The Hamburg Marine Insurance, 1736-1859 9004345299, 9789004345294, 9789004510265

Citation preview

The Hamburg Marine Insurance, 1736–1859

Brill’s Studies in Maritime History Series Editor Gelina Harlaftis, Institute for Mediterranean Studies/Foundation of Research and Technology – Hellas (FORTH) and University of Crete Editorial Board Maria Fusaro, University of Exeter, U.K. Michael Miller, University of Miami, U.S.A. Sarah Palmer, University of Greenwich, U.K. Amélia Polónia, University of Porto, Portugal David Starkey, University of Hull, U.K. Malcolm Tull, Murdoch University, Australia Richard W. Unger, University of British Columbia, Canada

volume 12

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/bsmh

The Hamburg Marine Insurance, 1736–1859 By

Markus A. Denzel Translated By

Franziska Streng

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: Hamburg seen from the river Elbe, painting of Elias Galli (1650–1712), c.1680. Museum für Hamburgische Geschichte. © https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Galli_Stadtansicht_Hamburg.JPGs The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at https://catalog.loc.gov LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022010432

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 2405-4917 ISBN 978-90-04-34529-4 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-51026-5 (e-book) Copyright 2022 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Preface ix List of Illustrations xi Note on Hamburg Currency xvi Introduction 1 Current State of Research 6 Source, Methods and Questions of Research 12 1 Spreading the Risk – Marine Insurance as a Commercial and Financial Innovation in Europe up to the Eighteenth Century 20 1.1 The Beginnings in the Medieval Mediterranean 20 1.2 The Emergence of the Marine Insurance Business in Early Modern Times 34 2 An Entrepôt in the North – Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport 46 2.1 Hamburg’s Maritime Trade from the Late Seventeenth to the Mid-Nineteenth Centuries 46 2.2 Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Transport 64 3 Depending on the City’s Commerce – the ‘Regional’ Hamburg Insurance Market in the Eighteenth Century 73 3.1 Marine Insurance and Convoy Shipping 73 3.2 Juridical Bases of the Hamburg Marine Insurance Business 83 3.3 The Hamburg Marine Insurance Market as “Centre of the Whole North” 87 4 A Business of Its Own – the ‘Global’ Hamburg Insurance Market in the Nineteenth Century 92 4.1 The Changing Basic Conditions in International Shipping 92 4.2 The Business of (Joint-Stock) Marine Insurance Companies in Hamburg 96 4.3 The Marine Insurance Business in Hamburg up to the 1850s 108

vi

Contents

5 From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz – Marine Insurance Rates for Destinations in the Atlantic 119 5.1 The North Atlantic: Greenland and Arkhangelsk 119 5.2 Norway 130 5.3 From the German North Sea Coast to the Sound 134 5.4 The Netherlands 143 5.5 The British Isles 148 5.6 The French Atlantic Coast 159 5.7 The Iberian Atlantic Coast 167 6 From Málaga to Smyrna – Marine Insurance Rates for Destinations in the Mediterranean Sea 178 6.1 The Western Mediterranean 179 6.2 The Eastern Mediterranean 185 7 From the Sound to Saint Petersburg – Marine Insurance Rates for Destinations in the Baltic Sea 192 7.1 The Hamburg Premium Rates 194 7.2 The Lübeck Premium Rates 200 7.3 Premium Rates from Amsterdam, London, Bordeaux, Portugal, and the Mediterranean 211 8 From New York to Lima – Marine Insurance Rates for Destinations in the Americas 223 8.1 The Iberian Transatlantic Routes in the Eighteenth Century 224 8.2 North American East Coast and Gulf of Mexico 230 8.3 The Caribbean 237 8.4 South America and California 246 8.5 The Russian Transatlantic Routes in the Early Nineteenth Century 253 9 From the Cape to Canton – Marine Insurance Rates for Destinations in the Indian Ocean 256 9.1 The European Routes to East India in the Eighteenth Century 256 9.2 The Hamburg Marine Insurance Premium Rates in the Nineteenth Century 262 Conclusions 268

Contents

Appendix 1: The Geographic Range of the Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current, 1736 to 1859 281 Appendix 2: The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current, 1736 to 1859 291 Bibliography 364 Geographic Index 407 Subject Index 416

vii

Preface The present book has a long history of origins: it must have been near the turn of the previous millennium – I do not recall the exact year – when my academic teacher Jürgen Schneider, who was then holding the Chair of Economic and Social History at the University of Bamberg, suggested to me the topic of marine insurance and the Hamburg tradition of sources. Yet, due to obligations to complete more urgent work first, the study did not take shape any earlier than 2004 to 2006, when the extensive volume of the Hamburg marine insurance premiums was collected in a database as a “by-product” in addition to the normal activities of the chair. The actual research on the subject began with the securing of funding from the Gerda Henkel Foundation under the title “Die Hamburger Seeversicherung von 1736 bis 1858” and was finished in late 2013. The final rough manuscript in German was realised by the end of 2015. In the meantime, however, the unexpected chance to publish the monograph in Brill’s Studies in Maritime History had occurred. Tackling the new challenge of providing a translation into English took some years more, but at the same time it was a good opportunity to include minor revisions, additions, and updates to the state of research. Eventually, after years of effort, the result can be presented. On the occasion of the book’s publication, I want to express my gratitude for the varied forms of support I have received in the course of my research. My initial thanks go to the Gerda Henkel Foundation for its generous funding of the research project for more than three years. Many colleagues and friends provided further reflections and helpful remarks, especially during the XXXVIIth and XLVIIIth Settimane di Studi of the Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Datini” in Prato (2005 and 2016) as well as the workshop “Risky Business: Pricing, Governance, and Integration in European Insurance Markets, c.1400–c.1870” organised by Sabine Go at the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam in 2019. By name, I want to thank Hilario Casado Alonso (Valladolid), Giovanni Ceccarelli (Parma), Christina Dalhede (Gothenburg), Mechthild Isenmann (Leipzig), Olga Katsiardi-Hering (Athens), Adrian Leonard (Cambridge), Michael North (Greifswald), and – above all – Werner Scheltjens (Bamberg) as well as two unknown reviewers. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Brill, and in particular to Associate Editor Alessandra Giliberto for adding the volume to the range of publications, and to Gelina Harlaftis (Rethymno) for including it in Brill’s Studies in Maritime History. Katharina Beberweil (now International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Amsterdam), research assistant at my chair at the time, was responsible for

x

Preface

the data input and the first steps of the analysis, for which I thank her as well. I am particularly grateful to my assistant Franziska Streng who with precision has made the effort of translating a sometimes demanding text, over a period of several years. For further support I received from so many members of my chair’s staff I would like to thank representatively Katja Wöhner (administration), Robert Jähnichen (literature research and procurement), and Christoph Streng (preparation of the maps). Furthermore, I would like to thank the Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald, where I was Senior Fellow as this volume was finalised. My warmest thanks, however, go to my dear wife Alexandra, who has accompanied the Hamburg insurance rate project for more than one and a half decades. Without the suggestion of my academic teacher and fatherly friend Jürgen Schneider, this book would never have been written – at least not in the present form. I therefore dedicate this volume to him in deep and heartfelt gratitude on the occasion of his honorary day on 14 February 2022. Leipzig and Greifswald, 8 January 2022 Markus A. Denzel

Illustrations Tables 2-1

Vessel arrivals in Hamburg from destinations beyond Cape Finisterre and from the Mediterranean, 1791–1800 55 2-2 Tonnage of Hamburg’s merchant vessels, 1672–1792 64 2-3 Number of Hamburg-flagged vessels, 1798–1858 66 2-4 Annual average of direct departures from Hamburg to non-European destinations, 1816–1840 69 4-1 Hamburg marine insurance companies in 1823 97 4-2 Premiums and losses of hull and grain cargo insurances, 1820–1822 101 C-1 Average premium quotations in the Amsterdam and the Hamburg marine insurance markets, 1766–1779 273 A1-1 Hamburg premium quotations, 1736–1762 281 A1-2 Hamburg premium quotations, 1762–1820 282 A1-3 Hamburg premium quotations, 1821–1834 283 A1-4 Hamburg premium quotations, 1835–1859 284 A1-5 Lübeck premium quotations for Baltic Sea ports, 1736–1859 286 A1-6 Other Baltic Sea ports’ premium quotations, 1821–1859 286 A1-7 Other European ports’ premium quotations, 1782–1842 289 A1-8 Other European ports’ premium quotations, 1821–1859 290 A2-1 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the North Atlantic, 1736–1859 291 A2-2 Arkhangelsk premium quotations, 1782–1834 295 A2-3 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in Norway, 1736–1859 297 A2-4 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations from the German North Sea Coast to the Sound, 1736–1859 301 A2-5 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Netherlands, 1736–1859 305 A2-6 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations on the British Isles, 1736–1859 309 A2-7 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the French Atlantic coast, 1736–1859 313 A2-8 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the Iberian Atlantic coast, 1736–1859 317 A2-9 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Western Mediterranean, 1736–1859 321

xii

Illustrations

A2-10

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1736–1859 325 A2-11 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1736–1859 329 A2-12 Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the Southern Baltic Sea, 1736–1859 333 A2-13 Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the Northern Baltic Sea, 1736–1859 337 A2-14 Amsterdam and London premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1821 341 A2-15 Bordeaux premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1821 343 A2-16 Portugal’s premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1821 345 A2-17 Mediterranean ports’ premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1821 347 A2-18 Hamburg premium quotations for the Iberian transatlantic routes, 1736–1820 349 A2-19 Hamburg premium quotations for North American destinations, 1804–1859 352 A2-20 Premium quotations for Saint Thomas, 1782–1842 354 A2-21 Hamburg premium quotations for Caribbean destinations, 1804–1859 356 A2-22 Hamburg premium quotations for South American destinations and California, 1820–1859 358 A2-23 Saint Petersburg premium quotations for American destinations, 1821–1834 359 A2-24 Premium quotations for destinations in East India, 1762–1820/34 360 A2-25 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Indian Ocean, 1820–1859 362

Graphs 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6

Hamburg’s seaborne trade, 1733–1798 52 Hamburg’s seaborne imports from Northwest Europe, 1733–1798 53 Vessel arrivals in Hamburg according to their flag, 1633–1820 54 Hamburg’s foreign trade (only duty paid goods), 1820–1844 60 Hamburg’s foreign trade, 1845–1859 61 Hamburg’s direct trade with non-European destinations, 1837/38 and c.1850 62

Illustrations 2-7 2-8 2-9 2-10 4-1 4-2 4-3 5-1

xiii

German commercial settlements in non-European countries, 1844/45 62 Vessel arrivals and departures in and from Hamburg, 1836–1851 68 Steam-powered vessels in Hamburg and their voyages, 1838–1852 70 Vessels in packet shipping from Hamburg to North America, 1836–1860 70 The sales at the Hamburg marine insurance market, 1836–1848 97 The development of the Hamburg insurance market, 1798–1859 109 Premiums for voyages into the Mediterranean, 1791–1805 110 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the North Atlantic, 1736–1859 125 5-2 Arkhangelsk premium quotations, 1782–1834 129 5-3 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in Norway, 1736–1859 132 5-4 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations from the German North Sea coast to the Sound, 1736–1859 141 5-5 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Netherlands, 1736–1859 146 5-6 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations on the British Isles, 1736–1859 156 5-7 Hamburg’s maritime traffic to the ports at the French Atlantic coast, 1760–1789 161 5-8 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the French Atlantic coast, 1736–1859 164 5-9 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the Iberian Atlantic coast, 1736–1859 172 5-10 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the Bay of Biscay, 1736–1859 174 6-1 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Western Mediterranean, 1736–1859 183 6-2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1736–1859 188 7-1 Hamburg’s seaborne trade with the Baltic Sea according to the Sound Toll Registers, 1736–1849 193 7-2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1736–1859 197 7-3 Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the southern Baltic Sea, 1736–1859 204 7-4 Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the northern Baltic Sea, 1736–1859 205 7-5 Lübeck premium quotations for the most important destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1815–1859 208

xiv

Illustrations

7-6

Amsterdam and London premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1821 213 Bordeaux premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1842 215 Portugal’s premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1820 217 Premium rates quoted in the Mediterranean for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1842 220 Hamburg premium quotations for the Iberian Transatlantic routes, 1736–1820 228 Hamburg premium quotations for North American destinations, 1804–1859 234 Premium quotations for Saint Thomas, 1782–1842 239 Hamburg premium quotations for Caribbean destinations, 1804–1859 244 Hamburg premium quotations for South American destinations and California, 1820–1859 251 Saint Petersburg premium quotations for American destinations, 1821–1834 254 Premium quotations for destinations in East India, 1762–1820/34 259 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Indian Ocean, 1820–1859 266 Amsterdam premium quotations for Hamburg and Hamburg premium quotations for Amsterdam in comparison, 1766–1779 272 Amsterdam and Hamburg premium quotations for Venice in comparison, 1766–1779 274

7-7 7-8 7-9 8-1 8-2 8-3 8-4 8-5 8-6 9-1 9-2 C-1 C-2

Figure 1-1

Model of the development from sea loan to marine insurance 28

Maps 3-1 3-2

Premium quotations for destinations in Hamburg’s maritime trade, 1736–1762 81 Premium quotations for destinations in Hamburg’s maritime trade, 1762–1820 82

Illustrations 4-1 4-2 4-3

Premium quotations for destinations in Hamburg’s maritime trade, 1821–1834 116 Premium quotations for destinations in Hamburg’s maritime trade, 1835–1859 117 Premium quotations for destinations in Hamburg’s maritime trade, 1835–1859 – the global perspective 118

xv

Note on Hamburg Currency In Hamburg, accounts were kept and payments were made in Mark Banko or rixdollar Banko (‘thaler’ in the nineteenth century), whereby one rixdollar or thaler was equal to three Mark Banko. The term ‘Banko’ refers to the fact that this Hamburg currency was a bank currency, which was never minted. It was the currency of account of the Hamburg Bank founded in 1619 (cf. chapter 2). In the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, 100 Mark Banko (of nominally 8.43 grammes of fine silver) were equal (official parity) to – 87.90 guilders Flemish current or – since October 1816 – 87.62 Dutch guilders in the Netherlands – 7.82, since November 1785 8.12 Louisd’ors in Bremen – 8.03 pounds Sterling in Great Britain – 187.12 Livres tournois, since 1795 187.33 Francs in France – 30.88, since 1854 35.04 Milréis in Portugal – 34.51 Pesos duros (1772–1848) in Spain – 224.53 Lire fuori di Banco, since 1827 187.11 Piedmontese Lire nuove in Genoa – 38.74 Pezze da otto reali or 222.75 Lire moneta buona in Leghorn – 44.04 Ducati del Regno in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies – 268.31 Ducati di Banco in Venice – 72.11 guilders Konventionskurant, since November 1858 75.79 guilders Österreichische Währung in the Habsburg Monarchy – 50.57 (since 1750/64), since 1821 50.46 Thaler Prussian current in Prussia – 124.89 guilders Polish current or 201.87 guilders Danzig current in Poland – 48.11 silver roubles in the Russian Empire – 98.37 Daler silver money, since 1776 32.78 rixdollars specie (up to 1857) in Sweden – 40.98 rixdollars Danish current, since 1813 66.69 Rigsbankdaler or – since March 1854 – rixdollars Rigsmønt in Denmark – 35.70, since 1834 36.00, since March 1853 36.69 dollars in the United States of America

This list of par values, which does not make the claim to be complete, is compiled according to: Denzel, “Paritätentabellen,” (1991) 216, 218–220, 230, 232, 235, 237 and 239; idem, “Paritätentabellen,” (1992) 42, 45–47, 49–51; idem, “Paritätentabellen,” (1993) 50, 52–55, 57, 59–60; idem, Handbook of World Exchange Rates, 58–59, 104–108, 190–193, 196–197, 255–256, 279–280, 307, 327–328, 339–340, 359–360, 379 and 404.

Introduction In a newspaper article of 8 December 1848 an overall economic significance had been ascribed to the Hamburg marine insurance since the eighteenth century: [T]here ought to be no other statistical evidence more suitable to measure Hamburg’s commercial prestige both in its previous development and current state than to assemble an overview of the local marine insurance businesses. Other branches of trade to surpass the importance of this exact business there are none.1 This rather lavish mid-nineteenth century appraisal of Hamburg’s marine insurance business focusses on two aspects: on the one hand, this apt quotation emphasises the rising importance marine insurance was garnering for international trade and transport. On the other, it highlights the business’s function as an indicator for the economic power of a particular commercial and financial centre. Since the late eighteenth century, Hamburg has not only been one of the European focal markets of marine insurance but one of global recognition: so, for instance, prior to the formation of local marine insurance markets and joint-stock insurance companies in the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, Hamburg’s marine insurance market had exceeded its municipal boundaries and served these regions at least until the 1860s. To the present day, marine, or more general, transport insurance is conventionally traded in international markets and even in landlocked countries such as Switzerland.2 In the eighteenth century, the Hamburg market had already claimed a position among international marine insurance markets. Thus the oldest and by far most potent German marine insurance market evolved in Hamburg; and by virtue of the largest number of long-standing insurance companies to engage in international ventures, the city managed to assert its status even after marine insurance businesses were set up in Bremen3 and Lübeck. In this way, Hamburg has become a centre for the advancement of the German insurance business well beyond marine insurance – and has been defending its position 1 SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599, Nr. 48,1 rot, fasc. 39: Das Hamburgische Seeversicherungsgeschäft. The newspaper article was clipped and provided with a manuscript commentary dating from 1849. 2 For reference of the 1960s situation see Jakobi, Seeversicherung, 89–141. 3 Prüser, Geschichte.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_002

2

Introduction

since those times.4 Hamburg’s marine insurance market therefore is ideal for discussing core aspects of marine insurance as an economic institution. In this study, the Hamburg marine insurance5 is discussed from its beginnings until the global economic crisis ensuing after the Panic of 1857. Alongside fairs, banks, and stock exchanges, marine insurance was one of the most important commercial institutions in pre-industrialised times. While fairs, banks, and stock exchanges served as pivots for the exchange of goods, money, and information, marine insurance protected the exchange between commercial centres, as long as this communication was dependent upon high-risk maritime transport: [Marine insurance] is not just the oldest constituent of transport insurance but the oldest branch of insurance in existence. Thus marine insurance has been the insurance branch to be first standardized by law and regulated by contracts in every country: by any accounts, it has been the most assiduously cultivated class of insurance by economic and commercial terms.6 Therefore, marine insurance became the blueprint for property insurance. As early as the fourteenth century is concerned, land transport insurance and inland marine insurance can be shown to have existed since 1384 and 1397 respectively.7 There is only one remarkable exception: life insurance has its foundations in annuity models.8 In other words, marine insurance brought the idea of insuring to the world.9 Marine insurance refers to insuring a vessel or cargo, or both – but not the people onboard the vessel. Deriving its origin from classical-period antecedents, this institution emerged in Italy during the 4 Cf. Koch, “Der hamburgische Beitrag”; as well as Müller-Lutz (ed.), Beiträge, part II, 8. 5 The history of providing insurance to persons such as sailors, mariners, or passengers are not taken into consideration. Neither are any of Hamburg’s early social security institutions that catered to sea-faring personnel in as much these institutions would purchase the freedom of sailors captured by pirates, such as the Casse der Stücke von Achten set up by the Schiffergesellschaft did, or the Sklavenkasse founded in 1624 by the Hamburg Admiralitätskollegium (Sulzer, Soziale Sicherungssysteme, 30–39; Ressel, Zwischen Sklavenkassen und Türkenpässen). Mutual insurances or hull clubs, which were commonplace in Groningen or minor British ports from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, are not discussed either (Kingston, “Governance and Institutional Change,” 13. Cf. Go, “Marine Insurance”; van Niekerk, “Insurance Law”, 636–639; Kotowski, “British Maritime Insurance”). 6 Leschke-Saenger, “Staatsaufsicht und Transportversicherung,” 86. 7 Scheller, “Die Geburt des Risikos,” 316. 8 Denzel and Holzhey, “Rente”. 9 Cf. Borscheid, “Mit Sicherheit leben”; Schug, Versicherungsgedanke.

Introduction

3

Commercial Revolution of the late twelfth to early fourteenth centuries. In addition to the bill of exchange as a key instrument of cashless payment and double entry bookkeeping, marine insurance was the third decisive innovation brought forth by the Commercial Revolution and it upheld its significance for centuries: “[T]he insurance contract (the exchange of a premium for the promise of an indemnity in the event of a specified loss) enabled risk-averse merchants to pursue high-risk, high-return trading opportunities that they might otherwise have foregone.”10 Indeed, the relative risk reduction of sea voyages11 prompted by marine insurance conduced to a sizeable increase in long-distance maritime trade, which was dominated by Italian merchants in the Mediterranean and along European Atlantic coastlines. With the European Expansion dawning, the positive effect marine insurance had had on maritime trade was transferred to Europe’s trade with the continents. In the same vein, insuring maritime transport was substantial to the development of the international division of labour in the nineteenth century, and, in a final consequence, contributed to the integration of the world economy in the Industrial Age. Marine insurance had unanimously matured into “a competitive and integrated market” at the latest by the end of the sixteenth century.12 It is also among the leading Italian innovations in the tertiary sector that disseminated to Europe where it became the origin and keystone of not only the European but worldwide insurance business.13 Not without reason, marine insurance today is regarded as the “most globalized insurance.”14 What is the purpose of marine insurance? Cargo and vessel, or both, are insured against the risk of the danger of being damaged at sea for several causes. In contrast to ‘danger’ that cannot be calculated, ‘risk’ can. In consonance with Niklas Luhmann, the essential difference between the two terms 10 11

12 13

14

Kingston, “Governance and Institutional Change,” 1. A voyage is a “journey by sea. It usually includes the outward and homeward trips, which are called passages” (Smyth and Belcher, Sailor’s Word-Book), and especially in marine insurance: “The voyage insured…, a technical term, which must be carefully distinguished from the actual voyage of the ship … is a transit at sea from the terminus a quo to the terminus ad quem in a prescribed course of navigation … which is never set out in any policy” (Arnould, Law Marine Insurance, I. i. xii. 333). Ibid., 4. Cf. Zwierlein, “Erfolgsmodell”; idem, “Insurances”. Outside Europe, the Muslim world knew a form of (marine) insurance, which did not spread beyond the Muslim cultural and commercial sphere; Rispler-Chaim, “Insurance and Semi-Insurance Transactions”; idem, Insurance in the World of Islam, 14–22; Çizakça, Islamic Capitalism. – Marine insurance emerged just as rarely in East Asia as in India, since in these regions the maritime moment was of minor economic importance. “Seeversicherung im Wandel,” 751.

4

Introduction

is that ‘danger’ means that a damaging event is perceived to be external and is thus attributed to the environment, whereas ‘risk’ connotes that the event of damage is the result of a decision. As for maritime trade, this decision is simply to expose one’s vessel and cargo to the dangers of the sea.15 The term ‘risk’ thereby is closely linked to the development of marine insurance, since this institution “transformed dangers into calculable risks.”16 The Latin risicum initially designated a possible event of damage. Since around 1180, the term risicum maris, which expressed the uncertainty of the future in the Mediterranean maritime trade, is proven to have existed. According to Benjamin Scheller, the term ‘risk’ “above all was applied to handle and settle specific new problems in the organization of the Mediterranean maritime trade since the late Middle Ages.”17 The background to this was the processing of long-distance trade on the basis of commenda contracts, in which the commendator, who invested in goods or capital but stayed on land, sought to increasingly safeguard himself against the perils of the sea.18 In contrast to its forerunners, the maritime exchange contract (cambium maritimum) and the maritime loan, classic marine insurance, as developed in the early fourteenth century, was the “first contract in which maritime risk became the object of the business agreement” and thus facilitated new strategies in dealing with uncertainty.19 From the perspective of the insurer, risk is defined as its venture “to be obliged to render a contractual service in case of an insurance claim.”20 In this sense, risk makes recourse to the probability that an insured event of danger might be realised. Which factors could influence this risk? Objective risk factors such as the dangers of heavy weather, stranding, grounding, collision, and fire were further conditioned by the vessel’s construction type and material, size, propulsion, and age.21 Other factors such as route of voyage, season, conditions of ports, type of cargo and voyage, be it either scheduled, chartered, or tramp shipping, count as being objective. Subjective human factors, however, are linked to the nautical personnel’s level of skill and qualification. As human error potentially could cause severe damage, Lloyd’s Register and its predecessor societies were not just famous for publishing the Register of Ships, for a time they 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Luhmann, Soziologie des Risikos, 30–31; idem, “Risiko und Gefahr,” 140–141; Scheller, “Die Geburt des Risikos,” 313. Zwierlein, “Sicherheit durch Versicherung,” 392. Scheller, “Die Geburt des Risikos,” 309–310 (cit. 310). Ibid., 316–317. Ceccarelli, “Risikostrategien,” 64. von Denffer; Pfeiffer; Plath and Tosberg, “Risikobewertung”. Goebel, “Kaskoversicherung und Schiffbautechnik,” 940–941.

Introduction

5

too provided biographical notes on shipmasters, which were collected in the Lloyd’s Captains Register. The extent of risk is expressed in the premium, which denotes “the consideration of payment to be rendered by the insured party for the insurer’s pledge to honour insurance claims – i.e. the acceptance of the risk –, and management fee.”22 Therefore the premium is the sum paid for accepting the risk. The insurance premium was the even more decisive element that distinguished the marine insurance in the fourteenth century from its antecedents, which had more or less implicitly integrated an insurance aspect and which are discussed in Chapter 1. The price of marine insurance in a specific market was expressed in the premium, which in principle was freely negotiable between the parties involved. With regard to the two main types of sources for insurance premiums, a very important difference has to be pointed out: the medieval and early modern insurance records, on the one hand, fixed the premium rates, which were actually paid. The price currents, on the other, document just an offer,23 towards which the contracting parties could agree (and which they to a large extent did); but there was no obligation to accept such an offer for their own transaction. The premium is to be paid by the insured, that is to say, the party that seeks out insurance. This insured party passes the risks to which vessel and cargo are exposed during a sea voyage on to the insurer or – in Hamburg – called the Assecuradeur, respectively.24 During the period of time discussed in this study, any individual or group involved in maritime trade could, regardless to 22 23 24

Falter; Hoffmann and Tosberg, “Prämie”. On the function of price currents as directories of wholesale prices, which were offered by the seller and the basis for price negotiations between wholesaler and retailer, see Gerhard and Engel, Preisgeschichte. Until the establishment of Hamburg’s first joint-stock insurance company in 1763, the term Assecuradeur solely denoted private underwriters, as there were no others. After this year, it appears that contemporaries continued to use the term for private persons who had dealings in marine insurance as well as for companies, i.e. corporate representatives. In any way, the confounded utilisation in the sources on which this research is based, forbids any observation of a clear division on the verbal level between ‘private underwriters’ and ‘(joint-stock) insurance companies’ as the two insurance-providing groups henceforth collectively were referred to as Assecuradeure. For instance, the ambiguity and confusion can be observed in the name and conduct of the Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure (est. 1797). Besides the acceptance of private underwriters, this society allowed representatives of insurance companies, who would be either a private person or a business itself (see Chapter 3), to join as members. In present-day German-language insurance terminology, Assecuradeur is traditionally applied to transport insurers – who, unlike private underwriters, are not personally liable, as the English translation ‘underwriting agent’ suggests. In a nutshell, 1763 marks a watershed when it comes to the term

6

Introduction

their function, constitute such an insured party. For this reason, not only merchants but also sailors concluded cargo insurances for goods aboard a vessel, whereas shipping companies and shipowners were in need of hull insurance for sea-going vessels. Until joint-stock insurance companies came up in the eighteenth century, private underwriters had tended to act as a group that signed policies together to share in the risk. These merchants were not yet specialized in insurance business only and similar to merchant-bankers, they pursued a trade, or possibly were carriers, bankers, or manufactory owners:25 “marine insurance in the eighteenth century, like banking, was properly an affair of merchants, not of financiers. The managers of successful insurance companies in London, Rotterdam, and the French ports were merchants and so were most of the private underwriters.”26 The business relationship between the two parties that interacted in an insurance transaction was not mandatory but optional to be mediated by a broker. In case of successful mediation, the broker was granted a commission or brokerage. Except for insurance brokers and average adjusters or dispatchers,27 anybody who held an interest in entering the pre-industrial insurance market was allowed to do so, as insurance business was then considered a commercial transaction.28

Current State of Research

Although marine insurance as commercial institution and as branch of mercantile activities was of substantial relevance for the commercial and whole economic development of Europe, it appears to have attracted less research interest than other commercial institutions. Operating smoothly in the background of trade and transport, marine insurance might seem to be rather an unspectacular institution and cannot be linked even to dramatic crises. This business never was in the public sphere; it remained in the domain of private entrepreneurship and merged companies. Therefore public banks and stock markets, the latter of which were publicly controlled, are attributed with the preservation of relevant source material. Only in the last two or three decades

25 26 27 28

Hamburg’s providers of insurance: if neither source material, nor literature, nor context support a differentiation between both, the general term ‘insurer’ is used instead. Dreyer, ‘Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung’, 31–35. Bosher, “The Paris Business World,” 288. A dispatcher or average adjuster is an expert in the processing of a general average and makes up the average-statement, indicating the claims and liabilities of all parties concerned. Dreyer, ‘Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung’, 33.

Introduction

7

has scholarly interest in the fascinating mechanisms of marine insurance and of its markets increased not least against the background of the debates on risk, danger, and security as historical paradigms. Research in the field of marine insurance had indeed already begun in the second half of the nineteenth century and has since focused on four major areas of enquiry: First, the largest portion of academic work has been and still is published on fundamental developments of the marine insurance business from the beginnings of premium marine insurance during the Commercial Revolution of the High Middle Ages and its subsequent diffusion to the ports and other commercial centres of Europe and the world, eventually culminating in a business capable of adapting to current trends. When considering the time period until the emergence of the world economy in the mid-nineteenth century, and which frames this study, it becomes apparent that older research literature predominantly concentrated on the advancement of marine insurance in Italy and its initial stages of diffusion in the Mediterranean. Based on comprehensive source material, and under critical reception of the institutions’ forerunners in ancient times, these aspects have enjoyed a detailed research history.29 Nevertheless, as Florence Edler de Roover, perhaps the best expert on this subject in the first half of the twentieth century, has stated, “the problem of the origins of marine insurance is one of the most complicated and controversial questions in the history of business institutions,”30 and it remains so up to this day. How marine insurance almost certainly developed via different stages and institutions’ forerunners up to its ‘classical’ type of the fourteenth century, is discussed in the following in Chapter 1.1. It is certain that this development took place in the (Western) Mediterranean and here in several commercial centres, where seaborne trade constituted the lion’s share of merchants’ business. More recent discussion though is directed at aspects of institutional economics: in particular, current research approaches indicate a high significance of marine insurance for the development of financial markets, the interconnection of trade and transport logistics in pre-industrial times. Of recent contributions to the body of newer literature on marine insurance, most notably Giovanni Ceccarelli’s and Christopher Kingston’s should be taken into account.31 In so doing, Ceccarelli also highlights the relevant mainstreams of theological and canonical thought on insurance up to the Renaissance and, 29 30 31

For reference to older works building on nineteenth-century literature, see in particular Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance”; Perdikas, “Die Entstehung der Versicherung”. – Results and findings of the older works are presented in brief in Denzel, “Die Seeversicherung”. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 172. Ceccarelli, Risky Markets; idem, “Stime senza probalità”; Kingston, “Governance and Institutional Change”; idem, “Marine Insurance in Britain and America,” 392–396.

8

Introduction

thus, exhibits the apologies of the insurance business against contemporaneous reproaches of it as usurious.32 The question to which extent technical progress has had repercussions on the marine insurance business is well aligned with current research aims, especially as far as the nineteenth century and the era of the Industrial Revolution is concerned.33 Second, the numerous marine insurance markets that evolved in Europe and in non-European countries dominated by Europeans since the eighteenth century have been and still are an important object of several studies. In distinct dependence on the comprehensiveness of the source material, some marine insurance markets are excellently researched: for Renaissance Italy, this holds especially true for the markets of Venice with the classical studies of Giuseppe Stefani, Alberto Tenenti, and Karin Nehlsen-van Stryk34 as well as of Genoa35 and Florence. For the latter, Ceccarelli investigates in his most recent monograph the relations between marine insurance and the trade in its background as well as the ways the Florentine marine insurance market functioned on an outstandingly broad source basis.36 But Ragusa (Dubrovnik) may also be seen as a quasi-Italian insurance market in the sixteenth century.37 In Spain, Barcelona and Burgos were the most important marine insurance markets, whereby among the recent studies especially those of Hilario Casado Alonso concerning the Atlantic-orientated insurance market of Burgos are worth mentioning.38 In the recent years, no publications on the marine insurance business in France have appeared, for which reason reference must still be

32 33 34 35 36 37 38

Ceccarelli, “Risky Business”. Meyer, Wechselbeziehungen. Stefani, Insurance in Venice, vol. I; Tenenti, Naufrages, corsaires et assurances maritimes; Nehlsen-van Stryk, Die venezianische Seeversicherung. Giacchero, Storia delle assicurazioni marittime. Ceccarelli, Risky Markets. Cf. as an earlier short version idem, Ceccarelli, “Coping with Unknown Risks”. Tenenti and Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio. Casado Alonso, “El mercado internacional de seguros”; idem, El seguro marítimo en Castilla; “Los seguros marítimos de Burgos”; idem, “El seguro marítimo en la Carrera de Indias,” 944– 948; Herrero Gil, “¿De la confusión a la negación?”; idem, “El comercio del hierro vasco”. Cf. Cespedes de Castillo, Seguros marítimos; Cruz Barney, El riesgo; Carrasco González, “El negocio”; Lepore, “Commercio e assecurazioni”; Lobato Franco, “El negocio del seguro”. For Barcelona see García i Sanz and Ferrer i Mallol, Assegurances i canvis marítims medievals; Sala, Un siglo de seguros marítimos barceloneses; Pons Pons, “Compañías de seguro marítimo”; eadem, “El pago del seguro marítimo”; eadem, Companyies i mercat assegurador; del Treppo, “Assecurazioni e commercio internazionale”.

Introduction

9

made to the standard works of Lucas-Alexandre Boiteux.39 Yet the important Dutch marine insurance markets in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Groningen from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, which were subject of the older authoritative studies by Violet Barbour and Frank C. Spooner (see below), have been revisited in a new comparative institutional economics study by Sabine Go.40 The marine insurance markets of London and whole of England have also been examined more frequently, although a comprehensive overall study is still lacking.41 Among the non-European commercial places, only Philadelphia became a marine insurance market of supra-regional relevance in the eighteenth century.42 In contrast to these larger studies, investigations of other ports and countries have produced some surveys which at best provide a detailed overview of the marine insurance business conducted in those places or countries. This was the case, for instance, for Leghorn,43 Naples,44 Portugal,45 Scotland,46 or Russia.47 Hamburg’s marine insurance business was analysed to some extent at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries, right at the time when the city port was ascending to become a trade port of global relevance.48 Nonetheless, later works added hardly any new insights to the source-based findings and results that had been presented at that time.49 Third, another aspect of research in the wide field of marine insurance is concerned with the micro-economic level and stresses the role of private underwriters and most prominently, insurance companies and their co-operations.50 For the older times, Ceccarelli’s study on the Florence marine insurance market is methodologically trendsetting because of its detailed analysis of insurance 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Hubrecht, “Seeversicherungsverträge”; Clark, “Marine Insurance”; Sée, “Notes sur les assurances maritimes”; Bosher, “The Paris Business World”; Dawson, Marine Underwriting; Ruffat, “French Insurance”. Barbour, “Marine Risks and Insurance”; Go, Marine Insurance in the Netherlands; Kracht, Die Rotterdamer Seeversicherungs-Börse. Owen, “Marine Insurance”; Röpling, Die Geschichte der englischen Seeversicherung; Kepler, “London Marine Insurance”; Jones, “Elizabethan Marine Insurance”; Rossi, “The Booke of Orders of Assurances”; Ibbetson, “Law and Custom”. Gillingham, Marine Insurance; Kingston, “Marine Insurance in Britain and America”; idem, “Marine Insurance in Philadelphia”. Addobbati, “L’assurance à Livourne”. Avallone, “Transformazioni e permanenze”. Oliveira Marques, Para a história dos seguros; de Souza, “Marine Insurance”. Forte, “Marine Insurance”. Rybnikoff, “Versicherung in Rußland”. Amsinck, “Assecuranz-Compagnien”; Kiesselbach, Entwicklung; Plaß, Geschichte. As with older times, this also applies to the more recent study by Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung. For Hamburg see Stritzky, Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure.

10

Introduction

companies, their Florentine entrepreneurs and brokers – the “risk experts” – as well as their contracts in the 1520s.51 Among these companies, which does not come as surprise, Lloyd’s in London has been analysed most thoroughly,52 but other joint-stock companies have received interest from scholars, who for instance shift their scope of research to network structures between shareholders. As an example, Greek businessmen displayed a serious measure of mercantile ambition in the marine insurance markets of Trieste, Leghorn, and Odessa.53 Some Hamburg examples are discussed in Chapter 4, although there is only some data available. Fourth and finally, marine insurance business needs to be pursued along the lines of legal history, which has been fundamental to the institution’s development,54 as it is pointed out in several studies.55 Above all, the investigation of marine insurance market regulations and the insurers’ terms and conditions illustrate the legal framework in a particular place. The merchants involved in insurance transactions usually elaborated on these regulations, which were called Pläne (sing. Plan) in eighteenth and nineteenth century Hamburg, and are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of the present study. In contemporary research, J. P. van Niekerk has published a seminal study of Dutch marine insurance law,56 which was mostly exemplary also for the Hamburg marine insurance market. In addition, Thomas Dreyer offers a detailed account in his 1990 study on the Assecuranz- und Havarey-Ordnung of 1731 for the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg; the legal basis that was valid in the local insurance market for most of the time the current study covers.57 Frank C. Spooner’s outstanding study remains particularly innovative in terms of methodology. And thus far, it is the only study that targets marine insurance premium rates, which in other publications tend to play a minor role – regularly due to the sources available.58 He meticulously scrutinises the Amsterdam marine insurance premiums for a relatively short 15-year duration (1766–1780) and uses his case study to highlight two factors in particular that had a considerable influence on the level of the individual premium

51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

Ceccarelli, Risky Markets, 205–238 as well as appendices 2 and 3. Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance, 3–100; Kimura, “Ursprung”; idem, “Entstehung”; Lehmann-Brune, “Lloyd’s of London”. Katsiardi-Hering, “Greek Commercial Traffic,” 453; Gekas, “Greek Port Towns”. See for instance Vance, “Insurance Law”; Idelson, “Kodifikation”; Guddat, Seeversicherung. E.g. Ceccarelli, Risky Markets, 13–32. van Niekerk, Insurance Law. Dreyer, Die ‘Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung’. Spooner, Risks at Sea.

Introduction

11

quotations:59 on the one hand, seasonal fluctuations, i.e. the difference between winter and summer premiums, and on the other hand, the distance to be covered. One example should be given: While the Amsterdam premiums for voyages to Scandinavia to Arkhangelsk and the Baltic Sea area to Saint Petersburg between September and November were five and a half times their lowest summer value in June, those for voyages to Hamburg, the Atlantic coasts and the Mediterranean area in January were just three and a half times their June value. Spooner can also confirm this finding with premium quotations from Rotterdam. However, a restriction must be made with regard to distances: although Spooner finds a high correlation between premium rate and distance for the month of June, he admits that there are considerable deviations for the winter months, at least for the northern routes – to Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea area – because of the sometimes extreme weather conditions. And even if an increase in the premium rate with the growing distance can be proven especially for southern destinations, this is not proportional to the distance: [T]he rate for Venice, for example, was not twice that for Cádiz. In brief, the problem can be set in the category of a ‘turnpike theorem’, with an initial phase of difficulties and increased costs in leaving harbour and coastal waters, before attaining to the rapid growth potential for profit on the high seas. Once on the open sea the problems of ‘in-shore soundings’ gave place to those of plotting the ship’s position out of sight of land.60 In addition to these two main price-determining factors, according to Spooner the quality and characteristics of ports and conditions of vessels, the dangers on the high seas and in shipping passages as well as the frequency with which a route was travelled, influenced the rate of both the quoted and the agreed insurance premium. For this reason, the condition of a vessel and the qualification of the crew could only play a role in the individual contractual agreement, but not in a price current for a relatively broad public. In a certain way, Spooner’s pioneering work outlines the road map for his study: the Hamburg marine insurance premiums can be analysed over a considerably longer time period spanning 120 years, because this is the most comprehensive data that is available for the Hamburg marine insurance market. Yet, as a result of the scarcity of relevant source material other than inherited premium quotations, Spooner’s degree of detail has to be renounced.

59 60

The following after ibid., 117–150. Ibid., 131.

12

Introduction

Source, Methods and Questions of Research

The background to this peculiar situation is the conservation status of Hamburg’s source material: although the city and its merchants were major players in the international marine insurance business and became more and more important in the course of the decades, this position is by no means commensurate with the quantity and quality of the surviving sources. Due to the conflagration of Hamburg – the so-called Große Brand of 1842 – that severely impaired the source tradition of Hamburg, only some sources of the marine insurance market, its business and local insurance companies, exist to this day. Evaluations of the development of the premium rate and of the overall market changes by contemporary brokers or experts are rare.61 Throughout the eighteenth century, sources commenting on marine insurance business cannot be found: neither can they be retrieved for ventures of private underwriters, nor for nascent joint-stock insurance companies. Only after the Napoleonic era, market insiders, who themselves were mostly authorised representatives (Bevollmächtigte) of insurance companies, began to leave their statements. G. L. Wilhelm Grasmeyer, authorised representative of the Assekuranz-Compagnie von 1815,62 and P. D. W. Tönnies, authorised representative and co-director of the Versicherungs-Gesellschaft von 1823,63 reported on trends in Hamburg’s marine insurance market in the 1820s. In the second half of the 1830s and the first of the 1840s, Otto Christian Gaedechens (1791–1856), co-owner of the trade company Brentano, Bovara & Urbieta, and since 1835 authorised representative of the Neue 8. Assecuranz-Compagnie,64 occasionally provided information about particular premium quotations. But more often than that, he recounts tragic ship accidents in the Berichte über das Hamburger See-Assecuranz Geschäft.65 Although each of these three sources present at least fragmentary insights into the Hamburg marine insurance market, they do not deliver a full picture for any period of time. Again, statements of contemporaries do not exist for the period since the mid-1840s. 61 62 63 64 65

Neither the documents of the Hamburg Admiraltät that existed until 1814, nor its successor, the Schifffahrt- und Hafendeputation yield any relevant information: StAHH, 371–2: Admiralitätskollegium; 371–6, Nr. 1242–1269: Schiffahrt- und Hafendeputation. Grasmeyer, Geschichtliche Wahrnehmungen. Tonnies, Chronik … 1823; idem, Chronik … 1824; idem, Chronik … 1825; idem, Chronik … 1826. Gaedechens, “Aus dem Leben Otto Christian Gaedechens”. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger See-Assecuranz-Geschäft des Jahres … von O. C. Gaedechens, 1835–1852 (actually drafted until 1844 only).

Introduction

13

Thus, Hamburg’s Preiscourant is the only source that has collected detailed and serialised information about the development of premium quotations since the second third of the eighteenth century, which thus renders the price current a central indicator for the city’s marine insurance market. Yet, scholars have not hitherto taken notice of this source in terms of an analysis of the premium quotations. The very quotation of the various destinations, which over decades were increasing in number as they were in places, indicates a long-term expansion of Hamburg’s marine insurance market. Around the mid-eighteenth century, the port was mainly focused on servicing ports along Europe’s coasts, but its reach spanned the globe a century later. On 24 February 1736 Hamburg’s first official price current, the Preiscourant der Wahren in Parteyen,66 was published by the Commerz-Deputation, which had been established in 1665 as an elected body for the merchants’ political representation and precursor of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce created in 1867. The new and – for the first time – official price current could be purchased every Friday at a price of three shillings.67 Both modifiers “in Parteyen” or “in Partien” denote the sort of prices that were listed: the price current was an index of wholesale commodity prices, that is to say, the prices at which brokers traded commodities en gros at the stock exchange. However, research literature dates back to the beginnings of price current publication in 159268 and 1607. Consequently, since the late sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries, Hamburg was among Europe’s commercial centres that published price currents more or less on a regular basis. The first price currents were published in Antwerp (starting in the 1540s), followed by Amsterdam (since 1585), Frankfurt am Main (1581), Venice (1585), Nuremberg (1586), Augsburg (1592), Florence (1598), Danzig, and London (both in 1608).69 Hamburg’s seventeenth-century price currents were, however, private publications that merchants and brokers released on joint private initiatives and therefore lacked any official character. Moreover, these publications were probably not that reliable, as on 18 October 1735 the Versammlung Eines Ehrbaren Kaufmanns ordered the Commerz-Deputation to issue an official price current.70 Additionally, the language was changed upon its introduction. Until then, price currents had mostly been published in Dutch. Now, the Commerz-Deputation chose to replace 66 67 68 69 70

Names under which the main source was published: see Bibliography. Baasch, “Waren-Preiskourant,” 125 and 131. See Ehrenberg, “Waaren- und Wechselpreiscourant”. McCusker and Gravesteijn, Journalism, 224–228; McCusker, “The Business Press”; idem, “Distance”; idem, “Business Press”; idem, “Antwerp”; Schmidt, “Kommunikations­ revolution,” 268–275. Gerhard and Kaufhold (eds.), Preise, 34.

14

Introduction

Dutch with German. The minutes recorded during the Commerz-Deputation’s session on 15 February 1736 on the launch of the official price current do not disclose any information about the listing of marine insurance premiums.71 The Hamburg price current not only listed wholesale commodity prices as well as money and exchange rates, but also premium quotations as offered by Hamburg’s marine insurers. While the first two categories have already been studied in depth,72 the insurance premiums have not yet been taken into consideration.73 Taking the shape of a varying number of columns in a boxed section within the Hamburg price current, this section of insurance premium quotations henceforth is referred to as the ‘Hamburg insurance price current’ (Hamburger Assekuranzpreiskurant). Despite having undergone changes and further reforms in the eighteenth and in the first half of the nineteenth century, the price current continuously recorded premium quotations,74 with the exception of a few missing years during the Napoleonic Wars.75 With the passing decades, the number of vessels’ destinations for which premium rates were quoted rose considerably. This process started with the first major reform of the Hamburg price current in 1762.76 In a contemporary document about revising the price current, the marine insurance business is mentioned in a solitary sentence, which reads: “[W]e have been considering a regular announcement of insurance premiums for our audience.”77 Nonetheless, in 1762 a further diversification of destinations set in – not unlike the increasing specification of the respective listed wholesale commodity prices and exchange rates. In the beginning, premium rates had been quoted for vast coastal regions. However, 71 72

73 74 75

76 77

SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 2 rot, fasc. 34: Extractus Protocolli Comm., 15. Februar 1736, betr. Preiscourant. For wholesale commodity prices see Gerhard and Kaufhold (eds.), Preise, 47–127 and 269–436; concerning the money and exchange rates see Schneider and Schwarzer (eds.), Statistik, 87–194; iidem and Schnelzer (eds.), Statistik, 147–216; as well as Schneider; Schwarzer and Zellfelder (eds.), Währungen der Welt I, vol. III, 301–337; iidem and Denzel (eds.), Währungen der Welt VI, 193–222; compiled in Denzel, Handbook, 207–230. First attempts have been made by idem, “The Price”; idem, “Die Hamburger Seeversicherung”; idem, “Hamburg-Swedish Connections”. Baasch, Waren-Preiskourant, 136. Cf. idem, “Handel und Öffentlichkeit,” 127. Individual printed insurance price currents can also be found in literature coeval with the time of their publication, e.g. in this index on several groups of tradesmen active in Germany, dating from 1799: Das gewerbfleißige Deutschland, 214–217 and 117 note *. See also Bohn, Wohlerfahrner Kaufmann, 60. In January 1762 the Commerz-Deputation resolved on the reform; a first draft was submitted on 25 August 1762 and was officially introduced on 10 September 1762; Baasch, Waren-Preiskourant, 136. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek SH 65: Warenpreiskurant 1762–1820, fasc. 6: Ms., 25. August 1762, betr. Neufassung des Preiskurants.

Introduction

15

due to local and regional conditions, be they topographical, maritime, or commercial, these regions were defined more and more accurately in the course of the decades. Indeed, this is a remarkable difference from the Amsterdam insurance market, where these rubrics had not been redefined decisively since 1730.78 In the much newer and therefore also more dynamic market which Hamburg was part of throughout the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth centuries, the remodelling of these rubrics arrived early. However, when several Hamburg entrepreneurs handed in a list for a revision of the price current at the Commerz-Deputation on Christmas of 1786, marine insurance was not a concern.79 The Napoleonic Wars caused the only interruption to what was, by comparison with other European price currents, almost a unique source – only the Amsterdam and London records allow for longer lists of marine insurance premiums to be assembled. In 1803, the quotation of insurance premiums was abated for the first time. Due to wartime events, between May 1804 and the end of 1807, the quotations were listed irregularly and were eventually neglected in 1808. On 31 December 1813 the price current as such was discontinued at issue No 572. But it was relaunched on 1 July 1814 at No 1 by the Commerz-Deputation’s decision of 18 June 1814 after the ‘French Period’ – the so-called Franzosenzeit beginning on 19 November 1809 – had come to an end on 28 April 1814: “[T]he first reform to be put in place was the resumption of the insurance premiums … the quotations begin again on 21 October 1814. The habit of issuing these premiums on special slips of paper published each Tuesday ceased henceforth.”80 This documents the high relevance the Commerz-Deputation attributed to the publication of insurance premiums. Thus, they remained a cornerstone of the price current throughout reforms and adjustments. Furthermore, since 1806 extracts of the premium quotations, alongside wholesale prices and exchange rates, were reproduced in the Börsenhalle, the second most important journal that informed about trade in Hamburg.81 During the time period analysed in the present study – from 1736 to the end of the 1850s – the list of vessels’ destinations, for which quotations of marine insurance premiums were available, changed considerably. Most of the reworking and adaption of the list of these premium quotations to meet the extending regions that were served by Hamburg’s insurers fell into the nineteenth century. 78 79 80 81

Spooner, Risks at Sea. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 37,1 rot, fasc. 3: Eingabe einer Anzahl von Firmen an die Commerz-Deputation, 24. Dezember 1786, betr. Verbesserung des Preiscourants. Baasch, Waren-Preiskourant, 155. Ibid., 154.

16

Introduction

Changes in the source were undertaken at several times and in most cases at the beginning of the year.82 Among these dates, the additions or changes that the source underwent in 1762, 1802/21, and 1835/36 were exceptionally extensive. For the time being, the geographical expansion of Hamburg’s premium quotations came to a halt in 1854, when California and Australia made it on the list of premium quotations (see Appendix 1). Further details of the development of this list over the decades are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. What kind of data does this source yield? The data set consists of marine insurance premium rates as they were quoted the day prior to publication for each destination that is indicated in the price current. These quotations are separated into “departing” (“gehend”) and “arriving” (“kommend”); depending on whether a vessel arrived or departed from Hamburg, the premiums could differ to some extent but did not have to. In most cases, the premiums for arriving and departing vessels were identical. Accordingly, the database contains an average premium rate, which has been averaged out from matching pairs of departing and arriving rates. The premiums were quoted on a biweekly basis, and later more frequently. When arranged in a series, it can be observed that the rates for departing and arriving deviate only marginally from one quotation to the next of the sequence. In the first analytical step, the data was assembled and prepared for the calculation of average premium rates for further examination. Therefore, only the first quotation of each month is singled out and enters the database, so that the dataset for each year comprises of 12 premium quotations.83 In some cases, e.g. in wartime, when the rates were quoted irregularly, the number of quotations might be lower. Subsequently, these at most 12 premium rates are selected to form the basis for two average premium rates: the first for the annual average rate of each year; and the second for each month to allow conclusions on changing seasonal conditions to be drawn. This basis for the data equally provides for a long-term and detailed analysis of marine insurance premiums, which up to now has not been carried out for a long time in this field of research.84 In offering a long-term approach, the present study strives to find answers to the questions of which factors led 82 83 84

So in September 1762, in February 1782, at 14 January 1791, at the beginning 1804, at 21 April 1820, at 3 August 1821, at 2. January 1824, at 5 January 1827, at 2 January 1835, at 8 January 1836, at 6 January 1843, at 7 January 1848, and at 6 January 1854. This procedure has proven valuable in the creation of a database of international exchange rate quotations, see: Schwarzer, “Forschungskonzeption”. Spooner, Risks at Sea, 167ff., follows such an approach, but his analysis of premium rate quotations only covers a 15-year period. The earliest study in the field of marine insurance markets, Ceccarelli’s Risky Markets, presents the premium quotations for just eight years, from 1520 to 1527 (ibid., 96, 98 and 109–112).

Introduction

17

to the general trend of declining marine insurance premiums. It seems to be certain that innovative technologies in shipbuilding cannot be the only decisive factor for this development. This argument may stand on a sound foundation, as premium rates already declined drastically in the 1820s, i.e. a long time before key technologies broke through. In addition to the broad tendency of the general premium rate development, every single destination rubric listed in the insurance price current, be it port, coastal region, or a country, may be analysed in a long-term perspective. For instance, long-term factors that influenced maritime travelling in the Mediterranean can be contrasted with those in the Baltic Sea. The Hamburg data set allows a concise long-term analysis of marine insurance premiums of each destination for a period over more than 120 years. This period begins in 1736 when the official Hamburg price current was first published. This was the exact time that Hamburg’s maritime trade saw a remarkable expansion against the background of its reorientation away from the Netherlands toward France and its better legal protection provided in the Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung of 1731. The decade of the first world-wide crisis in trade and finance, the 1850s with the Panic of 1857, has been chosen to mark the end of the period analysed in this study, mainly due to two developments: In the crisis’ aftermath, Hamburg’s economy had to deal with massive interruptions. And similarly, the expansion of Hamburg’s marine insurance business to almost all economically relevant countries around the globe was coming to an end in the 1850s. In the 1860s, the international marine insurance business, including Hamburg, entered a whole new era that lasted until the First World War and was driven by the rise of numerous technical, communicative, and commercial innovations. The steam-powered vessels and the first submarine communications cable laid between Europe and North America in 186685 were probably the most important of these innovations. But this new era is not the subject of this study. The methods employed in the second analytical step are significantly informed by Frank C. Spooner’s influential work Risks at Sea in which he researched the Amsterdam marine insurance market in depth covering 1766 to 1780. The fluctuations of insurance premiums – in other words: their economic cycle – will be examined in a cross-section analysis from a micro perspective. In so doing, this study focuses on the consequences that arose from individual political, economic, and weather-related events and factors at a specified time, and which had an effect on the premium quotations. In this process, questions such as ‘Which influence on particular premium quotations can be 85

Cf. Wobring, “Telekommunikation”.

18

Introduction

attributed to the Battle of Trafalgar, and which to the War of Independence or to the Seven Years’ War?’ are pursued. In this context, differentiation is advised: which events affected the premium quotations in their entirety, which events pertained to an individual or also to more than just one destination, and which ‘chain reactions’ were sparked off? This does not imply that all of the events on the seas and by the coasts, which at first glance seem to be profound, indeed resonated in the respective marine insurance premiums: quite the contrary, it is shown that some of the numerous military conflicts in the decades discussed here did not have any impact at all on the marine insurance premiums or caused only a marginal adjustment of the rates. However, there were in some cases short-lived but nonetheless strong reactions to crises in navigation, which can be detected and examined by a micro-perspective approach. In Hamburg, the following events are traceable through any series: – the Elbe blockades by the British in the first years of the nineteenth century, of which the second and third were most notable;86 – the promulgation of the Continental Blockade and the French Period, which had as a consequence the suspension of premium quotations for several years; – the French invasion in Spain in 1823; and eventually – the adverse effects on trade and navigation of two events that caused the suspension of premium quotations in the Hamburg insurance price current from April to September 1848 due to the First Schleswig War (1848–1851) and from April to August 1849 as result of the Elbe blockades, this time by the Danish. The third and last analytical step, which is particularly relevant, traces the quotations’ seasonal variation in the course of the year. The fact that premiums were inclined to rise in late autumn and winter, while they declined in spring and summer has been acknowledged by researchers. However, the degree of variation between individual destinations is significant. As for some destinations, rates were not quoted during winter, since voyages to these places, e.g. in the northern Baltic, were altogether suspended. In order to draw a meaningful comparison of seasonal variations of insurance premiums, the time period is split into two halves: from 1736 to the beginning of the nineteenth century, and from 1814 to 1859. This differentiation acknowledges that seasonal variations had a stronger effect on premium quotations in the eighteenth than in the nineteenth century. 86

Cf. Schilderung von dem Nachtheil…, re-printed in Baasch (ed.), Quellen, 229–243.

Introduction

19

All in all, the study centers on two aspects: Firstly, the long-term analysis of premium quotations of every destination on the basis of the annual average premium; and secondly, the seasonal analysis of premium quotations of every of these destinations, based on the average premium per month. Thereby, the eighteenth and the nineteenth century are discussed separately in the seasonal rates’ analysis. It needs to be said that these data, which are derived from the insurance price current, are not suitable either for an analysis of the insurance volume or the business of the entire Hamburg insurance branch. Although the listing of prices, exchange rates, or premiums is in the nature of price currents, they do not provide any information on the question of how much, if any, was actually traded at the indicated values. These data simply prevent the present study from duly taking into consideration this key aspect. So, the following analysis of the marine insurance premiums can try to provide answers to these main questions: First, how did the premium quotations of the single destinations develop in a long-term perspective, especially in years of economic or political crises and upheaval? Is it possible to reveal a kind of ‘economic cycle’87 of marine insurance premiums (which Spooner by choosing a rather limited time period approach was able to demonstrate only in part)? Next, which were the most important factors to contribute substantially to these developments? And indispensable in this context, which weather-related seasonal changes had an impact on the fluctuating premium rates between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Then, which factors were responsible and decisive for the long-term trend of declining premium rate quotations, especially in the second quarter of the nineteenth century? And eventually, what significance can be ascribed to the Hamburg marine insurance market in an international comparison? Finally, yet importantly, it should be stated that in Chapters 5 to 9 marine insurance premiums mainly from and to Hamburg, but also from and to Lübeck as well as between other Baltic ports, on the one side, and Amsterdam, London, Bordeaux, Portugal, and the Mediterranean, on the other, are analysed. In addition, some data series concerning the Iberian, Danish, and Russian transatlantic routes as well as the several routes between European ports and the Indian subcontinent are presented. Marine insurance premiums quoted in other European ports that were recorded in the Hamburg price current for only a couple of years are omitted from this study. 87

Concerning ‘economic cycles’ in the pre-industrial era, see Denzel, “Konjunkturgeschichte”.

chapter 1

Spreading the Risk – Marine Insurance as a Commercial and Financial Innovation in Europe up to the Eighteenth Century 1.1

The Beginnings in the Medieval Mediterranean

Unknown in Greco-Roman antiquity,1 marine insurance was developed in Italy during the Commercial Revolution lasting from the twelfth to the fourteenth century. Along with the bill of exchange as a key instrument of cashless payment, double-entry bookkeeping and commercial banking, marine insurance was an innovative element that came forth in this era. “Genuine insurance was a product of the commercial revolution,”2 as Florence Edler de Roover has stated. The idea of insurance did finally unfold during the Commercial Revolution, since this time period witnessed the transition from the travelling to the sedentary merchant, who continued to pursue business in long-distance trade, while he himself stayed at the branch office and sent representatives such as factors or correspondents off to faraway commercial centres to act on his behalf. Aiming at protection from risicum gentium, whereas safeguard against risicum maris did not seem probable, long-distance merchants escorted their merchandise by themselves and travelled together in caravans and convoys. This, by the nature of their metier, clearly was not an option for sedentary merchants.3 As reported by Bruno Dini, institutionalised marine insurance can first be traced through Tuscan documents around 1320. Genoese sources comprise a vast collection of such contracts beginning in 1343: in Genoa early contracts were drawn up as (pseudo-)loan (mutuum); since 1362 these took the form of (pseudo-) sales (emptio et venditio). In Palermo the existence of insurance contracts can be verified from 1350. The oldest policies in the full sense of this term were found in Tuscany, in Pisa, and written in 1379, followed by Genoa 1 Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 173; Perdikas, “Entstehung,” 433–434. Müller, “Versicherungswesen,” attempts to plausibly link the idea of insurance to burial funds, which were set up to take care of funerals, and to military associations (collegia militum), which had existed in the ancient world. 2 Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 173. In this sense the following argument is focused on economic aspects; for theological and canonical thoughts, see Ceccarelli, “Risky Business”. 3 Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 173–174.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_003

Spreading the Risk

21

(devised as fictitious purchase) and Venice.4 Yet the Florentine merchant and politician Francesco Balducci Pegolotti (c.1290–after 1348) seemed to be unaware of marine insurance. At least he did not mention it in his Pratica della mercatura.5 Surviving insurance contracts and policies of Italian commercial centres indicate that the terms and contents of contracts did not show a great variety. Genoese and Sicilian contracts were written by notaries and were thus in Latin, a tradition that was preserved in Antwerp well into the sixteenth century. In Pisa and Florence, however, insurance was intermediated by brokers and respective documents were already written in the contemporary Italian vernacular. Different languages aside, all insurance policies had in common the characteristic reference to risicum maris as well as to risicum gentium, which alludes to the perils of war and pirate attacks.6 “Nobody knows exactly how or when real premium insurance came into existence.” The observation that “early in the fourteenth century the rising sedentary merchants invented a new type of contract, when they discovered that none of the existing forms were quite satisfactory as a means of transferring and dividing sea risk” has appeared plausible to Florence Edler de Roover.7 Moreover, insurance contracts emerged simultaneously in several Italian seaports, although different business practices and legal forms were adopted.8 In support of older findings emphasised by German and Italian scholars,9 J. P. van Niekerk, who has argued that there was “a clear link between the maritime loan and the newly evolved insurance contract,”10 bolsters Edler de Roover’s stance. Already common and frequently utilised in Greco-Roman antiquity, the sea or maritime loan, the

4

5 6 7 8 9 10

Dini, “Seeversicherung,” 1691. For Pisa see Berti, “Economia marittima”. For the Genoese documents see Nelli, “The Earliest Insurance Contract”; Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 186; Piccinno, “Genoa”. For Palermo see Perdikas, “Die Palermo-Verträge”. For Venice, see Stefani, Insurance in Venice, vol. I, 35–37. For the relation between emptio et venditio and marine insurance, see van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 12–16. Pegolotti, La pratica della mercatura. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 187–189. Ibid., 180. Concerning the term ‘risk’ cf. Scheller, “Die Geburt des Risikos,” 307–315. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 185. Schaube, “Versicherung”; idem, “Versicherungsdarlehn,” 481–483; idem, “Versicherungsgedanke”. van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 27. Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 186, disagrees: “[A]s for Antiquity, any connection between the maritime loan and the autonomous agreement to assume risk can be negated.” Whereas “since mid-twelfth century, merchants of Italian cities felt a rising urge of security, which first was satisfied by the sea loan functioning as means of credit and security.” The author does not offer an explanation or cite respective sources why this could not possibly have been the case in antiquity.

22

chapter 1

foenus nauticum,11 was the classic long-distance merchants’ financial instrument in the Mediterranean from pre-Christian, ancient times to the first half of the thirteenth century. However, it is worth noting that the ‘medieval’ sea loan must not be confused with the bottomry loan.12 Arguably, the ancient sea loan had come to light in the fifth century BC within the realms of the Delian League13 and apparently been adopted by the Romans three centuries later.14 It endured the so-called ‘dark ages’ of the Early Medieval Period in the Byzantine Empire.15 Documents collected in the notarial registers of Genoa provide evidence that in the twelfth century the sea loan became a decisive source of credit in Italian commercial cities, and, first and foremost, debt was taken up to finance ‘overseas’ trade, which at that time denoted trade between Italy and the eastern Mediterranean. A sea loan was concluded between an investor lending a specified sum of money to a long-distance merchant, who was obliged to repay the loan only 11

12

13

14 15

Sieveking, Seedarlehen. For legal specifications of the foenus nauticum in contrast to the ordinary loan in Roman law see ibid., 32. Cf. Ashburner, Rhodian Sea-Law, ccxxi–ccxxiii. – Ankum, “Tabula Pompeiana 13,” 170–171, refers to the fact that in Roman antiquity the sea loan was referred to in most Roman law handbooks as contractus traiecticius (or pecunia traiecticia) instead of foenus nauticum. The first two terms can be found in the Justinianian code, whereas foenus nauticum first appeared in a constitution promulgated between 286 and 294 by the Emperors Diocletian (284–286) and Maximian (286–305, 307–308). Cf. Claude, Der Handel, 224. This mistake was made by Matthias, Das foenus nauticum, and by Hoover, “Sea Loan”. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 175 note 7, stresses that the bottomry loan was to be understood as a loan that was taken out in a foreign port by the shipmaster, for which he pledged a vessel and/or cargo. The shipmaster is the borrower/debtor in this scheme, whereas the loan was to be repaid by the shipowner upon save arrival in the port of destination. According to Landwehr, “Bodmerei”, the term ‘bottomry’ as such first appeared in the area of the Hanseatic League in the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries (precisely: 1387 in Lübeck). The question whether bottomry “had originated as legal institute in this (legal) sphere or it does share kinship with the Mediterranean sea loan” remains open to discussion. Older works mostly are in favour of the latter, for instance Pappenheim, “Bodmerei”; cf. Sieveking, Seedarlehen, 47 note 7. Van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 16 and 27, to a certain degree assumes an analogy between sea loan and bottomry. It was mostly Dutch authors writing in the seventeenth century who emphasised a close relationship between marine insurance and bottomry. For some common features of marine insurance and bottomry, variations combining parts of the two institutions, and profound differences between both, see ibid., 27–52, in particular 49–52. Cf. also Frentz, “Cambio marittimo,” 328–337. “It is even likely that the Phoenicians knew this contract”; de Roover, “The cambium maritimum Contract,” 17. See also Frentz, “Cambio marittimo,” 323–326; Dover, Handbook, 4–5, who equals bottomry with the foenus nauticum, tracing it back to the Code of Hammurabi (about 2250 BC); the Phoenicians also “were certainly familiar with bottomry.” Ankum, “Tabula Pompeiana 13,” 167. Claude, Handel, 224–227; Perdikas, “Die Entstehung der Versicherung,” 435–436.

Spreading the Risk

23

if the vessel (and the cargo in particular) had reached the port of destination safely (sana eunte nave), or also had to have returned from there in a technically safe condition (sana eunte et redeunte [veniente] nave). As practiced in ancient times, sea loans altogether served long-distance merchants to acquire cargo or vessel or both. Throughout the centuries the demand for credit persisted, and although the idea of insuring was of minor significance to the borrower it mattered without doubt.16 Both the lender and the borrower split the risk of the mercantile venture in which the prior allocated the necessary capital and the latter risked his own life and limb. If the voyage was fortunate, the lender received a fixed compensation and thus ‘only’ accepted risicum maris et gentium. He did not share the profit or loss of the venture whatsoever; therefore the risk of mismanagement was assumed by the borrower alone.17 Yet, sea loans were by no means made gratis et amore. Even more so, the repayable sum fixed in such a contract could exceed the sum the borrower had received in advance. This sum paid in advance was not required to be fixed in the contract.18 The interest rates were determined by the perils that might occur on a voyage rather than by its duration. Perils such as war and pirate attacks could provoke a steep rise in interest rates. This phenomenon, by the way, can be traced to fourth-century BC Athens.19 Legal restraints on interest rates were first stipulated in Roman law and codified under the rule of Emperor Justinian I (527–565) and so fixed at the maximum rate of 12 percent per annum,20 which in older research literature tempted scholars to assume a drastic interference with maritime trade.21 Justinian’s attempt probably did not enjoy much success, and if it did, the success was rather short-lived.22 During the Commercial Revolution, Italian interest rates could be considerably 16 17

18 19 20 21 22

Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 175; Schaube, “Versicherungsgedanke,” 174–175; van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 22–23. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 175; van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 23. According to Sieveking, Seedarlehen, 10, high interest rates, which were charged for sea loans, in the ancient world were to be understood as having a stake in the high profits that could be gained in maritime trade. Moreover, the lender or creditor respectively would lose his money if the borrower or debtor respectively were bankrupt in result of misfortune in business practices. Thus the risk assumed by the lender was twofold: the voyage as such and the inherent danger to the person who was the debtor. The latter danger was emphasised in Demosthenes’ judicial orations, in which was argued that the borrower should travel in the company of a trustworthy and confidant slave of the lender (ibid., 12–13 and 42). Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 175. Calhoun, “Risk in Sea Loans,” 574–579. Cf. von Jhering, “Zinsmaximum”. Claude, Handel, 224. E.g. Sieveking, Seedarlehen, 46–47. Stefani, Insurance in Venice, vol. II., 58.

24

chapter 1

higher; they were oftentimes quoted at 25 (de quatuor quinque) or 33 ⅓ percent (de tribus quatuor) per annum. As for voyages bound for the Levant, these rates were usual for outward and return voyages that also included the preparation and processing of an overseas transaction.23 Around the mid-twelfth century, the interest rate of sea loans granted by the Ziani, a Venetian doge family, was set between 12 ½ and 19 ½ percent per annum (in 1146) for trade voyages from Venice to Constantinople. In 1158, this family charged borrowers an interest rate of 25 percent (for nine months) for voyages between these port cities, inclusive of a sojourn in Alexandria.24 As the lender received a concealed or apparent interest upon advancing money, the sea loan fell under suspicion of usury and thus was condemned by Pope Gregory IX (1227–1241) in the decretal Naviganti vel eunti ad nundinas in 1234.25 Whether this decretal was the sole reason for a sharp decline in the number of sea loans taken out, or whether a change in methods to process trade and finance transactions contributed to this effect to some extent has raised debate with scholars.26 By analogy with the commenda, sea loans were “imperfect substitutes for true insurance contracts,”27 as risk was not distributed among a body of people who ‘granted insurance’. In the thirteenth century, when trade expanded both in spatial range and in volumes, the sea loan seemed no longer to be an adequate instrument to foster this economic development. In the years around 1230 the number of documented sea loans dwindled28 as merchants began to prefer the so-called maritime exchange contract (cambium maritimum or cambium nauticum). Schaube has pointed out that “notaries tended to draw up the contract as exchange business … in order to concur pro forma to [Gregory IX’s] prohibition.”29 At the latest since the Tractatus de Usuris by Franciscan Friar Alexander Lombard, also known as Alexander of Alessandria (†1314), the cambium was no longer considered as mutuum but as permutatio pecuniae and was thus cleared from the 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Cf. e.g. Schaube, “Versicherungsgedanke,” 169; idem, Handelsgeschichte, 112. Cf. for the following centuries Tenenti, “Risque et securité”. Fees, “Geschäfte,” 55 and 65–66. Cf. eadem, Reichtum, 78–79. This date appears uncertain, as in literature the years 1234, 1236, and 1237 can be found. Since the promulgation was in 1234, the latter two ought to be incorrect; van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 21, gives a time “between 1230 and 1235”. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 175; van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 23–25; Blumhardt, “Einfluß”. Cf. Zeno, Storia, 160–161. Kingston, “Governance and Institutional Change,” 2. Individual sea loan contracts apparently existed at least until late fourteenth century, mostly in Genoa, and there particularly for the trade with the Black Sea region; Groneur, “Seeversicherung,” 226–227 and 260 note 152. Schaube, Handelsgeschichte, 112.

Spreading the Risk

25

apprehension of being usurious. Most subsequent theologians more or less accepted this conception in the following decades.30 The maritime exchange contract differed from the ‘classic’ bill of exchange (or promissory note, for that matter) in respect that the obligation to repay depended on the safe arrival of the plighted goods in the port of destination, whereas classic bills of exchange had to be honoured unconditionally. Both kinds of ‘exchange contracts’ had in common the features of permutatio pecuniae and differentia loci; that is to say, the bill of exchange must be honoured in a different currency and place from where the contract had been concluded. In this way, any payment of interest was obscured as the interest was hidden in the exchange rates of the two currencies – which was a common practice throughout the Middle Ages when processing a bill transaction. In result, the maritime exchange contract and the sea loan transferred the risk of maritime trade from the borrower to the lender, who took the risk that the sea loan might not be honoured if the voyage did not turn out a success.31 From the mid-thirteenth to fourteenth century, the maritime exchange contract remained the elementary means to finance Italian overseas trade. A widely ramified and, in contrast to earlier decades, highly efficient organisation of money markets was the precondition for the utilisation of this particular contract. Unlike sea loans, the mercantile transaction and payment were not concluded in the same place but in two distinct commercial centres, which oftentimes were divided by great swathes of land. Transacting a maritime exchange contract was more arduous than processing ordinary bills of exchange, and thus incurred higher brokerage fees for intermediation services, as Pegolotti attests in his Pratica della mercatura. However, for reasons of higher feasibility and usability rather than accruing these additional costs, the ordinary bill of exchange rose in popularity during the fourteenth century, and tended to be more regularly employed than the maritime exchange contract. Again it should be noted that bills of exchange had to be honoured regardless, whereas repaying maritime exchange contracts was conditioned by a successful completion of a voyage. In a final consequence, the borrower was discharged from the responsibility to assume the risk of money-lending as well as the risks of sea travel.32 30

31 32

de Roover, “The cambium maritimum Contract,” 28–29; Denzel, “The Curial Payments System”; idem, “Das Problem des Wuchers”; Hamelin, Un traité, 179–185; de Roover, “Les doctrines économiques,” 858–860; idem, “The Scholastics”; Vereecke, “L’assurances maritime”. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 175–176; de Roover, “The cambium maritimum Contract,” 16–25; van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 53–54. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 176–177.

26

chapter 1

Adapting to the specific concerns in overseas trade, a new form of credit contract, the so-called insurance loan (prestito a scopo assicurativo), emerged to accommodate the merchants’ thriving need for ‘insurance’. The earliest sources of such contracts date from the late thirteenth century and were devised in Palermo.33 The prospective marine insurance as well as the insurance loan, the latter van Niekerk has called “the most important intermediary stage of the evolutionary process” from sea loan to marine insurance,34 shared three characteristics that were parallel to the business operations of sedentary merchants: while staying on land, the borrower (‘the insured party’) sent off merchandise without his company; repaying the loan no longer was tied to the vessel’s safe arrival but to that of the merchandise it carried (mutuum ad risicum maris et gentium).35 Insurance loan contracts were devised as mutuum gratis et amore, in stark contrast to the older, interest-bearing sea loan. In conclusion of such a contract, the borrower (or the insured party) raised a credit equaling either the total or partial value (25 to 30 percent) of the object to be insured. Which one it was – total or partial – has led to controversy, however. Insurance loans were paid in advance of a commercial transaction, and thus in the fashion of sea loans allowed for the purchase of goods. Although the documents are silent about the amounts paid, almost certainly the net payment was below the sum that had to be returned. In consequence, such a transaction not only obscured the rendition of interest but also the payment of a quasi ‘insurance premium’. In some cases a foreign transaction fee (if the return was required to be effectuated in a different currency), and a money transfer fee (if the return was to be made in another place) were added to the covert transaction costs. If the goods so ‘insured’ did arrive at their destination safely, the borrower (or insured party) was required to meet the contractual obligations and to repay the lender with the due return. In case he was unable or (otherwise) not prepared to do so, the lender was allowed to access both the insured goods that had been pledged as a security and the borrower’s remaining property. If the goods so ‘insured’ did not arrive safely, the borrower’s obligation to repay was waived. And the loan was reduced proportionately, if the borrower suffered partial losses of the goods insured. According to Schaube, these insurance loan contracts were borne by the canonical ban imposed upon the sea loan. Above all, the contracts continued to respond to the merchant’s need for 33

34 35

Ibid., 179. Cf. Zeno, Documenti; Schaube, “Versicherung,” 475–491. “The Insurance Loan Taken Out on the Vessel” (ibid., 492–494) pursuant to Edler de Roover’s definition (eadem, “Marine Insurance,” 175 note 7) was not an insurance, but a bottomry loan. Cf. Perdikas, “Schifferdarlehen”. van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 26. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 178. Cf. Valéry, “Les contracts d’assurances,” 472–473.

Spreading the Risk

27

credit. At the same time, they gave rise to the idea of insurance against which older sea loan contracts, or the cambium maritimum had stayed back:36 “[T]he transfer of risk was the primary aim of the agreement.”37 Yet there were two major disadvantages to the insurance loan: first, those who sought insurance but did not need a loan had to pay interest either way. Last, the lender had to advance the ‘insurance sum’ and the return oftentimes was gratuitously spent, as most voyages did not result in a case of loss. In accordance with Adolf Schaube, the following step was also the decisive one en route to ‘genuine’ marine insurance. The relationship between the insurer and the insured party was reversed in respect to the question of who pledged to return the insurance sum. Whereas an insurance loan relied on the borrower’s pledge to return the insured sum that he had received in advance, the newly conceptualised contracts brought forth a major change: the insurer pledged to return the insurance sum if the less probable case of an unsuccessful voyage came to pass; i.e. following Schaube, in a certain way, the insured party ‘credited’ the insurance sum to the insurer. Consequently, the price of the risk, or in other words, the insurance premium, already had to be paid before a venture began. Resulting from this, the insured party enjoyed an undeniable financial advantage as there was no need to pay interest on lent capital, (or) fees for money transfer, and/or foreign exchange fees. “For the most part, it was exactly this inversion of the insurance business, i.e. crediting the insured sum that formerly had to be paid in advance, by which the premium became a self-sufficient feature of the insurance business.”38 The insurer also turned this novel development to good account as he no longer had to render a service in advance. Thus he needed a lot less capital, which he could use to finance more insurance transactions and diffuse with more than just one vessel, resulting in a considerable reduction of risk.39 The significant force of innovation of the ‘new’ marine insurance alla fiorentina – named after the major centres Pisa and Florence, where it first came into being – lies in this major change. In the long run, its effects made marine insurance a key commercial institution in pre-industrial Europe. If one assumes that fourteenth-century Italian merchants did not ‘invent’ an entirely new form of contract when conceptualising marine insurance, as has been championed by Florence Edler de Roover, and later by Karin 36 37 38 39

Schaube, “Versicherungsdarlehn,” 481–483; Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 178. van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 26. Schaube, “Versicherungsdarlehn,” 484. Cf. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 185; van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 26. Schaube, “Versicherungsdarlehn,” 515.

chapter 1

CREDITOR

1

gives money/credits

including interest

2

TRAVELLING MERCHANT

credits

MERCHANT

pays back the credited sum including interest

2 Repayment only after a successful journey © Markus A. Denzel 2015/21

INSURER(S)/ UNDERWRITER(S)

1

pays an insurance premium pay(s) indemnities in case of loss

2

MERCHANT/ SHIPMASTER

Since 14th c.

Marine insurance

CREDITOR/ ASSECURATOR

1

13th to 14th c.

Insurance loan

Repayment only after a successful journey

Ancient world to 13th c.

Sea loan

28

Repayment only after an unsuccessful journey

figure 1-1 Model of the development from sea loan to marine insurance

Nehlsen-van Stryk,40 the slightly more than one hundred years’ development of marine insurance appears quite feasible. From the mid-thirteenth to mid-fourteenth centuries, marine insurance went through the stages of sea loan, maritime exchange contract, and most importantly, insurance loan. This standpoint is prompted by van Niekerk, whose arguments are predominantly rooted in legal history. His argumentation confirms the essential features of Schaube’s theories, which were put forward at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries, and since then have been revisited by several authors. By the end of the fourteenth century, “in the self-understanding of the ‘most progressive’ merchants, active and passive insurance services [began] to take the same rank that other business actions such as purchase and sale, loan and money exchange were already having, being usual and daily business.”41 For instance, marine insurance was an innovative and efficient instrument to Francesco di Marco Datini (c.1355–1410), famous business magnate of Prato. He 40 41

Nehlsen-van Stryk, Die venezianische Seeversicherung, 12–13; cf. Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 187. Groneur, “Seeversicherung,” 231.

Spreading the Risk

29

not only secured his own trade business by marine insurance, he also offered this service to other merchants.42 By the end of the fourteenth century, Datini insured cargoes shipped in the western Mediterranean usually at 4 percent, and occasionally at 3 or 5 percent. Only for voyages in the Atlantic from Cádiz to Southampton or Sluys he charged 8 percent.43 However, marine insurance business was not conducted by specialised banchieri but offered by all sorts of mercatores in the manner of any other commercial transaction. In many cases, the same merchants are documented as insurers as well as insured parties. Only a few merchants specialised in insurance business such as the Genoese Simone Guasconi, Battista de’ Darfini or Luciano Cattaneo. Again, as for Genoa, it can be noticed that “in respect to the insurers, assurance [has] to be regarded a rather elitist form of speculation in which less wealthy depositors generally did not invest.”44 Eventually, this observation is based on the fact that insurance business has always been, and only could be, profitable if the insurer managed to diffuse the risk broadly and thoughtfully. In other words, he had to engage in as many ventures as possible at the lowest costs possible. Datini at least partly owed his successful participation in the marine insurance business to this premise. As his quaderno dating from 1384 shows, he used to insure cargos between 50 to 100 fiorini d’oro in value, with two exceptions of 200 fiorini d’oro45 each cargo. Taking the opposite view, the insured party usually was not reduced to approach a single insurer, but could choose from a variety of insurers, whose services were intermediated by a broker (censarius). The insurance sum was split up into predefined shares: for instance, ranging from 31 ¼ (= ⅛) to 250 lire (= 1/1) in Genoa, to which insurers could subscribe. When added up, individual insurance sums must not exceed the total value of the goods. After all, insurance sums in general were more or less significantly lower than the value of the insured goods. In case of accident, at least portions of the cargo were expected to be salvaged.46 “By the fifteenth century marine insurance was established on a secure basis. The wording of the policies had already become stereotyped and changed very little during the next three or four hundred years.”47 Marine insurance had 42

43 44 45 46 47

Origo, Francesco di Marco Datini, 123. Cf. Bensa, Il contratto di assicurazione, 210–220; idem, Histoire du contrat d’assurance; idem, Francesco di Marco da Prato. Jacques LeGoff’s suggestion that Datini was downright ‘specialised’ in marine insurance business, as stated in idem, Kaufleute und Bankiers, 29, cannot be verified. Lopez and Raymond, Medieval Trade, 263–265. Groneur, “Seeversicherung,” 224, 238. For Venice see Tucci, “Gli investimenti assicurativi.” Lopez and Raymond, Medieval Trade, 263–265. Groneur, “Seeversicherung,” 227–228 and 238–243; Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 194. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 198.

30

chapter 1

grown into a customary business in any Italian port of a certain recognition, and in any place where Italian merchant-bankers intended to insure cargo for maritime transport. The first marine insurance policies were drawn up in the Netherlands and England for shipments to Italy.48 In the mid-fifteenth century, the Venice branch of the Medici regularly insured transports from England and back at a rate of 3 to 7 percent, depending on the vessel’s armament.49 Early in the fifteenth century, Genoa’s marine insurance business already had contributed to the international relevance of the city as financial market. On the one hand, this development was visible in the perpetuated insurance form, which evolved in late fourteenth century. On the other, Genoa’s marine insurance business was governed by the oldest directives among all Italian commercial cities. Building on prior decrees and statutes, which are not extant to this day, the decree Contra allegantes quod cambia et assecuramenta [ facta quoviscumque, cum scriptura vel sine,] sint illecita vel usuraria promulgated by the Genoese Doge Gabriele Adorno (1363–1370) in 1369 was the “first ever commentary on insurance by a state official,” which came to the defence of insured parties.50 This degree rendered illegal any person’s claim to usury, who had formerly acted as insurer and wished to escape the obligation to pay indemnities. In the late fourteenth and throughout the fifteenth century, further legislation was passed; but for all that, these laws apparently were hardly enforceable in praxi.51 Genoa’s ascent to one of the most important and innovative marine insurance markets of late medieval Europe was a result of what Lucien Febvre has called “besoin de sécurité,”52 which in late fourteenth-century Genoa was exceptionally strong and perseverant. The city was threatened both by pirates in its proximity and by its hostile ‘neighbours’ of Aragón, Savona and Nice. In particular, the defeat in the War of Chioggia (1376–1381) with traditional rival Venice gave rise to the need for security and thus for an efficient protection of her maritime trade. Considering the extent of potential danger, it becomes clear “why in Genoa insurance premiums were extraordinarily high and why insurance in general tended to gain a better foothold there than in Venice, which was known for her excellent organization of state and inner strength.” In the late fourteenth century, “the state power of the frail Ligurian metropolis had sunk to the bottom [and the city was unable] to prevent local merchants from reprisals, which compelled them to seek a 48 49 50 51 52

Kingston, “Governance and Institutional Change,” 3. Cf. Go, Marine Insurance, 147. Hunt and Murray, History, 159. Groneur, “Seeversicherung,” 221. Ibid., 222–223. Febvre, Pour l’histoire. Cf. Boiteux, La fortune de mer; Tenenti, Risque et securité.

Spreading the Risk

31

remedy for this situation. Insurance occurred a suitable means to these merchants.”53 Thus, Jacques Heers has found premiums predominantly at about 10 percent.54 By contrast, according to Venetian sources, premiums were often significantly lower: 4 to 5 percent were common, while rather safe galley voyages from Venice to Alexandria were even less costly, at 1 to 1 ½ percent.55 The background was that Venice maintained a standing naval fleet and merchant galleys, which used to travel in convoys (mude). Thus, the Serenissima was much better prepared to safeguard her merchants, so they did not depend on marine insurance as much as the Genoese. Therefore, in Venice the premium rates were significantly lower than in Genoa.56 Insurance premiums, however, varied frequently and depended on a number of different factors. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the distance between the port of departure and the port of arrival appears to have been the least decisive factor. It was not uncommon for insurance to be more expensive for shorter distances than for longer ones.57 For instance, the accounts book of Giacomo Badoer, a Venetian merchant in Constantinople in the 1430s, lists a 6 percent premium rate for voyages from Constantinople to Venice, whereas the much closer Ancona is indicated with a rate from 8 to 10 percent.58 Many other examples such as this could be cited. Very important, by contrast, was the port of destination and thus the danger of the voyage there. Corsica, which was part of the Republic of Genoa, and Sardinia, which was part of the Crown of Aragón, were considered particularly perilous because of the pirates who were roamed these western Mediterranean waters. For this reason, despite the short distances involved, relatively high premiums had to be paid for voyages from Genoa or the Provence to these islands, which could be markedly above those for voyages to North Africa or the Levant. At times, it was impossible to take out any insurance contract at all for voyages to Sardinia, due to hostilities between Genoa and Aragón in the western Mediterranean, despite official – and often revived – agreements that guaranteed the merchants of both powers reciprocal compensation in the event of acts of violence by the other side. However, voyages along the Ligurian and the Provençal coasts came at a high price for 53 54 55 56

57 58

Groneur, “Seeversicherung,” 259–260; cf. ibid., 220. Heers, “Le prix,” 18. Nehlsen-von Stryk, “Kalkül,” 202. Groneur, “Seeversicherung,” 260. For Genoa cf. Doehard, “Chiffres d’assurances”; and for the sixteenth century, see Tenenti, “Assicurazioni genovesi”. Cf. also Feldbauer and Morrissey, Venedig, 83; for details and rich description referring to later times, see Tenenti, Naufrages. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 190. Alfieri, La partita doppia, 91.

32

chapter 1

the Genoese, who had to face the economic and political rivals Savona and Nice, and also Marseille, which was considered to be a pirates’ nest.59 It is noteworthy that for voyages into the Black Sea, i.e. from Genoa to Tana (Azov) or to Caffa (Feodosia), so far no insurance premiums or any insurance contracts can be found; surviving contracts do not cover any voyage beyond Pera, i.e. the exact border of the Black Sea area. This phenomenon could possibly be explained by a low trade volume and traffic or the high risk of entering the Black Sea since the late fourteenth century, so that nobody would have dared to insure such a voyage.60 Another decisive factor to be considered was the vessel on which the insured cargo was transported. The Venetian state galleys were considered particularly safe, and the premiums for these were often half the rate that would have been charged for other, especially smaller vessels.61 Galleys seemed overall a favoured type, as similarities have been observed for galleys from Genoa, Florence, Ferrara, France, Catalonia, or Burgundy.62 Probably the most important factor of the premium rate, however, was news, or – rather rumours – of real or supposed dangers of war or the appearance of pirates, as Giovanni di Bernardo da Uzzano, for example, emphasises around the mid-fifteenth century: “[M]arine insurance from London to Pisa always is from 12 to 15 fiorini per each 100 [fiorini] of the insured value, and when more, according to the perils they [the underwriters] perceived, or to pirates or other.”63 As “insurance rates were sensitive to bad news,”64 which, as has been mentioned, could drive up the normally rather moderate premium rates at the shortest notice, to 20, 30, even 50 percent, this was especially so when it was a retroactive insurance, as Karin Nehlsen-von Stryk has worked out on the basis of Venetian and Barcelonan sources. In this form of insurance, a marine insurance policy was taken out after the departure of the vessel, so that there was a possibility that the insured event had already occurred at the time of the conclusion of the contract, whereby in individual contracts explicit reference was made to certain rumours.65 This extraordinary risk, especially if 59 60 61 62 63

64 65

Groneur, “Seeversicherung,” 256–259; Heers, “Le prix,” 18. Cf. Mollat, “Guerre”. According to Groneur, “Seeversicherung,” 257–258. Nehlsen-von Stryk, “Kalkül,” 201–202. On Catalonia in detail, see del Treppo, I mercanti catalane, 423–440, 483–522 and 639–733. Cf. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 192–193. Pagnini della Ventura, Della decima, vol. IV: La Pratica della Mercatura scritta de Giovanni di Antonio da Uzzano nel 1442, 119 (translation by Privatdozent Dr. Heinrich Lang, Leipzig). On the dangers of piracy between the Mediterranean and Northwestern Europe, see Mollat, “Guerre”. Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 191. Nehlsen-von Stryk, “Kalkül,” 203–206.

Spreading the Risk

33

rumours of a vessel sinking or a pirate attack were already circulating, could of course be highly remunerated by the underwriters or insurance companies. Thus “the retroactive insurance, albeit being indispensable, … nevertheless formed the actual and the with most difficulty to be controlled gateway for fraudulent manipulations and hazardous business practices.”66 For this reason, legislation sought to address this ‘loophole’ in marine insurance. This was first undertaken with the Barcelona Ordinances of 1458 and 1484, which governed marine insurance in large parts of Europe. As such transactions were highly speculative and thus ultimately usurious by nature, the Ordinances stipulated the nullity of corresponding contracts that had been concluded after the point in time when a message technically could have arrived at the place where the contract was concluded. This point in time was calculated on the basis of the distance between the place from which the accident was noted or where the news of the accident first arrived and the place where the insurance was concluded, travelling at the speed of one lega (approximately 3 miles or 4.5 to 5.5 kilometres) per hour.67 In the course of the fifteenth century, marine insurance was diffused beyond Italian centres of trade and finance of which Genoa, Florence and Venice were the most important insurance markets when the century was old.68 By its end at the latest, Naples had also become a centre of marine insurance. Alfonso Leone has ascribed this development to excess financial means, which Catalan and Florentine merchants had accumulated in the Neapolitan market and (re-)invested in insurance business. The profits realised in cloth imports from Perpignan, the most eminent Neapolitan import from Catalonia, were largely invested in marine insurance to cover for the transport of English cloth to Pisa.69 Similar to the introduction of cashless payment beyond Italy, marine insurance was established in places70 inhabited by plenty of Italian merchants with vested interests in this business. Merchants of origins other than Italian such as Catalans also worked closely with their Italian partners as they adopted this new commercial technique in a relatively short time. Therefore, in the fifteenth century, Barcelona claimed the position of the most important Mediterranean insurance market outside Italy. Acting as Catalonian centre of 66 67 68 69 70

Ibid., 207. Nehlsen-von Stryk, “Kalkül,” 207. Concerning the Barcelona Ordinance of 1484, see also Edler de Roover, “Marine Insurance,” 199–200. Spufford, “From Genoa to London”; for Florence see Ceccarelli, “Stime senza probalità”; idem, “Risikostrategien”; idem, “Risky Markets”. Leone, “Maritime Insurance,” 367. Cf. Denzel, Das System des bargeldlosen Zahlungsverkehrs.

34

chapter 1

trade and finance, the city set early precedents of regulating the marine insurance business. As early as 1435, and then again in 1484, ordinances to regulate marine insurance and a specialised court, the Consols de Mar, were installed.71 Venice followed suit in 1468 and set up the Consoli dei Mercanti, which were concerned with legal aspects related to commerce and marine insurance.72 At the turn to the sixteenth century, slaves were also insured as ‘commercial goods’.73 Other non-Italian marine insurance markets were formed in Marseille, Avignon, Montpellier, Perpignan, Valencia, Bruges, London, Lyon, and Ragusa.74 Especially Lyon influenced the development of the marine insurance business: “La création par les Florentines d’un marché d’assurances à Lyon marque le terme de l’expansion italienne.”75 1.2

The Emergence of the Marine Insurance Business in Early Modern Times

Although marine insurance was among the pivotal Italian innovations that evolved in the age of the Commercial Revolution, its diffusion beyond the Mediterranean into regions of Atlantic Europe lasted until the sixteenth century.76 The institution’s breakthrough in Northwestern Europe and in the Atlantic-orientated markets of the Iberian Peninsula was a result of the newly-arrived and reinforced economic gain in value of the ports along the European shoreline of the Atlantic in the wake of the European Expansion.77 On the one side, the marine insurance business subsequently languished in Italian seaports, or even declined to a certain degree. This development was underpinned by the Venetians, who increasingly accessed insurance markets in France or Amsterdam as seventeenth-century records demonstrate.78 On the

71 72 73 74

75 76 77 78

García i Sanz and Ferrer i Mallol, Assegurances, 131–164. Cf. Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 188–189. Stefani, Insurance in Venice, vol. I, 89. Armenteros Martínez, “Hacia el Mediterráneo Atlántico”. Dini, “Seeversicherung”, 1691; Boiteux, La fortune de mer, 89–94. Especially for Valencia, see Cruselles Gómez, “Aseguración en Valencia”; Igual Luis, “Movimento portuale”. For Bruges, see Spufford, “From Genoa to London”, 275, 278 and 286–287. For Ragusa, see Aristidou, “Maritime Insurance”; Quercia, “Le assicurazioni marittime”. Boiteux, La fortune de mer, 95. For the development of the marine insurance in Italy in Early Modern Times, see Addobbati, “Italy”. Ebert, “Atlantic Trade,” 103–106. Ibid., 106; Stefani, Insurance in Venice, vol. I, 112.

Spreading the Risk

35

other side, by the Atlantic new insurance markets such as Lisbon, Seville,79 and Burgos80 came into blossom in the sixteenth century. Up to the seventeenth century, marine insurance had spread from Northwestern Europe’s commercial and financial centres to intercontinental trade and expanded to ever more parts of the world. At the same time, this particular institution was adjusted to the situation of almost permanent naval wars fought by a set of hostile nations of varying allegiances. Furthermore, marine insurance was embedded within a legal framework and improved to facilitate the processing of cases of loss. Violet Barbour thus has called the sixteenth to the seventeenth century a “period of experiment” during which marine insurance merely was a “by-product” of mercantile activity. Only a few insurers specialised in this particular business as the lion’s share was taken up by all sorts of merchants or merchant-bankers.81 The first verifiable marine insurance contract was signed by a Genoese in Flanders as early as in 1370. However, in Bruges marine insurance contracts predominantly were devised among business partners from Romanic ‘nations’ such as Italians, French, and Portuguese.82 Italian merchants’ influence on the development of marine insurance in the Netherlands and entire Northwestern Europe prevailed until around mid-sixteenth century.83 The oldest English marine insurance contract dates back only to 1512. Afterwards, insurance business usances, which foremost were still informed by Italian (often so-called ‘Lombard’) merchants, emerged in England and became increasingly significant in the Netherlands as well. London’s insurance usances were commonly referenced in sixteenth-century Dutch insurance policies.84 In the beginning, the emergence of marine insurance in the Netherlands and England was restricted to insuring voyages to the Iberian Peninsula and the Mediterranean. At this stage, marine insurance did not yet perfectly reach the Hanse region. Even after mid-sixteenth century, Dutch or English merchants who concluded a marine insurance contract for a voyage in the North Sea or the Baltic remained an exception to the rule. In these regions the demand for marine insurance apparently was negligible in contrast to the trade area served 79 80 81 82 83 84

Pike, “The Sevillian Nobility,” 464. Basas Fernandez, El seguro maritimo; Casado Alonso, “Los seguros marítimos de Burgos”; Boiteux, La fortune de mer, 95–96 and 113–115. Cf. Spufford, “From Genoa to London,” 277–278. Barbour, “Marine Risks,” 595; cf. ibid., 571. Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 3–4; Kingston, “Governance and Institutional Change,” 3; Go, Marine Insurance, 149. Kracht, Die Rotterdamer Seeversicherungs-Börse, 9. Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 5–6; Jones, “Elizabethan Marine Insurance”; Kepler, “London Marine Insurance”.

36

chapter 1

by the Italians. The reason for this might be that in comparison to Italian galleys the trade vessels used in the North Sea and the Baltic were of smaller tonnage and therefore carried lower merchandise values. Additionally, distances within the area of the Hanseatic League were not as remote as between the Mediterranean and Northwestern Europe. Hanse merchants were tentative in adopting marine insurance as they had at their disposal other mechanisms and instruments to minimize the risk of maritime travel. The utilisation of Partenreederei, a partnership that denotes a joint ownership of vessel and cargo, was by far the most important reason for the merchants’ unassertive engagement in marine insurance. Whether or not the percentages of premium rates played a role in this85 has been open to discussion and cannot be finally answered. Another reason arguably was a lack of knowledge or ignorance about this particular service, which led to insured parties being defrauded for valid claims. As a result, the institution of marine insurance was discredited, as insinuated by an event that happened in 1531.86 Marine insurance was not restricted to European waters; in the sixteenth century this service also advanced to the New World. Premium rates for such voyages were quite similar to those between ports in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. In accordance with recently calculated figures for Burgos’s marine insurance market, in late sixteenth century, the rates for overseas voyages usually were below 10 percent. For example, average premium rates were cited at 8 to 9 percent for voyages between Portugal and India, and at 9 to 12 percent between Portugal and Brazil, but at 12 ½ percent between Porto and Leghorn. Premium rates for voyages from Seville via the Cape Verde Islands to Nombre de Dios, Cartagena or New Spain were between 11 and 12 percent.87 Similar rates are cited for seafaring between Lisbon and the Portuguese Estado da India.88 Since the fifteenth century, the Netherlands was becoming Northwestern Europe’s centre of insurance business: it was the only political entity that officially approached regulation of settling marine insurance disputes, which is exemplified by the placard of Philipp III, Duke of Burgundy (1419–1467), of 15 February 1458/59. This action set the starting point for the development of a complex insurance law, which in the Netherlands lasted well into the eighteenth century and in several European markets paved the way for the

85 86 87 88

Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 5–9. von Bippen, Seeversicherung. Cf. Denzel, “Neue Finanzprodukte”. Casado Alonso, “Los seguros marítimos de Burgos,” 242. de Souza, “Marine Insurance”.

Spreading the Risk

37

process of achieving legal capacity in the marine insurance business.89 In the sixteenth century, the financial and commercial centre of Northwestern Europe, Antwerp, matured into the regional focal market.90 The city’s stock exchange fulfilled a central function; all concluded insurance contracts were registered at the bourse. Around 1564, about 600 persons were reported to have availed themselves of marine insurance transactions.91 After the fall of Antwerp in 1585, Amsterdam took the lead as emergent financial and commercial centre of Northwestern Europe, while at the same time the city became the largest and most important European insurance market.92 In 1598, a chamber of commerce was established by an ordinance of Amsterdam’s city council and emulated similar institutions previously founded in Italy (Genoa), Spain (Barcelona) and also in the Netherlands’ very own Bruges and Antwerp. This chamber was approved of by the States General in 1612. Later on, Amsterdam was followed by Middelburg in 1600, London in 1601, Rotterdam in 1614/15 (a first effort had failed in 1604), Hamburg in 1623 (a first effort had failed in 1611), Marseille (1669) and Paris (1671).93 “The Amsterdam Chamber’s reputation for secrecy and for prompt settlement attracted merchants from all over Europe.”94 A genuine English insurance market, where English language policies were offered since the 1550s, emerged in London during the Elizabethan era under state surveillance when the ‘Lombards’ were repressed from continuing business in trade and finance. Three institutions proved critical to this market formation: first, the entire marine insurance business was centralised in the newly-built Royal Exchange, which opened in 1571. Second, the Office of Assurance, founded in 1575 and localised in the Royal Exchange’s premises, was modelled on the Antwerp stock exchange as central register for all concluded marine insurance contracts. Third, pursuant to the Marine Insurance Act of 1601, the Parliament installed the Court of Assurance as replacement for an arbitrating body, the Assurance Chamber established in 1577. In sum, the merits of these three institutions began to show in the last quarter of the sixteenth century: the standardisation of insurance policies, which were printed since 1656, as well as of marine insurance usances. Overall, the marine insurance 89 90 91 92 93 94

For a detailed and descriptive study of the role of the Dutch in marine insurance law, see van Niekerk, Insurance Law. Cf. De ruysscher, “Antwerp”. Cf. Spufford, “From Genoa to London,” 285–289. Stevens, “Antwerp”; Puttevils and Deloof, “Marketing and Pricing Risk”. Cf. Kellenbenz, Sephardim, 268. Go, “Amsterdam”; Spufford, “From Genoa to London,” 291–295. Barbour, “Marine Risks,” 573; eadem, Capitalism, 33; van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 198–229. Ebert, “Atlantic Trade,” 111. Cf. Barbour, “Marine Risks,” 573–575.

38

chapter 1

market concentrated in one place. In the years of the three Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars of the seventeenth century (1652–1654, 1665–1667, and 1672–1674) the number of marine insurance contracts grew rapidly, rendering an efficient registration impossible. Consequently, the importance of both the Office of Assurance and the Court of Assurance descended into irrelevance, and the insurance parties resorted to settling disputes informally.95 In the major French Atlantic port, Bordeaux, the earliest marine insurance themed documents, which were only slightly older than those of London, surfaced in the second quarter of the sixteenth century in reaction to the ongoing wars between France and England on the one side, and France against Spain on the other. These documents indicate that perils arising from privateers were widely covered by insurance, whereas damages resulting from the exposure to risicum maris were not. It appears that in Bordeaux, the idea of insurance had been entrenched some time ago, for the most part by Italian merchants. However, during this time period, the merchants themselves organised insurance and did not employ a broker’s service – a distinct feature of a marine insurance market that had not yet come to full maturation.96 In the course of the sixteenth century further marine insurance markets emerged along the French Atlantic coast in cities such as Rouen,97 Nantes and La Rochelle.98 Le Havre, and mostly Paris in the hinterland, followed in the eighteenth century, as did Marseille in the Mediterranean.99 Northern German insurance markets were formed in Hamburg, and to a lesser degree in Lübeck, “which at that time … out of the German cities by the Baltic probably was the only one to maintain an own insurance business.”100 Bremen might have joined in the seventeenth century, although there are no records to confirm that local marine insurance activities took place any earlier than 1767. That year Bremen’s first joint-stock marine insurance companies came into being and private underwriters followed only later.101 On the western shore of the Atlantic, Philadelphia and Boston could be considered important marine insurance markets at the latest since the 1740s. In 95

Rossi, “England”; Leonard, “London”; Röpling, Seeversicherung, 24–32, 49; Raynes, British Insurance, 38–69; Kepler, “London Marine Insurance”; Kingston, “Governance and Institutional Change,” 7. 96 Hubrecht, “Seeversicherungsverträge,” 48. 97 Spufford, “From Genoa to London,” 290–291. 98 Clark, “Marine Insurance,” 575–576. 99 Sée, “Notes sur les assurances maritimes”; Bosher, “The Paris Business World”; Dawson, “Marine Underwriting”; Boiteux, La fortune de mer, 96–98. Cf. Ruffat, “French Insurance,” 187–189; von den Driesch, Die ausländischen Kaufleute, 511–512. 100 Boiteux, La fortune de mer, 35, 30. 101 Ibid., 35–36; Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 208; Plaß, Geschichte, 510.

