Forging Napoleon's Grande Armée: Motivation, Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800-1808 9780814708279

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Forging Napoleon’s Grande Armée

Warfare an d C u lt u re Serie s General Editor: Wayne E. Lee A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen during King Philip’s War Kyle F. Zelner Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion, and Warfare in the Early Modern World Edited by Wayne E. Lee Warfare and Culture in World History Edited by Wayne E. Lee Rustic Warriors: Warfare and the Provincial Solider on the New England Frontier, 1689–1748 Steven C. Eames Forging Napoleon’s Grand Armée: Motivation, Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800-1808 Michael J. Hughes Under the Shadow of Napoleon: French Influence on the American Way of Warfare from the War of 1812 to the Outbreak of WWII Michael A. Bonura

Forging Napoleon’s Grande Armée Motivation, Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800–1808

Michael J. Hughes

a NEW YORK UNIVERSIT Y PRESS New York and London

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS New York and London www.nyupress.org © 2012 by New York University All rights reserved References to Internet websites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor New York University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hughes, Michael J., 1972Forging Napoleon’s Grande Armée : motivation, military culture, and masculinity in the French army, 1800-1808 / Michael J. Hughes. p. cm. —  (Warfare and culture series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8147-3748-4 (cl : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-8147-0827-9 (ebook) ISBN 978-0-8147-2411-8 (ebook) 1.  France. Armée. Grande Armée — History. 2.  France. Armée. Grande Armée — Military life. 3.  Soldiers — Attitudes — France — History — 19th century. 4.  Masculinity — France — History — 19th century. 5.  Military morale — France — History — 19th century. 6.  Sociology, Military — France — History — 19th century. 7.  Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 — Military leadership. 8.  Napoleonic Wars, 1800-1815. 9.  France — History, Military — 1789-1815.  I. Title. DC202.1.H84 2012  940.2’7420944 — dc23                                                            2011050070 New York University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and their binding materials are chosen for strength and durability. We strive to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the greatest extent possible in publishing our books. Manufactured in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

This book is dedicated to three people. First, I would like to dedicate it to Bill G. Kremper, a good Marine, a good man, and my beloved grandfather. I would also like to dedicate it to my father, Joseph R. Hughes, who would have been so proud of me for writing this book if cancer had not taken him from us. I miss you, dad. Lastly, I dedicate it to my amazing son, Gabriel Martin Hughes, who has his great-grandfather’s cheerful disposition, his grandfather’s inquisitiveness, and his father’s unconditional love.

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Contents

Acknowledgments

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Introduction: Military Culture and Motivation in the Armies of Napoleon

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From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland: The Grande Armée and Napoleonic Military Culture

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2 Honneur, Gloire, et Patrie: Honor in Napoleon’s Legions

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3 Imperial Virtue: The Evolution of French Patriotism

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4 Napoleon’s Manhood: Sex and Martial Masculinity in the French Army

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5 Clothing the New Emperor: Creating the Cult of Napoleon

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6 The Emperor’s Grognards: The Officer Corps

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7 Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors: The Rank and File

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Conclusion: Vive l’Empereur! Sustaining Motivation in the Armies of Napoleon, 1803-1808

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Notes

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Select Bibliography

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Index

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About the Author

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Acknowledgments

This book has been more than a decade in the making, so there are many people to thank. I would like to begin with my friend and mentor John A. Lynn II. I owe John a debt of gratitude that I can never repay. Without him, neither this book nor my academic career would have been possible. John has always been willing to make time to help me in any manner that he could. He kindly agreed to read this book in its many incarnations and never failed to provide valuable advice that improved it considerably. I also particularly admire John’s magnanimity. This book begins by challenging the historical interpretation of military motivation under Napoleon formulated by John himself. Academics often have prickly egos, and most do not welcome critiques of their scholarship, including those advanced by their former graduate students. John, however, supported this project from beginning to end in every conceivable way, and showed a professionalism and a generosity that I try to emulate in my own career. Finally, I would like to thank him most of all for his humanity. When I found myself questioning my decision to pursue a Ph.D. in history, and experienced some personal losses late in my graduate career, John gave me the encouragement that I needed to continue, and had the patience and compassion to let me proceed at my own pace. Next, I would like to thank Clare H. Crowston, who has had a profound impact on my development as a scholar. More than anyone else, she taught me the value of gender history, which transformed my original research project into a vastly different, and much better, book. The intellectual sophistication that Clare so effortlessly displays has also inspired me to follow her example in my own professional endeavors. In addition, I was fortunate enough to begin my career as a historian under the late Russell F. Weigley. From him, I learned the important lesson that war and combat are an integral part of military history. Others provided crucial assistance by reading and critiquing different chapters in this book. I am especially thankful for the help of Alan Forrest, who aided me at different stages of this project, and Philip Dwyer, whose |

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suggestions and generous support played a central role in its publication. This book has also benefited from the contributions of Jeremy Black, Sam A. Mustafa, Charles Esdaile, Kenneth M. Cuno, and Mark Grimsley. Furthermore, the knowledge and expertise of Frederick C. Schneid and Eman M. Vovsi proved essential for catching and correcting factual errors. In France, I need to thank Jean-Paul Bertaud, who helped me to secure funding for my research and generously offered me his time, his contacts, and his knowledge of document collections in Paris. I am also grateful to Gilbert Bodinier, Bernard Gainot, Christian Schneider, Laurent Henninger, Jean-Marie Linsolas, and Chantal Lheureux-Prévot for their assistance with my research and for enriching my time in France. Moreover, this book could not have been written without the aid of the staff of the Archives de la guerre (which are now the Archives de l’armée de terre), or a Chateaubriand fellowship granted by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Closer to home, I am very appreciative of my wonderful colleagues in the History Department at Iona College. They spared me from teaching new courses and from administrative duties by shouldering these burdens themselves, and gave me the time that I, as a junior faculty member, so desperately needed to write this book. I must also say a special thanks to Ed Helmrich and the rest of the staff at Ryan Library, who tracked down any source that I needed. I was equally fortunate to work with extraordinary people at New York University Press. The series editor, Wayne E. Lee, has been a firm supporter of this project from the start, and gave me useful commentary on the manuscript that made this a stronger book. Above all, I would like to thank my editor, Deborah Gershenowitz. Ever cheerful, Debbie was always available to provide advice, information, and encouragement, and she made writing this book much easier. I am likewise grateful for the help of her pleasant and professional assistant, Gabrielle Begue. I want to close by thanking my family. My parents, Joseph R. Hughes and Marilyn G. Hughes, contributed to this book in numerous ways. They were a constant source of love and support, both emotional and financial. No matter where my career happened to take me, they were eager to visit, whether it was Philadelphia, New York, Paris, or even more exotic east-central Illinois. Finally, I owe the greatest debt of gratitude to my beloved wife, Beatriz Martin-Ruiz. In many ways, this book is her victory as much as it is mine. Like the intrepid cantinières who followed their husbands in Napoleon’s armies across Europe, she accompanied me on every step of the long journey to publishing it. She too has suffered and sacrificed much along the way, leaving her remarkable family in Spain to marry an American obsessed with x

| Acknowledgments

French history who abandoned her on countless days, nights, and weekends to write. Considering that the Frenchmen whom I study probably fought and killed some of her ancestors, my wife’s devotion is even more commendable. Her love, patience, and support have given me the ability to complete this project, and I lack the words to fully express my appreciation. For now, I will simply say, Bea, I love you, thank you for making this accomplishment possible, and I’m so incredibly lucky that you’re here to share it with me. Some of the material in this book will be published in Michael J. Hughes, “Images of the Grognard: Songs, French Soldiers, and Military Culture in the Armies of Napoleon,” Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, Selected Papers 2003. This book also contains material that will be published in Michael J. Hughes, “Celebrating the Grande Armée: Military Motivation and National Identity in the Armies of Napoleon,” Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, Selected Papers 2009. Furthermore, some of the material in this book appeared in Michael J. Hughes, “Making Frenchmen into Warriors: Martial Masculinity in Napoleonic France,” in Christopher E. Forth and Bertrand Taithe, eds., French Masculinities: History, Culture, and Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). This material has been reproduced with the permission of Palgrave Macmillan. There are a few final intellectual debts to honor that I was unable to properly acknowledge elsewhere before this book went to press. My descriptions of the start of the Napoleonic wars, the diplomatic maneuvers involved, and the creation of the French Empire were strongly influenced by the works of Steven Englund, Frederick C. Scheid, and Isser Woloch. In addition, the information in this book about the French army under the Directory and its loyalty to generals other than Napoleon during the Consulate comes from Jean-Paul Bertaud and Gilbert Bodinier. Lastly, this study relies on statistical information about army sizes, unit strengths, and battle casualties from books by David G. Chandler, Scott Bowden, and Robert Goetz. Unless the notes specify otherwise, the figures contained in the following pages are drawn from them. The publications of all these individuals are listed in the bibliography.

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Introduction Military Culture and Motivation in the Armies of Napoleon

François-Joseph Zickel served as a cavalry officer in the armies of Napoleon Bonaparte, and his long military career spanned the entire period of the Napoleonic wars. Zickel was born the son of a soldier, and from a young age he eagerly desired to follow in his father’s footsteps. In the heady days of 1791, as Revolutionary France prepared its defenses, he enlisted in one of the new local guard units that were formed to supplement the regiments of the former Royal army. With popular support for the Revolution still in the ascendant, men from all over France volunteered for military service. Zickel, however, was unusual because he was only twelve years old. Two years later, he went a step further and joined a battalion headed to the front lines. Upon his arrival at the Armée du Nord, the military authorities discovered his age and promptly sent him home. Despite this setback, Zickel maintained his enthusiasm for the profession of arms. When he was finally old enough, he entered the 10th regiment of chasseurs à cheval, a unit of light cavalry. He was then nineteen, and the year was 1798. For the next fifteen years, Zickel had a remarkable military career. After several years as a noncommissioned officer (NCO), he was promoted to second lieutenant, a commissioned rank, in 1807. He fought under General André Masséna at the second battle of Zurich in 1799, participated in the capture of Ulm in 1805, charged with French cavalry at Jena in 1806, served in Spain during the disastrous Peninsular War, and took part in the defense of France in 1814. Although he fought in several major engagements, he miraculously managed to survive the Napoleonic wars. Yet while he dreamed of rising through the ranks like countless others, possessed years of experience, and was devoted to Napoleon, he never rose above the rank of second lieutenant.1 It is possible to reconstruct Zickel’s career through a series of letters that he wrote to his father. These letters reveal the officer’s feelings about war |

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and his military service, and illustrate the ways in which his motivation and political values changed over time. When he legally entered the army in 1798, Zickel had lost none of the Revolutionary ardor that inspired him to volunteer for the military as a boy of twelve. Following his description of the fighting around Zurich, he defiantly exclaimed, “Thus, vive la République [long live the Republic] forever one and indivisible, and death to tyrants!”2 Ten years later, Zickel showed the same enthusiasm for Napoleon Bonaparte, the emperor of France. After the French victory at Ocaña, Spain, in 1809, he proudly reported to his father, “Thus the loss of the enemy could amount to 40,000 men! Vive l’Empereur! [Long live the Emperor!]”3 What an astonishing transformation! Here we have a French officer who began his career as a dedicated Republican patriot expressing devotion to a hereditary monarch whose power was more absolute than that of any of the supposedly Absolutist kings of the Old Regime. Moreover, this monarch invaded and conquered a sovereign country, forced its rightful rulers to abdicate, and made his brother its king by force of arms. Such acts resembled those of the very tyrants whose deaths Zickel had professed to desire a decade earlier. The purpose of this book is to ascertain how and why this shift in attitudes occurred. It attempts to explain why Zickel and other French soldiers, who came from a France that shed so much blood and spent so much treasure to preserve the ideals of the French Revolution, fought so hard and so well under Napoleon and continued to give their lives year after year to expand the empire that he established. To accomplish this task, this study examines the military culture created by the Napoleonic regime to influence its troops, and its impact on the Frenchmen who served in the armies of the Consulate (1799-1804) and the First French Empire (1804-1814). In pursuit of these endeavors, the book examines cultural phenomena and concepts of masculinity that affected the military performance of soldiers like François-Joseph Zickel but that have been neglected or misunderstood. The product of these phenomena was an intricate motivational system that convinced French officers and enlisted men to wage war for a variety of compelling reasons. The motivation of Napoleon’s troops is not a new subject to historians. There is an enormous body of literature on the military history of the Napoleonic wars, and scholars have written about Napoleon’s morale-building techniques and their effects on the French army since the early nineteenth century.4 The standard interpretation on this topic in Anglo-American historiography can be characterized as the “army of honor” thesis, and was developed by John A. Lynn.5 Lynn proposes that Napoleon, who was hostile to the Revolution, changed the French army from an “army of virtue” into an 2

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“army of honor.” According to Lynn, the French Revolutionaries created an army of citizen soldiers whose primary source of military motivation was the concept of Revolutionary virtue. Revolutionary virtue was devotion to the common good and the willingness to sacrifice personal interests, including one’s life and well-being, to serve the collective needs of society and the nation. Maximilien Robespierre and other committed revolutionaries inculcated this ideal in the army as part of their efforts to transform France into a “Republic of Virtue” during the Terror. Lynn argues that Napoleon replaced virtue with honor as the driving force in the French army. Drawing upon the political theories of Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, he defines honor as the desire for prestige and status that was traditionally associated with the French aristocracy, and the exercise of absolute monarchy in the Old Regime. Montesquieu explained that aristocratic honor was the mechanism that allowed monarchy to function. To acquire the services of their proud nobles, French kings like Louis XIV offered them rewards, or “honors,” such as positions in the government, titles, and medals like the badge of the Order of Saint Louis. In return, the nobles, Montesquieu claimed, performed actions that furthered the interests of the monarchy to obtain the king’s honors. They did so because their sense of honor, their personal need to uphold their reputation, compelled them to win royal rewards and the increased status that they conveyed. The distribution of honors thus allowed French kings to manipulate aristocratic honor and harness it to the goals of the monarchy. Lynn contends that Napoleon, who wished to become an absolute monarch, imitated his Bourbon predecessors. He argues that the former Revolutionary general cultivated aristocratic forms of honor among his soldiers by creating a system of symbolic and material rewards such as promotions, the Legion of Honor, and titles of nobility. The purpose of these awards was to produce soldiers who valued individual prestige over the common good, and who owed their loyalties to the source of the rewards, Napoleon himself, instead of the French people, the Republic, or the nation. Together, these solders constituted an army of honor that provided Napoleon with the perfect instrument to achieve his imperial ambitions. Implying that Napoleon betrayed the Revolution, Lynn insists that he replaced the Revolution’s admirable emphasis on self-sacrifice with the self-interested desire for personal fame and aggrandizement. In his words, Napoleon “wished to appeal to the French love of honor in lieu of other affections, such as that for liberty.”6 These arguments were presented as a proposal to encourage further debate and inquiry, but despite Lynn’s intentions, they have taken on a life Introduction

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of their own to dominate Napoleonic military history. The bicentennial of Napoleon’s reign, which is still taking place, inspired a new wave of scholarship that reinforces, modifies, and challenges the army-of-honor thesis. Long neglected by nonmilitary historians, the Napoleonic wars have been rediscovered by scholars in other fields, and the study of them is experiencing something of a renaissance. One of the causes underlying this trend is the renewed interest in the Napoleonic period generated by the bicentennial. Perhaps just as important, Western historians appear to be discovering a new appreciation for the centrality of war in human history due to the military conflicts provoked by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result of these developments, historians in the United States and Europe increasingly recognize the Napoleonic wars as a pivotal event in the emergence of the modern world, and are producing innovative studies that reevaluate the nature, meaning, and impact of Napoleon’s reign and his wars on France and Europe. In this body of literature, the most important English-language work on Napoleon’s soldiers was written by Alan Forrest.7 Forrest modifies the armyof-honor thesis by emphasizing more continuity in the moral evolution of the army. He maintains that professionalism was more advanced in the Revolutionary armies and that patriotism was present to a greater extent in the armies of Napoleon than Lynn proposes. However, Forrest accepts Lynn’s basic theory, and characterizes the French army of the Napoleonic wars as an army of honor.8 Although he claims that Revolutionary forms of patriotism existed among the soldiers of both the Republic and the Empire, especially in the initial stages of their military service, he argues that this commitment to the national cause was transformed into professional pride in the army, the desire for personal rewards, and devotion to the emperor. Similar to other proponents of the army-of-honor thesis, Forrest also attributes the army’s loyalty to Napoleon to his personal charisma and talents, his ability to relate to his troops, and the awards that he offered to them. While Forrest discusses military motivation, it is not the primary focus of his book. He seeks to reveal the thoughts, emotions, and experiences of French troops during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. The point of this endeavor is to compare the men who emerge from his sources with the heroic images of the French soldier in Napoleonic propaganda, and to challenge the myths about Napoleon’s men that have persisted until the present day. Forrest succeeds admirably in these tasks. Unlike the existing literature on Revolutionary and Napoleonic soldiers, which relies mainly on secondary works and soldiers’ memoirs that were composed decades after 1815, he uses 4

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a large collection of letters and diaries written by French troops during their military service. Analyzing these documents, many of which are housed in departmental archives, Forrest argues that real French soldiers contrasted sharply with representations of them in official discourse as patriotic and warlike supermen. He claims that save for a small minority of officers and NCOs, Napoleon’s men generally disliked military life and were usually afraid, depressed, homesick, and eager for peace. Moreover, the Empire’s ceaseless wars and the suffering that they caused gradually eroded whatever enthusiasm for war or military service its soldiers might have possessed. Natalie Petiteau’s depiction of Napoleon’s troops resembles that of Forrest. In her studies on French soldiers and veterans of the Napoleonic wars, she attempts to shatter the myths about them that emerged in the nineteenth century and explain how the veterans contributed to the construction of French national identity.9 Popular legends surrounding the veterans and most historical literature portrayed them as fanatics devoted to the emperor and the French nation. After they were forcibly discharged from the army and became demi-soldes, this fanaticism led them to plot constantly to restore Napoleon and his dynasty to power.10 After examining the lives, careers, and political activities of French veterans during and after the Napoleonic wars, Petiteau concludes that they did not conform to the model of the disgruntled, Bonapartist grognard. The term “grognard” meant “grumbler” or “complainer.” Originally, it referred to the infantry of the Imperial Guard, but it later evolved into a popular nickname that was applied more generally to all of Napoleon’s soldiers. According to Petiteau, veterans, except for an active and vocal minority, reintegrated into civilian society and refrained from political activities. Most of them acquired a sense of national identity, group solidarity, and Bonapartist political sympathies in the decades after their service in the army. Like Forrest, she recognizes that many French soldiers possessed tremendous admiration and affection for Napoleon because they perceived him as a great man, a hero and a genius who could accomplish the impossible. She also proposes that some of them internalized the military values of the army and were seduced by martial glory. Others forged strong bonds within their regiment, which became a surrogate family and sustained them through the harrowing ordeal of the Napoleonic wars. Yet, challenging the army-of-honor thesis, Petiteau asserts that one of the principal sources of military motivation in Napoleon’s armies was a “spirit of submission.” Comparing their troops to the poilus of World War I, she claims that a “culture of obedience” in France inculcated subordination to familial, social, and political authorities.11 While some French men developed a desire for glory and Introduction

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patriotism in the army, and many soldiers had a strong attachment to Napoleon and their units, most were reluctant conscripts who waged war because they were habituated to following the dictates of their parents and the state. The distinguished French historian, Jean-Paul Bertaud, presents similar arguments about the motivation, or lack thereof, of the common soldiers of the First Empire. Bertaud’s most recent book investigates the role of the French army in the militarization of Napoleonic France.12 In it, he portrays the enlisted men of the Consulate and the Empire as victims of the Napoleonic regime, declaring that historians have tended to view relations between Napoleon and his soldiers through the myths of the Napoleonic legend. He claims that only “the reckless, young volunteers obsessed with adventure and glory” and “memorialists quick to embellish everything” possessed a passion for war. Once the novelty of military life wore off, fear, despair, and resignation characterized the sentiments of the majority of the grognards. Bertaud even suggests that the enthusiasm they displayed on the battlefield was due to drunkenness as much as any alleged “national gaiety.”13 Though he does not engage Lynn’s work directly or explicitly, Bertaud also disputes the army-of-honor thesis. In contrast to Lynn, who believes that Napoleon betrayed the French Revolution, Bertaud situates his reign and his armies within the broader framework of the Revolutionary era. He recognizes that Napoleon wanted new conquests to establish his political legitimacy, acquire personal glory, and secure his place in the historical record. However, he also proposes that the Empire’s wars were driven by a vision of the French nation developed during the Revolution. Napoleon and his supporters, Bertaud maintains, continued to regard France as la Grande Nation, or “the Great Nation.” The concept of the Great Nation identified France as the premier nation in Europe and the pinnacle of civilization. Moreover, this nation possessed an obligation to bring the rights of man, civil equality, and the principle of national sovereignty to the oppressed peoples of Europe. Bertaud contends that the Napoleonic regime inherited these ideas and used them to launch a new crusade. This struggle was a war to preserve the hegemony of the Great Nation, uphold its honor, and spread the benefits of the Revolution and French civilization to the rest of Europe. The conflict was also a battle between good and evil in which Napoleon, who embodied the Great Nation, was defending France and civilization itself from the barbaric and treacherous English. Bertaud demonstrates that Napoleon and his supporters continuously sought to enlist the French people and the French army in this crusade. They assembled a vast array of propaganda and rewards, and mobilized the 6

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educational system, the arts, and established churches to convince French men to commit themselves to the cause of the Great Nation. Honor, Bertaud explains, constituted an essential component of this program. Like Lynn, he maintains that honor was the principal attribute of the French army during the Napoleonic wars, and that Napoleon deliberately employed it as an instrument of military motivation. Yet Bertaud insists that Napoleonic honor differed fundamentally from the aristocratic honor of the Old Regime. In the crucible of the Revolution, traditional concepts of honor combined with Revolutionary virtue in the French army to forge a new form of honor. This new honor preserved the nobility’s need to demonstrate physical courage and loyalty, command respect, and protect the weak, but it rejected the selfinterest that had defined Old Regime honor. According to Bertaud, Napoleonic honor identified honor with service to the nation and the honor of the nation. Individuals and groups could only acquire status and prestige through acts that contributed to the common good. Virtue thus became honor during the Consulate and the Empire. Furthermore, Bertaud claims, Napoleon was not content to promote honor in the army. He institutionalized the military’s virtuous honor through the Legion of Honor, and held the army up as a model for civilian society in order to cultivate it in the general population. Bertaud therefore concurs that the French army evolved into an army of honor during the Napoleonic era, but argues that it possessed a motivational system that conserved revolutionary virtue in a modified form and required devotion to the revolutionary Great Nation. For him, Napoleon’s army resembled the military forces of the French Revolution far more than it did those of the Old Regime. The works reviewed thus far have dramatically expanded our knowledge of Napoleon’s soldiers, their values and motivations, and the relationship among war, political culture, and nationalism in Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. This book benefits greatly from these studies, but it also goes beyond them by combining military history with the analysis of culture and gender. There is still a need for further inquiry into the subject of military motivation in the armies of Napoleon. Recent monographs like those of Forrest, Petiteau, and Bertaud succeed in challenging many of the myths surrounding the grognards. Yet, in replacing the enthusiastic, patriotic, glory-obsessed, and emperor-worshiping French soldier with the resigned, unenthusiastic, and homesick conscript, they fail to offer a satisfactory explanation for the outstanding military performance of Napoleon’s armies. After reading their work, one is left wondering how an army composed of such troops could repeatedly defeat the highly trained, professional forces of their Introduction

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opponents on the battlefield, and continue to wage war year after year even as France’s enemies continued to multiply and the prospect of peace became increasingly remote. In addition, military motivation is a complex phenomenon that is produced by the interaction of numerous factors. One of the foundations of any system of military motivation is the military culture existing in an army. The historical literature on Napoleon’s armies, however, refrains from fully investigating the military culture created inside of the armies of the Consulate and the Empire. Existing studies often base their interpretations on the rewards offered to the army and neglect the cultural context in which they were distributed.14 Others draw conclusions from propaganda such as high art, monuments, and novels intended mainly for the civilian population that the vast majority of Napoleon’s troops never saw or experienced.15 Works that analyze the mentalities of the grognards tend to concentrate on their writings and experiences without exploring the environment of the army that surrounded them.16 These omissions are important because it necessary to understand the relationship between the attitudes of French soldiers and the military culture in which they were immersed to ascertain how motivation functioned in Napoleon’s armies. The meanings of rewards or references in the writings of French troops may remain obscure or be misunderstood unless the cultural framework that enveloped them is studied. Furthermore, the Napoleonic regime deliberately tried to isolate the army from the civilian population, and the army spent most of the Napoleonic wars away from France. It was usually abroad conducting new campaigns or garrisoned in the territories that it conquered. Consequently, the military culture of the army differed from the more general culture of war that Napoleon and his supporters constructed in France. Another lacuna in the military history of Napoleonic France is the absence of gender analyses. Gender history attempts to trace the evolution of gender identities created around biological sex differences, and to analyze the role of these identities in historical developments. Put more simply, gender historians study ideas and practices related to femininity, masculinity, and transgender identities, and try to determine how they affected history.17 Prominent scholars in the fields of gender studies, women’s history, and military history have recognized that war and gender are intimately connected, and have challenged historians to discover the ways in which they intersect and shape one another. Responding to this challenge, increasing numbers of historical studies explore the relationship among war, military institutions, masculinity, and femininity.18 8

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In the history of the Napoleonic era, however, relatively little work has been done on this subject. Well-known historians of masculinity such as Robert A. Nye and George L. Mosse characterize the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars as a formative period in the history of modern masculinity in which the concept of the citizen soldier came to define manhood in the West. Yet, their own research generally concentrates on the forms of masculinity that emerged in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and does not adequately explain how this change occurred.19 Karen Hagemann’s pioneering research reveals the ways in which gender influenced Prussian participation in the Napoleonic wars, and the effects of these conflicts on German masculinity.20 Yet, a comparable study of Napoleonic France does not exist. The feminist historians who have done so much to enhance our knowledge of the French Revolution and Napoleonic France through gender history generally ignore military topics.21 For their part, historians who have written about Napoleon’s soldiers and military campaigns neglect the role of gender in the French war effort. While many military historians remain uncomfortable with gender history, attitudes and behaviors related to masculinity form an essential component of military culture and military motivation. Throughout history, men performed their military obligations in and out of combat because they tried to conform to accepted standards of male behavior in their military forces or society at large. Illustrating this tendency, a study conducted by the United States military on the battlefield performance of American soldiers in World War II reported that “the code of the combat soldier can be summarized by saying that behavior in combat was recognized as a test of being a man. When this code was internalized, or enforced by playing on an internalized code of manliness, a man once in combat had to fight in order to keep his own self-respect: ‘Hell, I’m a soldier.’”22 Although manhood in the West has often been associated with the ability to wage war, masculine norms, of course, varied across time periods, cultures, societies, and military forces. For example, the wigs, lace, and hose worn by the aristocratic military officers of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, and the elegant manners that they cultivated, would probably be regarded as effeminate by the American soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan today. It is the obligation of the historian to analyze these differences, and explore their effects on war, military forces, and the development of masculinity. To understand the motivation of Napoleon’s soldiers, it is therefore imperative to discover the forms of manhood that existed in the armies of the Consulate and the Empire, and their impact on French troops. Introduction

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This book fulfills this task by engaging in a thorough analysis of the motivational system developed in three different armies: the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée of 1805-1808. Napoleon assembled the first two armies in 1803 to strike at England after the collapse of the Peace of Amiens. The Grande Armée was formed out of the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean and the Army of Hanover once a general European war began in 1805, known as the War of the Third Coalition. These armies are historically significant for two reasons. First, they reveal the ways in which Napoleon sought to alter the character of the army once he had established his political power in France. The first few years of the Consulate represent a transitional phase in which Napoleon shared power in the French state with political rivals, and in the military with powerful generals such as Jean Victor Moreau and Jean-Baptiste Jules Bernadotte. By 1803, Napoleon was in firm control of both politics and the military, and possessed the opportunity to solidify his hold over the army. Secondly, these armies won Napoleon’s greatest and most important victories. In slightly less than three years, the Grande Armée crushed the combined forces of Austria, Prussia, and Russia in a series of rapid campaigns that were unprecedented in their speed and decisiveness. Even more significant, the victories of the Grande Armée allowed Napoleon to establish French hegemony in Europe through the Peace of Tilsit in 1807. In the words of one of the leading historians of Napoleon’s empire, “the Grande Army was the crucial instrument of French aggrandizement and . . . the victories of 1805-1807 opened the way to a process of continental empire-building which had not been practicable before.”23 Two conceptual models are used in this book to provide a framework for the study of these armies: sustaining motivation and military culture. The concept of sustaining motivation was first developed by John A. Lynn in his work on the armies of the French Revolution.24 Sustaining motivation is different from initial motivation and combat motivation. Initial motivation concerns the reasons why individuals enlist in the military. Combat motivation can be defined as the collection of factors that cause individuals to fight in battle. Sustaining motivation, on the other hand, consists of the motives and precombat experiences that provide individuals with the moral fortitude or compulsion to remain in military service. Put more simply, it is what keeps men, and sometimes women, in the ranks and brings them to battle. As Lynn explains, “the range of behavior influenced by sustaining motivation runs from cheerful and energetic acceptance of duty to surrender, desertion, or mutiny.”25 10

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This form of motivation, sustaining motivation, is the subject of this book. Of course, the boundaries between different types of military motivation remain far more fluid than the theoretical model indicates. Consequently, this study will also account for the ways in which the initial motivation of French soldiers shaped other kinds of motivation, and more importantly, reveal how the factors that influenced their sustaining motivation affected their performance in combat. To understand why Napoleon’s troops waged war, I examine the creation and reception of Napoleonic military culture. Military culture communicates the value systems, establishes the behavioral standards, and provides the rewards and punishments that sustain the motivation and morale of soldiers. In this book, military culture is defined as the set of ideas, values, and practices that guide thought and behavior in the armed forces of a given society. It is a form of institutional culture that is developed for and by military forces, and it is distinct from the more general culture of war that exists in different societies and cultures. Military culture is not a closed system, nor is it static. It evolves and changes as a result of relationships within military forces, and because of interactions between military institutions and factors external to them such as politics, foreign relations, socioeconomic structures, and technology. Elements of military culture include, but are not limited to, strategic thought, concepts of military discipline, the role of the army in the state and society, the official goals of the military, and behavioral norms for conduct prior to, during, and after combat.26 While military culture encompasses a wide variety of phenomena, this study will concentrate on the facets of this construct related to military motivation. Napoleonic military culture coalesced as the Consular and Imperial state developed a series of measures to secure the loyalty of French soldiers, and to persuade as well as pressure them to wage war for it. This military culture changed as it responded to historical events as well as the goals and actions of French soldiers. Most of the instruments employed by the Napoleonic regime to influence its soldiers might be considered propaganda. Yet, such efforts involved more than just propaganda. A difficult term to define, like “military culture,” “propaganda” implies the overt use of different types of media, whether aural, visual, or literary, to produce desired attitudes and behaviors. Napoleonic officials certainly engaged in these sorts of activities, but they also did more. They created other means to mold their soldiers, including the threat of punishment, symbolic actions such as oath taking, and practices like the circulation of petitions to Napoleon. Although somewhat imprecise, the concept of military culture offers a more useful analytical Introduction

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tool than that of propaganda to examine this complicated system of rewards, punishments, ideas, and activities, and the broader cultural framework that they were designed to fabricate. As cultural historians such as Roger Chartier have shown, we cannot simply assume that individuals in the past passively accepted the ideas and practices to which they were exposed. To borrow a metaphor from Chartier, human minds are not like soft wax that bears the imprint of whatever is inscribed upon it.27 Individuals and groups appropriate cultural forms in different ways for reasons that may diverge widely from the manner intended by those who formulated them. It is therefore necessary to analyze the ways in which French soldiers internalized Napoleonic military culture. Only by undertaking this kind of investigation is it possible to understand their motivation. Studying Napoleonic military culture and its appropriation in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée reveals a complex motivational framework. The characterization of Napoleon’s armies as an army of honor or as an instrument forged to continue the Great Nation’s Revolutionary crusade obscures the elaborate mixture of ideas, values, and practices operating within the military forces of the Consulate and the Empire. No one single attribute defined the armies of Napoleon. Rather, the Napoleonic regime incorporated elements of Old Regime and Revolutionary military culture into a new military culture linked to Napoleon’s rule and the preservation of French hegemony in Europe. Yet, this creation resembled a patchwork collage more than a seamless canvas in which the old merged harmoniously with the new. Napoleonic military culture employed five main sources of motivation: honor, patriotism, a martial and virile masculinity, devotion to Napoleon, and coercion. The French army did become an army of honor under Napoleon, but it possessed more than one form of honor. The virtuous honor described by Bertaud appeared side by side with more traditional forms of honor characterized by the acquisition of martial glory and esprit de corps. Patriotism in the armies of the Consulate and the Empire associated the honor of the soldier with the honor of the nation. However, instead of being portrayed as a beacon of freedom, enlightenment, and civilization, France emerged as a warrior nation that needed to maintain its prestige and position in Europe through military conquests. Napoleonic military culture transformed Revolutionary virtue into Imperial virtue, which committed French soldiers to defending the reputation of the French nation as well as its physi12

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cal existence. The aggressive, militaristic character of Napoleonic France was reinforced through the inculcation of a concept of masculinity that required the soldiers of the Consulate and the Empire to demonstrate their manhood through displays of martial and sexual prowess. The Napoleonic regime literally offered its troops sex as a reward for military service, and encouraged them to prove the superiority of the French nation through their feats of arms and their sexual conquests among foreign women. To establish loyalties to Napoleon, representations of the emperor implied that his victories provided them with access to female bodies beyond France. Yet, similar to honor, the Napoleonic regime presented different, and often contradictory, images of the French leader to his troops. Napoleon was portrayed as an Absolutist ruler who governed by divine right and dispensed honors to his loyal servants, and as a patriotic monarch whose sovereignty rested upon the will of the French people, his service to the nation, and his preservation of the French Revolution’s achievements. In addition, he was a Romantic military hero who shared the glory of his incomparable victories with his army. If loyalty to Napoleon, honor, patriotism, and martial masculinity failed to make an impression on reluctant recruits, the military authorities resorted to the threat of punishment. They repeatedly informed the soldiers in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée about the harsh penalties for desertion, and forced them to witness the suffering and humiliation of those unfortunate enough to endure them. The multivalent character of Napoleonic military culture was one of the primary reasons why the French army was so successful during the first half of Napoleon’s reign. The Napoleonic regime offered its soldiers a variety of incentives that resonated with them, and in the process, produced determined armies with high morale that were superior to their European rivals. While Napoleonic military culture exercised a powerful influence over sustaining motivation in the French army, officers and enlisted men responded to it in different ways. The measures intended to shape the army had their greatest impact on the officer corps. Its members internalized the military culture in which they were immersed, and became true grognards, the kinds of soldiers who appeared in Napoleonic propaganda. Between 1803 and 1808, the lure of rewards, honor, and glory constituted the most important source of motivation for them. Yet, contrary to the assertions of historians who propose that the desire for honor increased over time, Napoleon’s officers displayed an intense commitment to France. Furthermore, in the later stages of the Napoleonic wars, their patriotism surpassed their passion for personal renown. Introduction

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A significant minority of the rank and file resembled their superiors and adopted the value system created in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. They possessed a cultlike attachment to their leader, but this devotion was not simply the product of the emperor’s victories, his personal interaction with his men, or rewards. Napoleon’s achievements and his ability to associate his rule with the traditions and ideals that defined political legitimacy in France allowed him to acquire a sacrality that inspired dedication to his person. He became the monarch that the French public had wanted since the middle of the eighteenth century, and his soldiers cherished him for it. Numerous NCOs and common soldiers also valued the glory that they obtained under his command, and appreciated the opportunities for female companionship and sexual encounters that the army provided. Many men in the enlisted ranks, however, regarded their military service with a sense of resignation and simply did what was required of them. Religious faith, prewar experiences, loyalty to their primary group, and the leadership of committed officers allowed them to endure the ordeal of war and transformed them into effective soldiers who triumphed over their opponents. The coercive apparatus put in place by the Napoleonic regime succeeded in motivating the rest by making them fear the consequences of desertion more than the risks of combat. These ideas are presented in seven chapters. The first chapter contains an overview of the history of the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée of 1805-1808. Afterward, it shows how Napoleon and his supporters constructed the military culture of these armies with different types of media, rewards, and symbolic activities. Chapter 2 examines the forms of honor cultivated in the army. The following chapter, chapter 3, concentrates on Napoleonic patriotism and demonstrates how Revolutionary virtue became Imperial virtue. The fourth chapter studies the efforts of the Napoleonic regime to manipulate French masculinity for military purposes, and its reliance on sex as a source of motivation. It also reveals the ways in which the promise of a libertine lifestyle and sexual conquests among foreign women contributed to the development of Imperial virtue. Chapter 5 then analyzes the representations of Napoleon communicated to the troops. The last two chapters assess the impact of Napoleonic military culture on the men who served in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. Chapter 6 evaluates sustaining motivation in the officer corps. The final chapter explains why common soldiers fought for Napoleon, and investigates the use of coercion to compel unwilling recruits to perform their military duties. 14

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While this book is about armies and military motivation, it has implications that extend beyond the study of war and military institutions. The armies of Napoleon transformed Europe and, ultimately, the world, through their conquests. As a result of their military victories, the French occupied a substantial amount of territory in Europe. They exported the values and institutions of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France to conquered territories and allied states. In the process, they helped to bring about the modernization of Europe. Moreover, the First Empire provoked the development of new forms of nationalism as a response to French expansion and Napoleon’s oppressive conscription and tax policies. Because of the essential contributions made by French soldiers to these changes, it is critical to know more about why they fought, and therefore, the different factors that shaped their identities and perceptions of military service. Just as significant, more than a million Frenchmen served in the armies of Napoleon. The formative experiences of these men, many of whom survived the Napoleonic wars to become an important part of French society, occurred during the period of their military service. Former soldiers occupied prominent positions in the state and civil society in post-Napoleonic France, and poor ex-soldiers constituted a social and political group that was active in the political struggles that wracked France in the first half of the nineteenth century. Many former soldiers were simply reintegrated into civilian society. There, they formed a substantial part of the male population that lived, worked, had families, and participated in the lives of their communities. Studying these men as they were forged in the fires of war can therefore provide a lens through which to analyze the development of a large and influential sector of French society that did much to mold modern France.

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1 From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland The Grande Armée and Napoleonic Military Culture

After weeks of marching across France, the soldiers of the Grande Armée finally discovered the task that lay ahead. As the army’s formations advanced into Germany, they received a proclamation from Napoleon. Issued on September 29, 1805, it announced, “Soldiers, the War of the Third Coalition has begun. The Austrian Army has passed the Inn [River], violated treaties, attacked and driven our ally from his capital.” In response, the proclamation declared, the Grande Armée would fight to assure the independence of Germany, aid the allies of France, and destroy the “new league which the hatred and gold of England had fabricated.” It also reminded the troops that the emperor marched with them and that they were the “advanced guard of the Great People.” Asserting that they would overcome “any obstacles,” it concluded with the defiant vow, “we will not rest until we have planted our eagles on the territory of our enemies.”1 The proclamation proved prophetic. Over the next few months, the Grande Armée compelled an entire Habsburg army to surrender, captured Vienna, the capital of the Habsburg Empire, and dismantled the Third Coalition, along with the main Allied field army, at the battle of Austerlitz. The campaign of 1805 was noteworthy for a number of reasons, not the least of which was its rapid and decisive conclusion. It opened a new stage in the Napoleonic wars, inaugurating a period of French military success that culminated in the establishment of French hegemony in Europe. If the campaign of 1805 represents the start of a new era, the preparations for it began two years earlier when First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte began to build an army for an invasion of Great Britain. The army assembled to confront France’s most implacable foe never would set foot on English shores, but it |

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did become the Grande Armée and consistently defeated its opponents from 1805 to 1808. One of the primary sources of its success was a distinctive military culture developed by Napoleon and his supporters to sustain the motivation of France’s soldiers. After presenting a brief history of these armies, this chapter introduces the different forms of media and symbolic activities used to create their military culture to provide a context for the material presented in the rest of the book.

The Expedition to England and the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean The forging of the Grande Armée began with the end of the Peace of Amiens, which was signed between Britain and France in 1802. The treaty was especially significant because it established a general peace in Europe after almost ten years of continuous warfare provoked by the French Revolution. The ambitious new leader of France, First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte, perceived the respite as a chance to increase French power and influence abroad. Consequently, he refused to allow British goods free access to French markets, maintained French troops in the Netherlands in violation of earlier diplomatic agreements, added Piedmont and Elba to France, publicly contemplated reconquering Egypt, and pursued diplomatic initiatives in India. The British government understandably perceived these measures as provocations, and viewed French expansion in the Mediterranean with apprehension. For their part, the British retained Malta, which they had promised to vacate at Amiens, and their press savaged the first consul in print. Under these conditions, tensions quickly escalated, and hostilities between Britain and France resumed on May 18, 1803. To defeat “perfidious Albion,” Napoleon planned to undertake a new amphibious invasion of the British Isles. It would take time, however, to assemble the military forces needed to ensure the expedition’s success. The first consul therefore began the war by launching a campaign against British holdings on the Continent. The first major military operation was the invasion of the Electorate of Hanover, a British possession in Germany. In May of 1803, Napoleon ordered General Adolphe Edouard Casimir Joseph Mortier to march against Hanover with approximately fourteen thousand men. The French overran the Electorate and forced its army to surrender a few months later. Mortier’s army, the Army of Hanover, occupied the Electorate until September of 1805. General Jean-Baptiste-Jules Bernadotte arrived to take command in 1804, and the army’s size was expanded until it contained twenty-six thousand troops.2 18

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While the French extended their control over Hanover, Napoleon built a much larger army for the invasion of England. In June of 1803, he issued instructions for the creation of an expeditionary force concentrated in six camps stretching from the south of France to the Netherlands. The sites originally chosen included Holland, Gand, Saint-Omer, Compiègne, Saint-Malo, and Bayonne. Some of these locations were discovered to be insuitable as staging areas for military operations against Britain. The first consul therefore adjusted his plans and assembled the new army in five main camps near Bayonne, Boulogne, Montreuil, Bruges in Belgium, and Utrecht in Holland. After the conclusion of successful diplomatic negotiations with Spain, Napoleon transferred the camp at Bayonne to Brest. The units in the Camp of Bruges also eventually relocated to Ambleteuse, a village a few miles from Boulogne. While these camps were identified with a particular city or town, they possessed so many troops that they tended to occupy a sizeable geographical area. The camp at Boulogne offers a good example. For most of its existence, its units were positioned at Boulogne, the neighboring town of Outreau, Ambleteuse, and the town of Wimereux. Altogether, the encampments extended for a nine-mile stretch along the coast. In addition to the principal army camps, there were also camps established at St. Omer, Amiens, Compiègne, Arras, and Paris for cavalry and reserve troops. French preparations for the assault on Britain gained momentum in the summer and fall of 1803 as troops and supplies streamed toward the camps. Napoleon christened the army to which they were headed the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean and established its headquarters at the Camp of St. Omer, the official name of the camp at Boulogne. The size of the Army of the Coasts, the more manageable title by which it was often known, grew slowly, but steadily. It numbered only 70,000 men in January 1804. However, the army contained roughly 120,000 troops by March and reached a total of slightly more than 170,000 in the summer of 1805.3 While French troops trained to invade Great Britain, the nature of the French government changed profoundly. Much like ancient Rome, whose symbolism would conspicuously mark the transformation, the Republic evolved into an empire. Napoleon and his supporters in the government contemplated the possibility of making him a hereditary ruler during the Consulate, the government that they created in 1799. However, they were well aware that such a move might provoke opposition from a country that had toppled the Bourbon monarchy and fought for a decade to ensure that France remained a republic. Support for the return of monarchy increased as the first consul’s policies succeeded in providing peace, stability, and prosperity From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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and in response to assassination plots against him, including one conspiracy that received the direct assistance of the British government. Many feared that Napoleon’s death would plunge France back into chaos and threaten the achievements of the French Revolution. Therefore, he and his supporters convinced the Republic’s government to offer him the position of monarch in May of 1804. Since France’s recent history rendered the label of king unthinkable, it bestowed upon Napoleon the more fitting title of Emperor of the French, and formally declared France an empire. The French population approved the change in a plebiscite by a margin of more than 3.5 million votes, and Napoleon crowned himself emperor at Notre Dame Cathedral on December 2. The Army of the Coasts of the Ocean sent delegations to participate in the events of the coronation, but most of its men remained in their camps. They continued to occupy the Channel coasts for another ten months. The time that these troops spent preparing for the expedition to Britain was particularly important because it gave them crucial training and combat experience. France’s soldiers honed their skills by participating in firing exercises and conducting maneuvers to improve their ability to adapt to various tactical situations. For example, General Auguste Frederic Louis Viesse de Marmont, the commander of the Camp of Utrecht, proudly informed Napoleon, “We maneuver by division three times a week, & twice per month with [all] three divisions united. The troops have become very highly trained.”4 The soldiers on the coasts also skirmished with British naval forces. They fought against boarding parties sent to disrupt Napoleon’s plans, engaged in artillery duels with British ships, and embarked on French vessels where they saw combat in small-scale ship-to-ship actions. The Army of the Coasts of the Ocean not only prepared the bodies of its members for war; it also trained their hearts and minds. The years from 1803 to 1805 represented a crucial period for the development of the French army and French military culture. During the later phases of the French Revolution, the armies of the Republic became disillusioned with their country’s politicians and with French civilian society. France’s soldiers were forced to fend for themselves in various countries because the Directory, the executive council in charge of the French government, lacked the means to supply its armies. They felt that they had been abandoned by politicians, that the Republic had been corrupted, and that the citizenry of France was no longer grateful for their sacrifices. The troops came to believe that only they continued to remain true to the principles of the Revolution. Consequently, they gave their allegiance not to the Directory but to charismatic generals such 20

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as Bonaparte, Jean Victor Moreau, and Jean-Baptiste Kléber. After the establishment of the Consulate, Napoleon possessed a sizeable following in the army that was composed of the men whom he had led. However, substantial portions of the soldiery still harbored devotion to other generals. The war with Britain provided Napoleon with the perfect opportunity to increase his influence. Forming the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean allowed him to concentrate most of the French army in a relatively small area for an extended period of time. Moreover, its camps were within easy reach of Paris. Napoleon thus possessed roughly two full years free from major interruptions to secure the loyalty of France’s soldiers for himself and the new government that he established. He did not waste them. The new leader of France frequently traveled to the encampments near the Channel coast. Much as he had done in Italy and Egypt, Napoleon spared no effort to acquire the allegiance of France’s largest army. Napoleon’s supporters inside and outside of the military complemented these activities with a series of measures that were designed to maintain the morale of its troops and ensure that they adopted their political and military values. Finally, since the Army of the Coasts remained on or near French soil, Napoleon’s agents kept a close watch on it to ensure that rivals in the military would not be able to recruit followers from within its ranks. As a soldier who acquired political power through a coup d’état, Napoleon was well aware of the threat posed by ambitious generals.

A Grande Armée for La Grande Nation Despite Napoleon’s best efforts to carry the fight to England’s shores, the battles of the Army of the Coasts remained limited to skirmishes at sea. The strength of the Royal navy and the inability of the French navy to concentrate sufficient forces in the English Channel prevented Napoleon from launching the invasion of Great Britain. The preparation that France’s soldiers received, however, would be put to good use on the Continent. Napoleon’s expansionist foreign policy, and transgressions such as his decision to abduct Louis Antoine de Bourbon, the Duke d’Enghien, in the neutral territory of Baden in order to carry out his execution, provoked the creation of a new alliance against France. By the summer of 1805, the Habsburg Empire, Russia, Naples, and Sweden joined Britain to forge the third Allied coalition to oppose France since the start of the French Revolution, hence its designation as the Third Coalition. To confront the threat posed by Habsburg and Russian forces, Napoleon reorganized the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean into the Grande Armée. From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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Each of the main camps and the Army of Hanover was made a separate corps in the new army. For example, the Army of Hanover became I Corps, and the Camp of St. Omer at Boulogne became IV Corps. Usually commanded by a marshal of the Empire, a corps was a small army combining infantry, cavalry, and artillery that was capable of operating by itself. From 1805 to 1808, the Grande Armée normally consisted of nine to twelve corps, including Napoleon’s Imperial Guard, and each corps had between fifteen thousand and thirty thousand troops. The corps were organized into three or four divisions. Divisions were in turn divided into two or more brigades, which were composed of one or more regiments. Infantry regiments generally possessed three or four battalions, one of which functioned as a training and garrison unit, or depot battalion. War battalions, the battalions that accompanied the army in the field, had a paper strength of 1,078 men in nine companies. Cavalry regiments, on the other hand, contained between two and four squadrons, each with two companies. The theoretical size of the squadrons was approximately 180-230 troopers, depending on the type of cavalry. The infantry battalion and the cavalry squadron constituted the basic tactical units of Napoleon’s armies, along with the artillery company, which tended to be comprised of one hundred soldiers and eight cannons.5 While on campaign, the Grande Armée’s battalions typically fielded around 600-800 soldiers, and its squadrons 80-150 troopers. The size of the army as a whole fluctuated, but it usually averaged 180,000 men. The Grande Armée started the campaign of 1805 with approximately 194,000 soldiers. Sickness and other factors, however, reduced the number of combatants to roughly 178,000 after it crossed the Rhine.6 Later, when Napoleon conducted operations against the Fourth Coalition in the fall of 1806 and the spring of 1807, it numbered between 175,000 and 190,000 troops.7 In the initial stages of the war of the Third Coalition, Napoleon sought to separate the Habsburg forces and the Russians, his most dangerous enemies on the Continent, and defeat each in detail. The Austrians assisted him by invading Bavaria and assembling an army near the city of Ulm under the command of General Karl Leiberich, Baron Mack. Moving faster than his enemies expected, the French emperor marched the nine corps of the Grande Armée along parallel routes to surround Mack’s troops. A series of engagements around Ulm, including Wertingen, Haslach, and Elchingen, prevented them from escaping. The French then drove the Austrians back into Ulm, where they were forced to surrender over twenty thousand soldiers. Marshal Pierre François Charles Augereau’s VII Corps followed the remnants of Mack’s forces, and captured them at Dornbirn. The Grande Armée’s other 22

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formations continued east, seizing Vienna and confronting a combined Austro-Russian army at Austerlitz. On December 2, 1805, exactly a year after Napoleon’s coronation, the French emperor won his greatest victory, shattering the Allied forces in a battle presided over by Alexander I, the tsar of Russia, and Francis I, the Hapsburg emperor. The French victory at the “Battle of the Three Emperors” dissolved the Third Coalition. It convinced Francis I to sign a peace treaty with France on January 1, 1806, and the tsar agreed to an armistice. A fourth coalition formed ten months later. The ruling class of Prussia resented the intervention of Napoleon’s government in German affairs. It was also humiliated by Prussian impotence in the face of French aggression during the war of the Third Coalition, which included violations of German and Prussian neutrality. A war party gathered around Queen Louise and Count Karl August von Hardenberg, and put increasing pressure on King Frederick William III to declare war. The king finally acted after Napoleon pushed him into closing Prussian markets to British trade and when he learned that the French emperor proposed to restore Hanover to Britain after he had granted it to Prussia. The war commenced in October of 1806 with an ultimatum from Frederick William III that required Napoleon to make a number of humiliating concessions by October 8, including the removal of all French troops to the left bank of the Rhine. The emperor responded by advancing with the Grande Armée to meet the Prussians. The French routed small enemy armies at Schleiz and Saalfeld, and then fought the main Prussian army in the twin battles of Jena-Auerstädt on October 14. Marshal Louis Nicholas Davout’s III Corps faced the main Prussian army at Auerstädt while Napoleon attacked the Prusso-Saxon advanced guard at Jena with the bulk of the Grande Armée. The herculean labors of Davout and his men averted a potential defeat, and the French won both battles. Afterwards, Napoleon’s army rapidly pursued the enemy, and succeeded in obliterating what was left of the Prussian army in a span of just over three weeks. The Grande Armée then turned to deal with the Russians, who had returned to the fray by joining the Fourth Coalition. Napoleon invaded Poland and the French quickly captured Warsaw. The Grande Armée then fought bloody and indecisive battles with Russian forces at Pultusk and Golymin on December 26. Following these engagements, Napoleon tried to settle into winter quarters. However, a Russian offensive led by General Leontiy Benningsen forced him to resume operations. Napoleon foiled Bennigsen’s plans, causing the Russians to retreat. The French brought them to bay at Eylau, where the two armies engaged in a horrific slugging match in the From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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middle of snowstorms on February 7-8, 1807. Both sides suffered tremendous casualties, with the French losses reaching close to thirty thousand men.8 The Russians withdrew, but the Grande Armée was so badly mauled that the emperor declined to pursue. While most of the army recuperated, Napoleon replenished his losses and created a new army corps under Marshal François Joseph Lefebvre to besiege the city of Danzig. After months of bitter fighting, Danzig fell on May 27. Military operations by the main French and Russian field armies then resumed in June. The Russians initially went on the offensive, but they stalled in front of French defenses along the Passarge River. The French counterattacked, assaulting the Russians in strong defensive positions at Heilsberg on June 10, 1807. This battle resulted in another costly draw, and the Russians retreated intact. The Grande Armée pursued and caught up with them at Friedland. On June 14, 1807, it attacked, forcing Bennigsen’s troops to fight with the Alle River to their rear. Breaking the Russian army in two, the Grande Armée won a resounding victory in which it inflicted roughly twenty thousand casualties. The battle of Friedland finally convinced the tsar to make peace. In meetings near the town of Tilsit in July, Napoleon, Alexander I, and Frederick William III signed treaties that brought the war of the Fourth Coalition to an end. The settlement reached at Tilsit also established French dominance in Europe, dividing the continent into French and Russian spheres of influence. After the Peace of Tilsit, most of the Grande Armée remained in Germany and occupied Prussia. Some formations returned to France and a few participated in a French intervention in Spain. Napoleon sent troops to the Iberian Peninsula in October of 1807 to force Portugal to join the Continental System, a land-based blockade of Britain. He did so again in February of 1808 to protect his new possessions in Spain. A dispute arose in the Spanish royal family that allowed Napoleon to force the king of Spain and his heir to abdicate. He then created a new Kingdom of Spain that belonged to the French Empire, and placed his brother Joseph on its throne. Soon afterward, Spain exploded into rebellion, and a series of setbacks followed. Spanish resistance and the arrival of a British expeditionary force led to the capture of an entire French army at Bailen and the evacuation of Madrid. With the situation rapidly deteriorating, Napoleon believed that drastic steps were necessary. Accordingly, he transferred the Grande Armée’s I, V, and VI Corps from Germany to Spain. The Grande Armée was then formally dissolved in October of 1808, and its troops became part of the Army of Spain and the Army of the Rhine. The army that won Napoleon’s greatest victories was no more, but 24

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its achievements and its impact upon the men who served in its ranks would affect France and the rest of Europe for decades to come.

The Construction of Napoleonic Military Culture Numerous factors contributed to the victories of the Grande Armée, but one of the most important was Napoleon’s legendary ability to motivate his soldiers. This skill seemed to come naturally to him, and it was a talent that he continuously exercised. To borrow a useful phrase, Napoleon was the “world’s first ‘media general,’” who employed every tool at his disposal to shape the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior of his troops.9 His gift for inspiring soldiers first became apparent in the Army of Italy. After assuming command in 1796, General Bonaparte relied on personal interaction with his men, rewards, and propaganda such as proclamations and newspapers to develop an intense bond with them. He earned the loyalty and admiration of his troops, and inspired them to achieve extraordinary victories under his command. When he became the leader of France, Napoleon devoted just as much effort to strengthening his hold over the soldiery. He simply did so on a much greater scale. Throughout the Consulate and the Empire, Napoleon endeavored to create a new military culture that would forge the entire French army into a military force that embodied his goals and values. This military culture was fashioned from a complex array of materials, including written and print media, songs, plays, and rewards. Festivals, ceremonies, and symbolic practices also played a prominent role in the indoctrination of Napoleon’s men. Napoleon, however, did not act alone in trying to mold a new army for his new regime. Studies on the soldiers of the Consulate and the Empire focus almost exclusively on the figure of Napoleon himself, and the methods that he used to acquire their devotion. To deny Napoleon’s centrality in the motivational system of his armies would be misleading, but it is crucial to recognize that a multitude of military and civilian officials, writers, composers, artists, and playwrights participated in the construction of Napoleonic military culture. Many, like the army’s leaders and civilian authorities, did so as part of their official functions. Napoleon likewise employed numerous individuals to create propaganda for his troops. In addition, there was a surprisingly large number of people who voluntarily helped him transform the French army. On their own initiative, they produced forms of media that expressed support for the Napoleonic regime and promoted what were perceived to be its values. Some engaged in this activity because they hoped to profit from Napoleon’s popularity, or because they From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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wished to curry favor with the government. Others, who may or may not have possessed these motives, genuinely wanted to show their enthusiasm for Napoleon and contribute to the war effort.

Proclaiming the Emperor’s Truths: Written and Print Media Napoleon encouraged the production of literature and art that contributed to his military culture by granting rewards to artists and writers whose work he favored. Yet, not all unsolicited aid was welcomed. A propaganda pamphlet by Bertrand Barère represents a good example. Barère was an influential politician during the Revolution who was famous for his rhetorical skills. In the summer of 1804, he wrote a leaflet entitled Lettre à l’armée that was intended to inspire the Army of the Coasts in its struggle to defeat England. Upon learning of its existence, the emperor delivered a stinging rebuke, exploding, “there is no need to speak to the army; it does not read the vain babbling of pamphlets, and a word in the order of the day would do more than a hundred volumes of Cicero and Demosthenes.” Continuing his tirade, Napoleon instructed his minister of police, Joseph Fouché, to try to prevent the brochure’s circulation. “Tell Barère,” he explained, “whose pompous proclamations and sophisms are not in harmony with his colossal reputation, to no longer dabble in this type of writing. . . . The only legal means to speak to the army is the order of the day. Everything else is intrigue and faction.”10 This letter, which is surprisingly harsh, revealed Napoleon’s desire to dispense with the heavy-handed indoctrination programs used in the armies of the French Revolution. Yet it also showed a firm willingness to use another form of the written word to speak to the army. He identified orders of the day as his favored method for addressing his soldiers. Along with orders of the day, the Napoleonic regime distributed other types of written and print media to the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. These items formed an important and distinct component of Napoleonic military culture. Unlike most measures that were intended to motivate Napoleon’s soldiers, they were presented to the armies of the Consulate and the Empire on an almost daily basis. Furthermore, such materials provided more information to the grognards than any other morale-building tool. The written and print media that appeared in Napoleon’s armies originated in the military culture of the French Revolution. Before 1789, French kings and their aristocratic generals rarely addressed common soldiers. 26

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Often regarding enlisted men with open contempt, they generally felt that it was unnecessary or beneath them to explain themselves to the troops. These attitudes disappeared along with the Old Regime. The political chaos generated by the Revolution and the multiple threats that France faced rendered the political loyalties and military motivation of the army matters that required immediate and sustained attention. The leaders of Revolutionary France therefore deluged the army with information, political messages, and encouragement through a bewildering assortment of printed materials. The Revolutionaries’ mobilization of the press resembled their frenzied attempts to rally all of France to defend the new social and political order that they created. Political groups like the Jacobin club gave various forms of literature to soldiers to recruit supporters. Government officials bought periodicals and pamphlets for dissemination among the soldiery, and even individual armies produced newspapers to indoctrinate their troops. The use of print propaganda became more systematic in the fall of 1792 when the central government began to regularly send political journals such as the Bulletin de la Convention Nationale and Père Duchesne to the military. By the end of July, 1794, the Republic purchased over 7.5 million copies of journals for the military. In addition, the army received official documents from the government such as constitutions, decrees, and reports, all of which were supposed to be read to the troops. Military commanders then supplemented these items with their own propaganda materials.11 General Napoleon Bonaparte was no exception, though he would prove more adept at using the written word than his peers. He routinely addressed his troops through proclamations and orders of the day, and developed the style that would appear in the military culture of the Grande Armée.12 While commanding the Army of Italy and the Army of the Orient, he likewise founded newspapers such as the Courrier de l’Armée d’Italie and the Courrier de l’Egypte that were distributed to his soldiers.13 Perhaps because of Napoleon’s awareness of the power of the printed word to shape the army in ways that he could not control, he reduced the amount of written and printed material issued to the military after the creation of the Consulate. The Napoleonic regime replaced the Revolution’s print propaganda with three forms of media: orders of the day, proclamations, and military bulletins. Napoleon’s comments about Barère highlighted the importance that he attached to orders of the day. They were instructions issued by French military commanders to the men serving under them. During the Consulate and the Empire, orders of the day served as the primary channel through which Napoleon and the army’s leadership communicated with the troops. As a From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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military manual explained, “The general order of the day and the particular order of the regiment, . . . is the publication of the intentions of commanders, and serves in some ways as a supplement to regulations: it is the means of publicizing news and memorable punishments.”14 Each level of the military’s command structure, from the general staff of the army to the colonels of individual regiments, produced orders of the day. They percolated down to the troops in the following manner. In the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the commander of each camp, or his chief of staff, composed an order for his units. Almost every morning, the camp’s chief of staff transmitted this order to the divisional generals, who furnished their own order of the day for their division. Both the order of the camp and the order of the division were communicated to the generals of brigade. The brigadier generals then attached their orders of the day for the brigade to the pile. This laborious process repeated at the regimental level. The final step occurred when corporals or their equivalent in the cavalry, brigadiers, informed the men in their squad of all of the orders that pertained to them. The squad was the smallest administrative unit in the army, and consisted of between eleven and sixteen men. The formation of the Grande Armée added a new layer of orders. Napoleon and his chief of staff, Louis-Alexandre Berthier, often visited the Army of the Coasts, but they did not issue it orders of the day. The commanders of the individual camps therefore penned the most important orders received by its troops. Since Napoleon commanded the Grande Armée in person, he supplied it with a continuous stream of orders of the day. Berthier’s staff then printed and sent these orders to the army’s corps. They descended through the chain of command along with the orders of the corps, division, brigade, and regiment, following the same pattern used in the Army of the Coasts.15 The Grande Armée possessed a printing division that allowed Berthier’s staff to produce copies of the army’s orders in large numbers, which facilitated their distribution. With the exception of the Camp of St. Omer, which acquired the services of a printer, the Army of the Coasts made do with the practiced, and undoubtedly calloused, hands of its staff officers. Whether transcribed by hand or printed, orders of the day were usually read to the troops during roll calls. Roll calls, or appels, typically took place twice per day, but as many as five could be made.16 The units in the Camp of St. Omer assembled every day at 1:00 p.m. to hear the order of the day of the camp and the order of their division.17 When the Grande Armée was on the march, the grognards heard the recitation of orders of the day either before they began their journey, during rest halts, or after their unit stopped for the night.18 28

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Orders of the day performed several tasks. They contained information about the routines that structured daily life in the army, such as where to obtain provisions and when roll calls would be made. In addition, orders of the day featured laws and military regulations. When violations occurred, they announced the conviction and punishment of the offenders. They also offered French soldiers praise and encouragement. Napoleon and his military commanders employed them to maintain morale, explain their goals to their troops, and list the rewards accorded to the army. The grognards were likewise provided with accounts of noteworthy military or political developments by orders of the day. Aside from this content, Napoleon and his military commanders frequently attached proclamations to their orders of the day. They normally did so on special occasions such as the establishment of the French Empire, before a battle, or after a victory. The men who led Napoleon’s armies also issued proclamations independently of their orders. Proclamations were such a useful instrument for addressing the troops because they could reach a wide audience. Since Napoleon and his subordinates could not speak to all of their soldiers due to the size of the forces that they commanded, these documents allowed them to give speeches to their men when they could not be physically present. Although Napoleon’s proclamations are legendary, historians have virtually ignored those of his subordinates. The latter delivered fewer declarations than their illustrious leader, but the ones that they did produce shaped the development of Napoleonic military culture in important ways. For example, Marshal Michel Ney’s address to VI Corps at the start of the 1805 campaign encouraged his troops to adopt certain attributes that were supposed to distinguish French soldiers: “I will not speak to the soldiers about their duty as warriors; I know the noble ardor that animates them; they will show the difference that exists between mercenaries fighting for a foreign cause and men who defend their unjustly attacked country; French blood only flows when honor orders it.”19 The proclamations composed by Napoleon also frequently portrayed France as the victim of foreign aggression. He issued thirteen addresses to the army from the fall of 1805 to the fall of 1808. To these may be added declarations to the Bavarian army in 1805 and to the people of Saxony in 1806, and three speeches that Napoleon gave to France’s legislatures about the wars of the Third and Fourth Coalitions. Although he did not initially deliver the speeches to the troops, they were affixed to the Grande Armée’s proclamations or orders of the day, indicating that Napoleon wanted his soldiers to hear them.20 Yet the proclamations were not just intended for the army. The From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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emperor made sure that they were published in newspapers, posted on placards, and spread abroad to influence the civilian population of the Empire and the rest of Europe. The proclamations normally took the form of stirring addresses that were replete with striking imagery and catchy phrases. In them, Napoleon explained the reasons for war, outlined his military plans, promised to reward the troops, challenged them to maintain their reputation, and praised their accomplishments. The famous announcement after Austerlitz contained several of these features: Soldiers! I am content with you; in the battle of Austerlitz, you justified all that I expected of your intrepidity; you have decorated your eagles with an immortal glory. An army of a hundred thousand men commanded by the Emperors of Russia and Austria has been cut down or dispersed in less than four hours; those who escaped your iron have been drowned in the lakes. 40 flags, the standards of the Russian Imperial Guard, 120 cannons, 20 generals, and more than 30,000 prisoners are the results of this forever memorable day. This infantry so renowned, and in superior numbers, could not resist your shock; and henceforth, you no longer have any rivals to fear: thus in two months, this third coalition has been vanquished and dissolved.21

Similar to orders of the day, the emperor’s proclamations were printed, distributed to the different units of the Grande Armée, and read aloud. Sometimes, they were read to the troops consecutively over a series of days to enhance their effect. Following the campaign of 1805, Marshal Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult ordered the proclamation of 6 Nivôse, year XIV, which announced peace with the Habsburg Empire, to be recited daily in the units of his corps.22 Such efforts were not in vain, for Napoleon’s proclamations appear to have had a significant impact. French troops mentioned the emperor’s proclamations in their writings, indicating that they considered them noteworthy enough to record.23 Some soldiers, like Corporal JeanJacques Bellavoine, even kept copies of them, further suggesting that they possessed special meaning for the men who served in the Grande Armée.24 Napoleon’s soldiers also expressed interest in the third type of print propaganda: the Bulletin de la Grande Armée. This publication took the form of a news sheet. It was short, usually consisting of a page or two, and its publication was irregular. The bulletins appeared when military operations commenced, and normally stopped when active campaigning was not taking place, or once hostilities ceased. Altogether, 124 of them were printed 30

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from 1805 to 1808.25 Napoleon is credited with writing most of the bulletins, and the rest have been attributed to his secretary of state, Hugues Bernard Maret. Like the emperor’s proclamations, Napoleon designed the Bulletin de la Grande Armée to appeal to a wide audience. He used it to justify France’s involvement in the Napoleonic wars and mobilize support for the struggle against the Allies. To reach the general public, Napoleon required newspapers like the Moniteur universel, the official journal of the French government, to feature the Bulletin. His officials displayed poster-sized copies in public squares in towns and cities, and encouraged public readings of the bulletins in churches, schools, and theaters. Furthermore, Napoleon’s agents circulated the bulletins throughout Europe to influence foreign leaders and manipulate public opinion.26 In the French army, the Bulletin de la Grande Armée took the place of the political journals that were supplied to the Republic’s military forces. It normally arrived a few weeks or even months after the events that it described. For example, the bulletins for the campaign of 1805 do not seem to have reached the Grande Armée until well after the battle of Austerlitz. On March 2, 1806, exactly three months later, Lieutenant Félix Avril excitedly reported to his father that his regiment had “just received the bulletins of our army.”27 French soldiers obtained the Bulletin through different channels. Avril’s comments suggest that either the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of War delivered copies of the Bulletin de la Grande Armée directly to the troops. The grognards could also find it in the Moniteur and other journals when they were able to acquire them.28 They may have read the bulletins in foreign newspapers or in pamphlet form when French military leaders had them published to influence public opinion in French-controlled territories.29 In addition, the Imperial government published compilations of the bulletins after the conclusion of the Grande Armée’s campaigns, which appear to have been provided to the army.30 The content of the Bulletin de la Grande Armée focused on military operations. It provided detailed accounts of the Grande Armée’s campaigns and battles, reported the maneuvers of military units and the actions of individuals, and explained their meaning. In doing so, the Bulletin showed French soldiers whose perception of events was limited by their proximity to the action exactly how they were contributing to the war effort. The bulletins also addressed a variety of other topics that provided the troops with the ability to comprehend their role in the wider drama of the Napoleonic wars. They discussed the motives of the enemy, the character of foreign peoples, and the goals of Imperial France. They refuted enemy propaganda and described From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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the qualities of the French soldier. As one might expect, the Bulletin likewise recounted anecdotes about Napoleon to illustrate his personal qualities and accomplishments. The rhetorical strategies that governed the Bulletin de la Grande Armée were also important. The bulletins employed an engaging style and vibrant images to portray war as a grand romantic adventure. They contained exciting descriptions of the events in which the Grande Armée participated, the sights that it witnessed, the peoples it encountered, and the personalities that determined its fate. The thirtieth bulletin, which recounted the battle of Austerlitz, displayed their riveting quality. Much like a movie, it allowed the audience to feel the electric ambiance of the battlefield while avoiding the danger and the carnage: The Emperor, surrounded by all of the marshals, was waiting to give his last orders until the horizon was fully illuminated. At the first rays of the sun, the orders were given, and each marshal rejoined his corps at full gallop. The Emperor said in passing in front of the camps of several regiments: “Soldiers, it is necessary to end this campaign with a clap of thunder that will silence the pride of our enemies;” and instantly, hats on the ends of bayonets and cries of “Vive l’Empereur!” became the true signal for combat.31

For the men who survived the terrifying ordeal of this battle and others, the bulletins’ compelling narrative diverted attention away from the horrors and hardships that they endured, and reminded them about the extraordinary nature of their experiences and accomplishments. Bulletins, proclamations, and orders of the day were not the only kinds of written and print media that circulated in Napoleon’s armies. The Ministry of War occasionally sent copies of the Moniteur to the men on the front lines.32 This periodical was one of the Napoleonic regime’s most important propaganda instruments. It printed news about international and domestic events from the perspective of the Consular and the Imperial government. Newspapers like the Moniteur and the semi-official Journal de l’Empire also reached the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée in other ways. Some French officers acquired private subscriptions to them, and the papers then arrived in the mail. Other individuals, like Jean-Baptiste Barrès, a foot soldier in the Imperial Guard, went to cafés to read them.33 Yet, the writings of Napoleon’s soldiers frequently complained about their ignorance of current events, indicating that the arrival of newspapers was irregular.34 32

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To prevent ignorance of the law, the French government provided official documents to the army such as ministerial reports, government decrees, and decisions rendered by France’s legislative assemblies.35 Upon their reception, these materials were communicated to the troops. Supplementing these notices, the army also received administrative and technical publications like the Journal militaire, which collected the latest laws, regulations, and memoranda pertaining to the military.36

Singing the Praises of Napoleon and His Grognards: Songs and the Theater In all likelihood, French soldiers listened to the recitation of most laws and regulations with resignation or indifference rather than enthusiasm. The songs that they heard in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée undoubtedly elicited a far more positive response. Singing and songs occupied a prominent place in French popular culture and military culture long before Napoleon’s reign. During the early modern period, the French were believed to have a particular affinity for singing.37 The soldiers of the Royal army enjoyed this activity as much as the civilian population. In fact, many of the songs sung by French children today, such as “Trois jeunes tambours,” “Malbrough s’en va t’en guerre,” and “Auprès de ma blonde,” were originally military songs that were sung first by the men who fought for the kings of France.38 With the collapse of the Old Regime, the Revolutionaries recognized the French soldier’s love of song and transformed it into a potent weapon. Different Revolutionary governments employed songs to both indoctrinate and motivate their troops. They patronized songwriters to compose military songs, and sent thousands of song sheets and songbooks to the troops. The “Marseillaise,” the French national anthem, was written for the soldiers of the French Revolution. Moreover, in just the fall of 1794, the Republic supplied forty-two thousand copies of the “Chant des victoires,” the “Chant du départ,” and the “Hymne à la fraternité” to its armies.39 Napoleon also relied on songs to influence the French army, but in a more indirect manner. The officials of the Consulate and the Empire did not send songs to the military on a regular basis. They did, however, stage events in which songs were deliberately sung to French troops and given out to them. Numerous songs were circulated in Paris for Napoleon’s coronation, and the large numbers of soldiers who were present for the occasion must have obtained them. A few years later, Napoleon’s government held a series From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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of celebrations for the Grande Armée when it returned to France after the Peace of Tilsit. The emperor actively participated in their planning, and he directed Emmanuel Cretet, the minister of the interior, to make sure that songs played a leading role in the festivities. Napoleon instructed Cretet to have songs written in Paris and sent to the different towns and cities through which the army would pass. He explained that these songs were to be sung to the troops in banquets, and that he wanted “three kinds of songs, so that the soldier will not hear the same ones sung twice.”40 The authorities carried out the emperor’s instructions by having songs passed out to the soldiers of the Grande Armée as they marched past cheering crowds and at the banquets given to them. Additionally, songs were sung to the grognards while they dined, and as they entered different French cities. In Paris, the Caveau moderne, a famous singing group, even performed for the troops at dinners in the Tivoli gardens.41 For the guardsman Barrès, the songs featured in these celebrations remained one of their most memorable features. He recalled that as the Guard marched through the city, “warlike songs were sung and distributed as we went by.”42 Soldiers like Barrès also acquired songs through other means. French periodicals such as the Moniteur occasionally printed them. When war broke out in 1803, it featured the songs “Chant de guerre” and “Chant guerrier pour la descente en Angleterre.”43 The Moniteur likewise published songs that were sung during the Grande Armée’s festivals. Beyond the songs that appeared in newspapers, a substantial number of military songs were available for purchase. Soldiers could buy songs at stores, from colporteurs or peddlers, and from street singers. The latter were individuals from the lower classes who wrote, sang, and sold songs to eke out a living.44 Finally, French troops probably acquired songs from cantinières and vivandières, suttlers who accompanied the army. They sold basic necessities and various trinkets. While soldiers possessed the freedom to purchase whatever songs they liked, the authorities regulated the selection of songs. Napoleon employed songwriters such as Yves Barré, Jean-Baptiste Radet, and Guillaume Desfontaines, the founders of the famous Théâtre du vaudeville, to produce propaganda.45 Some of the songs sold to soldiers would therefore have been written by individuals who either were members of the government or had been paid to compose songs on its behalf. In addition, Napoleon encouraged the production of songs that expressed his political and military values by giving rewards to songwriters.46 These rewards included sums of money, government pensions, and positions in the Conservatory of Music, a state institution that provided songs and music for official events.47 The police were also 34

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Figure 1. “Grand Dance of the Austrians, or He Who Laughs the Last Laughs Best,” popular song from Collection de Vinck. Un siècle d’histoire de France par l’estampe, 1770-1870, circa 1805, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris. The songs that were distributed or sold to Napoleon’s soldiers were often issued in the form of song sheets like this one.

