a human consciousness, inasmuch as he operates sensitively and intellectually through his assumed nature. These operations are both immanent (I see, I understand, I will) and effective (by opening my eyes I bring about or effect my actual vision; through agent intellect I bring about or effect an act of understanding in the possible intellect; through willing the end and through deliberation I bring about or effect my willing of the means). Immanent operations (which are in some sense passive, a kind of suffering, according to Aristotle and Thomas) we elicit; through effective operations, however, we produce both immanent operations and other effective operations. And the same should be said for Christ as man, since he is like us in all things.11 On vital operations, see Divinarum personarum 247–50 or De Deo trino, Pars systematica, 267–70.12

11 The word ‘effectivae’ (twice in this paragraph) was ‘transeuntes’ (transitive) in the 1960 edition. Note the discussion of pati in Lonergan, Verbum 118– 21. 12 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 546–53.

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6 ideo persona verbi est sibi praesens modo humano per operationes suas humanas sensitivas et intellectuales, quia (1) per ipsam incarnationem est omne quod est hic homo, iesus nazarenus et (2) hic homo, sicut et alius per omnia ei similis, est sibi praesens per operationes suas sensitivas et intellectuales. quoad factum, utrumque assertum videtur et evidens et certum. Propter incarnationem, enim, omnia quae in evangeliis de Iesu dicuntur, de Dei Fi­ lio dicta intelliguntur; quod iam thesi tertia probatum est. Praeterea, propter operationes sensitivas et intellectuales, homines sunt sibi praesentes; ubi autem dormiunt et non somniant, non sunt sibi praesentes; ubi autem psychologice operari incipiunt, et quidem pro perfectione operationis, sibi praesentes fiunt. Quod pariter de Christo dicendum est, si quidem est de fide definita eum esse per omnia nobis similem.

Quantum autem ad rei intelligentiam, utrumque factum aliquam difficultatem praebere posse videtur, testante A. Patfoort, RevScPhTh 43 (1959) 539,13 qui sic arguit: ‘Ce que l’on peut concéder à l’auteur c’est que le Verbe incarné par une partie de lui-même a conscience ainsi d’une partie de lui-même, mais on ne voit pas que par cette partie de lui-même il ait conscience de sa personalité divine. Il insistera: c’est pourtant le Verbe qui vit cette action consciente, qui en est le sujet, cette action consciente émane du Verbe; oui, dirons-nous, il y a une certaine continuité opérative, bien mysterieuse d’ailleurs, mais la conscience est-elle simple continuité opérative ou est-elle quand même connaissance (ou composante d’un acte de connaissance)? Si elle est connaissance, ne faut-il pas un contact ou mieux une unité de type immatériel entre ce par quoi on a conscience et ce dont on a conscience? Dès lors est-ce que la problème de la disproportion [scilicet, inter actum conscientiae creatum et personam infinitam consciam] ne se repose pas avec autant d’acuité?’14 Quibus respondemus imprimis quaestionem esse de metaphysica analysi conscientiae eamque resolvi, non per causalitatem efficientem vel continui-

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6 this is why the person of the word is present to himself in a human way through his sensitive and intellectual human operations: (1) because through the incarnation itself he is everything that this man jesus of nazareth is, and (2) because this man, like any other who is like him in all things, is present to himself through his sensitive and intellectual operations. As to the fact of the matter, each of these assertions would seem to be clear and certain. For, on account of the Incarnation, everything said in the gospels about Jesus is understood as a statement about the Son of God; this has already been proved in thesis 3. Further, on account of their sensitive and intellectual operations, human beings are present to themselves. When they are in a dreamless sleep, they are not present to themselves; but when they begin to operate psychologically, they become present to themselves in different degrees depending on how perfect the operation is. This is equally to be said of Christ, as it is a matter of defined faith that he is like us in all things. As to understanding the matter, however, each of these facts would seem to offer some difficulty; witness A. Patfoort, ‘Bulletin de théologie dogmatique,’ in Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 43 (1959) 539.13 He argues as follows: ‘What can be granted to the author [Lonergan] is this: In a part of himself the incarnate Word is thus conscious of a part of himself, but it cannot be seen that through that part of himself he would be conscious of his divine personality. The author insists: It is nevertheless the Word that lives this conscious action, that is the subject of such action, this conscious action comes forth from the Word; yes, shall we say, there is a certain operative continuity, very mysterious indeed, but is this consciousness mere operative continuity or is it nonetheless a knowing or a component of an act of knowing? If it is knowing, does it not entail a contact or, better, a unity of an immaterial kind between that through which one is conscious and that of which one is conscious? Therefore, does not the problem of the lack of proportion [that is, between the created act of consciousness and an infinite conscious person] come back with as much intensity as before?14 To this we respond as follows. In the first place, the question regards the metaphysical analysis of consciousness. As such it is not resolved through ef-

13 The text from here to § 7 was quite different in the 1960 edition. See below, Appendix 1. 14 Translation from the French by Louis Roy.

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tatem operativam vel contactum vel unitatem immaterialem, sed per causas constitutivas. Exempli gratia, si dicitur Socrates esse sapiens per habitum quendam in intellectu suo possibili receptum, obici potest non ipsum Socratem sed partem quandam eius esse sapientem. Quae sane obiectio, si admitteretur, tota rueret metaphysica. Nam quod unum simpliciter est, illud tum realiter est tum vere dicitur esse secundum omnia quibus vel constituitur vel constitutum afficitur. Unde per modum corollarii sequuntur tum notum axioma, actiones esse suppositorum, tum praecipua eiusdem applicatio, non sensum sentire, non intellectum intelligere, sed hominem per sensum sentire et hominem per intellectum intelligere. Iam vero Verbum incarnatum est unum simpliciter: nam unus idemque est et Deus et homo (db 148, ds 301). Cuius unitatis rationem aliqualem iam dedimus: ‘unum’ nempe non addere super ‘ens’ nisi negationes; quare, quo unumquodque ens simpliciter est (per proprium scilicet suum esse), eo etiam unum simpliciter sit necesse est. Quia ergo in Verbo incarnato non habetur nisi unum esse personale quo est tum in divinitate tum in humanitate, idem incarnatum Verbum est unum simpliciter. Et quia praeterea, quo perfectior est causa, eo perfectior est effectus, cum esse Verbi divinum sit perfectissimum, Verbum incarnatum perfectissime est unum simpliciter. Quibus positis, saltem illud habetur: sicut non pars Socratis sed ipse Socrates sapiens est per habitum in intellectu possibili receptum, ita etiam Verbum incarnatum ipsum et non pars quaedam eiusdem sapiens est per habitum in intellectu suo possibili receptum. Et pari omnino ratione, sicut non pars Socratis sed ipse Socrates intelligit per actum suum intelligendi, ita etiam non pars Verbi incarnati sed ipsum Verbum incarnatum intelligit per actum intelligendi qui est pati15 quoddam in intellectu suo possibili receptum. Neve dicas haec ontologice quidem valere non autem psychologice, ut nescio quomodo Socrates ontologice quidem intelligat sed psychologice stupeat. Psychologicum enim nihil aliud est quam genus quoddam entis: secus nihil esset. Et ideo, ubicumque ponitur ontologicum in debito gradu perfectionis ontologicae, ibi eo ipso habetur psychologicum.

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ficient causality, through operative continuity, through contact, or through immaterial unity, but through constitutive causes. If, for instance, you say that Socrates is wise through a habit received in his possible intellect, it can be objected that it is not Socrates himself who is wise but some part of him. Were such an objection admitted, it would be the ruin of metaphysics. For what is purely and simply one really is and also is truly said to be, on the basis of everything by which it either is constituted or once constituted is affected. Hence, there follow as corollaries both the well-known axiom ‘actions are the actions of supposits’ and the chief application of this axiom, namely, it is not sense that senses, or intellect that understands; it is a human being who senses by sense and understands by intellect. Now, the incarnate Word is purely and simply one, for it is one and the same who is God and man (db 148, ds 301, [dec 1: 86–87]). We have already given the reason for this unity: ‘one’ adds nothing to ‘being’ except negations; thus, whatever it is by which something is a being pure and simple (namely, its own act of existence) is necessarily that by which it is also purely and simply one. Therefore, because in the incarnate Word there is only one personal act of existence by which the Word is, both in divinity and in humanity, the same incarnate Word is purely and simply one. And moreover, because an effect is more perfect in the same measure that its cause is more perfect, the incarnate Word is purely and simply one in the most perfect way, since the divine Word’s act of existence is the most perfect of all. The foregoing brings us at least this far: As it is not a part of Socrates but Socrates himself who is wise through a habit received in his possible intellect, so too the incarnate Word himself, not some part of him, is wise through a habit received in his possible intellect. And for exactly the same reason, as it is not a part of Socrates but Socrates himself who understands through his act of understanding, so too it is not a part of the incarnate Word but the incarnate Word himself who understands through an act of understanding that is a kind of change15 received in his possible intellect. Beware of saying this holds from an ontological but not from a psychological viewpoint. How Socrates could be understanding from an ontological viewpoint, yet be puzzled from a psychological viewpoint, is beyond me. For the psychological is nothing other than a genus of being: otherwise it is nothing. So, wherever you posit the ontological in the required level of ontological perfection, there, by that very fact, you have the psychological. 15 As in Verbum 119, where ‘pati’ in the Latin quotation is translated as ‘undergoing change.’

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Dices tamen haec ita psychologice valere ut subiectum quidem cognoscat non autem ut cognoscatur. Omne enim quod ad genus cognitionis reducitur, per assimilationem quandam intentionalem vel per identitatem quandam immaterialem perficitur; sed conscientia ad genus cognitionis reducitur; et ideo sine illa assimilatione intentionali vel identitate immateriali haberi non potest conscientia. Respondetur: conceditur ergo Socratem per proprium suum intelligendi actum intelligere; negatur vero eundem per eundem actum conscie intelligere. Quid autem sit illud inconscie intelligere, non explicatur; neque quis umquam inconscie intellexerit, narratur; sed a priori proceditur, si quidem invocantur vel assimilatio intentionalis vel identitas immaterialis. Iam vero circa assimilationem intentionalem satis constat S. Thomam docuisse cognitionem obiecti sine recepta obiecti specie non perfici; quod tamen circa cognitionem subiecti non exigit, imo excludit, idem S. Thomas, uti patet, De ver., q. 10, a. 8, ad 5m et ad 9m in 2a ser., et caeterum satis manifestum est ex tota theoria aristotelica de cognitione ipsius intellectus. Cf. Gregorianum 40 (1959) 254, 260–61.16 Circa vero identitatem immaterialem, constat animam humanam semper esse immaterialem, semper esse sibi identicam, et non semper esse sui consciam. Remanet ergo ut homo, eo ipso quod homo est, sit subiectum psychologicum sui conscium in potentia; quae quidem potentia in actum reducitur, ut subiectum psychologicum sui conscium actu habeatur, ubicumque idem subiectum quodlibet obiectum actu sentit, intelligit, vult. Quod quidem sicut factis congruit ita etiam expresse a S. Thoma docetur, animam nempe intellectivam se ipsam cognoscere non per essentiam suam sed per suum actum. Et ut rem aliter dicam, sicut per intelligibile in actu cognoscitur obiectum, ita per intellectum in actu praesens sibi efficitur subiectum; quae quidem non duae causae sunt sed una, si quidem intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu. Iam vero Verbum Dei per esse suum infinitum vere et realiter est hic homo; hic homo ex ipsa sua natura est subiectum psychologicum potentia;

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You may be saying, however, that the foregoing is psychologically valid in such a way as to allow the subject to know but not to be known. For everything that is reducible to the genus of knowing is perfected either by an intentional assimilation or by an immaterial identity; but consciousness reduces to the genus of knowing, and therefore without that intentional assimilation or immaterial identity there can be no consciousness. Reply: It is granted, then, that Socrates understands through his own act of understanding, while it is denied that through this same act he consciously understands. What this unconscious understanding might be, however, is not explained. Nor does the objection say that somewhere someone did understand unconsciously; instead, it proceeds a priori, invoking either intentional assimilation or immaterial identity. Now with regard to intentional assimilation, Thomas did teach, clearly enough, that knowing an object is not complete without a received species of the object. In the case of knowing a subject, however, he does not require this and indeed rules it out; so much is clear from De veritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad 5m and ad 9m, 2ae ser. And the rest is sufficiently clear from the whole Aristotelian theory on knowing the intellect itself; see ‘Christ as Subject: A Reply,’ Gregorianum 40 (1959) 254, 260–61.16 With regard to immaterial identity, it is clear that the human soul is always immaterial, always identical with itself, and not always conscious of itself. It remains, therefore, that a man, by the fact that he is a man, is a psychological subject, potentially conscious of himself. This potency is reduced to act, with the result that there is a psychological subject actually conscious of himself, whenever that subject actually senses some object, actually understands it, actually wills it. This squares with the facts, and Thomas teaches it expressly as well: the intellectual soul knows itself, not by its essence, but by its act. To put this another way, as through the intelligible in act an object is known, so through intelligence in act the subject is made present to himself; these are not two causes but one, since the intelligible in act is intelligence in act. Now through his infinite act of existence the Word of God really and truly is this man; this man by his very nature is a psychological subject in

16 See Lonergan, Collection 174, 179–81.

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idem homo per actus suos ordinis psychologici est subiectum psychologicum in actu, sibi praesens, sui conscium. At dixerit forte alius sic nullo modo explicari quemadmodum Verbum divinum modo humano sit sui conscium. Nullus enim est influxus naturae assumptae in divinam personam, si quidem Verbo divino per totam incarnationem non accedit nisi relatio rationis. Praeterea, inutiliter invocatur influxus Verbi divini in naturam assumptam, nam cum omnis actio ad extra sit toti Trinitati communis, eiusmodi influxus non solum Filium divinum sed etiam Patrem et Spiritum sanctum modo humano conscios redderet. Respondetur argumenta probare conscientiam Christi per causalitatem efficientem explicari non posse; quod tamen minime mirandum est, cum tota quaestio causalitatem constitutivam respiciat. 7 in christo homine id quod est sibi praesens et cui operationes suae sunt praesentes est, non natura assumpta, non anima humana, non intellectus creatus, non conscientia humana, sed ipsa verbi persona in assumpta natura subsistens. quod ex antecessis constat. Nam ex thesi habetur quod divina persona Verbi modo humano est sibi praesens; et persona quae modo humano est sibi praesens etiam habet suas operationes sibi praesentes. Praeterea, cum operationes sint personae a natura, cumque persona sit sibi praesens per suas operationes, id quod est sibi praesens est persona Verbi, non quasi omni seclusa natura, sed ut subsistens in tali natura. Et ideo Christus ut Deus modo divino est sibi praesens per operationem divinam, et Christus ut homo modo humano est sibi praesens per operationes humanas sensitivas et intellectuales.

Assumpta autem natura, anima humana, intellectus creatus, et conscientia humana non dicunt id quod est sibi praesens, conscium, percipiens, reflectens, sed tantummodo ea quibus remote vel proxime subiectum est sibi praesens. Unde concludes quaestionem modo quodam inverso ab iis auctoribus (vide sententias, b) concipi et proponi, qui quaerunt quemadmodum aliquid creatum et humanum fiat conscium divinae personae. Quo ab errore non simpliciter libera sunt quae ab E. Gutwenger ponuntur, e.g., ‘Mit Rücksicht auf diese Tatsache ist die Menschheit Christi berechtigt, den Logos als ihren Logos anzusehen und in das Aktzentrum ihres Bewusstseins derart in-

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potency; the same man, by his acts in the psychological order, is a psychological subject in act, present to himself, conscious of himself. But perhaps someone else will say that this does nothing to explain how the divine Word is conscious of himself in a human way. For there is no influence of the assumed nature on the divine person, since the whole Incarnation brought nothing to the divine Word except a relation of reason. Furthermore, it is no use invoking an influence of the divine Word on the assumed nature, for since every external action is common to the whole Trinity, such an influence would render not only the divine Son but also the Father and the Holy Spirit conscious in a human way. To this the reply is that arguments proving the consciousness of Christ from efficient causality are impossible – not surprisingly, since the whole question regards constitutive causality. 7 in christ the man, that which is present to himself, and that to which the operations are present, is not the assumed nature, nor the human soul, nor the created intellect, nor the human consciousness, but the person of the word himself subsisting in the assumed nature. This is clear from what has preceded. For it was shown in the thesis that the divine person of the Word is present to himself in a human way; and a person who is present to himself in a human way also has his operations present to himself. Further, since operations belong to a person from his nature, and since a person is present to himself through his operations, that which is present to himself is the person of the Word, not as though shut off from the nature in its entirety, but as subsisting in such a nature. And thus Christ as God is present to himself in a divine way through the divine operation, and Christ as man is present to himself in a human way through sensitive and intellectual human operations. On the other hand, ‘assumed nature,’ ‘human soul,’ ‘created intellect,’ and ‘human consciousness’ do not refer to that which is present to himself, conscious, perceiving, reflecting; they refer only to that by which, remotely or proximately, the subject is present to himself. Hence, you will gather that authors (see ‘Opinions,’ b) who ask how something human and created can become conscious of a divine person are conceiving and posing the question the wrong way round. What E. Gutwenger has to say is not altogether free of this error; for instance: ‘Taking account of this fact, Christ’s humanity is authorized to regard the Logos as its Logos and to take it so intimately into the center of its conscious activity

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nig hineinzunehmen dass sie die lebensvolle Einheit von Aktzentrum und Logos also ihr “Ich” anreden muss.’ Op. cit., p. 77. Ipsi lineas subduximus.17 8 utrum persona verbi in natura humana subsistens sit persona composita vel subiectum psychologicum compositum. occasio quaestionis habes ex antecedente, § 7. Concilium Constantinopolitanum ii (db 216, ds 425): ‘… unitionem Dei Verbi ad carnem secundum compositionem confitetur, quod est secundum subsistentiam (hypostasin) …’ Quod plenius explicat d’Alès, De Verbo incarnato 183–86, ubi multae auctoritates citantur. Dicimus primo aliquam compositionem in aliquo sensu esse admittendam, si quidem ‘Verbum incarnatum’ dicit unionem Verbi et carnis. Distinguimus deinde compositionem secundum hypostasin et compositionem in natura. Ubi habetur compositio in natura, uti materiae et formae, corporis et animae, id quod ex compositione resultat, ipsum antea non erat neque idem est ac pars sui. Quam ob causam, homo ex anima et corpore compositus, ipse non est ante compositionem, ipse non est corpus suum, et ipse non est anima sua. Sed in unione hypostatica idem, qui ab aeterno est Deus, ex tempore est hic homo Iesus Nazarenus; sed qui ab aeterno est Deus, est Filius et Verbum; qui autem est hic homo, est Verbum incarnatum. Concludimus tertio theologos rationabiliter expressione ‘personae compositae’ rarius uti. Qui enim compositionem dicit, compositionem in natura quodammodo suggerit, si quidem unio hypostatica est sine simili a nobis noto. Qui autem compositionem in natura intelligeret, certo certius erraret; vide thesin tertiam, praenotum quintum, § 3. Unde et concludimus expressione ‘subiecti psychologici compositi’ abstinendum esse. Quamvis enim recte intelligi possit, longe facilius in sensum erroneum ducit. Qui enim subiectum psychologicum compositum in Christo homine ponit, aliud suggerit praeter divinam personam incompositam et aeternam. Sed, si recte ipse rem intelligit, si recte alii eum intelligunt, tunc, sicut idem est qui est Verbum aeternum et qui est Verbum incarna-

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that it must address the living center of conscious activity and the Logos as its “I ”’ (Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi 77; emphasis added).17 8 is the person of the word, subsisting in a human nature, a composite person? is he a composite psychological subject? Item 7 above is the occasion for the question. According to the Second Council of Constantinople (db 216, ds 425, [dec 1: 115]), ‘we confess the union of the Word of God with flesh on the basis of composition, that is, on the basis of subsistence (hypostasis).’ This is fully explained by d’Alès in De Verbo incarnato 183–86, with quotations from a number of authorities. We would say, in the first place, that composition in some sense of the term has to be admitted, since ‘incarnate Word’ refers to the union of Word and flesh. We distinguish, in the second place, composition on the basis of hypostasis and composition in a nature. In the case of composition in a nature, such as the composition of matter and form or body and soul, what results from the composition previously was not, and it is not the same as a part of it. For that reason, a man composed of body and soul was not before the composition; he is not his body; he is not his soul. In the hypostatic union, however, one who eternally is God is at a time this man Jesus of Nazareth; the one who eternally is God, however, is the Son and the Word, while he who is this man is the incarnate Word. We conclude, in the third place, that only on very rare occasions is it reasonable for theologians to use the expression ‘composite person.’ For to speak of composition is to suggest some composition in a nature, since nothing like the hypostatic union is known to us. But to understand [this] composition as composition in a nature is certainly mistaken; see thesis 3, preliminary note 5, § 3. Hence, we also conclude that the expression ‘composite psychological subject’ should be avoided. A correct understanding of it is possible, but far more easily it leads to a mistaken sense. For those who propose that there is a composite psychological subject in Christ the man are suggesting another subject besides the divine person, who is eternal and not composite. But, if they understand the matter correctly, and if others correctly understand

17 Translation by Matthew Lamb.

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tum, ita etiam idem est quod est subiectum psychologicum aeternum et quod est subiectum psychologicum conscientiae humanae. Quam ob causam, iterum quodammodo ab E. Gutwenger dissentimus, qui de persona composita et de subiecto composito loquitur. 9 persona verbi in humana natura subsistens est sui conscia, non ut obiectum introspectionis, reflexae perceptionis, visionis beatae, sed ut subiectum omnis suae operationis psychologicae. Ponitur contra sententias sub b enumeratas. Ratio autem iam est data, Notiones, 6, 8, 12. Sed accedit ratio specialis et theologica, nempe Filium Dei vere et realiter esse passum vera carnis passione (db 344, 422, ds 681, 791). Iam vero sensus doloris physici (a) non fit in inconscio, (b) habetur sine ulla introspectione, sine ulla reflexa perceptione, et sine visione beata, (c) est ‘experimentalis perceptio laesionis’ et ‘incipit a laesione corporis, et terminatur in apprehensione sensus tactus, propter quod dolor est in sensu tactus ut in apprehendente’ (De ver., q. 26, a. 9 c. et ad 3m). Quod non fit in inconscio, manifestum est ex interventu chirurgico in patiente per anaesthetica inconscio. Quod non fit per introspectionem vel reflexam perceptionem est manifestum. Nisi enim dolor iam sentitur, ab introspiciente vel reflectente frustra quaeritur; si autem iam sentitur, superfluit introspectio vel reflexa perceptio. Quod non fit per visionem beatam etiam est manifestum. Quod est in sensu tactus ut in apprehendente nihil aliud dicit quam quod iam pridem dictum est: subiectum esse conscium et sic sibi praesens, quia ipsum subiectum actus suos elicit sensitivos et intellectuales et, in casu, quia ipsum subiectum, flagellum per suum corpus apprehendens, non solum sibi praesens est sed etiam modo valde doloroso.

10 duae in christo deo et homine conscientiae uniuntur non directe inter se sed in uno earum subiecto psychologico. sicut enim duae in Christo naturae non directe uniuntur inter se sed in

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them, then, just as it is the same one who is the eternal Word and who is the incarnate Word, so too it is the same one that is the eternal psychological subject and the psychological subject of a human consciousness. For that reason we differ once again from E. Gutwenger, who speaks of a composite person and a composite subject. 9 the person of the word subsisting in a human nature is conscious of himself, not as the object of introspection, of reflective perception, or of the beatific vision, but as the subject of all his psychological operations. This statement is aimed against the views listed in ‘Opinions’ under b. The reason behind it, however, has already been given in ‘Notions,’ 6, 8, and 12. But there is also a special, theological reason, namely, that the Son of God really and truly suffered with the true suffering of the flesh (db 344, 422, ds 681, 791). Now the sense of physical pain (a) is absent from one who is unconscious; (b) it needs no introspection, reflective perception, or beatific vision; and (c) it is ‘the experiential perception of injury’ and ‘begins in injury to the body, and terminates in apprehension by the sense of touch, and therefore pain is to the sense of touch, as in the apprehending faculty’ (De veritate, q. 26, a. 9 c. and ad 3m). That the sense of pain is absent from one who is unconscious is obvious from surgical operations performed on patients who have been made unconscious by anesthetics. That it needs neither introspection nor reflective perception is obvious. If pain is not already sensed, there is no use seeking it through introspection or reflection. If, on the other hand, it is already sensed, then introspection and reflection are superfluous. That it does not occur through the beatific vision is also obvious. That it is in the sense of touch as in the apprehending faculty does not say anything other than what has been said already: the subject is conscious and thus present to himself, because the subject himself elicits his sensitive and intellectual acts and, in this case, because the subject himself, apprehending the whip through his body, is not only present to himself but also is present in a very painful way. 10 in christ, god and man, the two consciousnesses are not directly united between themselves but are united in the one psychological subject of both. Just as the two natures in Christ are not directly united between them-

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persona habente utramque naturam, ita etiam duae in Christo conscientiae non directe uniuntur inter se sed in subiecto psychologico utriusque conscientiae. Cuius ratio est quod conscientia est per operationes, operationes sunt personae a natura, et ideo conscientia est personae a natura. Iam vero unio Verbi incarnati facta est non in natura sed in persona. Sicut ergo naturae non directe inter se uniuntur, ita nec conscientiae. Quam ob causam, non comparatur conscientia Christi divina ad conscientiam eiusdem humanam sicut in homine comparatur conscientia intellectiva ad conscientiam sensitivam. In homine enim conscientia intellectiva et sensitiva unum quoddam naturale constituunt secundum multiplicem earum inter se interdependentiam (ut de sensibilibus per intellectum inquiramus, in sensibilibus intelligibile perspiciamus, intelligibilia secundum data sensibilia iudicemus, etc.). Sed in Christo conscientia divina est una et simplicissima et conscientia humana iterum est per se naturaliter una. Quibus perspectis atque retentis, agnoscenda est quaedam similitudo inter unitatem in Christo et in nobis. Sicut enim in nobis unum est subiectum psychologicum quod tam per sensitivas operationes quam per intellectuales est sibi praesens et sui conscium (quamvis modo diverso), iterum in Christo unum est subiectum psychologicum quod est sibi praesens et sui conscium tum modo divino per divinam conscientiam tum modo humano per humanam conscientiam. Quae quidem ipsam constitutionem unitatis psychologicae respiciunt. Sed hac unitate constituta, supervenit alia et dynamica, quatenus in Christo Deo et homine principaliter operatur Christus ut Deus, instrumentaliter autem Christus ut homo. Ubi caute distingues instrumentum separatum (ut baculum) et instrumentum coniunctum (ut manum): in omni enim sua operatione sacrosancta Christi humanitas est instrumentum divinitatis, separatum tamen instrumentum Patris et Spiritus, coniunctum vero Filii; cuius coniunctionis ratio est ipsa incarnatio. Sed ulterius in operationibus humanis et naturalibus Christi aliae sunt inconsciae et aliae consciae; et sicut inconsciae sunt instrumenti coniuncti propter unitatem personae, ita consciae sunt instrumenti coniuncti propter unitatem subiecti psychologici. (Cf. quae ex S. Thoma collegit Fr. Philippe de la Trinité, Ephemerides Carmeliticae 11 [1960] 12–28. Quem tamen censemus ita rationem instrumenti coniuncti in conscientia Christi humana agnovisse, ut tamen ipsam

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selves, but united in the person who has each nature, so too the two consciousnesses in Christ are not directly united between themselves, but united in the psychological subject of each consciousness. The reason for this is that consciousness is through operations, operations belong to a person from his nature, and so consciousness belongs to a person from his nature. Moreover, the union of the incarnate Word took place in a person, not in a nature. Thus, as the natures are not directly united between themselves, neither are the consciousnesses. For that reason, Christ’s divine consciousness is not related to his human consciousness in the same way as the intellective consciousness in man is related to the sensitive consciousness. For in a man the intellective and sensitive consciousnesses constitute a natural unity by their multiple interdependence (we inquire about sensible data through intellect, we grasp the intelligible in the sensible, we judge the intelligible according to the sensible data, and so on). But in Christ the divine consciousness is one and is utterly simple, and the human consciousness is, again, naturally one in itself. When all this is grasped and kept in mind, a certain similarity between unity in Christ and unity in us should be acknowledged. For in us it is one psychological subject that is present to himself and conscious of himself through sensitive operations as much as through intellectual operations (albeit in different ways); and again, in Christ it is one psychological subject that is present to himself and conscious of himself both in a divine way, through the divine consciousness, and in a human way, through his human consciousness. All this regards the very constitution of psychological unity. But once this unity is constituted, there supervenes another, dynamic unity insofar as in Christ, God and man, Christ as God operates principally, and Christ as man operates instrumentally. Be careful here to distinguish a separated instrument (such as a tool) from a conjoined instrument (such as a hand). In every operation the most holy humanity of Christ is the instrument of divinity – a separated instrument of the Father and the Spirit, but a conjoined instrument of the Son, the reason for the conjunction being the Incarnation itself. But further, some of the human, natural operations of Christ are unconscious and others conscious; and as the unconscious operations are those of a conjoined instrument because of the unity of person, so the conscious operations are those of a conjoined instrument because of the unity of psychological subject. (See the texts of Thomas collected by Philippe de la Trinité, ‘À propos de la conscience du Christ: Un faux

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coniunctionem sustulerit cum negaverit personam Verbi divinam esse sui consciam per conscientiam suam humanam. Cf. p. 50.)18

11 utrum filius dei per suam conscientiam humanam conscius fuerit sui ipsius, personae divinae, suae divinitatis.19 primo, sui conscius est.20 Nam Filius Dei per suam conscientiam humanam est sibi praesens, sui conscius. Deinde, conscius est personae divinae. Nam ipse, qui sui ipsius per conscientiam humanam conscius est, erat et est persona divina.21 Tertio, per solam suam conscientiam humanam Filius Dei non erat conscius suae divinitatis. Qui enim per solam suam conscientiam est divinitatis conscius, is sibi praesens est non modo humano sed modo divino. Et quamvis Filius Dei non solum modo humano sed etiam modo divino sit sibi prae­ sens, tamen hoc ab inquirente excluditur quia non totam rem sed solam rei partem considerare vult. Quarto, quamvis Filius Dei per conscientiam suam humanam non sit conscius suae divinitatis, attamen per conscientiam hanc humanam in potentia est ut per visionem beatam sciat se esse Deum. Verbi gratia, tum Dei Filius tum Beata Virgo Maria per visionem beatam sciunt quid sit Deus; sed per hanc Dei visionem Filius quidem, non autem Beata Virgo, scit se esse Deum; cuius differentiae ratio est conscientia Filii humana.22

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problème théologique’ 12–28. We consider, however, that while Philippe de la Trinité does acknowledge that Christ’s consciousness fits the meaning of a conjoined instrument, he acknowledges it in such a way as to abolish the conjunction itself when he denies that the divine person of the Word is conscious of himself through his human consciousness. See p. 50.)18 11 was the son of god, through his human consciousness, conscious of himself, conscious of a divine person, conscious of his divinity?19 First, he is conscious of himself.20 For through his human consciousness the Son of God is present to himself, conscious of himself. Second, he is conscious of a divine person. For he himself, the one who through his human consciousness is conscious, was and is a divine person.21 Third, through his human consciousness alone the Son of God was not conscious of his divinity. For one who through his consciousness alone is conscious of divinity is present to himself, not in a human way, but in a divine way. And although the Son of God is present to himself not only in a human way but also in a divine way, this is ruled out by the way the question is framed: not the whole of the matter but only a part of it is under consideration. Fourth, although the Son of God is not conscious of his divinity through his human consciousness, through that human consciousness he is nevertheless in potency to knowing, through the beatific vision, that he is God. For example, both the Son of God and the Blessed Virgin Mary know, through the beatific vision, what God is. Through this vision of God, however, the Son indeed knows himself to be God, but the blessed Virgin does not know herself to be God. The reason for this difference is the Son’s human consciousness.22 18 This paragraph does not appear in the 1960 edition. 19 In 1960, this reads, ‘Utrum Filius Dei per suam conscientiam humanam cognoverit se ipsum, personam divinam, suam divinitatem’ (Did the Son of God through his human consciousness know himself, the divine person, his divinity?). 20 In 1960: ‘Primo, cognovit se ipsum’ (First he knew himself). 21 In 1960: ‘Deinde, cognovit personam divinam. Nam ipse, qui se ipsum per conscientiam humanam cognovit, erat et est persona divina’ (Second, he knew a divine person. For he who knew himself through human consciousness, was and is a divine person). 22 1960: ‘Quarto, per solam suam conscientiam humanam Filius Dei est in potentia ad cognoscendam suam divinitatem. Nam per solam conscientiam humanam se, personam divinam, cognoscit; et accedente visione beata actu

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Dices23 forte non esse nexum inter illud reflexivum, se, conscientia Filii humana notum, et alia ex parte divinam essentiam, visione beata scitam. Respondetur adeo non deesse nexum ut circulus quidam claudatur. Idem enim est Filius Dei sui conscius tum per conscientiam divinam tum per conscientiam humanam; qui quatenus conscientia humana sui conscius est

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You may be saying23 that there is no link between the reflexive pronoun ‘himself,’ experienced through the human consciousness of the Son, and on the other hand the divine essence, known by the beatific vision. The reply to this is that a link that closes the circle is not lacking. For it is the same Son of God who is conscious of himself both through his divine consciousness and through his human consciousness. Insofar as he is con-

cognoscit se esse Deum; quod in visione aliorum beatorum contingere nonpotest’ (Fourth, through his human consciousness alone the Son of God is in potency to know his divinity. For through his human consciousness alone he knows himself, a divine person; and given the beatific vision he knows in act that he is God; this does not happen in the vision of the other blessed). 23 From here to the end of the thesis the 1960 edition reads as follows:   Obicitur: fieri nequit ut cognoscatur persona divina et non cognoscatur divinitas.   Respondetur: quod fieri potest, cognosci potest. Sed persona divina et non natura divina est incarnata. Quae persona, sui conscia, per conscientiam humanam, et praecisione facta tum a conscientia divina tum a visione beata, est quidem conscia ipsius personae incarnatae sed non est conscia naturae non incarnatae.   Vide De constitutione Christi 115, de exinanitione psychologica.   Obicitur: nullus est nexus inter personam divinam modo humano sibi praesentem et divinam naturam visione beata cognitam.   Respondetur: persona divina modo humano sibi praesens quaerit quid sum; et cum duas habeat naturas, duas habet quaestiones resolvendas; unde scientia humana acquisita respondet, sum homo, animal rationale; et scientia humana et beata respondet videndo Deum per essentiam seu sciendo quid sit Deus.   In English:   Objection: it cannot be that a divine person be known and his divinity not be known.   Reply: what can be can be known. But a divine person and not the divine nature is incarnate. This person, conscious of himself through human consciousness and prescinding from divine consciousness and from the beatific vision, is indeed conscious of the incarnate person himself but is not conscious of the non-incarnate nature.   See De constitutione Christi 115, on psychological ‘kenosis’ (The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 223).   Objection: there is no connection between a divine person present to himself in a human manner and the divine nature known by the beatific vision.   Reply: the divine person present to himself in a human manner asks, ‘What am I?’ and since he has two natures, he has two questions to be resolved. So with his acquired human knowledge he responds, I am a man, a rational animal; and with his human and beatific knowledge he responds by seeing God in his essence, that is, by knowing what God is.

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quaerit quid sum; cui quaestioni, cum duas habeat naturas, bis respondet: primo quidem sciendo quid sit Deus per visionem beatam; deinde etiam sciendo quid sit homo per scientiam vel infusam vel acquisitam. Instas tamen fieri non posse ut Filius Dei per conscientiam suam humanam eamque solam conscius sit personae divinae et non conscius sit naturae divinae. In divinis enim persona et natura nisi ratione non distinguitur. Respondetur: quod fieri potest, cognosci potest. Iam vero persona divina, non autem natura divina, est incarnata. Et ideo nihil impedit quominus per conscientiam Christi humanam innotescat quidem persona divina non autem natura divina. Cf. De constitutione Christi 115,24 ubi de exinanitione psychologica.

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scious of himself by his human consciousness, he asks, ‘What am I?’ To this question he gives two answers, since he has two natures: first, [he answers] by knowing, through the beatific vision, what God is; also, second, by knowing, through acquired or infused knowledge, what man is. You may go on to say that nevertheless it is impossible for the Son of God, through his human consciousness and that alone, to be conscious of a divine person and not conscious of the divine nature. For in God there is only a conceptual distinction between person and nature. Reply: Whatever can be, can be known. Now a divine person, but not the divine nature, is incarnate. And so nothing stands in the way of Christ’s becoming aware, through his human consciousness, of a divine person but not of the divine nature. See De constitutione Christi 115,24 on psychological ‘kenosis.’

24 See Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 223.

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PARS QUARTA

De Iis Quae Christi Sunt

Hactenus de unione hypostatica egimus, secundum scripturas (thesi 1a), secundum concilia (thesi 2a ad 5m), secundum fundamenta ontologica (thesi 6a ad 9m), et secundum manifestationem psychologicam (thesi 10a). At ideo Verbum Deus est homo factus ut nostra assumens sua nobis daret. Quae ergo Christo homini propria sunt, nunc considerari oportet ut in causa contemplemur quae in effectu a nobis participata et credimus et adhuc a Domino peregrinantes speramus. Quem in finem de gratia Christi (thesi 11a), de scientia Christi (thesi 12a), de impeccabilitate Christi (thesi 13a), et de libertate Christi (thesi 14a) nunc praecipue agendum est. Quibus peractis in quinta parte de redemptione nostra tractandum erit.1

THESIS 11 Natura humana Christi gratia sanctificante habituali cum virtutibus et donis ornatur et quidem cum singulari plenitudine. Termini gratia: multipliciter dicitur; proprie, ens creatum absolute supernaturale

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PART FOUR



What Belongs Properly to Christ

To this point we have considered the hypostatic union on the basis of scripture (thesis 1), the councils (theses 2 through 5), its ontological foundations (theses 6 through 9), and its psychological manifestation (thesis 10). But God the Word became human so that in assuming what is ours he might give us what is his. Hence, we now have to consider what belongs properly to Christ the man, in order to contemplate in their cause the things which in their effect we participate in – as we believe and, being pilgrims away from the Lord, as we also hope. To this end we now turn in particular to the grace of Christ (thesis 11), the knowledge of Christ (thesis 12), the impeccability of Christ (thesis 13), and the freedom of Christ (thesis 14). After that we turn in part 5 to treat the redemption.1 Thesis 11 The human nature of Christ is adorned by habitual grace, together with the virtues and gifts in singular fullness. Terms grace: the word is used in a number of ways; properly speaking, grace is an



1 The three theses (15–17) that treat the redemption have been moved to vol. 9 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, The Redemption (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).

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(i. e., excedens proportionem cuiuslibet essentiae substantialis et finitae). habitus: qualitas difficile mobilis; distinguitur entitativus (sanitas, pulchritudo) et operativus (qui potentias operandi perficit). gratia sanctificans: habitus entitativus accidentalis absolute supernaturalis, virtutes: habitus operativi boni supernaturales, dona: quibus quis prompte et suaviter a principio superiori in bonum, virtutes excedens, movetur. plenitudo: secundum totam rationem.2 singularis: non communis multis. Nota Quae explicite in scripturis habentur sunt de fide; ipsa tamen enuntiatio supponit systematizationem theologicam; quoad gratiam sanctificantem, ita est certa et communis ut contraria esset temeraria opinio; imo, Suarez propter consensum censet hanc partem esse de fide; quoad virtutes et dona, est certa et communis; quoad modum intelligendi plenitudinem, libere disputatur.

Auctores Boyer 155–77; Galtier 239–51; d’Alès 245–54; Bertetto 224–72 ubi bibliographia recens.3

Praenotamen: De natura probationis 1 Doctrinae evolutio generalis Quae in NT annuntiatur et describitur, nova creatura et nova in Christo vita, sub generali et communi nomine gratiae designari solet. Patres graeci

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absolutely supernatural created entity; that is, it exceeds the proportion of any finite substantial essence whatever. habit: a quality difficult to alter; there is a distinction between entitative habits (health, beauty) and operative habits, which perfect potencies of operating. sanctifying grace: an accidental entitative habit, absolutely supernatural. virtues: good, supernatural, operative habits. gifts: through gifts one promptly and easily is moved by a higher principle towards a good that exceeds the virtues. fullness: in keeping with their entire meaning.2 singular: not common to many. Theological note of the thesis What is explicitly in scripture has the note ‘of faith.’ The presentation itself, however, presumes a theological systematization. As regards sanctifying grace, what the thesis states is so certain and so commonly held that the contrary would be a rash opinion; indeed, the consensus on this part led Suárez to consider it a matter ‘of faith.’ As regards virtues and gifts, what the thesis states is certain and common. As regards the way their fullness is understood, the matter is freely disputed. Bibliography Boyer, De Verbo incarnato 155–77; Galtier, De incarnatione ac redemptione 239– 51; d’Alès, De Verbo incarnato 245–54; Bertetto, Gesù redentore 224–72, with a recent bibliography.3 Preliminary note: The nature of the proof 1 The general development of the doctrine What is proclaimed and described in the New Testament – a new creation and a new life in Christ – is usually given the general and common name of



2 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 7, a. 11. Christ’s grace is without measure in the sense that it includes whatever pertains to the meaning of grace. 3 For bibliographical details on these manuals, see the bibliography.

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praecipue ad hominem redemptum, transformatum, quodammodo deificatum attenderunt (cf. inter alios, J. Gross, La divinisation du chrétien chez les pères grecs, Paris 1938). Latini in pelagianismo expellendo incumbentes ad opera et merita mentem verterunt. Mediaevales systematizationem elaboraverunt. Qua in systematizatione initialis fuit gressus ut inter gratiam habitualem et actualem fieret distinctio. Ita iam anno 1201 Innocentius iii hanc opinionem memoravit loco secundo ut parvuli baptizati non solam culpae remissionem haberent (uti voluit prima opinio) sed etiam virtutes quoad habitum (db 410, ds 780). At saeculo elapso, concilium Viennense cum theologis tunc modernis sensit probabiliorem esse opinionem olim secundam (db 483, ds 904).4 Longe maioris momenti fuit distinctio inter duos ordines entitativos, naturalem nempe et supernaturalem, quae post annum 1230 communiter recipiebatur, ut scilicet non solum gratia naturam, fides rationem, caritas bonam voluntatem humanam, meritum coram Deo bonam aestimationem, visio Dei naturalem hominis felicitatem superaret, sed etiam ipsum hoc ‘superare’ fundamentum haberet ontologicum. Cf. A. Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, i, Regensburg, 1952. Longe brevius, B. Lonergan, Theol. Stud. 2 (1941) 289–307. Quam systematizationem plene evolutam apud S. Thomam seniorem invenies, qui in Summa theologiae, 1-2, qq. 49–54 de habitibus, qq. 55–67 de virtutibus, q. 68 de donis, qq. 109–14 de gratia, et 3, qq. 7 et 8 de gratia Christi tractavit. 2 Conspectus systematicus Systematice intellecta, gratia dicit ordinem supernaturalem. Quo in ordine, duo sunt momenta principalia: quorum primum est ubi Pater et Filius hunc hominem Spiritu sancto diligunt, ipse Spiritus sanc­ tus, donum increatum, eidem homini datur, unde in illo homine resultat (tamquam terminus ad extra) habitus entitativus absolute supernaturalis (gratia sanctificans); alterum autem momentum principale est ubi divina

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grace. The Greek Fathers gave special attention to man as redeemed, transformed, and in some sort deified (see, among others, J. Gross, La divinisation du chrétien chez les pères grecs [Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1938]). The Latin Fathers, intent upon rooting out Pelagianism, turned their minds to works and merits. Medieval thinkers worked out a systematization. In this systematization the first step was the drawing of a distinction between habitual and actual grace. Thus, even [as late as] 1201 a brief of Innocent iii gave second place to the opinion that baptized infants have not only remission of sins (as the first opinion maintained) but also [the infused] virtues as habitual [but not yet in actual exercise] (db 410, ds 780). Yet, a century later, the Council of Vienne joined theologians of the time in holding that the more probable opinion was the one that formerly had been only second (db 483, ds 904, [dec 1: 361]).4 Of far greater moment was the distinction between two entitative orders, natural and supernatural, which was commonly accepted after 1230: Not only does grace surpass nature, faith surpass reason, charity surpass human good will, merit before God surpass a good reputation, and the vision of God surpass natural human happiness; further, this ‘surpassing’ has an ontological foundation. See A. Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, vol. 1 (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1952); far more briefly, B. Lonergan, Theological Studies 2 (1941) 289–307 [Grace and Freedom, chapter i-1]. You will find this systematization fully developed in the later work of Thomas, who treats habits in Summa theologiae, 1-2, qq. 49–54; virtues in qq. 55–67; gifts in q. 68; grace in qq. 109–14; and the grace of Christ in 3, qq. 7 and 8. 2 Systematic overview Grace, systematically understood, denotes a supernatural order. In this order, there are two principal moments. In the first, the Father and the Son love a person in the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit, an uncreated gift, is given to this same person; and hence there results in the person, as an external term, an absolutely supernatural entitative habit, sanctifying grace. But in the second principal moment the divine essence slips into the



4 See Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) 18.

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essentia intellectui huius iusti et beatificandi illabitur, tamquam medium quo hic iustus ipsam divinam essentiam immediate intuetur, et ita divinam beatitudinem participat. In utroque momento principali habetur aspectus personalis: in primo, Deus se ipsum dat secundum dilectionem suam infinitam; in altero, Deus se ipsum dat ut ipsa sua beatitudo participetur. In utroque pariter habetur aspectus ontologicus: quod enim Deus contingenter facit, terminum ad extra convenientem exigit, nempe, in primo gratiam sanctificantem, in altero lumen gloriae. In utroque denique habetur aspectus operativus: in altero quidem quatenus ipsa beatitudo participata est in primis operatio Deum videndi; in primo autem quatenus ex gratia sanctificante, tamquam potentiae e substantia animae, fluunt virtutes infusae, dona Spiritus sancti, et proxima quaedam aptitudo ut homo per gratias actuales et sub speciali divina providentia illa bona opera in Christo faciat unde vitam aeternam merere possit. Cum tamen ordo hic supernaturalis advenit naturae non integrae sed lapsae, donum gratiae sanctificantis etiam est iustificatio impii, virtutes autem, dona, et gratiae actuales non solum hominem in ordine supernaturali operantem constituunt (gratia qua elevans) sed etiam remedium afferunt illi morali impotentiae secundum quam peccator sine gratia totam legem naturalem quoad substantiam diu implere non potest (gratia qua sanans). 3 Theologia et scriptura Quae ita systematice concepta atque ordinata sunt, nisi implicite in scripturis et traditione antecedente non inveniuntur. Quod idem intendunt et ipsa scriptura et traditio intermedia et theologia scholastica, in tractatu de gratia probatur. Quae quidem intentionis identitas in eo sane consistit, non quod vocabulum vocabulo corresponderet, non quod aliae conceptiones nescio quo pacto diversae aliis singulis substituerentur, sed quod idem verum intelligibile diversis modis decursu temporum et proficiente intelligentia, scientia, sapientia (db 1800, ds 3020) apprehenditur. Quam ob causam, qui huius theseos veritatem probare vult, in primis prae oculis habere debet, non vocabulum gratiae, non hanc vel illam gratiae definitionem, sed ipsam rem secundum totam suam amplitudinem concretam. Eadem enim est res quae in scripturis proponitur et quae a

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intellect of this justified person who is to be beatified, as the medium by which this justified person immediately beholds the divine essence itself, and thus takes part in divine beatitude. There is a personal aspect in each of the principal moments. In the first, God gives himself on the basis of his infinite love; in the second, God gives himself so that his very beatitude may be participated in. Likewise, there is an ontological aspect in each moment. For anything that God does contingently requires an appropriate external term – sanctifying grace in the first moment, the light of glory in the second. Finally, there is an operative aspect in each moment: in the second, in that participated beatitude itself is chiefly the operation of seeing God; but in the first moment also, in that there flow from sanctifying grace, as potencies flow from the substance of the soul, infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and a proximate aptitude such that through actual graces, and under special divine providence, one does those good works in Christ by which one can merit eternal life. Since, however, this supernatural order comes not to unfallen but to fallen nature, the gift of sanctifying grace is also the justification of the wicked, while virtues, gifts, and actual graces not only constitute one as operating in the supernatural order (grace as elevating) but also bring the remedy for that moral impotence which makes a sinner unable, without grace, to fulfill for long the whole natural law in its substance (grace as healing). 3 Theology and scripture What has been systematically conceived and ordered in this way is found only implicitly in scripture and in earlier tradition. The theological treatise on grace proves that it is the same reality that is intended by scripture itself, by Scholastic theology, and by the tradition between these. This identity of intention does not, of course, consist in word-for-word correspondence. Nor does it consist in replacing different single conceptions with others, according to who knows what rule. Rather does it consist in apprehending the same intelligible truth in different ways as time passes and as understanding, science, and wisdom advance (db 1800, ds 3020, [dec 2: 809]). For this reason, what those who would prove the truth of this thesis need to keep before their eyes is not the term ‘grace,’ and not this or that definition of grace, but above all the reality itself in all its concrete breadth. For what scripture sets out and what the theologians understand and conceive

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theologis systematice intelligitur et concipitur. Cuius rei apprehensio facit terminum medium per quem concluditur a Deo revelatum fuisse quod a theologis de gratia Christi docetur. 4 Modus procedendi Primo, exponitur doctrina sacrae scripturae de gratia Christi (a). Deinde, deducuntur conclusiones theologicae (b). Laudabiliter sane doctrina patristica etiam exponeretur. At haec doctrina tenet loca intermedia inter modum loquendi scripturisticum et multiplices scholasticorum distinctiones, ut, quod in scriptura habetur, facile apud Patres communiter repetitum inveniatur et, pro diversitate temporum et occasionum, haec vel illa distinctio scholastica iam adumbrata vel incepta vel evoluta ponatur. Quod maximam quandam complexitatem inducit. Indicationes apud Galtier 242–43, 248–49 habentur.

Argumentum (a)  gratia christi in scripturis 1 Exemplar omnis virtutis (a) Dilectio Patris. Io 8.29: quae placita sunt ei, facio semper. Cf. Io 4.34, 5.30, 14.31, Heb 10.5–10. (b) Dilectio proximi. Io 13.34 = 15.12: ut diligatis invicem sicut ego dilexi vos. Cf. Io 13.1, Gal 2.20, Eph 5.2, 5.25. (c) Exemplum. Io 13.15: exemplum dedi vobis, ut quemadmodum ego feci vobis, ita et vos faciatis. (d) Sequere me. (1) Dicitur individuis: Mt 8.22, 9.9, 19.21, Io 1.43, 21.19, 21.22; (2) universaliter: Mt 10.38. 16.24, Mc 8.34, Lc 9.23, 1 Pet 2.21, Io 8.12, 10.4, 10.27, 12.26. (e) Imitatio Christi. Gal 4.19: filioli mei, quos iterum parturio, donec Christus formetur in vobis. Cf. schema syntheticum paulinum, supra pp. 52–64. 2 Christus meruit suam gloriam. Phil 2.9, Heb 2.9. Nam ubi Deus dat exaltationem, coronam, propter opus, ibi est opus praemio dignum seu meritum.

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in systematic fashion is the same reality. Apprehending this reality provides the middle term by which to conclude that what the theologians teach about the grace of Christ has been revealed by God. 4 Procedure First the teaching of sacred scripture on the grace of Christ is expounded (a); then theological conclusions are drawn (b). Admirable though it would be to expound the patristic teaching as well, the place this teaching occupies is halfway between the scriptural way of speaking and the many distinctions of the Scholastics. Thus, it is easy to find what is in scripture commonly repeated in the Fathers, while here and there, from time to time, this or that Scholastic distinction is already foreshadowed or introduced or developed. This leads to the greatest complexity. There are indications in Galtier, De incarnatione ac redemptione 242–43, 248–49. The argument (a)  the grace of christ in scripture 1 The exemplar of every virtue (a) Love of the Father: ‘I always do what is pleasing to him’ (John 8.29). See John 4.34, 5.30, 14.31, Hebrews 10.5–10. (b) Love of neighbor: ‘… even as I have loved you, that you also love one another’ (John 13.34, 15.12). See John 13.1, Galatians 2.20, Ephesians 5.2, 5.25. (c) Example: ‘For I have given you an example, that you also should do as I have done to you’ (John 13.15). (d) Follow me: This is said (1) to individuals (Matthew 8.22, 9.9, 19.21, John 1.43, 21.19, 21.22) and (2)  universally (Matthew 10.38, 16.24, Mark 8.34, Luke 9.23, 1 Peter 2.21, John 8.12, 10.4, 10.27, 12.26). (e) Imitation of Christ: ‘My little children, with whom I am again in travail until Christ be formed in you’ (Galatians 4.19). Cf. the Pauline synthetic pattern, pp. 52–65 above. 2 Christ merited his glory. See Philippians 2.9 and Hebrews 2.9. If God gives exaltation, a crown of glory, on account of a deed, that deed is a merit, a deed worthy of reward.

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3 Filius a Patre diligitur. (a) Hic est Filius meus dilectus (Mt 3.17, 17.5, Mc 1.11, 9.7, Lc 3.22, 2 Pet 1.17). (b) Io 3.35: Pater diligit Filium et omnia dedit in manu eius. Io 10.17: Propterea me diligit Pater, quia ego pono animam meam, ut iterum sumam eam. Io 15.9: Sicut dilexit me Pater, et ego dilexi vos (cf. 15.13). Io 17.23: tu … dilexisti eos, sicut et me dilexisti; 17.24: dilexisti me ante constitutionem mundi; 17.26: ut dilectio, qua dilexisti me, in ipsis sit, et ego in ipsis.

(c) Eph 1.6: gratificavit nos in dilecto Filio suo. Col 1.13: eripuit nos de potestate tenebrarum, et transtulit in regnum Filii dilectionis suae.

4 Sanctitas Lc 1.35, Io 10.36, Act 3.14. Cf. thesin 13m de impeccabilitate Christi.

5 Habet sanctum Spiritum. (a) In specie columbae: Mt 3.17, Mc 1.11, Lc 3.22. (b) Mt 12.18: Ponam spiritum meum super eum. Lc 4.18: Spiritus Domini super me (cf. v. 21). Is 11.1–2: et egredietur virga de radice Iesse, et flos de radice eius ascendet, et requiescet super eum spiritus Domini: spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, spiritus consilii et fortitudinis, spiritus scientiae et pietatis, et replebit eum spiritus timoris Domini. Io 3.34.

(c) Dirigitur a Spiritu: Mt 4.1, Mc 1.12, Lc 4.1, 4.14. Cf. Lc 10.21: exsultavit Spiritu Sancto. Heb 9.14. (d) In spiritu Dei eicit daemones: Mt 12.28. (e) Dat, mittit Spiritum: Io 7.37–39, 14.17, 14. 26, 15.26, 16.7, 16.12–15.

6 Est fons gratiae. (a) 1 Tim 2.5: Unus enim Deus, unus et mediator Dei et hominum [homo] Christus Iesus, qui dedit semetipsum redemptionem pro omnibus. Heb 8.6, 9.15, 12.24: mediator melioris, novi testamenti (cf. 8.8–12).

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3 The Son is loved by the Father. (a) ‘This is my beloved Son’ (Matthew 3.17, 17.5, Mark 1.11, 9.7, Luke 3.22, 2 Peter 1.17). (b) ‘The Father loves the Son, and has given all things into his hand’ (John 3.35). ‘For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life, that I may take it up again’ (John 10.17). ‘As the Father has loved me, so have I loved you’ (John 15.9; see 15.13). ‘You … have loved them even as you have loved me’ (John 17.23). ‘You loved me before the foundation of the world’ (John 17.24). ‘That the love with which you have loved me may be in them, and I in them’ (John 17.26). (c) Ephesians 1.6 speaks of God’s ‘glorious grace which he freely bestowed on us in the Beloved.’ ‘He rescued us from the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of his beloved Son’ (Colossians 1.13). 4 Holiness See Luke 1.35, John 10.36, Acts 3.14. Also see thesis 13 on the sinlessness of Christ. 5 Christ has the Holy Spirit. (a) In the form of a dove; see Matthew 3.17, Mark 1.11, Luke 3.22. (b) ‘I will put my Spirit upon him’ (Matthew 12.18); ‘the Spirit of the Lord is upon me’ (Luke 4.18; cf. 4.21). ‘There shall come forth a shoot from the stump of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots. And the Spirit of the LORD shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and the fear of the LORD. And his delight shall be in the fear of the LORD’ (Isaiah 11.1–2). See also John 3.34. (c) Jesus is led by the Spirit (Matthew 4.1, Mark 1.12, Luke 4.1, 4.14). Cf. Luke 10.21, ‘he rejoiced in the Holy Spirit’; also Hebrews 9.14. (d) He casts out demons by the spirit of God (Matthew 12.28). (e) He gives and sends the Spirit (John 7.37–39, 14.17, 14.26, 15.26, 16.7, 16.12–15). 6 Christ is the source of grace. (a) ‘For there is one God, and there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all’ (1 Timothy 2.5). The letter to Hebrews speaks of him as the mediator of a new covenant, a better covenant (Hebrews 8.6, 9.15, 12.24; see also 8.8–12).

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Heb 5.9: factus est omnibus obtemperantibus sibi causa salutis aeternae. (b) Rom 5.15–21, Eph 1.5–7, Col 1.12–14. Cf. schema paulinum. (c) Io 15.1–11: vitis et palmites; cf. db 809, ds 1546; cf. textus de ‘vita’ apud Ioannem, supra p. 144. (d) Io 1.14, 1.16: plenum gratiae et veritatis … et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus et gratiam pro gratia. (e) Eph 3.16–19; Col 2.9–15; cf. supra pp. 114–32. (b)  conclusiones theologicae 1 Gratia Christi differt a nostra, quia Christus nullatenus habuit peccatum (thesis 13a) et ideo in eo non fuit remissio peccatorum, iustificatio impii, conversio iniusti in iustum vel inimici in amicum (db 799, ds 1528), vel gratia qua sanans naturam humanam lapsam. Praeterea, cum Christus fuerit Filius naturalis, nequaquam adoptivus (cf. scholion), non habuit adoptionem filiorum, neque mediatore indigebat (cf. db 790, ds 1513), neque in se ipsum, Filium Dei, credidit (thesis 12a). Praeterea, cum ipse sit vita aeterna (1 Io 1.2), non habuit spem vitae aeternae, quamvis aliam spem habuerit. 2 Habuit operationes supernaturales et virtutes infusas. Nam erat exemplar omnium virtutum, ideoque eas virtutes exercebat quae in vitam aeternam conducebant. Vide a, 1. Neque dicendum est eum operatione quidem exercuisse, ipsos tamen habitus operativos bonos et supernaturales non accepisse. Praerequiruntur enim habitus ad operationes, tum quia operationes sunt supernaturales, tum quia sine habitibus operationes non sunt connaturales, promptae, suaves. Sum. theol., 1-2, q. 110, a. 2. Neque rationabiliter dici potest Deum Patrem minus proprio Filio providisse quam iis quos propter Filium providet.

3 Habuit dona Spiritus sancti. Doctrina enim de donis fundatur maxime in Is 11.1–3; supra a, 5, b. Sed hic locus est messianicus. Praeterea, secundum dona operabatur. Qui enim semper facit quae sunt

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‘He became the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him’ (Hebrews 5.9). (b) Romans 5.15–21, Ephesians 1.5–7, Colossians 1.12–14. See above on the Pauline synthetic pattern. (c) The vine and the branches (John 15.1–11); see db 809, ds 1546, [dec 2: 678]; and p. 147 above on the texts about ‘life’ in John. (d) ‘Full of grace and truth … and from his fullness have we all received, grace upon grace’ (John 1.14, 1.16). (e) Ephesians 3.16–19, Colossians 2.9–15. See pp. 115–33 above. (b)  theological conclusions 1­ Christ’s grace is different from ours, since Christ had no sin at all (thesis 13). Not for him, therefore, the remission of sins, the justification of the wicked, the conversion of the unrighteous to righteousness, of enemies into friends (db 799, ds 1528, [dec 2: 673]); not for him, in short, the grace that heals fallen human nature. Further, since Christ was Son by nature, not by adoption (see the Scholion below), [God’s] adoption of sons did not pertain to him, nor did he need a mediator (see db 790, ds 1513, [dec 2: 666]), nor did he believe in himself, the Son of God (thesis 12). Further, since he himself is life eternal (1 John 1.2), he had not the hope of eternal life, although he had another hope. 2 Christ had supernatural operations and infused virtues. For he was an example of all virtues, and therefore he exercised those virtues which lead to eternal life. See a, 1 above. It should not be said that while he did exercise them in operation, he did not receive these good, supernatural, operative habits. For the habits are prerequisites for the operations, both because the operations are supernatural, and because without habits operations are not connatural, prompt, and agreeable. See Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 110, a. 2. Nor can it reasonably be said that God the Father provided any less for his own Son than what he provides [for others] on account of his Son. 3 He had gifts of the Holy Spirit. The teaching about these gifts is mainly founded on Isaiah 11.1–3 (above, a, 5, b). But this is a messianic passage. Further, he operated in accordance with these gifts. For one who always

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placita Patri, hoc non facit virtute cuiuslibet principii finiti (natura humana, virtutes infusae) sed quatenus a Spiritu Dei movetur. Vide a, 1, a; 5, cf. Sum. theol., 1-2, q. 68, a. 1; 3, q. 7, a. 5. Dices: erat persona divina. Respondetur: operationes sunt personae a natura; et nunc non agitur de operatione Christi divina sed humana. Dices: habuit summam caritatem. Respondetur: sed ipsa haec caritas etiam erat obedientia, Sum. theol., 3, q. 47, a. 2, ad 3m. Dices: habuit virtutem obedientiae. Respondetur: quamvis tam per obedientiam quam per dona ab alia moveamur, alia tamen manet ratio virtutis et alia ratio doni. Virtus enim facit bonum opus nobis connaturale, scilicet, ut opus characteri, personalitati correspondeat, conveniat, secundum quod dicitur: virtus hominem facit bonum et opus eius bonum reddit. Dona autem faciunt ut ea quae super nos, super principia finita, sunt, nihilominus prompte et suaviter in nobis et per nos a principio infinito efficiantur.

4 Habuit gratiam habitualem sanctificantem. (a) Vide Sum. theol., 1-2, q. 110, a. 1 c. Unde concludes gratiam habitualem sanctificantem esse terminum creatum supernaturalem receptum in homine ex speciali Dei dilectione erga eundem. Cf. thesin 9m, pp. 454–56. Iam vero Iesus est ‘Filius meus dilectus’ (a, 3, a); quia a Patre diligitur, omnia ei dantur; ita a Patre diligitur, sicut ipse nos diligit; ita a Patre diligitur, quia ponet animam suam (a, 3, b).5 Diligitur quidem a Patre ut Filius aeternus ante constitutionem mundi; sed sicut ipse a Patre diligitur, ita etiam diliguntur homines (Io 17.23, 17.24, 17.26). Unde in dilecto (Filio) gratificamur (Eph 1.6), et erepti a potestate tenebrarum in regnum Filii dilectionis transferimur (Col 1.13).

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does what is pleasing to the Father does so, not in virtue of any finite principle (human nature, infused virtues), but inasmuch as he is moved by the Spirit of God. See above, a, 1, a; also 5; and Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 68, a. 1; 3, q. 7, a. 5. You may be saying that he was a divine person. Reply: Operations belong to a person from his nature, and at present it is not a matter of Christ’s divine operation but of his human operation. You may be saying that he had supreme charity. Reply: But this charity was itself obedience also; see Summa theologiae, 3, q. 47, a. 2, ad 3m. You may be saying that he had the virtue of obedience. Reply: Although we are moved by obedience as much as we are by what someone else has given us, it remains that what is meant by virtue is one thing and by gift something different. For virtue makes a good deed connatural to us, that is, a deed corresponding with or appropriate to our character or personality; hence the saying, ‘Virtue makes a man good and renders good his deed.’ A gift, on the other hand, brings it about that things which are beyond us, which surpass finite principles, are nevertheless done promptly and easily, in us and through us, by an infinite principle. 4 Christ had habitual sanctifying grace. (a) See Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 110, a. 1 c. From this you will gather that habitual sanctifying grace is a supernatural, created term received in a person from God’s special love towards that person. See assertion 9, 454–57. Now, Jesus is ‘my beloved Son’ (above, a, 3, a). Because he is loved by the Father, all things are given to him; he is loved by the Father, as he himself loves us; he is so loved by the Father because he will lay down his life (a, 3, b).5 He is indeed loved by the Father as the eternal Son, before the foundation of the world; but as he is loved by the Father, so too does he love others (John 17.23, 17.24, 17.26). Hence, it is ‘in the Beloved,’ the Son, that grace is bestowed on us (Ephesians 1.6), and we have been rescued from the power of darkness and transferred to the kingdom of his beloved Son (Colossians 1.13).



5 Reverting to 1960, where ‘ita a Patre diligitur’ appears twice, prior to ‘sicut ipse nos diligit’ and to ‘quia ponet animam suam.’ Both are referenced in a, 3, b.

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(b) Baptismus Christi est exemplar nostri baptismi. Sicut ergo nos per baptismum habemus gratiam sanctificantem et donum increatum Spiritus sancti, ita baptismus Christi erat manifestatio gratiae sanctificantis Christi et doni increati Spiritus sancti ei dati (a, 3, a; 5, a, b). (c) Gratia sanctificans est principium meriti. Sed Christus meruit gloriam suam (a, 2) et salutem nostram (Rom. 5.19: ‘per obeditionem,’ quae solummodo per modum meriti habet effectum iustificandi multos). (d) Erat plenus gratia et veritate, de qua plenitudine nos omnes accepimus (Io 1.14, 1.16); in eo erat plenitudo deitatis in quo Colossenses sunt repleti (Col 2.9–10; supra, p. 130). 5 Habuit gratiam unionis. Sum. theol., 3, q. 2, a. 10; q. 6, a. 6. Gratia unionis est: ‘ipsum quod est humanam naturam esse unitam personae divinae’ (a. 10); et paulo aliter, ‘ipsum esse personale quod gratis divinitus datur humanae naturae in persona Verbi’ (a. 6). De hac ergo gratia iam egimus, thesibus 1a ad 9m. Per prius exponitur haec gratia sicut a. 6 definitur, scilicet, esse personale Verbi gratis datum huic naturae assumptae. Unde statim sequitur altera definitio, nempe, naturam assumptam esse unitam personae divinae, a. 10.

Sicut unionem consequitur actus supernaturalis, de quo assertum 9m, ita etiam gratiam unionis consequitur idem actus supernaturalis. Dicitur consequens, non tempore quia non prius natura humana actu assumitur quam habetur ille actus, neque ratione quia non est verum Filium hanc naturam assumpsisse nisi habetur ille terminus ad extra, sed realiter seu natura sicut Deus realiter scit, vult, facit, antequam fiat terminus ad extra.

6 Christus homo est substantialiter sanctus. Sicut Deus est ens per essentiam, verum per essentiam, bonum per essentiam, ita etiam per essentiam est sanctus. Sicut creaturae sunt entia, vera, bona non per essentiam sed per participationem (essentia enim creaturae non est essentia ipsius entis, veri, boni, sed ratio quaedam finita, uti angelica, humana, equina, etc.), ita etiam sunt sanctae per participationem.

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(b) The baptism of Christ is the exemplar of our baptism. Thus, just as we through baptism have sanctifying grace and the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, so also Christ’s baptism manifested his sanctifying grace and the gift of the uncreated Holy Spirit given to him (a, 3, a; 5, a, b). (c) Sanctifying grace is the principle of merit. But Christ merited his glory (a, 2) and our salvation (Romans 5.19: ‘through obedience,’ which only by way of merit has the effect of making many righteous). (d) He was full of grace and truth, and of that fullness have we all received (John 1.14, 1.16). In him dwells ‘the whole fullness of deity,’ with which the Colossians are filled (Colossians 2.9–10; see, p. 131 above). 5 He had the grace of union. See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 2, a. 10; q. 6, a. 6. The grace of union is ‘the fact that a human nature is united with a divine person’ (q. 2, a. 10). Stated somewhat differently, it is ‘the personal act of existence that is freely given by God to a human nature in the person of the Word’ (q. 6, a. 6). This grace has already been treated, therefore, in theses 1 through 9. This grace was first expounded as Thomas defines it in the latter article (6); that is, as the Word’s personal act of existence, freely given to this assumed human nature. His other definition follows at once: this assumed human nature is united with a divine person, as the former article (10) has it. Just as a supernatural act (treated in assertion 9) is the consequence of the union, so the same supernatural act is a consequence of the grace of union. It is said to be consequent, not in time, not [just] in our thinking, but really, by nature. It is not consequent in time, because the human nature is not actually assumed prior to that act. It is not consequent [only] in our thinking, because it is not true that the Son assumed this nature unless there is just that external term. Rather, it is really or by nature a consequence, just as God really knows, wills, and acts before an external term comes to be. 6 Christ the man is substantially holy. As God is being by essence, true by essence, good by essence, so too is he holy by essence. Creatures are beings or true or good, not by essence but by participation (for the essence of a creature is not the essence of being itself, of the true itself, or of the good itself, but some finite intelligibility – angelic, human, equine, and so on); and so also they are holy by participation.

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Supernaturaliter tamen creaturis communicatur ipsum sanctum per essentiam, et quidem dupliciter: uno modo, accidentaliter, uti in gratia sanctificante datur donum increatum Spiritus sancti, et in visione beata datur ipsa divina essentia intellectui creato illapsa (Sum. theol., 1, q. 12, aa. 4, 5); alio modo, substantialiter, quod in solo Christo invenitur in quo humana natura unitur Deo in persona Verbi. Jan Rohof, La sainteté substantielle du Christ dans la théologie scolastique. Histoire du problème (Fribourg [Suisse]: Éditions St-Paul, 1952). 7 Christus homo habuit plenitudinem gratiae singularem. Io 1.14-16; Col 2.9-10; a, 6, d, e. Sum. theol., 3, q. 7, aa. 9-11. Primo, secundum gratiam unionis, quod est esse personale Verbi gratis datum huic naturae assumptae. Nam substantialia non dicuntur secundum plus et minus; aut aliquid est Deus aut non, aut angelus aut non, aut homo aut non, aut equus aut non, etc. Porro, quae non dicuntur secundum plus et minus, aut plene sunt aut nullatenus. lam vero, gratia unionis erat secundum substantiam; et ideo necessario rationem plenitudinis habuit. Et cum nullus alius gratiam unionis habeat, haec plenitudo est singularis. Deinde, secundum gratiam habitualem, sanctificantem, quae est terminus specialis dilectionis Dei Patris. Nam dilectio Patris erga Filium aeternum erat plena atque singularis; neque minus Pater Filium diligit hominem factum; ergo plena et singularis erat dilectio Patris erga Filium hominem et, per consequens, gratia ex illa dilectione in Filio homine resultans erat plena et singularis. Tertio, secundum virtutes infusas et dona Spiritus sancti, nam horum mensura est gratia sanctificans ex qua resultant sicut potentiae ex substantia animae. Docet sane sacra scriptura beatam Virginem (etiam S. Stephanum) fuisse gratia plenam. Quae tamen plenitudo erat alterius rationis, nempe, relativa ad capacitatem recipientis, et non quia ipsa etiam erat persona divina. Cf. Sum. theol., 3, q. 7, a. 10, ad 1m. Quarto, quaeri solet utrum gratia Christi fuerit infinita. Respondetur eam non fuisse infinitam secundum entitatem, nam ens infinitum est Deus

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Essential holiness is, however, communicated to creatures supernaturally, and that in two ways. First, it is communicated accidentally. In this way the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit is given in sanctifying grace, and in the beatific vision the divine essence itself is given as it slips into a created intellect (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, aa. 4, 5). Second, it is communicated substantially. This happens only to Christ, in whom a human nature is united with God in the person of the Word. See Jan Rohof, La sainteté substantielle du Christ dans la théologie scolastique: Histoire du problème (Fribourg [Suisse]: Éditions St-Paul, 1952). 7 Christ the man had a singular fullness of grace. See John 1.14–16, Colossians 2.9–10; above, a, 6, d, e; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 7, aa. 9–11. In the first place, this fullness was his on the basis of the grace of union, which is the Word’s personal act of existence, freely given to this assumed nature. What is substantial is not so designated in terms of more or less. Something either is or is not God, either is or is not an angel, either is or is not a man, either is or is not a horse, and so forth. And what is not designated in terms of more or less either fully is, or else is not at all. Now the grace of union was substantial; necessarily, then, it meets the definition of fullness. And since nobody else has the grace of union, this fullness is singular. In the second place, this fullness was his on the basis of habitual sanctifying grace, which is the term of a special love on the part of God the Father. For the Father’s love for his eternal Son was full and singular, and the Father has no less love for the Son made man. Hence, the Father’s love for the Son [made] man was full and singular and, consequently, the grace resulting from this love was full and singular in the Son [made] man. In the third place, this fullness was his on the basis of infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, for the measure of these is sanctifying grace, from which they result as potencies result from the substance of the soul. Holy scripture does teach that the Blessed Virgin (and Stephen also) was full of grace. Here, however, fullness means something different, which is relative to the capacity of the receiver rather than because she herself was also a divine person. See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 7, a. 10, ad 1m. In the fourth place, it is often asked whether Christ’s grace was infinite. The answer is that it was not entitatively infinite, for infinite being is God alone.

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solus; dici tamen posse infinitam secundum rationem gratiae, i.e., non relative sed absolute plenam. 8 Christus homo habuit gratiam capitis. Gratia capitis est gratia Christi qua caput corporis sui mystici; ideoque est gratia secundum quam Christus est mediator, fons omnis gratiae, a, 6. Non distinguitur realiter a gratia sanctificante Christi, Sum. theol., 3, q. 8, a. 5. Christus est mediator omnis gratiae quia dilectio Patris erga Filium aeternum extenditur (1) in Filium qua hominem, unde gratia Christi sanctificans, et (2) mediante Filio in filios adoptionis. Vide Gal 4.4–6, Io 17.23, 17.24, 17.26, Eph 1.5–7.6 9 Christus homo habuit donum timoris Domini (db 378, ds 731). Nam timor Domini enumeratur inter dona Spiritus sancti (Is 11.3); et Chr­istus habuit dona, nam hic locus est messianicus. Habuit autem Christus hoc donum, non secundum timorem separationis a Deo per culpam, neque secundum timorem punitionis quae ex culpa sequitur, sed secundum affectum reverentiae erga Creatorem. Heb 5.7: exauditus est pro sua reverentia. Vide Sum. theol., 3, q. 7, a. 6. De fide et spe in Christo homine, ibid. aa. 3 et 4.

10 Utrum omnis gratia sit gratia Christi. Essentialiter, omnis gratia est gratia Christi. Nam gratia de se non est Dei, qui nulla creatura indiget, neque est creaturae, cuius proportionem gratia superat, sed est Christi hominis, seu personae divinae in natura creata subsistentis, nam gratia illi naturae confert ea quae personae divinae in tali natura subsistenti conveniunt, ut scilicet Deo uniatur secundum plenam amicitiam. Et secundum hoc intelligi potest quod a Patribus dicebatur: Christus nostra assumpsit ut sua nobis daret.

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But it can be said to be infinite with respect to what is meant by grace; not relatively full, that is, but absolutely. 8 Christ the man had the grace of the Head. The grace of the Head is Christ’s grace as Head of his mystical body, and so it is the grace by which Christ is the mediator and source of all grace (above, a, 6). It is not really distinct from the sanctifying grace of Christ; see Summa theologiae, 3, q. 8, a. 5. Christ is the mediator of all grace because the Father’s love for his eternal Son extends (1) to the Son as man – hence Christ’s sanctifying grace – and (2) through the Son as mediator to the Father’s adopted children. See Galatians 4.4–6, John 17.23, 17.24, 17.26, Ephesians 1.5–7.6 9 Christ the man had the gift of the fear of the Lord (db 378, ds 731). For the fear of the Lord is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit in Isaiah 11.3, and Christ had those gifts, since this is a messianic passage. Christ had this gift, however, not in the sense of a fear of separation from God through fault, nor in the sense of a fear of the punishment that results from fault, but in the sense of a feeling of awe towards the Creator. ‘He was heard for his godly fear’ (Vulgate, reverentia) (Hebrews 5.7). See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 7, a. 6. On faith and hope in Christ the man, see Summa theologiae, 3, q. 7, aa. 3 and 4. 10 Is every grace a grace of Christ? Essentially, every grace is Christ’s grace. Of itself, grace does not belong to God, who needs nothing created; it belongs to no creature, for grace is disproportionate to creatures; it belongs to Christ the man, to a divine person subsisting in a created nature, for grace confers on that nature what befits a divine person subsisting in such a nature, so that he may be united to God on the basis of full friendship. And it is possible to understand on that basis the Fathers’ saying: ‘Christ assumed what is ours that he might give us what is his.’



6 Further exposition of this theme may be found in Bernard Lonergan, ‘The Mystical Body of Christ,’ in Shorter Papers, vol. 20 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert C. Croken, Robert M. Doran, and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 106–11.

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Actualiter, omnis gratia est gratia Christi in redemptis, qui nisi per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum mediatorem gratiam non habent (db 790, ds 1513). Circa angelos, certum est in regno caelorum omnia Christo subici (Eph 1.20–22, Col 1.20, 2.10, Heb 2.8, 12.22, 1 Cor 15.24–28); quae subiectio maxime est intelligenda secundum vitam beatam eorum qui divinam beatitudinem participant, ideoque est secundum ordinem gratiae. Vide Sum. theol., 3, q. 8, a. 4; q. 13, a. 2, ad 2m. Ulterius processit Scotus qui docuit angelos primam suam gratiam Christo homini debuisse; quod a Thomista probari posse censet C. Boyer, p. 175; cf. Sum. theol., 2-2, q. 2, a. 7; 3, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5m.

11 Utrum a primo instante Christus habuerit gratiam perfectam. db 250, ds 479. Sum. theol., 3, q. 34, a. 1. A primo instante habuit gratiam unionis (db 250, ds 479). Ad quam immediate sequitur gratia sanctificans: semper enim Pater Filium hominem ut suum Filium diligebat. Sed immediate ex gratia sanctificante et secundum perfectionem gratiae sanctificantis procedunt virtutes infusae et dona, sicut et immediate ex anima intellectiva procedunt potentiae. A primo instante ergo Christus habuit iam perfectam omnem gratiam habitualem. Patet vero Christum hominem a primo instante non exercuisse omnes vitae suae mortalis operationes. Neque oeconomiae salutis conveniebat ut parvulus operaretur quasi vir esset. Et ideo secundum operationes, quibus tum habitus tum actuales gratiae manifestantur, dicitur Christus profecisse sapientia et aetate et gratia (Lc 2.52). Cf. Sum. theol., 3, q. 7, a. 12, ad 3m. Cyrillus Alexandrinus, Adversus Nestorium, iii, 4: ‘Quomodo igitur proficere dictus est? Ut ego arbitror, quia Deus Verbum divinorum illorum bonorum quae sibi aderant manifestationem pro incremento et aetate sui corporis admetiebatur’ (pg 76, 153; aco, i, 1, 6, p. 70. Xiberta p. 435, § 126).

12 Utrum realiter distinguantur gratiae in Christo receptae. Distinguitur gratia sanctificans a gratia unionis. Nam gratia sanctificans dicit specialem dilectionem Dei Patris; diligere autem est velle bonum alicui; et natura humana, cui confertur gratia unionis, non est aliquis nam persona non assumitur; et ideo gratia unionis non potest habere rationem

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Actually, every grace is Christ’s grace in the redeemed, who have grace only through the mediator, our Lord Jesus Christ (db 790, ds 1513, [dec 2: 666]). As to the angels, it is certain that in the kingdom of heaven all things are subject to Christ (Ephesians 1.20–22, Colossians 1.20, 2.10, Hebrews 2.8, 12.22, 1 Corinthians 15.24–28). This subjection is best understood in terms of the blessed life of those who participate in divine beatitude, and so in terms of the order of grace. See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 8, a. 4; q. 13, a. 2, ad 2m. Scotus, going further, teaches that the angels owe their first grace to Christ the man. According to C. Boyer (De Verbo incarnato 175), it is possible for Thomists to prove this. See Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 2, a. 7; 3, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5m. 11 Had Christ perfect grace from his first instant? db 250, ds 479; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 34, a. 1. From his first instant Christ had the grace of union (db 250, ds 479). His sanctifying grace follows this immediately: the Father always loved the Son made man as his own Son. From sanctifying grace, however, and on the basis of the perfection of sanctifying grace, infused virtues and gifts immediately follow, just as potencies proceed immediately from the intellective soul. From his first instant Christ therefore had, already perfect, every habitual grace. Now obviously Christ the man did not from his first instant exercise all the operations of his mortal life. Nor did it befit the economy of salvation that a baby should operate as though he were an adult. And so it is with regard to operations, by which both habits and actual graces are manifested, that Christ is said to have grown in wisdom and age and grace (Luke 2.52). See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 7, a. 12, ad 3m. Cyril of Alexandria writes in his treatise against Nestorius: ‘How then is it said that he grew? Because, in my judgment, God the Word measured out, according to the increase and age of his body, the manifestation of those divine goods that were present in him’ (3, 4; mg 76, 153; [Pusey, 6: 166]; aco, 1, 1, 6, p. 70; Xiberta, Enchiridion 435, § 126). 12 Are the graces Christ received really distinct? Sanctifying grace is distinct from the grace of union. For sanctifying grace denotes a special love on the part of God the Father; to love, however, is to will the good of someone, while the human nature on which the grace of union is conferred is not someone, since a person was not assumed. Thus, the

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gratiae sanctificantis. Accedit quod gratia unionis est secundum substantiam, sed gratia sanctificans est accidens; iterum quod multi habent gratiam sanctificantem, sed solus Christus gratiam unionis; neque obstat quod gratia sanctificans necessario sequitur gratiam unionis, nam quae dicuntur accidentia inseparabilia etiam necessario sequuntur substantiam. Praeterea, gratia sanctificans distinguitur a virtutibus. Nam virtutum est reddere hominem bonum; sed bonitas alicuius mensuratur secundum naturam eius; et ideo nisi prius elevata esset natura per gratiam sanctificantem, virtutes supernaturales non haberent rationem virtutis, sed in homine essent sicut simplicitas in serpente et prudentia in columba. Sum. theol., 1-2, q. 110, a. 3. Praeterea, virtutes et dona distinguuntur. Virtutes enim hominem reddunt bonum; sed dona respiciunt ulteriorem bonitatem quae haberi non potest nisi per coniunctionem cum primo principio agente. Cf. Rom. 8.14. Sum. theol., 1-2, q. 68, a. 1. Scholion: Christus etiam ut homo est Filius Dei naturalis nequaquam adoptivus. termini ut homo: specificative, qui est homo; non formaliter, quia est homo. filius naturalis: qui naturali generatione oritur. Generatio proprie dicta definitur: origo viventis e principio vivente coniuncto in similitudinem naturae (Div. pers. 74; De Deo trino, ii, 97).7 adoptio: acceptatio personae extraneae in iura filii, praesertim haereditatis. filius adoptivus: qui est filius non generatione naturaIi sed adoptione. quaestio Quaestio est duplex. Prima respicit haeresin sub finem saec. viii ortam. Altera respicit theologos catholicos qui alteram quandam filiationem di-

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grace of union cannot be understood in the same way as sanctifying grace. Also, the grace of union is substantial, while sanctifying grace is an accident; again, there are many who have sanctifying grace, while only Christ has the grace of union. Nor does it tell against this that sanctifying grace necessarily follows the grace of union, for what are called inseparable accidents likewise follow necessarily on substance. Furthermore, sanctifying grace is distinct from the virtues. For the virtues render someone good; but anyone’s goodness is measured according to his nature, and so supernatural virtues would not fit the definition of virtue unless nature were first elevated by sanctifying grace – they would be like simplicity in a serpent or prudence in a dove. See Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 110, a. 3. Furthermore, virtues are distinct from gifts. For virtues render someone good; gifts, however, regard the further goodness which cannot be had except in conjunction with the first agent principle. See Romans 8.14; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 68, a. 1. Scholion: Christ, even as man, is the natural – not adoptive – Son of God. terms as man: the term is used specificatively, ‘he who is man’; not formally, ‘in that he is a man.’ natural Son: one who originates by natural generation. Generation, properly so called, is defined as the origin of something alive from a conjoined living principle, with a resulting likeness in nature. See Divinarum personarum 74, or De Deo trino: Pars systematica 97.7 adoption: is acceptance into the rights of a son, especially the right to inherit, of a person who is not related to the one who adopts. adoptive son: one who is a son not by natural generation but by adoption. the question The question has two aspects. The first regards a heresy that arose at the end of the eighth century. The second regards Catholic theologians who



7 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 190–91.

