The European Union’s New Foreign Policy [1st ed.] 9783030483166, 9783030483173

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THE EUROPEAN UNION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The European Union’s New Foreign Policy Edited by Martin Westlake

The European Union in International Affairs

Series Editors Sebastian Oberthür Vrije Universiteit Brussel Brussels, Belgium Knud Erik Jørgensen Aarhus University Aarhus, Denmark Philomena B. Murray University of Melbourne Parkville, Australia Sandra Lavenex University of Geneva Geneva, Switzerland

This Book Series aims to be a central resource for the growing community of scholars and policy-makers who engage with the evolving interface between the EU and international affairs. It provides in-depth, cutting edge and original contributions of world-class research on the EU in international affairs by highlighting new developments, insights, challenges and opportunities. It encompasses analyses of the EU’s international role, as mediated by its own Member States, in international institutions and in its strategic bilateral and regional partnerships. Books in the Series examine evolving EU internal policies that have external implications and the ways in which these are both driven by, and feed back into, international developments. Grounded in Political Science, International Relations, International Political Economy, Law, Sociology and History, the Series reflects a commitment to interdisciplinary scholarship. We welcome book proposals relating to the changing role of the EU in international affairs across policies and the Union’s relations with different parts of the world, as well as relations with states and multilateral institutions. We are interested in research on values and norms, interests and global governance and welcome both theory-informed studies and studies comparing the EU with other major global actors. To submit a proposal, please contact Commissioning Editor Ambra Finotello [email protected].

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14438

Martin Westlake Editor

The European Union’s New Foreign Policy Foreword by Federica Mogherini

Editor Martin Westlake London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) European Institute London, UK College of Europe Bruges, Belgium

ISSN 2662-5911 ISSN 2662-592X (electronic) The European Union in International Affairs ISBN 978-3-030-48316-6 ISBN 978-3-030-48317-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Image Source/Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword: Standing Together, Standing Tall

Ten years ago, the very existence of a European foreign and security policy was an open question. Today I often wonder what would happen to the world and to Europe if the European Union’s external action disappeared all of a sudden. What if we had not contributed to achieving the nuclear deal with Iran and seeking to preserve it after the United States’ withdrawal? What if we had not rescued those UN Agencies that faced a budgetary crisis? What if Ukraine could not count on the largest support package it has received in the past five years—the largest ever put together by the EU for any country? The question today is no longer whether the European Union has a foreign and security policy. In these five years, the European Union has become a global point of reference for all those working towards a more cooperative system for global governance. The question today is how we can best use the instruments that we have put in place to render our foreign policy ever more effective. We live in an age of great-power competition, and at the same time, the centres of powers have multiplied compared to just a few decades ago. In a world of continent-sized powers and multinational companies such as Google or Facebook, with billions of users, the European Union is the best way for Europeans to “take back control” and regain sovereignty. This was one of the central ideas of the 2016 Global Strategy: none of our countries has the strength or the resources to address the challenges of our time alone, but together we are a global power. This is also the foundation

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of the “new European Union foreign policy” that Martin Westlake and his contributors describe in this book. In this foreword I would like to focus on three essential features of such a new foreign policy. First, since I presented the Global Strategy we have built the foundations of a European Union of Security and Defence. When we started talking about setting up the Permanent Structured Cooperation on defence (PESCO), many were sceptical. Yet, even with all the scepticism and resistance, we did it. And we went even further, with the first-ever unified command centre for EU military missions, with the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the Coordinated Annual Review of national defence budgets (CARD). These are not just names or acronyms. These are real and positive changes for our common security. We are helping Member States to make their defence spending more efficient, to train and equip their militaries together, and to develop all the military capabilities that we need for security in the twenty-first century—from the skies to the seas, to cyberspace. At the same time, we have deepened our cooperation with NATO and with other partners like never before. In the coming years, the full potential of these new initiatives will have to be exploited, and more work will be necessary to consolidate Europe’s strategic autonomy. But after seventy years of failures, we have shown that progress on European defence is possible and is only a matter of political will. The second feature I would like to stress is the defence of multilateralism. The European Union is, by definition, a cooperative power and multilateralism has always been in the EU’s DNA. Yet in recent years, as multilateralism and the UN system have come under increasing pressure, we have invested in multilateralism like never before. We have worked to achieve and preserve historic multilateral deals—not only the nuclear deal with Iran, but also the Paris agreement against climate change and the Sustainable Development Goals. We have stepped up our financial support to the United Nations, and saved the UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) from its funding crisis. We supported the UN Secretary General’s reform agenda. Most importantly, we have always tried to create the space for multilateral dialogue, even when dialogue and cooperation seemed impossible. In a moment when military confrontation in Venezuela seemed almost inevitable, we created the International Contact Group to stop the escalation and move towards a more positive dynamic—one that could lead towards a peaceful and democratic solution

FOREWORD: STANDING TOGETHER, STANDING TALL

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to the crisis. We have set up an unprecedented trilateral cooperation with the UN and the African Union, evacuating fifty thousand people from detention centres in Libya. We have always worked to bring together all regional powers to discuss peace, from Afghanistan to Syria. We have not just defended multilateralism but we have also renewed it, with innovative solutions. Thirdly, thanks to the Global Strategy we have improved substantially the way we work together, as a Union. The most obvious example is our external action on migration. When I arrived in Brussels, I was shocked that migration did not even feature on the agenda of EU Foreign Ministers. It was considered an issue for Interior Ministers only—as if migration could be dealt with as a mere border issue. In these years we have not just built the first-ever EU external policy on migration: we have tried to mobilise all our tools to make such policy as effective as possible. First of all, we have intervened directly to save lives at sea and in the desert. But we have also created smarter financial instruments, such as the Trust Funds, to better coordinate and to speed up our action. We have set up the largest ever investment plan for Africa. We have invested in our partners’ capacity to take care of their own security, for instance in a crucial area such as the Sahel. Only by mobilising all our instruments can we better govern an historic phenomenon like this. More generally, we have worked to enhance the coherence of our action through more coordinated work within the European Commission, thanks in particular to the Commissioners’ Group on External Action which I have convened regularly every month over the past five years. And the EU’s Member States— to give another example—have coordinated their positions as never before in the UN Security Council, something that seemed impossible until very recently. Today’s challenges are way too big for any European nation state. From global trade disputes to artificial intelligence, decisions are shaped by those who can mobilise a critical mass at the global level. A European foreign policy is our only way to advance our values and interests. If we want to prevent chaos from spreading, if we want a peaceful resolution of conflicts and a more equal global economy, we need to engage together in world affairs. We cannot expect someone else to do the job. We have to take direct responsibility. This is the foundation of the new European foreign policy: Europe has the potential to be a global power, and has the responsibility to be a

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global force for good. Fulfilling such potential and responsibility is only up to us. Bruges, Belgium

Federica Mogherini High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, 2014–2019

Federica Mogherini is Rector of the College of Europe and Co-Chair of the United Nations High Panel on Internal Displacement. She was the European Union’s High Representative on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and VicePresident of the European Commission, 2014–2019. She was previously Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. She was a Member of the Italian Parliament, 2008–2014, Head of the Italian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2013–2014, and Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2008–2013. She has been a Fellow of the German Marshall Fund for the United States since 2007 and of the Italian Institute for Foreign Affairs (IAI). An Italian national, Federica Mogherini has a Master’s Degree in Political Science from the University of Rome (La Sapienza), Italy, and an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland.

Acknowledgments

In the first place, I would like to thank my erstwhile colleagues at the LSE’s International Relations Department and particularly the members of the Dinam Fellowship selection committee for having given me the opportunity to participate for a year in the Department’s activities and to set up and host the Dinam Seminar Series; Professor Christopher Coker, Professor Toby Dodge and Dr. Jennifer Jackson-Preece. I would like to thank Mandy Cormack, granddaughter of David Davies, for her benign support and friendship. I would like to thank the (then) Head of the Department, Professor Peter Trubowitz, for always making me feel welcome at Department meetings, and my Dinam Fellowship mentor, Professor Chris Alden, who was always accessible and warmly supportive throughout my fellowship. And I would like to thank all of my colleagues who helped by co-chairing during the seminar series; Professor Karen Smith, Associate Professor Spyros Economides, Professor Chis Alden, Associate Professor Katerina Dalacoura, Fellow Dr. AlexandraMaria Bocse, Associate Professor Federica Bicchi, and Associate Professor Stephen Woolcock—two of whom, Alexandra-Maria Bocse and Karen Smith, went on to contribute chapters to this study. I would also like to thank the Head of the European Institute, Professor Simon Glendinning, for so kindly agreeing to co-sponsor and co-host the Dinam seminar series. At a practical level, I would have been lost without the support of Romy Mokogwu, Zoë Adams and Alison Carter in the International Relations Department and Adam Judge and Mathilde Bonvin in the European

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Institute. I would like to thank all of the contributors to the book for their patience, understanding and, above all, the quality and authority of their contributions. I would in particular like to single out Christian Leffler for special thanks. Christian is an LSE alumnus (indeed, we discovered that as a student he had occupied the same tiny office in Lincoln Chambers that I would much later occupy as Dinam Fellow) and was a fellow participant in the 1993 Salzburg Seminar on European Integration after the Cold War. Our paths have since occasionally crossed as we pursued our European careers. At a very early stage in the development of my ‘new foreign policy’ concept Christian gave up a considerable amount of his time on a very busy day to help me flesh out the theme and to suggest possible topics and speakers. Without that support and advice, the project would surely not have been so successful. I would like to thank my commissioning editor at Palgrave Macmillan, Ambra Finotello, for her patience and support. Last, and by no means least, I would like to thank my wife, Godelieve, for her supportive understanding as the manuscript was prepared and finalised. Brussels March 2020

Martin Westlake

Contents

1

Introduction: The European Union’s New Foreign Policy Martin Westlake

1

Part I Over-Arching Issues 2

Championing Multilateralism Christian Leffler

23

3

The Positive Narrative on Human Rights Stavros Lambrinidis

33

4

Values and Interests in Post-Lisbon European Union Foreign Policy Patrick Costello

45

5

Working Together for a Safer World Pedro A. Serrano de Haro

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6

Trade in Turbulent Times Maria Åsenius

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CONTENTS

7

The Growing Role of the European Parliament as an EU Foreign Policy Actor Myriam Goinard

107

A Cultural Superpower? The European Union’s Venture in Cultural Diplomacy Gijs de Vries

125

8

9

Creating and Managing a New Diplomatic Service Gianmarco Di Vita

139

Part II Some New Geo-Political Challenges 10

Looking After the Neighbourhood Johannes Noack

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11

The European Union’s Pivot to Africa Koen Vervaeke

165

12

The European Union’s Northern Window—A New View on the World Marie-Anne Coninsx

Part III 13

14

177

Some New Policy Challenges

The European Union’s New Climate Change Diplomacy: Innovating in Foreign Policy Alexandra-Maria Bocse

195

When Technology Becomes Geopolitics: The EU’s Response to Cyber Threats Nele Eichhorn, Alina Nedea, and Ulrik Trolle Smed

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CONTENTS

Part IV 15

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Conclusions

The European Union’s Post-Lisbon Foreign Policy Ten Years On Karen E. Smith

237

Afterword: The European Union’s New Foreign Policy—A Glass Half Full? Martin Westlake

253

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Maria Åsenius is currently a Policy Officer in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade, where she is responsible for Sustainable Development and Partnership Agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. She served as Head of the Private Office of European Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström, 2014–2019. She was also Head of Commissioner Malmström’s Private Office, 2010–2014, when she held the portfolio for Home Affairs. Before that she worked as State Secretary for European Affairs in Stockholm. She was a member, and then Deputy Head, of European Commissioner Olli Rehn’s Private Office, 2004–2007. She was a Political Adviser to the President of the European Parliament, 2002–2004, and before that was a desk officer for the ELDR Group in the European Parliament, 1995–2002. Åsenius graduated from the Stockholm School of Economics with a degree in business and economics in 1986, and subsequently started a career in journalism as an editorial writer at Göteborgs-Tidningen, 1986–1988 and at Dagens Nyheter, 1988. She then worked as a freelance journalist in Brasilia and Paris, including work as correspondent for the Swedish business magazine Veckans affärer. In March 1993 she began to work in the Government Offices in Stockholm, first as Deputy Press Secretary to the Minister for Finance and then as a Political Adviser to the Minister for Culture and Immigration. Alexandra-Maria Bocse is a Fellow in International Relations at the LSE. She completed a Ph.D. in Politics and International Studies at the xv

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University of Cambridge, UK and an M.Phil. in International Relations at the same institution. In 2015–2016 Bocse was a Fulbright-Schuman Fellow at Harvard University. Her research and analysis interests are related to European Affairs, energy and environmental politics and policy, as well as international governance. She has taught European Politics, Global Energy and Environmental Politics, and International Affairs at the University of Cambridge, the London School of Economics, and King’s College London. Marie-Anne Coninsx a lawyer and expert on Arctic affairs, was the first Ambassador at Large for the Arctic of the European Union (EU) from September 2017 to October 2019. She was previously the European Union’s Ambassador to Canada (2013–2017), after serving four years as the EU Ambassador to Mexico. In Canada, she extensively visited the Canadian Arctic. Her other postings abroad include having served as the number two at the EU Delegations in New York and in Geneva, providing her with an extensive experience on multilateral issues. MarieAnne Coninsx has been an official of the European Union for 35 years. She started her career in the European Commission at the Legal Service and worked for twelve consecutive years as a Staff Member at Cabinets of three Commissioners, dealing, respectively, with: External Relations and Trade; the Internal Market; EU Development Policy, and relations with the European Parliament. She also worked at the External Relations Department at EU HQ, overseeing relations between the European Union and Latin America. She studied law at Ghent University in Belgium and did post-graduate studies at Cambridge University (UK)— which included studying Law of the Sea, and at the European University Centre in Nancy (France). Patrick Costello is currently Head of the Democracy and Electoral Observation Division in the European External Action Service (EEAS). He has been an EU official for twenty-two years, working in the European Parliament, the European Commission and the EEAS and has served in a number of Private Offices including those of Chris Patten (European Commissioner for External Relations, 1999–2004), European Parliament President Josep Borrell (as diplomatic adviser), 2004–2006, Vice-President Margot Wallström (as deputy Head of Cabinet), 2007– 2009, and as Head of the Private Office of Karmenu Vella (European Commissioner for Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries). Other positions have included EEAS Head of Division for the Middle East

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and Deputy to the Chair of the Political and Security Committee. Prior to joining the European Union institutions, he worked for the United Nations in Haiti (MICIVIH) and as an electoral observer in South Africa (UNOMSA). He started his career as a human rights campaigner in Central America. Gijs de Vries is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the European Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Gijs de Vries has served as State Secretary in the Government of The Netherlands and as the Dutch Government’s representative in the European Convention. He is a former Leader of the Liberal and Democratic Group in the European Parliament. He has been a member of the European Court of Auditors, and a senior adviser to EU Secretary-General/High Representative Javier Solana. He is a former board member of the European Cultural Foundation and the European Union Baroque Orchestra and a co-founder of the European Council on Foreign Relations. His publications include a study on European external cultural relations, Cultural Freedom in European Foreign Policy (Stuttgart: Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, 2019). Gianmarco Di Vita is Director General for Budget and Administration in the European External Action Service, a post he has occupied since 2016. He previously served as Director for Resources in the Secretariat General of the European Commission, 2008–2015, and before that occupied a number of senior positions within the European Commission including participation in the Task Force on the administrative reform of the European Commission (1999–2001). He began his career in the European Commission’s DG in charge of Telecommunications policy and ICT research. An Italian national, he has a B.A. (Honours) in Political Science from the University of Rome (La Sapienza) and a Diploma of Advanced European Studies from the College of Europe (Bruges, Belgium). Nele Eichhorn is a Member of the Private Office of European Commission Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager. Her responsibilities include industrial, internal market, SME and space policy, plus trade and 5G. Eichhorn has worked in the European Commission since 2005 in different areas and in various positions. In 2019 she was appointed Deputy Head of the Unit in the Secretariat General in charge of the coordination of Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Implementation

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(including the Political and Security Committee). She was a Member of the Private Office of Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström between 2014 and 2019. Prior to joining the European Commission, she worked as a diplomat in the Permanent Representation of Estonia to the EU. Myriam Goinard is a policy advisor in the Directorate General for External Policies of the European Parliament (Secretariat of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 2011–2014, Eastern Partnership and Russia Unit 2015–2019, and since February 2020 in the Strategy and Innovation Unit). She previously worked in the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (2007–2011), as a lecturer at the University of Nantes (2003–2007) and as a policy assistant at the Institut für Europäische Politik in Berlin (2001–2002). She holds a Master’s Degree from the College of Europe (Natolin Campus), and a Ph.D. in Contemporary History from the University of Nantes and the LudwigMaximilians-Universität of Munich. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute (Fiesole, Italy) from February to June 2019. Stavros Lambrinidis is the European Union’s Ambassador to the United States of America, having taken up his position on 4 March 2019. From 2012 until 2019 he served as the European Union’s first Special Representative for Human Rights, having previously served as Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs. Between 2004 and 2011, he was a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and served as Vice-President of the European Parliament (2009–2011), Vice-President of the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee (2004–2009), as a Member of the Delegation of Relations with the United States, as well as a SubstituteMember of the Delegation of Relations with Iran and the Committee of the Constitutional Affairs. Between 2000 and 2004, he was DirectorGeneral of the International Olympic Truce Centre, an International Olympic Committee organisation. As a senior Greek civil servant, he served as Ambassador ad personam of the Hellenic Republic (1999–2004) and Secretary-General of the Greek Foreign Ministry (1996–1999). A Greek national, Stavros Lambrinidis took a B.A. in Economics and Political Science at Amherst College and a Doctor of Jurisprudence degree from Yale Law School. Christian Leffler served as Deputy Secretary General for Economic and Global Issues in the European External Action Service, 2015–2020. He

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was Managing Director for the Americas in the EEAS, 2011–2015. During a lengthy career in the EU institutions, he previously served as: an adviser to Catherine Ashton, the first High Representative, during the creation of the EEAS; Deputy Director General for Relations with the ACP states in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Development; Head of the Private Office of European Commission Vice-President, Margot Wallström; Director for the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean in the European Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations; Deputy Head of the Private Office of European Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten; Head of the Unit for Relations with the Council of the European Union in the Commission’s Secretariat General. Prior to joining the EU institutions, he was a Swedish diplomat stationed in Cairo and Paris before joining the Swedish Mission in Brussels, where he was part of the team on Sweden’s accession negotiations. Subsequent to accession he served as the first Swedish ‘Antici’. A Swedish national, he has a B.A. in Politics and International Relations from the LSE and undertook doctoral studies in Geneva. Alina Nedea is Deputy Head of the European Commission’s Sanctions Unit, within the Directorate-General in charge of Financial Services. Having specialised in EU law in Paris, she oversees or directly deals with a wide range of EU sanctions issues, from their shaping, negotiation and adoption, to their practical implementation and potential lifting, as well as their relationship with UN sanctions. Nedea also works on broader topics, such as the EU’s response to extra-territorial application of third-country sanctions, including the EU’s Blocking Statute, the ‘revival’ of which she oversaw in 2018. She is also in charge of coordinating the monitoring of EU sanctions application by Member States. Previously, Nedea was a lawyer in a leading Spanish law firm, advising and representing clients in competition law proceedings before national and EU authorities, and teaching EU law in Spain and Germany. She is a member of the Barcelona Bar Association and continues to cooperate with academia in Belgium. Johannes Noack has worked for the European Commission since 2006 and currently works in the private office of the Commissioner for budget and administration, Johannes Hahn. Until 2019, he worked extensively on the European Union’s enlargement and neighbourhood policy. Focusing on the Western Balkans and Turkey, he most recently did so in the private office for the then enlargement and neighbourhood policy Commissioner Johannes Hahn. Prior to this, he spent ten years in the

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corresponding Directorate General’s strategy team and Director General’s office. A German national, Johannes studied economics, French and European studies in Southampton, Brussels and Bonn. Pedro A. Serrano de Haro is Head of the Private Office of Josep Borrell, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2019–2024. He was Deputy Secretary General for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response at the European External Action Service (EEAS), 2015–2019. Previously, Serrano was Principal Advisor on External Relations to the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, 2012–2015. He was the first Head of Delegation/Ambassador of the EU to the United Nations in New York, after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 2007–2011. He was Director for Civilian Crisis Management at the General Secretariat of the Council, 2005–2007 and, before that, Deputy Head of the Private Office of the CFSP High Representative, Javier Solana, 2003–2005. Prior to joining the EU institutions, Pedro A. Serrano de Haro served as a Spanish diplomat in numerous positions including the Spanish Permanent Representation to the EU, the Spanish Embassy in Cuba, the Spanish Consulate in Frankfurt, the Spanish Permanent Representation to the UN in New York, and the Spanish Embassy in Tanzania. A Spanish national, he took a degree in law from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Karen E. Smith is Professor of International Relations and Head of the International Relations Department, at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She has taught courses on the EU in the World, EU Enlargement, European institutions, and genocide. Her main area of research is the ‘international relations of the European Union’, and she has written extensively on the formulation and implementation of common EU foreign policies. Her books include European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 3rd edition (Policy Press, 2015), and with Katie Verlin Laatikainen, eds., The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Ulrik Trolle Smed was a Member of Cabinet for the European Commissioner for the Security Union, Julian King (2019), where he led cabinet efforts on strategic digital affairs and security, including strategic autonomy, disinformation, and digital economy and society. Prior to joining the Cabinet, Smed was a Policy Analyst at the European Political Strategy Centre, the European Commission’s in-house think tank,

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where he advised on hybrid threats, interference in democracies, EUNATO cooperation, and European defence initiatives (2017–2019). He is also a career official with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he previously worked as a Head of Section for the Sahel region with the Africa Department (2017), after a time as Research Assistant with the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen (2015–2016) and as a Defence Policy Trainee at the Danish Embassy to the United States (2014–2015). During his early career and studies, Smed helped raise funds for NGOs, developed IT solutions, travelled the Middle East, and volunteered for anti-malaria campaigns. A Danish national, Smed graduated from the University of Copenhagen with an M.Sc. and B.Sc. in Political Science with a focus on international security and studied intelligence and diplomacy as a Visiting Student at Boston University. In early 2020 Smed returned to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Koen Vervaeke is a senior Belgian diplomat and, since December 2015, has served as the Managing Director for Africa in the European Union’s External Action Service (EEAS). He was previously the Director for Horn of Africa, East and Southern Africa, Indian Ocean, and the Senior EU Coordinator for the Great Lakes region, 2011–2015. From 2008 to 2012 he served as the first EU Special Representative to the African Union in Addis Ababa, (Ethiopia). In this capacity, he was involved in shaping EU policy towards Africa and in supporting major African mediation and peace efforts. He started his diplomatic career in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He worked for the Belgian Embassies in Tunis (Tunisia) and in Bujumbura (Burundi). From September 1995 until June 1999, he worked for the Belgian Permanent Representation to the United Nations in Geneva. He was the Belgian Foreign Ministry Spokesman under Louis Michel, during Belgium’s EU Presidency in 2001, and Belgium’s Special Envoy to the African Great Lakes Region, where he became involved in the Congo peace negotiations and the resulting Sun City Agreement. He then served as advisor to the EU High Representative Javier Solana on African affairs and Head of the Africa Unit in the Council’s General Secretariat. Martin Westlake has been a Visiting Professor in Practice at the LSE’s European Institute since 2013 and a Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges, since 2000. He was David Davies of Llandinam Research

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Fellow in the International Relations Department at the LSE, 2018– 2019. He took a B.A. in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at University College, Oxford, an M.A. in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, and a Ph.D. at the European University Institute, Florence. During a thirty-year European career, he worked in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the EU’s Council of Ministers and the European Commission, with the European Parliament, and in the European Economic and Social Committee, where he served as Secretary-General, 2008–2013. He has published widely on the European institutions and on European and UK politics.

Acronyms

ACP AfCFTA AfDB AI AMISOM APF APSA ARF ASEAN ASEM AU BEREC BRI CAR CARD CARIFORUM CBRN CC CDP CDT CETA CFSP CIA COP

African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States African Continental Free Trade Area African Development Bank Artificial Intelligence African Union Mission in Somalia African Peace Facility African Peace and Security Architecture ASEAN Regional Forum Association of South East Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meeting African Union Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications Belt and Road Initiative Central African Republic Coordinated Annual Review on Defence Caribbean Forum (ACP Sub-Group) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Civilian Compact Capability Development Plan Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (with Canada) Common Foreign and Security Policy Central Intelligence Agency Conference of the Parties xxiii

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ACRONYMS

COPUOS Coreper COSCO CPCC CPCO CSDP CSIRTs CTC CTG CW CWC DCI DDR DEG DGBA DRC DSU EAC EBCG EBRD ECA ECF EDA EDF EDF EDIDP EDITB EEA EEAS EED EFTA EIB EIDHR EIP EL EU OHQ EMSA ENI ENISA

Committee for the Peaceful Use of Outer Space Permanent Representatives Committee (from the French, Comité des représentants permanents) China Ocean Shipping Company Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Centre for Planning and Conduct of Operations Common Security and Defence Policy Computer Security Incidents Response Teams (EU) Counter Terrorism Coordinator Chinese Three Gorges Corporation Chemical Weapons Chemical Weapons Convention Development Cooperation Instrument Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (EP) Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group Directorate General for Budget and Administration (in the EEAS) Democratic Republic of Congo Dispute Settlement Understanding (Directorate-General for) Education and Culture European Border and Coast Guard European Bank for Reconstruction and Development European Court of Auditors European Cultural Foundation European Defence Agency European Defence Fund European Development Fund European Defence Industrial Development Programme European Defence Industrial and Technological Base European Economic Area European External Action Service European Economic Diplomacy European Free Trade Area European Investment Bank European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights External Investment Plan Hellenic European Union Headquarters European Maritime Safety Agency European Neighbourhood Instrument European Union Agency for Cyber Security (originally entitled European Network and Information Security Agency, hence the acronym)

ACRONYMS

ENP EP EPA EPF EU EUCAP Sahel Niger EU-ETS EUGS EUMS EUMSS EUNIC EUROPOL FAO FARC FDI FPI FRONTEX

FTA FTF FYROM G5 GATT GDP GDPR GHG GNA GRU HR/VP IAEA IAI IAS ICG IcSP ILO IMF

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European Neighbourhood Policy European Parliament Economic Partnership Agreement European Peace Facility European Union European Union Capacity Building Mission in Niger European Union Emissions Trading System European Union Global Strategy EU Military Staff European Union’s Maritime Security Strategy European Union National Institutes for Culture European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation Food and Agriculture Organization Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) Foreign Direct Investment Foreign Policy Instruments European Border and Coast Guard Agency (from the French acronym, Frontières extérieures, for ‘external borders’) Free Trade Agreement Foreign Terrorist Fighters Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (now North Macedonia) Group of Five Sahel Countries General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product General Data Protection Regulation Greenhouse Gas (Libyan) Government of National Accord (Russian) Military Intelligence Service (Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye) High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission International Atomic Energy Agency (Italian) Institute for Foreign Affairs (Istituto Affari Internazionali) Internal Audit Service International Contact Group Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund

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ACRONYMS

IMO INDC INF INTCEN Interpol IPA IPA IPC IPCM IS ITA-JFHQ JAES JCPOA JHA JSCC LGBTI LNG LoA MEP Mercosur MFF MICIVIH MINUSMA MNHQ MOAS MPCC NAC NATO NAVSTA Rota NDI NDICI NDPP NGO NIS NPT NSR OHQ OLAF OPCW

International Maritime Organisation Intended Nationally Determined Contribution Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (EEAS) Intelligence Centre International Criminal Police Organization Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Investment Protection Agreement Inter-Parliamentary Conferences Integrated Political Crisis Response Mechanism Islamic State Italian Joint Force Headquarters Joint Africa-EU Strategy Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Justice and Home Affairs Joint Support Coordination Cell Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Liquid Natural Gas Level of Ambition Member of the European Parliament Common Market of the South (Spanish acronym of Mercado Común del Sur) Multi-annual Financial Framework Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali Multinational Headquarters Migrant Off-shore Aid Station Military Planning and Conduct Capability North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Naval Station Rota (US) National Democratic Institute Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument NATO Defence Planning Process Non-Governmental Organization Network and Information Systems Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Northern Sea Route Operational Headquarters European Anti-Fraud Office (from the French acronym, Office Européen de Lutte Antifraude) Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

ACRONYMS

PAC PACE PESCO PSC PV QMV RAN SALW SAR SATCEN SCMs SDG SHADE SHAPE SIAC SMEs SNEs TEN-T TEU TFEU UAE UN UNCLOS UNDP UNESCO UNFCCC UNHCR UNOMSA UNRWA UNSCR US USTR WFP WIPO WTO

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Parliamentary Association Committee Parallel and Coordinated Exercise Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence Political and Security Committee Photovoltaic Qualified Majority Vote Radicalisation Awareness Network Small Arms and Light Weapons Search and Rescue Satellite Centre (in Torrejón, Spain) Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Sustainable Development Goal Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Single Intelligence Analysis Capability Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Seconded National Experts Trans-European Transport Network Treaty on European Union Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union United Arab Emirates United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees United Nations Security Council Resolution United States United States Trade Representative World Food Programme World Intellectual Property Organisation World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The European Union’s New Foreign Policy Martin Westlake

What’s New? That the European Union (EU) has something that can accurately be described as a foreign policy is a relatively recent phenomenon. For a long time, the European Community’s external policies were focused on trade and development. Foreign policy per se remained a jealously guarded Member State prerogative—defence was completely taboo. The story of the gradual emergence of the European Union’s foreign policy has been well-rehearsed,1 with most commentators identifying the 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty, with its provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as the moment when something recognisable as a proper foreign policy first started to emerge. The question arises, given that this is such a recent phenomenon, why does the title of this book refer to a ‘new’ foreign policy, with its strong implication that there was an ‘old’

M. Westlake (B) European Institute, College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_1

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policy? The answer is a composite one, comprising a series of constitutional and institutional, political and geographical developments that have resulted in a new geopolitical environment with a series of new challenges being addressed by a combination of new instruments and actors and old instruments and actors used in new and different ways. Thus, the ‘new’ of the title refers as much, by implication, to the new environment as it does to new instruments, actors and initiatives (and old ones used in new ways). It is, in short, this ensemble that justifies the term ‘new’. Clearly, the 2009 implementation of the Lisbon Treaty represented a major departure in this context, bringing many constitutional and institutional developments in its wake. Amongst the more important constitutional/institutional innovations were, variously: the creation of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; the (2011) creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS)2 ; the creation of the permanent Presidency of the European Council; the implementation of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) Article 3.53 and the concomitant establishment of a holistic overall external policy with a strong prescriptive element. Significant developments that have followed in the wake of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty have included: the consolidation of the European Council President’s role, as the EU navigated its way through three successive and unexpected crises—namely, the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis and Brexit4 ; the consolidation of the High Representative’s role and empowerment through a series of significant achievements (perhaps most notably, the normalisation of relations with Serbia and the establishment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme—JCPOA) that have, cumulatively, put the High Representative on the map and legitimised the role5 ; in that context, the 2014–2019 Juncker Commission’s creation of ‘teams’ of Commissioners, with one team of seven Commissioners, ‘Europe in the World’, led by the High Representative, finally realising an old ambition to encourage overall coherence in the European Commission’s external actions, and with the new European Commission of Ursula von der Leyen following the same model6 ; also, in that context, the development and adoption of the European External Action Service’s 2016 Global Strategy and its follow-ups (notably, annual reports)7 ; the 2017 activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence matters (PESCO)8 ; the growth of the role and powers of the European Parliament9 and the parallel growth of parliamentary diplomacy10 and the growing potential of the euro as a foreign policy instrument.11

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The European Union’s new geopolitical environment would include a number of significant developments. First, Africa’s continued evolution as an economic bloc and the European Union’s recognition of this rapidly emerging reality. In March 2018, 49 of the African Union’s 55 member states signed an agreement to create an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which, if ratified, will represent the largest free trade area in the world in terms of participating countries since the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. As Jean-Claude Juncker put it in his September 2018 ‘State of the Union’ address to the European Parliament (EP), ‘Africa is the future. By 2050, Africa’s population will number 2.5 billion. One in four people on earth will be African … Africa does not need charity, it needs true and fair partnerships. And Europe needs this partnership just as much’.12 It was this acknowledgement of Africa’s fast-evolving emergence as a regional trade bloc that led to what this book has dubbed the ‘pivot’ to Africa. As Juncker continued, ‘I believe we should develop the numerous European-African trade agreements into a continent-to-continent free trade agreement, as an economic partnership between equals’.13 Second, the EU has had to come to a new understanding about its neighbourhood, and has had to elaborate a new neighbourhood policy, particularly as a function of such developments as the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the stalling of the EU’s previous policy of offering the prospect of future candidate status to all of the former Member States of the Soviet Union without exception. Third, in part as a function of climate change, the Arctic region has been opening up as a source of commercial exploitation and transportation, creating new geopolitical strategic considerations for the EU, as well as concerns about the degradation of the environment. Fourth, the EU has increasingly had to contend with issues arising out of EU membership itself, ranging from ‘enlargement fatigue’ through to Brexit, but also continued difficult relations with Switzerland and the management of tensions and further progress in the Western Balkans. Fifth, the EU’s world view has had to be adapted to take into account a growing number of populist and revisionist leaders who cannot be relied upon to espouse the previously broadly shared attitudes towards growth, development, trade and multilateralism.14 The European Union’s new international political environment would similarly include a number of significant developments. A first concerns the changing behaviour of the United States, formerly considered the EU’s natural partner in a multilateral world order. Developments in

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this context would include the 2011 US pivot to Asia under President Barack Obama15 and the post-2017 US withdrawal from the multilateral world system (including trade and monetary policy) and President Donald Trump’s neo-Westphalian foreign policy stance. A second concerns the growth of an assertive China as an economic and trade power and also as a geopolitical actor, particularly since the 2013 launch of its ‘one belt one road’ (BRI) initiative.16 The EU has had to adapt not just to China’s increasing presence in areas of geopolitical importance, including Africa,17 but also to the instability arising out of US–China relations, particularly in trade and monetary policy. A third concerns the aggressive assertiveness of the Russian Federation under an increasingly autocratic Vladimir Putin, encapsulated in such developments as the Russian Federation’s 2014– 2015 military intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea,18 and its role in Syria and Libya, and an aggressive, though not pugnacious, stance in the Arctic region.19 A fourth concerns the imperative for the EU to establish a new, more bilateral and regional, trade policy following the 2008 stalling of the Doha round of WTO-sponsored trade talks, a policy which must, variously, fully implement the normative approach of TEU Articles 220 and 21(1)21 in general and take into account the muscular trade approaches of the US and China in particular. New and increasingly urgent challenges for the European Union include: migration and demography, with refugee flows on the one hand, but ageing populations and shrinking workforces on the other; climate change and environmental issues, and the concomitant development of energy policies; access to resources, including water and minerals; and, in an increasingly interconnected world, the rise of issues such as cybersecurity and autonomy in areas such as developing its own global satellite navigation system (Galileo).22 In all these different contexts—constitutional and institutional developments, the new geopolitical environment, the new international political environment, new and increasingly urgent challenges—the European Union has been developing new instruments and actors and bringing old instruments and actors to bear in new and different ways. Cumulatively, collectively, this is the new foreign policy in the title of this work.

David Davies of Llandinam (1880--1944) Lord David Davies was a Welsh businessman, (Liberal) politician, international campaigner and philanthropist. Profoundly influenced by the 1914–1918 war (he saw active service in the trenches on the Western

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Front), he devoted much of his post-war energy and thought to the search for a new approach to international relations. Indeed, although other origins have recently been posited,23 David Davies is commonly thought to have been the primary force in creating international relations as a distinct field of academic study. In particular, in 1919, he endowed what was to become Aberystwyth University with the Woodrow Wilson Chair in International Relations—the first of its kind anywhere in the world (the inaugural chairholder was Sir Alfred Eckhard Zimmern, creator inter alia of the concepts of ‘the Commonwealth’ and ‘the welfare state’). A founder member of the League of Nations Union and a dedicated liberal internationalist, Davies left a significant mark on the academic and political landscapes of Britain and Wales.24 In 1931 he conceived a society, ‘The New Commonwealth’, to seek a new international order between states. This became a major vehicle for his campaigning on the international stage. In 1934, he financed the building of the Temple of Peace in Cardiff (the building still stands and houses, inter alia, the Welsh Centre for International Affairs), a public building and memorial, incorporating meeting places and a library housing many books with international themes. Davies’ approach to international relations had at its core a profound commitment to democracy, a recognition that ordinary people paid the price for failures in relations between states, and a belief that elites everywhere should wake up to the fact that, in his words, ‘the world is our concern’. Davies was himself a prolific and prescient writer on international affairs, concerned about the potential for war in an anarchic international system, a theme he explored in several major works, including The Problem of the Twentieth Century (1934b), A Federated Europe (1940) and The Seven Pillars of Peace (1945). His prescience, and the urgency with which he pressed his case, were illustrated in his 1934 work, Force and the Future, in which he predicted that: ‘the next war will be waged in the air’ (p. 10); ‘nerve centres – cities, government buildings, factories, railways, ports, shipping, etc., will be bombed’ (p. 14); ‘there will be no distinction between civilians and the fighting forces’. It will be ‘la guerre totale’ (p. 16); and that ‘against attack from the air there is no defence except reprisals’ (p. 20). This was two years before the second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935–1936)25 and three years before the bombardment of Guernica (1937)—both bloody precursors of ‘la guerre totale’ that broke out in 1939. (Davies’s prescience, alas, did not prevent tragedy

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touching his own family; in September 1944 his oldest son, ‘Mike’, was killed in action with the 6th Royal Welch Fusiliers on the Dutch border.)

The LSE’s International Relations Department and the David Davies of Llandinam Research Fellowship The London School of Economics and Political Science was also an early and formative force in the creation of the new discipline of International Relations. In 1924 it created the Sir Ernest Cassel Chair of International Relations and appointed Philip Noel-Baker as the first holder of the chair.26 Noel-Baker started teaching several courses already in the 1924– 1925 academic year and in 1927 the LSE’s Professorial Council took the evident next step of creating a Department of International Relations, a Department that has gone from strength to strength, growing into one of the most prominent centres worldwide for the study of, and research into, international politics.27 In 2006, the trustees of the Dinam Charity, originally created by David Davies, decided to wind up the charity and create an endowment to support the David Davies of Llandinam (Dinam) Research Fellowship. The LSE’s International Relations Department was a logical home for the Fellowship, which was established to support the founder’s vision by furthering the understanding of international relations amongst academics and practitioners, particularly those involved in the field, and in policymaking. The Fellowship is intended to give practitioners in the field of international politics and policy an opportunity to undertake sustained research in an academic environment. The particular aim of the Fellowship is to bridge divisions between theorists and practitioners and support the study of international relations which directly links the application of expertise in international relations to policy development and execution. The idea is to advance understanding between academics, policymakers and practitioners and thus ensure that studies are rooted in the real world and concerned with practical, actionable outcomes. The Fellowship offers practitioners a period of reflection during which, with access to leading academic analysis and thought within a stimulating and supportive environment, they can develop a richer and more considered approach to their work.

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The Dinam Seminar Series, 2018--2019, and the Book It was my privilege and pleasure to be appointed the David Davies of Llandinam Research Fellow at the LSE’s International Relations Department for the 2018–2019 academic year. My research proposal, under the general title of ‘The European Union’s New Foreign Policy’, had two main elements: first, the organisation of a seminar series in Lent term, 2019, intended to bring to the LSE a series of distinguished EU practitioners who would interact with the faculty and students in the International Relations Department; and, second, to develop and edit a book project that would be built on the theme of the seminar series but also go beyond it. The seminar series was, I think all those who attended it would agree, a popular success. I am also Visiting Professor of Practice in the European Institute at the LSE and we threw the doors open also to students from the Institute. The large number of students present at the seminars made for lively exchanges in which the guest speakers were enthusiastic participants (a common refrain was ‘it is a shame we can’t do this more often’). Each of the seminars was co-chaired by the Dinam Fellow and a specialised member of the International Relations Department faculty. The Box sets out the speakers, themes and co-chairs of the nine seminars. In an ideal world, it would have been good to have had more speakers covering more themes, but the seminar could only be held once a week (and was, indeed, held every possible week of that term). The 2019 Dinam Seminar Series on the European Union’s New Foreign Policy at the International Relations Department and the European Institute at the LSE Friday, 18 January 2019, Christian Leffler, Deputy Secretary-General, European External Action Service, Global and Economic Issues, ‘Championing Multilateralism’. Co-chairs: Dr. Martin Westlake, and Dr. Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations. Friday, 25 January 2019, Stavros Lambrinidis, European Union Special Representative on Human Rights, ‘The Positive Narrative on Human Rights’. Co-chairs: Dr. Martin Westlake and Dr. Spryos Economides, Associate Professor in International Relations and European Politics. Friday, 1 February 2019, Koen Vervaeke, Managing Director, Africa, European External Action Service, ‘The “pivot” to Africa’. Co-chairs: Dr. Martin Westlake and Dr. Chris Alden, Professor of International Relations.

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Friday, 8 February 2019, Patrick Costello, Head of Division for Democracy and Electoral Observation, European External Action Service, ‘Values and Interests in Post-Lisbon European Union Foreign Policy’. Co-chairs: Dr. Martin Westlake and Dr. Katerina Dalacoura, Associate Professor in International Relations. Friday, 15 February 2019, Marie-Anne Coninsx, EU Ambassador at Large for the Arctic, ‘The European Union’s Northern Window—a New View on the World’. Co-chairs: Dr. Martin Westlake and Dr. AlexandraMaria Bocse, Fellow in International Relations. Friday, 1 March 2019, Pedro A. Serrano de Haro, Deputy SecretaryGeneral, European External Action Service, Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response, ‘Working for a Safer World’. Cochairs: Dr. Martin Westlake and Dr. Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations. Friday, 8 March 2019, Johannes Noack, Member, Private Office of Johannes Hahn, Commissioner responsible for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, ‘Looking after the Neighbourhood’. Co-chairs: Dr. Martin Westlake and Dr. Spyros Economides, Associate Professor in International Relations and European Politics. Friday, 15 March 2019, Gianmarco Di Vita, Director-General of Resources, European External Action Service, ‘Creating and Managing a New Diplomatic Service’. Co-chairs: Dr. Martin Westlake and Dr. Federica Bicchi, Associate Professor of International Relations. Friday, 22 March 2019, Maria Åsenius, Head of the Private Office of Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Trade, ‘Trade in Turbulent Times’. Co-chairs: Dr. Martin Westlake and Dr. Stephen Woolcock, Lecturer in International Political Economy.

The book project has grown out of, and is built upon, the Dinam seminar series but goes far beyond it. In the spirit of the Dinam fellowship, the main voice in the book is that of a group of distinguished practitioners, but there is also a mix with theoreticians (and, in some cases, as with the editor, contributors happened to be both practitioners and theoreticians).28 Clearly, the book could not be comprehensive in its coverage of all the ‘new’ backdrop set out in the introduction above. Rather, the approach taken is sample-based and illustrative. For example, the study covers climate change, but it does not cover energy policy; it covers the EU’s emerging cultural diplomacy, but it does not cover social clauses in trade agreements (for example); it covers parliamentary

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diplomacy, but it does not cover Member State EU foreign policy coordination; it covers Africa and the Arctic region, but it does not cover the Mediterranean. The book would have had to have been very big indeed to have covered all salient aspects! Similarly, the collection eschews any major discussion of the different possible theoretical approaches that might have served as the framework and the background to a more classical academic study. Nevertheless, the collection of studies gathered together in this volume provides a selection of authoritative analyses of various aspects of the European Union’s new foreign policy. The book is divided into three parts. Part I addresses a series of overarching issues; multilateralism, human rights, values and interests, security and defence, trade, but also parliamentary and cultural diplomacy. Thus, in Chapter 2, Christian Leffler, Deputy Secretary-General for Global and Economic Issues in the European External Action Service (2015–2020) considers the European Union’s distinctive attitude towards multilateralism from a practical point of view. The European Union itself embodies the multilateral approach to international relations and has served as a model for various similar regional organisations. Such developments as Vladimir Putin’s disregard for international cooperation and the Trump administration’s abandonment of multilateralism in favour of a more Westphalian approach to world affairs have left the EU alone to champion the cause of multilateralism, one of the core planks of its 2016 Global Strategy. What, in practice, does this mean and how can it be effectively managed, given the current behaviour of the world’s great powers and the Union’s other geopolitical concerns? The chapter concludes by considering the challenging fact that, going forward, ‘the EU will increasingly need to engage key international partners that will not necessarily be like-minded’. In Chapter 3, Stavros Lambrinidis, now the EU’s ambassador to the United States, but previously the EU’s Special Representative for Human Rights, 2012–2019, argues the practical case for a positive narrative on human rights. As reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions and the Global Strategy, the European Union’s basic stance is that all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent. The EU actively promotes and defends them both within its borders and when engaging in relations with non-EU countries. The EU’s human rights and democracy policy encompasses civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. The EU is adamant about protecting the universal nature of human

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rights when this is questioned on grounds of cultural or political differences. The EU furthermore believes that democracy is the only political system which can fully realise all human rights. The European Union is founded on a strong engagement to promote and protect human rights, democracy and rule of law worldwide. Sustainable peace and stability, long-term development and prosperity cannot exist without respect for human rights and democratic institutions. This commitment underpins all internal and external policies of the European Union. So how, in practice, did the EU’s Special Representative for Human Rights carry out his role? The chapter concludes by considering the UN’s/EU’s recent Good Human Rights Stories Initiative, both within the Union and in third countries. How does that work in practice? In Chapter 4, Patrick Costello, currently Head of Division for Democracy and Electoral Observation in the European External Action Service, considers values and interests in post-Lisbon European foreign policy. TEU Article 3.7 (of the Lisbon Treaty) declares that ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests … It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights…’. So how does such a complex organisation as the EU go about upholding and promoting its values, whilst also upholding and promoting its interests, and what mechanisms has it developed to ensure coherence and consistency between these two post-Lisbon concerns? In Chapter 5, Pedro A. Serrano de Haro, now Head of the Private Office of Josep Borrell, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, but Deputy Secretary-General for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response in the European External Action Service 2015–2019, considers how the European Union is constantly working for a safer world. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is now an integral part of EU foreign policy. Through its military operations and civilian missions, the EU has contributed to regional and global stability. Since its inception, the CSDP has responded to a shifting regional security context. It has played a vital role in crisis management in the EU’s near and wider neighbourhood, but it is also an essential part of the EU’s broader approach to the protection of Europe and capacity building. The EU’s capacity in this regard is rapidly increasing and its global footprint has, quietly but effectively, become ever greater. How

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can the EU work for a safer world when faced with American unilateralism and Russian neo-colonialism, to take but two of the most prevalent challenges it faces? In Chapter 6, Maria Åsenius, who was Head of the Private Office of the European Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström, 2014–2019, considers how the European Union, a trading and regulatory giant, is adapting its behaviour to the new reality of trade turbulence and the American drift away from multilateralism. She looks, in turn, at the EU’s steady development of deep and comprehensive bilateral agreements, whilst always hoping they might also serve as a basis for a more multilateral approach in due course, at how the EU is seeking to defend and reform the rules-based WTO system, and how it is managing its relations with a more pugnaciously Westphalian US. In Chapter 7, Myriam Goinard, a policy adviser in the External Policies Directorate-General of the European Parliament, considers the growing role of parliamentary diplomacy in the EU’s new foreign policy. Following the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in particular, the powers of the European Parliament in external relations have gradually expanded and its influence over the foreign policy of the European Union continues to grow—indeed, it has become a characteristic aspect of the EU’s new foreign policy. So, in what ways has the European Parliament become an international actor and what is its growing role outside the EU territory across different policy areas including human rights, international aid, trade, crisis management and the environment? What about the European Parliament’s regional interactions? And how is this growing parliamentary diplomacy subsumed within, and coordinated with, the EU’s overall foreign policy whilst respecting due institutional political autonomy? In Chapter 8, Gijs de Vries, currently a Senior Visiting Fellow at the European Institute of the LSE and who has served, among other things, as a Dutch minister and member of the European Parliament, looks at the currently neglected topic of the EU’s emerging cultural diplomacy. In June 2016, the EU High Representative and the then European Commissioner with responsibility for education and culture, Tibor Navracsics, put forward a proposal to develop an EU strategy for international cultural relations as part of the EU’s overarching priority of making the EU a stronger global actor. The strategy has three main objectives: unlocking the potential of culture and creativity for sustainable social and economic development; promoting peace and fighting radicalisation through intercultural dialogue; and strengthening cooperation on cultural heritage.

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How has the strategy been working out in practice and what leverage can it bring to bear? In Chapter 9, Gianmarco Di Vita, Director General of the European External Action Service’s Directorate-General for Budget and Administration, gives a view, from the coalface, of how the new European External Action Service (EEAS) was built and how it is managed. He considers the complexity of this remarkable and novel service and the managerial challenges it faces, in part because of its unique composition. Above all, he shows how the EEAS has proven the added value inherent in the logic of its creation. In particular, its single voice is more than a simple sum of the voices of all the EU Member States. Part II looks at some of the new geopolitical challenges the European Union faces. Thus, in Chapter 10, Johannes Noack, who worked in the Private Office of the European Commissioner with responsibility for the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies, Johannes Hahn, 2014– 2019, considers how the Union manages its relationships with its closest neighbours. The European Union has devised a cohesive strategy with regard to its neighbourhood, but the neighbourhood has not necessarily behaved as expected; for example, a Member State (the United Kingdom) has become a neighbouring country, whilst a candidate country (Turkey) has effectively frozen its accession negotiations. Meanwhile, the Western Balkan countries dream of membership whilst Ukraine and the Caucasus countries struggle for a stable relationship in a swirl of geopolitical angst. But the neighbourhood is important to the European Union, not only in terms of peace and stability but also as an economic partnership. So how is it done? How does the European Union look after its neighbourhood? In Chapter 11, Koen Vervaeke, Managing Director for Africa in the European External Action Service, considers the EU’s ‘pivot’ to Africa. In 1950, Germany, Italy and the UK were amongst the ten most populous countries in the world. By 2015, they had long since gone, replaced by the likes of Brazil, Pakistan and Nigeria. By 2100, five of the ten most populous countries in the world will come from the African continent— Congo, Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania (the others will be China, India, Indonesia, the USA and Pakistan). It is in part this prospect that led European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to declare the ‘pivot’ to Africa in his September 2018 State of the Union address. There is a sense of urgency about this twin ‘pivot’, from other trading blocs to the African continent, from development aid to trade partnerships. Already, as seen above, in March 2018, 49 of the African Union’s 55

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member states signed an agreement to create an African Continental Free Trade Area which, if ratified, will represent the largest free trade area in the world in terms of participating countries since the creation of the World Trade Organisation in 1995. How did this ‘pivot’ work its way through the EU’s new foreign policy machinery, and how will it be followed through? In Chapter 12, Marie-Anne Coninsx, the European Union’s first Ambassador at Large for the Arctic Region, 2017–2019, considers the EU’s northern window. The European Union is inextricably linked to the Arctic region by a unique combination of history, geography, economy and scientific achievements. Three EU Member States— Denmark (Greenland), Finland and Sweden—have territories in the Arctic. Two other Arctic states—Iceland and Norway—are members of the European Economic Area. Canada, Russia and the United States are strategic partners of the EU. European Arctic areas are a priority in the EU’s Northern Dimension policy. In April 2016 the High Representative and the European Commission adopted a Joint Communication on an integrated EU policy for the Arctic Region.29 Climate change, sustainable development and international cooperation on scientific and other matters are now all integral concerns within the EU’s overall post-Lisbon holistic approach to external relations. As part of that integrated policy, in 2017 the High Representative appointed a first roving ambassador to the region. What does the outgoing first ambassador see as being the challenges in a changing context where receding sea and land ice mean that shipping lanes and mineral resources are becoming increasingly accessible, and where the Union’s economic and geopolitical interests may not necessarily entirely overlap with its values? Part III looks at a few of the policy challenges the European Union is increasingly facing. In Chapter 13, Dr. Alexandra-Maria Bocse, Fellow in International Relations at the LSE, takes a look at the EU’s climate change policy as an aspect of its foreign policy. Through original interview material and additional research, she demonstrates how the European Union and certain Member States (particularly France) turned their diplomatic skills and the Union’s networks to good effect in pushing and pursuing the climate change agenda, culminating in the 2016 Paris Agreement. She shows also how, in the absence of US support, the EU has engaged in innovative diplomacy with individual US states, and she considers the irony embodied in the EU’s domestic progress rendering overall progress, in terms of temperature reduction, more difficult.

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In Chapter 14, three European Commission officials, Nele Eichhorn, Alina Nedea and Ulrik Trolle Smed, consider the European Union’s developing mechanisms in the fields of hybrid threats and cybersecurity more generally. As the world has become steadily more interconnected, so fresh threats to security have arisen posing new challenges for public authorities in general. How has the European Union reacted to these challenges? And how has it developed a coherent policy and effective instruments? They demonstrate how, quietly but surely, the Union has indeed been equipping itself to deal with this particular aspect of the modern world. In Chapter 15, Dr. Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations at the LSE, a renowned expert on the European Union’s foreign policy and author of the standard work on the subject, casts a critical eye back over the past decade and considers the European Union’s postLisbon foreign policy in the round. Ten years after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent creation of the European External Action Service, and at the beginnings of the mandates of a new series of high office holders and external relations actors, from the Presidents of the European Council and Commission through to the new High Representative, where does the European Union’s new foreign policy stand with regard to its initial lofty ambitions? Where has it succeeded and where does it still need to make progress? What major challenges has it faced, how has it overcome them and what has it learnt? Finally, in an Afterword, I will be considering whether and how the EU’s new foreign policy might be regarded a success and, as the title suggests, I will conclude, with measured optimism that, whilst much progress has been made and much further progress needs to be made, the momentum to progress is very much there.