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used to control the types of songs that were available to soldiers. Continuing a policy established by the Directory, Napoleon directed them to monitor the activities of individuals who wrote and sold songs for public consumption.48 Although it was impossible for him to fully determine which songs were presented to French troops, these different measures would have ensured that the soldiers of the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée usually encountered songs that the Napoleonic regime wanted them to sing, or at least deemed acceptable. The songs that were provided to French soldiers were generally printed on small sheets of paper, and were sometimes bound together into small pamphlets containing a few songs. Occasionally, printers produced larger compilations that were bound in paper and had anywhere from 20 to 150 pages. Song sheets normally contained a song’s title, its lyrics, and the name of the “air” or tune to which it was to be sung. They were sometimes decorated with images such as that of Napoleon, a soldier, or Marianne, the symbol of the French Republic, but songs did not feature music because they were set to popular melodies that everyone knew. Whether they were issued as individual song sheets or published in songbooks, songs were portable and inexpensive. One of the largest military songbooks from the Napoleonic period, Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, ou choix de chansons militaires, dédié aux braves (C’est-à-dire tous les soldats français), which contained 147 pages and approximately eighty songs, was the size and weight of a small notebook.49 The ease with which songs could be transported and disseminated rendered them an extremely effective conduit for the transmission of ideas. Songs constituted such a useful propaganda tool because it was not necessary for soldiers to read them or buy them. Napoleon’s troops simply needed to hear a song to learn it, and they could easily teach it to others. Many of the men who served in the armed forces of the Consulate and the Empire were illiterate, and came from social and cultural milieus where an oral, rather than a written, culture still held sway. Therefore, even if French soldiers did not possess songs in their knapsacks, they carried them in their minds, and spread them by word of mouth. The troops of the Consulate and the Empire did indeed have the proverbial song in their hearts even if forced marches and wretched footwear destroyed whatever spring they might have had in their step. Singing was one of the favorite pastimes of Napoleon’s soldiers, and they did it often. Raymond Aymery Philippe Joseph de Montesquiou-Fezensac, an infantry officer, recalled that the men in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean frequently occupied themselves by “singing songs, telling stories, sometimes arguing 36

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without knowing why, reading some bad books that they managed to procure for themselves; that was their life [of the soldiers], the use of the day of the sergeants like that of the soldiers, the officers like that of the sergeants.”50 The dragoon Jean-Auguste Oyon also described the enthusiasm of French troops for songs. In his journal, he noted that the Grande Armée’s march from Boulogne in 1805 was “enlivened by a song for the occasion that set the cadence marvelously. This song said that the emperor of Austria dared to menace France and defy its soldiers; and it ended with the truly prophetic phrase repeated by the columns on the march, ‘Ah! He will remember, la lira, the departure from Boulogne.’”51 This song, like all others, was immersed in cultural fields, and it is crucial to know how songs were performed and the contexts in which they were sung to grasp their meaning. Different groups appropriate songs in a variety of ways, and can employ them for multiple ends.52 However, sources like Oyon’s journal are unusual. Napoleon’s soldiers rarely wrote down their songs. The official records of the Consulate and the Empire, and the army, likewise offer almost no information about the songs that appeared in the French army from 1803 to 1808. As a consequence, it is difficult to determine what songs reached the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. With a handful of exceptions such as the song described by Oyon, it is harder still to ascertain which of them their troops actually sang. Fortunately, many of the songs that were sung and distributed to French soldiers during festivals were published.53 It is also possible to study the military songs that were produced under Napoleon. Their authors deposited them in the Bibliothèque Nationale, and publishers assembled them into songbooks known as almanachs or chansonniers.54 The most important of these works was Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, which can probably be considered the official military songbook of Napoleonic France. As its title indicates, this book contained an array of songs that were composed for and about the Grande Armée, including drinking songs, marching songs, and even songs from plays with military themes. Although the chansonnier was published in 1809, many of its songs originally appeared during the period of the Directory, the Consulate, and the initial years of the Empire.55 The songbook was also the largest collection of military songs published between 1803 and 1809. Just as significant, it was advertised in the Moniteur, which was the equivalent of an endorsement from Napoleon’s government.56 Even if most of the songs sung by the grognards remain unknown, the songs featured in songbooks like Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée and employed in festivals reveal the songs that were offered to them. Napoleon’s From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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reliance on songs as a source of military motivation in official celebrations, his strenuous efforts to police their production, and his soldiers’ penchant for singing likewise suggest that French troops did obtain these songs and sing them. After the Grande Armée crossed the Rhine in 1805, its soldiers may have found it difficult to acquire new songs that were published in France. These songs, however, would have eventually made their way into the army with the thousands of fresh conscripts supplied yearly by the draft. Along with draftees, the theater constituted another source of new songs. The connection between the sword and the stage might not be readily apparent to modern readers, but many songs that were labeled military songs in Napoleonic France first appeared in plays. Moreover, Napoleon’s soldiers did attend the theater. Much as with the United Service Organization, or USO, in contemporary America, the Napoleonic regime arranged the production of shows to maintain the morale of its armed forces. During the celebrations for the return of the Grande Armée to France, Napoleon’s government treated the Imperial Guard to the opera, Le Triomphe de Trajan. At the height of the performance, a cascade of laurel wreaths descended upon the troops to honor them for their recent victories.57 Knowing his audience, Napoleon normally provided his soldiers with less refined theatrical fare. At his request, the staff of the Théâtre du vaudeville traveled to Boulogne.58 The vaudeville was a theater in Paris that staged short, comical plays that usually dealt with current events, and featured catchy songs and parodies.59 Its members renamed themselves the Théâtre aux armées when they arrived among the camps of the Army of the Coasts, and performed for its troops from August 17 through September 1, 1805.60 Opportunities for Napoleon’s troops to enjoy shows were limited, though, for they spent most of the period between 1803 and 1808 in locations far from theaters and theater companies. Therefore, they probably heard the works of France’s playwrights more than they saw them because the show tunes that they wrote were often published as military songs.61

“It Is with Baubles That Men Are Led”: Rewards Numerous actors and singers appeared before the men who conquered an empire for France. Yet no one liked to perform for the French army more than Napoleon himself. One of his favorite roles was that of the generous leader who rewarded his soldiers for their service and sacrifices. In one of his most famous statements, Napoleon explained why it was necessary to give awards to French troops. He made this declaration as first consul while 38

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defending the Legion of Honor in front of his advisors. Responding to objections that it was a bauble more appropriate for a monarchy, he exclaimed, “You call these baubles, well, it is with baubles that men are led. . . . Do you think that you would be able to make men fight by reasoning. Never. That is only good for the scholar in his study. The soldier needs glory, distinctions, and rewards.”62 Napoleon exaggerated to make his case, for he employed a variety of measures to motivate his soldiers. Whether or not the rewards issued by the Napoleonic regime were baubles, they played a leading role in its military culture. Napoleon and his officials constantly handed out rewards. They gave awards to soldiers in military reviews, at festivals, after battles, and, sometimes, in special ceremonies designed to issue recompenses like the Legion of Honor. As General Marmont announced to his troops in the Camp of Utrecht, “The day of combats will be for you, all at the same time, the day of triumphs and rewards.”63 Providing the enormous numbers of awards that were dispensed following such days kept the army’s general staff very busy. After the Peace of Tilsit, a harried Marshal Berthier wrote to Napoleon, explaining, “Since your departure, Sire, I do not cease to work and to send out, through twelve secretaries, the rewards that you have granted and all of the favors that you have heaped upon your Grande Armée, and I will only leave when everything is entirely finished.”64 The Napoleonic regime continued certain practices concerning rewards that were inherited from the Revolution. Napoleon preserved its emphasis on equality and merit. Unlike the Royal army, where most awards, like the Order of Saint Louis, could only be won by officers, all soldiers possessed the ability to earn the recompenses granted by Napoleonic France.65 Napoleon also relied on many of the same rewards that were issued to the army during the French Revolution, including money, pensions, and promotions. He bestowed gifts of cash on soldiers for brave deeds and exceptional service to the army, and to units that performed particularly well during reviews.66 Furthermore, the Imperial government levied contributions on occupied territories to provide extra compensation to its troops.67 While money remained a reward for military service throughout the Consulate and the Empire, Napoleon preferred to give other prizes, believing that “the troops must not become accustomed to receiving money for courageous actions.”68 If Napoleon had reservations about awarding money, he did not have qualms about granting pensions. The Napoleonic state adopted policies concerning veterans that were far less charitable than those pioneered under the Republic. However, Revolutionary France lacked the funds and the bureaucracy From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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needed to care for retired soldiers. Napoleon, on the other hand, generally succeeded in providing aid to veterans and their dependents.69 Since Napoleon considered money to be an unsuitable reward for courageous deeds, they were more likely to be rewarded with promotions. Promotions constituted one of the principal recompenses given to the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. Napoleon personally promoted soldiers and officers on numerous occasions, giving rise to the popular myth that every grognard carried a marshal’s baton in his knapsack. He also made these events highly theatrical. A staff officer wrote a detailed description of them during the Jena-Auerstädt campaign. Commenting on the reviews conducted by Napoleon in Berlin, he explained, The Emperor comes down to the square which is in front of the palace, and after having reviewed the regiments, he asks the brigadier general and the colonels who are the officers who merit advancement. The Emperor orders that they leave the ranks, and that they place themselves in a line in front of the regiment, and they are named by him and confirmed [in their new rank] immediately.70

The reality of advancement did not quite live up to the legend. The meteoric rises that took place during the Revolution rarely occurred after 1799. Those who did ascend to the upper echelons of the command hierarchy usually attained high rank in the armies of the Republic. In principle, Napoleon preferred to promote young men from notable families who graduated from military academies such as the École speciale militaire at Fontainebleau. The impact of the military academies should not be overstated because they did not produce large numbers of officers until the later years of the Empire. Casualties also ensured that opportunities for advancement would remain for those who received their military education on the battlefield rather than in the classroom. Yet, Napoleon’s desire to staff his officer corps with wellconnected graduates of the military schools made it increasingly difficult for ambitious soldiers with less education and more humble social origins to rise above the rank of captain.71 Napoleon likewise sought to prevent the too-rapid advancement of officers to ensure that the men who led his troops had adequate knowledge and experience. To this end, he altered the procedures for promotion. He restricted the practice of electing officers that emerged in the armies of the French Revolution. Reserving one-third of the officer appointments for himself, he allowed colonels to nominate the remaining two-thirds of candidates 40

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for vacant posts. Marshals and generals received their positions from Napoleon himself, and individuals proposed for the rank of major or colonel could only be promoted after commanding their units in his presence. In addition, the minister of war, Marshal Berthier, issued a circular in 1805 that required candidates for promotion to have served for a certain number of years in the army and a particular number of years in their current rank. For example, to become a captain, an individual was supposed to have been in the service for eight years, and to have been a lieutenant for four.72 The trend toward professionalization began during the Revolution, with seniority becoming a key factor in promotion in 1795, but Napoleon did increase the pace of the process.73 To recompenses like promotion that had been used during the Revolution, Napoleon added a host of new awards. He instructed Berthier to write letters to soldiers that expressed his personal satisfaction for brave deeds.74 Elite units, such as the legendary Imperial Guard, were formed in order to reward soldiers with distinguished combat records, or veterans who lacked the qualifications for admission into the officer corps. As an incentive for old soldiers and NCOs, Napoleon decreed that individuals who remained in the army for ten, fifteen, and twenty years would receive extra pay and chevrons of red wool that identified them as veterans of long service.75 For men whose wounds made them incapable of long careers, the Imperial government created veterans camps that gave ex-soldiers lands in annexed territories. Furthermore, Napoleon ordered the construction of monuments to honor his grognards. The Arch of the Carrousel, which remains in Paris today facing the Louvre, was built to show his gratitude for the army’s victories against the Third and Fourth Coalitions.76 In 1806, the French emperor promised his troops that he would commission a more impressive monument, a temple to the Grande Armée, to celebrate their achievements.77 Not long after, Napoleon surpassed this grand gesture with the creation of a hereditary nobility. It would eventually function as “a powerful stimulant of devotion” in the officer corps, but it was just introduced in 1808 and few members of the Grande Armée were granted membership.78 The new aristocracy, therefore, only became a prominent feature of French military culture in the second half of the Napoleonic era. Prior to the establishment of the Imperial nobility, the Legion of Honor functioned as the most powerful stimulant of devotion for French troops. Napoleon founded the Legion of Honor in 1802 to reward individuals who had performed exceptional services to the state and the patrie, or homeland. Those admitted to the Legion swore an oath of allegiance to Napoleon and From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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the Empire, and then received a medal in the form of a white, five-pointed cross, attached to a red ribbon. Napoleon’s government organized legionnaires into cohorts and gave them a monetary stipend and other benefits that varied according to their rank in the institution. Shortly after the award’s creation, it became a coveted prize in the French army.

“Vive la République!” “Vive l’Empereur!” Festivals, Ceremonies, and Symbolic Practices To enhance the appeal of the Legion of Honor, Napoleon and his military commanders awarded its medals during festivals and reviews in the presence of large numbers of troops. This practice not only distinguished the new legionnaire by presenting him with his reward; it increased his prestige by recognizing his achievements in front of his peers. On some occasions, like the celebrations that Napoleon organized for the Grande Armée after Tilsit, the festival itself was the reward. As these examples suggest, the Napoleonic regime constructed its military culture from fêtes and symbolic activities as well as rewards, songs, and written and print media. Festivals became a routine aspect of military life during the French Revolution. The soldiers of the Revolutionary armies celebrated large, spectacular festivals involving thousands of participants, and smaller, more frequent ceremonies known as civic fêtes. The Republic’s armies organized major celebrations for important events like the adoption of the Constitution of 1793 and the anniversary of the capture of the Bastille. Civic fêtes took place when recruits joined the army, when units received their flag, and on the decadi, the final day of the week in the new calendar produced during the Revolution.79 The Consulate reduced the number of French Revolutionary festivals to two, July 14 and 1 vendémiaire. The festival of July 14 honored of the fall of the Bastille, the beginning of the Revolution, and the “triumph of liberty.”80 The fête of 1 vendémiaire commemorated the founding of the Republic. Vendémiaire was the first month in the Revolutionary calendar, and 1 vendémiaire normally fell between September 22 and September 24 in the Gregorian calendar. With the first consul’s blessing, the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean and the Army of Hanover celebrated the festivals of July 14 and 1 vendémiaire. The army’s leaders and civilian officials also introduced a set of fêtes that honored Napoleon and his government. These festivals included celebrations for the failure of an assassination plot involving Generals Moreau and Jean Charles Pichegru, and the anniversaries of the coup of 18 Brumaire, the 42

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battle of Marengo, and the creation of the Empire. The troops preparing to strike at Britain also fêted Napoleon’s coronation as emperor, and his acquisition of the title of king of Italy in May of 1805. The most important new festival, however, was held on August 15. It observed Napoleon’s birthday and the feast day of Saint Napoleon. The latter was, in all likelihood, invented by the Catholic Church. After Napoleon was declared emperor, he requested that a new saint be canonized on his birthday, and the Vatican fortuitously discovered that Neopolis, a Roman soldier who refused to swear allegiance to Emperor Maximilian, deserved the honor. Neopolis became Saint Napoleon, “the patron saint of warriors.”81 Starting in 1805, the Napoleonic regime reorganized the haphazard collection of French celebrations into a new system of imperial festivals. After Napoleon was crowned, the French army no longer commemorated July 14 and 1 vendémiaire. With impressive symmetry, the emperor issued a decree in 1806 that replaced them with two different annual holidays.82 One was the festival of August 15, which was known in the army as the “Festival of the Emperor” or the “Festival of Napoleon.” It honored the birth of the emperor, St. Napoleon’s day, and the return of Catholicism.83 The second imperial fête took place on the first Sunday in December. It memorialized the anniversary of Napoleon’s coronation and his victory at Austerlitz. Unless the Grande Armée was actively campaigning, it celebrated these official festivals every year, wherever it happened to be located. Moreover, it added a few additional fêtes. The army’s leadership still sometimes held celebrations for 18 Brumaire.84 More frequently, it organized festivities on the dates of the Grande Armée’s victories. To mark the anniversary of Jena-Auerstädt, the officers of Davout’s corps attended a ball that featured a pyramid ornamented with a medallion of the emperor bearing the inscription, “To the victors of 14 October 1806.”85 The Grande Armée even honored its costly “victory” at Eylau. On February 7, 1808, Marshal Soult announced that he was commemorating the battle, “which contributed so powerfully to preparing the brilliant victories that would lead to the Peace of Tilsit,” by giving each of his men a bottle of beer and an extra ration of eau-de-vie.86 These brilliant victories made the Grande Armée itself an object of veneration in 1807 and 1808. To express France’s gratitude toward its soldiers, the Imperial government orchestrated celebrations for the formations of the Grande Armée that came back to France. The first one took place in late November of 1807 for the return of the Imperial Guard to Paris. A year later, Napoleon organized festivals in French cities for the units that he was sending to Spain. As the corps of the Grande Armée marched to Iberia, they were fêted along the way. From the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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With the exception of the celebrations for the Grande Armée, the festivals observed by Napoleon’s soldiers between 1803 and 1808 followed a predictable pattern. They often began with a Catholic mass, which was attended by the commander-in-chief of the units present, his staff, the officers under his command, and an escort of grenadiers or cavalry. The mass tended to feature a Te Deum, a religious chant that offered thanks to God. When the religious ceremonies ended, the military rituals began. A parade and a military review took place, and the commanding officer or one of his staff gave a speech related to the subject of the particular celebration. Depending on the occasion, there might also be a special event such as the distribution of the Legion of Honor, the swearing of an oath, or the dedication of a monument. After the review and ceremonies, the troops conducted training exercises. They then received an extra ration of food, and an extra ration of drink, either wine, beer, or eau-de-vie. Fêtes normally closed with games, banquets, balls, and, sometimes, fireworks. Although it seems to have lacked a mass, the festival of 1 vendémiaire held in the Camp of Brest in 1804 illustrates the character of a typical Napoleonic military festival. On the night before the celebration, a twenty-gun artillery salvo was fired at sunset to announce the festival on the following day. At sunrise, another artillery salute was fired. Later in the morning, eight infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, four artillery companies, a company of the artillery train, two companies of sappers, and the gendarmes attached to the Camp of Brest assembled in full dress uniform on the camp’s training field. In total, approximately eight thousand soldiers took part. The camp’s general staff reviewed the troops. It then positioned them in a large, hollow square to award the Legion of Honor to the soldiers from the camp who had been admitted to its ranks. The recipients of the reward formed up in the center along with the flag bearers of the units present. Standing inside of the square, General Dorsner, the commanding officer of the camp’s artillery, declared, The glorious institution to which you belong, will call witness to the great deeds of warriors, the grandeur of the nation and the valor of its Chief. It will proclaim your services and your actions everywhere. What Frenchman would not glory in being a member of the Legion of Honor, of this Legion of brave men whom its august founder calls the elite of the nation! How it is flattering and touching for me in this moment to give to you, in his name, the symbols of these glorious titles! Let us recall that it is to honor that we owe them, and remember that which the Grand Chancel44

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lor [of the Legion of Honor] said to our brothers-in-arms on the 14th of July, when he received this decoration from the hands of the Emperor: associated with this immortal monument, these sacred words, henceforth inseparable and dear to all of the French[,] shine brightly: Honor, Patrie, Napoleon! That is what we are going to swear.

Dorsner administered the oath of the Legion of Honor, and each of the new legionnaires responded, “I swear it.” After an artillery salvo, Dorsner handed out the medals to cheers of “Vive l’Empereur!” The ceremony finished with a parade. Each of the soldiers who were part of the Camp of Brest and the local garrison received a ration of eau-de-vie. That evening, a banquet was held for the staff of the camp. At the dinner, General Dorsner toasted the emperor: “To Napoleon, Emperor of the French; may his genius triumph over the enemies of the nation and assure him, through new victories, a prompt and durable peace!” General François Xavier Donzelot, the chief of staff, then offered one to the camp’s leader: “To the Marshal of the Empire Augereau; may he soon lead us to victory once again!”87 The festival at Brest featured one of the many rituals employed by the Napoleonic regime to shape the military culture of the French army: the distribution of the Legion of Honor and the pomp that accompanied it. Another symbolic activity utilized by the army’s leaders consisted of the writing of petitions to Napoleon. On a number of occasions between 1803 and 1805, different groups, from entire military camps to single officers, penned letters to Napoleon expressing support for his political rule and congratulating him for particular accomplishments. The army sent addresses to Napoleon when he was saved from the assassination plot linked to Moreau and Pichegru. It also signed petitions in favor of creating the Empire and that applauded Napoleon for becoming king of Italy.88 Normally, the commander of a military camp or a specific unit, or a member of his staff, composed the text of a petition. Afterward, he invited his men to sign it. French troops likewise praised Napoleon using materials more durable than paper. One of their most surprising pastimes was the construction of monuments. The declaration of the Empire inspired a veritable building frenzy in which Napoleon’s military commanders sought to create the most spectacular monument in his honor. The Camp of Bruges boasted the highest number. Each of its regiments built its own small monument to Napoleon, and the camp’s second and third divisions raised two large ones.89 The Army of the Coasts of the Ocean and the Grande Armée built a variety of strucFrom the Coasts of the Ocean to the Snows of Poland

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tures, including triumphal arches, obelisks, pyramids, and earthen mounds topped with statuary. Some of the constructions were extremely elaborate. The soldiers of the 17th line infantry in the Camp of Bruges assembled a garden with two pyramids, a column with a bust of Napoleon, a fountain ornamented by shells “with style,” and two miniature fortresses complete with working artillery. During one of Napoleon’s visits, their cannons even fired a salvo in salute.90 By far, the most impressive monument was a massive pyramid in the Camp of Utrecht. Under the direction of General Marmont, the camp’s soldiers built it to the “glory of the Emperor and to the triumphs of our armies.” When completed, each side reached 150 feet high, and an obelisk 60 feet tall topped the pyramid. The four walls of the structure were composed of earth covered by sod, and bore a stone plaque with an inscription. The first stone tablet featured a dedication to Napoleon: “To the August Emperor of the French, Napoleon the First, Father of the People and the Army, from His Children at the Camp of Utrecht.” The second listed his victories. The third proclaimed the achievements of his government. The final plaque listed the names of the regiments, generals, and superior officers who had participated in the erection of the pyramid. Marmont also made sure that the common soldiers who did most of the work were not forgotten. He ordered a lead chest containing their names and an account of Napoleon’s deeds to be placed in a chamber inside the monument. Marmont’s troops started the pyramid on September 10, 1804, as part of a celebration for the distribution of the Legion of Honor. Perhaps because of their devotion to the emperor, they finished it in only thirty-three days.91 French troops not only built monuments to Napoleon; they swore oaths to him and habitually cheered him. After the creation of the Empire, all soldiers needed to perform the following oath of allegiance: “I swear obedience to the constitutions of the Empire and fidelity to the Emperor.” When the Empire was proclaimed in May of 1804, the Army of the Coasts and the Army of Hanover assembled their troops for large oath-taking ceremonies.92 Each new soldier who reported for duty and every newly promoted officer also pledged his loyalty to the emperor.93 Furthermore, French soldiers took an oath when they were inducted into the Legion of Honor, and vowed to defend the new eagle battle standards that Napoleon issued after his coronation.94 After oaths were given, it was common for the troops to yell, “Vive l’Empereur!” This expression became the rallying cry, the battle cry, and the most common cheer of the French army, replacing shouts of “Vive la Répub-

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Figure 2. Louis-Pierre Baltard, “Pyramid Raised to the August Emperor of the French Napoleon I by the Troops Camped in the Plain of Zeist Belonging to the French and Batavian Army Commanded by General-in-Chief Marmont,” engraving after a drawing by chef de bataillon Rouziès, circa 1804, from Collection de Vinck. Un siècle d’histoire de France par l’estampe, 1770-1870, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris. This pyramid, which was constructed at the Camp of Utrecht, was the most impressive monument built by French soldiers in honor of Napoleon’s accession to the Imperial throne. The animals and people wandering around its base highlight its massive size.

lique!” “Vive la Nation!” and “Vive la Constitution!” that had heartened the troops of the Republic. Military leaders encouraged the troops to adopt it by leading the cheers themselves. They even sometimes ordered their soldiers to greet Napoleon with “Vive l’Empereur!”95 The men who bellowed this cry also became intimately familiar with another type of ceremony: the review conducted by Napoleon. During his long military career, Napoleon spent more time reviewing his soldiers than he did leading them into battle. On these occasions, he inspected different units in the army, checked their equipment, spoke to their soldiers, put them through maneuvers, and quizzed their officers on their military knowledge.

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Reviews were grueling, and it was not uncommon for Napoleon to spend several hours with a single unit. The soldiers being examined thus stood in formation for hours at a time. The amount of preparation that Napoleon devoted to each review almost equaled the energy that he expended during the inspection. Before each one, he made sure that his subordinates provided him with the personnel records of the units to be seen, and that they pointed out men who had distinguished themselves or showed promise.96 Napoleon described his rationale and methods for conducting reviews in a letter to General Marmont. Before Marmont took command of the Camp of Utrecht, Napoleon advised, “Inspect the soldier often, and inspect him in detail. The first time that you arrive at the camp, place your troops in lines by battalions, and inspect the soldiers one by one for the next eight hours; receive their complaints, inspect their arms, and assure yourself that they lack nothing.” He further proposed, “There are a lot of advantages in making these reviews of seven to eight hours; it accustoms the soldier to remain under arms, proves to him that his commander will not succumb to idleness, and will occupy himself entirely with him [the soldier]; for the soldier, this is great cause for confidence.”97 Not all of the ceremonies performed by French troops concerned Napoleon. Some of them memorialized soldier-martyrs, heroic individuals who gave their lives to carry out their military duties. The Army of the Coasts preserved the memory of those who made the ultimate sacrifice in the physical layout of its camps. The streets of the camp at Ostende, which was part of the Camp of Bruges, bore the name of a “great man who died defending his patrie.”98 They had names such as Rue Desaix, Rue Kléber, Rue Hoche, Rue Joubert, and Rue La Tour d’Auvergne.99 The first four were named after famous generals. The latter referred to Théophile-Malo Corret de la Tour d’Auvergne, a legendary figure whose exploits during the French Revolutionary wars earned him the sobriquet, “First Grenadier of the Armies of the Republic.” After he was killed in the battle of Oberhausen, his regiment, the 46th line infantry, kept his heart in a silver urn.100 This unit formed part of the Camp of St. Omer and IV Corps of the Grande Armée, which were under the command of Marshal Soult. Almost every year, on the anniversary of La Tour d’Auvergne’s death, Soult organized a funeral service among his troops to venerate the famous soldier.101 The changing memory of the “First Grenadier of the Armies of the Republic” in the French army paralleled the evolution of Napoleonic military culture. He began as a Republican icon, but gradually metamorphosed into

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a symbol that evoked both selfless patriotism and an individualistic form of honor. Honor served as one of the foundations of sustaining motivation in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. Much like Napoleon himself, however, Napoleonic honor possessed multiple facets.

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Figure 3. V. Adam, “Distribution of the Crosses of the Legion of Honor at the Camp of Boulogne, 16 August 1804,” lithograph from Collection Michel Hennin. Estampes relatives à l’Histoire de France, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris.

2 Honneur, Gloire, et Patrie Honor in Napoleon’s Legions

It was a glorious day. Napoleon Bonaparte, the newly proclaimed emperor of France, stood upon a raised platform dressed in the blue-coated uniform of a colonel of foot grenadiers in the Imperial Guard. He gazed out over the densely packed ranks of approximately eighty thousand soldiers from the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean formed into an enormous semicircle. The sun gleamed off polished musket barrels and picked out silver and gold braiding on officers’ epaulettes and hats. The infantry presented a sturdy mass of blue and white, and the cavalry, especially the hussars with their exotic uniforms, added splashes of green, sky blue, and red. The troops stood in an open meadow just outside of Boulogne. The site was a natural amphitheater that overlooked the shores of the English Channel, and civilian spectators lined the surrounding hills. Coastal wind currents stirred the tricolor flags that decorated Napoleon’s platform. It also featured various military trophies wrested by the Republic’s armies from their enemies, and relics like the helmet and shield of the Chevalier Bayard that invoked France’s more distant military past. Bayard was a hero of the Italian Wars who was known as the perfect knight, “without fear and without reproach.” Surrounded by these powerful symbols, France’s newest hero, Napoleon, addressed the men assembled before him. Projecting his voice, he asked, “And you, soldiers, do you swear to defend, at the peril of your life, the honor of the French name, your patrie and your Emperor?” His audience roared back, “We swear it!” Cheers of “Vive l’Empereur!” then erupted throughout the amphitheater.1 This remarkable ceremony, which took place on August 16, 1804, was one of the grandest military festivals of Napoleon’s reign. The date was significant because it followed a day after the emperor’s birthday, and he intended the spectacle to coincide with the anniversary of his birth. Napoleon organized the festival primarily to distribute the medals of the Legion of Honor to the soldiers of the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean. In a number of important |

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respects, the fête at Boulogne inaugurated a new era while bringing an old one to an end. Linking himself to the French Revolution, Napoleon commemorated its accomplishments by rewarding its most devoted servants, the soldiers of the Republic, with the Legion of Honor. Yet even as France’s new ruler portrayed himself as the heir of the Revolution, he appeared to lead its seemingly interminable course to a successful conclusion. The ceremony at Boulogne announced to the army, and to France as a whole, that a new era was dawning. Henceforth, the emperor would preserve the gains of the Revolution while leading the patrie toward a new future, and its citizens would have a powerful new incentive to assist him in this endeavor, the Legion of Honor. Furthermore, Napoleon’s festival proclaimed to the men of the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean that the value system of the new regime would rest upon honor. While the army-of-honor thesis contends that honor and virtuous patriotism were incompatible, Napoleonic military culture combined them to produce effective models of sustaining motivation and combat motivation. The resulting synthesis, however, was far from seamless. There was not one, unitary Napoleonic honor. Rather, the military culture constructed in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée disseminated three distinct forms. One can be labeled “patriotic honor.” It obligated Napoleon’s troops to preserve the achievements of the French Revolution and identified service to the nation as the only way to acquire meaningful prestige. Another was a more traditional warrior honor that emphasized the pursuit of personal distinctions through warfare to enhance the reputation of the individual. The final type of honor was unit honor, or esprit de corps.

Military Honor under the Old Regime Honor occupied a privileged position in French history. While radicals committed to the Republic scorned and feared it, honor was often regarded as the principal attribute of French national character before and after the Revolution.2 It played an especially important role in the French military, where its history was both long and complex. Prior to 1789, honor defined the military culture of the Royal army. Its influence was particularly pronounced in the officer corps, where it served as the foundation of the value system that structured the lives and careers of its members. Like Napoleonic honor, the honor of the Royal army possessed multiple components, and it changed over time. At its core, the military honor of the Old Regime consisted of the officer’s sense of self-esteem and his need to establish and maintain his reputation 52

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among others. It was a sentiment that required the officer to be admired and respected by his peers, the men he commanded, and the general public. The officer’s public stature frequently determined his self-worth. To protect both, the officers of the king felt compelled to conform to a code of honor, a body of rules and standards that governed the acquisition and preservation of honor. The military’s honor code rested upon a warrior honor derived from the martial traditions of France’s nobility. This kind of honor encouraged the men who led the king’s soldiers to emulate heroes such as Bayard, and be both fearless and above reproach. Above all, it required French officers to display their bravery, audacity, and military skills through feats of arms. Over time, a code of refined conduct smoothed the coarse edges of these warlike standards. Mandating strict control over mind and body, it pressured officers to adapt to behavioral models that stressed politeness in interpersonal relations, the regulation of emotional displays, graceful comportment in physical activities, and even close attention to dress.3 The military honor of the Royal army likewise obligated the men of the officer corps to protect the weak and unfortunate. Officers believed that they were required to defend the reputation that they obtained through such actions. Honor was a personal possession as well as a sentiment and a code of conduct. An honorable reputation was a property that could be won and lost, and its loss shamed the individual unfortunate enough to be deprived of it. French officers attached so much value to their prestige that they resorted to deadly force to preserve it. When they thought that their honor had been violated, they fought duels to restore it. Although it seems like a tired cliché, the men who commanded the king’s troops did indeed fear dishonor more than death.4 French officers risked their lives to defend their reputation because most were nobles who regarded the obligations of the military honor code as an essential element of their gender, family, and corporate identity. The aristocracy considered honor to be a defining characteristic of the male noble and tended to identify itself as a warrior caste. Consequently, the nobles who dominated the officer corps of the Royal army faced strong pressures to adhere to the military’s honor code. The men who failed to meet its demanding standards risked being deemed unworthy of their aristocratic status. To prove their nobility, the officers of the king therefore sought to earn honor by distinguishing themselves on the battlefield and by showing their courage and martial prowess in duels.5 French kings such as Louis XIV tried to suppress dueling because it deprived them of precious servants. Although the monarchy failed in this endeavor, military honor ensured that the swords Honneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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of noble officers would be wielded against the enemies of the crown as well as their peers. The foundations of the Royal government rested upon a relationship between the French nobility and the king that was established during the Middle Ages. The nobles willingly served the crown in exchange for rewards, or honors, that gave them a privileged position in the social order. The Absolutist rulers of France persuaded aristocrats to wage war by offering them an array of incentives, including noble titles, officer commissions, and higher ranks within the military.6 They also issued honorary distinctions such as admission to royal orders like the Order of Saint Louis, whose members received a medal in the form of a four-pointed cross hung from a red ribbon, and a sizeable pension. Such awards performed an essential function in the military culture of the Royal army. On the one hand, they satisfied the demands that military honor imposed upon the officer corps. Royal rewards conferred the prestige that honor required; they constituted a visible and public sign that announced that the officer had met the standards of the military’s honor code, and deserved the respect of others. The king’s honors therefore bestowed the honor that men in the officer corps cherished, and proved to others that they were honorable. On the other hand, recompenses dispensed by the monarchy furthered the interests of the Royal government by motivating French officers to engage in activities that achieved the crown’s military goals. As the brilliant Montesquieu ascertained, they bound the monarchy and noble officers tightly together with the cement of honor: “Honor sets all the parts of the body politic in motion, and by its very action connects them; thus each individual advances the public good, while he only thinks of promoting his own interest.”7 Thus far, the form of honor that existed in the Royal army bears a strong resemblance to the one that appears in the army-of-honor thesis. This interpretation, however, mistakenly assumes that military honor remained static. As the French monarchy evolved, it modified honor to make it compatible with its needs. The rulers of France responded to the profound military and political changes of the early modern era by introducing a series of reforms that altered the size, composition, and character of their army. By the late seventeenth century, the Bourbon dynasty and its war ministers turned the Royal army from a motley collection of foreign mercenary units, private military forces raised by nobles, and household troops into a massive standing army composed of standardized regiments that were recruited, supplied, and controlled by the crown.8 Under the Bourbons, traditional martial virtues like courage and boldness were still prized. The improved Royal army, however, created a demand for 54

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additional talents. The men who led it not only had to be brave; they had to be loyal and diligent. They likewise had to possess organizational, financial, and tactical skills to make sure that their soldiers were ready and able to perform the services demanded by the king. Louis XIV, his military administrators, and military theorists who supported them endeavored to cultivate these abilities in the officer corps by incorporating a culture of service into French military honor. This innovation established a new honor code that combined traditional warrior values with a service ethic.9 The service culture of the Sun King rested on the premise that valiant deeds should be honored, but that they should also contribute to the common good and the welfare of the state. Moreover, it portrayed experience, administrative abilities, and obedience to the monarch as traits worthy of esteem. Honor survived the death of the Sun King and continued to evolve. The educational system of eighteenth-century France, including Royal military schools, reinforced the link between honor and service in the officer corps through a curriculum stressing classical studies. French officers were raised on a steady diet of literature and history about ancient Greece and Rome that celebrated the virtues and achievements of prominent figures from antiquity such as Quinctius Cincinnatus, Cicero, and Julius Caesar. This upbringing taught them that truly exceptional individuals who used their talents to serve the state could attain high positions and secure lasting fame.10 Classical models exerted more and more influence over French honor as the eighteenth century progressed. Shocked by the poor performance of the French military in conflicts like the Seven Years’ War and inspired by the Enlightenment, a group of military reformers engaged in a thoroughgoing examination of the Royal army’s deficiencies, and proposed ambitious solutions to remedy them. One of the key problems identified by this movement was French honor itself. The honor code that coalesced in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century formed an unstable mixture that never fully synthesized warrior honor and the service culture of the Absolutist state. The noblemen who officered the Royal army learned to take pride in their administrative duties, but they remained obsessed with their reputation and the need to distinguish themselves in combat, even if it meant disobeying the king to fight duels. This component of self-interest came under increasing attack in the eighteenth century. A group of “patriot writers” composed of military reformers and intellectuals blamed the decline of French power on the selfish honor of noble courtiers and rich bourgeoisie who purchased officer commissions. These individuals, according to their critics, obtained positions in the officer corps to enhance their status and failed to properly Honneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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devote themselves to the métier of arms. The army, the reformers charged, then suffered because it was commanded by men who lacked the inclination and skills to lead it to victory.11 To restore France’s military prowess, the patriot writers proposed that it was necessary to transform the country into a patrie, or patriotic homeland, that would be sustained by a new, patriotic honor.12 Their writings surfaced after the death of Louis XIV and generated a movement that gained momentum in the decades that followed. This movement provoked a vigorous debate among elites about the ways in which a spirit of patriotism should be developed in France. The source of inspiration for this patriotism was the concept of virtue that existed among the Greeks and Romans, “a selfless devotion to the political community at large.”13 However, since virtue seemed incompatible with the French character and monarchy, patriot writers decided that honor, which was considered more French, would be more likely to accomplish their goals. They proposed that the best means to cultivate devotion to the patrie would be to replace traditional forms of honor with a true or pure kind in which the individual would only be esteemed for actions that benefited the public good. If the reformers had their way, the service culture that emerged under Louis XIV would define French military honor. Furthermore, while conservatives in the nobility maintained that only noblemen possessed the honor necessary for genuine patriotism, the attribute began to escape the confines of the aristocracy. More and more writers appropriated honor for all French men, claiming that it was not just an aristocratic trait but a French one. Such ideas even led reformers like the army officer Joseph Servan de Gerbey to publish elaborate plans that envisioned using schools and the army to cultivate honor among the entire male population.14 These sorts of projects sparked intense discussions, but the will and resources to make them official policy did not exist before the Revolution. These attempts to redefine military honor were paralleled by changes in another martial virtue, glory. As with honor, the aristocratic officers of the Royal army yearned for glory. It was the renown that derived from extraordinary abilities and achievements.15 In the masterwork of the Enlightenment, the Encyclopédie, Voltaire defined it as “reputation united with esteem; it is at its height when admiration is added. It always implies brilliant things, in actions, in virtues, in talents, & always great difficulties surmounted.”16 The similarities between honor and glory are obvious, for both involved the individual’s reputation. They were also considered masculine attributes that belonged to the French nobleman, and winning glory constituted an important component of the army’s honor code. Yet, even though glory 56

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often accompanied honor, it was not synonymous with it. Both traits could be obtained in different ways and differed in magnitude. Glory could only be attained through exceptional accomplishments whereas honor could be secured through more mundane means such as honest conduct, loyal service to one’s superiors, and professional competence. Moreover, glory always bestowed honor upon the individual; in fact, it conferred the highest form of honor. As Voltaire’s definition clearly indicates, however, the same cannot be said of the reverse. Since glory functioned as a source of military motivation, it too attracted the attention of reformers. They supplemented their patriotic vision of honor with a civic-minded glory. A second entry for “glory” in the Encyclopédie illustrates this trend.17 The author of the section, Jean-François Marmontel, addressed the military dimensions of glory. According to him, “there is no glory comparable to that of warriors . . . the profession of arms has to be the most honorable, as it is the most perilous.”18 Yet Marmontel characterized the military glory that was achieved through the pursuit of personal ambitions as “false glory.” The deeds of conquerors who led “twenty thousand men in the hope of plunder  .  .  . to carnage” represented a “true marvel” but were “disastrous” because they were one of the causes of humanity’s “miseries.” Rejecting such “barbaric glory,” Marmontel explained that “true glory” consisted of “pleasant marvels . . . useful to the world.”19 He proposed that the most valuable type of glory was earned through actions that sacrificed personal interests for the public good. When most French officers contemplated the meaning of glory and honor, they normally reserved these attributes for themselves. The leadership of the Royal army presumed that the rank and file, who were generally recruited from the poor and the unemployed, lacked the moral and intellectual qualities necessary to appreciate such lofty virtues. Due to the military authorities’ low opinion of their workforce, they assumed that common soldiers would only respond to appeals to more basic human instincts. Accordingly, the Royal army created a motivational system that combined discipline, paternalism, and esprit de corps. Similar to Frederick the Great, who famously wanted his men to fear their officers more than the enemy, the aristocratic leaders of the French army believed that drill and punishment offered the best methods to transform their country’s wretched refuse into obedient soldiers. The Comte de Saint-Germain, who was the French minister of war from 1775 to 1777, expressed this perception, proposing, “We must turn to military discipline as the means of purifying this corrupt mass, of shaping it and making it useful.”20 With this goal in mind, Honneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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the individuals who commanded the king’s soldiers relied on continuous training and the threat of chastisement to convince them to perform their military duties. In addition to rigorous discipline, the Royal army offered its troops services that were designed to foster loyalty to the monarchy. As the Absolutist state exercised increasing control over the conduct of war, the possibility of amassing a fortune through plunder, which traditionally functioned as a leading incentive to enlist, declined dramatically. Furthermore, pay rates in the Royal army remained dismal, rendering the military one of the lowestpaid occupations in France.21 The monarchy compensated by providing common soldiers with a more secure existence. It developed an efficient military administration that supplied the troops with regular pay and basic necessities like food and clothing. The Royal government also organized a system of medical care to heal the sick and wounded, secured favorable treatment for soldiers who became prisoners, and orchestrated their release. Finally, it furnished aid to veterans who were too old or incapacitated to work, granting them pensions and the opportunity to reside in frontier fortresses and the famous Hôtel des Invalides at the state’s expense. While the rank and file still faced numerous hardships, these paternalistic measures did protect them from some of the vicissitudes of military life. In addition, they encouraged common soldiers to serve the monarch by demonstrating that he valued them and looked after their well-being.22 The benefits given to the army appear to have achieved this goal, for the soldiers of the Old Regime did possess a strong attachment to the king.23 Esprit de corps constituted a third source of motivation. It referred to the soldier’s devotion to his military unit, which in the Old Regime was normally the regiment. Esprit de corps, however, meant more than simple unit cohesion. It also involved the honor of the unit. Since most aristocratic officers considered their troops to be incapable of possessing the qualities that motivated them, they encouraged their men to identify with their regiment. The regiment became a kind of family that obligated its members to uphold its reputation as well as defend one another. Regimental pride was reinforced by unique flags that every regiment carried, different facing colors on uniforms, ranks and privileges held by particular units, and special rallying cries.24 Esprit de corps gained in importance over the eighteenth century. Military reformers such as the Comte d’Argenson advised French officers to treat their men more humanely and establish personal relationships with them to strengthen the group loyalties that were so essential to success in combat.25 58

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Honor and the French Revolution Even though traditional martial values like esprit de corps and honor began to assume more enlightened forms, they came under sustained attack during the French Revolution. Soon after the Revolution began, the French government provoked a series of wars in which it found itself desperately trying to defend itself from a powerful coalition of European states. The multiple threats that Revolutionary France faced forced it to undertake a radical restructuring of the French army. As its leaders endeavored to transform the military, they considered both honor and esprit de corps to be incompatible with their vision of the French soldier, and as potential dangers to the Revolution. Because esprit de corps bound men to their units rather than the common good, and because traditional warrior honor valued personal interests over devotion to the French people, they feared that continued reliance on these forms of motivation might produce military units who could be persuaded to defect to the counterrevolution. Accordingly, the Revolutionaries tried to purge these traditional martial values from the army and to replace them with virtue, the intense patriotism that the patriot writers of the Old Regime rejected. The focus of Revolutionary virtue was the patrie, the fatherland of France and the citizens who belonged to it, and political entities like the Republic that represented it. The most sweeping measure adopted to prevent esprit de corps was the amalgame, a reorganization of the army that combined Revolutionary volunteers and soldiers from the Royal army into new units called “demi-brigades,” which took the place of the king’s regiments.26 Furthermore, Revolutionary leaders discouraged unit loyalties by imbuing their armies with a new spirit of fraternity that stressed the bonds of brotherhood that united all Frenchmen instead of the ties that bound soldiers to particular military formations.27 Honor was despised for its aristocratic qualities and its ability to create social distinctions that might result in the reestablishment of the nobility. Maximilien Robespierre, the dominant figure in the Republic from 1793 to 1794, launched a frontal assault on it in his speeches. Honor, he argued, “supposes neither love of the patrie nor respect for humanity nor fidelity to the most sacred duties of the citizen.”28 The Revolutionary government attempted to remove it from the army by altering the rewards that were granted to military personnel. Awards that were believed to distinguish individuals, which in the minds of the Revolutionaries smacked of “feudalism and aristocracy,” disappeared from French military culture.29 Initially, the authorities encouraged the recipients of the Order of St. Louis to relinquish their medals. In 1793, the National ConvenHonneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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tion went further, decreeing that the holders of all royal military orders were required to surrender their decorations or be treated as suspects.30 Rather than recognize individual soldiers, the Republic usually offered rewards in the form of official declarations or monuments that honored entire armies or the French soldier in general. Illustrating these tendencies perfectly, the highest military award bestowed by the Republic was a proclamation in the name of the French people that announced that a particular army “deserved well of the patrie.”31 The campaign to eradicate the martial values of the Old Regime abated after 1794. After the fall of Robespierre’s government, the Directory frequently neglected the army. The absence of support or interference from the central government allowed, and even required, army commanders to develop their own methods for motivating their troops. French generals like Bonaparte therefore resorted to more traditional forms of military motivation. The military commanders of the Republic still appealed to the patriotism of their men. However, they increasingly supplemented patriotism with honor and esprit de corps. In the later years of the Directory, army commanders began to reward their personnel with decorated military items such as weapons and musical instruments. The Directory initiated this practice in 1797 to revive flagging patriotism in France.32 It gave out few such items, though; it was the generals who tended to make use of them. General Bonaparte in particular recognized their utility. During his Italian campaign, he distributed a hundred sabers bearing the slogan, “Liberty, the French Republic, Equality,” to the most deserving soldiers in his army. While these recompenses linked the soldier’s deeds to the cause of the Revolution, they differed from earlier rewards in that they honored the achievements of specific individuals. During the Consulate, the military items awarded under the Directory received the designation “Arms of Honor,” a move that openly acknowledged that their purpose was to appeal to the military’s sense of honor.33 The restoration of this sentiment intensified once Napoleon took charge of the French government. To secure both his own position and a promising future for France, he desired to bring the Revolution to a close and reconstitute French society on a new basis to provide stability and prosperity. Honor played a central role in these plans. Napoleon was educated in military schools and spent most of his life in the army. He believed that the qualities that he had acquired in the military were the source of his own accomplishments and had produced the great military victories during the Revolution that allowed France to regain its rightful position of power and grandeur. Napoleon therefore chose to rebuild the country using honor, the quintessential military virtue, as the foundation.34 60

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His understanding of French honor was shaped by his upbringing in the Old Regime, and he identified it as the traditional warrior honor of the nobility. Napoleon believed that Frenchmen were vain and possessed an intrinsic need to distinguish themselves. This compulsion manifested itself in their urge to demonstrate their bravery and martial talents in war. In his famous address to the Council of State about the use of “baubles” as a leadership tool, he revealed his thoughts about honor. Napoleon asserted, “I do not believe that the French people love liberty and equality; the French are not at all changed by ten years of revolution; they are like the Gauls were, proud and reckless. They have only one sentiment, honor: it is therefore necessary to nourish this sentiment, they need distinctions.”35 Continuing, he claimed that honor was responsible for the military achievements of the past: “The armies of the Republic did great things because they were composed of the sons of peasants and good farmers, and not the rabble; because the officers took the place of those of the Old Regime, but also for the sentiment of honor. It was for the same principle that the armies of Louis XIV did great things.”36 In the aftermath of a revolution founded upon egalitarianism, Napoleon recognized that these ideas were controversial and admitted, “I would not say this to a Tribune, but in a council of the wise and men of state, you need to say everything.”37

The Patriotic Honor of Napoleon’s Legion Napoleon’s beliefs about the utility and value of honor led him to create the Legion of Honor, the primary instrument through which he instilled honor in both the military and the civilian population of France. The Consulate established it through the Loi portant création d’une Légion d’honneur, which was passed on 29 floréal, year X (May 19, 1802). The purpose of the institution was to recompense soldiers and civilians who “rendered major services to the state” during the French Revolution and to compensate citizens whose military deeds, long military careers, and activities in “legislative functions, diplomacy, administration, justice, or the sciences” furthered the interests of the French state.38 The award replaced Arms of Honor, and the men who won them automatically received the Legion of Honor. The Legion assigned its members to cohorts, which were located in different geographical regions, and provided them with a stipend that differed according to their rank. Ranks ascended from legionnaire to the positions of officer, commander, and grand officer. Each cohort received an allotment of biens nationaux to pay the stipends of its members and fund services that were offered to them, Honneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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including the right to reside in special hospices when they “found themselves in need.”39 Biens nationaux were “national properties” that were appropriated by the French government during the Revolution from the church and nobles who fled France. Before individuals gained admission to the Legion of Honor, they were required to take an oath, which changed when Napoleon was declared emperor. After the Empire was established, all legionnaires pledged this vow: I swear on my honor to devote myself to the service of the Empire, and to the conservation of its territory in its integrity; to the defense of the Emperor, to the laws of the Republic and the properties that consecrated it; to combat by all the means that justice, reason, and the laws authorize, any enterprise that endeavors to reestablish the feudal regime; finally, I swear to contribute with all of my power to the maintenance of liberty and equality, the principal bases of our Constitutions.40

As a reminder to the legionnaires of their obligations to the emperor, they were granted a medal that bore his visage. These medals are more frequently identified with the Legion of Honor than its institutional apparatus, but they did not become an official part of it until 1804. Shortly after the creation of the Empire, Napoleon decreed that all individuals who earned the award would be given a decoration consisting of a white, five-pointed cross surrounded by a crown of oak and laurel. It was to be worn on a red ribbon, and its face featured Napoleon’s profile and the inscription “Napoléon, Empereur des Français.” The reverse side contained an eagle grasping lightning in its talons, and the motto “Honneur et Patrie.”41 These decorations were often referred to as “the cross” or “eagles” because of their shape and ornamentation. From its creation until the close of 1808, the Legion of Honor grew from approximately six thousand members to more than twenty thousand. Although individuals outside of the army obtained it, soldiers dominated its membership, with less than 10 percent of legionnaires coming from the civilian population.42 The award was therefore associated with the military, where it functioned as a key component of Napoleonic military culture. The first occasion in which French troops were publicly enrolled in the Legion of Honor occurred in August of 1803 when General Jean Andoche Junot assembled his soldiers to take its oath before the judges of the Paris court of appeals. A year later, its medals were awarded in the camps of the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean and the Army of Hanover in awards ceremonies like the one described at the beginning of this chapter. After this initial distribu62

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tion, the troops were issued their decorations on special occasions such as official fêtes and during Napoleon’s reviews. In the latter case, French soldiers might be granted the cross by requesting it from the emperor and defending their claims to it, or if their officers presented them to Napoleon for exemplary service. Most grognards, though, received their decorations through a different process. Following a battle or campaign, Napoleon normally allotted a number of positions in the Legion to particular units, military formations, or branches of service. For example, after the Peace of Tilsit, Napoleon gave I Corps 200 medals, III Corps 320, IV Corps 320, V Corps 200, VI Corps 320, and VIII Corps 150.43 The crosses were then divided among the officers and the soldiers, with half going to the officers and half to NCOs and the rank and file. The army’s leadership then consulted their subordinates and compiled lists of individuals judged deserving of the award. These lists were submitted to Marshal Berthier, who in turn provided them to the emperor for his approval. Once a soldier or officer was formally made a legionnaire by the emperor, the grand chancellor of the Legion of Honor sent him a certificate that announced his new status, and authorized him to wear the cross once he took the oath. Napoleon’s troops received their crosses on different occasions in a variety of settings. Most members of the Army of the Coasts and the Army of Hanover were awarded their medals in the festivals that took place in 1804 and 1805. In the Grande Armée, many soldiers acquired their decoration from the emperor himself during reviews that he held in foreign capitals.44 Napoleon also often bestowed the Legion of Honor in less formal encounters with his men while on campaign.45 Individuals who were not so fortunate probably had to wait for their medals to be transported to the army and were then issued them in ceremonies organized within their regiments. On these occasions, new legionnaires were decorated “in the name of the Emperor” in the presence of their units.46 Their commanding officers probably delivered a brief speech, and the recipient of the reward would have sworn the Legion’s oath.47 Some of the men honored in this manner had to settle for a ribbon, for it was not unusual for the certificates of the Legion to arrive in the army accompanied by a red ribbon, but missing the cross.48 The Legion of Honor was most often awarded for displays of bravery in combat. It was so much identified with courage in battle that Napoleon and his grognards referred to it as “the mark of the brave,” “the star of the brave,” and “the sign of fine deeds.”49 The law that established the Legion decreed that a soldier could become a member after twenty-five years of service durHonneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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ing peacetime. In times of war, exceptional feats of arms, which were known as actions d’éclat, constituted the primary means by which soldiers earned admission.50 Although the law did not define actions d’éclat, the decree that institutionalized Arms of Honor listed certain deeds that illustrate what the term meant. They included capturing a superior officer or a flag from the enemy, arriving first to seize an enemy cannon, aiming a cannon so that its effect was maximized, and other actions of “extraordinary valor.”51 The orders and decrees issued by Napoleon and his military commanders emphasized the need for soldiers to perform these kinds of feats in order to obtain the Legion. They typically instructed their subordinates to propose soldiers and officers for the Legion who merited the award because of their “distinguished or remarkable actions” or who had “distinguished themselves by their courage and their good conduct.”52 These directives also frequently required superior officers to justify their nominations by attaching reports that described the “traits of bravery by which” individuals “distinguished themselves.”53 Although courage remained the dominant factor in admission to the Legion of Honor, other criteria applied. Another nickname for the “star of the brave” was the “cross of merit.”54 By encouraging merit, the Napoleonic regime preserved the service culture that it inherited from the Royal army’s honor code. This quality encompassed exceptional exploits, but it likewise referred to lengthy service, good conduct, attention to duty, and the endurance of suffering. Requests for the Legion often listed a long career as an important reason for a soldier’s nomination.55 In Napoleon’s correspondence with his chief of staff, he complained that too many young men with only one year in the army were being proposed, indicating that considerations of seniority affected the selection of legionnaires.56 Sometimes, however, the Legion of Honor was given instead of a promotion if an officer did not have enough years in the army or in his rank to merit advancement.57 Along with seniority, distinguished conduct, propriety, and conceptions of duty played a role in admission. The correspondence of Claude-Antoine Préval, the colonel of the 3rd cuirassiers, is particularly revealing in this regard. In Préval’s orders and letters, he repeatedly explained that his choices for the Legion of Honor were strongly influenced by considerations of an individual’s devotion to duty and moral character. When he informed one of his NCOs of his nomination, Préval wrote, “I have to tell you that it is not only the reward for your courage, but that it is also for the zeal and the honesty that you employ in the conduct of your post.”58 The Legion of Honor was also used as a form of compensation for soldiers who were wounded or maimed in Napoleon’s service. Napoleon issued a decree in 1805 that increased its size by two thou64

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sand members, but specified that the new legionnaires were to be chosen from among soldiers and officers who “distinguished themselves in war” and received “at least one wound.”59 Whatever they did to obtain it, the men who served in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée coveted the Legion of Honor. Yet what kind of honor did it confer? For scholars who support the army-of-honor thesis, the award represented the return of aristocratic honor to French military culture. It was controversial even in Napoleon’s time, and many of his contemporaries viewed it with suspicion. General Moreau, one of Napoleon’s rivals, famously mocked the reward’s pretensions, rewarding his cook with “a casserole of honor.”60 It is impossible to deny that the award appealed to the innate sense of honor that Napoleon believed his soldiers possessed, or that it was designed to stimulate a desire for personal distinction in the armies of the Consulate and the Empire. Napoleon openly admitted these intentions in his defense of the institution before the Council of State. However, the French leader and his supporters used the Legion of Honor to disseminate a new, patriotic form of honor defined by a commitment to preserve the accomplishments of the Revolution and loyal service to the patrie.61 Napoleon was exposed to the ideas of the military reformers of the eighteenth century in the military academies where he was educated and in the social, cultural, and professional milieus that he inhabited after he graduated.62 Possibly because of their influence, he transformed what he regarded as the vain French honor of the Old Regime into a more virtuous honor, and employed it to bind French soldiers and civilians to the new order that emerged out of the Revolution. Fearing that the individualism and greed unleashed by the Revolution would destabilize France, Napoleon viewed the Legion of Honor as a means to create a large body of supporters dedicated to the preservation of his government and the positive changes wrought by the Revolution.63 Resting on the sentiment that defined the French character, the Legion of Honor would function, in his words, as one of the “masses of granite” that would solidify the fragile state and society that arose under his leadership.64 It would achieve this goal by promising prestige, improved social status, and a degree of material security to individuals who devoted themselves to the Napoleonic regime and promoted its values. The latter included some of the Revolution’s most sacred principles and achievements. Against the advice of his more cautious advisors, Napoleon himself made sure that the Legion’s oath required legionnaires to “to combat . . . any enterprise that endeavors to reestablish the feudal regime” and to defend “the properties Honneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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that consecrated” the Republic.65 These properties were the biens nationaux, which meant that legionnaires vowed to protect one of the most ambitious social programs of the French Revolution. The Legion of Honor likewise enshrined the Revolution’s egalitarianism. Individuals admitted to its ranks swore to “contribute with all of my power to the maintenance of liberty and equality,” and the award itself became a symbol of equality. In contrast to the royal orders of the Old Regime, Napoleon opened it to all men, regardless of their social or military rank. Napoleonic honor may have appealed to the self-interest of French soldiers, but it was also an honor that obligated them to conserve the gains of the French Revolution. In addition, it was an honor that any Frenchman could obtain. Perhaps most surprising, the Legion of Honor kept virtue alive in Napoleonic military culture. “Honor and patrie”—its motto was graven on every medal and signified that honor and patriotism were not only compatible but inseparable. Every member of the Legion also took an oath to serve the patrie by devoting himself to “the service of the Empire” and “to the defense of the Emperor” who led it and represented its interests. While the virtuous side of the award waned in the last few years of the Empire, Napoleon and his supporters initially created the award to cultivate patriotism. They expressed this intention in their efforts to pass the legislation that founded the Legion of Honor. In 1802, different members of Napoleon’s government gave speeches in the Tribunate and the Legislative Corps, the deliberative and legislative assemblies of the Consulate, respectively. Their goal was to convince these legislatures to vote for it. The orations specifically addressed the purpose of the Legion of Honor and the role it would play in the French army. Significantly, the arguments put forward did not simply reflect the views of civilian politicians. Among those who argued in favor of the Legion were General Marmont and General Mathieu Dumas, both of whom would hold leadership positions in the Army of the Coasts and the Grande Armée. The civilian spokesmen included Lucien Bonaparte, Counselor of State Pierre Louis Roederer, and the tribunes Jean-Baptiste Maximilien Villot de Fréville, Henri de Carrion-Nizas, and Stanislaus de Girardin. Although these individuals discussed the potential effects of the Legion of Honor upon civilians, they devoted greater attention to its military applications. Similar to Napoleon, they proposed that the French were distinguished by honor, and described it as the need to be esteemed by others. Providing the most elaborate definition, Freville characterized it as “this noble and powerful impulse . . . the desire to be received with esteem, honored by respect, made famous by glory,” and “the need to obtain a distinguished place 66

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in the opinion of those with whom one fights, and still more, those to whom one devotes oneself.”66 The first consul’s collaborators countered objections to the Legion of Honor by arguing that it was necessary to compensate the soldiers of the Revolution and to preserve virtue in the army. The Constitution of the year VIII, which founded the Consulate, promised to establish “national rewards” for “the warriors who rendered remarkable services while fighting for the Republic.”67 The government’s spokesmen maintained that the Legion of Honor simply fulfilled this promise, and that an “honorable recompense” was the only suitable way to “repay the nation’s debt to the army.”68 Moreover, such a reward not only expressed France’s gratitude for past services but would inspire actions that would benefit the nation in the future. The Legion’s defenders conceded that the ideal French soldier would be content with virtue itself, but contended that virtue for its own sake was incapable of motivating most men. A soldier himself, Dumas assured, “Virtue alone is not, for common men, a sufficient reward for virtue.”69 It was therefore essential to give French soldiers an incentive to serve the patrie. The Legion of Honor, a “double temple to honor and virtue,” would provide it.70 The orators who supported the recompense claimed that the “lure of a reward of honor” would motivate the nation’s youth to enlist in the army and encourage France’s troops to perform brave deeds that advanced the public interest.71 Marmont, for instance, imagined soldiers challenging others to follow their example: “This decoration of honor, this flattering sign of my services, is the reward for the blood I shed for the patrie, of the long watches that I devoted to it. . . . Let he who wants it purchase it at the same price, and he will obtain it!”72 To calm the fears of their opponents, Napoleon’s speakers stressed that the honor that accompanied the Legion was not the egotistical honor of the past, which Roederer condemned as the “honor of the court, the honor of caste, the honor of [social] corps.”73 It was a new honor that arose out of the Revolution, a “republican honor” and a “national honor” that strengthened France. According to Roederer, the first consul’s award would employ this constructive honor, “this passion of the French,” to foster virtue and “fix the bond that must unite citizens to the patrie.”74 Honor was not opposed to virtue. For Napoleon and his supporters, much like the patriot writers of the eighteenth century, it was an improved and more French version of the latter. These ideas extended beyond political circles, for French military commanders communicated similar messages to the soldiery. The most eloquent commentary was delivered by Marshal Davout. Napoleon’s most skilled marshal awarded the troops in the Camp of Bruges their medals on July 24, Honneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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1804. Before he handed them out, Davout gave a speech.75 Admitting that the Legion of Honor was intended to appeal to his soldiers’ enthusiasm for glory and personal distinctions, he explained that Napoleon formed it “to eternalize your glory.” Davout also proposed that the honor of winning the Legion’s cross should motivate his troops, praising it as “this sign of honor which will be the greatest of stimulants for all French soldiers.” Yet, like the individuals who helped Napoleon to create the award, Davout portrayed it as a means to preserve the ideals of the French Revolution: “Our Emperor Napoleon has, by this institution, assured and guaranteed to our descendants this true liberty, this equality, for which you fought so many combats and made so many generous sacrifices.” Forging another link between the Legion of Honor and the Revolution, he proclaimed that the Legion’s honor rested upon individual merit and patriotism rather than aristocratic privilege. “Yes soldiers!” he declared. “Under the reign of Napoleon, there will be no other titles except those [obtained] from personal services rendered to the patrie, no other source of renown than that of national gratitude, and no other distinction than that of honor between citizens of all ranks and all professions in the French Empire.” Davout developed this theme further by claiming that while the Legion offered French soldiers honor and glory, it did so to maintain virtue. Reminiscent of Roederer, he stated that Napoleon founded it “to bind more intimately to the patrie all of the soldiers and citizens who merited this honorable reward.” The transformation of French military honor that began in the seventeenth century was complete. Through the Legion of Honor, and with the help of the French Revolution, Napoleon succeeded in realizing the dreams of the patriot writers. More than any ruler before him, he harnessed French honor to the public good and the needs of the state. Eventually, however, the emperor proceeded to cut the bonds that Davout and others used to tie the Legion of Honor to virtue. Its medals would continue to bear the inscription “Honor and patrie” throughout the Empire. In 1809, however, he transformed the Legion from an institution into a simple, personal reward. He removed the administrative functions of its cohorts and sold off their properties.76 More importantly, two years later, Napoleon composed a new oath that abandoned the previous commitment to liberty, equality, and the social programs of the Revolutionaries. In it, legionnaires still pledged to serve the Empire, but they swore first and foremost to devote themselves to Napoleon and his family: I swear to be loyal to the Emperor and to his dynasty; I promise on my honor to devote myself to his service, to the defense of his person, and to 68

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the conservation of the territory of the Empire in its integrity; to attend no council or gathering contrary to the tranquility of the state; to warn His Majesty of all that which would conspire, to my knowledge, against his honor, his safety, or the welfare of the Empire.77

With this change, honor would henceforth be based on fidelity to the emperor.

Glory and Warrior Honor under Napoleon Despite the Napoleonic regime’s best efforts to reconcile honor and virtue, contemporaries recognized that tensions existed between them, and that the self-interest inherent in the former might subvert the selflessness required by the latter. To avoid this possibility, popular literature from the Consulate and the Empire continuously reminded its audience that true honor and glory came from service to the patrie. Printed works that addressed the subject of military honor also counseled their audiences to resist the temptation to seek prestige solely for personal aggrandizement. One of the best examples appeared in the book Les devoirs d’un guerrier, ou Instructions d’un père à son fils sur la profession militaire, which was published in 1808. The work, which was written by François Martin, took the form of a father’s advice to his son about a career in the military. Instructing his son about the value of glory, the father advised, “Under skillful leaders, the military career was always glorious for the French. Let this desire for glory animate all of your actions; let it unceasingly occupy your thoughts; let it trouble even your sleep. Without glory, existence has no worth.” He continued by associating the purest form of glory with devotion to the patrie: “Never forget that it is the patrie that confers honor in the Temple of Memory, and that it only gives a place there to those who serve it well.”78 In addition, Les devoirs d’un guerrier characterized honor and glory that were pursued only for individual fulfillment as “false” or “base,” and warned that they were to be avoided. Martin explained, “true bravery does not know interest: a vice so base is incompatible with the sentiments of honor that guide all of its actions.”79 This book and others like it may have claimed that there was one true form of honor, but their arguments implicitly acknowledged the existence of a less altruistic kind. Martin’s concerns about false honor were justified, for the warrior honor that occupied such a prominent place in the history of the French army persisted in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. It was especially prominent in the Napoleonic regime’s Honneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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reliance on glory to motivate its soldiers. Glory suffused the French army’s military culture between 1803 and 1808. It appeared more frequently than virtually any other motif, including honor and the patrie. The ubiquity of glory, in part, reflected Napoleon’s obsession with it. He was fascinated by military heroes like Alexander the Great whose extraordinary talents and abilities allowed them to shape the course of history. Napoleon’s achievements during the Italian campaign convinced him that he was one of these unique individuals, generating a powerful drive for glory at the heart of his character that led him to pursue endeavors that would earn him a preeminent place in human memory.80 This preoccupation was not unique; a general enthusiasm for glory also existed among French elites.81 Napoleon shared this passion for glory with his troops, and instructed his officials to do so as well.82 These efforts produced military songs that continuously celebrated the grognard’s need for glory. They described French troops as “[o]ur heroes, lovers of glory” and as “daring warriors” who “breathe only for glory.”83 The monuments built by and for Napoleon’s men likewise informed them that they were supposed to cherish glory. The 51st regiment of infantry constructed a pyramid featuring a sundial with the inscription, “every hour of the soldier belongs to glory.”84 In addition, military glory remained one of the predominant themes in the rhetoric employed in the armies of the Consulate and the Empire. Before General Marmont awarded the Legion of Honor in the Camp of Utrecht, he gave a speech assuring his troops that those who had not yet received the award would “one day receive a similar honor.” The only proof that he needed was their “love of glory.”85 Napoleon’s proclamations breathed the same glory as the soldiery. In 1808, he issued one that invoked their desire for glory by challenging them to win still more in Spain: “Soldiers, you surpassed the renown of modern armies; but have you equaled the glory of the armies of Rome, who, in the same campaign, triumphed on the Rhine and on the Euphrates, in Illyria and on the Tagus?”86 The awards that anchored the foundations of Napoleonic military culture also encouraged this quest to eclipse the glory of armies past and present. Several recompenses honored soldiers for lengthy service. However, the individuals who were the most likely to receive rewards, and the most valued rewards, were the men who distinguished themselves in combat. The Legion of Honor was normally awarded for actions d’éclat. Brave deeds also granted easier access to higher ranks. Napoleon preferred his troops to be led by educated officers from notable families and slowed the ascent through the command structure in the interests of professionalism. Yet, in the promo70

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tions that the emperor made after battles, he displayed a marked preference for individuals who demonstrated their courage and military prowess on the battlefield. He and his general staff also regularly instructed the army’s leadership to present individuals to him with impressive combat records, and to report actions d’éclat in their lists of nominations for advancement.87 Through exceptional martial exploits, men who lacked the required length of service, an influential patron, education, or the desired social background could win their way to a better position. The experience of Jean-Baptiste Guindey illustrates this practice. He was an NCO in the 10th hussars who killed Prince Louis-Ferdinand of Prussia at the battle of Saalfeld. Upon learning of this accomplishment, Napoleon personally gave him a commission as a second lieutenant and the Legion of Honor.88 Guindey’s feat, if not his name, appeared in the Bulletin de la Grande Armée.89 Others were more fortunate. The thirty-first bulletin, for example, noted that Colonel Corbineau distinguished himself at Austerlitz by having “four horses killed under him” and suffering a wound after he captured an enemy flag.90 Though not as impressive as the Legion of Honor or a battlefield promotion, being named in a bulletin or an order of the day was considered an honorable reward. Betraying his bitterness about his failure to earn a citation, Captain Jean Joseph Louis Elzéar Blaze pondered in his memoirs, “As for glory, what is it? It is an after-action report, where one is mentioned by name. How many were nominated after each battle?—Maybe ten persons out of 300,000. Yet everyone did their duty, but you cannot mention everyone.”91 This complaint revealed, even if inadvertently, that bulletins and orders of the day indeed functioned as an important source of glory. As Blaze’s comments indicate, they featured a limited number of names. The deeds of the army’s leadership also received more attention than the actions of enlisted men. The written and print media issued to French troops, however, did not neglect the accomplishments of common soldiers. It implicitly acknowledged them by describing the contributions of their units and the army as a whole to French victories. The Grande Armée’s order of the day for 28 vendémiaire, year XIV, exemplified these trends.92 It began by commending Napoleon’s troops for their perseverance: “The Emperor expresses his satisfaction to the army corps of Prince Murat, to those of Marshals Ney, Lannes, and Soult, and at the same time to General Marmont and the Imperial Guard for the marches that they have made, for the patience with which they have supported fatigues and privations of all kinds, which were worth the following accomplishments.” The order then listed the army’s trophies, announcing, “Memmingen capitulated Honneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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at the hands of Marshal Soult, surrendering 5 thousand prisoners, 9 flags, a great number of cannons and many magazines. Ulm capitulated: which was worth 25 thousand prisoners, 18 generals, 50 cannons, 3 thousand cavalry horses to mount our foot dragoons, and 40 flags.” The order continued by praising the units that fought exceptionally well: “At the battle of Elchingen the 76th and 69th Regiments of infantry and the 18th Dragoons successively distinguished themselves. At the battle of Albeck the 9th Light infantry, the 32nd and 96th covered themselves with glory.” The expression “covered themselves with glory” recurred frequently in orders of the day and the Bulletin de la Grande Armée. Through these forms of media, the glory won by the 32nd and 96th line infantry regiments, as well as other units and individuals, became tangible. Similar to honor, glory required affirmation by external authorities to exist. Rewards such as citations in bulletins, the Legion of Honor, and promotions performed this function. Much as the honors of the monarchy signified that the noble officers of the Royal army were honorable, these distinctions confirmed that the actions of Napoleon’s men were in fact glorious. They also conferred glory upon their recipients by announcing the significance of their deeds and bestowing the public acclaim that this quality required. Equally important, the Napoleonic regime enhanced the prestige attached to awards for feats of arms by issuing them in ways that maximized their publicity. The men who served in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée received the Legion of Honor and promotions in ceremonies witnessed by thousands of their peers. Their accomplishments were then recorded and transmitted in official orders and periodicals like the Bulletin de la Grande Armée, the Moniteur, and the Journal de l’Empire. These items were then read not only by their peers in the army but by their families, friends, and fellow citizens back in France, and by much of the population of Europe.93 Orders of the day, bulletins, and proclamations offered added benefits. They provided detailed descriptions of the prizes won by French troops. Like the order of 28 vendémiaire, the documents quantified the extent of their triumphs, measuring the glory that they acquired in statistical terms. Finally, they increased the renown of the grognards’ exploits by emphasizing the extraordinary nature of their victories. They characterized the army’s achievements as “forever famous” and as a “vast monument of glory that has no equal in the history of the world.”94 The glory conveyed by such methods often took the form of the civicminded attribute that Marmontel presented in the Encyclopédie and that Martin described in Les devoirs d’un guerrier. Napoleonic propaganda regu72

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larly associated glory with patriotism. For example, one of Napoleon’s proclamations promised the Grande Armée celebrations in Paris for victory in the War of the Third Coalition. “And afterwards,” it announced, “we will see where the welfare of our patrie and the interests of our glory call us.”95 This declaration reminded the soldiery that service to the patrie would provide opportunities for glory. The esteem that accompanied the Legion of Honor also explicitly derived from actions that benefited France. In these contexts, glory functioned like this award: as a device for the inculcation of patriotic honor. At the same time, the glory that figured so prominently in Napoleonic military culture featured a more purely martial dimension that preserved warrior honor in the French army. Military songs, orders of the day, and the Bulletin de la Grande Armée devoted greater attention to the French soldier’s love of glory and the celebration of his feats of arms than to his devotion to France.96 The political and military context in which these kinds of media were issued, as well as the references to the patrie that they contained, did remind Napoleon’s troops that their search for glory benefited their country. Yet, almost 25 percent of the bulletins printed between 1805 and 1808 simply reported and praised its deeds without any allusion to the patrie, France, or French interests.97 Furthermore, the importance that was attached to glory itself in Napoleonic military culture and the endless succession of martial exploits that appeared in its print propaganda indicated that military glory possessed an intrinsic value in its own right. These trends suggested that it was not a secondary motive or a lesser prize derived from a greater goal, but a primary source of motivation for Napoleon’s troops equal in worth to patriotism. The forty-sixth bulletin from the 1806-1807 campaign expressed this message in one of its clearest forms. It explained that the emperor wished official accounts of the Grande Armée’s combats to record the individual actions of its members for posterity, “because it is for it and to live eternally in its memory, that the French soldier confronts all dangers and all fatigues.”98 Here, glory superseded patriotism. The emphasis on glory in Napoleonic military culture represented something more than the simple transference of aristocratic qualities to all French men. Napoleon modified the martial values of the past. His warrior honor both reflected and contributed to a new sense of self-identity and a new culture of war that was beginning to coalesce in the second half of the eighteenth century. The growing influence of the novel and the Romantic movement produced an understanding of the self that stressed the unique qualities, traits, and emotions of the individual. It also celebrated the ability Honneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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of heroic personalities to shape the world around them. Hero worship itself was not new, for Old Regime and Revolutionary France founded a cult of great men to inspire the emulation of illustrious individuals who increased the grandeur and strength of the nation.99 Before Napoleon, however, this cult encouraged conformity to a preexisting set of attributes and behaviors. Individuals demonstrated their worth by modeling their behavior on the exemplars of the past. In military terms, this meant that the officers of the Royal army won honor and glory by acting in accordance with the military’s honor code. The new vision of the self focused on individuality, on the idiosyncratic and remarkable achievements of the distinctive person. At the same time that this trend was taking place, a strand of Enlightenment thought broke with early modern attitudes about war that regarded armed struggle as a normal feature of human existence. It portrayed war as both an aberration and a redemptive force that brought the most noble of human qualities to the fore. Due to the tumultuous changes that accompanied the French Revolution, the political and military elite in France adopted this conception of military conflict and put it into practice.100 Napoleon embodied both the new approach to war and new feelings about self-perception. He imagined himself as a character in a novel and viewed war as the most sublime of human activities that would reveal his genius and secure his immortality in posterity.101 More will be said about this subject in chapter 5, but for now it is necessary to point out that he transmitted his sense of self-identity and his understanding of war to his troops. Napoleonic warrior honor did not just pressure the French soldier to secure his reputation through adherence to a behavioral code. The value that it accorded to military glory encouraged him to seek personal fulfillment and validate his uniqueness in battle; it proposed that he too was part of the epic drama unfolding across Europe.

