The French army in Mexico 1861–1867: A study in military government [Reprint 2021 ed.] 9783112415023, 9783112415016

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S T U D I E S IN A M E R I C A N H I S T O R Y II

THE FRENCH ARMY IN MEXICO 1861-1867 A S T U D Y IN M I L I T A R Y G O V E R N M E N T BY

JACK AUTREY DABBS Department of Modern Languages A Si M College of Texas

1963 MOUTON & CO-THEHAGUE

© Copyright 1963 by Mouton ir Co., The Hague, The

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Netherlands

No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint,

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Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., Printers, The Hague

PREFACE

The establishment of a military government on foreign soil taxes the discipline and training of an army to its utmost. In periods of actual combat no one expects anything else. But after the wave of combat has passed, and an army has seized control of a land, what happens to the inhabitants? The answer is that the occupying force must create a system of control and supervision to replace the previous authority which it has captured, pushed back, or removed from power. This system at first will be the military forces themselves in the form of a military government. In recent years the term "civil affairs" has grown to represent the use of civilian personnel with the military and to designate the type of concern more clearly. The functions remain the same: To continue orderly processes of government, to secure the rear areas for troop operations, to represent sovereign powers, and to prepare for a surrender of governmental and sovereign powers to a civilian agency when conditions are again suitable. In earlier historical periods the operation of a military government or the functions of such a government in an occupied area went without special study as a natural function of a military force. While it cannot be said that such government is more important now than in the past, certainly we are in a better position today to study and analyze its processes, understand its problems under varied conditions, and learn lessons that will help such a government succeed in the future. The French Intervention in Mexico (1861-1867) provides a good case study of the problems facing an army of occupation: military combat, occupation of foreign soil, opposition by both organized and disorganized resident inhabitants, support by some elements of the residents, efforts to substitute military personnel for civil officers, assumption of sovereign rights to military chain of command, attempts to establish a friendly, substitute civil government that will allow the military to withdraw from those functions, the problems of

6

PREFACE

fighting and governing at the same time, withdrawal from an area without leaving a competent governing body behind, and cultural conflicts arising from the occupation of foreign lands. While it is not the purpose here to write a history of the French Intervention, a narrative of the main events and a description of much of the background for the governmental actions must be included. Since the military government is a highly authoritarian operation, particular focus is necessary on the personalities who represent the high military command. In this case Marshal Bazaine is a key figure. Studies made of the period of the French Intervention in Mexico have tended to center on the romantic figures of Maximilian and his Empress, or on the strongly controversial and passionate defense or denunciation by patriots of one or the other political persuasions, liberal or conservative. The tragic fates of the royal pair have made an appeal to popular imagination. On the other hand the stern and unbending stoicism of Juárez has cloaked him in an aura of venerable greatness which his successors have stoutly maintained. With these three figures the cast for the drama seems virtually complete. When other names crop up, they are added as afterthoughts: Porfirio Díaz, the supporter of Juárez and one of his successors in the presidency; Bazaine the French commander charged with "deserting" Maximilian, and a few others. Such a judgement overlooks the fact that the French Intervention, beginning actually on October 31, 1861, was two years and eight months old out of a total life of five years seven months when the Emperor set foot in Veracruz. French bayonets set the pace, the policy, and the basis for the brief Hapsburg tenure; and when French influence withdrew, the Empire was completely unable to support itself, either morally or physically. One of the chief sources of friction between the Emperor and his allies, as frequently pointed out in the voluminous writings on Maximilian, was the status of the French forces as represented primarily by Marshal Bazaine. Popular writers have blamed Bazaine for many of the weaknesses of the Empire and glorified Maximilian by emphasizing the unpleasant side of the French army as reflected in the figure of the Marshal. Recriminations and denunciations have been hurled at him and his army; praise has been rare. In the meantime the patriotic school, the Juárez proponents, have fulminated mostly against Maximilian and Napoleon III, not sparing their executive Bazaine. While these charges remain to be evaluated, there is little

PREFACE

7

doubt that his ill success in the War of 1870-1871 and his subsequent disgrace have established him as an object of ridicule and a whipping-boy for the apologists of the Second French Empire. A review of the writers on the French Intervention reveals that criticism or praise has generally varied with the sources available to the writers and their nationality. French writers have tended to rely on governmental records of the Second Empire; German and English-speaking writers also have drawn heavily on the correspondence of the royal pair and their countrymen. Mexican writers have tended to polemics rather than research material. Source materials, nonetheless, have been available, although access has varied. The records of the royal family were evacuated in 1866 when Maximilian for a time contemplated abandoning Mexico. They reached the ship, whence they found their way to the archives in Vienna and were locked up by the Hapsburg interests until after the fall of that dynasty at the end of World War I, when Count Corti was allowed access to them. Since then several writers have seen the papers, although Corti's excellent work has not been equalled. Other Austrian and Belgian officials in Mexico left scattered records, and a large number of them have been published. Many French soldiers and officials have also printed their personal correspondence and memoirs. In particular Emmanuel Domenech, Chaplain of the French Army in Mexico and Director of the Press for Maximilian, had access much earlier to Maximilian's correspondence and made good use of it in Volume II of his Histoire du Mexique. The official Mexican records of the period have remained to a large extent intact in the capital. Personal archives, which provide the more intimate and revealing materials, have suffered various fates. The personal letters from and to such important figures as Teodosio Lares, Mariano and Vicente Riva Palacio, have fortunately reached safe deposit and are evailable to the public as part of the Genaro García Collection at the University of Texas Library. The same is true of some 4,000 pages of various papers on the period collected by the indefatigable Genaro García and made part of his collection. Official French records of the period consist mostly of coresrpondence between Paris and the headquarters of the French military offices in Mexico and from the headquarters to lower units or individuals. The unpublished personal correspondence of the sundry participants has been difficult to gather; a few of the higher officials

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PREFACE

have written books based on their own notes or correspondence, but the letters themselves have gone to scattered addresses and seem generally lost. Of the official records mentioned first, Niox in 1882 prepared from the materials in the National Archives an extremely well-written review, except for the usual lack of index, but one clearly biased toward the French viewpoint. Other historians, such as H. H. Bancroft, generally followed his account. A great many of the official papers of Marshal Bazaine fortunately have survived. In Spain Bazaine gradually accumulated his belongings, including his archives, and had them on hand at his death. During his last years another writer, Ernest Louet, formerly a finance officer with the French army in Mexico, hoped to prepare a thorough history of the period. He went to Madrid, among other places, and there obtained from Bazaine access to important letters and other documents of use to the historian. He failed to complete his history; death overtook him shortly after he began, and his collection was left unused until Paul Gaulot took over the task and brought out a survey of the Intervention in three small volumes, entitled Rêve d'Empire, L'Empire de Maximïlien, and Fin dEmpire, in 1889 and 1890. Like many of the French histories, it has the fault of partiality to the French in controversial matters. After Bazaine's death the papers were rescued from oblivion by the Mexican minister to Spain, Jesús Zenil, who had them in Vienna at the time of his own death. Then Lic. Ignacio Mariscal, Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, had them brought to Mexico in December, 1906. Here Genaro García had selected transcripts and translations prepared, ten small volumes of which were published in the series Documentos inéditos o muy raros para la historia de México. The University of Texas later acquired these archives as a part of the great Garcia Collection. The archives, with both French and Spanish texts and copies, consist of twenty-six volumes of two hundred folios each. They, are well as the Riva Palacio Papers and the Intervention Archives, contain much material, edited and unedited. The present account is primarily based on these records. They throw much light on the subject and supplement other lacunae to the extent that an objective view may be obtained of the actual organization and workings of the French activities in Mexico, especially the role of Marshal Bazaine as representative of the French army and nation. The research for the present work was done primarily at the Latin

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PBEFACE

American Library, University of Texas, and the help and co-operation of the Library Staff, particularly of Dr. Nettie Lee Benson, is gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to Dr. George C. Engerrand and to the late Dr. Charles W. Hackett, both of the University of Texas, for helpful comments in the early stages of the work, and to Dr. Robert D. Rhode of the Texas College of Arts and Industries for reading the manuscript and for his useful suggestions. The author is indebted to the Research Fund, A & M College, for support that made possible preparation of illustrations used in this book. An earlier form of this work was prepared and accepted as Research Project Log. 8 of the 4000th Research and Development Unit, USAR, and by the Research and Development Board, Washington, D. C. Since that time the work has undergone further study and rewriting for its present form. April 8, 1960

JACK A U T R E Y

DABBS

CONTENTS

Preface

5

I.

Preliminary French Maneuvers for Position

. . .

II.

The Anabasis: Veracruz, Jalapa, Puebla, Mexico City .

III.

Establishment of Military Government on a National Basis

IV.

13 32

56

The Campaign of the Interior and Failure of Pacification Efforts

84

V.

The Empire as a Pseudo-reality

106

VI.

The Aftermath of the Confederate Collapse .

VII.

The Gnawing from Within

160

VIII. The Withdrawal of French Troops

183

IX.

The French Army in Mexico 1861-1867

217

X.

The Mexican People under the French Administration

252

XI.

Comparative Evaluation

274

.

.

.

135

Bibliography

287

Index

294

CHAPTER

I

PRELIMINARY FRENCH MANEUVERS FOR POSITION

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The French Intervention in Mexico was one more effort of the Bonapartist missionary zeal to export the benefits of the French Revolution. More cynical writers of the present century have endeavored to show the intervention as an imperialistic scheme to line the pockets of French businessmen — that is, as a business move of capitalists with influence at court, and as a drive for raw materials for European factories. That selfish interests were involved, there is no doubt; but such interests alone would hardly have carried the French through the four-year campaign when easier sources of raw materials were to be had for the asking in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific Islands. France had not been able for centuries to keep aloof from Mexico. The encroachments of French corsairs on the shores of New Spain began in the 16th century with contraband traders and piratical raids.1 Reports on the riches of the Aztecs and the mines of Zacatecas and Durango did not discourage the adventurers, and even the settlement of the Huguenots on the Florida coast may be related to the mines of San Luis Potosí. A century later La Salle's reported effort to settle the Mississippi Valley and his extreme error in geography have been imputed to an effort to reach the mines of Mexico overland.2 Forty years later the enterprising trader St. Denis made two hazardous trips to Mexico on flimsy pretexts that have been shown to have had connections with the mines.3 In Napoleonic times the 1 By 1596 these interferences were so frequent that a cédula was issued to forbid the trade — Puga, Cedulario, II, 263. In 1561 the King was asked for protection against the French Protestants. In 1561 the French attacked Campeche — Bancroft, History of Mexico, II, 646; and in May 1571 the port of Sisal suffered an attack. 2 Carlos E. Castañeda, Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, I, 287. 3 Henri Folmer, "Report on Saint Denis' Intended Raid on San Antonio in 1721", in Southwestern Historical Quarterly, III, 82-88.

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PRELIMINARY FRENCH MANEUVERS FOR POSITION

schemes for incorporating New Spain reappeared with French agents in Texas and Mexico and the slender claims of King Joseph to the Spanish colonies.4 Again after the defeat of the Napoleonic empire but before the final independence of Mexico, attempts were made to establish settlements in Texas — agricultural on the surface, but actually an armed invasion.5 Again after independence, in 1838, the Pastry War brought an intervention that involved actual occupation of Mexican soil for a short time.6 During the forties the interest of the French government in annexing the debated area of Texas was equally an affront to Mexican and American interests.7 In the fifties the ill-fated filibustering expedition of Raousset de Boulbon,8 if not directed by Napoleon III at the mines of Sonora, at least fitted into his spirit. Hence, intervention in Mexico was by no means a new move in French foreign policy. At the particular time of the intervention that concerns us here, the time was ripe, and intervention was indicated. Napoleon III believed that he had found the right moment to expand successfully into Middle America. The Valley of Mexico is in a strong geographical position. Cortes in 1519-1521, the American Army in 1847, and the French Army in 1863 reached it only after extensive and costly campaigns. In the revolutionary period it was never captured — only after the Treaty of Cordoba were the troops of the independence movement able to enter it. In later times if it changed hands often, it was because of the apathy of the populace, disaffection of the troops, and the shuffling of political affiliations.9 4

Francisco de Paula de Arrangoiz, Méjico desde 1808 hasta 1867, I, 44. That is, the Champ-d'Asile. See Harris Gaylord Warren, The Sword Was Their Passport, 210-233, and J. A. Dabbs, "Additional Notes on the Champd'Asile" in Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LIV, (1950) 347-358. β For a short account of the Pastry War, see Bancroft, History of Mexico, V, Chapter VIII, 166-205. 7 Frédéric Ledere, "Le Texas et sa révolution", in Revue des Deux Mondes, XXI, 4th Series (1840), 605-639, continued in XXII, 4th Series (1840) 220-253; A. Cucheval, "Le Texas et les États-Unis", in ibid., III, new series (1844) 233-282. 8 Bancroft, History of Mexico, V, 684-686. 9 Derwent Whittlesey, The Earth and the State, 431; Ratzel, Erdenmacht und Völkerschicksal, 149-159; Kuno Waltemath, "Ursprünge der Mexikanische Staatspolitik", in Zeitschrift für Weltpolitik, VIII, 379-383; Haushofer, "Berichterstattung aus der atlantischen Welt", in ibid., 128-131; Schmolck, "Die Wirtschaftliche Souveränität der lateinamerikanischen Staaten", in ibid., XV, 402-412; Samhaber, "Das Spanische Kolonialreich als Beispiel eines Künstlichen Staates", in ibid., X, 587-597. 5

PRELIMINABY FRENCH MANEUVERS FOR POSITION

15

If good generals develop from good officers by training and experience, and good troops from good leadership, the French army should have equalled any in the world. Although the colonial empire of the 18th century had long passed into English or American hands, the middle 19th century saw a revival of imperial designs that scattered the French military over the globe, picking up shreds of empire in every corner: Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Central Africa, Madagascar, Indo-China, Iran, China Proper, the harbor of Buenos Aires, and the Pacific Islands. A thousand skirmishes and battles on every continent gave French troop experience with colonial and non-Europeanized peoples second to none except perhaps that of the English; and the French troops, filled with proselyting spirit, were not only willing but eager to bear the white man's burden. Besides building its own empire, 19th century France had taken an active, important part in every major war of recent history. Eager to regain the prestige lost by the defeats of late Napoleonic times, France had launched into feverish activity in the military field that matched the intellectual ferment of its arts and belles-lettres. Not only was there a romantic movement in literature (Chateaubriand, Hugo, Lamartine, de Musset, George Sand, and Dumas), art (Delacroix, par excellence, and Géricault), music (Chopin, Gounod, Offenbach, Bizet), and sculpture (David, Barye, Carpeaus), but there was also a corresponding one in philology, as seen in the strenuous work over the Rosetta Stone, the deciphering of ancient languages, the collection of papyri, the excavations of Nineveh, the researches of Maspero, the founding of the Oriental societies and learned journals like the Journal Asiatique, all within the limits of and participating in the spirit of the romantic movement. The same trend can be observed in medicine, geography, economic theories, and the military. The concern for the far-away place, a typically romantic trait, was answered by the expansion of troops to far-flung points of interest: China, India, Africa, and America. The preoccupation with older times merged with the Napoleonic tradition and a desire on the part of the army officers to re-create the glories of the French army of Napoleonic times. The romantic emphasis on the dignity of the individual and the concept of the noble savage led to humane and protective treatment of colonial peoples — with a few notable exceptions — so that in French colonies native peoples generally prospered and were left, to a large extent, to pursue their own traditions and folkways below the surface of French administration.

16

PRELIMINARY FRENCH MANEUVERS FOR POSITION

Another aspect of the army of this period was the degree of scholarship. No longer were the officers spoiled nobles who could parade their liquor and arrogance in peace and fumble in war; they were trained men who began their career early and included men of great learning — poets, historians, novelists, researchers, and linguists. French army officers appeared as students, archaeologists, and scientists, as they did in the English army, more rarely in the Czarist Russian army, still more rarely in other armies. With this body of educated leaders versed in the literature and backgrounds of world history, two traditions remained firmly-fixed — the Napoleonic tradition of military glories, and the tradition of liberal politics left by the French Revolution. The conviction of the superiority of French liberalism led the army to feel the missionary and reforming zeal of 1792. Also, like the planners and dreamers of the Revolution, the agents of the 19th century often ran upon stiff opposition from peoples not converted to the philosophy of the Revolution and who showed a stubborn reluctance to be "freed" of their social bonds by a different civilization.

THE GOVERNMENT OF LA REFORMA

Though there might have been some French interference anyhow, political rather than military developments directly opened the way for armed intervention; and the professional French soldiers had little to do with the initial shape of the monster to which they were to fall heir.10 At the end of the Guerra de la Reforma, 1857-1860, the victorious party of Benito Juárez entered the capital and established itself as both de facto and de jure government. Recognized soon by most foreign governments, that regime immediately took steps to perpetuate itself by a new election and then proceeded to carry out some of the program it had championed during and even before the war.11 The program generally was called Uberai and was characterized by the Ley Juárez, the Ley Lerdo, and the Ley Iglesias, all of which 10 For some of the non-military background, see Aubry, The Second Empire, 288-295. 11 G. J. Pendergast to Isaac Toucey, Flagship Powhattan, off Sacrificios, January 21, 1861, in U.S. Navy, Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. IV, p. 68.

PKELIMINABY FRENCH MANEUVERS FOR POSITION

17

brought the political function of government into an encroachment upon traditional prerogatives of the established Church. It also relaxed the centralization of previous dictatorial governments, and, third, it sought to raise money by an invasion of property rights traditionally very rigid in Spanish society.12 Thus the government outraged the defeated party, which consisted largely of the higher clergy resisting the change in the traditional rights of the Church; of land owners, including some Church interests; and some political theorists of the Centralist school, as well as a good many military leaders who remained opposed to Juárez for reasons of personal passions, hates, and prejudices. Also at odds with the government were some leaders of outlaw bands who operated as the enemy of constituted authority of whatever political color. A number of well-intentioned men of both the cloth and the portfolio were left stranded in Europe by the collapse of the antiJuárez effort and appealed to governmental heads on the continent for aid to their cause. For them the Mexican situation played into their hands. Failing to defeat the Juárez faction by their own power in Mexico, they did not hesitate to urge the use of foreign troops to gain their ends. In Mexico the government of Juárez continued to exercise its prerogatives, although bands of conservatives not reconciled to the new regime still roamed the sparsely inhabited fringes of the central plateau and evaded capture. Outstanding among these leaders were Leonardo Márquez, Thomás Mejía, and Antonio Taboada.13 The vacuum that had resulted from half a century of unsettled conditions in Latin America naturally left the country open to ag1 2 Official statements of this policy and discussion of it are given by Benito luárez, Decreto a todos . . . habitantes, Veracruz, July 12, 1859, published in El siglo diez y nueve (Mexico), January 20, 1861, p. 2; also Juárez, Decreto a Todos.. .habitantes, July 23, 1859, printed in El siglo, January 21, 1861, 1-2; Fuente, Circular, in El siglo, January 22, 1861, 2-3. For the nationalization of Church property, see El siglo, January 24, 1861, 1, article by Sabino Flores, and the text of the law in ibid., February 11, 1861. For a summary of the manner in which this legislation was implemented, see J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America, 4 4 2 - 4 4 6 . Events leading up to the intervention are also discussed in Helen W . Harris, The Public Life of Juan Nepomuceno Almonte, Dissertation (PHD), The University of Texas, 309-356. 1 3 See El siglo for reported movements: For Mejía, January 22, 1861, p. 4, col. 1; February 24, 1861, p. 4, col. 1; July 19, 1861, p. 3, col. 3. For activities of Márquez see e.g., ibid., January 31, 1861, p. 2, col. 5; for Miramón, ibid., January 25, 1861, p. 2, col. 3; escape of Miramón, February 9, 1861, p. 4, col. 2 ; and February 10, 1862, p. 3, col. 5.

18

PRELIMINARY FBENCH MANEUVERS FOB POSITION

gression. When the protection of the United States was halted by civil war in 1861, this vacuum suddenly drew in the simultaneous Spanish intervention in Santo Domingo and French intervention in Panama, Ecuador, and Mexico.14 The ever-precarious financial status of Mexico gradually worsened, despite the internal measures taken to gain new revenue; and at last on July 17, 1861 Juárez signed a moratorium on foreign debts for a period of two years,15 a move which set the wheels of European intervention in motion. THE CONVENTION OF LONDON

The protests of the representatives of Spain, England, and France resounded to a degree proportionate to the amount of investments held by each nation. As a direct result their representatives met in London and, on October 31, came to an agreement for mutual efforts in Mexico to insure the interests of their nationals.16 Then the three set the stage for intervention by withdrawing diplomatic recognition from Mexico. The French minister, Dubois de Saligny, left Mexico in December to meet the French troops, leaving French affairs under the protection of the Prussian legation.17 The English minister also departed, leaving English affairs under the protection of the Belgian embassy.18 Evidently, then, unless the Mexican government withdrew its decree, armed intervention was inevitable. Even if the decree were withdrawn, more than likely some form of interference was imminent. 14 See also the pertinent discussion by Julio Duval in El siglo, July 22, 1861, p. 1, entitled "Polémica habida en Paris sobre los negocios de México". For French interests in South America at this time, see Francisco Zarco, "La tentativa de anecsar el Ecuador a la Francia", in ibid., July 27, 1861. For French interest in the Isthmus of Danen in April 1861, see also ibid., December 20, 1861, p. 2, col. 4. 15 For the text of the decree see El siglo, June 19, 1861, p. 2, col. 4, 5, and p. 3, col. 1; Manuel Dublán and José María Lozano, Legislación Mexicana, Mexico, 1878, IX, 243-245. 1(1 Because of the short life of this convention it is not further discussed here. The full text may be found in El siglo, January 3, 1862, p. 3, col. 4-5; also ibid., January 19, 1862, p. 2, col. 3; E. Lefêvre, Le Mexique et l'intervention européenne, 298-301; Primer calendario, 42-45. 17 El siglo, December 3, 1861, p. 3, col. 3; also December 6, 1861, p. 3, col. 4. 18 Ibid., December 18, 1861, p. 3, col. 2. ArTangoiz, Méjico desde 1808 hasta 1867, II, 401, says English affairs were left under the protection of the Prussian Minister, Mr. Wagner.

PRELIMINARY FRENCH MANEUVERS FOR POSITION

19

Already in London there had been talk of a king for Mexico, which adds weight to the supposition that the moratorium only furnished a pretext for plans already afoot.19 In view of the apparent determination of European powers to intervene, there was nothing to be gained by a withdrawal of the measure — it would only mean a search for another pretext. So the first answer of the Juárez government was to strengthen its army,20 and to give out a contract for new weapons, including 25,000 rifles,21 to a private contractor. In its resolution to defend itself, the government knew it could depend on what aid the United States could give.22 However, just before the Congress adjourned, in a last-minute effort to postpone an invasion, the legislature voted a repeal of the Law of July 17 as it applied to commitments made in London.23 It was too late then — the movement of foreign troops had begun, and there was no stopping them. The Spanish naval force, more anxious than the others, and having left Havana on November 29, arrived first. On December 8 two Spanish ships reached the bar at Antón Lizardo; and the commanding general, Joaquin Rubalcava, sent ashore a boat to Governor La Llave of Veracruz, asking for the surrender of the city and of San Juan de Ulloa within twenty-four hours.24 La Llave accepted and withdrew his forces.25 President Juárez answered by issuing a manifesto calling for unified resistance,26 sent General Zaragoza to command the Army of the East against the invader,27 and signed a decree making a traitor of any person who aided the Spaniards and setting a fifteen-day limit on the amnesty granted the "dissidents". It also formally recognized Ibid., D e c e m b e r 3, 1861, p. 3, col. 1. Francisco Ibarra and J u a n N . Méndez, " D e c r e t o " , Puebla, N o v e m b e r 28, 1861, in El siglo, D e c e m b e r 2, 1861, p. 3, col. 2. 21 F e r n a n d o Poucel, Letter to Editors of the Monitor republicano, Mexico, D e c e m b e r 2, 1861, published in El siglo, D e c e m b e r 3, 1861, p. 3, col. 3. 2 2 Secretary Seward, statement q u o t e d in El siglo, D e c e m b e r 3 , 1 8 6 1 , p. 3, col. 2. 2 S Text in El siglo, D e c e m b e r 17, 1861, p. 2, col. 2; p a s s e d b y vote of 6 3 to 34. 2 4 F o r the text of the d e m a n d see Gutiérrez d e R u b a l c a v a to the Governor of Veracruz, D e c e m b e r 14, 1861, printed in El siglo, D e c e m b e r 19, 1861, p. 2, col. 3; L e f ê v r e , Le Mexique, 306-308; Primer calendario, 38-39; García-Pérez, Estudio político-militar, D o c . iii, 306-308. 25 El siglo, D e c e m b e r 17, 1861, p. 1, col. 1; L a L l a v e to R u b a l c a v a , Veracruz, D e c e m b e r 15, 1861, in G a r c í a Pérez, Estudio político-militar, 309-311. 2Í El siglo, D e c e m b e r 18, 1861, supplement No. 337. 27 Ibid., D e c e m b e r 17, 1861, p. 3, col. 2. 18

20

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P R E L I M I N A R Y F R E N C H MANEUVERS FOR POSITION

the outbreak of hostilities with Spain. 2 8 T h e Spaniards promptly set u p their own government in Veracruz, 2 9 still ahead of the F r e n c h and English, w h o were thinking in terms of higher policy, crowns. 3 0

including

However, news that the Spaniards h a d been off V e r a c r u z

since D e c e m b e r 8 stirred them to new efforts. A quickly-organized task force of naval personnel and seasoned F r e n c h troops hastened to Veracruz, arriving January 7, 1862, 3 1 to join the Spanish force. T h e y m e t little formal resistance from the Mexican troops; and, after the commanders and their staffs h a d m e t and discussed their mutual problems, they issued a proclamation to the Mexican people, assuring them of their good intentions. 3 2

General Prim, the C o n d e de Reus,

28 For full text see Benito Juárez to Manuel Doblado, Mexico, December 17, 1861, in El siglo, December 19, 1861, p. 2, col. 4-5. The degree making traitors of collaborators was strengthened by the decree issued by the Governor of Veracruz on January 9, 1862, printed in ibid., February 4, 1862, p. 3, col. 1. Then on January 25, 1862 Juárez issued a comprehensive decree detailing acts of treachery in dealings with the allies, printed in ibid., February 1, 1862, p. 1, col. 1-3. It was still further strengthened by the decree of April 12, 1862 printed in Lefêvre, Le Mexique, 433-434. 29 Decree establishing supreme authority in Veracruz by Field Marshal Manuel Gasset y Mercader, Veracruz, December 12, 1861, printed in El siglo, December 23, 1861, p. 3, col. 3; also in García-Pérez, Estudio político-militar, Doc. ν, 311-313. Even in the succeeding months Spanish troops in effect were the ruling group in Veracruz; despite three- and four-power participation, the Spanish head was Rubalcava, but Military Governor was General Menduiña, whose administration included rules for cleaning the streets, collecting taxes, letting contracts for supplies for the city, and placing price controls on essential foods. — El siglo, February 9, 1862, p. 4, col. 1-2. In February also a paper El eco de Europa, was begun as a mouthpiece of the Spanish authorities. The decree of Gasset y Mercader is also printed in Lefêvre, Le Mexique, 315. 30 Maximilian was mentioned even this early, as opposed to the Spanish Infante Don Sebastián: El siglo, January 5, 1862, p. 3, col. 4 and Senior, Conversations with Distinguished Persons, II, 112-113. For other likely candidates see El siglo, January 17, 1862, p. 3, col. 5, also March 5, 1862, p. 4, col. 1. For further discussion of a monarchy for Mexico, see ibid., March 29, 1862, p. 3, col. 1-3. By February rumors were thick. — ibid., April 5, 1862, p. 1, col. 5. 31 For the instructions brought by the first troops, see Thouvenel to Jurien de la Gravière, Paris, November 11, 1861, in E. Lefêvre, Le Mexique et l'Intervention européenne, 322-326. For composition of the force, see the discussion of C. Niox, L'Expédition du Mexique, 46-50. For the proclamation of the Admiral to the troops on beginning the expedition, see El siglo, February 4, 1862, p. 2, col. 2. Such was the haste of departure that few animals were brought; the troops hoped to procure them at their destination or en route. In Cuba, however, few horses or mules could be found, and the French landed almost without animals. 32 Charles Lenox Wyke, E. Jurien de la Gravière, Hugh Dunlop, Dubois de Saligny, Count of Reus, "Proclama de los comisarios de las potencias aliadas", in El siglo, January 15, 1862, p. 3, col. 4-5. Also Niox, L'Expédition, 63-64, where authorship is attributed entirely to the ambitious General Prim. The last two

PRELIMINARY FRENCH MANEUVERS FOR POSITION

21

had by now assumed supreme comand of the Spanish forces, 33 Admiral Jurien de la Gravière of the French, and Sir Charles Wyke of the British. Before the allies could undertake any further operations, they were stricken by the plague of the tropical diseases and fevers that make the tierra caliente so unhealthy for Europeans. Therefore the majority of the troops moved up to a healthier elevation at Tejería and made camp. On January 13 the allied heads met officially and discussed a proposed ultimatum prepared by Dubois de Saligny, the French minister.34 It was changed to a milder form which omitted reference to reparations, and the latter version they sent to General Uraga, the commander of the Army of the East at that time. He received the envoys cordially, looked on their promises as favorable to Mexican interests, and sent the note to General Manuel Doblado, who then held the portfolio as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Meantime Juárez proclaimed a state of siege in Veracruz State, thereby eliminating the civil government and leaving it in the hands of military leaders. 35 Doblado sent the letter back on February 9 for a more specific statement of aims.30 Meanwhile, playing for time, General Zaragoza replaced Uraga and busied himself with military fortification of the two ordinary routes into the interior. T H E CONVENTION O F L A S O L E D A D

Doblado met the other envoys finally at La Soledad on February 19 and persuaded General Prim to sign an agreement, the Convention of La Soledad. The other allies, weakened by the example set by Prim, later on in the night signed the document, which impaired the allied signatories, Dunlop and Saligny, were supernumeraries; see El siglo, January 18, 1862, p. 4, col. 1. Also printed in Lefêvre, Le Mexique, 3 3 8 - 3 4 0 and Torres, El Archiduque Maximiliano, pp. 18-19, where it is dated January 10, 1862. 3 3 Proclamation on assumption of command, Veracruz, January 9, 1862, in El siglo, January 21, 1862, p. 3, col. 1. For composition of the naval forces, see L . M. Powell to Gideon Welles, Veracruz, February 19, 1862 in U.S. Navy, Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. I, pp. 307-308. 3 4 The full text is found in Niox, L'Expédition, 69-71. 35 El siglo, January 25, 1862, p. 2, col. 5. Neighboring Tabasco was placed in ibid., February 11, 1862, a state of siege by decree of December 27, 1861. p. 2, col. 4-5. By February 18, 1862, the following were in a state of siege: Puebla, Jalisco, Colima, San Luis Potosí, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and Querétaro. 3β Niox, L'Expédition, 82.

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cause37 in that it denied any ulterior intention to interfere with Mexican sovereignty. It accepted further negotiation of claims against Mexico, and it allowed the allied troops to move inland to healthy areas while negotiations proceeded, provided that, in case of a breakdown of negotiations, the allies would withdraw to approximately their present positions. Thereupon the French troops moved to Tehuacán, Spanish troops to Orizaba, and the English were granted the right to move to Córdoba, though their force of 700 was too small for such an operation to be very practical or to have any significance; it could be accomodated on ships in the harbor. Although Admiral de la Gravière acted the part of a well-bred, scholarly gentleman throughout the proceedings, evidently his conduct was not sufficiently vigorous for Napoleon III, who sent a new officer, General Charles Ferdinand Latrille, Count of Lorencez, at the end of January to take over command of field operations, while carefully, if illogically, leaving "political, maritime, and commercial matters to the Admiral".38 Lorencez landed on March 6, soon after the French troops had begun the march out of Veracruz toward Tehuacán. With him came the old Mexican minister to France, Juan N. Almonte, who, it was believed, would be a useful person to have on hand. On March 26 Lorencez reached Tehuacán, where the French forces totalled 2,500 men.39 Thereafter, if General Prim had any personal ambitions in Mexico, he saw that he could not succeed in the face of the heavy French contingent; hence from the arrival of Lorencez his role became a more conciliatory one, liberal toward the Mexican cause. As negotiations dragged on through March, Doblado insisted on the observation of that part of the Convention of La Soledad which required turning over the customs of Veracruz to Mexicans.40 Then 3 7 Full text in ibid., 8 5 The Spanish text is in El siglo, February 23, 1862, p. 1, col. 5 to p. 2, col. 1-5. For General Zaragoza's interpretation, see ibid., March 10, 1862, p. 3, col 4. The English translation in J. J. Kendall, Mexico under Maximilian, 37, omits three articles. The full text is also in Lefêvre, Le Mexique, 3 6 4 - 3 6 5 ; Frimer calendario, 51-52; Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales recogidos en la Secretaría privada de Maximiliano, I, 179-180; Friedrich von Hellwald, Maximilian I, Kaiser von Mexiko, 142-143; Torres, El Archiduque Maximiliano, pp. 22-23. For the movement of troops see Powell, Report, Veracruz, March 2, 1862, in U.S. Navy, Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. I, 3 5 4 - 3 5 5 ; Powell, Report, Veracruz, March 3, 1862, in ibid., Ser. I, Vol. I, 355. 38

40

Instructions of Napoleon III to Lorencez, in Niox, L'Expédition, El siglo, March 30, 1862, p. 4, col. 4. Ibid.

103.

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a firm in which Prim had an interest had a tax of 500,000 pesos levied on it by the Juárez government. By then it was clear to the easygoing Admiral La Gravière that Doblado had out-maneuvered and outsmarted the allies in obtaining the Convention of La Soledad; that he was now playing for time, which was more to Mexican advantage than to that of the allies; and that he was irritating the allies to the point of breaking off relations and thus requiring them to withdraw to the tierra caliente in the midst of the yellow fever season — a moral victory for the Mexicans if it could be realized. Finally the unnatural situation came to a head when Doblado requested the arrest of several émigrés who had disembarked under the aegis of the tricolor despite the price on their heads laid by the Juárez Government — principally Almonte, Miranda, Antonio de Haro y Tamariz, and even Miramón,41 with whom the English also had a score to settle for the incident of the Calle de los Capuchinos, where during the Guerra de la Reforma the Conservatives carried off English property, including considerable bullion. The French refused to turn the men over, though they were Mexican nationals on Mexican soil and though they had accepted the republican sovereignty of the land. Tempers flared, and negotiations had to cease.42 Thereupon Admiral Jurien de la Gravière ordered the withdrawal of his troops to the Chiquihuite River, thus acquitting himself of the agreement and leaving his movements thenceforward free.

E N D O F T H E CONVENTION O F LA SOLEDAD

That decision appeared to the English and to General Prim a unilateral act in violation of the Convention of London, and General Prim so stated in a letter of March 29, adding that the three should meet and recreate a united front toward the Mexicans.43 41 When the English finally seized Miramón, it gave great pleasure to the Juárez party. — El siglo, February 10, 1862, p. 3, col. 4. 42 These relations only worsened when two outlawed conservatives tried to reach and join the French forces: General Taboada succeeded in reaching Almonte with papers and credentials from Governor Santiago Vidaurri of Nuevo León; but General Robles Pezuela was intercepted by Zaragoza's troops and shot. — Senior, Conversations with Distinguished Persons, II, 291; Arrangoiz, Apuntes sobre el segundo imperio, 73-74. For the republican side, see El siglo, March 27, 1862, p. 4, col. 3-4. 4 3 Conde de Reus to Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, Orizaba, May 29, 1862, in Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 75-76.

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By that time the high-commissioners had received new instructions which only served to stiffen the attitudes already taken; and when the meeting of the three allies did take place on April 9, it was a stormy one,44 with Lorencez and Prim disagreeing violently. At the end the English and Spanish leaders abjured all participation in the French position. The allies then issued a joint communiqué, announcing that their alliance was terminated and that each should act independently, with the Spanish re-embarking their troops immediately.45 That movement was then effected. The allied, especially the French, stand was further weakened on March 13, when Almonte issued a proclamation on his own initiative,46 promising that soon a "firm government" would be established. Further, as captured documents revealed,47 he maintained secret communication with several outlawed bands and conservative leaders who planned to join him. Thus the Juárez government had no longer any illusions about French intentions. For some time a French ship had been lying off the port at Carmen. About the same time that Almonte issued his proclamation, the ship's crew came ashore and began to interfere in the city's functions by preventing the collection of the two-percent tax.48 The French troops, pursuant to earlier orders, had evacuated Tehuacán on April 1, with only a small guard left to watch the sick.49 That guard included enough disgruntled soldiers and trouble-makers 44 The minutes of this meeting are printed in full in Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 77-93. The proceedings are indicated as being in Lefêvre, Le Mexique, 394-401, but the two accounts differ so widely as to be almost unrecognizable. A third variant is found in Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, I, 199-207. 45 Letter of the Commissioners to Doblado, Orizaba, April 9, 1862, in El siglo, April 12, 1862, Suplemento al No. 452; also in García-Pérez, Estudio políticomilitar, Doc. No. ix, 323-324. On the same day Prim requested Spanish ships to embark his troops, refusing the English offer of transports. — El Conde de Reus to General Zaragoza, in El siglo, April 13, 1862, p. 4, col. 1. The letter of the Commissioners is also printed in Lefêvre, Le Mexique, 424; Frimer calendario, 54. For details of the evacuation, see L. M. Powell, Report, Veracruz, March 31, 1862, in U.S. Navy, Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. I, pp. 368-369; Powell to Welles, Veracruz, April 15, 1862, in ibid., Ser. I, Vol. I, pp. 379-380. 46 Printed in El siglo, March 20, 1862, p. 4, col. 2. 47 El siglo, March 29, 1862, p. 4, col. 2-3. The plan revealed by the documents was strangely accurate and a summary of what did happen, except that it did not fòrsee the break with the clerical party. 48 On the basis that it was a "forced contribution". — ibid., March 30, 1862, p. 4, col. 3; April 4, 1862, p. 4, col. 3. This was only a beginning of an increased activity of French interference with the processes of government. 49 El sigh, April 3, 1862, p. 4, col. 2.

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25

to foment a riot with local citizens and to bring discredit on the French cause.50 On April 7, immediately after the last meeting of the allies, French soldiers also began the evacuation of Orizaba.51 At that point the legal position of the French stood at a low ebb — they had lost out morally by their failure to live up to the terms of their own agreement and, in addition, would have to withdraw to Paso Ancho, giving an impression of defeat. Even if they remained in Mexico, it would be alone and with public opinion of both Spain and England against them. Also if they remained, their position would be uncomfortable until a victory, either political or military, came to bolster their stock. It must be reiterated here that up to that time France had not been at war with Mexico. So far only Mexico had recognized the existence of hostilities with France. The French position had been a withdrawal of recognition from the government of Juárez, which left the nation in a state of anarchy, with no responsible government, in the French view. Therefore the French could enter as in any other open, unorganized part of the world (Central Africa, The South Sea Islands, etc.) and conduct military operations. But after the Treaty of La Soledad the sovereign republican government was again recognized; and, therefore, a formal declaration of war was necessary. That declaration satisfied the requirement of international law52 except that the question may be raised as to whether Lorencez was a person competent legally to issue such a declaration. Generally the commander of an expeditionary force has the power to issue such documents, subject to ratification by the national government: The right of making war as well as of authorizing reprisals or any other acts of vindictive retaliation, belongs in every civilized nation to the supreme power of the state. The exercise of this right is regulated by the fundamental laws or municipal constitution in each country, and may be delegated to its inferior authorities in remote possessions . . . exercising under the authority of the State, sovereign rights in respect to foreign nations. 53

As the situation then existed, the French had fallen back both phys50 Some Martinique negroes started the riot by taking oranges and bananas from a local vendor. — El siglo, April 9, 1862, p. 4, col. 1. 51 Ibid., April 14, 1862, p. 4, col. 2. 52 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, Edition of 1866, reprinted in the Classics of International Law, No. 19, Oxford, 1936, p. 317. 53 Ibid., 313.

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ically and politically, to the position maintained before the signing of the Treaty of La Soledad and were reduced to the artifice of seeking some incident that would give them a casus belli for renewing their efforts. Therefore, after a few days' rest the French commissioners, Admiral Jurien de la Gr avière and Saligny, issued a proclamation to the Mexican nation, condemning the Mexican government, declaring a state of war, promising justice and equality to the people, and calling for their support.54 The next move was to find an excuse for opening hostilities, and it came soon. The French troops were slowly withdrawing into the tierra caliente, and the sick-rate was rising. General Lorencez chafed at the prospect of exposing the soldiers further, but the Admiral endeavored to hold him to the provisions of the Convention of La Soledad.55 At that time a letter came from General Zaragoza permitting the sick soldiers to remain at Orizaba but under Mexican superversion, specifying that the French guard should withdraw.56 As it happened, the French had left no guard in Orizaba, but some soldiers had carried their weapons in transferring from one hospital to another, and Zaragoza had interpreted the sight as evidence of an armed force. Lorencez established that fact in a letter the following day.57 Along with this tense situation came a rumor that three of the French soldiers in Orizaba had been maltreated;58 this rumor gave Lorencez the excuse he had sought for returning with his soldiers to a healthier climate and to the fulfillment of their mission. In his effort to give legal status to his plans, he wrote to the French diplomatic representatives as follows:

54 " . . . lo que queremos es llamar á todos los hombres de bien . . . a que concurran á la consolidación del orden, á la regeneración de vuestro bello pais; . . . E l gobierno mexicano ha contestado á la moderación de nuestra conducta con medidas á las cuales jamás hubiéramos prestado nuestro apoyo moral, y que el mundo civilizado nos reprocharía sancionar con nuestra presencia. Entre él y nosotros la guerra está hoy declarada.. . . Córdoba, 16 April, 1862." Printed in El siglo, April 20, 1862, p. 4, col. 2. This not to be confused with the letter Saligny and Jurien to the Minister of Foreign Relations of Mexico, on the same date and simply protesting the assassination of French soldiers on the road to Veracruz — El siglo, April 23, 1862, p. 1, col. 1-2. Printed also in Lefêvre, Le Mexique, 440-441. 5 5 Niox, L'Expédition, 136. 5 6 Zaragoza to Lorencez, Ingenio, April 18, 1862, in Niox, L'Expédition, 138. 57 Lorencez to Zaragoza, Córdoba, April 19, 1862, in ibid., 139. 5 8 Lorencez, Proclama, Orizaba, April 20, 1862, in El siglo, April 29, 1862, p. 4, col. 2; Lefêvre, Le Mexique, 451; Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, I, 230-231.

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27

Córdoba, April 19, 1862 On my taking command of the Expeditionary Force in Mexico, the Emperor confided to me the duty of directing military operations and guaranteeing the security of the troops. After learning of the stipulations of the Convention of La Soledad, ratified by the Commissioners of the three high contracting powers, I had to order all preparations necessary for concentrating my troops at Paso Ancho as soon as the Spanish army completed its withdrawal. The assassination of the three French soldiers near the camp did not seem to me sufficient motive for considering myself released from the strict execution of a treaty by the representatives of France; these attacks came only as a consequence of the decree of January 2 5 by the Juárez government which places us outside the law and classes us as pirates, a decree which they have outrageously maintained since the signature of the treaty. The situation in Veracruz, with our troops surrounded by numerous parties of guerrillas and reduced to a state of blockade, already seemed to me a violation of this treaty on the part of the Mexicans. Tonight I received from General Zaragoza an official note by which he informs me that he considers a group of the sick men left in Orizaba, and who have since convalesced, as a guard set up for the security of my hospital, and he protests such a scheme. Facing such a declaration, I have every reason to fear that our hospital cases can no longer count on the protection assured them by the Convention of La Soledad and that they are to be considered as hostages too lightly left in La Soledad and that they are now in the hands of the enemy. My duty is to march to their aid without loss of time, for it was imprudent on my part to leave them exposed to an undisciplined army and to unscrupulous chiefs. I therefore have the honor to inform you that in virtue of the military powers entrusted to me, I shall begin the march on Orizaba this evening. I have no other means of assuring your personal safety than to invite you to join the army in its march. Lorencez 59 T h a t same day General Lorencez issued orders for the about-face, and the troops in Córdoba, the rear guard of the main force, then began the march back toward Orizaba. BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES Mexican soldiers had followed close on the heels of the withdrawing force, and the F r e n c h troops very soon m a d e contact with a detachment barricading the road. Although the Mexicans withdrew rapidly, the little troop of Captain Capitan charged them with thirty-five cav59 Lorencez to Jurien de la Gravière, Cordoba, April 19, 1862, in Niox, L'Expédition, 139-140.

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alrymen of the Chasseurs d'Afrique and sabered five of them, capturing twelve more.60 So ended the "Battle" of Fortín, which drew the first real blood of the campaign. This battle broke political and diplomatic contacts, and thenceforth the only guiding principles were the accepted rules of warfare. General Lorencez pushed on to Orizaba, where he regrouped his forces and prepared to move into Puebla. The high command of the French forces received a shakeup during that pause, which did not change the strategy at all but clarified responsibilities. An order from the Emperor read: The Emperor's government has disapproved the treaty concluded with the Mexican General Doblado by General Prim and accepted by the allied plenipotentiaries, because the Convention seems not to be keeping with the dignity of France. Consequently M. de Saligny alone has been charged with full political powers, previously delegated to Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, and the latter has received orders to return to the command of the Naval Division.61 B A T T L E O F CINCO D E MAYO

On April 27 General Lorencez, then undisputed head of the expedition, with all his staff, took up the march on Puebla, invested the city, and made a quick effort to take it by assault on May 5. The French troops were overconfident, the position of Puebla lent itself well to defense, and General Zaragoza, the chief defender, had the best of the Mexican army on hand, well armed, and with a good morale whipped up by spreading, with some exaggeration, reports of outrages committed by the French. The result was a definitive defeat for the French arms.62 As a consequence General Lorencez had to withdraw to Orizaba to reorganize his troops, blaming his defeat on the ill-founded recommendations of Almonte and Saligny,63 and to 80 The skirmish was a confused affair. At the time of the charge General Prim himself, his wife, and General Milans del Bosch were in a convoy of carriages coming down the road, and they were caught in the charge. Milans saved one Mexican colonel from being captured, a certain Colonel Félix Díaz, by claiming he was under the duty of conducting him through the outposts. For General Zaragoza's account, see El siglo, Suplemento al Nùmero 4 6 5 , April 2 4 , 1862, in which he recognized that a state of war existed. 61 Niox, L'Expédition, 144-145. 82 This important battle is significant here mostly for its results. For details see Niox, L'Expédition, 156-171. For the Mexican side, see Zaragoza's report, in Primer calendario, 66-68; Juan de Marín, S de mayo de 1862 glorioso recuerdo histórico, Mexico (Guillermo Veraza), 1887. 63 Niox, L'Expédition, 173-174.

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29

await reinforcements and instructions. While there was no question of a capture of the remaining troops — 6,000 soldiers could maintain themselves indefinitely against any Mexican force — still the line of communications with Veracruz remained in continual danger and required heavy convoys to protect the supply trains, in default of which the trains were sure to be attacked and even annihilated.64 Both armies, well under the control of their leaders, were scrupulous about observing the general rules of "civilized" warfare; more than once there was an exchange of prisoners.65 Relations with Almonte, in the meantime, had grown worse. Already Almonte had taken the initiative of issuing a proclamation in Córdoba on April 17, 1862,60 promising the establishment of a stable government. Then on June 15, soon after the Battle of Cerro Borrego had relieved pressure on the French and practically forced the Mexicans to return to Puebla, the time seemed propitious to capitalize on the defeat by calling on all Mexicans in a new proclamation to support the French cause. That time, and apparently with the encouragement of some conservatives in Orizaba, he was more aggressive; he took to himself the title of "Chêf suprême de la Nation", emphasized the role of Mexican conservatives in the campaign, and threatened the rest of the Juárez army with defeat. Then he asked for confidence in the Franco-Mexican army and in himself.67 The proclamation did not circulate widely, and the only visible effect was to intimidate General Lorencez, who saw no reason for Almonte E.g., one was destroyed on June 10, 1862 — ibid., 180. Major Delsaux, of the Naval Artillery, was captured on June 13, released on parole, and then exchanged for an officer of the Mexican forces captured at the Battle of Barranca Seca — ibid., 189. On June 28 General Zaragoza released some prisoners he had taken; an officer and 12 soldiers. All praised the treatment they had received at the hands of their captors. Ten wounded soldiers, left in Puebla because they could not be moved, were turned over to the French, and in return General Lorencez sent to the Mexicans 28 of their own officers whom he had withdraw from the prisoners taken by General Márquez. - Ibid., 189-190. ββ Emmanuel M. A. Domenech, Histoire du Mexique, II, 70-72; Lefêvre, Le Mexique, 448-450. The Spanish text is printed in El siglo, April 24, 1862, p. 4, col. 2. An earlier proclamation given in Veracruz, December 18, 1861, is attributed to Almonte in ibid., May 28, 1862, but it said little worth repeating. 67 Printed in Paul Gaulot, Rêve d'Empire, 78-79; Lefêvre, Le Mexique, 452-453. Still another proclamation, issued on April 20, 1862, was signed by 93 members of the Mexican forces — El siglo, April 29, 1862, p. 4, col. 3. Not only Almonte took this title, but Manuel Serrano on May 1, 1862, issued a proclamation in which he referred to himself as having been appointed governor of the Department of Veracruz by the "Presidente provisional de la República, benemérito, General D. Juan Almonte", — ibid., May 6, 1862, p. 4, col. 3. 64

65

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to assume such a title, which conceivably could interfere with his own prerogatives as military commander and governor, inherent in his position.®8 When news of the defeat at Puebla reached Paris, the agitation of the Emperor and of the chief ministers led them to a resolution to carry the expedition on to a positive conclusion. Not only the honor of France was at stake, but the point of honor made it possible for Napoleon III to overcome any scruples of conscience or expense felt by his ministers or his Chamber of Deputies. He immediately received permission to finish the task.69 It was only much later that the high cost of the expedition began to tell on the French Treasury and created real opposition in the Chamber. THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The organization of the new force fell mostly to Napoleon III, and he picked experienced men to lead the work and veteran troops to carry it out. Major General Elias Frédéric Forey (1804-1872) was a graduate of St. Cyr, a veteran officer of the Algerian campaign, the coup d'état of 1851, the siege of Sevastopol, and the victory of Montebello.70 The next senior major general was François-Achille Bazaine (1811-1885), a veteran of North African wars, the Spanish Civil War, the Crimean Campaign, the Italian Campaign of 1859, and long years of colonial administration in North Africa.71 Other important names 68 An interference made worse when Almonte issued decrees in his own name - lune 1, 1862, June 4, 1862, Lefêvre, Le Mexique, 467-469; Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, I, 240-241. M Discours de S. Exc. M. Rouher Ministre d'État dans la séance du corps législatif, du 22 Janvier, 1864, p. 39. 70 Annuaire Militaire, de l'Empire français, pour l'année 1863, p. 26. 71 Because of his leading role in this account, his background is of extra interest. He came from a bourgeois family; his father was an engineer who worked in the service of the Tsar, leaving young Bazaine to be raised by relatives. Among other things, in his youth he worked as grocer-boy — a fact that his aristocratic colleagues never forgot. When he failed entrance exams for St. Cyr, he enlisted for African service and rose rapidly through the ranks. In 1835 he went with the Foreign Legion to Spain to help Queen Isabella II in the Carlist wars, and he learned to speak Spanish well. Then for ten years he headed the Bureau Arabe at Tlemcen, an extremely tricky and sensitive administrative position in which he tried to keep the Berbers and Arabs at peace. By 1851, a full colonel commanding the Foreign Legion, he married a Spanish girl whom he had helped educate. He took his regiment to the Crimean Peninsula and conducted himself so well there that at the end of the campaign he was named the military governor of Sevastopol, and he received a hero's welcome on his return to France. After the Italian campaigns of 1859 he was again left behind to control the civil

PRELIMINARY FRENCH MANEUVERS FOR POSITION

31

included General Félix Douay (1818-1879), Armand-Alexandre de Castagny (1807-1900), Pierre Jean Joseph Jeanningros (1816-1902), Edmond L'Hériller, and General Bertier, all of whom further distinguished themselves in later times. The troops included, among others, three regiments of Zouaves, five regular infantry regiments, two regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique, all along with various supporting artillery units, engineers, reconnaissance troops, and some gendarmerie for police work. Later on a battalion of troops recruited in Egypt was sent for service in the tierra caliente, where they were expected to react better than Europeans.72 In all, the force was planned for a total of 30,000. Reinforcements had been reaching Veracruz ever since the initial landing, and General Douay had arrived on May 16 with 300 men.78 Then the movement speeded up, with General Forey landing at the head of the new force on September 21. He reached Orizaba on October 20; and on November 10 Lorencez, relieved of his command, began his return trip to France, 74 to join the now growing list of careers for which the Mexican adventure proved the climax. The stage was set for extensive operations. population as the French withdrew. Then came the Mexican Campaigns. See Philip Guedalla, The Two Marshals; James Henry Skene, With Lord Stratford in the Crimean War; C. H. Morard, Héroïsme et trahisons, 1870-1871; Elihu Rich, Marshal Bazaine Before the Tribunal at Versailles; and Ch. Martin, Les assizes de Trianon, Guide pour les débats du procès Bazaine. 7 2 These were the so-called negro troops about which some complaints have been made. How many really were negroes, it is impossible to say, because the recruiting was done in Egypt, where there are many dark skins that are not at all negroid; however, there evidently were enough of the dark skins to give the name to the whole group. Many misguided references appear about the color of the troops, but they are mostly ill-founded: The Chasseurs d'Afrique and the Tirailleurs algériens were mostly colonial troops from North Africa, and their dark skins were sometimes taken to represent negroes, and the Zouaves are sometimes confused with them. But at this time the Zouaves were regular French soldiers, not colonial troops. ™ Niox, L'Expédition, 179. 7 4 In contemporary writings Lorencez was much criticized for his defeat. His officers, however, did not blame him at all — they seemed to consider him an able and efficient officer. — Niox, L'Expédition, 202.

CHAPTER

II

T H E A N A B A S I S : V E R A C R U Z , JALAPA, PUEBLA, M E X I C O CITY

INSTRUCTIONS TO FOREY

General Forey brought with him to Mexico a long letter of instructions which further developed the Emperor's thoughts on Mexico and served as a basis for the policy followed throughout the French occupation.1 The letter enjoined Forey to welcome all Mexicans who would leave the Juarist cause for that of the French; he should conduct all negotiations on a temporary basis but should avoid controversies as far as possible; he should show great deference to religion but at the same time reassure those who had acquired nationalized property; he should arm and train a Mexican army to take the main rôle in combat; he should maintain strict discipline and avoid antagonizing the populace; he should call an assembly, to include Almonte, which would decide on the form of government; he should introduce regularity and responsibility on the European model into governmental affairs with the aid of French specialists; while he should allow the Mexicans to select their own form of government, France was to favor a monarchy under Maximilian of Austria. Then Napoleon went on to explain the reasons for the intervention: A countermeasure to halt the spreading influence of the United States, to obtain new sources of raw materials, and to furnish outlets for French products. It was further made clear that whatever prince mounted the throne, he would owe his position to France and would have to depend on her for support. The rest of the letter consisted of recommendations for military operations, for which he suggested a single line of advance from Veracruz. A postcript to the letter 1 Napoleon III to Forey, July 3, 1862. The complete letter is printed in Niox, L'Expédition, 212-16. It is printed less two paragraphs in Genaro García, Colección de documentos inéditos o muy raros para la historia de México, XIV, 9-19 (Hereafter referred to as Col. doc.). Extracts are also printed in Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 121-3, from another Spanish translation, not always identical but usually closely following the French text. Extracts are also in Domenech, Histoire, II, 91-3.

THE ANABASIS

33

mentioned that Santa Anna might be of use to the French cause. The letter placed General Forey in supreme command, leaving Saligny only advisory powers. With those instructions as a basis for the renewed effort to master Mexico, General Forey landed at the head of his force on September 21 and took command as ordered. In accordance with instructions he issued a proclamation to the Mexican people, assuring them once again of the good intentions of the French, denying that he was warring against the Mexican people, and calling for supporters to join his cause.2 A few days later he made his position clearer by having another announcement published in the official paper, ordering Almonte to dissolve his ministry, abstain from issuing any laws or decrees, to drop his title of Supreme Head of the Nation, and to confine his efforts to organizing a Mexican army.3 On October 12 Forey moved out of Veracruz to establish his headquarters in Orizaba; the troops were suffering severely; his main body numbered only 515 men when he departed, and he left two hundred soldiers in the hospital.4 Soon after his arrival, on November 3, he issued another and pointless proclamation which pictured the horrors of war and asked the Mexicans not to call that horror down upon themselves. He warned them that they faced doom; then he praised the abilities of the French army and concluded that "Wherever this flag floats, it represents the cause of the people and of civilization".5 That done, Forey began to assemble his forces. Along with the order for the reinforcements to Mexico, Napoleon III had picked as division commander Major General Bazaine,6 naming him to command the First Division of Forey's troops, and 2 Forey, Proclamation, Veracruz, September 22, 1862, in Niox, L'Expédition, 218-9, where, however, the date is given as the 20th, that is the day before he landed. Also printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XIV, Doc. viii, 38-41, where the date is given as September 22; Gaulot, Rêve, 88-9, also given as September 22; Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, I, 255-6, where the date is given as September 24; García-Pérez, Estudio político-militar, Doc. X X . 359-60, where the date is given as September 24. 3 Forey, Notice, in Niox, L'Expédition, 2 1 7 - 8 ; Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, I, 320. 4 Niox, L'Expédition, 209. On his way through Córdoba he issued another proclamation to the citizens of that city in particular on October 22, 1863. — Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, I, 2 5 6 - 2 5 7 . 5 Forey, Proclamation, Orizaba, November 3, 1862, in Niox, L'Expédition, 2 1 9 - 2 2 1 ; Genaro García, Col. doc., XIV, 43-48. * Randon to Bazaine, Paris, July 9, 1862, in the Bazaine Archives (henceforth referred to as BA), I, folio 2, Spanish translation on folio 1; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XIV, 22-23.

34

T H E ANABASIS

to have as brigadier generals Castagny and Neigre. By August 4 this division was organized and ready to embark on two transports, St. Louis and the Navarin. In September the ships paused at the island of Martinique for recuperation; 7 then they continued and reached Veracruz on October 15. There Lieutenant Colonel La Croix, who was to be Bazaine's Chief of Staff, came aboard to acquaint him with the situation: The vómito negro was eating away at the ranks of the garrison; Juarist guerrillas maintained a virtual blockade of the port, and supplies in Orizaba had become so scarce that Forey had had to rescind his earlier policy of moving troops inland as soon as they debarked. 8 Thus Bazaine's division found itself caught in the uncomfortable predicament of having to maintain itself in the unhealthy tierra caliente and engage in minor skirmishes with local Juarist groups while waiting for orders to move inland. The high road to Orizaba was no more open than the trails; the whole countryside lay like an ocean waiting and hostile; and whenever groups of French soldiers moved out of Veracruz, it was like a ship venturing out on the high seas — the silent mass closed in on its bow, and it was on its own resources to reach its destination, turn back, or disappear.9 The energetic measures of the Juarists had so intimidated the French sympathizers that they dared not offer a helping hand lest reprisals reach them.10 Generally the area abounded in food, especially meat, but it had to be gathered by armed soldiers. Wheat was not a local product and had to be brought in from a distance at great hazard; the compromise was a bread in which they mixed corn — maize — with flour and produced a mixture not suited to the French taste. 11

COASTAL ACTIVITIES

For a time Bazaine's division had to content itself with guarding Veracruz and making forays into the countryside to combat Juarist forces. 12 Those brief attacks reached the Rio Blanco, the Rio Atoyac, 7 For the period spent in Martinique, see Charles Mismer, Souvenirs de la Martinique et du Mexique pendant l'Intervention française, i-104. 8 Niox, L'Expédition, 223. » Ibid., 223. Ibid., 223. 11 Ibid., 223. 12 At this time the Juarist bands were called variously guerrillas or guerrilleros and were not always considered to have the status of armed combatants. This is because of the divided attitude of the French. The latter wavered between their

T H E ANABASIS

35

and even Alvarado and TIacotalpan before the division was ordered back to Veracruz. During this period also a semi-independent military group began operations which later was to bring great discredit to the French cause: Stoecklin and his band of contre-guérillas, known chiefly for their cruelty, excesses, and unmilitary conduct. Later on a Colonel Dupin commanded them. The importance of Tampico then seemed to warrant its capture, and one regiment, the 81st Infantry, under Colonel La Canorgue, moved up by ship to occupy it. They succeeded against light opposition by Juarist General Pavón, but the expedition was neither wellsupported nor well-equipped; and the venture was abandoned the next month, January, 1863. The last troops left Tampico on January 22, bringing two hundred mules purchased there at a very high price.

T H E ADVANCE ON P E R O T E AND P U E B L A

In the meantime General Bertier with a strong force of mounted and foot troops had struck out in October to open up a new path to the interior, following the old route of General Winfield Scott in 1848 — to Jalapa, Perote, and Huamantla. By the end of December General Forey felt that he had enough troops at his disposal to allow his plans to materialize. He ordered the Second Division, under General Félix Douay, to advance on Orizaba, pick up Forey and his entourage, then advance on Puebla. General Bazaine, with the First Division, was to advance along the Jalapa-Perote route, and the two forces were to meet at or near Amozoc, from which point they could prodeclaration of a state of war with the Juarist government, as a result of which they had to treat the regular Mexican troops as lawful belligerents, and the earlier statements made to the effect that the Juárez government was not recognized and that the country was in a state of anarchy with no effective government and hence no recognized standing for its army. Under the Treaty of La Soledad the government was recognized; hence Lorencez was correct in declaring a state of war. But when the French government refused to ratify the treaty, and with it recognition of Juárez, then recognition became null and void, and the French could go back to their stand of no recognition, hence no legal status for the combatants. The policy was not strictly observed, as will be seen later. As for the term guerrilla, it was also used by the Juarist officials for some of the armed groups; and because some were recognized by the government; they may be said to have legal status. But for the French it was so difficult to tell the difference that as a rule no distinction was made. This is significant because if the bands were not legal combatants, then upon capture they should have been treated as criminals, not as prisoners of war.

36

THE ANABASIS

ceed with the investment of Puebla and retrieve the national honor. In preparation for the long march Forey instructed the conservative Mexican General Leonardo Márquez to proceed to Jalapa and there join Bazaine's force and put himself under Bazaine's orders. Thus began an uncomfortable acquaintance that continually required a firm hand. Niox attributes this order to the theory that the rowdy Mexican troops would probably serve better under newly-arrived officers than under those at Orizaba, with whom they already had had differences. 13 It should not be taken as an unkind trick on Bazaine, nor as an act of punishment because, being the second oldest and most experienced general on hand, Bazaine normally should have received the more difficult tasks and those requiring most perspicacity and tact. Those two qualities, and not the colorful, dashing, impatient brilliance of L'Hériller, of Du Barail, or even of Douay, were needed for handling the delicate relationship of the Mexican troops with the French. Already the Mexican conservatives in the French camp were chafing at their bits. During the several months of close living, the French soldiers, and particularly the officers, had shown contempt for the disorderly Mexicans, and they had even made fun of the conservative slogan, Viva la religion; but it was absolutely necessary for the Mexicans to remain with the French, for their cause was supposedly the same and, of late, because Lorencez, contemptuous of the irregular organization, had begun paying them salaries out of funds set aside for Almonte14 and had promised them French weapons. Forey continued that policy, hoping thereby to curb their marauding and confiscation of private property. Finally, by placing Márquez' troops under a new general and one who spoke the language and had had experience with the Spanish character, Forey was justified in assuming that he could avoid an open break. The advance guard of Bazaine's division left Veracruz on December 5, 1862, to secure the road to the first bivouac. At that time a short stretch of railroad extended from Veracruz to la Tejería, and it was used regularly to transport the troops that far. On December 6 Bazaine left with the main body and with his staff, proceeded to the bivouac at La Loma de San Juan, and rejoined the advance guard. The troops marched on across the Río de Tolomé at noon on De13 14

Niox, L'Expédition, Ibid., 238.

238.

T H E ANABASIS

37

cember 7 and bivouacked at Paso de Ovejas, which had been secured by a battalion of the 3rd Zouaves sent ahead for that purpose.15 The next day the division marched to Puente Nacional, where the troops rested. Bazaine rode out to inspect the hacienda of Santa Anna and the two forts defending it. The troops had difficulty in getting started the next morning because of a heavy rain. They marched only a short distance before the general, informed that firewood was available at La Rinconada, though no water, ordered a halt there so that the troops could stay warm. The troops bivouacked on December 10 at Plan del Rio, about fifty miles from Veracruz. They had advanced only about ten miles a day since they began the march, though a normal marching day was twenty. The troops had been weakened by their sojourn in the tierra caliente, the road was very bad, vigilance was required against attack, and bivouacs were selected for suitability, not at spaced intervals. The site chosen was also historically significant because it had been the headquarters of General Winfield Scott in preparation for the Battle of Cerro Gordo in 1848.16 All along the march, which closely followed Scott's route, Bazaine evidently profited from his knowledge of the War of 1848, especially the Veracruz-Mexico campaign. The troops left the bivouac on December 11 and rested at Corral Falso after a short march over extremely bad road. They camped at Los dos Ríos, a good camping ground, not accessible to wagons. The column reached and occupied Jalapa at noon on December 12. There they halted for three days to reorganize and rest the troops in preparation for the advance on Perote. At Jalapa agents informed them that considerable supplies were available in Loma de San Juan, and on the 15th a battalion of the 62nd Regiment took a convoy of 15 This march is given in some detail here for several reasons. First, it reveals the methods used by the French Army of the 1860's, the character of Bazaine's leadership, the status of the troops in the area, and the general plan of advance. Second, it has been treated very curtly by other writers: Niox, L'Expédition, gives only three pages to it, and other histories are equally uninterested. The account given here is taken principally (like that of Niox) from the Journal des Marches of the First Division, an official record, one copy of which was forwarded to Paris, and another of which was kept by General Bazaine as part of his personal archives. Hence it appears as folios 10-14 of Volume I (Spanish translation in folios 15-21) and is printed in both languages by Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XIV, Doc. xxxiv, 143-276. No comprehensive picture of this advance appears in any English-language publication examined. 18

Winfield Scott, Memoirs, II, 436.

38

T H E ANABASIS

Mexican wagons there to reach the food and grain. 17 Such practice was resorted to frequently because of the precarious line of communications. Official papers do not elucidate the character of the supply trains, but other records make it clear that they were much more of a problem than the soldiers. In the first place the French army had brought few supplies except arms, planning to obtain more locally. Reference has already been made to the ill success in obtaining mules in Cuba or Martinique. Also the Juarist forces had done their best to evacuate all wagons and animals from the occupied areas. Although the State of Veracruz normally abounded in animals, the French could obtain few mules, and the only vehicles were clumsy wagons. As one participant described it, The Mexican freight wagons are very heavy; they are mounted on four huge wheels and carry at least a load of thirty metric fifths. Usually the team consists of twelve or even sixteen mules. But during the winter season the roads become quagmires, and all transport of this sort stops from October, the time the rains inundate the terre chaude, until the month of May. It was at this time, the worst part of the rainy season, that we were going to set out with this huge convoy made up of wagons heavily overloaded, drawn by wornout teams and driven by arrieros who are taken, you might say, by force and who would take advantage of the first opportunity to escape. The wooded areas which abound along the road that we had to travel were infested with numerous guerrilla bands, who waited in the best ambushes for a favorable moment to fall upon the mired teams and pepper us with bullets and then disappear into a terrain so difficult that it was impossible for us to reconnoiter it in advance. They then could continue their attack on another part of our long column, disappearing as if by magic as soon as our men started out in pursuit.18 Loizillon, one of the officers on Bertier's staff and a brilliant correspondent, reported, Yesterday we left Veracruz for Santa Fé, a distance of twelve kilometers; to reach it we required two days on account of the sandy and cut-up roads in which our carriages floundered. Tomorrow I shall leave at 6:00 to reconnoiter the second stop, at San Juan, for our troops are so fatigued that we have to remain at the first stop.19 17 A particularly hazardous operation at this time because Díaz Mirón, Juarist governor, was known to be in the vicinity with 700 or 800 guerrillas. — Genaro García, Col. doc., XIV, 158-159. 18 (Jean Jacques Jules Lafont), Les bivouacs de Veracruz à Mexico, p. 8-9. 19 Henri Loizillon to his parents, Santa Fé, October 25, 1862, in Loizillon, Lettres sur l'expédition du Mexique publiées par sa soeur, 1862-67 (Hereafter referred to as Lettres), p. 3-5.

T H E ANABASIS

39

Further, on the state of provisions and the attitude of the Mexicans and French toward each other, he had much to say. Perote and Jalapa were wheat-producing areas, but the guerrillas kept such a close watch that the French were unable to take advantage of the fact: Instead, we only stir ourselves [from Jalapa] to go to Puente Nacional to try to get provisions, however small in quantity, brought from France. This activity is excessively fatiguing and raises our sick rate. Even when they decide to extend out and occupy Perote, it will be too late, for the resources will have been already carried off by the guerrillas... . For the moment everybody is deathly bored. Not even the cats will do you the honor of recognizing you, except, however, the conspirators who want jobs, spies, and merchants who sell at ten times real values. 20

The French march to the plateau was characterized by wagons stuck in the mud, soldiers pushing or pulling on the wheels, shivering from the cold rain, and urging on clumsy mule teams of twelve to twenty animals, who could barely pull loads of fodder sufficient to feed themselves. Bazaine's division left Jalapa December 16, marched until nearly noon, and bivouacked at the village of San Miguel. The column started out again the next morning, despite cold, fog, and rain, and the rocky, mountainous roads. Bazaine heard of some enemy troops nearby and halted just beyond La Hoya at 11:00 o'clock. La Hoya was a good defensive position with breastworks built for the American War of 1848, but the Mexicans had chosen not to defend it; the French column passed it by and entered a very rough, wooded area, made further unpleasant by masses of lava and volcanic rock. Then Bazaine's warning was justified: The advance guard was fired upon, and a lively skirmish resulted. The movement of the main body was not hindered, and at 4:00 o'clock the column bivouacked at Las Vigas. On December 18 Bazaine took a small force on ahead to the village of Cruz Blanca, where his scouts had sighted the enemy. With him went the troops of Márquez, who by then had joined him.21 20 Loizillon to his parents, Jalapa, November 19, 1862, in Loizillon, Lettres, p. 9-11. 21 Just when Márquez joined Bazaine's division is not clear. The Journal (Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XIV, 154) says the evening of the 17th; Niox, L'Expédition, 238, says the 7th (typographical error for the 17th?); but Blanchot, Mémoires de l'intervention française au Mexique, I, 156, places the meeting on the 12th.

40

THE ANABASIS

There was a brisk encouter just beyond Cruz Blanca, with losses on both sides before the road was cleared. The column then bivouacked at Cerro de León. The following morning the road was open, and no enemy appeared. The column reached Perote at noon and occupied it without resistance. The soldiers found a large amount of food and fodder, and the General took time to rest the troops, establish a hospital, and prepare the city defenses. 22 The troops remained there until January, 1863, when the rear detachment left at Puente Nacional was brought up to Perote. On its way up the detachment, the First Battalion of the 62nd Regiment, was attacked by the forces of Díaz Mirón 23 with some losses on both sides. During that time troops were also stationed in the haciendas Molino and Tenastepec, and parties foraged through the countryside gathering supplies. They soon had ample fodder as well as considerable wheat, and had located a herd of 900 cattle. On January 4 an individual referred to as Floriano Bernardi, Swiss by birth, was arrested as a spy. He was charged with being in the employ of the Consul of the United States, was tried by a war council, and was executed on the 6th of the month. 24 At last, on January 14, the movement out of Perote began on schedule, but in a thick fog and freezing cold. In that weather the division commander decided he could not engage the troops in the rough, wooded land ahead; he ordered the advance guard, Colonel Aymard's 62nd Regiment, to return, and he set some cavalry out to cover the return. He then fixed the 21st as the day of departure. 22 References are frequent at this time to the procurement of supplies, but rarely is it made clear how they were obtained. The usual expression in documents and printed works is trouver, recueillir, réunir, and fournir, but seldom is reference made to payment. We have seen that in the occupation of Tampico mules were "bought" at a very high price, and Loizillon referred to merchants who sold at very high prices, but in obtaining food and fodder there is a paucity of detail. It is evident, however, that in most cases at least payment was made in some form. The form of requisition (a receipt which could presumably be presented to French fiscal officers or authorities for payment) was one way; also actual pesos were available from the customs offices in Veracruz. Pesos, called piastres usually by the French, ran at the rate of one to five francs. Following Napoleon's instructions not to alienate the good will of the people, it would necessarily follow that confiscation was not the practice. The wooded areas contained many undomesticated cattle whose ownership was not easily established. In such cases, obviously, they were simply seized without ceremony. 23

Then the Governor of Veracruz appointed by Juárez. See Loizillon, Lettres, 34, for more details. Floriano had also fought the French in Rome and was one of a considerable number of irregular characters who reappeared in Mexico with anti-French bias from Italian experiences. 24

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41

Lieutenant Colonel Copmartin was left in command of the garrison in Perote.25 General Bazaine's Division started again on January 21. On account of the long and difficult road the column was divided into three sections. A reconnaissance showed that the next day's march could proceed by either of two routes: one direct but suitable only for mule trains, the other (to La Capilla by way of Quecholac) suitable for both mule and wagon trains. The general divided his troops, sending the foot troops, mountain artillery, and the mule train directly and sending the vehicles with guards by the longer route. The troops bivouacked at Tepetitlán on the 23rd and were rejoined by the wagon train. While the division rested there five days, the general on the 26th went with a small guard to San Andrés on a reconnaissance that kept him out overnight. That town, in the shadow of Mount Orizaba, marked one of the last stages of the march, with only the mountain mass itself separating Bazaine from his commander. As result of the reconnaissance Bazaine ordered his sick and his medical personnel ahead, guarded by General Bertier, to set up a hospital at San Andrés; on the 30th the rest of the division took up the march and reached La Concepción in the middle of the afternoon. There and at San Andrés a long pause allowed rear guards to be brought up, tired troops to rest, and communication to be established with General Forey. General Bazaine set out on February 1 for Nopalucán, which he reached that evening, although the rear troops had to stop at Ozumba or the Hacienda of San Miguel. Facilities were not suitable for the large body of troops, and the next day Bazaine moved on to Huamantla, hoping to find more supplies there and, doubtless, as he rounded the heights of Mt. Orizaba, to reflect on the footsteps of Cortés, which so far he had closely followed. Disappointed at the amount of food found at Huamantla, he left the town to be occupied by the troops of General Márquez and returned to Nopalucán. Juarist forces made several attacks during the return march, with the Mexican troops of Márquez bearing the heaviest of the assaults. The division was again busy with reorganization until the 16th of February, moving to better encantonments, and making itself comfortable. On the 16th Bazaine went personally with a foraging detachment to Huamantla, hoping to confer with Márquez, who was 25

Ibid.

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THE ANABASIS

expecting an attack from the large force of Juarist troops under Comonfort then waiting at a safe distance. Communications were then open with Orizaba, although convoys guarded each transit. The next week was used further for administrative housecleaning, but the commanders themselves were rarely present. They were busy on reconnaissance and in conferences. The units, while regrouping themselves, occupied successively nearer towns and haciendas in the direction of Amozoc — La Floresta, Acojete, Acatzingo Quecholac, Santa Rosa, San Bartolo, San Diego, La Venta del Pinal. By March 2 Nopalucán was almost evacuated.

THE FIGHT FOR PUEBLA

Finally on the 9th of March preparations for the investment of Puebla began. Amozoc was occupied by General Douay's Second Division. The First Division collected guides in and around Huamantla for the march toward Puebla. The 51st Regiment, absorbed by the First Division on the march, was returned to Douay's Division. The whole First Division set out on March 16 to by-pass Amozoc, where Forey had his headquarters, and to move into position further to the front. General Castagny's brigade led the column. He soon reached Chachapa and stopped, while Bazaine set up headquarters at San Bartolo.26 The next day Bazaine made a personal reconnaissance of the Río de la Garita de Amozoc, while the 51st Regiment moved to Álamos and the artillery to the Hacienda de Amalucán. The next day, the 17th, they moved closer to Álamos, then left the main road, turning south and following the river to the ford of El Batán, then crossing to the high ground and a commanding position immediately south of Puebla, where the main column bivouacked at the Hacienda de San Bartolo.27 A small amount of gunfire was encountered during the day's march. The scattered shots and the withdrawal of the enemy showed that the fire only came from outposts who fired and then returned to their lines with the information they

26

There is much confusion of names in the campaign because of the many similarities. The vicinity of Puebla contained four San Bartolo's, but this is evidently the hacienda between Amozoc and Ánimas. 27 Not the same San Bartolo; this one is two leagues (six miles) south of the city.

THE ANABASIS

43

had gained.28 Then the rear element of the division troops occupied the slopes of Cerro Tepoxúchil. On the 19th Bazaine made a daring reconnaissance to the west — to Puente de las Ánimas, on the Cholula Road — and he even climbed the Cerro de San Juan, leaving himself and his escort helpless between the city defenses and the troops of Comonfort at Cerro de Uranga. However, the view from the undefended San Juan was of great use in planning further moves. So useful was the view, in fact, that later on General Forey set up his headquarters on the mountaintop so that he could watch the progress of his army. Two days later the 51st Regiment occupied the Molino de Guadalupe, which gave no resistance; and two companies of Zouaves occupied La Noria. Forey then moved his cavalry forward under General Mirandol. They reconnoitered as far as Cholula, then north until they met and had a brisk skirmish with the troops of Comonfort, who had been hovering just far enough away to remain in intelligence contact with the French but avoiding a serious engagement. Since the plan of Forey called for a stubborn attack and capture of Puebla, he took great pains in the preparations for a siege. There is no evidence that the French hoped to capture the city with a short fight, as they had in Jalapa, Perote, or Amozoc. Evidently the fact that the Mexicans had once defeated the French at Puebla led to the assumption that the place would be defended. At any rate, when the First and Second Divisions were in position, Forey organized a series of trenches to be built around the city to prevent exit or entry. He also called up all of the available artillery and settled down to a long siege. The trenches were dug by rotating units of soldiers, with some hired laborers.29 The first series of trenches began near the Garita de Cholula and led up to about 1000 meters of San Xavier, one of the series of strongpoints on the outskirts of Puebla which the Mexicans had heavily fortified. The second trench advanced the parallel to 330 meters, and from there French artillery was able to fire point blank at the fort and reduce the walls to rubble. When a third parallel was dug in, about 125 meters from the fort, the Mexicans saw no use in losing their weapons. They withdrew the heavy guns,

Standard practice even today in most armies. International law, of course, precluded the use of prisoners of war for this purpose. — Rules of Land Warfare, 25. 28 29

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THE ANABASIS

leaving only foot troops. Then by March 28th the fourth parallel was dug near the fort itself, and Forey ordered an attack on San Xavier from the trench. The First Battalion of Chasseurs à pied and the Second Battalion of the 2nd Zouaves, of Douay's division, both veterans of the Cinco de Mayo battle, were chosen for the assault. After a severe, hand-tohand fight, they captured the fort; but then they found they were little better off. Every fort and every building was a new problem and a new battle.30 Heavy losses were sustained in an assault on the Penitenciario on March 31, another at San Marcos, another at San Agustín, as the troops concentrated on one strongpoint after another. During the siege Comonfort's troops continually harassed parties sent out to gather supplies. On April 14 such an attack was made at Ateixco on a foraging expedition, one regiment strong, under Colonel Brincourt. He turned on the harassers with his whole party and forced them to retreat, leaving some 200 soldiers on the field. Then Brincourt followed as far as San Lorenzo, where he again inflicted severe casualties31 and forced Comonfort out of the immediate area. Other notable battles were those at the Convent of Santa Inés, April 25, San Pablo del Monte on May 5, San Lorenzo on May 8, and Totimehuacán on May 12 — all bloody encounters that meant only the gain or loss of a house, a fort, or a cluster of buildings in a dismal succession of sacrifices, physical hardships, suffering, and sacraments.32 Two aspects of the siege concern the present account in particular. At the attack on the Penitenciario Bazaine was given the honor of leading the charge. He waited on the left of the foremost trench, and as the artillery bombardment died away, he stood on the top step to command the assault, shouting "First echelon of Zouaves and Chasseurs, forward! Long live the Emperor!33 As the assault lines 30 This conclusion coincides almost exactly with the experiences of World W a r II. Regardless of the amount of shelling or of artillery destruction in a brick or stone area, a determined defender can do almost equally well, and in some ways is at an advantage in being able to hide better in the shambles and use the ruins to build new defenses. The capture of one part of such a ruin means little for the whole. Every building, every floor, and every room has to be captured separately. 3 1 About one seventh of his whole force. — Niox, L'Expédition, 267-268. 3 2 They are not further treated here except as they concern General Bazaine. A good summary is found in Niox, L'Expédition, and a detailed account is in Genaro García, Col. doc., XIV, 217-259. 3 3 Blanchot, L'Intervention, I, 279.

THE ANABASIS

45

advanced, General Laumière, who was standing beside Bazaine, wheeled and fell with a bullet in his forehead, and Colonel Garnier was struck in the arm by a ricochet. Bazaine then had the engineers begin digging on a trench to the fort to make access to it safe as soon as it was taken. On another occasion in discussing the importance of Fort San Baltasar, Bazaine had persuaded General Forey to come into the trenches to see the situation for himself. Blanchot, in relating the incident,34 says that at the redoubt Bazaine stood up on the top platform and pointed as he spoke. Under the circumstances Forey could not remain on the floor. After a short hesitation he mounted the platform also, although he thus revealed himself to the enemy from knees up. The presumption in the incident as related is that Bazaine brazenly exposed himself to danger in order to require the reluctant Forey to do the same or lose face. We have no reason, however, to doubt Forey's physical courage; and if Blanchot retells the incident, it is only to emphasize Bazaine's coolness and humor. Shortly before the attack on Santa Anita the leaders held a council of war, a stormy one which clearly revealed the attitudes of the participants. Bazaine already35 had shown himself opposed to the suicidal assaults on the forts and stone buildings. Blanchot, though excluded from the high-level council, heard the proceedings through the partition in General Douay's quarters and made notes: Under the weight of deep emotion that had all the air of a drama that was to be played out, the council seemed impressed even by the sound of its own words, and they spoke in a low voice, doubtless out of respect for the dying who surrounded them. Then they quickened; discussions started up, and their friction needled on the severe words that were exchanged. The two division commanders (Bazaine and Douay), that is, the two executive arms of the High Command, energetically condemned the war of squares and heatedly declared themselves against a continuation of this system whereby our soldiers, our officers, showed a wealth of bravery against insurmountable obstacles and against a hidden, unpredictable enemy who killed without showing himself. In one month we have taken ten squares out of 2 0 0 in the city, not counting the outside forts. How Ibid., I, 315. Blanchot, L'Intervention, I, 307: "(The Douay clique) even had the audacity to propose in a council of war to give Bazaine the attacks on the squares (of the city) while Douay's division went off to pursue Comonfort. But the antipathy General Bazaine had shown against the war by blocks was so formal that no one dared give him such an order." 34

35

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T H E ANABASIS

long will it take, and how many men will be sacrificed to reach the goal? Besides, ammunition and men are scarce. The division generals favored taking the exterior forts and letting the garrison surrender or die of hunger. Thus, at least, we would avoid the methodical destruction of a great city and would save our soldiers. These fights are butcheries in which our men die struck by invisible arms and by a timid enemy who kills from in hiding. Attacks on the forts suit our men better because at least there they are fighting in the open and can see their adversaries. From the military viewpoint the place is virtually taken since we are masters of one of the main forts on the edge. . . . . . . the generals are in accord on abandoning the city, confining themselves to a complete encirclement, and finally a blockade, and to march against Comonfort and pass over the bodies of his army and present themselves at the astonished walls of Mexico, which, having but a few thousand men to defend it, then would need ten times that many; the liberated capital could pronounce itself in our favor and open its doors to us. An operation of this sort would suit our men and would be a sure success. Then what would the garrison at Puebla do? They might attack in one of these beautiful plains, where those barricaded heroes would promptly meet their reward; or else, if they remained in the city, then with us masters of the capital and beginning to run the affairs of the country, we could produce two hundred cannon and 5 , 0 0 0 cannonballs in Chapultepec and peacefully reduce Puebla under a hail of fire. Such was the essence of the ideas proposed, principally by General Bazaine. They were logical and the only practical ones. But it seemed that for that very reason they were not accepted. General Forey remained cold and indifferent to the sometimes heated discussion that his Chief-ofStaff, General Auvergne, presented, and he was not even able to direct the debate toward any solution. Nor did he seem to understand one. His careless air seemed to say, "God! How you bore m e ! " Then, when they had talked and discussed in terms sometimes passionate, and sometimes pathetic for an hour, and when everybody was anxiously and solicitously awaiting some kind of decision, he rose and started toward the porch, nonchalantly casting his last words to the others: "Faith, go on chatting and come to an understanding." Seeing the presiding officer leaving and knowing that there was nothing more to do, the members of the council adjourned without having decided anything. . . , 3 6

Not satisfied with his summary, Blanchot adds bits of the conversation that had taken place, notably one statement of Forey: Gentlemen, on my departure from France, I asked for equipment which was refused me. So! I decline my responsibility, and you may do the same if you like. 37 s» Ibid., I, 328-330. « Ibid., I, 331.

T H E ANABASIS

47

We may well agree with Blanchot's comment, if he has correctly repeated the statement: These were assuredly terrible words whose real import the General had not evaluated; for before a military tribunal they would be damning for their author. What? A commander-in-chief declining his responsibility? That is certainly a fine way to get out of a bad situation!38 Another incident, insignificant in itself, serves to point out a widening gap between Bazaine and Forey and the attitude of Bazaine toward the Mexicans. It will be recalled that Bazaine had had experience with the Arabs that had not been available to Forey. According to information gathered by Bazaine before the Battle of San Lorenzo, he ascertained that Comonfort waited at Pensa Cola with 4,000 men, and General La Garza at Ocatlán with 3,000, and that 5,000 others were in reserve near Tlaxcala. Forey also had sent out some Indian scouts, who reported that the enemy had withdrawn from San Lorenzo, leaving the field open. Bazaine refused to believe the report and confronted the scouts: He questions the Indians, who are still terrified by the heavy voice of General Forey, and he finally finds out that they had not dared approach the enemy, and that, having seen nothing, they said there was nothing.39 Then Bazaine and Forey studied the village from the top of San Juan, Forey using hugh, artillery binoculars, and Bazaine using standard ones. Forey saw nothing, Bazaine a cloud of dust. He ventured that a withdrawing enemy would not stir the earth so; even if the Mexicans were leaving, they could not be far away. Forey answered, "Well, go on, my dear Bazaine. If you find nothing, at least you will have had a good walk; and in the meantime, let's have dinner." 40 Bazaine's forces set out on a night march, leaving tents pitched, horses picketed, and camp fires burning to deceive Comonfort's spies, and reached an assault position from which Bazaine launched a daylight attack. 41 On the way they were challenged by a Mexican outIbid., I, 331. Ibid., I, 344. In this incident the pro-Bazaine and the anti-Forey bias of Blanchot is obvious. 40 Ibid., I, 344-345. 41 Ibid., I, 346. A point noteworthy for the future appears here. General Bazaine was accompanied on the whole maneuver and battle by a Prussian military observer, Major von Burg, whose observations on Bazaine's leadership, tactics, and troop administration paid heavy if inhospitable dividends in the Battle of Servigny, 1870, where von Burg was chief of staff of the corps opposing Bazaine. 38 39

48

THE ANABASIS

post who asked for their identity. Bazaine, who spoke Spanish, answered, "The Regiment of Durango", and they were allowed to proceed. When the guard's suspicions were again aroused, it was too late.42 The attack was completely successful, and full credit for the success was given to Bazaine, who for the moment became easily the most popular figure in the Expeditionary Force. 43 The repulse of the one serious effort to relieve the siege of Puebla left the city in desperate straits. The French renewed efforts to capture the forts; and General Ortega, sensing the inevitable end, made one serious effort to break out of the city through the Molino de Guadalupe and at Totimehuacán, but he was repulsed.44 The next day Ortega asked and received a suspension of arms so he could carry off his dead and wounded. By then Ortega evidently knew he would have to surrender, for he tried to use up all of his ammunition afterwards in a furious counterbattery fire that resulted in important losses in his own gun crews as well as guns. On May 16 Ortega sent General Mendoza, his chief of staff, with a proposal that the garrison be permitted to depart with its arms, baggage, and a part of its field artillery and withdraw with honors to Mexico. Forey rejected the offer and offered a counterproposal that honors of war be allowed but that arms must be surrendered and the army made prisoners of war.45 The next day, May 17, Ortega made his decision, issued an order of the day explaining his situation,46 and wrote to General Forey that he had dissolved his army and placed the city at the orders of Forey and himself and his officers at the disposal of the French as prisoners of war.47 Forey immediately notified Bazaine to cease his attacks but to double his guards to see that no one escaped. 48 Already the Mexicans had ceased resistance after spiking their cannon and blowing up their powder reserves. The 20th Chasseurs à pied entered La Ladrillera without a shot, and at 6:00 in the morning scouts from the 7th Chasseurs occupied Totimehuacán. At 42 Gaulot, Rêve d'Empire, 108, has him answer "The First Regiment of Guadalajara". 4 3 Niox, L'Expédition, 279. 4 4 But the cavalry under General Tomás O'Horan, did escape to the embarrassment of the French. — Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 131. 4 5 Niox, L'Expédition, 279. 4 6 Printed in ibid., 279-280. 47 Printed in ibid., 2 8 0 - 2 8 1 ; also in Gaulot, Rêve d'Empire, 110; Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, II, 274-275. 48 Forey to Bazaine, Cerro de San Juan, May 17, 1863, in BA, I, f. 57; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XIV, Doc. xxxi, 139-140.

THE ANABASIS

49

10:00AM the rest of the battalion entered the city to insure its safety, and a battalion of the 51st Regiment followed. In the afternoon an escort squadron of the 12th Chasseurs was sent to Amozoc to prepare to receive the prisoners of war. They set up a large camp at Puente de las Ánimas and began to receive the prisoners. On the way to the camp or at the camp many officers escaped, including Ortega himself, L a Llave, Patoni, Pinsón, García, and Luciano Prieto. Later on, along the road toward Veracruz Escobedo, Berriozábal, Antillón, Negrete, Ghilardi, and Porfirio Díaz escaped.

BEGINNING OF MILITARY RULE The problem of the disposition of the body of about 14,000 prisoners had its complications. They had twenty-six generals, 303 field-grade officers, 1,179 company-grade officers (lieutenants and captains), 11,000 non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, and 150 cannon.49 French losses in contrast had been eighteen officers and 167 men killed, seventy-nine officers and 1,039 men wounded, many of whom died later. In considering the problem, Saligny proposed that the prisoners be sent to Cayenne, next door to Devil's Island. Forey answered: By the stubbornness of the defense and the acuity that their leaders have exhibited, this army has succeeded in arousing the anger of politicians, but it has forced esteem and consideration on our soldiers. I will never permit these brave men to be treated as criminals!50 As for the conservative Mexicans in the French camp: Certain Mexican allies of ours had the barbarity to ask that the principal Niox, L'Expédition, 282. Blanchot, L'Intervention, I, 389. It is easy even for diplomats to forget the cardinal principle that prisoners of war are not criminals and are not to be treated as such. For a basic principle, cf. the following excellent description: "Since the 18th century these [principles of general international law on the treatment of prisoners of war] have gradually been established along the lines that war captivity is neither revenge nor punishment, but solely protective custody the only purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from a further participation in the war. This principle was developed in accordance with the view held by all armies that it is contrary to military tradition to kill or injure helpless people; this is also in the interest of all belligerents in order to prevent mistreatment of their own soldiers in case of capture." — Admiral Canaris, Memorandum to General Keitel, September, 1941, translation in Harris, Tyranny on Trial, pp. 177-178. 48

50

50

THE ANABASIS

leaders be shot. General Forey did not even honor such proposals with an answer.51 Whatever the proposals, the result was a treatment of the prisoners as lawful belligerents and with the conventional respects afforded prisoners of war. The officers were removed to Veracruz, whence they were transshipped either to Martinique or to France itself for internment. Before the departure, however, an offer was made to parole them, that is, to free them on the condition that they would return to their homes and agree not to serve against the French again in the current war. A few accepted the parole, but the great majority, about 1,200, refused. 52 Therefore their internment was imperative. Nonetheless, the problem of guarding them on the march was inefficiently handled, and hence the escapes already mentioned. The French were to regret their inefficiency bitterly in the next four years. As for the soldiers, they found an easier solution. Many of them were attached to the Juarist cause by slender ties of affection, and they found a change of masters easy. When their captors offered to incorporate them into the division of Márquez, over 10,000 accepted. Of the volunteers between 5,000 and 6,000 of the best were chosen. The rest were divided into smaller groups and put to work in various ways, especially in construction of the railroad then being extended out from Veracruz.53 After the formal entry of Forey into Puebla on May 19, with a parade of soldiers and a solemn Te Deum at the Cathedral, he established a military government. The entrance was also a solemn one, leading first through the desolate section of ruins, through the Penitenciario area, where an ominous silence reigned but for the drums of the French band. Not until they reached the Plaza Mayor did a crowd appear. On his return after the ceremony the soldiers at least greeted him with cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" Some officers enthusiastically shouted "Vive le Maréchal Forey!" to which Blanchot reports that the soldiers answered with cries of "Vive Bazaine!" a demonstration not favorably received by the staff.54 51 Blanchot, L'Intervention, I, 389; for the treatment of French prisoners in Mexican hands, see Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, I, 268-272. 52 Ibid., I, 389. The use of the parole in 1863 was essentially the same as today, but it was frequently used at that time. — Wheaton, Elements, 36 ff. For the history of the prisoners sent to France, see Epitacio Huerta, Apuntes para servir a la historia de los defensores de Puebla que fueron conducidos prisioneros a Francia, enriquecidos con documentos auténticos. .. . 53 Blanchot, L'Intervention, I, 388. " Ibid., I, 385.

THE ANABASIS

51

Two days later Bazaine received orders to continue the march on Mexico City. While Forey remained to consolidate his victory and while Douay remained to organize the prisoners and pacify the countryside, the conquest was to continue. The march began on May 25. Meantime General Forey took measures destined to influence the future of the intervention and to complicate the task of his successor. He set up a military government with Colonel Brincourt, a friend of his, as military governor. Then he issued a series of decrees to govern the most pressing problems. The first, on May 21, 1863, generally called the Decreto de Secuestro, provided for the confiscation of all of the property of those persons who took up arms against the French, applicable to all members of the army who did not give their parole and who were not prisoners of war, within fifteen days.55 On May 22 Forey issued what was called the Decreto sobre bienes municipales, which provided for a commission of five members, the prefecto político, and the prefecto municipal, and three appointees of Forey to review the sales of property by the "preceding" government in and around Puebla, and to fix an equitable price. In case of an evaluation higher than the price paid to the Juárez government, the purchaser would have the right to pay the difference and keep the property or to return it to the previous owner.56 The reason for that re-evaluation was simple: When the Juárez government seized and sold the property, it desperately needed the money and therefore sold at prices far below the real value. The Forey order, then, represented a sort of compromise between the demands of the conservatives for a return of the property and of common justice for guaranteeing purchases made in good faith, or, thirdly, of the right of previous owners to receive payment of the differences between the sale value and actual value. The legal thinking behind that decree was that of Budin, the Intendant of Finances, on whose recommendation Forey issued the decree;57 but since the decisions came from

5 5 Forey, Decreto, Puebla, May 21, 1863. Full text is printed in Boletín de ¡as leyes del Imperio mexicano, I, 15-21. Also in Colección completa de los decretos espedidos por el exmo. Sr. General Forey, pp. 8-9; Torres, El Archiduque Maximiliano, pp. 184-185. 5 6 Forey, Decreto, Puebla, May 22, 1863. Full text is printed in Boletín de las leyes, I, 20-21. Also in the Colección completa . . . , 13-14. 5 7 Budin to Forey, Puebla, May 22, 1863, in Colección completa . . . , 12.

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T H E ANABASIS

Forey's appointees, who were sure to be conservatives, it was generally considered an outright concession to the conservatives. Forey issued on May 27 the third of his decrees, also on the advice of Budin, a decree which hoped to stabilize the existing currency by prohibiting the export of gold or silver.58 By then Forey had more of the trappings of government available to him, and he began the publication of an official bulletin of the Acts of the Intervention: Le Moniteur Franco-Mexicain.

T H E OCCUPATION O F MEXICO CITY

It seemed at last that the road to Mexico City lay open, but not until the 25th did the movement on the capital begin. Bazaine's division led the advance, but with strict orders not to enter the capital. The march went on almost uninterrupted: Bazaine reached San Martin on the 27th, Puente del Rio on the 28th, and La Venta de las Palmillas on the 29th. On account of the strategic position of the pass of the Río Frio the French assumed that if they encountered any resistance, it would be there, and the historical example of General Winfield Scott's own advance through that spot bolstered that belief. 59 Their caution was unneeded; the Mexican troops, presumably the remnants of Comonfort's army, had repeated the error made in 1847 — failure to defend the strategic pass. Although signs abounded that work on fortifications had been pursued, the troops had given it up again and withdrawn. There, at 3:00 PM the General received a delegation of the consuls of England, Spain, Prussia, and, later on, of the United States.60 They announced to him that the Juárez government had given supreme power to Juárez and then had dissolved itself; that the republican

5 8 Forey, Decreto, Puebla, May 27, 1863, in Boletín de las leyes, I, 28-29, and in the Colección completa. . ., 16. It was withdrawn in September 7, 1863, - Boletín de las leyes, I, 283-284. 5 9 Scott, Autobiography, II, 466-467. 8 0 This account of the advance on and entry into Mexico City is summarized from Blanchot, L'Intervention, I, Chapter XVII, 387-417, and the same Journal des Marches used earlier in the chapter. This Journal des Marches is printed in Genaro García (ed.), Col. doc., XIV, Doc. No. xxxiv, 262-276, with the title Historique de la Première Division depuis son débarquement jusqu'à la nomination de son Général au Commandement en Chef, le 10 Octobre 1863.