About the Editor In a sense, the Dinam Fellowship and this book have been a return to source. As an undergraduate in the late 1970s, I was first introduced to the study of international relations by the inspirational lectures of a young Neil MacFarlane—then a post-graduate scholar at Oxford (and now Lester B. Pearson Professor of International Relations and Fellow of St. Anne’s College at Oxford University). The interest those lectures provoked encouraged me to take an M.A. in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies

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(Bologna Center), where I was privileged to study under two of the greats in the field; Hedley Bull (whom I had also heard lecturing at Oxford) and Pierre Hassner. Although in my subsequent Ph.D. I branched out into political science and EU studies, I never really lost my interest in international relations. (In any case, for a long time, European integration studies were considered to be a sort of subset of international relations studies; that was certainly the sous-entendu theme of the June 1993 Salzburg Seminar I attended on the theme of ‘European Integration after the Cold War’.) Now, the European Union has evolved so far that it has become an entity in its own right, with its own foreign relations. Over the almost thirty years of my career as an EU civil servant, it was my privilege and pleasure not only to play an active, if modest, part in the European construction process, but also to study and write about it, including in the field of what was for long referred to as ‘external relations’. As such, I have been lucky to have been both practitioner and theoretician. It is in that spirit—the spirit of the David Davies of Llandinam Research Fellowship, indeed—that this book has been edited and produced.

Notes 1. For example, Smith (2014), Keukeleire and Delreux (2014). 2. Spence and Bátora (2015). 3. ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’ 4. Van Rompuy (2014), Van Middelaar (2019). 5. See, for example, Viceré (2018). 6. See Westlake (2016, pp. 16–18). 7. European External Action Service (2016). 8. European External Action Service (2019). 9. Costa (2019). 10. Bajtay (2015). 11. European Commission (2018). 12. Juncker (2018, p. 8). 13. Ibid.

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14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28.

29.

Economides (2017). Davidson (2014), Shambaugh (2013). Ferdinand (2016). Alden (2007). Arbatova and Dynkin (2016). Astrasheuskaya and Foy (2019). ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’. ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.’ Westlake (2019). Thakur et al. (2017). Lewis (undated), Jones (2000–2001). Davies (1936). It is an irrelevance, but Noel-Baker is the only person ever to have won both an Olympic (silver) medal (as a runner, at Antwerp, in 1920) and the Nobel Peace Prize (in 1959, as ‘an ardent, lifelong worker for international peace and cooperation’). Bauer and Brighi (2003). As editor, I took a decision not to impose too much of an academic style on the practitioners’ contributions but, rather, to let them flow naturally, thus providing as much practitioners’ insights and observations as a more traditionally rigorous academic formalism. The book therefore contains a mixture of the two styles but is, I think, the stronger for it. European External Action Service (2016).

Bibliography Alden, Chris. 2007. China in Africa: Partner, Competitor or Hegemon? London: Zed Books. Arbatova, Nadezhda K., and Alexander A. Dynkin. 2016. World Order After Ukraine. Survival 58 (1): 71–90. Astrasheuskaya, Nastassia, and Henry Foy. 2019. Polar Powers: Russia’s Bid for Supremacy in the Arctic Ocean. Financial Times, April 29.

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Bajtay, Péter. 2015. Shaping and Controlling Foreign Policy: Parliamentary Diplomacy and Oversight, and the Role of the European Parliament. European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, Brussels, PE 549.045, July. Bauer, Harry, and Elisabetta Brighi (eds.). 2003. International Relations at the LSE: A History of 75 Years. London: Millenium. Costa, Olivier (ed.). 2019. The European Parliament in Times of EU Crisis: Dynamics and Transformations. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Davidson, Janine. 2014. The U.S. “Pivot to Asia”. American Journal of Chinese Studies 21 (June): 77–82. Davies, David. 1934a. Force and the Future. London: The New Commonwealth. Davies, David. 1934b. The Problem of the Twentieth Century: A Study in International Relationships, 2nd ed. London: Ernest Benn Limited. Davies, David. 1936. Nearing the Abyss: The Lesson of Ethiopia. London: Constable & Co. Davies, David. 1940. A Federated Europe. London: Victor Gollancz. Davies, David. 1945. The Seven Pillars of Peace. London: Longmans, Green and Company. Economides, Spyros. 2017. The EU, the Grand Strategy and the Challenge of Rising and Revisionist Powers. In EU Security Strategies: Extending the EU System of Security Governance, ed. Economides and Sperling. Abingdon: Routledge. Economides, Spyros, and James Sperling (eds.). 2017. EU Security Strategies: Extending the EU System of Security Governance. Abingdon: Routledge. European Commission. 2008. The European Union and the Arctic Region. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, November 20 (COM(2008) 763 final). European Commission. 2015. A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy. Brussels, February 25 (COM(2015) 80 final). European Commission and High Representative. 2016. An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, April 27 (JOIN(2016) 21 final). European Commission. 2018. Towards a Stronger International Role of the Euro. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council (Euro Summit), the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, December 5 (COM(2018) 796 final). European Council on Foreign Relations. 2019. Shaping Europe’s Present and Future: An Interview with Federica Mogherini, Conducted by Mark Leonard, January 11.

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European External Action Service. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels, June. European External Action Service. 2019. Permanent Structured Cooperation—PESCO: Deepening Defence Cooperation Among EU Member States (factsheet). Brussels, May. European External Action Service. 2019. From Vision to Action: The EU Global Strategy in Practice—Three Years on, Looking Forward. Brussels, June 14. European Political Strategy Centre. 2019. Strong Europe, Better World: Defending Global Cooperation, Multilateralism and Democracy in Turbulent Times. European Political Strategy Centre, Brussels, January. European Political Strategy Centre. 2019. Walking on Thin Ice: A Balanced Arctic Strategy for the EU. EPSC Strategic Notes, Issue 31, July. Ferdinand, Peter. 2016. Westward Ho: The China Dream and “One Belt, One Road”: Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping. International Affairs 92 (4): 941–957. Hill, Christopher. 1993. The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role. Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (3): 305– 328. Jones, J. Graham. 2000–2001. The Peacemonger. Journal of Liberal Democrat History 29 (Winter): 16–23. Juncker, Jean-Claude. 2018. State of the Union 2018: The Hour of European Sovereignty. Brussels, September 12. Keukeleire, Stephan, and Tom Delreux. 2014. The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 2nd ed. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Lewis, Peter. Undated. Biographical Sketch of David Davies (Topsawyer) 1818– 1890 and His Grandson David Davies (1st Baron Davies) 1880–1944. Llanidloes, Powys: St. Idloes Press. Missiroli, Antonio (ed.). 2016. The EU and the World: Players and Policies PostLisbon: A Handbook. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies. Shambaugh, David. 2013. Assessing the U.S. “Pivot” to Asia. Strategic Studies Quarterly 7 (Summer): 10–19. Smith, Karen E. 2014. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 3rd ed. London: Polity. Smith, Michael. 2013. Beyond the Comfort Zone: Internal Crisis and External Challenge in the European Union’s Response to Rising Powers. International Affairs 89 (3): 653–671. Spence, David, and Jozef Bátora. 2015. The European External Action Service: European Diplomacy Post-Westphalia. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Thakur, Vineet, Alexander E. Davis, and Peter Vale. (2017, September). Imperial Mission, ‘Scientific’ Method: An Alternative Account of the Origins of IR, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 46 (1): 3–23. Van Middelaar, Luuk. 2019. Alarums & Excursions: Improvising Politics on the World Stage. Newcastle-Upon-Tyne: Agenda Publishing. Van Rompuy, Herman. 2014. Europe in the Storm: Promise and Prejudice. Leuven: Davidsfonds Uitgeverij. Viceré, Maria Giulia (ed.). 2018. The High Representative and EU Foreign Policy Integration: A Comparative Study of Kosovo and Ukraine. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Westlake, Martin. 2016. Chronicle of an Election Foretold: The Longer-Term Trends Leading to the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ Procedure and the Election of Jean-Claude Juncker as European Commission President. LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series, N° 102/2016, January. Westlake, Martin. 2019. The European Union in Turbulent Times. In Western Europe 2019, 21st ed. London: Routledge.

PART I

Over-Arching Issues

CHAPTER 2

Championing Multilateralism Christian Leffler

As the EU’s outgoing High Representative, Federica Mogherini, reminds us in her preface, the European Union is genetically programmed to support multilateralism—multilateralism is in its ‘DNA’. To European minds, there are several strong reasons why the European Union, in particular, should make such an assertion. The first is that we have learned from history—our history—that countries cannot go it alone, and especially not now, in an increasingly globalised and interdependent world. The second reason is that the European Union itself embodies multilateral cooperation. A third reason is that the European Union faces a series of challenges which it is convinced it cannot address on its own. We need to reach out, to engage, to form coalitions of interest or ambition with actors in the world around us. The fourth reason is, quite simply, that it

All of the contributors to this book have written in a personal capacity only. The views expressed are their own and do not represent any official position of any organisation or institution. C. Leffler (B) Brussels, Belgium © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_2

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works; indeed, nothing can better convince us of the efficacity of multilateral cooperation than our own model and its success. However, for these four premises to remain valid, multilateralism must remain effective, and by this I mean that it must uphold international norms and agreements, contribute to the extension of multilateralism itself, and last but not least stimulate the ongoing reform of the international system towards a multilateral environment more fit for purpose. Though there are major challenges, which I will address below, multilateralism works—and the European Union is the proof of it. The EU’s attachment to multilateralism is probably also a reflection of the way it has grown into being a foreign policy actor. Foreign affairs (for long euphemistically dubbed ‘external relations’) have been an aspect of the European integration process from the beginning, since 1957. An obvious example is trade policy. A common commercial policy necessarily had an external dimension, even if the political aspects of that were less in evidence in the 1950s. In the context of the reform of the World Trade Organization and the current divergent views across the Atlantic, upholding economic openness and defusing protectionist tendencies is more important than ever. Economic multilateralism is an essential part of the EU’s effort. Similarly, agricultural policy, which some would see as a profoundly internal policy nevertheless has necessarily strong external effects (as, for example, some members of the Commonwealth were to discover when the United Kingdom joined the then European Economic Community in 1973). The aspiration to move beyond such external relations to a proper foreign policy (and security and defence) has also been evident from the beginning, as set out in various political declarations. But the European Union has grown from sectoral policies and technical issues and working on them in both their internal and external dimensions towards placing them in a broader political context, aided and abetted by political developments. One such development that gave a huge boost to this process were the events that led to the end of the Soviet Union in the 1989/1990 period and the subsequent expansion in the membership of the European Union, obliging it to take on political responsibility for the future of much of the European continent. In parallel to the development of a proper foreign policy, the EU has also aimed to insert, within the bilateral agenda it has with countries around the world, the priorities it pursues at a multilateral level. The bilateralisation of the multilateral agenda is indispensable for rallying support, aligning voting patterns and

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implementing action plans that may derive from key policies with global reach such as climate change, or more recently digital issues. This evolution towards foreign policy, from the technical to the political, with major events accelerating the process, is very different to the way foreign policy has developed in most of the Member States and most nation states, where the primary foreign policy emphasis was always on security and defence. This was otherwise known, a century or so ago, as war, or the threat of war—that is, defending your interests, if necessary, by force. Gradually, over the past half-century, states have extended their foreign policies into those sectoral areas where the EU effectively started. There is now a process of convergence between how foreign policy has evolved at the level of the Member States and at the level of the EU. That convergence is strongly anchored in a multilateral context, since many of those technical, sectoral areas have been the traditional subjects of multilateralism and, traditionally, the more successful examples of it. However, for Member States to be able to converge around a common formulation of foreign policy, it is indispensable to have unity among them. In the current international context, highly polarised and volatile, divisive issues are on the rise, and unity cannot be taken for granted. The less successful example of multilateralism, though just as important, and the one that has probably given multilateralism a bad name, is international security; the capacity—or the incapacity—of the United Nations Security Council to address global security challenges, and where the slightly more encouraging atmosphere of the late 1990s and early 2000s seems sadly to be fading again. This is not to say that there have not been successes, but those successes have been modest. However, the understandably higher profile of international security cooperation and its successes and failures has tended to obscure a general broad front of progress in multilateral cooperation throughout the world. This broad front of progress in multilateral cooperation is reflected in EU policy frameworks, most notably in the global strategy for security and defence, which Federica Mogherini placed on the Council table in June 2016 (but which didn’t generate as much attention as it should have done because of the distraction of the British referendum result). The strategy was global in the sense of being comprehensive, looking at all the policies, all the instruments that the EU can mobilise to promote and defend its interests in the world, but also in the sense of linking it to the global agenda. If you do a cross-read from the global strategy to the UN Agenda 2030 for the Sustainable Development Goals, some of the keywords used

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to describe what those strategies are about are the same. This is no coincidence. The two strategies complement each other in many ways. The EU global strategy has as its starting point security and defence, a successor to earlier EU security strategies, its focus is to secure the wellbeing and prosperity of European citizens, the security of European nations. The UN Agenda has as its historical starting point the Millennium Development Goals—so its starting point is socio-economic—but the conclusion is that for social and economic development you need the same things; you need stability, you need security, you need inclusion in order to ensure that prosperity is shared. So, actually, you have a pretty strong fit and within that fit there is a strong implicit assumption that, in order to be successful, we need to work together. However, when implementing development cooperation policy, the EU will need to move beyond traditional assistance-driven relations around the world, to a more partnership-based engagement. An example of this is the current EU– Africa Strategy, which also seeks a strong engagement with Africa at the UN or multilateral level (as my colleague, Koen Vervaeke, will consider in Chapter 9). That brings me to the observation that multilateralism actually works. The Agenda 2030 is a good example. There was a hugely complex exercise to develop an agenda with seventeen interrelated objectives, the sustainable development goals, and 169 targets grouped under those goals, and to get the entire global community to agree to all that— and to agree to the fact that they are interrelated. The EU was one of the champions, driving that process very hard, driving the interrelatedness and, in that context, bringing in security and stability, sustainable development goal N° 16, which is about fundamental rights, security and stability of societies. It was the first time that there was that recognition, by all around the world, that you cannot move forward on social and economic development unless you also work on governance and political development, internally and externally in the sense of security. At about the same time, we had the Paris Climate Agreement. As Dr. Alexandra-Maria Bocse describes convincingly in Chapter 14, the Paris Accord would almost certainly not have come into being without strong EU support. The EU tried to force things and get there earlier, which led to a fairly catastrophic meeting in Copenhagen in 2008, and then spent some years regrouping, but this was not something the EU could do with its traditional partners, such as the United States. Even before the current incumbent in the White House, the United States was

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no great champion of the climate change agenda—nor were Canada and Australia, and Japan, despite the Kyoto Protocol, was only lukewarm. The EU did this by reaching out to other partners. It did it by using the ACP countries in the Cotonou Partnership we have. With them it created what became known as the ‘coalition of the ambitious’. And it was literally because in Paris other countries saw that there were some ninety countries (the EU plus the ACP countries) walking down the aisle together to sign the document that others asked, ‘can we join?’ And so they came up, one-by-one, to join until, in the end, only the United States, North Korea and Nicaragua didn’t sign, though Nicaragua has since signed. But this was a context which allowed the EU to reach out to unexpected allies and form a new coalition. There is still a lot of work taking that forward but the COP in Katowice allowed the process to continue by defining what should be the next steps in much greater detail; what were the benchmarks required to turn the Paris Agreement commitments into reality. Another example of multilateral cooperation that has worked is the 2018 compact on migration and the parallel compact on refugees. This might sound surprising, given the disarray in which Europe went to the final phase in that process in Marrakech in December 2018 (with five of the EU Member States distancing themselves from the result). Nevertheless, it is the first time we have a globally agreed framework—a political one, not a legal one—for how to deal with migration issues, as opposed to refugees—broader, and more important in terms of the numbers involved. Secondly, since even before Ban-ki Moon took the initiative to hold a migration summit just before he left in the autumn of 2016, the EU was able, as the EU rather than as a group of like-minded states, to establish an agenda for that negotiation which was very close to its migration policy and the outcome is one that is also very close to the consensual centre ground of EU migration policy. It is therefore also a framework that will serve it well in its dialogues and cooperation with other countries around the world in the years ahead. It will be the reference point for any future discussions on migration issues. Two other examples to show that we are not only talking ‘soft’ foreign policy when talking of the EU. The first is the ongoing relations with Iran over their nuclear programme, leading to the JCPOA—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This was negotiated by the EU and ‘three plus three’—the United Kingdom, France and Germany, on the one hand, and the United States, Russia and China, on the other. A first interesting

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development worthwhile highlighting is that all six countries of the ‘three plus three’, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, agreed that the EU should act as the lead negotiator throughout the process, and they did that because none of the six would have enjoyed the same confidence of the other five or of the Iranians in all the different constellations and across all the different problems. So, it was very much an EU process, though clearly it couldn’t have been achieved without the active support of all six, with the result being endorsed by the Security Council, which is why, when President Trump announced that the United States would walk away from it, the EU pointed out that the agreement was ‘owned’ by the UN Security Council and thus it was (and is) for the Security Council to decide on next steps. Still, the EU is seeking to ensure that the agreement is fully implemented and respected and it does that by relying on international organisations; the regular, monthly verifications by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are absolutely essential for the EU and the other partners to know how far the process is being implemented. No single country could enjoy the same level of credibility necessary to carry out such a task. The Colombia peace process is another, though less well-known, example. The negotiations took place in Havana, hosted by the Cubans and facilitated by the Norwegians and, to some extent, by the Chileans, but with very strong and active support from the EU side in different ways and at different levels throughout the process. The EU worked together with the Colombian authorities and the FARC guerrilla leadership to see what it could bring in terms of very concrete policy support, in terms of cooperation and ideas, and in terms of creating perspectives, to enable the FARC leadership in particular to see what integration into civilian life might look like. Therefore, at the request of the Colombian government, after the conclusion of the peace deal, there was a strong role, a co-lead, of the EU and the UN in terms of supporting the implementation of the peace deal. Over recent years there has been a lot of progress on security and defence within the EU—more, perhaps, than is realised, particularly if compared with the situation ten or fifteen years ago. The establishment of a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism is a key milestone which will improve CFSP missions in the field, both military and non-military (police, judiciary, etc.). A dozen missions are in the field currently, most in Africa, some in the Middle East or the Near East, and

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some in the Balkans. There is a lot of very strong cooperation and coordination there, notably with the UN, and UN peacekeeping missions with, to some degree, a division of labour between the EU and the UN. You see that particularly in the Sahel countries, in North-Western Africa, as well as, to some degree, in the Balkans. There are naval missions—one in the Mediterranean, one off the Horn of Africa (which is mostly counterpiracy). The latter is interesting in that many countries around the world have recognised the importance of that mission in fighting piracy for trade flows around the world, leading up to the Suez Canal. That means that countries as diverse as China, India and Colombia have contributed naval vessels to that operation, to do the patrolling under an EU command— probably the only case where we have had a Chinese vessel under an overall EU command—Indian, too, for that matter. Many of the EU’s activities in this context rely on a close partnership with the United Nations, a relationship that we have strengthened over the years. In the autumn of 2018, in September, there was a joint statement of fact and of intention, signed by the Secretary General of the UN and the two Presidents of the EU—Donald Tusk (European Council) and Jean-Claude Juncker (European Commission), setting out the agenda in security and defence, in development and on institutional matters, in strengthening the EU as such—the agenda for the next few years and how we can take that forward. We take it forward together, particularly if we take it forward together with EU Member States (altogether amounting to by far the biggest budgetary contributor to the United Nations). The EU as such does not give the UN an assessed contribution; only Member States do that. Some developing countries would love the EU to be assessed as well, so that they could increase the contribution from Europe. We do it as a collective of states that are UN members but as regards voluntary contributions to the UN budget, the EU as the EU is the single biggest budgetary contributor. So, there is a lot of very close cooperation at the level of the UN itself. The current UN development agenda is closely aligned with the EU development agenda in the light of the SDGs, the so-called consensus for development was updated last year to bring it in line with the UN Agenda 2030. In addition, we find the same pattern in almost all the different agencies and technical organisations of the UN—for example, the IAEA, mentioned above, the UNDP, the WTO and other highly specialised entities such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),

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or the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). These have a fundamental role in policy shaping or making, in their respective fields, and it is actually through these technical organisations that we are able to break down the concept of multilateralism into its various parts. WTO is one of the rare UN organisations where the EU as the EU is a member— and not as an observer. On trade matters the EU is fully competent and so in Geneva there are three big actors, the EU, the United States and China, and those three actors, together with the Secretary General of the WTO, are the ones that determine success or failure in taking WTO work forward. So, where will the EU go next? We are in a very challenging landscape on multilateral issues, in which the EU is constantly seeking ways to strengthen partnerships around the world to address together the various global issues. But the reality is that the EU will increasingly need to engage key international partners that will not necessarily be like-minded. That is the challenge. As the EU navigates these waters it must constantly keep an eye on three different actors, three other counterpoints in this landscape; the United States, Russia and China. The United States was one of the founders of the global order as we know it and, over the decades, both the EU and its individual Member States have intuitively turned to the United States for partnering on multilateral issues in the multilateral institutions. For example, in the area of human rights, in the United Nations Human Rights Council, over many years, and even in the creation of the Council, Europe always enjoyed close cooperation with the United States. It is therefore challenging and somewhat distressing to see the United States now turn its back on that global order that they helped establish. This development was not something that started with the arrival of the current Trump Administration. The trend has been accelerated and accentuated, but the signs were there already, and some acts had already been taken. The beginning of the United States’s disenchantment with multilateralism and the contemporaneous US temptation to do things their own way predated the current administration. The trend certainly makes life more challenging for the EU; it doesn’t have its traditional ally to rely on. This opens up opportunities for those who would like to redefine the parameters of multilateral action, and we may even have the United States undermining what the EU is trying to achieve—for example, in the WTO. Its overall approach to multilateralism will need to adapt to relatively new playing fields of the international arena whose governance is still under discussion. I have in mind the impact of

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the digital age on multilateralism, where the EU will have to ensure that the revolution that Artificial Intelligence promises to entail is used as a force for good and for the development of societies. Russia (the Soviet Union) was also there at the creation but was always in opposition to the system as envisioned and defended by Western powers. They did not like the rules-bound order the way the West saw it, and they challenged it constantly. Throughout the years of the Cold War there were confrontations at the UN and rejection of the WTO. It is not a coincidence that it took almost twenty years to negotiate accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia joined the WTO in crab-like, or lobster-like, fashion, inching backwards into the organisation, questioning every step and complaining frequently. Russia, in the multilateral context, is an important actor and sometimes a necessary one (for example, the Iran deal, or less constructively, some of the conflicts in the Middle East—Syria, most evidently), but Russia is also a constant challenge and at times—as in the case of Ukraine—a threat to the very fundament of the international rules-based order: you don’t invade your neighbour. For these reasons, Russia’s commitment to multilateralism ever since the end of the Cold War shows a mixed track record and missed opportunities. In the medium to longer term, the most interesting and the most challenging counterpoint is that of the People’s Republic of China. China was not present at the creation. It was not there when the current global multilateral architecture was designed and subsequently established. The integration of China into this multilateral order in the last quarter of the past century, which occurred largely without friction or open conflict, was, in my view, one of the great achievements of late twentieth century bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Now, China is in the system. It is much stronger, self-confident and assertive, but still showing important deficiencies as we have seen with the coronavirus crisis. Now, contrary to the United States, with its disenchantment with the multilateral order, and Russia, which never really liked it very much, China says, ‘yes, we do like it, and we do want a rules-bound international order, but with our rules’. Thus the issue is how to broaden and deepen Chinese engagement, and how to ensure that we do anchor China as a partner in the global, multilateral, cooperative order, taking responsibilities, but doing so in a manner where, no doubt, rules will be tweaked and interpreted/developed in a manner which lies closer to China’s interests and its interpretation, but

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where the EU and its partners have to make sure that it does not lose its compass, and that, in engaging and reaching out, it does so on the basis of a very clear understanding of where its interests lie, what its agenda is and where its fundamental values are anchored, so that it doesn’t go beyond these in preserving or building the order further in the years ahead. As we celebrate this year the 75th anniversary of the UN Charter, we must continue working towards an effective multilateralism, fit for purpose, in order to ensure many more years of multilateralism to come.

CHAPTER 3

The Positive Narrative on Human Rights Stavros Lambrinidis

The European Union’s Special Representative for Human Rights is an embodiment of the EU’s abiding commitment to fundamental values, enshrined in the Treaties since 2009. As the EU’s first Special Representative, appointed in 2012, it was my duty and privilege to build up this new role and to start to flesh it out. As the 25 July 2012 Council of the European Union press release announcing my appointment declared, ‘His role will be to enhance the effectiveness and visibility of EU human rights policy. He will have a broad, flexible mandate, giving him the ability to adapt to circumstances, and will work closely with the European External Action Service, which will provide him with full support’.1

All of the contributors to this book have written in a personal capacity only. The views expressed are their own and do not represent any official position of any organisation or institution. S. Lambrinidis (B) European External Action Service, Former EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_3

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In this chapter I would like to look back on my experiences in my seven years as Special Representative and concentrate on a few themes and a few reflections that I drew from those experiences. I would then like to consider in particular the Good Human Rights Stories Initiative that was launched on 27 September 2018 in New York by the European Union, together with a coalition of thirteen partner countries. And I will conclude with a few additional reflections about how, in creating such a successful model, the European Union has also created a moral imperative to encourage others to adopt a similar methodology and a similar path to peace, prosperity and respect for fundamental rights. When I went to the more difficult places around the world, where human rights had never been respected, or to countries that used to be stronger on human rights but were not necessarily anymore, I would talk to presidents, ministers or other high officials to change their policy to be more supportive and more respectful towards human rights. After all, in the post-Second World War world human rights were recognised as being universal. But it was also true that I was there as the European Union’s Special Representative, and not as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (though the two offices have always enjoyed the closest and most supportive of relationships), and what I frequently found by way of a response to my visits was the ‘why?’ question. Why does the EU care that much about human rights? Why poison potentially beneficial ‘transactional’ relations with different countries by raising uncomfortable human rights issues? At the end of the day, what’s in it for the EU? Indeed, in the role of EU Special Representative for Human Rights, you need to have your ‘why’ because people need to understand not only that you mean what you say, but why you mean what you say—they need to understand that you are driven by something that is, at one and the same time, a personal belief but also a collective imperative. To underline the forcefulness and sincerity of the EU’s commitment to human rights eventually I would find myself coming to the core, and the core of the European Union is human rights. The European Union was built on tolerance, on inclusiveness, on trying to live together with people that, once not so long ago, we hated (and even killed). We have found it within ourselves to transit from hatred to unity, solidarity and friendship. On the basis of our experiences, born out of immense suffering and repeated war, we know that when we talk about human dignity and human rights we are not talking about some feel-good notion but about the only way to build the truly resilient,

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peaceful and prosperous society that the European Union has become. I would always answer with the passion and conviction of that basic reality. And I would find in the process that the European example of a rightsbased transition from war and destitution to peace and prosperity is still one that resonates among countless people around the world, living today under conflict, poverty or repression. A second ‘why’ for our human rights policy is that human rights are also our calling card. Hundreds of millions of people around the world look to the European Union as being the most successful and, hopefully, imitable example of prosperity and peace. We have good reason to be seen to be doing human rights well. Our ability to be effective and influential in the world depends on people not just respecting the European example but believing that we adhere to it. We need to ‘walk the walk’ and not just ‘talk the talk’. If we were to go around the world in best realpolitik mode, turning a blind eye to major human rights violations here or there because we needed the oil or for some other geostrategic reason, then we would find that our credibility had suffered not just in the human rights field but in virtually every other field because people would not take the EU’s noble declarations seriously under those circumstances. And those declarations are noble. As the introduction reminded us, TEU Article 21 declares that ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law’. Those are Treaty obligations. And they are also international, universal human rights obligations. They are our strength. The moment Europeans started acting as Machiavellians instead of people whose DNA was built on rights and freedoms would be the moment that people would see us as weak, insincere, and vulnerable. Another ‘why’ for pursuing human rights in our foreign policy is that if you look at virtually any conflict in the world today—and certainly conflicts in our neighbourhood—you will see that a violation of human rights is almost always at the root of that conflict and was not addressed in good time and that to resolve that conflict it is vital to resolve those human rights issues. So, human rights is not a footnote in our foreign policy, it’s not ‘soft’ politics, it is hardcore foreign policy as far as we are

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concerned because in fact preventing those major conflicts, or resolving them once they are there, is hugely important for the security of Europe as well. Moreover, though I don’t want to touch too much on the migration issue, a lot of the dynamics that lead to such movements of people are, at their source, about a denial of basic human rights, from a denial of safety because of conflict through to repression and poverty; ‘freedom from fear and want’, as the Universal Declaration’s preamble puts it, is ‘the highest aspiration of the common people’. These are some answers to the question ‘why?’—why we, the European Union, promote human rights. And then we have the ‘how?’ In that context, the European Union has changed over the recent past in terms both of equipping itself with a proper foreign policy and, in the EEAS, a proper foreign policy service, but also in how it ‘does’ human rights. The EU and its Member States have placed a major political emphasis on human rights policy and we have found that, by uniting, we have greatly enhanced coordination and multiplied our strength. For example, the European Union now prepares an annual report on human rights and democracy in the world with a section for every country. That exercise requires all the ambassadors of our EU Member States and the EU Ambassador to coordinate in drafting it—so it encourages coordination—it also encourages all the actors to coordinate on the policies they apply, on the political pressure they bring to bear, on the people and organisations they support and how they do that. The exercise has thus multiplied our on-the-ground presence dramatically. But the process has also resulted in favourable internal consequences for the EU, in particular by concentrating and unifying our institutions. The EEAS does foreign policy but the officials in charge of development policy in the European Commission have many of the resources, and for as long as those two sides spoke only intermittently to one another, the Union punched below its weight. The foreign policy specialists would determine what they saw as the strategic priorities, but the development specialists would often identify other sets of strategic priorities, based on their own perceptions. Now, there is efficient communication between all sides. Such relatively mundane issues, the behind-the-scenes basic mechanisms, are also part of the job of the human rights envoy. The biggest dedicated fund in the world today to support civil society is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights—1.3 billion euros for the 2014–2020 period. No other country or region comes anywhere close to that figure. The key objectives of the EIDHR are:

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enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in countries and regions where they are most at risk; strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, in supporting the peaceful conciliation of group interests and in consolidating political participation and representation; and supporting actions in areas covered by EU Human Rights Guidelines. Thus, the EU, representing about only 8% of the world’s population and about only 20% of the world’s economy provides more than 55% of the world’s development aid. That aid builds schools and hospitals and brings water to places where fresh water was previously unavailable, addresses around the world perhaps more than any other world power the issue of getting people out of poverty and facilitating economic development, and of empowering civil society and promoting and protecting the rights women and girls, to name just a few. And the European Union and its Member States are the biggest by far donor of humanitarian aid, including to the United Nations and the UNHCR, to security missions and UN missions. This is a big part of the ‘how’, of how we do things. In addition, the EU has broadened its focus when dealing with different countries around the world. Previously, we tended to focus mostly on the really ‘bad guys’ (committed and persistent violators of rights) or on the ‘good guys’ (the like-minded countries with whom we felt we should be building coalitions). Recently, however, the EU has started also to focus more on the vast, in-between, grey zone of human rights, countries that do not blink on your computer screen every day— because there may not be a daily crisis happening, you don’t have one more activist being thrown in jail or one more group of people dying because of hunger—but it is that grey zone of countries in the middle that will today determine the way the battle for human rights goes. Because it is not just authoritarians anymore that despise tolerance and inclusion and rule of law and all those universal human rights values and principles that are an impediment to their ability to bend the will of their people or their region, it’s also strongmen and populists. And those countries that are committed to violating rights are not anymore satisfied simply to say, ‘don’t criticise me, keep your hands off my sovereignty’, they want to export their bad practices to others. They are trying actively to change the human rights narrative; ‘I’m fighting terrorists, stay away! I’m fighting poverty, keep away! Human rights are a luxury we cannot afford. Human rights are a Western concept. You are trying to impose on the rest

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of the world your Western ideas. You are cultural imperialists’. Increasingly, these sorts of arguments are being very aggressively exported. In the middle are tens of countries that have not necessarily taken sides. Many of them are transitioning to becoming stronger democracies but could slide back. Previously, the EU focussed less on such countries. We had—and still have—to stop the major violators from getting away with abuses with impunity. And we still need to build our alliances with the ‘good guys’. But we also have to celebrate the increasing ‘ownership’ of the human rights agenda by many other countries around the world, and to work with each other to exchange best practices and to ensure that we constantly strive to improve on our own human rights records—and, one hopes, also to inspire others to do so. In September 2018, in New York, at a high-level meeting at the UN General Assembly, the EU, together with thirteen partners from all over the world, launched what we call the Good Human Rights Stories Initiative. This new coalition brought together the European Union and Georgia, Tunisia, Argentina, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chile, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Republic of Korea, The Gambia and Uruguay. All of these countries are different from one another—different in culture, in religion, in geography, in history—but they all had determined that the answer to the question ‘how do I build security and economic development and a just society?’ is not through policies that violate human rights but through policies that are human rights compliant. Thus, at a time of aggressive attempts to undermine the universality and indivisibility of human rights, including through the spreading of negative practices and narratives, this initiative aspires to create a fresh positive narrative on human rights in the world. As former EU High Representative Federica Mogherini said on the occasion, ‘Human rights are not a ‘nice to have’ policy, an abstract concept that only concerns those in New York or Geneva who spend so much time talking about them. It is not an elite thing. As our stories show today, human rights are real; they improve lives for millions of people; they strengthen societies and charter the path for a better collective future for humanity’.2 The initiative has demonstrated that human rights are universal and not a ‘Western’ concept. All of these countries work very closely with their civil societies, even though sometimes they disagree with them (as governments sometimes do) but they allow the space for civil society to

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operate and they felt that this actually enabled them to be more effective in implementing policies, as opposed to the space for civil society that is shrinking rapidly in other parts of the world (one of the major challenges to human rights at the moment). And these countries also put great emphasis on trying to maintain good institutions in addition to civil society—courts, parliaments, and so on. They don’t always succeed. There are grey zones. Many are somewhere in the middle. But they do have ownership and agency. They have understood that human rights are both an obligation to peoples’ dignity and a central way to achieve government priorities. In our work, we have not only had to better explain the EU’s motivation for becoming a world human rights champion (our ‘why’) and to enhance our instruments and coalitions better to promote human rights (our ‘how’). We have also had to address the arguments of committed rights violators who attempt to justify their violations through narratives based on political or cultural relativism, aimed directly at undermining the universality and indivisibility of human rights. ‘Why are you here, Mr. Lambrinidis, trying to support the civil society in my country? What business of yours are my citizens? What gives you the right to speak about human rights when you in Europe are facing so many challenges? Who are you to talk? Why are you raising such niceties as human rights when I’m trying to fight terrorists? Why are you disrespecting my cultural and religious traditions?’ We have had, in other words, to learn how to play better offence to advance rights, without being offensive and better defence against the narratives of rights violators, without being defensive. How should I have responded when a minister or a leader said something like, ‘I had to throw those activists in jail. We are struggling with terrorism and they were protesting against the government. When you fight terrorists, don’t human rights have to sometimes be suppressed for the bigger good?’ I replied with another question: I would tell them, OK, then answer me this: ‘What’s so scary about smart girls?’ Why did Boko Haram abduct 276 girls from a school in Chibok in April 2014 instead of just bombing one more army barrack? Why on 9 October 2012 did the Taliban try to kill Malala Yousafzai in Pakistan? And why did Isis in Iraq abduct, rape, forcefully marry and even kill so many young Yazidi girls? What’s so scary about smart girls? The answer is that smart girls normally become educated young women and educated women become empowered women and empowered women change entirely the balance of power in any society and the last thing a terrorist wants is empowered

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societies. They want societies that are malleable and fearful and deferential and which they can manipulate with their messages of hatred and violence. So, I would say, ‘if you want to fight terrorists, then educate girls (and boys)’. Access to education is a fundamental human right (Article 26 of the Universal Declaration; ‘Everyone has the right to education’). If you want to fight terrorists, look at everything they attack, and then make sure that you defend it. They hate freedom of speech (Article 19 of the Universal Declaration; ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression’). They hate freedom of religion and belief (Article 18 of the Universal Declaration; ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’). They hate powerful and independent courts and institutions (Article 10; ‘Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal’). They want to be the judges and the executioners. I could go on. And all of these, as I have shown, are fundamental human rights—fundamental and universal human rights. The other old saw I frequently heard was that human rights are unpopular. When I spoke to ministers, for example, about the death penalty, they would quite frequently point to opinion polls showing that high percentages of their populations supported the death penalty. They would react with disgust or amazement if I spoke about LGBTI rights. Again, opinion polls would be produced to justify their stances. Were they right? Are human rights ‘unpopular?’ The answer is that sometimes, yes, they can be. Indeed, it could be argued that some degree of unpopularity is, in a sense, often ingrained in human rights jurisprudence. Freedom of speech (Article 18), for example, would not be necessary if everybody agreed all the time. Freedom of speech guarantees disagreement and, because it does, it essentially exists to guarantee that the less popular voice—frequently that of a minority of some sort—can be expressed and can be heard, especially when there exists a more ‘popular’ and powerful opposing voice able and willing to silence it. Put another way, the human right of freedom of speech is fundamentally there to protect the less ‘popular’. Sometimes, ministers would push back against this argument. ‘Are you arguing’, they would ask me, ‘that we should ignore the democratic will of the people?’ To which I would reply that we are all, in the nature of things, ‘unpopular’ (in the sense of being in a minority) at some stage in our lives. Indeed, even in the same room, a person who is in the majority because of, say, their gender, can simultaneously be in

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the minority because of their skin colour, ethnic background, religion or sexual orientation. Open the door to violate the rights of one minority just because you happen to belong to the majority on that occasion, and you have also opened the door for your own discrimination on every other ground on which you are in the minority. Yes, respect the democratically expressed will of the people—meaning the majority—but at the same time, protect the equally democratically expressed voice of the minority. And, more generally, respect and protect everybody’s rights. Because in the end, at one point in our lives or another, we are all minorities. Having said that, human rights are fundamentally about saying how you can, or you cannot, act, not how you can, or you cannot, feel. They are enshrined in international law, and they are more often than not also enshrined in domestic law. And the law does not mandate you how to feel. An individual has the right not to like another individual. (Incitement to hatred and violence is another matter.) We have to find a language that communicates about human rights without appearing to be ‘criminalizing’ people’s feelings. We must find a way of enabling people to understand that their feelings are, within limits, their own affair, but violations of any individual’s rights are not. While working, in parallel, to change negative feelings and to combat prejudice. Put another way, to help people accept that human rights are not only for ‘people I like’ or for people who are ‘like me’. Finally, playing defence without being defensive: ‘Who are you, the European Union, to talk? You have your migrants and refugees and the transit camps and terrible conditions. You have your issues with the rule of law and judges in some Member States. Racism and xenophobia have been on the rise’. Of course, they are right to ask those questions. We, too, in the EU are sometimes challenged on human rights issues. No one is perfect. But to say that nobody is perfect does not mean that everybody is equally imperfect. All governments can sometimes violate rights—even governments committed to defending rights can violate them, inadvertently or through misunderstandings, for example, about rule of law issues. And that, in a sense, is the point. If the litmus test of human rights were perfection, then no one would meet it. But if it is not perfection, then what is it? My answer is that the real test is, do you have the independent institutions in place in your country that will not allow you to shove your human rights imperfections under the carpet? That will force you to face and address them? Do you have independent courts that

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can try a policeman accused of beating a peaceful protester in the street and that can find the policeman guilty, even if the government would not like to see a guilty verdict given? Do you have independent and strong national human rights institutions that can monitor government and make recommendations that will be listened to? Do you have parliaments that are composed of representatives elected through free elections and contain different parties and ideologies? With members of parliament who can stand up and accuse the government of human rights violations and others who can stand up and defend the government, without anyone being afraid that the government will arrest them or harass them, as unfortunately still happens in places around the world? Do you have universities, like the LSE, where you can speak your mind and say virtually anything you want to, and talk about human rights and freedoms and not be silenced or ostracised for taking a particular position? Do you have a vibrant and independent civil society that is able to function freely, even when it is opposed to government policy, with which the government meets and discusses and which can shine a spotlight on and make recommendations about the government’s actions without fear? So, having the institutions in place that can force a government to address its human rights imperfections is the litmus test. And the European Union stands ready to accompany countries that want to establish such courts and to train independent judges‚ that wish to establish powerful national human rights institutions, that are willing to enact laws that protect civil society‚ and so on. The fight to assert and protect human rights is not a desperate undertaking, as some violators would have us believe. Far from it. Fostering and protecting human rights is the only way that, ultimately, we can all live peacefully and prosperously together. I would like to conclude this chapter with a Nelson Mandela quotation (from A Long Walk to Freedom): ‘No one is born hating another person because of the colour of his skin, or his background, or his religion. People must learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love, for love comes more naturally to the human heart than its opposite’. As I wrote above, the European Union was built on the principle of turning hatred into ‘love’, of turning bad blood into good blood, of turning intolerance into tolerance. And because we have developed a successful model, it is not just in our interests but it is also a moral imperative for us to try and ensure that similar models, based on these values and, above all, respect for universal human rights, are established around the world.

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Notes 1. Council of the European Union (2012). 2. Mogherini (2018).

Bibliography Council of the European Union. 2012. Stavros Lambrinidis Appointed First EU Special Representative for Human Rights. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/dv/2012/2012090/20120903_eus rhr_en.pdf. Mandela, Nelson. 1994. A Long Walk to Freedom. Randburg, South Africa: Macdonald Purnell. Mogherini, Federican. 2018. Good Human Rights Stories: Together to Promote Human Rights Around the World. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/hea dquarters-homepage/51258/good-human-rights-stories-together-promotehuman-rights-around-world_es.

CHAPTER 4

Values and Interests in Post-Lisbon European Union Foreign Policy Patrick Costello

Article 21(1) of the Treaty on European Union declares that; ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world; democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the United Nations Charter and international law’. The same article concludes (paragraph 3) that ‘The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies’. Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the European Union has set itself

All of the contributors to this book have written in a personal capacity only. The views expressed are their own and do not represent any official position of any organisation or institution. P. Costello (B) European External Action Service, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_4

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entirely noble and commendable foreign policy ambitions, not only with regard to the values it seeks to propagate beyond its borders but also in pursuing a holistic approach in all its external relations. At the same time, the European Union continues to evolve into a major actor in international relations and, as such, seeks to pursue its entirely understandable interests as an economic, commercial and political entity. As the introduction to this study argues, this dynamic—at times, dilemma—between values and interests is central to the problems and the challenges with which the European Union, in general, and the European External Action Service, in particular, are grappling. This chapter will first consider three general observations, namely that: the EU’s values and interests, increasingly, are coinciding; the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has brought the values and interests agendas together, and the success of the EEAS’s initiatives and role depend on its capacity to ensure Member State buy-in. The chapter will then consider the example of the EU’s 2017 Syria strategy which, although ultimately ill-fated, illustrates well the three observations above and provides ample grounds for optimism as the EU’s foreign policy evolves. The first observation to be made, then, is that we are entering a period in which values and interests are coinciding in how we develop policy, and this convergence of EU values and EU interests in EU foreign policy has paralleled the establishment of the European External Action Service. This evolution, and just how far the EU has come, can be illustrated through the example of Tunisia in 2004 when I was working for the then Commissioner for external relations, Chris Patten. During a visit to Tunis, we discovered that the European Commission delegation on the ground was the only EU diplomatic mission that was receiving the Tunisian Human Rights League. It was very important to them that the Commission did so because it was their key protection from harassment and helped to enable them to operate. But at that time none of the Member State Ambassadors in Tunis were prepared to receive them. The sense of how things worked, at that time, was that the ‘values’ agenda was often delegated to the EU so that the ‘interests’ side could be taken forward by the Member States. The bilateral economic and trading relationships with Tunisia were important, and nobody really wanted to raise the difficult questions about how then President Ben Ali was behaving in power. Perhaps this is not surprising: Member States always have to defend their economic interests.

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Today, although the distinction remains, the situation is much better than it was. The reason for that progress is related to a second observation. If one looks at the history of the values agenda of the European Union, much of it came from the European Parliament, for whom the values agenda was more salient. Important policies such as the now standard human rights clauses in trade agreements or the entire democracy support agenda, were European Parliament initiatives. Recalling my time working for the President of the European Parliament, he could go and see the then Chinese President Hu Jin Tao, with only the values agenda on the table. On the other hand, the Parliament didn’t have that much leverage to be able to deliver it; we could say all the right things, but the Union’s real power lay elsewhere. One part of the potential of the new EEAS was that it enabled the values agenda to be pushed with the stronger leverage that the Member States brought to the table. This is not to say that the Member States were not working on the human rights and democracy agenda, but I would argue that the priority accorded to it depended on the importance to them of a number of other interests. To illustrate the point, consider the regular annual debate in the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) preparing the decision on the renewal of EU sanctions on Zimbabwe. A stranger, watching the discussion, would have witnessed a debate that was entirely framed as a discussion on human rights and democracy. But anyone who knew the nature of the different economic relationships with Zimbabwe could read between the lines and see that it was also a debate about tobacco interests versus diamond interests. Those pushing most strongly for the lifting of the sanctions had companies with links to the Zimbabwe diamond industry within their countries, whereas those pushing to maintain the sanctions had companies with links to Zimbabwe’s tobacco farmers. So, even though neither the word ‘diamonds’ nor the word ‘tobacco’ was mentioned during the debate, most people in the room knew that that was also why the discussion played out as it did. Post-EEAS, it is therefore logical that the values agenda becomes more embedded and linked to our interests because the ‘merger’ of the community and inter-governmental foreign policy pillars results in a merger of these two approaches. But it is also because the period we are living in is one where the proactive projection of values is becoming an important part of defending our strategic interests. As several authors in this volume have already pointed out, Federica Mogherini liked to say that democracy and human rights and multilateralism are in our DNA, but if you

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look carefully at what she was saying, and also at the global strategy, it is that in a world where there are other extremely powerful international players—notably Russia and China—successfully selling other models of governance around the world, in their economic interests, we have a strategic interest in countering that. We need to constantly re-emphasise today that democracy and human rights are actually based on a universal declaration that was signed up to by most of the world at the time.1 In a situation where other models are being sold, and when our historic partners are showing a little less commitment to the democracy and human rights agenda and the multilateral global governance, with the UN at its core, than has historically been the case, then there is a feeling in our service that we are the only powerful international player that is in a position to defend that agenda. But we have an interest in doing so because the more like-minded partners we have, the more we will be in a position to achieve the multilateral governance agenda we seek, and the more allies we will have in what is becoming a geo-strategic battle of influence. In other words, the ‘values’ agenda plays into our ‘interests’ agenda—they reinforce each other. To give one example, in February 2019, the PSC had its first discussion on democracy policy that it has ever had since it was effectively established in 2003. This development reflects an awareness that this is no longer about a values agenda that we can simply assume and don’t need to trumpet because it’s just there and part of what we do, but actually we need to develop a much more sophisticated narrative and public communication on why it is important for the rest of the world. It has therefore become a necessary part of our security policy. This came across very clearly in the ensuing 14 October 2019 Council conclusions on ‘Democracy’, the first ministerial-level statement on the subject for a decade.2 The third general observation is that whether we are successful in using our economic and soft power weight to deliver on our values agenda still depends fundamentally on whether Member States buy into it. When Member States do buy into this approach, we can be extremely successful. To give one example, when the EEAS started, one of the early PSC meetings that I was involved in, in 2012 (I was deputy to the Chair at the time and the EEAS had recently taken over the chairing of the PSC from the rotating presidency), had to discuss a situation in Belarus, where the authorities in Minsk had made our EU ambassador, together with the Polish ambassador, persona non grata because of our very public insistence on the release of political prisoners. In the PSC discussion we

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managed to reach a unanimous agreement of the (then) EU28 that all should withdraw their ambassadors. There was a lot of nervousness during the debate, with several Member States concerned that if they withdrew their ambassador, it would be difficult for them to return—conditions could be set, with the risk that they would be then unable to maintain their relations with all of the different players in Belarus that they needed to. But the feeling was that those potential disadvantages and worries were outweighed by the value of a very strong diplomatic statement of that kind, which could then change behaviour. This case was an example of a situation where there was recognition by the Member States that it was in their interests to act together and, although one or two of them were more reluctant it was actually the other Member States who were working behind the scenes to persuade them to come on board, because there was a value in having a united position. The reason why Member State buy-in is so important is because European foreign policy under the Lisbon Treaty, largely based on unanimity, requires a consensus to be able to move forward. That requires compromise, and the Treaty talks about ‘the principle of sincere cooperation’ (TEU Article 4), but if the Member States are not invested in having a common position then you can end up with lowest common denominator positions, which means that the EU can effectively do very little. In this context I would cite an illustrative anecdote that comes from a visit of the 28 PSC Ambassadors to the Middle East in 2012. We were received by the Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, in his office. The Israeli Prime Minister’s office is quite small, so to get 28 ambassadors plus two or three staff into it required everybody to squeeze in together. After a thirty-minute wait, Mr. Netanyahu came in, sat down, looked around the room, then turned to the Chair and said, ‘So, they tell me you take decisions by consensus. Ask me a consensual question, then’. Which many in the room read as his way of saying, ‘I can undermine anything you might care to put forward if I can get one Member State to come up with a different position. So, what’s the balance of power here?’ To be clear, where we can get unanimity, we can be powerful, but only as powerful as the extent to which all of the EU Member States buy in. And where we can’t achieve unanimity, we have a problem. Linked to that observation, it is not just about agreeing a compromise. It’s also, very often, about the largest Member States investing a certain amount of political capital in getting that compromise. One tactic that we regularly used in PSC when we had difficult discussions and where one

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or two of the Member States just didn’t want to sign up or had a particular reason for not coming into a unanimous deal was to take it off the agenda, and leave it for a few days. What would inevitably happen during those few days was that usually Britain or France, sometimes Germany or Italy, would be making calls to that Member State at capital level and using a sort of combination of carrots and sticks to bring that country into the compromise because they—the larger Member States—wanted it. The moment that political capital isn’t invested then again, the risk of ending up with a lack of consensus and a blockage grows exponentially. In that context, a development that has been most concerning over the past three years is that the level of that investment of political capital has been declining; there have been a few occasions where, for example, in taking positions for the United Nations Human Rights Council on sensitive countries like Egypt, or on China, it has proved impossible to reach unanimity. A lot of the internal discussion about why that is happening has been focussed on the individual countries that have refused to sign up. However, perhaps at least as much of the explanation for it is that the bigger Member States are no longer investing their energies in getting a European consensus around a position or around a policy. Of course, Brexit magnifies the problem because the UK played a very important role in achieving consensus on foreign policy matters, particularly in relation to the EU ten (the Central and Eastern European countries), because of its historic role in bringing those countries into the EU through its championing of enlargement. Post-referendum, the UK has had much less interest in investing political capital in achieving a unanimous EU position and it is probably not a coincidence that the problems of achieving unanimity have grown since then. The impetus given by the new Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen and HR/VP Josep Borrell to seeking to use the qualified majority provisions in the Treaty are a clear indication of the understanding that, without some concerted action, this could lead to paralysis. Those, then, are my general observations and, with those as background, I want to briefly look at what is perhaps the most challenging case for EU foreign policy, Syria, because in a way all of the challenges that I have described apply to the Syrian conflict. The experience shows the potential of EU foreign policy and the EEAS, but also the very real obstacles and difficulties. And it shows how the EU’s values and interests can coincide. First, it is worth considering the challenges. Member States were divided between those actively supporting the opposition and those

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who were more equivocal about them. As a result, a certain number of key Member States were not keen on the EU playing a significant political role because any EU compromise reached would dilute the approach that they were taking bilaterally. On top of this, the clout and leverage over Syria depended, as it still depends, on the military balance of forces, and the EU is not a military player (though that, as will be seen, brings advantages as well as disadvantages). In sum, there were huge challenges for an EU role but an absolutely central interest for the EU, because the impact of what happened in Syria affected Europe a great deal more than it did some of the bigger players involved—notably, the United States and Russia. Some history; in 2011 the EU moved very quickly to a position of, essentially, ‘Assad must go’—a position driven by a combination of those Member States supporting the Syrian opposition looking for international political support for what they were doing on the ground to support that opposition and a generalised feeling that, because of the Arab Spring, this would be very easy or, at least, probable. In 2012 the consensus broke down in what was a bitter disagreement among foreign ministers in the Council over the renewal of the arms embargo. This embargo was one of the first measures the EU took in response to the Syrian crisis and the reasoning behind it was the very basic thought that, if you have a civil war in your neighbourhood, the last thing that you want is to end up fuelling the conflict by making it easier for the players to get hold of weapons. In 2012, because by that stage the Syrian opposition had an armed wing (having begun as an unarmed opposition), its supporters wanted to remove the arms embargo. This argument was led by the UK and it reached the point where everyone else had accepted the position that maybe this wasn’t a good idea, while the UK persisted in arguing that it wasn’t that it wanted to sell or provide arms to the Syrian opposition; what mattered for them was the diplomatic signal it would send, legitimising the Syrian opposition’s acquisition of arms. Ultimately, the UK was in a position of one against twenty-seven. The foreign ministers met in the Council on a Monday evening, including over dinner, and the discussions were very animated. The sanctions regime ran out at midnight with the arguments still going on so there was actually a period of about two hours where there were no sanctions at all on Syria, because the UK would not sign up to a renewal of existing sanctions, for as long as those sanctions contained an arms embargo.