Eagles and Honorable Mentions: Esprit de Corps The grognards were urged to acquire glory not just for themselves but for their military units. Napoleon began to restore esprit de corps to French military culture as a general, and he continued to do so after he became first consul and emperor. He cultivated the French soldier’s loyalty to particular military units in different ways, including the distribution of a distinctive eagle standard to every regiment. When the French Republic became Napoleon’s Empire, the new emperor replaced the Revolution’s battle flags with a standard composed of a blue flagstaff topped with a bronze eagle bearing 74

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the number of the regiment. These new banners were consciously patterned on the eagle battle standards of Imperial Rome, and French soldiers took an oath to sacrifice their lives to defend them “and to maintain them constantly, by” their “courage, on the path to victory.”102 A regiment’s eagle embodied its honor, and its capture was considered a disgrace. The first battalion of the 4th line infantry regiment lost its eagle at Austerlitz. In an inspection after the battle, Napoleon rebuked the unit, asking, “you swore that it [the eagle] would be your rallying point, and that you would defend it at risk to your life; how have you kept this promise?” The battalion’s major replied that the unit was not aware that the eagle was missing because of the chaotic conditions that existed on the battlefield. He also claimed that it fought bravely and took two Russian flags from the enemy, which the regiment presented to the emperor in the hopes of earning a new eagle. Satisfied, a “smiling” Napoleon agreed to the request, but he notified the rest of the army about the episode in an order of the day to strengthen the resolve of his troops to defend their standards.103 Although Napoleon’s eagles remained an important source of esprit de corps, the written word functioned as the primary instrument through which he developed the honor of his military formations. Citations given to different units were intended to heighten the pride felt by soldiers in them, and to increase their members’ commitment to maintaining their reputation. By publicly honoring military formations in print, Napoleon likewise attempted to inspire his soldiers to win praise for their unit. This measure succeeded, for individuals of all ranks eagerly hoped to see their regiment, division, corps, or branch of service mentioned in bulletins and orders of the day. Marshals and generals lobbied to obtain such public expressions of the emperor’s satisfaction for their troops, and thanked Napoleon when their requests were granted.104 Conversely, indignant protests surfaced when units and their leaders felt that they had been unjustly left out of an order of the day or a bulletin. Shortly after the siege of Danzig, General Songis, the commander of the Grande Armée’s artillery, wrote a letter to Napoleon. He expressed his dismay about the order of the day of May 26, 1807, which announced the capture of Danzig and proclaimed that “the sappers covered themselves with glory.”105 Songis informed “His Majesty” that the order provoked “painful sentiments” in the artillery because it “has not seen itself included in the testimonies of satisfaction with which your Majesty honored in the eyes of the entire army, the works of the troops of the military engineers.”106 Napoleon carefully manipulated the esprit de corps revealed by Songis. He encouraged it at every level of the military hierarchy, for orders of the day, Honneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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bulletins, and proclamations publicized the accomplishments of regiments, divisions, corps, different branches of service, and entire armies. He also withheld praise in order to wring every last ounce of effort out of his units. In response to complaints from Marshal Jean Lannes that his corps had not been adequately recognized, Napoleon promised that he was only waiting for his troops to distinguish themselves again. He replied, “It is possible that your soldiers have been finding that we have not spoken of them as worthily as they have deserved; they are right to be demanding, for they are as brave as [they are] good. At the next battle, they will conduct themselves as at Austerlitz and at Jena, and we will take care to say a few more words.”107 Before battles, the emperor likewise challenged the Grande Armée to defend the honor of its military formations. After the capture of Ulm, Napoleon issued a proclamation that proposed that the Russians would soon put the reputation of French infantry to the test: “To this combat, the honor of the infantry is particularly attached. It is here that will be decided for the second time, this question which has already been [decided] in Switzerland and in Holland, if the French infantry is the second or the first in Europe.”108 The infantry of the Grande Armée succeeded in upholding its honor at the battle of Austerlitz, and its soldiers brought glory to themselves and their patrie that has not yet faded. The French army did become an army of honor under Napoleon, but it did not conform to the interpretation advanced by the army-of-honor thesis. It might be more accurate to describe it as an army of honors, for Napoleonic honor cannot be reduced to a single trait. The military culture created in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée disseminated three distinct kinds of honor. In many ways, the honor of Napoleon’s legions represented the culmination of trends that originated in the seventeenth century. The Napoleonic regime built on the service culture of the Royal army, the ideas of eighteenth-century military reformers, and the ideals of the French Revolution to produce a new, patriotic honor embodied by the Legion of Honor. It encouraged Napoleon’s troops to increase their personal prestige through service to the state, attention to their military duties, the defense of the French Revolution’s achievements, and feats of renown that contributed to the welfare of the patrie. The warrior honor that drove the officers of the king also persisted in the armies of the Consulate and the Empire. The prominence of glory in Napoleon’s military and the continuous distribution of rewards for actions d’éclat emphasized that French soldiers literally needed to conquer a reputation in combat. Finally, the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée witnessed a resur76

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gence of the esprit de corps that the radical Revolutionaries worked so hard to eradicate. Although Napoleon preserved older concepts of honor and glory in the French army, he and his supporters used them in new and different ways. They adapted honor and glory to the changes of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to produce compelling forms of sustaining motivation. Military reformers and philosophes began this process in the eighteenth century, but they were incapable of completing it, and many of them found it difficult to separate these qualities from the nobility. Napoleon’s personal beliefs, his unique talents, and the destruction of the aristocracy during the French Revolution allowed him to harness honor and glory to his military needs and those of France to a degree that was beyond the reach of the Bourbons. In contrast to the kings and aristocrats who commanded the Royal army, Napoleon offered honor and glory to all members of the army, from the humblest private to the grandest marshal. The renown and material gain that his honor and honors provided also gave their recipients an incentive to fight that the Revolutionaries’ demanding virtue rejected. Ambitious soldiers who were hostile or indifferent to the Revolution could openly pursue professional and social advancement without endangering themselves or their careers. For troops still devoted to the principles of the Republic, the use of rewards to compensate soldiers for their patriotism may have made virtue even more appealing. As General Junot explained in a speech about the Legion of Honor, Let the patrie say to the soldier: “Shed your blood for me; no one, not even your enemy, will be a witness to your devotion; you will die unknown, but you will have done your duty.” To obey this order would be the effort of a sublime resignation; but let it say instead: “confront death, your comrades see you, your general is depending on you; you will live on in the annals of war.” The act will not be less useful to the patrie, and at the same time, it will satisfy the victim.109

Napoleonic honor also altered combat motivation. It produced an emphasis on battlefield distinction that set the armies of Napoleon apart from the military forces of the king and the Republic, and their opponents. The French monarchy and the armies that fought against Napoleonic France trained their soldiers to follow orders and refrain from exercising personal initiative. Only officers were believed to possess the expertise and moral qualities necessary to play an active role in battle. The Royal army and Europe’s monHonneur, Gloire, et Patrie

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archies also gave their troops few incentives to pursue praiseworthy deeds beyond the respect of their fellow soldiers, extra pay, and pensions. Military trophies captured by a soldier, such as the sword of an enemy officer, usually became the property of his commander, and enlisted men were denied the honors bestowed upon aristocratic officers.110 The armies of the French Revolution did assume that their soldiers were capable of acting independently on the battlefield. Yet Revolutionary leaders valued martyrdom more than actions d’éclat. Therefore, they encouraged French soldiers to fight courageously in order to prove their willingness to sacrifice themselves for the patrie.111 Unlike his predecessors and his opponents, Napoleon created a military culture in which both soldiers and officers were supposed to actively contribute to French victories by their efforts to distinguish themselves. While he expected the rank and file to follow orders, Napoleon wanted his grognards to seize opportunities to perform actions d’éclat, and rewarded them with honor and glory when they succeeded.

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3 Imperial Virtue The Evolution of French Patriotism

After the triumphant conclusion of the War of the Third Coalition, Napoleon wished to offer his latter-day legions bread and circuses. On December 27, 1805, he announced to the Grande Armée that he would reward its soldiers with victory celebrations “in the first days of May at Paris.”1 This news generated an enthusiastic response among the troops. Lieutenant Barbara excitedly wrote to his father, “In a few days we are leaving for France. The Emperor already left. His address to the army said that on the first of May the entire army is to be present at Paris to celebrate a festival there. I desire this moment with impatience provided that our regiment is not diverted to someplace else.”2 An elaborate plan for the festival resides in the archives of the French army, envisioning a celebration lasting eight days. The festivities would begin with the army’s procession through the capital, and the city would be decorated with military trophies and triumphal arches. One of the highlights would be combats between “ferocious” bulls, dogs, and bears, which the emperor himself ordered because he believed that such “amusements” were “pleasing to warriors.”3 Unfortunately for Lieutenant Barbara and the rest of the Grande Armée, this fête never took place because war with Prussia and Russia kept the army in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet many of the activities planned for it appeared in a series of military festivals that were held after the Peace of Tilsit. Napoleon’s government fêted the Imperial Guard when it returned to Paris in 1807, and other formations in the Grande Armée were treated to celebrations throughout France as they marched to Spain in 1808. These celebrations reflected the fascination with antiquity that existed in Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, for they were modeled after a ceremony used in ancient Rome known as a “triumph.” The eternal city held triumphs to honor leaders who won particularly impressive or important military victories. They took the form of a procession in which military |

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trophies, captured wealth, sacrificial animals, and prisoners were paraded past the cheering populace. The climax of the celebration occurred when the victorious general or emperor and his army marched through the city, often passing under triumphal arches that were built for the event.4 The celebrations for the Grande Armée in 1808 resembled nothing so much as one continuous triumph across France. Yet, the festivals planned and executed by French officials between 1806 and 1808 differed from Roman triumphs and most Napoleonic fêtes because they celebrated the army rather than its leader. Napoleon even gave specific instructions to the festival organizers to focus their energies on the troops. In his orders for the return of the Guard, he wrote, “in the emblems and devices that will be made for this occasion, it is necessary that the emphasis will be on my guard and not me.”5 The emperor promised his troops in his proclamation of December 27 that the people of France would show their appreciation “toward its heroes and its defenders” during the army’s festivals.6 They behaved as expected, and came out in droves to cheer and marvel at the men whose adventures they had followed through the Bulletin de la Grande Armée. The object of admiration also gazed back. As Napoleon’s victorious soldiers received the accolades of their fellow citizens, they saw a vision of the French nation. This vision materialized more fully in the Empire’s victory celebrations than in any other type of propaganda, but it was not unique to them. Napoleonic military culture regularly communicated representations of the patrie to French soldiers and informed them of their obligations to it. While the France of the Consulate and the Empire bore some resemblance to the national community conceived by the Revolutionaries, it exhibited a far more aggressive character. Napoleonic France was presented to the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée as a warlike country driven by a need for military conquests and its commitment to preserving its reputation as the dominant nation in Europe. In addition, this concept of the patrie produced a new kind of French patriotism. It transformed Revolutionary virtue into Imperial virtue and fundamentally altered motivation in the French army.

Revolutionary Virtue and the French Army Whereas honor defined the Royal army’s value system, patriotism was the foundation of the French Revolution’s military culture. The Revolution began at a time when the states who were most likely to intervene were involved with the partition of Poland. The overthrow of the Bourbon Absolute monarchy and the corporate society that it governed therefore proceeded without 80

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foreign interference. Tensions between Revolutionary France and the other Continental powers, however, flared and quickly reached the breaking point. In spite of the unpreparedness of the French army and the protests of its generals, the French government declared war on the Habsburg Empire on April 21, 1792. Not long afterward, it found itself confronting enemies on all sides. The Revolutionaries’ belligerent domestic and foreign policies, which included the execution of King Louis XVI, alarmed foreign rulers as well as their own population. By 1793, the new French Republic was at war with every major country in Europe save Russia. In addition, a civil war erupted inside of France that pitted the new Republic against an array of opponents who had been alienated by the radicalism of the government in Paris. Revolutionary leaders discovered that the military forces that they inherited from the Old Regime were insufficient to meet these challenges. As a result, they endeavored to build a new army composed of a new kind of soldier. One of their most important innovations was a deliberate and massive effort to indoctrinate the military. The Republic implemented programs designed to transform the army into a “school of Jacobinism” that taught its students the ideals of the Revolution. To shape the values of French soldiers, civilian and military officials sent thousands of journals, pamphlets, and songbooks to the army, and organized festivals and other morale-building activities. The government in Paris also dispatched Representatives on Mission to the army who endeavored to develop the troops’ devotion to the Revolution’s cause.7 These activities created a new military culture that forged the French army into a potent instrument that not only defended Revolutionary France but spread its ideals at home and abroad. The Revolutionaries wished to make their troops into politically aware citizen-soldiers who owed their loyalties to the French people and the patrie rather than to military units, generals, and the king. The new citizen-soldier would also be dedicated to the principles of the French Revolution: he would be a foe of tyrants, aristocrats, and counterrevolutionary priests, and committed to the propagation of liberty and equality. His primary attribute, though, was supposed to be patriotism, which can be defined as the individual’s devotion to his or her country and its citizens. In Revolutionary France, country and citizenry coalesced in la patrie. “Patrie” can be roughly translated as “fatherland” or “homeland,” and is related to the concept of the nation. The word “nation” in late Old Regime and Revolutionary France referred to a sovereign political community that grouped together people who had enough in common to allow them to act as a unified, collective entity. It had strong political connotations and was Imperial Virtue

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increasingly associated with the state.8 On the other hand, “patrie” initially meant a relatively small, particular locality such as a province, town, or city. These locales likewise represented a homeland toward which the inhabitants felt strong loyalties and a sense of identification. Rather than considering themselves French, most of the people who lived in early modern France thought of themselves as members of a town, city, or region, as Parisians or Gascons instead of French men and French women. The meaning of “patrie” changed during the eighteenth century. In his writings about government, Montesquieu associated the term “patrie” with democracies, and especially republics, that were sustained by virtue. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, another leading figure in the Enlightenment, also depicted a patrie as a community of citizens bound together by a shared commitment to the welfare of the general public. Yet, he went beyond Montesquieu to describe the patrie as a geographical region to which an individual belonged and owed allegiance, especially when it needed to be defended against foreigners. The fires of France’s rivalry with Great Britain and the French Revolution eventually forged these ideas into a new vision of la patrie that equated it with the French nation. By the late eighteenth century, the intellectual and political elite conceived of the patrie as a geographical place—France—and as a political entity whose citizens were distinguished by virtue. During the Revolution, different political regimes tried to make France into a unified, homogeneous nation state based on this model.9 The most concerted effort to turn France into a virtuous patrie took place during the Terror, the period between October of 1793 and July of 1794. In this stage of the Revolution, radical politicians from the Jacobin club, like Robespierre, and the sans-culottes movement transformed the Republic into a dictatorship governed by the infamous Committee of Public Safety. To protect the Republic, the Committee required its citizens to adhere to Revolutionary virtue, an intense and demanding type of patriotism. Similar to theories about the patrie, the concept of Revolutionary virtue had roots in the Enlightenment. The philosophes invoked the civic devotion that existed in antiquity to claim that virtue was an essential element of republican forms of government. They proposed that virtue was egalitarian, and constituted the selfless desire to pursue the common good at the expense of personal goals. Montesquieu characterized it as the “love of the laws and of our country” and explained that it “requires a constant preference of public to private interest.”10 Radicals such as Robespierre who were influenced by these ideas strove to transform Revolutionary France into a “Republic of Virtue.” In this polity, the populace was expected to conduct itself according to the 82

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principle of virtue as defined by Enlightenment thinkers, and terror, in the form of draconian laws and public executions, was used to compel conformity to it. Robespierre’s speeches echoed Montesquieu, proclaiming that citizens should “think of nothing but the good of the country and the interests of humanity.”11 To be more precise, virtue for the Revolutionaries meant the obligation of all French citizens to serve the public interest, which was identified with the sovereign people, the patrie, the nation, and the Republic, and to subordinate individual concerns to the needs of these entities.12 The Jacobins built an army of virtue to defend their Republic of Virtue. Civilian and military authorities instilled the radicals’ patriotism in French soldiers by issuing propaganda materials that continuously proclaimed that they had to dedicate themselves to the patrie. The Revolutionaries also promoted self-sacrifice as the leading attribute of the French soldier. The emphasis on this ideal reached its most extreme form in the “Myth of the Patriotic Death,” one of the dominant motifs in Revolutionary military culture. This construct presented images of French soldiers who willingly gave up their lives for the good of the patrie. It provided a model of the virtuous citizen-soldier that was intended to inspire the troops of the Republic, and that encouraged them to engage in a similar “armed martyrdom.”13 French soldiers were likewise portrayed as heroes in Revolutionary military and political culture, and their accomplishments were acknowledged and praised. Official proclamations, print media, speeches given at festivals, and inscriptions on Revolutionary monuments constantly celebrated the achievements of the troops and thanked them for their service and sacrifices. Public appreciation acted as a stimulus for the development of patriotism because it gave the soldier an incentive to devote himself to the Republic and to risk his life for it. It offered him the psychological satisfaction of becoming a heroic figure, a valued member of the community who enjoyed the respect and admiration of his fellow citizens.14 This representation contrasted sharply with the treatment of the military under the Old Regime, where signs in public parks announced, “No dogs, whores, lackeys, or soldiers.”15

The Preservation of Virtue and Armed Martyrdom under Napoleon Although the Republic’s soldiers gained access to parks, they felt increasingly abandoned as the Revolution progressed. The Directory’s neglectful treatment of the army gave it the impression that the patrie ceased to appreciate it. Napoleon quickly reversed this trend upon coming to power. He and his supporters disseminated a variety of propaganda that expressed France’s Imperial Virtue

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gratitude toward its soldiers and encouraged them to fulfill their obligations to it. A proclamation by the emperor to the Grande Armée on the day after Austerlitz featured both of these messages. It highlighted the troops’ patriotic duties by vowing that they would only return to France “when all that which is necessary to assure the welfare and prosperity of our patrie is accomplished.” The document then concluded with the guarantee that they would receive the public recognition that they deserved, announcing, “my People will see you again with expressions of joy; it will suffice to say: ‘I was at the Battle of Austerlitz,’ for them to reply: ‘There is a Brave man.’”16 The newspapers offered to French soldiers backed this pledge with articles that described demonstrations of popular support for the army. The issue of the Moniteur for December 1, 1805, informed its readers that the Bulletin de la Grande Armée was read aloud to large crowds at Rouen. “Joy was universal,” the article stated. “[A]lso, the details of so many prodigies performed by the Grande Armée under the influence of its august chief excited the greatest enthusiasm.”17 Periodicals also contained patriotic rhetoric. Bulletins continuously proclaimed that Napoleon waged war to defend France and its interests, indicating that the army was fighting to do the same. Voicing the emperor’s anger, the twenty-ninth bulletin from the campaign in Prussia threatened vengeance against the Fourth Coalition. “This war must be the last,” it vowed, “and its authors so severely punished that whosoever would henceforth take up arms against the French people will know well, before engaging in such an enterprise, what the consequences can be.”18 The same themes that appeared in print media likewise emerged in songs. French military songs often mentioned and praised the soldier’s service to his country. They depicted Napoleon’s troops as “supporters of the patrie,” as “defenders” of the patrie, and proposed, “France owes them its glory, it will owe them its repose.”19 Furthermore, Napoleonic songs still identified self-sacrifice as one of the French soldier’s virtues. Le bon soldat told Napoleon’s troops that the “good soldier” not only valued glory and sought actions d’éclat, but risked his life “for his patrie.”20 Even though Napoleon’s soldiers risked their lives, they did not die nearly as frequently in songs as the soldiers of the French Revolution. Yet like the Revolutionaries, the Napoleonic regime continued to use the dead to maintain the virtue of the living. The veneration of individuals who sacrificed themselves for the good of the nation took on the character of a secular religion under the Republic. The most popular martyrs, such as Joseph Bara, acquired a kind of sainthood. Bara was a thirteen-year-old volunteer who 84

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was killed by counterrevolutionaries in the Vendée. The official report of his death stated that he died swearing profanely at the enemy while refusing to turn over horses in his care. The Revolutionary government and its propagandists altered the story to enhance its dramatic appeal. In the new version, Bara was killed because he cried out “Long live the Republic!” when commanded to proclaim his allegiance to the king. This selfless act touched off an explosion of speeches, plays, poems, and songs to memorialize the youth.21 In the Revolutionary armies, the myth of the patriotic death pressured French troops to imitate the example of Bara and others who surrendered life and limb for the patrie. As the Revolution progressed, however, it canonized military saints from higher ranks. Under the Directory, the army began to commemorate the deaths of prominent generals like Barthelemy Catherine Joubert, who was killed at the battle of Novi, with greater regularity than the martyrdom of humble common soldiers.22 The Napoleonic regime created its own pantheon of soldier-martyrs. Initially, it honored popular military leaders from the Revolution. During the Consulate, Napoleon ordered elaborate state funerals to be held for generals like Jean-Baptiste Kléber and Louis Charles Desaix, who were killed while serving France.23 The Army of the Coasts of the Ocean also celebrated the memory of these individuals. Chapter 1 mentioned how the streets of the French camp at Ostende were named after Kléber, Desaix, and other figures who lost their lives in the Republic’s armies. The troops of other camps commemorated the sacrifices of the Revolution’s military commanders in different ways. During the fête of Napoleon in 1805, the units around Brest witnessed a speech that “spread flowers over the tomb of generals who died on the field of honor.”24 Along with the memorialization of the Revolution’s generals, Napoleon introduced a new model of martyrdom that can be described as the myth of the glorious death. This ideal encouraged French troops to give their lives for the emperor and the glory that they achieved by dying in combat or from combat-related injuries. Like the myth of the patriotic death, it was constructed from images of soldier-martyrs. In contrast to Republican heroes, however, most Napoleonic military saints found satisfaction in death or injuries obtained through victory, service to the emperor, and the deeds of their unit. These figures were most visible in the Bulletin de la Grande Armée. The thirty-third bulletin, which contained an especially cinematic death scene, offered a good example. In its pages, General Valhubert, who was mortally wounded at Austerlitz, wrote a letter to Napoleon that expressed his departing wish: “I will die in an hour; I do not regret my death, because I particiImperial Virtue

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pated in a victory that will assure you a happy reign. When you think of the brave men who were devoted to you, think of my memory. It will suffice for me to tell you that I have a family: I do not need to appeal to you on their behalf.”25 Such representations told French troops to aspire to an end in battle that brought them everlasting fame by proving their bravery, and their commitment to Napoleon, victory, and their regiment. Glorious military martyrs like Valhubert outnumbered dead patriots in the propaganda of the Empire, but the myth of the glorious death did not replace the myth of the patriotic death in Napoleonic military culture. Two particular soldier-martyrs preserved it. One was Captain Auzouy of the Horse Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard. He appeared in the sixty-third bulletin, which was published following the battle of Eylau. It opens with the officer lying wounded on the battlefield. When his comrades arrive to take him to a hospital, Auzouy revives just long enough to convey his satisfaction with his fate. “Leave me my friends,” he commands. I die content because we have the victory, and because I can die on the bed of honor, surrounded by the cannons taken from our enemies and the debris of their defeat. Tell the Emperor that I have only one regret; it is that in a few moments, I will no longer be able to do anything in his service and for the glory of our beautiful France. . . . To her my last sigh.26

The other virtuous martyr was Théophile-Malo Corret de la Tour d’Auvergne, who was mentioned in chapter 1. He was one of the most colorful figures of the Revolutionary period. When the French Revolution began, he was a captain in the Royal army. La Tour d’Auvergne refused to emigrate, unlike many of his peers, and despite numerous opportunities to advance, he rejected all offers of promotion. Due to his experience and his patriotism, he received command of a division of grenadiers while retaining the official rank of captain. His men so distinguished themselves in Spain that they acquired the nickname “the Infernal Column.” While returning to France, La Tour d’Auvergne was captured by the British and became a prisoner for two years. After his release, he retired from the army in 1795 because he lost his teeth. A few years later, he reenlisted as a replacement for a friend’s son who had been drafted. The friend was in poor physical health and his son was his principal means of support. La Tour d’Auvergne therefore returned to the military in 1799 to save him from destitution or worse. The famous veteran’s generosity did not go unnoticed. After he reentered the army, First Consul Bonaparte wished to honor his selflessness and his impressive military 86

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career. The first consul awarded him a Saber of Honor, and more impressive still, the title of “First Grenadier of the Armies of the Republic.” According to legend, La Tour d’Auvergne did not wish to accept the title, telling Bonaparte, “Among us other soldiers, there is neither first nor last,” and asked simply to be referred to as the “Oldest Grenadier of the Republic.” Unfortunately, the old soldier’s tour of duty was short-lived. He was killed at the battle of Oberhausen on June 27, 1800, while serving in the Army of the Rhine. He was buried near the battlefield, but each soldier in the army donated a day of pay to purchase a silver urn that would contain his heart.27 Bonaparte persisted in his efforts to celebrate La Tour d’Auvergne, and found it easier to do so after his death. He issued a decree in July of 1803 that required an NCO of the grenadier company of the 46th regiment of line infantry, La Tour d’Auvergne’s regiment, to bear the urn carrying the heart of the “First Grenadier of the Republic” wherever the regiment served. His name would also remain on the roster of his company, and would be pronounced at every roll call. When it was read, the corporal of his squad would reply, “Dead on the field of honor!”28 Moreover, the regiment held a funeral service every year on the anniversary of La Tour d’Auvergne’s death. This unit was assigned to the Camp of St. Omer in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, and served in IV Corps of the Grande Armée. Marshal Soult announced the commemoration of La Tour d’Auvergne to the army in his orders of the day, and the First Grenadier of the Republic was rechristened “the First Grenadier of France.” The order of June 28, 1804, delivered a lengthy eulogy, full of effusive praise: Yesterday, 8 messidor, the staff and the officers of the 46th Regiment of Line Infantry celebrated a service in memory of the brave La Tour-d’Auvergne, First Grenadier of France, dead on the field of honor, in the parish church of Boulogne. . . . He earned from Bonaparte the title of First Grenadier of France: a title unique; a title as great by itself, as that of he who conferred it. . . . Appellation simple and sublime; an everlasting monument to glory, made to exalt courage and perpetuate it; of which one will find no example among any nation ancient or modern, and that the brave men of the 46th will honor, in imitating the devotion and the virtues of their comrade and their friend.29

The portrayal of both La Tour d’Auvergne and Captain Auzouy contained elements of the myth of the glorious death. Soult highlighted La Tour Imperial Virtue

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d’Auvergne’s glory and depicted his courage as a source of inspiration for the soldiers of Imperial France. He returned to these themes the following year, in another order of the day that proclaimed that the example of the First Grenadier of France would “maintain the love of glory in the heart of French soldiers” by “perpetuating the memory of brave men.”30 Auzouy too was a monument to glory. He died victorious, surrounded by trophies captured from the enemy, voicing his commitment to the emperor. Yet, his death was as patriotic as it was glorious. He breathed his “last sigh” to “our beautiful France.” His final act revealed what he valued most, his country. More importantly, it indicated that other French soldiers should possess the same devotion to their patrie. In spite of the importance that Soult attached to La Tour d’Auvergne’s glory and bravery, he also functioned as an icon that invoked the ideals of the Revolution. The fame of the First Grenadier of France came from what Soult’s order called his “devotion” and “virtues”: his achievements under the Republic, his modesty and renunciation of personal gain, and his selfless attachment to his fellow citizens. He sacrificed his life to ensure the well-being of his friend. Memorial services and speeches offered in his name invoked these qualities whether spoken or not. Comments about La Tour d’Auvergne by the hussar Georges Bangofsky illustrated this tendency. He mistakenly believed that when the famous soldier’s name was pronounced during roll call, the oldest grenadier in his company announced, “Dead for the patrie!”31 References to glorious military martyrs appeared more often in the Grande Armée’s military culture than images of La Tour d’Auvergne and Auzouy, but these two figures stood out more than other soldier-martyrs. Only the troops of Soult’s corps participated in funerary rites for La Tour d’Auvergne. However, the publicity that the marshal gave them kept his memory alive. Soldiers throughout the army, such as Bangofsky, knew who he was.32 Furthermore, the martyrdom of Captain Auzouy received more coverage in the Bulletin de la Grande Armée than that of any other battlefield death, and it was presented at a crucial moment in the War of the Fourth Coalition. Bulletins normally devoted a sentence or two to the deceased; Auzouy’s final moments took up a lengthy paragraph. The French army had also just suffered appalling losses at Eylau without achieving a clear victory, and the Napoleonic regime was undoubtedly relying on his example to sustain the resolve of both the military and the civilian population. The importance and visibility accorded to Auzouy and La Tour d’Auvergne balanced the greater numbers of glorious mili-

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Figure 4. “Auzoui, Captain of the Grenadiers à Cheval of the Imperial Guard Mortally Wounded at the Battle of Eylau,” anonymous engraving from Collection de Vinck. Un siècle d’histoire de France par l’estampe, 1770-1870, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris. Auzouy’s martyrdom was commemorated not only in the Bulletin de la Grande Armée but in popular images like this one.

tary saints, and maintained the ideal of the patriotic death in the French army. The myth of the glorious death did eventually supplant this form of martyrdom. Following the dissolution of the Grande Armée, images of soldiers who explicitly surrendered their lives for the good of France no longer appeared in bulletins.33 Napoleon himself even put an end to the commemoration of La Tour d’Auvergne. In early 1809, he commanded the minister of war to collect the urn containing his remains and order the 46th regiment to cease the rituals that honored his memory. Evidently having lost his admiration for the First Grenadier of France, the emperor justified his decision with the statement, “What regiment has not had a general, a colonel, or finally, a brave man, killed at its head? I have tolerated this singularity for long enough.”34 One suspects that more was at stake, that Napoleon preferred to celebrate the men who died to affirm his dynasty and build his Empire rather than an individual whose association with the French Revolution was unmistakable.

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Celebrating the Grande Armée: The Triumphs of 1807 and 1808 Fortunately for Napoleon’s soldiers, the living received as many accolades as the dead. The most spectacular measure used to cultivate patriotism in the troops of the Consulate and the Empire was the festivals that honored the Grande Armée after the Peace of Tilsit. The triumphs of 1807 and 1808 originated in Napoleon’s decision to organize victory celebrations for his men following the successful completion of the Austerlitz campaign. The emperor and his officials began planning this fête almost immediately after the War of the Third Coalition. Napoleon sent detailed instructions to the Minister of the Interior proposing festivities such as free theatrical performances, horse and chariot races, bullfights, and awards ceremonies for the recipients of the Legion of Honor. He also wanted the city of Paris to award new eagles decorated with gold laurel wreaths to the Grande Armée to replace the unadorned ones perched atop its battle standards.35 The emperor’s orders led to the composition of a lengthy program in early 1806 for an eight-day festival.36 While the fête did not actually happen, this remarkable document offers important insights into the construction of Napoleonic military culture. It does not contain the names of the individuals who composed the document, but it does reveal their goals and the messages that they intended to communicate to the Grande Armée. The planners began the festival with a procession resembling a Roman triumph. When the army arrived at Paris, it would be received at a triumphal arch placed near the former site of the Bastille at the entrance to the Boulevard, which was the road that encircled the capital. The troops would then march along the Boulevard, down to the Place de la Concorde, and over to the Tuileries. They would be preceded by local authorities and a cortege of chariots bearing military trophies and art captured during the army’s campaigns. The route for the procession would be decorated with trophies and garlands, and orchestras would be positioned on the route to provide music. On the second day, representatives of Paris would bestow gold laurel wreaths on the Grande Armée to ornament its eagles. At this event, hot air balloons would fly overhead, manned by “aeronauts” who would shower the troops with “palms and flowers.” One of them would even descend “with the aid of a parachute in full view of the army.” After the ceremony, the animal fights that Napoleon wanted would take place, and the soldiers would be treated to dances. The festival organizers scheduled the distribution of the Legion of Honor to two thousand soldiers on the third day, along with “knightly games,” including jousts. A monument was to be dedicated on the fourth day, and the emperor 90

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would hand out a prize for industry. The arts, sciences, and letters would display their gratitude toward the army on the following day. Trips would be organized for the troops to the monuments of Paris, and the general staff would be given tours of the jardin des plantes and the Napoleon Museum, which had been installed at the Louvre. Scientific experiments related to “electricity, optics, or other [subjects] that can be pleasing or astonishing” were to be performed for the rank and file in the theaters of Paris. On the sixth day, horse and chariot races would be held on the Champs Elysées, and street theater shows would be staged for the army. For the seventh day, government officials would organize a country fair in the Bois de Boulogne complete with a feast for “at least some units.” The feasting would continue on the eighth and final day. The soldiers of the Grande Armée would attend a banquet in the arena that had been built on the Champs-Elysées for the races. The overall impression conveyed by the document is that this celebration was intended to display the gratitude of the French nation toward its soldiers. The different components of the celebration demonstrated to the army that each segment of French society appreciated the army’s achievements and sacrifices. For example, during the reception of the army at the triumphal arch near the Bastille, the prefect of the department of the Seine was to give crowns of laurel wreaths to the generals of the Grande Armée on behalf of the central government. Representing the city of Paris, the twelve mayors of the capital would reward them with gold-hilted swords. The program explained, “We wanted, through these dispositions, to make it felt that the highest approval of the people is the finest reward for great actions; but that different portions of the people have to express their gratitude in different manners.”37 Therefore, even though the laurel wreaths were from the Imperial government and the swords came from the city of Paris, the awards received by the Grande Armée’s generals ultimately represented the thanks of an appreciative French people. Similarly, the thankfulness of other sections of French society would be communicated through the different activities planned for the army. The troops would witness the appreciation of artists in their tours to the monuments of Paris and the thanks of scientists in the experiments that they saw. The country fair in the Bois de Boulogne, according to the festival organizers, included the rural population in the festivities. It would serve as an “expression of gratitude from the fields toward those who have defended them.”38 These plans were put on hold due to the War of the Fourth Coalition. Yet Napoleon did eventually fulfill the promise that he made after Austerlitz. Following the Peace of Tilsit, he rewarded his soldiers with victory celebraImperial Virtue

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tions in France. They differed, however, from the festival planned in 1806. To ensure that Prussia honored the terms agreed upon at Tilsit, Napoleon left most of the Grande Armée in Germany. Instead of a monumental eightday festival for the entire army, the Napoleonic regime organized somewhat more modest celebrations for portions of it. The fêtes began in November of 1807 when the Imperial Guard returned to Paris. From November 25 to November 28, Napoleon’s government and the French capital paid tribute to the Grande Armée by celebrating the Guard. While not as elaborate as the festival proposed in 1806, the fête for the Guard incorporated several of its activities. The festivities included a parade under a massive triumphal arch, balloon flights, acrobatic acts, and an awards ceremony in which the Guard’s regiments received gold laurel wreaths for their eagles. The authorities also fueled the revelry by replacing the water of the fountain at the place du marché des Innocents with wine.39 A much larger portion of the army received similar treatment the following year. In response to uprisings in Spain and Portugal, Napoleon recalled approximately ninety thousand troops from the Grande Armée, which remained in Central Europe, for a campaign in Iberia. He endeavored to thank his hard-marching soldiers for their past accomplishments and maintain their morale by organizing victory celebrations in major French cities on their route.40 With the exception of Paris, the Imperial government would give each city chosen as a festival site an indemnity of three francs per soldier to fund the events. By October 10, 1808, the minister of the interior estimated the cost at 972,000 francs.41 Although Imperial authorities orchestrated the festivals, the emperor ordered his minister of the interior to make it appear as if French cities decided to honor the army on their own initiative.42 Leaving nothing to chance, Napoleon likewise provided instructions about the festivities featured in the Grande Armée’s triumphs. He expected local officials to raise monuments, give speeches to the troops, entertain them, and organize banquets in which songs would be sung to them. “Speeches, songs, free shows, dinners,” he explained, “that is what I expect from citizens for soldiers who return victorious.”43 The festivals began on September 10 and lasted well into December. The Grande Armée traversed France in four columns along three principal routes, and the troops of each column usually participated in at least three festivals. The military fêtes of 1808 normally opened at either Metz, Nancy, or Rheims, continued at Tours, Saumur, Sens, or Paris, and ended at Bourges and Bordeaux.44 The army traveled through France in detachments of one or two regiments. The cities chosen for the triumphs celebrated each detach92

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ment as it passed through. The festivities that greeted the troops generally followed a similar pattern, and since each column contained several regiments, they often continued for a week or more. For example, Paris fêted the men of I Corps from September 22 to September 27.45 The opening day of these celebrations reveals the character of the Grande Armée’s triumphs. The fête started at noon when municipal officials headed by the prefect of the department of the Seine took part in a procession to the Pantin barrier. They were met there by the military commander of Paris, General Hulin. At one o’clock, the first units of I Corps arrived. Their commander-in-chief, Marshal Claude Victor, advanced at the head of the column to meet with the delegation from the capital. He was accompanied by his staff, the officers of his units, and their standard bearers. The prefect then delivered a short speech: Sir Duke, generals, officers, soldiers of the Grande Armée! The capital that you are going to enter, decorated by your trophies, proud of your glory, grateful for the services that you have rendered to the patrie, bears you wreaths. The Emperor has allowed us to offer them to you: ornament your eagles with them while you march to new triumphs. Do not be astonished, soldiers of the Grande Armée! Do not be astonished that these hands unaccustomed to handling the weapons of war have obtained the right to attach these palms. Without doubt, it is only fitting for the hero who leads you to properly reward your bravery; but your love for his person, your devotion to his service, your zeal for the national cause, all of these virtues which, by assuring your success, provide for the health of the Empire, it is for the citizens, it is fitting for us to celebrate them; it is important for us to show them as an example to those of our children who pass into your ranks. Let these crowns therefore be for all of the Grande Armée a homage rendered to the civic and noble sentiments that inspire it to so much valor, and for each of you a mark of gratitude from this great city.

Victor replied with an address of his own that promised that the Grande Armée would continue to prove itself worthy of the admiration and rewards bestowed upon it: The triumphant crowns that you just offered to the 1st Corps of the Grande Armée in the name of the city of Paris will henceforth decorate its victorious eagles. The officers, NCOs, and soldiers who compose it will never Imperial Virtue

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look at these distinguished symbols of public respect and gratitude that they endeavored to deserve without promising themselves to earn the sentiment that has given them. The occasion will present itself soon, and then, as on the banks of the Danube and the Vistula, the soldiers of the Grande Armée will show themselves worthy of their name and the honors that they are receiving today. They will acquire, do not doubt it, new rights to the esteem of the Great-People, and to the paternal benevolence of our august sovereign, Napoleon-the-Great. Vive l’Empereur!

The crowds and the soldiers responded with cheers of “Vive l’Empereur!” Bands then played while the prefect attached wreaths to the eagles carried by Victor’s entourage. After the opening ceremony, the army column entered Paris and paraded down the rue du Faubourg Saint-Martin and the Boulevard to the Tivoli gardens. Upon reaching the gardens, the troops sat down to a banquet amidst a large crowd of spectators. The orchestra of the Conservatory of Music played during the meal, and singers, including members of the famous singing, drinking, and dining society, the Caveau moderne, sang songs to the troops. One of these songs predicted that the soldiers of the Grande Armée would soon win new laurels in Spain: The leopards still dare Far from their fleets to provoke war. Follow in its rapid flight The bird that bears thunder; To conquer you only need a few moments; You know, sons of Glory, The flight of the eagle, for a long while, Determines that of victory.

As the soldiers ate and drank, toasts were given by different luminaries to “His Majesty the Emperor and King,” “The Imperial Family,” “The Grande Armée,” and “The City of Paris.” Local authorities also provided various diversions for the troops after the meal. The soldiers spent the rest of the evening being entertained by groups of musicians, “rope dancers,” and acrobats who “performed diverse exercises.”46 Napoleon intended these festivities to instill a desire for glory in the Grande Armée. In his instructions for the celebrations, he explained that the prefects in the departments through which the army was to pass were 94

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Figure 5. “View of the Handsome Triumphal Arch Raised Near the St. Martin Gate and the Entrance of the French Army after Its Return from Its Glorious Campaigns, the 25th of November 1807,” anonymous engraving from Collection de Vinck. Un siècle d’histoire de France par l’estampe, 1770-1870, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris. This image depicts the celebration for the return of the Imperial Guard to Paris rather than the triumphs of 1808, but it illustrates the kinds of ceremonies that the soldiers of the Grande Armée experienced on both occasions.

“by all means” to maintain the “good spirit” that animated the troops and “their love of glory.”47 Accordingly, the emperor wanted the songs used in the fêtes to speak about “the glory that the army has acquired, of that which it will yet acquire, and the liberty of the seas that will be the result of its victories.”48 Glory did constitute one of the primary themes of the triumphs of 1807 and 1808. The rhetoric, symbolism, ceremonies, and purpose of the celebrations all praised the glory that had been won by the Grande Armée and encouraged it to obtain more through new victories. The presence of large, cheering crowds also not only confirmed the glory accumulated by Napoleon’s soldiers but also bestowed even more upon them. Imperial Virtue

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Figure 6. “View of the Magnificent Fête Given by the City of Paris the 25th of November 1807 to Celebrate the Return of the Imperial Guard,” anonymous engraving from Collection de Vinck. Un siècle d’histoire de France par l’estampe, 1770-1870, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris. Similar to the last image, the subject of this engraving is the celebrations for the Guard in 1807. However, it also illustrates the sorts of entertainments offered to Napoleon’s troops in 1808, and the festive atmosphere that prevailed during the festivals for the Grande Armée.

Yet just as the festival planners had intended in 1806, the Grande Armée’s victory celebrations likewise showed its members that France appreciated them. While highlighting the glory won by Victor’s troops, the prefect of the Seine informed them that Paris was “grateful for the services that you have rendered to the patrie.” In addition, he announced that it was important for the citizenry to “celebrate” their virtues, which maintained the “health of the Empire” and which included “their zeal for the national cause.” The Imperial Guard heard similar expressions of thanks the previous year. During the festivities, the Imperial Senate gave a banquet for the Guard in which its soldiers were told, “Representatives of the premier army in the World, receive 96

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from our voices, for you and for all of your brothers in arms, the best wishes of the great and good People whose love and admiration presage those of posterity.”49 Popular gratitude toward the army also appeared in other forms of media and in the actions of the French people themselves. Monuments for the fêtes featured statements that honored the army’s sacrifices as well as the names of its victories. A triumphal arch for the Guard contained the declaration, “Soldiers, your courage vanquished the enemy, your perseverance overcame harsh conditions; eternal thanks.”50 Furthermore, such thanks were still conveyed using rhetoric common to the military culture of the Revolution. At the city of Colmar, Imperial and local officials honored French officers with the toast, “To the brave defenders of the patrie.”51 The soldiers of the Republic would have expected such expressions of gratitude, but even they never beheld a display of national appreciation comparable to the one that greeted the Grande Armée. According to the reports of prefects and articles in the Moniteur, large crowds turned out to support its troops from one end of France to the other, from Metz to Bordeaux. The populace lined parade routes, participated in festival activities, and applauded the soldiers with the cheer, “Long live the Grande Armée!”52 Skeptics might question the popular enthusiasm described in official accounts of the fêtes, and dismiss it as an example of Napoleonic propaganda. The soldiers who experienced them, however, confirmed that the celebrations were well attended and that they had a positive impact on the army. The guardsman Barrès claimed that an “immense mass” of people were present for the return of the Guard. He asserted that “[a]ll the roofs and windows of the houses of the Faubourg Saint-Martin and the boulevards were packed with sight-seers. . . . In short, the enthusiasm was absolute and the festival worthy of the great days of Rome and Greece.”53 Second Lieutenant Alphonse d’Hautpoul was equally impressed by the reception of the Grande Armée in 1808. He believed that “nothing was neglected to maintain our enthusiasm.” As a result, the troops’ morale was so high that “we left almost no one behind.”54 While soldiers like d’Hautpoul and Barrès received the gratitude of their fellow citizens, they also witnessed the French nation in a way that most of the latter never would. When they returned to France and traveled from city to city on the way to Iberia, they literally saw and heard the patrie in the cheers, monuments, songs, speeches, and shows that greeted them. Symbols of the nation, like tricolor flags, were also present in abundance. French troops were treated as the heroes and defenders of France and portrayed as its most valued citizens, whose example would inspire the youth to emuImperial Virtue

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late them. In these experiences, the men of the Grande Armée watched the French nation materialize before their very eyes, and their obligations and commitment to it were continuously invoked and celebrated. The triumphs of 1807 and 1808 displayed the nation to Napoleon’s soldiers in a way that would have been inconceivable for most of the French population before the advent of modern forms of mass communications such as radio and television. The leaders of the French Revolution took a more active role in trying to forge France into a nation than the Napoleonic regime, but even they did not manage to communicate such a powerful and tangible vision of the patrie to the army.

The Warrior Nation and Imperial Virtue But what kind of patrie was it? Napoleon himself did not seem to have possessed a clear conception of the nation, nor did he develop a coherent program for nation building akin to those of the Jacobin Republic. His understanding of the nation derived from his beliefs about politics, which focused on the state. For Napoleon, the nation occupied a position of secondary importance behind the state, and the purpose of the latter was to increase the power of the former and organize its potential.55 To achieve this goal, he employed what Steven Englund calls “nation-talk.” Englund argues that Napoleon treated the term “nation” as an empty category to legitimize his rule, reduce partisanship, and avoid political theories that might produce disunity or opposition.56 He may well be correct about the French leader’s thoughts about nationalist rhetoric, but the military culture that Napoleon constructed did present a vision of France that was far from empty. The Napoleonic nation that appeared in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée evolved out of the image of France that was constructed during the French Revolution. Revolutionary nationalists envisioned a nation that was politically sovereign in which citizens were defined by their virtue, and whose character rested upon the principles of liberty, equality, and unity. Following the start of the French Revolutionary wars, the political and military culture of France increasingly portrayed the country as la Grande Nation, the “Great Nation.” This concept defined Revolutionary France as a beacon of enlightenment that would bear liberty and civilization to the oppressed peoples of Europe. There was a martial and imperial component to this national model, for the Revolutionaries intended to restore the preeminence that France lost over the eighteenth century. The crusade for liberty also implied a need for military conquests and encour98

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aged them. The vision of the “Great Nation” inspired the Republic to expand French influence abroad through military, political, and cultural means to spread the benefits of superior French civilization to others. At least in theory, however, France was dedicated to promoting liberty and equality, and would aid peoples who were suffering under the yoke of tyrants.57 This representation was reinforced by the legend of the nation-in-arms. The Revolutionaries created this legend by making their soldiers into symbols of patriotism that operated as a source of French national identity well into the twentieth century. The military and political culture of the French Revolution claimed that its armed forces were composed of brave young volunteers who left their families to answer the call of the patrie, which was threatened by the forces of tyranny. These men selflessly devoted themselves to the Republic and its political ideals, and shared the qualities of the citizenry from which they came. As such, the armies formed of these citizensoldiers truly represented the French nation, and their unique characteristics caused them to fight better than their opponents. According to Revolutionary propaganda, French soldiers, unlike the mercenaries recruited by their enemies, waged war to protect their rights and the rights of others.58 In Napoleonic military culture, the patrie retained some of the characteristics of the nation-in-arms. Consular and Imperial France preserved the Revolution’s commitment to the cause of liberty through an emphasis on the freedom of the seas. French military songs, Napoleon’s proclamations, the Bulletin de la Grande Armée, orders of the day, and articles in the Moniteur and other journals repeatedly claimed that England sought to rule the oceans of the world in order to dominate international commerce. These goals drove the oligarchs who ruled perfidious Albion, “the eternal enemies of the Continent,” to try to assassinate Napoleon and pay Europe’s monarchies with their “corrupting gold” to wage their unjust war against France, its main commercial rival.59 According to Napoleonic propaganda, England intended to secure global economic hegemony, which its leaders would then use to enslave the world. The French nation therefore struggled to preserve the liberty of the seas for all peoples to prevent this calamity. The cause that it defended was “the cause of Europe.”60 Only when its soldiers defeated England and “broke the scepter of Neptune” in “the hands of the tyrants of the seas” would universal peace be possible.61 Similar to Revolutionary France, the Napoleonic nation also furthered the cause of civilization. In the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée, England was constantly blamed for provoking wars in Europe and for the suffering that they produced. Using the exterminationist Imperial Virtue

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rhetoric that predominated during the Terror, the written and print media provided to Napoleon’s soldiers vowed to punish Britain, which was identified as “the spirit of evil” whose government was “habituated to crime.”62 After Austerlitz, the Bulletin de la Grande Armée described the battle’s casualties and howled, “May so much blood shed, may so many miseries finally fall on the perfidious islanders who caused them! May the cowardly oligarchs of London feel the pain of so many evils!”63 One of the evils that England inflicted upon Europe was the Russian army. Orders of the day and bulletins depicted Russia as a nation of barbarians who devastated the peoples and territories through which they passed. The twenty-fifth bulletin suggested that unlike the French and the Germans, who were “the sons of the Romans,” the Russians were “the children of the Tartars.” Because of their uncivilized origins, it continued, “These savage hordes do not content themselves with pillaging for their subsistence; they seize, they destroy everything.”64 In the military culture of the Napoleonic regime, France defended Europe and its civilization from Russia’s savage hordes and their English paymasters. The Bulletin de la Grande Armée drove this message home. It asserted that the battle of Austerlitz was not just a French victory but “a European victory, because it damaged the prestige that seemed to attach to the name of these barbarians,” the Russians whose “games” were “pillaging, the burning of villages, and murder.”65 Since England was always behind these crimes, Napoleon promised the French army in 1806 that “we will no longer put down [our] arms until we have forced the English, these eternal enemies of our nation, to renounce their project to trouble the Continent and the tyranny of the seas.”66 These depictions of England and Russia reveal the ways in which they functioned as “Others” that defined the French nation. The work of social theorists, cultural historians, and gender historians demonstrates that identities, both individual and collective, are often constructed on the basis of what someone or something is not. The Other is the opposite that provides individuals and groups with a sense of their own identity. For example, scholars like Linda Colley and Karen Hagemann have shown that British and German national identities coalesced in opposition to a French Other.67 The British and Germans developed an understanding of themselves and their nation by distinguishing themselves from the French and France, which possessed contrasting qualities. Because the French were associated with Catholicism, the British perceived their country as a Protestant nation. German patriots who wished to avenge Prussia’s defeat in 1806 and who resented the French occupation under Napoleon regarded the French as superficial, refined, and 100

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sensual. Accordingly, they depicted sensitivity, simplicity, and virtue as leading traits in German national character. The Napoleonic regime and its supporters generally did not reciprocate the hostility of German nationalists. From 1803 to 1808, they directed their anger toward France’s traditional foe, England, and its most powerful ally on the continent, Russia.68 The written and print media issued to the French army, as well as military songs and popular plays, defined the British nation as treacherous, greedy, cowardly, immoral, tyrannical, and even evil. They continuously highlighted England’s deviousness and wickedness by accusing it of violating treaties and “hatching plots” against France and Napoleon.69 They also described Britain as “the enemy of the world’s peace,” characterized its people as “liars” and “cowardly assassins,” and condemned “English corruption.”70 Moreover, songs for the army ridiculed English greed, announcing, “Far from the wars that he causes / the Englishman remains passive / and gorges himself in his quarters / with butter and roast beef.”71 Others poked fun at English cowardice. The aptly titled song “Le pas redoublé” gleefully exclaimed, “For combats, the Englishman, with little zeal / prepares himself very slowly / but he marches at the double-quick / when he beats a retreat.”72 Russia, on the other hand, was brave but barbaric. When Russians appeared in Napoleonic military culture, they were presented as “barbarians” who possessed “a savage instinct with which we are not familiar in our European armies,” and as members of one of the “barbaric nations.”73 Because France opposed these enemies and everything for which they stood, the French nation and its citizens represented their mirror image. The patrie was good, courageous, honest, generous, honorable, and civilized, and it only fought for peace. At times, Napoleon and his supporters made the contrast explicit. In the spring of 1804, Marshal Michel Ney issued an order of the day to his troops in the Camp of Montreuil. It highlighted French bravery and forthrightness by comparing them with the craven treachery of England. Ney vowed that when his soldiers finally “overcame the barrier that separates us from a perfidious and implacable enemy,” they “would prove to him” in “hand-to-hand combat” that “our bayonets are able to strike more sure blows than [their] daggers.”74 The reference to daggers alluded to British involvement in conspiracies to assassinate Napoleon. Later, while Ney’s VI Corps marched to Spain, a song was sung to the Grande Armée that illustrated the differences between the tyranny and immorality of England, and the munificence and pacific intentions of France. It confidently predicted that the French would prevail against their sinister foe: “For a long enough Imperial Virtue

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time, tyrants of the seas / Your crimes have soiled history . . . / We fight for the Universe; / The Gods owe us victory.”75 The image of France that emerges in this song is consistent with the Revolutionary concept of the Great Nation. It committed Napoleon’s soldiers to finishing a struggle that began during the French Revolution, a war to defeat the enemies of liberty that would permit France to bring peace, prosperity, and happiness to Europe. As the French Empire expanded, a more bellicose concept of the patrie overshadowed this vision. This shift coincided with a change in the French understanding of the nation. During the initial stages of the Revolution, the nation took the form of a political community of citizens whose membership rested upon a conscious decision to join it and adhere to its laws and ideals. By the turn of the nineteenth century, educated elites began to conceptualize national identities in a manner similar to German nationalists like Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. They increasingly thought of nations in terms of nationalities, as communities defined by their environment, culture, language, and traditions.76 Reflecting this development, Napoleonic military culture portrayed France as a warrior nation determined to assert its dominance in Europe by acquiring peoples and territories to enhance its grandeur. In contrast to the Revolutionary nation-in-arms, Imperial France became a nation-atarms distinguished by its military qualities. Representations of France that stressed its martial nature were especially prominent in the celebrations for the Grande Armée in 1807 and 1808. The songs and speeches that honored its men characterized France and its citizens as intensely warlike. They identified the French as an “invincible people” and a “warrior people” whose army was the “premier army in the world.”77 The fêtes also exhibited an unprecedented amount of enthusiasm for the French army and its conquests, and displayed a patrie captivated by military achievements and eager for more. As the prefect of the Seine explained to the troops of VI Corps, the festivals showed “the entirety of France occupied with celebrating the return of its heroes, singing about their victories, and encouraging them to new triumphs.”78 The Napoleonic regime associated this passion for war with French honor. It frequently informed the army that France, much like its soldiers, was distinguished by this trait. The patrie possessed a national honor, which was its determination to preserve its reputation and position among the states of Europe. This attribute rested upon the need to maintain the dominant and, in the eyes of French patriots, rightful place in the European order that France had attained in the wars of the Revolution. This belief in the necessity 102

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of French hegemony was reflected in the continued references in Napoleonic military culture to France as the “Great Nation” and the French people as the “Great People” and the “first people of the world.”79 These portrayals of the French nation and its citizenry implied that both were superior to all others. While such depictions were not new, they invoked military conquest to a much greater extent than they had under the Republic. For according to the propaganda materials received by Napoleon’s troops, the gravest threat to the French nation was the loss of its primacy. The Napoleonic regime did warn French soldiers about the physical consequences of military defeat. The Bulletin de la Grande Armée proposed that French provinces would be taken by the Allies and that invading armies, especially the Russians, would ravage the “fair territory of France.”80 Yet, the dishonor that would result from these hardships was presented as a more pressing concern. Napoleon’s proclamations, bulletins, and orders of the day explained that the emperor could not allow France to be defeated or accede to Allied conditions for peace because they would compel France to relinquish its dominance. This development would humiliate the Great Nation in the eyes of all of Europe. The triumph of the English and their Russian auxiliaries, declared a bulletin, would “dishonor France, make it submit to the yoke of England, make it abandon Belgium, and force the Emperor to hand his crown of iron [of the Kingdom of Italy] to the degenerate race of the Kings of Sardinia.”81 Further identifying honor as the distinctive trait of Napoleonic France, the written and print media issued to the Grande Armée depicted the emperor’s wars against the Third and Fourth Coalitions as a duel between nations. It characterized the peace terms that the Allies intended to impose on France as an insult to French honor that Napoleon and the army were obligated to avenge. This representation appeared frequently during the campaign against Prussia. A proclamation by Napoleon opened it by exposing the threat of dishonor posed by Prussia’s demands for the French to withdraw from Germany, which had been the pretext for war. The emperor defiantly rejected the ultimatum and thundered, “What! We will therefore have braved the seasons, seas, deserts, beaten a Europe united against us several times; bore our glory from the Orient to the Occident, to return today to our patrie like fugitives, after having abandoned our allies, and to hear it said that the French Eagle has flown terrified at the sight of Prussian armies.”82 Implying that such conditions violated French honor, the first bulletin for the campaign proposed that Prussia challenged Napoleon, the Grande Armée, and the nation of France itself to a duel. In it, Napoleon said to Marshal Berthier, “They are giving us a rendezvous of honor for the 8th: a Frenchman has never missed Imperial Virtue

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one; but, since they are saying that there is a beautiful queen who wants to be a witness to combat, let us be courteous, and march, without resting, for Saxony.”83 To avoid the ignominy that France would experience if it lost its rightful place in the European order, the Napoleonic regime insisted that it was necessary for French soldiers to fight to defend the honor of their nation. Just like the kings of France, Napoleon identified the reputation of France with his own interests and those of his dynasty. Reinforcing his own and the army’s commitment to protecting national honor, Napoleon declared through his proclamations that he and his soldiers were prepared to sacrifice their lives to uphold the patrie’s standing. After he secured peace with Austria in 1805, he promised the army that it would “do still more than we have done, if it is necessary, against those who would attack our honor or who would allow themselves to be seduced by the corrupting gold” of England.84 The grognards, however, were not only urged to defend the honor of their nation; they were pressured to enhance it. French soldiers were “heroes,” the “honor of France and the admiration of Europe,” who had a duty to bring further glory to the patrie through their victories.85 In the words of the emperor and his officials, they were the “worthy defenders of the honor of my crown and the glory of the Great People,” whose “bellicose eagles” carried “the glory of the French name” throughout “the entire world.”86 Finally, the honor of the army was directly linked to the honor of France. The written and printed materials distributed to the army proposed that it would increase the prestige of the French nation by proving itself superior to its rivals. The proclamation to the Grande Armée on the day before Austerlitz illustrated this relationship. It warned the army that the emperor would expose himself to enemy fire if victory was uncertain. For the honor of the French infantry was at stake, and its reputation “mattered so much for the honor of the entire nation.”87 This nation possessed a French identity rather than an imperial or supranational one. France became an empire in 1804. Because of Napoleon’s victories in the wars of the Third and Fourth Coalitions, it grew rapidly. When the ink dried on the treaty of Tilsit, the French Empire encompassed a wide variety of territories. Its core consisted of France, as defined by its borders in 1789, and the pays réunis. The latter were lands annexed directly to France such as Belgium, Luxembourg, the left bank of the Rhineland, Savoy, Nice, and parts of Switzerland and northern Italy. Beyond this greater France lay the pays conquis, which were satellite states governed by members of Napoleon’s family and French officials appointed by the emperor. They included territories such as the kingdoms of Holland, Italy, Naples, and Westphalia, 104

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the Duchy of Berg, and the Helvetic Confederation in Switzerland. In addition, Napoleon added the pays alliés to his empire. As the name suggests, such states were allied to France and comprised places like the kingdoms of Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony. They were also ruled by their own native sovereigns, but the bonds between them and the Empire went beyond formal alliances. Most of them were organized into the Confederation of the Rhine, a body of German states under French protection.88 Napoleonic military culture stressed the value of the Empire and informed French troops that they were obligated to defend it. When Napoleon was crowned the king of Italy in 1805, the Army of the Coasts and the Army of Hanover sent him petitions that expressed their joy that France and Italy were “members of the same family” and promised that “we are all ready to shed our blood for the prosperity of the Empire and the success of its arms.”89 While references to the Empire occasionally surfaced in the different measures used to motivate Napoleon’s troops, the French nation remained the dominant motif. Between 1800 and 1808, the soldiers of the Consulate and the Empire were continuously told that they were fighting for France. This message indicated that they were citizens of a nation that had conquered an empire to further its own interests rather than members of a multinational empire with its own distinct identity. The Empire did not replace France as the object of the army’s loyalties; it existed to serve France. This phenomenon is not surprising given its historical context. Napoleon’s victories from 1805 to 1807 represented a turning point in the history of the First Empire because they dramatically increased its control over Europe. As it expanded, it did evolve into more of a multinational state that needed to rely on officials and soldiers from outside of France to maintain itself. Moreover, an imperial identity did start to coalesce among the elites who ran it.90 These trends, however, were only just beginning to occur before 1808. Changing ideas about the nation that appeared in the French army altered patriotism in its military culture. The relationship between the grognard and France that was promoted by Napoleon and his collaborators bears many similarities to the bonds that the Revolutionaries forged between the French soldier and the patrie. The soldiers who served the Napoleonic nation, like the citizen-soldiers who served the Republic, were supposed to be imbued with virtue, but they were to possess a different kind of virtue. Revolutionary virtue committed soldiers to devote themselves to the common good of the patrie and defend the Republic from its enemies, which usually meant that they were to protect the physical existence of France and its people. This form of virtue was necessary under the Revolution since the Republic itself was Imperial Virtue

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threatened with extinction in the initial stages of the French Revolutionary wars. Furthermore, the citizens of France were endangered by the invading armies of Europe’s monarchies. The virtue that was disseminated by Napoleonic military culture likewise required French troops to defend the material well-being of France and its population. The emperor’s proclamation prior to the capture of Ulm communicated this goal. It promised the Grande Armée that “we are ready to be everywhere where the patrie has enemies to fight.”91 However, during the Consulate and the Empire, virtue obligated the army to protect the reputation of the patrie as well as its government, its properties, and its people. The virtue of the Revolutionaries and the virtue promoted by the Napoleonic regime both demanded the subordination of individual interests for the good of the nation. These interests were simply defined in different ways. Napoleon combined Revolutionary virtue with the traditional martial values of honor and glory to create a new synthesis that can be best described as Imperial virtue. The personal honor and glory of the individual were extended to the entire nation. This form of virtue required the French soldier to sacrifice himself to maintain the honor and glory of his patrie. The label of “Imperial” is fitting because the concept of virtue formulated by the Napoleonic regime obliged its soldiery to continuously pursue military triumphs. For it was ultimately through military victories and conquests that the prestige of the Napoleonic nation was sustained and enhanced, and French dominance on the continent preserved. Like the martyred Captain Auzouy, the embodiment of Imperial virtue, the grognards were supposed to be willing to give up their lives to contribute to “the glory of our beautiful France.” Virtue did not vanish from the armies of the Consulate and the Empire. It survived and even thrived in their fertile soil along with the honor and glory that saturated it. Napoleonic military culture continued to motivate French soldiers by informing them that they were members of the patrie who were fighting to protect the territories, interests, and welfare of the French people. The military martyrs who perished in the pages of the Bulletin de la Grande Armée and who were commemorated in festivals and monuments reinforced the grognard’s duty to surrender his life and well-being for France. The triumphs of the Grande Armée assured him that his sacrifices and achievements were both appreciated and honored by his fellow citizens. Through 1808, the French army thus remained an army of virtue, but the patrie and its virtue changed. Under Napoleon, the Grande Nation became a proud warrior nation driven by a need for martial success and its determination to maintain its superiority in Europe. This concept of the nation transformed 106

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Revolutionary virtue into Imperial virtue, a patriotism that compelled French soldiers to simultaneously defend the patrie and enhance its prestige. Napoleon and his supporters accordingly encouraged the troops of the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée to fulfill their patriotic obligations by winning new military conquests. The next chapter will reveal how the French warrior nation was also perceived to benefit from its ability to conquer members of the fair sex.

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4 Napoleon’s Manhood Sex and Martial Masculinity in the French Army

The military celebrations of 1807 and 1808 presented more than a vision of the French nation to the soldiers of the Empire. During the festivals for the Grande Armée, the Imperial government organized a series of banquets in Paris in which the Caveau moderne performed for its officers. The Caveau was a well-known organization dedicated to singing and drinking, and it celebrated the achievements of Napoleon’s victorious soldiers with numerous songs. Although the members of the group wrote these songs, they were composed at the request of the emperor himself.1 They were also probably distributed during the festivities in Paris, and sung throughout. One of them, “Aux braves de la Grande Armée,” praised the army’s “brave men” by proclaiming, For being jealous of his reputation For thoroughly doing justice to the taverns For dancing to the sound of the cannon For getting their hands on the girls And then leaving them for their muskets There is only the French.2

Presumably, the Caveau invited their audience to sing along, or the troops joined in on their own. It is easy to picture tipsy officers rising up from their seats, glasses or bottles in hand, wine sloshing around and spilling as they gesture, bellowing out the words. The depiction of the French soldier in the song captures the joyful and exuberant character of the celebration. Yet, the verse is also striking for another reason: it applauded the sexual prowess of Napoleon’s soldiers almost as much as their military prowess. In doing so, “Aux braves de la Grande Armée” communicated a militaristic form of masculinity that identified a lust for war and lust itself as the defining characteristics of the French man. 108

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This appeal to the manhood of the soldiers of the Empire reveals a practice that is common to most military cultures. The primary function of most military forces is to employ violence to defeat the enemies of a state or a society. Since the willingness to intentionally injure or kill other human beings must usually be learned, military forces socialize their members to make them capable of performing this task. The inculcation of particular forms of masculinity played, and continues to play, a central role in this process. Armies normally persuade and pressure their soldiers to conform to models of masculine behavior, or “military masculinities,” that correspond to the needs and goals of the military institution and to broader social and cultural values existing within the state and society that the military serves. To be accepted as a “real” man, individuals in the military must acquire and demonstrate their possession of the attributes comprising military masculinity.3 For example, manhood in contemporary British infantry units is defined by aggression, physical and mental toughness, heterosexual potency, and alcohol consumption. It also comprises cooperation with members of the unit and avoidance of individual acts of heroism that might endanger fellow soldiers. Officers and drill instructors try to develop these traits in infantry recruits and ridicule as effeminate those who fail to display them.4 While some characteristics, such as aggression, bravery, loyalty, toughness, and sexual virility, may appear to be timeless and universal features of military masculinity, the varieties of manhood created for and by military institutions vary across time and place.5 The masculinity imposed on the soldiers of the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée provides an excellent example. It associated manhood in France with innate martial qualities and aggressive heterosexuality. Although perhaps redundant, the most fitting label for this masculine ideal is “martial masculinity,” for it was intended to transform French soldiers into warlike and virile men who personified the virtues of the new warrior nation that had emerged during the French Revolution and Napoleon’s rule. To persuade its troops to internalize its concept of manhood and fight for France, the Napoleonic regime also promised them sex as a reward for military service. It offered them the prospect of a libertine lifestyle in which they would have endless opportunities for carnal adventures. While the lure of easy sex and the manipulation of masculinity to motivate soldiers may appear to reflect trends that characterize most, if not all, military forces, they represent a change in the French army. In contrast to the military culture of Napoleon, the military culture of the French Revolution explicitly discouraged its citizen-soldiers from surrendering to the pleaNapoleon’s Manhood

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sures of the flesh. This politically inspired Puritanism disappeared during the Consulate and the Empire. Napoleonic military songs explicitly encouraged French troops to win sexual conquests among foreign women to prove that Frenchmen were superior to all other men. In doing so, they played a leading role in the transformation of Revolutionary virtue into Imperial virtue.