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vinam8 praeter aeternam Filio astruunt propter gratiam creatam quae est regeneratio quaedam et quae filiationem fundat. Circa primam quaestionem: db 309–14a, ds 610–15, 619. Hefele-Leclercq, iii, 2.9 Xiberta, pp. 680–86. J. Solano, apud Grillmeier-Bacht, ii, 841–71. A. Grillmeier, Adoptionismus, ltk i. E. Portalié, Adoptionismus, dtc.10 P. Galtier, De Incarn., pp. 218–27. P. Vuillermet, Elipand de Tolède, Brignais 1911.11

sententiae (a) Elipandus archiep. Toletanus docuit ‘… Dei simul et hominis Filium, adoptivum humanitate non adoptivum divinitate …’ et distinxit ‘… illum qui natus est de Virgine … illum qui non est adoptione sed genere, neque gratia sed natura.’ Symbolum fidei, Xiberta, Enchir. 699, §§ 9, 8. ml 96, 917. Felix ep. Urgellitanus, in 2 Cor 5.19 commentans: ‘Quoniam Deus erat in Christo mundum reconcilians sibi. Non ait “Deus erat Christus” sed “Deus erat in Christo,” non quod Christus, homo videlicet assumptus, Deus non sit, sed quia non natura sed gratia atque nuncupatione sit Deus’ (fragmenta ex Apologia ad Carolum Magnum ab Alcuino extracta, ml 101, 191, Xiberta, Enchir. 694, § 43). Quae quidem a Nestorianismo parum absunt; sed aderat, uti ex citationibus apud Xibertam facile detegitur, confusio quaedam inter adoptionem et assumptionem. (b) Durandus et Scotus (3, d. 10) docent Christum etiam ut hominem esse Filium Dei naturalem, tenent tamen eum ratione unionis hypostaticae et gratiae sanctificantis etiam esse filium adoptivum.

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furnish the Son with another divine8 filiation, in addition to the eternal one, on account of his created grace which is a kind of re-generation and which grounds a filiation. On the first question see: db 309–14a, ds 610–15, 619; Hefele-Leclercq, 3/2;9 Xiberta, Enchiridion 680–86; J. Solano, ‘El Concilio de Calcedonia y la controversia adopcionista del siglo viii en España,’ in Grillmeier-Bacht, 2, 841–71; A. Grillmeier, ‘Adoptionismus,’ ltk, i, 153–55 ; E. Portalié, ‘Adoptionisme,’ dtc 1;10 P. Galtier, De incarnatione ac redemptione 218–27; P. Vuillermet, Elipand de Tolède (Brignais, 1911).11 opinions (a) Elipandus, archbishop of Toledo, taught [that Christ was] ‘Son of God and, at the same time, of man: adoptively, by his humanity; not adoptively, by his divinity.’ He distinguished between ‘him who was born of the Virgin’ and ‘him who is not by adoption but by generation, and not by grace but by nature’ (Creed, Xiberta, Enchiridion 689, §§ 9, 8; ml 96, 917). Felix, bishop of Urgel in Spain, commented as follows on 2 Corinthians 5.19: ‘God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. It does not say, “God was Christ” but “God was in Christ”; not that Christ, that is, the assumed man, is not God, but because he is God not by nature but by grace and pronouncement’ (fragment of an apology to Charlemagne, extracted from Alcuin, ml 101, 191; Xiberta, Enchiridion 694, § 43). These opinions scarcely differ from Nestorianism. But in the quotations given in Xiberta’s Enchiridion it is easy to detect a certain confusion between adoption and assumption. (b) Durandus and Scotus (3, d. 10) taught that even as man Christ is the natural Son of God. Yet they held that by reason of the hypostatic union and sanctifying grace, he was also an adoptive son.



8 The word ‘divinam’ does not appear in the 1960 and 1961 editions. 9 Charles Joseph Hefele and Dom H. Leclercq, Histoire des Conciles, vol. 3, part 2 (Paris: Letouzy et Ané, 1909). See pp. 1001–60. 10 Portalié’s contributions to dtc 1 on adoptionism are entitled ‘Adoptianisme au xiie siècle,’ 413–18, and ‘Adoptianisme. Nouvelles controverses depuis le xive siècle,’ 418–21. ‘Adoptianisme au viiie siecle’ (403–13) was written by H. Quilliet. 11 Pierre Vuillermet, Elipand de Tolède, Pour l’Histoire de l’Adoptianisme Espagnol, Étude de théologie historique (Brignais: Sacuny, 1911).

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Similis opinio Abaelardo imponi solet, sine fundamento secundum W. de Vries, art. Abaelard, ltk, i, 5. Suarez (disp. 49, sect. 2, § 30) docuit Christum ut hominem (specificative) esse Filium Dei naturalem; ei nullam aliam filiationem per gratiam sanctificantem advenisse; sed si consideratur Christus ut homo formaliter (non specificative) tunc est minor Patre et analogice filius per gratiam unionis.

nota Contra Elipandum et Felicem, de fide catholica (db 309–14a, 462, ds 610– 15, 619, 852). Contra scholasticos, certa.

argumentum 1 Christus ut homo est Filius Dei naturalis. Christus ut homo est persona divina in natura humana subsistens; atque illa persona divina est relatio subsistens filiationis, uti in tractatu de Deo Trino probatur; ergo Christus ut homo est relatio subsistens filiationis in natura humana. Aliter: secunda persona SS. Trinitatis constituitur per relationem filiationis, quae filiatio est naturalis, aeternam Filii generationem consequens. Et ideo ubicumque invenitur illa persona, sive in natura divina, sive in natura humana, ibi etiam necessario invenitur illa relatio filiationis naturalis.

2 Christus ut homo nequaquam est filius Dei adoptivus. Nam adoptio est acceptatio personae extraneae; et Christus non est persona extranea. Aliter: In Christo homine aut consideratur persona aut non. Si consideratur persona, cum illa sit divina, adoptari non potest quia extranea non est. Si non consideratur persona, sed sola natura creata, tunc non habetur quod adoptari potest, nam personae, non autem entia quibus,12 adoptantur in iura filiorum.

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A similar opinion is often attributed to Abelard – without grounds, according to W. de Vries, ‘Abaelard,’ ltk, 1, 5. Suárez (disp. 49, section 2, § 30) taught that Christ as man (in the specificative sense) is the natural Son of God; no further filiation accrues to him through sanctifying grace. But if one is considering Christ as man in the formal (not the specificative) sense, then he is less than the Father, and through the grace of union he is a son by analogy. theological note As against Elipandus and Felix, the note is ‘of catholic faith’ (db 309–14a, 462, ds 610–15, 619, 852). As against the Scholastics mentioned, the note is ‘certain.’ the argument 1 Christ as man is the natural Son of God. Christ as man is a divine person subsisting in a human nature. But that divine person is the subsistent relation of filiation, as is proved in the theological treatise on the Trinity. Therefore, Christ as man is the subsistent relation of filiation in a human nature. Otherwise stated: The second person of the holy Trinity is constituted by the relation of filiation, and this filiation is natural, the consequence of the eternal generation of the Son. And so wherever that person is found, whether in a divine nature or in a human nature, necessarily there is also found that natural relation of filiation. 2 In no way is Christ as man an adoptive son of God. For adoption is the acceptance of a person not related to the one who adopts; and Christ is not such a person. Otherwise stated: What is under consideration in Christ the man either is or is not his person. If the person is under consideration, then, since that person is divine, he cannot be adopted, because he is not an unrelated person. If only the created nature, not the person, is under consideration, then what is being considered cannot be adopted, for persons are adopted into the rights of children whereas beings by which12 are not.

12 Such as ‘nature.’

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3 Christus non habet aliam filiationem divinam praeter naturalem et aeternam. Alia filiatio divina: nam est filius Mariae secundum naturam humanam, quae tamen filiatio nisi relationem rationis non ponit in persona Verbi. Sum. theol., 3, q. 35, a. 5. Nulla alia divina praeter naturalem et aeternam: quia filiatio est habitudo personae ad personam; in Christo Deo et homine una est persona, eaque divina et aeterna, immutabilis, unam filiationem habens eamque naturalem. Neque nova quaedam et analoga filiatio per incarnationem additur: non ratione personae, quia persona est eadem; non ratione naturae, quia natura non est filius sed ens quo. Sum. theol., 3, q. 35, a. 5, ad 1m; cf. q. 23, a. 4. obicitur 1  Christus habet gratiam sanctificantem, cuius effectus formalis est facere filium Dei adoptivum. Respondeo: Effectus formalis primarius, negatur; secundarius, subdistinguitur, qui impediri potest, conceditur, qui impediri non potest, negatur. Gratia sanctificans facit de non filiis filios; sed in Christo filiatio naturalis est fundamentum unde sequitur ipsa gratia sanctificans, et ideo non est simile. Sum. theol., 3, q. 23, a. 4, ad 2m.

2  Melior est conditio filii adoptivi quam servi. Sed Christus dicitur servus (Is 42). Ergo a fortiori dicendus est filius adoptivus. Respondeo: Dicitur servus ratione naturae assumptae et ratione muneris, conceditur; ratione personae divinae, negatur. Filiatio autem dicitur non de natura sed de persona; et ideo non est simile.

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3 Christ has no other divine filiation besides his eternal and natural filiation. No other divine filiation, for he is the son of Mary on the basis of his human nature; but this filiation adds to the person of the Word only a relation of reason. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 35, a. 5. No other divine filiation besides his eternal and natural filiation, because filiation is the relationship of a person to a person. But in Christ, God and man, there is one person, a divine and eternal person, unchangeable, with one filiation, which is a natural one. Nor is some new and analogous filiation added by the Incarnation – not by reason of the person, since the person is the same, and not by reason of nature, since a nature is not a son but a being by which. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 35, a. 5, ad 1m; see q. 23, a. 4. objections 1  Christ had sanctifying grace, and the formal effect of sanctifying grace is to make someone an adoptive son of God. Reply: That this is the primary formal effect, I deny. As for whether it is a secondary formal effect, I subdistinguish. That it is a secondary formal effect which can be impeded, I grant; that it is a secondary formal effect which cannot be impeded, I deny. Sanctifying grace makes sons and daughters of those who are not sons and daughters; but in Christ, natural filiation is the foundation whence sanctifying grace itself follows, and so there is no similarity; see Summa theologiae, 3, q. 23, a. 4, ad 2m. 2  The status of adoptive sons is higher than that of servants. But Christ is called a servant (Isaiah 42). All the more, therefore, should he be called an adoptive son. Reply: That he is called a servant by reason of his assumed nature and by reason of his work, I grant; that he is so called by reason of his divine person, I deny. Filiation does not refer to nature, however, but to person; therefore there is no similarity.

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Thesis 12 Praeter scientiam divinam Christus his in terris degens humanam habuit scientiam,1 eamque tum ineffabilem tum effabilem; comprehensor enim scientia ineffabili, quae etiam beata dicitur, tum Deum immediate cognovit tum eodem actu sed mediate alia omnia quae ad munus suum pertinerent; viator autem scientia effabili eos elicuit actus cognoscitivos naturales et supernaturales qui vitam suam constituerunt humanam et historicam. Termini scientia: late sumitur pro omni cognitione praeter fidem et praeter cognitionem quam habent bruta animalia; analogice dicitur de Deo, de angelis, de animabus separatis, de hominibus, de beatis; incipit analogia ex iis quae intus experimur, et praecipue attenditur ad actum intelligendi. Quod enim immediate intelligitur aut est intelligibile in sensibilibus, aut est intelligibile a sensibilibus et corporalibus separatum; ulterius, ubi attingitur intelligibile separatum aut finitum attingitur aut infinitum. Ubi immediate attingitur intelligibile separatum et infinitum, idem est intelligere quod cognoscere; ubi finitum immediate attingitur, sicut esse et essentia realiter distinguuntur, ita actus intelligendi compleri debet per actum iudicandi ut cognoscatur res exsistens; ubi immediate attingitur intelligibile in sensibilibus, requiruntur operationes sensitivae ut id habeatur circa quod inquiritur, in quo intelligitur, secundum quod iudicatur.

Quare, cognitio homini proportionata tripliciter componitur, ex experientia, intelligentia, iudicio; cognitio angelo vel animae separatae proportionata dupliciter componitur, ex intelligentia et iudicio; cognitio denique divina est simplex et infinitus intelligendi actus.

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Thesis 12 Living on this earth, Christ had human knowledge1 both effable and ineffable, besides his divine knowledge. As a beholder, he immediately knew God by that ineffable knowledge which is also called beatific, and in the same act, though mediately, he also knew everything else that pertained to his work. As a pilgrim, however, he elicited by effable knowledge those natural and supernatural cognitional acts which constituted his human and historical life. Terms knowledge: ‘knowledge’ is taken broadly to refer to all knowing that is other than faith and other than the knowing which belongs to the beasts. The term is used analogically in reference to God, the angels, separate souls, human beings, and the blessed; the analogy takes its start from our inner experience, and special attention is due the act of understanding. For that which is immediately understood is either the intelligible in the sensible or else the intelligible separate from the sensible and the corporeal. Further, when a separate intelligible is attained, it is either finite or infinite. Where the separate and infinite Intelligible is immediately attained, understanding is the same as knowing. Where a finite intelligible is immediately attained, then just as essence and act of existence are really distinct, so the act of understanding has to be complemented by an act of judgment, so that it is an existing reality which is known. Where what is immediately attained is the intelligible in the sensible, sensitive operations are required so as to have something to inquire about, something in which to have insight, something on the basis of which to judge. Thus, the knowing proportionate to human beings is a threefold compound of experience, understanding, and judgment. The knowing proportionate to angels and separate souls is a twofold compound of understanding and judgment. Divine knowing, finally, is a simple and infinite act of understanding.



1 Throughout this thesis an attempt has been made to distinguish scientia from cognitio by using ‘knowledge’ only for the former and ‘knowing’ only for the latter.

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Quaeres tamen cur non aliter procedatur. Respondetur proprium intellectus actum esse actum intelligendi. Caeterae enim operationes, elementa, aspectus cognitionis humanae vel actum intelligendi praeparant (experiri, admirari, inquirere, imaginatione repraesentare, investigare) vel actum intelligendi praesupponunt et complent (concipere, definire, hypotheses et theorias formare, dubitare, evidentiam ponderare, iudicare). Quare, ubi cognitio perfectione est infinita, etiam intelligere infinitum est; et ubi intelligere est infinitum, tolluntur quae finitum vel praeparent vel compleant.

divina, humana: dividitur scientia Christi non secundum obiecta sed secundum principia: Christus qua Deus scit scientia divina, et Christus qua homo scit scientia humana; cf. thesin quintum ubi similiter non secundum obiecta sed secundum principia distinguuntur duae operationes Christi naturales et duae voluntates Christi naturales. his in terris degens: directe ergo in thesi agitur, non de Domino resuscitato qui ad dexteram Patris sedet, sed de Filio hominis morituro. effabilis: quae per se modo humano manifestari potest; ea sola est quae intelligibile in sensibilibus immediate attingit; ubi enim intelligibile intrinsece ad sensibilia et corporalia refertur, ibi et solummodo ibi habentur corporalia et sensibilia quae per se ad intelligibile referuntur et ideo per se intelligibile manifestant. ineffabilis: scientia quae per se modo humano (operationibus corporalibus et sensitivis) manifestari non potest; ea est quae immediate attingit intelligibile separatum; ubi enim actus intelligendi a sensibilibus non producitur, ubi intelligibile attingitur sine ulla operatione corporali vel sensitiva concomitante et correspondente, ibi corporalia et sensibilia per se intelligibile manifestare non possunt. Notate scientiam dici ineffabilem non rhetorice sed technice. Quatenus quis scientiam ineffabilem eamque solam exercet, sensibus neque indiget neque utitur; quibus omissis, actiones humanas corpore, sensibus, intellectu, et voluntate compositas non exercet; neque manum neque pedem neque linguam movet, sed raptus a sensibus alienatur (Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 175, a. 4). Quare, sicut quis scientiam ineffabilem neque humano modo addiscit, neque per verba dicit, neque per opera manifestat; ita secundum eam humano modo non vivit.

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You might ask, however, why there is not some other procedure. The answer is that the proper act of intellect is the act of understanding. Other operations, elements, and aspects of human knowing either prepare for the act of understanding (as do experiencing, wondering, inquiring, representing in imagination, investigating), or they presuppose and complement the act of understanding (as do conceiving, defining, formulating hypotheses and theories, doubting, weighing the evidence, judging). Thus, where knowing is infinite in perfection, understanding is also infinite; and where understanding is infinite, there is no longer a place for that which complements or prepares for finite understanding. divine, human: distinctions in Christ’s knowledge are drawn on the basis of its principles, not its objects. As God, Christ knows with divine knowledge; as man, Christ knows with human knowledge. See thesis 5, where Christ’s two natural operations and two natural wills were similarly distinguished, not by their objects but by their principles. living on this earth: directly, therefore, the thesis does not consider the risen Lord, seated at the Father’s right hand, but the Son of man before he died. effable: effable knowledge can, in itself, be manifested in a human way. It is this knowledge alone that immediately attains the intelligible in the sensible. For it is where the intelligible is intrinsically referred to the sensible and corporeal, and only there, that you have corporeal and sensible things which are in themselves referred to the intelligible, and which therefore in themselves manifest the intelligible. ineffable: ineffable knowledge cannot in itself be manifested in a human way (through corporeal and sensitive operations). It is this knowledge that immediately reaches an intelligible that is separate [from the sensible and corporeal]. For where the act of understanding is not produced by the sensible, where the intelligible is reached without any concomitant, corresponding operation that is corporeal or sensible, there the corporeal and the sensible cannot manifest the intelligible. Note that the sense in which knowledge is being called ineffable is technical and not rhetorical. To the extent that one exercises ineffable knowledge and this alone, one neither needs nor uses one’s senses; without these, one exercises no human action composed of body, sense, intellect, and will; one moves neither hand nor foot nor tongue, but is withdrawn from one’s senses in rapture (Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 175, a. 4). Thus, just as it is not in any human way that one learns ineffable knowledge, or expresses it in words, or manifests it in works, so too it is not in any human way that one lives by it.

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Notate deinde Christi mysterium scientiam tum ineffabilem tum effabilem exigere: ineffabilem, ut Christus homo mysterium divinum sciat; effabilem, ut mysterium divinum incarnato modo revelet, manifestet, communicet. comprehensor, viator: comprehensor finem suum attingit, viator autem ad finem operatur. Christus homo comprehensor fuit quatenus finem intellectus attingit; sed idem in vita sua terrestri ad ulteriorem finem operatus est, scilicet ut sibi gloriam nobis autem gratiam et gloriam compararet. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 15, a. 10. cognitio Dei: cognitio cuius obiectum est Deus. Ne tamen iis consentias qui, cum ‘obiectum’ audiant, nisi mythum perceptionisticum cogitare non valeant. mediata: quae obiectum suum non attingit nisi mediante alio obiecto prius cognito. Ubi notabis: (1) Omnis mediata Dei cognitio etiam analogica est et imperfecta; nam quod intervenit medium non est Deus, et ideo finitum est et creatum; sed per medium finitum et creatum, nisi analogice et imperfecte non cognoscitur Deus. Cf. db 432, ds 806: ‘inter creatorem et creaturam non potest similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda.’ (2) Deus non potest immediate cognosci per speciem finitam. Qualis enim est species, tale est obiectum immediatum; et ideo ubi intellectus secundum speciem finitam intelligit, ibi immediate attingit intelligibile, non infinitum, sed finitum. (3) Ubi intellectus creatus Deum immediate intelligit, intellectus est actu intelligens, non per speciem finitam, sed per ipsam divinam essentiam quae sese creato intellectui coniungit tamquam intelligibile in actu faciens intellectum in actu. Cf. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, aa. 2 et 4. (4) Ubi ipsa divinitas communicatur, exigitur consequens terminus ad extra. Sicut ergo ad unionem hypostaticam sequitur actus substantialis in essentia humana receptus, sicut ad donum increatum Spiritus sancti sequitur gratia sanctificans in anima iusti, ita ad communicationem divinae essentiae sequitur lumen gloriae in intellectu creato. Cf. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 1 a. 5. Praeterea, gratia sanctificans et lumen gloriae ad ordinem accidentalem pertinent et ideo plus et minus admittunt; sicut ergo maior vel minor in aliis et aliis est gratia sanctificans, ita maius vel minus in aliis et aliis est lumen gloriae. Cf. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 6.

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Note further that the mystery of Christ demands both ineffable and effable knowledge: ineffable, for Christ the man to know divine mystery; effable, for him to reveal, manifest, and communicate divine mystery in an incarnate way. beholder, pilgrim: a ‘beholder’ has attained his goal, while a pilgrim is operating towards a goal. Christ the man was a beholder insofar as he attained the goal of intellect; but in his earthly life he operated towards a further goal, namely, to bring glory to himself, and to bring grace as well as glory to us. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 15, a. 10. knowing of God: knowing of which God is the object. Do not, however, fall in with those who cannot hear ‘object’ without thinking in terms of the perceptionist myth. mediated: mediated knowing attains its object only through the mediation of another object previously known. Here you will note: (1) All mediated knowing of God is also analogical and imperfect. For the intermediary is not God, and therefore it is finite and created; but through a finite and created medium God is known only analogically and imperfectly. See db 432, ds 806, [dec 1: 232]: between Creator and creature ‘no similarity can be found so great but that the dissimilarity is even greater.’ (2)  God cannot be immediately known through any finite species. For as the species is, so is the immediate object. Therefore, when the intellect understands by a finite species, the intelligible it immediately attains is not infinite but finite. (3) When a created intellect understands God immediately, that intellect is actually understanding, or intelligent in act, not through a finite species, but through the divine essence itself, which has joined itself to the created intellect as the intelligible in act that is making the intellect be in act. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, aa. 2 and 4. (4) When divinity itself is communicated, a consequent external term is demanded. So, just as a substantial act, received in a human essence, follows on the hypostatic union, and just as sanctifying grace in the soul of one who is justified follows on the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, so also the light of glory in a created intellect follows on the communication of the divine essence. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 5. Moreover, sanctifying grace and the light of glory pertain to the accidental order, and so admit of degrees; thus, as sanctifying grace is greater in some and smaller in others, so the light of glory is greater in some and smaller in others. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 6.

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immediata Dei cognitio: in qua nullum intervenit medium cognitum inter cognitionem et obiectum. Cf. db 530, ds 1000. Notate: (1) Immediata est ea Dei cognitio quam descripsit Apostolus (1 Cor 13.12; cf. 1 Io 3.2); haec enim non est per speculum in aenigmate sed facie ad faciem, et non est ex parte sed sicut cogniti sumus. (2) Immediata Dei cognitio est ineffabilis. Nam Deus est spiritus, immaterialis, incorporalis. Qui ergo Deum immediate cognoscit, immediate attingit intelligibile, non in sensibilibus, sed a sensibilibus et corporalibus separatum prorsus. (3) Immediata Dei cognitio adeo aliena non est ab intellectu creato ut ei sit finis naturaliter desideratus (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 1; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8) quamvis nisi supernaturaliter non attingibilis (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 4; 1-2, q. 5, a. 5). (4) Ubi Deus immediate cognoscitur, cessat operatio ex desiderio finis vel in ordine ad finem attingendum; sed incipit operatio propter finem adeptum, perspectum, dilectum, secundum quod bonum est diffusivum sui. Quare, Christus homo qua comprehensor summum bonum attingebat, sed qua viator summum bonum diffundebat. (5) Neve dicas perfectiorem cognitionem et intensiorem dilectionem impedire quominus alii actus a subiecto eliciantur. Quo enim perfectior est cognitio et intensior dilectio, eo efficaciores sunt ad alios actus producendos propter finem perspectum et dilectum. (6) Neve dicas raptum seu alienationem a sensibus ex immediata Dei cognitione naturaliter resultare (Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 175, a. 4). Nullae sane sunt operationes sensitivae vel corporales quae immediatam Dei cognitionem concomitantur eique correspondent. Neque simul intra eandem conscientiam esse possunt multi actus nisi inter se ordinantur. Neque fieri solet ut scientia acquisita ante concessam cognitionem Dei immediatam perfecte cum concessa hac cognitione cohaereat. Quas ob causas, neque mirum est S. Paulum raptum subiisse, neque ex parte contraria mirum est Christum hominem, qui a primo instante Deum immediate cognoverit (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 34, a. 4), deinceps ex hac cognitione ad alios producendos actus processisse. (7) Neve concludas aliam in nobis esse et aliam prorsus in Christo homine fuisse ipsam processus psychologici structuram. Non enim in nobis sunt sensus causa totalis ut intellectu cognoscamus sed tantummodo materia causae (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 6 c. ad fin.); et ideo sensibilibus accedere oportet lumen intellectus agentis in quo nobis

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immediate knowing of God: in immediate knowing of God there is between the knowing and its object no intermediary that is known. See db 530, ds 1000. Note the following: (1) The knowing of God that Paul describes is immediate (1 Corinthians 13.12; cf. 1 John 3.2); it is not dim, in a mirror, but face to face, and not in part but as we are known. (2) Immediate knowing of God is ineffable. For God is spirit, immaterial, incorporeal. Anyone who immediately knows God, therefore, immediately attains the intelligible, not in the sensible, but utterly separate from the sensible and corporeal. (3) Still, immediate knowing of God is not altogether foreign to created intellect, of which it is the end naturally desired (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 1; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8) though attainable only supernaturally (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 4; 1-2, q. 5, a. 5). (4)  When God is known immediately, operation out of desire for that end, or ordered towards attaining it, ceases. But, in keeping with the self-diffusiveness of good, operation begins on account of the end that is achieved, grasped, and loved. As beholder, then, Christ the man attained the supreme good, but as pilgrim he diffused the supreme good. (5) Take care not to say that a more perfect knowing and a more intense love keep a subject from eliciting other acts. For the more perfect knowing is, and the more intense love is, the more effective they are in producing other acts for the sake of the end grasped and loved. (6) Take care not to say that rapture or withdrawal from the senses is the natural result of immediate knowing of God (Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 175, a. 4). Certainly there are no sensitive or corporeal operations concomitant with and corresponding to immediate knowing of God. Nor can there be many acts within the same consciousness unless they are ordered among themselves. Nor does it usually happen that there is perfect coherence between knowledge acquired before immediate knowing of God is granted, and this granted knowing. For these reasons, it is not surprising that Paul fell into a rapture, or on the other hand that Christ the man, who knew God immediately from his first instant (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 34, a. 4), went on from this knowing to produce other acts. (7) Take care not to conclude that the structure of psychological process is one thing in us and something altogether different in Christ the man. For in us the senses are not the whole cause of our knowing by intellect, but only the matter for the cause (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 6 ad fin.). To the sensible, therefore, must be added the light of agent intellect, in which

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est quodammodo omnis scientia originaliter indita (De Veritate, q. 10, a. 6 c. ad fin.); quo quidem lumine et admiramur, et inquirimus; quo lumine intime perspicimus nos aliqualiter sed nondum satis intellexisse; et eodem lumine, ubi satis intellexisse videmur, dubitamus et evidentiam usquequaque scrutamur; eodem etiam lumine, ubi certi iudicavimus, innumera alia vel invenienda vel addiscenda agnoscimus; eodem denique lumine efficimur aperti ut lumen fidei quaerere et accipere possimus. Quod lumen non aliud est quam intentio entis intendens; non enim ad aliquod genus restringitur sicut visus ad colores; neque aspectabili hoc mundo continetur sed ultra procedit ut quaerat de ipso Deo an sit et quid sit. Quod ergo nos naturali intellectus lumine intendimus et desideramus et adhuc nescimus, illud Christus homo immediate perspexit. Quod autem in nobis facit intentio, illud in Christo homine fecit immediata cognitio. Sicut enim ex intentione entis ad effabilem nostram scientiam acquirendam procedimus, ita et Christus homo ex ineffabili eius cognitione ad effabilem suam scientiam efformandam processit. Quod si lector in immediatis conscientiae suae datis lumen intellectuale non invenit, duplici consideratione se consolari potest: in primis enim ipse singulariter infelix non est cum maxima pars hominum, ubi super se reflectuntur, ultra conscientiam suam sensitivam haud ascendant; unde etiam ulterius concludere potest quam imaginariae et fictae sint difficultates quae communiter contra immediatam Dei cognitionem in Christo agnoscendam moveantur. Si enim lumen intellectuale adeo non perturbat ut potius non inveniatur in ea quam quis nominat conscientiam et psychologiam humanam, sane immediata Dei cognitio, quae lumine intellectuali longe spiritualior est, minime impedit quam in Christo homine vult conscientiam et psychologiam humanam. beata: est immediata Dei cognitio quatenus cum beatitudine connectitur. Unde notabis: (1) Beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus (Boethius, De consol., iii, 2; ml 63, 724). (2) Ad hunc statum perfectum immediata Dei cognitio tripliciter comparatur: primo modo, formaliter et perfecte, uti in angelis beatis et in hominibus iustis post resurrectionem corporis; altero modo, formaliter sed incomplete, uti in animabus separatis, iustis, et purgatis ante corporis resurrectionem (cf. db 530, ds 1000); tertio modo, principialiter et causaliter, uti in Christo homine durante vita sua mortali.

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all knowledge is in some manner originally conferred on us (De Veritate, q. 10, a. 6 c. ad fin.). By this light we wonder and inquire; by this light we grasp inwardly that we have understood to some extent though not yet thoroughly; and by this same light, when we seem to have understood thoroughly, we doubt and examine the evidence yet further; by this same light also, when we judge matters certain, we acknowledge that there are other things without number still to be discovered or learned; by this same light, finally, we are opened to the possibility of our seeking and accepting the light of faith. This light is nothing else than the intending intention [i.e., the notion] of being. For it is not restricted to any genus, as sight is to colors; nor is it contained within the visible world, but goes beyond it to ask about God himself – whether he is and what he is. Thus, what we intend and desire by the natural light of intellect, without knowing it yet, Christ the man immediately grasped. What intending does in us, however, immediate knowing did in Christ. For just as we proceed from the intention of being to the acquisition of our effable knowledge, so also Christ the man proceeded from his ineffable knowing to the formation of his effable knowledge. If you do not find this intellectual light in the immediate data of your own consciousness, you can be consoled by two considerations. In the first place, your unhappiness is not yours alone. Most people, when they engage in self-reflection, never get beyond their sensitive consciousness. In the second place, then, you can gather how fanciful and pointless the difficulties are which commonly get raised against acknowledging in Christ an immediate knowing of God. If intellectual light is so unintrusive as to have no place in what people call consciousness and human psychology, surely an immediate knowing of God, which is far more spiritual than intellectual light, is no obstacle to the human consciousness and psychology they want [to affirm] in Christ the man. beatific: beatific knowing is immediate knowing of God insofar as it is linked with beatitude. Hence you will note: (1) Beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things (Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, book 3, prose 2; ml 63, 724; [lcl 74: 228; ccsl 94: 38; Moreschini, 60]). (2)  Immediate knowing of God is related to this perfect state in three ways: first, formally and perfectly, as in the case of the blessed angels and of the righteous after the resurrection of the body; second, formally but incompletely, as in the case of righteous, separate souls being purged prior to the resurrection of the body (see db 530, ds 1000); third, as principle and causally, as in the case of Christ the man living his mortal life.

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(3) Christus homo adhuc mortalis atque moriturus statum omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectum non habuit; suberat enim naturalibus defectibus et corporis et animae (Summa theologiae, 3, qq. 14 et 15); actu subivit tum gravissimos corporis cruciatus tum profundam animae perturbationem (Io 12.27; Mc 14.33–42; Mt 27.46; Heb 5.7). Neve dicas Christum non vere passum (db 27, 72, 143; ds 166, 197, 293, 325) vel caeteris hominibus minus sensisse (ds 3924). (4) Quae tamen in Christo homine erat immediata Dei cognitio dupliciter ad statum beatitudinis refertur: principialiter, quia haec immediata cognitio est finis intellectus et, in perfecte beatis, initium, radix, et fundamentum caeterorum bonorum; causaliter, quia ex hac immediata Dei cognitione processit Christus homo ad eam vitam vivendam et mortem moriendam quae ipsi Christo gloriam (Phil 2.9, Heb 2.9) caeteris autem hominibus tum gratiam tum gloriam comparaverunt. (5) Cavete ergo ne male intelligatis quod dici soleat: ex immediata cognitione Dei naturaliter resultare statum omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectum. Naturalis enim resultantia non est causa efficiens, sed effectuum ordo; quem ordinem producit divina sapientia quae neque ipsa abstractis regulis gubernatur neque per abstractas regulas a nobis nisi imperfecte cognoscitur. Neque in praesenti quaestione dubius est ordo divinae sapientiae quae in Christo homine voluit gloriam ex immediata Dei cognitione oriri, non caeco quodam atque spontaneo processu, sed per ipsam Christi hominis voluntariam passionem et mortem. Quam mortis Christi efficaciam obscurant qui potius abstractas regulas de naturali resultantia cogitent quam concretum divinae sapientiae ordinem apprehendant.

(6) Neve dicas immediatam Dei cognitionem, si perfectam beatitudinem non statim produxerit, saltem veram passionem impediisse. Immediata enim Dei cognitio fecit ut intellectus Christi humanus in fine adepto gauderet; neque idem circa idem simul gaudet et tristis est. Sed tristis erat anima Christi usque ad mortem (Mc 14.34), tum quia intellectus non est unica animae potentia tum quia finis intellectus non est unicum bonum quod ad statum omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectum pertineat. Quod si in nobis ita uniuntur operationes intellectus et sensus ut vel dolor sensus operationem intellectus impediat aut operatio intellectus sensum a suo dolore quasi revocatum retrahat, in Christo homine res aliter se habuit cum immediata Dei cognitio cum nulla sensus operatione connectatur et ideo pati potuit Christus secundum omnia quae experimur et tamen gaudere

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(3) While he was yet mortal, one who was going to die, Christ the man had not the state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things. He was subject to natural defects of body and soul (Summa theologiae, 3, qq. 14 and 15); he actually underwent the most painful bodily tortures and deep distress of soul (John 12.27; Mark 14.33–42; Matthew 27.46; Hebrews 5.7). Take care not to say that Christ did not truly suffer (db 27, 72, 143; ds 166, 197, 293; [dec 1: 78], 325) or that he felt less than other men do (ds 3924). (4) In Christ the man there was, however, an immediate knowing of God that was referred in two ways to the state of beatitude: as principle, since this immediate knowing is the intellect’s end and, in those who are perfectly blessed, the beginning, root, and ground of other goods; causally, since out of this immediate knowing of God Christ the man proceeded to live that life and die that death which brought glory to Christ himself (Philippians 2.9, Hebrews 2.9) and brought both grace and glory to others. (5) Beware, then, of understanding in the wrong way a statement that is often made, namely, that the state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things ‘results naturally’ from the immediate knowing of God. Natural resultance is not an efficient cause but an order of effects. This order is produced by divine wisdom, which is not governed by abstract laws and which we know through abstract laws only imperfectly. Nor is there any doubt in the present question about the order of divine wisdom, which willed that glory in Christ the man should take its rise from his immediate knowing of God, not by a kind of blind, spontaneous process, but precisely through Christ the man’s voluntary suffering and death. The efficacy of Christ’s death is obscured by those who would rather think about abstract laws of natural resultance than apprehend the concrete order of divine wisdom. (6)  Be careful not to say that even if immediate knowing of God did not instantly produce perfect beatitude, at least it stood in the way of true suffering. Immediate knowing of God did make Christ’s human intellect rejoice in the end achieved, and nobody is joyful and sorrowful about the same thing. Yet Christ’s soul was sorrowful, even unto death (Mark 14.34), both because intellect is not the one and only potency of the soul and also because the end of intellect is not the one and only good that pertains to the perfect state of all goods in the aggregate. Even if, in us, the operations of intellect and sense are so united that a sorrow that belongs to sense blocks the operation of intellect, or the operation of intellect withdraws sense from its sorrow as though revoking it, things are otherwise with Christ the man, since immediate knowing of God is not linked with any operation

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secundum aliud quod nos numquam sumus experti. Denique ipsa haec oppositio atque contrarietas adeo passionem non tollit sed potius, cum passio in contrarietate consistat, passionem facit.

eodem actu: eo ipso actu quo Deus immediate cognoscitur. mediate: qui immediate divinam potentiam cognoscit, mediate ea intelligit ad quae divina potentia se extendit; et similiter qui divinam voluntatem immediate cognoscit, mediate ea intelligit ad quae divina voluntas se extendit. Sed in Deo eadem realiter sunt substantia, potentia, voluntas; et ideo qui immediate Deum cognoscit, pro perfectione huius immediatae cognitionis mediate intelligit tum possibilia tum actualia vel plura vel pauciora. munus Christi: opus a Christo peragendum vel peractum; cf. Ephesians 1.10; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 8, aa. 3 et 4; cum tamen directe hac in thesi de vita Christi terrestri agamus, convenientius, ne nimis protrahantur explicationes, lectorem ad S. Thomam remittimus circa ea quae scientiam Christi ad modum animae separatae vel angeli respiciant (Summa theologiae, 1, qq. 54–58, 89, 107; 3, q. 11). omnia quae ad hoc munus pertineant: omnia scilicet actualia praeterita, praesentia, futura, et omnia quae in potentia creaturae sunt (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 10, a. 2). De quibus tamen notate: (1) Haec omnium cognitio dici solet ‘cognitio in Verbo’ secundum distinctionem S. Augustini inter cognitionem angelorum matutinam et vespertinam. Cf. Super Genesim ad litt., iv, 22; ml 34, 312; De civitate Dei, xi, 7; ml 41, 322. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 3. (2) Qua cognitione apprehenduntur possibilia et actualia, non immediate in se ipsis, non singula seorsum, non unum post aliud, sed mediante divina essentia atque omnia simul. (3) Praeterea, sicut intelligibile infinitum et separatum cognoscitur per solum intelligendi actum sine sensu vel alia experientia externa, sine inquisitione et imaginatione, sine conceptione, reflectione, evidentiae evaluatione, iudicio, pariter per eundem intelligendi actum simul cognoscuntur in Verbo possibilia et actualia. (4) Quod si dicis intelligi non posse quemadmodum hoc fieri possit, respondetur immediatam Dei cognitionem sive in Deo sive in beatis nisi analogice et imperfecte a nobis hac in vita non intelligi. Analogice ergo

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of sense and so Christ could suffer with respect to everything we experience and yet rejoice with respect to something else, which we have never experienced. Finally, this opposition and contrariety, so far from taking away suffering, itself makes for suffering instead, since suffering consists in contrariety. in the same act: in the very same act by which God is immediately known. mediately: anyone who immediately knows divine power also understands, mediately, those things to which divine power extends. Likewise, one who immediately knows the divine will also understands, mediately, those things to which divine will extends. But substance, power, and will are really the same in God. Hence, anyone who immediately knows God understands, mediately, more or less of the possible as well as the actual, depending on the perfection of this immediate knowing. the work of Christ: a deed that is to be done or has been done by him; see Ephesians 1.10 and Summa theologiae, 3, q. 8, aa. 3 and 4. In this thesis, however, we are directly concerned with the earthly life of Christ. With regard to that knowledge of Christ’s which was of the sort that angels and separate souls have, it will be more convenient to refer the reader to Thomas Aquinas, so that these explanations do not become too long. See Summa theologiae, 1, qq. 54–58, 89, 107; 3, q. 11. everything else that pertained to his work: everything actual, whether past, present, or future, and everything in the power of creatures. See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 10, a. 2. On this, however, note the following: (1) This knowing of all things is usually called ‘knowledge in the Word,’ following Augustine’s distinction between the ‘morning’ and ‘evening’ knowing of the angels. See Super Genesim ad litteram, 4, 22, ml 34, 312 [csel 28.1: 121–22]; De civitate Dei, 11, 7, ml 41, 322 [ccsl 48: 326–27]. Also Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 3. (2)  By this knowing the possible and the actual are apprehended, not immediately in themselves, not each singly, not one after the other, but all together, mediated by the divine essence. (3) Further, the infinite, separate Intelligible is known through an act of understanding alone, without sensation or any other external experience, without inquiry and imagination, without conception, reflection, weighing of evidence, or judgment. So too, through the same act of understanding, the possible and the actual are known together in the Word. (4) If you are saying it is impossible to understand how this can be so, the answer is that in this life we understand immediate knowledge of God, whether in God or in the blessed, only analogically and imperfectly. We

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ratiocinari debemus, et analogiis contenti simus necesse est. Iam vero quo melius quis intelligit vel principium vel potentiam vel voluntatem, eo melius et plenius intelligit ea quae vel ex principio fluunt vel per potentiam fieri possunt vel a voluntate electa sunt. Ergo simili quodam modo qui intelligibile separatum et infinitum immediate intelligit, pro perfectione suae intelligentiae mediante infinito finita cognoscit. (5) Proinde, qui res in Verbo cognoscit, non omnibus modis eas cognoscit. Quod patet, cum nos res cognoscamus quin in Verbo quidquam perspiciamus. Sicut ergo nobis valde novum erit res in Verbo cognoscere, ita etiam Christo homini sine novitate non erat res cognoscere (a) non in Verbo sed in se ipsis, (b) non mediate sed immediate, (c) non omnia simul sed singula seorsum et aliud post aliud, (d) non sola intelligentia sed experientia interna et externa, inquisitione, intelligentia, et conceptione, reflectione, evidentiae evaluatione, et iudicio, (e) non scientia ineffabili sed scientia effabili, (f) non uno eodemque actu eoque perpetuo sed permultis actibus transeuntibus et pro varietate occasionis, temporis, loci, personarum, obiec­ torum distinctis. (6) Quas differentias nisi analogice et imperfecte non intelligimus; et nullatenus quidem intelligimus nisi exemplis et analogiis utimur. Ita qui pomum oculis videt, visu cognoscit sed tactu adhuc nescit; qui visum pomum manu arripit, et visu et tactu cognoscit sed gustu adhuc nescit. Iterum, qui geometriam more euclidiano perspectam habet, geometriam analyticam aggredi potest; analytica cognita, perspectivam addiscere potest; et cum tribus his modis geometriam prorsus sciverit, remanet ut riemannianam addiscere incipiat. Iterum, qui Divinam Comoediam saepius perlegit et sub omni aspectu penetravit, eandem in aliam linguam versurus, totum sane scit quod ei faciendum est et tamen adhuc nullatenus scit quid ipse in alia lingua scripturus sit. Denique sit eminentissimus quidam theologus idemque peritissimus cinematographus qui Summam theologiae iam pridem perspectam habeat nunc vero decernat ut ipse eandem cinematographice exprimat: totum ergo novit quod repraesentandum est, sed totum inveniendum est quemadmodum repraesentari possit.

Quae sane exempla claudicant omnia; non enim transitur ex intelligibili separato et infinito ad intelligibilia in sensibilibus. Sed eatenus quisque ab iis adiuvari potest, quatenus ipse determinat quousque rem illustrent et ubinam deficiant.

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have to reason analogically, therefore, and with analogies we have to be content. Now the better one understands a principle or a power or a will, the better and more fully one understands what flows from the principle, what can happen through the power, what is chosen by the will. In some similar way, therefore, one who immediately understands the separate, infinite Intelligible knows the finite by the mediation of the infinite, according to the perfection of his own intelligence. (5) At the same time, one who knows something in the Word does not know it in every way. So much is plain, since we know reality without perceiving anything in the Word. Hence, just as knowing reality in the Word will be altogether new for us, so too it was not without novelty for Christ the man to know things (a)  not in the Word but in themselves, (b)  not mediately but immediately, (c) not all at once but each singly and one after another, (d)  not by understanding alone but by inner and outer experience, by inquiry and understanding, by conception, reflection, weighing the evidence, and judgment, (e) not with ineffable knowledge but with effable knowledge, (f) not in one and the same perpetual act but in a multitude of transitory acts distinguished according to various occasions, times and places, persons and objects. (6) We understand these differences only in an imperfect and analogical way, and we do not understand at all without using examples and analogies. When you see an apple with your own eyes, then, you know it by sight but not yet by touch; if you take hold of the apple you have seen, you know it by sight and touch but not yet by taste. Again, if you have a grasp of Euclidean geometry you can advance to analytic geometry; once you know analytic geometry, you can learn perspective geometry; and when you know these three kinds of geometry there is still Riemannian geometry for you to start learning. Again, suppose you are going to translate the Divine Comedy into another language. After reading it over and over again, penetrating its every aspect, you certainly know all that you have to translate, and yet you know nothing as yet about what you yourself are going to write in the translation. Finally, suppose there is a very eminent theologian who is also a very accomplished film-maker, who already has a grasp of the Summa theologiae and is now determined to make it into a movie. He knows in its entirety what has to be represented, but the entirety of how it can be represented remains to be discovered. No doubt all these examples are lame: there is no transition from the separate and infinite Intelligible to the intelligible in the sensible. But they can be helpful to the extent that anyone determines for himself how far they illustrate the matter at hand and where they fall short.

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(7) Quibus perspectis, distinguas necesse est inter nescire2 et addiscere simpliciter et, ex parte contraria, nescire vel addiscere secundum quid. Qui actu scit, simpliciter scit; qui non actu sed habitu scit, secundum quid scit; et aliter se habet hoc ‘secundum quid scire’ ubi habitus actibus est acquisitus, aliter autem ubi habitus est infusus sed in actum vel in talem actum numquam reductus. Cf. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 5 ad 2m.

Qui simpliciter nescit, simpliciter addiscere potest; sed qui secundum quid scit et secundum quid nescit, etiam secundum quid addiscere non potest, et secundum quid addiscere potest. Quare, cum Christus mediante divina essentia omnia sciverit, non potuit simpliciter nescire, simpliciter addiscere, simpliciter inquirere, simpliciter interrogare ut sciat. Ubi tamen ‘simpliciter’ excluditur, minime excluditur ‘secundum quid.’ Et ideo cum in Christo agnoscamus non solum scientiam ineffabilem sed etiam effabilem, in eo etiam agnoscimus nescire secundum quid, addiscere secundum quid, inquirere secundum quid, interrogare secundum quid, nempe, secundum scientiam effabilem. vita: sumitur concrete; eam denotat realitatem totam quae per biographiam describitur; dicit ergo non solum substantiam sed etiam subiectum, non solum potentias et habitus sed maxime totam actuum seriem. Sicut ergo in Christo distinguimus Deum et hominem, comprehensorem et viatorem, ita in eodem distinguimus vitam divinam Christi qua Dei, vitam aeternam Christi qua hominis comprehensoris, et vita humanam et historicam Christi qua hominis viatoris. vita divina: est vita simplicissima cum in Deo idem sit esse, intelligere, velle, beateque vivere.

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(7)  In light of all this, you must distinguish, on the one hand, what it means to not know2 and to learn, purely and simply, and what it means to not know and to learn in some qualified sense. One who knows in act knows purely and simply; one who knows habitually but not in act knows in a qualified sense. And it is one thing to ‘know in a qualified sense’ when the habit is acquired by [prior] acts [of knowing], and something else when the habit is infused but never reduced to [any] act or to an act of some determinate kind. See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 5, ad 2m. One who purely and simply does not know is able purely and simply to learn. One who in some sense knows and in some sense does not know also is in some sense unable, and in some sense able, to learn. Accordingly, since Christ knew all things through the mediation of the divine essence he could not, purely and simply, not know, or pose questions in order to know. However, when ‘purely and simply’ is ruled out, ‘in some qualified sense’ is not. Thus, since we acknowledge in Christ not only ineffable but also effable knowledge, we also acknowledge a qualified sense in which he did not know, and a qualified sense in which he learned, inquired, and posed questions – all qualified, that is, by effable knowledge. life: life is taken concretely. It denotes the whole reality described in a biography. Thus, it refers not only to substance but to subject, not only to potencies and habits but most of all to a whole series of acts. Thus, as we distinguish in Christ between God and man, and between beholder and pilgrim, so in the same we distinguish between the divine life of Christ as God, the eternal life of Christ as man and beholder, and the human, historical life of Christ as man and pilgrim. divine life: utterly simple life, since in God to be (the act of existence), to understand, to will, and to live blessedly are all the same.

2 Literally, ‘not-knowing’ or ‘being nescient’; there is no corresponding verb in English. Nescience is not a lack, privation, or defect, but a simple negation, like finitude. It seems highly probable that Lonergan has in mind Aquinas’s distinctions between nescience, ignorance, and error (De malo, q. 3, a. 7c.). Nescience conveys a simple negation of knowledge, without importing any moral connotations of culpability or punishment. Ignorance, on the other hand, means that one does not know what one ought naturally to know, or it means that one habitually misunderstands what one ought to understand; either way it is a penal deprivation or lack of some appropriate good. Error, finally, adds judgment to ignorance; it is assenting to falsehood, and because it involves the act of judgment, it also directly involves personal culpability.

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vita aeterna: est ea pars vitae Christi hominis quae per scientiam ineffabilem et consequentes voluntatis actus constituitur; aeterna ergo dicitur haec vita, non quasi ante incarnationem exstitisset, sed quia inde ab ipsa incarnatione incepit et in aeternum permanebit. vita humana et historica: est ea pars vitae Christi hominis quae ad viatorem pertinet. (1) Humana est haec vita quia ex infantia per successiva stadia ita profecit ut Christus homo se hominem talem libere effecerit qualis demum esse inveniretur apud Deum et apud homines. Agitur ergo non de solo augmento et crescentia sed de processu humano evolutivo simul physico et psychico, simul apprehensivo et affectivo, simul intellectivo et electivo. Addiscit homo non solum ut sciat sed imprimis ut motus sui corporis coordinet et gubernet, ut ambulare, se nutrire, se vestire possit, ut operationes sensitivas reddat distinctiores et efficaciores, ut ita evolutas multipliciter coniungat, ut totum campum possibilium coniunc­ tionum exploret et qualibet quando voluerit utatur. Quae addiscentia ita corpore et sensu perficitur ut intellectus neque otiosus sit neque adhuc instrumentum sibi coniunctum perfecteque accomodatum habeat sed ut tale instrumentum sibi efformet. Quod quo magis perficitur, eo magis in ipsum processum influunt voluntates atque electiones propriae; unde ex parte contraria parentum et tutorum est ita frenos dare ut pueri pro se ipsis faciant, adulescentes pro se ipsis perspiciant, iuvenes pro se ipsis decernant.

Christum ergo dicimus humanitatem accepisse non adultam sed infantilem, eumque se fecisse adultum per ipsos suos experiendi, cognoscendi, eligendi actus; dicimus eum suam propriam indolem, suum proprium characterem, suum proprium atque individuum faciendi, agendi, loquendi, vivendi modum non solum habuisse sed etiam efformasse; dicimus eum se efformasse non solis actibus naturalibus, quasi in statu naturae purae exstitisset, non ex lumine fidei, quasi ipse non caput sed membrum sui corporis fuisset, sed ex immediata Dei cognitione ita divinum mysterium modo incarnato exhibuisse ut omnibus dicere potuerit: Sequere me. Cf. Lc 2.52. (2) Historica deinde est haec Christi vita quia in mundo humano et sub conditionibus mundi humani peracta est. Sicut enim vita humana etiam actibus cognoscitivis et electivis constituitur, ita homines conviventes suis apprehensionibus et electionibus mundum constituunt humanum techno-

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eternal life: that part of the life of Christ the man which is constituted by his ineffable knowledge and his consequent acts of will. This life is called eternal, therefore, not as though it existed before the Incarnation, but because it began with the Incarnation itself and will last to eternity. human, historical life: that part of the life of Christ the man which pertains to the pilgrim. (1) This life is human because it went forward, from infancy through successive stages, in such a way that Christ the man freely made of himself just such a man as he was found by God and by men to be. Not only, then, is it a matter of growth and aging, but of a developing human process, at once physical and psychic, at once apprehensive and affective, at once intellectual and elective. A human learns, not only in order to know, but first of all in order to coordinate and govern one’s own bodily movements, in order to walk, to feed and clothe oneself, to make one’s sensitive operations more distinct and effective, to combine these developments in many ways, and to explore the whole field of possible combinations and make use of them when and where one wills. This learning is perfected in the body and the senses in such a way that the intellect neither stands idle nor yet has an instrument conjoined and perfectly adjusted to it, but rather that it might form for itself such an instrument. The more this instrument is perfected, the more one’s own purposes and decisions influence the process itself; wherefore, on the other hand, it belongs to parents and teachers to loosen the reins so that children may do things for themselves, adolescents grasp things for themselves, and young people decide for themselves. We say, then, that Christ did not accept an adult but an infant humanity, and that he made himself an adult by his own acts of experiencing, knowing, and deciding. We say that he not only had but also formed his own disposition, his own character, his own way of behaving, acting, speaking, and living. We say that he formed himself, not by natural acts alone (as though he existed in a state of pure nature), and not by the light of faith (as though he were not the head but a member of his body), but out of his immediate knowing of God, so that he might incarnately display the divine mystery in such a way that he could say to everyone, ‘Follow me.’ See Luke 2.52. (2) Again, this life of Christ’s is historical because it was lived out in the human world and under the conditions of the human world. For just as human life is also constituted by acts of knowing and deciding, so people who live together constitute, by their apprehensions and decisions, the human

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logicum, oeconomicum, familiarem, politicum, socialem, culturalem, religiosum. Porro, tot sunt eiusmodi mundi humani, quot sunt gentes, quot linguae, quot loca, quot tempora; quos mundos secundum genesim, evolutionem, crises, decadentiam, mixturas, affiliationes, apparentationes investigant quidem historici profundiores, faciunt vero qui in singulis mundis vivant homines, etiam si se talia facere nesciant. Dicimus ergo Christum humanitatem accepisse non solum infantilem sed etiam e stirpe davidica, in regione palaestinensi, in tempore Augusti, ut aramaice loqueretur, ut sub lege iudaica educaretur, ut inter Galilaeos adolesceret. Dicimus eum non solum in determinato illo mundo humano esse natum sed etiam talem mundum, talem linguam, talem culturam fecisse suam. Quod “suum facere” sicut acceptionem atque assimilationem importat, ita etiam personalem quandam adaptationem atque recreationem dicit. Avidus ergo Iesus doctores legis Hierosolymis interrogabat ut acciperet; mirabilis duodecennis iisdem respondebat qui non solum accepit sed etiam penetravit et recreavit; neque invitus Nazareth rediit (Lc 2.41–52), qui non solum ex veteri testamento accipiebat sed etiam novum scientia effabili excogitandum habuit. actus cognoscitivi qui vitam constituebant: quaeritur ergo non de habitibus sed de actibus, et de actibus quaeritur non prout immanentem intellectus perfectionem dicant sed prout serie quadam determinata, evolutiva, historica vitam constituerint. Ubi notabis quantum inter se differant problematica mediaevalis et problematica recentior. Illa perfectionem scientiae in intellectu Christi investigabat, et ideo in primis habitus considerabat actusque potius possibiles quam de facto elicitos. Recentiores autem actus considerant prout partem vitae formant; et vitam humanam individualem considerant, prout partem historiae humanae facit. Unde concludes inepte procedere vel qui obiciant mediaevales errasse quia quaestionibus recentioribus non respondissent, vel qui thesin me­ diaevalem statuant et tamen recentiorum difficultatibus satis facere conentur. elicere: dicit originem actus sub aspectu naturali. Quare caute distinguas (a) naturam, (b) causam efficientem, (c) processum conscium. Natura est principium motus vel quietis in eo in quo est motus vel quies.

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world of technology and economy and family, the political, social, cultural, and religious world. Indeed, there are as many such human worlds as there are peoples, languages, places, and times. Investigating these worlds – their birth and development, their crises and decline, their mingling and progeny and final passing – is the work of serious historians; yet the work of making these worlds belongs to those who live in each of them, even if they do not know what they are making. We say, then, that Christ accepted not only the humanity of an infant but also a humanity descended from David, in the land of Palestine, in the time of Augustus, such that he spoke Aramaic, was educated under Jewish law, and grew up among Galileans. We say not only that he was born in that determinate human world, but also that he made that world, that language, that culture, his own. Just as ‘making it his own’ involves acceptance and assimilation, so too it means a personal adaptation and refashioning. So that he might accept, Jesus eagerly put questions to the doctors of the Law in Jerusalem; the answers he gave them, amazing in a twelve-year-old, were those of one who had not only accepted but also had penetrated and refashioned. He returned to Nazareth, not unwillingly (Luke 2.41–52), having not only accepted from the old covenant, but having as well a new one to think out through his effable knowledge. cognitional acts that constituted his life: it is not, then, a question of habits but of acts; and it is a question about these acts, not as indicating immanent perfections of intellect, but as a determinate, developmental, historical series constituting a life. Here you will notice how different the more recent problematic is from the medieval one. The medieval investigation was concerned with the perfection of knowledge in Christ’s intellect, and so first of all it considered habits and possible acts rather than acts in fact elicited. More recent authors, however, consider acts as forming part of a life and consider an individual human life as making a part of human history. Hence, you will gather how wrongheaded it is to proceed either by objecting that the medieval thinkers erred because they did not respond to more recent questions, or by establishing a medieval thesis yet trying to deal in a satisfactory manner with the difficulties of more recent authors. to elicit: indicates the origin of an act in its natural aspect. Distinguish carefully, then, between (a) nature, (b) efficient cause, and (c) conscious process. A nature is an immanent principle of movement and rest. The act of

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Elicitur ergo actus intelligendi in intellectu possibili et secundum speciem vel habitum; et, secundum hoc, intelligere dicitur quoddam pati.3 Movens vero vel agens vel producens est principium motus vel mutationis in alio secundum quod aliud. Idem ergo intelligendi actus, qui in intellectu possibili secundum speciem vel habitum elicitur, a multis producitur. Producitur a Deo tamquam a causa prima; producitur a magistro qui attentionem captat et imaginationem dirigit; producitur a phantasmate tamquam ab instrumento; producitur ab intellectu agente tamquam a principio quo proportionato; producitur ab homine qui intellectu agente et phantasmate utitur ut actum intelligendi suum producat. Conscius denique non quomodocumque sed modo conscio actus suos tum elicit tum alios per alios producit. Quia tamen Christus Deus et homo est unum indivise subiectum duplicis inconfuse conscientiae, attentius distinguendum est. Christus qua Deus conscius elicit actum divinum, sed increatum non producit; et idem Christus qua Deus conscius actus suos humanos elicuit quidem nullos sed producit omnes tum ut causa prima tum ut unum indivise subiectum duplicis naturae et duplicis conscientiae; et secundum hoc dicitur humanitas Christi instrumentum coniunctum divinitatis, non quasi una sit natura vel conscientia, sed quia unum est subiectum agens quod per naturam et conscientiam divinam efficit et per naturam et conscientiam humanam patitur. Christus autem qua homo omnes actus suos humanos elicit; sed qui omnes elicit non omnes producit; alios enim etiam conscios a divinitate recipit, per quos ipse conscius etiam alios conscios intra unitatem conscientiae humanae producit. Quae conscientiae humanae unitas non solum identitate subiecti constituitur sed etiam mutuo ipsorum actuum ordine. Quo in ordine prima est immediata Dei cognitio quam consequuntur voluntatis caritas atque obedientia. Qua ex cognitione, caritate, obedientia sequuntur suo loco et tempore actus scientiae effabilis et consequentes appetitiones, volitiones, actiones. Quibus in omnibus, cum gratia naturam supponat et perficiat, quodammodo priores sunt naturales et posteriores sunt supernaturales.

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understanding, therefore, is elicited in the possible intellect and on the basis of species or habit. Accordingly, it is said that ‘to understand’ means ‘to undergo’ or ‘to receive’ [a perfection].3 A mover, agent, or producer, however, is a principle of movement or change in another, inasmuch as it is other. Thus, the same act of understanding, which is elicited in the possible intellect on the basis of species or habit, is produced by many things. It is produced by God as by its first cause; it is produced by a teacher who catches the attention and channels the imagination; it is produced by phantasm as by an instrument; it is produced by agent intellect as by a proportionate principle-by-which; it is produced by the one who makes use of one’s agent intellect and of a phantasm to produce one’s own act of understanding. Finally, it is not in any way whatever, but in a conscious way, that one who is conscious both elicits his acts and produces some acts from others. However, since Christ, God and man, is one undivided subject of two unconfused consciousnesses, more careful distinctions are called for. Christ, conscious as God, elicits the divine act, but does not produce an uncreated [act]. The same Christ, conscious as God, elicited none of his human acts, but he did produce them all, both as their first cause and as the one undivided subject of two natures and two consciousnesses. Accordingly, it is said that Christ’s humanity is the conjoined instrument of his divinity, not as though there were one nature or one consciousness, but because there is one acting subject who by his divine nature and consciousness effects, and by his human nature and consciousness undergoes or receives. Christ as man, however, elicits all his human acts. But he who elicits them all does not produce them all. Some conscious acts he receives from his divinity, and through these he consciously produces other conscious acts within the unity of his human consciousness. The unity of this human consciousness is not constituted only by identity of subject, but also by the mutual order of the acts themselves. In this order what is first is the immediate knowing of God, on which follow charity and obedience of will. From this knowing, charity, and obedience, acts of effable knowledge and consequent desires, acts of will, and actions all follow in their own place and time. In all these, since grace presumes nature and perfects it, the natural acts are in some way prior and the supernatural ones are posterior.

3 The issues in this section are paralleled in Verbum at 116–51. At 118, Lonergan argues that the relevant meaning of insight as a pati is ‘received perfection.’

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naturales: qui obiecta attingunt secundum proportionem et modum humanae naturae; obiecta ergo sunt intelligibilia in sensibilibus; et attinguntur ex experientia, inquisitione, studio, addiscentia, etc. supernaturales: qui obiecta attingunt ultra proportionem vel modum humanae naturae, sed non immediate attingunt ipsum intelligibile separatum atque infinitum. Modum humanae naturae excedunt actus qui intra proportionem huius naturae iacent sed praeter communem naturae cursum fiunt; e. g., litteras scire sed eas non didicisse, cf. Io 7.15. Proportionem humanae naturae absolute excedunt actus qui absolute supernaturales sunt; et eiusmodi sunt omnia Christi hominis verba et opera quae mysterium Christi constituunt cum divinum mysterium modo incarnato revelent, manifestent, communicent. Quae enim nos per Christum credimus, eadem ipse Christus non credidit; sed scientia ineffabilis scivit quae scientia effabili vel dixit vel fecit; et Spiritu sancto adiutus (Mc 1.12, Mt 4.1, 12.18, Lc 4.1, 4.14, 4.18, 10.21, Io 3.34, Heb 9.14) ex scientia ineffabili ad scientiam effabilem actualem conscie processit. Proportionem denique humanae naturae non absolute sed relative excedunt actus ad modum animae separatae quibus immediate attinguntur intelligibilia separata quidem sed finita; de quibus actibus sicut etiam de habitibus acquisitis et infusis lectorem ad S. Thomam remittimus, tum quia problematicam respiciunt potius mediaevalem quam recentiorem, tum etiam quia breviorem volumus hanc terminorum expositionem. Magisterii documenta Concilium Chalcedonense: ‘et consubstantialem nobis eundem secundum humanitatem, “per omnia nobis similem absque peccato”’ [cf. Heb 4.15] (db 148, ds 301; cf. Concilium Constantinopolitanum iii, db 290, ds 554, ubi idem repetitur). Vigilius, R. P., Constitutum i, can. 4: excluditur futurorum ignorantia a Filio Dei et hominis; et negatur revelatio ei facta sensu nestoriano (ds 419; ml 69, 104; Xiberta, Enchir. 501, § 15). Concilium Constantinopolitanum ii: damnatur doctrina Theodori de evolutione Christi morali, et damnantur scripta Theodoreti contra Cyrillum Ale-

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natural: natural acts are those which attain their objects according to the proportion and the mode of human nature. These objects, therefore, are intelligibles in the sensible, and they are attained by experience, inquiry, study, learning, and so on. supernatural: supernatural acts are those which attain their objects beyond the proportion or mode of human nature, but do not immediately reach the separate and infinite Intelligible itself. The mode of human nature is exceeded by acts that lie within the proportion of human nature but take place outside the common course of nature; for instance, knowing letters but never having been taught them (see John 7.15). The proportion of human nature is absolutely exceeded by acts that are absolutely supernatural. Such are all the words and deeds of Christ the man which constitute the mystery of Christ, since they incarnately reveal, manifest, and communicate the divine mystery. For what we believe through Christ, Christ himself did not believe: he knew with ineffable knowledge what he said or did with effable knowledge; and, aided by the Holy Spirit (Mark 1.12, Matthew 4.1, 12.18, Luke 4.1, 4.14, 4.18, 10.21, John 3.34, Hebrews 9.14), he consciously proceeded from ineffable knowledge to actual effable knowledge. Finally, the proportion of human nature is exceeded relatively but not absolutely by acts in the mode of separate souls; these acts do immediately attain separate intelligibles, but only finite ones. For discussion of these acts, and also of acquired and infused habits, we refer the reader to Thomas Aquinas, because they regard a problematic more medieval than modern, and also because we want to keep this exposition of terminology brief. Documents of the magisterium The Council of Chalcedon: ‘the same one, consubstantial with us as to his humanity, “like us in all things apart from sin”’ [cf. Hebrews 4.15] (db 148, ds 301, [dec 1: 86–87]; see the Third Council of Constantinople, db 290, ds 554, [dec 1: 127], where the same thing is repeated). Pope Vigilius, in Constitution 1, canon 4, rules out ignorance of things future on the part of the Son of God and of man, and denies that revelation was made to him in a Nestorian sense (ds 419; ml 69, 104; Xiberta, Enchiridion 501, § 15). The Second Council of Constantinople condemned the teaching of Theodore on Christ’s moral development, and condemned Theodoret’s writings

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xandrinum (db 224–26, ds 434–36). Cf. ds 472 de auctoritate huius concilii. Gregorius Magnus, ad Eulogium patr. Alexandrinum, damnatio Agnoetarum (db 248, ds 474–76). Cui textui adiungo: ‘Ita autem doctrina vestra per omnia latinis Patribus concordavit, ut mirum mihi non esset quod in diversis linguis Spiritus non fuerit diversus’ (ml 77, 1096). De sensu huius damnationis, J. Ternus, apud Grillmeier-Bacht, iii, 112.

Sacrum Officium, approbante Pio x, damnantur sententiae modernistarum Christum respicientes (db 2031–35, ds 3431–35; annexa censura, db 2065a, ds 3466). Sacrum Officium, approbante Benedicto xv, tuto doceri non potest: Christum hominem his in terris scientiam comprehensoris non habuisse; non certum esse eum nihil ignoravisse et omnia actualia in Verbo cognovisse; non minus in scholis catholicis recipiendam esse sententiam recentiorem de limitata Christi scientia quam veterum de scientia universali (db 2183– 85, ds 3645–47). Pius xii, ‘Mystici corporis,’ agnoscit in Christo homine inde a sua conceptione beatam visionem per quam omnia membra corporis mystici Christo continentur perpetuoque sunt praesentia (db 2289, ds 3812). Pius xii, ‘Haurietis aquas,’ agnoscit in Christo homine tum scientiam beatam tum inditam vel infusam (ds 3924; aas 48 [1956] 327).

Scriptores quidam ­Petrus Lombardus, Lib. sent., 3, d. 14 S. Thomas, Summa theologiae, 3, qq. 9–12; q. 15, a. 3; q. 34, a. 4 Galtier 251–85 d’Alès 254–72. Bertetto 272–317. Schmaus 225–45. Fr. Schmid, ‘Die Lehre der Agnoeten und ihre Verurteilung,’ Zschr. kath. Theol. 19 (1895) 651–80.

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against Cyril of Alexandria (db 224–26, ds 434–36, [dec 1: 119–21]). See ds 472 on the authority of this council. Gregory the Great condemned the Agnoetae in a letter to Eulogius, patriarch of Alexandria (db 248, ds 474–76). To this text I would add the following [which precedes the Denzinger excerpt]: ‘Moreover, your doctrine so agreed in all respects with the Latin Fathers that I find, not to my surprise, that in diverse languages the Spirit has not been diverse’ (ml 77, 1096 [ccsl 140a: 853] [epistle 39, NPNF, 2nd series, vol. 13]). For the sense of his condemnation, see J. Ternus in Grillmeier-Bacht, 3, 112. The Holy Office, with the approval of Pius x, condemned modernist opinions regarding Christ (db 2031–35, ds 3431–35; annexed censure, db 2065a, ds 3466). The Holy Office, with the approval of Benedict xv, declared that the following propositions cannot be taught safely: Christ the man, on this earth, had not the knowledge of a beholder; it is not certain that he was ignorant of nothing and knew everything actual in the Word; recent opinions on Christ’s limited knowledge should not be any less acceptable in Catholic schools than the opinion of older theologians about a universal knowledge (db 2183–85, ds 3645–47). Pius xii, in the encyclical letter ‘Mystici corporis,’ acknowledged that from the moment of his conception Christ the man enjoyed the beatific vision through which all the members of his mystical body are contained and unceasingly present to Christ (db 2289, ds 3812). Pius xii, in the encyclical letter ‘Haurietis aquas,’ acknowledged in Christ the man both beatific knowledge and imparted or infused knowledge (ds 3924; aas 48 [1956] 327). Bibliography ­Peter Lombard, Sententiae, 3, d. 14 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, qq. 9–12; q. 15, a. 3; q. 34, a. 4 Paul Galtier, De Incarnatione ac Redemptione 252–85 Adhèmar d’Alès, De Verbo incarnato 254–72 Domenico Bertetto, Gesù Redentore 272–317 Michael Schmaus, Katholische Dogmatik (Munich: Max Hueber, 1957) 225– 45 F. Schmid, ‘Die Lehre der Agnoeten und ihre Verurteilung,’ Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 19 (1895) 651–80

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J. Maricm, De Agnoetarum Doctrina, Zagreb 1914. E. Schulte, Die Entwicklung der Lehre vom menschlischen Wissen Christi bis zum Beginn des Scholastik (Paderborn 1914) Fr. Diekamp, ‘Über das Wissen der Seele Christi,’ Theologische Revue 14 (1915) 97–108. J. Lebreton, Hist. du dogme de la Trinité, vol. 1, Note c (ed. 1919) 513–44; (ed. 1927) 559–86. S. Szabo, De scientia beata Christi, Xenia thomistica (Romae 1924) ii: 349–491. A.M. Dubarle, Eph. theol. Lov., 16 (1939) 111–20, de Cyrillo Alexandrino; ibid. 18 (1941) 5–25, de Augustino; Rev. sc. phil. theol. 29 (1940) 244–63, de Augustino.

M. Richard, ‘Saint-Athanase et la psychologie du Christ selon les Ariens,’ Mél. sc. rel. 4 (1947) 5–54. A. Sépinski, La psychologie du Christ chez saint Bonaventure (Paris, 1948). H. de Riedmatten, ‘Sur les notions doctrinales opposées à Apollinaire,’ Rev. thomiste 51 (1951) 567–68. A. Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, 2 (Regensburg, 1954) 44– 131. J. Liébaert, La doctrine christologique de saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie avant la quer­ elle nestorienne (Lille, 1951). J. Ternus, Grillmeier-Bacht, vol. 3, 81–237.

T. J. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin (Freiburg [Helv] 1954) 149–75. G. Jouassard, Rech. sc. rel. 43 (1955) 361–78; 44 (1956) 234–42; 45 (1957) 209–24. De Cyrillo Alexandrino.

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J. Maricm, De Agnoetarum Doctrina: Argumentum patristicum pro omniscientia Christi hominis relativa (Zagreb, 1914) E. Schulte, Die Entwicklung der Lehre vom menschlichen Wissen Christi bis zum Beginn des Scholastik (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1914) F. Diekamp, ‘Über das Wissen der Seele Christi,’ Theologische Revue 14 (1915) 97–108 Jules Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinité, 1, note c (Paris: Beauchesne, 1919 ed.) 513–34; (Paris: Beauchesne, 1927 ed.) 559–86 Szadok Szabo, De scientia beata Christi, Xenia thomistica (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1924) 2: 349–491 André Marie Dubarle, ‘L’ignorance du Christ chez saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie,’ Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 16 (1939) 111–20, on Cyril of Alexandria; ‘La connaissance humaine du Christ d’après saint Augustin,’ Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 18 (1941) 5–25, on Augustine; ‘La science humaine du Christ selon saint Augustin,’ Revue des sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 29 (1940) 244–63, on Augustine M. Richard, ‘Saint-Athanase et la psychologie du Christ selon les Ariens,’ Mélanges de Science Religieuse 4 (1947) 5–54 Augustinus Sépinski, La psychologie du Christ chez saint Bonaventure (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1948) H. de Riedmatten, ‘Sur les notions doctrinales opposées à Apollinaire,’ Revue Thomiste 51 (1951) 567–68 Artur Michael Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, 2/2 (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1954) 44–131 Jacques Liébaert, La doctrine christologique de saint Cyrìlle d’Alexandrie avant la querelle nestorienne (Lille: Centre National de la recherche Scientifique, 1951) Joseph Ternus, ‘Die Seelen- und Bewusstseinsleben Jesu: Problemgeschichtlich-systematische Untersuchnung,’ in Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, vol. 3 (Würzberg: Echter-Verlag, 1954) 81–237 Tarsicius J. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin (Fribourg, Switzerland: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1954) 149–75 G. Jouassard, ‘Un problème d’anthropologie et de christologie chez saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie,’ Recherches de science religieuse 43 (1955) 361–78; ‘Saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie et le schema de l’Incarnation Verbe-chair,’ ibid. 44 (1956) 234–42; and ‘“Impassibilité” du Logos et “Impassibilité” de l’âme humaine chez saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie,’ ibid. 45 (1957) 209–24, on Cyril of Alexandria

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F. Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia (Rome, 1956, Analecta Gregoriana 82). R. Baron, Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor (Paris, 1957) 156–60. J. Galot, Nouv. rev. théol. 80 (1958) 337–58; 82 (1960) 113–31. E. Gutwenger, Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi (Innsbruck, 1960). H. de Lavalette, Rech. sc. rel. 49 (1961) 426–29. L. Béranger, Rev. sc. rel. 36 (1962) 1–47. De Didymo Alexandrino.

K. Rahner, ‘Dogmatische Erwägerungen über das Wiss und Selbstwusstsein Christi,’ Trierer theol. Zschr. 71 (1962) 65–83; idem apud H. Vorgrimler, Exegese und Dogmatik (Mainz, 1962) 189–211.

Doctrinae evolutio Triplici stadio evoluta est doctrina de scientia Christi; stadio patristico, stadio mediaevali, stadio moderno. Patres, etsi non unice, praecipue quaerebant num Christus homo quid­ quam ignoraverit. Quam quaestionem nisi pedetentim non invenerunt, neque nostris distinctionibus tractaverunt. Sed ubi evolvebatur christologia, ubi nondum formulabatur distinctio technica inter naturalia et supernaturalia, ubi nondum cogitabatur systematica quaedam analogia quae cohaerenter de scientia divina, beata, angelica, et humana determinaret, ubi modo alius modo alius intendebatur finis ut scilicet vel Gnosticis vel Arianis vel Apollinaristis vel Nestorianis responderetur, vel ut sacrae scripturae exponerentur, vel ut intima Christi vita impeccabilis penetraretur, vel ut scientia Filii revelantis vindicaretur, pedetentim ad consensum universalem pervenerunt. Ab ineunte enim saeculo septimo tum in oriente tum in occidente communis voluit sententia Christum etiam hominem non ignorasse. Mediaevales deinde theologi sicut caetera catholica etiam hunc Patrum consensum susceperunt non solum ut idem repeterent sed etiam ut ipsam rem intelligerent, fundarent, explicarent. Quod quidem eo accuratius et

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Francis A. Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Analecta Gregoriana 82 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1956) Roger Baron, Science et sagesse chez Hughes de Saint-Victor (Paris: Lethielleux, 1957) 156–60 Jean Galot, ‘La psychologie du Christ,’ Nouvelle Revue Théologique 80 (1958) 337–58; ‘Science et conscience de Jésus,’ ibid. 82 (1960) 113–31 Engelbert Gutwenger, Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi (Innsbruck: Verlag Felizian Rauch, 1960) H. de Lavalette, ‘Candide, théologien méconnu de la vision béatifique du Christ,’ Recherches de science religieuse 49 (1961) 426–29 L. Béranger, ‘L’âme humaine de Jésus dans la christologie du De Trinitate attribué à Didyme L’Aveugle,’ Revue des sciences religieuses 36 (1962) 1–47, on Didymus of Alexandria Karl Rahner, ‘Dogmatische Erwägerungen über das Wissen und Selbswußtsein Christi,’ Trierer Theologische Zeitschrift 71 (1962) 65–83; also in Herbert Vorgrimler, Exegese und Dogmatik (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald­-Verlag, 1962) 189–211 Development of the doctrine The doctrine of Christ’s knowledge developed in three stages: a patristic stage, a medieval stage, and a modern stage. For the Fathers the chief question, though not the only one, was whether Christ the man was ignorant of anything. They came upon this question only gradually, and they did not treat it using the distinctions we have drawn. Christology was developing; a technical distinction between natural and supernatural was yet to be formulated, and a systematic analogy for coherently specifying divine, beatific, angelic, and human knowledge had yet to be thought out; different goals were being met in different ways – responding to the Gnostics or the Arians, the Apollinarians or the Nestorians; expounding holy scripture; exploring Christ’s sinless inner life; defending the knowledge of Christ the revealer. And yet, little by little, the Fathers reached a universal consensus. From the beginning of the seventh century, in East and West alike, common opinion insisted that Christ, even as man, was not ignorant. The medieval theologians, who received this consensus of the Fathers as they did the rest of Catholic beliefs, went on not only to repeat the same things they received but also to understand, ground, and explain the mat-

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plenius fecerunt, quo magis Christologiam eorum ontologicam evolverunt, quo clarius gratiam et naturam distinxerunt, quo profundius theoriam cognitionis penetraverunt et analogiam cognitionis divinae, angelicae, humanae, beatae determinaverunt. Non statim ergo sed pedetentim permultis­ que ambagibus eo perventum est ut communiter distinguerentur scientia Christi divina et scientia eiusdem humana, ut humana in beatam, infusam, et acquisitam divideretur, ut duplex in Christo homine agnosceretur omnium scientia, alia mediata in scientia beata contenta, et alia immediata per scientiam infusam habita (cf. Summa theologiae, 3, qq. 9–12). Quam doctrinam posteriores theologi ad nostra usque tempora fideliter repeterunt.

Quod tamen olim sine difficultate suscipiebatur et tradebatur, iam inter multos problematibus vel perobscuris vel insolubilibus scatere videtur. Cuius rei causam in terminis superius exponendis notavimus, aliud nempe mediaevales, aliud autem recentiores quaerere ubi de scientia Christi ageretur. Hi enim minime cogitant actus habitusque in intellectu receptos et technica quadam aristotelica descriptos, sed vitam in evangeliis narratam intelligere volunt et de conscientia, de processu psychologico, de opere historico concipiendo atque perficiendo audire. Quibus si quomodocumque satis facere vis, neque ideo tamen a doctrina in Ecclesia recepta recedere, graviorem illum non evitas laborem qui vetera novis augere et perficere intendat.4 Remanet, tamen, uti opinor, idem hodie ac media aevo radicale problema, ut scilicet quisque ex propria sua experientia cognitionem cognitionis humanae hauriat. Quod qui feliciter non peragit, neque initium neque fundamentum habet unde analogice procedere possit ad aliam cognitionem clare et distincte cogitandam. Deficiente vero analogia, fieri non potest quin in unam quandam lateque diffusam caliginem coeant scientia divina, scientia Christi ineffabilis, scientia Christi effabilis et supernaturalis, et scientia Christi effabilis et naturalis. Qua ex caligine audiuntur lamentationes: dura est haec thesis et quisnam eam capere possit.

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ter itself. This they did the more fully and accurately, the more they developed their ontological Christology, the more clearly they distinguished between grace and nature, and the more deeply they explored the theory of knowing and determined an analogy of divine, angelic, human, and beatific knowing. It was not overnight, therefore, but step by step and with many a detour, that the point was reached where a distinction between Christ’s divine knowledge and his human knowledge was commonly drawn, where his human knowledge was divided into beatific, infused, and acquired, and where it was acknowledged that in Christ the man knowledge of all things is twofold: a mediated knowledge contained in his beatific knowledge, and an immediate knowledge, which he has through his infused knowledge (see Summa theologiae, 3, qq. 9–12). Later theologians have repeated this doctrine faithfully, down to our own time. For many, however, it now seems that what once was received and handed on without difficulty is swarming with very obscure or even insoluble problems. We have noted the cause of this already, in explaining our terminology: where Christ’s knowledge is concerned, the medievals were asking one question and the moderns another. The latter do not think in terms of acts and habits received in the intellect and described with an Aristotelian technicality; they want instead to understand the life narrated in the gospels, and they want to hear about consciousness, about psychological process, about a historical work to be conceived and carried out. If you want to meet their demand in some fashion, without thereby retreating from the doctrine received in the church, you will not avoid that serious labor which aims at perfecting and enlarging old things with new.4 In my opinion, however, the radical problem is the same today as it was in the Middle Ages: it is from one’s own experience that knowing of human knowing may be drawn. Those who do not achieve this successfully have neither the beginning nor the foundation from which they can proceed by analogy to think clearly and distinctly about other knowing. Absent an analogy, it can only be that divine knowledge, Christ’s ineffable knowledge, Christ’s effable and supernatural knowledge, and Christ’s effable and natural knowledge will merge into one big hazy fog. And from the fog a wailing is heard: This is a hard thesis, and who can grasp it?



4 An allusion to Leo xiii’s encyclical ‘Aeterni Patris’; see Lonergan, Insight 747.

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Sententiarum indiculus (A)  Ante saec. xiii Numeri uncis inclusi ad documenta infra citata remittunt.

1 Contra gnosticam cognitionem ignorantiam Filii (Mc 13.32) invocavit Irenaeus (1). 2 Ubi Ariani ex ignorantia et profectu contra divinitatem Verbi arguebant, Athanasius ignorantiam in Verbo negavit sed in Christo homine admisit (4, 5); cf. Gregorium Nazianzenum (7), Epiphanium (8), Ambrosium (26, 28). 3 Ubi Apollinaristae animam Christi negantes eiusdem ignorantiam praeteribant, Antiocheni realem ignorantiam realemque profectum docuerunt (10–15); quorum Theodorus Mopsuestenus et Theodoretus Cyrensis postea damnati sunt (db 224–26, ds 419, 434–36).

4 Ex parte contraria Cyrillus Alexandrinus non semel ignorantiam Christi eiusque proficientem sapientiam in meram apparentiam reduxit (16–19, 22); neque cohaerenter sentire aliter poterant monophysitae et monenergetae. Cf. Theodorum Pharanitanum (55). 5 Non raro adhibebatur ars exegetica ut problema ignorantiae de medio tolleretur: vide Origenem (2), Basilium (6), Gregorium Nazianzenum (7 ad fin.), Hilarium (25), Hieronymum (ep 1389), Augustinum (ep 1555 et 35–37 [infra]), Gregorium Magnum db 248, ds 474–76. 6 Inter monophysitas (24) agnoetae, duce Themistio diacono (48), docuerunt Christum hominem ignorasse; quam sententiam tum in scripturis tum in Patribus invenit qui nominatur Auctor de Sectis (49).5 Gregorius Magnus damnavit Agnoetas (db 248, ds 476); concilium Lateranense (db 271, ds

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Summary of opinions (A) Prior to the thirteenth century Numbers in parentheses refer to the documents quoted below [see pp. 612–61]. 1 Irenaeus (1) invoked the Son’s ignorance (Mark 13.32) against Gnostic knowing. 2 When the Arians used his ignorance and growth as arguments against the Word’s divinity, Athanasius denied ignorance in the Word while admitting it in Christ the man (4, 5); cf. Gregory of Nazianzus (7), Epiphanius (8), and Ambrose (26, 28). 3 When the Apollinarians, denying Christ had a soul, put his ignorance to one side, the Antiochenes taught that his was a real ignorance and a real growth. Of these Antiochenes, Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret of Cyrrhus were afterwards condemned (db 224–26, ds 419, 434–36, [dec 1: 119–21]). 4 On the other hand, Cyril of Alexandria more than once reduced Christ’s ignorance and growth in wisdom to mere appearance (16–19, 22). Monophysites and monenergists could not think otherwise without being inconsistent. Cf. Theodore of Pharan (55). 5 Exegetical skill was used at times to banish the whole problem of ignorance; see Origen (2), Basil (6), Gregory of Nazianzus (7, at the end), Hilary (25), Jerome (ep 1389), Augustine (ep 1555 and 35–37 below), and Gregory the Great (db 248, ds 474–76). 6 Among the monophysites (24), the Agnoetae, led by the deacon Themistius (48), taught that Christ the man was ignorant; the author of De sectis 5 found this opinion both in scripture and in the Fathers (49). Gregory the Great condemned the Agnoetae (db 248, ds 476); the Lateran Council (db

5 For a review of opinions regarding the uncertain provenance of this treatise, see U.M. Lang, ‘The Date of the Treatise De Sectis Revisited,’ Orientalia Lovaniensia periodica 29 (1998) 89–98. See below, p. 649–9, where Lonergan indicates it is ‘ascribed to Leontius of Byzantium.’