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Eventually, a solution was found, and the arms embargo was restored‚ but for the following two years the foreign ministers did not talk about Syria because the ripples and the bitterness of that 2012 discussion had impacts on other files and on other country situations and so the Member States preferred not to talk about it. How, it might be asked, is it possible for the EU to have a sustainable policy on Syria if the body that is supposed to be setting the strategic direction for it is not even prepared to talk about it? And that situation endured for two years, with the EU’s role restricted to occasional handwringing and a lot of humanitarian aid. This changed a bit, and there was a huge opportunity, in the autumn of 2016, for several reasons. One was the effort being made at that time by US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to bring all of the key regional players together in Vienna to broker some kind of a compromise. This had started out very well, in the sense that a UN Security Council resolution (2254) was adopted which set the frame of a possible peace agreement. The EU was already becoming quite an important player in that process because, through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear deal), the EU’s High Representative, Federica Mogherini, was able to talk to the Iranian Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, about the situation in Syria in a way that very few of the other international players could and therefore, in terms of brokering some of those necessary compromises, there was a role for the EU and its High Representative to play within this international group. This all went bad in the summer of 2016 for a series of reasons. In part, continued Iranian-Saudi Arabian tensions undermined the process; it was clear that without a common way forward between the Iranians and the Saudi Arabians and the Turks, nothing would move. The Russians were also frustrated by the process because their main objective was military— military cooperation with the United States in combating Isis in Syria. Then there were two big incidents, occurring within three days of each other, which completely sabotaged everything: on 17 September 2016 there was a coalition air strike on a Syrian base in Deir ez-Zor which was protecting the town from Isis and in which a number of Russian soldiers were killed; this was followed just two days later by a Russian military attack on a humanitarian convoy going to Aleppo. I remember being in Damascus the day after these two incidents and talking to a senior Russian diplomat there, who said to me, ‘Well, the thing is, we feel that there’s too much democracy in the United States’. I looked at him in bemusement. ‘No, no’, he said. ‘Don’t get me wrong; I’m not talking about Congress

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here. It’s just that we can’t understand in our system that a policy that has been pushed by the Secretary of State, and that has been signed off by the President, can be sabotaged by the Pentagon and the CIA’. He clearly felt that they had been negotiating in good faith and had been promised things that weren’t delivered. A week later, there was a very bad-tempered meeting of the international Kerry–Lavrov-chaired group in New York. There was a feeling that the process was finished. And yet, in terms of interests and values, the EU clearly had an interest in facilitating a peace deal, and to take an initiative in support of a UN process clearly reflected the EU’s values. Therefore, after that 2016 setback, Federica Mogherini called a group of her officials working on Syria together and chaired several very long meetings on the topic because she believed there was both an opening and an obligation for the EU to play a role. She felt that the EU could take advantage of the fact that it wasn’t a military player and also of the fact that it was the only player that could convene all of the other regional players, because the EU/EEAS was in regular contact with the Iranians, the Saudi Arabians and the Turks. The Americans and the Russians had actually failed to get those three together in a small forum, essentially because the Iranians felt very uncomfortable about sitting in a small group with the Americans. But the EU could do that. The EU’s High Representative also felt that the EU had leverage, which was about reconstruction. This was not so much about money, because the amount of money that would be required to reconstruct Syria is so enormous that no public funds could ever do that. It was, essentially, about sanctions. The lifting of sanctions was, and still is, the absolute precondition of any reconstruction in Syria and therefore, because the EU’s sanctions were the ones that were most economically significant, it was possible to use that as a form of leverage to push the Syrians and their regional backers down a path towards some sort of negotiated agreement. The fourth advantage the EU had was that most of the players involved—other states, international organisations, even our own Member States—were in two groups: one was essentially based in Damascus and had maintained links at least with the UN system, if not with the regime, the second had very close links with the opposition and weren’t in Damascus because they had withdrawn their embassies and had offices in places like Gaziantep on the Turkish border in order to work through the opposition-held areas. But the EU was pretty much the only player that had both—we had a very active office in Gaziantep that was supporting the opposition, we had very close links with the

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opposition leadership, outside and inside the country, and we had our delegation, which we had evacuated to Beirut but with a Chargé d’affaires who was still going into Damascus every couple of weeks, so we had our contacts and we had our channels open with Damascus. Moreover, there was a good and trusting relationship between the EU’s High Representative, Federica Mogherini, and the UN’s Special Representative on Syria, Staffan de Mistura, which meant excellent communication and a low risk of stepping on toes. The EU High Representative considered that the EU had some important advantages, but Mogherini also had an innovative idea, which was to talk to the regional powers about what they wanted as the end game of the conflict. What if we were to talk to Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, but also to Qatar, to UAE, to Jordan, to Lebanon, and to Egypt, about what kind of Syria they would like to see, post-conflict. Would it be in their interests if Syria were broken up, if the only way of finding a peace agreement would be for it to be broken up? They would all say ‘no’. Would they, then, find it in their interest if there were a level of decentralisation that would enable the different parts to hold together as a single country and, if so, what kinds of decentralisation and what would be their red lines in terms of what they would like to see across their borders? Would a deal that resulted in a separation of powers between a president and a parliament be acceptable to them? As a first step, Mogherini won a mandate from the European Council; that is, she got the EU Heads of State or Government to sign up on the initiative, to make sure that the EEAS had the sort of Member State buy-in explained above. And then she met all of the foreign ministers of all the regional actors in the space of about two weeks, an initiative that necessitated some extremely onerous travel (I remember a half-day trip to Tehran in the middle of February 2017), although some of the ministers also came to see her in Brussels. The EEAS then followed up those initial high-level contacts at senior official level. We actually got to the point where we had uncovered, in all of those bilateral meetings, a pretty substantial body of common ground between Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and an agreement that they would meet, at least at senior official level. In parallel, we were organising a big international conference in Brussels which was the continuation of a series of conferences that had taken place in Kuwait and various other places and which was basically a donor conference, to raise the necessary funds for humanitarian operations. But the initial idea was to use that to organise something behind the scenes

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which would bring all those actors together and to reach the point of achieving a common position of all the regional powers. This would have had a major impact because they, in different ways, were the ones that were paying for and supporting the conflict on the ground. So, if they could agree on something, it would have dynamized the formal UNbrokered peace process in Geneva. Mogherini decided that before forcing the issue on a public statement of the common position, we should wait for the 19 May 2017 Iranian presidential election. If outgoing President Hussan Rouhani had not been re-elected, and if he and his government had been replaced by a more hawkish government, then the whole process would have almost certainly unravelled. If, on the other hand, as expected and hoped, Hussan Rouhani were to be re-elected, then the plan was to bring everybody together, at least at senior official level but with a view to having something very public at ministerial level. Sadly, the initiative was effectively sabotaged, by something over which the EU/EEAS had no control; the day after the result of the Iranian presidential election had been declared, with Rouhani the winner, US President Donald Trump made a speech at an Arab Islamic American Summit in Riyadh which, in part, was an aggressive attack on Iran; ‘Until’, he declared, ‘the Iranian regime is willing to be a partner for peace, all nations of conscience must work together to isolate Iran, deny it funding for terrorism, and pray for the day when the Iranian people have the just and righteous government they deserve’.3 And because he had done it in Riyadh, it meant that the Saudi Arabians were now thinking, ‘why should we work with the European Union and sit in a room with the Iranians when the Americans are going to ride over the hill with a white charger to solve our problem with Iran?’ The Iranians meanwhile were furious with the Americans, obviously, but also, in those circumstances, they then also felt much more uncomfortable about sitting in a room with the Saudi Arabians and the Turks. So, the Trump speech unwittingly created an enormous roadblock to the process. Once President Trump had sabotaged the process, it rapidly began to unravel and, under those circumstances, some of the EU’s Member States saw a need to return to more traditional, bilateral diplomacy. The initiative was ill-fated, but it was not, despite its failure, a reason for pessimism about the future. It is a sad and frustrating story but for three reasons the experience gives cause for optimism. The first is because EU foreign policy, like policy in many other areas, has always developed out of post-mortems of situations where things have gone badly wrong.

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Thus, defence policy came out of what happened in Bosnia, for example. Indeed, there is a strong case to be made that the whole setting up of the EEAS and having a High Representative of foreign policy came out of the failure of the Europeans to achieve any kind of united policy on Iraq in 2003. So, the fact that those divisions exist and have led to serious failures is not necessarily, looking to the longer term, an insurmountable problem. Second, because, as I pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, we have the Treaty with us, and that helps a lot because even though this is not an area where lots of court cases are taken as to whether things that happen are in conformity with the Treaty, it sets a frame which it is very difficult to break out of and things like the principle of sincere cooperation do have a long term effect in an organisation that has always worked on the basis of adherence to agreed rules. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, for a very long time, EU foreign policy has been one of the most popular areas among the general public, as Eurobarometer opinion poll surveys show. If European Union citizens are asked ‘would you like the EU to be doing more or less’ in a whole series of policy areas, foreign policy is the area that tends to come out on top, because there is a sort of irrefutable logic that, in a world of big players, we have an interest in joining forces in defending our external interests, and because of the fact that we have human rights and democracy and multilateralism in the DNA of what we do. Our interest, increasingly, is in furthering our values. The Syria initiative of 2016–2017 showed how the EU’s values enabled it to further its interests. In the end, it could not succeed, but the lessons learned, about methodology, about the effective use of soft power, and so on, will surely be put to good use in the future.

Notes 1. Where, I have recently discovered, Latin American countries played a significant role in ensuring that civil rights were incorporated into the declaration—put another way, these passages were not imposed by the Americans and the Europeans. 2. Council of the European Union (2019). 3. Trump (2017).

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Bibliography Council of the European Union. 2019. Council Conclusions on Democracy. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12836-2019-INIT/ en/pdf. Trump, Donald. 2017. President Trump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit, May 21. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/presid ent-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit/.

CHAPTER 5

Working Together for a Safer World Pedro A. Serrano de Haro

Introduction The past four years have seen significant developments in the field of European security and defence, mostly pursued in the framework of the implementation of the June 2016 Global Strategy (EUGS). The main aim has been to improve the EU’s capacity to promote its interests and values in an increasingly challenging international environment. Terrorism, irregular migration, cyber-attacks and foreign interference, including disinformation, figure among the most pressing security

A more extensive version of this chapter was first published in 2019 by the Real Istituto Elcano as ‘The bundle of sticks: a stronger European defence to face global challenges.’ I am grateful to Real Instituto Elcano for authorisation to publish this abridged version. All of the contributors to this book have written in a personal capacity only. The views expressed are their own and do not represent any official position of any organisation or institution. P. A. Serrano de Haro (B) Head of Cabinet of the High Representative for Common and Security Policy, European Union, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_5

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concerns of European citizens and societies. Some of these issues are having a significant impact on Europe’s national political landscapes. The Arab Spring revolutions of 2011 and resulting conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, as well as destabilisation in the Sahel, have unsettled regional balances and provided space for a new wave of terrorism. Instability and refugees fleeing from conflict have opened new routes for irregular migration. Organised crime has found fertile ground, strengthening links to terrorist groups and promoting migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. The 2014 annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine has brought back into Europe pressing threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity. Hybrid methods of aggression have shown the need to respond in a more complex manner and to enhance societal resilience. A return to global strategic competition further interferes with regional crises and adds new transnational dimensions to challenges and threats. The EU and its Member States are directly affected and concerned. The level of threat at their doorstep has increased exponentially in the past decade. And they are inevitably part of the broader strategic competition. During the past few years they have been actively developing security and defence instruments and capabilities, they have enhanced their engagement with their partners, notably with NATO, and they have continued to pursue a multilateral track to reinforce international peace and security. Cooperation on the development of defence capabilities has, no doubt, been one of the areas of greater expansion, notably through the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and work on a European Defence Fund (EDF). But the EU is also increasing its crisismanagement effectiveness with initiatives such as the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), the Civilian Compact (CC) and the proposal for a European Peace Facility (EPF). The EU is looking more strategically at its deployments to maximise the impact of its efforts, be it in the Sahel or on the high seas, or in other regions, including the Middle East. Conscious of the complex nature of the challenges, it is also developing instruments to face hybrid threats and enhance awareness, including improved cyber security (see Chapter 14) and defence capabilities. The protection of strategic sectors and infrastructure has become a priority. While enhancing its capacity to act, including autonomously if required, the EU is convinced of the need to cooperate with its partners in addressing security challenges. The Transatlantic relationship remains

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crucial to Europe’s security. Ties with NATO have been strengthened considerably through 2016 and 2018 Joint Declarations, co-signed by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, then President of the European Council Donald Tusk and then President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker. Much of what the EU has developed recently in the field of defence will support NATO directly, notably as regards capabilities and military mobility. It will also contribute to improved burden-sharing, particularly as regards hybrid threats and challenges coming from the South. A new and strong relationship in the field of security and defence will need to be built with the UK now that it has left the EU. Challenges and interests will remain common. Most of the EU’s security and defence instruments, including those developed more recently, foresee openings for cooperation with third states. It is to be hoped and expected that the UK will wish to avail itself of such possibilities. The EU has continued pursuing a multilateral approach to international peace and security, seeking to strengthen common understandings of the challenges within the international community and develop common approaches to contain proliferation, promote disarmament and prevent an arms race, including in outer space and in the use of artificial intelligence. The EU offers its Member States an unparalleled platform for cooperation on all these matters. The breadth of its scope for action and variety of tools allow it to develop integrated approaches covering the complex nature of today’s challenges and linking the internal and external dimensions of security. Together, the EU and its Member States are among the world’s most powerful actors. But the success of the EU in working together for a safer world will ultimately depend on its Member States’ commitment to promote and defend their common interests and on their determination in this collective engagement.

The Challenges This chapter was written before the COVID-19 pandemic. It seems worth saying that COVID-19 has enhanced the geostrategic rivalry among global players. At the same time, it shows that only cooperative and multilateral approaches provide answers to challenges that are increasingly global.

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The situations in Syria, Iraq and Yemen reflect specific realities in each of these countries, but also rivalries between major regional players. It will be difficult to address all of this in any sustainable manner unless the broader context and dynamics are considered. Informally, many have been calling for a Westphalian-type concert for the region, but international efforts continue to address each of these situations separately. It is in any case important to note that UN mediation efforts will only bear fruit if the main international players truly support them and cease pursuing divergent agendas. The impact of these crises on European security could not be clearer, from the spread of a new brand of terrorism exemplified by Daesh to their impact on uncontrolled movements of people. What they represent in terms of international insecurity is obviously much greater. And it is important to recall that the crises in Syria, Iraq and Yemen have in practice diverted international attention from the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This does not mean it has disappeared, nor that its potential for mobilisation is gone; it will return to the fore, and in the meantime options for advancing towards the two-State solution will have become even harder to pursue. The stabilisation of Libya and the adjacent Sahel region is a priority for the EU. Since Muammar Gaddafi’s overthrow (2011) Libya has remained submerged in instability. The internationally backed, Tripolibased Government of National Accord (GNA), wields limited practical authority. Organised crime, including that responsible for migrant smuggling and human trafficking, is flourishing and terrorist groups, such as Daesh, while defeated in Sirte, have established strongholds in various parts of the vast desert country. New arrangements to re-establish a nationally accepted State authority are key. This is the goal pursued by the UN. But stronger, genuine international support is crucial. External interference would currently appear more manageable than in the case of the Middle East/Gulf, but it is by no means negligible and helps fuel the myriad of militias and armed groups that under various denominations exercise practical control of the country’s territory. In addition to the insecurity this creates for the Libyan population itself, it puts at risk security in neighbouring countries, including in Europe. The dissolution of the Libyan State has had a deleterious effect on the broader Sahel region and contributed to Mali being virtually overrun by rebel and terrorist groups in 2012, transmitting further instability to its neighbours. One of the poorest regions in Africa is thus threatened by terrorist groups and organised crime in an unprecedented manner—a

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threat that, as seen in Mali or in the Central African Republic (CAR), can become existential. As my colleague Koen Vervaeke recalls in Chapter 11, the leadership in the Sahel countries has reacted in a courageous and enlightened way, opting to confront these threats head-on through enhanced regional coordination. They created the ‘Group of Five Sahel Countries’ (G5) to coordinate efforts not only through security instruments (such as the Joint Force1 created to operate along their internal borders) but also as regards economic and social development. Fault lines continue towards the East. The situations in the CAR, South Sudan and Somalia are clear flash points. While in the first two, internal dynamics are predominant, Somalia is a case of implosion where regional dynamics and the spread of terrorism, including recent developments in the Gulf, have combined to create a security situation that has been challenging its neighbours and the international community for more than twenty years. Security and stability in the Sahel belt, from Mauritania to Somalia, is no doubt a major strategic challenge for the region itself, but also for Europe’s own security. Increased demographic pressure in the coming years risks aggravating tensions. Fragile states will find it even more difficult to fight terrorism and organised crime, including networks responsible for migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. Porous borders open up paths towards Europe. The outbreak of conflict in Ukraine in 2014 marked the other big turning point for Europe’s security. The illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia and Moscow’s support for the separatists in the Donbas region constituted major breaches of the European security order as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the way these actions were carried out highlighted a more sophisticated modus operandi, comprising—among others—disinformation, covert action and the exploitation of internal weaknesses, currently described as ‘hybrid’ aggression. EU relations with the Russian Federation have continued to deteriorate and a more antagonistic Russian stance is visible, be it in Ukraine (the Azov Sea being a recent example), other European theatres (Moldova and Georgia, but also the Western Balkans) or beyond (for example, Syria). The Minsk process, on which a formal review of relations with Russia hinges, remains stalled and has inherent weaknesses. The Skripal case, adding a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) dimension, and Russian violations of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) directly impacting on European security, completes this quick description of a very worrying current state of

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affairs. While this occurs, Europe is suffering from increased disinformation campaigns against EU interests, interference in internal political processes and elections, and cyber-attacks (see Chapter 14), all breeding further mistrust. EU policy towards Russia is based on the Five Guiding Principles agreed by the Council in March 20162 and endorsed by the European Council. At the same time, Russia remains a key world player. It is also the main energy supplier for many EU Member States and new connections continue to be developed. Looked at from a geo-strategic perspective, it would appear that there are in fact substantial common interests, including in the fight against terrorism, and that, as dreamt by many in the 1990s, a mutually beneficial relationship with the Russian Federation, while currently seen as difficult to achieve, could be possible. In addition to the security challenges described above, it is important to consider other major global developments that have become even more apparent over the past decade and that impact directly on Europe’s security. First and foremost, there is a clear return to strategic competition between major powers, in particular the US, China and Russia, within a multi-polar world. Some of its manifestations are well known and reflected in interventions in key conflict areas (Syria most obviously), the search for territorial gain or influence (in Eastern Europe or the South China Sea) or competition over natural resources (in the Arctic, for example, as Chapter 10 will discuss). Contrary to the prevailing narrative during the Cold War, the rivalry is not based primarily on ideological grounds, with one model of society trying to impose itself upon others but, rather, power structures that seek to prevail or place themselves in a position of pre-eminence that will ultimately allow them to set the agenda for others, quite often following a zero-sum game logic. Second, the Asian continent, with its economic, technological and demographic capacity and potential, will occupy the international centre stage in the years to come. At the same time, with its numerous security fault lines, absence of an overarching regional security structure and with considerable nuclear military capability, it also raises serious concerns. Increased tensions or conflict in Asia would have consequences far beyond the region. Superpower rivalry and power politics are already active in this theatre. Third, it must be noted that the values of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, for which the EU and its Member States stand, are not equally understood, or recognised and accepted within the international community. It is essential to ensure

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that these values are not stifled, which would eventually endanger their survival, but, on the contrary, are further embraced by other societies as they evolve and develop, as Stavros Lambrinidis argues eloquently in Chapter 3. Fourth, the renewal of competition over an old domain—the seas—is now coupled with competition over two other key interconnecting spaces: cyber-space and outer-space. The significance of the latter two areas hardly needs to be emphasised in terms of communications, information control and situational awareness, including their military implications. To the extent they have a direct impact on the control of territory and oceans, they increasingly constitute decisive elements of power in the twenty-first century.

Addressing the Challenges The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive list of international threats and challenges, which, unfortunately, are much broader, both in terms of countries and regions affected by turmoil, or in terms of planetary problems that need to be addressed, from climate change to development issues. But it does reflect some of the main security issues the EU and its Member States must tackle if they want to promote and defend their interests effectively. It also shows that to protect Europeans against terrorism, organised crime, disinformation and cyber-attacks, or even to maintain Europe’s capacity to develop economically, it is important to look beyond the EU’s borders and actively address some of the key international problems that confront it and be well aware of their interlinkages. During the past three years the EU has therefore deployed a significant effort in developing its security and defence tools. It has worked comprehensively, since tackling many of the threats requires a combination of instruments ranging from security and defence, to diplomacy, development and trade, among others. The following section passes briefly in review some of the most important initiatives launched in the fields of defence capability development, crisis management, and security and defence policy. While many of the security challenges the EU and its Member States are facing require a multi-dimensional response, defence capabilities remain a crucial component for international engagement in support of international peace and security, for the direct protection of EU citizens

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and as a key element of deterrence, without which overall the EU Member States’ security would be compromised. The need for defence capabilities is even more important at times when other powers are investing significantly in this domain. This requires investing both more and more wisely. An important part of EU efforts in the past few years has been devoted to these objectives. Cooperation among Member States in producing defence capabilities will bring down costs, through improved economies of scale, and enhance interoperability. It will also contribute to consolidating Europe’s defence industry and strengthening its technological and research capacity. Bearing in mind that more and more EU Member States will be called to operate jointly under an EU, NATO, UN or other multinational framework, enhanced cooperation among them to develop defence capabilities is an obvious choice. The EU has therefore developed three main tools to assist and support cooperation: Permanent Structural Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defense Fund (EDF) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). Under PESCO, in line with the Treaty on European Union3 and the implementing Council Decision,4 the Member States that have decided to join (‘participating States’) have assumed commitments to invest more in defence, to do this jointly—in cooperation—and to be ready to deploy jointly as well, in promotion of common interests. Participating States must report annually on the implementation of these commitments through National Implementation Plans. The commitments are implemented, among other ways, through PESCO projects, of which there are two main types: those that aim at developing mechanisms or procedures to bring together existing defence assets in view of their joint use or deployment; and those that develop new defence capabilities from the research phase to coordinating industrial production. A ‘PESCO Secretariat’ (integrated by the EEAS and EDA) supports the participating Member States in implementing their reinforced cooperation under PESCO, as well as the High Representative in his functions within the PESCO framework. The 25 Member States that currently participate in PESCO (all except Malta and Denmark) have so far agreed on a total of 34 projects.5 Some of them are quite significant from an industrial and defence perspective. In addition, while PESCO is a mechanism for cooperation between Member States, cooperation with third countries on a case by case basis

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for specific projects is also foreseen.6 Modalities for this are being developed. The main goal is to ensure that third-State participation will bring real added value to the project (operational, technological or financial) and will not compromise the nature and goals of PESCO within the Union framework. As regards financial support, the EDF regulation is currently being negotiated within the broader discussions on the 2021–2027 EU Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF). It will be modelled on its predecessor, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), with a total of e500 million per year until 2021. The EDF proposal foresees e13 billion for the 2021–2027 period. This fund, which would be established within the EU budget, would finance both research activities in the field of defence and the development of projects up to the level of a prototype. The European Commission will propose a yearly programme based on project proposals received from the defence industry. EU financing is intended to incentivise cooperation, make industry more competitive and help mobilise greater investment from Member States. Finally, the CARD process complements these instruments. Through a periodic monitoring of national defence plans, it will help in identifying gaps in European investment while also serving as a pathfinder for further possibilities for cooperation between Member States who intend to invest in the same type of capabilities. Ultimately, CARD will contribute to the integration of these EU tools and methodologies within respective national defence planning processes in the Member States. The combination of these instruments results in the most ambitious and comprehensive multilateral cooperation mechanism for the development of defence capabilities ever conceived. To ensure internal coherence, the mechanism is based on a common identification of priorities established within the EU Capability Development Plan (CDP). The CDP is a primary reference for development of projects and programmes within both PESCO and EDF/EDIDP. It will help avoid the dispersion of efforts and ensure that EU capability defence development is aimed at addressing the most important gaps and thus enhance Member States’ operational capacity. In this regard, the CDP considers not only capability requirements within EU crisis management, but also the national defence requirements of Member States and capability goals agreed through the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP).

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In addition to the CDP, links have been established between PESCO and EDIDP/EDF management procedures to ensure that these instruments support each other and that industrial projects under PESCO can benefit from EDF/EDIDP financing. The High Representative/VicePresident, also in his capacity as Head of the European Defence Agency, chairs regular meetings with relevant European Commissioners to fulfil the Council mandate7 of bringing coherence to these initiatives. This level of cooperation for the development of defence capabilities can only be established between States that share values and a common perception of threats, and that, acknowledging their interdependence, are willing to mobilise jointly in order to promote their security interests. This does not exclude the association of third partners to specific projects, as signalled above as regards PESCO, but also for EDIDP and EDF, where specific provisions provide for cooperation with companies controlled by third countries or by third countries’ entities. The open nature of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and a clear understanding of the need to work with a broader group of partners, notably within NATO, has therefore been reconfirmed. The success of these cooperation instruments will depend essentially on the willingness of Member States and the European industry to make them work. The benefits are evident—notably in terms of economies of scale, pooling of investments, enhanced research capacity and reduction of duplication of efforts—but results will require readjustments in a sector closely linked to national sovereignty and that has operated mostly in more secluded environments. Implementation reports, such as those prepared by the ‘PESCO Secretariat’, and the CARD assessments will bring important elements of analysis that will help alert Member States on the effectiveness of actions undertaken. A new mentality of cooperation— as the default option for defence capability development—will need to take root. Ultimately, this will strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. The present situation is widely acknowledged as unsustainable, with real risks of loss of industrial and technological capacity, but old ‘habits’ are difficult to break and strong political follow-up at the EU Council level will remain crucial. An important dimension of CSDP, as defined in the Treaty,8 is the EU’s capacity to promote international peace and security through the deployment of civilian and military crisis management missions and operations outside the territory of Member States. Building on the so-called Petersberg tasks, the Treaty9 now describes the range of crisis

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management actions that could be undertaken and that comprise, in its most demanding form, military combat operations. CSDP has been an area of considerable success, allowing the EU to address security challenges throughout the full conflict cycle. Since 2003 the EU has launched and run 34 operations and missions on three continents, of which 22 were civilian, 11 military and one—in Darfur—mixed. Today, there are 16 ongoing CSDP operations, ten civilian and six military. The Western Balkans was the primary focus of initial deployments, but the emphasis has now shifted towards the South. Indeed, CSDP actions in the Sahel, Libya, Somalia and the CAR constitute an important element of the comprehensive support that the EU is providing these countries in order to address their security challenges. Naval operations, such as those in the Central Mediterranean (operation SOPHIA) or off the coast of Somalia (operation ATALANTA), have opened up a CSDP maritime security dimension with a strong potential for wider strategic projection. Europe remains, of course, a key theatre for CSDP engagement. Support for the Western Balkans is now complemented with key civilian deployments in Georgia and Ukraine. These signal a clear EU intent and constitute a contribution to deterrence. Finally, in the Middle East, the EU continues its support for the Palestinian authority through Statebuilding activities, notably as regards police and border management, and has recently deployed an advisory security-sector reform mission to Iraq. Since the launch of CSDP crisis management at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, different arrangements and procedures for its implementation have been progressively developed. In recent years substantial progress has been made, notably through two main decisions taken by the Council at the proposal of the High Representative/VicePresident; the establishment of a MPCC,10 and the agreement on a Civilian Compact11 to enhance the EU’s civilian crisis-management capability. A third proposal of the High Representative/Vice-President, the EPF,12 crucial to ensure the effectiveness of EU support for partners in crisis management, is currently under discussion (see below). Finally, an increasing emphasis is being placed on conflict prevention, where the EEAS has also recently improved its early warning capacity and developed other relevant tools. The 2017 creation of a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) to manage non-executive military missions13 filled a gap in the EU toolbox. Before the creation of the MPCC, these non-executive missions were deployed without an out-of-area Operational Headquarters

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(OHQ). Consequently, they did not benefit as much from support or guidance from EU structures, or from lessons learned, and were overall less resilient. This situation required frequent travelling of the Operations Commander/Head of Mission to Brussels and direct mission investment in management actions best handled centrally. The situation has now changed completely. The MPCC exercises command and control responsibilities. Horizontal operating procedures and lessons learned can be implemented across missions much more easily, for instance within the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Links to broader EU action have been strengthened and institutional memory and continuity enhanced. In addition, the MPCC facilitates the exercise by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of political control and strategic direction on non-executive military missions (since the Operation Commander is now based in Brussels instead of in the field). The benefits of this system quickly became evident to all, leading to the agreement by the Council in November 201814 to extend the responsibilities of the MPCC to cover an executive military operation of EU Battlegroup size (approximately 2500 troops). The existing system of national OHQs15 placed by some Member States at the disposal of the EU, and the possibility of making use of Berlin plus16 arrangements (as for Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia Herzegovina, where SHAPE provides the EU OHQ), remain unaffected by these arrangements. The MPCC thus provides a complementary capability that will enhance EU readiness. The MPCC should undertake its new tasks by 2020 and a review is also foreseen to consider any possible additional developments. The MPCC has been established at a relatively low cost in terms of personnel and builds on support immediately provided by the EU Military Staff, whose Director General was appointed to head the MPCC. In total the MPCC should consist of about 60 permanent staff, with an augmented capacity of an additional 95 staff to be called upon in case of the deployment of an executive operation. This is a lower number than if a national OHQ were to be activated for such an operation, particularly bearing in mind that other non-executive missions would be run in parallel. In addition to the already described advantages, it will bring a higher level of readiness and greater know-how of EU-specific planning processes. Finally, the creation of the MPCC has built a bridge, the Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC), to its civilian ‘brother’, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). The JSCC should facilitate synergies

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and coordination when civilian and military missions and operations are deployed in the same theatre. It should also facilitate the sharing of experience and broader mutual support. Civilian CSDP crisis management missions constitute a powerful security tool for the EU. Twenty-four have been launched since the early 2000s. They have, inter alia, assisted in developing partner capacities in police and the rule of law (from Afghanistan to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Palestine, Libya and the Sahel), in the management of borders and the monitoring of boundary lines (Gaza, Libya and Georgia). They have also provided observers in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes (Aceh), and supported stabilisation and the development of security structures in complex post-conflict processes (Kosovo). The value of civilian CSDP has been further highlighted by the need to respond to new challenges, such as terrorism and organised crime. Member States thus agreed in November 201817 to further enhance their capacity to provide civilian experts for CSDP missions and operations and to improve the EU’s overall capacity to deploy civilian CSDP missions and operations. To this effect, they have entered into a ‘compact’, assuming commitments to review their internal procedures and legislation in a way that will recognise the relevance of contributing to civilian CSDP and facilitate the provision of experts for such missions and operations. Although the Feira18 priorities remain mostly valid, a review is underway to better identify the type of expertise required by addressing some of the most pressing and novel challenges, notably those related to the fight against terrorism, organised crime, border management and cyber threats. The EEAS and the European Commission, for their part, have made the commitment to support these efforts, including through training, synergies19 with other instruments (Justice and Home Affairs [JHA] agencies) and review mechanisms. On 9 December 2019, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions endorsing the waypoints identified and welcoming progress on the implementation of the Compact. Building on the experience of these past few years, the High Representative/Vice-President, with the support of the European Commission, presented a proposal20 to develop an extra-budgetary fund, the European Peace Facility (EPF). The Facility would finance CSDP military operations, as currently done through the ATHENA mechanism.21 It would support military operations of partners in a crisis

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management context, as currently done through the African Peace Facility (APF), but without geographical limitations, i.e. also outside the African continent. Finally, it would finance the military equipment of partners, also within a crisis management scenario. At present, the latter function can only be performed in a limited manner and in the context of the APF, or linked to a development objective, following the recent reform of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). The EPF would therefore seek to overcome the limitations of present instruments by providing the EU with a flexible tool that, always upon the explicit decision of the Council and within the parameters detailed therein for each specific situation, would facilitate support for the defence efforts of partners, be it individual nations or regional or sub-regional organisations or coalitions, in a crisis management/stabilisation context and with the aim of contributing to international peace and security. The same instrument would deal with the financing of the EU’s own CSDP military missions and operations, thereby simplifying decision-making procedures, bringing greater unity and coherence to EU action in these contexts, as well as facilitating the availability of funds to launch a new CSDP military operation. An increase in common costs for EU military operations is also proposed to enhance solidarity. Discussions on this instrument are currently ongoing in the context of the EU MFF negotiations. A positive outcome would allow the EU to become a far more effective and influential partner in support of international crisis management. Many of the tools discussed above can contribute to crisis management as much as support a preventative agenda. The Civilian Compact is particularly clear in this respect. Furthermore, during the last two years, the EU has made important efforts to improve its capacity to detect potential crises and intervene before they erupt: early warning leading to early action. Building on past practice, an improved and updated new methodology for conflict prevention informs annual analyses based on a full list of key risk factors. This results in the identification of countries where structural weaknesses with the potential to lead to violent conflict in the coming years are highest. This analysis is refined in a whole-of-EU approach, led by the EEAS and associating all relevant European Commission services, resulting in the selection of four to five countries per year where the risk is deemed higher, where the impact on EU security may be significant and where the EU as such has some capacity and leverage to influence developments. Member States are continuously informed and involved

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throughout the process. They are associated with the subsequent phases of implementation that entail a conflict analysis (root causes and potential triggers) and the development of an ‘action plan’. An annual report explains the measures adopted by the EU and its Member States and assesses their impact and further developments. This mechanism, aimed at the early detection of countries structurally at higher risk of conflict and at deploying concerted EU action to try to address some of the weaknesses identified, is complemented by a shorter-term EEAS ‘horizon scanning’ tool that looks into the immediate future (three to six months ahead) to warn of more imminent risks and to identify potential triggers. This latter tool has been up and running for two years and its performance is monitored and constantly improved. In addition to the points above, important work has also been carried out these past years in the field of security and defence policy. New frameworks for action within the EU and engagement with partners have seen the light in areas ranging from hybrid threats to cyber defence and security, counterterrorism, maritime security and disarmament and nonproliferation. The need for horizontal action in many of these fields has been highlighted and coordination and cooperation between the EEAS and the European Commission has gained in strength and consistency. As mentioned above, the conflict in Ukraine opened a new chapter in the way security threats are considered within the EU. Following on from the 2016 European Commission and High Representative Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats,22 considerable progress has been made in identifying areas for assistance to Member States in order to increase resilience to hybrid attacks, notably as regards the protection of critical infrastructure, but also on disinformation, cyber resilience and overall hybrid awareness. Terrorism and organised crime figure prominently among the perceived security concerns of EU citizens. Organised crime often contributes to finance terrorism and many common routes are used by both criminal networks and terrorists. They both take advantage of weak State structures and contribute to weakening them further. Finally, the means to fight them have commonalities; they require strengthening State security and defence structures and more effective control of borders—they also call for better governance and development opportunities. Some preliminary considerations on the fight against terrorism and organised crime may be useful. First, instability and conflict in the immediate vicinity of Europe provide sanctuaries and facilitate the development

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of criminal and terrorist structures and their business models. As regards radicalisation and violent extremism, conflict also offers a motivation. Addressing these crises and active engagement with external partners is therefore essential. Internal protective measures will otherwise remain insufficient. Second, addressing the root causes of terrorism and organised crime requires a multidimensional response ranging from purely security approaches to development and governance—an ‘integrated approach’. Third, no Member State has the breadth of instruments, leverage and capacity to cover the vast geographical and thematic scope required to be effective. A concerted EU effort is therefore necessary. These considerations have been at the heart of the EU’s international engagement over the past three years. The EU has deployed key security and defence capacity-building missions in the Sahel and in Libya, and a major naval operation in the Central Mediterranean, Operation SOPHIA, to enhance its partner’s ability to confront these challenges, and, in the case of SOPHIA, to directly disrupt the business model of organised criminal networks responsible for migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Enhanced cooperation is being developed between CSDP missions and operations and JHA agencies, in particular EUROPOL and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG). These actions are complemented with reinforced political dialogue and development efforts targeting areas where State control is limited, thanks notably to the development of new, more flexible instruments, such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). In parallel, the EU has enhanced considerably its international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, deploying counterterrorism experts in key EU Delegations with priority in the immediate neighbourhood, but progressively to other regions as well. New efforts are underway to strengthen existing instruments for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. Formal dialogues have been developed with a number of countries, as well as with the UN. Action plans on the fight against terrorism have been coordinated, notably in the Balkans. This has been a fully inter-institutional effort, with the EEAS, European Commission services and the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) working hand in glove. Much of this work has concentrated on the issues of the exchange of information on the return of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) and experience on the prevention and countering of radicalisation. Cyber-space

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has an important role here as a vehicle for terrorist recruitment and incitement. The removal of content from the web is a key issue where the EU has also developed strong relations with leading Internet service providers, as well as enhanced understanding through the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). While terrorism remains a major threat to key partners in the EU’s vicinity, many of the most immediate terrorist threats in European cities are now home-grown, although often externally inspired. External efforts have therefore been accompanied by remarkable developments within the EU itself, notably enhancing the capacities of agencies such as EUROPOL and EBCG, and the overall exchange of information and increased capacity to coordinate the management of external borders. With 80% of world trade transiting through sea lanes, the maritime domain is of key importance for international security. Sovereignty-related disputes and threats from piracy and organised crime affect the freedom of navigation and endanger major trade routes. In addition, environmental concerns and the use of maritime natural resources have, if anything, acquired greater significance. The revised EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan adopted in June 2018 seeks to enhance the EU’s role as a global maritime security provider. The EU is active in this domain through its Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), capacity-building projects, notably in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, as well as two key CSDP maritime operations: EUNAVFOR Med Operation SOPHIA23 in the Central Mediterranean and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, off the coast of Somalia. SOPHIA’s main mandate is the fight against organised crime responsible for migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. Other security elements have been added by relevant UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions,24 in particular the implementation of an arms embargo imposed on, and the monitoring of oil smuggling from Libya. The operation is therefore evolving into a broader maritime security operation in an area of key importance for the security of the EU. Operation ATALANTA’s mandate against piracy off the coast of Somalia, also based on UNSC authorisation25 has not evolved significantly since its launch. Nevertheless, other trafficking (weapons, drugs, coal, militants…) is heavily present in this area and affects the security of riparian States. Both CSDP naval operations have become major hubs for international cooperation with other navies or maritime stakeholders (shipping and insurance companies), including through innovative mechanisms such

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as the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE). Success and innovative approaches in this domain open the door to other ideas that could be explored short of launching new CSDP maritime operations proper, such as coordinated EU maritime presences in areas of maritime security interest.26 In addition to operational action, the EU is heavily engaged in maritime cooperation with other international partners, in particular with the African Union (AU) and other African regional organisations in supporting efforts in the Gulf of Guinea, in particular the Yaoundé process, since 2013. The EU is promoting maritime security in the widest sense within broader international forums, where maritime security issues are being discussed, including the UN and the Our Ocean Conference. Preservation of the freedom of navigation remains a central objective as it directly affects the EU’s broader international engagement. The EU is a leader in supporting the universalisation and effective implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and conventions to which all its Member States are parties. Both terrorist threats and increased great-power rivalry have resulted in new challenges, undermining the positive trends of the previous two decades or so. Thus, unfortunately, and despite the successes of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), recent years have witnessed the renewed use of chemical weapons (or toxic chemicals, such as chlorine, as weapons) in the Syrian conflict, and as tools of political assassination. The EU has reacted resolutely to combat the impunity of CW usage, both within the CWC and in a new French-led initiative. It strongly supports the work conducted by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague, including its Fact-Finding Mission in Syria. The trend of decreased reliance on nuclear weapons in security and defence doctrines has also been stopped, if not reversed. The breach of the Budapest Memorandum by the Russian aggression against Ukraine has put into question the negative security assurances provided to Ukraine and some other States when they renounced nuclear weapons and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon States. The NPT review process has also been affected by other challenges, such as the long-standing issue of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The fate of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces in Europe (INF) is an equally worrying development directly affecting the EU.

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Conventional weapons also remain a matter of grave concern. The new EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms and Light Weapons, and their Ammunition, adopted in November 2018, takes account of the increased threat posed by conventional weapons in the hands of terrorists, as well as developments in weapons design and manufacturing (3D printing). The EU strongly supports the new UN Arms Trade Treaty. Furthermore, it spends considerable resources on the promotion of effective arms export controls and on strengthening border security in its neighbourhood and beyond, in order to prevent trafficking of arms, including from failed States and regional conflicts. Other fields require continued attention. Regarding the possible use of artificial intelligence in automated weapons, efforts are presently centred on a code of conduct to ensure that all weapons systems will ultimately need a human decision to be triggered. Regarding outer space, the EU and its Member States continue to promote a multilateral, inclusive and cooperative approach for responsible behaviour in the framework of the UN, more particularly building on the work on Long-Term Sustainability guidelines by the Committee for the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS). While the EU has established a Common Position on arms export control with a view towards the increased convergence of Member States’ policies, it has become increasingly evident that the export of dualuse equipment often facilitates the development of important defence capabilities in third countries. Such transfers of technology may ultimately have an impact on the collective security of Member States. Awareness in this regard is on the rise. The actual decision to export arms, however, remains the competence of Member States. Non-proliferation and disarmament will remain at the heart of superpower relations. The EU can and should continue to play a key role in mobilising the international community on these matters and pushing for a peace and security agenda. Over the past few years, the EU has expanded its action in outer space, notably through the Galileo programme. This set of satellites provides the EU with a unique geo-localisation system and access to the many uses this can offer. These efforts—coupled with the Copernicus programme aimed at the observation of the Earth and with intelligence instruments, such as the SATCEN agency that provides imagery analysis—are giving the EU an effective outer-space capacity. These are key contributions to international peace and security.

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Cooperating with Partners The EU is well aware that even while bringing together all the capabilities of its Member States, influencing world events also requires cooperation with other partners. This is firmly ingrained in the EU’s nature and its multilateral creed. It was acknowledged in the 2003 Security Strategy and reiterated in the Global Strategy of 2016.27 Cooperation with partners and international organisations is therefore present in all aspects of the EU’s security and defence policy. It ranges from participation of partners in CSDP crisis management operations, engagement in the fight against terrorism and organised crime and even extends to participation in defence capability development projects. It needs to be based on a shared understanding, shared interests and, as much as possible, on shared values, with specific decisions taken most of the time by the Council of the EU on a case by case basis. A new overarching framework for cooperation with partners on CSDP is currently under consideration in the EEAS. The aim would be to provide greater clarity on the overall network of EU engagement with international partners on security and defence issues, and greater flexibility to tailor specific relationships to the characteristics of, and commitments assumed by, each partner. It could, among others, comprise a review of modalities for participation of third countries in CSDP missions and operations, aimed at extending political ownership and benefiting more from the experience and capacities that partners may bring. The EU takes good care of its relations with key bilateral partners, holding regular summit meetings and consultations at high official level in many fields, including security and defence issues. (This will also be the case, it is hoped, with the UK now that it has left the EU.) In line with its general approach aimed at strengthening effective multilateralism, multilateral partners occupy a privileged position in the EU’s international engagement on security and defence. Special reference should be made in this context to recent developments in the EU’s cooperation with NATO, the UN, the AU and ASEAN. NATO’s role in collective defence is explicitly acknowledged in the Treaty of the European Union.28 NATO is also a main instrument for the operationalisation of the Transatlantic relationship. Accordingly, engagement with NATO has been a priority for the EU, while it has been unfolding momentous security and defence initiatives. As an outcome, EU-NATO relations have improved substantially in terms of mutual

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understanding and practical cooperation. The joint declarations by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, in 2016 and 2018 constitute the framework for this development. A set of 74 common actions have been identified covering: countering hybrid threats; operational cooperation including at sea and on migration; cyber security and defence; defence capabilities; defence industry and research; exercises and supporting Eastern and Southern partners’ capacity-building efforts. This has led to a constant process of engagement between the staff of both organisations, reciprocal briefings to respective committees and Councils and the reactivation of PSC-NAC meetings. All this is carried out in full respect of the autonomy of decision-making of each organisation, based on inclusiveness and reciprocity. The mutual benefits and complementarity of efforts deployed by both organisations is increasingly evident. The contribution of the EU to military mobility with a full action plan,29 including harmonisation of legislation and practices and revamping of critical transport networks in Europe, is a case in point. Similarly, as explained earlier, defence capabilities developed through PESCO and EDF are based on priorities (within the CDP) that take into account NATO’s Defence Planning Process (NDPP). In fact, responding to NATO requirements is a key criterion in the selection of PESCO projects. The most recent parallel and coordinated exercise (PACE) HEX-ML 18, where the EU was in the lead, developed a scenario that highlighted the unique tools the EU has to address a very complex hybrid attack. EU engagement in the South, Libya and the Sahel, at a time when NATO is deploying its Enhanced Forward Presence to the East of Europe, further underlines the complementarity of operational efforts. Thus, developments over the past few years have clearly shown the EU’s willingness to share information and work in a manner supportive of NATO. For its part, NATO decides on issues that are vital to the security of the EU and its Member States, such as deployments in Eastern Europe, or discusses other key issues for the EU, such as the INF Treaty. Some of the issues that render the relationship more complex, and that come to the surface from time to time, are well known and it is important to distinguish between positions of individual members or allies and the responsibilities of respective organisations.

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As Christian Leffler points out in Chapter 2, the UN is at the centre of EU efforts to promote effective multilateralism. Cooperation with the UN in crisis management30 has been a key dimension of CSDP since its very beginnings in the early 2000s. The first EU CSDP operations took over from the UN in the Balkans (EUPOL BiH and EULEX Kosovo) or supported UN deployments in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad. At present, important cooperation with the UN is underway in the CAR, Mali (and more generally the Sahel region), Somalia and Libya. A Steering Committee gathers UN and EU senior officials twice a year to review progress on crisis management and provide strategic guidance. Cooperation between respective missions and operations in the field is a daily matter and the EU is among the strongest supporters of UN efforts in the field of peace and security. A new set of priorities31 for cooperation in this area was agreed in September 2018, mostly based on operational cooperation, but emphasising Women, Peace and Security, as well as a preventative agenda. A conflict prevention dialogue with the UN is now also in place. As Koen Vervaeke considers in Chapter 9, many EU crisis management activities are carried out in Africa. The security of the African continent is of essential interest for Europeans. Consequently, the EU is one of the key supporters32 of the African Union (AU) and its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as well as financiers of AU operations, such as AMISOM (Somalia). An APF was created out of the European Development Fund for this very purpose and the new European Peace Facility will no doubt prove crucial in maintaining strong backing to African peacekeeping efforts. The EU further supports AU mediation work, including in the CAR, and its engagement in other peace endeavours in the Great Lakes and Libya. It also supports AU efforts at the UN to guarantee sustainable financing for AU peace operations. In order to further develop this cooperation, a Memorandum of Understanding on EU-AU cooperation33 on Peace, Security and Governance was agreed on the occasion of a European Commission to African Union Commission meeting in spring 2018. It comprises a decision to organise yearly meetings at senior-official level to review progress in crisis management cooperation, counterterrorism and countering violent extremism, maritime security, conflict prevention and small arms and light weapons (SALW) matters, among others. Implementation has started and a dialogue on conflict prevention was already launched in 2018. Trilateral EU-UN-AU engagement in all these matters is gaining strength and, if

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well managed, could become a real driver of a multilateralism agenda. It is also good to note that EU cooperation with African partners extends to other sub-regional actors, for example the G5 Sahel and its Joint Force and the Multinational Joint Force of the Lake Chad Basin. In considering EU engagement with multilateral partners, Asia deserves a special mention. Developments in this continent during the coming years will mark the world’s future. Cooperation with regional organisations in Asia is quite a challenge as, differently from the Americas, Europe or Africa, there is no pan-continental security organisation or arrangements and, at the same time, there are numerous security fault lines and unsolved conflicts, including territorial disputes. In this regard, the work performed over the years by ASEAN is quite remarkable. This grouping of States has managed to develop, in various concentric circles around itself, different level arrangements for cooperation/discussion of Asian regional security matters, involving the broader international community and thus introducing elements that may help compensate regional imbalances. The EU and ASEAN recently agreed to upgrade their relationship to a Strategic Partnership. In this context, the EU is engaging actively in the various security cooperation formats that ASEAN has established. The EU maintains its aspiration to become a permanent guest to the (ASEAN) East Asia Summit. This builds on the already existing participation of the EU in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) ministerial meetings and is complementary to the ASEM forum, where the EU already meets all Asian leaders at Head of State or Government level every two years.

The EU: An Unparalleled Platform for Cooperation on Security and Defence Given the nature and magnitude of the challenges with which they are confronted, it is clear that EU Member States will only be able to address them and have an effective capacity to engage with other major world players by working together. Individually, not even the most powerful Member State can intervene at a level equivalent to that of some of the other major players, mobilise the wide range of tools required and cover the broad spectrum of threats. Three main developments underline the value of the EU in addressing security and defence challenges; an integrated approach; the internal-external nexus; and the development of defence and crisis management capabilities.

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It has become increasingly evident that most security challenges and crises have multiple dimensions. The EU constitutes an unparalleled platform for cooperation. It covers all sectors and offers a full set of tools and procedures for their coordinated mobilisation, including diplomacy, sanctions, crisis management, development, trade and humanitarianism. Only within the EU can a global and comprehensive strategy for international engagement that takes into account the multiple variables and interconnections be implemented. This is described within the 2016 Global Strategy as the ‘integrated approach’. Many formal and informal mechanisms have been developed since the presentation of the Strategy, increasing considerably the coordination between the European Commission and the EEAS in addressing security and defence challenges. This is reflected now in countless joint strategies and action plans, but more importantly in actual engagement. The security challenges of the past years have led to an intensified development of JHA mechanisms and agencies. This is notably reflected in the expansion of competencies and capabilities of both EUROPOL and the re-configured and re-baptised European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG, the former FRONTEX). But there are many other examples, including cyber, where common training platforms and rapid reaction teams are being created. At the same time, it has become more evident that there is no solution exclusively ‘within’ the EU. Most of the internal security challenges have an important external dimension and, as much as possible, need to be addressed before they reach the EU’s borders. Consequently, the past few years have seen increased concerted EU engagement abroad to deal with issues such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, including through capacity building, greater international projection of JHA agencies and enhanced links and the exchange of information between CSDP missions and operations and JHA agencies. Member States’ bilateral international cooperation in such matters remains important, but the breadth of engagement offered by the EU is also of value. Finally, as examined in other sections of this paper, the past three years have shown that the EU remains a unique forum for defence-related initiatives. PESCO, EDF and CARD provide a solid architecture for cooperation between Member States in the development of defence capabilities, comprising joint prioritisation of requirements, political commitments for increased investment and cooperation and financial incentives. Integration of these tools into national defence planning processes will

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ultimately change the paradigm of European defence cooperation and transform Member States’ defence industrial and technological bases. At the same time, the MPCC, JSCC and Civilian Compact have raised the EU’s crisis-management capacity to unprecedented levels and placed the EU among the top three multilateral crisis management actors.

Conclusions This chapter has considered the magnitude of the challenges the EU is facing in its immediate vicinity and the need to address them against a backdrop of renewed strategic rivalry between major powers. It has shown how the EU helps Member States unite their efforts to deliver a multiplier effect in addressing such challenges and developing the capabilities required. Finally, it has considered how the EU facilitates and enhances engagement with international partners, including multilateral partners. While the EU will seek to act with partners as much as possible (this is its ‘default option’), it needs to have the capacity to do so on its own when required. ‘Strategic autonomy’ is a rallying cry to do and invest more in defence, and thereby have the capacity to ‘shoulder a greater part of the burden’ in the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion and defence of its own interests. It is also an expression of determination. Unfortunately, sometimes the use of these words leads to misunderstandings regarding the EU’s commitment to transatlantic relations or even NATO’s role. Part of the problem is that there is no agreed definition of what is meant by strategic autonomy within the EU (or even more broadly), but one thing is quite clear: absolute strategic autonomy, in the sense of having the capacity to face all security and defence challenges and threats without any external support, is unattainable. In the case of the EU, this argument is further reinforced by clear limitations included in its founding Treaty. Article 42(7) declares that ‘the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation…, for those States that are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation’. This means that higher-end military mobilisations aimed at guaranteeing collective defence remain a NATO responsibility and the EU will not develop structures or procedures to substitute for them. (This answers a related question; nuclear military deterrence remains outside the scope of EU actions.) However, despite the fact that there is no agreed definition of strategic autonomy, and that a broader

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definition of strategic autonomy taking into account trade and economic aspects, among many others, is also possible, greater convergence of what is meant by this within the field of defence is emerging within EU Member States. Three main components can be identified: capacity of decision, which also comprises situational awareness; development of defence capabilities and operational capacity. As an international political actor, the EU needs to have a fully autonomous capacity for decision-making and instruments at its disposal that will allow it to assess a situation and decide on the best course of action. EU decision-making mechanisms are indeed autonomous, and the EU possesses a broad range of equally autonomous capabilities that allow it to collect and analyse information and develop a comprehensive assessment of any international security situation with a view to taking relevant decisions. Among such capabilities, the 142 EU delegations across the world and the Satellite Centre (SATCEN) in Torrejón (Spain)—which provides a useful tool for analysing satellite imagery—deserve pride of place. All this is usefully complemented by the intelligence provided by Member States through the Single Intelligence Analysis Capability (SIAC), which brings together analyses from the EEAS Intelligence Centre (INTCEN) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) Intelligence Directorate. Being able to act when deemed necessary in a security context requires having the necessary defence capabilities, security of supply of such capabilities and access to relevant technology. This ultimately calls for the development of a stronger European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDITB). At the same time such a defence industrial base is a multiplier for economic development and cannot be neglected in the EU’s industrial policy. PESCO, EDF and CARD are tools that support these goals. In any case, defence capabilities developed in an EU framework will remain Member States’ capabilities. The EU itself does not possess defence capabilities, nor is it foreseen that it will have them. EU crisis management operations will be deployed based on capabilities put at the disposal of the EU by its Member States, as stated in the Treaty on European Union.34 Member States that are NATO allies will be able to use these capabilities for NATO operations as well. In fact, as seen, the NDPP has been taken into account in the identification of EU capability priorities that inform work within the PESCO and EDF. Greater investment by Member States in defence capability development will help implement

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NATO targets on its Allies’ defence expenditure. Reinforced cooperation between Member States in development of defence capabilities will further increase interoperability of their defence forces, to the benefit of NATO as well. Finally, while mechanisms such as PESCO and EDF have been developed to promote cooperation between Member States, there are possibilities of widening that cooperation to third States, provided it serves the interests of the project itself and does not create security risks. All in all, the efforts carried out within the EU for the development of defence capabilities will help consolidate and strengthen the defence industry of Member States and their technological capacity. From a NATO perspective, this should be understood as strengthening a ‘European pillar’ within NATO and therefore contributing to greater burden-sharing. The EU itself has clarified in the Treaty that a key goal of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is crisis management. The type of actions it intends to be able to carry out is defined within the ‘EU level of ambition’ (LoA). Its most recent iteration can be found in the November 2016 Council conclusions.35 At the higher end of the spectrum, these are expeditionary crisis management types of operation that can include combat operation. All of them taken together remain well beneath what could be interpreted as ‘collective defence’, but do provide a significant capacity to project power, drawing lessons from most recent international experience. Furthermore, the recent decades have proven that there is, in fact, a good practical division of labour between EU and NATO in crisis management. In any case, common elements of membership should help defuse conflict regarding decisions in any given situation, and the added value of the EU in certain theatres and its capacity to mobilise a variety of tools (diplomatic, economic, development, humanitarian, etc.), beyond security and defence, will no doubt be factors taken into account. The capacity of the EU to deliver an ‘integrated approach’ also strengthens its strategic autonomy and its capacity to shoulder the burden of maintaining international peace and security, in line with its own assessment of a given situation and within its agreed LoA. Strategic autonomy is both an overarching goal and the capacity to act when required. As an overarching goal, it aims to mobilise the Member States’ energies and EU mechanisms to develop the required defence capabilities and strengthen their readiness to intervene when required. The outcome must deliver the capacity to act, with partners in most cases, but also independently when required. Deepening of this understanding

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and greater awareness of the challenges that we are facing collectively should help Member States develop a stronger common ‘strategic culture’ that will help build determination and facilitate decisions on joint action to confront threats. The EU and its Member States can provide a solid response to today’s challenges. They can preserve the security of EU citizens and promote EU interests and values. They are, when standing together, a ‘superpower’ in their own right. But they need to believe in it and act as one; working together for a safer world.