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53

troops had evacuated the city, leaving it without any policing.61 Therefore the foreign embassies had taken it on themselves to organize a temporary civil police, about 700 men, to avoid wholesale looting. In the meantime command of the city had more or less been assumed by General Mariano Salas, an old conservative. The embassy heads also asserted to him that they would observe strict neutrality but that they opposed any political demonstration in the capital. General Bazaine answered "in a dry voice" that he would enter Mexico City and that if a demonstration were indicated, he would not ask their advice. Then he recommended that they continue on to Puebla and discuss their affairs with General Forey. The First Division bivouacked on the 2nd of June at the Hacienda de Buena Vista, traditional property of an old Spanish family, while on its flank General Bertier advanced on Ayotla. At that point a second delegation from the City of Mexico came out to meet General Bazaine. It called itself a deputation of "Notables", and the French officers prepared to receive them with cordiality until it was found that one of the delegates was a renegade Frenchman who was notorious for having attended a banquet in Mexico City during the siege of Puebla and "publicly raised his glass to a toast to the extermination of the French army". He was only one of a number of French political refugees in Mexico who had been in the habit of spreading "odious" proclamations to tempt the French soldiers to desert. Naturally, according to Blanchot, General Bazaine refused to receive the deputation, since it included "a man who could not be looked upon without his arrest and his being led before the firing squad". Hence the delegation took its black sheep back to Mexico City. The next day, June 3, another delegation came, calling itself the municipalité, formed after the departure of Juárez. The members described the precarious situation that existed in the city in spite of General Salas' efforts to maintain order. They requested that General Bazaine enter the city, but he referred the delegation to General Forey, Finally he received orders to enter the city the next day, that is, June 7. 6 1 This is strictly against the rules and customs of war, and the French strongly criticized the Juárez regime for it. When an established government withdraws from a city in the face of an advancing foe, it is supposed to turn over its authority and responsibility for law and order to some person or group who wields that power until the invader enters and assumes the power itself. That the Juárez government made no such provision lent further support to the French contention that it was no government at all.

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General Bazaine appointed Lieutenant Colonel Polier of the 95th Infantry Regiment as commander of the city with full powers to maintain order. With him went a committee to study the resources of the city and to make plans for the further occupation. With him also went the army's paymaster to arrange with the local bankers for the pay of the expeditionary force. That group set up at the Hotel Iturbide on the Calle Plateros, the station for carriage service into and out of the capital. Captain Blanchot accompanied the party, met a colony of Frenchmen there, and made arrangements for a supply of interpreters. Bazaine sent instructions on June 6 to make his entry a simple one, leaving the honors for General Forey. He declined the offer of Martin Daran, a French banker of Veracruz, to loan 40,000 francs to decorate arches in the streets. At last on June 7, 1863 General Bazaine entered at the head of the First Brigade. He stopped at the gate of San Lázaro to instruct Colonel Barail to take his troops and quarter them at Tacubaya, a few kilometers away. Then he held a review of his other troops before they marched to their billets. Afterwards he rode to the mansion where he was to live — a house belonging to an Englishman who was at the time in London. There they enjoyed an excellent meal prepared for the General and his staff, ending with the traditional cognac and Havana cigars. When he left to visit General Salas, the streets were filled with admiring people of both sexes. For the next two days the troops busily prepared for the formal entrance of General Forey. On June 10, 1863, Forey rode into the city with his staff.62 Bazaine met him just inside the city limits and accompanied the procession. Balconies and windows were decorated with banners and streamers, and crowds in holiday attire threw flowers and wreaths at the conquerors. At the city square Forey dismounted and entered the Cathedral for the Te Deum. After the review of the troops he was conducted to the Palace of Government, his new residence. Both Forey and Napoleon evidently believed that the intervention had succeeded and that the people would resign themselves to it. Forey assumed the title and prerogatives of military governor and proceeded with the establishment of a military rule pending political developments. The mass of the French troops were to be quartered e2

Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, I, 280, puts the date on the 11th.

THE ANABASIS

55

in and around the capital. When Bazaine entered the city, his committee already had made plans for the troops, and after the parade each unit marched off to its own billet area that very day. The 20th Reconnaissance Battalion was stationed in Tacubaya and the 7th Reconnaissance Battalion in Chapultepec; the 9th Regiment went first to La Teja but found it too small and moved to Tacubaya; the 62nd Regiment moved out to occupy Pachuca; the 6th Squadron of the 12th Reconnaissance Battalion under Major Correlet moved out to occupy Tlaxcala; General Bertier with the 51st Regiment, some artillery, and some engineers and supporting troops, occupied Toluca; and the rest of the capital garrison took positions variously in the city itself. So ended the first stage of the occupation. The army still had the task of establishing peace, maintaining it, and preparing for a government that could take over the reins of state.

CHAPTER

III

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT ON A N A T I O N A L B A S I S

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENTAL POSITION

When General Forey entered the capital, he brought along his dipplomatic staff, including Dubois de Saligny. The maladroitness of that diplomat already had alienated the British and Spanish and prematurely had forced Lorencez to attempt a clash for which he was not prepared. Forey at that time had let himself be guided or at least influenced by Saligny beyond any hope. Perhaps the fact that Bazaine was not at the headquarters where Saligny operated helped him obtain a perspective of that wily if not altogether untrustworthy statesman that opened his eyes wider than those of his commander. At any rate, upon the entry of Forey into Mexico City and the settling down to the real business of government, differences could no longer be hidden under the cloak of politeness. When Bazaine took over the reins of government, he found his range of activity considerably confined by the acts of his predecessors. In the first place, Saligny had been the advisor to Admiral Jurien de la Gravière at the time of the Convention of La Soledad, and the agreement to that document is due probably to his influence. As already pointed out, that measure gravely damaged the French position because it accepted the sovereign power of the Juárez regime. The Empire immediately rejected the treaty, but the harm was done, and that obstacle was to be faced for many months to come. In the second place, shortly after the arrival of Almonte in Mexico, he, with the consent of the French authority on the spot, began to issue proclamations. That practice further weakened the position of the French commander by his admitting another head of state. Again Saligny's close relations with Almonte had led him not to oppose those irregular steps. When Napoleon III heard of the acts of Almonte, he immediately objected; and as a result of that objection

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Forey

ordered

Almonte

to

cease

his

political

57

pronouncements. 1

In the third place, after the capture of P u e b l a F o r e y , as a result of the pressure either from Almonte or Saligny, m a d e the t w o decrees into instruments of reaction. Their influence was well known to other members of the Expeditionary F o r c e . Adrien de T u c é , a major in the 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique, in commenting later, in a letter from Mexico City, wrote, But Dubois de Saligny was still the diplomatic representative of His Majesty, and he had influence enough to cause the general to sign a series of decrees destined to give complete satisfaction to the most violent clericals and which will end by alienating from us all moderate minds of the national party. 2 Earlier he had remarked that If General Forey had been free to organize his government to suit himself, and he might willingly have included his old adversary Ortega whose brave resistance he admired; this generosity would have been useful, for there is no enduring peace that is not based on conciliation. 3 F o u r t h and last, once in Mexico City General F o r e y again let himself be led into leaving the organization of the n e w government u p to Saligny, w h o saw to it that the heads were representative of the three groups usually considered the most conservative in modern society: A churchman, a soldier, and a diplomat. T h e instructions furnished by Napoleon III, however, limited the amount of reaction possible; and the manifesto issued b y F o r e y on June 12 represented those instructions as they applied to specific problems: 1. In the future there will be no forced contributions or requisitions of any nature or under any pretext. If any exactions are demanded, the authors will be punished. 2. T h e person and property of citizens will be safeguarded by law. 3. Proprietors of nationalized property which had been legally acquired will not be molested, but owners may remain in possession of those goods. Fraudulent sales will be annulled. 1 Gaulôt, Rêve, 94: "I have declared that I want the Mexican people to choose their own government, but how do you reconcile this with the decrees of Almonte, who sets himself up as supreme chief of the Nation? From other sources I hear he has set up a government in Veracruz. All this results in weakness and anarchy... Wherever our flag flies, you should be absolute master." — Napoleon III to Forey, July 4, 1862. 2 Adrien de Tucé, Cinq ans au Mexique (Cahiers de la quinzaine), 66. 3 Ibid., 65.

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4. The press will be free but regulated according to the practice of warnings used in France. After two warnings the journals may be suppressed. 5. The army will be subject to mild recruitment which will stop this odious habit of seizing Indians and laborers from their families . . . ! 6. Imposts will be regulated as in civilized countries so that the weight will fall on all citizens in the measure of their wealth, and certain vexing and useless taxes which touch especially on the poor will be eliminated. 7. Officials handling public business will be suitably repaid; but if they do not perform their offices faithfully and honestly, they will be replaced. 8. The Catholic religion will be protected, and all bishops are recalled to their dioceses. 9. Measures will be taken to suppress brigandage, the plague of Mexico. 10. Courts of justice will be organized to render justice impartially and not to the highest bidder.4 It was difficult to call any sort of congress under existing laws; hence it was decided to form an assembly of notables chosen from within the capital. Saligny was charged with preparing the election. On June 18 Forey issued a decree designating thirty-five citizens to form a Junta Superior. 5 That Junta was to elect three of its members and two alternates to exercise executive power, and then to collect an assembly of notables by adding to it 213 more members.® As a result of the election arranged by Saligny, on June 24 executive power was placed in the hands of the triumvirate, entitled the Poder Ejecutivo: Archbishop Labastida, General Almonte, and General Salas. Alternates were Juan B. de Ormeachea, Bishop of Tulancingo, and Don Ignacio Pavón, President of the Supreme Court of Justice. 7 4 Forey, Manifiesto a la nación mexicana, Mexico, June 12, 1863, printed as a broadside in French and Spanish by Lara, Calle de la Paloma No. 4; Colección completa .. ., 17-20; Niox, L'Expédition, 289-292; Boletín de las leyes, I, 489-493; Torres, El Archiduque Maximiliano, 179-182; printed with some deletions in Gaulôt, Rêve, 121-122. Only the specific statements of policy are given here; the text begins with a review of the military operations and follows with a description of the political situation from the French viewpoint and a statement of general aims. This policy statement follows. 5 For the list see Forey, Decreto del nombramiento de los miembros de la ]unta Superior de Gobierno, Mexico, June 18, 1863, in the Colección completa, 35-36; also in Boletín de las leyes, I, 55-56; also in José Maria Hidalgo, Proyectos de Monarquía, 359-360. β Rules governing the functions are in Forey's decree, Mexico, June 16, 1863, in Boletín de las leyes, I, 51-54. Also in the Advenimiento, 20-22. 7 Boletín de las leyes, I, 59-60; Hidalgo, Proyectos de Monarquía, 360-361. This was preceded by a proclamation naming the triumvirate. — Forey, Proclama, June 23, 1863, in García-Pérez, Estudio político-militar, Doc. xxvi, p. 378-379.

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General Forey kept for himself only the presidency of the part of the Junta charged with the administration of the Department of War.

PROCLAMATION O F T H E E M P I R E

The Assembly of Notables met for the first time on July 8, 1863.8 Saligny claimed that they were chosen as moderate men of all parties; but the choice evidently was carefully made with his goal in mind, for on July 11 they issued a "report" adopting an imperial government, with the crown to be offered to Maximilian, Archduke of Austria 9 On July 13 the Bando announcing the decision was published on the streets, and a Te Deum was sung in the Cathedral. Then a deputation was sent to Europe to approach the Archduke. It consisted of Gutiérrez de Estrada, J. Hidalgo, the French General Adrian Woll (for many years a Mexican resident and citizen), Padre Francisco J. Miranda, Velázquez de Léon, Ignacio Aguilar, Suárez Peredo, Landa, Escandón, and Ángel Iglesias.10 In the meantime relations with Paris were not what Forey had anticipated. Upon his entry into Mexico City he had written to the Emperor an effusive letter more or less in praise of his own achievements. But Napoleon evidently had been unfavorably impressed by the dilatory siege of Puebla, the severity of some of the proclamations, and the inability of Forey to make his own political decisions. Also it is clear that the news of difficulties still facing the enterprise were widely known. Tucé, for example, had written home They will have to send us reinforcements; you cannot expect to keep peace in a country as big as Europe with twenty thousand men. But no one realizes it. They say that we do not want to back any party, though the appointment of the Provisional Government proves the contrary. Arrests which often serve personal ends also prove it. 8 For a list of the original members see Boletín de las leyes, I, Doc. 33, pp. 69-76. Also in Advenimiento, 24-29; also Hidalgo, Proyectos de Monarquía, 361-373. 9 Boletín de las leyes, I, 126; also in the Advenimiento, 55-65. For the French text see Rapport sur la forme du gouvernement qu'il convient au Mexique d'adopter pour le constituer d'une manière définitive; also Torres, El Archiduque Maximiliano, 220-221. 10 Boletín de las leyes, I, 541. The new government made an effort to give the decision the appearance of a popular vote, mostly in the form of a series of signed petitions. The French had little faith in the meaning of such a "plebiscite". — Senior, Conversations with Distinguished Persons, II, 293-294,

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For example, a decree has been issued giving a 50-piastre fine or 50 days in prison for anyone who works on Sunday without hearing mass and getting the priest's permission. It had such a bad effect that they had to withdraw the decree. Civil Affairs have been turned over to the priests, in a series of moves attributed to Saligny. It is supposed that he has been recalled; I hope so, for I believe he has done a great deal of harm. From what they say I consider him a rascal but a very fine and accomplished one, who only toys with General Forey. The latter is more a famous general than a bad diplomat. However, I shall not complain about him if he promotes me to lieutenant colonel.11

R E C A L L O F SALIGNY AND G E N E R A L F O R E Y

Some of those letters reached the Emperor, and some of the criticism also must have been clear to him, for on July 16, 1863 he issued orders for the promotion of Forey to Marshal and for his return to France. The letter added as a palliative, "The Marshal of France is too great a person to have to bother himself with the details of government." 12 At the same time other channels transmitted orders for the return of Saligny. Nonetheless a significant sentence, added to the order for Forey, foresaw that Saligny might be reluctant to leave the post in which he wielded so much power: "Saligny must already have left; if he has not, then bring him with you. I shall send a minister plenipotentiary from here." 13 The French courier arrived in the capital on August 20 with the mail, which had been awaited eagerly because it was expected to bring promotion orders after the victories recently achieved. It did bring a number of them, but the one that aroused the most comment was that of Forey, with its accompanying instructions to return. The news spread fast and in general was welcome. As Colonel Du Barail expressed it, M. Saligny was now replaced by M. de Montholon. This news was welcomed by all the Army, which saw in him [Saligny] the author of all the mistakes that had been committed, the creator of the reactionary and clerical political policy as opposed to the tastes of the Mexicans, and even 11 Tucé, Cinq ans, 68-69. The enthusiasm of Major Tucé led him to state the law very bluntly. The text, in Boletín de las leyes, I, No. 68, pp. 147-148, has so many equivocations that it is not nearly as arrogant as it sounds here. 12 Napoleon III to Forey, July 16, 1863, in Gaulôt, Rêve, 135-136. 18 Ibid.

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to the political institutions of France, and finally the principal obstacle to the long-sought peace. 14 The same mail brought the letter from Napoleon naming Bazaine as commander of the French Expeditionary Force to replace Forey, and repeating some of the previous instructions: I have invested you with both military and diplomatic authority, persuaded that you have all that is necessary to succeed in this enterprise in which you already have played a large role. I suppose that Marshal Forey must already have communicated to you my instructions. They consist of gathering together the honorable men of all parties and establishing a provisional government which will construct a government for the nation; of protecting the establishment of a monarchy if that is in accord with the desire of the greatest number; of organizing the military affairs of the country as well as its finances and administration. Do not become reactionary; do not retract the sale of clerical property; finally try to keep peace in the country while using mostly Mexican troops to do it. I have regretted the decrees of Forey on the confiscation of the property of hostile persons, and I am afraid that the triumvirate named in Mexico may be too reactionary. . . . Try to establish in Mexico a stable government that can regenerate the country.15 When Forey received his orders to return to France, he tended to believe the words of courtesy used to cover the withdrawal. It may be accepted that he actually believed the words he addressed to the Mexican people in his manifesto of June 12, in which he stated that the military problem was solved. This doubtless seemed to follow from the occupation of the capital. Generally speaking in European wars armed resistance ceased and a war was considered won when the enemy capital was captured; and though even European history presents some outstanding exceptions, they are not the rule. So General Forey, who had campaigned mostly in Europe, may very well have felt that with the capture of Mexico City the war ended and that the problem left was to organize a government and go back to France. Thus also we may account for the speed with which he allowed the schemers in his camp to assume control and to take over the reins of government under the guise of a regency within a fortnight of his entry into the city. Tucé, Cinq ans, 74. Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 1, Vichy, July 30, 1863, in BA, I, folio 64; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. ii, pp. 11-13. 14 15

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When Forey gave up hope of the order's being rescinded, he followed a perfectly natural tendency to relax in the duties he soon had to leave, and to allow a highly plastic situation to develop and harden without his determining the mold.

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY BAZAINE

General Bazaine, however, could do nothing at that time but cool his heels at the Governor's palace, watching the Regency take over more and more of the direction of affairs. He did, however, answer the letter of appointment of the Minister of War in Paris. In that letter he mentioned that General Forey had postponed his departure until the end of the month. He said, with some harshness, "This decision raises doubts in some minds and seems unusual in an army that is accustomed to obey immediately the orders of its superiors and of the Emperor.... This is a disagreeable situation in a country where the Mexican military leaders need a good example set."16 On September 1 Bazaine, in a courtesy answer to the letter of appointment from Napoleon, promised to carry out instructions. He warned that the Regency was acting very independently, and regretted that the political situation had not been kept more elastic. According to his idea, During this transitory period French-Mexican columns should have reached the capitals of Michoacán, Querétaro, Guanajuato, Guadalajara, San Luis, etc.; most of the country should have been conquered and put in order, and the government of Juárez forced to flee to the North or into the Pacific. These results could have been obtained in three months, and then we could easily have found it possible to found the Mexican monarchy on a larger base, and thus to have protected it from the criticism coining especially from Europe. 17

That campaign, he went on, could have been undertaken in June, July, or August because the rains were later in the north, and the drought in the north that year was an especial aid. Another source of irritation to Bazaine was that Forey was planning to distribute medals of the Legion of Honor to several Mexican officers at the farewell parade. Bazaine thought it was altogether premature to repay so well the officers "whose honor is not well" Bazaine to Marshal Randon, Mexico, August 27, 1863, in BA, I, f. 69. " Bazaine to Napoleon III, No. 1, Mexico, September 1863, in BA, I, f. 73-74; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. vii, pp. 24-31.

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recognized", and he suspected that the presentation would have an adverse effect on the French personnel.18 Later on he found that some of the French officers intended to attend the parade without their own ribbons in protest.19 Forey continued to hold office, and Bazaine began in September to express his opinion more frankly: "Forey and Saligny apparently are not disposed to obey their orders, and this is producing an unhappy effect in the army and among the populace. As for me, it takes the resignation of an Arab to support such a state of affairs."20 Finally, on September 30, Forey staged his final act. At a parade he issued his final proclamation, full of platitudes and formalities,21 and the next day, October 1, he was officially replaced by Bazaine. Forey, however, did not depart until October 4, and even then Saligny, who was supposed to go along, remained. He had begun negotiations for a marriage which was very advantageous to him, and he wanted to stay to complete it. Moreover, the newspaper l'Estafette was loudly protesting his recall, and it was yet possible that the orders might be changed.22 Immediately after taking over the task, Bazaine began an effort to establish the regime on a firmer basis. It was extremely difficult for him to reassume any of the powers of sovereignty which Forey had turned over to the Regency, and his position left him principally the office of military commander, with closely allied foreign affairs. To withdraw powers from the Regency would have meant weakening the stand of the embassy then on its way to Miramar and would have seemed contrary to his instructions of preparing a government to turn over to the new ruler. Moreover, reassumption of any powers would have led to speculation that France planned to make a colony of Mexico — a notion that Napoleon did not want to spread.23 There18 Bazaine to Randon, No. 2, Mexico, September 1863 in BA, I, f. 85; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. χ, pp. 36-38.

« Ibid. 2» Ibid.

21 For the full text see BA I, f. 98; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xiv, 52-56. 22 Bazaine to Randon, Mexico, August 27, 1863; in BA, I, f. 69; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. v, 19-22. 23 In spite of these efforts, the idea was widespread in the capital at least. For example, Manuel Siliceo, a liberal at heart but who had accepted a position in the Ministry of Education, maintained a clandestine correspondence with Manuel Doblado. One of the letters written during this period has survived in the Genaro Garcia Collection and bears this out clearly:

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fore, while Bazaine actually commanded all Franco-Mexican armed forces, he was confined in his approach to civil affairs to making recommendations to the Regency, and that is actually what took place between October 1 and June 12 of the next year. When there was reason for interfering in the civil government, he usually presented the problem in a letter to Almonte, with his recommendation. By March 10, 1864, that correspondence had reached a total of 194 letters.24 In addition, Bazaine also wrote letters of recommendation to members of the ministry set up by the Regency — to the UnderSecretary of State for War, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the Under-Secretaries of State for Hacienda, Fomento, and even Foreign Affairs, to the Prefecto Político of Mexico City, and to the Chief of Police. Usually those recommendations were acknowledged, and compliance was promised. The promise was not always realized in the manner expected, and repeated requests had to come from Bazaine or his Secretary, before action resulted; in some cases he was frustrated completely in his efforts to obtain some change in the Regency's program. In other cases he was faced with the need of using French troops to carry out orders that the officials of the Regency consistently failed to comply with. The Regency, in the meantime, had lost no time in establishing a government, appointing officials to civil office in all parts of the country accessible to them by French occupation. Later on, as the Intervention troops uncovered more territory, they assumed the control represented by the Military Governor — that is, the military commander became the head of a military regime because of the existence of a state of war. Later on, civil officials were sent out from Mexico City to occupy political positions, and as a rule the French commanders allowed them to take and hold office on good behavior. "Napoleon must have convinced himself that not being able to make peace with the Liberal Party, he will have to lean on the bands that call themselves the Party of Decent People (Conservatives) . . .; but since he does not want to leave off his plan for the domination of Mexico, he has decided he would be able to conciliate everybody by abandoning the Regency and the Empire, the Notables, etc., and changing things so that overnight we will find ourselves united to the French Empire like Algeria. . . . And now as soon as Bazaine takes office, I expect to see him take the Regency and the Notables by the tail and swing them out the door.. .." (Siliceo to Doblado, Mexico, September 13, 1863, in Papeles sobre la intervención francesa, Genaro García Collection, University of Texas.) While Siliceo misinterpreted the situation, many others must have expected something of the sort, also. 24 BA, V, f. 826.

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After the beginning of 1864, however, several of the areas near the capital were declared in a state of peace, and then the French officers had only advisory power over them, and the removal of the official required a recommendation either to the Regency itself or to the Secretary of State for Government. The instructions given Forey and summarized for Bazaine show some specific plans. These instructions were further formulated in two letters from Napoleon on September 12 and 29: Our main goal is to pacify and organize Mexico by appealing to t h e men of good will and avoiding being reactionary. Maintain the program published by Forey, which is to b e your line of conduct. Although there may be a provisional government as a way of avoiding the idea that I might want to keep Mexico, the French general still has the duty of controlling everything and deciding on everything by his influence. I cannot permit that after conquering Mexico, we should remain as impassive witnesses of arbitrary measures opposed to modern civilization. I am counting on you to direct the provisional government with firmness but also with justice and a spirit of conciliation. Have the election of Maximilian ratified by the greatest possible number of Mexicans because the hasty nomination already m a d e has the grave fault from the European point of view that it does not seem to b e the legitimate desire of the country. Pacify the country while reorganizing the Mexican army and gaining the sympathy of the I n d i a n s . . . . Have a confidential study made of the mines of Sonora and report on whether occupation of the area will b e possible. 25

Later on in the month Napoleon continued his discussion in a letter which, after summarizing the efforts of Arrangioz to negotiate a loan in France to support the Empire, went on to suggest cutting expenses by transferring he Foreign Legion to Mexican Service for a period of ten years and expanding it by filling the ranks with Indians.26

CONTINUATION OF THE CONQUEST

Under Forey the French army and the Mexican allies had suffered from inactivity. They had occupied several key cities in the Valley of Mexico and had established themselves firmly and then relaxed. 25 Napoleon III printed in Genaro 26 Napoleon III printed in Genaro

to Bazaine, No. 2 Biarritz, September 12, 1863, in BA, I, f. 82; García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. ix, pp. 34-36. to Bazaine, No. 3, Biarritz, September 29, 1863, in BA, I, f. 97: García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xiii, 49-52.

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As in all armies at such a time, they suffered a certain degree of demoralization. This was especially true because of the distance of the men from their homes and with no immediate prospects of returning, and because of the failure of their officers to furnish adequate materials or schemes to keep their minds busy. In the meantime the Juarist forces, with headquarters in San Luis Potosí, had several months to organize, plan, and harass the Intervention forces. Also the small guerrilla bands, whether legalized or not, continued to make short raids on occupied areas, intimidating the populace and forcing the Allied troops to remain on the alert for attacks. Obviously that state of affairs could not last, and Bazaine already had protested to Napoleon over the period of inactivity under Forey.27 Almost as soon as he taken command, he began plans to spread the conquest, drive Juárez out, and gather enough support to convince Maximilian and the European press that the will of the country was behind the offer made to the Archduke. Bazaine completed his plans by the 8th of October and outlined them to the Emperor: To concentrate available forces for a movement on Querétaro, then Guanajuato, with seven thousand troops. To do that he had to withdraw soldiers doing garrison duty: Two squadrons of Márquez' army were to replace the French at Jalapa and Perote. In some towns the whole garrison was to be withdrawn. To replace it, Bazaine planned to organize and arm a sort of local militia or guardia civil, whose duties were to defend their own town from bandits but not to campaign further. When the troops set out, they were to march in two columns of French soldiers, with Márquez' division on the left flank of the French and Mejia's division on the right, both converging on Querétaro. That separation of the four divisions he explained as in keeping with the principle of armies that expect to live on the country as they pass through: "Divide to live, but unite to fight."28 Finally on October 10 Bazaine reported, "I am ready to move out with my troops as soon as the various elements have joined."29 Other considerations, however, mostly political, made it necessary to postpone his departure for a month. 27

Bazaine to Napoleon III, No. 1, Mexico, September 9, 1863, in BA, I, f.73; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. vii, 24-31. 28 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, October 8, 1863, in BA, I, f. I l l ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xvii, 62-67. 29 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 1, Mexico, October 10, 1863, in BA, I, f. 120; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xx, 79-81.

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T H E IMPERIAL MEXICAN ARMY

Emphasis already had been placed by Napoleon III on the reorganization of a Mexican army; and that, too, occupied Bazaine as soon as he took command. It proved a lasting annoyance throughout his administration. It was the order of Napoleon and the promise of Forey, to be continued by Bazaine, that the Mexican troops were to be improved and trained after European patterns; and although the work never was carried to any successful end, a great deal of effort was expended in the work of organizing.30 The French were laboring under a real disadvantage; they were confined by the rules of chivalrous conduct of European civilization. Instead of impressment the French wanted to depend upon a system of volunteers to fill the ranks of the Mexican units; but, after an initial impetus, it fell off in October to practically nothing.31 Bazaine still hoped, however, that it would pick up again after a successful campaign against the liberals. Meantime the French had issued 4,000 rifles to the soldiers and had given the Mexican troops uniforms at a cost of three million francs, chargeable to the French government. At the same time they tried to improve the living conditions of the troops.32 Such efforts to mold the Mexican units into the French system were not always appreciated, and there was constant friction between the French custom and the traditional independence of action and policy enjoyed by subordinate leaders. For example, though volunteer recruiting was not supplying very many soldiers, Bazaine had to face an undesirable Mexican custom. When Colonel López of Márquez' Division requested permission to enlist into his regiment of the 3 0 For appointments and general regulations and organization see the Decree of the Regency, Mexico, September 25, 1863, in Boletín de las leyes, I, No. 135, pp. 305-314. 31 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Mexico, October 8, 1863, in BA, I, f. 118; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xix, 74-78. 32 One report is available to show details of the administration of Mexican troops: . . the pay of each soldier, whatever the grade, has one real per day withdrawn to pay for the three meals; one at 6:00 AM, consisting of coffee and bread, one at noon, consisting of soup, meat, and vegetables, and another at 6 : 0 0 PM, consisting of coffee, beans, and bread. Moreover, each month one and a half pesos are withheld from each man to pay for his shoe repair, laundry, barbering, and the lighting of the barracks. Unspent surpluses are distributed to the men. Officers and non-commissioned officers are paid every 15 days. The funds are turned over to administrative officers of each branch, guarded in a box with three keys, one kept by the colonel, one by the major [Battalion Commander?], and the third by the paying officer." — Sánchez Fació to Captain Blanchot, Mexico, October 1, 1863, in BA, I, f. 99; printed in Genaro García, Col. ehe., XVI, Doc. XV, 57-59.

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Imperial Guard some soldiers who had been selected from the prisoner of war concentrations, Bazaine refused permission. He recalled that already several times soldiers so enlisted had taken advantage of their liberty to desert. He believed that such persons should not be accepted but, rather, that the shortage of men should be made up by transfer from other units, as was done in France.33 However, despite the magnanimity shown there, civil war, unlike a national war, often owes successes to the practice of encouraging desertion to the other side of the struggle; and many rebellions have collapsed for the simple reason that too many of the rebels have gone over to the other side. In the second place, as already has been mentioned, Bazaine himself was glad to encourage prominent liberals to come over to his side, even offering them commands in the Imperial Army. And Forey had set an example after the fall of Puebla by taking in volunteers wholesale for Márquez' division. Moreover, his proclamations had called on Mexicans to come over to the Imperial cause. Impressment, or the levy, was another practice, as previously mentioned, that the French objected to: The forcible seizure and incorporation into the military service of various individuals as needed. Although an old practice in Mexico, it had been abjured in France since revolutionary days and in 1863 was considered a sign of uncivilized ways. A typical case developed near the capital on October 21. The alcalde, evidently with authorization of the Regency or some other political officer, gathered a levy of six young men for military service and assignment to the troops of General Montenegro, a subordinate of General Márquez. That was contrary to the decree of the Regency of August 19, 1863.34 When that act came to the attention of Bazaine, he reacted very unfavorably. He requested Almonte to remove the alcalde or prefect, and to make a public announcement of the action. Then he added "It is the duty of a governing body to see that its sovereign acts are carried out, and I definitely am determined to see that those measures for the interest of the country be respected."35 He then sent a letter of censure to Generals Márquez and Montenegro, two of the stalwarts of the Mexican army, warning that if such an act were repeated, he would ask for the latter officer's resignation or court-martial. 33 Bazaine to López, Mexico, October 10, 1863, in BA, I, f. 124; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xxiii, pp. 86-87. 34 Boletín de las leyes, I, No. 107, pp. 234-235. 35 Bazaine to Almonte, No. 38, Mexico, October 23, 1863, an unpublished letter in BA, I, f. 171.

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Another example indicative of the firmness and confidence of the military administration came a few days later, when General Taboada followed an old practice of issuing in his own name a proclamation to his fellow citizens on the course they should pursue. Such a practice was long out of style in European countries, and Bazaine protested it by asking Almonte to warn Taboada that in issuing such proclamations he was competing with the government of the Regency and that no authority had such a right except the Regency.36 The organization of a native army on European patterns not only had to face the trials of traditional independence and highhanded methods used by the leaders, but the social cleavage also offered severe obstacles. The general practice had been for the higher officers to come from the old landed families of Spanish extraction and the lower officers from less prominent families, and for the ranks to be filled with mestizos and Indians who understood little of what was going on and were completely at the mercy of the officers. Rarely did an Indian rise to a position of high command; and when he did, it was by way of assimilating himself to the creole class. That seems to have been more true of the military ranks than in political office (e.g. Juárez). French national policy, like that of most of Western Europe, however, blessed with a degree of racial homogeneity and the social mobility resulting from the Revolution, favored taking Mexicans into the army on a basis of equality and treating them all as equals. That is not to say that "race" prejudice did not exist among the French officers — witness the attitudes toward their own colonies — but from their favored position of power in Mexico they were able to urge the theory of race equality on all Mexicans because, feeling superior and patronizing toward Indians, mestizos, and creóles alike, they found it easy to treat them alike and to seek to mix them in military units. Very early it became clear that trouble would result from such an effort, and Bazaine soon realized it. His original plans were to organize three divisions, one with Mejia's men, one under Márquez, a part of which was to be the honored Imperial Guard, and a third, which presumably was to be commanded by Miramón, who by then had returned to Mexico from Cuba, where the English had released him. Bazaine's impression after the initial moves in this policy follows: " Bazaine to Almonte, No. 40, Mexico, October 26, 1863, in BA, I, f. 188; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xlii, pp. 167-168.

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This new division whose cadre and senior officers are ready, may be given to Miramón, who was welcomed by Forey and the Regency, although he inspires in me little confidence in the future because I am convinced that he is too ambitious, that he does not like us, and that he is working for his own benefit. So it may be necessary to use some time changing the personnel of the Mexican divisions so they will not be more subject to one general than to another, as was the case in the past, which permitted them to make a pronunciamiento whenever it entered their heads. The Mexican army is being organized, but it needs a complete moral reform: This will not be the work of a day. We shall have to have a law on recruitment, promotions, and the status of officers (so that they will not be at the disposal of the first rebellious general) . . . then a law about retreats, then administrative regulations that will protect the soldiers from the exactions of their leaders. . .. Ideas are so far behind in this country that an old Minister of War, General Blanco, told me recently that he did not believe it possible for the white race to be subjected to the same recruiting laws as the Indians, and that no colonial family would want to be mixed in the field with colored men unless serving as officers. It is quite evident that the Indian race is inferior at present, but it is because since the conquest no regime has done anything for it, and only exceptionally some parvenu is accepted among the gente de razón. This means that this race, which is so worthy of interest always has been treated as an inferior race . . . and as such it remains completely indifferent to what goes on in the country since they have no part in it.37 Bazaine relaxed to some extent his effort to force equal treatment upon the Mexicans, but he tried to make up for it to the Indians by following the plan mentioned by Napoleon: Organizing a Foreign Legion in which the Indians were favored. The French Foreign Legion at that time consisted of one regiment under the command of Colonel Jeanningros and was doing garrison and convoy duty between Puebla and Veracruz, with headquarters at Orizaba. Bazaine instructed Jeanningros to divide it into a brigade of two regiments, using the current personnel as cadre, and to fill up the ranks by enlisting Indians who seemed capable — giving them the same training, equipment, and treatment as the Foreign Legion. Only volunteers were to be taken from French units for the officers, to assure interest and co-operation in the enterprise. The Indians were to be allowed to work their way up through the lower ranks as in the African regiments. 38 In effect the French policy in Africa was to be applied in Mexico. 37 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, October 25, 1863, in BA, I, f. 173-175; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xxxviii, pp. 133-144. 38 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, November 19 17?, 1863, in BA, II, f. 325 and 370-371; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc Ixxii, pp. 253-258.

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71

By the time Bazaine left for the Campaign of the Interior, two companies of that Legion actually were organized on that basis, and 175 Indians had enrolled. They seemed satisfied to serve under the French officers, and Bazaine issued special orders that they were to be well cared for.39 POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The instructions of Napoleon III to Bazaine warned him to avoid becoming reactionary and expressed fear that the Regency might do so. The instructions also expressed dissatisfaction with the decrees issued by Forey at Puebla. Taking those instructions to heart, Bazaine immediately began negotiations with Almonte to obtain a revocation, especially of the decreto de los secuestros, directed against those who took up arms against the Empire. He succeeded in obtaining the revocation on October 8.40 Not only, however, was the decree contrary to the policy of the French, but it was feared that the Juarist officials would retaliate by confiscating land belonging to French citizens and distributing it to the Indians to gain their support. It soon became clear that in spite of the good relations of Bazaine and Almonte, the Regency as a whole, and with the support of many of the higher officials, was moving toward conflict; while Bazaine properly controlled only military affairs and some foreign relations, he had at the same time orders to prevent the government from becoming too reactionary and of including some liberal elements in an effort to draw the Juárez supporters over to his side. Unfortunately the Regency and its higher officials already were definitely reactionary, abetted first by Saligny, then permitted by Forey to go their own way and look on the French as police, as a necessary evil, and as an interference which would gradually withdraw from political activity and devote its time to enforcing the Regency's own rule. The weak stand of Forey had led them to expect that. But in Bazaine they found quite a different character from the old soldier who preceded him. He evidently was aware all along of what was happening and was not fooled either by Saligny or Almonte. Moreover, he had orders not to let things get out of hand. When we add the inevitable problems that arise with divided sovereignty in borderline cases and overlapping jurisdiction and interests, conflict was certain. The Re3» Ibid. 40

Text in Boletín

de las leyes,

I, 386-387.

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gency was represented by ambitious personages and supported by vigorous if numerically few adherents. Under such conditions conciliation with the liberals seemed unlikely. Bazaine explained: It is difficult to make progress with a blindfold, and that is exactly what the Regency is to me. Of course it is acting in good faith, but it is persuaded that the coutry is not sufficiently developed for the so-called Reform Laws promulgated by the Liberal Party. The whole question of consolidation lies therein, and the Liberals will remain adamant and in arms as long as the party in power [the Conservatives] does not demonstrate that it is disposed to keep what good has been done by the Liberals and that it is not vindictive or reactionary.41 Bazaine believed that in occupied areas the people were clearly for the Intervention and the monarchy so they could live in peace, without the turmoil of the last two generations. But outside that area the most desolate type of glumness prevailed. That would continue, he thought, as long as Juárez remained in San Luis Potosí with friendly governors in the capitals of the interior states, with considerable resources, and as long as he had ports on the Pacific and frontiers on the north. It was necessary, then, to force him back or to wear him out in his present location, which the Intervention could do if the Mexican government were more patient in its hopes of reorganization and more tolerant in its acts and more conciliatory toward the Liberal Party. Because, he further believed, there were important men disposed to rally about the monarchy and the Intervention who were prevented from doing so by the line of conduct followed by the Regency. He hoped that the nearly arrival of Emperor Maximilian would help out by making it possible for others to adhere to the Emperor as a middle ground, but without espousing the cause of the Conservatives. During that time, however, Bazaine pursued contacts with Doblado, whom he hoped to bring over to his side. Optimistic rumors already had reached Paris that both Doblado and Comonfort had come over to the Intervention, although actually only tenuous negotiations were going on at the time. In Pachuca the French were in contact with the leader Cano, who was interested in coming over. Bazaine encouraged him by offering a command. 42 As for the ideas of Do4 1 Bazaine to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 3, Mexico, October 8 , 1863, in BA, I, f. 115; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xviii, 68-73. 4 2 Bazaine to the Commanding Officer, 62nd Regiment, No. 14, Mexico, October 15, 1863, in BA, I, f. 137; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI. Doc. xxvii, 106-107.

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73

biado, reports reaching Bazaine indicated that he would come over if the laws of La Reforma were promulgated, the Regency and its acts were annulled, and a form of government determined by universal suffrage, with, in the interim, a provisional government under a French commander who would reorganize the administration. Also Doblado specified that hostilities and armed movements be suspended and that he be offered a command. Bazaine, judging from the tone of the offer and the far-reaching provisos, assumed that "this is the line to be followed by this party and shows he is persuaded, as I now am, that there is not much to be expected basically in the way of conciliation or for the unified organization of this poor country". 43 While it was generally assumed that the foreign element would favor the Intervention, Bazaine, after an analysis of the trends of public opinion, came to the conclusion that they were not as a rule: The foreigners are nearly all of the Liberal Party and do not fail to influence it in its conduct with the new government by assuring that Party that the interested powers [England, Austria, Prussia, the United States, etc.] will not accept the votes of the Assembly of Mexico as a fait accompli representing the rest of the nation.44 The foreign element must be conceived of as a divided group, one part consisting of the high investors in Mexico who would have much to lose unless a government were set up to protect the system of capitalist investment. The others were mostly the political refugees, especially those from France, who had found in Mexico a freedom from some of the abuses of European governments. This group would tend to oppose an extension of European monarchies to Mexico.

CIVIL SERVANTS AND P O L I T I C A L

OFFICERS

Along with the higher level of political maneuvers, Bazaine was faced with one of the most severe tests and one of the most critical problems of the whole Intervention — the confusion, inefficiency, and irregularity of public officials. That subject is also a delicate and sensitive one because it touches on the national honor and tends to 43

Ibid., f. 115v.

Bazaine to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 3, Mexico, October 8, 1863, in BA, I, f. 115; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xviii, pp. 68-73. 44

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arouse nationalist passions. On account of its importance, however, it cannot be overlooked here, as in most histories written since the beginning of the Diaz régime. In the time of the Intervention the Juarist forces did not hesitate to refer to the poor quality of Imperial officials, or to study their acts in the effort to bring charges against them later. Afterwards, the national pride that grew up under succeeding presidencies led the writers to skip that problem altogether in order to stress the glories of the Juárez government. The longer and more detailed histories were written by conservatives (Arrangoiz, Negrete, etc.) who had good personal reasons in their apologies for the Empire to omit any study of the officials, and French historians have been too concerned with the military and financial aspects. Hence no adequate treatment exists on this subject. In Mexico there existed no system of regular governmental employees of minor, non-policy-making functionaries like those developed in most European countries after the French Revolution — nor for that matter was a civil service system set up in the United States until several years later. That lack, or backwardness from the European viewpoint, was one of the first to impinge on the French occupying force. They found that most if not all government jobs were appointive and were filled generally by national figures who used their positions to reward faithful supporters and deserving party leaders. When the French first came to Mexico in 1862, the Spaniards had organized a military government in Veracruz, using their own officials. After the Treaty of La Soledad the allies moved out and occupied Tehuacán and Orizaba, but the Juarist officials remained at their posts elsewhere. But after the rupture of the alliance, after the English and Spaniards had withdrawn, the French were left with the problem of establishing a government. Their instructions were to establish a Mexican government, and that excluded the possibility of using Frenchmen to hold office, except that of military commander. However, in the French camp some of the ringleaders of the Conservatives, particularly Almonte, were ready and willing to assume the responsibility of directing new appointments; and Saligny likewise was eager to use his knowledge of personalities to help appoint civil officials. Lorencez, later Forey, had to hold Almonte's ebullition down and insist on having all appointments issued in the general's name. After the capture of the capital and the establishment of the Regency, Forey allowed the transfer of governmental appointments

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75

to the Regency, though presumably it was agreed that no appointments be made without French approval. The real leaders of the Conservatives lost no time in organizing a government with all its ramifications 45 and making the higher appointments from among the old conservatives and among the new converts who came to their ranks in the hope of employment. Also in the lower offices some essential employees of the previous regime necessarily remained for a time at least. The Regency also prepared lists of officials in various parts of the country who were supposed to move in and assume office when the army had cleared the enemy out of the area. Lacking such appointment, the French officers on the spot could appoint a temporary officer or perform the functions themselves. In the operation of that policy, however, Bazaine found much to criticize. The quality of those appointees generally was low. The officials should have accompanied the troops into the area they were to govern, but actually they seldom showed up, or at least came very late, and Bazaine or other commanders at times had to use French officers to do the work until the officials arrived. This weakened the French units and brought complaints. Moreover, even when the officials did show up, they generally were badly briefed for their responsibilities and had little or no conception of the duties they were to perform. That problem is so well illustrated by Bazaine's first outburst on the subject that his letter is worth repeating here, although it was written during the Campaign of the Interior: I had written to Admiral Bosse to welcome General Díaz de la Vega with honors and to use every means to aid him in the accomplishment of his mission. Now he writes me that he put a steamer at the disposal of General de la Vega, but the latter answered that he must not leave without receiving new instructions. From whom are these new instructions to come, and why were they not given the new Governor of Tabasco before he left Mexico City . . . ? I have a right to ask this question, and I have a right to be astonished at the answer of General Díaz de la Vega. General officers and higher functionaries, who receive missions from the Government of the Regency, should not be simply title holders or hold courtesy titles occupied in partibus. Each one must set himself to work seriously and furnish his share of energy and true devotion to the national cause. I will not permit this practice of not taking office or of onerous tardiness, which is a burden on the public treasury and of no help to the common good. 45

Boletín

de las leyes,

I, 7 6 - 9 6 .

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During my itinerary through the land far from the capital, I have had a chance to see that these officials appointed by the Regency are not making haste to reach their posts. I have already mentioned it to you, and I now very seriously call to your attention this grave abuse, whose consequences may be sad ones. Why is Mr. Yáñez not at his post in Guanajuato? Why do I not have with me the principal officials planned to set up the Government, provide administrative and public services in the capitals of the states that I pass through and where I am obliged to create skeletons of governments (fantômes d'administration)? At Aguascalientes I was obliged to turn the city over to Juan Chávez; at Lagos I found no one except Zermeño to perform the provisional functions of préfet politique. I found no one to install in Salamanca, Silao, or Irapuato. In a few days I will reach Guadalajara, the second capital of the Empire. Will it have to be turned over to Tovar or Lozada? Tomorrow will I have to set up Cuéllar as préfet politique of San Juan de Lagos? I do not know what has become of M. Carrasco, who was supposed to organize the couriers, appoint tax assessors, and customs wherever I passed. Truly I find the Government of the Regency guilty of inertia at a time when extreme energy and activity are necessary. I hope the appeal that I make to you will be heard and that prompt measures will prove to me that I have not called in vain on your high intelligence and patriotism.46 Speaking on another occasion of the appointees, he remarked that: As for the civil officials appointed by the Mexican Government, they are generally rather old, all of the Conservative Party, and hardly capable of performing their duties; and then they always place party spirit first. It will remain this way because the moderate liberals do not participate in spite of our official declarations of organizing the country with all honest elements. But the Provisional Government appoints these civil employees and is careful not to pick a capable man if he belonged to the old administration. It is to be hoped that when the country is pacified, those parties will be reassured and will no longer look on each other as enemies and will not think any more about the past. Then capable liberals will furnish their part of the employees.47 49 Bazaine to Almonte, December 27, 1863, No. 98, in BA III, f. 453; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, pp. 112-116. The references to reluctance in appointing the individuals named to government positions is pardy due to the shortage of Mexican officers: The loss of Tovar and Lozada from troop duty would cut down the effectiveness of the Mexican allies; but still more, the appointment of men like Zermeño to a political position of trust was undesirable because Colonel Julián Zermeño had only deserted the Juarist cause for the Empire two days before. — Bazaine to Almonte, No. 96, December 25, 1863, an unpublished letter in BA, III, f. 437. 47 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, November 19, 1863, in BA, II, f. 325; partly printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. lxvii, 253-258, although the last part of the letter, including this paragraph, is omitted.

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77

Those letters are only two of several references to the difficulty of setting up a working government. The reason is not far to seek — the number of the Conservatives and their sympathizers obviously was not as great as Saligny and the exiles in Europe had represented them. There were not enough capable qualified and willing candidates for the large number of positions, and Bazaine was continually dissatisfied with the performance of these officials and worked valiantly at the task of developing a better group. This search for public officials later on extended itself to offering positions to men of unsettled views who could be persuaded to run the risk of retaliation by Juarist forces if caught. That was especially true in smaller towns, as Bazaine found from the beginning of the campaign: The only difficulty that I find it hard to overcome at present is the timidity of the people, who welcome us with open arms but who do not dare choose their municipal authorities for fear of Juarist violence; and if you do appoint a person to an office, he does not accept. These unhappy people have no energy left, and while asking for arms, they insist on having garrisons, which is impossible.48 THE CLERGY

The Juárez régime had struck hard at the property of the Church as well as at other large, latifundial interests, and some of the leading Churchmen actually had been exiled.49 Therefore some members on the continent had labored industriously to gain foreign aid, and they had joined Almonte and Miramón, etc., in urging the intervention of France. When French troops landed, it seemed that their hopes for a conservative régime with revocation of the Juárez reforms would be realized. Forey's Puebla decrees encouraged their hopes, and the Conservatives in the Junta and the Assembly of Notables were considerably bolstered by clerical support. Finally, one of the three regents was a high Church official, Archbishop of Mexico Antonio de Labastida. He was in Europe at the time of his appointment, soliciting aid, and as alternate the Bishop of Tulancingo, Ormeachea, was to represent Labastida until his return. Immediately after the publication of Forey's manifesto of June 12, Ibid. Emparán, Orden .. . que salgan fuera de la República los señores Arzobispos y Obispos que mencionan, Mexico, January 17, 1861, in Basilio José Arillaga, Recopilación de leyes, decretos, bandos. . . . pp. 30-31. 48

49

78

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it became clear that the Church would not succeed in an easy recoupment of its fortunes in Mexico, but the recall of Forey left everything in a state of suspension until after October 1, when the full load fell on the shoulders of his successor. The sorest spot in the complaints was the derogatory attitude toward the Clergy and even the Church as a whole, although it never reached the extremes of 1917-1925. Hence the byword of the Conservatives was Viva la religión! as opposed to the Juarist expression of Libertad y reforma. In that respect the Church certainly solved its problem. Wherever the French occupation troops came, the clergy was protected and allowed to c a n y on most traditional functions. Bazaine himself, representing a Catholic nation and with the promise of the Manifesto of June 12 as a policy, had no quarrel with the Church; and although he had sharp criticisms to make later on about certain members of the clergy, it was, with only one or two exceptions, always on a personal basis aimed at what he considered abuses and extreme personal stands. With the occupation of the capital the religious in E u r o p e began to trickle back to Mexico; b u t Archbishop Labastida did not arrive until October, when Bazaine was ready to depart for the interior. The first contacts m a d e it clear that unpleasantness was brewing behind his back. H e explained his first impressions very well in a letter to the Emperor: The Archbishop of Mexico has arrived, and we got in touch with him immediately, but what a disappointment when I heard him explain his ideas on reorganizing the clergy — such means of execution with incessant captation on the one hand and on the other intimidation, judicial pressure, etc. I told him that my ideas were opposed to an annulment of the sale of the Church property but rather that it should follow the revision plan set forth in the manifesto of Marshal Forey and the revision should be handled by the State, not by the Clergy. The prelate was not satisfied with my answer and assured me that he had expressed his ideas to Your Majesty, who had appeared to approve them and that his conscience and his dignity were opposed to any such solution without receiving authorization from St. Peter. Then the day after our interview the Archbishop called the Regency to a special meeting at which M. Budin and I were asked to attend. Mgr. Labastida made the same declaration as on the day before, that he would never consent to any transaction unless it was authorized by the Pope. Then, turning to me, he said exultantly, "If your army was well received on its arrival in the Capital, it is the work of the clergy. And if you do not support it, if you do not go along with it, bring over another 15,000 men because your

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79

friends of today . . ." He did not finish, but he made a gesture indicating "You can no longer count on them". We therefore no longer can count on the Archbishop to help reconcile the country because he says outright that the Church should take over all temporal power.. . This prelate has refused to sign the revocation of the Decree of Secuestration, though Almonte and Salas agreed to it.. . . 50 The difficulty foreshadowed in that initial meeting later materialized. The Regency had divided its powers among the three members; and when Labastida took office on October 19, replacing Ormeachea, he took over as his function the ministries of Justice and of the Interior. Labastida immediately used his influence to make those aspects of government serve reactionary ends. The Decreto sobre secuestros had already been withdrawn by the Regency at the insistance of Bazaine, but Ormeachea had abstained from signing the order.51 Labastida, through the Ministries of Justice and Interior, refused to accept the withdrawal, but, rather, attempted to withdraw the Juarist decree secularizing the property of the Church held as mort main and to restore to the clergy the property sold under the laws of desamortization. He forbade the judges to hear cases involving exclerical property and tried to force the renters of such property to pay rent, leases, etc., to the previous owners and not to the adjudicataires; and he refused to recognize the rights of the latter to the property they had acquired. 52 Such a program was opposed directly to the orders given Bazaine, and it soon became clear that neither had any intention of yielding. Neither could in conscience change his position; and while no complaints made by Labastida about Bazaine have survived, if there were any, Bazaine recorded some caustic comments: Unhappily his ideas are those of the Roman clergy, worse than those of the Spanish clergy of the time of Philip IV, except for the Inquisition. We 5 0 Bazaine to Napoleon III, October 25, 1863, in BA, I, f. 173-174; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xxxviii, pp. 133-144. 51 "The Decree of Sequestration has been withdrawn; after many delays, much patience, friendly remonstrations, and a tiring struggle the Regency gave in, but unwillingly. This simple affair shows what struggles we will have to put up with when we come to ask for a reorganization of civil affairs, for no revocation of the sale of clerical property, for [Changes in] the judges who judge according to their feelings, and laws against reaction." — Bazaine to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 3, Mexico, October 8, 1863, in BA, I, f. 115; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xviii, pp. 68-73. For the text of the withdrawal, see Boletín de las leyes, I, No. 145, pp. 386-387. 52

Niox, L'Expédition,

325.

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cannot count on his help in reaching any conciliatory solution because nonpossumus is his only answer to any suggestion. 53

The program of Labastida, as expressed in the initial interview,54 called for purchasers who themselves had become adjudicataires in order to return the property to the Church to do so; second, the courts should hear and gradually settle the problem of those who had acquired the Church property without intending to benefit themselves thereby; third, those "evil" men who had "fraudulently" become adjudicataires to profit at the expense of the Church should be brought to trial, sentenced, and punished. Bazaine could only answer that he would see to the enforcement of the Manifesto of June 12, while cases of fraudulent sales would have to be tried before courts of law, and not by the clergy. Moreover, he asked that the Regency not interfere with the pagarés, the promissory notes issued on nationalized property, and finally that they lift the interdiction on the property then immobilized by litigation. He again and further insisted that the State should handle alleged injustices and dispose of the property as it saw fit. Another point of friction was the support of the clergy, since its usual income was not forthcoming under current conditions. Labastida opposed government support for the Church, adding that "Mexico cannot be compared to the Catholic countries of Europe [where state support is the cusom].55 Bazaine did not agree on that point, and insisted that neither did a large number of Mexicans, even members of the clergy, who had declared to him that they willingly would accept state support. On that basis Bazaine went ahead and asked the Special Commissioner of Finances to prepare a budget for the clergy and to have the Episcopal palace repaired, as well as the Seminary, on the hope that "The great majority of the clergy will accept what we are doing purely for their benefit". He continued: The Archbishop is wrong, and Mexico is no longer the Mexico of the Spanish [Kings]. His long absence from the country, his long stay at the Court of Rome are certainly the reason, and with patience . . . he will 68 Bazaine to the French Minister of War (ca. November, 1863), an unpublished letter in BA, II, f. 312. 54 Given in more detail in the letter Bazaine to the Minister of Foreign Relations, No. 4, n. d., in BA, II, f. 226; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xxxix, 145-161. 55 Ibid.

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81

finally accept the situation as it [has been changed] by the ideas of this country.5®

Even though the Regency had repealed the Law of Sequestration, it did not follow that the problem was solved. Judges and other officials of the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice kept bringing up old, half-forgotten laws from the past to hamper settlement of claims, and clearly obstructionism was destroying the effect of the word of the law.57 Almonte definitely sided with Bazaine in that, and Salas, though inclined toward the side of Labastida, was usually sufficiently impressionable for Almonte to win him over. But Labastida held a stronger position, and soon the Regency reached an impasse that threatened to paralyze the government until Bazaine broke it up by a show of force. First he made a final effort to achieve this end by persuasion and remonstrance; he wrote a strong letter to the Regency, asking for action in repealing the obstructionist laws and legal complications, and asking a more liberal policy on the part of the Regency. As a result: This little storm has in no way altered the good relations I have with Almonte, and he seems satisfied with the impetus I am giving to affairs. Only the Archbishop continually repeats to me that we are doing the greatest wrong in not supporting the Church, and he repeats interminable homilies, to which I only answer unmoved, "Monseigneur, I am only a soldier charged with carrying out an order, and it must be respected." Nonetheless we are on good terms, because I am having his Episcopal palace returned to him, am rebuilding his large seminary, and am repairing his country house at Tacubaya, where unhappily he has found nearly all of his olive trees chopped down. The rascals! The trees were such a good source of income for the Archbishopric! 58

Finally on October 20 the Regency sat in a meeting, able to accomplish nothing, when Bazaine marched up to the door, in full dress uniform and with his saber at his side. A company of 200 Zouaves marched along behind him to the door. The three caciques were surprised, but only Labastida protested. Bazaine stated that he did

Ibid. Blanchot, L'Intervention, II, 72. 58 Bazaine to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 5, Mexico, November 9, 1863, in BA, I, 86; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. lxii, 217-219. The date does not appear on the letter, but it is supplied by Genaro García in the printed work, though the source of his information is not indicated. 5e

57

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not want to hear any argument; he would concede nothing, and that he required that they withdraw and annuii all of those old and resurrected laws. He then made it clear that in the future the government should keep to a more liberal path in conformance with the will of the Emperor. Moreover, he said that he would not leave the room until he had an order to that effect signed by the three proconsuls, and which would be printed in the Journal officiel. That order withdrew the laws brought up recently, and it stated that the proclamation made by Bazaine on his assumption of command59 would govern, consequently that the regular sales of clerical property would be confirmed, and that in any litigation "justice" would be done. He obtained the signatures and left the Regency before it could recover from its surprise. His coup reassured many of the affected citizens, raised confidence in Bazaine, and left the Regency temporarily speechless — hence the French considered it a successful move in preparation for the departure on the campaign.60 As soon, however, as Labastida had recovered and taken counsel, he replied on the 14th of November in a letter he sent to the two other members of the Regency, saying that he would not attend meetings again until they withdrew the order of October 8 (revocation of the decree of sequestration).61 This demand brought on the real crisis toward which the other events had gradually led, and for Bazaine came as a most welcome relief. The two remaining members of the Regency, Almonte and Salas, therefore, on the suggestion and urging of Bazaine, declared on November 17 that Labastida was no longer a member of the Regency.62 Labastida's answer on that same day refuted the charges made, denying that he was in "opposition to the Regency" because he was a part of it; denying that he had been quoted correctly in his refusal to attend meetings, and denying further that Bazaine, or the Regency, had the right to depose him from

59 Bazaine, Proclama, in BA, I, f. 162; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. X X X V , 126-128. The date is given as October 22, evidently a typographical error for October 2. As for its content, the proclamation simply gave assurance that the Manifesto of June 12 would be carried out. 60 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, November 10, 1863, in BA, II, f. 269-270; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. lxiv, 223-231. 81 J. M. Arroyo, Secretary of the Regency, to José Ignacio Pavón, Presidente del Supremo Tribunal de Justicia del Imperio, Mexico, November 14, 1863, in BA, II, f. 315; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. lxxv, 260-261.

»2 Ibid.

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83

his post. He then asked that they bring the whole question before the Assembly of Notables.63 However, Almonte and Salas could do no less than maintain their position, and they did.64 Thereafter for some time the Archbishop remained absent from the Regency and confined his efforts to personal contacts; only once did he write to Bazaine in an effort to conciliate the two on that problem, and then after Bazaine had left for the field. The letter protested again his separation from the Regency and protested a term used by Bazaine in referring to "the imprudent and ill-advised friends who were trying to compromise him", and he stated that he alone was responsible for his acts. Bazaine did not succumb to the effort at reconciliation; he answered that the Archbishop always seemed more conciliatory in conversation than in reality, and he added that He should know by now that I will not suffer on his part any encroachment on the rights invested in me; and he should for the present confine himself to the spiritual direction of his following. His request to return to the Regency will not be conceded him. 65

That situation remained the status in the capital for about two months, when new outbursts came to cut short Bazaine's active participation in the campaign for the control of the western and northern states.

·* Pelagio A. Labastida to Almonte and Salas, Mexico, November 17, 1863, in BA, II, f. 316; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. lxxvi, 268-270. See also Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, November 19, 1863, in BA, II, f. 325; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. Ixxii, 253-258. Also Pelagio A. Labastida to Juan Ignacio Pavón, Mexico, November 21, 1863, an unpublished letter in BA, II, f. 338. 64 Juan Ν. Almonte to Bazaine, Mexico, November 18, 1863, an unpublished letter in BA, II, f. 321; also idem to idem., Mexico, November 23, 1863, an unpublished letter in BA, II, f. 342. «s Bazaine to Budin, December 4, 1863, in BA, II, f. 387; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xvi, pp. 58-63.

CHAPTER

IV

T H E CAMPAIGN O F T H E I N T E R I O R AND OF PACIFICATION EFFORTS

FAILURE

BEGLNNING OF THE CAMPAIGN

At the beginning of November the French position was a good one for further conquest. They held approximately the same area as that controlled by Cortés soon after his initial conquest of the capital, and it was an excellent base. Tampico, after a brief occupation in 1862 was reoccupied in August 1863, at the cost of one ship (the Jeanne d'Arc) run aground,1 and it was still held by a French force in spite of the unhealthy climate. Commerce was possible only about four months out of the year, and trade had dwindled in the past few years until customs intake was only about 500,000 pesos a year.2 In the past Tampico had been an important port for commerce in silver, and Bazaine hoped to see it return to that former importance. Yellow fever and the vómito negro were rampant. Bazaine, however, believed that the inhabitants were secretly in favor of the Intervention but were afraid of reprisals if they revealed their sympathy.3 The mouth of the Rio Grande was blockaded as far north as 25° 22', but Matamoros remained a free port, and there were signs of a large trade. During July eighty ships of all sizes and nations had entered it. Business men claimed that there were 12,000,000 pesos in merchandise stored in the city, and that the daily customs receipts were 6,000 pesos. Further downstream the town of Bagdad had 100 houses and some large stores, where four steamboats and sixty launches plied the river every day. But the winds made the harbor unsuitable from October to February except through the Laguna Madre approach. The French blockade was fairly effective, and, in Émile Kératry, La Contreguérilla française au Mexique, 105. Ibid., 105. For a description of life in Tampico during the Intervention, see W. Watson, Adventures of a Blockade Runner. 3 Bazaine to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 4, Mexico, October, 1863, in BA, II, f. 226; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xxxix, 145-161. 1

2

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case he decided on an occupation, Bazaine's plans were to land on the Barra de Jesús about February, when he figured the forced loans being imposed by Juárez would be developing enemies.4 News from Texas indicated that the Texans' main preoccupation was hostility toward the Northerners; and they were trying to oppose the Federal landing on the Rio Grande, while General Bee, the military commander of Brownsville, seemed favorable and had even hinted that he would be pleased to have the French land at Matamoros.5 Cortina, the Juarist governor of Tamaulipas, was still in control in the lower part of the state, including the port of Tuxpan, where blockade runners brought the Juarists supplies from the United States and from Havana. In the state of Veracruz guerrilla bands still beset the northern part, and the Juarist governor, Díaz Mirón, and his followers, though in hiding, maintained some contact with the United States Consul at Minatitlán.® The port city and lines of communication were well under the control of Colonel Jeanningros and his Foreign Legion Regiment, but otherwise the pacification of the state was left to the infamous Contreguérillas, led by Colonel Stoecklin, later Colonel Dupin, a swashbuckler who led that irregular group in raids and attacks aimed especially at the guerrilla bands. Actually it was a troop of free lances who fought fire with more fire and achieved the worst reputation of any part of the French Army. The state of Tabasco was under a Governor Arévalo, who had shown nominal allegiance to the Intervention but who continued to conduct affairs in the interest of the Juárez régime. He had, for example, raised 180,000 pesos by a forced loan, which was forbidden by the Manifesto of June 12, and in addition he had collected regular taxes. He had gathered a body of Spanish deserters from the army of General Prim; and when the town of Comalte pronounced for the Intervention, he turned it over for pillage. Then the town committee sent a lawyer to Veracruz to ask for aid against the governor.7 In Yucatán, where resistance to the Juárez régime was endemic, Ibid. Ibid. • Jeanningros to Bazaine, Veracruz, November 15, 1863, in BA, II, f. 308; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. lxxi, 251-252. 7 Jeanningros to Bazaine, No. 567, Veracruz, November 1, 1863, unpublished letter in BA, II, f. 243; see also letter J. M. Maldonado to A. Saudo, Villa del Carmen, October 26, 1863, in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xlv, 172-185. 4 5

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uprisings in favor of the Intervention had taken place as early as 1862, led by Pantaleon Barrera and Pedro Acereta, and internecine strife still was going on.8 The states of Guerrero and Oaxaca were outside the occupied area, and Porfirio Díaz, after his escape from the French in May, was known to have organized the Juarist cause there and to have raised an army of 3,000 men that still grew every day. Hence, he was able at that time to begin a small offensive of his own up from the south and to press hard on the Mexican garrison of General Vicario at Taxco and Iguala.9 The center of the State of Puebla was in a comparative state of peace under French garrisons, but both the extreme northern and southern parts again were beyond effective control. In the Valley of Mexico and its environs perimeter cities of the Empire were Iguala, Toluca, Tlalnepantla, Pachuca, Tulancingo, Tlaxcala; but everywhere bands, such as those of Butrón and Romero, were able to make occasional brief attacks. But that position was a key to the whole of the central plateau and the rich states to the west and northwest. Moreover, that area was a rich food-producing area, so that the burden on the lines of communication was much relieved. In the Pacific several French ships had reached the coast, but Bazaine had not made direct contact with them. In preparation for the campaign several garrison posts were turned over to Mexican troops, such as Perote and Jalapa.10 Where the Guardia civil was reasonably well organized, the French garrison was withdrawn in its favor, and large stocks of supplies were collected in the garrisoned cities for the maintenance of the troops.11 The French Army at that time amounted to some 25,000 men, but many were unfit for duty. Although French medical care at that El siglo, May 2, 1863, p. 3, col. 5. Rafael Espinosa, Subsecretario interino de Estado y del Despacho de Guerra y Marina, to Bazaine, No. 5, Mexico, November 11, 1863, unpublished letter in BA, II, f. 236 and idem to idem, No. 6, Mexico, November 1, 1863, unpublished letter in ibid., II, f. 238. 10 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, October 8, 1863, in BA, I, f. I l l ; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xvii, 62-67. 11 Niox, L'Expédition, 334-335. In Toluca the citizenry protested on hearing the French garrison was withdrawing and leaving them to face the Juarists, but Bazaine impassively turned a deaf ear to their appeal: "Let them cry and don't be too much moved by it." — Bazaine to Bertier, No. 26, Mexico, October 29, 1863, in BA, II, f. 205; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. Ini, 200-202. 8 9

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time probably was second to none, still many wounded died, and disease spread fast.12 About half of the availables were employed in the campaign. The long drought from which the country had suffered most of the year had broken up, and the rainy season had started; but Bazaine could not very well postpone his campaign any longer, despite the hardships the soldiers were to suffer. On November 8 the campaign got under way, although Bazaine had to wait another ten days to take the field. He expected a courier from France, perhaps with official letters affecting his plans. Within the occupied area he had declared a state of war, but not of siege, in order to give more civil power to the military commanders should they need it.13 He appointed General Neigre, with a force of about 3,500 men to command the capital as military governor during his absence.14 The choice was a wise one: Neigre was a young, energetic, officer, capable of his own decisions, as he soon proved. Although the Commander in Chief remained in Mexico for a time, the troops started the campaign on time and with every success. Bazaine actually left Mexico on November 17 to assume direction of the campaign, escorted by a small guard of one brigade, the backbone of which was the 3rd Regiment of Zouaves. As for the enemy situation, it was known that near Pachuca Juarist General Negrete waited with about 7,000 men; at Querétaro was Doblado with 3,000 men. Uraga had 4,000 in Morelia, and General Alvarez had 4,000 in Guerrero State. Juárez had set his capital up at San Potosí and directed affairs from there. Douay, commanding the Second Division and with Márquez' division protecting his left flank, moved along the main road to the 12 In October Bazaine admitted that he was glad to hear that 3,000 replacements were on the way because he had 5,000 soldiers who had to be returned to France on account of their ill-health. They were encumbering the hospitals and could only be cured in France. — Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 5, Mexico, October 8, 1863, in BA, I, f. 118; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xix, 74-78. 13 Bazaine, Circulaire, to the Commanders at Puebla, Orizaba, and Mexico, No. 13, Mexico, November 17, 1863, in BA, II, f. 320; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. lxxvii, 271-272. 14 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 7, Mexico, (November) 1863, in BA, II, f. 309; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xxvi, 101-106. The letter is undated, but letter No. 8 is dated November 17; No. 5 is dated October 8. While the official correspondence was numbered for each main recipient, it is unfortunate that Genaro García did not include the numbers in his publication of the letters.

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northwest: Castagny, commanding the First Division and with Mejia's division on his right flank, moved out to the north and west. They captured Querétaro on November 17. Then Douay moved on the road to Morelia. Márquez had just recovered from a small diversion in which he had to send a part of his troops to raise the siege laid on General Taboada at Iguala by Porfirio Díaz. After that defeat Diaz retired to Oaxaca and busied himself with organizing that center of resistance. WITHDRAWAL OF THE JUARIST FORCES

The French and their allies moved rapidly toward their objective, meeting with success everywhere, being forced to fight a few pitched battles and losing none. At almost every stage the Juarist troops withdrew either without a fight or after only token resistance. The reports sent to Europe were monotonous lists of cities occupied and skirmishes engaged in along the routes. The troops stayed close to to the roads or beaten paths — indeed were forced to most of the time by the rugged character of much of the terrain — where troops could seldom be massed. The Juarist generals wisely avoided heavy fights, where they obviously were outclassed by the well-trained French troops. Rather, they chose to withdraw and bide their time — trading space for time, which they could well do, and trying to wear out the French and their allies in a vain pursuit of a decisive battle. The campaign has been hailed as a success and as a well-planned and even brilliant achievement attributable to Bazaine.15 Some of the praise is well-earned, no doubt, but it should be recalled that a military campaign against a weak and scattered and retreating army is nearly always a success. The plans were usually carried out well, and the tactics seem to have been sound and even brilliant. Had the French and Mexican allies marched against the same number of Prussian soldiers in the same position, the story would have been very different. Bazaine, however, had much on his side; he clearly knew the enemy position and had studied the history of their leaders. The whole military force was under a unified military command, and he directed it without hesitation or indecision — a situation that did not exist in the unhappy war of 1870-1871. He expected victory and a successful campaign and achieved it. 15 Niox, L'Expédition, 341; Blanchot, L'Intervention, II, 89; Tucé, Cinq 82; François Charles Du Barail, Mes Souvenirs, II, 494.

ans,

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The progress of the army was constant and involved so little resistance or individual initiative from the subordinates that there is no need here to do more than enumerate some of the dates and places: Douay reached Querétaro November 17; Castagny entered Acámbaro on the 24th. On the 30th General Bertier, in support of Márquez' division, entered Morelia without a shot. Márquez then was left there to garrison the state with his division.16 On December 8 Douay entered Guanajuato; Bazaine joined Castagny to enter León on December 14, Lagos on the 15th, and Aguascalientes on the 23rd. The one heavy battle at that time took place at Morelia. Bazaine heard of troops being assembled at Piedra Gorda under Uraga, with reinforcements from Doblado, evidently to attack Morelia. He was about to depart to help out when he located Doblado near Aguascalientes; so he marched personally in pursuit of Doblado, leaving Castagny to aid Márquez.17 The aid was late in arriving — Uraga, knowing only Mexican troops were in Morelia at the time, made a furious attack on December 18 with 12,000 men and 36 field guns, and almost captured the central square. But the smaller force of Mexicans, inspired by the example of personal courage displayed by Márquez, rallied and drove Uraga away with heavy losses. That was the first real test of the Imperial army since its role in the Battle of San Lorenzo, and the first time that they had fought an independent action since the beginning of the Intervention. Evidently the training and equipment and organization furnished by the French paid off, for they conducted themselves well to the pleasant surprise of their allies.18 18 Bazaine to Bertier, No. 46, November 29, 1863, in BA, II, f. 363; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xl, 38-43. It is noteworthy that the Juarist General Berriozábal, in evacuating the city left a committee of three men who spoke French, to meet and receive the French forces. That is in striking contrast to the departure from Mexico City in May, without leaving any representatives of law and order. Márquez was then appointed governor of Michoacán, with General Ugarte as préfet politique of Morelia. Bertier was to remain close by to see that the administration was conducted along liberal lines — the past history of Márquez had left him the name of a cruel and relentless reactionary. 17 At the same time Bazaine sought to isolate Uraga by ordering General Tovar to move south of Guadalajara and cut off Uraga's communication with the forces under Rojas in Guadalajara — Bazaine to Tovar, No. 72, Lagos, December 17, 1863, an unpublished letter in BA, III, f. 419. Moreover Rojas was himself further isolated by the movement of Mexican General Lozada north of Guadalajara to cut off communication with Doblado. — Bazaine to Lozada, Lagos, December 17, 1863, in BA, III, f. 420; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xxii, 77-79. 18 Niox, L'Expédition, 344. Márquez' courage never was doubted, but never

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Uraga then withdrew and evidently hoped to join Doblado; but when he learned that Douay, at La Piedad, was in a position to intercept him, he withdrew along the road to Zamora; then Colonel Marguerite, with Douay's fast cavalry, entered the town on the 22nd, cutting off that escape route. Uraga then had to withdraw to the south, toward Uruapan, hastily, with the French in close pursuit. Douay did, in fact, enter Los Reyes (near the mountain of Paricutin) on December 28, just one day behind Uraga's rearguard. They overtook his supply train and captured a large amount of booty. 19 Thus disorganized, Uraga and about 2,500 men escaped to Colima, where they remained out of the fight for some months. The rugged country would not permit a pursuit, and Douay returned to the north to support Bazaine's advance on Guadalajara. One characteristic of that campaign not often discussed is the unusual command. Bazaine. while definitely in command, left his headquarters with General Castagny. But, with his own guard of about one brigade, commanded by Du Barail, he moved between the two divisions, aiding one here, then the other, and even going off on separate missions of his own. Fortunately the rapid succession of victories made his presence unnecessary, and his staff was able to handle problems that did arise. That practice, however, is not ordinarily a safe one — particularly in pursuit of independent missions. The principal objective of those missions was a prolonged pursuit of Doblado. At the beginning of the campaign Bazaine had been in communication with both Comonfort and Doblado, hoping to persuade them to come over to the Empire. Comonfort, who was Minister of War, was eliminated early because, on November 13, while riding with a small staff, he was ambushed. His escort fled, and the whole of his small party was killed. 20 That left Doblado to take over more respected than then, especially with the severe face wound he received. To celebrate his victory, he brought out a pamphlet giving details of the fight, with a list of the prisoners taken, etc.: Vincente F . Loaiza, Detall de la defensa de la Plaza de Morella del 18 de diciembre de 1863 que dirige al exrno. Sr. General Bazaine, en Gefe del Ejército Francomejicano, el General de División Leonardo Márquez, en Gefe de la de su nombre. 18 Including a money-coining machine. — Niox, L'Expédition, 345. 20 Dublán y Lozano, Legislación mexicana, IX, No. 5936, p. 669. The attack was made by a guerrilla band, but by that time there were bands operating proEmpire as well as pro-Juarist, and others that were outright outlaws. To say that the attack was directed by Bazaine is very rash; he was in contact and would not reasonably have removed such a man as long as chances of converting him to the Empire existed. The French themselves did not know the author of that attack:

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the duties of Minister of W a r . B u t since Bazaine was also in contact with Doblado, h e apparently w a n t e d to press him hard enough to urge upon him a decision to join the E m p i r e ; for in

December,

hearing that Doblado was at Salamanca, he set out with his own small force, entered Salamanca after Doblado h a d left, and h a d to return.

Then, hearing that he was in Aguascalientes, Bazaine also

marched on that city b u t in vain. All of that time h e was endeavoring to keep in touch with R o q u e Muñoz, the agent who maintained the communication with Doblado. 2 1

T h a t communication was evidently

w a r m enough for him to expect results: If, however, M. Doblado really wants to join us — and there is no question of negotiating with him on the subject, the movement of the allied troops will not change his mind at a l l , . . . I shall expect M. Doblado to come to me, and I am ready to welcome him. 2 2 And a few days later: Roque Muñoz seems to want to bring Doblado to us. I told him exactly what I thought: I will not deal with Doblado or anyone else. I shall accept his submission on the condition that it is complete. 2 3 Bazaine was at that time also in communication with L e r d o de Tejada, another minister, by means of an agent n a m e d Saborio, b u t — Loizillon, Lettres, 138. Because doubt exists as to whether Comonfort ever intended to espouse the Empire, the following quotations are supplied: "Doblado is [at the head of] Foreign Affairs, Comonfort [at the head of the Ministry] of War and Commander-in-Chief, with Uraga as second in command. Those three personages are still reporting through their friends in Mexico that they have the greatest desire to enter negotiations with the Intervention. I keep answering that there is nothing to say, that the Juarist Government no longer exists, and that I will accept the allegiance by all those who come frankly to work with us for the pacification of the country. . . . " — Bazaine to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 4, Mexico, n.d. in BA, II, f. 226; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xxxix, 145-161. 21 Bazaine to Colonel St. Hilaire, No. 48, December 6, 1863, an unpublished letter in BA, III, f. 403. Doblado by this time had quarreled with Juárez and had returned to his stronghold in Guanajuato as governor. — J. A. Quintero to J. P. Benjamin, Monterrey, September 16, 1863, in U.S. Navy, Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. Ill, 899-902. 22 Bazaine to the Archbishop of Mexico, No. 92, December 6, 1863, in BA, III, f. 409; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xvii, 64-65. Evidently Labastida was also in contact with Doblado, and that shows also that in spite of the differences between him and Bazaine over the nationalized property, there were other matters in which they were in agreement and co-operated with each other. 23 Bazaine to Almonte, No. 93, December 9, 1863, in BA, III, f. 411; printed in Genaro Garcia, Coi. doc., XVII, Doc. xviii, 66-67.

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the general import of the conversations was a desire to parley and discuss possible modifications of the Intervention policy. In that Bazaine was not interested.24 When contact again was made with Doblado, he wanted to interview Bazaine, but the officer sounded too much like the maneuver that Doblado had negotiated at the conference table at La Soledad to the discomfiture of the allies, the French in particular. So Bazaine refused the request, not to be caught in the same trap, and decided to give chase rather than parley.25 At the end of the year Doblado had disappeared temporarily into the mountains around Nochistlán, bearing with him, according to the rumors, a chest of one million pesos remaining from the treasury of the State of Guanajuato.2® The cold was becoming too severe for prolonged exertions without supplies for the marching troops, and at length Bazaine gave up the chase in favor of a slow advance along established routes to the main cities. Everywhere the French and Imperial arms were successful; Mejia, on the right flank, moved steadily on San Luis Potosí, defeating General Negrete and forcing the Juárez government to evacuate to the north. On the left Michoacán was left in charge of General Márquez' forces, with Márquez as governor. Bazaine was not, however, entirely confident that Márquez would follow the program of the Intervention; and he sent with his temporary nomination a list of restrictions that were to keep the Governor from the excesses hitherto associated with his name. The duties of the military governor, or commandant supérieur, as Bazaine saw them, included the general French policy: Since we are in a state of war, you clearly have superior command over all authorities, while leaving to the préfet politique his freedom of action over civil services. Your political line of conduct is that of the Manifesto of the Intervention of June 12, and you must resist all those, no matter what party they represent, who would influence you or subvert your administration out of this conciliatory policy. 24 J. N. Saborio to Boyer, Mexico, December 1, 1863, in BA, II, f. 376; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xiii, 48-52, also Saborio to Boyer, December 10, 1863, in BA, III, f. 412; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xix, 68-72. 25 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Lagos, December 27, 1863, in BA, III, f. 448; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xxix, 105-112.

28

Ibid.

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In short, accept all persons disposed to swear allegiance to the Government and to the Intervention. Take no steps that would give the impression that the Regency represents the reactionary party. Do not for the present change the sale of nationalized property, and require compliance with what has been decided in Mexico: That the judges recognize claims for the rent on the said property, the acceptance of the pagarés, and, chiefly, that the present owners should not be inquiet and t h a t . . . they should be free with a perfect right to dispose of the property; also that the revision of those [properties] illegally acquired will be taken care of when the time comes. Lend every effort to organize a civil guard and the Gardes rurales for the interior. . . . As for recruiting, volunteers may be taken in, but the leva is forbidden.... In cases where groups of soldiers coming from the enemy should be incorporated, you are authorized to form first companies, then battalions, so as to increase your present infantry regiments by two battalions and the cavalry by two squadrons. Announce the state of war that has been proclaimed for Mexico. Your Division court-martial will try those who have been guilty of crimes listed in the Moniteur officiel for November 19, No. 53, and will pass the sentences indicated there. No sentence of death will be executed before I give my approval. To that effect you will send me a summary of the sentences as pronounced. However, an individual taken in the flagrant act of assassination of the soldiers of your division will be tried immediately and shot. I do not need to recommend to you a severe surveillance over the discipline and the good conduct of the troops.27 Those instructions may be taken as a guide to the French policy: avoidance of party partiality, refusal to be led into a revision of the sales of property, and close but benevolent watch over the population and the army. In addition a French finance officer joined Márquez to help regularize the finances of the state, and General Bertier was sent with a brigade of French soldiers to occupy Morelia and still keep an eye on Márquez to see that he carried out his orders.28 The instructions to Bertier were essentially the same as those to Márquez. The beginning of the next year found the point of the French advance, with Bazaine personally at the head, approaching Guadalajara, which already had been evacuated by the republicans. On the fifth of January Bazaine entered the city without a fight and began the 2 7 Bazaine to Márquez, No. 4 7 (Acámbaro), November 29, 1863, in BA, II, f. 365; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. χ, 33-38. The permission to accept deserters from the Juarist army was a reversal of his previous stand. 2 8 Bazaine to Bertier, No. 46, Acámbaro, November 29, 1863, in BA, II, f. 363; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xi, 38-43.

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consolidation of the Jalisco area. Colonel Gamier was placed in command of the city itself, and smaller groups moved out in all directions to occupy the surrounding cities. It was Bazaine's hope to move on rapidly to the coast, to Tepic and to San Bias, where he could both cut off the communications between the north and south republican groups and also open contacts with the French naval squadron known to be approaching the coast.29 Meantime the program was for the French and their auxiliaries to watch for concentrations of Juarist forces and then break them up.30 RECALL OF BAZAINE TO THE CAPITAL

Plans to continue the campaign in person were cut short suddenly by unpleasant news from the capital. The uneasiness there revolved about the truculence of Labastida who, since his separation from the Regency, had continued to press his attitudes and program before other clericals who had remained in the capital, and, in particular, before many of the judges under the head of the Supreme Tribunal, which Labastida still influenced. Finally, assuming that no other recourse was possible, Colonel Boyer, the Chief of Bazaine's staff, took to Almonte the draft of a decree that Bazaine had left with him, which would dissolve the Supreme Tribunal, removing all the high judges and leaving Labastida without the support of his sympathizers there. The supporters had signed a petition on December 31, which protested that they could not in conscience accept and follow the rules issued by the two-man Regency. The new act was directed at those men, and it provided that all be deprived of their offices and none who had signed the protest were to be re-employed.31 Immediately Labastida called about him several Church officials and issued a formal excommunication on everyone who had taken part in the "despoiling" of the Church or who had co-operated in the accomplishment of the act.32 That, of course, included the whole French expeditionary force. It had become the custom to have a military mass at the Cathedral 29 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Guadalajara, January 5, 1864, in BA, III, f. 491; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xxxix, 146-149. 30 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 10, San Juan de los Lagos, November 29, 1863; in BA, II, f. 361; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. ix, 31-33. 31 For the text see Boletín de las leyes, II, No. 2, pp. 23-24. 32 Blanchot, L'Intervention, II, 112.

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each Sunday morning for the French troops; then the Archbishop announced that the mass would no longer take place — that the doors of the Cathedral would remain closed. That decision was announced on Saturday, and immediately General Neigre sent his aide-de-camp to the Archbishop with the statement that if the next day the doors of the Cathedral were not open, the General would open them with cannon balls. The next morning at seven o'clock in the morning a section of artillery rolled up to the Plaza and set up facing the doors, ready to open fire. A few minutes later the doors opened as usual, and the soldiers went in and heard mass. That rebuttal ended the particular incident, and, apparently the excommunication became a dead letter; no further extreme acts were overtly attempted by the clergy, but obviously only the bold action by Neigre had prevented them from gaining control in the capital. Salas and Almonte, however, afraid of the tense atmosphere that surrounded that crisis, requested that Bazaine return to Mexico.33 Such a request was not to be refused. Bazaine left the command of the forces in the field to General Douay and began the journey back to the capital. In his instructions to Douay,34 Bazaine explained his program: To occupy and pacify the states of San Luis Potosí, Guanajuato, and most of Jalisco. The operations in South Jalisco and in Colima were left to Márquez and Bertier. Castagny, then in Aguascalientes, was to consolidate his position and then move on Zacatecas at the same time that Mejia marched on Real Catorce. General López was to push from San Luis Potosí to Tampico to open trade routes. Thereupon Bazaine began his return to the capital, but he stopped at several towns along the way to inspect the measures taken to guard against Juarist attacks and to see how effective the political appointees were. At Penjamillo he found that a Juarist band under General Peña y Barragán had entered the town and was looting it. Bazaine sent a Mexican troop to aid the town, and they inflicted a costly defeat on the band, capturing some prisoners.35 The General held the prisoners in a threat of reprisal against the Juarists. Recently an 38 Ibid., II, 114. For a description of the military mass, see Anderson, An American in Maximilians Mexico, 23-24. 3 4 Bazaine to Douay, L a Piedad, January 20, 1864, in BA, III, f. 5 5 1 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xlv, 167-174. 3 5 Bazaine to Velarde, No. 90, L a Piedad, January 21, 1864, in BA, III, f. 5 5 7 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xlvii, 177-178.

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Imperial prefect, Don Antonio Santa Anna, had been captured at Salamanca. Therefore Bazaine announced that if the official were harmed, then he, Bazaine, would in reprisal shoot the prisoners, starting with Casimiro Peña y Barragán, the nephew of the general.36 That act he justified as follows: The struggle maintained by the leaders of bands cannot be qualified by a French general officer, and acts of brigandage will hereafter be answered by the rigorous measures demanded by their conduct and which are authorized by military law. 37

In Valle de Santiago, which he passed through, Bazaine found the town so weak under the "lazy and cowardly" disposition of the Imperial political prefect that it had let a band of fifty men attack and loot it. Bazaine found it necessary to punish the town for its pusillanimity by a fine of 10,000 pesos, and the political prefect by removal.38 The same day the city of Zamora registered a complaint that the French garrison was being removed and replaced by a group of Márquez' soldiers. That sort of complaint was met with scoffs; a city as big as Zamora should be able to defend itself against the chusmas who called themselves Liberals, he said, and the rôle of the French army was to liberate the cities, and to help them organize their own defenses and an honorable government; but if the town lost confidence just because the French flag moved a few leagues away, then they would only prolong the difficulties of pacification.39 Bazaine re-entered Mexico City on the 5th of February, one month after his entry into Guadalajara. In the capital he found that the 38 Bazaine to Mr. Carma "Commandant des bandes libérales de Pénjamo", No. 92, Salamanca, January 28, 1864, in BA, III, f. 559; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xlix, 180-182. Such a threat may give the impression of cruelty, but war is always cruel. It was perfectly legal in 1864 to take hostages to protect the lives of prisoners who had fallen into hands of irregular troops or whose lives have been threatened (Rules of Land Warfare, 90). The difference is that prisoners of war may not be used as hostages. — ibid. The only justification for this démarche would be for Bazaine to offer some reason for not accepting the men as prisoners of war. 37 Ibid. In that case, then, the troops of Peña y Barragán were considered bandits because they were taken in the act of a non-military assault on and looting of a town. Bazaine is on perfectly legal grounds here, provided the facts are as stated. 38 Bazaine to the Préfet Politique de Guanajuato, No. 93, Salamanca, January 26, 1864, BA, III, f. 560; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xlviii, 178-179. 39 Bazaine to the Préfet of Zamora, No. 9, January 29, 1864, in BA, III, f. 567; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. 1, 182-184.

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crisis had worn itself down to a calmer state; General Neigre had risen to the occasion and had maintained the dominant position of the French authorities. The Church officials had withdrawn from overt acts of defiance, and outwardly all was calm. Bazaine, therefore, was able to reassume his administrative duties in an air of peace, and he soon became so involved in the maze of government that he left the conduct of the campaign almost entirely to Douay, confining his rôle to outlining strategic orders and policy. In the south Oaxaca remained beyond control. In the city of Campeche, however, the surrender to the French was announced in February, and the whole of the peninsula evidently was ready to accept the Regency.40

CONTINUATION OF THE CAMPAIGN

The campaign in the north continued under the leadership of Douay; as early as January 29 he had taken Teocaltiche, where he executed as brigands the captured generals Jáureguy, Mendoza, and Ramírez.41 La Blanca, a rich mining town, fell to the French on February 6. There was a brief pause in February while Uraga came out and threatened Guadalajara, but he soon withdrew into Colima again. Whenever possible it was the practice to persuade the leaders to come over to the side of the Empire. As already indicated, Bazaine and even Labastida had been in contact with Lerdo de Tejada, Doblado, Comonfort, and Vidaurri. Some of those negotiations, however, bore fruit. General Lozada had made himself undisputed master of Tepic with an army of Indians, and under the new situation he considered leaving the Republic for the Empire. On March 19 he sent his lieutenant, General Rivas, to discuss accepting the Empire, and a contract was made with Douay whereby he received a cash subsidy to cover expenses incident to bringing his force of two thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry into the Mexican Imperial Army.42 The example thus set was soon followed by the submission of General Elizondo.43 40 Bazaine to Douay, No. 68, Mexico, February 7, 1864, in BA, III, f. 581-582; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. liv, 192-202. 41 Niox, L'Expédition, 352. 42 Ibid., 365. 43 Bazaine to the Sub-Secrétaire de Justice, No. 345, Mexico, March 22, 1864, in BA, VIII, f. 1543.

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Tula and Tapalpa fell on March 26 and 27; Rincón Gallardo, the son-in-law of Doblado, was driven out of the north-central mountains in May and June, and by August 17, with the death of General Cantarito at Rancho de Rodeo, the State of Guanajuato was virtually cleared of any large groups of republicans. Further west Castagny had entered the state of Zacatecas in February and had driven the bands out. In March they were back under José María Chávez, who recaptured Malpaso on March 25 in a bloody massacre. But the very next day the French under Captain Crainvilliers caught him by surprise. In May Colonel Potier captured Nochistlán after a heavy fight in which General Jesús Mejía was killed. The capture of Nochistlán opened the road to the interior, whither Sandoval was retreating. Before the rapidly advancing French, Generals Cadena and Sandoval saw no way to escape; so in August they also gave up and joined the Empire.44 On the east side movement was slower. Mejia's Division was incapacitated in March and April by an epidemic of typhus, but by May it was in better shape, although the fact was kept secret. Mejía had occupied Real Catorce and Matehuala some weeks earlier and stopped there to consolidate. In the meantime Bazaine had learned from some captured letters45 that the Juarist forces planned two last, heavy attacks, one on Mejía by Doblado, who had reconstituted his army, and the other at Zacatecas. Bazaine did not communicate that news, however, but rather sent Colonel Aymard north from San Luis Potosí in a disguised formation that concealed the actual purpose but was so timed as to reach Matehuala about the same time as Doblado.46 The scheme succeeded: Doblado made a furious attack with some 6,000 men and forced Mejia's men back to the central plaza; then Aymard appeared with the 62nd Infantry Regiment from the west and attacked the flank and rear of Doblado's force, almost annihilating it. Doblado himself was so depressed after his last opportunity to command any large forces, and other signs of republican displeasure became so plain, that he took that opportunity to give up his command.47 However, whatever lack of sympathy he had with Ibid. Niox, L'Expédition, 370. 4 6 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 19, Mexico, May 28, 1864, in BA, VIII, f. 1561; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. xxii, 80-84. 47 Bazaine, Ibid., claimed that Doblado had for some time wanted to remove himself from the field and needed only a crowning defeat like this to make it possible to withdraw honorably. 44

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the Juarist government, he still could not quite bring himself to accept the Empire; therefore he withdrew to the United States to remain neutral. On the extreme east the French in Tampico under Colonel Llórente were hard pressed by the chiefs Carvajal and Cortina until Colonel Dupin, head of the Contreguérillas, moved north in April and relieved him. Later in the year the two main lines of advance were continued. General L'Hériller entered Durango on July 4; Castagny entered Vanegas August 9 and on August 20 entered Saltillo, where the troops separated, half going to Monterrey while Colonel Aymard took the others to Parras. Monterrey was occupied on August 26. In September they took Mezquital, Fresnillo, and Porfiar Sencillo. Admiral Bosse landed marines at Bagdad August 22. There they held out against attacks until the arrival of Mejia September 26 at Matamoros. Thereafter Mejia was in charge of the northern part of Tamaulipas. In Colima General Uraga had held out for months, debating the advantages of accepting the Empire. He clearly was repulsed by the extreme cruelties with which republican leaders, such as Rojas and Gutiérrez, had dishonored the Juarist cause; but he was not inclined to accept the French. Finally, after the arrival of Maximilian, in August he accepted the Empire and a place on the Council of State. At the end of 1864, therefore, the Empire could point to an occupation of some three-fourths of the national domain, omitting Chiapas, Guerrero, southern Michoacán, Sonora, and Chihuahua. There, at least in the main cities, the Empire was proclaimed and to a large extent respected. The early part of the year 1865 saw the Empire at its height. In December 1864 Bazaine again took the field and completed the defeat of the Juarist forces in Oaxaca, driving the remnants into Guerrero. The state of Chiapas came over to the Empire of its own accord, and, except for a part of Tabasco, the south was under control. In the north Castagny gradually moved up the coast, taking most of the towns in Sinaloa. The Guerrero-Michoacán area, however, continually produced more and more guerrilla bands under Alvarez, Arteaga, Méndez, and Régules. Several serious campaigns were waged in the area, and Guerrero never was really subdued. Then in the mid-year campaign a final, all-out effort was made to drive Juárez out of Mexico and thus improve hopes of recognition of

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the Empire by the United States. Castagny moved into Sonora to keep Juárez from escaping through that route, and Brincourt led a brigade against Chihuahua with that specific purpose in mind. He reached Río Florido on July 22, then headed for Parral. After a very difficult crossing of the Rio de Conchos he moved on Rosales, which he reached on August 9. Four days earlier Juárez had left Chihuahua City for El Paso, and the Liberal army was scattered. Brincourt entered Chihuahua on the 15th and set up a departmental government. There he received reports, corroborated by articles in American newspapers, that Juárez had crossed over into the United States, and he so reported to Mexico. Shortly thereafter, possibly under the implied threat of American action, Brincourt was ordered to withdraw. He and some petitioners requested that the French stay in order to insure the safety of the population, and Bazaine accepted the petition. But his orders were too late; Brincourt already had withdrawn according to previous orders. A new expedition from Durango was therefore necessary. It re-entered Chihuahua on December 11, after Juárez, who returned on the French withdrawal, had moved back to El Paso. Meantime Gamier, of Castagny's division, moved up from Guaymas in July, 1865 and took Hermosillo without firing a shot. In Ures a revolt in favor of the Empire opened the doors of that city, and Gamier entered it on August 15, the same day that Brincourt was entering Chihuahua. That city, however, was as far as the French went; the 62nd Regiment was left to garrison both Sinaloa and Sonora, and the 51st was returned to Durango. Those last movements represented the farthest extensions of French occupation; after the fall of 1865 the pressure of the United States' hostile attitude and the instructions of Napoleon III led Bazaine to order a massing of his troops toward the center, and the extreme limits were not attained again.