Military Masculinities and the Militarization of France The martial masculinity that the Napoleonic regime endeavored to instill in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée formed part of a more general program to cultivate military values in France. The French Revolution led to the emergence of a new culture of war, and one of its byproducts was the separation of society into more distinct military and civilian spheres. Furthermore, the military increasingly considered itself superior to civilian society and wished to impose its moral and behavioral standards upon the civilian population to regenerate it.6 Napoleon shared these attitudes, and soon after he secured control of the French government, he began the militarization of the French population. To further his own ambitions and maintain French dominance in Europe, Napoleon felt that it was necessary to both preserve and propagate the warrior virtues that resided in the army. He therefore instructed his officials to foster the development of a “military spirit” in France, and encouraged them to “do things that inspire heroic sentiments in the nation, in the youth, and in the army.”7 Napoleon was not alone in the belief that the interests of the nation would be best served by nurturing its military spirit. Elites like Carrion de Nizas, a member of the Tribunate, eagerly assisted him. Assigned by the government to defend the creation of the Legion of Honor before his fellow tribunes, he implored them, “Let us watch over and conserve with care this warrior attitude, this spirit of military honor, in which our true grandeur resides.  .  .  . All the arts have their excellence and their beauty, without a doubt; but the arts of honor and victory are the true [arts] of the French people. So nature would have it, Providence even.”8 De Nizas and Napoleon did not think that it would be necessary to teach French men martial virtues. Rather, they intended to nurture the military qualities that inhered in them. Napoleon himself believed that the French, in addition to being vain and perpetually preoccupied about their honor, possessed a natural affinity for war. As he explained to his minister of the interior, he regarded the military profession as a “career natural to all Frenchmen.”9 110

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Such beliefs had deep roots. Since the Middle Ages, the masculinity of French noblemen was synonymous with their military functions. Male aristocrats, and especially the nobility of the sword, literally assumed that they had war in their blood. They were believed to inherit the martial traits passed on by their warrior forebears who had ruled and defended France since the time of Clovis. Inside and outside of France, French nobles were reputed to be natural warriors who aggressively pursued opportunities to prove their physical courage and their military skills.10 As the nobility evolved, changes in its composition, the development of the royal court, and the Enlightenment produced competing visions of aristocratic manhood.11 However, the nobility’s traditional association with military service continued to exert a strong influence over perceptions of noble manhood. Assertions about the nobleman’s innate aptitude for war even intensified in the twilight of the Old Regime as nobles found themselves forced to defend their privileged position in the social and political order.12 After the Revolutionaries knocked the aristocracy from its perch atop the Old Regime, they appropriated its military abilities for all French men. The leaders of the Republic worked diligently to purge the army of aristocratic honor, but they transferred the martial prowess identified with the nobleman to the common Frenchman. The citizen-soldier became the masculine ideal in Revolutionary political and military culture. According to this model, the new man who emerged during the Revolution possessed the same innate talent for war that existed among the aristocracy. His warlike potential remained dormant in times of peace, allowing him to remain a tranquil and productive citizen. Yet when war erupted, it unleashed the inner warrior, making the Frenchman a natural soldier whose innate élan and patriotism rendered his attacks, and especially those with cold steel, irresistible.13 During the Revolution, the ideal Frenchman was to be a devoted citizen of the patrie and a soldier when needed. Under Napoleon, the citizen-soldier became a soldier-citizen. The Napoleonic regime employed its vision of martial masculinity to forge a new kind of man defined by his military attributes, a man who was a soldier first, and who earned the benefits of being a citizen through military service. To accomplish this goal, Napoleon and his supporters mobilized every resource and institution at their disposal to disseminate military values among the population of France. In the arts, education, churches, the press, official awards, and public celebrations, the army became a model for society. Napoleonic propaganda portrayed its soldiers as the epitome of French manhood, as hypermasculine heroes whom all Frenchmen should strive to emulate. This process of militarization was unpreceNapoleon’s Manhood

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dented both in its scale and in its intensity.14 Because of its obvious utility for state building, the militarization of France even survived the death of the First Empire. The Napoleonic soldier-citizen evolved into the soldat-laboureur, a powerful masculine icon used to cultivate a French national identity and martial qualities in the peasantry throughout the nineteenth century.15 While Napoleon ruled France, the army did more than serve as a model for French society. It functioned as the principal instrument through which the Napoleonic regime turned French men and adolescents into soldiers who embodied the military values it cherished. Like the radical Revolutionaries who tried to make the army a school of Jacobinism, Napoleon recognized the potential of the army for social engineering. He therefore employed the military culture constructed in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée to pressure and persuade his soldiers to conform to his vision of French manhood. Then, each year, Napoleon’s government recruited tens of thousands of new soldiers from every part of the country, the vast majority of whom were conscripts in their early twenties. It sent them to the army, where they were immersed in Napoleonic military culture, compelled to adapt to its masculine ideal, exposed to veterans who had internalized it, and subjected to the rigors and pleasures of military life for several years. Through these measures, Napoleon and his supporters intended to make military service a rite of passage that would develop the natural military qualities of the French male and forge him into a committed soldier, the truest and best kind of Frenchman. Militarization did not end with the soldier’s return to civilian life. The Napoleonic regime expected him to marry, have children, and become a respected member of his community. In this role, he would transmit his martial virtues to his descendants, the young males of his community, and his fellow citizens. General Junot expressed these expectations to a gathering of soldiers who received the Legion of Honor in 1803. He explained that Napoleon “hoped that in your old age, seated in the middle of your children, you would tell them how you acquired an Arm of Honor, and how they would be able to win one. He foresaw that a sign of esteem, in perpetuating your memory, would become an obligation for your descendants, and never an exemption from imitating you.”16 Inspired by their fathers’ example, the offspring of soldiers would follow in their footsteps, preserving and perpetually augmenting the warlike character of France. Napoleon even admitted to his valet that he hoped to make military service synonymous with manhood to the point “where a girl will not want a boy who has not paid his debt toward the patrie.”17 112

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While the form of masculinity promoted by Napoleonic military culture played a leading role in Napoleon’s efforts to refashion France and French manhood, it also fulfilled a more practical function. It provided the men serving in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée with a powerful source of sustaining and combat motivation. The Consular and Imperial state continuously communicated heroic representations of French soldiers to the civilian population. Boys, adolescent males, and adult men were likewise encouraged to venerate and imitate them. The purpose of these measures was to prepare civilians for military service, generate enthusiasm and popular support for Napoleon’s wars, and, above all, give civilian males a reason for initial motivation. If French men and adolescents possessed the soldierly characteristics that Napoleon attributed to them, then they were more likely to volunteer for the army, or at the very least, report for duty if called to serve. Civilians, however, never experienced the pressures used within the army to promote conformity to its masculine ideal. They only had to prove their martial virtues if they were unlucky enough to be drafted. Napoleon’s soldiers, on the other hand, needed to demonstrate their adherence to the army’s standards of manhood in the harrowing test of combat, and on an almost daily basis while on campaign. These standards were then upheld and reinforced by an environment in which contact with women and civilian influences was restricted, and in which the troops were surrounded and judged by peers who acted in a similar fashion. Michael Kimmel, an influential historian of American masculinity, has convincingly argued that masculine identities tend to be produced more through homosocial enactment than through male-female relations.18 By “homosocial enactment,” Kimmel meant the process by which men establish their masculinity in their relationships with other men. In male groups, men continuously seek to perform actions that affirm their manhood in front of fellow men, forging durable masculine identities that require constant maintenance in interactions with male peer groups. Because the armies of Napoleon kept their members together on an almost permanent basis and limited their dealings with civilians, they placed intense demands on French soldiers to display the behaviors expected of France’s warlike men.

The Attributes of Martial Masculinity The model of manhood used to sustain the motivation of Napoleon’s grognards linked manliness in France to a set of clearly defined attributes. It portrayed French men as natural soldiers who possessed an innate talent for Napoleon’s Manhood

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war that made them virtually invincible on the battlefield. One of the best examples can be found in the song “Aux braves de la Grande Armée,” which was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. It declared, To gaily give battle, To break up [cavalry] squadrons, To batter down so many ramparts, To defy bombs and bullets, There is only the French.19

Other songs expressed similar messages. Adopting the same cheerful tone, a song written to honor the Imperial Guard suggested that the martial qualities of the French guaranteed that they would triumph over their enemies: The Frenchman, lover of Victory, Loving, singing, Drinking, fighting, And r’li, and r’lan, Everywhere wins the victory.20

To further illustrate the inherent French aptitude for war, songs, the Bulletin de la Grande Armée, and other periodicals presented Napoleon’s troops with images of new conscripts who were as enthusiastic for war as the veterans, and fought like them. The Moniteur frequently described the departure of new recruits for the army. In its pages, these events resembled parties in which young men always marched away singing and cheering.21 According to songs like “Le conscrit,” the warlike tendencies of the French male allowed these inexperienced draftees to become talented soldiers as soon as they were received into the ranks. It featured an anonymous conscript who remarked that young men who had “hardly left childhood” were ready to serve: “Like us, they are accustomed to war / While starting in the [military] career, / And the youngest of conscripts / Fights like an old soldier.”22 The ninth bulletin of the 1805 campaign also highlighted the ability of French draftees to develop quickly into skilled soldiers. It contained an account of Napoleon’s meeting with captured Austrian generals in which the emperor boasted, “With a word, 200,000 men will run to me, and in six weeks will be good soldiers; whereas your recruits will march only if forced, and will not be able to become soldiers for several years.”23 114

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In addition to their natural military talents, the men who were so eager to serve under the emperor possessed several other martial attributes. Two of the most prominent were audacity and bravery. Identifying these qualities with French manhood, songs described the Frenchman as a “[p]roud lover of glory” who “runs, flies to victory” while “laughing and drinking / and marching and singing, / Forward!”24 They also claimed that the French were “[c]ourageous, eager for glory.”25 The heroic men who appeared in the Bulletin de la Grande Armée resembled the men in songs. They demonstrated the same fanatical determination to fight, reminding the grognards that men who were daring and courageous in the face of danger represented the masculine ideal. A bulletin from 1805 honored Colonel Beaumont of the 10th hussars for his audacity, “this truly French spirit,” which propelled him to capture a captain of cuirassiers “in the middle of the enemy ranks.”26 French infantry displayed the same boldness. At the battle of Lübeck in 1806, another bulletin explained, “General Drouet, at the head of the 27th Light Infantry and the 94th and 95th regiments, attacked the batteries [defending the city] with this sang-froid and this intrepidity that belongs to French troops.”27 Bulletins even suggested that French men were brave to a fault, and revealed that Napoleon had to restrain overeager soldiers to prevent them from disrupting his battle plans. According to the fifth bulletin for the campaign of 1806, the Imperial Guard could not disguise its anger at being kept out of the fighting at Jena. Several of its young recruits who were “eager to demonstrate their young courage” shouted, “Forward!” Napoleon rebuked them, replying, “What was that? . . . It can only be a young man without a beard who would presume to judge what I must do; let him wait until he has commanded in thirty pitched battles before claiming to give me advice.”28 The French courage that Napoleon found necessary to control likewise made France’s soldiers superior to their enemies. If the Bulletin de la Grande Armée admitted that Russian soldiers were courageous, it also proposed that they were inferior to the French: “Russian troops are brave, but much less brave than French troops: their generals [have] an inexperience, and their soldiers, an ignorance and a ponderousness that, in truth, render their armies ineffective.”29 Bravery was often linked to the Frenchman’s need for glory. Preceding chapters explained how the Napoleonic regime employed an array of ceremonies, rewards, and propaganda to promote glory, honor, and patriotism in Napoleon’s armies. The vision of masculinity conveyed to the soldiery enhanced these efforts by portraying these virtues as essential components of French manhood. Voicing the kinds of sentiments that produced the Legion Napoleon’s Manhood

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of Honor, different forms of propaganda asserted that “honor alone leads to glory / Our officers in the same way as our soldiers” and depicted the men of the Grande Armée as “soldiers who are moved only by honor.”30 Glory also moved the French. The bulletin that appeared after the capture of Ulm proudly exclaimed, “The Frenchman only dreams of glory.”31 The song “Le départ d’un conscrit” informed Napoleon’s soldiers that all Frenchmen should have such dreams. In it, a conscript leaving for the army proclaims, “A good Frenchman loves glory, / I love it by loving victory.”32 As the song continued, it suggested that French men needed to love France as much as they loved glory. The eager recruit consoled his mother with the words, “From childhood, poetry / Had some attraction for my heart; / but now it is the patrie, / it is bravery and the Emperor.”33 In addition, the portrayal of patriotism as an essential element of masculinity appeared in orders of the day and festivals. General Marmont announced the celebration of Napoleon’s birthday to the Camp of Utrecht with an order emphasizing that all true Frenchmen were devoted to their patrie. Praising Napoleon’s contributions to its welfare, the order commanded Marmont’s troops to express their patriotism by demonstrating their loyalty to the emperor: “The day of birth of the Great man who has assured the glory and prosperity of France forever has to be a day of joy for every good Frenchman, and accordingly, there is not a soldier in this army who will not celebrate it with all the enthusiasm that this memorable day can only inspire in him.”34 Like Imperial virtue, the martial masculinity communicated to the armies of the Consulate and the Empire combined patriotism, honor, and glory. One of the best examples appeared in the song “La conscription ou le joyeux départ, en octobre 1806.” While attempting to inspire young men to take up arms against Prussia and Russia, it portrayed all three of these qualities as characteristics that defined the true Frenchman: What brilliant destinies Are promised to good Frenchmen! Patrie, Honor, Happiness, and Glory. Here are the words beloved forever!!! Such deeds, such deeds, Will inscribe sufficiently in history This motto of the French.35

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of French men to endure any form of hardship, a bulletin about the victory at Ulm announced that the soldiers of the Grande Armée marched for days through pouring rain in “mud up to their knees.” What really “afflicted them” was not the arduous nature of the campaign but that “five-sixths of the army had not fired a single musket shot.” “All have marched a lot,” it continued, “and they redoubled their speed when they had the hope of reaching the enemy.”36 A couple of years later, in the depths of Poland, Napoleon appealed to French toughness to sustain the morale of his battered Grande Armée. After the bloody battles of Pultusk and Golymin, he issued a proclamation that challenged his troops to prove that they were still Frenchmen by persevering in the face of adversity: Soldiers, in the middle of the frosts of Winter like the start of Autumn, beyond the Vistula as well as beyond the Danube, on the banks of the Niemen like those of the Sala, you will always be French soldiers, and the French soldiers of the Grande Armée. I myself will direct all of your movements; you will do all that which honor commands; and if they [the Russians] dare to stand before us, few will escape.37

The toughness of Frenchmen, along with their other natural martial qualities, allowed them to become exceptional soldiers. However, they were also endowed with another attribute that rendered them ideally suited for military service: an instinctual love of war. The natural enthusiasm for war that characterized the French man constituted one of the most prominent and recurrent themes in Napoleonic military culture. Speeches, songs, and print propaganda proposed that all Frenchmen regarded war as an exciting and enjoyable adventure. For example, one of the songs written for festivals honoring the Grande Armée in 1808 depicted its soldiers as carefree bon vivants who marched off to war like they were going to a party. “Every one of you, lusty fellows,” it cheered, “loves the table and war, / And runs to the sound of the cannon / Like he runs to the sound of the glass.”38 A speech given by General Marchand during these celebrations presented a similar vision. On behalf of the VI Corps, he thanked Paris for its warm reception. He then proclaimed that the Grande Armée’s return to France gave it “a new life and a new means to fly to new conquests.”39 Napoleonic military culture often linked this desire to a primal need for combat. The martial masculinity disseminated in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée portrayed a love of fighting as an essential component of manliness. It maintained that Frenchmen longed Napoleon’s Manhood

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for battle and greeted war as an opportunity to distinguish themselves in combat. To convey this message, military bulletins continuously presented images of soldiers who were eager to demonstrate their bravery and martial prowess in battle. One from the campaign in Poland offers a good example. It described an encounter during the battle of Heilsberg between Marshal Murat and a colonel of cavalry. The latter, his sword “dripping with blood,” boasted to Murat, “Prince, review my regiment, you will see that there is no soldier whose saber is not like mine.”40 Similar, though less sanguinary, representations appeared in military songs. The songs of the Caveau moderne described French troops as “proud children of victory,” whose “warrior ardor” always “aspires to some great feat.”41 In other songs, the French men in Napoleon’s armies were “burning to fight.”42 It was not just veterans who were ready to fight; the young men who were drafted into the army were also impatient to meet the enemy. The recruit that we encountered earlier in “Le départ d’un conscrit” tried to comfort his distressed mother by claiming, “One day you will know perhaps, / that my happiness comes from combats.”43 These kinds of scenes, in which French men left disconsolate women to satisfy their lust for combat, appeared repeatedly in military songs from the Consulate and the Empire. From them, one receives the impression that the most formidable obstacle in the Frenchman’s quest for glory was not enemy soldiers, but women. French men first had to defeat the female foes that threatened their military aspirations before they could defeat the Allies. In the songs that circulated in the armies of Napoleon, countless numbers of mistresses attempted to prevent their lovers from departing for the army, but they were always unsuccessful. Henri Simon’s “Adieux d’un conscrit à sa maîtresse, à son départ pour la Grande Armée, en vendémiaire an 14” illustrates this motif. In it, a young man drafted into the army bid farewell to his girlfriend, confessing, “for me, glory has a thousand charms.” He then justified his actions by invoking his manly obligation to love combat, win glory, and defend his patrie: Oh you! Who my departure afflicts, Rose, believe me, dry your tears; In the camps I will face the risks, Because a God protects our arms; Moreover, a Frenchman each day For glory risks his life: Before being born for love He was born for his patrie.44 118

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The warlike men of Napoleon’s France left more than miserable mistresses in their wake. A song sung during the festivals for the Imperial Guard in 1807 referred to the reluctance of mothers and wives to allow their husbands and sons to go to war. It praised the Guard by proclaiming that the first step in the French soldier’s military career was “triumphing” over the tears of his wife and mother.45 The despondent women who populated the military songs of the Consulate and the Empire reveal an important change in French military culture. Similar representations did appear in France before 1799. Paintings, popular engravings, and songs from the French Revolution contained emotionally charged scenes in which stoic or eager soldiers answered the call of the patrie surrounded by mothers, wives, and sweethearts who displayed a mixture of fear and sadness.46 These images, however, were presented in conjunction with one of the most powerful icons in the political and military culture of the French Revolution: the Republican mother.47 While this female archetype embodied the virtues of domesticity, modesty, and chastity, it also sometimes resembled the women of ancient Sparta who told their husbands and sons to come home with their shields or on them. Republican mothers in Revolutionary propaganda encouraged their sons to go to war and prepared them to sacrifice their lives for the patrie. This vision emerged forcefully in the “Chant du départ,” a celebrated military anthem known as the “brother to the Marseillaise.”48 In the third verse of the song, a French mother fiercely demanded that her son answer the Revolution’s call to arms: Do not fear tears from our maternal eyes, These cowardly pains [are] far from us! We have to triumph when you take up arms, It is for kings to shed tears! We have given you life; Warriors, it is no longer yours: All of your days belong to the Patrie, She is your mother before us!49

It is difficult to imagine a more striking contrast with the women depicted in Napoleonic military songs. Whereas the Republican mother was a defiant, strong, and warlike figure who actively compelled men to fulfill their military obligations, Napoleonic women relied on displays of sadness and complaints to prevent their men from departing for war. If the Republican mother exhorted her sons to fight for the patrie, women like Rose and the Napoleon’s Manhood

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mothers whose tears the grognards needed to overcome posed a dangerous threat to the military motivation and masculinity of French men. In all likelihood, the female imagery in Napoleonic songs more accurately represented the behavior of the real mothers, wives, and girlfriends who watched helplessly as their loved ones were fed into Napoleon’s insatiable war machine. Yet, they also reflected shifting attitudes about women and femininity in the French government. The revolutionaries possessed ambivalent feelings about active, assertive women like the Republican mother. Initially, many of them welcomed female involvement in the French Revolution. As the Revolution progressed, however, the leaders of the Republic increasingly feared the destabilizing effects of women’s participation in politics and war and tried to confine them to the domestic realm, where they would perform the roles of the dutiful wife and mother.50 They outlawed women’s political clubs in 1793, restricted the number of women who accompanied the Republic’s armies to a limited number of washerwomen and suttlers, and formally excluded women from combat duties.51 Napoleon shared the anxieties that were responsible for these restrictions, but his ideas about women were more complex than historians have recognized. Similar to many of his contemporaries, he believed that women’s emotional nature rendered them unfit for public life and that their involvement in matters such as politics and war could only lead to disorder, which would threaten the stability that he established in France. As a result, Napoleon preferred women who were submissive and homebound. When asked by Madame de Staël who he thought was the greatest woman in history, Napoleon infamously replied, “The one who had the most children.”52 His response was not the insult that it might appear. The example of his mother gave him an admiration for women’s strength, and he attached great importance to their influence in the home and their role as mothers. These beliefs inspired initiatives to educate girls and provide better medical care to pregnant women. On the other hand, they produced measures designed to ensure that women stayed at home and fulfilled the domestic responsibilities that Napoleon considered so crucial for the health of the Empire.53 The Napoleonic Code, for instance, subordinated women to their fathers, husbands, and families. Napoleon’s conception of femininity, together with fears about politically engaged women that existed in France, undoubtedly influenced the military songs composed during his reign. On the surface, the Republican mother might seem like a more effective instrument of military motivation than the Napoleonic woman. Much like Spartan women, the mother in the “Chant du départ” ensured that men per120

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formed their duty to defend their country. She also implied that the men who failed to meet this obligation were cowards who were no longer welcome in their family or the patrie. Yet, the Napoleonic girlfriend, wife, and mother offered French men equally powerful incentives to wage war. The female representations in Consular and Imperial songs appealed even more directly to the masculinity of French men to convince them to fight. By juxtaposing images of distraught women and representations of men who were eager for battle, Napoleonic military songs accentuated the martial character of French masculinity. They expressed an implicit comparison between the genders. If women and the feminine were associated with despair and anxiety in the context of war, men bravely embraced it and the opportunities and responsibilities that it provided. War was portrayed as the natural setting for masculine behavior that allowed men to achieve their full potential. The implications of this comparison would have been clear to the men serving in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. To be a true Frenchman, it was necessary to love war and combat, desire glory, and enthusiastically answer the call of the patrie. On the other hand, femininity meant emotion and fear and a lack of the moral qualities needed for war. These messages constituted an important source of motivation because they threatened the men who failed to live up to the standards that defined Napoleonic martial masculinity with a loss of manhood. They identified such men as effeminate, as lesser males controlled by female influences, who were fit only for the domestic realm, the sphere of women. The women abandoned by French soldiers in songs also shaped the motivation of Napoleon’s troops in other ways. They probably exercised a greater influence over French soldiers than the Republican mother because they bore a stronger resemblance to their real mothers, wives, and girlfriends. There were undoubtedly some French women who behaved like the mother in the “Chant du départ,” but research on desertion in Revolutionary and Napoleonic France indicates that they were few in number. Most families sent their husbands and sons off to war with extreme reluctance. They were more likely to encourage them to desert at the first opportunity than to threaten them with ostracism if they lacked the patriotism to fight for their country.54 Therefore, while the Republican mother may have inspired the citizen-soldiers of the Republic, most of them would not have associated this figure with the women in their own families. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that they would have been persuaded by images of the Republican mother that they would be abandoned by their mothers, wives, and lovers if they failed to display the proper degree of Revolutionary virtue. On the contrary, the men who Napoleon’s Manhood

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served during the Consulate and the Empire would have recognized the sad and worried women in their songs. Since these female models were closer to the reality that Napoleon’s soldiers lived, they may have resonated more deeply with the grognards. In addition, they may have convinced Napoleon’s soldiers to adopt the traits of martial masculinity to differentiate themselves from the women whom they left behind. Furthermore, the imagery in Napoleonic military songs reminded French troops that they needed to protect their women from the enemy. Although the Republican mother called upon her sons to defend their true mother, the patrie, she seemed quite capable of defending herself. A strong, almost Amazonian woman, akin to the central figure in Eugène Delacroix’s famous painting Liberty Leading the People, she can easily be envisioned wielding a musket in defense of her home and family. By comparison, the songs penned under Napoleon portrayed the women who endeavored to keep their men from war as weak, fearful, and intensely vulnerable. These images could only indicate to the soldiers in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée that French women required men to defend them. Along with images of women deserted by bellicose men, songs from the Consulate and the Empire linked masculinity to war by depicting military service as a rite of passage to manhood. They often characterized military service as one of the primary means by which French youths acquired the skills and attributes necessary to become men. For instance, in the song “Le poltron,” a “coward” promised, War hardly pleases me; But if our cousins and brothers, As soon are they are soldiers, Become handsome and well made, I say to you, my dear father, I will leave for war, When they will have made peace.55

Not only did war make men; it provided them with the qualities and opportunities that they needed to be valued members of society. Instead of speaking directly about the transformative potential of the army, most songs conveyed this message through representations of French soldiers who returned home to become successful husbands and fathers. This image emerged in songs like “Le bon soldat,” which claimed,

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Each of our brave warriors, When he returns to his home, Is, in the shade of laurels, A good son and a good brother, A good spouse, a good father.56

Sex and the French Soldier Although French troops would enjoy some of these benefits only after they returned from war, the Napoleonic regime would not make them wait for all of the rewards to which their manhood entitled them. It promised the men in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée that they would receive sex in exchange for their military service while they remained in the ranks. The overt use of sexuality to motivate French soldiers remains the most neglected facet of Napoleonic military culture. Sexual content did not appear in all forms of propaganda, but it pervaded the military songs of the Consulate and the Empire. These songs celebrated the sexual exploits and appetites of Napoleon’s troops almost as much as their martial prowess. For example, the Caveau moderne sang fifteen songs to the Grande Armée in 1808. Seven, only slightly less than half, contained references to sexual encounters.57 According to these songs, the men of the Grande Armée were “Young Heroes . . . in bed” as well as “in combat.”58 This celebration of sexual heroism revealed another component of martial masculinity. Napoleonic military songs reminded the army that the true Frenchman was defined by an aggressive heterosexuality as well as natural military qualities. For instance, they did not simply give Napoleon’s troops military labels such as “soldier” or “warrior.” They also applauded their skills in the bedroom, calling them “[l]overs, drinkers and warriors” and a “lover and soldier in turn.”59 Identifying war and sex as the twin loves of the French male, the songs composed for Napoleon’s armies also explained that when French soldiers were not fighting, their primary goal was to find female companionship. These themes appeared in one of the songs of the Caveau moderne, which stated that after “running, flying” to “where honor invited” them, “A Frenchman loaded with glory / Full of a sweet intoxication, / Only runs at twice the speed / To rejoin his mistress!”60 War clearly remained the primary preoccupation of the Frenchman, but sex came in second only by the smallest of margins.

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Songs also proposed that waging war under Napoleon would provide French soldiers with numerous opportunities to satisfy their compelling sexual desires. They portrayed military service as an aphrodisiac that made French men more attractive to women, and guaranteed soldiers that they would enjoy a rewarding sex life both during and after their career in the army. Highlighting the sexual adventures that awaited the good soldier, one song asked, “What fort has resisted you? What beautiful woman resists you?”61 Songs told the soldiery that the physical enhancement, glory, and patriotic achievements that war provided to French men would enhance their sex appeal. Then, upon their return home, French women would find them irresistible and reward them with love and sexual favors. This message appeared in a song celebrating the Peace of Tilsit: Next to their loyal mistresses, Our brave warriors come running; These kindly enchantresses Change laurels into myrtles. Ah! What a brilliant prosperous destiny! You triumph happy Frenchmen, Over enemies during war, And over the beauties during the peace.62

Another song, “Le retour de la Grande Armée,” asserted that soldiers made better lovers than the men who remained at home because they acquired strength and endurance in the army. In addition, it promised that their superior virility would give them a decided advantage over their civilian rivals: Little shop-keepers, merchant boys, In our sad taverns, Made our nice pretty lasses dance For a few minutes: But here are some lusty fellows Who dance strong and for a long time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The pretty ones that they will choose Will not be at all cruel, And always to these good soldiers We will find them faithful.63 124

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The song “Ronde” by Dupont de Lille even suggested that French women would remain faithful to soldiers who returned mutilated. This song contained a scene in which a French woman, Glicère, agreed to marry her lover, Alexis, even though he had lost an arm and his gaiety to war. Glicère was initially reluctant to accept Alexis as a husband because of his disfigured body and gloomy demeanor, but she overcame her doubts. Swayed by the glory and patriotism of her suitor, she said to herself, Alexis, all covered with glory . . . avenged his country! Of victory Let me be the prize! Count on the faith of Glicère.64

The sexual conquests of French soldiers, however, were not limited to French women. While women like Glicère waited at home, women in other countries would satisfy the amorous inclinations of the grognards while they conducted campaigns abroad. Napoleonic songs repeatedly described the sexual exploits of French troops in foreign lands. Some of them implied that foreign women would become the lovers of Napoleon’s soldiers because of the natural charisma of Frenchmen. One of the songs composed for the festivals honoring the Imperial Guard boasted, “In all places our great armies / Leave brilliant memories. / By their gaiety, the women are charmed.”65 Yet Napoleon’s soldiers not only charmed women outside of France; they also conquered them. Napoleonic military songs depicted women as prizes of war similar to glory and the Legion of Honor. In fact, they often seemed to suggest that victories over foreign women were as important to French men as victories over foreign armies. Consular and Imperial songs cheered each new sexual conquest that accompanied Napoleon’s battlefield triumphs. With great gusto, they told French troops, “You, to the beautiful women, dictate the laws,” and “Sing, drink, and serve the pretty ones; / There are very few cruel ones, / When you attack a heart, / As a conqueror.”66 Some songs were more specific about the kinds of hearts that the French attacked. While the dream of invading England remained a fantasy, French songs promised that the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean would defeat the British army and afterwards, “make the English women dance.”67 The song “A la paix” also described the war against Britain as an opportunity for French troops to obtain English lovers, proposing, “at London, as good soldiers, / You will surely embrace, / All the pretty little girls.”68 Other songs spoke about the Napoleon’s Manhood

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Figure 7. “Return of the Victors of Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, Friedland, etc., etc.,” anonymous engraving from Collection Michel Hennin. Estampes relatives à l’Histoire de France, circa 1807, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris. This image perfectly captures the relationship among love, sex, and war that existed in Napoleonic military culture. After performing their masculine military duties and earning hard-fought victories, which are symbolized by the laurel wreaths descending upon them, French soldiers return home where they are rewarded with love and sex by the grateful women of the patrie. The babies falling from the sky represent the beneficial results of these unions. 126

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German women that the French were far more likely to encounter. Before the Grande Armée left France in 1805, the Théâtre du vaudeville performed the song “Le Départ des camps de Boulogne,” which indicated that its troops would find sex and love in Germany. The song was sung by the French army throughout the Napoleonic wars and featured a grenadier who begged the Boulonnaises to stay faithful to their lovers in the army because “[w]e will dream of your feminine charms, / Although it will displease her, / A German woman / Cannot make us forget a French woman!”69 In a song composed shortly after, French officers bragged about the female prizes that they won during the Ulm/Austerlitz campaign: Valiant soldiers, Gallant Frenchmen You knew how to win two garlands, In beating the German men You attacked the German women, And we see by the booty Made in this short campaign, That you have laid your hand On more than one jewel of Germany.70

While visions of sexual encounters in foreign lands generally implied that French soldiers seduced their female adversaries, they did possess a more sinister side. Songs about women and sex, and especially those that featured foreign women, often hinted at rape. They indicated that women might need to be physically conquered for sex, or at the very least, that soldiers might have to overcome a woman’s initial resistance to achieve sexual relations. A significant number of the songs sung to the Grande Armée by the Caveau moderne suggested that coercion should and did play a prominent role in the carnal adventures of Napoleon’s soldiers. Proposing that French troops would do whatever was necessary to achieve their military and sexual goals, one proudly declared, “By turns Lovers, Soldiers, / Defying all resistance, / You know how in your combats / To conquer and populate states.”71 Another song contained a more veiled reference to aggressive sexual behavior. Likening sex to combat, it urged the troops to defeat the English just like they defeated the opposition of women: “Victory is a woman, / And you  .  .  . French soldiers.”72 The most striking example of sexual violence can be found in the song “Ran plan plan tambour battant, chanson de caserne.” This song, by an author listed as Delormet, described a sexual encounter in Pomerania between a Napoleon’s Manhood

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French soldier and “[a] rather pretty village girl / Coming from a neighboring market.” The soldier was a “drum major / In a brave regiment,” a “[g] ood soldier” and a “joyful lover.” Smitten by the girl, he “approached her gallantly / And spoke to her of love.” Though the girl was terrified, the soldier led her off into the woods, his “heart burning with desire.” Fearing for her life, the girl pleaded, “Alas! What are you going to do to me? / Kill me, that is very cruel!” Undeterred, the soldier had sex with her, and tried to soothe her by replying, “Relax, my dear, / The accident is not mortal: I will only do to you / What Papa did to Mama.” The girl soon overcame her inhibitions and enjoyed the experience. After two, apparently instructive, love-making sessions, she learned “the handling of the drumstick” and even begged the soldier for “a triple screw”: The look of the lass Was lively and endearing: You beat the retreat too soon, She said to me sighing . . . “Enemy that I love so much, Make another drum roll.”

The drum major, of course, obliged. He soon left with the army, and the girl, now pregnant, “was sad for nine months.” She bore the soldier a son, “a little drum of wood,” but he never married her. He only returned for sex, explaining, “I will return constantly / To embrace her three times a year.” In the interim, he occupied himself with other women. Poking fun at “sentimental lovers” who “babble out” their “torment” to “the tender eye, to the blond hair,” he ended the song gloating, “As for me, I am doing it right now.”73 There is nothing subtle about this song. Its graphic language and imagery are particularly jarring in an age where sexual violence against women has thankfully become unacceptable in public discourse. Yet, it is not entirely clear whether the soldier’s actions constituted a rape or a seduction. The song hinted at both, but the soldier seemed to cross the line. The fear of the girl, the image of the soldier pulling her off into the woods, and her initial reactions to the soldier’s advances strongly imply the use of force. Moreover, the song resembles a male rape fantasy. A man encounters a woman that he wants, forces her to have sex, and the woman, who resists at first, finds the sex to be pleasurable and literally pleads for more. Rape was a crime in the French army during the Consulate and the Empire. According to the military penal code of 1803, soldiers who were 128

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convicted of rape would receive a sentence of eight years in prison. If they employed excessive force, relied on the help of an accomplice, or raped a girl of less than fourteen years of age, the punishment was twelve years. The law decreed the death penalty for sexual assaults that killed their victims.74 Furthermore, soldiers in the Army of the Coasts and the Grande Armée who committed rape were arrested, condemned by military tribunals, and sentenced. Orders of the day then announced the name of the rapist and the verdict.75 Such announcements, though, were rare, suggesting that sexual violence was often unofficially tolerated as long as it did not involve excessive force, public disorder, murder, or child rape.76 This practice reflected the customary treatment of rape in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century France.77 “Ran plan plan tambour battant” and songs like it did not explicitly contradict the law, but they did encourage behavior that could lead to rape. They reveal an important, if disturbing, facet of Napoleonic military culture. Similar to the visions of Frenchmen who eagerly left distressed women to march off to war, such songs communicated a set of unmistakable messages. They proposed that Frenchmen were distinguished by a voracious sexual appetite and announced that they would be rewarded for their military service with sex, love, and female companionship at home and abroad. War and soldiering increased the virility and charisma of the Frenchman, which both drew women to him and facilitated his ability to seduce them. Therefore, he would be provided with a steady supply of foreign lovers who would fulfill his sexual needs while he fought to defend the Empire. Then he would be welcomed home by French women who were eager to become the wives and mistresses of France’s heroes. If women, particularly foreign women, resisted their advances, songs proposed that it was permissible, even necessary, to force them to have sexual relations. Portraying the women of France’s enemies as military trophies, songs such as “Ran plan plan tambour battant” proclaimed that sometimes, they had to be conquered like the Allied rulers and soldiers who refused to acknowledge French hegemony. Moreover, they implied that coerced sex was acceptable because women, similar to the Pomeranian lover of the drum major, would eventually experience pleasure in the embrace of French men. Songs likewise promised that Napoleon’s soldiers would suffer no negative consequences for their sexual conquests, forced or otherwise. Delormet’s drum major was rewarded rather than punished for compelling the pretty village girl to make love, he did not marry her despite impregnating her, nor did he show interest in the child that he fathered. Thus, the songs that formed such an essential component of Napoleonic military culture Napoleon’s Manhood

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offered French soldiers the prospect of a continuous series of carnal adventures free of the obligations and entanglements that normally accompanied sexual relations. This trend even reinforced French patriotism by encouraging French troops to avoid attachments to women outside of France that might threaten their loyalties to the patrie. The intensely sexual nature of Napoleonic martial masculinity and the use of sex as a source of military motivation might seem unexceptional, even normal. Many readers will probably assume that the aggressive heterosexuality promoted by Napoleonic songs reflected the swaggering machismo that is common to all soldiers and military forces. There is a persistent and widespread belief that soldiers, by virtue of their vocation, are and have always been predisposed to sexual aggression. Often, the robust sexuality of soldiers is linked to the rowdy masculine climate of military forces and the hypermasculinity generally connected with the physically demanding nature of military service. The feminist scholar Susan Brownmiller takes an even more extreme position in her pioneering study on rape. She argues that war and the military encourage men to unleash their impulse to display their manhood and the superiority of the male sex through the possession of women’s bodies. “In the name of victory and the power of the gun,” she asserts, “war provides men with a tacit license to rape. In the act and in the excuse, rape in war reveals the male psyche in its boldest form, without the veneer of ‘chivalry’ or civilization.”78 Sadly, military conflicts have given men opportunities to perpetrate sexual violence against women throughout history.79 However, the relationship among rape, the military, and war is more complex than Brownmiller proposes. The French government did not always attempt to foster vigorous masculine sexuality in its armies or appeal to the sexuality of French men to convince them to wage war. In fact, the emphasis on the sexually predatory character of French soldiers in Napoleonic songs signals an important change in French military culture. The reliance on sex as a motivational tool in the armies of the Consulate and the Empire, and the aggressive sexuality promoted by Napoleonic songs, form a stark contrast with the efforts of the Revolutionaries to sustain the morale of their soldiers. Before the French Revolution, sex did serve as one of the primary incentives for French men to serve in the Royal army. John Lynn demonstrates that the armies of early modern Europe were characterized by a “sexualized libertine lifestyle” that lured young men into the military and persuaded them to stay once they had joined.80 It constituted an “anti-morality that set proper civilian virtue on its head” and permitted soldiers to engage in activities such as gambling, heavy drinking, and pillage.81 One of the most compel130

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ling components of the libertine lifestyle was the availability of sex. Between 1450 and 1650, large numbers of women accompanied European armies. This practice granted soldiers greater access to women than they would have possessed in civilian communities as well as opportunities to enjoy sex and companionship without having to commit to a formal marriage. In the second half of the seventeenth century, the presence of women in the military declined because European states were able to supply their troops with the services that women normally performed, and because their rulers blamed camp women for the violence and disorder perpetrated by their armies.82 Although licentious behavior in the ranks decreased, the military was still associated with sexual freedom and male virility. Military songs from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries such as “Chanson d’un capitaine” and “Auprès de ma blonde” often highlighted the interest of French troops in women.83 Illustrating the importance of female companionship for the soldiers and officers of the king, the first verse of the former featured a soldier who explained, I joined the army For the love of a beautiful woman. It is not for my gold ring That she gave to another, But because of a kiss That she refused me.84

Such refusals seem to have been rare, for the noblewomen of the Old Regime often preferred soldiers for lovers, providing French aristocrats with a strong motive to acquire an officer position the Royal army. Jean-Baptiste Primi Visconti, an astute observer of Louis XIV’s court, revealed these tendencies. He explained that nobles were willing to bankrupt themselves to obtain a commissioned rank because “whoever does not serve in the war is despised. The ladies do not want any other lovers; it is why many men of the robe leave the profession of the pen for that of the sword.”85 The military and political culture of the French Revolution contained elements of bawdiness and occasionally appealed to the carnal desires of French soldiers. One song informed the troops of the Directory that they would find “lots of forts, and some brunettes and blondes” when they invaded Britain.86 In a study of popular prints, Joan Landes also demonstrates that the Revolutionaries represented the French nation with erotic female images in order to convince French men to devote themselves to the Republic.87 In the armies Napoleon’s Manhood

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that defended the Republic, however, sexual conquests were rarely offered as an incentive to wage war. Romantic love and sex were subordinated to the far more important tasks of defending the patrie and preserving the Revolution.88 Some of the military songs from the Revolution even addressed the issue of sex directly and suggested that French soldiers should not allow themselves to be distracted by it. One of the songs written for the armies of the Republic declared that unlike the Greek warrior who fought “only for his glory, or his mistress,” the troops of Revolutionary France “bore arms” for the more lofty goals of “liberty” and “peace.”89 The song “Ma maîtresse nouvelle” reminded soldiers even more sternly of their obligation to the Republic, emphasizing that they should possess only one true mistress, and she was not a woman: I was up to this moment Smitten with eleven thousand virgins, And for them, piously, I burned all of my nicest candles; But there is a certain beauty, Worthy of all of my endearments Who I prefer in truth, To these eleven thousand mistresses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . You guess that she is the LAW, Well! I would not know how to keep it silent, Since she received my commitment Can fate be contrary to me? I sleep without fear of rivals, In the eyes of this sovereign, Are we not all equal And free although in her chain?90

The discourse about French soldiers, women, and sex in this song highlights fundamental differences between Revolutionary and Napoleonic military culture. The latter may have told French troops that they should not permit women to prevent them from trying to demonstrate their military prowess, win glory, or fulfill their patriotic duties. Yet, unlike Revolutionary military songs, it certainly did not suggest that soldiers should suppress their interest in the female sex. On the contrary, songs from the Consulate and the Empire portrayed the soldier’s insatiable libido as a sign of his mas132

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culinity, and depicted sex as one of the benefits of military service. Through these messages, Napoleon and his supporters restored the promise of a libertine lifestyle to French military culture without returning the women who had originally made it possible. Instead of counseling their military forces to avoid the distractions of love and sex, the songs that they produced explicitly encouraged the troops to enhance their military achievements and their manhood by conquering the women of Europe while they defeated its men. Women may have been yet another laurel for the grognards to win, but these laurels belonged to the nation as well. From Louis XIV to Napoleon, the libertine lifestyle evolved from a threat to the state’s interests into a potent tool that could be used to benefit the patrie. Nothing better reveals the differences between the Napoleonic nation and the Revolutionary nation than martial masculinity and the promise of sex that complemented it. The masculine ideal disseminated in the armies of the Consulate and the Empire played a leading role in transforming Revolutionary virtue into Imperial virtue in French military culture. Revolutionary virtue obligated French men to defend and serve a patrie committed to the cause of liberty and fraternity. While protecting France from the tyranny of kings and nobles, they were supposed to free the people of Europe and share with them the achievements of the Great Nation. Revolutionary expansion possessed an imperial dynamic that led the French to assume that their civilization was superior to all others, and that European populations should acknowledge this truth and accept the leadership of the Great Nation. These ideas about French hegemony, however, rested on a promethean vision in which France would act as a benevolent liberator and mentor. The martial masculinity constructed in Napoleonic military culture presented a very different concept of the nation. It portrayed the patrie as a community of warlike men who were driven by a continuous and unrelenting need to demonstrate their martial prowess through feats of arms and military conquests. The civilizing mission of Revolutionary France and these impulses were not mutually exclusive, for the peoples conquered by Napoleon would presumably benefit from the Great Nation’s leadership. Yet Napoleon’s manhood repeatedly reminded French soldiers that the men of this nation, by definition, were dedicated first and foremost to military triumphs that enhanced their reputation and that of their patrie. In addition, the sexual ideals communicated by Napoleonic military culture fatally compromised the goals of liberation, brotherhood, and mentorship that characterized Revolutionary France. The propaganda of the Consulate and the Empire did sometimes portray other European men as Napoleon’s Manhood

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potential brothers who would help the French create a new and better world. A song celebrating the Peace of Tilsit, for example, proclaimed that peace would “[w]rest the murderous weapon / From the hands of the valorous soldier / Who burns to embrace his brother, / And to be humane and generous.”91 However, most French military songs encouraged Napoleon’s soldiers to embrace not his European brother, but his brother’s women. Liberty meant the freedom of French troops to do as they pleased with the wives and daughters of their fellow men. Rather than furthering France’s revolutionary crusade to aid the oppressed, the aggressive sexual virility of martial masculinity and its accompanying female imagery showed Napoleon’s armies a patrie that was committed to exploiting the population of Europe to gratify the sexual urges of its most valued members. This characterization of France as a warrior nation that required female prizes from defeated countries was fundamentally incompatible with the Revolution’s promise to liberate Europe from tyranny, indicating how much French patriotism under Napoleon metamorphosed into Imperial virtue. The importance of sexual conquests in the military culture of the Consulate and the Empire also added another dimension to Napoleonic patriotism. The sexual victories of Napoleon’s armies over foreign women would not just satisfy the intense sexual cravings of the Frenchman; they would demonstrate his superiority over his European rivals. On one hand, the ability of the French to seduce foreign women proved that they were more virile and attractive than foreign men. On the other, sexual victories won by force over enemy women emasculated enemy men. They signified that foreign men were inferior males whose impotence and weakness made them incapable of preventing the French from taking what they valued most. In either case, Napoleon’s soldiers would assert the dominance of Frenchmen over other, lesser men, enhancing the reputation of the patrie, which constituted one of the primary goals of Imperial virtue. It was here, in the sexual mission given to the French army, that Napoleonic imperialism appeared in its most arrogant, vulgar, and brutally oppressive form.

Martial Masculinity and Military Motivation Martial masculinity provided Napoleon with a powerful tool with which to forge national and gender identities in the French army, and in France more broadly. It also served another, equally important purpose, which was to convince French soldiers to fight. These functions, of course, operated in tandem, for ideas about the nation and manliness formed an essential part 134

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of the value system that made Napoleon’s soldiers willing to perform their military duties. The actions of soldiers at war, in turn, reinforced prevailing concepts of manhood and national identity by confirming the adherence of the troops to them. To sustain the motivation of its soldiers, the Napoleonic regime promoted a masculine ideal in the French army that transferred the military skills ascribed to the aristocracy to the entire male population of France. It identified a set of warlike attributes as the defining characteristics of the French man. They included natural military skills, bravery, audacity, honor, a love of glory, patriotism, toughness, and an innate desire for war and combat. The martial masculinity cultivated in Napoleon’s armies likewise characterized exuberant, even predatory, heterosexuality as a French trait, encouraging the grognards to be as bold in the bedroom as they were on the battlefield. This model of male behavior motivated the soldiers of the Consulate and the Empire by pressuring them to prove their manhood by displaying its qualities while on campaign and in combat. Soldiers who failed to do so risked emasculation. They exposed themselves to the danger of being considered the equivalent of women who sought to keep their husbands and sons at home. This threat intensified in the hypermasculine setting of the army, for its members were immersed in an environment populated by the very men who personified Napoleon’s vision of manhood. Along with the stick of emasculation, Napoleonic military culture offered French troops the tempting carrots of love and sex. Yet, not only were Napoleon’s armies promised female bodies; French military songs portrayed the conquest of foreign women, whether by seduction or by force, as a patriotic duty. Even as songs informed French soldiers that military victories led to sex, they challenged the men of the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée to demonstrate their masculinity and their patriotism by exploiting the libertine lifestyle that Napoleon’s wars offered. Gender also played an important role in other facets of Napoleonic military culture. Napoleon attempted to legitimize his political power in the army by portraying himself as a hypermasculine ruler who was determined to prevent dangerous female influences from intruding into the spheres of politics and war. The following chapter examines this effort, and the other means by which Napoleon endeavored to secure the loyalty of his troops.

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5 Clothing the New Emperor Creating the Cult of Napoleon

After the Peace of Tilsit, Marshal Soult’s IV Corps occupied Prussia in order to ensure that it paid an enormous war indemnity that Napoleon imposed upon the unfortunate monarchy. Even though Soult’s troops resided on foreign soil, they continued to celebrate the festivals of Imperial France. In 1808, two divisions of IV Corps that were camped near the city of Stettin observed the fête of Napoleon by participating in a ceremony in which they marched past a monument that they had constructed. It was an earthen mound in the shape of a spire topped by an altar. The altar itself was decorated with a trophy of arms and a “colossal” bust of Napoleon.1 Altars, statues, and military processions formed part of the normal symbolic repertoire of French festival culture in the Old Regime and the Revolutionary era. This scene presents a striking image nevertheless. It evokes a religious sensibility, a feeling of worship: French soldiers professing their faith to their new god by parading around a shrine built in his honor. Historians have taken notice of the quasi-religious character of Napoleon’s relationship with his men. The reverence that the grognards displayed toward their leader both during and after the Napoleonic wars led various scholars to claim that a “cult” of Napoleon developed in the French army.2 Most ascribe the troops’ cultlike devotion to the emperor to obvious sources such as his personal charisma, his ability to relate to his soldiers, his military talents, and the rewards that he distributed.3 While these practices and qualities played a leading role in Napoleon’s efforts to motivate his soldiers, his transformation into an object of worship went beyond them. Napoleon spent most of his life preoccupied with his public image, and he continuously invented and reinvented himself according to his circumstances. The obsession never left him.4 Even in defeat, from his miserable prison in the middle of the South Atlantic, he crafted a vision of himself in the Memorial of Saint Helena by Emmanuel de Las Cases that cap136

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tivated the Western imagination throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The military, too, was one of Napoleon’s most attentive audiences. Yet despite the time and energy that Napoleon expended in performing for it, the historical literature on his armies generally neglects the symbolic and politically charged depictions of him that were an essential part of the show.5 This chapter presents a more balanced view of Napoleon’s image making and demonstrates that such representations were a critically important facet of the French army’s motivational system. Because Napoleon required the army’s support to achieve his political and military goals, he and his supporters constantly endeavored to legitimize his rule in the eyes of the troops in order to maintain their loyalty. They strove to establish a cult of Napoleon by communicating a mixture of different ideas about him. As with Napoleonic honor, these representations did not present a unified, coherent message. They both complemented and conflicted with one another, and they changed over time. The cult of Napoleon offered French soldiers multiple reasons to venerate and serve their leader, and it proposed that his legitimacy derived from varied, and even contradictory, sources such as popular sovereignty, divine right, and military success. Ignoring these inconsistencies, the Napoleonic regime tried to invest the new emperor with a sacrality that would captivate his men and secure their allegiance.

Monarchies in Crisis: The Evolution of Kingship in Eighteenth-Century Europe During the eighteenth century, absolute monarchy was the main form of government in Europe. The political culture that upheld it rested on the theory of royal Absolutism, which was developed most fully in France.6 According to this theory, the power of the French king issued from God Himself, who placed the monarch on his throne to carry out His will and administer to His people. Since the king ruled by divine right, his authority was absolute. He was supposed to abide by the laws of religion and the “fundamental laws of the realm,” which were never formally defined, but he was not beholden to any earthly power. His subjects owed him obedience even if they considered his actions unjust. The ruler also performed other functions that maintained the political, social, and religious order. The king and his realm were one, conjoined in a mystical union that obligated him to protect its physical integrity, its reputation, and his subjects by force of arms. The living embodiment of his kingdom, the monarch was at the same time the father of his people and the head of the social body who ensured that its diverse members Clothing the New Emperor

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worked together to sustain it. He possessed a duty to preserve the welfare of his people and guarantee the privileges of the different groups that made up the society of the Old Regime. As God’s lieutenant, the king made sure that the laws of the church were observed as well. While these responsibilities and powers inhered in the king from birth, Absolutist political culture employed an array of symbols and rituals to make them coterminous with his person. The coronation ceremony, which was held at the Cathedral of Rheims, invested the monarch with the sacred and secular trappings of his office, such as the sword of Charlemagne, formally giving him the authority to rule. To remind the populace of the ruler’s relationship with God, the French monarchy organized ceremonies in which the king, whose touch was believed to heal disease, laid hands on the sick. The Te Deum was another important element of the royal religion. A Te Deum is a chant that was sung with exceptional pomp to give thanks to God for a fortunate occurrence. The monarchy ordered them to be sung in every parish of the realm for special occasions like military victories and royal births, and the ritual served an important political function by manifesting royal power where the ruler could not be present. By commanding the chanting of Te Deums, the king publicly displayed his sacred essence and his communion with God, whose favor was shown by the providential event for which the chant was held.7 Many of these customs and ideas predated absolute monarchy, but they took on a heightened significance in it. The principal architect of this change was King Louis XIV of France. Of all of Europe’s absolute monarchs, none cast a longer shadow in the realm of royal propaganda than the Sun King. He constructed a political culture that continuously presented the monarch as the exclusive source of authority.8 This process began with the powerful aura that Louis and his ministers assembled around his person. After the death of Cardinal Jules Mazarin, he famously refused to appoint a chief minister, which announced that he would rule France by himself. His carefully controlled behavior reinforced this message. Louis was an active ruler who frequently appeared before his people and conspicuously performed the duties of his office. He made a show of attending the meetings of Royal government councils, supervising his officials, and campaigning with his armies. Not content with managing his own body, he attempted to regulate those of his subjects. The most potent instrument in this endeavor was the Chateau de Versailles. Louis designed the palace, which became the home of the Royal court in 1683, to be the political center of France. Its grand scale and elaborate ornamentation were intended to manifest his grandeur as a king. He tried to tame French elites by requiring them to be present at court, 138

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mandating the observance of a strict court etiquette, and making himself the focus of all activities. Courtiers attended his awakening and bedtime rituals with clockwork regularity and kneeled upon entering his empty bedchamber. In addition, Louis XIV exercised constant surveillance over his court and his realm, which conveyed the impression that he was an omniscient ruler whose gaze extended everywhere. Beyond Versailles, the Sun King projected his power through control over culture. Louis XIV’s monarchy patronized authors like Bishop Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet to compose elaborate theories of Absolutism. It also founded royal academies such as the Academy of Painting and Sculpture to secure a monopoly over the production of high culture. Through these academies, Louis’ government enlisted the most talented artists and intellectuals in France to create art and literature that celebrated his qualities and accomplishments. These practices informed the king’s subjects, no matter how humble or how grand, that his authority was absolute, that he was the only sun around which all of France orbited. The Absolutist political culture of the Sun King was representational in nature. It represented the monarch’s authority before his subjects, who were supposed to passively accept it. Royal propaganda displayed his majesty without the desire for any response except compliance.9 The political theater performed by Louis XIV also rendered Absolutist political culture intensely personal. The Sun King’s endless self-presentation and the imagery and rituals that accompanied it created a polity in which the institution of the monarchy was strongly identified with the individual monarch.10 This trend ran counter to modern concepts of the state that were emerging in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period. Political theorists and rulers themselves increasingly associated the state with the institutions of government, and the legal and constitutional order that they maintained. Furthermore, they began to separate the state from the ruler. Similar to the medieval doctrine of the king’s two bodies, early-modern political theory held that individual kings died, but the state endured and possessed its own assets and interests.11 Louis XIV recognized this truth, but his political culture collapsed this distinction through its obsessive focus on the Sun King himself, making it difficult to differentiate the Absolutist state from the monarch who ruled it. The famous remark, “L’État, c’est moi,” that has been attributed to Louis XIV exemplified the identification of the king with the Absolutist state. The ongoing project during his reign to realize this statement, regardless of who actually said it, invested him with sacrality. This term possesses a strong religious connotation and normally refers to the sacred quality attached to a person, place, or object. Louis was a sacralized ruler in the religious sense. Like other French Clothing the New Emperor

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kings, he received God’s holy essence at birth and through the ritual of the coronation, and it both sanctified and conferred the authority that he exercised as a monarch. Social scientists, however, have redefined sacrality to give it a more expansive meaning. They identify it as the sacred quality that human societies bestow upon their social and political environment. Psychologically, human beings find it difficult to accept that their political and social institutions are arbitrary constructions of their own creation. They therefore link these entities to higher powers, whether religious or secular in nature, or both. They also associate them with a transcendent purpose such as the fulfillment of a divine mission to carry out God’s will or to liberate humanity from tyranny. Through these endeavors, people transform their communities, civilizations, and governments from accidents of history into elements of the natural order of the universe, as part of the way that things should be. Moreover, sacrality plays a leading role in politics. Rulers sacralize themselves and their governments to secure legitimacy. Using symbols, rituals, stories, and other instruments, they attempt to connect themselves to the social and political order in such a way that their exercise of power seems not only natural but necessary and fundamentally right. When they are successful, their sacrality imbues them with the aura of authority that emanates from political leaders, with the majesty of kings and the gravitas of presidents, which causes them to appear more than human and almost like demigods.12 The aura that surrounded the Sun King corresponds to this broad definition of sacrality, for it was more than religious. Akin to the symbol that represented him, Louis XIV occupied the center of the French universe and literally and figuratively drew every part of it into his orbit. Without him, his propaganda machine implied, the political and social order would cease to function properly. While hostile to this development, the Protestant pastor Pierre Jurieu accurately described it, writing, “The King has taken the place of the state. . . . The King is now everything and the state is nothing any more. . . . He is the idol to whom whole provinces, the high and the mighty as well as the lowly, towns, finances—in short everything—are sacrificed.”13 The radiance of Louis XIV’s sacral aura dimmed in his later years because of conflicts provoked by his religious policies, military defeats, and the suffering inflicted by his wars. Nevertheless, the Sun King’s brand of Absolutism captivated Europe’s monarchs as much as his own subjects. It became a model that other rulers, from minor princes to great emperors, sought to emulate.14 Once Absolutist political culture was entrenched, a series of developments arose in the eighteenth century that threatened its very foundations. The most important included the advance of secularization, the Enlighten140

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ment, the growing political significance of the nation, and the formation of the public sphere, a widespread communications network in which individuals engaged in the free exchange of ideas.15 These trends challenged the religious beliefs that defined Absolutism and established the nation and public opinion as alternate sources of authority to monarchs. The philosophes and the participants of the public sphere also generated a critical spirit that led educated Europeans to interrogate the core principles of Absolutist political culture and to propose alternatives when they found it wanting. The monarchies who survived the tumultuous eighteenth century reinvented themselves in accordance with these changes. In Prussia and the Habsburg Empire, the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs developed Enlightened Absolutism. Rulers such as Frederick the Great and Joseph II portrayed themselves as servants of the state whose personal interests were subordinate to the welfare of their country. They embraced the Enlightenment and introduced reforms based on its ideals to enhance the state’s power and efficiency, and benefit their people.16 The Hanoverian dynasty adopted a different approach in Britain, where a strong sense of nationhood emerged in the eighteenth century.17 After suffering a humiliating defeat in the War of American Independence, King George III and his supporters resurrected the British monarchy by forging a new model of patriotic kingship that appealed to this national identity. George III backed politicians like William Pitt the Younger who were renowned for their commitment to public service, and introduced a new ceremonial culture that celebrated British traditions and achievements. Royal celebrations likewise featured appearances by the king and welcomed the participation of the populace. Equally important, George was remarkable for his sheer ordinariness. Unlike his continental counterparts, he avoided ostentation. He enjoyed his role as a husband and father, established a reputation for piety and personal morality, displayed an avid interest in agriculture, and allowed his subjects access to his person. Through these activities, George III succeeded in turning himself into a living patriotic icon who represented the qualities and interests of the British nation.18 George III’s political recovery was due in no small part to the failures of his French rivals. The Bourbons stubbornly clung to the traditions that they inherited from Louis XIV. The Sun King’s successors did recognize that some change was necessary. For example, the growing prominence of the nation inspired the monarchy’s defenders to promote royal patriotism in the second half of the eighteenth century. It equated patriotism with love of the king, who was indistinguishable from the patrie.19 When push came to shove, however, the Bourbons asserted their authority over the nation. Throughout the eighteenth Clothing the New Emperor

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century, the French monarchy waged a series of political battles to suppress the Jansenist religious movement, introduce financial reforms, and prevent its high courts, the parlements, from imposing limits on its power. During these struggles, the parlements and their supporters opposed the king and conducted their campaign against him in the public sphere. They maintained that the judges represented the French nation, whose rights were being violated by the monarchy’s despotic actions. Louis XV and Louis XVI responded by dismissing these claims on the grounds that sovereignty resided exclusively in the king. Both rulers likewise sought to coerce their foes into submission. With Louis XV’s support, Royal Chancellor René-Nicolas-Charles de Maupeou exiled the judges of the Parlement of Paris in 1771 and restructured France’s court system. In 1788, Louis XVI tried this tactic with much less success. He then made the fatal mistake of trying to escape from Paris in 1791 during the “flight to Varennes” to rally his supporters against the new Revolutionary government. These measures turned public opinion against both kings, causing them to be perceived as tyrants. Almost as damning, France’s unimpressive military performance for much of the eighteenth century conveyed the impression that the monarchy was incompetent as well as tyrannical. Louis XIV might have been able to recover from these blows, but the men who followed him lacked his talents, charisma, and work ethic. Louis XV and Louis XVI felt uncomfortable in the public eye and overburdened by the duties of kingship. Consequently, both often avoided court, neglected their political responsibilities, and rarely appeared before their subjects. To function effectively, the representational political culture of Absolutism needed a monarch who maintained himself at the center of his kingdom’s political, social, and cultural life. The last two Bourbon kings before the French Revolution failed miserably at this task. Their absence in the Royal government and the ability of influential women like Madame de Pompadour and Queen Marie Antoinette to affect its policies likewise convinced educated elites that the monarchy was becoming corrupt and effeminate. These mistakes and the personal shortcomings of Louis XV and Louis XVI eroded the sacral aura that their predecessors so painstaking assembled. This desacralization began to divest the king of his semidivine status and his sacrosanct position at the heart of the political and social order. Since the king was so strongly identified with the Absolutist state, this process also eventually generated questions about the necessity of the monarchy itself. These trends and popular dissatisfaction with Bourbon Absolutism contributed to the movement to reform the Royal government that culminated in the French Revolution, and the complete elimination of the monarchy in 1792.20 142

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Bonaparte the Hero: From Political General to First Consul The destruction of the monarchy transferred sacrality to the entities deified by the Revolutionaries such as the nation, the patrie, the people, and the Republic.21 Napoleon lived through these changes and understood the need to manage public opinion in order to avoid the fate of Louis XVI. A more astute observer than the last two Bourbon kings, he also recognized that French political culture was still evolving and that negotiating its treacherous currents would not be easy. Napoleon’s political ambitions appeared early in his military career, but his true political apprenticeship began in the Army of Italy. His success as its commander-in-chief led him to craft a public image designed to maintain the loyalty of his soldiers and establish his reputation among the civilian population of France. The propaganda that originated in General Bonaparte’s headquarters presented him as a Revolutionary hero who was full of boundless energy and endowed with a unique genius that allowed him to master any situation, yet who was still selfless and committed to the French nation.22 To stay in the spotlight after the Italian campaign, he added new dimensions to his image. He acted as if he wished to avoid public acclaim in order to demonstrate his gravity and humility. In an attempt to win over civilian elites, he cultivated relationships with leading artists and scholars to convey the impression that he was a man of culture. Finally, he projected a simple, unkempt, and even frail physical appearance to make his accomplishments, which were at odds with his unimpressive figure, more astonishing.23 These techniques of self-promotion transformed Napoleon into a national hero. They likewise gave him the political stature necessary to become a leading figure in the intrigues that resulted in the overthrow of the Directory. Afterward, the public support enjoyed by the general allowed him to outmaneuver his rivals and secure the most important position in the Consulate. Once Napoleon was in charge of the government, he consolidated his power by continuing his campaign to conquer public opinion. Although he was accustomed to self-promotion, this activity represented a break with the practices of Revolutionary politicians and constituted one of the foundations of his political success. Ambitious individuals generally refrained from creating cults of personality during the French Revolution because of its egalitarian ethos, and they understandably wished to avoid the lethal label of tyrant, which they risked by overtly engaging in the pursuit of power. More than his idealistic predecessors, Napoleon realized that his contemporaries found it easier to identify with a particular person than with abstract principles like liberty, reason, and virtue.24 Clothing the New Emperor

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Napoleon conducted his public relations campaign with particular vigor in the army. For he was no longer just a general; he was the principal leader of the Republic. According to the Constitution of the Year VIII, which established the Consulate, he commanded all of the military forces of France.25 To perform the duties attached to his position, he needed to obtain the allegiance of troops who had never served under him. There were also compelling political reasons to acquire the support of the army. Its leaders frequently participated in political intrigues under the Directory. If the first consul wanted to prevent another coup d’état, it was imperative for him to convince the military that he deserved to govern. Relying on the techniques that had worked so well in the past, Napoleon sought to win over France’s soldiers with the image of the Revolutionary hero. He did, however, alter it to fit his new role. The military culture of the Consulate portrayed Napoleon as a devoted servant of the nation who preserved the ideals of the Revolution. This vision appeared in the army immediately after the coup of Brumaire, laying the foundations for his cult. To reassure the troops about Napoleon’s Republican principles, the commanders of the Army of Holland, the Army of the Rhine, and the Army of Italy issued proclamations when the Constitution of the Year VIII was ratified. One of them asserted that the document proved that the new consuls were dedicated “to the sacred cause of liberty.”26 The first consul and his supporters made the concept of the Revolutionary hero even more compelling through the myth of the savior. This representation depicted Napoleon as a messianic figure who used his extraordinary qualities to save the patrie from its enemies, rescue the Republic from its fratricidal conflicts, and bring the Revolution to a successful conclusion.27 Savior imagery was especially prominent after the discovery of a plan to assassinate Napoleon in 1804 involving General Moreau and the infamous counterrevolutionary Georges Cadoudal. Announcements in the army presented the plot as such a serious matter because it might have deprived France of the individual who had singlehandedly averted the calamities that imperiled its existence. General Soult’s order of the day for the Camp of St. Omer revealed the conspiracy by proclaiming, “SOLDIERS. . . . The life of the FIRST CONSUL was threatened. . . . But the plot was foiled, France will fulfill its high destinies, and BONAPARTE will live to assure them.” Reminding his troops that the patrie owed its well-being to Napoleon, Soult then promised, “we will be the shield of the Hero. The same thought, one sole sentiment animates us; it is to defend the life upon which rests the glory, the prosperity, the welfare of France, and the honor of the French name.”28 Along with the myth of the savior, the first consul maintained his ties to the Revolution through its festivals. With Napoleon’s encouragement, French 144

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troops continued to observe the fêtes of July 14 and 1 vendémiaire.29 In Paris, the first consul participated in the festivities, using the occasion to review the troops stationed in the capital. He often distributed flags during these inspections and administered oaths to the soldiers who received them. In the celebrations for July 14 in 1801, Napoleon awarded new standards to a group of units gathered at the Place du Carousel, and commanded, “Soldiers, you will always need to rally to this flag; swear that it will never fall into the hands of the enemies of the Republic, and that you will all perish, if it is necessary, to defend it.”30 Although this vow resembled the one that accompanied the Empire’s eagles, it differed in two crucial respects. It did not contain references to Napoleon, and it committed French troops to the defense of the Republic. The pledge therefore placed the first consul in a subordinate position to the latter, indicating that while he may have been both a hero and a savior, he governed as a servant of the Republic and the Revolution that created it. Even when Napoleon was not physically present, the festivals of 1 vendémiaire and July 14 communicated this message to French soldiers. The symbolism and ideals associated with the fêtes, which commemorated the founding of the Republic and the overthrow of absolute monarchy, announced to the army that Napoleon’s government would keep the French Revolution’s legacy intact.