Notes 1. The G5 Sahel Joint Force was officially launched on 2 July 2017 at a G5 Sahel summit in Bamako. It had been endorsed by the African Union and by the UN Security Council through Resolution 2359 (21 June 2017). 2. (1) Full implementation of the Minsk agreements; (2) strengthening relations with Eastern partners and other neighbours, including Central Asia; (3) strengthening the resilience of the EU; (4) selective engagement with Russia on issues of interest to the EU; and (5) need to engage in people-to-people contacts and support to Russian civil society. 3. Articles 42-6, 46 and Protocol 10. 4. Council of the European Union (2017a). 5. Council of the European Union (2018a, b). 6. Council of the European Union (2017a, Article 9). 7. Council of the European Union (2017b, 2018c). 8. Article 42-1 of the Treaty of the EU. 9. Article 43-1 of the Treaty of the European Union. 10. Council of the European Union (2017c). 11. Council of the European Union (2018c). 12. High Representative (2018). 13. At present the EU has three capacity-building missions in Mali, the CAR and Somalia. Other non-executive military missions could comprise observer missions, for example. 14. Council of the European Union (2018c). 15. Centre for Planning and Conduct of Operations (CPCO) in Paris, France; Armed Forces Operational Command (EinsFüKdoBw) in Potsdam, Germany; Hellenic European Union Headquarters (EL EU OHQ) in Larissa, Greece; Italian Joint Force Headquarters (ITA-JFHQ) in Centocelle, Rome, Italy; Naval Station Rota (NAVSTA Rota) in Rota, Spain; and Multinational Headquarters (MNHQ) at Northwood Headquarters in London, UK. This latter OHQ will no longer be an EU HQ after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

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16. The Berlin Plus agreement is a shorthand title of a 16 December 2002 package of agreements between NATO and the EU. Based on the conclusions of NATO’s 1999 Washington summit, these agreements allow the EU to draw on some of NATO’s military assets in its own peacekeeping operations. 17. Council of the European Union (2018c). 18. The European Council of 19–20 June 2000 in Feira identified the police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection as key priority areas for the development of civilian crisis management capabilities. 19. The establishment of a Crime Information Cell on board of the EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA flagship, to liaise with EUROPOL and EBCG is a major step in this direction. 20. High Representative (2018). 21. Athena is a mechanism which handles the financing of common costs relating to EU military operations under the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP). 22. Joint (2016). 23. Operation SOPHIA has been replaced since the writing of this chapter with a main mandate ensuring the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya. 24. Implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya according to UNSCR 2292 (2016), UNSCR 2357 (2017) and UNSCR 2420 (2018). Surveillance activities and gathering information on illegal trafficking of oil exports from Libya in accordance with UNSCR 2146 (2014) and 2362 (2017). 25. UNSCR 1814 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008, 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011), 2020 (2011), 2077 (2012), 2125 (2013), 2184 (2014), 2246 (2015), 2316 (2016), 2383 (2017), 2442 (2018). 26. A pilot project for the Gulf of Guinea is currently being discussed. 27. ‘Partnerships’ is acknowledged to be one of the principles guiding the EU’s external action; furthermore, engagement with others is reiterated throughout the strategy and specific references are made to NATO’s role in defence. 28. Article 42-2 (‘The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the CSDP established within that framework’) and 42-7 (‘Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which,

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29. 30.

31. 32.

33. 34.

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for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation’). Adopted on 28 March 2018. The EU-UN partnership in the field of crisis management and peacekeeping was established in September 2003, when the EU and the UN issued their first Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation in Crisis Management. Endorsed by the Council on 18 September 2018. EU has supported the APSA with e486 million under the APF (e348 million) and Regional Indicative Programmes (e138 million) between 2008 and 2020. AU-EU Memorandum of Understanding on Peace, Security and Governance, adopted on 23 May 2018. Article 42.1: ‘The Common Security and Defence Policy… shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States’. Paragraphs 7–10 of Council conclusions of 14 November 2016. Paragraph 7: ‘Drawing on the proposal in the Implementation Plan, the Council hereby determines the level of ambition which sets out the main goals which the EU and its Member States will aim to achieve in order to implement the EUGS in the area of security and defence, including through CSDP, in support of three strategic priorities identified in the EUGS: (a) responding to external conflicts and crises, (b) building the capacities of partners, and (c) protecting the Union and its citizens. In doing this, the EU will pursue an integrated approach linking up different EU instruments in a coordinated way, building on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach and promoting civil-military cooperation. While respecting the autonomy of the EU’s decision-making processes, it will also continue to work closely with its partners, particularly with the United Nations and NATO’. Doc. 24149/16, Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence (14 November 2016), annex to the annex: ‘Based on previously agreed goals and commitments, the EU should be capable to undertake the following types of civilian missions and military operations outside the Union, a number of which may be executed concurrently, in different scenarios, including in situations of higher security risk and underdeveloped local infrastructure: joint crisis management operations in situations of high risk in the regions surrounding the EU; joint stabilisation operations, including air and special operations; civilian and military rapid response, including military rapid response operations inter alia using the EU battlegroups as a

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while or within a mission-tailored Force package; substitution/executive civilian missions; air security operations including close air support and air surveillance; maritime security or surveillance operations, including long term in the vicinity of Europe; civilian capacity building and security sector reform missions (monitoring, mentoring and advising, training) inter alia on police, rule of law, border management, counter-terrorism, resilience, response to hybrid threats, and civil administration as well as civilian monitoring missions; military capacity building through advisory, training and mentoring missions, including robust force protection if necessary, as well as military monitoring/observation missions’.

Bibliography Council of the European Union. 2016. Council Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence, Nov 14. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/ 11/14/conclusions-eu-global-strategy-security-defence/. Council of the European Union. 2017a. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 Establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and Determining the List of Participating Member States. https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D2315. Council of the European Union. 2017b. 13 November 2017 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/ 2017/11/13/. Council of the European Union. 2017c. Council Decision (EU) 2017/971 of 8 June 2017 Determining the Planning and Conduct Arrangements for EU Non-Executive Military CSDP Missions. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D0971&from=ES. Council of the European Union. 2018a. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/340 of 6 March 2018 Establishing the List of Projects to Be Developed Under PESCO. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/? uri=CELEX%3A32018D0340. Council of the European Union. 2018b. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1797 of 19 November 2018 Amending and Updating Decision (CFSP) 2018/340 Establishing the List of Projects to be Developed Under PESCO. https:// op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/7567b97b-ed62-11e8b690-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-116988952. Council of the European Union. 2018c. 19 November 2018 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/ 2018/11/19/. High Representative. 2018. Proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with the Support of the Commission,

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to the Council of 13 June 2018 for a Council Decision Establishing a European Peace Facility. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/46331/new-european-peace-facility-worth-%E2%82%AC105-bil lion-bolster-international-security_en. Joint. 2016. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council JOIN/2016/018, Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats, a European Union Response. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/? uri=CELEX%3A52016JC0018. Serrano de Haro, Pedro A. 2019. The Bundle of Sticks: A Stronger European Defence to Face Global Challenges. Working Paper No. 3, May 2019, Real Instituto Elcano.

CHAPTER 6

Trade in Turbulent Times Maria Åsenius

Some Background Reflections In this chapter I would like to consider three different aspects of the European Union’s trading relations in what is, quite clearly, a turbulent period. The first is the EU’s search for, and negotiation of, modern bilateral agreements that it hopes can further its values in the absence of multilateral progress. The second is the challenge, in the multilateral (WTO) context, of China’s rise as a major economy and of American reactions to that development. The third is the challenge of the EU’s relations with its erstwhile multilateral partner, the United States. How do we manage these? First, a few background reflections. Currently the EU is, quite simply, the biggest trader in the world; the biggest exporter and importer, the biggest investor but also the biggest recipient of investments. This is currently the case, but only for the time being, since all economic projections show that in relative terms the Union is set to diminish over time, as other parts of the world will experience faster growth rates. It therefore makes sense for the Union to exploit to a maximum its current advantage

M. Åsenius (B) European Commission, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_6

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as a trade power to fashion mutually advantageous deals with the world around it and, through those deals, to try to fashion that world in accordance with its own strategic vision and values. We know also that up to 90% of future economic growth is expected to happen outside Europe, mainly in Asia, so it makes sense for the Union to forge open, structured relationships with those growth areas.

Bilateral Agreements The Union currently has in place some forty trade agreements, covering about seventy countries. Many of these agreements are fairly old and not as ambitious as the new types of agreement that the EU is nowadays negotiating. The old agreements typically covered mainly the abolition of tariffs, whereas the more modern deep and comprehensive agreements also cover services, public procurement, and have chapters on trade and sustainable development, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and so on. In terms of the EU’s negotiation of bilateral agreements, the recent past has been little less than record-breaking. The crown jewel is the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and Japan, which entered into force on 1 February 2019. The agreement is a very important political signal that both the EU and Japan have opted for open, rules-based trade and hence reject protectionism, but it’s also economically very important because the agreement effectively covers almost a third of world GDP; EU firms already export nearly e70 billion in goods and e28 billion in services to Japan every year. The agreement removes tariffs1 and other trade barriers and creates a platform to cooperate in order to prevent obstacles to trade; and it helps the Union to shape global trade rules in line with our high standards and shared values. It is, moreover, an ambitious agreement. One of this author’s favourite innovations in the agreement is a chapter on SMEs. It can be quite a burden for a small company just to find out the correct information. That can be a trade barrier in itself because most small companies do not have ‘spare’ staff who can devote their time to searching out information. Thus, the EU’s negotiators really tried to make the agreement user-friendly from an SME point of view, and to make it easy to find out what rules apply if, say, an SME wishes to import something from Japan or export something to Japan.

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Other agreements that will soon enter fully into force include the agreements on trade and investment with Singapore. The original agreement was held up because the European Commission chose to take it to Court in order to clarify the division between Union and Member State competences, in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty’s fresh provisions, particularly regarding investments. After the clarifying verdict from the European Court of Justice, the Commission decided to split the agreement into two.2 The EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Protection Agreements were signed on 19 October 2018. The European Parliament gave its consent to the Agreements on 13 February 2019. The EU Member States endorsed the Trade Agreement on 8 November 2019, and it entered into force on 21 November 2019. The Investment Protection Agreement will enter into force after it has been ratified by all EU Member States according to their own national procedures. Together, the Agreements remove nearly all customs duties and get rid of overlapping bureaucracy; improve trade for goods like electronics, food products, and pharmaceuticals; stimulate green growth, remove trade obstacles for green technology and create opportunities for environmental services, and will encourage EU companies to invest more in Singapore, and Singaporean companies to invest more in the EU. The EU expects the free trade agreement (FTA) and investment protection agreement (IPA) with Vietnam (the two texts were signed by the EU and Vietnam in Hanoi on 30 June 2019) to come into effect quite soon, following the European Parliament’s agreement, voted on 12 February 2020. The Union sees the FTA as being its most ambitious free trade deal ever concluded with a developing country, involving near complete removal of tariff barriers, elimination of over 99% of customs duties on exports in both directions, reduction of non-tariff barriers, and closer alignment with international standards. As a result, EU products (which already comply with these standards) will not require additional Vietnamese testing and certification procedures. Vietnam will also simplify and standardise customs procedures. EU companies will be able to compete for Vietnamese government contracts (and vice versa), there will be improved access to Vietnamese service markets and the FTA will make it easier for EU companies to operate in the Vietnamese postal, banking, insurance, environmental, and other service sectors. As importantly, the FTA includes commitments to implement International Labour Organization (ILO) core standards (for example, on freedom to join independent trade unions—potentially a momentous change as Vietnam does

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not at present have any such unions) and UN conventions (for example, on combatting climate change and protecting biodiversity). In the same context of bilateral agreements, the European Union and Mexico have reached an ‘agreement in principle’ on the main trade parts of a new EU–Mexico association agreement to replace a previous deal, the EU–Mexico Global Agreement, which entered into force in 2000. The original agreement already brought many trade benefits to the EU and Mexico. The new deal will, inter alia, scrap high Mexican tariffs on European food and drinks, allow EU firms to sell more services to Mexico and again, as importantly, pledge to protect workers’ rights and the environment. Negotiations with Mexico started in May 2016 and both sides reached an agreement in principle on the trade part on 21 April 2018. The only missing piece is Mexico’s clarification on how (what entities covered) it will deliver on its commitment to open parts if its public procurement market to the EU. The EU has been similarly engaged in negotiations with Chile with a view to modernising an original Association Agreement, including a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force in February 2003. Meanwhile, on 28 June 2019 the European Union and the Mercosur states—Argentina, Brazil Paraguay, and Uruguay, reached a political agreement on an ambitious, balanced, and comprehensive trade agreement. The EU is Mercosur’s number one trade and investment partner. EU exports to Mercosur were e45 billion in goods in 2018 and e23 billion in services in 2017. The EU is the biggest foreign investor in Mercosur with a stock of e381 billion, while Mercosur’s investment stock in the EU amounts to e52 billion in 2017. While the relationship is already substantial both exporters and potential investors face barriers in Mercosur markets. The goal of the new EU–Mercosur trade deal is to: remove these barriers and help EU firms—especially smaller ones (those SMEs again!)—to export more; strengthen worker’s rights and ensure environmental protection, encourage companies to act responsibly, and uphold high food safety standards; and to protect quality EU food and drink products labelled as Geographical Indications from imitations. The agreement represents a win-win for both the EU and Mercosur, creating opportunities for growth and jobs for both sides. The trade agreement is part of a comprehensive new Association Agreement under negotiation between the EU and Mercosur countries, composed of a political and cooperation pillar—on which negotiators already reached a general agreement in June 2018 in Montevideo—and the trade pillar. Beyond

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trade, the agreement will enhance political dialogue and increase cooperation in areas such as migration, digital economy, research and education, human rights, including the rights of indigenous people, corporate and social responsibility, environment protection, ocean governance, as well as the fight against terrorism, money laundering, and cybercrime. It will also offer increased possibilities for cooperation at multilateral level. Thus, the Association Agreement will complete the network of Association Agreements in the Americas and consolidate relations with the important partners in the region, supporting EU positions on many global issues. Elsewhere in the globe, Australia and the European Union (EU) launched negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA) on 18 June 2018. Based on 2018–2019 data, as a bloc, the EU was Australia’s second largest trading partner, third largest export destination, and second largest services export market, and the EU was Australia’s largest source of foreign investment in 2018. And the EU and New Zealand launched negotiations for a free trade agreement in the same period. The EU is New Zealand’s third largest trading partner, accounting for 13.5% of total trade (following China and Australia, which account for 22 and 13.5% of New Zealand’s trade, respectively). The stock of EU foreign direct investment in New Zealand amounted to e8.8 billion, and the stock of New Zealand’s investment in the EU was e5.9 billion in 2017. Australia, New Zealand, and the EU are natural partners, with a shared commitment to the rule of law, global norms, and free and open markets. Negotiations are proceeding encouragingly. Lastly, following successful exploratory discussions in April 2016 to further deepen EU–Indonesia trade and investment relations, negotiations for an EU–Indonesia free trade agreement were launched on 18 July 2016. Nine rounds have been held so far. The tenth round of negotiations will be held in mid-March 2020. These are some of the main developments in the bilateral field (relations and negotiations continue with other countries). The EU feels that, in a shaky global context, it makes sense to have trade agreements with friends around the world and, as I have indicated, to build on open, rulesbased trade so as to share values or, in the case of developing countries such as Vietnam, to encourage them to share our values and, in all cases, to join together in the cause of sustainable development. It is perhaps because of that feeling that the EU’s bilateral agenda is busier than ever, and it explains also why agreements are falling into place. There was, for example, a notable feeling of acceleration on both the EU and the Japanese side following the 2016 US Presidential elections. This busy

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bilateral agenda may seem like a paradox, but it does not contradict the fact that the EU, as other contributors to this volume have stressed, is multilateralist at heart and in instinct.

The Multilateral Agenda: China, the WTO, and the US Indeed, the EU’s fundamental belief has always been that, ideally, open, rules-based trade should be taking place between everybody in the world or, at the least, the 164 member countries of the World Trade Organization. That would be far better than the so-called ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect3 of ever-growing numbers of bilateral agreements that are so difficult for economic actors to follow. The Union still hews to that view, but it also hopes that the bilateral agreements it is negotiating can help break new ground that can also be used in the multilateral context and, of course, the Union, like other partners, has taken note of the fact that the WTO has not been able to deliver very much—it is definitely not useless, far from that, but it hasn’t been able to deliver many new rules over the past decade or so. And the international, rules-based trading system as we know it is actually facing its worst crisis since it was created after the Second World War or, at least, since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) came into being in October 1947. The rules at the core of the system are increasingly being questioned, including by some of the founding members of the system, and that is a situation of deep concern. For decades, trading nations have been able to interact on the basis of clear rules that have been a major asset for their companies and their economies. Doing away with the WTO would only increase confrontation. It would be the law of the jungle and might would replace right. Many of the tensions that we see today, globally, are rooted in the fact of China’s economic rise and the rapidity of its rise, but also the way in which China has grown. China is not a market economy. Foreign companies are forced to share technology and know-how in order to be able to do business in the country. They are asked for an unacceptable amount of information in order to get licences. And the competition is distorted through massive industrial subsidies, either directly, or via stateowned enterprises, or via soft loans that are given through state-controlled banks or financial institutes. For as long as the Chinese economy was relatively small, this didn’t matter too much, but now that China has grown

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so quickly, the situation has become a real headache. China is now the world’s third biggest economy. China is the EU’s second most important trading partner, and for China the EU is its N° 1 trading partner. We have an important trade deficit vis-à-vis China which, in itself, would not be a problem if it were not for the fact that the EU has such uneven access to the Chinese economy. The EU is very open to Chinese companies, but China is much less open to our companies. The investment patterns tell an interesting story. For a long time, year-by-year, Europe invested in China, but in the last few years that investment has declined dramatically, and the same thing has happened with investment from the United States and Japan. The Chinese, on the other hand, have steadily increased their investment in the EU. In 2017 China invested eight times more in the European Union than the EU’s Member States did in China. Such a statistic, clearly, says something about who is open and who is closed. So, we think that we could have a much more open relationship if China were to take down its discriminatory barriers to trade. We try to solve some of these problems in our own bilateral, EU–China, negotiations. Here, our goals are: fair competition between Chinese companies and foreign companies; less requests for joint ventures; we would like more transparency and predictability, especially when it comes to regulated sectors such as telecom and financial services and transport and postal services, and so on. And we want better discipline for the state-owned enterprises in China. Of course, we also have state-owned enterprises in Europe but, with very few exceptions, these companies take decisions on a commercial basis—they are, in other words, market competitive. And we think that the Chinese should be able to do the same thing when it comes to steel or cars or chemicals, for example. As concerns the bilateral negotiations between the EU and the Chinese on investment, they advance rather slowly. It would be a mistake for China to take for granted the idea that the EU will always remain as open as it is today, and so it might be in their interests to speed up the negotiations. Chinese growth and investment have certainly triggered a lot of debates and reflection in the EU. In 2016, for example, the Chinese company Medea bought the German robotics company, Kuka, a purchase that provoked a lot of discussion at the time, and there have since been other eyebrow-raising acquisitions, such as the gradual acquisition of the port of Piraeus close to Athens in Greece starting in 2016 by the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) and, a few years later,

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the Chinese Three Gorges (CTG) Corporation’s 2018 bid for Portugal’s largest company, Energias de Portugal. Such events were probably the reason why in March 2019 the Member States, meeting together in the Council, rapidly adopted a regulation on the screening of foreign direct investments.4 While its major trading partners already had comparable rules in place, this was the first time that the EU equipped itself with such a comprehensive framework. The new rules create a cooperation mechanism whereby Member States and the European Commission will be able to exchange information and raise specific concerns. Member States will nevertheless retain the power to review and potentially to block foreign direct investment on security and public order grounds, and the decision to set up and maintain national screening mechanisms will also remain the responsibility of individual Member States. Thus, the European Commission will not seek to dissuade Member States and, of course, Member States can be understandably keen to attract foreign investment.5 In March 2019, for example, the Italian government made headlines when it signed up to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—the first G7 member country to enter into such an agreement.6 Overall, it is a difficult situation. The WTO is facing its worse crisis ever, an increasingly powerful China is exploiting the distortions and advantages arising out of its non-market economy status and, on top of that, the United States is reacting by taking unilateral, WTO-incompatible measures that also create problems for the EU (see below). But progress is nevertheless being made. The EU believes that the WTO’s rules should be modernised to better cater for problems such as intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, the massive industrial subsidies, and overcapacity I referred to previously. Here, the EU has been working together with the United States and Japan in high-level trilateral meetings. There are gaps in the rule book. Nobody foresaw China’s rapid emergence as a major economy when it joined the WTO in 2001. Thus, in January 2020, in Washington, the EU, the US, and Japan announced an agreement to strengthen existing rules on industrial subsidies and condemned forced technology transfer practices.7 They agreed that the current list of subsidies prohibited under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) rules is insufficient to tackle market and tradedistorting subsidisation existing in certain jurisdictions and concluded therefore that new types of unconditionally prohibited subsidies have to be added to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMs). The three also agreed that, for particularly harmful

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types of subsidies, such as excessively large subsidies, the burden of proof should be reversed: the subsidising WTO member must demonstrate that there are no serious negative trade or capacity effects and that there is effective transparency about the subsidy in question. The signatories also reaffirmed the importance of technology transfers for global trade and investment and discussed possible core rules to be introduced to prevent forced technology transfer practices of third countries. The EU also has an EU–China working group where, once again, it tries to advance reforms, and in the autumn of 2018 the EU-tabled reforms to the WTO in Geneva on matters such as transparency and notifications and on reforms to the Appellate Body.8 With regard to the latter, for several years the United States has blocked the appointment of new judges to the Appellate Body due to complaints over judicial activism at the WTO and concerns over US sovereignty. Efforts to reform the dispute settlement system in response to US demands and pave the way for new appointments to the Appellate Body have been unsuccessful. Normally, there should be seven members of the Appellate Body and the quorum is three members at least. Thus, the Appellate Body has been slowly asphyxiating and at the end of last year it finally ran out of oxygen. On 10 December 2019, the terms of two of the three remaining Appellate Body members expired and since then the Appellate Body has lacked the quorum necessary to hear appeals, thus bringing the dispute settlement system to a halt and grievously hindering the WTO’s role in enforcing multilateral trade rules. In fairness, it should be pointed out that American complaints about the WTO preceded the current administration, but the United States has failed to table reforms that might answer its concerns on such recondite matters as the ‘90 day rule’ and ‘Article 15’.9 It was this lack of proposals that led ultimately to the EU’s decision, in the autumn of 2018, to take the lead. Interestingly, China is supportive of the EU’s proposed reforms to the Appellate Body but, perversely, such support raises American suspicions of a tactical alliance to its exclusion. The American strategy is unclear, raising doubts as to whether there actually is a strategic vision, particularly given its apparently contradictory behaviour. For example, the United States is critical of the WTO’s Appellate Body but, at the same time, it keeps launching cases before it, and the United States is very keen to launch plurilateral negotiations within the WTO framework about e-commerce. More generally, the United States is active in the WTO’s rule-making arm but, at the same time, there is the asphyxiation problem described above.

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The EU and the US EU–US relations in the commercial context have been something of a roller-coaster ride over the past decade or so. Basically, consensual negotiations to establish a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) were launched in 2013 but came to an effective halt in 2016, following the election of Donald Trump, as US President. Since then, the EU has sought to build a positive agenda. A particular source of friction has been a liberal interpretation by the Trump administration of Section 232 of the 1962 US Trade Expansion Act. The Section allows the US president to impose tariffs based on a recommendation from the US Secretary of Commerce if ‘an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten or impair the national security’. The Section was rarely used and had not been invoked since the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization. But on 27 April 2017, President Donald Trump ordered a review of steel and aluminium imports and threats to national security and, on 8 March 2018, President Trump signed an order to impose tariffs on steel and aluminium under Section 232 of the Act, citing ‘national security’ grounds. Then, on 23 May 2018, President Trump ‘instructed Secretary (Wilbur) Ross to consider initiating a Section 232 investigation into imports of automobiles, including trucks, and automotive parts to determine their effects on America’s national security’. The logic of the provisions of Section 232 was to enable a US president to move swiftly in times of war. The clear advantage of Section 232, from the Executive’s point of view, is that the president can enact such measures alone, and does not need to go to Congress. Under the Trump Presidency, Section 232 has been used aggressively to create mercantile leverage. It is a methodology that is far from the old spirit of the WTO framework. The EU initially sought to counter the Section 232 approach through reasoned argument—for example, the EU and its Member States are not of hostile intent and definitely not a security threat to the United States, many of the EU’s Member States are also members of NATO, the US Department of Defense itself argued that the country only needs 3% of the steel it produces, and so on. This approach was largely fruitless and in June 2018 tariffs—25% on steel, 10% on aluminium—were duly imposed on EU goods. The EU took the United States to court in the WTO and meanwhile put in place its own re-balancing measures. It saw the US tariffs as disguised safeguard measures10 and therefore used

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the WTO provisions on safeguard measures itself, targeting a number of American products chosen so as to create maximum pressure, particularly on Republican politicians, while minimising damage to EU companies; Harley Davidson motorcycles, for example, and peanut butter and orange juice from Florida, and so on. In tactical terms, this meant that the EU had to be able to source itself from other producers. (We discovered, for example, that the Netherlands produces peanut butter!) Behaving in such a way went against the grain and the spirit of the EU’s basic trading philosophy and was only done with a very heavy heart, but those special measures are still in place. The EU didn’t stop trying to find a more positive agenda, however. In July 2018, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker met President Donald Trump in the White House and the two agreed on a joint statement11 that has been the basis for working relations between the two sides since then. The relevant part of the statement declares that: We decided to set up immediately an Executive Working Group of our closest advisors to carry this joint agenda forward. In addition, it will identify short-term measures to facilitate commercial exchanges and assess existing tariff measures. While we are working on this, we will not go against the spirit of this agreement, unless either party terminates the negotiations. We also want to resolve the steel and aluminium tariff issues and retaliatory tariffs.12

Serendipity played a part in facilitating the agreement. For example, although not a planned economy, the EU was able to promise to increase its imports of US soya beans because China had banned the import of US soya beans and subsequently bought up a lot of other sources of soya beans (primarily South America), so the EU’s farmers (pig producers, for example) were actually happy to import US soya beans. The EU also committed itself to buying more Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), and that was possible, or even desirable, because many EU Member States were happy to diversify their supplies and hence reduce dependence on, for example, supplies from the Kola Peninsula. The agreement also contained measures to reduce complexity on licencing, and so on. EU imports of US soya and LNG subsequently rocketed.13 Other interesting aspects of the Joint Statement included an agreement to ‘work together toward zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, and zero subsidies

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on non-auto industrial goods’. In January 2019, the European Commission published two draft negotiating directives partially implementing the first point of the Joint Statement. The Commission requested the opening of negotiations on a trade agreement, which would strictly focus on the removal of tariffs on industrial goods and exclude agricultural products; and on an agreement on conformity assessment, that would help address the objective of removing non-tariff barriers. This would make it easier for companies to prove their products meet both EU and US technical requirements. Meanwhile in January 2019 the United States Trade Representative (USTR) published negotiating objectives for US–EU trade negotiations. The US objectives are more ambitious than those of the EU and include the elimination of tariff and non-tariffs barriers on agriculture—a particularly sensitive area for the EU as a whole and a highly sensitive political issue in some of its Member States in particular. In April 2019, the Council adopted a decision to authorise the opening of negotiations with the United States. A bilateral high-level Executive Working Group was subsequently established and negotiations in that context are ongoing, with agriculture being the main sticking point from the US negotiators’ point of view. Meanwhile, the US tariffs on EU steel and aluminium remain in place—a major sore point from the EU’s point of view. ‘Normal’ friction has continued within the WTO context. In October 2019, the US-imposed countermeasures worth nearly $7.5 billion on certain EU goods following a favourable ruling by the WTO arbitrator in a long-standing dispute over measures affecting trade in large civil aircraft (Airbus). A similar case brought by the EU against the United States over subsidies paid to Boeing is underway and a favourable ruling for the EU is expected. In December 2019, the US Trade Representative issued a statement against France’s Digital Services Tax, suggesting heavy duties on French products could be imposed. But the EU is clear-eyed in believing that even a limited deal, based on the Juncker-Trump Joint Statement, would be an attractive start. On 21 January 2020 the new European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, met with US President Donald Trump in Davos and the two discussed inter alia trade relations. Trump said afterwards that; ‘We’ve been talking about it for a while, and hopefully we can get something done … A deal between ourselves and essentially Europe is something that we all want to be able to make’, he added. For her part, von der Leyen declared that she was ‘looking forward to working with President

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Trump on the opportunities and challenges ahead of us. I am convinced that we can engage in a positive US-EU agenda in trade, as well as on technology, energy and much more besides’.14 Both sides know that the overall relationship, easily the largest economic relationship in the world, is too important to blow; the United States and the EU have a $1 trillion bilateral trade relationship with more than e3 billion in two-way trade every single day. Together, both sides count more than 830 million citizens and close to a third of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). With the correct political will on both sides, a deal (doing away with tariffs on industrial goods, including seafood15 ) could probably be closed fairly rapidly. The EU’s trade chief, Phil Hogan, is preparing a package of several agreements for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to present to President Donald Trump in the next few weeks.16 Such a deal would, quite clearly, serve as a confidence-building measure and calm the currently fraught relations. Another encouraging aspect of the Juncker-Trump Joint Statement is the potential for voluntary regulatory cooperation between US agencies and the European Commission, which could save both sides a lot of time and money; ‘we agreed today to launch a close dialogue on standards in order to ease trade, reduce bureaucratic obstacles, and slash costs’.17 To give an example of such an arrangement that is already in place, concerning the production of human medicines, both sides are already following so-called good manufacturing processes and have inspected each other’s inspections and agreed that they are mutually satisfactory, which means that we don’t need to duplicate such inspections, thus saving a lot of time and money, while guaranteeing our citizens’ health. This precedent could be extended to areas such as, for example, animals (where some work was already done in the TTIP context). Of course, there is one big cloud hanging over all of this, and that is that the United States has, in its wisdom, continued with its Section 232 investigation into cars and car parts. However, the Department of Commerce delivered its report to the president last year and the ninety-day deadline for him to decide has passed (not that he has to respect that deadline), but the threat remains and is clearly being used to gain leverage in various ongoing negotiations… To conclude, the EU remains at heart a multilateralist and it hopes yet for some sort of revival of the Doha Round spirit. But, in the meantime, it has sought steadily to build up bilateral relations with third countries that could, in due course, lead on to more multilateral approaches.

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At the same time, it has sought to bolster the faltering WTO system while managing difficult relations with the United States and with China and, in this way, it continues to trade in turbulent times!

Notes 1. Once the agreement is fully implemented, Japan will have scrapped customs duties on 97% of goods imported from the EU and annual trade between the EU and Japan could increase by nearly e36 billion. 2. The FTA covers exclusive EU competences, and can therefore be ratified by the EU alone, that is, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The IPA covers non-direct (‘portfolio’) investment and investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms: these are shared competences, on which the EU shares decision-making powers with Member States, meaning that the agreement must also be ratified by their respective national parliaments. 3. A term first used by Jagdish Bhagwati in 1995 (Bhagwati 1995). 4. Council of the European Union (2019). 5. For example, this author’s hometown, Gothenburg in Sweden, and particularly the Volvo plant and headquarters in nearby Torslanda, were very happy when, in 2010, it was announced that the Chinese car maker Geely was buying Ford Motor’s Volvo car unit. 6. BBC (2019). 7. European Commission (2020). 8. European Commission (2018a). 9. According to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) disputes and appeals should be completed in no more than 90 days. However, since 2011 the Appellate Body has frequently and increasingly breached the 90-day deadline. Article 15 concerns special and differential treatment for developing countries. 10. ‘A WTO member may take a “safeguard” action (i.e., restrict imports of a product temporarily) to protect a specific domestic industry from an increase in imports of any product which is causing, or which is threatening to cause, serious injury to the industry.’ https://www.wto.org/eng lish/tratop_e/safeg_e/safeg_e.htm. 11. European Commission (2018b). 12. Ibid. 13. European Commission (2019). 14. Rios (2020). 15. Econometric models project that such a deal would increase US exports by 9% and EU exports by 8%—so, it would represent a very well-balanced win-win development.

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16. Behsudi (2020). 17. European Commission (2018b).

Bibliography BBC. 2019. Italy Joins China’s New Silk Road Project. https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-47679760. Behsudi, Adam. 2020. Baking the EU-US Deal. Politico, February 20. https:// www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-trade/2020/02/20/baking-the-euus-deal-785551. Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1995. US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with FTAs. Discussion Paper Series No. 726. New York: Colombia University. https://core.ac. uk/download/pdf/161436448.pdf. Council of the European Union. 2019. Council Greenlights Rules on Screening of Foreign Investments. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2019/03/05/council-greenlights-rules-on-screening-of-foreign-dir ect-investments/. European Commission. 2018a. European Commission Presents Comprehensive Approach for the Modernisation of the World Trade Organisation. https:// ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5786. European Commission. 2018b. Joint US-EU Statement following President Juncker’s Visit to the White House. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/pre sscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_18_4687. European Commission. 2019. EU-U.S. Joint Statement: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Imports from the U.S. Continue to Rise, Up by 181%. https://ec.eur opa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/IP_19_1531?cookies=disabled. European Commission. 2020. EU, US and Japan Agree on New Ways to Strengthen Global Rules on Industrial Subsidies. https://ec.europa.eu/com mission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_43. Rios, Beatriz. 2020. Von der Leyen and Trump Fine Tune Transatlantic Relations in Davos. Euractiv, January 21. https://www.euractiv.com/sec tion/economy-jobs/news/von-der-leyen-and-trump-fine-tune-transatlanticrelations-in-davos/.

CHAPTER 7

The Growing Role of the European Parliament as an EU Foreign Policy Actor Myriam Goinard

Introduction Your work on the ground as been precious to me. I have always believed, as a former Member of a national parliament, that parliamentary diplomacy is an extraordinary tool, sometimes underestimated, and I think you made

Administrator in the Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Parliament. The views expressed do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. This chapter was drafted on the basis of a research carried out during a Visiting Fellowship at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) of the European University Institute (EUI) from February–June 2019. The author wishes to express her gratitude to the European Parliament, in particular to Pietro Ducci and Alexandre Stutzmann, for giving her the possibility to spend this time at the EUI, as well as to the whole team of the RSCAS, with special thanks to Prof. Brigid Laffan and to Prof. Adrienne Héritier. M. Goinard (B) Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_7

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the most out of it. It has been an essential part of our European foreign policy, and I can name plenty of countries where your missions, your visits (…) have really contributed enormously to the shaping of our policy but also to reaching out to MPs, civil society, political parties, complementing in an excellent manner the rest of our diplomacy on the ground.

These were the farewell words of HR/VP Federica Mogherini when she addressed the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Development Committees on 17 April 2019, for the last time during the 8th legislative term (2014–2019). This statement is illustrative of one of the most remarkable institutional dynamics characterising the EU’s foreign policy in the past decade, namely, the rise of the European Parliament as a diplomatic actor in its own right—an evolution which has started to attract some attention in the academic community, especially in the past five years.1 This evolution stands in sharp contrast with the still predominant perception that foreign policy is the ‘patch’ of the executive, but also with the limited set of formal prerogatives enshrined for the Parliament in the Treaties in the field of Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), for which legislative acts are excluded and decision-making powers lie with the Council of the European Union. To grasp the role and relevance of the EP as a foreign policy actor, it is therefore first of all necessary to look at the EU’s external action as a whole, with its combination of supranational and intergovernmental elements, which translates into various degrees of formal decision-making powers for the European Parliament (EP).2 The EP is a co-legislator in areas which are directly part of the EU’s external action (common commercial policy, cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid as provided for in part five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union [TFEU]), or through the external dimension of internal policies. Moreover, with the sole exception of agreements relating exclusively to the CFSP, no international agreements between the EU and third parties can enter into force without the assent of the Parliament. Parliament furthermore shares budgetary powers with the Council, including for administrative and operational expenditures in the CFSP area. Secondly, to capture the Parliament’s ‘actorness’ in today’s EU foreign policy it is important to look empirically at all of the activities of the EP in its relations with non-EU countries. In particular, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are active in one or several of the 44

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EP delegations for relations with third countries, are engaged in regular exchanges of views with high-level representatives and other stakeholders from third countries during Committee meetings, official visits outside the EU and party channels, and take position on developments in third countries in Committee and plenary debates and resolutions. They also participate in election observation missions as well as further democracy support activities like capacity-building and mediation. De facto, the EP’s engagement and influence in the field of foreign policy is to a large extent dependent on its own political will and the translation of this will into concrete initiatives, following a pattern typical for the ‘self-empowerment’ strategy pursued by the EP in numerous areas for decades.3 In a policy field where soft power proves at least as important as legally binding means,4 the European Parliament has been exploring the space and potential offered within the boundaries of the Treaties, with a view to developing its distinctive voice, influence and role in EU foreign policy, through an increased influence over the EU executive but also the development of its own diplomatic channels and initiatives.

Influencing the EU Executive at Different Stages of the Policy-Cycle---Setting the Agenda, Formulating Policies, Scrutinising Implementation Looking at the agenda-setting phase, the Parliament has steadily developed its function as the leading institutional forum for raising, publicly debating and framing issues linked to EU foreign policy, thus not only contributing to the transparency of this policy but also pushing for certain issues to emerge or to remain on the executive’s agenda.5 One of the most powerful instruments in this respect is the systematic inclusion on the plenary’s agenda of debates on foreign policy issues with the High Representative/Vice President in person, or represented by a Commissioner or by the rotating Council presidency. During these debates, often wound up by a plenary resolution, the executive is requested to take position publicly on international developments and to respond to MEPs’ questions. The EP Conference of Presidents, composed of the President and the chairpersons of the political groups, enjoys complete autonomy in deciding on the topics to be debated, and the monthly or bi-monthly rhythm of plenary meetings makes it possible for political groups to maintain

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sustained attention on certain issues. Own-initiative resolutions constitute another privileged channel for the EP’s agenda-setting role in the field of foreign policy. Out of the 517 such resolutions adopted between 2014 and 2019, 105 were prepared by the Foreign Affairs Committee alone (including its sub-committees for human rights and security and defence). These reports formulate the EP’s position either towards an EU policy/strategy, or a third country, or an emerging issue, based on meetings with different stakeholders, fact-finding missions and public hearings, as well as internal or external research. Due to their non-binding, nonlegislative nature, the question of the actual impact of such resolutions on the EU executive’s agenda is a highly complex one and has been so far largely under-researched. The formal follow-up communicated three months after their adoption by the Commission in line with the 2010 Framework Agreement between the two institutions6 constitutes in this respect only an entry point. Clearly, several EP requests have in the past been directly reflected in Commission proposals for legislation, especially in the trade area, such as the screening of Foreign Direct Investments or the so-called ‘conflict minerals’ regulation which will come into force on 1 January 2021. But, in practice, the impact of resolutions depends to a large extent on Parliament’s mobilisation of its own channels of influence in order to follow-up on the recommendations they contain, ideally through legally binding instruments such as the budgetary procedure or its legislative powers. For example, Parliament has been a keen promoter of EU research in the field of defence and has pursued this not only in numerous resolutions but also in a pilot project on CSDP research from the EU’s 2015 budget, and then in a preparatory action on Defence Research for 2017–2019. Both actions paved the way for a proper Commission proposal for a European Defence Fund under the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework. Likewise, the EP translated its call for an adequate EU response to pro-Kremlin disinformation—enshrined in a November 2016 resolution—into a ‘StratCom Plus’ pilot project in the 2018 EU budget and adopted a follow-up resolution in March 2019. Moreover, the informal and direct fora of interaction with the Commission and the Council which have emerged over the years, such as the participation of the Chair of the EP Foreign Affairs Committee in parts of the informal ‘Gymnich’ meetings of the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers, prove instrumental for promoting EP requests and outlining underlying arguments. The bi-annual Inter-parliamentary Conferences (IPC)

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on the CFSP and CSDP, as well as exchanges of views in parliamentary committees with representatives of national parliaments, constitute another privileged channel for the promotion of EP recommendations and for their endorsement by a multilevel constellation of parliamentary actors.7 For the upcoming years, the right to ask the European Commission to submit a legislative proposal under article 225 TFEU, which was not, in the sphere of external action, resorted to during the 8th legislative term, should be a promising avenue to follow-up on EP requests, at least for those not falling purely under the CFSP/CSDP area. In her July 2019 opening statement before the European Parliament, Ursula von der Leyen (then President-designate of the European Commission) committed her institution to responding with a legislative act to EP resolutions requesting that the Commission submit legislative proposals. During his hearing, Commissioner-designate for Interinstitutional Relations and Foresight Maroš Šefˇcoviˇc described this as a ‘right of initiative for the European Parliament’ meant to ‘mark the start of a new institutional era’, and proposed to put in place an early warning mechanism to ensure constant dialogue between the Commission and the EP. The introduction of an inter-institutional multiannual programming as foreseen in the Better Law-Making Agreement of 13 April 2016 also creates a new opportunity to enshrine Parliament’s priorities on a shared EU longer-term agenda, going beyond purely legislative matters. Another option which has been explored to reinforce the EP’s influence at the policy-formulation stage is the possibility for the Parliament to co-author EU strategies. In its resolution of 16 February 2017 on ‘improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty’, the EP pointed out that the ‘democratic legitimacy’ of decisions taken on the basis of TEU Article 228 (strategic interests and objectives of the EU) could be enhanced ‘if the Council and Parliament would adopt joint strategic documents on the basis of proposals by the VP/HR’.9 The only instance that has so far come close to such a format has been the adoption of the two ‘European Consensuses on Development’ in the form of a joint statement by the EP, Council and Commission, resulting from a sui generis interinstitutional negotiation process. Interestingly, the first Consensus was adopted in 2005, meaning in the pre-Lisbon era.10 The reactions within the EP after the negotiation of the 2017 New European Consensus on Development are, however, illustrative of the limits of such a joint authorship, with representatives

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of four political groups complaining about the lack of ambition of the negotiated text due to unanimity voting within the Council, and advocating for an alternative resolution. Further developing the EP’s capacity to influence the direction and content of a policy by providing a timely and substantive input at the (pre-)formulation stage, therefore seems to be a more promising avenue, providing more flexibility as well as more independence when scrutinising the implementation of a given policy. At the policy implementation stage, Parliament’s influence over the executive is conditioned by its ability to hold the executive accountable and therefore to carry out an in-depth, independent democratic control and oversight of policies. The general function of political control and consultation of the Parliament laid down in TEU Article 14 is further specified in Art. 36 TEU for CFSP and CSDP matters, according to which the High Representative must consult the Parliament on ‘the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy’ and keep it informed about how those policies evolve. The High Representative must furthermore ‘ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration’. Improving practices of scrutiny and democratic control over the executive has been a priority for the Parliament in recent years, as illustratively demonstrated by the 12 February 2019 adoption of a resolution on ‘Implementation of the Treaty provisions on Parliament’s power of political control over the Commission’, and the preceding work conducted by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. In the specific case of CFSP/CSDP, the 2010 Declaration on Political Accountability remains the key reference point for matters falling within the competencies of the HR/VP. But several structural shortcomings remain, despite attempts to address them in recent years. In particular, a non-consensual interpretation of TFEU Article 218(10), according to which Parliament shall be fully and immediately informed at all stages of the procedures for all international agreements, has proven detrimental to the EP’s influence as the flow of information remains piecemeal and incomplete. Negotiations between the EP, the Council, the Commission and the EEAS, foreseen under the Better Law-Making Agreement of April 2016, started in November 2016 with an aim to agreeing on ‘improved practical arrangements for cooperation and information-sharing on international agreements, in particular as regards their negotiation and conclusion’, but failed to reach a successful conclusion before the end of the 8th legislative term.

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The second point of frustration relates to the scrutiny of implementation of external financing instruments adopted under the Multiannual Financial Frameworks (MFFs). Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Parliament has requested the use of delegated acts for the adoption of multiannual programmes outlining the priority areas, objectives, expected results, indicative financial allocations and aid modalities. This request is substantiated by the argument that the two co-legislators should have equally binding powers when such strategic choices are made on the basis of a basic act adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure. Here again, a conflicting interpretation of the Treaty (in this case of TFEU Articles 290 [delegated acts] and 291 [implementing acts]) leads to interinstitutional tensions, and the introduction, for the external financing instruments under the MFF 2014–2020, of a ‘strategic dialogue’ between MEPs and the relevant Commissioner(s) to discuss multiannual programming documents ahead of their adoption has not proven a convincing format, in particular due to its non-binding nature. Due to the use of implementing acts, the leverage of the Parliament in the implementation phase of the different instruments is extremely limited, both in theory and in practice, despite a sophisticated structure of scrutiny. The ongoing negotiations on the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) and on the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA III) for the years 2021–2027 offer yet another occasion to unblock the situation, but the positions of the three institutions in this respect remain to date very much far apart. Lastly, the enduring information asymmetry in the field of CFSP/CSDP constitutes another hurdle for the exercise of the EP’s democratic control over EU external action. The 2002 EP-Council agreement on access to sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy was not revised during the 8th term, and the EP-Council agreement which entered into force in 2014 on exchange of classified information excludes CFSP matters already in its title. Improvement is however to be expected in the course of the 9th term (2019–2024), as the Council has given its green light to a resumption of talks on an update of the 2002 agreement. Closing these different gaps requires both a fair interinstitutional cooperation based on the Treaty principle of sincere cooperation and an adequate internal organisation within the Parliament. This is essential for the Parliament to fulfil its scrutiny and democratic control function on all aspects of EU external

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action, including security and defence, but also to enhance its influence at other stages of the policy cycle, as conclusions drawn from a thorough scrutiny feed into recommendations at agenda-setting and policy-formulation stages.

Parliamentary Diplomacy Beyond the scrutinising function over the executive, Parliament’s involvement at the implementation stage of EU external action is also characterised by an active engagement of MEPs, usually described as ‘parliamentary diplomacy’, understood here as the use of different channels and means of action by parliamentary actors aimed at exercising influence over developments in non-EU countries. Such parliamentary diplomacy unfolds inter alia through visits of MEPs (including of the EP president) to third countries, inter-parliamentary meetings, MEPs’ exchanges of views with third countries’ representatives in EP bodies or more restricted formats, the adoption of resolutions on developments in non-EU countries, democracy support activities and initiatives such as the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, etc. Understood as such, EP parliamentary diplomacy has largely expanded in recent years. The considerable attraction exercised by the EP for representatives of third countries is reflected in the number of exchanges of views in parliamentary bodies such as the EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee (293 such exchanges held between 2014 and 2019, including with 39 Foreign Affairs Ministers). Such statistics give only a glimpse of the actual level of interaction which takes place in EP premises, since stakeholders from non-EU countries, while usually striving to appear in an EP body, also seek bilateral meetings with influential MEPs—for example, Committee and Delegation Chairs, rapporteurs, political group leaders—and, for appropriate levels, the EP president. The rhythm of visits from a given third country (be it governmental or non-governmental actors) typically intensifies when a relevant EP report is in preparation. Even though these visits and exchanges are not always initiated by the EP, they constitute opportunities to pass or reinforce messages, and increase MEPs’ expertise and access concerning a given country. The vast network of standing inter-parliamentary delegations at bilateral level and four multilateral parliamentary assemblies have a less ad hoc character, as their meetings are usually subject to bi-annual planning. They form the EU component of inter-parliamentary bodies which are,

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for the large majority of them, established in international agreements concluded between the EU and a third country (or a group of countries). These delegations complement the work of EP Committees in a number of areas identified by the Conference of Presidents (such as human rights, implementation of recommendations made in the course of election observation missions, monitoring of implementation of international agreements), and provide sustained channels of communication notably with third countries’ parliaments, therefore enabling EU parliamentarians to engage in the long run in a political dialogue with their peers. In parallel, a remarkable recent evolution has been the rapid development of democracy support activities built around the electoral cycle, based on previous experiences but largely enriched and systematised through a ‘Comprehensive Democracy Support Approach’ under the political oversight of the EP ‘Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group’ (DEG) co-chaired by the chairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and of the Committee on Development. With this approach, the EP developed its expertise and capacity to provide comprehensive assistance to select third country parliaments through a variety of activities undertaken ahead of, during and after elections, including mediation processes, capacity-building measures and activities aimed to supporting the development of human rights policies in third countries. This has allowed a number of activities which until now had had a rather ad hoc character (election observation missions, for example, and capacity-building activities) to be integrated into a single framework and to institutionalise EP-led mediation processes which had in the past rather developed as initiatives of individual MEPs or of political groups.11 Parliamentary diplomacy operates furthermore through the resolutions on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (socalled ‘urgency resolutions’), 159 of which were adopted during the 8th legislative term, often calling for the immediate and unconditional release of human rights activists or political prisoners. Also, resolutions assessing developments in third countries, such as the yearly progress reports for the enlargement countries and the implementation reports for the associated countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, as well as more ad hoc, topical resolutions on third countries, form part of the Parliament’s channels to influence third countries. They are particularly closely followed in countries which want to join or come closer to the EU, or which are eager to maintain or develop good relations with the EU.