EFFORTS AT RECONCILIATION WITH THE LIBERALS

In spite of the successes of the French arms, the leading elements of Juarist forces did not give up. By the persuasion and conciliatory program already described, Bazaine sought to persuade responsible and conscientious leaders to desert the Juarist cause for the Empire. He had refused the program of the Conservatives in order to appeal

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to the more liberal Juarists. He had treated prisoners with reasonable leniency in the hope that they would allege adherence to the Empire. He had broken up the military concentrations wherever he heard of them, thus robbing the leaders of mutual influences that would maintain an esprit and attitude of defiance. He had offered positions of about the same rank and importance to officers and leaders who would come over to the Empire, and he sought to calm their hesitancy as well as that of the officials already accepted and in office by promising them that they need not fear that the French would abandon them to their fate.48 Another measure intended to attract the liberals was the system of amnesty. Such a measure was not by any means new to Mexico; it had been a regular practice to make offers of amnesty to the opposition; and after one faction succeeded to political power, it often presented the amnesty to groups holding out against the victors. Usually the offer was made for a definite period of time, with threat that thereafter severe measures would be taken.49 At the beginning of the intervention the French and the conservatives, as already shown, used the system of manifestos that simply called for sympathizers to join their cause. After the declaration of war the regular soldiers had to be treated as prisoners of war when taken; but roving, marauding bands were treated as outlaws. On the capture of Puebla the Mexican units were made available to volunteers from among the prisoners on an equal basis. Forey's law on courts-martial only spoke of malhechores armados, omitting any reference to organized soldiers.50 During the period from the fall of Puebla to the arrival of Maximilian the practice was to recognize as lawful belligerents those armed forces which met and fought with or retreated from the French. Those smaller groups known to have made raids on towns or individuals, no matter in whose name they operated, were treated as outlaws. In the meantime Almonte had prepared a decree that was in effect an amnesty. Officers of the "dissident" army were given fifteen days 4 8 Bazaine to Douay, No. 68, Mexico, February 7, 1864, in BA, III, f. 581-582; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. liv, 192-202. 4 9 For example, the Juárez government on November 29, 1861, issued a decree conceding in general an amnesty for all of its present opponents during the war of the Reform except a small number of special categories. The text is in Arrillaga, Recopilación de leyes. . . . XIX, 3-5 (December 2, 1861). 5° Boletín de las leyes, I, No. 25, 57-58,

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from the date of publication to take an oath of allegiance (the term universally used was faire un acte d'adhésion) to the new government. Bazaine objected that fifteen days would not be a fair amount of time, considering the wide areas over which the news must be spread; and he recommended a limit of thirty days. The final version accepted the change.51 In explaining his stand, Bazaine stated that Today the troops of ex-President Juárez are dispersed; the principal cities of the Empire are occupied by allied troops. I believe the moment has come to put into execution the decree in question, and I shall have it published in the name of the Regency and of the Empire at Guadalajara on the 9th of this month. 52

It is impossible to say whether the amnesty was a success. Some leaders had come over to the Empire before the publication; others came over later. There is no way at present to say whether the amnesty hastened the defections to the Empire. However, it was clear by the early summer of 1864 that many important personages were holding out either because of their convictions or because of their hope of negotiating. Finally, after the arrival of Maximilian, a new amnesty was proclaimed, but it affected principally prisoners already sentenced.53 The number of Juarist leaders who came to the Empire with the arrival of Maximilian was no large increase — General Uraga was the chief one. THE SANTA ANNA EPISODE

While some Juarist leaders thought seriously about joining the Empire, as already indicated, the more important and conscientious ones seemed to consider the significance of such a move and entered into negotiations, seeking to gain concessions for themselves. Those who sought any rank and position often were accomodated. The others, like Doblado and Lerdo de Tejada, who tried to deal in terms of liberalized government, were disappointed. Of that whole group one outstanding example is chosen here to illustrate the sort of problem that faced Bazaine in trying to bring over important personages without compromising the aims of the Intervention and without allowing himself to be hoodwinked into losing the dominant position he represented. Text in Bazaine letter in BA, 53 Text in 51 52

Boletín de las leyes, II, No. 8, p. 34-36. to Almonte, No. 107, Guadalajara, January 8, 1864, an unpublished III, f. 518. Boletín de las leyes, III, No. 37, 42.

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From his place in exile in the Virgin Islands Antonio López de Santa Anna had kept a close watch on events in Mexico, and with the Intervention he saw a new chance to return to at least some of his former importance. He immediately wrote to his friend Gutierrez de Estrada, offering his support and sympathy.54 Still later he humbly offered his services to the cause of the Empire.55 Receiving no answer, he decided to address himself to the French authorities and the Regency. He wrote to Bazaine and to Almonte, asking humbly that he be allowed to return to his native land to attend to some private business in the area of Jalapa. Both Bazaine and Almonte favored allowing the trip and so indicated to him. Thereupon he obtained passage on the English packet boat from Southampton to Veracruz, and once on board he announced his intention to issue a manifesto on his arrival — a manifesto that would explain his line of conduct to the Mexican people and the reasons he had for deciding to support the Empire. Bazaine immediately suspected a plot and outright refused Santa Anna permission to issue a manifesto or to develop before the nation any of his political theories or reasons for his conduct. Further, General Santa Anna is authorized to return to his native land as a simple citizen and as a retired Mexican general who is coming to rally about his flag. 59

Those instructions notwithstanding, upon his arrival in Veracruz and the day after he had signed a promise to the French authorities not to issue a manifesto, he did issue such a statement, reviewing his own services and saying little about the Empire. It was published in Mexico and Orizaba, March 3, 1864.57 Since the manifesto was dated February 28, it was evidently a breach of the promise.58 The tone was unfriendly toward the Intervention and the Empire, though not outwardly so. Bazaine had no 54 Santa Anna to Gutiérrez de Estrada, St. Thomas, October 15, 1861, in Martin, Maximilian in Mexico, Appendix VI, 451-452. Also idem to idem, St. Thomas, November 30, 1861, in ibid., 452-453. 55 Santa Anna to Maximilian, St. Thomas, December 22, 1863, in ibid., 453-454. 56 Bazaine to the Consul General de France à la Havane, Mexico, February 9, 1864, in BA, IV, f. 613v; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. Ixi, 234-237. 57 Printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., II, Anexos, No. 1, 197-204. 58 For the text of the promise to the French, see the letter of Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Mexico, March 9, 1864, in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVIII, Doc. XV, 52-60.

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sympathy for manifestos and would have no more of such duplicity; Santa Anna had made it clear already that his intentions were anything but domestic. Bazaine therefore issued orders to the French Navy to place a ship at his disposal and see that Santa Anna sailed away on it.59 In a heartbroken protest on the eve of his departure, the General explained that if he had signed a promise not to issue a manifesto, it was because he could not read French, and, besides, in earlier correspondence with Forey, nothing was said about not issuing manifestos. Furthermore, since Almonte was the head of the government and had not prohibited a manifesto, he saw no reason for not issuing one. Finally, in his distress the perennial curmudgeon threatened to report Bazaine's officiousness to Napoleon III. 60 Bazaine's only answer was a communique that outlined the circumstances that had prompted the new expulsion.61 Thereupon Santa Anna withdrew to the Virgin Islands again. His communication with friends and sympathizers in Mexico continued, and he kept a close watch for a new opportunity to intervene.

T H E LAST R E S O R T

Though with minor fights the conquest of Mexican territory continued steadily, and though a fairly large number of Mexican leaders came over to the Empire, it soon became clear that general sympathy was not with the Empire, and many respected men still refused to join. By November of 1864 the Intervention had reached its last stratagem. Leniency had been tried, amnesties offered, cash payments made; a liberal political policy had been offered, even to the extent of alienating the support of arch-conservatives. The main armies had been broken into bands; and for those whose stubbornness was based on a dislike of the French, a new neutral Emperor had been installed to offer a mutual appeal to all factions. But both the scattered bands and the organized forces in the far north held out, and in the capital many high-placed sympathizers gave lip service to the Empire while 59 Bazaine to Santa Anna, No. 24, Mexico, March 3, 1864; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., II, Anexo II, 205-206. 60 Santa Anna to Bazaine, Veracruz, March 12, 1864, in Genaro García, Col. doc., II, Anexo III, 2 0 7 - 2 0 9 . 61 Genaro García, Col. doc., XVIII, Doc. xx, 69-71.

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they secretly worked for the Republic. On November 3, 1864, then, the only tactic left seemed to be force; and with the publication of the Law of November 3, 1864, the policy turned to one of attrition, in which the superior organization, strategic location, and powerful ally (France) were expected to wear the opposition down until it disappeared.62 That law, after bland platitudes at the beginning, stated: We declare . . . that all the armed bands that still rove some parts of our beautiful country . . . should be considered cuadrillos de bandidos and fall consequently under the inflexible and inexorable severity of the Law. We order all officials, magistrates, and military leaders of the Nation to pursue them with all their forces, to annihilation.63

Boletín de las leyes, III, No. 178, 188-189. « Ibid. 62

CHAPTER V

T H E E M P I R E AS A P S E U D O - R E A L I T Y

ACCEPTANCE OF THE THRONE BY MAXIMILIAN

Until the middle of May is was not definite that Archduke Maximilian would accept the proffered crown, and his vacillation led to renewed nationalist hopes for an end to the Intervention; hence an upsurge of republican hopes. The course of the imposed government was very sensitive to such feelings, and for a time defections from the Juarist ranks fell off. Obviously no responsible person would undertake to join an imperial cause if the whole scheme seemed about to fall through. Several important Mexican leaders who had been thinking of coming over to the Empire ceased communication, and a stiffened situation resulted. On the other hand, after the Battle of Matehuala a virtual standstill developed in military operations except for the marauding of small guerrilla forces, and the French troops marched northward, meeting only sporadic resistance.1 Bazaine was quick to understand the situation. He immediately took steps to reassure the populace that the Empire was as good as a fact, although he himself was waiting impatiently for the imperial decision. The arrival of the Emperor, he hoped, would resolve in his favor the deadlock in the Regency. Accordingly he issued orders for the organization of an escort for the sovereign couple and published descriptions of the honors to be rendered them. Under his instructions the orders were published in the press and widely distributed. Thus to some extent he controlled wavering elements.2 However, the opposition of the United States to the notion of an empire weakened his influence, and by June of 1864 the problem was still unsettled.3 1 Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien — son élévation et sa chute, 33, goes so far as to say that never since 1821 had the country enjoyed such peace and quiet. 2 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Mexico, May 10, 1864, in BA, VIII, f. 1455 v. 8 Ibid. Loizillon also stated it clearly: "The further we go, the more we see the difficulties that exist everywhere. The uncertainty in which we find ourselves on the matter of the arrival of Maximilian, the threat of the American Congress,

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The French hoped that the Civil War in the United States would prevent any positive American action and that once the Empire was established, the Northern Republic would accept it as a fait accompli. Near the end of May the news of the definite acceptance of Maximilian and the conclusion of the Treaty of Miramar and the embarkation of the Archduke brought those discomforts to an end.4 Bazaine encouraged public celebration, including a Te Deum in the Cathedral. 5 While waiting for Maximilian's arrival, both sides played for time. The French felt confident6 that, if they could only establish the Empire with a show of independence from French control, the remaining dissident patriots — those opposed to the Intervention on account of the presence of the French army and those who opposed the extreme Conservatives in the civil administration — would flock to the Emperor, particularly if offered conciliatory inducements. The immediate problem was to avoid further antagonizing the Mexican leaders by more military campaigns, except possibly those directed at the core of diehards in the north. Then, upon the arrival of the Emperor pains were to be taken to show that Maximilian was not a French puppet but the possessor of real civil powers and with an army of his own. With such a government enough Mexican leaders all together keeps everyone from wanting to advance or compromise himself." — Loizillon to his sister, May 18, 1864, in Loizillon, Lettres, 225-226. The Confederate States, however, could hope to gain diplomatic recognition by recognizing the new government and at the earliest moment did so by sending General William Preston as Minister to the Mexican Empire. — Jefferson Davis to Maximilian, Richmond, January 7, 1864, in U.S. Navy, Official Records, Ser. II, Vol. Ill, p. 155 and idem to Preston, Richmond, January 7, 1864 in ibid., p. 154. Instructions to Preston leave no doubt of the vital concern of the Confederacy to make clear to the Empire their mutual danger from the North and to urge united action. — J. P. Benjamin to Preston, Richmond, January 7, 1864, in ibid., pp. 988-990; Benjamin to Slidell, Richmond, June 23, 1864, in ibid., p. 1156. The concern came to no avail. Lincoln, despite public statements and accompanying support of Juárez, had authorized his agent Mercier to intimate to Maximilian the chance of recognition of his government provided he avoided aid to the Confederate States. - Slidell to Benjamin, Paris, March 16, 1864, in ibid., pp. 1063-1065. John T. Pickett had already been appointed agent to the Juarez government. — R. Toombs to Pickett, Montgomery, May 17, 1861, in ibid., pp. 202-205. 4 For the text of the Treaty, see Advenimiento, 127-128; Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, I, 351-355; Martin, Maximilian in Mexico, Appendix III (French text) and Appendix IV (English translation), 443-447; José María Hidalgo, Proyectos de monarquía en México, 252-256; Carlos Sánchez-Navarro, Miramón, 252-254. 5 Bazaine to Maussion, Brincourt., etc., Mexico, May 20, 1864, in BA, VII, f. 1519. ' Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 18, Mexico, May 10, 1864, in BA, VII, f. 1455 v.

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might be brought into the fold to insure the collapse of the Juarist forces and open the way for a withdrawal of French troops.7 Thus the French policy would be to avoid open fighting except for police work and to use only undercover operations to undermine the opposition. R E C E P T I O N O F MAXIMILIAN

Upon receipt of the news of the departure of Maximilian from Europe, elaborate plans were laid for the reception, and all of the participants became impatient. On May 28 Bazaine wrote that he regretted the delay at a time when the Emperor s presence would be so useful in Mexico.8 The palace at Chapultepec was prepared for the royal residence, and provisions were made that on the arrival of the couple the Mexican flag should be hoisted to the top of the turret at the castle, alongside the French flag.9 Salvos of 101 guns were to be fired on the approach of the imperial couple, but even in other cities of importance similar honors were to be rendered. The political prefect of the city of Querétaro asked for permission to fire more than the one salvo indicated for the troops, and Bazaine approved, provided that the city should itself bear the expense of more than the one salvo, which was to be paid for by the French army, and that the French were not to mix in such business any more.10 The French troops, even in the capital, were instructed not to make themselves conspicuous but to participate by a parade and lend their presence 7 The French officers, even those in the field, were well aware of that situation, as shown by a letter of Loizillon: "At last Maximilian is going to arrive; we are waiting impatiently for him, and we are anxious to know what line of conduct he will adopt. Everything depends on the first impression he makes. "If, without alienating the clerical and reactionary party, he succeeds in convincing them that he has decided definitely not to support their demands, he will have a good chance of inspiring confidence in the Mexican people. "These beginnings should immediately result in the adhesion to the Empire of a large number of the people who have so far kept themselves aloof. . . . "Supposing that he can, as is being tried, take over six thousand men of our Foreign Legion, then we would only have to leave a brigade as an occupation force, and the rest of the army could be returned at the end of the year." Loizillon to Mme. Comu, June 1, 1864, in Loizillon, Lettres, 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 , 236. 8 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Mexico, May 28, 1 8 6 [ 4 ] , in BA, VIII, f. 1562-1568. ® Bazaine to the Mexican Secretary of Justice, Mexico, May 30, 1864, an unpublished letter in BA, VIII, f. 1575. 10 Bazaine to General Castagny, Mexico, June 5, 1864, an unpublished letter in the Bazaine Archives, IX, f. 1604.

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during the Te Deum at the Cathedral; then they were to return to their quarters and give the impression that the show was purely a Mexican one.11 Unassigned French officers, however, were permitted to attend the ceremonies.12 Along with the news of the departure of Maximilian from Europe came other communications affecting the French. First, Almonte was named Lieutenant General of the Empire, representing the Emperor until his arrival. That placed Almonte in the position of bearing sovereign powers; and he replaced the Regency, which thenceforth no longer existed.13 It also gave Almonte the right to sovereign honors. When it was learned that Maximilian was due to arrive on the 28th or 30th of May,14 the escort departed for Veracruz, presumably with all preparations made, but with the exact time of arrival not yet known. It was then left for Bazaine to make final provisions for adjusting French policy to meet the requirements of the new regime. On May 28, 1864 he wrote to Randon as follows: You may be sure that I shall use all necessary tact in my relations with Maximilian and his government and at the same time shall not lessen the authority of the Commander nor the dignity and influence of our flag. 15

That the situation might become a tense one was anticipated by Napoleon III: Your position must be difficult and delicate, but your firm and loyal character will, I have no doubt, lead you to triumph over all the obstacles. 16 » Ibid. Bazaine to Almonte, Mexico, May 18, 1864, an unpublished letter in BA, VIII, f. 1496. 13 Bazaine to Maussion, Brincourt, etc., Mexico, May 20, 1864, in BA, VIII, f. 1519; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. xix, 71-72. That was one of the first acts of Maximilian after his investiture, on April 10, 1864; see Acta remitida de Mirartxar por la Comision encargada de ofrecer los votos de los Mexicanos y la Corona de México à S. Α. I. y R. el Archiduque Fernando Maximiliano de Austria y decreto de S. M. et Emperador nombrando su lugarteniente al Exmo Sr. General D. Juan N. Almonte, Mexico, 1864. The act also appears in Advenimiento, p. 151; and Boletín de las leyes, III, No. 3, 14-15. 14 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, May 28, 1864, in BA, VIII, f. 1556; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. xxi, 74-79. 15 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 19, Mexico, May 28, 1864, in BA, VIII, f. 1561 ν; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. xxi, 80-84. 16 Napoleon III to Bazaine, Fontainebleau, July 7, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1706; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. liii, 173-175. 12

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In a circular letter to all of his commanders early in June, Bazaine offered a more specific policy: The Emperor has arrived in Mexico, and in a few days he will take over the throne. Naturally the duties of the Intervention are modified by the arrival of the Sovereign to direct the affairs of the country, and I shall designate what, from my point of view, your duties are and the rôle you are to play. Military command remains confided in you, and you will exercise all the authority provided in Article 5, Convention of April 10, 1864, of which I am sending you a copy. Civil administration devolves upon the Government of the Empire, and you will avoid getting involved with the various branches of the administrative services. Your surveillance over administrative and financial agents will likewise cease. Nonetheless you will continue to keep advised of the way affairs are going, and, as in the past, every fifteen days you will send me general reports to keep me abreast of events; these will permit me, if an occasion arises, to point out to the Emperor abuses or unhappy tendencies that might arise. In your relations with the delegates of Mexican authorities, you will show all the tact that you have shown heretofore, and you will avoid any conflict of authority or power... . You will not hesitate to refer to me any difficulty that might arise in this respect, and you will likewise report to me any scandalous acts or anything contrary to the principles that we have proclaimed and of which you must be aware. It is possible that His Majesty will maintain a state of war for some time in areas designated later. . . . In this case the powers of command are definite, and nothing will be changed. Your political actions will always maintain the good relations that should exist between civil and military functions, and by a judicious influence you will maintain confidence in representatives of France and the generous ideas that she has tried to bestow upon Mexico. The good harmony between our soldiers and the inhabitants is witness of this confidence. Your position toward the Mexican authorities will be analogous to that of a general officer to the prefect and administrative authorities in France. 17 While those instructions make some of the questions clear, it is noteworthy that they still relied heavily on the use of tact as a method of reaching the desired end of influencing the Mexican administration toward the pattern set by France itself. In those parts of Mexico where a state of war existed, of course, civil rights were lifted, and 17 Bazaine to all Commanders, No. 479, Mexico, June 3, 1864, in BA, VIII, f. 1590-1591; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. xxxii, 99-104.

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the will of the military commander was the supreme power. So in spite of its words, the situation was not greatly changed because most of the states were certain to remain in a state of war for some time. The escort at Veracruz met with organizational troubles and delays, and there were functional difficulties on the road. But it performed its major function and made the return trip with the minimum of inconvenience. The Emperor arrived in Mexico City on June 12, one year after the publication of Forey's Manifesto, although no attention was called to that fact. At Orizaba on the eve of his entry some liberal elements spread abroad small leaflets on which were written "Viva la república! Viva la independencia!" and "Death to the Emperor and the miserable black sheep!" On hearing of that incident, Bazaine ordered extra precautions to avoid a repetition of such an annoyance in the capital.18 The program of popularizing the Empire and the Emperor seems actually to have succeeded with the local Indians, though credit is probably due to local churchmen who had more direct contact with the Indians. At least all accounts seem to agree that the Indians met the Imperial party with enthusiasm,19 although it was an exaggeration to say that "not the least hostile demonstration took place on the trip".20 Bazaine was relieved and happy to report that "The attitude of His Majesty toward the [political] parties and the words spoken 18 Bazaine to the Mexican Undersecretary of State for Government, Mexico, June 8, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1608. Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Mexico, June 11, 1864, an unpublished letter in BA, IX, f. 1619; also expressed in the letter Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, June 11, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1616; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XX, Doc. xxxviii, 115-119. That aspect is more detailed in the letter of Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Mexico, June 24, 1864, an unpublished letter in BA, IX, f. 1653 (Spanish translation only). The Indians came long distances and crowded around the coaches and stayed with them for long periods, attesting with their vivas and demonstrations the confidence they had in the peaceful future and justice that was being prepared under the French flag, showing by their warm acclaim the support they were ready to give to the beginning of this era of liberty and progress. 20 Nor would they be expected with the precautions taken: The governors of Orizaba, Puebla, and Mexico successively escorted them, and General Neigre had two squadrons of cavalry guarding the bridge at Texmelucan; a volunteer company was posted in the woods near the road, and at the pass of the Río Frio; and two companies of Zouaves were stationed at Buena Vista. See Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Mexico, June 24, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1653; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. xlv, 137-140.

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at receptions show that the conciliatory policy of the Intervention will continue". The arrival of Maximilian led directly to the repatriation of a token group of the French soldiers — a move much desired by many of the soldiers themselves, as voiced by Loizillon. In continental France the continued arming and consolidation of the Prussian nation and the requirements of the Intervention were making heavy demands on the French Treasury to pay for additional manpower in the armed forces. In addition the strident voices of a few critics of the administration, notably Jules Favre, made a token move of repatriation especially desirable at this time. Thus Bazaine, aware of the pressure from Paris to begin the return of the Expeditionary Force, announced on the day the Emperor entered the capital, the repatriation of some of his troops: Today I can assure you that by the end of October we can return six battalions, a company of Engineers, one artillery battery, the Guard train, along with the personnel on leave. By not replacing them here, the corps will be reduced to about 2 5 , 0 0 0 except for unforeseen circumstances. This figure is enough to support the Mexican Army, which will go on growing, soon to be aided by the adhesion of General Uraga, of which I have every hope according to the last negotiations. 21

At the same time General Douay wrote a friend that he feared returning any part of the army in October. The letter reached Napoleon, who left the decision to Bazaine.22 Later on Douay could point to his warning as proof of his good judgement, but it must be kept in mind that Douay felt a definite rivalry with Bazaine. Besides, not being in command, he could feel free to criticize him for doing what he himself would probably have done under the same circumstances. The use of Uraga's men to replace those returned to France would not only add some two thousand soldiers to Imperial forces but would reduce the opposition by that amount. Moreover, the Empire could expect valuable help from the Belgian and Austrian troops due to arrive in October, about the same time that the French repatriates were to embark.23 These new European troops represented support 21 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, June 11, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1616; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. xxxviii, 115-119. 22 Napoleon III to Bazaine, Fontainebleau, July 7, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1706; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. liii, 173-175. Although that letter places responsibility for the decision on Bazaine, an air of relief at his decision is evident, and a postcript makes it even more clear. 23 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, June 28, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1673; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. xlvii, 150-154.

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for each of the royal houses of Maximilian and Cariota, furnished to help the couple establish themselves without complete dependence on the French. A plan had already been prepared for reorganizing the French troops after the return of the October contingent. No large-scale fighting was going on, although in Matamoros the mistreatment and execution of some French nationals by Cortina, the Juarist governor, led Bazaine to believe that the occupation of that town could not be long delayed. News of the civil war in the United States was encouraging — it seemed that the Federal troops were about to be forced to evacuate Texas and Louisiana. General Castagny had entered Monterrey September 6, and Mejia was on his way to Matamoros with his rear guarded by Dupin's Contreguérillas, with their headquarters at Victoria. Juárez had fled to Chihuahua, with Aymard close behind him.

BEGINNING OF IMPERIAL POLICY

By the end of June Maximilian began to make decisions of his own, and Bazaine was able and evidently glad to report that all political factions who had met the Emperor had been charmed by him and convinced of his ability to set up a liberal, conciliatory regime. Few officials were changed immediately. The religious question had been postponed pending the arrival of the Papal Nuncio, and in the meantime the problem was left to be handled as the French had been doing it. The Emperor had set up a Commission for Finance, with Corta at the head, and a Military Commission with Bazaine at the head, to plan a "moral and economical reorganization of these two branches of the government".24 In the meantime the relations between Bazaine and the Emperor were very easy; the latter was good enough to leave military affairs entirely in his hands, and Bazaine assured the Minister of War that he would not abuse the privilege, and that all decisions would be reported to the Emperor.25 All in all, the picture was promising, and the end of the French participation in the controls seemed almost in sight. Ibid. Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Mexico, June 28, 1864, an unpublished letter in BA, IX, f. 1674-1675. 24

25

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That happy relationship continued through the beginning ot July. In Bazaine's own words. So far nothing has come to disturb the harmony that reigns between our military command and the administrative authorities, and everything leads me to believe that this accord will continue without conflict.26 On the political front, however, Maximilian felt the need for dramatic and aggressive acts that would appeal to the Mexican people by identifying him with their problems. Quite in keeping with his past political record, he chose clemency over severity. On the 6th of June he proclaimed a general amnesty extending to all detainees (prisoners under court-martial sentence of less than ten years' imprisonment or of hard labor). It also allowed the return to Mexico of all the prisoners of war deported to Martinique. Since the prisoners were undei military control, this proposal became a military problem. Although Bazaine felt reluctant to allow the return of men who already once had fought his own troops, he prepared a list of the prisoners and forwarded it to Admiral Bosse for the necessary action. Bazaine's experience had taught him to keep a close check on the public pulse,27 but the reaction of the Mexicans to this decree was not all clear. There was as much danger that the Juarists would take the measure as a sign of weakness as there was possible advantage in the Emperor's paternal gesture for reconciliation. Another very liberal measure taken by Maximilian against the advice of the French had even more serious consequences. Impressed by the dwindling of maritime trade and the increase of contraband commerce, and also apparently influenced by some of the liberal members of his council, Maximilian ordered the blockade of Mexican ports lifted.28 That was a heavy blow to the French army, which had counted on keeping arms and supplies from reaching the Juarists. Under the new conditions the French ships could only watch and report; they could not capture ships bringing supplies to the republicans. Needless to say, the Juarists took full advantage of that unexpected windfall. While the French dealt with the Regency, nearly all differences in policy were resolved in French favor. But with Maximilian present 2 8 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Mexico, July 1, 1864, unpublished letter in BA, IX, f. 1686 (Spanish translation only). 27 Ibid. For the text of the amnesty, see Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 199. 28 Boletín de las leyes, III, No. 68, dated July 29, 1864, p. 86.

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in person, the French could not use a heavy hand. A few incidents will show how the French yielded deferently in cases where they would have taken a firmer stand before the Emperor's arrival. As early as March 10 Maximilian had issued a decree establishing a medal of Mérite Militaire, intended for soldiers and non-commissioned officers who distinguished themselves by acts of bravery. The medal was conferred upon several men in the French Army, and the medals were forwarded to Bazaine for distribution. On their arrival, however, it was discovered that the colors in the ribbon were identical with the pattern of the cross of the Legion of Honor. Therefore, to avoid embarassment and possible protest from the officers of the Legion of Honor, Bazaine withheld distributing the medals pending receipt of a direct approval by the Minister of War; and in the meantime he submitted recommendations to the Emperor for a change in the color combination.29 Again, soon after his arrival, Maximilian instituted on his birthday, June 6,30 grants of decorations of the Order of Guadalupe, some of which were received by members of the French Army. Bazaine had recommended fourteen names, but of them Maximilian chose only General Hurbal and General Vialla, Colonel Maneque, Colonel Aymard, Lieutenant Colonel Boyer, Chief of Gendarmerie Chastel, Dr. Hermann, and Captain Willette, Lieutenant Fleury of the 2nd Zouaves, and Second Lieutenant Girardin of the First Chasseurs d'Afrique, Sergeant Talbot of the Third Zouaves, and Corporal Litscher of the Second Chasseurs d'Afrique. He omitted General Douay, General Castagny, General L'Hériller, Intendent Wolf, and M. Budin. "This parsimonious promotion," Bazaine explained, "has caused a bad impression in the army; but since the Emperor has said he intends to name a larger number later, this impression will disappear."31 Therefore the incident did not constitute a real breach of friendship. 29 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 44, Mexico, June 8, 1864, an unpublished letter in BA, IX, f. 1606 (Spanish translation only). 30 To whose celebration the French Army contributed by public parade in their best uniforms. — Bazaine to the Grand Marshal of the Court, Mexico, July 2, 1864, an unpublished letter in BA, IX, f. 1693. Also the French army honored the day with three 21-gun salvos, at sunrise, after the T e Deum, and at sunset: Bazaine to Castagny, Mexico, July 5, 1864, an unpublished letter in BA, IX, f. 1702. " Ibid. For the establishment of and rules governing this order, see Boletín de las leyes, I, Doc. 138, 3 5 5 - 3 6 8 , and III, No. 4, 15-16, No. 5, 16-17. The order appointing the French members appears in ibid., III, No. 38, 44-45.

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Two months later, in August, Maximilian began his first extended visit to the northern provinces. In reporting on the events of the trip, Bazaine shared the displeasure which the Emperor had expressed at the Bishop of Querétaro's failure to come to his diocese in honor of the visit. Bazaine also approved the action of Maximilian in another matter. A number of Indians in Cadereyta had not been baptized because the clergy was not performing its duties. Maximilian offered to go there himself to see that they were baptized and to serve as their godfather. The clergymen, on hearing of the resolution, hastened to perform those duties, and, in Maximilian's own words, "since that time have been baptizing with fire pumps".32 These incidents involving clerical representatives were not isolated. Baron de Graux, formerly Belgian chargé d'affaires, had bought some of the nationalized property and had refused to "restore" it to the Church. Moreover, he had taken an oath to the Constitution of 1857. Recently, while he lay on his deathbed, the head chaplain of the army was called to him but refused to come because he was not authorized to administer rites in such cases. When Maximilian heard of the incident, he was moved, as Bazaine approvingly reported,33 but is was too late for remedial action of any use to the Baron. Though such annoyances appeared between Maximilian and the French, at least they were united in their opposition to the extreme position taken by the followers of Archbishop Labastida. Napoleon III recognized this agreement as soon as he read Bazaine's letter, and his answer shows his first reaction: I fear there will be a good many conflicts in the Government, but 1 want the Government to consider itself [i.e. Maximilian] able to fly with its own wings. T h e important thing is that his foreign army be well organized so that w e can leave as soon as possible. 3 4

On the 5th of September Bazaine was promoted to Marshal.3® The general approval of Maximilian's reactions continued for some time; and from the extensive data he gathered, Bazaine appraised his work thus: 32 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Mexico, August 27, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1796; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXII, Doc. ν, 30-34. 33 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Mexico, July 28, 1864; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. Ixii, 201-202. 34 Napoleon III to Bazaine, Fontainebleau, August 30, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1807; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXII, Doc. ix, 48. 3 5 Napoleon III, Decree, St. Cloud, September 5, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1817; Printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXII, Doc. xi, 54-56.

François Achille Bazaino, Marshall of France

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The impression made on the Emperor by what he sees wherever he goes is always the same; he sees with his own eyes and recognizes that there are many and fundamental reforms to be made in the organization and in the personnel of the Empire.. . . The people of the liberal party take pleasure in watching this tendency of the sovereign to cater to public opinion and general interests, and so they are showing themselves disposed to accept positions ip the administration. The reactionary party and the clergy on the contrary regard with dislike the enemies of their ideas taking part in the direction of affairs, and they are concealing their discontent only with difficulty. The clergy still show themselves to be restless and intolerant.36 Soon after this observation another case appeared wherein a man possessing nationalized property was refused absolution until he had renounced title for himself and his heirs to that property. Bazaine took care that the Emperor was informed of the new case also,37 but again it was too late to help the victim. Napoleon III, however, already had begun to doubt the ability of Maximilian to cope with the situation. When Eugénie wrote a letter of congratulations to Bazaine on his promotion, Napoleon added a postscript: "It seems to me that the Emperor will have to show a little more resolution". 38 By the end of September more weakness in Maximilian's policy became evident. It was true that after the Emperor's recovery from the illness that had delayed his visit to the interior, he had gone on and was everywhere welcomed and was acclaimed with favor by both the masses and by the intelligent classes, but he only went to centers safely in Imperial hands. Although the liberal party was influenced very favorably by the manner of the Emperor and some members were disposed to take part in the administration, they were still reserved about it and showed some disquietude. However, the Emperor's government had taken no decisive step that would show a constructive attitude toward the grave problems facing the nation. Beside the amnesty and end of the blockade, no decree, no law had appeared to show the Emperor's intentions or to reassure his subjects about the future. Even when apparent converts to the Empire took office under its government, these members of the liberal party sometimes went to the extremes used by the reactionaries, though for se Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 44, Mexico, September 10, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1848; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X I I , Doc. xvi, 79-85. 37 Ibid. a 8 Napoleon III to Bazaine, Schul(al)bach, September 14, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1861; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXII, Doc. xix, 98.

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opposite reasons — sabotage. To achieve their ends, certain officials urged the reactionaries on to "destroy the edifice built with such great pains". In short, the energy and intelligence of the country were all on the side of the liberals. Bazaine already had written to Napoleon to explain the mediocre abilities of the conservative officials because he feared that at that time the reactionary officials were only alienating the sympathy of the French officers. In summary: Everywhere there is a sort of indifference that can only be attributed to the reason mentioned above — that lack of any decision toward the solution of the serious questions that are dividing the country. Confidence seems to appear only where French bayonets have assured security and under French commanders who look after the general interest as well as the interests of individuals. It is impossible to leave garrisons everywhere, and I am trying to make them all understand that when a country saves itself, it must help itself and that it should play its own part in the work of regeneration.3· The same note of frustation was not evident in Maximilian, however, and on October 7 he sent congratulations to Bazaine on his promotion, adding The only thing that diminishes the joy we feel at this news is the possibility that it may be reason for you to leave our country. I hope that the Emperor will not deprive Mexico of the services that are so necessary to it." By October the situation had changed little; many responsible gov39 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 47, Mexico, September 27, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1900; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXII, Doc. xxv, 112-120. A certain degree of contradiction appears in many statements and attitudes stated in that letter. The Emperor was acclaimed, but the people were indifferent. The liberals were favorably influenced, but some were seeking to destroy the Empire from within. Liberals also were favorably impressed, but they showed "greater reserve", etc. Closer thought will show that those fluctuating impressions were very understandable. His sources, spies, informers, and frequent reports from French garrisons, were so copious that they must have given a fairly accurate picture of the occupied territory. Under the circumstances we should expect to find a great ferment of thought and attitudes, varying from one town to another and changing color daily, blowing hot and cold toward the Empire with the latest rumors and news, and with individuals influenced by a multitude of conflicting hopes, fears, and schemes. An honest report to Napoleon could not be a simple one. 40 Maximilian to Bazaine, No. 1, Penjamillo, October 7, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1910; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXII, Doc. xxix, 153-154. The language used here is strictly the language of diplomacy. As Corti (Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico) has shown, both Maximilian and Cariota were at the very time already indicating to Paris that the recall of Bazaine would meet with their approval.

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emmental officers were in a state of somnolence, doing nothing and showing no preparation for doing anything to further the Imperial cause. Evidently they were waiting for energetic action and leadership on higher levels. Maximilian, in the meantime, had continued his trip and "on his p a r t . . . replaced several functionaries whose incapacity or whose exaggerated zeal was compromising the interests of the administration and of the public treasure". Maximilian also had taken an interest in the administration of justice, but . . . the traditional habits of venality and the exasperating slowness of formalities and obstacles will not be easy to overcome, and must be opposed with an energetic hand and a determined will.41 Then speaking of the financial condition of the country, Bazaine used even harsher words: Elaborate import projects have been proposed, but they are not being carried out. I am awaiting an Imperial decision on which I do not dare count. The Emperor is perfectly well aware of the difficulties to be overcome and is searching every possible means of meeting his commitments. Unhappily the way His Majesty wants to economize is far from agreeing with the end that we want to reach.42 The fiscal program which Maximilian did evolve was to save on expenses by releasing a part of the Mexican army and then depending on the French army and the resguardos to maintain peace. While such a plan certainly would reduce the cost of government, it directly opposed the purposes of Napoleon III, and Bazaine accordingly felt compelled to try to dissuade the Emperor from pursuing it. It was the Marshal's hope to make the organization of an efficient Mexican army the principal point to depend on,43 and he succeeded in postponing action for several months. Contrary to Maximilian's lenient policy, when a Mexican, Hilario García, was sentenced to death in San Luis Potosí for the murder of two French soldiers, the Emperor approved the sentence as given.44 One aspect of the clemency shown was the decision of the Emperor 41 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 48, Mexico, October 10, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1916; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXII, Doc. xxx, 155-164.

42

45

Ibid., f. 1917 v. Ibid., f. 1917 v.

4 4 Bazaine to the Military Commander at Querétaro, No. 240, Mexico, October 16, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1925; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X I I , Doc. xxxiv, 172-173.

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early after his arrival that no more Mexicans sentenced to deportation should be sent to Martinique.45 However, the courts could and did continue handing out sentences of deportation. As a result Bazaine had to request the Emperor's government to name a place for the deportees to go. The problem came under his jurisdiction because such sentences were given by courtsmartial and by the consejo de guerra, and he was charged with such imprisonment. The Emperor on October 1 decided to use the island of San Juan de Ulúa and so designated the fortress. Bazaine immediately protested that the island was not suitable; that it was occupied by a French garrison, that it was a storehouse for French supplies, and that no local Mexican troops were available to guard the deportees. He in turn suggested as an alternative the Isla de los Sacrificios, which, with some work, could be made suitable.46 At the end of Maximilian's prolonged visit to the provinces north of the capital, and on his return to Mexico City, the Emperor did some of the things expected of him, clarifying several important points. First he declared the period of amnesty at an end and returned to the courts-martial the power of immediate execution of the sentences, under the rules of the tribunals.47 The French, as might be expected, approved the measure, and it received general approbation from the conservatives. On his return also Maximilian appointed six ministers to the portfolios of state, beginning with Velázquez de León, an arch-conservative who had come from Miramar with him. Bazaine approved of all the names and believed that the liberals also highly esteemed them: "They are all considered honest, and their appointment gives the government a security that up to now nearly always has been lacking."48 A more important measure for future concern was the appointment of special commissioners to go to the interior areas and inspect the préfets politiques as to their acts, method of administration, verification of complaints about them, and evaluation of their usefulness. 45 Bazaine to the Subsecretary of State for . . . [Justice], No. 435, Mexico, September 5, 1864, an unpublished letter in BA, X, f. 1818. 46 Bazaine to the Subsecretary of State for Justice, No. 457, Mexico, October 16, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1928; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXII, Doc. xxxiii, 170-172. 47 Boletín de las leyes, III, No. 106, pp. 116-117, dated September 16, 1864. 48 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 53, Mexico, November 27, 1864, in BA, XI, f. 2013-2015; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXIV, Doc. viii, 33-43.

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Bazaine highly approved of that measure. He himself had already requested the government to change some eight officials about whom he had received many complaints, and the request had been complied with. This commission, if properly executed, would relieve him of that burden thereafter. 49 Up to this time Mexican national governments had had a very unenviable record of tax collection but had relied very heavily on import duties for governmental expenses. Improvement in internal revenue was imperative; but as the Imperial officers seemed as helpless as their predecessors, Marshal Bazaine felt forced to take the initiative. He therefore requested of the new government that some financial agents from the French army be placed in the Mexican service and sent to the main cities of the Empire to try to maintain surveillance and control over the directors of Hacienda — the public treasury, and tax administration. Bazaine also supplied those agents with instructions and sent some of them out. Others were to follow when the Empire issued implementing instructions to the préfets politiques to receive them and to accept the orders of the agents. The French considered the plan extremely important because of pressures being brought to bear on them to reduce expenses, and Bazaine made it clear to the Mexican Secretary of State for Finances that he would suspend all advances to the Imperial Government if those officials did not go along with him in financial reforms and economies.50 The capture of the port of Mazatlán was expected soon to open another source of revenue, and later on Guaymas and Manzanillo. Douay had so pacified Jalisco and Colima by then that it was believed that soon the whole area, including Michoacán would have normal business restored. With French agents in control, there was reason to believe those sources of income would be operated more efficiently and honestly. However, to safeguard French interests and help insure popular support, Bazaine warned M. Harmant, the financial agent in Michoacán, to make it clear to the citizenry that responsibility for the program was to fall on the government, not on the French army.®1 " Ibid.

5 0 One agent, a M. Rolland, obtained control of the customs at Veracruz; M. Gervason was sent to Matamoros, which, when captured by Mejia, had $180,000 in the customs. Matamoros was still an important port for Texas cotton; over 100 ships were there at once sometimes; and the monthly customs ran to $180,000 or $200,000. - ibid. 51 Bazaine to Harmant, Mexico, December 9, 1864, an unpublished letter in BA, XI, f. 2029.

THE EMPIRE AS A PSEUDO-REALITY B E G I N N I N G O F T H E B R E A K IN F R E N C H AND I M P E R I A L

POLICIES

The Mexican government, however, failed to co-operate by issuing instructions to their officials to accept the French agents, and the latter were thus unable to assume their duties. Letters to the Secretary of Finance failed to break the deadlock as late as December. 52 Finally Bazaine even wrote to the Emperor to complain, but still to no avail. Not until late in December were the instructions forthcoming, and even then the officials did all they could to circumvent their being carried out.53 Bazaine saw in that lack of co-operation an effort to embarrass the French, and he noticed the same attitude in other acts of the government. 54 The clergy, he believed, was not satisfied with the Council of State, either, but nonetheless used its influence to help excite feeling against the French, thereby tending to the side of the nationalist, or liberal, party. 55 Relations with the Ministry became more strained in December when the Ministro de Gobernación wrote a critical letter to Bazaine, blaming the French for poor policing of some of the cities in the interior, specifically San Luis Potosí. The tone of the letter was such that Bazaine sent a very tart reply, after which only dislike and conflict could be expected from Velázquez de Léon: I am returning your letter signed by your secretary. I do not accept your last paragraph, where you use terms of reproach unsuitable and unmerited. I am responsible only to His Majesty for my acts, and I am responsible for those of my officers who only follow my instructions. If you had more energetic men at the head of your prefectures, we would not be obliged to police your highways and towns; and it is your function, my dear Minister, to look to that, not mine. So keep your reproaches for the ones who deserve them, and in the future abstain from corresponding with me through your secretary.59 5 2 Bazaine to the Undersecretary of State for Finance, Mexico, December 9, 1864, in BA, X I , f. 2 0 3 7 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X I V , Doc. xii, 53-55. 5 8 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 55, Mexico, December 27, 1864, in BA, XI, f. 2 0 7 9 - 2 0 8 0 ; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XXIV, Doc. xxiii, 102-110. 5 4 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 54, Mexico, December 10, 1864, in BA, XI, f. 2 0 4 7 - 2 0 4 9 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXIV, Doc. xiii, 56-68. 55 Ibid. 5 6 Bazaine to the Ministro de Gobernación, Mexico, December 23, 1864, in BA, XI, f. 2 0 7 1 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X I V , Doc. xxi, 97-98.

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Maximilian on December 4 had appointed a Council of State, consisting of a president, José María Lacunza, a moderate liberal, and a dependable man; Urbano Fonseca, a conservative legal expert; Hilario Elguerro, a conciliatory lawyer, well-educated, and a friend of Comonfort; he was a man of integrity, as Bazaine himself admitted; General José López Uraga, a highly-respected man but a free spender who had joined the Empire lately; Jesús Portillo López, ex-governor of Jalisco, and a moderate liberal; Vicente Ortigoza, a man of learning and well-known in Guadalajara as a moderate liberal; Francisco Ramirez, Maximilian's chaplain, ambitious, devoted to the palace, and momentarily with liberal tendencies; Manuel Siliceo, an extraliberal lawyer, well-educated, a friend of Comonfort, and also a man of integrity as well as a member of the National Party. One thing that the French noticed from the first was that they were all hostile to the "foreigner": "We must not count on the aid of the Council of State in the handling of questions that concern France in particular." 57 While Bazaine conceded that the appointments were, from the point of view of the Emperor, a very wise tactic, still he recognized that they were not favorable to French interests, and that they could account for a systematic obstructionism toward measures with which he had to deal; he clearly expected more trouble to come. The Court-martial system created its own problems. Forey had set up a system of courts-martial with jurisdiction over individuals who took part in the work of armed bands. 58 In all military courts sentences were passed and executed in the name of Napoleon III; but, on the request of Maximilian, his own name was substituted. In the composition of these courts, Bazaine had Mexican officers assigned so as to avoid the onus of having sentences and execution given purely by French officers. 59 5 7 B a z a i n e to the F r e n c h Minister of W a r , N o . 54, Mexico, D e c e m b e r 10, 1864, in B A , X I , f. 2 0 4 7 - 2 0 4 9 , w h e r e w e also f i n d the characterization of the individuals, a s B a z a i n e s a w them. 58 Boletín de las leyes, I, N o . 2 5 , p p . 57-58. 5 9 A special incident b r o u g h t this matter u p . D u r i n g the morning of D e c e m b e r 4 a F r e n c h court-martial c o n d e m n e d three " a s s a s s i n s " to d e a t h at S a n L u i s Potosí, a n d that s a m e e v e n i n g s o m e of the " l o w e r " class, the leperos, started an incident b y a t t a c k i n g three Z o u a v e s as they w a l k e d d o w n the street. Stones w e r e thrown, knives d r a w n , threats of d e a t h w e r e m a d e , a n d finally shots w e r e f i r e d a t a picket of g u a r d s w h o c a m e to the rescue. P r o m p t m e a s u r e s w e r e taken b y the F r e n c h ; they c a u g h t ten of the a r m e d ringleaders a n d h a d t h e m shot i m m e d i a t e l y , a n d the city r e g a i n e d its c a l m . T h e n the court-martial w a s t u r n e d over to M e x i c a n

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At last in December the long-awaited Papal Nuncio, Monseigneur Meglia, arrived. Bazaine learned even before the arrival, from agents in the main cities where Mgr. Meglia stopped, that he had come briefed to make no concessions on the question of the nationalized Church property but to revivify the claims. 60 As a result Bazaine foresaw that a strong impetus would be given the side of the clergy, and he had ample time to make up his mind what his own attitude was to be. He had not changed his own mind, and Maximilian had assured him that he would continue the intervention policy of Napoleon III.« After die first meeting with Maximilian it became clear that the Nuncio would not compromise with the French policy. Thereupon Maximilian called Bazaine in and explained that he was going to recognize the acts of the Juarist government on the property. Moreover, Maximilian added that he had collected a considerable number of scandalous but authentic documents on the private lives of the political and ecclesiastical leaders, even members of the Mexican clergy, and that he felt that they put into his hands a powerful weapon to counter any charges that the clergy might make. Bazaine's only comment was that the Emperor's energy would succeed in that difficult situation.62 The next day, December 28, Maximilian did in fact send a letter to the Minister of Justice, expressing his recognition of the sale of the ecclesiastical property by the Juarist regime.63 That move changed nothing, rather it only stiffened attitudes already held. The Nuncio sent a letter of protest to Maximilian, using such terms that the Emperor felt forced to return it to the sender.64 Commenting on this development, Tucé remarked as follows:

officers. — Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 54, Mexico, December 10, 1864, in BA, X I , f. 2048. «» Ibid. « Ibid. 6 2 The response seems to indicate that Bazaine had no faith in either the authenticity or efficacy of the reported documents. The fact that no more is heard of them indicates that Maximilian also gave them up as groundless or unethical. What happened to them after Maximilian surrendered to the Conservative Party in 1867? 6 3 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 56, Mexico, December 28, 1864, unpublished letter in BA, XI, f. 2085. For text of the letter, see Boletín de las leyes, III, No. 241, pp. 2 8 5 - 2 8 6 . For more details from Maximilian's point of view, see Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico, II, 4 5 0 - 4 5 5 . 8 4 Bazaine to the Minister of War, No. 57, January 9, 1865, in BA, XI, f. 2 1 0 3 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X I V , Doc. xxvii, 118-123.

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They have just published a decree of Maximilian that confirms the sale of clerical property, which with a few restrictions, places the ecclesiastics under civil jurisdiction, establishes freedom of religion. The clerical party is furious. On whom is the Emperor now going to lean? 65

Thereafter there was outward peace for a while. In February Labastida asked Maximilian for permission to go to Europe, but the Emperor refused permission. Bazaine seconded the decision: My opinion nevertheless is that M. M. [Labastida's] place was in his diocese. prelates be in Mexico while the serious being settled, than in Europe, especially

was right in objecting that his It is better that the Mexican problem of clerical property is in Rome. 86

The spirit of independence in the Mexican government already noted by Bazaine continued to grow in the last weeks of 1864, mostly represented by what Bazaine called the National Party — moderate liberals who had accepted the Empire formally but who still worked for a state of independence and who were still definitely opposed to ¡che French army and its policies. The political prefect in San Luis Potosí, for example, was so lax in his orders that he allowed leaflets to be printed that blamed the incident involving the three Zouaves on the energetic measures taken by General Neigre. Bazaine had the printers warned that he would in no way tolerate insinuations or malevolence toward the French army or the philosophy that it represented.67 Bazaine further tried to combat the rising tide of national spirit by warning Maximilian of it, telling him that the group was finding the French army in the way and trying to persuade themselves that they could get along by themselves.68 The general impression, then, is that at the end of the year Bazaine and Maximilian were, formally at least, on rather good terms, both determined to let the sale of Church property stand, both conscious of the undependable quality of the civil servants holding office, and at least with Bazaine convinced of the danger apt to arise from the growth of anti-French feeling among the Nationalist Party members. Bazaine had not engaged in any outright criticism of Maximilian or Tucé, Cinq ans, 104. o« Bazaine to L'Hériller, No. 44, Montoya, February 8, 1865, BA, XI, f. 2154; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXIV, Doc. xliv, 204-208 87 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 55, Mexico, December 27,1864, in BA, XI, f. 2079-2080; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXIV, Doc. xxiii, 102-110. The Secretano de Gobernación blamed Neigre for the incident, and even Bazaine as we have already seen. •8 Ibid. 65

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any effort to undermine his authority or push him aside. His policy shows, on the other hand, abundant evidence of a constant effort and desire to "civilize" or "reorganize" Mexico on the French pattern by imposing the forms of French civil and military organization and expecting the Mexicans to behave like Frenchmen and develop ability to handle their government as Frenchmen would. In this endeavor he found Maximilian unco-operative, but he hoped to make French financial aid and military support furnish the necessary compulsion. Maximilian, on the other hand, sought to develop a genuine independence and found the French army a necessary evil and French aid a primary necessity.

THE EMPIRE AT ITS APOGEE

With the beginning of 1865 Maximilian maintained his position, and Bazaine left him to manage his own affairs while the Marshal took charge of an expedition to capture Oaxaca. On his way he checked on the rural guards that had been formed and found a variety of conditions; some towns were well organized, others not. Some towns used lack of money to cover their failure to organize guards, and the rich landowners would not of themselves furnish it. Some of them, when pressed, proposed to pay but to take the money out of the wages paid to the peons. All of that Bazaine openly reported to the Emperor.69 The expedition continued through the rough terrain, building a road as it went, and carrying along heavy military equipment. Bazaine laid siege to Oaxaca in January, and on February 9 it surrendered with Porfirio Díaz and his whole garrison.70 In the meantime another problem had come to pester the heavilyburdened Emperor. He had in fact done what Bazaine persuaded him not to do four months before. As an economy measure, he reduced the Mexican army to two regiments, thus discharging several thousand soldiers and officers.71 The order created no small consternation among the high-ranking officers who saw themselves facing return to civilian pursuits. An anonymous letter to Bazaine ·» Ibid., f. 2103 v. Postcript to the letter Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 60, Montoya, February 8, 1865, an unpublished letter in BA, XI, f. 2157-2158. The postscript was added the next day, before the letter was sealed. 71 Boletín de las leyes, III, No. 183, pp. 199-204, dated November 7, 1864. 70

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warned him that Márquez might try to stage a coup-d'état and take over the government.72 Near the end of December Bazaine at least became aware of a conspiracy to default to the Juarist forces, but he took no action until General Vicario deserted and later turned up with a pronunciamiento against the Empire and a declaration in favor of the Juárez government.73 Then he ordered General L'Hériller, who was at that time the military commander of the capital, to keep a close eye on both Taboada and López, and, at the first move they made toward disaffection, to arrest them and send them under guard to San Juan de Ulúa. But, he specified, Maximilian was to be kept daily abreast of all that went on.74 Thereupon, after a brief surveillance L'Hériller did in fact arrest Taboada, but only after consulting Maximilian and obtaining his approval. It was the intent of the Emperor to exile Taboada. But the active spirit of L'Hériller went further. He investigated Gálvez and agitated Maximilian over him; he investigated the correspondence written by the bishops to the Emperor; he tightened some controls over the press; he dug up a plot between Santa Anna and two citizens, Blanco and Mosso, who were acting as his agents. All of those things were well known to Bazaine, but he had kept them to himself. Then he had to ask L'Hériller to keep quiet on those investigations and simply keep aware of them; moreover, to be careful not to make any political arrests without an order from Maximilian, being careful not to try to replace imperial authority.75 Other advice included in his letter: Denunciations at this critical moment might be considered as of personal or party origin; we must not make ourselves an instrument of hates or of the rancors that unhappily still exist. W e must avoid committing ourselves in such a way that certain government agents could use our acts against us and against French influence and which might make us a target for all parties if it should serve their interests.... Un mexicano to Bazaine, n. d., unpublished letter in BA, XI, f. 2092. " Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 59, January 20, 1865, unpublished letter in BA, XI, f. 2116. A temporary default; in September he asked to come back to the Empire, and Bazaine accepted him. — Bazaine to Vicario, No. 571, Mexico, September 2, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2616; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXX, Doc. lxxvii, 236-237. 74 Ibid. Also Bazaine to L'Hériller, Acatlán, January 7, 1865, in BA, XI, f. 2100; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXIV, Doc. xxvi, 116-117. 75 Bazaine to L'Hériller, Hacienda Blanca, January 22, 1865, in BA, XI, f. 2128; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXIV, Doc. xxxiv, 170-173. 72

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I am glad to see that His Majesty has accorded General Gálvez what 1 asked for him as regards his expedition to Yucatán before I left Mexico City. Nothing has changed on that score.

Those were not isolated cases: In February an officer named Valdez with four hundred men near Tula also deserted. He was caught by a company of partisans, suffered some losses, and two hundred of his men came back saying that they did not know where they were being led.78 There was no choice but to take them back; however, each of the defections represented a defeat for the Empire, but actually the only defeats. Elsewhere the Franco-Mexican arms were regularly successful, and republican troops reached their point of minimum effectiveness. While the area controlled by the Empire was reaching the maximum that it was ever to achieve, the financial situation was going from bad to worse. Early in February the businessmen, who had been accepting checks on the Empire, began to protest them. Negotiations for a loan in France were still going on, but the government could not wait. Bazaine therefore ordered his financial agent, M. Jupeaux, to advance money to the government for its current expenses.77 Bazaine had the power to advance or not advance the money. He had authority from Napoleon III to support the government by advances up to two million francs per month, and he was supposed to see to it that the credit and records of the debt were kept straight and to use the money as a tool to force a better administration.78 In spite of the power given him by that control, diplomatic restrictions made it impossible for Bazaine to deal with the Emperor on the crass terms of economic pressure that he could use and had used with the Regency. It is difficult to interpret his meekness before the Emperor without recalling the Marshal's own humble origin and the difficulty of refusing a request from royalty, even if it meant not insisting on the power that otherwise would have been at his disposal. At the 7e Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 60, February 8, 1865, unpublished letter in BA, XI, f. 2157. 77 Bazaine to Jupeaux, Montoya, February 7, 1865, in BA, XI, f. 2149; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XXIV, Doc. xlii, 197-199. 78 Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 15, Paris, March 15, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2221; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXVII, Doc. xi, 42-43. In May the French tightened controls to such an extent that only by a direct order on his own responsibility could Bazaine command money for the Mexican Government. — Jupeaux to Bazaine, Mexico, May 8,1865, an unpublished letter in BA, XII, f. 2327.

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same time he was punctilious in maintaining proper procedures for military command and in French relations with Imperial forces. For example, when Bazaine heard that the French commander at Silao had released a prisoner, Cabrera, who had been arrested by Mexican officers, he sent a reprimand to him, warning him that he was authorized to protest acts of injustice but not to exercise the power of annulment of decisions by Mexican governmental representatives.79 While Bazaine was perfectly justified in his corrective action, the incident helped show that the French officers did not always take the Mexican authorities seriously, nor as equals. On March 26 and with little warning, Maximilian dissolved with thanks the military commission, of which Bazaine had been president and which had made studies that resulted in the Law of February 26 and in other advice to the Emperor. The latter then left it to the newly-organized Ministry of War to continue the studies and carry out Imperial policy by means of the Mexican army left in existence, without the participation of Bazaine.80 The result was a confusion that reacted badly on national security. The Ministry of War violated the principle of unity of command by issuing orders direct to Mexican troops, not going through Bazaine's office — thereby circumventing a unified control and making it impossible for Bazaine to keep a cohesive picture of the military situation.81 Within two months the Mexican army was so hopelessly confused that even the Emperor saw that he must change the trend. First he sought a French general to take it over, but both Brincourt and L'Hériller refused to accept the offer. Therefore Maximilian chose Austrian General Thun, saying that it was because no French general would accept.82 Actually the men approached by Maximilian were, with Douay, the ones most hostile toward Bazaine. There is no reason to think that Bazaine opposed their accepting the offer; the incertitude of such an assignment was enough to deter any professional officer of general rank. In honor of the Bonaparte Prince, heir to Napoleon III, Maximilian 7 9 Bazaine to the Commandant supérieur in Silao, Mexico, No. 274, March 16, 1865, unpublished letter in BA, XII, f. 2 2 2 5 . 8 0 Maximilian to Bazaine, Mexico, March 26, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2 2 3 8 . 8 1 Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 59, says that road guards were often moved without notifying Bazaine, and even important prisoners, like Porfirio Díaz, were removed to Austrian care, where they were allowed to escape. 8 2 Maximilian to Bazaine, Hacienda de Jalapilla, May 5, 1865, in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 60.

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on March 16 had high mass said at the Cathedral, Bazaine staged a parade of French soldiers, and all the French officers attended the mass. However, the Emperor did not appear; instead he sent as his representative Eloin, the Chief of Staff. If the French felt disappointed, it was probably because they placed greater weight on the occasion than a Haps burg felt was justified. War contraband had been coming into southern Mexico through ports from Alvarado to Carmen, and the situation was further complicated by the fact that leaders in Tabasco had started a secessionist movement and declared the area a free state, independent of Mexico.83 Bazaine requested that Maximilian authorize measures to control the contraband traffic, and he was given permission to enforce an unofficial blockade on the area. Such halfway measures, of course, were no answer. The Ministry had prepared and promulgated on February 26 the new law covering decisions already made on nationalized property.84 At first Bazaine favored it as bearing out the aim of the Intervention; but, on a second reading he decided that Article 13 was so worded that it nullified the whole of the law and its intent.85 That article, in effect, said that the judiciary had the deciding voice in all litigations. Bazaine also noted that foreigners would be the first to suffer, while the lower classes of Mexican society were totally indifferent to what was going on, and the clergy, he claimed, was exercising its full powers to "exploit the discontent of the people to their own profit".86 It was also another step in the rapprochement of the Liberal and Conservative parties. That tendency was borne out by a spurious pamphlet published in Toluca which proclaimed that the only way of ousting the foreigners and invaders was by unity. The clerical problem was only made worse when a missionary priest, Mr. Alleau, who recently had come to Mexico from France in company with the Nuncio and supposedly was to represent the interests of the French clergy, was found to have published a pamphlet in which he attacked the arguments given for the "Reform 88 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 63, Mexico, March 28, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2246; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXVII, Doc. xxvi, 90-103. 84 Text in Boletín de las leyes, IV, No. 94, p. 194. 85 "No rights, immediately or originally proceeding from desamortization or nationalization may be exercised or have judicial value or extra-judicial value until its providence has been revised according to prescribed form." — Ibid., 196. 8β Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 61, Mexico, March 10, 1865, in BA, XI, f. 2191; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXVII, Doc. iv, 18-25.

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L a w s " and m a d e evil charges against Maximilian and the F r e n c h Intervention.

Presumably that connection showed where his sympa-

thies lay. Bazaine h a d him arrested and sent to N e w Orleans. 8 7 T h e month of M a r c h marks a hectic period of turmoil and ferment. On the one hand m o r e and m o r e small Juarist leaders w e r e joining and pledging allegiance to the E m p i r e .

At the same time a n e w

feeling of independence and of anti-French resentment was growing even in "pacified" areas. T h e United States was beginning to take a more active interest in the Mexican situation as the Civil W a r h e a d e d for a climax. Bazaine did not miss those currents and reported the larger ones to Napoleon I I I faithfully. B u t from this period his letters begin to show at times a note of helplessness and a realization of the immensity of the task facing him.

Guerrilla leaders continued their

depredations, and other bands w e r e continually springing up.

The

repressive measures taken in the past w e r e continued and unpleasant reports of them even r e a c h e d Maximilian's ears, 8 8 b u t after Bazaine had explained the circumstances, the E m p e r o r allowed the courtmartial trials to go on. 87 Ibid. For more details of this unhappy episode, see Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico, II, 457. 88 In Durango there was uncomfortable stirring, and in some places open rebellion; the populace in Sinaloa was so truculent and sullen that General Castagny, the commander, noted their discontent and the widespread activity of the guerrillas. In Cosalá and Cualicán [sp. for Culiacán?] ill will was so clear that General Lozada was sent to help pacify the people; on the other hand M. Gibert, the governor of Lower California, was almost ready to come over to the side of the Empire and to surrender to the French across the Gulf. A manifesto attributed to Doblado was circulated in Mexico; rumors of the Federal attacks on Brownsville and even Monterrey were widespread; the Mexican press took every advantage of opportunities to ridicule foreigners. In Puebla when the French were about to turn over the garrison to some Austrian troops, they were stoned by crowds. Violations of the press law were tried before courts-martial; in the north Juarist agents and Federal troops were co-operating in communication across the border; in California the Federal government harassed the French by prohibiting on January 20, the export of forage. That act struck at the French directly because Rear Admiral Mazères had gone to San Francisco to buy a supply for the French troops on the Pacific Coast; General MacDowell, Commander of the Pacific Department, forbade any person to sail without a special permit. That was obviously a move to thwart the scheme underfoot for the colonization of Sonora; finally the Department of the Pacific had set up a new Military Department of Arizona — a threatening gesture toward Mexico. Its command was given to General Mason, a man known for his hostility to the French Intervention in American affairs. — Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 63, Mexico, March 28, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2246-2248; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XXVII, Doc. xxvi, 90-103. The frankness of the report is in direct contrast to the contention of Corti (Maximilian and Charlotte, II, 462), that Bazaine always presented a "rosy" picture to Paris of the plight of the Empire.

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Gradually through the spring the anti-French feeling in the Imperial Cabinet grew and evidently influenced Maximilian. Bazaine knew it, too, and told the Emperor so: I have not hidden this from the Sovereign, and I have told him that I should continue being the vigilant and loyal sentinel charged with watching over the interests and security of the new Empire. . . ,89 When the Austrian and Belgian troops arrived, they were integrated in units into the Imperial armed forces. Soon rumors spread that they did not get along well with the French. Bazaine, as commander-inchief of all French and Imperial forces, denied any truth in those rumors and insisted that the leaders had been co-operative with him and that there were no quarrels. Moreover: His Excellency has been able to see, through the posts assigned the troops that I have tried to avoid too-frequent contacts between the men whose nationalities and way of life are so divergent.90 Along with those troubles it was encouraging to notice that business was picking up. Communication with various parts of the Empire were frequent, and the administration of the capital at least was doing well. Buildings were going up, public parks were being decorated, and luxuries were appearing. The State of Chiapas was organizing itself for the Empire, spontaneously, without any help from the French. In the Huasteca area General Ugalde was negotiating to join the Empire. 91 In the capital Bazaine took advantage of the quiet military situa89 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 67, Mexico, April 10, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2 2 8 0 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X V I I , Doc. xxxiv, 125-135. 90 Ibid. 91 Other news varied: In Durango and around Parras uprisings gained force. A guerrilla leader, Aguirre, invaded Saltillo and posted a proclamation. In Sonora the Indian tribes seemed ready to come over with the arrival of a new adherent, ex-Governor Gándara. At Guaymas Americans were reportedly bringing in supplies from San Francisco to supply their new Army Corps being organized in Arizona. In April the Americans even had the audacity to ask permission of the French General Castagny in Sonora to allow armed troops to disembark in Sonora and march across to Arizona. He refused, of course, "No country in the world allows armed troops to cross its territory; they will not be surprised at our insistence on this". — Bazaine to Castagny, No. 306, May 1, 1865, unpublished letter in BA, XII, f. 2317. In view of the American operations in the north, Napoleon III decided in April not to repatriate more French soldiers; but his decision did not reach Bazaine until after the 2nd Regiment of Zouaves had sailed. — Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 17, Paris, April 16, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2 2 8 9 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X V I I , Doc. xxxviii, 142.

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tion to further the arrangements for his marriage with Josefa de la Peña, approval of which was given by both emperors independently in the hope that it would help cement relations with the Mexican people and would improve public opinion.92 Bazaine's first wife had died in France some eight months after he left for Mexico. A number of French officers and soldiers contracted marriages in Mexico, particularly with daughters of wealthy families. Wealth was not involved here; but Bazaine has been criticized on account of the disparity in age of the two principals. In May Bazaine took into custody the families of Arteaga, Salazar, and Pueblita, all Juarist generals. He planned to intern them as hostages or to exchange them for French prisoners.93 When the scheme came to the attention of Maximilian, he ordered them released — an act not calculated to increase French friendship since it would certainly make the exchange of prisoners more difficult.94 The exchange of prisoners proceeded more irregularly than usual because of the violent emotions of the Juarist party, the lack of centralized control by the refugee government, and an unequal attitude toward the legal status of the two sides. Responsible Juarist leaders demanded the standing of lawful belligerents while the French tried to distinguish between real armed forces, independent or "bandit" bands, and guerrillas. Since there was no communication, even by intermediaries, these problems were never settled. Even the imperial troops did not always understand how they stood with the government. When Maximilian's Minister of War, Juan de Dios Peza, ordered General Lozada, then with a Mexican army detachment in Sinaloa, to return to give him a true picture of the situation there, the general hesitated. That order, circumventing Bazaine by going directly to Lozada instead of through the Commander-in-Chief of the Franco-Mexican Army, was a form of affront which Bazaine learned of only when Peza sent him a routine copy of •

• " .-1

Randon to Bazaine, Paris, May 15, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2 3 3 5 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X V I I , Doc. lix, 221-223. 93 Bazaine to Potier, No. 314, Mexico, May 5, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2 3 2 2 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X V I I , Doc. xlviii, 180. This delicate matter of holding families as hostages seemed so unfair that it is a surprise that the French resorted to it. Most of the devoted Juarist leaders had moved their families to safety early in the Intervention, first to Monterrey and Saltillo, then to San Antonio, Texas, New Orleans or to New York. 94 Bazaine to Potier, No. 331, May 17, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2 3 3 8 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXVII, Doc. Ixi, 226. 92

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THE EMPIRE AS Λ PSEUDO-REA LIT Y

the letter for Lozada. However he may have felt personally, Bazaine recorded only a marginal note to the letter: This procedure seems very unseasonable to me because the General is in the field in Sinaloa and because, again, he will hesitate to return to the capital where he fears being retained. 95

By the late spring, then, the Empire had strengthened its control over the political field and had by-passed the French to control its own troops directly. The position of the French had already shrunk to that of allies only, but on the lower echelon level there was direct interference by the French in governmental control. The French position had steadily declined from the early days of the Intervention when they entered Mexico as a conquering army with full governmental powers; it declined with the establishment of the Regency, which the French themselves set up and to which they surrendered sovereign rights and kept only the control of military operations. It further declined with the establishment of Maximilian and his Council of Ministers in power. When French advisory influence gradually became more marginal, they remained in a purely advisory capacity in the capital and remained in the field as unsympathetic allies who furnished military protection for a developing government with which they were not entirely in accord. This weakened position of the French was actually the original plan of the French Emperor; he intended to set up a friendly government and gradually withdraw from direct political control as he withdrew his troops, leaving a friendly government. His further plan was that by the time direct French political and military influence began to withdraw, the government would be effective, independent, and friendly; that is, it would give preferential treatment to France.96 Success of the Intervention rested on these three qualifications.

95 Peza to Bazaine, No. 1, Mexico, May 17, 1865, in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXVII, Doc. lx, 223-225. The note by Bazaine does not appear on the copy in the Archives, BA, XII, f. 2339. 96 This interpretation of Napoleon Ill's plan is based on statements committed to writing. Diplomats of the era, especially American diplomats, suspected that he planned a tighter control (see, e.g., Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 507-529). Whatever else Napoleon had in mind, I should have made it clear by now that after the spring of 1865 the contention that the government represented by Maximilian was a French "pawn", "puppet", or "satellite" is untenable.

CHAPTER

VI

THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONFEDERATE

COLLAPSE

INCREASED AMERICAN PRESSURE ON THE MEXICAN BORDER

In May the threat from the United States grew. Rumors bruited that deserters from the Federal and the disintegrating Confederate armies were being received in French-occupied Mexico. Some deserters from the Confederacy reportedly had been returned to the authorities, and a northern steamer was said to have been captured by the Confederates and sold to the Mexicans. General Tomás Mejía, Commander in Matamoros, when questioned, denied responsibility, saying that the ship, the Ark, was captured before Imperial forces reached Matamoros, when the Juarist General Juan N. Cortina was still in command. As for the surrender of deserters, Mejía denied the charge, but he admitted that four criminals had been extradited after presentation of proofs of their crimes. On the other hand after a fight between the Confederates and the Federals, many of the latter, from the 34th Indiana Regiment, had taken refuge across the river. There the commander at Bagdad had placed them at liberty except for two who had fired from the Mexican side of the river during the fight. Thus Mejía insisted that his command had maintained strict neutrality.1 Those explanations, if accurate, left the Empire in the clear, but the Belgian legation, concerned over the welfare of the Empire, nonetheless, protested to Bazaine for special precautions against antagonizing the United States: I still believe, Marshal, that open hostilities with the United States are not likely; however, in the state of over-excitement that the latter is in, it is important not to give cause for stirring up popular passions. So if General Slaughter appears himself at the border with his army, a great 1 Mejía to Bazaine, No. 176, Matamoros, May 24, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2353; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXVII, Doc. Ixx, 240-244. This part of Cortina's activities is treated very summarily by Woodman, Cortina, 86-87, and the facts are not yet clear,

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THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONFEDERATE COLLAPSE

margin of neutrality should be observed and declarations of respect for the neighboring country should be made. While asylum cannot be refused the exiles, they should be disarmed immediately, and their arms made available to the United States — after it has recognized the Empire.2 The danger at that time was that in the last development of crumbling Confederate resistance there might be battles in South Texas that would result in the withdrawal of Confederate units to Mexican soil;3 then the presence of a large, unfriendly, Federal army would be a hazard. Hope lay in the fact that the North already had begun to demobilize its army, and the Belgians at least felt that in another six months there would be left in the United States only enough troops for internal needs. Thus prudence called for taking all steps to avoid attracting any army to the Rio Grande for that period of time, even if it meant refusing asylum to Jefferson Davis, who was rumored to be thinking of leaving the Confederacy as a refugee. 4 Such fears were not the end of the rising specter of American interest in Mexico. Juárez was reported, though without confirmation, to have encouraged adventurers to join his army, and in New York General González Ortega was given a permit to enroll what he called immigrants. 5 Those threats had for several months occupied Bazaine, and therefore he had deployed mostly Mexican troops — Lozada and Mejia, along the border to absorb protests of breaches of neutrality, and he had backed them with French troops further in the interior, with Castagny's brigade in Sonora and Sinaloa and 2 Blondel van Cuelebroeck to Bazaine, Tacubaya, May 26, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2367; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXVII, Doc. Ixxi, 245-249. 3 The American government had, in 1846, set a precedent on the same spot for permitting such a withdrawal. The Secretary of War had stated: ". . . if a large military force should approach the Rio del Norte with the avowed intention of entering Texas, and any considerable number of Mexicans should retire across that river and be willing to enter the service of the United States, you are authorized to receive them as volunteers, in the event of hostilities or of decisive movements on the part of Mexico indicative of approaching hostilities." — W. L. M[arsh] to Z. Taylor, Washington, March 2, 1846, in Justin H. Smith Papers, XX, 78-79. 4 Blondel van Cuelebroeck to Bazaine, Tacubaya, May 26, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2367; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXVII, Doc. Ixxi, 245-249. 5 The Juarist representative in Washington was not even loath to solicit American troops for the republican cause. — Correspondencia de la legación mexicana en Washington durante la intervención extrangera, V, No. 202, pp. 296298. José María J. Carvajal was the authorized agent for financial and military aid in Washington and New York. — Juárez to Santacilia, Chihuahua, June 8, 1865, in Archivos privados de Juárez y Santacilia, I, p. 67.

T H E A F T E R M A T H OF T H E CONFEDERATE COLLAPSE

137

with Douay's from San Luis Potosí to Saltillo and Monterrey. These dispositions, however, did not help in the danger that Bazaine saw that General Slaughter's army might try to take refuge in Mexico. Under international law he could not refuse them, but their admission would be almost certain to draw Federal troops across the river.6 In May again the ugly head of the nationalized property reared itself again. Bazaine saw his fears realized when the sales were again thrown into the courts, which, he said . . . wanted to follow the old errors habitual to the officials of this unhappy country, and who are easily influenced by bribery and under that influence recognize the validity of titles that are more or less questionable, and serve the interests of the ones who offered most, neglecting or rejecting the rights even of honest purchasers whose legal arguments are not supported by any offer.7 Other baffling steps plagued Bazaine. The Imperial government lifted the laws of 1864 forbidding gambling as a concession to public demands. Bazaine called the move by the government a sign of weakness: The Government should have been able to find a more useful and moral means of flattering the Mexican people by appealing to other feelings. And I have also stated my opinion to the Empress.8 The repeal of the law was urged on by the Minister of State, Cortés y Esparza. He and the other Mexican ministers continued to plague Bazaine by hostile attitudes and refusal to change to French ways: I am absolutely convinced that the administration of justice is no better under Pedro Escudero y Echanove [Minister of Justice] . . . than under the worst days of the earlier governments . . . We must not deceive ourselves: Justice does not exist in Mexico.9 Moreover, the appointed officials in the provinces showed such an independence of spirit and hostility to the French that at last Bazaine decided to state frankly to the Emperor that he would have to withdraw the French garrison from any place where they did not find loyal and co-operative officials. Such a move was not calculated to win the friendship of either the Emperor or the officials, but evi6 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 72, Mexico, May 28, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2381; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXX, Doc. 1, p. 9-28. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. Carlota was at that time acting head of state while Maximilian was making a second tour of the provinces, » Ibid.

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T H E A F T E R M A T H OF T H E CONFEDERATE COLLAPSE

dently he saw it as a lever to urge on replacement of non-co-operative officials. In that measure, however, he had the full accord of the French Imperial government.10 June of 1865 saw no improvement in the situation. In Texas developments were ominous. On May 27 the Confederate troops in Brownsville rebelled, and a Colonel Fischer, who had served Juárez, tried to get the rebels to seize the artillery and desert with it across the river to join Juárez. General Slaughter and Colonel Ford prevented the success of the plot, although the artillery was brought across the river, where Mejia seized it. On the 29th Federal troops occupied Brownsville, and the refugee soldiers tried to escape to the other bank and join the groups of filibusters, estimated at some 20,000 in all, who were reported heading for the Juárez army.11 The state of the treasury was such that, in Mazatlán at least, it became necessary for the French to use fines levied on the inhabitants to obtain money necessary for sustaining themselves. Relations being very uneasy between the occupying force and the populace, there were ample occasions to levy fines.12 At that time the use of fines was becoming a frequent practice of the French, although they were required to report on each case and to have it approved by Maximilian. Their carefulness is exemplified by the fact that when the prefect of Durango levied a fine on the towns of San Miguel and Mezquital for having aided the Juarist band of Pedro Muñoz, he used the term exacción, but the French immediately protested that the term was not in the language or the practice of the French army and belonged only to the Mexican part. The prefect was then taken to task on the matter.13 The use of fines soon after10 Ibid. Also letter Eugénie to Bazaine, No. 18, Tuileries, May 31, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2393; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X X , Doc. ν, 33-34. 11 Mejia to Bazaine, No. 182, Matamoros, June 3, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2405; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X X , Doc. ix, 45-47. When the French and Federal troops encountered each other at the border, their hostility was not at all concealed. Sheridan reported, "General Steele says the French officers are very saucy and insulting to our people at Brownsville". — P. H. Sheridan to U. S. Grant, New Orleans, June 28, 1865 in U.S. Document 1237 (Executive Document No. 5), p. 50. For the Federal demands for the return of the cannon Mejia seized, see ibid., p. 50-54 and Juárez to Santacilia, Chihuahua, June 27, 1865, in Archivos privados de Juárez y Santacilia, I, p. 76. 12 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 356, Mexico, June 5, 1865, an unpublished letter in BA, XIII, f. 2410-2411. 13 Bazaine to Mejia, No. 365, June 17, 1865, unpublished letter in BA, XIII, f. 2436; also Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 534, June 17, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2437; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X X , Doc. xxix, pp. 90-93,

T H E A F T E R M A T H OF T H E CONFEDERATE C O L L A P S E

139

wards, however, was restricted by an Imperial decree that the money could only be used for fortifications.14 The American crisis seemed about to break in July. More disbanded Americans (Confederates?) crossed over into Mexico and worked their way into the jurisdiction of Colonel Jeanningros in Monterrey. Bazaine advised Jeanningros to accept them, disarm them, and to intern them in the interior, as far as possible from the frontier — San Luis Potosí or Matehuala.15 Soon thereafter fifteen ships with soldiers reached Brazos Santiago, and reports of the number of troops concentrated there went as high as 40,000. At any rate General Brown in Brownsville seemed very interested in the large quantity of cotton which the Confederates had exported to Mexican territory, and he even seized a Mexican river boat belonging to some Mexican businessmen, claiming that someone had raised the American flag on it. Mejia protested the seizure, but to no avail.16 That direct treatment with subordinate leaders on the question of the American soldiers called forth a mild rebuke from the Emperor's cabinet. Up to this time, lacking any Imperial pronouncement, the French had followed normal European military practice in dealing with the border problem. But on July 20, Loysel, the Emperor's Secretary, sent a short note informing Bazaine that Foreign Minister Robles had detailed instructions on how to deal with the Confederates and to settle all questions. Bazaine's answer was not an apology but a flat statement that in the absence of political representation it was impossible to leave the commander in doubt as to what to do.17 This answer did not assuage any wounded feelings and is one of the first direct marks in the Bazaine Archives of a firm attitude in defense of his own acts despite the fact that he may have overstepped his jurisdiction. There is nothing to indicate that he had discussed with Maximilian or his cabinet the instructions that he sent to Mejxa and Jeanningros, nor is his answer an effort to explain that it was a purely military, not a political problem, as he well might. The note, 14 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 372, Mexico, June 28, 1865, an unpublished letter in BA, XIII, f. 2456. 15 Bazaine to Jeanningros, No. 378, Mexico, July 6, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2475; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXX, Doc. xxxvii, 115-116. 19 Bazaine to Admiral Mazères, Mexico, July 12, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2501; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXX, Doc. xlv, 131-135. 17 Loysel to Bazaine, Note 43, Mexico, July 20, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2511; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXX, Doc, xlix, 146-147, with note added by Bazaine.

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THE A F T E R M A T H OF THE CONFEDERATE COLLAPSE

then, may be taken as a form of curtness indicative of impatience with the Imperial cabinet, if not also with the Emperor. The breach seemed wider in July, when rumors circulated that a great deal of merchandise was passing through Veracruz free of duty because it passed under the name of Maximilian and of the French army. Thus the contents of the packages may have escaped normal payment of import duty. Maximilian issued orders that all boxes bearing his name or that of the Empress should be opened at the port in the presence of state employees, and he requested that Bazaine issue similar orders for French boxes passing through the port.18 Bazaine answered that he had heard already of the rumor and had ordered that a list of contents be presented with each box going to or leaving Mexico, but that opening the boxes at Veracruz did not seem practical because the contents of the boxes usually came wrapped and sealed in zinc, and there would be too much damage if they were opened. The answer was uncompromising — a firm though formally polite refusal that must have seemed very abrupt to Imperial ears. At any rate the orders of the Emperor were modified later so that only boxes sent to Mexico City for the French army need be opened and then in the presence of a French officer. To that Bazaine offered no more objection.19 Then controls were tightened: Maximilian ordered that for the next two months all of his own packages be opened, on arrival, in the presence of two customs officials and a member of his household. Likewise, all boxes coming to the French army were to be opened on arrival by two customs officials and a French officer designated by Bazaine. Again Bazaine offered no resistance.20 To make use of some of the Confederate soldiers who refused to accept surrender, Bazaine in July proposed that they be allowed to join the Foreign Legion. Maximilian approved without reservation.21 18 Loysel to Bazaine, Note 46, Mexico, July 22, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2516; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXX, Doc. li, 149-151. 19 Loysel to Bazaine, Note 50, Mexico, July 23, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2525. 20 Loysel to Bazaine, Note 52, Mexico, July 28, 1865, un unpublished note in BA, XIII, f. 2541. The French Minister of Agriculture did not react favorably to those complications and did not co-operate. — Armand Behic to Bazaine, Paris, September 9, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2640; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXX, Doc. lxxxii, 251-252. 21 Loysel to Bazaine, Mexico, July 23, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2534; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXX, Doc. liv, 155. The suggestion was first made in May, though not in the form of a foreign legion. — Bazaine to Maximilian, Mexico, May 29, 1865, in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 69.

T H E A F T E R M A T H OF T H E CONFEDERATE C O L L A P S E

141

By that time Bazaine had received confirmation of his policy from Maximilian, and he ordered Jeanningros in Monterrey to keep track of the Americans going across. Meantime Foreign Minister Robles and a special Imperial commissioner, General Nicolás de la Portilla, set out for Monterrey to try to cope with the problem caused by the sudden influx. As Bazaine saw it, the Federal troops had enrolled many negro troops in their units and then tried to get rid of them by sending them by the thousands to Texas and letting them desert to Mexico. Jeanningros was instructed to register the generals and the field officers by name and to keep record of the lower ranks of officers and soldiers by number. 22 In France the Cabinet was also aware of the complications, and Marshal Randon, while recommending one more serious campaign in the North, spoke at the same time of the need for further economies; also, he shook his head at the continued resistance in the North. He apparently could not reconcile the continued guerrilla activity in Michoacán and Tamaulipas with the acts of adhesion to the Empire made by the cities in that area. Furthermore, You no longer mention [in reports] the organization of the Mexican army. However, the government should get busy with it, for we cannot stay eternally in Mexico; one would be blind not to see that public feeling in France is continually putting pressure on the government to put a quick end to our Mexican Expedition. Our relations with the United States are improving, but I don't know what they are doing with 100,000 men being sent to Texas. I don't believe in the figure 100,000, but I suspect the intentions of the United States in sending even a small number of troops to that area.23 On Bazaine's part he stationed one ship at the mouth of the Rio Grande to watch for acts of breach of neutrality by the Americans. He learned from General López that the Federal troops were well armed but poorly trained and poorly supplied. However, in case the ship detected any unneutral acts, it was to report the acts to the Mexican authorities.24 The instructions specifically stated that the French were not to take any action on their own; they were to act only as an ally to Mexico. Bazaine to Jeanningros, No. 393, Mexico, July 28, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2545. Randon to Bazaine, Paris, July 30, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2551-2553; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXX, Doc. Ivi, 157-163. 24 Ibid. 22

23

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T H E A F T E R M A T H OF T H E CONFEDERATE COLLAPSE

In Sonora, too, and in Durango Confederate bands were crossing the line and taking refuge. Bazaine's instructions to Castagny again were to accept the groups without encouraging them, disarm all individuals, stay on the alert for any who were in contact with Juárez, and try to get volunteers for the Foreign Legion. The latter were to be sent to San Luis Potosí and there enlisted for three-year terms.25 Some of the Confederate officers who came to Mexico requested commissions in the Legion, but such a proposition had to be referred to Paris, and in the meantime only enlistments as soldiers were possible. At the same time Bazaine feared to let the refugees go uncared for, lest they join the Juarist ranks. In particular two Americans, Terrill and Flourroy, were negotiating for a haven for the Confederate refugees, and Bazaine finally yielded to their importunities enough to encourage the refugees to come to the Imperial cause. He therefore accepted Terrill, Flourroy, and Colonel Denis as agents and made plans to urge Confederate General Halley to come to Mexico with honors and to erase the memory of the rough treatment he had received in Monterrey and San Luis Potosí.26 Marshal Randon, the French Minister of War, while optimistic on relations with the United States generally, doubted the wisdom of enlisting the Confederates and thereby calling for repercussions from the North.27 Such discussions were mostly academic and theoretical because as late as September 13 only one refugee had offered to enlist, and that for only six months. On that score one French officer wrote this opinion: One may be sure, as I have told you already, that the Confederates will not enlist to serve Mexico; they have no sympathy for this country, but what they do want to do is to start up a conflict in order to revive their own cause. They are beginning to see that this is difficult; Terrill has just told us that Seward stated in Washington that he would oppose with all his strength a war with France because he was persuaded that it would be disastrous for the United States. 28

Napoleon, however, at that time was more sanguinary on the possibilities of a conflict, and he offered advice contrary to that sent by Randon: 25

As an added inducement Bazaine supposed that after their terms of service, they would be given land on which to settle. — Bazaine to Castagny, No. 414, Mexico, August 16, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2575. 29 Bazaine to Douay, No. 420, Mexico, August 23, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2590. 27 Randon to Bazaine, Evian, September 12, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2651. 28 E. Seigland [spelling doubtful] to Le Noue, San Luis Potosí, September 13, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2655.

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THE AFTEBMATH OF THE CONFEDERATE COLLAPSE

Our relations with the United States are not bad, but if they take a turn for the worse, it is necessary that you be prepared. If the United States wants to invade Mexico, the only plan to follow would be to evacuate the border areas and to hold a central core. Then it would be necessary for them to wear themselves out by long, hard marches over an uninviting, barren country. . . . Do not try to occupy all of the area but sacrifice some in order to save more; boldly abandon all that you cannot advantageously occupy, and mass your troops instead of scattering them. I will see the Minister of War about what can be done in the way of unobtrusively increasing your forces. Tell the Emperor that in the grave circumstances in which we find ourselves today, there is no time for liberalism or clemency but for a show of energy, good judgement, and complete reliance on the only ones ones who can save him. 2 8 T h e J u á r e z forces w e r e still receiving arms from San Francisco, delivered at Acapulco, and two Juarist ships, the Merrimac Mississippi,

and the

w e r e on their w a y to that port following its evacuation

by the F r e n c h .

Another American steamer, the Ajax, was known to

be bringing arms to the Pacific coast, and the United States ship Elizabeth

Owens h a d left San F r a n c i s c o also with arms for San Pedro,

San Diego, and Acapulco. 3 0 Filibustering expeditions still w e r e being organized and disorganized and were plotting in California; F r e n c h consul prevented one filibustering ship, the Bronter,

the from

sailing to aid Juárez. H e h a d verbal but very v a g u e assurances from Major General M a c D o w e l l of aid in preventing those expeditions. 3 1 On the other side the F e d e r a l troops w e r e openly sheltering Cortina's b a n d of Juarist partisans near Matamoros, allowing it to cross the river and prey on the Matamoros area, then return w h e n pursued, 2 i Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 19, Châlons, August 17, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2578; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXX, Doc. lxii, 184-186. The complete reliance was evidently to be placed on the French Army, and on Bazaine in particular — the only ones who could save Maximilian. so Aboard were three Mexican officers as supercargos, each of whom had been a prisoner of war in France, but they had been released by the generosity of the Emperor. — Charles Cazotte, French Consul at San Francisco to Bazaine, San Francisco, August 19, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2585; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXX, Doc. Ixiv, 188-193. As early as 1864 the American (Federal) naval vessel the Saranac, patrolled the Gulf of California and maintained communication with Juarist officials like General Pesqueira. — C. H. Bell to C. H. Poor, Flagship Lancaster in Callao, September 13, 1864, in U.S. Navy, Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. Ill, p. 214. 31 Ibid., also Cazotte to Bazaine, San Francisco, September 9, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2638; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXX, Doc. lxxxiii, 253-254.

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THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONFEDERATE COLLAPSE

to the Texas side with arms and unmolested. 32 Each report showed an increase in the size of the bands led by Escobedo, Cortina, Canales, and Espinosa. In September they apparently had 2,500 men between Reynosa, Camargo, and Monterrey and were expecting Juárez to join them under American protection. 33 Randon, by the end of August, seemed even more impatient to give Mexico up than was Napoleon. Our intervention can hardly last long enough to accomplish the work we have set out on, and the Mexican Government must be thinking that we will sacrifice our own interests for theirs and will not leave the country until it is entirely peaceful — that is, not for an indefinite time.. . . We must try to limit the occupation of Mexico by our troops to the condition of recognition of the Mexican Empire by the United States. . . . the same government that is very willing to complain of the repatriation of a few thousand of our soldiers is not disposed to use native [Mexican] troops. However, the gaps must be covered in some way, and certainly the best way is to use the forces that can be gathered in the country.34 But when Bazaine, following the impetus given by Napoleon III, ordered new Mexican units organized, his subordinates responded with exasperating slowness. For example, Brincourt, with whom Bazaine already had had differences in Puebla, wrote, The organization of Mexican troops which are intended to occupy Chihuahua, after our departure, cannot be done immediately. The Imperial decree of January 26 . . . is not in my office. . . . Before thinking of forming a permanent corps in Chihuahua, order and especially confidence 3 2 For a more detailed account see Florentino López to Bazaine, Mexico, August 25, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2 6 0 0 - 2 6 0 1 ; printed Genaro García, Col. doc., X X X , Doc. lxx, 208-211. 3 3 Mejía to Bazaine, Matamoros, September 4, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2 6 2 8 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X X , Doc. Ixxxi, 248-250. The American aid was probably imagined. Juárez was not inclned to do anything with acknowledged American aid. Throughout this period when aid was reaching his forces in men and equipment, he wrote over a hundred letters to his son-in-law Santacilia but only twice did he as much as mention aid from the United States, and then only to place limitations on it: no alienation of Mexican territory, and the personnel coming to aid his military forces must furnish their own supplies. — Archivos privados de Juárez y Santacilia, I, pp. 52-53, 59, 67, 68. 3 4 Randon to Bazaine, Paris, August 31, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2 6 0 8 - 2 6 0 9 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X X , Doc. lxxiii, 222-228. It must have given Randon great pleasure to write those lines; he had never been in favor of that Intervention, and he was not consulted at its conception. — Mémoires du Maréchal Randon, II, 60.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONFEDERATE COLLAPSE

145

must be established. Your occupation is to be a limited one. I still think that the Marshal [Randon] must have in mind staying until the country is organized... ,85 THE "BLACK D E C R E E "

At last on September 14 news came that long had been anticipated — Juárez was said to have taken refuge in El Paso del Norte on August 30, with a few followers, but no real troops.36 That left only the State of Guerrero in the hands of the Juarists, and Bazaine next turned his attention to it. No maps existed that he knew of, and he was at a loss to plan operations, but he knew that the Indians were well armed, and that a campaign would be required.37 He then decided that since Santa Anna had fought several battles in that state, he, Bazaine, should be able to gather from the archives of the Ministry of War enough of the Santa Anna papers to furnish him essential military information about the area. He accordingly ordered that the archives be searched. No sustained campaign ever resulted; the short advance made by General Vicario toward Acapulco had no permanent results. The supposed flight of Juárez was the signal for a new step in the national policy. As long as he remained on Mexican soil, he had some measure of authority and a state of civil war had to be acknowledged. But once he was forced to leave, then he became a refugee, and the Imperial government had a much higher standing in the eyes of the European nations which belonged to the same military tradition. Henceforth the guerrilla bands could be considered as outlaws and dealt with accordingly.38 Further, as Blanchot, Bazaine's aide, understood it, 3 5 Brincourt to Castagny, Chihuahua, August 25, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 26022 6 0 3 ; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X X , Doc. lxix, 2 0 0 - 2 0 8 . 3 6 Bazaine to the Commandant Supérieur of Veracruz, No. 184, Mexico, September 14, 1865, telegram in BA, XIV, f. 2 6 5 7 ; Juárez to Santacilia, Chihuahua, July 27, 1865, in Archivos privados de Juárez y Santacilia, I, p. 77, and idem to idem, Chihuahua, August 3, 1865, ibid., p. 78; also idem to idem, Villa del Paso, August 18, 1865, in ibid., p. 78. 3 7 Bazaine to the Mexican Minister of War, No. 582, Mexico, September 15, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2 6 5 9 . 3 8 Legally they would now be "war rebels", defined as follows: " W a r rebels are persons within territory under hostile military occupation who rise in arms against the occupying forces or against the authorities established by the same. If captured, they may be punished with death, whether they rise singly or in small or large bands, whether or not they have been called upon to do so by their

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T h e Imperial [ M e x i c a n ] g o v e r n m e n t e x p e c t e d that the a b a n d o n m e n t of the c o u n t r y b y J u á r e z could b e considered an abdication and that doubtless w o u l d bring about t h e recognition of the E m p i r e b y the U n i t e d States. 3 9

It was as a result of the supposed flight and also the admonition already cited of Napoleon III to Bazaine ("This is no time for liberalism or clemency.") that the Decree of October 3 was promulgated. The decree was so significant as a subject of controversy and for its far-reaching results that it deserves some study here. The origin and authorship are both controversial. Corti and Niox, two scholarly and capable historians of the period, respectively pro-Maximilian and pro-French, differ. Corti attributes authorship to Bazaine and the signature to pressure brought to bear by Bazaine on the Emperor, and he defends his position with some force.40 Niox41 admits only the urging and advice given by Bazaine, and then with a milder intention than the one later attributed to the law.42 Blanchot denies that it was written by the Marshal; he admits that it was submitted to Bazaine for comment, and that he approved of it although he was surprised at its severity; he had urged strong measures on the Emperor, and therefore he hesitated to ask that the law be made weaker.43 The law itself was preceded by a Manifesto on October 2, which stated the reasons for the new decree. The Law of October 344 generally provided for a new court-martial system to try and sentence all members of armed bands or those who lent aid or support to such own expelled government, and, in event of conspiracy to rebel, whether or not such conspiracy shall have matured by overt act of hostility". — Rules of Land Warfare, par. 349. 39 Blanchot, L'Intervention, II, 353. 40 Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte, II, 538. 41 Niox, L'Expédition, 521. 42 Harding, The Phantom Crown, is extremely blasé in its accusations and inaccuracies and heaping of blame on Bazaine — doubtless the worst effort at a history of the Empire. In particular the present point is belabored on pages 2 1 4 - 2 1 5 . José Luis Biasio, who had a first-hand knowledge of the goings-on at the palace in the capacity of private secretary to the Emperor (Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, 60-61), attributed the authorship to some member of the Ministry of W a r but adds that Bazaine was responsible for adding Article 10. Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 14-15. Full text in El diario del Imperio, Mexico, October 3, 1865, II, No. 2 2 8 , pp. 1-2; Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 258-263; English translation in Martin, Maximilian in Mexico, Appendix V, 4 4 7 - 4 5 1 ; U.S. Document 1237 (Executive Document No. 5, 38th Congress), 2-5, and again 13-15. 43

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armed bands, with capital punishment and other severe sentences for some minor related offenses. It was different from the court-martial system imposed by Forey in 1863 in that it was to be composed of Mexican officers, and sentences were to be executed within 24 hours. Appeals were virtually impossible. An amnesty was also offered, to end on November 15, by which persons coming under the provisions of the law could present themselves and surrender their arms and be absolved of their past record. If caught before they presented themselves, of course, they were to be tried. Thus the measure was indeed more severe than anything the French had imposed, and hence it was likely not the work of a French hand but rather that of an extreme conservative of the old Mexican school of the Santa Anna days. One other aspect, mentioned also by Blanchot,45 is the possibility that the decree purposely was intended by a coalition of the Liberals and Conservatives in the Cabinet as an extreme measure, a non plus ultra which would react so heavily on the French and on the Emperor as to create an intolerable situation for them in Mexico. Bazaine may have believed that, for in his Archives there is an unpublished fragment of a letter by the Marshal which states This supposition [the one just introduced?] is not based on any fact; it only comes from the suspicions which are necessary and prudent in a country where bad faith and treachery among men in high places are passed off as second nature. The Emperor's councillors have in too many ways proved their ingratitude toward France and their lack of good faith toward their sovereign for their submission in approving the Decree of October 3 not to lead us to suspect them. Whatever may have been their motive, we must recognize that a serious step has been taken from the viewpoint of pacification of the interior. 46

However he may have felt about the origin of the law, the Marshal instructed his subordinates to observe it strictly, adding that he had "obtained" the promise of the Emperor that it would not become a dead letter like so many other such measures.47 A few days later he approvingly remarked that the law generally had produced a good 45

Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 14.

Bazaine to ?, n.d. n.p. fragment in BA, XIV, f. 2726. Here Bazaine meant the several liberals like Manuel Siliceo, who had signed without recorded protest. Not that severe measures were unknown to Mexican liberals, but in this case the measures were directed at their own camp. 47 Bazaine to the Commandants Supérieurs, No. 1271, Mexico, October 12 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2752. 46

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effect,48 but he was irritated to hear that in some cases the Mexican officials could not distinguish between the Juarist sympathizers and brigands on the one hand and, on the other, peaceful citizens who only submitted by force to the Juarist bands. The Law did not, of course, apply to the latter group.49

AMERICAN AID TO T H E JUÁREZ GOVERNMENT

Except for the reported flight of Juárez, other troubles in September, both internal and international, became routine. Evidence of American aid to Juárez became apparent; some Austrian prisoners who had escaped from Alatone at Misantla, brought news that a ship was due to bring arms to some port nearby, probably Nautla.50 Acapulco already had been reoccupied by French naval forces under Rear Admiral Mazères, as a means of denying that port to the Juarists.51 Nevertheless, by October 6 another ship had been located with a cargo of rifles and ammunition for the Juarist forces of San Bias and Tepic.52 Nor were those all. On October 10 news came that a load of arms was expected by Carbajal, the old guerrilla leader on the Gulf Coast, somewhere between Tuxpán and Tampico.53 From other sources Bazaine heard that the Cabinet of the United States had discussed war, but only one vote was cast for it. On the other hand Degollado, the Imperial representative then in New York, had sent pessimistic news that the situation was no better. He had heard that an invasion of Mexico was the order of the day in the United States; that early in September an army corps had moved from Shreveport, Louisiana, across Texas and had started toward the 4 8 Bazaine to Castagny and Douay, No. 462, Mexico, October 15, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2760-2761. 4 8 Bazaine to Douay, No. 501, Mexico, November 24, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2914. While the French courts-martial were gradually being dissolved, as late as December Bazaine learned that in Léon French officers still maintained a court, and he ordered it turned over to the Mexican military authorities. — Bazaine to Neigre, No. 517, Mexico, December 10, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3033. Could it be that the desire to place the onus of executing the decree on the shoulders of the Mexican officials was one reason why Bazaine approved the measure? 5 0 Bazaine to Cloué, Mexico, September 28, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2707. 5 1 Cazotte to Bazaine, No. 3, San Francisco, September 28, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2708. 5 2 Peza to Bazaine, No. 31, Mexico, October 6, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2727. 5 3 Bazaine to Commandant Cloué, Mexico, October 10, 1865, unpublished letter in BA, XIV, f. 2742.