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519), et concilium Constantinopolitanum iii (48), damnaverunt Themistium. 7 Ex quo communis facta est sententia negans ignorantiam in Christo, cum exclusa sit ignorantia in Verbo contra Arianos, ignorantia in homine quasi in persona distincta contra Nestorianos, et ignorantia in assumpta humanitate contra Agnoetas; quam ultimam sententiam reductive Nestorianam habuisse videtur Gregorius Magnus: ‘… quisquis Nestorianus non est, Agnoita esse nullatenus potest …’ (db 248, ds 476). 8 Ex antecessis concluditur unionem hypostaticam excludere ignorantiam in natura assumpta; non ideo tamen praeteriri debebant vel analogia inter cognitionem divinam et cognitionem humanam vel distinctio naturarum et naturalium operationum; quam ob causam reprehendi solet nimia facilitas apud Fulgentium (45), Eulogium (53), Maximum confessorem (57), Ioannem Damascenum (59–61), Hugonem Victorinum (63–66), Petrum Lombardum (68). Videsis Galtier 252–53, § 325; d’Alès 262; Boyer 178–79.

(B) Scholastici et recentiores 9 Quam lente priores scholastici ad doctrinam postea communem pervenerint, exhibuit A. Landgraf (op. cit.). 10 Haec doctrina communis ita ab omnibus proponebatur ut aliter ab aliis intelligeretur. Communiter docentur: scientia beata (immediata Dei cognitio), scientia omnium tum mediante scientia beata tum per scientiam infusam, et scientia naturaliter acquisita. Ubi autem S. Thomas scientiam beatam semper actu esse docuit (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 5, ad 1m), S. Bonaventura distinxit inter immediatam cognitionem Dei et consequentem cognitionem creaturarum ut illa semper actu fuerit, haec autem ex habitu in actum debito quodam modo profecerit (cf. Sépinski, 66 ss.); et similia senserunt Scotus, Toletus, alii (cf. Galtier 260, § 330). Iam vero haec et similes differentiae ex diversis de cognitione doctrinis procedunt: ubi enim aliter concipitur cognitio humana, aliter proceditur

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271, ds 519) and the Third Council of Constantinople (48) condemned Themistius. 7 Hence, the opinion that denied ignorance in Christ became common: ignorance in the Word was ruled out against the Arians; ignorance in the man, as though in a distinct person, against the Nestorians; and ignorance in the assumed humanity against the Agnoetae. Gregory the Great seems to have held that this last opinion came down to Nestorianism: ‘he who is not a Nestorian cannot be one of the Agnoetae’ (db 248, ds 476). 8 The conclusion is drawn from the foregoing that the hypostatic union rules out ignorance in the assumed nature. That, however, was no reason for putting aside either the analogy between divine and human knowing or the distinction between the natures and between the natural operations. This is why Fulgentius (45), Eulogius (53), Maximus the Confessor (57), John of Damascus (59–61), Hugh of St Victor (63–66), and Peter Lombard (68) are often criticized for being too facile. See Galtier, De Incarnatione ac Redemptione 252–53, § 325; d’Alès, De Verbo incarnato 262; Boyer, De Verbo incarnato 178–79. (B) The Scholastics and the moderns 9 A. Landgraf, in Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, 2/2, shows how slowly the early Scholastics arrived at the doctrine that would later be common. 10 This common doctrine was stated by everyone in such fashion that some understood it one way and some another. Their common teaching was: [in Christ there is] beatific knowledge (immediate knowing of God); knowledge of all things, both through the mediation of beatific knowledge and through infused knowledge; and knowledge naturally acquired. But where Thomas Aquinas taught that beatific knowledge is always in act (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 5, ad 1m), Bonaventure distinguished between an immediate knowing of God and a consequent knowing of creatures, such that the former is always in act, while the latter duly proceeds from habit to act (see Sépinski 66–73). Scotus, Toletus, and others held similar views (see Galtier, De Incarnatione ac Redemptione 260, § 330). Now this difference and others like it proceed from different doctrines of knowing, for different conceptions of human knowing lead to different

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ad cognitionem divinam, beatam, infusam analogice concipiendam. Ita qui fundamentum analogiae in actu intelligendi ponit, scientiam beatam tamquam actum intelligendi concipit; et cum fieri non possit ut intelligatur alicuius potentia vel voluntas et simul nesciatur ad quaenam extendatur potentia vel quaenam a voluntate sint electa, necessario reicitur sententia S. Bonaventurae et aliorum. Sed ex parte contraria qui aliud analogiae fundamentum secundum aliam cognitionis theoriam ponit, potius a S. Thoma dissentit et cum S. Bonaventura consentit. Quae sententiarum intricata multitudo atque quasi palus non tollitur nisi soluto problemate critico. Potius enim nocet quam prodest dicta illa theologia ‘dogmatica’ (cf. M.J. Congar, art. ‘Théologie,’ dtc 29: 432) quae ita communes omnium sententias collectas laudat ut obscuriores et dubias omittat. Quod enim aliter ab aliis intelligitur nisi omissa intelligentia ad commune non reducitur. Ubi autem rei intelligentia praeteritur, mox ipsa res in dubium vocatur, uti in praesenti quaestione videndum erit.

11 Ignorantiam in Christo homine docuerunt Lutherus, Calvinus, Zwinglius. Ipsam Christi divinitatem negabant rationalistae, tacere malebant qui christianismi non dogmata sed valores laudabant liberales. 12 Ab initio saeculi xix inter catholicos audiebantur querelae: rem non constare; probationes parum valere; apertam scripturarum doctrinam de proficienti Christi sapientia (Lc 2.52) eiusque ignorantia (Mc 13.32) praetermitti; cum passione beatam scientiam, cum libertate futurorum cognitionem, cum merito visum Dei splendorem componi non posse. Accedebant aetatis novae nova studia: ut Christus cogitetur non tantum ut persona sed etiam ut subiectum; ut tractetur non solum de obiectis apprehensis sed etiam de unitate conscientiae apprehendentis; ut exhibeatur homo per omnia nobis similis absque peccato, isque non abstractio quaedam atemporalis sed concretus et historicus secundum data in evangeliis inventa et methodo historico-critica reconstructa. Vides J. Ternus, op. cit., 177–86 (H. Schell), 199–208 (Günther, Rosmini, Existenz). E. Gutwenger, op. cit. 79–88. S. Szabo, op. cit., 361–62. O. Graber, Die Gottschauung Christi im irdischen Leben und ihre Bestreitung (Graz, 1920) 33–45.

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analogical conceptions of divine, beatific, and infused knowing. Those who lay the foundation of their analogy in the act of understanding will conceive beatific knowledge as an act of understanding; and since there cannot be an understanding of someone’s power or will and, at the same time, nescience as to how far that power extends or what that will has chosen, the opinion of Bonaventure and others must be rejected. But, on the other hand, those who lay the foundation of their analogy according to some other theory of knowing will agree with Bonaventure and disagree with Thomas. There is no way out of this tangled swamp of opinions short of solving the critical problem. More harm than good is done by that ‘dogmatic’ theology, so called (see M.-J. Congar, ‘Théologie,’ dtc 29: 432), which praises a collection of opinions that are common to everyone, so as to omit those which are more doubtful and obscure. But what different authors understand in different ways can be reduced to a common opinion only by leaving out understanding. But setting aside an understanding of any matter quickly calls the matter itself into doubt – and this, as we shall see, is what happened in the question at hand. 11 Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli taught that there was ignorance in Christ the man. Rationalists denied the divinity of Christ itself, while liberals, praising Christianity’s values but not its dogmas, opted for silence. 12 From the beginning of the nineteenth century complaints were heard among Catholics: the matter is not settled; the proofs are scarcely valid at all; the plain teaching of scripture as to Christ’s growth in wisdom (Luke 2.52) and his ignorance (Mark 13.32) is being set aside; the Passion cannot be reconciled with beatific knowledge, nor freedom with knowledge of things to come, nor merit with seeing the splendor of God. A new century has brought new investigations. Christ is thought of not only as a person but also as a subject. Not only are the objects of apprehension taken into account, but so is the apprehender’s unity of consciousness. Data found in the gospels and reconstructed by the historical-critical method show us a man who is like us in all things apart from sin, and who is not some atemporal abstraction but concrete and historical. See J. Ternus in Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, 3, 177–86 (H. Schell), 199–208 (Günther, Rosmini, Existenz); E. Gutwenger, Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi 79–98; S. Szabo, De scientia beata Christi 361–62; O. Graber, Die Gottschauung Christi im irdischen Leben und ihre Bestreitung (Graz: Verlag Ulrich Mosers, 1920) 33–45.

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Cf. tum modernistarum damnatio (db 2027–35, ds 3427–35) tum dubiorum exclusio (db 2183–85, ds 3645–47). 13 Recentius his problematibus subvenerunt: K. Adam, Der Christus des Glaubens (Dusseldorf, 1954, 1956, New York, 1957), cap. xix, qui sententiam S. Bonaventurae suis finibus adaptavit (cf. Gutwenger 86–87). R. Haubst, ‘Die Gottanschauung und das natürliche Erkenntniswachstum Christi,’ Theol. Quartalshrift 137 (1957) 385–412. K. Rahner, op. cit., qui immediatam Dei cognitionem in Christo homine per radicalem quandam conscientiam (Grundbefindlichkeit) explicat. De possibilitate huius sententiae, vide supra pp. 534–36.

Documentis illustratur traditio prior Quae superius brevissime diximus, nunc citationibus illustramus. Ne tamen quispiam opinetur vel historiam quaestionis intendi vel plenam cuiuslibet auctoris exponi doctrinam. Sed auditores nolumus nisi summaria non audire, nihilque legere. Sed speramus eos inceptam lecturam aliis in libris maximeque ipsis in fontibus continuaturos esse.

1 Irenaeus, Adv. Haer., ii, 28, 6: Irrationabiliter autem inflati audacter inenarrabilia Dei mysteria scire vos dicitis: quandoquidem et Dominus, ipse Filius Dei, ipsum iudicii diem et horam concessit scire solum Patrem, manifeste dicens: De die autem illa et hora nemo scit, neque Filius, nisi solus Pater. Si igitur scientiam diei illius Filius non erubuit referre ad Patrem, sed dixit quod verum est; neque nos erubescamus, quae sunt in quaestionibus maiora secundum nos, reservare Deo. Nemo enim super magistrum est (ep 204; Harvey, i, 355; mg 7, 808).6

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See the condemnation of the modernists in db 2027–35, ds 3427–35, and the ruling out of doubts in db 2183–85, ds 3645–47. 13 The following more recent authors addressed these problems: K. Adam, Der Christus des Glaubens: Vorlesgunen über die kirchliche Christologie (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1954, 1956), in English, The Christ of Faith: The Christology of the Church (New York: Pantheon, 1957), chapter 19, which adapts Bonaventure’s opinion to his own purposes (see Gutwenger 86–87). R. Haubst, ‘Die Gottanschauung und das natürliche Erkenntniswachstum Christi,’ Theologische Quartalschrift 137 (1957) 385–412. Karl Rahner, in ‘Dogmatische Erwägerungen über das Wissen und Selbswußstsein Christi,’ explains the immediate knowledge of God in Christ through a kind of radical consciousness (Grundbefindlichkeit). On the possibility of this opinion, see pp. 534–37 above. The early tradition: Documents We now illustrate with quotations the points made in very summary fashion above. It should not be supposed that our aim is a history of the question or that we are presenting the whole teaching of any of the authors quoted. However, we do not want the students to hear only summaries without reading anything [of the original authors], and we hope that once they start reading, they will keep reading in other books and above all in the sources themselves. 1 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, 2, 28, 6: ‘And you, absurdly puffed up, say boldly that you know the unutterable mysteries of God: whereas even the Lord, the very Son of God, allowed that the Father himself alone knows the day and hour of judgment, saying expressly, “Of that day and hour no one knows, nor yet the Son, but the Father only.” If therefore the Son felt no shame in referring to the Father the knowledge of that day, but spoke what is true, then neither let us be ashamed to reserve unto God those points in our inquiries which are too great for us. For nobody is above his teacher’ (ep 204; Harvey, 1, 355; mg 7, 808; [sc 294: 282]).6



6 Translation based on that found in A Library of the Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church: Anterior to the Division of the East and West, vol. 41, trans. John Keble (London: J.G. & F. Rivington; Oxford: John Henry Parker) 178.] ‘Harvey’

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2 Origenes, In Matthaeum commentarii, 10, 14: Qui novit quae sunt in cordibus hominum Christus Iesus … non ignarus interrogat, sed quoniam semel assumpserat hominem, utitur omnibus quae sunt hominis, quorum unum illud est, interrogare. Neque mirandum est si Salvator id fecit, quandoquidem rerum omnium Deus, hominum mores ferens, quasi quis homo filii sui mores ferat, interrogat, velut in his verbis: ‘Adam, ubi es?’ et ‘Ubi est Abel frater tuus?’ (Xiberta, Enchir. 46, § 16; Klostermann, Origenes, x, 16; mg 13, 865. Cf. Dt 1.31, Gen 3.9, 4. 9).7

3 Origenes, In Matthaeum comm. ser., ser. 55: De die autem illo … (Mt 24.36) … Et seipsum Salvator, secundum hunc locum, coniungit ignorantibus diem illum et horam. Et rationabiliter est quaerendum, quomodo qui confidit se cognoscere Patrem … (Mt 11.27) Patrem quidem novit, diem autem et horam consummationis non novit? et quomodo hoc abscondit Pater a Filio? Omnino enim ratio esse debet, quod a Salvatore tempus consummationis absconditum sit, et ignoret de eo. Audebit autem aliquis dicere, quoniam homo qui secundum Salvatorem (est) intelligitur proficiens sapientia et aetate et gratia coram Deo et hominibus, qui proficiens proficiebat quidem super omnes scientia et sapientia, non tamen ut veniret ei iam quod erat perfectum, priusquam propriam dispensationem impleret. Nihil ergo mirum est, si hoc solum nescivit ex omnibus, id est diem consummationis et horam … Post dispensationem autem … et Filius cognovit, scientiam a Patre suscipiens etiam de die consummationis et hora ut iam non solum Pater sciret de ea sed etiam Filius (Xiberta, Enchir. 47, § 19; Klostermann, Origenes, xi, 124–25; mg 13, 1686).

4 Arianorum argumenta narravit Athanasius. Primo, Filium non esse Deum secundum naturam, quia non naturaliter habuit ea quae a Patre ei sunt

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2 Origen, In Matthaeum commentarii, 10, 14: ‘Christ Jesus, who knew what is in human hearts … did not ask in ignorance; once having assumed humanity it was necessary to do all those things appropriate to it, one of which is asking questions. And it is not surprising that the Savior does this, for the God of the universe too, putting up with human manners much as a man might put up with the manners of his son, asks questions like “Adam, where are you?” and “Where is Abel your brother? ”’ (Xiberta, Enchiridion 46, § 16; Klostermann, Origenes, 10, 16; mg 13, 865; [sc 162: 194]. See Deuteronomy 1.31, Genesis 3.9, 4.9).7 3 Origen, In Matthaeum commentariorum series, series 55: ‘Concerning that day … (Matthew 24.36) … And the Savior, in this place, joins himself to those who do not know the day and the hour. It is reasonable to ask how one who confessed that he knows the Father … (Matthew 11.27) indeed knows the Father but does not know the day or the hour of the consummation? and how does the Father hide this from the Son? For surely there ought to be a reason why the time of the consummation should be hidden from the Savior and why he should be ignorant of it. Someone may venture to say, however, that the man who, being the Savior, is understood as growing in wisdom and age and favor with God and humans, was growing and indeed grew above everyone in knowledge and wisdom, yet not in such a way that what he came to know was already perfect, before his own earthly life was completed. So it is no wonder if, among all things, the one thing he does not know is the day and hour of the consummation … After his earthly life, however, the Son too knew, receiving knowledge from the Father even with respect to the day and hour of the consummation, so that then not only the Father but also the Son might know these things (Xiberta, Enchiridion 47, § 19; Klostermann, Origenes, 11, 124–25; mg 13, 1686). 4 The Arians: Their arguments are related by Athanasius. In the first place, the Son is not God by nature, since he did not naturally possess those things

refers to the edition of Adversus Haereses by W. Wigan Harvey (Cambridge: Typis Academicis, 1857). 7 Based on a translation from the Greek by Paul Crego, altered to fit Lonergan’s use of Migne’s Latin. ‘Klostermann’ in this selection and the next refers to Origenes Werke x: Origenes Matthäuserklärung i and Origenes Werke xi: Origenes Matthäuserklärung ii, ed. Erich Klostermann (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976).

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data: Mt 28.18, Io 5.22, 3.35, Mt 11.27, Io 6.37. Deinde, Filium non esse veram et naturalem Dei virtutem, quia ante passionem perturbatus est et pro se oravit: Io 12.27–28; Mt 26.30; Io 13.21. Tertio, Filium non esse veram et naturalem Patris sapientiam, qui sapientia profecit et interrogando ab aliis didicit: Lc 2.52, Mt 16.13, Io 11.33, Mc 6.38. Quarto, Filium non esse proprium et inseparabile Patris Verbum, quia a Deo est in cruce derelictus, quia pro se oravit, quia diem iudicii nescivit: Mt 26.46, Io 12.28, Mt 26.41, Mc 13.32. Athanasius, Orat. 3. c. Ar., 26; mg 26, 377. M. Richard, op. cit.

5 Athanasius obiectionibus Arianorum solvendis incubuit (Orat. 3 c. Ar., 27–58). Solutiones autem ad hoc fere reducuntur quod, quaecumque Verbo divino et aeterno non convenirent, ea de carne, de homine, propter nos esse dicta explicaret. Disputatur tamen inter eruditos quemadmodum Athanasius tunc temporis Filium qua hominem conceperit. Vide articulos supra citatos ab M. Richard et H. de Riedmatten conscriptos; etiam apud Grillmeier-Bacht, A. Grillmeier, i, 81–88, et J. Ternus, iii, 113.

Haec dicenda esse videntur. Primo, Athanasius optime novit nomen, caro, in usu scripturistico significare hominem (Or. 3 c. Ar., 30). Deinde, Athanasius expresse excludit adoptionismum: Verbum factum est homo; non in hominem venit (Or. 3 c. Ar., 30). Tertio, postea in Tomo ad Antiochenos Athanasius expresse exclusit apollinarismum: ‘non corpus inanimatum aut sensus expers aut mente carens Salvatorem habuisse’ (mg 26, 804b).8 Quarto, in Or. 3 c. Ar. Athanasius ita divinitatem Verbi qua Verbi defendit ut animam Christi humanam vitamque psychologicam creatam cogitare non videatur; eo scilicet modo procedit ut ad litteram sumendum esse videatur quod de Verbo homine facto dixerit: ‘cum Deus sit, proprium corpus habuit, et hoc utens instrumento, homo factus est propter nos’ (Or. 3 c. Ar., 31); cf. Richard. Quinto, ubi Verbum est omnisciens et non agnoscitur anima humana, ibi nulla vera et realis ignorantia esse potest; quam

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which were given him by the Father (Matthew 28.18, John 5.22, 3.35, Matthew 11.27, John 6.37). In the second place, the Son is not the true and natural power of God, since before his passion he was troubled and prayed for himself (John 12.27–28, Matthew 26.30, John 13.21). In the third place, the Son is not the true and natural wisdom of the Father, since he grew in wisdom and learned by questioning others (Luke 2.52, Matthew 16.13, John 11.33, Mark 6.38). In the fourth place, the Son is not the Father’s own inseparable Word, since he is forsaken by God on the cross, prayed for himself, and did not know the day of judgment (Matthew 26.46, John 12.28, Matthew 26.41, Mark 13.32). See Athanasius, Oratio 3 contra Arianos, 26; mg 26, 377; M. Richard, ‘Saint-Athanase et la psychologie du Christ selon les Ariens,’ (see above, p. 601). 5 Athanasius pondered solutions to the Arian objections (Oratio 3 contra Arianos, 27–58). For the most part, however, his solutions come down to this: whatever does not fit with the divine and eternal Word, should be explained as having been said about the flesh, about the man, on our account. There is scholarly debate, however, as to the way in which Athanasius at that time conceived the Son as man. See the articles by M. Richard and H. de Riedmatten cited above; also A. Grillmeier, in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, pp. 81–88 [Christ in Christian Tradition, 1, 308–18], and J. Ternus, in Grillmeier-Bacht, 3, p. 113. It seems this much may be said. In the first place, Athanasius knew quite well that in scriptural usage the word ‘flesh’ signifies man (Oratio 3 contra Arianos, 30). In the second place, Athanasius explicitly ruled out adoptionism: the Word became man; he did not come into a man (Oratio 3 contra Arianos, 30). In the third place, Athanasius afterwards, in the Tomus ad Antiochenos, expressly ruled out Apollinarianism: ‘the Savior had not a body without a soul, or lacking sense or mind’ (mg 26, 804 b).8 In the fourth place, in his third oration against the Arians Athanasius defended the divinity of the Word as Word in such a way that he seems not to have considered Christ’s human soul and his created psychological life. That is, he proceeded in such a way that it seems what he said about the Word made man is to be taken literally: ‘although he is God, he had his own body, and using this as an instrument he was made man for our sake’ (Oratio 3 contra



8 Translation altered from that found in A Select Library of the Nicene and PostNicene Fathers of the Christian Church [npnf], 2nd ser., vol. 4, 485.

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tamen conclusionem non deduxit Athanasius; imo, animam Christi humanam postea affirmavit explicite.

6 Basilius ep. Caesareae, Epist. 236, 2: Marci verba (13.32), quia aperte videntur ipsum Filium a cognitione excludere, ita intellegimus: Nemo novit, neque angeli Dei, sed nec Filius nosset, nisi nosset Pater; hoc est, causa et principium cognitionis Filii a Patre est. Ac violenta quidem non est, si quis aequo animo audiat, haec expositio, quandoquidem non adicitur solus, ut apud Matthaeum (24.36). Mens igitur Marci est eiusmodi: De die autem illa aut hora nemo scit, neque angeli Dei, sed nec Filius quidem nosset, nisi nosset Pater; siquidem ei a Patre data cognitio (mg 32, 880; ep 925; Xiberta, Enchir. 196, § 3).9

7 Gregorius ep. Nazianzenus, Orat. 30 (theol. 4), 15: Decimo loco ignorantiam ponunt illudque quod extremum diem et horam nemo cognoscat, ne Filius quidem, sed solus Pater. At quomodo fieri potest ut Sapientia quid­ quam eorum quae sunt ignoret? … Nonne omnibus apertum est eum id scire ut Deum, sed nescire ut hominem, si quis quod apparet disiungat ab intelligibili (Mason 131; mg 36, 124; ep 992; Xiberta, Enchir. 202, § 23).10 Cf. ibid. 16, ubi Gregorius solutionem Basilii repetit.

8 Epiphanius, Ancoratus 78, 9: Nam ob id ipsum evangelium de eo testatur: ‘Proficiebat sapientia et aetate’ (Lc 2.52). Non divinitas ipsa accessionem cepit aetatis, neque sapientiae incrementa desideravit, quae tota sapientia est. Verum sapientia progrediebatur Salvatoris inhumanatio (enanthroFpeFsis), non mentis expers, cum alioqui ne sapientia quidem praedita esse potuisset (mg 43, 165).11

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Arianos, 31); see Richard. In the fifth place, if the Word is omniscient and no human soul is acknowledged, then there can be no real, true ignorance. Athanasius did not draw this conclusion, however; indeed, he later affirmed Christ’s human soul explicitly. 6 Basil the Great, bishop of Caesarea, Epistle 236, 2: ‘The words of Mark (13.32), who appears plainly to exclude the Son from knowing [the day of judgment], we understand this way. No one knows, neither the angels of God, nor yet the Son would have known unless the Father had known: that is, the cause of the Son’s knowing comes from the Father. To a fair hearer there is no violence in this interpretation, because the word only is not added as it is in Matthew (24.36). Mark’s sense, then, is as follows: of that day and of that hour no one knows, nor the angels of God; but even the Son would not have known if the Father had not known, for the knowledge naturally his was given by the Father’ (mg 32, 880; [lcl 243: 394]; ep 925; Xiberta, Enchiridion 196, § 3).9 7 Gregory Nazianzus, Oratio 30 [Oratio theologica 4], 15: ‘Their tenth objection is the ignorance, and the statement that of the last day and hour no man knows, not even the Son himself, but the Father alone. And yet how can Wisdom be ignorant of anything? … Thus everyone must see that he knows as God and does not know as man – if one may distinguish what appears from what is intelligible’ (Mason 131; mg 36, 124; [sc 250: 256, 258]; ep 992; Xiberta, Enchiridion 202, § 23).10 See also section 16, where Gregory repeats Basil’s solution. 8 Epiphanius, Ancoratus 78, 9: ‘And so for this very reason the gospel attests concerning him: “He was advancing in wisdom and age” (Lk. 2.52). His divinity itself did not take on a progression of age, nor did it, which is the whole of wisdom, want any increases of wisdom. In truth, the Saviour’s becoming human (enanthroFpeFsis) was advancing in wisdom – not without a [human] mind, since otherwise wisdom could not have been bestowed’ (mg 43, 165; [gcsnf 10/1: 98]).11 9 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 2nd ser., vol. 8, 277. 10 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 2nd ser., vol. 7, 315. ‘Mason’ refers to The Five Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus, ed. Arthur James Mason (Cambridge: University Press, 1899). 11 Translation from the Greek by Paul Crego, revised to fit Lonergan’s use of Migne’s Latin. In this instance Lonergan seems to have altered the latter.

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9 Ioannes Chrysostomus, In Matthaeum homiliae, hom. 77, 1: De die autem illa … Quod ergo dixit: neque angeli, reprimit eos, ne discere quaerant id quod angeli nesciunt; cum autem dicit: neque Filius, prohibet non modo ne discant, sed etiam ne quaerant … et si vere Filius id ignorat, quandonam id sciet? An nobiscum? Quis hoc dixerit? Patrem clare novit, et tam clare quam ille novit Filium, et diem illam ignorabit?’ (mg 58, 702; ep 1178; Xiberta, Enchir. 250, § 8).12 Cf. Homiliam contra Anomoeos, ix (mg 48, 781–82; Xiberta, Enchir. 248, § 2).

10 Eustathius ep. Antiochenus, ob. 337, Adv. Arianos, lib. vi: Dicamus inquit cuius rei gratia Filius hominis diem proprii adventus ignorat. Neque enim dubium est, quia et hoc causa salutis hominum providens adinvenit omnium creator et generis opifex Deus. Sicut enim hominem causa salutis hominum Verbo coaptavit et Deo: sic et insignem iudicii diem causa divini beneficii homini competenter abscondit; ne forte ineffabilia mysteria similis generis hominibus homo indicans, et diem secundi adventus ostenderet (M. Spanneut, Recherches sur les écrits d’Eustathe d’Antioche, Lille, 1948, fragm. 49, p. 110; Xiberta, Enchir. 167, § 35; ml 67, 795). Cf. F. Sullivan, op. cit., 165–69; A. Grillmeier, apud Grillmeier-Bacht, i, 124–30.

11 Diodorus ep. Tarsensis, ob. 391–2, fragm. lat.: ‘Iesus proficiebat et aetate et sapientia.’ Hoc autem de Verbo Dei non potest dici, quia Deus perfectus natus est de perfecto, sapientia de sapientia, virtus de virtute. Ipse igitur non proficit; nec enim imperfectus est, ut ad perfectionem incrementis indigeat. Non enim ei mox formato vel edito omnem propriam sapientiam deitas contulit, sed hanc particulatim corpori tribuebat (Collectio palatina,

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9 John Chrysostom, In Matthaeum homiliae, homily 77, 1: ‘But of that day … By saying, “not the angels,” he stopped their mouths, that they should not seek to learn what these angels know not; and by saying, “nor the Son,” he forbids them not only to learn, but even to inquire … and if he [the Son] is ignorant of it, when will he know it? Will it be together with us? But who would say this? He knows the Father clearly, as clearly as the Father knows the Son; and of that day is he ignorant?’ (mg 58, 702; ep 1178; Xiberta, Enchiridion 250, § 8).12 See also his Homilia contra Anomoeos, 9 (mg 48, 781– 82; Xiberta, Enchiridion 248, § 2). 10 Eustathius, bishop of Antioch (d. 337), Adversus Arianos, book 6: ‘Let us, he says, declare the purpose for which the Son of man was ignorant of the day of his own coming. For undoubtedly God the provident creator of all things, maker of our kind, planned this too for the sake of men’s salvation. For just as he has joined a man with the Word and God for the sake of human salvation, so too he fittingly conceals the great day of judgment from the man for the sake of divine benefits – lest the man, announcing ineffable mysteries to men of similar kind, should perhaps disclose as well the day of his second coming’ (M. Spanneut, Recherches sur les écrits d’Eustathe d’Antioche [Lille: Facultés catholiques, 1948], fragment 49, p. 110; Xiberta, Enchiridion 167, § 35; ml 67, 795; [ccsg 51: 164]). See also F. Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1956) 165–69; A. Grillmeier, ‘Die theologische und sprachliche Vorbereitung der christologischen Formel von Chalkedon,’ in Grillmeier-Bacht, 1, 124–30 [Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1, 296–301]. 11 Diodore of Tarsus (d. 391 or 392), fragment 36: ‘Jesus increased in wisdom and in years. This cannot, however, be said of the Word of God, since he is born perfect God of the perfect [God], Wisdom of Wisdom, Power of Power. Therefore he himself does not increase; indeed, he is not incomplete so as to need additions for his completion. But that which grew in age and wisdom was the flesh. And as this had to be created and born, the Godhead

12 Translation based on that found in A Library of the Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, vol. 34, part 3, p. 1022.

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ed. E. Schwartz, aco, i, 5, 177–78; Xiberta, Enchir. 132, § 17).13 Cf. F. Sullivan, 181–96.

12 Theodorus Mopsuestenus, ob. 428, De incarnatione, ex lib. vii: Iesus autem proficiebat aetate, et sapientia, et gratia apud Deum et homines. Aetate quidem proficit processu temporum; sapientia vero, secundum progressum temporum intelligentiam acquirens; gratia autem, suscipiens virtutem et intelligentiae et cognitioni consentaneam; deinceps gratia quae illi erat apud Deum, accessionem et incrementum accipiebat … tanto perfectius et maiore facilitate virtutem exsequebatur, quam reliqui homines exsequi poterant; quanto Deus, qui in principio ipso formationis eius sibi eum unierat, maiorem e se cooperationem illi praebebat, ad perficiendum quae opus erant, ad salutem omnium omnia illius gubernans, et ad perfectiora incitans, ac labores illius, sive ad animam sive ad corpus pertinerent, ex maiore

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did not immediately impart to it all its own wisdom, but bestowed it upon the body in portions’ (Collectio palatina, ed. E. Schwartz, aco, 1, 177–78; Xiberta, Enchiridion 132, § 17).13 See F. Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia 181–96. 12 Theodore of Mopsuestia (d. 428), De incarnatione, book 7: ‘And Jesus increased in age and wisdom and in grace with God and men. He increased in age, to be sure, because time moved on, and in wisdom because he acquired understanding to match his advancing years. But he increased in grace by pursuing the virtue which is attendant upon understanding and knowledge. Because of this, the grace which was his from God received assistance … Therefore it is plain that he fulfilled virtue more exactly and more easily than was possible for other people, since God … had united Jesus with himself in his very conception and furnished him with a fuller cooperation for the accomplishment of what was necessary. Governing everything which concerned him for the sake of the salvation of all, he urged him on towards

13 Thus according to Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. 1, p. 356, whence the translation is taken. Lonergan is quoting the fragment as preserved in the Palatine Collection, in the edition of Schwartz (aco). The Palatine fragment is a Latin translation presumably by Marius Mercator. There also exists a Syriac version of the same fragment, preserved by Severus of Antioch, which, however, adds ‘but that which grew in age and wisdom was the flesh.’ Both fragments, in the original language and in English translation, are presented by John Behr (ed. and trans.), The Case against Diodore and Theodore: Texts and Their Contexts (Oxford UP, 2011): the Palatine fragment as PD 1, p. 266/7, and the Syriac fragment as SD 5, p. 238/9 (original language on the even page, ET on the odd). Here is Behr’s translation of SD 5: ‘Jesus grew in age and wisdom. It is not possible for this to be said concerning the God Word, for he is God, a Perfect One begotten from the Perfect One, Wisdom from Wisdom, Power from Power. He, therefore, grew not, for he is not imperfect such that he would grow to that which is perfect, but that which grew in age and wisdom was the flesh. Neither did the divinity, after it [i.e., the flesh] was formed or born, place immediately its entire wisdom in it, but rather little by little it gave [it] to the body.’ And here is Behr’s translation of PD 1 (i.e., of the Latin corresponding to Lonergan’s quote): ‘“Jesus grew in age and wisdom.” It is not possible for this to be said of the God Word, for he was begotten perfect God from the perfect, Wisdom from Wisdom, Power from Power. He, therefore, grew not; for he is not imperfect such that he would grow by steps to perfection. For the divinity did not, immediately upon his being formed or born, place in him its entire wisdom, but little by little conferred it upon the body.’

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parte allevans (apud Leontium Byzantinum, mg 66, 979).14 Cf. ds 419, 434, 435, db 224, 225; F. Sullivan 13–17.

13 Theodoretus ep. Cyrensis, ob. ca 460, Epist. 151: Quamobrem humana omnia Christi Domini, famem inquam sitim calorem somnum metum sudorem orationem inscitiam et alia huiusmodi quae nostra esse dicimus, accipiens divinum Verbum sibi univit nostrae salutis gratia. Cursum vero claudis restitutum, et mortuorum resurrectionem, et panis copiam, et aquae in vinum transmutationem caetera denique miracula, opera esse divinae potentiae credimus. Quare et pati dico ipsum Christum Dominum et passiones solvere. Pati quidem secundum oculorum receptionem, id est realiter secundum humanitatem; solvere vero passiones secundum divinitatem inexplicabilii modo in ipso habitantem (mg 83, 1425; Xiberta, Enchir. 398, § 75).15 Quae epistola Cyrillum non nominatum impugnat (vide col. 1418), et decretum Chalcedonense anticipat (col. 1419; cf. db 226, ds 436).

14 Theodoretus idem, a Cyrillo citatus: Cui igitur nos qui … consubstantialem esse et coaeternum Deo et Patri Filium confitemur … cui inquam attribuemus illud: ‘Deus meus, Deus meus, utquid me dereliquisti?’ et illud ‘Pater, si possibile est, transeat a me calix iste’16 et illud ‘Horam illam nemo novit, neque Filius hominis’ et alia quaecumque humiliter ab ipso, et a sanctis apostolis de ipso dicta scriptaque sunt? Cui famem et sitim adaptabimus? cui fatigationem et somnum? cui ignorantiam et formidinem? Quis angelico subsidio habebat opus? Si haec Dei Verbi sunt, quomodo ignoravit sapientia? Quomodo autem vocetur sapientia, quae ignorantiae infirmitati est obnoxia? Quomodo verax erit, dicens habere se omnia quae Pater, cum Patris cognitionem non habeat? Solus inquit enim Pater novit diem illum … Itaque si quidem se ignorare dicens verax fuit, haec aliquis de eo existimare possit. Si autem diem sciens, ut rem occultaret, ignorare se illum dicit, vide

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a larger perfection, the while lightening for him the greater part of his toils, whether they were of the soul or of the body’ (quoted by Leontius of Byzantium, mg 66, 979; [Behr, 286, 288]).14 See ds 419, 434, 435, db 224, 225; [dec 1: 119–20]; F. Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia 13–17. 13 Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus (d. ca. 460), Epistle 151: ‘On account of this, all the Lord Christ’s human features – I mean hunger, thirst, fatigue, sleep, dread, sweating, prayer, ignorance, and whatever else we say belongs to us from the first  – God the Word united to himself, working out our salvation. The walking of the lame, the resurrection of the dead, the springing forth of bread, the changing of water into wine, and all other miracleworking we believe to have been the works of divine power. I mean clearly that the Lord Christ both suffered and did away with suffering – suffering, on the one hand, according to what is seen (that is, really, according to his humanity), and doing away with suffering, according to the ineffably resident divinity’ (mg 83, 1425; Xiberta, Enchiridion 398, § 75).15 This epistle does not attack Cyril by name (see column 1418), and it anticipates the Chalcedonian decree (see column 1419; cf. db 226, ds 436; [dec 1: 121]). 14 Theodoret, as quoted by Cyril: ‘To whom do we  … who confess that the Son is consubstantial (homoousios) and co-eternal with the Father … attribute the following: “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?”; “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me”; “Father, save me from this hour”;16 “No one knows that hour, not even the Son of man”; and all the other sayings humbly said and written by himself or by the holy apostles? To whom do we attribute hunger and thirst? Fatigue and sleep? Ignorance and dread? Who is this who had the help of angels? If these belong to the Word of God, how can wisdom have been ignorant? How can anyone call wisdom what is subject to the weakness of ignorance? How can truth be speaking, saying that he has all things of the Father, yet has not the knowledge of the Father? “For,” said he, “only the Father knows that day” … If he spoke the truth, that he did not know, how can someone come to understand this

14 Translation altered from that found in R.A. Norris, trans. and ed., The Christological Controversy (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980) 119. 15 Translation from the Greek by Paul Crego, altered to fit Lonergan’s use of Migne’s Latin. Note that the clause in parentheses in the translation is in Migne’s Latin but not in Theodoret’s Greek. 16 This passage is not in Lonergan’s Latin.

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in quam blasphemiam, quod colligitur, evadat, ut veritas mentiatur: quae immerito veritas dicetur, si quid in se habet veritati adversum. Si autem veritas non mentitur, neque Deus Verbum diem quem fecit ignorat, quem ipse praedefinivit, in quo iudicaturus est orbem; sed habet Patris cognitionem ut imago incommutabilis. Non igitur Dei Verbi est ignorantia, sed formae servi, quae tanta per illud tempus sciebat quanta deitas inhabitans revelabat (apud Cyrillum Alexandrinum, Apologeticus contra Theodoretum pro xii capitibus, mg 76, 410–11).17

15 Cf. Cyrillum, ibid., col. 415 b: … cur dividis, et duos dicere filios non erubescis? An non plane duo erunt, si quidem non est idem qui dimensam habet scientiam cum eo qui novit omnia; et cum eo qui partitam recipit revelationem, is qui perfectus est in sapientia et tanta cognoscens quanta et Pater? (Vide ds 419.)

16 Cyrillus patriarcha Alexandrinus, In Lucam comment., 2.52: Si ergo in sapientia profecit, haud ipsa sapientia (id est, Verbum Patris sapientia) profecit, sed humana natura incrementum sapientiae habuit. Cum enim se revelaret quotidie ac manifestaret in ipso deitas admirabilior spectantibus semper fiebat (mg 72, 509; Xiberta, Enchir. 343, § 12).18

17 Idem, In Ioannem comment., 1.14: Igitur non qua Verbum est ac Deus dictus est proficere, sed cum magis magisque admirationem sui praeberet, ex operibus ipsis gratia in dies augeri spectatoribus videbatur, proficiente potius (ut vere dicam) admirantium habitu quam ipso ad gratiam, qui ut Deus perfectus est (mg 73, 165; Xiberta, Enchir. 346, § 21).19

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about him? If he knows the day but, wishing to conceal it, says he does not know, do you see into what blasphemy the implication flies? For truth lies, which is not suitably called truth if it possesses something contradictory. If the truth does not lie, and God the Word is not ignorant of the day that he himself made and he himself determined, the day on which the world is going to be judged, then he does possess the knowledge of the Father, as an unchangeable image. For the ignorance does not belong to God the Word but to the form of a servant, who came to know such things according to the time such as the indwelling deity revealed them’ (quoted in Cyril of Alexandria, Apologeticus contra Theodoretum pro xii capitibus, mg 76, 410–11; [Pusey, 6: 420–26]).17 15 Cf. Cyril himself: ‘… and why do you divide [him]? Do you not blush to say there are two sons? And will there not be two, since he that knows all is not the same as one to whom knowledge is measured out, and he that is perfect in wisdom (sophia) and knows the same things as the Father is not the same as he that receives a partial revelation?’ (Apologeticus contra Theodoretum pro xii capitibus, mg 76, 415 b; [Pusey, 6: 430]; see ds 419). 16 Cyril of Alexandria, In Lucam commentarium, 2.52: ‘If therefore he is said to increase in wisdom, it is not Wisdom (that is, the Word, the wisdom of the Father) that increases; no, that which is human grows in it. As the deity in him was every day revealed and made more manifest, he became ever more amazing to those who saw him’ (mg 72, 509; Xiberta, Enchiridion 343, § 12).18 17 Cyril of Alexandria, In Ioannem commentarium, on John 1.14: ‘Hence he is said to increase, not in that he is Word and God, but because he is ever more greatly marveled at [and] seemed, from his deeds, more full of grace to those who saw him, the disposition of those who marveled advancing in grace (as is true to say) rather than he who is perfect as God’ (mg 73, 165; [Pusey, 1: 144]; Xiberta, Enchiridion 346, § 21).19

17 Translation from the Greek by Paul Crego. 18 Translation from the Greek by Paul Crego. Note that the parenthetical clause is in Migne’s Latin but not in Cyril’s Greek. 19 Translation based on that found in A Library of the Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, vol. 43, p. 112.

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18 Idem, Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali Trinitate, Assertio 22: Facile constabit ipsum et diem et horam novisse ut Deum, tametsi, humanitatem suam ostendens, ignorare se dicat. Si enim omnia quae ante diem illum et horam eventura sunt manifeste explicat et dicit: Hoc quidem erit, illud vero accidet, et tum erit finis, manifestum est quod, si quae diem illum antecessura sunt novit, ipsum etiam diem cognoscat. Nam post illa quae ab ipso praedicta sunt, subiungit: Tunc erit finis (Mt 24.14); finis autem quid aliud sit quam ipse ultimus dies quem ignorare se respectu incarnationis dixit, ordinem humanitati convenientem servans. Humanitatis enim proprium est futura ignorare (mg 75, 368–69; Xiberta, Enchir. 352, § 39; ep 2072).20

19 Idem, ibid., Assertio 28: Naturalis quaedam lex vetat ne homo maiori prudentia, quam corporis aetas ferat, sit praeditus: sed una cum incremento corporis, concurrit quodammodo in nobis parique passu incedit sapientia. Erat itaque Verbum in carne factum homo … atque erat perfectus; sapientia enim erat et potentia Patris. Cum vero naturae nostrae consuetudinem prae se ferre deberet, ne peregrinum quid atque diversum ab ea esse censeretur, ut homo, crescente paulatim corpore, sapientiorem se in dies audientibus et videntibus ipsum ostendit: perfectus quidem in omnibus exsistens, sicut ante dictum est, communem vero naturae morem sequens. Cum igitutur audies eum profecisse sapientia et gratia, ne accessionem aliquam sapientiae in ipso factam fuisse existimes, nulla enim re indiget Verbum Dei; sed quia cernentibus sapientia ipsius et gratia magis conspicua fiebat, proficere dicitur, ut profectus ille ad habitum eorum qui ipsum admirabantur potius sit referendus (mg 75, 427; Xiberta, Enchir. 353, § 43).21 Vide quae sequuntur, col. 427, 430, ubi insinuatur tam realem fuisse in homine profectum quam realem in carne passionem.

20 Idem, Hom. paschalis xvii, 9: Itaque cum sit sui Sapientia Genitoris, proficere sapientia dicitur Deus in omnibus perfectissimus, ideoque quod ea

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18 Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali Trinitate, assertion 22: ‘It is plain therefore to see that he knew the hour and the day as God but, manifesting the humanity in himself, he said that he did not know. For if he states clearly all the things which are to come before that day and hour, and says, “This will be” and “That will happen, and then will come the end,” then it is clear that the sequence is before him and that he knows it. For once these things had been said by him, he added, “Then will come the end” (Matthew 24.14). What else would this “end” be, except the last day, which for the sake of the economy he said he did not know, preserving the fitting order of the humanity? For it is proper to humanity not to know what is yet to come’ (mg 75, 368–69; Xiberta, Enchiridion 352, § 39; ep 2072).20 19 Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali Trinitate, assertion 28: A certain law of nature does not allow a man to have wisdom to a degree which would be out of correspondence with his bodily stature; but our wisdom keeps pace and advances in a way with our bodily growth. Now the Word made flesh was man … and he was perfect, being the Wisdom and Power of God. And since it was necessary in a way that he should accommodate himself to the custom of our nature, to avoid being thought a portent by those who saw him as a man, while his body was gradually growing, therefore he concealed himself and kept daily appearing wiser to those who saw and heard him: existing as perfect in everything, as stated above, but following the common way of [our] nature. Thus, when you hear that he advanced in wisdom and grace, do not consider that any addition of wisdom occurred in him himself, since nothing is lacking to the Word of God. But because he was ever wiser and more gracious to those who saw him, therefore he was said to advance, the advance being in fact relative to those who admired, rather than to himself’ (mg 75, 427; Xiberta, Enchiridion 353, § 43).21 See what follows in columns 427 and 430, where it is hinted that increase in the man was as real as the suffering in his flesh. 20 Cyril of Alexandria, Homilia paschalis 17, 9: ‘Thus, while he is the Wisdom of his Father, God who is perfect in all things is yet said to have increased

20 Translation from the Greek by Paul Crego. 21 See Charles Gore, Dissertations on Subjects Connected with the Incarnation, 3rd ed. (London: J. Murray, 1907) 151–52.

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quae sunt propria conditionis humanae propter incarnationem voluntate suscepit (mg 77, 796; Xiberta, Enchir. 405, § 4).22

21 Idem, Ad reginas de fide orat. altera, 17: Quare licet ut homo aliquid nescivisse dicatur, ut Deus tamen omnia norat. Etsi ergo ut homo ignorationem prae se ferret dum de Lazaro, ‘Ubi posuistis eum?’ percontaretur, mox tamen dum potenti virtute ex mortuis illum exsuscitat, Deum se esse aperte declarat (mg 76, 1355; Xiberta, Enchir. 420, § 70).

22 Idem, Adv. Nestorium, iii, 4: … in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae … Quomodo igitur proficere dictus est? Ut ego arbitror, quia Deus Verbum, pro incremento et aetate sui corporis, divinorum illorum bonorum quae sibi inerant manifestationem admetiebatur … Perfectissimus ergo erat omni ex parte eiusmodi vir, neque ullo modo quidquam illi deerat ad absolutam perfectamque virtutem. Quando autem fuit minus in virtute perfectus qui etiam in utero Deus erat? de quo etiam propheta dicit Isaias: ‘Butyrum et mel comedet: antequam sciat vel eligat mala, eliget bonum’: quia antequam sciat puer bonum aut malum, repugnat improbitati ut eligat bonum. Ubinam igitur tibi suppetit virtutis imperfectionem in Christo demonstrare? quave ille progressione indiget, qui adeo est absolutus, ut universae improbitati repugnet, praeferatque illi, imo vero solam eligat, virtutem (mg 76, 154 bc, 155 a).23 23 Quaeres ergo quid senserit Cyrillus de ipsa finita et creata Christi humanitate, utrum realis an apparens fuerit ignorantia, profectus. Qua de re vide Lebreton, Dubarle, Liébaert, Grillmeier (Grillmeier-Bacht, i, 165 ss.),24 Jouassard, quorum non omnium est una sententia. Breviter dici potest Cyrillum ita divinitatem Verbi et Christi unitatetem docuisse, ita naturarum di-

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in wisdom, for this reason: because for the sake of the economy he willingly took on what is proper to the human condition’ (mg 77, 796; [see mg 77: 781a; sc 434: 278]; Xiberta, Enchiridion 405, § 4).22 21 Cyril of Alexandria, Ad reginas de fide oratio altera, 17: ‘Therefore, though he is said not to know something as human, still as God he knows all. And if then, as human, he showed ignorance when he asked of Lazarus, “Where have you laid him?” still when he soon raised him from the dead with mighty power, he openly declared himself God’ (mg 76, 1355; [Pusey, 7: 279]; Xiberta, Enchiridion 420, § 70). 22 Cyril of Alexandria, Adversus Nestorium, 3, 4: ‘In him “are all the treasures of wisdom.” How then is it said that he grew? Because, in my judgment, God the Word measured out, according to the increase and age of his body, the manifestation of those divine goods that were present in him … Fully perfect therefore is he, being such unto everything, and in no wise will he have the lack of being complete unto the achievement of virtue. And when was he less than perfect in virtue, who even in the womb was God, and of whom the prophet Isaiah says, “Butter and honey shall he eat, before he has knowledge to prefer evil, he shall choose the good; because before the child shall know good or evil, he refuses evil, to choose the good” [Isaiah 7.15–16]. Where then will you be able to demonstrate Christ’s imperfection unto good? Or what growth will he need who is so perfect as to refuse vice and to prefer to it, indeed choose, only good?’ (mg 76, 154 bc, 155 a; [Pusey, 6: 166–67]).23 23 What, then, did Cyril think about Christ’s finite, created humanity itself? Were the ignorance and the increase in wisdom real or only apparent? On this point, see Lebreton, Dubarle, Liébaert, Grillmeier (in GrillmeierBacht, 1, pp. 165–76),24 and Jouassard, not all of whom are of the same opinion. Briefly, it can be said that the way Cyril taught the divinity of the

22 Translated from Lonergan’s Latin; mg has only a Latin text in the place cited by Lonergan. Earlier in the same volume (77), Migne includes the same homily (17) with facing Greek and Latin. The corresponding column and section in the Greek version of the homily has been included in brackets. 23 Translation based on that found in A Library of the Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, vol. 47, pp. 113–14. Note that part of the same quotation appears at p. 563 above. 24 See above, p. 621.

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stinctionem post unionem exclusisse, ut de finita et creata humanitate qua tali disserere atque determinare parum potuerit vel voluerit. Alibi ergo ad adstantes et conspicientes recurrit, alibi ad Christum qua Deum absolute perfectum, alibi ad exegesin quae difficultatem minuit, alibi ad alios textus unde contrarium concludi potest.

24 Quam Christi unitatem concretam ulterius ita evolverunt monophysitae ut Gaianitae passibilitatem corporis Christi habuerint miraculosam, Theo­dosiani vero etsi corpus naturaliter passibile esse docuerint omnem defectum ab anima Christi arcuerint. Quare cum Themistius, monophysita et Agnoetarum dux, ignorantiam in Christo admiserit, quasi Nestorianus esset iudicabatur. Vide J. Lebreton; É. Amann, art. Themistius, dtc 29 (15) 219–22; J. Ternus, Grillmeier-Bacht, iii, 110–12; E. Gutwenger 100–102.

25 Hilarius, De trinitate, 9, 66–67: Sed ei, qui novit omnia, ea ipsa quae non nescit, dispensatio est aliquando nescire se loqui: dum aut Abraham scientia dissimulatur in tempus, aut apud stultas virgines et iniquitatis operarios cognitio negatur indignis, aut in sacramento filii hominis, interrogatio interrogantis ex homine est: in his se omnibus veritati corporeae nativitatis accommodans, quibus naturae nostrae infirmitas detinetur; non ita ut infirmus esset ex natura qui Deus est, sed ut infirmitates sibi hominum Deus homo natus assumpserit, assumpserit autem ita, non ut in naturam infirmam natura indemutabilis sit redacta, sed ut in natura indemutabili susceptionis esset sacramentum …

Intelligendum itaque est cur professus sit diem se nescire. Si omnino nescire creditur, Apostolus ita contradicit: In quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconsi (Col 2.3). Est ergo absconsa scientia: quae quia abscondenda est, interdum et nescientia confitenda est, ut esse possit absconsa. Nam si erit in protestatione, non etiam in secreto manebit. Negat ergo se scire ut scientia possit esse abscondita25 (ml 10, 334–35; cf. 9, 58–69; col. 327–36).

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Word and the unity of Christ, and the way he excluded any distinction of natures after the union, was such that he would not and could not discuss and specify the finite, created human nature as such. Sometimes, therefore, he has recourse to what is present and conspicuous; sometimes to Christ who, as God, is absolutely perfect; sometimes to exegesis that palliates the difficulty; sometimes to other texts from which it is possible to draw the opposite conclusion. 24 The monophysites developed this concrete unity of Christ to such an extent that the Gaianites would hold the suffering of Christ’s body to be miraculous, while the Theodosians, although they would teach that his body was naturally capable of suffering, would keep every defect away from Christ’s soul. Consequently, when Themistius, a monophysite and leader of the Agnoetae, admitted ignorance in Christ, he was judged a Nestorian. See J. Lebreton; É. Amann, ‘Themistius,’ dtc 29 (15) 219–22; J. Ternus, in Grillmeier-Bacht, 3, 110–12; E. Gutwenger 100–102. 25 Hilary, De Trinitate, 9, 66–67: ‘But he, who knows all things, sometimes by a practice of economy professes lack of knowledge of things about which he does not lack knowledge. Thus, in the case of Abraham, he concealed his knowledge for a time; in the case of the foolish virgins and the workers of iniquity, he refused to recognize the unworthy; in the mystery of the son of Man, his asking, as if ignorant, expressed his humanity. In these cases he accommodated himself to the reality of his birth in the flesh in everything to which the weakness of our nature is subject, not in such a way that he became weak in his divine nature, but that God, born man, assumed the weaknesses of humanity. He assumed them, however, not so as to reduce his unchangeable nature to a weak nature, but so that in the unchangeable nature there might be a mystery of reception … ‘We can now understand why he said that he did not know the day. If we believe he really lacked knowledge, we contradict the apostle, who says, In whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden (Colossians 2.3). There is knowledge which is hidden in him, and because it has to be hidden, it must sometimes for this purpose be professed as lack of knowledge, for once declared, it will no longer be secret. In order, therefore, that the knowledge may remain hidden, he declares that he does not know’ (ml 10, 334–35; see 9, 58–69, columns 327–36; [ccsl 62a: 446–47; cf. 436–50]).25

25 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 2nd ser., vol. 9, p. 178.

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26 Ambrosius, De fide ad Gratianum, ii, 11: Propter me Christus suscepit meas infirmitates, mei corporis subiit passiones, pro me peccatum, hoc est pro omni homine, pro me maledictum factus est … pro me filius ancillae, pro me diem iudicii ignorans, pro me nesciens diem et horam (ml 16, 580).26

27 Idem, ibid., v, 4: … nescire se simulat ut scire faciat nescientes … (ml 16, 660; Xiberta, Enchir. 269, § 24).

28 Idem, De incarnationis dominicae sacramento, vii, 72: Quomodo proficiebat Sapientia Dei? Doceat te ordo verborum. Profectus est aetatis et profectus sapientiae, sed humanae est. Ideo aetatem ante praemisit, ut secundum hominem crederes dictum; aetas enim non divinitatis sed corporis est. Ergo si proficiebat aetate hominis, proficiebat sapientia hominis (ml 16, 837).27 Vide infra, § 75, ubi obviat obiectionem ex duplici Christi sapientia sequi divisionem Christi, i.e., nestorianismum.

29 Idem, ibid., v, 38: ‘Quare me dereliquisti?’ sed intelligat quod secundum carnem ista dicantur, quae longe a plenitudine divinitatis aliena sunt. Aliena sunt enim a Deo verba delictorum, quia aliena sunt et delicta verborum: sed quoniam delicta aliena suscepi, etiam delictorum alienorum verba suscepi; ut derelictum me a Patre Deo esse dicam, qui apud Deum semper sum.28

30 Hieronymus, In Isaiam commentarii, iii, ad 7.15: Butyrum et mel comedet, ut sciat reprobare malum et eligere bonum … Et licet post saecula de eo evangelista testetur: Puer autem proficiebat … (Lc 2.52), et hoc dicatur ut veritas humani corporis approbetur, tamen adhuc pannis involutus et butyro pastus et melle, habebit boni malique iudicium, ut reprobans mala eligat bona. Non quod hoc fecerit aut reprobaverit vel elegerit; sed quod scierit reprobare et eligere, ut per haec verba noscamus infantiam humani

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26 Ambrose, De fide ad Gratianum, 2, 11: ‘For my sake Christ bore my infirmities, submitted to the passions of my body, for me (that is, for everyone) was made sin, made a curse … for me he was the son of a handmaid, for me he was ignorant of the day of judgment, for me he knew not the day and the hour’ (ml 16, 580; [csel 78: 91]).26 27 Ambrose, De fide ad Gratianum, v, 4: ‘… he pretends that he does not know, in order to make them know who do not know’ (ml 16, 660; [csel 78: 237]; Xiberta, Enchiridion 269, § 24). 28 Ambrose, De incarnationis dominicae sacramento, 7, 72: ‘How did God’s Wisdom increase? Let the order of the words teach you. He increased in years and he increased in wisdom, that is, human wisdom. So [the evangelist] placed ‘age’ first, so that you might believe that it was said humanly; for age does not belong to divinity but to the body. Thus, if he increased in human age, he increased in human wisdom …’ (ml 16, 837; [csel 79: 261]).27 See number 75 below, which eliminates the objection that the result of Christ’s having a twofold wisdom is a division of Christ, that is, Nestorianism. 29 Ambrose, De incarnationis dominicae sacramento, 5, 38: ‘[Let anyone who hears] “Why have you forsaken me” understand that these words, which are foreign to the fullness of divinity, are said according to the flesh … For the words of sinners are foreign to God, since the sins of words are foreign to him also. But because I have taken on the sins of others, I have also taken on the words of others’ sins, so that I say that I, always with God, have been forsaken by God the Father [csel 79: 242].’28 30 Jerome, Commentary on Isaiah 3 (on Isaiah 7.15): ‘ “Butter and honey shall he eat, that he may know to refuse the evil and choose the good …” And the evangelist would testify this of him, ages afterward: “But the child grew …” (Luke 2.52). This is said to confirm the truth of [his] human body; nevertheless, even when he is wrapped in swaddling clothes and fed with butter and honey, he will have judgment of good and evil, so that refusing the evil he may choose the good. Not that he will have done this, or that he will have

26 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 2nd ser., vol. 10, p. 236. 27 Translation altered from Saint Ambrose: Theological and Dogmatic Works, trans. Roy J. Deferrari (Washington, dc: Catholic University of America Press, 1963) 246–47. 28 Translation altered from Saint Ambrose: Theological and Dogmatic Works 233.

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corporis divinae non praeiudicasse sapientiae (ml 24, 110; ep 1400). Vide In Evangelium Matthaei commentarios, iv, ad 24.36 (ml 26, 181; ep 1389); ubi docet omnes thesauros sapientiae in Christo esse, sed absconditos; et ideo absconditos quia non est vestrum nosse tempora vel momenta (Act 1.7).

31 Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram, viii, 14, 32: … Verbum apud Deum, caro apud nos, Verbum caro inter Deum et nos. De illo quippe propheta dicit: ‘Priusquam sciat puer bonum aut malum, contemnet malitiam ut eligat bonum’ (Is 7.16 secundum lxx). Quomodo quod nescit aut contemnit aut eligit, nisi quia haec duo sciuntur aliter per prudentiam boni aliter per experientiam mali? Per prudentiam boni malum scitur, etsi non sentitur. Tenetur enim bonum, ne amissione eius sentiatur malum. Item per experientiam mali scitur bonum; quoniam quid amiserit sentit, cui de bono amisso male fuerit. Priusquam sciret ergo puer per experientiam, aut bonum quo careret aut malum quod boni amissione sentiret, contempsit malum ut eligeret bonum, id est, noluit amittere quod habebat, ne sentiret amittendo quod amittere non debebat. Singulare exemplum obedientiae; quippe non venit facere voluntatem suam, sed eius voluntatem a quo missus est ... (ml 34, 385). Cf. T. van Bavel 150.

32 Idem, Enarr. 2 in ps. 34, 2 (ad vv. 11, 12): Dicat ergo caput nostrum: ‘Insurgentes testes iniqui, quae ignorabam interrogabant me.’ Nos autem dicamus capiti nostro: Domine, quid ignorabas? Itane tu aliquid ignorabas? Nonne et interrogantium corda noveras? nonne eorum dolos ante perspexeras? nonne in eorum manus te sciens dederas? nonne ut ab eis patereris veneras? Quid ergo ignorabas? Ignorabat peccatum: et hoc peccatum ignorabat, non quasi non iudicando, sed non committendo (ml 36, 333).29 Cf. T. van Bavel 151.

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refused or chosen; but he will know how to refuse and choose, and through these words we may recognize that the infancy of a human body does not preclude divine wisdom’ (ml 24, 110; [ccsl 73: 105–106]; ep 1400). See In Evangelium Matthaei commentarios, 4, on Matthew 24.36 (ml 26, 181; [ccsl 77: 232]; ep 1389), where Jerome teaches that all the treasures of wisdom are in Christ, but hidden; and that they are hidden because ‘It is not for you to know times or seasons’ (Acts 1.7). 31 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, 8, 14, 32: ‘The Word was with God, the flesh with us, the incarnate Word between God and us. Of him the prophet says: “Before the boy knows good or evil, he will refuse wickedness and choose good” (Isaiah 7.16, Septuagint). How could he either refuse or choose what he does not know, unless these two are known in one way by discernment of good and in another way by experience of evil? By discernment of the good evil is known, though not perceived. For the good is held, lest by the loss of it evil should be perceived. Again, good is known by the experience of evil; for anyone for whom lost good is evil perceives what has been lost. Thus, before the boy knew, by experience, either the good he would lack or the evil he would perceive by loss of good, he despised evil and chose good, which is to say he was unwilling to lose what he had, lest he should perceive by losing what he ought not to lose. An outstanding example of obedience: he came, not to do his own will but the will of him by whom he was sent …’ (ml 34, 385; [csel 28: 253–54]). See T. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin 150. 32 Augustine, Enarratio 2 in psalmum 34, 2, on verses 11–12: ‘If, speaking in his own person, our Head says, “Unjust witnesses arose, interrogating me on matters of which I was ignorant,” we in our turn must ask our Head, “‘Lord, what was there that you were ignorant of? Were you ignorant of anything? Did you not know even the hearts of your interrogators? Had you not foreseen their tricks? Had you not delivered yourself knowingly into their hands? Had you not come for this, to suffer at their will? Of what, then, were you ignorant?” He was ignorant of sin, and of this sin, not in the sense that he could not judge it, but in that he did not commit it’ (ml 36, 333; [ccsl 38: 312]).29 See T. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin 151. 29 Translation altered from Augustine, Exposition of the Psalms 33–50, ed. John E. Rotelle, o.s.a., trans. Maria Boulding, o.s.b., The Works of St. Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, 3/16 (Hyde Park, ny: New City Press, 2000) 60.

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33 Idem, C. Maximinum, ii, 23, 7: Legimus quidem quod ‘Iesus proficiebat aetate et sapientia et gratia Dei erat in illo’ sed secundum formam hominis, quam pro nobis accepit ex nobis, non secundum formam Dei, in qua non alienum arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo. Verumtamen etiam in ipsa forma hominis legimus eum aetate et sapientia profecisse, non tamen ut ex non bono bonus fieret credendo meruisse’ (ml 42, 802).30 Cf. T. van Bavel 171.

34 Idem, Contra Mendacium, 13, 27: Talia sunt illa, ubi de muliere quae fluxum sanguinis patiebatur, ait, ‘Quis tetigit me?’ et de Lazaro, ‘Ubi posuistis eum?’ Sic quippe interrogavit, quasi nesciens quod utique sciebat. Ac per hoc nescire se finxit, ut aliquid aliud illa velut ignorantia sua significaret: quae significatio quoniam verax est, mendacium profecto non erat (ml 40, 537).31 T. van Bavel 152.

35 Idem, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, i, 22, 34: Secundum ipsam locutionem dicit et Dominus noster, nescire se diem et horam de fine saeculi. Quid enim esse potest quod ille nesciat? Sed quia hoc utiliter occultabat discipulis, nescientem se esse dixit, quia illos nescientes occultando faciebat. Secundum hanc figuram etiam Patrem solum dixit scire diem ipsum, quia eundem Filium scire faceret. Ex hac figura multae quaestiones in divinis scripturis, eis qui iam genus locutionis huius noverunt, sine ulla difficultate solvuntur (ml 34, 190).32 T. van Bavel 151.

36 Idem, Enarr. 1 in ps. 36, 1: Quia vero Dominus noster Iesus Christus magister nobis missus est, etiam Filius hominis dixit nescire illum diem, quia in magisterio eius non erat ut per eum sciretur a nobis. Neque enim aliquid

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33 Augustine, Contra Maximinum Arianum, 2, 23, 7: ‘We read that Jesus advanced in age and wisdom, and the grace of God was upon him (Lk 2.52), but this was according to the form of man which he took from us and for us, not according to the form of God in which he did not think it robbery to be equal to God. We also read that in the form of man he advanced in age and wisdom, but not that, by believing, he merited to become good after not being good’ (ml 42, 802).30 See T. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin 171. 34 Augustine, Contra Mendacium, 13, 27: ‘[There are certain things of the same kind pertaining even to the Savior in the Gospel, because the Lord of the Prophets deigned to be Himself also a Prophet.] Such are his saying about the woman who had a hemorrhage: “Who touched me?” and about Lazarus: “Where have you laid him?” For, thus he asked as if not knowing what he surely knew. Through this he pretended that he did not know, so that his supposed ignorance could signify something else. Because this signification was true, really no lie was involved’ (ml 40, 537; [csel 41: 507]).31 See T. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin 152. 35 Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 1, 22, 34: ‘According to this same mode of speech our Lord also says that he does not know the day or the hour of the end of the world. What can there be that he does not know? He was concealing it from the disciples for their benefit, and he said that he did not know it, because he was causing them not to know by concealing it. According to this same figure he said that the Father alone knew that day, because it was the Father who made it known to the Son. This figure easily resolves many questions in the divine scriptures for those who are familiar with this mode of expression’ (ml 34, 190; [csel 91: 103]).32 See T. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin 151. 36 Augustine, Enarratio 1 in psalmum 36, 1: ‘This is why our Lord Jesus Christ, who was sent to be our teacher, declared that even the Son of Man did not know the day, for it was not part of his teaching office that we should be

30 Translation altered from Augustine, ‘Debate with Maximinus,’ in Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle, The Works of St. Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, 1/18 (Hyde Park, ny: New City Press, 1995) 315. 31 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 1st ser., vol. 16, p. 160. 32 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 1st ser., vol. 84, p. 82.

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scit Pater quod Filius nescit: cum ipsa scientia Patris illa sit, quae sapientia eius est: est autem sapientia eius Filius eius, Verbum eius. Sed quia nobis scire non proderat … non solum sicut magister aliquid docuit, sed sicut magister aliquid non docuit. Tamquam enim magister sciebat et docere quod proderat, et non docere quod oberat. Sic autem quodam genere locutionis nescire Filius dicitur quod non docet: id est, nescire dicitur quod nescire nos facit, quomodo quotidie loquimur, modo quodam locutionis, ut dixi. Laetum enim diem dicimus, quia laetos nos facit; et tristem diem, quia tristes nos facit; frigus pigrum, quia pigros nos facit. Quomodo contra dicitur a Domino: Nunc cognovi. Dictum est Abrahae: ‘Nunc cognovi quod timeas tu Deum’ (Gen 22.12). Hoc Deus noverat et ante illam probationem. Nam illa probatio facta est, ut nos nossemus quod Deus iam noverat … et fortasse et ipse Abraham nondum noverat quas vires haberet fides eius: unusquisque enim se tentatione tamquam interrogatus agnoscit: sicut Petrus quas vires haberet fides eius utique nesciebat, quando dixit Domino: ‘Tecum sum usque ad mortem.’ Dominus autem qui noverat eum, praedixit ubi deficeret … (ml 36, 355).33 Cf. T. van Bavel 160.

37 Idem, De trinitate, i, 11–12, 23: Secundum formam Dei, omnia quae habet Pater, ipsius sunt: … Secundum formam servi, non est doctrina ipsius, sed illius qui eum misit. Et ‘de die et hora …’ Hoc enim nescit quod nescientes facit, id est, quod non ita sciebat ut tunc discipulis indicaret (ml 42, 836–37).34 T. van Bavel 158. Cf. De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, 60 (ml 40, 48; ep 1555).

38 Idem, Enarr. in ps. 63, 7: Similis enim nescienti erat inter ipsos Dominus

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informed about [the coming of that day] through him. There is certainly nothing that the Father knows that is not known also to the Son, since he who is the Father’s Wisdom is the Father’s Knowledge; and his Son, the Word, is his Wisdom. Undoubtedly, therefore, he who had come to teach us did know the day, but he had not come to teach us anything that it was unprofitable for us to know. Like a good teacher he taught some things, and withheld others. In his role as our teacher he knew both how to teach what would be to our advantage, and how to withhold what would be a hindrance. In stating that the Son is ignorant of something that he does not choose to teach us he is making use of a particular idiom: he says he does not know what he causes us not to know. We use a similar figure of speech ourselves every day. We say that today is a happy day, because it makes us happy; we call another day a sad day, because it saddens us; we call a cold day a lazy day, because it makes us lazy. The opposite use of it is when the Lord is represented as saying, “Now I know.” To Abraham it was said, “Now I know that you fear God” (Genesis 22.12). God already knew that, before putting Abraham to the test, but the test was designed to make us know what God knew already … Perhaps Abraham himself did not know beforehand the strength latent in his faith, for each of us is put to the question by our temptation, and through it we come to know ourselves. Peter, for instance, certainly did not know how much strength his faith would give him when he said to the Lord, “I will stay with you, even to death”; but the Lord, who knew him, foretold his weakness to him  …’ (ml 36, 355; [ccsl 38: 336–37]).33 See T. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin 160. 37 Augustine, De Trinitate, 1, 11–12, 23: ‘According to the form of God, all things that the Father has are his … according to the form of a servant, the doctrine is not his own, but his that sent him. Again, Of that day and that hour  … For he lacks knowledge of this, in that he made others nescient; that is, in that he did not so know as at that time to show his disciples’ (ml 42, 836–37; [ccsl 50: 61]).34 See T. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin 158. See De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus, 60 (ml 40, 48; ep 1555; [ccsl 44A: 119]). 38 Augustine, Enarratio in psalmum 63, 7: ‘The Lord certainly bore him-

33 Translation altered from Augustine, Exposition of the Psalms 33–50 90–91. 34 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 1st ser., vol. 3, p. 30.

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ignorantes quid nesciret et quid sciret; imo ignorantes eum nihil nescire, et ad hoc venisse ut illi facerent quod se potestate facere arbitrabantur (ml 36, 764).35

39 Idem, Contra Maximinum, ii, 25: Natura vero humana, qualem Christus humanae mentis assumpsit, quae nullo peccato potuit depravari, solus maior est Deus (ml 42, 803).36 T. van Bavel 167.

40 Idem, Epist. 147 (De videndo Deo), 22, 51: Quapropter donec diligenti inquisitione, si Dominus adiuverit, reperiatur quid secundum scripturas de spirituali corpore quod in resurrectione promittitur, probabilius sentiendum sit, interim nobis sufficiat quod unigenitus Filius, idemque mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus (1 Tim 2.5) ita videt Patrem sicut videtur a Patre (ml 33, 620).37 Cf. T. van Bavel 167. Hoc loco probabiliter agitur de visione beata Christi hominis post resurrectionem.

41 Idem, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta et tribus, 65: Et sublato lapide exiit (Lazarus) de monumento involutus manibus et pedibus et facies eius tecta erat sudario. Quod autem exiit de monumento, animam significat recedentem a carnalibus vitiis. Quod vero institis obvolutis, hoc est quod etiam a carnalibus recedentes et mente servientes legi Dei, adhuc tamen in corpore constituti, alieni a molestiis carnis esse non possumus, dicente Apostolo, Mente servio legi Dei carne autem legi peccati. Quod autem facies eius sudario tecta erat, hoc est quod in hac vita plenam cognitionem habere non possumus, sicut Apostolus dicit: Nunc videmus per speculum in aenigmate,

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self among them like one who knew nothing, but they had no idea about what he really knew or did not know. Or, rather, they were ignorant of the fact that there was nothing at all that he did not know, [that he knew everything,] and that he had come precisely to allow them to do what they thought they were doing by their own power’ (ml 36, 764; [ccsl 39: 812]).35 39 Augustine, Contra Maximinum Arianum, 2, 25: ‘But only God is greater than the human nature, that is, the nature of a human mind of the sort Christ assumed which could suffer no loss through sin’ (ml 42, 803).36 T. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin 167. 40 Augustine, Epistola 147, De videndo Deo, 22, 51: ‘Therefore, until we examine carefully and discover, with the Lord’s help, what the more probable opinion is about the spiritual body, which according to the Scriptures is promised at the resurrection, let it be enough for us meanwhile that the only-begotten Son, who is also the “Mediator of God and men, the man, Jesus Christ” (1 Timothy 2.5), sees the Father as He is seen by the Father’ (ml 33, 620; [csel 44: 326–27]).37 See T. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin 167. This passage probably concerns the beatific vision of Christ the man after his resurrection. 41 Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octaginta et tribus, 65: ‘Once the stone was removed, Lazarus went out of the tomb with his hands and feet wrapped, and his face was covered with a handkerchief. That he went out of the tomb signifies the soul withdrawing from carnal vices. That he was wrapped in bandages, however, signifies this: although we withdraw from carnal things and with the mind serve the Law of God, nonetheless, while situated in the body, we cannot be free from the vexations of the flesh, as the Apostle says: “with the mind I serve the Law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin.” And that his face was covered with a handkerchief signifies

35 Translation altered from that found in Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms 51–72, ed. John E. Rotelle, o.s.a., trans. Maria Boulding, o.s.b., in The Works of St. Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, 3/17 (Hyde Park, ny: New City Press, 2001) 252. The bracketed expression is not in Lonergan’s Latin, but it can be found in Augustine. 36 Translation altered from Augustine, ‘Debate with Maximinus,’ in Arianism and Other Heresies 317. 37 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 1st ser., vol. 20, p. 220.

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postea autem facie ad faciem. Et dixit Iesus: Solvite eum et sinite abire; hoc est quod post hanc vitam auferentur omnia velamina ut facie ad faciem videamus. Quantum autem intersit inter hominem quem Dei Sapientia gestabat, per quem liberati sumus, et caeteros homines, hinc intelligitur quod Lazarus nisi exiens de monumento non solvitur; id est, etiam renata anima nisi resolutione corporis libera ab omni peccato et ignorantia esse non potest, quamdiu per speculum in aenigmate videt Dominum: illius autem linteamenta et sudarium qui peccatum non fecit et nihil ignoravit, in monumento inventa sunt. Ipse enim solus in carne non tantum monumento non est oppressus ut aliquod peccatum in eo inveniretur, sed nec linteis implicatus ut eum aliquid lateret aut ab itinere retardaret (ml 40, 60).38 Cf. T. van Bavel 156.

42 Idem, ibid., 75: Haeredes ergo eius dicimur, quia reliquit nobis pacis ecclesiasticae possessionem per fidem temporalis dispensationis, quam hac in vita possidemus, quod testatus est dicens, Pacem meam do vobis, pacem relinquo vobis. Cohaeredes autem eius efficiemur, cum in fine saeculi mors absorbetur in victoriam. Tunc enim similes ei erimus quando videbimus eum sicuti est … Cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, auferetur quod ex parte est … imperfecta nostra in eum visio perfecta visione perimitur: et tamen nisi illa prior nos nutriret, ad aliam plenissimam et evidentissimam non efficeremur idonei.

Quod si etiam de Domino Iesu Christo, non secundum Verbum in principio Deum apud Deum, sed secundum puerum qui proficiebat aetate et sapientia, pius intellectus admittit (propria illa susceptione servata quae communis ei cum caeteris hominibus non est), cuius tamquam morte possideat haereditatem, manifestum est. Si autem pietas hoc non admittit, ut primo ex parte videret homo Dominicus deinde ex toto, quamquam in sapientia

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that we cannot have full knowledge in this life, as the Apostle says: “Now we see as in a mirror, enigmatically, but later, face to face.” And Jesus said: “Loose him, and allow him to go,” which means that after this life all coverings will be removed so that we may see face to face. ‘Moreover, [the passage in question] provides an understanding of how great a difference there is between the man whom the Wisdom of God bore, through whom we have been set free, and other men, because Lazarus is not loosed except by going out of the tomb. This means that, although the soul is reborn, as long as it sees the Lord as in a mirror, enigmatically, it cannot be free from all sin and ignorance except by a loosening from the body. However, the linen sheets and handkerchief of Jesus, who did not sin and was ignorant of nothing, were found in the tomb, for he alone of all flesh was not only not overcome by the tomb so that some sin should be found in him, but neither was he enveloped by the winding linen sheets so that something should hide him or hinder him from going’ (ml 40, 60; [ccsl 44A: 148–49]).38 See T. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin 156. 42 Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octaginta et tribus, 75: ‘Therefore we are called his heirs, for he has left the peace of the church, a peace which we possess in this life, in our possession through faith in the temporal dispensation. He has attested to this with these words: “My peace I give to you, peace I leave with you.” Moreover, we will become his coheirs when death will be swallowed up into victory at the end of the age, for we will then be like him when we see him as he is … “But when there comes what is perfect, what is partial will be laid aside.” … our imperfect vision of him is entirely done away with by the perfect vision. And yet, unless that earlier vision nourished us, we would not be made capable of the other vision, which is the fullest and clearest of all visions. ‘Furthermore, if in the case of the Lord Jesus Christ, not insofar as he is the Word in the beginning, God with God, but insofar as he was a boy, a sound faith admits that he grew in years and wisdom, having preserved as his own that assumption of humanity which he does not hold in common with other men, then it is clear by whose death, as it were, he came to possess the inheritance. (For we cannot ourselves be coheirs with him unless

38 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 1st ser., vol. 70, pp. 137–38.

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proficere dictus sit; in corpore suo intelligatur haeres, id est, Ecclesia, cuius cohaeredes sumus … (ml 40, 86–87).39 T. van Bavel 163. Dubarle, 6ss.

43 N.B. Ubi arguitur ex S. Augustino, non praesupponi sed probari debet (1) quod agitur de scientia non divina sed humana, (2) quod agitur de scientia humana ante mortem Christi, (3) quod excluditur ignorantia non tantum moralis (quae cum peccato vel peccabilitate connectatur) sed omnis prorsus generis.

44 Leporius, Libellus emendationis, 10: Ut autem et hinc nihil cuiquam in suspicione derelinquam, tunc dixi, immo ad obiecta respondi, Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum secundum hominem ignorare. Sed nunc non solum dicere non praesumo, verum etiam priorem anathematizo prolatam in hac parte sententiam; quia dici non licet etiam secundum hominem ignorasse Dominum prophetarum (ml 31, 1229; ep 2049). Cf. Dubarle 20; T. van Bavel 175.

45 Fulgentius Ruspensis, ob. 533, Epist. 14 ad Ferrandum, 26: Perquam vero durum est et a sanitate fidei penitus alienum, ut dicamus animam Christi non plenam suae divinitatis habere notitiam, cum qua naturaliter creditur habere personam. 31: Possumus plane dicere animam Christi habere plenam notitiam deitatis suae; nescio tamen utrum debeamus dicere quod anima Christi sic suam deitatem noverit, quemadmodum se ipsa deitas novit, an hoc potius dicendum est, quia novit quantum illa sed non sicut illa. Ipsa enim deitas sic se novit, ut hoc se naturaliter inveniat esse quod novit; ani-

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he himself is an heir too.) If, however, soundness of faith does not allow that the dominical man possessed first of all a partial vision, then a full vision – although he was said to have increased in wisdom – then he should be understood to be an heir in his body, that is, the church, of which we are coheirs …’ (ml 40, 86–87; [ccsl 44A: 215–17]).39 See T. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin 163; Dubarle, ‘La connaissance humaine du Christ d’après saint Augustin,’ Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 18 (1941) 6–9. 43 Note: In arguments drawn from Augustine’s writings, it ought to be shown, rather than presupposed, (1) that he is considering human knowledge, not divine; (2)  that he is considering human knowledge before Christ’s death; and (3) that not only moral ignorance (which is linked with sin or the capability of sin) but every kind of ignorance whatever is ruled out. 44 Leporius, Libellus emendationis, 10: ‘But so that here too I might leave nothing doubtful to anyone, at that time I said, or rather replied on the matter, that our Lord Jesus Christ, according as he was man, was ignorant. But now not only do I not presume to speak; indeed, I denounce the previous opinion set out in this regard; for it is not allowable to say that, even as man, the Lord of the prophets was ignorant’ (ml 31, 1229; ep 2049); see Dubarle, ‘La connaissance humaine du Christ d’après saint Augustin,’ Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 18 (1941) 20; T. van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin 175. 45 Fulgentius of Ruspe (d. 533), Epistola 14 ad Ferrandum, 26, 31, 33: ‘It is exceedingly hard and altogether foreign to the soundness of the faith to say that the soul of Christ does not have that full knowledge of his divinity which his person is naturally believed to have (26). We may say plainly that the soul of Christ has full knowledge of his deity; yet I do not know whether we ought to say that the soul of Christ knows his deity in the same way the deity knows itself, or whether it should rather be said that it knows as much as the deity does but not in the way the deity does. For deity knows itself, in

39 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 1st ser., vol. 70, pp. 191–93. Note that Lonergan’s quotation leaves out a sentence, here included in parentheses.

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ma autem illa sic totam deitatem suam novit, ut ipsa tamen deitas non sit. 33: Sic est ergo Christus plenus gratiae et veritatis, ut sicut est in divinitate eius plena humanitatis acceptio, sic in humanitate eius plena sit divinitatis agnitio (ml 65, 416, 420, 422; ep 2238–39; Xiberta, Enchir. 594–95, §§ 55, 58).

46 Vigilius, R. P., Constitutum i (ds 419). 47 Idem, Concilium Constantinopolitanum ii (db 224–25 ds 434–35).

48 Themistius, ca. 540, monophysita et Agnoetarum dux, damnatus est concilio Lateranensi (db 271, ds 519), et concilio Constantinopolitano iii, actionibus 10 et 11 (Mansi 11, 441 d, 501 bc). Fragmenta quaedam monophysitica (Xiberta, Enchir. 539–40). É. Amann, dtc 29 (15) 219–22. J. Ternus, apud Grillmeier-Bacht, iii, 111–12. 49 Auctor De sectis, x, 3: Agnoetae vero confitentes omnia quae Theodosiani, discrepant in hoc, quod Christi humanitatem ignorare Theodosiani negant, illis ignorare affirmantibus. Aiunt enim per omnia Christum nobis assimilari. Quod si nos ignoremus, et ipsum ignorasse. Quin et in Evangeliis ipsummet ita loqui, ut neminem dicat illum diem et horam nosse; ne Filius quidem, extra solum Patrem. Et rursus: ‘Ubi Lazarum posuistis?’ Haec enim omnia verba, inquiunt, ignorationem significant. Verum alii respondent ea Christum consilio quodam sic pronuntiasse; ut ab se discipulos averteret, qui horam consummationis avebant ex ipso cognoscere. Nempe, dicunt, a resurrectione rursus ab eis interrogatus, non amplius respondebat: Ne Filius quidem; sed, Nemo vestrum. Nos autem dicimus non adeo de his subtiliter inquirendum: nec synodus ipsa curiosius de hoc dogmate sollicita fuit. Sciendum tamen complures ex Patribus, ac propemodum universos videri dicere, quod ignoret. Nam cum per omnia nobiscum unius esse substantiae dicatur, et nos ignoremus: nimirum ignorabat et ipse. Quin et ipsa Scriptura dicit eum profecisse tam statura quam sapientia: discentem id scilicet quod ignorabat (inter opera Leontii Byzantini, mg 86/1, 1262–63).40

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that it finds itself naturally to be what it knows, whereas that soul knows the whole of deity even though it is not itself deity (31). Therefore, Christ is full of grace and truth in such a way that, just as there is full acceptance of humanity in his divinity, so there is full knowledge of divinity in his humanity (33)’ (ml 65, 416, 420, 422; ep 2238–39; Xiberta, Enchiridion 594–95, §§ 55, 58; [ccsl 91: 417, 423–24, 425]). 46 Pope Vigilius, Constitutum 1 (ds 419). 47 Pope Vigilius, Second Council of Constantinople (db 224–25, ds 434–35, [dec 1: 119–20]). 48 Themistius (ca. 540), monophysite and leader of the Agnoetae, was condemned at the Lateran Council (db 271, ds 519), and at the Third Council of Constantinople, acts 10 and 11 (Mansi, 11, 441d, 501bc). Certain monophysite fragments in Xiberta, Enchiridion 539–40. É. Amann, ‘Themistius,’ dtc 29 (15) 219–22. J. Ternus, in Grillmeier-Bacht, 3, 111–12. 49 The author of De sectis (ascribed to Leontius of Byzantium): ‘The Agnoetae profess everything as the Theodosians, except that the Theodosians do not say that the humanity of Christ is ignorant, whereas the Agnoetae do. They say that he is like us in all ways. If we are ignorant, clearly he is too. And indeed he says in the gospels that no one knows the day or the hour – not the Son, but only the Father. And again [he asks], “Where have you put Lazarus?” They say that all these questions are examples of ignorance. But others speak against them and say that Christ said these things according to the economy, in order to turn the disciples away from learning from him the hour of the end-time. But after the resurrection, when they were again asking him, he no longer said, “Not the Son,” but instead “None of you.” We say that it is not completely necessary to argue all the fine points, for the synod does not meddle in such dogmas. Besides, one must see that most of the Fathers, all of them perhaps, say that he appears to be ignorant. For if he is said to be of one substance (homoousios) with us in all things, and if we are indeed ignorant, then it is clear that he too is ignorant. And the scriptures say of him: “And he increased in age and wisdom.” It is clear that he was learning something of which he was ignorant’ (mg 86/1, 1262–63).40

40 Translation from the Greek by Paul Crego.

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50 Gregorius Magnus, de damnatione Theodori Mopsuesteni (ds 472).