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The strength and impact of such parliamentary diplomacy depends at least partly on the EP’s ability to ensure internal coherence and thus to overcome the challenges posed by the multiplicity of actors and initiatives, while respecting the pluralism which is inherent to democratic—and, all the more so, supranational—parliaments. The EP governing instances seek to enhance this internal coherence, notably by framing the relations between the Committees and the EP standing delegations. Also, there have been attempts to discourage various informal initiatives towards third countries where they are detrimental to the coherence and credibility of EP action. This is in particular the case for the so-called informal ‘friendship groups’ which have flourished in the past few years, usually as a result of initiatives by third countries’ authorities reaching out to individual MEPs. The latest revision of the EP rules of procedure in February 2019 introduces some obligations and limitations for the activities of the ‘unofficial groupings’ but is however unlikely to prevent them from blossoming further in the future. Another obstacle to the credibility and unity of EP engagement with third countries has been the participation of MEPs in unofficial election observation missions. This has been at least partly addressed through the adoption of new guidelines in December 2018 that introduce the possibility of sanctions for such cases. However, the process of consensus-building is as important as the rules. When the political groups manage to reach consensus, or at least a very broad majority on the EP stance towards third countries, this has beneficial effects for all EP diplomatic activities related to that particular third country. Where, on the contrary, the EP is divided and adopts resolutions only with a narrow majority, it affects its own capacity to conduct an effective policy dialogue with third countries. The impact of EP diplomacy furthermore depends on whether the different instruments—from formal prerogatives to purely soft power— are combined in a synergic and strategic way. Looking at the 8th legislative term, the way the EP approached the situation in Ukraine is illustrative of such an approach and was singled out by HR/VP Josep Borrell (himself a former President of the European Parliament) at the beginning of his parliamentary hearing in October 2019 (‘I fully recognise the vital contribution of the European Parliament in shaping European foreign policy and the added value of parliamentary diplomacy, as you did in Ukraine’). Building on an already long tradition of engagement with Ukraine, starting from the 2004 Orange Revolution up to the farreaching 2012–2013 mediation initiative known as the ‘Cox-Kwasniewski

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mission’,12 the EP deployed a whole range of initiatives to support Ukraine’s reform process after the Maidan Revolution of the winter 2013–2014 and its sovereignty in the context of Russia’s illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula and hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine. This was underpinned by a strong consensus between a majority of political groups regarding both the analysis of the situation in Ukraine and the need for an upgraded EP engagement. The EP Committees were actively involved at the formal decision-making stage, with the preparation for the consent on the Association Agreement (September 2014), the legislation on the waiving of visa requirements for short-stays of Ukrainian citizens in the EU (June 2017), on the four successive programmes of MacroFinancial Assistance between 2014 and 2017 as well as on autonomous trade measures (July 2017). Both the Foreign Affairs and the International Trade Committee monitored closely the implementation of the Association Agreement. Political support against Russian aggression was furthermore expressed through regular plenary resolutions and through the award of the Sakharov Prize to Oleg Sentsov (a Ukrainian filmmaker, writer and activist from Crimea) in December 2018. In parallel, the framework for political dialogue between the EP and the Ukrainian parliament was upgraded with the establishment of a ‘Parliamentary Association Committee’ (PAC) in February 2015, as foreseen in the Association Agreement. This upgrade resulted in practice in a close cooperation between the EU and Ukrainian Members of Parliament gathered in this framework, going far beyond the two annual formal meetings foreseen in the PAC’s rules of procedure. Constant channels of communication were introduced, inter alia via ‘PAC monitoring tandems’ composed of one MEP and one MP working together on a particular policy area and translated in many cases into thorough work on specific draft laws. These constant exchanges focused both on mechanisms necessary for a formal democracy to develop (free and fair elections, separation of powers and strong democratic institutions, judicial reforms) but also on conditions for the development of a substantive democracy (space for civil society, absence of corruption, diversity of free and critical media), according to Pridham’s terminology.13 In parallel with this political dialogue at inter-parliamentary level, democracy support activities were furthermore developed at an unprecedented level, based on the outcome of a ‘needs assessment mission’ carried out in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by former EP President Pat Cox on behalf of the EP in the second half of 2015. These activities were driven not only by

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the EP’s political will and the strong personal engagement of a number of MEPs, but also by an outspoken demand on the Ukrainian side. A memorandum of understanding and an administrative cooperation agreement were concluded between the two parliaments and a specific format of EP-facilitated dialogue was set up to discuss the recommendations stemming from the needs assessment mission among the leaders of the Verkhovna Rada (Speaker, Deputy Speakers and faction leaders). These ‘Jean-Monnet Dialogues for Peace and Democracy’ took place six times between October 2016 and May 2019. EP election observation missions were furthermore systematically deployed (including for local elections in October 2015) and the presidential elections of March 2019 were preceded by an innovative joint pre-election delegation composed of representatives of the US National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the EP.14 From all these aspects of EP engagement with Ukraine during the 8th legislative term emerges a pattern of a virtuous cycle as all elements reinforced each other and gave strength and credibility to the EP’s action. The legally binding powers of the EP (consent, legislation) provided leverage for the political dialogue with the Ukrainian Parliament in the PAC and other frameworks: the adoption of certain pieces of legislation was required for the introduction of a visa-free regime or the delivery of macro-financial assistance, and the PAC offered a forum to discuss such legislation. The Jean-Monnet format reinforced the standing of the EP in Ukraine as a trusted, reliable and respected EU institution, and furthermore opened direct channels of communication with the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada, which in turn proved instrumental to advance certain political priorities of the bilateral EU–Ukraine agenda. Taking advantage of a particularly conducive context for parliamentary diplomacy, the EP demonstrated its capacity to explore an untapped potential and to develop its own initiatives, complementary to those of the executive. The range of instruments deployed in this case is illustrative of the ‘comparative advantages’ of parliamentary diplomacy and of the relevance of the Parliament as a diplomatic actor; a ‘peer-to-peer’ dialogue between lawmakers focused on normative alignment, the political experience of EU parliamentarians, including on compromise- and consensus-building, their expertise and networks, the weight and democratic standing of the largest directly elected supranational Parliament in the world, its strong reputation regarding the defence of human rights, democracy and fundamental values, as well as a broader margin of manoeuvre when

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communicating to third countries’ stakeholders, compared to traditional diplomats. Looking at such examples helps answer the fundamental question as to whether EP diplomacy pursues autonomous goals—within the boundaries of the Treaties—or, rather, contributes to the achievement of objectives set by the EU’s executive.15 As outlined above, the EP does exercise influence at the agenda-setting and policy-formulation stages but is not a co-author of policies and strategies. The considerable degree of autonomy of the EP grounded on the sui generis features of the EU’s institutional setting is furthermore in itself one of its main assets when carrying out diplomatic activities, as it provides parliamentarians with the freedom and flexibility required to reach out to a diversified range of actors and tackle sensitive issues. The decision-making system of the EP (adoption of resolutions by simple majority) makes it easier for the EP than for the Council (still operating on the basis of unanimity voting) to reach a clear position on given foreign policy questions. However, the autonomy of the EP is reflected in different accents (typically with a stronger focus on human rights and fundamental freedoms, and a call for a more ambitious EU involvement) rather than in clearly diverging positions, which sets the frame for a cooperative approach in the phase of implementation of policies and strategies. This cooperative approach is illustrated not only by the logistical support provided by the EU delegation to MEPs’ visits to third countries,16 but also by the degree of informal coordination of messages ahead of inter-parliamentary meetings or Committee missions to third countries (preparatory meetings held with Commission/EEAS officials, oral briefings by the Head of Delegation/Heads of EU missions at the start of EP visits, exchanges of information and of ‘lines to take’ and so on.). Interviews conducted with various stakeholders in the EP furthermore indicate a rising trend of pro-active requests, from the side of the Commission and EEAS, to office holders in the EP to become active on certain issues where it is felt that the involvement of MEPs could help unlock a situation or efficiently push the EU agenda. Daan Fonck has convincingly demonstrated, on the basis of an analysis of Parliament’s diplomacy in North Macedonia, a pattern of ‘mutual dependence’ between executive and parliamentary actors, characterised by ‘an exchange of four sets of diplomatic resources: institutional capacity, legitimacy, knowledge and access’.17 Ten years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and despite the remaining divergences between the institutions on the interpretation

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of certain Treaty provisions, the time seems ripe for a new dimension of interinstitutional cooperation in foreign policy, building on the positive precedents of previous years. This is the line promoted in Parliament’s 14 January 2020 resolution on the annual CFSP report, in which Parliament stresses that the EU’s external action should ‘use all available means… including those offered by parliamentary diplomacy’ and calls for ‘a more integrated approach to EU foreign and security policy, which includes a parliamentary dimension’. To move towards such an integrated approach while preserving the autonomy and distinctive features of each institution will require finding the appropriate formats of discussion and coordination at various levels, and identifying shared objectives which can be better achieved through an articulated involvement of all EU diplomatic actors, including parliamentary ones, and a stronger focus on Parliament in EU delegations. At a time when the global rules-based order, multilateralism as well as democracy and human rights are increasingly under pressure worldwide, it appears as an absolute necessity to leverage all EU instruments—and this means both all policy areas and all institutional assets.

Notes 1. See, in particular Bajtay (2015), Stavridis and Irrera (2015), Rosen (2015), Janˇci´c and Stavridis (2016), Kleizen (2016), Cadilhac (2017), Fonck (2019), Raube et al. (2019). 2. Allik (2010), Wessels (2019). 3. Héritier et al. (2019), De Feo (2018). 4. Ohnesorge (2020). 5. Fonck and Raube (2019), Góra (2019). 6. Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, 20.11.2010, Official Journal of the European Union, L304/47. 7. On the IPCs see in particular Cooper (2019), Wagner (2019). 8. TEU Article 22(1): ‘On the basis of the principles and objectives set out in Article 21, the European Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union. Decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external action of the Union. Such decisions may concern the relations of the Union with a specific country or region or may be thematic in approach. They shall define their duration, and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States’.

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9. See also Cremona (2015). 10. For an analysis see Delputte and Verschaeve (2015). 11. For an overview of these activities see Ruthrauff et al. (2019); on previous mediation initiatives before 2014 see Redei (2019). 12. Kaminska (2017), Redei and Romanyshyn (2019), Fonck (2019). 13. Pridham (2000). 14. On democracy-support and mediation activities towards Ukraine see Fonck (2019), Ruthrauff et al. (2019), Immenkamp and Bentzen (2019a, b). 15. Fonck and Raube (2019), Fonck (2019), Zamfir (2019). 16. Zamfir (2019). 17. Fonck (2018 , p. 1309).

Bibliography Allik, M. 2010. European Union External Action Under the Treaty of Lisbon: Institutional Aspects and the Role of the European Parliament. Master’s Thesis, University of Tartu. Author’s Interviews Conducted with Members of the European Parliament, Officials from the European Parliament, European Commission and European External Action Service and the European Parliament Between January and October 2019. Bajtay, P. 2015. Shaping and Controlling Foreign Policy—Parliamentary Diplomacy and Oversight, and the Role of the European Parliament. Bruxelles: Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament. Cadilhac, M.C. 2017. La dimension parlementaire de l’action extérieure de l’Union européenne. PhD Dissertation, Université Rennes 1, Rennes. Cooper, I. 2019. The Inter-Parliamentary Conferences of the European Union: discussion Forums or Oversight Bodies? In Essential Companion, 139–157. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cremona, M. 2015. Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty—Improving Functioning of the EU: Foreign Affairs. Bruxelles: Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament. De Feo, A. 2018. Il processo di “empowerment” del parlamento europeo. In Dinamiche della forma di governo, tra Unione europea e Stati membri, ed. R. Ibrido and N. Lupo. Bologna: Il Mulino. Delputte, S., and J. Verschaeve. 2015. The Role of the European Parliament in EU Development Policy. In The European Parliament and Its International Relations, ed. S. Stavridis and D. Irrera, 35–51. New York: Routledge.

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Fonck, D. 2018. Parliamentary Diplomacy and Legislative-Executive Relations in EU Foreign Policy: Studying the European Parliament’s Mediation of the Macedonian Political Crisis (2015–17). Journal of Common Market Studies 56 (6): 1305–1322. Fonck, D. 2019. The Emergence of the European Parliament as a Diplomatic Mediator: Conceptualising, Exploring and Explaining Parliamentary Diplomacy in EU Foreign Policy. PhD Dissertation, KU Leuven. Fonck, D., and K. Raube. 2019. Bringing Transnationalism (Once Again) Back In: Insights for the Parliamentary Dimension of European Foreign Policy. In Parliamentary Cooperation and Diplomacy in EU External Relations: An Essential Companion, ed. K. Raube, M. Müftüler-Baç, and J. Wouters, 53–69. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. Góra, M. 2019. The European Parliament as an Agenda Setter of EU Policy Toward Its Neighbourhood. In Parliamentary Cooperation and Diplomacy in EU External Relations: An Essential Companion, ed. K. Raube, M. MüftülerBaç, and J. Wouters, 289–305. Cheltenham, England; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Héritier, A., C. Moury, M. Schoeller, K.L. Meissner, and I. Mota. 2015. The European Parliament as a Driving Force of Constitutionalisation. Brussels: European Parliament. Héritier, A., K.L. Meissner, C. Moury, and M.G. Schoeller. 2019. European Parliament Ascendant: Parliamentary Strategies of Self-Empowerment in the EU . Basingstoke: Palgrave. Immenkamp, B., and N. Bentzen. 2019a. Parliamentary Diplomacy: Democracy Support at the European Parliament: Dynamics and Transformations. In The European Parliament in Times of EU Crisis, ed. O. Costa, 413–437. Cham: Palgrave. Immenkamp, B., and N. Bentzen. 2019b. The European Parliament’s Evolving Soft Power—From Back-Door Diplomacy to Agenda-Setting: Democracy Support and Mediation. Brussels: European Parliament’s Research Service. Janˇci´c, D., and S. Stavridis. 2016. Special Issue on Parliamentary Diplomacy in European and Global Perspectives. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 11 (2–3): 105–120. Kaminska, J. 2017. The European Parliament and the Revised European Neighbourhood Policy. In The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy, ed. D. Bouris and T. Schumacher. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Kleizen, B. 2016. Mapping the Involvement of the European Parliament in EU External Relations—A Legal and Empirical Analysis. CLEER PAPERS 2016/4. Ohnesorge, H.W. 2020. Soft Power: The Forces of Attraction in International Relations. Cham: Springer.

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Pridham, J. 2000. The Dynamics of Democratization. A Comparative Approach. London and New York: Continuum. Raube, K., M. Müftüler-Baç, and J. Wouters. 2019. Parliamentary Cooperation and Diplomacy in EU External Relations: An Essential Companion. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. Redei, L. 2015. The European Parliament as a Diplomatic Precedent Setter: The Case of Parliamentary Relations with Kosovo. In The European Parliament and Its International Relations, ed. S. Stavridis and D. Irrera, 272–285. Abingdon: Routledge. Redei, L. 2019. MEPs as Mediators: An Emerging Trend of Parliamentary Diplomacy? In Parliamentary Cooperation and Diplomacy in EU External Relations: An Essential Companion, ed. K. Raube, M. Müftüler-Baç, and J. Wouters, 484–498. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. Redei, L., and I. Romanyshyn. 2019. Non-Parliamentary Diplomacy: The European Parliament’s Diplomatic Mission to Ukraine. European Foreign Affairs Review 24 (1): 61–79. Riddervold, M., and G. Rosén. 2016. Trick and Treat: How the Commission and the European Parliament Exert Influence in EU Foreign and Security Policies. Journal of European Integration 38 (6): 687–702. Rosén, G. 2015. Striving for Influence: The European Parliament in EU Foreign Policy. Oslo: ARENA. Rosén, G. 2016. A Match Made in Heaven? Explaining Patterns of Cooperation between the Commission and the European Parliament. Journal of European Integration 38 (4): 409–424. Rosén, G., and K. Raube. 2018. Influence Beyond Formal Powers: The Parliamentarisation of European Union Security Policy. British Journal of Politics International Relations 20 (1): 69–83. Ruthrauff, H., H. Roberts, and S. Crozier. 2019. EP Democracy Support Activities and Their Follow-Up, and Prospects for the Future. Brussels: European Parliament. Stavridis, S., and D. Irrera. 2015. The European Parliament and Its International Relations. New York: Routledge. Wagner, W. 2019. Rationales of Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation in European Security Politics: From the Inter-Parliamentary Union to the IPC-CFSP. In Parliamentary Cooperation and Diplomacy in EU External Relations: An Essential Companion, ed. K. Raube, M. Müftüler-Baç, and J. Wouters, 88–103. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. Wessels, R. 2019. Legal Aspects of Parliamentary Oversight in EU Foreign and Security Policy. In The Democratisation of EU International Relations Through EU Law, ed. J. Santos Vara and S. Rodríguez Sánchez-Tabernero, 135–154. New York: Routledge.

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Zamfir, L. 2019. Connecting Parliamentary and Executive Diplomacy at EU and Member State Level. Brussels: European Parliament Research Service.

CHAPTER 8

A Cultural Superpower? The European Union’s Venture in Cultural Diplomacy Gijs de Vries

Introduction Many European countries pursue policies to protect and promote culture, including as part of their foreign policy. In the European Union cultural policy is predominantly a national prerogative. The EU’s internal and external powers in this domain are modest and EU governments attentively guard the limits of its competence. Despite these restrictions, however, the European Union’s involvement in external cultural relations has grown. This chapter explores the EU’s venture into cultural diplomacy. The discussion opens with an exploration of concepts and definitions. An overview of policy developments follows. The chapter next explores the limitations of EU cultural diplomacy. Finally, future prospects are assessed.

G. de Vries (B) London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), London, UK © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_8

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Cultural Diplomacy in Europe Cultural diplomacy is generally considered a subset of public diplomacy, one of the ways in which national governments pursue soft power. Each of these terms is a contested concept. Some academics and practitioners argue that cultural diplomacy must be distinguished from international cultural relations. The distinction tends to be both normative and analytical, with cultural diplomacy being regarded as the domain of states and cultural relations seen as the preserve of cultural professionals, who pursue cultural objectives freely without being instrumentalized by politicians. In practice, the distinction is often blurred. Diplomats realize that artists, museum directors, or audio-visual professionals can serve as cultural envoys more credibly if they are not perceived as stooges of their national government, and European governments tend, on balance, to be attentive to this risk. At the same time, many cultural practitioners accept government funding to support their international work. This chapter will use cultural diplomacy and cultural relations interchangeably. Cultural diplomacy is regarded as a way to pursue economic interests—culture is a significant source of growth and jobs—and to promote the nation’s international reputation. International rankings of soft power such as the Monocle and Soft Power 30 surveys are carefully scrutinized to see which country is up and which is down. European governments have not been shy about their international cultural ambitions. The Irish foreign ministry, for example, argues that the global impact of Irish culture is one of Ireland’s greatest competitive advantages, acting as a ‘door opener’ that helps to secure jobs, trade, investment, and tourism. Its French counterpart regards soft power as a way to promote France’s image and to defend its economic, linguistic, and cultural interests. As chair of the G7, French President Emmanuel Macron hosted his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi in the prestigious Château de Chantilly; Russia’s Vladimir Putin had been fêted in Versailles some months earlier. The main objective of Hungary’s national cultural institute, Balassi, is to ‘project a quality-oriented image of our nation, thereby increasing Hungary’s prestige in the international sphere’. Germany’s parliament regards Germany’s international cultural relations policy as the country’s international calling card. The list could easily be expanded. That the European Union would find a role to play in such a competitive field is far from evident. How, then, did the EU become ‘strongly

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engaged in cultural diplomacy on the global scene as an investment in peace, conflict prevention, stability, development and reconciliation’?1 In the Maastricht Treaty (1992) the European Union was granted limited, supporting competences in the sphere of culture. While Member States retained primary competence, the EU was empowered to contribute to the flowering of cultures of the Member States, while at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore (TFEU Article 167). Cultural policy in the EU covers the arts, tangible and intangible heritage, and the cultural and creative industries. In the 2007 European Agenda for Culture it is defined as ‘a set of distinctive spiritual and material traits that characterize a society and social group. It embraces literature and arts as well as ways of life, value systems, traditions and beliefs’.2 Culture is more important to the European economy than is commonly assumed. The cultural and creative sectors represent 5.3% of the EU’s GDP and generate more than 12m full-time jobs (7.5% of the EU workforce). They are the third largest employer in the EU, after the construction and food and beverage sectors.3 Worldwide, the cultural sector is important as well; it is the largest single employer for young people between the ages of 15 and 29.4 The Maastricht Treaty authorized the EU to engage in cultural cooperation with third countries. However, it was only allowed to intervene to support, coordinate, or complement the action of EU Member States. Since 1992, the EU has become progressively more active in the field, including by means of projects outside the Union. Two developments accelerated this process. Following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in the US culture came to be regarded as a potential instrument in conflict prevention and the fight against violent extremism. In a separate turn of events, the EU played a leading role in the adoption of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. International cultural cooperation has become a politically salient topic. In 2007, the European Commission decided to build on the momentum generated by the Convention. It launched a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world. The EU, the Commission argued, must aspire to become an example of ‘soft power’. The following year, at the initiative of the Slovenian Presidency, the Council responded by calling for ‘a European strategy for incorporating culture consistently and systematically in the external relations of the Union and contributing to

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the complementarity of the Union’s activities with those of its Member States’. In 2011, the European Parliament adopted a budget of e500,000 for a ‘preparatory action’ to help the EU elaborate such a common strategy. The tender was won by a consortium of national cultural institutes that included the British Council, the Danish Cultural Institute, the Goethe Institut, the Institut Français, and the European Cultural Foundation. The institutes pushed for the inclusion of culture in the work of the newly created European External Action Service. Secretary-General Pierre Vimont agreed to appoint a senior advisor for culture, and in 2015 a cultural policy officer was included in the standing organization of the EEAS. That same year the Luxembourg presidency led the Council to call for a more strategic approach to culture in EU development policy. The EEAS subsequently became the driving force behind the promotion of culture in the EU’s external relations. High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini took a personal interest and called on the European Union to put culture at the heart of its external action. Culture, Mogherini said, was ‘one of the great issues in our foreign policy, and it deserves to be treated as such’. In a notable flourish she added, ‘We should not be afraid to say we are a cultural super-power’.5 Shortly afterwards the EEAS and the Commission published a joint paper on the EU’s international cultural relations.6 Straddling the doctrinal divide between cultural cooperation and diplomacy the paper proposed to promote cultural relations by means of development assistance, and to practice cultural diplomacy by promoting the Union and the cultures of EU Member States. By stepping up its engagement in culture, the EEAS and the Commission argued, the EU could become ‘a stronger global actor, a better international partner and a stronger contributor to sustainable growth, peace and mutual understanding’. In practical terms, the strategy contained little that was new, although cultural practitioners welcomed the intention to go beyond showcasing in a ‘new spirit of dialogue, mutual listening and learning, joint capacitybuilding and global solidarity’. There were other indications, too, that the EEAS and the Commission were careful not to provoke national opposition to their foray into the domain of culture. No new mechanism for coordination with EU Member States was proposed. Nor was new funding; the strategy would have to be implemented within the existing budget. The Council duly signed off on the approach. Two further initiatives followed. The Commission launched a Cultural Diplomacy Platform to help implement the strategy, and the EEAS

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and Commission stepped up cooperation with EUNIC, the European platform of national cultural institutes, to deliver joint projects. The Platform’s initial mission was ‘to enhance a widespread understanding and visibility of the Union and its role on the world scene’7 particularly in the ten strategic partners of the EU (Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, and the United States). This rather ambitious mandate was later toned down to the more mundane tasks of engagement with audiences in third countries, advising EU institutions, and organizing training in cultural diplomacy for national and EU diplomats. Implementation was handed to a consortium of six cultural organizations, headed by the Goethe Institut.

EUNIC EUNIC—European Union National Institutes for Culture is Europe’s network of national cultural institutes and ministries. Some EU Member States are represented by their national institute(s) (14), some by a ministry (8), and some by an institute as well as a ministry (5). Through EUNIC these national cultural institutes and ministries coordinate some of their international activities on a voluntary basis. In countries where at least three EUNIC members operate they can set up a collaborative platform. These EUNIC clusters are active in around half of the world (93 countries). Of the 116 clusters, 38 are located inside the EU and 78 outside of the EU. In Turkey, for example, the Institut Français, the Goethe Institute, and the Dutch embassy teamed up with the Istanbul Foundation of the Arts to enable Turkish artists to work for three to six months in France, Germany, or the Netherlands. Much of the work of national cultural institutes remains directed at national self-promotion and synergy with the EU’s international cultural strategy has been weak, although in recent years some joint projects have been initiated between EUNIC and EU delegations (Bolivia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Jordan, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Ukraine). Many EUNIC projects still take the shape of festivals (film, food, literature) with the European dimension consisting of parallel national showcasing, but innovative projects are becoming more common. In the United States, for example, EUNIC is planning to place European artists within research and development teams in Silicon Valley. Financing is often an issue. Most joint projects are small as not all members are

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prepared to contribute to the EUNIC Cluster Fund (in 2018 only one in four did). National willingness to fund the EUNIC secretariat has also been limited. The European Commission stepped in, and an EU subsidy now covers much of the EUNIC budget. The EU institutions have tried to boost EUNIC’s global role and their own involvement in other ways, but they have not always been successful. The story of the European Culture Houses is a case in point. In their 2016 joint strategy paper, the Commission and the EEAS urged the cultural institutes to pool resources and achieve economies of scale by creating European Houses of Culture in different parts of the world. The European Parliament enthusiastically embraced the idea and earmarked a sizeable budget of e2.5m for a preparatory action. EUNIC itself however was markedly cooler to the idea, with the powerful Goethe Institute and several other members objecting to so much European visibility. They preferred the ‘Houses’ to be understood symbolically. Faced with such opposition the Commission was forced to drop the idea of physical colocation. Instead, EUNIC was asked to create virtual European ‘spaces’ of culture, based on the existing models of cooperation. The limits of European institutional entrepreneurship in the sphere of culture had been reconfirmed.

Trade and Finance In most EU governments responsibility for external cultural relations is shared between the Culture ministry and the ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sometimes, as in Germany, the ministry of Development also plays a role. Each sector is served by a different EU Council formation. In the European Commission, four Directorates-General (EAC, NEAR, DEVCO, and TRADE) and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) share responsibility for external cultural relations. Foreign policy, including public diplomacy, is the responsibility of the European External Action Service (EEAS). These levels of complexity and fragmentation do not facilitate coordination, let alone the development of an integral perspective. It is difficult, even for insiders, to know who does what, and lessons about the success or failure of programmes are rarely shared across functional boundaries. In the European Commission, DG DEVCO is responsible for relations with developing countries. Its main financial instruments are the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which is part of the EU budget,

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and the European Development Fund (EDF), which EU Member States finance outside the EU budget. The DCI pays for initiatives such as the Heritage Corridors on the Silk Road. This heritage preservation project covers Iran, Afghanistan, and the Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan)—some of the countries targeted by China’s Belt and Road (BRI) strategy. The European Development Fund pays for European cultural cooperation with the 79 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP). The EU–ACP Culture Programme supports visual and performing arts, crafts, fashion, design, literature, film, audio-visual media and multimedia, and festivals. Cultural projects in Africa are also eligible for support under the European Union Trust Fund for Africa and the European Fund for Sustainable Development, set up in 2016 in response to the refugee crisis. Projects to promote freedom of cultural expression can be funded under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). DG DEVCO estimates it contributes around e180m per year to cultural cooperation. DG NEAR is in charge of the Commission’s relations with neighbouring countries. These include the seven pre-accession countries (candidate countries: Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey; potential candidate countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) and the sixteen countries of the European Neighbourhood (East: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine; South: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia). Cultural cooperation with the pre-accession countries, covered by the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), amounted to around e33m between 2007 and 2011.8 Cultural cooperation with the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, covered by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) received e17m between 2011 and 2018; e5m is available for 2019–2022. Between 2008 and 2017, the Commission earmarked e63m for programmes in the fields of culture and media in the ten Southern neighbourhood countries.9 Cultural cooperation with the Southern Mediterranean has been prioritized in response to the civil unrest and political instability in the countries and the migration crisis in the region. In 2018 Tunisia was allocated e60m over six years for handicrafts, heritage, tourism, and support to the Carthage Museum. In 2019, new funding was devoted to projects to prevent violent extremism by engaging young people with cultural heritage and cultural diversity throughout the Southern Neighbourhood.

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Jordan and Lebanon, for example, received funding for heritage development under the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis. Additional funds were made available by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), operated by the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), for a joint EU–UNESCO project to protect cultural heritage and diversity in complex emergencies in countries such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In addition to running the IcSP, the Commission’s FPI also funds cultural cooperation under the EU Partnership Instrument. This pays for initiatives that promote the EU’s strategic interests across the world, including in relations with the United States and China. Among other things, the FPI finances cultural cooperation with the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the EU’s Cultural Diplomacy Platform. Last but not least, international cultural cooperation is one of the tasks of DG EAC (education, youth, sport, and culture). DG EAC’s main instrument is the Creative Europe Programme for media and culture. The culture subprogram has a budget of e453m (2014–2020). Funding is mostly intended for projects in EU Member States, but thirteen non-EU-countries also benefit (Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Norway, Moldova, Montenegro, Republic of Serbia, Ukraine, Tunisia). DG EAC is also responsible for the Cultural and Creative Sector Guarantee Facility (e181m) that is expected to generate e1bn in loans for cultural and creative companies. The European External Action Service, which is responsible for public and cultural diplomacy, does not operate its own cultural relations budget but relies on the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (which reports directly to the High Representative in parallel position as Commission Vice President). DG Trade does not play a role in financing either. Its principal contribution consists in leading the EU in international trade negotiations that have a bearing on culture. EU trade policy has affected European international relations in different ways. At the behest of France, audio-visual services have been kept out of the Commission’s mandate in international trade negotiations (‘exception culturelle’). In recent years, the EU has excluded the audio-visual sector from the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada (2016), the negotiations about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP—suspended in 2018), and

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other agreements.10 The Commission did, however, take several initiatives to promote international trade in cultural goods and non-audio-visual services, particularly with developing countries. By ratifying the UNESCO Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005) the EU accepted to grant developing countries preferential treatment for their artists, cultural goods, and services. The Commission followed up by concluding preferential cultural protocols with the CARIFORUM (15 Caribbean countries), Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama), South Korea, and the Andean countries Colombia and Peru.11 Results have been slow in coming. The Economic Partnership Agreement with CARIFORUM, for example, did not substantially improve market access and export earnings for the countries of the region. To date, only ten CARIFORUM states and 23 EU Member States have ratified the EPA. No dedicated funding or cultural cooperation programmes have been put in place to help the mostly small cultural operators in the Caribbean access the EU market, European visa requirements hamper artistic exchanges, and awareness of the protocol remains low.12 The other agreements also had limited effects, and since 2012 no new cultural protocols have been concluded. At over $63bn of sales (2016) the licit global art and antiques trade is big business.13 So, unfortunately, is the illicit art trade. International trade in looted antiquities has long been a source of terrorist financing, and Interpol estimates that today’s black art market rivals the markets in drugs, weapons, and counterfeit goods. Europe is the main destination market, together with the United States. Following the destruction and pillage by IS/Daesh of cultural sites in Syria and Iraq the EU took measures to restrict the illegal trade in cultural goods. A 2019 regulation subjects imports of legal cultural goods older than 250 years to a system of licencing as soon as the necessary electronic system will be in place (which might not be until 2025).

Complexity As this brief overview illustrates, the EU is a global player in international cultural diplomacy, both in terms of trade policy and in terms of spending. The Commission’s spending cannot be directly compared with that of EU Member States, as national budgetary categories differ, but the EU’s role is significant, and it is growing. Estimated conservatively at more

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than e200m a year the EU’s contribution is larger than that of all but the largest EU Member States. Austria’s budget for international cultural relations, for example, is e5.5m,14 Ireland’s e4.5m,15 and the budget of the Netherlands is e22.5m.16 At the same time, however, EU spending is remarkably complex. Funding for European cultural cooperation and diplomacy is spread over seven partially overlapping financial instruments and several funds that are administered by three Commission Directorates-General and a Service, with the EEAS in charge of foreign policy but without a hand on the purse. An interservice group has been set up, but this is chaired by DG DEVCO (the main financier), not the EEAS. Not surprisingly, overall coordination is low. In practice the various actors operate their budgets semi-independently, and the European Commission finds it difficult to tally the numbers. In fact, the Commission has been unable to calculate its overall spending on international cultural cooperation. The Commission’s fragmented approach makes policy synergies difficult to achieve and limits the EU’s international visibility. It also makes it difficult to coordinate policy and spending with the EU Member States. Nor have national governments been keen to coordinate their public diplomacy and cultural development spending with the EEAS and the Commission. What little coordination takes place is largely confined to the local level in third countries. Even there, however, coordination is mostly informal and largely dependent on the personal initiatives of EU and national diplomats. The lack of overall coordination poses problems not only for the Union but also for the EU’s partners. Recipient countries often find themselves on the receiving end of different EU instruments, each with different rules and timescales. The Commission has proposed to simplify matters by merging several funding streams into a single Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument under the new Multiannual Financial Framework (2021–2027). At the time of writing the fate of this proposal remained unclear.

Prospects Beyond the initial initiatives of creating the Cultural Diplomacy Platform and increased cooperation between the Commission and EUNIC, the 2016 strategy paper does not appear to have had much impact. Federica Mogherini, who, as Bildt and Leonard put it, seemed to regard her job as reflecting Member State consensus rather than forging it, soon lost

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interest in cultural affairs.17 Although it was published only months after the Joint Communication, the EU’s Global Strategy, Mogherini’s flagship publication, mentioned culture only in passing. The ASEAN-EU Plan of Action (2018–2022) treats culture as one of 97 action points. Subsequent strategies for relations with EU strategic partners, such as India (2018) and China (2019), did not mention culture at all. Nor did the EU integrate culture in its relations with Russia.18 In the United States, relations between the EU Delegation and EU Member States do not allow for effective European cultural diplomacy. Member States tend to pursue national image-boosting strategies with little regard for the EU.19 An evaluation of the EU Delegation’s cultural diplomacy in the United States found that projects lacked impact as they tended to put quantity over quality and did not address shared policy concerns with the United States. The author, a former US Ambassador, advised the Delegation; ‘Do not get too hung up on stepping on toes of Member States, and do not restrict yourselves to a role as platform for small states’.20 On the positive side, cultural heritage protection was included in the mandate of the EU Advisory Mission in Iraq, in response to UN Security Council Resolution 2347 (2017) following the destruction of cultural sites by IS/Daesh. At the same time, however, EU Member States such as France, Germany, Italy, and the UK continued to promote competing international heritage protection schemes, without coordination with the EU.21 As MacDonald and Vlaeminck argue, it is questionable whether culture can be considered to be part and parcel of European foreign policy, as the EEAS intended in 2016.22 Interestingly, there are indications that EU governments are less than satisfied with this state of affairs. The EU is well-regarded internationally, and its positive reputation in the eyes of foreign publics is closely related to Europe’s cultural heritage. Member States are aware that European cultural diplomacy is underused as a complement to national policy. Besides, cultural diplomacy is attracting growing attention worldwide. China, Russia, India, Iran, the USA, Canada, Australia, and many others invest, sometimes heavily, in national efforts. In the Council there appears to have been a change of heart. In April 2019 the Foreign Affairs Council adopted conclusions that had been prepared by the Cultural Affairs Committee. The conclusions aim to strengthen the impact of EU foreign policy by integrating cultural relations. Member States are invited to increase their involvement in the preparation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of common

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cultural strategies and projects in third countries. The Commission and the EEAS are asked to designate cultural focal points in EU delegations, as they had promised to do in 2016. The Member States, Commission, and EEAS are also urged (‘within their respective spheres of competence and with due regard for the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity’) to improve mutual coordination, synergies and strategic guidance and to strengthen the role of culture, including under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Several aspects of this text are worth noting; not only the call to include culture in the CFSP but also the wish to improve coordination. Decades of European development policy notwithstanding, international donor coordination among EU governments continues to fall short,23 including in the field of cultural development. If subsequent Council Presidencies were to step up their involvement and push for greater synergies, they could make a considerable difference. In November 2019, the Council returned to the charge. It invited the Commission to prepare an action plan on the cultural dimension of sustainable development at EU level, to complement the work of Member States in this regard. Although the Finnish Presidency had intended the text to be even stronger (calling for a Commission Communication), this resolution is a rare example of the Council being more ambitious than the Commission in the sphere of culture. The ball now is in the camp of the Von der Leyen Commission and High Representative/Vice President Josep Borrell. Will there be a new dawn of sorts for European cultural diplomacy?

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Mogherini and Navracsics (2019). European Commission (2007). European Commission (2018). UNSG (2019). Mogherini (2016). EEAS and Commission (2016). EEAS (2016). European Commission (2014). Lisack (2014). Richieri Hanania (2019). Vlassis (2016). Burri and Nurse (2019).

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13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

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European Commission (2017). Indjein (2018). Cultural Ireland (2020). Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2020). Bildt and Leonard (2019). Valenza and Bossuyt (2019). Schunz and Trobbiani (2019). Schneider (2017). Foradori et al. (2018). MacDonald and Vlaeminck (2020). Carbone (2017).

Bibliography Bildt, Carl, and Mark Leonard. 2019. From Plaything to Player: How Europe Can Stand Up for Itself in the Next Five Years. London: European Council on Foreign Relations. Burri, Mira, and Keith Nurse. 2019. Culture in the CARIFORUM-European Union Economic Partnership Agreement. Paris: UNESCO. Carbone, Maurizio. 2017. Make Europe Happen on the Ground? Enabling and Constraining Factors for European Union Aid Coordination in Africa. Development Policy Review 35 (4): 531–548. Cultural Ireland. 2020. Review 2019. EEAS and European Commission, Joint Communication—Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations, JOIN(2016) 29. EEAS, European Cultural Diplomacy Platform Launched, Press Release, 31 March 2016. European Commission. 2014. Mapping of Cultural Heritage Actions in European Union Policies, Programmes, and Activities. European Commission, Communication on a European Agenda for culture in a globalizing world, COM(2007) 242. European Commission, Impact assessment of the Regulation on the imports of cultural goods, SWD(2017) 262. European Commission, Mid-term evaluation of the Creative Europe programme, COM(2018) 248. Foradori, Paolo, Serena Giusti, and Alessandro Giovanni Larmonica. 2018. Reshaping Cultural Heritage Protection Policies at a Time of Securitisation: France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The International Spectator 53 (3): 86–101. High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini, Speech at the Culture Forum in Brussels, 20 April 2016.

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˝ Indjein, Teresa. 2018. Vorwort, Jahrbuch der Osterreichischen Auslandskultur. Wien: Aussenministerium. Joint Statement by High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini and Commissioner for Education, Youth, Culture, and Sport Tibor Navracsis on the World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development, Brussels, 20 May 2019. Lisack, Gaëlle. 2014. European External Cultural Pathways: Paving New Ways? Brussels: IFA and More Europe. MacDonald, Stuart, and Erik Vlaeminck. 2020. A Vision of Europe Through Culture: A Critical Assessment of Cultural Policy in the EU’s External Relations. In Cultural Diplomacy in Europe, ed. Caterina Carta and Richard Higgott, 41. London: Palgrave. Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. 2020. Beleidskader internationaal cultuurbeleid 2021–2024. Rijksoverheid: Den Haag. Richieri Hanania, Lilian. 2019. Trade, Culture and the European Union Cultural Exception. International Journal of Cultural Policy 25 (5): 568–581. Schunz, Simon, and Riccardo Trobbiani. 2019. Diversity Without Unity: The European Union’s Cultural Diplomacy vis-à-vis the United States. European Foreign Affairs Review 24 (2/1): 43–62. Schneider, Cynthia. 2017. Assessment of EU Delegation to USA’s Cultural Diplomacy Programming and Activities. Brussels: Cultural Diplomacy Platform. United Nations Secretary-General, Culture and Sustainable Development, A/74/286 (2019). Valenza, Domenico, and Fabienne Bossuyt. 2019. A Two-Way Challenge: Enhancing EU Cultural Cooperation with Russia. Brussels: CEPS. Vlassis, Antonios. 2016. European Commission, Trade Agreements and Diversity of Cultural Expressions: Between Autonomy and Influence. European Journal of Communication 31 (4): 446–461.

CHAPTER 9

Creating and Managing a New Diplomatic Service Gianmarco Di Vita

Introduction: The Background Article J(8)3 of the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam provided that, ‘The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy’, and Article J(16) further provided that, ‘The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of

All the contributors to this book have written in a personal capacity only. The views expressed are their own and do not represent any official positions of any other institution or organisation unless specifically referred to as such. G. Di Vita (B) European External Action Service, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_9

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the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties’. TEU Article 18(2) (the Lisbon Treaty) further provides that, ‘The High Representative shall conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy. He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council’, and paragraph 4 of the same article further provides that the High Representative ‘shall ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action’. There have thus so far been four High Representatives: Javier Solana, 1999–2009, a former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs and NATO Secretary-General; Catherine Ashton, 2009–2014, a former Leader of the UK House of Lords and European Trade Commissioner; Federica Mogherini, 2014–2019, a former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Josep Borrell, 2019–2024, a former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs and a former President of the European Parliament.1 The Lisbon Treaty introduced two key innovations. The first was the creation of the hybrid position for the High Representative of being also Vice President of the European Commission2 with responsibility for coordinating all of the external action of the Union at large, with the exception of trade, and this function (previously primarily in the Council) was also intended to coordinate and unite Member States’ action at the European level and, to that end, the High Representative/Vice President took over the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Council and exercised a number of centralised representative functions.3 The second was the creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS), with a view to assuring greater coherence and effectiveness for the Union’s external action.4 The EEAS has peculiar definition in the 2010 Council decision that set it up,5 where it is described as being not an Institution or an agency, but ‘a functionally autonomous body of the Union’. What is the High Representative’s role? As mentioned before, s/he chairs the Foreign Affairs Council meetings (except when trade is being discussed). S/he contributes with his/her proposals to the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and ensures the implementation of Council and European Council decisions in the foreign policy domain. S/he attends the European Council meetings (chaired by the President of the European Council and composed of the Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States and the President of the European Commission) and chairs the informal meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Gymnich), Development and Defence, usually organised in the country holding the rotating presidency of the Council of the European

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Union, and EEAS officials representing him/her, chair meetings of the Political and Security Committee and of CFSP working parties in the Council, but not Coreper. The EEAS assists the High Representative in carrying out all of these activities and roles. What are the other changes that the Lisbon Treaty has brought to the Common Foreign and Security domain? A first is the creation of a permanent President of the European Council, currently former Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel, who shall, ‘at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’.6 The second, already considered, was the creation of the EEAS, to support the HR/VP in fulfilling his/her mandate. A third is that henceforth is the High Representative supported by the EEAS, and not the previous troika of rotating presidencies, who carries out political dialogue on behalf of the EU. It is the High Representative who puts forward the EU’s stance and its position vis-à-vis third actors and engages in what can sometimes be very tricky dialogues, especially when human rights issues are involved. A fourth, also already considered, is that the old-style External Relations Council chaired by the rotating presidency has been replaced by a Foreign Affairs Council chaired by the High Representative, with his/her representative chairing the Political and Security Committee. A fifth, far from insignificant, change is that the former European Commission delegations in third countries, which were mainly cooperation offices, became European Union ‘Delegations’, that is, the equivalent of a diplomatic mission/embassy. And lastly, sixth, the European Commission’s previous ‘full association’ with the Common Foreign and Security Policy ended. Henceforth, it is now the ‘doublehatted’ High Representative/Vice President who assures coordination on all foreign policy issues.

The European External Action Service What does the EEAS do? Most obviously, the service supports the High Representative in conducting the EU’s foreign and security policy, which involves everything from political reporting to preparing briefings to organising meetings and conferences (from small, thematic events to major donor conferences). The service manages diplomatic relations and strategic partnerships with non-EU countries, and it works with

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the national diplomatic services of the EU Member States, the United Nations and other international organisations. The service manages the external projection of the Union’s internal policies and values (human rights and climate change, for example), asserting the European Union’s position in various bilateral and multilateral contexts, sometimes in very difficult and/or very delicate circumstances. The service also supports peace-building processes (for example, in the Western Balkans, in North Africa, in the Middle East, in Ukraine, Colombia,…), through political, diplomatic, economic, and practical support. The service is involved in maintaining good relations with the EU’s immediate neighbours through the European Neighbourhood Policy and in the Union’s development and humanitarian aid. The service is responsible for supporting the HR in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Also, it is involved in developing and managing the EU’s responses to international crises (for example, migration) and new challenges (for example, terrorism) and the EU’s response to them whenever these occur. The logic in the creation of the EEAS is that the Union is stronger when all its component parts act together. The Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is more than the sum of the foreign policies of the Member States, providing a single voice and matching the EU’s undoubted economic power with political and diplomatic clout. That is the constant objective. The constant challenge is that, in order to achieve that objective, the service must bring together and coordinate the two different strands of the EU’s external action; on the one hand, the intergovernmental cooperation between Member States on foreign policy, and on the other, the external aspects of the Union’s Commission-led policies. With regard to the latter, it should be stressed that the European Commission has its own treaty-based autonomy, ranging from its sole right of legislative initiative through to its primary role in relation to, for example, the Union’s commercial policy (trade) or its policy on cooperation for development. In these contexts, it is the European Commission that designs and finances the projects (though the EEAS participates in the programming). The EEAS’s primary role is thus one of coordination, and so its aim is to be recognised by all the participants in the Union’s external activities as an actor of integrative diplomacy, an ‘honest broker’, facilitating the strategic conversation between the EU’s diplomacies. One of the ways it does this is through the “Heads of Mission meetings”, whereby the Head of the Union’s delegation (the EU ambassador) in a third country will organise regular coordination meetings

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bringing together all the Member States’ Ambassadors to that country. As an actor with strategic oversight, the EEAS is increasingly committed to the integration of short-term crisis responses into longer-term development policies, working closely together with the Member States. And the Union’s Treaty-based duty to ensure consistency in its external actions, together with the EEAS’s support role in that context (with the Council and the Commission), guarantees that the external dimensions of the EU’s internal policies are asserted coherently and effectively.7 How is the EEAS, this ‘functionally autonomous body’, managed? The administrative structure of the EEAS consists, first, of a layer of horizontal units of various sorts dealing with general affairs (ranging from policy coordination and parliamentary affairs through to strategic policy planning and a task force on space) and reporting more-or-less directly to the Secretary-General (currently Helga Schmid), who reports directly to the High Representative. The Secretary-General is assisted by three Deputy Secretaries-General and under these are a range of vertical services divided into three main functions; global issues (for example, human rights, migration, multilateral relations…), the geographical desks, arranged under five areas (Africa, the Americas, Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa), and the Common Security and Defence Policy and crisis response (this last is unique to the EEAS and is set to grow in size as the Union’s defence policy steadily evolves). Because of its unique status, another vertical service, the Directorate-General for European Union military staff, reports directly to the High Representative (and indirectly to the Deputy Secretary-General for CSDP). The Directorate-General for Budget and Administration (DGBA), although also a vertical service (with over 500 staff), reports directly to the Secretary-General, and is divided into a layer of horizontal coordination and three vertical services responsible for budget and support, human resources, and security and infrastructure. For the reasons explained above, the primary function of many of these services is coordination; I realised when drafting this chapter, for example, that as Director-General for Budget and Administration I work regularly with six different European Commission Directorates-General. I am also responsible for the EEAS’s 142 delegations and offices accreditated to third countries and international organisations and an important part of DGBA’s workload is support to the administrative sections of the delegations on, for example, legal and protocol matters and HR management. DGBA faces a number

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of distinctive challenges.8 The first is ensuring a strategic and dynamic allocation of human resources. Some 4200 people work in the EEAS. Roughly 2000 of those work at the headquarters in Brussels and the other 2200 work in the EU’s delegations throughout the world, to which you need to add the staff seconded by the Commission. There are important ‘overheads’ that account for the large number of staff at headquarters. That heavy workload includes the interinstitutional machinery of the Lisbon Treaty—meetings of the Council’s working parties, preparing ministerial and ambassadorial meetings (the PSC and the Council working groups, notably), coordination with the Commission, relations with the European Parliament, all the budgetary scrutiny and control functions described below, planning and programming, and so on. About one-third of all the EEAS’s staff in the ‘administrators’ category come from the diplomatic services of the EU Member States. The EEAS oversees selection, but for that third of its population, the selection also depends on who the Member States choose to send (an aspect of the EEAS which, inter alia, renders far more difficult a gender-balanced approach). The EEAS has an annual budget of some e680m in 2018, with about a third of that being spent at headquarters and the other two-thirds by the Delegations. The lion’s share of the budget goes, not surprisingly, on salaries, buildings, IT systems, and other service-related expenditure (travel and security, for example)9 and the EEAS budget is, it should be stressed, purely administrative. Now well-established in terms of the overall structure, the EEAS has been steadily consolidating its planning and reporting cycles notably through its strategic Annual Management Plan. The EEAS is accountable to the European Parliament and subject to the annual discharge procedure for its management of its resources (in effect, the Parliament signs off its accounts). It has its own Internal Audit Division (IAD) and, like all institutions and bodies, its accounts may also be audited by the European Court of Auditors (ECA), and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) may investigate allegations of fraud or corruption. Recently, in part to help overcome the challenge of developing a unique administrative culture in such a composite body, the EEAS has launched an Information Management Strategy, including safe and secure more communications. Security is of vital importance, both at headquarters but above all in the delegations, especially those in countries with significant terrorist activity. The Union is not a Member State, so it cannot call, as a Member State might, on its own forces of law and order (there is

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no EU gendarmerie) to protect its delegations and their staff. The EEAS is trying to build up working relationships with the Member States’ armed forces and security services in third countries. This is not easy since, obviously, their first priority is to their own embassies and consulates and diplomats. In the meantime, therefore, the EEAS has to rely largely on private security companies, meaning also calls for tender, audits, and so on. Security, whether of persons or buildings or communications, is also a matter of awareness, and so the EEAS runs a permanent awareness campaign. Another distinctive facet of the EEAS’s HR profile is the high number of Local Agents in its overall workforce (almost 25%, as opposed to 29% officials), all of them working in third country Delegations. As the name suggests, Local Agents are recruited locally to work in Delegations, and most are not EU nationals which, again, further emphasises the challenge, mentioned earlier, of developing and maintaining a common administrative culture and identity. In the same context, another distinctive facet of the HR profile in the delegations is that they also house a number of Commission staff—3700, in total—so that the overall EU workforce in the delegations is almost 6000 strong. Commission staff are mostly involved in managing development cooperation programmes and trade affairs. In terms of the national origins of EEAS staff, Belgium (13.6%), France (12.9%), Italy (11%), Spain (7.8%), and Germany (7.2%) are the most well-represented, as one would expect of the host nation10 and the four largest Member States. Poland (8.5% of the EU population, 4.8% of posts), on the other hand, is currently under-represented. As mentioned above, a third of the EEAS workforce is provided by Member State diplomats, and these are evenly balanced between positions in delegations (17%) and positions at headquarters in Brussels (16%). The EEAS also relies on a large number of Seconded National Experts (SNEs; 10.5% about 400)—that is, staff who are paid by the national administration of a Member State and seconded to the EEAS for a period of time (usually up to four years). This number is relatively large compared to other areas of the EU administration, because a large number of such experts work in the so-called military part of the EEAS and are experts in such areas as intelligence, counterterrorism, military missions, and so on. Here, the EEAS has little say on selection; it advertises positions, and the Member States decide who they will send. As with the high percentage of local agents, the large number of Seconded National Experts poses a particular challenge for the development and maintenance of a common

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Table 9.1 Comparative diplomatic representation Country

Pop. (m)

GDP (bn, USD)

Embassies

Consulates

Perm. missions

Other

US France UK Germany Hungary Slovenia EU

323.2 66.9 65.6 82.7 9.8 2.1 512.6

18,569 2465 2619 3467 124 44 18,500

167 160 149 149 81 37 142

90 89 55 61 32 4

9 15 9 12 7 6

7 2 12 2 3 1

administrative culture. The table gives a statistical basis for comparing the EU to other countries, including four Member States. From this it can be seen that the EU’s representation throughout the world is not disproportionate in terms of the number of diplomatic missions, given its population and economic size (though it should be noted that the EEAS performs no consular functions) (Table 9.1). What do the Heads of EU Delegations/Ambassadors do? In the first place, they perform the traditional diplomatic function of representing the EU in the host country. Second, as seen above, the EU Ambassadors chair the regular coordination meetings of all the Heads of Mission of all the EU Member States (since the Lisbon Treaty, EU Ambassadors have the status of full Ambassadors alongside those of any country). This is a novel and unique function that has already brought its fruit. Thirdly, they lead diplomatic démarches towards the country or region or organisation in question.11 And, fourthly, they report on political developments and, because also of the second function and their coordination with the European Commission staff on the ground, are able to bring a much deeper and richer level of intelligence to that reporting than might be the case for an individual bilateral ambassador. These reports are shared with the EU Member States, including those Member States that might be accredited to the country in question but not represented in it. For them, the EEAS represents a double bonus, as it extends them diplomatic range. The EU Delegations also manage European Union-funded projects, particularly development and cooperation, with the EU, as previous chapters have described, being the biggest development donor by far.12 There are, thus, important management functions, including the constant requirement, underlined by the EU’s financial rules and regulations and overseen by the

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various scrutiny exercises listed above, for EU Delegations to ensure that EU money is spent with all due propriety and efficiency. The EU/EEAS Delegations also participate in accession and association negotiations and in crisis responses. The latter is a particular challenge, given the variety of different actors involved and the instruments and policies at the EU’s collective disposal and the need to make the right choice at the right time. Gradually, the EU Delegations are becoming recognised as the primary ports of call for EU citizens. This chapter would be incomplete without some consideration of the EU’s civilian and military missions, though these are of course also covered in more detail in other chapters and by other authors in this book. With regard to managing borders, in 2017 the EU spent some e160m on the crisis response component and the EU has been present in all major ongoing crises, including those in the ten least peaceful countries, according to the Global Peace Index 2019,13 including the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Ukraine, Somalia, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Syria, of course. The EU is also helping in peaceful political transitions in, for example, Kenya and Uganda, carrying out conflict prevention exercises and electoral observation missions and continuing to support peace processes such as the Colombian peace process (as Christian Leffler recalls in Chapter 2), the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue, and so on. The conflict barometer (2018), published by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research14 reported that in 2018 there were a total of 372 conflicts worldwide, of which more than 57%, 213, were fought violently, while 150 remained non-violent. The report contains a ‘Global Conflict Panorama’ (a sort of network map) of ‘Interstate Conflict Constellations 2018’. The map is quietly impressive because the EU is present in all of the places it shows, either seeking to resolve or diminish the conflicts or reduce suffering or both. This support can range from training police forces to humanitarian aid to crisis management to rescue operations. The personnel, budgets and equipment are, it should be stressed, supplied by the EU’s Member States, but these operations all take place under the EU flag.15

Conclusions The EEAS was initiated after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 and formally established on 1 December 2010. The EEAS did not have an easy beginning. Very little preparatory work

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could be undertaken before the entry into force of the Treaty because of political sensitivities relating to the ratification of the Treaty through a second referendum in the Republic of Ireland. Thus, the EEAS’s beginning was something of a standing start, but with a clear expectation that it should rapidly come up to speed.16 Remarkably, the ensuing transition occurred without any major hiccups. To give one practical example, where significant friction might have been expected, Ambassadors of the larger Member States in third countries had, from one day to the next, to accept that the new EU Ambassadors (new, in the sense that previously they had been the Heads of the European Commission’s Delegations and were only called Ambassadors as a courtesy) would be playing a coordinating role. That Member States’ Ambassadors did this so rapidly and unconditionally illustrates the Member States’ underlying support for the logic that brought the EEAS and the High Representative/Vice-President into being. But it also points to the mechanism underlying the EEAS’s functioning; basically, it could not work without the resources and support of the Member States. Thus, the logic of coordination is complimented by the logic of cooperation. This chapter has not been comprehensive in its coverage, but it has set out to describe how an entirely new diplomatic service was established and how it is managed. The establishment of the EEAS, like the establishment of the euro, was an extraordinary accomplishment in both political and administrative terms, and attests both to the European Union’s political will and to its technical prowess.