Napoleon, by the Grace of God and the Constitutions of the Empire, Emperor of the French France did abandon the holidays of the Republic after 1805, but the representation of Napoleon as a Revolutionary hero endured, even though it assumed different forms as his cult evolved. This evolution was required by the creation of the Empire. Napoleon’s metamorphosis from the presidential figure of the first consul into a hereditary emperor forced him to reinvent himself again. This task presented a daunting challenge. He needed to avoid alienating those who supported the Revolution and who fought for over a decade to prevent the return of monarchy to France. At the same time, he wished to gain the support of constituencies who opposed the Revolution and adhered to more traditional values. He also desired to gain acceptance among Europe’s ruling class, which was not inclined to treat the him as an equal. In the army, where he was both sovereign and field commander, Napoleon faced the added necessity of persuading his soldiers to risk their lives for him. As a new monarch, he tackled these obstacles with his customary dynamism. He launched himself on a continuous search for legitimacy that inundated the military with imagery, symbols, and ceremonies. The Clothing the New Emperor

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representations of the emperor that appeared in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée expanded the cult of Napoleon beyond the concept of the Revolutionary hero. They associated him with multiple sources of authority, simultaneously presenting him as an absolute monarch, a patriotic emperor, and a Romantic hero. This scattershot approach reflected the complex political environment that existed in France, but it also resulted from Napoleon’s awareness of his precarious position. He lacked the royal blood and the dynastic tradition of governing that guaranteed Europe’s ruling families the automatic support of their subjects. The former Revolutionary general, whose reign began with a coup d’état, therefore needed to compensate with other kinds of legitimacy. At one point, Napoleon acknowledged the difficulties of this endeavor to one of his officials. Voicing his frustration, he complained, “my position resembles nothing like that of established sovereigns. They can live with indolence in their palaces; they can succumb without shame to all the diversions of a dissolute life; no one will contest their rights of legitimacy; no one will think of replacing them. . . . As for me, everything is different. . . . I only reign because of the fear that I inspire.”31 The Napoleonic regime resolved this dilemma by relying on quantity to make up for Napoleon’s deficiency in royal qualities. It clothed the new emperor by fashioning a sacral aura from every available material that promised results.32 Napoleon’s envy toward his fellow rulers at least partially explains the speed with which he was willing to adopt the mantle of absolute monarchy. Following the declaration of the Empire, kingly images of the emperor appeared in the Army of the Coasts and the Army of Hanover that linked Napoleon to the traditions of French royalty. These representations indicated that like his Bourbon predecessors, the emperor received his authority from God. Nothing conveyed this message more clearly than Napoleon’s coronation. It occurred after Napoleon was placed in his new position by the political assemblies of the Consulate. The initiative to proclaim the Empire was debated first in the Tribunate. Following this procedure, the Senate voted to make him emperor. The French people then approved the new imperial monarchy through a plebiscite. Yet Napoleon still felt that more was needed. A noble who grew up in the Old Regime, he recognized the power of the coronation ritual to capture the public imagination and enhance the majesty of monarchs.33 He therefore decided to organize an elaborate ceremony to crown himself emperor on December 2, 1804, that was presided over by the pope. While influenced by royal traditions, the imperial coronation differed significantly from its predecessors. It was not held at Rheims, but in the cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris. Any symbolism or rituals that might suggest too 146

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much deference to the Catholic Church were kept out of the ceremony. For example, the king normally received his crown from the archbishop of Rheims and swore an oath to “maintain peace in the church, oppose all rapine and all injustices, to enforce justice and mercy in all judgments, and exterminate heretics.” Napoleon, on the other hand, famously crowned himself and Josephine, and vowed to preserve religious freedom, which was denied by the king’s pledge.34 Despite these innovations, Napoleon was nevertheless crowned in a religious ceremony in the presence of the pope. Just as with French kings, his body was anointed with holy oil and he was invested with consecrated symbols to sanctify his authority. The items with which Napoleon was endowed were known as the “honors” of the emperor. They represented his different powers and consisted of a ring, a sword, a mantle, a globe, a scepter, and the hand of justice, which was a metal rod topped with a hand. After Napoleon’s anointment, the pope blessed the honors. Napoleon and his entourage then placed them upon his person or in the care of his attendants, and the pope said prayers about the functions associated with each one.35 Even if the emperor’s coronation featured Republican elements, it was impossible to miss the meaning of these rites: Napoleon was trying to claim the divine right of kings. The significance of the coronation was not lost on the army. Napoleon intended the military to play a leading role in its events, which included the distribution of the army’s eagles. Accordingly, the Imperial government required a delegation from every regiment to attend, with each containing a colonel, four other commissioned officers, five noncommissioned officers, and six enlisted men.36 Soldiers outside of Paris were also aware of the religious character of the emperor’s coronation. The Moniteur published a detailed program of the ceremony that described its rituals.37 In addition, military authorities informed the troops that the Pope would conduct the coronation. Shortly beforehand, the order of the day of the Camp of St. Omer announced, “The 11th of this month [frimaire], the army will celebrate the august day where NAPOLEON, FIRST EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH, will receive the crown which has been by bestowed upon him by the voice of the Nation, whose glory and welfare he guarantees, and will be coronated by HIS HOLINESS.”38 While this declaration suggested that the pope would simply confirm the sovereignty that the nation already conferred upon Napoleon, it did establish a link between the emperor and God. Furthermore, soldiers who witnessed the proceedings in Notre Dame saw the coronation for what it was. Dismayed by Napoleon’s Absolutist pretensions, Jean-François Boulart, an officer in the artillery, remarked, “Bonaparte, general-in-chief of the Army of Italy, he seemed to me greater than the Napoleon who had himself anointed to rule by virtue of a so-called divine right.”39 Clothing the New Emperor

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After the coronation, Napoleonic military culture continued to associate the emperor’s rule with the will of God. Religious references occasionally appeared in the propaganda addressed to the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. Newspapers sometimes printed circulars issued by French bishops that reminded the faithful that God placed the emperor on his throne. One in the Journal de l’Empire described him as “[t]he monarch to whom God has entrusted the welfare of France.”40 Te Deums reinforced the connection between the emperor and the divine more consistently. Although the chants formed an important component of Old Regime political culture, they continued to appear in the festivals held in the early stages of the French Revolution. Revolutionary Te Deums broke with the practices of the monarchy. Instead of expressing gratitude for the king’s good fortune, they thanked God for the favor that he bestowed upon the French people and the nation.41 Despite this change, Te Deums would have been rarely heard in fêtes after 1793 as hostility toward the church mounted and climaxed in the dechristianization campaigns of the Terror. When the Concordat restored Catholicism in France, the chants returned and became a regular part of the festivals celebrated by Napoleon’s armies, including the Revolutionary fêtes of July 14 and 1 vendémiaire.42 After these holidays were abandoned, the Grande Armée still witnessed Te Deums, but only during celebrations for the emperor’s victories and the annual festivals of the Empire.43 The decree establishing the Imperial fêtes even specifically mandated the use of Te Deums.44 These rituals were more significant than they might seem. In the Old Regime, the monarchy relied on them to remind its subjects of the king’s unique relationship with God. By restricting the chanting of Te Deums to the pivotal events of his life and reign, and their anniversaries, the emperor Napoleon did the same. The Napoleonic regime also contributed to the Absolutist depiction of the emperor by presenting him as a legitimate successor to France’s kings. The songs and speeches addressed to the army, the petitions that it signed, and the ceremonies in which it participated indicated that Napoleon was founding a fourth dynasty that represented a continuation of France’s monarchical tradition. In the Empire’s official genealogy, the first three dynasties were the Merovingians, the Carolingians, and the Capetians.45 The Carolingians enjoyed a more privileged position than the others.46 The army’s songs called Napoleon “our new Charlemagne” while its petitions compared him to the Carolingian ruler and declared him “the worthy successor of Charlemagne.”47 The most ambitious attempt to link the emperor to past monarchs occurred in official ceremonies. One of the best examples can be found in the distribution of the Legion of Honor at the Camp of Boulogne on August 16, 1804, which was 148

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described at the beginning of chapter 2. For this special occasion, the helmets and shields of the Chevalier Bayard and Bertrand du Guesclin served as containers for the medals that Napoleon awarded. Bayard was renowned for his heroic military exploits in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and du Guesclin was one of France’s greatest medieval warriors. Relics associated with them evoked the martial achievements of the Capetian and Valois dynasties. In addition, the bronze throne of Dagobert, a Merovingian king who reigned from 629 to 639, served as the emperor’s throne during the event.48 Although the Carolingians were missing, they figured prominently in Napoleon’s coronation. At Napoleon’s insistence, the Imperial government incorporated the “honors of Charlemagne” into the ceremony. These items consisted of the legendary emperor’s crown, sword, scepter, and hand of justice, which were traditionally used to invest French kings with their authority. The ornaments featured in Napoleon’s coronation, of course, did not actually belong to Charlemagne. The sword and the scepter dated back only to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, respectively, and the crown and the hand of justice were custom made for Napoleon because the originals had been lost.49 The Napoleonic regime simply concealed these inconvenient truths from the public and presented the honors as authentic. Moreover, Napoleon never touched them during the coronation rites; they were only carried by members of his court.50 Yet their mere presence, like the artifacts employed in the ceremony at Boulogne, forged ties between the Bonaparte dynasty and the royal families who preceded it, inventing historical roots to give Napoleon’s new monarchy deeper and stronger foundations. It is no coincidence that the Empire’s ceremonies avoided direct references to the Bourbons. Louis XVI’s brother, the count of Provence, still claimed to be the rightful ruler of France, and the hostility that Republicans harbored toward his family rendered any association with them politically unwise. If the emperor kept his distance from the Bourbons, he did restore key elements of their political and military culture. Similar to Louis XIV, Napoleon was portrayed as the preeminent source of political authority and military honor. In contrast to images of the first consul, which subordinated Bonaparte to the Republic, the patrie, and the people, depictions of the emperor indicated that a soldier’s loyalty to Napoleon took precedence over his allegiance to these entities, which he incarnated. Virtually every facet of Napoleonic military culture asserted his primacy. The oaths that French soldiers swore to the Empire, for their eagles, and for the Legion of Honor committed them to uphold the constitutions of the Empire, the defense of the French people, and the laws of the Republic, but they all contained a pledge to serve the emperor himself. The Clothing the New Emperor

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monuments built by the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean honored Napoleon and his achievements, and his face adorned the Legion of Honor’s cross. The French army’s new battle cry—“Vive l’Empereur!”—replaced cheers of devotion to the Republic and the French nation. Napoleon was also a leading subject in the Empire’s military songs, and he was the chief protagonist in the Bulletin de la Grande Armée. Finally, after 1805, the French army only held festivals that celebrated him and his victories. Along with these measures, Napoleon fixed the army’s attention on him through the distribution of rewards. Resembling the Absolutist rulers who inspired Montesquieu’s observations about honor, he relied extensively on recompenses such as medals, promotions, and even women to win the allegiance of his soldiers for himself and his dynasty. Even Napoleon’s praise was considered to be a prestigious award. Davout emphasized its worth in an order of the day, explaining that “expressions of the emperor’s satisfaction” were “the most honorable of recompenses.”51 This distinction more properly belonged to the monument that Napoleon commissioned to the army after his victories over Prussia. On the anniversary of his coronation and Austerlitz in 1807, he decreed the construction of a temple to the Grande Armée on the site of the church of the Madeleine in Paris. The army’s order of the day featured the decree, and it was read to the troops. Napoleon dedicated the structure to the soldiers who had won the victories of Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena, and it would bear the inscription, “From the Emperor Napoleon to the Soldiers of the Grande Armée.” The trophies captured by the army would be displayed in the interior, which would likewise contain statues of Napoleon’s marshals and carvings of the Grande Armée’s generals and colonels. Inside would also be marble tablets engraved with the names of soldiers who had fought in the three battles. Gold tablets would list those who perished.52 Grandiose gestures like this monument, coupled with the other rewards that continuously issued from Napoleon, established him as the essential source of the military’s honor. French troops acknowledged that Napoleon occupied this position. An officer in his Imperial Guard reacted to the “temple of glory” by exclaiming, “This decree proved to the army how the Emperor was wont to watch over its [the army’s] glory and encourage it to new triumphs.”53

The Patriotic Emperor and Romantic Hero Napoleon also watched over the gloire of the patrie. The new ruler of France did not deny his Revolutionary origins when he adopted the political and military traditions of the Old Regime. On the contrary, the most pervasive repre150

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sentation of Napoleon in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée defined the emperor as a patriotic monarch who received his power from the French people, preserved the gains of the French Revolution, and governed in the interests of the nation.54 In this vision, Napoleon bore a stronger resemblance to his foe, George III, than to Louis XIV. Of course, the emperor of the French displayed a far more Republican character than his British rival, who inherited his throne instead of receiving it from his subjects. The French version of patriotic monarchy evolved out of the heroic imagery that Napoleon developed before and during the Consulate, and it thoroughly dominated French military culture between 1804 and 1805. In this period, the propaganda that circulated in the army and the symbolic activities that it performed constructed a remarkably consistent narrative about Napoleon. It proclaimed that he was a hero who saved France from the turmoil, factionalism, and foreign enemies that threatened it during the Revolution. After he rescued the patrie, Napoleon then returned prosperity, morality, religion, and peace to its citizens. Additionally, he was praised for the Code Napoléon, the new law code that his government produced, and for encouraging commerce, science, and the arts. Napoleon was further credited with increasing the status and material well-being of the military. The pyramid built by Marmont’s troops at the Camp of Utrecht illustrated these trends perfectly. Its second face listed the battles that Napoleon won followed by the declaration, “everywhere he fought, he secured victory. It is because of him that French territory was increased by a third; he filled it with his glory.” The third side contained a stone plaque with equally hyperbolic rhetoric: “He ended civil war, destroyed all parties, replaced anarchy with a wise liberty, reestablished religion, restored credit, enriched the public treasury, repaired roads and opened new ones, constructed ports and canals, made the sciences and arts prosper, improved the lot of the soldier, honored the profession of arms; the general peace was his accomplishment.”55 In exchange for these and other benefits, French soldiers were told that the people of France chose Napoleon to rule. One of the songs composed for his coronation even compared him to France’s kings in order to accentuate the democratic sources of his legitimacy: The first man who made himself king Made use of his lance: Bonaparte, to our choice Gives the preference. Yes certainly, with good heart, Clothing the New Emperor

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And not through a system, To the forehead of our Emperor I am attaching a diadem. Virtue, good faith Merit a crown. Bonaparte, with one voice France gives it to you.56

In this song, Napoleon was no longer subordinate to the people, for he preferred to let them choose him, implying that he was the superior partner in their relationship. Such imagery, however, told French soldiers that even though their emperor was a monarch, he was still a ruler whose authority derived from popular sovereignty, one of the most cherished principles of the French Revolution. Unlike French kings who relied on force—the lance—to impose their rule, the French people awarded Napoleon his crown of their own free will because of his talents and the services that he rendered to them. These services included his conservation of the beneficial changes produced by the Revolution, and his commitment to reign according to its ideals. Napoleon himself professed his determination to perform these duties in the presence of his soldiers during his coronation. At the end of the ceremony, he swore a “constitutional” oath to “maintain the integrity of the territory of the Republic; to respect and to make respected the laws of the Concordat and the freedom of religion; to respect and make respected the equality of rights, political and civil liberty, the irrevocability of the sale of the biens nationaux.” He then concluded with a pledge to “govern only in the interests, the welfare, and the glory of the French people.”57 The emperor’s obligation to continue the Revolution’s legacy also appeared in the army’s camps. It constituted an especially prominent theme in the petitions from the Army of the Coasts and the Army of Hanover about the creation of the Empire. They frequently stated that the achievements of the Revolution, which France’s soldiers “conquered at the price of so much blood,” could only be preserved if the First Consul was made emperor.58 According to the First Dragoon Division, the “entire army” wanted Napoleon to become “our hereditary chief ” to “forever proscribe the return of the humiliating division of society into privileged and exclusive castes, and degraded and despised orders; consecrate the principle that distinctions will be founded uniquely upon merit and public service, or on age and property,” and to “consolidate true liberty.”59 After the Grande Armée left French soil in 1805, its military culture contained fewer overt references to the Revolution. Instead, the emperor became 152

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the embodiment of the nation who, as he vowed at his coronation, ruled according to the “interests, the welfare, and the glory of the French people.” The people of France, however, assumed a passive role in this partnership. The emperor was characterized as the sole representative of the nation who would speak and act on its behalf. This imagery appeared over and over again in the written and print media issued to French soldiers. Napoleon’s proclamations, the Bulletin de la Grande Armée, orders of the day, and military songs constantly explained that the emperor waged war solely to defend the patrie from England and its allies. This goal, they claimed, compelled him to win a just and lasting peace that would protect French trade and maintain the nation’s reputation. The thirty-sixth bulletin from the campaign of 1805 featured these themes. In it, Napoleon told the mayors of Paris that “he wanted peace, but a peace that assures the well-being of the French people, whose happiness, commerce, and industry are constantly fettered by the insatiable greed of England.”60 Because France was a warrior nation, the emperor also preserved its honor. Imperial songs such as “C’est lui. Ronde de l’auberge de Munich” proposed that his victories supplied the patrie with the glory that it required. Exclaiming, “We owe him our glory,” it promised, “our hearts, our arms are his.”61 Furthermore, the Empire’s propaganda declared that Napoleon was prepared to make any sacrifice to maintain this glory. He expressed this resolution in a bulletin from 1806. Conversing with a Prussian official, he stated that he “did not want war  .  .  . because the blood of my people is precious to me.” He made it clear, however, that he would “spill it for its safety and its honor.”62 While Napoleon carried on France’s struggle against the Allies, he also protected the patrie from an equally dangerous foe: politically active women. The use of female imagery was not limited to French military songs. The Bulletin de la Grande Armée mounted a series of malicious attacks against powerful women who played a role in their government’s decision to wage war against France. It targeted Queen Maria Carolina of Naples and Madame Colloredo, who was the wife of Count Franz Colloredo, the Austrian minister of foreign affairs. The Bulletin, however, hurled its most ferocious diatribes at Queen Louise of Prussia. She was a leading figure in the war party that prodded King Frederick William III to initiate hostilities in 1806. During the opening phases of the conflict, the queen also took part in the military preparations. She visited the camps of the Prussian army and inspected its troops while wearing a uniform of the queen’s dragoons. Such activities fed combustible fuel into Napoleon’s dynamic propaganda machine. Bulletins for the campaign of 1806 viciously denounced Louise. Ten out of the first twenty-two featured attacks on her.63 They characterized the queen as an Clothing the New Emperor

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Amazon, who by “writing twenty letters a day to excite anger everywhere” in order to foment war, was meddling in affairs that she, as a woman, was incapable of comprehending.64 According to the Bulletin de la Grande Armée, Louise’s war mania resulted from her infatuation with Tsar Alexander I. The eighteenth bulletin insinuated that the two had an affair when Alexander traveled to Prussia in 1805. It claimed that afterwards, “The change that had been effected since then in the spirit of the Queen, a timid and modest woman occupied with her domestic affairs who became turbulent and war-like, has been an unexpected revolution.”65 Developing this theme, the Bulletin suggested that the queen succumbed to hysteria. She was sighted in front of French outposts “in trances and in continuous alarms. . . . [S]he was unceasingly rousing the King and the generals; she wanted blood.”66 As this passage indicates, the king of Prussia was cast as a victim, “an honest man whom they [the war party] had made their dupe by their intrigues and their trickery.”67 Yet the king was not the only victim. All of Prussia suffered when “the Queen quit the cares of her domestic affairs and the grave occupations of the dressing-room to involve herself in the affairs of state, influence the king, and spread the fire with which she was possessed everywhere.”68 After the Jena-Auerstädt campaign, the Bulletin de la Grande Armée scoffed that the queen had guided the Prussian monarchy “so well” that “in a few days she has led it to the edge of a cliff.”69 The venom unleashed against Queen Louise reflected Napoleon’s hostility to ambitious women, but it also performed more important functions. Although the bulletins insisted that King Frederick William III was a good, honest ruler, the depictions of his wife conveyed a different message. Their emphasis on her ability to manipulate him suggested that Napoleon’s foes were weak rulers who were easily cuckolded and, worse, dominated by forceful women. Such effeminate opponents accentuated the masculinity of the French emperor. In bulletins, he was a strong, virile monarch who rebuked a Prussian official for his failure to control his women: “Well, Monsieur, your ladies wanted war; here is the result. You should restrain your family better.”70 By exposing the emasculation of Prussia’s leaders in this manner, Napoleon announced his firm intention to keep irrational and emotional women safely confined to the domestic realm. Instead of letting them meddle in politics and war, which would harm the patrie, Napoleon governed as a manly ruler who would never become one of the “unfortunate” princes “who allowed women to exercise an influence in political affairs.”71 This misogynistic imagery connected him to the hypermasculine political culture that emerged in France in the second half of the eighteenth century. It exploited the fear of female rule among educated elites that 154

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Figure 8. “The Beautiful Prussian Amazon Returns to Her Primary Occupations, Each to Their Craft . . . ,” anonymous engraving from Collection de Vinck. Un siècle d’histoire de France par l’estampe, 1770-1870, circa 1806, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris. This popular engraving provides a striking visual representation of the attacks on powerful women that appeared in the Bulletin de la Grande Armée. Queen Louise of Prussia, who is only partially dressed in a military uniform, gazes adoringly at a portrait of Tsar Alexander I of Russia. The queen’s exposed breasts and the double-headed Russian eagle between the tsar’s legs, which resembles a double-headed phallus, clearly indicate that a sexual relationship exists between the two. The statue of Frederick the Great stares in the opposite direction in obvious disgust at the cuckolding of his descendant.

contributed to the decline and fall of the Bourbon monarchy and led Revolutionary leaders to create a Republic that formally denied women the right to participate in politics. Napoleon must have been aware of the damage that the monarchy’s reputation sustained because its kings were perceived to have abdicated their authority to women such as Marie Antoinette. Through negative depictions of powerful women, he assured the men that he commanded that France and its government would remain in firm, masculine hands. The emperor’s steady hand also ensured that France stayed an egalitarian nation. Napoleon’s legendary efforts to develop a close relationship with his soldiers enhanced his patriotic image by demonstrating his adherence to equality and merit. Relying on the motivational skills that he perfected in the Clothing the New Emperor

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Republic’s armies, he presented himself to the soldiers of the Empire as a paternal leader who cared deeply about them. Napoleon believed that victory often depended on the ability of military leaders to establish relations of mutual affection, respect, and support with their subordinates.72 Whether conducting a military review or a campaign, he continuously bonded with his troops. Napoleon spoke to his grognards by name, responded to their requests, and tried to improve material conditions in the army to make them as happy and as comfortable as possible. During one of his inspections in Poland, he asked the men of his guard about their food, and especially their bread. The chasseur Barrès “told him without hesitation, very plainly, that it was not good, especially for putting in the soup.” The emperor tasted it and said, “Of course this bread is not good enough for these gentlemen.” This reply “crushed” the daring Barrès, and his comrades mocked him by calling him “the gentleman.” However, his candor was soon rewarded. He reported, “the next day we had white bread to put in our soup, rice, and a ration of grain spirit known as schnapps.”73 Napoleon and his supporters supplemented such activities with propaganda and other gifts that showed the emperor’s devotion to his troops. They promised the Grande Armée that the emperor would do whatever he could to spare the lives of his beloved men. To reassure his soldiers as they marched to meet the Russians in 1805, Napoleon issued a proclamation that announced, “my entire concern will be to obtain victory with the least amount of bloodshed: my soldiers are my children.”74 He honored the sacrifices of his fallen children by taking care of their loved ones. After Austerlitz, he decreed that the widows of soldiers killed in the battle would receive a pension and that their children would be raised at his expense.75 Less spectacular yet equally significant, orders of the day often announced that the emperor was granting the troops free supplies such as coats, pants, and shoes. They also repeatedly featured instructions from him commanding his officials to pay the army.76 These orders reveal that the troops’ pay was frequently in arrears, but they likewise promised that Napoleon was trying to address the problem. Along with these gestures, he treated his men as equals who deserved his attention and respect. Deliberately wearing a simple military uniform, Napoleon never dressed or acted like a king in front of them. Moreover, he did not require his soldiers to observe the strict etiquette of his new Imperial court, which imposed rigid behavioral standards upon anyone who wished to interact with him.77 When the emperor was with the army, he joked with his troops, slept in their camps, and exposed himself to the dangers and hardships that they endured. As one of Napoleon’s officers revealed in his memoirs, Napoleon also dealt with soldiers according to their merit and granted 156

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them a familiarity that would have been unthinkable for absolute monarchs like the Sun King: One often saw the Emperor detach his own cross of the Legion of Honor to fasten it himself on the chest of a brave soldier. Louis XIV would have asked first if the brave man were a noble. Napoleon asked if a noble were brave. A sergeant who had shown prodigious valor during a battle was brought before Louis XIV. “I grant you a pension of 1,200 livres,” said the King. “Sire, I would rather have the cross of St. Louis.” “I can believe that, but you won’t get it.” Napoleon would have hugged the sergeant, Louis XIV turned his back on him. That is an example of the sharp difference between the two periods.78

Depictions of the emperor likewise distinguished him from other monarchs. The sixth bulletin for the campaign of 1805 exemplified this tendency. It described an episode after the capture of Ulm in which an Austrian colonel “expressed his astonishment at seeing the Emperor of the French, soaked, covered with mud, as much and more tired than the last drummer in the army.” Ever the little corporal, Napoleon proudly replied, “Your master wanted to make me remember that I was a soldier; I hope that he will admit that the throne and the imperial purple have not made me forget my first profession.”79 In images like this one and through his behavior toward his soldiers, Napoleon transformed himself into an incarnation of the Revolution’s egalitarianism and meritocratic ideals. The emperor was presented as a humble soldier whose talents earned him the support of the French people and allowed him to become the ruler of the most powerful nation in Europe. Yet he forgot neither his roots in the armies of the Republic nor the work ethic that won him his crown. Accordingly, he understood and appreciated the soldiers of France in a way that no other ruler could. He marched in the same mud, faced the same risks, and came from the same ranks. This representation, combined with Napoleon’s modest appearance, his friendly relations with his grognards, his paternalistic attitude toward them, and his efforts to reward merit, promised his soldiers that he intended to give them the same opportunities to succeed that the Revolution offered him. The emperor forged a bond with his grognards by touching their imagination as well as their hearts. Napoleon possessed a fertile imagination that was nourished by his love of novels. He was an avid reader of Rousseau, Goethe, Clothing the New Emperor

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and other literary figures who anticipated the Romantic movement by connecting with their audience on a deep emotional level. Because of their influence and his personal inclinations, he often envisioned himself as a character in a book. In defeat at St. Helena, he mused, “Still, my life, what a novel!!!”80 Napoleon’s novelistic sensibility inspired him to present himself as a Romantic hero, a great man whose unparalleled genius and incomparable martial talents allowed him to achieve the impossible, transform the world, and express his individuality to his followers.81 This self-image was the most innovative component of Napoleon’s cult. Absolutist representations of the emperor borrowed from the political culture of the French monarchy, and his identity as a patriotic ruler incorporated political trends that emerged during the Old Regime and the French Revolution. Napoleon’s role as a uniquely extraordinary individual, however, was new, and set him apart from previous regimes. Rather than associating his authority with their values and traditions, this depiction proposed that he deserved to rule because of his distinctive personal qualities. The representation of the Romantic hero reached the army mainly through the Bulletin de la Grande Armée. It transformed Napoleon into a character whose adventures were as compelling as those of any fictional protagonist.82 In bulletins, he led his army to exotic settings and performed exploits that were unique in the annals of history. The eighty-sixth bulletin, which described the events at Tilsit, highlighted the momentous nature of his accomplishments. With a sense of wonder, it explained the reaction of the soldiers who watched the meeting between Napoleon and Alexander I in the middle of the Niemen River: “The great number of people from the one army and the other, who hastened from one bank and the other to be witnesses to this scene, rendered this spectacle even more interesting because the spectators were courageous men from the ends of the earth.”83 The emperor’s martial feats were even more impressive, and constituted the primary source of his greatness. The Bulletin characterized him as an invincible warrior king, a military genius whose instinctive ability to counter the maneuvers of his opponents produced victories that surpassed those of all other generals, living or dead. A passage from the twenty-sixth bulletin from the campaign against Prussia encapsulated this representation. “Since the Emperor began the campaign,” it declared, “he has not taken a moment to rest; always in forced marches, constantly divining the movements of the enemy. The results are such that, they have no example in history. Of the more than 150,000 men who were present at the battle of Jena, not one has escaped to carry the news beyond the Oder.”84 The vision of Napoleon as a Romantic hero was not confined to the Bulletin de la Grande Armée. Through his proclamations, he communicated his per158

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sonal thoughts and feelings to them, granting them an emotional connection that resembled the sentimental intensity expressed by literary characters such as Goethe’s Werther and Rousseau’s Emile. Napoleon’s address to the Grande Armée in 1806 after the destruction of the Prussian army illustrates this skill. It opened with praise for their qualities, announcing, “You are all good Soldiers.” Next, the emperor explained the magnitude of their victory to stir their pride: “One of the premier military powers of Europe who not long ago dared to propose a shameful capitulation to us is annihilated.” Sharing his indignation, he then pledged to punish the Russians and the English for their perfidy, vowing angrily, “henceforth, we will no longer be the playthings of a traitorous peace.” Finally, he concluded by professing his affection. “SOLDIERS,” he declared, “I cannot express the sentiments that I have for you better except to say that I bear the love for you in my heart that you show me every day.”85 The individuals who helped Napoleon to forge his military culture also echoed and magnified the great man imagery contained in proclamations and bulletins. Their speeches, songs, orders, and plays described Napoleon as the “greatest of heroes” and the “conqueror of all the earth.”86 The army’s petitions declared that he was superior to Charlemagne. Asking Napoleon to accept the Imperial crown, the address of the Camp of Montreuil declared, “Charlemagne, the greatest of all of our kings, obtained it long ago from the hands of Victory; with claims more glorious still, receive it now from those of Gratitude.”87 One of the regiments at the Camp of Bruges exceeded even this grandiose statement. It built a pyramid featuring the inscription, To Napoleon, Emperor of the French, [from] the 48th regiment of infantry His talents, his exploits, his profound wisdom, have placed him At the pinnacle of greatness forever, he governs the state, he reigns over our hearts, And his name alone is worth all the titles of the world.88

Not only did such images make Napoleon an object of admiration; they appealed to the troops’ sense of self-worth. In the story told by the bulletins and other components of Napoleonic military culture, the Grande Armée performed the role of the faithful companion. The grognards dutifully accompanied their heroic ruler on his exploits and served as the instrument that he wielded to win his astonishing victories and remake Europe. Consequently, Napoleon’s conquests granted his soldiers the immortality that he secured: his legend became their legend; his renown became their renown. The emperor and his officials also made sure that they knew it. When the Grande Armée Clothing the New Emperor

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returned to France in 1808, a song that was sung to its troops exclaimed, “the Great King Napoleon / . . . is the greatest of warriors / By marching under his banners/ You share his laurels.”89

Napoleon and the Resacralization of the French Monarchy In the cult of Napoleon, the French soldiers who marched under the eagle banners also marched under altars built to venerate the emperor. This cult preached three different gospels. After Napoleon became the emperor of the French, he constructed an Absolutist image that resembled the portrayal of the king in the political culture of the Old Regime. It claimed that he ruled by divine right and was a legitimate successor to the dynasties that had reigned over France since Clovis. Moreover, it identified him as the preeminent political authority in the new French Empire who bestowed honor upon his soldiers in exchange for their loyal service. The second representation of Napoleon was more similar to the vision of kingship that emerged in Great Britain under George III, and it appeared with greater frequency in French military culture between 1803 and 1808 than his other public images. This portrayal grew out of the figure of the Revolutionary hero that he adopted during the French Revolution and the Consulate, and depicted the emperor as a patriotic monarch who represented the values and attributes of his nation. He saved France, guarded its honor, introduced beneficial reforms, governed according to the principles of the French Revolution, and protected the patrie from its enemies, which included politically active women. In return, a grateful French people and its equally thankful army gave Napoleon his position as a hereditary monarch. Popular sovereignty and God’s will, however, were not the only sources of his power. The third image claimed that Napoleon’s legitimacy rested upon his unique capabilities and feats of arms. It presented him as a Romantic hero who shared himself, his adventures, and his military glory with his beloved soldiers. Similar to Napoleonic honor, the holy trinity of Napoleon’s cult contained internal contradictions. To borrow a useful phrase from Rafe Blaufarb, it represented an “improbable synthesis” in which Napoleon combined seemingly incompatible types of legitimacy such as divine right, popular sovereignty, and personal qualities.90 Some historians argue that the heterogeneous nature of the emperor’s sovereignty weakened popular support for his monarchy.91 It is true that the Empire did not survive the defeats of 1814 and 1815, and the notables, France’s political elite, did not rally to his son, the king of Rome, when Napoleon abdicated his throne. The relatively brief existence of the “fourth dynasty,” however, accounts for these developments better than 160

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anything else. Napoleon needed time to give his new monarchy firm roots that would make it more capable of withstanding setbacks, but the conflicts provoked by his insatiable ambitions denied it to him. In the shorter term, the cult of Napoleon created in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée offered French soldiers a variety of compelling reasons to back him and to wage war on his behalf. There is, of course, nothing particularly original about this revelation. Scholars have long recognized that Napoleon tried to be all things to all people. Yet, the representations of him that circulated in the French army demonstrate that something more profound took place. The French Revolution shifted sacrality from the king to the patrie, the nation, the Republic, and the people of France. The Napoleonic regime incorporated the traditions of Absolutism, the values of the French Revolution, and the political, intellectual, and cultural trends that transformed European politics in the eighteenth century into Napoleon’s public image in order to resacralize monarchy in France in the figure of the emperor. As anthropologist Clifford Geertz explains, At the political center of any complexly organized society . . . there is both a governing elite and a set of symbolic forms expressing the fact that it is in truth governing. No matter how democratically the members of the elite are chosen . . . or how deeply divided among themselves they may be . . . , they justify their existence and order their actions in terms of a collection of stories, ceremonies, insignia, formalities, and appurtenances that they have either inherited or, in more revolutionary situations, invented.92

Napoleon’s cult placed him squarely at the political center of France that had previously been occupied by its kings and the political entities that were sacred to the Revolutionaries. It attributed all of the characteristics that conferred political legitimacy in Old Regime and Revolutionary France to him, and added the traits of the Romantic hero that had begun to captivate the European imagination. In contrast to the Bourbons, who had become effeminate, abdicated their traditional military and political roles, and asserted their prerogatives over those of the patrie and public opinion, the emperor was the perfect monarch. He possessed all of the qualities that the French valued in a ruler: he was an energetic, hypermasculine ruler, an invincible warrior who defended the patrie and its reputation and had been chosen to govern by the people. As the words carved on one of the army’s monuments testified, “He is a great warrior, a great statesman, he possesses all of the virtues of the greatest of men, and has none of their vices.”93 Clothing the New Emperor

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Figure 9. Denis-AugusteMarie Raffet, “Ils grognaient, et le suivaient toujours,” lithograph, 1836, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris.

6 The Emperor’s Grognards The Officer Corps

The grognards of the First Empire, much like their famous leader, earned the rare honor of becoming a legend in their own lifetimes. Napoleon himself apparently invented the nickname “grognards” during the campaigns in Poland in 1807.1 The grenadiers of the Imperial Guard complained so much about the miserable conditions that they encountered fighting the Russians that he started to refer to them, not without affection, as “grognards.” The sobriquet, which meant “grumblers” or “complainers,” stuck. Auguste Raffet later immortalized the hard-bitten nature of the emperor’s guardsmen in the famous 1836 lithograph Ils grognaient et le suivaient toujours. It featured a scene in which the grenadiers marched through a driving rainstorm behind Napoleon, who was mounted but hunched down in the saddle. This powerful image captured the suffering that French troops endured in Poland, but its purpose was to illustrate their devotion to the emperor. The grognards “grumbled” yet they “always followed him,” wherever he led, no matter what the conditions. Over time, the term “grognard” was applied to all of Napoleon’s soldiers instead of just the grenadiers of the Old Guard, and it came to signify a veteran of the Empire’s armies.2 By 1935, the dictionary of the Académie française explained that a grognard was one of the “Old soldiers of the Empire.”3 This brief description, however, does not do justice to the richness of the title. As Raffet’s lithograph demonstrates, a legend grew around the Empire’s soldiers in the decades following the Napoleonic wars. Despite the best efforts of Restoration authorities to make France forget about them, their extraordinary experiences inspired writers, artists, playwrights, historians, politicians, and the veterans themselves to celebrate their lives and accomplishments. In the process, the grognard became an iconic figure, an archetype identified with specific traits. He was alternatively cranky and cheerful in adversity, courageous to a fault, audacious, clever, generous, a gallant seducer of women, and |

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a talented soldier. Above all, he was distinguished by his honor, his love for the patrie, and his fanatical enthusiasm for Napoleon.4 The legend assumed its most extreme form in the character of Nicolas Chauvin. Chauvin was a mythical soldier who was invented by songwriters and playwrights in the 1820s and ‘30s. His creators portrayed him as a warlike veteran of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars who proudly bore his scars and the Legion of Honor. He exhibited an unthinking and all-consuming passion for his country, the emperor, and sex. Because of these characteristics, Chauvin became a symbol of excessive patriotism, and received the dubious distinction of being memorialized in the word “chauvinism.”5 The military culture assembled in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée was intended to transform French men into soldiers like the grognards, to instill in them the values and attributes that were eventually associated with this icon. The Napoleonic regime came closest to achieving this goal in the officer corps. French officers appropriated Napoleonic military culture to a much greater extent than the rank and file and displayed the characteristics of the grognard. Adopting the honor and martial masculinity promoted by Napoleon and his supporters, they tried to win rewards such as advancement and the Legion of Honor, and actively pursued glory, battle, and women. French officers also developed a strong attachment to Napoleon himself. They viewed the emperor as a source of honor, an invincible warrior who won glory for them and France, and a patriotic ruler who partook in their hardships and defended French interests. Between 1803 and 1808, the officer corps showed more interest in honors than patriotism, but its members did develop a strong commitment to Imperial France, which became increasingly important to them in the later years of the Empire.

The Appropriation of Napoleonic Military Culture: Sources and Methods So far, this book has examined the tools used to construct Napoleonic military culture and the ideas and values that it communicated. Although this endeavor is worthwhile in its own right, it is still necessary to ascertain the impact of these measures upon the men who fought for Napoleon. Only then will it be possible to determine the broader historical significance of the phenomena analyzed in the preceding chapters. Moreover, we cannot assume that the individuals who served in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée passively accepted the cultural discourses 164

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to which they were exposed. Human beings appropriate culture in complex ways that are not necessarily foreseen or intended by their creators.6 The audience might misunderstand the message, reject it entirely, or adopt part of it depending on their personal inclinations and an infinite variety of environmental factors. Evaluating the appropriation of culture is therefore an extraordinarily difficult task. The military institutions, psychologists, and scholars that researched military motivation in the wars of the second half of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century possessed exceptional resources with which to pursue this endeavor. The American military conducted the most well-known studies of this nature during World War II by distributing questionnaires to its soldiers before and after combat in order to understand their behavior in battle. These activities were not unique, however. The military theorist Ardant du Picq undertook similar investigations in the French army prior to the Franco-Prussian War, and European military psychologists analyzed the experiences of soldiers who served in World War I.7 The expansion of education and literacy also gave soldiers the ability to produce thousands of letters and diaries about the military conflicts of the modern era. For example, James M. McPherson consulted approximately 25,000 letters and 249 diaries from 1,076 men to write his book on military motivation in the American Civil War.8 Higher literacy rates likewise allowed the individuals who produced these kinds of materials to express their ideas and feelings about war to a degree that was not possible for the vast majority of common soldiers from earlier periods, who received little or no formal education. In terms of quality and quantity, these letters, journals, and opinion surveys provide unparalleled resources for discovering how soldiers thought about combat and the military, how they responded to propaganda campaigns, and the factors that endowed them with the moral and emotional strength to endure the hardships and horrors of warfare. These sources likewise represent a large enough cross-section of the military population to permit the historian to draw fairly precise conclusions about the values of soldiers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To cite McPherson again, he provided a compelling statistical account of motivational trends among Union and Confederate troops to prove that patriotism was the primary reason why they kept fighting.9 Unfortunately, the sources that remain from Napoleon’s troops match neither the volume nor the quality of materials available to historians like McPherson. French soldiers did write diaries, letters, and memoirs, and significant numbers of them can be found in French archives and libraries. In The Emperor’s Grognards

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addition, these materials have been published in books and periodicals. The resulting body of evidence, however, numbers in the thousands of documents rather than the tens of thousands. The Napoleonic wars also lasted for over a decade, and most of the documentary record that survived comes from the period 1812-1814. At this time, Napoleon mobilized a much greater percentage of the population to undertake the invasion of Russia, protect French territories from Spain to Poland, and defend France itself. The enormous numbers of men who entered the military as a result generated a larger volume of written sources than did the soldiers who served during the first half of Napoleon’s reign.10 The writings of Napoleonic soldiers likewise disproportionately represent the officer corps. Officers wrote most of the diaries, memoirs, and letters that remain from the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. Although the Revolution created a French army that was far more egalitarian than its predecessor, significant differences existed between officers and enlisted men. Common soldiers were generally conscripts who did not necessarily want to enter the armed services. Napoleon’s officers, on the other hand, were usually volunteers who intended to become career soldiers, or individuals who had been drafted into the army during the Revolution and grew to accept the military as their profession. The officer corps also gained most of its recruits from the middling and upper levels of society; its members received at least some education and had to be able to read and write. The men they led, however, typically hailed from peasant and working-class families that could not afford to hire a replacement. Unlike the highly literate soldiers of the Civil War and the world wars, they rarely had more than a rudimentary education, if they had any at all. Consequently, more than half were probably illiterate. Only a small number of the rank and file kept diaries or wrote memoirs, and their letters are frustratingly laconic. They normally focused on the mundane concerns of their daily lives and seldom discussed topics like war or politics. These tendencies probably reflected their limited writing abilities. Most regular soldiers may simply not have possessed the knowledge or the skills to express complex thoughts and feelings through the written word.11 Furthermore, due to the social and experiential distance that separated enlisted men from officers, it would be foolish to presume that the writings of the latter reflected the sentiments of the former. The limitations of the documentary evidence generated by Napoleon’s troops will not permit a rigorous, statistical analysis of military motivation. The conclusions drawn in the final two chapters of this book will therefore necessarily be more anecdotal and impressionistic. The writings of the 166

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individuals who served in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée are far from worthless, however. It is true that only a small percentage of Napoleon’s enlisted men wrote letters, diaries, and memoirs, and that their content rarely ventured beyond the prosaic. French officers, however, wrote often and talked candidly about various topics. They expressed their hopes, fears, and disappointments. They commented on political and military matters, discussed their professional and personal goals, and recorded their responses to Napoleonic military culture. Their writings offer an excellent resource for examining the mindset of the officer corps. To study the rank and file, other materials were utilized to supplement the documents that they wrote. Four types of sources were used to evaluate the impact of Napoleonic military culture: the writings of Napoleon’s troops, observations of their morale, accounts of their actions, and historical studies on military motivation. The men who fought for Consular and Imperial France produced three types of personal written documents: diaries, memoirs, and letters. In total, 12 diaries, 18 memoirs, and approximately 670 letters from 28 officers, 5 NCOs, and 73 enlisted men who served in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée were consulted. Seven published articles based on letters written by different soldiers were also examined. The arguments presented in this chapter and the next rely most heavily on the information contained in letters and diaries, which were usually known as journals. These documents were especially valuable because they were produced when Napoleon’s men were in the midst of their military careers. The sentiments that they expressed were raw and immediate, and were much less likely to have been altered by the passage of time. Journals and letters therefore more accurately reflect the thoughts and feelings that occurred to French troops during the Napoleonic wars, at the time when they experienced the measures designed to motivate them. In contrast to these sources, soldiers normally composed their memoirs after they retired or were discharged from the army. They frequently wrote about their experiences for their families or for a public eager for tales about the dramatic events of Napoleon’s reign. Many published their stories in the 1840s and ‘50s in response to the rise of popular Bonapartism and nostalgia for the First Empire under Napoleon III. Because French officers and common soldiers penned their memoirs, or souvenirs as they were often called, years or even decades after they left the army, these documents must be treated with caution.12 The ideas that they communicate may be different from those held by the soldier during his military service. If memoirs The Emperor’s Grognards

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need to be taken with the proverbial grain of salt, they nevertheless constitute valuable sources. Soldiers often prepared them using notes that they took in the army, and some relied on letters that they wrote to family and friends.13 Thus, the material contained in memoirs was not necessarily distorted. Moreover, these documents sometimes offer insights that are missing in letters and diaries. The act of writing a memoir invited self-reflection in a way that letter and journal writing did not. Taking the time to compose their story may have forced some soldiers to think about their military service more deeply than they did while they were in the army and given them the ability to provide a more accurate assessment of what they felt and how they acted. The process of writing their souvenirs and distance from their experiences may have also made them willing to speak about certain subjects to a greater degree than they would have been comfortable doing in their letters and journals. Former soldiers did not always portray themselves in a flattering light. They acknowledged personal shortcomings, bad decisions, and changes of opinion, which testifies to their honesty. For example, one admitted that he deserted shortly after he was drafted.14 Memoirs were examined in conjunction with letters and journals to uncover patterns in these documents that show how French soldiers appropriated Napoleonic military culture and that reveal the factors that compelled them to do their duty. Yet even this methodology raises difficult questions for the careful scholar. One of the recent trends in the historiography of the Napoleonic era concerns the study of experience.15 This approach does not regard experience as the ways in which individuals lived through historical events and responded to them. Rather, it examines this phenomenon from a postmodernist perspective and treats it as a cultural product that is created within a specific historical context. For historians who employ this model, “experience” signifies the perception of experience; they try to discover how human beings understood and interpreted their interaction with the world around them, and how these processes varied over time according to their political, social, and cultural environment. From this viewpoint, the ideas expressed by Napoleon’s soldiers in their letters, journals, and memoirs do not necessarily reflect their true thoughts or feelings but only those that they chose to express in response to a set of circumstances on a particular occasion. Moreover, the response might change as the soldier reassessed his experience based on the conditions in which he found himself. When taken to extremes, this approach is incompatible with the study of military motivation. For if it is only possible to know how soldiers represented their values and behavior, and if we consider the beliefs that governed them to be 168

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beyond our reach, then the historian can never hope to figure out why men and women fought wars. Military historians cannot afford to dismiss the more theoretical conception of experience either. It forces them to adopt a more critical stance toward their sources. For example, in their letters, journals, and memoirs, Napoleon’s soldiers may have displayed the character traits that they presumed their audience wanted to see instead of their actual sentiments.16 The journal of Frédéric Charles Louis François de Paule, commandant de Lauthonnye, illustrates this point. When he left for the army, his father told him that “he loved me very much, but that he would prefer to know that I was dead [rather] than dishonored,” to never decline a duel, and to “distinguish myself on the battlefield by my bravery and my composure.”17 After hearing that death was more acceptable than disgrace or cowardice, de Lauthonnye, and others with relatives of a similar disposition, would have hesitated to admit any weakness or fear in their letters home. They also probably acted bravely to reassure such family members, whether they felt courageous or not. As a consequence, the factors that influenced the writings of the men who served in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée were taken into account as much as possible when they were analyzed. Although capturing the hearts and minds of Napoleon’s soldiers through their writings presents daunting obstacles, this pursuit can succeed. Certain trends recurred so consistently in their letters, journals, and memoirs that they cannot be dismissed as an exercise in deception designed to gain the approval of others. If numerous soldiers repeatedly professed their adherence to specific ideals, then it is more than likely that they were indeed sincere. Historian Jay Smith argues that beliefs exist beneath language that determine how words and symbols are deployed.18 Although it is far easier to grasp representations than the beliefs underneath, it is necessary to try, for beliefs were ultimately responsible for the decisions of historical actors to perform or abstain from particular actions. To quote Smith, “the historian must seek to uncover and explore the realm of experience where language and material existence inevitably converge: the realm of beliefs.”19 Studying the patterns in the written documents composed by Napoleon’s soldiers offers one way to access this realm. Finally, even if French troops simply played a role when they echoed official propaganda, they implicitly acknowledged that its values became part of the motivational system of the army. Their adoption of the discourses circulating in Napoleonic military culture demonstrates that its standards set the boundaries of acceptable thought and behavior. Awareness of these boundaries would have both encouraged and pressured Napoleon’s men to conform to them. The Emperor’s Grognards

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Since the contours of sustaining motivation were less visible in the writings of NCOs and enlisted men than that of their officers, other kinds of documentary evidence were consulted to bring the attitudes of the rank and file into focus. Reports on the army’s morale written by military and civilian authorities constitute one of these sources. Napoleon, Marshal Berthier, and other French military commanders requested information about the state of opinion in the army.20 In response, they were provided by their subordinates and the police with observations of the army’s “spirit.” These reports vary in quality and in detail. Like memoirs, they must also be treated with care since the officials who supplied them, and especially the marshals and generals who led the army, had strong incentives to state that all was well. A commander who could not maintain the morale of his troops or their devotion to the government was likely to incur Napoleon’s displeasure. As a consequence, he might be more inclined to claim that his men possessed the desired mental state than to admit a lack of enthusiasm. However, reports about the army did not always paint a favorable picture. They noted disaffection in the ranks, which indicates that military leaders and police agents may not have simply told Napoleon and the army’s brass what they wanted to hear. For example, in 1806, Marshal Lannes warned that the harsh conditions in Poland were taking their toll on V Corps: “The generals and colonels have remarked that for a few days the soldiers have been very unhappy, and that they are starting to murmur.”21 Napoleon needed to have reliable information about such trends. His ability to assess the attitudes of his men is also well known, and he spent a tremendous amount of time with them. He would thus have had ample opportunity to verify the truth of the reports that he received, and it is unlikely that he would have tolerated officials who consistently gave him inaccurate data. Therefore, observations of French troops offer a worthwhile body of evidence that can be used to supplement the written documents they left behind. Accounts of the actions of Napoleon’s soldiers offer another valuable source with which to evaluate their motivation. The behavior of the rank and file in battle and on campaign was frequently at odds with the content of their writings. Their words and deeds that were recorded by contemporary observers reveal a different kind of soldier than the miserable, resigned, or indifferent one that regularly emerges in their letters. The meaning of their actions is sometimes more difficult to decipher than their barely legible handwriting, for their conduct might not necessarily have reflected their thoughts. The cheers of “Vive l’Empereur!” that they shouted could have signified devotion to Napoleon, a formulaic slogan to which they had simply become accustomed, or the orders issued by zealous officers. Still, if the acts 170

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performed by the soldiery did not match the sentiments in its writings, it is necessary to explore this discrepancy and try to ascertain what the former can tell us. Finally, numerous scholars have analyzed the motivation of soldiers who served in diverse military conflicts from the early modern era to the twentieth century. The armies that they researched differed from those of Napoleon in a multitude of ways. They originated in different political, cultural, and social contexts, performed different functions in their states and societies, possessed different institutional structures, employed different technologies on and off the battlefield, and strove to achieve different ideological, strategic, and operational goals. At the same time, the individuals who fought in other Napoleonic armies and in other conflicts shared some common experiences with the soldiers of Consular and Imperial France. They too faced the threat of death and dismemberment, found themselves forced to adjust to the new norms of military life, and confronted the intense physical demands, and the occasional pleasures, that distinguish the environment of war. By revealing how soldiers from other armies and other periods coped with these phenomena, other studies on military motivation can help us to comprehend how Napoleon’s soldiers did so.

The Officer Corps, Honor, and Honors The officers who led France’s soldiers at the beginning of the nineteenth century received official authorization from the French state to perform the functions of a particular military rank in the form of a written commission. These ranks, from lowest to highest, were second lieutenant, lieutenant, captain, chef de bataillon or chef d’escadron (battalion chief in the infantry or squadron chief in the cavalry), major, colonel, brigadier general, divisional general, and marshal. Commissioned officers also occupied staff positions such as aide-de-camp, adjoint, and adjudant commandant, posts that were involved with military administration and command and control.22 While senior officers such as colonels, generals, and marshals will be mentioned in this chapter, it will concentrate primarily upon junior, or company-grade, officers, which included second lieutenants, lieutenants, and captains. These men constituted the bulk of the officer corps, spent considerable time with the men that they led, fought alongside of them, and performed most of the functions necessary for the army to operate. It is more difficult to separate Napoleon’s troops into different categories than it might appear. There was ample opportunity for advancement in The Emperor’s Grognards

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Napoleon’s armies. Consequently, the soldiers of the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée occupied different ranks at different times between 1803 and 1815. Many NCOs obtained commissions in this period. Although it was unusual, it was also not unheard of for wellconnected volunteers like Louis de Périgord to enter the army as a common soldier in 1803 and acquire a commission as a second lieutenant only a year later. He was the nephew of Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, the exRevolutionary who served as Napoleon’s minister of foreign affairs. More problematic still, numerous memoirs were written by men who became officers only in the later stages of the Napoleonic wars. These men therefore composed their memoirs from an officer’s perspective but were only regular soldiers or NCOs before 1808. The memoirs of Jean-Roch Coignet and Pierre Robinaux represent examples of this phenomenon.23 To solve this dilemma, the classification of officer will be applied to individuals who held or achieved the rank of commissioned officer during the Napoleonic wars. While this classification is somewhat artificial, the men who became officers under Napoleon generally shared many of the same values. During the Directory and the Consulate, a series of reforms intended to professionalize the army purged the officer corps of the incompetent, the old, the physically unfit, and political opportunists.24 The officers who remained or advanced to the officer corps therefore normally viewed military service as their profession. Some, like Robinaux, developed an interest in a military career after they were drafted and possessed the education, the talent, and the luck to rise through the ranks.25 On the other hand, many officers volunteered to join the army as common soldiers during the Revolution, the Consulate, and the first half of the Empire with the explicit goal of making a career in the army. Some, like Théodore de Mailhet-Vachères, joined regular units for this purpose.26 Others, such as Jean-Baptiste Barrès, enlisted in the vélites of the Imperial Guard, which offered the possibility of an officer’s commission after a period of active duty as a regular soldier.27 By whatever route they entered, the men who staffed the officer corps wanted to obtain higher rank and other honors. Like their predecessors in the Royal army, the officers of the Consulate and the Empire displayed a strong sense of honor, which played a leading role in their sustaining motivation between 1803 and 1808. Their honor also resembled the warrior honor of the Old Regime more than the patriotic form disseminated by Napoleonic military culture. For in contrast to official propaganda and rewards like the Legion of Honor, Napoleon’s officers did not normally identify honor with service to the patrie, and conceived of it in more individualistic terms. They 172

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did, though, link honor to duty and proper behavior in a manner reminiscient of the Royal officials who developed the service culture of the king’s army. The correspondence of Colonel Préval of the 3rd cuirassiers illustrates these tendencies. In his letters to his subordinates, he associated honor with personal reputation, distinguished conduct, bravery, and the fulfillment of responsibilities. Rebuking one of his soldiers for scandalous behavior, he explained angrily, “Is this what it means to have honor? [N]o, honor is the desire to be honored and esteemed; from there, [it] follows that one must not do anything that puts them to shame.”28 He defined the attribute in a similar manner to one of his staff who received the Legion of Honor: This distinction is not only the reward for your valor, it is still more for the zeal and the meticulousness that distinguishes you in the accomplishment of your duties. There now, you are hence associated with the bravest of the brave and the greatest men of the state. This idea must remind you every day that you must do nothing that will not make you honored and esteemed.29

Such detailed descriptions of honor rarely appeared in the writings of French officers. Most of them revealed its importance through their desire for rewards and glory, which appeared more regularly in their letters, journals, and memoirs than any other topic. The promise of honors not only maintained the morale of Napoleon’s officers; it also inspired them to try to distinguish themselves in combat. Apparently, it even invaded their dreams. At the beginning of the War of the Fourth Coalition, Second Lieutenant Charles-Maurice de Tascher exclaimed, A first bivouac, a first picket are an eternity for a young soldier; what thoughts run through the head during this long night! How many castles in the air made and unmade! After having (in [my] imagination) beaten the Prussians, saved the army, captured flags, won all the crosses of honor in the world, I awake from my dreams all a-quiver.30

Of the many rewards that French officers dreamed about, they hoped to win promotions the most. They constantly expressed their desire for advancement. As Blaze observed, Promotion—that’s the country, the Emperor, the king.  .  .  . You join the army because you know that so and so, simple soldiers, have become genThe Emperor’s Grognards

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erals, marshals, princes, kings. “Why can’t I do likewise?” says every soldier as he slings on his pack. We all had a commission as a marshal of France in our cartridge box; it was only a question of how to get it out.31

For volunteers who began as common soldiers, the commission itself constituted an important goal. Prior to receiving his in 1807, Théodore de MailhetVachères, who enlisted in the engineers, repeatedly spoke about his ambition to become an officer. Writing from Breslau in 1806, he worried that he might not have a chance to become one: “I hope that the campaign will not end without me obtaining the epaulette.”32 An epaulette was a decoration worn on the shoulder that normally signified that an individual was an officer. Earning one therefore meant the acquisition of a commissioned rank. Once Napoleon’s officers earned their epaulettes, they aspired to rise higher in the command structure. Second Lieutenant Félix Avril demonstrated that Napoleon’s grognards did indeed carry an imaginary marshal’s baton in their knapsack. After Austerlitz, where he saw action as a second lieutenant, he proudly wrote to his father, “The year 1806 is about to start, & I already have 4 campaigns. . . . I wish you, [and] at the same time to my Good Mother, a life long enough to see me Marshal of France.”33 When officers and would-be officers did receive promotions, no matter how small, they voiced their enthusiasm. After de Mailhet-Vachères made the short step from second class miner to first class miner, he told his mother, “This small rank is worth a chevron on the arm for me; that which makes me the most happy in this little advancement is that I can now be named corporal or even fourrier.”34 Jean-Baptiste Guindey did earn his epaulette at the battle of Saalfeld. In an effusive letter, he announced, “Rejoice at my happiness my dear mother and father, know that I killed Prince Louisferdonand [sic], brother of the king of Prussia in the middle of his army. . . . I am going to be an officer and a member of the Legion of Honor, the Emperor himself told me this.”35 Not long after Guindey acquired his commission, Lieutenant Barbara advanced to a captain’s rank. Even the harsh conditions in Poland could not diminish his excitement. He wrote to his father, “I am profiting my dear friend from a short halt . . . to announce to you my promotion to the rank of captain seven days after the battle [of Eylau]. I have been named by his majesty as a result of the request that the colonel made to him.” He then asked his father to thank his colonel because “I owe much to the latter. . . . Remind him that I am so moved that I will never know how to do enough to merit so much kindness and benevolence. I will apply myself completely to deserve them always.”36 174

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In addition to expressing their happiness about their promotions, Napoleon’s officers and aspirants to the officer corps also admitted their frustration when they did not obtain higher rank. De Mailhet-Vachères made no effort to hide his anger at the slow pace of his advancement in the engineers. In a letter from 1806, he complained, “When I think that I have been a soldier for more than two years, [and] that I do not yet have the rank of sergeant, I am beside myself.”37 Because of his aggravation, he even advised his parents to encourage his brother Elzéar to seek admission to the École speciale militaire instead of enlisting as a volunteer, for “the new regulations are all made in favor of the young men graduating from the school at Fontainebleau, lycées, etc.; and discourage a little those who are starting by being soldiers.”38 Napoleonic military culture and honor did not create this desire for advancement by themselves. Professional ambitions and material concerns were as important as or perhaps more important than either. Men who volunteered for the army or who attended military academies viewed the military as a career and hoped to proceed upward through its command structure to be as successful as possible in their chosen occupation. Aside from honor, higher rank likewise offered the promise of higher pay, more influence, and the possibility of a better life. As Blaze remarked, the ability of simple soldiers to become “generals, marshals, princes, kings” functioned as a compelling source of initial motivation. Countless numbers of volunteers and newly commissioned graduates of French military schools arrived in the army already determined to advance through the ranks as quickly as possible. It is also necessary to note, however, that the Napoleonic regime deliberately cultivated these aspirations in order to sustain their motivation. The frequent battlefield promotions awarded by Napoleon convinced French officers that the positions that they wanted were within their grasp as long as they distinguished themselves in combat. Like the staff officer Alexandre Coudreux, they “waited impatiently for the opening of a new campaign which will not fail to procure advancement, medals, and laurels for us!”39 One officer who did procure advancement fairly quickly was Félix Avril, who became a captain after only three and a half years. Following his promotion, he wrote a letter offering advice to his younger brother about a career in the army.40 In it, he proposed, “The Emperor, by a decree of June 30, named me captain in my regiment for my good conduct in several affairs of which he was instructed. This needs to be a motive of encouragement for you, it being the honorable manner by which his majesty rewards the services that his officers render to him.”41 These comments indicate that Avril sincerely The Emperor’s Grognards

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believed that Napoleon would compensate individuals who performed well in battle with higher ranks, and that this perception functioned as a “motive of encouragement” for the young officer himself. Moreover, his characterization of his promotion as “honorable” demonstrates that he felt that it enhanced his honor. The Legion of Honor also encouraged French officers to improve their reputation. Advancement may have been the principal goal of the men who led the armies of the Consulate and the Empire, but the prestige of winning the Legion’s medal or a higher rank within the order remained a close second. Jean-Baptiste Guindey readily admitted that he fought to win the Legion of Honor to enhance his prestige. His colonel promised him the “cross of merit” if he performed well “at the first affair.” “Animated by these promises and at the same time for my honor,” he wrote, “I did my duty extremely well” in a combat near Holseim.42 As the Grande Armée left France for the Ulm campaign, Avril entertained similar thoughts. In one of his letters, he informed his mother, “I will work in this campaign to win either advancement or a cross of honor.”43 Much like being promoted, admission to the Legion of Honor had a profound impact upon Napoleon’s officers, demonstrating how much they valued it. Of course, the most revered way of acquiring the award was from the emperor himself. Guindey was eventually fortunate enough to receive his medal in this manner. As he revealed to his parents, it left an impression: “I was received and decorated by His Majesty the Emperor and King. I had the honor of receiving his accolades accompanied by the most flattering words; imagine my happiness at all of that.”44 These comments hint at one of the reasons why French officers found the Legion of Honor so desirable: the renown that accompanied it. The artillery officer Boulart claimed that the moment when he was given his medal “was certainly one of the finest of my life . . . the attention, the regard and the favor of the public singularly increased the value of the reward in our eyes.”45 Napoleon’s officers also valued other rewards. Like Guindey, they were grateful for Napoleon’s “flattering words” and the praise that he gave them during inspections, and in proclamations and orders of the day. Believing that his division deserved Napoleon’s gratitude for its role in the defeat of Prussia, Honoré Grimaldi explained in a letter to his friend that “the Emperor has to give us a review on the 22nd, they are claiming that he has to say some kind things to us. So much the better, we have earned them.”46 Having one’s name or unit mentioned in the army’s order of the day or the Bulletin de la Grande Armée also constituted an important honor. Colonel Constant Corbineau hoped that his deeds at Austerlitz earned him a place in the latter. He 176

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proudly wrote his brother, “Perhaps you will see my name honorably cited in the bulletin of the army, where the report of the battle of Austerlitz will be made.”47 Later in the Empire, bulletins acquired a reputation for exaggerating the achievements of the Grande Armée and for crediting undeserving units and individuals with exceptional feats of arms. These tendencies eventually led to the popularization of the phrase “to lie like a Bulletin.” Yet the officers who served from 1803 to 1808 did not hold such a negative opinion. On the contrary, Lieutenant Avril excitedly informed his father in early 1806, “We have just received the Bulletins of our army & we see with pleasure that the exact truth is reported in them.”48 Because Napoleon’s officers attached such value to the Bulletin de la Grande Armée, they felt insulted when their deeds failed to appear in its pages. General Villate appealed to Marshal Ney’s chief of staff on behalf of his men when their contribution to the battle of Elchingen was overlooked, complaining, “It is . . . very painful to be forgotten, when one serves for honor and the finest reward is to merit the attention of one’s sovereign.”49 To increase their honor, French officers likewise served for glory. Their writings demonstrate that Napoleon’s efforts to instill a love of glory in the army succeeded in the officer corps. In a scene that resembled the imagery in a Napoleonic song, Colonel Jules-Alexandre-Léger Boutroue bid a difficult farewell to his pregnant spouse when called upon to command a regiment in the Army of the Coasts. Although “it is doubly painful to be obliged to leave my wife in this moment,” he told his brother, “glory is calling me to the Army of England and I am not hesitating.”50 The guardsman Barrès explained that as the campaign of 1805 opened, he eagerly anticipated winning glory in battle. After he crossed the Rhine, he “recalled to memory all the noble feats of arms which its banks had seen. Then warlike reminiscences made me long for a few glorious encounters in which I might satisfy my eager impatience.”51 Later in the campaign, he was upset that the Guard was not committed during the capture of Ulm, because he wanted to fight “in order to prove” that he “had as much love of glory as the veterans.”52 The veteran Amédée le Nourry, a captain in the 16th dragoons, displayed this sentiment to his sisters, confiding, “I will not be displeased to make war, where one wins glory and money.”53 French officers were also extremely proud of the glory that they accumulated. Although Second Lieutenant Antoine Viel suffered at times on the march to Austerlitz, he was pleased that he was able to participate in “this glorious campaign.”54 After the victory at Austerlitz, Colonel Corbineau announced to his brother that he had maintained his glory by capturing an The Emperor’s Grognards

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enemy flag and demonstrating his bravery in the battle. “Thus,” he wrote, “I have not tarnished the little glory that we were able to acquire in our earlier campaigns.”55 Following the campaign of 1807, de Mailhet-Vachères regretted that his brother “is not with the Grande Armée” because he would not be able to share in its laurels. As he explained, the campaign that led to the Peace of Tilsit “has covered the army with glory.”56 French officers strove to cover their units with glory as well as themselves, showing esprit de corps. Highlighting his attachment to the 18th regiment of infantry, Barbara believed that at Austerlitz, it “distinguished itself in an astonishing manner. We killed more than 1,000 men and took more prisoners. . . . If all of the regiments had been as fortunate as us, not one of these vain enemies would have escaped from our courage and our audacity.”57 Esprit de corps existed at several levels. Officers sought to preserve the reputation of their corps, brigades, regiments, and companies. Captain Honoré Grimaldi even took great pride in being a part of Marshal Murat’s staff in 1807, claiming, “I would tell you that the amaranthes . . . have had their effect in this campaign; the testimony of the army is in our favor. . . . Not a regiment has charged without having an amaranthe with it.”58 Amaranth, a dark, purplish red, was the distinctive color of the uniform of Murat’s staff officers. Although Napoleon’s officers developed attachments to different formations, they normally identified most with their regiment. Their satisfaction at seeing it cited in orders of the day and bulletins and their indignation when they did not receive the accolades they felt it deserved indicates that they were determined to maintain the reputation of their units. In addition, French officers wanted to increase their prestige because, as one officer explained, the regiment’s “glory had become mine.”59

Martial Masculinity in the Officer Corps The intention of French officers to win glory for themselves as well as their units conformed to the martial masculinity that formed such an important facet of the military culture constructed in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. They likewise adopted its warlike character and sexual virility. In their enthusiasm for war and combat, the individuals who commanded Napoleon’s soldiers resembled the French troops who appeared in Napoleonic propaganda. According to their letters, journals, and memoirs, they yearned for opportunities to demonstrate their bravery and armed prowess. At the Camp of Montreuil, François-Joseph Zickel looked forward to the invasion of England. He claimed that since he had not “found, 178

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in the war with the Austrians, any occasion where I could distinguish myself, I dare to hope that these arrogant Albions to whom I will make known the valor of my arms, will procure me a fine one.”60 Louis de Périgord showed an even greater appetite for combat. While he waited impatiently to resume operations against the Russian army in the winter of 1807, he declared to his father, “I ask again for a battle, you are going to tell me that I am acquiring a taste for them because I had to fight in two of them in 30 days, but I love them and I hate the Russians.”61 Other officers expressed their love of battle by displaying anger and disappointment when they missed it, an attitude that may seem incomprehensible to the twenty-first-century reader. Maurice de Tascher was disconsolate that he was not able to fight at Saalfeld. In his diary, he noted, “The young Prince Ferdinand, the brother of the king of Prussia, one of the principal authors of the war, has been one of its first victims; he was killed by a maréchal de logis of the 10th hussors named Gunid’ [sic]. Why was it not us who had seen the enemy the first?”62 Captain Amédée le Noury also complained about missed opportunities. A perfect example of the grognard, he grumbled to his sister, “I have, besides, made a disagreeable campaign[.] Not only have I not been in any exceptional combat, but also the two horses that I had . . . were taken from me in the cantonments in Upper Austria about two months ago.”63 Some of this rhetoric may be regarded as masculine posturing. Napoleon’s officers found themselves immersed in a military culture dominated by the values of glory and honor, and in which manhood was defined by the possession of martial qualities. It is therefore highly unlikely that the men who led the armies of Consular and Imperial France would have expressed indifference toward battle or fears about it. Yet, the will to fight appears so often in the written materials produced by Napoleon’s officers that it must have been genuine. At the very least, it indicates that they believed that they should want to fight, which itself put pressure on them to do so. French officers did acknowledge that the behavioral norms established in the officer corps required officers, and especially new officers, to distinguish themselves in combat. Raymond de Montesquiou-Fezensac described these standards in his memoirs. He recalled that as a newly promoted second lieutenant, he was too occupied with directing the men of his company during a bridge crossing and “forgot on this occasion that the primary concern of a young officer who makes his first appearance before the enemy needs to be to establish his reputation.”64 Besides proving themselves worthy of their rank, members of the officer corps had other reasons to crave combat. The battles of the Grande Armée usually resulted in victories, which made them a far more The Emperor’s Grognards

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appealing prospect than they would have been in less successful circumstances. Combat also offered Napoleon’s officers and prospective officers the opportunity to fulfill their personal and professional ambitions and confirm their masculinity. They, like Alexandre Coudreux, considered war “very precious” because “it is only through it that we can hope for advancement.”65 Their writings, however, indicate that it represented more than just a means to achieve higher rank and other honors. The passion for glory and battlefield exploits that they exhibited reveal that something more fundamental was at work than personal interests and material concerns. In part, it reflected the new Romantic understanding of war that was beginning to arise in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which regarded military conflict as the ultimate revelatory experience that taught individuals profound truths about themselves and the world.66 Like Napoleon, some French officers found self-fulfillment in the crucible of war, and the transformation that they underwent inspired them to ponder its significance in their postwar memoirs.67 Others probably enjoyed killing. Research on the experiences of American, British, and Australian soldiers in twentieth-century conflicts has revealed that a surprising number of them found the taking of human life in personal combat to be intensely pleasurable, even akin to feelings of sexual arousal and release. Their enjoyment arose from their ability to live the fantasies that they created as a result of exposure to war movies and literature, and chivalric ideas fashioned from traditional warrior myths. Face-to-face battle also allowed them to prove their love for their comrades and country and to revel in the carnivalesque inversion of social norms that accompanied war.68 A similar process certainly occurred among some French officers. Many of them were familiar with stories about legendary heroes like Achilles, the Twelve Peers of Charlemagne, and the Chevalier Bayard, and may have exulted in their opportunity to emulate these figures. Moreover, they might have simply liked the taste of the forbidden fruit of killing. Most officers. though, did not express enthusiasm for the sanctioned murder that occurred on the battlefield. In fact, in their writings, they rarely discussed their thoughts and feelings about the act of killing at all. Rather, their desire for combat seems to have reflected a new awareness of their own manhood and that of their countrymen, a manhood that war enhanced and purified. The officers of the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée internalized the warlike virtues and masculinity that played such a dominant role in Napoleonic military culture. They grew to value war, feats of arms, and martial traits for their own sake. François Digard confirmed this development in a letter to a friend: “I am a soldier, it is everything 180

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that I need to do.  .  .  . Speak to me of cartridges, bullets, muskets, cartridge boxes, and backpacks.”69 Voicing similar sentiments, Avril described himself as a “Soldier by taste & by passion.”70 An even more striking example can be found in the correspondence of Colonel Boutroue, who proudly wrote that his infant son shared his affinity for war: What gives me the most pleasure is that he laughs as soon as he sees a saber or a musket. With such taste, he can only become a good soldier. At his birth, I wrapped him in the flags of my demi-brigade, it is without a doubt what has given him a martial soul. A few days ago I gave him an engraving representing a Capuchin priest; . . . he looked at it for a moment and then threw it into the fire. . . . He then amused himself with my saber for more than an hour and started to cry as soon as I wanted to take it from him. Qualis pater, talis filius [Like father, like son].71

Boutroue surrounded his son with the tools of war to nourish his martial tendencies, but most of the officers of the Consulate and the Empire assumed that they occurred naturally in Frenchmen. At times, they reflected upon their own masculinity, and the role of war and the military in its development. Avril, for example, believed that service in the army catapulted him into manhood. “I dare say,” he announced to his father, “that from the moment that I was decorated with the epaulette, I thought and acted like a man.”72 In general, though, most officers did not discuss their feelings about their own masculinity. Instead, they attributed the military characteristics that defined the Napoleonic discourse on French manliness to their fellow soldiers. In one of his diary entries for the campaign of 1806, Second Lieutenant de Tascher of the 8th hussars portrayed his comrades as bon-vivants who treated war like a party: We have bivouacked three leagues from the camp of Hof, before the village of Lichtenberg; the night is superb, our bivouac resembles a fête; all the fires well aligned, these trophies of arms, these provisions of all types, the hussars around the fire, everything presents a warrior atmosphere that brings to the soul a mixed emotion of joy and courage; everyone is drinking, singing, and working at the same time; everything breathes of war, activity, and gaiety; there is only the Frenchman for knowing how to fight and dance at nearly the same moment.73

This passage bore a striking resemblance to the imagery featured in the Napoleonic military song “Le bon soldat.” It described the characteristics of The Emperor’s Grognards

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the “good soldier” as “singing and dancing at the bivouac” and “fighting like a true devil.”74 Comments by other officers reveal that they also considered French men to be inherently suited for war. Some officers emphasized the intrinsic bravery of Frenchmen. Colonel Taupin of the 103rd regiment of infantry believed that “all of the French valor and courage” was needed to overcome Prussian defenses at Jena.75 Others admired the love of combat, intrepidity, and tenacity that characterized French troops. Avril was impressed that the men of his division, who had been complaining about a lack of food and had been marching for eight leagues, began running toward the combat at Wertingen as soon as they “heard the sound of the cannon.” He reacted to this display of impetuosity and endurance by telling his father, “It is with the most lively satisfaction that I did not see the French character give way for one instant.”76 Barbara too noted French resilience. In a letter written from Poland in 1807, he proposed that “in the season where we are, the country that we inhabit is impracticable for any other except for the Frenchman.”77 If Napoleon’s officers thought that French men were distinguished by these martial attributes, then it is reasonable to assume that they defined their own masculinity according to such traits whether or not they wrote about it. One of the subjects that they did address more directly was women. Displaying the virility that French military songs celebrated with such gusto, Napoleon’s officers expressed their interest in the opposite sex and described their efforts to seduce the women that they encountered during their campaigns. In his memoirs Elzéar Blaze seemed to find great satisfaction in recalling his amorous exploits and the sexual adventures of his fellow officers.78 Only the prospect of such adventures made the thought of campaigning in Poland more bearable for Louis de Périgord. In the fall of 1806, he wrote to his father, “I am leaving Berlin with regret, especially when I think that we are going to bury ourselves in the snow, and without fighting, for there is no longer anyone before us. . . . There is only the idea that we will find some obliging Polish women who can cheer us up on the long journey that we are going to make.”79 Most French officers, including de Périgord, however, devoted much greater attention in their writings to symbolic and material rewards than to women, thereby demonstrating that rewards were a more important source of motivation than sex. Moreover, although they were inclined to chercher la femme when the opportunity presented itself, anecdotal evidence suggests that many in the officer corps considered sex involving physical coercion not only unacceptable but dishonorable. Some took direct action to prevent rapes from happening. During the capture of 182

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Lübeck, Georges Bangofsky and a small group of officers and NCOs protected the inhabitants of a house they entered from being pillaged and raped by the victorious soldiers of the Grande Armée. The owner tried to pay them for saving his possessions and “the life and even the honor of my spouse.” Refusing the offer, Bangofsky replied, Monsieur, as men of honor, we have only done our duty; a good deed cannot be paid for: it would no longer have merit if we received compensation for it; besides, we don’t need the money. Think of us sometimes, and remember that if there are people who are capable of vile behavior among soldiers, it is also possible to meet those who have honor.80

Napoleon “the Great” Unlike Bangofsky, many officers did expect to be rewarded for their actions because of Napoleon’s habitual distribution of honors. In their minds, their honor depended to a significant extent upon him, and devotion to the emperor played a leading role in the morale of the officer corps. To be sure, not all were enamored of him. Embittered by his failure to obtain high rank, Captain Elzéar Blaze insisted that French troops did not fight for Napoleon, but “for themselves, to defend themselves, because Frenchmen never hesitate to do so when the choice is between danger and disgrace.”81 Antoine-Augustin-Flavien Pion des Loches, an artillery officer whose writings betrayed strong royalist sympathies, also became increasingly critical of the emperor. In a letter written in 1807, he blamed him for the Grande Armée’s casualties, asking, “One would not find today a third of those who passed the Rhine two years ago. When will the ambition of sovereigns cease to kill their peoples?”82 Such criticism was rare. On the other hand, effusive praise and intense loyalty for Napoleon abounded in the letters, journals, and memoirs of officers. For example, Louis de Périgord, who was a member of Marshal Berthier’s staff, remarked to his father, “I have been very happy to make this campaign near him and to be in a position to admire him daily.”83 French officers and officer candidates did more than simply admire their leader. Napoleonic military culture combined with Napoleon’s extraordinary victories and the relationship that he cultivated with his men to invest him with the sacrality that he worked so hard to acquire. The men who served in the officer corps displayed a deep, emotional attachment to him consistent with sacralization. For the guardsman Jean-Roch Coignet, Napoleon was “our dear Emperor,” The Emperor’s Grognards

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and for Captain Louis-Florimond Fantin des Odoards, he was “our immortal Emperor” who “is always the son of Victory.”84 With even more reverence, Lieutenant Montbreton de Norvins characterized him as “the Master, who is an army to himself,” whose “will” was “truly sacred for me.”85 The staff officer Coudreux also considered the will of the emperor, whom he called “Napoleon the Great,” to be sacred. While occupying Prussia in 1808, he pledged to his brother, “We, however, endure our difficulties with patience, and we love our August Emperor so much that we will go to live in camp again next summer if it seems good to him, without letting the least complaint escape.”86 These feelings were partially due to the personal charisma for which Napoleon was so famous. Napoleon’s greatness in the eyes of his officers, however, derived more from the honor that he bestowed upon them, his unique qualities and achievements, and his role as a patriotic monarch. Napoleonic military culture succeeded in convincing the officer corps that he would recognize the service of its members and compensate them for it. They believed, like Colonel Boutroue, that “we receive new benefits from our Emperor every day,” and this assumption encouraged French officers to perform acts that would earn his gratitude.87 It also made them want to participate in campaigns that he considered important, and serve in the armies that he commanded. The engineer de Mailhet-Vachères reported that he did not regret participating in the sieges of Breslau and Graudentz even though he failed to win a promotion, but he added, “If I had been at Dantzik [sic], I would have perhaps snared something. The Emperor prized this place very much.”88 Much like the officers of the Royal army, the individuals who commanded Napoleon’s troops served their sovereign to acquire the rewards that their honor required. Yet they did not respond favorably to other facets of the emperor’s Absolutist image. Despite the use of symbols and ceremonies from the Old Regime, Napoleon’s officers never regarded the emperor as a divine right monarch. As time went on, they sometimes spoke about him in more kingly terms. While in Spain, the cavalry officer de Tascher described Napoleon in his diary as a successor to the French king Francis I.89 Most of the officer corps, however, remained indifferent or hostile to representations of Napoleon that evoked Absolutism. A number of them viewed Napoleon’s efforts to ape French kings with considerable trepidation. The artillery officer Jean Nicolas Auguste Noël, who witnessed the coronation, wondered, This pomp, at the debut of a reign of a democratic sovereign raised by the people, did it not anticipate a court and its abuses, did it not create the 184

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fear of a return of the Old Regime with parvenus instead of the former nobility? One was struck by the new pieces of money bearing on its face: Napoléon Empereur, on the reverse: République Français. Who were they trying to fool?90

These remarks betrayed a commitment to the Republican principles of the French Revolution, which a significant portion of the officer corps still possessed. The infantry officer François Vigo-Roussillon highlighted this tendency in his comments about the creation of the Empire: The army was still composed of men who served the Republic since its establishment and who grew up with it. It was in its name that our greatest victories were achieved, even by Bonaparte, and it was under the Republic that our great military reputation was formed. Our glory appeared to us to be inseparable from it. This glory, we had bought dearly, and up to then as much with selflessness as courage. It seemed to us that the past to which we were attached was going to be promptly forgotten under a new regime and especially under a monarchy which already had its courtiers.91