51 Idem, Epist. ad Eulogium patr. Alex. (db 248, ds 474–76). Vide J. Ternus, apud Grillmeier-Bacht, iii, 112; A. d’Alès 259; E. Gutwenger 101. 52 Stephanus ep. Hieropolitanus, Contra Agnoetas: Nemo igitur ignorantiam tribuat sive divinitati Christi ad modum Arianorum sive humanitati eius ad instar sequacium Pauli (Samosateni) et Nestorii. Unus enim cum sit atque idem prosopo et hypostasi, claram habet scientiam talis diei et horae ac sancti sui Patris et Spiritus vivificantis … (Apud F. Diekamp, Analecta patristica, Orientalia christiana analecta 117 [Romae, 1938] 156; Xiberta, Enchir. 577, § 100).

53 Eulogius ep. Alexandrinus, Contra Agnoetas oratio, Excerpta apud Photium: Sanctus autem Eulogius iste Christum Iesum Dominum nostrum neque secundum humanitatem quidem, multo minus vero secundum divinitatem, ignorasse sepulcrum Lazari neque etiam illum ultimum diem contendit. Neque enim humanitas Christi in unam inaccessibilis et substantialis Sapientiae hypostasim admissa quidquam velut rerum praesentium ita futurarum poterit ignorare, neque falsum esse potest quod dixit: ‘Omnia quaecumque habet Pater mea sunt,’ nisi et Patri, nihil non audentes, ignorantiam ascribent (mg 103, 1082 a; Xiberta, Enchir. 577, § 101). 54 Idem, ibid. … Sed nudae puraeque humanitatis signum proprium est ignorantia. Hac ratione ergo Christi humanitati, ut simplici et purae humanitatis naturae consideratae, ascribi poterit ignorantia. Et hoc est quod Theologus (Gregorius Nazianzenus) explicavit quando dixit: Scit quidem ut Deus; nescit vero ut homo (mg 103, 1083 bc; Xiberta, Enchir. 578, § 104).

55 Theodorus ep. Pharanitanus, De operationibus Christi, ad Sergium ep. Arsenoitam: Affatim, ut opinor, nobis sermo discutiendo monstravit, quia omnia quaecumque scripta sunt de Domino Christo, sive Dei seu animae seu corporis seu utriusque, animae inquam et corporis, (sint), singulariter (monadikof s) simul et inseparabiliter agebantur, incipientia quidem et, ut est dicere, effluentia ex Verbi sapientia et benignitate et virtute, mediante

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50 Gregory the Great, on the condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia (ds 472). 51 Gregory the Great, Letter to Eulogius, patriarch of Alexandria (db 248, ds 474–76). See J. Ternus, in Grillmeier-Bacht, 3, 112; A. d’Alès 259; E. Gutwenger, Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi 101. 52 Stephen, bishop of Hierapolis, Contra Agnoetas: ‘Let no one, therefore, ascribe ignorance either to Christ’s divinity, as the Arians do, or to his humanity, in the style of those who follow Paul (of Samosata) and Nestorius. For since one and the same person and hypostasis has as clear a knowledge of such a day and hour as have his holy Father and the life-giving Spirit …’ (In F. Diekamp, Analecta patristica: Texte und Abhandlungen zur griechische Patristik. Orientalia christiana analecta 117 (Rome: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1938) 156; Xiberta, Enchiridion 577, § 100). 53 Eulogius, bishop of Alexandria, Contra Agnoetas oratio, excerpts in Photius: ‘The blessed Eulogius, however, maintained that neither by reason of his humanity, much less by reason of his divinity, was Jesus Christ our Lord ignorant regarding the tomb of Lazarus or the last Day. Nor was Christ’s humanity, taken into the one hypostasis of unapproachable and substantial Wisdom, capable of ignorance regarding anything present or yet to come; nor could his saying, “All things that the Father has are mine,” be false, unless they stop at nothing and ascribe ignorance to the Father too’ (mg 103, 1082 a; Xiberta, Enchiridion 577, § 101). 54 Eulogius, Contra Agnoetas oratio: ‘But ignorance is the proper sign of mere, pure humanity. For this reason, ignorance can be ascribed to Christ’s humanity, considered as the pure and simple nature of humanity. And that is what the Theologian (Gregory of Nazianzus) explained when he said, “As God he knows; as man he does not” (mg 103, 1083 bc; Xiberta, Enchiridion 578, § 104). 55 Theodore, bishop of Pharan, De operationibus Christi, ad Sergium episcopum Arsenoitam: ‘In my opinion, this inquiry has thoroughly shown that everything whatsoever written about the Lord Christ refers either to God or soul or body or both, I mean soul and body, all at once (monadikofs), together, and inseparably, initiated by and as it were flowing out of the Word’s wisdom and goodness and power, emerging through the mediation of an in-

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vero intellectuali anima et corpore procedentia; et ideo una operatio totius, utpote unius eiusdemque salvatoris nostri, haec omnia et sunt et dicta sunt (Mansi 11, 567 d; 10, 959 bc; Xiberta, Enchir. 640, § 23). Cf. db 271–72, ds 519–20, 551, 563; J. Ternus, apud Grillmeier-Bacht, iii, 102–105. N.B. Tota trinitas omnes operationes finitas, et ideo etiam operationes Christi qua hominis, efficienter producit; sed solus Filius, mediante natura sua humana, actus finitos elicit. 56 Sophronius ep. Hierosolymitanus, Epist. synodica ad Sergium (ep 2290, mg 87/3, 3192). 57 Maximus Confessor (ob. 662), Quaestiones et dubia, Resp. 66: Si igitur in sanctis prophetis gratia dignoscebantur quae erant procul et non sunt nostrae facultatis, quomodo non magis omnia sciebat Filius Dei, et per eum humanitas (eius) non natura sed unione cum Verbo? Quemadmodum enim ferrum ignitum omnes habet proprietates ignis (quippe cum luceat utraque), tametsi natura non ignis sed ferrum exsistit, ita etiam humanitas Domini, inquantum Verbo erat unita, cuncta noverat et huiusmodi Deo convenientia exhibebat. Inquantum autem humana natura in eo non uniebatur, dicitur ignorare (mg 90, 840; Xiberta, Enchir. 647, § 20). Cf. J. Ternus, op. cit., iii, 105–10.

58 Germanus ep. Constantinopolitanus, ob. ca. 733, Epist. ad Armenios, 17: Nam etsi is maestus fuit, ignoravit, et passioni repugnantiam prae se tulit, haec tamen omnia cum Verbi consensu ac beneplacito in carne habitantis et ob illius voluntatem corpori accidebant; quia Verbum quatenus sibi libitum erat, corpori concedebat ut naturaliter ageret sicut scriptum invenimus … Ex his ergo discimus, ut doctus Cyrillus opinatur … (mg 98, 144; Xiberta, Enchir. 666, § 80). 59 Ioannes Damascenus, ob. ca. 749, De fide orthodoxa, iii, 14: Atqui Dominus cum purus homo non esset verum etiam Deus omniaque perspecta haberet, nec consideratione nec inquisitione nec deliberatione egebat neque etiam iudicio; quamobrem natura comparatus erat ut necessitudine quadam bono adhaereret ac rursus a malo averteretur … ‘Antequam sciat puer …’ Haec vox, antequam, hoc indicat quod non more nostro ex investigatione et deliberatione praevia sed ut qui Deus esset divinoque modo

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tellectual soul and a body; and therefore all these things are, and are said to be, one operation of the whole [Christ], our Savior, inasmuch as he is one and the same’ (Mansi, 11, 567 d; 10, 959 bc; Xiberta, Enchiridion 640, § 23). See db 271–72, ds 519–20, 551, 563; J. Ternus, in Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, 3, 102–105. Note: The whole Trinity efficiently produces all finite operations, and therefore also of the operations of Christ as man; but only the Son, through the mediation of his human nature, elicits finite acts. 56 Sophronius, bishop of Jerusalem, synodical letter to Sergius (ep 2290; mg 87/3, 3192; [Allen, 142]). 57 Maximus the Confessor (d. 662), Quaestiones et dubia, response 66: ‘Therefore, if it was by grace in the holy prophets that things far off and not of our power were discerned, how should the greater Son of God – and, through him, [his] humanity, not by nature but by union with the Word – not know everything? In the same way that red-hot iron has all the properties of fire (since both glow), and yet it is not fire but iron that is existing by nature, so too the humanity of the Lord, inasmuch as it was united with the Word, knew all things and in this way was shown to be appropriate to God. But inasmuch as human nature was not united in him, he is said to have been ignorant’ (mg 90, 840; [ccsg 10: 155]; Xiberta, Enchiridion 647, § 20). See J. Ternus, in Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, 3, 105–10. 58 Germanus, bishop of Constantinople (d. ca. 733), Epistola ad Armenios, 17: ‘For even if he was sorrowful and ignorant and displayed a repugnance to suffering, still all these things happened to the body with the consent and approval of the Word dwelling in the flesh, and because of his will; for insofar as it was agreeable to himself, the Word granted to [his] body that it should act naturally, as we find written … Thus we learn from this, as the learned Cyril opined …’ (mg 98, 144; Xiberta, Enchiridion 666, § 80). 59 John of Damascus (d. ca. 749), De fide orthodoxa, 3, 14: ‘But the Lord, being no mere man but also God, and knowing all things, had no need of inquiry and investigation, and deliberation, and decision, and by nature made whatever is good his own and whatever is bad foreign to him. For thus says Isaiah the prophet, Before the child shall know … [Isa 7.16]. For the word ‘before’ shows that it is not from investigation and deliberation, as is the way with us; it was as God and as subsisting in a divine manner in the

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secundum carnem subsisteret (hoc est, secundum hypostasin carni unitus), eo ipso quod erat et omnia noverat, bonum naturale habebat. Naturales enim sunt virtutes … (mg 94, 1044–45; cf. Xiberta, Enchir. 608, § 89).41

60 ldem, ibid. iii, 21: Velut enim hominum caro suapte natura secundum hypostasin vivifica non est; Domini autem caro Deo Verbo unita, non quidem a naturali mortalitate exempta fuit, sed tamen ob hypostaticam cum Verbo unionem vivifica facta est … sic humana natura suapte quidem essentia futurorum notitiam non habet; at Domini anima ob unionem cum ipso Deo Verbo et hypostasis identitatem, ut reliquorum miraculorum potestate, sic etiam futurarum rerum, ut dixi, cognitione ditata fuit (mg 94, 1084–85; cf. Xiberta, Enchir. 670, § 95).42

61 Idem, ibid. iii, 22: Qui autem sic eum sapientia et gratia profecisse aiunt tamquam horum incrementum acciperet, non a primo carnis ortu factam esse unionem asserunt, nec unionem secundum hypostasin tuentur; verum vanissimo Nestorio potius auscultantes, unionem quandam secundum affectionem et respectum ac nudam inhabitationem prodigiose fingunt, nescientes nec quae dicunt nec de quibus affirmant. Nam si caro a primo statim ortu vere Deo unita est, imo potius in ipso exstitit, et identitatem secundum hypostasin cum eo habuit, qui fieri potuit ut non omnibus prorsus sapientiae gratiaeque dotibus affluxerit? Non quidem ut gratiam participaret nec per gratiam in communionem eorum quae Verbi erant veniret; quin potius ob unionem illam secundum hypostasin, cum humana divinaque unius Christi propria facta essent, quippe qui Deus simul et homo erat, gratiam et sapientiam et bonorum omnium plenitudinem fontis instar mundo profuderit (mg 94, 1087; cf. Xiberta, Enchir. 670, § 96).43

62 Candidus quidam, saec. ix. Cf. H. de Lavalette, ‘Candide, théologien méconnu de la vision béatifique du Christ,’ Rech. sc. rel. 49 (1961) 426– 29.

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flesh (that is to say, being united hypostatically to the flesh), and because of the fact that he was, and that he knew everything, that he is possessed of good in his own nature’ (mg 94, 1044–45; [Kotter, 2: 143]; see Xiberta, Enchiridion 608, § 89).41 60 John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, 3, 21: ‘For just as the flesh of men is not in its own nature life-giving with respect to the subsistent reality, while the flesh of our Lord which was united with God the Word, although it was not exempt from the mortality of its nature, yet became life-giving because of the hypostatic union with the Lord … in like manner human nature does not in its own essence possess the knowledge of things to come; yet the soul of the Lord through its union with God the Word himself and its identity in hypostasis was enriched, as I have said, with the knowledge of things to come as well as with the other miraculous powers’ (mg 94, 1084–85; [Kotter, 2: 163]; see Xiberta, Enchiridion 670, § 95).42 61 John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, 3, 22: ‘But those who hold that he progressed in wisdom and grace in the sense of receiving some addition to these attributes, do not say that the union took place at the first origin of the flesh, nor yet do they uphold the union according to hypostasis; but giving heed to the foolish Nestorius they imagine some strange union according to affection and respect, some mere indwelling, understanding neither what they say nor whereof they affirm [1 Timothy 1.1]. For if in truth the flesh was united with God from its first origin, or rather if it existed in him and was identical with him according to hypostasis, how was it that it was not endowed completely with all wisdom and grace? Not that it might itself participate in the grace, nor share by grace in what belonged to the Word, but rather by reason of the union according to hypostasis, since both what is human and what is divine belong to the one Christ, and that he who was himself at once God and man should pour forth like a fountain over the world his grace and wisdom and fullness of every blessing’ (mg 94, 1087; [Kotter, 2: 165]; see Xiberta, Enchiridion 670, § 96).43 62 A certain Candidus (ninth century): see H. de Lavalette, ‘Candide, théologien méconnu de la vision béatifique du Christ,’ Recherches de science religieuse 49 (1961) 426–29. 41 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 2nd ser., vol. 9, p. 60. 42 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 2nd ser., vol. 9, p. 69. 43 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 2nd ser., vol. 9, pp. 69–70.

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63 Hugo Victorinus, De sapientia animae Christi an aequalis cum divina fuerit: … quia verbum sapientia est, et sapientia Deus est (ml 176, 848 d). 64 Ibid.: Ergo una sapientia est qua omnes sapiunt, nec tamen uno modo sapiunt, quia participando sapiunt. Quod si omnes hac sapientia sapiunt quaecumque sapiunt, multo magis hac sapientia sapit illa anima quae ipsi sapientiae unita fuit. Quae non sorte participationis ex illa viguit sed privilegio unitatis plenitudinem possidet. Quid enim de sapientia minus habere poterat cui ipsa plenitudo sapientiae incorporata erat. In quo, ait, inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter (ml 176, 851 b).

65 Idem, De sacramentis, ii, 1, 6: … eadem anima sicut plenam et perfectam Dei sapientiam unitam habuit, ita plene et perfecte ex ipsa et per ipsam sapientiam sapiens fuit, nec tamen ipsi sapientiae natura aequalis fuit, quia longe aliud est sapientia sapere atque aliud sapientiam esse. Ex quo enim humanitati divinitas coniuncta est, ex ipsa divinitate humanitas accepit per gratiam totum quod divinitas habuit per naturam, ita ut secundum illam ineffabilem unionem, et Dei esset in humanitate sua totum quod humanitatis erat, et hominis esset in divinitate sua totum quod divinitatis erat. Sic ergo humanitatem Verbi in anima rationali a prima conceptione sua, ex ineffabili unione divinitatis, plenam et perfectam sapientiam et potentiam et virtutem et bonitatem accepisse credimus … (ml 176, 383 cd).44

66 Idem, ibid.: Quapropter id quod dicit Evangelista, quod proficiebat Iesus aetate, sapientia, et gratia, non ita accipitur quasi in se ipso melior factus, sed quia hominibus quam ipse habebat sed latebat sapientiam et gratiam, prout ratio temporum postulabat, magis semper et magis aperuit. Ita apud homines ipse proficiebat, quando homines ipsi in eius cognitione profecerunt. Apud Deum autem profecit in eo quod, dum se sapientia et gratia Dei plenum ostenderet, eos ad laudem Dei Patris, a quo hoc esse testabatur,

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63 Hugh of St Victor, De sapientia animae Christi an aequalis cum divina fuerit: ‘… for the word is wisdom, and wisdom is God’ (ml 176, 848 d). 64 Hugh of St Victor, De sapientia animae Christi an aequalis cum divina fuerit: ‘So it is by one wisdom that everyone is wise, but they are not wise in the same manner, because they are wise by participation. For if everyone knew by this wisdom whatever they know, much more would that soul which is united with Wisdom itself know by this wisdom – a soul that does not flourish by chance participation in that [wisdom], but possesses fullness [of wisdom], by the privilege of unity. For what lesser wisdom could he have, to whom belonged the very fullness of incorporeal wisdom? In whom, it is written, the whole fullness of deity dwelt bodily’ (ml 176, 851 b). 65 Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis, 2, 1, 6: ‘… that just as the same soul had united with it the full and perfect wisdom of God, so fully and perfectly from wisdom itself and through wisdom was it wise; yet its nature was not equal to wisdom, since it is one thing to be wise with wisdom and far different to be wisdom. As a result of this then divinity was joined with humanity; from divinity itself humanity received through grace all that divinity had through nature, so that according to that ineffable union all that was of humanity was God’s in his humanity and all that was of divinity was man’s in his divinity. Thus, then, we believe that the humanity of the Word in the rational soul from its first conception received from the ineffable union of divinity full and perfect wisdom and power and virtue and goodness …’ (ml 176, 383 cd; [Corpus Victorinum 1: 298]).44 66 Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis, 2, 1, 6: ‘Therefore, what the Evangelist says, that Jesus advanced in age, wisdom, and grace, is not accepted as if he had become better in himself, but that the wisdom and grace which he himself had and kept concealed he disclosed to men ever more and more, according as the reason of the times demanded. Thus, he himself was advancing before men, when men themselves advanced in knowledge of him. Now he advanced before God in that he showed himself, full of the grace

44 Translation altered from that found in Hugh of St Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith, trans. Roy J. Deferrari (Cambridge, ma: Medieval Academy of America, 1951) 219. See Hugonis de Sancto Victore, De sacramentis Christiane fidei, cura et sudio Rainer Berndt sj, Corpus Victorinum 1: Textus Historici (Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorff, 2008).

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magis semper et magis provocavit (ml 176, 384a).45 Cf. R. Baron, Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor (Paris 1957) 156–60.

67 Zacharias Chrysopolitanus (Goldsbourg), In Unum ex Quattuor sive de concordia evangelistarum, i, 12: ‘Et Iesus proficiebat sapientia et aetate et gratia apud Deum et apud homines.’ Sapientia pertinet ad animam, aetas ad corpus, gratia ad utriusque salutem. Aetate itaque proficiebat, sicut carnis est aetatis incrementa suscipere. Porro, iuxta quod aetate proficiebat, dona gratiae quae sibi inerant et sapientiae magis ac magis patefaciebat hominibus, quod erat sapientia et gratia proficere non in se sed in aliis, apud Deum et homines, id est ad honorem Dei et salutem hominum. In se autem nequaquam per intervalla temporum proficiebat sapientia vel gratia, qui ab hora conceptionis plenus fuit gratiae et veritatis. Nota doctores communiter affirmare animam Christi ubi Verbo Dei unita est, tantum sapientiae et bonitatis suscepisse, quantum possibile fuit creaturam suscipere. In ea enim, ait Apostolus, sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae, in ea omnis plenitudo divinitatis inhabitat. Aliis spiritus ad mensuram datur, sed Christo, ut ait Ioannes evangelista, datus est non ad mensuram (Io 3.34). Multi ergo asserunt, ut Alcuinus in libro De Trinitate ad Carolum, animam Christi tantam scientiam de omnibus habere quantam divinitas ipsa habet; ita scilicet quod divinitas a se, non ab alio, sapiens est per naturam; anima vero Christi a divinitate per gratiam. Aliis vero non videtur quod aliqua creatura capax possit esse totius divinae cognitionis, vel totius divinae bonitatis, sicut nec omnipotentiae. Ducunt namque pro inconvenienti creaturam etiam hoc modo parificari Creatori, ut ab ipso tantam scientiam habeat quantam et ipse Creator (ml 186, 89 ab). Cf. E. Gutwenger 106; A. Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, ii/2, 50–62.

68 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. lib., iii, dist. 14, 2: Quibusdam placet quod (anima Christi) nec parem cum Deo habeat scientiam, nec omnia sciat quae Deus; quia in nullo creatura aequatur Creatori …

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and wisdom of God, to them ever more and more to the praise of God the Father from whom He testified that this was’ (ml 176, 384 a; [Corpus Victorinum 1: 298]).45 See R. Baron, Science et sagesse chez Hughes de Saint-Victor (Paris: Lethielleux, 1957) 156–60. 67 Zacharias of Chrysopolis (Besançon), In Unum ex Quattuor sive de concordia evangelistarum, 1, 12: ‘“And Jesus grew in wisdom and age and favor with God and humans.” Wisdom pertains to the soul, age to the body, grace to the well-being of both. He grew in age, therefore, just as it belongs to the flesh to undergo aging. Furthermore, as to what grows with age, the gifts of grace and wisdom which belonged to him were increasingly exposed to humans, and this was growth in wisdom and grace, not in himself, however, but in others, before God and humans, that is to God’s honor and human salvation. But in himself he who from the hour of his conception was full of grace and truth never grew over time in wisdom or grace. Note that the doctors commonly affirm that the soul of Christ, where it is united to the Word of God, received as much wisdom and goodness as it is possible for a creature to receive. For in [his soul], the Apostle says, are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, and in it the whole fullness of deity dwelt. To other people the Spirit is given by measure, but to Christ, as John the Evangelist says, it is not given by measure (John 3.34). Many therefore assert, as Alcuin does in his book De Trinitate ad Carolum, that the soul of Christ has as much knowledge of all things as the deity itself has; which is to say that divinity, from itself and not another, is wise by nature; the soul of Christ [is wise] from divinity through grace. To others, it does not seem that any creature is capable of the entirety of divine knowing, or the entirety of divine goodness, any more than it is capable of omnipotence. They consider it inappropriate to equate creature and Creator in this way, so that he had as much wisdom from himself as the Creator himself has’ (ml 186, 89ab). See E. Gutwenger, Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi 106; A. Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, 2/2, 50–62. 68 Peter the Lombard, Sententiae: ‘Some are pleased to say that the soul of Christ does not have knowledge equal with God, and does not know what God does, since a creature is in no way to be equated with the Creator …’ (Book 3, dist. 14, ch. 1, n. 2 [sb 5: 89])

45 Translation altered from ibid.

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Sent. lib. iii, dist. 14, 3: Quibus respondentes dicimus animam Christi per sapientiam gratis datam in Verbo Dei, cui unita est, quod et perfecte intelligit, omnia scire quae Deus scit; sed non omnia posse quae potest Deus. Nec ita clare ac perspicue omnia capit ut Deus. Et ideo non aequatur Creatori suo in scientia, etsi omnia sciat quae et ipse. Nec est eius sapientia aequalis sapientiae Dei; quia illa multo est dignior, digniusque et perfectius omnia capit quam illius animae sapientia. Ergo et in scientia maiorem habet sufficientiam Deus quam illa anima, quae dignior est omni creatura.

Sent. lib. iii, dist. 14, 4: Illud vero Apostoli quod inducunt: Nemo novit quae Dei sunt nisi Spiritus Dei qui solus scrutatur omnia, pro nobis facit. Mox enim ait Apostolus: Nos autem Spiritum Dei habemus; ut per Spiritum quem habebat, Dei profunda se scire ostenderet. Sed anima illa prae omnibus Spiritum Dei habuit cui Spiritus non est datus ad mensuram, ut ait Ioannes evangelista (3.34). Dona igitur Spiritus sancti sine mensura habuit; ergo et sapientiam. Omnia ergo scivit anima illa. Si enim quaedam scivit, et quaedam non, non sine mensura scientiam habuit. Sed sine mensura scientiam habuit. Scit igitur omnia.

Argumenti divisio Sex quasi gressibus thesin probamus: 1 Christus qua Deus divinam scientiam exercet. De fide formaliter sed implicite definita. 2 Christus qua homo his in terris degens scientiam humanam exercebat. Theologice certa, seu certo ex definitis deducitur. 3 Christus homo his in terris degens immediate Deum cognovit. Certa in theologia; consentiunt scilicet de re absolute supernaturali omnes theologi.

4 Christus homo omnia cognovit quae ad suum munus pertinerent. Certa in theologia; consentiunt scilicet posteriores patres et omnes theologi. 5 Quo actu Christus homo immediate Deum cognoscit, eodem actu sed

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‘In reply to these, we say that Christ’s soul, through wisdom freely given in the Word of God, to whom it is united, and which it perfectly understands, knows everything that God knows; but cannot do everything that God can do. It does not grasp everything as clearly and precisely as God does. And therefore it is not equal to its Creator in knowledge, even though it knows everything he does. Nor is its wisdom equal to the wisdom of God; for that [wisdom] is much worthier, and it more worthily and perfectly grasps all things than does the wisdom of that soul. Therefore too, God has a greater sufficiency in knowledge than that soul, which is more worthy than every creature’ (Book 3, dist. 14, ch. 1, n. 3 [sb 5: 90]). ‘The text of the Apostle that they cite – “No one knows what is God’s except the Spirit of God, who alone examines all things” [1 Corinthians 2.11] – is on our side. For the Apostle at once goes on, “For we have the Spirit of God”; just as he shows that he knows the deep things of God, through the Spirit he had. But that soul above all had the Spirit of God, to which “the Spirit is not given by measure,” as John the Evangelist says (John 3.34). Therefore, he had the gifts of the Holy Spirit without measure, and therefore wisdom too. That soul therefore knew all things. For if he knew one thing and did not know another, he did not have knowledge without measure. But he did have knowledge without measure. Therefore he knew all things’ (Book 3, dist. 14, ch. 1, n. 4 [sb 5: 90]). Division of the argument We prove the thesis in six steps as follows. 1 Christ as God exercises divine knowledge. [As to its theological note, this is] of faith formally but implicitly defined. 2 Christ as man, living on this earth, exercised human knowledge. Theologically certain, that is, deduced certainly from what is defined. 3 Christ the man, living on this earth, knew God immediately. Certain in theology [for the reason that] all theologians agree on a matter that is absolutely supernatural. 4 Christ the man knew everything that pertained to his work. Certain in theology [for the reason that] the later fathers and all theologians agree. 5 In the same act by which Christ the man knew God immediately, he knew,

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mediate omnia cognoscit quae ad munus suum pertineant. Quae est communis et conveniens explicatio partium tertiae et quartae. 6 Christus viator scientia effabili eos elicuit actus cognoscitivos naturales et supernaturales qui vitam suam constituerunt humanam et historicam. Quod quoad substantiam est solemniter declaratam in conciliis Chalcedonensi et Constantinopolitano iii: per omnia nobis similem absque peccato (db 148, 290; ds 301, 554). argumenti pars prima Christus qua Deus divinam scientiam exercet. Nam Christus est Deus (db 54, ds 125) et Deus est ‘intellectu ac voluntate omnique perfectione infinitus’ (db 1782, ds 3001). Ex cc. Nicaeno et Vaticano I, ergo, haec pars est formaliter implicite definita. argumenti pars altera Christus qua homo his in terris degens scientiam humanam exercebat. 1 Nam unus indivise Christus sicut duas inconfuse habuit naturas (db 148, ds 302) ita duas inconfuse exercebat naturales operationes divinam et humanam (db 292, ds 557). Sed scire est operatio homini naturalis. Ergo.

2 Christus est perfectus in humanitate, vere homo ex anima rationali et corpore, consubstantialis nobis secundum humanitatem, per omnia nobis similis absque peccato (db 148, ds 301). Quae dici non possunt de adulto eoque sanae mentis qui scientiam humanam non exerceat. 3 Evangelia in primis exhibent Christum hominem eumque scientia non orbatum sed loquentem, interrogantem, docentem, et aliquando (Mc 13.32) nescientem. Neque fides catholica admittit sive docetismum qui apparentias dictitet ut realitatem excludat sive apollinarismum qui animam Christi humanam neget. argumenti pars tertia Christus homo his in terris degens immediate Deum cognovit.

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though mediately, everything that pertained to his work. This is the common and fitting explanation of parts 3 and 4. 6 By his effable knowledge Christ the pilgrim elicited those natural and supernatural cognitional acts which constituted his human and historical life. As to its substance this was solemnly declared at the Council of Chalcedon and the Third Council of Constantinople: ‘like us in all things apart from sin’ (db 148, 290; ds 301, 554; [dec 1: 86–87, 127]). part 1 Christ as God exercises divine knowledge. Christ is God (db 54, ds 125, [dec 1: 5]) and God is ‘infinite in intellect and will and in every perfection’ (db 1782, ds 3001, [dec 2: 805]). From the Council of Nicea and the First Vatican Council, then, this part of the thesis is formally defined implicitly. part 2 Christ as man, living on this earth, exercised human knowledge. 1 As the one, undivided Christ had two natures without confusion (db 148, ds 302, [dec 1: 86–87]), so also he exercised without confusion two natural operations, divine and human (db 292, ds 557, [dec 1: 129]). But to know is a natural human operation. The conclusion therefore follows. 2 Christ is ‘perfect in humanity, true man [composed] of rational soul and body, consubstantial with us as regards his humanity, like us in all things apart from sin’ (db 148, ds 301, [dec 1: 86–87]). This could not be said of a sane adult who did not exercise human knowledge. 3 The gospels show Christ first of all as a man; not a man deprived of knowledge, but a man speaking, posing questions, teaching, and sometimes (Mark 13.32) not knowing. Nor does the Catholic faith admit either the docetism which insists on appearances to the exclusion of reality, or the Apollinarianism which denies Christ’s human soul. part 3 Christ the man, living on this earth, knew God immediately.

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Praenotamen i: In VT quae de Deo videndo dicuntur, non omnia idem sonant. Iacob dixit: Vidi Deum facie ad faciem et salva facta est anima mea (Gen 32.31; cf. Ex 24.11). Moyses etsi facie ad faciem cum Deo locutus sit (Ex 33.11, Dt 5.4) tamen, cum Deum facie ad faciem videre voluerit, hominem didicit non posse Deum videre et vivere (Ex 33.20–23). Gedeon (Iud 6.22–23) et Manue (Iud 13.22), cum angelum Domini, Deum, vidissent, timuerunt ne morerentur. Isaias Dominum vidit (Is 6.1, Io 12.41) et se in­ dignum lamentatus est (Is 6.5). In NT Deus dicitur invisibilis (Col 1.15, 1 Tim 1.17); lucem enim inhabitat inaccessibilem (1 Tim 6.16); Deum ergo nemo hominum vidit sed nec videre potest (1 Tim 6.16). Quater repetit Ioannes neminem umquam Deum vidisse, bis in contextu de Christo (Io 1.18, 6.46), et bis in contextu de caritate (1 Io 4.12, 4.20). Quod tamen de hac vita intelligendum est, cum in patria Deum cognoscituri simus non per speculum in aenigmate sed facie ad faciem, et non ex parte sed sicut cogniti sumus (1 Cor 13.12). Dum sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino; per fidem enim ambulamus et non per speciem (2 Cor 5.6, 5.7); nunc filii (tekna) Dei sumus et nondum apparuit (ephaneroftheF) quid erimus; sed scimus quoniam cum apparuerit (phaneroftheFi), similes ei erimus; quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est (1 Io 3.2).

Praenotamen ii: Christus homo his in terris degens a caeteris viatoribus distinguitur prorsus. Hi enim peccatores sunt omnes (Rom 1.18–3.20, Eph 2. 3), sed ipse non peccavit (Io 8.46, 14.30, 2 Cor 5.21, Heb 4.15, 7.26, 1 Pet 1.19, 2.22, 1 Io 3.5). Hi salvandi sunt ne pereant, sed ipse est redemptor (Io 3.14–18). Hi iudicandi sunt, sed ipse est venturus iudex (Mt 16.27, 2 Cor 5.10, Io 5.22, 5.27). Hi credere debent, sed ipse est in quem credi oportet (Io 3.15, 3.16, 3.18, 3.36, 6.29, 6.35, 6.40, 6.47, 7.38–39, 8.24,11.25–26, 13.19, 19.35, 20.31, Mc 16.16, Rom 1.16, 3.22, 10.4, 10.9–10, 1 Cor 1.21; etc.).

Praenotamen iii: Ideo in Christum credi oportet quia nulla agnoscitur dis­ continuitas inter Deum Patrem et verba quae loquitur Iesus homo. ‘Quem enim misit Deus, verba Dei loquitur’ (Io 3.34). ‘Mea doctrina non est mea, sed eius qui misit me’ (Io 7.16). ‘… qui me misit verax est, et ego quae audivi ab eo haec loquor in mundo’ (Io 8.26; cf. 3.33). ‘… sicut docuit me

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Preliminary note 1: There is some discrepancy among the Old Testament passages that speak of seeing God fact to face. Jacob said, ‘I have seen God face to face, and yet my life is preserved’ (Genesis 32.31; cf. Exodus 24.11). Moses spoke with God face to face (Exodus 33.11; Deuteronomy 5.4), yet when he asked to see God face to face he was told that no one can see God and live (Exodus 33.20–23). Gideon (Judges 6.22–23), when he saw an angel of the Lord, and Manoah (Judges 13.22), when he saw God, feared that they would die. Isaiah saw the Lord (Isaiah 6.1, John 12.41) and lamented his own unworthiness (Isaiah 6.5). In the New Testament God is said to be invisible (Colossians 1.15, 1 Timothy 1.17), for he dwells in unapproachable light (1 Timothy 6.16), so that no one has ever seen or can see God (1  Timothy 6.16). John repeats on four occasions that no one has ever seen God, twice in speaking of Christ (John 1.18, 6.46) and twice in speaking of charity (1 Jn 4.12, 4.20). All of these, however, are to be understood as concerning this present life, since in heaven we shall know God, not dimly in a mirror but face to face, and not in part but fully, as we have been fully known (1 Corinthians 13.12). While we are at home in the body, we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith and not by sight (2 Corinthians 5.6–7); ‘we are God’s children (tekna) now; it does not yet appear (ephaneroftheF) what we shall be, but we know that when he appears (phaneroftheFi) we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is’ (1 John 3.2). Preliminary note 2: Christ the man, living on this earth, is quite distinct from other pilgrims. For they are all sinners (Romans 1.18–3.20, Ephesians 2.3), but he did not sin (John 8.46, 14.30, 2 Corinthians 5.21, Hebrews 4.15, 7.26, 1 Peter 1.19, 2.22, 1 John 3.5). They have to be saved or they will perish, but he is the redeemer (John 3.14–18). They are going to be judged, but he is the judge who is to come (Matthew 16.27, 2  Corinthians 5.10, John 5.22, 5.27). They must believe, but it is he that ought to be believed in (John 3.15–16, 3.18, 3.36, 6.29, 6.35, 6.40, 6.47, 7.38–39, 8.24, 11.25–26, 13.19, 19.35, 20.31, Mark 16.16, Romans 1.16, 3.22, 10.4, 10.9–10, 1 Corinthians 1.21, and so on). Preliminary note 3: The reason why Christ ought to be believed in is that no discontinuity is acknowledged between God the Father and the words that Jesus the man speaks. ‘For he whom God has sent utters the words of God’ (John 3.34). ‘My teaching is not mine, but his who sent me’ (John 7.16). ‘He who sent me is true, and I declare to the world what I have heard from

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Pater, sic loquor’ (Io 8.28). ‘Quia ego ex me ipso non sum locutus, sed qui misit me Pater, ipse mihi mandatum dedit quid dicam et quid loquar … Quae ergo ego loquor, sicut dixit mihi Pater, sic loquor’ (Io 12.49-50). ‘Non creditis quia ego in Patre, et Pater in me est? Verba quae ego loquor vobis, a me ipso non loquor’ (Io 14.10). ‘Sermonem quem audistis non est meus sed eius, qui misit me, Patris’ (Io 14.24). ‘… verba quae dedisti mihi dedi eis’ (Io 17.8). ‘Ego dedi eis sermonem tuum. Sermo tuus veritas est’ (Io 17.14, 17.17). Quapropter, ‘Qui credit in me, non credit in me, sed in eum qui misit me’ (Io 12.44).

Praenotamen iv: Haec continuitas, quae Deum Patrem cum verbis a Iesu prolatis religat, minime intelligenda est ad modum prophetiae vel libri inspirati. Iesus enim non erat homo a Deo vocatus et missus sicut Moyses (Ex 3.1–12), vel Isaias (Is 6.1–13), vel Ieremias (Ier 1.1–10), sed quod caro factum est Verbum (Io 1.14), qui de caelo descendit Filius hominis (Io 3.13; cf. 6.62), qui ex Deo processit et venit (Io 8.42), qui exivit a Patre et venit in mundum ut iterum relinqueret mundum et rediret ad Patrem (Io 16.28). Quod si exivit a Patre, neque tamen Patrem reliquit, neque a Patre relinquebatur. Nam ‘Ego et Pater unum sumus’ (Io 10.30); ‘Pater in me est, et ego in Patre’ (Io 10.38); ‘Et qui misit me, mecum est et non reliquit me solum’ (Io 8.29; cf. 8.16); ‘Philippe, qui videt me, videt et Patrem. Quomodo tu dicis: Ostende nobis Patrem? Non creditis quia ego in Patre et Pater in me est? Verba quae ego loquor vobis, a me ipso non loquor. Pater autem in me manens, ipse facit opera. Non creditis quia ego in Patre et Pater in me est? Alioquin propter opera ipsa credite’ (Io 14.9–11).

Praenotamen v: Contra expressam intentionem evangelistae intelligitur haec intima unio, haec continuitas inter Patrem et verba Iesu, ubi ita in ontologicis, moralibus, religiosis, vel sentimentis insistitur ut scientia excludatur. Io 3.11: Amen, amen dico tibi, quia quod scimus loquimur, et quod vidimus testamur, et testimonium nostrum non accipitis. Io 6.46: Non quia Patrem vidit quisquam nisi is, qui est a Deo, hic vidit Patrem. Cf. Io 1.18, 1 Io 4.12, 4.20.

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him’ (John 8.26; see 3.33). ‘I speak these things as the Father has instructed me’ (John 8.28). ‘I have not spoken on my own authority; the Father who sent me has himself given me commandment what to say and what to speak … What I say, therefore, I say as the Father has bidden me’ (John 12.49–50). ‘Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own authority’ (John 14.10). ‘The word which you hear is not mine but the Father’s who sent me’ (John 14.24). ‘I have given them the words which you gave me’ (John 17.8). ‘I have given them your word … your word is truth’ (John 17.14, 17.17). Because of this, ‘He who believes in me, believes not in me but in him who sent me’ (John 12.44). Preliminary note 4: In no way should this continuity, which relates God the Father with the words spoken by Jesus, be understood along the lines of prophecy or an inspired book. For Jesus was not a man called and sent by God, as were Moses (Exodus 3.1–12), Isaiah (Isaiah 6.1–13), or Jeremiah (Jeremiah 1.1–10); he was the Word made flesh (John 1.14), the Son of man who came down from heaven (John 3.13; see 6.62), who proceeded and came forth from God (John 8.42), who came from the Father and entered the world in order to leave the world again and return to the Father (John 16.28). But though he came from the Father, he neither left nor was left by the Father. ‘I and the Father are one’ (John 10.30); ‘the Father is in me, and I am in the Father’ (John 10.38); ‘and he who sent me is with me; he has not left me alone’ (John 8.29; see 8.16). ‘Philip, he who has seen me has seen the Father; how can you say, “Show us the Father”? Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own authority; but the Father who dwells in me does his works. Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me; or else believe me for the sake of the works themselves’ (John 14.9–11). Preliminary note 5: It goes against the express intention of the evangelist to understand this intimate union, this continuity between the Father and the words of Jesus, in a way that insists on the ontological, the moral, the religious, the affective, to the exclusion of knowledge. John 3.11: ‘Truly, truly, I say to you, we speak of what we know, and bear witness to what we have seen; but you do not receive our testimony.’ John 6.46: ‘Not that anyone has seen the Father except him who is from God; he has seen the Father.’ See John 1.18, 1 John 4.12, 4.20.

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Io 7.28–29: … et verus est qui misit me, quem vos nescitis (cf. Io 5.37). Ego scio eum, quia ab ipso sum, et ipse me misit. Io 8.38: Ego quod vidi apud Patrem meum loquor. Io 8.54-55: … est Pater meus, qui glorificat me, quem vos dicitis quia Deus vester est, et non cognovistis eum: ego autem novi eum. Et si dixero quia non scio eum, ero similis vobis mendax. Sed scio eum, et sermonem eius servo. Io 10.15: Sicut novit (ginofskei) me Pater, et ego agnosco (ginofskof) Patrem. Cf. Mt 11.27, Lc 10.22; 1 Cor 13.12: ‘… tunc autem cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum.’ Quibus in locis agitur de ‘videre,’ ‘scire,’ ‘novisse,’ ‘agnoscere.’46 Cognoscitur autem Pater vel quod apud Patrem videtur. Quid senserint vt et nt de Deo videndo, iam praenotamine i diximus. Quae quidem omnia, sicut mentalitate graeca non sunt intelligenda, ita etiam mentalitate moderna et anti-intellectualistica non sunt interpretanda ut visio, cognitio, scientia excludatur.

Praenotamen vi: Quae in Deo ita absconduntur mysteria stricte dicta ut intellectum creatum suapte natura excedant (db 1795–96, ds 3015–16), cognitione Dei mediata cognosci non possunt. Ubi enim Deus mediate cognoscitur, prius creatura cognoscitur et nisi mediante creatura cognita non cognoscitur Deus. Quae cognitio necessario et analogica et imperfecta est. Vel, uti dixit Apostolus, eiusmodi cognitio est per speculum (mediata), in aenigmate (analogica), et ex parte (imperfecta). Proinde, sicut creaturam cognoscere, ita mediate Deum cognoscere non excedit proportionem intellectus creati. Divina ergo mysteria, quae suapte natura intellectum creatum excedant, cognitione Dei mediata cognosci non possunt.

Unde arguitur: Revelatio divina per Iesum Christum facta eo modo apud Ioannem exponitur ut in Christo homine immediata Dei cognitio agnoscenda sit.

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John 7.28–29: ‘He who sent me is truth, and him you do not know (cf. John 5.37). I know him, for I come from him, and he sent me.’ John 8.38: ‘I speak of what I have seen with my Father.’ John 8.54–55: ‘It is my Father who glorifies me, of whom you say that he is your God. But you have not known him; I know him. If I said I do not know him, I should be a liar like you; but I do know him and I keep his word.’ John 10.15: ‘As the Father knows (ginofskei) me and I know (ginofskof) the Father.’ See Matthew 11.27, Luke 10.22, 1 Corinthians 13.12: ‘then I shall know, even as I have been known.’ These passages speak of seeing and of various kinds of knowing.46 But the Father is known or that which is with the Father is seen. The Old and New Testament senses of seeing God have already been stated in our first preliminary note. Just as all these passages should not be understood in terms of a Greek mentality, neither should they be interpreted in terms of a modern anti-intellectual mentality that would rule out vision, knowing, and knowledge. Preliminary note 6: Mediated knowing of God cannot know those mysteries, strictly so called, which are so hidden in God that by their very nature they surpass created intelligence (db 1795–96, ds 3015–16, [dec 2: 808]). For when God is known mediately, some creature is known first and God is known only by the mediation of this known creature. Such knowledge is necessarily analogical and imperfect. Or, to speak with Paul, such knowledge is ‘through a mirror’ – mediated; it is ‘in a riddle (en ainigmati)’ – analogical; and it is ‘in part’ – imperfect. So then, just as it does not surpass the proportion of created intelligence to know a creature, neither does it surpass the proportion of created intelligence to know God mediately. On the other hand, divine mysteries, which of their own nature do surpass created intelligence, cannot be known through a mediated knowing of God. Hence the following argument: The revelation made by Jesus Christ is expounded by John in such a way that an immediate knowing of God is to be acknowledged in Christ the man. 46 In the Greek New Testament, as in the Vulgate, there are several verbs which English translations usually render as ‘know.’

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Admissa enim hac immediata Dei cognitione, ita textus intelligi potest ut a mente et intentione auctoris non discedatur. Ubi enim in textu dicitur Christus Patrem vel aliquid apud Patrem videre, scire, cognoscere, ibi intelligitur Christus tum qua Deus tum qua homo videre, vel scire, vel cognoscere. Et ita omnino salvatur mens intentioque auctoris qui Deum Patrem et verba a Iesu prolata tum aliter tum per scientiam coniungit. Negata autem hac immediata Dei cognitione, ubicumque in textu Christus dicitur mysterium stricte dictum videre, scire, cognoscere, ibi semper distinguendum est ut Christus qua Deus videat, sciat, cognoscat, sed Christus qua homo non videat, nesciat, non cognoscat (vide Praenot. vi). Quae perpetuo recurrens distinctio non solum posterioris est temporis, ut anachronistice textui imponatur, sed etiam ipsi menti et intentioni auctoris contradicit. Evangelista enim verba a Iesu prolata tum aliter tum per scientiam cum Deo Patre coniungit; sed introducta haec et posterior distinctio ita secernit, disiungit, separat ut Christus qua homo ea nesciverit quae se scire dixerit. Exemplo sit: ‘Deum nemo vidit umquam: unigenitus Filius qui est in sinu Patris ipse enarravit’ (Io 1.18). ‘Non quia Patrem vidit quisquam, nisi is, qui est a Deo, hic vidit Patrem’ (Io 6.46). Secundum Ioannem, is qui mysteria divina enarravit, Patrem vidit; neque ulla ponitur distinctio, ut sine discontinuitate a Deo Patre per scientiam Filii ad verba a Filio prolata procedatur. Cui omnino consentit theologus qui immediatam Dei cognitionem in Christo homine agnoscit. Sed Ioanni non consentit theologus qui immediatam Dei cognitionem in Christo homine negat. Dicit enim unigenitum Filium qua Deum et in sinu Patris manentem utique Deum et Patrem videre; sed negat unigenitum Filium qua hominem, qua verba proferentem et mysteria enarrantem, ea vel scire vel videre vel cognoscere quae tamen non solum dicat sed etiam se videre et scire dicat. Adnotantur: 1 Argumentum est transitus ex contextu biblico ad contextum dogmaticum et theologicum. In priori contextu nondum adsunt quae in posteriori explicite factae sunt distinctiones inter duas inconfuse naturas, operationes,

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Admit this immediate knowing of God, and the text can be understood in a way that does not depart from the thought and intention of the author. For where the text says that Christ sees or knows the Father, or something that is in the presence of God, it will be understood that Christ sees or knows both as God and as man. And this entirely preserves the thought and intention of the author, for whom God the Father is linked, through knowledge and otherwise, with the words spoken by Jesus. Deny this immediate knowing of God, however, and then in places where the text speaks of Christ as seeing or knowing a mystery in the strict sense, there will always be a distinction such that Christ as God sees or knows, but Christ as man does not see, does not know (see preliminary note 6). This distinction, which turns up again and again, not only belongs to a later time, and thus is imposed on the text anachronistically, but also contradicts the thought and intention of the author himself. For the evangelist links God the Father, through knowledge and in other ways, with the words spoken by Jesus; but once this later distinction is introduced it severs, disjoins, and separates in such a way that Christ as man does not know what he says he knows. For example: ‘No one has ever seen God; the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known’ (John 1.18). ‘Not that anyone has seen the Father except him who is from God; he has seen the Father’ (John 6.46). According to John, he who makes known the divine mysteries sees the Father. There is no distinction; John moves without discontinuity from God the Father, through the Son’s knowledge, to the words spoken by the Son. A theologian who acknowledges in Christ the man an immediate knowing of God will be in complete agreement with John. But theologians who deny any immediate knowledge of God in Christ the man will also disagree with John. For they will say that the only-begotten Son, as God and as remaining in the bosom of the Father, sees indeed God and Father; but they will deny that the only-begotten Son, as man, as someone speaking words and making mysteries known, knows or sees those things which, nevertheless, he not only says but also says that he sees and knows. Additional notes: 1 The argument effects a transition from the biblical context to a dogmatic and theological context. Not yet present in the earlier context are the distinctions, explicitly drawn in the later, between two unconfused natures,

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scientias, conscientias. Quae posteriores distinctiones minime introducuntur in interpretationem textus prioris ut supponatur Ioannes distincte cogitasse de diversis Christi scientis. Sed illud in priori textu perspicitur (modus quo facta est divina revelatio) quod determinat quid secundum posteriores distinctiones dicendum sit.

2 Quod de Christo homine revelante in argumento diximus, idem intellige de toto Christi mysterio. Quod quidem mysterium nihil aliud est quam hoc quod omnia sensibilia Christi verba et opera modo incarnato divinum mysterium nobis manifestant atque revelant. Verbum enim incarnatum est Verbum divinum carne manifestatum ut nobis viam commonstret, veritatem doceat, vitam donet (Io 14.6). Quod quidem facit Christus homo, non divinum mysterium ignorans, sed immediate cognoscens. 3 Cum Christus homo per totam suam vitam verbum divinum nobis manifestet, convenienter docetur (Sum. theol., 3, q. 34, a. 4) Christum inde a primo instante suae conceptionis immediate Deum cognovisse. 4 Quod ex Ioanne fecimus argumentum, etiam ex Mt 11.27 et ex Lc 10.22 fieri potest, quatenus his in locis evangelistae mutuam et exclusivam Patris et Filii cognitionem ita docent ut auctoritatem Filii revelantis (cui voluerit revelare) fundare velint.

5 Etiam probatur haec pars ex consensu theologorum. Sicut enim Patrum consensus, ita etiam theologorum omnium in re supernaturali inter loca theologica enumeratur et argumentum in theologia validum facit. Sed inde a saec. xiii omnes theologi catholici docent Christum hominem in vita sua mortali immediate Deum cognovisse.

6 Idem rite concluditur ex unione hypostatica et ex plenitudine gratiae iam probata. Immediata Dei cognitio proportionem cuiuslibet essentiae finitae et substantialis excedit. Quae tamen cognitio, etsi assumptae naturae proportionem excedat, assumenti personae in illa natura subsistenti debetur ut, qui Deus sit, Deum re vera sciat. Praeterea, cum immediata Dei cognitio omnium gratiarum finis sit et corona, etiam haec suprema gratia ei est attri-

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operations, knowledges, and consciousnesses. These later distinctions have not been introduced into the interpretation of earlier texts in a way that would suppose John to have thought distinctly about the differences in Christ’s knowledge. What is, however, grasped in the earlier texts (namely, the way divine revelation happens) is that which determines what is to be said in terms of the later distinctions. 2 What we have said in the argument about Christ the man who reveals, you should understand as applying to the whole mystery of Christ. That mystery is nothing else than this: all Christ’s sensible words and works incarnately manifest and reveal the divine mystery to us. For the incarnate Word is the divine Word manifested in flesh in order to show the way, teach the truth, give life (John 14.6). Christ the man does this, not in ignorance of the divine mystery, but knowing it immediately. 3 Since Christ the man manifests the divine Word to us through his whole life, it is fittingly taught that Christ knew God immediately from the moment he was conceived (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 34, a. 4). 4 The argument we have drawn from John can also be made on the basis of Matthew 11.27 and Luke 10.22, inasmuch as the evangelists, in these passages, teach a mutual and exclusive knowledge of the Father and the Son so as to ground the authority of the Son who reveals (‘any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him’). 5 This part [of the thesis] is also proved by the consensus of theologians. For where the matter is supernatural, a consensus of all theologians, like a consensus of the Fathers, counts as a theological source and makes for an argument valid in theology. But from the thirteenth century on all Catholic theologians have taught that in his mortal life Christ the man knew God immediately. 6 The same conclusion follows rightly from the hypostatic union and from the fullness of grace [in Christ], which have already been proved. An immediate knowing of God surpasses the proportion of any finite, substantial essence whatever. However, even if this knowing surpasses the proportion of an assumed nature, it is owed to the person who assumes that nature and subsists in it, so that he who is God may in fact know God. Furthermore,

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buenda qui gratiae plenitudinem habuit. Unde iterum concludes Christum hominem inde ab ipsa incarnatione Deum immediate cognovisse.

7 Idem muneri Christi convenit. Cuius missionis erat omnes gentes docere (Mt 28.19), ipse absurdum habuit caecum a caeco duci (Mt 15.14, Lc 6.39). Praeterea, fides in scientem reducatur necesse est: ubi enim omnes credunt et nemo scit, nemo rationabiliter credit. Propter divinam veritatem ergo divina fide credimus, non tamen immediate sed per Christum qui, sicut credenda nobis proposuit, etiam divinam veritatem cognovit.

8 Neve obicias Christum hominem, per omnia nobis similem absque peccato (db 148, ds 301; Heb 4.15), non debuisse ante resurrectionem immediate Deum cognoscere. Non enim unica sed duplex est nostra ad Christum similitudo. Alia enim est secundum quod Christus nostra assumpsit; alia autem est secundum quod Christus sua in nobis producit. Secundum primam Christus humanam naturam assumpsit, vitam humanam duxit, mortem humanam subivit. Secundum alteram nos Christum imitemur oportet; quos enim praescivit Deus, eos praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui (Rom 8.29); erimus ergo ei similes quando videbimus eum sicuti est (1 Io 3.2), si tamen compatimur ut conglorificemur (Rom 8.17). Neque inconveniens fuit Christum hominem aliquid ab initio habuisse quod nos nisi in fine non attingimus: quod enim in nobis est praemium, in eo erat principium; neque similis est ratio de capite et membris, de magistro et discipulis, de Domino et servis.

9 Obicitur tamen saltem in cruce morientem Christum immediate Deum non cognovisse qui clamarit: Deus meus, Deus meus, quare dereliquisti me? (Mt 27.46, Mc 15.34). Respondetur ex istis verbis libere interpretatis quodlibet fere sequi. Qui a Deo est derelictus, hypostatice cum Deo non unitur, gratiam sanctificantem non habet, poenam damni in infernis patitur, spiritum suum in manus Patris non commendat (Lc 23.46), obedientiam per passionem non addiscit (Heb 5.8), opus divinum se consummare non sentit (Io 19.30).

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since an immediate knowing of God completes and crowns all graces, this supreme grace is also to be attributed to him who has the fullness of grace. Hence, you will gather once again that Christ the man knew God immediately, from the very [moment of his] Incarnation. 7 The same thing is fitting with respect to the work of Christ. It belonged to his mission to teach all nations (Matthew 28.19), and he thought it absurd that the blind should lead the blind (Matthew 15.14, Luke 6.39). Furthermore, faith necessarily is reduced to a knower: when everyone believes and no one knows, no one is believing reasonably. It is on account of divine truth, then, that we believe with divine faith; not immediately, however, but through Christ, who, as he stated what is to be believed, also knew divine truth. 8 Do not object that before his resurrection Christ the man, who is like us in all things apart from sin (db 148, ds 301, [dec 1: 86–87]; Hebrews 4.15), ought not to have known God immediately. For our likeness to Christ has not a single aspect but two. There is one likeness on the basis of Christ’s having assumed what is ours, but another on the basis of his producing in us what is his. In line with the first, Christ assumed a human nature, lived a human life, and underwent a human death. It is in line with the second that we must imitate Christ; for those whom God foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son (Romans 8.29); therefore, we shall be like him when we see him as he is (1 John 3.2), provided we suffer with him in order that we may also be glorified with him (Romans 8.17). Nor was it inappropriate for Christ the man to have, from the first, something that we attain only at the last; what for us is a prize, for him was a principle; nor does the head fall under the same rule as the members, or the teacher as the disciples, or the Lord as the servants. 9 Still, it is objected that Christ, who cried, ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’ (Matthew 27.46, Mark 15.34) when he was dying on the cross, did not know God immediately. The reply is this. Interpret those words freely, and what follows from them is anything you please. One who is forsaken by God is not united hypostatically with God; he has no sanctifying grace; he suffers the punishment of the damned in hell; he does not commend his spirit into the hands of his Father (Luke 23.46); he does not learn obedience through his suffering (Hebrews 5.8); he does not think he has finished a divine work (John 19.30).

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Attamen verba, Heli, lamma sabacthani, parum differunt a versione aramaica (targum) incipientis Ps 21,47 ubi mox describitur passio Domini (vv. 7–19) ut deinceps exprimatur summa fiducia in Deum et futurus exspectetur triumphus. Totus ergo psalmus, quasi contextus, sensum illorum verborum manifestat, ut derelictio sit passio imminensque mors, finis (ut quid?) sit futurus triumphus, nexus denique inter utrumque sit fiducia in Deum qui mala non permittit nisi ut meliora fiant.

argumenti pars quarta Christus homo omnia cognovit quae ad munus suum pertinerent. 1 Hac ergo parte excluditur in Christo homine, non nescientia, sed ignorantia. Nescit autem qui ea non cognoscit quae ad munus suum non pertineant; ignorat vero qui ea non cognoscit quae ad suum munus pertineant. 2 Arguitur ex traditione catholica posteriori. Inde a saec. vii consenserunt tum Latini tum Graeci Christum hominem non ignorasse. Non clare constat damnationem Agnoetarum a Gregorio Magno esse definitionem infallibilem (cf. d’Alès 259; Galtier 282; Ternus 112; Gutwenger 101); quo tamen ex tempore exsistit consensus moraliter unanimis inter patres posteriores, inter scholasticos, inter theologos.

Quam consensum inter dubia recentiora defendit Sacrum Officium (db 2184, ds 3646); eoque usus est Pius xii (db 2289, ds 3812). Sicut ergo consensus vel patrum vel theologorum certum in theologia argumentum facit, eo magis hic qui ante theologos exsistebat et ab iis retentus est. 3 Arguitur deinde ex eo quod posterior consensus in priori evolutione dogmatica solide fundatur.

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Yet the words, Eli, lama sabachthani, scarcely differ from the Aramaic of the Targum on the opening verse of Psalm 21 [H 22],47 which at once describes the suffering of the Lord (verses 7–19) in a way that goes on to express supreme trust in God and to look for a coming triumph. The whole psalm, therefore, is as it were a context which shows the meaning of those words to be that forsakenness is suffering and imminent death; that its end (‘why?’) is a triumph to come; that the link between these is trust in God, who permits evils only that there may be greater goods. part 4 Christ the man knew everything that pertained to his work. 1 This part rules out ignorance, not nescience, in Christ the man. Nescience is not knowing what does not pertain to one’s work; ignorance, on the other hand, is not knowing what does pertain to it. 2 An argument from later Catholic tradition. From the seventh century onwards, both the Latin Fathers and the Greek agreed that Christ the man was not ignorant. It is not clearly established that Gregory the Great’s condemnation of the Agnoetae was an infallible definition (see d’Alès 259; Galtier 282; Ternus, in Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, 3, 112; Gutwenger, Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi 101). From this time, however, there has existed a morally unanimous consensus among the later Fathers, the Scholastics, and the theologians. The Holy Office has defended this consensus in the face of more recent doubts (db 2184, ds 3646), and Pius xii uses it as an argument (db 2289, ds 3812). Thus, as a consensus either of the Fathers or of the theologians makes for a certain argument in theology, all the more in this case: consensus existed before the theologians and they have retained it. 3 Next, an argument may be made from the fact that this later consensus has solid grounds in earlier dogmatic development. 47 Lonergan quotes Matthew’s version of Jesus’s cry, which for Mark’s Eloi (Aramaic) has the Hebrew form, Eli. The latter is, however, the reading of the Targum.

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Quod admirationem movere potest. Reiecto enim arianismo excluditur ignorantia in Verbo. Reiecto nestorianismo nisi secundum quid admitti non poterat ignorantia in illa persona quae et Deus erat et homo. E quibus simul sumptis logice non concluditur nisi quod Christus qua Deus non ignoravit. Praeterea, initio saec. vii potius obscurum quam clarum erat quid logice ex dogmate christologico sequeretur, ubi neochalcedonismus recipiebatur (cf. thesin quartum) et nondum orti monenergismus et monothelismus nondum condemnati sunt (cf. thesin quintum). Praeterea, priores patres quippe non consentientes posteriorem consensum non fundant; et eadem scripturarum loca diversimode a diversis et interdum diversimode ab eodem exposita potius nos dubios quam securos faciunt. Praeterea, qui clarissime ignorantiam excludant sive prior Fulgentius (45) sive posteriores Eulogius, Maximus confessor, Ioannes Damascenus, Hugo Victorinus, Petrus Lombardus (53, 57, 59–61, 63–66, 68), ii ipsi reprehendi solent quia divinam scientiam Christi et humanam non satis distinguunt. Quibus concessis, negamus tamen evolutionem dogmaticam vel theologicam in deductione logica consistere et secundum regulas artis logicae esse iudicandam. Hac enim in quaestione sicut in caeteris agitur de veris divinitus revelatis plenius atque accuratius intelligendis. Reiectis arianismo et nestorianismo non solum constabat Christum qua Deum non ignorasse sed etiam clarius ponebatur quaestio concreta de scientia personae divinae quae in natura humana subsistebat. Ratione naturae humanae non excludebatur ignorantia. Sed ratione personae divinae non facile agnoscebatur ignorantia. Quaestio ergo de consensu eiusque fundamento est quaestio de illo iudicio concreto quod fert sensus catholicus qui miratur utrum persona divina quatenus in natura humana subsistat ignorare possit. Imperfecta erat christologia Origenis qui tamen, cum Mc 13.3248 consideraret et Mt 11.2749 adiungeret, miratus est quemadmodum Filius Patrem quidem novisset sed

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This fact can prompt us to marvel. Once Arianism was rejected, ignorance in the Word was ruled out. Once Nestorianism was rejected, only in a qualified sense was it possible to admit ignorance in that person who was God and man. From these, taken together, the only logical conclusion is that Christ as God was not ignorant. Further, at the beginning of the seventh century, it was more obscure than clear what does follow logically from Christological dogma. Neochalcedonianism was received (see thesis 4) but monenergism and monothelitism were yet to arise and be condemned (see thesis 5). Further, the earlier Fathers, who in fact did not agree, were not the ground of later consensus; and the same passages of scripture, expounded differently by different authors and sometimes expounded differently by the same author, leave us more doubtful than sure. Further, those who most clearly ruled out ignorance – Fulgentius (excerpt 45 above) early on, and later Eulogius, Maximus the Confessor, John of Damascus, Hugh of St Victor, and Peter the Lombard (excerpts 53, 57, 59–61, 63–66, and 68) – are themselves often criticized for failing to distinguish sufficiently between Christ’s divine and human knowledge. All this being granted, we nevertheless deny that dogmatic or theological development consists in logical deductions and that it is to be judged by the rules of the art of logic. On this question, as on others, it is a matter of a fuller and more accurate understanding of divinely revealed truths. Once Arianism and Nestorianism had been rejected, not only was it established that Christ as God was not ignorant, but also there was posed more clearly a concrete question as to the knowledge belonging to a divine person who subsisted in a human nature. Ignorance was not excluded from what a human nature is by definition. But it was not easy to admit ignorance in what a divine person is by definition. Thus, the question of consensus and its ground is a question about that concrete judgment delivered by a Catholic sense that wondered whether a divine person, insofar as he subsisted in a human nature, could be ignorant. Origen’s Christology was incomplete; yet when he considered Mark 13.3248 and put it side by side with Matthew 11.2749 he wondered how it was that

48 ‘But of that day or that hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father.’ 49 ‘No one knows the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.’

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diem iudicii nescivisset (3). Ut ignorantiam in Verbo excluderet, ignorantiam in carne, in homine, propter nos admisit Athanasius; et tamen non sine causa dubitatur quo usque ad animam Christi humanam attenderit. Basilius ad solutionem exegeticam confugit (6), et eandem vel similes repetebant Gregorius Nazianzenus (7 ad fin), Hilarius (25), Hieronymus (ep 1389), Augustinus (ep 1555 et 35–37), Gregorius Magnus (db 248, ds 474– 76). Quaestione rhetorica negavit Chrysostomus Filium diem iudicii ignorasse qui ita Patrem novisset sicut a Patre cognosceretur (9). Si inter Antiochenos facile agnoscebatur ignorantia Christi hominis, inter eosdem clare non apprehendebatur ipsa quam consideramus quaestio, quemadmodum divina persona in humana natura subsistat et ignoret. Si monophysismus verbalis Cyrilli Alexandrini non nihil fecisse videtur ut ignorantia a Christo homine arceretur, per monophysismum minime explicas Augustinum qui semper ignorantiam in Christo homine negavit.

Ubi ergo consensum solide fundatum dicimus, non dicimus quaestionem exacte conceptam, non dicimus textus scripturae efficaciter allatos, non dicimus influxus extraneos vel erroneos semper exclusos. Dicimus tamen sensum catholicum qui in scripturis Filium nescire legebat et tamen non credebat, mirabatur, dubitabat, explicabat, et contrarium docebat. Sed et ulterius agnoscimus huius catholici sensus causam primam, divinam providentiam specialissimam, quae sicut in caeteris etiam hac in re eo suam direxit Ecclesiam quo eam perventuram praevidebat et volebat.

4 Quod si admisimus hunc consensum quodammodo contra scripturas esse efformatum, addere debemus eundem etiam propter scripturas esse determinatum. Quantum enim scripturas attinet, idem est processus hac in quarta parte ac antea in parte tertia. Sive enim de ipso Deo, sive de creaturis cognoscendis agitur, absolute de scientia Christi loquuntur scripturae, ut posterior theologia, sicut naturas distinxerit, ita scientias distinguendas habeat. 1 Cor 1.24: … Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam … 1 Cor 1.30: … in Christo Iesu, qui factus est nobis sapientia a Deo et iustitia et sanctificatio et redemptio … Col. 2. 2.2–4, 8–10: … instructi in caritate et in omnes divitias plenitu-

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the Son knew the Father but did not know the day of judgment (excerpt 3). Athanasius, in order to rule out ignorance in the Word, admitted it in the flesh, in the man, for our sake; yet not without reason it is questioned how closely he attended to Christ’s soul. Basil resorted to an exegetical solution (excerpt 6), and the same solution, or something like it, was repeated by Gregory of Nazianzus (excerpt 7, at the end), Hilary (excerpt 25), Jerome (ep 1389), Augustine (ep 1555 and excerpts 35–37), and Gregory the Great (db 248, ds 474–76). John Chrysostom, in a rhetorical question, denied that the Son, who knew the Father just as he was known by the Father, was ignorant of the day of judgment (excerpt 9). While the Antiochenes had no difficulty acknowledging the ignorance of Christ the man, they did not clearly apprehend the very question we are considering, namely, how a divine person could subsist in a human nature and yet be ignorant. While it seems that Cyril of Alexandria’s verbal monophysitism had not a little to do with his steering away from ignorance in Christ the man, monophysitism does nothing to explain Augustine, who always denied ignorance in Christ the man. When we speak of a solidly grounded consensus, therefore, we are not speaking of a question exactly conceived, we are not speaking of scriptural texts effectively brought to bear on the matter, and we are not speaking of extraneous or erroneous influences ruled out at all times. We are, however, speaking of a Catholic sense which read in scripture that the Son knew not, and yet did not believe [this], wondered, doubted, explained, and taught the contrary. But we are also acknowledging, further, the first cause of this Catholic sense: the very special divine providence which, in this matter as in others, directed his church to the place where he foresaw and willed that it would arrive. 4 While we have admitted that in some fashion this consensus was formed against the scriptures, we ought to add that it was also determined by the scriptures. To the extent that it touches scripture, the process is the same in this fourth part as it was earlier in the third. For the scriptures speak without qualification of Christ’s knowledge, whether it is a matter of knowing God himself or of knowing creatures, so that later theology would have to distinguish between knowledges, just as it distinguished [Christ’s] natures. 1 Corinthians 1.24: ‘Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God.’ 1 Corinthians 1.30: ‘Christ Jesus, whom God made our wisdom, our righteousness and sanctification and redemption.’ Colossians 2.2–4, 8–10: ‘that their hearts may be encouraged as they are

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dinis intellectus, in agnitionem mysterii Dei Patris et Christi Iesu, in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. Hoc autem dico, ut nemo vos decipiat in sublimitate sermonum … Videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam secundum traditionem hominum, secundum elementa mundi, et non secundum Christum; quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter, et estis in illa repleti, qui est caput omnis principatus et potestatis … Io 1.14, 1.16–17: Et Verbum caro factum est … plenum gratiae et veritatis … Et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus, et gratiam pro gratia. Quia lex per Moysen data est, gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est. Circa Col 2.2 vide textum graecum et variantia in apparatu;50 circa Col 2.9, vide supra pp. 58–60, 130–32; loca ioannea de veritate enumerantur, pp. 146–48. Anachronistice quaereretur utrum mens intentioque Pauli vel Ioannis Christum qua Deum an Christum qua hominem respiceret. Manifeste tamen agitur de mediatore inter Deum et vocatos Iudaeos atque Graecos (1 Cor 1.24), inter Deum et nos (1 Cor 1.30), inter Deum et Colossenses instruendos (Col 2.2–3), inter Deum et Colossenses replendos (Col 2.9–10); similiter Verbum caro factum est plenum gratiae et veritatis, et per Iesum Christum facta est gratia et veritas (Io 1.14, 1.17).

Neque hanc mediationem vere agnoscunt qui dicant Christum qua Deum esse sapientem, scientem, veritatis plenum sed Christum qua hominem ea ignorare quae ad suum munus rite implendum pertineant. Ita enim non salvatur sed simpliciter tollitur Christi mediatio. Ea ergo in Christo qua homine agnoscenda est sapientia, scientia, veritatis plenitudo quae ad munus suum rite implendum requirantur.

5 Praecipue in rebus fidei omnis ignorantia arcenda est a Christo magistro. Io 3.31–36. Qui neque de terra est neque de terra loquitur, sed de caelo venit et super omnes est, ita testatur quod vidit et audivit, ut ad idem rede-

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knit together in love, to have all the riches of assured understanding and the knowledge of God’s mystery, of Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. I say this in order that no one may delude you with beguiling speech … See to it that no one makes a prey of you by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the universe, and not according to Christ. For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily, and you have come to fullness of life in him, who is the head of all rule and authority.’ John 1.14, 1.16–17. ‘And the Word became flesh … full of grace and truth … And from his fullness have we all received, grace upon grace. For the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ.’ On Colossians 2.2, see the Greek text and the variants given in the critical apparatus;50 on Colossians 2.9, see pp. 58–61, 130–33 above. The Johannine passages on truth are listed above, pp. 146–49. It is anachronistic to ask whether it is Christ as God or Christ as man with whom the thought and intention of Paul or John are concerned. Obviously they are concerned with the mediator between God and those who are called, Jews and Greeks alike (1 Corinthians 1.24), between God and us (1 Corinthians 1.30), between God and the Colossians whom Paul is encouraging (Colossians 2.2–3), between God and the Colossians who have come to fullness of life (Colossians 2.9–10). In a similar way, the Word made flesh is full of grace and truth, and grace and truth came through Jesus Christ (John 1.14, 1.17). Those who say that Christ as God was wise and knowing and full of truth, but that Christ as man was ignorant of what pertained to the proper completion of his work, do not truly acknowledge this mediation. They do not thereby preserve the mediation of Christ; they simply do away with it. What must therefore be acknowledged in Christ as man is the wisdom, the knowledge, and the fullness of truth which were required for the proper carrying out of his work. 5 Especially in matters of faith, all ignorance should be kept from Christ the teacher. According to John 3.31–36, he who neither is of the earth nor speaks of the earth, but comes from heaven and is above all, bears such witness to 50 The variants (of which there are more than a dozen) concern the phrase ‘of God’s mystery, of Christ’ (rsv). The modern edition of the Vulgate, which Lonergan quotes, reads: ‘the mystery of God the Father and of Christ Jesus.’

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at eius testimonium recipere et Deum agnoscere veracem. Missus a Deo, verba Dei loquitur, tum quia Spiritus datus est ei non ad mensuram, tum quia dilectus a Patre de omnibus disponit. Quapropter qui ei credit, habet vitam; et incredulus vitam non habet. Cf. 1 Cor 12.4–11 ubi de divisionibus gratiarum quae singulis quasi ad mensuram dantur. Augustinus, In Ioan. tr., xiv, 10 (ml 35, 1508).

6 Quanta vero sint quae ad munus Christi pertineant, ex ipso eius munere concludendum est. In primis cogitantur quaecumque ab eo agenda vel dicenda erant ut opus revelatoris, redemptoris, sanctificatoris perageret, tum in vita sua mortali, tum etiam in sua gloria. Mt 28.20: Et ecce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem saeculi. Mt 18.20: Ubi enim sunt duo vel tres congregati in nomine meo, ibi sum in media eorum. Act 9.4: Saule, Saule, quid me persequeris. Pius xii, ‘Mystici Corporis,’ ‘… per beatam illam visionem, qua vixdum in Deiparae sinu exceptus, fruebatur, omnia mystici Corporis membra sibi praesentia habet, suoque complectitur salutifero amore’ (db 2289, ds 3812). Quibus accedunt quae ad Christum omnium iudicem pertinent. 2 Cor 5.10, Mt 16.27, 25.31–46, Io 5.22, 5.27. Sum. theol., 3, q. 59. Sed ultra humana se extendit munus Christi, qui est caput omnis principatus et potestatis (Col 2.10), in quo omnia instauranda sunt quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt (Eph 1.10). Unde S. Thomas, qui docuit Christum esse caput tum omnium hominum tum omnium angelorum (Sum. theol., 3, q. 8, aa. 3 et 4), negavit quidem Christum hominem omnia scire quae sunt in potentia Dei, affirmavit autem eum scire omnia actualia, praeterita, praesentia, futura, et praeterea ea quae sunt in potentia creaturae (Sum. theol., 3, q. 10, a. 2). Hanc vero similemve sententiam esse incertam tuto doceri non potest (db 2184, ds 3646). argumenti pars quinta Quo actu Christus homo immediate Deum cognoscit, eodem actu sed mediate omnia cognoscit quae ad munus suum pertineant. 1 Quaeritur quemadmodum fieri possit ut Christus homo omnia cognoscat

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what he has seen and heard that to receive his witness is to acknowledge that God is true. Sent from God, he speaks God’s words, because the Spirit is not given to him by measure, and also because the beloved of God disposes all things. On account of this, those who believe in him have life, and those who do not believe have it not. See 1  Corinthians 12.4–11, on the division of graces which are given to each as though by measure; also Augustine, In Ioan. tr., 14, 10 (ml 35, 1508; [ccsl 36: 148]). 6 It has to be gathered from Christ’s work itself how many things there are which pertain to it. First to be thought of is everything done or said by him in order to carry out the work of revealer, redeemer, and sanctifier, both in his mortal life and in his glory also. ‘And lo, I am with you always, to the close of the age’ (Matthew 28.20). ‘For where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them’ (Matthew 18.20). ‘Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?’ (Acts 9.4). According to Pius xii’s encyclical letter ‘Mystici Corporis,’ ‘no sooner had he been conceived in the womb of the Mother of God than he began to enjoy the beatific vision; and in that vision all the members of his mystical body were continually present and he embraced them with his redeeming love’ (db 2289, ds 3812). Add to this what pertains to Christ as judge of all. See 2 Corinthians 5.10, Matthew 16.27, 25.31–46, John 5.22, 5.27; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 59. But the work of Christ extends beyond that which is human, for he is the head of all rule and authority (Colossians 2.10) and in him all things are to be renewed, things in heaven and things on earth (Ephesians 1.10). Thus, Thomas Aquinas, who taught that Christ is head of all angels as well as of all men (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 8, aa. 3 and 4), denied that Christ the man knew all that is in the power of God, but affirmed that he knew everything actual, past, present, and future, and beyond that knew what is in the power of creatures (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 10, a. 2). It cannot be safely taught that this opinion, or one similar to it, is uncertain (db 2184, ds 3646). part 5 In the same act by which Christ the man knew God immediately, he knew, though mediately, everything that pertained to his work. 1 The question is how it was possible for Christ the man to know everything

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quae ad munus suum pertineant. Respondetur duplicem esse immediatam Dei cognitionem: aliam comprehensivam qua Deus se cognoscit; aliam plus minus perfectam qua intellectus creatus Deum immediate cognoscit. Porro, sicut Deus, cum se comprehendat, necessario etiam comprehendit possibilia quae facere ipse potest et actualia quae facere ipse vult, similiter intellectus creatus, pro perfectione qua Deum immediate cognoscit, plura vel pauciora possibilia in perspecta divina potentia, et plura vel pauciora actualia in perspecta divina voluntate perspicit. Quare, Christus homo, qui Deum non comprehendit (Sum. theol., 3, q. 10, a. 1; cf. 1, q. 14, a. 3; q. 12, a. 7), non ita divinam potentiam intelligit ut omnia cognoscat quae sunt in potentia creatoris (3, q. 10, a. 2). Attamen, idem Christus homo, non propter meritum sed ante meritum et propter dignitatem Filii (3, q. 19, a. 4), caeteris creaturis omnibus excellentius Deum immediate cognoscit (3, q. 34, a. 4); ita perspicit divinam potentiam ut omnia intelligat quae in potentia creaturae sunt, et ita perspicit divinam voluntatem ut omnia actualia, praeterita, praesentia, futura cognoscat (3, q. 10, a. 2). Quae cognitio semper actu est (3, q. 11, a. 5, ad 1m) inde a primo instante conceptionis Christi (3, q. 34, a. 4).

2 Obicitur tamen tantam rerum scientiam in Christo homine neque possibilem esse neque necessariam; hanc ergo opinionem reputandam esse mediaevalem atque derelinquendam. Cui obiectioni respondet db 2185, ds 3647. Ubi de possibilitate dubitatur, dicendum est: immediata Dei cognitio concipienda est, non proxime secundum analogiam cognitionis humanae, sed proxime secundum communicationem (non participationem) ipsius scientiae divinae. Porro, qui negat talem communicationem sufficere ut possibilis sit scientia Christo adscripta, aut dubitat de sufficientia luminis gloriae Christo concessi, aut dubitat de sufficientia divinae essentiae quae, tamquam species, facit intellectum creatum actu intelligentem. Sed lumen gloriae, Christo concessum, etsi finitum sit, mensuratur tamen secundum dignitatem Filii; quae sane mensura sufficit ut cognoscatur universum finitum. Et divina essentia, quia est principium sufficiens divinae omniscientiae, multo magis est principium sufficiens minoris scientiae Christi hominis.

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that pertained to his work. The answer is that immediate knowledge of God is twofold: a comprehensive knowledge, by which God knows himself, and a more or less perfect knowledge, by which a created intellect knows God immediately. Next, God, since he comprehends himself, necessarily comprehends too the possibilities that he is able to bring about and the actualities that he wills to bring about. And, similarly, a created intellect, depending on the perfection with which it knows God immediately, more or less grasps the possibilities in divine power, and more or less grasps the actualities in the divine will. Therefore, Christ the man, who did not comprehend God (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 10, a. 1; see 1, q. 14, a. 3 and q. 12, a. 7), did not understand divine power in such a way that he knew everything which is in the power of the Creator (3, q. 10, a. 2). Nevertheless, this same Christ the man, not on account of merit but prior to merit and on account of the dignity of the Son (3, q. 19, a. 4), knows God immediately in a more excellent way than all other creatures (3, q. 34, a. 4). He grasps divine power in such a way as to understand what is in the power of a creature, and grasps the divine will in such a way as to know all that is actual, whether past, present, or future (3, q. 10, a. 2). This knowing is always in act (3, q. 11, a. 5, ad 1m) from the first instant of Christ’s conception (3, q. 34, a. 4). 2 The objection to this, however, is that so much knowledge of things on the part of Christ the man is neither possible nor necessary; therefore, this opinion should be regarded as medieval and dispensed with. The reply to this objection is in db 2185, ds 3647. As to doubts about the possibility of such knowledge, what should be said is this. Immediate knowing of God is to be conceived, not proximately on the analogy of human knowing, but proximately on the basis of a communication – not participation – of divine knowledge itself. Next, those who deny that such a communication is sufficient to make possible the knowledge ascribed to Christ either doubt the sufficiency of the light of glory granted to Christ, or else doubt the sufficiency of the divine essence which, in the manner of a species, makes a created intellect actually understand. But even if the light of glory granted to Christ is finite, it is still measured according to the dignity of the Son, and surely this measure suffices for knowing the finite universe. And the divine essence, since it is the sufficient principle of divine omniscience, is much more the sufficient principle of Christ the man’s lesser knowledge.

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Ubi autem de necessitate dubitatur, distinguendum est inter necessitatem consequentem et necessitatem antecedentem. Qui de consequenti dubitat, dubitat utrum tanta sint munera a Christo homine per scientiam suam exsequenda ut tanta scientia ei sit necessaria. Qui de antecedenti necessitate dubitat, dubitat vel de dignitate Filii utrum sufficiat ut tantum ei concedatur lumen gloriae, vel de valore cognitionis utrum processus dialecticus per non-cognoscere ad cognitionem non magis conveniat intellectui creato, vel de possibilitate verae libertatis cum tanta scientia componendae (cf. Rahner 196–97).

Proinde fatendum est fontes revelationis alia Christi munera clarius et plenius, alia autem brevius minusque distincte docere. Plus cognoscimus quid Christus per suam scientiam circa homines operetur; minus autem quid circa angelos; et multo minus circa processus mundi materialis. Clare docemur omnia in Christo esse instauranda; sed statim inde concludere non possumus Christum hominem per suam scientiam hanc instaurationem efficere vel quanta in eo requiratur scientia ut eam efficiat. Quare, quantum ex munere Christi arguitur, non eadem certitudine omnia elementa in hac parte eius scientiae concludi videntur.