Notes 1. Despite the language of the Treaties, therefore, gender balance has been perfectly respected in appointments to the position of High Representative so far! 2. TEU Article 18(4); ‘The High Representative shall be one of the VicePresidents of the Commission’. 3. TEU Article 27(1); ‘The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy … shall chair the Foreign Affairs Council…’ TEU Article 27(2); ‘The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy…’. 4. TEU Article 27(3); ‘In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General

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Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States’. Council of the European Union (2010). TEU Article 16(6); TEU Article 26(1) provides that, ‘If international developments so require, the President of the European Council shall convene an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in order to define the strategic lines of the Union’s policy in the face of such developments’. TEU Article 21(3); ‘The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect’. I like to say, jokingly of course, that I am responsible for everything that doesn’t work. DGBA is constantly firefighting practical problems, from IT to security, throughout the world. See EEAS (2018), especially pp. 8–38, for detailed statistics. Similar statistics for the Cairo-based Arab League, for example, show a similar preponderance of staff of Egyptian origin. In diplomatic parlance, a démarche is a written or oral expression of the European Union’s position to the government of a third state or to an intergovernmental organisation. It may contain a request for specific actions or measures to be taken. Such démarches are formally under the responsibility of the High Representative and are carried out by the EU ambassadors in third countries under instructions from EEAS headquarters on CFSP matters. For example, EU ambassadors are quite frequently instructed to carry out démarches related to the use of the death penalty in third countries. Although public opinion poll surveys in third countries tend to underestimate the EU’s largesse. People frequently believe that the Russian Federation is the largest donor. It is actually third, after the EU and China. Institute for Economics and Peace (2019). Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2018). Indeed, the Member States are, in relative terms, resource rich themselves and austere in their budgetary attitudes towards the EEAS (for example, it is far easier to request a Seconded National Expert in, say, defence, than it is to request an additional budgetary post for an EEAS diplomat). ‘The EEAS must be operational as soon as possible after the entry into force of that Treaty’. Council of the European Union (2010).

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Bibliography Council of the European Union. 2010. 2010/427/EU: Council Decision of 26 July 2010 Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=celex%3A32010D0427. European External Action Service. 2019. Annual Activity Report, 2018. https:// eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eeas_annual_activity_report_2018_final.pdf. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. 2018. Conflict Barometer 2018: Disputes, Non-violent Crises, Violent Crises, Limited Wars, Wars, N° 27. https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/current-version/?lang=en. Institute for Economics and Peace. 2019. Global Peace Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex World. http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/ 06/GPI-2019-web003.pdf.

PART II

Some New Geo-Political Challenges

CHAPTER 10

Looking After the Neighbourhood Johannes Noack

This chapter will look in particular at two types of neighbouring countries—those with, and those without, a future enlargement perspective. The EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), first conceived in 2004, and revised in 2011, is designed to enable the EU and its southern and eastern neighbours to develop stronger relationships, but without there being a perspective of future accession to the European Union. This is in the spirit of TEU Article 8(1), which declares that ‘The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’. In geographical terms, the ENP’s neighbourhood stretches from North Africa to the Middle East (Algeria, Morocco, Egypt,

All of the contributors to this book have written in a personal capacity only. The views expressed are their own and do not represent any official position of any organisation or institution. This chapter is based in large part on a seminar I gave at the European Institute of the LSE on 8 March 2019. J. Noack (B) European Union, Brussels, Belgium © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_10

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Map 10.1

The European Neighbourhood

Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia) to the East (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine). In terms of an enlargement perspective, there are two large blocs on the map. One is Turkey, and the other is the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia). There are, of course, other neighbours, such as the Russian Federation (an entirely different arrangement, not covered by the ENP) and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (all members of the European Economic Area—EEA) and Switzerland (a member of the European Free Trade Area—EFTA), which are neither ENP nor future accession countries and enjoy specific multilateral (European Economic Area) and/or bilateral arrangements. This chapter will concentrate on the first two types of neighbouring countries—namely, ENP countries and countries with an enlargement perspective (Map 10.1). What distinguishes these two types of neighbouring countries or, to put it another way, why do some enjoy an enlargement perspective and

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others not? The primary condition laid down by the Treaties is being a European state, and a strong second is commitment to the Union’s values, as laid down in TUE Article 2. TEU Article 49 provides that, ‘Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union’. But the Treaties provide no definition of what it is to be a ‘European State’ and the condition can be understood and interpreted geographically, culturally or politically.1 On the basis of established precedents, no North African country can be considered European. The North African issue first arose, very briefly, in 1962, with Algerian independence. The country had until then been an integral part of the French economy and thus effectively a part of the European Economic Community. In the end, independent Algeria was granted association status.2 The issue arose more substantively in 1987, when Morocco formally applied for membership of the European Community (as it then was). The application was rejected by the Council on the grounds that Morocco was not a European state.3 In the case of Turkey, on the other hand, a 1963 Association Agreement signed with the country included the option of the country eventually acceding to the Communities. Turkey lodged such a formal application on 14 April 1987. The European Council, the Commission and the Parliament all subsequently confirmed Turkey’s eligibility.4 The second condition, a strong commitment to the Union’s values, requires thus: ‘respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities,’ and, ‘a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’ (TEU Article 2). But in 1993 the 21–22 June Copenhagen European Council further developed the set of criteria—the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’—which at the time were addressed to the newly free Central and Eastern European countries in particular, but are now considered to form part of the basis on which any potential applicant country’s readiness will be judged. Thus: Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required. Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of

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a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.5

In effect, there are two types of criterion in the Copenhagen Criteria. One is a country’s sustained respect for the EU’s economic and political model. The other is a country’s capacity to cope with membership and to respect all obligations arising out of membership from the day of accession, unless the accession treaty grants a time-limited extension in specific areas on technical grounds. In procedural terms, TEU Article 49 provides that the European Parliament and national parliaments shall be notified of any application, which the applicant State should address to the Council, ‘which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account’ (TEU Article 49). But over the years the European Union has developed procedures upstream of the application process itself and in these, which are basically predicated on European Council decisions, unanimity of all the Member States is also required. Those procedures, as they have evolved, entail the European Council first deciding whether or not to offer a country the perspective of membership, then helping that country to progress towards satisfying the conditions set out in Article 49 and the Copenhagen Criteria, typically through an Association Agreement, before an application under Article 49 is finally made. If an application is accepted, then a country becomes a formal candidate for accession to the European Union, which means that it is then eligible for financial and technical assistance through the EU’s Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). At some stage, upon a recommendation of the European Commission, the European Council will decide accession negotiations may begin and, when those have been completed, the resulting accession treaty, ‘shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’ (TEU Article 49). There are no time limits or deadlines for any of these steps towards accession. Currently, the European Council has offered the perspective of accession to the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey.

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It is worthwhile underlining the fact that countries are under no obligation to become Member States of the European Union. Indeed, there are neighbouring countries such as Iceland, Norway and Switzerland who have thought about the possibility but ultimately rejected membership in favour of different sorts of relationship (and, of course, now there is Brexit). Nor is the European Union under any obligation to accept new Member States, as the 1987 rejection of Morocco’s application illustrated. And, as seen above, the judgement of Europeanness will, ultimately, be the result of a political decision rather than some objective test of a previously agreed definition. Thus, though not countries in their own right, La Réunion, Tenerife and Martinique are all clearly parts of the European Union and therefore are somehow European in the sense of TEU Article 49 and, as seen, despite a large part of its landmass being in Asia, Turkey is considered a European State in the sense of Article 49 and has been accorded candidate status. The fundamental test of satisfaction of the criteria set out in Article 49 is unanimous political agreement among the Heads of State or Government of the existing Member States meeting in the European Council. This chapter now turns to the parameters and the paradigms under which the Union works in this area. It may be obvious, but the European Union does not exist in a vacuum. The drive behind the policy of engaging with neighbours, in one form or another—becoming a Member State or moving into some sort of Association—is a matter of fundamental self-interest for the European Union. It boils down to a simple choice; the EU chooses either to export stability or to import instability. The European Union has naturally chosen the former. Over just the last ten years, the names ‘Libya’, ‘Ukraine’ and ‘Syria’ have developed a very different connotation to what they signified in 2010 or before. Why do we need an association agreement or a neighbourhood policy or offer exchanges to people (opening access to the Erasmus programme, for example, or research programmes) with particular countries? Why would we invest EU taxpayers’ money, for example, in pre-2011 Syria? The answer is, fundamentally, stability. Once, alas, the worst came to the worst and a bloody civil war broke out, it rapidly became clear that people could walk from Aleppo and other stricken parts of Syria to Budapest central station (to give one graphic example). It is in the European Union’s fundamental interest to have a stable neighbourhood. One of the features the Union has identified as a critical issue with all its neighbours, whether the enlargement countries or the neighbourhood

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countries, is a massive welfare differential. This is the lever, the factor, that pulls or pushes people, risks the stability of institutions and leads to migratory flows. What this also means in terms of practical considerations is that when dealing with enlargement the issues are only half foreign policy issues; they are just as much domestic issues. It is clear, for example (having evoked Budapest central station!), that what was once the concern of Hungary’s foreign ministry—Syria as a third country— very soon became a matter of concern for the Hungarian ministry of the interior—displaced Syrians within Hungary. There is even a positive correlation between how much of a domestic issue a membership perspective is and how much of a foreign policy consideration it is. For example, all the foreign ministries of the European Union’s Member States agree that it is very important to extend a membership perspective to the countries of the Western Balkans. It is a question of geostrategic influence, of stability, a question of other actors in the world (the Chinese, the Turks, the Russians) and so on. However, at home, these perfectly harmonious foreign ministers aren’t necessarily in agreement with their own home ministries and they don’t agree necessarily with their presidents/prime ministers. The EU is walking, in effect, a slackline between foreign policy and domestic policy, and the closer it gets to acting upon a membership perspective, the more the domestic policy scene within the Member States is concerned. To give a practical example of this balancing between foreign policy’s concern to project stability and direct consequences about such matters as ‘who will sit next to me in the Agriculture Council meetings in five years’ time if this country joins?’ Does the agriculture minister care about the possibility of Iceland joining the European Union? Probably not. But it’s an Agriculture and Fisheries Council, so s/he does care. It’s the same with all sorts of money considerations. Eighty million Turkish people. Yes, we should offer them, as we have, visa-free travel to the European Union. A student or a tourist can enjoy a three-month visa-free stay in the Schengen Area. Here are seventy-two benchmarks, the European Union said to Turkey at the end of 2013. The ‘problem’ now is that Turkey has fulfilled almost all of them. Kosovo? Yes, all the countries neighbouring Kosovo enjoy visafree travel and Kosovo has fulfilled all of the benchmarks (the European Commission, evaluating the situation, has certified this). Does a qualified majority of the foreign ministers agree about granting Kosovo visa-free travel to the European Union? Probably, yes. Has it happened? No. Why?

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Because this is a home affairs matter requiring a qualified majority of ministers of the interior. The prospect of European Union membership is frequently a powerful facilitator. For example, the perspective helped facilitate an agreement between the previous Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, or the loathed acronym FYROM , and Greece and thus solve a twenty-sevenyear-old diplomatic and practical problem. Enlargement, as explained above, requires unanimity. Did the European Council achieve unanimity about opening accession negotiations when the European Commission repeatedly suggested that it should do this? No, and one important factor in the lack of unanimity was the name issue. Despite generalised agreement around the table about the geostrategic importance of extending that perspective to Kosovo, unanimity was impossible. But the stakes then changed. FYROM no longer exists and the EU is now dealing with the Republic of North Macedonia. The dispute was solved, essentially because the Republic of North Macedonia was eager to start the process of becoming a Member State of the European Union, for that process in itself—and the perspective of long-term stability that it would create—would bring welcome investment. The Greek government had also demonstrated flexibility and magnanimity in settling the name dispute—even at the risk of being penalised electorally. Was there, then, unanimity? No! Inconvenienced by the disappearance of the name issue, Member States with other concerns now had to show their cards; some could not vote in favour—yet—and the main reason for that was because a foreign policy issue had also become a domestic policy issue. The green light has now been given and the issue resolved.6 But the point is that enlargement, as argued above, sits between the two policy areas. The geographic scope of the EU’s neighbourhood means also that it is not one policy area—it’s multidisciplinary (as is the case with Africa and the Arctic region, as the following two chapters will show). The European Commission, equipped with quite powerful financial instruments to support it, can look at, say, Azerbaijan and Algeria not just as the Union’s gas suppliers, but at other aspects of concern to the Union, such as civil society (and both countries have significant democratic challenges). The Union can use its leverage as a major purchaser of their gas, for example, to encourage progress on these other areas of concern. The Union doesn’t only look at Ukraine as a security issue. It doesn’t just look at Turkey as a country wanting to join the European Union. We also work very closely with Turkey to help them, though major financial

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support, to shelter some 3.5 million Syrian refugees who would otherwise have been on their way to the European Union. Again, the foreign and domestic policy areas are intertwined. The EU’s outreach, in this multispectral way, enables it to cover concerns such as civil society, to open up EU programmes (Erasmus Plus, for example), to encourage mutual exchanges (including visa-free travel) but also, for countries on the path to future accession, there is an expectation of foreign policy alignment in bigger fora, such as the United Nations—sanctions, for example. Thus, countries that are gradually making their way towards EU membership have to put their cards on the table and align themselves with the team of which they hope to become a member. In terms of policy application, and in the context of the theme of this book, the European Union has moved away from what might be described as geostrategic autopilot. This was the view that saw the EU as a soft power, projecting values, some 12% of the world’s population, generating 30% of the welfare spending, and a quarter of the world’s GDP, and expected, with a mixture of complacency and perhaps some condescension, that other countries would naturally seek to emulate it and the values it espoused. In the case of the Arab Spring, for example, many expected it to lead to democratisation and modernisation of the countries involved. In the parlance of the time, the European Union would create a ‘ring of friends’ about it that would almost naturally be happy to be befriended by the EU. In retrospect, this was clearly a simplistic view. An Azerbaijani, say, gazing out on the Caspian Sea would probably have a different sense of what it was to be a national in a neighbourhood country to, say, a Moldovan already possessing a Romanian/EU passport. And many in those countries clustered around the European Union would be wondering how they, too, could open up the membership perspective enjoyed by Turkey and the Western Balkans. As of 2014, Federica Mogherini, the European Union’s High Representative, 2014–2019, and Johannes Hahn, the European Commissioner responsible for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations during the same period, devised a new approach. Rather than assuming similarity and adopting a uniform approach, they championed a policy based on differentiation and a tailor-made approach to each individual country. The basic idea was that there should be a toolbox of policies and programmes which, for every neighbouring country, could be used and applied as wished by both sides. The emphasis was now more openly on self-interest. The Union thus moved away from the ‘ring of

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friends’ concept (which, in the view of what had happened in Libya, Syria and Ukraine, the Economist magazine re-dubbed the ‘ring of fire’!), away from projecting a somewhat rose-tinted view of the world, towards a more gritty, granular and specific view of each neighbourhood area country, and towards seeking to build relationships that suited and were felt to be most appropriate. These relationships are based on a system of partnership priorities and reforms, agreed between the Union and each country, and which line up a lot of domestic policy in the countries but also international financial support, and not just from the EU. Thus, these priorities are lined up not only with the European Union and with its Member States bilaterally, but also with big donors, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and so on. So, ideally (although this is always an imperfect science) the bulk of European reform aid should be based on those reform areas. One of the ways in which this was described as a new approach for EU foreign policy was that the EU looks at its relations with these neighbouring countries, both in terms of enlargement and neighbourhood, as an investor—not in the classic sense of money in, more money out, but an investor who is nevertheless after returns. The returns, though, are not necessarily, or even mostly, cash. The EU puts in cash and a lot of political weight and energy, but it respects returns for these investments, and those returns are, basically, peace, stability and prosperity. This new approach acknowledges that the relationship is about self-interest for the EU, but it is also about shared interest with the country in question. It is clear that this ‘investor mindset’ can also work the other way around. For example, in the case of Turkey which, to be fair, was on a very positive track in the context of accession negotiations and undertook some impressive reforms (and, incidentally, with the same politicians in charge). But now that progress is increasingly being reversed and Turkey’s prospect of membership is becoming ever more distant. That reversal has ‘investor mentality’ consequences. Turkey used to receive support in the order of e650m per annum but that has gone down to e250m because the EU could no longer justify what was happening in terms of results. This example illustrates the economic conditionality of the process, but there is also political conditionality involved in the process of joining the European Union. To illustrate this, consider that Turkey opened its accession negotiations with the European Union in October 2005 on the

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exact same day as Croatia. Croatia has been a full Member State of the European Union since 2013. Meanwhile, Turkey has closed just one of thirty-five negotiating chapters and the Council has concluded that the negotiation process is de facto at a halt. In concluding, this chapter will look briefly at the Western Balkans, where there has been a more recent (2018) initiative that falls outside of the already-established enlargement cycle. At the request of its then President, Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission presented a strategy for the Western Balkans, setting out how the most advanced of those countries (that is, Montenegro and Serbia, which are already negotiating accession) could possibly become Member States of the European Union—assuming everything goes perfectly—by 2025. As the strategy states, ‘This perspective will ultimately depend on strong political will, the delivery of real and sustained reforms, and definitive solutions to disputes with neighbours’.7 The strategy was a way that the European Union, and the European Commission in particular, could anchor the European perspective of the Western Balkans way beyond the mandate of the 2014–2019 Commission and show the real commitment on the European side. This was very much a deliberate wake-up call to point out both that the Western Balkan countries can individually join and all will almost certainly become EU Member States sooner or later and within a foreseeable horizon (not some distant date like 2040) but also to alert the existing EU Member States to the urgency of undertaking pre-enlargement reform. Put another way, if the EU does not undertake such reforms and if all six remaining Western Balkan countries become Member States (Croatia having already joined in 2013), that will mean six more European Commissioners, six more ministers in the Council and Heads of Government in the European Council, (at least) six more judges at the European Court of Justice, six more members of the Court of Auditors and five additional languages (not to mention an as yet undetermined extra number of members of the European Parliament and of the consultative bodies—the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions). Taken all together, the countries of the former Yugoslavia would become a sizeable and significant bloc within the EU. The Lisbon Treaty, in TEU Article 17(5), already attempted to limit the size of future European Commissions, but the attempt was blocked off by political concessions made in the context of the second Irish referendum on the Treaty. Yet these institutional reforms, if they are

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to take place, will have to be undertaken hand-in-hand with the enlargement process. Will the totality of current and future EU Member States be able to agree that the Union does not need one Commissioner per Member State, and so on? Does the European Court of Justice, recently enlarged, need to be enlarged again? Each accession necessarily involves Treaty amendments, so the prospect of enlargement opens a window of opportunity, but also a challenge. As explained in the introduction, this chapter has not considered the Member States of the EEA and EFTA and nor has it considered the special case of Russia, but it has sought to describe and explain the European Union’s new, more targeted, more tailored, more country-specific approach to its neighbourhood. It is an approach in which the European Commission is more an assessor and not a cheerleader, in which realism better accompanies idealism, and in which the spirit of ‘principled pragmatism’, as evinced in the 2016 Global Strategy, is much to the fore. It is clear that the European Union will continue to integrate some parts of its neighbourhood. Neighbouring states will become Member States—but not all of them. It is equally clear that there will always be a neighbourhood, and the neighbourhood will always need to be looked after. As this chapter was completed a new neighbour arrived or emerged—the United Kingdom. Relations with the UK will of course also need to be looked after, but that is a topic for a chapter or a book that can only be written once the EU and the UK have negotiated their new relationship.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4.

Niessen (2019). Westlake (2020, p. 78). Council of the European Union (1987). European Council (1997), European Commission (1998), European Parliament (1997). 5. European Council (1993). 6. Since the presentation of my 8 March 2019 seminar, accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia have been opened (General Affairs Council of 24 March 2020, endorsed by the European Council on 26 March 2020). 7. European Commission (2018).

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Bibilography Council of the European Union. 1987. Council Decision of 1 October 1987. European Commission. 1998. European Commission Communication to the Council. European Strategy for Turkey—Initial Operational Proposals by the Commission COM(98)0124 final, 4 March 1998. European Commission. 2018. Strategy for the Western Balkans. https://ec.eur opa.eu/commission/news/strategy-western-balkans-2018-feb-06_en. European Council. 1993. Copenhagen 21–22 June 1993 European Council Conclusions. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf. European Council. 1997. Luxembourg 12–13 December 1997 European Council Conclusions. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-cou ncil/conclusions/1993-2003/. European Parliament. 1997. Resolution Doc. A4-0368/97, 4 December 1997. Niessen, Anne. 2019. A History of the States Europeanness from the EEC/EU Institutions’ Perspective: (Re)Consideriung the Current Relevance of the Instiututional Interpretations in Might of the Recent Crises. Paper prepared for the 16th EUSA International Biennial Conference Denver, May 9–11, in Denver, US. Westlake, Martin. 2020. Slipping Loose: the UK’s Long Drift Away from the European Union. Newcastle: Agenda Publishing.

CHAPTER 11

The European Union’s Pivot to Africa Koen Vervaeke

Consider three events. First, on 12 September 2018, the European Commission’s then President, Jean-Claude Juncker, delivered his annual ‘State of the Union’ speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. ‘To speak of the future,’ he said, ‘one must speak of Africa – Europe’s twin continent. Africa is the future: By 2050 … By 2050, Africa’s population will number 2.5 billion. One in four people on earth will be African. We need to invest more in our relationship with the nations of this great and noble continent. And we have to stop seeing this relationship through the sole prism of development aid. Such an approach is beyond inadequate, humiliatingly so. Africa does not need charity it needs true and fair partnerships. And Europe needs this partnership just as much.1

Second, on 7 December 2019, during a press conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the new, incoming President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, declared: ‘It has been now less than a week since

K. Vervaeke (B) European External Action Service, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_11

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the European Commission has taken office. And here I am, in the heart of the African continent. I have chosen Africa for my very first visit outside of Europe. I hope’, she continued, ‘my presence at the African Union can send a strong political message. … For my first visit, I have chosen the continent hosting the world’s fastest growing economies. A continent with immense ambition and aspirations, but also with immense needs. … For us, for the European Union, you are more than just a neighbour. … The African Union is a partner I count on and I look forward working with in the spirit of a true partnership of equals’. Third, on 9 February 2020, at the official dinner of the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, incoming European Council President Charles Michel declared: ‘Europe is reaching out to Africa so that we can map out a bright and promising future together. A strong Europe is good for Africa, just as a strong Africa is good for Europe. Our shared agenda must be a positive agenda, one that we draw up together. … And this I say with solemnity: Europe will meet the challenge. This is a priority for my new term as President of the European Council. We are at the dawn of a new decade. We are ready to exchange, to share and to cooperate. Long live the alliance between Europe and Africa!’ The 2018–2020 period has undoubtedly witnessed what might be described, without exaggeration, as a pivot by the European Union to Africa. In this chapter I will look at how Africa is evolving and consider the ways in which the European Union’s views about Africa have been changing and some of the reasons for that. And in a concluding section, I will look at some of the ways in which the relationship between the two Continents will probably move forward. In all its diversity, Africa has been undergoing profound political and economic change. Africa has been recording steady economic growth. Six of the fastest-growing economies in the world in 2018 were African countries. Thirty African countries are middle-income or high-income countries. The continent’s economic expansion has the potential to accelerate and drive broader social and human development with the new opportunities arising from the digital transformation, the demographic dividend, the green transition and low-carbon and circular economy, as well as African leaders’ transformative initiatives. It is an emancipated continent, taking ownership of its destiny and increasingly taking care of its security. Three examples illustrate how, even in more traditionally challenged parts of the continent, Africa has been

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generating its own solutions. In the Sahel, a region frequently struck by drought and food insecurity and with one of the world’s highest population growth rates, five countries have created an alliance, the G5 Sahel, to combat together their fiercest enemy: terrorism. In force since May 2019, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement is creating significant momentum for regional and continental integration. It will increase intra-African trade, including countries in North Africa, diversify exports, and improve product quality and safety. Ethiopia, meanwhile, answering the political and economic aspirations of the population, has experienced a democratic revolution, bringing an end to the long-standing conflict with Eritrea in its wake (and winning Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts). Africa is now fully included in the global world, which brings opportunities but also exposes the continent to global challenges, politically, economically and security wise. With a population expected to double to over 2 billion by 2050 it is a continent in profound transition with fundamental shifts occurring which underpin the changes. The first is the coming of age of a younger generation in African politics in a continent where the age gap between rulers and ruled is highest in the world. The second concerns the social and economic sustainability of rapid demographic growth. Overall the resilience to internal and external shocks, at regional and national level, will be tested. Growth rates have not generated sufficient jobs and have not been inclusive enough to significantly curb poverty. The IMF estimates that sub-Saharan Africa needs to create 20 million jobs a year till 2035 just to keep pace with population growth. Structural transformation in Africa should be based on manufacturing (taking advantage of raising labour costs in Asia), sustainable use of natural resources, agriculture transformation, renewable energy, infrastructure, services and digitisation. Continental integration, critical for investment and growth, has received a new boost with the agreement on the Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). The nature of politics—in terms of quality and content of democratic processes—is changing in Africa. Citizen’s political participation is on the increase, there is better observance of the rule of law, and open conflicts have been reduced. But processes remain fragile and the possibility of reversals lurks. The Mo Ibrahim Index on African governance over the last decade confirms that there is no time for complacency. In a context

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where the younger generation is bringing its political and economic aspirations to the streets, the response to these will determine the future of the continent. Fragility defines the entire Sahel-Horn of Africa belt in our neighbourhood but stretches deeper into the continent. A mix of transnational terrorism such as in the Sahel, home-grown extremism like Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabaab in Somalia, persistent armed groups in central Africa, determine future security challenges. The defeat of IS in Syria and Iraq, the conflict in Libya and growing cross-regional linkages with dynamics in the Middle East and the Gulf increase the vulnerability of weak state structures and offer a fertile ground for the exploitation of latent community tensions. Finally, as the most climate vulnerable continent, Africa is expected to be one of the hardest hit by climate change. All the developments mentioned so far—political and economic reform, demography and movements of people, terrorism, climate change, international cooperation—have brought the African continent much closer to Europe (and/or vice versa). Africa is no longer distant; it is our neighbourhood. A notion of interdependence has rapidly grown. Issues such as migration and terrorism and identity play in European domestic and European Parliament elections. There is a growing sense that, if problems are not resolved on the African continent, they will come, in one way or another, to the continent of Europe but also that Europe must seize the opportunities presented by Africa. That today’s challenges require a global response for which Europe and Africa have to work together. That is why the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy declared that; ‘we will invest in African peace and development as an investment in our own security and prosperity. … We must enhance our efforts to stimulate growth and jobs in Africa. … We will continue to support peace and security efforts in Africa and assist African organisations’ work on conflict prevention, counterterrorism and organised crime, migration and border management. We will do so through diplomacy, CSDP and development, as well as trust funds to back up regional strategies’.2 There is, in other words, an element of enlightened self-interest. As will be seen, realisation of this aspect has coincided with a search for multilateralism and a realisation that Africa is a rapidly growing economic and trading power to trigger the ‘pivot’ that has been occurring since 2018 and, in effect, for some time before that.

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To benefit both continents the partnership should be based on a clear understanding of each side’s respective and mutual interests and responsibilities, reflecting the comprehensiveness and maturity of the relationship. EU interests are clear; they include: promoting peace and security, including for the stability of our own continent; promoting trade and economic investment in support of sustainable growth and jobs, improving the business environment and investment climate ensuring a level playing field; combatting the impact of climate change, protecting biodiversity and developing a green growth model; ensuring wellgoverned migration and mobility; engaging together on the global scene to strengthen the multilateral rules-based order promoting universal values and adopting ambitious international norms and standards in all above areas. These interests are aligned with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and with recent initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, the Protocol on the Free Movement of People and the ‘Silencing the Guns’ initiative. They are also fundamentally intertwined: positive developments in one of these areas depend on progress in other areas. The EU (figures for 27 Member States) remains Africa’s largest trade and investment partner well before others such as China and the United States. The EU accounts for one third of Africa’s trade in goods compared to 17% with China and 6% with the United States, and it the most open market to African exports in the world. The EU and its Member States’ foreign direct investment in Africa represent e222 billion, compared to e42 billion for the United States and e38 billion for China. For the EU’s external trade, Africa may still be marginal (2.8% of EU’s exports, half of it with Sub-Saharan Africa) but Africa represents the last economic ‘new frontier’. Supporting Africa in developing its markets and economic standards is in Europe’s strategic interest. Recognising that development aid will not deliver the jobs the continent needs, the ‘Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs’ sets out for the first time a comprehensive economic agenda with job creation at its heart bringing together different strands of our work to create conditions for investment, to promote investment and to ensure that the necessary skills are available. It represents a radical shift in the way we work as partners towards a logic focussed on Africa’s economic potential and the mobilisation of the private sector. It creates a framework that brings more private investment to Africa supported by the External Investment Plan (EIP) which will mobilise over e44 billion in both public and private investment. It

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builds on Africa’s ambition to establish a Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and our work of past years—the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), the EIP, the European Economic Diplomacy (EED) work (with EU business clubs in most African capitals). It projects the EU as a prime economic partner who operates differently, who cares about the quality of jobs, the sustainability of investment and supports the transfer of technology. In relation to security and governance, the EU has asserted its role as a political actor and a security provider. Ensuring long-lasting peace and security in Africa is as much in Africa’s interest as it is in the EU’s. Peace and security are not only a basic need but also a key condition for sustainable development. Security needs have evolved from traditional peacekeeping to cooperation in the fight against terrorism, from multilateral UN-led operations to support to African-led efforts, from training to capacity building and security sector reform. Under the aegis of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Union has become increasingly involved in helping efforts to bring stability and to counterterrorism in Africa, whether through military training or institution building, and always on a cooperative basis. There are currently nine such EU missions across the continent, in Mali, Niger, Libya, Somalia, Central African Republic. They provide advice and training to more than 30,000 African military, police and judiciary personnel. Through its ‘African Peace Facility’, the EU is the main, and only predictable, contributor to all African peace efforts; e3.5 billion since it was established in 2004. The EU has mobilised the full range of its instruments (CSDP missions, trust funds, political work, bilateral support) focusing on the security/development dimension. Two regions of prime interest where this EU integrated approach is put into practice are Sahel/Mali (for 2014–2018 the EU and its Member States have invested e8 billion for the region at large) and Somalia (e4.5 billion in total including e1.7 billion for AU peacekeeping). The EU also heavily invested in the Central African Republic (CAR) (engaging more than e800 million). African states, supported by regional and continental organisations, bear the main responsibility to act, as they are the first actors of their own security. A good illustration; since 2017 the European Union has joined forces with the G5 Sahel countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad—to mobilise commitments of more than e400 million to help set up a Joint Force of the countries concerned to

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counterterrorism and organized crime involved in trafficking arms, drugs and people, thus contributing to the establishment of effective state control in areas affected by armed terrorist groups and criminal groups in order to create favourable conditions for the socio-economic development of the G5 Sahel region. The EU supports the G5 Sahel Joint Force not only through substantial financial contributions but also by providing advice and training. Furthermore, the EU has set up a Coordination Hub for international support to the Force. Funding covers the necessary infrastructure, equipment or the integration of a police component but, importantly, also the establishment of a human rights compliance framework. While many good results have been achieved through this partnership on peace and security—notably captured in the EU -AU Memorandum of Understanding for strengthened cooperation in the area on Peace, Security and Governance—the complexity of the efforts and the deteriorating situation in certain regions, such as the Sahel, require to markedly step up engagement. The AU-led Silencing the Guns initiative provides the appropriate context. In a situation where the nature of the threats is changing, policies, instruments and capacities on both sides should be further aligned. Despite progress on the AU Peace Fund, the financing of African-led peace support initiatives, including through UN-assessed contributions, remains to be addressed. The EU and Africa also need to adapt their way of working together in fragile areas in order to have a positive impact on governance at the local level. Africa is not to blame for climate change but is the continent most vulnerable to its consequences, which are politically destabilising and even a security threat multiplier. Europe and Africa are allies in the fight against climate change and environmental degradation—this generation’s defining task. To achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, the EU and Africa alike need to opt for a low-carbon, resource efficient and climateresilient future in line with the Paris Agreement. A future based on healthy ecosystems, limiting and halting global warming, reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing opportunities for people and ecosystems to adapt. This requires stepping up efforts on climate change mitigation and taking adequate adaptation measures in a socially sustainable way. Climate action should enable African countries to pursue a low-carbon, climate resilient and green growth trajectory, avoiding inefficient technologies, resisting new investment in coal power generation and deploying new renewable

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energy and hydrogen production. Trade should also facilitate the adoption of innovative, sustainable business models and play a leading role in the global action to shape a sustainable and climate-neutral future. Given the opposing demographic evolutions on both sides of the Mediterranean and the structural drivers of migration, cooperation on migration has become a priority. African migration and mobility flows are largely intra-African and regimes for free movement are being put in place at both regional and continental level. Some African countries host a substantial number of migrants, refugees and forcibly displaced persons. Since 2015, the EU and African countries have developed a joint approach to managing the external aspects of migration and mobility. Implementation of this approach has led to positive results in terms of a significant reduction in irregular arrivals in Europe, improved cooperation on the fight against migrant smuggling, and in developing more sustainable approaches for refugees in hosting countries in Africa. Further action is needed to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. Strengthened engagement to prevent and fight smuggling of migrants should include emphasis on addressing the role of criminal networks. Cooperation on return and readmission, and effective return rates should be improved, including through the conclusion of more readmission arrangements, and should be accompanied by sustainable reintegration. Projects on legal migration and labour mobility with African countries can inspire new approaches. The Joint Valletta Action Plan as well as the regional Rabat and Khartoum processes are the foundation of the EU’s approach. A Continentto-Continent Dialogue on Migration is advancing. The joint Trilateral Task Force on Migration and Libya is a positive example where the AU, the UN and the EU achieved the return of more than 50,000 stranded migrants in dramatic situations. Through the EU Trust Fund for Africa, the EU has in the last three years launched almost 200 new programmes (e4.2 billion) focusing on migration-related issues. The work with individual countries of origin and transit has made progress in addressing smuggling and trafficking; at the same time discussions on regulating migration and returns are laborious. Strengthening cooperation between the two continents, 54 + 27 Member States strong—on the global scene is a new feature of our relations. Triggered by good experiences on climate change and the SDGs, both sides recognise the interest to work together in international negotiations: the Paris Agreement, Sustainable Development Goals, Ocean

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Governance, the multilateral trade system. Collective action and outreach in support of the international rules-based order and the multilateral system should be a priority for EU and African Union members. In an increasingly competitive world where ideas and values circulate freely and alternative governance models, less demanding in terms of transparency and accountability, are being proposed, particular attention should be paid to public diplomacy in support of multilateralism across both continents, and around the world, by reaching out to young people, academics and other stakeholders who collectively shape the future world order. The institutional setup of the partnership has followed the evolution described above. The old developmental emphasis has been gradually replaced by a far more reciprocal approach based on mutual commitments. EU development aid remains an important aspect of the relationship, accounting for 46% of all aid flows to Africa, but even within it there has been a shift to investment in growth and jobs. And an over-arching continent-to-continent context for cooperation, the EU–AU Partnership, has been established and consolidated since it was established in 2000 at the first Africa–EU Summit in Cairo. The AU–EU Partnership is the formal political channel through which the European Union (EU) and the African continent work together, engage in political and policy dialogues and define their cooperative relationship. The partnership is guided by the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES), which was adopted at the second EU–Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007; it brought partnership to a new strategic level with a strengthened political dialogue and enhanced cooperation at all levels. The JAES, which reflects the Euro-African consensus on values, joint interests and common strategic objectives, is implemented through jointly identified priorities, of common interest to both the EU and Africa. Every three years, a Summit meeting, bringing together the leaders of 27 European Union and 54 African states, as well as the presidents of the continental institutions, define the priorities for the years to come towards long-term cooperation on jointly identified mutual and complementary interests. It is based on principles of ownership, partnership and solidarity. The AU–EU Partnership focuses primarily on cooperation at a continental level and specifically the relationship between the European and African Unions. As such, it complements the EU’s existing frameworks of cooperation with sub-Saharan Africa and with the EU Neighbourhood at bilateral and regional levels. Other existing frameworks go beyond the African continent, such as the ACP–EU Partnership Agreement (the

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Cotonou Agreement), which involves African countries, as well as the Pacific and Caribbean (ACP) Group of States. The Cotonou Agreement was concluded in 2000, entered into force in 2003 and subsequently revised in 2005 and 2010. The current version of the Cotonou Agreement, which expired in February 2020, has been extended while its successor is being negotiated. In those negotiations, more emphasis is being placed on the continent-to-continent dimension but, whatever the outcome, the African element of the ACP–EU Partnership Agreement will always be subsumed in the overarching Africa–EU Partnership, with its continental approach, as the primary instrument of political dialogue and cooperation between EU and African countries. Africa’s potential has attracted increasing interest from many players on the world scene, which is a welcome development, as it increases Africa’s options and creates room for synergies. It also means that Europe must adapt the way it engages with Africa, ensuring its positioning in line with its interests and values and giving more prominence to the quality of the partnership we propose to offer long term, sustainable solutions in all fields. The EU and its Member States are Africa’s biggest partner on all accounts, be it in terms of investment, trade, official development assistance or security. This multi-faceted partnership should now also translate into a strong political alliance. Stronger political, economic and cultural ties between Europe and Africa are crucial in a multipolar world where global public goods are under threat and collective action is needed more than ever. Enhanced cooperation on global and multilateral affairs will be at the heart of our common action. In his 9 February 2020 speech in Addis Ababa, European Council President Charles Michel reminded his African Union audience that: Our closeness connects us, our partnership is a rich one. Everything draws us towards one another: history, geography, culture and the many exchanges between us. Europe is your partner for trade, investment, cooperation and development. But this partnership is no longer enough; it needs to be reinvented. We must build a new house to accommodate our many common interests, and we must write a new chapter together.

In conclusion, the EU’s pivot to Africa has occurred and is now accelerating.

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Notes 1. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018speech_en_0.pdf. 2. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy_en.

CHAPTER 12

The European Union’s Northern Window—A New View on the World Marie-Anne Coninsx

A Region in Transformation and of Growing Geo-Political Importance When people think about the European Union (EU), they rarely think about its Northern window—the Arctic region, and yet the EU is, in part, in the Arctic region and the Arctic region is, in part, in the EU. Even if that were not the case, what is happening in the Arctic—particularly, but not only, in terms of climate change—is of increasing importance to the EU. As one analyst has put it: ‘A warmer Arctic makes for warmer geopolitics’.1 As a consequence of these developments and their implications far beyond the Arctic region, the EU has been gradually developing a fully fledged Arctic policy, as expressed in the 2016 Joint Communication on

All of the contributors to this book have written in a personal capacity only. The views expressed are their own and do not represent any official position of any organisation or institution. M.-A. Coninsx (B) European Union, Brussels, Belgium © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_12

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‘An integrated EU policy for the Arctic’,2 to be seen in conjunction with the EU’s Global Strategy also from 20163 which explicitly states that the EU has a strategic interest in the Arctic remaining an area of low tension. This chapter will first consider the various ways in which the Arctic region is changing and then look at the EU’s evolving global strategy and its Arctic policy. The rest of the chapter will then consider how and why the Arctic is of quite such strategic importance to the European Union and describe the various ways in which, across various policy contexts, the EU has been responding. The chapter will conclude by arguing that, despite obvious sources of potential tension, it is in the interest of all geopolitical actors in the region and beyond, to focus on enhancing cooperation, instead of on confrontation. The world is increasingly challenged by the consequences of one blunt and undeniable fact: the Arctic is dramatically warming up. As it warms, so the region changes, both with regional but also global consequences, particularly for the environment and the climate. In turn, those physical changes have both regional and global geo-economic and geopolitical consequences. In a vicious spiral, climate change is melting the earth’s ice caps but, as they melt, so they accelerate climate change. This is because of the so-called ‘albedo effect’. White surfaces, like ice and snow, reflect about 80% of the sun’s energy back into space. In contrast, darker oceans and land absorb up to 90% of the sun’s heat. The less snow and ice there is, the greater the expanse of the world’s oceans, and the more these warm up—and the more they do so, the more snow and ice melts. Thus, since the planet is an interconnected system, changes occurring in the Arctic region affect the whole world. The Arctic is local and global. Melting sea ice accounts for roughly 25% of global warming. Self-evidently, the melting of land-ice also affects sea levels. It is estimated, for example, that if the entire Greenland ice sheet—that is the glaciers—were to melt, sea levels globally would rise by some six metres. The gradual thawing of the Arctic permafrost—about 20% of the region is permafrost—is another consequence of global warming. Permafrost contains dead plants and animals that have been frozen in the ground for hundreds, even thousands of years. Thawing not only triggers a rotting process with deleterious local effects, but also releases huge amounts of carbon, such as greenhouse gases, methane and carbon dioxide, into the atmosphere. It is estimated that the permafrost currently contains double the amount of carbon already in the atmosphere. The release of these gases further contributes to the ‘doom loop’ of global warming. At the

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regional level, the thawing of the permafrost is provoking other grievous consequences. In Alaska, Canada and Siberia a lot of infrastructure— roads, houses, schools and other installations—is built on the permafrost. As the permafrost thaws, so communications—roads in particular—are lost with remote communities losing their few transport connections. And the thawing permafrost also has serious economic consequences, effecting industry—such as destabilising pipelines in Alaska, and causing massive coastal erosion obliging relocations of entire communities. Though the science is a little more speculative, the warming up of the Arctic region is thought to have various other negative consequences: more extreme weather, particularly through perturbations to the jetstream; the build-up of smog in China; unpredictable monsoons in India badly affecting food-security and an increase in fires in unfrozen tundra, resulting in vast smoke clouds and further releases of carbon dioxide. In 2019, for example, it was reported that an unprecedented outbreak of some one hundred wildfires in the Arctic region resulted in the release of more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere in one two-month period than Belgium or the Czech Republic each release in one year.4 Scientists might disagree in terms of precise measurements and the speed of the process, but all are agreed that the warming up of the Arctic region is not a good thing. And yet, as this chapter will show, the changes to the region are creating new economic opportunities, providing easier access to natural resources and opening up Arctic sea routes. These, in turn, are creating new geopolitical considerations that affect the European Union, just as developments in the EU necessarily affect the Arctic region. It is as a result of these considerations and the growing environmental, economic, social and political importance of the region, that the EU has, over the past decade or so, developed its own Arctic policy, as an integral part of its overall (2016) Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy. In terms of that strategy, the Union’s overarching key objective is to maintain the Arctic as a zone of low tension, peace, constructive dialogue and cooperation. Beyond that, the EU’s Arctic policy, as set out in the 2016 Joint Communication referred to above, is founded on three strategic pillars. A first is to counteract climate change and to seek to safeguard the Arctic environment as much as possible. A second is to promote the sustainable development of the region. About four million people live and work in the Arctic, and economic development, growth and prosperity are understandably important to them, but all of

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that has to be achieved, as far as possible, in a sustainable way. In this context, sustainable development means taking into account both the traditional livelihoods of the Arctic region’s inhabitants and the impact of economic development on the fragile environment. The third strategic pillar is to seek constantly to enhance international cooperation by deepening regional and multilateral cooperation. The EU engages not only in regional and multilateral forums—most obviously, the Arctic Council— seeking solutions to cross-border issues, but also with all Arctic partners as well as non-Arctic partners. That is why, in my last year in office as Arctic ambassador, I undertook missions not only to the Arctic states— all European Arctic States, plus Russia and the US, but also to China, Japan and South Korea. It should also be stressed that the European Union is strongly engaged in, and committed to, the Arctic region. This chapter will not list all the many different programmes and cooperative arrangements that bind it to the region. However, to give a few examples, the EU is, through its EU Horizon 2020 Programme, a major investor in Arctic research (more than e200m over the past four years). And, through the Copernicus and Galileo EU Space programmes, the EU is making major contributions towards the scientific observation of the earth, including of the Arctic region, and towards maritime safety and security. Above all, through its regional programmes, the Union supports sustainable, cross-national development in the EU and neighbouring regions—with a focus on green solutions, to the tune of some e1.3bn over the past four years. These contributions and commitments are both internationally valued and further emphasise and consolidate the EU’s status as an important actor in the region. Maintaining a safe, stable, sustainable and prosperous Arctic region is of manifest strategic importance to the EU as it is to the rest of the world. In the first place, as noted above, the European Union is neither an ‘outsider’ nor ‘near-by’ but is actually in the Arctic; three EU Member States—the Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland and Sweden—are Arctic states, as are two members of the European Economic Area—Iceland and Norway. In a similar fashion, the United States of America is an Arctic state because of Alaska. When it comes to ‘players’ in the region, the EU’s status is therefore fundamentally different from that of China. This is not a matter of dogma or philosophy but implies that EU legislation covers those ‘European’ parts of the Arctic region. This means concretely, that, given the EU’s

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expertise and experience in setting high standards and norms in areas and activities such as fishing, shipping safety, offshore drilling, climate change and environmental protection in general, the EU plays a constructive role in providing solutions through integrated policy responses to the many challenges the region faces. In the second place, what happens in the Arctic region has an impact on the whole of the European Union. Therefore, the EU has a strategic interest in addressing the major challenges the region faces, especially climate change. The EU is already a global leader in tackling climate change, particularly through its efforts to implement the Paris Climate Agreement and its commitment to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. In its 2 May 2018 communication on the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework for the 2021–2027 period, the European Commission proposed a more ambitious goal for climate mainstreaming across all EU programmes, with a target of 25% of EU expenditure contributing to climate objectives—that is, some e320bn. These actions, once implemented, will represent an important contribution to the protection of the Arctic region and its people. Also encouraging is the fact that the fight against climate change—as embodied in the EU Green Deal5 —is the number one priority of the new European Leadership, of European Commission’s President Ursula von der Leyen, strongly backed by the European Parliament. Another environmental challenge the region faces is pollution from human and industrial activities elsewhere. Given that the Arctic and European environments are so closely linked, the EU has a strong interest in supporting efforts that contribute to strengthening ecosystems, protecting and enhancing biodiversity, improving health and living standards and reducing pollution and marine litter. Two striking examples illustrate this point. The first is plastic pollution. The Arctic Ocean has the highest concentration of micro-plastics among the world’s ocean basins. In January 2018 the European Union adopted an ambitious European Plastics Strategy intended to transform the way plastic products are designed, used, produced and recycled in the EU. But it also aims to assist third countries and regions to work in the same direction; for example, an EU project (e9m in 2019) for reducing plastic waste and marine litter in East and South East Asia. The second is pollution from industrial and other human-driven activities, black carbon in particular—heavy pollutants, primarily originating in China, India, Russia and the Americas, which are carried by prevailing winds and weather systems

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to the Arctic region. So pressing has this problem become that Finland— the former Chair of the Arctic Council, has been strongly advocating the organisation of a Summit devoted to the topic. The European Union has an evident strategic interest in ensuring that economic activities in the Arctic region develop in a sustainable way. As noted above, the Arctic region has some four million inhabitants. The European part of the region in particular is quite ‘urban’ in parts, with vibrant cities, universities, industrial parks, relatively good infrastructure and connectivity. Growth, jobs and prosperity are important considerations and economic development is necessary, but it is vital that such development should occur in a sustainable way. The key challenge is to establish the right balance between safeguarding the Arctic’s fragile environment and increasing the region’s economic development in a sustainable way, while also respecting the rights of the region’s indigenous peoples. Indeed, it is in the interest of all stakeholders active in the Arctic to promote sustainable growth in the region in a responsible and environmentally sound manner. In the third place, though it is one of the ironies of the modern world, another major reason for the geostrategic importance of the Arctic region to the European Union, are the geo-economic implications of the warming up of the Arctic, notably the newly created economic opportunities. The first of these is the growing accessibility of the region and hence increasing interest in exploiting the region’s rich natural resources. The second, related development is greater accessibility to ‘new’ shipping routes especially along the north-eastern passage, for trade and tourism purposes. And thirdly, the changing Arctic region is creating new opportunities for connectivity. It is worthwhile considering these developments in some detail.

Rich Natural Arctic Resources According to a 2008 US geological study, the Arctic region holds about 22% of the world’s undiscovered oil and natural gas resources (13% of oil; 30% of gas). Some 84% of these resources are offshore and located in the shallow waters of the five Arctic coastal states’ continental shelves. These resources implications are particularly important for the Russian Federation. Already now, Russia relies on the Arctic region for some 25% of its GDP, and the bulk of the expected oil and gas reserves are on the Arctic continental shelf, especially under the Barents and the Kara Seas.

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With regard to offshore oil production, Russia is affected by the economic sanctions imposed upon it by the US and the EU. Both, in addition to financial restrictions, have imposed restrictive measures on equipment, technology and related services for use in Arctic offshore oil projects and for shale oil projects. These restrictive measures do not apply to the gas sector. Russia is investing heavily in the liquid natural gas (LNG) sector. The Yamal Peninsula, in Siberia, is Russia’s biggest natural gas reserve, holding some 20% of the planet’s known natural gas. The first phase of the Yamal LNG plant, a natural gas extraction, liquefaction and export project, was officially opened in December 2017, built with or financed by Russian, French (Total) and Chinese (30%) investments and expertise. Through the Yamal plant the Russian Federation has joined the European LNG market. It could well become the world’s fifth largest LNG producer before long. An LNG tanker leaves the Yamal plant every forty-eight hours! Although some Russian LNG is coming to Europe, most of its production is expected to go to China and Japan. Indeed, China’s demand for imported LNG is likely to rival Japan’s (currently the world’s biggest importer of gas). As Russian LNG comes on-stream it will surely affect the global energy market, with knock-on effects for other major LNG suppliers, such as Australia, which currently provides a lot of LNG to Asian markets. This expected impact on global energy markets, already beginning to be felt, is of evident geo-economic and strategic interest to the European Union, which currently imports more than 50% of its energy needs. There is an abundance of key minerals (including rare-earth minerals) in the European Arctic, which are crucial for developing new technologies. Europe consumes about 20% of all minerals in the world, mostly imported from China, where environmental standards are very different to those in Europe. We know that in the European Arctic, we can ensure that minerals can be extracted in an as green way as possible. Hence, the EU has an interest in these developments in the Arctic, in order to reduce Europe’s dependency on raw materials, and at the same time to promote sustainable production of minerals.

Increased Shipping in the Arctic Some 80–90% of world trade is currently transported by shipping, using sea routes. Thus, the opening of any new major sea route is bound to have consequences for shipping movements and trade flows. There are

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three key Arctic shipping routes, of which the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is expected to be the most promising in the future. Russia is clearly advertising the NSR to encourage stronger international transit, stressing the fact that the NSR is shorter than existing sea routes (such as the Suez and Panama Canals) and therefore represents benefits in terms of time and costs. But the economic viability of the NSR remains uncertain, certainly regarding container-shipping. The further development of the NSR is however a key objective of Russia’s Arctic policy. The country has an impressive fleet of icebreakers—including nuclear icebreakers, is working hard to build the necessary infrastructure and is enacting laws designed to regulate traffic in the NSR, such as allowing only Russian-flag-vessels and only vessels built in Russia, to transporting hydrocarbons and coal along the NSR. The EU is following closely the conformity of these laws with international law. In this context, China comes into play, since China, which published its first Arctic Policy in January 2018,6 has the clear ambition of becoming a polar power, claiming itself to be a “nearby-Arctic” state. Four aspects are of particular importance. First, China wishes to tap into the rich Arctic resources that will become more accessible and easier to exploit as a consequence of global warming. These include minerals, oil and gas. Second, China is excited by the prospect of Arctic shipping routes. Using the NSR would cut several thousand kilometres off journeys between Shanghai and Europe. China’s vision is of a ‘Polar Silk Road’, as part of its One Belt One Road (BRI) initiative. Third, China is investing heavily in the Arctic region, building ports and other facilities to encourage shipping and investing in LNG plants. Some 90% of Chinese trade is done through shipping. The potential of a ‘new’ major sea route, represents an important new development for Asia, and China in particular. Fourth, China is by far the world’s largest fishing nation. With the sea ice disappearing, the Arctic may become an important new fisheries frontier.