Although some officers feared the Absolutist tendencies of their new ruler, they embraced Napoleon the Romantic hero. It is difficult to determine from the available evidence whether the officer corps shared their leader’s novelistic sensibility, but its members were fascinated by his unique qualities and saw him as an invincible general whose military talents guaranteed them victory and glory. In their writings, Napoleon was the “conqueror of the world” and “the master of the destinies of Europe” whose “genius” allowed him to accomplish amazing things with his troops.92 Even Blaze grudgingly admitted, “Nevertheless, I know very well that the presence of the Emperor produced a great effect on the army. Everyone had complete, blind confidence in him; experience had taught us that his plans brought us victory.”93 This unshakeable faith in the emperor’s military abilities even sustained the officers of the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée later in their careers during the dark years of 1813-1814.94 What seemed to impress French officers most was not simply that Napoleon always triumphed but the extraordinary nature of his victories. He accomplished the impossible. A letter that Commandant Salmon wrote to his wife after Austerlitz communicated this belief. He marveled, “In the end, we won the battle. The loss of the enemy is innumerable. . . . What a battle; since the world was made, nothing like it has happened.”95 The Emperor’s Grognards

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French officers like Salmon became convinced that only the emperor could deliver the incredible success that the Grande Armée experienced. Louis de Périgord revealed this assumption in a letter written from Tilsit. “Two combats, two great battles won, the passage of the Alle and the Pregel, the capture of Konigsberg,” he exclaimed, “here are fine things that would not be believable if the Emperor was not leading us.”96 Second Lieutenant Viel likewise regarded Napoleon with amazement. Astonished by the achievements of the “glorious campaign” of 1805, he maintained, “I will permit myself only one reflection. It is fitting only for our Emperor to make war when one considers that in ten days he destroyed an army of 80 to 90 thousand men from Austria; this seems incredible and however it is true.”97 Immersion in Napoleonic culture alone did not create this perception. The speed and extent of French victories in the wars of the Third and Fourth Coalitions were unprecedented by the standards of the period. With the conquest of Prussia in 1806 alone, Napoleon achieved in two months what the combined might of France, Austria, and Russia failed to accomplish in seven years in the middle of the eighteenth century. However, the vision of Napoleon as a Romantic hero that circulated in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée must have clarified and strengthened the impression of the emperor as an extraordinary individual who alone was capable of performing such deeds. French officers also appreciated the glory that Napoleon’s triumphs brought to the patrie. In addition to the honor and glory that he offered, one of the reasons why the grognards always followed their emperor was that they perceived him as a patriotic monarch who saved the French nation, pursued its interests, and shared the hardships of its soldiers. Although some Republicans like Vigo-Roussillon were opposed to the Empire, most officers readily accepted the image of Napoleon as a savior who rescued France from the chaos of the Revolution. A report from Marshal Soult to the minister of war confirmed this trend. Early in 1804, the military commanders in charge of the different camps of the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean were asked to provide information about their troops’ opinion of the movement to make Napoleon emperor. In his reply, Soult described a “fairly lively altercation” between two second lieutenants under his command and a townsman. The former argued in favor of the Empire, using several of the justifications that appeared in Napoleonic propaganda. They asserted that Napoleon deserved to be a hereditary ruler because of his accomplishments and the services that he rendered to France: 186

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But if today the First Consul was proclaimed Emperor of the Gauls & if the hereditary succession was established in his family, at least we would have a guarantee & France would not be exposed to see the frightful reign of factions return if by some misfortune, we came to lose him. Moreover, this act must be considered a benefit for the nation rather than an advantage for the First Consul, though it must necessarily add much to his glory. But has he not acquired enough to merit also that of founding a dynasty? Of all the conquerors that preceded him, & who in creating empires perpetuated power in their family, who did more than him?98

These ideas emerged in the writings of French officers as well. Félix Avril, another second lieutenant in Soult’s camp, presented a particularly striking portrayal of Napoleon in one of his letters. He wrote a poem claiming, The hero of the French guides me to the field of honor, Shows me the grandeurs of enchanting pomp These combats so vaunted, these illustrious exploits Are nothing in my eyes in comparison with my good parents.99

Although the point of these verses was to express Avril’s love for his parents, they show that he internalized the image of Napoleon as a national hero. Barrès spoke about Napoleon’s contributions to France in greater detail. He depicted him as “this mighty man, who had overcome anarchy,” had “vanquished the enemies of France, and replaced by order the deplorable and bloody doings of the Revolution.”100 Barrès was not opposed to the Revolution itself but to its excesses. He was actually committed to maintaining its social gains and supported Napoleon because he preserved them. Fearing that they might be lost, Barrès asked his battalion commander in 1814, “what is going to become of France if she falls into the power of the Bourbons . . . ? What will become of our institutions, of those who founded them, of those who bought national stock, and so forth?”101 In addition, French officers were inspired by Napoleon’s commitment to the Revolution’s egalitarian spirit, which probably helped to allay the fears of those with Republican sympathies. They much preferred the soldier-king who marched alongside of them to the grandiose emperor of the coronation. His readiness to risk his life on the battlefield and endure the sufferings of his men both impressed and moved them. During a naval combat near Boulogne, Avril was astounded to see Napoleon remain on board a dinghy. Displaying his admiration, he declared in one of his letters home, “the sovereign The Emperor’s Grognards

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of the greatest Empire in the world was exposed in this battle like the least of his soldiers.”102 Witnessing Napoleon undergo these kinds of experiences played an important role in sustaining the motivation of France’s officers. On a few different occasions in Poland, Barbara remarked that the emperor’s example bolstered his morale and that of his comrades. In a letter in December 1806, he wrote, “I enjoy the best health in spite of our excessive toils. What is comforting is that our wonderful sovereign shares them.”103 Not long after, he again praised Napoleon: “The admirable constancy of the hero who leads us serves as a model and helps us to patiently support the vicissitudes of our condition.”104 The belief that Napoleon waged war on behalf of the patrie also compelled French officers to fight. Their writings demonstrate that they accepted official justifications for the wars in which they were involved. They believed that their emperor protected France from the unjust aggression of Britain and her allies, and struggled to bring peace to Europe. Like François-Joseph Zickel of the 10th chasseurs à cheval, they were eager to assist him in these endeavors. Proposing that Napoleon defended France from English treachery, he hoped that the “project of the First Consul” to invade Britain would succeed because he “wanted to show the entire population the laurels that we will have conquered from this arrogant nation so renowned for its villainy.”105 A couple of years later, Lieutenant Barbara also expressed his support for Napoleon’s policies. Reacting to news of diplomatic difficulties with Austria, he believed that the emperor only wished to put an end to hostilities and declared that the army was prepared to help: “Woe to those who will trouble the peace that our wise sovereign wants. We are like lightning ready to strike. I pity with all my heart the unfortunate Emperor of Austria! May the truth and wise advice reach him.”106

Officers of Virtue As these comments suggest, French officers felt that they too were trying to win peace for France. The patriotism that motivated the armies of the French Revolution persisted in the Napoleonic officer corps, although it did incorporate the expansionist tendencies of Imperial virtue. In letters, journals, and memoirs, officers frequently spoke about their devotion to the patrie. Like countless soldiers who appeared in Revolutionary military culture, the cavalry officer de Tascher even claimed that he was happy to shed his blood for it. After fighting at Jena, he wrote, “As for me, here I am wounded and I suffer, but I suffer for my patrie and it is at the battle of Jena that I was wounded, this idea consoles me.”107 Tascher’s statement perfectly illustrates 188

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the combination of self-interest and virtue that sustained the motivation of Napoleon’s officers. He was pleased that his wounds showed his dedication to the patrie, and he felt pride in experiencing combat in the great victory at Jena, which allowed him to share in the glory of the army’s triumph. Tascher sought to win glory and an opportunity to distinguish himself prior to the battle but had not had the opportunity to do so. Jena gave him both, as well as the ability to prove his virtue. French officers also wanted their fellow citizens to appreciate their service to the nation. Expressions of the patrie’s gratitude and admiration helped to maintain the morale of the Republic’s armies, and they continued to be important in those of Napoleon. Louis de Périgord highlighted their value in a letter to his father after the victory at Ulm, writing, “We have just made a fine campaign; I hope that France is satisfied with our success.”108 When the French population did show its satisfaction, it made a strong impression. In Germany, Adjudant-Major Coudreux told his brother that he was thrilled to read about the triumphs of 1808: I have already read in our journals about the details of the thousand brilliant receptions that you have made in France for the soldiers of the Grande Armée and I saw with a very great pleasure that the inhabitants of Tours had the honor of being cited in a particular article; a reception so flattering, and between us it must be said, so out of the ordinary, will increase the courage of our brave and relentless legions still more and the rebels [in Spain] will not enjoy themselves when they fall within their grasp. If the English dare to await them, they will see what it is like to experience combat with the bayonets of Austerlitz and Friedland.109

As these comments indicate, the men who commanded the Empire’s legions did not just want to defend France; they intended to make it the most powerful and prestigious nation in Europe. Their writings demonstrate that they appropriated the Imperial virtue cultivated by Napoleonic military culture and that they were committed to preserving what Félix Avril called “the greatest Empire in the world.”110 Jean-Pierre Bial explained in his memoirs that in 1804, “I was 30 years old, without any other ambition than to serve my country and contribute to the grandeur of France.”111 Others shared these goals. The infantry officer Barbara felt a profound sense of exhilaration after the victory at Austerlitz because of the prestige that it bestowed upon France. “The affair of Osterlitz [sic],” he exulted, “has to immortalize the French name and make us respected by the universe.”112 The Emperor’s Grognards

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Between 1803 and 1808, these expressions of patriotism were never as prominent in the writings of French officers as the desire for advancement, glory, and combat, but they were nevertheless present. Moreover, patriotic sentiment grew stronger among the individuals who served in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée in the last years of the Empire. Their accounts of this period and their letters from 1813-1815 reveal that patriotism gave them the will to keep fighting even when defeats began to become more frequent. The cavalry officer Georges Bangofsky represents an example of this trend. Before 1813, he rarely expressed a strong commitment to France in his campaign journal. Yet patriotic language began to appear in his entries for the last three years of the Napoleonic wars. During the campaigns in Germany in 1813, he noted that the landlord of a large peasant village spoke to him in a manner that “humiliated me so much, insulted the French nation so much, that I could not hold back my tears.”113 A few years later, when Napoleon returned in the Hundred Days, Bangofsky enlisted in the National Guard to protect France from further insults. Highlighting his devotion to the patrie, he asserted that the threat of an invasion by “the entirety of Europe” was “the signal for the gathering of all brave men, to defend their country and their rights.”114 Other officers exhibited the same intense patriotism. Dismayed by Napoleon’s defeat in 1814 and uncertain about his future, Second Lieutenant Zickel nevertheless swore, “But it matters not! I will always be the same, and always ready to spill my blood for my patrie, under whatever monarch I find myself!”115 The following year, Alexandre Coudreux took a similar vow. In the aftermath of Waterloo, he and his fellow officers “decided to get ourselves killed to the last man for the noble cause of our independence.”116 Furthermore, Napoleon’s officers were not only fighting to protect France. They struggled to preserve its conquests. Highlighting his concerns about France’s national honor, Barrès admitted that he was crushed by the loss of the Empire: “The order came to hand over the famous fortified city of Mainz, with its immense mass of material.  .  .  . We left it in virtue of the spoliating convention of the 23rd April, which confined France to her old frontiers. What loss we suffered in a single day! What bitter regret this abandonment caused us!”117 These expressions of despair and defiance were the groans of true grognards. The military culture forged in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée transformed French officers into men who possessed the qualities that would be associated with this archetype. Reflecting the complex mixture of ideas and values that were dissemi190

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nated in these armies, multiple factors made them willing to risk life and limb on the battlefields of Europe. The most important does seem to have been honor. While French officers regarded duty and respectable behavior as elements of this attribute, they adopted the warrior honor of the Napoleonic regime rather than its patriotic honor. During the first half of the Napoleonic wars, they strove to distinguish themselves in combat in order to win the promotions, medals, approval, and glory offered by the emperor. Members of the officer corps also desired battle to enhance the reputation of their unit and because they internalized the bellicose traits that were identified with French manhood. Displaying the exuberant sexuality that characterized the martial masculinity of Consular and Imperial France, they sought to conquer women as well as their enemies, but many of them considered rape to be dishonorable. In addition, French officers did fight for Napoleon. They served him to earn the baubles that he dangled before them. The emperor’s incredible victories and his willingness to share their dangers and hardships likewise gained him their devotion. Finally, patriotism and Imperial virtue motivated French officers to follow the emperor. They viewed him as a patriotic monarch and appreciated the benefits and prestige that he brought to France. Like the soldiers of the French Revolution, they too loved their patrie, suffered for it, and longed for the gratitude and admiration of its citizens. Moreover, the grognard officers of the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée committed themselves to upholding France’s status as the Great Nation, and they did not discard virtue in their quest for honor and glory. Rather, it grew stronger as the Empire weakened. The shifting emphasis on honor and patriotism represented the changing circumstances in which Napoleon’s officers found themselves. They could afford to pursue their personal goals from 1803 to 1808 because their country, their government, and their families were never truly threatened. France was not in imminent danger until 1814, so the fears of invasion that inspired so much patriotism during the French Revolution stayed dormant until the final stages of the Napoleonic wars. Between 1805 and 1808, many of the Empire’s soldiers also achieved their goals. They won glory, honors such as the Legion of Honor, and at least some advancement. They encountered opportunities to demonstrate their valor and their masculinity on the battlefield. As time progressed, the promise of higher ranks and even titles of nobility after 1808 remained, but grades above the rank of captain eluded most. When casualties and setbacks mounted after 1812, and the invasion of the patrie loomed, the luster of glory and honors faded in the face of impending danger. In these circumstances, virtue understandably became a more compelling motive than honor. The Emperor’s Grognards

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7 Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors The Rank and File

Nicolas Bognier was “a grognard in spite of himself.”1 He was drafted in 1806, incorporated into the 26th regiment of light infantry, and served in the French army until the spring of 1814. He possessed the grognard’s propensity to complain, but the letters that he wrote to his brother displayed none of the patriotism, honor, bellicosity, and emperor worship that appeared in the writings of French officers. Indeed, Bognier represented the antithesis of the ideal Napoleonic soldier. He showed an intense dislike for the military, asserting, “It is a poor career, that of the soldier.”2 The fearful Bognier also sought to avoid combat and criticized the emperor. Blaming Napoleon for his miseries, he griped, “when he finishes with one [war], he starts another, so that there is never peace.”3 The sufferings that Bognier endured made him obsessed with finding a way out of the army, with “getting out of there.”4 While at the siege of Danzig, he entertained thoughts of desertion and later assured his brother, “I would happily give 3000 frs. [francs] to get my leave.”5 Unfortunately for Bognier, he only managed to escape after Napoleon’s first abdication. Throughout his long military career, Nicolas Bognier remained unmoved by the Napoleonic regime’s efforts to impose its value system on French troops. The only thing that this reluctant conqueror shared with the more famous Nicolas Chauvin was a first name; he fought because he felt he had no other choice. Before the Russian campaign, he wrote, “There are still great miseries and sufferings to endure. Finally, what can you do? Because we have such a terrible fate, it is necessary to accept what God wants.”6 Bognier found military life more difficult to bear than most of his peers. Yet, this sense of resignation was a common theme in the writings of Napoleon’s soldiers, which seems to indicate that the military culture constructed in the Army 192

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of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée had no appreciable impact on them. This assumption, however, raises difficult questions. Why did Napoleon, who was reputed to have an exceptional talent for motivating his soldiers, devote so much time, effort, and resources to this activity for such meager results? Even more puzzling, how did such apparently unmotivated soldiers win such impressive victories? By themselves, the written documents produced by NCOs and enlisted men fail to provide satisfactory answers. A broader collection of sources, which combines them with other materials such as reports on the French army’s morale, accounts of its soldiers’ actions, and studies of military motivation in other armies, reveals that a significant minority of the rank and file did embrace the values that Napoleon endeavored to cultivate in the military. Resembling the officers who led them, they too acquired the qualities that distinguished the legendary grognard. Others appropriated Napoleonic military culture more selectively. Some of Napoleon’s soldiers internalized its martial virtues and developed an enthusiasm for glory and warlike deeds. Substantial numbers of them likewise found the army’s libertine lifestyle appealing. Above all, the propaganda, festivals, and symbolic activities used to manipulate French troops generated strong support for Napoleon, which manifested itself in their behavior more than their writings. Many soldiers, however, showed indifference to the cult of Napoleon. Napoleonic propaganda failed to transform them into dedicated grognards, and they served because the law required it. Religion gave many of these individuals the psychological strength to cope with military life. In addition, primary group loyalties kept such recruits in the army and convinced them to perform their military duties. The presence of more committed, veteran comrades in their units, and their relationships with their officers also sustained their motivation. For some men, neither bonds with their fellow soldiers nor the leadership of their officers sufficed. They remained in the army only because they feared the consequences of not doing so. To compel these individuals to fulfill their military obligations, Napoleon and the military authorities relied on force to deter desertion, making coercion a primary component of the French army’s motivational system.

Napoleon’s Other Grognards The rank and file fell into two categories: sous-officiers and soldats, or noncommissioned officers and regular soldiers. NCOs occupied a middling position between the commissioned ranks and private soldiers, though they Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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were normally lumped together with the latter to separate them from the officer corps. As their title suggests, they did not hold a commission from the government. With some variation according to the branch of service, the ranks of NCOs in the infantry included the following grades, from lowest to highest: sergeant, sergent-major, and adjudant-sous-officier.7 In the cavalry, NCO ranks had different titles. A maréchal des logis performed the functions of a sergeant, and the maréchal des logis chef those of a sergent-major. Fourriers, corporals, and brigadiers, the cavalry equivalent of a corporal, occupied a rung below these positions. They were not technically sous-officiers, but they did exercise a supervisory and leadership role equivalent to that of noncommissioned officers. NCOs, as well as corporals, brigadiers, and fourriers, assisted officers in their duties, commanded and looked after the men assigned to their units, and were responsible for training, discipline, and supply duties. Significant numbers of NCOs and regular soldiers shared the values of the officer corps and became Napoleonic grognards like their superiors. Most of them were volunteers who intended to make the military their profession. Some eventually became officers, but many ambitious volunteers never obtained a commission and spent their careers as NCOs. In spite of their frustration with “false promises of rapid advancement,” they developed the same qualities that distinguished their officers.8 Jacques Chevillet illustrates this trend. He was a trumpeter in the 8th chasseurs à cheval for much of his career until he was promoted to maréchal des logis in 1809. In his memoirs, he displayed virtually all of the characteristics attributed to the grognard: I had no other ambition in pursuing the profession of arms than to serve my patrie well, learn to fight like a good soldier for honor and for victory under the government of a prince beloved by the nation, the favorite of renown, who, because of his great genius and his talents, had already done [so much for] the glory and the hope of the French, the fortune of soldiers who served their patrie well, the terror of [our] enemies, and finally, the admiration of all of Europe and the universe.9

A more unusual case was that of Jean-Marie Merme, who enlisted during the Revolution. Happier as a “simple soldier,” he refused all promotion and served as a cavalry trooper in the Imperial Guard until he was discharged after Napoleon’s first abdication. He was completely devoted to his emperor and obsessed with glory. The fanatical Merme even vowed that he would “rise from his grave to follow” Napoleon if he returned from “the other world,” 194

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referred to the emperor as “the friend, the father, the God of the soldier,” and named his children after members of the Imperial family.10 Not all of the men who became committed soldiers of Napoleonic France began their careers as volunteers. Some were draftees who were gradually molded into grognards by the army. After being conscripted, they discovered a talent and a penchant for the military that eventually led them to become officers. One of them, Pierre Robinaux, who was mentioned in chapter 6, was particularly noteworthy because he readily admitted his unhappiness about being forced to join the army. Exclaiming “What a fatal day!” when he recalled the moment that he was drafted, he confessed that he “could not overcome the chagrin” that “unceasingly obsessed” him. He deserted soon after he arrived at his unit, but was caught. “Sincerely repentant,” Robinaux was allowed to return to his regiment without any serious punishment.11 With time, he became a patriotic and ambitious soldier dedicated to “Napoleon the Great.” In 1812, he acquired his officer’s commission in the 11th infantry regiment, as he proudly wrote, by “cannon shots” and “by virtue of hard work” instead of through personal connections.12 Robinaux did not explain how this change in outlook occurred, but it is reasonable to assume that the propaganda, rewards, and symbolic activities to which he was exposed were responsible, or at least contributed to it. Immersion within Napoleonic culture also gave other members of the rank and file an appetite for military glory. During an inspection of Davout’s camps in the spring of 1805, General Anne Jean Marie René Savary informed Napoleon, “The army of Ostende is very handsome[;] I have only seen smiling faces, and a fanaticism for glory animates the troops there.”13 Some NCOs and enlisted men also felt intense pride in their victories, and like their officers, calculated their glory by the number of trophies captured. Sergeant Etienne Dufourcq Sarthez experienced profound satisfaction for participating in the victory at Jena-Auerstädt. Despite the size of Prussian forces and “their advantageous positions,” he announced to his mother and sister that his corps “succeeded in making them quit the battlefield.” He eagerly continued, explaining, “After this battle, we captured from the Prussians up to 20,000 men without shooting a musket or a cannon,” and bragged that there were no more enemies left “because all fly before the army.”14 His ardor even withstood the carnage of Eylau. Revealing his determination to maintain the reputation of French infantry, he reported that he and his fellow soldiers were “accustomed to the fatigues of war” and “happy to fight with the premier infantry in the world.”15 He assured his mother and sister that “we defeated them easily,” and that “[i]f 25 000 Prussians had not arrived at noon, we were going to defeat all of the Russians.”16 Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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Others tried to overcome the defenses of female adversaries with equal vigor. Few NCOs and common soldiers spoke about women in their writings, and references to romantic love and sex are especially rare in their letters. This tendency is understandable, for many came from conservative peasant families and probably felt uncomfortable about addressing these topics with their relatives. Enough evidence exists, however, to indicate that Napoleon’s enlisted men were as preoccupied with sexual conquests as French military songs claimed and tried to take full advantage of the libertine lifestyle that they were promised. The memoirs of Raymond de Montesquiou-Fezensac illustrate the obsession with women that characterized the soldiers of the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. De Montesquiou-Fezensac was an astute observer of military life who was born into one of the most prestigious noble families in France. At age twenty, he enlisted as a volunteer in the 59th regiment of line infantry. He learned his trade quickly by occupying different ranks from private to sergent major, and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the summer of 1805. As his colonel explained, de MontesquiouFezensac acquired the skills necessary to command soldiers by “living with them.”17 In his description of the Camp of Montreuil, where he was stationed, he claimed that the morals of the troops “were better than one would have believed” because “you never saw women.”18 He explained that the absence of women was beneficial because they were a distraction. Emphasizing the troops’ interest in the fair sex, he remarked, “when by chance one sole woman came to appear, you cannot imagine the excitement that her presence caused; and these soldiers, so tranquil in camp, would have all wanted to have a mistress in the garrison.”19 A letter by Joseph Vachin confirmed the truth of these statements. Shortly after he was incorporated into the vélites of the Imperial Guard, he boasted to his uncle, “at present, training is an amusement for me.” He then broke into verse, declaring that he would much prefer to do some exploits, at the request, of marie jameton or Louisette, sometimes at the requisition, of antoinete [sic] Eulalie Margouton, and especially at night when it is very cold.20

Once the soldiers left for war and were freed from the constraints of the army’s camps, they wasted no time in trying to find women to keep them 196

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warm. Elzéar Blaze, who was a second lieutenant in the Grande Armée, reported, “Having arrived at his billet, everyone—officer, sergeant, or soldier—considered wooing the lady, or better, the daughter of the house; often nothing came of it; sometimes you were successful.”21 Some soldiers relished this sexual freedom. Léandre Pignot, for example, who served as a chasseur in the 27th light infantry, despised life in the army. One of the few aspects of soldiering that he found appealing was the opportunities it afforded to him to meet young and attractive women. He filled his diary with accounts of flirtatious encounters. Sometimes, his efforts won him more than a pleasant conversation. His journal entries for December of 1806 implied that he seduced not just one woman but two: “The 28th, the home of two charming ladies, curious and passionate, old husband. When a man is advanced in age, and he marries a young and pretty wife he has to expect that he will not be her only possessor, isn’t that right, reader? The next day, the 29th, I left with the memory of two amiable sisters.”22 French troops recognized that such behavior emasculated and angered the husbands, male relatives, and boyfriends of such women. In his observations about the occupation of Austrian territory in 1806, de Montesquiou-Fezensac wrote that the local inhabitants wanted the French to depart because the men “no longer felt like masters in their own homes, because we had emancipated their women by demanding respect and politeness from their brothers and uncles, which they were not accustomed to at all.”23 Philippe-René Girault, a musician who traversed Europe with the French army, was more blunt. “We must not be surprised at the hate which the Germans bear toward us,” he reasoned. “They cannot forgive us for having caressed their wives and daughters before their very faces for twenty years.”24 De Montesquiou-Fezensac claimed that foreign women “appeared very receptive” to the caresses of Napoleon’s troops because of their “cheerfulness” and their liveliness.25 There is some truth to these claims, for large numbers of German, Dutch, Polish, and Hungarian women accompanied the Grande Armée as sutlers in order to follow its soldiers who had become their husbands and lovers.26 Yet not all women found French troops appealing, and they did resort to force to conquer their female prizes. Orders of the day sometimes mentioned individual soldiers who were convicted of rape.27 Announcements intended to prevent it also appeared in them, proving that sexual assaults had taken place. The depredations committed by V Corps in the fall of 1805 reached such critical proportions that its leader, Marshal Lannes, issued a stern order of the day declaring that any soldier or employee attached to the army caught “pillaging, murdering, raping, menacing an Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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officer or striking him” would be “shot immediately.” To drive this message home, he specified that it was to be read “for two consecutive days.”28 The penalty decreed for soldiers who bullied their officers demonstrates that the latter tried to prevent their men from abusing the civilians that they encountered, and that they were often ignored or threatened with physical violence if they intervened. Even the risk of severe punishment did not deter some soldiers. In December of 1806, Marshal Murat reported to Napoleon that three soldiers of the 33rd regiment of infantry were arrested in a house in Warsaw where they “had stolen and raped.”29 Napoleon’s soldiers did not always spare French women either. When the Grande Armée left its camps on the English Channel to embark on the Ulm campaign, two soldiers from the 55th regiment of infantry took a detour to rape and rob a woman from the commune of Taisnière. They only stopped when a corporal traveling with the regiment’s baggage arrived to rescue their victim.30 Although French enlisted men and NCOs did rape women and girls whom they encountered, the majority of them were probably not guilty of sexual assault between 1803 and 1808. Like Léandre Pignot, most were content to flirt with women who were unwilling to become their lovers. When this soldier and his traveling companions failed to coax four sisters in Landau to spend the night with them, he teased them as they departed, promising, “If I had the fortune to return to my country, I would think about you sometimes.”31 Others who were less forgiving undoubtedly exercised restraint because they feared the punishments that they might suffer. Moreover, men such as the corporal from the 55th infantry who stopped the rape at Taisnière probably considered sexual assault dishonorable and felt obligated to protect women from soldier-rapists. Napoleon’s soldiers therefore normally endeavored to conquer their female opponents by seduction rather than force. Still, the evidence indicates that a significant number of them were willing to employ coercion to gratify their sexual desires. This willingness also unfortunately increased in the later stages of the Napoleonic wars. During the brutal guerrilla fighting and siege warfare that occurred in the Iberian Peninsula, in which French troops had difficulty distinguishing enemy combatants from civilians, they frequently raped Spanish women to punish the communities that they believed were responsible for the casualties that they suffered.32 Descriptions of these events by Napoleon’s soldiers also sometimes resembled the rape fantasies contained in French military songs, indicating that they may have influenced the behavior of the Empire’s troops in Spain. After the sack of Lerida in 1810, the officer Thomas Bugeaud reported to his sister, 198

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The soldiers, greedy for pillage, scatter themselves about among the houses; carnage ceases, and gives place to scenes of quite another kind; the conquerors are everywhere seen in the arms of the vanquished—Carmelites, grey sisters, old women, young nuns, all experienced the transports of our Grenadiers, and several of them are said to have cried out, “Oh, if we had known that this would be all we should not have been so much afraid.”33

One doubts that Bugeaud would have responded in such a cavalier fashion if his sister received such treatment at the hands of Spanish grenadiers, or that he would have assumed that she enjoyed it. It would be unreasonable to claim that the military culture of the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée was solely responsible for the aggressive sexual behavior of their personnel. The military forces of Consular and Imperial France contained large numbers of young, single men, many of whom were free of familial and community constraints for the first time. It is probable that they would have energetically sought female companionship regardless of whether official propaganda encouraged it. In addition, the obsession with the fair sex that characterized French troops was not unique. Sexual violence has unfortunately accompanied most military conflicts, and it constituted an especially prominent feature of the wars of early modern Europe.34 It was one of the reasons why the presence of an army was viewed with alarm even among populations that they served. The sexual freedom associated with the military enticed men all over Europe to enlist and convinced them to remain in the ranks.35 Moreover, other soldiers of the Napoleonic era pursued the pleasures of the flesh with an enthusiasm comparable to that of the French. Wellington’s redcoats normally shunned individuals who routinely engaged in violent criminal activities.36 Yet, after the capture of Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, and San Sebastien, a combination of brutal fighting, alcohol, and military customs that allowed attacking soldiers to sack towns that refused to surrender led them to indulge in rape.37 British soldiers and officers also tried to win the affections of women in Spain and Portugal through more peaceful means, and succeeded in convincing large numbers of Portuguese women to follow them around Iberia.38 Much like these and other men who served in European armies from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century, Napoleon’s soldiers, NCOs, and officers needed no urging to chercher la femme. Still, by celebrating the pursuit of women and linking it to manliness, the vision of manhood cultivated in the French army no doubt increased the tendency of the enlisted ranks to Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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seek out female sexual partners in order to demonstrate their virility to their peers. Moreover, Napoleonic martial masculinity may have sustained their morale by reminding them that they would always have new opportunities to find physical love and romance. For at least some young Frenchmen, most of whom came from peasant villages with small female populations, this prospect must have been enticing. Unfortunately, the high value attached to sexual prowess in French military songs could also have made them more willing to use the violence that sometimes accompanied their relations with women. Susan Brownmiller contends that the celebration of sexually coercive behavior in popular culture, which she refers to as the “myth of the heroic rapist,” encourages men to rape.39 There is good reason to believe that sexual content in Napoleonic military culture had this effect upon more than a few of the Empire’s soldiers.

Napoleon’s Faithful The men who filled the French Empire’s legions loved their leader as well as the women whom they met. A few NCOs and enlisted men spoke about him at length in their writings. Similar to their superiors, some appreciated his willingness to play the role of the little corporal. A soldier from Bastogne, for instance, showed his admiration for the emperor in a letter that he wrote after the battle of Austerlitz. He exclaimed, “The three Emperors even commanded in person. Why, if you had seen Napoleon run before his army like a true soldier crying: Courage, my children, the victory depends on you.”40 The diary of Léandre Pignot described Napoleon’s qualities in greater detail. It contained a poem that praised him as the savior of France: Dear to all the French, his people see in him, Their savior, their counsel, and their firmest support. Brave like Caesar, prudent like Turenne, Enemy of the factious and governing without trouble, On the throne strengthened by his noble exploits, Attracting our esteem and meriting his authority. France under his laws, in recovering its luster, Owes all of its happiness to this illustrious warrior.41

Pignot was not a typical private, though. He was an unusually eloquent soldier, and the content of his journal suggests that he was more highly educated than most of his compatriots. 200

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In stark contrast to men like Pignot and French officers, most members of the enlisted ranks did not mention their thoughts about Napoleon in their writings, suggesting that they were indifferent to him. Yet, other sources tell a different story. Reports about French soldiers and their actions show that Napoleonic military culture succeeded in converting them to his cult. Observations made by French military commanders and officers about the army’s morale demonstrate that support for the new leader of France grew throughout the Consulate and the Empire. When marshals and generals evaluated the army’s “public spirit” in their correspondence, they often emphasized its loyalty to Napoleon. General Berthier visited the Camp of St. Omer in 1803 as the minister of war to see how preparations for the invasion of England were progressing. During his inspection, he informed Napoleon, “I chatted with the soldiers without most of them recognizing me; I have seen everywhere the greatest devotion to your person.”42 Marmont was similarly pleased with his troops in the Camp of Utrecht. In October of 1804, he claimed, “Lastly, opinion has taken shape in the manner that I was able to hope. I can assure Your Majesty that there does not exist in the French army troops more devoted to Your Majesty than those that are under my orders.”43 The same kinds of reports continued to be made in the Grande Armée. In July of 1806, Marshal Mortier told the emperor, “the spirit that reigns in the 5th Corps of the Grande Armée is excellent. There is not one individual who composes it who does not desire to be able to find the occasion to prove again to our Emperor his admiration and his absolute devotion.”44 With the exception of the remarks made by Berthier, who was not in charge of the troops that he saw, the veracity of these reports is somewhat suspect. French military leaders possessed compelling reasons to present a favorable impression of the units under their command. While the reliability of reports written by marshals and generals is open to question, other sources substantiate their claims. French junior officers echoed the comments of their superiors in their letters, diaries, and memoirs. After Second Lieutenant Alexandre Coudreux arrived at his unit in 1806, he remarked to his brother, “Moreover, everything that the journalists publish about the spirit that animates the soldier is exactly true. Never has one seen more good will or more devotion. I have no doubt that we will gather victories again if the Emperor commands the Grande Armée once more.”45 Other eyes outside of the military also watched the army. Since Napoleon was well aware that he was not the only general with political ambitions, he directed the police to exercise surveillance over the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean to keep him informed about its attitude toward him and his govDevoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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ernment. A secret report composed by one of Fouché’s agents in July of 1804 provides one of the most compelling accounts of the army’s feelings about Napoleon. Although it offered a more sober assessment of the army’s loyalty, it essentially confirmed the statements made by its commanders. The informant who authored the document observed the troops near Boulogne, and explained, The officers and soldiers of the camp on the right, appeared to have been pleased with the affable manners and the signs of interest that the Emperor gave while speaking to a large number of soldiers. Everything inclines [one] to believe, and to give even the most complete assurance that it will be the same for the other camps where there exists a similar spirit, and a pronounced devotion for the leader of the Empire.

The report concluded, “We observe, in a word, that enthusiasm is growing for the person of the Emperor, that if it has been slow to develop, it will be without a doubt more solid and more durable.”46 The police and Fouché certainly followed their own agenda, which did not necessarily correspond to Napoleon’s, but they were not under the same pressures as army commanders to testify that French soldiers supported the emperor. Moreover, due to the assassination plots that existed during the Consulate, they were probably on the lookout for potentially subversive behavior and, consequently, less inclined to emphasize the army’s commitment to him if it was not present. The enthusiasm for Napoleon noticed by the police did grow more solid and durable, and the actions of French soldiers confirm it. On numerous occasions between 1803 and 1808, and especially between 1805 and 1807, the enlisted ranks of the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée engaged in very public demonstrations of loyalty. Cries of “Vive l’Empereur!” greeted Napoleon during his reviews and rang out at festivals, and there are numerous accounts of French troops shouting the slogan in battle.47 The commanders of various military formations sometimes required their men to perform these behaviors. After a while, the phrase also simply became the French army’s customary cheer, which some men undoubtedly yelled without thinking or used to voice their defiance of the enemy. Yet there are so many examples of Napoleon’s soldiers applauding their emperor that many of them could only have been sincere. The spontaneous nature of some of these events likewise strongly suggests that they represented the true feelings of NCOs and soldiers. Jean-Baptiste Barrès described an impromptu cheering session after the capture of Ulm. 202

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The Imperial Guard and another corps of the Grande Armée sighted the emperor outside of Vienna and greeted him with a thunderous reception “which proved . . . how the Emperor was loved by his troops.” He recalled, “We climbed a very steep slope and lined the road on either side. The 9th corps, which climbed the hill with us, gave way to the same impulse as the whole Guard. In a moment the cries of ‘Vive l’Empereur’ ran all along the line, our caps and bonnets on the ends of our bayonets.”48 Napoleon himself perceived such displays as a honest mark of affection. At about the same point in the campaign of 1805, he wrote a letter to his brother Joseph, stating, “I have good reason to be extremely satisfied with the spirit of heroism and the attachment to my person that animates the army.”49 Because of Napoleon’s keen understanding of his soldiers, this observation indicates that episodes like the one described by Barrès were not just the product of soldiers following orders or of ingrained habit. In addition to these examples, French rankers showed even greater dedication to the emperor by proclaiming their allegiance to him after they had been wounded. Mutilated soldiers expressed their commitment to him through actions that resembled scenes straight out of the Bulletin de la Grande Armée, revealing that they appropriated the myth of the glorious death. Maurice de Tascher wrote that during the battle of Jena, he encountered a soldier who had “his two legs cut off ” by a cannon ball. Despite the severity of his wounds, he swore, “if I could only raise myself, I would cry, ‘Vive l’Empereur!’”50 Marshal Murat reported an equally eloquent testimonial of support for Napoleon. He informed the emperor that following a combat near Ried in 1805, he met a maréchal de logis of the 8th dragoons “who, showing me his wrist cleaved by a saber cut, told me, ‘Prince, I only miss my hand because it can no longer serve our good Emperor.’”51 The most revealing sign of the success of Napoleon’s cult occurred right before the battle of Austerlitz. On the eve of the emperor’s most famous victory, which was also the night before the anniversary of his coronation, he went to inspect his troops. One of his soldiers ignited a torch to light his way. Others then lit more torches, held them aloft, and began shouting “Vive l’Empereur!” and “Vive l’Empereur Napoléon!” The torch-lit procession continued as he visited different camps. The entire army of over sixty thousand men, stretched along a front of a few miles, was shortly illuminated with torches and alive with the sound of cheering as the formations of the Grande Armée joined in the celebration. The event made a lasting impression upon those who witnessed it. Barrès described it as “a general conflagration, a movement of enthusiasm, so sudden that the Emperor must have been dazDevoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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zled by it. It was magnificent, prodigious.”52 There was so much light that the Austrians and Russians must have taken notice and wondered what the fires meant for the struggle ahead. By all accounts, the entire event was improvised and the leadership of the Grande Armée had nothing to do with it. The actions of the troops represented a spontaneous outpouring of enthusiasm and love for Napoleon, and it is difficult to imagine a more powerful demonstration of the army’s dedication to him. The intense commitment to the emperor that the Grande Armée’s rank and file exhibited on the night of December 1, 1805, and on other occasions derived from various sources. As many historians have argued, Napoleon’s natural charisma, his treatment of his soldiers, his ability to relate to them, and the rewards that he used to buy their loyalty contributed to the bond that he forged with his men. The extraordinary victories that his leadership produced and the emperor’s talent for appealing to the imagination of his troops also must have played a significant role in the success of Napoleon’s cult. By themselves, however, these factors do not fully explain the zeal for him that existed in the Grande Armée. It is unlikely that soldiers who lost limbs in battle would be eager to proclaim their devotion to him, or that the dazzling spectacle that took place before Austerlitz transpired because of his personal qualities, his skills as a general, or the rewards that he offered. They seem to have believed that he was greater than the sum of these parts, that he was a sacral figure who possessed the “power and mysterious force of kings.” The grenadier François Pils claimed that the army fêted Napoleon as he prepared for battle at Austerlitz “to prove its enthusiasm to its sovereign, because of the anniversary of his coronation, the confidence that it had in him and the hope that it would experience victory over its enemies.”53 Confidence in the emperor’s generalship and the desire for victory generated support for him. Yet these factors were also accompanied by allusions to his political legitimacy. Other soldiers made specific references to Napoleon’s coronation as well. The voltigeur Jean-Pierre Noel Asseré noted in his diary, “The 11th of frimaire, the anniversary of the coronation of the Emperor Napoleon, a fête that the entire army celebrated, at 10 at night, in a unique manner, and which deserves to be recorded.”54 Comments like these indicate that the nighttime parade at Austerlitz celebrated Napoleon’s political rule as much as his martial prowess. Furthermore, the written remarks of the rank and file and the emotional attachment that Napoleon inspired in them suggest that the military culture of the Napoleonic regime sacralized the emperor in their eyes. It appears to have convinced numerous NCOs and enlisted men that he was the ideal monarch who possessed all of the qualities 204

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listed in Léandre Pignot’s poem. Many probably agreed that he was “[b]rave like Caesar, prudent like Turenne,” and “[d]ear to all the French, . . . / Their savior, their counsel, and their firmest support.”

Religious Faith, Primary Groups, and Paternalistic Officers Although the cult of Napoleon sustained the motivation of a significant proportion of the rank and file, numerous soldiers refused to convert or failed to find it compelling enough to risk their lives. From their writings, and especially their letters, it is evident that large numbers of them appropriated little of the value system cultivated in the armies of the Consulate and the Empire. The letters written by NCOs and enlisted men tended to express love for family and friends and asked for news from home and money to pay for various necessities. They usually followed a formulaic pattern, which appeared in a letter by a soldier named Voidet in the 65th regiment of infantry: My dear father and my dear mother The present [letter] is to inquire about the state of your health, and at the same time that of my brother and sister, and I embrace you with all of my heart. As for me, I am doing fairly well for the moment, thanks be to God—I hope that the present finds you the same to my greatest happiness—Lots of compliments to the entire family, and at the same time to friends, and finally to all of the people who will ask about me—I will have you know that here is the second letter that I have written you since I received yours, which made me very happy to learn of your news; but what gives me much chagrin is to be for such a long time without receiving your news, thus I hope that as soon as the present is received, you will respond right away to take away my worries.55

In addition, letters and diaries typically contained simple descriptions of what their authors had seen and done without offering much in the way of commentary. When Napoleon’s soldiers did voice their feelings, they usually talked about their unhappiness with military life. The most pervasive sentiment in their writings is misery. They complained about their long marches, their poor rations, the high cost of food and supplies, low and late pay, and the harsh conditions that they experienced in the army. Jean-Pierre Béquet found life at the Camp of Boulogne extraordinarily difficult. He reported Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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that he was “in misery because all the provisions are so expensive” that he did not have enough money “to put a pair of shoes on my feet.”56 The spirits of such men did not necessarily improve once they left to go on campaign. Cherssant, a soldier in the 26th light infantry, groaned, “Alas my dear mother, I will have you know that I have had many hardships for we are doing 12 to 14 leagues per day every day . . . in the mud and in the snow up to the neck, and I will have you know that we are marching at night.” He echoed the thoughts of many of his comrades when he wrote, “I have had so many pains because heaven cannot give a greater punishment to a man than to give him the profession of soldier for it is a vile career.”57 Along with misery, French soldiers usually articulated a longing for peace instead of conquests. Voidet feared that Napoleon’s efforts to introduce the Continental System and his determination to keep fighting until a general peace was made would prolong his military service. He grumbled, “Thus you can believe that this is not yet finished, unfortunately for everyone and especially for the youth.”58 Although reluctant soldiers abounded, others appeared content with soldiering. Gilles Buret was impressed with army life because of the quantity of food that was provided to him. While marching to join his unit in Germany, he reassured his parents, “They give us eau-de-vie in the morning for the journey, as well as butter and meat for the halt. The march is not causing me difficulty. I have been welcomed by our officers and our captain. . . . You must not worry about me.”59 Contentment, however, usually reflected acceptance rather than enthusiasm. A significant proportion of the rank and file regarded military service as an obligation that they could not avoid. While they may not have been eager soldiers, they resigned themselves to their military duties and coped with the unpleasant features of war to the best of their ability. The dragoon Louis-Joseph Gorin exhibited these tendencies in a letter to his father. After crossing the Rhine in 1805, he advised, “We are in a position to experience misery, but it is all the same, it is necessary to suffer a little before entering Paradise. As a consequence, do not fret more than me, for the greatest suffering that I have had is to have done 120 leagues on foot.”60 Léandre Pignot held a far less optimistic outlook. His diary offers the most eloquent example of the fatalistic sense of resignation that characterized French troops. Although he admired Napoleon and enjoyed meeting new women, he considered virtually every other aspect of his military service intolerable. After two years as an “unhappy” soldier, he declared, “I do not like this profession at all, I knew tranquility, happiness before embracing it, every day I hope to retire from it.” Then, in verse he wrote, “I offer up 206

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prayers to heaven; it sees my tears run / And I remain always bearing arms.”61 Moreover, Pignot dreaded battle. As war with Prussia loomed, he worried, “I am going to be exposed to the risks of combat, I am going to be a victim of them.”62 Even though he disliked the army and desperately wanted to leave it, he refused to desert. His diary implies that his sense of virtue, of which Pignot was very proud and which he did not equate with patriotism, was responsible.63 It compelled him to accept the position into which he had been drafted. Perfectly illustrating his conformity to the role to which he had been assigned, the unfortunate ranker even sighed, “Finally, if they wanted to give me a promotion, I would say: Let’s accept, and because destiny has condemned me to bear the musket, let’s bear it to the extent of I do not know when, and I would be, in spite of my repugnance for this profession, exact and faithful to my duty.”64 Pignot’s ethical values convinced him to be faithful to his duties. Others also undoubtedly served because their civilian experiences accustomed them to submitting to the will of external authorities and to the perilous tasks assigned to them. Raised in a “culture of obedience” where they were conditioned to follow the orders of their parents, community leaders, and state officials, they approached their role in the army as one of their many obligations to their superiors.65 Many French soldiers also came from the peasantry, the urban poor, and artisan families where demanding, manual labor was the norm. Before they were drafted, they would have lived and worked in environments in which physical hardships, sickness, injury, and death were common. Earl J. Hess, in a study of Union soldiers, argues convincingly that the lifestyles of farmers and preindustrial workers helped them to endure the Civil War by equipping them with an insensitivity to danger. Additionally, it endowed them with the ability to accept whatever war threw at them by allowing them to treat their military duties as yet another unpleasant job that had to be done.66 The same must have been true of Napoleon’s troops. For many men, religion made their military obligations easier to bear. The letters of numerous French soldiers and NCOs demonstrate that they relied on God to see them through their military service.67 They frequently invoked the Almighty, thanked Him for preserving them from harm, and beseeched God to protect them from the perils that threatened. From the Camp of Boulogne, Corporal Parfait Triquet assured his parents, “I am doing well thank God, I hope that the present [letter] finds you the same as me, thanks to God, as nothing is more important than health, this is why I am praying to God for you.”68 While campaigning in Germany in 1805, Pierre Antoine Pelliçié told his father not to worry because God “put me where I am, he will keep Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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me always from danger.”69 Following Austerlitz, a French soldier from Bastogne revealed the strength of his faith by invoking God four different times in a letter home.70 Some of these appeals may have simply been expressions used in everyday speech rather than signs of religious devotion. Yet many of Napoleon’s soldiers came from the French peasantry, which was deeply religious. Moreover, the enlisted ranks mentioned God so often that it is far more likely that this behavior represented the presence of sincere religious beliefs than the use of a rhetorical convention. Devout soldiers may have also developed an attachment to Napoleon because of his efforts to restore Catholicism, and the religious content in the Empire’s festivals and print propaganda. However, since they did not normally associate him with religion or God in their writings, these speculations cannot be verified. The fearful soldiers who counted on God to save them and reluctant rankers who served out of necessity present a puzzling dilemma. It is difficult to reconcile their lack of enthusiasm for military service and their silence about the causes for which they were encouraged to fight with their battlefield performance. The Grande Armée did not win every fight between 1805 and 1808, but it did not suffer any noteworthy defeats. Its spectacular successes at Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena-Auerstädt, Friedland, and numerous smaller engagements led to rapid French triumphs in the wars of the Third and Fourth Coalitions. On a number of occasions, Napoleon’s troops also confronted and defeated capable, professional opponents who outnumbered them. The most noteworthy examples were the combat at Haslach in 1805, where General Pierre Dupont’s four thousand soldiers fought more than twenty thousand Austrians to a standstill, and the battle of Auerstädt in 1806, where Marshal Davout’s III Corps of approximately twenty-five thousand men routed Prussian forces with over fifty thousand. Furthermore, Napoleon took the offensive against the Allies strategically, operationally, and tactically, requiring the Grande Armée to attack the enemy wherever it found him. Therefore, for most of its existence, its soldiers did not have the luxury of adopting a defensive posture in combat, but found it necessary to exercise initiative, assault their opponents, and deliberately expose themselves to danger. In Poland, French troops repeatedly hurled themselves at carefully prepared positions bristling with artillery despite enduring horrific casualties, marathon marches through the rain, snow, and mud, empty stomachs, and constant harassment by Russian Cossacks. Yet they did not falter, and persevered until they caught and smashed the tsar’s army at Friedland. How did French soldiers, who seemed to be such reluctant conquerors, maintain the resolve necessary to accomplish such impressive feats? 208

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Fortunately, the scholarly literature on military motivation suggests two compelling answers: primary group loyalties, and the relationship between officers and the enlisted ranks. In Consular and Imperial France, new recruits were incorporated into units with other men, an experience that was common to soldiers of almost every era. They also forged bonds with these men. Historians and social scientists discovered that the relationships established among soldiers normally exert a decisive influence over their behavior. The most important relationships are those of the primary group, which is a small body of individuals combined together formally or informally, who know one another, live together, and fight together. Such groups typically contain between five and twenty members, the size of a section or a squad, and they perform a number of crucial functions related to military motivation. The individuals in the primary group learn to rely on one another for protection and emotional support, which provides them with the psychological strength necessary to withstand the risks, physical demands, and intense mental stress of war. These ties are especially critical in combat, an environment that is not conducive to thoughtful reflections about ideals such as patriotism and honor. Soldiers in battle therefore tend to fight to maintain the approval of their comrades and defend them. Cultural beliefs and primary group loyalties, however, are not mutually exclusive. Interaction within the group acts as a conduit that sets and enforces the values and behavioral norms of its members. To gain acceptance in the primary group, soldiers must conform to its standards.71 In the armed forces of the modern era, these standards often derived from the larger political community that the military served, reinforcing the troops’ obligations to cause and country.72 According to a leading military historian, “Primary group cohesion is probably a universal military phenomenon.”73 The scholarship on early modern and modern warfare largely confirms this proposition. At times, primary group loyalties proved insufficient to maintain the fighting abilities of European and American soldiers because heavy casualties hindered their formation, and other factors took their place. The experiences of the Wehrmacht on the eastern front exemplified this trend. The losses it suffered compelled German troops to identify with a larger, “ideal primary group” consisting of the German nation and the Aryan race.74 For much of the modern era, however, primary group loyalties made an essential contribution to the sustaining motivation of Western armies.75 The most extreme example, in fact, can be found among Napoleon’s red-coated adversaries. The British soldiers of the Peninsular War were deprived of adequate food and pay, the prospect of rewards or advancement, and even the hope of returning to their homes and Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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families since they enlisted for life. To compensate, they developed intense bonds with the individuals in their mess unit, who became their surrogate family. Their determination to defend this family made them exceptionally formidable on the battlefield.76 The enlisted ranks of the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée also formed strong primary group loyalties. The primary group seems to have been a mess group of between six and eight men. Similar to the armies of the Republic, the official mess unit of Napoleon’s armies was the ordinaire, which, in the infantry, normally consisted of fourteen to sixteen soldiers and a corporal.77 It also corresponded to the squad, the smallest subunit in a regiment. The army’s regulations stipulated that when encamped, each body of sixteen infantry who bunked together would receive two gamelles, or mess bowls, and that each body of eight cavalry troopers would receive one.78 These requirements indicate that French troops probably ate in small, unofficial mess groups of approximately eight men rather than the full ordinaire of fourteen or more. Raymond de Montesquiou-Fezensac’s description of the Camp of Montreuil confirms this practice. He explained that its soldiers ate “in mess groups of six to seven shares.”79 This intimate group offered Napoleon’s soldiers a more manageable body of comrades that was small enough to foster close-knit relationships among its members. The recruitment and replacement policies of the Napoleonic regime, and the experiences of the troops in the Army of the Coasts and the Army of Hanover played a crucial role in the development of these relationships. During the Consulate and the Empire, most regiments in the French army received conscripts from particular departments. The department of the Oise, for instance, sent most of its draftees to the 43rd line infantry, and the men conscripted from the Basses Alpes went into the 17th light infantry.80 This practice ensured that soldiers found themselves surrounded by men from their communities or at least their region, and it was not unusual for them to be placed in squads with their friends and neighbors from home. After he arrived at his regiment in the Camp of Ambleteuse, P. F. Dauchain informed his father, And I will have you know that I am not displeased; in any case I am with all of my neighbors and The veterans [who are] all good comrades and I will have you know that I am in the same company as Naquet and I sleep next to him and Victor [;] I also see Bellerd every day as well as all of the other fellows from the canton.81 210

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The presence of familiar faces, as this letter testifies, reduced the stress of adjusting to the alien environment of the military. Equally as important, it contributed to the bonding within mess groups by combining individuals with similar experiences and a shared attachment to their place of origin.82 Dauchain’s letter also reveals another factor that shaped the primary groups of Napoleon’s armies: the large proportion of experienced troops. The military authorities distributed conscripts among existing units, incorporating them into squads wherever they were needed.83 Raw recruits therefore entered primary groups that usually contained significant numbers of veterans. By the summer of 1805, the Army of the Coasts still contained approximately fifty thousand men who had participated in the campaigns of the Revolution and the initial years of the Consulate, which meant that almost a third of its troops were seasoned soldiers who had spent considerable time together.84 Moreover, 91 percent of its corporals, who had the potential to exert a powerful influence over their squads by virtue of their supervisory role, possessed at least twelve years in the service.85 The number of veterans varied according to unit, but most draftees would have been assimilated into existing primary groups with them. Adjusting to this new body of peers must have been profoundly stressful for many, though the emphasis on fraternity that pervaded the armies of the French Revolution may have made veterans from them more willing to assist newcomers.86 To gain acceptance, green soldiers would have had to prove themselves to groups of men that one study described as “old bands, accustomed to a war of requisitions, hardened and pitiless, whose reception was brutal to the point of encouraging desertions.”87 Those who succeeded would have had to adapt to the demanding standards of these old bands, who would have required their members to defend them and contribute to their welfare. In the process, new primary group loyalties coalesced that allowed recruits to benefit from the knowledge and skills of their battle-tested colleagues. The former likewise often admired the latter, and strove to emulate them. Berthier observed the positive effects of these relationships during his inspection of the troops camped around Dunkirk in 1803. After his review of the 25th line infantry, he reported, “None of the conscripts of the 25th have deserted. They already know what the unit did in Italy and Egypt and they have such esprit de corps, that they believe they have done, themselves, that which their older comrades tell them [about].”88 Although Berthier took notice of the regimental loyalty that existed among these troops, his remarks also show that ties had been forged between the unit’s existing members and draftees. Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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Such bonds would have proven crucial in the demanding conditions that prevailed during active military operations. A study of American forces who were involved in the brutal fighting in the Hürtgen forest during World War II demonstrates that a hardened core of veterans were one of the primary reasons why GIs continued to push forward in spite of heavy casualties and miserable physical conditions.89 Napoleon’s veterans probably would have had a similar effect. Units with significant numbers of veterans, such as the 25th line, also had plenty of time and numerous opportunities to develop cohesive primary groups. The Army of the Coasts spent almost two years preparing for the invasion of England, and its troops lived, trained, and worked together during this entire period. These circumstances both required and allowed them to become familiar with the men in their mess units and to develop relationships with them. In addition, they gave new recruits an occasion to earn the acceptance of the veterans and to learn from them. Combat facilitated these activities, for the soldiers camped along the English Channel did more than drill. They manned shore batteries and French naval vessels and embarked on ships patrolling the waters around its camps. During these operations, they sometimes skirmished with the Royal navy.90 Although these clashes were normally short and resulted in few casualties, they were important because they exposed the troops to combat without the risks involved in a large-scale engagement. This practice accustomed inexperienced soldiers to the sights and sounds of battle in a setting that minimized their chances of physical harm. Moreover, the challenges and dangers of combat forced them and their more seasoned colleagues to come together as a group in a way that camp life alone never would. When the Grande Armée left France in 1805, its experiences on the coasts would have ensured that it possessed strong primary groups that sustained its soldiers in the conflicts ahead. As the officer François Vigo-Roussillon correctly noted, “The campaign[s] of the year XII and the first half of the year XIII were not bloody, but they were not less useful for that, for, by small combats, they prepared our soldiers to engage in more serious ones.”91 The campaigns between 1805 and 1807 were bloody, but the primary groups of the Grande Armée remained intact. Despite the losses suffered at Austerlitz and Auerstädt, the mess groups that were established in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean and the Army of Hanover probably held together until late 1806. The dangers, adversity, and victories that their members shared also undoubtedly intensified the relationships within them. However, the heavy casualties sustained during the Eylau campaign must have 212

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depleted the Grande Armée’s primary groups. Fortunately, long intervals of inactivity consistently followed periods of intense fighting, which allowed them to replenish themselves and forge bonds between new and existing members. Almost nine months separated the French victory in the War of the Third Coalition and the beginning of military operations against Prussia in 1806. Following Eylau, most of the Grande Armée settled into winter quarters in late February 1807 and did not return to the field until early June. While the primary groups that participated in the Friedland campaign might not have been as tightly knit as those of Austerlitz, they did have sufficient time to coalesce, and seasoned veterans to stiffen their resolve. Such groups, whether they developed in the Army of the Coasts or the Grande Armée, gave individuals in the enlisted ranks a powerful incentive to wage war. For even if they were indifferent to Napoleonic military culture, they still had to perform their military duties in order to maintain the loyalty, support, and approval of their mess mates. It is possible, and even likely, that soldiers who internalized the attributes associated with the grognard set the values and behavioral standards enforced by their primary groups. Their commitment to the Napoleonic regime and its ideals probably pressured and inspired their comrades to follow their example. This phenomenon would explain the collective displays of loyalty to Napoleon that were so common, and the perseverance of the Grande Armée on campaign and in battle. For cohesive primary groups do not necessarily guarantee military effectiveness; under certain conditions, they can undermine it. Soldiers who forge tight bonds with one another and who regard the obligations imposed upon them as illegitimate sometimes rely on the collective strength provided by their comrades to defy their superiors or subvert their orders.92 Depending on their circumstances, they might mutiny, as the French and Russian armies did in 1917, desert en masse, or undertake missions deliberately designed to avoid the enemy, as some American units did in Vietnam. Napoleon’s soldiers did not engage in these kinds of activities between 1803 and 1808, which proves that they accepted their military duties as legitimate. Moreover, Napoleonic military culture and soldiers who responded favorably to it almost certainly fostered this belief in their mess units. Unfortunately, the limitations of the extant sources make it impossible to verify this hypothesis. Still, it seems reasonable to presume that zealous NCOs and common soldiers exerted at least some influence over their less enthusiastic peers. French officers may have affected the motivation of the latter to an even greater extent. Research on American and European forces during World Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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War I and World War II reveals that junior officers played a decisive role in troop endurance. Competent, composed leaders who took care of the physical and psychological needs of their men instilled confidence in them. Moreover, they heightened their soldiers’ morale by conveying a sense of order and safety that reduced the stress, fear, and anxiety that lowered their willingness to perform their military duties. These qualities and skills proved especially important for British and German soldiers who endured the terrifying ordeal of trench warfare in World War I. In fact, one scholar has convincingly argued that German units only ceased fighting when their officers decided that the war was lost and led their men to surrender.93 Two hundred years earlier, the French army expected their junior officers to show technical competence and the same paternalistic attitude that Napoleon displayed. During the Consulate, the army weeded out old and inept members of the officer corps, and military academies like the École speciale militaire at Fontainebleau were established to produce capable officers. Napoleon and his military officials also evaluated the proficiency of French officers, and individuals who failed this test could find themselves humiliated in front of their troops. After the emperor reviewed the 58th regiment of line infantry, the order of the day of the Camp of St. Omer announced that its major “had no knowledge of maneuvers.” “In consequence,” it added, “HIS MAJESTY ordered that he will be suspended for three months” and that he would not be allowed to return until he learned them.94 Napoleon and his staff likewise required their officers to treat their subordinates with respect and attend to their physical and emotional well-being. Following a wave of desertions in the summer of 1804, Marshal Berthier issued a circular that highlighted the officer’s responsibility to help his men cope with the difficulties of military life. Proposing, “it is not always sufficient to exercise . . . the most careful surveillance,” he explained, “it is included in the obligations of commanding officers to employ all of the means at their disposal to attach each soldier to the service and to his duties.”95 Napoleon himself defined these obligations more fully in an order of the day to the Grande Armée. He declared, “A chef de bataillon . . . must even know the name and the merit of the officers and soldiers of his battalion when he has been commanding it for six months. With regard to the captains, they must not only know the name of their soldiers, but even the region where they are from and everything that concerns them.”96 These reminders indicate that at least some French officers failed to meet official expectations, for otherwise Napoleon and his chief of staff would not have needed to issue them. However, most of the individuals who led French 214

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troops between 1803 and 1808 developed the leadership qualities necessary to motivate their subordinates. Experience from the French Revolutionary wars, instruction provided by military academies, and regular inspections ensured that Napoleon’s officers usually knew their profession. Officers also practiced their tactical skills in training exercises with their men. After Félix Avril was promoted to lieutenant, he led his company during maneuvers commanded by General Compans and proudly announced to his father that the general “said that he was very content & with my tone of command & with my instruction.”97 The young officer showed the same commitment to his soldiers that he displayed toward his technical abilities. On a shipboard review in the Army of the Coasts, he was asked if his soldiers were complaining about their provisions. To obtain better victuals for them, he replied that “the Meat and the beer were much worse than the previous month.”98 He continued to care for the men under his command as he rose through the ranks. In his letters, he emphasized his determination to make sure that his soldiers received the advancement that they deserved.99 When he was promoted to captain in 1808, he affectionately referred to his company as his “second family” and delighted in his new role as its “father.”100 The paternalism of Avril reflected a more general pattern of officer behavior that de MontesquiouFezensac described in his memoirs. He maintained that it was necessary to treat French troops “with firmness without harshness, with kindness without weakness. Harshness irritates them, weakness inspires their mockery. It is this measure, this golden mean, this paternal fraternity, . . . that our officers all exercise by instinct rather than calculation and of which foreigners would be incapable.”101 These qualities, which the Napoleonic regime explicitly cultivated in its officer corps, did have an impact. When common soldiers wrote letters to their families, the men who were satisfied with military life usually expressed positive opinions about their officers. The comments made by Victor Amédée Clapier of the 26th light infantry illustrate this tendency. Shortly after he arrived at his unit, he informed his parents, “Our officers appear very nice, that gives me hope that we will be treated with kindness, this consoles me a little from the chagrin that I had to see myself separated from you.”102 The paternal and competent leadership exercised by junior officers like Avril and de Montesquiou-Fezensac undoubtedly comforted other enlisted men and kept them in the army. In this manner, the military culture constructed in Napoleon’s armies exerted an indirect influence over the motivation of troops who served solely out of necessity. For even if official propaganda, the promise of rewards, and immersion in the martial environment of the army Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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were unable to transform them into committed grognards, they willingly followed officers whose dedication to the emperor and the Empire’s ideals drove them to ensure that their troops did their duty. It is also possible that some enthusiastic officers may have inspired their NCOs and soldiers to adopt their value system. When Second Lieutenant Frédéric Charles Louis François de Paule received new conscripts into his unit, he gave a speech “about Glory” but admitted, “my discourse did not make a great impression: honor, patrie, glory left them indifferent, the glory of gathering chestnuts had much more influence.”103 Although de Paule was unsuccessful, comparable efforts combined with time spent in the army must have made cause, country, and honor more compelling for some.

Coercion and Military Motivation For others, collecting chestnuts still held greater appeal. A number of soldiers never developed a compelling attachment to their officers, their comrades, or Napoleon. The presence of such soldiers in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée is perhaps best revealed by measures put in place by the Napoleonic regime to force them to remain in the army. Because of the frequency of desertion, Napoleon and his officials found it necessary to adopt harsh laws and techniques to prevent it, making coercion an essential component of military motivation. More importantly, it succeeded, for the only reason why rankers such as Nicolas Bognier, who was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, stayed in the service was fear of punishment. Desertion continued to plague the French army under Napoleon just as it had during the Revolution, and it preoccupied Consular and Imperial military authorities more than any other disciplinary problem.104 Most incidences occurred before conscripts arrived at their regiments, but large numbers of recruits also fled after they had been incorporated into their units. In January 1805, the minister of war received a report that 457 men had deserted from the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean during the month of brumaire alone. Even more startling, it noted that approximately double the amount of desertions took place every month toward the end of year XII.105 Napoleon and his military officials relied on a variety of measures to plug this steady drain on the army’s manpower. They employed the propaganda and incentives described in the first five chapters of this study to convince French soldiers to honor their military commitment. Along with these carrots, the Napoleonic regime resorted to the stick of threats and punishment. 216

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Napoleon issued several new pieces of legislation to combat desertion, the most important of which was the Arrêté concernant les dépôts de conscrits déclarés réfractaires, la composition et la compétence des conseils de guerre spéciaux, la procédure devant ces conseils et les peines contre la désertion of 19 vendémiaire, year XII.106 With minor modifications, this document governed legal procedures regarding desertion throughout the Napoleonic period. It created a new military tribunal, the Special Council of War, for judging deserters, and decreed a series of increasingly severe punishments for offenders. All convicted deserters were required to pay a fine of fifteen hundred francs. Further penalties then applied. The most common punishment was forced labor. This sentence was normally given to soldiers who escaped the army and returned to the interior of France. More serious offenses, which included desertion coupled with the theft of equipment belonging to fellow soldiers, and repeated instances of desertion, resulted in the “penalty of the bullet,” which carried at least a ten-year sentence. The condemned were shackled with a 2.5-meter chain attached to an eight-pound metal ball, which they were required to bear while they worked eight to ten hours a day in special military workshops. Finally, the Arrêté decreed death by firing squad for individuals who deserted to serve with the enemy, the leaders of group desertions, those who deserted with their weapons, and men who deserted while on sentry duty. The penalties decreed by the Arrêté of 19 vendémiaire were also designed to humiliate as well as punish. The Arrêté stipulated that all sentences were to be inflicted on convicted deserters in front of their unit. Men condemned to the bullet appeared before their comrades on their knees, blindfolded, wearing a special uniform, and bearing their ball and chain. After their sentence was read aloud, they then had to walk past the entire front of their unit, trailing their bullet. The unit would then parade past them with the company of the condemned leading the way. Deserters who received forced labor were only subjected to having their unit file past them. These ceremonies became a familiar sight in the armies of the Consulate and the Empire. While embarked on a ship in the English Channel, Félix Avril informed his father, “They punished a deserter from our regiment a few days ago with 7 years of forced labor, we marched past him with a detachment of all the units of the division.” Two days before, another soldier deserted with arms and equipment. “He,” Avril remarked, “was shot right away.”107 Most soldiers heard about the penalties for desertion more often than they saw them. The Arrêté of 19 vendémiaire was read to Napoleon’s soldiers more than any other document. The regulation itself commanded Devoted Soldiers and Reluctant Conquerors

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that a reading was to be performed the first Sunday of every month in every unit of the French army. The leadership of the Army of the Coasts attached the Arrêté to their orders of the day soon after it was promulgated. They also issued other orders to ensure that it was communicated to the troops. Some, like Soult, instructed their officers to recite it “every Sunday, at the head of each company.”108 In many cases, French troops listened to it along with the reading of the army’s disciplinary codes, which occurred every week or every few weeks.109 Moreover, regimental officers welcomed new recruits to the army by having the Arrêté read aloud to them.110 In addition to informing the army about the laws against desertion, orders of the day listed the judgments rendered against individuals who violated them. The orders of the Army of the Coasts featured lists of deserters on an almost daily basis. In the month of fructidor, year XII, the staff of the Camp of St. Omer issued eleven orders of the day. Ten of them contained notices about desertion, announcing a total of 132 incidences of the crime.111 Reports of desertion appeared less often in the Grande Armée’s orders, but they did remain a common feature.112 Announcements of the crime included the name of the deserter and his unit, town and department of origin, and sentence. The order for 15 thermidor, year XII, in the Camp of Bruges featured this formula: “In its meeting on the 9th of this month, the Special Council of War of the 2nd Division condemned one Louis Verdaux by name, a native of Meffond in the department of Haute Charente, a fusilier in the 48th regiment, to the bullet for 12 years for the crime of desertion and theft.”113 Orders of the day also specified when, where, and how a deserter was to be punished. One for 9 pluviôse, year XII in the Camp of St. Omer proclaimed that Louis Bernard, an infantry chasseur who was guilty of deserting with arms and baggage, would “suffer the punishment today pronounced by his sentence, in front of the camp of the first division.”114 The unfortunate Bernard was executed by firing squad. Such announcements and the treatment meted out to deserters in front of Napoleon’s soldiers conveyed a clear threat: if they left the army without permission, they could expect to suffer the same fate as men like Louis Bernard. Similar to Frederick the Great, who wanted his soldiers to be more afraid of their officers than the enemy, Napoleon intended his troops to fear the consequences of desertion more than they feared or disliked military service. Although substantial numbers of soldiers took their chances and tried to escape the army anyway, others decided that this course of action was not worth the risk. The army’s leadership certainly believed that coercion produced the latter effect. General Louis Friant had a soldier from the camp at 218

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Ostende executed for inciting desertion. He then made all of the recruits of the first two divisions of the Camp of Bruges file past the corpse. Afterwards, he remarked in his report to Marshal Davout that the event “appeared to make an impression.”115 Friant was correct; these harsh measures did frighten soldiers into doing their duty. Pierre Diuzeide exemplified this phenomenon.116 He was conscripted into the 12th light infantry in 1805 and served with the Grande Armée in Poland. An unhappy soldier, he frequently asked his father in his letters how deserters were treated back home, hinting that he was considering leaving the army without authorization. When Diuzeide returned to France after the Peace of Tilsit, he looked into hiring a replacement to fulfill his military obligation, which was permissible according to French conscription laws. Unsuccessful due to a lack of money, he stayed in the military. Yet Diuzeide did so only because he was intimidated by the penalties for desertion. Confessing these fears to his father, he claimed, “The law is very severe for deserters for I see examples of this every day in Paris, so, my dear father, I will never make this crazy mistake.”117 When the carrots offered by Napoleonic military culture failed to make grognards out of reluctant conquerors like Diuzeide, its coercive elements proved to be an intimidating stick capable of compelling them to fight.

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Conclusion: Vive l’Empereur! Sustaining Motivation in the Armies of Napoleon, 1803-1808

Systems of military motivation depend on forms of compliance to encourage or compel soldiers to perform the tasks assigned to them. The three main types are coercive, remunerative, and normative.1 Coercive compliance relies on strict discipline, punishment, and the threat of punishment to force soldiers to fulfill their military duties. Remunerative models employ material rewards such as pay, plunder, and promotions to persuade them to risk life and limb. Normative systems, on the other hand, are the most complex, for they rely on psychological, emotional, and symbolic factors to induce troops to fight and engage in other behaviors essential for the conduct of war. In them, armies endeavor to instill a set of values in their personnel that convinces them to follow orders voluntarily because they accept such commands as legitimate and necessary. These ideals might be supplied by the sociopolitical community that produced the military institution, the military itself or its composite units, the primary group, or a mixture involving all of these entities. According to one of the leading studies on compliance theory, “The individual complies, not because he will be punished if he does not, and not because he will necessarily be rewarded if he does, but because he accepts the basic ‘rightness’ or ‘oughtness’ of the demand or directive.”2 Since the French Revolution, normative compliance has become the dominant paradigm in Western military forces. The motivational system constructed through the military culture assembled in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée employed a potent combination of all three forms of compliance. As with other militaries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, normative factors played a leading role in these armies. They endeavored to persuade their members to wage war for honor, patriotism, manhood, and Napoleon himself. The French army did evolve into an army of honor |

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between 1803 and 1808, but it only partially resembled the one described by the thesis that currently dominates Napoleonic historiography. Three different kinds of honor were cultivated among its troops: a warrior honor defined by the performance of brave deeds that enhanced the reputation of the individual through the acquisition of martial glory; a patriotic type that conferred prestige upon individuals whose actions benefited France; and esprit de corps, a determination to uphold the status of particular military units. The armies of Napoleon also remained armies of virtue. Through the commemoration of military martyrs like La Tour d’Auvergne, the military celebrations for the Grande Armée in 1807 and 1808, the Legion of Honor, and other propagandistic activities, the Napoleonic regime continued to remind its soldiers that they were obligated to sacrifice themselves for the good of the nation. The France of Napoleon, however, was no longer content with protecting its citizens and its territories. It metamorphosed into a warrior nation distinguished by Imperial virtue, which required its soldiery to enhance its national honor and glory through military victories. To render these ideals still more compelling, Napoleon and his supporters portrayed them as the defining characteristics of the French man. They promoted a martial masculinity among their troops that pressured them to demonstrate their manhood by displaying their courage and skill in combat, their devotion to the patrie, and a lust for war, glory, and women. This vision of manliness attached almost as much value to sexual victories as it did to battlefield triumphs, and encouraged French troops to assert the supremacy of the patrie by conquering the women of Europe’s less virile men. The cult of Napoleon that was preached in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée proclaimed that the new ruler of France produced the victories that were responsible for their sexual and military exploits. It bestowed sacrality on Napoleon by presenting him as an absolute monarch who received his authority from God, his links to previous dynasties, and the distribution of honors. Simultaneously, the emperor appeared as a patriotic ruler who was chosen to govern by the French people, and who defended them, their interests, and the achievements of the Revolution from their enemies, including ambitious women. He was also portrayed as a Romantic hero whose unique qualities allowed him to accomplish extraordinary, even superhuman, feats, and to share himself and his glory with his loyal followers. For men interested in more tangible rewards than the satisfaction that derived from providing valued contributions to the patrie and its ruler, the army offered remuneration in the form of pensions and promotions to men 222

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who showed talent, bravery, and initiative on the battlefield. The Napoleonic regime also promised its soldiers a libertine lifestyle that provided easy access to carnal pleasures and proposed that military service would enhance the ability of soldiers to obtain wives and lovers after they had become true Frenchmen in the army. Those who found such carrots to be unappealing or to be insufficient compensation for the risks involved in their acquisition faced the threatening stick of punishment. Napoleon and the army’s leadership devised a variety of coercive measures to deter desertion and compel unwilling troops to remain in the ranks. The penalties imposed on deserters were not needed in the officer corps. The military culture created in the Army of the Coasts, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée succeeded in sustaining the motivation of French officers by molding them into grognards. The men who led Napoleon’s soldiers endeavored to increase their reputation and that of their units by earning honors and glory in combat. They also valued war and actions d’éclat, tried to conquer their female adversaries as well as enemy troops, and fought for their emperor. In addition, French officers adopted the Imperial virtue of the Napoleonic regime. Determined to defend France and its dominant position in the European order, they possessed an attachment to the patrie that grew over time, and became a stronger source of motivation than the honor that obsessed them in the early stages of the Napoleonic wars. Officers also maintained the morale of the enlisted ranks. A significant number of NCOs and common soldiers developed the values and characteristics of their superiors and resembled the legendary Nicolas Chauvin. A sizeable proportion also responded to particular facets of Napoleonic military culture. Official propaganda, rewards, festivals, and symbolic activities instilled a thirst for glory in some and made others appreciate the opportunities that the army offered them to seduce, and unfortunately rape, women throughout Europe. An even greater number of NCOs and regular soldiers converted to the cult of Napoleon and displayed an intense devotion to the emperor, who became the ideal, sacralized ruler in their eyes. On the other hand, many members of the rank and file, perhaps a majority, do not seem to have internalized the military culture that surrounded them beyond learning to accept their military service and the wars that they waged as legitimate. These reluctant soldiers felt that they had no choice but to conquer an empire for Napoleon and France. Resigned to their fate, a substantial proportion of them clung to religion and experiences from civilian life to endure the terrors of the battlefield and the difficult conditions of military life. The support and expectations of primary groups, which usually possessed experienced Conclusion: Vive l’Empereur!