Spreading the Risk

39

the early days merchants and carriers residing in the British North American colonies chose to approach London insurers. Since the 1730s underwriters’ presence can be traced for several ports. After independence numerous marine insurance companies were chartered in American states and, due to their advanced capability of risk distribution, outshone underwriters during the Quasi-War or Undeclared War with France (also called the Pirate Wars or the Half-War; 1798–1800).102 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, marine insurance was still risky in nature to the merchant who thought about insuring goods and/or the vessel, and to the insurer alike. In a certain way, the merchant seeking out insurance had to pay a kind of additional fee, which he ultimately passed on to the consumer. This merchant, however, had to be aware that competitors bore the risk to refrain from getting insurance and thus could calculate a lower price. From the insurer’s perspective, this particular business rested on thin capitalisation and oftentimes resulted in highly speculative transactions. Mostly the risk was distributed among an insufficient number of insurers and there was no opportunity for reinsurance. To add to the complexity, there was yet no statistical basis established to calculate risk and premium rates. Although insurers from major Northwest European insurance markets primarily from Amsterdam, London and Paris stayed in contact with each other and insurance brokers endeavored to implement stabilizing measures, marine insurance premiums were traded at market rate. “But, even in these leading commercial cities, insurance continued in the hands of merchants, who by turns were too timid or too rash.”103 To at least gather trusted information about these market rates of insurance premiums, price currents were consulted: indicating prices of commodities, money and bills of exchange as well as premium rates, price currents were an innovative medium of information and available for several seaport cities.104 Therefore Hamburg’s significance in the insurance business in the seventeenth century grew in proportion to the city’s converging development in becoming the Northern German centre for communication and postal traffic.105 In several markets the numerous wars of the seventeenth century incurred a high volatility in insurance premium rates. When the Dutch fought Spain in 1629, vessels leaving for Venice, Zante, Crete, Cyprus, Smyrna, and Constantinople 102 Kingston, “Marine Insurance in Britain and America,” 392–396; idem, “Marine Insurance in Philadelphia”; idem, “America”; idem, “Governance and Institutional Change,” 15; Wright and Kingston, “Corporate Insurers,” 454–455. 103 Barbour, “Marine Risks,” 591, 595–596. Cf. Daston, “The Domestication of Risk,” 237–260. 104 McCusker and Gravesteijn, Commercial and Financial Journalism. 105 Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 36–39.

40

chapter 1

were insured in England at a rate from 4 to 5 percent. In the Netherlands, rates for these ports were between 13 and 15 percent; plenty of other examples could be cited.106 Insurance rates fluctuating between 5 and 20 percent that had to be paid for the same voyage were anything but unusual; and as Charles Molloy (1640–1690), an Irish lawyer known as a writer on maritime law, wrote in 1676, “according as the Times are.”107 From time to time merchants felt urged to move to other markets; for example, during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667) English merchants turned to Genoa as the Dutch insurance market was barred. Nevertheless, the various naval wars taking place in the second half of the seventeenth century contributed to an increase in marine insurance business. In capturing the very essence, Violet Barbour has stated that “war was a stern instructor in the importance of insurance and, as the seventeenth century advanced, the volume of insurance increased greatly.”108 In a reciprocal effect, risk minimisation through insurance allowed for a sustainable development of commerce: “[I]t is no exaggeration to say that without marine insurance, British commerce would not have been able to survive the shocks of war in the way that it did, and the steady progress which Britain’s commerce demonstrates in this period would have been seriously hampered.”109 As marine insurance has been a high-risk business and the participating merchants were endangered to ruin themselves by speculation, in the seventeenth century they began to form larger associations to distribute risk more broadly and to provide a sound financial basis. Small-scale syndicates, i.e. temporary partnerships of underwriters with unlimited personal liability, which were organised by brokers, are known to have existed in the sixteenth century in places such as Venice, Bruges, Antwerp, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam.110 The existence of such partnerships lasted up to the eighteenth century: for example, the Chambre in Rouen (1727–1742), the Company for Insuring Ships, Vessels, Goods and Merchandise in Philadelphia (est. 1757) and a similar company founded in Boston in 1793111 attest to the longevity of such partnerships. In the Netherlands, large insurance companies targeting a broader risk distribution for the first time were contrived from 1628 to 1631, and followed by a second effort in the years 1634 and 1640/43. Both plans eventually failed as

106 107 108 109 110

Barbour, “Marine Risks,” 590. Molloy, De Jure Maritimo et Navali, 286, quoted after: Barbour, “Marine Risks,” 592. Barbour, “Marine Risks,” 589, 583. Crowhurst, British Trade, 81. Cf. O’Brien, “Inseparable Connections”. Stefani, Insurance in Venice, vol. I, 101–102 and 191–192; van Niekerk, Insurance Law, 595–598. 111 Dawson, “Marine Underwriting”; Gillingham, “Marine Insurance,” 114.

Spreading the Risk

41

Amsterdam and Rotterdam objected.112 Discussions about several options started in England in 1655 after the First Anglo-Dutch War was over. Although the war incurred great losses by damage at sea and bankruptcies of insurers, at the same time, it had an invigorating effect on marine insurance business. In France, in the course of the Colbertisme, the economic politics of Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683) since the 1660s, a discussion arose in 1664 to charter an insurance society to withdraw the profitable insurance business from the Dutch. Four years later, in 1668, that society was founded in Paris. In 1686, the society was relaunched as Compagnie générale des assurances et grosses aventures en France and was bestowed the exclusive privilege to transact all insurance contracts outside France.113 The idea to found a company or an association in English insurance business was revived in 1693 when the Smyrna convoy was almost entirely lost to hostile French in the Battle of Lagos. This event inflicted ruinous financial damage on the private underwriters and immensely curtailed London’s prestige as insurance market.114 Especially in times of speculation, in France due to John Law’s (1671–1729) financial politics and in England to the South Sea Bubble, in the Netherlands and England the creation of an insurance society was reconsidered. The first Dutch joint-stock insurance company was founded in 1720 in Rotterdam; according to its statutes it was also intended to regulate fire insurance. In the beginning, these shares often were subject to fluctuations and lost 78 percent of their stock market value in the first two months. After the first year had passed, however, a 20 percent dividend could be paid and the trust in the society was restored. Despite the rapid growth of the insurance business in the Netherlands the foundation of a second insurance company took until 1770, again residing in Rotterdam.115 After the Seven Year’s War (1756–1763) insurance companies experienced very prosperous times. Increasing transatlantic and Asian trade had repercussions on the insurance volume and the continental insurance markets wanted to emancipate from the domineering Amsterdam market. Amsterdam did not yet have an insurance company as local private underwriters had enough capital.116 Other markets on the European continent were in demand of efficient, innovative and well-funded joint stock institutions. Examples are the 112 Go, Marine Insurance. 113 Barbour, “Marine Risks,” 570 and 576–580; Kracht, Die Rotterdamer Seeversicherungs-Börse, 40–49. 114 Röpling, “Seeversicherung,” 49. 115 Kracht, Die Rotterdamer Seeversicherungs-Börse, 55–66. 116 Cf. Gelderbloom; de Jong and Jonker, “Insurance Contract”.

42

chapter 1

establishment of insurance companies in Hamburg (1766), Trieste (1766),117 Bremen (1769), Lübeck (after 1770?), Riga (1783), Venice (1788), Leghorn (1788),118 Cádiz (1790 onwards),119 and Odessa (1806).120 England’s insurance market, however, followed a unique course. After a first effort to create an insurance association had failed in 1661 and 1693, the London Assurance Corporation and the Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation were incorporated by Royal Charter pursuant to the Bubble Act of 1720. These two corporations formed a duopoly to offer marine insurance and bottomry services. In saying this, private underwriters were not prohibited from pursuing their business. It had in fact quite the contrary effect, as the Act substantially contributed to the development of English marine insurance business. Stipulated by this Act, every insurance-providing association required either a Royal Charter or an Act of Parliament to be incorporated (which in practice was only the case for the two aforementioned). For this reason, London’s private underwriters could prosper during the eighteenth century. Since the two corporations completely lacked experience in the insurance business and thus were offered less competitive conditions, this duopoly did not pose a threat whatsoever. Suffering through financial loss after incorporation, the simultaneous burst of the South Sea Bubble in 1720 harmed the reputation of each corporation. About 90 percent of the marine insurance sector remained with private underwriters.121 By tradition, these insurers settled their transactions in coffee houses that were located in the City of London. The most famous of these was that of Edward Lloyd (c.1648–1713), established in Tower Street in 1688 and then in Lombard Street since from 1691. Three times a week, Lloyd’s News gathered any information and news of correspondents and brokers, which might be informative to the guests in Lloyd’s Coffee House. Thus, Lloyd’s Coffee House became the underwriters’ central place to meet around 1740 and rose to particular fame especially as its owner in 1734 began to issue a weekly (bi-weekly from 1740) journal titled Lloyd’s List.122 For the first time in 1760, A Society of 117 Cova, Commercio, 151–162; Panariti, “Assicurazione”. The free port edict of Charles VI of 18 March 1719, regarded desirable the establishment of a Banco d’Assicurazione in order to safeguard the merchants’ maritime trade, “for which purpose would be to advance money for cargo to arriving and departing vessels…. If such society had come about and indeed existed, is unknown”; von Costa, Triest, 122. 118 Concerning the marine insurance in Leghorn see Addobbati, Commercio, 113–161. 119 Baskes, “Cádiz,” 232. 120 Katsiardi-Hering, “Greek Commercial Traffic,” 453. 121 Röpling, “Seeversicherung,” 33–42; Bogatyreva, “England”. 122 Geißler, “Die Lloyd’s List”. An earlier attempt at attracting patrons by publishing a ‘newspaper’ – Lloyd’s News – had failed in 1696(/97).

Spreading the Risk

43

Underwriters at Lloyd’s Coffee House published Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, the Green Book, which informed insurers and private underwriters in detail about a vessel’s condition. These two developments corroborate the importance of Lloyd’s Coffee House as a meeting place for London’s underwriters as well as it was the place of the formation of an association. In 1768, the coffee house was rocked by a scandal and Lloyd’s Underwriters relocated in 1774 under the newly assumed name Underwriters of New Lloyd’s to their new premises in the Royal Exchange (which by the way took the form of a coffee house). In 1779, the Underwriters of New Lloyd’s, by then a group counting more than a hundred persons, fixed the standard wording of a policy form that was mandatory for all members. The most decisive alteration was the insurer’s limited liability that since 1749 regularly was added to the postscript in cases of spoilage, waterlogging or natural loss of the transported goods. This 1779 policy was confirmed by Act of Parliament in 1795 and, apart from minor changes, has been definitive for English marine insurance to this day.123 Thus it should be noted that “at that time, having concluded an insurance contract with Lloyd’s meant that indemnities overall were guaranteed to be covered at hundred percent.”124 In late eighteenth-century England, most insurance contracts were made with private underwriters; the two insurance corporations together secured a market share of only 4 percent, but offered higher premium rates that by average were 2 percent higher than those of Lloyd’s Underwriters.125 As a result, “Lloyd’s coffee house emerged as the leading marine insurance marketplace and attracted orders for insurance from merchants across Europe and America.”126 Despite an increase in competing markets in Europe and America, in late eighteenth century, London became the leading marine insurance market worldwide by virtue of this characteristic feature. At any rate, competition between single marine insurance markets was a definitive factor in this particular business. The insured party chose the place that for whichever reason appeared to be the best and safest to conclude marine insurance. Therefore marine insurance contracts had not to be concluded either in the port of departure or arrival, which had been normal in the fifteenth century; but the merchant, carrier or shipmaster used the market that offered the most agreeable conditions for the venture. The Portuguese, for instance, insured their carreira do Brasil in the Netherlands. The Venetians 123 Röpling, “Seeversicherung,” 43–54; Kingston, “Marine Insurance in Britain and America,” 383–392. Cf. Supple, “The Royal Exchange Assurance”; Kimura, “Ursprung”; idem, “Entstehung”; Harris, Industrializing English Law, 207–208. 124 Röpling, “Seeversicherung,” 69. 125 Ibid., 73 and 75. 126 Kingston, “Governance and Institutional Change,” 3.

44

chapter 1

went to insurance markets in France and the Netherlands. And British residents in eighteenth-century America opted against domestic possibilities as they preferred London’s services.127 For the same reason, insurers or underwriters of Antwerp, Amsterdam, London and later Hamburg or Trieste could attract insurance transactions, which were beyond their range of trade and carrier activities. Apart from the constantly underlying question of costs, other factors were decisive to determine the relevance of a particular marine insurance market beyond the city of its location or proximate region.128 These factors were, first and foremost, the reputation of an insurance market, which was based on the good reputation of its underwriters and a swift response to indemnity claims. The second factor was the market liquidity, i.e. the possibilities to insure on a large scale (which will be a momentous factor in discussing the Hamburg market). Third, institutional regulations including taxation and trade restrictions existed, so that, last, in case both parties entered a dispute, it was possible to be heard by a specialised jurisdiction body in a timely manner.129 In addition, the legal security of insurers and insured parties was strengthened in the second half of the seventeenth century. Although marine insurance regulations were endorsed by the authorities as early as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, e.g. in Genoa in 1369, Venice in 1421, Barcelona in 1435 and 1484, a systematic codification of insurance law was undertaken only in the second half of the seventeenth century. However, the logical and efficient pursuance of these codified regulations was not portended, especially not if they ran contrary to mercantile traditions. Such codes were compiled in Sweden in 1667, France in 1681, Denmark in 1683, Rotterdam in 1721, Prussia in 1727 (Preußisches Seerecht) and 1766 (Assekuranz- und Havareiordnung), Hamburg (Assekuranz- und Havarey-Ordnung, see below), Bilbao in 1738, Amsterdam in 1744, London in 1746, Stockholm in 1750, and Venice in 1786.130 These dates elucidate a crucial difference in codification efforts: in marine insurance markets of a long-standing tradition such as Venice and later London or Amsterdam, which in the eighteenth century were prominent places to render such services, existing law was codified relatively late. Arguably this procedure might not have been regarded a necessity as efficient and informal mercantile regulations proved sufficient. On the contrary, in ‘younger’ and emerging marine 127 Ebert, “Atlantic Trade,” 105–112; Kingston, “Marine Insurance in Britain and America”. 128 When the Rouen merchant Robert Dugard insured voyages, for instance to Canada, he used the Amsterdam insurance market, which offered more competitive conditions than the local market. Miquelon, “Dugard of Rouen,” 30. 129 Kingston, “Governance and Institutional Change,” 3–4. 130 Ibid., 8.

Spreading the Risk

45

insurance markets such as in the Baltic countries or Hamburg, the need for a document granting legal security was emphasised more strongly so as to outrun competitors from other markets and thus appear a more attractive place to conclude insurance policies. The diffusion of a variety of legal literature dealing with marine insurance was informed by that urge. Nicolas Magens (1697–1764), a London-based German merchant, laid the groundwork. His Versuch über Assecuranzen, Havereyen und Bodmereyen insgemein of 1753, also published in English two years later under the title Essay on Insurances, can be regarded as the first synoptic handbook of international marine insurance business.131 Other publications in this field that have been relevant in legal history are those by Balthazard-Marie Émérigon (1716–1784)132 and James Allan Park (1763–1838),133 both published for the first time in the 1780s. In conclusion, the developments outlined in this chapter led to a deliberate expansion of Northwest European insurance markets over the course of the eighteenth century. This expansion needs not only be understood in quantitative terms, i.e. in the sense of multiplying insurance sums, but also and especially by the extended spatial range of voyages that were covered by insurance. Indicating insurance premium rates for various destinations, price currents can testify to each of these developments, as Frank C. Spooner134 has demonstrated in his analysis of the Amsterdam insurance market and henceforth is demonstrated for Hamburg. 131 132 133 134

Magens, Versuch über Assecuranzen (= SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/1093). Émérigon, Traité des Assurances. Park, A System of the Law of Marine Insurances. Spooner, Risks at Sea, 163–166.

chapter 2

An Entrepôt in the North – Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport 2.1

Hamburg’s Maritime Trade from the Late Seventeenth to the Mid-Nineteenth Centuries Hambourg est le point central du commerce de l’Allemagne avec les autres nations. Ses liaisons, ses connaissances, son crédit à l’étranger assurent au fabricant de l’intérieur le débouche facile et avantageux des fruits de son industrie.1

This 1809 evaluation characterises the situation of foreign trade throughout the entire eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Hamburg’s commercial framework, trade, and transport was chiefly aligned with its seaside localisation and conditions. However, a clear-cut differentiation of trade, on the one side, and shipping companies, transportation, and freight forwarding on the other, needs to be acknowledged. Not without reason, a specialised freight forwarding industry emerged in Hamburg during the eighteenth century.2 In the course of that century, the marine insurance business had also evolved into a separate line of business and a marine insurance market in a full sense of the term became evident when premium quotations were announced in the newly published Preiscourant der Wahren in Parteyen in 1736, although this price current had come into existence in earlier decades. This event coincided more or less with the end of convoy shipping in 1734 and Hamburg’s economic recovery, which started during the 1730s in the wake of undertakings of Hamburg and France to converge their commercial policies after 1716. The years around 1734 mark a turning point in Hamburg’s historical development of navigation and trade. Within these years, the foundations were laid for Hamburg’s emergence as a leading continental city in maritime trade and finance. By the end of that century, Hamburg gained an excellent standing amid other European capital markets.3 1 Histoire de la Ville de Hambourg, vol. II, 597; cit. Menke, Beziehungen, 225. 2 Kellenbenz, “Landverkehr,” 79; Hausherr, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 422–423. 3 Bohn, “Barbaresken”, 143.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_004

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport

47

In obtaining this commercial relevance, the instrument of marine insurance was urgently needed to preferably mitigate risk in increasing maritime traffic. Hamburg’s rise to a significant maritime trading place of supra-regional and international recognition started with and in the Thirty Years’ War: during these decades, Hamburg became the major hub for goods, money, and payments of Northern German belligerent states eager to benefit from Hamburg’s neutrality,4 which had never been officially recognised by international law. Situated at the broad Elbe estuary with a wide upstream hinterland of the Elbe and the Oder, since late sixteenth century, Hamburg’s almost ideal geographic location could be exploited so as to take advantage of the gradually increasing grain trade on the Elbe. Even more important, Hamburg profited more substantially from the booming Atlantic trade and economy ensuing the European Expansion than the competing cities of Lübeck and Bremen did.5 Hamburg’s economic progress can be regarded within an immediate context of continuant immigration of merchants from these Atlantic regions of which Dutch,6 Portuguese Sephardim,7 and English Merchant Adventurers8 were among the first. Resulting in a self-enforcing process, the immigrants used to arrive with their capital and thereby extended Hamburg’s economic and commercial power, which helped to attract other migrant groups. Moreover, these immigrants were not only highly adept in trade but also in credit business and cashless payment: techniques for credit and payment transactions, which had been originally developed in Italy but modified, refined, and even optimised in Northwest Europe, were transferred to Hamburg. In consequence of adopting the both reliable and innovative techniques, the port city by the Elbe9 soon reached the same level as the – in this respect – most progressive Northwest European economic centres. Since Hamburg was closing up on the financial proficiency of Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London, the city grew less dependent from the relatively ‘simple’ instruments that had been used by Hanse merchants. Decisive stages in this modernization process were: first, a stock exchange (Börsenversammlung) was founded in 1558. It was modelled on the Antwerp bourse and situated in a purposely paved and enclosed place near the Trostbrücke (known as place of moneychangers since 1266) opposite of the Old City Hall. Later on, it was moved to a new stock-exchange building, which was the city’s first edifice realised in 4 5 6 7 8 9

Cf. Kellenbenz, “Neutralität,” 31–48. North, Kommunikation, 19; idem, “Handelsexpansion,” 156–157. van Roesbroeck, “Flamen und Wallonen”. Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkräfte. In many aspects, Pöttering, Handel, offers a new approach. von Halle, “Merchant Adventurers”; Lingelbach, “Merchant Adventurers”. Concerning the Hamburg port Sprandel, “Der Hafen von Hamburg”.

48

chapter 2

Renaissance style and constructed by the Amsterdam architect Jan Andresen from 1577 to 1583.10 Second, exchange regulations (Wechselordnungen) were introduced in 1601 and 1603; they followed Dutch examples allowing multiple endorsement. Thus, bill of exchange transactions could significantly be accelerated and intensified.11 Third, the Hamburg Bank was founded in 1619, which was created after respective Amsterdam institutions. In this way it served as deposit, giro, and exchange bank conjoined with a loan bank.12 And fourth, the Commerz-Deputation was established in 1665 as an elected body for the merchants’ political representation.13 In sum, these innovative institutions transformed Hamburg into one of the most progressive and safest places for money and bill transactions in whole Europe. The fact that Hamburg was one of only a few German commercial centres that was spared damages inflicted by the Thirty Years’ War, but even managed to emerge prosperous,14 led to a significant and sustainable growth in trade.15 Up to the mid-seventeenth century, Hamburg’s principal partner in seaborne trade were the Dutch, in every respect. The quantity of Dutch vessels that arrived in the port testifies to their pre-eminence: in 1633, a stifling number of 994 vessels came from the Netherlands, but only 61 were noted to have sailed from England, followed by 44 from Southeast Europe, and 22 from France.16 Hamburg’s and Bremen’s cooperation with Holland peaked in conclusion of a trade agreement in 1645, in which the Netherlands guaranteed both cities safe conduct of trade on the Elbe and the Weser. In addition, the Dutch-Swedish victory over Denmark the same year eventually quenched the Danish king’s long-time intention to win from Hamburg supremacy over the Elbe.17 Ultimately, Dutch pre-eminence in Hamburg’s trade was identifiable by the number of vessels going to the Netherlands: in 1647/48, out of 1,773

10 11 12 13 14 15

16 17

Thöns, “Börsenleben”; Klein, Börse, 3–11. Cf. Postel, “Börse”. In Hamburg “is de Negotie in Wissel grooter als de der Goederen”; Le Moine d’Espine, De Koophandel van Amsterdam, vol. II, 283. Cf. Kellenbenz, “Teixeira,” 290. Denzel, “Hamburger Bank”. Cf. Wiechmann, “Hamburger Bank”. Baasch, Handelskammer; Handelskammer Hamburg (ed.), Hamburg. For concise information Wiskemann, Hamburgs Stellung, 87: “Hamburg had emerged unscathed by the Thirty Years’ War, had nurtured her prosperity and the number of its inhabitants had nearly doubled.” Cf. Baasch, “Kriegsmaterialien”; Ressel, “Seehandel”. Newman, “Hamburg”; Lindberg, “Hamburg”; Krieger, Geschichte, 62–68. For information on Hamburg’s overland trade, which is not discussed in the present study, see for example Wiskemann, Hamburgs Stellung, 93–94; Jochmann, “Wirtschaftsgeschichte,” 220–222; Baasch, “Reihefahrt”. Cf. North, “Handelsexpansion,” 153. Beutin, “Nordwestdeutschland,” 125; Baasch, “Hamburg und Holland,” 94–95. Wiskemann, Hamburgs Stellung, 86; Baasch, “Hamburg und Holland,” 47.

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport

49

vessels that departed from Hamburg 956 (or 53.92 percent) were bound for the Netherlands.18 In the 1650s, Hamburg began to emancipate from the States General when these were weakened by the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–1654) in the wake of the English Navigation Act of 1651 and by the temporary neglect of their military navy after 1648. In 1654/55, Hamburg entered initial negotiations with England as well as with France in order to ameliorate political and trade relations. These efforts culminated in the Traité de marine, commerce et navigation … entre la France et les Villes [H]Anséatiques – the so-called Seetraktat – concluded with Louis XIV (1643–1715) in 1655, who guaranteed neutrality to the Hanse towns in case war would be waged against the Empire. Moreover, the importance of Dutch herring in the Hamburg market decreased in favour of Nordic herring, which largely stemmed from Scottish sources. Herring, one of the essential commercial products “was, so to speak, an indicator for the closeness and meaningfulness of these relationships” between Hamburg and the Netherlands.19 The dominance of Dutch shipping companies in Hamburg’s maritime traffic, the frequent aversion of the Hamburg staple by the Dutch when purchasing wood – which was a vital commodity to them – and the refusal to lend aid against Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean and on this side of the Strait of Gibraltar further eroded their relations.20 Hamburg’s then ongoing process to break free from Dutch-dominated trade becomes discernible in two areas: from the 1660s onwards, Hamburg extended its merchant fleet, which in 1665 consisted of 219 vessels. In 1672, Hamburg already had 277 vessels at disposal, amounting to 309 vessels in 1674.21 Furthermore, this “boom period of the city’s merchant fleet” in the 1670s22 was paralleled by intensifying relations with France with which trade had been deliberately increasing since the conclusion of the maritime treaty of 1655. Fighting the Netherlands in the Dutch War (1672–1678), France exerted additional pressure on the Netherlands, which by that time were at war with the English in the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672–1674). In reaction to this simultaneous engagement by the Dutch, the commercial relations between the Netherlands and Hamburg were impaired perpetually and gave rise to those between Hamburg and France. Especially after France promoted Dunkirk, a flourishing free port that France had bought from England in 1662 18 19 20 21 22

Wiskemann, Hamburgs Stellung, 87. Baasch, “Heringshandel,” 62. Relevant data is provided in ibid., 100: Notice von dem Hering, so in Hamburg von Anno 1693 bis Anno 1744 gepacket worden. Baasch, “Hamburg und Holland,” 52–55; Wiskemann, Hamburgs Stellung, 88. Baasch, “Kauffahrteiflotte,” 41–42. Jeannin, “Handelsflotte,” 72.

50

chapter 2

and made a base for French corsairs, to the Hanse towns as a landing place for their vessels.23 Since the 1670s,24 Hamburg’s primary political campaigns were directed at being granted by France the same privileges in maritime trade and traffic that the Dutch already enjoyed.25 In settling the War of the Spanish Succession, the Peace of Utrecht of 1713 not only brought about change in relations of European political powers but also to the geography of commercial relations. Mostly at the expense of the States General, Great Britain emerged from the conflict in a strengthened position in respect to economy and naval power. Consolidated by favourable treaties with Spain (Asiento de negros 1713) and Portugal (Methuen Treaty of 1703), Great Britain was steadily approaching pre-eminence in worldwide trade and steered in a key position in Mediterranean trade after the 1704 seizure of Gibraltar. Conversely, the relevance of the once-leading European commercial metropolis of Amsterdam, which had been subtly waning away since the 1680s spiralled downwards while London benefited. By virtue of mercantilist commercial and economic policy, a large population, and the constant expansion of the sugar cane plantations on Martinique and Saint-Domingue, France remained the biggest and most prosperous national economy in continental Europe and witnessed a veritable boom that lasted to the 1730s. As a result, Hamburg managed to avail itself of both Anglo-Dutch and Franco-Dutch antagonism and thus to push back further the Netherlands’ influence in maritime trade.26 After the Hanse towns had entered arduous negotiations, in 1716 they and France concluded a new trade agreement pour l’utilité et avantage réciproques. On the one hand, equal treatment of the Hanseatic League members and the Dutch concerning commercial and custom-related policies in trading with France, which no longer accepted the special role of the Dutch. On the other hand, equal treatment of the French and the Dutch in Hanse towns helped both sides – the Hanse towns and France – to gain competitive advantages over Dutch intermediaries and merchants. Since “French 23 24

25 26

Baasch, “Hamburg und Holland,” 60; Kupfer, “Freihafenformen,” 190. The years from 1674 to 1686 in Hamburg were shaped by defending the city against Christian V of Denmark and Norway’s (1670–1699) efforts of conquest and annexation. Without going further into details of the conflict, it must be said that Brandenburg’s interest in trade on the Elbe, flowing as free as possible, guarded Hamburg’s continuant sovereignty. As the Great Elector, Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg (1640–1688), wrote to Johann Georg III, the Elector of Saxony (1680–1691): “We would be anxious that an emporium so noble and key to the Empire would not fall under a foreign potentate’s power and dominion”; cited after: Wohlwill, Neuere Geschichte, 43. Baasch, “Hamburg und Holland,” 70–71. Wiskemann, Hamburgs Stellung, 103; Huhn, Handelsbeziehungen, vol. I, 90–91.

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport

51

navigation was inferior to that undertaken by the Hanse towns it was up to them to maximize their leverage.”27 In the meantime, France had become Hamburg’s most important provider of sugar and outperformed competitors from Portugal,28 the Netherlands, and even England after 1716. The French-Hamburg connection in the sugar business was most advantageous and useful for both partners, as French sugar “was of a better quality than the Dutch product and cheaper than the English.” Hamburg also had a vast hinterland stretching beyond the Holy Roman Empire to Scandinavia and Russia – all of which had an appetite for sugar. For France, Hamburg had become “the gateway to Germany and Central Europe and … intermediary to Scandinavia and Russia.”29 In this way, France continued to be by far the most important commercial partner of the metropolis by the Elbe until the end of the Ancien Régime and was “carrefour du Nord” with “un commerce inter-européen d’entrepôt.”30 In 1788, according to Jean-François Bourgoing (1748–1811), the French envoy plenipotentiary in the Hanse towns from 1788 to 1790, more than half of the imports that arrived at port were reported to be French.31 Contrasted with earlier decades, Hamburg’s entire maritime trade had increased considerably in the 1780s (Graph 2-1). The eighteenth century was a maritime century with the Atlantic at its core. The economy oriented to sea ports and intercontinental trade, which both had greatly affected inland industries that traded goods consigned for export, especially to the Americas. The turmoil of war in the 1790s entailed three far-reaching developments that marred international cooperation, with lasting effects for Hamburg: first, Great Britain and France tried to disrupt Hamburg’s trade with the United States. Second, the commercial powers on the continent lost access to their traditional non-European markets, sources of raw materials, and plantation products. When Saint-Domingue, France’s economically most viable non-European possession, which made up three quarters of its entire maritime trade, was shaken by the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804), French trade with America collapsed. Therefore, France at last lost its role as intermediary of colonial products in Europe to Great Britain, which also supplanted France as Hamburg’s primary

27 28 29 30 31

Ibid., vol. I, 97–100 (cit. 100). For a detailed comparison of the commercial treaty of 1716 with the Peace of Utrecht and with the maritime treaty of 1655, see ibid., 101–104; cf. ibid., vol. II, 65–66 (supplement 7). Cf. Magalães Godinho, “Portugal”. Huhn, Handelsbeziehungen, vol. I, 163 and 165. Marzagalli, Le négoce maritime, 56. According to Huhn, Handelsbeziehungen, vol. II, 85 (supplement 22).

52

chapter 2

graph 2-1 Hamburg’s seaborne trade, 1733–1798 Source: the Hamburg Admiralitäts- und Convoygeld-Einnahmebücher, printed in: Schneider; Krawehl and Denzel (eds.), Statistik; cf. also Denzel, “Einfuhrhandel”, who discusses the problems of this source in regard of statistical processing. Particularly, the import trade from the Netherlands (north of the Scheldt) and from the Baltic (on that side of the Sound) and the Norwegian coast are not part of the data, as is the case for imports of customs-free bulk commodities such as black coal from England.

commercial partner in the 1790s.32 As the nineteenth century progressed, this development continued right after the period of French occupation had ended.33 Graph 2-2 illustrates said development for the eighteenth century: with the exception of the time period from the Seven Years’ War to the beginning of the French Revolutionary Wars, France was Hamburg’s dominating commercial partner, whereas Great Britain took the lead in the 1790s. According to little few data available for the eighteenth century, the Netherlands, which had once been Hamburg’s most important commercial partner, until 1790 was in a similar position as Great Britain and thus also conspicuously undercut the value of the goods France exported to Hamburg. Illustrated by the fact that since the beginning of the eighteenth century “the English and the French had pushed their economic position in Hamburg at Holland’s expenses,”34 this development can also be substantiated by the 32 33 34

Denzel, “Hamburg”. For more information, see Schmidt, Hamburg, part 1. Röhlk, Schiffahrt und Handel, vol. 1, 69.

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport

53

graph 2-2 Hamburg’s seaborne imports from Northwestern Europe, 1733–1798 Source: For France and Great Britain see the Hamburg Admiralitäts- und Convoygeld-Einnahmebücher, printed in: Schneider; Krawehl and Denzel (eds.), Statistik; for Holland (here: Admiralty of Amsterdam), see Röhlk, Schiffahrt und Handel, vol. 1, 180, which offers but little data that are converted according to Denzel, Handbook, 209–210. Data for the years between 1753 and 1784 indicate Holland’s exports to “Hamburg, Bremen en Kleine oost”, i.e. to German North Sea ports other than Hamburg. Based on Röhlk’s compiled data, a share of about 50 percent in the column “Hamburg, Bremen en Kleine oost” is calculated for 1790. This figure, as a ballpark estimation, has been assumed for 1753 and 1784.

number of vessels that arrived at Hamburg port. With the exception of 1806 – the year in between the blockades – Graph 2-3 indicates a swiftly rising significance of England’s participation in maritime transport since the 1790s, which the once dominating Dutch failed to impede even after 1815: in 1820, about 52 percent of the ship flags and thus more than half of the number of vessels that arrived in Hamburg were English. Only 16 percent were Dutch and, to note, “sailing vessels coming from Holland were small in size by comparison.”35 After the foundation of the Batavian Republic in 1795, trade as well as the financial and marine insurance business formerly concentrated in Amsterdam as ‘global centre’ first moved to Hamburg and from there to its long-term domicile, London. Consequently, intercontinental trade lost in relevance for the continental powers while Great Britain went on extending its intercontinental relations in regard to commerce and (the acquisition of) territory. When the continental blockade was established in November 1806, European countries 35

Ibid., 70.

54

chapter 2

graph 2-3 Vessel arrivals in Hamburg according to their flag, 1633–1820 Source: Röhlk, Schiffahrt und Handel, vol. 1, 69 (with reference to the exact sources).

on the continent were largely cut off from their non-European trading partners since 1807, and in this process lost their most valuable segment of maritime trade. These countries were effectively reduced to coastal trade and had to resort to their commercial ties with England, which after all remained a partner in trade and, more specifically, freight forwarding.36 This massive change in international commercial structures had permanent consequences for Hamburg: at first, a distinct commercial boom followed, but after that trade was paralysed for years. The positive commercial development of the 1790s, which had its primary origins in the French occupation of the Netherlands, led to rising trade with colonial products as well as (maritime) traffic with Great Britain and the United States.37 As early as in the 1790s, a remarkable number of vessels arrived directly from US port cities – most prominently from Charleston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York – and from several ports of the West Indies such as Saint Thomas, which was a reliable indicator of the increased significance of direct transatlantic traffic and trade. By comparison, destinations in Asia and Africa as well as in South-American regions did not yet play a prominent role. 36 37

Crouzet, “Kriege,” 232–237; North, “Kontinentalsperre,” 136–137. Vogel, Hansestädte, 5–8; Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 308–316. Cf. Büsch, Handelsverwirrung.

55

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport table 2-1 Vessel arrivals in Hamburg from destinations beyond Cape Finisterre and from the Mediterranean, 1791–1800a

Country or region of origin

Number

In percent

USA Portugal Spain (on this and on that side of Gibraltar) Italy (incl. Trieste) West Indies & Gulf of Mexico French Mediterranean Coast Indian Ocean (from Canton to Batavia) South America (the Guianas, Rio de la Plata) Ionian Islands, Smyrna Africa in total

939 741 597 501 237 109 46 22 21 14 3,227

29.10% 22.96% 18.50% 15.53% 7.34% 3.38% 1.43% 0.68% 0.65% 0.43% 100.00%

a SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek SH103: Assekuranz- und Bodmereiwesen 1748– 1820, Verz[eichnis] der von 1791–1800 von Häfen jenseits des Kap Finisterre in Hamburg ankommenden Schiffe; Verz[eichnis] der Schiffe, die von 1790–1800 aus dem Mittelmeer in Hamburg angekommen sind. – Cape Finisterre lies at the west coast of Galicia in Northwestern Spain. Arrivals of vessels from the French, Dutch and the German Atlantic coasts, from Great Britain, Scandinavia and the Baltic are thus omitted.

After a crisis had hit in 1799, Hamburg’s trade slid into a period of decline in 1801. Apart from minor interruptions, this period lasted until 1814 and for the most part was conditioned by external factors. In chronological order, these were in particular: – the Danish occupation of Hamburg and the ensuing first Elbe blockade by the British in 1801; – the second blockade of the Elbe: two months after the British government had declared war on France, on 18 May 1803, and thereby violated the provisions of the Treaty of Amiens, the British started to initialize the blockade in reaction to the French occupation of Hamburg’s county (Amt) Ritzebüttel at the Elbe estuary and to weaken French economic efforts; except for the confiscation of 3,000 tonnes of coal, British imports of grain and coal passed the blockade without hindrance;38 – the third British blockade of the Elbe (April to October 1806); 38

Altstaedt, Schauerlüd, 24.

56

chapter 2

– the integration of Northwest Germany within the French Continental System, and since 1806 in the Continental Blockade,39 the resulting relocation of Hamburg’s trade to adjacent towns of which Tönning became the most important, and, – finally, the beginning of the French Period in Hamburg on 19 November 1809 that ended only on 28 April 1814.40 In reaction to the declaration of war in May 1803, France occupied the Electorate of Hanover and also Hamburg’s exclave Cuxhaven: Hamburg, which had been neutral so far, was circumvented by international trade, particularly by bulk commodity trade such as black coal, even though neutrality during imperial wars was extended to the Hanseatic towns by the mediatisation in the Holy Roman Empire in 1803. The Elbe trade deteriorated considerably and shifted to Bremen, Stettin, and Emden but also to Lübeck, Kiel, and mostly to Tönning.41 Between 1803 and 1807 the entire maritime traffic originally destined for Hamburg arrived in Tönning, wherefrom merchants went on to transport the commodities overland. Since 1807, England maintained a depot for merchandise on Heligoland: “[T]his became important when Denmark joined the Continental System in 1808 and Tönning’s relevance as a smuggler’s port declined.”42 For some time, the ports of Lübeck, Wismar, Rostock, and Stralsund profited from the Elbe blockade. With the exception of Lübeck, these cities casually acted as intermediaries in smuggling English merchandise from Sweden to continental Europe and participated in contraband trade with North American vessels, which brought Atlantic goods and English black coal.43 39

40 41 42 43

In search of perfect ideas of the mercantilisme royal and to crush dominant British competition, the Continental System was Napoleon’s attempt to bring as much as possible of the European continent under French hegemony in order to put individual countries and regions into the service of the French economy and, in particular, of its nascent industries. His plan ultimately failed. From a mercantilist view, the Continental Blockade was the most radical instrument in the arsenal of policies that was actually practiced to enforce the concept, oftentimes requiring the use of military power. As an economic trade barrier, the blockade marked the apex of the whole mercantilist era in an age in which, in many an aspect, mercantilist economic politics were already labouring to overcome and a blockade must appear as anachronistic and indeed obsolete; Denzel, “Kontinentalsystem”. Cf. Schramm, “Kaufleute”. North, “Kontinentalsperre,” 137; Marzagalli, Le négoce maritime, 155–163; Schmidt, “Bordeaux”; Gehrmann, “Handelskonjunkturen,” 165–171; Vogel, Hansestädte, 12; Vogt, Beitrag, 46. North, “Kontinentalsperre,” 140. Cf. Marzagalli, Le négoce maritime, 155–164, 176–180; Gehrmann, “Handelskonjunkturen,” 159–171; Moorhenn, Helgoland, 27–45; Heckscher, Continental-System, 178–180. North, “Kontinentalsperre,” 141–144, 148; Marzagalli, Le négoce maritime, 164–170.

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport

57

“Whereas the British blockade of the Elbe only had obstructed Hamburg’s trade, the measures of the Continental Blockade concerned the correspondence with Great Britain as bill of exchange transactions and the insurance business were affected to a greater extent,”44 since the Continental Blockade implied a comprehensive restriction on any trade and traffic with England.45 During the second Elbe blockade, packet vessels sailed from Husum twice a week to deliver letters and periodical information on exchange rates to London; thus cashless payment had been upheld and marine insurance business could still prosper.46 For the duration of the Continental Blockade, a large part of trade was transferred to Danish Altona from where smuggling hardly ever could be controlled. The extensive network of customs control around Hamburg was undermined by bribery, smuggling, and fraudulent practices.47 Once again, Tönning became Hamburg’s port: grain was shipped on small vessels to England; non-European products, which arrived Holstein on English but mostly on Danish and American vessels, were reloaded in Tönning onto barges and crafts suitable for tidal flats. Danish certificates stating that the merchandise were not of English make found the acceptance of French customs authorities in Hamburg. After American-flagged vessels were prohibited from trading with Europe, pursuant to the Embargo Act of December 1807 whereby the last remaining ship-flag that retained a neutral status until then was driven out of European waters, the year 1808 marked “trade’s lowest point in the first time period of the Continental Blockade.”48 The French policy on restricting Hamburg’s trade culminated in the promulgation of the Trianon Decree and Tariff on 2 October 1810.49 As a result, Hamburg’s direct sea voyages diminished, and the number of vessels that were operated fell by almost 20 percent. The Hanseatic departments were not included in the French inland customs area and therefore did not possess the same rights as France; the customs border to France and Holland stayed intact while Hamburg was sealed off from its Lower-Saxon hinterland.50 In that time, the only progressive action taken was constituting an entrepôt by the Imperial 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

North, “Kontinentalsperre,” 139f. (cit. 139). This included the liquidation of the English Court in January 1807 (in force as of 20 April 1808), the factory (Faktorei) of the Merchant Adventurers, which had existed since Elizabethan times; Petersen, Engländer, 25–48. North, “Kontinentalsperre,” 138; Vogel, Hansestädte, 14. Cf. Hitzigrath, Hamburg. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 3–5; Vogel, Hansestädte, 24; Marzagalli, Le négoce maritime, 181–220; Schmidt, Hamburg, part 1, 248–327; Aalestad, “Paying for War”. Vogel, Hansestädte, 35 (cit.), 43–44. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 3–5. Vogel, Hansestädte, 35, 47–48.

58

chapter 2

Decree of 30 December 1812, which was agreed upon in negotiations that took place since November 1810. Early in 1813, Hamburg was liberated from French occupation for a short while, but by June the French were back in power and again governed the city. On 30 December 1813 even the stock exchange was closed.51 Ultimately, the French occupants relieved the Hamburg Bank of its cash reserve worth 7.5 millions of Mark Banko. Afterwards the French withdrew from Hamburg on 28 April 1814, and the city council was restored in its traditional rights on 26 May that year. On 13 May 1814 the stock exchange was reopened and the packet shipping taken up anew, which originally had been effected via the Netherlands, Cuxhaven (since 1795) and had ended in 1806. The Hamburger Bank was also reopened.52 “Step by step, the old trade institutions were getting off the ground again and by the end of the year normal conditions of trade nearly were reinstated, the exceptional business situation was overcome.”53 In the following years, Hamburg’s trade overall experienced an upswing. Despite reverting to a positive trend in its development, the city was confronted with several unpromising circumstances that were underlying this tentative commercial restoration: Altona and Bremen were still competitors and were joined by Harburg later on. Forming a part of the Kingdom of Hanover since 1848, this free port participated in the Customs Union since 1854.54 Barbary pirates imperilled maritime trade in the Mediterranean and off the Iberian Peninsula – a situation that had been criticized by Hamburg’s insurers since 1817.55 Furthermore, the shipping companies stagnated and a serious lack of current coins became manifest in the monetary crisis of 1817–1818. In addition, a new competitor was emerging in the Baltic when the United States, Brazil, and Cuba entered direct trade with Russia. From the perspective of commercial policy, a period of reform started in the 1820s of which the Elbschifffahrtsakte of 1821 was one of the most effective measures, which contributed significantly to the expansion of trade. The commercial usages were reformed as of 1 January 1823, and the exchange rate list was revised in 1824. A new commercial court had been existing since 1815 and a newly conceptualized regulation for brokers was issued after the 51 52 53 54 55

Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 6 (with note 1), 9. Ibid., 9. Vogel, Hansestädte, 56. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 46. Cf. idem, “Hamburg und Bremen”. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek SH 103, Assekuranz- und Bodmereiwesen 1748–1820, fasc. 3: Kaperwesen 1798–1819 – Türkisches Kaperwesen, Schreiben vom 5. Juli 1817; Barbaresken, Schreiben der Assekuradeure, 12 July 1817; fasc. 2: Eingaben der AssekuranzCompagnien an den Rat betr. Schutz vor den Kapereien der Barbaresken, 27 October 1827.

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport

59

revision efforts of 1816 and 1817 had not been met by broad acceptance. As transit trade was about 2 percent cheaper in Altona, Harburg, and Lüneburg, on 21 August 1823 export duties and ship tolls were reduced and smaller cargos were exempt from customs duties altogether, which served as a useful lever against those competing cities. The construction work to expand the Hamburg port began in 1834.56 “In general, Hamburg adhered more ardently than ever to free trade and the city’s free trade stance.”57 After the Great Fire of 1842 the customs duties levied on goods were raised to replenish the treasury. In 1844 and 1851 the ship toll was cut moderately and in December 1856 cotton and other commodities were excluded from import duties, and export duties were abolished altogether. The suppression of the Sound toll in 1857, however, was of little importance as “Hamburg had only a relatively small part in navigation in the Baltic.”58 In the period from 1848, year of revolution and war to the year of crisis in 1857, the economic situation was that of constant progress. Imports were marginally higher than exports, leading to a slightly negative foreign trade balance. When considering seaborne trade only, imports made up about 60 percent of total trade, which showed a downward trend since the second half of the 1850s. In the mid-1840s, seaborne exports rose from 35 percent of total trade to almost 50 percent in 1854. Great Britain, which accounted for about half of imports in terms of value and destination for over two thirds of exports, was by far Hamburg’s most important partner in maritime trade throughout the nineteenth century. The Netherlands and France reprised their eighteenth-century role as Hamburg’s main European maritime trading partners, although they clearly missed previous figures. Norway and Sweden were added as export partners. Furthermore, newly taken up direct trade with non-European destinations became more relevant, making up one fifth of maritime import and over one fourth of maritime export. In respect of the advancement of the marine insurance market, it should be noted that this intercontinental direct trade was of particular significance: in the course of the nineteenth century, the destinations were more diversified and differentiated so as to assign a precise denomination to each premium quotation. In the 1810s and the 1820s direct trade relations to various regions outside Europe either were reinstated or established: direct trade with the United States and Saint Thomas was resumed in 1814, Brazil and Venezuela followed 56 57 58

Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 11–16, 25–26 and 34; Teuteberg, “Entstehung,” 268–271. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 43. Ibid., 49 and 45.

60

chapter 2

graph 2-4 Hamburg’s foreign trade (only duty paid goods), 1820–1844 Source: Tabellarische Übersichten … 1845–1848 [1849], VII.

in 1815,59 Cuba in 1817 (Cuba was allowed to trade with all nations since 1815). Direct trade with Mexico initially was taken up again in 1822 and on a regular basis in 1827. South American west coast seaports were served since 1825. Finally, British North America, of which Newfoundland was most important, was added in 1826.60 About the same time, starting in late 1820s, more trade agreements were concluded with European and, in particular, with non-European countries: Great Britain (1825), Brazil and the United States (1827), Prussia (1828), Mexico (1832), Venezuela (1837), the Ottoman Empire (1839/41), Sweden-Norway (1841), France (1843), Piedmont-Sardinia (1844), Guatemala (1847), the Sandwich Islands (Hawaiian Islands, 1848/51), Costa Rica (1848), New Granada (Colombia, 1854), Liberia (1855), Persia (1857), Siam (1858), Zanzibar (1859), and China (1861).61 59

60 61

Although Baasch could prove that in the eighteenth century, “Hamburgers chartered their vessels in Portugal for voyages to Brazil in which they themselves and in most cases also the Hamburg ship’s crew took part”; Wiskemann, Hamburgs Stellung, 105; cf. Baasch, Beiträge, 21. Soetbeer, Hamburgs Handel, vol. I, 170, 172, 178, 194 and 204; Schwarzer, “Exporthandel,” 58, 68 and 70. Concerning Hamburg’s voyages to Newfoundland Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 427–440. These were usually concluded with Bremen and Lübeck at the same time (Prüser, Handelsverträge). List compilation based on Becker, Entwicklung, 80 and 85–86; Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 16 and 38. Cf. Becker, “Hansestädte”; Dane, “Primeras relaciones”; Stöpel, “Hansestädte”; Konsor, Hansestädte; Kossok, Lateinamerika. Cf. Ahrens, “Franzosenzeit,” 445–446; Moltmann, “Übersee”; Schmidt, “Abschluß,” 319; König, “Beziehungen”; Walter, “Gramlich”.

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport

61

graph 2-5 Hamburg’s foreign trade, 1845–1859, value in Mark Banko Source: Ibid., VIII and 12f.; Tabellarische Übersichten … im Jahre 1850 [1851], 4–5; dito 1851 [1852], 5; dito 1853 [1854], 3; dito 1855 [1856], 3; dito 1856 [1857], 7; dito 1857 [1858], 7; dito 1861 [1862], 7.

Among these trade agreements the relations established with Brazil proved to be the most fruitful (Graph 2-6): [T]he export of conventional (trading) goods to Brazil stood at its very beginning, whereas the actual worth of trading with Brazil was pulled in by the return cargos of sugar and coffee that were brought to Europe by English shipping companies. Those cargos were prohibited by law to be unloaded in England proper as foreign commodities must be acquired from its own colonies.62 Overall, Hamburg’s direct intercontinental trade foremost was concentrated on the American hemisphere: between 1845 and 1856 an average of approximately 90 percent of exports were shipped to the Americas and about 86 percent were imported from there between 1845 and 1859. During the same time periods, 9.5 percent of exports went to Asia and Australia while 11.5 percent of imports came from those regions. Africa scored only 2.5 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively. Around the mid-1840s, Hanseatic and other German commercial settlements outside of Europe reached similar proportions (Graph 2-7). 62

Kossok, “Brasilienvertrag,” 493.

62

chapter 2

graph 2-6 Hamburg’s direct trade with non-European destinations, 1837/38 and c.1850 Source 1837/38: Tabellarische Übersichten … 1845–1848 [1849], VIII, 12; dito 1850 [1851], 4–5; dito 1853 [1854], 3; dito 1855 [1856], 3; dito 1856 [1857], 7; dito 1857 [1858], 7; dito 1861 [1862], 7. – c.1850: Koeppen, Aussenhandel, 199; Arfs, Hamburg, 157.

graph 2-7 German commercial settlements in non-European countries, 1844/45 Source: SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 48,2 rot, fasc. 8: Übersicht der Deutschen Handelsetablissements auf überseeischen Märkten im Jahre 1844/45 (obtained from: Weser-Zeitung, 10 February 1846, N° 653).

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport

63

Only 4.1 percent of the trading stations were located in the Indian Ocean, 3.2 percent in Africa, and 92.7 percent in North and South America. As Britain suppresed any competition, Asia was of minor importance in Hamburg’s intercontinental trade as the political economist Adolph Soetbeer (1814–1892)63 stated in 1840: [T]o the present day, the German export business with the highly populated countries of the East Indies has been insignificant, partly because the inhabitants of those countries feel little demand for European goods, partly because of the English who are being in the decisive position when it comes to the supply with suitable manufactures, and lastly because the English and Dutch colonial system hampers the import of other European products by imposing high discriminatory tariffs.64 Only in 1852/54 did exports to Asia rise to roughly 14 percent.65 Despite a gain in value, Hamburg’s exports to Asia were very modest by comparison with those by the English: between 1854 and 1865, Hamburg’s exports only realised 3.88 percent of British exports to China and 0.22 percent to India.66 Australia and the Sandwich Islands first appeared as direct export destinations in 1847/48. In the wake of the Victorian gold rush, Australia registered a substantial growth within a short time since 1853.67 Although the trade with non-European goods rose in the 1850s,68 the trade volumes of Hamburg’s most important commercial partners outside of Europe did not exceed 25 percent of the city’s maritime foreign trade. Despite stressing the fact that Hamburg’s direct exports to these destinations gained in worth, the percentage of non-European trading partners in the city’s total exports never exceeded 13 percent (1852/53). This percentage even fell slightly, even though the absolute figures continued to rise. In 1854, when the value of the total direct exports to non-European destinations amounted to 65 million Mark Banko, the figure still fell behind the 75 million Mark Banko of exports bound for Great Britain. In other words, around the mid-1850s Great Britain was continually a far more important trading partner for Hamburg than any other country or region outside Europe. 63 64 65 66 67 68

Cf. Halle, “Soetbeer, Adolf Georg”. The original writing of his first name was ‘Adolph’. Soetbeer, Hamburgs Handel, vol. I, 208. Cf. Kellenbenz, “German Trade Relations”. Source: Tabellarische Übersichten … 1853 [1854], 3; dito 1855 [1856], 3. Bartsch, Handelsbeziehungen, annex VIII, IX, 68, 144–147. Cf. Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 463–471. Ibid., 449–462. Cf. Becker, Entwicklung, 86; Denzel, “Hamburg”.

64

chapter 2

table 2-2 Tonnage of Hamburg’s merchant vessels, 1672–1792a

Vessels

1672

1674

1791

1792

Less than 50 last 50 to 80 last 90 to 140 last More than 150 last

27,8% 27,1% 41,1% 4,0%

28,5% 26,5% 41,8% 3,2%

9,7% 39,0% 31,4% 19,9%

9,1% 38,4% 32,5% 20,0%

a Jeannin, “Handelsflotte,” 72. – ‘Last’ means the Hamburg commercial last (Commerz-Last), of which one last was equivalent to 3 tonnes or 6,000 (metric) pounds.

2.2

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Transport

Other than commerce, payment, or marine insurance, Hamburg’s maritime transport business had to concede to a period of relative decline in the eighteenth century, which on the one side was caused by Barbary pirates, and on the other by West European trading nations dominating the maritime transport business. According to Table 2-2, the total carrying capacity of the Hamburg merchant fleet had increased considerably from the late seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth centuries. The number of vessels of greater last had multiplied by five while that of vessels below the capability to carry a 50 last burden had decreased to about a third. This development was the result of high capital investments in shipping companies after the city had been hit by the Amsterdam financial crisis of 1763. In the same way, it was the basis for the start of intercontinental voyages in the 1790s. In an essay from 25 December 1827, titled Ueber die hamburgische Schiffahrt mit eigenen Schiffen, Senator Johann Ernst Friedrich Westphalen (1757–1833), a well-versed wholesale-merchant and member of the Ratsdeputation of shipping and commerce, reported that Hamburg’s merchant fleet in 1798 had comprised of 250 units amounting to 23,000 last altogether. During the French Period this relatively high level could not be upheld as the Hamburg fleet had to accept considerable losses, which partly but not entirely, were caused by redirecting maritime traffic to Tönning and other ports. Furthermore, the plan laid out in 1806 to establish a Vereinigte Compagnie zur Schiffsrhederey eventually foundered.69 As indicated 69

SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 67 rot, fasc. 2: Plan der Hamburgischen vereinigten Compagnie zur Schiffsrhederey, 1806.

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport

65

by Westphalen, until 1816, the Hamburg fleet operated about 100 units equivalent to 7,600 last that portended not only a significant decrease by number but also by size when compared to those at the turn of the century. This slow development of shipping companies continued in the 1810s and the early 1820s, while the numbers of vessels and lasts tended to dwindle. Not without a reason, Hamburg’s commerce and transport business was dependent on vessels from Schleswig and Holstein whereby the closest connection was formed with Aabenraa by the mid-nineteenth century.70 For the first time in 1816, a sea-going steamboat, the Lady of the Lake, served the Hamburg port. Nine years later, in 1825, the first two regular steam-operated services destined for London and Amsterdam respectively, were installed in replacement of the older Hamburg-Amsterdam connection, which was organised in the manner of a forerunner to regularly scheduled services called Reihe- or Börtfahrt. That former connection had become unprofitable and was officially discontinued in 1820.71 Navigation recovered at moderate rates, a slight betterment set in only after the mid-1820s, which, last but not least, was a product of the newly-entered trade agreements coming to fruition and the renewed efforts to get a foothold in direct intercontinental trade.72 By the mid-1840s, however, Hamburg failed to meet the pre-war figures despite a considerable increase in vessels and lasts. In 1848 port master Meineke assembled a list of Hamburg’s steam-powered vessels: Altogether, there were 13 such vessels that could be fitted for naval activities. Of these five were iron-hulled and three vessels were of wooden construction. Each of these vessels had a 116 horse-power engine on average and could carry 101 last.73 The slowly growing importance of steam navigation notwithstanding, the Regulativ für die Dampfschifffahrt von und nach Hamburg, laid out in the first half of the 1840s, was never realised.74

70 71 72 73 74

Brockstedt, Die Schiffahrts- und Handelsbeziehungen, 300; Japsen, “Aabenraa,” 59. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 18; Röhlk, Schiffahrt und Handel, vol. 1, 52–53. Cf. Szymanski, Dampfschiffahrt, 5. Kresse, “Handelsverträge”. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 48,2 rot, fasc. 21: Statistik der Hamburger Dampfschiffahrt, 9 December 1848, compiled by port master Meinecke. StAHH, 111–1 Senat, Cl. VII Lit. Ke Nr. 12: Regulativ für die Dampfschiffahrt von und nach Hamburg (unerledigt geblieben), 1843–1845. Beiliegende Materialien, insbesondere ähnliche Gesetze fremder Staaten.

66

chapter 2

table 2-3 Number of Hamburg-flagged vessels, 1798–1858a

Number of vessels 1788 … 1798 1799 … 1816 … 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 … 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843

CommerzLast

Average Commerz-Last

248 280

23.206

93,57

101

7.616

75,41

96 91 111 96 88 110 117 124 123 127

7.219 6.426 8.039 7.200 6.466 9.200 9.138 9.853 8.468 9.954

75,20 70,62 72,42 75,00 73,48 83,64 78,10 79,46 68,85 78,38

146 153 163 174 193 204 214 207

11.326 11.991 12.999 14.241 15.875 16.749 17.273 17.220

77,58 78,37 79,75 81,84 82,25 82,10 80,71 83,19

Thereof steampowered

159

2

24 32 (34?) 25 22 22 22 [3]

a SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 14,1 rot, fasc. 6: Statistische Notizen in Bezug auf die Tragfähigkeit der hamburgischen Schiffe sowie der in Hamburg angekommenen Seeschiffe etc. während der Jahre 1841 bis 1852 – Hamburgische Rhederei sowie Zunahme des See-Dampfschiffahrts-Verkehrs nach Hamburg; Tabellarische Übersichten … 1849 [1850], 7; Kellenbenz, “Außenhandel,” 25; Westphalen, Schiffahrt; cit. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 18 and 35 (cf. ibid., 65–66); Soetbeer, Handels- und Zollverfassung, 24, annex B; Hertz, Seehandelshaus, 72, annex IV (figures in square brackets indicate steam-powered vessels without sails, all other figures indicate steam-powered vessels with additional sails).

67

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport table 2-3 Number of Hamburg-flagged vessels, 1798–1858 (cont.)

1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 … 1855 … 1858

Number of vessels

CommerzLast

Average Commerz-Last

Thereof steampowered

206 223 228 249 257 286 326 351 369

17.670 19.023 19.515 22.203 23.897 27.351 31.670 34.633 37.628

85,78 85,30 85,59 89,17 92,98 95,63 97,15 98,67 101,97

25 (26?) 26 27 [5] 28 28 [13] 39 [9] 49 [6]

448

[11]

488

[19]

This development was accompanied by a gradual rise in the arrivals and departures of vessels in or from Hamburg’s port, which was expanded in 1834.75 In 1788, about 1,800 vessels had arrived in the port of which 12.22 percent (equal to 220 units) had flown the Hamburg flag.76 After the mid-1830s the number of arrivals, and from 1841 onwards the departures also, showed an upward tendency. Whereas the total number of arriving and departing vessels inclined to rise during this time, Hamburg’s intercontinental traffic under its own and foreign flags already had experienced a first boom period. The percentage of vessels arriving from non-European destinations fell from 10 in the 1830s to 9 percent by the mid-nineteenth century. As many vessels subsequently anchored in another European seaports where (additional) cargo was loaded onto the vessel that continued the voyage to non-European destinations, which for instance was the case for shipping salt from Setúbal to Brazil, the percentage of departures from Hamburg to non-European destinations was 7 to 9 percent lower than the figure of arrivals from there.

75 76

Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 34. Hävernick, Schiffahrt, fig. 18. Cf. Vogel, “Handelskonjunkturen,” 60, assumed 2,000 units per year, from the late 1770s to 1780.

68

chapter 2

graph 2-8 Vessel arrivals and departures in and from Hamburg, 1836–1851 Sources: Schumann, Handlung, 181–182 (the 1803 figure “includes smaller vessels”); Tonnies, Chronik … 1824, 118; Kellenbenz, “Aussenhandel,” 25; Soetbeer, Handels- und Zollverfassung, 24, supplement A (average figures from 1815 to 1834); Bondé, Hambourg, 45–52 and 54; Mathies, Reederei, 7. Cf. Ahrens, “Franzosenzeit,” 447. Depending on whether or not smaller vessels were included in the individual source, the figures deviate to some extent.

At the same time, the range of worldwide destinations which came to include California, Kamchatka, and the South Sea, was expanded, even though the largest portion of arriving and departing vessels connected Hamburg with Great Britain and the ports of Northwestern Europe.77 As for Great Britain, the abrogation of the Navigation Acts in 1843 was of major importance as “British restrictions on navigation had assigned particular commercial activities to Hamburg which (then) were expected to become the object of fierce competition by the English.”78 Since the 1830s, an increasing number of regular liner services emerged: for instance, the first one to make the passage to New York was opened in 183679 and the Mediterranean reappeared on Hamburg’s schedule after the French had conquered Algiers in 1830.80 77 78 79 80

For the time around the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, see North, “Kontinentalsperre,” 138; Hitzigrath, Kontinentalsperre, 6 and 11. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 44. Ibid., 34. Panzac, Corsaires, 259–292; Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 34–35. In this context, in 1836 consulates were created in Marseille and in Trieste.

69

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport table 2-4 Annual average of direct departures from Hamburg to non-European destinations, 1816–1840a

North America Central America, Caribbean South America West Africa, Cape, and China

1816–20

1821–25

1826–30

1831–35

1836–40

40 52 32 12

42 68 99 12

40 93 97 11

50 112 105 15

52 125 142 12

a von Halle, Amerika, 14; Arfs, Hamburg, 156 (Fig. 4).

The vast increase of departures to South America81 and the Caribbean is most exceptional and in the main was attributed to substantial trade relations with Brazil and Cuba.82 As discussed already for trade, the relatively meagre number of vessels bound for Africa,83 the Indian Ocean, and East Asia84 was caused by British dominance and Dutch activities in these spheres. Yet the number of voyages to North America, which in the beginning of Hamburg’s direct intercontinental trade made up a rather high portion, was languishing. By the mid-nineteenth century, North America became the first among non-European target regions to adopt the decisive technical innovation, the transition from wind- to (wind-and-)steam-powered navigation. In the 1820s steam-powered navigation was at an early stage and even tended to lose ground. “One of the main obstacles in the development of steam-powered navigation undoubtedly was the poor condition of the Elbe, which caused many unwelcome delays.”85 As late as 1825, Hamburg’s merchant fleet maintained two steam-powered vessels (see Table 2-3). Twenty years later, 26 such vessels regularly made the voyage to London, Amsterdam, Hull, and – since 1835 – Le Havre as well. Services established in the 1830s to Leith, Newcastle, Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Dunkirk were of limited duration. In 1847 projects for steam liners to Tönning and Gothenburg were conceived but never realised. The year after, the first German steam line to London was put into operation.86 In 1847, the era of 81 82 83 84 85 86

For a later perspective, cf. Behrens, Grundlagen. For the east coast of South America, see Kellenbenz, “Shipowners”. Cf. Jantzen, “Hamburg”. See Kresse, “Ostwärts Kapstadt”; Baasch, “Anfänge,” 94. Idem, Hamburgs Handel, 36. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 35; idem, “Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft”.

70

chapter 2

graph 2-9 Steam-powered vessels in Hamburg and their voyages, 1838–1852 Source: SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599, Nr. 14,1 rot: Statistische Notizen in Bezug auf die Tragfähigkeit der hamburgischen Schiffe sowie der in Hamburg angekommenen Seeschiffe etc. während der Jahre 1841 bis 1852 – Zunahme des See-Dampfschiffahrts-Verkehrs nach Hamburg.

graph 2-10

Vessels in packet shipping from Hamburg to North America, 1836–1860 Source: SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599, Nr. 46,2 rot, fasc. 1: Statistik betr. Exped[ition] Slomans in der Paketlinie nach New York, Quebec, New Orleans, 1836–71.

Hamburg as a Centre of Maritime Trade and Transport

71

the steam engine had its final breakthrough in Hamburg: founded on 27 May of that year by Hamburg-based shipowners and merchants, the HamburgAmerikanische Paketfahrt-Aktien-Gesellschaft (HAPAG), also known as the Hamburg America Line, organised emigrants’ passage to New York on fast-travelling sailing-ships (since October 1848) and steamships from 1856.87 Between the late 1840s and 1852, the quantity of last of Hamburg steam-powered sailing vessels almost doubled (from 50,000 to about 93,000), and the number of voyages of steam-powered sailing vessels rose from 272 in 1838 to 725 in 1852. According to quantity of last, Hamburg steam-vessels surpassed the number of sailing vessels that arrived the port coming from the North American east coast for the first time in 1858/59.88 About the same time the HAPAG liner service to New York went into operation, other destinations followed when the port of Hamburg was connected with Brazil in 1854;89 Spain was accessible via Southampton and two other individual lines to Antwerp and Liverpool were established. The network of Hamburg’s liner service was further expanded by including Mexico90 and the West Indies, as well as by regular connections to Australia and the Pacific served by sailing vessels offered by companies such as J. C. Godeffroy & Sohn and Ross, Vidal & Co.91 Although the international commercial crisis of 1857 had effects on maritime traffic, they did not persist and were overcome within a short time: The various Hamburg-based sailing-ship liner services, which were established in the years of reconstruction after 1848 and mostly after the Crimean War 1854/56 and heading for destinations in Europe and across the Atlantic but also to Chile and to Australia, suffered by the end of 1857. All of these liner services saw the opportunity to make a good fortune of sending a single one or all of their then abundant sailing vessels to the Far East. In 1853, twenty of the Hamburg vessels sailed the coasts of China; in 1860 that number was doubled and even reached 85 in 1864. An 87 88 89 90 91

Wiedenfeld, Welthäfen, 222; Clapp, Port, 78 and 88; Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 34; Wätjen, Frühzeit, 46–82. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 132. This was the Hamburg-Brasilianische Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft (kept on the Handelsregister since 1855; StAHH, 231–3Bd. 2, B 6259); see also Schramm, “Hamburg”. The Hamburg Vera-Cruz Paketfahrt-Gesellschaft entered the Handelsregister in 1857; StAHH, 231–3Bd. 2, B 6820. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 48. Concerning the merchants’ dynasty Godeffroy see Hertz, Seehandelshaus; concerning the merchant and politician Edgar Daniel Ross (1807–1885) and the family of his mother, the Vidal, see Steinsdorfer, “Ross”.

72

chapter 2

additional 200 sailing vessels from Hamburg on which coal was shipped to Singapore and Hong Kong went on sailing for several ports of call all along the Chinese coast and further embarked on worldwide tramp trade for many years.92 92

Kresse, “Ostwärts Kapstadt,” 104.

chapter 3

Depending on the City’s Commerce – the ‘Regional’ Hamburg Insurance Market in the Eighteenth Century 3.1

Marine Insurance and Convoy Shipping

In contrast to the Netherlands, marine insurance business had not become a sector of commercial activity in any of the Hanse towns until the late sixteenth century. Within the Hanse region, maritime risks were kept at bay by splitting up and loading cargo onto several smaller vessels, comprehensive restrictions on voyages during winter, and a preference to travel in coastal waters or tidal flats whenever the conditions happened to be favourable. Goods traded within this region were less valuable than those handled in the Mediterranean or the Atlantic, and apparently were not yet considered to necessitate insurance. However, in case precious luxury goods were imported via the Netherlands, these at once were insured in Antwerp or Amsterdam. It was only by the late sixteenth century that Hamburg’s marine insurance business grew into a crucial economic factor. This advancement was unfolding almost simultaneously to the expansion of Hamburg’s bill of exchange market1 and was another result of the Dutch and the Portuguese-Sephardic immigration to Hamburg in the wake of the Eighty Years’ War and the Fall of Antwerp in 1585. Three years later, the conclusion of the first marine insurance contract can be verified to have taken place in Hamburg. These immigrants not only considerably increased the city’s capital; even more important, they were knowledgeable in innovative commercial techniques such as marine insurance that they had brought with them to the city by the Elbe. The establishment of an English staple in Hamburg supported this process. Yet, the marine insurance business was firmly in the hands of the Dutch and the Portuguese Sephardim until the 1630s as Dutch-written policies demonstrate, which conformed to the Antwerp commercial usages. Moreover, these policies also prove that until the mid-seventeenth century, cargo insurances for goods and koopmannschappen were predominant – while the hull was left uninsured – as a draft for insurance regulation dating from 1657 shows. For the most part, Hamburg’s private underwriters can be identified as Dutch or 1 Denzel, System des bargeldlosen Zahlungsverkehrs, 169–170 and 206–210.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_005

74

chapter 3

Portuguese. Indeed, when disputes arose between the parties of an insurance contract, one addressed Antwerp-based institutions. A Hamburg court was concerned with ruling in a marine insurance case as late as 1590.2 Hamburg’s underwriters, sole providers of marine insurance throughout the seventeenth and also for part of the eighteenth century,3 seldom subscribed to policies that insured goods worth more than 100 pounds Flemish. Even the city authorities used to conclude insurance contracts in Amsterdam for its convoy ships, as did the Hanseatic merchants if they wished to insure valuable goods. As late as in 1701, 18 such private underwriters were known in Hamburg and there were only six more in 1722. By contrast, in 1720, about 100 insurance brokers ran their business in Amsterdam. Since 1679, no more than 60 Christian and 10 Jewish brokers were active in Hamburg. Hamburg’s dependence from the Amsterdam insurance market was a consequence of being reliant upon Amsterdam credit: as Hamburg merchants frequently sought out credit, Amsterdam-based creditors were concurrently authorized to insure the goods they had credited. In consequence, Hamburg’s insurance market, if the term can be meaningfully applied to the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries at all, lagged behind Amsterdam, and London as well.4 The largest proportion of insurances that were purchased in Hamburg covered voyages to the Iberian Peninsula but also to Norway. However, insurances for voyages in the North Sea, for instance to the Netherlands, were considered rather negligible as vessels used for these were smaller in size and normally sailed near the coast or through tidal flats – if the construction of the watercraft was suitable. In doing so, these vessels could escape the pirates and privateers’ vessels of deeper draught. In general, piracy in this region was curbed by Dutch warships. Conversely, voyages to Hamburg’s principal seventeenth-century commercial partners Spain and Portugal, which chiefly were undertaken by Hamburg merchants, were threatened by more than a single peril. Vessels underway to the Iberian Peninsula were not only exposed to the privateers of Atlantic nations but also to Barbary pirates endangering maritime transport in the Mediterranean, which in turn raised insurance premiums for voyages to these destinations.5 “The insurance of voyages to Spain and Portugal

2 Plaß, Geschichte, 30ff.; Mossner, Rückversicherung, 41; Deggim, Hafenleben, 155; Dreyer, ‘Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung’, 26–27 (with note 7) and 32–33; Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 190. 3 Stritzky, Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure, 10. 4 Cf. Beukemann, “Geschichte,” 447ff. 5 Ibid., 13–15, 20–29, 33–34 and 109–110; Kellenbenz, Sephardim, 269–270; Zwierlein, “Renaissance Anthropologies,” 167–173.

Depending on the City ’ s Commerce

75

constituted the largest and most important category of Hamburg’s insurance business that overshadowed any other.”6 In addition to the numerous naval wars fought by the Atlantic nations England, France, and the Netherlands, the existence of the Barbary pirates was a principal determining factor of the entire insurance business up to the nineteenth century. In 1623, Hamburg’s port authority, the Admiralität, was founded to coordinate various protective measures against the North-African Barbary pirates thriving in the Mediterranean. “During the Thirty Years’ War, trade routes between Mediterranean countries and Northern Europe had translocated from German routes to sea transport passing through the Strait of Gibraltar and the English Channel. This development was utilized by the Janissary dynasties of North-African despotic regimes of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, but also by the rulers of Morocco, to demand tributes in the fashion of tolls levied for the passage of other straits” such as the Sound.7 Efforts by the Hamburg Admiralität to organise more efficient convoy shipping and better armament of vessels eventually came to nothing as other naval powers just had made peace with the Barbary pirates, who instead began to turn their eyes to neutral ports such as Hamburg. Insurance premiums quoted in Hamburg in those times were double or triple the rates of Amsterdam’s in times when the Netherlands were at peace with the Barbary pirates. When a convoy of eight vessels fell victim to the Barbary pirates in 1662, Hamburg’s underwriters were no longer willing to subscribe to insurances for southern destinations, even at the outrageous premiums quoted. In a next step, Hamburg tried to secure voyages to Spain and the Mediterranean, which had been an important affiliation since Hanse times,8 by building convoy ships that were supported by privately owned escort ships to make voyages a little more secure.9 In this so-called convoy system, two warships each escorted a fleet of merchantmen. The question whether a vessel sailed in a convoy became essential to determine the insurance premium rate; in the latter case, the rate could be up to four times as high.10 6 7 8 9

10

Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 29. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 46. Häpke, Spanienfahrt. SHWA Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 1 rot, fasc. 39: Articulus Brieff und Instruction wornach sich unser Bürgermeister und Rath der Stadt Hamburg denen nachher Spanien und der Mittelländischen See gehenden Convardey-Schiffen zur Convoye adjungierte Commandeur, dann auch bestalter Leutnant unter Commandeur und andere Officirer, Soldaten und Matrosen zu richten, Hamburg 1664; Bohn, “Barbaresken,” 147; Ressel, Zwischen Sklavenkassen und Türkenpässen, 99–113. Ibid., 39–41.

76

chapter 3

Nevertheless, the Barbary threat determined Hamburg’s whole trade with Spain and the Mediterranean for the remainder of the seventeenth, and throughout the eighteenth century.11 As piracy, which entailed kidnapping, slave trade, and extortion of ransom, was the Barbary states’12 primary source of revenue,13 European trading nations saw in them the greatest danger to sea travel and maritime trade on this and on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar.14 However, the Levant and the Aegean Islands were also roamed for years by local pirates. As for the latter, piracy was rife during the Greek Revolution in the 1820s, albeit the “Golden Age of Piracy,” designated to the Buccaneers in the Caribbean had ended around the 1730s.15 Since 1690, Hamburg had operated three convoy ships for a good reason: protecting Hamburg’s merchants in the Mediterranean, these ships were altogether equipped with 180 canons and the crews amounted to 600 men. Vessels maintained by a city with a convoy were a more desirable choice to merchants as they gained a commercial advantage in loading them, which lasted up to the War of the Spanish Succession at least.16 While the Northwest European commercial powers abandoned the convoy system after the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 for financial reasons and instead paid tributes to the North African potentates, above all to the Dey17 of Algiers to avoid captivity, Spain fought the ‘enemies of Christianity’ at sea in a protracted petty war. Great Britain, however, furnished annual tribute payments of 40,000 pounds sterling, the Netherlands paid 200,000 guilders from 1726 onwards, and even as late as 1795, the United States paid 225,000 pesos duros. At the same time, the great trade nations instrumentalised the Barbary States to render ineffective unwelcome competition. The Netherlands chose this course as they were not interested in fostering their Hanseatic competitors 11 12

13 14 15 16 17

Cf. Beutin, Seehandel, 59. From the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century, the Maghreb territories between the Atlantic and Egypt, Algiers, Constantine, Tunis, Tripoli, and Barca (modern-day Marj in Libya), as well as the Republic of Bou Regreg established in the Moroccan twin cities Salé and Rabat by the Atlantic were known as the ‘Barbary States’ (derived from ‘Berbers’). Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli formally were Ottoman provinces, but de facto regained independence at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Ressel and Zwierlein, “Ransoming”. Discussed in depth in for example Mössner, Völkerrechtspersönlichkeit; Tinniswood, Pirates; Davis, Slaves; Bono, Piraten. Angster, Erdbeeren, 263–264. Bohn, “Barbaresken,”147–151. In the Barbary State of Algiers, which had been largely independent from the Ottoman Empire since 1711, the title ‘dey’ (in Turkish: dayı) was conferred upon an officer by the Janissaries and corsairs to rule. The High Porte in Constantinople merely confirmed the decision.

Depending on the City ’ s Commerce

77

in the Mediterranean: thus, the Dutch approach was simply that “we should leave this thorn of the Turkish pirates in their [the Hamburg traders’] Side,”18 as Pieter de la Court (1618–1685), a famous Dutch merchant, economist and political philosopher wrote. By the mid-nineteenth century, (almost) all of the seafaring nations had made such treaties with the Barbary pirates – except for the German seaports.19 After 1713, the shipping companies’ business declined significantly as the maritime powers Holland and England, by virtue of the treaties that they had made with the Barbary pirates, were in the position to guarantee a much more secure voyage than travelling with the Hamburg convoy. The resulting loss for the Hamburg insurance business could be balanced by a general rise in trade under foreign flags. In 1734, Hamburg’s merchants informed the city Senate that the convoy was no longer cost-effective, as “local merchants would prefer shipping their cargo on foreign vessels rather than on our own, even if the vessels do travel in convoy.”20 The unwillingness to integrate into a convoy was not only caused by the higher expenses, but was rooted deeply in insurance law: When a shipmaster … did encounter a convoy, he oftentimes was forced to drift from the planned course – and lost the insurance coverage in the process as vessels were only insured on predefined sea routes; any deviance from these rendered the contract void. If the merchant fell prey to an attack despite travelling in a convoy, or he was attacked after he had left the convoy, the merchant himself, the shipowners, and the owners of the merchandise would not receive indemnities for the damage suffered.21 From an insurance law perspective, the loss of shipping documents, as a result of a pirate assault, was an important point, as “the owners of the vessel and those of the cargo were required to prove that the damage indicated to the insurer had actually been suffered.”22 Nevertheless, the trade emporium Hamburg and other Hanse towns were unable to proceed following the Spanish pattern of naval warfare, or conclude a treaty of protection. The former came to nought for lack of instruments of power, while the latter would have clouded the commercial relationship with Spain. After lengthy negotiations, the treaty with 18 19 20 21 22

So Baasch, “Hamburg und Holland,” 54. Bohn, “Barbaresken,” 147–149; Ressel, Zwischen Sklavenkassen und Türkenpässen, 446–462. Bohn, “Barbaresken,” 143; Baasch, Convoyschiffahrt, 54. Cf. Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 66. Angster, Erdbeeren, 270–271. Ibid., 268.

78

chapter 3

Algiers was signed in 1750 and led to a serious trade conflict that was feared to incur massive financial losses for Hamburg’s trade with Spain. For averting exposure to the dangers of practically being forced to resort to coastal trade, i.e. supplying Holland, England, and the Baltic, Hamburg had endeavoured to negotiate a peace treaty with the Barbary states since 1741; about the same time, in 1746, Denmark had succeeded in that matter.23 As late as 1746/47, Hamburg lost 13 vessels that traveled in the first convoy to set out after 1729 and at the same time Hamburg’s last to navigate in the Mediterranean.24 Hamburg-based underwriters acted promptly. After the loss of 1746, insurance premiums for vessels going to, or coming from Portugal and Spain on this side of the Strait of Gibraltar rose to 6 to 7 percent, while premiums for voyages to Málaga, French and Italian Mediterranean seaports increased to 7 to 8 percent; and “underwriters even wanted to insure no voyage farther than to Cádiz.”25 In result of strenuous negotiations, Hamburg and Algiers concluded a treaty on 28 February 1751,26 which did not provide for tribute payments but for the delivery of munitions of war and shipbuilding material. The treaty induced a serious conflict with the main enemy of the Barbary pirates, the king of Spain, who discontinued the relations with Hamburg on 23 October 1751. He further threatened all Hamburg merchants resident in Spain with expulsion from the country; subjects of the Spanish crown in Spain proper and in Spanish America were officially prohibited from trading with Hamburg (albeit trade was resumed in secrecy). For these reasons, Hamburg had to resign from this treaty with Algiers so as to release pressure from the more important trade with Spain, which otherwise was to be taken over by Dutch competitors. Fearing to be compelled to give away the trade with Spain to the Dutch, Hamburg concurred to the breach of the treaty with Algiers, which prompted King Ferdinand VI of Spain (1746–1759) to officially re-establish diplomatic and commercial relations with Hamburg as of 14 November 1752. From then on, trade between Spain and Hamburg could flow without obstructions, but the Hamburg vessels again were exempt from protection from the attacks of the Barbary pirates.27 “Hamburg’s wound inflicted by Barbary privateering would

23 24 25 26 27

Cf. Gøbel, “The Danish Algerian Sea Passes”. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 46. Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 83–84. (cit.: 84). See Panzac, Corsaires, 38–41 and 335–337; the author does not consider this treaty. Baasch, Barbaresken, 29–59; Ressel, Zwischen Sklavenkassen und Türkenpässen, 446–530; Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 20–28. Cf. also idem, “Die diplomatischen und konsularischen Beziehungen”.

Depending on the City ’ s Commerce

79

not heal. In the remaining decades of the eighteenth century, Hamburg-flagged vessels rarely sailed to South European destinations beyond Lisbon.”28 Robert Bohn has argued that this situation coerced Hamburg to act and discover a way of “advantageous re-orientation” that indeed was found by employing Altona’s navigation privileges. Since most trade with Southern Europe was effected on Danish-flagged vessels, local shipping companies started to flourish as a result:29 in 1779, 83 percent of the entire Altona fleet was on Hamburg’s pay roll and the number of Danish vessels active in the trade with Spain increased to the extent that it came close to the Dutch and English vessels. Hamburg shipping companies stopped trading with Southern Europe altogether. Unanimously, Hamburg’s “nautical-mercantile and financial integration” within the French re-export trade with colonial goods set in, contributing to the city’s alignment towards intercontinental trade30 that had been evolving over several decades until being evident in the nineteenth century. In consequence, Hamburg grew into one of the most important transshipment places of goods in Europe. Until 1800, Hamburg’s colonial goods imports rose by approximately 200 percent in contrast to the percentage realized at the beginning of the century.31 Yet, the scope of coerced “advantageous re-orientation” was not limited to an increment of economic importance of Hamburg’s port; it did lead to innovations in the city’s own commercial structure as well.32 The commercial capital became increasingly disconnected from 28

29 30 31 32

Bohn, “Barbaresken,” 150–151. Cf. Baasch, Barbaresken, 1–59 and 62; Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 66, 68, 83; Ressel, Zwischen Sklavenkassen und Türkenpässen, 487–531 and especially 543: “For some centuries, Hamburg and thus Germany was suffering significant losses inflicted by the pirates, in particular since 1726…. Without the corsairs, Hamburg’s trade with Southern Europe would have had flourished more and the city would have had a bigger fleet and many more sailors. However, frequent trade with France and the invigorating effect brought to the city by the introduction of the transit duty in 1727 certainly could offset these losses already in the first half of the eighteenth century.” For example Jestrzemski, Altonas Blütezeit. Bohn, “Barbaresken,” 151. Cf. Kellenbenz, “Deutschland und Spanien,” 19. Bohn, “Barbaresken,” 152. Researchers are currently debating to what extent the Barbary threat could have sparked off a “necessitation to innovate.” In Bohn’s view, “the modern term diversification is fit to describe the situation in which Hamburg had steered when voyages to Southern Europe had been becoming impossible. In this sense, commercial capital gradually becomes separate from shipping, and instead is re-allocated to newer mercantile capital investment. Banking and (marine) insurance, which, by the way, had its roots in an institution set up to pay ransom for captured Hamburg sailors, most prominently joined in this innovative activity” (Bohn, Sklavenkassen, 36). Ressel disagrees: “After 1753, the marine insurance business did not share roots with the Hamburg Sklavenkasse; at best it secured a smallish segment” (Ressel, Zwischen Sklavenkassen und Türkenpässen, 533; cf. Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 57–60), nonetheless, in one aspect Ressel supports Bohn:

80

chapter 3

shipping companies and the marine insurance business. In 1800, Johann Georg Büsch already claimed that this development gathered momentum through the Barbary pirates.33 In defiance of the risks at sea, voyages to the Iberian Peninsula had still been playing the most prominent role in Hamburg’s marine insurance market. As Hamburg upheld close contact with Iberian merchants34 and strongly engaged in commercial activities in Brazil, and the Spanish business with the West Indies; since 1736, the price current indicated insurance premiums for routes to these destinations. Since the second half of the seventeenth century, voyages to England and France became more vital to the marine insurance business. Additionally, there were connections to the Mediterranean, to Norway and Sweden, and since the seventeenth century to Greenland (for whaling and sealing) and to Arkhangelsk. The Hamburg Preiscourant quoted premiums for voyages in the Baltic, to Russia (Saint Petersburg) and Poland (Danzig), as it also considered and expressed in premium rate quotations the trade with the Netherlands (see Table A1-1). For voyages to North German coastal cities in Hamburg’s vicinity, marine insurance generally came into use only since 176235 as insurance cover for rather short and safe voyages had not been regarded a necessity before. Hamburg’s growing intermediary trade, which had been ascending since late seventeenth century, provides the background of these observations: the rise of intermediary trade can be considered a consequence of, firstly, the Franco-Dutch War from 1672 to 1678; secondly, the German states’ expanding export of mainly Silesian canvas to non-European destinations, which was effected via Hamburg; and thirdly, the War of the Polish Succession (1733–1735/38), which had led to an unprecedented surge in the trade of French colonial products and French wine in Hamburg.36 Hereby, the quotations for the destinations of the Atlantic trade area became the most diversified in the Preiscourant, incorporating a great variety of individual ports and coastal regions. By contrast, the Mediterranean trade area was subdivided in only two destinations for which premiums were quoted: firstly, the western Mediterranean stretching from Spain’s and France’s coasts to Italy; and secondly, the Adriatic including the Ionian Islands. In the Baltic trade area,

33 34 35 36

“From the perspective of economic history, the unsolved Barbary question drove important modernization of Hamburg’s and Altona’s trade system. As of now, this statement is nothing more than a probable hypothesis and hence the debate remains open” (ibid., 544) Without doubt, the author’s last statement is utterly correct. Büsch, Sämtliche Schriften; see also Tonnies, Merkantilistisch-geschichtliche Darstellung. Cf. Weber, Deutsche Kaufleute. Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 47–50. Büsch, Handlung, 72, 87–90 and 98–102.

Depending on the City ’ s Commerce

map 3-1

81

Premium quotations for destinations in Hamburg’s maritime trade, 1736–1762 © Markus A. Denzel and Christoph Streng, 2020. – Source: Table 1 in Appendix 1

the geographic proximity to the Sound was the decisive factor for defining destinations: Poland, Prussia, and Sweden were defined as destinations in medium range, whereas the eastern region, the Gulf of Finland, was a farther-off destination. The classification of destinations in the Mediterranean and in the Baltic allowed broader strokes than for the Atlantic coast, which signifies the latter’s more important position in Hamburg’s marine insurance business.

82

map 3-2

chapter 3

Premium quotations for destinations in Hamburg’s maritime trade, 1762–1820 © Markus A. Denzel and Christoph Streng, 2020. – Source: Table 2 in Appendix 1

In 1762, the Hamburg insurance price current was not only extended, but individual destinations appeared in more defined detail (see Table A1-2); it retained its (original) form until 1820. The only major addition entered this list in 1804 as an outcome of the onset of Hamburg’s direct transatlantic trade: Saint Thomas, a Danish possession in the Caribbean, and the Atlantic ports of the young United States of America formed the first American destination. Until then, insurance premiums had only been quoted for voyages from and to non-European ports of departure and destination operated by Europe’s trading nations that held possessions in the Americas or in the Pacific. Therefore, the Hamburg insurance price current (since 1836) listed premium rates for voyages between Portugal and Brazil as well as between Spain and the West Indies (“West-Indien”). In 1762, premiums for sea routes that connected Portugal with Copenhagen and Gothenburg, as well as those for a connection between

Depending on the City ’ s Commerce

83

Trieste and East India (“Ost-Indien”) could be retrieved from the price current. In 1782, voyages from Copenhagen to Saint Thomas were added; next to Trieste, Leghorn was added as European port for voyages to East India. These seven quotations were upheld until 1820. 3.2

Juridical Bases of the Hamburg Marine Insurance Business

In its early days, Hamburg’s marine insurance business relied on legal foundations that Dutch immigrants had brought to, and also practiced in, their new domicile. Following the example of several Dutch cities, a plan was conceived for the establishment of a chamber of insurance (Assekuranzkammer) in 1611. Since these efforts lead nowhere, after 1623, disputes arising from matters of marine insurance (but not of maritime trade!) were delegated to the Admiralität.37 Throughout the seventeenth century, statutory regulation of insurance law was omitted, which had not even been part of the Hanseatische Seerecht of 1614 (Marine Law of the Hanse Towns) either. Against this backdrop of non-regulation, the Hamburg merchants opted to settle disputes in front of an arbitration board composed of knowledgeable colleagues, who intermediated between the parties in accordance with traditional customary law, a function that these merchants found represent in the Admiralität, rather than appearing in front of the inexpert general jurisdiction of the city authorities. “Thus, the merchants’ needs concerning insurance were met by non-settlement. When in doubt, the honourable men might have consulted the well-known Dutch laws anyway.”38 Nevertheless, as insurance disputes amassed efforts to establish a chamber of insurance with an Assekuranzordnung (insurance ordinance) that was modeled on the Dutch institution revived in the 1650s. Yet, neither the 1657 draft of the insurance ordinance (Artikell und Ordinantie eines Erbaren Rhates der Stadt Hamburgk, weghen der aßurantie uff vorgende policie) eventually was enacted, nor did a chamber of insurance come into being.39 Even though the intention to devise insurance legislation was revisited in 1674, a series of settlements between the underwriters was the only outcome, perhaps a result of the diminishing threat of the Barbary pirates in the 1670s. These settlements were informal, written agreements valid within a given time, and tackled insurance law related problems that required a solution. The earliest of these settlements dates from 29 December 1677; it was first prolonged 37 38 39

Frentz, Admiralitätsgericht; Scherner, “Konfliktlösung,” 132–136. Dreyer, ‘Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung’, 40–41. Cf. Kadens, “Myth”. For details Dreyer, ‘Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung’, 41–50.

84

chapter 3

on 16 December 1679, and for a second time on 15 May 1683. After a longer interruption, the settlement was renewed on 3 January 1687 (with effect as of 1 March that year), then again on 9 February 1697, and on 22 December 1705 (with effect as of 1 February 1705) whereby provisions were slightly modified from time to time. On the one side, these settlements illustrate the fact that the practice of collective underwriting of insurance policies made constant and binding arrangements mandatory, on the other, the settlements demonstrated that “binding guidelines were adequate for underwriters … to adjust the Dutch insurance law, which had been recognized by customary law, to Hamburg’s insurance situation.”40 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Barbary pirates imperilled maritime travel once more, while the number of convoys fell, stimulating Hamburg’s and Amsterdam’s insurance businesses. Although the establishment of a joint-stock insurance company failed in 1720 (see below), the increasing number of disputes settled by the Admiralität, made the necessity of binding insurance law more obvious, if the positive development of Hamburg’s maritime trade should not be jeopardised. On 10 July 1722, Heinrich Langenbeck (1668–1729), a lawyer and underwriter, submitted a preliminary draft of an Assecurance- und Havarey-Ordnung (insurance and average order) to the Commerz-Deputation, which was to become the basis for further proceedings including the draft of 4 September 1724 and finally the Assekuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung41 enacted in 1731. The sources of law from which the ordinance was derived were mostly exceptional. It was not only based on the Dutch legal tradition, embodied in the Amsterdam Ordinance of 1598 and the settlements of Hamburg underwriters but also on the Ordonnance touchant la marine du mois d’août 1681 enacted by Louis XIV, which has been attributed as an innovative instrument in the progress of sea law.42 Thus, the jurisprudential reception of the new French marine insurance law was not a mere reaction to France’s increasing relevance in Hamburg’s trade; it was, at the same time, substantial to the renewal and modernisation of customary marine insurance law. The Assekuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung of 1731 constituted the legal basis for the further development of Hamburg’s marine insurance business and the economic boom in maritime trade and transport that was yet to come. 40 41

42

Ibid., 65; for the particularities of these settlements see ibid., 51–64. Der Stadt Hamburg Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung [1731]. Also in: SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/185: Langenbeck, Anmerckungen über das Hamburgische Schiff- und See-Recht [1727]. Cf. ibid., S/1093: Magens, Versuch über Assecuranzen, Havereyen und Bodmereyen insgemein [1753]. Described detailed in Dreyer, ‘Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung’, 66–114.

Depending on the City ’ s Commerce

85

The ordinance of 1731 put an end to insurance law provisions (formerly) being absent from the Hanseatische Seerecht of 1614, in as much as it was the capstone of earlier efforts to create such legislation that had begun in the second half of the seventeenth century. This particular piece of legislation “was the first to regulate any legal relationship within the ambit of marine insurance.”43 In doing so, these two legal institutions, marine insurance and compensation for loss,44 which had previously existed independently from one another, were interrelated by “the possibility of indemnity payments for a part of the damages incurred during the occurrence of an average.”45 This being said, a detailed account on each provision is not offered, but the key contents of the ordinance are pertinent to note. Insurance law recognised convoy shipping for the first time and the ordinance was the first legal text, which, in elaboration of French law, defined particular average.46 Moreover, the ordinance allowed for insuring anticipated profits and made life insurance accessible. In addition, seven different policy forms were devised in German language for insurance on hull,47 cargo, and freight charges, bottomry, the voyage to Greenland (Grönlandfahrt) and fishery insurance, life insurance, and

43 44

45 46 47

Ibid., 205. In the German commercial code, the German Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) the processing of pecuniary claims arising from sea damage (Havarie) is termed average (Haverei). Until a major adaption towards international law effective as of 25 April 2013, the HGB recognized (1) general average (Große or Allgemeine Haverei, Avarie grosse or extraordinaire) that takes place when a vessel or her passengers are in a dangerous situation and the master thus decides to intentionally damage vessel or cargo in order to preserve the vessel, its crew, and the cargo from a common peril. Permitted measures include throwing cargo overboard (a procedure known as jettison, which traditionally had been a part of European maritime laws since the lex Rhodia de iactu dating back to the third century BC), lightering of cargo, intentional stranding of the vessel, or defence from pirates. The rescue attempt must be successful to be assessed a general average. (2) Petty or ordinary average (Kleine or ordinäre Haverei, Avarie ordinaire) that included all additional expenses of maritime travel not fixed in the contract and to be jointly borne by the contracting parties such as pilotage, port charges, light dues, towage, costs for quarantine and digging out vessels of ice. Petty and particular average (see footnote 44) are omitted from the HGB as of 25 April 2013. Cf. Lau, Seehandelsrecht, 216–235; Cordes, “Seerecht,” 67–72. Dreyer, ‘Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung’, 115. Until 25 April 2013, particular average (Besondere or Privat-Haverei, Avarie particulière) covered all expenses for damages that are not part of great average and are not extra expenses of the freight. For an example of such a policy on commodities according to which in case of loss individual members of a group of underwriters were held liable for different sums, see Plaß, Geschichte: ‘Drei Seeversicherungs-Policen in Facsimile’.

86

chapter 3

insurance against the Turkish threat and of land carriage.48 Above all, the ordinance introduced the novelty that was full cover insurance, “which has been without parallel in other European sea laws. The relinquishment of having to take own risk has been a critical step in the development of insurance law … the former tool of trade has become a business in its own right.”49 Full cover insurance, which had its legal basis in the Hamburg marine insurance law, became a crucial, even decisive structural advantage for the further advancement of Hamburg’s marine insurance market in all of Northern Europe. Overall, the Hamburg ordinance of 1731 was a “formidable example of lawmaking.”50 By virtue of its many innovations, the insurance ordinance of 1731 was “seminal” for later ordinances in Northern Europe, particularly so for the Ordonnantie van Asseurantie en Avaryen of Amsterdam of 10 March 1744, the Kongl. Maj’st Försäkrings- och Hafweri-Stadga gifwen Stockholm i Räd-Cammaren then 2 October 1750 and the Assekuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung für sämtliche Köngl. Preußl. Staaten of 18 February 1766. Key provisions of the Hamburg ordinance of 1731 also entered the Allgemeine Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten of 1794, the Code de Commerce, the Allgemeine Deutsche Handelsgesetzbuch of 1861 and the Handelsgesetzbuch of 1897.51 Initial efforts to reform the ordinance of 1731 already began in 1747 and dragged on until 1769. With the 1765 advent of numerous joint-stock marine insurance companies, which laid down their organization, terms and conditions whereby they would effect a policy in their own charters (the so-called Pläne), complementary reform attempts were rendered obsolete as these charters gradually filled in the ordinance’s blank spaces. As time went on, the continually declining number of Hamburg’s private underwriters joined one or another Plan of such an insurance company. Since these Pläne tended to become more mutually incompatible overtime, insurers reacted with unease and feared that in the long run this situation was potentially dangerous for the Hamburg insurance market. Merchants and insurers thus consented to the “Bedingungen von 1800”, which were made known by the end of 1799 and intended to be the only valid charter.52

48 49 50 51 52

Described in detail in Dreyer, ‘Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung’, 115–197. Ibid., 123. Ibid., 215. Ibid., 204–213; Stritzky, Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure, 24. Ibid., 16f.; Dreyer, ‘Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung’, 202.

Depending on the City ’ s Commerce

3.3

87

The Hamburg Marine Insurance Market as “Centre of the Whole North”53

The Hamburg insurance market started to boom after the Seven Years’ War, which has been ascribed to the growth of transatlantic trade in the first place, and to a minor degree to the trade with East India. Yet, for contemporaries and the subsequent generation this development was the beginning of “a wholly new era” of Hamburg’s marine insurance business, as Büsch stated in 1797.54 Since 1762, the Hamburg price current listed insurance premiums for voyages from Portugal, Emden, Gothenburg, and Copenhagen to India; and for the first time, premiums were quoted for voyages along the adjacent North Sea coast (Jutland, Friesland, Bremen, and the river Eider). The expansion of the Hamburg insurance business was substantiated by the Assekuranz-Compagnie für Seerisiko,55 a joint-stock insurance company founded in 1765, which was matched by the foundation of such a company in Trieste around the same time in 1764/65 and followed by similar institutions set up in Emden (1768),56 Bremen (1769), and Lübeck. Ensuing the surge in the number of insurance companies founded in the Northwest European financial centres, in Hamburg there had been attempts to establish a joint-stock insurance company as early as 1720. Hamburg merchants wanted to shake off their dependence from the Amsterdam insurance market. The establishment of a joint-stock company had ultimately failed because of the Senate’s indifference and perhaps because of a skeptical opinion of this particular form of business organisation, as the impressions from the burst speculative bubbles in France in England were still fresh.57 After the 1765 establishment, which was conceived following the Dutch archetype, other insurance companies were to be formed in 1779 and 1782; these became quite numerous especially in late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The first Hamburg insurance company was the outcome of the commercial crisis of 1763 that had many underwriters plunge into bankruptcy. Since those events, Hamburg merchants and shipowners preferred “to insure in Hamburg; transfer of finance was processed by Hamburg banks instead of Amsterdam institutions, which resulted in an influx of foreign 53 54 55 56 57

Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 51. Büsch, Handlung, 109. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/420, fasc. 1: Einrichtung und Ordnung der Assecuranzcompagnie 1765. Emden’s first insurance company of 1768 was followed by another two in 1783 that were supported by local merchants. Müller, “Emdens Schiffahrt,” 108. Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 36–39, 43–46; Amsinck, Assecuranz-Compagnien.

88

chapter 3

capital. Thus, Hamburg not only became Europe’s central market but also the most important place for banking and insurance, next to London.”58 This insurance company facilitated insuring higher values,59 which promoted the entry of Hamburg’s shipowners into the transatlantic trade.60 Concerning the first establishment, Büsch comments as follows: In the year of 1765, the first insurance company had been established in Hamburg for the proliferation of the local trade business. Up to that year, this city had had many underwriters. However, partly their prudence forbade them to subscribe to large [insurance] sums on individual vessels, and partly their sources of credit might have been insufficient to do so. Thus, not all insurance sums could possibly be covered, rather foreign correspondents were commissioned than [local] underwriters were addressed. These insurance [commissions] therefore went to London, and to Amsterdam, where insurers were far more numerous just as were the inhabitants of that area, especially in Zaanredam. Since this institution, which then was new, found imitators so plenty that as of now there are seven of those companies, all of which authorize their representatives to subscribe to a sum up to 30,000 Mk. on each vessel, there is hardly a policy traded in the Hamburg stock exchange that is too expensive either for these companies or for the many underwriters. The Hamburg merchant thereby accrues profits as he justly acts as commission agent for insurance-seeking parties in Amsterdam, London, and elsewhere. Upon [the consignor’s request], he assumes del credere liability if the insurer becomes destitute.61 At the same time, an early kind of re-insurance was introduced as stipulated by the ordinance of 1731.62 However, the conclusion of such a contract bore high risks for insurers, since in 1783 re-insurers had to accept the responsibility for an insolvent company and two others that were on the verge of insolvency, as Büsch points out. In Hamburg, insurance business as such was risky per se, as Danish wrecking laws were applied along the banks of the Elbe. In this case, an

58 59 60 61 62

Bohn, “Barbaresken,” 152. Grasmeyer, Geschichtliche Wahrnehmungen, 18: “The modest sums private underwriters of that time dared to invest were insufficient to cover for all ventures at any time.” Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 51–56. Büsch, Handlung, 150–152. Dreyer, ‘Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung’, 173–175.