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Rio Grande; and that an American officer in Texas was heard to express the opinion that the current concentrations in Texas indicated an invasion of Mexico. Travelers from Texas estimated the forces on the Rio Grande at between 60,000 and 100,000. 54 But in spite of those threatening rumors, when Mejia protested that American soldiers had been shooting across the river and striking some houses,55 General Steele of the Federal troops at Brownsville, sent an apology, promising punishment of the culprits if they could be found.56 Apologies notwithstanding, trouble went on, and Mejia sent a patrol out to examine the river banks. It was fired on by Cortina's band from the Texas side, and thereupon the patrol returned.57 The month of October, 1865, witnessed a continuation of the same series of troubles. Investigations continued of the three depots of supplies for the Juarists on the Pacific; 58 the Juarist forces between Piedras Negras and Camargo continued to grow; Mejia had two hostile notes from General Steele in answer to his latest protests;59 and even Matamoros was threatened and besieged by the guerrillas.60 And in San Francisco, despite the assurances of General MacDowell, Juarist agents still were busily shipping war supplies out of that port.61 Moreover, Juarist agents were known to have been introduced into the Mexican army units that were being formed.62 Rumors of an 54 Bazaine to Douay and Castagny, No. 451, Mexico, September 30, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2716. 55 Mejia to Bazaine, Matamoros, September 26, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2699, details in BA, XIV, 2791. 58 Major General Steele to Mejia, Brownsville, September 30, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2722. 57 Mejia to Bazaine, No. 287, Matamoros, October 12, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2748. 58 Bazaine to Admiral Mazères, No. 33, Mexico, October 16, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2766. 5» Mejia to Bazaine, No. 301, Matamoros, October 16, 1865, in BA, XIV, f 2769; samples of this correspondence are printed in Niox, L'Expédition, 536. 60 Mejia to T. Wurtemberg, the French Vice-Consul in Matamoros, No. 305, Matamoros, October 17, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2773. An account of the siege is in letter T. A. Wurtemberg to Bazaine, Matamoros, October 27, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2787-2789, where it is definitely stated that the guerrillas were obtaining arms from the Texas side of the river. The account is continued in idem to idem. Matamoros, November 4, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2820-2821. For relief of Matamoros by the French Navy, see idem to idem, Matamoros, November 8, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2834, also Mejia to Bazaine, Matamoros, November 9, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 28432844; also in Bazaine to Rear Admiral Mazères, No. 43, Mexico, November 23, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2902; and Bazaine to Cloué, No. 45, Mexico, November 26, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2928. 61 Cazotte to Bazaine, No. 4, San Francisco, October 20, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2774. 62 Loysel to Bazaine, Note 82, November 2, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2813.

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agreement between the Juarists and Santa Anna reached the Marshal.63 The name of General Sheridan was brought into the supply of arms and ammunition to the Juarists around Bagdad. 64 The confederate General Shelly (Shelby?) was said to have sold a battery of artillery to the Juarists,65 which the Federals paid no attention to, although they did try to repossess some guns sold to Mejia by the Confederates at Brownsville.66 On one occasion it was charged that 300 men of the Illinois Regiment crossed the river and helped the Juarists — an act of outright war if true.67 Finally Bazaine, on his own initiative undertook to act in his own defense. He gave orders to Commandant Cloué, who was stationed off Matamoros, that if the Americans fired at him from the Texas frontier, he was to return the fire, shot for shot.68 In short the situation became so delicate that Bazaine sent a request to Rear Admiral Diderot, then in command of the Antilles Fleet, to come to Veracruz as soon as possible with all his ships.69 Relations with the Imperial court remained rather cool, and at times Bazaine failed to show the respect and formalities required for correspondence with the Emperor. On two occasions he had his letters returned by Loysel as "officious" and with the request that he, Bazaine, not write again unless on strictly official business.70 In accordance with the urging of Napoleon, the French renewed their efforts to organize a Mexican army. New plans divided the country into nine military districts, with a Mexican general at the head of each. The French provided 1,698 officers and soldiers to act as cadre and organizers for the army. They soon designated the units, but the ranks were not filled. The army had the failings of earlier Mexican armies: Recruiting was not regular, and, since the French army no longer bore the expense, pay was irregular, caudilloism was common, desertions were frequent, and local officials made little effort to apprehend the deserters. Bazaine blamed the " Bazaine to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 615, Mexico, November 10, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2848. 64 Wurtemberg to Bazaine, Matamoros, November 14, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2862. β5 Ibid. «· Ibid., f. 2863. 67 Bazaine to Boyer, No. 218, Mexico, November 20, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2895. 68 Bazaine to Cloué, No. 45, Mexico, November 26, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2928. " Bazaine to Diderot, Telegram, Mexico, November 18, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2882. 70 Loysel to Bazaine, Mexico, November 18, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2881. The letters by Bazaine have not been preserved.

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lack of recruits on the failure of the landowners to aid the effort to enlist soldiers.71 In no case, however, had Maximilian taken the field with any troops; he had claimed that he could not engage in civil war and would command personally only in two cases: in the event of a campaign against the wild Indians of Yucatán, or against the North Americans.72 At last Napoleon III wrote impatiently in quest of a more direct answer as to the time when the French could leave. He evidently had become discouraged over the situation and only wanted to bow out as gracefully as he could: . . . we cannot stay in this state of uncertainty which paralyzes progress and raises French expenses. In the meantime lend your attention to organizing a Mexican army so that we can leave at some definite time. . . . the danger of war with America is avoided. We must know in what state we shall leave Mexico after our departure. The Emperor must understand that we cannot stay indefinitely in Mexico and that it is essential to put his finances and the larger problems in order. Let him know very well that it is much easier to abandon a government that does nothing to stay alive than it is to support him in spite of himself.73 In November minor events indicated a growth in Juarist strength. North American elections had given the country a Republican majority, and the party in power evidently hesitated to take any decisive step, although the border breaches of neutrality continued. 74 At the same time, while news that Juárez was having difficulties floating a loan in New York was encouraging, other news that in California an organization called Sons of Colombia had been formed and was propagandizing for Juárez, was not.75 On November 22 a band of Mexicans and American filibusters attacked the French ship Antonia, but they were beaten off. 76 Later on, the American ship 71 Bazaine, Período Imperial, unpublished document in BA, XV, f. 2 9 4 0 - 2 9 4 3 . This document has no addressee, but the content indicates a general summary of the situation in Mexico at the end of the year. 72 Ibid. 73 Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 20, Compiègne, November 29, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2947. 74 Bazaine to Douay and Castagny, No. 507, Mexico, November 30, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2974. ™ Ibid. 76 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 91, Mexico, December 3, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2995.

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Enterprise brought a load of ammunition to the Juarists, and Amei ican officers supervised the unloading.77 With news of the arrival ol six cavalry regiments in Texas, Bazaine also learned that at Brownsville the Federals had 500 boats ready to breach the boundary at a moment's notice.78 Juárez' soldiers were wearing new uniforms and buying horses in Brownsville.79 No improvement could be seen for the Empire by the end of December. General Crawford arrived in Texas with a large loan to be made available to Juárez. The commander at Brownsville asked Mejia to treat the Juarist bands as belligerents, but he refused.80 He could not do otherwise; to accept the Juarists as lawful belligerents would mean according them the right, under the customs of war, of treatment as prisoners of war, etc. But the Decree of October 3 excluded treating the captured Juarists as prisoners of war. Hence Mejia would be violating the law if he recognized the Juarists as belligerents.81 Other typical events and problems in December included the cap ture by General Castagny of some guerrillas in Sonora. There being no Mexican officials at hand, he sent them to San Bias to face trial under the Law of October 3 before a Mexican court-martial.82 Then François Blanco, in Cedrai, was fined for not defending himself against the bandits in May. He appealed that he was the only one Wurtemberg to Bazaine, Matamoros, December 7, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 3012. Bazaine to Douay and Castagny, No. 523, Mexico, December 17, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3037. 79 Wurtemberg to Bazaine, Matamoros, December 21, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3070. 80 Mejia to Bazaine, No. 347, Matamoros, December 21, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3078. 81 To be classed as a lawful belligerent, the parties in question must fulfill these conditions: They must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; they must have a fixed, distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance (uniform, e.g.); they must carry arms openly, and they must conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and usages of war. — Red Cross Convention of Geneva, 1864. For the text of the convention see "Ginebra" pp. 112-114, Vol. 26, Enciclopedia Ilustrada Espasa-Calpe. These traditional requirements were embodied into later conventions. — Annex to the Hague Convention No. IV, of October 18, 1907. To maintain that their forces were organized in an orderly manner under responsible commanders, the Juarists deposited with the American Department of State a copy of the organization of the "Central Army", that is, the one operating in the Michoacan area, all under General Vicente Riva Palacio and General Régules (second-in-command). — U.S. Document No. 1237, p. 9. 82 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 532, Mexico, December 22, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3082. 77

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who did at that time defend himself.63 The French garrison, isolated at Acapulco, was in desperate straits through lack of co-operation with other Mexican officials,84 and Bazaine finally decided to replace it with a Mexican garrison made up of men recruited in and around Tehuantepec and lower Oaxaca.83 Mejia still felt alarmed in Matamoros, though Colonel Jeanningros in Saltillo did not share the feeling.86 More filibusters were reported joining the Juarists, under the direction of General Crawford and Colonel Reed.87 Near Guaymas the countryside was tending more to favor the rebel leader Garcia Morales, than the Imperial officers.88 In Mexico City the year ended with the return of the Empress from Yucatán, the strained relations between Bazaine and the Emperor, a dubious loyalty from the Cabinet toward the Emperor, some rumblings of discontent from the French subordinates in the field, and a growing insistence from Napoleon III to put an end to the Intervention.

G R O W T H O F A M E R I C A N F I L I B U S T E R I S M IN M E X I C O

The year 1866 opened with more of the problems which the recent one had failed to solve. Communications between Monterrey and Matamoros were too hazardous for commerce;89 war supplies still were arriving for the Juarists on the coast at Soto Vento; Pedro Barreda was the purchasing agent in New York, and the Mexican packet-boat Rigoletto was on its way to Dos Bocas or Cupilco with another load.90 González Ortega and Huerta, both Juarist generals, were reported on their way back to Mexico via Galveston from their Bazaine to Douay, No. 533, Mexico, December 22, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3083. Bazaine to the Mexican Minister of War, No. 657, Mexico, December 24, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3091. 8 5 Bazaine to Mazères, No. 53, Mexico, December 26, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3094. 8 6 Jeanningros to Bazaine, No. 1342, Saltillo, December 28, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3106. 8 7 Mejia to Bazaine, No. 362, Matamoros, December 30, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3 1 1 2 Ms. Rumors placed the number as high as 25,000, but even Juárez did not believe such reports. — Juárez to Santacilia, Chihuahua, June 29, 1865, in Archivos privados de Juárez y Santacilia, I, p. 71. 8 8 Santiago Campillo to Emilio Langberg, Guaymas, December 31, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3118. 8 9 Douay to Bazaine, No. 2, San Luis Potosí, January 1, 1866, in BA, XVI, f. 3137. 9 0 Loysel to Bazaine, Note 107, January 2, 1866, in BA, XVI, f. 3146. 85

84

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missions in New York.91 In Mazatlán the Imperial forces, although supplied with new weapons from San Francisco and although outnumbering the Juarists at Culiacán by 2,000 men, still feared to attack it without the help of a French contingent.9-' Some American filibusters were about to land on the Pacific coast, and, with the two small French garrisons at Mazatlán and Guaymas about to withdraw, Corona's guerrilla band was becoming more aggressive.93 Then in the middle of January a group of irregulars, negroes mostly, with Federal officers, attacked and occupied Bagdad and held it for some time despite the protests of the French and the assurances of General Clark at Brownsville that they were on the point of withdrawing.94 Mejia's report was that about 400 of 500 negro soldiers with American officers in uniform crossed the river and seized the town. They tried to attack the French steamer Antonia again, but they were beaten off. They looted the city with the usual excesses and carried off the merchandise stored there. An Imperial ship, the Tartare, moved in close to shore and finally persuaded the Americans to leave on January 22, and only 80 of Cortina's band remained in the city when Mejia's aid arrived. Across the river General Weitzel, while not denying that aid was given the Juarists, took the attitude that it was not a serious matter, and he listed for the Adjutant General of Texas several ways in which the Imperial forces also had violated their neutrality.95 91 Castillo, Mexican Interim Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Minister of War, Mexico, January 12, 1866, in BA, XVI, f. 3172. Neither knew it, but González Ortega had been on no official mission to New York. His recruiting was a personal matter. — Juárez to Santacilia, Chihuahua, June 15, 1865, in Archivos privados de Juárez a Santacilia, I, p. 68. 92 Gamboa to ?, Mazatlán, January 15, 1866, in BA, XVI, f. 3193. 93 José J. Ramírez to the Emperor, Mexico, January 20, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3227. Bazaine to Douay, No. 367, Mexico, January 24, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3258. 95 Weitzel to Colonel C. H. Whitlesley, Adjutant General of the Department of Texas, January 25, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3285-3286, including the damaging admission: "It is impossible to deny that our arrival and our presence had given a very great moral support to the Liberals, and it may have happened that some of our officers or soldiers may have given some material support. But I cannot be held personally responsible for these facts." And he outright refused to return the arms which Mejia insisted had been stolen from Bagdad the night before. — Kodalich for Mejia, to Major Wilson, Commanding Officer at Clarksville, Bagdad, January 25, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3288. But to the French he claimed that he only occupied Bagdad on invitation of General Escobedo, whom his Government recognized as a lawful belligerent, thus denying that he had violated the American neutrality. — Bazaine to Douay, No. 575, Mexico, February 7, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3418. His line of thinking is not clear: A belligerent does not have the right to

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While this invasion constituted a serious incident, no help was forthcoming from the new division at San Luis Potosí because it was suffering from a lack of supplies and pay, and morale was low, which encouraged desertion.96 General Ugalde, operating in the nearby Huasteca area, had suffered slights from the Mexican government that led him to believe he personally was in disfavor, and therefore his aid was not to be expected. 97 In the meantime a similar attack was made on Matamoros by Crawford and Reed, but it was repulsed. Then Crawford and the Juarist General Escobedo quarreled over the cruelties the latter wanted to inflict on the city, and Escobedo went off with his band into the interior.98 While Bazaine wrote a faithful account to Maximilian of the events, including the reoccupation of Chihuahua by the French, he blamed the uprisings on the neglect of the authorities, poor choice of the heads of the rural guards, their carelessness with their sworn word, and the inveterate spirit of revolution in the country. Maximilian answered by adding a fifth cause, and one which, though not spoken, was a heavy load on his mind: the insufficiency of French troops. He did not, however, deny the other charges. Then he continued: However, if these events are distressing and are grave in themselves, they must not cause any discouragement in us. I realize that a spirit of revolution cannot be corrected in a day, and that I have accepted a singularly difficult task, but my courage is capable of supporting the load, and I shall resolutely go on to the end. I expect on the return of this courier the names of the authorities that seem to you disloyal, and they will have to be released; for I want to place at your disposal all the means in my power. I will replace these authorities by those who will have your confidence. As for the Guardias rurales, you, as commander-in-chief of the army have the right to change their officers. However, if you believe that I should intervene, I will likewise approve of all modifications that you propose. You insist on regular payment of the troops. In this respect I must remark that my government has done everything possible. It has even invite a neutral to aid in the occupation of belligerent territory. Nor did the United States support this stand; General Crawford was imprisoned in New Orleans, as a result. — ibid. For the French interpretation, see Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 55-61. ββ Carlos Oroniz to Bazaine, San Luis Potosí, February [January?], 26, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3289. 97 Ugalde to Bazaine, January 26, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3291. 98 Mejia to Bazaine, No. 27, Matamoros, January 27, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3297-3309.

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postponed the most necessary improvements in civil services to furnish the necessary resources to the army. The army is absorbing all the state income, and you need only look at the records of the Ministro de Hacienda to be assured of it. In short, this new uprising of the dissenters is a last effort of the rebels to attract the attention of the United States Congress. In confiding to free-lance companies the task of pursuing them relentlessly, I am convinced that these bands will soon disappear as they disappeared in 1864, but this time they will not profit from your clemency."

A new complicating factor arose in the south during that climatic month. Porfirio Díaz with a new army had appeared and threatened the French lines of communication. Bazaine proposed, although apparently in strict confidence, to agree to an exchange of prisoners and a tacit permit for Diaz to come as far north as to occupy Tehuacán, provided he promised not to pass that line and not to annoy the Veracruz road again. 100 Recruiting for the new Mexican army was not progressing well, but when the Minister of War proposed a general recruitment throughout the Empire, the Emperor decided against it and confined the efforts to an enlistment bonus of five pesos.101 The French Vice-Consul in Galveston wrote that he recommended a recruiting campaign like that of the Juarists. He said some young Irishmen had already approached him, and he recommended that type on account of their religion and forensic inclination.102 The Juarist party, it must be recalled, not only had friends in the United States but also in France. In January an agent Gusto Pastor y Ramírez, who had been a Juarist colonel at Puebla, came incognito from El Paso del Norte as a special agent for Juárez and with a mis" Maximilian to Bazaine, Cuernavaca, January 6, 1866, in BA, XVI, f. 3158; quoted also by Corti (Maximilian and Charlotte, II, 564) from a draft in the Vienna National Archives. This significant letter is perhaps the climax of the fortunes of the Empire. Maximilian hereby admitted his defeat and in spite of his pride of position and family, gave up the task of governing, leaving it to the talents of a French soldier, and swallowing the charges made by Napoleon III of lack and energy and resolution. Moreover, at the very time he placed the great decisions of government in the hands of Bazaine, he was endeavoring to have him replaced and sent back to France, as Corti (ibid., II, 556) has shown. Thus Napoleon's asseveration that he could find it easy to abandon anyone who did nothing to help himself struck home better than at the time he wrote the line. 100 Secretary of Bazaine to Douay, No. 430, Mexico, January 17, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3204. 101 Loysel to Bazaine, Note 117, Mexico, January 20, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3221. 102 H. de St. Cyr to Le Ministre (?), Galveston, January 29, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3322.

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sion for Riva Palacio. He visited Manuel Reyero, who revealed the story, and told him frankly, The Juarist party is at the end of its rope, but it is counting heavily on certain members of the Chambers in France. Unhappily for the Juarists the Chambers are much weaker than the head of the French government that has to be overcome. Consequently the Juarists have ordered the death of Napoleon III by means of a poisoned arrow.103 The plot was to send José María Cocio, an expert archer, to Paris to the home of a Mexican who was innocent of the plot, and there tc carry out the scheme. Once revealed to Bazaine, the plot fell through. Bazaine sent Reyero to Paris to give further evidence on the details so that proper precautions might be taken. 104 If the French government in Paris had difficulty understanding the situation in Mexico, they might be excused to some extent, because even in Texas, where one would suppose the state of affairs was well known, the Vice-Consul in Galveston wrote his impression of the military situation: The frontier of North Mexico, the Rio Grande, being the most vulnerable point of this country, should be the best defended. I am not surprised if they avoid sending European troops there; the dangers of desertion are too great, and Texas already contains a large number of European deserters coming from Mexico. But doesn't the Mexican Army have a few thousand solid, dependable men to whom it could confide this mission?... . 105

F R E N C H DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM MEXICO

Apparently not, and the combination of growing Juarist strength and threatening attitude from the Americans and the failure of Maximilian to rise to the occasion brought the inevitable result. From both J. P. Oudriot to Bazaine, Mexico, January 29, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3309. Bazaine to M. Pietri, Préfet de Police à Paris, No. 1986, Mexico, June 9, 1866, in BA, XXI, f. 4131. 1 0 5 H. de St. Cyr to Minister [in Paris?], Galveston, January 29, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3323. No answer is on record for these questions, but one might well imagine the answer Bazaine or any other French officer might make, when one considers the reasons already described for holding back French troops. If the highly disciplined but homesick European troops tended to desert over the river, what would one expect of the slippery Mexican soldiers? If there were a few thousand devoted, solid Mexican troops in the Empire, no one could have made better use of them than Bazaine could. 103 104

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points of contact, through the diplomatic channels in Paris and the military in Texas the Americans were taking the aggressive stand, and the French were wavering, playing for time, and defending themselves. Upon occasion, to be sure, some Americans abjured sympathy for the Juarist side: The aide-de-camp [of General Clark] and several officers have said that they were through with the Liberals; I don't believe they ever loved them very much, but they made use of them on occasion.106 They nonetheless maintained an uncompromisingly hostile attitude toward the Empire. Just when Napoleon began to see that his intervention was doomed, is not clear; but as early as November 10, 1865, he had apparently come to that conclusion; and after a breakfast meeting with James Watson Webb, he declared I wrote you at Rio that I got into the Mexican affair very unintentionally. . . . When I wrote you announcing my intention to retire altogether, as soon as possible, if your Government did not put it out of my power to do so with honor, I hoped before now to have got rid of the affair altogether.107 Such a statement, made in an informal conversation, may not have been the whole truth. Nonetheless it fits so neatly into other actions both earlier and subsequent, along with the rest of the conversation, that we find it hard not to believe. At any rate it shows that Napoleon III did not hesitate to have recourse to the rule his uncle followed when faced with a situation he could not conquer — Abandon it. But less precipitate if as sanguinary as his uncle, he could not disengage himself with too heavy a load on his conscience. His first commitment to withdraw came on January 15, when he wrote to Bazaine, The difficulties that the Mexican expedition continually bring me force me to put a definite date on the recall of my troops. The longest time I can give for the repatriation of the army corps, which must be done in stages, is the beginning of next year. I shall send you Baron [illegible: 106 Bazaine to Douay and Castagny, No. 567, Mexico, January 31, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3364. 107 William Henry Seward, Dispatch, September 6, 1865, December 16, 1865, and November 23, 1866, letter, February 14, 1866. - Frederic Bancroft, The Life of William. F. Seward, II, 437-439; Hanna, "The Roles of the South in the French Intervention in Mexico", Journal of Southern History, X X (1954) 17.

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Saillard?] to come to an agreement with you and with Emperor Maximilian on the execution of this measure. I should like for the evacuation of Mexico not to compromise the power of the Emperor. So take steps to organize a firm Foreign Legion and Mexican army. The Emperor will have to show great energy and find within his own country the necessary resources to support his expenses. I have also just written the Emperor Maximilian to this same effect. 108 Then at the end of the month, to maintain the decision, he confirmed the previous instructions: I will repeat to you what I have charged Mr. S[aillard] with telling you. Circumstances stronger than my desires oblige me to evacuate Mexico, but I do not want to do without leaving Maximilian every chance of maintaining himself with his own forces and the Foreign Legion. Put all your zeal and intelligence into organizing something durable in the country. . . . You may have a year or 18 months for it; it is a difficult task. If by chance the Emperor Maximilian should not have the power needed to remain in Mexico after the departure of our troops, then a Junta will have to be convened. Have a government organized and through your influence bring about the election of a president for the republic whose powers should extend for six to ten years. This government would then have to undertake to pay most of the debts due us in Mexico. Do not fall back on this combination except as a last extreme, for my sincerest desire is that Emperor Maximilian should be able to maintain himself.10» Thus the tide of the Second E m p i r e in Mexico had reached its flood, and the forces that brought it into being began to subside and reveal the barrenness that it had covered.

108 Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 21, Tuileries, January 13, 1866, in BA, XVI, f. 3186. But Napoleon was not straightforward in this. The letter of the same day to Maximilian, printed in Corti (Maximilian and Charlotte, II, 580-581 and another translation 930-931) only said that the troops would be withdrawn "as soon as possible". 109 Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 22, Tuileries, January 31, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3346. The influence of diplomatic conferences with James Watson Webb, American Ambassador, and the diplomatic policy of Bismarck are not to be discounted; but they lie on the periphery of this work. For a discussion, see Blumenthal, A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations, 176-180 and Duniway, "Reasons for the Withdrawal of the French from Mexico", in American Historical Association Annual Report, 1902, No. XIV.

CHAPTER

VII

THE GNAWING FROM

WITHIN

SHIFT OF VIEWPOINT TOWARD EVENTUAL EVACUATION

From the beginning of February, 1866 the French forces continuali)· worked with an evacuation in mind, though not a sudden one. They therefore began to concentrate their troops toward the highland and toward the central core of Mexico. The problem created by the movement was whether to withdraw the troops in small driblets, town by town, or else to mark off whole departments or states for abandonment at a time. The first inclination was to pull out of Sonora altogether, but Admiral Mazères on the Pacific coast, protested when he heard of the plan, and Bazaine modified it accordingly.1 In his answer Bazaine admitted that the American situation had improved along the border; the American government had denounced the recent aggressive acts at Bagdad, and the only immediate danger was from filibusters, who were also disavowed by the United States. However, Bazaine still felt that the prudent move would be to gather the troops where they could defend themselves against a numerically superior enemy if necessary. Thus in favor of a prudent concentration, he chose to give up the hope of "pacifying' certain sections of Mexico. Furthermore: As our occupation cannot last always, it is a good idea to inure the Mexicans gradually to depending on themselves; for experience has proved that in localities where there are French garrisons, the people will not take measures to defend themselves until they are absolutely obliged to. On the other hand a large number of towns and villages always have followed our urgings and have made their property respected.2 Momentarily there was a surge of new activity as more power was

1 Bazaine to Mazères, No. 68, Mexico, February 12, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3457. 2 Ibid.

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placed in French hands. Bazaine called for new energies from the French troops in the field: Let us study a way to make Mexican authorities as active as possible in their organization, civil and military. Emperor Maximilian at the moment seems animated by very good intentions and is disposed to concede whatever we ask of him. So there is no place for criticism alone; we must propose what we believe the most advantageous for the interest of his Empire.3 New hope for a respite in the fighting was born with the news that González Ortega had returned from New York with presidential aspirations, and that already dissensions in the Juarist ranks had come to French ears as the presidential term neared its end.4 The conservative hopes for a struggle between Juárez and González Ortega over the presidency, however, proved fruitless.5 New advice from Napoleon III included more details, but always with a view to ridding himself of the problem as soon as possible. He recommended further cuts in expenses, the recruitment of a Foreign Legion of 15,000 men, the dissolution of the Belgian and Austrian units with chosen cadres to be taken into the French Foreign Legion, which could be paid by France until the evacuation was completed. Mexican troops should be reduced to a small force with volunteer French cadres; the customs were to be run by the French, and the nationalized property of the Church, if free, should be returned to the clergy with the provision that a part of the value be shared with the government. The most surprising new advice was that the Emperor should go back to a federal system by dividing Mexico into eight or nine states with local representation and a governor, all linked by a weak, central federation. Maximilian should keep the customs, the army, and foreign affairs, but he should leave administration otherwise to the states, using the central state as a hearth of "civilization" which would then spread to the other states. In such a case the French need only leave a few thousand men on the coast to collect customs and repay the interest due France. In short: 3 Bazaine to Douay and Castagny, No. 587, Mexico, February 15, 1866, BA, XVIII, f. 3477. 4 Bazaine to Aymard and Castagny, No. 578, Mexico, February 11, 1866, BA, XVIII, f. 3452. 5 Juárez to Santacilia, El Paso, December 1, 1865, in Archivos privados Juárez y Santacilia, I, p. 101; idem to idem, Chihuahua, December 8, 1865, ibid., p. 107, 109.

in in de in

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Evacuate as soon as possible, but do everything required of us to see that our work does not fall into ruins the day after we leave.6 To aid in the forces to be made available, both Elliot, a railroad contractor, and General Thun, then head of the Mexican army, recommended enlisting a battalion of American negroes to serve in the Veracruz area. Bazaine treated the idea very coolly. Experience with Egyptian troops had not been especially happy, and the United States had protested the enlistment of a second battalion of Egyptians on the grounds that it would increase the negro population in America. Particularly he opposed the employment of ex-confederates as officers or supervisors lest more protests be incurred. 7 In view of those objections, Emperor Maximilian decided against the importation of negroes. 8

GROWTH OF REPUBLICAN MILITARY STRENGTH The Juarist forces, in the meantime, despite any friction with González Ortega over the presidential succession, learned in some way of the contemplated concentration of French troops, and a wide conspiracy was organized for an outbreak to flare up in several places at once at the proper moment. Corona had established himself in Coatlán; Regules in Michoacán with some 4,000 men, and Ortega at Sierra Hermosa (west of Zacatecas) were all ready to spring. Bazaine was unable to send reinforcements because he had to use all β Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 23, Paris, February 16, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3484. The letter is printed in a more complete form in Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 16-18, where it is also pointed out that in several ways this letter reverses the policy in the past; on the Mexican army, on the payment of foreign troops, on the disposition of Church property (a violation of Forey's Manifesto of June 12, 1863), and the centralist philosophy of French politics. Evidently Napoleon did not see clearly how to shake off the Mexican Empire and was hoping for a workable plan. Hence the concessions both to the Conservatives and the Federals. 7 Bazaine in an indorsement to Note 143 of Loysel to Bazaine, Mexico, February 14, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3504. The United States had also protested the dispatch of more Austrian volunteers. — Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 108109; Seward to Bigelow, Washington, March 20, 1866, in U.S. Executive Documents, No. 93, p. 40; Seward to Motley, Washington, March 19, 1866, in ibid., p. 44; idem to idem, Washington, March 19, 1866, in ibid., p. 45; idem to idem, Washington, April 6, 1866 in ibid., 45-46; idem to idem, Washington, April 16, 1866, in ibid., pp. 46-47. The U.S. agent in Paris had protested the further importation of Egyptian troops, and the protest evidently bore weight. — Bigelow to Seward, Paris, January 5, 1866 in ibid., p. 13. 8 Loysel to Bazaine, Note 149, Mexico, February 22, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3512.

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available men to protect the high plateaux." Only a part of Castagny's scattered French troops and those of General Lozada were available to hold Sinaloa and lower Sonora. The Juarists were of the opinion that war between the United States and France would break out in the spring; but when, in February the United States Congress temporarily shelved the Mexican question, they suffered a relapse, and the Empire experienced a corresponding ebullience. 10 Again when news came of the proposal of Woodridge in Washington for a fifty-million peso loan to the Mexican Republic, Imperial fears flared again, not so much that the loan was likely to materialize as the fact that the encouragement would aid Juarist morale. 11 They need not have worried so. Juárez resolutely refused to consider any financial offer that would endanger Mexican territorial integrity. When his agent, José María J. Carbajal, favored such a loan, Juárez denounced the loan and recalled Carbajal. From February on Maximilian no longer acted on his own initiative on important matters. Practically every appointment was sent to Bazaine for approval; when Bazaine authorized a $ 400,000 advance to the Empire, Maximilian's thanks were profuse. 12 Nearly all military problems were sent to him for a decision as if Maximilian were

9 Bazaine to Mazères, No. 71, Mexico, February 25, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3539, where he called the plateaux "The heart of the Empire". For earlier activities of Corona, see C. H. Poor to Charles H. Bell, Mazatlán, November 7, 1864, in U.S. Navy, Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. Ill, p. 391. 10 Bazaine to Douay and Castagny, No. 602, Mexico, March 1, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3566. 11 Concerning the war-talk and aid to Juárez, Loizillon wrote: "To my surprise your letters . . . show the greatest tranquillity toward the United States. Here we are far from the same confidence. We have had many proofs of the bad intentions of the Americans. . . What is more vexing is that the Americans will not follow up their threats, but they will continue . . . to offer refuge . . . to Juarist bands, furnishing them money, arms, and munitions; and sending to the Juarists as reinforcements the negroes that they discharge and who are an embarrassment to them. .. . They know very well that they can with impunity violate the laws of war [le droit des gens] for however strong we would be in Mexico, we would be equally weak if we went into their immense country; we would be swallowed u p . . . . [The Americans] will continue to insult us as Mr. Seward has done in his letter to the French ambassador. They depend on their filibusters, on the lack of money in the Mexican treasury, and on the opposition of the French Chambers to force us to abandon Mexico, carrying Maximilian with us and leaving them to prey on the country where we have spent so much blood and so much money." — Loizillon to his sister, Mexico, February 6, 1866, in Lettres, No. lxxxvi, 362-367. 12 Maximilian to Bazaine, Palais de Mexico, February 5, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3392; printed in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 100.

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anxious to avoid the responsibility.13 He did baulk at the proposals brought by Baron Saillard from Napoleon with the instructions given Bazaine on January 15 and 31. Acceptance of the terms would have left his Empire on very thin legs. Maximilian prolonged negotiations until at last Baron Saillard left without any definite understanding. 14 Bazaine, however, already had prepared his plan for the evacuation, beginning in November with a first contingent of 6,000 French soldiers. Several ports on the Gulf were to be held ready for the movement, as well as for the collection of revenues.15 Evacuation of the Pacific Coast, however, was postponed until the end of the year.16 In March more signs appeared that the Empire was beginning to totter. Farsighted but lukewarm supporters hastened to secure their fortunes and persons against the hard blows to come. Hidalgo, the minister in Paris, when recalled, almost refused to come back to Mexico; then as soon as he had settled his affairs at home, he returned to Paris to live as a private citizen.17 Almonte, who had a neck to lose if caught by the Juarists, departed as minister to Paris. Not only was he made minister, but he took along a projected revision of the Treaty of Miramar and a brief of the negotiations he could enter into. Generally he was to present the projected treaty; if it was rejected outright, he was to demand the immediate withdrawal of French troops, with the understanding that Maximilian would not "abandon" Mexico. Negotiations were to be kept secret, but if the French made them public, Almonte was immediately to notify Maximilian so that they could be published in Mexico, too. If Napoleon III accepted the treaty, immediate reinforcements were to be requested. If French troops were to be maintained in Mexico, the Mexican government was to decide on the areas to be occupied; they were not, for example, to occupy the capital. If ships were to be sent to evacuate French soldiers, they were to be asked to deliver other volunteers awaiting shipment in Europe. On the other hand, Maxi1S This included even personal feuds like that between General Thun, military commander at Oaxaca, and Imperial Commissioner Francisco Franco. — Letter of Loysel to Bazaine, No. 152, Mexico, February 25, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3540. 14 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Coded Telegram No. 378, Mexico, March 1, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3558. 15 Bazaine to Didelot, Coded Telegram No. 390, Mexico, March 14, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3635. 18 Bazaine to Mazères, Coded Telegram No. 394, Mexico, April 4, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3739. 17 Bazaine to Admiral Didelot, Coded Telegram No. 382, Mexico, March 5, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3606.

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milian would favor the appointment of a French Under-secretary of War and four high officials to watch over the expenses of state. If it would please Napoleon III more, Maximilian would even make Bazaine a duke and give special medals to other deserving French soldiers.18 Generally the idea was to obtain further French aid for Mexico, especially financial aid. In that effort Almonte failed. In March the Mexican gendarmerie had completed its organization and was sent to garrison points along the Mexico-Veracruz road.19 The road from Monterrey to Matamoros had been cut for some three months.20 In San Francisco the American customs officials had relaxed their observance of rules against allowing arms to be sent to Juárez. 21 In fact, General Billier, the customs inspector, had received instructions not to put any obstacles in the way of loading out arms or ammunition for either of the two belligerents. 22 On the Texas border General Mejia reported that the guerrilla officers Negrete, Carbajal, Aureliano Rivera, and Guillermo Prieto came down from the interior of Texas to Brownsville with 7,000 rifles to issue to "a troop of filibusters," 23 who continued to threaten Matamoros. General Crawford escaped from prison and was reported on the way back to Brownsville.24 In the organization of the new Foreign Legion, embracing the Austrians, Belgians, some French, and some Mexicans, totaling 15,000, Maximilian proposed that General Brincourt be placed in charge. Bazaine did not oppose the idea except to admit that the Belgians and Austrians might want a voice in it. So he counterproposed a 18 Instrucciones que llevó el g ral Almonte á Francia y proyecto de tratado secreto, Mexico, April 4, 1866, in Archiv Kaiser Maximilians von Mexiko, University of Texas transcript, 142-148. The transportation of volunteers to Mexico was a dead issue when Almonte reached Europe. On May 10, 1866 the Austrian government, acceding to the strong protest of U.S. Minister to Vienna John Lothrop Motley, had Austria's promise to prevent the departure of the two thousand volunteers. — Bancroft, Life of William Henry Seward, II, 441. 19 Bazaine to the Ministro de Gobernación, No. 674, Mexico, March 21, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3676. 20 Pierron to Bazaine, No. 124, Mexico, March 21, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3681. 21 E. Colson to Bazaine, Paris, March 25, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3706. 22 Bazaine, Rapport de Quinzaine, to Douay, Castagny, Mazères, and Didelot, No. 621, Mexico, March 31, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3723. From this new development Bazaine concluded that "So we can see that if the United States wants to avoid a war with France, she is nonetheless trying to create the greatest possible embarrassment to our political policy." 2' Ibid. 24 Mejia to Bazaine, April 2, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3733.

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commission to handle the organizing and command of the Legion with Brincourt as a member but also with General Thun, Colonel Zack, and Colonel van der Smissen representing other European interests.25 Maximilian may have recommended Brincourt as a mild affront to Bazaine, since Brincourt had on at least two occasions protested Bazaine's policy and leadership with a vehemence that almost amounted to insubordination. But Bazaine had recognized the ability of Brincourt, had smoothed over the incidents, and kept him under control and on more or less friendly terms. When this new question arose, Brincourt had recently been relieved of his command in Chihuahua and was in the capital awaiting a new assignment. When Napoleon's plans were made known to Maximilian, the latter objected to certain parts and offered a counterproposal that was almost the same as the plan offered by Bazaine. Bazaine objected that the counterproposal was only a means of prolonging the negotiations and thus drawing more heavily on the French treasury.26 At any rate Bazaine succumbed to pressure. After the penury of the Mexican Treasury was revealed at a meeting of the Council of State, the Marshal agreed to an advance of two million francs, although he was well aware that his government would barely tolerate any more such advances. It was not the poverty of Mexico that persuaded him, however; there is some reason to believe that Maximilian threatened to leave Mexico if he did not get the loan.27 Whatever plans Bazaine may have made for the return of the troops were superseded in April by a new letter from Napoleon III. The new schedule was set for 9,000 men to return at the end of October, 9,000 more in the spring of 1867, and the remaining 11,300 in October, 1867. Along with that schedule Bazaine was surprised to find himself authorized to return to France, though the time of return was not specified. The next eighteen months were to be spent in organizing the foreign contingents and the Mexican army. A French general agreeable to Maximilian would be given command over the Legion. Brincourt, for example. Also: 25 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Coded Telegram No. 395, Mexico, April 4, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3743. 26 Idem, to idem, Coded Telegram No. 407, Mexico, May 1, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3932. 27 Idem, to idem, Coded Telegram No. 402, Mexico, May 1, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3936. Also Loizillon to his sister, Mexico, June 26, 1866, in Lettres, No. xcv, 384-390. Loizillon was at the time chief of staff of the auxiliary (Belgian-Austrian) troops and was in a position to receive information from the inner councils.

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I repeat and insist that for your glory as well as for mine things must be handled so that after the departure of our troops the Emperor's government will be able to maintain itself and live on its own strength. I do not need to tell you how happy I shall be to see you again and to express all my appreciation for your conduct in Mexico.28

In April good and bad news came from the United States. The Congress had voted money to maintain a legation with the Mexican Republic. The Federal army was down to 150,000 men, and a bill before the Senate would have cut it to 50,000; so that the element of extensive armed strife between France and the United States no longer needed to figure in plans for Mexico. Monthalon in Washington was endeavoring to get the open policy on shipments of arms revoked. General Sheridan was again reported on his way to the Rio Grande to quell the insubordination of the Federal troops there.29 On the Rio Grande all was quiet.30 Although the rumored movements of filibusters continued, 31 they showed themselves only on the Pacific coast. There Corona and about twenty-five of the American filibusters in La Paz boarded a ship bringing arms for the Empire from San Francisco and seized the cargo.32 Early in April Colonel Jeanningros marched north to open the road from Monterrey to Matamoros, and Mejia went out from Matamoros on the 10th to meet him. The very next day General Olvera heard that an attack by the Juarist leader Canales, supported by American filibusters, was coming, and he prepared his forces for an attack. No attack came, fortunately, and on the 14th General Mejia returned. 33 Then he in turn set out to pursue the reported guerrillas. He met them and seized 56 prisoners, 137 horses, and the official corespondence of Cortina. Mejia then set out again and had a fight, as a result of which Cortina was rumored (three versions) killed. Actually he escaped, but it was es28 Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 24, Paris, April 12, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3766. This letter has a lacuna in the Bazaine Archives, but it is printed complete in Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 62-63. The missing part designates Douay to succeed Bazaine and offers a letter of appointment, leaving the date to be filled in by Bazaine himself on his departure. 29 Bazaine to the French Consul in New York, No. 1860, Mexico, April 20, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3847. 30 Bazaine to Douay, etc., No. 627, April 15, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3783. 31 Bazaine to Mejia, No. 1856, Mexico, April 18, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3825. 32 Bazaine, Rapport de Quinzaine, No. 635, Mexico, April 30, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3916.

33

T. Wurtemberg to Bazaine, Matamoros, April 19, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3840« 3841,

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tablished that among the dead were several ex-soldiers of the Federal army.34 In the northwest Castagny tried to organize the cities under his control to handle their own government under Imperial colors. After the withdrawal of Brincourt from Chihuahua the second time, in 1865, it seemed very unlikely that French troops would return under existing plans. Yet Bazaine continued to hold out that hope in order to encourage the government officials to maintain their efforts. Moreover, he intended to be ready in case a change of orders or plans would allow a return to the north. Also: We must expect certain movements of our troops as a consequence of new instructions that may come from either a desire to make concessions to public opinion or from our firm intention to compel the Mexican government to follow paths more in harmony with the interests that the French army represents here. We must wait for an opportune moment to renew our expedition to Chihuahua. I do not give up showing our flag in those distant lands; but unless I receive instructions from my government, I likewise maintain the principle that I have upheld always, that is, that it is better to give an insurrection a certain confidence and let it establish itself at a point it hopes to defend; then the blow it receives will be the surer and more decisive.35 The campaign in the State of Guerrero did not go well, and Vicario's limited operations there soon ceased. Despite the difficulties he encountered in building up troops for the expedition, Bazaine still asked the consul in San Francisco to get word to the rebels, as a means of intimidating them, that a heavy campaign was in preparation.36 This indirect means of communication was typical. Although the French had maintained an occupation of Acapulco for many months, the state was otherwise in the control of the Alvarez family — firm supporters of Juárez. On April 5 the newspaper Moniteur published an article describing the plan for the projected withdrawal of the French, and it caused D. M. Frossard to Bazaine, April 30, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3850 and 3907. Bazaine to Castagny, No. 637, Mexico, May 2, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3941. That was indeed the theory on which he had operated on many occasions, and it was successful wherever it had free play: The capture of Puebla, of Matehuala, of Oaxaca. The greatest difficulties he met in the field came from vain pursuits and the refusal of the enemy to concentrate where he could reach them. 36 Bazaine to the French Consul in San Francisco, No. 1907, Mexico, May 5, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3960. See also Bushnell, The Military and Political Career of Juan Alvarez. 34

35

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a small panic among their supporters. French policy assumed that it would subside when the populace saw evidence of a strong Imperial army to take over.87 When months passed, however, and the strong army did not materialize, the feeling did not subside. 38 Defections from the Juarist side had virtually ceased. Recruiting for the new army made such slow progress that in May authorities welcomed 1,000 reinforcements arriving in Mexico, although the government protested the extra expense, and Bazaine had to advance money to pay them as well as the $123,000 required for their transportation. 39 This newly-forming Mexican army was likewise short on arms, and continued requests reached Bazaine for a supply. He had none to spare, but it was known to him that large quantities were stored in the capital, and he recommended that they be purchased, though he had no suggestion as to the mode of payment. 40 The popular unrest had caused Maximilian to bestir himself in the organization of the army, and he began holding semi-weekly meetings of a commission in charge of the organization. 41 The strain proved too much for him, and on June 3 he turned over the whole problem of organization of the army to Bazaine. 42 However, without consulting Bazaine, he issued an order of the day to the Austrian and Belgian troops. This was interpreted in several ways, but probably was meant as an appeal for them to stay by him and accept incorporation into the Foreign Legion. 48 Some such stimulation was necessary. Recruiting

37 Bazaine, Rapport de Quinzaine, No. 642, to D o u a y , etc., Mexico, M a y 15, 1866, in B A , X X , f. 3996. Also Bancroft, Life of William Henry Seward,, II, 438. 3 8 Bazaine, Rapport de Quinzaine, No. 653, to D o u a y , etc., Mexico, M a y 31, 1866, in B A , X X I , f. 4 0 7 8 . 89 Pierron to Boyer, Mexico, M a y 22, 1866, in B A , X X I , f. 4037. 4 0 B a z a i n e to Robles, Commissaire Impérial à Leon, No. 1945, Mexico, M a y 26, 1866, in B A , X X I , f. 4 0 6 1 4 1 Bazaine, Rapport de Quinzaine, No. 653, to D o u a y , etc., Mexico, M a y 31, 1866, in B A , X X I , f. 4078. 4 2 Maximilian to Bazaine, Mexico, J u n e 3, 1866, in B A , X X I , f.4091. T h a t was a complete surrender, b u t perhaps also a last move to rid himself of the constant complaints of B a z a i n e that " e n e r g y " and " a c t i o n " were n e e d e d , and to avoid the delays B a z a i n e s a w c a u s e d by the discussions and negotiations of the Cabinet. Henceforth, to m a k e the surrender more complete, he a g r e e d to set u p a B u r e a u of Mexican Affairs under the General H e a d q u a r t e r s , h e a d e d b y General Osmont. General F r i a n t w a s to h e a d the B u r e a u of Administration, and all of their instructions were to bear the c o m m a n d line of " B y Order of the E m p e r o r " . 4 3 B a z a i n e to the F r e n c h Minister of W a r , C o d e d T e l e g r a m No. 4 3 2 , Mexico, J u n e 13, 1866, in B A , X X I , f. 4151.

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for the Mexican army showed few results, and at last the first step of the "fair" recruiting program promised by Forey on June 12, 1863, saw light, evidently as a result of French impulsion. It took the form of a sort of lottery to be held in the Departments of Mexico, Puebla, and Querétaro to decide on a certain number of members who would be drafted into the army.44 In that way it became clear that at last real and constructive, if belated, steps were being taken in the foundation of a national army. New orders from Napoleon III, issued in April, did not reach Bazaine until the beginning of June, and he then modified his own plan to allow the departure of the second contingent of 9,000 to be broken up and to depart in small groups between November and April; and the last 11,000 were to leave in October, 1867. 45 At first Bazaine received without a murmur the order for his own return and proposed to Didelot that a ship be designated for him, the Magellan or the Themis, provided it was ready to return on regular rotation sometime in November. 46 More concerned with details than Napoleon, Marshal Bandon wrote in some anxiety to ask how the evacuation was to take place. He had arranged with a trans-Atlantic steamship company to place three transport at the service of the army to do the evacuating, beginning in September and continuing through March, 1867. But he was worried about that last contingent: What positions will you have the last regiments occupy? What will they be doing the last five or six months while they await their turn to embark? Will the country be in such a situation that they can move toward Veracruz surrounded by nothing but the benedictions of the people, in the tranquillity and well-being to which they will have dedicated four or five years of rough work?47 Bandon then went on to suggest that naval ships bring back those animals which the army could not sell. He had heard rumors that the Austrians and Belgians would refuse to accept French superversion under the new plan, even if it meant being regularly paid from French pockets, and he was fully aware that critical moments were bound to appear. He realised full well that the Mexican army would not be able to guard the Empire: "The misfortune is that it 44 Bazaine, Rapport de Quinzaine, No. 666, to Douay, etc., Mexico, June 15, 1866, in BA, XXI, f. 4173-4174. 4 5 Bazaine to Didelot, No. 91, Mexico, June 3, 1866, in BA, XXI, f. 4099. 46 Ibid. 47 Randon to Bazaine, Paris, June 15, 1866, in BA, XXI, f. 4166-4167. This last question must be taken as skepticism if not downright sarcasm,

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[The Mexican Government] has never wanted to prepare for it." 48 Shortly after that letter, however, Randon gave his approval to the plan for the Foreign Legion but warned Bazaine that he would have to do it all with the forces he already had; no more reinforcements would be sent. He frankly disapproved of any further activity in Chihuahua. He flatly refused to send any more arms to Mexico. Otherwise he did not pretend to understand the situation: I do not speak of military operations. I get lost in all these marches and countermarches, but what is very clear is that the profession of guerrilla is one of the most lucrative in Mexico and that the leaders of bands are never bothered about finding soldiers and money — two elements of war in which the Mexican government is in default. May your efforts to organize an armed force even this late, turn out well, and I hope the measures taken for regularization of taxes fill the empty state treasury. 49

As for the military situation in Central Europe, Randon recognized that many officers would be concerned about France's rôle; but he reassured Bazaine that the government was taking no steps to intervene in the Austro-Prussian difficulty and did not in fact know which side to favor. ABANDONMENT OF THE NORTHERN PROVINCES

The results of the withdrawal began to appear in June. Juárez, who knew very well via Paris, New York, and Washington of the French committent, had ordered a general offensive along the line of occupation. Colonel Jeanningros in Monterrey could not guard convoys to Matamoros, and the troops of Mejia in the north were unpaid and isolated. Mejia had borrowed from merchants to support the troops but could do so no longer. Therefore he proposed to come to the capital personally to ask for the necessary funds or else to resign his impossible command.50 Under the circumstances no aid could be sent. Then, urged on by orders from Jeanningros and Douay, Mejia placed General Olvera and 1,600 men in charge of a commercial convoy which was to meet French troops at Mier. There the French 48 Ibid. Randon went on that assumption purely from official reports — he was never in Mexico. 46 Randon to Bazaine, Paris, June 30, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4224-4226. 50 Mejia to Bazaine, No. 176, Matamoros, June 4, 1866, in BA, XXI, f. 4106; Juárez to Santacilia, Villa del Paso, March 9, 1866, in Archivos privados de Juárez y Santacilia, I, p. 126-127,

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would take over the convoy, and Olvera was then to return. But some Austrian troops in the force were too uninured to the climate, and they required a slow pace. On the 14th, near Camargo, the convoy was overtaken by Canales and his band of four or five thousand men, including some 1,200 North Americans. After the fight only about seventy men got back to Matamoros with the news. The captured Austrians were shot. Mejia saw the situation was hopeless and embarked his remaining 700 men, leaving Matamoros to make its peace with the Juarist General Escobedo, who was hot on his heels. The Juarists were no longer troubled by lack of arms and other supplies; Escobedo himself acknowledged receipt of supplies on contract shortly before the last fight. 51 Mejia then withdrew to Tampico, where he was made military commander, replacing General L a Madrid. 52 On top of that unhappy situation the préfet of Zacatecas Saltierra, forwarded reports that the Juarists were counting heavily on a loan from the United States and that Gonzaléz Ortega with 10,000 filibusters and 100,000 rifles, was at Piedras Negras, with Cortina and Barrios poised to attack Monterrey and Saltillo in conjunction with his offensive, with Negrete to attack in Tamaulipas, and Corona to attack Culiacán. In return for the U.S. aid, rumor had it that the Juarists had offered to sell Lower California. 53 In the Gulf of Cali51 Mejia to Bazaine, No. 192, July 9, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4273-4274; also Bazaine to Mazères and Didelot, Coded Telegram No. 98, Mexico, July 1, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4242. For a description of the tumultous times in Matamoros following its capture by the Juarists, see T. Wurtemburg to Bazaine, Brownsville, September 24, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4606-4607. Mejía's account of this, the Battle of Santa Gertrudis, is very short. More details and from the French point of view are in Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 147-153. For supplies received by Escobedo, see M. Escobedo to M. Romero, Linares, May 27, 1866, in Circulares y otras publicaciones hechas por la legación mexicana en Washington, durante la guerra de intervención, I, 194. The reference is evidently to the supply of new arms, repeating guns of the machine-gun type. He armed several squadrons with them and obtained brilliant success, which gives Escobedo the doubtful honor of being the first military leader to use automatic weapons in field operations. The Gatling Gun came out just at the close of the American Civil war. It has generally been assumed that automatic weapons first appeared in the War of 1870-1871. — Albert Hans, La guerre du Mexique selon les Mexicains, 8-9. 52 Secretary of the Emperor to Bazaine, Mexico, June 30, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4230. 55 Pierron to Bazaine, No. 127, Mexico, June 6, 1866, in BA, XXI, f. 4108. For the combined attack see also Bazaine, Rapport de Quinzaine, to Douay, etc., No. 666, Mexico, June 15, 1866, in BA, XXI, f. 4173-4174, where Corona's attack was to be made on Mazatlán. The offer of Lower California was rumor only.

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fornia a group of filibusters under a leader called Colonel Dana, seized a ship, the John L. Stephens, took it to Aitata, picked up 500 more men, then, under the American flag, sailed to Mazatlán and tried to board the French frigate Victoire, which had most of its crew on shore leave. The attack failed, but the daring of the adventurers and the danger to the French Navy in Mexican waters was clear.54 The general pattern on the west coast was for American filibusters to sign contracts as colonists with General Vega in San Francisco, take a ship to San Pedro or Los Angeles, then go overland to Sonora. Guns and ammunition were brought to Libertad on the Sonora coast. No blockade being declared, the French ships were powerless to intervene.55 In Veracruz at the same time authorities uncovered a plot to seize the town, and they arrested five men.58 A curtain of silence fell on upper Tamaulipas after Mejia had left Matamoros, but a large body of Juarists was located near Monterrey itself. 57 .

CARLOTA'S MISSION TO

FRANCE

In view of the growing disquiet, Bazaine decided to go north to use his personal influence to solve the confused problem. 58 It turned out to be an exceedingly bad time to leave the capital, where intrigues were getting out of control. Immediately excitement broke out. Two days later, as soon as Bazaine reached Querétaro, he received a secret telegram from his secretary stating that the Empress was about Juárez maintained an unalterable stand on that point. — Juárez to Santacilia, Chihuahua, March 2 , 1 8 6 5 , in Archivos privados de Juárez y Santacilia, I, p. 42-43. 5 4 Bazaine to Admiral Mazères, No. 92, Mexico, June 10, 1866, in BA, X X I , f. 4 1 4 2 - 4 1 4 3 . 55 Cazotte to Bazaine, No. 19, San Francisco, June 29, 1866, in BA, X X I I , f. 4209. At the time of writing that letter the Keoko, in San Francisco Bay, was loading on American volunteers for the Juarist army. It departed on the 8th of July for Port Isabel on the Colorado River(?) with 3 5 Americans to be unloaded at Libertad or L a Paz, where they could join Pesqueira. — Cazotte to Bazaine, No. 20, San Francisco, July 10, 1866, in BA, X X I I , f. 4 2 7 7 ; also Cazotte to General (?), San Francisco, July 14, 1866, in BA, X X I I , f. 4 2 9 7 , with clipping from the Morning Call of San Francisco, July 14, 1866. Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Mexico, July 3, 1866, in BA, X X I I , f. 4 2 5 3 . Jeanningros to Douay, No. 556, Monterrey, July 5, 1866, in BA, X X I I , f. 4 2 5 7 . The news came in that the local head men in all the villages reported receiving orders to prepare herds of cattle, maize, and hay for a large body of troops. 5 8 Bazaine's Secretary to Commandant Cloué, No. 444, Mexico, July 2, 1866, in BA, X X I I , f. 4249. 58 57

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to depart for France by packet boat to try to persuade Napoleon III to reverse his stand on the withdrawal of the army.59 Thus it became even more clear that Bazaine's mastery of intrigue reached even the most secret councils of the royal couple. The secretary also revealed that the news began to leak on the 5th. The informer (Barrés?) believed that Carlota was going to Paris "full of venom" to "deceive" Napoleon on the situation in Mexico and to ask for a loan of thirty million francs for Imperial soldiers and officers. Further, the departure was timed so that, though the Secretary could send a courier to Veracruz in time to reach the United States mailboat (with messages for France) before Carlota reached Veracruz, there was no hope to do so if he waited for instructions from Bazaine. The Secretary therefore took it on himself not to impede the departure of the Empress, even if Bazaine should like to do so, but rather to rob the voyage of its secrecy. He therefore had inserted in the Moniteur on the 7th the notice: T h e Empress leaves tomorrow for Europe. Concern over the interests of Mexico and settlement of various international questions are the reasons for the voyage.

and the Secretary added, "We give this news out so that the public will know Her Majesty's true purpose."60 Further proof that the voyage was intended to be a secret lies in the fact that, as the Secretary pointed out in the coded part of the telegram, on the preceding day the Empress had visited Señora Bazaine but had said not a word about an impending departure. Public gossip, now avid for news during the critical period, already had seized upon the departure as a sign of a coming abdication and departure of the Emperor.61 59 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Coded Telegram No. 445, Mexico, July 4, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4254. The news was confirmed by idem to idem, Coded Telegram No. 446, Mexico, July 6, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4266. The news was betrayed by Barrés [Charles de Barrés, Editor of l'Estafette?]. Hyde, The Mexican Empire, 205, doubts that the revelation makes it clear that it was one of several schemes that Maximilian was up to. Corti is silent on that point. Furthermore the following pages should make it abudantly clear that reasons given by Hyde are baseless. 60 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Telegram No. 447, July 8, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4267. The telegram is partly coded, but this part was sent in the clear. 61 Ibid., coded part. It was a common rumor by the 8th that Maximilian had decided to abdicate on July 3, when the French government had refused to allow any more advances to pay Mexican soldiers and when Almonte's mission had failed completely. Only Carlota's offer to go to Paris had persuaded him to remain. — Loizillon to his sister, Mexico, July 8, 1866, Lettres, No. xcvi, 390-393.

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During the month new instructions came from Randon, letters full of complaints at Bazaine's self-assertion in commissioning thirty-six new officers beyond his authority, and the delay in taking over the customs at Veracruz to obtain money for the French debt, as earlier instructions had required. 02 The news of the fall of Matamoros had further persuaded him that French soldiers ought to leave Mexico as soon as possible. Later on he wrote angrily that public opinion had reacted unfavorably to that news, and he reiterated that the time had come for France to put an end to her sacrifices and to use all her resources in guarding her own interest. He repeated that no new expense should burden France in the development of final measures, and he regretted that the pay of Belgian and Austrian troops already had been promised. Although he spoke no word of direct reproach, he made it unmistakable that he was very dissatisfied with the situation.63 Those same ideas were maintained even after Empress Carlota reached Paris and spoke with Napoleon. No plans were changed, wrote Randon, nothing else could be done; the evacuation was to go on as planned. He changed only one item: He recommended that Bazaine stay and leave with the last troops instead of after the first contingent.64 CONSOLIDATION OF FRENCH FORCES

The time had come for the French to pull out of Coahuila and Nuevo León, as they already had from Chihuahua. Douay, with his headquarters at Saltillo, first called for Jeanningros and the Belgian troops in Monterrey to leave on the 25th and 27th, to reach Saltillo on the 27th, there to remain dispersed for a few days until the march was to resume. From Saltillo there would be two columns, following the road to Matehuala. 65 The Juarists, however, left them no peace. While Juan de la Garza remained in Matamoros, a large force under Escobedo, Treviño, and Cortina, threatened Monterrey even before the departure and hovered like vultures on their trails.66 In the south Alvarado was attacked by Juarist General Tomás Lozano on July 28.67 82

Randon to Bazaine, Paris, July 15, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4312-4314. Randon to Bazaine, Paris, July 31, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4370. 94 Randon to Bazaine, Paris, August 15, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4436-4439. 85 Douay to Bazaine, No. 468, Saldilo, July 23, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4329. ββ Secretary to Bazaine, Telegram No. 465, Mexico, July 25, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4341. " Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, No. 471, Mexico, July 29, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4353. 63

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After suffering a defeat, Imperial General Calderón apparently went over to the Juarists, while the remnants of his garrison straggled into Veracruz. 68 Tampico was attacked on August 1 and captured; only Casamata remained in the hands of a Contre-guérrilla band, and the small ship Mosquito got away with the news and something over two hundred members of the garrison.69 The Contre-guérilla band took the offensive a few days later and with French naval aid recaptured Tampico. 70 On August 11 Tuxpan called urgently for reinforcements, saying that the population was demoralized.71 Two more filibuster groups were reported en route in August, from New York and San Francisco bound for Matamoros and Sonora respectively.72 In Mazatlán General Rivas, when ordered to place his soldiers under the French Major Morand, to form a new battalion, delayed and told his officers privately that Mexican soldiers would never again serve under French leaders.73 Colonel Camacho in Tacotalpam saw his situation untenable and pulled out for Alvarado on August 18.74 Juarist General Martinez captured Hermosillo on August 14 and executed all of the Frenchmen there. 75 When an inspector reached Mazatlán and Guaymas, he found the small French garrisons on the verge of evacuating before the threat of Pesqueira and Angel Martinez.76 68 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Coded Telegram No. 472, Mexico, July 30, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4355. 69 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Telegram No. 486, Mexico, August 11, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4407; also in idem to idem, Coded Telegram No. 477, Mexico, August 4, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4377. 70 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Telegram No. 483, Mexico, August 10, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4403. The recapture is described by Commandant Cloué in telegram to Bazaine, No. 487, Tampico, August 11, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4411. A Mexican captain from Tampico later told a very different story of the incident that made the French Navy seem to have a very weak role. — Noue to Bazaine, No. 31, Mexico, August 22, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4477-4478. By the time Napoleon heard of the loss and wrote the city off, the recapture had been accomplished. - Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 27, Saint Cloud, August 30, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4486. 71 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, No. 495, Mexico, August 14, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4421. 72 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Telegram No. 500, Mexico, August 17, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4450. 73 C. Loysel to Bazaine, Note 164, Mexico, August 20, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4452. 74 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Telegram 504, Mexico, August 20, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4455. 75 José María Iribarren to Bazaine, Mazatlán, August 20, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4459. ™ Ibid.

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With that dirge of catastrophes hounding him, Bazaine reached the upper provinces and found that his plans for withdrawal meant only an abandonment to the Juarists. In a pessimistic tone he wrote to Maximilian: However extreme the program I have decided upon may appear at first glance, in evacuating Saltillo and Monterrey, each day I see more clearly that is was necessary to act in this way. In fact the people have no sympathy at all for the new order of established things; and the country does not offer enough resources to maintain a garrison sufficient to keep order and assure security. Any garrison that I might have left at Monterrey would not have been reliable and would have been in such an absolute isolation that it would have reacted upon the morale of the soldiers and perhaps even on that of the officers. It would have been necessary to keep in touch with them by means of heavy convoys, strong and therefore very costly. So there was no use in hesitating from either the political, military, or financial point of view. Besides, we are now able to reinforce the southern areas and thus, you might say, set up a new line of northern frontiers, solid and easy to guard, with a veritable arid, resourceless desert separating this line from the lands evacuated.77 Another suggestion by Maximilian was that the whole of Mexico be declared in a state of siege. From his point of view such a state would have several advantages: Direct power would devolve upon military commanders, French mostly, and they could act in their own name instead of having to go through the cumbersome channels of Mexican administrators. Bazaine, although usually asking for a more efficient system of government, did not respond favorably to that suggestion, and he delivered to the Emperor a long lecture on the character and implication of such a move. The state of siege, he said, was a transitory stage by which powers were placed in the hands of the military, upsetting executive and judicial functions and placing the citizens in an abnormal, strained situation. It is likewise [only] as a general measure and in a moment of great, unforeseen crisis that sovereign authority resorts to this extreme of indicating that force is the only argument that he has left to employ. Is this the case to apply now to the Mexican Empire? I do not believe so, and I request the Emperor to allow me to show him that the measure is useless.78 77 Bazaine to Maximilian, Hacienda de las Bocas [near San Luis Potosí], August 4, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4387. 78 Bazaine to Maximilian, Peotillos, August 10, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4400; printed in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 154-157. The letter of Maximilian to which this is the answer is printed in ibid., 152-153.

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Bazainewent on to explain that the creation of a state of siege should only be transitory one and should not be resorted to unless an improvement were in view; such a state would shake popular confidence in the government; court-martial already functioned and would not be changed by such a declaration, and it would be an admission of weakness, since the government had been turned over to the Mexicans, to return it to the French. Besides, the time when the French army was preparing to quit Mexico was not the time to scatter its officers in other administrative duties, and it would deprive the Mexicans of actual experience in their own government. In short: Under these conditions a state of siege would increase the number of enemies of the Empire and would give credence to the calumnies used by the dissenters to appeal to national feeling by saying that France only came to Mexico for the purpose of conquest.79 As a result of the advice Maximilian peevishly authorized independent Mexican and Austrian generals to declare a state of siege in their own areas, but not the French. 80 Once Bazaine left the capital, Maximilian showed a burst of activity that could only mean that he had been waiting for the opportunity. Not only he allowed Carlota to go off to Europe, but he ousted most of the members of his cabinet and tried to fill the posts with new faces, though he still referred the appointments to Bazaine for approval. One of the changes was to remove Generals Osmont and Friant — two particularly efficient administrative officers on Bazaine's staff but who were known to be quite well disposed toward the Empire — and to appoint them to new, more significant positions as ministers of War and Finance respectively. They replaced Langlais, the French expert who had taken over the administration of finances in February, 1866. 81 Dano, the French Minister to Mexico, opposed

79 Ibid. The arguments are all sound, though somewhat exaggerated. It must be recalled that in the summer of 1866 Maximilian was seeking desperately for a way to keep the French in Mexico. Stripping his proposal of its verbiage, he hoped by declaring a state of siege to harness the French military authorities down with the additional burden of civil administration, casting the stigma of executioner on them in their responsibility for public discipline, and generally slowing down their withdrawal by the imposition of new duties linking them to the areas they occupied. Bazaine was obviously not deceived by the stratagem. 80 Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 223. 81 Maximilian to Bazaine, No. 6, Mexico, July 25, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4337; also Bazaine to Aymard and Castagny, No. 578, Mexico, February 11, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3452.

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179

the appointment of Friant, but to no immediate avail.82 Bazaine himself only approved the appointments temporarily, pending confirmation from Paris.83 The French Ministry did not approve of the appointment of Osmont, citing as a reason some past indiscretions on his part.84 Napoleon objected to the two officers' holding ministerial jobs and French commissions at the same time.85 The coup de grâce was given by Colonel Carlson of the Ministry of War,86 and the two ministers had to resign their portfolios. They were followed in the Ministry of War by General Ramón Tavera.87 By that time the two officers had taken their work so seriously and had become so valuable to Maximilian that he did not want to see them leave. He even wrote a special request for a means of keeping them.88 Still later, while dispensing with their official services, he assured Bazaine that he meant nonetheless to keep them as friends and to go by their advice.89 The hand of the United States also entered the small controversy with the complaint that French officers in such positions could be construed as a usurpation of government.90 During his brief ministry Friant developed such rigid control over the chaotic finances that even Maximilian could not touch the slender resources. When the Emperor decided in late August to go to San Luis Potosí to use his personal influence to help organize the army, he had to ask Friant for money for the trip. Friant allowed him $15,000.« 8 2 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, No. 469, Mexico, July 28, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4349. 8 3 Bazaine to Maximilian, Hacienda de las Bocas, August 4, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4387. Personal account of the circumstances surrounding Osmont's appointment is given in Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 198-202. 8 4 Courtois d'Hurbal to Bazaine, No. 508, Mexico, August 22, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4468. 8 5 Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 26, St. Cloud, August 29, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4484. «« Carlson to Bazaine, Paris, August 31, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4495. 8 7 Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 238. Tavera was appointed on recommendation of Blanchot, who was then Under-Secretary of War, if we are to believe his account. 8 8 Maximilian to Bazaine, No. 7, Mexico, September 16, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4565. 8 9 Maximilian to Bazaine, No. 8, Mexico, October 4, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4653. 9 0 Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 306; also letter Seward to Montholon, Washington, August 16, 1866, printed in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 185-186. 9 1 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Coded Telegram No. 483, Mexico, August 10, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4403.

180

T H E GNAWING F R O M W I T H I N

At the end of the month Napoleon III still firmly insisted that the plan of evacuation follow its schedule. He had told Cariota so, and later he wrote to Maximilian to that same effect. Likewise he reiterated to Bazaine that if he did not think that Maximilian could support himself, then the Emperor should abdicate and come along, and then a new assembly should be gathered to elect a government that would recognize the French debt and guarantee order and the security of French nationals. He left it to Bazaine to decide how it was to be done. In the case of an abdication he wanted the whole army to leave in February.92 Bazaine had marked out his strategy and had supervised the initial steps by the end of August. Abandoning the north as untenable, he hoped to set up a new frontier and defend a line extending roughly from Tampico, Matehuala, and Zacatecas, west to Guadalajara, with Mexican garrisons at Matehuala, Cedrai, Vanegas, Guadalupe, and Carnicero. He would thus cut off commerce between these cities and Monterrey.93 Bazaine made no pretense of holding the towns on the Pacific coast. He instructed Rear Admiral Mazères to choose his own time and occasion for evacuating the troops from the coast. He left it up to the Mexican authorities to decide whether to remain in charge or to withdraw with the French. If they chose to withdraw, then the French had orders to get in touch with Juarist General Corona, evidently the only strong leader left in the area, and to avoid fighting, pillage, and disorders by notifying him of the time of the withdrawal so that he could take proper measures. This proposal was not to be confused with surrending to Corona; it was to be merely a means of peaceful evacuation and occupation. The French Military Commander was to warn Corona that if he committed acts of barbarism or vengeance, Bazaine would not hesitate to visit reprisals upon him with every means at his command.94 Lieutenant Colonel Fistié was to evacuate Guaymas and move to San Bias, where he would join the French troops from Mazatlán. These orders and the withdrawal of troops from Monterrey and Saltillo as described make it difficult to reconcile such a policy with 9 2 Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 26, St. Cloud, August 29, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4484. 9 3 Bazaine to Douay, No. 702, August 31, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4505. 94 Bazaine to Rear Admiral Mazères, Coded Telegram No. 514, September 1, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4515.

THE GNAWING FROM WITHIN

181

the very bald statement made to Minister of Justice Lares, who inquired about the "evacuation of cities" by the French. The Marshal answered: Another error that your Excellency commits, involuntarily, no doubt, on account of your [past] separation from the Government but which I undertake to rectify, is attributing the evacuation of the cities to the French troops. They are not evacuated them but have turned them over to Mexican [Imperial] troops who, for one reason or another, have not defended them. That is the truth, and your Excellency should know it.95 In the south the Empire forces under General Prieto inflicted a severe defeat on the Juarist troops at Juchitán, leaving them almost without ammunition. He missed this logical time to pursue the Juarists to complete destruction there because just as Visitador Imperial Franco started a new expedition against the Juarist troops, the whole Imperial military establishment received orders from the capital to withdraw to the city of Oaxaca.98 Even the fairly modest areas that Bazaine planned to hold in the North proved difficult to manage. Early in September when Castagny evacuated Durango and Fresnillo, that cautious officer noted public sentiment against the Empire. He had organized in Durango a Mexican company called Proaño, using his best organizational facilities. It was paid regularly out of both regular funds and company funds of the mines which it helped protect. But in September army funds were so low that the company had to disband, much to Castagny's disgust.97 The area marked off for evacuation included all the main commercial routes in the northwest, and the Juárez government was thus left free to develop its fairly extensive trade with California along the coast as well as overland.98 The Mexican troops were so few in number that Castagny found it impossible to expect them to garrison the reduced number of posts " Bazaine to the Minister of Justice, No. 702, Mexico, October 16, 1866, in BA, X X I V , f. 4718. Such a statement does not seem to agree with the facts as shown and most likely resulted from an effort to dissimulate or else referred to only the cities around the perimeter of the new line of defense. · · J. P. Franco to Bazaine, Tehuantepec, September 8, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4530, and Luciano Prieto to Bazaine, Tehuantepec, September 7, 1866, in BA, X X I I I , f. 4 5 3 0 - 4 5 3 1 . •7 Bazaine's Secretary to Blanchot, No. 2105, September 11, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4548. 9 8 Castagny to Bazaine, No. 1361, León, September 27, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4 6 2 2 - 4 6 2 3 , which has an extensive account of the commercial routes and the road system.

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indicated by Bazaine. The formation of the Mexican army moved slowly because of the improverishment of the Mexican treasury, the unpopularity of the cause, and the continual refusal of the Mexican authorities to introduce and enforce a regular system of recruitment. Finally Bazaine, in a complete surrender of principle, turned to the very practice that he previously had condemned so conscientiously — the levy — to furnish troops for the new units, and even for the navy: I recommend that you adopt for the Navy the same system of leva that I have been forced to adopt for the Cazadores. Write to the Commander at Veracruz and ask him to furnish you for service on the Mosquito from that port and others, fifty or a hundred sailors, or whatever number you judge necessary. Add these recruits to your crews and send me each month an account, which I shall reclaim from the Mexican Government to reimburse the commissary of your division. Of course, I give this to you as an idea; apply it if you believe you need to do so." The Marshal evidently found this surrender a difficult one, for when Imperial Commissioner Robles in Guanajuato recommended filling ranks with "criminals" and "vagrants", Bazaine remarked: I w r o t e . . . to the Imperial Commissioner to explain to him the revulsion that I felt for that sort of recruiting.... I received a second letter .. . in which he tried to explain to me that in Mexico what one meant by reos and vagos was not the same as what we call in France coupables and des vagabonds. In answer I recommended that the commanders of the battalions of Cazadores should not be very circumspect in admitting recruits.100 French officers meantime, in the Cazadores, were accepting soldiers raised by the levy only under protest, and they were clearly fearful of the results of using soldiers who had to be "kept in sight day and night, in combat and the rest." 101 In its "civilizing" efforts to produce a dependable army on the European level, the Intervention had failed.

99 Bazaine to Commandant Cloué, No. 106, Mexico, September 15, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4559. 100 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 720, Mexico, September 21, 1866, unpublished letter in BA, XXIII, f. 4577. 101 Commandant [illegible] to Bazaine, September 15, 1866, printed in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 178-179; also idem to idem, September 23, 1866, printed in ibid., 179-180.

CHAPTER

Vili

THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH

TROOPS

DETERIORATION OF THE IMPERIAL CAUSE

General Ignacio Ugalde, a serious patriot who represented the Huasteca area had come into the Empire not after a defeat but as the result of a treaty signed with the Emperor and on an idealogical basis. As events moved toward an evacuation by the French he became doubtful about the desirability of remaining. As result of a request from Colonel Boyer he sent a frank statement of his understanding of the situation: In my concept the solution to the political future of Mexico lies not only in the democratic spirit of its people but in the close link with the republican system and interests of the United States, although the protection of civilization and understandable interests lies with France and other nations that, like France, look to the progress of the human race. Therefore the future of Mexico can only be assured by solicitude for and combination of these three interests. The United States, jealous of democratic institutions on the American continent and fearful of losing its own by the adoption of any other system in neighboring countries, invokes and sustains a respect for the will of the people and universal suffrage.1 Mexico, he went on, after a bloody struggle of over half a century, would not and could not support any other principle than that of absolute independence under a representative, federal, republican government. The liberal party, he maintained, held an absolute majority, even excluding those men who used it as an excuse for crime. The restoration, then, of a free, independent, republican government, must come; and he was concerned only in how Mexico could effect it without a resultant effusion of blood. He went on, then, to recommend an election, somewhat like the plan already outlined by Napoleon, to gather representatives for a government which would replace the Empire, and which would enjoy the support of both the United States and France. Thus the nation could maintain its territorial integrity 1

Ugalde to Bazaine, Mexico, September 17, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4568-4569.

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THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH TROOPS

against the United States, and the continuation of French spiritual and racial hegemony would be reconciled with national independence. This excellent exposition of the problem, agreeing with the thoughts of Napoleon III in many ways, seemed to furnish a pragmatic solution to the Mexican plight; but there is no sign that Bazaine seriously considered it. Apparently the Marshal recalled Napoleon's proviso that he should turn to such a move only as a last resort, and evidently he could not yet convince himself that the continuation of the Empire was untenable. The Imperial government did not wait for much philosophic musing. Facing constant crises, its political calm changed in early September. With the appointment of Teodosio Lares to the Ministry of Justice, and with some other appointments, the balance swung toward the extreme Conservatives. To a commensurate degree, perhaps due to his absence on purely military duties in the North at that time, the Marshal had taken less and less active part in the councils of state and of the ministry in spite of the complete surrender to French influence that Maximilian had made in April. That failure of Bazaine to take aggressive measures during August evidently had left a vacuum in Imperial councils. The extreme liberals went out, and lacking the French, the only aggressive group capable of filing the gap was the Conservative Party. By the middle of September, when Bazaine realized that, his concerns with evacuation plans allowed him no time to intervene. Nor did he wish to do so, as he explained to Castagny: Less than ever is it up to us to mix in the political affairs of this country, especially in questions of [appointment of] officials. The new phase that Minister Lares is inaugurating requires that we be very reserved. So I think that the only thing to do is to keep a careful watch on the attitude of the different parties, and keep abreast of the effect on the country created by the new combination that the Conservatives are trying to bring to power, and the new officials who no doubt are going to replace those now employed. We have no more advice to give; ours has too often been scorned. I mean that we should avoid the initiative in councils and confine ourselves to answering invitations that come to us. Let us see the men come, and let us judge them by their future acts.2

He did not have long to wait. Minister Lares soon came to him with the request that the French suspend their system of imposing fines on * Bazaine to Castagny, No. 720, Mexico, September 21, 1866, in BA, XXIII,

f. 4577.

T H E WITHDRAWAL OF F R E N C H TROOPS

185

towns and cities as punishment for various derelictions. Bazaine grudgingly but loyally followed that new policy, as he had, in fact, all along, and issued orders to that effect. Thereafter, instead of fines, offending towns had to submit to the corvée for a specified number of days, i.e., required labor on public works, roads, bridges, etc. 3 In his resolve to stay clear of the Empire Bazaine refused to allow the French troops to receive as competent officials the delegation from the Inspector of Finances, sent by Minister of Hacienda Friant. 4 Castagny had gone on the assumption that Friant, being a member of the French Headquarters in Mexico, had to b e received and heard as a staff officer. 5 Thus Napoleon's objections were well founded when he anticipated confusion from the dual role of Friant and Osmont. By the middle of September Napoleon had become dissatisfied, like Randon, with the turn of events and decided to send a special emissary to check on operations and policies. H e announced the idea in a letter, naming General Castelnau: I repeat. . . General Castelnau has all my confidence. I have acquainted him in detail with my intentions and the line of political and military conduct that you as well as the other French civil or diplomatic authorities should follow. The power that I saw fit to confer on General Castelnau gives him the right to approve in my name all measures to be taken and to intervene in any deliberations that may precede such measures.. . . Otherwise the intervention of General Castelnau has the purpose not of paralyzing your freedom of action or destroying or weakening your responsibility toward me; your responsibility remains as complete as my confidence in your political acumen and your high military capacity.. . . e E v e n that new letter did not end the conflicting and confusing orders issued from Paris. Before Castelnau could reach Mexico, Napoleon again gave up the scheme and wired for Bazaine to gather all his troops and return them at once. 7 Such an order was physically impossible, and Bazaine continued according to the previous plans. 3 Bazaine, Circular to all Commanding Officers, No. 2117, Mexico, September 21, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4583. 4 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 722, Mexico, September 23, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4589. 5 Castagny to Bazaine, No. 257, León, October 3, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4646. 6 Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 28, Tuileries, September 15, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4556. 7 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 536, Mexico, September 28, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4635.

186

T H E W I T H D R A W A L OF F R E N C H TROOPS

The evacuation of troops began with the 81st Infantry Regiment, but by the end of September the rainy season had started, and bad weather made the Veracruz road so bad that Bazaine ordered the Regiment back to a staging area at Orizaba until the weather cleared up.8 At the same time, Juarist pressure began to increase in the Tamaulipas area, and by October 5 the Austrian garrison at Tulancingo found itself opposed by some 2,000 Federal troops, and the commander called for help from Mexico. 3 Northeast of Zacatecas a band of 1,500 Juarists began to move on Sombrerete, where if successful they could cut off Castagny's withdrawal from Durango. 10 The arrival of General Castelnau at the beginning of October caught Bazaine out of town on an inspection of troops at Puebla and Tlaxcala, 11 and Maximilian got the advantage of sending Pierron to meet the General at the port.12 Then Maximilian gathered his ministers and several liberal leaders, totaling seventeen, at Chapultepec to receive Castelnau and "to persuade the General that you [Bazaine] are the only obstacle." 13 To assure himself of the first audience with Castelnau, Dano, the French Minister, departed on the 7th, and it seemed for a while that Maximilian intended to follow him.14 It is a sad duty to report that Maximilian in his eagerness to reach Castelnau first, stooped to deception. As soon as Bazaine had left the capital, Maximilian wrote that he, Maximilian, was expecting Carlota's return on the 20th or 21st and wanted to go to Veracruz to meet her. 15 On October 9 an amendment changed the proposal to a request for Ba8 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Coded Telegram No. 535, Mexico, September 28, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4633. » Lt. Col. Polaki to Bazaine, Tulancingo, October 5, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4661. But no help was forthcoming, and by October 17 communication with Tulancingo and Pachuca had been shut off. — Tavera, Minister of War, to Bazaine, Mexico, October 19, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4725. 10 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, transmitting Castagny's Coded Telegram No. 354, Mexico, October 6, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4666. 11 Bazaine to Maximilian, Telegram No. 349, Mexico, October 2, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4643. 12 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Coded Telegram No. 353, Mexico, October 6, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4664 and Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Coded Telegram No. 355, Mexico, October 7, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4669. « Ibid. 14 Ibid., and also Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Coded Telegram No. 357, Mexico, October 8, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4672. 15 Maximilian to Bazaine, No. 9, Mexico, October 4, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4659; printed in Kératry L'Empereur Maximilien, 192, where the date is given as the 19th.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH TBOOFS

187

zaine to send an escort for the Empress.16 The ruse of the Empress' return was doubly tragic in view of Carlota's fate, not then known to the Emperor. However, the specter of abdication was abroad, and in spite of the possibilities raised by the Castelnau mission, Maximilian continued his growing dislike for the whole of French participation. This dislike replaced his frantic concern during the summer and early fall for the retention of French troops and support. In a momentary desire to rid himself of the French altogether, he even wrote to the President of the United States, asking for a proclamation to aid him, promising in that case to eschew all French support or participation in the government. He did not mail the letter.17 The shock suffered by Maximilian on learning of the Empress' affliction may very well have struck him a grievous blow18 but not grievous enough to shake him out of his spirit of dissimulation. In spite of the formal politeness exchanged between him and Bazaine, he never gave any indication that he ever felt at home with the Marshal or trusted him to the extent of sitting down and frankly discussing the situation and problems, such as that of abdication. Meetings were formal, and transactions mostly by correspondence. That uncomfortable situation evidently resulted from small differences that arose early after the arrival of the Emperor, and they had only grown with the passing months. If it had been possible earlier for close relations to exist, by October it was too late. Suspicions and private recriminations had reached the point where frankness was impossible. The accusations against the Marshal which Cariota had taken to Paris only made matters worse. So the Emperor, who had available in Bazaine the best knowledge of the political situation, refused to demean himself by calling on the Marshal for the benefit of his knowledge. Rather, he leaned on the highly personalized counsel of his household retainers, none of whom had more than general and spotty knowledge of the state or of its potentialities. When news of Cariota arrived and Maximilian replied to Bazaine's letter of regret, he announced that on the advice of his doctor he was leaving for Orizaba for his health. He said nothing of the conflicting advice and counsel he was weighing concerning an abdication. Only 18 Maximilian to Bazaine, No. 10, Chapultepec, October 9, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4678. 17 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, Coded Telegram No. 358, Mexico, October 8, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4674. 18 Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte, II, 735; Hyde, The Mexican Empire, 240.

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T H E W I T H D R A W A L O F F R E N C H TROOPS

in his choice of a bodyguard of Austrian volunteers did he reveal a hint that he wanted to free himself of the presence and influence of the French. 19 The very next day Maximilian apparently had resolved on abdication and planned for a period of peace to cover his departure; namely, he proposed that the court-martial system desist from trying political crimes, that the Law of October 3, 1865 be revoked, that all hostilities cease, and that Bazaine should confer with Marin, Lares, and Tavera on measures to achieve that end.20 Arrangoiz and Kératry have printed the letter with one significant sentence that does not appear in the copy in the Bazaine Archives nor in that printed by Gaulot. A reference was made to certain documents being sent to Bazaine, and the sentence included by Arrangoiz and Kératry states: "Said documents will be kept secret until the day that I indicate to you by telegraph." If the original letter contained this sentence, then the documents were clearly abdication announcements, and possession of them placed a great responsibility in Bazaine's hands. Of this Castelnau could have had no knowledge. If Bazaine had desired to hasten the abdication, he could have forced it by publishing the papers. His failure to do so indicates that the Marshal respected the confidence to the end. Although Maximilian said no outright word in the letter about an abdication, he clearly intended not to return to the palace. Loizillon reported that "It seems certain" that Maximilian had warned the Marshal of his departure by saying that he was going to Europe to look for the Empress if she were not dead, but that in any case he

19 Maximilian to Bazaine, No. 11, Chapultepec, October 20, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4730; printed in Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 171; also in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 203-204. 20 Maximilian to Bazaine, No. 12, [Hacienda de Zoquiapa], October 21, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4738; printed in Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 172-173; also in Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 334-335; Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 207-208. This damaging letter was either written under strain, desperation, or by another, untrained hand. For an Emperor to describe his own administration as having allowed courtsmartial to "intervene" in political crimes, or to say that it had engaged in "political persecution" to the point of having to "cease" such action is a selfcondemnation unworthy of the dignity of the high office. It is the language of propagandists, not of diplomats. Blanchot (L'Intervention, III, 263) names Fischer as the guiding spirit of the letter, but he does not go so far as to attribute the wording to him. The machinations of Father Fischer remain one of the mysteries of this period. For a few biographical details, see García Gutiérrez, La iglesia mejicana, pp. 92-94.

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THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH TROOPS

would return. At any rate he h a d his belongings and personal property crated for shipment. 2 1 Not until O c t o b e r 3 1 did Maximilian specifically commit to recorded writing his consideration of an abdication. At the same time he appointed Colonel Kodolich to c o m m a n d the Austrian troops and sent him to arrange with Bazaine the status of those troops. 2 2

The

E m p e r o r then spent the month of November in Orizaba in virtual seclusion, seeing only a few chosen intimates and following a vacillating path in which he tried to choose between abdication and a struggle to retain his crown.

M u c h of the time the F r e n c h head-

quarters did not know w h a t was going on in Orizaba, 2 3 but at the end of the month, after the momentous meeting with the eighteen members of his new council and ministry, Maximilian issued a proclamation announcing his decision to remain until a "national

congress

gathered on the largest and most liberal basis" could m e e t and decide whether to keep the E m p i r e or not. 2 4 Bazaine, in the meantime, completed his inspection trip to Puebla, and returned to Mexico on October I I . 2 5 T h e next day h e sent Castelnau a telegram offering his own hospitality if the General did not desire to a c c e p t the Emperor's offer of lodging at the palace. 2 0 In the 21 Loizillon, letter to his sister, Mexico, October 28, 1866, in Lettres, No. civ, 412-418. It is unfortunate that he gave no source for this information because the supposition would help to understand Maximilian's subsequent acts. Until some further proof is found, it will have to be taken as one of the many rumors current. Neither Maximilian's letter No. 11 (October 21) nor No. 13 (October 31) has any such indication. If conveyed, the statement must have been by verbal message. 22 Maximilian to Bazaine, No. 13, Orizaba, October 31, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4756; printed in Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 176; Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 216-217. 23 Bazaine to Potier, Telegram No. 371, Mexico, November 2, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4759. Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte, II, 735-745, has delved into the period in some detail, but the full story of the definite volte-face is still inadequately explained. 24 Maximilian, Proclamation, Orizaba, December 1, 1866, printed in Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 312; also in El diario del Imperio (Mexico), IV, No. 587, December 6, 1866. 25 Bazaine's Secretary to Douay, Telegram No. 362, Mexico, October 11, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4680. Puebla was probably on the itinerary all along, but it was significant that he reached Puebla on October 8 because it may have meant that he hoped for an early meeting with Castelnau. If so, the plan failed, but it is further interesting in that it would make all three leading personages in Mexico, Dano, Maximilian, and Bazaine, unified in their personal efforts to obtain early meetings with the general. Loizillon (Letter to his sister, Mexico, October 9, 1866, in Lettres, No. ciii, 409-412) believed Bazaine hoped to meet Castelnau. 25 Bazaine to Pierron, No. 364, Mexico, October 12, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4686.

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THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH TROOPS

meantime Bazaine suspended all troop movements and held his soldiers ready for whatever decisions might result from the meetings with the General.27 Rumors were widespread that Castelnau had come to insist on an abdication, and evidently the rumors reached Maximilian and impressed him unfavorably. The two crossed paths at Puebla, as Maximilian was on his way to Orizaba, but the Emperor refused him an audience. His reasons for the refusal after he had set out for Veracruz have been much debated; all indications are that Maximilian already had decided on abdication and used the trip to Veracruz as a blind for avoiding a public appearance — hoping to slip away quietly. With the arrival of Castelnau he or his advisors for a time hoped that the General would promise enough support to enable him to keep French troops in sufficient numbers to maintain the throne. Then, hearing that Castelnau intended to insist on an abdication, the Emperor stiffened in resentment; he refused an audience, and his marked Francophobia deepened. On his arrival in the capital and since the Emperor had already left the palace, Castelnau accepted and set up in French military quarters evacuated by Blanchot.28

T H E CASTELNAU

MISSION

The arrival of the General ushers in another of the very controversial aspects of the Intervention period. First we have the problem of whether Castelnau really had the power to replace Bazaine at will, and second, what part Bazaine played in the decision of Maximilian not to abdicate. In the first place, it is very bad military practice to send a brigadier general to pass on his own initiative on a marshal of France, and even Napoleon likely would not have breached that traditional line of conduct.29 The established practice is clear for all armies of Western Europe, including the North American, namely to send an inspecting officer who could examine, inspect, and then send a recommendation to his appointing authority, which, in turn could make 27 Bazaine to the Minister of Justice, No. 702, October 16, 1866, in BA, X X I V , f. 4718. The decision was supported by a telegram from Paris on November 8. — Loizillon to his sister, Mexico, November 9, 1866, in Lettres, No. cv, 4 1 9 - 4 2 3 28 Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 276. » Ibid., p. 274.

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191

a decision on the recommendation. Again, the orders given to Castelnau by Napoleon were couched in such general terms that they did not specify just what extremes his authority could reach. 30 In a mission of such grave import most likely Napoleon III, if ever, would have been direct and specific. Again, Dano, the French Minister, should have been notified through political channels of such an important aspect in the mission, but evidently he was not. Again, Randon, the literal-minded and frank Minister of War, must certainly have known of such a mission, and he certainly would have protested to the Emperor or to Bazaine. He did neither; both his letters and those of Napoleon show no sign of such powers invested in Castelnau, and Randon's letters show no sign of an anticipated change in command.31 On the other hand we must recall that Randon was on leave at the time Castelnau received his orders.32 The instructions given by Napoleon33 make only one point perfectly clear; they empowered Castelnau to change any orders issued by "toutes les authorités françaises au Mexique." But no French authority in Mexico could replace Bazaine; only those in Paris! Another set of instructions, dated Tuileries, September 15, 1866,34 directed to Castelnau personally, again gave him the power to countermand and change orders, but it said nothing of his authority over the person of the High Command. In his discussion of the situation, Louis Sonolet, more specifically than other writers,35 makes the bald statement that Castelnau had the authority to replace Bazaine by Douay. He offers no direct documentation to prove what we must therefore consider his assumption. There is also no indication among recorded papers as to how Castelnau could have removed Bazaine from command. It is utterly Ibid., 273. Napoleon III to Bazaine, No. 28, Tuileries, September 15, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4 5 5 6 ; Randon to Bazaine, Paris, November 30, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4 9 0 1 ; idem to idem, December 15, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4 9 5 9 - 4 9 6 1 ; idem to idem, December 31, 1866, in BA, X X V I , f. 5023-4. 32 Niox, L'Expédition, 628. 33 Printed in ibid., 628. 5 4 Printed in Sonolet, "L'Agonie de l'Empire du Mexique," in Revue de París IV (34th year), August, 1927, 6 0 1 - 6 0 2 . 55 Niox, L'Expédition, 628, expresses the idea in a double-entendre. He evidently wanted to avoid committing himself. Corti (Maximilian and Charlotte, II, 733), Hyde (The Mexican Empire, 241), and Martin (Maximilian in Mexico, 56) avoid a commitment. Gaulot (Fin d'Empire, 190-191) accepts the wide powers attributed to Castelnau, justifying himself by saying, "Otherwise there would have been no reason for it [the mission]." 30

31

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incomprehensible to military administration to think of a brigadier general writing out an order to such an effect, and putting his own name to it. With what authority? He certainly would have to quote some specific authorization to make the change, and, as has just been shown, his instructions were very vague. Orders removing an officer from duty to the status then called disponibilité, since it would affect Bazaine's pay, necessarily would have to go through certain steps that only the personnel offices in Paris and the paying offices could handle. Those things were fixed rather firmly in the French army, ¿ven more so than in the American army of that time; and even an emperor would not dare upset French ideas of orderliness to that extent. The only other suggestion is that Castelnau might have brought with him the proper orders made out for the removal of Bazaine, but with the date left blank, like the orders held by Bazaine for his own departure at the date chosen by him. There is no indication, no preserved record, to indicate that Castelnau had such undated orders. It is extremely unlikely then, that Castelnau had any such powers. The most bizarre aspect of the controversy appeared later. One day during his sojourn in Mexico, Castelnau was observed to leave the public toilet used by the officers at the lodgings where he lived, and soon thereafter a young officer, La Pierre, entered and found among the scraps of paper used for the humble purpose connected with the place, a rumpled sheet bearing writing. La Pierre, purely out of curiosity, examined the writing and recognized it as a letter from Castelnau to Emperor Napoleon, in which he charged Bazaine with being the principal influence in persuading Maximilian to remain in Mexico. La Pierre took the paper to Bazaine, who immediately prepared a refutation and sent the whole to the Minister of War in Paris.36 The letter stated that the writer, obviously Castelnau, had found documentary proof that Bazaine had induced Maximilian to remain in Mexico by assuring him that French support would continue for another year.37 His proof consisted of statements from Colonel Kodolich, Archbishop Labastida, and Princess Iturbide. He had, then, s® Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 279. Corti's account (Maximilian and Charlotte, II, 762) of the discovery is not documented, and his statements are therefore assumed to be deductions. Blanchot, who was on the spot, had reason to know the truth, and he is followed here. 37 Undated letter fragment in BA, X X V I , f. 5 0 4 1 - 5 0 4 2 (Spanish translation only); French text printed in Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 218-219.

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according to Castelnau's writing, debated on whether the Marshal should be relieved of command or he, Castelnau, should confront him with the evidence of his duplicity in an effort to "turn him to the path of loyalty to Napoleon." To avoid scandal, the general had chosen the latter alternative. 38 The piece of writing was undated and incomplete. It was evidently a discarded version, never sent to Napoleon; for on December 9, 1866, Castelnau wrote a much longer letter in which he attacked Bazaine but confessed that he had no proof. Then there was attached as a postscript a continuation with three letters included.39 It was the first draft of the postscript, then, that La Pierre found and surrendered to Bazaine. But it was enough to urge the Marshal to action. To defend himself, he sought to refute the "documentary" evidence gathered by Castelnau. The documents, he found, actually were a statement by Kodolich, a note from Labastida to Princess Iturbide, the mother of Maximilian's adopted heir, reporting a statement made by Bazaine to Lares, and a statement by Ramón Tavera saying that the recent policy of Maximilian (recourse to a conservative ministry) was the one that Bazaine believed should have been followed all along; that he, like the conservatives, believed that Maximilian's return would be for the good of the country, and that he desired Maximilian's return to the capital and that he would support him as always, to the extent allowed by his sovereign (Napoleon); and that his reason for not going to Orizaba was that there was no one to whom he could turn over his command.40 To defend himself, Bazaine obtained refutations of those letters and sent a letter of protest to Paris. Included was a statement from Labastida that the document he reportedly had sent to Princess Iturbide was false and that Lares had never said such things to him.41 38 Ibid. The words were: "J'avais deux partis à prendre: Retirer au Maréchal le commandement, et le donner au général Douay, ou bien aller trouver le Maréchal.. . . " These words indicate that Castelnau believed himself empowered to oust Bazaine. While this sounds like unimpeachable evidence, remember that the letter was re-written before mailing, and that since his arrival in Veracruz rumors had so widely attributed to him that power that he may very well have come to believe it himself, even if it did not exist on paper. 39 Castelnau to Napoleon III, Mexico, December 9, 1866, in Louis Sonolet "L'Agonie de l'Empire du Mexique", in Revue de Paris, IV (34th year), August, 1927, 590-625. 40 The documents are also printed in Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 216-217. 41 Labastida to Bazaine, No. 2, January 7, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5067. Note that this in only the second letter that the Archbishop had written to Bazaine.