Ubi autem de necessitate antecedenti agitur, cum dignitas divinae personae sit infinita, vix argui potest nimium ei concedi lumen gloriae quod ad omnia actualia scienda sufficeret. Quantum autem processum dialecticum attinet et quae dicitur ‘die Positivität des Nichtwissens,’ haec sunt notanda: primo, Christus est persona divina per naturam humanam nobis manifestanda, et Christus non est persona humana per modum personae humanae perficienda; deinde, Christus homo utique involvitur in processu humano et dialectico, non tamen ut peccator, sed ut impeccabilis atque tollens peccata mundi; tertio, quantum ad scientiam attinet, cum aliter sentiendum sit de scientia ineffabili et aliter de effabili, seorsum de his loquemur. Quoad inffabilem scientiam, Christus homo non scivit omnia possibilia; omnes ergo rerum ordines possibiles inter se comparare non potuit; et ideo ei ignotum erat cur Deus hunc rerum ordinem (in quo ipse pati et mori debuit) potius quam alium possibilem elegisset; id quod ad positivitatem

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As to doubts about its necessity, distinguish between consequent necessity and antecedent necessity. Those who doubt the consequent necessity doubt whether the works to be performed by Christ the man through his knowledge were so great as to require such great knowledge. Those who doubt the antecedent necessity doubt the dignity of the Son, or the value of knowing, or the possibility of freedom. Does the dignity of the Son suffice for so great a light of glory to be granted him? Would not a dialectical process through not-knowing to knowing be more fitting to a created intellect? Can true freedom possibly be combined with such great knowledge? (See Rahner, ‘Dogmatische Erwägerungen über das Wissen und Selbswußtsein Christi’ 196–97.) Admittedly, the sources of revelation do teach some of Christ’s works more clearly and fully, others more briefly and less distinctly. About what Christ operates through his knowledge, we know the most where men are concerned, less where the angels are concerned, and much less where the material process of the world is concerned. We are clearly taught that all things are to be restored in Christ, yet from this we cannot leap to the conclusion that Christ the man brings about this restoration through his knowledge, nor infer how much knowledge is needed in him in order to bring it about. Hence, insofar as the argument starts from Christ’s work, it does not seem to arrive with the same certitude at conclusions regarding all the elements in this part of his knowledge. [So much for consequent necessity.] As for doubts about antecedent necessity: Since the dignity of a divine person is infinite, one can scarcely argue that it is too much to grant him a light of glory that would suffice for knowing everything actual. As far as a dialectical process goes, and what is called the ‘positiveness of not-knowing,’ note the following. In the first place, Christ is a divine person, to be manifested to us through a human nature; Christ is not a human person, to be perfected in the way a human person would be. In the second place, Christ the man is indeed involved in a human, dialectical process – not, however, as a sinner but as one who is incapable of sin and who takes away the sins of the world. In the third place, as far as knowledge goes, ineffable and effable knowledge have to be thought of differently, and so we shall speak of these separately. With respect to ineffable knowledge: Christ the man did not know everything that is possible. He was therefore unable to compare with each other all possible world orders, and so it was unknown to him why, instead of some other possible order of things, God chose this one, in which he him-

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nescientiae referri potest vel, traditionaliter, ad excellentiam obedientiae. Quoad effabilem scientiam, aderat in Christo homine quae dici potest dialectica intelligentiae; nam secundum hanc scientiam Christus nova iugiter intellexit quae antea non actu intellexerat; et ipse hic addiscendi processus in eo consistit quod ad pleniorem intelligentiam quaerendam movemur per expertam insufficientiam intelligentiae adeptae. Cum tamen in Christo aderant tum impeccabilitas tum scientia ineffabilis (quae iudicii errorem positivum ab effabili scientia excluderet), etiam secundum scientiam effabilem in Christo homine non aderant dialectica vel peccati vel erroris positivi. Denique, quod veram libertatem meritumque Christi respicit, ad thesin 14m remittimus.51 3 Etiam obici potest divinam essentiam non esse medium aptum ad actualia cognoscenda; eadem enim entitative est divina essentia divinaque voluntas sive Deus creat sive non creat. Respondetur obicientem praeterire hoc quod nostra harum rerum cognitio est analogica. Deus vere et realiter vult actualia; mediante sua voluntate Deus vere et realiter cognoscit actualia; et quamvis plura de hac re alibi dicenda sint,52 de praesenti sufficit supponere divinam omniscientiam et ex ea concludere ad sufficientiam medii assignati.

argumenti pars sexta Christus viator scientia effabili eos elicuit actus cognoscitivos naturales et supernaturales qui vitam suam constituerunt humanam et historicam. 1 Hac parte agitur de Christo viatore, de scientia effabili, de actibus qui

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self had to suffer and die. This can be referred to a ‘positiveness of notknowing,’ or, in traditional terms, to the excellence of obedience. With respect to effable knowledge: There was in Christ the man what can be called a dialectic of intelligence. For in keeping with this knowledge Christ was ever understanding new things which previously he had not understood in act. This process of learning, in itself, consists in this: our experience of the insufficiency of the understanding we have achieved moves us to seek fuller understanding. But since in Christ there were both ineffable knowledge (which would exclude from effable knowledge positive errors of judgment) and impeccability, there was in him no dialectic of sin or dialectic of positive error, even on the basis of his effable knowledge. Finally, as to Christ’s true liberty and merit, we refer the reader to thesis 14.51 3 It can also be objected that the divine essence is not a suitable medium for knowing actualities. For the divine essence is entitatively the same, and so is the divine will, whether God does or does not create. The reply to this objection is that it sidesteps the fact that our knowing of these matters is analogical. God really and truly wills what is actual; through the mediation of his will, God really and truly knows what is actual; and while there is more to be said about this elsewhere,52 at present it is enough to assume divine omniscience and to conclude from this to the sufficiency of the assigned medium. part 6 By his effable knowledge Christ the pilgrim elicited those natural and supernatural cognitional acts which constituted his human and historical life. 1 This part of the argument is concerned with Christ the pilgrim, with his

51 Thesis 14 deals with the third doubt with respect to Christ’s knowing all that pertained to his work – whether such knowledge can exist together with true liberty. 52 No indication is given here as to whether Lonergan was thinking of something in his own work, but ‘God’s Knowledge and Will’ (‘De scientia atque voluntate Dei’) in Early Latin Theology, vol. 19 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011) is a place where more is said about these matters.

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simul corpore, sensu, intellectu, voluntate peraguntur. Agitur ergo de iis actibus quod narrant evangelia. Quod autem Christus comprehensor scientia ineffabili scivit, quod consequenter caritate et obedientia voluit, hoc totum a Christo homine etiam infante vel dormiente peragebatur. 2 In genere probatur haec pars ex omnibus locis scripturae ubi docetur Iesum aliquid vel dixisse vel fecisse: nisi enim scientia effabili homo nihil dicere vel facere potest. Iterum in genere probatur haec pars ex conciliis Chalcedonensi et Constantinopolitano iii: … et consubstantialem nobis eundem secundum humanitatem, ‘per omnia nobis similem absque peccato’ (db 148, 290; ds 301, 554). 3 In specie, elicuit Christus homo actus cognoscitivos naturales. Qui enim manducat vel bibit, non amens sed sciens et prudens manducat et bibit; qui actus sunt naturales quoad substantiam. Sed Filius hominis tum manducavit et bibit tum dixit se manducare et bibere (Mt 11.19). Dices: Filius hominis manducavit et bibit in gloriam Dei secundum Apostolum (1 Cor 10. 31). Respondetur: ergo quoad modum actus erat supernaturalis ratione finis intenti; sed manet actum secundum substantiam fuisse naturalem. 4 Deinde, Christus elicuit actus cognoscitivos supernaturales. Ubi enim doctrinam Christi credimus et praecepta Christi servamus et exemplum Christi sequimur, vitam supernaturalem agimus; quod autem supernaturale est in nobis credentibus, servantibus, sequentibus, idem supernaturale in Christo homine docente, iuvente, faciente. Sed secundum scientiam effabilem constituti erant actus Christi hominis docentis, praecipientis, facientis; erant enim actus simul sensu et intellectu eliciti circa intelligibilia in sensibilibus. Erat ergo in Christo homine scientia supernaturalis sed effabilis. Quam ergo Patris doctrinam scientia ineffabili Christus novit, eandem

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effable knowledge, and with acts performed by his body, sense, intellect, and will together. Thus, it is concerned with the acts narrated in the gospels. By contrast, what Christ the beholder knew by his ineffable knowledge, and what he consequently willed in charity and obedience, Christ the man performed in its entirety, even as a baby and even when sleeping. 2 In general, proof of this part of the argument is based on all the scriptural passages which teach that Christ said something or did something; for a man can say or do nothing except through effable knowledge. Again, in general this part is proved from the Council of Chalcedon and the Third Council of Constantinople: consubstantial with us as regards his humanity, ‘like us in all things apart from sin’ (db 148, 290; ds 301, 554; [dec 1: 86–87, 127]). 3 Specifically, Christ the man elicited natural cognitional acts. When someone eats or drinks, it is not one who is mindless who is eating and drinking, but one who knows and who exercises prudence; and these acts [of eating and drinking] are natural as to their substance. But the Son of man ate and drank, and he also spoke of himself as eating and drinking (Matthew 11.19). You may be saying that the Son of man ate and drank to the glory of God, in line with what Paul says in 1 Corinthians 10.31. Reply: In that case the act, as to its mode, was supernatural by reason of the end intended; but as to its substance it was nevertheless a natural act. 4 Further, Christ elicited supernatural cognitional acts. When we believe Christ’s teaching and keep his commandments and follow his example, we are leading a supernatural life. But what is supernatural in us who believe and keep and follow was supernatural in Christ the man who teaches and commands and does. But it was on the basis of his effable knowledge that the acts of Christ the man, teaching and commanding and doing, were constituted; for they were acts elicited by sense and intelligence together, with regard to the intelligible in the sensible. There was, then, in Christ the man, a supernatural but effable knowledge. The doctrine of the Father, Christ knew by his ineffable knowledge; by

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scientia effabili ita docuit ut homines admirarentur (Mt 7.28–29; Lc 2.47, 4.22, Io 7.47). Quemadmodum Pater Filium dilexerit, Christus homo scientia ineffabili scivit; sed scientia effabili Christus homo similiter nos dilexit (Io 15.9–10) quatenus nos monstravit quemadmodum ipsi invicem diligere deberemus (Io 13.34, 15.12). Quaenam in omnibus fuerit Patris voluntas, scientia ineffabili Christus scivit; sed scientia effabili eandem voluntatem vita sua humana et historica implevit (Io 4.34, 5.30, 6.38, 8.29, 10.17–18, 14.31, 19.30, Rom 5.19, Phil 2.8).

5 Gratia naturam supponit et perficit. Sine corpore non sentimus; sine sensu non intelligimus; sine intelligentia non iudicamus; sine iudicio non eligimus; sine his omnibus actus humanos non elicimus et modo humano non vivimus. Quam humanam vitam vita secundum gratiam non tollit sed eam supponit, in ea se inserit, eam complet per alium actuum ordinem, eamque etiam in ratione perfectionis naturalis perficit. Quaeres ergo utrum in Christo homine gratia naturam supposuerit et perfecerit an forte gratia naturam praecesserit. Iis ergo omissis quae substantiam et habitus respiciant et ad hanc nostram considerationem non pertineant, respondemus cum distinctione. Gratia praecessit secundum scientiam ineffabilem et secundum consequentem caritatem et obedientiam voluntatis. Sed secundum scientiam effabilem et consequentes volitiones praecessit natura et superveniebant actus supernaturales. Praecessit secundum scientiam ineffabilem quae perfecta erat in infante; sequebatur secundum scientiam effabilem secundum ordinem evolutionis humanae in qua prius corpore quam sensu et prius sensu quam intellectu operamur.

6 Alii alio tempore erant actus Christi naturales. Nam Iesus proficiebat sapientia et aetate et gratia apud Deum et apud homines (Lc 2.52); et ideo in eo non defuit illa differentia quam in se agnovit S. Paulus (1 Cor 13.11). Qualis in homine sit hic profectus, multis libris inde ab anno 1926 descripsit J. Piaget. Brevissime: aliter catulus aliter nascitur homo; catulus mox omnes fere operationes vitae modo fere adulto peragit; sed parvulus huma-

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his effable knowledge he taught that same doctrine in a way that made people marvel (Matthew 7.28–29, Luke 2.47, 4.22, John 7.47). How the Father loved the Son, Christ the man knew by ineffable knowledge; but by his effable knowledge Christ the man similarly loved us (John 15.9–10) inasmuch as he showed us how we ought to love one another (John 13.34, 15.12). What was the Father’s will in all things, Christ knew by his ineffable knowledge; but by his effable knowledge he carried out that same will in his human and historical life (John 4.34, 5.30, 6.38, 8.29, 10.17–18, 14.31, 19.30, Romans 5.19, Philippians 2.8). 5 Grace supposes nature and perfects it. Without our bodies we do not sense; without sense we do not understand; without understanding we do not judge; without judgment we do not decide; without all these we do not elicit human acts or live in a human way. Life according to grace does not take away this human living but supposes it, implants itself in it, completes it through another order of acts, and also, in the sense of its natural perfection, perfects it. Thus, you might ask whether in Christ the man grace supposed and perfected nature, or perhaps preceded it. Leaving aside what regards substance and habit, since this does not pertain to our present topic, we would respond with a distinction. With respect to his ineffable knowledge and with respect to the consequent charity and obedience of will, grace preceded. But with respect to his effable knowledge and the consequent acts of will, nature preceded and supernatural acts supervened. Grace preceded [nature] with respect to that ineffable knowledge which was already perfect in the infant; it followed [upon nature] with respect to effable knowledge, in keeping with the order of human development in which we operate through our body before we operate through our sense, and through our sense before through our intelligence. 6 Christ’s natural acts were different at different times. For Jesus grew in wisdom and age and grace before God and man (Luke 2.52); and thus he did not lack the differences that Paul acknowledged in himself (1 Corinthians 13.11). This kind of growth has been described by J. Piaget in numerous books from 1926 onwards. Very briefly stated, a puppy and a human being are born differently. A puppy at once performs almost all the operations of

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nus nisi per menses et annos ea non addiscit quae vitam humanam adultam constituunt. Cuius ratio est non imperfectio sed maxima perfectibilitas corporis et sensitivitatis humanae quae evolvitur simul cum evolutione intellectuali et eo tendit ut intellectui praestet instrumentum adaptatum. Simul ergo et interdependenter addiscimus tum corpore tum sensu tum intellectu; et haec addiscentia fit per modum interactionis inter personas resque externas atque internam spontaneitatem psychicam et intellectualem.

7 Alii alio tempore erant actus Christi supernaturales. Sicut non mutabatur dignitas Filii, ita non mutabatur quae hanc dignitatem consequebatur scientia ineffabilis; et idem sentiendum est de actibus caritatis et obedientiae quae immediate ex scientia ineffabili processerunt. Actus autem supernaturales secundum scientiam effabilem alii alio tempore erant. Non enim unum idemque vel opus vel verbum per totam suam vitam repetebat Iesus. Accedit quod actus naturales alii erant parvuli, alii pueri, alii adulescentis, alii iuvenis, alii viri; proficientibus autem naturalibus, proficere poterant actus supernaturales quia aliud et aliud successive habebant quod supernaturaliter complerent atque perficerent. Unde apud Lucam discimus Christum sapientia, aetate, gratia apud Deum et apud homines profecisse; quod sane excludit nullum fuisse profectum secundum actus supernaturales. Neque praetereundum est quod docet epistola ad Hebraeos, sicut caeteros homines, etiam Christum laboribus, aerumnis, doloribus ad suam perfectionem humanam profecisse. Heb 2.10, 4.15, 5.7–8; cf. J. Coste, ‘Notion grecque et notion biblique de la souffrance éducatrice,’ Rech. sc. rel. 43 (1955) 481–523. 8 De unitate conscientiae humanae Quamvis non eadem sit ratio scientiae ineffabilis et scientiae effabilis, neque eadem effabilis naturalis et effabilis supernaturalis, una tamen erat conscientia Christi humana, neque solummodo secundum identitatem subiecti conscii, sed etiam secundum mutuam ordinationem actuum inter se. Vehementer ergo erraret vel qui ita distingueret actus naturales et supernaturales ut duas et separatas actuum series et quasi duas conscientias duas­

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its life in nearly the same way a full-grown dog does. But only over time, through months and years, does a human baby learn the things that constitute an adult human life. The reason for this is not an imperfection but rather an enormous capacity for perfection in the human body and sensitivity, which develops together with intellectual development and tends to give intelligence an instrument adapted to it. Thus, it is through body and sense and intelligence, interdependently and at the same time, that we learn; and this learning takes place in and as interaction between [1] external persons and things and [2] internal spontaneity, psychic and intellectual. 7 The supernatural acts of Christ were different at different times. As the dignity of the Son did not change, neither did the ineffable knowledge following upon that dignity; and the same should be understood of the acts of charity and obedience that proceeded immediately from his ineffable knowledge. But supernatural acts in accord with his effable knowledge were different at different times. For one thing, Jesus did not just repeat one and the same word, or one and the same deed, throughout his whole life. For another, the natural acts of the baby, the boy, the adolescent, the young man, the adult, were all different. But with the growth of his natural acts, his supernatural acts were able to grow, since they had something successively different to complete and perfect in a supernatural way. Thus, we read in Luke that Christ grew in wisdom, age, and grace before God and man. This surely rules out that there was no growth where his supernatural acts were concerned. Nor is there any getting round what the letter to the Hebrews teaches: like other people, Christ grew to his human perfection through labors, hardships, and sorrows. See Hebrews 2.10, 4.15, 5.7–8; J. Coste, ‘Notion grecque et notion biblique de la souffrance éducatrice,’ Recherches de science religieuse 43 (1955) 481–523. 8 The unity of human consciousness Although the notion of ineffable knowledge is not the same as that of effable knowledge, nor that of natural effable knowledge the same as that of supernatural effable knowledge, it remains that Christ’s human consciousness was one, not only by the identity of the conscious subject but also by the mutual ordering of acts among themselves. It is wildly mistaken, then, either [1] to distinguish natural from supernatural acts in such a way as to

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que vitas cogitaret, vel qui ita unum processum actibus simul naturalibus et supernaturalibus compositum agnosceret ut tamen scientiam ineffabilem ab hoc processu seiungeret et seorsum quasi in secreta quadam arce mentis collocaret. Parum denique est errorem reicere et tamen positivam quandam, etsi analogicam et imperfectam, rei intelligentiam praeterire.

Quod ergo in nobis facit naturale lumen intellectus et supernaturale lumen fidei, illud in Christo homine faciebat immediata Dei cognitio. Quod in nobis ineffabile est, cuius expressio est nostra vita, illud est lumen in quo omnis scientia nobis est originaliter indita, quo naturaliter ens, et ideo Deum, per essentiam cognoscere desideramus. Quod autem in Christo homine erat ineffabile, cuius expressio erat vita Christi humana et historica, erat ipsum divinum Verbum immediate cognitum. Ubi ergo nos ex intentione finis in finem attingendum operamur, Christus homo ex fine adepto, perspecto, dilecto bonitatem diffundebat; quae quidem diffusio per prius erat ipsa sua vita humana et historica et per posterius omnia includit quae per suam vitam Christus operatus est. Porro in ipsis suae vitae initiis Christus homo secundum scientiam ineffabilem et Deum et omnia actualia cognovit, sed idem eodem tempore secundum scientiam effabilem adhuc nihil actu cognovit. Pedetentim vero, prout actus naturales et supernaturales secundum scientiam effabilem eliciebat, plura semper cognovit actu; quae quidem plura erant duplicis generis, cum alia fuerint quae infans, parvulus, puer, adulescens, iuvenis, vir eius temporis et loci naturaliter cognosceret, et alia fuerint quae ipse Iesus scientia effabili invenit ut suum ineffabile sibi aliisque vel diceret vel aliter exprimeret.

Superius enim diximus Christum Patris doctrinam, dilectionem, voluntatem scientia ineffabili scivisse sed effabili scientia docuisse, demonstrasse, implevisse. Sed nunc ipsum transitum ex ineffabili in scientiam effabilem considerari oportet: aliud enim est secundum intelligibile separatum et infinitum intelligere, et aliud est secundum intelligibilia finita et sensibilibus contenta intelligere. Qui primo modo intelligit, divina mysteria scit sed ea modo humano declarare vel monstrare non potest; qui altero modo intelligit, ita divina mysteria declarare vel monstrare potest ut eadem nisi mediate, analogice, imperfecte non cognoscat. Quae tamen duo et distincta in

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think there are two separate series of acts and, as it were, two consciousnesses and two lives, or [2] to acknowledge one process composed at once of natural and supernatural acts, in such a way as would nevertheless cut ineffable knowledge out of this process and lodge it separately, as though in a secret redoubt of the mind. And finally it is not enough to reject the error and yet shrink from some positive, albeit analogical and imperfect, understanding of the matter. What the natural light of intellect and the supernatural light of faith do in us, then, immediate knowing of God did in Christ the man. What is ineffable in us, what our life is the expression of, is the light in which all knowledge is originally imparted to us, the light by which we naturally desire to know being and therefore to know God by his essence. What was ineffable in Christ the man, however, and whose expression was Christ’s human and historical life, was the divine Word itself, immediately known. Thus, where we operate from intention of an end to attaining that end, Christ the man diffused goodness from an end achieved, beheld, and loved. This diffusion was first his own human and historical life; it goes on to include everything Christ worked through his life. Next, at the very beginning of his life Christ the man by his ineffable knowledge knew both God and all that is actual, but at that same time he did not yet actually know anything on the basis of his effable knowledge. Gradually, as he elicited natural and supernatural acts by his effable knowledge, he actually came to know more and more, and this ‘more’ was of two kinds. On the one hand, there were the things that the baby, the child, the boy, the adolescent, the young man, the adult, living in his own time and place, naturally knew; different from these, on the other hand, there were the things that Jesus himself discovered by his effable knowledge so that he might express, in speech or otherwise, to himself and to others, his ineffable knowledge. We said earlier that Christ knew the doctrine and love and will of the Father by his ineffable knowledge, but that he taught, displayed, and carried these out by his effable knowledge. Here, however, we need to consider in itself the transition from ineffable to effable knowledge; for it is one thing to understand on the basis of the separate and infinite Intelligible, and another to understand on the basis of finite intelligibilities contained in the sensible. One who understands in the first way knows the divine mysteries but cannot declare or express them in a human way; one who understands in the second way is able to declare or show divine mysteries in such a

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unitate unius conscientiae humanae coniungebantur, cum Christus homo scientia ineffabili divina mysteria sciverit et scientia effabili docuerit.

Quaeres tamen quemadmodum Christus homo ex ineffabili ad effabilem scientiam processerit. Sed in primis quaerendum est quemadmodum scientificus ad intelligentiam, quemadmodum philosophus ad veritatem, quemadmodum sanctus ad vitam sanctam procedat; nondum enim intelligit qui intelligentiam quaerit, nondum veritatem possidet qui veritatem quaerit, nondum sanctus est qui vitam sanctam adhuc peragendam habet; qui tamen omnes modo quodam iam cognoscunt quod desiderant et ideo agnoscere poterunt cum attingerint. Quibus quodammodo similis erat Christus et quodammodo dissimilis. Dissimilis enim erat quatenus finem adeptus Deum immediate cognovit; similis autem erat quatenus omnes eius potentiae omnesque vires humanae, quasi vacuum implendum, eo nitebantur ut effabile redderent quod intra eandem conscientiam modo ineffabili possidebatur. Quem in processum influxit ipsa ineffabilis scientia consequensque caritas et obedientia, non ut miracula patraret (nisi hoc aliunde constat), non ad modum inquietae et parum consciae partis irascibilis vel concupiscibilis, non ut naturalem corporis, sensitivitatis, intelligentiae spontaneitatem destruet, sed plena intelligentia atque pacifica voluntate. Quae sponte in homine evolvuntur, sponte in se evolvi voluit Dominus; et eiusmodi sunt quae ad evolutionem corporis, sensitivitatis, intelligentiae pertineant. Quae autem rationaliter et libere fiunt, uti iudicia et electiones, haec superiori et ineffabili scientia vel comprobavit et confirmavit vel, ex parte contraria, impedivit et ulteriorem considerationem voluit. Ne tamen hunc processum seu transitum ex scientia ineffabili ad effabilem cogites quasi non esset nisi profectus scientiae effabilis. Non enim Christus vixit ut cognosceret sed cognovit ut viveret et vitam daret. Ex Verbo divino immediate cognito processit ut modo incarnato per omnia sua sensibilia vel verba vel opera Verbum divinum nobis revelaret, manifestaret, communicaret. Qui ergo in Christo homine fuit processus ut effabile redderetur quod ineffabile possidebatur, ipsa vita Christi humana atque historica erat; quae autem in Christo homine erat vita, propter originem erat divina revelatio et propter finem erat propositum obiectum nostrae fidei, motivum quoddam nostrae caritatis, exemplar vitae christianae, et operatio redemptionis generis humani. Quod si originale et principale in vita Christi hominis erat ut effabile et

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way as to know them only mediately, analogically, and imperfectly. But although they are distinct, these two are conjoined in the unity of one human consciousness, since Christ the man knew divine mysteries by his ineffable knowledge and taught them by his effable knowledge. How, you might still ask, did Christ proceed from ineffable to effable knowledge? But the first question is how a scientist proceeds to understanding, how a philosopher proceeds to truth, how a saint proceeds to a holy life. Those who are in search of understanding have not yet understood, those who are in search of truth do not yet possess it, and those who have yet to live a holy life are not yet holy; yet all these already know, in a way, what they desire and so can acknowledge it when they attain it. In some sense Christ was like them, and in some sense unlike. He was unlike them inasmuch as he knew God immediately, achieving the end; yet he was like them inasmuch as all his human abilities and powers were straining, like a void that has to be filled, effably to render that which was possessed, ineffably, within the same consciousness. This process was influenced by ineffable knowledge itself, and by the consequent charity and obedience, not in order to work a miracle (unless this is established on other grounds), not by way of the restless and scarcely conscious irascible or concupiscible part of him, not so as to destroy the natural spontaneity of his body, sensitivity, or intelligence, but with full intelligence and calm will. What spontaneously develops in man, the Lord willed to develop spontaneously in himself; and this includes all that pertains to the development of body, sensitivity, and intelligence. What happens reasonably and freely, however, as do judgments and choices, he either approved and confirmed by his higher, ineffable knowledge, or on the contrary held back, willing a further consideration. Do not, however, think of this process or transition from ineffable to effable knowledge as though it were only the growth of effable knowledge. For Christ did not live in order to know: he knew in order to live and give life. From the divine Word he knew immediately, he proceeded so that, through all his sensible words and works, he might incarnately reveal, manifest, and communicate the divine Word to us. This process in Christ the man, a process of rendering effable what was ineffably possessed, was the human and historical life of Christ itself. But what in Christ the man was life was, on account of its origin, divine revelation, and, on account of its end, an object proposed to our faith, a motive of our charity, the exemplar of Christian life, and the working of the human race’s redemption. If the principal and original thing in the life of Christ the man was ren-

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palpabile redderet quod in eo erat ineffabile, sequitur Christum eo sensu secundum scientiam effabilem profecisse ut tamen ipse non ab aliis hominibus doceretur sed potius ex se inveniret (Sum. theol., 3, q. 7, a. 8). Quod tamen non eo modo intelligi oportet ut historicitas vitae Christi tolleretur. Sicut enim homo a rebus sensibilibus per suos sensus accipit, ita etiam ab hominibus agentibus et loquentibus ea omnia accipit quae mundum faciunt humanum et historicum: linguistica, culturalia, socialia, oeconomica, politica, moralia, religiosa. Sed in hac acceptione, sicut sensus non est totalis causa cognitionis intellectualis sed materia causae (Sum. theol., 1, q. 84, a. 6), ita etiam quae a parentibus, sociis, magistris aliisque dicuntur et aguntur, non sunt totalis causa sed materia causae in illo processu quo homo suam propriam indolem, mentalitatem, characterem sibi efformat. Etsi enim forte sint qui nihil cogitent, dicant, faciant nisi quod alios cogitare, dicere, facere reputent, attamen iis ipsis non volentibus et non eligentibus imputatur haec eorum quasi non-exsistentia. E contra, quo magis unusquisque proprium exercet ingenium et proprium suae vitae finem sibi constituit, eo magis nisi materialiter non accipit ab aliis, et eo radicalius omnia quae accipit in proprios usus et fines transmutat atque convertit. Quae cum ita sint, quia Christus vitam historicam agebat, eum fatemur ab aliis hominibus et praecipue a beatissima Virgine accepisse; quia vero illud intus habuit exprimendum quod totam experientiam humanam transcendat prorsus, eundem dicimus omnia quae acceperit in suos usus suosque fines adaptasse, transmutasse, convertisse. Ita, cum Hierosolymis doctores legis puer interrogaret, ex traditione hebraica et iudaica accipiebat; sed ideo accipiebat quia, uti dixit, ‘in his, quae Patris mei sunt, oportet me esse’ (Lc 2.49); et hoc ipsum non a parentibus didicit qui hoc verbum non intellexerunt (Lc 2.50).

Actus ergo naturales et supernaturales scientiae Christi effabilis reducimus (1) materialiter in sensibilia a Christo homine percepta et in socioculturalia sui temporis et loci, (2) formaliter in haec materialia prout trans­ mutata analogice exprimerent quod in eadem conscientia humana erat ineffabile, (3) actualiter secundum iudicia et electiones in ipsam scientiam ineffabilem et quae eam consequebantur caritas et obedientia, et (4) in ipsam primam causam trinitariam, in Deum Patrem qui Filium misit, in ipsum Filium qui unum indivise erat subiectum duplicis suae conscientiae, et in Spiritum sanctum non ad mensuram Christo homini datum (Io 3.34;

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dering in an effable and palpable way what in him was ineffable, it follows that the sense in which Christ grew with regard to his effable knowledge was such that he was not taught by others but instead discovered in himself (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 7, a. 8). This must not be understood, however, in a way that would cancel the historicity of Christ’s life. For just as we each accept from sensible things through our senses, so too from people acting and speaking we accept all that makes up the human, historical world – linguistic, cultural, social, economic, political, moral, and religious. In this acceptance, however, just as sense is not the whole cause of intellectual knowing but the matter for the cause (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 6), so too what is said and done by parents, companions, teachers, and others is not the whole cause but the matter for the cause in that process by which one forms for oneself one’s own talent, mindset, character. Some people, perhaps, think and say and do nothing but what they reckon others are thinking and saying and doing. But even so, the blame for this non-existence of theirs, so to call it, lies in their own not-willing and not-choosing. By contrast, the more I exercise my own originality and constitute for myself my own end for my own life, the more is my accepting from others a material accepting only, and the more radically do I convert and transform to my own uses and ends everything I accept. That being so, since Christ led a historical life, we would hold that he did accept from others, and especially from the blessed Virgin; however, since he had in himself something to express which utterly transcends all human experience, we say that he adapted, transformed, and converted to his own use and his own ends everything he accepted. So, when he questioned the doctors of the law in Jerusalem, he was accepting from Hebrew and Jewish tradition; but he was accepting it, as he said, because ‘I must be about my Father’s business’ (Luke 2.49). This itself was something he did not learn from his parents, who did not understand his saying (Luke 2.50). We thus resolve the natural and supernatural acts of Christ’s effable knowledge (1) materially, to the sensible data perceived by Christ the man in his socio-cultural time and place; (2) formally, to these materials as, analogically transformed, they express what was ineffable in the same human consciousness; (3) actually, as regards judgments and choices, to this ineffable knowledge itself and to the charity and obedience that follow it; and (4) to the Trinitarian first cause itself: to God the Father who sent the Son, to the Son himself, who was undividedly one subject of his twofold consciousness, and to the Holy Spirit given to Christ the man without measure (John 3.34;

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cf. Is 11.2, Mc 1.10, 1.12, Mt 3.16, 4.1, 12.18, Lc 3.22, 4.1, 4.14, 4.18, 10.21, Io 1.32, 7.39, 14.26, 15.26, 16.14, 20.23, Heb 9.14). 9 De ipso profectu secundum scientiam effabilem actualem Quaerenti vero quid quo tempore Christus homo primo effabiliter et actu cognoverit, respondendum est scripturas hac de re nisi perpauca non docere. Constat quidem in puero fuisse profectum sapientia, aetate, et gratia apud Deum et apud homines (Lc 2.52); constat in ipsa Christi passione eum ex iis, quae passus est, obedientiam didicisse (Heb 5.8); quibus forte non nulla alia addi possunt. Uti enim notavit K. Adam (The Christ of Faith 264), Christus in Cana Galilaeae Matri suggerenti respondit: nondum venit hora mea (Io 2.4); idem vero mox ita egit quasi perspicisset iam advenisse horam ut publice miraculum patraret. Similiter, suadentibus fratribus ut ad festum ascenderet, respondit suum tempus nondum advenisse (Io 7.6, 7.8); mox tamen non manifeste sed occulte ad festum perrexit. Quae forte de transitu ex scientia ineffabili ad effabilem intelligi possunt. Communius tamen ipsa initia proficientis scientiae effabilis determinare non possumus. Sane Christus, cum futuram suam passionem et mortem apostolis praedixerit, eandem effabiliter et actualiter cognovit. Sed desunt indicia unde concludere possimus quando ipse eandem actu effabili non novisset. Et similiter de aliis dicendum est. Accedit quod ab alio evangelista non solum alius intenditur finis sed etiam sub alia quasi perspectiva narratur vita Christi. Apud Ioannem inculcatur scientia Christi. Nam praeter alia et multa iam superius adducta, notanda sunt: Io 1.47, 2.24–25, 6.6, 7.15, 7.46, 11.42, 12.30. Quibus accedunt silentia de praedicatione Nazareth (cf. Mc 6.6), de ficu sine ficis (Mc 11.13), de imminenti parousia (cf. A. Feuillet, dbs, vi, 1331–1419). Similis autem praeoccupatio apud Marcum vix detegitur: Iesus scivit cogitationes cordis (Mc 2.8); praedixit suam passionem (Mc 8.31, 9.30, 10. 33–34); in Iesum credi oportet (Mc 13.31, 16.16); attamen Iesus miratus est incredulitatem incolarum Nazareth ubi virtutem facere non potuit (Mc 6.6; cf. Io 2.24–25); ante tempus ficorum ficos carpere voluit (Mc 11.12–13); nescivit diem et horam iudicii (Mc 13.32).

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see Isaiah 11.2, Mark 1.10, 1.12, Matthew 3.16, 4.1, 12.18, Luke 3.22, 4.1, 4.14, 4.18, 10.21, John 1.32, 7.39, 14.26, 15.26, 16.14, 20.23, Hebrews 9.14). 9 The growing itself, as regards [Christ’s] actual effable knowledge What and when did Christ the man first know, effably and in act? The answer to anyone who asks this question is that scripture has only a very little to teach here. What it establishes is that there was growth in wisdom, age, and grace before God and men (Luke 2.52), and that he learned obedience from the things he suffered (Hebrews 5.8). Beyond that, there may be a few things to add. As Karl Adam has observed (The Christ of Faith 264), Christ’s reply to his mother’s suggestion at Cana in Galilee was, ‘My hour has not yet come’ (John 2.4); at once, however, he acted as though he did grasp that the hour had come, by working a public miracle. Likewise, when his brothers were urging him to go up to the feast, he answered that his time had not yet come (John 7.6, 7.8); at once, however, he set out for the feast, not openly but in secret. It may be possible to understand these episodes in terms of the transition from ineffable to effable knowledge. More commonly, however, we cannot determine the very beginning of growth in effable knowledge. To be sure, at the time when Christ foretold to his apostles his coming passion and death, he actually and effably knew it. But we lack evidence from which we could infer at what time he did not know it effably and in act. And the same goes for other instances. In addition, there is the fact that not only were the aims of the several evangelists different, but also they told the story of Christ’s life as though from different viewpoints. John’s teaching stresses Christ’s knowledge. Besides the many other passages adduced above, these should be noted: John 1.47, 2.24–25, 6.6, 7.15, 7.46, 11.42, 12.30. In addition to these there is John’s silence about the preaching at Nazareth (cf. Mark 6.6), about the barren fig tree (Mark 11.13), and about an imminent parousia (see A. Feuillet, ‘Parousie,’ dbs, 6, 1331–1419). A preoccupation like this is barely detectable in Mark. Jesus did know the thoughts of the heart (Mark 2.8) and foretell his own passion (Mark 8.31, 9.30, 10.33–34), and he ought to be believed in (Mark 13.31, 16.16). Nevertheless, Jesus marveled at the unbelief of the townspeople at Nazareth, where he could do no mighty work (Mark 6.6; cf. John 2.24–25); he wanted to pick figs before it was time for figs (Mark 11.12–13); he did not know the hour of judgment (Mark 13.32).

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Inter Marcum et Ioannem locum intermedium tenent Matthaeus et Lucas. Mutua et exclusiva Patris et Filii cognitio laudatur (Mt 11.27, Lc 10.22; cf. Io 10.15); omnia tradita sunt Filio (Mt 11.27, 28.18, Lc 10.22; cf. Io 3.35; et apparenter oppositum apud Mt 20.33). Quae habuit Mc 6.6, multo mitigavit Mt 13.58, et aliter exposuit Lc 4.22–30. Quae habuit Mc 11.13. 11.20, multo mitigavit Mt 21.19, et omisisse videtur Lucas (cf. Lc 13.6–9). Ubi simplicem quaestionem posuerunt Mc 6.38 et Mt 15.34, narrationem sine quaestionibus posuit Lucas (Lc 9.13, 9.16), et quaestionis explicationem Ioannes (Io 6.5–6). Explicite Marcus, implicite Matthaeus, nullo modo Lucas dicunt Filium nescire diem et horam consummationis (Mc 13.32, Mt 24.36, Act 1.7); in Ioanne autem simpliciter deest problema de imminenti parousia.

Quae cum ita sint, neque facile ex his diversis perspectivis ad unam Christi vitam humanam et historicam cum certitudine concluditur neque, ex parte contraria, fieri posse videtur ut tota haec res sufficienter elucidetur nisi in Christo homine agnoscantur vel eae vel similes quas posuimus dis­ tinc­tiones inter scientiam ineffabilem et effabilem, inter effabilem supernaturalem et naturalem, inter immobilitatem scientiae ineffabilis et profectum in actibus effabilibus. Remanet ut obiectionibus quibusdam satis faciamus. Interrogavit ergo Iesus, non solum ut sciens (Mt 9.4–5, 12.48, 26.40, Mc 7.18, 8.20, Io 6.5, 21.15–17), sed etiam secundum sensum magis obvium ut ipse addisceret (Mt 15.34, Mc 6.38, Lc 2.48, 8.30, Io 11.34, 18.34). Respondetur: ut homo simpliciter addisceret, negatur; ut addisceret secundum scientiam effabilem, subdistinguitur, ut doctrinam revelandam addisceret, negatur, ut materialia acquireret, subsubdistinguitur, ubi aliud suadetur (cf. Io 18.34 et Io 2.24–25), negatur, ubi aliud non suadetur, conceditur. Sed Filius nescivit diem iudicii. Sensu ariano, negatur. Sensu nestoriano, negatur (ds 1419). Sensu Agnoetarum, negatur (db 248, 2184; ds 474–76, 3646). Filius ergo tum ut Deus tum ut homo scientia ineffabili scivit; admitti tamen potest eum tunc temporis scientia effabili nescivisse; et quamvis Marcus has distinctiones non posuerit, vix apud eum invenies indicia quod de alia scientia quam effabili cogitavit; et ideo ad mentem Marci dici potest haec solutio. Quam tamen

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Matthew and Luke hold an intermediate place between Mark and John. They extol the mutual, exclusive knowledge of the Father and the Son (Matthew 11.27, Luke 10.22; cf. John 10.15); all things have been delivered to the Son (Matthew 11.27, 28.18, Luke 10.22; cf. John 3.35 and the seemingly opposite statement of Matthew 20.33). What is said in Mark 6.6 is greatly modified in Matthew 13.58 and explained differently in Luke 4.22–30. What is said in Mark 11.13 and 11.20 is greatly modified in Matthew 21.19, and Luke seems to omit it (see Luke 13.6–9). Where Mark 6.38 and Matthew 15.34 pose a simple question, Luke gives a narrative without questions (Luke 9.13, 9.16) and John explains the questions (John 6.5–6). That the Son did not know the day and hour of the consummation is said explicitly by Mark, implicitly by Matthew, and not at all by Luke (Mark 13.32, Matthew 24.36, Acts 1.7), whereas for John the problem of an imminent parousia is simply not there. All that being so, from these diverse viewpoints it is no easy matter to conclude with any certainty to one human and historical life of Christ. On the other hand, it does not seem possible to give a satisfactory account of this whole matter without acknowledging in Christ the man the distinctions we have drawn, or similar ones, between ineffable and effable knowledge, between natural and supernatural effable knowledge, and between the changelessness of ineffable knowledge and growth in effable acts. We still have to satisfy certain objections. [1] Jesus, then, posed questions, not only as one who knows (Matthew 9.4–5, 12.48, 26.40, Mark 7.18, 8.20, John 6.5, 21.15–17), but also in the more obvious sense of asking in order to learn (Matthew 15.34, Mark 6.38, Luke 2.48, 8.30, John 11.34, 18.34). Reply: That [Christ] the man learned, purely and simply, I  deny. As to whether he learned with respect to his effable knowledge, I subdistinguish. That he learned any teaching that was to be revealed, I deny. As to whether he learned in order to acquire material, I subdistinguish further. That he did so where another view is persuasive (see John 18.34 and John 2.24–25), I deny; that he did so where no other view is persuasive, I grant. [2] But the Son did not know the day of judgment. [Reply:] That this is so in an Arian sense, I deny. That it is so in a Nestorian sense, I deny (ds 1419); likewise the sense of the Agnoetae (db 248, 2184, ds 474–76, 3646). Both as God and as man, therefore, the Son knew with ineffable knowledge; it can be admitted, however, that at the time he did yet not know by his effable knowledge; and while Mark does not present these distinctions, you will scarcely find indications in his gospel that he

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modo exclusivo non proponimus, cum hac occasione eadem brevitate uti potuisset Dominus quacum dixerat: ‘non est meum dare vobis’ (Mt 20.23; cf. 11.27, 28.18).

Scholion 1: De scientia Christi infusa et acquisita Agitur de scientia non actu sed habitu, non per intelligibile separatum et infinitum, sed per intelligibilia finita sive separata sive in sensibilibus contenta. Ponuntur hi habitus tum ratione generali tum ratione speciali: ratione generali, ut actus sint connaturales subiecto, et fiant facile, prompte, delectabiliter; ratione speciali, ut actus determinetur secundum obiectum; habitus enim cognoscitivus est ordinata quaedam specierum complexio. Distinguuntur scientia infusa et scientia acquisita secundum originem: infusa a Deo immediate producitur; acquisita a Deo mediantibus principiis naturalibus producitur. Quare, ad actus Christi hominis cognoscitivos et naturales ponitur scientia acquisita, quae quidem acquiritur in ipso processu cognoscitivo naturali; sed ad actus Christi hominis cognoscitivos et supernaturales ponitur scientia infusa. Dividitur ipsa scientia infusa secundum obiecta quae actibus attinguntur: alia enim obiecta sunt supernaturalia tantummodo quoad modum, et alia sunt supernaturalia quoad substantiam; haec vero vel relative vel absolute supernaturalia sunt. Ita litteras scire est naturale; sed supernaturale quoad modum est litteras non didicisse et eas tamen scire; et ideo in Christo ponenda est scientia infusa supernaturalis quoad modum, si evangelista approbavit Iudaeorum opinionem (Io 7.15). Notate tamen hanc scientiam infusam maxime in parte non intellectiva sed sensitiva inveniri, cum ‘litteras scire’ fere totum sit in consociationibus inter auditos sonos et signa visa. Iterum naturale est angelo et, pro suo statu, animae separatae per intelligibilia a sensibilibus separata intelligere; sed idem relative supernaturale est animae humanae corpori coniunctae. Quia ergo Christus est caput omnis potestatis et principatus (Col 2.10; Sum. theol., 3, q. 8, a. 4), in eo ponitur scientia infusa relative supernaturalis (ibid. q. 11, a. 1, ad 2m; a. 2).

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was thinking about any but effable knowledge; and so this solution can be said to agree with the thinking of Mark. We do not propose it, however, as excluding other solutions, since on that occasion the Lord could have been using the same brevity with which he said, ‘It is not mine to give you’ (Matthew 20.23; see 11.27, 28.18). Scholion 1: Christ’s infused and acquired knowledge This scholion does not concern knowledge in act but habitual knowledge, not through the separate, infinite Intelligible, but through finite intelligibles, whether separate or contained in the sensible. There is a general and a special reason for positing these habits. The general reason is so that the acts are connatural to the subject and happen easily, promptly, and enjoyably; the special reason is so that an act may be determined by its object, since a cognitional habit is an ordered complex of species. Infused knowledge and acquired knowledge are distinguished by their origin. Infused knowledge is produced immediately by God; acquired knowledge is produced by God through the mediation of natural principles. Accordingly, the acquired knowledge is assigned to the natural, cognitional acts of Christ the man; such knowledge is acquired in the natural cognitional process itself. But infused knowledge is assigned to Christ the man’s supernatural cognitional acts. Infused knowledge is itself divided according to the objects attained by its acts: some objects are supernatural only as to their mode; others are supernatural as to their substance, and are either relatively or absolutely supernatural. Thus, it is natural to know one’s letters; but to know one’s letters without having learned is supernatural as to its mode; and thus, if the evangelist agreed with the opinion of the Jews (John 7.15), infused knowledge that is supernatural as to its mode has to be posited in Christ. Note, however, that this infused knowledge is found chiefly at the sensitive rather than the intellectual level, since ‘to know one’s letters’ is almost entirely a matter of associations between sounds heard and signs seen. Again, what is natural for an angel, and also, for its state, for a separated soul – namely, to understand through intelligibles separated from the sensible – is relatively supernatural for a human soul joined with a body. Thus, since Christ is the head of all authority and power (Colossians 2.10; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 8, a. 4), there is posited in him a relatively supernatural infused knowledge (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2m; a. 2).

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Sed nulli creaturae naturale est cognoscere mysteria in Deo abscondita (db 1795–96, ds 3015–16). Et cum Christus homo non solum scientia ineffabili sed etiam effabili mysteria cognovit, etiam in eo agnoscenda est scientia infusa absolute supernaturalis; quae quidem concipienda esse videtur ad modum donorum Spiritus sancti, doni prophetiae, etc. Vide Sum. theol., 1-2, q. 68; 2-2, qq. 171–78. Et dico ‘ad modum’ quia in nobis haec dona cum fide connectuntur, sed in Christo homine non erat fides (Sum. theol., 3, q. 7, a. 3) neque sicut in caeteris prophetis prophetia (ibid. a. 8).

Circa historiam doctrinae, in primis sciendum est S. Thomam invenisse et introduxisse hanc distinctionem inter scientiam infusam et scientiam acquisitam. Acquisita enim scientia in Christo homine non agnoscebatur sive a praedecessoribus eius sive a contemporaneis (cf. Sépinski 98); quinimo ipse S. Thomas iunior cum caeteris theologis sui temporis consentiebat (In III Sent., d. 14, a. 3, sol. 5, ad 3m; d. 18, a. 3, ad 5m); postea vero bis et expresse priorem suam sententiam memoravit atque repudiavit (Sum. theol., 3, q. 9, a. 4; q. 12, a. 2) et scientiam naturaliter acquisitam affirmavit (ibid. q. 9, a. 4; q. 12, aa. 1–4). Quam eius doctrinam communiter docent theologi posteriores. Obici tamen potest S. Thomam tantam in Christo homine posuisse scientiam infusam ut locus relinquatur nullus ad ulteriorem habitum cognoscitivum acquirendum (vide Sum. theol., 3, q. 11, a. 1). Respondetur fieri posse ut S. Thomas in nova evolvenda sententia omnes suas implicationes non statim perspexerit; sed ideo neganda non est ipsa nova sententia tam clare et expresse proposita atque a tot aliis theologis recepta. Tantam ergo in Christo homine agnoscimus scientiam infusam quantam requirebat vel requirit munus Christi convenienter obeundum. Instatur tamen scientiam infusam cum vita Christi humana et historica pugnare. Respondetur scientiam infusam significare non actus elicitos sed habitum (Sum. theol., 3, q. 11, a. 5). Praeterea, intra conscientiam inveniuntur subiectum, actus, processiones actus ex actu; sed non inveniuntur habitus, potentiae, essentia animae, quae non cognoscuntur nisi ab iis qui concludant ex obiectis et actibus. Praeterea, habitus scientiae acquisitae importat obiecta aliquando fuisse

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But it is not natural to any creature to know mysteries hidden in God (db 1795–96, ds 3015–16, [dec 2: 808]). And since Christ the man knew [these] mysteries not only by ineffable but also by effable knowledge, absolutely supernatural infused knowledge should also be acknowledged in him, and it would seem that this knowledge should be conceived as somewhat akin to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the gift of prophecy, and the like. See Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 68; 2-2, qq. 171–78. And I say ‘somewhat akin to’ these gifts because, in us, they are connected with faith, whereas in Christ the man there was no faith (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 7, a. 3), and neither was there prophecy as in other prophets (q. 7, a. 8). Turning to the history of doctrine, the main point is that Thomas discovered and introduced this distinction between infused knowledge and acquired knowledge. Neither his predecessors nor his contemporaries acknowledged acquired knowledge in Christ the man (see Sépinski, La psychologie du Christ chez saint Bonaventure 98); indeed, the younger Thomas himself agreed with other theologians of his time (In III Sententiarum, d. 14, a. 3, sol. 5, ad 3m; d. 18, a. 3, ad 5m). Later on he twice recalled his earlier opinion and expressly renounced it (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 4; q. 12, a. 2), affirming [Christ’s] naturally acquired knowledge (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 4; q. 12, aa. 1–4). Since then theologians have commonly taught Thomas’s later doctrine. Still, it can be objected that the infused knowledge that Thomas posited in Christ the man was such as to leave no room for acquiring a further cognitional habit (see Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 1). Reply: It is possible that in developing new opinions Thomas did not at once grasp all their implications; but that is no reason for denying the new opinion itself, set out so clearly and expressly and received by so many other theologians. Therefore, we acknowledge in Christ the man as much infused knowledge as the appropriate carrying out of Christ’s work did or does require. But again: Infused knowledge conflicts with Christ’s human and historical life. Reply: Infused knowledge designates a habit, not elicited acts (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 5). Further, the subject, his acts, and processions of one act from another are all found within consciousness, but habits, potencies, and the essence of the soul are not; they are known only by those who infer them from objects and acts. Further, a habit of acquired knowledge means that objects were at some

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actu cognita, sed habitus scientiae infusae neque importat actus aliquando iam esse elicitos neque importat fore ut actus aliquando eliciantur. Unde S. Thomas arguit habitum non esse inutilem etiam si ‘non in omnia actualiter tendat, dummodo tendat actualiter in id quod convenit loco et tempori’ (Sum. theol., 3, q. 11, a. 5, ad 2m). Praeterea, ubi habitus in actum transit secundum quod convenit loco et tempori, et secundum quod ‘congruit ad debitum finem voluntatis secundum exigentiam negotiorum et temporis’ (ibid.), ibi non tollitur vita humana et historica contra scripturas et concilia et thesin. Praeterea, habitus facit ut quis prompte, facile, delectabiliter intelligat; sed nisi in immediata Dei cognitione aliud est intelligere et aliud est cognoscere. Ubi intelligitur intelligibile finitum et separatum, non attingitur nisi essentia, et ideo ulterius requiritur iudicium ut exsistentia cognoscatur. Ubi intelligitur intelligibile finitum quod intrinsece ad sensibilia refertur, ibi praerequiritur sensibile seu phantasma; secus nihil intelligitur (Sum. theol., 1, q. 84, a. 7). Praeterea, etsi Christus secundum scientiam infusam phantasmatibus vel uti vel non uti potuerit (Sum. theol., 3, q. 11, a. 2), tamen qui phantasmate non utitur, scientia effabili non utitur. Praeterea, sicut differunt angelus et anima separata, etiam differunt intelligibilia separata et intelligibilia in sensibilibus contenta. Quare, qui intelligibilia in sensibilibus non complet per phantasmata, ille intelligit non res sed rerum formas; quae formarum intelligentia per iudicium de exsistentia formae compleri debet antequam habeatur cognitio formae exsistentis. Praeterea, in scientiis rerum materialium et humanarum pars longior est in excogitandis et faciendis instrumentis, in evolvendis terminologiis exactis, in inveniendis signis aliisve abbreviationibus aptis, in colligendis bibliothecis, catalogis, indicibus; quae omnia partis sensitivae et laborem minuunt et efficaciam augent. Modernistarum ergo obiectio Christum hominem potuisse et noluisse scientias modernas docere (db 2034, ds 3434) non fundatur in scientia infusa quam S. Thomas in intellectu Christi posuit sed ulterius supponit miraculosam quandam sensitivitatem. Qui enim docet, scientia effabili utitur; qui scientia effabili utitur, sensibus utitur; qui sensibus utitur ad scientias modernas docendas, etiam utitur innumeris

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time known in act, but a habit of infused knowledge does not mean that acts were at some time elicited, and it does not mean that at some time they are going to be elicited. Hence, Thomas argues that a habit is not useless even if ‘it does not actually extend to everything, but does actually extend to what is appropriate to the time and place’ (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 5, ad 2m). Further, in the case of a habit that passes into act in keeping with what is appropriate to the time and place and in keeping with what ‘fits with the due end of the will according to the exigence of time and circumstance’ (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 5, ad 2m), human and historical life is not taken away, as would be contrary to scripture, the councils, and our thesis. Further, it is because of a habit that one understands promptly, easily, and with pleasure; but apart from immediate knowledge of God it is one thing to understand and another to know. Understanding a finite and separate intelligible attains only an essence; in order to know existence, there is a further requirement: judgment. Understanding a finite intelligible that is intrinsically referred to the sensible has as a prerequisite sensible data or a phantasm; otherwise nothing is understood (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 7). Further, even if Christ was able, on the basis of his infused knowledge, either to make use of phantasms or not (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 2), it remains that anyone who does not make use of phantasm is not using effable knowledge. Further, just as an angel is different from a separated soul, so also separate intelligibles are different from intelligibles contained in the sensible. Hence, anyone who does not complement the intelligible in the sensible with a phantasm does not understand real things but the forms of things. This understanding of forms has to be complemented with a judgment on the existence of the form before there is any knowledge of existing forms. Further, in the natural and human sciences, the more tedious part of knowledge lies in devising and constructing instruments, developing precise terminology, inventing signs and other suitable abbreviations, compiling libraries, catalogues, and indexes. All these serve to reduce the labor and enhance the effectiveness of the senses. Thus, in objecting that Christ the man could, but would not, teach modern science (db 2034, ds 3434), the modernists had no ground in the infused knowledge that Thomas posited in Christ’s intellect; instead, their objection presupposes in addition a miraculous capacity of the senses. If you teach, you use effable knowledge; if you use effable knowledge, you make use of your senses; if you make use

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fere adminiculis quae laborem sensuum minuunt eorumdemque efficaciam augent. Quae cum ita sint, concedendum est S. Thomam pro mentalitate sui temporis de perfectione intellectus Christi potius cogitasse quam de concreta vita, de actibus consciis, de actuum connectione et successione; sed negandum esse videtur suam doctrinam ab iis bene intelligi qui inde concludant scientiam infusam cum vita Christi humana et historica pugnare.

Scholion II: De potentia Christi hominis Vide Sum. theol., 3, q. 13; Galtier 322–42; Boyer 205–13; plenius ubi de causalitate sacramentorum in tractatu de sacraments in genere. Ulterius desideratur consideratio de causalitate historica quam Christus homo manifeste exercet.53 Thesis 13 Christus ut homo non solum non peccavit sed etiam absolute impeccabilis fuit. Quaestio Peccatum est actus humanus malus (Sum. theol., 1-2, q. 71, a. 6) et, cum ea praesertim malitia attendenda sit quae in offensa Dei consistat, etiam definitur peccatum ‘dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem aeternam’ (ibid.). Quattuor quaeruntur: (1) Utrum Christus homo peccaverit. (2) Utrum peccare potuerit. (3) Cur peccare non potuerit. (4) Utrum ad peccandum inclinaretur. Pars 1: Christus homo non peccavit. 1 Nota: de fide divina et catholica

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of your senses for teaching modern science, you also make use of countless tools for reducing the labor of the senses and enhancing their effectiveness. That being so, it should be granted that owing to the mindset of his time Thomas gave more thought to the perfection of Christ’s intellect than to his concrete life, his conscious acts, the connection and sequence of those acts. But what should be denied, it seems, is that Thomas’s teaching has been well understood by those who go on to conclude that infused knowledge is in conflict with Christ’s human and historical life. Scholion 2: The power of Christ the man See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 13; Galtier 322–42; Boyer 205–13; more fully, the causality of the sacraments treated in the theological treatise on sacraments in general. There is need for further consideration of the historical causality that Christ the man manifestly exercises.53 Thesis 13 Christ as man not only did not sin but also was absolutely incapable of sin. The question Sin is an evil human act (Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 71, a. 6) and, since that evil is especially to be attended to which consists in offence of God, sin is also defined as ‘something said or done or desired against the eternal law’ (Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 71, a. 6). There are four questions: (1) Did Christ the man sin? (2) Was he able to sin? (3) Why was he unable to sin? (4) Was he inclined towards sinning?

Part 1: Christ the man did not sin. 1 Theological note: Of divine and catholic faith

53 On this issue we refer the reader to the text of volume 9 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, The Redemption, specifically to articles 38–42 in chapter 6 in the supplementary document on the redemption.

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2 2 Cor 5.21: eum qui non noverat peccatum. Heb 4.15: tentatum autem per omnia pro similitudine absque peccato. Heb 7.26: sanctus, innocens, impollutus, segregatus a peccatoribus et excelsior caelis factus. 1 Pet 1.19: pretioso sanguine quasi agni immaculati Christi et incontaminati. 1 Pet 2.22: qui peccatum non fecit. Io 8.46: quis ex vobis me arguet de peccato. Io 14.30: venit princeps mundi huius, et in me non habet quidquam. 1 Io 3.5: Et peccatum in eo non est. Lc 1.35: quod nascetur ex te sanctum.

3 Obicitur : 2 Cor 5.21: Eum qui non noverat peccatum, pro nobis peccatum fecit, ut nos efficeremur iustitia Dei in ipso. Respondetur: Exegetarum sententiae exponuntur apud Lyonnet, in 2 Cor. 256–62.1 Responsio ex ipso textu habetur ex parallelismo antithetico inter Christum, qui factus est peccatum, et nos, qui efficimur iustitia Dei. Iam vero quod in nobis efficitur non est ipsa divina iustitia sed eiusdem effectus (db 799, ds 1529), et ideo quod in Christo factum est non peccatum sed effectus peccatorum est. Instatur: Heb 7.26 agit de Christo iam in caelis, ubi non habet cotidianam necessitatem offerendi pro propriis peccatis; ‘hoc enim fecit semel se ipsum offerendo.’ Constat ergo sacrificium crucis fuisse etiam pro peccatis Christi. Respondetur: Talis interpretatio excluditur a Heb 4.15, ‘absque peccato,’ a reliquis scripturae locis, et a db 122, ds 261: ‘non enim eguit oblatione, qui peccatum omnino nescivit.’ 4 Magisterium. Concilium Florentinum.: sine peccato conceptus, natus, et mortuus (db 711, ds 1347; cf. db 286, 122, ds 539, 261).

5 Concordant unanimiter omnes Patres et theologi. Imo etiam rationalistae (paucis exceptis) et liberales Iesum habent hominem eximium. Pars 2: Christus peccare non potuit. 1 Nota: theologice certum

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2­ Christ, ‘who knew no sin’ (2 Corinthians 5.21), ‘who in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sinning’ (Hebrews 4.15), is ‘holy, blameless, unstained, separated from sinners, exalted above the heavens’ (Hebrews 7.26). The ‘precious blood of Christ [is] like that of a lamb without blemish or spot’ (1 Peter 1.19). ‘He committed no sin’ (1 Peter 2.22). ‘Which of you convicts me of sin?’ (John 8.46). ‘The ruler of this world is coming. He has no power over me’ (John 14.30). ‘In him there is no sin’ (1 John 3.5). ‘The child to be born of you will be called holy’ (Luke 1.35). 3 Objection: ‘For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God’ (2 Corinthians 5.21). Reply: Lyonnet’s work on 2 Corinthians expounds the views of the exegetes (pp. 256–62).1 There is a reply from the text itself, in the antithetical parallel between Christ, who is made to be sin, and us, who are to become the righteousness of God. Now what is to be effected in us is not divine righteousness itself but its effects (db 799, ds 1529, [dec 2: 673]), and so what in Christ has come to be is not sin but the effect of sins. But again: Hebrews 7.26 is about Christ in heaven, where he has no need to offer sacrifices daily for his own sins; ‘he did this once for all when he offered up himself.’ So it is clear that the sacrifice of the cross was also made for Christ’s sake. Reply: Such an interpretation is ruled out by the ‘without sinning’ of Hebrews 4.15, by the other scriptural passages cited, and by db 122, ds 261, [dec 1: 60–61]: ‘for as he was sinless, he had no need of any offering.’ 4 Magisterium: According to the Council of Florence, Christ ‘was conceived, born, and died without sin’ (db 711, ds 1347, [dec 1: 575]; cf. db 286, 122, ds 539, 261, [dec 1: 60–61]). 5 All the Fathers and theologians unanimously agree. Even the rationalists (with a few exceptions) and liberals held that Jesus was an exceptional man. Part 2: Christ was not able to sin. 1 Theological note: Theologically certain



1 Lonergan is referring to Stanislas Lyonnet, Exegesis Epistolae secundae ad Corinthios (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1956).

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2 Adversatur: Günther qui docuit Christum peccare potuisse, Deum autem praevidisse eum non peccaturum esse. 3 S. Cyrillus Alexandrinus, Contra Anthropomorphitas, c. 23: Stolidi ac dementes prorsus sunt qui ipsum etiam Christum nescio quo pacto peccare potuisse affirmant … Quemadmodum igitur in Adam condemnati sumus ob inobedientiam mandatique transgressionem, ita in Christo iustificati sumus propter omnimodam ipsius a peccato immunitatem sive puritatem et perfectam inculpatamque obedientiam (mg 76, 1119 bc). S. Augustinus, De correptione et gratia, § 30: Neque enim metuendum erat ne … natura humana suscepta per liberum voluntatis peccaret arbitrium, cum ipsa susceptio talis esset ut natura hominis a Deo ita suscepta nullum in se motum malae voluntatis admitteret (ml 44, 934 ad calc.; ed. Boyer, p. 43).2 4 Concilium Constantinopolitanum iii: … humana eius voluntas deificata non est perempta, salvata autem est magis, secundum deiloquum Gregorium dicentem: ‘Nam illius velle, quod in Salvatore intelligitur, non est contrarium Deo, deificatum totum’ (db 291, ds 556). 5 Quod modo litterario a Magisterio et Patribus docetur, technica praecisione ab omnibus theologis affirmatur: Christum hominem peccare non potuisse. Pars 3: Christus homo absolute non potuit peccare. 1 Quaeritur cur Christus homo peccare non potuit, et quoad duo omnes consentiunt, quoad tertium autem disputant. Concedunt omnes naturam humanam esse peccabilem et ideo rationem impeccabilitatis in Christo non fuisse naturam assumptam qua naturam. Concedunt omnes Christum non potuisse peccare ratione donorum gratiae, scilicet, propter visionem beatam, gratiam habitualem, virtutes infusas et dona Spiritus, gratias actuales efficaces, et divinam providentiam gubernantem; quamvis diversae scholae diversimode nexum inter gratiam et bona opera intelligant.

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2 This part has been opposed by Günther, who taught that Christ was able to sin, although God foresaw that he was not going to sin. 3 Cyril of Alexandria: ‘They are utterly demented and obtuse who affirm that even Christ himself, I know not how, was able to sin … In the same way, then, that we are condemned in Adam, on account of his disobedience and transgression of the commandments, so we are justified in Christ on account of his immunity in every way from sin, his purity, and his perfect and blameless obedience’ (Contra Anthropomorphitas, c. 23; mg 76, 1119 bc). Augustine: ‘Nor was there any danger that … the human nature taken on should sin through free choice of will, since that taking on is such that the nature of man thus taken on by God admits in itself no motion of evil will’ (De correptione et gratia, § 30; ml 44, 934 ad calc. [csel 92: 255]; Boyer ed. 43).2 4 The Third Council of Constantinople: ‘His human will was not taken away by being divinized, but is preserved rather, according to the words of Greg­ ory [of Nazianzus] the Theologian, “For his will is not at all opposed to God; it is wholly divinized”’(db 291, ds 556, [dec 1: 128–29]). 5 What the Fathers and the magisterium teach in a literary manner is affirmed with technical precision by all theologians: Christ the man was not able to sin. Part 3: Christ the man was absolutely unable to sin. 1 The question is why Christ the man was not able to sin. Here everyone is agreed on two points, but there is dispute on a third. Everyone grants that human nature is capable of sin and thus the reason for impeccability in Christ was not his assumed nature as nature. Everyone grants that Christ was not able to sin, by reason of his gifts of grace, which is to say, on account of the beatific vision, habitual grace, infused virtues and gifts of the Spirit, actual efficacious graces, and the governance of divine providence; although different schools understand the link between grace and good works in different ways.



2 Divi Augustini De correptione et gratia: Secundum textum Maurinorum, ed. C. Boyer (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1932).

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Disputatur autem utrum Christus fuerit impeccabilis ratione ipsius personae, quae divina est. Nam ex communicatione idiomatum sequitur: si Christus homo peccat, Deus peccat. Et alii dicunt ‘Deum peccare’ contradictionem continere, et ideo absolute esse impossibile. Alii autem contradictionem vident solummodo si Deus in natura divina peccare dicitur. 2 Durandus (In III Sent., d. 12, q. 2) non videt contradictionem in eo quod Deus peccare dicitur in natura assumpta. Scotus impeccabilitatem Christi deducit solummodo ex visione beata et divina providentia gubernante (citationes indicantur apud Galtier 287, § 362). n.b. Ex decreto Pauli v haec Scoti sententia per notam theologicam non est censuranda. Cf. Viva, De Trin., disp. 5, q. 6, § 6. Praeter Scotistas caeteri theologi affirmant Christum impeccabilem absolute, scilicet, non solum ratione gratiarum, sed etiam ratione personae. 3 Nota: assertum defenditur ut certum; sed sententia Scoti non censuratur.

4 Arguitur: si Christus homo peccat, persona divina peccat; atqui personam divinam peccare repugnat; ergo Christum hominem peccare repugnat. Maior: si Christus homo peccat, aliqua persona peccat; et nulla alia est persona in Christo homine nisi divina; ergo. Minor: videtur evidens; cuius evidentiae declaratio facilius fit per solutas obiectiones. 5 Obicitur : non repugnat personam divinam in natura non divina peccare; nam operationes sunt personae a natura; et natura non divina non excludit peccatum absolute. Respondetur: Operationes sunt personae a natura, quatenus natura determinat genus operationis, eius perfectionem finitam vel infinitam, eius possibilitatem, et similia, conceditur; quatenus natura facit operationes quae deinde personae dicuntur, negatur. Nam persona est id quod operatur, et natura non est id quod sed solummodo id quo operatur. Instatur: principium-quod non influit in actum; et ideo principium-quod non determinat utrum talis actus sit possibilis necne.

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There is dispute, however, as to whether Christ was incapable of sin by reason of his person, which is divine. For it follows from the ‘interchange of properties’ that if Christ the man sins, God sins. And some say that ‘God sins’ contains a contradiction, and thus is absolutely impossible. Others, however, see a contradiction only if God is said to sin in the divine nature. 2 Durandus (In III Sententiarum, d. 12, q. 2) sees no contradiction in saying that God sins in an assumed nature. Scotus deduces Christ’s impeccability solely from his beatific vision and the governance of divine providence (citations in Galtier 287, § 362). Note: According to a decree of Paul v, this opinion of Scotus’s is not to be censured by theological note. See Viva, De Trinitate, disp. 5, q. 6, § 6. In contrast with the Scotists, other theologians affirm that Christ was absolutely – that is, not only by reason of his graces but also by reason of his person – incapable of sin. 3 Theological note: This assertion is defended as certain; but the opinion of Scotus is not censured. 4 Argument: If Christ the man sins, a divine person sins. But that a divine person should sin is unthinkable. Therefore, it is unthinkable for Christ the man to sin. As to the major premise: If Christ the man sins, some person sins; and there is no person in Christ the man except a divine person. Therefore, the conclusion follows. The minor premise would seem to be obvious; its obviousness is very easy to show by solving the objections to it. 5 Objection: It is not unthinkable for a divine person to sin in a nature that is not divine. Operations belong to a person from his nature, and a nature that is not divine does not absolutely rule out sin. Reply: That operations belong to a person from his nature, insofar as nature determines the genus of operation, its finite or infinite perfection, its possibility, and the like, I grant. That operations belong to a person from his nature, in the sense that a nature performs operations which are then referred to the person, I deny. A person is that which operates, and a nature is not that which operates, but only that by which a person operates. But again: A principle-which has no influence on act; and therefore a principle-which does not determine whether such an act is possible or not.

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Respondetur: Principium-quod non influit in actum ad modum naturae, neque exercet neque efficit actus suos sine natura, conceditur; principiumquod non est id quod exercet atque efficit actus suos liberos, negatur. Instatur: actiones sunt suppositorum non realiter sed denominative; et ideo non magis repugnat personam divinam in natura humana subsistentem peccare quam repugnat eam vagire, esurire, pati. Respondetur: Alia est realitas actionis et alia est realitas suppositi, conceditur vel transeat; suppositum non vere et realiter agit, negatur. Ad additam conclusionem, negatur paritas; nam actus qua moraliter boni vel mali sunt personae qua exercentis propriam libertatem; et aeterna Filiatio, quae est secunda persona SS. Trinitatis, per assumptam naturam potest quidem omnia facere quae ad finem incarnationis conferunt, sed ei repugnat aeternam Paternitatem denegare. Pars 4: Christus homo fomitem peccati non habuit.3 1 Sum. theol., 3, q. 15, a. 2. Galtier 289–95, §§ 366–73. 2 Damnatio Theodori Mopsuesteni a concilio Constantinopolitano ii, db 224, ds 434: … alium esse Deum Verbum et alium Christum a passionibus animae et desideriis carnis molestias patientem, et a deterioribus paulatim recedentem, et sic ex profectu operum melioratum, et a conversatione immaculatum factum … et post resurrectionem immutabilem cogitationibus et impeccabilem omnino factum fuisse.

3 S. Basilius, Epist. 261, 3: Liquet Dominum naturales quidem affectus suscepisse ad confirmationem verae nec phantasticae incarnationis, vitiosos vero affectus, qui nostrae vitae puritatem coinquinant, ut intaminata divinitate

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Reply: That a principle-which has no influence on act in the natural mode, and that it neither exercises nor effects its own acts without a nature, I grant. That a principle-which is not that which exercises and effects its own free acts, I deny. But again: actions are the actions of supposits, not really but by denomination; and therefore it is no more unthinkable for a divine person subsisting in a human nature to sin, than it is for him to weep or be hungry or suffer. Reply: That the reality of an action is one thing and the reality of a supposit another, I grant or pass. That a supposit does not really and truly act, I deny. As to the conclusion drawn, I deny its parity. Acts, as morally good or evil, are acts of the person as exercising his own liberty; and the eternal Filiation, which is the second person of the holy Trinity, is indeed able through an assumed nature to do everything which bears on the end of the Incarnation, but for him to deny the eternal Paternity is unthinkable. Part 4: Christ the man had not the spark of sin.3 1 See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 15, a. 2; Galtier 289–95 §§ 366–73. 2 The condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia by the Second Council of Constantinople: ‘[Theodore said] that God the Word is one, while Christ is another who was subject to disturbance by the passions of the soul and by the desires of the body, but who was gradually set free from inferior inclinations; and thus being made better through the improvement of his works, and becoming irreproachable by his conduct … after his resurrection he has become steadfast in purpose and wholly incapable of sin’ (db 224, ds 434, [dec 1: 119–20]). 3 Basil: ‘Hence it is evident that our Lord assumed the natural affections to establish his real Incarnation, and not by way of semblance of incarnation, and that all the affections derived from evil that besmirch the purity of our



3 For the translation of fomes and its origin, see the Blackfriars dual-language edition of the Summa theologiae, 3, qq. 7–15, vol. 49, ed. Liam G. Walsh, o.p. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974) 194–95, note a.

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indignos, reiecisse. Eam ob causam dictum est factum eum fuisse ‘in similitudine carnis peccati’ … (mg 32, 972 b).4 S. Gregorius Nyssenus, Epist. 3: Non erubescit scriptura omnia de eo narrare quae sunt naturae nostrae propria, esum, potum … omnia per quae naturae nostrae character exprimitur, excepta propensione ad peccatum. Peccatum enim aberratio a natura est, non eius proprietas … (mg 46, 1022 a–c).5 S. Leo Magnus, Epist. 35: Sensus corporei vigebant sine lege peccati … nec tentabatur illecebris, nec cedebat iniuriis (ml 54, 809 a). S. Augustinus, Opus imperf. cont. Iul., iv, 47: Quisquis credit carnem Christi contra spiritum concupisse, anathema sit (ml 45, 1366). S. Cyrillus Alexandrinus, vide Galtier 104–107, §§ 132–33. Ulteriora, 291– 92, §§ 368–69. Xiberta, Enchir., indicem, p. 791. 4 Fomes peccati est (1) appetitus sensitivus quatenus est principium motuum inordinatorum (non tantum carnalium) qui rationalem voluntatis motum praeveniant, avertant, impediant, retardent, et ideo ad peccatum incitare dicuntur, (2) magis proprie, talis inclinatio inquantum est de facto in actuali salutis ordine ex peccato originali, secundum Tridentinum (db 792, ds 1515), ‘ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat.’ 5 Admittere fomitem in Christo homine sensu nestoriano, esset haereticum ex damnatione Theodori (db 224, ds 434). Perspectis Patrum testimoniis, restringi non potest haec damnatio ad sensum nestorianum; et ideo fidei proximum habetur quod Christus non actualiter in peccatum inclinabatur. Ulterius theologi docent fomitem in Christo non solum ligatum fuisse sed etiam exstinctum. Nam in eo non erat peccatum originale, et in eo erat plenitudo gratiae; et quamvis minor gratia non excludit concupiscentiam, gratiae plenitudo excludit.

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life he rejected as unworthy of his unsullied Godhead. It is on this account that he is said to have been “made in the likeness of sinful flesh” …’ (Letter 261, 3; mg 32, 972 b; [lcl 270: 80, 82]).4 Gregory of Nyssa: ‘Scripture unabashedly records with regard to him all the properties of our nature, even eating, drinking … everything that marks our nature, except the tendency to sin. For sin is an aberration from nature, not a property of it …’ (Letter 3 [17], to Eustathia, Ambrosia, and Basilessa; mg 46, 1022 a–c; [sc 363: 136]).5 Leo the Great: ‘His bodily senses flourished without the law of sin … he was not tempted by allurements, nor did he yield to injuries’ (Letter 35; ml 54, 1087). Augustine: ‘Whoever believes that the flesh of Christ was concupiscent against the spirit, let him be anathema’ (Opus imperfectum contra Julianum, iv, 47; ml 45, 1936; [csel 85.2: 52]). Cyril of Alexandria: See Galtier 104–107, §§ 132–33; further, 291–92, §§ 368–69. Also Xiberta, Enchiridion, index, p. 791. 4 The spark of sin is (1) sensitive appetite insofar as it is the principle of inordinate (not merely carnal) motions that take precedence of the rational motion of will, avert it, impede it, retard it, and thus are said to incite one to sin. More properly, it is (2) such an inclination insofar as it is in fact within the actual order of salvation because of original sin, as stated at the Council of Trent: ‘It is from sin and inclines to sin’ (db 792, ds 1515, [dec 2: 667]). 5 Following the condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia (db 224, ds 434, [dec 1: 119–20]), to admit the spark of sin in Christ in a Nestorian sense would be heretical. In view of the patristic testimony, this condemnation cannot be restricted to the Nestorian sense, and therefore it is held to be a matter ‘of proximate faith’ that Christ was not actually inclined towards sin. Furthermore, the theologians teach that in Christ the spark of sin was not only dampened but also extinct. For there was no original sin in him, and in him there was fullness of grace; and although a lesser grace does not rule out concupiscence, the fullness of grace does.



4 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 2nd ser., vol. 8, p. 300. 5 Translation altered from that found in npnf, 2nd ser., vol. 5 (where the passage appears in ‘Letter xvii’), p. 543.

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6 Obicitur : tentatum per omnia pro similitudine absque peccato (Heb 4.15). Respondet Gregorius Magnus: ‘Qui in utero virginis incarnatus in mundum sine peccato venerat, nihil contradictionis in se ipso tolerabat. Tentari ergo per suggestionem potuit, sed eius mentem delectatio non momordit; atque ideo omnis diabolica illa tentatio foris, non intus fuit’ (ml 76, 1135). Plura apud Galtier 295, § 373.

Thesis 14 Christus homo libera voluntate humana gavisus est ac libere passionem et mortem acceptavit. Termini voluntas: appetitus rationalis; appetitus sequens rationem humana: scil. altera e duabus Christi voluntatibus naturalibus, cf. thesin quintam. libera: cuius actus sunt liberi. Liber autem est actus voluntatis creatae inquantum non sequitur necessario ex ullo ente finito et praevio. Nota ­ hesis est theologice certa. Explicita eius mentio non fiebat nisi forte per T transennam, donec doctrina de duabus voluntatibus evoluta sit, implicite tamen continebatur in scriptura et traditione, tum in descriptione actuum humanorum Christi, tum in laudibus virtutis Christi. Argumentum 1 Mt 26.38, 26.39, 26.42, 26.44. Ubi tristitia, oratio ter repetita, oblatio sui ter repetita, clarissime manifestant hominem liberum.

2 Io 10.17–18: Propterea diligit me Pater, quia ego pono animam meam, ut iterum sumam eam. Nemo tollit eam a me, sed ego pono eam a meipso; et potestatem habeo ponendi eam et potestatem habeo iterum sumendi eam. Hoc mandatum accepi a Patre meo. Diligitur Christus a Patre, non propter actum hominis sed propter actum

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6 Objection: Christ ‘in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sinning’ (Hebrews 4.15). Let Gregory the Great reply. ‘He who came into the world without sin, incarnate in the Virgin’s womb, allows nothing of contradiction within himself. Thus, he was able to be tempted by suggestion, but the allurement did not consume his mind; and thus the whole temptation of the devil was not within him but without’ (ml 76, 1135; [ccsl 141: 111]). For more, see Galtier 295, § 373. Thesis 14 Christ the man enjoyed a free human will and freely accepted his suffering and death. Terms will: a rational appetite; an appetite that follows reason. human: that is, the second of Christ’s two natural wills. See thesis 5. free: a free will is one whose acts are free. The act of a created will, however, is free insofar as it does not follow of necessity from any previous finite being. Theological note The thesis is theologically certain. No explicit mention of it is made, except perhaps in passing, until the doctrine of two natures had developed. Implicitly, however, it is contained in scripture and tradition, both in the description of Christ’s human acts and in the praise of Christ’s virtues. The argument 1 Matthew 26.38–39, 26.42, 26.44. Sadness, the prayer repeated three times, and the self-oblation, likewise repeated three times – all these clearly manifest a free man. 2 John 10.17–18. ‘For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life, that I may take it again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again; this command I have received from my Father.’ Christ is loved by the Father, not on account of the act of a human be-

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humanum;1 quod explicite, etsi non technice, affirmatur per illa verba ‘ego pono eam a meipso’ et ‘potestatem habeo’; cf. Mt 26.53: An putas quia non possum rogare Patrem meum, et exhibebit mihi plusquam duodecim legiones angelorum. 3 1 Pet 2.18–25. Laudantur Christiani si patiuntur non iuste sed iniuste. Iis exhibetur exemplum Christi ‘qui cum malediceretur, non maledicebat; cum pateretur, non comminabatur; tradebat autem iudicanti se iniuste’2 (v. 23). Sed vanae sunt laudes si, qui iniuste patitur, non libere sed necessario patitur. 4 db 148, 290, ds 301, 554: Christus est verus homo, perfectus in humanitate, per omnia nobis similis absque peccato. Sed verus homo, perfectus in humanitate, per omnia nobis similis absque peecato, habet liberam voluntatem humanam. 5 Non habetur meritum sine libertate. Atqui Christus meruit. Ergo Christus habuit libertatem. Maior: contraria sententia Iansenistarum damnata est ut haeretica (db 1094, ds 2003). Si obicitur quod damnatio respicit meritum in statu naturae lapsae, respondetur quod a fortiori habetur libertas a necessitate in statu naturae non lapsae. Minor: db 790, 799, ds 1513, 1529 ubi definitur meritum Christi esse unicum remedium contra peccatum originale; passionem Christi esse causam meritoriam nostrae iustificationis. Theologi 1 Quoad ipsum factum libertatis, nemo dubitat. Quoad modum quo libertas Christi humana conciliatur cum determinata voluntate divina eiusdem

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ing but on account of a human act.1 This is explicitly, if not technically, affirmed in the words ‘I lay it down of my own accord’ and ‘I have power’; cf. Matthew 26.53: ‘Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and he will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels?’ 3 1 Peter 2.18–25. Christians are praised if they suffer, not justly, but unjustly. They are shown the example of Christ: ‘When he was reviled, he did not revile in return; when he suffered, he did not threaten; but he handed himself over to him who judges unjustly’2 (2.23). But it is empty praise if the one who suffers unjustly does so not freely but of necessity. 4 Christ is true man, perfect in humanity, like us in all things apart from sin (db 148, 290, ds 301, 554, [dec, 1: 86–87, 127]). But a true man, perfect in humanity, like us in all things apart from sin, has a free human will. 5 Without freedom there is no merit. But Christ acted meritoriously. Therefore Christ had freedom. As to the major premise: The contrary opinion of the Jansenists has been condemned as heretical (db 1094, ds 2003). If it is objected that this condemnation regards merit in the state of fallen nature, the reply is that there is all the more freedom from necessity in a state of unfallen nature. As to the minor premise, see db 790, 799, ds 1513, 1529, [dec 2: 666, 673], where Christ’s merit is defined as the sole remedy for original sin, and Christ’s suffering is defined as the meritorious cause of our justification. Theologians’ views 1 About the fact of freedom itself, no one has doubts. About the way in which Christ’s freedom may be reconciled with the same person’s deter-





1 The distinction here is between (1) acts (such as seeing) that are a human being’s acts yet are not, for that reason alone, specifically human acts, and (2) acts that are both those of a human being and also specifically human, particularly acts involving moral agency. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 1, a. 3. 2 Thus according to the Vulgate: ‘tradebat autem iudicanti se iniuste,’ ‘but handed himself over to him who judges unjustly.’ The Greek has ‘justly,’ i.e., ‘he entrusted himself to him who judges justly.’ Lonergan’s argument turns not on this single word but on the meaning of the whole passage, in which Christ is praised for his patient endurance of injustice.

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personae, cum mandato a Patre dato, cum impeccabilitate, cum obedientia Filii perfecta, permultae sunt auctorum sententiae.

2 Thesi quinta iam notavimus S. Maximum Confessorem et S. Ioannem Damascenum ita liberam electionem Christo attribuisse ut tamen deliberationem ab eo excluderent, pp. 330–34 supra. 3 S. Thomas rem breviter tractat, Sum. theol., 3, q. 18, a. 4. Negat dubitationem ignorantis esse de necessitate libertatis; affirmat electionem fuisse in Christo; docet voluntatem Christi determinatam quidem fuisse ad bonum, sed libere elegisse hoc vel illud bonum.

4 Caeterorum theologorum sententias ordinate exposuit Boyer 255–59, ad quem remittimus. Galtier 304–11, §§ 388–98. Bertetto 423–30. Pesch, Praelect. Dogm., iv, 192–209 (ed. 1922), ubi modo ampliori fit expositio opinionum.3 5 Alii censent praeceptum moriendi cum libertate acceptationis componi non posse. Unde, Lugo dicit nullum fuisse praeceptum antequam ipse Christus illud voluerit et petiverit (disp. 26, sect. 8).4 de la Taille dicit Christum sponte se obtulisse in ultima coena, ut postea vera obligatione teneretur (Mysterium fidei, elucid. 8, ed. 1921, p. 99).5 Billot negat praeceptum sub poena peccati (thesi 29).6 6 Alii variis modis conciliare conantur verum praeceptum cum vera libertate. (a) Ante damnationem Iansenistarum erant qui libertatem non a neces-

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minate divine will, with the command given by his Father, with his sinlessness, and with the Son’s perfect obedience, the authors have a great many opinions. 2 Already, in thesis 5, we took note of Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus, who attributed free choice to Christ in a way that excluded from him any deliberation. See pp. 330–35 above. 3 Thomas Aquinas treats the matter briefly in Summa theologiae, 3, q. 18, a. 4. He denies that the hesitation of one who is ignorant is necessarily part of freedom, affirms that there was choice in Christ, teaches that while Christ’s will was indeed determined with respect to the good, he freely chose this or that [particular] good. 4 There is an orderly presentation of other theologians’ opinions in Boyer 255–59, to which we refer the reader. Also Galtier 304–11, §§ 388–98; Bertetto 423–30; Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, 4, 192–209 (1922 edition), where there is a more ample discussion of these opinions.3 5 Others consider that it is impossible to put a precept of dying together with freedom of acceptance. Hence: Lugo says that there was no precept before Christ himself willed and sought it (Disp. 26, sect. 8).4 De la Taille says that Christ freely offered himself at the Last Supper, and afterwards was held by a true obligation (Mysterium Fidei, elucid. 8; 1921 ed., p. 99).5 Billot denies any precept [laid on Christ] under pain of sin (thesis 29).6 6 Others have tried in various ways to reconcile a true precept with true freedom. (a) Until the condemnation of the Jansenists there were some who de-



3 Christian Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, vol. 4 (Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder, 1922). 4 Juan de Lugo, Disputationes scholasticae et morales (Paris: Vivès). Disp. 26, sect. 8, is found in vol. 3 (1859) 13–17. 5 Maurice de la Taille, Mysterium fidei (Paris: Beauchesne, 1921) 99; in English, The Mystery of Faith, vol. 1 (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1940) 135. 6 See above, p. 405, note 35. The relevant pages in Billot are 248–51.

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sitate sed a coactione defenderent. Secundum Suarezium eiusmodi erat sententia Scoti et Gabrielis. (b) Alii distinguunt actum et circumstantias actus: debuit Christus mori; sed intentio, motivum, tempus, adiuncta suae libertati relinquebantur. Vel etiam distinxerunt actum in se et actum ut connexum cum fine, ut in se sit liber sed ut connexus sit necessarius. Ita Fonseca, Valencia, Vasquez.