Depending on the City ’ s Commerce

89

insurer had to assume that a third of the salvaged goods were lost to the wreckers, and also the Royal Danish Chamber collected another third.63 The decisive institutional foundation of the expansion of the insurance business in the wake of the Hamburg ship-owner’s entry to the transatlantic trade after the start of the American War of Independence (1775–1783) was thus laid. The nexus of war and Hamburg’s neutral flag “[undermined] the credit of the large Dutch and French insurance markets … and [brought] foreign insurance commissions to the Hamburg market in numbers then unknown.”64 At the request of the Hamburg merchants, the premiums quoted in the Preiscourant were therefore diversified in 1782, since the city’s insurers increasingly offered insurance coverage for voyages starting from other trading places such as in the Danish, Swedish, Prussian, Austrian, and Portuguese trade with India; or from Amsterdam, London, Ostend, Bordeaux, Arkhangelsk, and from the Mediterranean (see Tables A1-6, A1-7 and A1-8). For safeguarding maritime traffic in the Baltic, Lübeck used to acquire insurance services in the Hamburg market (see Table A1-5), as the progress of its own insurance exchange was inadequate to meet demand. Even though during the eighteenth century insurance markets started to emerge in other Baltic ports, those were confined to their locality or region at best (see Table A1-6). So, the expansion of the insurance market after the establishment of the first joint-stock marine insurance companies in the 1760s brought a fundamental change: The proportion of voyages starting in other commercial centres than Hamburg for which Hamburg insurers provided insurance contracts rose continually.65 The business of Hamburg’s insurers increasingly demerged from the import and export trade undertaken by Hamburg’s merchants. The late eighteenth century witnessed a boom in Hamburg’s shipping companies: shipowners and masters, who of course did not exclusively answer to Hamburg’s trade-related demands, seized every income opportunity that was at hand; and all of these voyages had to be insured. In this process, Hamburg’s marine insurance market developed into a market of an overall European dimension and relevancy. The establishment of joint-stock insurance companies produced a new profession of authorised representatives, the Bevollmächtigte: “[T]he directorate of the insurance company, which is similar to a modern-day supervisory board, advised a trusted person or company to cover for insurance contracts 63 64 65

Büsch, Handlung, 152, 155. Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 51–55 (cit. 55). The insurance markets of Denmark and Sweden showed quite a similar development; Thomsen, “Dänemark,” 443; Söderberg, Försäkringsväsendets historia; Petersson, Swedish Marine Insurance, 42–43.

90

chapter 3

en lieu of the insurance company.”66 Since the 1780s, private underwriters and the authorised representatives of the insurance companies started to harmonise their business procedures: on the occasion of a broker’s bankruptcy in 1784, both groups agreed that in the future the validity of an insurance contract was dependent only from the payment of the premium to the insurer, and not to the broker. Hamburg’s merchants complained to the Commerz-Deputation, ruling that the decision rested with the insurer whether or not he was prepared to subscribe to an insurance contract; this was anything that could be imposed by the city authorities. In 1790, both groups of insurers acted together against their Bremen competitors. When in reaction to the French continental system Great Britain decided that any vessel that had formerly sailed under the French or the Dutch flag did not lose her quality as an enemy vessel even if she was sold to Hamburg and flew the city flag, Hamburg’s private underwriters and authorised representatives declared that they would not insure under any other terms and conditions than those of the See-Assecuranz-Compagnie, a maritime insurance company founded in 1782. A complex set of difficulties urged underwriters and authorised representatives to call for joint action: the perpetuated international conflict at sea, Hamburg’s politics oscillating between Great Britain and France (with a keen interest in repelling neither), and the serious threat of neutral property by English vessels caused them to unite in the Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure (society of Hamburg insurers) on 3 April 1797 in which a group of shipowners, who acted as underwriters as well, made the principal decisions. In the nineteenth century, this institution would be concerned with the repercussions of technical progress in shipbuilding for the marine insurance business.67 The late eighteenth century is characterised by at least a partial reduction of risk for the insurer, which can be attributed to three novelties that shaped the insurance business. First, insurance companies installed agents or commission merchants in the top foreign trading places, who in case an average had occurred credited money and thus rendered the costly bottomry loans obsolete, which until then were at the charge of the Hamburg insurers. Second, the transmission of ship news was accelerated through publication in relevant journals and public displays. Lastly, in 1764/65 a ship classification register was

66 67

Stritzky, Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure, 10. Ibid., 10–14; Plaß, Geschichte, 541ff. The documents in StAHH, 613–3/94, Nr. 1–4: Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure von 1797, cover only the time from 1897 to the 1958 winding-up.

Depending on the City ’ s Commerce

91

introduced, which modelled after that of the Society of Lloyd’s in London, gave information about the vessels’ condition and equipment.68 Hamburg’s insurance business was exposed to strong competition by other Northwest European markets after 1783. However, with the outbreak of war in 1793 and by virtue of Hamburg’s neutrality, the Northwest European insurance business again concentrated at the Elbe, as the financial market in French-occupied Amsterdam was inaccessible.69 This recurring boom of the insurance business gave rise to the creation of several new insurance companies. As of 1806, 36 joint-stock insurance companies existed; 12 had been in business in 1802. In addition, there were 11 private underwriters and several agencies from foreign companies: “Perhaps the insurance business had grown into the main branch of the local stock exchange.”70 68 69 70

Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 60–64. “Hamburg managed to break free from Amsterdam’s dominance only after the 1795 occupation of the Netherlands”; Ressel, Zwischen Sklavenkassen und Türkenpässen, 533, with reference to Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 57–60. Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 56–59 (cit. 58).

chapter 4

A Business of Its Own – the ‘Global’ Hamburg Insurance Market in the Nineteenth Century 4.1

The Changing Basic Conditions in International Shipping

The nineteenth century saw enormous technical improvements and innovation, which substantially lowered the risks in international maritime trade and passenger transport, and had a positive impact on marine insurance premium rates, which tended to decline. To begin with, the following risk-mitigating factors contributed to this development: first, the advanced ship maintenance and repair in dry and floating docks equipped with mechanic contrivances and machines; second, the seaport construction and deepening of waterways; third, the start of meteorology as a science;1 fourth, the revised training for prospect sailors; and finally, enhanced communications initially by means of optical telegraphy, then by electromagnetic and still later by wireless telegraphy. From the perspective of communication, telegraphy, which in its early days genuinely denoted the conveyance of information by visual signals, turned out to be a decisive innovation that in the long term boosted Hamburg’s marine insurance business.2 In 1836, the merchant and manufacturer Johann Ludwig Schmidt from Altona established the first privately owned telegraph line that until its termination on 19 August 1849 ran from Hamburg to Cuxhaven, passing through Altona, Stade, and Otterndorf. The system comprised of flagpoles (semaphores) and each carried an array of movable mechanical elements. The information encoded in the position of these elements were passed on to the semaphore next in line.3 To transmit shipping news gathered by a ship reporting service, this semaphore line was installed along the Lower Elbe. However, the Commerz-Deputation would not see beyond the new system’s disadvantages as “news of a sunken vessel will only relieve the insurer of payment of loss, placing the burden upon the individual merchant.” In addition, the Commerz-Deputation was anxious that growing uncertainty in the business would likely result in hesitation to provide insurance, as “insurance contracts

1 Gehler and Brandes, “Meteorologie”. 2 Cf. Wobring, Telekommunikation. 3 Wessel, “Telegrafenlinie,” 206–208.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_006

A Business of Its Own

93

would be executed but with trepidation for one cannot know whether the news of the arrival of a vessel have already been reported or not.”4 After all, the technology had already found wide acceptance around 1840, specifically after the Great Fire of 1842, during which the Hamburg semaphore line was used extensively. On 15 October 1848, the electromagnetic telegraph of the Elektro-Magnetische Telegraphen-Compagnie came into operation.5 Nevertheless, for the time covered in the present study, the analysis of historical sources does not yet purport the notion that telegraphy had had any immediate effect on the eventual decline of insurance premiums. Overall improved access to information had become a key piece of the framework of marine insurance business. In order to collect information that is more exact on the vessels to be insured, a ship register6 was compiled on the model used by the Society of Lloyd’s in London. Since around 1800, the Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure kept such register that classed the vessels of Hamburg’s shipowners according to these criteria: – Class A.1: best vessels accurately constructed from oak timbers, not older than four years; – Class A.2: well-preserved vessels constructed from oak timbers and well-built vessels of pine timbers, between two and four years of age; – Class A.B.1: vessels in good condition, constructed from oak timbers, of more than nine years of age, and vessels in good condition constructed from pine timbers, of more than four years of age; – Class A.B.2: vessels in worn condition, of faulty or lightweight construction, in need of repair due to age and poor maintenance. Early in the 1820s, ship surveys and the management of the process apparently intensified. Marine surveyors conducted these inspections on behalf of the Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure until they were directly employed with it in 1825. The reports of the surveys entered the register and were made accessible to its members. Despite shipowners complained about this in 1823, the practice remained unchanged as to make maritime cargo shipping as secure as possible. The Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure and Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping signed an agreement for the interchange of ship registers as to learn about the partner’s vessels in 1836. An analogous agreement was concluded with Bremen and Lübeck in 1841. In 1862, the Verein Hamburger 4 Cit. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 36. Cf. Stritzky, Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure, 31. 5 Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 37. 6 Ship classification denotes expert assessment of “the quality of a vessel based on the components’ sturdiness, state of maintenance, and the condition of vessel equipment”; Torner, Schiffsklassifikation, 633.

94

chapter 4

Assecuradeure acquired the ship register of the Bureau Veritas, a company, which had been established in Antwerp in 1828 and was relocated to Paris four years later.7 In Northern Europe, information about the vessels to be laden with cargo and to be insured therefore became more transparent. However, not just intensified marine surveying but also technical progress in ship construction had lasting effects on security while travelling the oceans. The following innovations may be considered fundamental in nineteenth-century shipbuilding:8 the first innovation was the step-by-step adoption of iron in shipbuilding, which in the beginning was exclusively used for interior elements (frames, keel, and deck beams). Full-iron vessels replaced this composite construction until the advent of steel vessels in the 1880s.9 In a long-term perspective, this innovation reduced the vessels’ degree of exposure to natural hazards. At the same time, risk increased as higher volume of maritime traffic, faulty ship design, and human error had the potential of heightened impact on iron and steel vessels than on traditional wooden vessels.10 The introduction of the steam engine was the second innovation: its gradual improvement resulted in higher speed11 and thus shortened travelling time, although this technology was deemed utterly dangerous at first. A breakout of fire aboard caused by boiler fire and boiler explosion, leaving the vessel disabled in case of engine failure and absence of sails, made steam-powered sailing vessels appear the more attractive type for many a decade to come. Most importantly, insurers charged higher premiums for steam vessels than for sailing vessels.12 Since the 1850s, steam vessels travelled on a growing number of newly established passenger liner services, depriving sailing vessels of their former rank. The overall trend to accelerate sea travel did not stop short of wind-powered cargo shipping, which for some more decades managed to assert its position. Steam vessels were, however, at a disadvantage over sailing vessels as the engine and the coal to keep the engine running took up space for

7 8 9 10 11 12

Stritzky, Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure, 24–25 and 30; Plaß, Geschichte, 446; Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 99. See Meyer, Wechselbeziehungen, 13 and 27–32. Neudeck; Schulz and Blochmann, Schiffbau, part I, 65; von Liebig, Seeversicherung, 192; Ulrich, “Schiffbautechnik,” 3; Walle, “Seeverkehrswesen,” 75. Torner, Schiffsklassifikation, 632. Schües, Geschichte, 41–42. – For more information on improvement of the steam engine used in shipbuilding see Laeisz, Technik. Already in the eighteenth century, time management in navigation had improved considerably; Pourchasse, “Temps”.

A Business of Its Own

95

storing goods. Moreover, shipping under sail profited from coal transport for steam liners.13 Last, but not least, the replacement of paddle-wheel propulsion by the ship’s propeller developed in 1827 may be seen as the third and perhaps decisive innovation. Such ship’s propellers were used in practice only after 1845.14 And vessels generally increased in size and draught, which added to the risk of stranding. Since insurers had not yet observed anything of empirical value concerning the newly invented special purpose vessels, they were unable to fathom the risk they would assume when insuring those.15 Furthermore, the ongoing technical progress incurred higher costs of ship maintenance having in turn a negative effect on the development of the premium rates. However, in his Berichte über das See-Assecuranz-Geschäft, the authorised representative of the Neue 8. Assecuranz-Compagnie in Hamburg, Otto Christian Gaedechens, paints a much brighter picture of insuring steam-powered vessels:16 Expanding year after year, steam navigation has fared fortunate this year and insurance for steamships has been a favorite among the concluded marine insurance contracts. Thereupon, the elimination of differences in the premium rates was bound to happen: whether the voyages were taking two or four days did not make a difference; [premiums covering voyages to] London and St Petersburg, Amsterdam and Havre were subscribed to at a ¼ percent rate. For instance, journeys to Hull could be insured at low premiums: ¼ percent was the steamer rate, while the rate for sailing vessels was 5/16 percent,17 so that sail was slightly more expensive than steam. For 1842, Gaedechens reports that premiums for steamers, or more precisely, steam-powered sailing vessels, i.e. sailing vessels with auxiliary steam propulsion, were much lower than premiums for pure sailing vessels were. According to Gaedechens, premium rates for voyages to South America on steam vessels were quoted at ¼ percent, whereas rates for voyages to Brazil and Buenos Aires were usually quoted at 1 ¼ and 1 ½ percent, respectively. “However, it was not possible to convince 13 14 15 16 17

Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 193; Gerstenberger and Welke, Sozialgeschichte, 104. Cf. “Great-Britain und Napoléon”. Herzog, Transport-Versicherung, 110. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger SeeAssecuranz-Geschäft des Jahres … von O. C. Gaedechens, 1835–1852 – … des Jahres 1837, fol. 10. Ibid., fol. 9.

96

chapter 4

all authorised representatives to take part in this arrangement.”18 It is unclear if this finding, that is, a reduction of insurance costs for vessels with (auxiliary) steam propulsion, can be generalised. Indicated in the Berichte that only some insurers offered low-cost insurance might be a token of differences in risk assessment. Anyhow, Gaedechens repeatedly stresses the fact that insurances for steam vessels or steam-powered sailing vessels rose markedly from the second half of the 1830s.19 Thus, it should be stated that advancement in technology did not just mitigate risks, which tended to cut premium rates. In a period of transition, however, the potential risk increased which could, but was not determined to, contribute to rising premium rates. Specifically, the use of steam power fueled mistrust among insurers, and as terms and conditions demonstrate, steam vessels were not subjected to any relevant regulation prior to the 1850s. Steam power was an accepted norm as late as in the 1860s, at least in the eyes of Hamburg’s insurers. 4.2

The Business of (Joint-Stock) Marine Insurance Companies in Hamburg

In the nineteenth century, Europe’s marine insurance business largely was in the hands of joint-stock insurance companies. Their portion in total revenue increased considerably in the course of the nineteenth century, whereas private underwriters lost ground. In 1836, private underwriters secured 18.3 percent of the (annual) total sum insured, after deduction of “Ristorno und Rückgaben” (cancelled insurance contracts and other refunds); throughout the 1840s, the percentages were clearly below 10, or even 5 percent.20

18 19 20

Ibid., … des Jahres 1842, without fol. Ibid., … des Jahres 1835, fol. 1–2; … des Jahres 1838, fol. 8. The Bremen figures were almost identical. In 1858, the annual total sum insured was 65.47 million Louis d’ors. Of this sum, participants in the marine insurance market scored the following percentages: 76.3 percent by local Bremen joint-stock companies, 4.6 percent by local private underwriters, 17.1 percent by local agencies of other German insurance companies, 2 percent by local agencies of foreign-county insurance companies; Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 212.

97

A Business of Its Own

graph 4-1 The sales at the Hamburg marine insurance market, 1836–1848 Source: Tabellarische Übersichten … 1853 [1854], 130; SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger See-AssecuranzGeschäft des Jahres … von O. C. Gaedechens, 1835–1852 … des Jahres 1835, fol. 13–14. table 4-1 Hamburg marine insurance companies in 1823a

Zweite Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1821 Fünfte Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1819 Siebente Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1816 Zweite See- und Feuer-Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1821 Vierte Assecuranz-Societät von 1815 Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1815 Dritte See-Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1815 Assecuranz-Gesellschaft von 1815

Capital insured

Premiums collected

586,000 2,719,000 2,722,000 4,531,000 2,177,000 11,847,000 4,142,000 2,042,000

15,100 80,600 77,800 103,600 58,600 242,000 89,200 58,900

a Tonnies, Chronik … im Jahr 1824 [1825], 137. – In addition, the Wasser Assekuranzcompagnie provided insurance for river navigation. In 1823, the company charged ⅛ percent for insuring upscale commodities on the Elbe from Magdeburg to Meissen, Dresden and Pirna; and ⅙ percent to Niedergrund (Dolní Grunt, since 1948 Dolní Žleb) in Bohemia which was famous for its sandstone (since 1980 the village is part of Děčín/Tetschen); SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 87 rot, fasc. 8: Bekanntmachung der Wasser Assekuranzcompagnie, 1823, betr. Assekuranzprämien.

98

chapter 4

table 4-1 Hamburg marine insurance companies in 1823 (cont.)

Zweite Minerva-Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1817 Neue See-Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1815 Hamburger Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1815 Neue dritte Versicherungs-Gesellschaft von 1816 Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1816 Fünfte See-Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1817 Neunte Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1818 Sechste See-Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1819 Zehnte Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1820 Patriotische Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1820 Hamburger Assecuranz-Societät von 1823 Versicherungs-Bund von 1823 Versicherungs-Gesellschaft von 1823

Capital insured

Premiums collected

4,269,000 785,000 3,064,000 5,552,000 8,292,000 6,310,000 2,236,000 5,704,000 6,480,000 11,322,000 2,916,000 4,886,000 7,997,000

83,800 17,700 64,900 110,400 154,300 159,200 44,000 114,300 102,400 268,500 63,200 108,300 182,800

In 1802, 12 joint-stock insurance companies existed in Hamburg, and until 1807, 22 more were established. By 1815, six companies out of the first set and four out of the second had survived. Thirteen other such companies were set up by 1823, of which two failed that year, leaving the total number of 21 insurance companies in 1823. Table 4-1 reveals that these companies nominally had not been established prior to 1815, since the duration of business operation of such insurance companies was limited to five or 10 years. After expiration, they were usually founded anew. Thus, when contemporary sources speak of frequent termination of insurance companies,21 these do not necessarily indicate bankruptcy due to mismanagement, which, for instance, had ended the Versicherungsgesellschaft von 1806 after five years.22 Rather, a company was re-established and continued to do business under a sometimes slightly altered company name after the former company had been liquidated as provided for in the charter, which was the case for the 12te Assekuranz-Compagnie von 1833. 21 22

For instance, as of 11 June 1831, 10 societies, all of which were established between 1805 and 1829, were being liquidated; SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599, Nr. 37,1 rot, fasc. 1: Actien-Verkauf, 11 Juny 1831, zus[ammen]gestellt von Ernst Friedrich Goverts. StAHH, 621–1/1, D. Versicherungsgesellschaft von 1806 – D1 – Vollmacht der Gläubiger zur Liquidation der Gesellschaft, 8 March 1811.

A Business of Its Own

99

The minutes of several meetings of the directors of this insurance company unequivocally report that in 1843 it was not liquidated because of irregularities or mismanagement but that liquidation was purposely scheduled and therefore a regular action.23 After liquidation, this company was re-established for a second time as Neue 12te Assekuranz-Compagnie, under which name it was listed in the Hamburg Commercial Register until 1852.24 The Patriotische Assekuranz-Compagnie von 1811, established on 5 June 1819 as to commence business on 1 March 1820, represents the sequential re-establishments or prolongations. Each time the end of a decade drew near, the company’s duration was prolonged to the end of the upcoming decade; this sequence is verified to have lasted until 1870. These prolongations obviously were ascribed immense importance: as opposed to its handwritten original charter, the certificates of prolongation were printed and inserted in a small gilt-edged book of octavo or quarto format and wrapped in green leather; the design of the book being overall highly elaborate. All shareholders signed the certificate of prolongation with their full name. If they later sold their shares, the signature would be stricken through.25 The minutes of the Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1856, which was kept on the Commercial Register until 1876, show a similar procedure.26 Among other examples, the Neue 6te Assecuranz-Compagnie maintained an entry from 1834 to 1878,27 and the Neue See-Assecuranz-Compagnie von 1815 appeared on the register until 1849.28 Examples of other insurance companies having undergone this process are extant. G. L. Wilhelm Grasmeyer, authorised representative of the AssekuranzCompagnie von 1815, traces the declining profits of the insurance companies in the 1820s to the pressure of competition, which in his account was the result of too many joint-stock companies.

23 24 25

26 27 28

StAHH, 621–1, B. 12te Assekuranz-Compagnie von 1833 – B1 – Protokoll der Direktionsversammlungen 1833–1843, fol. 19. StAHH, 231–3vol. 2, B 5438. StAHH, 621–1, A. Archiv der Patriotischen Assekuranz-Compagnie – A1 – Gründungsurkunde 5. Juni 1819 mit eigenhändigen Unterschriften der Aktionären und Aktienzahl; A2 – Prolongation der Compagnie bis zum 29. Februar 1840, 19 May 1829; A3 – Prolongation der Compagnie bis zum 28. Februar 1850, 14 May 1839; A4 – Prolongation der Compagnie bis zum 29. Februar 1860, in December 1848; A6 – Prolongation der Compagnie bis zum 28. Februar 1870, 5 May 1859. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/450: Die Assecuranz-Comp[agnie] von 1856 – Protokolle, 2 December 1855 to 29 May 1866; StAHH, 231–3vol. 2, B 8555. StAHH, 231–3vol. 2, B 5767 and 13615. StAHH, 231–3vol. 2, B 4537.

100

chapter 4

Currently the number of insurance companies over-abounds our commercial needs, or, vice versa, the trade volume mismatches the local insurance institutions. Neither do we have enough trade on own account, nor does the character of our trade on commission suffice to counterbalance the deficits, which are inevitably to be incurred. Certain branches of trade on commission we attract from the North and the East, and the arising commissions for insurance therefrom, cause these deficits as our insurance contracts are too inexpensive.29 In 1823, more insurance companies had set up their business in Hamburg than in London, Amsterdam, Bremen, or Lübeck. A total sum of 12,225,000 Mark Banko, divided into 4,085 stocks capitalised these insurance companies and covered for risks amounting to 417 million Mark Banko.30 Hamburg’s marine insurance business focused on trade on own account, for which own vessels were typically used, as well as on trade on commission. In case of the latter, business operations fell into the categories of southern and western trade, which “is a delightful fruit borne by our safe bank and our dealings in bills of exchange,” and northern and eastern trade on commission, which “attracts insurance contracts for ship hulls, and for cargo such as grain, salt, and timber.” In peaceful times, approximately 20 percent of the total sum insured were realised by trading on own account, northern and eastern trade on commission scored some 20 percent; the remaining 60 percent were taken up by the southern and western trade on commission.31 Hamburg’s insurers displayed serious commitment to trade on commission, which “puts the weight on our shoulders to insure vessels from many foreign nations, which dangers we do not sufficiently acknowledge.”32 In Grasmeyer’s account, this was particularly true for hull insurance, which generated the largest portion of financial losses. Altogether, the insurance contracts arising from trade and traffic with the Baltic would bring to Hamburg more disadvantages than advantages, even more so as the vessels built in these regions would be of a much lesser quality than those constructed in Hamburg and Western Europe.33 In this context, Gaedechens recounts that

29 30 31 32 33

Grasmeyer, Geschichtliche Wahrnehmungen, 6–7. Ibid., 8–9. Ibid., 13–14 (cit. 14). Ibid., 17. Ibid., 18–22.

101

A Business of Its Own

[of the annual total sum insured], the percentage of contracts for annual hull insurance increased year after year; these predominantly provided insurance cover for the hulls of Danish, Norwegian, and Prussian vessels. Hence, contrary to the custom of concluding six, eight or more such separate insurance contracts throughout the year, only one contract appears in the abovementioned sum insured.34 Since 1820, it was mostly insurance for hulls and cargos of grain that at an average incurred substantially higher losses than the premiums collected (in advance). Insuring consignments or cargos of salt and timber was associated with resulting in even worse ratios: [W]hen loaded onto a vessel going to the Baltic, the salt’s value conventionally is negligible and hence it is so insured. If, however, the vessel suffers general average, upon arrival at the destination, the value of the salt will be received at market price pursuant to existing law; whereby the costs of great average for a salt consignment often are more than double the price of hull insurance. How dearly we pay for insuring timber-laden vessels journeying from the Baltic to France! Much over 100 percent general average in more than just one occasion.35 table 4-2 Premiums and losses of hull and grain cargo insurances, 1820–1822a

Hull insurance

1820 1821 1822

Grain cargo insurance

Average premium rate

Average loss

Average premium rate

2 ¼–2 ½% 3% 3 ½%

4–4 ¼% 3 ¾% 5%

2% 2% 2 ¼%

a Grasmeyer, Geschichtliche Wahrnehmungen, 22.

34 35

SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger See-Assecuranz-Geschäft des Jahres … von O. C. Gaedechens, 1835–1852 – … des Jahres 1839, fol. 1. Ibid., 23–24.

102

chapter 4

Hamburg’s insurers nonetheless eschewed higher premium rates, as these might motivate clients to seek out insurance in the vicinal insurance markets of Lübeck, Copenhagen, Bremen, Antwerp, Ostend, Amsterdam, and London.36 Instead of raising the premium rates, the ever-growing competition between the various insurance companies depressed the premium rates so that eventually the insurers were prevented from covering their costs, or smallish profits were used for offering insurance. If a substantial loss occurred, they would instantly verge on bankruptcy.37 This development had been set off by the clandestine scheme of some insurers who undercut by ¼ to ½ percent the premium rates that were offered by their rivals for so-called cardinal risks in the last years of the nineties, when the rates were still on a high level. Pressuring the rates brought advantage to some, to those who had concocted the scheme, while it did great damage to the entire insurance business. If a premium rate of 2 ¾ percent was fixed in an insurance contract that stood at 3 percent, this might have gone unnoticed for some time, and might be randomly discovered over irksome business correspondence. If other insurers did not want to lag behind, they would have to offer 2 ¾ percent, and the obscure process would be (further) perpetuated.38 In the last years, by which Grasmeyer seemingly alludes to the time after the Napoleonic Wars, he identified a tendency that “the newer companies often dictate[d] the premium rates that the older companies practically [had] to observe, especially when insuring lucrative cargos.”39 In addition, foreign competitors “are too dominant and too antagonizing for our numerous insurance institutions.”40 Hamburg’s main contestants in the marine insurance business were Great Britain and the Netherlands. In the shipping of goods, the United States rivaled Hamburg: “[W]hen it comes to insurance, the English are more than ten times as competitive as we are.”41 Over the period of one year, Lloyd’s underwriters alone were reported to have provided insurance for more than 20,000 vessels with cargo, while Hamburg’ s insurers insured only 2,500 to 3,000 vessels during the same time: 36 37 38 39 40 41

Ibid., 24. Ibid., 6–7. Ibid., 33. Ibid., 34. Ibid., 7. Ibid., 41.

A Business of Its Own

103

Of the respectable consignments arriving in Hamburg from London, Hull, Leith etc. and going to the Baltic, only the pettiest fraction is insured in Hamburg. Almost nothing, or close to almost nothing, of the considerable volume of English maritime trade going or coming from Western and Southern Europe as well as from or to other parts of the world.42 At another point Grasmeyer reports that “less than the twentieth part” of English manufactured goods that were exported to Germany and the Baltic were insured in Hamburg as English insurers insured those at a premium rate of ¼ percent. In the opposite direction from Hamburg to England, the same would apply to consignments of specie – the so-called Contanten –, zinc, and wool. Similarly, English insurers were leading in furnishing insurance services for intercontinental voyages, be it to the seaports of the Americas or India, much to Hamburg’s disappointment.43 Furthermore, there was another key factor adding to England’s preferability: “[A]ttacks on English vessels are far more seldom than on those travelling under any other flag.”44 This observation was attributed to the fighting power of the Royal Navy targeting privateers and pirates.45 However, the Amsterdam and even the Lübeck insurance markets were serious rivals: “many insurance businesses have therefore left, as Lübeck’s insurers and mostly those of Amsterdam offered more competitive premium rates.”46 Moreover, in Grasmeyer’s view, the progress in shipbuilding had a negative impact on the development of the Hamburg marine insurance business: In earlier days, vessels could be built at a lower price here and elsewhere because any kind of material was inexpensive then. A greater effort went into construction, as freight was more expensive at that time and yielded higher profits for shipowners Since vessels were sturdier in those days, there was less sea damage, than it is now. The main point is, however: repair was not as costly as it is these days, for many a reason. One of them is the fact that at some countries’ shores, entering of ports and repairing the vessels has become a sort of business at the insurers’ expense.47

42 43 44 45 46 47

Ibid., 41–42. Ibid., 43–45. Ibid., 46. Angster, Erdbeeren, 247–248. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger SeeAssecuranz-Geschäft des Jahres … von O. C. Gaedechens, 1835–1852 – … des Jahres 1835, fol. 1. Grasmeyer, Geschichtliche Wahrnehmungen, 7–8.

104

chapter 4

Insurers were certainly aware of all this; in 1821, the members of the Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure probably agreed to subscribe to any policy below a certain premium rate. A committee came into existence to determine premium quotations on a fortnight or monthly basis. The Commerz-Deputation did not confirm this proposition as it did not want “to approve of any procedure that would tantamount to a monopoly of the Verein’s insurers.”48 Nevertheless, marine insurance companies apparently recovered in the 1830s at the latest: The increment of the insurance business in Hamburg was all the more so conspicuous, as insurance institutions had emerged in many other places … In Amsterdam, Bremen, and Trieste terms and conditions had been introduced that were more favourable to the insured party than ours were. Also Lübeck and Copenhagen-based insurers offered inexpensive premiums. Shipping of grain, in which England and Norway, joined also by France in autumn, needed the help of the German states, Prussia, and Denmark might have been a primary reason for this increment.49 Having survived in the papers of Senator Martin Johann Jenisch the Younger (1793–1857),50 the annual accounts of individual marine insurance companies do at least support the assumption of an overall positive business development in the 1830s. Between 1829 and 1840 the 5te Assecuranz-Compagnie realised net profits of almost one million Mark Banko. The company experienced fluctuating profits throughout the years, with profits of more than 200,000 Mark Banko (in 1834) or losses of roughly 35,000 Mark Banko (in 1837).51 The fact that the latter was incurred in the year of the English-American trade crisis confirms Gaedechens’ assessment. The Patriotische Assecuranz-Compagnie delivers another example to highlight the process of the development in insurance business in the early 1840s and 1850s: the company’s profits comprised 15 to 22 percent of the collected marine insurance premiums, while indemnity

48 49 50 51

Stritzky, Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure, 24. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger SeeAssecuranz-Geschäft des Jahres … von O. C. Gaedechens, 1835–1852 – … des Jahres 1839, fol. 1. Since 1834 Senator Martin Johann Jenisch the Younger was member of the Hamburg Ratsdeputation of customs and excise; Köster, Staats-Kalender auf das Jahr 1835, 72 and 77. StAHH, 621–1/1: Archiv der Patriotischen Assekuranz-Compagnie – A7 – Jahresabrechnungen 1840–1852, esp. Status der fünften Assecuranz-Compagnie, 28 March 1840.

A Business of Its Own

105

claims paid for sea damages added up to 23 and 31 percent, allowing for generous accrual and payment of dividends of 7.5 percent.52 Certainly, the comprehensive reform of the insurance business’s legal framework contributed to the overall successful business operations of Hamburg’s marine insurance companies. Considered a groundbreaking piece of legislation when enacted, particularly the Assekuranz- und Havarie-Ordnung von 1731 seemed to be obsolete and inadequate to adapt to the changing situation in maritime transport, which, finally yet importantly, was kindled by increased turnover. In 1820, the Commerz-Deputation already had requested the Senate for revision of the law;53 the consultations started in 1843 and a result was achieved in 1847.54 The new Allgemeine Plan hamburgischer Seeversicherungen von 1847, “although revised multiple times since then, as of today [1901; M.D.], [the Allgemeine Plan] is still forming the backbone of this particular business and it has been adopted by most German seaport cities.”55 For the period analysed in the present study, the sole relevant change of the Allgemeine Plan, which had been undergoing revision since 1850, became law on 1 January 1853 and brought about mere editorial adjustments.56 Nevertheless, steam vessels were

52 53

54

55 56

Ibid., Status der Patriotischen Assecuranz-Compagnie, 13 May 1840; dito, 4 May 1841; dito 4 May 1852. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 66 rot, fasc. 6: Vorschläge zu Bedingungen nach welchen die Hamburgischen Assecuradeurs fernerhin Versicherungen übernehmen, undated [not before 1819]; fasc. 4: Extractus Protocolli Senatus Hamburgensis, Lunae, d. 6. Novembris 1820 zur Verbesserung der Assecuranz-Ordnung. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 165a blau: Protocoll der Commission zu Berathung eines Allgemeinen Planes hamburgischer Seeversicherungen 1843–1847; Nr. 165b blau: Protocoll der Commission des Auffm Ordtschen Entwurf eines Allgemeinen Planes hamburgischer Seeversicherungen, angefangen den 13. December 1843, beendigt den 6. März 1847; Nr. 67 rot, fasc. 4: Amendements und Bemerkungen zu einzelnen §§ des Entwurfs eines Allgemeinen Plans, February 1844; fasc. 1: Entwurf eines Allgemeinen Plans hamburgischer See-Versicherungen, Hamburg 1846; Nr. 68 rot: Entwurf eines allgemeinen Plans hamburgischer See-Versicherungen, Hamburg 1843 (printed; numerous copies, each includes hand-written annotations and commentaries); S/1122: Allgemeiner Plan Hamburgischer See-Versicherungen, hrsg. v. der Commerzdeputation, 1847 mit Ergänzungen von 1853. A detailed description of the long road to the 1847 revision can be found in: Baasch, Handelskammer, vol. 2, I. Abt., 632–639. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 33–34 (cit. 34). Cf. Plan der Anno 1841 prolongirten zweiten Seeund Feuer-Assekuranz-Compagnie. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 165a blau: Protocoll der Commission zur Revision eines Allgemeinen Planes hamburgischer Seeversicherungen 1850–1852; Nr. 165c blau: Extracte aus den Protokollen der Commerz-Deputation, 20. November 1850– 11. August 1852; Nr. 66 rot, fasc. 13: Revidirter allgemeiner Plan hamburgischer SeeVersicherungen, hrsg. v. d. Commerz-Deputation, in Kraft tretend am 1. Januar 1853.

106

chapter 4

not an object of said revision. They were included as late as on 1 January 1868, when the Allgemeine Seeversicherungs-Bedingungen von 1867 became effective: If the insurer of hull or cargo is not informed that the vessel is of iron, notwithstanding that the hull is of full iron, iron-sheathed, or built from pine timber; in case of loss, the insurer will be obliged to render only half of the insurance sum that he would have had to render, if the insurer was properly informed.57 The shipowners were victorious in their lobbying against the provisions of paragraph 38, which was rescinded in December 1867. However, in the 1850s, Hamburg’s marine insurance companies had to fend off new rivals: Since the 1850s, the booming economy and the revolutionary acceleration of communicating news by electro-magnetic telegraphy were drew other German and foreign joint-stock insurance companies to participate in Hamburg’s marine insurance market through agencies.58 Such a development had taken place already after 1825, when the Preussische Seeassekuranz Compagnie founded an agency in Hamburg, followed by other agencies of other foreign companies. Yet all of these agencies quit business until 1847.59 Between 1850 and 1852, the existence of only two agencies from other German states or foreign countries can be verified; in 1853, there were four, 10 in 1857, and even 15 in 1859. This development has to be regarded in context with the promotion of electromagnetic telegraphy, having become a widely used technology: Hamburg was right at the centre of a network spanning the kingdoms of Prussia, Hanover, and Denmark. Since 1859, a telegraph line connected Hamburg with England.60 Thus, instructions could be

57 58 59

60

Plaß, Geschichte, 444. Cf. Meyer, Wechselbeziehungen, 45 (with note 3); Voigt, SeeversicherungsRecht; Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 194. Ibid., 196. For example, the Compagnie commercial d’assurances maritimes à Antwerpen 1834–1836 and its successor, the Deuxième Compagnie commerciale d’Assurances maritimes zu Antwerpen 1836–1838 (official legal names in the Handelsregister: StAHH, 231–3vol. 2, B 6950 and 6952); Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 197. So since 1850 the Kais[erlich] Kön[iglich] Priv[ilegierte] Nuova Società Commerciale di Assicurazione in Trieste (kept on the Handelsregister until 1896, StAHH, 231–3vol. 2, B 7149); Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 86–87.

A Business of Its Own

107

transmitted within a short time and relevant information could be exchanged, which was a “decisive precondition for extending subscribing actions.”61 Moreover, since the 1860s, marine insurance markets of local, or at best, regional significance emerged in numerous Baltic and Scandinavian seaports (such as Tønsberg, Stockholm, Stavanger, Christiania, and Gothenburg). The Hamburg Commercial Register lists other companies from Bremen (Norddeutscher Lloyd), Mainz (Rheinschiffahrts-Assecuranz-Gesellschaft), Frankfurt am Main (Providentia), the Netherlands, Brussels, Paris, London, Russia, Danzig, Stettin, Lübeck, Saint Gall, Porto, Madrid, Barcelona, Trieste, Athens, and even from Batavia.62 As a result, the number of foreign insurance contract commissions from Scandinavia and the Baltic declined and returned to Hamburg,63 adding to the competition in the Hamburg market as well as to that between various insurance markets. Insurance contracts were placed with inland cargo insurers, whose contracts were inclusive of covering overland transport. Since the mid-nineteenth century, some liner shipping companies began to issue bills of lading for continuous transport on land and seaways, thus ending the separation between marine and overland cargo insurance, and even temporary storage was provided for. The so-called open policy was a milestone en route to general cargo insurance: this policy embraced the entire goods movement in a blanket policy, instead of reflecting each individual contract.64 In addition, due to increasing risk, insurers more often used reinsurance. In 1846, the king of Prussia chartered the first reinsurance company, the Kölnische Rückversicherungsgesellschaft, which commenced business on 1 July 1852.65 Altogether, these developments transformed Hamburg’s marine insurance business as “Hamburg’s insurers saw themselves forced to adapt their business techniques, which up to that time basically corresponded to those firmly rooted in the eighteenth century, to the changing preconditions.”66 Having started in the 1860s and finally leaving behind eighteenth-century structures, the reorganization of the Hamburg marine insurance undoubtedly marked a watershed in the history of the city’s marine insurance market. From an overall economic perspective, the reorganisation coincided with the worldwide 61 62 63 64 65 66

Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 199. StAHH, 231–3vol. 2; for instance, the Tönsberg Söforsikringsselskab 1867–1869 (ibid., B 13589). Kiesselbach, Entwicklung, 86. Meyer, Wechselbeziehungen, 34–35; Ehrensperger, Seetransportversicherung. Mossner, Rückversicherung, 89; Stutz, Rückversicherung, 58. Cf. Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 206. Ibid., 196.

108

chapter 4

economic crisis of 1857, whose effects permanently altered Hamburg’s economy. In setting the period of this study from the eighteenth century to the late 1850s, only the traditional marine insurance market is analysed hereafter. 4.3

The Marine Insurance Business in Hamburg up to the 1850s

As sources are rudimentary, a complete overview of the development of the marine insurance business in Hamburg is hard to assemble; for the eighteenth century, it is simply impossible. The oldest data start in 1798, being available regularly from 1814, which carry information on total sums insured and form the basis of calculating average premium rates. The authorised representatives of the marine insurance companies kept records of these data. Thus, exclusively the business activities of joint-stock insurance companies formed the basis, whereas individual underwriters were included only from 1836 to 1848. Business activities of agencies, from other German states or foreign, are omitted.67 Reviewing the first six decades of the nineteenth century, in terms of value, the insurance volume increased notably, while the premium rates, at which insurance contracts were concluded on average, markedly declined (Graph 4-2). As part of this basic tendency, the following short-and medium term developments are remarkable. Even during the prosperity period in the second half of the 1790s, the total insurance volume was meagre in comparison to that after the French Period. Since 1798, this figure dwindled, as selected data indicating premiums for voyages bound for the Mediterranean demonstrate (Graph 4-3). This observation stands in clear contrast to the London insurance market, where revenues increased, particularly at this time. During the War of the Second Coalition (1798/99–1801/02), the insurance premiums increased after three events in particular: first, the rates rose immediately after France’s declaration of war on Austria on 12 March 1799. Second, the British destroying the Danish naval fleet in the Battle of Copenhagen on 2 April 1801 left an imprint on the rates. Lastly, the British blockade of the Elbe estuary in 1803 had a lasting effect.68 After the average premium rates quoted 67 68

As explicated in the Tabellarische Übersicht … 1853 [1854], 130, these figures were compiled “excluding local underwriters and agents of foreign societies.” Naturally, this phenomenon did not just occur in the Hamburg market. The rise of premium rates in any other insurance market such as London was driven by hostile actions, as was the number of the concluded contracts, for instance at Lloyd’s. There, underwriters differentiated between regular risks for voyages between England and foreign ports, and cross risks for voyages from a foreign port to another. In case of the latter, and during

A Business of Its Own

109

graph 4-2 The development of the Hamburg insurance market, 1798–1859 Sources: SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599, Nr. 48,1 rot, fasc. 39: Übers[icht] des Hamburger Seeversicherungsgeschäfts, 1816–49; Grasmeyer, Geschichtliche Wahrnehmungen [1824], 36; Büsch, Theoretisch-praktische Darstellung, 2. Theil, 499; Tonnies, Chronik … im Jahr 1823, 22 [?]; Bondé, Hambourg et son commerce, 136f.; Tabellarische Übersichten … 1845–1848 [1849], IX; dito 1853 [1854], 130. Cf. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel und Verkehr, 33. Plass, Geschichte der Assekuranz, 459, lists only (total) sums insured without deduction of “Ristorno und Rückgaben” (cancelled insurance contracts and refunds).

between 1798 and 1801 had reached exorbitant 7 to 9 ¾ percent, they plunged to 3 ⅜ percent in 1802 as a result of the Treaty of Amiens of 25/27 March 1802, ending the War of the Second Coalition. In 1802, a ‘year of peace’, the risk of maritime transport was assessed to be little as “the capture of ships had seized and international trade and maritime traffic were invigorated, even more so as high premiums caused by the perils of war discontinued.”69

69

autumn and winter months when susceptibility to loss increased, much higher premiums (4 percent at average) were charged. At the same time, fewer insurers offered their services in the second half of the years so that each of them could attain a higher business volume; Röpling, Seeversicherung, 65–66 and 70–71. North, “Kontinentalsperre,” 137.

110

chapter 4

graph 4-3 Premiums for voyages into the Mediterranean, 1791–1805 Source: Stritzky, Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure, 20. For such voyages that bore a greater inherent risk of privateering and of the crew falling victim to slavery, the Admiralty reimbursed shipowners with half the premium paid.

This boom period of Hamburg marine insurance business in the 1790s lasted until the outbreak of the War of the Third Coalition on 17 March 1803, when the business suffered a sudden and sharp decline. The decisive momentum was the disruption of maritime traffic by the second and third English blockade of the Elbe estuary (July to October 1803, April to October 1806, see Chapter 2).70 In that year, the average premium rate rose to only 5 3/16 percent, for which the fact that insurance cover was exclusively provided for relatively low-risk voyages, was seemingly responsible. Anyway, the quotation of premium rates in the price current was suspended for the duration of 1803. In 1804, premium rates were quoted only from March to July and on a regular basis since August 1805. Low average premiums between 1804 and 1805 (about 3 ½ percent) suggest a rather mediocre business solely on safe sea routes. The occupation of Hamburg by the French in 1806 and the promulgation of the Continental Blockade led to the definitive collapse of Hamburg’s marine insurance market.71 In that year the French confiscated Danish and Prussian vessels, while the English captured Danish, Portuguese and neutral-flagged 70 71

During the third Elbe blockade from April to October 1806, premium rate quotations were published regularly. For the periods of the two British Elbe blockades, see Petersson, “Zuckersiedergewerbe,” 57. For more information on peculiarities in the marine insurance business during the Continental System, see Kim and Oldham, “Insuring Maritime Trade,” 561–586.

A Business of Its Own

111

vessels, which made Hamburg enduring a loss of 3 million Mark Banko, consuming 35 percent of the total premium volume of 8.5 million Mark Banko. During the French Period, Hamburg lost its neutrality and the marine insurance market forfeited on its attractiveness for the moment: “[T]he insurance business soon came to a standstill.”72 In the course the of French occupation, the French Period, which had started on 19 November 1806 during the War of the Fourth Coalition and ended on 30 May 1814, three weeks after the allied forces had taken over Paris, there was no record of the sums insured or average premium rates. Premium quotations from the beginning of 1807 to October 1814 were suspended from the contemporaneous Hamburg price current. These findings give strong credence to the contemporaries’ reports that de facto there were no activities in the Hamburg insurance market or just to a minor extent. Premium quotations were published again on a regular basis as late as November 1814, and even the total annual sum insured of 1814 three times surpassed that of 1805. The tendency of a rapid growth of this figure lasted until the trade crisis of 1818,73 which became visible in its massive decline of about a quarter (26.54 percent) the year after. Even though revenues improved in 1819, the extremum of 175 million Mark Banko in 1818 was not exceeded any earlier than in 1830. In 1822 to 1823, the total annual sum insured sank below 100 million Mark Banko. These findings conform to the critical statements from the authorised representative Grasmeyer, and Tonnies, the co-director and authorised representative of the Versicherungs-Gesellschaft von 1823, who both gave a negative assessment of the development of the Hamburg marine insurance market at the beginning of the 1820s. According to Grasmeyer, the nine years of peace, which had passed since the end of the Napoleonic Wars did not bring to the marine insurance business the envisioned increment in revenues. “Enticed by the exuberant profits enjoyed during war in the nineties to 1805,” one had expected “the wars to drum up business,”74 which is an allusion to the French invasion in Spain by decree of the Holy Alliance.75 This event, however, caused the average marine insurance premium to rise from 2 11/32 percent (in 1822) to 3 3/32 percent (in 1823), only to bounce back to 2 3/16 percent in 1824. 72 73 74 75

Stritzky, Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure, 17–18 and 21 (cit.). Ibid., 23. Grasmeyer, Geschichtliche Wahrnehmungen, 2. In order to vanquish the 1820 revolt, or revolution in Spain that was aimed at reinstating the liberal Charter of 1812, and to reinstall King Ferdinand VII (1808, 1814–1833) in his traditional, absolutistic rights, the Congress of Verona (1822) decided the French to invade the country; de Grandmaison, L’expédition française; Nichols Jr., The European Pentarchy; Larroche, L’expédition d’Espagne.

112

chapter 4

The critical occurrences in the Hamburg marine insurance market thus lingered on past the mid-1820s. An upward long-term trend marked by increasing annual total sums insured and annual average premiums sinking below 2 percent cannot be identified for any earlier year than 1826/27. Gaedechens emphasised the positive economic situation of the Hamburg marine insurance market in his Berichte über das Hamburger See-Assecuranz-Geschäft. Only the Panic of 1837,76 a financial and speculation crisis that originated in the USA and encroached upon London’s financial market, and the seasonal adverse weather conditions had entailed a recession, or, in Gaedechens’s words, had caused “perceptible doldrums in the insurance branch.” Although “subscriptions at a reasonable price” were available from some insurers who did not want to renounce profits entirely, due to the persisting crisis, business relations with the United States were sluggish.77 Intriguingly, effects on the annual average premium rate were insignificant. Much the same way, this observation holds for the Great Fire of 1842,78 the next event that shocked the Hamburg marine insurance market. Consequently, the insurers moved their businesses to London, which they had not done even during the cholera outbreak in 1831. In 1842, the total sum insured in marine insurance contracts declined by one eighth compared to the previous year, but in 1844 it rose slightly above the 1841 amount. When the marine insurers returned to Hamburg, they had to make serious concessions, mostly to coffee and (raw) cane sugar importers: the insurers had to give in to offer insurance conditions similar to those in England but at just a slightly higher premium rates than usual. As foreign markets undercut Hamburg’s low premium rates and substantial losses were suffered in 1848, the Verein of Hamburger Assecuradeure established a new committee to fix premium rates. Again, the insurers failed to come to an arrangement, putting an end to the whole discussion.79 Whereas the crisis of Hamburg’s marine insurance market ensuing the city fire could be overcome quite quickly, the Danish blockade of the Elbe in the wake of the First Schleswig War (1848–1851) was a profound threat. When the war broke out in March 1848 and the Danish defeated some of their opponents, within a few days, the Northern German maritime and coasting trade came to a halt. Marine insurance premiums were not recorded from April to 76 77 78 79

Leppler, The Many Panics. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger SeeAssecuranz-Geschäft des Jahres … von O. C. Gaedechens, 1835–1852 – … des Jahres 1837, fol. 2. Cf. Matthes, “Der Große Hamburger Brand”. Stritzky, Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure, 29 and 35–37.

A Business of Its Own

113

September 1848 – for the first time since the French Period – and, once again, from late April to August 1849. On 5 April 1849, seaports of Schleswig and Holstein, Kammin, Swinemünde, Wolgast, Greifswald, Stralsund, and Rostock were barred. On 12 April, the blockade was imposed on Danzig and Pillau, and the mouths of the rivers Elbe, Jade, and Weser. The crisis on the German coast and in the Baltic worsened when a part of the Russian Baltic Fleet embarked to come to Denmark’s aid against Prussia, sparking off potential conflict among the European superpowers. The ceasefire agreement between Denmark and Prussia, which was endorsed also by the German Confederation and signed on 10 July 1849, lifted the blockades.80 In the course of these events, the average premium rate rose from 1 17/32 percent (in 1847) to 2 1/16 percent (in 1848) and fell again to 1 9/16 percent (in 1849). The latter was possible only because there were fewer subscriptions to insurances during the decisive months of the Danish blockade of the Elbe, which the suspension of quoting premium rates in the insurance price current suggests. Eventually, the Panic of 1857, which had a severe impact on Hamburg and its insurance market at the end of the period analysed in this study, requires consideration:81 this crisis “soon was forgotten in the rest of Germany because the population growth … spurred economic expansion. Yet in Hamburg trade and navigation suffered through stagnation for years.”82 This observation is also and specifically validated by the dynamics in the marine insurance market: the annual total sum insured dropped from nearly 734 million Mark Banko in 1857 to a bit more than a quarter (26.6 percent) in 1858, and recovered only at a moderate rate in 1859 (by 7.5 percent). However, the figures did not fall below those of the first half of the 1850s, when the insurance business performed poorly. Thus, the sharp decline of the figures from 1857 to 1858 was a consequence of the boomlet in trade and therefore affected the insurance business.83 Since the descent followed a period of high business activity, it was the more drastic. Nonetheless, the effects of the Panic of 1857 on the premium rate that insured parties were charged at average, were rather marginal: the rate rose from 1 ⅜ percent (in 1857) to 1 7/16 percent (in 1858), which as well frequently happened in years not stirred by crisis. Even more so, except in 1848,

80 81 82 83

Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 100; Stolz, Erhebung, 115 and 139–140; Svendsen, The First SchleswigHolstein War; von Bezold, Die schleswig-holsteinische Erhebung. Ahrens, Krisenmanagement. – In SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599, Nr. 55 rot: Handelskrise 1857, a vital link between the developments of the marine insurance markets in the wake of the Panic of 1857 cannot be retrieved. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 113. Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 197.

114

chapter 4

the trend of lower premium rates continued in the 1850s and in the subsequent decades. In 1871, the premium rate fell below 1 percent for the first time.84 The growing importance of the Hamburg insurance business of the first half of the nineteenth century was also reflected in the expansion of the insurance price current in these decades: though the resumption of premium quotations in the Hamburg price current on 1 July 1814 did not bring a change in the listed destinations and the scheme introduced in 1807 simply was continued, new categories were introduced on 21 April 1820, especially such tapping on the increasing intercontinental trade. These newly established rubrics were rearranged on 3 August 1821 and in this form, which was slightly revised in 1824 and 1827, the Hamburg insurance price current was retained until 1830. In 1820/21 the premium quotations therefore began to adapt to the changes in the overall conditions in maritime transport, which then were having its breakthrough and stood in contrast to the pre-French Period time. Reflecting the political and economic developments of the time, the change becomes visible in the partial renaming of traditionally quoted destinations along Europe’s coasts. The revamped insurance price current indicated a greater number of ports than before, on nearly any coast there was. Without providing a detailed explanation at this point, which is given later, the designation of destinations was fluid and the composition, respectively the arrangement of individual ports that were grouped together, changed for some multiple times throughout the consecutive two decades. As late as 1843, the designation of individual destinations was again relatively stable. In addition, since 1821, some destinations along Europe’s coasts were newly established, or were disaffiliated from their former region: (Kingston upon) Hull and Newcastle (upon Tyne), the Scottish and the Belgian ports; Iceland (only until 1823); Madeira and Tenerife as well as Zante, Patra, Smyrna (not listed from 1826 to 1835), and Çeşme (since 1835), which was the only destination that included a small part of the Anatolian coast. In addition, the Danish and Norwegian destinations were defined in greater detail. However, the onset of the intercontinental trade in late eighteenth century brought the most important change, which in its early beginnings took the form of transatlantic direct trade and had made its first entry in Hamburg’s insurance price current in 1804 jointly quoting Saint Thomas and the North American ports. Since the 1820s, when Hamburg continued to conclude international trade agreements, the insurance business expanded to an almost global scale. Therefore, the number of premium quotations for non-European 84

Tabellarische Übersichten des Hamburgischen Handels, 406.

A Business of Its Own

115

destinations rose significantly, even more so as Hamburg-flagged vessels pursued transport business between several ports outside Europe. This development must be regarded in context with the new alignment of Hamburg’s commercial policies towards direct trade with non-European, but mostly American, ports. In a first step, destinations at the east coast of the both Americas and in the Caribbean as well as the Cape of Good Hope, Bengal, Batavia, Canton, and Manila were quoted (see Table A1-3). In a second step, the Gulf of Mexico and the west coast of South America were established as individual destinations in 1827. The third, and, for the time being, last addition of non-European destinations to the insurance price current were California and Australia, as late as in 1853 (see Table A1-4). These two destinations were also closely connected to the extension of the range of Hamburg’s shipping and direct trade in these coastal regions. After mid-nineteenth century, almost all important destinations playing a crucial part for international trade and maritime transport were registered in the Hamburg insurance price current, so that in geographical terms the development of the marine insurance market reached a certain degree of saturation by the 1850s (see Maps 4-1 and 4-2). This survey of the destinations listed in the Hamburg price current demonstrates both the central relevance of Hamburg’s marine insurance business for entire Northern Europe and the market’s international reputable position, which was only outrivaled by London and Amsterdam. Therefore, and unlike other markets such as Trieste,85 the Hamburg marine insurance market not only served the city and its numerous commercial ties as enormous as these had been but extended to a vast hinterland of smaller and larger ports that maintained international maritime shipping relations. For this reason, the Hamburg insurance market can be assigned a place of overall European importance for maritime transport and international commerce. 85

The range of the Trieste marine insurance market was rather limited and around 1800 embraced only the most important Mediterranean and Black Sea ports as well as London, Amsterdam, Bremen, and Hamburg; Denzel, “Österreichs Direkthandel,” 139–140.

map 4-1

Premium quotations for destinations in Hamburg’s maritime trade, 1821–1834 © Markus A. Denzel and Christoph Streng, 2020

116 chapter 4

map 4-2

Premium quotations for destinations in Hamburg’s maritime trade, 1835–1859 © Markus A. Denzel and Christoph Streng, 2020

A Business of Its Own

117

map 4-3

Premium quotations for destinations in Hamburg’s maritime trade, 1835–1859 – the global perspective © Markus A. Denzel and Christoph Streng, 2020

118 chapter 4

chapter 5

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz – Marine Insurance Rates for Destinations in the Atlantic 5.1

The North Atlantic: Greenland and Arkhangelsk

Until early in the eighteenth century, Hamburg’s North East convoy (“Nord­ ostconvoy”) “was identical with the Greenland convoy (Grönlandconvoy)…. the convoy ship escorted the whalers of the Arkhangelsk traders (Archangel­ fahrer) to Spitsbergen, waited there for the duration of the hunting season, which took one or two months, and accompanied the reunited fleets back to Hamburg.”1 Therefore, Arkhangelsk and Greenland are discussed in concert in this chapter. Competing interests and a struggle for competencies among the different groups of merchants – the Greenland whalers on the one hand and the Arkhangelsk traders on the other –, and rising dangers of sea travel during the Great Northern War (1700–1721) had the Arkhangelsk traders strive for a convoy ship of their own to protect the fleets. For this reason, in 1703, the Arkhangelsk traders founded an association, the Gesellschaft der Muscovien­ fahrer, so they would be able to jointly bear the costs of their own convoy ship. Having a convoy ship became an urgent necessity while the Great Northern War was raging since both the Swedish and the Russians, each for their own reasons, severely interfered with trade in the Baltic. It was precisely for this reason, however, that voyages to Arkhangelsk became more frequent among all Northwest European trading nations, as the entire Russian imports concentrated in the White Sea port and rose considerably because of the necessities of war. Thus, in 1704, the Gesellschaft der Muscovienfahrer and the Hamburg Convoy-Kollegium concluded a contract according to which the safety of the Hamburg fleet on its annual voyage to Arkhangelsk and return should be protected by a warship. Participating merchants were charged varying sums per year for this contractual service, usually between five and ten thousand rixdollars. This sum was rendered on top of the ‘usual’ convoy rate, in form of a 2 percent surcharge levied on all goods the merchants imported and exported.2

1 Menke, Beziehungen, 243. 2 Ibid., 242–243. See also Der Archangelischen Kaufleut-Buch [1702], in: Ibid., 396–397.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_007

120

chapter 5

In its proper sense, the term Grönlandfahrt connotes the voyage to Spitsbergen to catch herring, whales, and seals in coastal waters. When Dutch navigator Willem Barents (c.1550–1597) discovered the islands in 1596, which in present day are referred to as the Svalbard archipelago, that area was assumed to form the eastern part of Greenland. The contemporary term Grönlandfahrt derives from the delusive perception of geography. In Hamburg, fishing for herring was the chief reason for the voyage to Greenland. Nonetheless, “nowadays [herring fishing] has lost (much of) its former importance, therefore the [Hamburger fishermen] have merged it with the hunt for common seals and other pinnipeds.”3 After the dissolution of the Noordsche Compagnie in 1642, which had been chartered in 1614 in the Dutch Republic, King Christian IV of Denmark and Norway (1588–1648) stepped into the breach, creating a new one. As the actual sovereign over Greenland, even if only presumptuously over Spitsbergen, he bestowed a privilege upon the Societas Groenlandiae, which a Dutchman had already established in Hamburg. As a result of this society’s founding, Hamburg strongly pushed whaling, which experienced a first boom period since the three Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars of 1652–1654, 1665–1667, and 1672–1674, when Dutch Greenland traders were prohibited from leaving port due to English privateering. Consequently, Dutch competition was effectively eliminated. Since late 1660s, the number of whaling ships, which were accompanied on their voyages by sturdy convoy ships, rose from 40 to 50 between 1669 and 1673, then from 50 to 60 between 1678 and 1680, and up to 83 in 1675. Nevertheless, the Dutch held on to the top position: in 1670, they had 148 whalers at their disposal. However, whaling sites shifted from the fjords and coasts of Spitsbergen at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In a northern direction, whalers overcame the pack ice belt off the East Greenland Current; westwards of Spitsbergen they ventured into the Davis Strait, separating the island belonging to the Kingdom of Denmark from Baffin Island. Since 1719, whalers therefore also travelled to the Davis Strait, and from 1721 specialised vessels, the so-called Robbenschläger, were equipped for the seal hunt, or seal cull, a practice first recorded in 1716. The year 1742 marked the beginning of the last great upswing of the voyage to Greenland, which experienced its decline from 1767/69 onwards.4 The reasons for this downward development to its nadir in 1808, 3 Büsch, Handlung, 58. Concerning the reduction of the fishing for herring in the second quarter of the eighteenth century cf. Baasch, “Heringshandel,” 100: Notice von dem Hering, so in Hamburg von Anno 1693 bis Anno 1744 gepacket worden. 4 Cf. SHWA Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 14,2 rot, fasc. 4: Verz[eichnis] der Anzahl von 1740–1769 nach Grönland gehenden Walfangschiffe und Fangergebnisse; Description

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

121

when no Grönlandfahrer departed from Hamburg’s port, were manifold: relatively high charges, the strong Dutch competition until 1798, which was further increased by the English (from 1788 onwards) and by the ports in Schleswig, Holstein, Hanover, and Sweden. Moreover, difficulties in recruiting crews, poor catches, and the never-ending naval wars made matters worse (which, however, were hardly reflected in the insurance premiums). Singular natural setbacks, such as the loss of seven large ships in drift ice in 1777, were added to this. After 1814, the voyage to Greenland was revived once again at a low level, but since the 1820s only very few ships – usually three –, sailed per year, from 1854 only one or two ships, and in 1861 the last Hamburg voyage to Greenland was recorded.5 Such whaling tours for the extraction of spermaceti,6 whale oil, baleen (‘whalebone’), and ambergris7 lasted from April/May to September. From 1736 onwards, the Hamburg insurance price current indicated three destinations in the North Atlantic. As for Greenland, whaling and sealing are listed separately. Whereas smaller vessels sufficed for sealing, whaling required larger ships.8 In conjunction with Greenland, the Davis Strait first appeared in the insurance price current in 1762. Until 1781, entries for whaling, sealing, and fishing, i.e. herring fishing, were kept separate. In the second half of the 1770s, this categorisation, which purely was based on the vessel size, was no longer valid: [T]wenty and some more years ago, the Hamburgers commenced to fit smaller [vessels] for hunting whale-fish, which has raised their confidence in making profits from fishing in general. Nonetheless, they do keep a[n] extensive number of large ships in reserve, solely for the hunt for whale-fish. These ships depart later, when two months have passed.9

5 6

7 8 9

von der Grönländischen und der Straße v[on] Davisschen Fischerey (with data material for the years 1764–1769). Oesau, Grönlandfahrt, 65–86; Brinner, Grönlandfahrt, 134, 136, 152 and 218–254; Baasch, “Hamburg und Holland,” 60 and 64; Wiskemann, Hamburgs Stellung, 86–87; Münzing, Jagd, 28–30; Voigt, Nordfriesen, 23–32 and 89–91. Cf. Moltmann, Handelsschiffahrt, 77–79. Spermaceti is a fatty, and in purified form wax-like, substance created in the spermaceti organ in the head (and to some extent in other parts) of the sperm-whale and some other whales and dolphins; it was used largely as a lubricant and in the manufacture of fine candles; Rice, “Spermaceti”. Ambergris consists mostly of indigestable parts of giant squids found in the abdomen of sperm-whales (also floating or washed ashore) and has been a staple substance used in perfumery. Büsch, Handlung, 58. Brinner, Grönlandfahrt, 240.

122

chapter 5

Since the 1770s, whaling had clearly gained in importance – not least because of Denmark’s mercantilist economic policy in this area – and therefore the sealing probably no longer appeared to be sufficiently profitable in relation to this. Beginning in 1783,10 whaling in the Davis Strait lost its importance, and the Napoleonic Wars and, above all, the Continental Blockade brought whaling to a virtual standstill. By the time whaling was resumed in 1814, whale stocks had nevertheless been so depleted that such voyages were increasingly carried out as sealing. For this reason, the premium quotations for whalers were not continued after 1819, and in 1820 the destination was thus omitted from the insurance price current: Since the four ships that sailed from Hamburg used to return to port unsuccessfully, [whaling] in the Davis Strait has come to an end because the ships usually arrived too late, when the ice floes already were too small and the whale-fish could swim too freely.11 For several months of 1820, two categories were listed for the destination referred to as Greenland; these were called “whaling” (“auf dem Walfischfang”) and “depart and return” (“hin und zurück”). Since 1821, only one quotation was left: “depart and return”. In 1821, the quotations for the sealing were resumed and in fact discontinued after 1838; a last quotation – at a much lower premium – took place in August 1847. Between 1821 and 1823, “Iceland, depart and return” was indicated separately, which was about half a percentage point higher than that for the sealers. However, such voyages to Iceland do not seem to have lasted long, because this destination was quitted after rather a short time. Since 1843, this destination was simply named “Greenland” until it ultimately disappeared from the insurance price current in 1848. In the North Atlantic Russia’s first seaport, Arkhangelsk, had been gaining prominence. Founded in 1584 at Tsar Ivan IV’s (1533–1584) order, the city’s significance in maritime trade fell far behind Saint Petersburg’s in the first half of the eighteenth century. However, the city’s seaport managed to recover once more: as of 1762, Arkhangelsk was the third most important Russian port of export, relegated to its place only by Saint Petersburg and Riga.12 From a Hamburg perspective, “around 1772/73 … the importance of the Arkhangel-Fahrt is unrivalled. Yet in the eighties, Baltic shipping routes grow more important and surpass the voyages to the White Sea for the first time 10 11 12

Ibid. Büsch, Handlung, 59. Menke, Beziehungen, 112.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

123

in 1787.”13 Arkhangelsk was originally designed to be Moscow’s port on the White Sea: [T]ravelling to Moscow via Arkhangelsk was a six months’ journey, and returning took even nine (that were three, respectively six months longer than transport in the Baltic Sea would take). Yet the profits that were estimated and actually realized, a rather peaceful voyage during times of war, and, above all, being offered the chance to establish direct trade relations tipped the balance in favour of taking the longer way.14 Located on both banks of the Northern Dvina, 40 kilometres south of the river’s mouth into the White Sea, the port of Arkhangelsk, which was blocked by ice from October to May, was connected to the Volga and its tributary Kama river by two canals, creating a vast hinterland that stretched to even Moscow.15 The shipping route to Arkhangelsk was preferable over the Baltic route since it was safer than travelling in the Baltic and less costly as the Sound toll was circumvented on this way. Marine traffic from Northwest European ports to the White Sea usually began in April or July and took four to six weeks. The vessels reached Arkhangelsk in May respectively August, leaving the merchants enough time to pay visit to the annual fair16 and to sail back south when autumn set in. In addition, there was another practical reason: when arriving earlier than the regular ships were expected to moor in Arkhangelsk – a practice known as Frühfahrt – which was worthwhile as commodities from the last season that had been stored there during winter could be purchased at a lower price. Trade in Arkhangelsk was organised at annual fairs where the incoming Russian and foreign merchants tried to sell everything they had brought with them: All negotiants agree that trading as far as to Archangelsk is to be favoured as the drudgery to which those are subjected who trade further into the country, evil debts (that in reality seldom are repaid) but to be made everywhere, the pride, the impermanence, self-interest and cunning of the Russian nation, as well as the evil practice with the foreigners, causes that few got their money to trade deeper into the country, unless they, 13 14 15 16

Kresse, Materialien, 21. Menke, Beziehungen, 113. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 13. In the late seventeenth century, Kilburger reported on this in Kurzer Unterricht von dem russischen Handel; cit. Menke, Beziehungen, 379–380.

124

chapter 5

like the English and Dutch, which have long practice and knowledge, are forced to do so because of their outstanding debts.17 This trade was largely carried out as a barter transaction; but those merchants who paid cash received more favorable prices.18 – Hamburg began the Arkhangelsk trade in the early seventeenth century, and mainly grain – for resale to the Netherlands – and timber, but also tar and pitch, mats, linseed and hemp seed and cordage were brought to the Elbe. This trade tended to decline after its heyday during the Great Northern War until around mid-eighteenth century and remained of secondary importance for Hamburg’s foreign trade.19 It was only in the last years of the Seven Years’ War that an upward movement began when various Hamburg merchants with vested interests in invigorating trade with Russia revived the Gesellschaft der Muscovienfahrer from 1764 onwards, which had been lying dormant for decades. In particular, with the increasing grain deliveries, Hamburg’s trade with Arkhangelsk took a new upswing, especially since these represented a considerable object of speculation. The grain was not only shipped to Hamburg, but could be carried in a kind of trilateral trade to Amsterdam, France, or Portugal where return cargo was loaded to Hamburg.20 In this context, the growth and the significance of Arkhangelsk trade as a whole during the reign of Tsarina Catherine II (1762– 1796), which increased significantly compared to previous decades, should also be regarded.21 From a Hamburg perspective, it should be added that “in peaceful times more vessels sailed for the Northern Dvina. If, however, greater profits were expected elsewhere – most notably in times of war –, interest in Arkhangelsk diminished”, which was the case exactly during the American War of Independence (1775–1783).22 Hamburg reintroduced the grain trade with Arkhangelsk after 1814, but it no longer achieved its former relevance. From the 1830s onwards, the voyage to Arkhangelsk became “completely insignificant” for Hamburg.23 – Arkhangelsk was listed in the Hamburg insurance price current as a distinct destination from 1736;24 in addition, the Kola Peninsula was mentioned from 1762 to 1820.

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Marperger, Moscowitischer Kaufmann, 76. Ibid., 77; Kellenbenz, “Marchands en Russie,” 213. Menke, Beziehungen, 111–115; Moltmann, Handelsschiffahrt, 72. Büsch, Handlung, 147–150; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 13. Menke, Beziehungen, 255–256. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 13. Ibid., 16. For some single insurance rates of and to Archangelsk in the seventeenth century, see Hart, “Amsterdam Shipping,” 24.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

125

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 5-1 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the North Atlantic, 1736–1859, in percent. Source: Table A2-1

126

chapter 5

In contrast to the marine insurance premium rates of any other destinations, premium quotations for the two Greenland voyages were characterised in particular by the fact that they did not react visibly to external influences or changes in the seasons – apart from the winter months, which made the voyage to Greenland impossible due to ice-drift. The Greenland quotations were not subject to any economic cycle in the proper sense, in other words, they did not fluctuate. Showing little deviation, the values overall remained stable for many decades, but only for those months in which the voyages to Greenland actually took place. Sometimes minor deviations can be observed, but as a rule the rates fixed in spring seem to have applied to an entire whaling or sealing season, since neither war events nor piracy made the waters navigated unsafe. It also seems that only one insurance policy per year was necessary, as the Greenland routes were only used once per season. This was the case for sealers who left for Greenland in February/March, hunting rarely until September or even October, for which months higher premiums were quoted, as a sudden start of winter posed a serious risk. These quotations did not occur from November to January, partly until February. Overall, the findings for premium quotations of whaling follow this pattern, although in some rare cases premium rates were quoted in the winter months as well, incidentally with the same figures as in summer. An exception to this is the partially significant increase in quotations when autumn arrived, the vessels had not yet returned and the insured parties felt that they had to be reinsured, but this was not the rule. The premium rate averaged out for the time period up to 1807 was 3 ⅔ percent for sealing and 4 ⅔ percent for whaling. The premium rates for sealing consistently were around 1 percentage point lower than those for whaling, as for the latter insurance was required for larger vessels and harpooning of whales was more risky than culling seals. In 1779/80, both premium rates were increased – whether or not the war events in North America had a part to play in this is questionable – and in 1781, quotations for sealing were altogether suspended for the time being. In contrast, the premium rate quotations of the voyages to Arkhangelsk were subject to both long-term economic cycles and significant seasonal fluctuations. The former, however, were only partially in line with the economic cycles of the other Atlantic destinations determined by the war events. Up to 1747, the premium quotations for Arkhangelsk fluctuated between just under 3 percent and a good 4 percent on average over the year and then – despite all the naval wars in the Atlantic region – plummeted to only about 1 ¾ percent by 1758/60. However, they then rose again to 5 percent by 1775 and fluctuated around the 4 percent mark for a good decade. The fact that they plunged again in the early 1790s is due to the absence of the high rates in the winter months,

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

127

so that these figures appear ‘distorted’. The same applies to the peak of the 1797/98 curve: both extrema values are only due to the absence of the other monthly quotations. Thus, no influence of the Napoleonic Wars on the premium development can be determined until the Continental Blockade came. While the increase in the annual average premium rate of 1805 was probably still primarily due to the lack of quotations, there was also a significant increase in rates to 13 percent following the promulgation of the Berlin Decree in autumn 1806. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, however, the Arkhangelsk voyages seems to have hardly been carried out in spring (April), as the individual quotations were shifted further and further into the autumn. After the resumption of quotations after the Napoleonic Wars, the voyage to Arkhangelsk was initially quoted at a very high level – 17 percent – but this value returned to normal rather quickly. In 1818/19, it reached over 6 percent again, but then it tended to fall, apart from 1848/49, so much so that in the 1850s it was around 1 ½ percent. The seasonal fluctuations in the premium rate quotations for the voyages to Archangelsk were very high due to the weather. If in the period up to 1807 the quotations in the winter months took place at all, they were clearly above 6 percent, in December and January even at 7 ¼ to 7 ¾. In March, shortly before the April voyage, the average premium rate had already fallen below 2 percent, and from May to July, it was 1 ⅔ percent, before rising again from August onwards. With an average annual average of 3 ½ percent, the premium rate for the Arkhangelsk voyage was lower than that the insured were charged for the two voyages to Greenland. After 1814, the quotation then remained uninterrupted from December25 to February and only began to rise again in March, averaging just over 2 ⅛ percent. The lowest value was recorded in June at 1 ⅓ percent, and then premiums rose by 5 ⅔ percent until November. Arkhangelsk was also of further importance in the Hamburg marine insurance market: as the city had been a vital commercial partner for Hamburg since the 1760s, from 1782 onwards marine insurance premiums were also recorded for voyages from the White Sea to various European destinations, namely Amsterdam and London – with identical quotations – the Bay of Bourgneuf, Lisbon, and the Mediterranean. After 1814, only the premiums for Amsterdam and London – since 1820 with additional mention of Leith – and Lisbon (1820/21 also Porto was called) were continued relatively regularly and finally stopped in 1834. The quotations for the Mediterranean – under the designation “Barcelona, Marseille, Livorno” (Leghorn) – had already come to an end in 1820, those for the Bay of Bourgneuf – in 1820/21 under “Bordeaux” – in 1822. In 25

December quotations are only available in two cases between 1814 and 1859.

128

chapter 5

general, premium quotations for the market of Arkhangelsk in Hamburg were not as regular as those for voyages to and from Hamburg itself; quotations over the entire possible voyage period of a year, i.e. from April to December, were the exception rather than the rule, so that it is difficult to make general statements about the respective economic cycles. First of all, despite all the irregularities in the individual quotations, it should be noted that the relative levels of the individual premium quotations remained the same for many years. Amsterdam and London recorded the lowest rates, the Bay of Bourgneuf was ½ to 1 percent or slightly more, Lisbon another ½ to 1 percent. The Mediterranean was then above this with a clearer distance of 1 ½ to 2 percent, where not only the much further distance than Lisbon, but above all the danger emanating from the Barbary pirates increased the risk considerably. In a few years, however, the quotations for Amsterdam/ London and the Bay of Bourgneuf, or for the latter and Lisbon were almost to completely the same, but especially in times of war they also diverged further. In 1796, for instance, the average premiums for Northwest European destinations were around 6 percent, but those for Lisbon were 9 percent and those for the Mediterranean over 10 percent. A year later, the first three ranked from 6 ¼ to 7 ¾ percent, but the latter at 13 ¼ percent. Similar rates were recorded in 1801 and 1805. In the winter months of 1805 to 1807, the premium quotations for the Mediterranean even reached up to 25 percent, whereby the lower quotations of the summer months occurred only sporadically, resulting in com­ paratively high average figures. As with the other Atlantic destinations, the naval wars and then the Continental Blockade seem to have had an influence on the premiums quoted since the second half of the 1790s. When quotations resumed in 1814, the rates remained comparatively high for some years, again caused by irregular quotations. Only in the case of Bordeaux were they already below 2 percent on annual average in 1820, but even for Amsterdam/London, as they were only recorded from August, an annual average rate of 6 ⅛ per­ cent was reached. Only since 1823/24, the figures for Lisbon and Amsterdam/ London decreased significantly and, despite slight increases from 1827 to 1829, mostly remained below 3 percent, in 1832 even below 2 percent. Similar to the Hamburg quotations of the Arkhangelsk trade, the seasonal fluctuations were also considerable in the premiums for the Arkhangelsk destinations, both due to weather conditions and irregular quotations. From January to March, no information was given at all. In April, they started with very low rates, i.e. for the period until 1807 at 1 ⅜ percent for Amsterdam and London, at 1 ¾ percent for the Bay of Bourgneuf, at 2 ¼ percent for Lisbon, and at 4 ¼ percent for the Mediterranean. In the following months, they then

129

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

22,5000

Amsterdam & London

20,0000

Bay of Bourgneuf

17,5000

Lisbon

15,0000

Mediterranean

12,5000 10,0000 7,5000

5,0000 2,5000 0,0000

a) Annual average premium rates

Amsterdam/London

22,5000 20,0000 17,5000 15,0000 12,5000 10,0000 7,5000 5,0000 2,5000 0,0000

I

II

III

IV

V

Bay of Bourgneuf

VI

VII

VIII

Lisbon

IX

Mediterranean

X

XI

XII

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1782–1807 Amsterdam/London

17,5000 15,0000 12,5000 10,0000 7,5000 5,0000 2,5000 0,0000

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

Lisbon

IX

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 5-2 Arkhangelsk premium quotations, 1782–1834, in percent Source: Table A2-2

X

XI

XII

130

chapter 5

rose to their peak values in December, which ranged on average from 12 ⅛ to 20 ¼ percent. This range meant that, in the case of Northwestern European destinations, December figures were more than eight times higher than April figures. The increase in premium rates was moderate for all destinations until July/August, but after that they went up very steeply, especially from October to November and from November to December. Quotations were particularly frequent in the months from August to October, and they were for “arriving”, i.e. insurance was primarily for voyages to (and much less frequently from) Arkhangelsk from the individual destinations. It is obvious that at least a certain part of the quotations may have been for Arkhangelsk traders from Hamburg who did not sail directly to Arkhangelsk on their outward voyage but to other ports before, then entered the White Sea, tried to return to the Elbe again before winter and thus completed a kind of triangular voyage. For the period from 1814 onwards, a quite similar finding can be made, albeit on the basis of lower figures, which set in as early as March with average premiums of about 1 ½ percent, which then rose to 13 ½ percent for Amsterdam and London and 16 percent for Lisbon by December. The Portuguese destination, with an annual average of 5 ⅓ percent, was about 1 ½ percentage points higher than for Great Britain and the Netherlands. During this period, premiums were mainly quoted under the column “departing” in the spring months, i.e. for voyages from Arkhangelsk, and in autumn mainly for “arriving”. 5.2 Norway Hamburg’s trade with Bergen, until 1880 Norway’s most important port and largest city, lagged behind that of Bremen, Rostock, and Lübeck.26 It was “of very little importance” and took place only between 1789 and 1800 “with some regularity”, although with a small number of Hamburg vessels.27 Since 1736, the entire Norwegian west coast was listed as one destination named “Bergen, Trondheim”, which was not divided until 1762: along the Norwegian coast, the section between Kristiansund (in the north; hence “Kristiansund N”) and Trondheim now formed one destination, the Shetland Islands (Hittland), Bergen and eastern Norway the other. From the year 1820, the previous destination “Trondheim, Kristiansund” was continued unchanged, whereby Kristiansund was since the year 1691 a centre of the production of dried cod or stockfish that was exported as bacalao to the Iberian Peninsula. 26 27

Moltmann, Handelsschiffahrt, 74. Kresse, Materialien, 22.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

131

To the south, the destination “Bergen and Kristiansand” followed whereby from 1821, Kristiania (Oslo), the capital of Norway, was also specially mentioned, while Kristiansand was dropped from 1834 onwards. Kristiansand (early Christianssand), the capital of the so-called “South Land” (Sørlandet; hence “Kristiansand S”), had an easily accessible natural harbour, where passing vessels sought shelter from storms and from where timber was exported to the Netherlands originating from the Agder provinces.28 In 1835, a separate premium quotation was established for the northernmost part of Norway under the name “Tromsö, Hammerfest”, which “seems to be very popular”29 as business opportunities were respectable and risks comparatively low. The Hamburg premium quotation for the Norwegian west coast began in the 1730s with rates between 2 and 3 percent, with a rising tendency, but by no means to the same extent as for the other Atlantic destinations during the naval wars of the late 1740s and 1750s. In 1748/49, the premium rate stood just over 3 percent, but this ‘peak value’ was comparatively low, so that the influence of the wars on these premium quotations was rather small. After the tendency of the listed values to fall in the 1750s, from 1762 onwards – after the differentiation of the northern from the southern destination – the former was listed higher between ¼ to ¾ percent, which may reflect the considerably greater distance. However, both destinations could still be quoted at identical rates in single years, which indicates that the distance factor may not always have played a decisive role. It is noteworthy, however, that the premiums for the destinations did not develop in a certain cyclical synchronism. On the one hand, this is due to the more irregular way in which the rates are quoted for the northern destination, especially in the winter months, and on the other hand to the adverse weather conditions that are more of a risk factor for the more northerly anchorages, which may therefore have caused an ‘economic cycle’ that deviated from the values for Bergen etc. Only from the end of the 1780s onwards, a more or less parallel development of the quotations for the two destinations can be observed, with one exception: in 1791, the southern destination was only recorded in January and February, which resulted in a very high annual average premium rate, while the values for the northern destinations, which were significantly higher in the winter months, were ‘balanced’ again in the medium term by the regular year-round quotation, so that this annual 28 29

In later decades, the vessels from Christiania to Bergen, Hull, London, Hamburg, Rotterdam, and the steamships from Trondheim to Hamburg, Copenhagen, and Stettin (from 1827) anchored in Kristiansand. See Tuchtenhagen, Geschichte, 123. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger SeeAssecuranz-Geschäft des Jahres … von O. C. Gaedechens, 1835–1852 … des Jahres 1837, fol. 7.

132

chapter 5

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 5-3 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in Norway, 1736–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-3

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

133

average figure was significantly lower. Apart from this particular exception, the two series ran largely side by side, whereby – with peak values in 1801 – the naval wars of the Napoleonic Wars seem to have had a much lesser influence on the height of the quoted premiums than in the more southern Atlantic destinations. The same applies to the promulgation of the Continental Blockade in the autumn of 1806, which, although evident from an increase in premiums in 1807, is not particularly high. For the period from 1814 onwards, premium rates for both destinations again largely followed a parallel course, although the difference between the annual averages could be up to 1 percentage point. First of all, a clear drop in the annual averages can be seen, which, however, increased again in the early 1820s, only to fall back to figures well below 1 percent by the end of the period analysed, with the exception of 1848. The difference between the two destinations also decreased to 1 to 2 per mille points. In contrast, the third destination, which was added in 1835 and included the northernmost anchorages in Norway, was up to ¼ percentage points higher, provided that the quotations were regular, and at the end of the period under study even almost ½ percentage points higher. As for the Norwegian destinations, deviations from these basic trends were mainly caused by the sometimes irregular notation method, which could skew some annual average premium rates, especially if quotations were not available in the winter months. The seasonal fluctuations were quite high for all three Norwegian destinations. In the period up to 1807 they ranged from 1 ¼ or 1 ⅓ percent in June/July to 4 ½ or 4 ¾ percent in December/January, so that in the winter months they were quoted about three and a half times as high as in summer. Similar to the voyage to Arkhangelsk, however, the low summer quotations lasted long by comparison, mainly from April to September, in which months the differences in the individual premiums were marginal. In the period from 1814 until 1857, a largely similar finding can be seen, although the Trondheim destination in January reached a higher average value of 5 ⅓ percent than in the eighteenth century. The background is on the one hand very high premium rates in January (and February) of up to 8 ½ percent, but also on the other hand a lack of quotations, so that these rather extraordinary values are not offset by ‘normal’ values in other years. Between April and September the premiums for the two traditional destinations averaged between ⅔ and 1 ⅓ percent, and even for Tromsø and Hammerfest they were only 0.9 percent between May and July, while in November they were highest at 3 ¼ percent and from December to February only in individual years. The southern destination, by contrast, only recorded premiums of under 4 percent

134

chapter 5

even in January. Towards the end of the period under review, the premiums for the summer months had declined to values between ½ percent for the south and ¾ percent for Tromsø and Hammerfest. 5.3

From the German North Sea Coast to the Sound

When the Hamburg price current was first published regularly in 1736, no distinct section was intended for premium quotations for destinations along the German North Sea coast and Denmark. At first glance, the relative proximity of these destinations becomes apparent, which might be the reason for a lack of insurance cover for voyages into these regions, albeit this presumption seemed not to be the case. A comparison of individual data series demonstrates a high congruence progression between the annual average premium rate for the destinations “Göteborg, Sund” and “Jütland, Friesland, Bremen, Eider” since 1762. In demonstrating the congruence of annual average premium quotations, it seems to be very likely that in the early years of the official price current, voyages were insured to destinations along the German and the Danish coast that were subsumed under “Göteborg, Sund” but for accuracy should have gotten the name “to Gothenburg and/or the Sound.”30 A distinct section for voyages along adjacent parts of the North Sea coast (Jutland, Frisia, Bremen, Eider) was established only in 1762, which was the only ‘new’ destination that was established after the reorganization of the price current that year, while the existent destination “Göteborg, Sund” was renamed “Göteborg, Varberg, Helsingör, Kopenhagen”. In addition to the internationally important ports of Gothenburg and Copenhagen, which were also the headquarters of the East India Companies of Sweden and Denmark, the only regionally relevant ports of Varberg in the Swedish Halland on the Kattegat and Elsinore at the Danish side of the northern exit of the Öresund were also mentioned in this section. Until well into the eighteenth century, Elsinore only had floating bridges and a small harbour at the castle, Slotshavn, and only in the years 1764–1767, it got an actual port; this port or Kronborg castle was also the place where from 1429 to 1857, the Sound toll was collected from (approximately all) vessels that wanted to sail from the Kattegat to the Baltic Sea and vice versa. The fact that Elsinore was no longer specifically mentioned in this destination from 1781 onwards indicates that its relevance as a trading port and port of call for Hamburg shipping was only of secondary importance from a Hamburg perspective. From 30

Incidentally, such simplified heading descriptions can also be found in the insurance price current in other cases, especially for non-European destinations.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

135

1820 onwards, the destination concerning the Sound as an access to the Baltic Sea area continued to be listed under “Gothenburg and Copenhagen”, until 1821 briefly under the section “Schonen” (Scania). In 1834, a separate rubric was established for Copenhagen, which only differed from that of Gothenburg in a few individual quotations and was therefore discontinued as early as 1842. In general, Copenhagen seems to have been clearly subordinated to Gothenburg within this destination, as a large part of the commodities destined for Copenhagen were delivered from Hamburg either overland or via Lübeck (see below) to avoid paying the Sound toll. Between 1835 and 1842, the Gothenburg section also mentions the small port of Halmstad, which is located in the Halland region halfway between Malmö and Gothenburg at the mouth of the Nissan river. Why, in addition to the international ports of Gothenburg and Copenhagen, small ports such as Varberg or Halmstad were also mentioned in this section could not be detected. The second destination, introduced in 1762, spanned the entire Danish coastal region from Skagerrak to the river Eider, plus the Frisian land and islands, and Bremen. Emden, which had belonged to the Kingdom of Prussia since 1744, achieved supra-regional prominence in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Prussian East India Company and a herring fishing company (from 1769) had set up their headquarters, despite its disadvantageous port.31 For this positive development, the free port privilege of 15 November 175132 on the one hand, and the neutrality of the Prussian flag in the naval wars of the Northwest European powers on the other, were responsible.33 Bremen was connected with Hamburg from about 1630 by some kind of cabotage (or the so-called Kleine Küstenfahrt), a regular transportation service in form of a defined order of smaller vessels, which was called Reihe- or Börtfahrt. This was 31

32 33

“Since the Ems had changed its course, a constantly increasing silting up of the fairway had occurred. Vessels arriving from seaward were only able to enter the port at particularly high tide and fair winds. Because of the insufficient depth of the Ems, the commodities destined for the hinterland had to be reloaded into barges and then taken to their destination by Emden skippers, while the vessels sailed empty behind”; Müller, Schiffahrt, 98. Only vessels with a maximum draught of 3 to 3.5 meters could enter the port without problems, and only in the Hanoverian period, 1846–1848, a new fairway of 4 to 4.5 meters depth was dug. “But the inland port of 1600 m length, 4.8 m depth and a bed width of 17.6 m was still exposed to the tide and the port soon silted up again, while at the same time the outer fairway suffered from increasing silting. The arrival and departure of larger ocean-going vessels was soon impossible again, they had to anchor and lighten again as before in the roads of the Ems”; ibid., 128–129 (cit. 129). Ibid., 163 (annex 2). Ibid. For the statistical underpinning of this finding, cf. Kaufhold and Wallbaum (eds.), Ostfriesland, 485–571.

136

chapter 5

the same in the case of Amsterdam, and therefore, the cabotage to Bremen was organised according to the Amsterdam Börtordnung, which is documented until 1786/97.34 The Kleine Küstenfahrt was considered to be a “threshold not only between sea and inland navigation, but also between freight and fishing.” Even though in the nineteenth century the Weser was open to traffic, it lost its importance for Hamburg, as Bremen’s relevance as Hamburg’s entrepôt to North America went down in the wake of Hamburg’s increasing direct traffic to America.35 Apart from Bremen and Emden, only smaller ports were located in this destination, although they gained their importance by serving as intermediaries for Hamburg’s trade during the British blockade of the Elbe in the first decade of the nineteenth century. The relatively most important of these was Tönning at the Eider, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had only handled local and medium long-distance traffic to Norway, Danzig, France, or England. After the construction of the Eider Canal (1777–1784), which connected the Kiel Fjord by the Levensau to the Eider near Rendsburg via six water locks, Tönning, as western port of discharge, recorded a significantly increased volume of cargo with agricultural products of the region.36 In addition, by the Treaty of Tsarskoe Selo of 27 August 1773, the Holstein territories of the Russian heir to the throne Paul Petrovich, Duke of Holstein-Gottorf (1762–1773), the later Tsar Paul I (1796–1801), were ceded to the Kingdom of Denmark.37 This “gave Kiel a new role as a bridgehead in sea to land traffic between Copenhagen and Hamburg at the expense of Lübeck. In this sense, regular maritime traffic between Copenhagen and the Kiel Fjord began to develop.”38 This was also reflected in the Hamburg insurance price current: from 1820 to 1834, a premium was recorded for the trip from Copenhagen to Kiel by packet vessel, which was

34 35 36

37

38

Cf. SWHA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 14,2 rot: Bremer Börtfahrt 1717, 1769–71. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 19–21 (cit. 21). Köppen, Handelsbeziehungen, 139–140. Cf. also Kellenbenz, “Landverkehr,” 87: “In contrast to the numerous canals in England, France, the Netherlands, and Prussia, which were primarily used for domestic traffic, the Eider Channel became important for international traffic from Amsterdam to (Saint) Petersburg. In 1785, 453 vessels passed through the canal, in 1788 there were 1072.” This treaty between Russia, Denmark, and the prince bishop of Lübeck contained the largest barter deal of the eighteenth century: Holstein became a part of Denmark, Lübeck’s Prince Bishop Friedrich August I of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorf (1750–1785) received the County of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, which was raised to the status of Duchy of Oldenburg by Joseph II (1765–1790) in 1774. Kellenbenz, “Landverkehr,” 87.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

137

almost always below 1 percent and from 1827 in the summer months (May to July/August) was only 5/16 percent. During the time of the Elbe blockades, when France also occupied the Electorate of Hanover and Hamburg’s Amt Ritzebüttel inclusive of Cuxhaven in 1803, the previously neutral Hamburg was excluded from international trade, especially in bulk goods, e.g. black coal. So, the trade on the Elbe relocated to Tönning in addition to Bremen, Stettin, Emden, Lübeck, and Kiel:39 [T]he port [of Tönning; M.D.] could be called spacious before 1805; since then it is no longer possible. Since the Elbe blockade, no vessel that drafts more than 10 feet [of water] are permitted to enter the port, in order not to disturb the journey. Larger vessels have to be anchored on the beach in winter and on the river [the Eider; M.D.] in summer. The roadstead is quite safe. In the past, smaller vessels drove up half a mile in case of persistent western storms. Nowadays the larger vessels lie on the river in safety and are not allowed to go that far up the river. As much as possible, all vessels are discharged as soon as they arrive…. fruit-carrying vessels, and those that have loaded manufactured goods [from England; M.D.] for the [Leipzig; M.D.] fairs take precedence over the rest when unloading.40 Between 1803 and 1807/10 all traffic destined for Hamburg landed in Tönning, wherefrom the merchants mostly transported the cargo overland: [T]he direct land route is still heavily used. Articles of great value take it to save the insurance premium. All English manufactured goods go by road. However, all goods that are in great haste must also be shipped in this way…. The Wadden Sea was used at the beginning of the Elbe blockade, sometimes, but with concern whether England would permit it. Before they would reach Tönning, the goods are usually unshipped on the Eider into smaller vehicles, and go across the mud flats along the coast of Dithmarschen directly to Hamburg.41 Tönning, after the attempt to upgrade Kiel to an entrepôt for Hamburg’s trade had failed due to the excessively high freight costs overland, became

39 40 41

North, “Kontinentalsperre,” 137; Marzagalli, Le négoce maritime, 155–163. Cf. Schmidt, “Bordeaux”; Gehrmann, Handelskonjunkturen, 165–171; Vogel, Hansestädte, 12. Nemnich, Tönning, 14–15. Ibid., 30–31.

138

chapter 5

an outstanding port for the trade to Hamburg.42 Located in the still neutral Denmark and at a relatively far distance from the French sphere of influence, the city by the Eider grew into “to the most important staple place at the North Sea,”43 not least for Hamburg’s direct trade to the Americas.44 In the summer of 1805, for example, vessels sailed from Tönning to Montevideo at the behest of Hamburg citizens, insured at a premium of 10 percent – a ‘moderate’ rate according to estimates of the time.45 From a Hamburg perspective, Tönning had become so important that “the Hamburg insurers … have an authorized representative in Tönning, who will assist the shipmasters and merchants in every way in the event of accident, and in doing so must act to the best of his consignor’s interests.”46 However, this remarkable ‘special economic cycle’ ended when England set up a goods depot on Heligoland in 1807: “[T]his became important when Denmark joined the Continental System in 1808 and Tönning lost its importance as a smuggling port.”47 On 6 June 1810, King Frederick VI of Denmark (1808–1839) closed the port of Tönning, as well as Husum and all other Danish ports in Schleswig and Holstein, to North American vessels, probably at the instigation of Napoleon.48 The destination “Jütland, Friesland, Bremen, Eider” was also divided into several premium quotations in 1820: first, East Friesland with Emden and Leer was split off, while Bremen was still counted as part of “Tönning, Ripen, Ringköbing”, i.e. the area of the Eider (Tönning) and West Jutland with Ribe and Ringkøbing as the most important ports. As early as 1821 Bremen was moved to the East Frisian destination, thus uniting the ports of the Weser and Ems estuaries. Ultimately, this was coastal shipping, which served not least to connect the Kingdom of Hanover to Hamburg’s trade on the seaward side. From 1821 the more northern destination appears under “Tönning, Husum, West Jütland” and was again divided in 1835, on the one hand into “Tönning, Husum”, i.e. the area from the Eider to North Frisia. On the other hand, one may 42 43 44 45 46

47 48

Oddy, European Commerce, 51, 59 and 61. Köppen, Handelsbeziehungen, 141. Concerning the routes for the transport of goods from Tönning to Hamburg see Oddy, European Commerce, 62. Köppen, Handelsbeziehungen, 142–152; Vogt, Beitrag, 46–47. Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 272. Nemnich, Tönning, 16. Even some kind of stock exchange meeting was held in Tönning: “[A]n open space near the port is mockingly called The Royal Exchange. Here, in the afternoon between 4 and 6 o’clock, freight forwarders, brokers, shipmasters etc. gather”; ibid., 36. North, “Kontinentalsperre,” 140. Cf. Marzagalli, Le négoce maritime, 155–164 and 176–180; Gehrmann, Handelskonjunkturen, 159–171; Moorhenn, Helgoland, 27–45; Heckscher, Continental-System, 178–180. Köppen, Handelsbeziehungen, 166–168.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

139

find “Ringköbing, Ripen, Warde” and thus the West Jutlandic area, whereby the port of Varde, located between Ringkøbing and Ribe, was mentioned for the first time. Already in 1842 this division was reversed and the two destinations, which had been separated in 1835, were joined into one covering Tönnig, Husum, and the west coast of Jutland. In addition, an East Jutland destination was created in 1820, which until 1821 operated under the name “Aalburg, Randers, Ahus”. Called “Ostküste von Jütland” from 1821 onwards, the ports of Aalborg and Randers were again named between 1835 and 1842, but excluding Åhus. From 1843 the name changed to “Agger Canal, Ost-Jütland”, hiding a shift in shipping, which from 1834 onwards had been affected by the storm tide of 1825. The Agger Channel was created by the storm tide of 3 February 1825, the Great Hallig Flood.49 This canal enabled vessels to go from the North Sea through the Limfjord to Aalborg, the largest city and most important port on the fjord, and from there to the east coast of Jutland without having to sail along the north coast of Jutland through the Skagerrak and Kattegat, which significantly shortened the distance to the ports on the east coast of Jutland. Located three kilometres north of the present Thyborøn Channel and named after Agger Tange, a 8.5 kilometre long promontory in North Jutland’s southwest, or the village of Agger, the channel widened to 440 metres by ocean drift by 1849. Maritime traffic passing through the Agger Channel experienced a remarkable spike in trade for the towns on the Western Limfjord. In 1855, about 1,800 vessels sailed through the channel, which then started to silt up again towards the end of the study period.50 Hamburg’s maritime traffic with the ports along the German North Sea coast with Emden and Husum as the most important ports was – similar to the traffic with the Netherlands – mainly carried out by small vehicles,51 which were organised by Emden as regular transportation service. The export of the [East Frisian; M.D.] national products was mainly mediated by regular transportation services. Such regular voyages were maintained with Amsterdam, Bremen, Hamburg and the towns on the East Frisian coast. The essence of this institution was that a number of shipowners let their vessels sail one after the other. Each vessel lay ‘on the beurt’ for a certain period of time, during which only this and no other 49 50 51

Cf. Arends, Sturmfluten; Höch, “Sturmflut”. The storm tide of 1862 then created the Thyborøn Channel, so that shipping through the Agger Channel was abandoned in the mid-1860s. In 1875 the Agger Channel was finally closed in favour of the Thyborøn Channel. Moltmann, Handelsschiffahrt, 82.

140

chapter 5

vehicle was allowed to take on cargo. Once the time limit had expired, it had to sail off, regardless of whether it had full cargo or not, and the next vessel next in line took its place. The vessels used for this service going to Amsterdam and Hamburg must have had a capacity of 18 last, the one to Bremen 15 last.52 The plans conceived in 1847 to establish steam liner services with Tönning and with Gothenburg did not come to fruition.53 The annual average premium rates for the destination reaching to the Sound were at a rather low level in the eighteenth century compared to other countries, generally between 2 and 3 percent, but with a slight upward trend over the decades. Relative peaks were reached in individual war years, such as 1747/48 (> 2 ½ percent), 1759 (> 3 percent), and 1785 (just under 3 ½ percent). Only in the warlike 1790s were they consistently above 2 ½ percent, only to fall below 2 percent again from 1804 to 1806; in 1807 they rose again to 3 percent. However, the quotations were suspended several times between 1803 and 1805, during the second British blockade of the Elbe, and in the first half of 1807, when Great Britain waged war against the Danish fleet in the Sound and off Copenhagen. The quotations of the second destination from the Ems to Jutland from 1762 onwards essentially followed the cyclical course of those to the Sound, but with annual averages of around ½ to 1 percent below, mostly around ¾ percent. Therefore, the background to the establishment of this destination could have been that those vessels that did not sail as far as Gothenburg or the ports near the Sound but had their port of destination in a geographically much greater proximity to Hamburg were not to be insured at the same high premiums as the vessels that went on longer and farther voyages, but at an appropriately lower percentage. This development continued after 1814, when premium quotations for both destinations resumed. Initially, the difference between the respective annual averages was about 1 percentage point, but it decreased in the 1830s to ½ and then to ¼ percentage point by the end of the period analysed in study. In 1820, both previously listed destinations were differentiated again. From the destination reaching to the Sound, another one was split off for East Jutland, which, however, had only slightly lower annual average values than the former: initially these were in the per mill range, then in the 1850s in the tenths of a per mill range. The destination from river Ems to Jutland was divided into 52 53

Müller, Schiffahrt, 149. Cf. Baasch, Börtfahrt. Baasch, Hamburgs Handel, 35.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

141

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 5-4 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations from the German North Sea coast to the Sound, 1736–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-4

142

chapter 5

one for the German North Sea coast and one for West Jutland, which since the 1830s were also quite close to each other in their annual averages, but also showed differences of ⅓ percentage point, in the 1850s only of ¼ percentage point. All quotations on an annual average since the 1830s showed a downward trend, with the exception of the peaks of 1848, so that at the end of the period under study the annual average for the nearby German North Sea ports was still ½ percent and that for the other destinations around ¾ percent. In the period until 1807, the monthly averages of the destination reaching up to the Sound showed quite high differences between the individual months. The highest figures were recorded in December and January with over 4 percent, the lowest from May to August with 1 ¼ to 1 ⅖ percent. In some years, January values could even rise above 6 percent, while those in the summer months reached just 1 percent or even slightly below. For the destination from the Ems to Jutland, the differences between the individual monthly averages were much smaller, ranging from about 1 to ⅛ percent in the summer months to 2 ¾ percent in December and January. The voyage to the Sound also showed the highest figures and differences between the respective monthly averages in the period from 1814 onwards. They were even higher for January than in the period up to 1807, as very high rates, up to 7 ½ percent, were quoted here in the 1810s and 1820s, while since the 1830s there were no more premium quotations at all in January and February, and partly also in December, while the voyage to the Sound seems to have been mostly suspended. This applies similarly to the destinations of West and East Jutland, although the December quotations only ceased between 1827 and 1842, whereas the quotations for January and February were often from 1829 to the end of the period under study. Only the destinations of the nearby North Sea ports were listed reasonably regularly throughout the winter months. The monthly averages for East Jutland in the winter months were about ½ percentage points lower than those for voyages to the Sound, while between April and October the difference was only 0.1 percentage points. The lowest average values and the difference between the individual months were for the destination from the Ems to Jutland; even in January these reached only just over 2 percent and even fell between May and July under ½ percent, as they had often been only ⅜ or 5/16 percent since the late 1820s. By 1859, even in the winter months, they had fallen to only ½ to ¾ percent. The monthly averages for West Jutland then lay between the latter and those for East Jutland, with an average of about 3 percent in January and 0.56 percent in the summer; since the 1840s, they generally ranged between May and July at ½ percent, and towards the end of the 1850s even at ⅜ percent.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

5.4

143

The Netherlands

“The diversity of Dutch trade in conjunction with close family ties, which had been initiated by the acceptance of Dutch refugees, promoted Hamburg’s trade and maritime traffic with the Netherlands to an extraordinary degree.”54 In the eighteenth century, the Netherlands consistently occupied a leading position in Hamburg shipping traffic in terms of the number of ships leaving seaward. However, these generally rather small vessels were used chiefly to import herring.55 Main exported commodities were grain and timber from the Baltic, traded in bulk. The general cargo traffic was handled as Bört- or Reihefahrt (beurtvaart), which was established at the end of the sixteenth century and first regulated in 1613:56 The participating vessels were loaded and departed one after the other, so that a vessel could only start loading when the previous one had departed, which guaranteed regular voyages and fixed freight rates: [T]he Bört- or Reihefahrt was operated by a shipmasters’ guild whose members – Amsterdamers and Hamburgers – were obliged to sail one after the other at intervals of six, ten, or fourteen days, whether they carried a full load or not, and to accept everyone’s goods, especially general cargo, at the prescribed moderate freight rates. The shipmasters had the advantage of having to suffer no competition on the day of departure. The advantage for the merchants of both cities, however, was the regular and reasonably punctual ship connection to the other port, especially for smaller cargoes.57 The Börtfahrt, which had to be interrupted during the French Period was resumed again in 1816 but seems to have been no longer efficient enough, so that in April 1820 its end was announced in the stock exchanges of both cities.58 Since the 1730s, the trade with the Netherlands was declining in terms of the number of vessels used, which can be attributed not so much to declining grain deliveries but primarily to an increase in imports of overseas

54 55 56 57 58

Moltmann, Handelsschiffahrt, 80. Röhlk, Schiffahrt und Handel, 41–46 and 56–70, esp. 70. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerbibliothek S/599 Nr. 19 rot, fasc. 4: Schiffswesen V.: Specielle Fahrten, Konv. Mss. betr. Amsterdamer Börtfahrt, 1655–1783 – Börtordnung, undat­ iert; Extract der Börrt-Ordnung von A° 1613 von Hamburg auff Amsterdam. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 16–17. Röhlk, Schiffahrt und Handel, 52–17; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 17.