Connectivity The third geo-economic implication of a warming Arctic region is connectivity. Although it does not address the Arctic region explicitly, the European Union has adopted a Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia7 as part of the implementation of its overall Global Strategy. New maritime routes are identified as means of promoting connectivity, but the focus

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is very much on promoting sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based connectivity. In general, the European Union’s preference is always to establish stronger networks and strengthen partnerships for sustainable connectivity across all sectors (transport, energy, digital, human connections) based on respect for common rules. Thus, the EU favours enhanced connectivity in general but also with regard to the Arctic region, both within the region—digital connectivity is important for people living in the Arctic in areas like, for example, the health sector, and with the outside world—through, for example, the construction of new infrastructure, such as airports and roads. To give two examples in this context: (1) Finland and Norway are working on the concept of an Arctic railway that would link Kirkenes, in northern Norway—a port on the NRS, close to Murmansk—with Finland and that would connect up with the Baltic states and, via the TEN-T networks, with the rest of Europe. Were such a railway project to be realised, it would connect up the Arctic shipping routes (NSR) with northern, central and western Europe. (2) A second example is provided by the projected ‘Arctic Connect Submarine Cable’. Through a range of feasibility studies, Finland (the Cinia compagny) in alliance with other Nordic, Russian (Russia’s telecom giant MegaFon) and Japanese partners, is planning such a trans-Arctic sea cable route to enhance digital connections between Europe and Asia—it is calculated that this would speed up digital transmissions by 25% and, according to Finnish sources, the project could be completed already by 2022.8 In short, the warming up of the Arctic is leading to more economic activity in the region—more drilling, shipping and fishing, and this is a fragile environment with unknown potential impacts on the region and its peoples. As one of the largest economies in the world, the European Union is clearly affected by and involved in these developments. European business and economic operators are also exploring new economic opportunities in the high north. Arctic and non-Arctic states alike have an increased interest in such activities in the region. But here the EU, through its strong commitment to the UN Sustainable Development Goals and its own sustainability policies, can play a key role, in close cooperation with third states, in ensuring that such new economic opportunities are exploited in a responsible and sustainable way. Such geo-economic implications lead inexorably on to the geo-political implications of a changing Arctic region—‘Global climate change has catapulted the Arctic into the centre of geo-politics’.9 What do these

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dynamics mean for the EU? The European Union’s 2016 Global Strategy states that ‘the EU has a strategic interest in the Arctic remaining a lowtension area, with ongoing co-operation ensured by the Arctic Council, a well-functioning legal framework, and solid political and security cooperation’. The focus therefore is on cooperation which, as Federica Mogherini stresses in her preface to this book, is in the DNA of the European Union. Cooperation, particularly multilateral cooperation, is the essence of the EU’s Arctic policy. And hence international cooperation is one of the three priority areas of the EU’s Arctic Policy, as set out in its 2016 Joint Communication. It is not difficult to understand why there should be such an emphasis. The challenges the Arctic region faces, and the solutions required to address them, all require joined-up responses, whether at regional, international or global level. Cooperation, in the context of the Arctic, necessarily means working closely together with all relevant stakeholders, from the region’s specific organisations and institutions, through individual states, both Arctic and non-Arctic, through to the region’s indigenous peoples and local communities. It is worthwhile considering each of those in turn in a little more detail. Cooperation with Arctic-specific fora, notably with the Arctic Council: three of the eight full members of the Arctic Council are EU Member States (Denmark, Finland, Sweden) and two EEA Member States (Iceland and Norway) are also full members. In addition, six of the thirteen observer states to the Council are currently EU Member States (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). The European Union has itself requested full observer status, though this application is blocked at the moment. Notwithstanding this, the EU is a de facto observer, treated in practice exactly the same way as the other observers. Together with its Member States, the EU is working very closely with the Arctic Council, contributing to its working- and expert groups, and co-financing projects. Cooperation and being active in non-Arctic-specific fora: clearly, the Arctic Council is the key forum of governance, but it is not the only or exclusive international body or organisation that is of importance for the region. For example, the United Nations, particularly the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the International Maritime Organization also play important roles in and for the region in their respective fields of competence. Also, inclusive major conferences, such as the yearly Arctic Circle Assembly and its Regional Fora, are becoming increasingly important, being designed to increase

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participation in Arctic Dialogue and strengthen the international focus on the future of the Arctic. Another example of how the EU can play an important role—not linked to specific Arctic fora, is the Second Arctic Science Ministerial that the EU co-organised together with Germany and Finland in Berlin, in October 2018. It is considered to have been a great success, also because of its deliberately ‘inclusive’ approach—not being limited only to the Arctic states. It brought together 26 nations, nine international and six indigenous peoples’ organizations; the political level interacted actively with the scientific community, and it resulted in multiple concrete commitments promoting Arctic research cooperation. The Arctic provides a good example of ‘science for diplomacy’. International scientific cooperation on and in the region is particularly strong and such cooperation inevitably improves international relations between countries, despite geopolitical tensions in other parts of the globe. And the EU and its Member States play a major part in encouraging such scientific cooperation, building bridges for dialogue, trust, understanding and the avoidance of conflict. Despite the nature of its relations elsewhere and on other issues, the European Union enjoys, without exception, good cooperation with all the Arctic states on matters to do with the region. And it enjoys similarly good cooperation with the non-Arctic states, whether European or nonEuropean, that are, nevertheless, important stakeholders in the region. For the EU it matters that cooperation on the Arctic is inclusive, including with new actors on the file such as in Asia. The reasons being that we need to join forces in order to address the major challenges that the Arctic is facing such as climate, but also in order to ensure that international law—especially UNCLOS (the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea) is being respected. Lastly, inclusiveness means also that the EU attaches great importance to the indigenous peoples and local communities living in the Arctic, organizing, for example, an annual Indigenous Peoples’ Dialogue. The most recent took place in Umeå (Sweden) in October 2019, along with the first EU Arctic (Stakeholders) Forum. In other words, the EU cares about people living in the Arctic and feels their voices must be heard. The growing geopolitical importance of the Arctic means that the European Union has been increasingly addressing the region in terms of its external relations policy. Indeed, all major Arctic players are adopting Arctic policies that suit their geo-economic and geopolitical relations.

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Hence the EU’s decision to appoint an Ambassador at Large for the Arctic in 2017, with a primary task of promoting Arctic diplomacy— a position and a role I had the privilege to pioneer. The major foreign policy challenges in the Arctic differ a little from those in the rest of the world. The risks of conflict in the region, for example, are low, though they cannot be excluded. Currently, the Arctic is considered one of the most secure regions in the world. However, as the region opens-up, so it could become less secure. Perhaps the biggest risk is the potential of spill-over of conflicts, or their consequences, from other parts of the world. In general, the North is hardly immune from wider geopolitical winds. For example, despite the fact that Russia argues that high politics should be kept out of the Arctic, it is objecting to formal observer status for the EU at the Arctic Council because of the EU’s position in response to Russian actions in Ukraine in 2014, including the occupation of Crimea. That said, the EU does, in general, cooperate well with Russia on Arctic and Northern matters. There is particularly good cooperation in the Barents’ Euro-Arctic Council—the forum for intergovernmental cooperation concerning the Barents region, and within the Northern Dimension Partnership—a joint policy between the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland, initiated in 1999, thanks to programmes focussing on people-to-people contacts, cross-border projects, sub-regional cooperation and projects in the field of the environment, such as addressing nuclear waste treatment, waste water management and black carbon. The Arctic is marked by a relatively low level of political or military tension, but the possibility of increasing national competition, disputes and even conflicts in Europe’s Far North cannot be ruled out. In that context, Russia’s more assertive foreign policy and illustrations of its readiness to resort to military means to advance its interests, have raised concerns about an arms race in the region. It is a fact that Russia is strengthening its military presence. Some consider this more as a sort of ‘balancing strategy’ vis-à-vis the US and NATO, rather than being specifically Arctic related. Others argue that the deployment of increased military presence has dual use purposes, needed for the economic development of the region, requiring also search and rescue capabilities. For Russia it is clear that economic interests are of primordial importance and therefore open conflict would not be in its interest. The issue of ‘Security in the Arctic’ was addressed at the January 2019 Arctic Frontiers Conference in Tromsø. Many participants stressed that security in the region

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cannot be taken for granted and must be constantly maintained through hard work. As Norway’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide put it: ‘It is no coincidence that the Arctic today is a region that is characterised by peace, stability and international cooperation. It is a result of political choices’. More generally, the issue of security in the Arctic is increasingly being raised and discussed at conferences. For example, the Munich Security Conference has decided to address the region’s security challenges and chances for enhanced international cooperation through a series of high-level events. However, such conferences rarely concentrate on ‘hard security’ but, rather, primarily on maritime safety and security. In that context, the Arctic region is also addressed by the European Union’s Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS, adopted by the General Affairs Council on 24 June 2014). For the world’s largest trading bloc and as a global security provider, maritime security is a necessary priority for the EU. Two actions in the 2018 Revised Action Plan of the EUMSS— adopted by the General Affairs Council on 26 June 2018, specifically address the Arctic. The first action is the promotion of maritime capability development in the region, for example through the potential use of EU Member States’ icebreakers in Polar regions and through the use of space-based services—particularly Copernicus, the EU’s Earth Observation Programme. In the latter context, the European Union is making major contributions to Arctic shipping safety and environmental performance through its satellite systems, Galileo—the EU’s Global Satellite Navigation System, and the Copernicus Maritime Surveillance Service. The second action is the continued promotion of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the rule of law more generally, and international cooperation in Polar regions in particular in the context of the Arctic Council and, for example, taking into account the work of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. There are growing expectations that the EU should be more active on security issues regarding the Arctic, beyond what it has been doing so far. This would be in line with the EU Global Strategy that explicitly pleads for solid political and security cooperation, given the EU’s strategic interest in the Arctic remaining a low-tension area. Some EU Member States, such as Germany, in its newly adopted Arctic Policy Guidelines (21 August 2019), advocate for more intensive involvement in the security policy implications on the part of the EU and NATO.

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Notwithstanding the above considerations about ‘security’, the Arctic is widely regarded as a place where countries have so far managed peacefully to resolve disputes and, above all, to cooperate. It is even known as the ‘Arctic Spirit’. Indeed, the Arctic region can be held up as an example of constructive cooperation, from oil spill detection to the safety of maritime routes. The European Union has actively contributed to, and participated in, these positive trends, through constant constructive dialogue with all Arctic states, regional authorities and indigenous peoples. In the EU’s view, this ‘Arctic Spirit’ should not only be preserved but also enhanced and expanded, including with ‘new’ actors who are increasingly becoming engaged in the region. Despite the fact that the implementation of EU’s 2016 Arctic Policy is progressing well and has achieved a lot, more and more it is felt that the EU should be updating or revising its Arctic policy or strategy. I fully share this view. The main reasons being that EU’s Arctic policy has to take into account the rapid and sometimes dramatic developments since 2019, especially regarding climate change, and the geo-economic, geopolitical and security implications of the warming up of the Arctic. This implies that the Arctic needs to be mainstreamed in all relevant EU internal policies and to be more actively addressed in the EU’s external and security policy. The EU’s strong engagement on the file is appreciated, but more is expected. As Finnish Prime Minister Antti Rinne said at the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik (Iceland) on 10 October 2019: ‘We believe that there should be more EU in the Arctic and more Arctic in the EU.’ He added that ‘I believe that a new joint communication on the EU’s Arctic Policy building on the incoming Commission’s priorities would be useful in this regard’. In conclusion, the Arctic region is a global issue of strategic interest for many players and of great strategic importance for the European Union. The region is key in addressing global challenges, such as climate change. A safe, stable, sustainable and prosperous Arctic is not only indispensable for the sake of its people and of the region, but also for the whole European Union and for the rest of the world. Despite ‘extra-Arctic developments’ and political tensions, it is in all actors’ interests to keep the Arctic as a low-tension area. Hence, for all, the focus is, and should remain, on cooperation, and not confrontation in the European Union’s Northern Window—the Arctic region.

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Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Baker (2019). JOIN (2016). Global Strategy (2016). Luhn (2019). European Commission (2019). China (2018). JOIN (2018). Barents Observer (2019). Ebinger and Zambetakis (2009).

Bibilography Astrasheuskaya, Nastassia, and Henry Foy. 2019. Polar Powers: Russia’s Bid for Supremacy in the Arctic Ocean. Financial Times, April 29. Baker, Rodger. 2019. A Warmer Arctic Makes for Hotter Geopolitics, Stratfor. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/warmer-arctic-makes-hottergeopolitics-climate-change. Barents Observer. 2019. Japanese and Nordic Partners Team Up with Russia’s Telecom MegaFon, Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Set Up TransArctic Telecom Company, June 6. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/ind ustry-and-energy/2019/06/mou-signed-set-arctic-telecom-cable-company. China. 2018. China’s Arctic Policy, January 26. http://www.xinhuanet.com/eng lish/2018-01/26/c_136926498.htm. Ebinger, Charles K., and Evie Zambetakis. 2009. The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt. International Affairs 85 (6): 1215–1232. European Commission. 2008. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The European Union and the Arctic Region, COM(2008) 763 final, Brussels, November 20. European Commission. 2019. The European Green Deal, COM(2019) 640 final, Brussels, December 11. European External Action Service. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, June. European Political Strategy Centre. 2019. Walking on Thin Ice: A Balanced Arctic Strategy for the European Union, EPSC Strategic Notes, Issue 31, July. JOIN. 2016. European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic, JOIN(2016) 21 final, Brussels, April 27.

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JOIN. 2018. Joint Communication of European Commission and the EU High Representative on Connecting Europe and Asia–Building Blocks for an EU Strategy; JOIN(2018) 31 final of 19 September 2018. Luhn, Alec. 2019. Climate Change Warning as Arctic Circle Burning at Record Rate. Daily Telegraph, July 27. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/ 07/27/climate-change-warning-arctic-circle-burning-record-rate-forest/. Stepien, Adam, and Andreas Raspotnik. 2019. The EU’s Arctic Policy: Between Vision and Reality, College of Europe Policy Brief (CEPOB), 5.19 (August). file:///C:/Users/westl/Downloads/stepien_raspotnik_cepob_5-19_0.pdf.

PART III

Some New Policy Challenges

CHAPTER 13

The European Union’s New Climate Change Diplomacy: Innovating in Foreign Policy Alexandra-Maria Bocse

Introduction The European Union has often been characterized as an environmental and a climate change leader, particularly from the 1990s onwards,1 with some scholars claiming that the EU and the United States (US) are the only political actors that have the capacity to exercise global environmental leadership.2 There aren’t many areas where the EU can claim global action and reach. However, in shaping global climate politics the EU has enjoyed considerable success in terms both of reach and influence.3 The EU played a key role in the development and entry into force of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and, in that context, became a ‘very substantial player in international environmental politics’.4 Thereafter,

A.-M. Bocse (B) Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_13

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EU climate diplomacy suffered a set-back at the December 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, where the United States and several emerging economies effectively excluded the European Union from key negotiations. The EU subsequently changed its strategy and recovered its influence in the years that followed by embracing a role as a ‘leadiator’ (leader and mediator).5 Thus, the EU played an important role in launching and conducting the negotiations that led to the 2015 Paris Agreement, providing the current framework for the fight against climate change. As of November 2019, 195 UNFCCC members have signed the Paris Agreement and 187 are parties to it. The Agreement, which entered into force on 4 November 2016, aims to hold by the end of the century ‘the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to press for efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’.6 Scientific evidence shows that the current global emissions reduction effort needs to be considerably improved in order to achieve the 1.5 °C goal. The prospect of the Paris Agreement delivering on its targets has been further complicated by the announced withdrawal of the United States from the Agreement. Given this, many have argued that the EU needs ‘to play a key role in the long process to turn pledges made in Paris into action’.7 This chapter relies on analysis of official documents and press releases, as well as on a large set of semi-structured interviews conducted in Washington, Beijing, and Brussels in 2017–2019. These interviews capture the perspective of policymakers on EU climate diplomacy (what it is or what it needs to be) and on EU–US and EU–China climate relations (on which there has so far been limited information in the public domain). Such semi-structured interviews support the study of new facts and patterns, while ensuring that the data gathered is comparable.8 As an issue on the international and regional agenda, climate change is constantly growing in importance and urgency, constantly obliging states to adapt their diplomatic tools in order to address it effectively. This study is centred on a major economic and political entity—the European Union—whose importance in regulating climate change has been steadily increasing but whose influence has also, ironically and paradoxically, been reduced by its own success in meeting its climate change goals. The chapter considers the climate diplomacy tools the EU uses in relation to two of its strategic partners and leading CO2 emitters; China and

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the United States—China, the United States, and Europe being the most visible entities in international climate negotiations.9 The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses the various areas of EU engagement on climate diplomacy. Sections three, four, and five discuss several tools that the EU has used successfully in its climate diplomacy recently. The last section draws some conclusions in particular by highlighting, in the context of the overall theme of this book, what is new about the European Union’s climate diplomacy.

Climate Diplomacy; Areas of Engagement, and Tools Unlike in other external affairs areas, on climate change issues the European Union is perceived as being a unified, credible, and influential actor by participants in international climate negotiations.10 It can be argued that over the last decades the EU has impacted global climate politics in at least two ways; by contributing to the development of a global climate regime while being at the centre of global environmental negotiations, and by developing climate policies and regulations that show substantial ambition and that can be potentially replicated by other states. In addition, in contrast to other economic powerhouses, such as the United States and China, the EU has managed over the last decades to progressively reduce its CO2 emissions as a result of climate policies, but also due to changes in the economies of its Member States (for instance, the United Kingdom and Central and Eastern European countries), changes which have had the concomitant consequence of reducing emissions.11 As both the incoming President of the 2019–2024 European Commission and the new 2019–2024 European Parliament have signalled strongly, the EU intends not only to remain committed to fighting climate change in the international context, but to enhancing its efforts. The European Union’s 2016 Global Strategy made extensive reference to climate change (in recognition of the importance and urgency of the issue on the global agenda) and set the framework for the EU’s external commitment on climate change. Thus the Union asserts involvement in the global governance of climate change by leading through its own example and therefore intends to ‘increase climate financing, drive climate mainstreaming in multilateral fora, raise the ambition for review foreseen in the Paris Agreement, and work for clean energy cost reductions’.12

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In its climate action, the EU remains committed to multilateralism; ‘the EU will partner with the UN and the G20, as well as new donors, civil society, and the private sector’.13 According to the strategy, the EU plans to engage on climate change with strategic partners such as Russia, the United States, and China. When it comes to America, the strategy mentions that; ‘The EU will deepen cooperation with the United States and Canada on crisis management, counter-terrorism, cyber, migration, energy, and climate action’.14 Fighting climate change also constitutes an important dimension of the EU’s interaction with China; ‘The EU will deepen trade and investment with China, seeking a level playing field, intellectual property rights protection, greater cooperation on high-end technology, dialogue on economic reform, human rights, and climate action’.15 Reaching goals in the field of climate change is dependent on access to economic and diplomatic tools which, in relative terms, the EU has in greater supply than it has military instruments. Indeed, the EU has often used its economic power to make an impact on international climate politics. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) came into force in 2005 after Russia ratified it, and the EU played an important role in bringing about this ratification by supporting Russian membership of the World Trade Organization in return for Russian ratification of the Protocol.16 The EU includes environmental clauses in the trade agreements it concludes, conditioning commercial relations on environmental action. This is the case, for example, with the Free Trade Agreement the EU has concluded with South Korea (formally ratified in 2015). Article 13.5 of the Agreement states that; ‘the Parties reaffirm their commitment to reaching the ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol’.17 In addition to economic tools, a wide range of diplomatic tools have in recent years supported the EU’s international commitment to fighting climate change, including; European diplomatic human resources shaping climate negotiations, the export of climate policy solutions and ideas on climate, and engagement with sub-federal actors in the United States.

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The Symbiosis of Supranational and National Diplomatic Resources Several actors are involved in formulating and implementing the EU’s climate diplomacy, with the Member States (acting individually or through the Council of the European Union and its more specialized structures), the European Commission, and the European External Action Service constituting the key players. Within the European Commission, the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) plays a key role, given its large number of employees specialized in climate change matters and given also that, together with the rotating Council Presidency, it negotiates on behalf of the EU in the UNFCCC negotiations.18 The bilateral diplomatic relations between the EU and other countries are maintained through the EU Delegations, working closely with the Member States’ national diplomatic staff in the Embassies which certain Member States have maintained in certain countries. Sometimes, the limited resources in certain Delegations do not allow the EU to ‘deepen its understanding of the preferences and domestic politics of key third countries’,19 this is the case particularly in relation to China.20 Logically, Delegations that are more active in climate diplomacy tend to recruit and retain staff with a higher level of climate expertise.21 Large EU Member States (such as the UK (until January 2020), France, and Germany) tend to deploy more staff specialized on climate abroad, particularly in their Embassies in the capitals of key climate players, such as China, India, and the United States. Small Member States with a special interest in climate change, such as Sweden and Denmark, can deploy numbers of climate diplomats that rival those of the large EU Member States.22 The EU played an important role in the negotiation and architecture of the 2015 Paris Agreement. The European Union’s influence was achieved as a result of its involvement in climate negotiations as a bloc, but also because of the considerable diplomatic efforts that individual Member States made. This was particularly the case for France, which held the Presidency of COP21 and was highly interested in reaching an ambitious agreement in Paris.23 The EU was successful in securing five-year mandatory reviews for each signatory country’s commitments and was present at every major development in the negotiations. Ahead of the signing of the Agreement, the European Union announced its intention to commit to high

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emissions reduction targets, hoping that other countries, inspired by the EU’s move, would show greater ambition in their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs). During the Paris negotiations, the EU spoke with one voice, through the then European Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy, Miguel Arias Cañete, and Luxembourg, which held the Council Presidency24 ; ‘the EU and its Member States coordinated their positions and strategy without major hiccups throughout the process, prior to and at the international negotiations’.25 The experience of the French diplomats, as summit organizers, and their skilful use of tactics and strategies played important roles both in setting high ambitions for and in concluding the Paris Agreement. France invested substantial diplomatic resources in making the conference a success. Several pre-meetings were organized ahead of the December 2015 climate summit in Paris and the French team also travelled widely around the globe to meet with Parties and prepare the negotiations. The French strategy included enrolling the French President, François Hollande, to reach out to key players and to strike pre-summit understandings, as was the case with the understanding with China, concluded in November 2015. French diplomatic skills stood out particularly during the COP21. In particular, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Laurent Fabius, acting as COP President, showed great diplomatic skill. He ‘regularly convened open meetings of the COP to take stock of progress and discuss the way ahead with all delegations’.26 He contributed in this way to building trust among the delegations. The French Presidency gave the impression of being an ‘honest broker’, albeit one that was pushing for an ambitious deal, and this impression facilitated the acceptance of the final proposal, the result of considerable compromise, by all parties.27 While the French Presidency showed interest in consulting everybody, they aimed at ‘keeping the results of consultations generally unknown to delegations who were not directly involved’.28 Secret meetings, meetings with restricted participation or meetings that did not produce any formal written agreement facilitated the resolution of issues that had been debated fruitlessly for many years. The Presidency team and the COP21 President, Fabius, made sure that deals were closed on key issues between the concerned actors, while keeping other delegates in the dark about the compromises that had been reached.29 According to Dimitrov ‘pieces of privately negotiated text were thrown into the final text on the last day, when it would be too late to oppose without appearing to spoil

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the deal’.30 By compartmentalizing the negotiation process and practicing secret diplomacy, the French Presidency facilitated the conclusion of an ambitious agreement through which both developed and developing countries pledged to reduce their emissions. Diplomats later praised the Presidency team for the timing and sequencing of sessions and their organizational tactics. France was not the only EU Member State to act as a flanking partner in the EU’s negotiations but, because it held the COP21 Presidency, it played a far more prominent and important role and, in so doing, illustrated well the European Union’s strength in such circumstances. The symbiotic relationship between the resources of the EU and those of its Member States enhances its effectiveness and, in the specific context of climate change, enabled it to champion, broker, and successfully negotiate an ambitious Paris Agreement in 2015.

Exporting Policy Solutions Climate leadership can be exercised by ‘creating innovative solutions to the complex global policy problems’.31 Anthony Zito, for example, points to the spread in the 1980s of regulatory ideas applicable to hazardous waste originating in the European Community. Sharing experience, good practices, and policy solutions is part of the EU’s work as a directional, but also as an intellectual, leader. An intellectual leader ‘produces intellectual capital or generative systems of thought’.32 Producing policy solutions is an intellectual exercise, while the diffusion of solutions can also be associated with directional leadership. Scholars have seen the EU as having the potential to act as a model (as a directional leader) for other climate players; here the multiplicity of EU actors can have a considerable impact on a wide range of objectives. Thus, the Commission and the member state environmental ministries can offer their insights and experiences at international fora while other EU actors can engage with different levels of society.33

China is a globally leading greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions generator. This makes China key to the process of managing climate change and ensuring a successful global energy transition. The European Union, recognizing that fact, has therefore sought to act as a sort of directional partner with China. Two important areas of policy transfer between the

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EU and China concern emissions trading and the decarbonization of the energy system. The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) is a capand-trade system that sets a cap on GHG emissions, generates emissions allowances and allows businesses to trade the allowances. Basically, the system attaches a cost to pollution. The EU-ETS is the most wellestablished emissions trading system. Although the EU-ETS has not worked perfectly in recent years and has had to undergo substantial reform, it constitutes an area in which the EU can effectively export policy and expertise. China was particularly interested in using the European expertise on emissions trading in the process of upgrading its provincial systems to a nationwide system. The European Commission helped the Chinese in the design and implementation of emissions trading based on the EU experience.34 Thus, the Chinese are building capacity in emissions trading by trying to reproduce successful policy and practices and to avoid the mistakes of their European counterparts.35 A project worth e10m, EU–China ETS, and administered by DG CLIMA, facilitates the knowledge exchange on carbon market design and emissions trading systems between the EU and China. The knowledge exchange between the EU and China on the EU-ETS started in 2014 and entailed, in the first stage, ‘assistance to the Chinese Government’s plans to establish pilot emissions trading schemes in seven provinces and cities, drawing on prior EU experience of setting up the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’.36 Exchanges have intensified recently; funding doubled and is coming now from the EU Foreign Partnership Instrument (FPI) rather than from EU international cooperation and development funds, reflecting the increase in the relevance of this bilateral interaction area and the joint commitment to implement the Paris Agreement. In 2018, the EU and China signed a memorandum through which they also pledged to undertake joint research activities on emissions trading. Fostering the transition to a low-carbon energy system is key to global action on climate and an area in which the EU is determined to exercise leadership; global leadership of the European Union on the clean energy transition is required. As a global market place for clean technologies is being unlocked at an unprecedented scale, the European Union is using its external policies to share its experiences in this area and to mainstream the shift to

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a low-carbon global economy, first and foremost by developing strong partnerships with countries and regions.37

Interviewees at the centre of EU climate and energy policy-making and involved in shaping the EU–China bilateral relations, showed optimism regarding the potential for EU–Chinese joint work on decarbonization, especially as the United States is taking a step back from climate governance.38 This cooperation goal is formally included in the EU– China Roadmap on energy cooperation (2016–2020), which declares that ‘China and the European Union have a mutual interest and role to promote low-carbon development, protect the environment, address climate change and encourage clean energy development’.39 A key concern of developing economies (including China) is that action on climate change will negatively impact economic growth. Economic and ecological thinking in the European Union has advanced the thesis of ecological modernization, according to which environmental and economic growth goals can be simultaneously met, without sacrificing one or the other.40 Ecological modernization is widely embraced in Europe and in the last years it has gained more support internationally. The drop in the price of solar photovoltaic (PV) technology deployment is enabling countries such as China to generate the energy needed for their economic growth with a minimum impact on the environment. The diffusion of concepts and ideas such as ‘green growth’ and ‘ecological modernization’ strengthened the economic case behind climate action.41 Indeed, such ideas changed national policies and paved the way for the Paris Agreement.

Getting Creative and Engaging New Actors on Climate The 2016 election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States triggered a radical change in the US’s domestic and international climate policy. On climate action, the United States has taken several steps back in the last few years. The Obama Administration pledged to achieve CO2 emissions reductions of 26–28% by 2025 (with 2005 as a reference point).42 However, US CO2 emissions are currently increasing, after having declined in previous years. This is posing new challenges to global efforts to fight climate change.

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Under the Obama Administration, the United States played an important role in convincing large emitters such as China to sign up to a Paris Agreement that requires emissions reductions also from developing countries. The United States offered side payments (such as climate action funding) to these countries. The United States also created, together with China, programmes ‘to study and test low-emission energy technologies’.43 In addition, the United States under Obama adopted internal policies, such as the Clean Power Plan, that would support the United States in delivering on its GHG emissions reduction commitments, undertaken in Paris. Such policies were reversed by the Trump Administration. At first, after Donald Trump won the 2016 US Presidential elections, the EU tried to continue to engage with the United States at federal level. Leaders of the EU institutions, as well as leaders of influential EU Member States, pleaded with Donald Trump and tried to persuade him to keep the United States in the Paris Agreement. The French President, François Hollande, stated at COP22 in Marrakesh; ‘The United States, the world’s leading economic power and second biggest greenhouse gas emitter, must respect the commitments that have been made’44 and pledged to engage with the United States in a dialogue to persuade the country to keep its commitment to the Paris Agreement. Jean-Claude Juncker, then President of the European Commission, tried privately and publicly to persuade Donald Trump not to leave the Paris Agreement; ‘I am a trans-Atlanticist. However, if in the coming hours or days the American President says that he wants to withdraw from the Paris agreement, it is Europe’s duty to tell him: It doesn’t work like that ’.45 However, such appeals fell on deaf ears. On 1 June 2017 (ironically, International Children’s Day, that is, a day to celebrate the future generations that will more heavily be impacted by climate change), Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement. The withdrawal cannot become effective earlier than 4 November 2020, one day after the next, 2020, US Presidential elections. Nevertheless, the announced withdrawal of the United States placed more pressure on the EU to deliver on climate change. Immediately after the withdrawal announcement, European policymakers claimed the US withdrawal had increased the importance of EU leadership in the field of climate.46 In effect, the American policy shift turned the EU into ‘a climate leader by default’.47

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To a certain degree, the American withdrawal from the Agreement had a more limited impact than expected. Several American companies,48 environmental groups, states, and local administrations remained committed to delivering on climate change, including by supporting the development of renewable energy. This was a consequence of the fact that many of these actors had realized that decarbonization also makes economic sense and can generate profit.49 In the face of the Trump Presidency’s continued intransigence on climate change, the European Union started to look for and engage with alternative interlocutors in the United States, such as NGOs, businesses, cities, or states that showed interest in continuing to work on climate change. The governor of the state of California, Jerry Brown, was received with great enthusiasm in Brussels in November 2017.50 Taking advantage of this opportunity, the EU and California pledged to enhance their cooperation in the fields of clean transport and carbon markets. In recent years, the EU and California have engaged in cooperative work on carbon pricing and emissions trading systems. The EU constitutes the largest carbon market in the world, while California also has a properly established carbon market, linked to markets in Ontario and Quebec, Canada. Greater alignment of the EU’s and California’s markets advantages both parties.51 Since 2018, Brussels has also volunteered to host the Secretariat of the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, reuniting local leaders committed to ambitious climate action. The hosting comes as a recognition that local actors and municipalities in the United States and all over the world can play an important role in fighting climate change. The inaugural board meeting of the Covenant was held in Brussels on 27 June 2017 and was co-chaired by Maroš Šefˇcoviˇc, then the European Commission Vice President for Energy Union, and Michael Bloomberg, former mayor of New York City (and now a former candidate for the Democratic Party’s nomination in the 2020 US presidential election). Thus, the EU has experienced considerable success in filling the vacuum left by the US withdrawal from international climate politics. Andresen and Agrawala (2002) studied developments in climate leadership including on the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol. They argue that the EU used the lack of leadership shown by the United States (and by Japan) to advance its ‘self-declared leadership role on the climate issue’ and that the EU’s engagement on climate was; ‘perhaps equally important as a stepping stone to stand forth as a strong and unified block on

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the world scene’.52 Therefore, the announced/planned withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement has offered an opportunity for the EU to become more engaged and to consolidate its position as a global diplomatic actor. Of great interest in the context of the overall theme of this book is that when the EU found that the US federal level was no longer cooperative, it creatively engaged with sub-federal and local actors in the United States.

Further Discussion and Conclusions The case of climate diplomacy is helpful in making sense of several ‘new’ dimensions in EU foreign policy; responding to new challenges; adapting to a new political environment and using new instruments or employing old instruments in new ways. The EU action in the field of climate change has implications for the EU further consolidating itself as a foreign policy actor and for the ability of the EU and its Member States to contribute to solving one of the greatest challenges, if not the greatest challenge, of the twenty-first century. The EU has been involved in addressing climate change for over three decades, so the policy challenge is not a new one. However, the urgency of acting is now more pressing than ever before. An increase of 1.5 °C in global temperature compared with preindustrial times could take place within eleven years, rather than by the end of the century, according to a recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, released in October 2018. This would trigger ever more extreme weather conditions and further accelerate biodiversity loss. Monitoring the EU’s policies and positions on climate change is relevant not only for international policy transfers that can help other countries tackle climate change, but also to help get a better sense of whether the Paris Agreement is still relevant. For, without the EU’s commitment to its implementation, the Paris Agreement has very little chance of succeeding. The new political environment has also increased the pressure on the EU to engage in climate diplomacy. President Trump’s 2017 announcement further confirms the US’s disengagement from the multilateral world system. This has increased the importance of the EU partnering up with China and making sure that it remains committed to the Paris Agreement and to climate action. Experience has shown that there is a need for the engagement and commitment of at least two polities with great stakes for the climate field (given their emissions, but also resources that can be

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mobilized for climate action) to support climate agreements in the negotiation, as well as in the implementation stage. China plays a very important role in the geopolitics of climate change as it accounts for about 27% of the global CO2 emissions, while the EU’s share is 10%.53 Ironically, the fact that the EU is a declining polluter reduces its leverage in international climate diplomacy. Consequently, the EU has to be creative with the instruments it uses in its external climate action in engaging China, the United States (particularly at sub-federal level), and other countries. The EU has resorted to new diplomatic tools to engage with China and the United States. As seen above, the EU has engaged with China on climate by exporting climate policy solutions, for instance, the design of emission trading systems. Innovative arguments developed in the European school on ecological modernization played an important role in convincing developing countries that green policies can support economic growth. When faced with an unresponsive US federal government, the EU approached climate progressive US states and cities and turned them into its American interlocutors on climate change. The EU showed creativity by interacting with alternative actors to keep the United States engaged on climate. At the same time, the EU used old diplomatic tools and strategies in order to impact international negotiations in Paris, such as the skilled diplomatic human resources of one of its most influential and currently climate-committed Member States, France. Over the last decades, climate has been one of the most successful fields of EU international engagement. There are unfortunately also several challenges to the EU as an international climate actor. The EU has managed to reduce its emissions relative to other powerhouses (China, US, India) so it plays a smaller role in the geography of pollution. In this regard, the EU is the victim of its own successful domestic emissions reduction policies. The success of EU climate action is increasingly more connected with its ability to engage main polluters and convince them to act (while in the past substantial action could be taken by reducing the EU’s own domestic emissions, which is something the EU will, of course, continue to do). In addition, continued internal disunity might have a negative effect on the EU’s international climate action. Furthermore, Brexit will deprive the EU of important financial and diplomatic resources in its global engagement on climate. If the EU is successful in surpassing at least some of these challenges, it is very likely to further consolidate its position as a globally relevant climate diplomatic actor and intellectual leader.

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The recently elected European Parliament and the new European Commission treat climate action with priority. The European Parliament declared in November 2019 a continental and global climate emergency and the European Council reached in December 2019 an important milestone in the process of the EU committing to climate-neutrality by 2050. The European Commission, led by President Ursula von der Leyen, outlined in December 2019 measures for achieving climateneutrality through the European Green Deal. These recent developments demonstrate the European Union’s reinforced commitment to the Paris Agreement and its objectives and suggest that the Union will continue its engagement on climate and maintain the ambition to be a leader in this field.

Notes 1. Zito (2005), Andresen and Agrawala (2002), Kelemen and Vogel (2010), Groen et al. (2012), Parker et al. (2017), etc. 2. Kelemen and Vogel (2010). 3. Vogler and Stephan (2007), Zito (2005). 4. Vogler and Stephan (2007, p. 395). 5. Bäckstrand and Elgström (2013). 6. The Parties to the Agreement (2015, Article 2). 7. Pardo (2017, p. 1, for example). 8. Gillham (2005). 9. Venturini et al. (2014). 10. Parker et al. (2017). 11. Global Carbon Atlas (2019). 12. EEAS (2016, p. 40). 13. EEAS (2016, p. 43). 14. EEAS (2016, p. 37). 15. EEAS (2016, p. 38). 16. Walsh (2004). 17. The European Union, Its Member States and the Republic of Korea (2011). 18. Biedenkopf and Petri (2019). 19. Torney (2014, p. 134). 20. Torney (2014). 21. Biedenkopf and Petri (2019, p. 56) 22. As indicated by an analysis, undertaken by the author, of information available on the Embassies’ websites. 23. Countries are particularly active when they host UNFCCC climate negotiations as shown by Venturini et al. (2014).

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24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

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Oberthür and Groen (2018). Oberthür and Groen (2018, p. 719). Oberthür and Groen (2018, p. 718). Oberthür and Groen (2018). Dimitrov (2016, p. 6). Dimitrov (2016). Dimitrov (2016, p. 6). Zito (2005, p. 370). Young (1991, p. 298). Zito (2005, p. 372). Rayner and Jordan (2016). Interview with EC Official, DG CLIMA 1 (2017). Torney (2014, p. 128). European Commission (2017, p. 12). Interview with EC Official, DG CLIMA 1 (2017), Interview with EC Official, DG Energy (2017), Interview with EP Official (2017), Interview with MEP (2017), Interview with MEP Policy Adviser (2017). 39. EU-China Roadmap; Arias Cañete and Bekri (2016, p. 1). 40. Mol (1999). 41. Dimitrov (2012, 2016). 42. USA 2016, First NDC submission. 43. Victor (2013, p. 12) 44. Hollande (2016). 45. Juncker (2017). 46. Interview with EU Official (2017), Interview with Governmental Official (2017). 47. Interview with MEP Policy Adviser (2017). 48. ExxonMobil (2017). 49. Interview with EC Official, DG CLIMA 2 (2017). 50. Interview with EP Official (2017), Interview with MEP (2017). 51. DG CLIMA (2018). 52. Andresen and Agrawala (2002, p. 45). 53. Based on 2017 data, http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emi ssions.

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Bibliography Andresen, Steinar, and Shardul Agrawala. 2002. Leaders, Pushers and Laggards in the Making of the Climate Regime. Global Environmental Change 12 (1): 41–51. Arias Cañete, Miguel, and Nur Bekri. 2016. EU-China Roadmap on Energy Cooperation (2016–2020). Available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/ene rgy/sites/ener/files/documents/FINAL_EU_CHINA_ENERGY_ROA DMAP_EN.pdf. Last accessed 17 Feb 2018. Bäckstrand, Karin, and Ole Elgström. 2013. The EU’s Role in Climate Change Negotiations: from Leader to Leadiator. Journal of European Public Policy 20 (10): 1369–1386. Biedenkopf, Katja, and Franziska Petri. 2019. EU Delegations in European Union Climate Diplomacy: The Role of Links to Brussels, Individuals and Country Contexts. Journal of European Integration 41 (1): 47–63. DG CLIMA. 2018. EU and California to Step Up Cooperation on Carbon Markets. Available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/eu-and-califo rnia-step-cooperation-carbon-markets_en. Last accessed 17 Oct 2019. Dimitrov, Radoslav S. 2012. Persuasion in World Politics: The UN Climate Change Negotiations. In Handbook of Global Environmental Politics, ed. Peter Dauvergne, 72–86. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Dimitrov, Radoslav S. 2016. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Behind Closed Doors. Global Environmental Politics 16 (3): 1–11. European Commission. 2017. Second Report on the State of the Energy Union, COM(2017) 53 final. Available online at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource. html?uri=cellar:16b10dae-e931-11e6-ad7c-01aa75ed71a1.0003.02/DOC_ 1&format=PDF. Last accessed 17 Nov 2017. European External Action Service (EEAS). 2016. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Available online at: https://eeas.eur opa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf. Last accessed 29 Oct 2019. ExxonMobil. 2017. ExxonMobil’s Perspectives on Climate Change. Available online at: http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/search?search=climate. Last accessed 17 Sept 2017. Gillham, Bill. 2005. Research Interviewing: The Range of Techniques. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press. Global Carbon Atlas. 2019. CO2 Emissions. Available online at: http://globalcar bonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions. Last accessed 27 Nov 2019. Groen, Lisanne, Arne Niemann, and Sebastian Oberthür. 2012. The EU as a Global Leader? The Copenhagen and Cancun UN Climate Change Negotiations. Journal of Contemporary European Research 8 (2): 173–191. Hollande, François in Cécile Barbière. 2016. Hollande to Trump: Paris Agreement is ‘irreversible’, Euractiv, November 16. Available online at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/news/hollandeto-trump-the-paris-agreement-is-irreversible/. Last accessed 17 Sept 2019.

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Interview with EC Official, DG CLIMA 1. 9 November 2017. The interview took place in Brussels. Interview with EC Official, DG CLIMA 2. 9 November 2017. The interview took place in Brussels. Interview with EC Official, DG Energy. 8 November 2017. The interview took place in Brussels. Interview with EP Official. 9 November 2017. The interview took place in Brussels, in a European Parliament building. Interview with EU Official. 4 July 2017. The interview took place in Brussels, in a Commission building. Interview with Governmental Official. 23 June 2017. The interview took place in Beijing in an embassy. Interview with MEP. 9 November 2017. The interview took place in Brussels, in a European Parliament building. Interview with MEP Policy Adviser. 10 November 2017. The interview took place in Brussels. Juncker, Jean-Claude in Lars Andersen. 2017. Juncker Cautions Trump Against Withdrawing from Paris Agreement, The Brussels Times, June 1. Available online at: https://www.brusselstimes.com/all-news/belgium-all-news/ 42688/juncker-cautions-trump-against-withdrawing-from-paris-agreement/. Last accessed 25 Oct 2019. Kelemen, R. Daniel, and David Vogel. 2010. Trading Places: The Role of the United States and the European Union in International Environmental Politics. Comparative Political Studies 43 (4): 427–456. Mol, Arthur P.J. 1999. Ecological Modernization and the Environmental Transition of Europe: Between National Variations and Common Denominators. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 1 (2): 167–181. Oberthür, Sebastian, and Lisanne Groen. 2018. Explaining Goal Achievement in International Negotiations: The EU and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Journal of European Public Policy 25 (5): 708–727. Pardo, Romain. 2017. The US Exits Paris: Can the EU Drive International Climate Action? European Policy Centre Discussion Paper. Available online at: http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_7842_usexitsparis.pdf. Last accessed 15 Nov 2017. Parker, Charles, Christer Karlsson, and Mattias Hjerpe. 2017. Assessing the European Union’s Global Climate Change Leadership: From Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement. Journal of European Integration 39 (2): 239–252. Rayner, Tim, and Andrew Jordan. 2016. Climate Change Policy in the European Union. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science, 1–31. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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The European Union, Its Member States and the Republic of Korea. 2011. Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Korea, of the Other Part. Available online at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=OJ: L:2011:127:TOC. Last accessed 20 Oct 2019. The Parties to the Agreement. 2015. Paris Agreement. Available online at: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_ agreement_english_.pdf. Last accessed 20 May 2016. The White House. 2014. US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change. Available online at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/ 2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change. Last accessed 15 Nov 2017. Torney, Diarmuid. 2014. Challenges of European Union Climate Diplomacy: The Case of China. European Foreign Affairs Review 19 (Special Issue): 119– 134. USA. 2016. First NDC Submission. Available online at: http://www4.unfccc. int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Unitedpercent20Statespercent20ofp ercent20Americapercent20First/U.S.A.percent20Firstpercent20NDCpercent 20Submission.pdf. Last accessed 15 Nov 2017. Venturini, Tommaso, Nicolas Baya Laffite, Jean-Philippe Cointet, Ian Gray, Vinciane Zabban, and Kari De Pryck. 2014. Three Maps and Three Misunderstandings: A Digital Mapping of Climate Diplomacy. Big Data and Society 1 (2): 1–19. Victor, David. 2013. Climate Diplomacy. MIT Technology Review 116 (5): 12. Vogler, John, and Hannes Stephan. 2007. The European Union in Global Environmental Governance: Leadership in the Making? International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 7 (4): 389–413. Walsh, Nick Paton. 2004. Putin Throws Lifeline to Kyoto as EU Backs Russia Joining WTO. The Guardian, May 22. Available online at: https://www.the guardian.com/world/2004/may/22/environment.russia. Last accessed 10 Dec 2019. Young, Oran R. 1991. Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society. International Organization 45 (3): 281–309. Zito, Anthony R. 2005. The European Union as an Environmental Leader in a Global Environment. Globalizations 2 (3): 363–375.

CHAPTER 14

When Technology Becomes Geopolitics: The EU’s Response to Cyber Threats Nele Eichhorn, Alina Nedea, and Ulrik Trolle Smed

Introduction Digital technologies have radically transformed the world and continue to do so. This creates opportunities as well as challenges. Billions of devices, objects and systems are becoming connected as new networks permeate

All of the contributors to this book have written in a personal capacity only. The views expressed are their own and do not represent any official position of any organisation or institution. N. Eichhorn (B) · A. Nedea · U. T. Smed Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] A. Nedea e-mail: [email protected] U. T. Smed e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_14

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our digital societies from the homes of 500 million European citizens to the critical sectors providing them with basic services such as energy, health and transport as well as business and industrial control systems carrying sensitive information. In other words, whether it is in times of peace, crisis or conflict, the criticality of digital technologies seems only to grow. Hybrid threats such as cyber-attacks, espionage, manipulation of elections and forced transfers of technology contribute to a new environment where technology is becoming geopolitics and Member States and the EU have to react. The resilience of these systems as well as the European competitive ability in the field of technology is becoming ever-more critical to the continued security of governments, businesses, citizens and the functioning of our democratic institutions in a world where the threats are not limited by borders and affect us ‘without boots on the ground’. The use of digital technologies is making it harder to uphold the traditional distinction between foreign policy and external threats, on the one hand, and internal security policy and Member State competence on the other. Cross-border preparedness and a joint political will to take action become key for boosting the resilience and deterrence effect. With an aggressive Russia, a transactional United States and an increasingly assertive China, the geopolitics of technology is solidifying as the border between physical and digital is washed away. This changing geopolitical dynamic has put the Lisbon Treaty in a new light. In parallel, the role of the High Representative/Vice-President has increased with the need for new structures to meet these emerging challenges, to discuss the increased use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and to solidify new instruments, including the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox (CDT), a new horizontal sanctions regime and ongoing work on EU resilience. This chapter will use three lenses to describe the development of EU policy to mitigate and counter cyber threats. The first part will focus on policies towards ‘classic’ cyber threats‚ resulting in the development of an operational EU framework with the CDT, sanctions and the 2019 Cybersecurity Act.1 The second part will consider how the EU has positioned itself to mitigate the increasing cyber-enabled threats such as disinformation around the European Parliament elections as well as the European approach to critical digital infrastructure like 5G networks. The third part will explore how the EU has become, also as guided by the orientations in the Global Strategy of 2016, an increasingly geopolitical actor in the technological domain. At the outset, the EU and its Member States have recognized this need and encouraged the development by jointly

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monitoring and addressing the challenges that cyberspace poses both internally as well as to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Whether this might continue remains to be seen. While the three types of threats merely represent an analytical separation of the interwoven cyber challenges that the EU faces today and the policy responses to meet them, they do also provide a chronological reminder of how and how quickly the cyber domain developed.

A New Kind of Diplomacy---Recognising and Responding to Classic Cyber Threats In previous years the EU has pursued an active policy to coordinate the interests of Member States in the cyber domain. Beginning with the CDT, this discussion went through carefully crafted compromises on a cyber sanctions regime towards industrial and research coordination with a certification framework and a European network of cybersecurity competence centres. Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox In February 2015, the Council adopted Conclusions on Cyber Diplomacy.2 These affirmed that cybersecurity poses continuously evolving challenges for EU external policies, including the CFSP, and that the EU and its Member States should address these cross-cutting multifaceted issues with a coherent international cyberspace policy. With the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as a series of zero-day cyber-attacks on Ukrainian digital infrastructures such as banking and energy systems, an understanding has evolved at European level that deterrents would be likely to have more effect when banded together. Smaller Member States like Estonia had already experienced the pressure of Russian interference with the ‘Bronze Soldier’ incidents in 2007, while France and Spain were targeted by online interference in the 2017 French Presidential election as well as the 2017 independence vote in Catalonia.3 Against the policy background of the Global Strategy of 2016, the Council followed up with the adoption of a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities in June 2017.4 This ‘Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’ aims to leverage the full continuum of CFSP measures to respond to malicious cyber activities targeting the integrity and security of the EU and its Member States so as to keep cyberspace open, stable and secure. It mainstreams cyber into EU foreign

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policy and EU foreign policy into EU cyber crisis response mechanisms. The toolbox contains a variety of measures ranging from confidence and capacity building, awareness-raising in third countries to statements, Council Conclusions, dialogues and démarches, to restrictive measures or sanctions. In the following years, the EU began exercising its new role as a diplomatic actor in relation to cyberspace. The EU is regularly engaged by likeminded partners with a view to international cooperation on addressing malicious cyber activity (e.g. NATO, the United States and Canada). In the aftermath of the global cyber-attacks Wannacry and NotPetya, both originating in Ukraine and attributed to Russia by a number of Member States individually, the CDT was publicly deployed for the first time in April 2018 when Council Conclusions were adopted as a response to malicious cyber activities.5 Later that same year European Council President Donald Tusk and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker delivered a joint statement, together with High Representative Federica Mogherini, supporting the Dutch–British attribution of an attempted cyber-attack against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) by the Russian military intelligence service (GRU) to undermine the institution’s integrity.6 Furthermore, in April 2019, the High Representative issued a declaration on behalf of the EU stressing the need to respect the rules-based order in cyberspace, urging actors to stop undertaking malicious cyber activities, including the theft of intellectual property, and calling on all partners to strengthen international cooperation, notably in the United Nations, to promote security and stability in cyberspace.7 The EU has initiated a broader international effort to reduce risks to international peace, security and stability as well as a message to the diplomatic actors, including multilateral and regional organisations engaged in processes aimed at establishing norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. The EU engages in capacity building as part of its development cooperation to strengthen cyber resilience in third countries. The EU has been supporting the building of cyber capacity and resilience of Ukraine. In 2019, for instance, the EU supported the further development of cybersecurity8 as well as enhanced stability in Ukraine by reinforcing cybersecurity in elections.9 Almost two years passed between the adoption by the Council of the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, in 2017, and the establishment by the EU

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of the so-called ‘cyber sanctions’ regime in May 2019.10 The discussions around the sanctions regime became a milestone. To begin with, Member States needed to choose between establishing country-specific regime(s)—like most of those currently in place for the EU—or a socalled horizontal regime, allowing to target, under a single instrument, cyber-attackers regardless of their connection with a (third) state. The fact that at the time the EU only had two horizontal restrictive measures regimes in place concerning terrorism11 and one concerning chemical attacks12 but over thirty country-specific regimes, shows that the choice in favour of a horizontal regime was not made lightly. Whom to target was another difficult choice. Prizing itself as a community based on the rule of law, the EU is duty-bound to ensure that restrictive measures as a foreign policy tool uphold the rule of law in accordance with TEU Article 21. Hence, having a robust framework which could withstand the closest scrutiny was vital and required clear and legally sound criteria on the basis of which cyber-attackers and their supporters could be subject to EU restrictive measures. The added challenge was that, unlike in the case of the other two horizontal regimes, based in one way or another on internationally recognised standards,13 criteria for ‘cyber sanctions’ necessitated defining the necessary concepts in a way that was not only relevant and legally sound, but also consistent with pre-existing EU legal acts, such as Directive 2013/40 on attacks against information systems.14 The result was a horizontal regime targeting ‘cyber-attacks with a significant effect, including attempted cyber-attacks with a potentially significant effect, which constitute an external threat to the Union or its Member States’, with restrictive measures also possible in response to cyber-attacks against third States or international organisations under certain conditions. Three elements are relevant in order to understand what the EU seeks to counter with its ‘cyber-sanctions’; the notion of ‘cyber-attack’, the ‘significant effect’ and the notion of ‘external threat’. Cyber-attacks are defined as actions involving access to information systems, information system interference, data interference or data interception, and which are not duly authorised by a right holder or permitted under EU or national law. The definition is one of the most limited in this restrictive measures regime, no doubt in order to ensure that the targeted behaviour is clear and that other activities taking place in the cyber area are not unintentionally caught. It is also built around existing concepts in Directive 2013/40, although with some important nuances. What is

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missing from the definition of cyber-attacks is a reference to the intentions behind them, and it is only by reading the preamble to Council Decision 2019/797 that it becomes clearer that the restrictive measures ‘should focus on cyber-attacks … that are wilfully carried out’. Whether ‘focus on’ means ‘exclusively target’ intentional behaviour remains to be seen in practice. The potential use of the restrictive measures is also dependent on whether a cyber-attack has a significant effect, such as the scale of the disruption caused to critical state functions, the number of Member States concerned, economic loss caused, or benefit gained by the perpetrator and so on. Some resemblance exists between this ‘significant effect’ and the ‘significant disruptive effect’ in the Directive on the security of network and information systems (NIS Directive), yet the two are quite distinct. The Decision and the Regulation illustrate, in a non-exhaustive way, which cyber-attacks could constitute a threat to Member States or the Union. Some of these examples, such as the reference to the economic and social well-being of the people, speak to the shared values of the EU and its Member States; others are classic examples of essential social and economic activities, such as energy, transport or health; others echo recent events which raised the stake in the fight against cyber-attacks, such as the references to public elections or the voting process; and others, finally, address the supranational nature of the EU, with references to EU institutions, common security and defence policy operations and missions and so on. In any event, the threat needs to have an external element— meaning, for example, that its origin, perpetrating agent or infrastructure used is located outside the Union. Sanctions are a foreign, not a domestic, policy tool. Purely EU-internal cyber activities with similar effects are not covered by the restrictive measures and should be dealt with, rather, by national law enforcement authorities. The carefully crafted compromise of novel and existing legislative elements, values and prescriptive norms, and stakeholder interests, is bound to generate further discussion for the EU when it comes to deciding on potential ‘candidates’ to whom to apply sanctions. Designations will result in a freeze of assets and, for natural persons, a travel ban; yet no economic restrictions, not even an arms embargo, have been established. However, as the Preamble to Council Decision 2019/797 recalls, designations will not amount to an attribution of responsibility for cyberattacks to a third State, which remains ‘a sovereign political decision taken on a case-by-case basis’, and on which ‘[e]very Member State is free to

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make its own determination’. Cyber security remains a national competence of Member States and therefore at EU level the draftsmen decided explicitly to decouple designation and attribution in this context. Cybersecurity Act and a European Network of Competence Centres Entering into force in June 2019, the EU Cybersecurity Act introduced two strategic initiatives to EU cyber policy. First, an EU-wide cybersecurity certification framework for digital products, services and processes, which means that companies doing business in the EU will benefit from certifying these only once and see their certificates recognised across the European Union.15 While the framework is still in its infancy, with Member States only just beginning discussions in the autumn of 2019, this is an opportunity to set standards for Europe which could spill over to the global market. However, while EU-wide certification would be a major step forward for cybersecurity, as well as business innovation, discussions will most likely continue to inform how certification can be used in the twenty-first century for new technologies and a widening digital ecosystem. For 5G networks where hardware is becoming virtualised into software, which in turn will be serviced on a continuous basis, potentially by foreign providers and manufacturers, the traditional certification focus on products—not systems, services and supply chains—may not be enough.16 Second, the Act revamped and strengthened the EU Agency for cybersecurity (ENISA), established in 2004, by granting it a permanent mandate beyond 2020, more resources and new tasks. As part of the new framework, the Agency was granted a key role in setting up and maintaining the European cybersecurity certification framework by preparing the technical ground for specific certification schemes and informing the public on the certification schemes as well as the issued certificates.17 Moreover, the Agency was also mandated to increase operational cooperation at EU level by helping EU Member States upon request to handle cybersecurity incidents and supporting the coordination of the EU in case of large-scale cross border cyber-attacks and crises. While this constituted an extension of the Agency’s existing role as secretariat of the national Computer Security Incidents Response Teams (CSIRTs) Network, established by the NIS Directive, it had been clear from previous experiences that the cyber domain constituted an integral part of national security

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for Member States. Building trust was therefore key—and not a given— for developing greater European cooperation.18 But, as cyber threats continue to develop in quality and quantity, Member States have been increasingly willing to let the EU support their efforts in creating platforms for a coordinated response to the security challenges in the digital domain, which will be shown in the following section. Finally, with an aim of increasing joint cyber capabilities as well as technological and industrial capacities across Member States, the Cybersecurity Act was supported by an ambition for the EU to mature its joint capacity in cybersecurity research and development. This materialised in a proposal for a European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and Network of National Coordination Centres.19 By helping direct the cybersecurity funds under the next Multi-Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027, the initiative intends to help create an inter-connected, Europe-wide cybersecurity industrial and research ecosystem. It should encourage better cooperation between relevant stakeholders (including between cybersecurity civilian and defence sectors) to make the best use of existing cybersecurity resources and expertise spread across Europe by building on existing expertise with more than 660 cybersecurity expertise centres from all Member States. While the negotiating mandates were adopted in March 2019, the Parliament and the Council still need to reach agreement and negotiations are currently ongoing in the Council.20 They should be seen in the context of negotiations on the MFF and potentially shrinking EU budget as a result of both hardliner positions among certain Member States, as well as ‘Brexit’.