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Ther. was a letter from Lares stating that he knew nothing of the document presumably in Castelnau's hands and that no offer of French troops' staying in Mexico had influenced Maximilian's decision.42 As for the third document, when Kodolich was approached for a statement to defend Bazaine, the Austrian officer made a new statement that about November 18, 1866, Bazaine had said to him that if Maximilian decided to remain at the head of the government, then some French troops (des troupes françaises) would be able to stay until the end of November of 1867. Moreover, he added that Pierron had asked him to state that in writing, which he did.43 This helps to clear up the mystery. Pierron had been transferred to the "available" list, that is, not on active duty with the French Army on account of his long service with Maximilian and sympathy for him. Bazaine was obviously the author of the change, and it could only have affected Pierron's attitude toward Bazaine adversely. At the same time Castelnau, by his own admission was looking for documentary proof that Bazaine was obstructing the abdication. Clearly then Pierron had obtained this statement and turned it over to Castelnau to damage Bazaine. In rebuttal Bazaine, while not denying the conversation, added that he only meant the Foreign Legion, which possibly could have stayed under the provisions of the Treaty of Miramar. 44 The refutation sent by Bazaine reached Napoleon, and he accepted it outright; and if he had believed stories against Bazaine before, he was convinced to the contrary. The new Minister of War, Marshal Niel, wrote to Bazaine to that effect: The Emperor has charged me with saying to you that he deplored the inventions and indiscretions that could have wounded you and the lack of understanding among the officers who had his esteem and whose loyalty he had never in the least doubted.... 42 Lares to Bazaine, Mexico, January 9, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5 0 7 8 ; Bazaine to Lares, No. 7 4 2 , Mexico, January 8, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5071. 4 3 Kodolich, Statement, Mexico, January 9, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5082. See also Maximilian to Napoleon, November 8, 1866, printed in Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte, II, 947; also Niox, L'Expédition, 638-639, where it is shown that Castelnau and Pierron were in secret communication. 44 There is an important point here in the words of Kodolich. In his second statement he credited Bazaine with saying that des troupes françaises might remain. This could very well mean the Foreign Legion and the cadres training the Cazadores. They had been virtually promised in past correspondence. But if Bazaine had said that les troupes françaises would stay, it would be a very different matter and a proposal involving an unauthorized commitment.

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When facts speak so highly, do not be bothered, my dear Marshal, by the intrigues with which they have managed to mislead the opinion of General Castelnau if they have not reached the point that you suppose. Finish your work in peace by completely repatriating the army that you have so well commanded.45 Unfortunately the preceding letter did not arrive until after Bazaine's departure, and he did not know of its contents until he reached France. For the rest of his stay in Mexico he worked under the heavy burden of suspense, not knowing what reception to expect on his return. The foregoing facts seem to show that Bazaine probably was not guilty of all the duplicity sometimes claimed and that Castelnau's imagination itself was impeachable. The reasons he had for attempting to throw the blame on Bazaine are not entirely clear. Castelnau came to Mexico with the primary mission of seeing to the abdication. At the same time complaints against Bazaine, mostly by Douay, had reached the court, and Castelnau had to investigate them. Then, when Castelnau's efforts to obtain an abdication failed and he looked for a scapegoat, he found a likely person in Bazaine because of those same charges. It would be easy to understand a tendency for Bazaine to favor Maximilian's staying on in Mexico. Whatever happened he faced a situation that could result in personal advantage as well as disaster. Since the time of his marriage in 1865 to Josefa de la Peña, he had become more and more influenced by her. She came from an old and honored but not a very wealthy family. She had preferred Bazaine over several more personable suitors who had presented themselves, whereupon she immediately became the second hostess of the capital, and, after the departure of Carlota, the first. She was very sensitive to the honors to which her high position entitled her, and it was to be expected that she would want to enjoy them as long as possible. She had, when needed, employed all the resources of feminine diplomacy to arrive at her goals.46 We are safe, therefore, in assuming that Señora Bazaine used her very effective influence over the Marshal to encourage his staying Niel to Bazaine, No. 31, Paris, February 13, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5 1 7 4 . Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 214. Gaulot does not even hesitate to give her credit for trying to arrange a marriage for Castelnau in order to encourage him to remain in Mexico longer and to hold French troops there. He also credits her with arranging the very advantageous marriage of Dano with a wealthy Mexican lady to hold him. 45 49

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in Mexico and in a position of social preferment. If this meant prolonging the Empire, it is easy to understand her opposing an abdication. If she favored an abdication, on the other hand, it is difficult to explain her shortsightedness; if the abdication took place and an interim regency were set up to prepare for a new government, with French and even United States aid, to be sure the only logical man for the position, which would be practically a dictatorship, would be Bazaine. But such a role could only be ephemeral and highly dangerous both professionally and physically. So while the influence of La Maréchale on Bazaine seems undoubted, it can have been only one more of the many conflicting considerations that he had to weigh before making a decision. It would have required an extreme inconsistency of character for Bazaine, who had so consistently criticized the conservatives and some clericals in 1863, 1864, and even in 1865, to turn coat suddenly and join the arch-conservatives in a secret or at least furtive effort to maintain the Emperor in power. The unkind attitude taken by Labastida after Bazaine ousted him from the Regency and the hostile dichotomy that continued in 1864 and 1865 would not lead us to believe that the arch-conservatives would ever turn to Bazaine or support him, or that he could lack the perception to realize the fact. He must have known full well that once the conservatives took over the Council and Ministry and dominated Maximilian, they would likewise spurn him as the man to wield power. Rather, after their terrible mistake in mis-estimating the French before, they would turn to a more dependable stalwart of conservatism, such as Márquez or Miramón. Nothing in his background or existing documents indicates that he was so gullible. In theory Bazaine personally may have had much to win by hastening the abdication. If a regency were set up, he would likely dominate it. If a dictatorship were set up, he could handle it best, and, at any rate the ambitions of La Maréchale could be realized better. Although such things are possible, it does not speak well for the indoctrination of the French army that a man so honored, who had spent so many years in faithful service should be willing at the height of his career to throw it overboard in pursuit of a frail political title in an ephemeral government that he knew to be doomed. The dispositions he had made in withdrawing to the heart of the Mexican national domain for a last stand by Mexican troops indicated that he had no anticipation of a return. No one knew better than Bazaine

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tiie inadequacy of the Imperial troops to withstand the Juarists. It is only fair to conclude, then, that while he may have intrigued with every element that would deal with him, no proof has been presented, and it is inconsistent with the trend of events to think that he had any plan in mind for very long except a return to France. If his wife tried to persuade him otherwise, it could only have been a fleeting yielding. Nonetheless, there was one solution that must not be overlooked, which would benefit Bazaine. If Maximilian remained on the throne until the Marshal's return to France, it would look better for his reputation. He could return, giving the impression to the uninitiated that he had succeeded in installing Maximilian on the throne. That doubtless would give Bazaine greater stature in his own army and a hero's welcome on his return. If, later on, the Empire fell, he already would have received his firm seating in France, and his reputation could absorb the shock. If such were his plan, he could be expected to withdraw as soon as possible after December 1 and to make no further effort to urge Maximilian to abdicate. The early instructions of Napoleon had urged Bazaine to set up another government if Maximilian could not support himself, but he preferred to have Maximilian stay if possible. Moreover, there was the danger that the sudden collapse of the Empire, along with the resignation of the ministers would catch the French troops in the midst of furious civil war. To avoid such a complication at least until spring would be to the advantage of the French army.47 As early as 1865 Maximilian had intimidated the French by threatening to leave if they repatriated any more soldiers. Such an abdication would have made the French the laughing stock of Europe. 48 Some of that feeling still existed, and Bazaine doubtless saw the French becoming ridiculous if the Emperor deserted them before they left. To avoid such a pass, the Emperor had to stay, if only for a few more months. When the French had returned in honor to Europe, then Maximilian could gracefully and safely withdraw from Mexico under the protection of his conservative government. The evidence collected by Castelnau, however, is contradictory, extremely indirect and circumstantial, and generally worthless. That Castelnau placed such weight on it does not speak well for that 47 Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilian, 205-206, takes the attitude that the consideration just given explains Bazaine's apparent desire to prolong the Empire. 48 Loizillon to his sister, Mexico, March 26,1865, in Lettres, No. lxviii, 310-312.

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officer's perspicacity. He leaned heavily on the fact that many elements in Mexico were personally concerned with discrediting Bazaine and seeing his work and reputation broken.49 Maximilian, Pierron, Douay, the extreme conservatives, and the Juarists were only too glad to receive and use anything that would work to his detriment; they could even attribute plots to him on flimsy evidence.50 If Castelnau did not agree with Bazaine's evaluation of the possible solutions, it was because his instructions called for an abdication while he was on hand to see to it, not at a later date when his role would not be clear. A part of their difference in viewpoint then rests on the fact that Bazaine desired to postpone the abdication until after the French withdrawal. T H E ABDICATION CRISIS

Maximilian in November, still in Orizaba and in a despondent mood, apparently had resigned himself to an abdication. With a careless abandon toward his duties, the Emperor then devoted his time to a settlement of his personal affairs. He worried about the future of the Austrian soldiers and requested provisions to care for their repatriation, pensions for the disabled, and a separation bonus on their return to Austria. For his private debts he charged Sánchez Navarro with selling his personal property and furniture to pay outstanding bills, and he urged Bazaine, Castelnau, and Dano to see that the new Mexican government liquidated his other obligations.51 In accord with his final preparations Maximilian asked Bazaine finally to come Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 328. Ibid., III, 329. Loizillon, who knew so much of the goings-on in Mexico, had been in Puebla for several months and out of touch with the capital. If Bazaine sought to keep Maximilian, Loizillon did not know it: "At this moment the Emperor must be in Orizaba. All of the efforts of the Marshal and of General Castelnau must be tending to pull an abdication from him." — Loizillon to his sister, Mexico, October 28, 1866, in Lettres, No. xiv, 412-419. As has already been shown, Bazaine may have had an abdication in his possession but evidently Castelnau did not know it. 5 1 Pierron to Bazaine, Mexico, November 16, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4 8 1 6 ; printed in Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 199-200. Other provisions were made for the Austrians, Belgians, Princess Iturbide, and private debts on November 12, when Maximilian asked these three Frenchmen to guarantee the provisions as asked. — Maximilian to Bazaine, November 12, 1866, printed in Kératry, L'Empereur Maxtmilien, 238-240. This they did insofar as their powers allowed. — Bazaine, Dano, and Castelnau to Maximilian, Mexico, November 16, 1866, printed in ibid., 240-241. 49 50

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to Orizaba to confer with him,52 but Bazaine felt unable to leave the capital before the arrival of Douay for the reason that he had no one to whom to leave the command.53 The invitation did not state the purpose of the interview; but since Maximilian was concerned also over his financial problem, it is possible that he hoped to induce the French to ease up on the terms of the Convention of July 30, which allowed the French to take over the customs at Veracruz on November 1 in order to help pay the interest on the debt due them.54 So far Bazaine had permitted no variations in the terms and had placed Rolland, a trusted Finance agent, in charge at Veracruz.55 The studies made by General Castelnau at first inclined him to favor the relief of Bazaine from his command; but he failed to act at the climactic moment, and in January he found himself relegated to a secondary role as events rushed past him faster than he could grasp them. His last significant effort to control the situation came on December 6, 1866. Castelnau and Dano, evidently in the desire of committing Bazaine to favor abdication since they suspected his feelings, prevailed upon him to sign a statement with them, declaring that only by abdication could the interests of the Empire be served.56 Whatever Bazaine's feeling toward abdication had been and whatever the pressure, if any, brought to bear on him to obtain the signature, this document marks a commitment. At no time thereafter did Bazaine openly favor Maximilian's staying on. After this climactic point 52 Maximilian to Bazaine, Telegram, Orizaba, November 18, 1866, printed in Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 2 0 2 - 2 0 4 ; Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 243; GarcíaPérez, Estudio político-militar, 254. 53 Bazaine to Maximilian, Telegram No. 382, Mexico, November 18, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4 8 2 0 . That refusal was on the advice of Dano and Castelnau (Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 203). Castelnau feared that Bazaine would counsel Maximilian to stay, making common cause with the Conservatives in their program. Since Castelnau definitely wanted an abdication, he did not want Bazaine to attend the meeting. — Castelnau to Napoleon, December 9, 1866, printed in Sonolet, "L'Agonie de l'Empire du Mexique", Revue de Paris, IV, (34th year), August, 1927, 6 6 4 - 6 7 5 , specifically page 665; also in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 244. In view of those circumstances Corti's explanation (Maximilian and Charlotte, II, 7 5 1 ) that "Bazaine was afraid of being saddled with an unwelcome dictatorship and begged to be excused" is inadmissible. 5 4 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Telegram No. 368, Mexico, October 27, 1866, in BA, X X I V , f. 4744. 55 Bazaine to the French Minister of Finance, No. 2 1 9 9 , Mexico, November 27, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4 8 7 0 , also Maintenant to Bazaine, No. 185, Mexico, November 28, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4 8 7 9 - 4 8 8 0 . 56 Bazaine, Dano, and Castelnau, Mexico, December 8, 1866, printed in Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 356.

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Castelnau so embroiled himself in petty intrigues that he could no longer rise to the high level of leadership demanded by the changing scene. Bazaine, during this delicate period, maintained his control as well as command over the troops, regulating movements of the withdrawal smoothly. He did, however, in view of the chance of his being relieved and returned to France, wire Douay to hasten the latter's movement from Querétaro to the capital in order to be available if the change of command took place.57 Randon, in Paris, did not anticipate the departure of Bazaine and continued to send him instructions on the embarkation of troops. As for the contention of Cariota and of Maximilian and his sympathizers that the rapid withdrawal of the troops violated the Treaty of Miramar, Randon shrugged it off easily: I have on several occasions studied the situation of the Foreign Legion. As I see it, the Treaty of Miramar, which had admitted the possibility of a stay of several years — this Treaty of Miramar, I say, seems to me to have been set at naught for a long time, and it seems that there can be no doubt as to the fate that must be reserved it [The Legion], to wit, its repatriation at the same time as your other troops.58

Later on he reiterated the statement: You ask me whether the Foreign Legion should be evacuated. There is no doubt of it since the Convention of Miramar has become a dead letter, so dead that it is likely if not certain that the Emperor Maximilian will have left Mexico before us.59

However, when Randon heard that the Emperor was staying, his sang-froid deserted him for a moment of sympathy: I never thought that in any sense these confused affairs would find an easy solution. You have only to put yourself in Maximilian's place to realize that it is not easy for him to beat a retreat that would be a stain on his 80 political life

Napoleon had no idea of insisting on an abdication, either, though he clearly favored it.41 An interlude in November showed Bazaine that the United States 5 7 Bazaine to Douay, Telegram No. 378, Mexico, November 14, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4805. 5 8 Randon to Bazaine, Paris, November 30, 1866, in BA, X X I V , f. 4 9 0 1 . 5 0 Randon to Bazaine, Paris, December 15, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4 9 5 9 - 4 9 6 1 . 6 0 Randon to Bazaine, Paris, December 31, 1866, in BA, XXVI, f. 5 0 2 3 . · ' Napoleon III to Castelnau, No. 30, Paris, January 10, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f, 5083; printed in Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 243.

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had not forgotten the Empire, even if pressure on the northern frontiers had dwindled. With no previous warning for the French, an American frigate, the Susquehanna, sailed into Tampico Bay bearing General Sherman and a diplomatic agent, Campbell, who asked to see Bazaine. The latter, immediately suspecting some drastic action, alerted both the Gulf and the Pacific fleet to stand by at Acapulco and Veracruz until he found out the tenor of the visit.62 Meantime he ordered that the frigate be received like any friendly warship and offered the welcome of the port. 63 The frigate reached Isla Verde on November 29, 64 despite a storm. 65 Before the two envoys could reach Bazaine, the news of Maximilian's decision not to abdicate reached them, and with the supposed reason for their visit dissipated, they unceremoniously departed without explaining the occasion of their arrival. 66 At the end of November, after a long period of solitude and meditation, and conference with a few close companions, Maximilian gave up thoughts of abdication and decided to remain. For weeks there had been no communication between him and Bazaine; so that the latter could not have influenced his final decision. 67 On December 1 Maximilian announced his plan to return to Mexico, 68 though he did not really come back for several weeks. But the 92 Bazaine to Mazères, Telegram No. 389, Mexico, November 26, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4861. 63 Bazaine to Cloué, Telegram No. 391, Mexico, November 26, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4866. 84 Cloué to Bazaine, Telegram, Veracruz, November 29, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4890. •5 Idem to idem, Telegram, Veracruz, November 29, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4891. ββ Bazaine to Cloué, Coded Telegram No. 395, Mexico, December 2, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4919, also Cloué to Bazaine, Telegram, Veracruz, December 3, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4923. 67 Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte, II, 736-755. Why Corti thought that the decision caught Bazaine unawares is not clear. Who besides Castelnau, possibly Dano, had advised him? Evidently his conservative companions. Ibarra de Anda (Carlota, p. 188) states without proof that during this critical time Maximilian received a telegram from his mother and from his brother Emperor Franz-Josef, reminding him that a Hapsburg had never fled his duties but would rather die and that Maximilian had already renounced all rights in Austria. These telegrams, if they existed, plus the news of the illness of Carlota, adequately explain not only his decision to remain, but also the suicidal military expedition to Querétaro, where his death or capture was predictable. 68 Bazaine to Randon, Coded Telegram No. 393, Mexico, December 1, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4916. For the Emperor's proclamation, see Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 343-344; Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 253; García-Pérez, Estudio políticomilitar, 255.

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announcement was made with a measure of independence that showed a relief at the decision and new confidence born of the protestations of his new advisors. He set up a strongly conservative cabinet: Lares, Márquez, Miramón, Mejía, Luis de Arroyo. Immediately thereupon Lares and Arroyo issued a statement that Mexico would rest upon its own strength and asked the French to turn their military establishments and supplies over to the Empire.6® The recipients of the request, Bazaine, Dano, and Castelnau, acting jointly, did not accept the request but restated their belief that a decision to abdicate would have been the proper course.70 SEPARATION O F F R E N C H

INTERESTS

Bazaine accepted the new ministry with resignation; he was then intent only on quitting himself of his military duties. He sent orders to Admiral Mazères on the west coast to complete the evacuation in February, leaving the Mexicans to fend for themselves.71 He even wired Paris to designate a ship to take him away.72 The other details devolved upon him; Randon's letters concerned themselves mostly with details of shipping and disposition of the mules and horses.73 In the meantime Bazaine continued to cut himself off from the acts of the Mexican government, especially where his participation might be onerous to both sides. When Mejía levied on an American citizen, Moorhead, in San Luis Potosí, $1,050 as a "special war impost" and the American Consul in Mexico protested to Bazaine, the latter brushed aside the complaint by saying that Mejía was "in no way under my orders". He went on, A n d e v e n w e r e he, this m a t t e r is probably for military operations and is an administrative m e a s u r e to w h i c h I a m far from lending m y approval or support. " Lares and Arroyo to Dano, Bazaine, and Castelnau, Orizaba, December 6, 1866, printed in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 354-355. 7 0 Dano, Bazaine, and Castelnau to Lares, Mexico, December 8, 1866, in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 257-258. 7 1 Bazaine to Mazères, Coded Telegram No. 408, Mexico, December 13, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4944. Mazères was relieved in this way because as soon as he loaded all his impedimenta, he would have to return by way of Cape Horn and thus would be out of communcation with Bazaine for weeks. 7 2 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, Telegram No. 409, Mexico, December 14, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4948. 7 3 Randon to Bazaine, Paris, December 15, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4 9 5 9 - 4 9 6 1 .

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I have even given orders to the Colonel of the Foreign Legion . . . not to mix in any question of the Mexican government and not to lend their aid except on purely military matters. It is to the government of His Majesty, the Emperor Maximilian, that the claim . .. should be addressed.74 Throughout all these exchanges the French troops continued their orderly march. The great fair at San Juan de los Lagos was due, and the 62nd Regiment, coming from Mazatlán, received authorization to stay there long enough to protect the fair. 75 Early in November the Bataillon d'Afrique headed for the capital via San Luis Potosí, and Douay received orders to withdraw his headquarters by way of Querétaro. 76 The movements, while fairly peaceful in the north, did not prevent Porfirio Díaz from attacking the distressed garrison at Oaxaca and capturing some Mexicans, French, and Austrians. José María de la Cadena, Mexican commander at Puebla, proposed an exchange of the Juarist Prisoners at Puebla for those taken. 77 About 400 men under Larrañaga had escaped to Tehuantepec, where Bazaine ordered them rescued and taken to the relative safety of Acapulco. 78 Jalapa fell to the Juarists on the 11th,79 although a relief force of French and Austrians had already started to the aid of the city. Puente Nacional fell shortly thereafter, thus giving rise to fear of a possible effort to cut the Veracruz road. To avoid such a difficulty, Commandant Cloué was ordered to concentrate all his naval forces at Veracruz to aid in any such eventuality. 80 The critical period for the French army, in withdrawing, irregular bivouacking, and leave-taking, made it all the more important that the French keep communication lines open, and Bazaine found it necessary to issue a special circular to all commanders, ordering them to inform all inhabitants that under the existing state of war, any 74 Bazaine to the United States Consul in Mexico, No. 2216, December 15 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4963. 75 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 747, Mexico, October 29, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4751. 76 Bazaine to Douay, Telegram No. 370, Mexico, November 2, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4757. 77 Cadena to Bazaine, No. 2084, Puebla, November 7, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4770. 78 Bazaine to Mazères, No. 376, Mexico, November 13, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4794. 79 Bazaine to the Mexican Minister of War, No. 727, Mexico, November 20, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4836. β» Ibid.

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person damaging, destroying, or pilfering the railroad property or causing interruption of service would be liable for trial before a courtmartial and to punishment as indicated. The ruling applied also to telegraph lines.81 During this period also more and more responsibility for the defense of the Empire fell on the shoulders of the Mexican army. At the end of October, as a result of the hastened activity on the part of the French during the summer and early fall, the Mexican army had a total of twenty-two battalions, including the Cazadores de Mexico, ten cavalry regiments, two companies of gendarmerie, some field artillery, and engineers — a total of 17,259 men. Besides, there were 6,811 men in the Austro-Belgian legion and guard posts — a tota1 of 28,000 manpower.82 There was a powder factory, a cartridge factory, a machine shop, wood and leather-working factory, all devoted to army orders, in Puebla, thanks to the attentions of the Austrian troops who had been stationed there. There were 46,000 rifles available, and 6,000 more arrived from the United States in November.83 Throughout the Empire the native officials returned to practices that the French originally had hoped to cure in Mexico. In Alvarado the notoriously corrupt Imperial authorities allowed contraband for the Juarists to pass through the post in large quantities on payment to the garrison commander for the privilege.84 Porfirio Díaz, the chief recipient of the contraband, continued to grow in importance and even assumed the graciousness of an equal antagonist. After the death of the French officer Testard, he sent the officer's saber back to Bazaine's office for transmittal to Testard's family in recognition of his heroic conduct before he fell.85 That gallantry was perhaps only a blind and a pretext to enter through the bearer of the saber into negotiations with the French on the subject of the withdrawal.86 81 Bazaine, Circulaire, No. 2135, Mexico, October 15, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4702. 82 Bazaine to the Minister of Justice, No. 702, Mexico, October 16, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4718-4719. The discrepancy between the two sums and total of 28,000 is not explained. Perhaps the difference represented the navy and some police troops. 83 Bazaine to the Minister of War of Mexico, No. 610, Mexico, November 8, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4774. 84 Bazaine to ?, No. 205, Mexico, December 9, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4932. 85 Espinosa Gorostiza to Boyer, Oaxaca, December 9,1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4935. 89 Porfirio Díaz to Boyer, Oaxaca, December 9, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4936.

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The same envoy, Charles Thiele, visited Puebla more than once, discussing an exchange of prisoners; but Douay, then with his headquarters at Puebla, saw in his long negotiations only a pretext for spying on the French activities for Porfirio Díaz.87 Other communications with the enemy continued. Lalanne, aide-de-camp to Vicente Riva Palacio, was captured at Toluca early in November;88 and although Bazaine recognized him as a prisoner of war coming as an emissary,8® and not as a spy, Tavera, the Minister of War, had him imprisoned. Nearly two months later Bazaine intervened to ask that he be set free80 so that he could be exchanged. General Vicente Riva Palacio also protested that such treatment was contrary to the uses of war of civilized nations.91 Later Bazaine had to ask again for news of Lalanne.92 That same lack of co-operation delayed efforts to exchange the Austrians taken prisoner at Matamoros and Guachinango.93 Negotiations also were attempted with General Escobedo to exchange some Juarist prisoners taken at Parras94 for some of the ninety-four French prisoners at Guadalajara.95 After final arrange ments had been made with Porfirio Díaz for an exchange, General Toro escaped from French hands, further complicating matters. Since all parties had already signed the treaty, Bazaine maintained that he still was entitled to the return of the French. 96 By the middle of December the Empire forces, covering some of the French withdrawal, had been forced out of Iguala, and the frontiers were shrinking.97 On the Pacific coast in the meantime filiDouay to Bazaine, No. 715, Puebla, December 18, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4973. Bazaine to Blanchot, No. 717, Mexico, November 8, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4776. 8 9 Bazaine to the Mexican Minister of War, No. 719, Mexico, November 10, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4 7 8 6 . 9 0 Bazaine to Mexican Secretary of State for War, No. 738, Mexico, December 21, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4995. 9 1 Riva Palacio to Bazaine, December 31, 1866, in BA, XXVI, f. 5020. 9 2 Bazaine to the Mexican Minister of War, No. 740, Mexico, December 31, 1866, in BA, X X V I , f. 5030. 9 3 Bazaine to Chargé d'affaires d'Autriche, No. 2234, Mexico, January 4, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5052, prolonged into January. — Bazaine's Secretary to Joaquin Martinez, No. 2236, Mexico, January 11, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5084. M Bazaine to Douay, Telegram No. 766, Mexico, January 5, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5 0 5 9 . 9 5 Castagny to Bazaine, Telegram, January 6, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5065. 9 6 Bazaine to Douay, No. 766, Mexico, January 5, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5 0 5 9 . 9 7 Bazaine to Mazères, Coded Telegram No. 408, Mexico, December 13, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4944. 87

88

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busters preyed on Mexican ships almost at will and over the continual protests of the French Consul in San Francisco. 98 Bazaine on December 17 asked Dano to meet with him at the home of Castelnau, who was confined by an illness, to consider a letter from Lares and Márquez in which these two asked for a restitution to Mexico of the customs income at Veracruz for October." Maintenant, the Inspector General of Finances, insisted that the Mexicans were not entitled to it under the terms of the Convention of July 30, 100 and the trio supported him. The controversy continued. That same day, December 17, 1866, the new Under-Secretary of Hacienda sent Bazaine a bill for the income collected, $9,999.87, 101 but Maintenant denied the grounds, 102 and Bazaine refused the request. 103 There then followed a temporary lull in the conflict. Bazaine issued a circular on December 18 in which he called for the French troops to watch their behavior especially during the withdrawal in order to leave no bad impression in Mexico: No executions without trials, no burning of property, no confiscations, and abstention from favoring the various political parties. 104 The conditions of the pier at Veracruz would not allow its use for large-scale embarkations, and Bazaine again had to authorize 80,000 francs to the engineers to repair it for the movement of troops. 105 The 98 A good example is the case of the Mexican Empire brig Basco, Captain Domec, belonging to a Frenchman. At Cape San Lucas it was boarded by three filibusters under Gaston d'Artois, who claimed to have orders from Corona to seize all Imperial ships. They failed to find the cargo of silver ingots hidden under some baskets of oranges but took a check for $10,000 payable in San Francisco. Once back in that port Cazotte sued him for the act. The Juárez minister in San Francisco, Manuel Guillén, refused to acknowledge the filibusters, and the local prosecutor arraigned d'Artois before a grand jury. — Cazotte to Bazaine, No. 20, San Francisco, November 30, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4908. 99 Bazaine's Secretary to Dano, No. 2218, Mexico, December 17, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4965. 100 Maintenant to Bazaine, No. 192, Mexico, December 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4982-4983. 101 Campos to Bazaine, Mexico, December 19, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4989. 102 Maintenant to Boyer, No. 195, Mexico, December 20, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4991. 103 Bazaine to the Secretary of State for Hacienda, No. 739, Mexico, December 21, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4996. 104 Bazaine, Circulaire, Mexico, December 18, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4969. Not an unnecessary order by any means; an army evacuating in peace is always apt to impose temperamental injustices on a defenseless populace; petty annoyances and arrogant carelessness are apt to be general. 105 Bazaine to L'Inspecteur général des Finances, 207, Mexico, December 22, 1866, in BA, XXVI, f. 5003, also Bazaine, Réquisition, Mexico, [December], 1866,

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railroad bridges at Paso Ancho and Paso del Muerto also were dangerously weak and had to be examined carefully before troops could entrain.106 On December 26 Castagny moved out of Léon. San Luis Potosí already was in the hands of the Imperial troops, and now the whole frontier was left to them.107 However, even that late, Bazaine still tried to use the threat of a new offensive at Guadalajara to force the Juarists there to release some French prisoners.108

T H E F I N A L BREAK W I T H T H E CONSERVATIVES

A few days after the return of Maximilian, he invited Bazaine to an interview with him at the Hacienda of La Teja, where he was residing. There he greeted Bazaine more kindly than in the past, and they spoke of generalities not touching the torrent of conspiracy that raged about them. For that very reason they reached no new decisions or understandings. Then, surprisingly enough, on January 11 Bazaine again received an invitation in the name of the Emperor to a meeting on the 14th.109 He attended, despite the vagueness of the invitation. Once at the Palace of Government, he was confronted by a junta of forty persons with the news that the Emperor had decided not to attend.110 Rather than withdraw, leaving the field to the Conservatives without a struggle, Bazaine made the declaration he had come prepared to give; he pointed out the poor quality of the defense afforded by the Imperial troops as a sign of the weakness of the Empire. Significant if true, . . . each state has returned to its place in the Federation; elections have validated the majority of the Federal authorities after the departure of in BA, X X V I , f. 5035. Fort San Juan de Ulloa in Veracruz was to be taken over by the fleet so that not even Juarist prisoners could be accomodated there. — Bazaine to the Under-Secretary of State for War, No. 7 4 1 , Mexico, January 4, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5054. 108 Bazaine to Barron, No. 2 2 2 8 , Mexico, December 31, 1866, in BA, X X V I , f. 5031. For a history of this railroad, see Anderson, An American in Maximilians Mexico, p. 15. 107 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 420, Mexico, December 26, 1866, in BA, X X V I , f. 5009. 108 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 421, Mexico, December 27, 1866, in BA, XXVI, f. 5013. 109 Lares to Bazaine, Mexico, January 11, 1867, in Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 396; also in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 2 8 0 - 2 8 1 . 110 For a list of the persons attending, see Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 3 8 6 - 3 8 7 ; however, he lists only 34.

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the Imperial authorities. The Federal regime, then, has been re-established in the greater part of the territory.111 The people, he said, no longer supported the Empire after the disillusionment of the last two years; and it did not have enough revenue to support its troops. The United States had supported the Federal government out of its fear of having any other form of government established in the continent. From the military point of view he did not believe that the Imperial army could maintain the government. The government did not function well enough to furnish adequate income without such impositions as forced loans, and the people seemed so favorable to a federation that he doubted whether "an appeal to the people" would be favorable to the Empire. In short he believed that Maximilian could not continue to govern under honorable conditions without falling into party strife and therefore, for his own glory and safeguard, he should return the government to the nation. When Bazaine had finished, a general discussion followed. Then the junta took a vote on whether to maintain the Empire. Eighteen voted for retaining it, eight for abdication, nine abstained, and the others were not called on. Thus the Empire was upheld by one vote. Bazaine thereupon took leave of the Junta, and from that moment the latter went its own way without inviting his counsel. Attitudes of hostility became more and more pronounced. He sent a copy of his statement to Maximilian, but it did not reach him.112 Maximilian had become the prisoner of the Conservatives. With the development of plans for withdrawal of the French and the consequent increase in authority and self-assertion of the Conservative Mexican officials, an increase of friction between the two inevitably resulted. The French obviously thought mostly of the disengagement of all their personnel and property, even at the cost of more and more negotiations with enemy troops. The exchange of prisoners of war was one of their principal concerns and one with which the conservative Imperial cabinet would not sympathize. They little cared then what happened to French prisoners in Juarist hands. The French were in a disadvantageous position. Normally at the end of a period of belligerency the two opposing sides contract a treaty of peace or some document having the effect of one, and the contract 111 Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 349; the statement is also printed in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 281-283. 112 Bazaine to Maximilian, Mexico, n.d., in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 283.

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specifies that all prisoners held by each side will be returned or at least that humane provisions be made for them. But the French were leaving by turning over the responsibilities to the Imperial forces, not by virtue of a treaty of peace nor anything resembling it. Therefore unless they made separate negotiations for the exchange of the prisoners, the latter would be left to the tender mercies of the Juarists; and, under existing moods, the Imperial government likely would not concern itself with their safety. Rather than face that prospect, Bazaine chose to deal with the Juarist leaders whom he had found to be dependable. These leaders, mostly generals, appeared in localized areas; no communication with the Juárez headquarters existed. By the middle of January Bazaine had an understanding with both Porfirio Díaz and Riva Palacio that the French withdrawal would not be molested.113 The smoldering resentment of the conservatives reached the surface immediately after Bazaine's meeting with the Junta and manifested itself primarily in opposition to negotiations with the Juarists. The Mexican officials in the capital arrested a certain Pedro Garay, known as a Juarist agent. General Maussion, who still maintained much of his authority as Military Commandant of Mexico City, asked for his release, claiming that Garay had the protection of a safe-conduct from the French headquarters. The Interim Undersecretary of War refused the request.114 Thereupon General Maussion arrested the Mexican Chief of Police, General Ugarte, to hold until Garay's release.115 The protest of Murphy became very vociferous,116 but Ba1 1 3 Diaz to Colonel ?, Oaxaca, January 12, 1867, printed in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 291; Vicente Riva Palacio to the Colonel Chief of Cabinet, Tenancingo, January 19, 1867, printed in ibid., 292. These understandings indicate individual action or caudilloism rather than Juarist policy. Bigelow had suggested nearly a year earlier that Juarist troops would probably give up their attacks if it were clear that the French were leaving. He did not speak for Juárez but out of his rationalization. — Bigelow to Seward, Paris, January 11, 1866, in U.S. Executive Document No. 93, pp. 14-15. Juárez either brushed aside such suggested policy or had too weak a control over his troops to co-ordinate the arrangements. 114 Tomás Murphy, Subsecretario Interino de Guerra, to Bazaine, Mexico, January 16, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5109. Blanchot (L'Intervention, III, 312) gives the name erroneously as J. Murphy and (ibid., III, 404) blames the arrest on the obstreperousness of Márquez. 1 1 5 Maussion to Bazaine, No. 238, Mexico, January 16, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5112. 1 1 6 Bazaine to the Subsecretario de Estado, Mexico, January 17, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5117, also idem to Undersecretary of W a r Murphy, No. 743, Mexico, January 19, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5 1 2 3 .

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zaine backed Maussion up completely since a point of honor was involved. The Mexicans yielded with ill grace and released Garay to French custody.117 As a result of this encounter the Imperial government declared itself the sole media for negotiations for the exchange of prisoners, with Colonel José Valero appointed to handle such affairs.118 The move was directed specifically at Joaquín Martinez, another Juarist agent in Mexico on a French safe-conduct pass to arrange for an exchange of Austrian prisoners.119 Hearing what had happened to Garay, Martinez went into hiding. To get him out, Murphy asked that he present himself to Valero for an Imperial safe-conduct to replace the French one. Bazaine approved of the solution as recommended,120 but Martinez would not negotiate with the Imperial officials,121 and a stalemate temporarily resulted. At last Murphy acceded and turned over to the French a Juarist lieutenant, three sergeants, a corporal, and two soldiers in exchange for a like number of Austrian prisoners, thus tacitly accepting the negotiations with Martinez through the French.122 The Imperial government could do no less at this time because with the concentration of French troops the area around Mexico and the road to Veracruz were teeming with French troops and equipment and military action could very well result. The fortifications of Mexico City, which French engineers had built up and renovated during the last five years, still were garrisoned entirely by them. Leonardo Márquez, the conservative stalwart, had been appointed one of the Empire's three corps commanders and was theoretically in charge of the capital,123 but he dared not yet attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the French nor enter any conflict with them, although in private conversations he had expressed himself as very bitter toward the French. 1 1 7 P. O., L'Offr. d'Ordonnance [signed by initials only]. Receipt signed in Mexico, January 18, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5118. Arrangoiz (Apuntes, 358) says that Bazaine had called out an infantry company and threatened to seize the prison if Garay were not released. 1 1 8 T. Murphy to Bazaine, Mexico, January 20, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5129. 1 1 9 Bazaine's Secretary to Joaquín Martinez, No. 2236, Mexico, January 11, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5084. 1 2 0 Bazaine to Murphy, No. 745, Mexico, January 22, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5132. 1 2 1 Bazaine to Murphy, No. 746, Mexico, January 23, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5136. 1 2 2 Murphy to Bazaine, Mexico, January 28, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5143. But he complained at the time that those were not regular prisoners of war, which were not on hand, but indicted conspirators, subject to trial. 1 2 3 Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 403.

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Lares, as President of the Council, likewise took more and more authority on himself in January and wrote several letters that Bazaine considered rude. He therefore protested that "in the future I do not want to have any relations with your Ministry".124 Lares then wrote again, as if intentionally antagonizing the Marshal by accusing him of failing to help Imperial troops in desperate need. Bazaine sent a copy of the letter to Maximilian at the Hacienda de la Teja, where he had taken up residence on his return from Orizaba rather than return to empty Chapultepec Palace, protesting the attitude of Lares.125 Fischer, who stayed with Maximilian most of the time at the Hacienda de la Teja, returned the letter, protesting in turn its rudeness and concluding with "He [the Emperor] does not wish to have any direct relations with you in the future."126 The terms used are so similar to those used by Bazaine to Lares that it seems beyond a doubt that there was collusion between Lares and Fischer in the writing of the last letter, and that both were throwing Bazaine's own words back at him. The break in relations with Maximilian, or at least with the advisors and counsellors who alone had access to his presence, was confirmed at the end of January, when Bazaine wrote concerning new appointments to the Order of Guadalupe.127 His letter was not shown to Maximilian, but was sent back with the suggestion that it be resubmitted over another signature.128 On the other hand, as relations with the Imperial leaders worsened, those between the French and the Republicans gradually became less and less bellicose as the departure approached, and communication between them increased. Bazaine had privately informed the Juarists that he would not undertake any new expeditions provided they would not attack the French; on the other hand, however, he made it clear that the French would attack any Juarist troops that came within two days' march of his troops.129 Along the Rio Grande exIbid., III, 407; also in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 298. Bazaine to Maximilian, Mexico, January 25, 1867, printed in Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 4 0 8 - 4 0 9 ; also in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 2 9 6 - 2 9 7 . 129 Fischer to Bazaine, Mexico, January 28, 1867, in Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 4 1 0 ; also in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 299. 127 Bazaine to Maximilian, Mexico, January 28, 1867, printed in Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 359. 128 Fischer to Osmont, Mexico, February 1, 1867, in Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 421; also in Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 361; Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 300. 128 Bazaine has been roundly criticized for his communications with the Juarists, 124

125

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change of prisoners with Juarist General Berriozábal proceeded on terms of good will, although many French prisoners either escaped into Texas or were released there and, like some deserters, preferred to stay rather than accept repatriation. 130 Negotiations were conducted from the French naval vessel Phlegeton, which was waiting at the river mouth. The replacement of French by Mexican troops had almost ended by the beginning of February; and the last soldiers from the north, west, and south had gathered, with only a rear guard remaining in the capital. The large amount of equipment necessary for the field had become useless appendages; and, in conformity with the instructions of Randon, 131 the horses and harness were sold gradually in Mexico or in staging areas along the road to Veracruz. Artillery ammunition would not fit the calibrations of Mexican artillery and was too cumbersome to carry home; it was destroyed. 182 Enough but under the conditions presented here, it seems that he could hardly have done otherwise. In the British view, e.g., "They (The French) have tried to bribe the Liberals to let the French troops get off uninjured by delivering over to them unprotected the poor wretches who have ventured to call themselves Imperialists, or have been friendly to the French. Marshal Bazaine has had only one object in view — not the defense of his flag, or the maintenance of the fidelity due those who trusted him, but the safe retirement of the greatest number of French soldiers." — "Mexico", (Editorial) in The Saturday Review, XXIII, No. 584, January 5, 1867, pp. 6-7. 180 Wuertemberg to Bazaine, Brownsville, March 4, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5193. 131 Randon to Bazaine, Paris, January 15, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5100-5102. 132 Bazaine has been criticized for the destruction (Hyde, The Mexican Empire, 247, for example) but only from the layman's viewpoint. The Mexicans could only make use of the ammunition, granted their shortages, if the guns had been left; but the French needed their artillery and took it home. Charged projectiles are too heavy and dangerous to carry in large quantities on transports with soldiers, and also too dangerous to salvage. The army could handle the ammunition only by blowing it up or dumping it in large streams. Moreover, in view of the belligerent relations between Márquez, the fanatical conservatives, and the French, it was not outside the range of possibility that any powder left could be used against the French by the Imperial troops as a final act of defiance. So Bazaine would have been negligent of his duty if he had left the powder in the fortresses of Mexico. As for the ammunition, even if not useable, if it fell into the hands of the Juarist forces, it could be claimed as war booty to the detriment of the "honor" of the French army. Loizillon has assured us that under existing moods in the capital Márquez was capable even of an attack on the French. — Loizillon to his sister, Mexico, January 9, 1867, in Lettres, No. cix, 432-434. One very reprehensible act for the officer involved was the sale in Puebla of some Austrian property. The Mexican government had asked the French to guard a convoy of wagons to and from Perote to retrieve some personal and private property of the Austrians captured there. When the convoy reached Puebla, the lieutenant commanding there, not receiving in time a sum of $8,000 for the guard

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uniforms were sold to the Imperial forces of M á r q u e z to

213 outfit

8 , 0 0 0 men. 1 3 3 THE EXODUS Finally on F e b r u a r y 3 the Marshal issued a proclamation to the Mexican people: Mexicans, in a few days the French troops will leave Mexico City. During the four years that they have stayed in your beautiful capital, they could only congratulate themselves on the sympathetic relations that were established between themselves and the people. So in the name of the French army under his orders and in his own name the Marshal of France takes his leave of you. I tender you all our best wishes for the welfare of the chivalrous Mexican nation. All our efforts have tended to establish internal peace. Rest assured of that; and I assure you at this moment of leaving you, that our mission has never had any other object, and it has never entered the intentions of France to impose upon you any form of government contrary to your will. 134 T h e last arrangements in the capital were rapid and significant. T h e Marshal sold his furniture and even the p a l a c e of Buenavista given him as a wedding present. 1 3 5 Most of the other officers, soldiers, and civilians likewise h a d a c c u m u l a t e d large amounts of belongings for of the convoy, sold the property to Republican General Aurelio Rivera. — Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 363. Immediately thereafter the Mexican government sent General Jeanningros the $8,000 via Dano, and he, Jeanningros, turned it over to Bazaine, who investigated and found out the truth. — Douay to Jeanningros, Telegram No. 2, Orizaba, February 8, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5161; Jeanningros to Douay, No. 3, Córdoba, February 23, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5186. 183 Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 426. 134 Bazaine, Proclamation, Mexico, February 3, 1867, in BA, XXVI, f. 5155; printed in Niox, L'Expédition, 696; Gaulot, Fin d'Empire, 253-254; Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 436-437. 135 Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 429, defends the sale by saying that the original terms of the gift provided that when the Marshal no longer "needed" it, the palace was to be bought back for $100,000. Considering the hostile attitude of the Imperial government at the end, it is clear that imputations would be leveled at the sale, even if it was justified, and that the restoration government would continue the claims in order to repossess the palace. The republican government did, in fact, take it over later (Niox, L'Expédition, 486) for its own use. Arrangoiz (Apuntes, 296) does not deny the right of Bazaine to sell the palace except insofar as Maximilian had no right to give it to him. The letter of donation signed by Maximilian, Castillo, and Almonte, appears in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 75, where it is denied that Bazaine's sale of the property was ever consummated.

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which transportation had to be provided. The French residents in the capital were divided; the older ones felt they would be safe if they remained, but the newcomers feared reprisals and took advantage of the opportunity to return to France.138 With the families and movable property acquired in Mexico the civilian element made up a large and motley assortment that greatly encumbered the military operation. Overloaded wagons, inadequate self-protection, helplessness of some of the family groups, personal regrets at leaving, and blame thrown in all directions made the evacuation from the capital a tremendously complicated movement. Administrative details continued to plague the French. Their wagon trains followed the road alongside the railroad, crossing it often and doing some damage so that the trains were halted at times.137 Such troubles were not due to any relaxation of discipline but to a normal deterioration under unusually heavy traffic. Those complaints may be searched in vain for references to sabotage, such as the soldiers' using the ties for fuel or for camp fires. With a few isolated instances the discipline of the French army was carefully maintained. At reveille on February 5 the tricolor was raised to the top of the flagpole at the French headquarters in the capital, then lowered for good. At the same time the troops billeted in various parts of the city began their march, converging on the great square, where they lined up. Bazaine with his large staff appeared; they took their position at the head of the column and led the march out of the capital. There was little sign of recognition or interest on the part of the Imperial government. The rearguard only moved out of the city five kilometers, to La Piedad, and there it camped.138 Once again Bazaine wrote a letter to Maximilian, offering an escort to Veracruz if he saw fit to go along. The messenger with the letter was turned away at the hacienda with the statement that Maximilian refused to receive the letter. The march continued on February 6. On the 10th the troops Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 431. R. de Zampone to Bazaine, Veracruz, March 5, 1867, in BA, X X V I , f. 5 1 9 7 , where it is claimed that over 1500 railroad ties were broken or damaged by repeated pressures of wagon wheels. Damage at that time was estimated at five or six thousand pesos. 138 Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 439, says the sojourn was to guard the city while the Imperial groups of Márquez took charge of the defenses and prepared to defend the city against the possibility of an atttack. Also, evidently, to test the attitudes of the governing personages. 13e 137

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entered Puebla. There Castelnau, impatient at the slow pace and seeing his mission at an end, took the stagecoach for Veracruz, where he had a chance to catch the February 15 mailboat to France. On the 15th Bazaine, after checking the defenses of Puebla,139 moved on along the road. There, too, he received the news that Miramón, who had taken over the command of the northern line of defense as organized by Bazaine, had crossed the line to capture Zacatecas, only to be driven back with heavy losses a few days later by General Escobedo. Word came from Mexico City that Márquez had instituted a reign of terror. The news led Bazaine to try once more to free Maximilian. He sent a wire to Dano, who had remained in the capital, asking him to intercede and try to get Maximilian to join him soon because in a few days it would be too late. The message, sent on the 13th, reached Dano too late; the evening of the same day the Emperor had departed to take personal command of the army in the north, taking along the regiment of Lancers, under Colonel Miguel López. The rearguard halted at Orizaba, one of the two staging areas that regulated the embarkation. The ships chartered by Randon began to arrive in Veracruz late in January. The first to embark were the Belgian and the Austrian contingents, most of whom had elected to return home. The Belgians embarked on January 20, the Austrians on the 21st. The commander of the Austrians, Lieutenant Colonel Polak, at Córdoba, the last staging area, addressed a letter of thanks to Bazaine for his recent solicitudes on their behalf.140 Bazaine kept the letter the rest of his life — one of the few words of genuine thanks that came his way after his four years of work. As the ships arrived, their capacity was telegraphed to Orizaba, and a like number of individuals with such belongings as they had not sold, walked a short distance to Paso del Macho, boarded a train there, and rode to Veracruz, where they embarked immediately, avoiding the unhealthy port city. Generally this plan worked smoothly. Only once, on February 26, a band of guerrillas set fire to the bridge at La Soledad. The wood was still green, and damage was 1 3 9 He left Puebla in excellent shape and in the hands of Imperial troops who, two months later, April 7, abandoned it at the first assault by Porfirio Díaz. — Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 449. 1 4 0 Polak to Bazaine, Orizaba, January 17, 1867, printed in Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 433; Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 294-295, where it is dated January 27.

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small. Bazaine sent his engineers out to repair it, and a guard was posted on the bridge.141 Bazaine then left the column to Castagny and went ahead to inspect the embarkation and to reward some of the French sailors on the ships for their services. From that point on, and with no news from the interior, for the voyagers Mexico lay behind and France ahead. Only the 7th Regiment and a few of Bazaine's staff officers were left on shore when on the 8th of March the last two ships arrived: the Souvereign and the Castiglione. Bazaine and his family embarked on the Souvereign. On the 12th of March the last two ships set out, completing the evacuation and leaving Maximilian to the tender mercies of his own court no less than to those of the Juarist republicans.

141 Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 465. Logistics of the evacution did not always work out as planned; despite the plan for avoiding crowding in Veracruz, the city did become crowded, prices rose, lodgings became scarce, and disease spread. — Stevenson, Maximilian in Mexico, pp. 2 6 5 - 2 6 6 .

CHAPTER

IX

T H E F R E N C H ARMY IN M E X I C O 1861-1867

PERSONNEL

The French participants in the Intervention have copiously documented both their own activities and those of their enemies. They were a very literate people with a long tradition of literary expression by means of personal and private letters, and they wrote voluminously. The newness of the Mexican land and people called for descriptions, and long campaigns interspersed with long periods of boring garrison duty called for a variety of outlets for the vigorous health both of the intellect and of the body. For five years many thousands of Frenchmen tramped the roads, paths, and trails and stood guard over hundreds of cities, towns, and villages and worked in dozens of headquarters. The impact of such an experience could not fail to achieve a lasting impression on the manners, language, and culture of the nation. Aside from the political aspects the French brought much to Mexico, but the gift varied from the desirable to the undesirable, the wanted to the unwanted, the welcome and the rejected. The loans made by the French government were desirable, wanted, and welcome. The political compulsion and the new political institutions were welcomed or rejected by various groups depending on their background and ability to adapt. The French soldiers were often undesirable, unwanted, and were rejected at the first opportunity. We see a fairly distinct demarcation in the various strata of French personnel, and their activities vary with their rank and duty. The higher officers alone, the generals and in a few cases colonels, had charge of high-level planning and policy, execution of the Imperial desires, both French and Mexican, and their decisions reflected the conservative, the sedate, and the cautious lines of protocol, all highly flavored with the fervent patriotism that marks the true soldier. The generals showed concern for the good discipline of the troops, the good name of France, and a reluctance to see her policy in Mexico

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fail. Their official life also revealed a concern about the laws of war, international law, protocol, the rules of gentlemanly conduct between belligerents, and they moved cautiously in every new decision, carefully weighing advantages and disadvantages. Precedent meant much, and they watched military procedures with a proprietary air, continually comparing their armies with those of Napoleonic days. The lower officers, the colonels, majors, and a few others of assimilated rank, fell into the strictly professional class. The expeditionary force consisted of a professional army, and the field-grade officers remained continually conscious of their professional standing. Patriotism played a prominent role, and they thought always in terms of the glory of France. They eagerly sought promotion and carefully avoided giving offense to higher officers. They did not share the generals' concern about the formalities of war. The rules of international law meant less to them than the customs of the French military service, which they took very seriously. Actual breaches of discipline among them occurred at times and even became notorious, but the percentage of these cases remained consistently low. The younger officers, from second-lieutenant up, including some of the group just described, felt energetic, proud, jealous of their rank and prerogatives, enthusiastic about everything they did, about France, the Empire, their duties. But they were rash, impetuous, and inclined to take advantage of their position to impose upon less fortunate individuals. They showed a form of fatalism that made gallantry and bravery in combat as natural as effrontery and levity in their pleasures. The soldiers were not so easily controlled. They included many soldiers of fortune who had not the ability, appearance, nor talents to reach commissioned ranks. They came from many nations and for many reasons, especially those in the Foreign Legion. Their discipline continually raised problems because of the variety of their origin and the irregular nature that already had proven them unable to live in a peaceful, civilian society. The regular French soldiers, however, submitted more easily to control. Many were conscripts serving their required term; hence they were young, homesick, and uninterested in the political maneuverings of their Emperor. The older ones worried more about making life easy on themselves, enjoying the social pleasures available to them, and venting on the Mexican people the pent-up repressions that they gathered from their professional duties. In all groups discipline was strict and punishments severe. They

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maintained a very distinct social cleavage; the officers lived on an entirely different plane from that of the soldiers and treated the latter as simple, sometimes naughty children. Socially they met and had dealings with different classes of each community. The generalizations given did not always hold true. Individual exceptions appeared, of course, and a sense of humor, sympathy, and tender-heartedness pervaded the whole army and at times rendered the formalities less bitter. BILLETING

In nearly all cases after the capture of Mexico City the French billeted their troops in Mexican homes or buildings taken for that purpose. The Maréchal des logies had charge of examining each newly occupied area and assigning billets; usually in a new area the senior officer received assignment to the home of the richest family of the town or city. There he generally found himself accepted as a guest and treated with respect; he returned the compliment by not taking advantage of his position except to favor the host in small ways, such as exempting him from fines or from having to furnish supplies or support other billets. The other officers were assigned to various homes and billets in the order of rank and the desirability to the house. Finally the soldiers' assignments took them to the houses left over, one or more in a house according to the accomodations available. The authorities preferred large buildings with much room in order to keep their troops concentrated and under control. While the arrangement worked out amicably more often than not, individual cases sometimes turned out unhappily. Especially in the case of the soldiers, the accomodations might be disdained, the meager food sneered at, the host insulted, the women molested, and small, portable objects of value seized. To relieve the problem of billeting the soldiers, the authorities made wide use of church property. When the French entered Mexico City in 1863, they found many of the convents and monasteries empty as a result of the nationalization program and its legal complications. Under the power of a military commander to control and use state-owned property 1 the French took over some church buildings to house large numbers of troops.2 They 1 Rules of Land Warfare, 81, par. 315. For the right to billet soldiers in private homes, see ibid., 83, par. 325. - Blanchot, L'Intervention, II, 26.

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billeted a whole battalion in the Monastery of Bethlemites on San Andrés Street.3 In Morelia a few nuns and three monks in the convents and monasteries refused to allow the French to enter them. The latter had to seize the buildings by force to house the soldiers.4 In Saltillo the troops occupied the parochial church of San Esteban, but on the request of the priest there, the officers promised to move them when other quarters turned up.5 In Tacámbaro the officers had billets in private homes; the soldiers were installed in the church.6 Troops in Veracruz used the convents of San Domingo and La Merced, the monasteries of San Francisco and San Agustín,7 but returned them later. At Potrero the Prussian consul, Hugo Finck, protested the billeting of prisoners at his home while a nearby inn had accomodations.8 After the death of Manuel Doblado his widow returned to her home at León. On account of her bereavement and the possible strained relations if French officers had billets in her home, the occupying authorities allowed her to avoid them by furnishing lodgings in another place at her expense.9 In Nonalco the French took over the church itself as nationalized property and used it as storeroom for gunpowder.10 In March, 1866, Jesús Dueñas of Querétaro complained of the unfair billeting of large numbers of French soldiers on his property; but since the concentration was a part of the general withdrawal of the French troops, they could not help the situation,11 because of the lack of quarters in many parts of the area. — Personal incompatibilities proved the greatest hindrance to the billeting system, but the opposite could also appear. One favorite anecdote current among French officers in 1864 told of the case of an infantry captain who was billeted in Mexico City with a widow 3 Artigas, Ministro de Instrucción Pública y Cultos, to Bazaine, Mexico, January 10, 1866, in BA, XVI, f. 3169. 4 Loizillon to his sister, Morelia, January 4, 1865, in Lettres, No. lxiii, 2 8 7 - 2 9 1 . 5 Bazaine to Flores, Priest of Saltillo, No. 1936, Mexico, May 21, 1866, in BA, X X I , f. 4029. 8 Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 122. 7 Bazaine to the Mexican Ministro de Gobernación, No. 466, Mexico, October 31, 1866, in BA, X, f. 1966. 8 Bazaine to the Commandant Supérieur à Cordoba, No. 468, Mexico, October 20, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2775. The billeting was an irresponsible act by badly disciplined troops and was so denounced by Bazaine. 9 Bazaine to the Commandant Supérieur de León, No. 632, Mexico, April 26, 1866, in BA, X X , f. 3888. 10 Bazaine to the Subsecretario de Gobernación, Mexico, August 2, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1758. 1 1 Bazaine's Secretary to Dueñas, No. 1761, Mexico, March 14, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3636.

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and her presentable and marriageable daughter. The officer's personal servant — orderly in American military terminology — was also billeted in an appropriate part of the house. In due course the officer and the daughter went through the usual period of courtship and desired to be married. The captain, according to regulations, asked the permission of his commanding officer for the ceremony, and he was surprised on his return from the audience to have his orderly approach him with a request for permission to marry the widow herself, with whom in the meantime he had become closely associated. This placed the captain in the very awkward position not only of being the son-in-law of his own orderly, but also of having to share with him the prospects of the considerable inheritance!12 Whatever the quantity or quality of accommodations, the French officers took the most desirable. Arrangoiz, voicing the anti-French bias later on, complained that they lodged themselves like marshals.13 In smaller and poorer towns, which lacked satisfactory billets, the officers took the best available, and the Mexican Treasury reimbursed them for their inconvenience. In the capital after the occupation had settled down, the Mexican government discarded billets for the officers in favor of an allowance with which the officer had to find and pay for his own lodging. Loizillon, as a captain, received fortyfive pesos a month, and his single room cost thirty-two pesos; stable rent for his three horses amounted to eleven pesos a month.14 The officers in the capital spent most of their time in office work, and, although they all maintained two or more horses, most of them did not do enough riding to keep themselves saddlebroken or in good physical shape. Three exceptions were Marshal Bazaine, Colonel Petit, and Major Lardeur, all of whom rode regularly.15 New officers rendered the usual visits of courtesy to their senior officers punctiliously.16 MILITARY D I S C I P L I N E AND H E A L T H

Among the senior officers and generals the French maintained a fairly high state of discipline. In 1863 and even 1864 that was espe12 Blanchot, L'Intervention, II, 30. . . 1 3 Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 279. 1 4 Loizillon to his sister, Mexico, April 10, 1865, in Lettres, No. lxix, 312-316. 1 5 Mismer, Souvenirs de la Martinique et du Mexique, 187. 18 Castagny to Bazaine, Durango, December 1, 1866, in BA, XV, f. 2981.

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cially true, but personal feelings began to come to the fore later. When Bazaine took command in 1863, the expeditionary corps still had several senior officers whose friendship for Forey made them resent his replacement. The outstanding one was Colonel Brincourt. At the same time some friends of General Douay believed that he, not Bazaine, should have taken over command because he had served in Mexico some four months longer, although he was far junior in rank to Bazaine. Thus the officers somewhat divided themselves into three camps. Douay himself performed his duties conscientiously but at the same time wrote unpleasant letters to France, criticizing Bazaine. He even took advantage of a sick leave to return to France and meet the highest officers of the army in Paris and present his complaints. He made a point of cultivating Maximilian, and the latter found in him a responsive spirit that matched his own dislike for Bazaine. However, Douay carefully avoided any overt action that would leave him open to criticism on his performance of duty. His letters to Bazaine were formal and businesslike, correct and uncomplaining. Brincourt, on the other hand, continually wore a chip on his shoulder. In 1864, when military commander at Puebla, he took violent exception to conflicting orders from Bazaine's headquarters and the fact that he received a letter bordering on a reprimand but written by a clerk in Bazaine's offices. To indicate his sincere protest, he asked to be sent back to France to avoid serving longer under Bazaine, and he suggested that he might resign. Bazaine would have liked to rid himself of the thorny problem by acceding to the request and sending Brincourt back to France. But to do so would at the same time deprive him of a capable officer and would set a precedent for any officer who desired to return to France to follow the same line of conduct and, by complaining and threatening to resign, obtain his return. Therefore Bazaine refused to allow Brincourt's repatriation and refused to forward the resignation on to Paris. As a result Brincourt stayed on. Later, in 1865 the headquarters transferred him to the northern frontier, placed him in charge of the expedition into Chihuahua, and promoted him to brigadier general. But in Chihuahua Brincourt again became discontented because of the order to withdraw from the state soon after he had reached the capital. He also had the protests of the pro-Empire part of the population to pacify. He asked for permission to stay, and on his return to Durango

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he acted insubordinately toward his senior officer, General Castagny, and again he submitted his resignation. Bazaine understood that Brincourt's attitude came from his incomplete understanding of the gradual withdrawal according to Napoleon Ill's confidential orders; so he again refused to forward the resignation to Paris. Brincourt stayed on, though fuming with anger at his treatment. When later on he passed through Mexico City on his way to embark during the normal course of rotation, Bazaine called him and had a long disc i s s i o n , the details of which are not recorded, but it broke up with a friendlier feeling of mutual respect, and no more complaints by Brincourt appear.17 Although these unhappy incidents called up bitter words, in retrospect they reflect credit on the discipline and good order of the French army. Both principals ironed out their troubles in private, and patriotism and devotion to duty overcame what might have become a hopeless quarrel. The army was spared a good officer, and both men deserve congratulations for keeping their heads. A similar case of less importance arose in 1866 when the Prince de Bouffremont, who commanded a regiment, turned in his resignation. W e have no details, but Bazaine evidently classed the case as a peeve and refused to forward the letter to Paris. 18 Among the lower officers discipline meant mostly keeping hotblooded subalterns out of trouble. Many of them, especially in the capital, became embroiled in difficulties with Mexican girls and women. While some contacts resulted in marriages, the scandalous type also appeared. Fortunately only in a few cases did the liaisons break out into public scandal.19 One of the greatest vices which affected the younger officers especially was gambling. At first, under the conservative Regency gambling was forbidden, but it went on flourishing just the same. Monte 17 Brincourt to Bazaine, Puebla, April 20, 1864, in BA, VII, f. 1264-1266; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVIII, Doc. lxx, 259-264; Bazaine to Brincourt, Mexico, (April, 1864), in BA, VIII, f. 1415; Brincourt to Bazaine, Yanuitlán, September 14, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1858-1859; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXII, Doc. xxi, 101-106; Castagny to Bazaine, Durango, September 1, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2612, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X X , Doc. lxxv, 232-233; Brincourt to Bazaine, Chihuahua, September 18, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2681; Bazaine to Commandant Supérieur de Veracruz, No. 399, Mexico, April 14, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3779. 18 Bazaine to Bouffremont, No. 1868, Mexico, April 22, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3869. 1β Blanchot, L'Intervention, II, 30-31.

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was by far the most popular gambling game indulged in, and the French rapidly became addicted to it.20 Roulette was also popular. Budin, the commissioner for Finances, estimated that despite the legal restrictions, over $10,000 a month changed hands over the gambling tables in the capital.21 Sometimes scandals also resulted from heavy losses suffered by the officers, from dishonesty, and the usual vices that accompany the pastime.22 All too often the French officers brought an insolent attitude into their duties. In March 1866 a certain Boyer de Kerleau illegally put on a captain's insignia and went to Veracruz and claimed to be a secret agent sent by Maximilian to keep surveillance over Mexican and French authorities. He stayed drunk most of the time and issued peremptory orders to the French Gendarmerie that led to complaints and revelation of his false pretentions.23 Shortly thereafter a young Major Jumel in Castagny's division who pretented to be related to Napoleon III, insisted that he was no "ordinary" officer and that he had other things to do besides going to mass. He further called attention to himself by spreading slanderous tales about the loyalty of Lieutenant Colonel Lewal, a trusted officer on Castagny's staff. Soon after his arrival in Durango his orderly had a pair of trousers stolen, and Jumel wrote an insolent letter to the local prefect, imposing, without competent authority, a fine of twenty pesos. Castagny reprimanded Jumel and rescinded the fine. Jumel then spread the rumor that Bazaine first had offered him the command of the Chihuahua expedition but had later retracted it. In describing this outlandish character and liar, Castagny said, Jumel does not think he is in Mexico on the same standing as the other officers; he ridicules his assignment as staff officer; he thinks he is called upon to play greater roles. That is a fixation that could very well lead him into some foolish act.24 Relations between French officers and Mexican officers and political agents sometimes became very strained. Bazaine would not permit French troops to serve under the orders of Mexican officers, and the implications of the slight cut very deeply into the sensibilities of the Ibid., II, 33. [Budin] to Bazaine, Mexico, December 22, 1863, in BA, III, 425. 22 Mismer, Souvenirs de la Martinique et du Mexique, 187. 23 Bazaine's Secretary to Maury, No. 1790, Mexico, March 21, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3688. 24 Castagny to Bazaine, Durango, June 17, 1866, in BA, XXI, f. 4183-4184. 20

21

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Mexican allies. Colonel D'Ornant had barely taken command in the Tula-Tamaulipas district when he clashed with the Mexican political agent, Joaquin Silva, and the latter left his office in anger.25 Captain Pierron, private secretary to Maximilian, received a reprimand for using insulting language toward the municipal prefect in San Martin Texmelucán.26 In Sombrerete, September 3, 1865, a popular uprising against the French occurred, and the Mexican officials retired, making no move to aid the French.27 Many of the French officers after a period brought their families from France, and the French ladies set the tone of society. Even at the imperial receptions the men took them as models.28 At the beginning European fashions were practically unknown or at least unimitated, and the Mexican women wore the traditional costumes and sombre colors. With the French ladies came the fashions of the Empire, the hoop skirt, the Eugénie hat, the décolletage, and the bare arms of the Champs Elysées. At first these styles shocked the Mexican women, and the clergy opposed the public appearance of such styles. In May 1864 a priest in the parish of San José of the capital protested the appearance of Madame Rancy, the wife of a French officer, at church, and he even threatened her by "menacing" her with his fist if she would not leave. Bazaine protested that foreigners in general had the right to wear the costume common in their own country.2· French fashions, anyhow, made rapid headway, and long before the end of the intervention the Mexican women of fashion had discarded the dreary petticoats for the crinolines, which were already ten years old in France and in less than ten more years were to become passées.30 The soldiers, as expected, gave the greatest trouble. They had no » Silva to Bazaine, Tula, April 20, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3857. 26 Bazaine to Martroy, Telegram No. 366, October 20, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4731. The insults were passed both ways. — Bazaine to the Juez Premier Municipal de San Martín Texmelucán, Telegram No. 367, October 20, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4733. 27 Bazaine to Mexican Minister of War, No. 623, November 20, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2896. 28 Loiseau, Le Mexique, 78. 28 Bazaine to Labastida, No. 434, Mexico, May 14, 1864, in BA, VIII, f. 1486. A similar incident took place in Guadalajara, shortly afterwards. — Tuce, Cinq ans, 98. In the latter case the trouble arose over the hat. The Mexican women wore regularly the rebozo in church. so Tucé, Cinq ans, 99.

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families in Mexico, and their social contacts rarely reached above the lower economic classes. Internal discipline problems compared about evenly with those in other armies and other countries. As an English observer put it, They [the French] have conducted their conquest with very little regard for the feelings of the population. The higher officers of the army, of course, behave in most instances as becomes their position; but the lower officers are too often brutal, coarse, ignorant men who abuse the power they possess for committing acts of petty tyranny, and who have little respect for property or for families. . . . Many of the troops sent to Mexico also belonged to those irregular regiments which are formed from the refuse of France and Europe, and some of the worst acts of robbery which have occurred lately in the district between Veracruz and Mexico are ascribed to deserters from the French Army.31 Generally the health of the soldiers in the field held up well. They spent much time on the march and in the field, and they often could march for ten or fifteen hours without losing a man by the wayside. Their commissaries furnished a good quality of bread and fresh meat regularly, although delicacies were rare.32 Nonetheless the sick rate was high in absolute figures. Wounded men often died from complications. Disease incapacitated many soldiers. Two-thirds of the hospital cases were for venereal disease.33 In Veracruz in October 1864 there were five hundred hospital cases.34 In Acapulco, where the French could never range very far from the city limits, ships had to bring all supplies, and the garrison often lacked sufficient food.35 The garrison fortunately had as medical officer Doctor Murray, whose diligence and ability gradually won out over the endemic fevers. Unhappily the Mexican doctors in Acapulco could not help much.36 French doctors also went to aid Mejia's troops at Cadereyta after a battle with the Juarists.87 In the tierra caliente ravages of climate and disease became so bad that when a battalion of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, the Zephirs, was transferred to San Luis Potosí, out of 31 "Mexico", in The Saturday Review, XXII, No. 570, September 29, 1866, pp. 372-374. 32 Bazaine, "Consideraciones", (1865?), in BA, XI, f. 2093-2094. 33 Ibid. 34 Bazaine to the Mexican Minister of State, No. 466, October 31, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1966. 3 5 Bazaine to the Mexican Ministre de la Guerre, No. 657, Mexico, December 24, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3088. 3 6 Bazaine to Mazères, No. 78, Mexico, April 5, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3750. 37 Mejía to Bazaine, Matamoros, September 4, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2628; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X X , Doc. lxxxi, 248-250.

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1,000 men only seventy-six were battleworthy — all the others were ill; the officers had to evacuate some in wagons or leave them in the hospital. The battalion of Zouaves that escorted them left 118 men in the hospital.38 In Tancasneque when the Bataillon d'Afrique had orders to evacuate, they had so many hospital cases that they could not move and had to wait for water transportation from Tampico.39 An epidemic in Veracruz in 1862 had carried off 2,000 persons.40 The army never mastered venereal disease. By May, 1864, the venereal rate had risen to an alarming figure, and in Mexico City authorities attempted to control it by regulating prostitution; but it was not successful,41 even with the strictest examinations. Syphilis was as usual the most difficult problem. By August, 1864, there were three hundred cases among the French soldiers in Mexico City alone. The principal solution tried was closer and ever closer watch on and medical examination of prostitutes, but to no avail.42 The same problem existed in Oaxaca, and Colonel D'Ornant described it thus: There is more danger inside Oaxaca than outside on account of the demoralization of the troops. Old statistics show that before the capture of the city there were eleven women to each man, a figure that has doubled since the arrival of the French in Mexico. In view of the hostile factions among the people and in the whole area, there is a very serious danger against which too rigorous measures cannot be taken. I have spoken to the prefect at length about it. They are going to watch the houses frequented by our soldiers and those where they spend the night without permission. The sale of brandy will be reduced as much as possible by reviving a police ordinance that has fallen into disuse and which requires the closing of cabarets at six in the evening. 43

One very significant indication of the discipline of an army measures the treatment of and attitude toward the civilian population. The ideally-disciplined soldier would probably remain rather aloof from the civilians, would treat them with formality when dealing with them, and would remain rigorously alert to avoid wounding Tucé, Cinq ans, 112. Bazaine to Cloué, No. 186, Mexico, September 16, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2668. 40 Ëlisée Reclus, The Earth and its Inhabitants: North America, II, 132. 41 Bazaine to the Sous-Secrétaire d'État de Justice, No. 355, Mexico, May 28, 1864, in BA, VIII, f. 1572; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. xxiii, 85-86. See also Reglamento de la prostitución, 1-15. 42 Bazaine to the Sous-Secrétaire d'État de Gobernación, No. 409, Mexico, August 9, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1768; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XX, Doc. box, 221-222. 43 D'Ornant to Mangin, No. 97, Oaxaca, March 14, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2215-2216. 38

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sensibilities by violating the customs of the people or by breaching his own discipline. Such models rarely appear, even in the commissioned corps, and the French soldiers in Mexico felt subject to some of the pressures of older armies. The billeting of soldiers with private families made aloofness further impossible. At the same time a definite feeling of superiority on the part of the French even reached the high command. They tended to look down commiseratingly on any people who had not had the advantages of the French Revolution, to offer freely the example of French culture and governmental organization, to regard with mistrust anyone who refused to accept French cultural superiority outright, and to brand any failure to grasp or slowness to assimilate French culture as either a sign of hopeless incapacity or of perverse obstructionism. In either case they felt free to resort to force and take advantage of the lower culture. Thus the French imposed upon the Mexicans in many ways, as any foreign army does in occupying the soil of another. French soldiers looked with contempt upon the irregular army of Márquez in 1862, and the ill will that resulted led to his assignment to Bazaine's command. The title of the Three Caciques, bestowed on the Regency, showed a humorous levity, and the ease with which the high French officials appointed and deposed Mexican officials, though necessary in such circumstances, showed little regard for the personal pride of the officials. To the French their own soldiers were sacrosanct; the Mexicans could rarely touch them. In February, 1864, Mexican police of the Guardia Municipal in the capital tried to arrest some drunk French soldiers who had caused a disturbance. In their resistance to arrest by Mexicans the French soldiers opened and drew fire, and one of them was killed. Thereafter Bazaine ordered that the patrols of the Guardia Municipal should not carry loaded guns. Not only such a policy made it more difficult to apprehend Mexican criminals, but a short time thereafter a similar incident occurred, in which a guardia tried to arrest a zouave, but, having no means of firing at him, he then gave him a bayonet thrust that gravely wounded the zouave. Later on a guardia got in a fight with a zouave, but he fled on the approach of a French patrol, leaving his gun behind. Then Bazaine supported the inviolability of the French by ordering that no Mexican troops could take part in any question of the discipline or order of the French military, that no Mexican soldier or police could arrest a French soldier; and he warned the French not

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to become involved in quarrels with Mexican soldiers. Rather, if Mexican soldiers discovered a French soldier in some breach of good order, they should warn the nearest French patrol or post, and the latter would do the rest.44 This practice became the policy. In Mexico City a French courtmartial tried the case of any Mexican who insulted or provoked trouble with a French soldier. In San Luis Potosí a Mexican officer wounded two French hospital attendants. Authorities brought him before French court, and Bazaine, hearing of a similar case in Querétaro, recommended that the same procedure apply there.45 Two French soldiers later on started a disturbance with officials in San Luis Potosí, which resulted in imprisonment of the justice of the peace, the police commissioner, and several citizens who came to the aid of the former.46 About the same time in Sombrerete an uprising of "vagabonds" started against the French garrison, and the Mexican officials gave the French no sign of help.47 While some blame probably existed on both sides, the French did not hesitate to use force to express their impatience and contempt for the Mexicans. They mistreated the arrieros on whom they had to depend, by beatings: The oftentimes difficult task that these drivers have to accomplish should not expose them to the corporal punishment that is sometimes inflicted on them by officers who do not understand their duties.48 On the other hand the French malefactors did not always enjoy this protection, though they generally received light treatment in embroilments with Mexicans. On November 18, 1866, Minister of Justice Teodosio Lares was coming out of his house to get in his coach, when a drunken French soldier approached the carriage driver and threatened to kill him if the driver did not take him to his barracks. Lares identified himself and tried to argue with the soldier, but without success. Finally, after the soldier had struck the driver with his rifle, Lares, to avoid a scene, agreed to take the soldier to the garrison in 4 4 Bazaine to the Comandante de la Guardia Municipal de México, Mexico, February 29, (1864), in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVIII, Doc. iv, 19-22. 4 5 Bazaine to the Commandant Supérieur de Querétaro, No. 460, October 12, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2746. 4 · Ramírez to Bazaine, Mexico, October 31, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2856, The French story was that the two zouaves were set upon without provocation by a Mexican police patrol and had to defend themselves. — Bazaine to the Mexican Minister of W a r , No. 618, Mexico, November 15, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2 8 7 4 . 4 7 Bazaine to L e Ministre de la Guerre (Mexican), No. 623, Mexico, November 20, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2896. 4 8 Osmont, "Circulaire," No. 2003, Mexico, May 15, 1866, in BA, X X I , f. 4007.

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the Santísima area. Mexican police who had come up did not dare interfere.49 In spite of the severity of the misdemeanor and the fact that he was a confirmed drunkard, the soldier when tried received a a sentence of only fifteen days in prison.50 Besides disease, gambling, drunkeness, and superciliousness, the the French soldiers lowered respect for themselves by widespread desertion. Members of the Foreign Legion figured among the greatest offenders. First Bazaine hoped to stay the plague of desertions by severity. He offered a bounty for deserters turned in and then doubled it. Then he even decided to use harsher means: I shall have some of them shot. It is quite clear that a good many of them enrolled in the corps [Foreign Legion] to get a free trip, but it will cost them dearly if they are caught.51 By 1865 Porfirio Díaz had organized a troop of three hundred French deserters, and they operated as a separate and very effective group against the Intervention forces.52 In Saltillo, where chances of escaping were good, even French groups like the Bataillon d'Afrique suffered many desertions.53 Such actions showed symptoms of a growing demoralization, and repressive measures could not prevent them. Some desertions continued right up to the final departure.

FRENCH

JUSTICE

Since the French had the responsibility for a legislative policy or for seeing one developed, and also bore responsibility much of the time for executing the policy, and since the units in the field had to answer for their acts only to their military commanders, who protected them in every possible way, not to civil officials, a variety of fluctuating attitudes naturally resulted. Forey in his Manifesto had promised to establish justice, specifically that all persons would meet equal treatment before the law. That ideal was one of the tenets of French revolutionary philosophy; Lares to Bazaine, Mexico, November 19, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4 8 2 6 . A. Rouvière to the Comandante de la Plaza de Mexico, México, November 19, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4 8 2 8 . 51 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 17, Mexico, April 2 7 , 1864, in BA, VII, f. 1344-1345; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., X X , Doc. ν, 24-29. 52 Loizillon to his sister, Morelia, February 6, 1865, in Lettres, No. lxv, 2 7 4 - 3 0 0 . 5 3 Douay to Bazaine, No. 433, Saltillo, July 6, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4 2 6 0 . 49

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and although even in France it is evident that the people had not yet achieved that goal, it formed an important platform in the proselyting zeal of French expansionism. The speed of justice was as important as its course, and Bazaine railed continually against the paralyzing, obstructive procrastination of court action and the refusal of judges to hand down sentences in accordance with set legal principles. But within the jurisdiction of the French courts themselves there also existed room for the liberal treatment he advocated for Mexican courts. Until the Law of October 3, 1865, except for a brief period late in 1864, the French courts-martial had a wide jurisdiction that could include anyone who seemed to oppose the establishment of the Empire and also the ordinary felony cases in areas where Mexican courts failed to function, as well as any crime that involved French soldiers or property. As it worked out, French policy under Bazaine showed a wide inconsistency. The French in many cases alternated severity with a softhearted, appeasing, reforming role. On the capture of Miguel Garcia Aguirre as a bandit in Uruapan, although his crime called for a death penalty, Bazaine took pity on his youth and ordered a sentence of imprisonment in the Acordada jail where his parents could visit him, and then he remanded the youth to their custody.54 When General Gálvez was charged with disaffection, Bazaine would not lift a hand to aid him: The opinion of the Marshal is that justice should take its course and that only thereby can the desired result be reached.55 Bazaine appealed to the government for mercy for the husband, however, when Dolores Iglesias de Gálvez pleaded with him for clemency.56 When a French soldier at Cuautitlán found a woman with a broken leg, he hired five men to carry her to a place where they could obtain proper attention. The five men put in a claim to the French army for pay for the work, and Bazaine authorized a disbursement of twenty pesos to them. 57 In Puebla, to ease demands on 54 Bazaine's Secretary to Colonel Lafon, No. 1999, Mexico, June 15, BA, X X I , f. 4178. 55 Marginal notation on Note, C. Loysel to Bazaine, No. 157, March in BA, X X I , f. 3574. 5 6 Bazaine to Mexican Minister of War, No. 680, Mexico, April 22, BA, X X , f. 3865. 57 Bazaine's Secretary to the Sous-Préfet de Cuautitlán, No. 1801, March 26, 1866, in BA, X I X , f. 3709.

1866, in 2, 1866, 18Θ6, in Mexico,

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local supplies, Colonel Jeanningros had the French soldiers plant and maintain their own gardens. 58 When representatives of the Jecker Company asked him to intervene to help them recover some nationalized property claimed by them, Bazaine refused: I do not know how you can ask me to intervene in questions of that kind. You know that my role in Mexico is purely military and that I do not desire to overstep it.59 Bazaine had no sympathy for the cruelties engaged in by the Juarist leaders; and when Imperial forces captured ex-Governor Chávez of Aguascalientes, he wrote: . . . Captain Crainwilliers . . . took forty prisoners, among them Chávez, the ex-Governor of Aguascalientes, whom I am going to bring before a courtmartial if he does not die of his wounds, on account of his conduct of savage barbarism toward the people who have accepted the Empire.60 When Colonel Aymard took over Puebla from the Austrians in September, 1866, he found the prisons full of prisoners of war languishing in complete disorder. He recommended that with a few exceptions they be set free. Bazaine approved. 61 At the Hacienda de Chamal on September 7-9 French troops took advantage of their position to seize property at the home of Miguel Blanco and at his soap factory. Since an investigation did not identify the culprits, the French Treasury paid the damages. 62 French justice did not always work out so mildly nor unarbitrarily. Sometimes the court-martial system covered pre-arranged acts of personal severity. Colonel Dupin of the Contre-guérillas especially mis-used his authority thus. When Maximilian complained about the outright acts of arbitrary cruelty, Bazaine warned Dupin: Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 57. « Bazaine to MM. Jecker et Cie., No. 1884, April 29, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3903. Note that critics of the Second Empire both in France and in Mexico have cited commercial interests, such as those of Jecker as the motivating force in the inception of the intervention. The marshal either did not know of or did not accept such influence. «» Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, April 10, 1864, in BA, VII, f. 1276; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVIII, Doc. lxii, 219-224. « Aymard to Bazaine, No. 189, Puebla, September 22, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4584, with marginal note of Bazaine's office. Those not set free, Aymard wanted to remove to better quarters; imprisonment is not proper treatment for prisoners of war; they are not to be treated as criminals unless found guilty of specific war crimes. M Bazaine to Douay, No. 487, Mexico, November 4, 1865, in BA, f. 2822. 58

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Do not have any summary executions. You have a court-martial at your disposal; it is always available to you, and in all cases have it pronounce the sentence, and it will save your responsibility.83 The responsibility for other acts could shift, if not onto the courts, then onto Mexican officials, as in the case when Bazaine reprimanded Castagny for suppressing a newspaper, the Primavera of Aguascalientes: I must say I regret that you did not follow . . . the spirit of my circulars, which tend to leave that sort of execution to the Mexican authorities. In setting up Mexican courts-martial and suppressing ours, I had no other purpose than to exculpate our army from the odium of summary execution.64 Not only Colonel Dupin but also at times other officers dispended with courts. Captain Herve, while on his way through Tula, captured Jorge Garcia, took some testimony from witnesses, pronounced him guilty of spying, then had him shot. 6 ' The court-martial system covered sloven attempts at justice in many cases, and the liberal press knew it. When a large part of Romero's "bandit" band fell into Imperial hands and appeared before the court, it condemned eleven members to death and twenty-two to deportation. When the papers protested, the Marshal had the editors themselves arrested and tried. 66 The abruptness of the French court-martial system by 1866 had so overcome the constructive work done by their impartiality that the republicans at least equated the term justicia a la francesa with injustice and oppression.67 Collective punishments came into common use under the French. The most frequent of all types was the imposition of a fine of a certain amount which local authorities collected and turned over to the government. While the money derived from fines supposedly •3 Bazaine to Dupin, No. 650, Mexico, May 21, 1866, in BA, X X I , f. 4027. " Bazaine to Castagny, No. 680, lune 30, 1866, in BA, X X I I , f. 4 2 3 6 . 65 Bazaine to the Mexican Minister of War, No. 650, September 17, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2678. The excuse was that being on the march, Herve could not stop to hold court. The excuse is weak and evidently only an attempt to cover up a dereliction of efficiency on the captain's part. 60 Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 232. Romero's band had roved about Mexico City for over two years without being caught. It was a great relief to the French to apprehend him, but in the meantime he had come to appeal to the popular imagination. 67 Iglesias, La Intervención francesa, II.

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went for local fortifications, it sometimes found its way into the secret funds of the French headquarters. When authorities imposed fines upon Prudencia de León, owner of the Hacienda de Buena Vista, and the towns of Ramos Arispe and Capellanía, Douay kept $700 of it for local fortifications.68 At San Miguel, near Arroyozarco, when three men with muskets held up the stagecoach from Mexico at the station, the Military governor authorized a fine of $200 to punish the town for its poor policing.69 When the civil authorities in Puebla fined the populace $50 for the theft of telegraph wire, Bazaine countermanded the order, saying that under the existing state of war only the military authorities could levy fines.70 The inhabitants of Cedrai complained to the Marshal when Major Dilloge fined them, but Bazaine supported the French action unequivocally.71 When the guerrilla band of Fragoso threatened the town of Arroyozarco, Bazaine used the threat of a fine to urge the inhabitants to help destroy the band.72 Durango suffered a fine of $3,000;73 Señor Jiménez of the Hacienda of Santa Rosa, $2,000,74 the city of Álamos de Parral, $6,000, of which $1,000 were turned over to the volunteer company of Captain Didier. That action drew a sharp rebuke from Bazaine, who reiterated that they should use such sums for public works.75 Don Gregorio Niño of Hacienda de Cañelo, near Matehuala, was fined $1,000 for having paid a Juarist band $2,000 not to confiscate his herd of cattle. But when a few weeks later, Niño proved to the satisfaction of Colonel Dupin that he had received no protection from the garrison at Matehuala and therefore was in no position to refuse the demands of the Juarists, Bazaine ordered the fine returned to Bazaine to Douay, Mexico, No. 641, May 10, 1866, in BA, X X , f. 3969. Bazaine to Captain Boistard, No. 2107, Mexico, September 11, 1866, in BA, X X I I I , f. 4549. 70 Bazaine to the Commandant Supérieur de Puebla, No. 105, Mexico, October 29, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1957. 71 Bazaine to the Minister of W a r of Mexico, No. 572, September 2, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2618. 7 2 Bazaine to L e Commandant Supérieur d'Arroyozarco, No. 427, September 3, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2622. 73 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 529, Mexico, December 19, 1865, unpublished letter in BA, XVI, f. 3059. 7 4 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 555, Mexico, January 23, 1865, in BA, XVII, f. 3250. 75 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 495, November 13, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2854. A recent decision of Maximilian had required fines to go to the State Treasury for accounting, thus taking the funds out of French hands but not affecting their destination, mostly fortifications. — Loysel to Bazaine, Note 68, Mexico, October 8, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2 7 3 5 . 88

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him.76 In Pinos, when they imposed a fine, the French commander took the decorations, ornaments, and vases from the church as security for payment. Bazaine ordered the articles returned but sustained the fine itself.77 When the Intendant at Las Bocas paid a $500 fine, Bazaine ordered it returned to him.78 But when the political prefect of Tlaxcala received orders for collecting a fine on the city, he procrastinated and later reported that "so far it has been physically impossible and contrary to common justice to carry out the order".79 Considering the date of the incident, it clearly shows a case of the rising obstructionism and un-co-operativeness of Imperial officials. Colonel Dupin went so far as to threaten to levy fines of horses rather than of pesos on the towns of Tamaulipas.80 When the government halted the system of fines in 1866, the corvée substituted for it.81 Another weapon of compulsion legally available to a military commander is taking and using hostages. Forey had set an example in August, 1863, after a melée between some zouaves and some citizens. First he imposed a fine of $6,000 on the town. At the same time he published an order that a certain number of citizens would be taken to Mexico City and for every French soldier "assassinated", one of the hostages would be shot.82 Also besides two other cases already mentioned, the Belgians at Tacámbaro took Señora Régules, wife of the Juarist leader, and her children as hostages, and the populace sullenly resented what they considered an inhumane act.83 Reprisal furnishes another legal if immoral compulsion of which the military commander may avail himself in need. Though falling into disuse in later times, it still had some currency in 1865, partic7 8 Bazaine to the Commandant Supérieur de Matehuala, No. 2128, Mexico, September 30, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4638. 77 Bazaine to L'Hériller, No. 215, Mexico, August 9, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1766; printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XX, Doc. lxx, 223-224. 7 8 Bazaine to Douay, No. 739, October 16, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4706. 78 Ibid. 8 0 Dupin to Bazaine, No. 164, Tampico, May 27, 1865, in BA, XXI, f. 4068. 81 Bazaine, Circulaire, No. 2117, September 21, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4583. The corvee was the sovereign right to demand labor on public works from nearby citizens, who presumably would benefit most from the improvement. 8 2 Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, 333. " . . . it was not until the Geneva convention of 1949 on the protection of civilians that the taking of hostages was prohibited by international convention." — Harris, Tyranny on Trial, p. 508. 8 3 Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 124-125.

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ularly when applied to peoples of lower cultures. Lefêvre reports but without documentation, that in 1863 Bazaine ordered the town of Ajusco burned in reprisal for a guerrilla attack originating there. 84 More certainly it came to the attention of Bazaine in 1864 that the town of Tlacolulán served as a refuge for guerrillas. He therefore ordered Mexican General Liceaga to burn it. Liceaga demurred but to no avail: I have your letter in which . . . you describe the difficulties involved in the attack on the town of Tlacolulán. I do not think the enterprise is as serious as you foresee it, and in giving you orders to go and burn the village, I supposed that you had sufficient means. I insist upon having no center of guerrilla refuge on the road from Jalapa to Perote.85 When Liceaga still procrastinated, Bazaine became more emphatic: I repeat that it is necessary to destroy Tlacolulán. With my own eyes I have seen the country that surrounds the village, and I am convinced that it is easy to capture. A severe example is necessary in this country. If, despite my orders, you do not want to do it, I shall send a handful of soldiers from here to do it.86 General Castagny, despairing of ever converting the town of Concordia (4,000 inhabitants) to the Empire, and exasperated at its continued support of the Juarists, ordered it burned to the ground.87 In preparation for his occupation of Guaymas, General Castagny from off-shore position bombarded the city, although the Juarist forces under Pesqueira had withdrawn to avoid damage to the city. The Juarists felt deep resentment over the death of some women and children, but we have no reason to think that Castagny knew that Pesqueira had declared it an open city. In probably all armies of Western civilization pillage constitutes a crime, and strict rules guard against it. In at least one case the French allowed it in Mexico. When they captured the town of Galeana, the inhabitants fled rather than accept the consequences of 8 4 Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, 333-334. He gives the Continental of New York, No. 26, December 26, 1863, as a source, but in such a period of emotional prejudices and inaccuracies a newspaper article may be a rumor or propaganda. 85 Bazaine to Liceaga, Mexico, February 29, 1864, in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVIII, Doc. iii, 16-19. 86 Idem to idem, Mexico, March 7, 1864, in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVIII, Doc. xi, 43-46. 87 Tucé, Cinq ans, 136. Also Juárez to Santacilia, Chihuahua, April 13, 1865, in Archivos privados de Juárez y Santacilia, I, p. 55.

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the new order. As punishment for its harboring of guerrillas, the commander allowed the troops to pillage the town.88 No commentary on the attitude of the lower officers toward their vaunted justice could outdo the description of one of the French courts-martial as described by Mismer.89 Two Mexicans stood accused of having disguised themselves as French soldiers and entered a home for the robbery of a hatchet and a silk neckcloth. After the arraignment, translated by an interpreter, the two accused protested their innocence. The president of the court then asked for the witnesses. A man and a woman entered and on questioning described the alleged crime. The president asked one question, "Since you were forced to lie on your stomach during the robbery, how could you be sure these were the men?" The witnesses claimed that they had looked up while the house was being searched and that the culprits were holding candles in their hands. Then, after a brief speech by the prosecutor, a captain in the French army, there came a shorter one by the defending representative, a French sergeant, in which the latter pointed out the inconsistency and incompatibility of the whole charge and evidence. Then the president rose and pronounced in the name of the Emperor the sentence of death within twenty-four hours, without appeal. The interpreter translated, and the two accused bowed their heads humbly and said, "Está bien, señor." Later on in the day the president of the court, when accosted by Mismer and questioned about the manner of the trial, answered: "Bah! Every Mexican is a guerrillero; either he has been or he will be. You don't take any risk of being wrong when you shoot the ones you catch." Then the president laughed when Mismer tried to explain that the law of retribution — an eye for an eye, etc. — governs history, and that by abusing the laws of war, one risks loosing on his own country the avenging furies.

88 Young Ferdinand Millet found it very amusing to see Frenchmen chasing chickens and pigs down the streets. — Millet to his mother, Agua Nueva, May 21, 1866, in Tucé, Cinq ans, 118-119. The miserable town had almost nothing else to be captured except its spirit of independence and of resentment. 89 Mismer, Souvenirs de la Martinique et du Mexique, 172-175.

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SCHEMES

The official French attitude toward Mexico encouraged immigration. From the earliest stages the arguments of ex-Senator Gwyn had appealed to the Duc de Morny and to Napoleon III, and both had hoped to see their scheme for the colonization of Sonora realized. After the arrival of Maximilian the Imperial Cabinet and Ministry also interested themselves in immigration, leaving a minor rôle to the French. One aspect, however, appealed to the Marshal, and he took an active interest in it — namely, the idea of coloring Mexican society and politics by settling there discharged French soldiers. The first record of the idea of settling ex-soldiers came from Durango. A rich hacendado, Sr. Juan Flores, soon after the arrival of General L'Hériller with his occupying force, made a donation of fifty square leagues of his property to the French army. The land was at Yagualito in the district of Mineral de Mapimí.90 He evidently planned to encourage French soldiers to settle there, displace the "backward" population, and assure the scientific development of the area. The subject rested until the fall of 1865, when other colonial schemes were in the air. Marshal Bazaine then asked for a report on the status of the land and on any ex-soldiers established there, but the scheme had apparently fallen through.91 The schemes of the Confederates to set up colonies in Mexico may have brought the matter to his attention. Bazaine at that time was exploring the possibilities of attracting soldiers from the Confederate States by making offers of land to them on discharge. Frank Moore, for example, had come from New Orleans to try to arrange for the enlistment of a large number of Irish, French, and Spanish emigrants in the Cazadores. He claimed the ability to get as many as 5,000. He planned to sign them up as immigrants, and on arrival in Mexico they would enlist.92 The negotiations stalled over the special considerations he wanted for the new immigrants, and Frank Moore returned to New Orleans without a contract. 90 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 44, September 10, 1864, in BA, X , f. 1848-1849; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., X X I I , Doc. xvi, 79-85. 91 Bazaine to Castagny, No. 514, October 8, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2739. 92 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, August 7 [1865?], in BA, XIII, f. 2557. Ex-Senator W . M. Gwin (Gwyn) had proposed to set up a colony in Sonora for residents in California of Confederate feelings. — John Slidell to J. P. Benjamin, Paris, June 2, 1864, in U.S. Navy, Official Records, Ser. II, Vol. Ill, pp. 1139-1141.

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Another scheme for colonization, offered and approved by the Marshal, proposed a highly socialistic program: Engagement for a five-year period, common work and pay, and a division of profits at the end of the year. The colony itself would advance clothing, food, and essential tools. After an optimistic start the colony failed. 93 The settlement of French soldiers advanced further in November when Maximilian decreed that land be given to discharged soldiers who evidenced a desire to settle in Mexico. 94 Specifically the Emperor set aside certain land accrued to the government by the Reform laws of nationalization in the area of Tacubaya. 95 Unfortunately the decree contained several annoying restrictions: No individual could obtain more than 8,000 square meters. Bazaine complained that it required 50,000 to 60,000 square meters to support a family. Moreover, the law provided that where the maguey plant was cultivated, the plants must sell at the market price of one peso each, while in Tacubaya generally the price they went for was three reales. Although some French soldiers who knew something about horticulture became interested in the offer, the obstacles seemed too great for them to make a success of the program.96 Another project for settling the soldiers involved the Hacienda de Guadalupe near Orizaba. There the colony of Tourville established a settlement almost entirely with discharged soldiers. The steps by which it began originally are not clear, but in November, 1866, the owners of the Hacienda de Guadalupe brought a court suit against the colony for illegal occupation of their land. The owners won the suit, and the court issued an eviction order against the French colony. Bazaine did not protest the court action, but he insisted that the Frenchmen should be indemnified for the crops they would have to leave.97 On the other hand he carefully prevented imposition upon the Carlota Colony of ex-Confederates or their subjection to mistreatment by subsequent governments.98 93 Bazaine to the Commandant Supérieur de Córdoba, No. 169, August 18, 1865, in BA, XIII, f. 2580. 9 4 Bazaine to the Ministro de Fomento, No. 6 1 7 , November 14, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2865. 9 5 L . Robles to Bazaine, Mexico, January 12, 1866, in BA, XVI, f. 3173. 9· Bazaine to the Ministro de Fomento, No. 672, March 6, 1866, in BA, X I X , f. 3611. 97 Bazaine to L e Ministre de France à Mexico, No. 2 1 7 2 , November 10, 1866, in BA, X X I V , f. 4782. 98 Bazaine to Dupin, No. 752, November 13, 1866, in BA, X X I V , f. 4 7 9 7 ; Bazaine to Isham Harris, No. 2178, November 13, 1866, in BA, X X I V , f. 4798. See also Anderson, An American in Maximilians Mexico for the Cariota Colony.