(c) Alii ad diversas Christi scientias attendunt, ut amor ex visione beata non influeret in electionem, quae erat libera. Ita Suarez. Diversi actus caritatis ex diversis scientiis docentur etiam a Salmanticensibus, Molina. (d) Alii distinxerunt Christum ut viatorem et ut comprehensorem; ut viator pati potuit, ut obiectum non usquequaque bonum ei non appareret; unde et liber remansit. Galtier. (e) Multi cum Bannesio distinguunt sensum divisum et compositum.7 Ita Salmanticenses. (f) Alii dicunt Christum necessario in bonum tendere libere autem eligere hoc vel illud bonum. Ita Pesch, Boyer. 7 Censemus Christum habuisse mandatum a Patre ita ut vere obediret. Videtur sensu carere opinio quae astruit praeceptum sub poena peccati ei esse impositum qui peccare non potuit. Dicimus tamen fieri non potuisse ut Filius non obediret. Quae tamen quemadmodum cum libertate componi

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fended freedom, not as freedom from necessity but as freedom from coercion. Such, according to Suárez, was the opinion of Scotus and Gabriel [Biel]. (b) Others distinguish between an act and the circumstances of the act: Christ had to die; but the intention, motive, time, and occasion of his freedom were left to his freedom. Or they also distinguished between an act in itself and the act as connected with its end, so that in itself an act might be free but necessary as so connected. Thus [Pedro da] Fonseca, s.j. [1528– 99], [Gregorio de] Valencia, s.j. [1549–1603], and [Gabriel] Vasquez, s.j. [1549–1604]. (c) Others focused on Christ’s having had different kinds of knowledge, so that the love resulting from his beatific vision did not influence his choice, which was free. Thus Suárez. Diverse acts of charity from diverse knowledges were also taught by the Salmanticenses and Molina. (d) Others distinguished between Christ as pilgrim and as beholder. As pilgrim he could suffer, [but] in such a way that no object that was not altogether good would appear to him; hence, he also remained free. Thus Galtier. (e) With Bañez, many distinguish between divided and composed sense.7 Thus the Salmaticenses. (f) Others say that Christ necessarily tended towards the good, but freely chose this or that good. Thus Pesch, Boyer. 7 Our view is that Christ had a command from the Father so that he might truly obey. There seems to be no sense in the opinion which adds that a precept was imposed under pain of sin on him who could not sin. We say, however, that it could not happen that the Son did not obey. But how all

7 A distinction in modal logic and metaphysics employed by some scholastics to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom. The propositions ‘Socrates is sitting’ and ‘Socrates is able not to sit’ are said to be compatible in a ‘divided sense,’ since the predicate ‘sitting’ can be divided from the subject. But the same propositions are not compatible in a composed sense, that is, a sense referring to subject and predicate together, since it is not possible for Socrates both to be sitting and not to be sitting. Bañez used this distinction to explain how an efficacious grace could be irresistible, in a composed sense, but leave freedom intact, in a divided sense. See Bernard Lonergan, ‘The Supernatural Order,’ in Early Latin Theology, vol. 19 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011) 233 § 133. See also below, pp. 758–59.

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possint, sequentibus declaramus, ubi radix solutionis in divina transcendentia ponitur. Problema de libertate Christi Fieri non posse videtur ut Christus homo liberam voluntatem habuerit. Nam idem habuit voluntatem divinam cui comparatur voluntas eius humana ut sequens, non resistens, non reluctans, mota (db 291, ds 556). Quod si concilium8 dicit voluntatem eius humanam non esse peremptam, fieri non posse videtur ut saltem libertas eiusdem voluntatis humanae non sit perempta. Praeterea, Christus homo habuit visionem beatorum in qua omnia et ideo etiam omnes suos actus futuros exacte cognovit; quod cum libertate vera et reali non componi potest. Praeterea, Christus habuit mandatum a Patre ut animam suam poneret (Io 10.18). Iam vero contrarium facere non potuit, tum propter perfectam eius dilectionem erga Patrem, tum propter visionem beatam et alias gratias, tum propter impeccabilitatem. Praeterea, Christus obedivit (Phil 2.9, Rom 5.19, Heb 5.8). Sed sicut repugnat Filium peccare, ita etiam repugnat eum non obedire. Sed quod repugnat absolute fieri non potest. Ergo necessario Christus obedivit. Sed contra est quod in thesi iam attulimus. Respondetur quod in solutionem huius quaestionis dupliciter procedi potest: uno modo, ut positiva quaedam rei intelligentia habeatur; alio modo, ut argumenta contraria demonstrentur fallacia. Iam vero non primo modo sed secundo procedemus, quamvis ex ipso facto quod contraria argumenta demonstrentur fallacia, per ulteriorem reflexionem etiam gignatur quaedam quasi positiva rei intelligentia. Proinde, in ipsa hac negativa solutione non omnia simul sunt consideranda, sed a difficultate fundamentali, duarum nempe voluntatum, inci-

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this can be put together with freedom we state in what follows, placing the root of the solution in divine transcendence. The problem of Christ’s freedom It would seem impossible that Christ the man had a free will. He had a divine will to which his human will was related as following, as not opposing or reluctant, as moved (db 291, ds 556, [dec 1: 128–29]). Even if the council8 does say that his human will was not taken away, at least it would seem to be impossible that the freedom of his human will was not taken away. Further, Christ the man had the vision of the blessed, in which he knew everything in detail, and therefore also all his own future acts. This cannot be put together with real, true freedom. Further, Christ had received from his Father the command of laying down his life (John 10.18). And he could not do anything against this, because of his perfect love for the Father, because of his beatific vision and other graces, and because of his sinlessness. Further, Christ obeyed (Philippians 2.9, Romans 5.19, Hebrews 5.8). But as it is unthinkable that the Son should sin, so too it is unthinkable that he should not obey. But the unthinkable absolutely cannot happen. Therefore Christ obeyed of necessity. On the other hand, there is our statement in the thesis. The reply is that there are two possible procedures for solving this question. One way would be to reach some positive understanding of the matter. The other way would be to demonstrate that contrary arguments are false. We proceed by the second way, not the first, although from the very fact that contrary arguments are shown to be false there also arises, through further reflection, an understanding of the matter that is in some sense positive. Accordingly, in this negative solution itself, not everything is to be considered at once. Instead, the starting point should be the fundamental dif-



8 The Third Council of Constantinople; ds 556 is part of its definition of Christ’s two wills and two operations. The conciliar text was introduced in thesis 5, the proof, part 2, n. 2. The relevant part here is that ‘his human will was not destroyed by being deified.’ Lonergan’s key terms are almost all drawn from the conciliar Latin: sequens, non resistens, non reluctans, non perempta. The one he has changed is ‘subiecta’ into ‘mota.’ He is closely reporting the statement of the council.

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piendum est ut postea, aliis additis considerationibus, omnes obiectiones solvantur. Denique, ipsa fundamentalis difficultas nisi per theorema quoddam generale, idque satis complexum, non solvitur; et ideo elementa huius theorematis singillatim proponimus sub numeris distinctis quo facilius omnium elementorum synthesis perspiciatur. 1 Necessitas conditionata non tollit libertatem. Nam necessitas conditionata nihil est aliud quam principium noncontradictionis, e.g., Socrates, dum sedet, necessario sedet. Ubi sensus est Socratem contingenter quidem atque libere sedere, sed tamen fieri non potest ut sedeat et non sedeat. Cf. Sum. theol., 1, q. 14, a. 13, ad 2m. 2 Quod contingenter de Deo dicitur non habet adaequationem veritatis nisi accedit per modum conditionis consequentis terminus conveniens ad extra. Ratio est quia veritas contingens non habet totam suam adaequationem in realitate prorsus necessaria; Deus autem est actus purus prorsus necessarius, entitative immutabilis. Res plenius declaratur, supra asserto 9; De constitutione Christi 51–56;9 Divinarum personarum 197–99; De Deo trino, ii, 217–19.10 3 Contingenter de Deo dicitur eum scire vel eum velle vel eum efficere hunc actum creatum liberum. Nam absolute fieri potuit ut Deus nihil crearet; etiam absolute fieri potuit ut, si Deus crearet, alium mundum eligeret in quo non occurreret his actus creatus et liber. 4 Ubi verum est Deum scire vel velle vel efficere hunc actum creatum et liberum, requiritur conveniens terminus ad extra ut habeatur adaequatio veritatis. Quod statim sequitur ex antecessis, 2 et 3. 5 Qui conveniens terminus nihil est aliud quam ipse actus liber. Si enim terminus supponitur aliquid aliud praevium ad ipsum actum liberum, tunc actus ex illo praevio sequitur vel necessario vel contingenter;

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ficulty – two wills – so that later, with the addition of other considerations, all the objections may be solved. Finally, the only solution of the fundamental difficulty itself is a general theorem, and quite a complicated one. We therefore set out the elements of this theorem one by one, each with its own number, the better to grasp the synthesis of the whole ensemble. 1 Conditional necessity does not do away with freedom. Conditional necessity is nothing other than the principle of non-contradiction. For instance, Socrates, while he is sitting, necessarily sits. Here the sense is that although Socrates does sit freely and contingently, still it is impossible that he is both sitting and not sitting. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 13, ad 2m. 2 Contingent predications about God lack the correspondence of truth unless an appropriate external term is added by way of a consequent condition. The reason is that contingent truth does not have its whole correspondence in an utterly necessary reality. God, however, is pure act, utterly necessary and entitatively unchangeable. The matter is stated more fully in Assertion 9 above; in De constitutione Christi 51–56;9 and in Divinarum personarum 197–99, or De Deo trino: Pars systematica 217–19.10 3 It is contingently predicated of God that he knows or wills or effects this or that particular, free, created act. For it is possible, absolutely speaking, for God to create nothing at all; it is also possible, absolutely speaking, that if God does create he should choose a world in which this particular, free, created act would not occur. 4 When it is true that God knows or wills or effects this free and created act, an appropriate external term is required in order to have the correspondence of truth. This follows at once from the two preceding points. 5 This appropriate term is nothing other than the free act itself. For if the term is supposed to be something else prior to the free act itself, then the act follows from that previous thing, either necessarily or

9 See Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ 94/95– 104/105. 10 See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 438/39–446/47. See also Lonergan, Insight, chapter 19.

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si necessario, tollitur libertas actus; si contingenter, non salvatur adaequatio veritatis.11 Si autem terminus supponitur aliquid aliud non praevium, tunc terminus non est conveniens. 6 Propositiones sunt in signo simultaneo veritatis, si adaequationem veritatis non habent nisi una eademque realitas exsistit.12

7 Hae propositiones sunt in signo simultaneo veritatis: (a) exsistit hic actus creatus et liber; (b) Deus scit hunc actum creatum et liberum exsistere. Nam illa (a) non est vera, nisi a parte rei datur realitas illius actus; et haec (b) non est vera, nisi habetur conveniens terminus ad extra (supra, 4), qui nihil est aliud quam realitas eiusdem actus (supra, 5). Et ideo ex definitione signi simultanei veritatis (supra, 6), sequitur assertum.

8 Pari ratione, hae propositiones sunt in signo simultaneo veritatis: (a) exsistit hic actus creatus et liber; (b) Deus vult hunc actum creatum et liberum exsistere. Etiam, pari ratione, hae propositiones sunt in signo simultaneo veritatis: (a) exsistit hic actus creatus et liber; (b) Deus efficit hunc actum creatum et liberum. 9 Quamvis istae propositiones sint in signo simultaneo veritatis, realitates tamen per propositiones significatae non sunt in eodem signo.

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contingently. If it follows necessarily, the act’s freedom is done away with; if it follows contingently, the correspondence of truth is not preserved.11 If, however, the term is supposed to be something else not prior to the free act, then the term is not appropriate. 6 Propositions are in signo simultaneo veritatis, ‘simultaneously true meanings,’ if there is no correspondence of truth unless one and the same reality exists.12 7 The following propositions are ‘simultaneously true meanings’: (a) there is such and such a free, created act; (b)  God knows this free, created act exists. For proposition (a) is not true unless the reality of this act is given on the side of the real; and proposition (b) is not true, unless there is an appropriate external term (point 4 above), which is nothing other than the reality of this same act (point 5). And so, from the definition of propositions that are ‘simultaneously true meanings’ (point 6 above), the assertion follows. 8 By the same reasoning, these two propositions are ‘simultaneously true meanings’: (a) there exists this free, created act; (b) God wills this free, created act to exist. Also, by the same reasoning, these two propositions are ‘simultaneously true meanings’: (a) there exists such and such a free, created act; (b) God effects this free, created act. 9 Although the foregoing propositions are ‘simultaneously true meanings,’ the realities meant by the propositions are not meant in the same way.

11 Lonergan seems to have in mind here the Bannezian interpretation of ‘premotion,’ which assigns the created premotion, rather than the free act, as the appropriate contingent term. See Lonergan, Early Latin Theology 220/21; also point 9 below. 12 ‘Simultaneity in truth’: one and the same metaphysical condition is entailed by both propositions, though in different ways. For a fuller discussion in similar terms, see Lonergan, Early Latin Theology 278/79–282/83. Cf. Lonergan, Insight 685: ‘It is impossible for it to be true that God understands, affirms, wills, effects anything to exist or occur without it being true that the thing exists or the event occurs exactly as God understands, affirms, or wills it. For one and the same metaphysical condition is needed for the truth of both propositions, namely, the relevant contingent existence or occurrence.’

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Nam causa est prior effecti. Sed scientia Dei est causa rerum (Sum. theol., 1, q. 14, a. 8), et ideo est causa etiam actuum liberorum. Similiter, voluntas Dei est causa rerum (ibid. q. 19, a. 4), et ideo est causa etiam actuum liberorum. Manifeste autem actio Dei est causa rerum (cf. ibid., q. 25, a. 1, ad 4m), et ideo actio Dei etiam est causa actuum liberorum. Praeterea, prioritas divinae causalitatis est absoluta. Nullatenus enim divina scientia vel divina volitio vel divina actio ab effectu suo dependet; et totaliter effectus a divina scientia, volitione, actione dependet. Praeterea, ‘nullatenus’ significat ‘nullatenus.’ Ita divina scientia est infallibilis propter infinitam perfectionem Dei, et non propter terminum ad extra. Divina volitio est efficax propter infinitam perfectionem Dei, et non propter terminum ad extra. Divina actio est irresistibilis propter infinitam perfectionem Dei, et non propter terminum ad extra. (Notate: nihil refert quemadmodum concipiatur terminus, sive nobis­ cum uti ipse actus liber, sive cum Bannesianis uti praedeterminatio phy­­ sica. Nulla creatura quicquam confert sive ad constituendam sive ad explicandam infallibilitatem divinae scientae, efficaciam divinae voluntatis, irresistibilitatem divinae actionis). Praeterea, scientia et volitio divina praecedunt terminum non solum causalitate sed etiam aeternitate. Quamvis enim actio divina dicitur de Deo ex tempore, scire tamen et velle dicuntur ab aeterno, Sum. theol., 1, q. 13, a. 7, ad 13m. 10 Quae ut clariora sint, ponatur obiectio. Actus creati et liberi fiunt in tempore. Quia ergo sunt termini ad adaequationem veritatis necessarii, non habetur verum nisi ex tempore. Quod ergo ex tempore fit verum, ab aeterno nondum erat verum. Ubi autem dicitur quod nondum est verum, dicitur quod iam est falsum. Falso ergo dicitur Deum ab aeterno scire et velle hunc actum creatum et liberum. Respondetur obicientem, loco conceptionis aeternitatis adhibere imaginationem temporis quam maxime diuturni. Nam Deus saltem scit et vult hunc actum fieri quando fit. Exsistit ergo aliquod ‘nunc’ divinae scientiae et volitionis quando verum est Deum hunc actum scire et velle. Sed in ente aeterno omnia sunt simul. Et ideo si umquam Deus scit et vult, ab aeterno scit et vult. Unde S. Thomas loquitur de Deo sciente res in earum praesentialitate; et similiter solvit problema aristote-

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For cause is prior to effect. But God’s knowledge is the cause of things (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 8), and so it is the cause of free acts also. Likewise, God’s will is the cause of things (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 4), and so it is the cause of free acts also. Plainly, moreover, the action of God is the cause of things (see Summa theologiae, 1, q. 25, a. 4, ad 4m), and so the action of God is the cause of free acts also. Further, the priority of divine causality is absolute. For divine knowledge or divine willing or divine action is not at all dependent upon its effect; and the effect is totally dependent on divine knowledge, willing, and action. Further, ‘not at all’ means ‘not at all.’ Thus, divine knowledge is infallible because of God’s infinite perfection, not because of an external term. Divine willing is efficacious because of God’s infinite perfection, not because of an external term. Divine action is irresistible because of God’s infinite perfection, not because of an external term. (Note that it does not matter how the term is conceived, whether, as on our view, as the free act itself, or instead, with the Bannezians, as a physical predetermination. No creature whatever contributes anything either to the constitution or to the explication of the infallibility of divine knowledge, the efficacy of divine will, the irresistibility of divine action.) Further, divine knowledge and willing precede their term not only causally but also eternally. For although divine action is predicated of God at a time, his knowing and willing are predicated as from eternity (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 13, a. 7, ad 3m). 10 To make all this clearer, let us consider an objection. Acts that are free and created occur in time. Since, then, they are the terms necessary for the correspondence of truth, there is not a truth except at a time. What becomes true at a time, therefore, was from eternity not yet true. But to speak of what is not yet true is to speak of what now is false. Hence, it is false to say that from eternity God knows and wills such and such a free, created act. The reply to the objection is that in place of a conception of eternity the objector is using the image of a very long time. At least God knows and wills such and such an act to happen when it happens. There exists, then, some ‘now’ of divine knowledge and willing when it is true that God knows and wills this act. But in an eternal being everything is all at once. And thus if God knows and wills anything, he knows and wills it from eternity. Thus, Thomas speaks of God’s knowing things in their

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licum de futuris contingentibus, dicendo ista contingentia nobis quidem esse futura sed Deo esse praesentia. In I Peri herm., lect. 14; Spiazzi, § 195.13

11 Quibus praemissis, ponitur difficultas universalis contra libertatem ex divina scientia, volitione, actione. Si Deus infallibiliter scit hunc actum creatum et liberum fore, si efficaciter vult eum fore, si irresistibiliter facit ut fiat, tunc necessario est hic actus. Atqui de omni actu creato, libero, futuro Deus et scit infallibiliter et vult efficaciter et facit irresistibiliter. Ergo omnis actus eiusmodi necessitatur. Maior: intrinsece repugnat Deum scire infallibiliter et tamen falli; intrinsece repugnat Deum velle efficaciter, quod tamen non fit; intrinsece repugnat Deum efficere irresistibiliter, quod tamen non efficitur. Ergo non solum ex omnibus simul sed etiam ex singulis antecedentibus necessario habetur consequens. Minor: et divina scientia et eius infallibilitas, et divina volitio et eius efficacia, et divina actio et eius irresistibilitas, necessario sequuntur ex infinita Dei perfectione. 12 Solutio est: distinguitur maior: hic actus est necessarius necessitate absoluta, negatur; necessitate conditionata, conceditur. Minor conceditur. Pariter distinguitur consequens: hic actus est necessarius, necessitate absoluta, negatur; conditionata, conceditur. Iam vero, supra sub § 1, statutum est necessitatem conditionatam minime cum libertate pugnare. Quod autem necessitas consequentis non absoluta sed conditionata est, etiam ex iam dictis constat. Nam antecedens non habet adaequationem veritatis nisi exsistit ipse actus liber, uti ex §§ 7 et 8 habetur. Quare, quando conceditur minor, asseritur illum actum exsistere; et si exsistit, tunc necessario necessitate tamen conditionata exsistit.

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presentness, and solves the Aristotelian problem of future contingents, by saying that these contingents are future for us but present for God. See In I Peri herm., lect. 14; Spiazzi, §195 [197].13 11 Given these premises, we may pose the universal difficulty that divine knowledge, willing, and action raise with regard to freedom. If God infallibly knows that such and such a free, created act will be, if he efficaciously wills that it will be, if he irresistibly makes it occur, then this act cannot but be. But with regard to every free, created, future act, God infallibly knows and efficaciously wills and irresistibly acts. Therefore, every such act is necessitated. As to the major premise: It is intrinsically unthinkable for God to know infallibly and nevertheless err; it is intrinsically unthinkable for God efficaciously to will what nevertheless does not happen; it is intrinsically unthinkable for God irresistibly to effect what nevertheless is not effected. Therefore, not only from all the antecedents taken together but also from each of them taken singly, the consequent follows of necessity. As to the minor premise: Both divine knowledge and its infallibility, both divine willing and its efficacy, both divine action and its irresistibility, follow necessarily from God’s infinite perfection. 12 The solution is as follows. In the major premise, I distinguish. That the act in question is necessary with absolute necessity, I deny; that it is necessary with conditional necessity, I grant. The minor premise I grant. As to the consequent, likewise, I distinguish. That the act is necessary with absolute necessity, I deny, but its conditional necessity I grant. Moreover, as was stated above in point 1, conditional necessity in no way conflicts with freedom. But from what has already been discussed it is also clear that the necessity of the consequent is conditional, not absolute. For the antecedent lacks the correspondence of truth unless there exists the free act itself; this was said in points 7 and 8. Hence, to grant the minor premise is to assert that this act does exist; and if it exists, then it exists necessarily, but the necessity is conditional.

13 Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros Peri hermeneias et Posteriorum analyticorum expositio, ed. R.M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1964). On ‘[197]’ see below, pp. 758–9.

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13 Quibus positis, reflectendum est. In §§ 1–12 pedetentim constructa est demonstratio quaedam. Quod tamen ex demonstratione intelligitur, non est habitudo inter infallibilem divinam scientiam et scitum, non est habitudo inter efficacem divinam volitionem et id quod Deus vult, non est habitudo inter irresistibilem divinam actionem et id quod Deus efficit. Id quod ex demonstratione intelligitur, est nullum argumentum valere posse quod ex scientia, voluntate, actione Dei ad absolutam necessitatem cuiusdam actus creati concludat. Totus ergo fructus immediatus est negativus: genus quoddam argumentorum non valet. Sed ipse hic fructus negativus suum aspectum positivum habet, nempe, talem esse Deum ut pari infallibilitate, pari efficacia, pari irresistibilitate scit vel vult vel facit sive necessaria sive contingentia sive libera. Quam divinam transcendentiam exprimit S. Thomas dicendo Deum esse ‘omnino extra ordinem temporis,’ et ‘extra ordinem entium exsistens velut causa quaedam profundens totum ens et omnes eius differentias,’ omnia dependere a divina voluntate ‘sicut a prima causa, quae transcendit ordinem necessitatis et contingentiae.’ In Peri herm., lect. 14, §§ 195, 197. Plura, Theological Studies 3 (1942) 541–47.14 14 Divina transcendentia Ne perpetuo omnia repetamus quae a §§ 1 ad 13 dicta sunt, nominemus divinam transcendentiam illam proprietatem exclusive divinam (In I Peri herm., lect. 14, § 18) secundum quam haec sunt vera: (1) Deum omnia ab aeterno cum independentia absoluta scire infallibiliter, (2) Deum omnia ab aeterno cum independentia absoluta velle efficaciter, (3) Deum omnia cum independentia absoluta efficere irresistibiliter, (4) exsistere actus humanos liberos, (5) nullam posse demonstrari contradictionem inter praecedentia vera, (6) hanc demonstrationis impossibilitatem demonstratam manifestare divinam transcendentiam, nempe, Deum stare extra ordinem temporis, entium finitorum, necessitatis et contingentiae, et ideo pari infallibilitate scire contingentia esse contingentia ac scit necessaria esse necessa-

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13 Now that all this has been set out, reflection is in order. In §§ 1 through 12 a demonstration has gradually been built up. What is understood from the demonstration, however, is not the relationship between infallible divine knowledge and what it knows, nor the relationship between efficacious divine will and that which God wills, nor the relationship between irresistible divine action and that which God effects. What is understood from the demonstration is that there can be no valid argument which concludes from God’s knowledge, will, and action to the absolute necessity of any created act. Thus, the immediate fruit is entirely negative: arguments of a certain kind are invalid. But this negative fruit has its positive aspect: God is such that with equal infallibility, equal efficacy, and equal irresistibility he knows or wills or effects the necessary, the contingent, or the free. Thomas expresses this divine transcendence by saying that God is ‘altogether outside the order of time,’ and ‘outside the order of existing beings as a cause penetrating all of being and all its differences’; and that all things depend on the divine will ‘as on the first cause, which transcends the order of necessity and contingency’ (In Peri herm., lect. 14, §§ 195, 197). See further Theological Studies 3 (1942) 541–47.14 14 Divine transcendence In order not to repeat all over again what was said in §§ 1 to 13, let the name divine transcendence be given to that exclusively divine property (In I Peri herm., lect. 14, §18) because of which the following are true. (1) From eternity and with absolute independence, God infallibly knows all things. (2)  From eternity and with absolute independence, God efficaciously wills all things. (3) With absolute independence God irresistibly effects all things. (4) There exist free human acts. (5) Between the foregoing truths no contradiction can be demonstrated. (6) The demonstrated impossibility of such a demonstration manifests divine transcendence: God stands outside the order of time, of finite beings, of necessity and contingency. Thus, he knows contingent things to be contingent, and necessary things

14 See Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) 104–11.

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ria, pari efficacia velle contingentia esse contingentia ac vult necessaria esse necessaria, pari irresistibilitate efficere ut contingentia sint contingentia ac efficit ut necessaria sint necessaria. Praeterea, cum argumenta supra posita non valerent si de ente quodam finito fierent (e.g., de praedeterminatione physica), manifestum est transcendentiam esse proprietatem exclusive divinam. 15 Prima difficultas Prima difficultas erat ex duabus Christi voluntatibus. Videbatur enim impossibile ut libera sit voluntas humana quae divinae voluntati eiusdem personae comparatur ut sequens, non resistens, non reluctans, mota.15 Divina enim voluntas Christi iam ab aeterno voluit voluntatem eiusdem humanam velle quaecumque umquam voluerit; neque haec quidquam aliud velle potuit. Respondetur: valeret obiectio si una de Christi voluntatibus non fuisset divina; sed de facto una erat et est divina; et cum proprietate transcendentiae gaudeat, fieri non potest ut ulla sit contradictio inter completum dominium divinae voluntatis et perfectam libertatem humanae voluntatis. 16 Altera difficultas Quod Christus homo a primo instante omnes suos futuros actus certo scivit, sequitur ex iis quae de scientia Christi hominis diximus thesi 12. Dupliciter autem ex hoc facto contra libertatem argui potest: primo modo, inquantum haec scientia movet voluntatem, secundum quod voluntas est appetitus intellectum sequens; altero modo, inquantum repugnat scientiam esse certam de futuro contingenti. Nunc ergo hanc alteram obiectionem consideramus, et primam ex scientia qua movente ad sequentia remittimus. Aristoteles ergo et S. Thomas docent scientiam de futuro contingenti non posse esse certam (In I Peri herm., lect. 14). Nam ille eventus futurus ex factis actualibus aut necessitatur aut non: si necessitatur, non est contingens; si non necessitatur, deest nunc sufficiens evidentia ad iudicium certum nunc faciendum.

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to be necessary, with equal infallibility; he wills contingent things to be contingent, and necessary things to be necessary, with equal efficacy; he effects that contingent things are contingent, and that necessary things are necessary, with equal irresistibility. Further, since the arguments set out above would be invalid if applied to a finite being (to physical predetermination, for instance), it is clear that this transcendence belongs exclusively to God. 15 First difficulty A first source of difficulty lay in Christ’s having two wills. It seemed impossible that a human will should be free which was related to the divine will of the same person ‘as following, as not opposing or reluctant, as moved.’15 For the divine will of Christ had already willed from eternity that his human will should will whatever it willed; nor could it will anything else. Reply: The objection would be valid if neither of Christ’s wills had been divine. But in fact one of them was and is divine; and since this will enjoys the property of transcendence, no contradiction between the complete dominion of the divine will and the perfect freedom of the human will can occur. 16 Second difficulty From what we have already said about Christ’s knowledge in thesis 12, it follows that from his first instant Christ the man certainly knew all his future acts. There are, however, two ways to argue against freedom on the basis of this fact: first, inasmuch as this knowledge moves the will, the will being an appetite that follows the intellect; second, inasmuch as it is unthinkable for knowledge of future contingents to be certain. We shall now consider this second objection; to the first, based on knowledge as that which moves [the will], we shall return later [in point 17 below]. Aristotle and Thomas, then, teach that it is impossible to be certain about future contingents (In I Peri herm., lect. 14). For either the future event is necessitated by actual facts or it is not. If it is necessitated, it is not contingent; if it is not necessitated, then at present the evidence sufficient for making a certain judgment is lacking.

15 The wording here is that of the Third Council of Constantinople; see the beginning of the section.

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Quod tamen minime impedit quo minus Deus certo sciat omnia futura etiam contingentia; quamvis enim ista contingentia nobis sint futura et a nobis certo sciri non possint, Deo tamen sunt non futura sed praesentia (cf. supra § 10). Neque impedit quominus prophetia sit certa. Nam prophetia est participatio quaedam divinae scientiae. Sed divina scientia comparatur ad res non ut futuras sed ut praesentes. Et prophetia comparatur ad res, quatenus vera est, mediante divina scientia. Quare, prophetia, quatenus vera, comparatur ad res non qua futuras sed qua praesentes. Cf. Sum. theol., 2-2, q. 171, a. 6, ad 1m. Quod autem valet de prophetia, etiam valet de scientia Christi. Qui enim Deum per essentiam cognoscunt et alia praeter Deum in divina essentia cognoscunt, nihil aliud habent quam communicationem16 quandam ipsius divinae scientiae. Et sicut scientia divina non habet adaequationem veritatis sine terminis convenientibus ad extra, ita etiam scientia beatorum non habet adaequationem veritatis sine iisdem terminis. De singulis ergo actibus liberis Christi hominis sequentes propositiones sunt in signo simultaneo veritatis: (a) exsistit hic actus liber Christi hominis; (b) Deus infallibiliter scit hunc actum liberum Christi hominis; (c) Christus homo certo scit hunc actum liberum suum. Quibus suppositis, obviatur obiectio aristotelica de futuris contingentibus circa scientiam Christi. Nam haec Christi scientia non est certa quia aliquid finitum17 nunc exsistens necessitat actum futurum, sed est certa quia nunc exsistit scientia infinita18 ad quam ille actus comparatur non ut futurus sed ut praesens. 17 Tertia difficultas Tertia ergo difficultas sit scientia Christi qua eum movens ad actus certo scitos faciendos; et quaeritur utrum certa scientia eligentis tollat liberatatem electionis.

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In no way, however, does this keep God from knowing all future things, even contingent ones. While for us those contingent things are in the future and we cannot know them certainly, to God they are not future but present (see § 10 above). Neither does it keep prophecy from being certain. Prophecy is a kind of participation in divine knowledge. But divine knowledge is related to things not as future but as present. And prophecy, insofar as it is true, is related to things through the mediation of divine knowledge. Hence prophecy, insofar as it is true, it related to things not as future but as present. See Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 171, a. 6, ad 1m. What holds for prophecy, however, holds also for Christ’s knowledge. Those who know God by his essence, and know, in the divine essence, other things besides God, have nothing other than a communication16 of the divine knowledge itself. And just as divine knowledge lacks the correspondence of truth unless there are appropriate external terms, so too the knowledge of the blessed lacks the correspondence of truth without the very same terms. The following propositions about individual free acts of Christ the man are therefore ‘simultaneously true meanings’: (a) there exists such and such a free act on the part of Christ the man; (b) God infallibly knows this free act of Christ the man; (c) Christ the man certainly knows this free act of his. Once this is granted, it does away with the Aristotelian objection with regard to future contingents, so far as Christ’s knowledge is concerned. For this knowledge of Christ’s is not certain because something finite17 now existing necessitates a future act; it is certain because there now exists infinite18 knowledge to which that act is related, not as future but as present. 17 Third difficulty Thus, there is a third difficulty: Christ’s knowledge, considered as that which moves him to perform acts which he certainly knows. The question is whether certain knowledge on the part of one who chooses takes away freedom of choice.

16 In the 1960 and 1961 editions, ‘participationem’ (participation). 17 In the 1960 version, ‘aliquod’ (without ‘finitum’). 18 In the 1960 version, ‘infinita’ does not appear.

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Conceditur ergo inusitatissimum esse ut quis certo sciat quid ipse electurus sit; sed negatur ignorantiam esse conditionem necessariam libertatis. Habetur enim libertas ubi (1) multis viis ad finem procedi potest, (2) haec multiplicitas cognoscitur, et (3) ipsa eligentis voluntas, finem volens, se determinat ad hanc aliquam viam eligendam. Quae quidem omnia manent, etiam si quis scit quid electurus sit. Nam scientia futurae electionis, etsi deliberationem reddat superfluam, ipsam tamen electionem superfluam non reddit, neque conditiones electionis essentiales mutat. Quod quidem nos omnes quodammodo experimur. Quamvis enim non simus absolute certi nos cras esse pransuros, tamen hoc summa probabilitate cognoscimus. Quae summa probabilitas nullo modo minuit libertatem qua prandebimus; neque sane minus liberi pranderemus, si certo sciremus nos esse pransuros.

18 Quarta difficultas At Christus non solum scivit suos actus futuros sed etiam scivit se debere ipsos illos actus eligere. Sed peccare non potuit et, etiamsi de peccato non ageretur, tamen erga omnem et minimam Patris sui voluntatem tamquam Filius perfectissime obediens necessario se habuit. Et ideo scientia Christi de actibus suis futuris, quatenus obligavit Filium necessario obedientissimum, libertatem omnis electionis sustulit. Sed antequam haec conclusio concedatur, quaerendum videtur quemad­ modum mandatum seu praeceptum Patris intelligatur. Hoc enim prae­ ceptum concipi potest vel (1) ut usquequaque determinatum vel (2) ut plus minus indeterminatum. Si primo modo concipitur, fieri non potest ut prae­ ceptum impleatur nisi actus quidam, secundum omnes suas determinationes concretas atque individuales determinatus, a Christo homine ponatur. Si vero altero modo concipitur, fieri potest ut idem praeceptum impleatur vel hodie vel cras vel post annum, sub his adiunctis vel sub aliis, etc. Et primo quidem modo concipitur praeceptum Patris, si sumitur secundum quod ipsi actus liberi a Christo eliciti subiacebant vel divinae scientiae vel scientiae ab ipso Christo habitae. Altero autem modo concipitur praeceptum, si sumitur secundum quod actiones Christi futurae vel in prophetiis vt vel in ipsis Christi verbis erant praedictae; quamvis enim omnes prophetiae de facto in vita Christi sint impletae, nihilominus eaedam prophetiae, cum non sint usquequaque determinatae, etiam aliis et diversis modis impleri potuissent.

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I grant, then, that it is most unusual for someone certainly to know what he is going to choose; but I deny that ignorance is a necessary condition of freedom. For there is freedom where (1) it is possible to reach an end in more ways than one, (2) this multiplicity is known, and (3) the will of the one who chooses, willing an end, itself determines itself to choose some one way of reaching the end. All these remain, even if someone knows what he is going to choose. For knowledge of a future choice, while it makes deliberation superfluous, still does not make choosing superfluous, and neither does it change the essential conditions of choice. All of us experience this in some fashion. While we may not be absolutely certain that we are going to eat breakfast tomorrow, we nevertheless know it with a very high probability. This high probability in no way diminishes the freedom with which we will have breakfast, and neither would we breakfast any less freely if we did know for certain that we were going to have breakfast. 18 Fourth difficulty Not only did Christ know his own future acts; he also knew that he ought to choose those very acts. But he could not sin, and even if there was no sin involved, still his attitude towards his Father’s will in each and every regard was necessarily the attitude of an obedient and entirely perfect Son. And thus, Christ’s knowledge of his future acts, insofar as it obligated the Son whose obedience was necessarily complete, undermined all freedom of choice. But before granting this conclusion it seems we should ask how the charge or command of the Father is being understood. For it is possible to conceive this command either (1) as completely determinate or (2) as more or less indeterminate. Conceived in the first way, there is no possibility of carrying out the command unless an act is performed by Christ the man which is determined in every concrete and individual detail. Conceived in the second way, the same command could be carried out today or tomorrow or in a year’s time, under these or those conditions, and so on. And the Father’s command is being conceived in the first way, if it is taken in the sense that the free acts which Christ elicited were themselves subject to the divine knowledge or to the knowledge that Christ himself had. The command is being conceived in the second way, however, if it is taken in the sense that Christ’s future actions were foretold either in the Old Testament prophecies or in Christ’s own words; for although all prophecy is in fact fulfilled in the life of Christ, those prophecies, since they are not completely determinate, could also have been fulfilled in other, different ways.

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Cuius distinctionis momentum statim apparebit, si recolitur Patrem Christo praecepisse, non ex necesitate divinae naturae, sed contingenter. Fieri enim potuit ut Deus non crearet, ut alium mundum crearet, ut in hoc mundo nullum fuisset peccatum, ut alio modo mundus salvus factus esset, etc. Cum ergo praeceptum sit contingens, cum praeterea sit actus divinae sapientiae et divinae voluntatis, ad adaequationem veritatis praeceptum affirmantis omnino requiritur terminus ad extra conveniens. Sed si terminus in prophetiis ponitur, tunc praeceptum non usquequaque determinatur sed plus minus indeterminatum est. Quare et multipliciter impleri potest. Quod si multipliciter impleri potest, minime tollitur Christi libertas. Obiective enim fieri potuit ut multis viis praeceptum impleretur; et hanc multiplicitatem ipse Christus cognovit, sicut et omnia cognovit quae sunt in potentia creaturae (Sum. theol., 3, q. 10, a. 2); et ideo per liberum suum arbitrium ipse Christus homo determinavit per quamquam viam ipse praeceptum plus minus indeterminatum impleret. Si autem terminus in ipsis Christi actibus ponitur, tunc utique habetur praeceptum usquequaque determinatum. Attamen in eodem signo veritatis sunt et tale praeceptum et ipsi Christi actus, ut non prius verum sit Patrem ita praecipere quam verum sit Christum hominem praeceptis Patris obedire. Ubi autem veritates sunt in signo simultaneo, ibi alia aliam non necessitat nisi necessitate conditionata. Unde et colligitur, sicut scientia divina infallibilis et voluntas divina efficax et actio divina irresistibilis, ita etiam praecepta divina (usquequaque determinata) Christo homini imposita divinam transcendentiae proprietatem habere. In eodem enim signo veritatis verum est et dari talia praecepta et eadem impleri. Quibus positis, nulla habetur difficultas ex impeccabilitate Christi vel ex perfectissima et necessaria Filii obedientia. Sicut enim repugnat infallibilem falli, vel efficacem frustra velle, vel omnipotenti resisti, ita et repugnat divinam personam peccare vel Filium Patri non obedire. Et sicut illae repugnantiae necessitatem rebus non imponunt, ita etiam hae repugnantiae libertatem Christi non tollunt. In omnibus enim idem verificatur, nempe, in eodem veritatis signo inveniri tum scire et scitum, tum velle et volitionis obiectum, tum agere et actionis effectum, tum praeceptum et praecepti impletionem. Denique tandem sicut in ordine physicae causalitatis praecedit divinum scire, divinum velle, divinum agere ita sit ut absolute independens a termino quem Deus scit, vult, efficit, ita etiam in

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The importance of this distinction appears at once if it is recalled that the Father commanded Christ, not from the necessity of the divine nature, but contingently. For it could have been the case that God did not create, that he created another world, that in this world there was no sin, that the world was saved in some other way, and so on. Since the command is contingent, then, and since it was moreover an act of divine wisdom and divine will, affirming the command requires an appropriate external term for the correspondence of truth. But if this term is located in prophecy, then the command is not completely determinate but more or less indeterminate. Hence, it could be fulfilled in more ways than one. If it could be fulfilled in several ways, Christ’s freedom is not taken away at all. For [in that case] it was objectively possible for the command to be fulfilled in more ways than one; and Christ himself knew this multiplicity, as he knew all that is in the potential of creatures (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 10, a. 2); and thus through his own free will Christ the man himself determined what the way would be in which he fulfilled the more or less indeterminate command. If the term is located in the very acts of Christ, however, then there is indeed a completely determined command. Nevertheless, such a precept and the very acts of Christ are simultaneously true, in eodem signo veritatis; and so the truth that the Father so commands is not prior to the truth that Christ the man obeys the commands of the Father. But where truths are simultaneous, neither of them necessitates the other except with conditioned necessity. Hence too it may be gathered that as infallible divine knowledge and efficacious divine will and irresistible divine action have the divine property of transcendence, so too do the divine commands (completely determinate) imposed on Christ the man. For that such commands are given and that the same commands are fulfilled are simultaneous truths. That being the case, there is no difficulty posed by Christ’s incapability of sinning or by the necessary and utterly perfect obedience of the Son. For as it is unthinkable that someone who is infallible should err, that someone efficacious should will in vain, or that someone omnipotent should be resisted, so it is also unthinkable for a divine person to sin, or for the Son not to obey the Father. And just as the first three contradictions impose no necessity on things, so too the fourth does not take away Christ’s freedom. For in all four cases the same thing holds, namely, that the knowing and the known, the willing and the willed, the acting and the effect of the action, the command and the fulfillment are found to be truths that are simultaneous. And finally, just as di-

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ordine causalitatis moralis ita praecedit divinum praecipere ut absolute independens sit a termino per quem praeceptum impletur.

19 Obiectiones ulteriores (a) Visio Dei per essentiam necessitat voluntatem videntis. Sed Christus Deum per essentiam videbat. Ergo Christus habuit voluntatem necessitatam. Respondetur. Necessitatur voluntas videntis, ut divinam bonitatem amet, conceditur, ut obiecta secundaria in essentia perspecta ipse efficiat, negatur. (b) Instatur. Saltem necessitatur voluntas ad obiecta secundaria quae ipse in divina essentia videt a se eligenda atque efficienda esse. Respondetur. Aut agitur de obiecto usquequaque determinato aut agitur de obiecto plus minus indeterminato. Si de primo, non est verum tale obiec­ tum esse eligendum in signo veritatis anteriori ad ipsum obiectum iam electum. Si de altero, non est verum voluntatem necessari, nam praeceptum plus minus indeterminatum multis viis impleri potest. (c) Prophetia et scriptura non habent sensum plus minus indeterminatum ut multis viis impleri possint. Respondetur. Non habent sensum indeterminatum, quatenus procedunt e scientia divina vel quatenus intelliguntur in alia scientia quae divinae in­ haeret, conceditur; non habent sensum indeterminatum (i.e., non usquequaque determinatum), quatenus constituunt terminum quendam ad extra unde dici potest Deum scire, velle, praecipere ut talis eventus fiat, negatur. Patet sane prophetias de passione Christi minus dicere quam in quattuor evangeliis de actuali passione narratur; neque ipsae narrationes omnibus exegetarum quaestionibus satisfaciunt. (d) Fieri potuit ut esset terminus ad extra et plene determinatus et anterior ad ipsam Christi electionem, unde falsum evaderet hoc assertum, in signo simultaneo veritatis inveniuntur et praeceptum et praecepti impletio. Respondetur. Tractamus problema exsistens, non problema pro lubitu obicientis fictum. Si erat talis terminus, assignetur.

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vine knowing, divine willing, and divine acting have such precedence in the order of physical causality as to be absolutely independent of the term that God knows, wills, and effects, so too the precedence of divine commanding in the order of moral causality is such as to be absolutely independent of the term by which the command is carried out. 19 Further objections (a) Seeing God by his essence imposes necessity on the will of the one who sees. But Christ saw God by his essence. Therefore, Christ’s was a necessitated will. Reply: That it is necessary for the will of one who sees [God by his essence] to love the divine good, I grant. That such a will necessarily brings about the secondary objects grasped in that essence, I deny. (b) But again: At least a will is necessitated with respect to those secondary objects that it sees, in the divine essence, are to be chosen and brought about by itself. Reply: Either the objection is talking about a completely determinate object, or about a more or less indeterminate object. If the first, that such an object is going to be chosen is not true with a true meaning that is prior to the being chosen of that very object. If the second, it is not true that the will is necessitated, for a more or less indeterminate command can be fulfilled in more ways than one. (c) The sense of prophecy and scripture is not more or less indeterminate, allowing the possibility of fulfillment in many ways. Reply: That their sense is not indeterminate inasmuch as they proceed from divine knowledge, or inasmuch as they are understood in some knowledge which inheres in the divine, I grant. That theirs is not an indeterminate sense (that is, a sense not completely determined), inasmuch as they constitute an external term from which it is possible to say that God knows, wills, and commands that such and such an event should take place, I deny. It is quite obvious that the prophecies of Christ’s passion say less than what the four gospels narrate about the actual passion; and those narratives themselves do not satisfy all the exegetes’ questions. (d) There could have been an external term, fully determined and prior to Christ’s choice itself. Hence, this assertion – that both the command and the fulfillment of the command are found to be ‘simultaneously true meanings’ – is a false evasion. Reply. We are treating an existing problem, not a problem invented for the amusement of objectors. If there was such a term, let it be assigned.

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Caeterum, non exsistebat talis terminus antequam Christus in horto captus sit. Tunc enim ipse dixit: An putas quia non possum rogare Patrem meum, et exhibebit mihi modo plusquam duodecim legiones angelorum? (Mt 26.53). Tunc ergo potuit passionem et mortem imminentem avertere. Et potuit, qui peccare non potuit. Potuit qui non obedire non potuit. Sed non potuisset, si tunc exstitisset praeceptum usquequaque determinatum. Quod si tunc non exstitit, obiciens vix et ne vix quidem dicere potest, quandonam ante ipsas singulas Christi electiones liberas habitum fuerit praeceptum usquequaque determinatum. (e) Non habetur vera obedientia nisi ante fiat praeceptum quam praecepto obediatur. Respondetur. Pro duplici intelligentia praecepti, dupliciter Christus vere et proprie obedivit, et quidem in utroque casu libere. Primo modo, verum erat Patrem sic et sic ordinasse, voluisse, praecepisse, quia habebatur terminus contingens et conveniens in prophetiis de Christo editis sive in vt sive in nt. Sed praeceptum sic intellectum multipliciter impleri potuit; et quia multipliciter potuit, non habebatur necessitas ut eo modo impleretur quo impletum est. Neque hoc in casu de obedientia dubitari potest. Altero modo, verum erat Patrem sic et sic ordinasse, voluisse, praecepisse, quia habebatur terminus ad extra contingens et conveniens in ipsis Christi electionibus. Et praeceptum sic intellectum nisi uno modo impleri non potuit. Sed de praecepto ita intellecto obiciens concedit quidem et libertatem Christi et perfectam conformitatem voluntatis Christi ad voluntatem Patris; negat tamen ibi obedientiam invenire quia praeceptum obedientiam praecedere debet. Concedimus ergo prius natura esse praeceptum quam praecepti impletionem. Quam tamen prioritatem salvamus. Nam divinae sapientiae ordinatio, divinae voluntatis electio, et utriusque praeceptum prorsus sunt independentes a termino ad extra, uti supra habitum est, §§ 9, 18 ad finem. Negamus autem ad essentiam obedientiae pertinere ut praeceptum tempore prius sit quam obedientia. Praecipere enim est alium movere per rationem et voluntatem (Sum. theol., 2-2, q. 104, a. 1). Obedire autem est moveri per rationem et voluntatem alterius, et materialiter quidem quatenus id fit quod praecipitur, formaliter autem quatenus ideo fit quia praecipitur (ibid. a. 2, ad 1m). Nec quidquam impedit quominus in eodem veritatis signo verae sint hae propositiones (1) Deus per suam rationem et voluntatem

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Besides, there did not exist such a term before Christ was arrested in the garden. For it was then that he said, ‘Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and he will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels?’ (Matthew 26.53). At that time, then, he could have averted his imminent suffering and death. He could have done so, although he could not sin. He could have done so, although he could not disobey. But he could not have done so, if there had existed a completely determinate command. If it did not exist at that time, when did a completely determinate command exist, prior to Christ’s particular free choices? That, surely, the objector can scarcely say. (e) There is no true obedience unless there is a command before the command is obeyed. Reply. In both ways of understanding a command, Christ truly and properly obeyed, and in each case freely. In the first way, it was true that the Father ordained, willed, and commanded such and such, because there was an appropriate, contingent term in the prophecies concerning Christ set out either in the Old or in the New Testament. But a command, on this understanding, can be fulfilled in more ways than one; and because it can be fulfilled in many ways, there is no necessity that it should be fulfilled in the way it is fulfilled. Nor is there any doubt, in this case, as to obedience. In the second way, it was true that the Father ordained, willed, and commanded such and such, because there was an appropriate, contingent term in the choices of Christ himself. And the command, on this understanding, can only be fulfilled in one way. But here, the command being so understood, the objector grants both Christ’s freedom and the perfect conformity of Christ’s will to the will of the Father; he declines, however, to see any obedience because obedience should be preceded by a command. We grant, then, that by nature a command is prior to its fulfillment. This priority, however, we have preserved. For the ordination of divine wisdom, the choice of divine will, and the command of both are entirely independent of their external term, as was shown above in § 9 and at the end of § 18. We deny, however, that the priority in time of command to obedience pertains to the essence of obeying. For to command is to move another through reason and will (Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 104, a. 1). But to obey is to be moved by the reason and will of another, materially insofar as that which was commanded is done, but formally insofar as it is done because it was commanded (Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 104, a. 2, ad 1m). Nothing prevents these two propositions from being ‘simultaneously true meanings’:

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movet rationem et voluntatem Christi; (2) Christus movet rationem suam atque voluntatem secundum et propter motionem Patris. (f) Ad idem ergo redit haec sententia ac solutio Bannesiana per sensum divisum et compositum. Respondetur. Eadem est inspiratio in verbis S. Thomae, conceditur, eadem est solutio, negatur. Nam apud Bañez eiusque sequaces illi creaturae, quae est praedeterminatio physica, attribuitur transcendentia quam nos iudicamus proprietatem exclusive divinam, secundum S. Thomam, In I Peri herm., lect. 14, § 197. Unde apud hos auctores totaliter aliud intelligitur per sensum divisum et compositum. (g)19 Saltem haec sententia non docet Christum esse liberum nisi quoad adiuncta. Respondetur. Docet haec sententia Christum esse liberum tum quoad adiuncta tum maxime quoad ipsum actum; distinguuntur indeterminatio prophetiae et determinatio eventus, non ut explicetur libertas Christi, sed ut excludatur fallacia; Christus obedivit non prophetis sed Patri; et Christus intellexit prophetas, non indeterminate quasi exegeta esset, sed determinate intelligendo voluntatem Patris immediate cognitam. (h) Nulla est vera obedientia nisi praeceptum exsecutioni antecedit. Respondetur. Voluntas Patris omnino antecedit voluntati Christi hominis; sed propositio vera de voluntate Patris est in eodem signo veritatis ac propositio vera de voluntate Christi hominis. Obiciens confundit realitates et propositiones de realitate. Instans: Requiritur prioritas temporis. Respondetur. Requiritur prioritas temporis ubi voluntas Patris mediate cognoscitur, conceditur; ubi voluntas Patris immediate cognoscitur, negatur. Ipsa enim voluntas Patris non est in tempore, sed solummodo signa quae mediate notam faciunt voluntatem Patris. (i) Si necessario fit quod Deus infallibiliter scit, efficaciter vult, irresistibiliter facit, tunc Deus est auctor peccati.

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(1) through his reason and will God moves the reason and will of Christ; (2) Christ moves his own reason and will in accordance with, and on account of, the motion of the Father. (f) This opinion, then, comes down to the same thing as the Bannezian solution through the ‘divided and composed sense.’ Reply. That the inspiration of each lies in the same words of Thomas, I grant; that the solution is the same, I deny. To that creature which is physical predetermination, Bañez and his followers attributed the transcendence that in our judgment, following Thomas (In 1 Peri Herm., lect. 14, §197), is an exclusively divine property. In our view, then, those authors understood something totally different by the ‘divided and composed sense.’ (g)19 At least this opinion teaches that Christ was free only with regard to circumstances. Reply. This opinion teaches that Christ is free not only as regards circumstances but also and chiefly as regards the act itself. It distinguishes between the indeterminacy of prophecy and the determinacy of event, not in order to explain Christ’s freedom but in order to rule out a fallacy. Christ obeyed the Father, not the prophets; and Christ understood the prophets, not in an indeterminate way, as though he were an exegete, but by understanding determinately the Father’s immediately known will. (h) There is no true obedience unless the command precedes its execution. Reply. The will of the Father entirely precedes the will of Christ the man; but a true proposition about the Father’s will is true simultaneously with a true proposition about the will of Christ the man. The objection confuses realities with propositions about reality. But again: What is required is a priority in time. Reply. That priority in time is required in the case where the Father’s will is known mediately, I grant; that it is required in the case where the Father’s will is known immediately, I deny. In itself the will of the Father is not in time, but only the signs which make the Father’s will mediately known. (i) If what God infallibly knows, efficaciously wills, and irresistibly does happens necessarily, then God is the author of sin.

19 The objections headed (g) and (h) were added in the version of 1964. There they are headed (f) and (g), owing to duplication of headings that has been corrected here.

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Respondetur. Haec est alia quaestio, hic non tractanda. Solutionem invenies, Theol. Studies 3 (1942) 547–52.20 Cf. thesin 17, Scholion ii.21

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Reply. That is a different question, which will not be treated here. You will find the solution in Theological Studies 3 (1942) 547–52.20 See Thesis 17, Scholion 2.21

20 See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom 111–16, ‘The Possibility of Sin.’ 21 Thesis 17 will appear in vol. 9 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, The Redemption.

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APPENDIX I



Primo ergo quaeritur quemadmodum persona divina revera ea habeat quae ad hunc hominem, Iesum Nazarenum, pertinent. Respondetur personam Verbi vere et realiter esse hunc hominem; ideo esse hunc hominem et omnia quae ad hunc hominem pertinent, quia per esse suum divinum est tum Deus tum hic homo, et Deus quidem est necessario et ab aeterno, hic homo autem est per assumptionem temporalem huius essentiae humanae realis et individualis cum omnibus quae ad eam consequuntur. De quibus plura videsis in thesi septima, ubi data explicatio per terminum ad extra non minus accidentia quam nudam essentiam respicit. Deinde autem quaeritur quemadmodum persona, quae est hic homo, per operationes accidentales ipsa sibi praesens sit. Iam vero si agitur de universali quaestione de praedicatione vera et reali propter accidentia, vix est cur de ea hic agatur. Accidens de quo quaeritur non intelligitur sensu logico sed sensu metaphysico; ipsum de sua ratione non subsistit sed alteri inhaeret, sicut circulus in superficie plana, et simitas in naso; unde et actiones sunt suppositorum, ut sensus non sentiat sed homo per sensum, etc. Si autem quaeritur de cognitione, respondendum est aliam esse rationem cognitionis obiecti et aliam praesentiae subiecti. Non enim cognoscitur obiectum, nisi species obiecti vel proportionata vel eminentior in potentia

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APPENDIX 1



End of § 6 in ‘Corollaries and Scholia’ in Thesis 10, 1960 Edition1

First, then, it is asked how a divine person really has those things that pertain to this man, Jesus of Nazareth. The answer is that the person of the Word truly and really is this man; and the reason why he [the person of the Word] is this man and everything pertaining to him, is that by his divine act of existence he is both God and this man, and is God indeed necessarily and from eternity, but is this man by the temporal assumption of this real and individual human essence together with everything attendant upon it. You may see more on this in thesis 7, where the explication given in terms of an external term has regard no less to accidents than to the bare essence. Second, however, it is asked how the person, which is this man, is present to himself through accidental operations. Now if the issue is the universal question of true and real predication based on accidents, there is no point in treating it here. The accident of which the question is asked is not understood logically but metaphysically; by definition it does not itself subsist but inheres in another, as a circle in a plane surface and snubness in a nose; hence, too, actions are of supposits, so that a sense does not sense but a man through his senses, etc. But if the question is about knowledge, the answer is that the formality of knowledge of an object is one thing and that of the presence of the subject is something else. The object is not known unless a species of the object,



1 See above, p. 521, note 13.

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cognoscitiva recipitur. Sed subiectum non ideo est sibi praesens quia species eius in potentia cognoscitiva recipitur (De veritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad 5m et ad 9m, 2ae ser.). Subiectum est sibi praesens quia ipsum est quod sentit, quod intelligit, quod vult, quod timet. Transit subiectum ex absentia sibi in praesentiam sibi eo quod actuatur; et actuatur subiectum vere et realiter, non solum ubi substantialiter mutetur, sed etiam ubi accidentaliter perfectionem aliam accipit.

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either proportionate or higher, is received in the cognitive potency. But the subject is not present to himself because his species is received in a cognitive potency (De veritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad 5m and 9m, second series). The subject is present to himself because he it is that senses, that understands, that wills, that fears. The subject passes from absence to self to presence to self in that he is actuated; and the subject is truly and really actuated, not only when he is substantially changed, but also when he receives accidentally another perfection.

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APPENDIX II



THESIS 12 Praeter scientiam divinam Christus habuit scientiam humanam et beatam et infusam et acquisitam. Termini scientia: dicitur proprie, late, strictius. scientia proprie: est certa rerum per causas cognitio; praecipue autem ad causam formalem seu essentiam attendendum est tum aliis in scientiis tum maxime in theologia; Deus enim habet essentiam, sed non habet finem, exemplar, vel causam efficientem, et ideo nisi per essentiam cognoscitur, per nullam causam cognoscitur. scientia late : est quaelibet certa cognitio. Ita theologia naturalis, quamvis Deum exsistere demonstret, tamen Deum non per essentiam sed analogice tantum·cognoscit. Fides autem non solum ad essentiam non pertingit et ideo analogiis utitur sed etiam ipsam creditorum exsistentiam non demonstrat sed propter auctoritatem scientis credit.

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APPENDIX 2

1960–1961 Versions of Thesis 121



THESIS 12 In addition to divine knowledge Christ had human knowledge of three kinds: beatific, infused, and acquired. Terms knowledge: the term is used properly, broadly, and in a stricter sense. knowledge in the proper sense: certain knowledge of things through their causes. Especially to be attended to, however, is the formal cause or essence. This is so in other sciences but also and especially in theology; for God has an essence, but has neither an end, nor an exemplar, nor an efficient cause, and so unless he is known through his essence he is not known through any cause. knowledge broadly speaking: any certain knowing. Thus, natural theology, although it does demonstrate God’s existence, still knows God only analogically and not through his essence. Faith, by contrast, not only does not pertain to essence, and therefore makes use of analogies; also, it does not demonstrate the very existence of the believed but believes on the authority of one who knows.

1 The most substantial revision that Lonergan made in the 1964 version of De Verbo incarnato concerned thesis 12, which he more or less completely rewrote. This appendix contains the earlier version, which was almost entirely the same in the 1960 and 1961 versions of the text.

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scientia strictius: est habitus intellectus speculativi qui ab habitibus ‘intellectus’ et sapientiae distinguitur; sic scientia est conclusionum, ‘intellectus’ autem cognitis terminis cognoscit principia, sapientia denique ipsos terminos diiudicat, e.g., quemadmodum ‘ens’ sit concipiendum. Sum. theol., 1-2, q. 57, a. 2; q. 66, a. 5. divina: ipsum intelligere. Sum. theol., 1, q.14. humana: scientia proprie, late, vel strictius dicta quae in intellectu humano recipitur atque exercetur. beata: est cognoscere Deum per essentiam. Sum. theol., 1, q. 12; q. 62, a. 2; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; q. 5, a. 5; C. Gent., 3, 25–63. infusa, acquisita: scientia dicitur infusa vel acquisita secundum originem, ut ‘infusa’ a Deo dante proxime habeatur et ‘acquisita’ per lumen intellectus agentis ex sensibilibus derivetur. Subdividitur infusa in ‘per se’ et ‘per accidens,’ ut per se infundatur quae ex sensibilibus derivari non possit, per accidens autem infundatur quae ex sensibilibus haberi potuisset. Distinguuntur autem tum infusa tum acquisita scientia a beata, quatenus illae per species creatas et finitas habentur, haec autem non habetur nisi per ipsam divinam essentiam intellectui creato illapsam.

Doctrinae evolutio 1 Uti ex testimoniis constabit, doctrina de scientia Christi evoluta est, neque tantum quia notiones priores de una persona, duabus naturis, duabus operationibus naturalibus nisi pedetentim non sunt formatae, sed etiam quia haberi non potest doctrina de scientia Christi nisi per prius habeatur doctrina de scientia. Ita verbi gratia Petrus Lombardus, cum scientiam plus vel minus claram distinguere potuerit, Christum ut hominem docuit omnia scire quae scit Deus non tamen adeo clare neque adeo perspicue (3, d. 14). Sed S. Thomas, cum scientiae naturam profundius scrutatus sit, permulta non solum subtiliter sed etiam accurate disputavit. 2 Quas de scientia tradidimus notiones e S. Thoma hausimus. At quamvis eadem nomina apud auctores communiter invenias, non tamen idem apud omnes est sensus. Nam S. Thomas ad experientiam humanam et intellectualem respiciens, exacte novit sensum vocis ‘essentiae,’ sensum quae­ stionis ‘quid sit,’ et realitatem actus qui proprie ‘intelligere’ dicitur. Alii

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knowledge in a stricter sense: ‘science,’ a habit of the speculative intellect, distinct from the habits of understanding and wisdom. Thus, science is of conclusions, while understanding knows the principles of known terms. Wisdom, finally, judges the terms themselves; for example, the way in which being is to be conceived. Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 57, a. 2; q. 66, a. 5. divine knowledge: the act of understanding itself. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14. human knowledge: knowledge (whether properly, broadly, or more strictly speaking) received and exercised in human intellect. beatific knowledge: knowing God by his essence. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12; q. 62, a. 2; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; q. 5, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, cc. 25–63. infused, acquired: knowledge is infused or acquired depending on its origin, so that as ‘infused’ it is had proximately as a gift from God, and as ‘acquired’ it is derived from sensible data by the light of agent intellect. Infused knowledge is subdivided into knowledge infused ‘in itself’ (per se) and knowledge infused ‘accidentally’ (per accidens). It is infused in itself when it cannot be derived from sensible data, but infused accidentally when it might have been had from sensible data. Both infused and acquired knowledge are distinct, however, from beatific knowledge, inasmuch as they are had through created and finite species, whereas beatific knowledge is had only through the divine essence itself slipping into a created intellect. Development of the doctrine 1 As the evidence will establish, the doctrine of Christ’s knowledge developed, not only because the prior notions of his one person, his two natures, and his two natural operations were formulated only gradually, but also because there could not be a doctrine of Christ’s knowledge before there was a doctrine of knowledge. So, for example, since Peter Lombard was able to distinguish knowledge only more or less clearly, he taught that Christ as man knew everything God knows, though not so clearly or so precisely (3, d. 14). But Thomas Aquinas, having examined the nature of knowledge in a more profound way, argued many things not only subtly but also accurately. 2 The notions regarding knowledge that we have passed on we have drawn from Thomas. But while you will commonly find authors using the same terms, not all use them in the same sense. For Thomas, attending to human intellectual experience, knew exactly what the word ‘essence’ means, what the question ‘what is it?’ means, and the reality of the act that is properly

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autem ipsam experientiam intellectualem praetermittentes, imo cum Scoto facta maxime obvia et omnini fundamentalia negantes (Theological Studies 8 (1946) 372–79),2 intellectum secundum analogiam sensus concipiunt. Unde non parvae sequuntur differentiae quarum, caeteris missis, hic duas tantum considerari oportet. 3 Apud S. Thomam haec omnia necessario idem dicunt: cognoscere quid sit Deus, cognoscere Deum per essentiam, videre Deum per essentiam, visione beatorum gaudere. Praeterea, nisi Deus per essentiam cognoscitur, tunc Deus non cognoscitur ut obiectum nisi analogice. Aliis autem, quibus non est clarum quid significet ‘intelligere,’ etiam clarum non est nullam aliam esse posse cognitionem Dei praeter essentialem et analogicam. Unde definitio de visione beatorum, db 530, modum loquendi S. Thomae non adhibet; et theologi in tractatu de Deo Uno multum laborare solent ut demonstretur immediatam Dei cognitionem esse beatorum visionem, contra sententiam e.g. H. Schell (de quo vide J. Ternus, op. cit. inter auctores, pp. 180–86).3

4 Ulterius, qui intellectum secundum experientiam intellectualem concipiunt, clare sciunt quantum differat ab experientia sensitiva. Qui autem intellectum secundum analogiam sensus concipiunt, nisi mediate ipsum intellectum non cognoscunt eumque sibi fingunt sensibus longe similiorem quam re vera est. Et ideo quando doctrinam thomisticam de scientia Christi beata, infusa, et acquisita audiunt, maximam quandam, etsi confusam, patiuntur difficultatem; credunt videlicet tot et tantas scientias componi non posse cum illa Christi psychologia vere humana quam exigit definitio ecclesiae: per omnia nobis similem absque peccato, db 148. Quae difficultas et facillime et difficillime solvitur. Facillime: si enim paulisper ad propriam experientiam intellectualem attenderent (id quod hucusque in tota vita fecisse non videntur), facillime concluderent id quod in se ipsis exsistere tam diu non sunt suspicati non aptum natum esse ad

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called ‘to understand.’ Others, however, overlooking intellectual experience itself and denying, with Scotus, facts that are quite clear and utterly fundamental (see Theological Studies 7 [1946] 372–79),2 conceived intellect on the analogy of sense. Hence, there followed not a few differences. Omitting the rest, only two of these need to be considered. 3 According to Thomas, all of the following necessarily denote the same thing: to know what God is, to know God by his essence, to see God by his essence, and to enjoy the vision of the blessed. Further, unless God is known by his essence, then God is known as an object only in an analogical way. But others, for whom it is not clear what ‘to understand’ means, are also unclear on the impossibility of any other knowing of God besides the essential and the analogical. Thus, the definition of the vision of the blessed in db 530, ds 1000–1001, does not follow Thomas’s way of speaking; and in their treatises on God as One theologians are often at great pains to demonstrate that immediate knowing of God is the vision of the blessed, as against the opinion, for example, of H. Schell. (On Schell, see J. Ternus, in the work cited above, 180–86).3 4 Moreover, those who conceive intellect in a way that accords with intellectual experience know clearly how much it differs from sensitive experience. Those who conceive intellect on the analogy of sense, however, know intellect itself only mediately, and imagine that it is far more similar to the senses than in fact it is. Consequently, when they hear the Thomist doctrine of Christ’s blessed, infused, and acquired knowledge, they labor under a very great, though confused difficulty: that is to say, they believe that such and so many knowledges cannot be combined with that truly human psychology of Christ demanded by the church’s definition that Christ is ‘like us in all things apart from sin’ (db 148, ds 301). The solution to these difficulties is both quite difficult and quite easy. It is quite easy, for if they would attend for a little while to their own intellectual experience (something that they seem never to have done so far in their whole lives), they would quite easily conclude that something that has



2 See Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, vol. 2 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 38–46. 3 The Ternus reference is given above, p. 601. Ternus refers to H. Schell, Katholische Dogmatik, vol. 3 (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1892).

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impediendam psychologiam vere humanam, etiamsi ad illam perfectionem produceretur quam in Christo fuisse docent theologi. Attamen, haec facillima obiectionis solutio etiam hypothetica est; habetur quidem si paulisper quis ad propriam experientiam intellectualem attendit; at huius conditionis impletio difficilima esse videtur, quatenus ex communiter contingentibus etiam in viris magni nominis iudicare licet.

5 Quod si doctrina de scientia Christi humana propter evolutam scientiae notionem etiam ipsa evoluta est, quaeri potest utrum ulterior quaedam evolutio admitti possit. Cui quaestioni responsio generalis quidem omnino affirmativa est, secundum decretum Vaticani, db 1800, ut scilicet idem doceatur et melius intelligatur. Quem in finem, de praesenti nihil fructuosius facere possum quam, quantum in me est, iam adeptam intelligentiam communicare.4 Auctores5 adversarii 1 Ariani et Apollinaristae (thesi secunda) animam humanam negantes etiam scientiam humanam negaverunt. 2 S. Fulgentius, Alcuinus, Hugo Victorinus, Petrus Lombardus quibusdam videntur non satis salvasse distinctionem inter scientiam Christi humanam et divinam. Vide Boyer 178–79; d’Alès 262; Galtier 252, n. 325.6

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existed so long in themselves without their suspecting it is not the sort of thing that should stand in the way of a truly human psychology, not even if that psychology is extended to the perfection that theologians teach was in Christ. Nevertheless, this quite easy solution to objections is also hypothetical. It depends on one’s attending for a little while to one’s own intellectual experience; yet the fulfillment of this condition would seem to be quite difficult, judging by what commonly happens even in people of great reputation. 5 If the doctrine of Christ’s human knowledge itself developed on account of a developed notion of knowledge, it is possible to ask whether some further development can be admitted. The general answer to this question is entirely affirmative, in keeping with the First Vatican Council’s decree in db 1800, ds 3020, to the effect that the same thing is to be taught and better understood. Towards that end, I can do nothing more fruitful than communicate, so far as I am able, the understanding already achieved.4 Bibliography5 opponents of the thesis 1 The Arians and the Apollinarians (thesis 2), who denied Christ’s human soul, also denied his human knowledge. 2 Fulgentius, Alcuin, Hugh of St Victor, and Peter Lombard did not, it seems, sufficiently preserve the distinction between Christ’s human knowledge and his divine knowledge. See Boyer, De Verbo incarnato 178–79; d’Alès, De Verbo incarnato 262; Galtier, De incarnatione ac redemptione 252, n. 325.6







4 It may reasonably be thought that the revision of this thesis in the 1964 edition was an effort to do more than communicate the ‘understanding already achieved,’ that it was Lonergan’s attempt to work out ‘some further development.’ 5 The bibliography of 1964 (see above, pp. 598–603) contained all the items listed in 1960 and 1961 and added the references to Schmaus, Richard, de Riedmatten, Liébaert, Jouassard, Sullivan, Baron, Lavalette, Béranger, and Rahner. The earlier list is omitted here. 6 For bibliographical information see the bibliography.

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3 Ignorantiam in Christo homine admiserunt: (a) Non pauci Patres (vide infra b, 2), vel textu Mc 13.32 moti, vel contra Arianos Verbum qua Deum defendentes, vel contra Apollinaristas veram humanitatem demonstrantes. Quod maxime circa Antiochenos conceditur.

(b) Agnoetae, secta monophysitica, Themistio duce, c. 540 orti, db 248 damnati. Vide supra pp. 280–82. (c) Lutherus, Calvinus, Zwinglius. (d) Modernistae qui et errores in Christo addiderunt (db 2027–35). (e) Dubitantes, quibus responsum est, db 2183–85. Cf. J. Galot, op. cit., 127 n. 46.

4 Scientiam acquisitam aliquando negavit S. Thomas sed postea eandem affirmavit. Scientiam per se infusam negaverunt et, loco scientiae acquisitae, per accidens, infusam posuerunt nonnulli antiqui scholastici; Boyer 180.

Argumentum a  De scientia Christi humana, doctrina Novi Testamenti 1 Homines scientiam Christi admirabantur: Mt 7.28–29, Lc 2.47, 4.22, Io 7.46: Numquid sic locutus est homo, sicut hic homo. 2 Iesus alios interrogasse narratur: Mt 8.26, 9.4–5, 15.34, 26.40, Mc 6.6, 6.38, 7.18, 9.21, 11.13, Lc 2.49, 8.30, Io 6.5, 11.34, 12.27, 18.34, 21.15–17. Quod multipliciter pro adiunctis exponitur. Testantur evangelistae Iesum scivisse: Mt 17.25–26; Mc 2.8; Io 2.25: opus ei non erat ut quis testimonium perhiberet de homine; ipse enim sciebat quid esset in homine; Io 11.42: Ego autem sciebam quia semper me audis, sed propter populum, qui circumstat, dixi, ut credant quia tu me misisti. (Quo in loco non directe de cognitione agitur, sed principium interpretationis praebet.)

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3 Ignorance in Christ the man was allowed by: (a) Not a few of the Fathers (see part b of the argument below, point 2). Either they were moved by the text of Mark 13.32, or they were defending the Word as God, against the Arians; or they were demonstrating his true humanity, against the Apollinarians. This may be granted especially in the case of the Antiochenes. (b) The Agnoetae, a monophysite sect led by Themistius, arose around 540; condemned in db 248, ds 474–76. See above, pp. 280–83. (c) Luther, Calvin, Zwingli. (d) The modernists, who also ascribed mistakes to Christ (db 2027–35, ds 3427–35). (e) Skeptics, to whom the reply is that of db 2183–85, ds 3645–47. See J. Galot, ‘Science et conscience de Jésus,’ Nouvelle revue théologique 82 (1960) 127 n. 46. 4 At one time Thomas Aquinas denied acquired knowledge in Christ, but later he affirmed it. A number of the early Scholastics denied any knowledge infused ‘in itself’ and, in place of acquired knowledge, posited knowledge infused ‘accidentally.’ See Boyer 180. The argument a  The New Testament teaching on Christ’s human knowledge 1 People marvelled at Christ’s knowledge (Matthew 7.28–29, Luke 2.47, 4.22). ‘No man ever spoke like this man’ (John 7.46). 2 Jesus is portrayed as asking questions of others (Matthew 8.26, 9.4–5, 15.34, 26.40, Mark 6.6, 6.38, 7.18, 9.21, 11.13, Luke 2.49, 8.30, John 6.5, 11.34, 12.27, 18.34, 21.15–17). This is expounded in many ways, depending on circumstances. The evangelists attest that Jesus knew (Matthew 17.25–26, Mark 2.8). ‘He needed no one to bear witness of man; for he himself knew what was in man’ (John 2.25). ‘I knew that you hear me always, but I have said this on account of the people standing by, that they may believe that you sent me’ (John 11.42; this passage is not directly concerned with knowing, but it supplies a principle of interpretation).

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3 Iesus exhibetur ut omni fide dignus. Mt 24.35: Caelum et terra peribunt, verba autem mea non praeteribunt. Mt 28.18–20: Data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra … docete omnes gentes … docentes eos servare omnia quaecumque mandavi vobis … Mc 16.16: Qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit salvus erit; qui vero non crediderit condemnabitur. 4 Ideo Iesus est omni fide dignus, non quia ipse alteri crediderit, non quia ipse more prophetarum revelationem acciperit, sed quia ipse est Filius, ipse scit, novit, vidit, a Patre audivit. (a) Iesus quidem a quibusdam ut propheta habetur: Mt 16.14, 21.11, 21.46, Mc 6.15, Lc 7.16, 7.39, 9.8, 24.19, Io 4.19, 6.14, 7.40, 9.17. Sed est magnus ille de quo Moyses (Act 3.22). Ioannes Baptista erat plus quam propheta quia praecursor Domini, Mt 11.9–10. Olim Deus locutus est per prophetas, novissime per Filium, Heb 1.1. (b) Mt 11.27: Omnia mihi tradita sunt a Patre meo. Et nemo novit Filium nisi Pater, neque Patrem quis novit nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare. Cf. Lc. 10.22. (c) Io 1.14, 1,16, 1.18: et vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi Unigeniti a Patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis … Et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus … Deum nemo vidit umquam: unigenitus Filius qui est in sinu Patris ipse enarravit. (d) Io 3.11: quod scimus loquimur et quod vidimus testamur, et testimonium nostrum non accipitis. Cf. 3.12: alii credunt; 3.13: Iesus est Filius hominis qui de caelo descendit. (e) Io 3.31–36: Iesus de caelo venit; quod vidit et audivit, hoc testatur; cae­teri si credunt habent vitam aeternam; si non credunt, vitam non videbunt sed ira Dei manebit super eos. (f) Io 6.46: Non qui Patrem vidit quisquam, nisi is, qui est a Deo, hic vidit Patrem. Amen, amen dico vobis: qui credit in me, habet vitam æternam. Cf. 5.37: neque vocem eius (Patris) umquam audistis, neque speciem (eidos) eius vidistis. (g) Io 8.26, 8.28: quæ audivi ab eo, hæc loquor in mundo … sicut docuit me Pater, hæc loquor.

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3 Jesus is portrayed as worthy of all belief. ‘Heaven and earth will pass away but my words will not pass away’ (Matthew 24.35). ‘All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me … Make disciples of all nations … teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you …’ (Matthew 28.18–20). ‘He who believes and is baptized will be saved; but he who does not believe will be condemned’ (Mark 16.16). 4 This is why Jesus is worthy of all belief: not because he believed others, not because he received a revelation in the way the prophets did, but because he is the Son, because he knows, sees, hears from the Father. (a) Some held Jesus to be a prophet (Matthew 16.14, 21.11, 21.46, Mark 6.15, Luke 7.16, 7.39, 9.8, 24.19, John 4.19, 6.14, 7.40, 9.17). But he is that great prophet of whom Moses spoke (Acts 3.22). John the Baptist was more than a prophet because he was the forerunner of the Lord (Matthew 11.9–10). ‘God spoke of old … by the prophets; but in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son’ (Hebrews 1.1). (b) ‘All things have been delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him’ (Matthew 11.27; see Luke 10.22). (c) ‘We have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth … And from his fullness have we all received … No one has ever seen God; the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known’ (John 1.14, 1.16, 1.18). (d) ‘We speak of what we know, and bear witness to what we have seen; but you do not receive our testimony’ (John 3.11). See John 3.12 (others believe) and John 3.13 (Jesus is the Son of man who came down from heaven). (e) Jesus has come from heaven; to what he saw and heard, he bears witness; others, if they believe, have eternal life; if they do not believe, they will not see life, but the wrath of God will rest upon them (John 3.31–36). (f) ‘Not that anyone has seen the Father except him who is from God; he has seen the Father. Truly, truly, I say to you, he who believes in me has eternal life’ (John 6.46). See John 5.37, ‘his voice (the Father`s) you have never heard, his form (eidos) you have never seen.’ (g) ‘I declare to the world what I have heard from him … I speak thus as the Father taught me’ (John 8.26, 8.28).

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(h) Io 8.38: quod vidi apud Patrem meum, loquor. (i) Io 8.54, 8.55: non cognovistis eum (Deum): ego autem novi eum. Et si dixero quia non scio eum, ero similis vobis mendax. Sed scio eum et sermonem eius servo. Cf. alia supra, p. 174. (j) 1 Cor 1.23, 1.24, 1.30: Christus crucifixum … Dei sapientiam … factus est nobis sapientia a Deo. (k) Col 2.2–3: Christi, in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. (l) Eph 3.17–19: … Christum habitare per fidem in cordibus vestris … ut possitis comprehendere cum omnibus sanctis quae sit latitudo et longitudo, et sublimitas et profundum; scire etiam supereminentem scientiae (gen. comparat.) caritatem Christi, ut impleamini in omnem plenitudinem Dei. (m) Col 2.9–10: quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo deitatis corporaliter, et estis in illo repleti. 5 Mc 13.32: De die autem illo vel hora nemo scit, neque angeli in caelo neque Filius, nisi Pater. Mt 24.36, cf. apparatum criticum. Act 1.7: Non est vestrum nosse tempora vel momenta, quae Pater posuit in sua potestate. Cf. Io 5.22 et 12.47, Mt 20.23 et 11.27, 28.18, Io 12.49–50, 7.16, 8.26, 8.28, 14.10. b  De scientia humana Christi apud Patres 1 Circa statum investigationum, vide Gutwenger 99. 2 Christus ut homo ignoravit diem iudicii. (Xiberta, Enchiridion 98, § 23). Origenes (Xiberta, Enchiridion 47, § 19); Hilarius (Xiberta, Enchiridion 180, § 24); Athanasius (Xiberta, Enchiridion 191, § 27; 192, § 29); Gregorius Nazianzus (Xiberta, Enchiridion 202, § 23); Epiphanius (Xiberta, Enchiridion 225, § 40; p. 230, § 55); Ambrosius (Xiberta, Enchiridion 268, § 20; 271, § 32; sed cf. 269, § 24); Diodorus Tarsensus (Xiberta, Enchiridion 132, § 17); Cyrillus Alexandrinus (Xiberta, Enchiridion 343, § 12; 353, § 43; 421, § 70; aliter 346, § 21; 405, § 4; 431, § 110; 435, § 126); Andreas de Samosata (Xiberta, Enchiridion 381, § 8); Theodoretus Cyrensus (Xiberta, Enchiridion 390, § 47; 398, § 75); Germanus, episcopus Constantinopolitanus, ob. c. 733 (Xiberta, Enchiridion 666, § 80).

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(h) ‘I speak of what I have seen with my Father’ (John 8.38). (i) ‘But you have not known him (that is, God); I know him. If I said, I do not know him, I should be a liar like you; but I do know him, and I keep his word’ (John 8.55). See the other passages cited above, p. 175. (j) ‘Christ crucified … the wisdom of God … whom God made our wisdom’ (1 Corinthians 1.23, 1.24, 1.30). (k) ‘Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge’ (Colossians 2.2–3). (l) ‘That Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith; that you … may have power to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ which surpasses knowledge, that you may be filled with all the fullness of God’ (Ephesians 3.17–19). (m) ‘For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily, and you have come to fullness of life in him’ (Colossians 2.9–10). 5 ‘But of that day or that hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father’ (Mark 13.32). See Matthew 24.36 and the critical apparatus of the Greek text. ‘It is not for you to know times or seasons which the Father has fixed by his own authority’ (Acts 1.7). See John 5.22 and 12.47, Matthew 20.23 and 11.27, 28.18, John 12.49–50, 7.16, 8.26, 8.28, 14.10. b  Christ’s human knowledge according to the Fathers 1 On the state of the investigation, see Gutwenger 99. 2 Christ as man was ignorant of the day of judgment (Xiberta, Enchiridion 98, § 23). Origen (Xiberta, Enchiridion 47, § 19); Hilary (Xiberta, Enchiridion 180, § 24); Athanasius (Xiberta, Enchiridion 191, § 27; 192, § 29); Gregory of Nazianzus (Xiberta, Enchiridion 202, § 23); Epiphanius (Xiberta, Enchiridion 225, § 40; 230, § 55); Ambrose (Xiberta, Enchiridion 268, § 20; 271, § 32; but see 269, § 24); Diodore of Tarsus (Xiberta, Enchiridion 132, § 17); Cyril of Alexandria (Xiberta, Enchiridion 343, § 12; 353, § 43; 421, § 70; otherwise at 346, § 21; 405, § 4; 431, § 110; 435, § 126); Andrew of Samosata (Xiberta, Enchiridion 381, § 8); Theodoret of Cyrrhus (Xiberta, Enchiridion 390, § 47; 398, § 75); Germanus, bishop of Constantinople, died around 733 (Xiberta, Enchiridion 666, § 80).

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Vide Galtier 280; Gutwenger 97–100. 3 Aliter locuti sunt: Clemens Alexandrinus, Christus erat perfectus gnosticus (Xiberta, Enchiridion 44, § 12; sed cf. 43, § 6); Eustathius Antiochenus, Christus ignoravit ne ineffabilis mysteria ostenderet (Xiberta, Enchiridion 167, § 35); Basilius, Christus ignoravit quatenus causa cognitionis in Filio est Pater (Xiberta, Enchiridion 196, § 3); Chrysostomus, sicut Patrem novit, ita diem iudicii novit (Xiberta, Enchiridion 250, § 8; 248, § 2); Hieronymus, explicat Mc 13.32 per Act 1.7 (Xiberta, Enchiridion 288, § 85); adde loca supra indicata apud Ambrosium, Cyrillum Alexandrinum.

4 Themistius, c. 540, monophysita contra confusionem naturarem agens, explicite ignorantiam in Christo docuit; unde Agnoetae, vide supra pp. 280– 82. Xiberta, Enchiridion 539. Auctor de Sectis, x, iii; MG 86/1, 1262–63, inter opera Leontii Byzantini (Xiberta, Enchiridion 570, § 77), narrat de doctrina Themistii, dicit Patres similiter sensisse, quaestionem esse subtiliorem.