144

chapter 5

products from France.59 By the mid-1830s, the Hamburg-Amsterdam trading connection was almost completely severed, as Dutch steam vessels had taken over this business.60 “In contrast to the bustling traffic between Hamburg and Holland, a maritime connection of the Hanse city to the Southern Netherlands was of little importance.”61 Here, the Scheldt Estuary – the gateway to Antwerp – was sealed off from international maritime traffic well into the 1790s, since the Spanish had occupied it on 17 August 1585.62 So, vessels coming from Hamburg had to use the harbour of Ostend, which got ever more relevant in the wake of the Reforms of Emperor Joseph II (1765–1790). It is not without reason that the Hamburg insurance price current quoted Ostend premiums between 1782 and 1791.63 “However, it was mostly coasting vessels that upheld the not very extensive traffic, travelling to Ostend and on to Dunkirk.”64 After the French occupation of the Southern Netherlands, this traffic stopped in 1798. In 1796 Hamburg already had established a still very irregular connection to Antwerp to fill the blank, after the French had proclaimed the re-opening of the Scheldt Estuary in 1794, which was recognized by the Batavian Republic in 1795.65 In the Hamburg price current of the eighteenth century, “Holland”, i.e. the Republic of the Seven United Provinces, or the United Netherlands, was listed first, which not only hints at the geographically close proximity but also the outstanding importance of the Northern Netherlands in trade as well as in the marine insurance business. Since 1762, this destination was known as “Holland, Zeeland”. The Southern Netherlands including Antwerp were not taken into account until the reorganisation of the insurance price current in 1820; despite their joint membership of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands, or the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1815–1831), the Northern and the Southern Netherlands formed the destinations “Holland” and (later) “Belgium”. The first of these appeared as “Amsterdam, Rotterdam”, since 1843 as “Holland”. Zeeland was omitted from the price current, as Middelburg had lost its former position 59 60 61 62 63

64 65

Moltmann, Handelsschiffahrt, 80–82. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 17. Röhlk, Schiffahrt und Handel, 71. Cf. de Nave (ed.), Antwerpen; van der Wee, Growth, vol. II, 258–260; Hildebrandt, “Bedeutung Antwerpens,” 10–17. Specifically, these are premiums for the Bay of Bourgneuf, Bristol, Liverpool, Glasgow and Ireland, Portugal and Spain as far as Cádiz, the Spanish coast in the Mediterranean, the French coast in the Mediterranean, England and France in the Channel, the Italian coast to Leghorn and Messina as well as Ancona, Venice and Trieste. – Cf. for the older times also Baasch, “Ostende”. Kresse, Materialien, 23. Ibid.; Röhlk, Schiffahrt und Handel, 71.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

145

in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784) due to the imminent occupation by the French and the silting up of its canals, which increasingly hampered the port’s accessibility.66 Rotterdam and the traffic on the Meuse were, however, “without any significance” from a Hamburg perspective in the eighteenth century – with the exception of the years 1794 to 1796; only after the Napoleonic Wars did this change “markedly.”67 The Belgian destination was recorded as “Antwerp, Ostend” since 1820, in reference to the Final Act of the Vienna Congress re-opening of the Scheldt Estuary to international trade and maritime traffic, which enabled Antwerp to regain its status as a port of international relevance. Yet maritime traffic between Antwerp and Hamburg was not of great relevance, less than 2 percent of the total number of vessels arrived from, or departed to the other city.68 Between 1821 and 1834, this Belgian destination stretched as far as to Le Havre, which did not make it on the price current prior to 1820. Le Havre was categorised as a distinct destination from 1824 to 1826, excluding Rouen, which had been included until 1820. From 1835 onwards, after the foundation of the Kingdom of Belgium, Ghent was added to the Antwerp and Ostend destination. Despite Ghent’s relative inland location, this commercial centre was the continental European ‘textile capital’ at the end of the 1820s and was (indeed) considered a ‘seaport’ from Hamburg’s perspective, because Ghent was connected with Antwerp via the river Scheldt and via an expanding and consolidating canal system – and here especially the canal between Ghent and Terneuzen constructed from 1825 to 1827 – with the Western Scheldt and the North Sea. Since 1843 this destination was called “Belgium.” Not least due to the proximity and relative safety of coastal shipping, even in the eighteenth century the marine insurance premium rates quoted in Hamburg for “Holland”, or the Netherlands, were already on the low end by international comparison. Until the mid-1770s the premiums quoted usually ranged between 1 ¼ and 1 ½ percent. A slight rise in the rates was noticeable only at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession (1748). The premiums again started to increase in the second half of the 1770s when the Netherlands supported the future United States in the fight for their independence from Great Britain, leading up to the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. The growing unsafety of sea travel in the Northern Atlantic and in the English Channel of these years found expression in an upward trend of premium rates for Holland. Since 1785, they bounced back just as quickly to a ‘normal’ level, only to soar up in 66 67 68

Cf. Sigmond, Nederlandse zeehavens. Röhlk, Schiffahrt und Handel, 70. Ibid., 72.

146

chapter 5

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 5-5 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Netherlands, 1736–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-5

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

147

the wake of the Wars of the First and the Second Coalition in the 1790s, the so-called Revolutionary Wars. The premium rates were skyrocketing in particular during the French occupation of the Netherlands (1794/95), at the time of the proclamation of the Batavian Republic (on 19 January 1795), during and after the French coups d’état of 1798 and 1801, and during the enforcement of the Continental Blockade proclaimed in 1806. The latter was carried out rather superficially under the rule of Napoleon’s brother, King Louis Napoléon Bonaparte of Holland (1806–1810). Above all – and contrary to France’s orders – the ports of Holland were not closed to maritime traffic. Nevertheless, shipping in and with the Netherlands hit a dangerously low point. With the resumption of insurance premium quotations in Hamburg in 1814, the destination Holland was soon back at the rather low level of pre-1775 after some comparatively high values in the winter of 1814/15. Since 1817, the annual average was below 1 ½ percent showing a downward trend, so that in the 1830s, average premiums around 1 percent were common, which, with the exception of 1847/48, continued to decline and just reached a good ½ percent towards the end of the period under study. When an independent quotation was established in 1820 for the ports of the Southern Netherlands, and especially for the re-emergent Antwerp, premium rates were at a comparatively low level, but in the following years they rose significantly due to the weather-related high premiums in the winter months. It was not until 1825 that the Belgian quotations normalised and were now regularly 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points above the Dutch ones. Even in the revolutionary year 1830, the distance between the two destinations hardly increased at all, and the Anglo-French blockade of the Dutch coast and especially the Scheldt from 1831 to 1833 had no effect whatsoever.69 In the following three decades, the economic cycles of the two series became more and more similar, so that in the 1850s (with the exception of 1854) the differences in annual averages fell below 0.1 percentage points. However, the differences between individual monthly average premium rates increased from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, which can be ascribed to the use of small vessels that sailed to Holland in coastal waters and small changes between the summer and winter months in the first period of investigation up to 1807. Quoted at average monthly rates between 2.3 to 2.4 percent, December and January premium rates were the most expensive throughout this period, while from June to August they were only just over 1 percent. In the period from 1814 onwards, the average premium rates for the winter months mentioned above very barely declined (2.2 to 2.4 percent), 69

Cf. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 19; Stubmann, Hamburg, 4.

148

chapter 5

whereas the average premium rates calculated for April to August plunged to just 0.5 to 0.6 percent. Premium quotations of ⅜ percent were the rule rather than the exception in these months. The corresponding figures for the Belgian destination were also of the same order of magnitude in the summer months, while monthly averages exceeded 2.8 percent in December and January and still substantially higher than for the Dutch destination. The differences between the winter and summer months had thus become greater. In other words: the weather-related safety risks in winter had not changed since the eighteenth century. Summer navigation, which was already quite low risk in the eighteenth century, seemed to have become even less problematic. All in all, the annual average premium rate for the destination Holland fell from 1 ½ to just over 1 percent, while it was somewhat higher for Belgium with just under 1 ¼ percent after 1814. 5.5

The British Isles

Great Britain had already been one of Hamburg’s most esteemed trading partners in the eighteenth century, but it was not until after 1815 that it attained an almost imperious position due to the import of manufactures into Germany via Hamburg. Until the end of the Ancien Régime, the British Isles ranked far behind France in terms of seaborne imports (see Graph 2-2). After all, Hamburg’s imports from the British Isles regularly amounted to between 2.5 and 5 million Mark Banko, excluding the duty-free import of grain and black coal. The years 1762/63 were exceptional, as Great Britain overtook France as Hamburg’s most important trading partner for the first time at the end of the Seven Years’ War. Until 1798, a solid 30 percent of Hamburg’s total seaborne imports from countries south of the Scheldt were accounted for by Great Britain, although only 0.9 percent came from Ireland and 2.05 percent from Scotland, with England domineering at a whopping 96 percent. In the nineteenth century, Hamburg’s most important maritime trading partner by far was Great Britain, which accounted for a good half of the value of imports and more than a third of exports. Immense imports of manufactured and industrial goods (finished and semi-finished products), which initially was driven by the textile industry and later followed by more and more branches of industry, but also of overseas raw materials and English black coal were behind these figures. Around 1840, yarn and manufactures from England alone made up for between 35 and 40 percent of Hamburg’s total annual seaborne imports.70 In 70

Soetbeer, Hamburgs Handel, vol. 2, 155–160; vol. 3, 144.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

149

the years from 1846 to 1859, an average of 26.05 percent of all imports came from Great Britain each year; in relation to seaborne imports, the figure was even 46.40 percent.71 For all these products Hamburg was the ‘gateway’ to Central Europe. However, the thriving commerce with Great Britain does not appear to have transmitted to the marine insurance business. Other than the significant increase in trade would suggest, voyages from and to Great Britain rarely were covered by insurance, because … marine insurance contracts were typically concluded by the parties for whose account the transactions were carried out; if the latter worked with loans, they were usually insured in the country of the lender. This could be Hamburg; … but the far greater number of contracts [went] to England, in particular, transactions financed by borrowed capital preferably were insured in London for the provision of a more extensive risk coverage; thus the already existing credit balance in England’s favour in this area grew even beyond the framework set by the movement of goods between Germany and England alone.72 In the insurance business with England in the nineteenth century, it was common that “mostly only the risk of a total loss (‘free of average’)” was insured. The insurance value was composed of the ‘free on board’ (‘FOB’) value73 of the goods to be delivered plus 10 percent.74 While Hamburg’s maritime traffic to England was rather dull, in the other direction, England’s had been on the rise since the late sixteenth century. Also more English than Hamburg vessels maintained the regular transportation service in the form of a Bört- or Reihefahrt that began operation in 1768 to connect London and Hamburg,75 as had been common practice between Amsterdam and Hamburg for many decades. “The grain trade that began in the eighteenth century to feed a growing industrial population busied Hamburg’s sailing vessels.”76 Voyages to England, to London specifically, were of paramount importance for Hamburg vessels because of England’s need for timber and grain; with London being called at on about four-fifths of all maritime 71 72 73 74 75 76

Tabellarische Uebersichten … 1857 [1858], 1f.; dito … 1861 [1862], 1–2. Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 224–225. Weick, “Incoterms,” 585. Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 350 note 396. SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/599 Nr. 14,2 rot, fasc. 6: Convention betr. Bootfahrt Hamburg – London 1769 und 70. Moltmann, Handelsschiffahrt, 84.

150

chapter 5

voyages to England. In contrast, the other ports fell far behind: Hull was a well-frequented alternative port during wartime, Liverpool only gained in relevance from the 1790s onwards “in connection with the North America voyage of Hamburg vessels”, and Bristol with the Severn Estuary did not become important for Hamburg until the middle of the nineteenth century.77 In contrast, the voyage to London from the 1820s onwards became “a woefully little important” event for Hamburg, even if it continued until the 1850s. A scheduled liner service utilising screw steamers replaced that connection in 1848, first under Robert Miles Sloman’s (1783–1867) auspices.78 Hamburg’s, and Central Europe’s, hunger for black coal, which came from Newcastle by the legendary ‘coal fleets of Newcastle’,79 from Leith, and since 1795 from Sunderland, almost exclusively was shipped on British, but rarely on Hamburg vessels unless they returned to one of the three Hanse cities.80 In addition, Hamburg vessels were excluded from voyages between British ports as well as from such voyages to British non-European territories.81 As for the British Isles, when introduced in 1736, the insurance price current only differentiated between two destinations due to their relevance for Hamburg’s trade. On the one hand, “London, Hull, Exon” was named; on the other hand, the Anglo-Welsh west coast with Bristol formed the second destination together with Ireland. Looking at the first and much more important destination, the Hamburg Admiralitäts- und Convovgeld-Einnahmebücher reveal that London was the dominant port (83 percent), and only Exmouth with Topsham (together 12 percent) and Kingston upon Hull (4 ½ percent) are worth mentioning, which were exactly the three ports that are also mentioned as destinations in the marine insurance price current.82 This destination covered the east coast of England from the Thames estuary via the Humber with the central transshipment point Kingston upon Hull and the south coast to 77 78 79

80 81 82

Kresse, Materialien, 20; idem, Fahrtgebiete, 24. Ibid., 23, 28 (cit. 23). – Concerning Sloman cf. Küttner, “Sloman”. And also of the Hamburg merchant fleet, as Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 31, writes: “A coal brig, which sails seven times a year in ballast to Newcastle upon Tyne, and returns to Hamburg fully laden, has after five years achieved a transport performance that was remarkable for its time. For our imagination is still not quite kindled by these voyages across the North Sea … The coals are being wronged…. [They] are developing … into the bulk cargo that is becoming one of the most important cargoes for the smaller vehicles of the Hamburg merchant fleet alongside grain and timber.” Moltmann, Handelsschiffahrt, 83; Kresse, Materialien, 20 and 31. Idem, Fahrtgebiete, 24. Schneider; Krawehl and Denzel (eds.), Statistik, passim. The role of Scottish ports for Hamburg’s trade, however, came close to nothing (together 0.05 percent). For this distinction cf. Childs, “Networks”.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

151

the river Exe with Topsham to its eastern bank and Exmouth at its estuary. Exmouth, the port of Exeter, “[conducts] a lively maritime trade … where vessels of 100 to 150 tons can reach the town”, but was “a negligible trading place by the sea.”83 Hull’s supreme status is explained by its function as a port for the up-and-coming manufacturing and industrial cities of Northern England, especially Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield. Of these, Manchester was connected to Hull by a canal. All three sourced raw materials and semi-finished products from the Baltic Sea region and Scandinavia via the Humber waterway and at the same time transported some of their exports, to Hamburg, for example, using this way.84 The trade between Hamburg and Hull was therefore not so much own-account trade on both sides, but was primarily ‘in transito’.85 Although this was a very important relationship, it was not possible to establish a regular shipping service between the two cities.86 This was achieved from Leith by an English company founded in 1815.87 Between Hull and Hamburg, English sailing vessels dominated again from the 1820s onwards, as they had done before 1780. In addition, Joseph Gee’s steam vessels were added to augment the service from about 1830 onwards, and only from 1841 onwards those of the Hanseatische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft and later the Elbe-Humber-Dampfschifffahrt Gesellschaft.88 The second destination, the Anglo-Welsh west coast and Ireland, mentioned only Bristol as the most important intercontinental trading port in this region. Ireland could only be called at irregular intervals by Hamburg vessels, namely when the British government allowed it, to purchase butter as a priority.89 The 1762 reform of the price current brought, among others, a clear distinction between the English east and south coast. While ‘the east coast’ led from the Thames estuary (London) via the Humber (Kingston upon Hull) to the Tyne (Newcastle upon Tyne), ‘the south coast’ was defined as stretching from Exmouth to Topsham in Devon via Plymouth to Falmouth in Cornwall. The destination Ireland and England’s west coast appeared from 1762 on the British side from Bristol via Liverpool to Glasgow, Scotland’s main port, so that Scotland was now also integrated into the Hamburg insurance price current. Once again, this was in line with the demands that trading and marine business 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. III, 111. East, “Kingston-upon-Hull”; Jackson, Hull, 142; cf. Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 151–153; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 28; Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. III, 172. Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 152. Baasch, Handelskammer, vol. I, 344; cf. Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 152. Ibid., 154. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 28–30. Idem, Materialien, 20–21.

152

chapter 5

made on the Hamburg insurance market. For in the North Sea area, the British east coast from London up to Leith in Scotland, the outer port of Edinburgh,90 and Wick just off the Orkney Islands was by far the most important destination in terms of value, after the Admiralitätszoll- und Convoygeld-Einnahmebücher scoring a good 18 percent of Hamburg’s total imports in terms of value. With a share of more than two thirds of the recorded value of goods, London was by far the most important port of export of this destination, followed by Hull (22 percent), while Leith (5 percent), Yarmouth91 (2 ¼ percent) and Newcastle (⅓ percent) hardly counted at all. From the south coast of England came just under 3 percent of all goods recorded, especially from the much more important Plymouth, while Exmouth and Topsham had even fallen behind such comparatively small port towns as Falmouth, Dartmouth, and Gosport. Gosport “very vividly engages in trading shipbuilding materials, and has many direct links with Russian places…. The importance of this place is due in part to the proximity of Portsmouth, located east of it, on a small island.”92 Falmouth, however, was a “port open to the sea, actually only a mere roadstead, where the outgoing East Indiamen often wait for favourable winds, … The spacious roadstead is frequently visited as a refuge for vessels that do not dare to enter the Channel in bad weather or adverse winds.”93 Falmouth was also important because it was where the Royal Post packet vessels left for the Americas and the Antilles. According to the Admiralitäts- und Convovgeld-Einnahmebücher, a good 5 percent of all goods were delivered to Hamburg from the British west coast including Ireland. Thereby, the aspiring overseas port of Liverpool with the increasingly industrial manufacturing and factory cities in its hinterland had become the most important export port and, together with the Lancaster area, totalled two-thirds of the value of the imports, while Bristol exported only a good quarter and the two Irish ports of Cork and Waterford about 6 ½ percent. The Scottish west coast with Glasgow was not mentioned at all, and from Hamburg’s perspective, it only gained relevance in the 1790s.94 Quoted under three designations until 1820, the British Isles then were subdivided in five destinations. Since 1820, London, the centre of trade and transport, appeared as a separate destination, whereas Hull, around 1835 “one 90 91 92 93 94

Cf. Rössner, Scottish Trade, 53–55; idem, “Structural Change,” 36–37; idem, “New Avenues of Trade”; Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. III, 157. Yarmouth was the “port of the populous Norwich … There is little traffic with Hamburg”; ibid., 177. Ibid., 108. Ibid., 114. Ibid., 91.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

153

of the largest logistics centres in the world”,95 and Leith, the offshore port of Edinburgh, formed the second destination. Until 1821, Newcastle upon Tyne was also mentioned, which seemed to be unnecessary after that, although Crüger still speaks of “buoyant commercial relations” around 1835, he based on black coal deliveries for the Hamburg sugar processing industry.96 The generally smaller vessels sailing under the Hamburg flag had their route primarily along the coast between London and Hull – a “coastal traffic limited to local conditions.”97 In 1835, Goole was added to this destination, a small port town near the mouth of the river Ouse into the Humber, which had only been built since 1828. Goole became an important addition to Hull, as the new harbour was connected to the up-coming industrial centre of Leeds by inland waterways. Therefore, Goole was immediately connected to Hamburg by a steam liner service, which, however, was abandoned after a few years and then re-established as the business with Hamburg had been expanding.98 The south coast of England was only considered until 1834, with Portsmouth and Plymouth being mentioned as the most important ports, while the port towns of Cornwall were not listed after 1820. Portsmouth was regarded “England’s best fortress, … provided with such a beautiful, secure and spacious port that … it could accommodate the entire fleets of all the powers of the whole world.”99 The destination previously reserved for the British west coast and Ireland was also split in 1820, firstly into Bristol, Liverpool, and Ireland, with Ireland no longer being listed after 1834. Bristol, England’s third most important trading centre in the first half of the nineteenth century, with numerous factories and factory towns in the hinterland, maintained the central connection to Newfoundland – for fishing – and was the most important import port for German wool with close commercial ties to Hamburg.100 Liverpool was second among the British ports and was deemed “the most excellent point of union of the whole world with North and South America, concerning correspondence and voyages thither” as well as the most important European hub for cotton.101 However, the further distance to Hamburg, with which Liverpool maintained “quite lively trade relations”, posed a certain disadvantage:

95 96 97 98 99 100 101

Ibid., 172. Ibid., 167. Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 148 and 162. Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. III, 175. Ibid., 108. Ibid., 118–119. Ibid., 125–126 (cit. 125).

154

chapter 5

At times when freight rates and insurance premium rates are high, the London market becomes more attractive for relations with the countries of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea; but even then, sometimes profitable business is done from here, and that is through the Glasgow Canal.102 The Irish ports, above all Dublin opposite Liverpool or Cork, were not listed individually in the Hamburg insurance price current, as the latter “has nothing to do with Hamburg” and “direct connections between Hamburg and Ireland are overall minimal.”103 The second destination included the west coast of Scotland with Glasgow and Greenock, since 1835 summarised as “the coast of Scotland”. Greenock, situated south of the mouth of the Clyde into the Firth of Clyde, was also the outer port of Glasgow, which was situated about 40 kilometres to the west and was considerably more important as a port and trading town. After 1707, Greenock was considered to be a very important port on the west coast of Scotland, especially for voyages to Africa and for sugar imports from the Caribbean.104 The addition “durch den Kanal” (‘through the canal’) gave a basic indication of the type of traffic: in order to get to Glasgow and Greenock, one could use the Forth and Clyde Canal, which was 56 kilometres in length and constructed from 1768 to 1790, connecting the Firth of Forth and the Firth of Clyde and suitable for seagoing vessels. It was supplemented by the Edinburgh and Glasgow Union Canal (today: Union Canal), which was built between 1818 and 1822 and was about 50 kilometres long. A complete circumnavigation of the British Isles was therefore no longer necessary when travelling ‘through the canal’ to Glasgow or Greenock. This made the voyage to Scotland and the Firth of Fourth in the 1820s interesting for smaller Hamburg vessels and the most important route to Great Britain, superseded only by the east coast destinations.105 However, already around 1835 it can be stated that Hamburg … used to be in a flourishing direct trading relationship with Glasgow, but this has been completely lost in recent times…. So, in those days, Hamburg was not only reached by direct shipments from Glasgow and Greenock, but even from Liverpool, which passed through the Canal. This connection between the countries of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, and the trading places of Liverpool and Glasgow, which are becoming 102 103 104 105

Ibid., 126–127. Ibid., 137. Ibid., 144–145. Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 162; Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. III, 157.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

155

more and more important every day, are of great value to the merchant, particularly, however, in times of naval war, when freight and insurance are such essential objects and thus both being very high; because of the perils of the Irish Sea, which will be swarmed with privateers.106 Hamburg’s premium rate quotations for British destinations in the eighteenth century are virtually a reflection of the numerous naval wars waged by Great Britain in these decades. The mere fact that the quotation for the destination “West Coast and Ireland” was about 1 percent higher than that for London and the east coast (of the British main isle) shows the additional risk of sailing through the Channel even in the ‘peaceful’ 1730s. In particular, the Second Silesian War (1744/45) fought between France and England at sea as part of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and the resulting privateering drove insurance premiums for voyages to the English coast up to 10 percent and thus also significantly higher in the annual averages. Although the premiums dropped again in the following years, they did not return to the ‘normal’, i.e. pre-war level of about 1 ½ percent until after the Second Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748. However, there is no apparent reason why the premium quotation for the English west coast was omitted from August 1739 to June 1746, as the War of Jenkins’ Ear only started in October 1739. When these quotations resumed, they were still about 1 to 1 ½ percent higher than those for the east coast, and this situation did not change until the Napoleonic Wars, even though the gap between the premium series increased rather than decreased. A temporary low point was reached in the last year of peace, 1753. Already in the following year, with the outbreak of the French and Indian War (1754–1763) in North America and the Third Carnatic War (1756–1763) in India between Great Britain and France, the premiums rose again significantly, soon amplified by the European involvement in the Seven Years’ War with peak values in 1756/57. Since 1761/63, the annual average premium quotations for the east coast stabilised at around 1 ½ percent, and that for the west coast at 2 ½ to 3 percent, while the new destination of the south coast of England, which was added in 1762, was quoted at around 2 percent. However, Hamburg merchants lamented the insecurity of English waters due to British privateers as late as summer 1764.107 The next remarkable rise in premiums was then brought by the American War of Independence (1775–1783) and the parallel Fourth Anglo-Dutch Naval War (1780–1784), the peak rates being recorded as early as 1778/79 with up to 10 percent in winter. After these wars, the premium 106 Ibid., 147 and 157–158. 107 Cf. Comm.-Deputierte an den Rath…, printed in: Baasch (ed.), Quellen, 81–84.

156

chapter 5

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 5-6 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations on the British Isles, 1736–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-6

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

157

quotations for the east and south coast converged to within a few tenths of a percentage point of each other – in 1789 they were almost identical – while a marked gap of about 1 ½ percentage points to those of the west coast remained. The clear anomaly in the figures for the south coast in 1791 is due to the fact that only in the first two months of this year was a quotation made at all, so that this value appears clearly skewed. Apart from this singularity, the figures show an annual average until 1795 and then rising until 1798, after the War of the First Coalition (1792–1798) had extended to the sea powers with the declaration of war by France to Great Britain and the Netherlands on 31 January 1793. The gap between the quotations for the east and south coast on the one hand and those for the west coast on the other hand becomes increasingly wider, rising to 3 ¾ percentage points on the annual average of 1799. This points to the high risk of French privateering when passing through the English Channel, whereas when travelling to the south coast of England with smaller vessels, the risk of an ambush was kept rather low by sailing hard on the coast. A similar finding applies to the months that set the stage for the Battle of Trafalgar between the British and the allied French and Spanish on 21 October 1805. The Hamburg premiums for the English west coast rose in the run-up to the battle from 2 ¾ percent in September to 5 ½ percent in October and after the battle to 8 ½ percent (November and December), in January 1806 (also season-related) even to 11 percent, only to fall again. In contrast, the premiums of the two other destinations increased only very moderately during this period, as was the case in almost every winter. In the autumn of 1806, a similar development can again be observed in all three series of premium quotations. This time, however, the background to this was the proclamation of the Continental Blockade by the Berlin Decree of 12 November 1806, which meant that listing further maritime insurance premiums for British destinations in Hamburg must cease at the beginning of 1807. When premium quotations to the three British destinations resumed in November 1814, they started at a very high level compared with the pre-war period but declined significantly in the following years. The average annual premium for the east coast remained below 1 percent from 1823 – with the exception of 1825 – and since the 1840s mostly fluctuated between ½ and ¾ percent. Only slightly higher was the south coast destination quoted, mostly around ½ percent, but this rate converged to that for the east coast, so that from November 1834 this destination was not quoted separately. Since 1820, the area of the northeast coast of Britain with the ports of Hull and Leith was listed with an own value, which was usually similarly low to that of London and in some cases even lower. Only 1848/49 were comparatively high premium rates recorded here, which can be ascribed to the irregular Hamburg quotation in these years. Moreover, since 1820, there was a separate series for the Scottish

158

chapter 5

west coast, i.e. for the passage through the Forth and Clyde Canal, which in its annual averages was about one and a half to twice as high as the London ones, with a decreasing tendency, but could even fall below them. Admittedly, this rate was still competitive compared with that of the British west coast, which certainly contributed to the boom in the Scotland journey in the 1820s. Voyages to the British west coast and to Ireland still had the highest premiums after 1814, even though with such a declining tendency that they were on an annual average on a par with those to the Scottish west coast in the late 1850s. Thus, they amounted to about one and a half times the premium for voyages to London or Hull. In the 1850s, the four series (of premium rates) had converged to such an extent that, on the one hand, the east and northeast coasts and, on the other, the English and Scottish west coasts, including Ireland, each had similar, and in some cases even identical, values. This illustrates not least how much the premium quotations for the west coast of England and Ireland in particular had fallen since the 1820s. In the 1850s, it no longer mattered, at least from an insurance perspective, whether a vessel passed through the Forth and Clyde Canal to the west coast of England or through the English Channel, whereas in the 1830s and 1840s this had been of some significance. The seasonal fluctuations of the three British destinations in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were not unlike those of the other European destinations in the Atlantic. Graph 5-6 shows the significant risk factor represented by adverse weather conditions, especially on voyages to the British west coast and Ireland. According to Crüger’s Handelsgeographie of 1835, the harsh season with storms and gales lasted from October to March, the fair season from April to September. The voyage through the Irish Sea was considered particularly dangerous because of its rocky shoreline, cliffs and islands, the adverse currents, the frequent occurrence of fog and mists, the long winter nights and generally the cloudy, windy and ‘dark’ weather.108 While the premium rates for these destinations averaged only 1.95 percent in June and July, and were thus not that far removed from those of the east and south coasts (approx. 1.25 and 1.31 percent respectively), they rose to well over 5 percent in the winter months (5.36 percent in the January average). The premiums for the other two destinations, however, were ‘only’ 3.10 and 3.53 percent in the January average. This remarkable difference of around 2 percentage points in winter premiums was a key factor in the fact that the British west coast with Ireland was so clearly above the other two destinations even in the annual averages, and this even in peacetime years when the crossing of the English Channel was not extraordinarily risky. Yet it is striking that premium quotations for the east and south coasts rose only slightly over large parts of the 108 Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. III, 411–412.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

159

year, even in times of naval wars – except when the Netherlands was involved as an adversary. This suggests that the route between Hamburg and London or Hull or other ports on this coast is comparatively safe even during war and crisis. If, however, winter was added to this, premiums could also rise steeply in the short term, for instance in 1744/45 and 1778/79. In this case, premium rates would oscillate between an otherwise rather unusual range – about 2 to 8 percent or 3 to 10 percent – which on the one side makes recourse to the ‘normal’ value (2 to 4 percent) and on the other side takes into account the doubly increased risk compared to the summer months. Upon restoration of safety in the Atlantic region after the Napoleonic Wars, the seasonal fluctuations in premium quotations for the various destinations changed considerably: in general, the differences between the winter and summer months were high compared with other, more southerly destinations in Europe. During the summer months, however, premiums were low, especially for the northeast and east coasts, i.e. around or even under ½ percent. For Hull, Leith, etc., this even applied from April to September, so that this route could be insured at bargain rates for six months. Even for the ‘most expensive’ route, the one to the west coast and Ireland, the premiums in June and July were under 1 percent. However, in January, they could still rise to 6 percent and above in the 1820s, while since the 1830s, even in winter, values between 4 and 3 percent became common, with a downward trend.109 The month with the highest average premium rate for this destination was December, in which the average premium was five times higher than in the month with the lowest figures, June. The fact that the seasonal fluctuations were particularly pronounced for the British destinations is shown not least by the fact that the premiums in the other series were also around 4.25 to 4.80 times higher in the months with the highest quotations than in the months with the lowest values. 5.6

The French Atlantic Coast

Outside the Netherlands and the Baltic Sea region with the adjacent Scandinavian areas, the French Atlantic coast of the Bay of Bourgneuf (“Bucht von Frankreich”) was by far the most important exporter and re-exporter of Hamburg by sea in the eighteenth century. According to the Admiralitätszoll- und Convoygeld-Einnahmebücher, over 40 percent of the goods imported into Hamburg from the Bay of Bourgneuf alone came from Bordeaux (approximately 46.5 percent), Nantes (approximately 30 percent), and Lorient (14 percent), while other ports in this area, such as La Rochelle (4.4 percent) and 109 Cf. Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 350.

160

chapter 5

Bayonne (1.75 percent), played only a very minor role, if at all. Up to the 1760s, when about a third of all goods still came from this region, Bordeaux’s position in Hamburg’s seaborne imports trade strengthened so considerably that it became Hamburg’s most important trading partner alongside Amsterdam and London. At that time, about seven-eighths of all goods listed in the price current under the Bay of Bourgneuf came from Bordeaux, while the relevance of Nantes (about 7.7 percent) and La Rochelle (3.5 percent), but also of Brest (4.8 percent), had decreased significantly compared to the 1730s.110 Bordeaux, located approximately one hundred kilometres upstream of the Gironde, could accommodate vessels with a capacity of up to 250 lasts and “was one of the best Atlantic ports alongside Lorient and Brest.”111 The trade in Aquitaine wines as well as sugar and other commodities from the Antilles elevated the city to new heights from 1713 to 1740; its (re-)exports to the north went primarily to Hamburg.112 In Nantes, France’s general naval depot in the Ancien Régime,113 however, the silting up of its port meant that only vessels with a capacity of 100 lasts could dock, so that larger vessels had to have their goods unloaded in the upstream Paimboeuf. So, Nantes came second behind Bordeaux, a position that Nantes owed its trade relations with Spain and the Antilles, and above all the slave trade. Lorient, built as a privileged trading port for the French Companie des Indes, held the monopoly on the re-export of East Indian goods after the re-foundation of the Companie in 1723. Therefore, Hamburg’s imports from India and China were transshipped here. This did not change when the Compagnie des Indes was dissolved and Lorient opened up to free trade.114 La Rochelle experienced its (last) boom in the first half of the eighteenth century due to its trade with the Antilles, Louisiana, and especially Canada, for which it had an import monopoly for furs. It served Hamburg, according to the Admiralitätszoll- und Convoygeld-Einnahmebücher, as a rather modest supplier of colonial products as well as of cognac from the Charente.115 Bayonne, a free port since 1784, finally had a certain importance for Hamburg as a fishing port and wine exporter, but was of little interest as supplier of West Indian commodities.116 As a result, it should be noted that “in the course of the 110 Schneider; Krawehl and Denzel (eds.), Statistik. For the late seventeenth century cf. Voss, “Bordeaux”; Fayard, “Bordeaux”; Butel, “Les négociants allemands”; idem, “France”. 111 Huhn, Handelsbeziehungen, vol. I, 26. Cf. Weber, Deutsche Kaufleute, 154–165; Pounds, “Port and Outport,” 224. 112 Huhn, Handelsbeziehungen, vol. I, 26–27. 113 Kresse, Materialien, 24. 114 Huhn, Handelsbeziehungen, vol. I, 26, 28 and 32–33. 115 Schneider; Krawehl and Denzel (eds.), Statistik. Cf. Clark, La Rochelle. 116 Huhn, Handelsbeziehungen, vol. I, 31–32; Kresse, Materialien, 24.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

161

eighteenth century … the shipments of French overseas products to Hamburg increased to such an extent that it became the gateway for French goods on the mainland.”117 In the eyes of their French contemporaries, the Hamburg manufacturers enjoyed the advantage of being able to produce the best types of sugar, which above all surpassed the French products, at the same price but in a shorter working time. On the one hand, the cheap, “ordinary melis”, a more or less white sugar, was cooked from the brown raw sugar,118 about a third of which came from the Antilles. On the other hand, the Hamburg operators of the sugar refineries – the so-called Zuckerbäcker – processed the two thirds of the white sugar into refined sugar for use in coffee or tea and packaged it in the form of sugar-loafs, which could also be ‘re-exported’ back to France. The sugar was transported from Bordeaux to Hamburg in larger vessels, which usually made three voyages in two years, and from Le Havre in smaller vessels, which could cover the distance six or seven times a year and brought the necessary clay for the sugar moulds and syrup jugs from Rouen.119 This finding was reflected in the maritime traffic between Hamburg and the French Atlantic ports, which grew considerably, particularly in the late Ancien Régime:

graph 5-7 Hamburg’s maritime traffic to the ports at the French Atlantic coast, 1760–1789 – number of departing vessels Source: Huhn, Handelsbeziehungen, vol. II, 83 (annex 20). 117 Huhn, Handelsbeziehungen, vol. I, 20. 118 Two and a half to three pounds of raw sugar are refined into one pound of white sugar; ibid., vol. I, 180. 119 Ibid., vol. I, 181–182. – Concerning the trade by sugar refineries, often referred to in older literature as “sugar industry”, Petersson, “Zuckersiedergewerbe und Zuckerhandel”.

162

chapter 5

Bordeaux was by far the most important port of destination for Hamburg’s voyages to the French Atlantic coast. Between 1760 and 1789, almost 42 percent of all Hamburg vessels sailed to Bordeaux,120 while Rouen and, from 1780 onwards, also Le Havre only had 16 percent departures. In the post-Napoleonic era, however, French shipping policy “hindered the resumption of the HamburgBiscayan voyage” by increasing port fees and additional customs duties for imported commodities, so that Hamburg vessels hardly sailed to France since the 1840s.121 Nonetheless, the three above-mentioned ports are also the two main destinations for Hamburg’s trade with France, as reflected in the insurance price current. The first destination on the French Atlantic coast was the English Channel or La Manche, called “Dunkirk, Calais, Rouen”, which covered the section from the Strait of Dover122 (or Pas-de-Calais) to the Seine Estuary with its aspiring port of Le Havre, although in its hinterland Rouen was still considered the real and traditional centre of trade and textiles. Both cities served as ports of Paris.123 Since around the mid-seventeenth century, Rouen and Hamburg were linked by Börtfahrt until 1651, when the service was dissolved or discontinued;124 but to re-establish the service to Rouen and to Dunkirk, several shippers submitted a report to the Commerz-Deputation on 1 February 1700.125 Dunkirk, however, bought by England in 1662, developed into a base for French corsairs (the so-called ‘Dunkirkers’) and declared a free port, was the landing place recommended by France to the Hanseatic cities since the later seventeenth century and now flourishing.126 The second destination was called “Bucht von Frankreich”, in the language of the Hanseatic League the ‘Baie de Bourgneuf’ or simply ‘the Baie’ lying south of the Loire estuary, which had been a destination from Hamburg since the thirteenth century because of the bay-salt available there.127 In the insurance price current of the second quarter of the eighteenth century, this was almost certainly also understood to include 120 According to Kresse, Materialien, 24, it was even 60 percent: “[I]f one further takes into account that frigates, i.e. ships with a larger volume, were generally deployed to Bordeaux, while smaller vessels often sailed to the French ports on the Channel, the significance of Bordeaux for Hamburg at that time becomes even clearer.” Cf. idem, Fahrtgebiete, 38. For the period after, see Marzagalli, “Le négoce allemande”; eadem, “Le négoce bordelaise”. 121 Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 38, 42. 122 Dover itself was “heavily fortified” and “not a trading port, but an emergency port for vessels;” Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. III, 106. 123 Kresse, Materialien, 24; Pounds, “Port and Outport,” 222–223. 124 Cf. Lista oder Specification…, printed in Baasch (ed.), Quelle, 308–310. 125 Cf. Supplik von Schiffern…, printed in: Ibid., 310–311. 126 Baasch, Hamburg und Holland, 60; Kupfer, Freihafenformen, 190. 127 Huhn, Handelsbeziehungen, vol. I, 13–14.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

163

the north coast of the Iberian Peninsula, i.e. the entire Bay of Biscay from Galicia to Brittany along the north coast of Spain and the west coast of France. This is indicated by the segmentation of destinations from the summer of 1762 onwards, which then distinguished between the French and northern Spanish coastal cities. From 1762 the French Channel coast appeared under “Dunkirk, Rouen, Brest”, from February 1781 only under “Dunkirk and Rouen”. Calais, which in any case had no significance in Hamburg’s trade of that time,128 had thus been omitted. This destination consequently extended at least until 1781 to Brest, which was then joined by the more southern destination of the Bay of Bourgneuf with Nantes, La Rochelle, the Charente, and Bordeaux. Thereby, the denomination ‘Charente’ – a name given to a river and to a landscape – is conspicuous in the list of ports: the reason was the navigability of the Charente river from its estuarine waters near Rochefort, opposite the Ile d’Oléron, to Angoulême over a length of about 150 kilometres as well as its function as an important transport route for the region’s brandy, the famous cognac. When the Hamburg insurance price current was reorganised in 1820, the northern destination was extended to Nantes for a short time, but from 1821 onwards, it was regarded as a unit from Antwerp to Le Havre. The southern destination covered the distance from Bordeaux to Bayonne, which was again assigned to Nantes from 1821 onwards, while Bayonne was again considered a part of the northern Spanish destination. From 1835 Rouen appeared as a separate destination (alongside Le Havre), and in 1843 Bayonne changed back to the French destination of Bordeaux and Nantes, so that since then there have been three destinations for France: first, Le Havre as the most important port of the French Channel region; second, Rouen as the most important river port on the way to Paris; and finally – in summary – the Bay of Bourgneuf. The premium rate quotations for the ports on the French Atlantic coast were significantly influenced by the comparatively frequent armed conflicts in the Channel and Bay of Biscay. While they averaged between 1 ½ and 3 percent in peacetime, they rose to well over 5 percent in years of war, especially when it concerned the ports in the Bay of Bourgneuf. The difference between the premiums for these two French destinations tended to become larger rather than smaller in the course of the eighteenth century. Up to the 1790s it was mostly between ½ and ¾ percentage points, but in the 1790s it rose to as much as 2 percentage points, which illustrates the significantly increasing danger to vessels in the Bay of Bourgneuf compared with the route that only reaches into the Channel. The first stage of markedly rising premium quotations were the 128 Cf. Schneider; Krawehl and Denzel (eds.), Statistik, 64–65.

164

chapter 5

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 5-8 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the French Atlantic coast, 1736–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-7

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

165

years from 1744 to 1748, i.e. the period of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) with the maritime conflict between France and Great Britain in the English Channel, whereby in 1745/46 the annual averages were definitely falling again. In the aftermath of the two naval battles at Cape Finisterre on 14 May and 25 October 1747, in which Great Britain defeated French squadrons serving as escort convoys, they began to rise again.129 After a few years of normali­ sation, when the annual average premiums were around 1 ½ percent in the case of the Channel ports and 2 percent in the case of the Bay of Bourgneuf, the Seven Years’ War followed, which was already being waged ‘worldwide’, the French and Indian War in North America and the Third Carnatic War in India.130 This rekindled struggle between France and Great Britain led to an increase in premiums after 1754, in August of which the British had begun to confiscate French merchant vessels, to just under 6 percent for the Bay of Bourgneuf (1758) and 4 ½ percent for the French Channel ports (1759). These average annual premiums were the highest recorded before the Napoleonic Wars. The Peace of Paris in 1763 heralded another new period of relatively low rates, albeit slowly rising, which lasted until the first years of the American War of Independence, in which France and Spain were on the side of the future USA against Great Britain. It was not until 1778 that premiums rose again to an average of just over 5 percent, or just under 3 ½ percent, but they also fell rapidly in the following years. A final peak was reached in 1785 with just under 3 ½ or 2 ½ percent. However, the gap between the series of the two destinations increased to about 1 percentage point. After the low point of 1791 with 2 ⅕ or 1 ½ percent, the outbreak of the Coalition Wars in 1792 marked the beginning of a permanent rise in average premium rates to figures of 3 ½ to just under 5 percent for the ports of the Bay of Bourgneuf, and up to just under 4 percent also were charged for the Channel ports. In 1802, a year of peace, the premiums sank almost immediately to their pre-war level. With the outbreak of the next war, however, they immediately went up again, especially after the promulgation of the Continental Blockade in autumn 1806. After the interruption of the Hamburg premium quotations from 1807 to the autumn of 1814, the rates initially began with very high annual averages, which by 1816 had already returned to the pre-war level and tended to fall further, although, with the exception of the years 1823 to 1826. The years from 1823 to 1826 were exempt from this development, since 1823 in particular may have been linked to the year of the French invasion of Spain to restore the absolutist rule of King Ferdinand VII (1808, 1814–1833) on behalf of the Holy Alliance. 129 Cf. Harding, Seapower, 195; Black, European Warfare, 150. 130 Cf. Baugh, The Global Seven Years War; Externbrink (ed.), Der Siebenjährige Krieg; Füssel, Der Siebenjährige Krieg.

166

chapter 5

Thereafter, the premium for the ports of the French Channel region continued to decline, while that for the Bay of Bourgneuf rose again to over 2 percent from 1837, probably primarily due to comparatively high quotations in the winter months. Since the early 1840s, the annual averages for both destinations – with the exception of 1848/49 – were continuously listed at 1 ½ percent, and for the ports of the Channel region even mostly below 1 percent. At the end of the period under study, the annual averages for the ports of the Bay of Bourgneuf were still 1 ⅛ percent and those for the Channel region ⅔ to ¾ percent, so that the figures for the two destinations converged to about ½ percentage point. The special premium quotation for Rouen, introduced to the insurance price current in 1835, which included not only the coastal shipping but also the voyage up the Seine towards Paris, was only a few tenths of a percentage point above the annual averages of the ports of the French Channel region, and in some years even below. However, there is a tendency to show a very similar business cycle, which was below 1 percent at the end of the period analyzed in this study. A comparison of the monthly averages shows the significantly higher weather dependency of the Bay of Bourgneuf and the Bay of Biscay respectively, compared to the more protected Channel region. It is not for nothing that this sea area has been notorious for bad weather, fierce storms and extreme swell. In the stormy winter months of December and January, the periods with the highest quotations, averages of 4 ½ percent were achieved for the Bay of Bourgneuf in the period up to 1807, while the Channel region recorded a premium range from 3 ⅓ to 3 ¼ percent. The lowest rates were achieved in the months of June to August, just under 1 ½ percent for the Channel region and 1.6 percent for the Bay of Bourgneuf, so that the difference between the two destinations was less prominent here, hardly existing at all, and was most likely due to the greater distance. This finding can still be observed in the nineteenth century: although all monthly averages decreased, those of the winter months decreased less than those of the summer. In January, the average for the Bay of Bourgneuf was still 4 ¼ percent, in December just under 4 percent, for the Channel region 3 ¼ percent. The latter, however, only incurred an average of ⅔ percent between May and July, the former only slightly more at 0.85 percent in June and July. The special quotation for Rouen was in both cases still below the average rates of the Channel region, but this is based on the fact that this quotation only began when the figures were already significantly lower than in the 1810s and 1820s. Therefore, the average rate for the destination Rouen reached well ½ percent from May to July, but in December and January 2 ½ percent. This clear difference between the summer and winter months, which can be observed in all three destinations, is almost characteristic of the – in these

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

167

cases French – Atlantic coasts. In addition, the Bay of Biscay still represented a comparatively high risk for seafaring in the nineteenth century, as it was listed on average more than twice as high (3 ½ percent) as the Channel region (1 ½ percent). There, also the gap had been even smaller in the eighteenth century, when just under 4 percent for the Bay of Bourgneuf was contrasted with 2 ¼ percent for the Channel region. This shows that the monthly averages of the summer months decreased more than those of the winter. This applies even more to the Bay of Biscay and the Bay of Bourgneuf than to the Channel region – a finding that is also evident on the north coast of the Iberian Peninsula. 5.7

The Iberian Atlantic Coast

For Hamburg, Portugal was one of its major suppliers of sugar, which had been coming to Europe from Brazil since the seventeenth century.131 At the height of the ‘sugar cycle’, Brazil produced about 1 million centners of sugar per year. In the eighteenth century, Brazil still processed about 200,000 centners of sugar per year, of which a quarter remained in Portugal, a third was re-exported to the Mediterranean region, to Italy and the Levant, and the remainder (about 40 percent) was sold on to Northern Europe. Brazilian-Portuguese sugar was cheaper than Antillean-French sugar, but the latter was generally preferred because of its better quality.132 Among the Portuguese ports, Lisbon was by far the most important, whereas Porto only gained importance in the course of the eighteenth century. The salt port of Setúbal (then also colloquially known as ‘Saint Hubes’) should at least be mentioned as the third, although it only gained importance for Hamburg in the nineteenth century, when salt was loaded as cargo on empty vessels arriving from America.133 The Hamburg-Portugal trade, which was only undertaken occasionally due to the peril of the Barbary pirates, was intensified again from 1778 onwards, after the country had begun the fight against the pirates on its coasts from 1775 onwards. Between 1794 and 1802, more Hamburg vessels were involved in the Portugal trade than in the trade with France: “the upheavals in France contributed no small amount to this expansion of Portugal trade and maritime traffic – and the stability of political conditions in Portugal, but above all its neutrality, which was maintained

131 Cf. Opatrný, “El azúcar Americano”. 132 Huhn, Handelsbeziehungen, vol. I, 179. 133 Kresse, Materialien, 26.

168

chapter 5

until 1807.”134 In the nineteenth century, Hamburg’s interest in Portugal began to wane, especially since the sugar trade translocated from Lisbon to Bahia after Brazil’s declaration of independence in 1822 and during the Miguelite or Liberal War in Portugal (1828–1834).135 Even the revival of maritime transport after 1834 and the declaration of Lisbon and Porto as free ports only brought episodic stimuli to Hamburg’s involvement in Portugal until the summer of 1836. In 1838, regular voyages to Portugal were cancelled until further notice.136 Unlike Portugal, Spain was, from Hamburg’s point of view, perceived a predominantly ‘Mediterranean’ country, as most of the country’s export products, especially raisins, fresh and dried tropical fruits, almonds, wine and spirits, olive oil, spices and medicinal plants native to the country,137 came from its Mediterranean ports. The second, initially less important branch of trade was the distribution of colonial products, in particular dye-stuffs (cochineal, indigo, and dyewoods) and medicinal drugs (cinchona bark, sarsaparilla, cascarilla, and jalap). They found their way to Hamburg mainly via Cádiz,138 which became the second most important Spanish port of export in traffic to Hamburg. All in all, Hamburg was the most important entrepôt for Spain in trade with the whole of Northern Europe, or “la mejor o principal Plaza para las ventajas de nuestro comercio en el Norte”,139 but Hamburg’s trade with Spain had already been regarded as a “tedious, slow business with little benefit” since the 1680s.140 The importance of the Bay of Cádiz as a region of (re-)export only began to grow significantly in the 1790s, mainly through the re-export of sugar from Havana and hides from the Latin American mainland. Cádiz and the ports of its Bay replaced the Mediterranean ports as the most important Spanish export region to Hamburg. But Cádiz was the most important destination for Hamburg’s exports – most notably, canvas141 – as well. Until the nineteenth century, the Bay of Cádiz was also considered to include the Canary Islands,142

134 135 136 137 138 139

Idem, Fahrtgebiete, 42. Ibid., 43. Ibid., 44–46. Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 173–187. Ibid., 191–213; Weber, Deutsche Kaufleute, 89. Wrote the Spanish envoy in Berlin, Miguel de Gálvez, in a letter to Count Floridablanca on 15 January 1787; cit. Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 228 as well as 290–291 (annex 4). Cf. also ibid., 125; von den Driesch, Die ausländischen Kaufleute, 419–420. 140 Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 9. On this and the following issue, see also the following summarising study: Idem, “The Hamburg Colony”. 141 Cf. Kossok, “Bedeutung”; Zorn, “Schwerpunkte”. 142 This is due to the close trade relations between the Canary Islands and Cádiz in the eighteenth century; cf. Morales Padrón, El comercio, 249–268 and 357–393.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

169

“which have always been in direct communication with Hamburg”.143 As regions of origin, the ports of the Bay of Biscay played a slightly greater role as only in a few exceptional years, especially since exports of Spanish wool via Bilbao increased significantly in the 1780s.144 In the early years of the Hamburg marine insurance price current, the ports on the Iberian Atlantic coast had been united in an individual premium quotation, although both countries had quite distinctive importance in Hamburg’s trade and maritime traffic. So, no distinction was made between Portugal and Spain on this side of Gibraltar until the Hamburg’s convoy shipping ending in either Cádiz or Málaga was discontinued in 1747.145 The most important handicap to trade with the Iberian Peninsula was the threat of the Barbary pirates, which made voyages to the southern Spanish Atlantic coast or even to its Mediterranean ports a high-risk adventure, since in the eighteenth century convoys became obsolete and useless. In 1746/47, the last convoy left for Spain and Portugal, which of course had an impact on the premiums of marine insurance. After the abandonment of the convoy, it seemed necessary to split up the destination in April 1748 under which all Iberian ports were subsumed in order to act on the significantly higher degree of risk for voyages to Cádiz, compared to the lower risk for voyages to Lisbon, for example, which was simply due to the Barbary threat. Even this time, however, no strict distinction was made between political borders, as is indicated by the names of the two destinations mentioned from 1762 onwards. The Portuguese Atlantic coast with Porto, Lisbon, and Setúbal was distinguished from the Spanish coast east of Gibraltar, to which, however, aside from Cádiz and Sanlúcar de Barrameda, the Canary Islands, and the Portuguese city of Faro, i.e. the Algarve, were assigned. The delineation of the destinations along the Iberian Atlantic coast was thus less shaped by political affiliation than on geographical conditions, with the Cape Saint Vincent separating the west coast from the south coast. Apart from this ‘Iberian-Atlantic destination’, the ports in the Bay of Biscay, which were assigned to the Bay of Bourgneuf in 1736 (see Chapter 5.6), were the only exception. Only in 1762, Bayonne, Bilbao, and San Sebastián were separated from the Bay of Bourgneuf and given their own premium quotation. The choice was made against the backdrop of Barbary pirates imperiling maritime transport so that Hamburg’s voyage to Spain since the middle of the 1750s was “almost exclusively” directed towards northern Spain, Bilbao in particular. The Hamburg vessels brought canvas and other commodities to Bilbao and loaded 143 Baasch, “Statistik,” 110. 144 Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 189–190. 145 Moltmann, Handelsschiffahrt, 90–91.

170

chapter 5

them with wool, tropical fruits, copper, and iron or sailed in ballast to Bayonne, Bordeaux or Porto to take on cargo.146 San Sebastián, the port of registry of the Real Compañia Guipuzcoana de Caracas, founded in 1728,147 was a relevant export location for Hamburg as well, where grain, canvas, manufactures, and shipbuilding materials went. This connection was therefore not too extensive, but “steady.”148 Even though by far the largest part of this section of the Atlantic coast belonged to Spain, the French (Basque) city of Bayonne, which was included, was the most important port in this region from Hamburg’s point of view. From 1820 onwards, the northern Spanish destination went by the name “Bilbao, La Coruna”, which was followed by Bayonne until 1842, when it was merged with Bordeaux for a few months in 1820/21 to form a separate quotation. Until 1834, the name was “Bilbao, Bayonne to Coruna”, i.e. the main port of the region, Bilbao, was first called and then its westward extension from Bayonne to La Coruña. The latter city was the Spanish naval port of this region, to which, among other things, the people of Hamburg delivered weapons during the Carlist uprising or the First Carlist War respectively (1833–1840).149 From 1834 onwards, only Bilbao and Bayonne appeared, and from 1843 Bilbao alone, since Bayonne was more strictly political in nature and again assigned to the “Bay of Bourgneuf”. The Portuguese destination followed under the name “Lisbon, Porto”, which was merged into “Portugal” from 1843, and since 1820, the destination Madeira and Tenerife. At the Canary Islands, Santa Cruz de Tenerife was mostly called at,150 so that ‘Tenerife’ was named pars pro toto of the whole archipelago. Especially since the 1780s, voyages to Tenerife became more frequent as more and more of tropical fruits came from there. Moreover, the island was a stopover for the voyage over the Atlantic.151 Significantly larger changes were, however, in the case of the southern Spanish destinations, which were no longer strictly separated between the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions. In 1820, the designation “Cádiz, Sanlúcar, Sevilla, Málaga” was introduced, which means that for the first time, the entire southern Spanish coast was merged and considered as one single destination. But already in the year 1821, the traditional distinction was again made between Cádiz and Seville on the one hand, whereby Sanlúcar de Barrameda as the Sevillian outpost at the mouth of the Guadalquivir was not 146 147 148 149 150 151

Kresse, Materialien, 25. Kellenbenz, “Deutschland und Spanien,” 17. Kresse, Materialien, 25. Ibid.; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 39. Kellenbenz, “Deutschland und Spanien,” 19. Kresse, Materialien, 25.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

171

mentioned anymore, and Gibraltar and Málaga on the other hand. The Rock of Gibraltar was thus once again seen as the landmark dividing the Atlantic and Mediterranean destinations. Between 1827 and 1834, Gibraltar even formed its own destination. From 1835 onwards, Gibraltar and Cádiz were joined in one destination, whereas Seville was named together with Málaga until 1842, only to disappear completely from the insurance price current afterwards. However, Hamburg voyages to the Iberian Peninsula became less important in the nineteenth century, as direct traffic with Brazil and the former Spanish possessions in America increased. After 1814, Portugal and Spain had, from Hamburg’s perspective, forfeited “their importance as intermediaries to their former overseas possessions.”152 Similar to the French Atlantic coast, the Iberian coast was also affected by the manifold naval wars of the time in the eighteenth century, whereby in the case of the Spanish south coast, the not inconsiderable problem of the danger of the Barbary pirates was added, which made the insurance premiums even more expensive. This was one of the reasons why the average annual premiums in the respective wars virtually skyrocketed, reaching heights that were significantly higher than the premiums for voyages to the French Atlantic coast. It is striking that the quotations for Portuguese and Spanish ports on this side of Gibraltar were regularly roughly the same in peacetime, and in some cases – as was the case until 1747 – were even identical. In times of war, however, in which Spain was then more or less directly affected, the premiums for Spanish ports were constantly higher than those for Portuguese ports; and this, if one considers about 1762, to a not inconsiderable extent, namely plus 1 ⅓ percentage points higher. In the case of the Atlantic coast of the Iberian Peninsula, the ‘normal’ annual average premiums in peacetime were, as can be seen in the 1730s and 1740s, between 2 ¾ and 3 ½ percent. In times of war, however, they rose to over 5 percent, even just below 6 percent, between 1745 and 1748, i.e. in the second half of the War of the Austrian Succession. Immediately after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, “the efforts of Frederick the Great began to persuade the Silesian merchants to trade directly to Spain at their own risk. However, they refused to do so. The dangers of such a trade were too great, the business would be profitable only after some years had passed, and with the high insurance premiums the final profit was hardly 4 ⅕ percent. It would therefore be more profitable to trade via Hamburg and Holland.”153 The normalisation of premium quotations after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle 152 Moltmann, Handelsschiffahrt, 122. 153 Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 134.

172

chapter 5

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 5-9 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the Iberian Atlantic coast, 1736–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-8

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

173

continued until 1754/55, but then the risk to fall victim to pirate attacks apparently increased again, as the following example demonstrates: When the shipowner and merchant Friedrich Mertens wanted to send his vessel Maria Dorothea to Porto and Málaga in 1755 under the command of the ship-master Johann Ernst, he could find no underwriter who was willing to insure it against the Turkish threat beyond Porto. The [Hamburg] Admiralität therefore forced him to send his ship only as far as Porto, as the journey from Porto to Málaga was too perilous.154 In 1759, a new peak was reached with 5½ percent for Portugal and 5¾ percent for Spain. The Great Lisbon Earthquake on 1 November 1755, a seminal event for the entire era, was not, remarkably enough, reflected in the premium quotations. After a final peak in 1762, a new period of normalisation and stability of premium notations began with values around 3 up to 3 ½ percent, whereby the quotations for the Portuguese and Spanish south coasts hardly deviated from each other. This only changed again with the intervention of France and Spain in 1778/79 in the American War of Independence on the side of the insurgents. In particular, the British privateering in the Atlantic, against which Russia, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Prussia formed the First League of Armed Neutrality as a protective alliance against the encroachments of British naval warfare in 1780, caused a significant increase in insurance premiums for voyages to the Iberian Peninsula to more than 4 ½ percent. Portugal was only affected in 1778,155 but the Spanish ports on this side of Gibraltar were affected up to and including 1781. This was due to the Spanish-British conflict in these waters over the British possessions of Menorca and Gibraltar, which culminated in the Spanish defeat off south of Cape Saint Vincent on 16 January 1780 and the failed Great Siege of Gibraltar (1779–1783).156 However, even after the Treaty of Paris of 1783, the annual premium rates averaged out for the Spanish ports on the south coast remained higher than those for the Portuguese ports in their respective annual averages around ¼ to ½ percent, even though the premiums sank overall until 1790/91. The third quotation established in these decades for the destination of the Spanish north coast, i.e. the Spanish ports on the Bay of Biscay including the 154 Ibid., 84. 155 Cf. Kresse, Materialien, 26: “[E]specially in times of war, the passage to Portugal was important for the Hamburg vessels, since Portugal remained neutral in the American War of Independence and also during the Revolutionary Wars…. This passage to a neutral country was exposed to less stress and danger than the passage to England or France.” 156 Chartrand and Courcelle, Gibraltar.

174

chapter 5

French Bayonne, throughout the period from 1762 to 1858, ranked clearly – by ½ percent to 1 percent – among the other two destinations and mostly slightly above those of the Bay of Bourgneuf, due to the somewhat longer distances in equally adverse weather conditions, as the following Graph shows:

graph 5-10

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the Bay of Biscay, 1736–1859, in percent – annual average rates Source: Tables A2-7 and A2-8

During the Coalition Wars of the 1790s, the situation in Spanish coastal waters worsened again, so that the premiums again rose significantly, reaching an annual average over 7 ¼ percent in 1794/95. The particular background to this were French corsairs, who imperiled voyages between Hamburg and Cádiz to such an extent that premiums could rise up to 8 percent even outside the wintry months.157 In 1796, the English government then issued letters of marque for privateers to attack Spanish vessels, which could have had consequences for the neutral Hamburg vessels as well: There were not even insurers who insured for 30 or 40 percent possessions of Spanish subjects. English privateers used to search all neutral vessels and rob any goods that gave the slightest suspicion that they were Spanish property.158 However, the repercussions for the Hamburg insurance market were not as drastic, with premiums actually falling by 2 ¼ percentage points on average 157 Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 90–91. 158 Ibid., 91.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

175

over the year, although they remained at a significantly higher level than in the pre-war years. Premiums for Portugal and the ports in the Bay of Biscay had also risen in the respective annual averages, but consistently undercut the annual rates averaged out for those in the Strait of Gibraltar. In 1801, another peak was reached with annual averages of more than 7 ½ percent for the ports on the south coast of Spain and just under 6 ¼ percent for Portugal, which can be ascribed in particular to the very high premiums of up to 12 and 10 percent respectively, listed until April. Whether the background to this can be seen in the looming War of the Oranges (2 May to 9 June 1801) between Portugal and Spain, which was allied with France, is disputable, but at the same time cannot be completely dismissed. The peaceful year 1802 brought a significant decline in premiums of about 2 ½ percentage points. Nevertheless, there was hardly any cargo for Spanish vessels in Hamburg, as the insurers had greater confidence in Danish vessels, so that premiums charged for Spanish vessels were between 1 ½ to 2 percentage points higher.159 Even in 1805, the Battle of Trafalgar (21 October) between the British Royal Navy and its Franco-Spanish opponents caused a much higher increase in premiums for southern Spanish ports (on average plus 2 ¾ percentage points year-on-year) than for those in Portugal (plus ⅜ percentage points) or on the Bay of Biscay (minus ½ percentage points). Upon the proclamation of the Continental Blockade in autumn 1806, the premiums for all three destinations rose again. Out of these, the lowest, of course, were those for Portugal, allied with Great Britain (annual average 1807: 4 ¾ percent), while the two Spanish destinations were slightly above and below 6 percent respectively. When the premium quotations resumed in the autumn of 1814, the risk for the southern Spanish ports was with over 10 percent the highest among all ports at the Iberian Atlantic coast, due to distance as well as because of the Barbary threat to be expected again. The destination ‘Portugal’ followed at a solid 9 percent and that for the Bay of Biscay at ‘only’ a good 7 percent. In 1818, the premiums had decreased to well under 3 percent and in the following years levelled off at annual averages between 2 ½ percent and 3 percent. The exception was 1823, when a French invasion on behalf of the Holy Alliance ended the Trienio Liberal (1820–1823), which had begun with the 1820 uprising, and ended the absolutist regime of Ferdinand VII. This event led to significantly increased premium quotations for all three Spanish destinations throughout the year (between 5 and 6 ⅓ percent on an annual average), while the annual average for Portugal was only 4 ½ percent. After Madeira and Tenerife had got their own quotation in 1820, these premiums essentially followed the economic 159 Ibid., 32–33 and 78–79.

176

chapter 5

cycle of the other three destinations. In the 1820s, however, premiums quoted for Madeira and Tenerife had often been the highest of the four destinations, whereas by the end of the period under review this picture was reversed and they became the lowest. The general trend of declining premium quotations since the 1820s was only interrupted significantly in 1848/49 and – in the case of Portugal – in the early 1830s. The so-called Liberal or Miguelistic War, also known as the ‘War of the Two Brothers’ (Guerra dos dois irmãos, 1828–1834) between the supporters of King Miguel I (1828–1834) and the followers of his brother, the ex-King Pedro IV (1826) and his daughter Maria II (1826–1828 and 1834–1853),160 led to the suspension of the premium quotation in autumn 1832. Since the 1840s, the annual average of premiums generally fell below the 2 percent mark, and this with a tendency to keep falling, so that at the end of the period under study values of only just over 1 percent were achieved, in the case of Madeira and Tenerife even below 1 percent on an annual average. Monthly averages for Iberian destinations, as is common in the Atlantic area south of the English Channel, were also marked by significant differences between the winter and summer months, both in the eighteenth and, albeit in a more limited form, in the nineteenth centuries. In the first period under study, the highest average premiums were reached in December and January, with the Spanish south coast, at more than 6 ⅛ percent, ahead of Portugal with 5 ¾ percent and the Bay of Biscay with 5 ½ percent. In June and July, the lowest annual average quotations are found in the Bay of Biscay with 2 percent and 2 ⅔ percent for the Spanish south coast. The difference between winter and summer months becomes even more striking when one considers the extrema, which in the case of Spain on this side of Gibraltar could be 10 to 12 percent (1801) in winter, but only 1 ½ percent (1767) in summer. Voyages to the Bay of Biscay sometimes were insured at only a 1 percent premium, so in the years 1770 to 1776. While the differences between the summer and winter months were up to 3 ½ percentage points in the first period under study, in the second it was only 2 ½ percentage points. The most expensive month was now December with just under 4 ½ percent among the three traditional destinations, while Madeira and Tenerife recorded on average only 3 ½ percent. In June and July, the lowest values were reached with 1 to 1 ¼ percent, with the Bay of Biscay at the lower end of the scale while Spain on this side of Gibraltar was placed at the upper. Since the mid-1830s, figures between ⅝ and 1 percent in the summer months were the rule rather than the exception. With Algiers conquered by the French in 1830, the threat of the Barbary pirates to maritime transport 160 Cf. Pina Manique, A Causa.

From Arkhangelsk to Cádiz

177

vanished161 and brought down the premium rates of the Iberian destinations to a normal level as the Spanish ports on this side of Gibraltar could be called at more or less unscathed. Although the adverse weather conditions in the winter months pertained, the reduction of the risk after 1830 is clearly visible in the significant drop in premiums in the summer months compared with the first period under review. 161 Angster, Erdbeeren, 266.

chapter 6

From Málaga to Smyrna – Marine Insurance Rates for Destinations in the Mediterranean Sea In the eighteenth century, the entire Hamburg trade with the Mediterranean region and thus also the related marine insurance business was under the sword of Damocles of the Barbary threat. From the 1740s it was therefore transacted through vessels of foreign nations as Hamburg abandoned its maritime transport to the Mediterranean altogether. Denmark and Sweden had by now also concluded agreement with the Africans [Barbary pirates in Algiers; M.D.], and the vessels of both states sought to make profits in cargo shipping for the Hamburg traders. Until then, and especially in the naval war after 1745, in which neutral vessels were amiss, only a few armed vessels had dared to sail into the Mediterranean Sea, and Hamburg had given them a convoy for the last time. So many of these [armed vessels] were taken from them [the Barbary pirates] that no underwriter wanted to take out insurance on a Hamburg vessel, just as the cost of armament was too high. So since then, Hamburg shipping has had Lisbon as its outermost border. Since the pirates are limited by all tractates to the Cape Finisterre, it would not be possible to get so far if Portugal was not at war with them, and at almost any time a squadron would bar the strait. However, no Hamburg vessel ventures to leave for Cádiz, or rather, no underwriter would subscribe to such a policy.1 In increasing numbers, English ships took the place of Hamburg vessels as the more the Dutch were squeezed out of the freight business and the English took their place, the more direct traffic between Hamburg and the Mediterranean was pushed forward. Until the Napoleonic Wars the conditions in this trade were so uniform that its particularities can be summarized for the [eighteenth] century.2

1 Büsch, Handlung, 106–107. 2 Beutin, Seehandel, 59. Cf. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 46.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_008

From Málaga to Smyrna

179

On the whole, however, trade with the Mediterranean never attained a level of importance even approaching that of the Northwest European trading nations. The primary commodities Hamburg obtained from the Mediterranean were the typical and traditional products of the countries, above all raisins and – from the Ionian Islands – currants,3 wine, and olive oil, but also almonds, brandy and liquors, cotton from Macedonia or Smyrna, citrus fruits and juice, as well as remedies and drugs.4 The Barbary threat was still present even after the Napoleonic Wars. For this reason, the British Royal Navy took action against the pirates in the Mediterranean, first against Algiers in 1816. Even though the Dey of Algiers soon signed a ceasefire, he ignored its provisions, and a second bombardment ensued in 1824. A final blow to the Barbary pirates, however, only occurred in 1830 with the occupation of Algiers by France.5 6.1

The Western Mediterranean

When the Hamburg insurance price current was first set up, the entire western Mediterranean was grouped together under “Málaga, Marseille, Genoa, Leghorn”, which included four out of six of the region’s ports of major relevance to Hamburg; to these the ports of Cette6 and Alicante were added, while Barcelona and Valencia had not (yet) risen to a comparable status. Thus, the Spanish south coast east of Gibraltar, the Iberian east coast, the French Mediterranean coast, and the Liguria-Tuscan coast constituted a common destination despite the immense geographical distance. The islands of the western Mediterranean were not taken into account, nor was the North African coast, whose Barbary States were in any case strong antagonists of the Hanse city’s maritime transport. Aside from Cádiz, Málaga was considered Spain’s main port of export to Hamburg; in particular, tropical fruits, raisins, almonds, figs, etc., as well as wine were shipped from there. Alicante – of much lesser importance – primarily supplied Hamburg with the so-called ‘Valencia almonds’, which were deemed the best and most beautiful of their species and accounted for about 90 percent of Hamburg’s total almond imports.7 From the French perspective, 3 Raisins of the grape variety Zante currants, the so-called ‘korinthiaki’, or ‘black corinths’. 4 Cf. Beutin, Seehandel, 69–74, who arrived at a somewhat different assessment – not least due to an alternate spatial division of the Mediterranean. 5 Angster, Erdbeeren, 266. Cf. Zwierlein, “Vermischungen”. 6 The modern spelling ‘Sète’ is binding only since 19 January 1928. 7 Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 11 and 174–176.

180

chapter 6

Marseille represented both the hinge between Occident and Orient, i.e. for the entire Levant trade, as well as for the distribution of West Indian commodities in the Mediterranean area. However, “the maritime traffic between Hamburg and Marseille … was scarce (four to six vessels per year) as the voyage took a long time and was fraught with danger and the situation even worsened after the outbreak of the plague (1720) and epidemics in the Levant and Algeria.”8 So, due to its proximity to Montpellier and to the Canal du Midi, the rather small port of Cette had become the commercial centre of the Languedoc and supplied Hamburg not only with Levantine commodities, but also with wines and textile products from southern France.9 In the territory of the Republic of Genoa, in addition to the main and free port of Genoa itself, Oneglia, Mentone, and Porto Maurizio were called at, in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany exclusively the free port of Leghorn.10 It was precisely its free port status since 1590, its cosmopolitanism and the resulting favourable trading usages that made Leghorn the most important entrepôt between the western and eastern Mediterranean and the port through which the commodities captured by the North African Barbary pirates returned to the European trade circuit.11 Leghorn was at the same time “the commercial centre of the Mediterranean at the core of Hamburg’s interest,” even more so since the Hamburg traders had left their Dutch competitors within the organisation of the Dutch-German Nation (Nazione Olandese Alemana) in Leghorn behind them – “one of the most striking signs of the triumph of the Hamburg merchants in the eighteenth century over the competition from the Netherlands.”12 Due to its outstanding relevance for Hamburg’s trade, Leghorn became the second western Mediterranean destination in 1748. The reorganiszation of the insurance price current in 1762 meant that the previous integrated destination was divided up for the entire western Mediterranean area: the 8 9 10 11

12

Huhn, Handelsbeziehungen, vol. I, 31 and 105. Ibid., 31; Kellenbenz, “Landverkehr,” 82. In the local dialect, Livorno was called ‘Ligorno’, thus in English it was ‘Leghorn’. Already in 1625, the Venetian envoy Giovanni Battista Salvago told the doge about this: “[I] n Algiers and Tunis, however, there are merchants from Leghorn, Corsica, Genoa, France, Holland, England, Jews, Venetians and from other countries. They purchase all the goods they [the Barbary pirates] have captured and ship them to the free port of Leghorn, which truly lives up to its name, because from there they can reach the whole of Italy unhindered. Some goods are also shipped to Genoa, to Villafranca and Nice in Savoy and from Nice to Marseille. However, the cargo always goes via Leghorn, even though no customs duty is charged on landing and merchants can store their commodities for a whole year without having to pay the slightest duty;” cit. Bono, Piraten, 239. – Cf. also Trivellato, “The Port Jews”. Ressel, “Ein Ansbacher,” 587.

From Málaga to Smyrna

181

largest part of the Spanish Mediterranean coastline, from Málaga via Alicante to Valencia, was established as the first destination, with Mallorca, i.e. the Balearic Islands, being added to this coastal section. Barcelona as the key port of Catalonia was assigned to the southern French coast with Marseille, Cette, and Toulon. From the year 1762, the Republic of Genoa and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany were joined together in a third destination, whereby between the years 1781 and 1803, a distinction was also made between the ports of both states, but this was given up from the year 1804. Apart from Genoa, Mentone and Oneglia were also named as ports for the territory of the eponymous republic and the Republic of Liguria, while within Tuscany only Leghorn was mentioned. This result essentially corresponded to the ports of export most vital for Hamburg. With the reorganisation of the insurance price current in 1820, the Mediterranean destinations were again redefined: from 1820, the first purely Mediterranean destination in relation to the distance to Hamburg was that from “Cartagena to Barcelona”, i.e. the east coast of the Iberian Peninsula, which was renamed “Alicante, Barcelona” from 1821. From 1827 to 1834, Málaga was also added here, as it had been before 1820, but from 1835 to 1842 it formed a destination of its own together with Seville, which proves that after the Barbary pirates had been eliminated in the Mediterranean region, the Strait of Gibraltar was no longer perceived to mark the limit of shipping in south-eastern direction. It was not until 1843 that a single destination was created for the Spanish Mediterranean coast from “Málaga to Barcelona”. This was followed by the destination “Cette to Leghorn” for the southern French and Northwest Italian area, and from 1821 “Cette, Marseille to Leghorn”. From 1824 until the end of the period under study, this was limited to “Cette, Marseille” and thus permanently separated from the Liguria-Tuscan coast. Until 1826 Leghorn was run as a separate destination, then together with Naples, which had previously merged with Messina, and from 1835 also with Genoa, so that by that time the entire Italian west coast was a single destination. In the subsequent analysis, therefore, the Mediterranean is divided into five destinations: – “Málaga” as pars pro toto for the Spanish Mediterranean coast, although until 1762 the entire western Mediterranean area appeared under this name and from 1835 to 1842 Seville was also included under this listing; – “Leghorn” for the Italian west coast, which from Genoa finally reached Naples and to which the southern French coast was added in 1820 to 1823; from this destination was removed – “Genoa” for the Ligurian coast – a special destination, which existed only from 1782 to 1803;

182

chapter 6

– “Marseille” for the French Mediterranean coast, which until 1820 included the Catalonian coast; and – “Barcelona” for the Catalonian Mediterranean coast since 1820, although from 1827 to 1834, this category disappeared from the price current, and both Alicante and Barcelona joined “Málaga”. Finally in 1843, the destination was discontinued altogether and assigned to “Málaga”. Admittedly, these destinations’ names are chosen rather arbitrarily and do not necessarily correspond to the real geographical and political conditions of the respective epoch. The western Mediterranean destinations had a striking feature in common: individual premium rates quoted for each of the five destinations and the respective annual premium rate differed by narrow margin. For the most part, the individual series varied only some by tenths of a percentage point. In the insurance price current’s early years, premium rates for the western Mediterranean region averaged between 3 ½ and 4 percent over the year.13 They rose from March 1747, particularly in the advent of the First Battle of Cape Finisterre (on 14 May), whereafter the premiums plateaued on a rather high level until the War of the Austrian Succession ended (in 1748). After a phase of normalisation, the rates moved upwards again in the wake of the Anglo-French hostilities from 1755 onwards and reached a peak in 1758/59. After the Treaty of Paris in 1763, premium rates fell again to pre-war levels, and this was the case for all three destinations Málaga, Leghorn, and Marseille. The American War of Independence (1775–1783) and the Fourth Dutch-English War (1780–1784) induced a renewed, yet quite moderate increase in premiums, which reverted to their ‘normal level’ in the late 1780s. Only the Wars of the Coalitions in the 1790s and 1800s caused the rates to rise permanently and differences between the various destinations became clear. In the annual average of 1801, for instance, the premiums that computed for Leghorn and Genoa were about 1 ½ up to 2 percentage points above those for the Spanish and French Mediterranean coast, whereby the differences between the quotations for the Tuscan and Ligurian coasts had become so marginal that in 1803 the two were merged again. Moreover, in the winter of 1805/06, the premium rates rose sharply – perhaps in the wake of the Battle of Trafalgar on 21 October 1805. Since premium quotations in Hamburg were not resumed until the winter of 1814, they were also very high for destinations in the western Mediterranean during the first few months, but then soon plunged steeply. In 1818, the 13

According to Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 81, in 1736, the premium rate for ports west of the Strait of Gibraltar for vessels stood between 4 and 4 ½ percent, to Málaga or Marseille even 5 percent; however, this can only be verified for December 1736.

183

From Málaga to Smyrna 16,0000 14,0000

12,0000 10,0000

8,0000 6,0000

4,0000 2,0000 Málaga

0,0000

Leghorn

Genoa

Marseille

Barcelona

a) Annual average premium rates

Leghorn

Málaga

Marseille

Genoa

8,0000 6,0000 4,0000 2,0000 0,0000

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

XI

XII

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

Málaga

Barcelona

Marseille

Leghorn

6,0000 5,0000 4,0000 3,0000 2,0000

1,0000 0,0000

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

XI

XII

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 6-1 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Western Mediterranean, 1736–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-9

184

chapter 6

premium rates levelled off between 3 ½ to 4 percent, i.e. a certain normality had returned. With the establishment of a further quotation – this time for the Spanish coastal section between Cartagena or Alicante and Barcelona – a dichotomy between the four destinations became apparent. The destinations “Málaga” and “Barcelona” on the one side and “Marseille” and “Leghorn” on the other were listed with very close, partly even identical quotations; which is the reason why the separate quotation for the region Alicante-Barcelona was first stopped in 1827 and, after its resumption in 1835, once again and finally in 1843. This development of the convergence of the individual series can be observed, with a continuing downward trend in premiums – with the exception of the years 1847/48 – until the end of the period under study, when the premium rates for the Spanish Mediterranean coast were around 1 ¼ percent and those for the Italian and southern French ports around 1 ½ percent. As for the western Mediterranean ports, the seasonal fluctuations were very pronounced in the premium quotations, but with only scant differences between the various destinations. Throughout the first period of analysis (1736 up to 1807), the annual premium rates averaged out for the three destinations that were quoted for a longer time, Málaga, Leghorn, and Marseille range between 4 ½ and 4 ¾ percent; only the annual average figure of the short-lived destination “Genoa” is markedly higher at around 5 ¼ percent. December and January appear as the months with the highest quotations, with 6 ¾ to 7 ¼ percent. In June and July, they averaged 2 ¾ to just under 3 percent, well below half of the highest values. For the abovementioned reason, the highest monthly average figures are calculated for the “Genoa” destination. During the rest of the nineteenth century, pronounced seasonal fluctuations can be detected, dividing the western Mediterranean destinations in two groups; the Spanish on the one side, as well as the Italian and southern French on the other. The quotation for “Málaga” was on average 2 ¾, the other two about 3 ⅛ percent. In this setup, Barcelona proves a special case: at just under 3 percent, the premium that has been averaged out was roughly in the middle, but would have been considerably lower if the high December rates of the early 1820s, which could also be observed for the other destinations, had been offset by the lower values of the later years. After 1814, December was clearly the month with the highest premiums, in the case of Málaga with 4.8 percent, in that of Marseille and Leghorn with 5.3 to 5.4 percent. For Málaga, June was the month with the lowest quotations with just under 1 ½ percent, for Marseille it was July with almost the same values, for Leghorn and the entire Italian west coast it was July again, but with 1 ¾ percent. Besides, the western Mediterranean destinations in this region are also examples of how outstanding political and military events could overshadow

From Málaga to Smyrna

185

the seasonal development. In fact, one can assume that 1815 was a reaction to the Hundred Days (from 1 March to 18/22 June 1815), as Napoleon’s attempt to reinstall his power had started on the island of Elba located just off the Tuscan coast. At the beginning of March, the monthly premium of the destination “Leghorn”, the immediate ‘catchment area’ of Elba, was still at 4 ¾ percent and then – after the lack of quotations in April – shot up again in May to 15 ½ percent as in the previous winter, only to bounce back to 5 ¾ percent in August – after the end of the Bonapartist adventure. For the other two destinations in the western Mediterranean at this time, premium rates were somewhat lower (quotations were also made for “Málaga” in April), but the course of the quotations was essentially the same. 6.2

The Eastern Mediterranean

In the following, the eastern Mediterranean is understood to be the area of the Adriatic Sea including the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily as well as, from 1815, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Greece to the Levant. Vast in its dimensions and varied in structure, this region of the world contributed much less to Hamburg’s trade than the western Mediterranean did. For instance, the Ottoman Empire played almost no role in Hamburg’s direct trade in the eighteenth century, since the majority of Levantine commodities, especially cotton from Saloniki and Smyrna as well as coffee from Mocha, were shipped to Hamburg via the entrepôts of the Adriatic and the western Mediterranean. Direct imports can be traced only through some years, but these stopped after the mid-1750s and only set in again in the 1790s. Among the ports that had ever had direct traffic with Hamburg – Aleppo, Cyprus, Crete (Candia), Santorini, Saloniki,14 and Tunis – Smyrna was by far the most important, if only from the 1730s to some years into the 1750s.15 However, Hamburg’s trade contacts with the ports of the Ottoman Empire before the Napoleonic Wars were so irregular that a separate premium quotation does not seem to have been necessary. The transport connections to the Adriatic region, however, were closer, with Zante (Zakynthos), Gallipoli in the Gulf of Taranto (and thereby no longer in the western Mediterranean in the narrower sense), the island of Cephalonia and Trieste being the most important ports of export from Hamburg’s perspective, 14 15

Svoronos, Salonique; Vacalopoulos, “Port of Thessaloniki”, 301–303. Cf. Schneider; Krawehl and Denzel (eds.), Statistik, 262. For Tunis, see Panzac, Corsairs, 139–145; Zwierlein, “Vermischungen”.

186

chapter 6

whereas Venice was not. Similar to Spain, Italy also brought mainly its own products to Hamburg, above all currants from Trieste and Zante, but also from Messina and Leghorn.16 Therefore, from the beginning of the premium quotations, there was one destination “Apulia, Venice, Zante”, which covered the entire Adriatic. In 1762 this destination was separated in two: a section was created for “Venice, Trieste, Cephalonia, Zante”, another one for the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily (from 1815 the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies), and the former “Apulia”, for which Naples, Messina, and Gallipoli were listed as ports. In 1781, this destination was further divided between Gallipoli on the one hand, with Naples and Messina on the other. Gallipoli, situated in the Gulf of Taranto, was thus no longer considered part of the western Mediterranean, while her two ports, the most important ports of the Kingdom of Naples and the Kingdom of Sicily, were also regarded as a single destination during the Napoleonic Era, although they belonged to two different states between 1804 and 1815. Thus, the Adriatic area, as a destination, was expanded beyond Venice and Zante, to expressly include Cephalonia and, most notably, the ascending Austrian trade port Trieste.17 The reorganisation of the insurance price current in 1820 also brought about considerable changes for the destinations in the eastern Mediterranean: until 1821 Naples, Messina, and Gallipoli, i.e. the three most important ports of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, were grouped together as one destination. This destination was first separated in 1821, leaving only Messina on the one side, and Naples plus Gallipoli on the other. Three years later, Naples was assigned to Messina and in 1826 to Leghorn, while Gallipoli – for the Gulf of Taranto – and Messina – for Sicily – each became separate destinations. From 1835 onwards, the Leghorn-Naples destination was combined with Genoa, so that the whole of the Italian west coast formed a single destination. Therefore, the premium quotations for Naples from this period are listed and analysed in the subchapter on the “Western Mediterranean”. With the change of the insurance price current in 1820, one destination called “Venice, Trieste” and another named “Zante, Patra, Smyrna” were established. Smyrna was the by far most important port of the Ottoman Empire on the coast of Anatolia.18 Patra – called ‘Patrasso’ in Italian style in the price current – was the central port of the Greek peninsula – especially for 16 17 18

Weber, Deutsche Kaufleute, 236; Pohl, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs, 173–191, especially 175. Cf. Denzel, “Österreichs Direkthandel”; Cova, “Commercio”; Drobesch, “Il ruolo di Trieste”; Barbudieri, “Maritime Commerce”. Frangakis-Syrett, The Commerce of Smyrna; Frangakis, “The Port of Smyrna”, 261–263.

From Málaga to Smyrna

187

the export of currants –, and became more prominent in Western European consciousness with the beginning of the Greek struggle for independence in 1821. This destination was not recorded from 1827 to 1834 and was continued from 1835 under “Smyrna, Çeşme”, while Zante was by then assigned to the Venice-Trieste destination and Patra was no longer considered. Çeşme (spelled ‘Tschesme’ in the price current), a small port town off the bay of Smyrna (İzmir kör), vis-a-vis the island and the city of Chios, supplemented the port of Smyrna, which was located about 100 kilometres to the west. Due to these multiple changes in the insurance price current, a distinction is made between four destinations in the following: – the ports of the Adriatic and Ionian coasts, which in the early years also included “Apulia”, i.e. the Kingdom of Naples (perhaps also the Kingdom of Sicily); – the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, i.e. the unified Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily with their main ports Messina and Naples, the latter was added to the Leghorn destination in 1826; – Gallipoli in the Gulf of Taranto, whose premium quotations more than once took a unique course, due to the town’s peculiar geographical location; and – the ports of the Ottoman Empire. The destinations in this region recorded rather high premium rates by European standards, consistently over 4 percent, in some cases well over 5 percent, which rose to almost 11 percent during the War of the Austrian Succession and in January 1748 even to 17 ½ percent. After a significant drop in premiums, there was a new peak in 1755 with almost 7 percent. After the Peace of Paris of 1763, the quotation fell to a normal level between 4 ⅓ to 5 percent, although this only applied to the Adriatic ports as in the meantime another destination had been established for the ports of the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. These premiums were about ½ up to 1 percentage point lower than those of the Adriatic coasts, which was not only due to the shorter distance, but probably particularly to the increased risk inherent to the geographical proximity to the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary pirates. Although the Austrians had entered trade agreements with the Sublime Porte (25 May 1747) and the Barbary pirates (23 December 1748 and 27 June 1749), attacks by Ottoman pirates remained common. It was not until 1783 that the Porte and, following suit, the Moroccan Alaouite Sultan Mohammed II (1757–1790) in Fez 1783 consented to a contractual guarantee of security and indemnity for vessels flying the Habsburg flag, which was renewed in the Treaty of Sistova on 4 August 1791. In order to settle indemnity claims arising from events of loss inflicted by pirate attacks, a specialised court was established in 1784, and the Imperial Divan actually paid

188

chapter 6

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 6-2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1736–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-10

From Málaga to Smyrna

189

damages when vessels were lost to the pirates.19 In fact, the average marine insurance premiums for this area also tended to decline thereafter, although the question of whether they followed the general trend of the period shared with other destinations or to the reduced risk cannot be answered. From Hamburg’s perspective, the wars in the Atlantic – the American War of Independence (1775–1783) and the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784) – naturally also had an impact when sailing into the Mediterranean Sea as the waters where belligerents carried out naval operations had to be crossed first. In 1782, a destination was set up for Gallipoli in the Gulf of Taranto, the premium rates of which were slightly lower than or equal to those of Naples and Messina. This picture only changed when Great Britain and the Netherlands (Dutch Republic until 1795) entered the War of the First Coalition (1792–1798) in 1793 and carried the conflict into the Mediterranean. Since 1794, the premiums for all three destinations increased noticeably; beginning in the Adriatic region, they spread to Gallipoli in 1801/02. Peak figures of over 11 percent were achieved on an annual average, and since December 1800 up to 15 percent in individual months. Napoleon’s Egyptian Campaign (1 July 1798 to 23 August 1799) left no notable traces in the premium quotations, however. If a slight drop can be found after the Treaty of Amiens (1802), there was another extremum in the year of the Battle of Trafalgar, 1805, and then again after the proclamation of the Continental Blockade by the Berlin Decree of November 1806. When quotations resumed in November 1814 after the interruption of many years, premiums were initially very high in the winter of 1814/15; 18 percent were recorded for the Adriatic ports, 15 ½ percent for Naples and Messina, and 13 ¾ percent for Gallipoli. After that, quotations began a long-term descent, with shorter periods of increase in 1823 and 1848/49. In particular, the series for Messina on the one side (Naples was meanwhile quoted together with Leghorn and from 1835 also with Genoa) and Gallipoli on the other, first in the early 1820s and then since the 1830s, were so similar that they were almost or completely identical in most years. In the second half of the 1820s, however, the Gallipoli series yielded considerably lower premium rates than the Messina series – mainly a consequence of higher premium rate quotations in the winter months, which were not recorded for Gallipoli. This disparate availability of seasonal premium rates had been a conspicuous feature of 1826; thus for that year, the lower annual average rate has been computed on the sole basis of lower summer rates. 1820 also saw the start of a fourth destination for ports of the Ottoman Empire, but after 1821 only a few single premiums were listed, so that these usually very high values are rather highlights than useful data 19

Kaltenstadler, “Seehandel,” part II, 42–43; von Costa, “Triest”, 49–50.

190

chapter 6

material conducive to the construction of a ‘business cycle’. The background of these high rates was probably a surge of raids by Greek pirates during the Greek War of Independence (1821–1827). These pirates, known as ‘klepths’ (from Greek kléftes = thieves, but here: patriots), severely impaired maritime traffic in the Aegean Sea and in the Gulf of Patra since 1825. The conflict could only finally be settled after the Battle of Navarino (20 October 1827) and after the capture of Gravusa (today Gramvousa) in the Sea of Crete, the last pirate stronghold, in February 1828.20 Regular premium quotations for Smyrna and Çeşme began in 1835. They were mostly above those for the Apulian ports, in some years also below, but still above those for Messina and Gallipoli. Thus, in the second half of the 1830s, the risk for voyages to ports in Anatolia had sometimes been reduced to such an extent from Hamburg’s perspective that it appeared even lower than departing, for instance, to Trieste. Since the 1840s, the four series ran virtually parallel, with premiums of 1 ½ percent for Messina and Gallipoli, 1 ¾ percent for the ports of Apulia and 2 percent for those of Anatolia towards the end of the period under review. The destinations of the eastern Mediterranean region showed considerable seasonal fluctuations, especially in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: while June and July, the months with the lowest premium notations on average, produced figures between 3 and 4 percent, December and January, the months with the highest rates, saw figures ranging from 7 ½ to 8 ½ percent. On average, Messina and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies with 5 percent ranked well below Gallipoli with 5 ½ percent and the Adriatic ports with 5 ¾ percent. The analysis of monthly average rates brings to light some intriguing insights: on the one hand, premium rates in times of war rose particularly in the winter months, i.e. when the risk increased, and quickly reached values of over 10 percent. On the other hand, from April to August, premium rates – in many cases also in times of war and crisis – were relatively even, i.e. without notable extrema. Throughout the period beginning in 1814, the average premium rate of single months was consistently about 2 percent lower than those that have been averaged out per month until 1807. The fact that the (monthly) average figures for the ports of the Ottoman Empire were lowest by comparison is a result of the late addition of regular premium quotations to the price current in 1835, when the other destinations already recorded quite low premiums. Leaving aside the special case of the Ottoman Empire, Gallipoli had the lowest average figures during this period, while the Adriatic ports had the highest. 20

Angster, Erdbeeren, 269–270, 274 and 277. Concerning the Greek shipping of the later decades Harlaftis, Shipping.

From Málaga to Smyrna

191

At 4 to almost 6 percent, the average figures for the month December, the highest of the year, were still quite high. The lowest average figures were reached in the months April to July, ranging from 1 ⅔ to 2 ⅔ percent, with the Adriatic ports even scoring a more favourable average premium in April than in May. Towards the end of the period, the quotations for this month fell to 1 to 1 ¼ percent, and in the case of the Ottoman ports to 1 ½ percent, i.e. to very low levels in relation to previous quotations.

chapter 7

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg – Marine Insurance Rates for Destinations in the Baltic Sea From Hamburg’s perspective, the Baltic Sea region traditionally played a much smaller role in trade than the Northwest European trading nations, even more so as Lübeck had retained its position as the most important German hub for Baltic Sea trade in the eighteenth century.1 Nevertheless, Hamburg had become the intermediary for the French Commerce du Nord in the eighteenth century and remained “the intermediary with overseas” for the Baltic ports in the nineteenth century.2 This service was aimed less at the actual trade in goods than to the exchange and insurance business, for which Hamburg was the financial centre of the entire northern European region. For this reason, the Hamburg insurance price current not only recorded the Hamburg premiums for voyages to the Baltic region, but also those that were charged in Lübeck and various other European ports as well as premiums from Baltic ports for western and southern European destinations. The largest number of premium quotations in the Hamburg price current therefore relate to the Baltic region, which clearly underlines the exceptional importance of the Hamburg marine insurance market for this entire economic region – this was also the case with the international bill of exchange trade.3 The business cycles of Hamburg’s seaborne Baltic trade are evident from the data of the Danish Sound Toll Registers.4 The Sound toll (Øresundstolden) were a toll on the passage through the Sound (Øresund), introduced in 1429 by Eric VII of Pomerania, King of Denmark (1412–1439), for which non-Danish vessels had to pay shipping dues in Elsinore (Helsingør). It was one of the most important sources of income for the Danish Crown until the nineteenth century. Since 1567, the vessels’ cargo was taxed, with a weight duty and – unlike in Hamburg – no ad valorem duty. The Sound Toll Registers therefore indicate the commercial weights, or for that matter, hollow or liquid dimensions; they are,

1 2 3 4

Menke, Beziehungen, 226. Moltmann, Handelsschiffahrt, 122. Cf. Denzel, “Hamburg as a Financial Market”; idem, “Monetary and Financial Innovations”. Hamburg’s insignificant land trade with the Baltic region, which was conducted from the ports of Copenhagen and Lübeck, is therefore absent from this analysis.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_009

193

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

35000 30000 25000

Import

Export

20000 15000 10000 5000

17 3 17 6 3 17 8 4 17 0 4 17 2 4 17 4 4 17 6 48 17 5 17 0 5 17 2 5 17 4 5 17 6 5 17 8 60 17 6 17 2 6 17 4 6 17 6 68 17 7 17 0 7 17 2 7 17 4 76 17 7 17 8 8 17 0 8 17 2 84 17 86 17 8 17 8 9 17 0 9 17 2 9 17 4 9 17 6 9 18 8 0 18 0 0 18 2 0 18 4 06 18 0 18 8 1 18 0 1 18 2 1 18 4 1 18 6 1 18 8 2 18 0 2 18 2 2 18 4 2 18 6 2 18 8 30 18 3 18 2 3 18 4 36 18 3 18 8 4 18 0 4 18 2 44 18 4 18 6 48

0

graph 7-1 Hamburg’s seaborne trade with the Baltic Sea according to the Sound Toll Registers, 1736–1849, in metric tons

however, silent about the value of the goods to be paid dues on, but they reflect the transport boom in Hamburg’s Baltic trade (see Graph 7-1).5 Without going into a detailed analysis of the business cycles of Hamburg’s Baltic Sea trade, the enormous discrepancy between imports and exports can simply be noted.6 For the most part, this imbalance is due to the fact that Hamburg primarily imported grain from the Baltic Sea region, but only at times when demand reached a critical point, and particularly large-scale grain imports were in dire need during the years of the European famine crises, e.g. at the beginning of the 1770s (1771/72).7 Hamburg (re)exported comparatively valuable commodities to the Baltic Sea region, in the eighteenth century increasingly sugar, alongside other luxury foods and raw materials from overseas. These exports took place on a markedly lower level, but – in contrast to imports – with all the more regularity and, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century, with a generally rising trend.8 It thus remains, as Pierre Jeannin notes, the basic tendency 5 The data from the Sound Toll Registers was kindly provided to the author by Werner Scheltjens, Bamberg University. All figures are converted into metric tons. 6 The generalising conclusion of Jeannin (“Hansestädte,” 66) that “Hamburg’s exports to the North increased, while the exports of these countries to Hamburg decreased relatively,” can thus no longer be agreed with. 7 Cf. ibid., 67. 8 That there was nevertheless a great imbalance between imports and exports is visible in the comparatively high proportion of ballast by weight, which by 1790 accounted for just under

194

chapter 7

that the northern and Northeast European markets as a whole were far less important suppliers to Hamburg as southern Europe was. As far as Hamburg is concerned, it is insightful pointing out how small the number of vessels arriving from southern Baltic ports was in general.9 7.1

The Hamburg Premium Rates

Hamburg’s premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea region were based on Hamburg’s Baltic Sea trade, which was primarily concentrated in comparatively few ports on its southern coast from Pomerania to the Gulf of Finland. According to the Sound Toll Registers, Danzig was the most important trading partner here in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, followed by Saint Petersburg, which was not founded until 1703 and via which three-quarters of all Russian imports came into the country. Further partners were Riga, Königsberg (present-day Kaliningrad) together with Pillau (Baltijsk), Stettin (Szczecin) and the small port towns Libau (Liepāja), Reval (Tallinn), and Pernau (Pärnu) – the latter equipped with an exiguous port and lacking sufficient hinterland – which were of relatively little relevance for goods coming from Hamburg.10 Even if one takes into account the participation of German merchants in British trade with Russia,11 Hamburg’s trade with Russia was of comparably little quantitative significance.12 Nevertheless, Hamburg was qualitatively of particular importance for Russian foreign trade, as the merchants of Saint Petersburg or Riga could sell their commodities better in this receptive, well-visited and differentiated market than in France, Italy or even in North America…. the long duration and dangerous nature of the journeys, especially in spring and autumn, made it often seem advisable … to divide the journey into two parts, as it were. Southerners as well as Russians sent their commodities to Hamburg and

9 10 11 12

10,000 metric tons or exactly 7 ⅓ percent of the ‘total export’ to the Baltic region. Shipping with a high proportion of ballast or even exclusively in ballast, for example to import the highly demanded grain, was therefore not uncommon and can be observed almost every year. It is not without reason that above-average ballast percentages can be detected in years in which a particularly large amount of grain was or had to be imported from the Baltic Sea region. For example, 1772, the year of the highest grain import, also saw the highest export of ballast (408 metric tons) in the years up to 1790. Cf. ibid., 66. Ibid., 64. Menke, Beziehungen, 25, 110–111, 166 and 172. Schulte Beerbühl, “Staatsangehörigkeit”. Jeannin, “Hansestädte,” 65.

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

195

each of them could not only count on receiving an adequate price for their commodities in Hamburg, but also on being able to stock up on the commodities they needed at almost any time, and which could be sent to them comparatively quickly on the shorter route.13 Stockholm and Copenhagen, which were very important internationally, were also of minor importance in Hamburg’s maritime trade; Stockholm was sidelined as Hamburg’s main connection to Sweden was via Gothenburg, for which no Sound tolls had to be paid, as was Copenhagen, because a large part of Hamburg’s trade was transacted ‘overland’ here for the same reason. Both cities were also served by sea from Lübeck. During the time of the Elbe blockades, international trade flows in the Baltic Sea region turned completely around: while Hamburg had previously and subsequently brokered Northwest European commodities to the Baltic Sea region, the Baltic Sea ports of Lübeck, Wismar, Rostock, and Stralsund briefly benefited as intermediaries in the smuggling of English goods from Sweden to the continent and were able to earn money from the contraband trade of North American vessels with overseas commodities and English coal.14 Therefore, two destinations were established in 1736, on the one hand “Danzig, Königsberg, Stockholm” and on the other hand “Saint Petersburg”. Since 1762, the northern Baltic Sea region was known as “Stockholm, Saint Petersburg”, from which “Reval, Riga and Courland”, the Baltic regions, were distinguished – only to become already reunited in 1781 to form a single destination as “Stockholm, Riga, Reval, and Saint Petersburg”. The southern Baltic Sea region was subsumed to the destination “Königsberg or Pillau, Danzig, Pomerania”, since 1781 called “Pomerania, Danzig, Königsberg, Memel”. Thereby, Hamburg’s maritime traffic with Danzig was much smaller than that of the Dutch, but “Hamburg contributed substantially to the supply of colonial commodities to Danzig”, even if “the carriers are mostly Dutch.”15 13 14

15

Menke, Beziehungen, 233. North, “Kontinentalsperre,” 141–144 and 148; Marzagalli, Le négoce maritime, 164–170. Cf. Voeltzer, Wirtschaftslage; Decker, Kontinentalsperre; Babendererde, “Rostocks Seehandel”; Bohlmann, Kontinentalsperre; Stuhr, “Kontinentalsperre”; Huschner, “Wismar”. The United States of America hardly played a role in the international trade of the time: although its trade with Europe increased by a factor of five by 1807, the Embargo Act of 1807 (until it was repealed in 1809) imposed a general ban on shipping outside American waters. The result was the cessation of trade. The Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 then restricted the ban on trade to Great Britain and France, but the volume of trade with the neutral states remained meagre; Saalfeld, “Kontinentalsperre,” 128; Frankel, “Embargo”; Heckscher, Continental-System, 127–148. Vogel, “Beiträge II,” 93.