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SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES

In the middle of 1865 a commission of French botanists arrived from France to study the tropical flora." At Veracruz they separated to explore different parts of Mexico. At that particular time the rage for orchids had become the fashion in Paris, and one of the botanists capitalized on it by sending several loads of plants and buds to France, reaping a rich reward thereby. At about the same time a commission of geologists, mineralogists, and geographers arrived with letters of recommendation from the Minister of Public Instruction.100 All received full recognition and co-operation from the French headquarters, and the local Scientific Commission. As early as February, 1864, the Minister of War in Paris had suggested that Mexico set up a scientific comission to increase general knowledge of scientific subjects in the capital. Bazaine than asked Colonel Doutrelaine, the staff engineer, to undertake the organization of such a group, and he obtained the moral support, but not the financial aid, of Under-Secretary of State for Public Instruction, Señor Salazar. Another engineer, Mr. Marby, was retained as treasurer.101 The first meeting took place in the Grand Hall of the Mining Building, at which time Bazaine addressed the group as follows: . . . I had the idea of collecting a scientific, artistic, and literary commission, including a certain number of Mexican officers, some French officers, and some foreigners, whose work, studies, and private inclinations make them apt to furnish papers and interesting reports that would be of use to Mexico.102

Continuing, he called on scientists of all kinds to lend their efforts to make progress in the development of Mexican science. Specifically and individually he called on naturalists, geologists, mineralogists, astronomers, geographers, doctors of medicine, agronomists, technicians, financiers, statisticians, historians, archaeologists, and specified some of the possibilities awaiting them.103 Then there followed other Blanchot, L'Intervention, II, 347. Ibid., II, 348. 101 Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 17, March 24, 1864, in BA, VI, f. 1003. 102 Bazaine to Corta, No. 360, April 18, 1864, in BA, VII, f. 1256. 103 Bazaine to Doutrelaine, No. 372, April 22, 1864, in BA, VII, f. 1282. 89

100

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speeches by Colonel Doutrelaine104 and Ministro de Fomento José Salazar Ilarregui.105 The commission, bolstered soon by the added membership of M. de Quatrefages and Milne Edwards of the Museum,106 began to hold sessions and to encourage scientific works of all kinds. A few days after the first meeting the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs placed at the disposal of the Commission a section of the old Treasury Building next to the section occupied by the Mexican Society of Geography and Statistics.107

ENGINEERING

The French had a high development of both practical and cultural aspects of modern science, and the Empire made rapid strides under their tutelage and leadership. For many years before the Intervention large numbers of French engineers had worked in Mexico. The scientific schools in France had turned out civil engineers equal to those of any other nation and better than most. They left their mark on every colonial possession — wherever the army marched. The French Empire had special interests in mining, and specialists came to study the mineral deposits. Before the French occupation of Mexico City the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works had commissioned a mining engineer, Monsieur Laur, to explore the provinces of Sinaloa and Sonora to took for mineral wealth.108 But after some work in the area, Apache raids, which were terrorizing northern Sonora, so hampered his work that he had to cease operations.109 When the French entered Sonora late in 1864, they established sufficient safeguards to enable Laur to go on with his work until 1866, at which time the French troops withdrew to Guaymas. The indios bravos followed hard on the heels of the retreating army, and soon Laur again had to cease his explorations. The request of the French Minister of War that the Mexicans furnish him escorts to protect 104 Discurso del Exmo General Bazaine in "Discursos pronunciados en la instalación de la Comisión científica, artística y literaria de México", Boletín de las leyes, II, Apéndice, 4 4 4 - 4 4 9 . 10ä Ibid., 449-453. 106 Ibid., 453-457. 107 El pájaro verde, II, No. 392, October 19, 1864, p. 3. 108 Randon to Bazaine, Paris, March 15, 1866, in BA, X I X , f. 3638. 109 Bazaine to Napoleon III, October 2 6 , 1863, in BA, I, f. 183.

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Laur came to naught, and he soon had to abandon the work.110 At the same time gold hunters, represented by a Mr. Burnoff and supported by the Ministry of Public Works, made a systematic study of Michoacán.111 Military engineers worked continually in Mexico. A company of sappers accompanied every division, and often they had hard, dirty, and unrewarded labors at the head of the columns in testing bridges, measuring fords, and opening roads and bridges. The City of Mexico had suffered some severe floods in the past, and the danger arose again in 1864. Colonel Doutrelaine, the French staff engineer, had the water level and the drainage checked and reported certain dangers existing in the rising level in Lake Texcoco from water flowing from the lakes at a higher altitude.112 French engineers built up the fortifications of Mexico City from a negligible pusillanimity to a modern fortress, guarded by thirteen kilometers of trenches and backed with cannon at strategic points, supplied with 300 rounds of ammunition per gun.113 During the same period 20,000 francs went for building up the fortifications at Casamata.114 Immediately upon their arrival in Mexico the French laid military telegraph lines from Veracruz, with stations at Mexico, Ayotel, Río Frío, San Martín, Tehuacán, Aculcingo, Orizaba, Córdoba, Paso del Macho, La Soledad, and Veracruz.115 As the troops marched into the interior, they remained linked by the magic copper wire. By 1865 civilian firms had made contracts to join Durango and San Luis Potosí by wire.116 When the decampment of Carlos C. Clute voided his contract, a new one went to a Señor Kieffer, but he proved so incompetent in carrying out the project that at last Bazaine turned the work over to a young engineer captain who had had experience with telegraphs at Châlons.117 A company of the Foreign Legion did Randon to Bazaine, Paris, March 15, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3645. Loysel to Bazaine, Note 158, March 3, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3586. 1 1 2 Doutrelaine to Bazaine, No. 463, Mexico, October 18, 1864, in BA, X, f. 1932; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXII, Doc. xxxv, 174-179. 113 Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 425. 114 Bazaine to Budin, No. 131, June 19, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1625. 1 1 5 Maximilian to Bazaine, Telegram, Orizaba, November 19, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4829. 116 Robles Pezuela to Bazaine, Mexico, November 2, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2811. The contract was let to Carlos C. Clute, who turned out to have so little capital that he had to go to the United States to try to get credit to buy the wire. 1 1 7 Bazaine to le Ministre de Fomento, No. 607, November 2, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2816 v. 110

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the work.118 Some of the officers of the Foreign Legion paid for the wire, and Captain Charrier supervised the work.119 The officers later recouped their outlay from the income from fines levied on the various cities, and from the contractual pay forfeited by Kieffer. The wharf at Veracruz wore out under the heavy traffic of the intervention period and seemed too dangerous to support the evacuation.120 The military engineers repaired it. Minister President Lacunza proposed that the French engineers do the work at no expense to the Mexican Treasury except the cost of the materials.121 The siege of Oaxaca required that the French engineers build or at least supervise the building of over four hundred kilometers of road, over paths that had never before allowed wheeled traffic. 122 The $2,000 fine levied on the town of San Felipe went to the improvement of the road from Veracruz to Mexico, which the withdrawing army had to traverse.123 Maximilian wanted to set up and maintain a road and highway system on the American plan, but for that project he required more and more engineers. The latter had become scarce in France, too, and after the arrival of the organic engineering units with the troops, no more came to Mexico, and the Empire had to get along with the ones it had.124 Mapping was traditionally an engineering function, and the French engineers had a new field in Mexico. Although the excellent geographer Vivien de Saint-Martin had furnished some data in the first volume of the Archives de la Commission du Mexique, the Intervention began with very poor maps of the country. Only the atlas of García Cubas and his large map were available, another map by M. de Saussure, and a very sketchy map of the Valley of Mexico made by the Americans in 1848. Immediately the French troops set themselves to the task of improving the cartography. Each separate column that set out included an engineer officer, who made sketches of the terrain features along the sides of the road; later on the sketches were fitted together to furnish the outlines of 28,000 kilo«8 Bazaine to Douay, No. 761, December 2, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4913. "» Ibid. 120 Bazaine to le Ministre de Fomento, No. 6 7 5 , March 21, 1866, in BA, X I X , f. 3679. 121 Lacunza to Bazaine, Mexico, July 10, 1866, in BA, X X I I , f. 4 2 8 4 . 122 Bazaine to le Ministre de Guerre, No. 57, Huajuapan, January 9, 1865, in BA, XI, f. 2103. 123 Bazaine to Jeanningros, No. 721, September 24, 1866, in BA, X X I V , f. 4611. 124 Randon to Bazaine, Evian, September 12, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2 6 5 1 .

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meters of roadway. Not having surveying instruments, the engineers labored under a handicap in elevations, but they soon developed accurate eyes for estimates and rendered rather careful maps. Thev then fitted the sketches into established maps and reduced them to a scale of 1/80,000, and then to another of 1/500,000, which became the standard map used by most of the French expeditionary columns. The engineers in the capital began work on a map of the scale 1/1,000,000 in eight sheets, but they did not finish it. Finally the standard map adopted near the end of the Intervention was one on the scale of 1/3,000,000, made with the help of an able Mexican engineer, Francisco Diaz Covarrubias.125

L I T E R A T U R E AND T H E ARTS

Culture was both an item of export and of home consumption for the French. Out of the twenty-seven ships that sailed from Le Hâvre for Mexico with commercial cargoes, ten of them specified books as part of the manifest.126 French presses enjoyed a boom, and French literature maintained a peak popularity throughout the world, even outstripping the English. The emphasis on the culture represented by France extended to music, and in 1864 seventy-seven pianos left Le Hâvre for Mexico alone, besides numerous musical instruments of smaller size.127 While reported imports came in ships leaving Le Hâvre, the military themselves received large amounts of supplies in ships that left from Brest and on which they maintained no records. The French lost no opportunity to immortalize their military feats. No sooner had the French established themselves in Mexico than an official military artist, M. Beaucé, left France for Mexico. He came on a commission from the Minister of State to record the campaign historically in paintings. He arrived in time to accompany Bazaine on the first part of the Campaign of the Interior. M. Beaucé, who already had accompanied the army in Syria and Italy, went along like an old trooper and enjoyed considerable popularity among the Niox, Notice sur la Carte du Mexique, 5. J. M. de Mora y Ozta, "Estado general de los buques que han sido espedidos en este Consulado para los puertos del Imperio en el año de 1864 y cargamento que han conducido", in El Diario del Imperio, I, No. 25, January 31, 1865, p.l. Several other ships listed small manufactured articles and ended the manifest with an etc. that probably included shipments of books. 127 Ibid. 125

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French officers. When Captain Willette, Bazaine's aide-de-camp, returned to France on sick leave, he took along a sample of Beaucé's work: I take advantage of the departure of this officer to send you a canvas painted by Mr. Beaucé, and representing his Majesty the Emperor amid a group of His soldiers in one of our bivouacs in Mexico. The subject, hypothetical though it may be, will prove to His Majesty that His army in Mexico thinks of Him... . 1 2 8

Beaucé was only one professional artist amid a host of amateurs. A necessary part of a gentleman's education included lessons in drawing and sketching, and military training involved still more such work for its practical application. Therefore a surprising number of French officers whiled away some of their leisure hours making drawings of scenes that appealed to them, and, fortunately, a large number of these drawings found their way to the pages of the popular news magazines, such as L'Illustration, to be preserved for posterity. Lieutenant Colonel Copmartin, for example, contributed several good sketches. The documentation provided thereby is excellent but highly subjective; the scenes represented show a biased, pro-French aspect. Soldiers trading with Mexicans, on the march, in battle line, at rest — generals on horseback, cheering crowds, gala costumes, and rows of bayonets on parade — such were the favorite themes.

CULTURAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The reputation of French culture had long preceded the expeditionary force to Mexico. Nearly all well-educated individuals knew the French language, and all who aspired to culture eagerly sought instruction in it. The French chaplain Pierard established a school in San Luis Potosí and found interest in French high there: Besides my lessons for the Bishop of Monterrey and my regular duties at the convent and at the city seminary, I had established a public course in French at my house. It was attended by a large number of students, some of whom in a short time have made rapid progress.129

Nearly all the special, private schools in Mexico City taught French, such as the Colegio Hispano-Mexicano de Jesús and El Colegio Literario de Idiomas y Bellas Artes. Self-taught books and grammars 128 129

Bazaine to Vaillant, No. 30, Mexico, June 26, 1864, in BA, IX, f. 1656. Pierard, Souvenirs du Mexique, 143.

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featuring such popular methods as the Ollendorf method and the Chantreau methods received wide advertisement.130 The Instituto Primario de Idiomas gave French instruction to the youngest children;131 and while such individuals as Henry Ward Poole offered private lessons in English, Señorita Chivilini and others gave private lessons in French as well as in Italian.132 The French did not easily assimilate to other cultures; and wherever the tricolor went, French culture followed. The drama was a favorite cultural as well as recreational medium. The French brought dramatic companies from Martinique almost as soon as they occupied the capital.133 As early as April, 1864, French dramatic troupes came to Mexico for the theatre in the capital.134 The secret nature of Freemasonry does not allow full evaluation of its influence in the Intervention period. Certainly stress given to this philosophical and even political movement in the history of the 19th century in Mexico underestimates its importance rather than overstresses it. We also know that in 19th-century France the movement had more influence than published histories indicate. The nature of the movement, however, precludes the use of original documentation, and most of the information available comes as secondary source material. Not once in his voluminous correspondence does Marshal Bazaine mention Freemasonry; yet his attitude toward the Church authorities and his general feeling of respect but not reverence for the Church personalities seem to indicate, though not to prove, the kind of anticlerical bias that we often associate with the movement. On the other hand the highly intellectual nature of French culture in general and the wide spread of positivism in France as a philosophy particularly for men may well explain these attitudes by themselves. Since extreme conservatives and Church interests invited the French Intervention, they can hardly have expected to have large numbers of Freemasons in the military hierarchy; but on the other hand since French capital was heavily invested in nationalized 130 El pájaro verde, I, No. 1, July 17, 1863, p. 4; ibid., I, No. 4, July 21, 1863, p. 4; ibid., I, No. 45, September 7, 1863, p. 4. 181 Ibid., I, No. 4, July 21, 1863, p. 4. 132 Ibid., I, No. 50, September 12, 1863, p. 3. 133 Bazaine to M. le Gouverneur de la Martinique, Mexico, October 31, 1863, in BA, II, f. 212; also Anderson, An American in Maximilians Mexico, p. 11. 134 Bazaine to the Commandant Supérieur de Veracruz, Telegram No. 10, Mexico, April 21, 1864, in BA, VII, f. 1278.

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Church property, it seems a classic example of poor judgement that the Church should call on France to restore Church property. At least one French-speaking lodge, called Émulos de Hiram, existed in the capital between 1863 and the end of the Intervention, but whether the personnel came from the French army or from the large French civilian colony is not clear.135 IMPACT O F M E X I C O ON T H E F R E N C H L A N G U A G E

Some words had come into the French language from Spain at intervals from medieval times, but the structural similarities of the two languages made it easy to transfer words from one to the other and to naturalize them. The contact of Frenchmen of education with Mexico, however, furnished a new experience indeed. Relatively few French officers had experienced extended contact with Spanishspeaking persons; many knew some Arabic expressions from Algerian experiences; the Crimean War did not last long, and they made few contacts with Russians. The Italian campaign, however, recently had brought them into contact with the Italian language for a considerable period, and lengthy contact had resulted. Thus a large number of French officers and some soldiers knew something of Italian already. Their knowledge influenced their use of Spanish in Mexico considerably. Although they made relatively few attempts to learn Spanish, their spelling and misspelling show an Italian influence. Proper nouns in particular show Italianizations: Coffre de Perote,138 Lasso,137 El Passo del Norte,138 Passo del Macho,139 Passo Ancho,140 Rio Secco,141 Barranca-secca,142 Pazcuaro for Pátzcuaro,143 Pedrazza for Pedraza,144 Vittoria for Victoria,145 Carlotta.146 Obispado (a section Félix Navarrete, La masonería, p. 112. Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 70. 137 Ibid., 316, 35. 138 J. P. Oudriot to Bazaine, Mexico, January 29, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3309. 139 Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 3 4 4 ; also (Lafont), Les bivouacs de Veracruz à Mexico, 63, 66, 83 (Hereafter referred to as Bivouacs). 140 Bivouacs, 66. 141 Ibid, 80. >« Ibid., 92. 143 Loizillon, Lettres, 303. 144 Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 74. 1 4 5 Niox, L'Expédition, 414. 148 Felipe Tinajero to Bazaine, Monterrey, November 28, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2943. In the same letter the term appears both as Le fort Carlotta and as du fort Charlotte. 135 186

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of the city of Monterrey) was not translated. 1 4 7

Other Italianizations

are San L o r e t t o for San Loreto, 1 4 8 M a t t a indios, 149 and San Martino. 1 5 0 T h e Intervention c a m e at a time when the English h e g e m o n y even touched the F r e n c h language, 1 5 1 and many new English words in the F r e n c h correspondence verify that tendency: Yankees

appears often. 1 5 2

Lunch

was used by Almonte in his plans

for the reception of Maximilian. 1 5 3 m o r e specialized meaning. 1 5 4 Jury

Filibusterisme

c a m e in with a

was used to refer to American or

English legal systems. 1 5 5 Toasts also appeared. 1 5 8 Some half-way translations of Spanish terms: Grito de l'Indépendance, 1 5 7 s'est -prononcé rurales,159

with the meaning of rebelled, 1 5 8 ruraux

also such hybrids as Les juntas

des notables

se

for

montrent

Ibid. Jean-Joseph-Gustave Cler, Souvenirs d'un officier du 2me de Zouaves, 291. 149 Bivouacs, 31, 33, 34. 150 Ibid., 38. 151 Just Amerò, "L'Anglomania dans la langue française", in L'Illustration, (25th year) XLIX, No. 1250, February 9, 1867, p. 91; also XLIX, No. 1251, February 16, 1867, p. 106. 152 E.g., "Mais si nous avons la guerre avec les américains, je quiterai l'armée regulière, je gagnerai la sierra, où je puis lever facilement 6,000 cavaliers, et les yankees trouveront en moi, je vous assure, le plus terrible des guerilleros." — A statement made by General Mejía later reported by T. Wuertemberg, in a letter to Bazaine, Matamoros, December 8, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3020. Also: "Les dissidents font habiller leur troupe à Camargo, ils achètent à Brownsville Ies chevaux reformes par les yankees." — T. Wuertemberg to Bazaine, Matamoros, December 21, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3070. Again, "Le Colonel Rubio . . . sauta sur un cheval et les pistolets aux poings, se rendit en face des yankees, auquel il intima l'ordre de laisser le chaland." — Idem to idem, Matamoros, November 4, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2820 ν. 153 Almonte to Baron de Pont, No. 1162, Mexico, February 8, 1864, in the Archiv Kaiser Maximilians von Mexiko, taken from the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv in Wien, transcript in the University of Texas Archives. 154 E.g., "Il nous devient permis d'espérer que la paix ne sera troublée que par un filibusterisme désavoué du gouvernement." — Bazaine to Mazères, No. 68, Mexico, February 12, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3457. 155 E.g., "Monsieur De los Leake . . . m'a promis de poursuivre le sieur d'Artois avec la rigueur de la loi et de demander sa comparution devant le grand jury." - Cazotte to Bazaine, No. 20, San Francisco, November 20, 1866, in BA, XXV, f. 4908. 155 E.g., "La France, L'Empereur Napoléon, l'armée et la marine française ont eu la plus large part des honneurs et des toasts." — T. Wuertemberg to Bazaine, Matamoros, December 7, 1865, in BA, XVI, f. 3012. 157 Loizillon, Lettres, 261. 158 Loysei to Bazaine, Note 126, January 29, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3335. 159 Tinajero to Bazaine, Monterrey, November 28, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2943: "Une petite garnison de cavalerie de ruraux." 147

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peu indisposés à.. .,160 Pénitencier de St. Xavier, 161 Saint-Louis de Potosí,162 Saint-Cosme,163 au premier Juzgado criminal,164 Notre Dame de la Guadalupe. 165 They spelled some Spanish or Mexican names phonetically as they sounded to the French ear: Etchegaray for Echegaray, 166 Monte de las Cruses, 167 and Djeria for Tejería. 168 Some words were simply misspelled: Calle del Pulgue,169 Ramirès,170 Cancrejos,171 bandites,172 haciendados, 173 Saltilo,174 and the confused effort at translation as "Ahier se ha apprendido un tal Villalobos".175 Whenever a people with intellectual curiosity feel the impact of a new social order, they tend to try to understand it and to express it in terms familiar to themselves. The Frenchmen who wrote letters home to relatives or friends or who later composed memoirs which have been preserved continually felt a compulsion to use new terms, and they could not avoid explaining the terms to their readers. Thus it is possible to date the entry of some of the new words into the French language by noting the terms that regularly seemed to the writer to require a definition or description. When the word became so familiar that the writer no longer needed to call attention to it, then it may be said to have become a part of the language, even though the dictionaries may not accept it until later. Because of the copious writing of the period, the entry of many words may be 1 6 0 B a z a i n e to le Ministre d e la Guerre, No. 59, H a c i e n d a Bianca, J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1865, in B A , X I , f. 2116. 161 Bivouacs, 135. 362 Ibid., 173. 163 Ibid., 243. 1 6 4 B a z a i n e to Almonte, No. 329, M a y 16, 1864, in B A , V I I I , f. 1488. 1115 B u f f o n , La tragédie mexicaine, 133, 137. 1ββ Bivouacs, 186. 1 6 7 B u f f o n , La tragédie mexicaine, 121, quoting Cariota. 168 Bivouacs, 5, 6, 11. 1 β » B u f f o n , La tragédie mexicaine, 133. 170 Bivouacs, 200. 1 7 1 B u f f o n , La tragédie mexicaine, 232. 1 7 2 Loizillon, Lettres, 265. 1 7 3 An analogical creation caused by the influence of hacienda with its diphthong. - B a z a i n e to Major d e L e u c h e y , No. 1876, April 25, 1866, in B A , X X , f. 3883. Since F r e n c h did not suffer the s a m e diphthongization under stress, the radical-changing verbs and nouns give the s a m e trouble that they give other foreigners; cf. other analogical spellings, such as hacienderos. — Bivouacs, 122; B u f f o n , La tragédie mexicaine, 192. 1 7 4 Tinajero to Bazaine, Monterrey, N o v e m b e r 28, 1865, in B A , X V , f. 2943. 1 7 5 Bazaine's Secretary to the Prefecto Superior, No. 4 1 0 , M a y 5, 1864, in B A , V I I I , f. 1432.

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spotted and dated from the Intervention. A few interesting cases are given here. Of course the French did not understand the terms correctly in all cases, but their misunderstandings are a part of the acquisition of new words, too. Attention was called to new words by explanations as appositives, in parentheses, and by footnotes.

Samples of these new words adobes: "grandes briques séchées au soleil." — Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 67. aguaceros·. "Averses ou montagnes d'eau." — ibid., 169. aguardiente·. "l'eau de vie de canne." — Bivouacs, 82. alcade (for alcalde?)·, "le principal personnage de l'endroit." — Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 52, 160. apartado (separation of gold and silver in mining operations): "Les Mexicains appellent cette opération el apartado, ce qui signifie la chambre écartée." — Pierard, Souvenirs du Mexique, 153. arrieros: "muletiers". — Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 27; cf. "Ne venez plus tard, Messieurs voulir [sic] me rendre responsable si quelques arrieros (muletiers) persistaient à prendre d'autre route que celle que je vous ai indiquée. . . . " — Capitaine Jaquin quoted in the letter Duprat, de la Torre, and Claussen to Capitaine P. Carrère, Tampico, January 28, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3303. Among the soldiers the word had become so common even by 1863 that it was no longer glossed. — Bivouacs, 9, 20, 26, 31, 40. arroyo de piedras: "ruisseau de pierres". — Bivouacs, 33. Ayuntamiento·. "Le palais de l'Ayuntemiento. . . . " — Bivouacs, 215. "Le palais de ¡'Ayuntamiento (mairie)". — Blanchot, L'Intervention, II, 26. "Hôtel de la mairie". — Bivouacs, 81. barranca·. "Bavin du lit d'un torrent désseché". — Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 28. "Ravin". — Bivouacs, 17. Thereafter this work sometimes indicated the word by italics, other times not. barreal: "Pour envoyer un convoi au général Brincourt, il fallait savoir ou il passerait puisqu'il avait declaré qu'il ne voulait pas traverser les barreales [sic]." - Castagny to Bazaine, Durango, September 4, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2626. barretas: "S'il n'y a pas de pics à roc, on peut les remplacer avec avantage par les barretas dont se servent les indiens." — Bazaine, note added to Loysel to Bazaine, Note 79, October 31, 1865, in BA, XV, f. 2807. caballeros: "Gentilshommes". — Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 124. cabo: "Caporal mexicain". — Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 223. cacaotier: 'le Cacaotier et autres arbres originaire d'Amérique". — Bivouacs, 61. calera: "four à chaux". — Bivouacs, 161. cancrejos: "écrevisses". — Buffon, 232. carbonero: "charbonnier". — Loiseau, 212. catalán: "eau de vie tellement forte qu'on ne peut la boire si ce n'est mêlée à trois fois son volume d'eau." — ibid., 35. cazadores: The term was a standard translation of chasseurs, or light infantry, but by the end of the intervention even the French Minister of War used it as a normal word, although he misspelled it as cazaderos: "Il ne vous échappera pas davantage que le passage, dan les bataillons de Cazaderos, que vous vous

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251

proposez de former, d'officiers français. . . . " — Randon to Bazaine, Paris, June 30, 1866, in BA, XXII, f. 4224. Chapultepec: "Le mont aux cigales". — Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 76. Chile: "un piment". — ibid., 33. "chile de chilli, 'piment'." — Lussan, 27. Citlaltepelt (sic): "Montagne de l'Étoile". — Loiseau, 42. chocolate: "chocolate de chocolatl... on remarquera que les trois derniers mots sont également devenus français." — Lussan, Souvenirs du Mexique, 27. cohetes: "sorte de pétards". — Mismer, 230.

CHAPTER

Χ

THE MEXICAN P E O P L E UNDER THE FRENCH ADMINISTRATION

The Mexico of the intervention period retained much of its colonial aspect. The higher and wealthier classes formed a group in themselves, and only through occasional cracks in their armor did a man from the lower classes enter. Wealth passed from generation to generation, as did abject poverty. A new aristocracy of hacendados replaced the Spanish aristocracy, and they furnished the leaders of the great political tumults of the century. The first fifty years of independence had wasted the national strength so liberally in fighting that internal improvements were scarce. A large population of foreigners only strengthened the cultural links of the hacendados with Europe and further separated the lower classes from participation in the government.1 Latifundial conditions had become almost intolerable, especially in the central and northern portions; the Juárez reforms had shaken the mold but had not upset it.

T H E CAPITAL

Mexico City was the hub of Mexican society, and the only city with a population capable of supporting intellectual pursuits on any appreciable scale. The hand of the French occupation troops laid the groundwork for a little Paris. Mexico City needed much work. It had grown to include some 300,000 inhabitants, but offered them only primitive facilities. Spanish and Moorish architecture still dominated the streets (with no sidewalk or very narrow ones); square buildings with massive doors beginning at the very edge of the street or walk and gave a dull, grey appearance to the outsider, whatever the luxury or plainness within the compass of the walls. 1 There were 2,000 Frenchmen, for example, in Mexico at the beginning of the Intervention, nearly all participating in the higher society of the cities or as hacienda owners or mining impresarios. — Du Barail, Mes Souvenirs, II, 482.

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The streets were utterly incapable of their task. There were a few streets near the very center of the city where the paseo and public gatherings were held, and the traffic problem there on busy days was severe. The young bloods of the city and the more spirited of the wealthy class tried to race their horses and carriages in the square, and carriages were continually meeting with accidents in the other streets, where excited and excitable drivers urged on their chargers with little regard for other vehicles. The French found the traffic problem intolerable and asked more than once that cavalrymen help control the crowds, but the cavalry did little good.2 In describing the situation in the capital, one English reporter wrote, In fact the back streets of Mexico are so very filthy and disgusting that there is practically only one direction in which it is possible to ride or drive for exercise or pleasure; and there the main street ends in the Alameda.. . . The Alameda is a wretched corner, something like the garden of a London square. . . . The paseo is a broad, dusty road a mile or more long, where everyone comes to see everyone else. There is a great deal of wealth in Mexico, the carriages are handsome and in great numbers, and the ladies dress with great care for their daily drive.. . . There was never a city where there was so little for the idler. There are no objects of interest, no galleries, no museums, or churches . . . Every exit except that by the Alameda is closed by the intolerable filth, and as to the road by the Alameda, directly the mournful gloom of that disordered garden is passed, the walker finds himself in the deep dust of the Paseo.3

A carelessness in sanitary matters characterized the outer edges of the city; and not only were the streets bogs in wet weather, but the debris and the sewage lightly abandoned there made the alleyways a most distasteful area for French soldiers to guard. Bazaine found that in the area of the guard posts and the entry gates "one is continually seized by the most unwholesome odor, that certainly must have an unhealthful effect on public health and may cause all sorts of epidemics".4 Horses and mules played an essential role in Mexican society. Not

2 Bazaine to the Préfet politique de Mexico, No. 190, Mexico, March 8, 1864, in BA, V, f. 804; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVIII, Doc. xiii, 47-49. 3 "Mexico", in The Saturday Review, XIX, No. 491, March 25, 1865, pp. 338-340. * Bazaine to the Préfet Politique, No. 190, March 8, 18Θ4, in BA, V, f. 804.

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only the great distances and sparse population made it necessary to use mounts to go from one place to another, but the streets and roads were so dirty and unpleasant that the richer classes hesitated to walk on them except when absolutely required to do so.5 Moreover, travel on horseback carried with it a mark of distinction — distinguishing the higher classes from the peons and the Indians. Hence the middle classes eagerly desired that mode of travel. The use of riding animals meant more stableroom in the crowded quarters and a greater sanitation problem. Horse-drawn vehicles required so much roadspace that they created traffic jams in the narrow and dusty or muddy streets and in alleys. Soon after the French arrived, some civic improvements began. City authorities let contracts to pave some of the dusty streets with cobblestones, but even then they provided no drain pipes or culverts to carry away the rainwater, and soon the cobblestones were lost in the mud underfoot.® A contract let for erection of gas street lights made slow progress.7 Nonetheless, by 1865 improvements had appeared: Mexico has been made something like a European city. It has grown richer and dares to show its riches. Its material condition is improving and in a few months it will be lighted with gas, and in less than a year a railway 100 miles long will run out of its gates. 8

The only public transportation besides the regular stage coaches was a sort of railroad between Tacubaya and the capital. It was drawn by horses and could make the trip each way in twenty minutes.9 The outer aspects of the Mexico of 1862 had advanced little since colonial days. City homes still consisted of those of Spanish architecture, with only developments in specialization, such as heavier and heavier doors with more and more brass nails and bands. 10 The Mexican cuisine was not a highly developed art. Staples were beans with pepper, tortillas, and much fruit. Richer families added a variety of meats. The only real development was in the preparation 5 "Mexico", in The Saturday Review, XX, No. 531, December 30, 1865, pp. 800-801. « El pájaro verde, I, No. 40, September 5, 1863, p. 3. 7 Bazaine to Budin, No. 11, Mexico, October 18, 1863, in BA, I, f. 144. 8 "Mexico", in The Saturday Review, XX, No. 531, December 30, 1865, pp. 800-801. • Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 73. 10 Pierard, Souvenirs du Mexique, 74.

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of cookies and small cakes. Pierard reports two hundred varieties of those dishes.11 Chocolate was drunk several times a day. Chili was a plebian dish.12 RECREATION

In spite of the dreary picture earlier given of the intellectual life, there was considerable recreational activity. The Mexicans had not developed hunting as a pastime as in Europe.13 The tertulia was a favorite means of collecting people with similar ideas and interests under one roof.14 Bull fighting15 and cock fighting16 were the most common public sports. Young men passionately pursued gambling as a pastime, and each night they won and lost high stakes in the capital. Gambling went on mostly sub rosa because the conservatives had outlawed it, and women were not supposed to participate.17 The richer Mexican women liked to ride about the center of town in fine carriages drawn by fancy mules, and from 4:00 to 9:00 in the evening they daily created traffic problems.18 They preferred fine mules over horses, and some of the best came as imports from the United States at costs of 5,000 francs or more, over four times the price of the best horses.19 The gentlemen of the towns generally rode about on richly caparisoned mounts to see and be seen. Before long the French, Austrian, and Belgian officers came to take part in the same practice.20 The theatre in Mexico enjoyed a far better development than in other Latin American countries. The dramatic tradition of Juan Ruiz 11 Ibid., p. 74. Of course the many methods of preparing corn and beans did not attract French attention since the French cared little for corn (Zea mays) in any form. 12 F o r eating chili, Loiseau remarks: "This strange dish wrings a wince from the European who eats it for the first time. It is served in a little earthen plate or in a calabash. Maize cakes [tortillas?] replace bread and also serve as spoons. The fingers serve as knife and fork." — Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 33. 13 Ibid., 79. 14 Ibid., 81. Mismer complained that they were terribly boring and dry. No refreshment were served; when he asked for a glass of water, he found he should have brought his own dipper. 15 Ibid., 82-84. 16 Pierard, Souvenirs du Mexique, 75. 17 Ibid., 75. 18 Ibid., 75. 19 Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 73. 'o Ibid., 74.

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Alarcón and the Spanish school was unbroken.

Mexico City, Puebla,

Guadalajara, and even smaller cities h a d theatres, and the programs drew good audiences. 2 1 T h e y not only furnished the vicarious pleasure of observing the plays but also an opportunity to make public appearances, and boxes w e r e usually full of grand ladies in their flashy b e a u t y and costumes. T h e opera in the capital presented mostly Italian operas, with both local and imported talent. 2 2

In 1863 the most popular operatic so-

prano was Ángela Peralta, and the leading conductor was Cenobio Paniagua. 2 8

While the T e a t r o Nacional specialized in t h e

opera,

various other theatres presented regular stage plays. Both local products and standard Spanish works appeared on the stage, b u t some were translations of standard d r a m a t i c compositions. 2 4

Loiseau (ibid., 61) had to push his way into a theatre in Puebla. Examples of the operas presented in the early days of the Intervention (from El pájaro verde, I, No. 7, July 17, 1863 ff.): At the Teatro Nacional, July to October, 1863: La traviata, Hernani, Il trovatore, Clotilde de Coscenza, Catalina de Guisa, Pietro d'Ahono, El rey de Bastos by Juan de Mota, Lucia de Lammermoor, and El rey de Bastos, supplemented by verses read by Zorrilla. 2S Ibid. 24 An idea of the repertoires may be obtained from the programs presented during the first months after the French occupation of the capital (ibid.): At the Teatro de Oriente between August and October, 1863: Treinta años o la vida de un jugador, El relator o La Berlina del Emigrado, La Cabana de Tom, El falso nuncio de Portugal, Los Misterios de París, Primera Parte and Segunda Parte, El Bufón del rey, Zarzuela, Los colejiales son soldados, o la defensa de Montereau en 1812, El último día de Venecia, ¡Malditas sean las mujeres! and La madre del sentenciado, by Madame D. Rouy. At the Teatro Principal, July to October 1863: La boda de Quevedo, also Un soldado de Napoléon, Las cartas del Conde Duque, El entremetido en las mascaras, also Treinta años o la vida de un jugador, Una noche y una aurora, La bola de nieve, La dicha en el bien ajeno, also Una boda improvisada, Dios, mi brazo y mi derecho, Jugar por tabla, La cruz del matrimonio, also Los pobres de Madrid, Por1 derecho de conquista, Muérete y verás¡ Juana y Juanita, o las dos son mis hijas, El cuarto de hora, Una dogma y un beso, also La cruz del matrimonio, also Mi secretario y yo, Un mal padre, also D. Francisco de Quevedo o el privado de un monarca, El cadi (an opera), El triunfo del Ave María, Un marido como hay muchos, Me voy de Madrid, Sullivan, El abuelito, La campana de la Agonía, El hombre de mundo by Ventura de la Vega, Los pavos reales, by José Núñez de Lara, Zarzuela La isla de San Bolondrón by Luis Pico, La tertulia de confianza by Eusebio Blasco, Un año en quince minutos, ¡Bien adventurados los que lloran! by Luis Mariano de Larra. At the Teatro Hidalgo, August to October, 1863: La cabana de Tom o la esclavitud de los negros, Los misterios de París by Eugene Sue, first part, El asombro de Jerez, Juana la Ravicortona, El molino de Guadalajara, La viuda y el sacristán, La plegaria de los naufragos, El grito de Dolores en 1810, La vivandera. At the Teatro Iturbide, October, 1863: Cuerpo y sombra, La familia improvisada, Buenas noches, D. Simón. At the Gran Teatro Imperial in October, 1866: Un ájente de 21

22

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257

STATUS O F W O M E N

The social position of women was an unhappy one. Frequently observers remarked on the preponderance of females over males in Mexico.25 They generally attributed the disproportion to the continuous civil wars, which preyed more heavily on men. The social structure, however, was rigidly repressive; Mexico had not reached the period of an industrial revolution, and the problem of unmarried women was acute. Few could go into work in factories or businesses, and even then only from the lowest classes in the social scale. The public employement of women violated the social mores of the highest levels. In the past, convent life and dedication to religion had furnished a means of making life meaningful to large numbers, but with the Reform Laws the religious life had become much more difficult, and that outlet was almost halted.26 During the Intervention the French authorities did little to restore the services previously furnished by the convents, and thus they failed to help with the problem of the women. Under the pressure of heavy numbers and failure to find other outlets, it is common for prostitution to increase. Many women of the middle and lower classes fell or wandered by devious paths into that practice, and such women abounded in every city and town. In particular, outside the capital, large concentrations of prostitutes appeared in Silao, Guanajuato, Guadalajara, and San Luis Potosí, which were at the same time important centers of the white-slave traffic.27 Another large number of the women of the lower class became policía by Bretón de los Herreros, Los conspiradores, by Carlos Frontaura, La novia colèrica, translated from the French, La mosquita muerta, by Enrique Pérez Escrich, paso, La Jacara, zarzuela, El niño. At the Teatro de Nuevo México in October, 1866, ¡Benditas sean las mujeres!, La primera piedra, by Luis Mariano de Larra, La Isla de San Bolondrón. Cf. also Reyes de la Mazza, El teatro en México, Indice alfabética de obras representadas . . . , pp. 183-196. 2 5 Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 81; D'Omant to Mangin, Oaxaca, March 14, 1865, in BA, XII, f. 2 2 1 5 - 2 2 1 6 . 2 9 Blanchot, L'Intervention, II, 3. 27 Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 82. Specific documentation on this subject is hard to come by, but the problem seems to be the same as in the days of the American occupation, 1846-1848. Caught in the economic crisis that accompanied the end of the military operations, one ex-govemment official and gentleman of culture and education lamented of his poverty, " . . . mi Pilar [his daughter] ha salido a la calle." Letter, May 6, 1848, No. 2 6 2 8 , Mariano Riva Palacio Archives (University of Texas Library). The writer is not identified here since his daughter later married a prominent Mexican military figure.

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soldadas and followed the armies. Although the French were not unaccustomed to the vivandières or the nailettes, they tended to deprecate the soldadas and called them zopilotes en jupons. But the role of these women was not entirely a despicable one. Not only they performed some medical and nursing functions, but many acquired marital status during their service with the troops; and they often relieved the soldiers of heavy loads by carrying not only their own meager belongings and perhaps a child, but also some of the soldiers' equipment, thus increasing the latter's maneuverability.28 The women of the wealthier classes who could not follow the normal course of family life furnished a fertile field for social upsets. A very honorable life of religious devotion and work became difficult in the early sixties with the troubles suffered by the convents. There remained the alternatives of "living with" their families as spinster aunts and sisters and caring for aged and infirm relatives and helping care for children. Obviously such life could not always furnish a satisfactory existence, and random escapades or seductions were apt to disgrace the women or lead them into the clutches of the whiteslave empresarios who could profit handsomely from the girl's previous gentility. As a result of this situation the French soldiers and officers, nearly all of whom came without families, met a welcome with arms as open as the mores of the society would permit.29 The usual matchmakers found rich fields to exploit, and a good many marriages resulted from contacts with the French.30 About one month after the entry of the French into Mexico City General Forey gave a formal ball to which many Mexicans were invited, and once the ice was broken, such affairs multiplied. The marriages of Bazaine, Dano, and Saligny and the efforts to ensnare Castelnau were only outstanding examples of the social mobility that followed. Despite restrictions on their movements the women of the middle and upper classes often had better educations than the men. Most of them had schooling for several years and learned to read and write. After the age of fourteen or so they entered a more retired life, spending their time mostly in studying music, smoking cigarettes, which they rolled themselves, and reading innumerable novels in Ibid., 170-171. " T h e Mexican ladies have an easy-goingness which does not however, pass certain bounds and in which the Europeans ought not to be mistaken." — Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 73. 30 Blanchot, L'Intervention, II, 29-31. 28

29

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French or translated from French.31 If the family had pretensions to culture, they often carried musical studies rather far and added such languages as English and French. Pains were taken with the dress and the coiffeur, and the use of cosmetics. Loiseau described the fair sex of the capital thus: The women with their big, black eyes shaped like almonds and connected by thick eyebrows recall the purest Spanish type. Also some melancholy German and English women are to be seen, and some lively and intelligent Frenchwomen. There are, finally, the mestizas, who are as beautiful as the creóles themselves and are possessed moreover of a thoroughbred air that gives the very best effect. 82

Both rich and poor preferred white for dresses, though more sombre colors predominated in practice.33 The French introduced crinolines, and they soon became the vogue. The mantilla was the usual headdress; the hat, the bonnet, and the cornette were practically unknown.34 Even high-class Mexican women often went bareheaded in public or wore ribbons and flowers in their hair. Tuce, speaking of the women of Guadalajara, said they went bareheaded, with their hair in two tresses over the shoulders.35 RELIGIOUS PRACTICES

The early missionaries and the centuries of secular administration by the Church had done its work well, and the great mass of Mexican people were regular devotees of the cult. While the Indians were said to have retained and adapted to the Catholic religion many of their earlier concepts, the creóles and middle-class mestizos had much less of the admixture and practised a purer Christian religion based on a better understanding of the religious mysteries and Christian philosophy. The universal practice of the Catholic religion was broken only by scattered enclaves of Protestants. These in devious ways had immigrated to Mexico and had made small numerical gains. Throughout the nation traditional Catholicism also faced that brand of liberalized Christian attitudes and philosophy represented by fairly large numbers of Freemasons. While the overall picture almost coincided with the practice in all 31 32 33 34 35

Ibid., 92, Ibid., 73. Pierard, Souvenirs du Mexique, 74. Ibid., 73. Tucé to Madame Payen, Guadalajara, June 18, 1864, in Cinq ans, 98.

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Latin American countries, some special developments merit attention because of their uniqueness. The veneration paid to the high Church officials may not have been greater than in many other countries, but the French Revolution had greatly modified French ties with the Church, and Frenchmen believed the Mexican attitude worthy of note. For example, it impressed Tuce to find that on occasion when a priest was invited to an elaborate entertainment, he came with a procession of torches and musical instruments escorting his carriage, and on his departure all guests knelt in respect.38 It does not appear whether such attentions were localized in Guadalajara, nor whether such acts were a regular practice, although he leads the reader to think so and specifies that such things "sembleraient bizarres en France". When the French did not share in such demonstrations, the Mexicans took them for Jews!37 One religious practice was highly displeasing to the Europeans: Every Holy Thursday the young Mexican girls in Mexico City used to go to the church and there before the altar inflict upon themselves in expiation of their "sins" a punishment in the form of flagellation. That they did at midnight and in complete obscurity and with the dérobement necessary for direct application of the switches. Some unimpressed, Rabelaisian French soldiers in protest at the practice managed to take some covered lanterns by stealth into the church and at a signal during the height of the flagellation, they uncovered the lanterns, throwing light on the floors and so startled and shamed the girls that they fled crying abomination. But, adds Loiseau, "the adventure was such a scandal, it seems, that since then there has never been a question of flagellation in Mexico City".38 French irreverence and liberalized attitude toward the conservative members of the Church appear best in a letter from the French commander at San Luis de la Paz. That officer, brashly voicing certain criticism that the French had been harboring against the clergy, whether justified or not, sent Marshal Bazaine a report in which he described the great poverty of the city and then charged that the clergy was intentionally keeping the people in ignorance as a means of assuring hegemony over them. Bazaine, who had maintained a certain graciousness toward the Church in general, though he criticized some individuals, answered as follows: 38 37 38

Idem to idem, Guadalajara, June 18, 1864, in Cinq ans, 99. Ibid. Loiseau, Le Mexique et la Légion Belge, 210-211.

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Even while recognizing the justice of some of your observations, I urge upon you a great moderation on a subject as delicate as religious beliefs and practices. You should avoid any sort of offense and rest assured that time is a better remedy than remonstrances and disdain. 39

THE IMPERIAL ARMY

Some description is given in Chapter III of the early efforts to organize the Mexican troops into an army and to fit them into the French patterns. The effort failed, and early in 1865 Maximilian discharged much of the army, keeping only a few of the best-disciplined troops, such as the division of Mejia. Then, as it became obvious that the Austrians and Belgians would not suffice to maintain peace after the departure of the French allies, the Emperor began to cling closer and closer to the French troops until mid-1866, and at the same time began to try again to organize Mexican units as regular troops. Those troops he placed under the general direction of General Thun. Their organization followed somewhat the Austrian and French patterns; thus they had special units of the Cazadores or light, elite infantry, with French officers and some French soldiers. The plan was to train them into special troops for quick movement and mobile firepower. Supposedly the French officers were to stay for several years after the departure of the regular French units and were to become a part of the Mexican military establishment. However, late in 1866, when Napoleon III decided upon a total withdrawal, the French headquarters reviewed the contracts and gave the officers of the Cazadores the choice of staying or of returning to France along with the rest. Most of them chose to return to France. Therefore they turned their offices over to new, Mexican officers and left them in inexperienced hands. One full regiment of cavalry was named in honor of the Empress and also went by the name of the Lancers, but the quality of the group may be judged by its commander, Colonel Miguel López, who was with Maximilian at Querétaro and allegedly betrayed him to the Juarists. The Guardias rurales, a form of militia, developed as a creation of Bazaine or at least of his office. From his first weeks in command he began to plan for local troops whom French cadres would arm and 39 Bazaine to the Commandant Supérieur at San Luis de la Paz, No. 443, September 17, 1865, in BA, XIV, f. 2676.

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train in scattered centers of population. They were not a part of the national army and could not be ordered far from their homes. They lived at home and carried on civilian pursuits, but they dropped them at the call of the commander to meet and resist invaders or to punish guerrilla depredations. The conception was a good one, and in later years the Diaz regime adopted a modified form of the rurales for his own purposes, but Bazaine should receive credit for its inception. The regular troops did not always follow French organizational patterns. In the days of the Regency Almonte, although generally accepting Bazaine's leadership, had stubbornly thwarted the plans for a purely European type of organization; finally the French had to leave the regular troops of Mejia and Márquez pretty much as Mexican custom had developed them: Instead of having an allied army organized as we could have done it, and on which we could count, we have only bands of brigands who are capable only of exploiting the highways. Every time that we want to send them toward the enemy, they flatly refuse. 40

The Gendarmerie took the French name and proposed to be an elite police force. Original plans for the force called for volunteers of Mexicans, French, Belgians, and Austrians on a non-discriminatory basis, and their numbers could go as high as 1,900. But in the first six months it gained only one hundred volunteers. The officers up to the rank of captain had to pass an examination in Spanish. Actually the members accepted in Mexico did represent all four of the nationalities. The group in Mexico City had charge of the prison and had the duties of receiving the individuals denounced as having aided the dissidents, or Juarists. In that prison the gendarmerie had the right of interrogating the newcomers and subjecting them to the bastinado to obtain confessions. The task of obtaining confessions by force did not appeal to any except a group of Croatians from the Austrian contingent, who took a sort of delight in their severities. With them the officials sometimes had to interfere to avoid illegal ill-treatment. After a few months Colonel Lafon replaced the Belgian Lieutenant Colonel in command of the gendarmerie in Mexico, and the abuses ceased.41 4 0 Loizillon, Guadalajara, April 10, 1864, in Lettres, No. xlv, 212-222. This accusation is clearly false. Generally the troops of Mejia and Márquez fought bravely and well. Loizillon must have meant some of the smaller bands of fluctuating loyalty. 41 Mismer, La Martinique et le Mexique, 184-186.

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The gendarmerie never achieved any very great usefulness. For a large part of their time in service the men had no arms. They spent their time grooming horses and working at the public-works program, and a laziness crept into the whole organization that made it almost powerless. Another development of internal security in Mexico goes back to the days of López de Santa Anna, although Bazaine, who had studied the career of that stormy petrel carefully, adopted it for use under his own command. When Santa Anna first came to power in Mexico, he found the country beset with banditry on a scale more loosely controlled than ever. The hacienda peons rarely had handled firearms, and the richer class discouraged their use by the peons. Santa Anna ordered each hacendado held responsible for all acts of brigandage comitted on his property. The hacendados then had to arm their more trusted peons and servants to act as a sort of militia. The system proved effective for some years. Bazaine tried to revive the system in 1863-1865 by helping to arm the haciendas and punishing the hacendados and separate villages which failed to control banditry or guerrilla warfare in their own areas. Punishments usually took the form of fines. That system may very well account for the comparative security and peace that obtained in 1864. Then in 1865, when the Law of October 3 went to the Marshal for comment, he only changed it by adding Article 10, which in effect legalized the previous policy.42 Whatever the organization, the French did not find the Mexican troops as amenable to training as they had anticipated; and into their relationship crept feelings of contempt on the part of the French and of resentment on the part of the Mexicans. The most common complaint made against the Mexican officers and soldiers was widespread dishonesty, deceit, and a tendency to embezzlement. In 1864 when the French were procuring uniforms for the Márquez division, Colonel Sánchez Fació made such a scandal out of his embezzlement that Bazaine ordered him before a courtmartial despite the fact that Forey had pinned the cross of the Legion of Honor on his chest.43 After Chávez, a guerrilla leader, 42 Loizillon to his sister, Guadalajara, April 9, 1864, in Lettres, No. xliv, 187191; also idem to idem, Guadalajara, April 10, 1864, in ibid., 220; also Maximilian, "Decree of October 3, 1865", in Martin, Maximilian in Mexico, Appendix V, 447-449. 43 Loizillon, Guadalajara, April 10, 1864, in Lettres, No. xlv, 212-222.

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came over to the Empire and took office as political prefect of Aguascalientes (Chapter III), his outrageous thefts and murders reached the point that common decency required his court-martial.44 Castellanos, the military commander at Tepetitlán, another ex-guerrilla, so terrorized the countryside with thefts and banditry that the French arrested him; but a friend persuaded General Douay to release him. Fortunately Mexican General Tovar knew Castellanos for his true worth and re-arrested him and insisted on a court-martial, which then sentenced him to death.45 The military commander of the gendarmerie in Guadalajara, Señor Savignon, was implicated with Castellanos, and Douay had to arrest him, also. In Acapulco General Montenegro, supposedly on the side of the Empire sold to Juarist sympathizers the food intended for his own troops.46 Thus the early fears of Loizillon found ample justification: He [Maximilian] has just withdrawn administrative surveillance of the native army from the French generals; the same is to be done with the public treasury. Then is when the squandering will start in on a vast scale.47 The gendarmerie needed new uniforms, and Mexican purchasers contracted for leather trousers at eleven pesos a pair, while the regular market price was four pesos. They bought boots for eleven pesos, although the French shoemakers offered to make them for six.48 Butrón, another bandit chief, joined the Mexican army with his band, and the French treasury paid them. They nonetheless continued their robbing and assassinations in the same manner as before, but in the name of the Intervention, until at last the French could stand it no longer; they arrested Buitrón, court-martialed him, and shot him.46 In Alvarado the Imperial troops sold contraband to the republicans on such a scale that "in view of the lack of uniforms in Tlacotalpan it would be hard to tell which were the enemies of the Empire".50 Besides the malversation and dishonesty of the officials, the French at first considered their inconstancy a remediable weakness, but later Ibid. Ibid. « Bazaine to Mazères, No. 92, June 10, 1866, in BA, XXI, f. 4142 v. " Loizillon, Guadalajara, August 12, 1864, in Lettres, No. liii, 246-252. 48 Bazaine to Colonel Lafont, No. 1791, March 21, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3691. 4Í Loizillon, Guadalajara, April 9, 1864, in Lettres, No. xliv, 194. 50 Bazaine's Secretary to Bazaine, No. 405, June 16, 1866, in BA, XXI, f. 4180. 44 45

A Courtmartial Scene

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they came to view it as an incurable cancer affecting officers and soldiers alike. Under-Secretary for W a r for the Empire, Blanchot, saw much evidence of that trait: As for the officer corps, it is strongly mixed, as I convinced myself during my term at the Ministry. The officers of more mature age who came from the old government army were generally good and possessed a certain amount of military instruction; as for the others, with the most varied backgrounds, they were rather mediocre, especially in practical and technical knowledge. But, under the circumstances created by Maximilian, they generally lacked one fundamental virtue so precious at that time: fidelity to the flag.51 In the creation of the Cazadores the French hoped to develop esprit de corps, but in vain; immediately upon the formation of the first units, the payment of the promised recruiting bonus, and on receipt of their arms, a large number deserted. 52 In the contact between the French and the Cazadores, That assembly of two races different by manners and temperament was bad. So in one single battalion, in a few weeks 150 Mexicans disappeared, and after a short time nothing remained but the French soldiers.53 This practice should not have surprised the French; even early in the intervention the Mexican army allies sometimes deserted a company at a time. 54 In Guadalajara they encountered the same experience: The Mexican troops of the government are absolutely good for nothing. Their organization and their composition are deplorable. They do not dare leave the towns where they are stationed. The [guerrilla] bands have a deep contempt for them and beat them whenever they meet. So it is said that Maximilian wants to discharge them.55 In Yucatán the soldiers deserted so fast that it was impossible to maintain a garrison. 56 At Tula the garrisons always had trouble, and toward the end of the Intervention the penury of the Empire began to tell in desertions over lack of pay and equipment. 57 51

Blanchot, L'Intervention,

« Ibid.

III, 2 0 5 - 2 0 6 .

Ibid. Loizillon to his sister, Mexico, October 8, 1863, in Lettres, No. xxix, 130-132. 8 5 Tucé to Madame Millet, Morelia, January 2, 1865, in Cinq ans, 103. 58 Francisco B. Casanova in letter J. Garcia to Bazaine, June 18, 1866, in BA, X X I , f. 4 1 9 0 . 57 Carlos Oroniz to Bazaine, San Luis Potosi, February 26, 1866, in BA, XVIII, f. 3552. 55

54

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Bazaine himself until the concluding months did not despair of making something out of the Mexican soldiers, and his comments regularly showed a search for means and a criticism of inadequate planning and legislation: . . . T h e lack of a serious recruiting, w h i c h this g o v e r n m e n t n e v e r was willing to put into p r a c t i c e , and t h e penury of t h e finances little b y little [ a d d e d ] to t h e dissolution of the corps a n d to demoralization, b e c a u s e t h e troops w e r e irregularly paid, and, being without clothing, etc., t h e y preferred t h e adventurous life of the b a n d s . 5 8

The navy also came in for its share of contempt: "In what has been done by the Department of the Mexican Navy I see only disorder, prevarications, and intrigues."59 The stoicism of the Mexicans again surprised the French. On one occasion, when some troops of General Lozada were besieged in a church by the bandit Gutiérrez, the latter called on them to surrender, and they did so, although knowing full well that they would be killed. He hanged all twenty. Such an act made the French wonder at their weakness. If they knew they would die, why did they not sell their lives dearly? In view of the poor marksmanship attributed to the Mexicans, they could have held out a day or two.00 Loizillon could only conclude that in a hopeless situation they simply preferred to die rather than to fight. On another occasion the cold-bloodedness of General Lozada61 shocked the French. Knowing that Gutiérrez had 500 men at Amatitlán, Lozada dispatched a group of thirty soldiers to make an attack on them. When questioned by his French allies about the rash tactic, he answered that the thirty men were poor soldiers and that to rid himself of bad soldiers he had the habit of sending them into places

Bazaine, "Période Impériale", (1867?), in BA, XVIII, f. 3409. Bazaine to Cloué, No. 102, August 31, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4 5 0 2 . 6 0 Loizillon, Guadalajara, April 9, 1864, in Lettres, No. xliv, 193. 61 Ibid.., 190-192. Lozada was a type that illustrates the weakness of the Imperial army. Of Indian blood, he lived on an hacienda as a peon until the police called on him for some military service about 1850. When he failed to show up, the police came to his home, found him gone, and whipped his mother. Lozada took to the mountains and became a bandit, sworn to vengeance. He caught the policeman who had whipped his mother, tortured him by slashing his feet and forcing him to walk over hot sand, then hanged him to a tree for the buzzards. When his band became stronger, he designated himself general. He maintained himself independent of all governments until he embraced the Intervention and accepted French pay. 58 58

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where he knew that they would be massacred. 62 The operation turned out as expected: At a wood called Salta . . . we see all the unfortunates taken at Amatitlán by Gutiérrez and hanged by him fifteen days before. All the bodies were naked and had their eyes eaten out by the birds, and they bore signs of mutilations impossible to describe. Those who were hanging too near the ground had their legs and insides eaten away by the foxes... . We hastened to leave that frightful spectacle which was so revolting to every heart. . . . The soldiers promised to give no quarter to the Gutiérrez band if we ever met up with it.03 THE JUARIST ARMY

The opponents of the French program appeared in a variety of forms. The troops given regular recognition by the Mexican republican government correctly may be called an army because some form of organized command existed throughout the intervention. Vicente Riva Palacio commanded the troops in Michoacán, called the Army of the West, but he had few contacts with Juárez, and his actions were almost independent. The Army of the East in the VeracruzTamaulipas area came more directly under the control of Juárez, and messengers could travel back and forth. Sincerity and chicanery were not peculiar to either side. Guerrilla bands operated in the name of either or both, and both Bazaine and Juárez made efforts to disavow and punish extreme offenders. In the beginning of the intervention and until mid-1865 the Juárez troops suffered from lack of arms and supplies. Thereafter, with moral, financial (if unofficial) and logistical support from the United States, they became more powerful numerically and in equipment. American arms of the latest and best types came in volume, and volunteers or filibusters flocked to the aid of Juárez. Active leaders easily attained high rank, and the republicans distributed military titles freely as compared to the more conservative French practice. Many of the Juarist officers were foreigners and men of ability and experience on other battlefields; Ghilardi had been a follower of the liberal Garibaldi; 64 Carlos de Gagun was a German officer of experience, and Eldemiro Mayer was an Argentine. 65 Several French officers held commands, and many Americans were officers. One 82 83 64 45

Ibid., 197. Ibid., 197. Lefêvre, Documentos oficiales, I, 334. Hans, La guerre au Mexique selon les Mexicains, 57.

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whole guerrilla band was made up of Californians.60 Deserters from Imperial forces found ready acceptance, even encouragement, and the Foreign Legion furnished many valuable recruits. As a result the officers had an acquaintance with the rules of warfare as observed in Europe and maintained a certain amount of regular conduct. In particular the very brief and formal correspondence between Bazaine and Vicente Riva Palacio shows that feelings of mutual respeci existed between those chiefs, and each accorded the other's troops the treatment practiced in Europe. This attitude became especially clear during the last few months of the intervention.87 If the anti-Empire forces, regular or irregular, lacked unified command and operated in bands, they suffered no lack of names. Often the soldiers or guerrillas went simply by the name of the leader, but in other cases they had a more enduring cognomen. Los Bello were simply bandits taking the name of their leader, but they were singled out for special attention in prison, where most of them wound up, for their daring and passionate opposition to the Empire.68 Los chinacos were erroneously taken by Loizillon to be the "nom générique donné à toutes les bandes".69 The French rarely used the term, but others applied it generally to the guerrillas or scattered bands of the Michoacán area. Since it was originally a term of deprecation, the republicans of the area took a certain glee in applying it to themselves in an ironic contrast to their feats of valor and wit against the French.70 Los Cravioto were members of a band south and east of Mexico City who had been led originally by a chief, Simón Cabrioto, but with time and a handy metathesis they took on a new identity.71 Their agent in Tulancingo, Gayol Haro y Yarto, also vice-consul for ··

Ibid. Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 418. 6 8 Aymard to Bazaine, Puebla, September 22, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4584-4585. 69 Loizillon to his sister, Morella, March 5, 1865, in Lettres, No. lxvii, 302-310. 7 0 The French could direct barbs both at themselves and at the chinacos: "It has been a long time since I received news from you. Three couriers from England and France are following us, and they should all arrive at the same time if the chinacos let them by." — Tuce to Madame Millet, Morella, January 2, 1865, in Cinq ans, 102-104. But, "Our captain instead of letting us charge the Mexicans, remained planted there, and we missed a fine business, for we were eighty horsemen, and there were only five hundred chinacos before us." — Ferdinand Millet to his mother, Mexico, December 9, 1866, in Tucé, Cinq ans, 121-122. 7 1 "Los Cabriotos", in El pájaro verde, I, No. 67, October 5, 1863, p. 3. 67

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Spain, had been sending messages with military information to Simón Cabrioto in the form of cigarette papers. He also had tried to urge Ángel Anduaga, son-in-law of Cabrioto, to institute suit against the French for alleged atrocities which the band itself really had committed.72 When some of the band fell prisoner, the leader entered negotiations offering to surrender to the Empire the band as well as all the people he influenced, in return for which he should receive a sum of money.73 The Imperial government refused, and the members of the band whom they caught went to Puebla as prisoners of war. Two years later Colonel Aymard relieved the Austrians at Puebla and checked through the prisons and found them separately guarded, although friends of the Imperial government had brought some pressure to free them.74 Bazaine still refused to free them and left them for the Empire to handle. Los cristeros operated in the area around Zacapu.75 Los galeanos were members of the bands of bandits and guerrillas led by Rojas, one of the cruelest of the guerrilla chiefs. They operated mostly in the state of Jalisco, hence their name, probably from Nueva Galicia.76 Los hombres vestidos de azul are referred to once as a special group: According to news that I receive from the south, it seems that the men dressed in blue, who clearly are on the side of Diaz, have been detached from the Jiménez brigade at Tuxtla by orders of Alvarado. Otherwise the detail is of little importance.77 Los patricios were on the side of the Empire. They were a group of anti-Juarist Mexicans organized and led by a Captain Remugio Toledo in and around Tehuantepec, which they captured, declared for the Empire, and controlled until the last weeks of the Intervention.78 Their name may go back to the years 1846-1848 when a number of Irish soldiers in the army of General Winfield Scott 72 Bazaine to the Sous-Secrétaire d'État de Gobernación, September 1, 1864, in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXII, Doc. χ, 49-53. 73 Bazaine to le Ministre de la Guerre, No. 53, November 27, 1864, in BA, XI, f. 2114. 74 Aymard to Bazaine, Puebla, September 22, 1866, in BA, XXIII, f. 4584-4585. 75 Eduardo Ruiz, Historia de la Guerra de la Intervención en Michoacán, p. 104. 7® Irene Paz, Algunas campañas, I, 10. 77 Bazaine to Franco, No. 1822, April 4, 1866, in BA, XIX, f. 3735. 78 Bazaine [to Mazères], No. 32, Montoya, February 1, 1865, in BA, XI, f. 2142; Bazaine to Toledo, No. 33, Montoya, February 2, 1865, in BA, XI, f. 2143; Bazaine to Mazères, Telegram No. 376, November 13, 1866, in BA, XXIV, f. 4794.

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deserted to the Mexican side and formed a separate unit which took its name from San Patricio. Los plateados were mountain guerrillas of long standing. They had preyed on the civilian population in and around Cuernavaca and Chalco for years before the Intervention, and at that time some of their number embraced respectability by joining a recognized government.79 Some of them even negotiated for recognition by the French authorities, and Bazaine, pursuant to his policy of appeasement and unification, did not object.80 The ones who remained in defiance of the French maintained themselves and had a band of five hundred ready to fall upon Tulancingo and loot it the moment the French and the Austrians evacuated the city.81 They were a cruel and merciless group who preyed both on the French, Mexican citizens, and on the Indians alike.82 The attitude of Bazaine and the French is well illustrated by their terms of identification. The Convention of London in 1861 bore out the non-recognition of Juárez by refusing to describe a "government" of Mexico. It only spoke of the "coasts of Mexico", "the littoral of Mexico", and the "Mexican nation".83 The Treaty of La Soledad, however spurious, again recognized the "República mexicana" as an established, sovereign government.84 With the repudiation of the treaty Lorencez could no longer refer to it as a government of Mexico; he used the term le gouvernement de Juárez.85 By the time Bazaine arrived, the term ennemi of course was common, but for formal terms Bazaine and his headquarters used the expression le gouvernement de Juárez also.86 He reserved the term l'armée mexicaine regularly for the Imperial forces.87 Les troupes El pájaro verde, I, No. 21, August 10, 1863, p. 3. Bazaine to Captain Dubessol, No. 88, March 13, 1864, in BA, V, f. 851; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVIII, Doc. xix, 66-67. 81 Blanchot, L'Intervention, III, 415. 82 Carlota to Bazaine, Mexico, September 16, 1864, in Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien, 86-87. 83 Convention of London, October 31, 1861, in Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 42-44. 84 Convention of La Soledad, February 19, 1862, in Arrangoiz, Apuntes, 69-70. 85 Lorencez to the French Plenipotentiaries, Córdoba, April 19, 1862, in Niox, L'Expédition, 139-140. 88 Bazaine to Napoleon III, No. 1, September 9, 1863, in BA, I, f. 73; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. vii, 24-31. 87 Bazaine [to Randon], No. 2, September, 1863, in BA, I, f. 85, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. χ, 36-38; Bazaine to Marshal [Randon], No. 3, September 23, 1863, in BA, I, f. 90, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xi, 39-45. 79

80

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mexicaines meant only the troops of the Regency and the Empire. 88 Likewise the term gouvernement de Mexico meant the Regency and the Empire. 89 The Juarist forces, besides the standard ennemi were referred to, for example, as les troupes régulières.β0 A more common term was l'armée guariste,91 or les troupes juarist es,92 or even simply les juaristesP In deference to the political attitudes the French sometimes even called the Juarists des bandes fédérales (for fédéraux?).9* The term libéral was confusing. The French used it to represent the previous (Juarist) government as a political entity. 95 In at least one case the terms juaristes and libéraux were used synonymously in the same sentence; and the same persons are also called bandits within the letter. 96 At the same time the word meant the attitude of pro-Reform individuals whose love for Juárez and whose dislike for the Intervention was not strong enough to lead them into open revolt or to cause them to take to the field of battle to defend the republic. 97 Besides the regular titles, various less formal terms were used. The

89 Bazaine to Napoleon III, October 8, 1863, in BA, I, f. I l l , printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xvii, 62-67; Bazaine to M. le Ministre de la Guerre, No. 5, Mexico, October 8, 1863, in BA, I, f. 118, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xix, 74-78. 89 Bazaine to [Randon], No. 3, September 23, 1863, in BA, I, f. 91, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xi, 39-45. 90 Bazaine to Vicario, No. 8, October 10, 1863, in BA, I, f. 122, printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xxii, 83-85. 91 Bazaine to Napoleon III, La Piedad, lanuary 20, 1864, in BA, III, f. 547, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xliv, 163-166; Bazaine to Almonte, No. 106, January 6, 1864, in BA, III, f. 508; Bazaine to Napoleon III, Guadalajara, January 5, 1864, in BA, III, f. 494, printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xxxix, 146-149. 92 Bazaine to Manuel de Lozada, No. 56, January 6, 1864, in BA, III, f. 502. 93 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, February 9, 1864, in BA, III, f. 597, printed in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. lvii, 209-217. 94 A. de la Lande, to Bazaine, No. 4, Mexico, December 22, 1863, in BA, III, f. 424, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xxiv, 87-89. 95 Bazaine to the Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, No. 3, October 8, 1863, in BA, I, f. 115; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xviii, 68-73; also Bazaine to le Ministre de la Guerre, No. 1, October 10, 1863, in BA, I, f. 120, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xx, 79-81. 98 Bazaine to le Ministre de la Guerre, No. 10, San Juan de los Lagos, November 29, 1863, in BA, II, f. 361, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. ix, 31-33. 97 Bazaine to le Ministre de la Guerre, No. 1, October 10, 1863, in BA, I, f.120, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xx, 79-81.

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term Guerrilla

(also guérilla,

guerilleros)

was m e a n t to cover the anti-

E m p i r e soldiers not a part of the recognized a r m y of Juárez and who operated in small groups independently. in

various

troupes,102

ways:

or une réunion

the expression pillards.107

moucherons,08

levée

de

T h e y also were referred to

gavillas,M

de guérillas,103 boucliers),

105

ladrones,100

rebelles,10*

bandes,101

and boucliers

(in

bandes

de

perturbateurs,

100

O n e Imperial official within the compass of one letter used

the epithets to apply to the Juarists as follows: los revoltosos, tos de revolucionarios, dad,

los facciosos

Cadena,

gavillas

los anarquistas, que

merodean

de facciosos,

T h e n a m e partisans

trastornadores

capitaneados

gavillas

por

del marasmo,

los cona-

de la García los

tranquilide

la

alzados.108

appeared in the modern sense, that is, synon-

ymous to guerrillas b u t with political overtones. 1 0 9

M o r e commonly

it bore the older meaning of supporter or backer. 1 1 0

Lussan, how-

88 Bazaine to Napoleon III, October 8, 1863, in BA, I, f. I l l , printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVI, Doc. xvii, 62-67. 98 Bazaine to le préfet politique de Guanajuato, January 26, 1864, in BA, III, f. 560, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xlviii, 178-179. 100 Ibid. 101 Bazaine to Canna, No. 92, Salamanca, January 26, 1864, in BA, III, f. 559; Bazaine to Douay, No. 60, La Piedad, January 20, 1864, in Genaro Garcia, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xlv, 167-174; Bazaine to Velarde, No. 90, January 21, 1864, in BA, III, f. 556, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xlvii, 177-178. 102 Bazaine to Velarde, No. 90, January 21, 1864, in BA, III, f. 556, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xlvii, 177-178. 103 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Mexico, February 9, 1864, in BA, III, f. 597; printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. lvii, 209-217. 104 Maximilian to Bazaine, Cuernavaca, January 6, 1866, in BA, XVI, f. 3158 v. 105 Ibid. 106 Gutiérrez to Maximilian, Querétaro, January 17, 1866, in BA, XVII, f. 3202. 107 Bazaine to Napoleon III, Silao, December 12, 1863, in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xx, 72-74. 108 J. Ignacio Gutierréz to Bazaine, No. 104, Guadalajara, May, 1866, in BA, XX, f. 3923. 109 It corresponded more exactly to the Contre-guérilla. The difference seemed to rest on the point of view. Irregular troops, French or Mexican, operating almost independently and given to excesses, such as to deprive them of the right to treatment as lawful belligerents, roamed the areas of the tierra caliente, very similar to the Contre-guérilla of Colonel Dupin and Stoecklin. Because they supported the French, the latter called them partisans. The same sort of bands operating against the French were, of course, called guerrillas e.g. Bazaine to Mr. le Capitaine Dubessol, Commandant la Compagnie des partisans, No. 88, March 13, 1864, in BA, V, f. 851. 110 Mangin to Bazaine, No. 72, Oaxaca, March 2, 1865, in BA, XI, f. 2197, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XXIV, Doc. lviii, 248-257; Bazaine to Napoleon III, Silao, December 12, 1863, in BA, III, f. 415, printed in Genaro García, Col. doc., XVII, Doc. xx, 72-74.

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ever, took it as a term of umbrage and equivalent to robber.111 After the arrival of Maximilian and the formal establishment of the Empire, the term gouvernement de Juárez became rare, as it was not proper to admit the existence of such a government. Also, the term ennemi gave way in part to both the Juarists and guerrilla leaders and bands. The term libéraux almost dropped out of use, but guerrilla continued in current usage. As the end of the French occupation drew near, and as more contact with Juarist forces brought a certain amount of recognition, Bazaine changed the terms again. After November, 1866, the expression dissidents was less commonly used by the French, but recognition of Juárez did not by any means follow. Vague terms appeared, such as "the troops commanded by Riva Palacio".112 Porfirio Díaz was recognized as a general instead of as a bandit.113 However, the Empire did not recognize Juárez in any official capacity again until well after the evacuation of French troops. In his prelude to the Law of October 3, 1865 Maximilian only referred to him as "Don Benito Juárez".114

Lussan, Souvenirs du Mexique, 26. Bazaine to le S/Secrétaire d'État de la guerre, No. 738, December 21, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4993. 1 1 3 Douay to Bazaine, No. 715, Puebla, December 18, 1866, in BA, X X V , f. 4973. 1 1 4 Maximilian, Proclamation, Mexico, October 2, 1865, in Pierard, Souvenirs du Mexique, 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 . 111

112

COMPARATIVE

EVALUATION

CHAPTER

XI

SUBSEQUENT C A R E E R O F MARSHAL BAZAINE

The Souvereign, bearing Marshal Bazaine back from the unhappy Mexican experiment, entered Marseilles in April, 1867, and landed the last contingent with a quiet disembarkment. No one considered him a returning hero; the intervention in Mexico, never very popular in France,1 had grown increasingly unpopular as the years passed, and, in spite of the losses in men and money, everyone rejoiced too much to see it end for a show of great demonstrations either for or against the leaders. Besides, since Castelnau had arrived already, weeks before, and had reached the Emperor's ear, the latter clearly had received a briefing to the disadvantage of Marshal Bazaine. The Marshal could only pace the ship's deck and wonder what arrival would bring. It brought letters of assurance written weeks before, in which Napoleon affirmed his confidence, but it brought no gala reception.2 As a marshal without a command, Bazaine had to report to the 1 Case, French Opinion on the United States and Mexico, 1860-1867, p. 310. However, among the military it was quite popular at the beginning, and officers actually sought assignments to the Expeditionary Force. For the unenthusiastic opinion of popular journals toward the end of the Intervention, see Bigelow to Seward, Paris, January 30, 1866, in U.S. Executive Document No. 93, pp. 21-22. Nor was the Intervention very popular in Austria. — J. L. Motley to his mother, Vienna, March 16, 1864, in Correspondence of John Lathrop Motley, II, 152-154; idem to idem, Vienna, September 22, 1863, in ibid., II, 138. 2 The biographical data in this chapter come from the following: Guedalla, The Two Marshals, 119-230; General de Rivière, "Rapport", in the Procès Bazaine, 1-276; Colonel Ch. Martin, Guide pour les débats du Procès Bazaine, 1-189; C. H. Morard, Herotsme et trahisons, 1870-1871; Bazaine, Lettre de Bazaine, sa justification (Extrait du New York Herald), 1-16; Réponse du Général Montaudon à la brochure de M. le Général Frossard, 1-7; Réponse du Général Metman à la brochure de M. le Général Frossard, 1-10; Bazaine, Rapport sommaire sur les opérations de l'armée du Rhin du 13 Août au 29 Octobre 1870, 1-28; Rapport sur les opérations du 64ème régiment de Ligne pendant la campagne de 1870, 21 July-28 October 1-35.

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Ministry of War for assignment. At St. Cloud Napoleon III met him with a kindly welcome that proved his confidence. For several months Bazaine waited in Paris, taking some part in the social life and impatiently hearing both public praise and censure for his recent work. In the winter of 1867 Bazaine finally received assignment to the post of Commander of the 3rd Army Corps with headquarters at Nancy. Immediately he busied himself with the skill of an experienced general, studying the terrain and the military installations throughout the area and working with his staff on plans for future eventualities. In 1869 he commanded the full corps on maneuvers and upset some of the traditional tacticians by pointing out some lessons taught by the American Civil War, such as the use shelter trenches, entrenching tools, and extensive entrenchments. The memory of Mexico by 1869 had dimmed somewhat in view of the new threat; and when the nation needed a new minister of war to succeed Marshal Niel, Bazaine received mention in high circles re a loyal and capable administrator. However, for a man from the ranks and a leader in the Mexican failure, he still could not quite win the support needed, and Marshal Le Boeuf took the office. Bazaine, in compensation for his near failure, became Commander of the Imperial Guard, a very high honor indeed for a professional soldier. The readiness of the Prussian masters to risk a war with the greatest nation on the continent came from careful calculations and accurate appraisals. The Prussian army had developed a new, efficient needle gun to replace old rifles. They had a large army recently experienced in combat with a reputable European army in which they suffered few losses, and a unified command directed their operations. The French army labored under several disadvantages. In spite of the general prosperity of the country it had spread its army out in Algiers, Egypt, and the Far East, and its navy in all the oceans. The army was small for a national war, and it still carried obsolete weapons. Even in Mexico only the elite troops had guns with rifled bores,3 and not until 1867 did Napoleon prevail on the army to adopt the more advanced Chassepôt rifle. Not all troops had them. The army had suffered considerable losses in Mexico, and the financial loss was a heavy blow. The army in Mexico had fought irregulars in bands, often badly-armed bands, and nearly always weaker than the 3

Hans, La guerre du Mexique selon les Mexicains, 60.

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French in equipment and discipline. The French had a colonial army used to fighting against colonial peoples far from home. Many of the troops were African mercenaries of questionable devotion. At the right time the Prussians maneuvered the French government into presenting an envoy for a rebuff — a favorite casus belli in Europe, and an excuse for challenging another nation to fight. Honor required a declaration of war, and the die was cast. Strategic plans called for the organization of the French defenses into three armies: The Army of Lorraine, commanded by Bazaine and two others commanded by Marshal MacMahon and Marshal Canrobert. At the last minute Napoleon changed the plan, but after a heavy set-back on the Lorraine front, he returned command to Bazaine.4 That move boosted morale because Bazaine was welltrusted at the time, and spirits were high when he reported to Napoleon at Metz to take charge. Bazaine was then a critical figure in French history. The whole defense of the nation rested on his decisions, and as Commander of the Army of the Rhine, he had charge of both the armies of MacMahon and of Canrobert — officers under whom he had served years before. But the Army of the Rhine was a retreating army at the time, and retreating armies are notoriously hard to stop. Bazaine planned to halt the retreat at Châlons. Enormous traffic problems faced a hundred thousand men trying to funnel through Metz with all their impedimenta. Bazaine rode out to observe the hopeless task at the point of contact with the Prussians and got a shell fragment in his shoulder for his pains. With his wound as an excuse he asked to be relieved of command, but Napoleon reassured him and kept him on. After consultation with his staff over his deteriorating position, Marshal Bazaine decided to retain his army around Metz in order to give more time to the reserve forces to prepare to resist the Prussians. Thus he expected to put up such severe opposition that the Prussians would have to stop and waste enough time on his troops to allow the reserves to organize a counterattack.5 By the end of August the rapid Prussian advance isolated the army 4 These rapid shifts in strategy only proved the inadequate preparation for the war. At the beginning of the war, as he stepped on the train to report to his new post, Bazaine is reported to have said to someone on the platform: "Nous marchons à un désastre". — Guedalla, The Two Marshals, 136. 5 Procès Bazaine, "Rapport du Général de Rivière", 97.

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at Metz; and Bazaine, instead of being able to contain the enemy by means of a series of harassing attacks, could not break out of the tightening encirclement. Bazaine had occasion to know between August 31 and October 7, 1870, some of the trials of his old adversary Ortega at Puebla. Instead of thinking in terms of maneuvers, he had to watch his fortified places and the guard posts and his battery positions. Despite the large stores of food earlier accumulated, the heavy concentration of troops rapidly devoured what should have been ample supplies. With all communications cut, the army learned only by means of a smuggled newspaper that MacMahon, who was likewise bottled up at Sedan, had surrendered, and that the Emperor, Napoleon III, had been captured with the army. Furthermore, the revolution in Paris had ousted the remnants of the Empire. In spite of the crushing news, Bazaine asked his army to continue their resistance. 6 The army was avid for more news, but the only source for news was the enemy army. Therefore Bazaine entered into negotiations with the Prussian commander, Prince Frédéric-Charles, asking for news of France. He received a courteous letter with what was in effect an accurate summary of recent developments.7 Thereafter more and more negotiations continued, gradually involving the idea of a capitulation, and after an elaborate and complex exchange of letters and couriers, the army surrendered on October 28, 8 turning over to the Prussians 163,000 soldiers, six marshals, and over 6,000 officers. Bazaine himself went as a prisoner of war to Kassel, where he met and had many talks with Napoleon, another prisoner in that city. Evidently Napoleon could understand the situation, and he offered no recriminations. Negotiations for peace dragged on; but in 1871, after the establishment of a peace, the victors freed Bazaine and other marshals to return to their own country. It was not a welcome return. The loss of the war and the support of an army of occupation had stirred tempers and passions to a boil, but the French probably never had stopped to compare the mild treatment they received at the hands of the Prussians with the harsher treatment meted out a few years before to the Mexicans. • Bazaine, "Ordre Général No. 9", Armée du Rhin, Bain-Saint-Martin, September 16, 1870, in Procès Bazaine, 127-128. 7 Frédéric-Charles to Bazaine, Quartier général devant Metz, September 16, 1870, in ibid., 133. 8 For the terms of the surrender see "Texte de la capitulation", in Colonel Ch. Martin, Guide pour les débats du Procès Bazaine, 13-15.

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The public conscience needed a scapegoat as a cleansing agent on whom it could vent the fury of their disgrace. Bazaine as the chief commander was the most likely choice, and several highly placed officers demanded charges against him. Some of the press took up the hue. Bazaine then had to face a far more serious trial than the criticisms stimulated by his administration in Mexico. His efficiency, ability, honesty, and patriotism were challenged. After a long trial and much public discussion and great popular interest on both sides, Bazaine could not expect to get off free. Popular demand insisted on punishing someone, and the court found him guilty and imposed a sentence of death. Such an act had the desired effect on the public. The sentence was almost as good as the execution, and passions calmed, only to be heated again for brief periods for another generation whenever the controversial problem again came up for discussion. If Bazaine was dead for the public, he lived on in fact. President MacMahon, who also had surrendered to the Prussians, but who had survived the disgrace to become president, commuted the sentence to life imprisonment on the island of Sainte Marguerite, and Bazaine went there to live out a cold, Helena-like existence and to try to make his peace with his conscience. Some months later the lonely figure of the Marshal attracted the rebellious spirit of two English girls, who resolved to rescue him. Before their plan could bear fruit, Madame Bazaine and a few friends took more active steps. They hired a small ship and sailed out to the island and picked up Bazaine, who found his way to the shore by descending a flimsy rope over the side of the cliff. The ship made for the Italian shore, and the Marshal was on his own resources. Liberty brought no relief, and Bazaine was worse off than before, when he was a ward of the state. The French government made no serious effort to retake him; his political value was gone. He wandered about the continent and England, finally returning to Spain, where, in view of the services he had rendered that country during the Carlist Wars, he was granted a refuge in Madrid. Gradually his family gathered about him, and he collected his personal possessions, particularly his official archives. The Marshal made a few feeble attempts to defend himself from the burden of alleged guilt, but he aimed his scant pamphlets at the recent war. It so overpowered his mind that he had no time left for reviewing or explaining the unsolved problems of the Intervention in Mexico.

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Bazaine spent his last years in real poverty, and his death in 1888 was so quiet that France barely noticed it in the rush of new events. Although he gathered charges of egoism, Bazaine rarely spoke of himself in his official papers, and then only as an officer who is sure of himself and specific in his plans and orders. The long years of patient drudgery in the Bureau Arabe without recognition do not bear out a charge of egoism. As an officer of ability and decision he could not do otherwise. No general worthy of the name could appear in public as easygoing and unsure of himself or subject to changing his mind on short notice. He wore his Foreign Legion uniform even after he became a marshal, and he made a point of keeping in contact with the lowest ranks by stopping and talking with them and seeing to their comforts as best he could. Politically appointed generals tend not to do those things. As for his military and political ability, history must class him as an able and deserving professional soldier of the caliber needed by any army. He knew the army from a lifetime of soldiering; he had experienced a variety of problems and had come off well in most of them. He was close enough to the bourgeois class to see problems from their point of view, and he studied problems from a critical, analytical perspective that often escaped higher statesmen. His gift of plans, ambitions, and stubborn adherence to convictions and his ability to lead by inspiration lacked the touch of greatness or of genius, so that he could never have become a ruler of Mexico, nor a substitute for Napoleon III, nor for any other political figure who would have to depend on psychological appeal. His gifts were those of a good, professional soldier: self-discipline, an alert mind, obedience to orders, and an acceptance of established authority. FRENCH IMPERIAL POLICY

With respect to his administration in Mexico, as well as that of Maximilian, it is very attractive to take advantage of hindsight to criticize and to point out errors. As far as the French in Mexico were concerned, the existence or lack of individual errors is almost inconsequential. No matter what brilliant actions on the part of Bazaine or of Forey, the French Intervention was doomed to failure. For France to send troops four thousand miles from home to occupy and hold so huge a country was out of the question. Only one such experiment has succeeded: England held most of India for a century

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and a half, but in most of the sub-continent the English only held control over allied native princes with whom they maintained treaties. They did not try to make over India into a new England. A common complaint against French colonial policy, however, has been that it has called for a revision of native governments on the French model, the installation of French officers in even minor offices, and the imposition of French law over the new areas. In Mexico that policy was not followed. The French plan hoped to avoid conflict over the Monroe Doctrine by setting up a new government by "elections" rather than by incorporating the land into the French Empire. In such a case the new government, popularly chosen, could not be challenged. The French would withdraw, and Mexico would be only de facto, not de jure, under French influence. Statements on a broad level early in the intervention have been reviewed in earlier chapters. Even as late as 1866 official policy stated by the Chief Minister in Paris maintained no suggestion of a permanent French military force: We went there not to bring about a monarchical proselytism, but to obtain reparation and guarantees which we ought to claim, and we sustain the government which is founded on the consent of the people because we expect from it the satisfactions of our wrongs, as well as the securities indispensable to the future.9 No responsible official ever maintained a suggestion of a permanent French occupation or further direct French control than a transitional military government. The incorporation of some individuals to the armed forces of the Mexican Empire was not the same thing because it involved an oath of allegiance and a transfer of loyalty. The French went to great pains to obtain a ballot by which they could show that the Maximilian Empire was elected by a popular vote and represented the will of the public. This vote was criticized more in Europe than in the United States, but for the same reasons. French representatives corresponding with agents of the United States often spoke of the popular choice of Maximilian; but the United States agents, when they did mention it, disclaimed its significance: The United States . . . are of opinion that such an acceptance could not have been freely produced or lawfully taken at any time in the presence of the French Army of invasion.10 9 Drouyn de Lhuys to the Marquis de Monthalon, Paris, January 9, 1866, in U.S. Executive Document No. 93, pp. 17-20. Translator not shown. 10 Seward to Monthalon, Washington, February 12, 1866, in ibid., esp., p. 29.

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The inconsistency between this policy of the United States and the acceptance of balloting done in the ex-Confederate States during the military occupation of the South by Federal troops is obvious, but no longer of moment. The French program might have succeeded if the Civil War had resulted in a separate nation along the Gulf of Mexico. But the effort of the Confederate States failed, and the Mexican Empire thereafter had to face uniformly strong opposition from the North. Apart from the opposition of the United States there is some reason to believe that the experiment might have succeeded. In 1864, with little aid from the North, Juárez was almost driven out of Mexico, and the army was almost destroyed; only with the material aid that began in 1865 on a large scale did his fortunes improve. Without that aid Juárez could not have continued the struggle, and organized resistance would have dissolved. With the United States next door, aid to the patriots was inevitable in United States interests. Only an extremely weak or a treacherous American administration would have failed to secure a native government on its southern border. Napoleon, or his advisors, in his effort to extend French influence, counted too heavily on the weakness of the two divided armies of the northern neighbors. A more careful study of world geography would have shown several parts of the earth more favorable for an extension of French economic materialism, and the positivists in the Paris government should have understood them better. The intervention in Indo-China was more successful because there was no strong nation to protect the peninsula. France had an equal chance with England to extend her possessions in Africa, but the English, with a better understanding of world forces, seized the healthiest part of Africa, leaving the less desirable to the other nations. The French were well advised in their seizure of Madagascar; there were no protecting forces; and only rivalry with Russia and England kept Iran from falling to France, and the Pacific Islands were for the taker to choose. But in America the choice of Mexico was a particularly bad one — the area lay immediately adjoining the strongest nation in the New World. If Napoleon had made an attack on a South American country, he might have had better chance of success. If he had attempted to seize one of the latter, for example, he would have come nearer his military goals. Whatever the intentions of the United States, it would have been physically impossible for them to give aid to one of the South American countries on the scale that Mexico

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received it. Except for Brazil, all were much smaller, and the same number of troops could have maintained order better. But the idealistic purposes of Napoleon and perhaps the more mundane ones of the Duc de Morny and unofficial advisors, overrode the pragmatic positivism of the time. Napoleon hoped to raise Latin prestige in the New World by inserting a block or dam to retard the United States' expansion into Latin America. The logical place to begin was in Mexico, not in South America. Once he stopped the expansion, then French culture as well as industry and economic influence could increase their rôle. The story would have been different if the French had provoked an outright invasion by American Federal troops. Mexico could not have come out of such an occupation without territorial loss. The United States Government was in the hands of expansionists, but, fortunately for Mexico, the energy was finding an adequate outlet in the development of the West at that time. Nonetheless, considering the weak position of the northern states, the exploratory filibustering expeditions, and the projected railroads to the Gulf of California, it would have been almost impossible for Mexico to have rid herself of American allies without divorcing herself at the same time of Sonora, Lower California, Chihuahua, or all three. The decision of Napoleon to withdraw without a fight saved Mexico territorial loss, and Napoleon evidently knew it. The French definitely were overextended in Mexico. It would have taken twice as many troops to police the country. There were two alternatives: They could have made use of local armies to a greater extent; Márquez, Mejía, and even Vidaurri, Lozada, Uraga, Ugarte, and López could probably have maintained armies in their own way that could have controlled whole states, leaving the French fewer key positions. But the French policy and philosophy were too idealistic and anti-clerical to allow such a condition. They could not bring themselves to allow the Mexican generals to operate in their own way; they had to impose French rules of conduct, and it cost them heavily. Again the liberal philosophy of the Revolution succumbed before the realistic requirements of the situation. Another alternative was open. The French might very well have given up the whole of Northern Mexico and concentrated their efforts on a smaller scale in the South. The Yucatán Peninsula and the States of Chiapas and Tabasco could have been occupied effectively from the beginning, but it was not in the plan. The Mexican con-

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servatives wanted the French in Mexico proper, and the legendary mines of Sonora kept all eyes peeled on the north. Yucatán could have become a last refuge, and the Imperial court and the French very likely could have held out there for a very long time if the threat of the northern neighbor did not materialize. But again the drawback was that a withdrawal to Yucatán could have left a vacuum in Mexico that would have furnished an open invitation for American troops to march south. The only answer was a withdrawal.

SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES

The work of the Intervention was a permeation of French influence into every phase of life. Many public officials received training in governmental administration that continued into later presidencies. French literature was more widespread than ever; the language was more common; and, after the initial period of patriotic hatred subsided, more people began to recognize the improved way of life that the French had brought. They left the metric system of measurements firmly seated as the official one. They modified the architecture from the Spanish drabness. They stimulated literature and the arts and brought new philosophical systems, particularly the positivist, as the last word and the magic key to man's conquest of nature. More interesting, however, is the failure of the intervention to remedy the social ills. In particular the allies seriously disappointed the Indians.11 They had for the first time a deliverer who made a show of bringing them freedom. But the deliverers soon fell into the slough of Mexican custom and failed to carry out their promise. Once Maximilian entered upon his duties and abjured the support of the arch-conservatives, but while he still had the support of the French army, he had the one great moment since 1521 to raise the Indians out of the mires into which society had forced them. For a period of over a year Maximilian owed nothing to the conservatives, and he could have founded his empire on Indian support that would have immeasurably strengthened his position and drained the Juarist armies of their manpower. By an Indianization of the Empire, it could have come much nearer success. » Dabbs, "The Indian Policy of the Second Empire", 1 1 2 - 1 2 6 .

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The position of the Indian in Mexico differed greatly from tnat in the United States. When English colonists with their legal authorities reached the New World, they met Indian leaders and recognized them as sovereign groups with whom they made treaties, recognizing the chiefs as sovereign heads of state — hence the common expressions The Cherokee Nation, the Iroquois Nation, and the Tuskarora Nation. That the settlers violated the treaties is another matter. After 1776 the United States continued this legal status, recognizing Indians as non-citizens, later to be segregated in restricted areas or reservations, where they did not have voting privileges. In the Spanish realms, however, colonization began earlier and continued more of the feudal line of thought. There was at first a lively debate, but it settled with recognition of the Indians as subjects of conquest. When the conquistadores took new land, they asked or forced the Indians to accept the King of Spain as their liege lord and accept a feudal allegiance to him. Thereafter as long as they did not revolt, Indians were subjects of the King, and elaborate laws tried to protect them from exploitation. That they were exploited by Spaniards is another matter. With the independence of Mexico and the rest of Spanish America, this relationship continued. Indians of Mexico were considered citizens. They could enjoy most of the privileges of citizenship provided they fitted themselves into the social and cultural patterns of creole society and gave up their Indian identity. Exploitation of the Indians was extra-legal. The Indians maintained many separate enclaves with their own language and customs, but they had practically no political organization. When they took part in politics, it was because a leader from the creole society called them to follow him on a campaign. They did not follow through political conviction. The French military leaders, with a rare insight far ahead of the rest of Western Europe or America, had a certain vision of the basic problem; and they tried to organize separate battalions of Indians without Mexican (creole) officers, rather using French officers at first and trying to develop non-commissioned officers, later officers, from the ranks. These battalions made a good start, but later on recruiting dropped off. In these battalions Spanish was still the means of communication. The battalions made a good showing, but the whole enterprise was contrary to creole social patterns and was not supported by the Conservatives. When the French began to prepare for a withdrawal, Empire, that is, Conservative, officers took the place

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of the French officers, and the whole experiment came to nought.12 Maximilian had an excellent opportunity to make an appeal to this populous group. He was excellent linguist, and he could have made use of the Nahuatl tongue quickly enough to make it popular by his own example. Native art had waned, but there was enough left to reconstruct the throne of Montezuma and to capitalize on the rumors linking Maximilian with the legendary hero, Quetzalcoatl. Millions of Indians would have acclaimed him and followed his standards with a fervor that the creóles could not have withstood. He could have surrounded himself with Indian cabinet officials — not Hispanicized Indians like Mejia or Lozada, or even Juárez or Diaz, who were only creóles with Indian parents — but real leaders from the Indian tribes, who were still a part of the Indian tradition. The Christian matrix would have made no difference because the Indian culture of 1864 was no longer that of 1519, and the Christian religion was an integral part of their life. Maximilian could have held his audiences on or in the shadow of the pyramids of Cholula or San Juan Teotihuacán — archaeological accuracy would not have been required. Thus he could have made himself a messiah of the people. In particular he could have made Nahuatl the official language of the court or at least could have put it on an equal basis with Spanish. The Non-Nahuatl speaking Indians could not have found it more difficult than Spanish. When the Empire's stand became widespread, and when the Indians saw that their interest genuinely lay with the Empire, the accrual to the Empire forces would have left the Juarists with armies staffed only by officers. The historic moment was at hand and crying out for embodiment. Both Maximilian and his French supporters had glimmerings of the problem, but neither was able to rise effectively to the occasion. Instead of invoking the legends of Montezuma and of Quetzalcoatl, the latest Hapsburgs tried briefly to awaken the shades of Charles V; he set himself up in the palace of the viceroys and spoke Spanish. He 12 Ibid. Aside from the battalions raised by the French, several moves made by Maximilian himself showed some concept of the need. He welcomed Indian leaders who presented themselves, primarily the Kickapoo visitors and Maya leaders. He passed laws aimed at relieving the virtual peonage of Indians on the haciendas, and he favored them when he could. But he was essentially the guest of the landowners and Conservatives who preferred the older status. He had difficulty finding real Indian leaders. The best example would have been Juan Alvarez in Guerrero State, an Indian leader of Indians; but the Emperor completely failed to attract Alvarez to the Empire's side.

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EVALUATION

surrounded himself with an administration and with advisors whose training and political philosophy were those of 19th-century Western Europe. The time had not come for the leaders to realize, trust, nor appeal to the tremendous power of the Indian masses. Not until the next century were political leaders to learn to tap that source of political power. The Interventionists tried to appeal to the strategems of European politics and to the strata of society that they knew best. They predicated the new throne on political intrigues and tried to bring together Conservatives and the Liberals, both primarily creóles who only used the Europeans as tools and as weapons to fight each other. They thought in terms of diplomacy, of protocol, of guns, and of leaders who lived on the toil of the Indians. Their support was so ephemeral and fluctuating that there was no firm footing on which to build. Only by organizing it on the bedrock of a popular appeal to the subordinated peoples could the Europeans construct a lasting empire; and when the Interventionists defaulted on their chance to make that appeal, the empire had to fall.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES 1. Manuscript Materials "Archiv Kaiser Maximilians von Mexiko", from the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv in Wien. 225 leaves. Transcript in the University of Texas Archives. Bazaine Archives, 1862-67. Twenty-six volumes, 5,265 leaves. In the Latin American Library, University of Texas. Justin H. Smith Papers. Sixteen volumes. In the Latin American Library, University of Texas. "Papeles sobre la intervención francesa", in the Genaro García Collection. 2,611 leaves. In the University of Texas Library, Latin American Library. 2. Contemporary Accounts and

Documents

Acta remitida de Miramar por la Comisión encargada de ofrecer los votos de los mexicanos y la Corona de México a S. A. I. y R. el Archiduque Fernando Maximiliano de Austria y decreto de S. M. El Emperador nombrando su lugarteniente al Exmo Sr. General D. Juan N. Almonte. Mexico (Andrade y Escalante), n.d. (c. 1864). 15 pp. Advenimiento de SS. MM. II. Maximiliano y Carlota al trono de México. Documentos relativos y narración del viaje de nuestros soberanos de Miramar a Veracruz. Mexico (J. M. Andrade y Escalante) 1864. 368 pp. Anderson, William Marshall, An American in Maximilians Mexico 1865-1866. The Diaries of William Marshall Anderson, edited by Ramón Eduardo Ruiz, San Marino, California (The Huntington Library) 1959. 132 pp. Archivos Privados de D. Benito Juárez y D. Pedro Santacilia. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Publicaciones de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, Biblioteca Nacional, 1928. Vol. 1. Arrangoiz y Berzabal, Francisco de Paula de, Méjico desde 1808 hasta 1867. Four volumes, Madrid (Pérez Dubrull) 1871-1872. —, Apuntes para la Historia del Segundo Imperio Mexicano, Madrid (Rivadeneyra) 1869. 459 pp. Arrillaga, Basilio José (Ed.), Recopilación de leyes, decretos, bandas, reglamentos, circulares y providencias de los supremos poderes y otras autoridades de la República Mexicana. Fourteen volumes. Mexico (J. M. Fernández de Lara) 1821-1839. Bazaine, Achille-François, Rapport sommaire sur les opérations de l'armée du Rhin du 13 Août au 29 Octobre 1870 par le Commandant en Chef Maréchal Bazaine. Berlin (L. Simion) 1870. 28 p. —, Lettre de Bazaine sa justification (Extrait du New York Herald). Liège (Désiré) 1874. 16 pp.

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Periodicals

El diario del Imperio, Mexico, Vol. 1-5, 1865-67. Imprenta Andrade y Escalante. The Saturday Review. London, Vol. 1- , 1855- . El siglo diez y nueve. Mexico, Vol. 1- , 1841- . El pájaro verde. Mexico, Vol. 1- , 1864- . L'Illustration. Paris, Vol. 1- , 1843- .