5 Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus, 65, ml 40, 60 (Xiberta, Enchiridion 324, § 98): Christus hominem ante mortem latuit nihil. De quo loco, Galtier 256; Gutwenger, 95–96. Negavit ingnorantiam in infante (Xiberta, Enchiridion 337, § 137); Christus eatenus nescivit, quatenus homines nescire fecit (Xiberta, Enchiridion 324, § 96); Christus profecit in sapientia, i.e., corpus mysticum profecit (Xiberta, Enchiridion 325, § 100). Unde: (b) Leporius retractare debuit quam in Christo homine affirmaverat ignorantiam (Xiberta, Enchiridion 292, § 98). (c) Fulgentius Ruspensis, ob. 533, epist. 15 ad Ferrandum, ml 65, 415–22. Ex quo fere deducitur quod scholastici Augustino vel Ambrosio imponebant: Christus homo per gratiam ea omnia cognovit quae Deus per naturam cognoscit (Galtier 253; Gutwenger 105–106). Vide Xiberta, Enchiridion 594–96, §§ 55–60. (d) Vigilius, Constitutum I, canon 4; ml 69, 104; Xiberta, Enchiridion 501, § 15: negat revelationem Christo homini quasi alteri (i.e., sensu Nestoriano) factam. (e) Gregorius Magnus, ad Eulogium patriarcham Constantinopolitanum,

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See Galtier 280; Gutwenger 97–100. 3 The following spoke otherwise: Clement of Alexandria: Christ was the perfect gnostic (Xiberta, Enchiridion 44, § 12; but see 43, § 6); Eustathius of Antioch: Christ was ignorant lest he should expose ineffable mysteries (Xiberta, Enchiridion 167, § 35); Basil: Christ was ignorant inasmuch as the cause of knowing in the Son is the Father (Xiberta, Enchiridion 196, § 3); Chrysostom: he knew, as the Father knew, the day of judgment (Xiberta, Enchiridion 250, § 8; 248, § 2); Jerome, who explained Mark 13.32 in light of Acts 1.7 (Xiberta, Enchiridion 288, § 5). To these should be added the passages indicated above under Ambrose and Cyril of Alexandria. 4 Themistius, about 540, a monophysite acting against confusion of the natures, explicitly taught ignorance in Christ. Hence the Agnoetae: see pp. 280–83 above; Xiberta, Enchiridion 539. The author of De sectis relates the teaching of Themistius, and says that the Fathers held similar views and that the question is a subtle one (x, iii; mg 86/1, 1262–63, among the works of Leontius of Byzantium; Xiberta, Enchiridion 570, § 77). 5 Augustine states that from Christ the man before his death nothing was concealed (De diversis quaestionibus, 65; ml 40, 60; Xiberta, Enchiridion 324, § 98). On this passage see Galtier 256; Gutwenger 95–96. He denied ignorance in Christ as infant (Xiberta, Enchiridion 337, § 137); Christ was ignorant to the extent that he made men not to know (Xiberta, Enchiridion 324, § 96); Christ grew in wisdom, that is, the mystical body grew (Xiberta, Enchiridion 325, § 100). Hence: (b) Leporius should have retracted what he had affirmed in Christ the man, namely, ignorance (Xiberta, Enchiridion 292, § 98). (c) Fulgentius of Ruspe, d. 533, Letter 15 to Ferrandus (ml 65, 415–22). From this, what the Scholastics imposed on Augustine or Ambrose is nearly deduced: by grace Christ the man knew all things that God knows by nature (Galtier 252; Gutwenger 105–106). See Xiberta, Enchiridion 594–96, §§ 55–60. (d) Vigilius denies a revelation made to Christ the man as though to other men; that is, he denies it in the Nestorian sense (Constitution 1, canon 4; ml 69, 104; Xiberta, Enchiridion 501, § 15). (e) Gregory the Great, writing in 600 to Eulogius, patriarch of Constanti-

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anno 600, db 248, damnat Agnoetas (utrum ex cathedra sit haec damnatio? d’Alès 259, negat; complexius, Gutwenger 101). Gregorius tripliciter Mc 13.32 explicat: (1) corpus mysticum ignorat, (2) Christus fecit nos nescire, (3) Christus homo scivit non tamen vi humanae naturae. Gregorius docuit: qui Nestorianus non est, Agnoeta esse non potest; quia Verbum fecit omnia, omnia scivit; quia omnia dedit ei Pater in manus (Io 13.3), omnia scivit. (f) Eulogius patriarcha Constantinopolitanus, Xiberta, Enchiridion 577– 78, §§ 100–105, negat ignorantiam. (g) S. Maximus, Xiberta, Enchiridion 647, § 20, Christus homo cuncta noverat, non vi naturae humanae, sed vi unionis, sicut ferrum de se non est callidum, sed totum ignitum proprietates ignis induit. (h) Damascenus, Xiberta, Enchiridion 668, § 89; 670, § 95; 671, § 96: negat deliberationem in Christo homine; Christus non ratione humanitatis sed ob personae identitatem et indivulsam unionem, perfecte omnem sapientiam habuit. 6 Scholastici (a) Hugo Victorinus: tota sapientia Dei est in anima Christi, et tamen aliud est sapientia sapere, aliud sapientiam esse. ml 176, 853 A. Galtier 252, qui etiam citat Ioannem de Ripa; d’Alès 262, qui similiter sensisse censet Lombardum, Albertum Magnum. (b) Alii ex schola Abaelardi aliter: Zacharias Chrysopolitanus: Christus homo ea scivit quae creatura scire potest. Gandulphus Bononiensis: creatura scire potest quae facta vel futura sunt, non autem quot vel quanta a Deo fieri possent. Cf. Gutwenger 106. Landgraf, 50–62. c  Conclusiones theologicae 1 Christus habuit duas scientias, divinam et humanam. (a) Assertum est theologice certum, uti probatione elucebit. Ab omnibus theologis docetur. Lombardus, 3, d. 14. Aquinas, Sum. theol., 3, q. 9, a. 1. Commentatores in hoc locum. (b) Deus habet scientiam divinam. Christus est Deus. Ergo Christus ha-

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nople (db 248 [= ds 474–76]), condemned the Agnoetae. (It is a question whether this condemnation was ex cathedra; d’Alès 259 denies that it is; Gutwenger 101 holds that the matter is more complicated.) Gregory explains Mark 13.32 in three ways: (1) the mystical body was ignorant; (2) Christ made us not to know; (3) Christ the man knew, but not in virtue of his human nature. Gregory taught that ‘he who is not a Nestorian cannot be one of the Agnoetae.’ Since the Word made all things, he knew all things; since the Father gave all things into his hands (John 13.3), he knew all things. (f) Eulogius, patriarch of Constantinople, denied ignorance (Xiberta, Enchiridion 577–78, §§ 100–105). (g) Maximus the Confessor: Christ the man knew everything together, not in virtue of his human nature, but in virtue of the union, just as iron is not hot in itself but being wholly on fire takes on the properties of fire (Xiberta, Enchiridion 647, § 20). (h) John of Damascus denied deliberation in Christ the man; not by reason of his humanity but from the identity of his person and its inseparable union, Christ perfectly had all wisdom (Xiberta, Enchiridion 668, § 89; 670, § 96; 671, § 96). 6 The Scholastics (a) Hugh of St Victor: the whole wisdom of God is in the soul of Christ, and yet it is one thing to be wise and another to be wisdom (ml 176, 853 a). See Galtier 252, who cites John de Ripa; d’Alès 262, who considers that Peter Lombard and Albert the Great held similar views. (b) Others, belonging to Abelard’s school, thought otherwise: Zacharias of Chrysopolis: Christ the man knew those things that it is possible for a creature to know. Gandulph of Bologna: it is possible for a creature to know what has happened or will happen, but not the measure of what can come to be from God. See Gutwenger 106; Landgraf 50–62. c  Theological conclusions 1 Christ had two kinds of knowledge, divine and human. (a) The assertion is theologically certain, as the proof below will clearly show. It is taught by all theologians. See Peter Lombard, 3, d. 14; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 1; and commentators on this passage. (b) God has divine knowledge. Christ is God. Therefore, Christ has di-

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bet scientiam divinam. Maior: probatur in tractatu De Deo uno. Minor: cf. thesin primam. (c) Scire est operatio quaedam naturalis tum naturae divinae tum naturae humanae. Atqui Christus Deus et homo inconfuse et immutabiliter habet operationes naturales tum naturae divinae tum naturae humanae. Ergo Christus inconfuse et immutabiliter habet tum scire divinum tum scire humanum.7 Maior: extra omne dubium est, e.g. definitio personae, definitio animae humanae ut rationalis (cf. db 111a, 148, 290). Minor: db 292.

(d) Nisi in Christo ponuntur duae scientiae, divina et humana, poni non possunt duae naturales voluntates. Sed in Christo sunt duae naturales voluntates. Ergo sunt duae scientiae. Maior: nam voluntas est appetitus rationalis, seu appetitus sequens intellectum; et naturalis voluntas sequitur intellectum eiusdem numerice naturae. Minor: db 291. (e) Nisi in Christo ponitur scientia humana, tollitur Christi hominis libertas et tollitur eius meritum. Sed tollere libertatem Christi hominis est erroneum, et tollere meritum est haereticum. Ergo ponenda est in Christo scientia humana. Maior: homo non potest agere libere et meritorie nisi per actus humanos;8 et actus humani non fiunt sine scientia humana. Minor: libertas, thesi 14a; meritum, db 790. Obicitur : potuit Christus per divinam scientiam scire et per voluntatem humanam velle. Respondetur: ita tollitur voluntas naturalis humana, quae sequitur intellectum humanum; et praeterea, confunduntur operationes naturales, ut sint, non personae a natura, sed personae partim ab una natura et partim ab alia natura. (f) Si Christus homo vera nobis revelavit, scientiam humanam habuit. Atqui Christus homo vera nobis revelavit. Ergo scientiam humanam habuit.

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vine knowledge. As to the major premise, it is proved in the treatise on God as One. On the minor premise, see thesis 1. (c) To know is a natural operation, both of the divine nature and of a human nature. But to Christ, God and man, unconfusedly and unchangeably belong the natural operations both of the divine nature and of a human nature. Therefore, it belongs to Christ, unconfusedly and unchangeably, both to know divinely and to know humanly.7 The major premise is beyond all doubt, for example from the definition of person and the definition of the human soul as rational (see db 111a, 148, 290, ds 250–51, 301–303, 554–55). The minor premise is defined in db 292, ds 557–58. (d) Were there not in Christ two knowledges, divine and human, there could not be two natural wills. But in Christ there are two natural wills. Therefore, there are two knowledges. Major premise: the will is a rational appetite, or an appetite that follows intellect; and a natural will follows the intellect of the nature that is numerically the same. Minor premise: db 291, ds 556. (e) Were there no human knowledge in Christ, the freedom of Christ the man would be taken away, and with it his merit. But it is erroneous to take away the freedom of Christ the man, and heretical to take away his merit. Therefore, human knowledge should be posited in Christ. Major premise: a man cannot act freely and meritoriously except through human acts;8 and human acts do not come to be without human knowledge. Minor premise: on Christ’s freedom, see thesis 14; on merit, db 790, ds 1513. Objection: It was possible for Christ to know through divine knowledge and to will through his human will. Reply: This is to take away his natural human will, which follows human intellect. Furthermore, it confuses natural operations in such a way that they do not belong to the person from his nature but belong to the person partly from one nature and partly from the other. (f) If what Christ the man revealed to us is true, he had human knowledge. But Christ the man did reveal to us what is true. Therefore, he had human knowledge.

7 Literally, Christ unconfusedly and unchangeably has both the divine ‘to know’ and a human ‘to know.’ 8 ‘Human acts’ as distinct from pre- or non-moral acts ‘of a human being’: see thesis 14, note 1, p. 729.

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Maior: secus inducitur appollinarismus, ut Christus qua Deus sciat et Christus qua animal (cum anima sensitiva sed sine anima rationali) loquatur. Minor: exemplo probatur. Mt 11.25, 11.27: … respondens Iesus dixit: … nemo novit Filium nisi Pater, neque Patrem quis novit nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare. Quo in loco, verum proponitur, nam scriptura non errat; verum revelatum proponitur, nam agitur de relationibus inter Patrem et Filium; quod verum revelatum proponitur a Christo homine, nam legitur ‘Iesus dixit.’ Obicitur : apollinarismus consistit, non in negatione scientiae humanae, sed in negatione animae humanae rationalis. Respondetur: Apollinaris negavit animam rationalem in Christo, conceditur; affirmavit intellectum humanam in Christo, negatur. Apollinaris negavit et animae et intellectum; imo explicite docuit unam in Christo operationem, supra p. 188. Instatur: Sed apollinarismus damnatur propter negationem animae rationalis. Respondetur: ita damnatur propter negationem animae rationalis ut affirmetur Christus perfectus in humanitate, per omnia nobis similis absque peccato, imo cum duabus naturalibus operationibus et voluntatibus. Historice, monophysismus, monenergismus, monothelismus sunt progenies apollinarismi. Eutyches propter apollinarismum damnatus est Constantinopoli ante c. Chalcedonense; monophysitae erraverunt quia sacrosanctam voluerunt formulam apollinaristicam incaute a S. Cyrillo adhibitam; propter monophysitas conciliandos orti sunt monenergisus et monothelismus. Neque Patres umquam ita animam Christi humanam defenderunt ut concederent Christum ut animal miraculose vera enuntiasse. n.b. Propositum est hoc argumentum, sub (f), quo facilius fiant argumenta subsequentia de scientia Christi humana. Ideoque ad conditiones per probationem minoris illustratas attendendum est. E.g., simile argumentum ex Io 1.18 non habetur, quia non constat ea verba esse ab ipso Iesu pronuntiata. Momentum vero huius argumenti manifestum est. Si enim dici posset Christum hominem esse locutum per solam scientiam divinam et sine ulla cognitione humana, fieri non posset ullum argumentum ex scripturis de scientia Christi humana.

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Major premise: Anything else leads to Apollinarianism, such that it is Christ as God who knows and Christ as animal (with a sensitive soul but without a rational soul) who speaks. The minor premise is proved by an example. ‘At that time Jesus declared, … no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him’ (Matthew 11.25, 11.27). In this passage truth is proposed, for scripture does not err; revealed truth is proposed, for it concerns the relations between the Father and the Son; this revealed truth is proposed by Christ the man, for it reads, ‘Jesus declared.’ Objection: Apollinarianism does not consist in denying human knowledge, but in denying a rational human soul. Reply: That Apollinaris denied a rational soul in Christ, I grant. That he affirmed a human intellect in Christ, I deny. Apollinaris denied both soul and intellect; indeed, he explicitly taught there is one operation in Christ (see p. 189 above). The objection continues: But Apollinarianism was condemned because it denied a rational soul. Reply: It was condemned because it denied a rational soul, so as to affirm that Christ is perfect in humanity, like us in all things but sin, and indeed, with two natural operations and wills. Historically speaking, monophysitism, monenergism, and monothelitism were spawned by Apollinarianism. It was on account of his Apollinarianism that Eutyches was condemned at Constantinople prior to the Council of Chalcedon; the monophysites erred by insisting that an Apollinarian formula, carelessly used by Cyril, was sacrosanct; it was because the monophysites were conciliated that monenergism and monothelitism arose. Nor did the Fathers ever defend Christ’s human soul in such a way as to grant that Christ as animal miraculously proclaimed truths. Note: The argument in point (f) has been proposed, the more easily to present arguments later on concerning Christ’s human knowledge. For that reason attention is drawn to the conditions illustrated by the proof of the minor premise. From John 1.18, for example, no such argument can be had, because it is not established that these words were pronounced by Jesus himself. The importance of this argument is plain. For if it is possible to say that Christ the man spoke through his divine knowledge alone, without any human cognition, then there can be no argument from scripture for Christ’s human knowledge.

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2 Christus homo in terris degens Deum per essentiam cognovit. (a) Contraria sententia tuto doceri non potest, db 2183. Est communis omnium theologorum. A S. Thoma exponitur, Sum. theol., 3, q. 9, a. 2; q. 10; q. 34, a. 4. Implicite continetur in scriptura et traditione; quae tamen implicatio decursu temporum elucebat, scilicet, post distinctiones explicitas inter duas naturas, post expresse agnitas duas naturales operationes et voluntates, et post evolutam quandam scientiae notionem atque doctrinam. Nota est theologice certa, non tamen propter certam deductionem ex revelatis, sed propter consensum omnium theologorum in re supernaturali, prout in tractatu de locis theologicis explicatur, scilicet talis theologorum consensus, sicut et Patrum consensus, facit argumentum in theologia certum. Etiam datur deductio certa ex revelatis; quod tamen notam non fundat, cum theologi alii aliter de notione scientiae opinentur.

(b) Quae Christus homo mysteria in Deo abscondita revelavit, ipse ea cognovit per cognitionem quandam humanam quae fuit vel fides vel acquisita vel infusa vel beata scientia. Atqui cognitio illa humana non erat fides neque acquisita neque infusa scientia. Ergo erat scientia beata (per quam Deus per essentiam cognoscitur). Maior: tria sunt probanda, (1) Christus homo mysteria revelavit, (2) quae ipse cognitione humana noverat, et (3) haec cognitio humana erat vel fides vel scientia acquisita vel infusa vel beata. Ad primum: contraria sententia est modernistarum (db 2027–35, 2038– 40, 2052, 2054–55) reprobata et proscripta (db 2065a) sub poena excommunicationis latae sententiae (db 2114). Ad secundum: iam supra probatum est, l, f. Ad tertium: nam enumeratio est completa, vide terminos definitos post thesin hanc enuntiatam. Minor: probatur per partes. (a′) Excluditur fides ex tenore nt, vide a, 3 et 4. Concedimus in nt non fieri distinctionem inter scientiam Christi divinam et humanam. Negamus autem cum verbis nt reconciliari posse sententiam hanc: Christus homo non scivit sed tantummodo credidit quae ipse revelavit.

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2 Christ the man, living on this earth, knew God by his essence. (a) The contrary opinion cannot safely be taught (db 2183, ds 3645). The conclusion stated is common to all theologians. Thomas expounds it in Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 2; q. 10; and q. 34, a. 4. It is contained implicitly in scripture and tradition. This implication, however, became clear in the course of time, that is, after explicit distinctions between the two natures had been drawn, after two natural operations and wills were expressly acknowledged, and after some notion and doctrine of knowledge had developed. Its note is theologically certain, not however on account of a certain deduction from revelation, but on account of a consensus of all theologians in a supernatural matter, as is explained in the treatise on theological sources. This is to say that such a consensus of theologians, like a consensus of Fathers, makes an argument certain in theology. A certain deduction from revelation is also given; this is not the ground of the note, however, since different theologians have held different opinions on the notion of knowledge. (b) Christ the man revealed mysteries hidden in God, which he himself knew through a human knowing that was either faith or acquired knowledge or infused knowledge or beatific knowledge. But that human knowing was neither faith nor acquired knowledge nor infused knowledge. Therefore, it was beatific knowledge (the knowledge through which God is known by his essence). As to the major premise, there are three things to be proved: (1) Christ the man revealed mysteries, (2) which he himself knew by human knowing, and (3) this human knowing was either faith or acquired knowledge or infused knowledge or beatific knowledge. First point: The contrary opinion is that of the modernists (db 2027–35, 2038–40, 2052, 2054–55, ds 3427–35, 3438–40, 3452, 3454–55), reproved and proscribed (db 2065a, ds 3466) under pain of excommunication latae sententiae (db 2114). The second point has already been proved above, conclusion 1 (f). As for the third point, the enumeration of possibilities is exhaustive; see ‘Terms’ above. The minor premise is proved in parts. (a′) Faith is ruled out by the general drift of the New Testament; see section a above, §§ 3 and 4. We grant that in the New Testament there is no distinction between Christ’s divine and his human knowledge. We deny, however, that this opinion, ‘Christ the man did not know, but only believed,

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Exemplo sit Io 3.11: quod scimus loquitur et quod vidimus testamur, et testimonium nostrum non accipitis. Sane Christus ut Deus haec scit et videt; tamen Christus non ut Deus sed ut homo loquitur et testatur; quod si dicis loquentem et testantem secundum naturam qua loquitur et testatur neque scire neque videre sed tantummodo credere, adhibes distinctionem inter scientiam Christi divinam et humanam ad infirmandum intentionem evangelistae. Iterum, excluditur fides ex consectariis absurdis. Si enim Christus homo mysteria tantummodo credidit, ei facta est revelatio, ei data sunt signa credibilitatis, ei concessus est pius credulitatis affectus, ei acquirenda erat quaedam imperfecta mysteriorum intelligentia; unde habetur ne propheta quidam sed tantummodo theologus; neque videtur cur (1) eius doctrina non debeat perfici ab aliis theologis contra db 1800, vel (2) cur tempora et loca revelationis ei factae a speculationibus historicorum et exegetarum non sint determinanda, contra Mt 11.27 et Io 1.18 et multa similia ubi ad scientiam Filio propriam recurrunt evangelistae.

(b′) Excluditur scientia acquisita. Nam mysteria in Deo abscondita sunt praeter ea ad quae naturalis ratio pertingere potest (db 1795) et, sicut bona divina, humanae mentis intelligentiam omnino superant (db 1786); imo, intellectum creatum excedunt (db 1796). (c′) Excluditur scientia infusa, nam quantum ad Deum cognoscendum attinet, eiusdem ordinis est scientia infusa ac scientia acquisita. Utraque enim est scientia per species creatas et finitas; utraque proportionatur tantummodo ad aliquid creatum intelligendum; utraque non fundat nisi cognitionem Dei analogicam; sed mysteria in Deo abscondita ideo absconduntur quia ‘inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda’ (db 432 ad finem).

Obicitur (1) Iam thesi decima constat Christum hominem per omnem suam operationem psychologicam fuisse personam divinam sibi modo humano praesentem. Superfluit ergo scientia beata ad testimonia Iesu explicanda. Idem

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what he himself revealed,’ can be reconciled with the words of the New Testament. There is in John 3.11, for example, ‘we speak of what we know and bear witness to what we have seen; but you do not receive our testimony.’ Certainly Christ as God knows and sees these things; not as God, however, but as man does Christ speak and bear witness. But if you say that he who speaks and bears witness, in keeping with the nature by which he speaks and bears witness, neither knows nor sees but only believes, you are using a distinction between the divine and the human knowledge of Christ in a way that overturns the evangelist’s intention. Again, faith is ruled out because of the absurd consequences of affirming it. Suppose Christ the man only believed the mysteries. Even so, it is to him that the revelation is made; to him the signs of credibility are given; to him is granted the devout feeling of credulity; by him some imperfect understanding of the mysteries had to be acquired. The upshot of all this is not a prophet but only a theologian. Nor does there seem to be any reason (1) why his teaching should not be completed by other theologians, which would contradict db 1800, ds 3020, or (2) why the places and times of the revelation made to him might not be determined by the speculations of historians and exegetes, which would contradict Matthew 11.27, John 1.18, and many similar passages where the evangelists come back to knowledge that belongs to the Son. (b′) Acquired knowledge is ruled out. For mysteries hidden in God are beyond what natural reason can reach (db 1795, ds 3015), and, like the divine good, they utterly surpass the understanding of the human mind (db 1786, ds 3005); indeed, they exceed created intellect (db 1796, ds 3016). (c′) Infused knowledge is ruled out, for as far as knowing God is concerned, infused knowledge and acquired knowledge are of the same order. Each of these is knowledge arrived at through created and finite species; each is proportionate only to understanding some created thing; each grounds only an analogical knowing of God. But the reason why mysteries hidden in God are hidden is that ‘between Creator and creature no similitude can be expressed without implying a greater dissimilitude’ (db 432, ds 806). Objections (1) Thesis 10 has already established that through all his psychological operation Christ the man was a divine person present to himself in a human way. Beatific knowledge, therefore, is superfluous to explain Jesus’ testi-

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enim sui conscius et per divinam scientiam scivit et per potentias humanas locutus et testatus est. R. Superflueret scientia beata si duae Christi conscientiae unirentur non solum in persona sed etiam in natura, conceditur; ita prudentes volumus, etsi conseqentias volitionis non per voluntatem sed per intellectum sciamus; et similiter secundum sensibilia iudicamus, etsi sensibus sensiamus et intellectu iudicemus. Superflueret scientia beata, si duae conscientiae Christi uniuntur non in natura sed tantum in persona ita ut naturae naturalesque operationes non confundantur neque immutentur, salvis utriusque proprietatibus, negatur. Per conscientiam enim humanam persona divina est sibi praesens modo humano et non modo divino; quia non est sibi praesens modo divino, conscia quidem est personae divinae sed non naturae divinae neque scientiae divinae (vide thesin decimam, coroll. et schol. 11); quia sibi est praesens modo humano, sui modo humano operantis conscia est; quae quidem conscientia per se sola non sufficit ad essentiam animae humanae cognoscendam (Sum. theol., 1, q. 87, a. 1); et multo minus ad essentiam divinam cognoscendam sufficit. (2) Sed supposita conscientia Christi humana, qua persona divina modo humano est sibi praesens, et ulterius additis gratiis divinis omnino singularibus et iam thesi undecima probatis, Christus homo concludere potuit se esse Deum. R. Christus potuit coniecturaliter ita concludere, conceditur, certitudinaliter, negatur. Ratio autem eadem est ac datur circa quaestionem, Utrum homo possit scire se habere gratiam, Sum. theol., 1-2, q. 112, a. 5. Gratia enim gratia est secundum intrinsecam suam ordinationem ad ipsum Deum; et ideo nisi cognoscitur Deus per essentiam, cognosci non potest utrum hoc ens finitum, e.g., hic filiationis sensus, habeat intrinsicam ordinationem ad ipsum Deum, necne; quo non cognito, homo nescit utrum hoc ens finitum re vera sit gratia; quamvis ex multis indiciis, uti dictum est, coniecturaliter concludi potest. Et ideo circa Christum hominem dicendum est quod (1) si Deum per essentiam cognoscit, etiam certo cognoscere potest se re vera gratiam eamque in singulari plenitudine accipere, sed (2) si Deum per essentiam non cognoscit, cum certitudine iudicare non potest utrum illa plenitudo re vera sit entis absolute supernaturalis.

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mony. For it was the same one who was conscious of himself and who knew through divine knowledge and who spoke and bore witness through human powers. Reply: I grant that beatific knowledge would be superfluous, if Christ’s two consciousnesses were united not only in person but also in nature. Thus, we will to be prudent, though we know the consequences of our willing through intellect and not through will. And likewise we judge according to sensible data, though we sense with our senses and judge with our intellect. But I deny that beatific knowledge is superfluous, if Christ’s two consciousnesses are united not in a nature but only in a person, in such a way that the natures and the natural operations are neither confused nor changed, the properties of each being preserved. For through his human consciousness a divine person is present to himself in a human and not in a divine way. Because he is not present to himself in a divine way, he is conscious of a divine person but not of the divine nature or of divine knowledge (see thesis 10, corollaries and scholia, § 11 [pp. 534–39 above]). Because he is present to himself in a human way, he is conscious in a human way of himself operating; in itself, this consciousness alone is not enough for knowing the essence of the human soul (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 87, a. 1), and still less is it enough for knowing the divine essence. (2) But suppose Christ’s human consciousness, by which a divine person is present to himself in a human way, and suppose further the utterly unique divine graces already proved in thesis 11: then Christ the man was able to conclude that he was God. Reply: That Christ was able conjecturally so to conclude, I grant; that he was able certainly so to conclude, I deny. The reason, moreover, is the same as that given in Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 112, a. 5, with regard to the question whether one can know that one has grace. For grace is grace according to its intrinsic ordination towards God himself. Thus, unless God is known by his essence, there can be no knowing whether or not this finite being – for example, this sense of sonship – has an intrinsic ordination towards God himself. That being unknown, one does not know whether this finite being is in fact a grace, although from many indications, as was said, one may be able conjecturally to conclude that it is. With regard to Christ the man, then, it should be said (1) that if he knows God by his essence, he certainly can also know that in fact he has received grace, and received it in singular fullness; but (2) that if he does not know God by his essence, he is not able to judge with certainty whether that fullness is in fact the fullness of an absolutely supernatural being.

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Unde habes aliud argumentum ad affirmandum scientiam beatam in Christo homine. (3) Sed suppositis et conscientia et gratiae plenitudine, saltem sufficit ulterior quaedam illuminatio intellectus Christi hominis ut certo sciat se esse Deum. R. Si illa illuminatio est lumen gloriae ut Christus homo Deum per essentiam videat, conceditur; si non est lumen gloriae, tunc non excedit rationem scientiae infusae, quae non sufficit uti iam probatum est. (4) Christus in terris degens nondum erat glorificatus, Io 7.39; cf. Phil 2.9–10, Heb 2.9. Sed si ponitur in Christo homine in terris degente cognitio Dei per essentiam, ponitur quod in beatitudine est principale. R. Non constat loca citata excludere cognitionem Dei per essentiam, si quidem Ioannes adeo in cognitione Filii insistit (a, 4, c–i) et ipse Paulus de omnibus thesauris scientiae et sapientiae et de plenitudine divinitatis (a, 4, k) loquitur. Caeterum, alia est cognitio Dei per essentiam, et alia est eiusdem cognitionis in sensibilitatem et in ipsius corporis transformationem redundantia. Qualis redundantia nisi post resurrectionem a Christo homine non habita est, excepta forte transfiguratione (Mt 17.1–8, Mc 9.2, Lc 9.28). (5) Ipse Christus homo se a Deo derelictum testatus est, Mt 27.46. Saltem ergo moriens in cruce Christus homo Deum per essentiam non cognovit. R. Quod aliquando a quibusdam concessum (Maldonato, Melchior Cano), a theologis non admittitur. Sensus exclamationis maxime e Ps 21 (cf Ps 68.22) repetendus est. Derelictus est Christus homo, qui potuit ‘rogare Patrem meum et exhibebit mihi plus quam duodecim legiones angelorum’ (Mt 26.53), ‘quem definito consilio et praescientia Dei traditum est per manus iniquiorum affligentes interemistis’ (Act 2.23), qui pro peccatis omnium omnibus satisfecit, qui in proprio sanguine sacrificium Deo obtulit. Cf. Galtier 48, n. 59; Gutwenger 154.

3 Christus homo Deum per essentiam cognovit a primo instante suae conceptionis. Quaeritur quandonam Christus homo Deum per essentiam cognoscere inceperit, et cum S. Thoma (Sum. theol., 3, q. 34, a. 4) et reliquis theologis

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Thus, we have another argument for affirming that there was beatific knowledge in Christ the man. (3) But suppose both Christ’s human consciousness and his fullness of grace: at least some further illumination of intellect would be enough for Christ the man to know with certainty that he is God. Reply: That this would be the case if that illumination was the light of glory, so that Christ the man saw God by his essence, I grant; if it was not the light of glory, then it does not go beyond what is meant by infused knowledge, which, as has already been proved, is insufficient. (4) When he was living on the earth, Christ was not yet glorified, according to John 7.39; see also Philippians 2.9–10 and Hebrews 2.9. But to posit in Christ the man, living on the earth, knowing of God by his essence is to posit the chief thing in beatitude. Reply: It is not established that the passages cited rule out knowing of God by his essence, since John insists so much on the knowing of the Son (see a, 4, c–i above), and Paul himself speaks of all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge and of the fullness of deity (a, 4, k). Besides, knowing God by his essence is one thing; the overflow of that knowing into the sensibility and into the transformation of the very body is another. Such an overflow belonged to Christ the man only after his resurrection, except perhaps in his transfiguration (Matthew 17.1–8, Mark 9.2, Luke 9.28). (5) Christ the man himself bore witness that he had been forsaken by God (Matthew 27.46). At least when he was dying on the cross, then, Christ the man did not know God by his essence. Reply: this, formerly granted by such as Maldonatus and Melchior Cano, is not allowed by the theologians. The sense of Jesus’ cry is to be sought above all in Psalm 21 [evv 22] (cf. Psalm 68.22 [evv 69.21]). It is Christ the man who is forsaken, who was able to ‘appeal to my Father, and he will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels’ (Matthew 26.53), who was ‘delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, … crucified and killed by the hands of lawless people’ (Acts 2.23), who for the sins of all made satisfaction for all, and who offered to God a sacrifice in his own blood. See Galtier 48 n. 59; Gutwenger 154. 3 Christ the man from the first moment of his conception knew God by his essence. The question is when Christ the man began to know God by his essence, and we answer, with Thomas Aquinas (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 34, a. 4) and

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respondetur eum inde a primo instante suae conceptionis Deum per essentiam cognovisse. Arguitur autem sic: Constat Christum hominem a primo instante suae conceptionis plenitudinem gratiae habuisse (thesis undecima, b, 7 et 11). Sed cognitio Dei per essentiam est gratia quaedam, et caeterarum gratiarum finis atque corona. Qui ergo plenitudinem gratiae habuit, etiam gratiam videndi Deum habuit. Praeterea, ideo in filiis adoptionis primo datur iustificatio, deinde probatio, et tertio gloriae corona, quia probandi sunt utrum visione Dei sint digni. Sed ipse Dei Filius non erat probandus utrum sit dignus visione sui ipsius secundum naturam suam divinam. Et ideo in Filio Dei non erat cur temporis intervallum intercederet inter caeteras gratiae et gratiam visionis.

Praeterea, quae alicui sunt propria, ei sunt statim danda. Sed sicut caeterae gratiae, ita etiam gratia visionis, quamvis proportionem naturae assumptae excedat, minime tamen superat ea quae personae divinae debetur (Sum. theol., 3, q. 2, a. 12). Operari enim sequitur esse. Qui ergo est Deus, Deum per essentiam cognoscere debet. Sed Christus homo est etiam Deus. Et ideo Deum per essentiam cognoscere debet. Praeterea, Christus homo est fundamentum totius ordinis supernaturalis (thesis undecima, b, 10). Quae enim filiis adoptionis propter Filium naturalem conceduntur, ea ipsa ad Filium naturalem ratione ipsius Filii pertinent, quia videlicet est persona divina in natura non divina subsistens. Iam vero quae alicui pertinent ratione sui ipsius, ea statim habentur. Et ideo Filius ut homo visionem Dei inde a primo instante suae conceptionis habuit. Obstare tamen videtur quod, si inde ab initio Christus homo visionem Dei habuit, tunc ipse eandem visionem non meruit. Sed dicendum est meritum non esse optimum simpliciter sed tantummodo secundum quid: Deus enim est Deus, non per meritum sed per naturam; et similiter Filius ut homo visionem Dei habet, non ratione meriti, sed ratione ipsius personae. Cf. Sum. theol., 3, q. 19, aa. 3 et 4. 4 Utrum Filius ut homo Deum comprehenderit. Comprehensio Dei est illa Dei cognitio quam ipse Deus habet, secundum quod idem est ipsum esse et ipsum intelligere, Sum. theol., 1, q. 14, aa. 2 et 4. Quae comprehensio Christo homini non est attribuenda, cum alia in

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the rest of the theologians, that it was from the first moment of his conception that he knew God by his essence. The argument, moreover, is this: It is established that from the first moment of his conception Christ the man had the fullness of grace (thesis 11, b, 7 and 11). But knowing God by his essence is a grace, and the goal and crown of the other graces. One who has the fullness of grace therefore has the grace of seeing God. Further, this is why, in children by adoption, justification is given first, then probation, and thirdly the crown of glory: because they are to be tested as to whether they are worthy of the vision of God. But the Son of God himself had not to be tested as to whether he was worthy of the vision of himself according to his divine nature. And thus in the Son of God there was no reason why an interval of time should come between other graces and the grace of vision. Further, those things that properly belong to someone should be given to him at once. But as with other graces, so too with the grace of vision: even though it exceeds the proportion of the assumed nature, still it hardly surpasses those things that are owed to a divine person (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 2, a. 12). For operating follows being. Therefore, he who is God ought to know God by his essence. But Christ the man is also God. And therefore he ought to know God by his essence. Further, Christ the man is the foundation of the whole supernatural order (thesis 11, b, 10). For the things granted to the children of adoption, on account of the natural Son, are the very things belonging to the natural Son by reason of his being the Son, that is, because he is a divine person subsisting in a nature that is not divine. Now, those things that pertain to someone by reason of his being who he is, are his at once. And thus the Son as man had the vision of God from the first moment of his conception. An obstacle to this would seem to be that, if right from the beginning, Christ the man had the vision of God, then he did not merit that vision. But it should be said that merit is not, in an unqualified sense, the best thing, but only in a qualified sense. For God is God, not by merit but by nature; and likewise the Son as man had the vision of God, not by reason of merit, but by reason of his person. See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 19, aa. 3 and 4. 4 Did the Son as man comprehend God? Comprehension of God is that knowing of God that God himself has, in accord with the identity of the act of existence itself and the act of understanding itself. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, aa. 2 and 4. This comprehension is not to be attributed to Christ the man, since in

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Christo sit operatio naturalis divina et alia naturalis humana. db 292. Cf. Sum. theol., 3, q. 10, a. 1. Et ideo Christo homini attribuitur illa cognitio Dei per essentiam quae etiam a beatis per lumen gloriae et illapsam intellectui creato essentiam divinam habetur. Sum. theol., 3, q. 9, a. 2.

5 Utrum Filius ut homo omnia quae potest facere Deus cognoverit. Sicut Deus non solum essentiam comprehendit sed etiam omnia alia et possibilia et actualia in sua essentia perfecte cognoscit (Sum. theol., 1, q. 14, aa. 5–7), ita etiam beati, divinam essentiam contemplantes, alia etiam in divina essentia (seu, uti dicitur, in Verbo) vident (ibid., q. 12, a. 8). Quaeritur ergo de Filio homine utrum ita perfecte Deum per essentiam cognoverit ut omnia possibilia eo ipso sciret. Cui quaestioni negative respondetur, et sic arguitur: Cognitio divinae essentiae comparatur ad cognitionem aliorum in divina essentia, sicut cognitio causae comparatur ad cognitionem effectuum. Iam vero qui perfectius intelligit causam, perfectius intelligit effectus inde subsequentes. Et ideo Deus qui suam essentiam comprehendit, omnia possibilia perfectissime cognoscit. Sed iam habitum est Christum hominem non comprehendisse divinam essentiam. Ergo non omnia possibilia in divina essentia cognovit. Sum. theol., 3, q. 10, a. 2.

6 Utrum Filius ut homo omnia actualia in Verbo cognoverit. Et videtur quod non, nam ipse testatus est se nescire diem et horam iudicii, Mc 13.32 (cf. apparatus criticum ad Mt 24.36). Et accedunt testimonia multorum Patrum supra indicata (b, 2). Praeterea, ‘sicut immortalis mori dignatus est ut nos liberaret a morte, et aeternus ante tempora fieri voluit temporalis, ita Dei Sapientia ignorantiam nostram suscipere dignata est ut nos ab ignorantia liberaret’ (ml 77, 1098 cd). Est obiectio Anatolii diaconi recitata a Gregorio Magno ad Eulogium; non ponitur db 248; habetur Xiberta, Enchiridion 508, § 42. Praeterea, eadem entitive est divina essentia sive creat sive non creat; et ideo actualia multo minus quam possibilia in divina essentia a beatis videntur (cf. Gutwenger 107).

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Christ natural divine operation and natural human operation are different (db 292, ds 557–58). See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 10, a. 1. And therefore, what is attributed to Christ the man is that knowing of God by his essence that the blessed have also, through the light of glory and through the divine essence slipping into created intellect. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 2. 5 Did Christ as man know everything that God can do? Just as God does not merely comprehend his own essence but also comprehends perfectly everything else, possible and actual, in his own essence (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, aa. 5–7), so too the blessed, contemplating the divine essence, also see other things in the divine essence (or, as it is said, ‘in the Word’; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 8). The question about the Son as man is thus whether he so perfectly knew God by his essence as by that very fact to know everything possible. The answer to this question is No, and the argument is as follows: Knowing the divine essence is compared to knowing other things in the divine essence, as knowing causes is to knowing effects. Now the more perfectly one understands a cause, the more perfectly one understands the effects that follow from it. And thus God, who comprehends his own essence, knows everything possible in the most perfect way. But it has already been shown that Christ as man did not comprehend the divine essence. Therefore, he did not know, in the divine essence, everything possible. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 10, a. 2. 6 Did the Son as man know, in the Word, everything actual? It would seem that this also he did not know, for he himself bore witness that he did not know the day and hour of judgment (Mark 13.32; see the critical apparatus on Matthew 24.36). Add to this the testimony of the many Fathers cited above (b, 2). Further, ‘as he who is immortal deemed it right to die in order to free us from death, and he who is eternal before all time willed to become temporal, so the Wisdom of God deemed it right to take on our ignorance in order to free us from ignorance’ (ml 77, 1098 cd). This is the objection of the deacon Anatolius reported by Gregory the Great to Eulogius; not a part of db 248, ds 474–76), it will be found in Xiberta, Enchiridion 508, § 42. Further, the divine essence is entitatively the same, whether God creates or not; and thus the blessed behold in the divine essence things actual much less than things possible (see Gutwenger 107).

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Sed contra est damnatio Agnoetarum a Gregorio Magno, db 248, supra b, 5, e. Accedunt multa Patrum testimonia (b, 3 et 5) et omnium theologorum consensus. Unde tuto doceri non posse decrevit Sacrum Officium, db 2184, certam non posse dici sententiam quae affirmat Christum hominum omnia actualia in Verbo cognoscere. Respondetur sacram scripturam Christo homini attribuisse non solum gratiae sed etiam cognitionis plenitudinem. Dicitur enim gratiae et veritatis plenus, Io 1.14, 1.16, et sicut plenitudo gratiae non ponitur in Filio qua Deo, plenitudo veritatis in Filio qua homine agnoscenda esse videtur. Iterum, in Filio qua homine ‘sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi’ (Col 2.2–3), imo in eo ‘inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter, et estis in illo repleti’ (Col 2.9–10), unde etiam Ephesii ex eodem fonte debent ‘comprehendere cum omnibus sanctis’ et ‘scire’ ut impleantur ‘in omnem plenitudinem Dei’ (Eph 3.17–19). Vide pp. 58–60 supra de his locis. Ulterius, si Spiritus veritatis docebit discipulos omnem veritatem (Io 16.13), quanto magis ipse Filius ut homo omne cognitionis donum habuit; si quidem ‘quam misit Deus, verba Dei loquitur, non enim ad mensuram dat Deus Spiritum. Pater diligit Filium et omnia dedit in manu eius’ (Io 3.34–35). Unde et arguit Gregorius Magnus: ‘Quis ergo ita stultus est, ut dicat, quia accepit Filius in manibus, quod nescit.’ db 248. Ulterius, sicut Filius iterum venturus est iudicare vivos et mortuos (Omnes enim nos manifestari oportet ante tribunal Christi, ut referat unusquisque propria corporis, prout gessit sive bonum sive malumm, 2 Cor 5.10), ita iam venit et pro omnibus omnium peccatis satisfecit.9 Quod si non ignorans iudicat, ita non ignorans satisfecit. Ulterius, sicut Domino resuscitato omnia sunt subiecta (supra pp. 76–78), neque ignoranti subiecta, ita Dominus his in terris degens dicere potuit ‘ego vici mundum’ (Io 16.33); et si ignorans vincere potuit, tamen ignorans se vicisse dicere non potuit.

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But on the other hand there is Gregory the Great’s condemnation of the Agnoetae (db 248, ds 474–76; above, b, 5, e). Add to this the testimony of many of the Fathers (b, 3 and 5) and the consensus of all the theologians. Hence, the Holy Office decreed (db 2184, ds 3646) that it is not safe to teach that the opinion which affirms that Christ the man knew, in the Word, everything actual, is uncertain. The reply is that holy scripture attributes to Christ the man a fullness not only of grace but also of knowing. For he is said to be full of grace and truth (John 1.14, 1.16), and as fullness of grace is not posited in the Son as God, it would seem that fullness of truth should be acknowledged in the Son as man. Again, in the Son as man ‘are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge’ (Colossians 2.2–3), and indeed ‘in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily, and you have come to fullness of life in him’ (Colossians 2.9–10). Hence too, from the same source the Ephesians are to ‘comprehend with all the saints’ and to ‘know,’ so that they may be ‘filled with all the fullness of God’ (Ephesians 3.17–19). On these passages see pp. 58–61 above. Moreover, if the Spirit of truth will teach the disciples all truth (John 16.13), how much more had the Son himself, as man, every gift of knowledge, since ‘he whom God has sent utters the words of God, for it is not by measure that he gives the Spirit; the Father loves the Son, and has given all things into his hand’ (John 3.34–35). From this also Gregory the Great argues: ‘Who then is so silly as to say that the Son receives into his hands that which he knows not’ (db 248, ds 474–76). Moreover, as the Son will come to judge the living and the dead – ‘For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each one may receive good or evil, according to what he has done in the body’ (2 Corinthians 5.10) – so he has already come and has made satisfaction for all sins on behalf of everyone.9 If it is not one who is ignorant that judges, so it is not one who is ignorant that has made satisfaction. Moreover, as all things are subject to the Risen Lord (above, pp. 76–79), and not subject to one who is ignorant, so the Lord living on this earth was able to say, ‘I have overcome the world’ (John 16.33); and if one who is ignorant can overcome, still one who is ignorant cannot say that he has overcome.



9 Reference is made to thesis 16, which will appear in vol. 9, The Redemption.

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Quibus perspectis, tuto sane doceri non potest: Placitum quorumdam recentiorum de scientia animae Christi limitata, non est minus recipiendum in scholis catholicis, quam veterum sententia de scientia universali (db 2185). Vide Sum. theol., 3, q. 10, a. 2; q. 11, a. 1; q. 15, a. 3. Unde ad obiectiones respondendum est. (1) Quantum ad Mc 13.32, planum est aliquam distinctionem esse faciendam. Nam Filius sine addito nescire dicitur; sed Filius est Deus; et Deus est omnisciens. Neque videtur in ipsis scripturis subaudienda esse distinctio inter Filium qua Deum et Filium qua hominem. Eiusmodi enim distinctio supponit notiones personae et naturae evolutas, distinctas, applicatas; quae potius sunt temporis posterioris. Dici quidem potest Dominum locutum esse ad mentem discipulorum et schemate prospectivo usum esse (supra, p. 44). Quod sane consonat cum futuro die iudicii; neque tamen omni dubitatione est maior, si quidem inusitatissimum est apud Mc ponere ‘Filium’ sine addito. Quod si contextum respicit, dubitari haud potest ipsam discipulorum quaestionem fuisse indiscretam, sicut et illa, Act 1.7, ubi respondisse dicitur Iesus: Non est vestrum nosse tempora et momenta, quae Pater posuit in sua potestate. Non enim Domino, etiam scienti, omnia dicere licuit, secundum illud: ‘qui misit me Pater, ipse mihi mandatum dedit quid dicam et quid loquar … quae ergo ego loquor, sicut dixit me Pater, sic loquor’ (Io 12.49–50; cf. 7.16, 8.26–28, 14.10). Neque dubium est Dominum indiscrete petentibus cum obvia quadam loquendi oeconomia respondisse. Filiis enim Zebedaei dixit: ‘non est meum dare vobis’ (Mt 20.23); qui tamen alibi expresse affirmavit: ‘omnia mihi tradita sunt a Patre meo’ (Mt 11.27), et ‘data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra’ (Mt 28.18), et ‘Pater diligit Filium et omnia dedit in manu eius’ (Io 3.35; cf. 5.20, 17.2).

Quibus perspectis, non certo constat sensu Mc 13.32 esse Filium ignorasse; sicut enim Christus filiis Zebedaei dixit, ‘non est meum dare vobis,’ ita et discipulis dicere potuit, ‘neminem neque angelos neque Filium sed solum Patrem scire.’ Quod si in caeteris eruditi nos monent apud Hebraeos nomina et verba cognitionem significantia parum a voluntate praescindere

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Once all this has been grasped, it is impossible safely to teach this: that the more recent view as to the limited knowledge on the part of Christ’s soul should be received in Catholic schools no less than the older opinion on his universal knowledge (db 2185, 3647). See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 10, a. 2; q. 11, a. 1; q. 15, a. 3. From this a response should be given to the objections. (1) So far as Mark 13.32 is concerned, it is plain that some distinction has to be made. For it is said that the Son (with no additional words) does not know; but the Son is God, and God is all-knowing. And it does not seem that the scriptures themselves suggest a distinction between the Son as God and the Son as man. Such a distinction presupposes notions of person and nature that have been developed, distinguished, and applied; these belong rather to a later time. It is possible to say that the Lord spoke in keeping with the mind of the disciples and that he was using a prospective pattern (p. 45 above). This is quite consonant with a future day of judgment; but it is not beyond all doubt, since in Mark it is most unusual to find ‘Son’ without additional words. If you attend to the context, it can scarcely be doubted that the disciples’ question itself was inappropriate, as it is in Acts 1.7 also. There Jesus is said to have responded: ‘It is not for you to know times or seasons which the Father has fixed by his own authority.’ Even for the Lord, knowing indeed, it is not allowable to say everything, according to this passage: ‘The Father who sent me has himself given me commandment what to say and what to speak … What I say, therefore, I say as the Father has bidden me’ (John 12.49–50; cf. John 7.16, 8.26–28, 14.10). Nor is there any doubt but that to those who besought him inappropriately the Lord responded with an obvious ‘economy’ or reserve in speaking. For to the sons of Zebedee he said, ‘It is not mine to give you’ (Matthew 20.23), although he nevertheless affirms elsewhere that ‘all things have been delivered to me by my Father’ (Matthew 11.27), that ‘all authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me’ (Matthew 28.18), and that ‘the Father loves the Son, and has given all things into his hand’ (John 3.35; cf. John 5.20, 17.2). Once all this has been grasped, it is not certainly established that the sense of Mark 13.32 is that the Son was ignorant; for just as Christ said to the sons of Zebedee, ‘It is not mine to give you,’ so too he could say to the disciples, ‘no one, not even the angels of heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father, knows.’ For since in other cases scholars warn us (lest we should

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(ne mentalitate graeca iudaica legemus scripta), fieri sane potest ut etiam hoc in casu illud ‘nescire’ non solum intellectum sed etiam voluntatem manifestet. Circa autem contraria Patrum testimonia (b, 2), dici potest sicut de persona et naturis ita etiam de scientia Christi hominis evolutionem quamdam intelligentiae (db 1800) esse factam. (2) Quantum deinde ad obiectionem Anatolii diaconi, respondendum est illam analogiam premi non posse. Certo immortalis assumpsit nostram mortalitatem. Sed etiam certum est impeccabilem non assumpsisse nostram peccabilitatem (vide thesin tertiam decimam) sed gratiae fuisse plenum. Neque in genere dici potest nostram assumpsisse ignorantiam, si quidem ipse non solum gratiae sed etiam veritatis plenus fuisse dicitur. Unde communiter a theologis doceri solet Christus homo eos humanae naturae defectus assumpsisse qui perfectioni donorum gratiae et scientiae non obstant. Ita Sum. theol., 3, q. 14, a. 4. (3) Ad tertium denique dicendum est divinam essentiam entitative quidem esse eandem sive Deus creat sive non creat, et ideo non secundum entitatem divinae essentiae beatos magis actualia quam possibilia in Verbo cognoscere. Attamen ad visionem beatorum duo concurrunt, nempe, et divina essentia et lumen gloriae; et sicut secundum perfectionis luminis gloriae alii beati aliis perfectius Deum cognoscunt (Sum. theol., 1, q. 12, a. 6), ita etiam fieri potest ut secundum idem lumen beati videant et ea possibilia quae sunt actualia et eadem qua actualia.

7 Utrum in Christo homine fuerit scientia infusa. Sum. theol., 3, q. 9, a. 3; q. 11. Et communiter a theologis docetur. Respondetur quod inter dona Spiritus sancti enumerantur sapientia, intellectus, consilium, scientia (vide Sum. theol., 1-2, q. 68, a. 4); quae cum intellectus perficiant et iustis infundantur, in genere scientiae infusae sunt collocanda. Iam vero iam probatum est Christum eam plenitudinem gratiae habuisse ad quam sequitur plenitudo donorum Spiritus sancti (thesis undecima, b, 7). Et ideo dubitare non potest Christum scientiam habuisse infusam. Convenienter praeterea ad scientiam infusam reducuntur quae in scripturis ponuntur de speciali quadam scientia Christi, uti Mc 2.8, Mt 17.25–26, Io 2.25.

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read Jewish writings with a Greek mentality) that for the Hebrews nouns and verbs signifying knowing in no way prescind from will, surely it could be that in this case too ‘not knowing’ manifests not only intellect but also will. As for the contrary witness of the Fathers (b, 2), however, what can be said is that, just as a development of understanding (db 1800, ds 3020) has come about with regard to Christ’s person and his natures, so too with regard to the knowledge of Christ as man. (2) So far as the objection of Anatolius the deacon is concerned, the reply should be that that analogy cannot be pressed. It is certain that the immortal one took on our mortality. But it is likewise certain that the one incapable of sinning did not take on our ability to sin (see thesis 13), but was full of grace. Nor, in general, can it be said that he took on our ignorance, since he is said to have been full not only of grace but also of truth. Hence, it is commonly taught by theologians that Christ the man assumed those defects of human nature that do not stand in the way of the perfection of his gifts of grace and knowledge. Thus in Summa theolgiae, 3, q. 14, a. 4. (3) To the third objection, finally, what should be said is that the divine essence is entitatively the same whether God does or does not create, and thus it is not according to the entity of the divine essence that the blessed know, in the Word, things actual more than things possible. Yet two things converge in the vision of the blessed, namely, the divine essence and the light of glory; and just as according to the perfection of the light of glory some of the blessed know God more perfectly than others (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 6), so too it is possible that according to the same light the blessed see both those possible things that are actual, and also the same things as actual. 7 Was there infused knowledge in Christ as man? See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 3; q. 11. And this is commonly taught by the theologians. The reply is that among the gifts of the Holy Spirit are numbered wisdom, understanding, counsel, and knowledge (see Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 68, a. 4); since these perfect the intellect and fill the justified, they are grouped in the genus of infused knowledge. Now it has already been proved that Christ had that fullness of grace on which follows fullness of the gifts of the Holy Spirit (thesis 11, b, 7). And thus it cannot be doubted that Christ had infused knowledge. Furthermore, what is set out in scripture about special knowledge on Christ’s part, as in Mark 2.8, Matthew 17.25–26, and John 2.25, is appropriately reduced to infused knowledge.

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Ad extensionem autem scientiae infusae Christi quod attinet, habetur auctoritas S. Thomae et theologorum ut quis affirmet Christum hominem in propria specie per scientiam infusam cognovisse omnia quae per modum obiecti secundarii in Verbo cognovit. Sum. theol., 3, q. 11, a. 1. Obiecerit tamen quispiam contra sententiam S. Thomae atque theologorum quod inutilis est scientia infusa ad ea iterum cognoscenda quae iam in Verbo cognoscuntur. Quem tamen fugit quantum intercedat inter contemplationem intellectualem syntheticam et cognitionem minus generalem. Qui tamen vehicula aerea vel interplanetaria construunt, magis impedirentur quam adiuvarentur si omnia secundum specialem relativitatis theoriam10 considerarent. Neque ideo quia nimis universalis et minus accurata est haec theoria, cum et univeralior et magis accurata sit, sed quia intellectum finitum plura et magis exacte considerare cogit quam rei necessitas postulat. At ipsa divina essentia ad omnes mundos possibiles comparatur, sicut theoria scientifica ad partem quandam eamque minorem huius mundi. Et sicut theoriae minus generales in hoc mundo cognoscendo suam habent utilitatem, eamque maximam, similiter scientia infusa Christo homini perutilis dici debet.

8 Utrum in Christo homine fuerit scientia acquisita. Sum. theol., 3, q. 9, a. 4; q. 12. Ubi citatur Heb 5.8: didicit ex his quae passus est obedientiam; Lc 2.52: Iesus proficiebat sapientia; Ambrosius: proficiebat secundum sapientiam humanam (ml 16, 872); quibus addi posse videntur textus supra citati (a, 2). Neque dubitari licet hanc scientiam in Christo fuisse. Nam in homine scientia acquisita non est peccatum; sed Christus est per omnia nobis similis absque peccato; et ideo sicut in nobis ita etiam in Christo fuit scientia acquisita. Quod si obicitur superfluere acquisitam scientiam si omnia iam scientia beata et infusa cognoscuntur, respondendum est idem multipliciter cognosci posse. E.g., per scientiam infusam Christus homo intelligere potuit qualis in hominibus sit quae dicitur intelligentia vulgaris (common sense) sed

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As to how far Christ’s infused knowledge went, there is the authority of Thomas Aquinas and the theologians, such that one may affirm that by infused knowledge Christ the man knew, in its own species, everything which, in the Word, he knew in the manner of a secondary object. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 11, a. 1. Someone may object, however, against the opinion of Thomas and the theologians, that infused knowledge is of no use for knowing all over again those things that are already known in the Word. What escapes this objector is how much difference there is between synthetic intellectual contemplation and less general knowing. Those who build airplanes or spaceships are hindered rather than helped if they consider everything according to the special theory of relativity.10 Nor is this because that theory is too universal and less accurate (since it is both more universal and more accurate), but because it forces a finite intellect to consider more, and more accurately, than the needs of the matter call for. But the divine essence itself is related to all possible worlds in the same way that scientific theory is to some part of this world, and a minor part at that. And just as less general theories have their usefulness in knowing this world, and the greatest usefulness at that, so likewise the infused knowledge should be said to have had great usefulness for Christ the man. 8 Was there acquired knowledge in Christ the man? In Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 4, and in q. 12, Thomas quotes the following: Hebrews 5.8, ‘he learned obedience through what he suffered’; Luke 2.52, ‘Jesus increased in wisdom’; and Ambrose, who says that he increased according to his human wisdom (ml 16, 872). To these it would seem possible to add the texts cited above (a, 2). Nor may it be doubted that this wisdom was in Christ. For in man acquired knowledge is not sin; but Christ is like us in all things but sin; and therefore as in us, so too in Christ there was acquired knowledge. If the objection is raised that acquired knowledge is superfluous if all things are known already by beatific and infused knowledge, the reply is that the same thing can be known in many ways. For instance, Christ the man could understand through infused knowledge how it is that men have

10 In 1960 Lonergan had written ‘secundum generalem vel etiam specialem relativitatis theoriam’ (according to the general or even special theory of relativity).

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solummodo per scientiam acquisitam ipse talem cognitionem (quae se non intelligit) habere potuit. Scholion 1: De psychologia Christi humana Quae thesibus decima ad duodecimam posita sunt, minime sufficiunt ad psychologiam Christi humanam describendam, cum nisi principia quaedam valde generalia non determinent. At si quis magis·determinate loqui voluerit, quaestionibus vel disputatis vel etiam haud consideratis undique premitur. Quas solummodo enumerare id forte emolumenti habere potest ut res in propria ‘perspectiva’ consideretur. Quae auctores moderni de re psychologica investigaverunt, praecipue psychologiam sensitivam respiciunt. Duae sufficiant indicationes: (1) G. Cruchon, ‘Genèse et structure du moi humain,’ NouvRevThéol, mars–avril, 1951; (2) permulta opera a J. Piaget inde ab anno 1926 de evolutione parvulorum, ubi subest theoria maximi acuminis et valoris circa concretum evolvendi processum; ipsa theoria prorsus generalis est, cum nihil aliud sit applicatio generalissimi cuiusdam theorematis mathematici de circulis operationum (Group Theory). Eiusmodi cognitiones quam maxime quaestionem de psychologia Christi clarificarent, non quidem directe et positive, sed indirecte et prohibentia removendo, si quidem omnes fere homines compertum habere videntur quod, ubi sermo fit de intellectu, re vera sermo est de sensibus; et ideo si per longa capitula de psychologia sensitiva tractaretur, quibusdam saltem persuasum esset subsequentia capita de re alia disputare. Desiderantur deinde clarae expositiones circa differentias (1) inter conceptum scientiae graecum et mediaevalem et realitatem scientiae modernam, (2) inter cognitionem scientificam et philosophicam, (3) inter has disciplinas et cognitionem humanam vulgarem et huius variationes secundum loca, tempora, culturas; desiderantur praeterea notitiae bene definitae de harum omnium habitudinibus inter se et cum vita hominis sensitiva. Ulterius, desiderantur tractatus de aspectu experientiali vitae supernaturalis; unde et procedi posset ad notionem, si non positivam, saltem negative definitam de scientia infusa, qualis sit et quemadmodum a diversis cognitionis typis supra enumeratis differat, quid iis adderet et forte quemadmodum eiusmodi additio fieret. Quibus peractis, ad quaestiones disputatas circa visionem beatam eliminandas procedendum esset, unde forte doctrina et

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what is called common sense, but only through acquired knowledge could he have had such knowing (which does not understand itself) himself. Scholion 1: The human psychology of Christ For describing Christ’s human psychology, what was set out in theses 10 through 12 is not enough, since these theses determine only certain generally valid principles. But if one wishes to speak in a more determinate fashion, one is pressed on all sides with questions or disputes or even matters scarcely considered. Simply listing these can perhaps have the advantage of putting the matter in perspective. Modern authors who have investigated psychology have mostly given their attention to sensitive psychology. Let two indications suffice: (1) G. Cruchon, ‘Genèse et structure du moi humain,’ Nouvelle revue théologique 73 (1951) 261–74, 364–84; (2) the many works of J. Piaget, beginning in 1926, on the development of children, beneath which lies a theory of the greatest acumen and value about the concrete process of development. This theory is utterly general, since it is nothing else than an application of very general mathematical theorems on circles of operations (Group Theory). Knowledge of this kind greatly clarifies the question of Christ’s psychology, not indeed directly and positively, but indirectly and by removing prohibitions, since nearly all seem to take for granted that when there is discussion of the intellect it is in fact discussion about the senses; and thus after reading through long chapters of sensitive psychology they will almost be persuaded that the later chapters are disputing about something else. Next, what is needed is clear exposition of the differences (1) between the Greek and medieval conception of science and the modern reality of science, (2) between scientific and philosophical knowing, (3) between these disciplines and common sense with its variations according to places, times, and cultures; besides this, well-defined notions are needed concerning the relationships of all these with each other and with our sensitive living. Further, these is needed a treatment of the experiential aspect of the supernatural life. From this it would be possible to go on to a notion, if not positive at least negatively defined, of infused knowledge – what sort of thing it is and how it differs from the different types of knowing listed above, what it adds to them and perhaps how such an addition comes about. Once all this has been done, we could proceed to the elimination of

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exacta et plene determinata, etsi analogica et ad pauca quaedam capita redacta, haberetur. Deinde tandem nisi methodo clara et exacta haec omnia vel tentari non debent; et cum ad summam perfectionem methodus theologica nondum pervenisse videatur, forte ibi incipiendum esset. Scholion II: De potentia Christi hominis11 Vide Sum. theol., 3, q. 13; Galtier 322–42; Boyer 205–13; plenius ubi de causalitate sacramentorum in tractatu de sacramentis in genere. Ulterius desideratur consideratio de causalitate historica quam Christus homo manifeste exercet.

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disputed questions about the beatific vision, and from there perhaps to an exact and fully detailed doctrine, even if it were analogical and reduced to a few chapters. Finally, all of this should be attempted only through a clear and exact method; and since theology does not yet seem to have arrived at the highest perfection of its method, perhaps it might begin here. Scholion 2: The power of Christ the man11 See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 13; Galtier 322–42; Boyer 205–13; more fully, the causality of the sacraments treated in the theological treatise on sacraments in general. There is need for further consideration of the historical causality that Christ the man manifestly exercises.

11 This scholion, and virtually nothing else in this thesis, is identical with the corresponding passage in the 1964 version of De Verbo incarnato. See above, pp. 714/15.

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Abbreviations

AAS ACO

Acta Apostolicae Sedis Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, ed. E. Schwartz, Argentorati-Berolini-Lipsiae Bidez-Parmentier J. Bidez and L. Parmentier, eds., The Ecclesiastical History of Evagrius with the Scholia (London: Methuen, 1898; repr. Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1964) CCSG Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca CCSL Corpus Christianorum Series Latina (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1953–) Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (VindoboCSEL nae [Vienna]: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1866–) DB H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum, ed. C. Bannwart DBS Louis Pirot, André Robert, and Henri Cazelles, Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1928) DEC The Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 2 vols., ed. G. Alberigo et al.; English trans., ed. N. Tanner et al. (Washington, dc: Georgetown University, 1990) DS H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum, ed. A. Schönmetzer DTC Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, ed. A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, and É. Amann (15 vols., 1903–50)

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Abbreviations

EP ET EVV Fliche-Martin

GCS

GCSNF HE LCL LTK LXX MG ML NPNF RSV SB SC Schwartz

TDNT

TWNT Wickham

Enchiridion Patristicum: Loci SS. Patrum, doctorum scriptorum ecclesiasticorum, 21st ed. (Barcinone: Herder, 1959) English translation English versions (of the Bible) Augustin Fliche and Victor Martin, Histoire de l’Église depuis les origines jusqu’à nos jours (Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1948) Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs; Berlin: AkademieVerlag, 1897) – (It is customary to refer to the various editors: e.g., Klostermann.) Die Grieschischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte Neue Folge Historia Ecclesiastica (Eusebius [in mg 20]) Loeb Classical Library Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche Septuagint Patrologia Graeca, ed. J.P. Migne (162 vols., 1857–66). Patrologia Latina, ed. J.P. Migne (221 vols., 1844–64) Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers Revised Standard Version Spicilegium Bonaventurianum Sources Chrétiennes Drei Dogmatische Schriften Iustinians, ed. E. Schwartz, vol. 2 of Legum Iustiniani Imperatoris Vocabularium –Subsidia; 2nd ed., ed. M. Amelotti, R. Albertella, and L. Migliardi (Milan: Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, 1973) Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, trans. and ed. Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids, mi: Eerdmans, 1967) Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1932) Cyril of Alexandria: Select Letters, ed. Lionel R. Wickham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983)

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Bibliography of Modern Authors

Works Cited by Lonergan or Added by Editors Adam, K. Der Christus des Glaubens: Vorlesgunen über die kirchliche Christologie. Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1954, 1956. In English, The Christ of Faith: The Christology of the Church. New York: Pantheon, 1957. Allen, Pauline, ed. Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh-Century Heresy: The Synodical Letter and Other Documents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Allen, Pauline, and Neil Bronwen, eds. Maximus the Confessor and His Companions: Documents from Exile. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Altaner, Berthold. Patrologie: Leben, Schriften und Lehre der Kirchenväter. Fribourg: Verlag Herder, 1958. In English, Patrology. Trans. Hilda C. Graef. New York: Herder and Herder, 1961. Arnou, R. ‘Nestorianisme et Néoplatonisme: L’unité du Christ et l’union des “Intelligibles.”’ Gregorianum 17 (1936) 116–31. Bacht, H. ‘Die Rolle des orientalischen Mönchtums in den kirchen-politischen Auseinandersetzungen um Chalkedon (431–519).’ In Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, vol. 2, 193–314. Backes, Ignaz. ‘Die christologische Problematik der Hochscholastik und ihre Beziehung zu Chalkedon.’ In Grillmeier-Bacht, Das Konzil von Chalkedon, vol. 2, 923–39. Baron, Roger. Science et sagesse chez Hughes de Saint-Victor. Paris: Lethielleux, 1957. Bartsch, Hans Werner. Der gegenwärtige Stand der Entmythologisierungsdebatte: Ein kritischer Bericht. In the series Kerygma und Mythos, vol. 1, part 2. HamburgVolksdorf: H. Reich, 1955. Behr, John, ed. and trans. The Case against Diodore and Theodore: Texts and Their Contexts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

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Theodore of Mopsuestia. Les homélies catéchétiques. Reproduction phototypique du ms. Mingana Syr. 561. Selly Oak Colleges’ Library, Birmingham. Translation, intro., index, by Raymond Tonneau in collaboration with Robert Devreesse. Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, 1949. Tixeront, Joseph. Histoire des dogmes dans l’antiquité chrétienne. Vol. 3, La fin de l’âge patristique. Paris: Librairie Victor LeCoffre, 1912. In English, The History of Dogmas. Vol. 3, The End of the Patristic Age. Trans. Henry L. Brianceau. St Louis; B. Herder, 1916. Torrance, Iain R., ed. Christology after Chalcedon: Severus of Antioch and Sergius the Monophysite. Eugene, or: Wipf and Stock, 1998. Torrell, Jean-Pierre. Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1993; rev. ed., 2002. In English, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work. Trans. Robert Royal. Washington, dc: Catholic University of America Press, 1996. – ‘Le thomisme dans le débat christologique contemporain.’ In Saint Thomas au XXe siècle: Colloque du centenaire de la ‘Revue Thomiste’ (1893–1992), Toulouse, 25–28 mars 1993. Ed. Serge-Thomas Bonino. Paris: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1994. van Bavel, Tarsicius J. Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin. Fribourg, Switzerland: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Swisse, 1954. Vogt, E. ‘ “Mysteria” in Textibus Qumrân.’ Biblica 37 (1956) 247–57. Vuillermet, Pierre. Elipand de Tolède, Pour l’histoire de l’adoptianisme Espagnol, Étude de théologie historique. Brignais: Sacuny, 1911. Wolfson, Harry Austryn. Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Cambridge, ma: Harvard, 1947. Xiberta, Bartholomaeus M. Enchiridion de Verbo incarnato: Fontes quos ad studia theologica collegit. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto ‘Francisco Suárez,’ 1957. – El Yo de Jesucristo. Barcelona: Herder, 1954.

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Scriptural Passages

1 Corinthians 1.2  75, 93, 95 1 Corinthians 1.8  93 1 Corinthians 1.17  125 1 Corinthians 1.21  665 1 Corinthians 1.23  779 1 Corinthians 1.24  133, 681, 683 1 Corinthians 1.30  681, 683 1 Corinthians 1.31  91 1 Corinthians 2.4–5  71 1 Corinthians 2.7  55, 59, 113 1 Corinthians 2.8  55, 111, 125 1 Corinthians 2.11  661 1 Corinthians 3.5  75 1 Corinthians 4.4  75 1 Corinthians 4.6  123 1 Corinthians 4.16  53 1 Corinthians 4.18–20  71 1 Corinthians 4.19  75 1 Corinthians 4.19–21  75 1 Corinthians 5.4  71 1 Corinthians 5.5  71, 93 1 Corinthians 7.10  75 1 Corinthians 7.12  75 1 Corinthians 7.17  75, 77 1 Corinthians 7.22  75 1 Corinthians 7.31  123

1 Corinthians 7.32  75, 77 1 Corinthians 7.34  75, 77 1 Corinthians 7.39  75, 77 1 Corinthians 8.4–6  117 1 Corinthians 8.5  151 1 Corinthians 8.6  37, 45, 63, 77, 97, 119, 129, 131, 145, 151 1 Corinthians 9.1–3  75 1 Corinthians 9.15  125 1 Corinthians 9.19  63 1 Corinthians 9.22  63 1 Corinthians 10.6  129 1 Corinthians 10.22  91 1 Corinthians 10.26  91 1 Corinthians 10.31  693 1 Corinthians 10.33  63 1 Corinthians 11.1  53 1 Corinthians 11.3  57 1 Corinthians 11.7  129 1 Corinthians 11.14  117 1 Corinthians 11.26  75 1 Corinthians 11.32  75 1 Corinthians 12 and 13  57 1 Corinthians 12.3  75, 93, 127 1 Corinthians 12.4–11  685 1 Corinthians 12.5  75

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Scriptural Passages

1 Corinthians 12.6  63 1 Corinthians 13.11  695 1 Corinthians 13.12  579, 665, 669 1 Corinthians 14.37  75 1 Corinthians 15.20–28  45 1 Corinthians 15.22  57 1 Corinthians 15.24  127 1 Corinthians 15.24–28  73, 77, 179, 563 1 Corinthians 15.25  179 1 Corinthians 15.28  63, 179 1 Corinthians 15.31  45 1 Corinthians 15.43  113 1 Corinthians 15.44–47  119 1 Corinthians 15.45  47, 55 1 Corinthians 15.46  121 1 Corinthians 15.47  45 1 Corinthians 15.47–49  55 1 Corinthians 15.49  129 1 Corinthians 15.58  75 1 Corinthians 16.7  75 1 Corinthians 16.10  75 1 Corinthians 16.22  77, 91 1 John 1.1  69 1 John 1.1–2  95, 145 1 John 1.2  143, 145, 553 1 John 1.5  145 1 John 1.6  147 1 John 1.7  147 1 John 1.8  147 1 John 2.4  147 1 John 2.8  145, 147 1 John 2.21  147 1 John 2.25  145 1 John 2.27–28  147 1 John 3.2  579, 665, 675 1 John 3.5  665, 717 1 John 3.14–15  145 1 John 3.18–19  147 1 John 4.2–3  69 1 John 4.6  147 1 John 4.9  87, 145

1 John 4.12  149, 665, 667 1 John 4.20  665, 667 1 John 5.1  69 1 John 5.6  147 1 John 5.11–12  145 1 John 5.11–13  145 1 John 5.16  145 1 John 5.20  103, 145, 149 1 Kings 8.10–11  61, 109 1 Peter 1.11  111 1 Peter 1.19  665, 717 1 Peter 1.21  111 1 Peter 2.18–25  729 1 Peter 2.21  549 1 Peter 2.22  665, 717 1 Peter 2.23  729 1 Peter 2.24  69 1 Peter 3.22  75 1 Peter 4.11  111 1 Peter 4.14  113 1 Peter 5.4  113 1 Peter 5.10  113 1 Thessalonians 1.6  53 1 Thessalonians 1.9–10  77 1 Thessalonians 2.12  113 1 Thessalonians 2.14  53 1 Thessalonians 4.6  75 1 Thessalonians 4.15–18  77 1 Thessalonians 5.2  93 1 Timothy 1.1  655 1 Timothy 1.17  665 1 Timothy 2.5  69, 551, 643 1 Timothy 3.16  111 1 Timothy 6.15  91 1 Timothy 6.16  91, 107 2 Corinthians 1.2  99 2 Corinthians 1.3  101 2 Corinthians 1.14  93 2 Corinthians 3.7–11  113 2 Corinthians 3.7–18  119 2 Corinthians 3.8  119 2 Corinthians 3.16–18  119

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Scriptural Passages

2 Corinthians 3.18  55, 123, 129 2 Corinthians 4.4  47, 55, 77, 121, 129, 135 2 Corinthians 4.6  113, 145, 231 2 Corinthians 4.17  113 2 Corinthians 5.6  75, 77, 665 2 Corinthians 5.6–7  665 2 Corinthians 5.10  73, 665, 685, 801 2 Corinthians 5.11  75 2 Corinthians 5.14  97 2 Corinthians 5.14–18  119 2 Corinthians 5.15  73 2 Corinthians 5.17  39 2 Corinthians 5.21  69, 665, 717 2 Corinthians 6.18  81 2 Corinthians 8.9  123 2 Corinthians 9.3  125 2 Corinthians 10.8  75 2 Corinthians 10.17  75 2 Corinthians 11.13–14  123 2 Corinthians 11.31  101 2 Corinthians 12.8  75, 93 2 Corinthians 12.12  71 2 Corinthians 13.10  75 2 John 1  147 2 John 4  147 2 John 7  69 2 Peter 1.1  75, 99 2 Peter 1.11  99 2 Peter 1.17  87, 111, 115, 551 2 Peter 2.20  99 2 Peter 3.2  99 2 Peter 3.10  93 2 Peter 3.18  99 2 Samuel 23.2  139 2 Thessalonians 1.9  75 2 Thessalonians 1.12  99 2 Thessalonians 2.2  93 2 Thessalonians 3.7  53 2 Thessalonians 3.9  53 2 Timothy 2.10  113 3 John 7  95

3 John 12  147 Amos 3.1  139 Acts 1.7  637, 707, 779, 781, 803 Acts 2.16–21  95 Acts 2.20  91, 93 Acts 2.21  75 Acts 2.22  117, 191 Acts 2.24  135 Acts 2.25  91 Acts 2.29–36  73 Acts 2.32–36  85 Acts 2.33–36  93 Acts 2.36  177 Acts 2.37–38  71 Acts 3.6  71 Acts 3.14  551 Acts 3.22  777 Acts 3.22–23  73 Acts 4.10  93, 95 Acts 4.12  93, 95 Acts 4.26  91 Acts 5.5  71 Acts 5.10  71 Acts 5.12  71 Acts 5.19  71 Acts 5.31  73 Acts 5.41  73 Acts 6.6  71 Acts 7.2  111 Acts 7.2–53  35 Acts 7.55  111 Acts 8.12  71 Acts 9.3  71 Acts 9.4  685 Acts 9.14  75, 93, 95 Acts 9.20  83 Acts 9.21  75 Acts 9.22  83 Acts 10.36  73 Acts 12.7  71 Acts 12.23  111 Acts 13.10–11  91

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Scriptural Passages

Acts 13.16–22  35, 115 Acts 13.33  45, 47, 49, 85, 177 Acts 14.15–17  35, 115 Acts 14.22  71 Acts 15.17  91 Acts 16.30  91 Acts 17.22–31  115 Acts 17.24  117 Acts 17.24–28  35 Acts 17.25  117 Acts 17.26  117 Acts 17.27  117 Acts 17.28  117, 131 Acts 17.29  117 Acts 17.31  191 Acts 19.8  71 Acts 20.25  71 Acts 20.28  103 Acts 22.11  111, 115 Acts 22.16  75 Acts 25.26  91 Acts 28.23  71 Acts 28.26  161 Acts 28.30–31  71 Colossians 1.12–14  553 Colossians 1.13  45, 127, 551, 555 Colossians 1.15  55, 129, 135, 665 Colossians 1.15–16  45, 77 Colossians 1.15–17  63, 127, 129 Colossians 1.16  127, 131, 133, 145, 147 Colossians 1.16–17  59, 135, 137 Colossians 1.17  97 Colossians 1.18  57, 129 Colossians 1.18–20  129 Colossians 1.19  61 Colossians 1.20  563 Colossians 1.22  57 Colossians 1.26–27  59 Colossians 2.2  59, 61, 103, 683 Colossians 2.2–3  683, 779, 801 Colossians 2.2–4  681 Colossians 2.8  59, 129

Colossians 2.9  683 Colossians 2.9–10  61, 127, 131, 147, 557, 559, 683, 779, 801 Colossians 2.9–15  553 Colossians 2.10  59, 61, 131, 135, 563, 685, 709 Colossians 2.17  129 Colossians 2.19  59 Colossians 3.1  73 Colossians 3.4  113 Colossians 3.9–11  57 Colossians 3.10  129 Colossians 3.11  63, 75 Colossians 3.22  91 Colossians 3.23  75 Colossians 4.1  91 Colossians 4.12  75 Daniel 2.44  77, 179 Daniel 2.47  107 Daniel 7.14  77, 179 Daniel 7.27  77, 179 Deuteronomy 1.31  615 Deuteronomy 4.35  37 Deuteronomy 5.4  665 Deuteronomy 6.4  37, 117 Deuteronomy 10.17  107 Ecclesiasticus 24.5 Vulgate  141 Ecclesiasticus 24.32 Vulgate  141 Ephesians 1.3  101 Ephesians 1.5  83 Ephesians 1.5–7  553, 561 Ephesians 1.6  551, 555 Ephesians 1.9  59 Ephesians 1.9–10  59, 63 Ephesians 1.10  127, 135, 585, 685 Ephesians 1.20  135 Ephesians 1.20–21  75, 95 Ephesians 1.20–22  563 Ephesians 1.21  135 Ephesians 1.21–22  127 Ephesians 1.22  73 Ephesians 1.23  57, 59, 61, 63

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Ephesians 2.3  69, 633, 665 Ephesians 2.5–6  59 Ephesians 2.15–16  59 Ephesians 2.16  57 Ephesians 2.21  59 Ephesians 3.3  59 Ephesians 3.6  59 Ephesians 3.9  59 Ephesians 3.16  113 Ephesians 3.16–19  553 Ephesians 3.17–19  61, 63, 131, 147, 779, 801 Ephesians 3.19  61 Ephesians 3.21  111 Ephesians 4.4  57 Ephesians 4.4–6  63 Ephesians 4.6  63 Ephesians 4.10  59, 61 Ephesians 4.12  57 Ephesians 4.16  57, 59 Ephesians 4.22–24  57 Ephesians 5.1  55 Ephesians 5.2  549 Ephesians 5.14  145 Ephesians 5.23  57 Ephesians 5.25  549 Ephesians 5.28  57, 63 Ephesians 5.30  57 Ephesians 5.32  59 Ephesians 6.5  91 Ephesians 6.7  75 Ephesians 6.9  91 Exodus 3.1–12  667 Exodus 6.2–8  35 Exodus 15.11  121 Exodus 24.11  665 Exodus 24.15–18  109 Exodus 33.11  665 Exodus 33.20–23  665 Exodus 40.34–38  61, 109 Ezekiel 1.3  139 Ezekiel 1.26–28  109

Ezekiel 37.1–14  165 Ezekiel 37.6  165 Ezekiel 37.13  165 Ezekiel 37.14  165 Ezekiel 43.1–7  109 Galatians 1.5  111 Galatians 2.15  117 Galatians 2.20  73, 549 Galatians [3–4]  59 Galatians 3.26  81 Galatians 3.26–28  59 Galatians 3.27  53 Galatians 4.4  69, 119 Galatians 4.4–6  47, 119, 141, 561 Galatians 4.4–7  89 Galatians 4.5  83 Galatians 4.6  63, 89 Galatians 4.8  117 Galatians 4.19  53, 549 Genesis 1.1  143 Genesis 1.3  139 Genesis 1.26–27  57, 119, 121, 125, 153 Genesis 2.2–3  163 Genesis 2.7  55, 119, 155 Genesis 3.5  121, 125 Genesis 3.9  615 Genesis 4.9  615 Genesis 22.12  641 Genesis 31.13  105, 107 Genesis 32.31  665 Hebrews 1.1  777 Hebrews 1.1–4  141 Hebrews 1.2  145 Hebrews 1.2–3  47, 77 Hebrews 1.2–4  133 Hebrews 1.3  73, 125, 129, 135 Hebrews 1.5  85 Hebrews 1.6  129, 309 Hebrews 1.8  133 Hebrews 1.8–9  97 Hebrews 1.13  73 Hebrews 2.8  73, 563

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Scriptural Passages

Hebrews 2.9  549, 583, 795 Hebrews 2.10  697 Hebrews 2.17  69 Hebrews 3.5–6  133 Hebrews 4.2  135 Hebrews 4.12  135 Hebrews 4.15  69, 597, 665, 675, 717, 727 Hebrews 5.5  85 Hebrews 5.7  191, 561, 583 Hebrews 5.7–8  125, 597 Hebrews 5.8  191, 307, 675, 705, 807 Hebrews 5.9  71, 553 Hebrews 6.6  133 Hebrews 7.3  133 Hebrews 7.26  665, 717 Hebrews 7.28  133 Hebrews 8.6  551 Hebrews 8.8–12  551 Hebrews 9.14  551, 597, 705 Hebrews 9.15  551 Hebrews 10.1  129 Hebrews 10.5–10  549 Hebrews 10.28–29  133 Hebrews 11.3  135 Hebrews 11.17  87 Hebrews 12.22  563 Hebrews 12.24  551 Hebrews 13.21  111 Hosea 1.1  139 Isaiah 6.1  109, 665 Isaiah 6.1–3  111 Isaiah 6.1–13  667 Isaiah 6.3  109, 111 Isaiah 6.5  665 Isaiah 6.9–10  161 Isaiah 6.10  109 Isaiah 7.15  635 Isaiah 7.15–16  631 Isaiah 7.16  637, 653 Isaiah 11.1–2  551 Isaiah 11.1–3  553

Isaiah 11.2  705 Isaiah 14.14  121 Isaiah 35.2  111 Isaiah 40.3–5  95 Isaiah 40.5  111 Isaiah 40.25  121 Isaiah 42  571 Isaiah 42.8  109 Isaiah 43.10  109 Isaiah 43.25  109 Isaiah 45.12  109 Isaiah 45.17–19  109 Isaiah 45.23  93, 95, 127 Isaiah 48.11  111 Isaiah 52.6  109 Isaiah 53  125 Isaiah 55.10–11  139 Isaiah 66.18–21  111 James 1.1  75 James 2.1  55, 111 James 2.7  93, 95 Jeremiah 1.1–10  667 Jeremiah 1.4  139 Joel 3.5  95 John 1.1  103, 105, 107, 141, 167, 181 John 1.1–2  95, 143 John 1.1–14  47, 159 John 1.3  77, 133, 159, 165 John 1.4  105, 147 John 1.6  105, 141 John 1.8  105 John 1.9  141, 145, 149 John 1.10  145, 147 John 1.12  83 John 1.12–13  105 John 1.14  61, 69, 77, 87, 107, 111, 115, 127, 141, 143, 147, 151, 167, 181, 465, 553, 557, 627, 667, 683, 777, 801 John 1.14–16  559 John 1.15  129 John 1.16  61, 131, 147, 553, 587, 777, 801

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Scriptural Passages

John 1.16–17  683 John 1.17  147, 683 John 1.18  87, 105, 107, 129, 141, 143, 175, 665, 667, 671, 777, 787, 791 John 1.20  105 John 1.30  129 John 1.32  705 John 1.43  549 John 1.47  705 John 1.49  83 John 2.4  705 John 2.11  111 John 2.14  307 John 2.17  307 John 2.19  149, 219 John 2.22  149 John 2.24–25  705, 707 John 2.25  775, 805 John 3.2  105 John 3.3  173 John 3.5  173 John 3.11  667, 777, 791 John 3.12  777 John 3.13  79, 119, 167, 667, 777 John 3.14–18  665 John 3.15  145 John 3.15–16  665 John 3.16  87, 107 John 3.17  87 John 3.18  87, 665 John 3.19–21  147, 161, 171 John 3.21  105, 147 John 3.31–36  683, 777 John 3.33  147, 667 John 3.34  551, 597, 659, 661, 665, 703, 801 John 3.35  175, 551, 617, 707, 803 John 3.35–36  89 John 3.36  145, 665 John 4.6  307 John 4.14  145 John 4.18  147