196

chapter 7

When the insurance price current was rearranged in 1821, Saint Petersburg became a separate destination after the Russian trading metropolis on the Neva had been briefly named together with Reval. Stockholm, however, was combined with Riga, the most important Baltic port, and – until 1821 – with Åbo (present-day Turku), the capital of the then Grand Duchy of Finland, which had fallen to the Russian Empire. From 1843 onwards, Riga was named alone and since then probably stood pars pro toto for all Baltic ports, while Stockholm was no longer mentioned at all. In the southern Baltic Sea region, the layout of the individual destinations changed relatively often after 1820: that year, there were three destinations in this region, with Königsberg forming a single destination throughout; until 1821 they were also called “Memel and Libau”, then Danzig was added, and still later, from 1835 to 1842, Stettin. A second destination was set up in 1820 for “Stettin to Danzig”, which from 1821 onwards operated under the name “Rostock, Stettin”, i.e. including the Mecklenburg and Pomeranian coasts, after Danzig had been joined with the Königsberg destination. During the years when Stettin belonged to the Danzig-Königsberg destination (1835–1842), this second destination was named “Wismar, Rostock, Stralsund”. After that, the entire region was grouped under “Baltic coast to Stettin”. For a short time (1820/21), there was even a third destination – “Kiel to Stralsund” – which, however, was merged into the Mecklenburg-Pomeranian destination (“Rostock, Stettin”) after a few months. In the following, a differentiation is made between four general destinations, of which the latter is not discussed in detail: The trend of the premium rate for the voyages from Hamburg to the Baltic ports differed fundamentally from that for destinations in the Atlantic region. On the one side, the individual wars of the eighteenth century did not play such an important role in this region as they did in the Atlantic area. The last war that took place centrally in this area, the Great Northern War, ended in 1721. Only the Russo-Swedish War (8 August 1741 to 7 or 18 August 1743)16 found expression in the suspension of the premium quotation for the northern destination including the Baltic countries from September 1741 to August 1743. What influence the naval wars waged in the Atlantic area may have had on shipping traffic in the Baltic Sea “must be left aside.”17 On the other side, weather conditions had a decisive influence on premium quotations, at least in the eighteenth century, and especially in the northern Baltic Sea area, as voyages in winter were more often cancelled than they were undertaken. Piracy no longer existed here at all and could therefore not have had a negative influence on 16 17

Cf. Böhme, “Schwedens Teilnahme”. Vogel, “Beiträge II,” 114.

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

197

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 7-2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1736–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-11

198

chapter 7

premium quotations, nor is there any apparent connection between the premium quotations with the trade cycle.18 The annual averages for both the northern and southern Baltic Sea regions in the eighteenth century were mostly between 3 and 4 percent, and thus higher than for some Atlantic destinations. The northern Baltic coast was usually – intriguingly, not always – higher quoted than the southern coast, mainly because of the much more expensive premiums in the winter months. The same background also applies to the peak values recorded, for example, for the destination of the northern Baltic coast in 1766 and 1775/76. The fluctuations between the individual years were similarly high for both destinations and only began to decrease in the 1820s. The premiums for the Baltic ports, which were recorded separately between 1762 and 1781, were largely in line with the business cycles of the other two destinations and were generally between them in terms of value. Until 1781, this quotation was so close to that for Saint Petersburg and Stockholm that it seemed superfluous to record it after 1781; now, Reval and Riga were subsumed under the destination for the northern Baltic coast. This probably also corresponded to the usual route from Hamburg to this region of the Baltic Sea, where the shipmasters successively called at several ports at the Baltic coast, the Gulf of Finland, and also Stockholm. Since the second half of the 1780s, the business cycles of the two destinations were largely similar and more or less uniform. This development also continued through the 1790s, even though the difference between the premium quotations of the northern and southern Baltic Sea coasts became significantly larger again in the time of war that was about to begin. From 1804 onwards, however, the quotations – at least for the northern destination – became so irregular that the annual averages showed enormous hikes. After 1814, the business cycle of premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea region was much more uniform than in the eighteenth century, and at the same time it followed the general trend, which was also to be found in other destinations, much more strongly. After recording very high premiums, when quotations were resumed, they fell rapidly to below 2 percent in the 1830s as a regular annual average for all four destinations that were then listed. In 1830/31, the Polish November Uprising became visible in increasing premiums for Saint Petersburg. 1848 and 1854/55 were exceptional years, with premiums tending to decrease by the end of the period under study. While premiums rose sharply for the last time in 1848 (2 ¼ to 3 ⅛ percent), the quotation for Saint Petersburg and the Baltic ports was suspended during the Crimean War and were only resumed in the spring of 1856. The background to this 18

Cf. ibid., 114–115.

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

199

was the blockade of Russian Baltic ports by British warships, which began in March 1854, the attack on Bomarsund Fortress on the island of Åland between Finland and Sweden in August of that year, and the Anglo-French bombardment of the docks at Suomenlinna (then also known as Sveaborg) off Helsinki in 1855.19 The premiums for the southern Baltic coasts did not increase, however. Towards the end of the investigation period, all quotations had reached a level of just under 1 to about 1 ¼ percent. If one compares the monthly averages of the individual destinations with each other, considerable differences between the summer and winter months can be seen in all of them. These weather-related differences can be regarded as a specific characteristic of the destinations by the Baltic Sea. In the period leading up to 1807, the destination of the northern Baltic Sea coast was about ⅓ percentage points above that of the southern coast on an annual average, and the Baltic countries, although only listed in just under two decades, were even slightly higher. The month with the highest quotations was December on the northern coast with almost 7 ¾ percent, followed by January and February; in the south it was January with ‘only’ 6 percent. The reason for this marked difference results from the fact that premiums for the southern coast were also quoted in the winter months, if not consistently, then still more regularly than for the northern coast. If the latter was given a premium at all in winter, it was comparatively high; values between 7 and 10 percent were not exceptional, and in the war year 1807, 16 ½ percent was even reached in December. The same applies to the Baltic countries, although there February was the most expensive month at 7 ⅜ percent, followed by January and December. July, in contrast, was the month with the lowest premium quotations, which averaged less than 2 percent for the southern coast and the Baltic countries, and about 2 1/7 percent for the northern coast. Therefore, in the eighteenth century the Baltic Sea region was navigable from March/April to September/October on the basis of premiums that were rather low by international standards – apart from individual years of war. This indicates a rather high level of safety, whereas in the winter months, caused by the adverse weather conditions, such voyages could only be secured, if at all, with high premium payments. The largest part of the trade, i.e. the shipment of bulk goods, was also handled congruently, because “most timber is shipped in the months of May to October, whereas grain shipments take place in two distinctly different seasons, first in March and April, and then again from mid-October.”20

19 20

Cf. Baumgart, Crimean War; Figes, Crimean War. Vogel, “Beiträge II,” 108.

200

chapter 7

This basic constant in Baltic shipping remained as it was in the first half of the nineteenth century, and even became more pronounced in that the newly listed destinations – on the one hand for the Baltic and Sweden, and on the other for the coast of Mecklenburg and Pomerania – were only recorded in exceptional cases in January and February, with December being somewhat more frequent. Even for the two traditional destinations, the quotations, if they were made at all, were sometimes even higher than in the eighteenth century. January was now the most expensive month for the whole Baltic Sea, with 8 ¾ percent for the northern coast and with 5 ¼ percent for the southern. In the summer months, in contrast, very low premiums were recorded on average, which between April and August the premiums were below 1 ½ percent for all destinations. For the coastal ports of Mecklenburg and Pomerania they were even below ¾ percent between May and July and even for those on the northern Baltic coast they were just over 1 percent. On an annual average, the premiums for the northern Baltic Sea coast were still a good 2 percent, for the southern and Baltic coasts a good 1 ¾ percent and for the Mecklenburg-Pomeranian coast below 1 ½ percent. Although they were thus considerably lower than the average figures of the eighteenth century, Baltic shipping in the winter months of the nineteenth century was still characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, which was drastically reflected in the premiums. 7.2

The Lübeck Premium Rates

Voyages between Hamburg and the Baltic posed a peculiar situation, as the majority of Hamburg’s trade with the Baltic ports was not processed directly in Hamburg but via Lübeck. Thus, the Hamburg insurance price current indicates premium quotations also for voyages from Lübeck to the most important Baltic destinations (see Table A1-3). This fact points, on the one side, to the differentiation of shipping traffic with the Baltic Sea due to its geographical characteristics: access could only be through the Sound, the Great Belt or the Little Belt, and the cost of transport through the Sound increased considerably. On the other side, Lübeck’s still central importance, which this traditional ‘capital’ of the Hanseatic League still had in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century in the trade and shipping of this economic area, is evident.21 For the Sound toll made the transport of goods from Hamburg ‘overland’, i.e. usually via the Elbe and the Stecknitz Canal22 (the so-called ‘Stecknitzfahrt’), to Lübeck and 21 22

Kikuchi, “Trade through Lübeck”. Cf. Kellenbenz, “Landverkehr,” 9.

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

201

only from there, as well as by vessel over sea, in many cases cheaper than if the goods had been shipped around Denmark and through the Sound. From Hamburg’s perspective, Lübeck was thus a kind of outpost of its Baltic trade, from which marine insurance premiums for the various destinations in the Baltic Sea region must have been in the Hamburg merchants’ own interest in order to be able to make their corresponding price calculations. Conversely, Hamburg also played an outstanding role for the Lübeck traders: [I]t can hardly be regarded as an actual intermediate port, but individual Lübeck shipmasters apparently chose it as a permanent base for their cargo voyages, sailed from there to France or Spain in repeated journeys and often did not return home for years.23 These in turn were then dependent on Hamburg’s premium quotations for the respective western European and Mediterranean ports. Within the Baltic Sea region, however, Lübeck’s shipping traffic was not only directed at the city or port of Lübeck itself: A considerable number of the Lübeck shipmasters, however, took their cargo or main cargo (as many departed from Lübeck with a larger or smaller partial load) elsewhere. This was primarily timber and its by-products, secondarily grain, as well as flax and hemp; everything else probably played a rather minor role. Accordingly, the intermediate ports are distributed around the entire Baltic Sea area.24 At the beginning of the insurance premium quotations in the Hamburg price current in 1736, a distinction was made between three destinations for Lübeck’s Baltic Sea traffic: the first covered the southern Baltic coast as far as Danzig and Königsberg, including Sweden, which may have corresponded to the routes that served the respective ports one after the other at the time. The second destination reached the Baltic countries (Livonia and Estonia) with Riga and Reval (today Tallinn) as the most important ports, to which from 1762 onwards Pernau (Pärnu) was added. The third served the Gulf of Finland, with Saint Petersburg, by far the most important port in this region, being the only one at first; but from 1762 on the ‘neighbouring’ ports of Narva, the ‘timber port’ Wiborg (Vyborg),25 and Helsinki were also listed separately. The order of 23 24 25

Vogel, “Beiträge I,” 130–131. Ibid., 128. Kresse, Materialien, 21.

202

chapter 7

naming – first Narva, then Saint Petersburg, Wiborg, and Helsinki – refers to the route that the vessels from Lübeck probably took. As late as in the eighteenth century, the first-mentioned destination, in whose context Memel (today Klaipėda) was also explicitly mentioned since 1762, was divided several times, from which one can conclude the variety of sea routes used. As early as in 1748 Sweden was separated from “Danzig, Königsberg” and the destination then renamed “Stockholm and Northern Ports” in 1762. This conceptual concretisation had become necessary because at the same time an independent destination was established for the southern Swedish ports of Västervik and Kalmar (both in Småland), Karlskrona (in the province of Blekinge), and Åhus (in Scania), which had become particularly important for the Swedish trade in Lübeck since the second half of the seventeenth century.26 At the same time, two further destinations – “Stralsund, Stettin and the rest of Pomerania” and “Libau, Windau, Ösel” (present-day Liepāja, Ventspils, Saaremaa) – were ‘cut out’ of “Danzig, Königsberg”. This was probably done so as to be able to take account of the markedly different distances between Lübeck and the Pomeranian, Polish-Prussian, and Courland ports through correspondingly differentiated premium quotations. Concerning the Courland ports, Libau was more important than Windau, which had been destroyed during the Great Northern War. In addition, a canal from Libau to Lake Libau was built between 1697 and 1703. Libau’s port was still located at the widened mouth of the canal and navigable for large vessels from 1730. The island of Ösel with its capital Arensburg, closing the Gulf of Riga, was part of the Russian Governorate of Livonia. With the reorganisation of the price current in 1820 and 1821, the destinations for the southern Baltic Sea region were again combined into two, one for the ports from Stettin to Königsberg – including Danzig – and the other for the route along the Curonian Spit to Memel. The latter was only listed until 1834 and then also included in the one for “Danzig, Königsberg”, so that all Prussian Baltic ports formed a single destination. In 1821, the ports of Scania, as well as those of Courland, and Riga, were added to the Swedish destination, which had been operating under the name “Stockholm” alone since 1843. A separate destination was established for Copenhagen in 1821. In the northern Baltic Sea region, the independent listing of a premium rate for Baltic ports was interrupted between 1821 and 1843, with Riga being moved to Stockholm, and Reval to Saint Petersburg (until 1834). Apart from the latter, Åbo or Turku respectively, the most important port of the Grand Duchy of Finland at that time, was also named until 1826, for which a separate 26

Cf. Vogel, “Beiträge I,” 128 and 130.

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

203

destination of “Finnish Ports” was established in 1827. In the same year Turku was almost completely destroyed by a fire, and in 1828 the capital function of the Grand Duchy of Finland was transferred to Helsinki, which is closer to Saint Petersburg. In 1838 “the shipments from Lübeck to the Finnish ports … were very much revived again, as the Finns had obtained from Russia a prolongation of their own customs laws.”27 Destinations of the Lübeck maritime traffic in the North Sea (contemporarily called ‘Westsee’), are not mentioned, however, as the corresponding Hamburg premium quotations were decisive for this. At the beginning of the regular quotations of Lübeck’s marine insurance premiums in the Hamburg price current, the destination “Sweden, Danzig, Königsberg” was probably the most important of the three series recorded, especially since those for Saint Petersburg and Riga were suspended during the Russo-Swedish War from September 1761 to July 1763. During the 1740s, the annual average premium rates for the southern Baltic Sea region fluctuated between 2 and 2 ½ percent, but after the split of the joint quotation from 1749, the premiums for Sweden tended to go up, while those for the Pomeranian and Prussian ports declined in the following years. Thus, the different safety risk for voyages to Sweden on the one hand and such along the southern coast of the Baltic Sea region on the other seems to have been the decisive factor for the differentiation into different destinations since the end of the War of the Austrian Succession. At the same time, it should be noted that the two quotations for the more northern ports were significantly higher than those for the Swedish and Prussian ports even outside the war years, and that those for Saint Petersburg were even higher than those for Riga. The distance therefore probably had a similarly significant influence on the premium quotation as the risk of adverse weather conditions in the winter months, which was significantly greater in the Gulf of Finland than along the southern or even Baltic countries’ coast. The Lübeck premium quotation for the southern coast of the Baltic Sea ranged between 1 ½ and 2 percent until well into the Seven Years’ War and then fluctuated around 2 percent until 1770. In the 1770s, annual averages of around 2 ½ percent were the norm, which then rose steeply in the 1780s and reached a provisional peak of 3 ⅔ percent in 1785. By the end of the first period of investigation (1807), the annual averages were again mostly at values around 2 ½ percent, but rose in 1798/99 and then, after the proclamation of the Continental 27

SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger SeeAssecuranz-Geschäft des Jahres … von O. C. Gaedechens, 1835–1852 – … des Jahres 1838, fol. 7–8.

204

chapter 7

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 7-3 Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the southern Baltic Sea, 1736–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-12

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

205

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 graph 7-4 Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the northern Baltic Sea, 1736–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-13

206

chapter 7

Blockade in the autumn of 1806, to well over 3 percent. The course of the premiums’ business cycle outlined on the basis of the destinations Danzig and Königsberg was observed cum grano salis since 1762 in the other destinations of the southern Baltic Sea region in a similar manner. However, the premiums for the Pomeranian ports were usually ⅝ percentage points below this level, owing to their greater proximity to Lübeck, and those for the southern Swedish ports of ½ percentage point below and up to ½ percentage point above. It was not until the first decade of the nineteenth century, but even before the Continental Blockade and the growing importance of the southern Swedish ports for smuggling British goods to Germany28 that these premiums rose well above those for voyages to Danzig and Königsberg. They were increasingly based on those for Stockholm and the more northern ports of Sweden, to which the destination for Scania and southern Sweden was added when the insurance price current was changed in 1820. Most of the Courland ports, including Ösel, were quoted at ½ percentage point above the premiums for Danzig and Königsberg. Deviations from this were a regular occurrence for the lack of quotations (due to weather conditions) and the resulting shifts in the annual average values. Since the 1780s, the premiums for the Courland destination increasingly converged with those for Prussia, so that the differences generally melted down to one or a few tenths of a percentage point – because of the somewhat greater distance. It took much longer for the destinations in the northern Baltic Sea region to develop a more or less uniform business cycle for the individual premium quotations. As already mentioned, the annual averages for Sweden, after the separation of Danzig and Königsberg, followed an incremental upward development (up to over 3 percent in 1751) and then they fluctuated until the 1770s with an initially declining trend, but from the mid-1760s onwards a rising trend of between 2 and 3 percent. In 1785, with an annual average figure of 4 ½ percent, the highest since the quotation in the Hamburg price current was charged. Subsequently, the premium rates fell back to figures between 2 and a good 3 percent, only to rise again significantly with the proclamation of the Continental Blockade in autumn 1806. In contrast, the fluctuation margins of the destinations Riga and Saint Petersburg were conspicuously higher, and some of the series were also interrupted during the Russo-Swedish War of 1741– 1743. In the first decades they were only somewhat constant; sometimes the annual average for Riga was even higher than for Saint Petersburg, although this may be related to the greater irregularity of the latter destination. For the 28

Marzagalli, Le négoce maritime, 164–172; North, “Kontinentalsperre,” 141–144 and 148; from the perspective of Lübeck Voeltzer, Wirtschaftslage.

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

207

same reason, Saint Petersburg’s average quotation showed significantly higher and more frequent swings, several times approaching or even slightly exceeding the 4 percent mark. It was not until the 1780s that all three destinations developed a more or less synchronized business cycle, which continued with interruptions until the end of the first study period. This cycle fluctuated with a rather falling tendency, mostly with values between 2 ½ and 3 ½ percent until the end of the 1790s, only to rise again significantly. Within this period, the Lübeck premium quotation for Sweden, Riga, and Saint Petersburg was equally interrupted from February to December 1791, whereas this did not happen in Hamburg: the background was the so-called Ochakov Affair or Ochakov Crisis, a consequence of the Russo-Swedish War from 1788 to 1790,29 which had not yet had any consequences for the premium quotation. Towards the end of this war, however, Russia had taken away the Ochakov Fortress at the mouth of the Dnieper-Bug-Liman, a strategical key position in the Black Sea, from the Ottoman Empire, which was allied with Sweden. Thus, the European balance in this time threatened to change in favour of Russia, and Great Britain and Prussia wanted to prevent this. Tsarina Catherine II (1762–1796) reacted to their war preparations by assembling a large fleet in the Baltic Sea.30 Although no war action broke out and the crisis was quickly forgotten,31 this Ochakov Affair seems to have so impressed the Lübeck marine insurance market that premium quotations for the three northeastern destinations were discontinued during this period. For all three destinations the comparatively high irregularity of the premium quotations is conspicuous, so it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that the weather anomalies had a significant influence on the premium cycles, or to put it another way: maritime travel to this part of the Baltic Sea region was significantly more risky than along the south coast or even along the Atlantic coasts. With the resumption of premium quotations in the autumn of 1814, not only a further convergence of the business cycles of the annual average rates for the destinations in the northern and southern Baltic Sea area can be observed, but also, since the second half of the 1820s, for all Baltic Sea routes, as the comparison between the destinations Prussia, Sweden, and Saint Petersburg shows (Graph 7-5). The fact that for the new destinations Copenhagen and Finland, 29 30 31

The decisive event was the Second Battle of Svensksund in the Gulf of Finland off Kotka on 9 to 10 July 1790, in which Russia lost a third of its fleet and Sweden recorded the greatest success of its navy; Anderson, Naval Wars, 241–293. Webb, “Ochakov Affair”; Łojek, “British Policy,” 13–14; Anderson, Naval Wars, 294–295. Webb, “Ochakov Affair,” 32.

208

chapter 7

graph 7-5 Lübeck premium quotations for the most important destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1815–1859, in percent Source: Tables A2-12 and A2-13

which were added after the Napoleonic Wars, special economic cycles – above all due to irregular quotations – must also be taken into account remains unaffected. Despite the obvious convergence of the individual data series, various specific features are still noteworthy: on the one hand, the quotation for Saint Petersburg deviates strongly from the other two on several occasions, and during the war in the Baltic Sea region as part of the Crimean War no premium was quoted for Saint Petersburg. On the other hand, the fluctuations of the Saint Petersburg quotation are still more frequent and higher than those of the other destinations in the nineteenth century, although not to the same extent as in the eighteenth century. For the most part, the annual average figure for Saint Petersburg is the highest of all three destinations, with a long-term downward trend since the 1820s, except for the years around 1848 and the Crimean War. Usually, it was ¼ to ½ percentage points above the two other quotations, which since the 1830s only showed notable differences in individual years and otherwise only deviated by a tenth of a percentage point, which also applies to the destination Riga. Overall, the annual averages of the three or four – if Riga is included – most important destinations in the Baltic Sea region since the 1830s mostly ranged between ⅝ and 1 percent, sometimes slightly higher (for Saint Petersburg up to 1 ¼ percent), and only during the Crimean War did they exceed the 1 percent mark in the case of Sweden and Prussia as outcome of the generally more uncertain situation in the Baltic Sea region. The other series, which cover only shorter periods of time, also largely fit in with these findings: while the series for southern Sweden and Scania were

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

209

already oriented more towards Stockholm than towards the southern Baltic Sea area in the 1800s, those for the Pomeranian and Courland ports, which ended in 1819 and 1834 respectively, remained very close to those for the destination Danzig and Königsberg. Copenhagen, a new destination introduced in 1821, widely followed the business cycles of the Swedish and Prussian ports, and since the end of the 1820s – with the exception of 1848 and 1857 – annual averages were consistently between ½ and ⅞ percent. Only the quotation for Finnish ports that was established in 1827 was quite clearly above the level of the other destinations, even above that of Saint Petersburg, whose average figures were approached only towards the end of the period studied. Probably caused by a highly irregular quotation, annual average figures for these ports were between 1 to 1 ¾ percent; almost 2 ½ percent were averaged out for 1848. During the battles in the Baltic Sea in the course of the Crimean War, the Finnish destination was also not recorded, which is obvious due to the bombardment of the Suomenlinna fortress off Helsinki. The fact that the weather conditions, particularly in the case of the Baltic Sea destinations, had a significant, if not decisive influence on the premium quotations – not only on their level, but also whether they occurred at all – has already been stressed on several occasions, but is further emphasised by the comparison of the individual monthly averages. For all Lübeck quotations, it should be noted that the winter months were markedly higher than the summer months, which per se would not be particularly noticeable if this finding were not reinforced in the nineteenth century. The background to this development, which is exceptional in the context of the overall investigation, is the fact that since the eighteenth century, premium quotations in the winter months tended to rise rather than fall, and at the same time, more and more often no longer occurred at all. This leads to the conclusion that voyages in the winter months by tendency became ever less frequent, or in most years they did not take place at all, or – to put it another way – that maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea region increasingly concentrated on the summer months with their better weather conditions. This basic finding applies to a much greater extent to the northeastern destinations of Saint Petersburg, Finland, or Riga than to the southern and western ones such as the Pomeranian and Prussian ports or even Copenhagen. The monthly averages of the destinations on the southern Baltic Sea coast in the eighteenth century ranged from 1 ⅛ percent in the summer months to 4 ¾ percent in the winter months, and those on the northern Baltic Sea coast from 1 ⅓ to 6 ½ percent. In the summer months – with the lowest values between June and August – the differences between the individual destinations were rather minor. They ranged between 1 ⅛ (Pomerania) and

210

chapter 7

1 ¼ percent (Courland); even for the northern destinations they were only slightly higher, ranging from 1 ⅓ percent (Sweden, Riga) to just under 1 ½ percent (Saint Petersburg), so that for the economically relevant summer trip the risk was apparently generally classified as comparatively low. In the winter months of December and January, premium quotations rose significantly, starting at 3 ½ percent for Pomerania, 4 ¾ percent for Courland and Sweden, and 5 ½ percent for Riga to 6 ½ percent for Saint Petersburg, and this, as already mentioned, with a (still) relatively regular listing in Hamburg’s price current. In individual months, however, the premiums for Saint Petersburg could also reach 8 ½ percent, and under the conditions of the Continental Blockade they even rose to 13 ½ percent in December 1807. Riga could also be quoted very high in the winter months, in individual years up to 9 ½ percent (e.g. 1806), although in these cases Saint Petersburg or the other ports of the Gulf of Finland were not at all priced with a premium, so that due to the expected adverse weather conditions Riga was the last stop in the northeast of the Baltic Sea that could be called at all. Nevertheless, these high premium quotations in the winter months do not seem to have been too detrimental to the central branches of trade with Russia, as they reached a maximum of a good 2 percent between April and September, so that timber, forest products and winter grain could be shipped westwards at rather lower premiums. Just for the transport of the summer grain, which took place in October/November, they were a not insignificant cost factor. In the case of destinations on the southern Baltic coast, the premium quotations were generally made throughout the year, which means that even for the winter months there was a limited, but still fairly regular shipping traffic. This situation then changes in the second period under study: since the 1820s in particular, premium quotations in the winter months were largely discontinued, not only for the northern, but also for the southern destinations. This was particularly true of January and February, but also of December, for which, however, quotations were listed with a certain regularity since the mid-1840s. In the case of Saint Petersburg and the Finnish ports, however, this only applied in some exceptional cases, and premiums were rarely quoted in March either. Riga occupied an intermediate position in this respect, since for this destination, regular quotations were not made until April, although this continued into December with the exception of 1849 to 1856. If premiums were quoted in the winter months, as they were still rather regularly in the 1810s, they were very high – in January and February they were higher than in December – and reached rates of 4 percent for Danzig and Königsberg, 5 percent for Courland, and 8 to 12 percent for Riga, Sweden, and Saint Petersburg. Even in December, if one wants to calculate a monthly average, despite the

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

211

irregular quotations, the average was over 4 percent for Sweden and Riga, and 5 ½ percent for Saint Petersburg. In the summer months, the nineteenth century averages had fallen in comparison with the eighteenth century; they were just over ½ percent for Danzig and Königsberg (from May to August), Sweden and Riga (in August), just under ⅔ percent for Saint Petersburg (from May to August) and ¾ percent for Finnish ports (in June and July). For the latter, they already rose again in August, for all other destinations only in September. Thus, the differences between destinations in the averages for the summer months in the nineteenth century had become very small and quotations from ½ to ¾ percent were not uncommon for the Finnish ports or Saint Petersburg. Copenhagen, the closest destination to Lübeck, even recorded at average less than ½ percent between May and August, and regularly ⅜ percent towards the end of the survey period. However, even for Copenhagen, values between 2 ½ and 2 ⅝ percent were achieved in December and January, and in November and February about 1 percentage point less. To conclude, it has to be noted that even in the nineteenth century weather conditions in the Baltic Sea region had an outstanding influence on the level of the premium quotation, even for short distances. In addition, the fact that in many cases no premium was quoted at all in winter, i.e. there was no (regular) shipping, may also appear to be a specific characteristic of the Baltic Sea region. 7.3

Premium Rates from Amsterdam, London, Bordeaux, Portugal, and the Mediterranean

From 1782 until its reorganization in 1820/21, the Hamburg price current presents insurance rates for Baltic ports not only from Hamburg itself and Lübeck, but also from Amsterdam, London, Bordeaux, Portugal and the Mediterranean (see Table A1-7). For these cities or regions respectively, exports to the Baltic Sea region were already or became essential in the eighteenth century, and in the Hamburg insurance market it seems to have been a welcome business to insure such voyages, at least for some decades. Up to 1821, premiums were differentiated for the Sound region (Copenhagen and Gothenburg) as well as for the southern and northern Baltic Sea, although not all three destinations were always listed. As the price current was reformed in summer 1821, only one rate of each port or region of departure – Amsterdam, London, Bordeaux, Portugal, and the Mediterranean – was regularly quoted, namely in the rubric “Into the Baltic Sea as far afield as Memel”. In addition, there is a remark about the price current during the years from 1830 to 1834 that a half percent more than the

212

chapter 7

normal rates has to be paid for voyages farther than Memel, i.e. for destinations at the northern coasts. Only two destinations were differentiated from Amsterdam and London: in the case of Amsterdam, the southern Baltic Sea region included Pomerania, Königsberg, and Memel and from 1820 was listed under “Into the Baltic Sea as far afield as Königsberg”. The northern destination included Riga and Saint Petersburg, and from 1820 onwards it was listed under “Into the Baltic Sea as far afield as Saint Petersburg”. Sweden was not taken into account.32 London differentiated between Pomerania, Königsberg, and Memel, since 1820 Danzig and Königsberg on the one side (southern Baltic Sea) and Saint Petersburg and Stockholm, since 1820 Saint Petersburg and Riga on the other (northern Baltic Sea). The Amsterdam and London premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea region showed very similar trends – apart from the exceptional Dutch economic situation in 1795. They were disturbed by the numerous wars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and these routes to the Baltic Sea were much exposed to the risks inherent in all Atlantic voyages. Although 1795, the year of the French occupation and the foundation of the Batavian Republic, was marked by very high premium quotations in the Netherlands, these were completely omitted for the southern Baltic coast from May to October, while the northern part was not quoted from December 1794 to January 1796. The discontinuation of premium quotations in particular also ensured that the northern Baltic coasts, which are generally higher priced, was able to be more favourable than the southern region, which is less risky, on average over the year. Amsterdam’s as well as London’s slight differences between the two destinations within the Baltic Sea continued until 1821. Thereby, the premiums were extremely high when they were resumed in autumn 1814 and then declined very quickly to a more or less ‘normal’ level. Since the summer 1821, as just one rate was quoted for each port of departure, the level of quotations went still down. Since the end of the 1820s, the London rate for the Baltic Sea was around 1 percent higher than that of Amsterdam, which ranged between ⅞ to 1 ⅔ percent up to 1842. The London rate, which had been valid also for Leith and, therefore, for the whole British east coast since 1821, ended already in 1834. The differences between the individual months were also quite pronounced, as could not be expected otherwise for the Baltic Sea ports. Monthly averages for the southern Baltic Sea were 7 percent or more in December and January, while the northern Baltic Sea, if it was quoted at all between November and February, was 8 ¼ percent in December, with London figures being rather, if 32

In 1820, a premium for the Dutch colony Suriname was also quoted for a few months.

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

213

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1834/42 graph 7-6 Amsterdam and London premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1821, in percent Source: Table A2-14

214

chapter 7

not consistently, lower than Amsterdam. Up to 1821, the monthly averages in June and July were 2 percent (from London) to 2 ¼ percent (from Amsterdam) for the southern and 2 ½ to just over 2 ¾ percent for the northern Baltic Sea, and, thus, also much closer together. Since 1821, there were only a very few quotations in the winter months, so that authoritative statements are hardly possible; the average rates ranged between 5 ½ and 7% in Amsterdam and 5 ½ to 6 ½ percent in London. In the summer months, however, the average rates went down to 1 1/5 to 1 ¼ percent in London and 1 1/7 to 1 1/9 percent in Amsterdam. So, it can be stated that in the period up to 1807 it was, on trend, cheaper to insure a voyage to the Baltic coasts in London than in Amsterdam, whereas in the period after 1814 it was just contrary – and this even for the years up to 1834. From 1782 onwards, there was also a quotation of insurance rates of Bordeaux in the Hamburg price current, i.e. for direct traffic from the Bay of Bourgneuf, to destinations in the Baltic Sea. Up to 1820/21, three destinations in the Baltic Sea were quoted, namely the ports of the Sound region (Copenhagen and Gothenburg33), of the southern (from Lübeck via Pomerania to Königsberg34) and of the northern Baltic Sea (Riga, Saint Petersburg, and Stockholm). Since 1821, Bordeaux – up to 1834 together with Nantes – quoted insurance rates for the “Baltic Sea as far afield as Memel”. Thereby, there were three different quotations for 1821 to 1823, namely for wine and for sugar (only “departing”) as well as for wood (only “arriving”). As is well known, these were the three most important commodities for Bordeaux’s trade in this time, sending wine and sugar in the Baltic ports and getting timber as return shipments. For the further analysis at hand, the rate for wine has been chosen because the relative frequency of these quotations is much higher than those for sugar or for timber. Bordeaux’s premium quotations for voyages to the Baltic Sea essentially followed the Hamburg premiums for voyages to Bordeaux in terms of their economic situation, but were considerably higher as the voyage took a longer time and the risk was significantly higher. The fact that sometimes the lower-risk voyage to the ports of the Sound region had to be insured at a higher annual average than the higher-risk voyage into the Baltic Sea region is for because the former was carried out throughout the year. The latter were oftentimes discontinued in the winter months, when premiums were particularly high, resulting 33 34

In 1820, the destination was split into Gothenburg on the one side and Copenhagen and Flensburg on the other; the quotations shown here (Graph 7-7) are those quoted for Gothenburg. In 1820, a separate destination was established for voyages to Rostock and Wismar as far afield as Stettin, which is not considered further in the following, because this rubric existed only for some months.

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

215

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1782–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1842 graph 7-7 Bordeaux premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1842, in percent Source: Table A2-15

216

chapter 7

in lower values on an annual average than for the ports of the Sound region. The same applies to the destinations of the southern and northern Baltic Sea coasts. The Bordeaux quotations thus not only reflect the war events since the 1780s, but also the massive influence of the weather conditions. In the winter months, they resulted in average premiums of 7 ½ percent for the Sound, 8 ½ percent for the southern Baltic Sea and even over 10 ½ percent for the northern Baltic Sea, if the latter destinations were listed at all. In 1814/15, premiums for the Baltic and Sweden climbed to 14 ½ percent in December and January and even to 19 percent in 1805/06. In the summer months of June and July, however, the monthly averages were between 2 ½ percent (the Sound) and 2 ½ percent (northern Baltic Sea), but could also reach values of up to 6 percent in years of war. During the Hundred Days and the events surrounding the Battle of Waterloo in May 1815, they shot from 13 ½ to 15 ½ percent. With exception of 1823 – the year of the French invasion in Spain – the average insurances rates went down in the 1820s, so that they regularly turned around 2% since 1827. If at all quoted, the premiums in the winter months, however, stayed as rather high as in the eighteenth century, namely between 7 ¼ and nearly 8 percent on average. Only the summer rates went significantly down in the 1820s and 1830s; the lowest average value can be stated for August with 1 ½ percent. From Portugal, i.e. the ports of Lisbon and – up to 1834 – Porto as well,35 the Hamburg insurance price current presents two data series, one for the southern Baltic Sea (“Into the Baltic Sea as far afield as Königsberg”) and another for the northern ports Riga and Saint Petersburg. The fact that premiums from Portuguese ports to the Baltic were recorded in Hamburg was probably primarily due to shipment of wine and sugar (but also bay salt from Setúbal) that were bound for these destinations, while timber was the most important return cargo to Portugal. This is hinted at by the division of the premium quotations in the years 1821 to 1823, which is different for these three goods. As in the case of Bordeaux, the wine rates has been chosen once more for the analysis on hand because they were quoted most regularly. From 1835 onwards, only Lisbon rates are given. For long stretches, the series of the Portuguese premium quotations developed like the Bordeaux rates and were often only slightly above those, which was caused by the greater distance between the ports of destinations. The phenomenon that higher rates were generally charged for voyages to the northern Baltic Sea ports, especially to the Gulf of Finland, than they were for those to southern Baltic ports can be observed also for these rates. At the beginning 35

From 1821 to 1823, even Cádiz was mentioned in this rubric of the Portuguese ports.

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

217

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1782–1807

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1842 graph 7-8 Portugal’s premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1820, in percent Source: Table A2-16

218

chapter 7

of the 1780s, the annual average rate for the ports of the northern Baltic were a good 4 percent, and between 3 ½ and 4 percent for the southern ports. In the years after the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War the rates rose to 5 percent and above,36 in times of the Coalition Wars of the 1790s they climbed to 8 percent and roughly 7 percent, respectively. Since Portugal fought on the side of the Coalition in 1793 and remained Great Britain’s last ally on the continent in 1795, vessels underway from Portugal to the Baltic indeed were in grave danger. The War of the Oranges of Spain and France against Portugal (April to June 1801) and the Battle of Copenhagen (2 April 1801) led to unusually high rates that year in May (13 ½ and 11 percent) and were thus markedly above the rates, which in result of the War of the Second Coalition already were expensive. In a similar way, Napoleon’s ultimatum to Portugal to join the Continental Blockade against Great Britain in winter 1806–07, the French occupation of the country and the flight of the Portuguese court to Brazil at the end of November 1807 drove up the premium rates; in December 1807 they stood again at 13 ½ percent for both Baltic destinations. In the few years after 1814 of premiums being recorded between Portugal and the Baltic these followed in general the pattern that has been observed for the abovementioned ports at the European Atlantic coast. After some extremely high values were recorded in the first months, they soon bounced back to a level that had been customary in normal years of the eighteenth century. Already around 1820, they produced one of the lowest average figures of the eighteenth century, a good 2 percent since the late 1820s. Only during the French Invasion in Spain in 1823, the rates raised up to 8 percent in December and after all to 6 ½ percent on average. The fact that higher values were recorded in some other years of the 1820s and 1830s has its cause in the relatively high number of expensive rates that were recorded in the winter months, whereas the expected rather low rates of the summer months had ended. As was the case with all premium quotations for the Baltic ports, the seasonal fluctuations of the rates for voyages leaving from and going to Portuguese ports were particularly pronounced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For the southern coastal spots by the Baltic Sea they were – even without in these regions – over 8 ½ percent at average in December and January, in the northern ports even over 10 percent. However, the validity of the averages for 36

In this context, the premium rates for the southern Baltic ports as an exception were higher than for the northern ones from 1785 to 1787, but this may have been due to the greater comprehensiveness of listings, as the northern ports were listed less frequently and regularly than the southern ones in these years.

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

219

both months is limited by the very small number of available quotations for these places. Around 1815 the rates for the winter months sprang up to 13 ½ percent for the southern and up to 16 ½ percent for the northern coasts. After 1817, almost no rates were recorded in December and January and the average November figures stood at a good 6 percent. The lowest premium rates were realized in the individual months of June with averages of 3 ¼ percent for the southern ports and 3 ¾ percent for the northern ports. In the 1820s and 1830s, the averages in the summer months fell to about 2 percent. Even from the Mediterranean, premiums were finally quoted for three Baltic Sea destinations from 1782 onwards, because “direct traffic between the Mediterranean ports and Lübeck was just starting to develop in the eighteenth century, especially since the middle [of the century], only it was procured by vessels of foreign flags, which were better protected against the Barbary threat.”37 For example, vessels from the Baltic Sea region sailed to Málaga, and on the return journey from Mediterranean ports, Baltic ports were also called at – decidedly ‘on commission of Hamburg’.38 In detail, premiums were recorded for Copenhagen, for the southern Baltic Sea region (Lübeck and Pomerania as far afield as Königsberg) and the northern Baltic Sea region (Riga, Stockholm, and Saint Petersburg). It is not specified from which Mediterranean port the direct route may have started. The Hamburg premium quotation for the Leghorn destination has been chosen as a reference for the following presentation, as this city was Hamburg’s most important trading partner in the Mediterranean in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The premiums for voyages from the Mediterranean to Baltic Sea ports are considerably higher than those for Amsterdam, Bordeaux or Portugal, which was due both to the further distance involved and the higher risk of the Barbary threat. Starting at around 4 percent, the premiums rose to a maximum of 5 ½ percent in the middle of the 1780s, then declined until the beginning of the 1790s, only to rise more steeply, more cautiously or – in 1796 and 1802 – also fall in the following years in line with the course of the Coalition Wars. In particular the Battle of Copenhagen (2 April 1801) drove the premiums up or just did not let the already high quotations in the winter months fall in spring, so that the annual average for the destination Copenhagen (just under 9 ½ percent) was ¾ percentage points above that for the southern Baltic Sea area, which was neutral in this British-Danish conflict. The northern Baltic Sea region nevertheless achieved a value of more than 10 ⅛ percent. The fact that in 1805 the 37 38

Vogel, “Beiträge I,” 131. Kellenbenz, “Deutschland und Spanien,” 18.

220

chapter 7

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1782–1807

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1842 graph 7-9 Premium rates quoted in the Mediterranean for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1842, in percent Source: Table A2-17

From the Sound to Saint Petersburg

221

latter also recorded a clear upward ‘anomaly’ – 11 ⅛ percent compared with 8 to 8 ¾ percent for the other destinations – was due to the exceptionally high prices in autumn and winter 1805/06 (up to 19 percent), which were not set off by the absence of the low summer prices at this annual average. The next and last rise in the first period of study was finally initiated with the proclamation of the Continental Blockade in the autumn of 1806, which also caused a perfect lack of quotations until May of the following year. The years after the resumption of these quotations in the autumn of 1814 are characterised by a continuous drop in the very high average rates for the year (15 to 18 ½ percent), whereby in 1818 the level of the early 1780s is approximately reached again and in 1820 it is significantly lower. Up to this time, it can be said that the quotation for Copenhagen tended to be lowest, and that the quotation for the northern Baltic Sea region tended to be highest, as could not be otherwise expected in as much as the weather conditions were oftentimes harsh. From 1821 to 1834, rates from Trieste, Gallipoli, Cette and Marseille as far as Leghorn, and Barcelona and Málaga were quoted side by side, but – apart from exceptions in rare cases – without remarkable differences. Therefore, only one series is presented on hand, that of Leghorn, which was identical to those of Cette and Marseille from 1821 to summer 1823 and from 1827 onwards. The background is that Leghorn was probably Hamburg’s most important trading partner in the Mediterranean in this time. Since 1835, one collective rate was quoted from all the Mediterranean ports together for the Baltic Sea ports. This data series follows the common trend of the 1820s and 1830s: the quotations went down to 2 ½ percent on average – with one exception: the French invasion in Spain of 1823 had the consequence that the rate bounced up to 9 ¾ percent on average, in some months even to 11 and 12 percent. As with all quotations for Baltic Sea destinations, the differences between the winter and summer months were very high in the case of premiums for voyages from the Mediterranean. In June/July they averaged from 3 ½ percent for Copenhagen to a good 4 percent for the northern Baltic region. In winter, by contrast, which must be calculated from the Mediterranean perspective from November to February, they ranged from a good 9 to over 12 ½ percent on average in December and could still soar up as high as 20 percent in the northern Baltic Sea area in January. This means that the premiums for voyages in winter in the case of the northern Baltic Sea region were around three times as high as in the summer and more than two and a half times as high in the case of the other two destinations. These high rates to go from the Mediterranean to the Baltic departing between December and February may be more because

222

chapter 7

of the weather in the north when the ships would arrive there than about the weather in the Mediterranean on departure. Since 1821, virtually no rates were quoted for December and January so that the highest quotations were those of November, with an average value of 7 ⅞ percent. In the summer months, the quotations sank to average figures between 2 ½ to 2 ⅞ percent, which, intriguingly, in April were at their lowest.

chapter 8

From New York to Lima – Marine Insurance Rates for Destinations in the Americas Throughout much of the eighteenth century, Hamburg was dependent on the mediation of the Northwest European trading nations France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands for the purchase of overseas luxury food and raw materials. Direct trade relations between Hamburg on one side and the North Atlantic trading area on the other were only rudimentary until the time of the American War of Independence. Prior to 1776, however, the West Indies were much more important than the North American ports, from which the first significant direct imports reached Hamburg, especially in the last years of the Seven Years’ War. According to the Hamburg Admiralitäts- und Convovgeld-Einnahmebücher, an average of about 20 percent of the total imports from the West Indies were not geographically specified.1 A further 55.17 percent of the imports came from the Danish island of Saint Thomas, which was a free port since 1764 and was considered the most important entrepôt among the Antilles.2 8.73 percent came from Havana and smaller portions from the Swedish entrepôt Saint Barthélemy as well as from the French colony Saint-Domingue (c.3.6 percent each), and other islands. All these entrepôts were of particular interest for Hamburg’s direct trade, while direct trade relations with the plantation holdings of the Northwest European trading nations remained the exception rather than the rule. In these places, commercial agents, for instance, from France, England, or the Netherlands, were still decisive. Hamburg’s entry into transatlantic direct trade therefore did not take place ‘directly’ by establishing contact with the producers, but rather indirectly via the Antillean entrepôts. Thus, they could become important especially if the intermediary function of the Northwest European trading nations was compromised by war. This was increasingly so for England and France during the French and Indian War (or the Great War for the Empire, 1756–1763) in the North American-Caribbean region. Hamburg’s direct trade with North American ports, which can be traced back in its early beginnings to 1736,3 was discontinued after 1763, while isolated transactions with the West Indies continued. From Hamburg’s perspective, 1 Schneider; Krawehl and Denzel (eds.), Statistik, passim. 2 Kellenbenz, “St. Thomas,” 140. 3 Cf. Schweer, “Hamburg,” 18.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_010

224

chapter 8

the North American ports were not economically viable until after independence, even though it was to take until the early 1790s before there were regular direct business connections between Hamburg and American enterprises:4 “[T]he American War of Independence did indeed entice people to sail directly to North America, but because of the security measures of the British this route was too risky. The safer route was to travel to the West Indian island of Saint Thomas, which belonged to Denmark.”5 Although direct connections were sought as early as 1783 and shipping traffic started from Hamburg – first with Charleston in South Carolina (from 1787) – direct imports from the USA remained modest in the 1780s and far behind the indirect trade via England as the main staple market for rice and tobacco.6 Nevertheless, they had reached a value of several hundred thousand Mark Banko in the meantime, therefore already dwarfing direct trade with West Indian entrepôts. 8.1

The Iberian Transatlantic Routes in the Eighteenth Century

The legal transatlantic trade of Spain and Portugal with their respective American possessions took place under the direction and control of the respective Crown from the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries until well into the eighteenth century. Due to this crown monopolies, marine insurance premiums were not quoted directly from Hamburg, but on the one part for the voyage to the Spanish or Portuguese ports of departure of the transatlantic fleets and on the other for the Spanish or Portuguese transatlantic voyage itself. These insurance premiums were very important for Hamburg merchants, not least because they needed it for the price calculation and invoicing of their most important export product – canvas7 – to the American possessions of the Iberian powers. The Spanish transatlantic voyage, the Carrera de Indias or Sistema de flotas y galeones, as the system was called in contemporary Spanish sources, consisted of two convoys: since 1564, both set sail from Cadiz or Sanlúcar de Barrameda at the mouth of the Guadalquivir for the voyage to America.8 The flota, the New Spain Fleet – around the middle of the eighteenth century about 16 4 5 6 7 8

Wätjen, Frühzeit, 4. Kellenbenz, “Außenhandel,” 25. von Halle, Die Entwicklung des wirtschaftlichen Verkehrs, 81. About its origin, see Harder-Gersdorff, “Leinen-Regionen”. About the organization of the West Indies fleets Pietschmann, Organisation, 86; Schleich and Schmitt, “Überseehandel,” 49–50. Cf. also Wolff, “Chilenische Opposition,” 147–148.

From New York to Lima

225

merchant vessels with a loading capacity of 500 to 1,000 metric tons,9 started in April. It sailed via Dominica and Santo Domingo to the Viceroyalty of New Spain (Mexico) with the port of destination Veracruz. The galeones or Tierra Firme Fleet which called at Cartagena de Indias and Portobelo on the Isthmus of Panama, did not depart until August. Both fleets used the northeast trade wind. From these two main fleets, smaller flotillas regularly separated, which headed for Ponce (Porto Rico), Trujillo (at the coast of modern-day Honduras), Trinidad, Isla Margarita, Maracaibo and Santa Marta. The return voyage for all vessels began the following March from Havana in Cuba. So the galeones in Portobelo and Cartagena started in January, while the New Spain fleet started in May, just a few weeks after their arrival. If silver was transported, the convoy called at Seville throughout, while vessels with other goods also called at Cádiz or Sanlúcar. All vessels, however, were subject to the control and registration by the Casa de (la) Contratación – or formally correct: Casa y Audiencia de Indias –, the royal maritime trade authority. The Carrera de las Indias lasted between 55 and 160 days to Veracruz, between 43 and 175 days to Portobelo, an average of 75 days from Cádiz and some 90 days from Sanlúcar.10 In 1735, the convoy system was abandoned for the first time and the trade was transferred to registros sueltos, which were licensed, so-called register ships of merchant groups. But in 1755 the traditional convoy system was re-introduced as the economic situation deteriorated rapidly. After in 1765 the convoy system was again loosened, the final fleet left in 1776. The Reglamento para el Comercio Libre of 1777, which introduced free trade in transatlantic traffic from 1778, henceforth making possible free shipping and trade between most American and Spanish ports. However, most of the trade and maritime traffic continued to be carried out via the Andalusian ports, which only changed with the separation of Las Indias from Spain in the first decades of the nineteenth century. The Casa de Contratación was abolished in 1790. Portugal had a similar fleet system since the foundation of the Companhia Geral do Comércio do Brasil11 by King John IV (1640–1656) on 10 March 1649, with which it maintained the connection to Brazil.12 This trading company had already become a crown authority since 1664. After its liquidation on 1 February 1720, three fleet convoys sailed per year from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Pernambuco. Thereby, the Rio de Janeiro fleet was by far the most 9 10 11 12

According to Campbell, The Spanish Empire, 47–53; cit. from the translation by Schleich, in: Emmer et al. (eds.), Wirtschaft und Handel, 66. Chaunu, Séville, 223. Boxer, Império, 220ff.; de Freitas, A Companhia Geral. About the Portuguese-Brazilian connection, see Schleich, “Brasilien,” 654–656.

226

chapter 8

important according to value of the goods transported – primarily diamonds, gold from Minas Gerais, Goiás Cuiabá and Mato Grosso, but also silver smuggled from Peru to San Sacramento. Rio de Janeiro – capital not before 1763 – had been the port of export for these precious metals since 1702, while Bahia and Pernambuco exported sugar in addition to tobacco, tropical timber, and hides. The Brazilian fleets were usually scheduled to leave one of the Portuguese ports between 15 December and 20 January and to return to Brazil between the end of May and 20 July, but these dates were often not respected. In 1765, the convoy system in the Portuguese transatlantic trade was abandoned, which allowed merchants and shipowners involved in trade between Brazil and Portugal to plan their voyages freely. The Brazilian fleets consisted of much smaller vessels than those of the Spanish Carrera de las Indias. As a rule, they had a loading capacity of less than 150 metric tons, but there were fleets of more than 100 vessels. These comparatively small vessels facilitated merchants’ and shipowners’ favourable response to changing conditions in the sugar market, required less capital investment and carried less risk, and could eventually make two voyages a year if necessary. In addition, unlike trade with Spanish America, trade with Brazil was also often conducted by non-Portuguese companies, from 1654 onwards and then increasingly since the Methuen Treaty of 1703 mainly by English companies. For both the Spanish and Portuguese transatlantic routes, the practice of the convoy system had a considerable influence on the insurance premiums quoted in Hamburg,13 which were hardly subject to any changes in their annual averages as long as the respective systems lasted: after 1736, the Brazil voyage was initially insured for years at an average of 3 ½ percent. Towards the end of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), when the Franco-English conflict over North America (King George’s War, 1744–1748) increasingly extended to the European Atlantic coasts, minor fluctuations began to occur, which caused premiums to rise to a good 4 percent. In the following years, especially with the beginning of the French and Indian War between Great Britain and France in North America in 1754, the premium fluctuated between 3 ½ and 4 percent, only to remain at 4 percent after the end of the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) and the Treaty of Paris, until the American War of Independence in 1777 caused the premiums to rise to over 5 percent. The quotations for the Spanish transatlantic routes, which did not differentiate between voyages to Veracruz on the one hand or Portobelo or Cartagena on the other, were at a very similar level for decades. In 1736, they started at 13

On the insurance of transatlantic maritime traffic in Spain itself, see Casado Alonso, El seguro marítimo, 948–960.

From New York to Lima

227

about 5 percent, whereby the voyage to the Caribbean was insured at a much lower rate (4 ½ percent) than the return voyage (6 percent), and this at all seasons. The reason for this is probably the duration of the voyage, which was considerably longer on the return than on the outward passage, since a stopover in Havana was planned for. During the War of Jenkins’ Ear between Great Britain and Spain (1739–1742) these quotations were adjusted in July 1739 – even before the British capture of Portobelo on 21 November. Only after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (18 October 1748), which ended the War of the Austrian Succession, were they resumed in December. Almost parallel to the quotations for the Portuguese voyage to Brazil, those for the Spanish Caribbean routes also fluctuated between 3 ½ and 4 percent in the following years, only to remain at 4 percent from 1765 to 1775. From February 1762 to March 1763 the quotations for both transatlantic routes were interrupted, the Spanish route then again from June to December 1771, but without this leading to changes in premium levels. American independence and the abandonment of convoy systems, which had promised security in the meantime, made insurance premiums more expensive from the second half of the 1770s. During the ten years between 1765 and 1775, which had not been marked by military conflicts on the Atlantic, the abandonment of convoy systems had not led to an increase in risk and premiums.14 However, with the continuation of the American War of Independence and intensified by the parallel Fourth Anglo-Dutch Naval War (1780–1784), the risk on the transatlantic routes became considerably higher, which – in the absence of convoy protection – was reflected in the premium quotations. While those for the Brazil voyage initially rose to a good 5 percent, only to fall again – with an interruption from April 1778 to August 1780 – and still reach 3 ¼ percent in the year of the Peace of Paris (1784), the deflections on the Spanish Caribbean route were much more pronounced. In the course of the premium quotation, not unlike the Portuguese, the interruption here initially lasted until September 1781, when quotations began at 22 ½ percent, one of the highest rates in the entire history of Hamburg marine insurance in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The suspension of premium quotations from April 1778 was due to the American-French alliance on 6 February 1778, which led to France and Spain intervening in the war on the American side in 1778/79. Only towards the end of the war – in March 1783 – did this prohibitive premium fall back to a ‘normal’ 4 ½ percent. The premium development during the American War of Independence shows how much Hamburg had to orientate itself towards Great Britain in terms of trade policy already in 14

Cf. Garcia-Baquero González, “Prestamo”.

228

chapter 8

a) Annual average premium rates, 1736–1820

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1795

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1736–1807 Graph 8-1 Hamburg premium quotations for the Iberian Transatlantic routes, 1736–1820, in percent Source: Table A2-18

From New York to Lima

229

those years: indeed, sales to New Spain were possible, but had to be secured by extremely high premiums, because the danger of Spanish vessels being sunk by the British had also increased extraordinarily. In contrast, the premiums for the Brazil route were like in peacetime even during the last years of the war, as Portugal was on the British side. Even after 1783, the premiums for the transatlantic routes did not fall to the pre-war level but fluctuated between a good 4 ½ and 6 percent; the quotation for the Brazil route stabilised at the latter rate from the end of 1790 to 1794. In the wake of the War of the First Coalition (1792–1797), from April 1794, when the British carried the war against France to the West Indies, the quotations for both transatlantic routes were discontinued and only resumed in March 1798, although the premiums for both routes were almost always identical in the following years until 1807. During the War of the Second Coalition (1798/99– 1801/02), quotations rose to an average of 16 percent (1801), and in the winter of 1800/01 even to 19 percent. During the War of the Third Coalition (1805) the premiums also rose again, the Spanish even higher than the Portuguese, which can probably be seen in connection with the maritime action of the French-Spanish fleet against the British. When the two quotations, which had been suspended again since 1808, were resumed in the spring of 1815, differentiated premium rates began to appear for the transatlantic routes, which averaged between just under 4 and well over 6 percent for the year – an indication that the risk in transatlantic traffic was still relatively high. At the end of July 1818, both quotations were discontinued at the same time. In the medium term they were replaced by quotations for direct shipping from Hamburg to the American ports, partly because of the increasing transatlantic direct trade of Hamburg’s merchants and shipowners, partly because of the declining importance of trade via Spain and Portugal in the wake of the progressive Latin American independence movements. Furthermore, Great Britain now became Hamburg’s leading intermediary for transatlantic traffic with Latin America. It is not without reason that the Hamburg price current from January 1835 to the end of 1842 also lists premiums for voyages from London to five American destinations – North America and the West Indies, Brazil and Buenos Aires, Valparaíso and Lima, Central America, and the Gulf of Mexico (Havana, Veracruz, and New Orleans). The premium quotations for the Iberian transatlantic routes of the eighteenth century (until 1795) were much less dependent on the season during the time of the convoy systems and even afterwards than those for European destinations during this period. This is particularly true for the Brazil route, which was the lowest in June with an average of 3.96 percent and the highest in December with 4.35 percent (annual average 4.19 percent); the difference is

230

chapter 8

less than 0.4 percentage points. In the case of the Caribbean route, which at 5.18 percent on average for the year also had to be insured at a higher premium overall, the difference was slightly greater at 0.95 percentage points, but still below the European level. The highest average value was again achieved here in December with 5.45 percent, the lowest in August with 4.50 percent. Of course, this finding only applied until 1795, i.e. until the time when the American rim was then also increasingly drawn into the Napoleonic Wars. Since these had a strong influence on the quotation of premiums, it is not clear how important seasonal effects on the one side and military reasons on the other side were. In the peacetime after 1814, the transatlantic traffic also showed clear seasonal fluctuations, which were again less pronounced in the case of the Brazil route than for the Caribbean route. The difference for the former was more than 2 percentage points – between 4 ¼ percent in the early summer months and 6 ½ percent in winter –, for the latter even up to 4 percentage points – between 4 ½ in summer and 8 ½ percent in winter. In the summer of 1815, however, values of up to 8 ½ percent were recorded, which may be ascribed to the uncertain political situation in the West Indies. 8.2

North American East Coast and Gulf of Mexico

The earliest premium quotations for direct voyages from Hamburg to non-European destinations did not begin until 1804 and covered Saint Thomas and the North American ports, which were combined in a single premium quotation until 1820. In the course of the reorganisation of the insurance price current in the spring of 1820, separate sections were then set up for Saint Thomas and for the “North American ports as far afield as Florida”, which from 1821 onwards operated under the name “North America, east coast”.15 This included not only all US ports on the east coast from New England to Florida – especially New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston, partly also Baltimore and Savannah16 – but most probably also the ports on the British North American east coast, i.e. Canada and particularly Newfoundland. It was to the latter island that Hamburg not only had the comparatively closest trade relations within British North America – for the supply of food to the local fishing

15 16

However, the leading German port for voyages to North America was not Hamburg but Bremen; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 49. Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. IV [1836], 94–165.

From New York to Lima

231

industry – but also by far the largest number of Hamburg voyages of all those with British overseas possessions took place until the early 1850s.17 From 1815 onwards, Hamburg vessels sailed also to New Orleans,18 the cotton export metropolis of the American South, with which there was a “very vivid” trade connection established.19 Thus, New Orleans was furnished with its own premium quotation – not least due to its dangerous port entrance.20 Within this rubric, Mobile, the main port of Alabama, was also quoted from 1835. Since 1848 – after the end of the war between the USA and Mexico over Texas – the Texas main port Galveston southeast of Houston was also listed in this destination. Galveston, only officially founded as a city in 1839, had become one of the most important ports for immigrants in the USA – not least for Germans21 – and at the same time an important port of export for cotton since the 1840s. Since 1841, the Texas frontier area had also become a destination for Hamburg’s Amerikafahrt (voyage to the Americas).22 Cuba was very closely connected with the southern US states through trade and transport relations,23 because “Cuba with its extensive sugar cane cultivation ensured good home cargo for the vessels from 1820 to 1840,”24 while the rigid Spanish tariff regulations since the 1830s “made it almost impossible to import into the Spanish colonies under foreign flag.”25 Havana had been called at by Hamburg vessels from 1797, and “from 1814 Havana took the first position in Hamburg’s voyage to the West Indies.”26 Since 1820, Havana had had its own section in the Hamburg insurance price current, in which Matanzas was also integrated from 1835. The relatively early premium quotation for Cuba indicates the great importance for Hamburg of Cuban production of sugar, tobacco and – as the sole supplier – cigars. It is not without reason that direct traffic to Cuba had already existed since 1814. In the nineteenth century, Matanzas – a good 100 kilometres from Havana – developed into a main hub for sugar, through which more than half of the total Cuban production was exported. In contrast, Havana was and remained the centre of cigar production, several million of which were exported to Hamburg every year. In addition, until 1823, a 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 425–440, esp. 425–426; Moltmann, Geschichte, 122. Kresse, Materialien, 26. Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. IV [1836], 185. Ibid., 186f. Bade, Deutsche im Ausland; Hoerder, Migration. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 54f. This is demonstrated not least by the New Orleans exchange rate quotations for Havana; Schneider; Schwarzer and Zellfelder (eds.), Währungen der Welt I, vol. I, 444. Moltmann, Geschichte, 119. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 57. Idem, Materialien, 27.

232

chapter 8

large part of trade with Mexico was conducted via Cuba.27 The most important German export product to Cuba was canvas: However, since English cotton products put German canvas under competitive pressure and contributing to the latter gradually losing its market, and since beet sugar in Germany affected the import of West Indian raw sugar, this traffic lost its outstanding position in Hamburg’s overseas trade; yet it remained important, since the export of industrial products was now beginning.28 With the increase in beet sugar production in Germany and the simultaneous decline in cane sugar production in Cuba the Hamburg-Cuba voyage with sailing vessels ended around 1850.29 It was only from 1827 onwards that premiums were recorded for the ports on the Gulf of Mexico, with Tampico30 and Veracruz being named as the two main ports on Mexico’s east coast and the country’s most important ports for foreign trade as destinations; here Hamburg (and Bremen) consulates also existed from 1832.31 The background was the establishment of direct trade relations and shipping from Hamburg since 1822, whereas business with Mexico had previously been conducted via Havana.32 Despite increasing turnover, business with Mexico was very risky at least until the end of the 1830s as the political situation in the country remained uncertain and unstable due to the rapid succession of revolutions and governments. In addition, piracy was widespread, especially in and around Veracruz.33 1827 was also the year in which the first trade agreement between the Hanse towns and Mexico was concluded (16 May), although it was not ratified. Only the second trade agreement of 19 February 1831, amended on 7 April 1832, was signed, albeit years later (on 8 November 1841). According to the anachronistic Navigation Act of the Mexican President Antonio López de Santa Anna (1794–1876) of 30 January 1854 (in his last presidency of 1853 to 1855), it was terminated again

27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Schwarzer, “Exporthandel,” 64. Moltmann, Geschichte, 119–120. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 58–59. Destroyed by pirates in 1683, repopulated only in 1823. Becker, Hansestädte, 52. Schwarzer, “Exporthandel,” 57–58. Cf. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 56; Humphreys, British Consular Reports, 307ff.; Dane, Beziehungen, 191 (annex 13 a). Schwarzer, “Exporthandel,” 62–63; Dane, Beziehungen, 26–27; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 53, 55.

From New York to Lima

233

in the autumn of 1854.34 Around 1840, from the perspective of Hamburg’s export trade, Mexico took “first place among the transatlantic countries … of Spanish descent.”35 This is also illustrated by the rising trend in Hamburg’s overall traffic with Mexico. “Only once [in 1847; M.D.] there was a major market break, probably a side effect of the Mexican-American War [1846–1848], which was overcome by the end of the war in 1848.”36 However, from a German point of view, “with the end of the 1840s and especially in the 1850s … the Mexican business declined more and more due to the English and French competition and the constant political unrest in Mexico, which exhausted the country financially.”37 Exceptions from Hamburg’s viewpoint were probably 1853 to 1857, from the beginning of the last period of rule of Santa Anna until the outbreak of the Mexican civil war between clergy and liberals (1857–1861). In these years, an increasing number of Hamburg vessels sailed to Veracruz and returned home via the timber loading station Laguna de Terminos, partly via Tabasco, Minatitlan (near Veracruz), or Tampico as well.38 However, “the whole Gulf of Mexico … did not have a single perfectly good port;” that of Veracruz was “not much more than a roadstead,” while Tampico was more advantageous than Veracruz for imports into several populous provinces.39 As direct trade from Hamburg to the Americas was established around the mid-1780s, no premium quotations for such voyages were recorded. Hamburg’s early transatlantic transport was probably insured in the first two decades via the London insurance market, since on the one hand only a few vessels sailed on these routes and on the other hand Hamburg still lacked experience in direct transatlantic business. Only when Great Britain blocked the Elbe for the second time since July 1803 and there was no end in sight to this ‘chicane’, a premium quotation for Saint Thomas and the North American ports was established in the Hamburg insurance price current in 1804. This quotation thus applied to all direct transatlantic traffic and was also resumed in this form 34 35

36 37 38 39

Becker, Hansestädte, 25–50 and 77–85; Dane, Beziehungen, 28–30; Tardiff, Historia general, vol. 2, 310–314. Despite another attempt being made in 1856, a new trade agreement was only concluded after the end of the investigation period. Soetbeer, Hamburgs Handel, vol. 1, 177. There were no premium quotations for the Central American republics, with which Hamburg established direct trade in 1838 that increased since the 1850s; the trade volume with these countries was – in contrast to e.g. Mexico – simply marginal; Dane, Beziehungen, 93, 113, 146, 198 (appendix 14), 211– 212. (appendix 23: Guatemala), 214–215. (appendix 24: El Salvador), 216 (appendix 25: Honduras), 217 (appendix 26: Nicaragua), 223 and 226 (appendix 30: Costa Rica). Dane, Beziehungen, 74. Ibid., 154. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 137. Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. IV, 239–240 and 258.

234

chapter 8

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1859 Graph 8-2 Hamburg premium quotations for North American destinations, 1804–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-19

in 1814. Until the proclamation of the Continental Blockade in November 1806, Hamburg, just like the USA, was able to use the advantage of its neutral flag in transatlantic trade, and this was largely secure, as the premiums amounted to 2 ½ to 3 percent for most of the year, and only in the winter months did they double. This changed, however, towards the end of 1807, when both the United States had been driven out of European waters by the Embargo Act of December 1807 and the English fleet was taking more and more massive action against all continental European vessels suspected of collaborating with the Napoleonic France. Thereafter the premiums for transatlantic voyages in Hamburg rose to 9 to 10 percent. At a similarly high, even higher level (12 to 15 percent), they then resumed in November 1814. What significance the

From New York to Lima

235

British-American battles in Louisiana in the winter of 1814/15, culminating in the Battle of New Orleans on 8 January 1815, still had for this is not clear. After all, it took until 1816 until the premiums had more or less normalised to the pre-war level, at least during the summer months. At the end of the joint quotation for Saint Thomas and the North American ports, the quotation was 4 ½ percent. When the North American ports on the east coast as far afield as Florida got their own rubric, premiums fell considerably compared with the previous period, resulting in a first low point of an average of just over 2 percent for the year of 1820. The same finding also applies to Saint Thomas, so that different insurance policies can be ruled out due to possible local problems or incidents. However, as was generally the case in the Hamburg insurance market, the quotations rose again significantly until 1823 – to almost 4 percent – and then fell in the long term to 2 percent on average over the year until 1830 – a figure around which the annual average quotations revolved in the 1830s and early 1840s. After the brief increase in 1848/49, premium quotations for North American ports tended to fall further in the 1850s, falling by 1 ½ percent at first and then by 1 ⅓ percent towards the end of the decade. The destinations of New Orleans and Cuba (or Havana), which were introduced in 1820, recorded significantly higher premium quotations until the early 1830s. The reason for this was – at least for Cuba – probably the greater risk of privateering in the period between 1818 and 1820 and thus a higher insurance risk than for voyages to other ports in this part of the world.40 As for New Orleans, quotations started at 5 to 7 percent or an annual average of more than 3 ½ percent, then rose to annual averages of 7 to 7 ¼ percent in 1822/23 and finally fell slightly more than the quotations for the ports on the east coast. Since 1843, they generally were about ¼ percentage point above the latter and remained essentially at this level until the end of the period under review, even if they did not follow the renewed fall in premiums for the east coast in 1858/59. The premiums for Cuban ports were even more expensive than for New Orleans. There, premiums began in 1820 at around 5 percent and then rose to over 8 percent on average for the year, with some months even reaching 12 to 15 percent. But the premiums did not fall below 6 to 7 percent in the summer months 1822/23 either – similar to New Orleans, where they did not fall below 5 to 6 percent. From 1824 onwards, the premiums for New Orleans and Cuba converged more and more, were even exactly the same in 1829/30 and 1832 and differed at most by a few tenths of a percentage point until the beginning of the 1840s. Since 1842 the premiums for Cuban ports were regularly quoted at 40

Schwarzer, “Exporthandel,” 65.

236

chapter 8

¼ up to ⅓ percentage point higher than those for New Orleans. Whether this was a reaction to the repeated military invasion attempts on Cuba since that year, which, although without official US support, intended to annex Cuba to the USA, is questionable, but cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, the close relationship between the two premium quotations should be emphasised, which refers not least to the geographic and economic proximity between the Cuban ports and the American ones in the Gulf of Mexico. The Atlantic ports of Mexico, Veracruz and Tampico, which had become separate destinations in the Hamburg insurance price current since 1827, also belonged to this economic area according to the insurance premiums quoted for them. Until 1832 the quotations were approximately the same as those for the Cuban ports on an annual average. It was not until 1833 that they were quoted slightly higher (approximately ¼ percentage point), only to fall back to the Cuban level by 1842. From the beginning of 1843 to the end of 1847, the premium quotation for Tampico and Veracruz was completely omitted. The background to this is probably the US-Mexican conflict over the territories of Texas and the West, which was already looming in the early 1840s and culminated in the Mexican-American War (1846–1848) with a sea blockade of Mexican ports. Tampico was taken by the Americans on 12 November 1846, and on 9 March 1847 they landed at Veracruz – this war was undoubtedly particularly detrimental to maritime trade with Mexico. It was only with the emerging peace agreement that premium quotations for the two Mexican ports were resumed in Hamburg, although now with ¼ to ¾ percentage points higher than those for the Cuban ports. On a long-term average, however, it was the Cuban destination that recorded the highest average premium, if only because of the high premium quotations in the first half of the 1820s. At 3.11 percent, it was ahead of the Mexican ports (2.91 percent) and the North American ports of the east coast (2.69 percent). The passage through the Florida Strait around Key West made insurance premiums considerably more expensive. In addition, it was also the much greater distance between the ports in the Gulf of Mexico compared with those of the northern states in particular that increased the risk and thus the premiums. Spread over the years, December and January were the months with the highest premium quotations, which were 4.10 to 4.40 percent for the Cuban ports and around 4 percent for the other two destinations west of Florida. Only the American east coast could also be served in the winter months with premiums from 3 ¼ to 3 ½ percent. Premiums were most favourable for all destinations from May to July. They averaged 1 ¼ percent for the American east coast, around 2 percent for New Orleans, 2 ⅛ percent for Mexican ports and around 2 ⅓ percent for Cuba. Since 1843, however, premiums of only 1 percent for the

From New York to Lima

237

American east coast for the period from March to August of each year were the norm, while those up to 1 ¼ percent were rather the exception. For New Orleans they were on average ¼ percentage points higher, for Cuba at 1 ¾ (up to 2 percent) and for Mexico around 2 ¼ percent. While the average premium quotations for the summer months at the first three destinations had thus fallen sharply over the decades, in Mexico’s case they had even risen somewhat in the long term, since in the late 1830s at around 1 ¾ percent they had mostly been below those of the 1850s. It can only be assumed that uncertainties in Mexico’s foreign trade policy, especially under President Santa Anna, were at least partly responsible for this. 8.3

The Caribbean

The Caribbean attracted attention in the Hamburg insurance market when Danish trade with the islands there grew strongly: whereas around 1760 only three or four vessels a year called at the Danish crown colony of Saint Thomas, a decade later the figure had risen to 35 per year. When the South American countries started their wars for independence in 1804, Saint Thomas flourished because the Danish Prince Regent Frederik (VI, 1784/1808–1839) declared the main port Charlotte Amalie a free port that year. During the wars against Spain, trade was conducted for both sides in the neutral Charlotte Amalie. In 1804 alone, more than 1,300 vessels entered the port and in 1820, more than 2,300. In 1782, a premium quotation for voyages from Copenhagen to Saint Thomas was established on the Hamburg insurance price current not for reasons of direct trade but as an offer for Copenhagen traders, shipowners, and shipmasters. Saint Thomas functioned as the centre of the Danish Caribbean trade and intermediary between the Lesser Antilles – above all Porto Rico – and the Venezuelan mainland. Within the scope of its emerging transatlantic direct traffic, which Hamburg ‘copied’ from the Danes, this island was Hamburg’s most important Caribbean destination at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A discrete Hamburg quotation on Saint Thomas – together with the North American ports on the east coast (see chapter 8.2) – was established immediately after the town of Charlotte Amalie had been declared a free port in 1804, because this officially allowed Hamburg traders, like all other trading nations, to trade directly with Saint Thomas. From 1821 to the end of the period under review, the number of vessels sailing from Hamburg to Saint Thomas tended to rise from about ten to nearly 50 per year.41 In the 1820s 41

Vogt, Beitrag, 67.

238

chapter 8

and 1830s,42 Saint Thomas was “the focal point for extensive smuggling in the region” and thus a “first-class sales market” for Hamburg, not least for smuggled goods.43 In 1820, when Hamburg began to differentiate in its premium quotations between the various destinations in the North American-Caribbean area, a quotation from Flensburg to Saint Thomas was added. The background to this was that Flensburg was the second largest port in the Danish state after Copenhagen between 1460 and 1864. From there vessels could reach the North Sea not through the Sound with the Sound tolls but through the Little Belt, which implied a remarkable cost advantage.44 In the eighteenth century, the city experienced a period of prosperity owed to its trade in rum. The cane sugar required for this was imported from the Danish West Indies and then refined in Flensburg, which explains the high relevance of Saint Thomas and the voyages there for Flensburg. And “as early as 1824, a Copenhagen newspaper complained that the thirteen Flensburg merchants trading with the West Indies usually brought their return loads to Hamburg and were also re-equipped there.”45 If not enough return cargo could be obtained in Saint Thomas, Cuba, Porto Rico, or Charleston were used as stopovers.46 With the change in the Hamburg insurance price current in 1842, the premium quotations from Copenhagen and Flensburg to Saint Thomas were discontinued, while those from Hamburg to Saint Thomas were subsumed under “other West Indies”. The premium quotations for voyages from Copenhagen to Saint Thomas, which were recorded in Hamburg from 1782 onwards, i.e. only after the time of the existence of the Danish West India Company or Danish West India-Guinean Company (Vestindisk kompagni or Det Vestindisk-Guineiske kompagni, 1671– 1776), were comparatively high. They were almost consistently above 5 percent on an annual average and rose to over 6 percent in the second half of the 1790s, then over 8 percent. In the year of the destruction of the Danish fleet by the British in the port of Copenhagen (2 April 1801), an average premium of 11 ⅛ percent was reached, and in the first four months of the year, the average rate arrived at 15 percent almost throughout. From 1802 the quotation ‘normalised’ again at 4 ½ up to 6 percent, until it was temporarily suspended after 1807. In these years (1804–1807), it was possible to insure the same route from 42 43 44 45 46

In 1839, Saint Thomas was made a stop for the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company founded in Britain, later for the Hamburg America Line. Many of the island’s inhabitants left after 1840. Schwarzer, “Exporthandel,” 68–69. Cf. Kellenbenz, “Landverkehr,” 81. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 59. Brockstedt, Schiffahrts- und Handelsbeziehungen, 302–303.

239

From New York to Lima 14,0000 12,0000 10,0000 8,0000 6,0000 4,0000 2,0000 From Copenhagen

From Hamburg

From Flensburg

0,0000

a) Annual average premium rates

From Copenhagen

8,0000 6,0000 4,0000 2,0000 0,0000

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

XI

XII

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1782–1807 From Flensburg

From Hamburg

From Copenhagen

6,0000

5,0000 4,0000 3,0000 2,0000 1,0000 0,0000

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

c) Monthly average premium rates: 1814–1842 Graph 8-3 Premium quotations for Saint Thomas, 1782–1842, in percent Source: Table A2-20

XI

XII

240

chapter 8

Hamburg to Saint Thomas under a neutral flag and without sailing through the Sound at much lower rates (at least by ½ percentage point). When the premium quotations resumed towards the end of 1814, they were initially exceptionally high, from Hamburg at 13 ½ percent, from Copenhagen in early summer 1815 still at 8 ½ percent. Thereafter, premiums from both cities declined, with Hamburg’s regularly ranking one to two tenths of a percentage point below Copenhagen. After the last major rise in 1822/23, a steady downward trend can then be observed, which led to values between 1 ½ and 2 percent around 1840. The premium quotation from Flensburg to Saint Thomas, which began in 1820, also fitted into this trend: the Flensburg values were generally somewhat higher than those of Hamburg, but lower than those of Copenhagen, even though they had the lowest average overall, as they were only quoted at all from 1820 onwards. The total average rate of the premium quotation from Copenhagen to Saint Thomas was more than twice as high for the period up to 1807 as for the years after 1814. In these earlier decades, premiums were quoted at 7.9 percent in the winter months, with the highest quotations in December and January, and the lowest between May and August, at 4 ⅝ to 4 ¾ percent. However, the range of fluctuation in the single years was still very high, because in the war years 1795 and 1799, for example, premiums of up to 8 percent, in 1801 up to 10 percent even in the summer months were nothing out of the ordinary, despite Danish neutrality. In contrast, they could fall to 2 ½ percent in August 1805, a year of war as well and again without direct Danish participation. After 1814 then, as said, the Flensburg premium (from 1820 on) was the cheapest in the overall average, followed by the Hamburg and Copenhagen premium, even though from 1820 on the insurance could usually be taken out from Hamburg at somewhat lower costs than from Flensburg. December and January remained also in the nineteenth century by far the most expensive months for insurance to Saint Thomas, in Copenhagen with over 5 ⅓ percent, in Flensburg with 4 ¾ up to 5 percent and in Hamburg with 4 ⅛ to 4 ½ percent. The lowest premiums were then quoted from April to August. In June, the month with the lowest prices, they averaged 2 percent from Copenhagen, 1 ¾ percent from Hamburg and 1 ½ percent from Flensburg. The differences between the months with the highest and lowest premium quotations were therefore very marked; in the case of Flensburg, the average December value was even 3.4 times the average June rate. In addition, Saint Thomas played a prominent role as an entrepôt to the Spanish island of Porto Rico as well as to the Costa Firma.47 Hamburg’s direct 47

Moltmann, Geschichte, 118–119; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 59.

From New York to Lima

241

trade with Porto Rico, the most important producer of the so called ‘colonial’ products in this region, began to take off in the 1830s and intensified from 1839 onwards, especially since Saint Thomas had lost “its outstanding mediating function” between the Costa Firma and Porto Rico since the late 1830s.48 Consequently, Porto Rico was also explicitly mentioned in the section for Saint Thomas from 1835. From 1820 onwards, a premium quotation was also listed for “Santo Domingo”, i.e. the insular state Haiti, which was united from 1821/22 to 1844. Only between 1827 and 1834, Cap-Haïtien and Port-au-Prince, the two most important port cities of Haiti represented this destination.49 During the two decades of relatively peaceful development between 1821 and 1843, Haiti was of particular importance to Hamburg, because besides the US-Americans, it was above all Hamburg merchants who find a field of activity here without flag discrimination, differential duties and otherwise privileged competition, who set up branches and establish trade not only with Hamburg, but can also engage in business relations with the Netherlands and even with Great Britain.50 In the 1840s, the premium quotations for Haiti approached those of Saint Thomas – but not those of nearby Cuba – so closely that from 1843 both could be grouped together under the denomination “other West Indies”. However, European and North American interest in Haiti waned in the 1850s because of the uncertain rule of Faustin (I) Soulouque (1847–1849 president and 1849– 1859 emperor of Haiti).51 Around the middle of the century, the various Haitian and Dominican commercial places were sailed to by Hamburg vessels in a kind of ‘round trip’ that shows the close connection to Saint Thomas and Porto Rico, and partly also to Cuba. Thereby

48 49

50 51

Schwarzer, “Exporthandel,” 68–69. In 1822, the (formerly) Spanish Santo Domingo had been connected to the former French Saint-Domingue (Haiti), unifying the territories of Hispaniola until divided again 1844. Concerning Hamburg’s trade with Santo Domingo ibid., 72–74. According to Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 65, Santo Domingo and Puerto Plata, the two ports in the eastern part of Hispaniola did not play a role for Hamburg prior to the 1844 division of the island – in contrast to those in the western part. Trade with these only became more important after the mid-nineteenth century. Ibid., 62. Ibid., 139.

242

chapter 8

the departure was normally to Saint Thomas … [the vessel] sailed on in ballast to the Colombian or Dominican ports and from there returned to Hamburg with tropical products – with coffee, sugar and tobacco from the coastal places of Porto Rico and above all with tobacco, but also tropical timber from Puerto Plata on the Dominican north coast.52 In 1820, Curaçao and La Guaira, Venezuela’s main port, finally formed a third destination in the Caribbean, which was split up again in 1821. From 1821 La Guaira, the most important port for the supply of the Venezuelan metropolis Caracas, then represented an independent destination, from 1835 together with Puerto Cabello, where a consular representation Hamburg had existed since 1828 as in Caracas. From Hamburg’s point of view, these were the two most important mainland ports in this region.53 Puerto Cabello, a free port since 1826, was considered the bottleneck of the export of agricultural and colonial products from the fertile valleys of the Acarigua region … Puerto Cabello also had the advantage over La Guaira of having deeper water in front of the port and thus being directly accessible and unloadable. In La Guaira, the vessels had to anchor far out and the cargo had to be brought ashore in smaller watercrafts.54 By virtue of its function for Caracas, importing in La Guaira was more or less the same as exporting, while the other Venezuelan ports can primarily be described only as ports of export.55 From 1843 to 1847, this premium quotation was suspended and then continued under “La Guaira and Angostura” – the latter called Ciudad Bolívar since 1846, and located in a narrow spot by the Orinoco. The fact that Angostura and no longer Porto Cabello was mentioned next to the main port of La Guaira in the Hamburg insurance price current was probably related to the safety of shipping traffic with this port: In the heyday of sailing vessels, [Angostura; M.D.] was the safest place to reach from Europe, as the estuaries of the Orinoco delta were under the winds of all the islands and therefore had more advantageous

52 53 54 55

Ibid., 141. Pietschmann, “Hamburg und Lateinamerika,” 406; Moltmann, Geschichte, 119. Walter, Preußen und Venezuela, 25–26. Ibid., 26.

From New York to Lima

243

connections with the trading centres of the Antilles than the ports on the north coast.56 Angostura was the centre of the export of agricultural goods from the province of Barinas, especially cocoa, indigo, cotton, and sugar.57 Probably in those years when this destination was not listed separately, the corresponding ports were subsumed under the section “other West Indies”, which at least suggests a very close approximation of the corresponding premium quotations. Hamburg’s direct trade with Venezuela began in 1815 but was limited to only a few vessels annually in the first years. From the 1830s onwards, Venezuelan ports were increasingly, i.e. with a tendency towards a growing number of vessels (up to 30 per year in the 1850s), directly provided for, whereas previously Saint Thomas had served as an intermediary for about 30 percent of all goods.58 The Colombian Caribbean coast, with Cartagena as its main port, was only called at directly from Hamburg around 1850.59 From 1821 to 1834, Curaçao finally had its own premium quotation. The discontinuation of quotation as early as 1834 was probably not least due to the fact that no more vessels from Hamburg departed for the island from 1831 to 1833, and that in the years before – since 1818 – usually one or two Hamburg vessels a year had sailed there. It was not until 1848 that shipping traffic with Curaçao resumed,60 but again on a very small scale. It was probably for this reason that a renewed independent premium quotation was not made. However, Curaçao could have been included under the section “other West Indies”. The absence of Hamburg premium quotations for other destinations in the Caribbean region had its origins in the fact that the “British West Indies … were almost no longer considered for the sale of German goods after 1814.”61 The same is essentially true for the Dutch and French possessions in Latin America.62 This meant that at this point the possibility of transport and consequently insurance business was also eliminated. 56

57 58 59 60 61 62

Ibid.; and “this navigational advantage was gradually lost with the advent of steam vessels; moreover, the Orinoco was navigable for overseas steamers up to a certain point up the river.” According to idem, “Gramlich,” 120, the Hamburg vessels “increasingly” called at Maracaibo. Idem, Preußen und Venezuela, 27. Schwarzer, “Exporthandel,” 68–71; Walter, “Entwicklung Venezuelas,” 75; idem, Venezuela und Deutschland; Vogt, “Beitrag,” 66. Schwarzer, “Exporthandel,” 74. Vogt, “Beitrag,” 65 with note 2. Schwarzer, “Exporthandel,” 68 and 74. Ibid., 75.

244

chapter 8

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rate: 1814–1859 Graph 8-4 Hamburg premium quotations for Caribbean destinations, 1804–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-21

Hamburg’s premium quotation for Saint Thomas was the most important within the entire Caribbean region at least until around 1840. This is shown not least by the fact that the quotations of other Caribbean destinations at certain times approached those for Saint Thomas to such an extent that they were virtually merged with the latter. Since the second half of the 1820s, the quotation for Saint Thomas tended to move in the direction of 2 percent, in the 1830s and 1840s – since 1843 under the designation “other West Indies” – it was generally lower, with a downward trend (up to 1 ½ percent). It rose only in 1848 and again above the 2 percent mark during the international trade crisis in 1857(/58).

From New York to Lima

245

In 1820, a joint premium quotation was introduced on Venezuela (La Guaira) and the island of Curaçao, but this was already split in the summer of 1821. The quotation for the Venezuelan port then rose much more sharply than that for Curaçao as the War of Independence (since 1810) was still smouldering in the former Captaincy General of Venezuela and was only ended in August 1823. Premium quotations rose to 8 to 15 percent in the autumn of 1822 and were then suspended until December 1823, when they resumed at 7 percent. Thereafter, the annual averages fell sharply, approaching the quotations for Saint Thomas more and more closely, until the 1842 quotation was just ⅛ percentage point above it. From 1843 to 1847 the premium quotation for Venezuela was suspended and probably subsumed under the heading “other West Indies”. It began again in 1848 – again slightly above that for Saint Thomas or the “other West Indies” – but by 1851 it was already below that and tended to fall throughout the 1850s and no increase in the wake of the crisis of 1857 is to be noted here. Towards the end of the 1850s, premium quotations for Venezuelan ports were more than ½ percentage points below those for the “other West Indies” – a sign that this route had developed a higher level of safety and frequency than those to the Caribbean islands. The quotations for Curaçao also rose significantly after 1821, although less strongly than those for Venezuela. The background to this was probably the Venezuelan War of Independence (1810–1823), which also affected the neighbouring islands and their trade. In addition, there were the raids of the Colombian privateers, whose privateering against the Spanish flag Simon Bolívar as Dictator of the so-called Gran Colombia (1828–1830) did not end until 1828 – two years after the withdrawal of the Spanish from South America.63 At the end of 1822, rates of 8 to 10 percent were reached, then the listing was suspended and only resumed in December 1823 with 5 percent. Afterwards the price also tended to fall, and until 1832 was consistently lower than that of Venezuela. In 1833/34, the two destinations were quoted at approximately the same price, so that the quotation for Curaçao was discontinued at the end of 1834. It is obvious that the Venezuelan destination henceforth also might have included Curaçao. For Haiti or “Santo Domingo”, as it was called in Hamburg at the time, a separate premium quotation was also established in 1820, which was still somewhat higher than that for Venezuela and Curaçao. The quotation was suspended in 1822, probably due to the internal riots, which were hardly comprehensible from a European angle, but which led to the uniting of the various 63

Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 11.

246

chapter 8

island regions up to 1844. In 1823 this destination was again listed at very high prices, initially at up to 8 to 12 percent; it was not until spring 1825 that premiums fell below the 5 percent mark. Thereafter, the quotation for Haiti also rapidly approached that of the other destinations in the Caribbean, averaging just 1 ¾ percent for the year in 1842; in the summer of that year, it was possible to insure vessels to Haiti for just 1 percent. From 1843 Haiti was probably also included under the heading “other West Indies”. In the nineteenth-century Caribbean, December and January were also the months with by far the highest premium quotations on average over the year. For Saint Thomas they were 4 percent below, for Venezuela ½ to ¼ percentage points below, for Haiti ⅓ to ¾ percentage points above and for Curaçao even well over 5 percent (5.2 to 5.45 percent). In contrast, premiums fell to less than half in the months from April to August; in June, they averaged 1 ½ percent for Venezuela, about 1 ¾ percent for Saint Thomas and Haiti, and only Curaçao was just above the 2 percent mark. The relative rate of the premiums for Curaçao is also due to the fact that the fewest quotations by far were available for this island; above all the rapid decline in figures in the 1850s, as can be observed for Venezuela, for example, is no longer documented separately here. All in all, the total average between the destinations Saint Thomas and Venezuela is then roughly the same (approximately 2 ¾ percent), which, due to the economic and trade structure outlined above, is quite obvious, while Haiti with 3 percent and Curaçao with 3 ½ percent are considerably higher. 8.4

South America and California

For South America – here understood without the Venezuelan ports that are counted as belonging to the Caribbean – the premium quotations in Hamburg did not begin at all until 1820, whereas previously only those from Spain or Portugal were recorded for such destinations. Direct trade and consular relations between Hamburg and Brazil had already existed since 1808, since the Portuguese court moved to Rio de Janeiro,64 and vessels only began to sail from 1816. Official Hamburg travel to Brazil began in 1820, although in the first few years there was no German export to pay for the sugar purchases.65 In 1827, the first trade agreement was concluded between the Hanse towns and the independent Empire of Brazil.66 At the same time, 64 65 66

Pietschmann, “Hamburg und Lateinamerika,” 406; Schweer, “Hamburg,” 27–30. Kresse, Materialien, 27. Schmidt, “Abschluß,” 317–320.

From New York to Lima

247

Hamburg profited from English trade with Brazil, because “since England preferred the products of its own colonies, English vessels that left for Brazil with English manufactured goods but found little return freight for England were often ordered to return to Hamburg, which thus became the market for Brazilian products.”67 “The over 800 Brazilian voyages by Hamburg vessels in the years 1824/49 are ample evidence of how important this trade was for the development of Hamburg’s trade and shipping companies.”68 The preliminary highlight of this development was the establishment of a sailing shipping line in 1852, the Hamburg-Brasilianische Packetschiffahrt-Gesellschaft, which required a considerable volume of cargo and a sufficient number of trading companies interested in this line of business.69 From the beginning of the premium quotations in the Hamburg price current in 1820, Bahia, Brazil’s capital until 1763 and its most important trading centre up to 1838/40,70 and Rio de Janeiro were regarded as separate destinations. Since 1821 they were grouped together to form the destination “Brazil”, with a distinction being made between “coming” and “going” from 1854 onwards. The voyage from Hamburg to Bahia and back took about five to six months.71 At the same time, Brazilian ports were also important as intermediaries for traffic to the La Plata region at least until the 1850s.72 Hamburg was also involved in this business: “if the vessels leaving for the east coast of South America lacked cargo, they took salt from the Iberian Peninsula to Brazil as well as to La Plata … Between La Plata and Brazil, coastal voyages were made if the cargo was inexpensive.”73 Buenos Aires, from 1821 the Rio de la Plata, and from 1835 Buenos Aires together with Montevideo formed an own destination. Hamburg’s direct trade with the Rio de la Plata region and its “ports of entry for upmarket goods of a sophisticated demand”74 had increased rapidly since the free trade decree of 18 November 1797 – especially in the years 1803 to 1806 – after the Spanish Crown had considerably relaxed its trade restrictions 67 68

69 70 71 72 73 74

Moltmann, Geschichte, 117; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 69. Ibid., 77; and: “The fact that so many companies abandon this business line and move on – initially from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro, later leaving Brazil and going to the [South American] west coast, to the Far East or entering global tramp shipping – cannot be explained by the country’s lack of political safety alone. Certainly, it was significant that sugar was then losing its paramount importance before coffee became the country’s decisive product.” Ibid., 151. Ibid., 73–74. Ibid., 80. Arfs, Hamburg, 182. Moltmann, Geschichte, 117. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 77.

248

chapter 8

on foreigners in the 1790s.75 Traffic with this region, which was significantly less than with Brazil,76 remained restricted to the ports of the estuary until the middle of the nineteenth century. Only when shipping and trade was opened up by all the riparian states in 1852/53 were the river Paraná and the river Paraguay also navigated by Hamburg vessels, although this was not reflected in the premium quotations.77 “A major expansion of the Hanseatic export business was prevented by the low interest of Hamburg importers in goods from the La Plata region. The importance of the Hanse city as a transshipment and intermediate trade centre for La Plata products remained low by European standards prior to 1871.”78 The distance of the La Plata region was considered to be very far from Hamburg; in 1836 the journey to Buenos Aires took 94 days, in 1854 it still took more than 2 months: [T]he financial effort and the risk of such shipments were correspondingly great…. The voyage across the North Atlantic was relatively safe, as this part of the ocean was largely spared from storms that threatened crews and vessels. For steamers, the South America voyage was even considered one of the safest routes in general. Problems usually arose only when entering the Rio de la Plata. The huge delta was one of the most dangerous rivers in the world.79 Responsible for this were sandbanks, shoals, shallow banks, dangerous currents and last but not least the lack of any signaling, capable pilots and reliable maps; in addition there were heavy storms and poor local harbours: [T]he port of Buenos Aires was unworthy of a commercial center of this importance. For it was neither sufficiently fortified against storms by dams nor equipped with a landing bridge that would have allowed overseas vessels to unload directly at the roadstead, despite the flat and rocky shores.80

75 76 77 78 79 80

Pietschmann, “Hamburg und Lateinamerika,” 396; Vogt, “Beitrag,” 45; Kresse, Materialien, 27–28. For consulates in this region Schweer, “Hamburg,” 30–33. Moltmann, Geschichte, 118. Arfs, Hamburg, 119–120. Ibid., 141, 154–155 and 158–161. Ibid., 117. Ibid., 118.

From New York to Lima

249

Only in the second half of the 1850s–during the time of the rivalry between the province of Buenos Aires and the Argentine Confederation (from 1853) – were improvements made.81 In contrast, Montevideo and its harbour protected by a small bay was much better situated and more easily accessible … But also here the unloading and loading operations at sea had to be interrupted for hours, sometimes even days, as all larger vessels could only anchor in the outer roads which were not protected against southern winds.82 Premium quotations for the South American west coast began in 1827, with a distinction being made between Valparaíso and Lima or its port of Callao. Both quotations were combined into one from 1834.83 The debut Hamburg voyage “to Trujillo on the coast of the South Seas” – actually to Lima – had already taken place in 1799 and had continued with a few voyages until 1806, but “the turmoil of the following years in South America and Europe seems to have put an end to this voyage for the time being.”84 From 1845 on, the Hamburg traffic to and from Chile and Peru was significantly intensified. However, it was only after the middle of the century that these places became of greater importance for direct Hamburg traffic.85 This was caused in particular by German emigration to Chile, by the import of Chilean copper ore (until 1856) and by the import of guano from the islands off the Peruvian coast via the port of Callao as well as the incipient import of so-called Chile saltpetre from the then border area between Peru, Bolivia and Chile via the (then still) Peruvian export port of Iquique.86 From a German perspective, Valparaíso was the most important port in this region; “from there, the first relations with the islands of the

81 82 83

84 85 86

Ibid., 119. Ibid., 119. Notwithstanding this, some Hamburg vessels sailed further north, e.g. to load cacao in the Ecuadorian port Guayaquil, to obtain Costa Rican coffee in Puntarenas or tropical timber in Mazatlán, the principal Mexican port at that time; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 92. – according to Lloyd’s Register, Llorca-Jaña, “The Marine Insurance Market,” 34, stated a quotations’ peak in 1838 because of the war of Chile against the Peru-Bolivian Confederation (Guerra de Confederación Perú-Boliviana; 1836–1839). In the Hamburg rates, a comparable indication could not be found. Kresse, Materialien, 28. Cf. idem, Fahrtgebiete, 88–89; idem, “Handels- und Schiffahrtsbeziehungen,” 25. Arfs, Hamburg, 120 and 182; Wätjen, Wirtschaftsaufbau. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 161–162 and 165; idem, “Handels- und Schiffahrtsbeziehungen,” 26–27.

250

chapter 8

South Seas were established.”87 In any case, even before the middle of the nineteenth century, the west coast became “more and more a normal shipping area for the Hamburg flag.”88 With the California Gold Rush in 1848/49, the west coast of North America with its trade and economic centre of San Francisco was connected in rapid succession to both intra-American and transpacific and transatlantic trade. In 1854, “California” became a destination in its own right in the Hamburg price current, but by 1855 the railway across the Isthmus of Panama had already been completed, so that travellers generally no longer took the route via Cape Horn. According to this, the number of Hamburg vessels going to California decreased significantly since the mid-1850s.89 Since 1850 there had been a Hanseatic consulate in San Francisco, which had been moved north from Mazatlán in Mexico.90 At that time Mazatlán was the main port on Mexico’s west coast, despite poor shipping conditions. It was characterized by “bad drinking water, mostly unbearable temperatures, shallow roads, [and] insufficient protection against stormy winds.”91 From Hamburg’s angle, the voyage to California was only a continuation of the route to the South American west coast, which itself was seen as an extension of the voyage to Brazil and the Rio de la Plata. For this reason, California as a destination is also dealt with here in the context of considerations about South America. The Hamburg premium quotations for South American destinations and California show the importance of long distances for the level of premiums in an almost ideal-typical way: the further away the individual ports were from Hamburg, the higher the premiums, and especially in the winter, when no one wanted to double Cape Horn. In the 1820s, for example, premiums were quoted for the Brazilian ports of Bahia and Rio de Janeiro that were at least 2 percentage points below those for Buenos Aires and Montevideo. Only towards the end of the 1820s did this difference narrow to about 1 percentage point, and in the 1830s the two quotations converged further and further, so that the differences were consistently below ½ percentage point. In some years, premiums were approximately the same for all ports on the east coast of South America. The tendency of these quotations was downward, and since about 1842/43 – with the exception of 1848/49 – they were all quoted at rates of less than 2 percent. The exceptionally high premium quotations in the early 1820s are remarkable: 87 88 89 90 91

Moltmann, Geschichte, 118. Cf. Kellenbenz, “Relaciones consulares”; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 96. Ibid., 96. Idem, “Handels- und Schiffahrtsbeziehungen,” 28. Becker, Hansestädte, 53. Cf. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 167–168. Ibid., 168.

From New York to Lima

251

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1820–1859 Graph 8-5 Hamburg premium quotations for South American destinations and California, 1820–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-22

in Hamburg winter and spring months between 1821 and 1824 they almost regularly reached around 6 percent for Brazilian ports, and even around 8 to 10 percent for those on the Rio de La Plata. That for the latter, moreover, an exorbitantly high average rate of 9 percent for the year 1823 resulted for this time was due to the fact that from February 1823 to August 1824 no premiums were noted at all. The next interruption in quotations was from March 1826 to July 1827 and then again from April to October 1828, because of the Cisplatine or Argentine-Brazilian War over the Banda Oriental (the Eastern Bank), i.e. the Cisplatine Province or province of Montevideo (1825–1828), which resulted in

252

chapter 8

the independence of what is nowadays Uruguay.92 However, it should also be noted that the multiple blockades of the harbour of Buenos Aires in the late 1830s and 1840s by the French (1838–1840, 1845–1848) and British fleets (1845– 1847)93 obviously did not have too great an impact on premium quotations. Although they did not occur in the Hamburg winter months of 1838/39 and 1840 they were otherwise not remarkably higher than in other years. By contrast, premiums were considerably higher for voyages around the still dangerous Cape Horn to the west coast of South America, which is considerably further away from Hamburg, to Valparaíso and Lima or Callao. Premium quotations began at 6 to 8 percent for Valparaíso and between 8 and 10 percent for Lima. The difference between Valparaíso and the Rio de la Plata was initially between 1 and 1 ½ percentage points, and the difference for Lima was about ½ percentage points higher. The latter difference was gradually narrowing until the early 1830s, so that in 1835 Valparaíso and Lima were combined into a single premium quotation, which may have also been valid for other, even more northerly ports on the west coast of South America, such as Guayaquil. The premium quotation for South America’s west coast tended to fall in the same way as that for the east coast and, apart from the exceptional years of 1848/49, were consistently below 3 percent since 1843, and in the last years of the period under review it was even below 2 ½ percent. With the expansion of the voyage along the American west coast to the north, California was finally added in February 1854. In the first years, it was listed at between 3 ½ and 4 percent, which was again a good 1 percentage point higher than the ports on the South American west coast or even more than 2 percentage points higher than the Brazilian ports in these years. A slightly declining tendency is only evident here at the very end of the period under review in 1859. The comparatively high premium quotation for California in the early years was not only an indication of the long distance from Hamburg, but also of the still uncertain trade and traffic conditions there, which were also reflected in the still irregular exchange rate quotation from San Francisco to Hamburg.94 In terms of the averages for the individual months, January was consistently the month with the highest premium quotations, which averaged 3 ⅔ percent for the Brazilian ports, approximately 4 percent for the Rio de la Plata,

92 93 94

Whether the domestic political turmoil that followed after the collapse of the Unitarian Republic Argentina (1827) also played a role in this cannot be clarified here. Schneider, Frankreich, vol. I, 234–237. Cf. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 79–80. Schneider; Schwarzer and Zellfelder (eds.), Währungen der Welt I, vol. I, 452.