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veterans and men who came from the same region, likewise transformed unenthusiastic recruits into determined soldiers who were consistently capable of defeating their opponents in combat, even when outnumbered. The complex motivational system constructed in the French army from 1803 to 1808 did affect these troops through their officers. The leadership of competent and paternalistic officers who were thoroughly dedicated to Napoleon, his government, and their ideals contributed to the sustaining motivation of their troops by helping uncertain recruits adjust to the stressful environment of the army. Moreover, their professional abilities and their efforts to meet the physical and emotional needs of their men probably gave their troops the confidence and the assurances that they required to carry out their military duties. Finally, the individuals who did not regard cause, country, comrades, or commanders as sufficient reasons to risk life and limb did submit to the threat of punishment. Their desire to avoid the penalties for desertion overcame their aversion to military life and their fear of battle. The military culture formed during the first half of Napoleon’s reign thus presented France’s soldiers with a variety of incentives to wage war. The Grande Armée, which was forged in the camps of the Army of the Coasts and the Army of Hanover, and whose troops fought at sea against the Royal navy, and at Austerlitz, Jena-Auerstädt, Eylau, and Friedland, was much more than an army of honor. Following its dissolution in 1808, the Napoleonic regime, the wars that it conducted, and the army itself underwent significant changes that may have fundamentally altered its character. The Empire became increasingly monarchical with the establishment of the Imperial nobility, the emperor’s marriage to a Hapsburg princess in 1810, and the birth of his heir, the king of Rome. French satellite kingdoms ruled by members of the Bonaparte family multiplied, and Napoleon’s military conflicts, beginning with the Peninsular War, increasingly resembled dynastic wars of conquest. Prior to 1808, Napoleon, in spite of his aggressive foreign policy, could claim with some justification that he was defending a France that had been attacked by the Allies. It was much more difficult to characterize the invasions of Spain and Russia as defensive actions. Furthermore, the composition of the army changed substantially. Napoleon relied increasingly on foreign troops to create armies large enough to both defend and expand his Empire. The number of Revolutionary veterans declined, and new conscripts and officer cadets flooded the army to replace the men who were killed, promoted, or discharged due to age or infirmity. As a result of all of these changes, it is possible, perhaps even probable, that the French army evolved into the military force described by the army of honor thesis. The 224

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patriotic rhetoric and martyrs featured in the Bulletin de la Grande Armée and the army’s ceremonial culture appeared much less frequently after 1808. In addition, the new oath for the Legion of Honor in 1811 required its members to devote themselves to the preservation of the emperor and his dynasty. Such changes are understandable. French Imperial virtue had little to offer the hundreds of thousands of Germans, Poles, and Italians who filled out the ranks of the First Empire’s legions, and the Napoleonic regime would have needed to adjust its military culture to appeal to its cosmopolitan armies. Even so, we cannot simply assume that the armies of the late Empire abandoned virtue and other elements of the French Revolution’s military and political culture. The Chansonnier de la Grande Armée, one of the most important military songbooks of the Napoleonic era, which contained songs with patriotic and Republican themes from the Consulate and early Empire, was published in 1809. Its songs, therefore, would have been known and most likely sung by soldiers who fought at Wagram, Borodino, Salamanca, Leipzig, and Waterloo. After 1812, Napoleon’s foreign allies also abandoned him, and the Imperial army became more and more French as the Empire contracted. Moreover, it was soon forced to defend France itself for the first time since the Revolution, allowing the Napoleonic regime to rally its soldiers around a patrie, which was once again threatened. On the eve of Waterloo, for example, Napoleon issued a proclamation that reminded his troops of their obligation to sacrifice themselves for the nation. It promised that with a victory, “the rights, honor and welfare of the patrie will be reconquered. For every Frenchman who has courage, the moment has come to conquer or perish!”3 The prominence of similar sentiments in the letters of Napoleon’s officers from the twilight years of the Empire likewise indicates that French military culture and motivation in the later stages of the Napoleonic wars were far more complex than they might seem. For all of these reasons, additional research is necessary to determine whether the army of honor label is applicable to Napoleon’s military forces after 1808, and if so, how and why. Further study is essential because the military culture of Napoleonic France did more than sustain the motivation of its soldiers. One of its most important effects was its contribution to the militarization of French manhood.4 The martial masculinity disseminated in the armies of the Consulate and the Empire transferred the warrior qualities traditionally associated with the aristocracy to all men, and encouraged the hundreds of thousands of individuals who were recruited into Napoleon’s legions to adopt them in order to prove themselves Frenchmen. The writings of the officer corps and Conclusion: Vive l’Empereur!

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some NCOs and enlisted men demonstrate that they accepted this vision of manliness. In addition, the behavior of the rank and file in battle suggests that many others at least felt compelled to display its characteristics in front of their peers. In the aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat, idealized representations of the French soldier that circulated in Napoleonic military culture also combined with the more general war culture of Consular and Imperial France to generate powerful masculine icons such as the legendary grognard and Nicolas Chauvin. They became the incarnation of the soldat-laboreur, an archetype that portrayed the French peasant as the model soldier and citizen because he was attached to the land of the patrie, accustomed to violence and hard work, obedient rather than politically engaged, and possessed of a virile sexuality that would produce future generations of devoted soldier-citizens. Political and intellectual elites used this swaggering, bellicose figure to inculcate military virtues and a French national identity in the male population of France, and especially the peasantry, throughout the nineteenth century.5 Furthermore, it contributed to the subordination of women by identifying them as dependents who needed men to protect them. The soldat-laboureur met with limited success among the rural population before 1870, for peasant culture still treated the soldier with ambivalence.6 The military culture of the Consulate and the Empire, however, appears to have given the peasants who were removed from their villages to serve in the army a greater awareness of the nation. Recent research on Napoleonic veterans reveals that they played a prominent role in the political, social, and cultural life of nineteenth-century France through their actions as well as the legends that coalesced around them. Initially, many of the approximately one million soldiers who returned home in 1815 struggled with their reintegration into civilian society.7 They suffered terrible physical and psychological wounds in the army, and their experiences distanced them from their fellow citizens. The restored Bourbon monarchy denied them aid and public gratitude because it distrusted and feared them, and the authorities carefully watched them. As a result, ex-soldiers often found themselves relegated to society’s margins during the Restoration. With time, they adjusted, and their fortunes improved to the point where they became valued and respected members of their local and national communities. Much as Napoleonic military songs promised, soldiering did indeed enhance the attractiveness of French troops, for veterans were usually more able to contract advantageous marriages with younger women than their civilian rivals. They also used the skills that they learned in the military to pursue careers in education, public and private administration, and policing.8 226

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Even though veterans began new lives, most never fully left their extraordinary wartime experiences behind. They gathered in public and private to reminisce, frequently assembling on noteworthy anniversaries like Napoleon’s birthday, the date of his death, and the entry of the Grande Armée into Moscow.9 The soldiers of the Empire likewise wrote memoirs to help them make sense of what they had seen and done. Many of these activities performed an explicit political function, and veterans became actively involved in the political struggles that occurred between 1815 and 1848. Their political views varied widely, and it was not unusual for ex-soldiers to express Royalist sympathies in their writings.10 Yet most veterans supported Bonapartist and liberal political movements, which they contributed to by engaging in subversive acts that undermined the Bourbon regimes, and by participation in the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848.11 In part, they joined these causes because the veterans believed that they represented the true interests of the French nation. They spread their understanding of this nation through the different forms of public remembering that they performed throughout France, and through their political endeavors, whether overt or subtle. These trends culminated in the emergence of Napoleon’s veterans as a more distinct sociocultural group during the Second Empire. Aided by the spread of a popular legend constructed around Napoleon, and the political and cultural rehabilitation of the Napoleonic era during the July Monarchy, public appreciation toward them grew in the decades after 1815. To honor military veterans from the French Revolution and the Empire, Napoleon III created the Medal of Saint-Helena in 1857. This award and the accolades that Napoleon I’s soldiers received in public celebrations like the festival of Saint-Napoléon fostered a new sense of solidarity among them, transformed them into living symbols of patriotism, and inspired them to teach their commitment to the nation to their fellow citizens.12 The latest scholarship on Napoleonic veterans proposes that the postwar experiences of the Empire’s troops played a greater role than their military service in the development of their national identity. It contends that during Napoleon’s reign, French soldiers were more attached to martial glory and the emperor, whom they venerated for his military talents and his paternalism, than to France. Then, after the fall of the Empire, several factors instilled in them a new awareness of belonging to the French nation. According to recent historiography, the factors responsible for this shift included participation in Bonapartist and liberal political causes, petitioning government authorities for aid, the public acclaim that they increasingly enjoyed, and a Napoleonic legend that portrayed the emperor as a champion of French sovConclusion: Vive l’Empereur!

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ereignty, national pride, and the liberal ideals of 1789. As a result of these developments, the loyalty of the French soldier to his country came to equal, supersede, or replace his commitment to Napoleon.13 This book demonstrates that this trend began much earlier in the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, the Army of Hanover, and the Grande Armée. The absence of patriotic sentiment in the writings and actions of a substantial proportion of their rank and file indicates that a majority of Napoleon’s soldiers probably did not possess a pronounced sense of national identity prior to 1815. During the first half of the Napoleonic wars, however, they were exposed to a steady supply of images, propaganda, festivals, and ceremonies that continuously informed them that they were members of the French nation and that they were required to protect it and its honor. They also reminded the soldiery that Napoleon represented the patrie and received his crown from its people. These measures succeeded in convincing the officer corps and a sizeable minority of NCOs and enlisted men that they had an obligation to defend the interests of France while they were still fighting to preserve its empire. Immersion within Napoleonic military culture for several years with men from every part of their country provided the rest with a nationalist education that must have contributed to their eventual ideological transformation in the decades afterward.

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Notes

Introduction 1. Henri Lecoq, ed., “Lettres et souvenirs d’un officier de cavalerie légère (1798-1832),” Carnet de la Sabretache 6 (1907): 665-96, 761-89. 2. Ibid., 676. 3. Ibid., 762. 4. Leading studies on Napoleon’s armies include Jean Morvan, Le soldat impérial (1800-1814), 2 vols. (F. Teissèdre, 1999); John R. Elting, Swords around a Throne: Napoleon’s Grande Armée (Da Capo, 1997); Gilbert Bodinier, “Du soldat républicain à l’officier impérial. Convergences et divergences entre l’armée et la société” and “L’Armée Impérial,” in De 1715 à 1871, vol. 2, Histoire militaire de la France, ed. Jean Delmas (Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), 281-342; Gilbert Bodinier, “Le courage, la gloire et l’honneur vus par les officiers et les soldats de l’armée du premier empire,” in Actes du colloque, Napoléon, Stendahl et les romantiques: L’armée, la guerre, la gloire, Musée de L’armée, 16-17 novembre 2001, ed. Michel Arrous (J & S éditeur, 2002), 197-219; Alain Pigeard, L’armée Napoléonienne 1804-1815 (Editions Curandera, 1993). 5. John A. Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789-1815,” French Historical Studies 16, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 152-82. Other works that adopt Lynn’s thesis include Charles J. Esdaile, The Wars of Napoleon (Longman, 1995), 54-70; Steven Englund, Napoleon: A Political Life (Harvard University Press, 2004), 269-72, 379-81. 6. Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor,” 170. 7. Alan Forrest, Napoleon’s Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire (Hambledon and London, 2002). 8. Ibid., 93. 9. Natalie Petiteau, Lendemains d’empire: les soldats de Napoléon dans la France du XIXe siècle (Boutique de l’histoire, 2003); Natalie Petiteau, “Pour une anthropologie historique des guerres de l’Empire,” Revue d’histoire du XIXe siècle [En ligne] no. 30 (2005), placed online 28 March 2008, consulted at http://rh19revues.org/index1013.html; Natalie Petiteau, “Survivors of War: French Soldiers and Veterans of the Napoleonic Armies,” in Soldiers, Citizens, and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820, ed. Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, and Jane Rendall (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 43-58. 10. Demi-soldes were officers who were discharged from the army after Napoleon’s defeat and only given half their pay by the government of the Bourbon Restoration. 11. Petiteau, Lendemains d’empire, 48-49. 12. Jean-Paul Bertaud, Quand les enfants parlaient de gloire: L’armée au coeur de la France de Napoleon (Aubier, 2006).

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13. Ibid., 140-42. 14. Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor”; Morvan, Le soldat impérial, 2: 425-520; Elting, Swords around a Throne, 589-603. 15. Bertaud, Quand les enfants; Forrest, Napoleon’s Men, 55-58, 75-76. 16. Forrest, Napoleon’s Men; Petiteau, Lendemains d’empire; Petiteau, “Pour anthropologie historique”; Petiteau, “Survivors of War”; Bodinier, “Le courage, la gloire et l’honneur.” 17. Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (Columbia University Press, 1988), 1-11, 28-50. 18. For examples of these trends, see John A. Lynn, “The Embattled Future of Academic Military History,” Journal of Military History 61 (October 1997): 777-89; Joshua S. Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Leo Braudy, From Chivalry to Terrorism: War and the Changing Nature of Masculinity (Knopf, 2003); Paul R. Higate, ed., Military Masculinities: Identity and the State (Praeger, 2004); Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and John Tosh, eds., Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History (Manchester University Press, 2004); Robert A. Nye, “Western Maculinities in War and Peace,” American Historical Review 112, no. 2 (April 2007): 417-38. 19. Ibid.; Robert A. Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France (University of California Press, 1993); George L. Mosse, The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity (Oxford University Press, 1996). 20. Karen Hagemann, “Of ‘Manly Valor and German Honor’: Nation, War, and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising against Napoleon,” Central European History 30, no. 2 (1997): 187-220; Karen Hagemann, “Mannlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre”: Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preußens (Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002); Karen Hagemann, “German Heroes: The Cult of the Death for the Fatherland in Nineteenth-Century Germany,” in Masculinities in Politics and War, ed. Dudink, Hagemann, and Tosh, 116-34. 21. See for example, Joan B. Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Cornell University Press, 1988); Lynn Hunt, The Family Romance of the French Revolution (University of California Press, 1992); Jennifer Ngaire Heuer, The Family and the Nation: Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary France (Cornell University Press, 2005). Exceptions to this trend include Joan B. Landes, Visualizing the Nation: Gender, Representation, and Revolution in Eighteenth-Century France (Cornell University Press, 2001); Dominique Godineau, “De la guerrière à la citoyenne. Porter les armes pendant la Révolution française et la Révolution française,” Clio 20 (2004): 43-69. Godineau studies women’s participation in the armies of the French Revolution, and Landes demonstrates that Revolutionary France relied on feminine images of the nation to motivate men to defend the Republic. 22. Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath (Princeton University Press, 1949), 132. 23. Geoffrey Ellis, The Napoleonic Empire, 2nd ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 58. 24. John A. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791-1794 (Westview, 1996), 21-40, 163-82. 25. Ibid., 36.

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26. This definition of military culture is my own. It is based on the following: John Keegan, A History of Warfare (Knopf, 1993), 3-60; John A. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, rev. ed. (Westview, 2003), xiv-xxvi, 359-69; Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Cornell University Press, 2005), 93-109; Peter H. Wilson, “Defining Military Culture,” Journal of Military History 72 (January 2008): 11-41. My understanding of military culture has also been influenced by the literature on political culture in Revolutionary France. For examples, see Keith Michael Baker, Colin Lucas, François Furet, and Mona Ozouf, eds., The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, 4 vols. (Pergamon, 1988-1994). 27. Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Duke University Press, 1991), 83. For Chartier’s ideas about the appropriation of culture, see also “Culture as Appropriation: Popular Culture Uses in Early Modern France,” in Understanding Popular Culture: Europe from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century, ed. Steven L. Kaplan (De Gruyter, 1984), 229-53.

C ha p t e r 1 1. Order of the day, Grande Armée, Augsburg, 1 brumaire, year 14, C17 235, Service historique de la Défense, Archives de l’armée de terre, du ministère de la Guerre et du ministère de la défense, Vincennes [hereafter AAT]. The order containing this proclamation was dated 1 brumaire, year 14, but it was originally issued on 7 vendémiaire, year 14 [29 September 1805]. See Paul Claude Alombert-Goget and Jean-Lambert Colin, La campagne de 1805 en Allemagne, 4 vols. (R. Chapelot, 1902-1908), 2: 601-2. 2. “Situation of the troops of all arms which compose the Army of Hanover, at the time of 1 frimaire [year 13],” AFIV 1594, plaquette 4 [hereafter pl.], Archives nationales, Paris [hereafter AN]. 3. Édouard Desbrière, 1793-1805: Projets et tentatives de débarquement aux Iles Britanniques, 4 vols. (R. Chapelot, 1900-1902), 3: 425-27, 429; Alombert and Colin, La campagne de 1805, 1, part 2: 105. 4. The Commander in Chief to His Majesty the Emperor, the Army of Batavia and Camp of Utrecht, 16 thermidor, year 12, AFIV 1594, pl. 3, AN. 5. For the organization and official strength of the Grande Armée’s formations, see Alombert and Colin, La campagne de 1805, 1, part 2: 120-31; Elting, Swords around a Throne, 55-61, 183-279. 6. Alombert and Colin, La campagne de 1805, 2: 168. 7. Paul-Jean Foucart, La cavalerie pendant la campagne de Prusse (7 octobre–7 novembre 1806), d’après les archives de la guerre (Berger-Levrault, 1880), 2-11; F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon’s Campaign in Poland, 1806-1807: A Military History of Napoleon’s First War with Russia, Verified from Unpublished Official Documents (Hippocrene, 1975), 275-76. 8. James R. Arnold and Ralph Reinersten, Crisis in the Snows: Russia Confronts Napoleon, the Eylau Campaign, 1806-1807 (Napoleon Books, 2007), 381-82. 9. David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It (Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 198. 10. Napoleon Bonaparte, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier publiée par ordre de l’Empereur Napoléon III, 32 vols. (Henri Plon, J. Dumaine, 1858-1869), piece number [hereafter no.] 8001, 9: 511.

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11. For the use of print propaganda in the armies of the Revolution, see Marc Martin, Les origines de la presse militaire en France (1770-1799) (Ministère de la Defense, État Major de l’Armée de terre, Service Historique, 1975), 103-337; John A. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791-1794 (Westview, 1996), 119-41. 12. Napoléon Bonaparte, Proclamations, ordres du jour et bulletins de la Grande Armée, ed. Jean Tulard (Union générale d’éditions, 1964), 5-33. 13. For Napoleon’s military journals in Italy and Egypt, see Martin, Les origines de la presse militaire, 295-383; Wayne Hanley, The Genesis of Napoleonic Propaganda, 1796-1799, chapters 2, 3, and 6, consulted at http://www.gutenberg-e.org/haw01/ on 7/21/10 at 8:30 p.m.; JeanPaul Bertaud, La presse et le pouvoir de Louis XIII à Napoléon Ier (Perrin, 2000), 203-12. 14. Bardin, Manuel D’Infanterie ou résumé de tous les règlemens décrets, usages, renseignemens, propres à cette arme. Ouvrage renfermant tout ce que doivent savoir les sous-officiers, 2nd ed. (Chez Magimel, 1808), 254. 15. This account of the transmission of orders of the day is based on the following sources: Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 23 vendémiaire, year 12, B14 2, AAT; Order of the day, Army of the Coasts of the Ocean, 15 thermidor, year 13, C2 275-76, AAT; Order of the day, IV Corps, Rosenau, 8 May 1807, C2 380, AAT; Napoleon Bonaparte, Unpublished Correspondence of Napoleon I Preserved in the War Archives, ed. Ernest Picard and Louis Tuetey, trans. Louise Seymour Houghton (Duffield, 1913), no. 203, 1: 135; “Règlement provisoire sur le service de l’infanterie en campagne. Du 5 Avril 1792,” in Règlement provisoire sur le service de l’infanterie en campagne (L’Imprimerie de la République, Fructidor, an 7), 40-44; Elting, Swords around a Throne, 88. 16. Ibid., 45-47; Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 23 vendémiaire, year 12, B14 2, AAT; Order of the day, IV Corps, Rosenau, 8 May 1807, C2 380, AAT. 17. Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 23 vendémiaire, year 12, B14 2, AAT. 18. Jean-Baptiste Barrès, Memoirs of a French Napoleonic Officer: Jean-Baptiste Barrès, Chasseur of the Imperial Guard, ed. Maurice Barrès, trans. Bernard Miall (Greenhill, 1988), 58. 19. Marshal Ney, Proclamation, 4 vendémiaire, year 14, C2 3, AAT. 20. Proclamation to the Bavarian Army, 1 brumaire, year 14, C17 235, AAT; Order of the day, Grande Armée, 6 October 1806, C2 380, AAT; Order of the day, VI Corps, 3rd Division, 8 vendémiaire, year 14, C2 3, AAT; Order of the day, Grande Armée, 10 March 1806, C17 235, AAT; Order of the day, Grande Armée, 7 October 1807, C2 11, AAT. 21. Proclamation to the Army, 12 frimaire, year 14, C2 11, AAT. For the use and characteristics of Napoleon’s proclamations, see Robert B. Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda (Louisiana State University Press, 1950), 90-105; Nada Tomiche, Napoléon écrivan (Armand Colin, 1952), 185-95. 22. Order, IV Corps, 23 February 1806, C2 379, AAT. 23. Barrès, Memoirs, 58, 66, 93; Général Ruby and Général Lacomme, eds., “Lettres de Louis de Périgord, Aide de Camp du Maréchal Berthier au cours de Campagnes de 18051806-1807,” Carnet de la Sabretache no. 39 (1977): 107. 24. Fernand Beaucour, “Notes et Souvenirs de J.J. Bellavoine, soldat du camp de Boulogne,” Revue du Nord 50, no. 198 (Juillet-Septembre 1968): 443. 25. J. David Markham, ed., Imperial Glory: The Bulletins of Napoleon’s Grande Armée, 1805-1814 (Greenhill; Stackpole, 2003), 9-183. 232

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26. Joseph J. Mathews, “Napoleon’s Military Bulletins,” Journal of Modern History 22, no. 2 (June 1950): 137-43; Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda, 92-96. 27. F. Avril to his father, Zimmern, 2 March [1806], 35J 11, Archives départementales du Finistère [hereafter AD Finistère]. 28. Elzéar Blaze, Military Life under Napoleon: The Memoirs of Captain Elzéar Blaze, ed. and trans. John R. Elting (Emperor’s Press, 1995), 111. 29. Chief of Squadron Thiard to the Emperor, Dresden, 8 November 1806, C2 30, AAT; Marshal Davout to the Prince of Neufchatel [Marshal Berthier], Posen, 15 November 1806, C2 31, AAT; The Grand Duke of Berg [Marshal Murat] to the Emperor, Warsaw, 4 December 1806, C2 32, AAT. 30. Bertaud, La presse et le pouvoir, 213; the Prince of Bénévent [Talleyrand] to the Prince of Neuchâtel [Marshal Berthier], Mainz, 24 October 1806, C2 28, AAT. 31. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9541, 11: 450-51. For the characteristics of the bulletins, see also Mathews, “Napoleon’s Military Bulletins”; Tomiche, Napoléon écrivan, 203-7; Bertaud, Quand les enfants, 262-68. 32. Entry entitled “Andréossy (aide major général chef de l’État Mor gal de la grande Armée) au Général = on lui adresse 1000 exemplaires des Moniteurs des 3,4, et 5 vendre pour être distribués aux troupes de la Grande Armée,” in “No. 1. Repertoire de la Correspondance Relative Aux Armées,” C2 205, AAT; the Secretary General to General Andréossy, 3 vendémiaire, year 14, C2 201, AAT; Order of the day, VI Corps, 3rd Division, Grande Armée, Stuttgart, 8 vendémiaire, year 14, C2 3, AAT; Report to the Minister, 27 October 1806, C2 217, AAT. 33. Captain Barbara to Monsieur Barbara, Cantonment near Prasnitz, 10 January 1807, M1 1832, AAT; Barrès, Memoirs, 46, 51. 34. Captain Barbara to Monsieur Barbara, Vilshofen, 20 April 1806, M1 1832, AAT; F. Avril to his father, Armersdorf, 14 July 1806, 35J 11, AD Finistère; Forrest, Napoleon’s Men, 26-27, 40-41. 35. Rapport du Grand-Juge Ministre de la Justice, au Gouvernement, Paris, 27 Pluviôse, year 12, B14 2 bis, AAT; Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 29 pluviôse, year 12, B14 4, AAT. 36. B. C. Gournay, ed., Journal militaire, contenant tout ce qui est relatif à la composition et à l’administration de la force publique; et enfin tout ce qui concerne les militaires (year 9, 1808). 37. Laura Mason, Singing the French Revolution: Popular Culture and Politics, 1787-1799 (Cornell University Press, 1996). 38. Thierry Bouzard, Anthologie du Chant militaire Français (Editions Grancher, 2000), 9. 39. For the use and effects of Revolutionary songs in the armies of the Republic, see Jean-Paul Bertaud, La Révolution armée: Les soldats-çitoyens et la Révolution français (Éditions Robert Lafont, 1979), 146-52; and Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 141-50, 172-82. 40. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 14331, 17: 518-19; no. 14291, 17: 486-87. 41. Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel précédé d’une introduction historique remontant au 5 mai 1789, contenant un abrégé des anciens États-généraux des assemblées des notables et des principaux événemens qui ont amené la Révolution (Chez Selier) [hereafter Moniteur], 23 September 1808, 14 October 1808, 18 October 1808, 21 October 1808, 8 November 1808; Hommage du caveau moderne à la Grande Armée, ou chansons et couplets

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chantés à Tivoli pendant les dîners donnés par la ville de Paris aux braves qui ont traversé cette capitale dans le courant de Septembre 1808 (Imprimerie de Brasseur Ainé, 1808); Journal de l’Empire, 27 September 1808; Brigitte Level, A Travers deux siècles: Le Caveau, société bachique et chantante, 1726-1939 (Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1988), 119-50. 42. Barrès, Memoirs, 120. 43. Moniteur, 27 prairial, year 11; 3 nivôse, year 12; 27 Novembre 1807; 23 Septembre 1808. 44. Mason, Singing the French Revolution, 20-24. 45. Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda, 157-61. 46. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 8216, 10: 72. 47. Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda, 157-61. 48. Ibid., 161; Mason, Singing the French Revolution, 148-220; Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 7200, 9: 55. 49. Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, ou choix de chansons militaires, dédié aux braves (C’est-à-dire à tous les soldats français) (Chez Marchand, 1809). 50. Raymond Aymery Philippe Joseph de Montesquiou-Fezensac, Souvenirs militaires de 1804 à 1814, 3rd ed. (J. Dumaine, 1869), 34-35. 51. Jean-Auguste Oyon, “Campagnes et Souvenirs Militaires de Jean-Auguste Oyon (1783-1852). Maréchal des logis chef au 4e régiment de dragons,” Carnet de la Sabretache 1 (1913): 109. 52. Laura Mason convincingly argues this position in Singing the French Revolution, 5-12, 209-20. 53. Yves Barré, Jean-Baptiste Radet, and Guillaume Desfontaines, Chansons populaires composées pour les fêtes du couronnement (Chez Léopold Collin, year 13); Jean Sarrazin, Le onze frimaire, ou discours analytique de la vie, des exploits mémorables, et des droits de Napoléon I.er à la couronne impériale (Chez Dubroca, year 13); Hommage du caveau moderne; Moniteur, 27 November 1807, 29 November 1807, 23 September 1808. 54. For the songs housed in the Bibliothèque Nationale, see Bibliothèque Nationale, Département des Imprimées, Catalogue de l’Histoire de France, Tome III: Premier RepubliqueMonarchie de Juillet (n.p., 1968). For the role of almanachs and chansonniers in the publication of songs, see Roger Nourisson, “Chants de soldats au camp de Boulogne (1798-1805),” Études napoléoniennes 111, nos. 23, 24 et 25 (1990): 264, note 14. 55. Many songs in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, such as “La danse française dédiée à notre brave armée d’Angleterre,” were printed as individual song sheets prior to 1809. Some songs, like “Aux braves de la Grande Armée,” were also published in other songbooks like the Hommage du caveau moderne à la Grande Armée. For their original publication dates, see Hommage du caveau moderne, 11-13; Bibliothèque Nationale, Tome III: Premier République-Monarchie de Juillet; Pierre Barbier and France Vernillat, Histoire de France par les chansons. Tome IV. La Révolution, 5th ed. (Gallimard, 1957), 270-71; Ginette Marty and Georges Marty, Dictionnaire des chansons de la Révolution, 1787-1799 (Éditions Tallandier, 1988), 234-36. The content of most of the songs in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée also indicates that they date from before 1809. 56. Moniteur, 12 February 1809. 57. Moniteur, 29 November 1807; A.B., Histoire des Triomphes Militaires, des Fêtes Guerrières et des Honneurs accordés aux braves chez les peuples anciens et modernes; Particulièrement aux Armées Françaises, jusqu’au 1er janvier 1808 (Chez Ant. Bailleul, 1808), 464. 234

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58. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 7333, 9: 119. 59. Christian Bailleux and Brigitte Loir Chatel, Le Théâtre du Vaudeville au Camp de Boulogne, août-septembre 1805 (L’Imprimerie Graphimer, 2007), 15-52; Graham E. Rodmell, French Drama of the Revolutionary Years (Routledge, 1990) 54-55. 60. Bailleux and Loir Chatel, Le Théâtre du Vaudeville; Nourisson, “Chants de soldats,” 274-75; Charles Otto Zieseniss, “Le théâtre aux armées,” Souvenir Napoléonien (June 1974): 19-21. 61. Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 11-14, 20-21, 50-53, 56-61, 67-71, 80-82, 90-95, 98-100, 100-103, 110-11, 117-22, 125-26, 128-30. 62. Antoine-Claire, Comte Thibaudeau, Mémoires sur le Consulat. 1799 à 1804 (Chez Ponthieu, 1827), 83-84. 63. Order of the day, Camp of Utrecht, 23 fructidor, year 12, C1 19, AAT. 64. The Prince of Neuchâtel to the Emperor, Konigsberg, 15 July 1807, C2 51, AAT. 65. Starting in 1771, common soldiers could receive the “Medal of the Two Swords” for exceptionally long service. See André Souyris-Rolland, Histoire des distinctions et des récompenses nationales, 2 vols. (Public-Réalisations, 1987), 26-31. 66. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 7001, 8: 455; Marshal Soult, Order, Boulogne, 7 thermidor, year 12, AFIV 1601, pl. 1 (III), AN; Morvan, Le soldat impérial, 2: 454. 67. Order of the day, Grande Armée, 18 frimaire, year 14, C17 235, AAT. 68. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 7527, 9: 239. 69. Isser Woloch, The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration (University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 77-109, 195-261. 70. Général Ruby and Général Lacomme, ed., “Lettres de Louis de Périgord,” Carnet de la Sabretache no. 39 (1977): 108. 71. Rafe Blaufarb, The French Army, 1750-1820: Careers, Talent, Merit (Manchester University Press, 2002), 164-93. 72. Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 10 prairial, year 13, B14 4, AAT; Morvan, Le Soldat Impérial, 2: 428-43; Jean-Paul Bertaud, “Napoleon’s Officers,” Past and Present 112 (August 1986): 91-111; Elting, Swords around a Throne, 157-82; Bodinier, “Du soldat républicain à l’officier impérial.” 73. Bertaud, La Révolution armée, 177-80, 322-24. 74. The Minister of War to Marshal Soult, Boulogne, 14 thermidor, year 12, C1 16, AAT; the Minister of War to Marshal Soult, 16 prairial, year 13, C2 201, AAT; Frédéric Masson, ed., “Notes et documents provenant des archives du Général Baron Ameil,” Carnet de la Sabretache 6 (1907): 206. 75. “Arrêté relatif à la haute-paie accordée aux caporaux et soldats pour ancienneté de service. Du 3 thermidor an 10,” and “Décret impérial relatif à la haute paie pour ancienneté de service. Du 24 messidor an 12,” in Léglislation militaire ou recueil methodique et raisonné des Lois, Décrets, Arrêtés, Réglemens et Instructions actuellement en vigueur sur toutes les branches de l’état militaire, ed. H. Berriat, 4 vols. (Chez Louis Capriolo, 1812), 3: 59-60. For units as rewards, see Morvan, Le soldat imperial, 2: 443-50. 76. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 8687, 10: 378; no. 9012, 11: 33; no. 9891, 12: 103. 77. Order of the day, Grande Armée, 2 December 1806, Posen, C17 235, AAT. 78. Baron Boulart, Memoires (1792-1815), ed. Jacques Jorquin (Tallandier, 1992), 235. 79. Bertaud, La Révolution armée, 205-9, 313-14; Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 151-53.

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80. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 4442, 6: 34. 81. Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda, 106-11; Sudhir Hazareesingh, The Saint-Napoleon: Celebrations of Sovereignty in Nineteenth-Century France (Harvard University Press, 2004), 3-4; “Saint Napoleon, Officier Romain, Martyr,” in the Collection de Vinck, Qb370, vol. 61, no. 8136, Cabinet des Estampes, Richelieu Site, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris. 82. See the decree of 19 February 1806 in the Moniteur, 22 February 1806; Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9803, 12: 36-37; Natalie Petiteau, Les Français et l’Empire (1799-1815) (La Boutique de l’Histoire/Éditions Universitaires d’Avignon, 2008), 67-73. 83. Hazareesingh, The Saint-Napoleon, 3-4. 84. Moniteur, 26 November 1807. 85. Extract from the Journal de l’Empire, in ibid., 13 November 1807. 86. Order of the day, IV Corps, Stettin, 7 February 1808, C2 380, AAT. 87. This description is based on the following sources: Tableau Comparatif de la force des Troupes Françaises à l’Epoque du 1er au 20 fructidor an 7 à celle du 15 floréal an 12, C1 35, AAT; Supplement to the Order of the day, Camp of Brest, 5th complementary day, year 12, C1 19, AAT; Brigadier General Donzelot to Marshal Augereau, Brest, 2 vendémiaire, year 13, C1 19, AAT. 88. For examples, see Copie de l’adresse au Premier Consul, faite [sic] à Ostende le 11 floréal, an 12, Camp of Bruges, 11 floréal, year 12, C1 10, AAT; Copie de l’adresse presentée par le Général Commt en Chef, les généraux, officiers, soldats & les administrations des camp de St. Omer. Au Premier Consul, Montreuil, 18 floréal, year 12, C1 10, AAT; “Felicitations adressées à Sa Majesté Impériale sur son avenement au Trône d’Italie,” in AFIV 1027, AN; Moniteur, 3 ventôse, year 12. 89. See “Letter from the Journal de Paris,” printed in the Moniteur, 8 fructidor, year 12. 90. Ibid. 91. Pierre Robinaux, Soldats de Napoléon. Journal de route du capitaine Robinaux, 1803-1832 (Plon, 1908), 17-18; Order of the day, Camp of Utrecht, 20 fructidor, year 12, C1 19, AAT; Order of the day, Camp of Utrecht, 23 fructidor, year 12, C1 19, AAT; General Marmont to the Emperor, Camp of Utrecht, 24 fructidor, year 12, AFIV 1594, pl 3, AN. 92. Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 1 prairial, year 12, B14 4, AAT; Order of the day, Camp of Utrecht, 3 prairial, year 12, C1 11, AAT; Report, General Mathieu Dumas to the Minister of War, Bruges, 5 prairial, year 12, C1 11, AAT; the Minister of War to the generals commanding the camps and armies, Paris, 29 floréal, year 12, C1 11, AAT. 93. Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 5 prairial, year 12, B14 4, AAT; Report of the 4th Division, Camp of St. Omer, Wimille, 1 thermidor, year 12, C1 15, AAT. 94. “Cérémonie de la distribution des Aigles au Champ-de-Mars, le Mercredi 14 frimaire an 13,” in Cérémonial de l’Empire français (La Librairie Économique, 1805), 392-93. 95. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 53, 151; Order of the Division, 3 thermidor, year 13, C2 412, AAT; Soult, Instructions, Boulogne, 27 thermidor, year 12, C1 16, AAT; Marshal Bernadotte to Marshal Berthier, Paris, 28 frimaire, year 13, C1 24, AAT. 96. Marshal Soult to General Andréossy, Boulogne, 3 thermidor, year 12, C1 15 , AAT; General Dutaillis to General Dupont, Montreuil, 17 thermidor, year 13, C1 34, AAT. 97. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 7616, 9: 287. 98. Moniteur, 8 fructidor, an 12. 99. Lieutenant of Engineers Hémat, “Campement de la 2eme Division du camp de Bruges,” Ostende, 24 pluviôse, year 13, L3 123, feuille [hereafter fe] no. 2, AAT. 100. Elting, Swords around a Throne, 165. 236

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101. Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 9 messidor, year 12, B14 4, AAT; Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 5 messidor, year 13, B14 4, AAT; Order of the day, IV Corps, 29 June 1807, Konigsberg [sic], C2 380, AAT.

C ha p t e r 2 1. The description of this ceremony is based upon the following sources: Moniteur, 1 fructidor, year 12; Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 21 thermidor, year 12, B14 4, Service historique de la Défense, Archives de l’armée de terre, du ministère de la Guerre et du ministère de la défense, Vincennes [hereafter AAT]; Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 24 thermidor, year 12, B14 4, AAT; Pion des Loches, Mes Campagnes (1792-1815), notes et correspondance du colonel d’artillerie, Pion des Loches (Librairie de Firmin-Didot, 1889), 133-34; Général Béchet de Léocour, Souvenirs: écrit en 1838-1839, ed. Christian Schneider (F. Teissèdre, 1999), 206-12. 2. Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor; Jay M. Smith, Nobility Reimagined: The Patriotic Nation in Eighteenth-Century France (Cornell University Press, 2005). 3. Bell, The First Total War, 34-51. 4. This description of the military honor of the Old Regime is based upon ibid; Harold T. Parker, “Napoleon and the Values of the French Army: The Early Phases,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 18 (1991): 233-42; Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor, 15-30; Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor,”; John A. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715 (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 248-318; Blaufarb, The French Army, 1750-1820, 12-45; Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701 (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 156-58, 222-25, 318-35; Smith, Nobility Reimagined; Bertaud, Quand les enfants, 165-69; Hervé Drevillon, L’Impôt du sang: Le métier des armes sous Louis XIV (Éditions Tallandier, 2005), 319-436. 5. For the relationship between honor and nobility, see Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor, 15-30; Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor”; Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 248318; Blaufarb, The French Army, 12-45; Jay M. Smith, The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789 (University of Michigan Press, 1996); Smith, Nobility Reimagined; Drevillon, L’Impôt du sang, 319-436. 6. Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor, 15-30; Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor”; Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 248-318; Smith, The Culture of Merit; Blaufarb, The French Army, 12-45; Rowlands, The Dyanastic State, 222-25, 318-35. 7. Charles Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Sprit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent, 2 vols. (Hafner, 1949), 1: 25. For the relationship between honor and honors, see André Corvisier, Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494-1789, trans. Abigail T. Siddall (Indiana University Press, 1979), 87-109; Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor”; Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 248-318; Smith, The Culture of Merit; Jean-Paul Bertaud, Guerre et société en France de Louis XIV à Napoléon Ier (Armand Colin, 1998), 11-29. 8. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle. 9. Smith, The Culture of Merit, 11-190; Drevillon, L’Impôt du sang, 319-436. 10. Harold T. Parker, The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries: A Study in the Development of the Revolutionary Spirit (Octagon Books, 1965), 8-36; Frederick C. Schneid, Napoleon’s Conquest of Europe: The War of the Third Coalition (Praeger, 2005), 6-9.

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11. David Bien, “The Army in the French Enlightenment: Reform, Reaction, and Revolution,” Past and Present no. 85 (November 1979): 68-98; Blaufarb, The French Army, 12-45; Smith, The Culture of Merit, 191-261; Smith, Nobility Reimagined. The term “patriot writers” comes from Jay M. Smith in Nobility Reimagined. 12. For the transformation of honor, see Smith, Nobility Reimagined. 13. Ibid., 28. 14. Ibid., 201-5. 15. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 248-318; Abel Poitrineau, “Fonctionnarisme militaire ou Catharsis Guerrière? Les facettes de la gloire, au temps de la Grand Nation, d’après les actes et les écrits des soldats de l’Empire,” in La bataille, L’armée, la gloire, 1745-1871, ed. Paul Viallaneix and Jean Ehrard, 2 vols. (Association des Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Clermont-Ferrand, 1985), 2: 210-12. For the difference between glory and honor, see Rowlands, The Dynastic State, 156-58. 16. Voltaire, “Gloire, Glorieux, Glorieusement, Glorifier,” in Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond D’Alembert (University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Projet, Winter 2008 edition), consulted at http://artfl.uchicago.edu/cgibin/philologic31/getobject.pl?c.58:134.encyclopedie1108 on 31 October 2009 at 4:06 p.m., see the section under the heading “(Page 7:716).” 17. Jean-François Marmontel, “Gloire,” in Encyclopédie, ed. Diderot and D’Alembert, consulted at http://artfl.uchicago.edu/cgibin/philologic31/getobject.pl?c.58:134.encyclopedie1108 on 31 October 2009 at 4:01 p.m. 18. Ibid., see the section under the heading “(7:720).” 19. Ibid., see the sections under the headings “(7:717)” and “(7:716).” 20. C. L. Saint-German, Mémoires de M. le comte de Saint-Germain (Chez Marc-Michel Rey, 1779), 201. See also Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 1715-1789 (Barnes & Noble Books, 1997), 96-104; Lynn, Battle, 123-25. 21. Albert Babeau, La vie militaire sous l’ancien régime: Les soldats (Firmin-Didot, 1889), 116-35; André Corvisier, L’armée française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul. Le soldat, 2 vols. (Presses universitaires de France, 1964), 2: 821-34. 22. For the role of paternalism in the Royal army, see Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 415-50; Bertaud, Guerre et société, 43-45. 23. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 438-50; Babeau, La vie militaire, 236-37. 24. For the role of esprit de corps in the Royal army, see Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 27-30; Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor”; Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 417, 439-43, 468-69; Bertaud, Guerre et société, 185-91. 25. Christy Pichichero, “Le Soldat Sensible: Military Psychology and Social Egalitarianism in the Enlightenment French Army,” French Historical Studies 31, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 553-80. 26. For the suppression of esprit de corps, see Bertaud, La Révolution armée, 212-13; Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 181-82; Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor,” 163-64. 27. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 172-74; Brian Joseph Martin, Napoleonic Friendship: Military Fraternity, Intimacy, and Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century France (University of New Hampshire Press, 2011), 19-39. 28. Maximilien Robespierre, “Discours de Maximilien Robespierre sur le licenciement des officiers de l’armée,” in Oeuvres de Maximilien Robespierre, ed. Marc Bouloiseau, Georges Lefebvre, and Albert Soboul, 10 vols. (Presses universitaires de France, 1952), 7: 476. 238

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29. MR 1993, AAT, quoted in Bertaud, La Révolution Armée, 203. 30. Jean-Paul Bertaud, “La Révolution française et les récompenses nationales,” in La Légion d’Honneur: Deux siècles d’histoire. Actes du Colloque du Bicentenaire, ed. Jean Tulard, François Monnier, Olivier Echappé (Perrin, 2002), 27-28. 31. For the rewards used during the Revolution, see Bertaud, La Révolution armée, 194227; Bertaud, “La Révolution française et les récompenses,” 26-28; Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 150-62, 178-82; Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor,” 166-69. 32. L. Bonneville de Marsangy, La Légion d’Honneur, 1802-1900 (Librairie Renouard, 1907), 14-15. 33. For a description of Arms of Honor, see ibid.; Bertaud, La Révolution armée, 26; Bertaud, “La Révolution française et les récompenses,” 30-32; Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor,” 168-69. 34. Natalie Petiteau, “Pourquoi Bonaparte crée-t-il la Légion d’honneur?” in La Légion d’Honneur, ed. Tulard, Monnier, Echappé, 35-44; Bertaud, “Napoleon’s Officers”; Bertaud, Quand les enfants, 165-78. 35. Antoine-Claire, Comte Thibaudeau, Mémoires sur le Consulat. 1799 à 1804 (Chez Ponthieu, 1827), 83. 36. Ibid., 84. 37. Ibid., 83. 38. “Loi portant création d’une Légion d’honneur du 29 Floréal an X de la République,” in Manuel de la Légion d’Honneur, Nouvelle édition (Chez Rondonneau, 1804), 6-7. 39. Ibid., 5-6. 40. “Détails historiques sur la cérémonie de la prestation du serment dans la Chapelle de l’Hôtel des Invalides, le jour de l’anniversaire du 14 Juillet. Du 26 Messidor an XII. (Extrait du Journal officiel, no. 298.),” in ibid., 22. 41. These inscriptions can be translated as “Napoleon, Emperor of the French,” and “Honor and Patrie.” See “Décret impérial sur la décoration des membres de la Légion d’honneur. Du 22 Messidor an XII,” in ibid., 17-18. 42. My figures are based on Jean Daniel, La Légion d’Honneur: Histoire et organisation de l’ordre national (Éditions André Bonne, 1948), 113-20; Louis Bergeron, France under Napoleon, trans. R. R. Palmer (Princeton University Press, 1981), 62-65; Jean Tulard, Napoleon: The Myth of the Saviour, trans. Teresa Waugh (George Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984), 123-24, 246-51. 43. Order of the day, Grande Armée, Konigsberg [sic], 13 July 1807, C17 166, AAT. 44. Barrès, Memoirs, 92-93; Philippe de Ségur, Count, An Aide-de-Camp of Napoleon: Memoirs of General Count de Ségur of the French Academy, 1800-1812, ed. Count Louis de Ségur, trans. H. A. Patchett-Martin (D. Appleton, 1895), 310. 45. Oyon, “Campagnes et souvenirs militaires,” 165-67. 46. “Décret impérial relatif à la décoration des membres de la légion d’honneur. Du 22 messidor an 12,” in “Supplement an XII,” in Manuel de la Légion d’Honneur, 17-18. 47. For an example of such ceremonies, see Order of the day, 64th infantry, 10 germinal, year 13, C2 412, AAT. 48. Grand Chancellor Lacépède to General Eblé, Paris, 27 May 1806, C2 22, AAT. 49. Jean-Marie Merme, “Des Pyramides à Moscou, souvenirs d’un soldat de Napoleon I.er,” Recueil des mémoires et documents de l’Academie de la Val d’Isere 14 (1978): 34; Oyon, “Campagnes et souvenirs militaires,” 165-67; Pierre Berthezène, Souvenirs militaires de la république et de l’Empire, 2 vols. (J. Dumaine, 1855), 2: 340. 50. “Loi portant création de la Légion d’honneur,” 7.

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51. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 4451, 6: 39-40. 52. Order of the day, Camp of Utrecht, 13 brumaire, year 12, C1 17, AAT; Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 8803, 10: 452; no. 12240, 14: 581; Marshal Berthier to General Belliard, Chief of staff of the Cavalry Reserve, Konigsberg [sic], 13 July 1807, C2 51, AAT. 53. Order of the day, Grande Armée, Konigsberg [sic], 13 July 1807, C17 166, AAT. 54. Pierre Grigeul, “Jean-Baptiste Baurens, capitaine de la Grande Armée,” Société des sciences, arts et belles-lettres du Tarn nos. 45-46 (1991-1992): 600. 55. General Grouchy to Marshal Berthier, January 1806, C2 19, AAT; Colonel Préval to M. de Lacépède, Paris, 20 July 1806, M1 1913, AAT. 56. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 10181, 12: 342. 57. Colonel Latrille to General Dupont, Ulrickirchen, 1 nivôse, year 14, C2 10, AAT. 58. Colonel Préval to Maréchal des logis chef Gaillard, St. Germain, 16 ventôse, year 12, M1 1913, AAT. 59. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 8803, 10: 452. 60. Alphonse Aulard, ed., Paris sous le consulat. Recueil de documents pour l’histoire de l’esprit public à Paris, 4 vols. (Léopold Cerf, Noblet, Maison Quantin), 3: 632. 61. Jean-Paul Bertaud presents a similar interpretation about the Legion of Honor and Napoleonic honor in Quand les enfants, 164-202. However, we arrived at our conclusions about these subjects independently. I first presented my ideas about the patriotic character of the Legion of Honor in my doctoral dissertation, which was defended before Bertaud’s book appeared. See Michael J. Hughes, ““Vive la République! Vive l’Empereur!”: Military Culture and Motivation in the Armies of Napoleon, 1803-1808” (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005), 127-44. 62. Schneid, Napoleon’s Conquest of Europe, 6-10. 63. Petiteau, “Pourquoi Bonaparte crée-t-il la Légion d’honneur?”; Michel Kerautret, “La Légion d’honneur et le Grand Empire,” in La Légion d’Honneur, ed. Tulard, Monnier, and Echappé, 40-47, 49-60; Bertaud, Quand les enfants, 164-202. 64. Thibaudeau, Mémoires, 85. 65. Jean-Jacques-Régis Cambacérès, Mémoires inédits: Éclaircissements publiés par Cambacérès sur les principaux événements de sa vie politique, ed. Laurence Chatel de Brancion, 2 vols. (Librairie Académique Perrin, 1999), 1: 700. 66. See Fréville’s speech, Moniteur, 30 floréal, year 10. 67. See footnote 12 in Petiteau, “Pourquoi Bonaparte crée-t-il la Légion d’honneur?” 38-39. 68. See Fréville’s speech and the speeches of Lucien Bonaparte, Moniteur, 30 floréal, year 10, and Girardin’s speech, Moniteur,1 prairial, year 10. 69. See Dumas’ speech, Moniteur, 1 prairial, year 10. 70. Ibid. 71. See Roederer’ s speech, Moniteur, 1 prairial, year 10. 72. See Marmont’s speech in ibid. 73. See Roederer’s speech in ibid. 74. Ibid., and see Carrion-Nizas’s speech, Moniteur, 30 floréal, year 10. 75. Marshal Davout to the Minister of War, 8 thermidor, year 12, Ostende, I1 83, AAT. 76. Kerautret, “La Légion d’honneur,” 66-67. 77. Daniel, La Légion d’Honneur, 184.

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78. François Martin, Les devoirs d’un guerrier, ou instructions d’un père à son fils sur la profession militaire, par F.M. (Chez Lemarchand, 1808), 28-29. 79. Ibid., 5, 202. 80. Annie Jourdan, Napoleon: Héros, Imperator, Mécène (Aubier, 1998); Englund, Napoleon, 142-50, 332-39; Philip G. Dwyer, “Napoleon and the Drive for Glory: Reflections on the Making of French Foreign Policy,” in Napoleon and Europe, ed. Philip G. Dwyer (Longman, 2001), 118-35; Dwyer, Napoleon: The Path to Power, 1769-1799 (Bloomsbury, 2007). 81. Poitrineau, “Fonctionnarisme militaire ou catharsis guerrière?”; Englund, Napoleon, 142-50, 243-69, 332-39. 82. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 11855, 14: 324; no. 14291, 17: 486. 83. Armand-Séville, “Le tambour, chanson bruyante,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 109. Pierre-François Palloy, “Le banquet de famille,” in Pierre-François Palloy, Le troubador des armées françaises, ou les chants de la victoire aux armées françaises (Pelletier, n.d.). 84. Moniteur, 8 fructidor, year 12. 85. Order of the day, Camp of Utrecht, 23 fructidor, year 12, C1 19. 86. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 14338, 17: 521. 87. Marshal Berthier to the Marshals and the Commanding Generals, 1 vendémiaire, year 14, C2 201, AAT; Order of the day, Cavalry Reserve, 22 frimaire, year 14, C2 241, AAT; Order, 1st Corps of the Grande Armée, Goerken, 11 February 1807, C2 38, AAT. 88. M. E., “Guindey (Jean-Baptiste), 1785-1813,” Carnet de la Sabretache 3 (1904): 228-39. 89. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 10987, 13: 340. 90. Ibid., no. 9546, 11: 459. 91. Blaze, Military Life, 113. 92. Order of the day, Grande Armée, 28 vendémiaire, year 14, C17 235, AAT. 93. Bertaud, Quand les enfants, 269-74. 94. Proclamation, Austerlitz, 12 frimaire, year 14, C2 11, AAT; Order of the day, 3rd Division, VI Corps, Clagenfort, 2 January [1806], C2 18, AAT. 95. Napoleon, Proclamation to the Army, 6 nivôse, year 14, Schoenbrunn, C2 11, AAT. 96. See, for example, the orders of the day contained in C17 166, AAT, and C17 237, AAT; Markham, Imperial Glory, 9-183; Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée; Hommage du caveau moderne. As a rule, the bulletins that I have cited came from the Correspondance de Napoléon in order to present my own translation and understanding of the original documents. I am citing Markham’s book to provide the reader with a more convenient source with which to verify my arguments. It contains every issue of the Bulletin de la Grande Armée translated into English in a single volume. 97. Markham, Imperial Glory, 9-183. 98. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 11514, 14: 119. 99. Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 107-39. 100. For the new relationship between the self and warfare that emerged in the eighteenth century, see Lynn, Battle,179-216; Bell, The First Total War, 78-83, 201-22, 293-317; Yuval Noah Harari, The Ultimate Experience: Battlefield Revelations and the Making of Modern War Culture, 1450-2000 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 127-306. 101. Dwyer, “Napoleon and the Drive for Glory”; Bell, The First Total War, 201-22.

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102. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 7876, 9: 434; “Cérémonie de la distribution des Aigles au Champ-de-Mars, le Mercredi 14 frimaire an 13,” in Cérémonial de l’Empire français (La Librairie Économique, 1805), 392-93. 103. Order of the day, Grande Armée, Schonbrunn, 4 nivôse, year 14, C17 235, AAT. 104. Marshal Lannes to the Emperor, Stetin [sic], 2 November 1806, C2 30, AAT; Marshal Ney to the Emperor, Magdebourg, 14 November 1806, C2 31, AAT; the Major General [Berthier] to the Emperor, Schonbrunn, 7 nivôse, year 14, C2 10, AAT. 105. Order of the Day, Grande Armée, Finkenstein, 26 May 1807, C17 235, AAT. 106. General Songis to the Emperor, 29 May 1807, C2 47, AAT. 107. Napoleon, Correspondance, 11257, 13: 537. 108. Proclamation, Elchingen, 29 vendémiaire, year 14, C17 235, AAT. 109. Moniteur, 12 vendémiaire, year 12. 110. Bertaud, La Révolution armée, 204. 111. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 173-76.

C ha p t e r 3 1. Napoleon, Proclamation to the Army, 6 nivôse, year 14, Schoenbrunn, C2 11, Service historique de la Défense, Archives de l’armée de terre, du ministère de la Guerre et du ministère de la défense, Vincennes [hereafter AAT]. 2. Lieutenant Barbara to Monsieur Barbara, Ubervaserdorf près Vienne, 2 January 1806, M1 1832, AAT. 3. Programme. Fêtes triomphales pour le retour de la Grande Armée, located in the folder labeled, “1806. Janvier. Sans indication du jour,” C2 19, AAT; Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9832, 12: 56. 4. H. H. Scullard, Festivals and Ceremonies of the Roman Republic (Cornell University Press, 1981): 213-18. 5. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 13312, 16: 127. 6. Napoleon, Proclamation to the Army, 6 nivôse, year 14, Schoenbrunn, C2 11, AAT. 7. For the effort to politicize the French army during the Revolution, see Bertaud, La Révolution armée, 109-229; Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 119-82; Alan Forrest, The Soldiers of the French Revolution (Duke University Press, 1990), 89-124. 8. Michel Vovelle, “Entre cosmopolitisme et xénophobie: patrie, nation, république universelle dans les idéologies de la Révolution française,” in Nations and Nationalisms: France, Britain, Ireland, and the Eighteenth-Century Context, ed. Michael O’Dea and Kevin Whelan (Voltaire Foundation, 1995), 11-26; Pierre Nora, “Nation,” in A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, ed. François Furet and Mona Ozouf, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1989), 742-53; Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 20. 9. For the evolution of the concept of the patrie and its role in the Revolution, see ibid., 107-97; Norman Hampson, “The French Revolution and the Nationalization of Honor,” in War and Society, ed. M. R. D. Foot (n.p., 1973), 201-4, 207-12; Norman Hampson, “La Patrie,” in The Political Culture of the French Revolution, ed. Colin Lucas, vol. 2 of The French Revolution and the Creation, 125-38; Vovelle, “Entre cosmopolitisme et xénophobie.” 10. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, I: 34. 11. J. M. Thompson, Robespierre and the French Revolution (Collier, 1962), 114. 242

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12. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 138-39, 147-48, 153, 162, 178-80; Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor,” 152-55, 157-62; Hampson, “The French Revolution and the Nationalization of Honor”; Hampson, “La Patrie”; Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 20, 98-101, 154-59, 163-68, 198-201. 13. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 173-76. 14. Ibid., 119-82. 15. Esquieu, L’armée d’autrefois. Le racolage et les racoleurs, 6, cited in Corvisier, L’armée française, 1: 92. 16. Napoleon, Proclamation, 12 frimaire, year 14, Austerlitz, C2 11, AAT. 17. Moniteur, 10 frimaire, year 14. 18. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 11223, 13: 512. 19. “Chant guerrier pour la descente en Angleterre,” in Moniteur, 3 nivôse, year 12; Palloy, “Hommage à la Garde Impériale,” in Palloy, Le troubador des armées françaises; Armand-Gouffé, “Hommage aux braves de la Grande Armée,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 29. 20. Barré, Radet, et Desfontaines, “Le bon soldat,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 40. 21. Bertaud, Guerre et société, 150; Bell, The First Total War, 141-42. 22. For the myth of the patriotic death, see Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 173-76; Bertaud, La Révolution armée, 210-12; Bertaud, Guerre et société, 168-71; Bell, The First Total War, 140-43. 23. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 5086, 6: 453. 24. Général de Brigade Sarrazin, Rapport Général de la Batterie Sarrazin, 8 fructidor, year 13, St. Merzin, AFIV 1601, pl 3, Archives nationales, Paris [hereafter AN]. 25. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9550, 11: 463. 26. Ibid., no. 11907, 14: 355. 27. This biography of La Tour d’Auvergne is based on L. L-T., “La Tour d’Auvergne (Théophile-Malo Corret de),” in Nouvelle biographie générale depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu’à nos jours, avec les renseignements bibliographiques et l’indication des sources à consulter, ed. M. Le d’Hoefer (Firmin Didot frères, fils, 1862), 29: 833-37; Henri Chaperon, Historique du 46e régiment d’infanterie (Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1894), 36-51; Elting, Swords around a Throne, 165. 28. Napoleon, Corresondance, no. 6913, 8: 402. 29. Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 9 messidor, year 12, B14 4, AAT. 30. Order of the Day, Camp of St. Omer, 5 messidor, year 13, B14 4, AAT. 31. Georges Bangofsky, Les étapes de Georges Bangofsky, officier lorrain: Fragments de son journal de campagnes (1797-1815), ed. Alesandre de Roche du Teilloy (Berger-Levrault, 1905), 27. 32. Barrès, Memoirs, 41; Blaze, Military Life, 41. 33. Markham, Imperial Glory, 184-425. 34. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 14727, 18: 234. 35. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9832, 12: 55-56. 36. Programme. Fêtes Triomphales pour le retour de la Grande Armée, located in the folder labeled, “1806. Janvier. Sans indication du jour,” C2 19, AAT. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid.

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39. For descriptions of the festivities, see Moniteur, 25 November 1807; 26 November 1807; 27 November 1807; 29 November 1807; Barrès, Memoirs, 119-22; and A.B., Histoire des Triomphes Militaires, 459. 40. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 14291, 17: 486; no. 14331, 17: 518-19; no. 14338, 17: 520-21. 41. See Minister of the Interior, Report to his Majesty the Emperor and King, Paris, 28 September 1808, AFIV 1050, AN; Minister of the Interior, Letter to the Emperor, Paris, 10 October 1808, AFIV 1050, AN. 42. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 14291, 17: 486. 43. Ibid., no. 14291, 17: 486-87. See also ibid., no. 14331, 17: 518-19. 44. Ibid., no. 14331, 17: 518-19; Minister of the Interior, Report to his Majesty the Emperor and King, Paris, 28 September 1808, AFIV 1050, AN; Minister of the Interior, Letter to the Emperor, Paris, 10 October 1808, AFIV 1050, AN. 45. Napoleon, Correspondance, 22 September 1808. 46. This account of the celebration in Paris is based on the following sources: Moniteur, 23 September 1808; Hommage du caveau moderne; Journal de l’Empire, 27 Septembre 1808; Pierre Charrie, Drapeaux et etendards de la Révolution et de l’Empire (Copernic, 1982), 11718; Brigitte Level, A Travers deux siècles: Le Caveau, société bachique et chantante, 1726-1939 (Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1988), 119-50. 47. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 14291, 17: 486. 48. Ibid., no. 14331, 17: 518. 49. Moniteur, 29 November 1807. 50. A.B., Histoire des Triomphes Militaires, 459. 51. Moniteur, 20 December 1808. 52. Ibid., 14 October 1808; 10 November 1808; Copy of a letter of the Prefect of the Moselle to His excellence, the Minister of the Interior, Metz, 11 September 1808, AFIV 1050, AN. 53. Barrès, Memoirs, 119-20. 54. Alphonse d’Hautpoul, Mémoires du général marquis Alphonse d’Hautpoul, pair de France, 1789-1865, ed. Estienne Hennet de Goutel (Perrin, 1906), 32. 55. André Palluel-Guillard, “L’idée de nation en France entre 1800 et 1815,” in Voies nouvelles pour l’histoire du Premier Empire: Territoires. Pouvoirs. Identités. Collque d’Avignon, 9-10 mai 2000, ed. Natalie Petiteau (Boutique de l’Histoire, 2003), 28-31. 56. Englund, Napoleon, 196-200. 57. Jacques Godechot, La Grande Nation: L’Expansion révolutionnaire de la France dans le monde de 1789 à 1799, 2nd ed. (Éditions Aubier Montaigne, 1983); Jacques Godechot, “The New Concept of the Nation and Its Diffusion in Europe,” and Clive Emsley, “Nationalist Rhetoric and Nationalist Sentiment in Revolutionary France,” in Nationalism in the Age of the French Revolution, ed. Otto Dann and John Dinwiddy (Hambledon, 1988), 13-26, 39-52; Jean-Yves Guiomar, “Histoire et significations de ‘La Grande Nation’ (août 1797–automne 1799): problèmes d’interprétation,” in Du directoire au consulat. 1. Le lien politique local dans la grande nation, ed. Jacques Bernet, Jean-Pierre Jessenne, Hervé Leuwers (Centre de recherche sur l’Histoire du Nord Ouest, 1999), 317-28. 58. For the legend of the nation-in-arms, see Alan Forrest, The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican Memory (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-37. 244

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59. Proclamation, Shonbrunn [sic], 6 nivôse, year 14, C2 11, AAT. 60. See “Exposé de la conduite réciproque de la France et de l’Autriche, depuis la paix de Lunéville, lu par le ministre des relations extérieures,” in Journal de l’Empire, 4 vendémiaire, year 14. 61. De Jouy, “Aux Soldats de la Grande Armée,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 10. 62. For the exterminationist rhetoric used during the French Revolution, see Bell, The First Total War, 120-85. For the descriptions of England, see Order of the day, Grande Armée, Bamberg, 7 October 1806, C2 11, AAT; Order of the Day, Camp of St. Omer, 29 pluviôse, year 12, B14 4, AAT. 63. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9541, 11: 453. 64. Ibid., no. 9502, 11: 419. 65. Ibid., no. 9556, 11: 468. 66. Proclamation of the Emperor and King, the Imperial Camp at Potsdam, 26 October 1806, C2 11, AAT. 67. Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, rev. ed. (Yale University Press, 2009); Hagemann, “Of ‘Manly Valor and German Honor’”; Hagemann, “Mannlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre,” 242-55, 271-393; Hagemann, “Francophobia and Patriotism: AntiFrench Images and Sentiments in Prussia and Northern Germany during the Anti-Napoleonic Wars,” French History 18, no. 4 (December 2004): 404-25. 68. For an extended analysis of the British Other in Napoleonic France, see Bertaud, Quand les enfants, 203-19. 69. See, for example, Order of the day, Ostende, 30 pluviôse, year 12, I1 83, AAT; Rapport du Grand-Juge Ministre de la Justice, au gouvernement, Paris, 12 pluviôse, year 12, B14 2 bis, AAT; Proclamation, Elchingen, 29 vendémiaire, year 14, C17 235, AAT; Francis, “Encore un coup!” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 24. 70. Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 5 floréal, year 12, B14 4, AAT; Ducray-Duminil, “Le Départ d’un soldat Français,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 33; E. A. Dossion, “Chanson triomphale,” in Chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 10; Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 12747, 15: 330. 71. Barré, Radet, and Desfontaines, “L’impromptu,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 68. 72. Armand-Gouffé, “Le pas redoublé,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 8. 73. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9502, 11: 420; no. 9510, 11: 427; Order of the day, Reserve army corps, St. Polten, 18 brumaire, year 14, C2 241, AAT. 74. Order of the day, Camp of Montreuil, 13 Germinal, year 12, B14 4, AAT. 75. Désaugiers, “Aux Braves de la Grande Armée,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 22. 76. Palluel-Guillard, “L’idée de nation,” 35-38. 77. Moniteur, 29 November 1807; Moreau, “Ronde adressée à la Grande Armée, à son passage à Paris,” and Laurenceau, “La prophétie de Jonas. Aux Anglais,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 40, 50. 78. Moniteur, 29 September 1808. 79. General Vandamme to the general officers and to all of the grades of the 2nd Division (of IV Corps), Landsberg, 20 vendémiaire, year 14, C2 5, AAT; Order of the day, VI Corps, 3rd Division, Stuttgard, 8 vendémiaire, year 14, C2 3, AAT; Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 11040, 13: 378-9; Proclamation, Schonbrunn, 6 nivôse, year 14, C2 11, AAT; Proclamation of the Emperor and King, Bamberg, 6 October 1806, C2 380, AAT.

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80. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9574, 11: 479; no. 11167, 13: 472. 81. Ibid., no. 9550, 11: 464. 82. Proclamation of the Emperor and King, Bamberg, 6 October 1806, C2 380, AAT. 83. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 10967, 13: 326. 84. Proclamation, Schonbronn [sic], 6 nivôse, year 14, C2 11, AAT. 85. Moniteur, 26 November 1807. 86. Proclamation of the Emperor and King, Potsdam, 26 October 1806, C2 11, AAT. 87. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9533, 11: 441. 88. Geoffrey Ellis, “The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism,” in Napoleon and Europe, ed. Dwyer, 97-117; Ellis, The Napoleonic Empire, 15-19, 54-58, 81-96; Michael Broers, Europe under Napoleon, 1799-1815 (Arnold, 1996), 24-49, 60-98, 144-201. 89. The generals, officers, and soldiers of the First Division to his Excellency, the Marshal of the Empire Bernadotte, Lunébourg, 9 germinal, year 13, AFIV 1027, AN; Army of Hanover, 2nd Division, To his Excellency, the Marshal of the Empire Bernadotte, Verden, 11 germinal, year 13, AFIV 1027, AN. 90. Stuart Woolf, Napoleon’s Integration of Europe (Routledge, 1991), 53-116, 185-96; Broers, Europe under Napoleon, 125-41, 263-66. 91. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9381, 11: 324.

C ha p t e r 4 1. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 14331, 17: 518-19; no. 14291, 17: 486-7. 2. Brazier, “Aux Braves de la Grande Armée,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 12. 3. Paul R. Higate, “Introduction: Putting Men and Military on the Agenda” and “‘Soft Clerks’ and ‘Hard Civvies’: Pluralizing Military Masculinities,” John Hockey, “No More Heroes: Masculinity in the Infantry,” and Deborah Harrison, “Violence in the Military Community,” in Military Masculinities, ed. Higate, xvii-xxii, 15-25, 27-42, 71-90. 4. Hockey, “No More Heroes,” 15-25. 5. Dudink, Hagemann, and Tosh, eds., Masculinities in Politics and War; Goldstein, War and Gender; Higate, ed., Military Masculinities; Braudy, From Chivalry to Terrorism; Nye, “Western Masculinities in War and Peace.” 6. Bertaud, La Révolution armée, 284-333; Bell, The First Total War, 217-19, 223-62. 7. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9832, 12: 55; no. 13567, 16: 335; no. 11644, 14: 203. 8. Moniteur, 30 floréal, year 10. 9. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 10876, 13: 259. 10. Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor, 15-30; Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 248-318. 11. Anne C. Vila, “Elite Masculinities in Eighteenth-century France,” in French Masculinities: History, Culture, and Politics, ed. Christopher E. Forth and Bertrand Taithe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 15-30. 12. Blaufarb, The French Army; Smith, Nobility Reimagined. 13. Bertaud, La Révolution armée, 109-229; Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 119-82; Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor”; Forrest, The Soldiers of the French Revolution, 89-124; Sean Quinlan, “Men without Women? Ideal Masculinity and Male Sociability in the French Revolution, 1789-99,” in French Masculinities, ed. Forth and Taithe, 31-50. 246

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14. Bertaud, Quand les enfants parlaient de gloire; Alan Forrest, “The Military Culture of Napoleonic France,” in Napoleon and Europe, ed. Philip G. Dwyer (Longman, 2001), 43-59; Michael J. Hughes, “Making Frenchmen into Warriors: Martial Masculinity in Napoleonic France,” in Forth and Taithe, eds., French Masculinities, 51-66; Bell, The First Total War, 186-282. 15. David M. Hopkin, Soldier and Peasant in French Popular Culture, 1766-1870 (Boydell Press/Boydell & Brewer, 2003), 285-322; Gérard de Puymège, Chauvin, Le SoldatLaboureur: Contribution à l’étude des nationalismes (Éditions Gallimard, 1993); Gérard de Puymège, “The Good Soldier Chauvin,” in Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past. II: Traditions, ed. Pierre Nora, Lawrence D. Kritzman, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Columbia University Press, 1997), 333-62. 16. Moniteur, 12 vendémiaire, year 12. 17. Louis Joseph, Comte Marchand, Mémoires de Marchand, premier valet de chambre et exécuteur testamentaire de l’Empereur, publié d’après le manuscrit original, ed. Jean Bourguignon, 2 vols. (Plon, n.d.), 1: 98, quoted in Puymège, Chauvin, 39. 18. Michael S. Kimmel, “Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity,” in Theorizing Masculinities: Research on Men and Masculinities, ed. Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman (Sage, 1994), 119-41; Michael S. Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural History (Free Press, 1996), 7-8, 26, 61-62, 110, 125, 197, 312, 332. 19. Brazier, “Aux Braves de la Grande Armée,” 11. 20. Dossion, “Chanson pour le retour de la Garde impériale. Couplets grivois,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 27. 21. Moniteur, 15 brumaire, year 14; 13 January 1806; 20 November 1806; 5 February 1807. 22. Barré, Radet, Desfontaines and Dieu-la-Foi, “Le conscrit,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 59. 23. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9408, 11: 345. 24. Palloy, “La prise de Berlin. Couplets,” in Palloy, Le Troubador des armées françaises. 25. Henri Simon, “Les drapeaux d’Inspruck, chant militaire,” Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 63. 26. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9361, 11: 306. 27. Ibid., no. 11223, 13: 509. 28. Ibid., no. 11009, 13: 358. 29. Ibid., no. 9550, 11: 464. 30. E. A. Dossion, “L’honneur. Stances militaires,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 36; Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 11737, 14: 263. 31. Ibid., no. 9408, 11: 344. 32. Dorchy, de Douai, “Le départ d’un conscrit,” Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 144. 33. Ibid. 34. Order of the day, Camp of Utrecht, 30 thermidor, year 12, C1 17, AAT. 35. Palloy, “La conscription ou le joyeux départ, en octobre 1806,” in Palloy, Le troubadour des armées françaises. 36. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9392, 11: 334, 336. 37. Napoleon, Proclamation, n.d., C2 11, AAT. 38. Moreau, “Ronde adressée à la Grande Armée, à son passage à Paris,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 40.