John 4.19  777 John 4.23  147, 149 John 4.26  107 John 4.34  549, 695 John 4.36  145 John 4.37  149 John 4.39  149 John 5.16–30  161 John 5.17  163 John 5.17–18  167 John 5.18  159, 163 John 5.19  163, 165, 169, 173, 177 John 5.19–20  169 John 5.19–23  89 John 5.19-30  165, 167 John 5.20  103, 145, 165, 169, 803 John 5.21  165 John 5.22  73, 163, 165, 617, 665, 685, 779 John 5.22–23  309 John 5.23  165, 169, 171 John 5.24  145, 149 John 5.25  165 John 5.26  89, 107, 143, 145, 159, 165, 173, 177 John 5.27  73, 163, 165, 665, 685 John 5.28–29  165 John 5.29  145 John 5.30  163, 165, 177, 549, 695 John 5.31–32  147 John 5.33  147 John 5.36  175 John 5.37  669, 777 John 5.37–38  149 John 5.39–40  145 John 5.42  161 John 5.42–44  171 John 5.44  161 John 6.5  707 John 6.5–6  707, 775 John 6.6  705 John 6.14  777

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John 6.20  107 John 6.27  145 John 6.29  665 John 6.32  149 John 6.35  107, 145, 665 John 6.37  617 John 6.38  695 John 6.40  89, 145, 665 John 6.44  147 John 6.45  105 John 6.46  161, 777 John 6.47  665 John 6.47–48  145 John 6.51  145 John 6.53  145 John 6.55  147 John 6.57  173 John 6.61  161 John 6.61–62  79 John 6.62  119, 167, 667 John 6.63  145 John 6.64  161 John 6.65  161 John 6.66  161 John 7.6  705 John 7.8  705 John 7.15  597, 705, 709 John 7.16  175, 665, 779, 803 John 7.18  147 John 7.28  149 John 7.28–29  669 John 7.37–39  551 John 7.38–39  665 John 7.39  113, 705, 777, 795 John 7.40  777 John 7.45–52  161, 171 John 7.46  705, 775 John 7.47  695 John 8.12  107, 145, 147, 549 John 8.13–14  147 John 8.16  149, 175, 667 John 8.17  147

John 8.19  173 John 8.23  173 John 8.24  109, 161, 171, 665 John 8.26  147, 175, 667, 777, 779 John 8.26-28  803 John 8.28  109, 175, 667, 777, 779 John 8.29  175, 549, 667, 695 John 8.32  147 John 8.35–36  89 John 8.38  175, 669, 779 John 8.40  147, 175 John 8.42  79, 667 John 8.43  149 John 8.43–47  161, 171 John 8.44–46  147 John 8.46  665, 717 John 8.54  105 John 8.54–55  669 John 8.55  779 John 8.58  107, 141, 161, 173, 251, 509 John 8.59  173 John 9.9  105 John 9.16  105 John 9.17  777 John 9.33  105 John 9.39–41  161, 171 John 9.41  173 John 10.4  549 John 10.7  107 John 10.10   145 John 10.11  107 John 10.14  173 John 10.15  173, 669, 707 John 10.17  551 John 10.17–18  695, 727 John 10.22–39  171 John 10.24  171 John 10.25  171, 175 John 10.26  171 John 10.27  549 John 10.27–29  171 John 10.28  145

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John 10.28–30  175 John 10.29  175 John 10.30  107, 159, 171, 173, 509, 667 John 10.30–31  161 John 10.31–33  171 John 10.33  105, 161 John 10.34  83 John 10.34–36  171 John 10.36  551 John 10.37–38  171, 175 John 10.38  159, 173, 509, 667 John 10.39  171 John 10.41  147 John 11.4  113 John 11.9–10  147 John 11.25  107, 145 John 11.25–26  665 John 11.33  617 John 11.34  707, 775 John 11.40  113 John 11.42  705, 775 John 11.52  83 John 12.16  113 John 12.23  113 John 12.25  145 John 12.26  549 John 12.27  583, 775 John 12.27–28  617 John 12.28  95, 113, 617 John 12.30  705 John 12.35–36  147 John 12.37–43  147, 171 John 12.38  91, 149 John 12.39  161 John 12.40  109 John 12.41  109, 111, 665 John 12.44  175, 667 John 12.45  173 John 12.46  147 John 12.47  779 John 12.49  175 John 12.49–50  667, 779, 803

John 12.50  145 John 13.1  549 John 13.3  783 John 13.15  549 John 13.19  109, 665 John 13.21  617 John 13.34  549, 695 John 14.6  107, 145, 147, 149, 151, 161, 673 John 14.7  173 John 14.9  135, 173 John 14.9–11  667 John 14.10  173, 175, 509, 667, 779, 803 John 14.11  175, 509 John 14.12  173 John 14.13  89, 113 John 14.16  151 John 14.17  147, 551 John 14.20  509 John 14.23  509 John 14.24  149, 175, 667 John 14.26  151, 551, 705 John 14.28  175 John 14.30  665, 717 John 14.31  509, 549, 695 John 15.1  107, 149 John 15.1–11  553 John 15.3  149 John 15.9  551 John 15.9–10  695 John 15.12  549, 695 John 15.13  551 John 15.18  129 John 15.22–25  173 John 15.25  149 John 15.26  147, 151, 509, 551, 705 John 16.7  147, 551 John 16.12–15  551 John 16.13  147, 175, 801 John 16.13–15  151, 173 John 16.14  113, 175, 705

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Scriptural Passages

John 16.15  173, 175 John 16.28  509, 667 John 16.30  105 John 16.32  175 John 17.1  89, 113 John 17.2–3  145 John 17.3  103, 149, 177 John 17.4  113 John 17.5  79, 87, 115, 125, 143, 173 John 17.6  95 John 17.8  149, 667 John 17.10  173 John 17.11  95 John 17.12  95 John 17.14  149, 173, 667 John 17.16  173 John 17.17  147, 149, 667 John 17.19  147 John 17.21  173, 509 John 17.22  173 John 17.23  551, 555, 561 John 17.24  79, 115, 143, 173, 551, 555, 561 John 17.26  95, 117, 551, 555, 561 John 18.5–8  107 John 18.34  707, 775 John 18.37–38  147 John 19.7  105, 161 John 19.13  149 John 19.28  307 John 19.30  675, 695 John 19.35  147, 149, 665 John 20.23  705 John 20.27  69 John 20.28  103, 309 John 20.30–31  159 John 20.31  145, 665 John 21.15–17  707, 775 John 21.19  549 John 21.22  549 John 21.24  147 Judges 6.22–23  665

Judges 13.22  665 Jude 1  75 Luke 1.32  85, 95 Luke 1.33  77, 179 Luke 1.35  85, 551, 717 Luke 1.46  91 Luke 1.68  91 Luke 2.7  129 Luke 2.9  111, 115 Luke 2.14  111 Luke 2.47  695, 795 Luke 2.48  707 Luke 2.49  703, 775 Luke 2.50  703 Luke 2.52  191, 563, 591, 611, 617, 619, 627, 635, 639, 695, 705, 807 Luke 3.22  87, 551, 705 Luke 4.1  551, 597, 705 Luke 4.3  85 Luke 4.9  85 Luke 4.14  551, 597, 705 Luke 4.18  91, 551, 597, 705 Luke 4.21  551 Luke 4.22  695 Luke 4.22–30  707, 795 Luke 4.32  73 Luke 4.41  83 Luke 6.35  81 Luke 6.39  675 Luke 7.12  87 Luke 7.16  777 Luke 7.39  777 Luke 7.47–48  73 Luke 8.30  707, 775 Luke 8.42  87 Luke 9.8  777 Luke 9.13  707 Luke 9.16  707 Luke 9.20  83 Luke 9.23  549 Luke 9.31  111 Luke 9.32  111, 115

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Luke 9.38  87 Luke 9.56  77 Luke 10.16  169 Luke 10.21  551, 597, 705 Luke 10.22  87, 89, 129, 669, 673, 707, 777 Luke 13.6–9  707 Luke 19.10  77 Luke 19.33  91 Luke 19.38  111 Luke 20.41–44  73 Luke 22.44  191 Luke 22.67–71  85 Luke 23.35  83 Luke 23.46  675 Luke 23.47  83 Luke 24.19  777 Luke 24.26  55 Malachi 3.1  95 Mark 1.1  85 Mark 1.3  91, 95 Mark 1.10  705 Mark 1.11  85, 87, 551 Mark 1.12  551, 597, 705 Mark 1.14–15  71 Mark 1.22  73 Mark 1.35  191 Mark 2.1–12  51 Mark 2.7  73 Mark 2.8  705, 775, 805 Mark 2.9  71, 73 Mark 2.28  71 Mark 3.1–6  71 Mark 3.10  71 Mark 3.11  85 Mark 3.14–15  71 Mark 4.12  161 Mark 4.38–41  71 Mark 5.7  85 Mark 5.13–14  71 Mark 6.5  71 Mark 6.6  705, 707, 775

Mark 6.7  71 Mark 6.13  71 Mark 6.15  777 Mark 6.38  617, 707, 775 Mark 6.41  71 Mark 6.46  191 Mark 6.52  85 Mark 6.56  71 Mark 7.18  707, 775 Mark 7.28  91 Mark 7.29  71 Mark 7.35  71 Mark 8.20  707 Mark 8.25  71 Mark 8.29  83 Mark 8.31  705 Mark 8.34  549 Mark 8.38  111 Mark 9.2  123, 795 Mark 9.7  85, 87, 551 Mark 9.21  795 Mark 9.24  71 Mark 9.30  705 Mark 10.18  37 Mark 10.33–34  705 Mark 10.45  77 Mark 10.52  71 Mark 11.12–13  705 Mark 11.13  705, 707, 775 Mark 11.20  707 Mark 11.20–24  71 Mark 12.1–11  133 Mark 12.6  87 Mark 12.9  91 Mark 12.10–11  91 Mark 12.29  91, 117 Mark 12.29–30  37, 73 Mark 12.35–37  73 Mark 12.36  91 Mark 13.26  111 Mark 13.31  705 Mark 13.32  89, 607, 611, 617, 619, 663,

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679, 705, 707, 775, 779, 781, 783, 799, 803 Mark 14.33–34  307 Mark 14.33–42  583 Mark 14.35  191 Mark 14.36  89, 343, 349 Mark 14.39  191 Mark 14.61  85 Mark 15.34  675 Mark 15.39  83, 85 Mark 16.12  123 Mark 16.16  665, 705, 777 Matthew 3.2  71 Matthew 3.9  37 Matthew 3.16  705 Matthew 3.17  87, 551 Matthew 4.1  551, 597, 705 Matthew 4.3  85 Matthew 4.6  85 Matthew 4.10  37 Matthew 4.12  307 Matthew 5.9  49, 81 Matthew 5.11  73 Matthew 5.21  71 Matthew 5.27  71 Matthew 5.31  71 Matthew 5.38  71 Matthew 5.43  71 Matthew 5.44–45  81 Matthew 6.2  71 Matthew 6.5  71 Matthew 6.7  71 Matthew 6.9  87, 95 Matthew 6.16  71 Matthew 7.24  71 Matthew 7.26  71 Matthew 7.28–29  695, 775 Matthew 7.29  73 Matthew 8.20  45 Matthew 8.22  549 Matthew 8.26  775 Matthew 8.29  77

Matthew 9.4–5  707, 775 Matthew 9.5–6  45 Matthew 9.9  549 Matthew 9.13  77 Matthew 9.35  71 Matthew 10.23  46, 73 Matthew 10.34  77 Matthew 10.38  549 Matthew 11.9–10  777 Matthew 11.19  45, 693 Matthew 11.25  37, 91, 787 Matthew 11.27  87, 89, 129, 615, 617, 669, 673, 679, 707, 709, 777, 779, 787, 791, 803 Matthew 12.8  45 Matthew 12.18  551, 497, 705 Matthew 12.28  551 Matthew 12.32  45 Matthew 12.40  45 Matthew 12.48  707 Matthew 13.14–15  161 Matthew 13.37  45 Matthew 13.41  45, 73 Matthew 13.43  113 Matthew 13.58  707 Matthew 14.23  191, 509 Matthew 14.33  85 Matthew 15.14  675 Matthew 15.27  91 Matthew 15.34  707, 775 Matthew 16.13  617 Matthew 16.14  777 Matthew 16.16  37, 83, 85 Matthew 16.20  83 Matthew 16.24  549 Matthew 16.27  73, 665, 685 Matthew 16.27–28  45 Matthew 16.28  73, 509 Matthew 17.2  123 Matthew 17.5  87, 551 Matthew 17.9  45 Matthew 17.12  45

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Matthew 17.22  45 Matthew 17.25–26  775, 805 Matthew 18.11  77 Matthew 18.20  685 Matthew 19.17  37 Matthew 19.21  549 Matthew 19.26  37 Matthew 19.28  45, 73, 111 Matthew 20.18  45 Matthew 20.23  709, 779, 803 Matthew 20.28  45, 77 Matthew 20.33  707 Matthew 21.11  777 Matthew 21.19  707 Matthew 21.46  777 Matthew 22.32  37 Matthew 22.41–46  73 Matthew 24.14  71, 629 Matthew 24.27  45, 73 Matthew 24.30  45, 73 Matthew 24.35  777 Matthew 24.36  89, 615, 619, 637, 707, 779 Matthew 24.37  73 Matthew 24.44  73 Matthew 25.31  111 Matthew 25.31–46  73, 685 Matthew 25.34  71, 73 Matthew 25.40  73 Matthew 25.45  73 Matthew 26.2  45 Matthew 26.24  45 Matthew 26.30  617 Matthew 26.38–39  727 Matthew 26.40  707, 775 Matthew 26.41  617 Matthew 26.42  191, 727 Matthew 26.44  191, 727 Matthew 26.45  45 Matthew 26.46  617 Matthew 26.53  729, 757, 795 Matthew 26.63  37

Matthew 26.64  73, 85 Matthew 27.26  307 Matthew 27.35  307 Matthew 27.40  83, 85 Matthew 27.42  85 Matthew 27.46  583, 675, 795 Matthew 27.50  307 Matthew 27.54  83 Matthew 27.62–63  91 Matthew 28.18  75, 617, 707, 709, 779, 803 Matthew 28.18–20  75, 777 Matthew 28.19  89, 675 Matthew 28.20  685 Micah 1.1  139 Philippians 1.1  75 Philippians 2.1–5  123 Philippians 2.3  125 Philippians 2.6  121, 225 Philippians 2.6–7  47, 77 Philippians 2.6–11  123, 135, 141 Philippians 2.7  267 Philippians 2.7–8  69, 123 Philippians 2.8  191, 695 Philippians 2.8–9  343 Philippians 2.9  135, 549, 583, 735 Philippians 2.9–10  95, 795 Philippians 2.9–11  73 Philippians 2.10  75, 97, 309 Philippians 2.10–11  93 Philippians 2.15  81 Philippians 3.10–11  55 Philippians 3.20  123  Philippians 3.21  55, 113 Philippians 4.20  111 Proverbs 8.22–36  139 Proverbs 8.32  141 Psalm 7.18 [evv 7.17]  95 Psalm 9.9 [evv 9.8]  165, 169 Psalm 9.11 [evv 9.10]  95 Psalm 10.16  77, 179 Psalm 17.50 [evv 18.49] 95

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Psalm 19.6 [evv 20.5]  95 Psalm 21.1  677 Psalm 21.7–19  677 Psalm 23.8 [evv 24.8]  111 Psalm 28 [evv 29]  109 Psalm 32.6 [evv 33.6]  139, 143 Psalm 32.9 [evv 33.9]  135 Psalm 43.6 [evv 44.5]  95 Psalm 44.7 [evv 45.6]  135 Psalm 44.7–8 [evv 45.6–7] 97 Psalm 53.3 [evv 54.1]  95 Psalm 56.6 [evv 57.5]  111 Psalm 56.12 [evv 57.11] 111 Psalm 62.3 [evv 63.2]  111 Psalm 65.2 [evv 66.2]  111 Psalm 71.19 [evv 72.19] 111 Psalm 73.18 [evv 74.18] 95 Psalm 78.9 [evv 79.9]  111 Psalm 81.6 [evv 82.6]  83 Psalm 85.12 [evv 86.12] 95 Psalm 88.7 [evv 89.6]  121 Psalm 88.25 [evv 89.24] 95 Psalm 91.2 [evv 92.1]  95 Psalm 95.13 [evv 96.13] 165 Psalm 96 [evv 97]  109 Psalm 97.9 [evv 98.9]  165 Psalm 109.1 [evv 110.1] 73, 93, 135 Psalm 137.5 [evv 138.5] 111 Psalm 142.2 [evv 143.2] 69 Revelation 1.5  129 Revelation 1.8  107 Revelation 1.17  107 Revelation 2.8  107 Revelation 3.21  73 Revelation 4.9  111 Revelation 5.11–13  75 Revelation 5.12  309 Revelation 5.12–13  111 Revelation 7.12  111 Revelation 11.15  77, 179 Revelation 15.8  111 Revelation 16.9  111

Revelation 17.14  107 Revelation 19.12–13  135 Revelation 19.13  95, 143 Revelation 21.6  107 Revelation 21.12  107 Revelation 21.16  107 Revelation 21.23  111 Revelation 22.13  107 Revelation 22.20  77, 91 Romans 1.1  75 Romans 1.3  69, 73, 119 Romans 1.3–4  47, 85 Romans 1.4  45, 49 Romans 1.16  665 Romans 1.18–3.20  665 Romans 1.20–3.20  69 Romans 1.23  129 Romans 1.25  101 Romans 1.26–27  117 Romans 2.14  117 Romans 3.22  665 Romans 4  59 Romans 4.8  91 Romans 4.14  125 Romans 4.20  111 Romans 5.2  113 Romans 5.8  87 Romans 5.12–21  57 Romans 5.14  125 Romans 5.15–21  553 Romans 5.19  125, 191, 343, 557, 695, 735 Romans 6.3–11  55 Romans 6.4  111 Romans 8.3  69, 125 Romans 8.5–18  119 Romans 8.14  49, 81, 565 Romans 8.15  83, 89 Romans 8.17  55, 113, 675 Romans 8.18  113 Romans 8.19  49, 81 Romans 8.21  113

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Romans 8.23  83 Romans 8.29  53, 123, 129, 675 Romans 8.29–30  113 Romans 8.32  87 Romans 8.34  73 Romans 8.35  73 Romans 9.4  83 Romans 9.5  69, 99, 101, 103 Romans 9.26  81 Romans 9.28  91 Romans 10.4  665 Romans 10.9  93, 95 Romans 10.9–10  665 Romans 10.9–11  75 Romans 10.12  75 Romans 10.13  75, 93, 95 Romans 11.21  117 Romans 11.34  91 Romans 11.36  63, 111, 117, 131 Romans 12.2  55, 123 Romans 12.4–5  57

Romans 12.11  75 Romans 13.14  53 Romans 14.8–9  73 Romans 14.9  73 Romans 14.10–11  127 Romans 14.11  93, 95, 175 Romans 15.11  91 Romans 15.18  71 Romans 16.1–2  75 Romans 16.12  75 Romans 16.22  75 Romans 16.25  59 Romans 16.27  111 Sirach 24.23  141 Titus 2.13  89 Wisdom 7.22  139 Wisdom 7.25  139 Wisdom 7.25–26  133 Wisdom 7.27  139 Wisdom 18.14–15  139 Zephaniah 1.1  139

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Index

‘Abba,’ 89 Abelard, 569, 783 Acacius, 279 Acephaloi, 277, 279 Act(s): first a., 375; free a., 727–61 passim; human a. of Christ, 473; a. of human being and specifically human a. distinguished, 729 & n. 1, 785 & n. 8; intellect in a., 399; as metaphysical notion, 373, 375, 379 n. 10, 381; natural a. of Christ, 591, 595, 597, 693, 695, 697, 699, 703; and object, 475, 483; pure a., 343; second a., 375; a. specified by object, 489; and subject, 475, 483; substantial a., see Act of existence: secondary a. of e.; a. of subject, and consciousness, 467, 477, 481, 483, 485, 489, 527; supernatural a., 33; supernatural a. of Christ, 557, 595, 597, 695, 697, 699, 703; a. as that by which one is conscious; and two operations/wills, 335, 343; a. of understanding, 65. See also Act of existence; Potency-Form-Act Act of existence: as actual constitutive element, 425; angelic, 381; and a

being, 379, 389, 417, 431; divine, 157, 379, 427; divine a. of e. in incarnate Word, 427, 429, 431, 441, 443, 445, 447, 451, 523; doctrine of a single a. of e. in Christ, 433–47 passim, 523; and essence, 389–405 passim, 411, 415, 421, 423 (see also Distinction, real d.); and grace of union, 557, 559; and human essence of Christ, 413; as intrinsic and constitutive principle of being, 379, 415; as metaphysical notion, 379, 381, 383; and ‘one,’ 385, 427, 429, 431, 447, 451, 523; and person, 407, 425; proper a. of e., 385, 387; proper and proportionate a. of e. lacking, 415, 417, 431; proportionate a. of e., 385, 387, 415, 417; and the real, 381–405 passim; secondary a. of e., 453–65 passim; and subsistent, 389; as ‘to be,’ 381, 383, 401, 407, 421, 423, 431 Adam, K., 613, 705, 813 Adeodatus, Pope, 321 Adoption: defined, 565, 569 Adoptionists/Adoptionism, 9, 133, 243, 567, 617

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Adoptive: a. son and natural Son, 565, 567, 569, 571 Adoration: of Christ, 309–15 Aetius, 185, 327 Agatho, Pope, 321 Agent intellect: 63, 453, 519, 579, 581, 595, 769; as intending intention of being, 581 Agnoetae, 179, 181, 599, 607, 609, 633, 649, 677, 707, 775, 781, 783, 801 Aktistites, 279 Albert the Great, 783 Albigensians, 7 Alcuin, 567, 659, 773 Allen, P., 323 n. 7, 329, 333 n. 15, 653, 813 Altaner, B., 7 & n. 3, 9, 11, 185, 187, 193, 229, 233, 241, 243, 329, 331, 335, 813 Amann, É., 241, 243, 265, 277, 305, 327, 331, 337, 633, 649 Ambrose, 195, 251, 257, 607, 635, 779, 781, 807 Ammonius, 233 Anachronism, 49, 51, 671, 683 Analogy: and adequate but not proportionate objects, 377; Aristotelian a. (of substance), 397; and basic notions, 373; and beatific vision, 611, 687; a. of being, 395, 401; biological a. in Paul, 117; body-soul a. and human-divine natures, 185, 233, 239, 255, 295; a. of contingent predication, 369, 427, 441–45; and essence/ existence, 423; and Father-Son in John, 167, 173; a. of finite composite being, 433–41; a. of form, 395; and Kant, 15; a. of knowledge, see Knowing/knowledge: analogy of; and knowledge of potency-form-act, 373; in natural theology, 155; a. of substance, 395; for understanding Christ

as one, 432–47; for understanding mysteries, 373 Anatolius, 799, 805 Andrew of Samosata, 205, 207, 779 Animated, 181, 369, 371, 389, 391, 413, 415 Antioch, Synod of, 9 Antiochenes, 47, 191, 241, 255, 361, 607, 681, 775 Aphthartodocetists, 279 Apollinaris/Apollinarians, 11, 47, 185–91, 193, 203, 207, 209, 211, 213, 227, 231, 241, 243, 255, 257, 259, 261, 281, 285, 305, 319, 325, 355, 361, 603, 607, 617, 663, 773, 775, 787 Apostles’ Creed, 39, 223, 247, 511 Appropriate/fitting (conveniens), 455, 457, 737, 739, 753, 757 Archaism, 49, 51 Arians/Arius, 9, 11, 47, 183, 185, 189, 191, 207, 209, 211, 247, 257, 285, 603, 607, 609, 615, 617, 619, 621, 651, 679, 773, 775 Aristotle, 55 n. 38, 181, 233, 379 n. 10, 383, 391, 393, 397, 399, 401, 423, 425, 453, 489, 519, 747 Arnou, R., 233, 241, 813 Artemas, 9 & n. 6 Assimilation: intentional a. and knowing a subject, 525 Assume: to a., 453; to a. and efficient causality, 453; formally to a., 453 Assumed human nature/human essence/humanity, 201, 253, 269, 293, 305, 307, 387, 415, 417, 419, 421, 431, 437 Assumed man, 189, 205, 253 n. 33, 309, 513, 567 Assumption (in Incarnation): of flesh animated by a rational soul, 307, 369, 371, 401, 413; and union, 433, 447, 453

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Athanasian Creed, 39, 293, 301 Athanasius, 185, 187, 189, 191, 193, 207, 209, 271, 607, 615, 617, 619, 681, 779 Athanasius Camelarius, 323 Attributes: divine (see also Things divine), 37, 155, 169, 199, 251, 267 Augustine, 7, 251, 285, 309, 475, 513, 585, 601, 607, 637, 639, 641, 643, 645, 647, 681, 685, 719, 725, 781 Bacht, H., 261, 813 Backes, I., 405 & n. 33, 813 Baconthorp, J., 413 Bañez, D. / Bannezians, 733 & n. 7, 739 n. 11, 741, 759 Baptism: of Christ and of us, 557 Bardy, G., 227 & n. 17, 229, 231, 241, 261, 265, 277, 279, 281, 329 Baron, R., 603, 659, 773 n. 5, 813 Baronius, 354 & n. 23, 603, 659, 773 n. 4, 813 Barth, K., 27 & n. 22 Bartsch, H., 23 & n. 18, 813 Basil of Caesarea (Basil the Great), 195 & n. 20, 271, 607, 619, 681, 723, 781 Basiliscus, 277 Baudissin, W.W., 91 Bazaar of Heracleides, 243 Beatific: b. knowing/knowledge, 29, 537 n. 23, 571, 573, 581, 599, 603, 605, 609, 611; b. vision, 115 & n. 66, 439, 443, 471, 473, 531, 535, 537 & nn. 22 and 23, 559, 599, 643, 685, 719, 721, 733, 735, 767, 769, 789, 791, 793, 795, 807, 811 Beatitude: in Christ, 583, 795; defined, 581; and grace, 547, 563 Behm, J., 123, 125 Behr, J., 623 n. 13, 625, 813 Beholder: Christ as, 573, 577, 579, 589, 599, 693, 733 Being: and act of existence, 369, 379,

381, 383, 405, 415, 417, 437; b. analogically known, 401; analogy of, 369, 395, 481, 491; apart from b. there is nothing, 373; and assumed nature, 417, 437, 461; b. by essence, 383, 401, 557; b. by participation, 401, 557; b. by which, 275, 421, 569, 571; and consciousness, 373, 523; and essence, 369, 371, 379, 383 & n. 12, 401; and intellectual nature, 387; b. is everything, 399; known through truth, 29, 31; notion of, 581; and one, 385, 429, 523; b. object of intellect, 377, 399; proportionate b., 201 n. 3; b. pure and simple, 369, 371, 379 & n. 10, 385, 415, 431, 433, 437, 447, 449, 451, 495; b. in qualified sense, 379 & n. 10, 383, 437; b. quidditatively known, 401; and real, 389; and subsistent, 389, 417, 429; b. unrestricted, 399; b. which, 275, 421 Benedict xv, Pope, 599 Béranger, L., 603, 773 n. 5, 814 Bertetto, D., 405 & n. 36, 469, 543, 599, 731, 814 Beryllus of Bostra, 9 Billot, L., 393 & n. 27, 405 & n. 35, 407, 411, 419, 433, 731 & n. 6, 814, 816 Bishops: and theologians, 283, 285 Blessed Virgin: Christ accepting from, 703 (see also Body/flesh animated by rational soul); Theotokos, 219 (see also Ephesus, Council of). See also Mary Body/flesh animated by rational soul, 181, 233, 259, 273, 331, 369, 371, 389, 391, 393, 405, 407, 413, 415, 457; and person, 259, 371 Boethius, 197, 387, 581, 820 Bonaventure, 601, 609, 611, 613, 711, 822 Bousset, W., 91 & n. 48, 121, 814

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Boyer, C., 303 & n. 22, 543, 563, 609, 715, 719, 731, 733, 773, 775, 811, 814 Bréhier, L., 227 n. 17, 263, 265, 279, 319 & n. 2, 321, 323, 325, 329, 331, 333, 355 Brière, M., 193 & n. 15, 814 Bultmann, R., 23 & nn. 17 and 19, 26, 27 Buri, F., 23 Cajetan, 405, 411, 419, 433, 447, 493 Calvin, J., 611, 775 Camelot, T., 205 & n. 9, 241, 243, 259, 261, 814 Candidus, 655 Cano, M., 795 Capreolus, 393, 411, 493, 816 Cassirer, E., 251 & n. 31 Catholic sense: and consensus, 679, 681 Causality: constitutive c., 445, 447 & n. 9, 523, 527; divine c., 741; historical c. of Christ, 715, 811; moral c., 755; physical c., 755 Cause: efficient c. of Incarnation, 449, 451, 703; form as c. of being, 395, 397; God as c. of everything, 35, 741 Causes: ‘outside its c.,’ 381 n. 12, 415, 421; c. of progression in revelation of Christ’s divinity, 39, 41, 43 Celestine, Pope, 213, 251 Cerfaux, L., 7 & n. 3, 91 & n. 48, 93, 99 & n. 53, 814 Chalcedon, Council of, 5, 11, 49, 51, 135, 183, 201, 203, 205, 229, 231, 233, 241, 245 n. 29, 247, 249, 257, 261, 263, 265, 267, 269, 271, 277, 279, 283, 287, 289, 299, 301, 317, 323 nn. 4 and 5, 325, 327, 329, 341, 347, 349, 353, 501, 509, 513, 597, 661, 663, 693, 787 Champagne de Labriolle, Pierre, 227 n. 17 Charlemagne, 567

Chosroes ii, 321 Christ: acknowledgment of divinity of C. and human way of learning, 5; baptism of, 557; as beholder, 573, 577, 579, 589, 599, 693, 733; consciousness of, 371, 373, 377, 464–539 passim, 595, 697, 699, 701, 703, 793, 795; death of and divine wisdom, 583; distinct graces of, 562–65; divine consciousness of, 467, 501, 533, 537 (see 464–539 passim); divinity of C. denied by Christians, 27, 29; divinity of C. progressively revealed, 38–43; divinity of C. and schematic patterns, 42–53 (esp. 51–53), 247; as exemplar of every virtue, 549; faith and hope in C., 553, 561; freedom of, 726–61; C. as God, C. as man, 364–67; grace of, 540–71; grace of different from ours, 553; grace of in scripture, 548–53; grew in wisdom, age, grace, 697, 705; had fear of Lord, 561; had gifts of Holy Spirit, 552–55; had grace of Head, 561; had grace of union, 557; had habitual sanctifying grace, 554–57, 559; had Holy Spirit, 551; had a singular fullness of grace, 541, 794; had supernatural operations and infused virtues, 553; holiness of, 551; hope of, 553; how C. knew himself to be divine, 534–39; human consciousness of, 371, 465, 467, 501, 507, 511, 515, 517, 519, 531, 533, 535, 537, 539, 595, 697, 699, 701, 703, 793, 795; human knowledge of, see Knowledge: multiple entries; human operations of, 343, 451, 517, 519, 521, 527; human psychology of, 771, 808–11; impeccability of, 714–27; knew everything pertaining to his work, 573, 585, 661, 663, 676–91; knew God immediately from moment of conception,

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599, 687, 694–97; knowledge of, see Knowledge: of Christ; as life eternal, 553; made himself an adult, 591; as mediator of all grace, 561; merited his glory, 548–51; names, titles, and honors of, 80–115; as natural and not adoptive Son of God even as man, 564–71; obedience of, 191, 307, 343, 555, 557, 637, 675, 691, 693, 695, 697, 701, 703, 705, 719, 731, 751, 753, 757, 759, 807; as pilgrim, 572–715 passim (see 577, 579, 589, 591, 663, 665, 691); sinless, 714–27; as Son loved by Father, 551, 555, 727; Son by nature and not by adoption, 553, 564–71; as source of grace, 550–53; as substantially holy (holy by essence), 556–59; two consciousnesses of, 464–539; what belongs properly to C. as man, part 4 passim; work of, 585, 685. See also Divinity of Christ Christotokos, 219 Clamer, 171 & n. 95 Common sense: and theory, 515, 809 Communicatio idiomatum (interchange of properties), 273, 303, 305 & n. 24, 471, 721 Composition: on basis of hypostasis, 233, 271, 437, 441, 529; intentional c., 375, 491, 493; in a nature, 239, 437, 441, 529 Conceiving: and outer words, 203; and understanding, 41, 43, 487, 493, 499, 513 Concepts: and data, 15; different and developing c. expressing same truth/ doctrine, 51. See also Conceiving Conceptualism, 15 Congar, M.-J. (Yves), 611 Consciousness: as accompanying, 485; and being, 497, 501, 523; as concomitant, 483; defined, 467; and dream-

ing, 475, 499, 501; empirical c., 483, 497; as experience, 481; inchoate c., 483, 497, 501; intellectual c., 483, 497; and interior experience, 481, 483, 515; and introspection, 473, 478–81, 484–87, 531; and knowledge of oneself, 473, 483, 485; levels of, 483, 497; as perception or introspection (reflection), 473, 486–91; and person, 471, 473, 493, 495, 501, 513, 515; phenomenology of, 490–93; prior in one sense and accompanying in another, 485; rational c., 483, 497; self-c., 477, 483, 497, 499; as self-presence, 467, 477, 479, 483, 485, 489, 503, 505, 507; two of in Christ (proof), 500–11; unity of human c., 696–705; unity of two consciousnesses in Christ, 530–35 Consensus: in theology, 673, 679, 681, 789, 801 Constans, 325, 333 Constantine iii, 325 Constantine iv, 325 Constantinople, First Council of, 9, 183 & n. 1, 191, 277, 787 Constantinople, Second Council of, 193, 201, 231, 241, 245 & n. 29, 263, 265, 267, 295, 297, 317, 319, 347, 353, 529, 597, 649, 723 Constantinople, Third Council of, 183, 249, 267, 325, 327, 333, 335, 337, 339, 343, 345, 347, 349, 353, 355, 357, 501, 597, 609, 649, 663, 693, 719, 735 n. 8, 747 n. 15 Constantinus, Patriarch of Constantinople, 321 Constitutive causality, 445, 447 n. 9, 527 Context: biblical and dogmatic-theological c., 670–73 Contingent predication: 455, 737. See also Term: consequent external t. Coptic (Egyptian) Church, 263, 321

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Cosma, G., 323, 329, 814 Coste, J., 697, 814 Coulbeaux, E., 263 Creeds: and Father, Son, Spirit as God, 39 Cruchon, G., 809, 814 Cullmann, O., 67 & n. 39, 83 & n. 44, 101, 249, 251, 814 Cyril of Alexandria, 11, 47, 183, 187, 201, 205, 207, 209, 211, 213, 215, 217, 219, 221, 223, 225, 227, 229, 231, 235, 237, 239, 243, 245, 247, 249, 257, 259, 261, 263, 265, 269, 279, 283, 285, 287, 289, 297, 299, 301, 361, 563, 599, 601, 607, 625, 627, 629, 631, 653, 681, 719, 725, 779, 781, 787 Cyril of Jerusalem, 193 Cyrus, bishop of Phasis and patriarch of Alexandria, 323, 326 n. 7, 327, 329, 335, 337, 339, 345, 357 D’Alès, A., 267 & n. 10, 433 & n. 3, 529, 543, 599, 609, 651, 677, 773, 783, 814 Damasus, Pope, 251 Daniélou, J., 9 & n. 5, 469, 814 ‘Day of the Lord,’ 93 Debrunner, A., 137 Deductivism, 15 Definite article, 89, 99, 105 Degl’Innocenti, P. Umberto, 411, 815 Dekerygmatizing, 23 De la Taille, M., 437 & n. 5, 439, 441, 731 & n. 5, 815 De Lavalette, H., 603, 655, 815 Deloffre, Marie-Hélène, 465 n. 1, 815 Demythologizing, 23 Déodat de Basly, J.M., 253, 467, 469, 513 De Raeymaeker, L., 391 & n. 22, 407, 463 De Riedmatten, H., 185, 601, 617, 773 n. 5 De Sectis, 607, 649, 781

De Urbina, I.O., 229 & n. 19, 289, 291, 815 De Vries, W., 245, 569, 815 Dhanis, É., 31 & n. 38, 45, 49, 67, 85, 87, 121, 815 Dialectic of intelligence: in Christ, 691 Diekamp, F., 601, 651, 815 Diem, H., 27 & n. 23, 815 Diepen, H., 253, 413, 469, 473, 513, 815–16 Diodore of Tarsus, 11, 47, 205, 207, 209, 361, 621, 779 Dioscorus, 261, 283, 291 Discovery, order of: and order of teaching, 285 Distinction: adequate minor real d., 383; analogically drawn d., 281, 295, 299, 315, 347, 349, 451; conceptual d./d. of reason, 201, 203, 295, 297, 301, 389, 539; and Cyril/monophysite question, 201, 203, 209, 239, 281, 283, 287; d. defined, 255, 389, 415, 465; of essence and existence, see Essence: and existence, ‘to be’; inadequate minor real d., 201 & n. 3, 203, 235, 253, 383; major real d., 201, 255, 293, 295, 297, 427, 429, 451; minor real d., 255, 283, 287, 293, 295, 297, 359, 361, 383, 427, 429, 451, 495; minor real d. analogically drawn, 295, 299, 315, 347, 349; real d., 201 & n. 3, 203, 209, 255, 291, 295, 341, 345, 373, 389, 391, 409, 411, 417, 421, 573. See also Nature(s), Supposit Divided from everything else: meaning of, 385 Divinity of Christ: and Chalcedon, 247, 288–91; does not admit of degrees, 51; and Letter to Hebrews, 132–37; and ‘Lord,’ 90–95; and ‘man-God’ pattern, 207; and ‘name above every other name, 94–97; and New Testa-

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ment ‘more scriptural’ passages, 78–115; and New Testament ‘more theological passages,’ 114–79; and Nicene creed, 223, 247; and Pauline conceptions, 114–33; and philosophy, 29; progressive revelation of, 38–43; and schematic patterns, 42–53 (esp. 51–53), 247; and ‘Son,’ 80–89; and Son’s equality and unity with Father, 158–79; and transference of ‘glory,’ 108–51; and transference of ‘God,’ 96–107; and transference of other divine titles, 106–109; and ‘Word-flesh’ pattern, 207; and Word in John, 136– 59. See also Act of existence: divine a. of e. in Incarnate Word; doctrine of a single a. of e. in Christ Docetists/docetism, 7, 307, 663 Dodd, C.H., 109 & n. 62, 141, 151, 163, 816 Dogma: complication of d. and end of Patristic era, 283; development of Christological d., 360–65; development of d. and logic/deduction, 679; development of d. and order of discovery, 285; development of d. and providence, 360–65; development of d. and scripture, 163; development of d. in seventh century, 339; and truth, 13 Dogmatic theology: and critical problem, 611; and Kant, 15 Domnus of Antioch, 261 Donus, Pope, 321 Doxologies, 111, 115. See also Glory of God Draguet, R., 279 Dreaming: and consciousness, 475, 477, 499, 501 Dubarle, A.M., 601, 631, 647, 816 Dulia: and latria, 311, 313 Duméry, H., 29, 31 & n. 27

Dupont, J., 63 & n. 37, 816 Durandus, 567, 721 Ebionites, 7, 9 Eidos, 271, 395, 397, 777 Ekonomou, A.J., 323 n. 4, 816 Ekthesis, 325, 331, 335, 337, 339, 345, 353, 359 Elert, W., 327, 816 Elicit: defined, 593, 595; and efficient causality, 519, 593, 595, 653 Elipandus, 567, 569 Ephesus, Council of, 11, 183, 210–25, 230, 233, 237, 243, 245, 247, 249, 277, 407 Ephesus, Robber Council of, 231, 261, 277, 299 Epiphanius, 9, 183, 191, 205, 607, 619, 779 Ervigius, King of Spain, 355 Essence: and ‘a being,’ 379, 383, 385; being by e., 401, 557; as constitutive principle of being, 379; defined, 415; and existence, ‘to be,’ 381, 383, 385, 387, 389, 391, 401, 409, 415, 417, 421, 423, 433, 435, 447; and formal constitutive, 425; in God, 381, 383, 558; and nature, 417; and non-Christian philosophy, 371; and person, 203, 235, 389, 423; e. pure and simple, 381, 385, 461; e. qualified, 381; said in three ways, 381; for Thomas, 401, 423; union on the basis of e., 233, 235, 243 Essentialism, 243, 369, 388–95, 401, 407, 409, 411, 413, 419, 421, 423, 425, 435 Eternity: and time, 235, 487, 741 Ethiopian Church, 263 Eudoxius, 185 Eugenius i, Pope, 321 Eulogius, 599, 609, 651, 679, 781, 783, 799 Eunomius, 211

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Eusebius (of Caesarea), 9 & n. 6, 179 Eusebius of Dorylaeum, 261 Eusebius of Emesa, 207, 209 Eustathius of Antioch, 207, 251, 781 Eutyches, 187, 207, 231, 247, 259, 261, 279, 283, 291, 787 Evagrius, 277, 279 Existentialism, 21, 403 Experience: in broad sense, 481; external/outer e., 481, 483; as first potency of human knowing, 375, 493; and knowing, 375, 403, 491; interior/ inner e., 481, 483, 485, 491, 515, 573; and knowing, 375, 403, 491, 573, 587; in strict sense, 481, 491; and understanding, 513 Fabro, C., 383, 816 Facundus, 193 Faith: as assent, 33, 41, 43; no f. in Christ the man, 711; preambles to, 33; reduced to a knower, 675; a supernatural virtue, 13; and truth, 13, 27; in Vatican i, 13 Father: and continuity with words of Jesus, 664–69; and God in New Testament, 37, 53, 89; in John, 79, 89; in Matthew, 89; mutual and exclusive knowledge/relationship of F. and Son, 87, 89, 673, 707; ‘Our Father,’ 87; in Paul, 89 Felix, bishop of Urgel, 567 Felix, Pope, 187, 213 Felix iii, Pope, 279 Feuillet, A., 705, 816 Fideism, 27 First-born, 47, 77, 129, 141 First Vatican Council, 13, 31, 79, 373, 427, 663, 773 Fitzmyer, J., 9 & n. 4, 816 Flavian (bishop of Constantinople), 205, 207, 247, 261

Flesh: ‘according to the flesh,’ 101; f. animated by a rational soul, 181, 259, 273, 391, 413, 415, 457; f. assumed from the Virgin, 369, 389, 393, 413; in Paul, 57. See also Word-flesh Fliche-Martin, 227, 241, 261, 263, 266, 277, 279, 319, 321, 323, 325, 329, 331, 333, 355, 814 Florence, Council of, 349, 717 Fonseca, Pedro da, 733 Forgeries: Appolinarian f., 185, 187, 209, 259 Form: analogy of f., 369, 373, 395, 491; for Aristotle, 385, 425; artificial f., 385; f. intrinsic and constitutive principle of being, 379 & n. 10; f. is first act, 373; natural f., 385; potency-f.-act, 369–79, 383, 385; for Thomas, 399. See also Form of God; Form of servant; Potency-Form-Act Formal constitutive: of a person, 423 Form of God: 47, 77, 79, 123, 125, 127, 135, 141, 219, 641; and glory, 123, 125, 127, 135, 141; and imitation, 53 Form of servant, 47, 77, 123, 125, 127, 137, 255, 267, 627, 641 Formally to assume, 453, 457 Forms: Platonic, 395 Formula of Reunion, 227, 229, 247, 249, 257, 261, 281, 283, 299 Foucher, D., 393 & n. 27, 411, 816 Freedom: of Christ, 727–61; f. of Christ and divine transcendence, 735, 745, 747, 753; f. of Christ and obedience, 751, 753, 757, 759; f. and conditional [hypothetical] necessity, 737, 743; f. and divine knowledge, willing, and action, 743; f. and ignorance, 749, 751 Fulgentius of Ruspe, 647, 781 Fundamental theology: and fideism, 27; and Kant, 15

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Future contingents, 743, 747, 749 Gaianites, 278–81 Gaianus, 279 Galot, J., 253 n. 33, 469, 603, 775, 816 Galtier, P., 251, 253, 303, 405 & n. 34, 433, 467, 473, 513, 517, 543, 549, 567, 599, 609, 677, 715, 721, 723, 725, 727, 731, 733, 773, 781, 783, 795, 811, 816 Gandulph of Bonon/Bologna, 783 Garrigou-Lagrange, R., 405, 423 Generation: defined, 565 Genos, 271 George, Patriarch of Constantinople, 321 Germanus, bishop of Constantinople, 653, 779 Gifts: bestowed on human nature of Christ, 253, 541, 553, 555, 719; and Christ’s fullness of grace, 541; defined operationally, 543; and virtues, 547, 563, 565 Gilson, É., 393, 816–17 Glory of God: and beatific vision, 439; and divine essence, 115, 127; transference of, 108–15. See also KaboFd Yahweh Gnostics: and Christ, 7 God: G. of Abraham and God of philosophers, 37; comprehension of, 797; as Father, see Father; Jesus as G. in New Testament, 78–179 passim; for Jews and Gentiles, 37; name of in creeds, 39; name of in New Testament develops, 37; notion of in New Testament, 34–39, 41; as ‘the one who,’ 35; transference of name ‘G.,’ 96–107 Gore, C., 629 n. 21, 817 Graber, O., 611, 817 Grace: g. an absolutely supernatural created reality, 543; actual g., 545,

547, 563; of Christ, see Christ, grace of; as elevating, 547; every g. as g. of Christ, 560–63; fullness of, 558–61, 673, 675, 725, 795, 797, 801, 805; and Greek and Latin Fathers, 545; habitual g., see Sanctifying grace; habitual and actual distinguished, 545; g. of Head, 561; as healing, 547; and nature, 545, 605, 695; and nature in Christ’s knowledge, 597; and new creation, new life in Christ, 543, 545; and supernatural order, 545, 547. See also Grace of union; Sanctifying grace Grace of union: and act of existence given to humanity of Christ, 557; and consequent supernatural act, 557; and fullness of grace, 559 Grammar: and psychology, 489 Grandmaison, Léonce de, 5 & n. 1, 817 Gregorian Armenian Church, 263 Gregory the Great, 307, 599, 607, 609, 651, 677, 681, 727, 781, 799, 801 Gregory of Nazianzus, 195, 251, 619, 651, 681, 779 Gregory of Nyssa, 187 & n. 9, 189 Gregory Thaumaturgus, 187 Grillmeier, A., 9 & n. 7, 43 n. 31, 47 & n. 32, 185 & nn. 4 and 7, 187 n. 8, 189, 191, 205, 207, 209, 211, 229, 241, 247, 261, 303 n. 23, 405 & n. 33, 567, 617, 621, 623 n. 13, 631, 817 Gross, J., 545, 817 Grumel, V., 293, 323, 325, 327, 331, 333, 817 Günther, A., 611, 719 Gutwenger, E., 469, 473, 509, 527, 531, 603, 611, 613, 633, 651, 659, 677, 779, 781, 783, 795, 799, 817 Habit(s); acquired h., 589, 597, 708–15; defined, 543; entitative h., 543, 545; and form, 375; infused h., 589, 597,

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708–15; operative h., 543, 553; three h. of speculative intellect, 65 & n. 38, 769 Hahn, A., 257 & n. 1, 817 Harvey, W.W., 612 & n. 6, 817 Haubst, R., 469, 613, 817 Heavenly man: 121; for Apollinarians, 189, 207, 209, 325, 361; for Arians, 207; for Philo, 153, 155 Hefele-Leclercq, 203, 263, 331, 333, 353, 355, 567 Hegel, G.W.F., 15, 17 Heidegger, M., 23 n. 17 Henoticists, 277, 279 Henoticon, 279 Henry, P., 125 & n. 71, 267, 818 Heraclius, Emperor, 325, 331, 359 Hilary, 251, 309, 607, 633, 681, 779 Hippolytus, 7, 187 Historical causality: h.c. of Christ, 715, 811 Historicity: of Christ’s life, 703; and interpretation of New Testament, 23; of New Testament, 49 History: critical h., 17, 19 & n. 16, 21; critical h. and mind of historian, 21; existential h., 17, 19; methodical h., 17, 21; narrative h., 17, 19 & n 15; and preunderstanding/presuppositions, 21; salvation h., 25, 27; scientific h., 17 & n 14, 25 Holiness: h. by essence communicated accidentally and substantially, 557, 559; h. by participation, 557 Holy Office, 5, 85, 599, 677, 801 Holy Spirit: bestowed/sent by Christ, 73, 151, 173, 509; and Christ’s baptism, 557; and Christ’s knowledge, 597, 711; in creeds, 39; gifts of, and Christ, 553, 561, 661, 711, 805; had by Christ, 551; and internal communication, 61; and ‘Jesus is Lord,’ 75,

93; and name ‘God,’ 37; procession of, 505; and prophets, 61, 151; and sanctifying grace, 439, 459, 545, 557, 559, 577; and Trinity, 349, 449 Honorius i, Pope, 321, 323, 325 & n. 7, 329, 331, 337, 352–59 Hormisdas, Pope, 279 Hugh of St Victor, 609, 657 & n. 44, 670, 773, 783 Husserl, E., 29, 491 Hyparxis, 269, 271 Hypokeimenon, 271 Hypostasis: as operator, 275; and ousia, 203, 269; and person,135, 189, 203, 205, 247, 249, 255, 419; and physis/nature, 203, 231, 237, 247, 249, 255, 269, 283, 361, 419; and prosoFpon, 269, 271; and reality, 135; and real supposit, 389, 415; union on basis of, 235, 237, 239, 271, 327, 529, 655 Hypostatic union: 273, 529; did not take place in a nature, 299, 439, 461; immediate and mediate terms of, 305; principles of, 369, 371, 446–53, 461; and supernatural, 459; took place in a person, 299, 439, 461 ‘I’: Christ saying ‘I,’ 509; ‘I’ by which we mean, 501; ‘I’ as conclusion, 501; ‘I’ that is meant, 501; ‘I’ that is speaking, 501; phenomenologically considered, 493; philosophically considered, 493; subsistent, 513 ‘I am,’ 107, 109, 141, 161, 173, 251 Ibas (bishop of Edessa), 245 & n. 29, 261 Idealism: 21, 25, 403 Identity: consciousness of, 484–87 Idion, 271, 273 Ignatius of Antioch, 99 Ignorance: and lack of knowledge, 589 & n. 2

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Image of God: Jesus as, 53, 55, 77, 79, 121, 123, 125, 129, 135, 141 Images: and relative adoration, 311, 313 Imitation of Christ: and Pauline schematic pattern, 53, 55, 549 Impeccability: of Christ, 691, 714–27 Ineffable: in us and in Christ, 699. See also Knowledge: ineffable k. Innocent iii, Pope, 545 Instrument: conjoined i., 533, 535, 595; humanity of Christ as, 533, 595; and unity of two consciousnesses, 533 Intellect: natural desire of, 63; participated likeness of uncreated light, 63; proper object of, 15, 397 (see also Intelligible: and/in sensible) Intelligible: finite, 573, 709, 713; infinite, 573, 587, 597, 699, 709; and/in sensible, 15, 65, 161, 375, 395, 493, 533, 573, 575, 587, 597, 693, 699, 709, 713; separate from sensible, 573, 575, 579, 585, 587, 597, 699, 709, 713 Intelligible in act is intelligence in act, 483, 489, 525 Intending: i. in us and immediate knowing in Christ, 581 Interchange of properties: see Communicatio idiomatum Introspection: commonsense i., 481; and consciousness, 473; and direct inquiry, 479; methodical i., 481 Irenaeus (of Lyons), 7, 607, 613 Irenaeus of Tyre, 261 Jaeger, W., 187 & n. 9, 189, 193, 195, 259, 817 Jansenists, 729, 731 Jaspers, K., 23 Jerome, 195, 251, 607, 635, 637, 681, 781 Jesus of history and Christ of faith, 15 Jesus of Nazareth: calls forth unique love for himself, 3, 73; and creation,

5, 45, 47, 53, 71, 77, 97, 129, 131, 139, 143; dying and rising of, 71, 73, 179; as forgiving, 71, 73; and healing, 71; is Lord, 75, 93, 107, 127; is true God, 3, 51, 78–179, 191, 247, 729; is true man, 3, 66–69, 191, 247; and kingdom, 67, 71, 73, 77; participates in divine, 3, 53, 70–79; and pre-existence, 45, 49, 77, 119, 121, 127; as prophet, 73, 777; and relation to Father, 251; will come again, 71, 73; will repay everyone, 73. See also Christ John (evangelist): 47, 62, 79, 83, 87, 89, 105, 107, 109, 119, 127, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 151, 159, 161, 163, 165, 167, 169, 171, 177, 179, 665, 669, 671, 673, 683, 705, 707, 787, 791, 794; conception of Word in, 107, 136–51, 159; and ‘I am,’ 107; pattern in Gospel of, 47; procedure in gospel of, 161 John, Patriarch of Constantinople, 321 John iv, Pope, 321, 355, 357 John of Antioch, 211, 227, 229, 247 John Chrysostom, 621, 681, 781 John of Damascus (John Damascene), 335, 339, 341, 349, 609, 653, 655, 679, 731, 783 John Philoponos, 281 Jouassard, G., 601, 631, 773 n. 5, 818 Jovian, 207 Judgment: and act of existence, 391; j. of existence/existential j., 15; and knowing, 405, 573, 587, 713; and second act, 375, 493, 499; and truth, 17; and understanding, 391, 573 Jugie, M., 257, 259, 261, 263, 269, 277, 279, 281, 305, 323, 325, 331, 333, 335, 339 Julian of Halicarnassus, 279 Julianists, 279 Julius, Pope, 187, 213

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Justification, 25, 57, 73, 547, 553, 729, 797 Justinian, 203, 245 n. 29, 263, 265, 283, 319 KaboFd Yahweh, 61, 79, 109, 125. See also Glory of God Kant, I. / Kantian, 15, 21, 25 Kenosis, 267, 537 n. 23, 539 Kenoticists, 267 Kittel, G., 123 n. 70, 814, 818 Kleinknecht, H., 137, 151 Klostermann, E., 179 & n. 96, 615 & n. 7, 814, 818 Knowing/knowledge: acquired k., 537 n. 23, 539, 579, 589, 605, 609, 623, 708–15, 767, 769, 771, 775, 789, 791, 807, 809; adequate object of human k., 377; analogy of, 603, 605, 609, 611, 687; angelic k., 399, 603, 605; beatific k., see Beatific; beatific k. and Christ’s suffering, 583, 585; k. broadly speaking, 573, 767; of Christ, 572–715 passim; of Christ in New Testament, 681, 774–79; conceived as intuition, looking, 489; by confrontation and by identity, 489, 525; development of doctrine of Christ’s k., 602–605, 768–73; divine k. of Christ, 575, 605, 661, 663, 783, 785, 787; effable k. of Christ, 573, 575, 577, 581, 587, 589, 593, 595, 597, 605, 663, 689, 691, 693, 695, 697, 699, 701, 703, 705, 707, 709, 711, 713; and experience-understanding-judgment, 375, 377, 403, 405, 481, 493, 513, 515, 573, 587; human k. of Christ, 572–715 passim, 783, 785, 787; as identity, 525; immediate k. of God, 579, 581, 583, 585, 591, 595, 605, 609, 613, 669, 671, 673, 675, 687, 699, 771; ineffable k. of Christ, 575, 577, 581, 587, 589, 591, 597, 605, 689, 691, 693,

695, 697, 699, 701, 703, 705, 707, 711; infused. k. of Christ, 539, 599, 605, 609, 611, 708–15, 767, 769, 771, 775, 789, 791, 795, 805, 807, 809; mediated k., 605, 609; mediated k. of God, 669; natural and supernatural effable k., 697, 703, 707; k. in proper sense, 767; proportionate object of human k., 377, 401; transition from ineffable to effable k. in Christ, 699, 701, 705; k. in the Word, 585, 587 Knox, R.A., 59 n. 36 Kyrios, 91, 97 Lamentabili, 5 Landgraf, A., 545, 601, 609, 659, 783, 818 Lang, U.M., 607 n. 5, 818 Lateran Council, 263, 265, 293, 301, 321, 325, 333, 335, 347, 357, 359, 607, 649 Latria: and dulia, 311, 313 Latrocinium: see Robber Council Lawton, J.S., 29 & nn. 25 and 26, 267, 818 Learning: in Christ, 589, 591, 597, 691, 705, 707, 807. See also Knowing/ knowledge: acquired k. Le Bachelet, X., 309 Lebon, J., 261, 263, 267, 269, 277, 281, 305, 818 Lebreton, J., 151 & n. 85, 601, 631, 633, 818 Leo i (Leo the Great), Pope, 243, 251, 255, 259, 261, 275, 277, 283, 291, 329, 345, 361, 725 Leo ii, Pope, 321, 353, 355, 357, 359 Leo xiii, Pope, 604 n. 4 Leontius of Byzantium, 185, 309, 607 n. 5, 625, 649, 781 Leporius, 251, 647, 781 Libellus Emendationis, 251, 647

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Liberal theology: and Kant, 15 Liber Heraclidis, 241 Liébaert, Jacques, 601, 631, 773 n. 5, 818 Lietzmann, H., 185, 187, 189, 191, 207, 209, 259, 361, 818 Light of glory, 439, 473, 547, 577, 687, 689, 795, 799, 805 Logical: l. analysis and psychological analysis, 515 Logos: for Arians, 9; for John, 107, 136–51, 159; for Philo, 105, 107, 137, 150–59 Logos-anthroFpos, 47 Logos-sarx, 47 Lohmeyer, E., 91 & n. 92 Lombard, Peter, 405, 407, 599, 609, 659, 679, 769, 773, 783 Lonergan, B.: Works referred to in text or by editors: ‘Christ as Subject: A Reply,’ 471, 491 n. 6, 525, 818; ‘Christology Today: Methodological Reflections,’ 43 n. 31; De Deo trino: Pars dogmatica, 23 n. 19, 157 n. 91; De Deo trino: Pars systematica (or De Deo trino, 2), 203 n. 6, 285, 301 n. 19, 315 n. 1, 373, 387, 389, 445, 453, 505, 507, 519, 565, 737, 818; ‘The Dehellenization of Dogma,’ 11 n. 9, 819; De Verbo incarnato, 1960 and 1961 editions, 7 n. 2, 13 nn. 10–11, 23 nn. 19–20, 75 n. 42, 127 n. 73, 169 n. 94, 183 n. 1, 189 n. 11, 203 n. 6, 207 n. 11, 221 n. 16, 227 n. 18, 265 n. 8, 275 n. 13, 301 nn. 19 and 21, 339 n. 17, 361 n. 24, 369 n. 1, 385 nn. 14–16, 387 n. 17, 395 n. 30, 397 n. 31, 433 nn. 1–2, 437 n. 4, 445 n. 8, 449 n. 2, 471 n. 2, 479 n. 5, 511 n. 10, 519 n. 11, 521 n. 13, 535 nn. 18–22, 537 n. 23, 555 n. 5, 567 n. 8, 749 nn. 16–18, 762–65, 766–811; Di­­vinarum personarum, 157 & n. 91, 203 n. 6, 285, 301, 315, 373, 387, 389,

445, 453, 505, 507, 519, 565, 737, 819; Early Works on Theological Method 1, 31 n. 27, 475 n. 3, 819; Early Works on Theological Method 2, 275 n. 13, 819; Grace and Freedom, 545 & n. 4, 745 n. 14, 761 n. 20; ‘Horizons and Transpositions,’ 43 n. 31; Insight, 201 n. 3, 251 & n. 31, 275 n. 13, 379 n. 10, 383 n. 12, 395, 471, 481, 605, 737 n. 10, 739 n. 12, 819; ‘Method in Catholic Theology,’ 371 n. 4; Method in Theology, 17 n. 14, 19 nn. 15 and 16, 41 n. 30, 43 n. 31, 819; ‘The Mystical Body of Christ,’ 561 n. 6, 819; ‘The Natural Desire to See God,’ 377 n. 7; The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 377 n. 8, 383, 413 nn. 39–40, 416 n. 41, 439 n. 6, 445 n. 7, 469, 473, 537 n. 23, 539 n. 24, 737 n. 9, 819; ‘The Origins of Christian Realism (1961),’ 11 n. 9, 818; ‘The Origins of Christian Realism (1972),’ 211 n. 15, 818; ‘Theology as Christian Phenomenon,’ 43 n. 31, 819; The Triune God: Doctrines, 9 n. 6, 17 n. 14, 23 n. 19, 27 n. 22, 49 n. 34, 819; The Triune God: Systematics, 65 n. 38, 159 n. 91, 203 n. 6, 285 n. 16, 301 n. 19, 315 n. 1, 373 n. 5, 387 n. 19, 445 n. 7, 447 n. 1, 453 n. 3, 505 n. 8, 519 n. 12, 565 n. 7, 737 n. 10, 819; Verbum, 65 n. 8, 389 n. 21, 391 nn. 23–24, 399 n. 32, 519 n. 11, 523 n. 15, 595 n. 3, 771 n. 2 Loofs, F., 211 & n. 14, 217, 243, 820 ‘Lord’: and divinity, 79, 91; transference of name ‘L.,’ 90–95 Lucius, bishop of Alexandria, 185, 189 Lugo, Juan de, 731 & n. 4 Luther, M., 267, 611, 775 Lyonnet, S., 717 & n. 1, 820 Macarius, 325, 333, 337

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Maldonatus, 795 Malmberg, F., 445, 447, 471, 820 Man-God: as schematic pattern, 204–11, 231, 367 Manicheans, 7 Mansi, J.D., 187 & n. 10, 203, 261, 263, 327, 329, 331, 333, 337, 357, 649, 653, 820 Maranatha, 77, 91 Marcellus of Ancyra, 179 & n. 96 Marcionites, 7 Mari the Persian, 245 Maricm, J., 601, 820 Mariology, 249 Marius Victorinus, 195 Martin i, Pope, 321, 325 Mary: and Nestorius, 219; what was assumed by the word from M., see Flesh: f. assumed from the Virgin Maximus the Confessor, 321, 325, 333 n. 15, 609, 653, 679, 731, 783 Mason, A.J., 619 & n. 10 Matter: assigned m., 385; m. for cause, 579, 703 Memnon, bishop of Ephesus, 211, 227 Merit: and Christ’s beatific vision, 797; and Christ’s glory, 549, 557; and freedom, 729, 785; and sanctifying grace, 545, 547, 557 Methodius, 251 Michaelis, W., 129 Mode: and Incarnation, 409, 411, 413, 419; and potency-form-act, 372–79, 401 Modernists/Modernism, 29, 85 n. 46, 599, 613, 713, 775, 789 Moeller, C., 263, 265, 283, 820 Molari, C., 471, 820 Molière (Jean-Baptiste Poquelin), 29 n. 24 Molina, L., 733

Monenergists/monenergism, 323, 327, 337, 345, 349, 359, 363, 607, 679, 787 Monophysites/monophysitism, 11, 47, 207, 235, 256–67, 280–89, 299, 305, 309, 317, 319, 321, 323, 337, 341, 497, 607, 633, 649, 681, 775, 781, 787; Severian m., 241, 257, 266–77, 319, 327, 337, 341, 349, 359, 361, 373; results of Severian m., 276–81 Monothelites/monothelitism, 265, 325, 337, 345, 349, 359, 363, 679, 787 Montalverne, I., 229, 820 Mother of Christ, 11, 219 Mother of God, 11, 189, 217, 219, 225, 237, 249, 303, 685 Muñiz, Francisco P., 411, 820 Nagranitae, 279 Name: change of ‘God’ from personal n. of Father in NT to common n., 37, 53; and person, 95; n. ‘Son,’ 80–89;’ transference of n. ‘God,’ 96–109; transference of n. ‘Lord,’ 90–95 ‘Name above every name,’ 75, 79, 94–97 Natural theology, 15, 27, 155, 441, 443, 767 Nature(s): assumed human n. not a subsistent or person, 415, 417; cannot be described psychologically, 497; defined, 253; distinction of two n. in Christ, 252–313 passim; doctrine of two n. in Christ, 252–313 passim; dogmatic notion of, 358–61; from two n. and in two n., 11, 239, 273, 281, 283, 287, 291, 337; intellectual n., 63, 197, 387, 389, 415, 417, 423, 425, 495, 501, 503, 513, 515, 517; and operation, 253, 317, 349 (see thesis 5 passim); and person, real distinction of, 201, 203, 289, 359 (see theses 3 and 4 passim); as remote principle-by-which, 359, 361; and subject, see Subject:

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psychological s. and nature; as that by which the way one is present to oneself is determined, 497. See also Properties; Unchanged; Unconfused Nau, F., 243, 259 Nédoncelle, M., 393 & n. 25, 820 Negative theology: in Duméry, 29; in Philo, 155, 159 Neil, Bronwen, 333 n. 15, 813 Nemesius of Emesa, 233 Neobites, 281 Neochalcedonianism, 262–65, 301, 679 Neoplatonists, 137, 151, 181, 233 Nestorius/Nestorians, 3, 11, 47, 183, 205, 207, 211, 213, 217, 219, 221, 223, 225, 227, 229, 231, 235, 237, 241, 243, 245, 247, 249, 263, 271, 275, 277, 281, 285, 287, 289, 305, 319, 329, 331, 361, 373, 497, 563, 567, 597, 603, 609, 633, 635, 651, 655, 679, 707, 725, 781, 783 Newman, J.H., 395 & n. 28, 407, 820 Nicea, Council of, 9, 39, 133, 135, 181, 197 n. 1, 215, 217, 219, 663 Nicea, Second Council of, 311 Nicene Creed, 197, 211, 213, 221, 223, 225, 237, 247, 255, 277, 279 Norris, R.A., 213, 215, 217, 219, 237 n. 22, 625 n. 14, 820 Obedience, 191, 307, 343, 555, 557, 595, 637, 675, 691, 693, 695, 697, 701, 703, 705, 719, 731, 751, 753, 757, 759, 807 Obenauer, Klaus, 465 n. 1 Object(s): and acts, 475; adequate o. of human knowing, 377; o. not conscious, 479; and presence, 479; proportionate o. of human knowing, 377, 401; and subject, 475 Objectivity: and positivism, 31 Olypius of Ravenna, 321 One: and act of existence, 385, 427, 431, 463, 523; and being, 385, 429,

523; defined, 197, 385, 427; and form, 385; incarnate W. is o., thesis 7 passim; and matter, 385; and potencyform-act, 375; o. purely and simply, 387, 427, 429, 431, 447, 449, 451, 465, 523; the same o., 199, 221, 223, 225, 247, 255, 301, 363, 531, 597; what is o. and union, 235. See also the following three entries One person in two natures, 201, 241, 255, 283, 285, 315, 317, 349, 361, 371, 423, 431 One and the same, 3, 5, 133, 233, 235, 247, 249, 253, 255, 281, 293, 329, 347, 423, 429, 435, 451, 465, 473 One subject of two consciousnesses, 465, 473, 500–39, 595, 703 Only-begotten, 61, 87, 197, 199, 215, 217, 219, 223, 329, 365, 643, 671, 777 Operate: to o. belongs to a person from one’s nature, 341, 343, 346–49, 359, 367, 407 Operation(s): immanent o. and causing/effective, 451, 519; immanent and transient o. in Christ, 451, 453; and nature, 253; one o. in Trinity, 181; for Severian monophysitism, 275; two natural o. in Christ, thesis 5 passim; vital o., 519 Operatory, 275 & n. 13 Orbe, A., 7 & n. 3, 820 Order(s): entitative o., 545 Order of discovery, 285 Order of teaching, 285 Orientals, 227, 229, 283 Origen, 607, 615, 679, 779 Origenists, 307, 607, 615, 679, 779 Ott, L., 405 & n. 33, 821 Ousia, 203, 241, 259, 269, 271, 395, 397 Parente, P., 469, 473, 821 Passibility: natural p. of Christ, 306–309

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Patfoort, A., 521, 821 Paul, 7, 34–37, 39, 53, 56–59, 61, 63, 65, 69, 71, 73, 79, 83, 84, 89, 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 111, 113, 115, 117, 119, 121, 123, 127, 129, 133, 135, 151, 179, 189, 197, 201, 219, 225, 239, 255, 293, 355, 579, 669, 683, 693, 695, 721, 795 Paul, Patriarch of Constantinople, 321, 325, 333, 335, 337, 345, 353 Paul v, Pope, 721 Paul the One-eyed, 323 Paul of Samosata, 9, 651 Pauline pattern, 47, 52–65, 549, 553 Perego, A., 469, 473, 821 Person: and act of existence, 407, 425; and body animated by rational soul, 259, 371; and consciousness, see Consciousness: and person; defined, 197; as distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature, 197 (see also Subsistent: distinct s. and person); divine p. in Christ, thesis 3 passim; divine persons psychological subjects by analogy, 515; does not lie outside consciousness, see Consciousness: and person; and essence, 203, 235, 389, 423; formal constitutive of, 423; and hypostasis, 135, 189, 203, 205, 247, 249, 255, 419; and hypostatic union, 299, 439, 461; known in first potency through consciousness, in first act through understanding, in second act through judgment, 493; and nature, 161, 201, 203 (see also Nature: and person, real distinction of; one person in two natures); and operation, see Operate; as principle which, 275, 317, 361, 439, 447, 449, 451, 453, 461; and psychological subject, 473, 479, 493, 495, 501, 515, 517, 519, 525, 527, 531, 533 Pesch, C., 731 & n. 3, 733, 821

Peter, Patriarch of Constantinople, 337 Petit, L., 263 Phantasiastae, 279 Phantasm: and effable knowledge, 713; and knowledge of singular, 501; and understanding, 399, 453, 595, 713 Phenomenology: of consciousness, 490– 93; origins of, 491; as prescinding from philosophic questions, 490–93; as a scientific method, 490–93; Philippe de la Trinité, 471, 511, 533, 535, 821 Philo of Alexandria, 105, 107, 119, 121, 123, 137, 143, 151, 153, 155, 157, 159 Philosophy: and attack on faith and revelation, 13, 17, 27; Christian p., 371 & n. 4, 393, 411, 419; and merely essential order, 419; and presuppositions, 21 Philoxenus (Akhsenaya) of Mabbug, 269, 275 Photius, 651 Physis, 203, 231, 269, 271, 281, 283 Piaget, J., 695, 809 Pilgrim: Christ as, 573, 577, 579, 589, 591, 663, 691, 733 Pirot, L., 171 & n. 95, 813 Pius x, Pope, 599 Pius xii, Pope, 5, 51, 599, 677, 685 Plato/Platonists, 129, 153, 157, 181, 233, 395, 489 Plinval, G. de, 227 n. 17 Porphyry, 233 Portalié, E., 567 & n. 10 Positiveness of not-knowing, 689 Positivism, 17, 21 Potency: and essence, 415, 435, 465; first p., 373, 375, 481; and nature, 497; natural p., 459; obediential p., 459; second p., 373 Potency-Form-Act: 369, 373, 375, 377,

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381, 383, 385; and knowing, 403, 481, 491, 493, 515 Power: p. of Christ the man, 715 Present/presence: and absence, 475; and consciousness, see Consciousness: and self-presence; divine Word present to self in divine way, 502–507; divine Word present to self in human way, 506–509; three kinds/meanings of p., 477 Principle(s): constitutive p. of being, 379, 381 n. 10, 383, 417, 431, 435, 437; defined, 359; of hypostatic union, 368–371, 446–53; and understanding, 65; p. which and p. by which, 275, 277, 317, 361, 439, 447, 449, 451, 453, 461 Priscillianists, 7 Proclus, bishop of Constantinople, 205, 207, 229 Properties: 255; of Christ, 205; interchange of, see Communicatio idiomatum; for Severian monophysites, 273; p. of two natures of Christ, 253, 283, 291, 315, 339, 347, 349, 371, 431, 451, 793 Propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis, 430–31 Prosdokios, 277 Prosopon, 231 Prümm, K., 59 & n. 35, 91 & n. 48, 821 Pseudo-Athanasius, 193 Pseudo-Dionysius, 281 Pusey, P.E., 187, 207, 237, 239, 563, 627, 631, 821 Pyrrhus, Patriarch of Constantinople, 321, 335, 337, 339 Qumrân, 7, 9 n. 4, 59 n. 35 Rahner, K., 37 & n. 29, 603, 613, 689, 773 n. 5, 821

Ranke, L. von, 19 n. 16 Rationalism/rationalists, 15, 25, 189, 289, 611, 717 Rational soul, of Christ, 181, 183, 207, 217, 233, 259, 273, 281, 289, 293, 301, 369, 371, 389, 391, 393, 413, 415, 417, 423, 657, 663 Real: and being, 389 Receive: to understand is to r., 595 Reduplicative, 168 & n. 93 Reflection: and introspection as notion of consciousness, 472–81, 531; and judgment, 375, 481, 493, 495, 585, 587; r. on phantasm, 501 Regional diversity: and patterns, 208–11 Relativism, 403 Resultance: natural r., 583 Revelation: how r. happens, 673; r. progressive, 38–43, 45; and unveiling, 27 Richard, M., 193 & n. 16, 203, 205, 229, 241, 251, 263, 513, 601, 617, 619, 773 n. 5, 821 Riedmatten, H. de, 185, 601, 617, 773 n. 5, 821 Ripa, John de, 783 Robber Council, 231, 261 Rohof, Jan, 559, 822 Rome, Council of, 183 & n. 1, 181, 203, 265, 295, 297, 325, 333, 347 Rosmini, A., 611 Salaville, L., 279 Salmanticenses, 733 Sanctifying grace: as absolutely supernatural entitative habit, 543, 545; accidental, 459, 543, 577; Christ had s.g., 554–57; and Christ’s baptism, 557; and Christ’s fullness of grace, 558–61; and Christ’s virtues and gifts, 547, 559, 563, 565; defined, 543; as elevating, 547; as external term, 547, 559, 577; and grace of Head, 561; and

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grace of union, 563, 565; as healing, 547; and justification, 547; as principle of merit, 557; and uncreated gift of Holy Spirit, 545, 557, 559 Sardica, Council of, 251 Schell, H., 611, 771 Schematic pattern(s): 43, 45, 199, 247, 365; importance of, 49, 51; inverse retrospective s.p., 47: Johannine s.p., 47; s.p. outside New Testament (see Logos-sarx; Logos-anthroFpos; Wordflesh; Man-God); Pauline s.p., 52–65, 121; prospective s.p, 45, 179; s.p. and proving divinity of Christ, 42–53 (esp. 51–53), 247; retrospective s.p., 45, 47 Schmaus, M., 599, 773 n. 5, 822 Schmid, F., 599, 822 Schoeps, H.J., 9 & n. 5, 822 Schulte, E., 601, 822 Schwartz, E., 203, 211, 263, 265, 283, 297, 623 & n. 13, 813, 814 Schweizer, O., 395, 822 Scipioni, L., 243, 822 Scotus, John Duns, 407, 409, 411, 417, 489, 493, 563, 567, 609, 721, 733, 771 Seiller, L., 469, 471, 513, 517, 822 Self-knowledge, 483 Sempiternus Rex, 471, 513 Sense in act is the sensible in act, 483, 489 Sépinski, Augustinus, 601, 609, 711, 822 Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople, 321, 323, 325, 327, 329, 331, 335, 337, 339, 345, 353, 359, 653 Sergius the Grammarian, 273, 281 Severinus, Pope, 321 Severus of Antioch, 263, 269, 279, 623 n. 13 Simultaneously true meanings, 739, 749, 755, 757 Sin: Christ without s., 69, 289, 291, 305, 307, 355, 507, 511, 519, 553, 597, 603,

611, 645, 663, 665, 675, 689, 693, thesis 13 passim; defined, 715; spark (fomes) of, 722–27 Singular: defined, 543 Sirmia, First Synod of, 257 Sixtus, Pope, 229 Solano, J., 567, 822 ‘Someone’: and ‘someone else,’ 3, 197, 199, 223, 247, 253, 255, 293, 317, 393, 429, 511 Son: exclusive relationship with Father, 87, 89, 673, 707; as God in New Testament, 37, 53; loved by Father, 551, 555, 559; in Nicene Creed, 39 ‘Son’: and proof of divinity, 37, 79, 81, 85, 89 ‘Son as God,’ 49, 167, 343, 803 ‘Son as Man,’ 49, 167, 343, 365, 803 ‘Son of God,’ 37, 49, 81, 83, 85, 89 ‘Son of Man’ (as expression), 37, 45, 49, 67, 77, 89, 119, 121 Son of Man: and progressive pattern, 45 Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, 323, 325, 329, 339, 357, 653 Soul of Christ, see Rational soul, of Christ Spanneut, M., 621, 822 Species: and acquired and infused knowledge, 769, 791; finite s., 577; as form, 395; and knowing a subject, 525; and soul, 489 Stephen, bishop of Hierapolis, 651 Stephen Niobis, 281 Stoics, 137, 147, 151, 157, 309 Suarez, F., 409, 419, 439, 493, 543, 569, 733 Subject: and act, 475; and consciousness, 467, 477, 483, 487; divine Word as psychological s. of human consciousness, 517, 519, 525, 527; and object, 475; one psychological s. unites

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two consciousnesses, 531, 533, 595, 703; psychological s., 479, 501, 519; psychological s. in act, 479, 495, 519, 521, 525; psychological s. in Christ, 517; psychological s. and nature, 495, 497, 499; psychological s. and person, 473, 493, 495, 515; psychological s. in potency, 479, 495, 526 Subjectivism, 21 Subordination: of human to divine operation in Christ, 317, 337, 339 Subordinationism, 157, 179 Subsistent; and act of existence, 379, 389; and assumed human nature, 369, 389, 413, 415, 417; defined, 415; distinct s. and person, 197, 387, 393, 415, 423, 425, 495, 517; and divine relations, 505, 569; God as indistinct s., 389; and the ‘I,’ 493, 501, 513; and incarnate Word, 429; and Johannine Logos, 159; and major real distinction, 201, 255; and one, 427; and supposit, 417; three in God, 389. See Subsisting in a human nature; Supposit Subsisting in a human nature, 529, 531, 561, 569, 679, 797 Substance: analogy of, 395; in Aristotle, 383, 395, 397, 405, 407; first s., 383; second s., 383 Succensus, 201, 209, 239, 259 Suffering: Christ’s s. and beatific knowing, 583, 585; Christ’s s. and freedom, thesis 14 passim; Christ’s s. and human consciousness, 507, 509; Christ’s s. and natural passibility, 307; and contrariety, 585 Sullivan, F.A., 11 & n. 8, 193, 241, 265, 603, 621, 623, 625, 773 n. 5, 822 Supernatural: absolutely s., 455, 459, 543; s. acts, 597 (see also thesis 12 passim); defined, 455; s. end, 399; and knowing a mystery hidden in God,

33; s. order, 545, 547; theorem of natural and s., 363, 603 Supposit: and assumed human nature, see Subsistent: and assumed human nature; in God, 389; and hypostasis, 389, 415; logical s., 417; real s., 389, 415 Synapheia, 219, 225 Synoptic problem, 39 Synousians, 11 Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite) Church, 263 Szabo, Szadok, 601, 611, 822 Term: consequent external t., 441, 443, 447, 455, 457, 461, 547, 557, 577, 737, 739, 753, 755; as effect, 455, 457, 461; and sanctifying grace, 545, 555, 557, 559; and substantial act in incarnation, 457, 461, 557 Ternus, J., 469, 599, 601, 611, 617, 633, 649, 651, 653, 677, 771, 822 Tertullian, 7, 251 That which: and that by which, 203, 235, 283, 383, 415, 477, 527. See also Principle: p. which and p. by which Theandric: uses of the term ‘t,’ 275, 281, 317, 327, 345, 347 Themistius of Alexandria, 281 Theodore, bishop of Pharan, 323, 327, 335, 337, 339, 345, 355, 607, 651 Theodore, Patriarch of Constantinople, 321, 325 Theodore i, Pope, 321, 325 Theodore of Mopsuestia, 11, 47, 183 & n. 2, 193, 205, 207, 209, 231, 233, 241, 243, 245, 265, 361, 597, 607, 623, 651, 723, 725, 822 Theodoret of Cyrrhus, 261, 597, 607, 625, 779 Theodosians, 633, 649 Theodosius (patriarch), 281

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Theodosius ii, 261 Theodotus, 9 Theologians: and bishops, 283, 285 Theopaschitism, 277 Theos: in New Testament, 29, 101; and ho theos, 105 Theotokos, 219 Things divine and things human, 197, 249 Thomas, Patriarch of Constantinople, 321 Thomas Aquinas: Works cited: Compendium theologiae, 429; De potentia, 373, 387 n. 18; De veritate, 63, 153, 489, 525, 531, 581, 765; In IX Metaphysicorum, 373; In Peri Hermeneias, 743, 745, 747, 759; Quaestio disputata de Unione Verbi Incarnati, 429, 461, 463 n. 1; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 429; Summa contra Gentiles, 391, 399, 495 n. 7, 769; Summa theologiae, 15, 29, 63, 65 n. 38, 115 n. 66, 153, 163, 253, 285, 299, 303, 305, 307, 311, 313, 341, 351, 367, 391, 399, 407, 425, 429, 435, 439, 447, 449, 457, 461, 463, 465 n. 1, 501, 503, 505, 543 n. 2, 545, 553, 555, 557, 559, 561, 563, 565, 571, 575, 577, 579, 583, 585, 587, 589, 599, 605, 609, 673, 685, 687, 703, 709, 711, 713, 715, 723, 729 n. 1, 731, 737, 741, 749, 753, 757, 769, 783, 789, 793, 795, 797, 799, 803, 805, 807, 811; Super I Sententiarum, 387 n. 18; Three Chapters, 201, 245 & n. 29 Time: and consciousness of identity, 484–87; and eternity 235, 487, 741 Timothy Aelurus (the Weasel), 269 Timothy of Berytus, 257 Tiphanus, 405, 409, 411, 413, 417, 457, 493, 513 Tisserand, E., 245 Tixeront, J., 337, 822 Toledo, Eleventh Council of, 251

Toletus, 611 Torrance, I.R., 269 n. 12, 823 Torrell, Jean-Pierre, 463 n. 1, 465 n. 1, 823 Transcendence: theorem of, 735, 745, 747, 753 Trent, Council of, 31, 311, 725 Trinity: as extrinsic efficient cause, 450; as principle from which Word is a man, 447, 449 Tritheists, 281 Truth: and absolute, 13, 31; and being, 29, 31; as correspondence, 13, 455; and councils, 13; and dogma, 13; doing the t., 147; and faith, 13, 27, 33; in John, 147; and judgment, 13; objective and subjective manifestations of t. of faith, 33; and revelation, 13, 27; supernatural t., 13, 15. See also Contingent predication; Term: consequent external t. Truths: simultaneous t., 753 Twelve anathemas, 213, 237, 249, 279 Typos, 325, 333, 335, 337, 339, 353 Ubiquitarianism, 267 Unchanged: two natures in Christ u., 253, 283, 291 Unconfused: two natures in Christ u., 253, 283, 291 Understanding: and conceiving, 487, 493, 499, 513; as insight into concrete, 65; and judgment, 375, 393, 403, 405; as proper act of intellect, 575; regards principles, 65 Undivided in itself: meaning of, 385 Valencia, Gregorio de, 733 Valentinus, 261 Van Bavel, T.J., 601, 637, 639, 641, 643, 645, 647, 823 Vasquez, Gabriel, 733

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Victor i, Pope, 9 n. 6 Victorinus Afer, 195 Vienne, Council of, 545 Vigilius, Pope, 245 & n. 29, 265, 267, 319, 597, 647, 781 Virtues: in Christ, 553 (see also thesis 11 passim); defined/described, 543; and gifts, 565; and sanctifying grace, 563, 565 Vitalian, Pope, 321, 325 Viva, D., 721 Vogt, E., 59 & n. 35, 823 Vorgrimler, H., 603, 821 Vuillermet, P., 567 & n. 11, 823 Walz, P.A., 463 What has not been assumed has not been healed, 193 Wickham, L., 183 & n. 3, 195 n. 21, 201, 209, 237 n. 22, 239, 259, 287, 297, 814 Wie es eigentlich gewesen, 20 & n. 16 Will(s): in Christ, thesis 3 passim (see also thesis 14 passim); defined, 315; free human w. of Christ, thesis 14 passim; free w. defined, 727; for Severians, 275, 277, 327

Wisdom: divine w., 583; as habit, 65 & n. 38, 769; w. personified, 139, 141 Word: conception of in John, 107, 136–51, 159; creative w., 139; w. of gospel, 141; personified w. of God, 139; prophetic w., 139 Word-flesh: as schematic pattern, 204–11 Work: Christ’s w. and his knowledge of all that pertains to it, 573, 585, 661, 663, 677, 684–93 Xiberta, B., 183 & n. 3, 185, 189, 191, 193, 195, 203, 209, 211, 213, 217, 229, 241, 243, 245, 259, 263, 269, 279, 281, 283, 309, 327, 329, 331, 333, 337, 339, 341, 353, 355, 361, 413, 469, 473, 563, 567, 597, 615, 619, 621, 623, 625, 627, 629, 631, 635, 649, 651, 653, 655, 725, 779, 781, 783, 799, 823 Zacharias of Goldsbourg/Chrysopolis, 659, 783 Zeno (Emperor), 279 Ziodé, I., 263 Zwingli, H., 611, 775

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