From New York to Lima

253

4 1/6 percent for Chile and Peru and a good 4 percent for California.95 The quotations then fell rapidly for the two destinations on South America’s east coast, with the lowest rates recorded from May to July (1 ⅔ to approximately 2 percent). After that, a renewed upturn began and lasted into the Hamburg winter. In contrast, the differences in premium quotations between the single months were much smaller for destinations on the American west coast: in the Hamburg spring and summer months, the average rates fell only slightly compared with January, namely to around 3 percent for South America and 3 ½ percent for California. For the long voyage to the American west coast, the time at which the insurance was taken out therefore appears to have been of less relevance than for the shorter voyage to the east coast. The differences in the single months in the 1820s were also much greater than in the 1850s: in the Hamburg winter months in the 1820s, premium quotations of up to 8 percent – in single cases even 10 percent – were nothing unusual, whereas in the 1850s the 3 percent mark was hardly ever exceeded. At the end of the 1850s, it seems that the voyage to the Brazilian ports from Hamburg had become such a commonplace that even in the Hamburg winter premiums were only 1 ½ to 2 percent, while in the rest of the year they even fell to 1 ¼ percent. For the route to the Rio de La Plata they were only ¼ percent higher. The trip around Cape Horn, however, still made the premiums considerably more expensive – especially in winter times! –, just as far as Chile and Peru in the Hamburg winter at 2 ½ up to a good 3 percent, in summer to a good 2 percent. And for California in 1859 they were still at 3 ½ to 4 percent in the Hamburg winter and 2 ½ to 3 percent in the summer. This clear gradation points to the considerably more dangerous journey to the American west coast with increasing distance. 8.5

The Russian Transatlantic Routes in the Early Nineteenth Century

A special feature among the overseas premium quotations in the Hamburg insurance price current are the Saint Petersburg premium quotations for voyages to Brazil and Cuba (Havana) in the 1820s and early 1830s. These are Saint Petersburg’s only premiums from outside the Baltic Sea, and they are due to Russian trade expansion in the Atlantic region after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. It can be assumed that the Saint Petersburg marine insurance market, which had no experience whatsoever with transatlantic insurance, could not provide adequate risk management for such new routes, so that the merchants 95

Whereas only some rates are available from the 1850s for California, up to 8 percent had to be paid on average in the January months of the 1820s for Chile and Peru.

254

chapter 8

12,0000 10,0000 Brazil

8,0000

Havana

6,0000 4,0000 2,0000 0,0000

a) Annual average premium rates

Brazil

Havana

10,0000 8,0000 6,0000 4,0000 2,0000 0,0000

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

XI

XII

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1821–1834 Graph 8-6 Saint Petersburg premium quotations for American destinations, 1821–1834, in percent Source: Table A2-23

and shipowners may have resorted to the nearest marine insurance market, the Hamburg market, where such insurance became ever more common in the 1820s. Both premium quotations began in 1821 at an above-average level, with the voyage to Havana having to be insured at a higher level than the voyage to Brazil, which was much further away, throughout the whole period under review. This was due to the increased risk in the Caribbean region in those years as the wars of independence were not yet over and pirates were therefore

From New York to Lima

255

still rampant.96 It was not without reason that premiums of 10 to 15 percent were quoted for Havana in the late summer and autumn of 1822, while for Brazil premiums of 6 to 7 percent were quoted. From 1824, quotations then settled at a comparatively low level, with a downward trend until 1834, namely from a good 4 percent (Brazil) to just under 5 percent (Havana) to around 2 ½ to 3 percent, although since 1828 the difference between the two quotations was only between ¼ and ½ percentage points. Russian transatlantic voyages started in April each year – no premiums were quoted from December to March – and premiums remained fairly moderate up to and including July, ranging from about 3 percent in the case of Brazil and 3 ½ to 4 percent in the case of Havana. From August onwards, they increased significantly on a monthly average and peaked in November at 7 ¼ percent and 8 ⅔ percent respectively. Thereby, average insurance premiums in May were higher than in April; this is due to the fact that in 1823 premiums were paid in May – as in the following months – at a relatively high level, but none were quoted in April, which meant that the monthly averages were ‘shifted’. In the other years, the premium quotations in the spring months were generally the same. 96

Schwarzer, “Exporthandel,” 65.

chapter 9

From the Cape to Canton – Marine Insurance Rates for Destinations in the Indian Ocean 9.1

The European Routes to East India in the Eighteenth Century

Premiums for the Indian Ocean area were first quoted in Hamburg with the reworking of the insurance price current in 1762, yet similar to the case of transatlantic trade, not for voyages from Hamburg, but from the ports of those countries that served as carriers for Hamburg’s import and export. A more or less regular Hamburg direct trade with the Indian Ocean area only started in the 1790s1 – since 1797 with Great Britain’s permission2 – then gathered momentum from the 1830s. The first ‘direct’ insurance premiums were recorded in the 1820s. In the early eighteenth century, direct Hamburg trade connections to non-European places remained rare exceptions, which can only be proven in single years for instance to China in 1705.3 The premium quotations of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were for “East India”, although it is not explained which ports or coastal areas were specifically included in this destination. However, the list of ports of departure allows to draw conclusions: since 1762, information is given for two routes to “East India”, one from Portugal and the other from “Copenhagen, Gothenburg, Emden”. Since 1782, four series of premium rates were listed: first, for the departure from Portugal; second, from Copenhagen; third, from Gothenburg; and fourth, from Trieste and Leghorn. This leads to the conclusion that Hamburg’s traffic with “East India” was not only oriented towards Portugal, but also and above all towards the trading companies of the ‘smaller’, usually neutral trading and shipping nations of the time – as Hamburg insisted on its neutrality – and their home ports. This concerned the Danish East India Company re-established in 1732 as Asiatisk Kompagni, the Danish Asiatic Company, with Copenhagen as home port,4 the Svenska Ostindiska Companiet,

1 2 3 4

Moltmann, Geschichte, 98f. Kellenbenz, “Der deutsche Außenhandel,” 25. Baasch, Statistik, 98–100, 106, 108 and 110. The monopoly on trade with India was withdrawn from the company in 1772, while that for trade with China was left untouched; Krieger, Kaufleute; idem, “Danish Trading”.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_011

From the Cape to Canton

257

the Swedish East India Company, newly established in 1731 in Gothenburg,5 the insignificant East India Company of Brandenburg(-Prussia) with Emden, founded in 1765,6 and the Austrian Société Impériale asiatique de Trieste (1781– 1784)7 as well as the vessels of ‘free’ merchants and shipowners leaving from these home ports.8 The large Northwest European East India Companies, however, could not be taken into account as they covered their risks in the maritime insurance markets of their home countries, London and Amsterdam. By contrast, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia did not yet have insurance markets comparable to Hamburg. Also in Trieste, it was only after the revival of both Levantine and transatlantic direct trade in the second half of the 1780s – beginning with the Banco d’Assicurazione e Cambi Maritimi on 26 March 1786 – that the foundations of marine insurance companies surged, although they were more interested in the routes to the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea areas, and then to Western and Northwestern Europe.9 The business of the Trieste-East India route therefore also seems to have been of interest in Hamburg, as was that of the second Habsburg port of importance in the Mediterranean: Leghorn, which belonged to the Habsburg secondo-geniture of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, was consistently recorded together with Trieste in the same premium quotation. The fact that insurance premiums for Danish, Swedish, Prussian, and Habsburg vessels to Asia were thus recorded in the Hamburg price current allows the conclusion that “East India” could certainly not only mean the ports of the Indian subcontinent, since the main interest of the ‘small’ trading and shipping nations in the Indian Ocean area was in China or in its tea export port, Canton. Sweden, Prussia, and Habsburg did not have any trading bases in India, but – the latter two at least partially – were engaged in intercontinental tea trade. “East India” thus probably refers to the entire Indian Ocean area, whether the vessels sailed to Canton directly or, like the Danish vessels, via their trading base in India, Tranquebar. The Portuguese, however, who were not involved in the Cantonese tea trade, called at the remains of their Estado 5 Müller, “The Swedish East India Company”; Koninckx, Swedish East India Companie; idem, “Swedish East-Indian Trade”; Söderpalm (red.), Ostindiska Compagniet. 6 This was the successor to the Königlich Preußische Asiatische Compagnie in Emden nach Canton und China (‘Royal Prussian Asiatic Company in Emden to Canton and China’, or ‘Emden Company’ for short), which had to cease its activities in 1757 and was eventually liquidated in 1765; Henderson, “Außenhandel,” 666; cf. Denzel, “Handel und Zahlungsverkehr”. 7 von Pollack-Parnau, Handelskompagnie; Gilibert, “Il mercante”; Barbudieri, “L’Espansione mercantile”; von Aretin, “Fürst Kaunitz”. 8 Cf. e.g. Denzel, “Geschäftspraxis,” 84–86. 9 Beschreibung der Handlung [1804], 90.

258

chapter 9

da India, the trading bases of Goa on the Malabar Coast and Macao on the South Chinese coast. The quotation for the Portuguese ports was first recorded in 1762 – shortly before the end of the Third Carnatic War in India10 (1754–1763) –, and ceased in 1818. In 1762, a joint quotation also began for Copenhagen, Gothenburg, and Emden, i.e. for the three ‘Nordic’ East India Companies or their home ports from which vessels sailed into the Indian Ocean area. Twenty years later, the series was changed in such a way that Copenhagen and Gothenburg were listed separately and Emden no longer at all. This finding takes into account the declining importance of Emden in East Asian trade in the late era of King Frederick II (1740–1786), and even the vague attempts of Frederick William II (1786–1797) in the late 1780s to revive the trade with China could not change this.11 The Gothenburg quotation was upheld until 1820,12 the Copenhagen quotation even until 1834. While the Danish Asiatisk Kompagni – despite bad business – was only dissolved in 1840 and Denmark kept Tranquebar until 1845, Sweden had completely withdrawn from Asian trade since the beginning of the nineteenth century or had been ousted by the British. The Gothenburg quotation had thus simply become obsolete. The same was true of the Trieste and Leghorn rates – that of the ‘Imperials’ (the ‘Kaiserliche’), as the Austrian merchants were termed in the Cantonese trade13 – which also began in 1782 and was discontinued in 1817. Finally, since 1820, a premium was quoted for the modestly growing direct trade of Hamburg with the Indian Ocean area, which is used here as a comparison with the quotation from Copenhagen. As in the case of the Iberian transatlantic routes of the eighteenth century, an extraordinarily high degree of constancy, indeed equality of premiums, can be observed for the routes into the Indian Ocean area in the years leading up to the outbreak of the American War of Independence (1775–1783). Portuguese, Swedish, Danish, and Prussian ports had a premium rate of 7 percent throughout the year, a value, which, given the long distance involved, may seem reasonable. It is doubtful, however, whether the never fluctuating quotations had their causes in brisk business activity. Yet this seems to have increased significantly during the American War of Independence and the parallel Fourth Anglo-Dutch Naval War (1780–1784), as the neutral ‘small’ countries were able to become increasingly involved in the freight forwarding business from China, 10 11 12 13

This war in which Great Britain fought against France took place for the most part in the Carnatic region, i.e. between the Eastern Ghats and the Coromandel Coast (today: northern part of the Indian state Tamil Nadu). Denzel, Preiskurant, 32–33. For Gothenborg idem, “Hamburg-Swedish Connections,” 210–212. Schleich, “Denkschrift,” 313 note 5.

From the Cape to Canton

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates, 1762–1793

c) Monthly average premium rate, 1762–1807 graph 9-1 Premium quotations for destinations in East India, 1762–1820/34, in percent Source: Table A2-23

259

260

chapter 9

as Great Britain and France had tied up their forces in the Atlantic area.14 And this not only affected the Danes and Swedes, who were traditionally involved in this business, but for a number of years also the ‘Imperials’, who, probably not least for this reason, were included in the Hamburg insurance price current with Trieste and Leghorn at this very time.15 In any case, premium quotations tended to decline for some years. The rates then settled at a new level, which, as time went on, differentiated according to the individual ports of departure and destination in Europe, at which they again remained without seasonal fluctuations well into the 1790s: Trieste, Leghorn, and Copenhagen recorded the highest premiums with 7 ½ percent, followed by Portugal with 6 ½ percent, and Gothenburg with 5 ½ percent. These remarkable differences, as they persisted for years, are probably due to the different risks associated with the individual routes. According to this, sailing under the Swedish flag was the least risky, and it is not without reason that Swedish tea exports from Canton were in third place behind Great Britain and the Netherlands in the late 1780s and early 1790s, and only after that came those of the Danes, French, and ‘Imperials’. During the Napoleonic Wars, the premium quotations of all ports of departure and destination rose massively, during the War of the Second Coalition (1798/99–1801/02) to well over 10 percent, in some months to as much as 20 percent. In the War of the First Coalition (1792–1797), quotations for Portuguese ports were already omitted (April 1794–February 1798), as had been the case between April 1778 and July 1780. These interruptions took place at the same time as the Portuguese transatlantic route to Brazil, as both routes were apparently too risky from the Hamburg perspective in these war years. Napoleon’s French campaign in Egypt (1798/99) and the Franco-English war in the Mediterranean caused the rates for the two Mediterranean ports in particular – Leghorn had been under French influence since the Peace of Lunéville (9 February 1801) – to rise even higher than for the others. In 1801, they were 20 percent for most of the year, with an annual average of 19.42 percent. It was only after the Peace of Amiens in March 1802 that they all declined again, but at around 10 percent they remained well above the pre-war level. This high level of premium quotations, which applied to all East India routes listed in Hamburg around the middle of the first decade of the nineteenth century, continued from 1814/15, with the Austrian Mediterranean ports recording 14 15

This is demonstrated by the export figures of the individual trading nations from Canton: Dermigny, La Chine, vol. II, 539. Cf. Denzel, “Wirtschaftsbeziehungen”; idem, “Wirtschaftliche Wechselbeziehungen”. Schleich, “Denkschrift,” 313 note 5.

From the Cape to Canton

261

the highest premiums at well over 10 percent. It was not until 1818 that the values began to decline, only to then, if still quoted, to be largely at the pre-1793 level in the 1820s. The Copenhagen quotation, which continued until 1834, and the new Hamburg quotation tended to be the same. The rates rose in the early 1820s up to a maximum in the ‘crisis year’ of 1823 – with annual averages above 7 percent for Copenhagen and above 8 percent for Hamburg. They reached another peak in 1826 with annual averages of 7 ½ percent only to fall to just over 5 percent in the case of Copenhagen and even lower in the case of Hamburg. All premium quotations for the East India routes were subject to almost no seasonal fluctuations until 1793, but remained essentially the same throughout the year. In the individual months they hardly deviated by more than 0.1 percentage point from the annual averages, so that seasonal fluctuations in the setting of premiums can virtually be ruled out. If, however, one looks at the entire first study period up to 1807, seasonal differences do indeed arise, whereby the sometimes considerable fluctuations in premium quotations are undoubtedly also attributable to the respective politico-military events and the resulting increased risk, especially for voyages over such long distances. The premium quotations were consistently highest in the winter months (approximately 8 to 10 ½ percent), while Portugal, Trieste and Leghorn recorded the highest in May (7 and 8 ¾ percent respectively) and Copenhagen and Gothenburg the lowest in August (7 ½ and 6 ¾ percent respectively). A similar finding for Copenhagen is also found for the 1820s and early 1830s, although with somewhat lower values. In the long term, voyages under the Portuguese flag to Asia were thus the safest – not least because of Portugal’s close affiliations with Great Britain. It was followed by the neutral Swedish and Danish flags, while the Imperial Habsburg flag was by a remarkable margin the most unsafe. However, this was due less to an anti-England-policy of the Habsburgs than to the fact that vessels coming from or going to Habsburg ports had to take the extremely dangerous passage through the Strait of Gibraltar, which was roamed by the North African Barbary pirates, while all other vessels to be considered here were spared this. The central role of this aspect in the 1810s is shown by the Second Barbary War between the Dey of Algiers and the United States of America in 1815,16 when premiums for the East India Route from Trieste and Leghorn soared from 11 percent in March to 25 percent in May and then remained at 22 ½ percent until July. Only after the peace treaty, signed at Algiers on 3 July 1815, did they fall to ‘only’ 13 ½ percent in August and less. 16

Cf. Lambert, The Barbary Wars.

262 9.2

chapter 9

The Hamburg Marine Insurance Premium Rates in the Nineteenth Century

With the reorganisation of the Hamburg insurance price current in 1820, two destinations were established for Asian ports, which had not been directly quoted with Hamburg premiums until 1820: the first destination was named “Ile de France”, i.e. Mauritius,17 to which the Cape of Good Hope was also assigned from 1821. From 1794 onwards, Hamburg vessels sailed around the Cape at irregular intervals,18 initially mainly to the Danish entrepôt Tranquebar,19 and from 1799 increasingly to Mauritius.20 Since 1835, this quotation was only valid for the Cape, probably including the neighbouring coasts, even if Hamburg’s trade with the Cape Colony can only be proven in a few individual cases.21 A second destination covered “Bengal and China”, i.e. the entire South and East Asian area. Since 1821, a distinction was made between Bengal and Batavia on the one hand and Canton and Manila on the other. In 1827 the two were merged again to form a single destination “Bengal to Canton”, although Batavia was now listed separately. From 1834 onwards, Singapore became part of the Batavia destination, and from 1843 onwards Bengal was again included in the Batavia destination. The background of this ‘reorganisation’ seems to be clear: to get to Batavia, given the prevailing winds, the standard practice was to cross the southern Indian Ocean and then go north before reaching the coast of Australia and then pass through the Sunda Strait. Since that was the case visiting Bengal would logically come after a stop in Batavia or Singapore. To go directly to the Bay of Bengal might have entailed crossing the Indian Ocean at a more northerly latitude and so facing the problems of the seasonality of monsoon winds. In contrast, the other destination was renamed “Bengal, Canton, Manila” from 1834 onwards, and since 1843 “China, Manila”. Like Cape Town, the Asian destinations did not gain importance for Hamburg’s direct traffic until after the middle of the nineteenth century.22 In 1853 a destination “Australia” was eventually created, made possible by the repeal of the last British Navigation Act, which had prohibited foreigners 17

18 19 20 21 22

In 1715, the island was conquered by the French, who changed its name to ‘Ile de France’. Initially, the island was owned by the French East India Company and after their bankruptcy in 1767 became a crown colony. In 1810, the island was occupied by the British and made their crown colony in 1814. Kresse, “Ostwärts Kapstadt,” 101. Krieger, Kaufleute, 34–51, 103–115 and 132–146. Kresse, Materialien, 28–29. Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 452–456. Arfs, Hamburg, 182; Kellenbenz, “German Trade Relations,” 134–140.

From the Cape to Canton

263

from voyages to British colonies. The reason for Hamburg – i.e. in particular for wholesale trader and shipowner Johan Cesar VI Godeffroy (1813–1885)23 – to start the voyage to Australia was first the discovery of copper ore deposits in Southern Australia near Adelaide in 1843/46. As a result of the Victorian gold rush, since 1853 the exports from the Zollverein (German Customs Union) to Australia increased rapidly, and so the rubric “Australia” was established in the Hamburg insurance price current that year. Last but not least, there were numerous emigrant vessels from Hamburg, which in many cases also loaded copper ore as return cargo.24 Behind these almost confusing, frequent changes of destination names for ports in Asia, there are basically two main routes for Hamburg vessels: first, the Canton-Manila-Hamburg triangular route; and second, the Canton-Java (Batavia)-Hamburg triangular route, on which Singapore, the intermediary between Javanese, Malaysian, and Chinese trade in Southeast Asia,25 was also visited. Bengal could previously be touched on both routes, which is why this destination was taken into account in the premium quotations. Thereby, tea, cassia, and bamboo canes were loaded in Canton, sugar, hemp, and timber in Manila, and Javanese coffee, rice, and tobacco in Batavia.26 Initially, Batavia was the only port in Dutch India that could be called at by vessels flying any other than the Dutch flag. In 1846 the new free port of Makassar27 on Celebes (today Sulawesi) was added, later also Samarang (modern spelling: Semarang), and after the middle of the century Batavia lost its importance for Hamburg. In the Philippines, Manila held a similar function to Batavia in Dutch India until 1858 from a Hamburg perspective: “Manilla [sic] is the only place with which Europe has been in contact until now; it has become a kind of free port, while the Spanish had to give up their connections with it.”28 In particular the trade from Manila to the USA increased significantly in the first half of the nineteenth century, so that “the cargoes which come to Hamburg … often [are] on North American account.”29

23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Gossler, “Godeffroy, Jean César VI.”; Škrivan, “Das hamburgische Handelshaus”. Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 426 and 457–462; Moltmann, Geschichte, 120; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 171; idem, “Ostwärts Kapstadt,” 103. “Even from Hamburg ventures have been made directly there”; Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. III, 301 (cit.) and 302–303. Bartsch, Hamburgs Handelsbeziehungen, 69 note 1. “… which has a good anchorage, but is difficult to access due to many sandbanks and cliffs;” Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. III, 331. Ibid., 344. Ibid., 347.

264

chapter 9

In the free port of Singapore, the important coal transports that made this city a coal station for British steamers were reserved for British vessels until 1847.30 On the journey via Singapore to China, one of the Burmese rice ports was often approached, among which Akyab (modern-day Sittwe) at the mouth of the Arakan (today known as Kaladan river) was the most important one for the Hamburg traders from 1854 onwards, because free coastal traffic had existed from here since the 1840s (except 1849/50). This so-called Reisfahrt (the ‘rice voyage’) from the southwest to the northeast of Asia was a part and one of the foundations of Hamburg’s ‘Chinese coastal shipping’.31 Despite proven direct deliveries from Calcutta, since the 1760s the “most brilliant point of the immense British trade in these regions,”32 to Hamburg since 1792 “no Hamburg vessel seems to have called at the British East Indian ports until 1824.”33 Since 1825, a few voyages of Hamburg vessels to Bombay and Calcutta are documented with comparatively low direct imports.34 It was not until 1839 that the first German trading company was founded in Bombay and a Hamburg consulate was established both there and in Calcutta, but these were not continuously staffed in the following decades.35 Nevertheless, even after the repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849, the Hamburg merchants were not able to gain a permanent foothold in the British Indian market, which was dominated by the East India Company, especially since the tariff increases of 1845 kept them from doing so in the long run.36 Not even when the Hamburg shipping company Wachsmuth & Krogmann established a liner service with a three-month interval between Hamburg and Calcutta in 1861 was it possible to expand direct trade to a remarkable extent.37 Also in Canton, the Hamburg merchants were mainly in the service of North American trading companies:

30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37

Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 99. Ibid., 180 and 186; idem, “Ostwärts Kapstadt,” 104. For Hamburg’s so-called ‘Chinese Coastal Shipping’, which around 1870 spanned the whole South and East Asian regions reaching to Vladivostok and Nikolayevsk-on-Amur as well as to Japan and Australia, see Moltmann, Geschichte, 120; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 177 and 182–189; Sieveking, “Kunst & Albers”. Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. III, 275–276. Bartsch, Hamburgs Handelsbeziehungen, 112. Contrastingly, Baasch, “Anfänge,” 96, suggested that Hamburg-flagged vessels already sailed since 1794 to British East India. Cf. Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 463. Ibid., 466. Cf. Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. III, 278. Bartsch, Hamburgs Handelsbeziehungen, 120–121 and 125. Ibid., 129 and 138–140; Krawehl, Schiffs- und Warenverkehr, 467–477. Ibid., 469; Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 179.

From the Cape to Canton

265

“although Hamburg has no real connection with Canton … sometimes loads come directly to Hamburg, usually through American companies.”38 It was not possible to clarify to what extent the premium quotations for destinations in the Indian Ocean area were also relevant for the increasingly frequent voyages to the West African coast in the 1840s and 1850s.39 The premium quotation series for the various ports of the Indian Ocean area, which began in the 1820s, were more or less uniform, with a downward trend beginning in the late 1820s. “Bengal & East Asia” recorded the highest values, starting at around 5.5 percent and falling to just under 3 percent in the long term (since 1844), although it was still reminiscent of one of Hamburg’s highest premium rates. The quotations were interrupted from April 1840 to April 1842, which was a consequence of the First Opium War (1839–1842).40 In the course of this war Hamburg’s voyages to East Asia had to be suspended, so that the corresponding premium quotation also ceased to apply. The quotation for the destination “Bengal & Southeast Asia” was also partly influenced by this war, but it only fell out of use during the last months of the war, from February to April 1842. Incidentally, its values were consistently around ½ percentage point below those of the East Asian destination. They started at just over 5 percent and levelled off at around 2 ½ percent since the mid-1840s. The shorter distances to Singapore and Batavia from Hamburg compared with Manila and Canton may have been partly responsible for this. Again, the insurance premiums for voyages that only went as far as the Cape of Good Hope or at most as far as Mauritius were considerably cheaper. Thereby the latter seems to have been of no importance for Hamburg after 1835, as Mauritius is no longer mentioned as a final destination. This much shorter route was insured with premiums that were about ¾ percent below the destination “Bengal & Southeast Asia”. Between the early 1820s and the 1850s they fell from around 5 to about 1 ¾ percent. Eventually, the Australian destination was insured from 1853 onwards at about 2 ½ percent premium, but this fell to 2 ⅛ percent towards the end of the study period. The premiums were thus at the same level as those for voyages to Southeast Asia, so that the distance factor seems to have receded into the background in this case.

38 39 40

Crüger, Handelsgeographie, vol. III, 373. Kresse, Fahrtgebiete, 189–194; Hieke, “Wm. O’Swald & Co.”. Dabringhaus, Geschichte Chinas, 56–57; Hamashita, “Tribute and Treaties”; Beeching, Opium Wars; Denzel, “Wirtschaftsbeziehungen”.

266

chapter 9

a) Annual average premium rates

b) Monthly average premium rates: 1820–1859 graph 9-2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Indian Ocean, 1820–1859, in percent Source: Table A2-25

The most expensive month to insure vessels sailing in the Indian Ocean was December, followed by November and January. The average December figures were 5.15 percent for the destination “Bengal & East Asia”, 4 ½ percent for “Bengal & Southeast Asia”, 3.92 percent for the Cape destination and 2 ⅞ percent for Australia, for which rates are only available from the 1850s. By contrast, they were lowest during the months of May to July, with the lowest point in June, when premiums were on average – with the exception of those for Australia – about 1 percentage point lower than in December. Due to the short time taken to document premiums for Australia, the difference between the

From the Cape to Canton

267

most expensive and cheapest month was much smaller in this destination than in the others. For these destinations, this difference narrowed over the decades. In the 1820s it was still significantly higher than in the 1850s, when the rates quoted in the individual months became more and more similar. In the 1820s, however, prices of up to 9 percent for East Asia could also be achieved in the winter months, and up to 6 percent for the Cape destination, while at the end of the period under study these were just over 3 and just under 2 percent respectively.

Conclusions With this study, Hamburg is the first marine insurance market of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for which a detailed long-term analysis of the premium development has been carried out. This has been possible mostly by virtue of the exceptionally good tradition of source material in this respect, as well as the need to once again shine a bright light on the institution of marine insurance, which is so important in the commercial world. After all, marine insurance is more than ‘just’ the insurance of transports, cargo and vessels during their voyage by sea: it was with it that the idea of insurance came into the world. With Hamburg’s development into the first marine insurance market in Europe to the north-east of Amsterdam, the Hanseatic city also became Germany’s first location for insurance, where numerous other insurance companies – above all the Hamburger Feuerkasse (the ‘Hamburg Fire Insurance’), founded in 1676 – were later established. The fact that Hamburg has remained one of the most important German locations for insurance to the present day is due not least to the marine insurance business transacted here. In Hamburg, the institution of marine insurance was established for the first time in the area of the Hanseatic League – one is almost tempted to say ‘anchored’. Similar to the bill of exchange as a medium of cashless payment transactions or double-entry bookkeeping as a medium of accounting, marine insurance, which had been developed in Italy, was brought to Hamburg via western European, especially Dutch, merchants, and later to the entire area of the (former) Hanseatic League. Danzig as the most important transshipment centre of the Baltic Sea in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not play a comparable role in this mediation process, as voyages within the Baltic Sea area or from there to the North Sea coasts were traditionally left uninsured. The instrument of the Partenreederei, the joint ownership of a merchant vessel, served the Hanse merchants as sufficient and proven measure of safeguarding their transport business, for which a more extensive marine insurance seemed unnecessary to them. This was different in Hamburg, because here – not least through the immigrants from the Iberian Peninsula – there were close connections to Spain and Portugal and then further into the Mediterranean: such voyages tended to be insured because of the much higher risk inherent in them. The Dutch and Iberian Sephardim therefore also used the instrument of marine insurance in Hamburg. Thus they laid the building blocks for the first and most relevant marine insurance market in the area north-east of Amsterdam, which was the centre of international marine insurance business in the seventeenth century.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_012

Conclusions

269

The marine insurance business thus established in Hamburg attained high relevance within a few decades, initially for the Hamburg financial market itself. Similar to the bill of exchange business in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the sale of marine insurance policies became a vital line of business in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It was at least so important that its most relevant information, the premium quotations, were regularly published in Hamburg’s official price current, which was established in 1736. Until after the mid-eighteenth century, marine insurance business was dominated by private underwriters, who came together in changing co-operations to take out policies. A new level comparable to the major insurance markets of western Europe was reached after the Seven Years’ War with the founding of the first joint-stock insurance companies. By the end of the eighteenth century, the marine insurance business had become an integral part of Hamburg’s stock exchange trading and thus a central pillar of the Hamburg financial centre as a whole. This was all the more true in the period after the Napoleonic Wars, when turnover in the Hamburg marine insurance market increased significantly and the spatial range of insured shipping routes expanded ever further, until at last, around the middle of the century, it could duly be described as quite ‘global’. The marine insurance business benefited from the expansion of Hamburg’s trade, in particular the grain trade with the Baltic Sea area and then, in the nineteenth century, direct trade with the economically most interesting non-European countries. And the other way around: such an expansion of the volume of trade and transport would have been difficult to achieve without the corresponding insurance system. Hamburg’s rise to the status of a so-called ‘world port’, as it was often referred to in the German Empire, was also the consequence of a parallel expansion of marine insurance business that covered the risks associated with maritime transport. However, the relevance of the Hamburg marine insurance market extended far beyond the Hanseatic City. As had been customary in other European marine insurance markets since the late Middle Ages, it was also possible to insure voyages in Hamburg that did not start directly from the city or had its port as destination. Because of the commercial geography, a large part of the transport of commodities between Hamburg and the Baltic Sea was handled overland, i.e. via Lübeck. The tolls levied in the Sound made it necessary to be able to insure Lübeck routes in the Baltic Sea on the Hamburg marine insurance market. In addition, sea transports – unlike the actual commercial business – were not only handled bilaterally between two places, but vessels and crews continued on their passages from port to port and oftentimes called at several ports during their voyage, dropped off commodities and

270

Conclusions

loaded new goods. Thus, they undertook ‘tramp voyages’, as these were called in the nineteenth century. Therefore, it was essential to be able to insure such voyages in Hamburg as well, which did not directly affect the city. At the same time, the Baltic Sea and Scandinavia, with its less developed financial infrastructure even in the eighteenth century compared with the ports of western Europe, was the most important hinterland of the Hamburg marine insurance market. There were hardly any possibilities of taking out marine insurance there until around the middle of the nineteenth century. Particularly in times of war, it appears that even west European competitors were able to make it profitable to have voyages to or from the Baltic Sea or to the Scandinavian coasts insured via Hamburg, or to handle them entirely via Hamburg and under its neutral flag. Furthermore, Hamburg was also attractive as a marine insurance market for the East and West Indian companies of its ‘neighbours’ – right down to Trieste – and that cargoes were even insured from Spain to the West Indies and from Portugal to the East Indies. For this reason, Hamburg was capable to enter the intercontinental business even before direct trade or transport to non-European countries even started at all in the late eighteenth century. Marine insurance from and to non-European countries can thus be regarded as the forerunner of the later direct trading and forwarding activities with these countries. The fact that Hamburg vessels were able to achieve comparatively great importance as a means of transport on the world’s oceans within a short space of time in the nineteenth century is not directly attributable to the older marine insurance business with overseas ports. It is reasonable to assume, however, that there was a certain tradition and, above all, a background of experience in this field. In Hamburg, people knew what could be expected when they sent a vessel on a tramp voyage to Bengal, to the Chinese coasts, or to Manila, for instance. This background of experience relates in a special way to the risks to be insured, which had remained essentially the same since the Middle Ages, even though they occurred at different times with varying intensity. It is not surprising that also in the case of Hamburg, the different weather conditions in summer and winter, which were particularly noticeable on voyages to Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea area, should initially be mentioned as a central influencing factor. Their relevance is evident, but is nevertheless often enough emphasised in the few available contemporary reports. For instance, the already well-known Hamburg insurance expert Gaedechens judged the extraordinary cold of the winter of 1836, which caused temperatures to drop to −25° to −28° C in Saint Petersburg, to −34° C in Arkhangelsk and even to −6° C in Greece, to be especially damaging to the marine insurance business,

Conclusions

271

and “the summer was not particularly conducive to business either.” Two years later, in January and February, Hamburg seafaring was closed due to the severe cold and ice, and the Norwegian ports and fjords froze over, so that “vividness in the insurance business was only noticed late.”1 The year 1852 was also characterised by particularly bad weather conditions.2 In addition, important individual events are also mentioned: in the night from 18 to 19 December 1835, for example, “a hurricane-like storm from the east” caused flooding in Kiel, Aabenraa, Sonderburg, and other ports on this coast, “as the oldest people did not remember when this last came to pass.”3 These examples could be continued, but none of them show any direct connection with the level of premium quotations. In fact, such weather phenomena are not usually reflected in a particularly distinct way in the premium quotations in the Hamburg price current, as a comparison of the various events with the premium quotations shows. They may therefore have influenced the tendency of the quotations, but they are not strikingly conspicuous. This even applies equally to a global natural catastrophe such as the Tambora eruption in 1815 with its comparatively long-lasting consequences for the weather and the economy.4 No direct influence on the marine insurance market can be proven to date. As a result, the annual seasonal fluctuations between the summer and winter months with the respective better or worse weather conditions appear to have had greater overall relevance for the development of premium quotations than brief disruptive events whose influence on a possible increase in premiums cannot be directly proven in individual cases. In connection with the general weather conditions in Europe, the economic cycle of agriculture also seems to have played a considerable role – at least in the case of Hamburg due to its importance in grain trading and transport.5 In his report on the year 1838, Gaedechens emphasised that grain transports stimulated the transport business, whereby the “economic cycle of grain” also “contributed significantly to the revival of the insurance business.”6 This is also 1 SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger See-AssecuranzGeschäft des Jahres … von O. C. Gaedechens, 1835–1852 – … des Jahres 1836; … des Jahres 1838, fol. 2. 2 Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 197 note 22; Plaß, Geschichte, 456. 3 SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger See-AssecuranzGeschäft des Jahres … von O. C. Gaedechens, 1835–1852 – … des Jahres 1835, fol. 11. 4 Behringer, Tambora. 5 For the Netherlands see Scheltjens, Dutch Deltas, 91–130. 6 SHWA, Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger See-AssecuranzGeschäft des Jahres … von O. C. Gaedechens, 1835–1852 – … des Jahres 1838, fol. 3.

272

Conclusions

supported by the fact that the premium quotations in the famine years 1771 and 1772 did rise significantly, although certainly not as much as in the war years of the 1740s, 1750s or 1770s. In the long-term perspective chosen here, the distance between the port of departure and the port of destination does not appear to have been as relevant as in Spooner’s results. It is true that in individual cases it can also be stated for Hamburg that the premium to be paid increased with growing distance, as can be demonstrated above all in the Baltic Sea, where Saint Petersburg was generally quoted remarkably higher than, for instance, Danzig or Königsberg. But if distance were the only factor that mattered, the premium quotations from Hamburg to Amsterdam would have to be the same as from Amsterdam to Hamburg. However, in the only comparable period in terms of sources – the years between 1766 and 1779 – this is not so: 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00

1766

1767

1768

1769

1770

1771

1772

Amsterdam: Rate to and from Hamburg

1773

1774

1775

1776

1777

1778

1779

Hamburg: Rate to and from Amsterdam

Graph c-1 Amsterdam premium quotations for Hamburg and Hamburg premium quotations for Amsterdam in comparison, 1766–1779 Source: The Amsterdam data according to Spooner, Risks at Sea, 258–285, according to which the number of quotations available for the year 1770 is incomparable to the Hamburg quotations.

As a rule, the route between Amsterdam and Hamburg or vice versa was cheaper to insure in Amsterdam than in Hamburg. Only in times of war was it the other way around (see Table C-1). Despite the significantly higher premiums in Amsterdam at the outbreak of the American War of Independence in 1775/76, to insure in Hamburg cost 10.17 percent more than in Amsterdam, on average and over the period under review, by which it was cheaper to insure in Amsterdam than in Hamburg.

273

Conclusions

How did Hamburg’s insurance costs compare with those of Amsterdam but with third ports involved? The following findings can be observed: table c-1 Average premium quotations in the Amsterdam and the Hamburg marine insurance markets, 1766–1779a

Destination

Amsterdam premium

Hamburg premium

Difference

Venice Bay de Bourgneuf London & Hull Königsberg & Danzig Bergen & Trondheim Hamburg-Amsterdam route

3,28% 2,00% 1,29% 3,84% 2,70% 1,31%

5,04% 2,90% 1,93% 3,60% 2,43% 1,46%

34,81% 30,91% 32,86% −6,69% −11,43% 10,17%

a Source for Amsterdam: see Figure C-1. For Table C-1, only such destinations have been chosen that are actually comparable and listed with a similar name in the Amsterdam source.

According to Table C-1, voyages to the Baltic and Scandinavian destinations – this can be generalised – were insured more cheaply in Hamburg than in Amsterdam. Both destinations, albeit partly belonging to two different maritime trade areas, the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic, were part of the immediate catchment area of the Hamburg marine insurance market. All voyages to the west and through the Channel to the south cost about a third more in insurance premiums in Hamburg than in Amsterdam. However, only the premiums for the destination Venice were so high in both marine insurance markets that the Hamburg premium for Venice was almost exactly the same as the sum of the Amsterdam premium there plus the Hamburg premium for the Hamburg-Amsterdam route. If one compares the premium for the direct route from Hamburg to Venice with that for the route from Hamburg to Venice via Amsterdam, i.e. with a stopover there, one has to state that the first – the direct route – was just 5.89 percent more expensive than the route via Amsterdam. Is this a (calculated) coincidence? Or can this finding be interpreted as an indication that the Hamburg insurers oriented themselves so much to the Amsterdam market for the long and dangerous voyages into the Adriatic that they simply added the premium for the voyage from Hamburg to Amsterdam to the premium quoted there? This would be an indication that the Hamburg insurance market, at

274

Conclusions

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

1766

1767

1768

1769

1770

1771

1772

From Amsterdam to Venice From Hamburg via Amsterdam to Venice

1773

1774

1775

1776

1777

1778

1779

From Hamburg to Venice

Graph c-2 Amsterdam and Hamburg premium quotations for Venice in comparison, 1766–1779 Source for Amsterdam: see Graph C-1.

least for these voyages that were already special because of their high-risk potential, remained dependent on Amsterdam in a certain sense even after the Seven Years’ War. However, this must remain speculative, since no other sources are available. In any case, the distance factor alone cannot be held responsible for the difference in premium levels, since the risk was higher for voyages to Saint Petersburg, for example, than for voyages that only led along the southern Baltic coast, partly because of the much worse weather in the Gulf of Finland. It was not only in the nineteenth century but already in the first half of the eighteenth century that the long voyages of the Spanish, Portuguese, and East Indian companies to the West and East Indies were insured at significantly lower premiums than, for example, voyages to the Mediterranean area, which was imperiled by pirates. Distance, if at all, should therefore be regarded as a rather secondary factor influencing the respective premium rate, as was already the case in earlier centuries. In contrast, wars and, until the Invasion of Algiers of 1830 by the French, the Barbary and other pirate risks in the Mediterranean area played a decisive role in determining the level of premiums in the Hamburg marine insurance market. The latter in particular drove up quotations for voyages to the Iberian Peninsula – especially beyond Cádiz – and the Mediterranean, as Hamburg had neither the military or political means to contain them nor the possibility of maintaining an extensive convoy system. The danger of piracy in the Mediterranean area was a permanent factor of negative influence until the

Conclusions

275

1820s. By then it was even increased by attacks in the wake of the War of the Greek Independence.7 The numerous wars that Hamburg sought to avoid through its policy of neutrality also had a major influence on the development of premium quotations. With regard to the wars, a distinction must be made between the major European conflicts and regional disruptions. In the former, Hamburg was sometimes even able to gain advantages for its trade and transport business, and therefore also for the necessary insurance, due to its consistent policy of neutrality. This had been possible even though many of the major European conflicts of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries were reflected in rising marine insurance premiums, especially when the Channel region was affected as a passage to the south and the Baltic Sea area – as in the Ochakov Affair of 1791 or during the Crimean War. As a rule, however, the acts of war taking place in the immediate vicinity of Hamburg were far-reaching, especially the British blockades of the Elbe during the Coalition Wars, the cordoning off of Hamburg during the Continental Blockade and the Danish blockade of the Elbe during the conflicts over Schleswig-Holstein at the end of the 1840s. In the wake of these events, not only did premium rates rise, but the quotation of premiums was even temporarily suspended altogether, i.e. in the end, marine insurance business collapsed to a large extent, if not completely. Due to the city’s policy of neutrality, other wars or diplomatic-military conflicts did not play a comparably decisive role for Hamburg, and could even have a favourable effect on the marine insurance business, since Hamburg managed to attract parts of the transport business from London or Amsterdam to the Elbe during these war years. This is shown by the comparison with Amsterdam, for which Spooner analyses the war events of the 1770s and early 1780s as influencing factors for marine insurance premiums.8 If one compares the premium quotations on the Amsterdam marine insurance market for the Hamburg destination and those on the Hamburg market for Amsterdam, the beginning of the war in North America is only noticeable in Amsterdam, but not in Hamburg, in the rate of the insurance premiums (see Graph C-1). At this time, a shift in business from Amsterdam to Hamburg was probably the most appropriate option, since the passage between Amsterdam and Hamburg could then be insured in Hamburg at much lower cost than in Amsterdam. As no further data are available for the Amsterdam marine insurance market to this day, no further comparisons are necessary. 7 Vacalopoulos, “Piracy”. 8 Spooner, Risks at Sea, 248.

276

Conclusions

Whereas wars and the threat of pirate attacks in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were one reason for the rising of premium rates, their disappearance since the 1820s and 1830s became an aspect in the long-term decline in premiums. Incidentally, this was already the case in 1802, the year of peace, when “the cessation of the insurance premium against the peril of war … meant great savings for shipowners and merchants.”9 The increasing safety on the world’s oceans, guaranteed in particular by the Royal Navy in the post-Napoleonic era, had such a major influence on the further development of premiums that distances – formulated somewhat exaggeratedly – appear to have played almost no role any more. This also and especially applies to intercontinental traffic. Even for voyages to Australia, to give an extreme example of distance, the premium towards the end of the 1850s was only just over 2 percent, just over a third more than the annual average premium across all destinations published by the Hamburg marine insurance companies. Particularly from the perspective of the nineteenth century, a special influence of technical progress on a decreasing risk of shipping and therefore on the sinking of marine insurance premiums is obvious.10 In the eighteenth century, however, a relatively stable level can be observed, as technology was being kept on a constant stage.11 One can see their rise and fall according to the seasons, but apart from a few brief fluctuations, they did not tend to fall at any time up to the Seven Years’ War. It was not until the following decades that summer premiums began to fall slightly for voyages in the North Sea, to Northwestern Europe and to the Iberian Peninsula. Yet, this finding cannot be observed for other destinations or for winter premiums. With the beginning of the Coalition Wars in 1792, this short phase of falling premiums was over again, despite the increasing pressure of competition due to the existence of more and more insurance companies.12 In the literature to date it is assumed that only since the end of the 1830s a steady downward movement of the average premium rate [set in], which becomes all the more apparent the more the influence of technical progress becomes apparent…. If one compares the development of the average premium rate with the development of the number of

9 10 11 12

Pohl, “Beziehungen Hamburgs,” 96 note 124. Cf. Williams and Armstrong, “Technological Advances”. Meyer, Wechselbeziehungen, S 38. Kiesselbach, “Entwicklung,” 52 and 60.

Conclusions

277

steamships in German ports, a negative correlation between the two figures can be established.13 Moreover, the differences between summer and winter premium rates would have been significantly reduced,14 which can be clearly confirmed by the analyses in Chapters 5 to 9. However, it is very uncertain to what extent the decrease in insurance premiums can be attributed to technical progress, especially since around 1880 almost 80 percent of all total breakdowns for steamships and only a good 20 percent for sailing vessels still occurred.15 In addition, there is another aspect that should not be neglected: [A]s much as it is justified that the improvements in shipping and transport reduce premiums in the same proportion, it is generally the case that premium reductions have always been far ahead of the improvements. The excessive competition in the transport insurance business does not allow time to gather experience of the improvements. The risk associated with new inventions and experiments is not estimated, but premiums are first reduced and then it is hoped that the improvement will justify the reduction.16 The above studies suggest a different view in general: while the slight fall in average premium quotations since the 1860s can certainly be seen in connection with the increased use of steamships, which were built ever larger since the 1850s, this is by no means a compelling reason for the period up to the end of the 1850s. As Graph 4-2 already shows, it should rather be noted that, after the peaks of the early nineteenth century, annual average premiums fell most sharply in the years between 1814 and around 1830, while after that – apart from the crisis year 1848 – they only continued to decline by very small steps. The reasons for this can by no means be found in the technical progress of steam navigation, which did not yet play a decisive role in those years. However, it is not only changes in shipbuilding technology that were responsible for this development but also the technical advances in communication, which made it possible to calculate premiums more cheaply, and the intensified competition in the marine insurance markets.17 Essentially the 13 14 15 16 17

Meyer, Wechselbeziehungen, 39. Ibid., 40. Ibid., S. 41; Schües, Geschichte, 63–64. Herzog, Transportversicherung, 90. Meyer, Wechselbeziehungen, 40.

278

Conclusions

same applies to the former as to steam navigation: the decisive advance – the introduction of electric telegraphy – only began well after the fall in premiums between 1814 and 1830. The fact that the faster and safer communication provided by electric telegraphy then encouraged the further, slight fall in quotations cannot be denied, but an initial spark cannot be attributed to it and its predecessor, optical telegraphy. The competition in the marine insurance markets was probably much more momentous: [T]he founding boom in insurance business that accompanied the growing expansion of trade and shipping at the end of the eighteenth century had created a competitive situation, which, due to the concessions made by the insurers, made even premium rates for voyages in winter seem comparatively affordable contrasted with earlier times.18 Although this development was also accelerated again in the 1860s, its influence on the reduction of insurance premiums cannot be ignored, especially if the contemporary statements about competition in the Hamburg insurance market quoted above are taken into account. Ultimately, at least in the first half of the nineteenth century, competition in the market as a whole appears to have been more important than technical progress, but it is probable that the absence of wars and the end of piracy were the most relevant of the influencing factors in the long-term and lasting fall in premiums after 1815. Seasonal weather conditions, wars, and piracy can be regarded as the most significant factors influencing the premiums offered and paid in the Hamburg insurance market. Compared with these three factors, which are crucial for Hamburg’s marine insurance market, others are less important: neither distance nor technical progress in maritime transport and communication played a decisive role in the development of the premium rate quotations. In the case of technical progress, insurers in the first half of the nineteenth century often even rated the risk of a voyage on a steamship higher than on a sailing vessel. It was not technical progress that caused the average premium quotations on the Hamburg marine insurance market to fall in the long term since the late 1820s, but the averted dangers of piracy and naval warfare. It was not until the 1860s, and especially then in the 1870s and 1880s that technical progress in shipbuilding and steam propulsion as well as in electric telegraphy – especially with the commissioning of the first submarine cables to overseas – was perceptible in the then only very moderately declining premiums. This is without doubt 18

Umbach, See- und Transportversicherung, 195–196, according to Gerstenberger and Welke, Sozialgeschichte, 15.

Conclusions

279

due to the fact, although not directly demonstrable in detail, that the improving quality of shipbuilding, which was still a traditional craft, contributed to reducing the risk. As the construction of vessels became increasingly stable – also before the iron hull – so the impact of seasonal weather fluctuations were no longer as striking as they had been in the eighteenth century. This improved quality was also documented in Hamburg, following the example of Lloyd’s in London, and thus made public. This information about the vessels to be insured then added, like the increasing competition among the various insurance companies, to the reduction in premium rates in the nineteenth century. Eventually, it should be pointed out that the adaptation of the legal framework conditions, which in the eighteenth century with the Ordnung of 1731 and in the nineteenth century with the Allgemeine Plan of 1847 provided legal certainty and ensured a ‘modern’ business activity in keeping with the times. Whether and to what extent the legal framework conditions can be regarded as influencing factors on the premium rates must, however, be left open here due to the lack of meaningful source references. The fact that the legal certainty created had a stabilising effect on the marine insurance market of the respective era is surely not to be disputed, however. These results in the premium development on the Hamburg marine insurance market, which, after a relatively high continuity in the eighteenth century, is characterised by a clear drop in the average figures of the costs of the risk since the end of the 1820s, apart from the numerous peaks resulting from the frequent war actions. This was accompanied by a growth in insured values and premiums received that was just as significant as that which is evident above all for the insurance companies, rather than for private underwriters, whose numbers declined. From the 1830s, Hamburg thus experienced a remarkable upswing in its marine insurance market – despite the naysayers’ cries – which neither external nor internal crises were able to harm in the long term. Quite the contrary: both the crisis following the Great Fire of 1842, when the insurance business even had to be outsourced to London, and the international trade crisis of 1857, which provided the initial impetus for internal business reforms in the 1860s, strengthened the marine insurance business in the long run. How relevant was the Hamburg insurance market in an international comparison? This question can certainly not be answered conclusively from the Hamburg perspective alone, but it can at least be estimated on the basis of the developments shown in this study. At no time in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was Hamburg the leading marine insurance market in Europe. In this respect, the Hanseatic City was placed far behind Amsterdam in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and London thereafter. However, since

280

Conclusions

the seventeenth century Hamburg had become the leading, and at that time the only, marine insurance market in Europe to the north-east of Amsterdam. There, as already mentioned, the institution of marine insurance was established for the first time in the former area of the Hanseatic League, while in the two remaining Hanseatic Cities of, Bremen and Lübeck smaller marine insurance markets only came into existence much later. Until the 1860s, Hamburg remained the most important marine insurance market in the whole of Northeastern Europe, while local developments in the Baltic Sea and Scandinavia lagged for decline. It was not until the 1850s, when foreign and overseas insurance companies began to establish themselves in Hamburg and to compete ever more fiercely with domestic companies, that Hamburg’s position in this region was somewhat relativised, particularly since in the 1860s at the latest, when separate marine insurance markets began to develop in numerous ports along the Baltic and Scandinavian coasts. Both competitive situations led to a gradual reform of Hamburg’s marine insurance business from the 1860s onwards, so that Hamburg again suffered no losses but was able to expand without disruption. However, it was no longer the only significant provider of marine insurance in Northeastern Europe. That Hamburg was and continued to be one of the most important marine insurance markets in the whole of Europe throughout the nineteenth century is unchallenged. The premium quotations, especially those of the nineteenth century, are evidence of the expansion of the Hamburg marine insurance market – ultimately over the entire economically relevant world – on the basis of the increasing number of recorded destinations. Around the middle of the nineteenth century – even before the breakthrough of technical progress in shipbuilding, steam propulsion, and telegraphy – it was possible to insure voyages to Australia, East Asia, or California in Hamburg as it had been possible before only in London or Amsterdam. And such insurances for far off intercontinental destinations were sold at premiums that had been customary for vicinal ports on the Atlantic coast in the eighteenth century. The portion of voyages in the total marine insurance business in Hamburg cannot be estimated, of course. But the simple quotation alone, i.e. the possibility of taking out such a policy, is proof not only of the quantitative growth of the Hamburg marine insurance market mentioned above but also of its simultaneous geographical expansion in the early industrial era and emerging world economy. In the second half of the nineteenth century – and a look not least at its marine insurance market demonstrates this – Hamburg did indeed become a port of global relevance. In this sense, the study of the Hamburg marine insurance market can also be understood as a contribution to a global maritime history.

appendix 1

The Geographic Range of the Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current, 1736 to 1859 table a1-1

Hamburg premium quotations, 1736–1762

Atlantic

Mediterranean

Baltic

Holland

Málaga, Marseille, Genoa, Leghorn Apulia, Venice, Zante

Gothenburg, The Sound Danzig, Königsberg, Stockholm Saint Petersburg

Dunkirk, Calais, Rouen London, Hull, Exon Bay of Bourgneuf (“Bucht von Frankreich”) Bristol, Ireland Portugal, Spain on this side of Gibraltar Greenland, – whaling (“auf dem Walfisch-Fang”) – sealing (“auf dem Robben-Fang”) Arkhangelsk Bergen, Trondheim

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_013

282 table a1-2

appendix 1 Hamburg premium quotations, 1762–1820

Atlantic

Mediterranean

Baltic

Holland and Zeeland

Málaga, Alicante, Valencia, Mallorca

Dunkirk, Rouen, Brest (until 1781)

Barcelona, Cette, Marseille, Toulon Genoa, Mentone, Oneglia, Leghornb Naples, Messina, Gallipoli (in Apulia)c

Gothenburg, Varberg, Elsinore (until 1781), Copenhagen Stockholm, St Petersburgd Reval, Riga, and Courlandd Königsberg/Pillau, Danzig, Pomerania, Memel (since 1782)

London, Hull, Newcastle upon Tyne Exon/Topsham, Plymouth, Falmouth Bristol, Liverpool, Glasgow, Ireland Nantes, La Rochelle, Charente (until 1781), Bordeaux, Brest (since 1782) Bayonne, Bilbao, San Sebastián Porto, Lisbon, Setúbal Cádiz, Sanlúcar de Barrameda, Faro, Canary Islands Greenland and Davis Strait(s)a Arkhangelsk, Kola Peninsula Kristiansand, Trondheim since 1782: Shetland Islands or Shetland(s) (Hittland), Bergen, East Norway Jutland, Frisia, Bremen, Eider since 1804: St Thomas, North American ports

Venice, Trieste, Cephalonia, Zante

a kept separate until 1781 as “fishing” (“auf dem Fischfang”) and “sealing and fishing” (“auf dem Robben- & Fischfang”). b separate destination between 1782 and 1803. c separate destination since 1782. d since 1782 both destinations appeared in the price current together as one (without mentioning Courland).

283

The Geographic Range of the Premium Quotations table a1-3

Hamburg premium quotations, 1821–1834

Atlantic

Mediterranean

Baltic

TransAtlantic

Africa – Asia

Bremen, Emden, Leer

Gibraltar, Málaga (until 1826)

Gothenburg, Copenhagen

Amsterdam, Rotterdam

Alicante, Barcelona, Málaga (since 1827) Cette, Marseille as far afield as Leghorn (until 1826) Messina

Rostock, Stettin Danzig, Königsberg

North America, east coast New Orleans

Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius Bengal, Batavia Manila, Canton

Antwerp as far afield as Le Havrea

Hull, Leith Glasgow, Greenock through the (Forth and Clyde) Canal

Naples, Gallipoli (in Apulia),c Leghorn (since 1827)

London Portsmouth, Plymouth

Trieste, Venice Zante, Patra, Smyrna

Bristol, Liverpool, Ireland Bordeaux, Nantes Bilbao, Bayonne as far afield as La Coruña Porto, Lisbon

Odessad

Cádiz, Seville since 1827: Gibraltar Madeira, Tenerife Tönning, Husum, West Jutland East Jutland Bergen, Kristiansand, Kristiania Trondheim, Kristiansund

Havana

Stockholm, St Thomas Riga St Petersburg Santo Domingo (Cap-Haïtien, Port-auPrince) Curaçao since 1827: Tampico, Veracruz La Guaira Brazil Rio de la Plata since 1827: Valparaíso

284 table a1-3

appendix 1 Hamburg premium quotations, 1821–1834 (cont.)

Atlantic

Mediterranean

Baltic

TransAtlantic

Africa – Asia

Arkhangelsk Icelandb (until 1826) Greenland** a b c d

separate destination from 1824 to 1826. going there and return. no quotation available. separate destination since 1827.

table a1-4

Hamburg premium quotations, 1835–1859

Atlantic

Mediterranean

Baltic

TransAtlantic

Africa – Asia

Hull, Leith, Goole

Málaga, Sevilleb

coast of Scotland

Alicante, Barcelonab

Halmstad,a Gothenburg Copenhagen

North America, east coast St Thomas, Porto Ricoe

London

Cette, Marseille

Wismar, Rostock, Santo Domingoe Stralsund

Bristol, Liverpool

Genoa, Leghorn, Naples

Bremen, Emden, Leer Amsterdam, Rotterdam, since 1843 Holland Antwerp, Ostend, Ghent, since 1843: Belgium Le Havre

Messina

Stettin,d La Guaira, Königsberg, Puerto Cabelloe Danzig Riga, Stockholma Havana, Matanzas Saint Petersburg Veracruz, Tampicoe

Cape of Good Hope Batavia, Singapore, Bengal (since 1848) Bengal (until 1847), Canton/ China, Manila since 1854 Australia

Gallipoli (in Apulia) Trieste, Venice, Zante

New Orleans, Mobile

Smyrna, Çesme

since 1848 Galveston

The Geographic Range of the Premium Quotations table a1-4

285

Hamburg premium quotations, 1835–1859 (cont.)

Atlantic

Rouen Bordeaux, Nantes, Bayonne (since 1843) Bayonne,a Bilbao Porto, Lisbon, since 1843 Portugal Madeira, Tenerife Cádiz, Gibraltar Tönning, Husum, west coast of Jutland (since 1843) Ringkøbing,a Ribe,a Varde,a since 1843 Agger Channel, east coast of Jutland Kristiania, Bergen Trondheim, Kristiansund Tromsø, Hammerfest Greenlandc Arkhangelsk Aalborg,a Randersa

Mediterranean

Baltic

TransAtlantic

Africa – Asia

Brazil Buenos Aires, Montevideo Valparaíso, Lima since 1854 California

a until 1842. b listed as one 1843 destination called “Málaga bis Barcelona” (“Málaga as far afield as Barcelona”) since 1843. c quoted until 1847; until 1842: there and return back. d since 1843 separate destination called “Ostseeküste bis Stettin” (“Baltic coast as far afield as Stettin”). e since 1843: listed as one destination “other West Indies” (“übriges Westindien”), Veracruz and Tampico were separated again since 1848.

286

appendix 1

table a1-5

Lübeck premium quotations for Baltic Sea ports, 1736–1859

1736–1762 to …

1762–1820 to & from …

1) Stralsund, Stettin, Pomerania; Sweden, 2) Danzig, Königsberg, Memel Danzig, 3) Stockholm, Königsberg Northern ports; 4) Västervik, Kalmar, Karls-krona, Åhus Riga, Reval 1) Riga, Reval, Pernau; 2) Libau, Windau, Ösel St Petersburg Narva, Saint Petersburg, Wiborg, Helsinki

1821–1834 to …

1835–1842 from & to …

1843–1859 from & to …

Copenhagen Stettin, Danzig, Königsberg

Copenhagen Danzig, Königsberg

Copenhagen Danzig, Königsberg

Stockholm, Riga, Pernau

Stockholm, Riga, Libau

Stockholm

Memel, Libau, Windau Saint Reval, Saint Petersburg, Åbo Petersburg (until 1826) since 1827: Finnish ports Finnish ports

Riga Saint Petersburg Finnish ports

From 21 April 1820 to 2 August 1821, premium rates were quoted for these three destinations only: Stettin, Königsberg, Memel, Riga, Reval, Saint Petersburg. table a1-6

Other Baltic Sea ports’ premium quotations, 1821–1859

Copenhagen 1821–1834 to …

Flensburg 1835–1842 1820–1834 from & to … to …

Kiel Stettin, Danzig, Königsberg Stockholm, Riga, Reval, Saint Petersburg

Stettin, Danzig

St Thomas [St Croix]

Kiel & Rostock, Wismar, since Neustadt 1843 also Stettin 1835–1842 1835–1842 1835–1842 1843–1859 from & to … from & to … from & to … to … St Thomas, Copenhagen East St Croix England Baltic ports London, Holland, Holland Bay of Bourgneuf

East England Holland, Belgium French west coast

287

The Geographic Range of the Premium Quotations table a1-6

Other Baltic Sea ports’ premium quotations, 1821–1859 (cont.)

Copenhagen 1821–1834 to …

Flensburg 1835–1842 1820–1834 from & to … to …

Kiel & Rostock, Wismar, since Neustadt 1843 also Stettin 1835–1842 1835–1842 1835–1842 1843–1859 from & to … from & to … from & to … to …

Iceland Saint Thomas, St Thomas, Saint Croix Saint Croix India

1835–1842 from & to …

Saint Petersburg, Baltic Sea since 1835 also Riga ports as far afield as Memel 1821–1834 1821–1834 1835–1842 1843–59 from & to … to … from & to … to …

Saint Petersburg

English Channel

Gothenburg Danzig, Stettin

Rostock, Wismar Northern Francea Portugal

Mediterranean Bergen Sea Trondheim

Stockholm, since 1835 also Gävle 1821–1834 to …

1835–1842 from & to …

Northern France

Mediterranean Sea

North American east coast

Gothenburg

Holland Antwerp as far afield as Le Havre / Northern France London, Leith

Havana

Danzig, Stettin, Königsberg

Stettin

Brazil Copenhagen, Gothenburg East Norway, Norway Bergen

Mediterranean Sea

288 table a1-6

appendix 1 Other Baltic Sea ports’ premium quotations, 1821–1859 (cont.)

Stockholm, since 1835 also Gävle 1821–1834 to …

1835–1842 from & to …

Gothenburg

1835–1842 from & to …

Saint Petersburg, Baltic Sea since 1835 also Riga ports as far afield as Memel 1821–1834 1821–1834 1835–1842 1843–59 from & to … to … from & to … to … Liverpool Nantes, Bordeauxb Porto, Lisbon, Cádiza Málaga, Barcelona Cette, Marseille (as far afield as) Leghorn Gallipoli (in Apulia) Trieste

a “auf Eisen” (transport of iron) b differentiated for the transport of sugar, wine, and timber until 1823 From 21 April 1820 to 2 August 1821, the insurance price current lists premium quotations for voyages from Wismar and Rostock (to Stockholm, to Leith, London and Liverpool, as well as to Porto and Lisbon), from Stettin (to Saint Petersburg and Riga, to Copenhagen and London, to Liverpool and Bordeaux, to Lisbon, to Cette and Marseille, as well as to Gallipoli and Trieste) and from Saint Petersburg (to Stockholm, Copenhagen, Portugal, into the Mediterranean, as well as to North America).

289

The Geographic Range of the Premium Quotations table a1-7

Other European ports’ premium quotations, 1782–1842

Arkhangelsk London 1782–1820 1782–1834 to … to …

Amsterdam Ostend 1782–1842 1782–1791 to … to …

Amsterdam, London Bay of Bourgneuf

Bordeaux 1782–1842 to …

England, French Canal Region

Gothenburg, Copenhagen (until 1820)

Portugal 1782–1842 to …

Mediterranean 1782–1842 to … Copenhagen (until 1820)

Pomerania, Königsberg, Memel

Pomerania, Königsberg, Memel

Bay of Bourgneuf

Lübeck, Pomerania as far afield as Königsberg

Baltic Sea as Lübeck, far afield as Pomerania as Königs-berg far afield as Königsberg

Stockholm, Saint Petersburg (until 1820)

Riga, Saint Petersburg (until 1820)

Bristol, Liverpool, Glasgow, Ireland

Riga, Saint Petersburg, Stockholm (until 1820)

Riga, Saint Petersburg (until 1820)

Lisbon

Portugal, Spain as far afield as Cádiz

Barcelona as far afield as Leghorn

Spanish Mediterranean coast

Riga, Saint Petersburg, Stockholm (until 1820)

French Mediterranean coast Italian coast as far afield as Leghorn & Messina Ancona, Venice, Trieste From 21 April 1820 to 2 August 1821, the insurance price current lists premium rate quotations for passages from Arkhangelsk (to Amsterdam, to London and Leith, to Bordeaux, to Lisbon and Porto, to Barcelona, Marseille and Leghorn as well as to North America), from Bergen (to Saint Petersburg, Riga and Stockholm, to Gothenburg and Copenhagen, to Amsterdam, into the Bay of Bourgneuf and to Bilbao, to Setúbal, to Barcelona, Naples and Leghorn, as well as to Trieste and Ancona), from London (to Danzig and Königsberg, to Riga and Saint Petersburg as well as to Trieste), from Amsterdam (to the Baltic Sea as far as Königsberg or to Saint Petersburg, respectively, as well as Suriname), from Bordeaux (to Flensburg and Copenhagen, to Rostock and Wismar as far as Stettin, as well as to Riga, Stockholm and Saint Petersburg) and from Odessa (to Marseille as well as to Porto and Lisbon).

290 table a1-8

London 1821–34 to … Gothenburg Trieste

appendix 1 Other European ports’ premium quotations, 1821–1859

Great Britain, since 1836 London & East England 1834–1842 from & to …

Liverpool & Ireland 1836–1842 from & to …

Bergen & Trondheim 1835–1859 from & to …

Arkhangelsk

Baltic ports North America, Caribbean Havana, Veracruz, New Orleans Brazil, Buenos Aires Valparaíso, Lima Central America

Baltic ports Baltic ports Amsterdam North America, Bay of Bourgneuf London Caribbean Veracruz, Bilbao Lisbon Tampico Barcelona, Marseille, Leghorn Trieste, Ancona Setúbal (1843–53)

1821–1834 to …

appendix 2

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current, 1736 to 1859 table a2-1

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the North Atlantic, 1736–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

North Atlantic

I Arkhangelsk

II Greenland I (sealing)

III Greenland II (whaling)/Iceland

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762

3.3281 3.8929 4.3875 3.2500 3.1667 3.5000 3.2857 2.8333 3.0833 2.9688 3.6250 3.8333 3.4861 3.0391 2.6719 2.1875 2.3462 2.4474 2.1667 2.0469 2.0938 2.4107 1.8125 1.6667 1.8214 2.2344 2.4412

4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.7500 3.7500 3.9000 3.7500 3.5000 3.5000 3.8281 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.6667 3.8571 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000

5.0000 3.7857 4.5000 3.5714 4.5000 4.1429 3.8750 3.8000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.6563 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004510265_014

292 table a2-1

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the North Atlantic (cont.)

North Atlantic

I Arkhangelsk

II Greenland I (sealing)

III Greenland II (whaling)/Iceland

1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796

2.6250 3.6607 2.1833 2.6563 3.0000 2.6250 3.2708 3.1786 3.2045 3.4063 4.5455 4.0250 5.0000 4.3365 3.1389 4.9531 3.9737 4.7308 4.7625 3.4833 3.9643 4.2656 4.8281 3.7250 5.0750 3.3173 4.4444 2.5417 2.2083 1.7222 5.5000 3.3125 3.8750 2.5833

3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.4167 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 4.0000 3.5000 5.0000 5.0000

4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 4.5000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 4.6667 5.0000 5.0000 5.1667 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-1

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the North Atlantic (cont.)

North Atlantic

1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830

293

I Arkhangelsk

II Greenland I (sealing)

III Greenland II (whaling)/Iceland

7.2500 1.8036 2.2500 1.5000 3.3929 2.1750

5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000

2.5000 6.8000 11.1667 9.5000

5.5000 5.5000 5.0000

17.0000 2.6731 3.6618 4.8438 6.6000 6.1250 3.5278 3.4000 3.6250 3.8125 2.3750 2.7000 2.0000 2.5357 2.6250 2.7500 2.6429

5.5000 6.0000 6.0000 4.7500 4.6667 4.7000 5.5000 5.5000 6.0000

5.0000

5.0000 5.8333

294 table a2-1

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the North Atlantic (cont.)

North Atlantic

I Arkhangelsk

II Greenland I (sealing)

1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1736–1807 average 1814–1859

2.4750 1.8214 2.3438 2.3750 2.5000 2.0357 2.0938 2.0893 1.8542 1.8125 1.5625 1.5000 1.9773 1.8750 1.8281 1.6071 1.8333 3.0000 2.2917 1.5417 1.7813 1.4464 1.4464

5.0000 5.5000 5.0000 5.5000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000

1.6000 1.4375 1.5000 1.3542 3.4998 2.8495

III Greenland II (whaling)/Iceland

1.5000

3.6871 –

4.6738 –

295

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-2

Arkhangelsk

1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812

Arkhangelsk premium quotations, 1782–1834, in percent (annual average premium rates)

I Amsterdam & London

II Bay of Bourgneuf

III Lisbon

IV Mediterranean

3.2083 3.6750 4.1250 5.6000 4.5500 5.6000 2.5682 5.0833 3.9167 3.3333 4.5000 7.5000 4.8000 5.5000 6.1000 6.2500 4.5000 2.7500

3.6389 3.9500 6.1250 6.2000 4.8000 6.3000 4.3750 5.0833 4.4167 3.8333 5.5000 8.5000 6.0000 6.5000 5.7143 7.0000 5.6250 4.2500

4.0278 4.5000 6.1250 6.7000 4.9500 6.9000 5.1250 5.1667 4.5833 3.6250 5.5000 9.0000 7.1000 7.5000 9.0000 7.7500 6.6250 4.7500

5.6944 6.0000 7.2500 7.5000 7.8333 7.8000 6.0000 6.0833 5.6667 4.3333 6.5000 11.0000 7.5000 8.5000 10.2000 13.2500 7.8000 5.2500

5.0833 2.4500

6.1667 2.8750

6.9167 3.4500

10.3333 4.9500

2.7500 8.8438 14.0000 10.8333

3.5000 10.7813 14.0000 13.1667

3.7500 12.6563 17.6000 16.0000

5.0000 17.2188 20.8000 18.5000

296 table a2-2

Arkhangelsk

appendix 2 Arkhangelsk premium quotations, 1782–1834, in percent (cont.)

I Amsterdam & London

1813 1814 17.0000 1815 8.3125 1816 6.8333 1817 1818 5.0000 1819 1820 6.1250 1821 4.0000 1822 3.7917 1823 4.1000 1824 2.5000 1825 2.7000 1826 2.0000 1827 2.5357 1828 2.8056 1829 2.8571 1830 2.7500 1831 2.4750 1832 1.8929 1833 2.1250 1834 2.0357 average 1782–1807 5.3133 average 1814–1834 3.7037

II Bay of Bourgneuf

III Lisbon

IV Mediterranean

19.0000 15.5000 8.8333

20.0000 11.6667 9.6667

22.5000 15.3333 12.6667

6.0000

7.0000

9.0000

1.8281 1.3750 2.7143

7.8750 6.0000 4.8000 2.0000 2.1667 3.2500 2.6000 3.1429 3.6667 3.4286 3.2500 2.6750 1.8750 3.7500 2.5714 7.0542 5.3360

8.8750

6.1792 –

8.7901 –

297

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-3

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in Norway, 1736–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Norway

I Bergen & the South

II Trondheim & the North

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767

2.0125 2.4063 2.3646 2.4167 2.4286 2.5000 2.3021 2.2604 2.5990 2.4545 2.5500 2.7813 3.1458 3.0417 2.9167 2.8542 2.6979 2.5104 2.5000 2.3958 2.6875 2.5833 2.3542 2.3958 2.8542 2.2813 2.1458 2.5921 2.3333 2.0521 2.1042 2.2125

3.9375 2.8542 3.1944 2.5750 2.8333 2.5000

III Tromsø & Hammerfest

298 table a2-3

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in Norway (cont.)

Norway

I Bergen & the South

II Trondheim & the North

1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800

2.3542 2.1667 2.2813 2.1458 2.2500 2.3750 2.3977 2.2813 2.3750 2.1979 2.3636 2.1979 2.4792 2.0455 1.7917 2.0875 2.6705 3.0000 1.8409 2.9625 2.6591 2.3229 2.3125 4.7500 2.1875 2.8750 2.5625 2.2083 1.7917 2.6354 2.6458 2.5000 2.1250

2.2222 2.1667 2.8333 2.0833 2.5870 2.5000 2.3958 2.5938 2.8438 2.6979 2.7000 3.3021 2.7813 2.8636 2.4861 2.5750 2.5833 3.6071 2.8194 3.4868 2.6190 2.2500 2.5104 2.4479 2.3021 2.9583 2.5729 2.0139 2.6042 2.5313 2.6875 2.5000 2.1250

III Tromsø & Hammerfest

299

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-3

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in Norway (cont.)

Norway

I Bergen & the South

II Trondheim & the North

1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833

3.1354 2.0521

3.4271 2.3542

1.8125 1.9000 1.8125 2.3571

2.0625 2.2750 2.2500 2.8571

7.0000 2.7727 2.5938 2.5938 2.2159 2.0208 1.5703 1.7727 2.5938 1.6667 2.3125 2.1875 2.4830 2.0227 1.7273 1.3333 1.2750 1.1750 1.2250 1.2639

7.7500 3.3295 3.2188 3.2708 2.1818 2.4167 1.8906 1.3229 2.4167 2.0500 2.8229 2.8636 3.0563 2.9886 2.2159 1.4500 1.5625 1.1375 1.5250 1.5139

III Tromsø & Hammerfest

300 table a2-3

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in Norway (cont.)

Norway

I Bergen & the South

II Trondheim & the North

III Tromsø & Hammerfest

1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1736–1807 average 1814–1859

1.3750 1.2875 1.2250 1.2750 1.1719 1.3281 1.2000 1.0156 0.9444 1.1250 1.3542 1.0064 1.1250 0.9125 1.5625 0.9375 0.8250 1.0104 0.8125 0.6667 0.7313 0.8750 0.8438 0.8068 0.7222 0.7708 2.4316 1.5373

1.7000 1.6375 1.5875 1.6125 1.5313 1.5938 1.0261 0.9464 1.0446 1.3542 1.3538 1.2431 1.4375 1.2245 2.1250 1.3750 1.2308 1.4319 1.1813 1.2500 1.2615 1.4933 1.3182 1.1313 0.9107 0.8125 2.6527 1.8652

2.1250 1.7656 1.6406 1.6071 1.1000 1.1667 1.1667 1.1875 1.5786 1.4673 1.6036 1.8807 1.1591 2.5000 2.4063 1.4447 1.3438 1.3906 1.4063 1.2225 1.4286 0.9994 1.2578 1.1607 1.2500 – 1.4904

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-4

301

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations from the German North Sea Coast to the Sound, 1736–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

North Sea Coast to the Sound

I Sound (Gothenberg)

II from the Ems to Jutland

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767

1.7500 2.3854 2.1875 2.3958 2.2976 2.1591 1.9271 1.7841 2.1944 2.1023 2.3250 2.6136 2.6771 2.4167 2.1875 2.3542 2.0625 1.9271 2.0000 2.0104 1.8438 2.0417 2.0104 3.2083 2.7083 2.1354 2.1250 2.3000 2.0833 2.0833 2.0313 2.2250

2.2083 1.3542 1.3646 1.4167 1.2396 1.4792

III West coast of Jutland

IV East coast of Jutland

302 table a2-4

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations (cont.)

North Sea Coast to the Sound

I Sound (Gothenberg)

II from the Ems to Jutland

1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800

2.4635 2.2917 2.2292 2.3864 2.3750 2.5521 2.4886 2.5521 2.5313 2.2292 2.6042 2.5208 2.4271 2.3864 2.1806 2.0875 2.7045 3.4167 2.9271 2.8000 2.6307 2.4583 2.3646 2.3542 2.3333 2.9583 2.6563 3.2188 2.4063 2.6771 2.6250 2.5000 2.6771

1.6042 1.5000 1.3646 1.5729 1.5208 1.5417 1.4479 1.4688 1.6875 1.6563 1.8542 1.8021 1.6979 1.4792 1.6563 1.4688 1.6042 2.3021 1.8854 1.8409 1.7813 1.7396 1.7552 1.5417 1.5417 1.9167 1.8229 2.4375 1.8750 1.9375 1.8438 1.7396 1.7917

III West coast of Jutland

IV East coast of Jutland

303

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-4

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations (cont.)

North Sea Coast to the Sound

I Sound (Gothenberg)

II from the Ems to Jutland

1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834

3.0625 2.0729

2.2083 1.5729

1.8125 1.6750 1.9063 3.0000

1.5625 1.8000 1.4583 2.0000

6.5000 2.4602 2.4167 2.2188 1.7188 1.7396 2.2750 2.0500 2.8438 2.2188 2.4219 2.2500 2.9271 2.2386 1.8580 1.3938 1.4125 1.1528 1.1813 1.3333 1.3403

3.1250 1.3295 1.4375 1.4375 1.1563 1.0729 1.3125 1.1818 1.5313 1.0946 1.1146 1.2252 1.1250 1.0625 1.0208 1.0994 1.1250 1.0521 0.9692 0.8243 0.9659

III West coast of Jutland

IV East coast of Jutland

0.9844 1.2500 1.6563 1.2708 1.3850 1.3750 1.8636 1.6136 1.4261 1.2313 1.3500 1.3523 1.3011 1.0556 1.1000

1.2500 1.8409 2.7708 1.8958 2.0313 1.7955 2.7045 2.3182 1.9205 1.4750 1.2778 1.0972 1.1313 1.3056 1.2083

304 table a2-4

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations (cont.)

North Sea Coast to the Sound

I Sound (Gothenberg)

II from the Ems to Jutland

III West coast of Jutland

IV East coast of Jutland

1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1736–1807 average 1814–1859

1.3750 1.3438 1.3194 1.3203 1.4297 1.3125 1.2031 1.0556 1.2135 0.8750 1.0139 1.1198 0.9625 1.5625 1.0125 0.8625 0.8500 0.8625 0.8313 0.7625 0.8688 0.8438 0.8011 0.6563 0.7375 2.3675 1.5684

1.0004 0.9696 0.8977 0.8675 0.8433 0.8181 0.7422 0.5598 0.6096 0.6244 0.5830 0.6683 0.6673 0.8438 0.6554 0.5240 0.6410 0.6475 0.6181 0.5114 0.6540 0.5506 0.6338 0.4943 0.5013 1.6965 0.9432

1.0375 0.9563 1.0625 1.0139 1.1319 1.1688 1.0486 0.5139 1.0104 1.1042 0.8542 1.0208 0.8625 1.3125 0.9750 0.8250 0.9948 0.8125 0.7250 0.7250 0.7938 0.6938 0.8011 0.6528 0.7188 – 1.0758

1.3000 1.2375 1.1944 1.2656 1.3750 1.2500 1.1172 0.9844 1.3229 1.2813 1.1042 1.1875 0.9313 1.5313 0.9750 0.8125 0.8920 0.8125 0.7875 0.7563 0.8625 0.7063 0.8295 0.6944 0.7917 – 1.3006

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-5

305

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Netherlands, 1736–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Netherlands

I Holland

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768

1.2125 1.3438 1.3854 1.4167 1.5104 1.4063 1.3542 1.4063 1.5833 1.4323 1.5000 1.5208 1.8438 1.3542 1.3438 1.4271 1.2604 1.2708 1.2708 1.4271 1.2917 1.4583 1.2813 1.3229 1.3958 1.3750 1.3438 1.3333 1.4896 1.3750 1.2292 1.2813 1.3542

II Belgium

306 table a2-5

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Netherlands (cont.)

Netherlands

I Holland

1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802

1.3646 1.3646 1.5313 1.4271 1.4271 1.5208 1.5000 1.5521 1.5208 1.7604 1.5521 1.6250 1.6875 1.4688 1.4271 1.6198 1.8438 1.7396 1.6136 1.5729 1.4375 1.3542 1.2813 1.2813 1.6146 1.6875 2.2813 1.7604 1.5104 2.0208 1.9875 1.9659 2.5625 1.5000

II Belgium

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-5

Netherlands

1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Netherlands (cont.)

I Holland

II Belgium

1.7500 1.8500 1.7708 2.7857

3.3750 1.4688 1.7188 1.5000 1.1042 1.0990 1.3229 1.3068 1.7083 1.2266 1.1458 1.4688 1.3490 1.2917 1.3438 1.2448 1.3021 1.1250 0.9716 0.7917 1.0341 1.0781 1.0729

1.2031 1.6818 2.2604 2.6979 1.7292 2.0625 2.1302 1.9792 1.5365 1.5938 1.6458 1.3472 1.0694 0.9861 1.2045 1.2031 1.1927

307

308 table a2-5

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Netherlands (cont.)

Netherlands

I Holland

II Belgium

1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1736–1807 average 1814–1859

0.9115 1.0000 0.9427 0.9792 0.7083 0.5573 0.7083 0.7396 0.6641 0.7917 0.8646 1.4875 1.1875 0.6719 0.8177 0.7500 0.7656 0.5990 0.8229 0.7135 0.7552 0.5573 0.5781 1.5184 1.0788

1.1364 1.2557 1.0455 1.1328 0.9094 0.7156 0.7500 0.7865 0.7841 0.8490 0.9323 1.6146 1.3203 0.9271 0.8854 0.8229 0.8229 0.7557 0.8750 0.7708 0.8177 0.6420 0.6510 – 1.2182

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-6

309

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations on the British Isles, 1736–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

British Isles

I London & East coast

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767

1.2125 1.6979 1.6354 1.9323 2.6771 2.1458 1.9583 1.8542 5.5625 3.5000 2.7917 2.3438 2.3750 1.6458 1.5625 1.6250 1.4688 1.3854 1.4375 1.6458 2.1771 2.0833 1.6979 1.8542 1.8542 1.6354 1.7917 1.6563 1.6458 1.5000 1.4792 1.5417

II South coast

IV III Northeast West coast & Ireland coast 2.1875 2.5729 2.6667 2.1071

2.5000 2.0625 1.9792 1.8438 1.7917 1.7813

3.1071 3.8333 3.7083 2.8438 2.5000 2.8021 2.1563 2.0313 2.4167 3.2500 3.5208 3.1042 2.7917 2.9167 2.5833 2.4792 2.7917 2.6667 2.5104 2.5313 2.5833 2.5104

V Scottish west coast

310 table a2-6

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations on the British Isles (cont.)

British Isles

I London & East coast

II South coast

1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800

1.6250 1.6667 1.7448 1.7292 1.7604 1.8021 1.7188 1.7604 1.8021 2.1146 3.8438 2.3854 1.7396 1.6979 1.6771 1.6979 1.7604 2.1875 1.9063 1.7727 1.7500 1.5417 1.5104 1.3438 1.3542 2.1250 2.2396 2.7813 2.1146 1.9167 2.1042 1.9063 1.9375

1.9115 1.8438 2.1042 2.0729 2.1042 2.1354 2.1250 2.1146 2.3646 2.8021 4.2500 2.8438 2.5313 2.5208 1.8750 1.9792 1.9688 2.3646 2.3646 2.1136 1.9688 1.5521 1.6354 [2.7500] 1.6146 2.2083 2.2396 2.8958 2.1146 1.9167 2.4375 2.5000 2.8125

IV III Northeast West coast & Ireland coast 2.7500 2.5521 2.7917 3.0938 2.7500 2.7813 2.7604 3.3490 3.2083 3.3333 5.6667 4.3125 3.4427 3.3125 3.0938 2.9792 2.9167 3.7083 3.8125 3.3750 3.3542 2.9688 2.8542 2.5208 2.7188 4.1667 3.9583 5.1042 4.5625 4.3333 5.2083 5.7292 4.6667

V Scottish west coast

311

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-6

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations on the British Isles (cont.)

IV III Northeast West coast & Ireland coast

British Isles

I London & East coast

II South coast

1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834

2.4479 1.6875

2.9219 2.0625

5.7917 3.8125

1.8125 1.6875 1.7240

2.1250 2.5000 2.0417

3.6250 5.3750 5.1042

4.2500 2.0114 1.7396 1.5729 1.2135 1.0323 1.1719 1.0156 1.2344 0.8620 0.9974 1.1250 0.9740 0.9557 0.8542 0.8750 0.8542 0.9271 0.8542 0.7159 0.8125

5.0000 2.2159 1.8854 1.6667 1.2240 1.1146 1.5313 1.6818 2.2448 1.3750 1.3854 1.3250 1.5682 1.3229 1.1667 1.4792 1.1875 1.1875 1.2159 1.0909 0.7500

9.7500 3.6250 3.7917 3.7396 2.6667 2.2604 2.5000 2.5341 3.2188 2.7396 2.6406 2.2273 3.1989 2.4115 2.2396 2.6563 2.8542 2.1080 1.8438 1.6198 1.9261

0.7969 1.0000 1.0625 0.7292 0.8229 0.9870 0.8217 0.9010 0.7179 0.7392 0.7396 0.8646 0.7965 0.6359 0.6674

V Scottish west coast

1.1563 1.7727 2.3021 1.3385 1.0833 1.0455 1.2375 1.0909 0.9773 0.9545 1.1023 0.9886 1.1250 0.9479 0.6563

312 table a2-6

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations on the British Isles (cont.)

British Isles

I London & East coast

1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1736–1806 average 1814–1859

0.7188 0.6901 0.8464 0.9115 0.8099 0.7448 0.7943 0.7839 0.5964 0.6198 0.5260 0.6354 0.7370 0.5885 0.6875 0.7839 0.7500 0.7354 0.6953 0.7708 0.8281 0.7292 0.8438 0.5781 0.7552 1.9393 0.9628

II South coast

IV III Northeast West coast & Ireland coast

V Scottish west coast

2.2419 1.6009

0.7005 0.6196 0.7003 0.8542 0.8073 0.9063 0.7836 0.7522 0.5964 0.6224 0.5653 0.6667 0.7368 1.1563 0.9609 0.6953 0.7385 0.6250 0.7422 0.7552 0.8073 0.8125 0.8281 0.6193 0.6979 – 0.7758

1.4602 1.4659 1.6042 1.3438 1.2813 1.1188 0.8214 0.7422 0.8854 1.0026 0.9261 1.2031 1.4688 2.0000 1.2500 1.4219 1.2969 1.2700 1.3333 1.4167 1.4167 1.4063 1.4740 0.9097 1.2102 – 1.2386

2.1042 2.1771 2.3177 2.3438 2.1250 1.8920 1.6875 1.5125 1.4271 1.6510 2.1250 1.4063 1.4948 3.7500 2.0859 1.4219 1.3073 1.2865 1.3958 1.3333 1.4271 1.2708 1.3281 1.0625 1.1250 3.3284 2.2959

313

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-7

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the French Atlantic coast, 1736–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

French Atlantic coast

I Bay

II English Channel

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768

2.0250 2.6354 2.4167 2.5260 2.7240 2.5938 2.2813 2.2396 4.3750 3.6042 3.3125 4.2500 5.2708 2.5729 2.2604 2.3542 2.0000 2.0104 2.1042 3.2500 3.7917 3.5104 5.9375 5.5000 2.9583 2.3646 2.6875 2.3750 2.4479 2.5104 2.3125 2.3906 2.4323

1.5500 1.9479 1.7760 1.8854 2.0208 1.9167 1.7083 1.7708 3.4583 2.9167 2.6979 3.2708 4.7500 1.8021 1.6042 1.7813 1.5833 1.5208 1.6458 2.2917 2.8958 2.7604 4.3333 4.5833 2.4375 1.8958 2.1042 1.9583 1.8958 1.9479 1.8958 1.8646 1.8958

III Rouen

314 table a2-7

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the French Atlantic (cont.)

French Atlantic coast

I Bay

II English Channel

1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802

2.5104 2.4688 3.0000 2.9896 2.7292 2.6563 2.9063 3.1354 2.6771 5.0625 3.2708 3.0938 2.9792 2.5000 2.6354 2.7188 3.3958 3.1771 2.8068 2.7292 2.4792 2.5208 2.1979 2.4167 3.8542 4.1250 4.7292 3.6042 3.5625 3.6875 4.5208 3.9167 4.9167 2.5729

1.8021 2.0000 2.2188 2.1354 2.0833 2.0781 2.1250 2.1250 2.0833 3.3958 2.7083 2.4271 2.1563 1.7500 1.6979 1.9375 2.4063 2.1979 1.9091 1.8958 1.7292 1.6250 1.5521 1.5938 2.2083 2.3438 2.7083 2.2813 2.1875 2.3750 3.0417 3.1354 3.8333 2.1875

III Rouen

315

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-7

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the French Atlantic (cont.)

French Atlantic coast 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836

I Bay

II English Channel

3.6875 5.3250 3.6875 4.7857

2.5625 4.9000 3.3750 4.5000

5.8750 4.2750 2.5833 2.3021 1.9271 1.8542 2.0521 2.0568 2.4896 4.4167 2.5625 2.8854 2.8438 2.4375 2.0781 2.1146 2.1146 1.7727 2.0417 1.6364 1.8068 1.8646 1.7969

4.5000 2.6750 1.9792 1.9583 1.7292 1.4792 2.1146 1.8295 2.2083 2.8750 2.1250 2.2396 2.3229 1.5313 1.5833 1.5625 1.6146 1.3611 1.7083 1.2500 1.3977 1.3333 1.3021

III Rouen

1.6146 1.5156

316 table a2-7

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the French Atlantic (cont.)

French Atlantic coast

I Bay

II English Channel

III Rouen

1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1736–1807 average 1814–1859

2.0313 2.2656 2.2240 2.0208 1.4886 1.2841 1.2917 1.3385 1.1823 1.4219 1.4531 2.3542 1.9609 1.3177 1.2969 1.2760 1.3229 1.3281 1.4010 1.2135 1.2240 1.1406 1.1146 3.9122 3.4923

1.4375 1.3807 1.2841 1.2344 1.0000 0.7875 0.8490 0.8750 0.8523 0.9271 1.0341 1.8542 1.5000 1.0417 1.0625 1.0104 1.0313 0.9375 1.0104 0.8542 0.8438 0.6705 0.7188 2.2269 1.4973

1.5114 1.1641 1.2222 0.8984 0.7864 0.6641 1.0000 1.0365 0.9830 1.1094 1.1591 2.0625 1.7031 1.1771 1.2140 1.1771 1.1771 1.0833 1.1615 0.9896 1.0208 0.8352 0.8392 – 1.1642

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-8

317

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the Iberian Atlantic coast, 1736–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Iberian Atlantic coast

I

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767

2.7250 3.2917 3.0208 3.0208 3.0708 3.3125 2.7604 2.8958 4.7708 5.1042 4.7708 5.9167 5.7250 3.6875 3.2917 3.4167 3.0729 2.7917 2.9271 5.1875 3.4688 3.9167 5.2083 5.5000 3.7708 3.0833 4.1667 3.4167 3.5000 3.3750 2.9792 3.0938

II Spain on this side of Gibraltar

III Bay of Biscay

6.6250 3.7083 3.3750 3.4375 3.0417 2.7917 2.9271 5.8958 3.4688 3.9167 5.2083 5.7500 3.7708 3.0833 5.4583 3.4792 3.5000 3.3646 3.0208 3.0000

3.7188 2.5538 2.3095 2.2773 2.2561 2.3624

IV Madeira & Tenerife

318 table a2-8

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the Iberian Atlantic (cont.)

Iberian Atlantic coast

I

II Spain on this side of Gibraltar

III Bay of Biscay

1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800

3.3125 3.0313 3.0417 3.5521 3.2500 3.1875 3.1667 3.4583 3.6250 3.3958 4.5833 3.6875 3.8229 3.6563 3.2708 3.2917 3.2500 3.8229 3.6875 3.3409 3.3333 2.9792 3.1458 2.8021 2.8854 4.7500 5.8125 6.3333 4.2708 4.0208 4.2708 5.0833 5.1458

3.3750 3.0625 3.0417 3.6563 3.2083 3.1042 3.1667 3.5000 3.6146 3.4688 4.6667 4.4792 4.6250 4.3750 3.5417 3.5208 3.6250 4.4063 4.0208 3.4659 3.6250 3.3958 3.3229 5.5000 3.0729 5.4167 7.2708 7.3750 5.0208 6.6042 4.8125 5.6250 5.9583

2.4156 2.4262 2.3837 2.7882 2.7135 2.6181 2.4900 2.7452 3.0547 2.5009 4.0000 3.2569 3.3199 3.2140 2.9583 2.7457 2.6923 3.4366 3.2778 3.0682 2.9479 2.8520 2.9905 4.5000 2.6493 4.7127 5.4688 5.4470 4.2135 3.8516 3.8090 4.6172 4.7882

IV Madeira & Tenerife

319

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-8

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the Iberian Atlantic (cont.)

II Spain on this side of Gibraltar

III Bay of Biscay

Iberian Atlantic coast

I

1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833

6.2083 3.5729

7.5833 4.0104

5.4054 2.9266

3.2500 3.6250 3.2188 4.7857

4.0625 6.8000 4.1146 6.1429

4.5000 4.0799 3.1293 5.7292

9.2500 5.0341 4.0208 3.5521 2.5313 2.5521 2.7000 2.5795 3.0104 4.5521 2.8646 3.0000 2.7865 2.7188 2.3125 2.1667 2.1146 1.8409 1.4531 2.6618

10.7500 5.6667 4.4583 3.5625 2.6667 2.1875 2.3125 2.3889 3.2159 6.3261 3.0208 3.0521 2.8177 2.5729 2.4167 2.1250 2.1146 1.8864 2.1146 1.6042

7.3125 4.6425 2.8420 3.0009 2.0547 2.1545 2.3095 2.2082 2.7571 5.0000 2.5972 2.9596 2.8320 2.5968 2.1502 2.0332 2.0124 1.8595 2.0226 1.6175

IV Madeira & Tenerife

2.5625 2.9167 3.4479 6.0417 2.8500 3.0455 3.3333 3.2083 2.6477 2.2727 2.4479 2.2159 2.4583 1.9545

320 table a2-8

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations at the Iberian Atlantic (cont.)

Iberian Atlantic coast

I

II Spain on this side of Gibraltar

III Bay of Biscay

IV Madeira & Tenerife

1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1736–1807 average 1814–1859

1.9545 2.0313 1.8958 2.1042 2.2708 2.1302 2.0729 1.7917 1.4813 1.3594 1.4375 1.2670 1.5938 1.6250 2.3500 1.6375 1.4063 1.4063 1.3958 1.4167 1.5104 1.5208 1.3438 1.3542 1.2448 1.1979 3.8158 2.3152

1.8864 2.0104 1.8958 2.0625 2.2500 2.0938 2.0000 1.7917 1.6198 1.3646 1.4063 1.2784 1.5365 1.5625 2.3125 2.1250 1.4375 1.4479 1.4167 1.4167 1.4583 1.4688 1.3281 1.3229 1.1615 1.0833 4.1786 2.3913

1.9060 1.7756 1.7422 2.0035 2.1771 2.1445 1.9492 1.7194 1.4831 1.1762 1.2530 1.2237 1.3073 1.3724 2.2326 1.8232 1.2522 1.2088 1.2088 1.2309 1.2630 1.2856 1.1654 1.2196 1.1102 1.0890 3.5509 2.1555

2.0455 2.0938 1.8229 1.7708 1.9583 1.7250 1.7604 1.7500 1.5938 1.3125 1.2708 1.1818 1.3542 1.2969 1.8250 1.7031 1.4167 1.4479 1.3438 1.3438 1.2708 1.4583 1.2188 1.2083 1.0729 0.9792 – 2.0157

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-9

321

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Western Mediterranean, 1736–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Western Mediterranean

I Málaga

II Leghorn

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768

3.2500 3.6563 3.5833 3.5521 3.8542 3.7292 3.5833 3.4167 5.8333 6.1250 6.0833 9.4583 8.2708 4.1250 3.9688 3.9167 3.4063 3.4167 3.4792 5.6875 4.2083 4.5417 5.9375 6.5000 4.3333 3.7708 5.9167 3.8750 3.7500 3.5417 3.6042 3.5833 3.8750

5.8500 4.2292 4.0625 4.0000 3.4688 3.4167 3.5625 5.0625 4.2083 4.4583 5.5833 5.2500 4.2708 3.8125 4.3125 4.0000 3.8333 3.5208 3.6042 3.5417 3.7292

IIa Genoa

III Marseille

6.8750 4.0543 3.8333 3.6042 3.6458 3.5417 3.7500

IV Barcelona

322 table a2-9

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Western Mediterranean (cont.)

Western Mediterranean

I Málaga

II Leghorn

1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801

3.5417 3.7708 4.2813 3.8750 3.6458 3.8333 4.1250 4.2917 4.2708 5.4792 4.5833 4.6875 4.3750 3.8958 3.8333 4.0417 4.7500 4.0417 3.6591 3.6667 3.4583 3.3438 3.2083 3.2813 5.5000 7.3542 6.7500 5.0833 6.6042 5.5208 5.8333 6.0625 7.6042

3.5521 3.8958 4.0417 3.6875 3.5625 3.7500 4.0208 4.3958 4.2708 5.7500 4.7500 4.5938 4.6458 4.3542 4.1250 4.6042 5.1667 4.6354 4.0568 4.1667 3.8750 3.9375 3.5104 3.7917 5.6875 7.3542 6.7500 5.1818 6.7500 5.9792 6.1667 7.4375 9.5000

IIa Genoa

III Marseille

3.9773 4.1250 4.4167 4.9167 4.5417 3.8182 3.8333 3.6458 3.4583 3.2292 3.4479 5.6875 7.3542 6.7500 5.3750 6.9375 5.9792 6.1667 7.4375 9.4583

3.5521 3.8958 4.0417 3.6875 3.5625 3.7500 4.0208 4.3750 4.1667 5.6250 5.0625 4.7083 4.7292 4.2708 4.1250 4.2917 4.8958 4.4792 3.8182 3.8542 3.6250 3.4375 3.2292 3.3438 5.6875 7.3542 7.0000 5.2917 6.9375 5.8333 5.8333 6.4792 7.9792

IV Barcelona

323

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-9

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Western Mediterranean (cont.)

Western Mediterranean 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834

I Málaga

II Leghorn

IIa Genoa 5.1667

III Marseille

4.3542

5.2500

4.5000 7.3000 4.6354 6.4286

5.0000 8.0000 5.2292 7.2143

5.0000 8.0000 5.1250 6.8571

12.2500 7.2386 4.9583 4.0625 2.9063 3.1458 2.9375 2.5139 3.7159 6.7083 3.5990 3.7188 3.4620 2.6364 2.5114 2.2045 2.4792 2.2273 2.4158 1.9898 2.1932

15.5000 10.0250 5.9792 4.9792 3.6354 3.5417 3.3438 3.6705 4.0521 8.6429 3.6429 4.1023 4.3370 2.9091 2.8636 2.8636 2.7708 2.5455 2.7188 2.2500 2.5114

13.5000 7.4750 5.4167 4.5833 3.5208 3.3750 3.3438 3.6705 4.0521 9.6429 3.6429 4.1136 4.3478 3.0000 2.8523 2.4318 2.7292 2.5114 2.7188 2.2045 2.5114

IV Barcelona

4.7083

2.6719 2.5156 2.9792 7.4583 3.6023 3.6023 3.8043

324 table a2-9

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Western Mediterranean (cont.)

Western Mediterranean

I Málaga

II Leghorn

1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1736–1807 average 1814–1859

2.2083 2.0417 2.2292 2.3333 2.1875 2.1042 1.9063 1.7500 1.5188 1.4313 1.3750 1.6933 1.6573 2.5000 2.2344 1.5859 1.5813 1.5188 1.5250 1.5538 1.5825 1.4048 1.3627 1.2156 1.2148 4.6381 2.7027

2.5313 2.3125 2.4792 2.5833 2.5521 2.3021 2.1667 1.9688 1.6458 1.6875 1.5568 1.8542 1.8333 2.8125 2.4688 1.5729 1.7292 1.6563 1.6667 1.6771 1.7083 1.6250 1.6667 1.4688 1.5938 4.5255 3.1740

IIa Genoa

III Marseille

IV Barcelona 2.4659 2.2188 2.3854 2.4375 2.4167 2.1979 1.9792 1.8977

5.2249 –

2.5313 2.3021 2.4792 2.5729 2.5284 2.2566 2.1146 1.9688 1.6354 1.6875 1.5568 1.7784 1.8333 2.8125 2.4531 1.6563 1.7292 1.6563 1.6667 1.6771 1.7083 1.6250 1.6667 1.4583 1.4896 4.7981 3.0557

– 2.9755

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-10

325

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1736–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Eastern Mediterranean

I Adriatic coasts

II Kingdom of the Two Sicilies

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767

4.2750 4.5208 4.8523 5.0227 5.9167 5.1042 5.0909 4.6667 7.1667 8.0000 8.0000 10.9167 8.3542 4.7292 4.6875 4.4167 3.9792 3.8125 3.7813 6.9688 4.9167 5.2708 5.8333 5.5417 5.0208 4.3333 4.8125 4.6875 4.7083 4.5000 4.1875 4.3333

6.0000 4.0833 3.8750 3.5833 3.6042 3.5000

III Gallipoli

IV Ottoman Empire

326 table a2-10

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Eastern Mediterranean (cont.)

Eastern Mediterranean

I Adriatic coasts

II Kingdom of the Two Sicilies

1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799

4.5833 4.6042 4.5000 4.9792 5.0208 4.7292 4.5625 4.8958 5.3958 5.3333 6.7083 6.6667 6.1875 6.2917 5.2292 5.1042 5.7917 6.2917 5.7708 5.0909 4.8958 4.9583 4.5625 4.1875 4.5833 6.9167 8.7500 7.9167 6.3750 8.3333 7.1250 7.7083

3.7083 3.5521 3.9375 4.0833 3.6875 3.5625 3.7500 4.0417 4.3958 3.9583 5.7083 5.0833 4.7604 4.7917 4.2500 4.1667 4.7500 5.2500 4.8854 4.1591 4.2083 3.9375 3.9375 3.5938 3.7917 5.6875 7.8542 7.3333 5.5000 7.0625 6.0625 6.2500

III Gallipoli

3.3409 4.0208 4.3333 4.8125 4.6875 3.1667 3.7045 3.8958 3.8958 3.5104 3.5729 5.6458 8.2500 6.9792 5.3333 7.0625 6.0625 5.4000

IV Ottoman Empire

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-10

327

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Eastern Mediterranean (cont.)

II Kingdom of the Two Sicilies

III Gallipoli

Eastern Mediterranean

I Adriatic coasts

1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831

9.3750 11.2917 5.1458

7.5833 9.9375 5.3958

7.4091 11.0417 6.0833

5.5000 9.4500 5.8542 7.5000

5.0000 8.0000 5.2292 7.2143

5.1250 8.0500 4.7292 7.2143

18.0000 11.5250 7.4792 6.5208 5.1250 4.8958 4.4792 4.8409 5.4583 8.4167 5.0909 4.1125 5.1042 4.0000 4.0455 3.3182 3.1591 3.1818

15.5000 10.3250 6.0625 5.0833 4.0208 3.5833 3.3333 3.5568 4.6250 8.1957 4.0714 4.1705 4.4565 3.5227 3.2955 2.4271 2.8125 2.6591

13.7500 8.4250 5.1458 4.6458 3.5000 3.2500 3.4792 3.5568 3.2353 5.9231 2.7857 3.3125 [1.8077] 2.7222 2.3750 2.4432 2.7500 2.5000

IV Ottoman Empire

4.4063 4.0000

[8.0000] [6.0000]

328 table a2-10

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Eastern Mediterranean (cont.)