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39. Moniteur, 29 September 1808. 40. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 12793, 15: 356. 41. Francis, “Encore un coup!” and Ducray-Duminil, “A la Grande Armée,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 23, 18. 42. Palloy, “Les jeunes conscripts ou la suite du joyeux depart, En mai 1807,” in Palloy, Le troubadour des armées françaises. 43. Dorchy, de Douai, “Le depart d’un conscript,” 144. 44. Simon, “Adieux d’un conscrit à sa maîtresse,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 3, 4. 45. Moniteur, 27 novembre 1807. 46. Citoyen Auguste, Acteur du Vaudeville, “Couplets d’un soldat républicain, prêt à profiter d’un congé pour revenir se marier,” in Le chansonnier de la montagne, ou recueil de chansons, vaudevilles, pots-pourris et hymnes patriotiques (Chez Favre, l’an 3), 115-16; Michel Vovelle, La Révolution Française: Images et recit, 1789-1799. Tome III: septembre 1791 à juin 1793 (Éditions Messidor/Livre Club Diderot, 1986), 9-10, 51, 53-55; Forrest, The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars, 30. 47. Landes, Visualizing the Nation, 91-102; Hunt, The Family Romance, 122-23, 151-91. 48. Joseph Vingtrinier, 1789-1902, Chants & chansons des soldats de France recueillis par Joseph Vingtrinier (Albert Méricant, 1902), 27. 49. Ibid. 50. See for example, Dena Goodman, The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment (Cornell University Press), 233-304; Landes, Women and the Public Sphere; Landes, Visualizing the Nation; Hunt, The Family Romance; Joan W. Scott, Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man (Harvard University Press, 1996), 1-56; Jennifer Ngaire Heuer, The Family and the Nation: Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary France (Cornell University Press, 2005). 51. John A. Lynn II, Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 213. 52. Owen Connelly, The French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, 3rd ed. (Harcourt College, 2000), 212. 53. For Napoleon’s ideas about women and their effects, see June K. Burton, Napoleon and the Woman Question: Discourses of the Other Sex in French Education, Medicine, and Medical Law, 1799-1815 (Texas Tech University Press, 2007), 3-113. 54. Alan Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire (Oxford University Press, 1989), 74-117; Isser Woloch, The New Regime: Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789-1820’s (Norton, 1994), 411-18; Bertaud, Quand les enfants parlaient de gloire, 347-93. 55. Barré, Radet, Desfontaines, and Dieu-la-Foi, “Le poltron,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 61. 56. Barré, Radet, and Desfontaines, “Le bon soldat,” in ibid., 42. 57. Hommage du caveau moderne. 58. Francis, “Encore un coup!” in ibid., 25. 59. Ibid., 23; Simon, “Adieux d’un conscrit à sa maîtresse,” 5. 60. Armand-Gouffé, “Le pas redoublé,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 8. 61. Moreau, “Ronde adressée à la Grande Armée,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 40.

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62. Dessey du Leyris, “Chanson, à l’occasion de la paix, chanté à la préfecture des Landes, le 15 aôut 1807,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 132. “Myrtles” refers to the myrtle plant, which was used in French wedding ceremonies. The song indicates that the laurels that French soldiers won made French women willing to marry them, transforming their laurel wreaths, which signified victory, into myrtles, a symbol of marriage. 63. Barré, Radet, and Desfontaines, “Le retour de la Grande Armée,” in ibid., 37-38. 64. Dupont de Lille, “Ronde,” in ibid., 124. 65. Dossion, “Chanson pour le retour de la Garde Impériale,” in ibid., 26-27. 66. Jérome Davide, dit Grain de Sel, Chanson. Sur la bataille d’Iéna, 1806 (n.p., 1806); Palloy, “La prise de Berlin.” 67. “La danse française. Dediée à notre brave Armée d’Angleterre,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 6. 68. Palloy, “A la paix,” in Le troubador des armées françaises. 69. Michel Lefevre, Chansons, hymnes et danses du Boulonnais du XIIIè siècle aux années 1930 (Michel Lefevre, 1989), 241. 70. Henri Simon, “Couplets chantés dans un repas où se trouvaient plusieurs officiers de la Garde Impériale, après la bataille d’Austerlitz,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 22. 71. “Ronde adressée à la Grande Armée par les convives du caveau moderne, invités par M. le Conseiller d’état Préfet du département de la Seine, et par M. M. les Maires de la ville de Paris au repas donnée aux généraux et officiers français dans les jardins de Tivoli,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 44. 72. Armand-Gouffé, “Hommage aux braves de la Grande Armée,” in ibid., 30. 73. Delormet, “Ran plan plan tambour battant, chanson de caserne,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 95-98. 74. Code Pénal Militaire, ou Lois et Arrêtés relatifs à la justice militaire (Chez Magimel, an 11 [1803]), 25-26. 75. The Grand Duke of Berg to the Emperor, Warsaw, 10 December 1806, C2 33, AAT; Order of the day, IV Corps, Stettin, 14 January 1808, C2 380, AAT. 76. In my research on the orders of the day of the Army of the Coasts and the Grande Armée, I found only one announcement for rape, which is cited in the previous note. 77. Georges Vigarello, A History of Rape: Sexual Violence in France from the 16th to the 20th Century, trans. Jean Birrell (Polity, 2001), 9-127. 78. Susan Brownmiller, Against our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (Simon and Schuster, 1975), 33. 79. Ibid., 31-113; Linda Grant de Pauw, Battle Cries and Lullabies: Women in War from Prehistory to the Present (University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 18-19, 165, 220-21, 259, 27273; Lynn, Women, Armies, and Warfare, 30, 104, 153-59. 80. Lynn, Women, Armies, and Warfare , 40-47, 220-21. 81. Ibid., 41. 82. Ibid., 216-28. 83. M. Chomel. Vieux airs militaires français et vieilles chansons (C. Joubert, Editeur de Musique, 1911), 1st series, 4-5, 2nd series; Georges Kastner, Les chants de L’armée française ou recueil de morceaux à plusieurs parties composés pour l’usage spécial de chaque arme et précédés d’un essai historique sur les chants militaires des français (G. Brandus, Dufour; Jules

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Renouard, 1855), 54; Vingtrinier, Chants & chansons des soldats, 79-81; Thierry Bouzard, Anthologie du chant militaire français (Éditions Grancher, 2000), 9. 84. Vingtrinier, Chants & chansons des soldats, 79. 85. Jean-Baptiste Primi Visconti, Mémoires sur la cour de Louis XIV, 1673-1681, ed. JeanFrançois Solnon (n.p., 1988), 104, quoted in Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, 254. 86. Les vrais amis du peuple et des loix, “L’Embarquement de Calais,” in Daniel. Recueil factice de cahiers de chansons imprimées chez lui (Chez Alexandre Daniel, n.d.). 87. Landes, Visualizing the Nation, 135-74. 88. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 147-50; Captain Loy, “Le livret de route du caporal Joseph-Claude Tondeur de la 94e demi-brigade 1793-1801,” Carnet de la sabretache (1928): 399-408. My argument is also based on the Revolutionary songs in the following sources: Recueil d’hymnes patriotiques, chantés aux séances du conseil général de la commune (n.p., 1793) (I would like to thank Jean-Paul Bertaud for loaning me his personal copy of this songbook.); Chansons patriotiques chantée à Lille (n.p., an 2); Chansons patriotiques imprimés par ordre de l’Assemblée générale de la Section du Contrat-sociale, (n.p., n.d.); Le chansonnier patriote ou recueil de chansons, vaudevilles et pot-pourris patriotiques (Chez Garnéry, an 1); Potevin et al., Le sans-culotte républicain (n.p., an 2); Le chansonnier de la Montagne; Thomas Rousseau, L’Âme du peuple et du soldat. Chants Républicains (n.p., n.d.); Thomas Rousseau, Les chants du patriotisme, avec des notes. Dédiés à la jeunesse citoyenne (n.p., 1792). 89. “Chanson guerrier,” in Le chansonnier patriote, 79. 90. Dorat Cubiere, “Ma maîtresse nouvelle,” in Recueil d’hymnes patriotiques, 27-28. 91. Pierre-François Palloy, “Patria, Napoleo, Victoria, Pax,” in Palloy, Le troubadour des armées françaises.

C ha p t e r 5 1. Moniteur, 31 August 1808. 2. Morvan, Le soldat impérial, 2: 506-17; Colonel Vachée, Napoleon at Work, trans. C. Frederic Lees (Adam and Charles Black, 1914), 213-39; Maurice Choury, Les grognards et Napoléon (Perrin, 1968), 53-62; J. Lucas-Dubreton, Les soldats de Napoléon (Jules Tallandier, 1977), 369-98; Bodinier, “Du soldat républicain à l’officier impérial, 282-85. J. Lucas Dubreton also writes about the existence of a “cult of Napoleon” in post-Napoleonic France in Le Culte de Napoléon, 1815-1848 (Éditions Albin Michel, 1960). 3. See, for example, Morvan, Le soldat impérial, 2: 425-71, 506-16; Vachée, Napoleon at Work; Marcel Baldet, La vie quotidienne dans les armées de Napoléon (Hachette, 1964); Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Indiana University Press, 1978), 136-38; Elting, Swords around a Throne, 593-603; Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor”; Forrest, Napoleon’s Men, 99-104; Petiteau, Lendemains d’empire, 48-49; idem., “Pour une anthropologie historique,” paragraphs 29-37; Natalie Petiteau, “Survivors of War,” 47-48. 4. Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda; Hanley, The Genesis of Napoleonic Propaganda; Jourdan, Napoleon; Bell, The First Total War, 196-206, 244-50; Sudhir Hazareesingh, The Legend of Napoleon (Granta, 2004), 15-71; Philip G. Dwyer, Napoleon: The Path to Power, 1769-1799 (Bloomsbury, 2007). 5. Noteworthy exceptions to this tendency include Forrest, Napoleon’s Men, 53-78; Bell, The First Total War, 196-206, 244-50; and Bertaud, Quand les enfants, 37-49, 203-346.

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6. The following description of Absolutist political culture is based on Richard A. Jackson, Vive le Roi! A History of the French Coronation from Charles V to Charles X (University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Jeffrey W. Merrick, The Desacralization of the French Monarchy in the Eighteenth Century (Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 1-48; Peter Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV (Yale University Press, 1992); Joel Cornette, Le roi de guerre: Essai sur la souverainété dans la France du Grand Siècle (Éditions Payot & Rivages, 1993); Colin Jones, The Great Nation: France from Louis XV to Napoleon (Penguin, 2002), 1-28; T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe, 1660-1789 (Oxford University Press, 2002), 29-99. Bertaud, Guerre et société, 21-22. 7. Cornette, Le roi de guerre, 223-29. 8. The following description of Louis XIV and Absolutist political culture is based on Burke, The Fabrication; Smith, The Culture of Merit, 125-90; Jones, The Great Nation, 1-28; Blanning, The Culture of Power, 29-52. 9. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (MIT Press, 1989), 5-17; Blanning, The Culture of Power, 1-52. 10. Ibid., 185-94; Burke, The Fabrication; Jones, The Great Nation, 1-18. 11. For the concept of the autonomous state, see Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1978), I: xi-x, II: 287-90, 349-58; Blanning, The Culture of Power, 185-94. For the doctrine of the king’s two bodies, see Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton University Press, 1957). 12. This definition of sacrality was initially formulated by Emile Durkheim in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (Free Press, 1965). It was applied to politics by David I. Kertzer, whose ideas strongly influenced the description of sacrality contained in this chapter. See David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (Yale University Press, 1988), 35-56. My understanding of sacrality is also based on the following: Clifford Geertz, “Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power,” in Culture and Its Creators: Essays in Honor of Edward Shils, ed. Joseph Ben-David and Terry Nichols Clark (University of Chicago Press, 1977), 150-71; Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (Oxford University Press, 2009); Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions (Oxford University Press, 1997); Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 22-49. 13. Marcel Marion, “État,” in Dictionnaire des institutions de la France aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (n.p., 1968), 215, quoted in Blanning, The Culture of Power, 185. 14. Blanning, The Culture of Power, 53-99. 15. Numerous works describe the effects of these trends upon Absolutist political culture, and there are simply too many to list here. My interpretation was most influenced by the following: Chartier, The Cultural Origins; Burke, The Fabrication, 125-33; Bell, The Cult of the Nation; Habermas, The Structural Transformation; Blanning, The Culture of Power, 103-356. 16. Blanning, The Culture of Power, 194-265, 428-32. 17. Ibid., 266-356; Colley, Britons. 18. Colley, Britons; Blanning, The Culture of Power, 322-56. 19. Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 63-68.

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20. This description of the desacralization of the French monarchy is based on numerous works, including Landes, Women and the Public Sphere; Chartier, The Cultural Origins; Merrick, The Desacralization of the French Monarchy; Hunt, The Family Romance; Robert Darnton, The Literary Underground of the Old Regime (Harvard University Press, 1982); Dale Van Kley, The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560-1791 (Yale University Press, 1996); Blanning, The Culture of Power, 374-427. It is necessary to point out that some historians dispute the desacralization of the monarchy. See for example, Simon Burrows, “Robert Darnton, The Devil in the Holy Water; or, The Art of Slander from Louis XIV to Napoleon. Review Essay,” H-France Forum 5, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 12-17, consulted at http://www.h-france.net/forum/forumvol5/darnton3.pdf on 4/22/11 at 11:30 a.m. Timothy Tackett also raises questions about desacralization in Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790) (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006) 102-4, 151-58; and When the King Took Flight (Harvard University Press, 2003). His research reveals that Louis XVI was revered prior to the French Revolution and during its initial stages. While critics of the desacralization thesis prove that desacralization was not a linear process, the negative portrayals of Louis XV that flooded France before the Revolution, and the rapid erosion of Louis XVI’s support after his attempt to flee Paris in 1791 indicate that the monarchy was no longer considered sacrosanct by the educated public. In any case, Louis XVI’s execution and the creation of the Republic replaced the king with other objects of loyalty and devotion. 21. François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 14-79; Mona Ozouf, Festivals and the French Revolution, trans. Alan Sheridan (Harvard University Press, 1988); Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 140-97. 22. Hanley, The Genesis; Dwyer, Napoleon: The Path to Power, 205-58, 304-29. 23. Ibid., 343-47, 375-83, 449-60; Jourdan, Napoleon, 57-136. 24. Forrest, Napoleon’s Men, 73. 25. Thierry Lentz, La France et l’Europe de Napoléon, 1804-1814: Nouvelle histoire du Premier Empire, Volume III (Arthème Fayard, 2007), 35. 26. Proclamation du Général en chef de l’Armée du Rhin, 24 frimaire, year 8, AFIV 1594, pl. 1(I), Archives nationales, Paris [hereafter AN]. 27. Jean Tulard, Napoleon: The Myth of the Saviour, trans. Teresa Waugh (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984), 19-71; Dwyer, Napoleon: The Path to Power, 449-62, 505-14. 28. Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 29 pluviôse, year 12, B14 4, AAT. 29. He issued proclamations in 1801 and 1802 promoting the celebration of July 14. See Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 5633, 7: 193; no. 5634, 7: 193; no. 6180, 7: 518. 30. Moniteur, 26-27 messidor, year 9. 31. Jean-Antoine-Claude Chaptal, Mes souvenirs sur Napoléon (Plon, 1893), 218-19. 32. For Napoleon’s approach to his legitimacy, see Frédéric Bluche, Le Bonapartisme: Aux origines de la droite autoritaire (1800-1850) (Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1980), 15-46; Jourdan, Napoleon; Englund, Napoleon, 247-51; Thierry Lentz, Napoléon et la conquête de l’Europe: Nouvelle histoire du Premier Empire, Volume 1 (Arthème Fayard, 2002), 29-101; Thierry Lentz, La France et l’Europe, 36-48; Jacques Olivier Boudon, “Les fondements religieux du pouvoir impérial,” in Voies nouvelles, Petiteau, ed., 195-212. 33. Lentz, Napoléon et la conquête, 69-71. 34. Cérémonial de l’Empire français, 395-97. 252

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35. For the royal coronation ceremony, see Jackson, Vive le Roi! 15-23; Cornette, Le roi de guerre, 216-21. For Napoleon’s, see Moniteur, 9 frimaire, year 13; Frédéric Masson, Le sacre et le couronnement de Napoléon, 3rd ed. (Paul Ollendorff, 1908), 49-216; Jean Tulard, ed., Procès-verbal de la cérémonie du Sacre et du couronnement de Napoleon (Imprimerie national Éditions, 1993), xix-60; Lentz, Napoléon et la conquête, 80-101. 36. Marshal Soult, Circular, Boulogne, 6 vendémiaire, year 13, C1 19, AAT. 37. Moniteur, 9 frimaire, year 13. 38. Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 9 frimaire, year 13, B14 4, AAT. 39. Jean-François Boulart, Baron, Mémoires (1792-1815) du général d’artillerie baron Boulart, ed. Jacques Jorquin (Tallandier, 1992), 124. 40. Journal de l’Empire, 4 October 1805. 41. Bertaud, Quand les enfants, 220-27. 42. For examples, see Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 1 vendémiaire, year 12, B14 2, AAT; Order of the day, Camp of Utrecht, 25 messidor, year 12, C1 15, AAT; General Donzelot to Marshal Augereau, Brest, 27 messidor, year 12, C1 15, AAT. 43. For examples, see The Prince of Neuchâtel to the Emperor, Munich, 12 August 1806, C2 24, AAT; The Grand Duke of Berg at Warsaw to the Emperor, Warsaw, 3 December 1806, C2 32, AAT; Report of 16 August 1807, General Hulin, Commandant of Berlin, C2 52, AAT. 44. See the decree of February 19, 1806, in the Moniteur, 22 February 1806. 45. Jean Tulard, “L’Empire entre dictature et monarchie,” Souvenir napoléonien no. 400 (Mars-Avril 1995): 22. 46. Robert Morrissey, L’Empereur à la barbe fleurie: Charlemagne dans la mythologie et l’histoire de France (Gallimard, 1997), 349-68; Thierry Lentz, “Napoléon et Charlemagne,” in Napoléon et l’Europe: Regards sur un politique, ed. Thierry Lentz (Arthème Fayard, 2005), 11-30. 47. Piis, “Suzette à sans-quartier, qui ne fait que passer par Paris,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 15; “Address of the Camp of Montreuil,” in Moniteur, 19 floréal, year 12; “Address of the 11th Regiment of Dragoons” in Moniteur, 28 floréal, year 12. 48. Constant Wairy, Mémoires de Constant, premier valet de chambre de l’Empereur, sur la vie privée de Napoléon, sa famille et sa cour, 6 vols. (Imprimerie de Cosson, 1830), 1: 26465; Béchet de Léocour, Souvenirs, 207-9; Susan L. Siegfried and Todd Porterfield, Staging Empire: Napoleon, Ingres, and David (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 28-31. 49. Masson, Le sacre, 135-39; Lentz, “Napoléon et Charlemagne,” 23. 50. Tulard, ed., Procès-verbal, 23-60. 51. Order of the day, Camp of Bruges, 10 thermidor, year 12, I1 83, AAT. 52. Order of the day, Grande Armée, 2 December 1806, Posen, C17 235, AAT. 53. Barrès, Memoirs, 93. 54. My portrayal of Napoleon as a patriotic monarch borrows from T.C.W. Blanning’s ideas about patriotic kingship in Great Britain in The Culture of Power, 266-356. 55. Robinaux, Journal de route, 18. 56. Jean Sarrazin, “Chanson de table pour le jour du couronnement de Bonaparte,” Le onze frimaire, 95. 57. Tulard, ed., Procès verbal, 58. 58. “Address of the third division of the camp at Dunkirk,” in Moniteur, 22 floréal, year 12.

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59. “Address of the first division of dragoons,” in ibid., 19 floréal, year 12. For a more extended analysis of the army’s petitions about the creation of the Empire, and their role in its establishment, see Isser Woloch, Napoleon and His Collaborators: The Making of a Dictatorship (Norton, 2001), 110-13. 60. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9574, 11: 480. 61. Picard, “C’est lui. Ronde de l’auberge de Munich,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 77. 62. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 11102, 13: 429. 63. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 10967, 13: 326-27; no. 10987, 13: 340; no. 11018, 13: 363; no. 11026, 13: 368; no. 11053, 13: 385; no. 11065, 13: 401; no. 11069, 13: 405; no. 11094, 13: 421; no. 11097, 13: 424-25; no. 11111, 13: 435. 64. Ibid., no. 10967, 13: 326-27. 65. Ibid., no. 11094, 13: 421. 66. Ibid., no. 11018, 13: 363. 67. Ibid., no. 10967, 13: 327-28. 68. Ibid., no. 11069, 13: 405. 69. Ibid., no. 11094, 13: 421. 70. Ibid., no. 11102, 13: 429. 71. Ibid., no. 11097, 13: 425. 72. Martin, Napoleonic Friendship, 5-7. 73. Barrès, Memoires, 106-7. 74. Order of the day, Grande Armée, Elchingen, 29 vendémiaire, year 14, C2 380, AAT. 75. Order of the day, Grande Armée, 14 frimaire, year 14, C17 235, AAT. 76. For examples, see Order of the day, 14 brumaire, year 13, B14 4, AAT; Order of the day, Grande Armée, 11 fructidor, year 13, C2 275-76, AAT; Order of the day, Grand Armée, 26 January 1807, C17 235, AAT. 77. For the Imperial court, see Lentz, Napoléon et la conquête, 34-39; Lentz, La France et l’Europe, 202-10; Jacques-Olivier Boudon, Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire, 1799-1815 (Perrin, 2000), 189-95. 78. Blaze, Military Life, 176. 79. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9392, 11: 334. 80. Emmanuel de Las Cases, Le mémorial de Saint-Hélène, ed. Gérard Walter, 2 vols. (Éditions Gallimard, 1956), I: 859. 81. Bell, The First Total War, 199-207. Steven Englund also emphasizes the romantic impulse behind Napoleon’s hold over French troops. See Englund, Napoleon, 379-81. 82. Bertaud also makes this point in Quand les enfants, 262-68. 83. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 12827, 15: 373. 84. Ibid., no. 11154, 13: 463. 85. Proclamation of the Emperor and King, Potsdam, 26 October 1806, C2 11, AAT. 86. General Suchet, Order of the Division, 2 thermidor, year 13, C2 412, AAT; Brazier, “Aux braves de la Grande Armée,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 13. 87. Address of the Camp of Montreuil, in Moniteur, 19 floréal, year 12. 88. Letter from the Journal de Paris in ibid., 8 fructidor, year 12. 89. Ducray-Duminil, “A la Grande Armée,” in Hommage du caveau moderne, 17. 90. Blaufarb, The French Army, 164-93.

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91. See especially, Englund, Napoleon, 249; Lentz, Napoléon et la conquête, 98-101. 92. Geertz, “Centers, Kings, and Charisma,” 152-53. Natalie Petiteau also proposes that a resacralization of monarchy occurred under Napoleon. See Petiteau, Les Français et l’Empire, 157-190. There are some similarities between my interpretation of this phenomenon and hers, but they are coincidental. I only became aware of Petiteau’s work on this subject very late in the process of publishing this book when it was no longer possible to address it at length. Moreover, my ideas about Napoleon’s sacrality in this chapter and the following chapters derive mainly from the research that I conducted for my doctoral dissertation, which was deposited three years before Petiteau’s book was published. For proof, see Hughes, ““Vive la République! Vive l’Empereur!”,” 30-92, 363-70, 387-94. 93. Letter from the Journal de Paris in Moniteur, 8 fructidor, an 12.

C ha p t e r 6 1. David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History’s Greatest Soldier (Macmillan, 1966), 515; Arnold and Reinertsen, Crisis in the Snows, 95. 2. Alain Pigeard, Dictionnaire de la Grande Armée (Tallandier Éditions, 2002), 40. 3. “Grognard,” in Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, huitième édition: Version informatisée, consulted at http://atilf.atilf.fr/dendien/scripts/generic/cherche.exe?15;s=1955 30455 on 27 July 2010, at 10:29 a.m. 4. Puymège, Chauvin, Le Soldat-Laboureur; Puymège, “The Good Soldier Chauvin”; Barbara Ann Day-Hickman, Napoleonic Art: Nationalism and the Spirit of Rebellion in France (1815-1848) (University of Delaware Press, 1999), 36-83; Hazareesingh, The Saint Napoleon, 78-104; Hazareesingh, The Legend of Napoleon, 234-59 ; Petiteau, Lendemains d’empire, 8-19, 128-34; Forrest, The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars, 38-86. 5. Puymège, Chauvin; Puymège, “The Good Soldier Chauvin.” 6. Roger Chartier, “Culture as Appropriation: Popular Culture Uses in Early Modern France,” in Understanding Popular Culture: Europe from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century, ed. Steven L. Kaplan (De Gruyter, 1984); Chartier, The Cultural Origins, 67-91; Mason, Singing the French Revolution, 5-12, 209-20. 7. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier; S. L. A. Marshall, Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (Peter Smith, 1978); John Keegan, The Face of Battle (Viking Press, 1976), 68-72; Alexander Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale, and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918 (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 8-10. 8. James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (Oxford University Press, 1997), viii, 11-12. 9. Ibid., 98-103. 10. See, for example, the letters located in the following collections: Rp 1315-1317, Archives départementales de l’Oise, Beauvais; L1137, 49F 48, Archives départementales de la Savoie, Chambéry; IJ 625, IJ 1237, Archives départementales du Pas-de-Calais; 1F 256, Archives Départementales des Yvelines; I J 409, Archives départementales de la Mayenne; 20 R 1/2, Archives départementales de la Drôme. 11. For the writings produced by Napoleon’s soldiers and the factors that shaped them letters written by common soldiers, see Forrest, Napoleon’s Men, 28-52.

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12. For the methodological issues involved in the use of memoirs, see ibid., 21-27; Forrest, The Legacy, 64-86; Hazareesingh, The Legend, 234-42; Philip G. Dwyer, “Public Remembering, Private Reminiscing: French Military Memoirs and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars,” French Historical Studies 33, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 238-58. 13. For example, Jean-Baptiste Barrès wrote his memoirs based “dozens of little notebooks” that he kept “for twenty years, over half the highways of Europe.” See, Barrès, Memoirs, 9. 14. Robinaux, Journal de route, 6-11. 15. Forrest, Hagemann, and Rendall, eds., Soldiers, Citizens, and Civilians, especially 6-12; Karen Hagemann, “Reconstructing ‘Front’ and ‘Home’: Gendered Experiences and Memories of the German Wars against Napoleon—A Case Study,” War in History 16, no. 1 (2009): 25-50. 16. For the methodological difficulties involved with the use of soldiers’ letters, see Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, and Jane Rendall, “Introduction,” in Soldiers, Citizens, and Civilians, ed. Forrest, Hagemann, and Rendall, 9-10; Dwyer, “Public Remembering, Private Reminiscing,” 233-34. 17. Frédéric Charles Louis François de Paule, commandant de Lauthonnye, “Ma vie militaire par le Commandant de Lauthonnye (1789-1860),” Carnet de la Sabretache 9 (1910): 348. 18. Jay Smith, “No More Language Games: Words, Beliefs, and Political Culture in Early Modern France,” American Historical Review 102 (1997): 1413-40. 19. Ibid., 1439. 20. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 7683, 9: 323; no. 14338, 17: 520-21; The Minister of War to General Soult, Paris, 13 brumaire, year 12, B14 11, AAT. 21. Marshal Lannes to the Grand Duke of Berg, Gawtow near Soyhaezen, 29 November 1806, C2 32, AAT. 22. Elting, Swords around a Throne, 676-77. 23. Ruby and Lacomme, eds., “Lettres de Louis de Périgord,” Carnet de la Sabretache no. 34 (1976): 99-111; Coignet, The Narrative of Captain Coignet; Robinaux, Journal de route. 24. Blaufarb, The French Army, 166-72. 25. Robinaux, Journal de route. 26. M. Couston, ed., “Lettres de guerre de Theodore et d’Elzéar de Mailhet (1805-1812),” Carnet de la Sabretache 6, no. 428 (1965): 1245-71. 27. Barrès, Memoirs. 28. Letter to citizens Putry and Devars, St. Germain, 8 vêntose, year 12, M1 1913, AAT. 29. Letter to Adjutant Pierre, St. Germain, 16 vêntose, year 12, M1 1913, AAT. 30. M. Robert Balsan, ed., “Notes de Maurice de Tascher, sous-lieutenant au 8e régiment de hussards, puis capitaine au 12e régiment de chasseurs à cheval. Mort à l’age de 27 ans dans la retraite de Moscou,” Carnet de la sabretache 35, no. 356 (Janvier-Fevrier 1932): 45. 31. Blaze, Military Life, 113-14. 32. Couston, ed., “Lettres de guerre,” 1258-59. 33. F. Avril to his father, Vienna, 29 frimaire [year 14], 35J 11, Archives départementales du Finistère [hereafter AD Finistère]. 34. Couston, ed., “Lettres de guerre,” 1246-47. 35. M.E., “Guindey,” 234. 256

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36. P. Barbara to Monsieur Barbara, Mohrungen, Poland, 24 February 1807. 37. Couston, ed., “Lettres de guerre,” 1255-56. 38. Ibid., 1249. 39. Alexandre Coudreux, Lettres du Commandant Coudreux à son frère, 1804-1815, ed. Gustave Schlumberger (Paris: Librairie Plon-Nourrit, 1908), 126. 40. F. Avril to his father, Konigsberg, 10 July 1807, 35J 11, AD Finistère. 41. F. Avril to his brother Maurin, Konigsberg, 15 July, 1807, 35J 11, AD Finistère. 42. M. E., “Guindey,” 231. 43. F. Avril to his mother, Boulogne, 10 fructidor, year 13, 35J 11, AD Finistère. 44. M. E., “Guindey,” 235-36. 45. Boulart, Mémoires, 121-22. 46. Charles de Cossé-Brissac, ed., “Lettres d’Honoré. Souvenirs d’un jeune officier de cavalerie (1806-1807),” Carnet de la Sabretache 8, no. 431 (Septembre 1966): 187. 47. Capitaine, ed., “Le colonel Constant Corbineau,” 294. 48. F. Avril to his father, Zimmern, 2 March [1806], 35J 11, AD Finistère. For the army’s views about the Bulletin de la Grand Armée later in the Empire, see Morvan, Le soldat impérial, 2: 486-88; Elting, Swords around a Throne, 601-2; Bertaud, Quand les enfants, 266. 49. General of Brigade Villatte to General [Dutaillis], Inspruck [sic], 30 brumaire, year 14, C2 8, AAT. 50. M. A. d’Hauterive, ed., 1793-1805. Lettres d’un chef de brigade, 33e de ligne, 65e et 68e demi-brigades, 56e de ligne (L. Baudoin, 1891), 89. 51. Barrès, Memoirs, 58. 52. Ibid., 63. 53. Amédée le Noury to his sisters, Schiesling, 5 April 1806, M1 645, AAT. 54. Valère Fanet, “Austerlitz (Récit d’un témoin),” Carnet de la Sabretache 4 (1905): 699. 55. Capitaine, ed., “Le colonel Constant Corbineau,” 294. 56. Couston, ed., “Lettres de guerre,” 1260. 57. P. Barbara to Monsieur Barbara, Vienna, 20 frimaire, year 14, M1 1832, AAT. 58. Cossé-Brissac, ed., “Lettres d’Honoré,” 199-200. 59. Montesquiou-Fezensac, Souvenirs militaires, 97. 60. Le Coq, ed., “Lettres et souvenirs,” 683. 61. Ruby and Lacomme, ed., “Lettres de Louis de Périgord,” Carnet de la Sabretache no. 41 (1978): 19. 62. Balsan, ed., “Notes de Maurice de Tascher,” Carnet de la Sabretache 35, no. 356 (January–February 1932): 48. 63. Amédée le Noury to Adel le Noury, Schiesling, 5 April, 1806, M1 645. 64. Montesquiou-Fezensac, Souvenirs militaires, 61. 65. Coudreux, Lettres, 44. 66. Harari, The Ultimate Experience, 197-299. 67. Ibid.; Dwyer, “Public Remembering, Private Reminiscing,” 236-58. 68. Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in 20th- Century Warfare (Basic Books, 1999). 69. Georges Sangnier, “Les trois frères Digard, soldats du Premier Empire,” Annales historiques de la Revolution française 33 (1961): 237. 70. F. Avril to his father, Vienna, 29 frimaire [year 14], 35J 11, AD Finistère. 71. D’Hauterive, ed., Lettres d’un chef de brigade, 75.

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72. F. Avril to his father, Vienna, 29 frimaire [year 14], 35J 11, AD Finistère. 73. Balsan, ed., “Notes de Maurice de Tascher,” Carnet de la Sabretache 35, no. 356 (January-February 1932): 46-47. 74. Barré, Radet, et Desfontaines, “Le bon soldat,” in Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 41. 75. “Une Épisode de 1806. Lettre de C.el Taupin, du 163e regt. de ligne, à son ami Heegmann, à Lille,” Le Carnet historique et Littéraire 2 (Juillet-Décembre 1898): 722. The editor of this article was mistaken. Eloi-Charlemagne Taupin was actually the colonel of the 103rd regiment of infantry. 76. F. Avril to his father, Augsbourg, 18 vendémiaire [year 14], 35J 11, AD Finistère. 77. P. Barbara to his father, In cantonments near Prasnitz, a league above Warsaw, 10 January 1807, M1 1832, AAT. 78. Blaze, Military Life, 60-63, 83, 132-33, 152-53, 157. 79. Ruby and Lacomme, ed., “Lettres de Louis de Périgord,” Carnet de la Sabretache no. 39 (1977): 108. 80. Bangofsky, Les étapes de Georges Bangofsky, 35-36. 81. Blaze, Military Life, 172. 82. Pion des Loches, Mes campagnes, 235. 83. Ruby and Lacomme, ed., “Lettres de Louis de Périgord,” Carnet de la Sabretache no. 37 (1977): 44. 84. Coignet, The Narrative of Captain Coignet, 146, 267; Louis-Florimond Fantin des Odoards, Journal du général Fantin des Odoards. Étapes d’un officier de la grande armée, 1800-1830 (E.Plon, Nourrit, 1895), 51. 85. Albert Depréaux, ed., “Les Gendarmes d’Ordonnance en campagne (1807-1808),” Carnet de la Sabretache no. 320 (Janvier 1928): 154, 166. 86. Coudreux, Lettres, 91, 118. 87. D’Hauterive, ed., Lettres d’un chef de brigade, 92. 88. Couston, ed., “Lettres de guerre,” 1259-60. 89. Balsan, ed., “Notes de Maurice de Tascher,” Carnet de la Sabretache 35, no. 357 (Mars-Avril 1932): 170-71. 90. Jean Nicolas Auguste Noël, Souvenirs militaires d’un officier du Premier Empire (17951832) (Berger-Levrault, 1895), 36. 91. François Vigo-Roussillon, Journal de Campagne (1793-1837) (Éditions France-Empire, 1981), 133. 92. Ruby and Lacomme, ed., “Lettres de Louis de Périgord,” Carnet de la Sabretache no. 34 (1976): 107; Barrès, Memoirs, 81; Capitaine, “Le colonel Constant Corbineau,” 294. 93. Blaze, Military Life, 172. 94. Robinaux, Journal de route, 127, 175. 95. M. le Lieutenant-colonel Chéré, ed., “Austerlitz (Lettres de deux témoins de la bataille),” Carnet de la Sabretache 4 (1905): 732. 96. Ruby and Lacomme, ed., “Lettres de Louis de Périgord,” Carnet de la Sabretache no. 44 (1978): 160. 97. Fanet, “Austerlitz,” 699. 98. General Soult to the First Consul, Boulogne, 27 germinal, year 12, AFIV 1599, pl. 2 (III), Archives nationales, Paris [hereafter AN]. 99. F. Avril to his parents, Boulogne, 15 frimaire [year 13], 35J 11, AD Finistère. 258

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100. Barrès, Memoirs, 34. 101. Ibid., 198-99. 102. F. Avril to his father, Boulogne, 10 fructidor, year 12, 35J 11, AD Finistère. 103. P. Barbara to Monsieur Barbara, Posen, 5 December 1806, M1 1832, AAT. 104. P. Barbara to Monsieur Barbara, Cantonments near Prasnitz, a league above Warsaw, 10 January 1807, M1 1832, AAT. 105. Le Coq, “Lettres et souvenirs,” 683. 106. P. Barbara to Monsieur Barbara, Landau, in Bavaria, 22 August 1806, M1 1832. 107. Balsan, ed., “Notes de Maurice de Tascher,” Carnet de la Sabretache 35, no. 356 (January-February 1932): 53. 108. Ruby and Lacomme, ed., “Lettres de Louis de Périgord,” Carnet de la Sabretache no. 34 (1976): 107. 109. Coudreux, Lettres, 137. 110. F. Avril to his father, Boulogne, 10 fructidor, year 12, 35J 11, AD Finistère. 111. Jean Pierre Bial, Les carnets du Colonel Bial, 1789-1814. Souvenirs des guerres de la Révolution et de l’Empire rédigés à Leipzig au depôt des prisonniers, ed. Gabriel Soulié (Les Éditions de l’officine, 2003), 169. 112. P. Barbara to Monsieur Barbara, Vienna, 20 frimaire, year 14, M1 1832, AAT. 113. Bangofsky, Les étapes de Georges Bangofsky, 68. 114. Ibid., 80. 115. Lecoq, ed., “Lettres et souvenirs,” 776. 116. Coudreux, Lettres, 283. 117. Barrès, Memoirs, 199.

C ha p t e r 7 1. Pierre Debeauvais, “‘Un grognard malgré lui.’ Lettres de guerre de Nicolas Bognier,” in Soldats et armées en Savoie. Actes du XXVIIIe Congrès des Sociétés Savantes de Savoie, Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, 6 et 7 septembre 1980. Numéro spécial de l’Histoire en Savoie, 189-96. 2. Ibid., 193. 3. Ibid., 194. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., 193. 7. For French NCO ranks and their functions, see Elting, Swords around a Throne, 676; Pigeard, L’Armée Napoléonienne, 501-12. 8. Jean-August Oyon, “Campagnes et souvenirs militaires,” Carnet de la Sabretache 1 (1913): 101. 9. Jacques Chevillet, Ma vie militaire, 1800-1810, ed. Georges Chevillet (Hachette, 1906), xxii. 10. Jean-Marie Merme, “Des Pyramides à Moscou, souvenirs d’un soldat de Napoleon I.er,” Recueil des mémoires et documents de l’Academie de la Val d’Isere 14 (1978): 70, 72, 75-76. 11. Robinaux, Journal de route, 1, 6, 11. 12. Ibid., 163, 175, 118.

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13. General Savary to Napoleon, Ostende, 7 germinal, year 13, AFIV 1601, pl. 2, Archives nationales, Paris [hereafter AN]. 14. Jacques Staes, “Lettres des soldats béarnais de la Révolution et du Premier Empire,” Revue de Pau et du Béarn no. 9 (1981): 150-51. 15. Ibid., 152. 16. Ibid. 17. Montesquiou-Fezensac, Souvenirs militaires, 13. 18. Ibid., 35. 19. Ibid. 20. Lagrave, Joseph Vachin, 53. 21. Blaze, Military Life, 60. 22. André Debray, ed., “Léandre Pignot, souvenir d’un soldat de l’Empire,” Bulletin de la société Belge d’études napoléoniennes no. 63 (1968): 17. 23. Montesquiou-Fezensac, Souvenirs militaires, 94. 24. Philippe-Réné Girault, Les campagnes d’un musicien d’etat-major pendant la République et l’Empire, 1791-1810 (Société d’Editions Littéraires et Artistiques, 1901), 133. 25. Montesquiou-Fezensac, Souvenirs militaires, 94. 26. Thomas Cardoza, Intrepid Women: Cantinières and Vivandières of the French Army (Indiana University Press, 2010), 64. 27. Order of the day, IV Corps, Stettin, 14 January 1808, C2 380, AAT. 28. Order of the day, V Corps, Grande Armée, Efferding, 11 brumaire, year 14, C2 7, AAT. Marshal Soult issued similar orders. See Order of the day, IV Corps, Hadmersleben, 20 October 1806, C2 380, AAT. 29. The Grand Duke of Berg to the Emperor, Warsaw, 10 December 1806, C2 33, AAT. 30. See the dossier “Taisnieres anth” in 2R 1133, Archives départementales du Nord, Lille. 31. Debray, ed., “Léandre Pignot,” 21. 32. Edward J. Coss, All for the King’s Shilling: The British Soldier under Wellington, 18081814 (University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 22-24, 26. 33. H. D’Ideville, ed., Memoirs of Marshal Bugeaud from His Private Correspondence and Original Documents, 1784-184, ed. and trans. Charlotte M. Yonge, 2 vols. (Hurst and Blackett, 1884), 1: 71. I would like to thank Charles Esdaile, who brought this source to my attention by providing me with his unpublished book chapter, “Women in the Peninsular War.” 34. Brownmiller, Against Our Will, 31-113; Linda Grant de Pauw, Battle Cries and Lullabies: Women in War from Prehistory to the Present (University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 18-19, 165, 220-21, 259, 272-73; Vigarello, A History of Rape, 15; Lynn, Women, Armies, and Warfare, 228-29, 104, 115, 153-59. 35. Lynn, Women, Armies, and Warfare, 28-29, 40-44, 153-54, 220-21; Hopkin, Soldier and Peasant, 267-75. 36. Coss, All for the King’s Shilling, 20, 114-17. 37. Ibid., 26-27, 226-33. 38. George Bell, Rough Notes by an Old Soldier during Fifty Years of Service (Day and Son, 1867), 59-60; Alexander R. C. Dallas, Felix Alvarez; or, Manners in Spain, Containing Descriptive Accounts of Some of the Prominent Events of the Late Peninsular War; and Authentic Anecdotes Illustrative of the Spanish Character; Interspersed with Poetry, Original, and from the Spanish, 3 vols. (Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1818), 3: 294. I would also like 260

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to thank Charles Esdaile for bringing these sources to my attention through his chapter, “Women in the Peninsular War.” 39. Brownmiller, Against Our Will, 283-308, 391. 40. Louis Lefebvre, “Au service de Napoléon: un bastognard à Austerlitz, 2-12-1805,” L’Institut archéologique du Luxembourg. Bulletin trimestriel 34th year (1958): 7. 41. Debray, ed., “Léandre Pignot,” 18-19. 42. The Minister of War to the First Consul, Boulogne, 25 [vendémiaire, year 12], AFIV 1599, pl. 2 (I), AN. 43. General Marmont to His Majesty the Emperor, 9 brumaire, year 13, AFIV 1594, pl. 3, AN. 44. Marshal Mortier to the Prince of Neufchatel and Valangin, Dunenhof, 19 July 1806, C2 24, AAT. 45. Coudreux, Lettres, 62. 46. Secret police, report of 6 thermidor, year 12, AFIV 1601, pl. I (III), AN. 47. See for example, F. Avril to his father, Boulogne, 10 fructidor [year 12], 35J 11, Archives départementales du Finistère [hereafter AD Finistère]; The Grand Duke of Berg to the Emperor, Lubeck, 6 November 1806, C2 30, AAT; Jérôme Dumas, “Journal Historique de la Division de Grenadiers d’Oudinot,” ed. C. de Froment, Carnet de la Sabretache 9 (1910): 488; Jacques-Laurent-Louis-Augustin Vial, “Journal d’un mois de campagne à la Grande Armée (septembre-octobre 1805),” Carnet de la Sabretache 9 (1901): 455. 48. Barrès, Memoirs, 71. 49. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 9409, 11: 346. 50. M. Robert Balsan, ed., “Notes de Maurice de Tascher,” Carnet de la Sabretache 35, no. 356 (January–February 1932): 52. 51. Marshal Murat to the Emperor, Ried, 8 brumaire, year 14, C2 6, AAT. 52. Barrès, Memoirs, 75. 53. François Pils, Journal de marche du Grenadier Pils (1804-1814), ed. Raoul de Cisternes, 4th ed. (Paul Ollendorff, 1895), 21. 54. J.C., “Journal du voltigeur Asseré (Nivôse an XI [Décembre 1806]),” Carnet de la Sabretache 4 (1905): 723. 55. Monsieur Voidet to Monsieur Voidet, Anclam, 26 December 1806, Rp 1317, Archives départementales de l’Oise, Beauvais [hereafter AD Oise]. 56. Jean-Pierre Béquet to Monsieur Nicolas Béquet Cariez, Boulogne, 6 frimaire, year 13, Rp 1315, AD Oise. 57. Cherssant to his family, 1 April 1807, 49F 48, Archives départementales de la Savoie, Chambéry [hereafter AD Savoie]. 58. Monsieur Voidet to Monsieur Voidet, Anclam, 26 December 1806, Rp 1317, AD Oise. 59. Jean Barros, “Souvenir du premier empire: Gilles Buret (1787-1824), conscrit de 1806,” Revue du département de la Manche 30 (1988): 11. 60. Gorin to Monsieur Gorin, Heismille, 4 vendémiaire, year 14, Rp 1316, AD Oise. 61. Debray, ed., “Léandre Pignot,” 20-21. 62. Ibid., 36. 63. Ibid., 21. 64. Ibid. 65. Petiteau, Lendemains d’empire, 48.

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66. Earl J. Hess, The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat (University Press of Kansas, 1997), 133-36. 67. This point is also made in Forrest, Napoleon’s Men, 110-12. 68. Citizen Parfait Triquet to Madame the widow Triquet, the Camp of Wiméreux by Boulogne, 1 August 1804, Rp 1317, AD Oise. 69. Pierre Antoine Pelliçié to his father, Phalsbourg, 30 October 1805, L 1137, AD Savoie. 70. Lefebvre, “Au service de Napoléon,” 7. 71. The literature on the military functions of the primary group is extensive. See especially, Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, 130-48; Stephen D. Westbrook, “The Potential for Military Disintegration,” in Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Sage, 1980), 244-78; Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 30-35, 163-77; Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” in Motivating Soldiers: Morale or Mutiny, ed. Peter Karsten (Routledge, 1998), 266-302; Peter S. Kindsvatter, American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam (University Press of Kansas, 2003), 124-54; Coss, All for the King’s Shilling, 191-210. 72. See for example, Westbrook, “The Potential for Military Disintegration”; Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 163-82; McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, 77-116; Kindsvatter, American Soldiers, 124-54. 73. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 32. 74. Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (Oxford University Press, 1992). 75. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, 130-48; S. L. A. Marshall, Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (Peter Smith, 1978), 138-56; Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 163-82; Shils and Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht”; John Bourne, “The British Working Man in Arms,” in Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced, ed. Hugh Cecil and Peter H. Liddle (Leo Cooper, 1996), 33652; McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, 77-89; Kindsvatter, American Soldiers, 124-54; Watson, Enduring the Great War, 44-84. 76. Coss, All for the King’s Shilling. 77. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 164-65; Bardin, Manuel d’infanterie, 408, fn. 1. 78. “Instruction pour le campement de l’infanterie,” in Journal Militaire 28, no. 4 (frimaire, an 2): 135; “Instruction pour le campement des troupes à cheval,” in Journal Militaire 29, no. 1 (germinal, an 12): 6. 79. Montesquiou-Fezensac, Souvenirs militaires, 14-15. 80. “État des conscrits que chaque département doit fournir sur les classes de l’an 11 et de l’an 12, et désignation des corps sur lesquels ils doivent être dirigés,” in Journal militaire 28, no. 1 (vendémiaire, an 12): 30-40. 81. P. F. Dauchain to Monsieur Pierre François Dauchain, Camp of Ambleteuse, 8 thermidor, Rp 1315, AD Oise. 82. For the importance of local ties, see Forrest, Napoleon’s Men, 136-38; and Petiteau, “Pour une anthropologie historique,” paragraphs 15-17. 83. Bardin, Manuel d’infanterie, 332. 84. Alombert and Colin, La campagne de 1805, I, part 2: 145-47. 85. Scott Bowden, Napoleon and Austerlitz: An Unprecedentedly Detailed Combat Study of Napoleon’s Epic Ulm-Austerlitz Campaigns of 1805 (Emperor’s Press, 1997), 77. Bowden also stresses the importance of the Grande Armée’s primary groups and officers. 262

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86. For the persistence of the Revolutionary ideal of fraternity in the armies of Napoleon, see Martin, Napoleonic Friendship, 40-100. 87. Alombert and Colin, La campagne de 1805, I, part 2: 172. 88. The Minister of War to the First Consul, Dunkirk, 26 vendémiaire, year 12, AFIV 1599, pl. 2(I), AN. 89. Robert Sterling Rush, Hell in Hürtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment (University Press of Kansas, 2001). 90. Desbrière, 1793-1805, 3: 509-70; 4: 13-44, 91-146, 395-428. 91. Vigo-Roussillon, Journal de campagne, 136. 92. Westbrook, “The Potential for Military Disintegration”; Kindsvatter, American soldiers, 149-50. 93. Watson, Enduring the Great War, 184-235. For other studies on the role of officers in military motivation, see ibid., 108-39; Gary Sheffield, “Officer-Man Relations, Discipline and Morale in the British Army of the Great War,” in Facing Armageddon, ed. Cecil and Liddle, 413-24; Gary Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale, and Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War (Macmillan/St. Martin’s, 2000); Rush, Hell in Hürtgen Forest, 309-36; Kindsvatter, American Soldiers, 229-45. 94. Order of the Day, Camp of St. Omer, 3 vendémiaire, year 13, B14 4, AAT. 95. Letter from the Minister of War to the Colonel of the 72nd Regiment of infantry, Boulogne, 7 thermidor, year 12, C1 15, AAT. 96. Order of the Day, Grande Armée, Schonbrunn, 2 nivôse, year 14, C17 235, AAT. 97. F. Avril to his father, Shoenau, 30 May [1806], 35J 11, AD Finistère. 98. F. Avril to his father, National Flotilla, 18 ventôse, [year 12], 35J 11, AD Finistère. 99. F. Avril to his father, Liebstadt, 17 March 1807, 35J 11, AD Finistère. 100. F. Avril to his father, Augerunende, 8 February 1808, 35J 11, AD Finistère. 101. Montesquiou-Fezensac, Souvenirs militaires, 121. 102. Victor Amédé Clapier to Citizen Jean Clapier, Sedan, 24 ventôse, year 13, L1137, AD Savoie. 103. de Lauthonnye, “Ma vie militaire,” 348. 104. Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters; Woloch, The New Regime, 404-18. 105. Report, Chief Inspector of Reviews Fririon to the Minister of War, Boulogne, 15 nivôse, year 13, C1 25, AAT. Year 12 began on September 1, 1803, and ended on September 22, 1804. 106. This title can be translated as “Order Concerning the Depots of Conscripts Declared Refractors, the Composition and Jurisdiction of Special Councils of War, the Procedure Before these Councils and the Punishments Against Desertion.” “Arrêté concernant les dépôts de conscrits déclarés réfractaires, la composition et la compétence des conseils de guerre spéciaux, la procédure devant ces conseils et les peines contre la désertion” in Journal militaire 28, no. 2 (vendémiaire, an 12): 44-59. 107. F. Avril to his father, National Flotilla, 11 ventôse [year 12], 35J 11, AD Finistère. 108. Supplement to the order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 23 brumaire, year 12, B14 4, AAT; General report of the situation of the 2nd Division of the 4th Corps of the Grande Armée at the time of 20 July 1806, 20 July 1806, C2 24, AAT. 109. Report for the first fifteen days of thermidor, Camp of St. Omer, 4th Division, Wimille, 16 thermidor, year 12, C1 16, AAT. 110. Order of the day, 64th Regiment, 27 floréal, year 13, C2 412, AAT.

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111. See the orders of the day of the Camp of St. Omer between 3 fructidor, year 12, and 29 fructidor, year 12, in carton B14 4, AAT. 112. For desertion in orders of the day, see the documents contained in carton B14 4, C17 235, C2 380, AAT. 113. Order of the day, Camp of Bruges, 15 thermidor, year 12, C1 16, AAT. 114. Order of the day, Camp of St. Omer, 9 Pluviôse, year 12, B14 4, AAT. 115. Report, 12 thermidor, year 13, C2 384, AAT. See also Order of the day, Camp of Bruges, 14 thermidor, year 13, C1 34, AAT. 116. Staes, “Lettres de soldats béarnais de la Révolution et du Premier Empire,” Revue de Pau et du Bearn no. 19 (1992): 156-60. 117. Ibid., 159.

C onc lu sion 1. Westbrook, “The Potential for Military Disintegration,” 247-51. 2. Ibid., 248. 3. Napoleon Bonaparte, Proclamations, ordres du jour, et bulletins de la Grande Armée, ed. Jean Tulard (Union générale d’éditions, 1964), 174. 4. Michael J. Hughes, “Making Frenchmen into Warriors: Martial Masculinity in Napoleonic France,” in French Masculinities: History, Culture, and Politics, ed. Christopher E. Forth and Bertrand Taithe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 5. Puymège, Chauvin, Le Soldat-Laboureur; Puymège, “The Good Soldier Chauvin.” 6. Hopkin, Soldier and Peasant, 285-322. 7. Dwyer, “Public Remembering, Private Reminiscing,” 235. 8. For the experiences of Napoleonic veterans and their role in post-Imperial France, see J. Lucas-Dubreton, Le Culte de Napoléon, 1815-1848 (Éditions Albin Michel, 1960), 80-90; Woloch, The French Veteran; Petiteau, Lendemains d’Empire, 75-266; Petiteau, “Survivors of War,” 52-53; Hazareesingh, The Saint-Napoleon, 78-104; Hazareesingh, The Legend of Napoleon, 234-60; 64-86; Dwyer, “Public Remembering.” 9. Dwyer, “Public Remembering,” 236-37; Petiteau, Lendemains d’Empire, 128-31; Hazareesingh, The Legend of Napoleon, 237-42. 10. Petiteau, Lendemains d’Empire, 267-98; Forrest, The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars, 64-86; Dwyer, “Public Remembering.” 11. Hazareesingh, The Legend of Napoleon, 72-150, 234-42. 12. Ibid., 234-59; Hazareesingh, The Saint-Napoleon, 78-104; Petiteau, Lendemains d’Empire, 308-15, 355-56; Petiteau, “Survivors of War,” 54-55. 13. Petiteau, “Survivors of War,” 44-48, 54-55; Petiteau, Lendemains d’Empire; Hazareesingh, The Legend of Napoleon, 234-259.

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Index

Absolutist political culture. See Monarchy, French Actions d’éclat, 70-71, 76, 78 Alexander I, Tsar of Russia, 23-24, 154-55, 158 Armies of the French Revolution, 20; military culture of, 26-27, 33, 42, 46-47, 59-60, 78, 80-83, 105, 131-34; sex and, 109-10, 131-33 Arms of Honor, 60, 61, 112 Army of Hanover, 10, 18, 22, 42 Army of honor thesis, 2-7, 52, 65, 224-25, 229n5 Army of the Coasts of the Ocean: creation of, 19; importance, 10; operations, 20; role in the creation of Napoleonic military culture, 21, 51-52 Arrêté concernant les depots de conscrits declares réfractaires, 217-18 Auerstädt, battle of, 23, 208, 212 Augereau, Pierre François Charles, 22, 45 Austerlitz, battle of, 17, 23, 30, 31, 76, 84, 85, 100, 104, 127, 150, 156, 174, 177, 178, 189, 200, 201, 208, 212-13, 224 Austria. See Habsburg Empire Auzouy, Captain, 86-89 Avril, Felix, 31, 174, 175, 176, 177, 181, 182, 187, 189, 215, 217 Bangofsky, Georges, 88, 183, 190 Barbara, Lieutenant (later Captain), 79, 174, 178, 182, 188, 189 Barrès, Jean-Baptiste, 32, 34, 97, 156, 172, 177, 187, 190, 202, 203 Bayard, Chevalier, 51, 53, 149, 180 Bernadotte, Jean-Baptiste Jules, 10, 18

Bertaud, Jean-Paul, 5-7, 240n61 Berthier, Louis-Alexandre, 28, 39, 41, 103, 170, 183, 201, 214 Biens nationaux, 61-62, 66, 152 Blaze, Jean Joseph Louis Elzéar, 71, 173, 175, 182, 183, 185, 197 Bognier, Nicolas, 192, 216 Boutroue, Jules-Alexandre-Léger, 177, 181, 184 Brownmiller, Susan, 130, 200 Bulletin de la Grande Armée, 241n96; attacks against politically active women, 153-55; Napoleon’s Romantic hero image in, 158; reputation for dishonesty, 177; soldier-martyrs in, 85-89, 106; source of glory, 71; use and characteristics, 30-32; vision of the French nation in, 100, 103-4. See also Written and print media Camp of Boulogne, 19, 148, 202, 207. See also Camp of St. Omer Camp of Brest, 19, 44-45, 85 Camp of Bruges, 19, 45-46, 47, 48, 67-68, 159, 218, 219 Camp of Montreuil, 19, 101, 159, 178, 196 Camp of St. Omer, 19, 22, 48, 87, 144, 147, 201, 214, 218 Camp of Utrecht, 19, 20, 39, 46-48, 70, 116, 151, 201 Carrion-Nizas, Henri de, 66, 110 Caveau moderne, 34, 94, 108, 127 Ceremonies. See Symbolic practices Charlemagne, 138, 148, 149, 159 Chartier, Roger, 12 Chauvin, Nicolas, 164, 192, 223, 226

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Coercion, as a source of motivation, 12-14, 216-19, 223 Coignet, Jean-Roch, 172, 183 Common soldiers, 13-14; coercion and, 14, 193, 216-19, 224; desire for glory, 193, 194-95, 223; esprit de corps, 211; interest in women, 14, 193, 196-200, 223; martial masculinity and, 199-200; misery of, 205-7; national identity of, 227-28; observations of, 167, 170, 201-2; officers’ leadership and, 14, 193, 213-16, 224, 263n93; patriotism of, 194-95; primary groups and, 14, 193, 209-13, 223-24; rape and, 197-200, 223; religion and, 14, 193, 207-8, 223; resignation toward military service, 192-93, 206-7, 223; role of veterans among, 193, 211-13, 224; in the Royal army, 57-58, 83; views of Napoleon, 14, 193, 194-95, 200-205, 223; with attributes of the grognard, 193-99, 213, 223; writings, 165-71, 193, 205, 225-26. See also Napoleon Bonaparte; NCOs; Officers Compliance, in systems of military motivation, 221-23 Corbineau, Constant, 176-78 Coudreux, Alexandre, 175, 180, 184, 189, 190, 201 Davout, Louis Nicholas, 23, 67-68, 150, 195, 208, 219 Desertion, 13, 14, 121, 193, 195, 216-17, 219, 223 Directory, 20, 37, 60, 83, 85, 143 Discipline, in Royal military culture, 57-58 Eagles, 46, 74-75, 145, 147, 149, 160 École special militaire, 40, 175, 214 Empire, creation of, 19; territories of, 104-5 Encyclopédie, 56-57, 72 England. See Great Britain Englund, Steven, 98, 254n81 Enlightenment, the, 55, 82-83, 111, 140-41 Enlisted men. See Common soldiers Esprit de corps, 12, 52; Napoleonic military culture and, 74-77, 222; Revolutionary military culture and, 59-60; in Royal 280

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military culture, 57-58. See also Common soldiers; Officers Experience, theoretical concept of, 168-69 Eylau, battle of, 23, 43, 86, 89, 174, 195, 212, 224 Festivals, 25, 34, 144, 148; Festival of Napoleon, 43, 51-52, 136; Festival of Napoleon’s coronation and Austerlitz, 43, 150; Fête of July 14, 42, 145, 148; Fête of 1 vendémiaire, 42, 44, 145, 148; Napoleonic military culture and, 42-45, 51-52, 148, 150; Revolutionary military culture and, 42; Triumphs of 1807 and 1808, 43, 79-80, 90-98, 102, 108-9, 117, 119. See also Nation, French; Patriotism Forrest, Alan, 4-5, 262nn67, 82 Fouché, Joseph, 26, 202 Fourth Coalition, 23, 84; war of, 23-24, 29, 88, 103-4, 173, 186, 208 Frederick the Great, 57, 141, 155, 218 Frederick William III, King of Prussia, 23-24, 153-54 Friedland, battle of, 24, 189, 208, 213, 224 Gender, 8, 135; Revolutionary and Napoleonic historiography and, 8-9 George III, King of Great Britain, 141, 151, 160 Glory: attribute of martial masculinity, 115-16, 118-19, 121, 135; civic-minded concept of, 57, 68, 72-73; defined, 56-57; in the Royal army, 56-57; source of combat motivation, 78-79; source of warrior honor in Napoleonic military culture, 69-74, 76. See also Common soldiers; Honor; Officers; Martial masculinity, Napoleonic Grande Armée: campaigns, 22-24; creation, 21; dissolution of, 24-25; importance of, 10; organization, 22; size, 22 Great Britain, 18, 21, 23, 82, 103, 104, 141, 153, 159, 160, 188; army of, 199, 209-10; as “Other,” 99-102, 245n68; planned invasion of, 17, 18, 21, 178

“Great Nation,” concept of, 6-7, 98-99, 1023, 106, 133 Grognard: definition and characteristics of, 5, 163-64, 190-91. See also Common soldiers; Officers Guindey, Jean-Baptiste, 71, 174, 176 Habsburg Empire, 10, 21, 22, 23, 30, 81, 104, 141, 179, 186, 188; army of, 17, 21, 22, 23, 204 Hagemann, Karen, 9, 100 Haslach, battle of, 22, 208 Homosocial enactment, 113 Honor, 2-3, 12, 52; attribute of martial masculinity, 115-16, 135; French national honor, 52, 102-7, 150, 153, 228; French nobility and, 3, 53-57; Napoleonic historiography and, 2-7; Napoleonic military culture and, 12, 49, 51-52, 60-78, 137, 221-22, 240n61; patriotic honor, 7, 52, 56, 65-69, 76, 172, 222; Revolutionary military culture and, 59-60, 76; in the Royal army, 52-58, 80; warrior honor, 52-53, 59, 69-74, 172, 176, 222. See also Esprit de corps; Glory; Martial masculinity, Napoleonic; Napoleon; Nation, French; Nobility; Officers Imperial Guard, 32, 38, 41, 71, 79-80, 92, 95, 96, 97, 114, 115, 119, 150, 163, 172, 177, 194, 203 Imperial nobility, 41 Imperial virtue, 12, 14, 80, 102-7, 116, 133-35, 188-91, 222, 225; definition, 106 Jena, battle of, 1, 23, 76, 115, 150, 182, 188-89 Jena-Auerstädt, campaign and battle of, 23, 40, 43, 154, 208, 224 Journal de l’Empire, 32, 72, 148 Journal militaire, 33 Junot, Jean Andoche, 62-63, 77, 112 Lannes, Jean, 71, 76, 170, 197 La Tour d’Auvergne, Théophile-Malo Corret de, 48-49, 86-89

Le chansonnier de la Grande Armée, 36-37, 225, 234n55 Legion of Honor, 7, 39, 41-42, 44, 45, 46, 51-52, 61-69, 110, 112, 115-16, 125, 148, 149, 157, 164, 172, 173, 174, 225; creation, 61-62; distribution, 62-65; organization, 61-62; reward for bravery, 63-64; reward for devotion to Napoleon’s dynasty, 68-69, 225; reward for merit, 64; source of patriotic honor, 65-69, 73, 76-77, 240n61; source of glory, 70, 72. See also Honor; Napoleon Bonaparte; Officers Les devoirs d’un guerrier, 69, 72 Lynn, John A., 2-4, 130, 229n5 Libertine lifestyle, 14, 109, 130-31, 133, 135, 193, 196, 223 Louis XIV, 3, 53, 55, 61, 138-42, 149, 151, 157 Louis XVI, 81, 142, 143, 149, 252n20 Louise, Queen of Prussia, 23, 153-55 Mailhet-Vachères, Théodore de, 172, 174, 175, 178, 184 Marmont, Auguste Frederic Louis Viesse de, 20, 39, 46-48, 66-67, 70, 71, 116, 151 Marmontel, Jean-François, 57, 72, 201 Martial masculinity, Napoleonic, 2, 12-14, 110-30, 132-35, 221-22, 225; attributes of, 113-18, 123-28, 132-35, 222; encouragement of sexual violence, 127-29, 133-35, 199-200; female imagery and, 118-22, 123-30; role in military motivation, 113, 134-35, 221-22; sex and, 108, 109, 123-30, 132-35; war as a rite of passage in, 112, 122. See also Common soldiers; Glory; Honor; Officers; Patriotism; Rape; Women Masculinity: the French Revolution and, 111; historical study of, 8-9, 109; military masculinities, 109; war and, 8-9. See also Gender; Martial masculinity, Napoleonic; Nobility McPherson, James M., 165 Militarization, of Napoleonic France, 11013, 225 Military culture, 10; appropriation of, 12, 164-65, 168-71; defined, 11-12, 231n26

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Monarchy, French, 3, 53-56, 77, 80, 137-42, 147, 148, 151-52; Absolutist political culture and, 137-42; desacralization, 142-43, 252n20 Moniteur universel, 31-32, 34, 37, 72, 97, 114, 147 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de, 3, 54, 82-83, 150 Montesquiou-Fezensac, Raymond Aymery Philippe Joseph de, 36, 179, 196, 197, 210, 215 Monuments, 41, 45-47, 70, 83, 90, 97, 136, 151, 159, 161; Temple to the Grande Armée, 41, 150 Moreau, Jean Victor, 10, 21, 42, 45, 65, 144 Mortier, Adolphe Edouard Casimir, Joseph, 18 Motivation, 2, 8; combat motivation, 10, 52, 77-78; initial motivation, 10, 175; sustaining motivation, 10-11, 49, 52, 77, 175, 205 Murat, Joachim, 71, 118, 178, 203 Myth of the Glorious Death, 85-89 Myth of the Patriotic Death, 83-86, 88-89, 188 Napoleon Bonaparte: Absolutist ruler image, 13, 146-50, 158, 160-61, 184-85, 222; army’s devotion to, 12, 184-88, 200-205, 223; creation of the Empire, 19; cult of, 14, 136-37, 143-61, 201, 205, 222, 223, 250n2; cultivation of esprit de corps, 75-76; efforts to militarize the French population, 110-13; hypermasculine ruler image, 135, 154-55, 160-61, 222; ideas about French honor, 60-61; ideas about French masculinity, 110; ideas about the nation, 98; ideas about promotion, 40-41; ideas about rewards, 39-40; ideas about women, 120; and the Legion of Honor, 51-52, 61-66, 68-69; manipulation of his public image, 25, 136-37, 143-46; myth of the savior, 144; obsession with glory, 70; novelistic sensibility of, 158, 185; patriotic monarch image, 13, 146, 150-58, 160-61, 184, 186-88, 222, 253n54; plans for the Triumphs of 1807 282

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and 1808, 79, 90-92, 94-95; propaganda techniques, 26, 27, 34-36, 38, 83-84, 13637; relations with soldiers, 21, 25, 27, 136, 143-44, 156-58, 163, 214; and reports on the army’s morale, 170; reviews of, 40, 46-48, 63; Revolutionary hero image, 143-45; Romantic hero image, 13, 74, 146, 157-61, 185-86, 222, 254n81; sacrality and, 14, 137, 146, 161, 183-84, 204-5, 222, 223, 255n9; search for legitimacy, 137, 145-46, 155, 160-61; use of glory in the army, 70, 94-95; use of honor, 51-52, 60-61; use of rewards, 38-41, 60, 61-66, 86-87, 150, 157, 175, 183. See also Common soldiers; Empire; Honor; Glory; Festivals; Legion of Honor; NCOs; Officers Nation, French: concept of during the French Revolution, 81-83, 98-99, 102, 133-34; concept of in Napoleonic military culture, 80, 98-107, 109, 133-35, 150, 153, 222, 228; displayed to the French army, 96-98; and the French Empire, 104-5 Nation-in-arms, legend of, 99, 102 NCOs, 14; effects of Napoleonic military culture on, 193-219; ranks, 194. See also Common soldiers Ney, Michel, 29, 71, 101 Nobility, 3, 53-57, 77; masculinity of, 9, 53, 56, 111, 131. See also Honor Oaths, 46, 145, 149 Officers, 13; desire for glory, 13, 164, 177-78, 191, 223; desire for the Legion of Honor, 176; desire for promotion, 173-76, 180, 191; desire for rewards, 173-77, 191, 223; esprit de corps, 178, 191; as grognards, 13, 163-64, 172-91, 192, 223; honor of, 13, 164, 172-78, 182-83, 191, 223; and Imperial virtue, 188-91, 223; martial masculinity and, 178-83, 191, 223; national identity of, 228; patriotism of, 13, 164, 188-91, 223; ranks, 171; in the Royal army, 52-57, 131; views of Napoleon, 164, 183-88, 191, 223; views of the Bulletin de la Grande Armée, 176-77; and women, 164, 182,

191; writings, 165-70, 192, 225-26. See also Common soldiers Order of Saint Louis, 3, 39, 54, 59 Orders of the day: role in coercion, 218; source of glory, 71-72; use and characteristics, 26, 27-29 Paternalism, in Royal military culture, 57-58 Patrie, concept of, 56, 59, 81-83, 99, 102-7, 133-34 Patriotic kingship, 141 “Patriot writers,” 55-56, 238n11 Patriotism, 12, 13, 14, 48, 52, 56, 59-60, 65-69, 79-107, 133-35, 141, 188, 22122; attribute of martial masculinity, 115-16, 118-19, 121, 135; defined, 81. See also Armies of the French Revolution; Honor; Imperial virtue; Nation, French; Officers; Revolutionary virtue Paule, Frédéric Charles Louis François de, 169, 216 Peninsular War, 1, 24, 92, 198-99, 209, 224 Pensions, 39-40, 156, 222 Périgord, Louis de, 172, 179, 182, 183, 186, 189 Petiteau, Natalie, 5-6, 255n92, 262n82 Petitions, 45 Pignot, Léandre, 197, 198, 200, 205, 206-7 Préval, Claude-Antoine, 64, 173 Primary group, concept of, 209, 213 Print propaganda. See Written and print media Proclamations: of French military leaders, 29; the French nation in, 103-6; Napoleon’s Romantic hero image in, 158-59; Napoleon’s use of, 17, 27, 29-30; use and characteristics, 29-30 Promotions, 39-41, 70-72, 222. See also Napoleon Bonaparte; Officers Prussia, 10, 23, 79, 84, 92, 100-101, 103, 116, 136, 141, 150, 153-55, 176, 186, 213; army of, 23, 153, 159, 195, 208 Rank and file. See Common soldiers Rape, 127-30, 182-83, 197-200

Religion. See Common soldiers Republican mother. See Women Revolutionary virtue, 2-3, 12, 14, 59, 80-83, 105-7, 121, 133 Rewards, 25; Revolutionary military culture and, 59-60; Royal military culture and, 3, 54; use in Napoleonic military culture, 38-42, 222-23. See also Army of honor thesis; Honor; Legion of Honor; Napoleon Bonaparte; Women Robespierre, Maximilien, 3, 59, 82-83 Robinaux, Pierre, 172, 195 Roederer, Pierre Louis, 66-68 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 82, 157, 159 Royal army, 1, 54-55, 77; military culture of, 39, 52-58, 90, 129-30 Russia, 10, 21, 22, 23, 24, 79, 81, 103, 116, 156, 159, 163, 186; army of, 21, 22, 23, 24, 115, 195, 204; as “Other,” 100-101 Saalfeld, battle of, 23, 174, 179 Sacrality, 139-40, 143, 161, 251n12 Self, Romantic concept of, 73-74, 180 Sex. See Armies of the French Revolution; Common soldiers; Martial masculinity, Napoleonic; Officers; Rape; Royal army; Women Smith, Jay, 169 Soldat-laboureur, 112, 226 Soldier-martyrs, 83-89 Songs, 25; Revolutionary military culture and, 33; Royal military culture and, 33, 131; sexual imagery in, 123-29, 132-34; use in Napoleonic military culture, 33-38 Soult, Nicolas Jean de Dieu, 30, 43, 48, 71-72, 87-88, 136, 144, 186-87, 218 Symbolic practices, used in Napoleon’s armies, 45-49 Tascher, Charles-Maurice de, 173, 179, 181, 184, 188, 203 Te Deums, 44, 138, 148 Terror, the, 3, 82 Theater, 25, 34, 38 Théâtre du vaudeville, 34, 38

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Third Coalition, 21; war of, 10, 17, 22-23, 29, 73, 79, 103, 186, 208, 213 Tilsit, Peace of, 10, 24, 39, 43, 79, 90, 91, 92, 104, 134, 136, 158, 186, 219 Triumphs of 1807 and 1808. See Festivals Ulm: capture of, 1, 72, 76, 116, 117, 150, 157, 177, 189, 202, 208; campaign, 127, 176, 198 Veterans, 5-6, 15, 39-40, 41, 58, 164, 211-13, 224, 226-28; national identity of, 227-28 Voltaire, 56-57 Women: attitudes about during the French Revolution, 120, 154-55; in early modern armies, 130-31; foreign, 125-30, 133-35, 222; French, 124-25, 129; images of in Napoleonic military culture, 12-14, 11822, 122-30, 133-35, 153-55, 160-61; military activities during the French Revolution,

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120, 230n21; in Napoleonic armies, 197, 199; as part of libertine lifestyle, 109, 130-31; Republican mother, 118-22; role of female imagery in Imperial virtue, 133-35, 222; as sexual rewards, 12-14, 110, 122-30 133-35, 222-23; used to portray Napoleon as a hypermasculine ruler, 153-55, 160-61. See also Common soldiers; Imperial virtue; Libertine lifestyle; Napoleon Bonaparte; Nation, French; Officers; Rape; Songs Written and print media, 25, 26; Napoleonic military culture and, 26-33; Revolutionary military culture and, 26-27. See also Bulletin de la Grande Armée; Journal de l’Empire; Journal militaire; Moniteur universel; Orders of the Day; Proclamations Zickel, François-Joseph, 1-2, 178, 188, 189

About the Author

M i c ha e l J . Hu g h e s is an associate professor at Iona College in New Rochelle, New York.

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