SECONDARY SOURCES Annuaire militaire de l'Empire française pour l'année 1863 publiée sur les documents communiqués par le Ministre de la Guerre. Paris (Veuve BergerLafrault et fils) 1863. 1192 pp. Aubry, Octave, The Second Empire. Philadelphia (Lippincott), n.d. 638 pp. Translated by Arthur Livingston.

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INDEX

Page reference is given only once, no matter how often the word appears on the page, unless the treatment changes. When a name or subject mentioned in the text is further explained or identified in a footnote, designated in the same sentence, the footnote is not indexed for that name or subject. Place names, especially cities and towns, when identifiable, show the name of the state in parentheses. Explanatory notes appear in brackets [ ]. Variant spellings appear in parentheses ( ). Royalty is listed by first name; others by family name. Not indexed: The name Mexico referring to the nation; names on maps; names in Bibliography that appear alphabetically; publishers and place of publication in Bibliography. Abdication, announcement against, 201202; by Juárez, 146; objected to, 194-196; signs of, 174, 187-188, 198199; suggested by Napoleon, 180, 190, 195; voted on, 208 Absolution refused, 117 Acámbaro, occupation of, 89 Acapulco (Guerrero), arms delivered to Juarists, 143; campaign toward, 145; evacuated by French, 143; naval port, 201; reoccupied, 148, 153, 168; soldiers put ashore, 203; supplies at, 226, 264 Acatlán (de Pérez Figueroa) (Oaxaca), 127 fn 74 Acatzingo (Puebla), troop movement via, 42 Acereta, Pedro, 86 Acojete, troop movement via, 42 Acordada, La, jail, 231 Acta remitida . . . , 109 fn 13 Aculcingo [Acultzingo] (Veracruz), telegraph line, 242 Adjudicataires, disadvantages, 79-80 Adjutant General, 154 Administrative regulations needed, 70 Admirals, see Canaris, Didelot, Jurien de la Gravière, Mazères

Advenimiento . . . , 59 fn8-9, 107 fn 4, 109 fn 13 Africa, campaigns, 30; colonial expansion, 13, 15, 31; policy used in Mexico, 70 African regiments, French, 70, 276 Agent, secret, 224. See Roque Muñoz, Saborío Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works, Ministry of, 241 Agronomists, 240 Agua Nueva (Sinaloa), 237 fn 88 Aguascalientes, City of, appointed official, 76; campaign, 91, 95; newspaper suppressed, 233; occupied, 89 Aguascalientes, State of, political prefect, 264 Aguilar y Marocho, Ignacio, sent to Europe, 59 Aguirre, guerrilla leader, 132 fn 91 Aide-de-camp, 245; captured, 205; mission of, 95 Ajax, ship, 143 Ajusco (Mexico), bumed, 236 Alameda, Mexico City, 253 Alamos, troop movement to, 42 Álamos de Parral (Sonora?), 234 Alarcón, see Ruiz Alarcón

INDEX

Alatorre, leader of Juarist band, escape from, 148 Alcalde, levy raised, 68 Algeria, French interest in, 15, 247; Mexico compared with, 64 fn 23; troops in, 275 Algerian Campaign, veteran of, 30 Alleau, missionary priest, 130 Allied troops, see Franco-Mexican Army Allowances, quarters, 221 Almonte, Juan Nepomuceno, 248, 288, 291; advice of, 28; appointed Lieutenant General, 109; duties in Regency, 64, 68-69, 71, 79, 81-83, 94-95, 104; elected to Regency, 58; funds furnished, 96; goes to Paris, 164; independent actions, 24, 29, 30 fn 68, 56, 57 fn 1, 101, 262; letters 213 fn 135, 248 fn 153; letters to, 91 fn 23, 103, 249 fn 164, 271 fn 91; mission fails, 165, 174 fn 61; political prominence, 32, 74; political ties, 23 fn 42, 77; powers reduced, 33, 57; returns to Mexico, 22-23 Aitata (Sinaloa), 173 Alvarado, Mexican leader, 269 Alvarado (Veracruz), attack on, 175; contraband via, 130, 204, 264; French troops in, 35; withdrawal to, 176 Alvarez, Juan, 285 fn 12, 291; control in Guerrero State, 168; Juarist troops, 87, 99 Amalucán, Hacienda de (Puebla), troop movement to, 42 Amatitlán (Jalisco), massacre at, 266267 Ambassadors, to France, 22 American Army, see United States Army, Confederate Army American Historical Association, Annual report, 291 American occupation, 257 fn 27 Americans, supplies to Guaymas, 132 fn 91 Amero, Just, 248 fn 151 Amnesty, offer of, 101-102, 114, 117, 147; termination, 19, 120 Amozoc (Puebla), in campaign plans, 35, 42, 42 fn 26, 43; PW camp in, 49 Anderson, William Marshal, 95 fn 33, 207 fn 106, 239 fn 98, 246 fn 133 Anduaga, Angel, 269

295

Animals, draft, 20 fn 31. See Horses, Mules Animas, see Puente de las Animas, 42 Annuaire militaire, 30 fn 70 Antilles Fleet [French Navy], 150 Antillón, Florencio, escape, 49 Antonia, ship, attack on, 151, 154 Antón Lizardo (Veracruz) bar at, Spanish ships at, 19 Apache raids, 241 Appeals from sentences, 147 Arabic language, 247 Arabs, administration of, 30 fn 71 ; comparison with, 63 Archaeologists, 240 Archbishop, see Labastida Archer, see Cocio Architecture, 252, 254, 283 Archiv Kaiser Maximilian, 165 fn 18, 248 fn 153 Archives, Ministry of War, Mexican, searched, 145; of Cortina, 167 Archives, National, French, 8 Arévalo, Eduardo G., Governor, 85 Archives de la Commission du Mexique, 243 Argentine, in Juarist Army, 267 Arillaga, Basilio José, 77 fn 49 Arizona, Military Department of, established, 131 fn 88; supplies, 132 fn 91 Ark, ship, captured, 135 Armed combatants, 34 fn 12 Armée mexicaine, see Imperial Mexican Army Army of Lorraine, 276 Army units, Austrian, care of prisoners, 129 fn 81 Army, Mexican, Imperial (Conservative), authorized to declare state of siege, 178; commander, 162; confused by competing commanders, 129; control of, 161; criticism, 264; execution of Imperial policy, 129; friction with French, 208; garrisons released to, 86, 169; growth of, 112; guard details, 120, 157; inactivity, 65, 154; increased responsibility, 203; independent success in battle, 89, 181; joined by Lozada, 97; Juarist agents in, 149; left to garrison outposts, 180-181, 197, 202, 207, 212; marksmanship, 266; numbers, 181,

296

INDEX

204; organization, 32-33, 58, 65, 67, 112,116,141,144,150-151,159,166, 169, 179, 182, 261; proclamation, 29 fn 67; recruiting, 156, 170; reduction in size, 119, 126, 161, 261; refuse French officers, 176; salaries, 36, 150, 155, 174 fn 61, 182; supply of weapons, 172; status of troops, 133, 155; tradition of individualism, 67; weakness of, 207-208, 211; training, 67 Army, Mexican, Juarist (National, Republican), attack by, 41, 95, 209 fn 113; defeat, 29, 99, 281; defections to, 176; defense of Puebla, 28; deserters from, 93 fn 27, 169; designations for, 271-272; dispersal of, 100-102, 108; equipment, 19; evacuation of d r a f t animals, 38; excesses committed, 99; exchange of prisoners, 29, 203; filibusters join, 138, 153, 173; follow French withdrawal, 211; harassing tactics, 175; in Monterrey, 173; legal status, 267; manpower, 283; new arms, 172 fn 51; offensive ordered, 171; order for supplies, 173 fn 57; praise of, 49; preparation of defense, 66; resistence, 20, 226; strength grows, 151, 154, 162, 186; successes, 261; tactical error, 52; threats directed toward, 29; treatment of Prisoners, 50 fn 51; U.S. supplies furnished, 152-153, 267; war supplies denied, 212 fn 132; withdrawal before French, 88. See also Ejército del Centro, Army of the East Army Corps (U.S.) in Arizona, 132 fn 91 Army of t h e East, 19, 21, 267; of the West, 267. See Ejército del Centro Arrangoiz, Francisco d e Paula, 14 fn 4, 18 fn 18, 23 fn 42-43, 24 fn 44, 32 fn 1, 48 fn 44, 114 fn 27, 146 fn 44, 179 fn 90, 188 fn 20, 201 fn 68, 207 fn 110, 210 fn 117, 211 fn 127-128, 213 fn 132,135, 221 fn 13, 233 fn 66, 270 fn 83-84, appointment, 65; history, 74 Arrests, authority for, 228-229 Arrieros, use of, 38, 229 Arrillaga, Recopilación, 101 fn 49 Arrow, poisoned, 157 Arroyo, J. M., letter, 82 fn 61

Arroyo, Luis de, 202 Arroyozarco, 234 Arteaga, José María, Juarist general, 99; family, 133 Artigas, Francisco, Minister of Public Instruction, 220 fn 3 Artillery, at Cathedral, 95; capture, 49; counter-battery fire, 48; destruction, 48; disposal of ammunition, 212, 212 fn 132; effect of fire, 44 fn 30; Imperial Army, 204; mountain, 41; movements, 42, 138; repatriation, 112; quarters, 55; sold to Juárists, 150; sold to Mejia, 150. French Artillery units in Mexico: 1st Battery 3rd Regiment, 1st Battery 6th Regiment, 1st Battery 7th Regiment, 1st Battery 9th Regiment, 1st Battery 11th Regiment, 1st Squadron Artillery Train in Mexico (rest remained in Algiers); 1st Company 3rd Squadron in Mexico (rest remained in home station at Vincennes); 1st Company 6th Squadron in Mexico (Remainder at home station in Metz) Artois, Gaston d', 206 fn 98, 248 fn 155 Asia, colonial extension, 13 Assembly, constituent, recommended, 180 Assembly of Mexico, see Assembly of Notables Astronomers, 240 Atlixco (Puebla), battle at, 44 Atoyac, Rio, 34 Atrocities, charge of, 269 Aubry, Octave, 16 fn 10 Austria, 32, 73, 201 fn 67; Archduke, 59; chargé d'affaires, 205 fn 93; popularity of Intervention, 274 fn 1, return of soldiers to, 198 Austrians, capture, 203, 205, 210, 212 fn 132; garrison troops, 186, 269-270; in Mexico, 7; in Puebla, 206, 232; power of generals, 178; property sold, 212 fn 132; repatriation, 198, 215; riding habits, 255; troops in Mexico, 112, 131 fn 88, 132, 161, 165, 169170, 172, 175, 189, 198, 203, 261262; volunteers, 162 fn 7, 188, 204 Austro-Prussian W a r , 171 Automatic weapons, 172 fn 51 Auvergne, Louis Henri d', General, 46 Aymard, Alphonse-Édouard Antoine,

INDEX

232; Battle of Matehuala, 98; campaign in Parras, 99, 113; command of 62nd Regiment, 40; decorated, 115; letter by, 268 fn 68, 269 fn 74; letter to, 161 fn 4, 178 fn 81 Ayotla (Mexico), troops reach, 53 Aztecs, wealth of, 13 Bagdad on Rio Grande (Tamaulipas), attack on, 154, 160; capture by French, 99; commercial activity, 84; frees Federal soldiers, 135; supplies to Juarists, 150 Bain-Saint-Martin, 277 fn 6 Baja California, 282; governor of, 131; proposed sale, 172 Ballot, 280-281 Bancroft, Frederick, 158 fn 107, 165 fn 18, 169 fn 37 Bancroft, H.H., history, 8, 13 fn 1, 14 fn 6, 8 Bandits, court-martial provided, 123; defense against, 66, 96 fn 37, 133, 152; executed, 97; Juarists declared, 104; law against, 104; trial, 231. See Guerrillas Bando, publication, 59 Banker, see Martin Duran Banks, funds provided by, 54 Baptism, of Indians, 116 Barail, François Charles du, 36, 54, 88 fn 15, 252 fn 1; criticism of Saligny, 60; tactics, 90 Barons, see Graux, Pont Barra de Jesús María (near Río Grande, Tamaulipas), 85 Barracks, French, 229 Barragán, see Peña y Barragán Barranca Seca, 247; Battle of, 29 fn 65 Barredo, Pedro, Juarist agent, 153 Barrera, Pantaleón, 86 Barrés, Charles de, 173 Barrios, Juarist leader, 172 Barron, letter to, 207 fn 106 Barye, Antoine Louis, 15 Basco, (Imperial) ship, 206 fn 98 Bastinado, 262 Bataillon d'Afrique, 203, 227, 230 Batán, El, 42 Battles, see Barranca Seca, Cerro Borrego, 29, Cerro Gordo, Cruz Blanca, Forbach-Spikeren, Fortín, Matehu-

297

ala, Montebello, San Lorenzo, Santa Gertrudis, Servigny Bayonets, used by police, 228 Bazaine, François-Achille, advances money to Empire, 166, 169; appointment, 30, 33; archives, 8 (see Archives, Bazaine); authorship of law, 146; biographical notes, 30 fn 71, 274-279; campaign against Puebla, 35-36-37, 41, 45; campaign plans, 66, 88, 99, 179; Circulaire, 87 fn 13; circumvented in orders, 133; coastal activities, 34-35; criticism, 6-7, 197, 212 fn 129-132; criticism of Saligny, 63; death, 279; defies Empire, 210 fn 117; difficulties with Regency, 64, 79-81; dukedom suggested, 165; enters Mexico City, 54; experience with Arabs, 47; headquarters, 42; in the field, 173-174; investigates injustice, 213 fn 132; joined by Márquez, 36, 228; leads daylight attack, 47-48; letters by and to, 27, 33 fn 6, 103, 118 fn 40 (others too numerous to list); marriage, 133, 258; Maximilian's attitude toward, 118 fn 40, 163, 165-166, 178, 198, 207; military reconnaissance, 43; negotiations with Juarists, 56, 211 fn 129, 270; new duties, 61, 64-65, 67; Oaxaca campaign, 99; occupation of Mexico City, 51-55; policy, 9, 47, 97, 179; policy towards Maximilian, 109, 192, 194, 199, 202, 208, 211; popularity, 50; proclama, 82; promotion, 116-118; proposal for ending siege, 46; refuses delegation, 53; replacement problem, 191, 193, 195, 199-200; return to France, 166-167, 170, 175, 197, 274; returns to Mexico City, 95-96; riding habits, 221; surrender, 277; trial, 278, 289-290; weakness of policy, 56; wounded, 277 Bazaine Archives (abbreviated BA), attitude, 139; lacuna, 167 fn 28, 188; preserved, 8, 37 fn 15, 278. Footnote references too numerous to list Bazaine, Señora, see Josefa de la Peña y Bazaine Beaucé, Jean Adolphe, military artist, 244 Bee, Hamilton Prioleau, General, 85 Behic, Armand, letter, 140 fn 20

298

INDEX

Belgians, chargé d'affaires, 116; embarcation, 215; in charge of English affairs, 18; legation, 135-136; officials in Mexico, 7, 235; provisions for, 198 fn 51; riding habit, 255; troops serving in Mexico, 112, 132,161, 165, 169-170, 175, 204, 261-262, 289 Bell, C. H., letter by, 143 fn 30; letter to, 163 fn 9 Belligerency, end of, 208 Belligerents, disqualification, 272 fn 109; lawful, 218; recognized, 101; standing of, 133; status refused, 152, 152 fn 81, 154 fn 95 Bello, Los, 268 Benjamin, J u d a h P., letter from, 107 fn 3; letter to, 91 fn 21, 238 fn 92 Benson, Nettie Lee, 9 Berbers, administration of, 30 fn 71 Bernardi, Floriano, executed as spy, 40 Berriozábal, Felipe B., Juarist General, escape, 49; exchange of prisoners, 212; withdrawal, 89 Bertier, Alexis-Bénigne-Louis de, General, 31, 38, 55, 86 fn 11, 89; garrison duty, 93, 95; letter to, 89 fn 16; protection provided, 27, 41, 53 Bethlemites, Monastery of, used by French, 220 Bigelow, John, letter by, 209 fn 113, 274 fn 1; letter to, 162 fn 7 Billets, French soldiers, 54-55, 219-220, 228 Billier, General, 165 Binoculars, 47 Bishops, letters to Maximilian, 127; recalled to dioceses, 58. See Ormeachea, Querétaro Bismarck, see Prussia Bizet, Georges, 15 Blanca, Hacienda, 249 fn 100 Blanca, La (Zacatecas), occupied by French, 97 Blanchot, Charles, bias, 47 fn 39, 146147; duties, 54; letter to, 67 fn 32, 181 fn 97, 205 fn 88; quarters, 190; quoted, 39 fn 21, 44 fn 32, 45, 45 fn 35, 47, 49 fn 50, 50, 52 fn 60, 53, 81 fn 57, 8 8 fn 15, 94 fn 32, 145, 155 fn 95, 162 fn 7, 172 fn 165, 178 fn 80, 179 fn 83, 87, 188 fn 20, 189 fn 24, 190 fn 28-29, 192 fn 36, 198 fn 49, 199 fn 56, 207 fn 109, 208 fn 111,

209 fn 114, 210 fn 123, 211 fn 125126, 128, 2 1 3 fn 132-135, 214 fn 136, 138, 215 fn 139-140, 216 fn 141, 220 fn 2, 221 fn 12, 223 fn 19, 240 fn 99, 242 fn 113, 250 fn 176, 257 fn 26, 258 fn 30, 265 fn 51, 268 fn 67, 270 fn 81; Under-secretary of W a r , Imperial, 265 Blanco, François (Francisco?), fined, 152 Blanco, Miguel, General, advice to Bazaine, 70; plot, 127 Blanco, Miguel, soap factory, 232 Blanco, Rio, French troops in, 34 Blasco, Eusebio, 256 fn 24 Biasio, José Luis, account of court, 146 fn 42 Blockade, ended, 117, 173; Mexican ports, 114, 130; Río Grande, 84; Veracruz, 27 Blockade runners, Tuxpan, 85 Blumenthal, Henry Α., reference, 159 fn 109 Bocas, Las ((Durango), fine, 235 Bocas, Hacienda d e las, 177 fn 77 Bofill y Ferro, Jaime, 291 Boistard, Ad. P. Ph. E., Captain, 234 fn 69 Boletín de las leyes, text in, 51 fn 55-56, 52 fn 58, 5 8 fn 5-7, 5 9 fn 8-10, 60 fn 11, 67 fn 30, 68 fn 34, 71 fn 40, 75 fn 45, 79 fn 51, 94 fn 31, 101 fn 49, 102 fn 51, 53; 105 fn 62-63, 109 fn 13, 114 fn 28, 115 fn 31, 120 fn 47, 123 fn 58, 124 fn 63, 126 fn 71, 130 fn 84, 241 fn 104 Bonaparte, Prince, 129 Bonapartist, missionary zeal, 13 Bonus, enlistment, 156, 265; separation, 198 Books, imported, 244 Border crossings, 141 Bosse, Admiral, letter to, 75, 114; operations, 99 Botanists, arrival of, 240 Bouffrement, Prince, de, 223 Boulbon, Raousset de, expedition, 14 Bounty, for deserters, 230 Boyer, Napoleon, Lieutenant Colonel, decorated, 115; dissolves Tribunal Supremo, 94; letter by, 183; letter to, 92 fn 24, 150 fn 67, 169 fn 39, 204 fn 85, 206 fn 102. See Boyer de Kerleau

299

INDEX

Brandy, sale, 227 Brazil, 282 Brazos Santiago, (South end of Padre Island, Texas) 139 Brest, ships from, 244 Bribes, allow contraband to pass, 204 Bridges, damage to, 215-216; railroad, 207; repair, 242 Brigade Jiménez, 2 6 9 Brigandage, suppression, 58, 96, 263 Brincourt, Augustin-Henri, Colonel, 44; appointed military governor, 54; campaign in north, lOO, 168; criticism, 144; critical of Bazaine, 166, 222-223; enters Chihuahua City, 100; letter to, 107 fn 5, 109 fn 13; proposed command, 165-166; refuses assignment, 129 British, criticism of French, 212; friendship alienated, 56 Bronter, filibuster ship, 143 Brown, General (Federal), 139 Brownsville, Texas, 172 fn 51, 212 fn 130; amphibious operations proposed, 152; attack on, 131 fn 88, 138; commander, 152; Confederate troops at, 150; supply to Juárez via, 165; troops in, 85, 138-139, 149, 154 Budget, for clergy, 80 Budin, 115; at meeting, 78; Intendant of Finances, 51, 224; letter, 224 fn 21; letter to, 83 fn 65, 242 fn 114, 254 fn 7 Buenavista, guards at, 111 fn 20 Buenavista, Hacienda de, 53, 234 Buenavista, Palace of, sale, 2 1 3 Buenos Aires, French interest in, 15 Buffon, Camille, 2 4 9 fn 165, 167, 169, 171, 173 Bulletin, publication, 52 Bull-fighting, 255 Bureau Arabe, 30 fn 71, 279 Bureau of Administration, 169 fn 42 Bureau of Mexican Affairs, 169 fn 42 Burg, von, Major, 47 fn 41 Burnoff, M. [E.?], 242 Bushneil, Clyde Gilbert, 168 fn 36 Butrón, Ignacio, outlaw-band leader, 86, 264 Cabarets, 227 Cabinet, French, 141 Cabinet, Mexican, Imperial, 285; anti-

French feeling, 132, 208; covert opposition to France and Maximilian, 147, 153, 169 fn 42; extreme measures, 147; French impatience with, 140; policy 238; rebukes Mejia, 139 Cabinet, United States, discusses war, 148 Cabrera, prisoner, released, 129 Cabrioto, Simón, 268-69 Caciques, the Three, 228 Cadena, José María V. de la, Juarist general, joins Empire, 9 8 Cadena, José Maria de la, 203 Cadereyta de Montes (Querétaro), 116,

226

Cadre, furnished by French, 150 Calderón, J. (Imperial general), defeat, 176 California (State), Confederate colony from, 238; French harassed, 131 fn 88; guerrilla band from, 268; Mexican trade with, 181; support for Juárez in, 143, 151 California, Gulf of, 282; filibusters in, 172-173; patrolled by U.S. Navy, 243 fn 30 Callao (Peru), 143 fn 30 Calle del pulque, 249 Calle de los Capuchinos, incident, 23 Camacho, (Imperial) Colonel, 176 Camargo (Coahuila), battle at, 172; Juarist troops in, 144, 149 Campaigns, Veracruz to Mexico City, 35-49; of the Interior, 70, 87-100, 244 Campbell, M.L.D., diplomatic agent (US), 201 Campeche (Campeche, earlier Yucatán), accepts the Empire, 97; attack on, 13 fn 1 Campillo, Santiago, letter by, 153 fn 88 Campos, Mariano, Under-Secretary of Hacienda, 206 fn 101 Canales, Servando, (Juarist) General, attack by, 167, 171; increase in troops, 144 Canaris, Wilhelm, Admiral, 4 9 fn 50 Cañelo, Hacienda de, 234 Cannon, production of ammunition, 46. See Artillery Cano, see García Cano Canrobert, François-Antoine-Certain, Marshal, 276 Cantarito, (Juarist) General, death, 98

300

INDEX

Cape Horn, return via, 202 fn 71 Capellanía, La (Nuevo León), fined, 234 Capilla, La (Veracruz), routes via, 41 Capital punishment, for offenses, 147; for war rebels, 145 fn 38 Capitulation, 277. See Surrender Captains, Mexican (Imperial), 269 Captains, French, see Capitan, Carrère, Charrier, Didier, Dubessol, Jaquin, Willette Capitan, Prosper-Aimé, Captain, attack by, 27 Carbajal (Juarist leader), José María J., agent, 136 fn 5, 163; guerrilla band, 165 (same?); near Tampico, 99, 148 Carlist Wars, 30 fn 71, 278 Carlota, Empress, 6, 247, 288, 291-292; criticism, 137, 200; illness, 201; letter, 270 fn 82; military support, 113; packages, 140; return, 186-187; returns to France, 174-175, 178, 180, 187, 195; Yucatán trip, 153 Carlota Colony, 239 Carina (Leader of outlaw band), letter to, 96 fn 36, 272 fn 101 Carmen, Isla de, 85 fn 7; contraband via, 130; French occupation, 24 Carnicero (Jalisco), line of defense, 180 Carpeaux, Jean Baptiste (Jules), 15 Carrasco, appointment of, 76 Carrelet, Paul P[ierre], Major, 12th Cavalry, 5 5 Carrère, Captain P., 250 fn 176 Carriage service, H q . 54 Carvajal, José María J. See Carbajal. Juarist agent, 136 fn 5 Casamata (Veracruz), 176; fortification, 242 Casanova, Francisco B., 265 fn 56 Case, Lynn M „ 274 fn 1 Castañeda, C. E., 1 3 fn 2 Castagny, Armand Alexandre, 31, 34, 115, 131 fn 88, 132 fn 91, 142, 152; Brigade, 42, 136; campaign, 89, 95, 98-99, 113, 216, 223, 236; Division Commander, 88, 163, 224; letter by, 205 fn 95, 250 fn 176; letters to, 108 fn 10, 138 fn 12, 139 fn 14, 141, 145 fn 35, 148 fn 48, 149 fn 54, 151 fn 74, 152 fn 78, 82, 158 fn 106, 161 fn 3-4, 163 fn 10, 165 fn 22, 178 fn 81, 182 fn 100; 184 fn 2, 203 fn 75, 207 fn 107-108, 222 fn 16, 233 fn 64, 234

fn 73-74, 238 fn 91; organizational work, 168, 185; withdrawal, 181, 186, 207 Castellanos, Military commander, 264 Castelnau, Henri Pierre Jean-Abdon, General, arrival, 186, 189-190; communication with Pierron, 194 fn 43; complications caused by, 187, 190, 195, 200, 202; d r a f t letter found, 192; favors abdication, 188, 199 fn 53, 201 fn 67; illness, 206; letter by, 193, 199 fn 53-56; letter to, 198, 198 fn 51, 200 fn 61; mission announced, 185; powers, 190-193, 197, 199; proposed marriage, 195 fn 46, 258; returns to France, 215, 274 Castiglione, ship, 216 Castillo y Cos, Martin del, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 154, 213 fn 135 Casualties, see Medical problems Casus belli, sought, 26, 276 Catholic Religion (Roman, Apostolic), powers, 79; protection of, 58. See also Church officials; Nationalized Property; Clergy Cattle, for Juarist Army, 173 fn 57, 234; ownership of, 40 fn 22 Caudilloism, increase of, 150 Cavalry, escape from Puebla, 4 8 fn 44\ guard bridge, 111 fn 20; Imperial Army, 204; in campaign, 90; Márquez Division, 93; of Lozada, 97; protective screen furnished by, 40, 43; use as police, 253. See Chasseurs. 5th Regiment (Hussars) h a d 1 squadron in Mexico; the rest stayed in h o m e station at Mans Cavalry, American, arrival of, 152 Cayenne, proposed for prisoners of war, 49 Cazadores (Mexican troops), cadres, 194 fn 44, 261; recruiting, 182, 204, 238, 265 Cazotte, Charles, letter, 143 fn 30-31, 148 fn 51, 149 fn 61, 173 fn 55, 248 fn 155; sues filibuster, 206 fn 98 Cedrai (San Luis Potosí), fine levied, 152, 234; garrison, 180 Censorship, of t h e press, 5 8 Centralist leaders, opposition to Juárez, 17. See Conservatives Cerro Borrego, Battle of, 29 Cerro de León, bivouac, 4 0

INDEX

Cerro de San Juan, 43, 47 Cerro de Uranga, 4 3 Cerro Gordo, Battle of, 37 Cerro de Tepoxúchil (also Loma de Tepoxúchil), 43 Chachapa (Puebla), troop movement via, 42 Chalco, bands near, 270 Châlons, 242, 276 Chamal, Hacienda de, 232 Chamber of Deputies, French, 30 Champ-d'Asile, 14 fn 5 Champs Elysées, styles, 225 Chantreau Method, 246 Chaplain, French Army, 7, 245; Maximilian's, 123; refuses services, 116 Chapultepec, Imperial court, 186; left unused, 211; munition manufacture, 46; refurbishing, 108; troops quartered in, 55 Chargé d'affaires, Austrian, 205 fn 93; Belgian, 116 Charles V, 285 Charrier, François Edouard, Captain, 243 Chassepot rifles, 275 Chasseurs à pied, First Battalion, 44; 7th Battalion, 48; 20th Battalion, 48. First Battalion had 6 companies in Mexico; two companies remained at Saint Omer. 7th Battalion had 6 companies in Mexico; two battalions remained at home station in Toulouse. 18th Battalion had 6 companies in Mexico; two companies remained in Strassbourg. 20th Battalion had two companies in Mexico; two companies remained in Auxonne Chasseurs d'Afrique, 31 fn 72, 57, 115, 226; Military action, 28; sent to Africa, 31; 1st, 115; 2nd, 115; 12th Regiment, 49. First regiment had First and Sixth Squadrons in Mexico; rest remained at home station at Mustaphas. Second Regiment had 3rd and 4th Squadrons in Mexico; the rest stayed at home station in Oran. The Third Regiment had 4th and 5th Squadrons in Mexico; the rest remained at home station in Oran. The Twelfth Regiment had two squadrons in Mexico; the rest remained at home station in Carcassonne

301

Chastel, Major, of Gendarmerie, 115 Chateaubriand, François-René, 15 Chávez, José Maria, 98, ex-Governor of Aguascalientes, 232, 263-264; political prefect, 264 Chávez, Juan, appointed, 76 Checks (on Empire), protested, 128; (personal) seized, 206 fn 98 Chef suprême de la Nation, title, 29, 33 Cherokee Nation, 284 Chiapas State, joins Empire, 99, 132, 282; not in Empire, 99 Chief of Staff, Forey's, see Auvergne; Loizillon, 166 fn 27; Ortega's, see Mendoza Chihuahua City, French occupation, 155; Juárez flees from, 100, 113 Chihuahua, Estado de, 282; expedition, 224; French withdrawal from, 166, 168, 171, 175; occupied by French, 100, 222; outside Empire, 99; use of Mexican troops in, 144 China, French influence in, 15 Chinacos, Los, 268 Chiquihuite River, withdrawal to, 23, 27 Chivilini, Señorita, 246 Cholula, Garita de, 43; pyramids, 285; reconnaissance, 43; road, 43 Chopin, Frédéric-François, 15 Christian Religion, 285 Church, Catholic, Roman, Apostolic, missionary work, 259; officials, 77; prerogatives, 17; property rights, 77, 161. See Catholic; Clergy; Nationalized Property Church officials, criticism of, 260; withdrawal from overt defiance, 97 Churches, see San Esteban; absence of(!), 253; French billets in, 220; ornaments taken from, 235 Chusmas, outlaw bands, 96 Cinco de Mayo Battle, 44 Circular Letters, to all commanders, 110, 165 fn 22, 203-204, 206, 234 fn 81 Circulaire . . . , 172 fn 51 Cities, burned, 236; evacuation by civil government, 53; evacuation by French, 180-181; fight in ruins, 44 fn 30; fines, 185; occupation of, 88; self-protection, 160; theatrical programs, 256

302

INDEX

City government, Carmen, 24; organization, 168; Veracruz, 2 0 fn 29 Civil administration, limits on, 234; relinquished to the Empire, 1 1 0 Civil affairs, compulsion, see Fines, levy, corvée; left to military commanders, 87, 178 fn 79; reorganization, 7 9 fn 51; responsibility for, 64, 92; turned over to priests, 61 Civil rights, suspended, 110 Civil service system, in U.S., 74; postponed, 156 Civil W a r , acknowledged, 145; danger of, 197; peculiarity, 68; sovereign's neutrality, 151 Civil W a r (U.S. Federalists vs. Confederates, 1861-1864), developments in Texas, 113; lessons of, 275, 2 8 1 ; U.S. preoccupied with, 107, 131 Civil W a r , Spanish, veteran of, 3 0 Clark, William (General, U.S.), at Brownsville, 154, 1 5 8 Clarksville (Texas), 154 fn 95 Claussen, Ed. Α., letter by, 2 5 0 fn 176 Clemency, appeal for, 2 3 1 Cler, Jean-Joseph Gustave, 2 4 8 fn 148 Clergy, attitude, 117, 124; criticized, 79, 122; discontent fomented, 130; documents ' critical of, 124, 2 6 0 ; duties, 116; income, 80; jurisdiction, 80; oppose European styles, 2 2 5 ; reform of, 78; responsible for Indian attitudes, 111. See Church Property Clericals, civil jurisdiction over, 125; represent conservative policy, 57, 1 0 8 fn 7; return to Mexico, 78. See Church officials Cloué, G. Commander, Letter to, 148 fn 50, 5 3 , 1 4 9 fn 60, 150, 173 fn 58, 176 fn 70, 182 fn 99, 2 0 1 fn 63, 66, 227 fn 39, 2 6 6 fn 59; orders to, 2 0 3 ; telegram from, 2 0 1 fn 64 Clute, Carlos C., 2 4 2 Coahuila, State of, French withdrawal, 175; state of siege, 2 1 fn 35 Cocio, José María, 157 Cock-fighting, 2 5 5 Cofre de Perote, 2 4 7 Colección completa de los decretos . . ., 51 fn 55-57, 52 fn 58, 5 8 fn 4-5 Colegio Hispano-Mexicano de Jesús, 245 Colegio literario de Idiomas y Bellas

Artes, 2 4 5 Colima, State of, escape to, 90, 9 7 ; pacification, 9 5 , 99, 121; state of siege, 2 1 fn 35 Collaborators with French, decree, 2 0 fn 28 Collective punishment, 2 3 3 Colonels, Belgian, see Zack, Van der Smissen Colonels, Confederate, see Denis Colonels, Federal (U.S.), see Dana(?) Colonels, French, see Aymard, Carlson, D'Ornano, Doutrelaine, Gamier, L a Canorgue, L a Croix, Lafon(t), Llórente, Manèque, Marguerite, Maussion, Morard, Petit Colonels, Lieutenant, French, see Boyer, Copmartin, Fistié, Lewaí, Potier Colonels, Mexican (Empire), see José Valero, López, Rubio, Sánchez Fació, Zermeño Colonels, Mexican (Juarist), see Pastor y Ramírez Colonial administration, French, 30, army adapted to, 276 Colonists, contract with Juarists, 173 Colonization scheme, 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 Colorado River (?), 173 fn 55 Colonization, Sonora, 131 fn 88 Colson, E . , letter by, 165 fn 21, 179 fn 85 Columbia, see Sons of Columbia Comaltefco] (Veracruz), 8 5 Combattants, legal, recognition, 3 5 fn 12 Command line, 1 6 9 fn 42 Commandant Supérieur, letter to, 147 fn 47; Arroyozarco, 2 3 6 fn 72; Córdoba, 2 2 0 fn 8, 2 3 9 fn 93; León, 2 2 0 fn 9; Matehuala, 2 3 5 fn 76; Puebla, 2 3 4 fn 70; Querétaro, 2 2 9 fn 45; San Luis de la Paz, 2 6 1 fn 39; Silao, 129; Veracruz, 145 fn 36, 2 2 3 fn 16, 2 4 6 fn 134 Commercial activity, commercial cargoes, 2 4 4 ; increase in, 132; Jecker interests, 2 3 2 ; Matamoros, 153; Monterrey, 153, 180; routes, 181, 181 fn 98; Tampico, 84 Commissary, expenses of, 182; supplies,

226

Commission, to handle property, 51

INDEX

Commissions, Military, French officers, 179; granted by Bazaine, 175; requested by Confederates, 142 Commissioners, appointment, 120; Imperial, 141, 169 fn 40, 182 Communication, Juarist, 267; lines of, 203; within the Empire, 132 Comonfort, Ignacio, 123; death, 90; military action, 43-44, 52; negotiations with Empire, 72, 90-91, 97; threats of attack from, 42-43; pursuit of, 45 fn 35, 46-47 Company-grade officers, capture, 49 Concepción, La (Puebla), troop movement via, 41 Conchos, Río de, 100 Concordia (Sinaloa), 236 Conductors, musical, see Cenobio Paniagua Confederate Agents, see Mercier. Other agents not discussed here: Albert Vignau, Juan Quintero, R. T. Ford, Charles J. Helm Confederate Army (CSA), colonization scheme, 238; deserters from, 135; fight with Federals, 135-136; rebellion, 138; refuge in Mexico, 137, 139, 146 Confederate Officers, request commissions, 142 Confederate Refugees in Mexico, 136; enlistment, 142; instructions on treatment of, 139; offers to, 140 Confederate States of America, ballots accepted, 281; exports, 139; recognition policy toward Mexico, 107; refugees, 136 Confiscation, order against, 206; supplies, 40 fn 22 Congress, difficulty of calling, 58; national, to be called, 189 Congress, Mexican (Juárez Government), repeals moratorium, 19 Conorgue, see Meri de la Conorgue Consejo de guerra, 120 Conservative Party, appeal to European governments, 17; authorship of law, 147; appointments, 184, 193; approval of Imperial measures, 120; comes into power, 184, 202, 207; concessions to, 52, 162 fn 6, 193; controls Maximilian, 208, 283; criticism, 196; demands for reforms, 51;

303

French opposition to, 100, 196; influence of, 29, 284; in government office, 74-77, 107; Mexican opposition to, 107; oppose French, 198; party of decent people, 64 fn 23; policy, 72, 78, 117, 161, 246, 255; rapprochement with liberals, 130, 286; relations with French Army, 36, 104, 196, 199 fn 53, 212 fn 132; severity of suggestions, 49-50, 147 Conspiracy, conspirators subject to trial, 210, fn 122; increase in, 207; Veracruz, 173 Constitution of 1857, oath to, 116 Consul Général de France, à la Havane, 103 fn 56; San Francisco, 143 Consuls, see England, Spain, Prussia, United States, French, Mexican; delegation of, 52 Continental, Newspaper (New York), 236 fn 84 Contraband, commerce in, 114; entry of, 204, 264; traders, 13; war goods, 130 Contre-guérillas, 35, 85, 99, 113, 176, 232 Convention of July, 37, 199, 206. See Treaties Convents, 245; for women, 257-258; used by French, 219. See San Domingo (Santo Domingo), Santa Inés, La Merced Convoy duty, 70; by French guards, 212 fn 132; by Olvera, 171-172 Copmartin, Louis-Henri-Eugène, Lieut. Col., 245; garrison, 41 Cordoba, proclamation, 29; telegraph line, 242; Treaty of, 14; troops in, 22, 27, 215 Corn (zea mays), used as food, 34, 255 fn 11 Cornu, MMe., 108 fn 7 Corona, Ramón, Juarist general, alleged orders, 206 fn 98; attacks ship, 167; communication with, 180; increased strength, 162, 172; guerrilla band, 154 Coatlán del Rio (Morelos), Corona in, 162 Corral Falso (Vera Cruz near Plan del Rio), bivouac in, 37 Correspondencia de la legación . .., 136 fn 5

304

INDEX

Corta, Carlos Eustaquio, appointment, 113; letter to, 240 fn 102 Cortés, Hernando, 14, 4 1 , 84 Cortés y Esparza, José María, Minister of State, 137 Corti, Egon Caesar Graf, 7, 18 fn 40, 124 fn 63, 131 fn 87-88, 146, 156 fn 99, 1 5 9 fn 108, 174 fn 59, 187 fn 18, 189 fn 23, 191 fn 35, 1 9 2 fn 36, 194 fn 43, 199 fn 53, 2 0 1 fn 67 Cortina, Juan N. (Juarist leader), 2 9 3 ; archives, 1 6 7 ; ; controls Tamaulipas, 85; in Bagdad, 154; increase in troops, 144, 172; in Matamoros, 113, 135, 143; in Tampico, 99; in Texas, 149; tactics, 175 Corvée, defined, 2 3 5 fn 81; used as means of compelling obedience, 185, 235 Cosalá (Sinaloa), 131 fn 88 Cosmetics, use of, 2 5 9 Cotton, exports, 121 fn 50, 1 3 9 Council of State, 1 2 3 (Council of Ministers); attitudes toward, 122; absence of Bazaine, 184; Lares heads, 211; meeting, 166; powers, 134, 196; Uraga appointed, 9 9 Coup d'état, 1851, 30; feared, 127 Courtois Roussel d'Hurbal, CharlesJoseph Henri, General, decorated, 115; letter, 1 7 9 Court-martial, amnesty, 114; continued, 131; criticized, 188 fn 20; described, 2 3 7 ; dissolved, 148 fn 49; jurisdiction, 2 2 9 , 2 3 1 ; law on, 101; new system, 146-147, 188; operation of, 93, 123, 178; sentences, 120, 123, 204, 2 3 0 , 233, 2 6 4 ; powers, 120; threatened, 68; trials by, 131 fn 88, 152, 2 6 3 - 2 6 4 . See also W a r Council, Consejo de Guerra Courts of Justice, 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 impartiality, 58, jurisdiction, 80, 2 3 1 ; sentences, 120. See Court-martial Covarrubias, see Diaz Covarrubias Crainvilliers, Jacques-Isidore, Captain, attacks Malpaso, 9 8 Cravioto, Los, 268. See Cabrioto Crawford, Samuel Wylie, General [Federal], aid to Juárez, 153; attack by, 155; escape, 165; imprisonment, 155 fn 95; loan for Juárez, 152 Creole class, 69, 2 8 4

Crimean Campaign, 2 4 7 , 2 9 2 ; veteran of, 3 0 Criminals, Mexicans, 2 2 8 Cristeros, Los, 2 6 9 Croatians, in Gendarmerie, 2 6 2 Cruelty, complaints of, 2 3 2 , 2 6 2 , 2 6 7 Cruz Blanca (Veracruz), reconnaissance, 39-40 Cuautitlán (Mexico), incident at, 2 3 1 Cuba, purchase of mules, 2 0 fn 31, 38; return from, 6 9 Cuchevel, Α., 14 fn 7 Cuelebroeck, Blondel van, letter, 136 fn2,4 Cuéllar, Rafael, Colonel, in Lagos, 7 6 Cuemavaca (Morelos), 2 7 0 Cuisine, Mexican, 2 5 4 - 2 5 5 Culiacán (Sinaloa), 131 fn 68; Juarist forces near, 154, 172 Cupilco (Tabasco), Juarist supply point, 153 Currency, stabilization decree, 52 Customs officers, American, 165; in Veracruz, 2 2 , 4 0 fn 22, 121 fn 50, 140, 175, 199, 206; operated by French, 161, 206; organization, 7 6 , 161; packages free of duty, 140; receipts, 84, 164, 206; Tampico, 84 Dabbs, J. Α., 14 fn 5, 2 8 3 fn 11 Damages, paid by French, 2 3 2 Dana, Francisco, Colonel (also called Captain), 1 7 3 Dano, Alphonse, 2 1 3 fn 132; French Minister, 78, 2 0 2 , 2 0 6 ; instructions, 191, 1 9 9 fn 53, 2 0 1 ; letter by, 198, fn 51, 1 9 9 fn 56; letter to, 198; marriage, 195 fn 46, 258; meeting with Castelnau, 186, 1 8 9 fn 25, 199; wire to, 2 1 5 Daran, Martin, offer refused, 54 Darien, Isthmus of, 18 fn 14 David d'Angers, Pierre Jean, sculptor, 15 Davis, Jefferson, 136; letter by, 107 fn 3 Daylight attack, 4 7 Death Penalty, for robbery, 2 3 7 ; for war rebels, 1 4 5 fn 38; mitigated, 2 3 1 Debts, Foreign, Mexican, collection, 175; French, 180; interest on, 199; Maximilian, 198; moratorium, 18; provision for, 1 5 9 Decrees, Imperial, of January 2 6 , 144;

INDEX

of October S, 146, 152; on fines, 149 Decrees, issued by French, Forey, 51 57, 77; Junta Superior, 58; stabilization of currency, 52. See Decreto Decrees of Mexican Government of Juárez, 18 fn 15, 19, 20 fn 28, 21 fn 35, 27; secularizing Church property, 79 Decrees of the Regency, amnesty, 102; August 19, 1863, 68; military organization, 67; on Sunday work, 60; on Tribunal Supremo, 94 Decrees, Spanish Military Government, 2Û fn 29 Decrees, of Almonte, 30, 101. See Bando Decreto, 19 fn 20 Decreto de secuestro, 51; disapproval, 71, 79; withdrawal, 82 Decreto sobre bienes municipales, 51; disapproval, 71 Decreto sobre secuestros de bienes, criticized, 61, 71, 79; revoked, 71, 81 Defections, see Desertion; 128 Degollado, [Santos], in New York, 148 Delacroix, Ferdinand-Victor-Eugène, 15 Delsaux, Major, 29 fn 65 Democratic Political System, 183 Denis, Colonel, Confederate agent, 142 Deportation, sentence to, 233; to Martinique, 120 Desamortization, laws of, 79 Deserters, accepted by Imperial Army, 93 fn 27, 102; accepted by Juarists, 267; crimes committed by, 226 Desertion, Cazadores, 265; encouraged, 68, 97, 100, 104, 141, 155; French soldiers, 53, 230; frequency, 150, 157, 265; of military leaders, 102, 128, 169; over lack of pay, 265; Spanish soldiers, 85 Devil's Island, 49 Diario del Imperio, El, 146 fn 44, 189 fn 24, 243 fn 126 Díaz, Félix, 28 fn 60 Díaz, Porfirio, 6, 273, 285; attack by, 215; captured, 126; escape, 49, 86, 129 fn 81; letter by, 209 fn 113; military harassment, 88, 156, 203, 230; negotiations with French, 209; received contraband, 204; regime, 74, 262; spying, 205; troops, 269 Diaz Covarrubias, Francisco, 244

305

Díaz de la Vega, Rómulo, appointment, 75 Díaz Mirón, Manuel, Colonel, Governor of Veracruz, 38 fn 17, 85; guerrilla band, 38 fn 17, 40 Dictatorship, possibility, 196 Didelot, Rear Admiral, letter to, 165 fn 22, 172 fn 51; orders to, 150, 164 fn 15, 17, 170 Didier, Gérard-Léon, Captain, 234 Dilloge, Major, 3rd Zouaves, 234 Diocese, 58 Diplomats, American, 134 Disaffection, charge of, 231 Discipline, military, French, 214, 217219, 221 Diseases, endemic fevers, 226; sick rate, 226-227; spread of, 216 fn 141; tropical, 21; venereal, 226-227. See Vòmito negro, Typhus Dishonesty, Imperial officials, 264 Dissidents, use of term, 273 Doblado, Manuel, correspondence, 63 fn 23, 73; defeat at Matehuala, 98; letter to, 20 fn 28, 24 fn 45; manifesto, 131 fn 88; military command, 87, 89-90; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21; negotiations, 22-23, 28, 72, 91-92, 97, 102; pursuit of, 91; quarrel with Juárez, 91 fn 21; signs convention, 21; son-in-iaw, 98; widow, 220 Doctors, French, 226; Mexican, 226; of medicine, 240. See Medical officers, Ángel Iglesias Documentos inéditos o muy raros . .., references too numerous to list Domec, Captain, 206 fn 98 Domenech, Emmanuel, history, 7, 29 fn 66, 32 fn 1 Dos Bocas (Veracruz), Juarist supply point, 153 Dos Ríos, Los, (Puebla), camp, 37 Douay, Félix, 36, 42, 44-45, 115, 129, 142 fn 26; appointment, 31, 222; campaign 89-90, 97, 121, 175; care of PW's, 44, 205; command, 87-88, 95, 137, 167 fn 28, 191, 199, 234; complaint against Bazaine, 195; letter by, 153 fn 89, 213 fn 132, 230 fn 53, 273 fn 113; letter to, 148 fn 48-49, 149 fn 54, 151 fn 74, 152 fn 78, 153 fn 83, 154 fn 94-95, 156 fn 100, 158 fn 106, 161 fn 3,163 fn 10, 165 fn 22,

306

INDEX

167 fn 30, 172 fn 53, 173 fn 57, 180 fn 93, 189 fn 25, 200, 203 fn 76, 205 fn 96, 232 fn 62, 234 fn 68, 235 fn 78, 243 fn 118, 272 fn 101; opinions, 112, 198, 264; orders to, 35, 203; tactics, 45 fn 35, 171 Doutrelaine, Louis-Touss.-Simon, Colonel, 240, 242 Drama, 292. plays presented, 256-257 [They are not separately listed in the index]; recreational medium, 246; Spanish plays, 256 Drouyn de Lhuys, Edouard, 280 fn 9 Drunkenness, 224, 229-230 Dubessol, Captain, see Dufaure du Bessol Dublán y Lozano, Manuel, 18 fn 15, 90 fn 20 Dueñas, Jesús, 220 Dufaure du Bessol, Joseph Arthur, 270 fn 80, 272 fn 109 Dukedom, suggested for Bazaine, 165 Dumas, Alexandre, 15 Duniway, Clyde Α., 159 fn 109 Dunlop, Hugh, 20 fn 32 Dupin, Charles, Colonel, command of Contreguéríllas, 35, 85, 99, 113, 234235, 272 fn 109-, courts-martial, 232233; letter by, 235 fn 80; letter to, 239 fn 98 Duprat, H „ 250 fn 176 Durango City, fined, 234; occupied by French, 99-100, 224 Durango, State of, colonization scheme, 238; Confederate refugees in, 141; French garrison in, 100, 222; French withdrawal, 181, 186; mines, 13; opposition to French, 131 fn 88, 132 fn 91; telegraph line, 242; towns fined, 138 Durango, Regiment of, 48 Duty Status, disponibilité, 192 Duval, Julio, 18 fn 14 Echánove, see Escudero y Echánove Echegaray, Miguel María [also Echeagaray], 249 Eco de Europa, El, 20 fn 29 Economic problems, raw materials for France, 32 Economic theories, 15 Ecuador, French intervention, 18, 18 fn 14

Edwards, Milne, 240 Education, of women, 258. See Ministry of Education, Ministro de Instrucción Pública, Public Instruction Egypt, French influence in, 15; troops in, 275; troops recruited in, 31, 162 Ejército del Centro [Central Army], organization of, 152 fn 81 Election, Americans, 151; of Juarist government, 16, 207; of new government, 58, 280; proposed, 73; to retain Empire, 208; universal suffrage, 183 Elguerro, Hilario, appointment, 123 Elizabeth Owens, supply ship, 143 Elizondo, (Juarist general), joins Empire, 97 Elliot, railroad contractor, 162 Eloin, Félix (Belgian), Chief of Staff to Maximilian, 130 El Paso (Texas) or El Paso del Norte, 247; Juárez flees to, 100, 145; travel from, 156 Embarcation, see French Expeditionary Force Embezzlement, 263 Emparán, Orden . . . ,77 fn 49 Emperor, see Napoleon III, Maximilian Epidemic, death from, 227; typhus, 98 Empire, French (Second), 297; critics, 232, 293; dress styles, 225; inclusion, 280; support of Bazaine, 138. See Randon, Minister of War, Paris [Government of]. Empire, Mexican, Second, abandonment, 54 fn 23; assumes more powers, 210; cities favor, 141; co-operation with French, 122, 150, 210, 213 fn 135; critics, 232, 292; designation, 270-271; danger of collapse, 197, 199, 207-208; deteriorating position, 131 fn 88, 164, 197; diplomatic recognition, 107 fn 3, 144-145, 281; divided into Military districts, 150; encouragement for, 163; establishment, 59, 106-107; finances, 128, 161, 163, 165, 171, 182, 208; French separation of interests, 185, 202-203, 210; French responsibilities left to, 209; hope for support, 107, 232, 269; ignored by Santa Anna, 103; ignores French departure, 214; Indian policy, 291; joined by Juarist generals, 97, 266 fn 61, 269; loses popularity, 181;

INDEX

manifesto, 146; national security, 129, 177; policies executed, 217; pronunciamiento against, 127; reforms needed, 117, 119, 168, 204; requests French aid, 212 fn 132; substitute for, 183, 189; to decide on occupation areas, 164; to settle Maximilian's debts, 198; warned not to help Confederacy, 107 fn 3; weapons supply, 167. See Political analysis, Imperial Army, Imperial Government Empire de Maxitnilien, 8. See Gaulot Empress of Mexico, see Carlota Emulos de Hiram, 247 Engerrand, G. C., 9 Engineers, civil, 240; military, 45, 204; mining, 241; repairs by, 206, 216; quarters, 55; return of, 112 England, 73, 278, 281; Consul, 52; diplomatic recognition withdrawn, 18; Empire, 279; Indian policy, 284; military alliance, 18 English, absorb old French Empire, 15; affairs left to Belgian legation, 18, see 18 fn 18; claim against Miramón, 23, 69; disillusion with Intervention, 23-25; offer of navy transport, 24 fn 45; packet boat, 103; women, 259, 278 English Army, 20; command, 21; in ships, 22; scholarship among officers, 16; withdrawn, 74 English Language, influence on French, 248; instruction in, 246, 259 Englishmen, home of, 54 Enlistments, see Recruiting Enterprise, delivers supplies, 152 Epidemics, 253 Escadrons du Train, Third Company, Second Squadron in Mexico; rest remained at home station in Algiers. Third Squadron, First and Second Companies in Mexico, rest at home station in Oran. Fifth Company, 4th Squadron in Mexico, rest at home station in Châteauroux. Fifth Squadron, fifth and sixth companies in Mexico; rest at home station in Vernon Escandón, Antonio, sent to Europe, 59 Escobedo, Mariano, (Juarist General), at Matamoros, 171; cruelties, 155; escape, 49; increase in troops, 144,

307

154 fn 95; negotiations, 205; supplies, 172 fn 51; tactics, 175, 215 Escudero y Echánove, Pedro, Minister of Justice, 137 Esparza, see Cortés y Esparza Espasa-Calpe Enciclopedia, 152 fn 81 Espinosa, (Juárez general), increase in troops, 144 Espinosa, Rafael, letter by, 86 fn 9 Estafette, L', editor, 174 fn 59; opinions, 63 Estrada, see Gutiérrez de Estrada Eugénie, Empress, 291; letter by, 117, 138 fn 10 Europe, 174, 255, 286; comparison with Church problems in, 80; Conservatives left in, 17; departure of Maximilian, 108-109; deputation sent to, 59; intervention starts, 18-19, 80; military situation, 171; military tradition, 190, 268; raw materials for, 13; reports sent to, 88; volunteers from, 164 Europeans, health, 21; on Rio Grande, 157 Eviction, 239 Exacción, term protested, 138 Excommunication, by Labastida, 94-95 Executions, summary, 264, 266; approval of, 119; Austrians, 171; desertion, 230; reprisal, 96; restricted, 93, 206, 233 Executive power, exercise of, 58 Exiles, asylum offered, 136 Expeditionary force, French, see French Expeditionary Force. Extradition, of criminals, 135 Facio, see Sánchez Fació Factories, cartridge, 204; labor in, 257; powder, 204; soap, 232 Fair, at San Juan de los Lagos, 203 Far East, French Army in, 275 Fashions, European dress, 225, 259 Favre, Jules, opposition policy, 112 Federal Army (Northern U.S. as distinguished from the Confederates), 222; aid Juarist troops, 143, 149 fn 60, 152, 168, 172; attack Bagdad, 154; attacks by, 131 fn 88, 135; breach of neutrality, 149, 154; demobilization, 167; deserters, 135, in Brownsville, 138; insubordination, 167; meet

308

INDEX

French Troops, 138 fn 11; negro problem, 141; on Rio Grande, 85, 113, 149; supervise elections, 281; supplies, 141; threat represented by, 135, 137; training, 141 Federal political system, 183; recommended for Mexico, 161 Federals (Mexican), see Liberals, Juarist Government; designation, 271; Federal regime, 208 Federal troops, (Mexican, Juarist), increased pressure, 186 Federation, see Republic of Mexico Felony Cases, trial of, 231 Feudalism, 284 Field-grade officers, capture, 49; registration, 141 Filibusters, attack French ship, 154; attack Imperial ship, 206; in Mexico, 139, 143, 282; join Juárez forces, 138, 153-154, 160, 163 fn 11, 165, 167, 172-176, 267; to furnish own supplies, 144 fn 33 Finance, Commission for, established,

113

Finances, Inspector General of, 206 Finance Officer, Mexican, key to chest, 67 fn 32 Finances, Secretary of State for (Imperial), 121; criticism of, 122; loan for, 174 Finance Officer, French Army, in Mexico, 54; help Mexican officials, 121; pay of Foreign Legion, 170; sent to help Márquez, 93; subsidy, 128, 264. See Gervason, Jupeaux, Harmant, Langlais, Rolland Finances, artillery salvos, 108; control of, 179; Imperial projects, 119, 151; payment of troops, 162 fn 6, 169; political pressure exerted by subsidy, 126, 128; relinquished to Empire, 110; sale of nationalized property, 51, 80, 124-125; secret funds, 234; special commissioner for, 80; subsidy to Empire, 166; subsidy to Lozada, 97 Finances, Inspector of, Imperial, Mexican, 185 Financiers, 240 Finck, Hugo, Consul, 220 Fin d'Empire, 8. See Gaulot Fines, at Mazatlán, 138; for military

weakness, 96, 152, 263; for Sunday work, 60; imposition suspended, 184; increased use of, 138, 224; military use, 233-235, 243; protection from, 219; restrictions on, 139 Firearms, handling of, 263. See Weapons. First Brigade, First Division, 54 First Division, commander, 33; coastal activities, 34; guides, 42; in siege of Puebla, 35, 39-41, 43; march, 53 Fiscal Officers, French, payment requisitions, 40 fn 22 Fischer, Agustín, Colonel, implicated in rebellion, 138; letter by, 211 fn 123; priest, 188 fn 20; with Maximilian, 211 Fistié, Jean-Phil.-Léandre, Lieutenant Colonel, 180 Flag, American, fidelity to, 265; on river boat, 139; on ship, 173 Flag, French, at Chapultepec, 108; dignity, 109; Mexico, 214; represents Intervention Policy, 111 Flag, Mexican, at Chapultepec, 108 Flagellation, 260 Flagship, see Powhatten Fleury, Christophe, Lieutenant, decorated, 115 Floods, Mexico City, 242 Flora, study, 240 Florido, Río, 100 Flores, parish priest, 220 Flores, Juan, 238 Flores, Sabino, 17 fn 12 Floresta, La (Puebla), troop movements to, 42 Florida Coast, 13 Flourroy, Confederate agent, 142 Folmer, Henri, 13 fn 3 Fonseca, Urbano, appointment, 123 Foods, illegal sale, 264; listed, 254; military supply, 34, 226, 277; prices, 20 fn 29 Forage, export prohibited, 131 fn 88 Forbach-Spikeren, 290 Forced contributions, outlawed, 57 Ford, John S., Colonel, prevents loss of guns, 138 Fords, 242 Foreign Affairs, control of, 161; minister of, 21; Under-secretary of State for, 241; vested in Bazaine, 63, 71

INDEX Foreign element/colony in Mexico, opposition of, 7 3 Foreign Legion, 2 4 2 - 2 4 3 , 2 7 9 ; characterization, 218; desertion, 2 3 0 , 2 6 8 ; inclusion of Indians, 7 0 - 7 1 ; opened to Confederate refugees, 140, 142; orders to, 2 0 3 ; organization, 166, 171; recruitment, 159, 161, 165, 169; service with, 3 0 fn 71, 85; transfer to Mexico contemplated, 65, 108 fn 7, 169, 194, 194 fn 44, 200. T w o battalions were in Mexico; one battalion remained in home station at Sidi-belAbbés Foreigners, 2 4 0 ; as officers, 2 6 7 ; dress allowed, 2 2 5 ; placed at disadvantage, 130; ridiculed, 131 fn 88 Forey, Elias Frédéric, 74; appointment, 30, 33; campaign plan, 35-36, 4 4 ; communications, 4 1 , 104; consolidation of position, 51; courage, 4 5 ; court-martial system, 123, 147; declines responsibility, 4 6 ; decree, 58; departure delayed, 6 1 - 6 3 ; enters Mexico City, 54-56; friends of, 2 2 2 ; headquarters, 42-43; instructions, 32, 57, 6 5 ; correspondence with, 103; letter to, 32 fn 1; Manifesto of June 12, 5 7 - 5 8 , 65, 170, 2 3 0 ; policy, 2 3 5 , 2 5 8 - 2 6 3 ; policy toward Mexican troops, 36, 4 9 - 5 0 , 70; political weakness, 6 0 , 66; proclamation, 33, 77; promotion, 60; surrender of authority, 59, 63; staff conference, 4 5 - 4 7 Fortifications, funds for, 2 3 4 fn 75; money for, 139; work on, 5 2 Fortín, Battle of, 2 8 Fragoso, Juarist leader, 2 3 4 France, affairs left to Prussian legation, 18; ambassadors to, 22; Carlota's trip to, 174; Chambers, 1 5 7 - 1 6 3 fn 11; Consul, 167 fn 29, (See also Viceconsul); couriers from, 87; cultural leadership, 183-184; diplomatic recognition withdrawn, 18; engineers needed, 2 4 3 ; good name, 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 ; interest in Mexico, 13, 32; interests in South America, 1 8 fn 14; intervention in Panama and Ecuador, 18; loan negotiations, 65; military alliance, 18; prisoners sent to, 50, 143 fn 30; proposed support of new government, 196; public feeling against

309

Intervention, 141; relations with the U.S., 142, 163, 167; return travel to, 31, 60, 2 1 4 , 2 1 6 , 2 2 2 , 2 7 4 ; Romantic movement, 15; supply of provisions, 39; toasted, 2 4 8 fn 156; travel from, 130; used as model, 5 8 , 110; viceconsul, letter, 5 6 Franco, Francisco, 164 fn 13; letter to, 2 6 9 fn 77; visitador imperial, 181 Franco-Mexican Army, 29; command, 64, 132-133; General Headquarters, 169 fn 42; harassment, 66; internal conflicts, 2 2 4 ; occupation of main points, 102, 154; responsible for order, 177; successes, 128; surveillance, 224 Franco-Prussian War, failure of, 7, 88, 275-277 Franz-Josef, Emperor of Austria-Hungary, 2 0 1 fn 67 Frédéric-Charles, Prince, 2 7 7 Freemasonry, 2 4 6 , 292 French Ambassador, 163 fn 11 French Army, campaign of 1863-1867, 14, 20, 85; chain of command, 192; chaplain, 7; contributions to Mexico, 2 1 7 ; criticism of, 6; Empire's independence from, 107; enlistment in, 3 0 fn 71; experience of troops, 15; Finance officer, 8; garrisons withdraw, 96; inactivity, 65; leave for Mexico, 20; movement of troops, 34, 37 fn 15; opposition to, 4 0 fn 24, 5 3 : pay, 54; personnel offices, 192; point of honor, 2 1 0 , 212 fn 132; policies, 9, 2 1 7 ; scholarship among officers, 16; strength of tradition, 196; used as example, 126; widespread contingents, 2 7 5 French civilians, 247; colony in Mexico City, 54; in Matamoros, 113; political refugees, 53; property of, 71; renegade, 53; women, 2 5 9 French consul, San Francisco, 2 0 6 French corsairs, 1 3 French Empire, Second, apologists, 7; colonies, 64 fn 23; intervention urged, 77; policy executed, 2 1 7 ; weapons supply, 167 French Expeditionary Force, 4 8 ; administration of, 2 1 4 ; asked to leave, 2 0 2 ; attitude toward, 7 1 , 122, 131 fn 88, 138, 147, 187, 2 7 4 fn 1; atti-

310

INDEX

tude toward Juarists, 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 fn 129; available list, 1 9 4 ; care for, 2 7 ; consolidation of forces, 160, 162, 1 6 8 ; convoy guard, 2 1 2 fn 132; danger of Empire's collapse, 1 9 7 ; dominant status, 9 7 ; discipline, 2 1 4 ; embarcation, 2 0 0 , 2 0 2 , 2 1 6 ; end urged, 141, 158; evacuation plans, 164, 166, 170, 175, 1 8 4 ; excommunicated, 9 4 ; financial aid to the Empire, 1 2 1 ; furnishes cadre, 1 5 0 ; garrison duty, 154, 1 7 8 ; in Acapulco, 1 6 8 ; increased duties, 1 1 9 ; insufficient numbers, 155, 2 8 2 ; leaves Mexico City, 2 1 4 ; legal status, 2 5 - 2 6 - 2 7 ; meets Federal troops, 1 3 8 fn 11; not to serve under Mexicans, 2 2 4 ; packages in customs, 1 4 0 ; parade, 1 1 5 fn 30; pays damages, 2 3 2 ; police responsibilities, 1 2 2 ; protest breach of neutrality, 1 5 4 ; reinforcements, 164, 1 6 9 ; relinquishes responsibilities to Empire, 2 0 9 , 2 1 2 ; relations with Austrians and Belgians, 1 3 2 ; reorganization, 1 1 3 ; repatriation, 112, 197, 2 0 0 ; retention attempted, 178, 1 9 4 ; periodic reports, 110; sale of Austrian property, 2 1 2 fn 132; size, 8 6 ; supplies, see Supplies, Military; supports Empire, 1 4 3 fn 29, 1 7 4 fn 61; supports Mejia and Lozada, 136; surveillance over Imperial officials, 1 1 0 ; troop movements, 2 2 - 2 3 , 2 0 3 ; withdrawal of troops, 1 7 6 - 1 7 7 , 183, 1 9 5 - 1 9 6 , 2 0 3 - 2 0 4 , 2 0 8 - 2 1 0 , 2 2 0 , 2 7 0 . S e e Deserters F r e n c h Government (Empire), disapproval of treaty, 3 5 fn 12, 5 6 ; interest in Mexico, 14; plans in Mexico, 24, 112; requests for commission sent to, 142; telegram to, 2 0 2 ; understanding of Mexican situation, 1 5 7 ; withdrawal anticipated, 1 0 8 F r e n c h Headquarters in Mexico, staff officers, 1 8 5 F r e n c h Intervention in Mexico, aims, 5 8 fn 4, 6 3 , 6 5 , 1 0 2 , 126, 130, 1 3 4 ; enemies attracted to, 9 1 fn 20; financial requirements, 1 1 2 ; garrison, 8 6 ; inception, 13; legal status, 2 5 ; opposition to, 1 2 5 , 131, 131 fn 88, 1 4 4 fn 34; plans for Maximilian, 107; policy, 92, 104, 110, 1 1 4 ; popular attitude toward, 72, 8 4 - 8 6 , 103, 1 2 7 ;

support of, 7 2 ; terminal plans, 144, 151 F r e n c h Ladies, dress styles, 2 2 5 F r e n c h Language, 2 4 5 - 2 4 6 , 2 8 3 ; Spanish influence, 2 4 7 - 2 4 9 ; study of, 2 5 9 Frenchmen, divided feelings, 2 1 4 ; executed, 1 7 6 ; private property, 2 0 6 fn 98 French Ministry (Imperial), disapproval by, 1 7 9 French Officers, 2 4 0 ; assignments, 2 6 1 ; characterized, 217-218, 223-224; complaints against, 179; disponibilité, 192; families, 2 2 5 ; for Foreign L e gion, 7 0 ; marriage of, 1 3 3 ; on courtmartial, 1 4 8 fn 49; relations with Mexican officers, 2 2 4 ; riding habits, 2 5 3 ; visits of courtesy, 2 2 2 . Here are the names of some other F r e n c h officers who took part in the Expeditionary F o r c e in Mexico but who are not mentioned in the text: Ignace-Adolphe Ackermann, Charles-Balthasar Anderer, François Banvais, Ê m i l e Barbet-Massin, Émile-George BarrilIon, Jules-Blaise-Gustave Basset, JeanBaptiste Baubonne, Antoine-Alexandre-H. deBeauguesne, Henri Berge, Dom.-Antoine Bianchini, Henry-Stanislas Bidot, Phil.-Adolphe Bourgeois, J e a n Baptiste Théodore Braçonnier, Camille-Fél.-Maurice Brillet, Guillaume Auguste Burgairolles, Marcellin-Léonard-Adr. Chapplain, Claude Ch.-Jos. Chopard, JosephAlexis Colas, A. H. H. T . ColletMeygret, Nicolas Corbin, Henri Hippolyte Cotel, Thomas Courteil, Augustin Danis, Léonce-Jos.-François Daumas, Jean-Baptiste Victor Davenet, Charles-Henri-M. Delloye, Jean-Ant.-Louis Delmas, Charles Maximil. Delpierre, Charles D e s grange, Antoine-Paul D o m b r e , JeanBaptiste Dormont, Jean Phillipe Dromard, Jules-Auguste Ducy, JeanBaptiste Valentine Dufaure, Gustave Dutilleux, Alexandre-Eugène E c k e n dorff, L é g e r Espinat, Adolphe F a b r e , Pierre-Auguste Faivre, GustavePierre de F a y e t , François-Théodule Favret, Alexandre Feize, Léon Flandrin, M . J . S. H. A. Françés, F r .

311

INDEX Amédée de Franchessin, Antoine-L.Ch. A. Franchi, Émile Réné Gaffiot, Marie-Nic.-Edmond Garcin, LouisArsène Gelée, Louis-François Godefroy, Charles-Louis Goguet, MyrtilMoïse Grodvolle, Henri Groult, Rauel de Guéroud, Justin-Marie-Emm. Guibout, Joseph-Stanislas Guilloire, Nicolas-Ch. Heckenbinder, AchilleThéod.-Fr. Herclat, Louis Hourdoux, Louis-Adrien Huray, Joseph Jacques, Claude Joly, Al.-Edouard-Adr. Juving, Pierre Léon Labarbe, ÉdouardAlexandre Ladurelle, Jean-Gabriel Lafaille, Ch.-I>omin.-Osc. Lahalle, Michel-Félix Laillault, Charles-André de Lajaillie, Jean Laulhé, JérômeJulien Leclerc, Louis François Héctor Lejeune, Victor Lelong, Charles-Camille Lenfant, Auguste-Jacques-Ant. Léonard, Guillaume-Louis Lévis, Claude Luquet, H.-Hypolyte-Victor Magouet du Mondesorme, EmestPhillippe Mahieu, Pierre Jean-Vincent Malé, Louis-Cyrille Marby, Léop.Léon-Joseph Martin, Richard Martin, Nicolas Victor-Jules Maujean, Jules Édouard Maupin, Pierre Alex Mik. Massot, François-Léon Mélard, Jacq.Hippol.-L. Mestres, Marie-Hippolyte Meunier, Nicolas-Henri Michel, Hippolyte Michelet, Marie-Franç.-J. de Miribel, Édouard-Théodore Monnac, Barth.-Hip.-Jos.-A. Morlière, CharlesJean-Baptiste Nicolas, Luc-Antoine Olivier, Jean-Eug.-Aristide Pagel, Alexis Panouillot, Eugène-Auguste Pézéril, Balthasar Pierga, AugustinJacques Prédol, Paul Ranson, PierreÉdouard Relhié, Louis Richard, LouisEugène Rives, Auguste-Denis-Cl. Rochard, Louis-Hip. Rothmann, AlbertAlexandre Sanson, Charles LouisAuguste Saunier, Adolph Schmitt, Léon Ségonne, Victor-Henri Sivan, Gabriel Marie É t . Tartrat, Antoine Terralion, Henri Thouroude, Aug.H.-Jules-Hipp. Tubert, H. C. F . Vasse Saint-Ouen, Léonide Vaudrey, Jean Vigier, Jean-Franç. Voirol, JeanAndré-Edmond-Kerch Vuillaume, Charles August L . Warnet, JeanCharles Weiss, Charles-Martin Zeller

French Protestants, 13 French Revolution, 13; administrative developments, 74, 2 8 2 ; effect on religon, 2 6 0 ; philosophy of, 16, 162, 228, 2 3 0 French Soldiers, arrest, 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 ; attitude toward Mexican people, 228; attitude toward Mexican soldiers, 36, 39, 2 2 8 ; capture, 2 0 3 ; correspondence, 7; crimes against, 119; decorated, 115, 165; desertion, 53, 2 3 0 ; discharge, 238; discipline, 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 ; disguised as, 2 3 7 ; health, see Medical problems; in Foreign Legion, 165; in Gendarmerie, 2 6 2 ; Mexican marriages, 133; mistreatment rumored, 26-27; objection to medals for Mexican officers, 63; privileged position, 2 2 8 ; quarters, 5 4 ; religious practice, 2 6 0 ; soldiers of fortune, 2 1 8 French Troops, see First Division, Second Division, Infantry Regiments, Artillery, Cavalry, Reconnaissance Battalion, Zouaves, Chasseurs Fresnillo (Zacatecas), occupied by French, 99; withdrawal, 181 Friant, Charles-Nicolas, General, appointment, 169 fn 42, 178-179; Minister of Hacienda, 185; policy, 179 Froissard, 2 9 0 Frontaura, Carlos, 257 fn 24 Frossard, General, 2 7 4 fn 2 Frossard, D . M., 168 fn 34 Fuente, published circular, 17 fn 12 Furniture, sale, 2 1 3

Gagun, Carlos de, 2 6 7 Galeana (Chihuahua? Nuevo León?), 236 Galeanos, Los, 2 6 9 Galveston, Texas, French consul, 156157; return travel via, 153 Gálvez, José Maria, General, charged, 231; investigation, 127; Yucatán trip,

128

Gambling, addiction, 2 2 4 , 2 3 0 , 2 5 5 ; laws repealed, 137 Gamboa, Manuel, letter by, 154 Gándara, Francisco, Ex-Governor, 132 fn 91 Garay, Pedro, 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 Garcia, Alejandro, escape, 4 9

312

INDEX

García, Genaro, Collection, 7; transcripts, 8 García, Hilario, executed, 119 García, J., 265 fn 56 García, Jorge, executed, 233 García Aguirre, Miguel, 231 García Cano, Carlos, leader of band, 72 García Cubas, maps, 243 García de la Cadena, 272 García Gutiérrez, 188 fn 20 García Morales, José, Juarist Colonel, 153 García-Pérez, Antonio, 19 fn 24-25, 20 fn 29, 24 fn 45, 33 fn 2, 58 fn 7, 199 fn 52, 201 fn 68 Gardens, by soldiers, 232 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 267 Garita de Amozoc, Río de la, 42 Garita de Cholula, 43 Garnier, Isidore-Théodule, Colonel, campaign, 100; in command of Guadalajara, 94; wounded, 45 Garrisons, duty, 70; turned over to Mexican troops, 66 Garza, Juan de la, Juarist General, 47; in Matamoros, 175 Gasset y Mercader, Manuel, decree, 20 fn 29 Gatling Gun, 172 fn 51 Gaulot, Paul, history, 8, 29 fn 67, 33 fn 2, 48 fn 42, 47, 57 fn 1, 58 fn 4, 60 fn 12-13, 162 fn 6, 167 fn 28, 188 fn 19-20, 189 fn 22, 191 fn 35, 192 fn 37, 193 fn 40, 195 fn 46, 198 fn 51, 199 fn 52-53, 200 fn 61, 213 fn 134 Genaro García Collection, 7-8, 63 fn 23 Genaro García, Colección de documentos . . . References too numerous to list Gendarmerie, 224; Chief of, 115; Mexican, 165, 204, 262-263; sent to Mexico, 31; uniforms, 264 Generals, Austrian, see Thun Generals, Brigadier, powers, 190. See Brincourt Generals, Confederate, registration, 141. See Halley, Shelby, Slaughter Generals, Federal (U.S.A.), see Billier, Brown, Clark, Crawford, Grant, MacDowell, Scott, Sheridan, Steele, Weitzel Generals, French, assignment for, 166.

See Auvergne, Bazaine, Bertier, Douay, Forey, Frossard, Hurbal, Laumière, Lorencez, Metman, Mirandol, Montaudon, Neigre, Rivière, Vialla Generals, German, see Keitel Generals, Mexican, Juarist, capture, 49. See Alvarez, Arteaga, Cadena, Cantarito, Díaz, Doblado, Elizondo, Huerta, Jáuregui, La Garza, Lozada, Martínez, Jesús Mejía, Méndez, Mendoza, Negrete, O'Horan, Ortega, Pavón, Peña y Barragán, Pesqueira, Pueblita, Ramírez, Régules, Riva Palacio, Rivas, Salazar, Sandoval, Tomás Lozano, Toro, Ugalde, Uraga, Vega, Zaragoza Generals, Mexican (Imperial), assignment, 150. See Almonte, Blanco, Calderón, Elizondo, Gálvez, La Madrid, Liceaga, López, Lozada, Márquez, Montenegro, Olvera, Portilla, Prieto, Rivas, Salas, Taboada, Tavera, Vicario, Woll General, Lieutenant, see Almonte Geneva Convention, 152 fn 81 Gente de razón, Indians excluded, 70 Geographers, 240 Geography, interest in, 15 Geological descriptions, 39 Geologist, 240 Géricault, Jean-Louis-André Theodore, 15 German, historians, 7; officers, 267; women, 259 Gervason, financial expert, 121 fn 50 Ghilardi, Luis, 267; escape, 49 Gibert, Félix, Governor of Lower California, 131 fn 88 Girardin, Jules, Lieutenant, decorated, 115 Gobernación, see Ministro de Gobernación Gold, export limited, 52; hunters, 242 González Ortega, Jesús, General, commendation, 57; escape, 49; recruiting by, 136; return to Mexico, 153, 154 fn 91, 161-162, 172; surrender, 48, 277 Gorostiza, Espinosa, 204 fn 85 Gounod, Charles François, 15 Government, Civil, replacement by military, 21; required, 74. See Secre-

313

INDEX tary of S t a t e for G o v e r n m e n t G o v e r n m e n t , Military, duties, 8 - 9 , 9 7 G o v e r n m e n t , restoration, 2 1 3 fn 135. See Juárez Government. G o v e r n m e n t , U n d e r - s e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for, letter to, 1 1 1 fn 18. S e e G o b e r nación G o v e r n m e n t Officials (Imperial), appointments, 7 5 - 7 6 , 1 8 4 , 2 2 8 ; arrests b y , 1 2 9 ; discharge proposed, 1 5 5 ; effectivenes, 95, 177; experience a c c u m u l a t e d , 2 8 3 ; F r e n c h criticism of, 7 4 - 7 7 , 1 2 1 , 1 3 7 , 1 4 7 , 1 5 3 , 1 5 5 , 1 6 1 ; reforms n e e d e d , 1 1 9 , 1 2 5 , 1 6 1 G o v e r n m e n t Officials (Juarist), positions occupied, 7 4 G o v e r n m e n t , Provisional, 6 5 ; appointm e n t s , 7 6 ; proposed, 7 3 . S e e R e gency Governors, I m p e r i a l , system of, 1 6 1 . See Gándara, Gibert, Márquez Governors (Juarist), Arévalo, 8 5 ; C o r tina, 8 5 ; D í a z M i r ó n , 8 5 ; D o b l a d o , 9 1 fn 21; G i b e r t , 1 3 1 fn 88 G r a n d J u r y , 2 0 6 fn 98 G r a n d M a r s h a l of t h e Court, 1 1 5 fn 30 G r a n t , Ulysses S., 1 3 8 fn 11 G r a u x , B a r o n de, death, 1 1 6 Gravière, J u r i e n d e la, letter b y , 2 6 ; letter to, 2 0 fn 31, 2 3 fn 43, 2 7 ; n e w duties, 2 2 , 2 8 ; policy, 2 2 - 2 3 , 2 6 , 5 6 ; P r o c l a m a t i o n , 2 0 fn 32, 2 1 G u a d a l a j a r a (Jalisco), 6 2 , 1 2 3 , 2 6 5 ; a m nesty declared, 1 0 2 ; C h u r c h incident, 2 2 5 fn 29; F r e n c h prisoners, 2 0 5 ; line of defense, 1 8 0 ; maneuvers near, 8 9 fn 17, 9 0 , 9 3 , 9 7 ; occupation of, 7 6 , 9 6 ; offensive t h r e a t e n e d , 2 0 7 ; p o licing of, 2 6 4 ; social conditions, 2 5 7 , 2 6 0 ; theatres, 2 5 6 , w o m e n , 2 5 9 G u a d a l a j a r a , R e g i m e n t of, 4 8 fn 42 G u a d a l u p e (Zacatecas), garrison at, 1 8 0 . S e e Molino de G u a d a l u p e G u a d a l u p e , H a c i e n d a de, colonization scheme, 2 3 9 G u a d a l u p e , Nuestra S e ñ o r a de, 2 4 9 G u a n a j u a t o , City, 6 2 ; c a m p a i g n via, 6 6 , 8 9 ; officials of E m p i r e , 7 6 ; social conditions, 2 5 7 G u a n a j u a t o , S t a t e of. D o b l a d o as G o v ernor, 9 1 fn 21; pacification, 9 5 , 9 8 ; p r é f e t politique, 9 6 fn 38, 2 7 2 fn 9 9 ; recruiting in, 1 8 2 ; T r e a s u r y , 9 2

G u a r d train, F r e n c h , 1 1 2 G u a r d i a Civil, organization, 6 6 , 8 6 , 9 3 G u a r d i a Municipal, 2 2 8 Guardias rurales, not to b e sent far f r o m home, 2 6 2 ; officers of, 1 5 5 ; organization of, 9 3 , 2 6 1 Guards, military, 1 2 3 fn 59 Guards, road, removed, 1 2 9 fn 81 G u a y m a s (Sonora), A m e r i c a n supplies to, 1 3 2 fn 91; F r e n c h w i t h d r a w a l , 1 7 6 , 1 8 0 ; J u á r e z favored, 1 5 3 ; o c c u pied b y F r e n c h , 1 0 0 , 1 5 4 , 2 3 6 ; port opened, 1 2 1 G u e d a l l a , Philip, 3 1 fn 71, 2 7 4 fn 2, 2 7 6 fn 4 G u e r r a de la R e f o r m a , end, 16; i n c i d e n t in, 2 3 G u e r r a y M a r i n a , Subsecretario interino de E s t a d o y del D e s p a c h o de, 86 fn 9 Guerrero, S t a t e of, 2 8 5 fn 12; c a m p a i g n against, 1 6 8 ; Juarist troops, 8 7 , 9 9 ; maps, 1 4 5 ; outside I m p e r i a l control, 8 6 , 9 9 , 1 4 5 ; produces guerrilla b a n d s , 99 Guerrillas, capture, 1 5 2 ; defined, 3 5 fn 12; harassing activities, 3 8 , 3 8 fn 17, 3 9 , 6 6 , 8 5 , 9 0 fn 20, 9 9 , 1 0 6 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 1 fn 88, 1 3 2 fn 91, 1 4 1 , 1 4 8 - 1 4 9 , 154, 165, 215, 236, 262-263, 265, 2 6 7 , 2 6 9 ; legal status, 3 5 fn 12, 1 3 3 , 145, 152; names, 2 6 8 , 2 7 2 , 2 7 3 ; parties of, 2 7 , 3 4 ; pursuit, 1 6 7 ; rewards, 171 Guides, c o l l e c t e d , 4 2 Guillén, M a n u e l , Juarist Minister, 2 0 6 fn 98 G u l f Coast, M e x i c a n , 2 8 1 ; Guerrillas on, 1 4 8 ; G u l f F l e e t , 2 0 1 ; ports for e v a c u ation, 1 6 4 G u n s , loaded, G u a r d i a M u n i c i p a l not to carry, 2 2 8 Gutiérrez, J . I g n a c i o , letter b y , 2 7 2 fn

106, 108

Gutiérrez, S i m ó n , Juarist officer, bandit, 2 6 6 - 2 6 7 ; cruelties, 9 9 Gutiérrez Estrada, José María, 2 8 8 ; letter to, 1 0 3 ; sent to E u r o p e , 5 9 G u t i é r r e z de R u b a l c a v a , J o a q u í n , 1 9 fn 24-25; c o m m a n d , 2 0 fn 29; demands, 19 Gwyn, William M., Senator, 2 3 8 H a c e n d a d o s , 2 4 9 ; aristocracy of, 2 5 2 ; discourage recruiting, 1 5 1 ; in militia

314

INDEX

system, 263; reluctant to furnish guards, 126; schemes, 238 Hacienda, Department of (Treasury), French finance officers help, 121 Hacienda, Ministro de, records, 156 Hacienda, Secretary of State for, 206 fn 103 Hacienda, Under-Secretary of, 206 Hacienda Blanca (Oaxaca State?), 127 fn 75 Haciendas, occupation, 42; ownership, 252; treatment of Indians, 285 fn 12. See Amolucan, Blanca, Bocas, Buenavista, Cañelo, Chamal, Guadalupe, Jalapilla, La Teja, Molino, San Miguel, Tenastepec, Zoquiapa Hackett, C. W., 9, 291 Hague Convention, 152 fn 81 Halley, General (Confederate), invited to Mexico City, 142 Hanna, 158 fn 107 Hans, Albert, 172 fn 51, 267 fn 65, 275 fn 3 Hapsburgs, family pride, 130, 201 fn 67, 285; archives, 7; tenure in Mexico, 6 Harding, Bertita, 146 fn 42 Harmant (Harmand), French financial expert, 121 Haro y Tamariz, Antonio del, return to Mexico, 23 Haro y Yarto, Gayol, 268 Harris, Helen W., 17 fn 12 Harris, Whitney R., 49 fn 50, 235 fn 82 Harris, Isham, 239 fn 98 Haushofer, Carl, 14 fn 9 Havana, 103 fn 56; cigars, 54; sailing from, 19; supplies for Juárez, 85 Hâvre, Le, 244 Health, of troops, 22, 26, 41, 84, 226; sick rate, 39 Hellwald, Friedrich von, 22 fn 37 Hermann, Dr., decorated, 115 Hermosillo (Sonora), occupied by French, 100; occupied by Juarists, 176 Herreros, Bretón de los, 257 fn 24 Herve, Constant-Maríe (3rd Zouaves), Captain, 233 Hidalgo, José Manuel, return to Europe, 164; sent to Europe, 59 Hidalgo, José María, 58 fn 5, 7, 59 fn 8, 107 fn 4

Historians, 240; French, 74; German, 7; English-speaking, 7; Mexican, 7 Histoire du Mexique, 7 Hombres vestidos de azul, 269 Holy Thursday, 260 Honors of War, proposed, 48 Horses, disposal, 202; fines in, 235; purchase, 20 fn 31, 152; sale, 212; upkeep, 221; use, 253-255 Horticulture, 239 Hospital, Military, attendants, 229; establishment, 40-41; guards, 24; patients, 33, 227 Hostages, internment, 133; legality, 96 fn 36, 235 Hostilities, cessation of, 188. See War. House of Representatives, 290 Hoya, see La Hoya Huachinango, 205, see Guachinango Huajuapan (Oaxaca), 243 fn 122 Huamantla, French troops in, 35, 41-42 Huasteca area, Political negotiations, 132; Ugalde in, 155, 183 Huerta, Epitacio, Juarist General, 50 fn 52; return to Mexico, 153 Hugo, Victor, 15 Huguenots, settlements, 13 Hunting as pastime, 255 Hurbal, see Courtois Roussel d'Hurbal Hyde, Montgomery, 174 fn 59, 187 fn 18, 191 fn 35, 212 fn 132

Ibarra, Francisco, 19 fn 20 Ibarra de Anda, F . 201 Iglesias, José María, 233 fn 67 Iglesias y Domínguez, Ángel, Dr., 59 Iglesias de Gálvez, Dolores, 231 Iguala (Guerrero), garrison in, 86, 205; siege of, 88 Ilarregui, see Salazar Ilarregui Illinois Regiment, aids Juarists, 150 Illness, of Intervention troops, 21; of Castelnau, 206 Illustration, L', 245, 248 fn 151 Immigrants, encouraged, 238; Protestants, 259; recruited, 136 Imperial Army, commands offered, 68; plans for, 69-70 Imperial Government, office holders, defectors from Juárez welcomed, 93; duties, 58; pay, 58

INDEX

Imperial Guard, organization, 69; recruitment, 68 Imperial Guard, French, 275 Import duties, packages free of duty, 140; source of income, 121 Imports, see Taxes Imprisonment, sentences, 120, 278 Independence Movement, in Tabasco, 180 India, British control, 279-280; French interest in, 15 Indians, baptism, 116; disappointed by Empire, 283; distribution of land to, 71; drafted into army, 58, 70; hope for improvement, 70; indifference to politics, 70; indios bravos, 241; in Foreign Legion, 65; in Guerrero, 145; Lozada's army, 97; of Yucatán, 151; religion, 259; scouts, 47; social level, 254, 284; support of Maximilian, 111, 132 fn 91; treatment by guerrillas, 270. See Apache, Kickapoo, Maya. Indo-China, French influence in, 15, 281 Infantry regiments, French, 210 fn 117·, Márquez division, 93; sent to Mexico, 31 Infantry Regiment, 7th, 216. The regiment had two battalions in Mexico; the Third Bn. remained in home station in Caen Infantry Regiment, 9th, quarters, 55 Infantry Regiment, 34th, Indiana (Federal Army, US), refuge, 135 Infantry Regiment, 51st, 42-43, 49; garrison duty, 100; quarters, 55. Two bns. were in Mexico; the 3rd Bn. remained at Angers Infantry Regiment, 62nd, 37, 40; garrison duty, 100; quarters, 55; withdrawal, 203. Two bns. in Mexico; 3rd Bn. was at Dijon Infantry Regiment, 81st, 35; evacuation, 186. Had 2 bns. in Mexico; 3rd Bn. remained in Puy Infantry Regiment, 95th? Had 2 bns. in Mexico; 3rd Bn. remained in Antibes Infantry troops (not clearly organized), of Lozada, 97 Ingenio, 26 fn 56 Inquisition, 79 Institutions, legal, see Decrees, Desamortization, Dishonesty, Embezzle-

315

ment, Eviction, Exacción, Extradition, Fines, Grand Jury, Interdiction, Malversation, Mortmain, traffic control, Tribunal de Justicia del Imperio Institutions, Military, see Adjutant general, Cadre, Capitulation, Circular letter, Civil affairs, Collective punishment, Command Line, Duty status, Garrisons, Guardia civil, Insubordination, Insurrection, Intelligence Operations, Leave, Logistical support, Looting, Marksmanship, Massacre, Military governor, Military occupation, Militia, Orderly, Pillage, Quarter, Quarters, Recall, Repatriation, Reprimand, Resignation, Reveille, Rotation, Safe conduct, Salute (artillery salvoes), Staging area Institutions, Political, see Alcalde, Amnesty, Deportation, Dissidents, Emperor, Governors, Ministers, Ministry, Prefecto político, President, Regency, Subsecretario Institutions, Religious, see Absolution, Archbishop, Baptism, Bishop, Excommunication, Flagellation, Mass, Priests, Te Deum. See Clergy Institutions, Social, see Drama, Exile, Metric System, Mutilations, Opera, Paseo, Refugees, Tertulia Instituto Primario de Idiomas, 246 Insubordination, Brincourt, 223; Federal troops, 167 Insurrections, policy on, 168 Intelligence operations, French, captured letters, 98 Intendants, Las Bocas, 235. See Wolf Intendant of Finances, 51 Interdiction, on Church Property, 80 Interest due on loans, 161 Interior, Ministry of the, obstructionism, 81; placed under Labastida, 79 International Law, concern for, 218; declaration of war, 25; use of prisoners of war, 43 fn 29 Interpreters, supply of, 54, 89 fn 16; use of, 237 Intervention Archives, 8 Investiture, Maximilian, 109 fn 13 Iran, French influence in, 15, 281 Irapuato (Guanajuato), lack of officials, 76 Iribarren, José María, 176 fn 75

316

INDEX

Irishmen, deserters, 269; emigrants, 238; recommended for army, 156 Iroquois Nation, 284 Isabella II. Queen, French aid to, 30 fn 71 Isla Verde, Sherman reaches, 201 Islands, see Carmen, Devil's Island, Isla Verde, Martinique, Sacrificios, Sainte Marguerite, San Juan de Ulúa Isthmus of Darien, French interest in, 18 fn 14 Italian campaign, 40 fn 24, 244, 247; veterans, 30, 30 fn 71 Italian Language, 247; instruction, 246; operas, 256 Italy, 278 Iturbide, Hotel, Hq. at, 54 Iturbide, Princess, 192-193, 198 fn 51 Jalapa (Veracruz), 39, 103; falls to Juarists, 203; French advance to, 3537, 43; garrison, 66, 86; road via, 236 Jalapilla, Hacienda de, 129 fn 82 Jalisco, State, governor, 123; guerrillas in, 269; occupation by French, 94-95, 121; state of siege, 21 fn 35 Jaquin, Laurent, Captain, 250 fn 176 Jáureguy (Jáuregui), Juarist General, executed, 97 Jeanne d'Arc, ship, aground, 84 Jeanningros, Pierre Jean Joseph, 139; appointment, 31; command in Foreign Legion, 70, 232; effective control, 85, 153, 171; expedition toward Matamoros, 167; letter by, 173 fn 57-, letter to, 271 fn 123; money sent to, 213 fn 132-, orders to, 141, 175 Jecker, Financial Company, debts, 232 Jews, 260 Jiménez, fined, 234 Jiménez, [Próspero?], Brigade, 269 John L. Stephens, ship, 173 Joseph (Bonaparte), claim to Spanish colonies, 14 Journal asiatique, 15 Journal des marches, 1st Division, 37, 52 fn 60 Journal of Southern History, 291 Journal officiel, 82 Juárez, Benito, 285, 288, 292; American support of, 144; appointments, 40 fn 22; Archivo, 136 fn 5, 138 fn 11, 144

fn 33, 153 fn 87; consolidation of victory, 16-17; decree, 20 fn 28; driven north, 99-100, 145; encourages U.S. help, 136; headquarters in San Luis Potosí, 72, 87; leaves Chihuahua, 100, 113; leaves Mexico, 145146, 148; leaves Mexico City, 53; letter by, 20 fn 28, 136 fn 5, 145 fn 36, 153 fn 87, 154 fn 91, 161 fn 5, 171 fn 50, 236 fn 87; manifesto, 19; military orders, 171; official acts, 18, 21; opposition by Mexican leaders, 17, 85; policy, 209 fn 113, 267; presidential succession, 161; publications, 17 fn 12; reverence shown, 6; suspicious of U.S. aid, 144, 163, 173 fn 53; title, 273 Juárez Government, agreement with Santa Anna, 150; American loan, 151152; amnesty, 101 fn 49; attitude toward Maximilian, 216; attracted to the Empire, 71, 100, 131; bounty offered for émigrés, 23; capitalizes on Empire's weakness, 114, 204, 270; condemned, 26, 53 fn 61; continued resistance of, 141, 145; contraband, 204, 264; criticism of Imperial officials, 74; defection from, 76 fn 46, 97-98; defection to, 127; deposits military lists, 152 fn 81; designation, 270; disillusionment with, 99; dispersal, 62, 66, 98; fear of, 77, 86 fn 11; forced loans, 85, French interference, 24 fn 45, 142, increase in strength, 151,181, 207; interests secretly maintained, 85, legal status of combattants, 133; military force organized, 86, military reparations, 19, no communications with French, 209; realizes French plans, 24; recognition withdrawn, 25, 35 fn 12, 91 fn 20; retaliation, 71; sale of artillery to, 150; sale of nationalized property; 51, 77, 124; sovereignty recognized, 56; supplied by blockade runners, 85; support by soldiers, 50; tax, 23; U.S. aid to, 107 fn 3, 136, 143, 148, 149150, 154 fn 95, 163 fn 11, 172, 281; withdrawal from Guadalajara, 93; withdrawal from San Luis Potosí, 92. See also Reforma, Federal Army, Benito Juárez, Decrees Juarist agents, in Imperial army, 149;

INDEX in New York, 153; in San Francisco, 149; negotiations with, 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 ; with Federal troops, 131 fn 88 Juarist Party, agent with Confederates, 138; attitudes, 23, 198; band, 2 3 4 ; dissension within, 161; friends in France, 156; rumors of U.S., 163; supplies sold to, 264; sympathizers indistinguishable, 1 4 8 Juarist leaders, cruelties punished, 2 3 2 ; Imperial contacts with, 113; send families to U.S., 133 fn 9 3 Juchitán (Oaxaca?), 181 Judges, criticism of, 79, 137; influence upon, 94; removal of, 94 Judicial pressure, used by regent, 7 8 Judiciary, deciding voice in litigation, 130 Juez Municipal, 2 2 5 fn 26 Jumel, Major, 224. Probably AntoineValentin Jumel de Nairterre who served as captain on the Imperial Staff Junta, meets Bazaine, 2 0 7 - 2 0 9 ; to be organized, 159 Junta Superior, duties, 59; formation, 58, 7 7 Jupeaux, Financial agent, 128 Jury, Grand, 2 4 8 fn 155 Justice, danger to during withdrawal, 2 0 6 fn 104-, French administration of, 2 3 0 - 2 3 7 ; speed of, 2 3 1 Justice, Ministry, appointments, 183; criticism, 137; letter to Under-Secretary, 97 fn 43, 124; letter to Secretary, 108 fn 9, 1 2 0 fn 45-46; obstructionism, 81; placed under Labastida, 79; slowness, 119, 231. See Lares, Escudero Justice of the Peace, imprisoned, 2 2 9 Juzgado criminal, 2 4 9

Kassel, Germany, Prisoners of war in, 277 Keitel, General, 4 9 fn 50 Kendall, J. J., 22 fn 37 Keoko, ship, 1 7 3 fn 55 Kératry, Émile, 84 fn 1, 106, 129 fn 8182, 140 fn 21, 163 fn 12, 177 fn 78, 1 7 9 fn 90, 182 fn 101, 186 fn 15, 188 fn 19-20, 1 8 9 fn 22, 197 fn 47, 199 fn 52-53, 201 fn 68, 2 0 2 fn 6 9 - 7 0 ,

317

207 fn 109, 2 0 8 fn 111-112, 2 1 1 fn 124,128, 2 1 3 fn 135, 2 1 5 fn 140, 2 4 7 fn 144, 2 7 0 fn 82 Kerleau, Boyer de, 2 2 4 Kickapoo Indians, 2 8 5 Kieffer, Contractor, 2 4 2 - 2 4 3 Kodalich (Kodolich), Alfonso T . , Colonel, 194 fn 44; appointed, 189; letter by, 154 fn 95; statement, 192-194