Eastern Mediterranean

I Adriatic coasts

II Kingdom of the Two Sicilies

III Gallipoli

1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1736–1807 average 1814–1859

2.8750 2.8409 3.1136 3.0417 2.7917 2.9271 2.9375 2.9063 2.7292 2.6458 2.6125 1.8646 1.9688 1.9167 2.1667 1.9167 3.0833 2.8125 1.9896 2.0104 1.9896 1.9167 1.9479 2.0000 1.9375 1.9792 1.7500 1.8542 5.7827 3.8104

2.3977 2.3182 2.5568 2.5313 2.3021 2.4896 2.5938 2.5000 2.3021 2.1771 2.0208 1.6563 1.6875 1.5568 1.8542 1.8333 2.9375 2.4688 1.6563 1.7396 1.6563 1.6667 1.6771 1.7083 1.6250 1.6667 1.4688 1.6042 4.9935 2.8633

2.3636 2.1364 2.4432 2.5000 2.3125 2.4479 2.5521 2.5833 2.3021 2.1563 2.0833 1.6042 1.6458 1.5568 1.8542 1.8333 2.7708 2.4688 1.6563 1.7396 1.6563 1.6667 1.6771 1.7083 1.6458 1.6667 1.4688 1.6042 5.4931 3.2251

IV Ottoman Empire

2.9773 3.0833 2.5714 2.6000 2.8864 2.3875 2.6477 2.7045 2.2083 2.2396 2.0729 2.3854 2.3750 3.1250 2.9531 2.1667 2.1979 2.1042 2.0000 2.0521 2.0833 2.0729 2.1563 1.8229 2.0417 – 2.8387

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-11

329

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1736–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Baltic Sea (Hamburg)

I Northern coast & the Baltic

II Southern coast

III The Baltic & Sweden

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766

3.5179 2.9000 3.0417 3.3750 3.6111 2.3750

2.0938 1.8750 2.8000 2.6389 2.3929 1.9750 2.9500 2.7188 3.1250 3.0556 2.9375 2.9861 3.5000 3.5455 3.1667 2.3750 2.6875 2.7500 2.9167 3.2750 3.0417 3.2917 2.9625 3.9048 3.6667 3.2857 3.2292 3.4500 3.4583 3.2941 4.0417

4.0833 3.0962 3.0000 3.0000 4.1250

4.4500 3.5000 3.1500 2.8333 3.0000 3.6923 2.8333 2.2917 3.3529 3.4118 2.8333 3.6429 3.9167 3.5263 3.4875 4.1250 3.5909 3.3158 3.0625 2.5667 3.5588 2.6667 3.1923 4.7059

IV Mecklenburg & Pomeranian coasts

330 table a2-11

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea (cont.)

Baltic Sea (Hamburg)

I Northern coast & the Baltic

II Southern coast

III The Baltic & Sweden

1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798

3.2143 3.3438 3.1875 2.9615 3.5417 3.8667 3.4375 3.9125 4.8409 4.6111 3.8929 3.2500 3.9500 3.8438 3.8438 3.3750 3.3929 3.4583 3.5417 3.8333 3.9107 3.1429 2.9306 2.4722 3.0972 3.2500 4.7500 4.2500 3.9583 3.2500 3.9444 4.3125

3.5833 3.2639 3.4250 3.1250 3.0278 3.8864 3.5208 3.5250 3.7500 3.7396 3.1667 4.2188 4.0625 3.1875 2.8056 2.7500 2.6389 2.5833 3.9286 3.3333 3.3036 2.8214 2.8194 2.4167 2.7500 3.5500 4.3636 4.3636 4.5000 3.7727 3.3611 3.2000

3.5313 3.1471 3.6071 3.0714 3.5000 4.2353 4.1429 3.6667 4.5000 4.4250 3.5714 3.2500 3.6000 3.5938 3.4375

IV Mecklenburg & Pomeranian coasts

331

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-11

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea (cont.)

Baltic Sea (Hamburg)

I Northern coast & the Baltic

II Southern coast

1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830

4.5625 3.0625 3.8750 4.0000

3.5208 2.2969 3.1875 3.3854

1.7500 5.0750 3.5682 7.0714

2.8750 3.6000 3.5625 3.8571

3.7614 4.2500 3.9091 2.7875 3.6875 1.9732 2.6176 2.2917 3.1833 3.0938 2.5000 2.7667 2.3214 1.9333 2.0469 2.2188

8.0000 2.8295 2.6932 3.1250 2.4091 2.4148 1.4286 1.9706 2.4333 2.8088 2.3889 1.6667 1.8472 2.0625 1.7431 1.5469 1.6328

III The Baltic & Sweden

IV Mecklenburg & Pomeranian coasts

1.7768 2.5956 2.8750 2.9844 2.6875 2.3214 2.4688 2.0357 2.1111 3.1875 1.8750

1.8750 1.9706 2.2813 2.6618 2.2778 1.7969 1.9063 1.5972 1.5625 1.2361 1.3125

332 table a2-11

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea (cont.)

Baltic Sea (Hamburg)

I Northern coast & the Baltic

II Southern coast

III The Baltic & Sweden

IV Mecklenburg & Pomeranian coasts

1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1736–1807 average 1814–1859

2.6429 1.4531 1.8750 1.5313 1.8611 1.5625 1.5625 2.0156 2.0000 1.4107 1.2500 1.1696 1.6705 1.4625 1.3906 1.4688 1.6625 3.1250 2.1563 1.4018 1.3984 1.3438 1.4375

1.6964 1.3889 1.3889 1.4722 1.4444 1.3750 1.5208 1.5156 1.5156 1.3889 1.2734 1.2266 1.2727 1.1188 1.3472 1.5677 1.3063 2.4375 1.6250 1.0139 1.2847 1.0547 1.0859 1.3625 1.4444 1.5833 1.3693 0.9766 1.1813 3.2172 1.8096

2.1964 1.2969 1.6528 1.7639 1.6517 1.6528 1.8056 1.5625 1.7969 1.2321 1.1250 1.0893 1.4432 1.3053 1.5694 1.5000 1.5500 2.6875 1.8750 1.2054 1.2500 1.2188 1.2734

1.5893 1.2778 1.3472 1.4444 1.2778 1.2500 1.3403 1.3594 1.5078 1.3333 1.2109 1.1016 1.2614 1.0688 1.2708 1.4688 1.1750 2.2500 1.4000 0.9306 1.1597 0.9453 0.9688 1.1875 1.2361 1.4323 1.1761 0.8438 0.9938 – 1.4322

1.3929 1.3304 1.1406 1.2266 3.5580 2.0764

1.3393 1.4531 1.0078 1.2938 3.6292 1.7820

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-12

333

Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the Southern Baltic Sea, 1736–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Lübeck I: Southern Baltic Sea

II I Pomerania Danzig, Königsberg

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767

1.6528 2.4740 2.3542 2.0625 2.2917 2.3000 2.1250 2.1146 2.0250 2.2045 2.3194 2.2396 2.3542 1.9688 1.8750 2.0208 1.8542 1.5833 1.5521 1.6354 1.7083 1.9896 1.8542 1.9375 2.1042 1.9063 2.1250 2.0568 2.1458 2.1000 1.9792 1.9205

2.1875 1.6591 1.5729 1.5875 1.6667 1.6705

III Scania

IV V Courland Copenhagen

2.4688 1.9167 2.0417 1.8750 1.7604 1.7778

3.3750 2.3068 2.3864 2.3500 2.2396 2.2375

334 table a2-12

appendix 2 Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the Southern Baltic Sea (cont.)

Lübeck I: Southern Baltic Sea

II I Pomerania Danzig, Königsberg

III Scania

IV V Courland Copenhagen

1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800

2.2344 1.8854 2.1364 2.4318 2.5682 2.4688 2.3409 2.5000 2.8295 2.5000 2.4886 2.3542 2.5568 1.9625 2.2000 2.1818 2.6042 3.6458 2.8958 2.4444 2.8295 2.6354 2.3646

2.2708 1.8750 2.0278 2.2273 2.3500 2.3523 2.3977 2.4271 2.7250 2.4875 2.3977 2.2917 2.1806 2.4659 2.4375 2.6136 2.8958 3.5000 2.6136 2.6528 3.0000 2.7955 2.6042 2.3409 2.3500 2.2955 2.1563 2.7083 2.3958 2.7396 2.6111 2.9792 1.7344

2.6354 2.1563 2.5341 2.7045 2.7500 2.6458 2.6250 2.8229 2.8864 2.7386 2.6932 2.6875 2.9750 2.4250 1.7656 2.2625 2.8750 3.8542 3.1458 2.7083 2.7045 2.4659 2.5833 2.2045 2.3875 2.5682 2.2917 2.4028 2.2917 2.6771 2.5125 3.2292 1.9844

2.5375 2.6136 2.1979 2.5694 2.2813 2.7604 3.0938 3.1042 1.8906

1.8125 1.5833 1.7273 1.9432 1.8864 1.9688 1.8523 2.0625 2.2045 2.2727 2.2045 1.9896 1.9545 1.4500 1.4861 1.6477 2.1354 2.9792 2.6875 2.2125 2.4091 2.1875 1.9583 1.9167 1.8958 2.0227 1.9688 2.2361 1.9896 2.2604 2.9063 3.0208 1.6875

335

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-12

Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the Southern Baltic Sea (cont.)

Lübeck I: Southern Baltic Sea

II I Pomerania Danzig, Königsberg

III Scania

IV V Courland Copenhagen

1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833

2.0469 2.6250

1.8750 2.2955

2.2656 2.8750

2.0703 2.7500

1.8125 2.1625 2.1563 3.3571

1.5625 1.9625 1.7917 3.0714

3.1875 3.4125 2.2875 3.7143

2.0625 2.4625 2.6979 3.4286

6.3750 2.2045 2.3409 2.2500 1.4375 1.4375 1.0938 1.5875 2.4896 1.8719 1.4375 1.1188 1.0417 0.8906 0.7778 0.8281 0.8438 0.9643 0.6667 0.8472

4.7500 1.8409 1.8068 1.8438 1.2784 1.4148

6.5000 2.0000 1.9773 2.5417 2.7679 2.1979

6.4375 2.3409 2.3636 2.4375 1.6250 1.5114 1.2813 1.4861 1.3750 1.6493 1.7500 1.1667 1.1250 0.9688 0.8750 0.8906 0.7500 1.2500 0.6944 0.8472

1.7250 1.9167 1.4886 1.3333 1.1250 0.8438 0.9205 0.8646 0.7625 0.5625 0.6607 0.5433 0.5972

336 table a2-12

appendix 2 Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the Southern Baltic Sea (cont.)

Lübeck I: Southern Baltic Sea

II I Pomerania Danzig, Königsberg

1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1736–1807 average 1814–1859

0.7917 0.8681 0.8542 0.8472 0.8750 0.9219 0.9531 0.6161 0.5357 0.6458 0.5859 0.8810 1.0777 0.9188 1.7500 0.8125 0.7553 0.8194 0.6863 0.9097 0.9125 1.1453 1.1458 1.0885 0.5859 0.7818 2.3043 1.2077

III Scania

IV V Courland Copenhagen

0.8056

2.0316 –

2.4774 –

2.5903 1.6015

0.6528 0.7375 0.8636 0.7760 0.7597 0.8281 0.7500 0.7188 0.4766 0.6375 0.5234 0.7083 0.8698 0.7500 1.3438 0.8625 0.7563 0.7778 0.6328 0.6736 0.6111 0.8403 0.8854 1.0313 0.5391 0.6875 – 0.8471

337

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-13

Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the Northern Baltic Sea, 1736–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Lübeck Ii: Northern Baltic Sea

I Sweden

II Riga

III Saint Petersburg

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767

1.6528 2.3542 2.2292 2.0625 2.2917 2.3000 2.1250 2.1458 2.1000 1.9773 2.3194 2.2396 2.3542 2.4125 2.6750 3.1354 2.4000 2.1979 2.4167 2.5000 2.3854 2.4063 2.1310 2.7500 2.2708 2.0875 2.4167 2.3289 2.3056 2.1250 2.1563 2.2222

2.2500 3.0938 3.0208 2.7188 2.7083 2.2083

3.0469 4.8636 4.0000 2.8846 3.0625 2.6500

2.8000 2.6111 2.5375 2.9444 2.8056 3.3000 2.8875 2.8125 3.0313 2.4750 2.2159 2.4792 2.6875 2.7292 2.8333 2.7188 2.7917 3.0208 2.5250 2.8542 2.7750 2.8889 3.9167 2.5938 2.4722

3.3000 3.0694 3.1375 3.2188 3.1875 2.9833 3.0694 3.2632 2.6125 2.3889 2.3690 2.7391 2.7083 2.8929 3.0000 2.7159 2.5000 3.4792 2.6875 3.2083 3.2105 3.3194 3.2222 3.0313 2.9583

IV Finland

338 table a2-13

appendix 2 Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the Northern Baltic Sea (cont.)

Lübeck Ii: Northern Baltic Sea

I Sweden

II Riga

III Saint Petersburg

1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800

2.6667 2.2938 2.3889 2.6364 2.8750 2.7727 2.7159 2.8125 3.1750 2.9500 2.9091 3.0000 3.1319 2.7563 2.5000 2.5250 3.0000 4.5000 3.3594 3.5139 3.5750 3.1932 3.0313

2.8125 2.6146 2.8472 3.1364 3.1250 2.9063 2.9432 3.1771 3.2250 3.1625 3.1250 2.8125 3.0556 2.7000 2.2639 2.4500 3.3385 4.2375 3.2188 3.1597 3.1625 2.8295 2.8333

3.1705 3.1250 3.0588 3.3125 3.6875 3.4545 3.2250 3.9375 4.0000 3.1094 3.9318 3.5938 3.4583 3.2250 2.7083 2.9250 2.6250 3.6071 3.7813 3.5417 3.5750 2.9125 2.5375

3.1000 3.2727 2.9886 3.1429 3.1042 2.3611 2.7222 2.9792 2.0169

2.7500 3.4545 2.8333 3.2917 2.7083 3.1302 2.8625 3.5625 2.2031

3.2500 3.8182 3.0341 3.2143 3.1042 2.7292 3.1563 3.8542 2.6563

IV Finland

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-13

339

Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the Northern Baltic Sea (cont.)

Lübeck Ii: Northern Baltic Sea

I Sweden

II Riga

III Saint Petersburg

1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833

2.2969 3.0481

2.3125 2.9896

2.4844 3.4271

3.1875 3.7125 2.2875 4.0714

3.1875 2.8625 3.0885 3.8571

3.7125 2.2875 4.5714

8.1250 2.8977 2.8864 3.0729 2.4091 2.3438

7.3750 2.7273 2.6023 2.9063 2.0568 1.9148 1.4297 1.0500

2.1875 1.4500 1.9826 2.0417 1.2188 1.2222 1.0938 0.9583 0.8281 0.8594 1.3393 0.7708 0.8472

8.8750 3.1875 3.0909 3.5833 2.6364 2.3438 1.0714 1.7813 1.6167 1.9853 1.5781 1.3828 1.5069 1.2969 1.2292 1.1094 1.0469 1.5089 0.7422 0.9722

IV Finland

1.6071 1.7321 1.6429 1.2500 1.8125 1.1429 1.3571

340 table a2-13

appendix 2 Lübeck premium quotations for destinations in the Northern Baltic Sea (cont.)

Lübeck Ii: Northern Baltic Sea

I Sweden

1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1736–1807 average 1814–1859

0.9167 0.8958 0.9097 0.9167 0.9018 1.0625 0.7375 0.6813 0.5893 0.8500 0.5781 0.8750 1.1375 0.9313 1.8333 0.8681 0.6797 0.8403 0.7188 0.9167 0.8750 1.1389 1.0500 0.9219 0.7344 0.8250 2.6979 1.3760

II Riga

0.8125 0.7109 1.0000 1.2250 1.0375 2.1250 0.9375 0.7768 0.8214 0.8047

0.9286 1.0000 0.7344 0.8688 2.9348 1.3504

III Saint Petersburg

IV Finland

1.0938 1.0469 0.8125 0.8509 1.2813 1.2500 0.7679 0.6964 0.6429 1.0250 0.7969 0.8438 0.8438 1.2500 2.0000 0.9766 0.9167 1.0000 0.9375 0.9643

1.3750 1.8438 1.6607 1.5179 1.9063 1.4107 1.1875 1.1250 1.2000 1.6016 1.2857 1.2656 1.3281 1.6797 2.4375 1.8333 1.2054 1.2321 1.0625 1.2321

1.0179 1.1563 0.8359 0.7500 3.2137 1.5069

1.1458 1.1614 1.0234 1.4063 – 1.4410

341

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-14

Amsterdam and London premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1821, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Amsterdam & London destinations in the Baltic Sea

I Amsterdam: Southern Baltic Sea

II Amsterdam: Northern Baltic Sea

III London: Southern Baltic Sea

IV London: Northern Baltic Sea

1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813

2.5139 2.6875 3.6563 4.9167 4.6563 3.9167 4.7727 3.8333 3.3125 3.0208 3.7083 4.5833 5.0833 8.3000 4.2917 4.8542 4.9167 4.0500 3.1250 3.6250 3.3438

3.2500 3.3056 3.3438 4.2917 4.2500 4.4688 4.3036 3.5556 2.8750 3.4125 3.8250 5.6000 5.6591

2.3472 2.6875 3.5682 4.9167 4.6591 4.0750 4.7273 3.8333 3.2083 2.8958 3.6563 4.5833 5.0833 5.6042 3.8250 4.8021 4.8750 4.0313 3.1563 3.5625 3.3438

2.7969 2.8971 3.3438 4.2083 4.3500 4.7500 4.2857 3.5556 2.9167 3.4125 4.1979 5.6818 5.6591 5.5556 4.3250 4.3611 4.7500 4.9167 4.1875 5.0313 4.3438

2.7500 3.9750 3.5417 4.7857

3.6250 5.8250 3.7250 6.0000

2.5000 3.6000 3.1979

3.6250 5.2500 3.2000

4.3250 4.3611 4.3889 4.5000 4.2857 5.0938 4.3438

342 table a2-14

appendix 2 Amsterdam and London premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea (cont.)

Amsterdam & London destinations in the Baltic Sea

I Amsterdam: Southern Baltic Sea

II Amsterdam: Northern Baltic Sea

III London: Southern Baltic Sea

IV London: Northern Baltic Sea

1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 average 1782–1807 average 1814–1834 average 1814–1842

9.7500 3.8636 3.7083 3.0521 2.2292 2.1136 1.8625 2.2813 2.6094 2.0139 1.6458 2.1944 2.3611 2.0313 1.6000 1.4444 1.4583 1.4141 0.8906 1.2778 0.8750 1.6181 1.1250 1.6736 1.6042 1.5547 1.0089 1.3194 0.9609 4.0888 2.4256 2.1311

11.7500 4.5000 4.4330 3.9886 2.5750 3.3750 2.5000 1.6250

9.0000 3.4432 3.3833 3.0208 2.2708 1.8295 1.8250 1.6328 1.9844 1.9286 2.0938 2.3906 2.1324 1.6458 1.8036 2.3000 1.8750 2.3125 2.0417 2.0625 1.6500

11.0000 4.4318 4.2273 3.9500 2.5500 2.8333 2.5156 1,3750

4.2756

3.7129 2.5060

4.2026

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-15

343

Bordeaux premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1821, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Bordeaux destinations in the Baltic Sea

I The Sound

II III Southern Baltic Sea Northern Baltic Sea

1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813

2.6125 2.5417 3.6250 4.7500 4.3958 4.0000 4.6818 3.9167 3.4167 3.0833 3.6250 5.5833 6.9444 5.5417 4.4318 5.0208 4.8333 5.2500 4.4444 6.2500 3.5521

2.6806 3.0500 3.1806 4.5156 4.6932 5.0125 4.3056 3.5500 2.7917 2.8977 3.9688 6.6667 7.6875 6.0556 4.7273 5.4896 5.1375 5.8750 4.2813 5.4375 4.0625

3.6875 3.5278 3.7188 4.3333 4.6250 4.4688 4.1875 3.7000 3.0972 3.6500 3.7750 6.3000 7.1250 6.3333 4.7500 5.0833 5.7500 7.0417 5.1875 6.1875 5.0000

3.5000 6.7250 4.8125 5.7143

3.7500 7.2250 5.0729 6.5000

4.8750 9.4750 6.1875 8.0714

344 table a2-15

appendix 2 Bordeaux premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea (cont.)

Bordeaux destinations in the Baltic Sea

I The Sound

II III Southern Baltic Sea Northern Baltic Sea

1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 average 1782–1807 average 1814–1842

10.5000 6.7500 3.8750 3.5417 2.3750 2.4167 2.2125

11.5000 7.8000 4.2708 4.1146 2.7708 2.5455 2.5875 2.4063 3.2917 5.9500 2.8173 2.4167 3.0441 1.9375 2.2000 1.8750 1.7222 1.6944 1.0469 1.9219 1.4375 2.0625 1.6641 2.0764 1.8611 2.0688 1.4821 1.6944 0.9063 4.7446 2.8712

4.5301

12.7500 8.4750 5.1250 4.4318 2.8125 3.7083 3.4844

5.2055

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-16

345

Portugal’s premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1821, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Portugal’s destinations in the Baltic Sea

I Northern Baltic Sea

II Southern Baltic Sea

1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813

4.1563 4.3889 4.6875 4.8333 5.2500 4.7813 4.9643 4.0833 3.4167 4.3000 4.3250 7.7000 7.5455 8.0000 5.5238 5.6667 6.6667 6.8542 5.6250 9.3125 6.4583

3.5000 3.7222 3.7500 5.3056 5.8125 5.1500 4.6389 3.2500 2.9028 3.7250 3.7250 6.9000 6.5000 6.7222 4.8810 5.2222 5.2000 6.1042 3.2188 6.0625 5.1458

5.7500 7.4250 6.1875 8.0714

5.1250 5.4750 4.6458 6.5000

346 table a2-16

appendix 2 Portugal’s premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea (cont.)

Portugal’s destinations in the Baltic Sea

I Northern Baltic Sea

II Southern Baltic Sea

1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 average 1782–1807 average 1814–1842

15.5000 8.0750 6.4886 6.3636 4.4063 3.3333

13.0000 6.9091 5.6563 5.4318 3.7813 3.5313 2.6250 4.7500 3.6875 6.5000 2.7692 2.5625 2.4000 2.3333 2.4500 1.8056 2.1389 2.3846 1.4038 3.2667 1.9531 2.3906 2.0417 2.1944 2.3929 2.3750 2.2188 2.4167 1.5125 4.9274 2.6340

5.8389

347

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-17

Mediterranean ports’ premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea, 1782–1821, in percent (annual average premium rates)

From the Mediterranean to the Baltic Sea

I Copenhagen

II Southern Baltic Sea

III Northern Baltic Sea

1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813

3.9500 3.9375 4.4167 5.5417 5.3125 4.6250 5.0833 4.3125 3.8542 3.6250 4.2292 6.0000 6.8750 7.3333 5.3958 7.5833 7.4167 7.3125 6.6389 9.4583 5.0417

3.7500 3.4444 4.2222 4.1071 4.3611 5.1000 4.9125 4.0500 2.8889 3.6136 3.8750 7.2000 7.3636 6.8000 4.8958 7.2500 6.7000 7.3125 6.0938 8.6875 5.6875

4.4375 4.2500 4.1250 5.0833 5.5278 4.7188 4.9643 4.2778 3.4167 4.1000 4.4250 7.4000 7.8182 6.5000 5.0833 7.8333 7.4444 8.3958 6.6250 10.1875 6.7500

4.1250 8.5500 5.4688 6.9286

5.0000 8.7500 5.9583 8.0714

6.2500 11.1500 6.9583 9.4286

348 table a2-17

appendix 2 Mediterranean ports’ premium quotations for destinations in the Baltic Sea (cont.)

From the Mediterranean to the Baltic Sea

I Copenhagen

II Southern Baltic Sea

III Northern Baltic Sea

1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 average 1782–1807 average 1814–1842

15.0000 10.6750 6.7083 5.4583 3.8333 3.6875 2,6250

17.2500 11.8250 7.3333 6.0313 4.3542 4.0682 2.6250 6.0000 4.1250 9.7692 4.5909 3.5000 3.3594 2.9167 2.6563 1.7500 2.2500 3.0313 2.0000 2.6500 2.3056 2.7875 2.4625 2.6375 2.5625 2.4375 2.0357 1.8571 1.7813 5.6038 4.2398

18.5000 12.8500 8.3636 6.7727 4.4750 5.4375

5.7206

6.2860

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-18

349

Hamburg premium quotations for the Iberian transatlantic routes, 1736–1820, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Iberian transatlantic routes

I from Spain to the West Indies

II from Portugal to Brazil

1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766

4.8846 5.2391 5.2500 5.2500

3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5417 3.8261 4.1875 3.7500 4.0000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 4.0000 3.5000 4.0000 3.7500 4.0000 4.0000 3.5833 4.0000 4.0000 4.1667 4.0000 4.0000

5.0000 4.3125 4.0909 4.0000 3.5000 3.5000 3.5000 4.0000 3.4000 4.0000 3.7500 4.0000 4.0000 3.5833 4.0000 4.6111 4.1667 4.0000 4.0000

350 table a2-18

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for the Iberian transatlantic routes (cont.)

Iberian transatlantic routes

1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797

I from Spain to the West Indies

II from Portugal to Brazil

4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 3.7083 5.1667 5.5000

4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 4.0000 5.2500 5.5000

22.5000 22.5000 7.5000 4.9167 5.0000 4.7917 4.9091 5.1667 4.4792 4.7500 5.1667 5.0000 5.1667 5.5000

4.8333 4.7500 4.7500 3.2917 4.2083 4.6667 4.2500 5.5909 5.7083 5.6250 5.0000 6.0000 6.0000 6.0000 6.0000

351

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-18

Hamburg premium quotations for the Iberian transatlantic routes (cont.)

Iberian transatlantic routes

I from Spain to the West Indies

II from Portugal to Brazil

1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 average 1736–1795 average 1736–1807

5.8000 8.6250 12.7083 16.0000 6.7500

5.8000 8.6250 12.7083 16.0000 6.0833

7.2500 9.0000 5.3542 6.6429

7.2500 7.6000 5.1667 6.6429

6.5750 5.6875 6.1000 5.6667

5.4000 4.9375 6.8750 5.3333

5.1788 5.7222

4.1850 4.7553

352 table a2-19

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for North American destinations, 1804–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

North America

1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834

I North American east coast

II New Orleans

III Cuba

3.6429 4.6818 7.2917 6.9792 4.5455 4.5833 4.2813 3.9583 3.7083 3.1667 3.0521 2.9271 2.5521 2.2841 2.5682

4.9375 5.1364 8.3125 8.1042 4.9792 4.4792 4.3542 4.1667 3.7292 3.1667 3.0521 2.9375 2.5521 2.3068 2.7045

IV Gulf of Mexiko

4.5000 5.0000 3.7292 5.6429

13.5000 6.3750 4.0625 3.8750 3.1667 3.0833 2.0714 2.7727 3.5208 3.8958 3.0208 2.8229 2.4271 2.3958 2.1250 2.0104 2.0000 1.9375 1.8438 1.6023 1.7955

4.1250 3.7292 3.1875 3.1354 2.6875 2.6591 2.6136 2.9091

353

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-19

Hamburg premium quotations for North American destinations (cont.)

North America

I North American east coast

II New Orleans

III Cuba

IV Gulf of Mexiko

1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1804–1859

1.7813 1.7396 1.8854 2.0938 2.1146 1.8750 1.8542 1.7396 1.4271 1.4063 1.3750 1.5875 1.6042 2.3542 2.0156 1.5341 1.4688 1.5000 1.4375 1.4479 1.5417 1.4583 1.5208 1.3854 1.2955 2.6936

2.6250 2.3958 2.4479 2.5938 2.5938 2.3229 2.2083 2.1750 1.7604 1.7917 1.6563 2.0972 1.8229 2.6042 2.3438 1.7708 1.7708 1.6875 1.6458 1.7188 1.6979 1.6771 1.7604 1.8438 1.7471 2.7745

2.6979 2.5104 2.6146 2.7708 2.6875 2.5938 2.5104 2.6500 2.2500 2.1458 2.1146 2.2159 2.1136 2.7250 2.6406 2.2083 2.2708 2.2188 2.1354 2.1667 2.2604 2.1979 2.3021 2.1458 2.1875 3.1063

3.0208 2.7813 2.7917 2.9318 3.3472 3.0000 2.6625 2.7250

3.0500 2.6406 2.6771 2.6563 2.5521 2.5208 2.5938 2.9479 3.0000 3.1458 2.7188 2.5521 2.9058

354 table a2-20

appendix 2 Premium quotations for Saint Thomas, 1782–1842, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Saint Thomas

I from Copenhagen

1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814

5.2273 4.8333 5.5833 5.7708 5.2708 5.5227 5.3750 4.9375 5.1250 4.9583 5.2083 5.4167 5.6458 6.4453 6.1042 5.9792 7.2917 8.5000 8.4167 11.1250 5.4792 6.1250 5.4000 4.5417 6.1429

II from Hamburg

4.5000 5.0000 3.7292 5.6429

13.5000

III from Flensburg

355

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-20

Premium quotations for Saint Thomas, 1782–1842, in percent (cont.)

Saint Thomas

I from Copenhagen

II from Hamburg

III from Flensburg

1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 average 1782–1807 average 1814–1842

6.4750 5.3333 4.7292 3.7500 3.3750 3.1042 3.3125 4.9167 4.4688 3.2826 3.4375 3.0417 2.3542 2.5417 1.8636 2.3333 2.0114 1.9318 1.5250 2.0000 1.9091 1.9750 2.3750 1.6528 1.6250 1.6477 1.5469 1.4219 5.9209 2.8550

6.3750 4.0625 3.8750 3.1667 3.0833 3.1771 2.9545 3.6042 4.0729 3.0417 2.9167 2.5208 2.4375 2.2083 2.1667 2.0729 1.9583 1.8542 1.6023 1.7955 1.7604 1.6458 1.8021 1.8438 1.8750 1.6563 1.7188 1.5000 – 2.5981

2.5469 3.3977 4.5000 4.3854 3.2500 3.4167 3.0000 2.5455 2.5833 2.0500 2.3333 2.0000 1.9318 1.5250 2.0000 1.8636 1.7500 1.9792 1.6528 1.7625 1.6477 1.5313 1.4219 – 2.3731

356 table a2-21

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for Caribbean destinations, 1804–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

The Caribbean

1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834

I II Saint Thomas Venezuela

III Curaçao

IV Haïti

3.5625 4.2727 7.5217 5.0000 4.7000 4.2292 3.0833 3.0000 2.7292 2.5417 2.4167 2.4583 2.0909 2.0682 2.3295

3.7500 4.5795

4.5000 5.0000 3.7292 5.6429

13.5000 6.3750 4.0625 3.8750 3.1667 3.0833 3.1771 2.9545 3.6042 4.0729 3.0417 2.9167 2.5208 2.4375 2.2083 2.1667 2.0729 1.9583 1.8542 1.6023 1.7955

3.5625 3.1667 9.4688 7.0000 5.2647 4.3333 3.9792 3.7708 3.3542 2.8958 2.6875 2.5729 2.3333 2.0455 2.2614

8.8889 7.2045 4.0625 3.0625 3.1458 2.5521 2.4792 2.3854 2.2708 2.0313 1.7386 2.0795

357

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-21

Hamburg premium quotations for Caribbean destinations (cont.)

The Caribbean

I II Saint Thomas Venezuela

1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1804–1859

1.7604 1.6458 1.8021 1.8438 1.8750 1.6563 1.7188 1.5000 1.5781 1.4375 1.4318 1.7125 1.4773 2.0500 1.8000 1.4875 1.6667 1.6563 1.5341 1.7813 1.8125 1.8854 2.2917 2.0938 1.8646 2.6936

III Curaçao

2.3438 2.1458 2.2396 2.2813 2.2500 1.9479 1.8333 1.6250

2.1458 1.9063 1.5417 1.6250 1.5417 1.4688 1.4375 1.4583 1.3958 1.4271 1.4167 1.2604 2.6854

IV Haïti 2.1042 2.0417 2.0625 2.2500 2.2396 2.0208 1.9167 1.6979

3.4669

3.0256

358 table a2-22

appendix 2 Hamburg premium quotations for South American destinations and California, 1820–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

South America

I Brazil

II Rio de la Plata

IIIa Valparaíso

IIIb Lima

1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852

2.8281 3.5909 4.3333 5.8068 3.8021 3.6771 3.3542 3.2292 2.8958 2.8021 2.8646 2.6771 2.3854 1.9583 2.3750 2.2813 2.1771 2.2500 2.3646 2.4167 2.1979 2.0833 1.9792 1.5938 1.5313 1.5729 1.5938 1.6771 2.3125 2.1250 1.7813 1.8646 1.8646

4.0625 4.5000 6.5556 9.0000 6.0000 4.6042 5.6250 4.8500 4.6000 3.9375 3.5625 3.2955 3.2292 2.7727 2.8864 2.7500 2.5625 2.6667 2.4167 2.6250 2.2917 1.7604 2.1875 1.7500 1.7083 1.7396 1.9583 1.9271 2.6042 2.4063 2.0313 2.0313 1.9792

5.8750 5.3333 5.4167 4.5417 4.1667 4.2083 4.2727 4.6364 4.4271 3.8333 3.9583 3.9167 3.8864 3.7917 3.5208 3.4500 2.7188 2.6875 2.5104 2.6000 2.6250 3.1354 3.1094 2.7083 2.7135 2.7188

7.0417 6.2500 5.8333 5.4167 4.7727 4.5417 4.7273 4.6364

IV California

359

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-22

Hamburg premium quotations for South American (cont.)

South America

I Brazil

II Rio de la Plata

IIIa Valparaíso

1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1820–1859

1.8125 1.5938 1.7500 1.6458 1.7292 1.5833 1.5208 2.3971

1.8958 1.7386 1.8646 1.7500 1.8333 1.9167 1.8542 3.0432

2.6875 2.5521 2.8021 2.6354 2.6042 2.3854 2.3646 3.4786

table a2-23

IIIb Lima

IV California

3.6023 3.9167 3.8958 3.9583 3.7500 3.2083 3.7219

Saint Petersburg premium quotations for American destinations, 1821–1834, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Russian transatlantic routes

I Brazil

II Havana

1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 average

6.7500 4.6667 7.1071 4.0417 4.2917 3.0000 3.2222 3.1667 3.1250 2.7143 3.0625 2.8594 2.1071 2.4286 3.7531

8.7500 11.3000 9.1429 4.7917 4.5417 4.0000 4.2222 3.6667 3.3750 3.1786 3.3750 3.0625 2.3571 2.9286 4.9066

360 table a2-24

East India

1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793

appendix 2 Premium quotations for destinations in East India, 1762–1820/34, in percent (annual average premium rates)

I from Portugal

7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 5.5833 5.5000 6.4167 6.5000 5.6250 5.5000 5.5000 5.5000 5.5000 5.6818 6.5000 6.5000 6.5000 6.5000 6.5000 6.5000

II from Copenhagen

IV III from Trieste from Gothenberg & Leghorn

7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 7.0000 5.0000 5.2857 6.0833 7.0000 6.2500 6.7083 6.5417 7.0000 7.3750 7.0417 6.6250 7.5000 7.5000 7.5000 7.5000 7.5000 7.5000

5.0000 5.4167 5.5000 5.5000 5.5000 5.5000 5.5000 5.5000 5.5000 5.5000 5.5000 5.5000

6.0000 6.4167 6.5000 6.6667 7.5000 7.0455 7.5000 7.5000 7.5000 7.5000 7.5000 7.5000

V from Hamburg

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-24

361

Premium quotations for destinations in East India (cont.)

II from Copenhagen

IV III from Trieste from Gothenberg & Leghorn

8.6000 11.3333 14.2500 16.7083 8.2500

9.5000 9.9167 8.1875 10.0000 11.0833 12.4583 14.2500 15.1250 8.7083

5.5000 5.5000 5.6250 6.0000 9.5833 12.2500 14.2500 16.7083 9.5833

7.5000 9.0000 11.1429 10.0000 10.8750 16.1667 15.9167 19.4167 10.0833

9.0000 9.8000 9.2917 11.6429

10.0000 9.5000 9.5417 10.2143

9.5000 9.7000 9.7083 10.2143

10.2500 11.6000 10.4167 11.5714

East India

I from Portugal

1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826

6.5000

10.4000 9.0000 10.2500 8.0000

11.4500 9.7083 9.2083 6.9583 4.8333 5.2917 5.2083 6.6667 7.1250 6.8750 6.8333 7.5500

11.4500 9.7083 9.1364 6.7727 5.2727 5.5000

V from Hamburg

15.5000 14.3000 11.7083 13.3333

5.5000 5.3182 6.4167 8.3333 7.0000 6.5417 7.5000

362 table a2-24

East India

1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 average 1762–1793 average 1762–1807

table a2-25

appendix 2 Premium quotations for destinations in East India (cont.)

IV III from Trieste from Gothenberg & Leghorn

V from Hamburg

6.4769

6.4545 6.2917 5.5000 5.5556 5.5000 5.6364 5.5000 5.4000 6.9035

5.4514

7.0941

6.4167 5.9583 5.8333 5.2917 5.2917 5.0000 5.0114 4.8409 –

7.4921

8.0444

7.5816

9.5627

–

I from Portugal

II from Copenhagen

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Indian Ocean, 1820–1859, in percent (annual average premium rates)

Indian Ocean

I Bengal & East Asia

II Bengal & Southeast Asia

III Mauritius & Cape

1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830

5.5000 5.3182 6.4167 8.3333 7.0000 6.5417 7.5000 6.4167 5.9583 5.8333 5.2917

5.4000 6.0833 7.1667 5.7917 6.2500 6.9167 5.9583 5.1667 5.2917 4.7083

4.4375 4.0909 5.0833 6.1250 5.2609 5.1250 5.7500 5.0000 4.6250 4.6250 3.9167

IV Australia

The Premium Quotations in the Hamburg Price Current table a2-25

363

Hamburg premium quotations for destinations in the Indian Ocean (cont.)

Indian Ocean

I Bengal & East Asia

II Bengal & Southeast Asia

III Mauritius & Cape

1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 average 1820–1859

5.2917 5.0000 5.0114 4.8409 4.9167 4.6875 4.7083 4.6667 4.5455 4.2500

4.5000 4.1136 4.5000 4.3636 4.3542 4.1250 4.1667 4.0417 4.0909 3.8958 3.5250 3.1071 3.0417 2.6563 2.4688 2.3958 2.4432 2.7292 2.7969 2.4583 2.4479 2.3750 2.3958 2.3438 2.3750 2.3438 2.3542 2.2500 2.1771 3.8351

4.0625 3.9583 3.5455 3.9545 3.8333 3.8125 3.7917 3.7500 3.2386 2.9167 3.0455 2.6389 2.4375 2.2813 2.1667 2.1458 1.9167 2.4792 2.2656 1.8646 1.8021 1.7708 1.7292 1.6591 1.6875 1.6667 1.7708 1.7292 1.6250 3.2396

3.4583 3.3542 2.9896 2.9583 2.8333 2.5625 2.6667 3.1875 2.8229 2.8438 2.7604 2.7917 2.7917 2.8021 2.7708 2.7292 2.6771 2.7500 4.3533

IV Australia

2.5795 2.4896 2.5000 2.5313 2.3125 2.1458 2.4265

Bibliography Archives

Staatsarchiv Hamburg (StAHH)



Stiftung Hanseatisches Wirtschaftsarchiv der Handelskammer Hamburg (SHWA), Safebestand der Commerzbibliothek

111-1 Senat, Cl. VII Lit. Ke Nr. 12: Generalia, Schiffahrt und Handel betreffend. 231-3: Handelsregister. 371-2: Admiralitätskollegium. 371-6, Nr. 1242–1269: Schiffahrt- und Hafendeputation. 613-3/94, Nr. 1–4: Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure von 1797. 621-1/1: Archiv der Patriotischen Assekuranz-Compagnie.

S/47: Bericht über das Hamburger See-Assecuranz-Geschäft des Jahres … von O[tto] C[hristian] Gaedechens, 1835–1852. S/185: Hermann Langenbeck, Anmerckungen über das Hamburgische Schiff- und See-Recht, wie solches in den XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. XVIII. und XIX. Tituln des Andern Theils Stadt-Buchs enthalten, Und die dahin gehörige Rechte der Admiralität, Assecurance, Avarie, Dispache, Pilotage, des Schiff-Baues, der Strand- und Bergung, Dupe und Haven, wie auch der Grönlandischen Fahrt; Nach dieser Stadt, wie auch allgemeinen und verschiedener Nationen … See-Rechten … gesammlet, beschrieben und ausgearbeitet, Hamburg 1727. S/420, fasc. 1–5. S/450: Die Assecuranz-Comp[agnie] von 1856. S/599 Nr. 1 rot. S/599 Nr. 2 rot. S/599 Nr. 14,1 rot; Nr. 14,2 rot. S/599 Nr. 19 rot. S/599 Nr. 37,1 rot. S/599 Nr. 46,2 rot. S/599 Nr. 48,1 rot; Nr. 48,2 rot. S/599 Nr. 55 rot: Handelskrise 1857. S/599 Nr. 66 rot; Nr. 67 rot; Nr. 68 rot: Akten zum Hamburgischen See-Versicherungswesen. S/599 Nr. 87 rot. S/599 Nr. 165a blau; 165b blau; 165c blau: Akten zum Hamburgischen SeeVersicherungswesen. S/1093: Nicolas Magens, Versuch über Assecuranzen, Havereyen und Bodmereyen insgemein; und über verschiedene hiebeygefügte wirckliche Vorfälle und deren

Bibliography

365

Berechnungen insbesondere nebst einer Sammlung der vornehmsten alten und neuen Verordnungen etc. von einem Kaufmanne in London, Hamburg 1753 [engl.: An Essay on Insurances (London, 1755)]. S/1122: Allgemeiner Plan Hamburgischer See-Versicherungen, hrsg. v. der Commerzdeputation, 1847 mit Ergänzungen von 1853. SH 65: Warenpreiskurant 1762–1820. SH 103: Assekuranz- und Bodmereiwesen 1748–1820.



Printed Sources

Hamburger Preiskuranten

Preis Courant der Wahren in Partheÿen, Hamburg 1736–1751. Preis-Courant der Waaren in Partheÿen, Hamburg 1752–1771. Preis-Courant der Waaren in Partheyen, Hamburg 1772–1821 (which from 1782 to 1802 bore the additional information “Berechnung der Waaren bey Partheyen in Hamburger Banco ohne Rabatt” as subheading). Allgemeiner Preis-Courant, Hamburg 1822–1823 (Juni). Allgemeiner Preis-Courant von Waaren in Partheyen, Hamburg 1823 (Juli)–1839. Allgemeiner Preis-Courant von Waaren in Partheien, Hamburg 1840–1842. Hamburg. Preis-Courant von Waaren in Parthieen, Hamburg 1843–1859. [copies are available in the Wirtschafts- und Währungshistorische Sammlungen at the Chair of Social and Economic History of Leipzig University] Arnould, Joseph, A Treatise on the Law of Marine Insurance and Average. With References to the American Cases and the Later Continental Authorities (London, 1848). Baasch, Ernst (ed.), Quellen zur Geschichte von Hamburgs Handel und Schiffahrt im 17., 18. und 19. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 1910). Beschreibung der Handlung und des Industriefleißes der K. K. Seestädte und Freihäfen Triest und Fiume (Leipzig and Triest, 1804). Bohn, Gottfried Christian, Wohlerfahrner Kaufmann, welcher umständliche Nachricht ertheilet, in was für Waaren die vornehmsten Handels-Städte in Deutschland, Spanien, Portugal, Frankreich, Eng- und Holland, Brabant, Dännemark, Polen, Schweden, Italien, der Schweiz, Lief- und Rußland verkehren, dem auch die neuesten WechselOrdnungen und andere dahin gehörige Handels-Sachen hinzugefüget worden (Hamburg, 1750). Bondé, Knut, Hambourg et son commerce. Principalement dans ses relations avec la Suède et la Norvège (Hambourg, 1849). Crüger, Carl, Handelsgeographie, oder, Beschreibung der Erde, was sie für den Kaufmann ist (Hamburg, 1833–1836).

366

Bibliography

Das gewerbfleißige Deutschland; oder systematisch geordnetes Verzeichniß der jetzt lebenden Kaufleute, Fabrikanten, Manufakturisten … nebst Erläuterungen zur Handlungserdbeschreibung, Fabrik- und Waarenkunde, 8. Theil, den 2. Bd. der Handlung von Hamburg enthaltend (Leipzig, 1805). Denzel, Markus A., Handbook of World Exchange Rates, 1590–1914 (Farnham and Burlington, 2010). Der Stadt Hamburg Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung, gedruckt und publicirt auf Befehl E. Hochw. Raths daselbst (Hamburg, 1731). Émérigon, Balthazard-Marie, Traité des Assurances et des Contrats à la Grosse (Marseille, 1783). Gehler, Johann Samuel Traugott and Heinrich Wilhelm Brandes, “Meteorologie,” in Physikalisches Wörterbuch: Me – My, vol. 6/3 (1837) 1817–2083. Grasmeyer, G. L. Wilhelm, Geschichtliche Wahrnehmungen beim See-Assekuranz-Wesen in Hamburg seit den letzten Zwanzig Jahren (Hamburg, 1824). “Great-Britain und Napoléon. Zwei neue Dampfschiffe mit archimedischer Schraube,” Illustrirte Zeitung Nr. 21, 18. November 1843 (Leipzig, 1843) 332–335. Histoire de la Ville de Hambourg, vol. II (Paris, 1809). Kilburger, Johann Philipp, Kurzer Unterricht von dem russischen Handel, wie selbiger mit aus- und eingehenden Waaren 1674 durch ganz Russland getrieben worden (Hamburg, 1769). Köster, J. C., Hamburger Staats-Kalender auf das Jahr 1835 (Hamburg, [1835]). Le Moine d’Espine, De Koophandel van Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 51734). Marperger, Paul Jacob, Moscowitischer Kaufmann (Lübeck, 1805). Molloy, Charles, De Jure Maritimo et Navali (London, 1676). Oddy, J[oshua] Jepson, European commerce, shewing new and secure channels of trade with the continent of Europe; detailing the produce, manufactures, and commerce, of Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany; as well as the trade of the rivers Elbe, Weser, and Ems ; with a general view of the trade, navigation, produce, and manufactures of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Ireland (Philadelphia, 1807). Pagnini della Ventura, Giovanni-Francesco, Della decima e di varie altre gravezze imposte dal commune di Firenze, della moneta e della mercatura de’ Fiorentini fino al secolo XVI, 4 vols. (Lisbona and Lucca, 1765/66), vol. IV: La Pratica della Mercatura scritta de Giovanni di Antonio da Uzzano nel 1442. Park, James Allan, A System of the Law of Marine Insurances, with three Chapters on Bottomry, on Insurances on Lives and on Insurances against Fire (London, 1787). Pegolotti, Francesco Balducci, La pratica della mercatura, ed. Alan Evans (Cambridge MA, 1936; repr. New York, 1970). Plan der Anno 1841 prolongirten zweiten See- und Feuer-Assekuranz-Compagnie (Hamburg, 1841).

Bibliography

367

Schneider, Jürgen; Oskar Schwarzer and Friedrich Zellfelder (eds.), Währungen der Welt I: Europäische und Nordamerikanische Devisenkurse 1777–1914, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1991). Schneider, Jürgen; Oskar Schwarzer and Friedrich Zellfelder (eds.), Währungen der Welt I: Europäische und nordamerikanische Devisenkurse 1777–1914, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1991). Schneider, Jürgen; Oskar Schwarzer and Petra Schnelzer (eds.), Statistik der Geldund Wechselkurse in Deutschland und im Ostseeraum (18. und 19. Jahrhundert) (= Quellen und Forschungen zur Historischen Statistik von Deutschland, vol. XII) (St. Katharinen, 1992). Schneider, Jürgen; Oskar Schwarzer; Friedrich Zellfelder and Markus A. Denzel (eds.), Währungen der Welt VI: Geld und Währungen in Europa im 18. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1992). Schneider, Jürgen; Otto-Ernst Krawehl and Markus A. Denzel (eds.), Statistik des seewärtigen Hamburger Einfuhrhandels im 18. Jahrhundert nach den Admiralitäts- und Convoygeld-Einnahmebüchern (= Quellen und Forschungen zur Historischen Statistik von Deutschland, vol. XX) (St. Katharinen, 2001). Schumann, August, Die Handlung von Hamburg, oder, Beschreibung der Kaufmännischen und Manufaktur-Gewerbe, und zuverlässige Nachrichten von den Handelsanstalten, den Münzen, Maassen, Gewichten, Zöllen, Verordnungen u.s.w. dieser ersten Handelsstadt von Deutschland, 1. Bd. (Leipzig, 1805). Smyth, William Henry, The Sailor’s Word-Book. An Alphabetical Digest of Nautical Terms, rev. Edward Belcher (Cambridge, 1867). Soetbeer, Adolph, Die deutsche Handels- und Zollverfassung und das Freihafen-System. Mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Hamburg (Hamburg, 1848). Soetbeer, Adolph, Ueber Hamburgs Handel, vol. 1 (Hamburg, 1840); vol. 2: Statistik des Hamburger Handels 1839, 1840 und 1841 (Hamburg, 1842); vol. 3: Statistik des Hamburger Handels 1842, 1843 und 1844 (Hamburg, 1846). Statistik der Geld- und Wechselkurse in Deutschland (1815–1913) (= Historische Statistik von Deutschland, Bd. XI), eds. Schneider, Jürgen and Oskar Schwarzer (St. Katharinen, 1990). “Tabellarische Übersichten des Hamburgischen Handels,” Zeitschrift für Versicherungswesen 15 Nr. 33 (24 August 1891) 406. Tabellarische Übersichten des hamburgischen Handels während der vier Jahre 1845–1848 (Hamburg, [1849]). Tabellarische Uebersichten des hamburgischen Handels im Jahre 1850, ausgearbeitet von dem handelsstatistischen Bureau (Hamburg, [1851]); dito für die Jahre 1851 [1852]– 1859 [1860].

368

Bibliography

Tonnies, P[eter] D. W., Chronik des Hamburger See-Assecuranz-Geschäfts im Jahr 1824. Begleitet von mehreren darauf Bezug habenden Aufsätzen (Hamburg, 1825). Tonnies, P[eter] D. W., Chronik des Hamburger See-Assecuranz-Geschäfts im Jahr 1825. Begleitet von mehreren darauf Bezug habenden Aufsätzen (Hamburg, 1826). Tonnies, P[eter] D. W., Chronik des Hamburger See-Assecuranz-Geschäfts im Jahr 1826. Nebst mehreren Aufsätzen und Belegen verwandten Inhalts (Hamburg, 1827). Tonnies, P[eter] D. W., Verfolg der Chronik des Hamburger See-Assekuranz-Geschäftes im Jahr 1823 und der Ansichten über die geschichtlichen Wahrnehmungen des Herrn G. L. Wilh. Grasmeyer (Hamburg, 1824). Tonnies, Peter D. W., Merkantilistisch-geschichtliche Darstellung der BarbareskenStaaten und ihrer Verhältnisse zu den Europäischen und Vereinigten NordAmerikanischen Staaten (Hamburg, 1826). Westphalen, J. E. F., Ueber die hamburgische Schiffahrt mit eigenen Schiffen (Hamburg, 1827).

Literature Aalestad, Katherine, “Paying for War: Experiences of Napoleonic Rule in the Hanseatic Cities,” Central European History 39 (2006) 641–675. Addobbati, Andrea, Commercio, rischio, Guerra. Il mercato delle assicurazioni marittime di Livorno (1694–1795) (Roma, 2007). Addobbati, Andrea, “Italy 1500–1800: Cooperation and Competition,” in A. B. Leonard (ed.), Marine Insurance. Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850 (Houndsmills and Basingstoke, 2016) 47–77. Addobbati, Andrea, “L’assurance à Livourne au XVIIIe siècle, entre mutualisme et marché concurrentiel,” in Clara Eugenia Nuñez (ed.), Insurance in Industrial Societies: Economic Role Agents and Market from the 18th Century / L’assurance dans les sociétes industrielles: rôle économique, acteurs et marché du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours / El seguro en las sociedades industriales: papel económico, actores y mercado, del siglo XVIII a nuestras días (Sevilla, 1998) 13–30. Ahrens, Gerhard, Krisenmanagement 1857. Staat und Kaufmannschaft in Hamburg während der ersten Weltwirtschaftskrise (Hamburg, 1986). Ahrens, Gerhard, “Von der Franzosenzeit bis zur Verabschiedung der neuen Verfassung 1806–1860,” in Werner Jochmann / Hans-Dieter Loose (eds.), Hamburg. Geschichte der Stadt und ihrer Bewohner, vol. 1: Von den Anfängen bis zur Reichsgründung, ed. Hans-Dieter Loose (Hamburg, 1982) 415–490. Alfieri, Vittorio, La partita doppia applicata alle scritture delle antiche aziende mercantili veneziane (Torino, 1891).

Bibliography

369

Altstaedt, Karl Heinrich, Schauerlüd, Schutenschupser und Kaitorten: Arbeiter im Hamburger Hafen (Erfurt, 2011). Ammannati, Francesco (ed.), Religione e istituzioni religiose nell’economia europea, 1000–1800 / Religion and Religious Institutions in the European Economy, 1000–1800. Atti della “XLIII Settimana di Studi”, 7–11 maggio 2011 (Firenze, 2012). Ammannati, Francesco (ed.), Sciavitù e servaggio nell’economia europea, secc. XI– XVIII / Slavery and Serfdom in the European Economy from the 11th to the 18th Centuries. Atti della “XLV Settimana di Studi”, 14–18 aprile 2013 (Firenze, 2014). Amsinck, Caesar, “Die ersten hamburgischen Assecuranz-Compagnien und der Actienhandel im Jahre 1720,” Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte 9 (1894) 465–494. Anderson, Roger C., Naval Wars in the Baltic, 1522–1850 (London, 1969). Angster, Julia, Erdbeeren und Piraten. Die Royal Navy und die Ordnung der Welt 1770– 1860 (Göttingen, 2012). Ankum, Hans, “Tabula Pompeiana 13: ein Seefrachtvertrag oder ein Seedarlehn?” IURA. Rivista internazionale di diretto romano e antico 29 (1978) 156–173. Arends, Fridrich, Gemählde der Sturmfluten vom 3.–5. Februar 1825 (Bremen, 1826). Aretin, Karl Otmar Frhr. v., “Fürst Kaunitz und die österreichisch-ostindische Handelskompagnie von 1775. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des österreichischen Staatsbewußtseins unter Kaiser Joseph II.,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 46/3 (1959) 361–377. Arfs, Jörn H., Die Beziehungen der Hansestadt Hamburg zu den La Plata-Staaten, 1815– 1866 (Münster, 1991). Aristidou, Ekaterini Chr., “Maritime Insurance of Ragusan Ship Routes in the Mediterranean and Particularly to Cyprus from the 15th to the 18th Century,” in: Centre de Recherches néohelleniques (ed.), Actes du IIe colloque international d’histoire (Athènes, 1985) 401–413. Armenteros Martínez, Iván, “Hacia el Mediterráneo Atlántico. La partcipación catalana en el primer tráfico atlántico de esclavos (finales del siglo XV–principios del XVI),” in: Francesco Ammannati (ed.), Sciavitù e servaggio nell’economia europea, secc. XI–XVIII / Slavery and Serfdom in the European Economy from the 11th to the 18th Centuries. Atti della “XLV Settimana di Studi”, 14–18 aprile 2013 (Firenze, 2014) 631–650. Arrighi, Giovanni; Takeshi Hamashita and Mark Selden (eds.), The Resurgence of East Asia. 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspectives (London and New York, 2003). Aschmann, Birgit and Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann (eds.), 1813 und die Folgen für Europa: Entgrenzung und Einhegung (Stuttgart, 2015). Asdrachas, Spyros I. (ed.), Greek Economic History, 15th–19th Centuries, vol. I (Athens, 2007).

370

Bibliography

Ashburner, Walter, The Rhodian Sea-Law (Oxford, 1909; repr. Aalen, 1976). Aspetti della vita economica medievale. Atti del Convegno di Studi nel X Anniversario della morte di Federigo Melis, 10–14 marzo 1984 (Firenze, 1985). Avallone, Paola, “Transformazioni e permanenze nel campo assecurativo nel Mediterraneo: il caso del Regno di Napoli tra XVI e XIX secolo,” in Raffaela Salvemini (ed.), Istitzione e traffici nel Mediterraneo tra età antica e crescita moderna (Napoli, 2009) 161–197. Baasch, Ernst, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Hamburg und Amerika (Hamburg, 1892). Baasch, Ernst, “Der Verkehr mit Kriegsmaterialien aus und nach den Hansestädten vom Ende des 16. bis Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts,” Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 137 (3rd ser. 82) (1932/II) 538–543. Baasch, Ernst, “Die Anfänge des modernen Verkehrs Hamburgs mit Vorderindien u. Ostasien,” Mitteilungen der geographischen Gesellschaft in Hamburg 13 (1897), 92–130. Baasch, Ernst, Die Börtfahrt zwischen Hamburg, Bremen und Holland (Hamburg, 1898). Baasch, Ernst, Die Handelskammer zu Hamburg, 1665–1915, 2 vols. (Hamburg 1915). Baasch, Ernst, Die Hansestädte und die Barbaresken. Mit einem Anhang (Kassel, 1897). Baasch, Ernst, “Ein Verzeichnis der hamburgischen Kauffahrteiflotte von 1672,” Zeitschrift für Hamburgische Geschichte 15 (1910) 39–52. Baasch, Ernst, “Geschichte des hamburgischen Waren-Preiskourant,” in Forschungen zur hamburgischen Handelsgeschichte III (Hamburg, 1902) 123–171. Baasch, Ernst, “Hamburg und Bremen und die deutschen wirtschaftlichen Einheitsbestrebungen von der Begründung des Zollvereins bis zum Anschluß Hannovers (1854),” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 47 (vol. 27) (1922) 115–169. Baasch, Ernst, “Hamburg und die Compagnie von Ostende,” Zeitschrift für Social- und Wirthschaftsgeschichte 5 (1981) 309–319. Baasch, Ernst, “Hamburg und Holland im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 16 (1910) 45–102. Baasch, Ernst, Hamburgs Convoyschiffahrt und Convoywesen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Schiffahrt und Schiffahrtseinrichtungen im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 1896). Baasch, Ernst, Hamburgs Handel und Verkehr im 19. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 1901). Baasch, Ernst, “Handel und Öffentlichkeit der Presse in Hamburg,” Preußische Jahrbücher 110 (1902) 121–142. Baasch, Ernst, “Zur Geschichte der Berlin-Hamburger Reihefahrt,” Zeitschrift des Vereins für hamburgische Geschichte 9 (1890) 182–201. Baasch, Ernst, “Zur Geschichte der ersten deutschen Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft im Verkehr zwischen Hamburg und England,” Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 115/1 (3rd ser. 60) (1920) 143–149.

Bibliography

371

Baasch, Ernst, “Zur Geschichte des hamburgischen Heringshandels,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 12 (1906) 61–100. Baasch, Ernst, “Zur Statistik des Ein- und Ausfuhrhandels Hamburgs Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 54 (1929) 89–144. Babendererde, Paul, “Rostocks Seehandel während der Kontinentalsperre,” Beiträge zur Geschichte der Stadt Rostock 21 (1938/39 [1939]) 41–51. Bade, Klaus J., Deutsche im Ausland – Fremde in Deutschland. Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart (München, 1992). Barbour, Violet, Capitalism in Amsterdam in the 17th Century (Ann Arbour, 1963). Barbour, Violet, “Marine Risks and Insurance in the Seventeenth Century,” Journal of Economic and Business History (1928/29) 561–596. Barbudieri, Fulvio, L’Espansione mercantile austriaca nei territori d’Oltremare nel XVIII secolo e suoi riflessi politici ed economici (Milano, 1978). Barbudieri, Fulvio, “Maritime Commerce of the Habsburg Empire: The Port of Trieste, 1789–1913,” in Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos; Constantinos D. Svolopoulos and Béla K. Király (eds.), Southeast European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies from the Mid-Eighteenth Century to 1914 (Thessaloniki, 1988) 221–244. Bartsch, Karin, Hamburgs Handelsbeziehungen mit China und Britisch-Ostindien (1842– 1867) (Hamburg, 1956). Basas Fernandez, Manuel, El seguro maritime en Burgos (siglo XVI) (Bilbao, 1963). Baskes, Jeremy, “Cadiz 1780–1808: A Corporate Experiment,” in: A. B. Leonard (ed.), Marine Insurance. Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850 (Houndsmills and Basingstoke, 2016) 229–247. Baugh, Daniel A., The Global Seven Years War, 1754–1763. Britain and France in a Great Power Contest (Harlow, 2011). Baumgart, Winfried, The Crimean War, 1853–1856 (London, 1999). Bavendamm, Dirk et al. (eds.), 150 Jahre C. Woermann. Wagnis Afrika. Die Geschichte eines Hamburger Handelshauses 1837–1987 (Hamburg, 1987). Becker, Felix and Holger M. Meding (eds.), Iberische Welten. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Günther Kahle (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 1994). Becker, Felix, “Die Hansestädte und Mexiko 1825–1867. Ein Kapitel hanseatischer Vertragsdiplomatie und Handelsgeschichte,” Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte 69 (1983). Becker, Ursula, Entwicklung und Organisation des hanseatischen Kaffeehandels im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Diss. rer. pol. Münster, 1995). Beeching, Jack, The Chinese Opium Wars (London, 1975). Behrens, Hans Oscar, Grundlagen und Entwickelung der regelmäßigen deutschen Schif�fahrt nach Südamerika (Halle/Saale, 1905). Behringer, Wolfgang, Tambora und das Jahr ohne Sommer. Wie ein Vulkan die Welt in die Krise stürzte (München, 2015).

372

Bibliography

Bensa, Enrico, Francesco di Marco da Prato. Notizie e documenti sulla mercatura italiana del secolo XIV (Milano, 1928). Bensa, Enrico, Histoire du contrat d’assurance au Moyen Âge (Paris, 1897). Bensa, Enrico, Il contratto di assicurazione nel medio evo. Studi e ricerche (Genova, 1884). Bernholz, Peter and Rudolf Vaubel (eds.), Explaining Monetary and Financial Innovation. A Historical Analysis (Heidelberg and New York, 2014). Berti, Marcello, Economia marittima e assicurazione a Pisa nella prima metà del trecento, in: Aspetti della vita economica medievale. Atti del Convegno di Studi nel X Anniversario della morte di Federigo Melis, 10–14 marzo 1984 (Firenze, 1985) 413–422. Beukemann, Ulrich, “Die Geschichte des Hamburger Mäklerrechts,” in Deutschlandrechtliche Beiträge 7/5 (Heidelberg, 1921). Beutin, Ludwig, Der deutsche Seehandel im Mittelmeergebiet bis zu den Napoleonischen Kriegen (Neumünster, 1933). Beutin, Ludwig, “Nordwestdeutschland und die Niederlande seit dem Dreißigjährigen Kriege,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 32 (1939) 105–147. Beyrer, Klaus (ed.), So weit das Auge reicht: Die Geschichte der optischen Telegrafie, ed. Museum für Post und Kommunikation (Frankfurt am Main) (Karlsruhe, 1995). Bezold, Andreas von, Die schleswig-holsteinische Erhebung 1848–1851. Im Spannungsfeld zwischen Deutschland und Dänemark (Hamburg, 2014). Bippen, Wilhelm von, Seeversicherung und Seeraub eines hansischen Kaufmanns im 16. Jahrhundert (Bremen, 1889). Black, Jeremy, European Warfare in a Global Context, 1660–1815 (London, 2007). Blumhardt, “Der Einfluß des kanonischen Wucherverbots auf die Entwicklung der Assekuranz,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft 11 (1911) 66–80. Bogatyreva, Anastasia, “England 1660–1720: Corporate or Private?” in A. B. Leonard (ed.), Marine Insurance. Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850 (Houndsmills and Basingstoke, 2016), 179–203. Bohlmann, Karl Otto, Die Napoleonische Kontinentalsperre und ihre Wirkungen in Wismar (Diss. Rostock, 1933). Böhme, Klaus-Richard, “Schwedens Teilnahme am Siebenjährigen Krieg  – Innenund außenpolitische Voraussetzungen und Rückwirkungen,” in Bernhard Kroener (ed.), Europa im Zeitalter Friedrichs des Großen  – Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Kriege (München, 1989), 193–212. Bohn, Robert, “Die Barbaresken und die deutsche Seefahrt im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert,” in Volker Grieb and Sabine Todt (eds.), Piraterie von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart, 2012), 139–153. Bohn, Robert, “Von Sklavenkassen und Konvoifahrten. Die arabischen Seeräuber und die deutsche Seefahrt im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert,” in Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann (ed.), Geschichtsbilder. Festschrift für Michael Salewski zum 65. Geburtstag (Stuttgart, 2003), 25–37.

Bibliography

373

Boiteux, L[ucas] A[lexandre], La fortune de mer. Le besoin de sécurité et les débuts de l’assurance maritime (Paris, 1968). Bono, Salvatore, Piraten und Korsaren im Mittelmeer. Seekrieg, Handel und Sklaverei vom 16. bis 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 2009). Borscheid, Peter, “Mit Sicherheit leben. Zur Geschichte und Gegenwart des Versicherungswesens,” Zeithistorische Forschungen  / Studies in Contemporary History 7/2 (2010) 188–202, URL:  http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/2-2010/ id=4422 (Abruf: 20.11.2015). Bosher, John F., “The Paris Business World and the Seaports under Louis XV. Speculators in Marine Insurance, Naval Finances and Trade,” Histoire Sociale  / Social History 12 (1979) 281–297. Boxer, Charles R., O Império Marítimo Português. 1415–1825 (Lisboa, 2001). Brakensiek, Stefan; Christoph Marx and Benjamin Scheller (eds.), Wagnisse. Risiken eingehen, Risiken analysieren, von Risiken erzählen (Frankfurt/Main and New York, 2017). Brinner, Ludwig, Die deutsche Grönlandfahrt (Berlin, 1913). Brockstedt, Jürgen (ed.), Wirtschaftliche Wechsellagen in Schleswig-Holstein vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart (Neumünster, 1991). Brockstedt, Jürgen, Die Schiffahrts- und Handelsbeziehungen Schleswig-Holsteins nach Lateinamerika 1815–1848 (Köln and Wien, 1975). Büsch, Johann Georg, Theoretisch-praktische Darstellung der Handlung in deren mannigfaltigen Geschäften, 2 parts (Hamburg, 1797). Büsch, Johann Georg, Geschichtliche Beurtheilung der großen Handelsverwirrung im Jahre 1799. Nebst Anmerkungen mit besonderer Bezugnahme auf die Krisis von 1857 von H. S. Hertz (Hamburg, 1858). Büsch, Johann Georg, Sämtliche Schriften über die Handlung, hierin: Geschichtliche Beurtheilung der am Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts entstandenen großen Handlungsverwirrung (Hamburg, 1800). Büsch, Johann Georg, Versuch einer Geschichte der Hamburgischen Handlung (Hamburg, 1797). Butel, Paul, “France, the Antilles, and Europe in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Renewals of Foreign Trade,” in James D. Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires. Long-distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750 (Cambridge, 1993 [1990]) 153–173. Butel, Paul, “Les négociants allemands de Bordeaux dans la deuxième moitié du XVIIIe siècle,” in Jürgen Schneider (ed.), Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege II: Wirtschaftskräfte in der europäischen Expansion. Festschrift für Hermann Kellenbenz (Stuttgart, 1978) 589–613. Calhoun, George M., “Risk in Sea Loans in Ancient Athens,” Journal of Economic and Business History 2 (1930) 561–584.

374

Bibliography

Campbell, John, The Spanish Empire in America (London, 1747). Carrasco González, María Guadalupe, “El negocio de los seguros marítimos en Cádiz a finales del siglo XVIII,” Hispania 59/1 núm. 201 (1999) 269–304. Casado Alonso, Hilario, “El comercio del hierro vasco visto a través de los seguros marítimos burgaleses (1565–1596),” Istas Memoria. Revista de estudios marítimos del Pais Vasco 4 (2003) 165–195. Casado Alonso, Hilario, “El mercado internacional de seguros de Burgos en el siglo XVI,” Boletín de la Institución Fernán González 219 (1992) 277–306. Casado Alonso, Hilario, “El seguro marítimo en la Carrera de Indias en la época de Felipe II,” in Juan José Iglesias Rodríguez; Rafael M. Pérez García and Manuel F. Fernández Chaves (eds.), Comercio y cultura en la edad moderna. Comunicaciones de la XIII Reunión cientéfica de la Funación Española de Historia Moderna (Sevilla, 2015) 943–960. Casado Alonso, Hilario, “Juan Henríquez, un corredor de seguros de Amberes a mediados del siglo XVI,” in Palabras de Archivo. Homenaje a Milagros Moratinos Palomero (Burgos, 2018) 49–68. Casado Alonso, Hilario, “Los seguros marítimos de Burgos. Observatorio del comercio internacional portugés en el siglo XVI,” Revista da Faculdade de Letras História, Porto, III série 4 (2003) 213–242. Casado Alonso, Hilario, El seguro marítimo en Castilla en los siglos XV y XVI (Medina del Campo, 2021). Cavaciocchi, Simonetta (ed.), Produzione e commercio della carta e del libro, secc. XIII– XVIII (Prato, 1992). Cavaciocchi, Simonetta (ed.), Ricchezza del mare. Ricchezza dal mare. Secc. XIII–XVIII. Atti della “Trentasettesima Settimana di Studi”, 11–15 aprile 2005 (Firenze, 2006). Ceccarelli, Giovanni, “Coping with Unknown Risks in Renaissance Florence: Insurers, Friars and Abacus Teachers,” in: Cornel Zwierlein (ed.), The Dark Side of Knowledge. Histories of Ignorance, 1400 to 1800 (Leiden and Boston, 2016) 117–138. Ceccarelli, Giovanni, “Risikostrategien auf den Versicherungsmärkten der Frühen Neuzeit am Beispiel Florenz,” in Stefan Brakensiek; Christoph Marx and Benjamin Scheller (eds.), Wagnisse. Risiken eingehen, Risiken analysieren, von Risiken erzählen (Frankfurt/Main and New York, 2017) 63–89. Ceccarelli, Giovanni, “Risky Business: Theological and Canonical Thought on Insurance from the Thirteenth to the Seventeenth Century,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 31/3 (2001) 607–658. Ceccarelli, Giovanni, “Stime senza probalità. Assicurazione e rischio nella Firenze rinascimentale,” Quaderni storici 3 (2010) 651–703. Ceccarelli, Giovanni, “The Price for Risk-Taking: Marine Insurance and Probability Calculus in the Late Middle Ages,” Journ@l électronique d’histoire des probabilités et de

Bibliography

375

la statistique / Electronic Journ@l for History of Probability and Statistics 3/1 (2007) 1–26. Ceccarelli, Giovanni, Risky Markets. Marine Insurance in Renaissance Florence (Leiden and Boston, 2021). Centre de Recherches néohelleniques (ed.), Actes du IIe colloque internationale d’histoire (Athènes, 1985). Cesarani, David (ed.), Jews and Port Cities, 1590–1990: Commerce, Community and Cosmopolitanism (London, 2006). Cespedes de Castillo, Guillermo, Seguros marítimos en la carrera de Indias (Madrid, 1948). Chartrand, René and Patrice Courcelle, Gibraltar 1779–1783: The Great Siege (Oxford, 2006). Chaunu, Pierre, Séville et l’Amerique aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles (Paris, 1977). Childs, Wendy R., “England’s Maritime and Commercial Networks in the Late Middle Ages,” in Reti marittime come fattori dell’integrazione europea / Maritime Networks as a Factor in European Integration. Selezione di ricerche / Selection of Essays (Firenze, 2019) 89–115. Çizakça, Murat, Islamic Capitalism and Finance. Origins, Evolution and the Future (Cheltenham, 2011). Clapp, Edwin J., The Port of Hamburg (New Haven, London and Oxford, 1911). Clark, John G., La Rochelle and the Atlantic Economy during the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore, 1981). Clark, John G., “Marine Insurance in Eighteenth-Century La Rochelle,” French Historical Studies 10 (1978) 572–598. Claude, Dietrich, Der Handel im westlichen Mittelmeer während des Frühmittelalters (= Untersuchungen zu Handel und Verkehr der vor- und frühgeschichtlichen Zeit in Mittel- und Nordeuropa, part II) (Göttingen, 1985). Comercio y burguesia mercantil en el Cádiz de la Carrera de Indias (Cádiz, 1989). Cordes, Albrecht and Serge Dauchy (eds.) with contribution of Andreas Karg and Anika Auer, Eine Grenze in Bewegung: Private und öffentliche Konfliktlösung im Handels- und Seerecht / Une frontière mouvante: Justice privée et justice publique en matières commerciales et maritimes (München, 2013). Cordes, Albrecht, “Die Regelung von Interessenkonflikten im Seerecht des späten 13. Jahrhunderts. Ein Vergleich,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 137 (2020) 52–90. Costa, Heinrich von, Der Freihafen von Triest, Oesterreichs Hauptstapelplatz für den überseeischen Welthandel (Wien, 1838). Cova, Ugo, Commercio e navigazione a Trieste e nella monarchia asburgica da Maria Teresa als 1915 (Udine, 1992).

376

Bibliography

Crouzet, François, “Kriege, Kontinentalsperre und wirtschaftliche Veränderungen in Europa 1789–1815,” in Heinz-Otto Sieburg (ed.), Napoleon und Europa (Köln and Berlin, 1971) 231–250; english: “Wars, Blockade, and Economic Change in Europe, 1792–1815,” Journal of Economic History 24/4 (1964) 567–588. Crowhurst, Patrick, The Defense of British Trade 1689–1815 (Folkestone (Kent), 1977). Cruselles Gómez, E., “La formación de un Mercado subsidiario de aseguración en Valencia (finales del XIV–primera mitad del XV),” Anales de la Real Academia de Cultura Valenciana 67 (1989) 229–274. Cruz Barney, Óscar, El riesgo en el comercio hispano-indiano: préstamos e seguros marítimos durante los siglos XVI a XIX (Ciudad de Mexico, 1998). Dabringhaus, Sabine, Geschichte Chinas 1279–1949 (München, 2006). Dane, Hendrik, Die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen Deutschlands zu Mexiko und Mittelamerika im 19. Jahrhundert (Köln and Wien, 1971). Dane, Hendrik, “Primeras relaciones diplomático-commerciales entre Alemania y México,” Historia Mexicana 17/1 (1967) 72–102. Daston, Lorrain J., “The Domestication of Risk: Mathematical Probability and Insurance 1650–1830,” in Lorenz Krüger; Lorraine Daston and Michael Heidelberger (eds.), The Probabilistic Revolution, vol. I: Ideas in History (Cambridge MA and London, 1987) 237–260. Davis, Robert C., Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters. White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500–1800 (Basingstoke et al., 2003). Dawson, Warren R., Marine Underwriting at Rouen 1727–1742 (London, 1931). Decker, Wilhelm, Die Napoleonische Kontinentalsperre und ihre Wirkungen in Rostock (Diss. Rostock, 1922). Deggim, Christina, Hafenleben in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit. Seehandel und Arbeitsregelungen in Hamburg und Kopenhagen vom 13. bis zum 17. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 2005). del Treppo, Mario, I mercanti catalane e l’espansione della corona d’Aragona nel secolo XV (Napoli, 1972). Denffer, Herbert von; Christoph Pfeiffer; Werner Plath and Adolf Tosberg, “Risikobewertung,” in Eberhard Finke (ed.), Handbuch des Versicherungswesens, vol. 2 (Darmstadt, 1958) 1744. Denzel, Markus A. and Alexandra Holzhey, “Rente,” in Friedrich Jaeger (ed.), Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit, vol. 15 (Stuttgart and Weimar, 2012) 835–837. Denzel, Markus A. and Christina Dalhede (eds.), Preindustrial Commercial History: Flows and Contacts between Cities in Scandinavia and North Western Europe (Göteborg and Stuttgart 2014). Denzel, Markus A.; Jan de Vries and Philipp R. Rössner (eds.), Small is Beautiful? Interlopers and Smaller Trading Nations in the Pre-Industrial Period. Proceedings of the XVth World Economic History Congress in Utrecht 2009 (Stuttgart, 2011).

Bibliography

377

Denzel, Markus A., “Das Problem des Wuchers im bargeldlosen Zahlungsverkehr des späten Mittelalters – Theorie und Wirklichkeit,” in Petra Schulte and Peter Hesse (eds.), Reichtum im späteren Mittelalter. Politische Theorie – Ethische Norm – Soziale Akzeptanz (Stuttgart, 2015) 95–114. Denzel, Markus A., Das System des bargeldlosen Zahlungsverkehrs europäischer Prägung vom Mittelalter bis 1914 (Stuttgart, 2008). Denzel, Markus A., Der Preiskurant des Handelshauses Pelloutier & Cie aus Nantes (1763– 1793) (Stuttgart, 1997). Denzel, Markus A., “Der seewärtige Einfuhrhandel Hamburgs nach den Admiralitätsund Convoygeld-Einnahmebüchern (1733–1798),” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 102 (2015) 131–160. Denzel, Markus A., “Die Errichtung der Hamburger Bank 1619. Wegbereitung einer stabilen Währung und Ausdehnung des bargeldlosen Zahlungsverkehrs,” in Dieter Lindenlaub; Carsten Burhop and Joachim Scholtyseck (eds.), Schlüsselereignisse der deutschen Bankengeschichte (Stuttgart, 2013) 38–50. Denzel, Markus A., “Die Hamburger Seeversicherung vom 17. bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 65/2 (2020) 281–304. Denzel, Markus A., “Die Seeversicherung als kommerzielle Innovation im Mittelmeerraum und in Nordwesteuropa vom Mittelalter bis zum 18. Jahrhundert,” in Simonetta Cavaciocchi (ed.), Ricchezza del mare. Ricchezza dal mare. Secc. XIII– XVIII. Atti della “Trentasettesima Settimana di Studi”, 11–15 aprile 2005 (Firenze, 2006) vol. I, 575–609. Denzel, Markus A., “Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen China und Europa: Seehandel und Zahlungsverkehr von 1702 bis 1914,” Jahrbuch für Europäische Überseegeschichte 14 (2014) 101–152. Denzel, Markus A., “Hamburg als Zentrum des mitteleuropäischen Handels mit Übersee vom späten 17. bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” Annales Mercaturae 2 (2016) 77–108. Denzel, Markus A., “Hamburg as a Financial Market from the Late Sixteenth to the Mid-nineteenth Century. Exchange Market  – Girobank  – Insurance Market,” The Bulletin of the Institute for World Affairs, Kyoto Sangyo University 28 (2013) 17–36. Denzel, Markus A., “Hamburg-Swedish Connections: Exchange Rates and Maritime Insurance from the Late Seventeenth to the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” in: Idem and Christina Dalhede (eds.), Preindustrial Commercial History: Flows and Contacts between Cities in Scandinavia and North Western Europe (Göteborg and Stuttgart, 2014) 199–230. Denzel, Markus A., “Handel und Zahlungsverkehr im internationalen Kontext. Ein Beitrag zur Integration der Märkte,” in Bernd Sösemann and Gregor Vogt-Spira (eds.), Friedrich der Große in Europa. Geschichte einer wechselvollen Beziehung (Stuttgart, 2012) vol. 1, 448–466.

378

Bibliography

Denzel, Markus A., “Konjunkturgeschichte im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit,” in Günther Schulz et al. (eds.), Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Arbeitsgebiete – Probleme  – Perspektiven. 100 Jahre Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Stuttgart, 2004) 191–215. Denzel, Markus A., “Monetary and Financial Innovations in Flanders, Antwerp, London and Hamburg: Fifteenth to Eighteenth Century,” in Peter Bernholz and Rudolf Vaubel (eds.), Explaining Monetary and Financial Innovation. A Historical Analysis (Heidelberg and New York, 2014) 253–282. Denzel, Markus A., “Neue Finanzprodukte, Wissensmanagement und Wissensmärkte im Europa des 15./16. Jahrhunderts,” in Rolf Hammel-Kiesow and Stefan Selzer (eds.), Hansischer Handel im Strukturwandel vom 15. zum 16. Jahrhundert. Tagung des Hansischen Geschichtsvereins 2014 in Lübeck (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 2016). Denzel, Markus A., “Paritätentabellen,” in Jürgen Schneider; Oskar Schwarzer and Friedrich Zellfelder (eds.), Währungen der Welt I: Europäische und nordamerikanische Devisenkurse 1777–1914, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1991) vol. I, 208–242. Denzel, Markus A., “Paritätentabellen,” in Jürgen Schneider; Oskar Schwarzer; Friedrich Zellfelder and Markus A. Denzel, Währungen der Welt VI: Geld und Währungen in Europa im 18. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1992) 40–53. Denzel, Markus A., “Paritätentabellen,” in Jürgen Schneider; Oskar Schwarzer and Petra Schnelzer (eds.), Statistik der Geld- und Wechselkurse in Deutschland und im Ostseeraum (18. und 19. Jahrhundert) (= Historische Statistik von Deutschland, vol. XII) (St. Katharinen, 1993), 48–60. Denzel, Markus A., “Österreichs Direkthandel mit Übersee. Die kommerziellen Verbindungen von Triest über See (18. Jahrhundert bis 1914),” Jahrbuch für europäische Überseegeschichte 13 (2013) 105–145. Denzel, Markus A., “The Curial Payments System of the Late Middle Ages and the Sixteenth Century: Between Doctrine and Practice of Everyday Life,” in Francesco Ammannati (ed.), Religione e istituzioni religiose nell’economia europea, 1000–1800 / Religion and Religious Institutions in the European Economy, 1000–1800. Atti della “XLIII Settimana di Studi”, 7–11 maggio 2011 (Firenze, 2012) 131–154. Denzel, Markus A., “The Price of Minimalizing the Risks at Sea: The Hamburg Marine Insurance Rates in the 18th and Early 19th Century,” in Francesco Ammannati (ed.), I prezzi delle cose. Nell’età preindustriale  / The Prices of Things. In Pre-industrial Times: selezione di ricerche / Selection of essays (Firenze, 2017), 365–383. Denzel, Markus A., “Vom Scheitern eines Modells. Das Kontinentalsystem als europäischer Wirtschaftsverband,” in Birgit Aschmann and Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann (eds.), 1813 und die Folgen für Europa: Entgrenzung und Einhegung (Stuttgart, 2015), 187–216.

Bibliography

379

Denzel, Markus A., “Wirtschaftliche Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Reichsterritorien und Übersee in der Frühen Neuzeit,” in Matthias Manke (ed.), Kapitäne, Konsuln, Kolonisten. Beziehungen zwischen Mecklenburg und Übersee (Lübeck, 2015) 39–64. Denzel, Markus A., “Zur Geschäftspraxis eines Nanteser Handelshauses: Der Preiskurant von Pelloutier & Cie (1763–1793),” in Jochen Hoock and Winfried Reininghaus (eds.), Kaufleute in Europa. Handelshäuser und ihre Überlieferung in vor- und frühindustrieller Zeit. Beiträge der Tagung im Westfälischen Wirtschaftsarchiv 9. bis 11. Mai 1996 (Dortmund, 1997) 61–87. Dermigny, Louis, La Chine et l’Occident. Le commerce à Canton au XVIIIe siècle 1719– 1833, 3 vols. (Paris, 1964). Deruysscher, Dave, “Antwerp 1490–1590: Insurance and Speculation,” in A. B. Leonard (ed.), Marine Insurance. Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850 (Houndsmills and Basingstoke, 2016) 79–105. Die Transportversicherung, part 1 (Berlin, 1914). Dini, Bruno, “Seeversicherung,” in: Lexikon des Mittelalters, vol. VII (München and Zürich, 1995) 1691–1692. Doehard, Renée, “Chiffres d’assurances à Gênes en 1427–1428,” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire 25 (1949) 736–756. Dorwart, Reinhold A., “The Earliest Fire Insurance Company in Berlin and Brandenburg, 1705–1711,” Buiness History Review 32/2 (1958) 192–203. Dover, Victor, A Handbook to Marine Insurance Being a Textbook of the History, Law and Practice of an Integral Part of Commerce for the Busines Man and the Student (London, 1975). Dreyer, Thomas, Die ‘Assecuranz- und Haverey-Ordnung’ der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg von 1731 (Frankfurt/Main, 1990). Driesch, Wilhelm von den, Die ausländischen Kaufleute während des 18. Jahrhunderts in Spanien und ihre Beteiligung am Kolonialhandel (Köln and Wien, 1972). Drobesch, Werner, “Il ruolo di Trieste tra i porti marittimi e fluviali austriaci (1719–1918),” in Roberto Finzi; Loredana Panariti and Giovanni Panjek (eds.), Storia economica e sociale di Trieste, vol. II: La città dei traffici 1719–1918 (Trieste, 2003) 349–367. East, W. G., “The Port of Kingston-upon-Hull during the Industrial Revolution,” Economica 11 (1931) 190–212. Ebert, Christopher, “Early Modern Atlantic Trade and the Development of Maritime Insurance to 1630,” Past and Present 213 (2011) 87–114. Edler de Roover, Florence, “Early Examples of Marine Insurance,” Journal of Economic History 5 (1945) 172–200. Ehrenberg, Richard, “Ein Hamburgischer Waaren- und Wechselpreiscourant aus dem XVI. Jahrhundert,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 1883 (Leipzig, 1884) 165–170. Ehrensperger, Heinz, Der laufende Versicherungsvertrag in der Seetransportversicherung, besonders seine Rechtsnatur (Diss. Zürich, 1944).

380

Bibliography

Emmer, Piet C. et al. (eds.), Wirtschaft und Handel der Kolonialreiche (= Dokumente zur Geschichte der europäischen Expansion, ed. Eberhard Schmitt, vol. 4) (München, 1988). Externbrink, Sven (ed.), Der Siebenjährige Krieg (1756–1763). Ein europäischer Weltkrieg im Zeitalter der Aufklärung (Berlin, 2010). Falter, Ernst; Reinhold Hoffmann and Adolf Tosberg, “Prämie,” in Eberhard Funke (ed.), Handwörterbuch des Versicherungswesens, vol. 2 (Darmstadt, 1958) 1601. Fayard, Jeanine, “Notes sur le trafic maritime entre Bordeaux et Hambourg a la fin du XVIIe siècle,” Annales du Midi 79 (1967) 219–228. Febvre, Lucien, Pour l’histoire d’un sentiment: le besoin de securité, in: Pour une histoire à part entière (Paris, 1962). Fees, Irmgard, “Die Geschäfte der venezianischen Dogenfamilie Ziani,” in Wolfgang von Stromer (ed.), Venedig und die Weltwirtschaft um 1200 (Stuttgart, 1999) 53–69. Fees, Irmgard, Reichtum und Macht im mittelalterlichen Venedig, Die Familie Ziani (Tübingen, 1988). Feldbauer, Peter and John Morrissey, Venedig 800–1600. Wasservögel als Weltmacht (Wien, 2002). Figéac, Michel (ed.), La modernité triomphante (1715–1815) (Bordeaux, 2002). Figes, Orlando, The Crimean War. A History (New York, 2011); german: Krimkrieg. Der letzte Kreuzzug (Berlin, 2011). Finke, Eberhard (ed.), Handbuch des Versicherungswesens, 2 vols. (Darmstadt, 1958). Finzi, Roberto; Loredana Panariti and Giovanni Panjek (eds.), Storia economica e sociale di Trieste, vol. II: La città dei traffici 1719–1918 (Trieste, 2003). Forte, Angelo D. M., “Marine Insurance and Risk Distribution in Scotland before 1800,” Law and History Review 5/2 (1987) 393–412. Frangakis, Elena, “The Port of Smyrna in the Nineteenth Century,” in Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos; Constantinos D. Svolopoulos and Béla K. Király (eds.), Southeast European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies from the Mid-Eighteenth Century to 1914 (Thessaloniki, 1988) 161–272. Frangakis-Syrett, Elena, The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700–1820) (Athens, 1992). Frankel, Jeffrey A., “The 1807–1809 Embargo against Great Britain,” Journal of Economic History 42/2 (1982) 291–308. Freitas, Gustavo de, A Companhia Geral do Comércio do Brasil (1649–1720). Subsídios para a História Econômica de Portugal e do Brasil (São Paulo, 1951). Frentz, Eva-Christine, “Cambio marittimo – Bodmerei – Respondentia: Kreditinstrumente des Kapitäns in der Kontroverse,” in Vito Piergiovanni (ed.), The Growth of the Bank as Institution and the Development of Money-Business Law (Berlin, 1993) 311–343.

Bibliography

381

Frentz, Eva-Christine, Das Hamburgische Admiralitätsgericht (1623–1811). Prozeß und Rechtsprechung (Frankfurt/Main, Bern and New York, 1985). Friedland, Klaus (ed.), Maritime Food Transport (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 1994). Fusaro, Maria and Amélia Polónia (eds.), Maritime History as Global History (St. John’s, 2010). Fusaro, Maria, “Maritime History as Global History? The Methodological Challenges and a Future Research Agenda,” in Ibid., 267–282. Füssel, Marian, Der Siebenjährige Krieg. Ein Weltkrieg im 18. Jahrhundert (München, 2010). Gaedechens, Cipriano Francisco, “Aus dem Leben Otto Christian Gaedechens,” Hamburgische Geschichts- und Heimatblätter 18/4 (1860/61) 306–311. García i Sanz, Arcadi and Maria-Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, Assegurances i canvis marítims medievals a Barcelona (Barcelona, 1983). Garcia-Baquero González, Antonio, “Prestamo e inversión financiera en el Cádiz de la Carrera de Indias: El riesgo marítimo en las flotas de 1765 y 1768,” in Comercio y burguesia mercantil en el Cádiz de la Carrera de Indias (Cádiz, 1989) 135–155. Gehrmann, Rolf, “Handelskonjunkturen in Schleswig-Holstein zur Zeit der Kontinentalsperre, 1807–1813,” in Jürgen Brockstedt (ed.), Wirtschaftliche Wechsellagen in Schleswig-Holstein vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart (Neumünster, 1991) 145–173. Geißler, Stefan, “Die Lloyd’s List. Information und Risiko in der frühneuzeitlichen Marineversicherung,” in Eva van Contzen; Tobias Huff and Peter Itzen (eds.), Risikogesellschaften. Literatur- und geschichtswissenschaftliche Perspektiven (Bielefeld, 2018) 115–134. Gekas, Sakis, “Nineteenth-century Greek Port Towns. History, Historiography and Comparison. The Case of the Marine Insurance Companies,” in Paper[s] presented at the New Researchers’ Session, Economic History Society Annual Conference (Royal Halloway, April 2004). Gelderbloom, Oscar; Abe de Jong and Joost Jonker, “Learning how to Manage Risk by Hedging: the VOC Insurance Contract of 1613,” in European Review of Economic History 23 (2019) 1–24. Gerhard, Hans-Jürgen and Alexander Engel, Preisgeschichte der vorindustriellen Zeit. Ein Kompendium auf Basis ausgewählter Hamburger Materialien (Stuttgart, 2006). Gerhard, Hans-Jürgen and Karl Heinrich Kaufhold (eds.), Preise im vor- und frühindustriellen Deutschland. Nahrungsmittel – Getränke – Gewürze. Rohstoffe und Gewerbeprodukte (Stuttgart, 2001). Gerstenberger, Heide and Ulrich Welke, Vom Wind zum Dampf. Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Handelsschiffahrt im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung (Münster, 1996). Giacchero, Giulio, Storia delle assicurazioni marittime. L’esperienza genovese dal Medioevo all’età contemporanea (Genova, 1984).

382

Bibliography

Gilibert, Giorgio, “Il mercante, il banchiere e l’imperatrice. L’avventura coloniale della Compagnia Asiatica di Trieste,” in Roberto Finzi; Loredana Panariti and Giovanni Panjek (eds.), Storia economica e sociale di Trieste, vol. II: La città dei traffici 1719–1918 (Trieste, 2003) 3–20. Gillingham, Harold E., Marine Insurance in Philadelphia, 1721–1800 (Philadelphia, 1933). Gleich, Utta (!) von (ed.), Deutsch-Venezolanische Beziehungen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart  – Relaciones Germano-Venezolanas en el pasado y presente (München and Hamburg, 1988). Go, Sabine C[hrista] P. J., “Amsterdam 1585–1790: Emergence, Dominance, and Decline,” in A. B. Leonard (ed.), Marine Insurance. Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850 (Houndsmills and Basingstoke, 2016), 107–129. Go, Sabine Christa, Marine Insurance in the Netherlands 1600–1870. A Comparative Institutional Approach (Diss. rer. pol. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2009). Gøbel, Erik, “The Danish Algerian Sea Passes, 1747–1838: An Example of Extraterritorial Production of Human Security,” Historical Social Research 35/4 (2010) 164–189. Goebel, Ernst, “Beziehungen zwischen Kaskoversicherung und Schiffbautechnik,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungs-Wissenschaft 11 (1911) 937–952. Gossler, Claus, “Godeffroy, Jean César VI.,” in Franklin Kopitzsch and Dirk Brietzke (eds.), Hamburgische Biografie, vol. 5 (Göttingen, 2010) 144–146. Grandmaison, Charles-Alexandre Geoffroy de, L’expédition française d’Espagne en 1823. Avec onze lettres inédites de Chateaubriand (Paris, 1928). Grassmann, Antjekathrin (ed.), Niedergang oder Übergang? Zur Spätzeit der Hanse im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 1998). Grieb, Volker and Sabine Todt (eds..), Piraterie von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart, 2012). Groneuer, Hannelore, “Die Seeversicherung in Genua am Ausgang des 14. Jahrhunderts,” in Knut Schulz (ed.), Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Herbert Helbig zum 65. Geburtstag (Köln and Wien, 1976) 218–260. Guddat, Martin, Die Entwicklung der Strandungs-, Bruch- und Schiedsgerichtsklausel in der Seeversicherung (Diss. iur. Berlin, 1971). Häberlein, Mark and Christof Jeggle (eds.), Praktiken des Handels. Geschäfte und soziale Beziehungen europäischer Kaufleute in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit (Konstanz, 2010). Halle, Ernst von, Amerika: Seine Bedeutung für die Weltwirtschaft und seine wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zu Deutschland, insbesondere zu Hamburg. In Einzeldarstellungen (Hamburg, 1905). Halle, Ernst von, “Die Company of Merchant Adventurers und der Ausgang ihrer Niederlassung in Hamburg 1808,” Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik 2 (1908) 438–446.

Bibliography

383

Halle, Ernst von, Die Entwicklung des wirtschaftlichen Verkehrs zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (1904). Halle, Ernst von, “Soetbeer, Adolf Georg,” Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 54 (Leipzig, 1908), 399–408. Hamashita, Takeshi, “Tribute and Treaties: Maritime Asia and Treaty Port Networks in the Era of Negotiation, 1800–1900,” in Giovanni Arrighi; Takeshi Hamashita and Mark Selden (eds.), The Resurgence of East Asia. 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspectives (London and New York, 2003) 17–50. Hamelin, Alonzo M., Un traité de morale économique au XIV e siècle: Le tractatus de Usuris de Maître Alexandre d’Alexandrie (Louvain, 1962). Hammel-Kiesow, Rolf and Stefan Selzer (eds.), Hansischer Handel im Strukturwandel vom 15. zum 16. Jahrhundert. Tagung des Hansischen Geschichtsvereins 2014 in Lübeck (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 2016). Handelskammer Hamburg (ed.), Die Hamburger Börse 1558–2008. Trends im Börsenwesen (Hamburg, 2008). Handelskammer Hamburg (ed.), Wir handeln für Hamburg. 350 Jahre Handelskammer Hamburg (Kiel and Hamburg, 2015). Handwörterbuch des Versicherungswesens, vol. 2 (Darmstadt, 1958). Häpke, Rudolf, “Die Erforschung der hansischen Spanienfahrt,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 49 (Bd. 29) (1924) 147–154. Harder-Gersdorff, Elisabeth, “Leinen-Regionen im Vorfeld und im Verlauf der Industrialisierung (1780–1914),” in Hans Pohl (ed.), Gewerbe- und Industrielandschaften vom Spätmittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1986) 203–253. Harding, Richard, Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650–1830 (London, 1999). Harlaftis, Gelina, A History of the Greek-owned Shipping. The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day (London and New York, 1996). Harris, Ron, Industrializing English Law. Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720–1844 (Cambridge, 2000). Hart, Simon, “Amsterdam Shipping and Trade to Northern Russia in the Seventeenth Century,” Medelingen van de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Zeegeschiedenis 26 (1973) 5–13. Hausherr, Hans, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Neuzeit (Köln and Graz, ³1960). Hävernick, Walter, Hamburgs Schiffahrt in ihrer Entwicklung. Ein Führer durch die Schiffahrtsabteilung des Museums für Hamburgische Geschichte (Hamburg, 1936). Heckscher, Eli, The Continental-System. An Economic Interpretation (Oxford, 1922). Heers, Jacques, “Le prix de l’assurance maritime à la fin du moyen âge,” Revue d’histoire économique et sociale 37 (1959) 7–19. Heitz, Gerhard and Manfred Unger (eds.), Hansische Studien. Heinrich Sproemberg zum 70. Geburtstag (Berlin, 1961).

384

Bibliography

Henderson, William O., “Der Außenhandel Preußens,” in Jürgen Ziechmann (ed.), Panorama der Friedericianischen Zeit. Friedrich der Große und seine Epoche – Ein Handbuch (Bremen, 1985) 666–667. Herlihy, David; Robert S. Lopez and Vsevolod Slessarev (eds.), Economy, Society, and Government in Medieval Italy. Essays in Memory of Robert L. Reynolds (Kent OH, 1969). Herrero Gil, María Dolores, “¿De la confusión a la negación? Reflexiones sobre la utilidad aseguradora del contrado de riesgo,” Espacio, Tempo y Forma ser. IV (Historia Moderna) 18–19 (2005/06) 133–154. Hertz, Richard, Das Hamburger Seehandelshaus J. C. Godeffroy und Sohn, 1766–1879 (Hamburg, 1922). Herzig, Arno (ed.), Das Alte Hamburg (1500–1848/49). Vergleiche – Beziehungen (Hamburg, 1989). Herzog, C., Die Praxis der Transportversicherung (Berlin, 1909). Hieke, Ernst, “Das hamburgische Handelshaus Wm. O’Swald & Co. und der Beginn des deutschen Afrikahandels, 1848–1853,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 30 (1937) 347–374. Hiery, Hermann et al. (eds.), Lexikon zur Überseegeschichte (Stuttgart, 2015). Hildebrandt, Reinhard, “Die Bedeutung Antwerpens als Börsenplatz 1579,” Scripta Mercaturae 8/1–2 (1974) 5–21. Hitzigrath, Heinrich, Hamburg und die Kontinentalsperre (Hamburg, 1900). Höch, Otto, “Die Sturmflut vom 3./4. Februar 1825 im hamburgischen Staatsgebiet,” Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte 28 (1927) 155–224. Hoerder, Dirk, Geschichte der deutschen Migration (München, 2010). Höfele, Andreas and Stephan Laqué (eds.), Human Kinds. The Renaissance and its Antropologies (Berlin and New York, 2011). Hoock, Jochen and Winfried Reininghaus (eds.), Kaufleute in Europa. Handelshäuser und ihre Überlieferung in vor- und frühindustrieller Zeit. Beiträge der Tagung im Westfälischen Wirtschaftsarchiv 9. bis 11. Mai 1996 (Dortmund, 1997). Hoover, Calvin B., “The Sea Loan in Genoa in the Twelfth Century,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 40 (1925/26) 495–529. Hubrecht, Georges, “Die ersten Seeversicherungsverträge in Bordeaux aus der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts,” Versicherungswissenschaftliches Archiv (1955) 41–49. Huhn, Fred-Konrad, Die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Frankreich und Hamburg im 18. Jahrhundert unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Handelsverträge von 1716 und 1769 (Diss. phil. Hamburg, 1952). Humphreys, Robert A., British Consular Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin America 1824–1826 (London, 1940).

Bibliography

385

Hundt, Michael and Jan Lokers (eds.), Hanse und Stadt. Akteure, Strukturen und Entwicklungen im regionalen und europäischen Raum. Festschrift für Rolf HammelKiesow zum 65. Geburtstag (Lübeck, 2014). Hunt, Edwin S. and James M. Murray, A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200– 1550 (Cambridge, 1999). Huschner, Fritz, “Zu den Auswirkungen der napoleonischen Kontinentalsperre auf die Stadt Wismar,” Wismarer Beiträge 4 (1987) 27–35. Huybrechts, Marc; Eric van Hooydonk and Christian Dieryck (eds.), Marine Insurance at the Turn of the Millenium, 2 vols. (Antwerp, 1999/2000). Ibbetson, David, “Law and Custom. Insurance in Sixteenth-Century England,” Journal of Legal History 29 (2008) 291–307. Idelson, Wladimir, “Zur Kodifikation des englischen Seeversicherungsrechts (Marine Insurance Bill),” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungs-Wissenschaft 4 (1904) 352–359. Iglesias Rodríguez, Juan José; Rafael M. Pérez García and Manuel F. Fernández Chaves (eds.), Comercio y cultura en la edad moderna. Comunicaciones de la XIII Reunión cientéfica de la Funación Española de Historia Moderna (Sevilla, 2015). Igual Luis, David, “Movimento portuale, reti marittime e diversità dei mercati a Valenza nel XV secolo,” in: Reti marittime come fattori dell’integrazione europea / Maritime Networks as a Factor in European Integration. Selezione di ricerche / Selection of Essays (Firenze, 2019) 71–87. Jackson, Gordon, Hull in the Eighteenth Century (London et al., 1972). Jaeger, Friedrich (ed.), Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit, vol. 15 (Stuttgart and Weimar, 2012). Jakobi, Walter, Angebot und Nachfrage in der Seeversicherung. Eine Untersuchung westeuropäischer Seeversicherungsmärkte (Diss rer. pol. Köln, 1968). Jantzen, Günther, “Hamburg, sein Überseehandel und Westafrika,” in Dirk Bavendamm et al. (ed.), 150 Jahre C. Woermann. Wagnis Afrika. Die Geschichte eines Hamburger Handelshauses 1837–1987 (Hamburg, 1987) 30–47. Japsen, Gottlieb, “Aabenraa bys økonomiske historie 1850–1864,” Sønderjydske Aarbøger 3 (1935) 1–88. Jaspert, Nikolas and Sebastian Kolditz (eds.), Seeraub im Mittelmeerraum. Piraterie, Korsarentum und maritime Gewalt von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit (Paderborn, 2013). Jeannin, Pierre, “Die Hansestädte im europäischen Handel im 18. Jahrhundert,” Hansische Ge-schichtsblätter 89 (1971) 41–73. Jeannin, Pierre, “Zur Geschichte der Hamburger Handelsflotte am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts,” Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hansische Geschichte 57 (1971) 67–82. Jestrzemski, Dagmar, Altonas Blütezeit und ihr jähes Ende. Die Reederei Hinrich Dultz 1756–1807 (Hamburg, 2000).

386

Bibliography

Jhering, Rudolf von, “Das angebliche gesetzliche Zinsmaximum beim foenus nauticum,” Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Privatrechts 19 (N.F. 7) (1881) 2–23. Jochmann, Werner and Hans-Dieter Loose (eds.), Hamburg. Geschichte der Stadt und ihrer Bewohner, vol. 1: Von den Anfängen bis zur Reichsgründung (Hamburg, 1982). Jochmann, Werner, “Hamburgisch-schlesische Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Ein Beitrag zur abendländischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte,” in Geschichtliche Landeskunde und Universalgeschichte. Festgabe für Hermann Aubin zum 23. Dezember 1950 (Hamburg, 1951) 217–228. Johansen, Jens Christian V. et al. (eds.), Clashes of Cultures. Essays in Honour of Niels Steensgaard (Odense, 1992). Jones, W. J., “Elizabethan Marine Insurance. The Juridical Undergrowth,” Business History 2 (1960) 53–66. Kadens, Emily, “The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant,” Texas Law Review 90 (2012) 1153–1206. Kaltenstadler, Wilhelm, “Der österreichische Seehandel über Triest im 18. Jahrhundert,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 55/4 (1968 [1969]) 481– 500; 56/1 (1969) 1–104. Katsiardi-Hering, Olga, “The Networks of the Greek Commercial Traffic,” in Spyros I. Asdrachas (ed.), Greek Economic History, 15th–19th Centuries, vol. I (Athens, 2007) 435–455. Kaufhold, Karl Heinrich and Uwe Wallbaum (eds.), Historische Statistik der preußischen Provinz Ostfriesland 1744–1806 (Aurich, 1998). Kellenbenz, Hermann, “Der deutsche Außenhandel gegen Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts,” in Friedrich Lütge (ed.), Die wirtschaftliche Situation in Deutschland und Österreich um die Wende vom 18. zum 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1964) 4–60. Kellenbenz, Hermann, “Deutschland und Spanien. Wege, Träger und Güter des Handelsaustauschs,” in: Idem, Europa, Raum wirtschaftlicher Begegnung. Kleine Schriften I (Stuttgart, 1991) 1–41. Kellenbenz, Hermann, “Die erste bewaffnete Neutralität und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Hamburgische Schiffahrt,” Zeitschrift des Vereins für hamburgische Geschichte 62 (1976) 31–48. Kellenbenz, Hermann, “Diego und Manoel Teixeira und ihr Hamburger Unternehmen,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 42 (1955,) 289–352. Kellenbenz, Hermann, Europa, Raum wirtschaftlicher Begegnung. Kleine Schriften I (Stuttgart, 1991). Kellenbenz, Hermann, “German Shipowners on the Transatlantic Routes. The Case of Brazil and the River Plate (1815–1850),” Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 32 (1987) 145–165.

Bibliography

387

Kellenbenz, Hermann, “German Trade Relations with the Indian Ocean from the End of the Eighteenth Century to 1870,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 13/1 (1982) 133–152. Kellenbenz, Hermann, “Landverkehr, Fluß- und Seeschiffahrt im europäischen Handel (Spätmittelalter bis Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts),” in Idem, Europa, Raum wirtschaftlicher Begegnung. Kleine Schriften I (Stuttgart, 1991) 1–115. Kellenbenz, Hermann, “Marchands en Russie aux XVIIe–XVIIIe siècles,” in: Ibid., 205–283. Kellenbenz, Hermann, “Relaciones consulares entre las Ciudades Hanseáticas y Chile: El caso de Valparaíso hasta los años de 1850,” Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas (1988) 117–140. Kellenbenz, Hermann, Sephardim an der unteren Elbe. Ihre wirtschaftliche und politische Bedeutung vom Ende des 16. bis zum Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts (Wiesbaden, 1958). Kellenbenz, Hermann, “St. Thomas, Treffpunkt des karibischen Handels,” in HannsAlbert Steger and Jürgen Schneider (eds.), Karibik (München, 1982) 135–144. Kellenbenz, Hermann, Unternehmerkräfte im Hamburger Portugal- und Spanienhandel, 1590–1625 (Hamburg, 1954). Kepler, J. S., “The Operating Potential of London Marine Insurance in the 1570’s: Some Evidence from ‘A Broke of Orders of Assurances within the Royall Exchange’,” Business History 17/1 (1975) 44–55. Kiesselbach, G. Arnold, Die wirtschafts- und rechtsgeschichtliche Entwicklung der Seeversicherung in Hamburg (Hamburg, 1901). Kikuchi, Yuta, “Trade through Lübeck Instead of the Sound – Route Choice in Early Modern Hamburg’s Baltic Trade,” in Jan Willem Veluwenkamp and Werner Scheltjens (eds.), Early Modern Shipping and Trade. Novel Approaches Using Sound Toll Registers Online (Leiden and Boston, 2018) 95–112. Kim, Su Jin and James Oldham, “Insuring Maritime Trade with the Enemy in the Napoleonic Era,” Texas International Law Journal 47/3 (2012) 561–586. Kimura, Eiichi, “Der Ursprung der Lloyd’s Seeversicherungspolice,” Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce & Management 3 (1965) 27–49. Kimura, Eiichi, “Die Entstehung der Lloyd’s Seeversicherungspolice,” Ibid. 7 (1972) 1–35. Kingston, Christopher, “America 1720–1820: War and Organisation,” in A. B. Leonard (ed.), Marine Insurance. Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850 (Houndsmills and Basingstoke, 2016) 205–226. Kingston, Christopher, “Governance and Institutional Change in Marine Insurance, 1350–1850,” European Review of Economic History 18 (2013) 1–18. Kingston, Christopher, “Marine Insurance in Britain and America, 1720–1844. A Comparative Institutional Analysis,” Journal of Economic History 67 (2007) 379–409.

388

Bibliography

Kingston, Christopher, “Marine Insurance in Philadelphia during the Quasi-War with France, 1795–1801,” Journal of Economic History 71/1 (2011) 162–184. Klein, Gottfried, 400 Jahre Hamburger Börse. Eine geschichtliche Darstellung (Hamburg, 1958). Klinger, Andreas; Hans-Werner Hahn and Georg Schmidt (eds.), Das Jahr 1806 im europäischen Kontext. Balance, Hegemonie und politische Kulturen (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 2008). Koch, Peter, “Der hamburgische Beitrag zur Entwicklung des Versicherungswesens in Deutschland,” Versicherungswirtschaft 49 (1994) 274–287; or in: Heinz-Leo Müller-Lutz (ed.), Beiträge zur Geschichte des deutschen Versicherungswesens, part II. Aus Anlaß des 70. Geburtstages von Peter Koch. Ausgewählte Beiträge aus der Zeitschrift Versicherungswirtschaft aus den Jahren 1994 bis 2004 (Karlsruhe, 2005) 7–14. Koeppen, Heinrich E., Hamburgs Außenhandel zur See von 1750–1810 und die Entwicklung seines Überseehandels von 1814–1850 (Köln, 1968). König, Hans-Joachim, “Die Deutsch-Venezolanischen Beziehungen von der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung bis 1837,” in Utta (!) von Gleich (ed.), Deutsch-Venezolanische Beziehungen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart – Relaciones Germano-Venezolanas en el pasado y presente (München and Hamburg, 1988) 83–100. Koninckx, Christian, “Marginal but Profitable Foodstuffs, Drugs and Spices. Swedish East-Indian Trade in the Eighteenth Century,” in Klaus Friedland (ed.), Maritime Food Transport (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 1994) 465–482. Koninckx, Christian, The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Companie (1731–1766). A Contribution to the Maritime, Economic and Social History of North-Western Europe in its Relationships with the Far East (Kortrijk, 1980). Konsor, Dietrich, Die Hansestädte und Venezuela zwischen 1825 und 1865. 4 Jahrzehnte Hanseatische Handelsvertragspolitik an der Nordküste Südamerikas unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Hamburger Anteils, 2 vols. (Diss. Hamburg, 1955). Kontogeorgis, Dimitrios M., “Marine Insurance Companies in the Lower Danube during the Third Quarter of the 19th Century. Foreign Merchants, Commercial Innovation and Institutional Modernization,” Annales Mercaturae 2 (2016) 109–126. Kopitzsch, Franklin and Dirk Brietzke (eds.), Hamburgische Biografie, vol. 5 (Göttingen, 2010). Köppen, Heinrich E., Die Handelsbeziehungen Hamburgs zu den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Diss. rer. pol. Köln, 1973). Kossok, Manfred, “Der Brasilienvertrag von 1827. Bemerkungen zur Diplomatie und Handelspolitik der Hansestädte in der ‘Südamerikanischen Frage’,” Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig 11/3 (1962) 491–501. Kossok, Manfred, “Die Bedeutung des spanisch-amerikanischen Kolonialmarktes für den preußischen Leinwandhandel am Ausgang des 18. und zu Beginn des 19.

Bibliography

389

Jahrhunderts,” in Gerhard Heitz and Manfred Unger (eds.), Hansische Studien. Heinrich Sproemberg zum 70. Geburtstag (Berlin, 1961) 210–218. Kossok, Manfred, Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz. Deutschland und Lateinamerika 1815–1830 (Berlin, 1964). Kotowski, Maciej, Hull Clubs and British Maritime Insurance. An Analysis of Risk Preferences and Insurance Markets, 1720–1840, Working Paper (Univ. of California, Berkeley, 2007). Kracht, Fritz, Die Rotterdamer Seeversicherungs-Börse. Ihre Entwicklung, Bedeutung und Bedingungen (Weimar, 1922). Krawehl, Otto-Ernst, Hamburgs Schiffs- und Warenverkehr mit England und den englischen Kolonien 1814–1860 (Köln and Wien, 1977). Kresse, Walter, “Die Auswirkungen der Handelsverträge der Hansestädte mit amerikanischen Staaten auf die Hamburger Schiffahrt,” Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte 60 (1974) 139–146. Kresse, Walter, Die Fahrtgebiete der Hamburger Handelsflotte, 1824–1888 (Hamburg, 1972). Kresse, Walter, “Hamburgs internationale Handels- und Schiffahrtsbeziehungen: Jenseits Kap Hoorn  – Die Anfänge der Westküstenfahrt unter Hamburger Flagge,” Beiträge zur deutschen Volks- und Altertumskunde 18 (1979) 25–29. Kresse, Walter, Materialien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Hamburger Handelsflotte 1765–1823 (Hamburg, 1966). Kresse, Walter, “Ostwärts Kapstadt. Die Anfänge der Handelsfahrt nach Java, Australien und der chinesischen Küste unter Hamburger Flagge,” Beiträge zur deutschen Volks- und Altertumskunde 19 (1980) 101–105. Krieger, Martin, “Danish Trading in the Indian Ocean Region. Perspectives for Further Research,” in Markus A. Denzel; Jan de Vries and Philipp R. Rössner (eds.), Small is Beautiful? Interlopers and Smaller Trading Nations in the Pre-Industrial Period. Proceedings of the XVth World Economic History Congress in Utrecht 2009 (Stuttgart, 2011,) 49–60. Krieger, Martin, Geschichte Hamburgs (München, 2006). Krieger, Martin, Kaufleute, Seeräuber und Diplomaten. Der dänische Handel auf dem Indischen Ozean (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 1998). Kroener, Bernhard (ed.), Europa im Zeitalter Friedrichs des Großen  – Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Kriege (München, 1989). Krüger, Lorenz; Lorraine Daston and Michael Heidelberger (eds.), The Probabilistic Revolution, vol. I: Ideas in History (Cambridge MA and London, 1987). Kupfer, Hellmuth, “Die Entstehung von neuen Freihafenformen,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 19 (1923,) 188–219. Küttner, Sibylle, “Sloman, Robert Miles senior,” in Neue Deutsche Biographie, vol. 24 (Berlin, 2010) 504–505.

390

Bibliography

La Ville et la transmission des valeurs culturelles au bas Moyen Âge et aux Temps Modernes / Die Städte und die Übertragung von kulturellen Werten im Spätmittelalter und in die Neuzeit / Cities and the Transmission of Cultural Values in the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Period. Actes / Abhandlungen / Records (Bruxelles, 1996). Laeisz, Walter, Technik und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Schiffahrtsbetriebe (Jena, 1910). Lambert, Franklin, The Barbary Wars. American Independence in the Atlantic World (New York, 2005). Landwehr, G., “Bodmerei,” in Lexikon des Mittelalters, vol. II (München and Zürich, 1983) 307. Larroche, Emmanuel, L’expédition d’Espagne. 1823: de la guerre selon la Charte (Rennes, 2013). Lau, Gerd, Das Hamburgische Seehandelsrecht im 18. Jahrhundert (Diss. Hamburg, 1975). LeGoff, Jacques, Kaufleute und Bankiers im Mittelalter (Frankfurt/Main and New York, 1993; Paris, 1956). Lehmann-Brune, Marlies, Die Story von Lloyd’s of London (Düsseldorf, 1999). Leonard, A. B. (ed.), Marine Insurance. Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850 (Houndsmills and Basingstoke, 2016). Leonard, A. B., “London 1426–1601: Marine Insurance and the Law Merchant,” in Ibid., 151–176. Leone, Alfonso, “Maritime Insurance as a Source for the History of International Credit in the Middle Ages,” Journal of European Economic History 12 (1983) 363–369. Lepore, Amedeo, “Commercio e assecurazioni e Cadice tra età moderna e contemporanea: La Presenza dei Lloyd’s,” Rivista storica italiana 120/1 (2008) 272–293. Leppler, Jessica M., The Many Panics of 1837. People, Politics, and the Creation of a Transatlantic Financial Crisis (New York and Cambridge, 2013). Leschke-Saenger, Clara, “Staatsaufsicht und Transportversicherung. Betrachtungen über ein deutsches Wirtschaftsproblem vom Standpunkt der Privatwirtschaft, Volkswirtschaft und Weltwirtschaft,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 18 (1922) 75–162. Liebig, Eugen von, Die Seeversicherung. Systematische Darstellung des Seeversicherungswesens (= Die Transportversicherung, part 1) (Berlin, 1914). Lindberg, Erik, “The Rise of Hamburg as a Global Marketplace in the Seventeenth Century: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 50/3 (2008) 641–662. Lindenlaub, Dieter; Carsten Burhop and Joachim Scholtyseck (eds.), Schlüsselereignisse der deutschen Bankengeschichte (Stuttgart, 2013). Lingelbach, William E., “The Merchant Adventurers at Hamburg,” American Historical Review 9/2 (1904) 265–287. Llorca-Jaña, Manuel, “The Marine Insurance Market for British Textile Exports to the River Plate and Chile, c.1810–50,” in Robin Pearson (ed.), The Devlopment of International Insurance (London, 2010) 25–35.

Bibliography

391

Lobato Franco, Isabel, “El negocio del seguro en Barcelona, 1650–1712,” B.I.F.G. Burgos 74, Anexo al n.° 210 (1995) 91–108. Łojek, Jerzy, “Britisch Policy towards Russia, 1790–1791, and Polish Affairs,” Polish Review 28/2 (1983) 3–17. Lopez, Roberto S. and Irving W. Raymond, Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World. Illustrative Documents Translated with Introductions and Notes (New York and London, ²1961). Luhmann, Niklas, “Risiko und Gefahr,” in idem, Soziologische Aufklärung, vol. 5: Konstruktivistische Perspektiven (Wiesbaden, 42009) 126–162. Luhmann, Niklas, Soziologie des Risikos (Berlin and New York, 1991). Luhmann, Niklas, Soziologische Aufklärung, vol. 5: Konstruktivistische Perspektiven (Wiesbaden, 42009). Lütge, Friedrich (ed.), Die wirtschaftliche Situation in Deutschland und Österreich um die Wende vom 18. zum 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1964). Magalães Godinho, Vitorino, “Portugal and the Making of the Atlantic World. Sugar Fleets and Gold Fleets, the Seventeenth to the Eighteenth Centuries,” Review. A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems and Civilizations 28/4 (2005) 313–373. Manke, Matthias (ed.), Kapitäne, Konsuln, Kolonisten. Beziehungen zwischen Mecklenburg und Übersee (Lübeck, 2015). Marshall, Peter J. (ed.), The Eighteenth Century (=  The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. II) (Oxford and New York, 1998). Marzagalli, Silvia, ‘Les boulevards de la fraude.’ Le négoce maritime et le Blocus continental, 1806–1813. Bordeaux, Hambourg, Livourne (Paris, 1999). Marzagalli, Silvia, “Le négoce allemand et le commerce de Bordeaux pendant la Révolution et l’Empire: Continuités et ruptures dans les réseaux d’échanges,” in Alain Ruiz (ed.), Présence de l’Allemagne à Bordeaux du siècle de Montaigne à la veille de la Seconde Guerre mondial. Hommage au Goethe-Institut de Bordeaux, à l’occasion de son 25e anniversaire (Talence, 1997) 77–87. Marzagalli, Silvia, “Le négoce bordelais et ses hommes,” in Michel Figéac (ed.), La modernité triomphante (1715–1815) (Bordeaux, 2002) 85–115. Mathies, Otto, Hamburgs Reederei 1814–1914 (Hamburg, 1924). Matthes, Olaf, “Der Große Hamburger Brand von 1842. Preußens Hilfe und Hamburgs Dank,” in Ortwin Pelc (ed.), Katastrophen in Norddeutschland. Vorbeugung, Bewältigung und Nachwirkungen vom Mittelalter bis ins 21. Jahrhundert (Neumünster, 2010) 151–162. Matthias, Bernhard, Das foenus nauticum und die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Bodmerei (Diss. iur. Würzburg, 1881).

392

Bibliography

McCusker, John J. and Cora Gravesteijn, The Beginnings of Commercial and Financial Journalism. The Commodity Price Currents, Exchange Rate Currents, and Money Currents of Early Modern Europe (Amsterdam, 1991). McCusker, John J. (ed.), Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World (London and New York, 1997). McCusker, John J., “The Business Press in England before 1775,” The Library: Transactions of the Bibliographical Society 6th ser. 8 (1986) 205–231; repr. in Idem (ed.), Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World (London and New York, 1997) 145–176. McCusker, John J., “The Demise of Distance: The Business Press and the Origins of the Information Revolution in the Early Modern Atlantic World,” American Historical Review 110 (2005) 295–321. McCusker, John J., “The Italian Business Press in Early Modern Europe,” in Simo­ netta Cavaciocchi (ed.), Produzione e commercio della carta e del libro, secc. XIII– XVIII (Prato, 1992) 797–841: repr. in: John J. McCusker (ed.), Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World (London and New York, 1997) 117–144. McCusker, John J., “The Role of Antwerp in the Emergence of Commercial and Financial Newspapers in Early Modern Europe,” in La Ville et la transmission des valeurs culturelles au bas Moyen Âge et aux Temps Modernes / Die Städte und die Übertragung von kulturellen Werten im Spätmittelalter und in die Neuzeit  / Cities and the Transmission of Cultural Values in the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Period. Actes / Abhandlungen / Records (Bruxelles, 1996) 303–332. Mélanges en l’honneur de Fernand Braudel, vol. I: Histoire économique du monde méditerranéen 1450–1650 (Paris, 1973). Menke, Christoph F., Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Beziehungen der Hansestädte zu Rußland im 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert (Diss. phil. Göttingen, 1959). Meyer, Klaus, Über die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen der Entwicklung der Schiffbautechnik und der Seeversicherung im 19. Jahrhundert unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Verhältnisse in Hamburg (Diploma Hamburg, 1964). Miquelon, Dale, Dugard of Rouen. French Trade to Canada and the West Indies, 1729– 1770 (Montreal and London, 1978). Mollat, Michel, “Guerre de course et piraterie à la fin du Moyen Age: Aspects économique et sociaux. Position de problèmes,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 90 (1972) 1–14. Moltmann, Bodo Hans, Geschichte der deutschen Handelsschiffahrt, ed. Walter Kresse (Hamburg, 1981). Moltmann, Günter, “Hamburgs Öffnung nach Übersee im späten 18. und im 19. Jahrhundert,” in Arno Herzig (ed.), Das Alte Hamburg (1500–1848/49). Vergleiche – Beziehungen (Hamburg, 1989) 51–72. Moorhenn, Wernher, Helgoland zur Zeit der Kontinentalsperre (Diss. Köln, 1926).

Bibliography

393

Morales Padrón, Francisco, El comercio canario-americano (siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII) (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2011). Mossner, Bernd, Die Entwicklung der Rückversicherung bis zur Gründung selbständiger Rückversicherungsgesellschaften (Berlin, 1959). Mössner, Joerg M., Die Völkerrechtspersönlichkeit und die Völkerrechtspraxis der Barbareskenstaaten (Algier, Tripolis, Tunis 1518–1830) (Berlin, 1968). Müller, Albert, “Ansätze zum Versicherungswesen in der römischen Kaiserzeit,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungs-Wissenschaft 6 (1906) 209–219. Müller, Annemarie, “Emdens Schiffahrt und Seehandel von der Besitzergreifung Ostfrieslands durch Preußen bis zur Eröffnung des Dortmund-Ems-Kanals 1744–1899,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 55 (1930) 90–170. Müller, Leos, “The Swedish East India Company  – Strategies and Functions of an Interloper,” in Markus A. Denzel; Jan de Vries and Philipp R. Rössner (eds.), Small is Beautiful? Interlopers and Smaller Trading Nations in the Pre-Industrial Period. Proceedings of the XVth World Economic History Congress in Utrecht 2009 (Stuttgart, 2011) 83–101. Müller-Lutz, Heinz-Leo (ed.), Beiträge zur Geschichte des deutschen Versicherungswesens, Teil II. Aus Anlaß des 70. Geburtstages von Peter Koch. Ausgewählte Beiträge aus der Zeitschrift Versicherungswirtschaft aus den Jahren 1994 bis 2004 (Karlsruhe, 2005). Münzing, Joachim, Die Jagd auf den Wal. Schleswig-Holsteins und Hamburgs Grönlandfahrt (Heide in Holstein, 1978). Nave, Francine de (ed.), Antwerpen en de scheiding der Nederlanden (17 augustus 1585) (Antwerpen, 1986). Nehlsen-van Stryk, Karin, Die venezianische Seeversicherung im 15. Jahrhundert (Ebelsbach, 1984). Nehlsen-von Stryk, Karin, “Kalkül und Hasard in der spätmittelalterlichen Seeversicherungspraxis,” Rechtshistorisches Journal 8 (1989) 195–208. Nelli, Humbert O., “The Earliest Insurance Contract. A New Discovery,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 39 (1972) 215–220. Nemnich, Philipp Andreas, Tönning. Beschreibung des Orts in merkantilischer Hinsicht (Hamburg and Tönning, 1805). Neudeck, Georg; Bruno Schulz and Rudolf Blochmann, Der moderne Schiffbau, part I: Geschichtliche Entwicklung des Schiffes, theoretischer und praktischer Schiffbau (Leipzig and Berlin, 1912). Newman, Karin, “Hamburg in the European Economy, 1660–1750,” Journal of European Economic History 14/1 (1985) 57–93. Nichols, Irby Jr., The European Pentarchy and the Congress of Verona (Den Haag, 1971). Niekerk, J. P. van, The Developments of the Principles of Insurance Law in the Netherlands from 1500–1800, 2 vols. (Cape Town, 1998).

394

Bibliography

North, Michael (ed.), Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Ein Jahrtausend im Überblick (München, 2000). North, Michael, “Die Auswirkungen der Kontinentalsperre auf das nördliche Deutschland und den Ostseeraum,” in Andreas Klinger; Hans-Werner Hahn and Georg Schmidt (eds.), Das Jahr 1806 im europäischen Kontext. Balance, Hegemonie und politische Kulturen (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 2008) 135–148. North, Michael, Kommunikation, Handel, Geld und Banken in der Frühen Neuzeit (München, 2000). North, Michael, “Von der atlantischen Handelsexpansion bis zu den Agrarreformen (1450–1815),” in Idem (ed.), Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Ein Jahrtausend im Überblick (München, 2000) 107–191. Nuñez, Clara Eugenia (ed.), Insurance in Industrial Societies: Economic Role Agents and Market from the 18th Century / L’assurance dans les sociétes industrielles: rôle économique, acteurs et marché du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours / El seguro en las sociedades industriales: papel económico, actores y mercado, del siglo XVIII a nuestras días (Sevilla, 1998). O’Brien, Patrick K., “Inseparable Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal State, and the Expansion of Empire, 1688–1815,” in Peter J. Marshall (ed.), The Eighteenth Century (= The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. II) (Oxford and New York, 1998) 53–77. Oesau, Wanda, Hamburgs Grönlandfahrt auf Walfischfang und Robbenschlag vom 17.– 19. Jahrhundert (Glückstadt and Hamburg, 1955). Oliveira Marques, António Henrique, Para a história dos seguros em Portugal. Notas e documentos (Lisboa, 1977). Opatrný, Josef, “El azúcar americano en la Europa del siglo XVIII,” Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 32 (1995) 215–230. Origo, Iris, ‘Im Namen Gottes und des Geschäfts.’ Lebensbild eines toskanischen Kaufmanns der Frührenaissance. Francesco di Marco Datini 1335–1410 (München, ²1986). Owen, Douglas, “The History and Practice of Marine Insurance,” Journal of the Chartered Insurance Institute 4 (1901) 395–418. Panariti, Loredana, “Assicurazione e banca. Il sistema finanziario triestino (secc. XVIII–XIX),” in Roberto Finzi; Loredana Panariti and Giovanni Panjek (eds.), Storia economica e sociale di Trieste, vol. II: La città dei traffici 1719–1918 (Trieste, 2003) 369–458. Panzac, Daniel, Barbary Corsaires. The End of a Legend 1800–1820 (Leiden and Boston, 2005); french: Les Corsaires babaresques. La fin d’une épopée (1800–1820), (Paris, 1999). Pappenheim, Max, “Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Bodmerei,” Zeitschrift für das gesammte Handelsrecht 40 (N.F. 25) (1892) 378–393.

Bibliography

395

Pelc, Ortwin (ed.), Katastrophen in Norddeutschland. Vorbeugung, Bewältigung und Nachwirkungen vom Mittelalter bis ins 21. Jahrhundert (Neumünster, 2010). Perdikas, Panayotis, “Das Schifferdarlehen an den Befrachter in Palermo als Vorläufer der Versicherung,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft 64 (1975) 295–336. Perdikas, Panayotis, “Die Entstehung der Versicherung im Mittelalter. Geschichtliche Grundlagen im Verhältnis zu Seedarlehen, Überseekauf, commenda und Bodmerei,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft 55/3–4 (1966) 425–509. Perdikas, Panayotis, “Die Palermo-Verträge und ihre Bedeutung für die Entstehung der Versicherung,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft 59 (1970) 151–161. Perrin, William F.; Bernd Würsig and Johannes G. M. Thewissen (eds.), Encyclopedia of Marine Mammals (Burlington MA et al., ²2009). Perucci, Paola (ed.), La contabilità nel bacino del Mediterraneo (secc. XIV–XIX), Milano 2009. Petersen, Anne D., Die Engländer in Hamburg 1814 bis 1914. Ein Beitrag zur Hamburgischen Geschichte (Hamburg, 1993). Petersson, Astrid, Zuckersiedergewerbe und Zuckerhandel in Hamburg im Zeitraum von 1814 bis 1834. Entwicklung und Struktur zweier wichtiger Hamburger Wirtschaftszweige des vorindustriellen Zeitalters (Stuttgart, 1998). Petersson, Astrid, “Zuckersiedergewerbe und Zuckerhandel in Hamburg,” Hamburger Wirtschafts-Chronik, new ser. 1 (2000) 53–81. Petersson, Gustav Jakob, Swedish Marine Insurance between the World Wars (Umea, 2008). Piccinno, Luisa, “Genoa, 1340–1620: Early Development of Marine Insurance,” in A. B. Leonard (ed.), Marine Insurance. Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850 (Houndsmills and Basingstoke, 2016) 25–45. Piergiovanni, Vito (ed.), The Growth of the Bank as Institution and the Development of Money-Business Law (Berlin, 1993). Pietschmann, Horst, Die staatliche Organisation des kolonialen Iberoamerika (Stuttgart, 1980). Pietschmann, Horst, “Hamburg und Lateinamerika in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in Felix Becker and Holger M. Meding (eds.), Iberische Welten. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Günther Kahle (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 1994) 381–407. Pike, Ruth, “The Sevillian Nobility and Trade with the New World in the Sixteenth Century,” Business History Review 39/4 (1965) 439–465. Pina Manique, Francisco, A Causa de D. Miguel (Lisboa, 2007). Plagemann, Volker (ed.), Übersee: Seefahrt und Seemacht im deutschen Kaiserreich (München, 1988).

396

Bibliography

Plaß, Friedrich (together with Robert Ehlers), Geschichte der Assecuranz und der Hanseatischen Seeversicherungsbörsen Hamburg – Bremen – Lübeck (Hamburg, 1902). Pohl, Hans (ed.), Die Auswirkungen von Zöllen und anderen Handelshemmnissen auf Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart (Wiesbaden and Stuttgart, 1987). Pohl, Hans (ed.), Gewerbe- und Industrielandschaften vom Spätmittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1986). Pohl, Hans, Die Beziehungen Hamburgs zu Spanien und dem spanischen Amerika in der Zeit von 1740 bis 1806 (Wiesbaden, 1963). Pohl, Hans, “Die diplomatischen und konsularischen Beziehungen zwischen den Hansestädten und Spanien in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 83 (1965) 46–93. Pohl, Hans, “The Hamburg Colony in Late 18th Century Spain,” in Jens Christian V. Johansen et al. (eds.), Clashes of Cultures. Essays in Honour of Niels Steensgaard (Odense, 1992) 255–272. Pollack-Parnau, Franz von, Eine österreichisch-ostindische Handelskompagnie 1775– 1785. Ein Beitrag zur österreichischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte unter Maria Theresia und Joseph II. (Stuttgart, 1927). Pons Pons, Jerònia, “Compañías de seguro marítimo en España (1650–1800),” Hispania 67/1 núm. 225 (2007) 271–294. Pons Pons, Jerònia, Companyies i mercat assegurador a Mallorca (1650–1715) (Palma de Mallorca, 1996). Pons Pons, Jerònia, “El pago del seguro marítimo y los conflictos ante el tribunal consular,” Pedralbes. Revista d’historia moderna 12 (1992) 71–94. Postel, Rainer, “Anton Meybuschs Portugaleser auf die Börse und den Elbhandel,” in Ralf Wiechmann and Joist Grolle (eds.), Geprägte Geschichte. Hamburger Medaillen des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts (Hamburg, 2014) 186–195. Pöttering, Jorun, Handel, Nation und Religion. Kaufleute zwischen Hamburg und Portugal im 17. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 2013). Pounds, Norman J. G., “Port and Outport in North-West Europe,” The Geographical Journal 109/4–6 (1947) 216–228. Pourchasse, Pierrick, “Le dynamisme des petits ports de l’espace baltique au XVIIIe siècle,” Rives méditerranéens 35 (2010) (Les petits ports) 99–115. Pourchasse, Pierrick, “Temps et grand cabotage européen. L’exemple de la navigation dans les mers du Nord de l’Europe,” Annales de Bretagne et des Pays de l’Ouest 117/3 (2010) 25–37. Prüser, Friedrich, Geschichte der Bremischen Seeversicherung (Bremen, 1925). Prüser, Jürgen, Die Handelsverträge der Hansestädte Lübeck, Bremen und Hamburg mit überseeischen Staaten im 19. Jahrhundert (Bremen, 1962).

Bibliography

397

Puttevils, Jeroen and Marc Deloof, “Marketing and Pricing Risk in Marine Insurance in Sixteenth-Centuy Antwerp,” Journal of Economic History 77/3 (2017) 796–837. Quercia, Potito, “Le assicurazioni marittime a metà Cinquecento attraverso le fonti contabili ragusee,” in Paola Perucci (ed.), La contabilità nel bacino del Mediterraneo (secc. XIV–XIX), Milano 2009, pp. 109–122. Raynes, Harold E., A History of British Insurance (London, ²1964). Ressel, Magnus, “Der deutsche Seehandel im Dreißigjährigen Krieg zwischen lokalem Verlust und Expansion in der Ferne,” in Sandra Richter and Guillaume Garner (eds.), ‘Eigennutz’ und ‘gute Ordnung.’ Ökonomisierungen der Welt im 17. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden, 2016) 67–94. Ressel, Magnus, “Ein Ansbacher in nordafrikanischer Sklaverei. Ein mikrohistorischer Blick auf die Hamburger Seefahrt im 18. Jahrhundert,” in Michael Hundt and Jan Lokers (eds.), Hanse und Stadt. Akteure, Strukturen und Entwicklungen im regionalen und europäischen Raum. Festschrift für Rolf Hammel-Kiesow zum 65. Geburtstag (Lübeck, 2014) 577–592. Ressel, Magnus, Zwischen Sklavenkassen und Türkenpässen. Nordeuropa und die Barbaresken in der Frühen Neuzeit (Berlin and Boston, 2012). Ressel, Magnus and Cornel Zwierlein, “The Ransoming of North European Captives from Northern Africa. A Comparison of Dutch, Hanseatic and English Institutionalization of Redemption from 1610–1645,” in Nikolas Jaspert and Sebastian Kolditz (eds.), Seeraub im Mittelmeerraum. Piraterie, Korsarentum und maritime Gewalt von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit (Paderborn, 2013) 377–406. Reti marittime come fattori dell’integrazione europea / Maritime Networks as a Factor in European Integration. Selezione di ricerche / Selection of Essays (Firenze, 2019). Rice, Dale W., “Spermaceti,” in: William F. Perrin; Bernd Würsig and Johannes G. M. Thewissen (eds.), Encyclopedia of Marine Mammals (Burlington MA et al., ²2009) 1098–1099. Richter, Sandra and Guillaume Garner (eds.), ‘Eigennutz’ und ‘gute Ordnung’. Ökonomisierungen der Welt im 17. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden, 2016). Rispler-Chaim, Vardit, “Insurance and Semi-Insurance Transactions in Islamic History until the 19th Century,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 34/2 (1991) 142–158. Rispler-Chaim, Vardit, Insurance in the World of Islam. Origins, Problems and Current Practice (Ph.D.-Thesis Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1985). Roesbroeck, Robert van, “Die Niederlassung von Flamen und Wallonen in Hamburg (1567–1605),” Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte 49/50 (1964) 53–76. Röhlk, Frauke, Schiffahrt und Handel zwischen Hamburg und den Niederlanden in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. und zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts (Wiesbaden, 1973). Roover, Raymond de, “Les doctrines économiques des scholastiques: à propos du traité sur l’usure d’Alexandre Lombard,” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 59 (1964) 854–866.

398

Bibliography

Roover, Raymond de, “The cambium maritimum Contract According to the Genoese Notarial Records of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” in David Herlihy; Robert S. Lopez and Vsevolod Slessarev (eds.), Economy, Society, and Government in Medieval Italy. Essays in Memory of Robert L. Reynolds (Kent OH, 1969) 15–33. Roover, Raymond de, “The Scholastics, Usury, and Foreign Exchange,” Business History Review 41 (1967) 257–271. Röpling, Gerhard, Die Geschichte der englischen Seeversicherung (Weißenburg/Bay., 1956). Rossi, Guido, “England 1523–1601: The Beginnings of Marine Insurance,” in A. B. Leonard (ed.), Marine Insurance. Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850 (Houndsmills and Basingstoke, 2016) 131–148. Rossi, Guido, “The Booke of Orders of Assurances. A Civil Law Code in the 16th Century London,” in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 19/2 (2012) 240–261. Rössner, Philipp R., “New Avenues of Trade: Structural Change in the European Economy and Foreign Commerce as Reflected in the Changing Structure of Scotland’s Commerce, 1660–1760,” Journal of Scottish Historical Studies 31/1 (2011) 1–25. Rössner, Philipp R., Scottish Trade with German Ports, 1700–1770. A Sketch to the North Sea Trades and the Atlantic Economy on Ground Level (Stuttgart, 2008). Rössner, Philipp R., “Structural Change in European Economy and Commerce, 1660– 1800. Lessons from Scotland’s and Hamburg’s Overseas Trades,” The Bulletin of the Institute for World Affairs, Kyoto Sangyo University 27 (2011) 25–62. Ruffat, Michèle, “French Insurance from the ancien régime to 1946: Shifting Frontiers between State and Market,” Financial History Review 10 (2003) 185–200. Ruiz, Alain (ed.), Présence de l’Allemagne à Bordeaux du siècle de Montaigne à la veille de la Seconde Guerre mondial. Hommage au Goethe-Institut de Bordeaux, à l’occasion de son 25e anniversaire (Talence, 1997). Rybnikoff, J., “Die Entwicklung der Versicherung in Rußland bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungs-Wissenschaft 28 (1928) 303–311. Saalfeld, Diedrich, “Die Kontinentalsperre,” in Hans Pohl (ed.), Die Auswirkungen von Zöllen und anderen Handelshemmnissen auf Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart (Wiesbaden and Stuttgart, 1987) 121–139. Sala, Mario, Un siglo de seguros marítimos barceloneses en el comercio con América (1770–1870) (Madrid, 2012). Schaube, Adolf, “Der Uebergang vom Versicherungsdarlehn zur reinen Versicherung,” Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 61 (3rd ser., 6) (1893) 481–515. Schaube, Adolf, “Der Versicherungsgedanke in den Verträgen des Seeverkehrs vor der Entstehung des Versicherungswesens. Eine Studie zur Vorgeschichte der Seeversicherung,” Zeitschrift für Social- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2 (1894) 149–223.

Bibliography

399

Schaube, Adolf, “Die wahre Beschaffenheit der Versicherung in der Entstehungszeit des Versicherungswesens,” Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 60 (3rd ser., 5) (1893) 40–58 and 473–509. Schaube, Adolf, Handelsgeschichte der romanischen Völker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzüge (München and Berlin, 1906). Scheller, Benjamin, “Die Geburt des Risikos. Kontingenz und kaufmännische Praxis im mediterranen Seehandel des Hoch- und Spätmittelalters,” Historische Zeitschrift 304 (2017) 305–331. Scheltjens, Werner, Dutch Deltas. Emergence, Functions and Structure of the Low Countries’ Maritime Transport System, ca. 1300–1850 (Leiden and Boston, 2015). Scherner, Karl Otto, “Formen der Konfliktlösung im Handels- und Seerecht in Nürnberg, Hamburg und Leipzig zwischen 1500 und 1800,” in Albrecht Cordes and Serge Dauchy (eds.) with contribution of Andreas Karg and Anika Auer, Eine Grenze in Bewegung: Private und öffentliche Konfliktlösung im Handels- und Seerecht / Une frontière mouvante: Justice privée et justice publique en matières commerciales et maritimes (München, 2013) 117–140. Schleich, Thomas and Eberhard Schmitt, “Der spanische Überseehandel: Organisationsformen, Schiffe, Routen und Waren,” in Piet C. Emmer et al. (eds.), Wirtschaft und Handel der Kolonialreiche (=  Dokumente zur Geschichte der europäischen Expansion, ed. Eberhard Schmitt, vol. 4) (München, 1988) 47–51. Schleich, Thomas, “Brasilien als Milchkuh Portugals und Englands: Louis-Antoine de Bougainville schildert das Handelszentrum Rio de Janeiro (1771),” in Ibid., 654–656. Schleich, Thomas, “Eine Denkschrift des Schweizer Kaufmanns in Diensten der Compagnie des Indes Charles Constant über den Teehandel in Kanton (1793),” in Ibid., 302–313. Schmidt, Burghart, “Bordeaux, Hamburg and Leghorn: Three European Ports and the Pressures of the Continental Blockade,” in: International Journal of Maritime History 13/1 (2001) 177–185. Schmidt, Burghart, Hamburg im Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution und Napoleons (1789–1813), part 1: Darstellung (Hamburg, 1998). Schmidt, Rudolf, “Der Abschluß eines Handelsvertrages zwischen den Hansestädten und Brasilien vor 100 Jahre,” Hamburger Übersee-Jahrbuch 6 (1928) 317–320. Schmidt, Sven, “Kommunikationsrevolution oder Zweite Kommerzielle Revolution? Die Neuen Geschäftsmedien des 16. Jahrhunderts und ihr Einfluss auf die Praktiken des frühneuzeitlichen Börsenhandels am Beispiel des Nürnberger Preiscourants (1586–1640),” in Mark Häberlein and Christof Jeggle (eds.), Praktiken des Handels. Geschäfte und soziale Beziehungen europäischer Kaufleute in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit (Konstanz, 2010) 245–282.

400

Bibliography

Schneider, Jürgen; Oskar Schwarzer and Friedrich Zellfelder (eds.), Währungen der Welt I: Europäische und nordamerikanische Devisenkurse 1777–1914, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1991). Schneider, Jürgen; Oskar Schwarzer; Friedrich Zellfelder and Markus A. Denzel, Währungen der Welt VI: Geld und Währungen in Europa im 18. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1992). Schneider, Jürgen; Oskar Schwarzer and Petra Schnelzer (eds.), Statistik der Geld- und Wechselkurse in Deutschland und im Ostseeraum (18. und 19. Jahrhundert) (= Historische Statistik von Deutschland, vol. XII) (St. Katharinen, 1993). Schneider, Jürgen (ed.), Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege. Festschrift für Hermann Kellenbenz, vol. II: Wirtschaftskräfte in der europäischen Expansion (Stuttgart, 1978). Schneider, Jürgen, Frankreich und die Unabhängigkeit Spanisch-Amerikas. Zum französischen Handel mit den entstehenden Nationalstaaten (1810–1850) (Stuttgart, 1981). Schramm, Percy Ernst, “Hamburg – Brasilien: Die Forderung einer Dampferverbindung, 1854 verwirklicht. Ein Beitrag zum Problem: Privatinitiative – Regierungssubventionen,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 52 (1965) 86–90. Schramm, Percy Ernst, “Kaufleute während Besatzung, Krieg und Belagerung (1806– 1815). Der Hamburger Handel in der Franzosenzeit, dargestellt an Hand von Firmen- und Familienpapieren,” Tradition. Zeitschrift für Firmengeschichte und Unternehmerbiographie 4/1 (1959) 1–22; 4/2 (1959) 1–22. Schües, Walter G., Die Geschichte der “Nord-Deutsche Versicherungs-Gesellschaft” zu Hamburg 1857–1957. Festschrift (Hamburg, 1957). Schug, Albert, Der Versicherungsgedanke und seine historischen Grundlagen (Göttingen, 2011). Schulte Beerbühl, Margrit, “Staatsangehörigkeit und fremdes Know-how. Die deutschen Kaufleute im britischen Rußlandhandel des 18. Jahrhunderts,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 89/4 (2002) 379–399. Schulte, Petra and Peter Hesse (eds.), Reichtum im späteren Mittelalter. Politische Theorie – Ethische Norm – Soziale Akzeptanz (Stuttgart, 2015). Schulz, Günther et al. (eds.), Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Arbeitsgebiete – Probleme – Perspektiven. 100 Jahre Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Stuttgart, 2004). Schulz, Knut (ed.), Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Herbert Helbig zum 65. Geburtstag (Köln and Wien, 1976). Schwarzer, Oskar, “Der Hamburger Exporthandel mit der Karibik und Mexiko (1814– 1838),” Scripta Mercaturae 17/1 (1983) 45–88. Schwarzer, Oskar, “Eine EDV-gestützte Forschungskonzeption zur Bearbeitung historischer Geld- und Wechselkurse,” in Jürgen Schneider; Oskar Schwarzer and Friedrich Zellfelder (eds.), Währungen der Welt I: Europäische und nordamerikanische Devisenkurse 1777–1914 (Stuttgart, 1991) vol. I, 180–196.

Bibliography

401

Schweer, Walter, “Hamburg – Brasilien – La Plata: Handels- und Schiffahrtsbeziehungen einst und jetzt,” Hamburger Übersee-Jahrbuch (1929) 21–58. Schweer, Walther, “Hamburg – New York. Handels- und Schiffahrtsbeziehungen einst und jetzt,” Hamburger Übersee-Jahrbuch (1928) 17–40. Sée, Henri, “Notes sur les assurances maritimes en France et particulièrement à Nantes au XVIIIe siècle,” Revue historique du droit français et étranger 4e sér. 62 (1927) 287–311. “Seeversicherung im Wandel,” Zeitschrift für Versicherungswesen 59/22 (2008) 751–752. Serruys, Michael-W., “Oostende en de Generale Indische Compagnie. De opbloei en neergang van een koloniale handelshaven (1713–1740),” Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 24/1 (2005) 43–59. Sieburg, Heinz-Otto (ed.), Napoleon und Europa (Köln and Berlin, 1971). Sieveking, Heinrich, Das Seedarlehen des Altertums (Leipzig, 1893). Sieveking, Heinrich, “Die Hamburgische Firma Kunst & Albers in Wladiwostok 1864– 1914,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 34 (1941) 268–299. Sigmond, J. P., Nederlandse zeehavens tussen 1500 en 1800 (Amsterdam, 1989). Škrivan, Aleš, “Das hamburgische Handelshaus Johan Cesar Godeffroy & Sohn und die Frage der deutschen Handelsinteressen in der Südsee,” Veröffentlichungen des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte 81 (1995) 129–155. Söderberg, Tom, Försäkringsväsendets historia i Sverige intill Karl Johanstiden (Stockholm, 1935). Söderpalm, Kristina (ed.), Ostindiska Compagniet. Affärer och föremål (Göteborg, 2000). Sösemann, Bernd and Gregor Vogt-Spira (eds.), Friedrich der Große in Europa. Geschichte einer wechselvollen Beziehung (Stuttgart, 2012). Souza, Testonio R. de, “Marine Insurance and Indo-Portuguese Trade History: An Aid to Maritime Historiography,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 14 (1977) 377–384. Spooner, Frank C., Risks at Sea. Amsterdam Insurance and Maritime Europe, 1766–1780 (Cambridge, 1983, ²2002). Sprandel, Rolf, “Der Hafen von Hamburg,” in Heinz Stoob (ed.), See- und Flußhäfen vom Hochmittelalter bis zur Industrialisierung (Köln and Wien, 1986) 193–210. Spufford, Peter, “From Genoa to London: the Places of Insurance in Europe,” in A. B. Leonard (ed.), Marine Insurance. Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850 (Houndsmills and Basingstoke, 2016), 271–297. Stamm-Kuhlmann, Thomas (ed.), Geschichtsbilder. Festschrift für Michael Salewski zum 65. Geburtstag (Stuttgart, 2003). Stefani, Giuseppe, Insurance in Venice from the Origins to the End of the Serenissima, vol. I (Trieste, 1958); Documents Published for the 125th Anniversary of the Company [Assicurazioni Generali di Trieste e Venezia] (1831–1956), vol. II. (Trieste, 1958).

402

Bibliography

Steger, Hanns-Albert and Jürgen Schneider (eds.), Karibik (München, 1982). Steinsdorfer, Helmut, “Edgar Daniel Ross (1807–1885), ein deutsch-britischer Liberaler aus der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg,” Mitteilungen des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte 11/8 (1987) 184ff. Stevens, Fred, The Contribution of Antwerp to the Development of Marine Insurance in the Sixteenth Century, in: Marc Huybrechts; Eric van Hooydonk and Christian Dieryck (eds.), Marine Insurance at the Turn of the Millenium, 2 vols. (Antwerp, 1999/2000) vol. 2, 15–20. Stolz, Gerd, Die schleswig-holsteinische Erhebung. Die nationale Auseinandersetzung in und um Schleswig-Holstein von 1848/51 (Husum, 1996). Stoob, Heinz (ed.), See- und Flußhäfen vom Hochmittelalter bis zur Industrialisierung (Köln and Wien, 1986). Stöpel, Ursula, “Der Freundschafts-, Handels- und Schiffahrtsvertrag der Hansestädte mit Sansibar 1859–61,” Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig 4 (1954/55) 95–124. Stritzky, Oscar von, 1797–1972. Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure [Hamburg, 1972]. Stromer, Wolfgang von (ed.), Venedig und die Weltwirtschaft um 1200 (Stuttgart, 1999). Stubmann, Peter, Hamburg, Rotterdam und Antwerpen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 1912) (repr. Marine-Rundschau 6. Heft, June 1912). Stuhr, Friedrich, “Die Napoleonische Kontinentalsperre in Mecklenburg (1806–1813),” Mecklenburgische Jahrbücher 71 (1906) 325–364. Stutz, Alfred, Die Rückversicherung im Transport-Versicherungs-Geschäft (Zürich, 1893). Sulzer, Melanie, Soziale Sicherungssysteme in der Seeschifffahrt. Von der berufsständischen Armenfürsorge zur See-Sozialversicherung (Bremen, 2012). Supple, Barry, The Royal Exchange Assurance. A History of British Insurance 1720–1970 (Cambridge, 1970). Svendsen, Nick, The First Schleswig-Holstein War 1848–50 (Solihull (West Midlands), 2008). Svoronos, Nicolas G., Le commerce de Salonique au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1956). Szymanski, Hans, Die Anfänge der Dampfschiffahrt in Niedersachsen und in den angrenzenden Gebieten von 1817 bis 1867 (Hannover, 1958). Tardiff, Guillermo, Historia general del comercio exterior mexicano (Antecedentes, documentos, glosas y comentarios), vol. 2: 1848–1869 (México DF, 1970). Tenenti, Alberto and Branislava Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio: l’assicurazione mediterranea vista da Ragusa (1563–1591) (Roma, 1985). Tenenti, Alberto, “Assicurazioni genovesi tra Atlantico e Mediterraneo nel decennio 1564–1572,” in Jürgen Schneider (ed.), Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege. Festschrift für Hermann Kellenbenz, Bd. II: Wirtschaftskräfte in der europäischen Expansion (Wiesbaden, 1978) 9–36.

Bibliography

403

Tenenti, Alberto, Naufrages, corsaires et assurances maritimes à Venise 1592–1606 (Paris, 1960). Tenenti, Alberto, “Risque et securité: Course et assurance entre Levant et ponent du Bas Moyen Age à l’Époque Moderne,” in Centre de Recherches néohelleniques (éd.), Actes du IIe colloque internationale d’histoire (Athènes, 1985) 385–400. Teuteberg, Hans J., “Die Entstehung des modernen Hamburger Hafens (1866–1896),” Tradition. Zeitschrift für Firmengeschichte und Unternehmerbiographie 12 (1972) 256–291. Thomsen, Alfred, “Dänemark,” in Eberhart Finke (Hrsg.), Handbuch des Versicherungswesens, vol. 1: Abando – Liberalisierung (Darmstadt, 1958) 443–454. Thöns, Heinrich, “Viereinhalb Jahrhunderte Börsenleben in Hamburg,” in Handelskammer Hamburg (Hrsg.), Die Hamburger Börse 1558–2008. Trends im Börsenwesen (Hamburg, 2008) 17–53. Tinniswood, Adrian, Pirates of Barbary. Corsairs, Conquests, and Captivity in the Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean (New York, 2010). Torner, Herbert, “Schiffsklassifikation und Schiffssicherheit,” Versicherungswirtschaft 17/18 (1962) 632–635. Tracy, James D. (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires. Long-distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750 (Cambridge, 1993 [1990]). Treppo, Mario del, “Assecurazioni e commercio internazionale a Barcellona 1428– 1429,” Rivista storica italiana 69 (1957) 508–541; 70 (1958) 44–81. Trivellato, Francesca, “The Port Jews of Livorno and their Global Networks of Trade in Early Modern History,” in David Cesarani (ed.), Jews and Port Cities, 1590–1990: Commerce, Community and Cosmopolitanism (London, 2006) 31–49. Tucci, Ugo, “Gli investimenti assicurativi a Venezia nella seconda metà del Cinquecento,” in Mélanges en l’honneur de Fernand Braudel, vol. I: Histoire économique du monde méditerranéen 1450–1650 (Paris, 1973) 633–643. Tuchtenhagen, Ralph, Kleine Geschichte Norwegens (München, 2009). Ulrich, Rudolf, “Die neueren Fortschritte der Schiffbautechnik in ihrer Bedeutung für die Transportversicherung,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungs-Wissenschaft 5 (1905) 1–19. Umbach, Kai, Das grenzüberschreitende Geschäft in der See- und Transportversicherung von Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts bis in die 1990er Jahre: Ein internationaler Gewerbezweig auf dem Weg hin zu “globalisierten” Verhältnissen? (Diss. phil. Marburg, 2008). Vacalopoulos, Apostolos E.; Constantinos D. Svolopoulos and Béla K. Király (eds.), Southeast European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies from the Mid-Eighteenth Century to 1914 (Thessaloniki, 1988). Vacalopoulos, Apostolos E., “Piracy during the Last Years of the Greek War of Independence,” in Ibid., 363–377.

404

Bibliography

Vacalopoulos, Constantin A., “Commercial Development and Economic Importance of the Port of Thessaloniki from the Late Eighteenth Century to 1856,” in Ibid., 301–307. Valéry, Jules, “Les contracts d’assurances au moyen âge,” Revue générale du droit, de la législation et de la jurisprudence 39 (1915) 469–478. van Contzen, Eva; Tobias Huff and Peter Itzen (eds.), Risikogesellschaften. Literaturund geschichtswissenschaftliche Perspektiven (Bielefeld, 2018). Van der Wee, Herman, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy (14th–16th Centuries) (Louvain, 1963). Vance, William R., “The Early History of Insurance Law,” Columbia Law Review 8/1 (1908) 1–17. Veluwenkamp, Jan Willem and Werner Scheltjens (eds.), Early Modern Shipping and Trade. Novel Approaches Using Sound Toll Registers Online (Leiden and Boston, 2018). Vereecke, L., “L’assurances maritime chez les théologiens des XVe et XVIe siècles,” Studia moralia 8 (1970) 347–385. Voeltzer, Friedrich, Lübecks Wirtschaftslage unter dem Druck der Kontinentalsperre (Lübeck, 1925). Vogel, Walter, “Beiträge zur Statistik der deutschen Seeschiffahrt im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert I,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 53 (1928) 110–152. Vogel, Walter, “Beiträge zur Statistik der deutschen Seeschiffahrt im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert II,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 57 (1932) 78–151. Vogel, Walter, Die Hansestädte und die Kontinentalsperre (München and Leipzig, 1913). Vogel, Walter, “Handelskonjunkturen und Wirtschaftskrisen in ihrer Auswirkung auf den Seehandel der Hansestädte 1560–1806,” Hansische Geschichtsblätter 74 (1956) 50–64. Vogt, Annette Christine, Ein Hamburger Beitrag zur Entwicklung des Welthandels im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 2003). Voigt, Harald, Die Nordfriesen auf den Hamburger Wal- und Robbenfängern 1669–1839 (Neumünster, 1987). Voigt, Johann Friedrich, Das deutsche Seeversicherungs-Recht. Commentar zu Buch 5 Titel 11 des Allgemeinen deutschen Handelsgesetzbuchs und zu den ‘Allgemeinen Seeversicherungs-Bedingungen von 1867’ (Jena, 1887). Voss, Peter, “‘Eine Fahrt von wenig Importanz?’ Der hansische Handel mit Bordeaux 1670–1715,” in Antjekathrin Grassmann (ed.), Niedergang oder Übergang? Zur Spätzeit der Hanse im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 1998) 93–138. Walle, Heinrich, “Das Seeverkehrswesen,” in: Volker Plagemann (ed.), Übersee: Seefahrt und Seemacht im deutschen Kaiserreich (München, 1988) 71–79. Walter, Rolf, “Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Venezuelas und die venezolanischdeutschen Handelsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in Lateinamerika-Studien 7: Venezuela – Kolumbien – Ekuador (München, 1980).

Bibliography

405

Walter, Rolf, “Georg Gramlich und der Deutsch-venezolanische Freundschafts-, Handels- und Schiffahrtsvertrag vom 27. März 1837,” in Utta  (!)  von Gleich (ed.), Deutsch-Venezolanische Beziehungen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart  – Relaciones Germano-Venezolanas en el pasado y presente (München and Hamburg, 1988) 115–124. Walter, Rolf, Preußen und Venezuela. Edition der preußischen Konsularberichte über Venezuela 1842–1850 (Frankfurt/Main, 1991). Walter, Rolf, Venezuela und Deutschland (1815–1870) (Wiesbaden, 1983). Wätjen, Hermann, Aus der Frühzeit des Nordatlantikverkehrs. Studien zur Geschichte der deutschen Schiffahrt und deutschen Auswanderung nach den Vereinigten Staaten bis zum Ende des amerikanischen Bürgerkriegs (Leipzig, 1932). Wätjen, Hermann, Der deutsche Anteil am Wirtschaftsaufbau der Westküste Amerikas (Leipzig, 1942). Webb, Paul L. C., “Sea Power in the Ochakov Affair of 1791,” International History Review 2/1 (1980) 13–33. Weber, Klaus, Deutsche Kaufleute im Atlantikhandel 1680–1830. Unternehmen und Familien in Hamburg, Cádiz und Bordeaux (München, 2004). Weick, Günter, “Incoterms 2010 – Ein Beispiel für die ‘neue lex mercatoria’,” Zeitschrift für das Juristische Studium N° 10 (2012) 584–592. Wessel, Horst A., “Die optische Telegrafenlinie von Hamburg nach Cuxhaven,” in Klaus Beyrer (ed.), So weit das Auge reicht: Die Geschichte der optischen Telegrafie, ed. Museum für Post und Kommunikation (Frankfurt am Main) (Karlsruhe, 1995) 205–214. Wiechmann, Ralf and Joist Grolle (eds.), Geprägte Geschichte. Hamburger Medaillen des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts (Hamburg, 2014). Wiechmann, Ralf, “‘Zu Beförderung der Commercien und Handlung’ – Die Hamburger Bank,” in Ibid., 382–397. Wiedenfeld, Kurt, Die nordwesteuropäischen Welthäfen(.) London, Liverpool, Hamburg, Bremen, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerpen, Havre in ihrer Verkehrs- und Handelsbedeutung (Berlin, 1903). Williams, David M. and John Armstrong, “Technological Advances in the Maritime Sector: Some Implications for Trade, Modernization and the Process of Globalization in the Nineteenth Century,” in Maria Fusaro and Amélia Polónia (eds.), Maritime History as Global History (St. John’s, 2010) 177–202. Wiskemann, Erwin, Hamburgs Stellung in der Welthandelspolitik von den Anfängen bis 1814 (Hamburg, 1928). Wobring, Michael, “Telekommunikation, überseeische,” in Hermann Hiery et al. (eds.), Lexikon zur Überseegeschichte (Stuttgart, 2015) 796–798. Wobring, Michael, Die Globalisierung der Telekommunikation im 19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt/Main, 2005).

406

Bibliography

Wohlwill, Adolf, Neuere Geschichte der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg (Gotha, 1914). Wolff, Inge, “Chilenische Opposition gegen die Wirtschaftspolitik des Vizekönigreiches Peru, 1778–1810. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der interkolonialen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen Spanisch-Südamerikas am Vorabend der Unabhängigkeit,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 43 (1956) 146–168. Wright, Robert E. and Christopher Kingston, “Corporate Insurers in Antebellum America,” Business History Review 86 (2012) 447–476. Zeno, Riniero, Documenti per la storia del diritto marittimo nei secoli XIII e XIV (Torino, 1936). Zeno, Riniero, Storia del diritto marittimo nel Mediterraneo (Catania, 1915). Ziechmann, Jürgen (ed.), Panorama der Friedericianischen Zeit. Friedrich der Große und seine Epoche – Ein Handbuch (Bremen, 1985). Zorn, Wolfgang, “Schwerpunkte der deutschen Ausfuhrindustrie im 18. Jahrhundert,” Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 173 (1961) 422–447. Zwierlein, Cornel (ed.), The Dark Side of Knowledge. Histories of Ignorance, 1400 to 1800 (Leiden and Boston, 2016). Zwierlein, Cornel, “Entangled History, Vermischungen? Europäische Blicke auf Tunis und Algier in der Frühen Neuzeit,” Historische Zeitschrift 297 (2013) 621–656. Zwierlein, Cornel, “Sicherheit durch Versicherung: Ein frühneuzeitliches Erfolgsmodell,” in Christoph Kampmann and Ulrich Niggemann (eds.), Sicherheuit in der Frühen Neuzeit. Norm, Praxis, Repräsentation (Köln, Weimar and Wien, 2013) 381–399. Zwierlein, Cornel, “Insurances as Part of ‘Human Security’, their Timescapes and Spatiality,” Historical Social Research 35/4 (2010) 253–274. Zwierlein, Cornel, “Renaissance Anthropologies of Security: Shipwreck, Barbary Fear and the Meaning of ‘Insurance’,” in Andreas Höfele and Stephan Laqué (eds.), Human Kinds. The Renaissance and its Antropologies (Berlin and New York, 2011) 157–182. All maps were created with the aid of the Natural Earth-Project (naturalearthdata .com) and the OpenStreetMap-Project (©  OpenStreetMap-Mitwirkende, openstreet map.org).

Geographic Index “Hamburg” is not included in the index. A Coruña see La Coruña Aabenraa 65, 271 Aalborg 117, 139, 285 Åbo (Turku) 196, 202, 203, 286 Adelaide 118, 263 Adriatic coasts 325–328 Africa 62, 63, 69, 154 Agger Channel 117, 139, 285 Agger Tange 139 Agger, village 139 Åhus 139, 202, 286 Akyab (modern-day Sittwe) 264 Åland 199 Aleppo 185 Alexandria 24, 31 Algarve 169 Algeria 180 Algiers 68, 75, 76n.12, 78, 176, 178, 179, 180n.11, 261, 274 Alicante 82, 116, 117, 179, 181, 182, 184, 282–284 Altona 57–59, 79, 80n.32, 92 America, Central 69, 229, 290 America, North 54, 62, 63, 69, 82, 116–118, 126, 136, 153, 165, 194, 224, 226, 229, 230, 234, 250, 275, 288–290, 352, 353 America, South 62, 63, 69, 95, 115–117, 153, 245–247, 250–252, 358, 359 America, west coast 62, 115, 247n.68, 249–253 Amsterdam 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 34, 37, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 65, 69, 73, 74, 75, 83, 88, 89, 91, 95, 100, 102–104, 115–117, 124, 127–130, 136, 139, 140, 144, 149, 160, 211–214, 219, 268, 272–275, 279, 280, 283, 284, 288, 290, 295, 296, 341, 342 Anatolia 114, 186, 190 Ancona 31, 144n.63, 289, 290 Angostura 242, 243 Angoulême 163 Antilles, the 152, 160, 161, 223, 237, 243

Antwerp 13, 37, 40, 44, 47, 69, 71, 73, 74, 94, 102, 116, 117, 144, 145, 147, 163, 283, 284, 287 Apulia 81, 186, 187, 190, 281, 282, 283, 284, 288 Aquitaine 160 Aragón 30, 31 Arakan (today Kaladan River) 264 Arensburg 202 Argentina 249, 252n.92 Arkhangelsk 11, 80–82, 89, 116, 119, 122–130, 133, 270, 281, 282, 284, 285, 289–296 Asia, East 3n.13, 62, 69, 258, 265–267, 280, 362, 363 Asia, Southeast 265, 266, 362, 363 Athens 23, 107 Atlantic coast, French 159, 161–164, 171, 286, 313–316; see also Bay of Bourgneuf Atlantic coast, Iberian 81, 117, 163, 167, 169, 171–173, 175, 317–320; see also Bay of Biscay, Bay of Cádiz Augsburg 13 Australia 16, 61–63, 71, 115, 117, 118, 262–264, 266, 276, 280, 284, 362, 363 Austria 108, 173 Avignon 34 Baffin Island 120 Bahia 168, 225, 226, 247, 250 Balearic Islands 181 Baltic Sea 329–332, 341–348 Baltimore 54, 230 Banda Oriental (the Eastern Bank) 251 Barbary States 76, 78, 179 Barca (modern-day Marj) 76n.12 Barcelona 8, 33, 37, 44, 82, 107, 116, 117, 127, 179, 181–184, 221, 282–285, 288–290, 321–324 Barinas, province of 243 Batavia (modern-day Jakarta) 55, 107, 115–118, 262, 263, 265, 283, 284

408 Batavian Republic 53, 144, 147, 212 Bay of Bengal 262 Bay of Biscay 163, 166, 167, 169, 172–176, 317–320 Bay of Bourgneuf 81, 127–129, 144n.63, 159, 160, 163–167, 169, 170, 174, 214, 273, 281, 286, 289, 290, 295, 296, 313–316 Bay of Cádiz 168 Bayonne 82, 116, 117, 160, 163, 169, 170, 174, 282, 283, 285 Belgium 117, 144–146, 148, 284, 286, 305–308 Belt see Great Belt, Little Belt Bengal 115–118, 262, 263, 265, 266, 270, 283, 284, 362, 363 Bergen 81, 82, 116, 117, 130, 131, 132, 273, 281, 282, 283, 285, 287, 289, 290, 297–300 Berlin 168n.139 Bilbao 44, 82, 116, 117, 169, 170, 282, 283, 285, 289, 290 Blekinge 202 Bohemia 97 Bolivia 249 Bombay (modern-day Mumbai) 264 Bordeaux 19, 38, 82, 89, 116, 117, 127, 128, 159–163, 170, 211, 214–216, 282, 283, 285, 288, 289, 343, 344 Boston 38, 40 Bou Regreg, Republic of 76n.12 Brandenburg 50n.24 Brazil 36, 58–62, 67, 69, 71, 80, 82, 95, 116–118, 167, 168, 171, 218, 225–229, 246–248, 250–255, 260, 283, 285, 287, 290, 349–351, 358, 359 Bremen 1, 38, 42, 47, 48, 53, 56, 58, 60, 82, 87, 90, 93, 96n.20, 100, 102, 104, 115n.85, 116, 117, 130, 134–140, 230n.15, 232, 280, 282–284 Brest 82, 107, 160, 163, 282 Bristol 81, 82, 116, 117, 144n.63, 150–153, 281–284, 289 Britain 63, 223, 238n.42 British Isles, the 148, 150, 152, 154, 156, 309–312; see also Great Britain British North America 60, 62, 230 British West Indies 243 Brittany 163 Bruges 34 ,35, 37, 40 Brussels 107

Geographic Index Buenos Aires, city 95, 117, 118, 229, 247, 248, 250, 252, 285, 290 Buenos Aires, province of 249 Burgos 8, 35, 36 Burgundy 32 Burma 263 Byzantine Empire 22 Cádiz 11, 42, 78, 82, 116, 117, 119, 144n.63, 168–171, 174, 178, 179, 216n.35, 224, 225, 274, 282, 283, 285, 288, 289 Caffa (modern-day Feodosia) 32 Calais 81, 162, 163, 281 Calcutta (modern-day Kolkata) 264 California 16, 68, 115, 117, 118, 246, 250–253, 280, 285, 358, 359 Callao 249, 252 Canada 44n.128, 160, 230 Canal du Midi 180 Canary Islands 82, 118, 168–170, 282 Canton 55, 115, 116, 117, 118, 256, 257, 260, 262–265, 283, 284 Cape Colony 262; see also Cape of Good Hope Cape Finisterre 55, 165, 178 Cape Horn 250, 252, 253 Cape of Good Hope 69, 115–118, 256, 262, 265–267, 283, 284, 362, 363 Cape Saint Vincent 169, 173 Cape Town 262 Cape Verde Islands 36 Cap-Haïtien 116, 118, 241, 283 Caracas 242 Caribbean 356, 357 Carnatic region 258n.4 Cartagena 36, 181, 184 Cartagena de Indias 225, 226, 243 Catalonia 32n.62, 33, 181 Celebes (modern-day Sulawesi) 263 Cephalonia 82, 185, 186, 282 Çeşme 114, 117, 187, 190, 284 Cette 82, 116, 117, 179, 180, 181, 221, 282, 283, 284, 288 Channel (region), the 144n.63, 155, 157, 158, 162, 162n.120, 163, 165, 166, 167, 176, 273, 275, 287, 313–316 Channel ports 165 Charente 82, 160, 163, 282

Geographic Index Charleston 54, 224, 230, 238 Charlotte Amalie 237 Chile 71, 249, 253 China 60, 62, 63, 69, 71, 160, 264 Chios 187 Christiania see Kristiania Christianssand see Kristiansand (S) Ciudad Bolívar 242 Clyde 154 Clyde see Firth of Clyde Constantine 76n.12 Constantinople 24, 31, 39, 76 Copenhagen 82, 83, 87, 102, 104, 116, 117, 131n.28, 134–136, 140, 195, 202, 204, 207– 209, 211, 214, 219–221, 237–240, 256, 258–261, 282–284, 286–289, 333–336, 347, 348, 354, 355, 360–362 Cork 152, 154 Cornwall 151, 153 Coromandel Coast 258n.4 Corsica 31, 180n.11 Costa Firma 240, 241 Costa Rica 60, 233n.35, 249n.83 Courland 82, 195, 202, 204, 206, 209, 210, 282, 333–336 Crete (Candia) 39, 185 Cuba 58, 60, 62, 69, 224, 225, 231, 232, 234–238, 241, 253, 352, 353 Cuiabá 226 Curaçao 116, 118, 242–246, 283, 356, 357 Curonian Spit 202 Cuxhaven 56, 58, 92, 113, 137 Cyprus 39, 185 Danish West Indies 238, 243 Danzig (modern-day Gdańsk) 13, 80, 81, 82, 107, 116, 117, 136, 194–196, 201–204, 206, 209–212, 268, 272, 273, 281–284, 286, 287, 289, 333–336 Dartmouth 152 Davis Strait(s) 120, 121, 122, 282 Delmenhorst 136n.37 Denmark 44, 48, 54, 56, 78, 89n.65, 104, 106, 113, 120, 122, 134, 136, 136n.37, 138, 173, 178, 201, 238, 257, 258, 260 Devon 151 Dithmarschen 137 Dniepr-Bug-Liman 207

409 Dominica 225 Dover 162n.122 Dresden 97 Dublin 154 Dunkirk 49, 69, 81, 82, 144, 162, 163, 281, 282 Dutch India 263 East India see India Ecuador 249n.83 Edinburgh 152, 153 Edinburgh and Glasgow Union Canal (today Union Canal) 154 Egypt 76n.12, 260 Eider 82, 87, 134–138, 282 Eider Canal 136 El Salvador 233n.35 Elba 185 Elbe 18, 47, 48, 50n.24, 51, 55–57, 69, 73, 88, 91, 92, 95, 108, 110, 112, 113, 124, 130, 136, 137, 140, 195, 200, 233, 275 Elsinore 82, 134, 192, 282 Emden 56, 87, 116, 117, 135–139, 256–258, 283, 284 Ems 135n.135, 138, 140–142, 301–304 England 9, 30, 35, 38, 40, 41, 43, 48, 49, 5–54, 56, 57, 61, 75, 77, 78, 80, 87, 103, 104, 106, 108n.68, 136, 137, 138, 144n.63, 148–151, 153, 155–159, 162, 173, 180, 286, 289, 290, 309–312; see also Great Britain Estado da India 36, 257, 258 Estonia 201 Exe 151 Exeter 151 Exmouth 150–152 Exon 81, 82, 150, 281, 282 Falmouth 82, 151, 152, 282 Faro 82, 169, 282 Ferrara 32 Fez 187 Finland 196, 199, 202, 203, 205, 207, 209, 210, 211, 286, 337–340 Firth of Clyde 154 Firth of Forth 154 Flanders 35 Flensburg 214n.33, 238–240, 286, 287, 289, 354, 355 Florence 8, 9, 13, 21, 27, 32, 33

410 Florida 230, 235, 236 Florida Strait 236 Forth see Firth of Forth Forth and Clyde Canal 154, 155, 158, 283 France 8, 17, 32, 34, 38, 41, 44, 46, 48–57, 59, 60, 75, 79, 80, 83, 87, 90, 101, 104, 107, 124, 136, 137, 144, 147, 148, 155, 157, 160–163, 165, 167, 173–175, 179, 180n.11, 194, 195n.14, 201, 218, 223, 226, 229, 234, 258n.4, 260, 287 Frankfurt am Main 13, 107 French Channel coast/region 163–166, 289 Frisia, Friesland 82, 87, 134, 138, 139, 282 Galicia 55, 163 Gallipoli 82, 116, 117, 185–190, 221, 282–284, 288, 325–328 Galveston 117, 118, 231, 284 Gävle 287, 288 Genoa 8, 20, 22, 24n.28, 29, 31–33, 37, 40, 44, 81, 82, 179–184, 186, 189, 281, 282, 284, 321–324 Genoa, Republic of 31, 180, 181 Germany 14n.75, 51, 55, 56, 79n.28, 104, 106, 108, 113, 148, 149, 206, 232; see also Holy Roman Empire German Confederation 113 Ghent 117, 145, 284 Gibraltar 50, 55, 81, 82, 116, 117, 169, 171–173, 176, 179, 283, 285, 317–320 Gironde 160 Glasgow 82, 116, 144n.63, 151, 152, 154, 282, 283, 289 Glasgow Canal 154 Goa 258 Goiás (contemporary also Goyaz) 226 Goole 117, 153, 284 Gosport 152 Gothenburg (Göteborg) 69, 81, 82, 82, 87, 107, 116, 117, 134, 135, 140, 195, 211, 214, 256, 258–261, 281–284, 287–290, 301–304, 360, 361, 362 Gran Colombia 245 Gravousa (modern-day Gramvousa) 190 Great Belt 200 Great Britain 50–55, 57, 59, 60, 63, 68, 76, 90, 102, 130, 140, 145, 148, 149, 154, 155, 157, 163, 165, 175, 189, 195n.14, 207, 218, 226, 227, 229, 233, 241, 256, 258n.4, 260, 290; see also British Isles, England

Geographic Index Greece 185, 186, 270 Greenland 80, 81, 82, 83, 116, 117, 119–122, 125–127, 281, 282, 284, 291–294 Greenock 116, 154, 283 Greifswald 113 Groningen 2n.5, 9 Guadalquivir 170, 224 Guatemala 60, 62, 233n.35 Guayaquil 249n.83, 252 Guianas, the 55 Gulf of Finland 81, 194, 198, 201, 203, 207n.29, 210, 216, 274 Gulf of Mexico 55, 115, 229, 232–234, 236, 352, 353 Gulf of Patra 190 Gulf of Riga 202 Gulf of Taranto 185–187, 189 Habsburg Monarchy 257 Haiti 62, 241, 244–246, 356, 357 Halland (in Sweden) 134, 135 Halmstad 117, 135, 284 Hammerfest 117, 131–134, 285, 297–300 Hanover, Electorate of 137 Hanover, Kingdom of 106, 121, 138 Harburg 59 Havana 116–118, 168, 223, 225, 227, 229, 231, 232, 235, 253–255, 283, 284, 287, 290, 359 Hawaiian Islands see Sandwich Islands Heligoland 56, 138 Helsingör see Elsinore Helsinki 199, 201–203, 209, 286 Hispaniola 241n.49 Hittland see Shetland Islands Holland 48, 52–54, 57, 77, 78, 81, 82, 117, 144–148, 171, 180n.11, 189, 281, 282, 284, 286, 287, 305–308 Holstein 57, 65, 113, 121, 136, 138 Holy Roman Empire 49, 50n.24 Honduras 233n.35 Hong Kong 72 Houston 231 Hull 69, 81, 82, 95, 103, 114, 116, 117, 131n.28, 150–153, 157–159, 273, 281–284 Humber 150, 151, 153 Husum 57, 117, 138, 139, 283, 285 Iberian Peninsula 58, 74, 80, 130, 163, 167, 169, 171, 173, 181, 247, 268, 274, 276

Geographic Index Iceland 114, 116, 122, 125, 284, 287, 291–294 Ile d’Oléron 163 Ile de France 116, 118, 262; see also Mauritius India 3n.13, 19, 36, 63, 87, 103, 155, 160, 165, 256n.4, 257, 258, 287 India (East India) 63, 83, 87, 256, 257, 259, 264n.33, 270, 274, 360–362 Indian Ocean 362, 363 Ionian Islands 55, 80, 179 Iquique 249 Ireland 81, 82, 116, 144n.63, 148, 150–156, 158, 159, 281–283, 289, 290, 309–312 Isla Margerita 225 Italy 2, 7, 8, 20, 22, 30, 33, 37, 47, 54, 55, 167, 180n.11, 186, 194, 268 İzmir see Smyrna Jade 113 Japan 264n.31 Java 263 Jutland 82, 87, 117, 134, 138–142, 282, 283, 285, 301–304 Kalmar 202, 286 Kama 123 Kamchatka 68 Kammin 113 Karlskrona 202, 286 Kattegat 134, 139 Key West 236 Kiel 56, 136, 137, 196, 271, 286, 287 Kiel Fjord 136 Kingston upon Hull see Hull Kola Peninsula 82, 124, 282 Königsberg (modern-day Kaliningrad) 81, 82, 116, 117, 194–196, 201–204, 206, 209–212, 214, 216, 219, 272, 273, 281–284, 286, 287, 289, 333–336 Kotka 207n.29 Kristiania 107, 131, 131n.28, 283, 285 Kristiansand (S) 82, 116, 117, 131, 131n.28, 282, 283 Kristiansund (N) 116, 117, 130, 283, 285 La Coruña 116, 170, 283 La Guaira 116–118, 242, 245, 283, 284 La Plata 62, 116, 247, 248, 251–253

411 La Rochelle 38, 82, 159, 160, 163, 282 Laguna de Terminos 233 Lancaster 152 Languedoc 180 Le Havre 38, 69, 116, 117, 145, 161–163, 283, 284, 287 Leeds 151 Leer 116, 117, 138, 283, 284 Leghorn 36, 42, 81, 82, 116, 117, 127, 144n.63, 179–187, 189, 219, 221, 256–261, 281–284, 288–290, 321–324, 360–362 Leipzig 137 Leith 69, 103, 116, 117, 127, 150–153, 157, 159, 212, 283, 284, 287–289 Lesser Antilles, the 237; see also Antilles, the Levant 24, 31, 76, 167, 180, 185 Levensau 136 Libau (modern-day Liepāja) 194, 196, 202, 286 Liberia 60 Liguria, Republic of 181 Lima 117, 118, 223, 229, 249, 251, 252, 285, 290, 358, 359 Limfjord 139 Lisbon 35, 36, 79, 82, 116, 117, 127–130, 167–170, 178, 216, 225, 282, 283, 285, 288–290, 295, 296 Little Belt 200, 238 Liverpool 71, 82, 116, 117, 144n.63, 150–154, 282–284, 288–290 Livonia 201, 202 Livorno see Leghorn Loire 162 London 6, 9, 13, 15, 19, 32, 34, 37–39, 41–44, 47, 50, 53, 57, 63, 69, 74, 81, 82, 88, 89, 91, 93, 95, 100, 102, 103, 107, 108n.68, 112, 115–118, 127–130, 131n.28, 149–153, 155–160, 211–214, 229, 233, 273, 275, 279–284, 287–290, 295, 296, 309–312, 341, 342 Lorient 159, 160 Louisiana 160, 235 Lübeck 1, 22n.12, 42, 47, 56, 60, 87, 89, 93, 100, 102–104, 107, 192, 195, 200–203, 206–209, 214, 219, 269, 280, 286, 289, 333–340 Lüneburg 59, 130, 135–137 Lyon 34

412 Macao 258 Macedonia 179 Madeira 114, 116–118, 170, 172, 175, 176, 283, 285, 317–320 Madrid 107 Magdeburg 97 Maghreb 76n.12 Mainz 107 Makassar 263 Malabar Coast 258 Málaga 73, 81, 82, 116, 117, 169–171, 173, 178–185, 219, 221, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 288, 321, 322, 323, 324 Mallorca 82, 181, 282 Malmö 135 Manchester 151 Manila 115–118, 262, 263, 265, 270, 283, 284 Maracaibo 225, 243n.56 Marseille 32, 34, 37, 38, 68n.80), 81, 82, 116, 117, 127, 179–184, 221, 281–284, 288–290, 321–324 Martinique 50 Matanzas 117, 118, 231, 284 Mato Grosso 226 Mauritius 118, 262, 265, 266, 283, 362, 363; see also Ile de France Mazatlán 249, 250 Mecklenburg 200, 329–332 Mediterranean 295, 296, 347, 348 Mediterranean, eastern 180, 185, 188, 325–328 Mediterranean, French coast 80, 144n.63, 179, 289 Mediterranean, Liguria-Tuscan coast 179, 181 Mediterranean, Spanish coast 80, 179, 289 Mediterranean, western 179, 180, 183, 321–324 Meissen 97 Melbourne 118 Memel (today Klaipėda) 82, 195, 196, 202, 211, 212, 214, 282, 286–289 Mentone 82, 180, 181, 282 Messina 82, 116, 117, 144n.63, 181, 186, 187, 189, 190, 282–284, 289 Meuse 145 Mexico 60, 62, 71, 231, 232, 233, 236, 237, 249, 250; see also New Spain

Geographic Index Middelburg 37, 144 Minas Gerais 226 Minatitlan (near Veracruz) 233 Mobile 117, 118, 231, 284 Mocha 185 Montevideo 117, 118, 138, 247, 249, 250, 285 Montpellier 34, 180 Morocco 75 Moscow 123 Nantes 38, 82, 116, 117, 159, 160, 163, 214, 282, 283, 285, 288 Naples 9, 33, 82, 117, 181, 186, 187, 189, 282, 284, 289 Naples, Kingdom of 185–187; see also Two Sicilies, Kingdom of the Narva 201, 202, 286 Netherlands, the 17, 48–52, 54, 58, 59, 73–76, 80, 91n.69, 102, 107, 124, 130, 131, 136n.36, 139, 143–147, 157, 159, 173, 180n.11, 189, 212, 223, 241, 260, 271n.5, 305–308 Neustadt (Holstein) 286, 287 Neva 196 New England 230 New Granada (Colombia) 60 New Orleans 116–118, 229, 231, 234–237, 283, 284, 290, 352, 353 New Spain 36, 225, 229; see also Mexico New York 54, 68, 71, 223, 230 Newcastle upon Tyne 69, 82, 114, 150, 150n.79, 151–153, 282 Newfoundland 60, 153, 230 Nicaragua 233n.35) Nice 30, 32, 180n.11 Niedergrund (Dolní Grunt, modern-day Dolní Žleb) 97 Nikolayevsk-on-Amur 264n.31 Nissan 135 Nombre de Dios 36 North America 54, 62, 63, 69, 126, 136, 153, 165, 194, 224, 226, 229, 230, 234, 250, 275 North America, east coast 71, 230, 234, 237, 282–284, 287, 352, 353; see also British North America North Atlantic 291–294 North Sea coast 301–304 Northern Dvina 123, 124

413

Geographic Index Norway 59, 60, 74, 80, 82, 104, 130–133, 136, 282, 287, 297–300 Norwich 152n.91 Nuremberg 13 Oder 47 Odessa 10, 42, 116, 283, 289 Oldenburg 136n.37 Oneglia 82, 180, 181, 282 Øresund see Sound, the Orinoco 242, 243n.56 Orkney Islands 152 Ösel (Saaremaa) 202, 206, 286 Oslo 116, 117; see also Kristiania Ostend 89, 102, 117, 144, 145, 284, 288 Otterndorf 92 Ottoman Empire 60, 76, 188–190, 207, 325–328 Ouse 153 Paimboeuf 160 Palermo 20, 26 Panama, Isthmus of 225, 250 Paraguay, River 248 Paraná 248 Paris 37–39, 41, 94, 107, 111, 162, 163, 166 Pas-de-Calais 162 Patra (Patras, Patrasso) 114, 116, 186, 187, 283 Pera 32 Pernambuco 225, 226, Pernau (modern-day Pärnu) 194, 201, 286 Perpignan 33, 34 Persia 60 Peru 226, 249, 253 Peru-Bolivian Confederation 249n.83 Philadelphia 9, 38, 40, 54, 230 Philippines 263 Piedmont-Sardinia 60 Pillau (modern-day Baltijsk) 82, 113, 194, 195, 282 Pirna 97 Pisa 20, 21, 27, 32, 33 Plymouth 82, 116, 151–153, 282, 283 Poland 80, 81 Pomerania 82, 194, 195, 200, 202, 204, 209, 210, 212, 214, 219, 282, 286, 289, 329–332, 334–336 Ponce (Porto Rico) 225

Port-au-Prince 116, 118, 241, 283 Porto 36, 82, 107, 116, 117, 127, 167–170, 173, 216, 282, 283, 285, 288, 289 Porto Maurizio 180 Porto Rico 225, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 284 Portobelo 225–227 Portsmouth 116, 152, 153, 283 Portugal 9, 19, 36, 50, 51, 54, 55, 60n.59, 74, 78, 82, 87, 124, 144n.63, 167–173, 175, 176, 178, 211, 216–219, 224–226, 228, 229, 246, 256, 259–261, 268, 270, 281, 285, 287–289, 345, 346, 349–351, 360–362 Prato 28 Prussia 44, 60, 81, 104, 106, 113, 135, 136n.36, 173, 206–209, 257 Puerto Cabello 117, 118, 242, 284 Puerto Plata 241n.49, 242 Puntarenas 249n.83 Rabat 76n.12 Ragusa (modern-day Dubrovnik) 8, 34 Randers 117, 139, 285 Rendsburg 136 Reval (modern-day Tallinn) 82, 194–196, 198, 201, 202, 282, 286 Ribe 117, 138, 139, 285 Riga 42, 82, 116, 117, 122, 194–196, 198, 201– 203, 205–212, 214, 216, 219, 282–284, 286–289, 337–340 Ringkøbing 117, 138, 139, 285 Rio de Janeiro 225, 226, 246, 247, 250 Rio de la Plata 55, 247, 248, 250–252, 283, 358, 359 Ritzebüttel, Amt 55, 137 Rochefort 163 Rostock 56, 113, 116, 117, 130, 195, 196, 214n.34, 283, 284, 286–289 Rotterdam 6, 9, 11, 37, 40, 41, 44, 69, 131n.28, 117, 144, 145, 283, 284 Rouen 38, 40, 44n.128, 81, 82, 117, 161–164, 166, 281, 282, 285, 313–316 Russia, Russian Empire 9, 51, 54, 58, 80, 107, 124, 136n.37, 173, 194, 196, 203, 207, 210 Saaremaa see Ösel Saint Barthélemy 223, 224 Saint Croix 286, 287 Saint Gall 107

414 Saint Hubes 167; see Setúbal Saint Petersburg 11, 80, 81, 82, 116, 117, 122, 136n.36, 192, 194–196, 198, 201–203, 205–212, 214, 216, 219, 253, 254, 270, 272, 274, 281–284, 286–289, 337–340, 359 Saint Thomas 54, 59, 82, 83, 114, 116–118, 230, 233, 235, 237–246, 282–284, 286, 287, 354–357 Saint-Domingue (Haiti) 50, 51, 241, 241n.49 Salé 76n.12 Saloniki 185 Samarang (modern spelling Semarang) 263 San Francisco 250, 252 San Sacramento 226 San Sebastián 82, 169, 170, 282 Sandwich Islands (Hawaiian Islands) 60, 63 Sanlúcar de Barrameda 169, 170, 224, 225, 282 Santa Cruz de Tenerife 170 Santa Marta 225 Santo Domingo 116–118, 224, 241, 245, 283, 284 Santorini 185 Sardinia 31, 60; see also Piedmont-Sardinia Savannah 230 Savona 30, 32 Savoy 180n.11 Scandinavia 11, 51, 55, 107, 151, 270, 280 Scania 135, 202, 204, 206, 208, 333–336 Scheldt 52, 144, 145, 147, 148 Schleswig 65, 113, 121, 138 Schleswig-Holstein 275 Schonen see Scania Scotland 9, 117, 148, 151, 152, 154, 156–158, 284, 309–312 Seine 162, 166 Sète 179n.6; see also Cette Setúbal 67, 82, 167, 169, 216, 231, 268, 282, 289, 290 Severn 150 Seville 35, 36, 116, 117, 170, 171, 181, 225, 283, 284 Sheffield 151 Shetland Islands 82, 130, 282 Siam 60 Sicily 185–187; see also Two Sicilies, Kingdom of the Singapore 72, 117, 118, 262–265, 284

Geographic Index Skagerrak 135, 139 Sluys 29 Småland 202 Smyrna 39, 41, 55, 114, 116–118, 178, 179, 185–187, 190, 283, 284 Sonderburg 271 Sørlandet see South Land Sound, the 52, 75, 81, 81, 134, 135, 140, 141, 142, 192, 200, 201, 211, 214, 215, 216, 238, 240, 269, 281, 301, 302, 303, 304, 343, 344 South Carolina 224 South Land (Sørlandet) 131 South Seas 249, 250 Southampton 29, 71 Spain 8, 18, 37–39, 50, 54, 55, 71, 74–78, 82, 111, 144n.63, 160, 165, 168–176, 179, 186, 201, 216, 218, 221, 224, 225, 226n.13, 227–229, 237, 246, 268, 270, 281, 289, 317–320, 349–351 Spanish America 78, 226 Spitsbergen 81, 82, 119 Stade 92 States General, the see Netherlands, the Stavanger 107 Stecknitz Canal 200 Stettin (modern-day Szczecin) 56, 107, 116, 117, 131n.28, 137, 194, 196, 202, 283–289 Stockholm 44, 81, 82, 107, 116, 117, 195, 196, 198, 202, 206, 209, 212, 214, 219, 281–285, 287–289 Strait of Dover 162 Strait of Gibraltar 49, 75, 76, 78, 175, 181, 182n.13, 261 Stralsund 56, 113, 117, 195, 196, 202, 284, 286 Sunda Strait 262 Sunderland 150 Suomenlinna (Sveaborg) 199 Suriname 212n.212 Svalbard archipelago 120, 289 Sweden 44, 54, 56, 59, 60, 80, 81, 89n.65, 121, 134, 173, 178, 195, 197, 199–203, 205–208, 210–212, 216, 257, 258, 260, 286, 329–332, 337–340 Swinemünde 113 Switzerland 1 Sydney 118

415

Geographic Index Tabasco 233 Tamil Nadu 258n.4 Tampico 116–118, 232, 233, 236, 283–285, 290 Tana (modern-day Azov) 32 Tenerife 114, 116–118, 170, 172, 175, 176, 283, 285, 317–320 Terneuzen 145 Texas 62, 231, 236 Thames 150, 151 Thessaloniki see Saloniki Thyborøn Channel 139 Tönning 56, 57, 64, 69, 116, 117, 136–140, 283, 285 Tønsberg 107 Topsham 82, 150–152, 282 Toulon 82, 181, 282 Tranquebar 257, 258, 262 Trieste 10, 42, 44, 55, 68, 82, 83, 87, 104, 107, 115–117, 144n.63, 185–187, 190, 221, 256–261, 270, 282–284, 288–290, 360–362 Trinidad 225 Tripoli 75, 76n.12 Tromsø 117, 131–134, 285, 297–300 Trondheim 81, 82, 116, 117, 130, 131n.28, 132, 133, 273, 281–283, 285, 287, 290, 297–300 Trujillo 225, 249 Tschesme see Çeşme Tunis 75, 76n.12, 180n.11, 185 Turku see Åbo Tuscany 20, 180, 181, 257 Two Sicilies, Kingdom of the 185–188, 190, 325–328 Tyne 151 United States of America 51, 54, 58–60, 76, 82, 102, 112, 145, 195n.14), 224, 231, 234, 236, 261, 263

Uruguay 252 USA see United States of America Valencia 34, 82, 179, 181, 282 Valparaíso 116–118, 229, 249, 251, 252, 283, 285, 290, 358, 359 Varberg 82, 134, 135, 282 Varde 117, 139, 285 Västervik 202, 286 Venezuela 59, 60, 62, 223, 237, 242, 243, 244, 245, 245, 246, 356, 357 Venice 11, 13, 21, 24, 29n.44, 30, 31, 33, 34, 40, 42, 44, 81, 82, 116, 117, 144n.63, 186, 187, 273, 274, 281–284, 289 Veracruz 116–118, 225, 226, 229, 232, 233, 236, 283–285, 290 Villafranca 180n.11 Vladivostok 264n.31 Volga 123 Waterford 152 Weser 48, 113, 136, 138 West Indies 54, 55, 62, 71, 82, 224, 228–231, 238, 241, 244–246, 270, 274, 285, 349–351 Westsee 203 Wiborg (modern-day Vyborg) 201, 202, 286 Wick 152 Windau 202, 286, Wismar 56, 117, 195, 196, 214n.34), 284, 286, 287, 288, 289 Wolgast 113 Yarmouth 152 Zaanredam 88 Zante (Zakynthos) 39, 81, 82, 114, 116, 117, 185–187, 281–284 Zanzibar 60 Zeeland 82, 144, 282

Subject Index “Marine insurance” is not included in the index. Admiralität(skollegium) 2, 12, 75, 83, 84, 173 Allgemeine Seeversicherungs-Bedingungen (1867) 106 Allgemeiner Plan hamburgischer Seeversicherungen (1847) 105, 279 Almond 179 Ambergris 121 American War of Independence (1775–1783)  89, 124, 155, 173, 182, 223, 224, 227, 258, 272 Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars (1652–1654, 1665– 1667, 1672–1674, 1780–1784) 38, 40, 41, 49, 120, 145, 155, 182, 218, 227, 258 Annual fairs see Fairs Argentine-Brazilian War (1825–1828) 251 Asiento de negros (1713) 50 Assecuranz- und Havareiordnung (1766) 44 Assecuranz- und Havarey-Ordnung (1731)  10, 17, 44, 84, 88, 105, 279 Assekuranzkammer 83 Assekuranzordnung 83 Average 85, 149 Baleen 121 Ballast 170, 194, 242 Bamboo 263 Banco d’Assicurazione e Cambi Maritimi 43, 257 Barbary pirates 49, 58, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 128, 167, 169, 176, 177, 178, 179, 187, 219, 261 Barcelona Ordinances (1458, 1484) 33 Battle of Copenhagen (1801) 108, 218, 219, 238 Battle of Navarino (1827) 190 Battle of Trafalgar (1805) 157, 175, 189 Battle of Waterloo (1815) 216 Berlin decree (1806) 127, 157, 189 Bevollmächtigter (authorised representative) 89, 90 Bill of exchange (cambium) 20, 24, 25, 38, 57, 73, 269

Blockade 113, 147, 236, 251; see also Continental Blockade, Elbe Blockade Börsenhalle 15 Bört-, Reihefahrt 65, 135, 136, 139, 143, 149, 162 Bottomry 22, 85 Brandy 179 Broker 21, 29, 74 Bulk 150, 199 Cabotage (Kleine Küstenfahrt) 135, 136 cambium maritimum see Maritime exchange contract Canvas 80, 168, 170, 224, 232 Carreira do Brasil 43 Carrera de las Indias 224, 225, 226 Casa de (la) Contratación 225 Casse der Stücken von Achten 2 Cassia 263 Charter of 1812 111 Cholera 112 Cigars 231 Citrus fruit, juice 179 Coal, black coal 55, 56, 94, 95, 148, 150, 264 Coalition Wars 108, 109, 110, 111, 147, 155, 165, 174, 182, 189, 218, 219, 229, 260, 275 Cocoa 243, 249 Cod 129 Coffee 161, 185, 242, 247, 249, 263 Colbertism 41 commenda 4, 24 Commercial banking 20 Commercial Revolution 2, 7, 20, 23, 24, 34 Commerz-Deputation 13, 14, 15, 84, 90, 92, 104, 162 Compagnie des Indes 160, 262 Compagnie générale des assurances et grosses aventures en France 41 Companhia Geral do Comércio do Brasil 225, 226 Congress of Verona 111 Consoli di Mercanti 34

417

Subject Index Consols de Mar 34 Continental Blockade 18, 56, 57, 110, 122, 127, 128, 133, 147, 157, 165, 175, 189, 203, 206, 218, 234, 275 Continental System 56, 138 Contraband trade 56 Convoy, convoy shipping, convoy system 31, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 119, 169, 274 Convoy-Kollegium 119 Copper, copper ore 170, 249, 263 Cotton 153, 232, 243 Credit 26, 27, 28, 47 Crimean War (1854–1856) 71, 198, 208, 209, 275 Currant 179, 187 Danish Asiatic Company 256, 258 Danish West India Company 238 Delian League 22 Diamonds 226 Dispatcher 6 Double-entry bookkeeping 20 Drug 179 Dye-stuffs 168 East India Company 264 East India Company of Brandenburg (-Prussia) 135, 257 Egyptian Campaign 189, 260 Eighty Years War (1568–1648) 73 Elbe blockades (British, Danish) 18, 53, 55, 57, 108, 112, 113, 140, 233, 275 Elbschifffahrtsakte (1821) 58 Embargo Act (1807) 57, 195 Exchange regulations 48 Fair, annual fair 2, 123 Fig 179 Financial crisis (Amsterdam 1763) 64 First Battle of Cape Finisterre (1747) 182 First Carlist War (1833–1840) 170 First Opium War (1839–1842) 265 First Schleswig War (1848–1851) 18, 112 Fishery insurance 85 Fishing 121, 153, 230, 231; see also herring Foreign exchange 27 Franco-Dutch War (1672–1674) 49, 80

Franzosenzeit, French Period (1809–1814)  15, 18, 56, 110, 111, 113, 114, 143 Freight costs 137 French and Indian War (1754–1763) 155, 223 French Invasion in Spain (1823) 216, 221 French Revolutionary Wars 52 Fruits, tropical fruits, citrus fruits 137, 170, 179 Gesellschaft der Muscovienfahrer 119, 124 Gold 226 Gold rush 63, 250, 263 Grain 55, 101, 124, 148, 149, 150, 170, 193, 194, 269, 271 Great Fire see Großer Brand Great Hallig Flood (1825) 139 Great Lisbon Earthquake (1755) 173 Great Northern War (1700–1721) 119, 124, 196, 202 Great War for the Empire (1756–1763) see French and Indian War Greek Revolution 76 Greek War of Independence (1821–1827)  190, 275 Großer Brand, Great Fire (1842) 12, 59, 93, 112, 279 Guano 249 Half-War (1798–1800) 39 Hamburg America Line 238 Hamburg Bank 48, 58 Hamburg-Amerikanische-PaketfahrtAktiengesellschaft (HAPAG) 71 Hamburg-Brasilianische Paketschiffahrt-Gesellschaft 247 Hamburger Feuerkasse 268 Handelsgesetzbuch 85 Hanseatisches Seerecht (1614) 83, 85 Hemp 263 Herring 49, 120, 121, 135 Hide 226 Hull 101 Indigo 243 Inland marine insurance 2 Insurance law 36, 37, 44, 45 Insurance loan 26, 28

418 Insurance Policy 20, 21, 126, 269 Invasion of Algiers (1830) 274 Iron 170 Joint stock insurance companies 1, 5, 6, 38, 41, 87, 91, 96–108, 269 King George‘s War (1744–1748) 226 Königlich Preußische Asiatische Compagnie in Emden 257 Land transport insurance 2 Last, commercial last 64, 65, 160 Life insurance 2, 85 Liquor 179 Lloyd’s 10, 93, 102, 108, 279 Lloyd’s Captains Register 5 Lloyd’s Coffee House 42 Lloyd’s List 42 Lloyd’s News 42 Lloyd’s Register (of Shipping) 4, 43 Lloyd’s Underwriters 43 Loan (mutuum) 20, 24, 26; see also bottomry loan, insurance loan, maritime loan, sea loan Manufactures, manufactured goods 63, 137, 148, 247 Marine Insurance Act (1601) 37 Maritime exchange contract 4 Maritime exchange contract (cambium maritimum) 24, 25, 27, 28, 35 Maritime loan (foenus nauticum) 21, 22 Medicinal drugs 168 Mercantilisme royal 56 Merchant Adventurers 47, 57 Methuen Treaty (1703) 50 Mexican civil war (1857–1861) 233 Mexican-American War (1846–1848) 233, 236 Miguelist or Liberal War (Portugal, 1828– 1834) 168, 176 Napoleonic Wars 102, 111, 122, 127, 133, 159, 178, 179, 230, 269 Navigation Act (Mexican) 232 Navigation Act (British) 262, 263, 264

Subject Index Neutrality 91 Noordsche Compagnie 120 Ochakov Affair/Crisis 207, 275 Office of Assurance, London 37 Olive oil 179 Ordonnance touchant la marine … (1681) 84 Packet vessels, packet shipping 57, 58, 70, 71, 136, 152 Panic of 1837 112 Panic of 1857 2, 17, 113, 279 Partenreederei 36, 268 Peace of Paris (1784) 227 Peace of Utrecht (1713) 50, 76 Peace/Treaty of Paris (1763) 165, 182, 187 Pirates, piracy 33, 190, 196, 254, 274, 278; see also Barbary pirates Polish November Uprising (1830/31) 198 Preußisches Seerecht (1727) 44 Price current 13, 14, 19, 38, 45, 46, 48, 80, 81, 114, 134, 136, 150, 154, 171, 186, 187, 192, 200, 211, 237, 262, 263, 269 Privateer 174 Promisory note 25 Raisin 179 Raw materials 193 Reglamento para el Comercio Libre 225 Regulativ für die Dampfschifffahrt … 65 Remedies 179 Revolutionary Wars 173 Rice 224, 263, 264 Risk, risicum maris, risicum gentium 3, 4, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 32, 33, 38, 73, 94, 149, 169, 212, 214, 253, 254 Robbenschlag, Robbenschläger see Seal, sealer Royal Exchange 37, 42 Royal Mail Steam Packet Company 238 Royal Navy 179 Royal Post 152 Russo-Swedish Wars (1741–1743, 1761–1763, 1788–1790) 196, 203, 206, 207 Salt 67, 101, 162, 167, 170 Saltpetre 249

419

Subject Index Schiffergesellschaft 2 Sea loan 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 Seal, sealer (Robbenschläger), sealing (Robbenschlag) 120, 121, 125 Second Barbary War (1815) 261 Second Silesian War (1744/45) 155 Seetraktat (Traité de marine, commerce et navigation) 49 Seven Year’s War (1756–1763) 41, 52, 124, 148, 155, 165, 203, 223, 226, 269 Shipbuilding materials 170 Silver 226 Sklavenkasse 2, 79 Smuggling 138, 226 Societas Groenlandiae 120 Société Impériale asiatique de Trieste 257 Sound toll 59, 123, 134, 192, 193, 194, 195, 200, 269 South Sea Bubble 41, 42 Specie 103 Spermaceti 121 Steamer, steam-powered vessel/navigation, steamboat, steamship 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 94, 95, 96, 150, 248, 264, 280 Stock exchange (bourse, Börsenversammlung) 2, 37, 47, 48, 91, 269 Stockfish (bacalao) 129 Submarine cable 278 Sugar 51, 112, 161, 167, 193, 214, 216, 226, 231, 232, 242, 243, 263 Swedish East India Company 256, 257 Syrup 161 Tambora eruption (1815) 271 Tea 161, 263 Telegraphy (optical, electric) 92, 93, 278, 280 Textile industry 148 Third Carnatic War (1756–1763) 155, 165, 258 Thirty Years War (1618–1648) 47, 48, 75

Timber 101, 150, 199, 211, 216, 226, 249, 263 Tobacco 224, 226, 231, 242, 263 Trade agreement 60, 61, 246 Tramp shipping, tramp voyages 72, 247, 270 Treaty of Aix-la Chapelle (1748) 155, 171, 173, 227 Treaty of Algiers (1815) 261 Treaty of Amiens (1802) 55, 109, 189, 260 Treaty of Paris (1763, 1784) see Peace of Paris Treaty of Sistova (1791) 187 Treaty of Tsarskoe Selo (1773) 136 Trienio Liberal (1820–1823) 175 Underwriters of New Lloyd’s 43 Usury 5, 24, 30, 112 Venezuelan War of Independence (1810–1823) 245 Verein Hamburger Assecuradeure 5, 112 Vereinigte Compagnie zur Schiffsrhederey 64 Versammlung Eines Ehrbaren Kaufmanns 13 War of Chioggia (1376–1381) 30 War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739–1742/48) 155, 227 War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748)  145, 155, 165, 171, 182, 187 War of the Oranges (1801) 175, 218 War of the Polish Succession (1733–1735/38) 80 War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714)  50, 226 Whale, whaler, whaling 119, 120, 121, 122, 125, 126 Wine 179, 216 Wood 214 Wool 103, 170 Yarn 148 Zinc 103