Labastida, Pelagio Antonio de, Archbishop, 196; boycotts Regency, 82; dropped from Regency, 82; duties in Regency, 7 9 - 8 0 , 83; election, 58; in Regency, 7 7 - 7 8 ; letter by, 8 3 fn 6 3 , 193 fn 41; letter to, 91 fn 22, 2 2 5 fn 29; military mass stopped, 95; policy in Mexico, 94, 97, 116; requests permission to go to Europe, 125; statement, 192-193; support of, 81 L a Conorgue, Colonel, see Meri de la Conorgue L a Croix, Saint Ange-Edmond, Lieutenant Colonel, 34 Lacunza, José María, appointment, 123; letter by, 2 4 3 fn 121; Minister, 2 4 3 Ladrillera, La, surrender, 4 8 Lafon, (Lafont), Jean-Jacques-Jules, Colonel, 3 8 fn 17, 2 3 1 fn 54, 247 fn 139, 2 6 2 , 264 fn 48 Lagos, occupied, 89. See San Juan de los Lagos Laguna Madre, approach to Bagdad, 84 L a Hoya, troop movement via, 3 9 Lakes, see Texcoco Lalanne, Jesús, Colonel, capture, 2 0 5 L a Llave, Ignacio de, escape, 4 9 ; Governor of Veracruz, 19; letter, 19 fn 25 L a Madrid, Francisco, Imperial General, 172 Lamartine, Alphonse de, 15 Lancaster, Flagship, 143 fn 30 Lancers, Imperial regiment, 2 1 5 , 2 6 2 Land, to be given veterans, 142 fn 25; distribution, 71 Landa, José María de, sent to Europe, 59 Lande, A. de la, 2 7 1 fn 94 Landowners, see Hacendados Langberg, Emilio, letter to, 153 fn 88 Langlais, Financial expert, 1 7 8

318

INDEX

Languages, decipherment, 15; Spanish, 284. See French, English, Italian L a Paz (Lower California), filibusters, 173; ship in, 167 L a Pierre, Jean, Lieutenant, finds letter, 192 Lardeur, Charles-Joseph, Major, riding habit, 2 2 2 Lares, Teodosio, 292; archives, 7; letter by, 194, 206, 207 fn 109; letter to, 2 0 2 fn 70; Minister of Justice, 181, 184, 188, 202; President of the Council, 211; statement to, 193; street incident, 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 Larra, Luis Mariano de, 2 5 6 fn 24 Larrañaga, escape, 2 0 3 L a Salle, Robert Cavalier, Sieur de, 13 Latifundial conditions, 2 5 2 Latin America, religion, 2 6 0 , 2 9 2 ; theatrical development, 2 5 5 ; unsettled conditions, 17, 2 8 2 Latin prestige, 2 8 2 Latrille, Charles Ferdinand, see Count of Lorencez Laumière, see Vernhet de Laumière Laur, Mining Engineer, 2 4 1 Law, French, 2 8 0 Law, International, 293; refuge, 137 L a w of October 3, 1865, 105, 146, 152, 2 3 1 , 2 6 3 , 2 7 3 ; revoked, 188. See Decrees Lawyers, services, 85. See Elguerro Lawful belligerents, 3 5 fn 7 Laws, confused state, 58; Convention of April 10, 1864, 110; courts-martial, 101; desamortization, 7 9 ; equality before, 2 3 0 ; favoring Indians, 2 8 5 fn 12; moratorium, 18; needed, 70; of the press, 131 fn 88; reviewed, 81. See L a w of November 3, 1864, L e y Juárez, L e y Lerdo, L e y Iglesias Leaflets, spread, 111, 125 Leake, D e los (?), 2 4 8 fn 155 Leather-working factory, 2 0 4 Leave, sick, 2 2 2 , 2 4 5 L e Boeuf, Edmond, Marshal, 2 7 5 L e Clerc, Frédéric, 14 fn 7 Lefêvre, 1 8 fn 16, 19 fn 24. 2 0 fn 2829, 31, 2 1 fn 32, 2 2 fn 37, 24 fn 4445, 2 6 fn 54, 58, 2 9 fn 66-67, 3 0 fn 68, 33 fn 2-4, 4 8 fn 47, 5 0 fn 51, 54 fn 62, 107 fn 4, 2 3 5 fn 82, 236 fn 84, 2 6 7 fn 64

Legion of Honor, confusion of colors, 115; for Mexican officers, 6 2 , 2 6 3 Legislative policy, 2 3 0 León, see Velázquez de León León (Guanajuato), 185 fn 5; Courtsmartial, 1 4 8 fn 49; Doblado's home, 2 2 0 ; French billets, 2 2 0 ; French withdrawal, 2 0 7 ; occupied, 8 9 León, Prudencia de, 2 3 4 Leperos, riots by, 1 2 3 fn 59 Lerdo de Tejada, Sebastian, negotiations with, 91, 97, 102 Letters, anonymous, 127 Leuchey, Gustave-Therèse Seb. Guyot de, Major, 2 4 9 fn 173 Levy (Impressment) (Leva), French accept, 182; French object to, 6 8 , 9 3 Lewal, Jules-Louis, Lieutenant Colonel, 224 L e y Iglesias, implemented, 16 L e y Juárez, implemented, 16 L e y Lerdo, implemented, 16 L'Hériller, Edmond-Aimable, 36, 115; appointment, 31; campaign, 99, 238; letter to, 1 2 5 fn 66, 2 3 5 fn 77; orders to, 127; refuses assignment, 129. Sometimes appears as L'Hérillier, but L'Hériller seems to be correct Lhuys Drouyn de, 2 8 0 fn 9. See Drouyn de Lhuys Liberal Party, 6 4 fn 23, 72; (usually used to mean supporters of Juárez), attitudes, 118, 130; conciliation efforts, 72; dismissal, 184; foreigners in, 73; leaders gathered, 186; majority, 183 Liberals (term used vaguely to mean individuals or political groups who opposed the Intervention), 96, 158, 271, 2 7 3 , 2 8 6 ; coalition with Conservatives, 147; favorably impressed b y Maximilian, 117; French negotiations with, 2 1 2 Libertad (Sonora?), 173 Liceaga, General (Imperial), 2 3 6 Lieutenants, see Fleury, Girardin Linares (Nuevo León), 172 fn 51 Lincoln, Abraham, suggests support of Empire, 107 fn 3; supports Juárez, 107 fn 3 Libertad y reforma!, slogan, 7 8 Lights, street, 2 5 4 Literature, French, 2 4 4 , 2 8 3

INDEX Litscher, Nicolas, Corporal, decorated, 115 Livingstone, Arthur, 290 Llórente, Manuel J., Colonel, in T a m pico, 99 Loaisa, Vincente F., 90 fn 18 Loans, Carlota's request, 174; forced, 85, 208; Juárez', 151, 163, 172; negotiations for, 65; to the Empire, 163, 166, 171, 217 Logistical support, 267 Loiseau, Claude J., 220 fn 6, 225 fn 28, 232 fn 58, 235 fn 83, 247 fn 136,139, 250 fn 176, 254 fn 9, 255 fn 12, 19, 256 fn 21, 257 fn 25, 27, 258 fn 29, 260 fn 38 Loizillon, Pierre Henri, 4 0 fn 22; report, 188; correspondence, 38, 40 fn 23, 91 fn 20, 106 fn 3, 108 fn 7, 112, 163 fn 11, 166 fn 27, 174 fn 61, 189 fn 21, 25, 190 fn 27, 197 fn 48, 198 fn 50, 212 fn 132, 220 fn 4, 221 fn 14, 230 fn 52, 247 fn 143, 248 fn 157, 249 fn 172, 262 fn 40, 263 fn 42-43, 264, 264 fn 47, 49, 265 fn 54, 266 fn 60, 268 fn 69 Loma de San Juan, La, bivouac, 36-37 London, 54, 253 London, Treaty/Convention of, 18, 18 fn 16; interests in Mexican throne, 19; status of Mexico, 270; violation, 23 Looting, prevention of, 53; punishment, 96 fn 37 López, ex-governor of Jalisco, see Portillo López López, Miguel, Colonel, command of Lancers, 215, 261; enlistments, 67 López, Florentino, General, campaign, 95; defection feared, 127; letter by, 144; report, 141 López d e Santa Anna, Antonio, 288; agreement with Juarists, 150; campaigns, 145; hacienda, 37; internal security system, 263; plot, 127; recommended, 33; returns to Mexico, 103 López Uraga, José, 91 fn 20, 282; appointment, 123; campaigns, 89, 97; defeat and withdrawal, 90; General, 21, 87; joins Empire, 99, 102, 112; replaced, 21 Lorencez, Count of (Charles Ferdinand

319

Latrille), dissatisfied with Almonte, 29; instructions, 22 fn 38; letter by, 26 fn 57, 27; letter to, 26 fn 56; military program, 28; mission to Mexico, 22; payment of Mexican troops, 36; policy, 24-26, 29 fn 65, 35 fn 12, 56, 74, 270; proclamation, 26 fn 58; return to France, 31 Los Angeles, California, 173 Lottery, for recruiting, 170 Louet, Ernest, history, 8, 288 Louisiana, Federal troops in, 113, 148 Lower California, see Baja California Loysel, Charles-Joseph-Martin, letters by, 139, 140 fn 18-21, 149 fη 62, 153 fn 90, 156 fn 101, 162 fn 7-8, 164 fn 13, 176 fn 73, 231 fn 55, 234 fn 75, 242 / η 111, 248 fn 158, 250 fn 176; returns letters, 150 Lozada, Manuel, General, 76, 131 fn 88, 282, 285; biographical data, 266 fn 61 (for more biographical details, see Vigil, La Reforma, 254), border posts, 136, 163; joins Empire, 97; letters to, 271 fn 92; return, 133-134; tactics, 89 fn 17, 266 Lozano, José María, 18 fn 15 Lozano, Tomás (Juarist General), 175 Lussan, Eloi, 251, 273 fn 111 Luxury goods, increase of, 132 MacDowell, Irvin, General, harass French authorities, 131 fn 88, 143, 149 Macmahon, Marie-Edme.-Patrice-Maurice, Count, D u c de Magenta, Marshal, 276-278 Machine, money-coining, 90 / η 19 Machine shop, Imperial Army, 204 Madagascar, French influence in, 15, 281 Madrid, search for archives, 8, 278 Magellan, ship, 170 Maguey Plant, cultivation, 2 3 9 Mail, arrival from France, 60 Maintenant, Finance expert, 199 fn 55, 206 Majors, see Correlet, Dilloge, Jumel, Kodalich, Lardeur, Leuchey, Moraud, Tucé Maldonado, J. M., letter, 85 fn 7

320

INDEX

Malpaso (Zacatecas), fight for, 9 8 Malversation, 2 6 4 Manèque, Claude-Jules-Isidore, Colonel, decorated, 1 1 5 Mangin, Louis-Eugène, Colonel, 2 2 7 fn 43, 2 5 7 fn 25, 2 7 2 fn 110 Manifesto, Juárez, 19; October 2, 146, of J u n e 12, 5 7 , 7 7 - 7 8 , 8 0 , 8 2 fn 5 9 , 85, 9 2 , 1 1 1 , 1 6 2 fn 6, 169, 2 3 0 ; Santa Anna, 1 0 3 ; system, 1 0 1 Mantillas, 2 5 9 Manzanillo (Colima), port facilities, 1 2 1 Mapimi, Mineral de, colonization scheme, 2 3 8 Maps, Guerrero State, 1 4 5 ; preparation of, 2 4 3 Marby, Louis-Cyrille, Treasurer, 2 4 0 Maréchal des logis, 2 1 9 Maréchale, L a , See Josefa Peña de B a zaine Marguerite (Margueritte?), J e a n Auguste, Colonel, tactics, 9 0 Marín, Teófilo, Ministro de Gobernación, 1 8 8 Marín, Juan de, 2 8 fn 62 Marines, F r e n c h , land at Bagdad, 9 9 Mariscal, Ignacio, Minister, 8 Maritime trade, 1 1 4 Marksmanship, 2 6 6 Márquez, Leonardo, 17 fn 13, 2 8 8 - 2 8 9 ; appointed governor, 89, 9 2 ; bivouacs, 4 1 ; danger from, 127, 2 0 9 fn 114; enmity toward F r e n c h , 2 1 0 , 2 1 2 fn 132; in Cabinet, 2 0 2 , 2 0 6 ; mission in Colima, 9 5 ; new command, 2 1 0 ; opposition to Juárez, 17; placed under Bazaine, 3 6 , 3 9 fn 21 ; prisoners taken from, 2 9 fn 65, 2 1 0 ; reign of terror in Mexico City, 2 1 5 ; reputation, 8 9 fn 16, 9 2 ; support b y Conservatives, 196, 2 8 2 ; troops of, 3 9 Márquez Division, T h e , attacks on, 4 1 ; garrison duty, 66, 9 2 , 9 6 ; in campaign of the Interior, 6 6 , 8 7 , 8 9 ; organization, 6 9 , 2 6 2 ; Prisoners of war enrolled in, 5 0 , 6 8 ; recruitment, 6 7 , 93; takes charge of Mexico, 2 1 4 ; uniforms, 2 1 3 Marriage, Bazaine, 133, French-Mexican, 6 3 , 133, 2 2 1 , 2 2 3 , 2 5 8 ; Saligny, 63; soldadas, 2 5 8 Marseilles, 2 7 4 Marsh, W . L . , letter by, 1 3 6 fn 3

Marshal, authority, 190; promotion to, 6 0 , 116. See Bazaine, Forey, Randon Martin, Ch., Colonel, 2 7 4 fn 2, 2 7 7 fn 8 Martin, Percy F . , 3 1 fn 71, 1 0 3 fn 54, 107 fn 4, 1 4 6 fn 44, 191 fn 35, 2 6 3 fn 42. Martínez, Ángel (Juarist General), 1 7 6 Martínez, Joaquin, 2 0 5 fn 93, 2 1 0 Martinique, 2 8 9 ; deportation to, 1 2 0 ; dramatic company, 2 4 6 ; Prisoners of war sent to, 5 0 , 114; ships stop at, 3 4 , 3 4 fn 7; supplies from, 3 8 ; troops from, 2 5 fn 50 Martroy, letter to, 2 2 5 fn 26. [Perhaps this is the Vicomte de Martroy, Councillor on Commission Mixte des T r a vaux Publics.] Mason, John Sanford, General, command, 131 fn 88 Maspero, J e a n , researches, 15 Mass, military, 9 4 , 2 2 4 ; birthday, 130 Massacre, 2 6 6 Mata indios (Veracruz), 2 4 8 Matamoros (Tamaulipas), 1 7 6 ; attacks by Juarist forces, 149, 1 5 5 ; Austrians captured, 2 0 5 ; border troubles, 1 3 5 ; commerce via, 153, 1 6 7 ; Cortina's rule, 113, 1 4 3 ; control of customs, 1 2 1 fn 50; falls to Juárez, 1 7 2 - 1 7 3 , 175; free port, 8 4 ; F r e n c h Vice-consul, 1 4 9 fn 60; F r e n c h welcomed, 85; Mejia in, 9 9 , 153, 1 6 7 ; naval protection, 150; retreat to, 1 7 2 ; roads, 165, 171 Matehuala (San Luis Potosí), 2 3 4 ; battle at, 9 8 , 106, 168; F r e n c h withdrawal, 1 7 5 ; internment area, 1 3 9 ; line of defense, 1 8 0 Maury, Matthew Fontaine, letter to, 2 2 4 fn 23 Maussion, Ernest-Louis-Marie de, Colonel, letter to, 107 fn 5, 1 0 9 fn 13; military commandant, 2 0 9 Maximilian, Emperor, 6 - 7 , 2 2 4 , 2 6 1 , 2 8 4 , 2 8 8 - 2 8 9 , 2 9 1 - 2 9 2 ; accepts crown, 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 ; advised of developments, 117, 1 2 7 ; anti-French bias, 130, 132, 187, 1 9 0 ; appeal for support, 104, 178, 2 0 0 ; appointments, 120, 123, 184; approval required, 1 3 8 , 140; arrival, 9 9 , 1 0 1 - 1 0 2 , 110, 112, 2 3 8 , 2 4 8 , 2 8 3 ; arrival awaited, 7 2 , 1 0 8 ;

INDEX

by-passed, 139; Castelnau meeting, 189 fn 25; complaints sent to, 122; covert opposition, 147, 153, 166, 186, 198; decrees, 115, 146, 234 fn 75, 240; dissolves military commission, 129; dominated by Conservatives, 196; elected, 59; generosity, 143 fn 30; illness, 117; independent policy, 113-114, 116, 126, 134, 156, 165, 177, 193, 213 fn 135; invites Bazaine to conference, 198, 207; last effort to save, 215; left in Mexico, 216; letter by, 118 fn 40, 129 fn 80, 82, 156 fn 99, 163 fn 12, 169 fn 42, 172 fn 51, 177 fn 78, 178 fn 81, 179 fn 88, 89, 1 8 6 fn 15, 1 8 7 fn 16, 1 8 8 fn 19-20, 189 fn 21-22, 194 fn 43, 2 4 2 fn 115;

letter to, 103 fn 55, 107 fn 3, 140 fn 21, 150, 154 fn 93, 155, 159 fn 108, 177 fn 77-78, 1 7 9 fn 83, 180, 1 8 6 fn 11, 198 fn 51, 199 fn 53, 208 fn 112, 211 fn 125, 127, 214, 272 fn 104,

106; mentioned, 20 fn 30, 32; military activity, 169; military support, 113, 192; name used in courts-martial, 123; orders, 133, 162, 178, 261; personal charges against, 131; packages in customs, 140; packs belongings, 189; personal negotiations, 183, 203, 232; personal weakness, 157, 163, 179, 208, 222; policy, 243, 265, 273, 279; policy toward the Church, 124-125; popularity, 117, 280; private secretary, 146 fn 42; proclamation, 189 fn 24, see Proclamations; ratification of election, 65-66; recognizes nationalized property, 124; reports to, 131; returns to capital, 207; secretary, 225; separation from Mexico, 7, 163 fn 11, 164, 195; substitution, 197; troop leadership, 151; urges Bazaine's recall, 156 fn 99; warned against National Party, 125; visits provinces, 116, 120, 137 fn 8; warnings to, 137, 143, 151, 159, 208; abdication problem, 166, 174, 189, 194, 197-198, 200-201; yields to French pressure, 146, 161, 184 Maya Indians, 285 Mayer, Eldemiro, 267 Mazatlán (Sinaloa), capture, 121; fines, 138; French withdrawal, 180, 203; Imperial forces in, 154, 176; Juarist

321

forces at, 172 fn 53, 173, 176 Mazères, Rear Admiral, in Acapulco, 148; letter to, 139 fn 16, 149 fn 58, 60, 153 fn 85, 163 fn 9, 164 fn 16, 165 fn 22, 172 fn 51, 173 fn 54, 201 fn 62, 202, 203 fn 78, 205 fn 97, 226 fn 36, 248 fn 154, 264 fn 46; order to, 180; protest, 160; supplies from San Francisco, 131 fn 88 Mecham, J. Lloyd, 17 fn 12 Medals, Mérite militaire, 115; to be given, 165 Medical officers, see Dr. Murray. Here are some other medical and veterinary officers who served in the Mexican Expeditionary Force: J. F. Afflatet, Alphonse Aubert, Casimir-Lucien Azaïs, J. F. X. M. J. Benoît, Gustave Marcelin Borei, François-Réné Brault, Erasme-Achille Buez, Jacques Cazeneuve, Victor-Achille Champenois, C. L. H. Chevassu, J. F. Claudel, Jules-Victor Cléramboust, LéonAlex.-Hipp. Coindet, Jean-Léon Cornuty, J. T. Coupard, Auguste-Adolphe Crouillebois, J. J. Damour, Jacques-Edmond Dauzats, E. J. A. E.-Emery Desbrousse, Jean-Baptiste Drexer, Albert Ducellier, CharlesAlbert Ehrmann, Jules Fabre, EugèneA. Fégueux, J. H. A. Fernández-Murillo, François-Martin Fricot, François-Jean-Baptiste Fuzier, P. F. L. Gouchet, Louis Auguste Guemeau, M. H. L. Honneur, François-JosephCharles-Gabriel Hounau, Jean-Gabriel Jacob, A. J. B. Lagreula, Etienne Gabriel Lambert, Jean-Baptiste Noël Laval, Pierre-Desiré Legendre, Guillaume-Henri Lespiou, Émile Leug, Charles Londe, F. C. Mercadier, Alphonse-Isidore Merchier, EdmeEtienne-Henri Morel, Jean Mouillac, J. F. Palisset, Eugène Patin, E. Pocret-Duverger, Alfred Poirée, François Poncet, Pierre-E.-J. Puig, MichelÉmile Rebstock, François-Alex. Rioublant, Paul-Réné Roy, S.-E.-Josué Sainte-Rose, Jean-Joseph-Jacques Taulera, E. C. R. V. Thomas, François-Joseph Thomas, J. B. M. F. Verdier, B. J. F. Veret Medical problems, French Army, 33;

322

INDEX

care of troops, 86; hospitalization, 87; loss of w o u n d e d , 87, losses at Puebla, 49; soldadas, 258 Medical Problems, Mexican, care of dead and wounded, 48 Medicine, Romantic movement, 15 Meglia, Pedro Francisco, Msr. Papal Nuncio, arrival, 124; protests, 124 Mejía, Jesús (Juarist General), killed, 9 8 Mejía, Tomás, 17 fn 13, 285, 294; in Cabinet, 202; in Matamoros, 121 fn 50, 135, 153, 167, 171; letter by, 144 fn 33, 155 fn 98, 226 fn 37; letter to, 167 fn 31; opposition to Juárez, 17, 152, 282; protests, 139, 154 fn 95; protests breach of neutrality, 149; report, 154, 165; returns to older practices, 202; seizes rebel artillery, 138; statement, 248 fn 152; withdrawal, 173 Mejía's Division, 69, 261, 262; border assignments, 136; in Campaign of the Interior, 66, 88, 92, 95, 113; medical care, 226; patrols Rio Grande, 149; pay, 171; reaches Bagdad, 99; typhus epidemic, 9 8 Méndez, Jüan Ν., 99, 282; decree, 19 fn 20 Mendoza, Juarist General, 48; executed, 97 Menduiña, Ramón, General, 20 fn 29 Mercader, see Gasset y Mercader Merced, La, Convent, 220 Mercier, Henri, Lincoln's agent to Maximilian, 107 fn 3 Mérida (Yucatán), siege, 289 Mèri d e la Canorgue, P. I. E . G. Jean Baptiste, in Tampico, 3 5 Mérite militaire, medal established, 115 Merrimac, ship, 143 Messages, via cigarette papers, 268. See Telegrams Mestizos, mestizas, 259; restrictions on, 69 Metman, Jean-Louis, General, 274 fn 2 Metric system, 283 Metz, 276-277 Mexican Army, dependence on, 112. See Imperial Mexican Army, Juarist Army Mexican Consul (Juarist), in Sán Francisco, 206 fn 98 Mexican Empire, Administration, ac-

cepted by Juarist defectors, 76; reorganization, 6 1 Mexican Empire, Military Affairs, organization, 61. See Imperial Mexican Army Mexican Empire, Finances, organization, 61, 266 Mexican Government, supreme power turned over to Juárez, 52 Mexican ladies, dress, 225 Mexican Officers (Imperial), 240; arrests by, 129; class consciousness, 70; courts-martial, 123, 147, 233; criticism, 263-265; in civil government, 76 fn 46; law needed, 70; Medals for, 62; on courts-martial, 233; prisoners of war in France, 143 fn 30; relations with French officers, 224; sources, 69 Mexican Officers (Juarist), foreigners among, 267 Mexican People, attitude toward French, 39; choice of government, 57 fn 1; favor federation, 208; French sympathizers, 34; French treatment of, 218-219; lower classes, 130; popularity sought, 137; proclamation, 20; residents in Paris, 157; self-reliance urged, 160; society, 252; treatment by guerrillas, 270 Mexican Question, shelved, 163 Mexican Republic, see Republic of Mexico. Mexican Society, plans for, 238 Mexican Soldiers, administration, 67 fn 32; equal treatment advocated, 69; example needed, 62; in Foreign Legion, 165; pay, 67 fn 32; transfers, 70; treatment, 263 Mexican Sovereignty, acknowledged, 22; over sick soldiers, 26 Mexico, alienation of Mexican territory, 144 fn 33; claims against, 22; description in t h e Convention of London, 270; financial status, 18, 159; French agents in, 14; French export trade with, 32; French occupation, 14, 64; independence from Spain, 14; Indian policy, 284; mines, 13; monarchist movement, 19; national interests, 21; previous governments, 17, 121; protection of northern border, 157; U.S. invasion rumored, 149

323

INDEX Mexico, Archbishop of, see Labastida Mexico, State (Department), governor escorts Maximilian, 1 1 1 fn 20; recruiting in, 1 7 0 Mexico City, 128, 1 5 3 ; archives, 7 ; banditry near, 3 3 fn 66, 2 6 8 ; Cathedral, 54, 5 9 , 9 4 - 9 5 , 107, 109, 1 3 0 ; description, 2 5 2 ; diplomats leave, 18, 7 5 ; divided jurisdiction over, 2 2 9 ; floods, 2 4 2 ; fortifications, 2 1 0 , 2 4 2 ; government formed, 5 3 ; Halley invited to, 1 4 2 ; left without government, 5 3 , 8 9 fn 16; manifesto published, 1 0 3 ; march on, 4 6 ; military commander, 54, 96, 2 0 9 ; military governor, 87, 2 3 5 ; occupation, 5 1 , 5 5 , 2 5 8 ; police in, 2 6 2 ; prefecto político, 6 4 ; reign of terror, 2 1 5 ; religious practice, 2 6 0 ; sale of horses in, 2 1 2 ; sanitary measures, 2 2 7 ; schools, 2 4 5 ; theatres, 2 5 6 ; travel through, 2 2 3 ; withdrawal proposed, 4 8 Mexico, Republic of, leaflets, 111; loan proposed, 1 6 2 ; proposal for, 1 5 9 ; recovery of strength, 2 0 7 ; U.S. legation, 167. S e e Juarist Government Mexico, Valley of, geo-political position, 14; map, 2 4 3 ; occupation, 65, 86 Mezquital (Durango?), fined, 138; occupied b y French, 9 9 Michoacán, State, 6 2 , 2 9 0 ; finances of the state, 9 3 , 1 2 1 ; geological study, 2 4 2 ; guerrilla bands, 99, 141, 2 6 8 ; Imperial governor, 8 9 fn 16, 9 2 ; Juarist army in, 152 fn 81, 162, 2 6 7 ; outside Imperial control, 9 9 ; to come within the Empire, 121 Mier (Coahuila), convoy at, 171 Milans del Bosch, Lorenzo, 2 8 fn 60 Military administration, observed, 4 7 fn 41 Military Commander, Brownsville, 8 5 ; duties, 6 3 , 7 4 , 87; letter to, 1 1 9 fn 44 Military Commission, dissolved, 1 2 9 ; established, 1 1 3 Military Customs, border problems, 1 3 9 ; responsibility lacking political representation, 1 3 9 Military Department of Arizona, established, 131 fn 88 Military districts, E m p i r e divided into, 150

Military forces in Mexico, F r e n c h , see Expeditionary Force, F r e n c h . Correspondence, 7 Military Government, establishment, 5 1 , 2 8 0 ; in Puebla, 5 0 ; in Veracruz, 20, 7 4 ; need for, 7 5 Military Governor, appointment, 51, 8 7 ; duties, 9 2 ; duties assumed, 5 4 , 6 4 ; fines, 2 3 4 ; prerogatives of, 3 0 ; Rubalcava, 2 0 fn 29 Military L a w , 9 6 Military observer, 47 fn 41 Military operations, 2 5 7 fn 27; daylight attack, 4 7 ; encumbered b y private property, 2 1 4 ; left to Imperial Army, 2 0 2 ; ship-to-shore landing, 3 5 ; summary, 5 8 ; suspension of arms, 48, 7 3 Military orders, blank, 1 9 2 ; conflicting, 2 2 2 ; issuing authority, 192 Military policies, 15; Bazaine's concern over, 7 1 ; health of troops, 2 2 Military status, see Armed combattants, Guerrillas, Lawful belligerents Military titles, distribution, 2 6 7 . See individual ranks Military tradition, authority, 1 9 0 ; followed b y F r e n c h , 2 8 2 ; on prisoners of war, 4 9 fn 50 Militia, organization, 66, 119; rural guards, 126, 2 6 1 . S e e Guardia Civil; Resguardos Millet, Ferdinand, 2 3 7 fn 88, 2 6 8 fn 70; Mme, 2 6 8 fn 70 Minatitlán (Veracruz), U.S. Consul, 8 5 Mineralogists, 2 4 0 Mines, attraction of, 13, 2 8 3 ; impresarios, 2 5 2 fn 1; mining explorations, 2 4 1 ; protection, 181. S e e Durango, L a Blanca, San Luis Potosí, Sonora, Zacatecas Mining Building, Grand Hall, 2 4 0 Minister Plenipotentiary, 6 0 Minister of Agriculture, F r e n c h , 140 fn

20 Minister of Finance, appointment, 1 7 8 Minister of F i n a n c e (French), letter to, 1 9 9 fn 55 Minister of Foreign Affairs, F r e n c h , letter to, 9 1 fn 20, 2 7 1 fn 95 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mexican, Doblado, 9 1 fn 20; letter by, 1 5 4 fn 91; letter to, 26, 1 5 0 fn 63; Mariscal,

324

INDEX

8; Robles, 139 Minister of Hacienda, Friant, 185 Minister of Justice, letter to, 190 fn 27, 204 fn 82. See Lares Minister of Public Instruction, 240 Minister of State, letter to, 226 fn 34 Minister of War, Paris/French, 62, 242; appeal to, 115; letter to, 87 fn 14, 94 fn 30, 98 fn 46, 103 fn 58, 106 fn 2, 107 fn 5, 108 fn 7, 109 fn 15, 111 fn 19-20, 113 fn 25, 114 fn 26, 115 fn 29, 116 fn 32-33, 117 fn 36, 118 fn 39, 119 fn 41, 120 fn 48, 122 fn 53-54, 123 fn 57, 124 fn 59, 63-64, 125 fn 67, 126 fn 70, 127 fn 73, 128 fn 76, 130 fn 83, 86, 131 fn 88, 132 fn 89, 137 fn 6, 138 fn 13, 151 fn 76, 164 fn 14, 166 fn 25, 169 fn 43, 202 fn 72, 230 fn 51, 249 fn 160, 269 fn 73, 270 fn 88, 271 fn 96-97; policy, 240. See also Randon, Niel. Minister of War, Mexican (Empire), 70, 90-91, 156, 186 fn 9, 233 fn 65; appointment, 178; archives searched, 145; letter to, 153 fn 84, 154 fn 91, 203 fn 79, 204 fn 83, 205 fn 89-90, 92, 225 fn 27, 226 fn 35, 229 fn 4647, 231 fn 56, 234 fn 71, 238 fn 90, 243 fn 122, 273 fn 112; orders, 133 Ministers, French, 178; letter to, 239 fn 97. See also Dano, Montholon, Saligny Ministers, Mexican, appointment of French officers, 179; hostility toward French, 137; to Spain, 8 Ministre d'État, 30 fn 69 Ministro de Fomento, 239 fn 94, 96; letter to, 242 fn 117, 243 fn 120 Ministro de Gobernación, blames Neigre, 125 fn 67; letter by, 122, 220 fn 7; letter to, 165 fn 19; UnderSecretary, 227 fn 42, 269 fn 72 Ministro de Instrucción pública y Cultos, 220 fn 3 Ministry, set up by Regency, 64. See also Ministro de Gobernación, Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works Ministry of Education, 63 fn 23 Ministry of War, Mexican (Imperial), appointments, 179; assignments, 275; authorship of law, 146 fn 42; charged with Imperial policy, 129

Ministry of War, French, 179 Miramar, 120; embassy to, 63; Treaty of, 107, 164, 194, 200. Miramón, Miguel, 288, 292; commands northern defenses, 215; division planned for, 69-70; in Cabinet, 202; political ties, 77; returns to Mexico, 23; support of Conservatives, 17 fn 13, 196 Miranda, Francisco Javier, Padre, return to Mexico, 23; sent to Europe, 59 Mirandol, Joseph Edouard de, General, 43 Misantla (Veracruz), escape from, 148 Mismer, Charles, 34 fn 7, 221 fn 15, 237 Missionaries, work of, 259 Mississippi, ship, 143 Mississippi Valley, settlement, 13 Molino, Hacienda, 40 Molino de Guadalupe, 43, 48 Monarchy for Mexico, 291; favored, 32, 61, 72; movement, 20 fn 30; opposition to, 73; support needed, 62 Monasteries, see San Agustín, San Francisco Moniteur Franco-Mexicain, Le, 52, 168, 174 Moniteur officiel, list of crimes, 93 Monitor republicano, 19 fn 21 Monroe Doctrine, 30 Montaudon, Jean-Baptiste Alexandre, General, 274 fn 2 Monte (game), popularity, 224 Monte de las Cruces, 249 Montebello, victory at, 30 Montenegro, General, embezzlement, 264; recruitment policy, 68 Monterrey (Nuevo León), 248; Bishop of, 245; commerce in, 153, 163; families moved to, 133 fn 93; filibusters in, 139; French occupy, 99, 113, 137, 141-142, 171; French withdrawal, 175,177,180; Juarist military strength in, 144, 172; roads, 1Θ5; rumors, 131 fn 88 Montezuma, 285 Montgomery, Alabama, 107 fn 3 Montholon, Marquis de, in Washington, 167; letter to, 179 fn 90, 280 fn 9-10, replaces Saligny, 60 Moore, Frank, 238

INDEX

Moorhead, American citizen, 202 Mora y Ozta, J. M. de, 243 fn 126 Morard, C. H., 31 fn 71 Moratorium, on debts, 18; repealed, 19 Morand, Antoine, Major, 176 Morelia (Michoacán), battle for, 89; French billets, 220; march on, 8889; occupation, 93 Morning Call, newspaper, 173 fn 55 Morny, Duc de, 238, 282 Morocco, French interest in, 15 Mortmain, Church lands, 79 Mosquito, ship, 176, 182 Mosso, plot suspected, 127 Mota, Juan de, 256 fn 22 Motley, John Lathrop, letter by, 274 fn 1; letter to, 162 fn 7; protest, 165 fn 18 Mules, disposal of, 170, 202; mule trains, 41; preferred over horses, 255; purchase, 20 fn 31, 35, 38, 40 fn 22 Municipalité, delegation, 53 Muñoz, Pedro, leader of Juarist band, 138 Muñoz, Roque, 91 Murder, punishment for, 119, 264 Murphy, Tomás, 210; letter to, 209 fn 116; protests arrest of Ugarte, 209 Murray, Dr., medical officer, 226 Murray, Robert Hammond, 288 Museum, 241, 253 Music, 244, 258-259 Musset, Alfred de, 15 Mutilation of prisoners, 267

Nahuatl Language, 285 Naïlettes, 258 Names, for political groups, 271-272; military groups, 268, 271-272; theatrical productions, see Drama Nancy, 275 Napoleon III, 7, 14, 64 fn 23, 104, 112, 165, 245, 277; capture, 277; Carlota's visit, 174-175; conspiracy against, 157; envoys, 164; heir, 129; instructions, 22 fn 38, 27, 30, 32, 40 fn 22; 57, 60, 71, 100, 142, 146, 150-151, 153; letter by, 32 fn 1, 61, 65, 109 fn 16, 112 fn 22, 116 fn 34, 117, 128 fn 78, 132 fn 91, 143 fn 29, 158, 159

325

fn 108-109, 161, 162 fn 6, 167 fn 28, 176 fn 70, 179 fn 85, 191 fn 31, 200 fn 61; letter to, 59, 66, 86 fn 10, 92 fn 25, 94 fn 29, 109 fn 14, 111 fn 19, 112 fn 21, 23, 186 fn 8, 192, 194, 194 fn 43, 199 fn 53-54, 232 fn 60, 241 fn 109, 270 fn 86, 271 fn 88, 91, 93, 272 fn 98, 103, 107, 110-, name used in courts-martial, 123; orders, 61, 116 fn 35, 128, 132 fn 91, 166, 170, 185, 191, 223; organization of forces, 30; plans, 166; policy, 22, 54, 56, 65, 67, 70, 82, 109, 116, 119, 124, 144, 156 fn 94, 158, 164, 179-180, 190, 238, 261, 274-275; 281-282; recommendations, 183-185, 197, 200; relatives, 224; reports to, 131; support of, 193, 218; toast, 248 fn 156 Napoleonic times, 13; agents in New Spain, 14; defeat of Empire, 14-15; tradition of, 16, 218 National Party, 57; defined, 125; members, 123. Not an organized political party but a general term to describe the Moderates, neither Conservatives nor outright Juarists Nationalized property, purchase of, 32 Naturalists, 240 Nautla (Veracruz), ship due in port, 148 Naval Artillery, French, 29 fn 65 Naval Division, French, command, 28 Navarin, ship, 34 Navarrete, Félix, 247 fn 135 Navy, French, Antilles Fleet, 150; approaches coast, 94; assignment of ship, 202; attacks, 13 fn 1, 176; danger to, 173; in Acapulco, 148; leaves for Mexico, 20; negotiations on Rio Grande, 212; orders sent to, 104, 201; relieves Matamoros, 149 fn 60; sailors rewarded, 216; surveillance of ships, 114; wide spread of, 275 Navy, Mexican (Imperial), 204 fn 82; criticism, 266; recruits for, 182 Navy, Spanish, evacuation of troops, 24 fn 45; reaches Mexico, 19 Navy, United States, patrols Gulf of California, 143 fn 30. See also Susquehanna Negotiations with the Enemy (Juarists), Conservative opposition to, 209; increase of, 204-205, 208-209, 211, 277 Negrete, Miguel, General, defeat, 92;

326

INDEX

escape, 4 9 ; history, 74; military operations, 172; troops, 87, 165 Negroes, enlistment of, 162; from Martinique, 2 5 fn 50; in Federal Army, 141, 154; sent to Mexico, 163 fn 11; troops from Egypt, 3 1 fn 72 Neigre, Charles-Louis-Camille, Baron, appointment, 34, 87; energetic activity, 125; escort, 111 fn 20; letter to, 148 fn 49; meets crisis, 95, 97 Neutrality, breaches of, 136, 141, 151 New Orleans, Louisiana, 2 3 8 ; deportation to, 131; families moved to, 1 3 3 fn 93; imprisonment in, 155 fn 95 New Spain, attacks on, 13; French agents in, 14 Newspapers, articles published in, 106, 173 fn 55, 2 3 3 ; smuggled, 2 7 7 ; U.S. reports in, 100. See Continental, Morning Call, Primavera, New York Herald, El Siglo New York City, Degollado in, 148; families moved to, 1 3 3 fn 93; French Consul, 167 fn 29; Juarist agents in, 171; loan for Juárez, 151; purchasing agent, 153; recruiting for Mexico, 136, 154, 176 New York Herald, 274 fn 2 Niel, Adolphe, Marshal, 2 7 5 ; letter by, 194, 195 fn 45 Nineveh, excavation, 15 Niño, Gregorio, fined, 2 3 4 Niox, Gustave Léon, history, 8, 20 fn 31-32, 2 1 fn 34, 36, 22 fn 38, 26 fn 55-56, 2 7 , 2 8 fn 61-63, 3 1 fn 73-74, 32 fn 1, 3 3 fn 2-5, 34 fn 8-11, 36, 37 fn 15, 3 9 fn 21, 44 fn 30-31, 4 8 fn 43, 45-47, 4 9 fn 49, 5 8 fn 4, 7 9 fn 52, 86 fn 11, 8 8 fn 15, 8 9 fn 18, 9 0 fn 19, 97 fn 41, 9 8 fn 45,146,149 fn 59,191 fn 32, 35, 194 fn 43, 2 1 3 fn 134-135, 2 4 3 fn 125, 2 4 7 fn 145, 2 7 0 fn 85 Nochistlán, Doblado's refuge in, 92; occupied by French, 9 8 Non-commissioned officers, captured, 49 Non[o]alco (Hidalgo), French billets,

220

Nopalucán (Puebla), troop movement via, 4 1 - 4 2 Noria, L a (Puebla), occupation, 4 3 North, T h e (U.S.), see Federals (U.S.), United States

Northerners (Individuals from the northern U.S. as distinguished from the Confederates), 85 Notables, Assembly of, 64 fn 23; elections, 59, 73; formation, 58, 77; jurisdiction, 83 "Notables," delegation of, 5 3 Nouë, Ludovic-M. François, Captain, letter, 176 fn 70 Novels, reading of, 2 5 8 Nueva Galicia, see Jalisco Nuevo León, State, French withdrawal, 175; Governor, 2 3 fn 42; state of siege, 2 1 fn 35 Nuns, protest by, 220 Núñez de Lara, José, 256 fn 24 Nuremberg, 291

Oath of allegiance to the Empire, 102, 280 Oaxaca City, capture by Diaz, 203; sanitary regulations, 2 2 7 ; siege and capture, 2 4 3 ; withdrawal to, 181 Oaxaca, Estado de, new troops raised, 88; occupied by Austrians, 164; occupied by French, 99, 126, 168 fn 35; opposition to the Intervention, 97, 99; outside Imperial control, 86; recruiting in, 1 5 3 Occupation, Army of, 277 Ocotlán (Oaxaca), troops at, 47 Offenbach, Jacques, 1 5 O'Horan, Tomás, General, escape, 4 8 fn 44 Olive trees, destroyed, 81 Ollendorf Method, 246 Olvera, Rafael, Imperial General, 167; convoy, 171-172 Opera, in the capital, 256 Oranges, 2 0 6 fn 98 Orchids, 2 4 0 Ordonnance, Offr. d', 2 1 0 fn 117 Order of Guadalupe, appointments, 211; decorations, 115; rules, 115 fn 31 Order of the Day, Maximilian, 169; Ortega, 4 8 Orderly (personal servant), military, 221, 2 2 4 Orders, see Military Orders Ordinance, Police, 227 Oriental Societies, 15

INDEX Orizaba (Veracruz), 193, 2 1 1 , 2 3 9 ; communications, 4 2 , 2 4 2 ; Conservatives in, 2 9 , 36; French headquarters at, 31, 33-35, 70; French start evacuation, 25; manifesto published in, 103; Maximilian in, 111, 187, 189-190, 198-199; return of troops to, 27-28, 186; sick soldiers in, 2 6 - 2 7 ; Spanish troops in, 22, 74; travel via, 2 1 5 Orizaba, Mount, 4 1 Ormeachea, Juan B. de, Bishop, election, 58, 7 7 ; refusal, 7 9 Ornant, Marie-Edouard d\ 2 2 5 , 227, 257 fn 24 Oroniz, Carlos, letter, 155 fn 96, 2 6 5 fn 57 Ortega, General, see González Ortega Ortega, Eulalio, Juarist leader, 162 Ortigosa, Vicente, appointment, 123 Osmont, French General, appointment, 169 fn 42, 178-179, 185; circular, 2 2 9 fn 48; letter to, 211 fn 123 Oudriot, J . P., letter by, 157 fn 103, 2 4 7 fn 138 Outlaw bands, opposition to Juarists, 17; treatment, 101, 145. See Bandits Outposts, Mexican, 4 7 Ozumba (Mexico), bivouac at, 41 P. O. (initials), 2 1 0 fn 117 Pachuca (Hidalgo), communications cut, 186 fn 9; Imperial control, 86; Juarist troops near, 87; troops stationed at, 55, 7 1 Pacific Coast, evacuation, 164, 180, 2 0 2 ; filibusters, 154, 167, 2 0 5 ; French on, 131 fn 88, 160; Juarist supplies on, 143 Pacific Department (Military Zone, U.S.A.), commander, 131 fn 88 Pacific Fleet (French), 2 0 1 Pacific Islands, Colonial extension, 13, 15, 2 8 1 Pacific Ocean, French ships in, 86; ports on, 72 Packet boat, British, 103; Carlota on, 174; Mexican, 153; to F r a n c e 2 1 5 ; U.S. 174 Pagarés, protection of, 80, 9 3 Paintings, military, 2 4 4 - 2 4 5 Pájaro Verde, El, newspaper, 2 4 1 fn 107, 2 4 6 fn 130, 2 5 4 fn 6, 2 5 6 fn 22, 2 6 8 fn 71, 2 7 0 fn 79

327

Palace, Episcopal, repair, 8 1 Palace of Government, Bazaine meets Junta, 2 0 7 ; residence of Forey, 54 Palmillas, see Venta de las Palmillas Pamphlet published, 1 3 0 Panamá, French intervention in, 18 Paniagua, Cenobio, 2 5 6 Pansa Cola (Tlaxcala), troops at, 47 Papal Nuncio, awaited, 113; arrival, 124; company, 130. See Meglia Papeles sobre la intervención, 6 4 fn 23 Papyri, 15 Parade, farewell, 62; French soldiers, 50, 108, 1 1 5 fn 30, 130 Parícutin (Michoacán), 9 0 Paris, 2 5 2 ; (French) Government, 157, 174-175, 187; correspondence with, 7, 37 fn 15, 59, 190 fn 27, 2 0 2 , 223; fashion, 2 4 0 ; Juarist agents in, 171; Mexican Minister to, 164; news of Mexico in, 30, 72; orders from, 185; police, 157 fn 104; revolution, 2 7 7 ; social life, 2 7 5 ; U.S. agent in, 162 fn 7. See French Ministry, Minister W a r , Randon, Napoleon I I I Parks, Public, 132 Parole, officers, 50; officer released on, 2 9 fn 65; punishment for refusing, 51 Parral (Chihuahua), occupied by French, 1 0 0 Parras (Coahuila), prisoners of war taken at, 2 0 5 ; uprisings, 132 fn 91 Partisans, attack by, 128; shelter, 143; use of term, 2 7 2 fn 109. See also Guerrillas Paseo, 2 5 3 Paso (dramatic composition), 2 5 6 fn 24 Paso Ancho (Veracruz), 2 0 7 , 247; French withdrawal to, 25, 2 7 Paso del Macho (Veracruz), 215, 247; telegraph lines, 242 Paso del Muerto (Veracruz), 2 0 7 Pastor y Ramírez, Gusto, 156 Paso de Ovejas, bivouac, 3 7 Pastry W a r , 14, 14 fn 6 Patoni, José María, escape, 4 9 Patricios, Los, 2 6 9 Patriotism, 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 , 2 2 3 Pátzcuaro (Michoacán), 2 4 7 Pavón, Desiderio, General, Juarist, 3 5 Pavón, Ignacio, election, 58; letter to, 82 fn 61, 8 3 fn 63 Payen, Madame, 2 5 9 fn 35

328

INDEX

Paz, Irene, 269 fn 76 Peace, state of, 65 Pedraza, 247 Peña (de Bazaine), Josefa de la, (Azcárate), 174; marriage, 133, 195; prefrences, 196; rescues Bazaine, 278 Peña y Barragán, General, Juarist leader, 95; looting of town, 96 fn 37 Peña y Barragán, Casimiro, 9 6 Pendergast, G. J., letter, 16 fn 11 Penitenciario, E l , attack on, 44; entrance, 50 Penjamillo (Michoacán), Juarist attack on, 95 Pénjamo (Guanajuato), guerrilla b a n d s in, 96 fn 36 Pensions for Austrians, 198 Peons, on haciendas, 263; peonage, 285 fn 12; social level, 254; wages paid, 126 Peotillos (San Luis Potosí), 177 fn 78 Peralta, Angela, 256 Peredo, see Suárez Peredo Pérez Escrich, Enrique, 257 fn 24 Período Imperial, 151 fn 71; 266 fn 58 Perote (Veracruz), 39; convoy to, 212 fn 132; French advance to, 35, 37, 40, 43; garrison, 41, 66, 86; road via, 236 Pesqueira, Juarist General, advances, 176; filibusters join, 173 fn 55; U.S. aid to, 143 fn 30; withdrawal, 236 Petit, Louis-Jean-Edmond, Colonel, Chasseurs d'Afrique, riding habit, 226 Petitions, 59 fn 10 Peza, J u a n d e Dios, letter by, 148 fn 52; Minister of W a r . 133 Pezuela, see Robles Pezuela Philip IV, 79 Philology, 15 Phlegeton, ship, 212 Pianos, importation, 244 Piastres, 40 fn 22 Pickett, John T., U.S. agent to Juárez, 107 fn 3 Piedad, L a (Michoacán), French troops in, 90, 214, 272 fn 101 Piedra Gorda (Jalisco), troops at, 89 Piedras Negras (Coahuila), Juarist bands in, 149, 172 Pierard, Aristide, 245, 245 fn 129, 250 fn 176, 254 fn 10, 2 5 5 fn 16, 259 fn 33, 2 7 3 fn 114

Pierron, Edouard, 198; communication with Castelnau, 194 fn 43; letter by, 165 fn 20, 169 fn 39, 172 fn 53, 198 fn 51 ; letter requested, 194; letter to, 189 fn 86; reprimand, 225; sent to meet Castelnau, 186 Pietri (Prefet d e Police, Paris), 157 fn 104 Pillage, avoided, 180; captured towns, 85, 236 Pinos (Zacatecas), 235 Pinsón (Pinzón, José María de Jesús?), escape, 49 Pirates, classification, 27 Plan del Río, bivouac at, 37 Plateados, Los, join Empire, 270 Plateros, Calle de los, 54 Plaza de México, Comandante de, 230 Plaza Mayor, Puebla, 50 Poder ejecutivo, established, 58 Polaki (Polak), Lieutenant Colonel, 186 fn 9; letter by, 215 Police, 64, 204 fn 82; Chief of, arrested, 209 Police, Civil, in Paris, 157 fn 104; Mexican, 228; organized, 5 3 Police, Military, French rôle as, 71 Police Commissioner, imprisoned, 229 Policing of cities, failure in, 234; Mexico City, 253; San Luis, 122 Political analysis, 183 Political crimes, not to b e tried by courts-martial, 188, 188 fn 20 Political officers, see Prefecto político, Government Officials Political policy, French, opposition to, 60; re-statement, 61, 206 Pont, Baron de [confidential secretary to Maximilian], 248 fn 153 Poole, Henry W a r d , 246 Poor, C. H., letter by, 163 fn 9; letter to, 143 fn 30 Pope, approval required, 78 Population, preponderance of females, 257 Porfiar Sencillo (Nuevo León), 99 Portilla, Nicolás de la, Imperial General, 141 Portillo López, Jesús, 282; appointment, 123 Port Isabel (?), 173 fn 55 Ports, Mexican, blockade lifted, 114 Positivism, 246, 282-283

INDEX

Potier, Charles-Marie-Ferdinand-Jacques, Lieutenant Colonel, appointed, 54; captures Nochistlán, 98; letter to, 133 fn 93-94, 189 fn 23 Potrero, French billets in, 220 Poucel, Fernando, letter, 19 fn 21 Powder, gun, destruction, 48; factory, 204; storeroom, 220 Powell, L. M., letter by, 21 fn 33; report, 22 fn 37, 24 fn 45 Powhattan, flagship, 16 fn 11 Precedent, 218 Prefect, see Prefecto Prefecto municipal, appointed to commission, 51; improper address, 225; letter to, 224 Prefecto político (préfet politique), appointment 264; appointed to commissioner, 51; Durango, 138; duties, 92, 96; fined, 235; inspection of, 120; laxness, 125; letter to, 253 fn 2, 4, 272 fn 99; Mexico City, 64; orders to, 121; temporary appointments, 76, 89. See also Santa Anna Prefecto Superior, 249 fn 175 President, election of, 159; presidential succession, 161-162 Presidente Provisional, Almonte, 29 fn 67 Press (Publishing), European, 66; liberal, 233; regulations on, 58; ridicules foreigners, 131 fn 88 Press, Director of, 7; controls over, 127. See Leaflets Preston, William, Confederate agent, 107 fn 3 Prices, controls, 20 fn 29, 239; inflation of, 39, 40 fn 22, 216 fn 141; lodging, 221; uniforms, 264 Priests, authority over civil affairs, 60; respect shown, 260. See Alleau, Clergy Prieto, Guillermo, Juarist leader, 165 Prieto, Luciano, General (Imperial), 181; escape, 49; letter, 181 fn 96 Prim, General (Conde de Reus, Marqués de los Castillejos), assumes command, 20; commercial interests, 23; convention, 21, 28; disillusion with intervention, 23, 24 fn 45, 85; letter by, 23 fn 43, 24 fn 45; policy, 22, 24; proclamation, 20 fn 32

329

Primavera, newspaper, 233 Primer calendario, 18 fn 16, 22 fn 37, 24 fn 45, 28 fn 62 Prince, see Bouffrement, FrédéricCharles Printers, warned by Bazaine, 125 Prison, escape from, 165; rigors of, 262; terms, in decree, 60 Prisoners of War, 48; Austrian, 148; camp, 49; escape, 49, 129 fn 81, 148, 212; exchange, 29, 133, 156, 205, 208, 210; French, 50, 207; list, 90 fn 18; not to be hostages, 96 fn 36; recruitment from among, 68; release, 209-210, 210 fn 122; returned to Mexico, 114, 143 fn 30; rights, 35 fn 12, 43 fn 29; treatment, 49, 96, 101, 152, 207 fn 105, 232, 267, 269, 277 Prisoners under sentence, amnesty, 102, 114; released, 129 Proaño, guard company, 181 Procès Bazaine, 276 fn 5 Proclamation, 20, 26, 29, 29 fn 66, 33, 56, 63; Bazaine, 213; disapproval, 59; Maximilian, 189, 201 fn 68, 273 fn 114; Taboada, 69 Promotions, concern for, 218; law needed, 70; orders, 60 Pronunciamiento, by Vicario, 127; discouraged, 70 Property, Church, nationalization, 17 fn 12, 79, 124; return, 161-162; sale, 61, 78, 82; used by French, 220 Property, nationalized, adjudication, 51, 80, 130; colonization scheme, 239; French investment, 246; purchase, 32, 57, 116-117; punishment of participants in, 94; recovery, 232; sale, 93, 125, 137 Property, Private, burning of, 206; confiscation, 51; donation, 238; safeguarded, 57; seizure, 36 Property, State-owned, rights of military to, 219 Property rights, invasion of, 17 Prostitution, increase of, 257; regulation of, 227 Protestants, 259 Protocol, 217-218 Provisional Government, see Regency Prussia, 73; comparison with, 88; consuls, 52, 220; diplomatic policy, 159

330

INDEX

fn 109; threat to France, 112, 275278 Prussian legation in Mexico, affairs left with, 18, 18 fn 18; military observer, 47 fn 41 Public Instruction, French Minister for, 240; Under-Secretary for, 240 Public Works, fines used for, 234; Ministry of, 242 Puebla, Cathedral, 5 0 Puebla de los Ángeles (Puebla), 77, 198 fn 50; advance on, 35-36; communication with Veracruz, 70; defeat of French, 28, 30; defenses, 215; factories, 204; French troops in, 29 fn 65, 131 fn 88, 186, 189, 212 fn 132, 215, 231; Imperial commander at, 203; Maximilian in, 190; Mexican troops in, 29, 156, 277; military government in, 144, 222, 234; negotiations with Juarists, 205; prisoners in, 269; siege and capture, 42-49, 53, 59, 68, 101, 168; surrender, 48-49, 57; theatres, 256; travel to, 53 Puebla (State/Department), Governor escorts Maximilian, 111 fn 20; Imperial control, 86; recruiting, 170; state of siege, 21 fn 35 Pueblita, Manuel G., Juarist General, family, 133 Puente de las Ánimas, 43; Prisoner-ofwar camp, 4 9 Puente del Río, troops arrive at, 52 Puente Nacional/Puente Imperial, falls to Juarists, 203; troop movements via, 37, 39-40 Puga, Cedulario, 13 Quatrefages de Bréau, Jean-Louis-Armand de, 241 Quarter (clemency), to be refused, 267 Quecholac, route via, 41-42 Querétaro, Bishop, 116 Querétaro, City, 119 fn 44, 261; Bazaine in, 173; capture, 88-89, court-martial jurisdiction, 229; French billets, 220; military expedition to, 201 fn 67; salute to Maximilian, 108 Querétaro, State (Department), 62; campaign via, 66; French withdrawal, 200-203; Juarist troops near, 87; recruiting, 170; state of siege, 21 fn 35

Quetzalcoatl, 2 8 5 Quintero, J. Α., letter, 91 fn 21

Race, see Social Problems Railway, at Veracruz, 36; contractor, 162; damage to, 204, 214; labor on, 50; Mexico City, 254; plans, 282; repair on, 207; roads follow, 214 Rain, effects, 37, 39 Ramirez, 249. See also Pastor y Ramírez Ramírez, Francisco, appointment, 123 Ramírez, José J., letter by, 154 fn 93 Ramírez, Juan, Juarist General, executed, 97 Ramos Arispe (Coahuila), fined, 234 Rancho de Rodeo, 98 (not identified. Probably modern town of Rodeo in Michoacán). Rancy, Captain, Staff, 2nd Division; Madame Rancy, 225 Randon, Jacques-Louis-César-Alexandre, 191; letters by, 33 fn 6, 133 fn 92, 144 fn 34, 175, 191 fn 31, 200 fn 58-60, 202 fn 73, 212 fn 131, 241 fn 108, 242 fn 110, 243 fn 124, 250 fn 176; letter to, 62 fn 16, 109, 201 fn 68, 270 fn 87, 271 fn 89; Mémoires, 144 fn 34; recommendations, 141142, 144, 170-171, 185, 200, 202, 212; sends ship, 215 Rank, Military, in chain of command, 222 Rapport de Quinzaine, 165 fn 22, 167 fn 32, 169 fn 37-38, 41, 170 fn 44, 172 fn 53 Ratzel, Friedrich, 14 fn 9 Real Catorce (San Luis Potosí), pacification, 95, 98 Rebels, 156. See Juarist Army, Juarist Government Rebozo, 225 fn 29 Recall, Saligny and Forey, 63 Réclus, Elisée, 227 fn 40 Recognition, diplomatic, by the Confederate States, 107; of Empire, 100, 107 Reconnaissance Battalion, 20th, 55; 7th, 55; 12th, 55. See Chasseurs Recruiting System for Army, announced, 58; bonus, 265; decline, 67,

INDEX

169; irregular, 150, 156, 182, 266; law needed, 70; recommendations, 162; volunteers, 93 Red Cross Convention of 1864, 152 fn 81

Reed, [Horatio Blake?], Colonel, aid to Juárez, 153; attack by, 155 Reform Program (La Reforma), 292; laws, 72-73, 130-131, 252, 257; policy, 16, 271; revocation, 77; use of land, 239 Reforma, Guerra de la, 16; amnesty offered, 101 fn 49 Refugees, Confederate, 136; Juárez, 145; return to Mexico, 23 Regency for Empire of Mexico. 262, 270; abandonment alleged, 64 fn 23; abolished, 109; accepted by Campeche, 97; appeal to, 81; appointive powers, 75; appointments, 76; assumes control, 61-62, 64, 75; Bazaine's coup, 82-83; boycotted by Labastida, 82; composed, 58-59; criticism, 72-73; establishment, 74; favored by Santa Anna, 103; gambling forbidden, 224; influence over, 63; internal conflicts, 71, 106; Labastida dropped, 82, 94, 196; named, 228; policy defined, 93; prerogatives, 69; programs, 69, 71; proposed, 196; relations with Bazaine, 64-65, 114; restrictions, 80, 128; sovereign rights, 63. See Decrees Reglamento de la prostitución . .., 227 fn 41 Regules, Nicolás, Tuarist General, 99, 152 fn 81, 162; wife, 235 Religion, freedom of, 125; of Irish, 156; respect shown, 32, 78; state support opposed, 80 Religious Activity, attendance at mass, 60; profession of religious devotion, 258 Religious Question, postponed, 113. See Nationalized Property Rent, paid on nationalized property, 79, 93 Reparations, for losses, 280 Repatriation of soldiers, 112, 132 fn 91, 212; criticized. 144; provisions for, 198 Representation, Local, recommended for Mexico, 161

331

Reprimand, to officers, 129, 222, 225, 233 Reprisals, authorization, 25, 235; by Juarists, 34; fear of, 84; threat of, 95, 180 República Mexicana, 270 Republican Party (U.S.A.), victory at polls, 151 Republicans, see Juárez Government Republican Political System, recommended for Mexico, 183 Requisitions, outlawed, 57 Research and Development Unit, 4000th, 9 Research and Development Board, Washington, D.C., 9 Resguardos, responsibilities, 112. See Militia Resignation, threatened, 68, 222-223 Retreats, law needed, 70 Reus, Conde de, see General Prim Rêve d'Empire, 8 Reveille, 214 Revenue, Internal, efforts to raise money, 17-18; need for, 121. See also Taxes, Imposts Review of court-martial cases, 93 Revolution, spirit of, 155 Revue de Paris, 191 fn 34, 193 fn 39, 199 fn 53, 292 Revue des deux mondes, 292 Reyero, Manuel, 157 Reyes, Los, occupation of, 90 Reyes de la Mazza, Luis, 257 fn 24 Reynosa (Tamaulipas), Juarist troops in, 144 Rhine, Army of the, 274 fn 2, 276 Rhode, Robert D., 9 Ribbons, see Legion of Honor, 63 Rich, Elihu, 31 fn 71 Rigoletto, Mexican packet-boat, 153 Rincón Gallardo (Juarist leader), 98 Rinconada, La (Veracruz), bivouac, 37 Rio [de Janeiro], 158 Río Frio, pass of, 52, 111; telegraph station, 242 Rio Grande (Rio del Norte) (Rio Bravo), blockade, 84; Federal troops on, 167; international tension over, 136, 152, 157; landing along, 85; negotiations with Juarists on, 211; ship stationed in, 141; shooting across, 135; withdrawal of troops, 136 fn 3

332

INDEX

Río Seco, 247 Riva Palacio, Mariano, Archives, 7-8 Riva Palacio, Vicente, 293; Archives, 7 8; General, 152 fn 81, 267-268, 273; letter by, 209 fn 113; mission for, 157; negotiations w i t h French, 205, 209 Rivas, Manuel, Juarist general joins Empire, 97; Imperial General, 176 Rivera, Aureliano, Juarist leader, 165; sale to, 213 fn 132 Rivers, see Atoyac, Blanco, Chiquihuite, Conchos, Florido, Frio, Garita de Amozoc, Tolomé Rivière, General, 274 fn 2 Roads, building, 243; conditions, 37-38, 41, 242; guarded, 165; system of, 181 fn 98; to Veracruz, 214 Robbery, bands, 264; robbers, 272; small articles, 237 Robles Pezuela, Luis, Commissioner, 169 fn 40, 182; Foreign Minister, 139-140; Ministro d e Fomento, 239 fn 95, 242 fn 116 Robles Pezuela, Manuel, General, executed, 2 3 fn 42 Rojas, Antonio, Juarist General, communications, 89 fn 17; cruelty, 99, 269 Rolland, M., Lieutenant Colonel, financial expert, 121 fn 50, 199 Rome, campaign in, 40 fn 24; residence in, 80, 125 Romero, Mateo, letter to, 172 fn 51 Romero, Nicolás, leader of "outlaw" band [Juarist colonel commanding First Brigada Mixta, Republican Army?], 86, 233 Rosales (Chihuahua?), 100 Rosetta Stone, 15 Rotation of service, 223 Rouher, M., speech, 30 fn 69 Roulette, popularity, 224 Rouvière, Honoré Albert, 230 fn 50 Rouy, D., Madame, 256 fn 24 Rubalcava, see Gutiérrez de Rubalcava Rubio, Colonel (Imperial), 248 fn 152 Ruiz, Eduardo, 269 fn 75 Ruiz, Ramón Eduardo, 287 Ruiz Alarcón, Juan, 256 Rules of L a n d Warfare, 219 fn 1, 292293; definition, 146 fn 38; hostages, 96 fn 36; observed, 28-29, 268. See also Geneva, Hague Convention

Rurales, see Guardias rurales Russia, rivalry with, 281 Russian Army, Czarist, 15, 247

Saber, return to French, 204 Saborío, Juan Napoleón, agent for Empire, 91; letter, 92 fn 24 Sabotage, by Liberal Party, 118; French troops, 214; guerrillas, 215 Sacrificios, Isla de los, deportation to, 120; U.S. ship off shore, 16 fn 11 Safe conduct, given b y French, 210; to b e given by Empire, 210; to b e honored, 209 Sailors, recruiting of, 182 Saillard, Baron, mission to Mexico, 159, 164 St. Cloud, 275 St. Cyr, education at, 30 St. Cyr, H. de, letter by, 156 fn 102, 157 fn 105 St. Denis, Louis Juchereau de, expeditions, 13, 13 fn 3 St. Hilaire (?), Colonel, letter to, 91 fn 21 [Perhaps an error for Lieutenant Colonel Amédée H. Charles Sainthillier of t h e 2nd Infantry Regiment. T h e only St. Hilaire that I can identif y is Captain E u g è n e Alex.-George Wright Prévost Saint-Hilaire of t h e Dragons de l'Impératrice, stationed in Melun] St. Louis, ship, 34 Saint-Martin, Vivien de, 243 St. Peter, see Vatican Sainte Marguerite, 278 Salamanca (Guanajuato), 272 fn 101; campaign near, 91; lack of officials, 76; prefect captured, 96 Salaries, Mexican troops, 36 Salas, José Mariano, assumes charge of Mexico City, 53; elected to Regency, 58; policy, 79, 81-83, 95; visited, 54 Salazar, Próspero(P), General, family, 133 Salazar Ilarregui, José, 241 Undersecretary, 240 Sale of nationalized property, 51 Saligny, Dubois de, duties, 28, 33; influence, 57-60, 71, 74, 77; in Mexico City, 56; leaves Mexico City, 18; letter by, 26 fn 54; marriage, 258; pro-

333

INDEX clamatíon, 2 0 fn 32, 2 6 ; proposal, 21, 49; recall, 60, 6 3 Salta (Wood in Jalisco?), 2 6 7 Saltierra, Prefect, 172 Saltillo (Coahuila), 2 4 0 , 2 4 9 ; families moved to, 133 fn 93; French withdrawal, 175, 177, 180; invaded by 132 fn 91; Juarists guerrillas, threaten, 172; occupied by French, 99, 137, 153, 2 2 0 Salute, artillery salvoes, 108, 115 fn 30 Samhaber, Ernst, 14 fn 9 San Agustín, Fort, attack on, 4 4 San Agustín, Monastery, 2 2 0 San Andrés, 4 1 ; Street in Mexico City,

220

San Antonio, Texas, families moved to, 133 fn 93; raid, 13 fn 3 San Baltasar, Fort, 4 5 San Bartolo, Hacienda de, 4 2 ; troop movement via, 4 2 San Bias (Nayarit), French advance on, 94; French withdrawal, 180; Juarist forces, 148; prisoners sent to, 152 San Cosme, 2 4 9 San Diego, Juarists supplied via, 143; troop movement via, 4 2 San(to) Domingo, convent, 2 2 0 San Esteban, Church, 2 2 0 San Felipe [del Progreso] (Mexico), 2 4 3 San Francisco (California), aid to Juarists, 165, 176; arraigns filibuster, 2 0 6 fn 98; communication with rebels via, 168, 173; filibusters in, 206; forage purchased, 131 fn 88; supplies from, 132 fn 91, 143, 149, 154, 167 San Francisco, Monastery, 2 2 0 San Francisco Bay, ships in, 1 7 3 fn 55 San Javier, Penitenciario de, 249; Fort, 43-44 San José, Church, incident in, 2 2 5 San Juan, bivouac, 38. See also Cerro de San Juan San Juan de los Lagos, 94 fn 30, 2 7 1 fn 96; Fair, 2 0 3 ; officials in, 76 San Juan de Ulúa, Island of (Veracruz), French supply center, 120; imprisonment on, 127; surrender, 19; used by French, 2 0 6 fn 105 San Juan Teotihuacán (Mexico), 2 8 5 San Lázaro, Gate of, 5 4 San Lorenzo, Fort, Battle, 44, 4 7 , 8 9 San Loreto, 2 4 8

San Lucas, Cabo de (Baja California), ship boarded at, 2 0 6 fn 98 San Luis de la Paz (Guanajuato), 260-

261

San Luis Potosí, City, 2 2 6 , 2 4 9 ; campaign against, 92, 95; executions in, 119; French headquarters, 142; French withdrawal, 2 0 3 ; Headquarters of Juárez, 6 6 , 72, 87; internment in, 139; maneuvers near, 9 8 ; Maximilian in, 179; mines, 13; policing, 122, 123 fn 59, 137, 155, 202, 2 2 9 ; political activity, 125; prostitution in, 2 5 7 ; school, 245; state of siege in, 2 1 fn 35 San Luis Potosí, State, 6 2 , 177 fn 77; pacification, 95; telegraph lines, 2 4 2 ; turned over to Imperial troops, 207 San Marcos, attack on, 4 4 San Martin, 2 4 8 ; troops reach, 52 San Martín Texmelucán (Puebla), 225, 2 4 8 (?); telegraph line, 242 San Miguel, 2 3 4 ; bivouac, 39; Hacienda, 4 1 San Miguel (Durango), fined, 138 San Pablo del Monte, battle at, 4 4 San Patricio, 2 6 9 San Pedro [Lagunillas, Nayarit?], Juarist supplies via, 143, 171 San Xavier, see San Javier Sánchez Fació, Colonel, 2 6 3 ; 6 7 fn 32 Sánchez Navarro, Carlos, duties, 198 Sánchez-Navarro y Peón, Carlos, 107 fn 4 Sand, George, 15 Sandoval, (Juarist General), joins E m pire, 9 8 Sanitation, Military, 2 2 6 - 2 2 8 ; cities, 253 Santa Ana, Antonio, Prefect, 9 6 Santa Anita, Fort, attack on, 4 5 Santa Anna, see López de Santa Anna Santacilia, Pedro, letter to, 136 fn 5, 145 fn 36, 1 5 3 fn 87, 1 5 4 fn 91, 161 fn 5, 2 3 6 fn 87 Santa F e (Veracruz), troop movement to, 3 8 Santa Gertrudis, Battle of, 172 fn 51 Santa Inés, Convento de, 4 4 Santa Rosa, troop movement via, 4 2 ; Hacienda de, 2 3 4 Santiago, see Valle de Santiago Santísima area, Mexico City, 2 3 0

334

INDEX

Santo Domingo, Spanish Intervention in, 18 Saranac, U. S. patrol ship, 143 fn 30 Saturday Review, 212 fn 129, 226 fn 31, 2.53 fn 3, 254 fn 5, 8 Saudo, A. letter to, 85 fn 7 Saussure, M. de, 243 Savignon, arrest of, 264 Schmolk, Herbert Helmuth, 14 fn 9 Scientific Commission, 240 Schools, in Mexico City, 245 Scott, Winfield, campaign of 1847-48, 37, 52, 269 Sebastián, Don, Infante, 20 fn 30 Second Division, Commander, 35, 87; in Amozoc, 42; in siege of Puebla, 43 Secret negotiations, 164 Secretary of State for Government, recommendations to, 65 Secretary of State for War, see Minister of War Sedan, surrender, 277 Seigland, Jean-François-Fl., 142 fn 28 Seminary, repair on, 80-81 Senior, Nassau William, 20 fn 30, 23 fn 42, 59 fn 10 Sequestration Law, see Decreto sobre secuestros . . . Sentence of death, execution, 147; restriction, 93. See Capital Punishment Serrano, Manuel, proclamation, 29 fn 67 Servigny, Battle of, 47 fn 41 Sevastopol, Military Governor, 30 fn 71 ; siege of, 30 Seward, William Henry, dispatch, 158 fn 107; letter, 162 fn 7, 179 fn 90, 280 fn 10; letters to, 209 fn 113, 274 fn 1; opposes war with France, 142; statement, 19 fn 22, 163 fn 11 Shelby, Joseph O., General, Confederate, rumors of, 150 Shelly, see Shelby Sheridan, Philip H., interested in aid to Juárez, 150; letter, 138 fn 11; travel to Mexico, 167 Sherman, General (U.S.), Mexican Mission, 201 Ships, at Matamoros, 121 fn 50; attacks on, 206; captured, 135, 173; commerce by, 84; flagship, 143 fn 30; French, 173; French Navy, 86; Juarist supplies, 143, 148, 173; Mexican river boats, 139; military supply by,

226; ship-to-shore landing, 35; stationed in Rio Grande, 141; troop transports, 139, 215. See Ark, Ajax, Antonia, Basco, Bronter, Castiglione, Elizabeth Owens, Enterprise, Jeanne d'Arc, Lancaster, John L. Stephens, Magellan, Merrímac, Mississippi, Mosquito, Navarin, Phlegeton, Rigoletto, Saranac, Souvereign, St. Louis, Susquehanna, Tartare, Themis, Victoire. Not mentioned in the text, the following ships also operated in Mexican waters during the Intervention Period: [French] Achéron, Adonis, l'Allier, Amazone, Ardent, Ariadne, Asmodée, d'Assas, Astrêe, Augustine, Brandon, Canadá, Cordelière, Cères, Colbert, Darien, Diligente, Entreprenante, Eugénie, Finistère, Fontenoi, Forfait, La Foudre, La Guerrière, Louise, Lucifer, Lutin, Pallas, Pique, Rhône, Sainte-Barbe, Tactique, Tarn, Tempête, Tisiphone, Tourmente, Turennc; [Austrian] Dandolo, Novara; [Mexican] Álamo, Camargo, Tabasco, Veracruz; [British] Challenger Shreveport (Louisiana), troop movement via, 148 Siege, state of, described, 177; lifted, 87-88; of Puebla, 43-49; proclaimed, 21, 177 Sierra Hermosa (Zacatecas), 162 Siglo Diez y Nueve, El, newspaper, 17 fn 12-13, 18 fn 14-18, 19 fn 19-27, 20 fn 28-32, 21 fn 33, 35, 22 fn 37, 39-40, 23 fn 41-42, 24 fn 45-49, 25 fn 50-51, 26 fn 54, 58, 28 fn 60, 29 fn 66-67 Silao (Guanajuato), 272 fn 107; French commander, 129; lack of officials, 76; social conditions, 257 Siliceo, Manuel, appointment, 123; approves extreme measures, 147 fn 46; letter by, 63 fn 23 Silva, Joaquín, 225 Silver, escapes seizure, 206 fn 98; export, 84; export limited, 52 Sinaloa, Estado de, French occupy, 99; garrison in, 100, 133-134, 136, 163; geological study, 241; opposition to French, 131 fn 88 Sisal (Yucatán), attack on, 13 fn 1

INDEX

Skene, James Henry, 31 fn 71 Slaughter, James E., Confederate General, 135, 137-138 Slidell, John, letter by, 238 fn 92; letter to, 107 fn S Smissen, Baron Alfredo van der, Colonel, 166 Smith, Justin H., papers, 136 Soap factory, 232 Social problems, restrictions on Indians, 69 Socialistic colonization scheme, 239 Society of Geography and Statistics, Mexican, 241 Soldadas, functions, 258 Soldiers, private, capture, 49 Soledad, La, bridge at, 215; Convention of, 21, 56, 74, 270; negotiations, 92; repudiation, 26-28; telegraph lines, 242; terms of treaty, 22-23, 25, 35 fn 12, 270 Sombrerete (Zacatecas), Franco-Mexican conflict, 225, 229; Juarist pressure on, 186 Sonolet, Louis, 191, 193 fn 39, 199 fn S3 Sonora, State, 282; colonization scheme, 131 fn 88, 238; Confederate refugees in, 142; filibusters in, 173; guerrillas in, 152; mines, 14, 65, 241, 283; occupation by French, 100, 132 fn 91, 136, 163; occupation considered, 65; outside Empire, 99, 160; travel across, 132 fn 91, 176 Sons of Columbia, organized, 151 Soprano, operatic, see Ángela Peralta Sota Vento, Juarist supplies via, 153 South, see Confederate States of America South America, French interests, 18 fn 14, 281 Southampton, packetboat via, 103 Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 291 Souvereign, ship, 216, 274 Sovereign Rights, delegated to Almonte, 109; delegation, 25; division of, 71; Indians, 284; reassumption difficult, 63; resort to state of siege, 177; surrender to the Regency, 59 Spain, Bazaine's refuge in, 8, 278; consul, 52, 268; diplomatic recognition withdrawn, 18; end of alliance with French, 25; French aid to, 80

335

fn 71; intervention in Santo Domingo, 18; Indian policy, 284; Mexican ministers, 8; military alliance, 18; outbreak of hostilities, 20 Spanish Army in Mexico, deserters from, 85; friendship alienated, 56; movements, 22; outlawed, 19; withdrawal, 24 Spanish Colonies in America, 14 Spanish, aristocracy, 252; emigrants, 238; theatrical tradition, 256 Spanish Language, examination, 262; knowledge of, 30 fn 71 Spies, deceived, 47; employment, 39, 118 fn 39, 205; execution, 40, 233 Staff engineer, 240 Stagecoach, 254; held up, 234; to Veracruz, 215 Staging area, 215 States, powers of, 161 Statisticians, 240 Steamer, captured, 135; used in Mexico, 75 Steamship Company, ships chartered, 170 Steele, Frederick, Federal General, 138 fn 11, 149 Stevenson, Sara Yorke, 216 fn 141 Stoecklin, guerrilla band, 35, 85, 272 fn 109 Strafford, Lord, 292 Strategy, error in judgement, 52 Streets, cleaning of, 20; decoration, 54; gas lights, 254; of Mexico City, 253254, see Calle de los Plateros; paving, 254; sanitation, 254 Studies in Mexican History, 291 Suárez Peredo, Antonio (Conde del Valle), sent to Europe, 59 Sub-prefect (sous-préfect), 231 fn 57 Sub-secretario de Gobernación, 220 fn 10 Sue, Eugene, 256 fn 24 Suffrage, universal, proposed, 73 Supplies, Military, collection, 86; from France, 39; procurement, 38-40, 40 fn 22. See Escadrons de Train Supreme Court of Justice, President, 58 Surrender, facing death, 266; offer of, 269; Puebla, 48 Suspension of arms, requested, 48 Susquehanna, ship, 201 Swiss nationality, 40

336

INDEX

Syphilis, 227 Syria, F r e n c h in, 244 Tabasco, Estado de, 282; Governor, 75, 85; independence movement in, 130; part of Empire, 99; state of siege, 21 fn 35 Taboada, Antonio, at Iguala, 88; defection feared, 127; joins French, 233 fn 42; opposition to Juárez, 17; proclamation, 69 Tacámbaro, French billets, 220; hostage taken, 235 Tacotalpam (Tabasco), surrendered, 176 Tactics, military, in siege of Puebla, 45 Tacubaya (Distrito Federal), Archbishop's house, 81; colonization scheme, 239; railway, 254; troops billeted in, 54-55 Talbot, Auguste Désiré, Sergeant, decorated, 115 Tamariz, see Haro y Tamariz Tamaulipas, Estado de, 225; controlled b y Mejía, 99; falls to Juarists, 173; fines, 235; governor, 85; guerrilla bands in, 141, 172; Juarist army in, 186, 267; state of siege, 21 fn 35 Tampico (Tamaulipas), 148; capture by French, 35, 4 0 fn 22, 84, 176; commerce at, 84; communication with the interior, 95; falls to Juarists. 176; line of outposts, 180; Mejía in, 172; pressure from guerrilla bands, 99; sea transportation, 227; U.S. Navy ship in, 201 Tancasneque (Tamaulipas), 227 Tapalpa, occupation by French, 98 Tartare, ship, 154 Tavera, Ramón, 193; appointment, 179; Minister of W a r , 186 fn 9, 188, 205 Tax Administration, reforms in, 121 Taxco (Guerrero), garrison, 86 Taxes, collection, 20 fn 29; collectors, 76; levied, 23; past record, 121; regularization, 171; regulation of, 58; special war impost, 202 Taylor, Zachary, letter to, 136 fn 3 Teatro d e Nuevo México, 257 fn 24 Teatro d e Oriente, 256 fn 24 Teatro Hidalgo, 256 fn 24 Teatro Imperial, Gran, 256 fn 24 Teatro Iturbide, 256 fn 24

Teatro Nacional, 256 Teatro Principal, 256 fn 24 Technicians, 240 T e Deum, sung, 50, 54, 59, 107, 109, 115 fn 30 Tehuacán (Puebla), Díaz to occupy, 156; French troops in, 22, 24, 74; telegraph line, 242 Tehuantepec (Oaxaca), 181 fn 96; capture, 269; escape to, 203; recruiting, 153 Teja, La, troops quartered in, 55 Teja, Hacienda d e la, 207, 211 Tejada, see Lerdo de Tejada Tejería, 249; railway, 36; troop movement to, 21 Telegrams, sent to Maximilian, 215; sent to Orizaba, 215; used, 145 fn 36, 150 fn 69, 164 fn 14-15, 17, 166 fn 25-27, 169 fn 43, 172 fn 51, 173, 176 fn 68-70, 72, 74,179 fn 91, 180 fn 94, 186 fn 8, 10-14, 187 fn 17, 188 fn 23, 189 fn 25, 190 fn 27, 199 fn 52-54, 200 fn 57, 201 fn 62-68, 202 fn 71-72, 203 fn 76, 205 fn 94-95, 97, 213 fn 132, 225 fn 26, 269 fn 78 Telegraph lines, 204; military, 242; theft of wire, 234 Tenancingo (Mexico), 209 fn 113 Tenastepec, Hacienda de, 40 Teocaltiche (Jalisco), occupied by French, 97 Tepetitlán (Hidalgo), 264; bivouac, 41 Tepic (Nayarit), French campaign, 94; Juarist forces in, 148; Lozada's army in, 97 Tepoxúchil, see Cerro Tepoxúchil Terrill, Confederate agent, 142 Tertulia, 255 Testard, French officer, 204. Not identified. There were two lieutenants named Testart in t h e French Army at this time, b u t neither was posted to Mexico Texas, D e p a r t m e n t of, Adjutant General, 154 fn 95 Texas, State of, Adjutant General, 154; aid to Juarists, 165; attitude toward Intervention, 85; Cortina in, 144; cotton export, 121 fn 50; Federal troops in, 113, 136, 141, 148-149, 158; F r e n c h agents in, 14; French interest in, 14; French settlements,

INDEX 14; military operations, 1 3 6 , 1 3 8 , 1 5 0 ; report from, 157; soldiers escape to, 2 1 2 . See also E l Paso, San Antonio, Galveston Texas, University of, 7; Library, 8 - 9 Texcoco, Lake, 2 4 2 Texmelucan (Oaxaca), Bridge at, 111 Theatre, in Mexico, 2 5 5 Thefts, 2 2 4 , 2 6 4 Themis, ship, 1 7 0 Thiele, Charles, 2 0 5 Third Army Corps, 2 7 5 Thouvenel, Édouard-Antoine, letter by, 2 0 fn 31 Thun, Francis, Count, General, appointment, 129, 1 6 6 , 2 6 1 ; personal dislikes, 164; recommendation, 162 Tierra caliente/Terre chaude, 2 1 , 23, 31, 2 2 6 ; effect on troops, 37; troops in, 34, 2 7 2 fn 109; withdrawal of troops to, 2 6 Tihosuco (Yucatán), 2 8 9 Tinajero, Felipe, 2 4 7 fn 146, 2 4 8 fn 159, 2 4 9 fn 174 Tirailleurs algériens, 31 fn 72 Tlacotalpan (Veracruz), French troops in, 35; Imperial troops, 2 6 4 Tlacolulán (Veracruz), burned, 2 3 6 Tlalnepantla, Imperial control, 86 Tlaxcala (Tlaxcala), fine, 2 3 5 ; Imperial control, 86; troops at, 4 7 , 55, 186 Tlemcen, Bureau Arabe, 3 0 fn 71 Tobacco, use of cigarettes, 2 5 8 Toilets, public, 192 Toledo, Remugio, Captain, 2 6 9 Tolomé, Río de, 3 6 Toluca (Mexico), French withdrawal, 8 6 fn 11, 2 0 5 ; occupied by French, 55, 86; pamphlet published, 130 Toombs, R., letter by, 107 fn 3 Toro, Juarist General, escape, 2 0 5 Torre, E . de la, 2 5 0 fn 176 Torres, Martín de las, 2 1 fn 32, 2 2 fn 37, 51 fn 55, 5 8 fn 4, 5 9 fn 9 Totimehuacán, Battle at, 44, 48; occupation, 4 8 Toucey, Isaac, letter to, 16 fη 11 Tourville, Colony, 2 3 9 Tovar, Remigio, Imperial General, 76, 2 6 4 ; maneuvers, 8 9 fn 17 Trade routes, Maritime, 114; opened, 95 Traffic problem, caused b y Women,

337

255; in Mexico City, 253; in retreat, 276 Traitors, decree on, 2 0 fn 28 Trains, supply, attacked, 2 9 Translation, of Spanish terms, 2 4 8 Transportation, for personal property, 214; public, 2 5 4 ; soldadas, 2 5 8 ; water, 227. See Ships, Roads, Communications Transports, troop, chartered, 170 Treason, decree on, 19; defined, 1 9 Treasury, French, cost of Intervention, 30, 112, 275; Mexican maneuver to draw on, 166 Treasury, Mexican, Department of, see Hacienda; penury of, 138, 163 fn 11, 2 4 3 , 2 6 6 ; reimbursement to French for billets, 2 2 1 ; State of Guanajuato, 92; Treasury Building, 2 4 1 Treaties, 2 9 3 ; for exchange of prisoners, 2 0 5 , 2 0 8 ; Indians, 294; with Britain, 280. See also Conventions, Córdoba, L a Soledad, Miramar, Ugalde Treaty of Córdoba, 14 Trenches, military, 4 3 , 2 7 5 Treviño, Gerónimo, Juarist leader, 1 7 5 Trial, prisoner subject to, 2 1 0 fn 122. See Courts-martial Tribunal, Military, use of, 47. See Courts-martial Tribunal de Justicia del Imperio, Supremo, influence on, 9 4 ; president, 82 fn 61 Troupes mexicaines, see Imperial Mexican Army Tsar of Russia, service of, 3 0 fn 71 Tucé, Louis Adrien de, 6 0 fn 11, 8 8 fn 15, 124-125, 2 2 5 fn 29-30, 2 2 7 fn 38, 2 3 6 fn 87, 2 3 7 fn 88, 2 5 9 fn 35, 2 6 5 fn 55, 2 6 8 fn 70; criticism of Mexican policy, 59; criticism of Saligny, 57 Tuileries, 191 Tula (Hidalgo), 128, 2 3 3 ; desertions in, 2 6 5 ; occupied by French, 9 8 , 2 2 5 Tulancingo (Hidalgo), 2 6 8 ; Austrian garrison, 186; Bishop of, 58, 77; communication with, cut, 186; I m perial control, 86; withdrawal of Imperial forces, 2 7 0 Tuskarora Nation, 2 8 4 Tuxpan (Veracruz), call for help, 176; control of, 85; ships' arrival, 1 4 8

338

INDEX

Tuxtla (Chiapas), 269 Typhus, epidemic, 9 8

Ugalde, Ignacio, General, loyalty, 155; negotiation w i t h French, 132; political analysis, 183 Ugarte, General, 282; appointment, 89; Chief of Police, 209 Under-Secretary of State for Fomento, 64 Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 64 Under-Secretary of State for Hacienda, 64 Under-Secretary of State for Justice, 64; letter to, 227 fn 41 Under-Secretary of State for W a r , 64, 265; letter by, 209 fn 114. See Blanchot, T o m á s M u r p h y Uniforms, f u r n i s h e d Mexican troops, 67, 213; gendarmerie, 264; Juarist army, 152 United States of America, 73; absorption of F r e n c h colonies, 15; agent in Paris, 160 fn 7; aid in proposed government, 196; breach of neutrality denounced, 160; citizen fined, 202; civil service, 74; diplomatic recognition, 100, 106, 136, 144, 146; elections, 151; Indian policy, 284; inf l u e n c e to b e reduced, 32; interest in Texas, 14; mules imported f r o m , 255; n e w interest in E m p i r e , 201; political system, 183; protection of Latin America halted b y civil war, 18; protests by, 179, 280-281; protests importation of negroes, 162; recruiting by, 136 fn 3; relations with France, 141-143, 151, 165 fn 22, 282; rumors of invasion, 148; size of a r m e d forces, 136; supplies for Juárez, 85; support of Juárez, 19, 100, 131, 135-136, 148, 156-158, 172, 204, 208, 267; territorial designs, 184; travel to, 242 fn 116; w i t h d r a w a l to, 99 United States Army, campaign of 1847, 14; p r e c e d e n t set, 136 United States Congress, attention of, 156; on Mexican question, 163, 167 United States Consul, alleged spy, 40; favors Juarist side, 85; in delegation,

52; in Minatitlán, 85; protest, 202 U.S. Executive D o c u m e n t , Series 100, 162 fn 7, 209 fn 113, 274 fn 1, 280 fn 9 U.S. Executive D o c u m e n t , Series 1237, 138 fn 11, 146 fn 44, 152 fn 81 U.S. Minister, to Vienna, 165 fn 18 U.S. Navy Official Records, 16 fn 11, 2 1 fn 33, 22 fn 37, 24 fn 45, 91 fn 21, 107 fn 3, 143 fn 30, 163 fn 9, 2 3 8 fn 92 United States, D e p a r t m e n t of State, Juarist Military list, 152 fn 81 United States, President of, letter to, 187 United States Senate, vote, 167 Unity of c o m m a n d , principle violated, 129 Uraga, see L ó p e z Uraga Uranga, see Cerro d e Uranga Ures (Sonora), joins Empire, 100 U r u a p a n (Michoacán), bandits in, 231; troop movements toward, 90

Vaillant, Marshal Jean-Baptiste Philibert, letter to, 245 fn 128 Valdez, officer, desertion of, 128 Valero, José, Imperial Colonel, 210 Valle de Santiago, 96 Vandersmissen, see Smissen Vanegas (San Luis Potosí), garrison, 180; occupied by French, 99 Vatican (used to refer to administration of the Catholic Church), referred to as St. Peter's, 78 Vega, Juarist general, 173 Vega, Ventura d e la, 2 5 6 fn 24 Velarde, General, letter to, 95 fn 35, 272 fn 101-102 Velázquez de León, Joaquín, alienated f r o m F r e n c h side, 122; appointment, 120; sent to E u r o p e , 5 9 Venta d e las Palmillas, La (Mexico), troops reach, 52 Venta del Pinal, La, troop m o v e m e n t via, 42 Veracruz (Veracruz), 6, 2 9 fn 66, 54; arrival in, 193; attacks on road to, 2627; blockade, 27; conspiracy, 173; c r o w d e d conditions d u r i n g evacuation, 216 fn 141; customs offices at, 40 fn 22; escort sent to, 109, 111;

INDEX

escort offered Maximilian, 213; French troops arrive, 20, 34-35; garrison troops in, 162, 220; guarding, 34; hospitals, 226; line of communications, 69-70, 156, 165, 186, 212, 242; military government, 20, 20 fn 29, 57 fn 1, 74; naval ships ordered to, 150, 201, 203; packet-boat, 103, 174; port authorities, 103; railway, 36; repair to pier, 206; Santa Anna in, 103; surrender demanded, 19; travel to, 85, 170, 174, 176, 190, 215, 224, 240; troop movement out of, 22, 36-38; troop movements via, 31-33, 49, 215; troop transports in, 215; troops sent to, 50, 186; wharfs, 243. See Customs Veracruz, Commandant Supérieur, letter to, 145 fn 56; order to, 182 Veracruz, Estado de, decree, 20 fn 28; food supply, 38; Governor, 19, 19 fn 24, 29 fn 67, 38 fn 17, 40 fn 22; guerrilla activity, 85; military operations, 267; state of siege in, 21 Veracruz-Mexico Campaign, of French, see Campaigns; of Scott, 37 Veraza, Guillermo, 2 8 fn 62 Vernhet de Laumière, Xavier-JeanMarie-Hénri-Clément, General of Artillery, death, 45 Versailles, Tribunal at, 290 Veterans, land to be given to, 142 Vialla, Ernst-Victor-Joseph, General, decorated, 115 Vicario, Imperial General, defection of, 127; garrison, 86; letter to, 271 fn 90; Guerrero Campaign, 145, 168 Vice-Consul, in Matamoros, 149 fn 60 Victoire, ship, 173 Victoria, Ciudad (Tamaulipas), 247; Dupin's headquarters, 113 Vidaurri, Santiago, 282; credentials, 23 fn 42; negotiations with, 97 Vienna, Archives, 7-8, 156 fn 99; U.S. Minister, 165 Vigas (Veracruz), bivouac, 39 Villalobos, [Joaquín?], arrest, 249 Virgin Isles, exile in, 103-104 Visits of Courtesy, 222 Viva la religión, slogan, 36, 7 8 Vivandières, 2 5 8 Volunteers, from Europe, 164; in U.S. Army, 136

339

Vómito negro, prevalence of, 34, 84 Vote, popular, for Maximilian, 59 fn 10; privilege, 284

Wagner, E. von, Prussian Minister, 18 fn 18 Wagons, freight, Mexican, 38 Waltemath, Kuno, 14 fn 9 War, acts of war, 150; cessation of hostilities, 188; declaration, 26, 101; declared, 35 fn 12; effect of capture of capital city, 61; effect on government, 92; effect on male population, 257; state of, 64, 110; state of war recognized, 28 fn 60, 35 fn 7; 87, 93, 203, 234 War booty, denied Juarists, 212 fn 132 War, Customs of, concern for, 217; violation, 163 fn 11 War, Department of, administration, 59 War, Under-Secretary of (Imperial, Mexican), letter to, 213 fn 105; to be French, 165 War Captivity, defined, 4 9 fn 50 War Crimes, conviction of, 232 fn 61 War Council, trial by, 40 War of 1847-1848, deserters from U.S. Army, 269; fortifications, 39. See also Scott War Rebels, status defined, 145 fn 38 War Supplies, arrive on Mexican Coast, 153; shipped from San Francisco, 149 Warren, Harris Gaylord, 14 fn 5 Washington, D.C., 142, 163; Juarist agents in, 171; Mexican recruiting in, 136 fn 5; Monthalon, 167 Watson, W., 84 fn 2 Weapons, carried by sick soldiers, 26; contract for rifles, 19; for Empire, 167, 169; furnished Mexican troops, 36, 67, 165; machine-gun type, 172 fn 51, rifles, 204, 265, 275; stored in capital, 169; supply stopped, 171; surrender, 48, 147; supplied Juarist forces, 143, 148, 150, 154, 167, 172173; to be returned to the U.S., 136 Weather, cold, 40; drought, 87; fog, 40; rainy season, 87, 186; storm, 201 Webb, James Watson, interviews, 158 Weitzel, Godfrey, General (Federal, U.S.), border incident, 154

340

INDEX

Welles, Gideon, letter to, 21 fn 33, 24 fn 45 Wheat, production, 39; scarcity, 34 Wheaton, Henry, 25 fn 52, 50 fn 52 White-slave traffic, 257-258 Whitlesley, C. H., Adjutant General of Texas, 154 Whittlesey, Derwent, 14 fn 9 Willette, Henri-Léon, Captain, decorated, 115; return to France, 245 Wilson, Major (Federal, U.S.), 154 fn 95 Wire, 242 fn 116 Witnesses, court-martial, 237 Wolf, Alexis-Théodore-François, Intendent, 115 Woll, Adrian, 288; sent to Europe, 59 Women, not to gamble, 255; recreations, 255; social status, 257-258 Woodman, Lyman L., 135 fn 1 Woodridge, proposals, 163 Woodworking factory, 204 World War I, 7 World W a r II, comparison, 44 fn 30 Wurtemberg (Wuertemberg), T., letter by, 150 fn 64, 152 fn 77, 79, 167 fn 33, 172 fn 51, 212 fn 130, 248 fn 152, 156; letter to, 149 fn 60 Wyke, Charles Lenox, proclamation, 20 fn 32, 21 Yáñez, Manuel M., absence of, 76 Yanuitlán (Oaxaca), 223 fn 17 Yaqualito, 238 Yarto, see Haro y Yarto Yellow fever, season, 23-24 Yucatán, State, Carlota's visit to, 153; Gálvez' trip to, 128; Indians of, 151; military problems, 265, 282-283; resistence to Juárez, 85

Zacapu (Míchoacán), 269 Zacatecas, City; Juarist military pressure on, 186; Miramón captures, 215 Zacatecas, State, line of defense, 180; mines, 13; pacification, 95, 98; prefect of, 172. See Sierra Hermosa Zack, Colonel, 166 Zamora (Michoacán), complaint by, 96; occupied by French, 90; préfet politique, 96 fn 39 Zampone, R. de, letter, 214 fn 137 Zaragoza, Ignacio, General, 19, 21, 22 fn 37, 23 fn 42, 28 fn 60, 62; defense of Puebla, 28; letter by, 26, 26 fn 55, 27; letter to, 24 fn 45, 26 fn 57 Zarco, Francisco, 18 fn 14 Zarzuelas, 256 fn 24 Zeitschrift für Weltpolitik, 291-293 Zenil, Jesús, in Spain, 8 Zéphirs (Chasseurs d'Afrique), 226 Zermeño, Julián, appointment, 76 Zopilotes en jupons, 258 Zoquiapa, Hacienda de, 188 fn 20 Zorrilla, José, 256 fn 22 Zouaves, 31 fn 72, 44, 235; arrest, 228; attack on, 123 fn 59, 125; guard detail, 81, 111; mission given, 43, 227; sent to Mexico, 31; 2nd Regiment, 44, 115, 132 f n 91; 3rd Regiment, 37, 115. Of the First Regiment of Zouaves the Second and Third Battalions were in Mexico; the First Battalion remained at home station in Coléah. Of the Second Regiment the First and Second Battalions were in Mexico; the 3rd Battalion remained at home station in Oran. Of the Third Regiment the First and Second Battalions were in Mexico; the Third Battalion remained at home station in Philippeville

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¡VERACRUZ! ALVA RAEIO!

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