From Classic to Cyber-Enabled Threats and Digital Critical Infrastructure The EU cybersecurity strategy and CDT represented policy responses to long-standing discussions internally between Member States as well as globally on how to approach the cyber domain in a proportional manner. As the threats developed and the digital side of society became more critical to citizens’ everyday lives, the determination grew to deliver a credible response, even if the art of EU compromises might eternally leave something to be desired for the most ambitious actors. Having spent the first decade of the twenty-first century understanding the cyber threats, Member States would dedicate the second to crafting an increasingly robust, coordinated response and even integrated response

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to what traditionally had constituted national security (and therefore national competence with little EU responsibility) in a highly sensitive domain. As the two following examples will show, this distinction between national competence and a coordinated EU response were to blend even further. The Code of Practice and the Action Plan Against Disinformation Over the course of the early twenty-first century, the EU as well as other democratic societies and global actors have faced increasing disinformation campaigns online, in particular through social media platforms and closed messaging services such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Whats-App. Following high-profile events in the United States and Europe such as the hack and leak of the Democratic National Convention in 201621 as well as the Emanuel Macron French presidential campaign in 2017, these campaigns proved to be a major challenge to the ability of the ‘Western’ democracies to hold free and fair elections, and the ability of citizens to take informed decisions, while permeating the risk of manipulation and calling into question the outcomes of democratic election processes. To respond to the challenge, the Commission put in place several initiatives, which were notably guided by the Communication on Tackling online disinformation, the Action Plan against Disinformation and the Elections Package, which were all adopted throughout 2018 and aimed at mobilising a range of private and public stakeholders such as national and EU institutions, civil society, online platforms, advertisers, media, factcheckers and educators. In June 2019, the Commission and the High Representative reported on the progress achieved in the fight against disinformation and the main lessons drawn from the European elections. Although the May 2019 European elections were not free of disinformation,22 the EU stated that the actions helped to limit the impact of disinformation operations, which in practice progressed along five critical tracks. The first track was the Code of Practice against Disinformation.23 The Code was finalised in September 2018, and its initial signatories include Facebook, Google, Twitter and Mozilla as well as trade associations from the advertising sector, with Microsoft joining the Code later, in May 2019.24 The Code includes fifteen commitments, which were monitored by the European Commission on a monthly basis towards the European elections. The current next steps include a series of reviews, including

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self-assessment reports by the signatories to the Commission25 and a number of other reports by independent and Member State government experts towards a comprehensive assessment expected in 2020. Should the results prove unsatisfactory, the Commission may propose further actions, including of a regulatory nature. Second, the Commission also brought together Member State electoral commissions and cybersecurity and data protection experts in the reinforced election cooperation network, beginning in October 2018, to share best practices and promote cooperation with a view to reducing the threat surface.26 Third, the EEAS established a Rapid Alert System in March 2019 among the EU institutions and Member States in order to share information as well as spot and tackle coordinated disinformation campaigns. Consultations currently continue to develop an enhanced channel for information exchange with the online platforms and researchers, and build a strengthened hub for research and analytics, while strengthening cooperation with NATO and the G7.27 Fourth, over the past two years, the Commission has worked to mobilise a multidisciplinary community of fact-checkers, researchers and civil society to help detect and analyse disinformation campaigns and design adequate responses capable of reaching wide and relevant audiences. To boost the impact of this community, a new European online platform on disinformation is expected through the Connecting Europe Facility Programme.28 Secure access to data from platforms for these trusted stakeholders will be critical to enable deeper research and unlock better responses while necessary ethical and professional standards are upheld. Fifth, the EU also helped fund new tools and partners to curb disinformation. Through Horizon 2020, the Commission has invested more than e40m to harness new technologies to combat disinformation by accelerating mind-to-market timing of high-impact innovation projects such as partnerships between researchers and businesses. The Commission also proposed a dedicated budget of e61m in the 2021– 2027 Creative Europe programme to support quality journalism, media freedom, media literacy and media pluralism while foreseeing funding in the Horizon Europe programme (2021–2027) for these new tools and standards critical for the digital era.29 Digital Critical Infrastructure and 5G Security In March 2019, the Commission committed to fostering industrial cross border cooperation with strong European players, around strategic

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value chains in the context of the EU–China Strategy as well as the Recommendation on Cybersecurity of 5G Networks.30 The motivation came from the recognition that 5G networks will be a future backbone of Europe’s increasingly digitised economies and societies. Billions of connected objects and systems are concerned, including in critical sectors such as energy, transport, banking and health, as well as industrial control systems carrying sensitive information and supporting safety systems. Ensuring the security and resilience of 5G networks is therefore essential. To remain resilient in a changing global geopolitical climate, Member States recognised the need to act together to identify and mitigate potential weaknesses and vulnerabilities which might undermine our collective security. The Recommendation sets out a three-stage process to encourage Member States to develop national risk assessments and formulate mitigation strategies as well as to share these and arrive at an EU-wide risk assessment and toolbox of responses. In October 2019, Member States published a report on the EU coordinated risk assessment on cybersecurity in 5G networks with the support of the European Commission and the European Agency for Cybersecurity.31 The report was based on the results of the national cybersecurity risk assessments by all EU Member States and identified the main threats and threats actors, the most sensitive assets, the main vulnerabilities (including technical ones and other types of vulnerabilities) and a number of strategic risks. These security challenges are mainly linked to key innovations in the 5G technology, in particular the important part of software and the wide range of services and applications enabled by 5G, as well as the role of suppliers in building and operating 5G networks and the degree of dependency on individual suppliers. In this context of increased exposure to attacks facilitated by suppliers, the risk profile of individual suppliers will become particularly important, including the likelihood of the supplier being subject to interference from a non-EU country.32 As part of the next steps, the Cooperation Group is working to agree on a toolbox of mitigating measures to address the identified cybersecurity risks at national and Union level with the aim of assessing the effects of the Recommendation by 1 October 2020 and determining whether further action is needed. To support this work, a number of processes are in place. First, the Cybersecurity Act, already discussed above, boosts the cybersecurity of online services and consumer devices, and various voices have expressed

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an expectation that 5G infrastructure could be an important part of the Agency’s first certification efforts. Second, under the NIS Directive, all Member States have to adopt a national strategy in this area, defining the objectives and appropriate policy and regulatory measures. Third, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Screening Regulation will allow Member States and the Commission to exchange information in their assessment of risks and raise specific concerns posed on the security or public order by foreign investments, including in digital infrastructure. Fourth, the Commission provided a set of further guidelines in July 2019 on the EU’s rules on public procurement including how Member States and public authorities can prioritise measures such as security and data protection standards. Fifth, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) will provide the Commission with their assessment on 5G networks and security measures taken across Member States.33

The EU’s Role in a World Where Technology Is Becoming Geopolitics Decisive steps have been taken by the EU and its Member States to leverage European interests and the institutions that underpin them in recent years. A primary aim has been to close vulnerabilities to stability and to secure more control in relation to external pressure. Recognising the criticality of digital technologies, the European Commission of President Ursula von der Leyen has decided to boost European ‘technological sovereignty’ as part of a vision to turn the EU into a ‘geopolitical’ actor, a direction already requested and later endorsed by European leaders.34 For the most part, the instruments described in this chapter form part of a new EU toolbox to understand, build capacity and grapple with cyber threats in the years to come. Some instruments have already been put to use—like the CDT and the NIS Directive—while others remain to be activated such as the cyber sanctions and Rapid Alert System for the European Parliament elections. Still, a number of areas require more work for the EU to become more geopolitically relevant in a ‘geotech’ world. First, in the evolving ‘cyber-nexus’ between foreign and domestic policy, restrictive measures represent an example of the merging between political tools contributing to EU foreign policy and regulatory instruments restricting economic and financial relations with certain countries or persons. With the Lisbon

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Treaty, this dual nature was further emphasized with the creation of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with a connection to the Commission through a complementary VicePresident role and the European External Action Service. Both were given a leading role in shaping the EU’s policy on restrictive measures, for instance through proposals for Council decisions (TEU Article 30) and regulations (TFEU Article 215). However, the economic aspects of the policy—including measures that might actually ‘bite’—would require a full mobilisation of policy mechanisms and communities, including the European Commission. In its Communication from September 2018 the Commission advocates tapping into the potential of the Treaty on European Union by using the full range of possibilities within the CFSP, in particular by increasing the use of QMV as regards human rights issues in multilateral fora, sanctions policy and civilian CFSP missions. This would enable the EU to become a more effective and stronger global actor as well as shield Member States from targeted pressure by third countries that try to divide the EU. Second, it would be hard to imagine a geopolitical Commission in a ‘geotech’ world without a strategic budget to help leverage the visions of the Member States. A couple of initiatives aimed at this thinking include funding and efforts to guide ethical reflections around the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Although still under negotiation, the current proposal for the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) includes a commitment to invest e15bn in ‘Digital and Industry’ for, e.g. AI, cybersecurity and quantum computing through the Horizon Europe programme. In addition, the Digital Europe programme includes e4.5bn dedicated to testing facilities, software and data platforms, and other activities connected to AI. Third, tying the existing assets together in Member States requires more than a coordinated effort on a European level, something which could be unlocked with new movement on the proposal for a European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and Network of National Coordination Centres under the new Commission. Finally, there are a wide range of other technologies and issues which could be addressed as well. While only one of the top five largest companies in the world by market capitalisation was digital in 2001, the top five are all from the digital sector today, and none is European. There is no EU company in the world’s top digital fifteen and, as a result, the

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contribution of European businesses to the global digital supply chain has gradually diminished, despite the fact that the region remains one of the world’s largest markets for digital products and services.35 In some sectors, EU firms have to engage in joint ventures with Chinese firms, transferring technology and intellectual property.36 In addition, foreign businesses face challenging framework conditions, such as insufficient intellectual property rights protection in China.37 Whether these challenges are to form part of the work on ‘technological sovereignty’ is to be seen. However, a first step seems to be a definition of which technologies will be critical for future European welfare and security and where there might be a need for Member States to take action on a European level. This would require a closer look at areas such as the European research and innovation base to compete and understand key technological developments, what robust digital supply chains mean, having European companies with the capacity to compete in the face of, e.g. state subsidies, lack of market access and forced technology transfers, as well as a broader technological risk assessment approach to securing European critical digital infrastructure in the case of control of key components by foreign powers and non-state actors. An economy of 500 million inhabitants with a GDP of about e18,000 bn should certainly be able to master key technologies and secure critical infrastructures, and, by effect, be able to bolster the resilience of its security and economic system as well as help shape its future surrounding geopolitical context.

Conclusion The European Union has traditionally valued openness to the world and expected the world to open in return. But recent years have seen an increased awareness of the risks related with opening and globalising one’s public debate, market, critical infrastructure and supply chains. As the geopolitical and socio-economic landscape has shifted, security challenges have become more diverse and hybrid in nature for Member States, which is likely to create a continued demand for coordinated measures towards technology and cyberspace. While acknowledging the evolving nature of the threats, it is clear that whenever the EU and Member States build such resilience measures, they are potentially building solutions for the world, given their complex and diverse nature. European societies may be more similar compared to other regions in the world—especially due to the lasting effects of decades of interdependent regulation—however,

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there are few, if any, places in the world where solutions have to work for such a diverse community of governments and societies with potentially legally binding rules. Furthermore, building stability in the EU in the cyber domain can help project stability in the European neighbourhood such as Ukraine and the Western Balkans. Being more stable at home would at least leave the EU more time and resources for helping others abroad as well as limit the number of attacks on neighbours leveraged through EU digital infrastructure. Over time, improved attribution forensics may lead to an enhanced role of sanctions while better encryption or machine learning could increase the role of prevention and denial of attacks. Together with greater consistency between internal and external policies such efforts could, indeed, provide the EU with more agility as a geopolitical actor in the twenty-first century, and in particular in the technological domain. However, for the EU as an actor and for the EU’s response—what will always matter the most is the art of negotiating and maintaining unity.

Notes 1. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj. 2. Council of the European Union (2015). 3. BBC News (2017), Alandete (2017), Vilmer (2019), Rudd (2018), Berlingske (2017), Brattberg and Maurer (2018). 4. Council of the European Union (2017). 5. Council of the European Union (2018). 6. European Council (2018). 7. European Council (2019a). 8. European Commission (2019a). 9. Estonian Centre of Eastern Partnership (2019). 10. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797; Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796. 11. Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693; Council Regulations (EC) 881/2002 and (EU) 2016/1686); Common Position 2001/931/CFSP; Council Regulation (EC) 2580/2001. 12. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544; Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542. 13. For terrorism, UN Security Council Resolutions 1267(1999) and 1373(2001), and for chemical weapons, Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC) of 27 June 2018. 14. European Parliament and European Council (2013). 15. European Parliament and European Council (2019), European Commission (2019b).

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16. Julian King (2019a). 17. European Parliament and European Council (2019), European Commission (2019c). 18. Mariya Gabriel (2019). 19. European Commission (2018a). 20. Legislative Train Schedule (2019). 21. The Guardian (2018). 22. European Commission (2019d)., Davis et al. (2019), Avaaz (2019), Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2019). 23. European Commission (2018b). 24. European Commission (2019e). 25. European Commission (2019f, g, h, i, j, k). 26. European Political Strategy Centre (2018). 27. European External Action Service (2019) 28. European Commission (2019l). 29. European Commission (2019m). 30. European Commission (2019n, o). 31. European Commission (2019p). 32. See particularly 2.37 in above; also Julian King (2019b). 33. Julian King (2019c). 34. European Council (2019b, pp. 1–2, 4), European Council (2019c, pp. 7, 9), Council of the European Union (2019). 35. PWC (2019, p. 19). 36. Wall Street Journal (2019), European Commission (2018c). 37. European Commission (2018d, pp. 5–8).

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European Commission. 2019j. News Article: Fourth Intermediate Results of the EU Code of Practice Against disinformation, May 17. https://ec.europa.eu/ digital-single-market/en/news/fourth-intermediate-results-eu-code-practiceagainst-disinformation. European Commission. 2019k. News Article: Last Intermediate Results of the EU Code of Practice Against Disinformation, June 14. https://ec.europa. eu/digital-single-market/en/news/last-intermediate-results-eu-code-practiceagainst-disinformation. European Commission. 2019l. News Article: Commission Launches Call to Create the European Digital Media Observatory, Oct 7. https://ec.eur opa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-launches-call-create-eur opean-digital-media-observatory. European Commission. 2019m. Memo: Questions and Answers—Code of Practice Against Disinformation: Commission Calls on Signatories to Intensify Their Efforts, Jan 29. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ en/MEMO_19_752. European Commission. 2019n. Commission Recommendation of 26 March 2019 on Cybersecurity of 5G Networks C(2019) 2335, March 26. https:// ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/cybersecurity-5g-networks. European Commission. 2019o. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: European Commission and HR/VP Contribution to the European Council EU-China—A Strategic Outlook, Mar 12. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/ files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf. European Commission. 2019p. Press Release: Member States Publish a Report on EU Coordinated Risk Assessment of 5G Networks Security, Oct 9. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6049. European Council. 2018. Joint Statement by Presidents Tusk and Juncker and High Representative Mogherini on Russian Cyber Attacks, Oct 4. https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/10/04/joint-sta tement-by-presidents-tusk-and-juncker-and-high-representative-mogherini/. European Council. 2019a. Press Release: Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the EU on Respect for the Rules-Based Order in Cyberspace, Apr 12. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/ 04/12/declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-res pect-for-the-rules-based-order-in-cyberspace/. European Council. 2019b. European Council Meeting (21 and 22 March 2019)—Conclusions, pp. 1–2, 4. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/doc ument/ST-1-2019-INIT/en/pdf.

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European Council. 2019c. European Council Meeting (20 June 2019)— Conclusions, pp. 7, 9. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39922/2021-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf. European External Action Service. 2019. Factsheet: Rapid Alert System, Mar 15. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headQuarters-homepage/59644/ factsheet-rapid-alert-system_en. European Parliament and European Council. 2013. Directive (EU) 2013/40 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems. European Parliament and European Council. 2019. Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on Information and Communications Technology Cybersecurity Certification and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act), https://eur-lex.europa. eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj. European Political Strategy Centre. 2018. Election Interference in the Digital Age: Building Resilience to Cyber-Enabled Threats, European Commission, High-Level Conference, Oct 15–16. https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/events/ele ction-interference-digital-age-building-resilience-cyber-enabled-threats_en. Gabriel, Mariya. 2019. Keynote Speech at 15 Years Anniversary of ENISA— Building Cybersecurity Bridges Together, Mar 19. https://ec.europa.eu/ commission/commissioners/2014-2019/gabriel/announcements/keynotespeech-commissioner-mariya-gabriel-building-cybersecurity-bridges-together15-years-enisa_en. The Guardian. 2018. US Indicts 12 Russians for Hacking DNC Emails During the 2016 Election, July 14. Jon Swaine & Andrew Roth. https://www. theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/13/russia-indictments-latest-news-hac king-dnc-charges-trump-department-justice-rod-rosenstein. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. 2019. Interim Briefing: Propaganda and Digital Campaigning in the EU Elections, May 2019, https://www.isdglobal.org/ isd-publications/interim-briefing-propaganda-and-digital-campaigning-in-theeu-elections/. Julian King. 2019a. Remarks at CERT-EU 2019 Annual Conference, Nov 6. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/king/ announcements/commissioner-kings-remarks-cert-eu-2019-annual-conferenc e_en. Julian King. 2019b. Europe’s 5G network will be secure – if we work together, The Guardian, Oct 28. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/28/europe-5g-network-technology. Julian King. 2019c. Keynote speech at Munich Cyber Security Conference, Feb 14. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/king/

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announcements/commissioner-kings-keynote-speech-munich-cyber-securityconference_en. Legislative Train Schedule. 2019. Proposal for a Regulation Establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial. Technology and Research Competence Centre. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-connec ted-digital-single-market/file-european-cybersecurity-competence-centers. Accessed 30 Oct 2019. PWC. 2019. Global Top 100 Companies by Market Capitalization, July. p. 19, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/audit-services/publications/assets/glo bal-top-100-companies-2019.pdf. Rudd, Amber. 2018. Home Secretary Speech on Cyber Security to Commonwealth Business Forum, Apr 24. https://www.gov.uk/government/spe eches/home-secretary-speech-on-cyber-security-to-commonwealth-businessforum. Treaty on European Union. Latest consolidated version available in the OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, pp. 13–388. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Latest consolidated version published in the OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, pp. 1–388. UN-based and Autonomous Restrictive Measures Against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 and Council Regulations (EC) 881/2002 and (EU) 2016/1686) coexist with a semi-autonomous regime targeting terrorism (Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Council Regulation (EC) 2580/2001). UN Security Council Resolutions 1267(1999) and 1373(2001) for Terrorism, as well as the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC) of 27 June 2018. Vilmer, Jean-Baptiste Jeangène. 2019. The “Macron Leaks” Operation:A PostMortem, June. Institut de Recherche Strategique at De L’Ecole Militaire & Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2019/06/The_Macron_Leaks_Operation-A_Post-Mortem.pdf. Wall Street Journal. 2019. Forced Tech Transfers Are on the Rise in China, European Firms Say, Julie Wernau, May 20. https://www.wsj.com/articles/for ced-tech-transfers-are-on-the-rise-in-china-european-firms-say-11558344240.

PART IV

Conclusions

CHAPTER 15

The European Union’s Post-Lisbon Foreign Policy Ten Years On Karen E. Smith

Introduction A decade on from the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty provides a good opportunity to assess what difference its provisions have made to the process and influence of European Union foreign policy; we are now on the third set of holders of the posts created by the Lisbon Treaty, so the extent to which the reforms have made a difference can be more clearly identified beyond the impact that particular individuals may have made. The series of seminars that Martin Westlake organised at the LSE during the academic year 2018–19 brought together a number of high-level EU officials and LSE academics and students in an ongoing conversation about the past decade of cooperation on foreign policy issues within the European Union. This volume recounts some of those conversations and brings in further analyses; this chapter provides a critical account of the effects of the Lisbon Treaty and the past decade of EU foreign policy.

K. E. Smith (B) London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3_15

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The first section of this chapter considers the role that institutions and decision-making processes can have on fostering cooperation among states. The second section then looks briefly at the Lisbon Treaty reforms to EU foreign policymaking institutions and decision-making processes. In the third section, some of the EU’s successes in the foreign policy field are summarised, linking them to the new institutions and decision-making processes. The fourth section casts a more critical eye at the last decade of EU foreign policy and considers the extent to which the EU has been able to respond effectively to the many challenges it now faces.

Institutions and Cooperation In liberal institutionalism, an important strand of International Relations theory, institutions are critical for enabling and fostering international cooperation between states1 : transparent and clear rules mean that rulebreakers can be identified and possibly disciplined. As a result, states can learn to trust each other, in a virtuous cycle of cooperation and institutionalisation. The extent to which institutions can foster unity—defined here as sustained collective agreement—is, however, an open question, as is the length of time required for trust to build between states. In 2004, Pascal Lamy, then the EU Trade Commissioner, reflected on why the EU had not become the ‘fortress Europe’ that many outsiders (and insiders) had feared. The role played by the decision-making processes in reducing protectionism was crucial—but also a long time in the making. Trade policy is a supranational policy area, where decisions are made by qualified majority voting (QMV) and the European Commission negotiates on behalf of the EU. However, he noted: It was evident that my predecessors as Trade Commissioner spent about two-thirds of their time negotiating with EU member governments, leaving only one-third for negotiating with the non-European world … I am convinced that increased European unity on trade policy (through no exceptional efforts on my part, by the way) meant that these percentages were reversed under my tenure. The lesson for global governance is that new, non-unanimous rules for making decisions cannot produce solidarity overnight. However, confidence in them and trust in one’s negotiating partners builds over time as such rules are repeatedly used. Trust is the cement that binds an institution into a social contract which, implicitly, constitutes the foundation of the structure.2

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Expecting institutions and decision-making rules to work their magic quickly, may be unreasonable. But has a decade of the operation of the Lisbon Treaty fostered more trust among the Member States and more unity in foreign policymaking?

The Lisbon Treaty Reforms It is worth remembering that the Lisbon Treaty had a torturous journey, as it emerged out of the ashes of the Constitutional Treaty, which was rejected by the Dutch and French electorates in referenda in 2005. The Lisbon Treaty was also initially rejected by the Irish electorate in a referendum in 2008, before finally being ratified after a second successful Irish vote almost a year later. The Lisbon Treaty recreated almost all of the reforms to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that had been embedded in the Constitutional Treaty. Although the Lisbon Treaty formally abolished the separate ‘pillars’ (European Community, CFSP), it still keeps foreign, security and defence policy as a separate, intergovernmental, decision-making sphere. The need for unanimity remains in almost all cases of decision-making, and the crucial institutions are the intergovernmental ones; the European Council hammers out agreement on the trickiest matters, such as sanctions on Russia3 ; the Foreign Affairs Council (composed of the foreign ministers) is responsible for taking decisions; the Political and Security Committee (PSC) prepares the Council meetings. Decisions are still mostly taken by unanimity, so EU actorness depends on unity. However, there are a few exceptions to the unanimity rule in foreign and security policymaking. Firstly, the Council can vote by QMV when choosing EU special representatives (envoys). Secondly, the Council can vote by QMV when implementing an earlier CFSP decision that was taken by unanimity or a European Council decision on the EU’s strategic priorities. Thirdly, the Council can use QMV when deciding on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council. In addition, a so-called passarelle clause allows the European Council to take a unanimous decision to extend the cases in which the Council may vote by qualified majority. One innovation of the Lisbon Treaty was to create a new post, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which has an enormous amount of responsibility:

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• The High Representative chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, which means that the rotating presidency no longer plays this role. Furthermore, all the committees are chaired by officials from the European External Action Service (EEAS), again eliminating the former role of the rotating presidency. This reform is intended to provide more continuity to EU leadership and representation with third countries. • The High Representative engages in dialogue and diplomacy with third countries and at international organisations (like the ‘old’ High Representative, Javier Solana, did). • The High Representative heads the EEAS. • The High Representative is also a vice-president of Commission. • Together with the European Commission, the High Representative can make proposals for EU action (the European Commission thus can no longer make such proposals on its own, as it could since the Maastricht Treaty). Another innovation was the creation of the EEAS, as it is composed of officials from the Commission (especially the old Directorate-General for External Relations), the Council secretariat and the Member States. The EEAS should thus help ensure ‘horizontal coherence’ (coordination and cooperation between the various EU institutions) and ‘vertical coherence’ (coordination and cooperation between the EU level and the Member States). The EEAS prepares and implements EU foreign policies, in conjunction with the European Commission, which still has primary responsibility for enlargement and neighbourhood policy, development aid policy and trade. The driving force behind the reform of the CFSP was to make the EU a global power, and one that acted as a force for good in the world. The 2001 Laeken Declaration by the European Council, which launched the process that led first to the Constitutional Treaty and then the Lisbon Treaty, contains these notable aspirations: The role [Europe] has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world’s heartrending injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development.4

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The next two sections assess the EU’s foreign policy over the past decade, focusing particularly on the extent to which the new institutions and decision-making procedures have fostered unity and effectiveness.

Assessing the Past Decade of EU Foreign Policy: Some Good News The past decade has seen some notable developments in the EU’s foreign policymaking system, and in its effectiveness. After a rocky start—with numerous news stories about various alleged shortcomings—the first post-Lisbon High Representative, Catherine Ashton, ended her time in office with notable successes, including fostering rapprochement between Kosovo and Serbia, and the initial agreement on a deal over Iranian nuclear capabilities. Her successor, Federica Mogherini, has not suffered anything like the bad press that Ashton had to cope with, and was able to seal the Iran nuclear deal, work out a Global Strategy for the EU (2016) and launch a series of successful attempts to foster cooperation on defence. Thus, both High Representatives were able not just to act on behalf of the EU, but also sought to play a more active diplomatic role both in terms of ‘upgrading the common European interest’ and of pursuing European interests at the international level. The creation of the EEAS was also rather tortured; there was no guidance in the Lisbon Treaty as to the organisation and functioning of the EEAS (this was to be decided separately by the Council). And, because of sensitivities over the second Irish referendum, the construction work could not begin explicitly until shortly before the service was expected to come into being. Bureaucratic battles ensued, and responsibility for some key areas of foreign policy—notably relations with the neighbourhood—lay outside the EEAS and inside the Commission. There were reports of unhappiness among EEAS officials and high staff turnover, as the different cultures of former Commission officials, Council secretariat officials and Member State diplomats clashed.5 Ten years on, such reports have diminished, and the EEAS seems well embedded among Brusselsbased institutions. The EU’s 142 Delegations across the globe have ‘brought many of Europe’s assets together on the ground’,6 representing a useful step towards more ‘joined-up’ decision-making. As Patrick Costello points out in Chapter 4, the European public remains highly supportive of EU foreign policy. Eurobarometer reports on public opinion across the EU Member States have consistently shown

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high public support for a common security and defence policy (for example, 74% in favour, spring 2019), common trade policy (71% in favour, spring 2019) and CFSP (66% in favour, spring 2019).7 A weakness in EU foreign policy has long been the failure or inability to agree on strategy; EU Member States and institutions have always struggled to agree clear priorities for external policies. There is a proliferation of EU ‘strategies’, but these rarely set priorities, because each Member State has its own priorities, and making trade-offs can simply be too difficult to negotiate.8 Indeed, crisis management and response tend to characterise EU external relations, rather than long-term planning: For in the absence of clear priorities, the EU rarely takes to the initiative on the key foreign policy issues of the moment (contrary to the other great powers) or, when it does, its initiatives tend to be fragmented and stove piped. Consequently, it is not very successful in prevention, despite its rhetoric, and to which it has not been able to prevent, it tends to react late.9

High Representative Federica Mogherini sought to change this, working on the Global Strategy throughout 2015–16, and releasing it (alas) just days after the UK voted to leave the EU in a referendum in June 2016.10 The Global Strategy contains lofty ambitions (and still a lack of priorities), but in some ways represents a more realistic view of the EU’s role in international affairs: idealistic aspirations tempered by ‘principled pragmatism’.11 It states that investment in all dimensions of foreign policy has to increase. The EU should ‘join up’ its external action in areas such as energy diplomacy, cultural diplomacy (but see Chapter 8) and economic diplomacy; internal and external security; security and development policy; and human rights and gender issues. One aspect of the Global Strategy that has rapidly been turned into concrete outcomes is the intention to strengthen European defence capabilities. Since 2016, the EU has: established a Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD), to foster information sharing and cooperation among Member States; launched Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) with binding commitments from Member States to cooperate with each other on specific projects (34 as of 2019); created the European Defence Fund, to provide EU funding for research and capability development; and proposed a European Peace Facility, to fund the common costs of Common Security and Defence Policy missions.12

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The (rather limited) Lisbon Treaty provisions extending the use of QMV in foreign policy have been used just once: the EU special representative to the Sahel was appointed by QMV in 2015,13 in addition, Cyprus ‘constructively’ abstained from a decision on the EULEX mission in Kosovo.14 The challenge of reaching decisions by unanimity thus continued after the Lisbon Treaty entered into effect. However, the case of sanctions on Russia since 2014 has been a remarkable instance in which the Member States have held to a position—despite the differences between them, particularly in terms of the differing economic impact that sanctions have on them.15

Assessing the Past Decade: Some Bad News ‘Crisis’ and ‘failure’ were terms often used to describe the state of the EU’s foreign relations before the Lisbon Treaty, from the EU’s inability to stop bloodshed in the Bosnian war in the early 1990s to the spectacular bust-ups over the 2003 Iraq War. The new institutions and procedures introduced by the Lisbon Treaty were supposed to enable the EU to perform better. But although new institutions have been established, a global strategy has been published, and a few foreign policy successes can be claimed, the past decade of EU foreign policy is not marked by much dynamism, unity or effectiveness. The EU’s new, post-Lisbon foreign policy has come into existence in what can only be described as ‘challenging times’—a global financial and economic crisis, the spread of violence and even war in the EU’s neighbourhood (engulfing Libya, Syria, Ukraine and other states), the rise of authoritarian and/or illiberal regimes challenging EU norms, the growth of strong anti-EU movements within Europe, and the election of a US president openly hostile to European integration and key EU policies, such as support for the Iran nuclear agreement. There has been much disappointment in the extent to which the EU has been able to respond to this much more challenging external context: ‘The last five years have not been kind to the European Union’s foreign policy. The EU has been less relevant, less active, and less united than was hoped in the heady days after the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2010’.16 The limits of the institutions have been apparent. The High Representative can easily be side-lined in a crisis, as Member States assume leading roles—such as France and Germany in the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Although the EU Global Strategy and its various follow-ups signal an

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attempt to be more forward-looking, there is still little sign that the EU’s ability to prevent rather than respond to crises has improved significantly. This is evident in recent cases of mass atrocities. There were, for example, numerous credible warnings of violence against the Rohingya in Rahkine State in Myanmar, but even though the European Commission and EU High Representative published ‘Elements for an EU strategy vis-à-vis Myanmar/Burma’,17 the document underestimated the Myanmar government’s unwillingness to respect the human rights of the Rohingya. The outbreak of what was described as a ‘textbook case of ethnic cleansing’18 in August 2017 then took the EU by surprise; moreover, its response has been fairly tepid while the Rohingya refugees are internally displaced and remain in limbo.19 The impressive and rapid development of defence cooperation, as described by Pedro A. Serrano de Haro in Chapter 5, still leaves open several questions. It is not clear that the EU Member States share a strategic culture, that is, ‘a pool of sufficiently shared norms, beliefs and ideas regarding the means and ends of defence policy’.20 What role should UN Security Council authorisation play in EU decisions to deploy CSDP missions? How willing are Member States to use military force? In 2014, France was dismayed by the lack of support by Member States for a relatively small military mission to protect populations in the Central African Republic.21 It is not clear that the Member States would be any more inclined to intervene militarily now. Furthermore, simply having better military capabilities will not make the EU more effective and influential. At the heart of the challenges that EU foreign policy faces is the lack of Member State unity. Over fifty years ago, Stanley Hoffman argued that European economic integration would not spill over into the political realm due to the ‘logic of diversity’ among (the then six) Member States: the Member States had different international allies, friends, interests, and these could not be easily melded into European common stances.22 Despite the impressive development of extensive machinery to foster common EU foreign policies, the logic of diversity arguably is as strong as it ever was. In the last two years alone, one or more Member States have blocked a number of potential EU common positions:

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• In June 2017, Greece vetoed an EU statement at the UN Human Rights Council because it condemned China.23 • In January 2019, Italy blocked a common EU position recognising the opposition leader as president of Venezuela; 19 EU Member States then did so separately (so nine Member States did not join them).24 • In March 2019, the Romanian prime minister announced that Romania would follow the US and move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, contradicting a settled EU position.25 • Hungary requested exemptions in the 2018 renewal of the EU’s arms embargo on Belarus, though these were dropped in 2019.26 • The EU was divided over a UN Pact for Migration, agreed in December 2018, with three EU Member States voting against it (alongside the EU), five abstaining and the rest voting in favour. • Hungary blocked an EU mandate for negotiating with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries until stronger anti-migration language was inserted.27 The problems seem to go deeper, however, than single or small groups of Member States objecting to majority positions. The EU has struggled to come up with a common response to the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. There is no common EU response to China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI). The EU’s response to Libya ever since the 2011 uprising has been low-key, initially due to Germany’s disquiet over the use of military force, and then because of competing visions over the future of the country. The lack of an effective EU response to the atrocious violence in Syria is glaring and the disarray over how to approach the Assad regime notable. Greece and North Macedonia finally reached an agreement over the name of the latter country, a dispute that had led Greece to veto the country’s entry into the EU and NATO, but then the subsequent block on EU enlargement to North Macedonia (now over) was led by France and the Netherlands.28 The European Commission29 has responded to the lack of unity by proposing that the ‘passarelle clause’ (see above) be used to introduce QMV in the following circumstances:

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• EU positions on human rights in UN fora. • Adoption and amendment of EU sanctions regimes. • Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy missions. It is arguably the case that the EU has been most dynamic in international affairs in the areas where QMV is used: trade policy (the EU has been negotiating and concluding a number of new trade agreements in the past five years—see Chapter 6); climate policy (see Chapter 13); and areas such as digital privacy (the GDPR). The problem in the CFSP, however, is that the Member States may have an obligation to support the Union’s external policy but are not obliged to agree one in the first place. They have other options. They can act unilaterally, or with states from outside the EU. They can ‘forum shop’ and look for the most appropriate multilateral forum in which to pursue their interests. The strengthening of central institutions and supranationalisation of decision-making processes may not lead to more unity, but the opposite. Christian Lequesne has argued that ‘In European integration, the institutionalisation of any policy produces simultaneously convergence and resistance from the Member States’.30 Institutions themselves, including those created by the Lisbon Treaty, may not therefore foster a more united, effective EU in the world. But this does not mean that there are no ways forward. Lisbeth Aggestam and Federica Bicchi31 argue that Member States can act outside institutions, but in smaller groups among themselves, hoping to pave the way for more collective action. The future of the ‘new’ EU foreign policy may thus be found in the actions of small groups of Member States or of separate Member States assuming a leadership role.

Conclusions This chapter has argued that the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have had some effect in terms of embedding the new institutions, prompting more strategic thinking and encouraging more joined-up policymaking. But the fundamental challenge of fostering Member State unity remains. In retrospect, however, the most significant provision of the Lisbon Treaty for the future of the EU’s foreign policy does not fall within the Treaty’s sections on the CFSP: it will be article 50, setting out the procedure for the withdrawal of a Member State. The UK’s triggering of article

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50 in March 2017 after the ‘Brexit’ referendum, and its exit from the EU, will have far-reaching consequences for the EU’s foreign policy. Brexit will affect EU foreign policy in several ways, both material and non-material. The principal basis for the EU’s power in international relations is the size of its single market: the GDP of the EU28 is around the size of that of the US, and slightly larger than that of China, and these three big players have a similar share of world trade in goods.32 The EU’s size and wealth give it leverage. The UK’s GDP is approximately 15% of EU GDP, so the EU27 market is now smaller by almost a sixth.33 The UK’s withdrawal will also reduce the size of the EU’s budget by about 12–15%.34 The EU will still be one of the world’s largest donors, though with a smaller budget than it currently has.35 The UK has not been a major contributor of troops to EU civilian and military missions (under 5%), but it has provided crucial resources to some missions, such as the anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia.36 EU diplomacy also depends on the diplomatic capacities of its Member States, and the loss of the UK, with a relatively large, highly respected diplomatic service, will undoubtedly be felt, as Patrick Costello, in Chapter 4, suggests may already be occurring. The EU’s presence in the UN Security Council will depend on the sole permanent member, France.37 Brexit diminishes the EU’s soft power, or the power of attraction. One of its former key Member States has left the organisation, tacitly damaging the EU’s global image and potentially reducing the EU’s ability to exercise influence in international affairs. Indeed, considerable damage to the EU’s soft power has already been sustained. Yet Brexit has also served the notable function of uniting the Member States in defence of the single market and fundamental EU principles. This should provide some optimism about the future of the EU’s new foreign policy in a much more challenging world.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Keohane (1989). Lamy (2004, p. 16). van Middelaar (2019). European Council (2001, p. 20). See Balfour et al. (2015). Bildt and Leonard (2019, p. 2). European Commission (2019, p. 35). Smith (2014, chapter 9), Müller (2016).

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9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

Biscop (2012). European Union (2016), Tocci (2017). European Union (2016, p. 16). European Union (2019). See also Chapter 5. Schuette (2019, p. 4) Bendiek et al. (2018, pp. 3–4). See Sjursen and Rosén (2017). Bildt and Leonard (2019, p. 1). European Commission and EU High Representative (2016). UN News (2017). Smith (2018). Meyer (2005, p. 524). Tardy (2015), Barbiére (2014). Hoffmann (1966). H. Smith (2017). Rettman (2019). Gurzu (2019). Radio Free Europe (2019). Chadwick (2018). France24 (2018). See also Chapter 8. European Commission (2018, pp. 11–12). Lequesne (2015, p. 54), see also Saurugger and Terpan (2015), K. Smith (2017). 31. Lisbeth Aggestam and Federica Bicchi (2019). 32. World Bank (2019), World Trade Organisation (2019). 33. World Bank (2019). 34. HM Treasury (2019). 35. OECD (2019). 36. European Parliament (2019, p. 3). 37. See Gowan (2018).

Bibliography Aggestam, Lisbeth, and Federica Bicchi. 2019. New Directions in EU Foreign Policy Governance: Cross-Loading, Leadership and Informal Groupings. Journal of Common Market Studies 57 (3). Balfour, Rosa, Caterina Carta, and Kirsti Raik (eds.). 2015. The European External Action Service and National Foreign Ministries: Convergence or Divergence?. Farnham: Ashgate. Barbière, Cécile. 2014. France Frustrated by Europe’s Shortcomings in the Central African Republic. Euractiv, Mar 19.

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Bendiek, Annegret, Ronja Kempin, and Nicolai von Ondarza. 2018. Qualified Majority Voting and Flexible Integration for a More Effective CFSP? SWP Comment No. 25. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Bildt, Carl, and Mark Leonard. 2019. From Plaything to Player: How Europe Can Stand Up for Itself in the Next Five Years. European Council on Foreign Relations. Policy Brief. https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/From_plaything_to_pla yer_ECFR.pdf. Biscop, Sven. 2012. Raiders of the Lost Art: Strategy-Making in Europe. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 4. Brussels: Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations. Chadwick, Vince. 2018. What’s at Stake as EU, Africa, Caribbean, Pacific Negotiate New Accord. Devex, Nov 1. https://www.devex.com/news/what-s-atstake-as-eu-africa-caribbean-pacific-negotiate-new-accord-93568. Dempsey, Judy. 2018. The European Union Has Decided That It’s Time to Cuddle Up to Dictators. The Washington Post, Mar 21. European Commission. 2018. A stronger Global Actor: A More Efficient Decision-Making for EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. COM (2018) 647, Sep 12. European Commission. 2019. Standard Eurobarometer 91, Spring 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/ getsurveydetail/instruments/standard/surveyky/2253. European Commission and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 2016. Elements for an EU Strategy vis-à-vis Myanmar/Burma: A Special Partnership for Democracy, Peace and Prosperity. JOIN (2016) 24 Final, June 1. European Council. 2001. Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Laeken, Dec 14 and 15 2001. Document no. 300/1/01 REV 1. https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20950/68827.pdf. European Parliament. 2019. Briefing: What Role in European Defence for a Post-Brexit United Kingdom? http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etu des/BRIE/2019/637941/EPRS_BRI(2019)637941_EN.pdf. European Union. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/ eugs_review_web.pdf. European Union. 2019. The European Union’s Global Strategy: Three Years on, Looking Forward. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_global_str ategy_2019.pdf. France24. 2018. EU Delays Decision on North Macedonia, Albania Membership Bids, June 18. https://www.france24.com/en/20190618-eu-delays-decisionnorth-macedonia-albania-membership-bids.

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Füle, Štefan. 2011. Speech on the Recent Events in North Africa to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. European Parliament, Brussels, SPEECH/11/130, Feb 28. Gowan, Richard. 2018. Separation Anxiety: European Influence at the UN After Brexit. Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations. https://www. ecfr.eu/publications/summary/separation_anxiety_european_influence_at_ the_un_after_brexit. Gurzu, Anca. 2019. Romania to Move Israeli Embassy to Jerusalem. Politico, Mar 24. HM Treasury. 2019. European Union Finances 2018. CP 114. https://ass ets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/814387/190618_HMT_2018_Annual_Statement_on_Eur opean_Finances_print.pdf. Hoffmann, Stanley. 1966. Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe. Daedalus 95 (3): 862–915. Keohane, Robert. 1989. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory. Boulder: Westview Press. Lamy, Pascal. 2004. Europe and the Future of Economic Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies 42 (1): 5–21. Lequesne, Christian. 2015. At the Centre of Coordination: Staff, Resources and Procedures in the European External Action Service and in the Delegations. In The European External Action Service and National Foreign Ministries: Convergence or Divergence?, ed. Rosa Balfour, Caterina Carta, and Kirsti Raiki. Farnham: Ashgate. Meyer, Christoph O. 2005. Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms. European Journal of International Relations 11 (4): 523–549. van Middelaar, Luuk. 2019. Alarums and Excursions: Improvising Politics on the European Stage. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing. Müller, Patrick. 2016. EU Foreign Policy: No Major Breakthrough Despite Multiple Crises. Journal of European Integration 38 (3): 359–374. OECD. 2019. Development Aid at a Glance: Statistics by Region. 1 Development Countries, 2019 Edition. http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustai nable-development/development-finance-data/World-Development-Aid-at-aGlance-2019.pdf. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2019. EU Extends Belarus Arms Embargo, Feb 20. Rettman, Andrew. 2019. Italy Gags EU on Venezuela Crisis. EU Observer, Feb 5. Saurugger, Sabine, and Fabien Terpan (eds.). 2015. Resisting European Norms in Foreign and Security Policy. Special issue, European Foreign Affairs Review 20 (2/1).

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Schuette, Leonard. 2019. Should the EU Make foreign Policy Decisions by Qualified Majority Voting?. London: Centre for European Reform. Sjursen, Helene, and Guri Rosén. 2017. Arguing Sanctions: On the EU’s Response to the Crisis in Ukraine. Journal of Common Market Studies 55 (1): 20–36. Smith, Helena. 2017. Greece Blocks EU Criticism at UN of China’s Human Rights Record. The Guardian, June 18. Smith, Karen E. 2014. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press. Smith, Karen E. 2017. EU Member States at the UN: A Case of Europeanisation Arrested? Journal of Common Market Studies 55 (3): 2017. Smith, Karen E. 2018. The EU and the Responsibility to Protect in an Illiberal Era. Dahrendorf Forum Working Paper 3. https://www.dahrendorf-forum. eu/publications/the-eu-and-the-responsibility-to-protect-in-an-illiberal-era/. Tardy, Thierry. 2015. EUFOR RCA: Tough Start, Smooth End. Issue Alert, March: European Union Institute for Security Studies. Tocci, Nathalie. 2017. Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World. London: Palgrave Macmillan. UN News. 2017. UN Human Rights Chief Points to “Textbook Example of Ethnic Cleansing” in Myanmar, Sept 11. Available at: https://news.un. org/en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-exa mple-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar. Accessed July 2018. World Bank. 2019. World Bank Open Data. https://data.worldbank.org/. World Trade Organisation. 2019. WTO Data Profile. https://data.wto.org/.

CHAPTER 16

Afterword: The European Union’s New Foreign Policy—A Glass Half Full? Martin Westlake

High Ambitions As Christian Leffler recalls in Chapter 2, the European Union and its predecessors (the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, the European Communities), have always, necessarily, been engaged in external relations, and a discernible foreign policy has been steadily evolving since European Political Cooperation was codified in the Single European Act (1986) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy was established in the Maastricht Treaty (1993). In terms of that evolutive process, the Lisbon Treaty (2009) nevertheless represents a step change, whether in terms of scope and reach, or in terms of actors (the High Representative/Vice President and the European External Action Service) and available resources, but above all in terms of ambitions. Not only shall ‘The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy … cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common

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defence’ (TEU Article 24(1)), but ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world…’ (TEU Article 21(1)). These are lofty and noble ambitions but, as with many Treaty articles, they contain a blend of the descriptive (in other words, what the EU was already in effect doing), the prescriptive (what the EU should, according to its own lights, always be doing) and a statement of intent (what the EU has determined it will do and therefore will work towards). To the extent that the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions are prescriptive and a statement of intent, they imply that the Union has the necessary instruments and capacity to do what it says it is going to do. But here, again, the Treaty articles contain a blend of the descriptive (what already exists) and the evolutive (what the EU will work towards). A good example of the latter is provided by the phrase ‘progressive framing’ in TEU Article 24(1) above, coupled with the word ‘might’. To the question, ‘does the EU intend to have a common defence policy?’ the current answer, reading between the lines of the Treaty provisions, is, ‘maybe’.1 This is not the language of constitutional settlement but, rather, of constitutional ambition (or determination, as some would argue). This ambitiousness creates a unique conundrum, again alluded to by Christian Leffler in Chapter 2 and by Patrick Costello in Chapter 4. The EU does not ‘just’ practice foreign policy, but it effectively uses that practice to help advance its constitutional ambitions. Put the other way around, third countries and regions are not (or not only) interacting with a fixed state regional organisation, but with a steadily evolving entity, one that is constantly seeking to improve itself. Each success, and each failure, of the EU’s evolving foreign policy is not just put down to experience but is part of a learning process. And that same conundrum is also felt inwardly. The Lisbon Treaty’s provisions contain a strong presumption that all of the EU’s existing actors (the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and its various Directorates-General, the European Parliament, the Member States and so on) together with all of its new ones (the permanent President of the European Council, the High Representative/Vice President, the European External Action Service) will harmoniously work together in realising the Lisbon Treaty’s lofty, noble ambitions, pooling their resources and coordinating their actions wherever necessary in such a way as to advance the common cause. And all of this is to take place not in a vacuum, but in a rapidly changing world

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where existing and fresh challenges are pressing up against the Union, as various chapters in this study have illustrated. It was always going to be a big ‘ask’ but, then, many would have made the same comment about Robert Schuman’s 9 May 1950 declaration…

Great Complexity Part of the reason for the scale of the challenge is the great complexity of the evolutionary process that has been under way and of the various elements, actors and sensitivities involved. One of the greatest sensitivities is that of the Member States’ prerogatives—a theme that runs through many of the contributions to this book. The point is well illustrated by the way the treaties have been amended over time and the ingenuity involved in the way those amendments have been drafted. The Single European Act was so called because it managed to bring into a sole package of treaty amendments a new, separate treaty text that first formalised intergovernmental cooperation in the foreign policy sphere. Seven years later, in similar crab-like fashion, the Maastricht Treaty brought in the Common Foreign and Security Policy via an intergovernmental ‘pillar’. The US Constitution deals with foreign, security and defence policy through one section with two short articles. In contrast, the Treaty on European Union deals with foreign, security and defence policy through a title (V) with two chapters (1 and 2) together containing twenty-three articles. In addition, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’s provisions on external action (a distinction that does not exist in the US Constitution) are made through a Part (5) with seven Titles (I-VII) together comprising twenty-two articles covering inter alia the common commercial policy (that is, trade), development cooperation, humanitarian aid, international agreements and relations with international organisations. The Lisbon Treaty’s provisions are so painstakingly detailed because that was the necessary price to be paid for the undoubted progress that was achieved by both the Convention on the Future of Europe and the ensuing Intergovernmental Conference, but the fundamental distinction between ‘common’ (that is, basically intergovernmental) policies and the ‘Community method’ remain, with the ‘double-hatted’ High Representative/Vice-President straddling the divide.2 A second strong set of sensitivities, to some extent reflecting the first, concerns the prerogatives of the various institutions involved. TEU

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Article 17(1) provides that, ‘With the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties’, the European Commission ‘shall ensure the Union’s external representation’. But what is a foreign policy without the muscle of trade and development aid—especially in the absence of a fully fledged defence capacity? The strong and clear implication is that the newly created European External Action Service and the European Commission should work very closely together but, as anybody who lived through the birth of the EEAS following the 2009 implementation of the Lisbon Treaty will recall, various turf battles were fought before clear lines of responsibility started to emerge and a more cooperative relationship could be established (as Karen Smith relates in Chapter 15). In some part this situation was created by the political sensitivities relating to the holding of the second Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. Nothing could be done, or be seen to be done, that might be misrepresented as anticipating the result of that referendum, which was held on 2 October 2009. The Lisbon Treaty entered into force just two months later, on 1 December 2009. As Catherine Ashton, the first High Representative, put it, ‘Despite the length of the negotiations on the Constitution and then the Lisbon Treaty nothing had been put in place to make the EEAS a reality – in part because of the legal and political uncertainty surrounding the process’, with the result that she felt she was ‘trying to fly a plane while still bolting the wings on. The institutional challenges, and sometimes battles, were many…’3 Thus, at the outset the EEAS was, ‘beset by resource constraints and the conflicting visions and interests of its different stakeholders’.4 Recondite though the distinction might be, part of the problem related also to the fact that the EEAS was not an Institution (with a capital ‘I’) but, rather, a service, whose ‘organisation and functioning’ were to be ‘established by a decision of the Council’. (TEU Article 27(3))5 The new service’s tripartite composition,6 and the lack of any pre-implementation reflections about how its sui generis nature would interact with the EU’s existing budget and staff regulations further complicated an already difficult beginning. Of course, the draftswomen and men of the Treaties were aware that there would be birth pangs and a need for coordination. Hence TEU Article 21(3) provides that, ‘The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect’. The European

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Parliament7 and the Council of the European Union8 were swift to build on the constructive recommendations set out in Catherine Ashton’s July 2013 review, urging further reforms. By the end of her term, in 2014, the High Representative could fairly claim that the EEAS had ‘developed into a modern and operational foreign policy service, equipped to promote EU interests and values in our relations with the rest of the world. Although much remains to be done, we can see the benefits of the comprehensive approach in the Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa, the crises in Africa, in support of the transition in Burma-Myanmar and in many other parts of the world’.9 There was indeed a sense of genuine progress and the second High Representative, Federica Mogherini, duly built on the foundations established by her predecessor, as her Foreword, and various chapters in this book, attest. Continued dynamic tensions between the Institutions and services within the EU and between the Member States and the EU are nevertheless apparent. When in 2014, for example, European Commission President-Designate Jean-Claude Juncker introduced the concept of a cluster of Commissioners, grouped thematically and working together under a Vice-President, this was heralded as a long-overdue and muchanticipated reform.10 It had indeed long made functional sense for some sort of coordination among the Commissioners with external relations responsibilities, and the obvious authority above them was the High Representative/Vice-President. But the High Representative’s coordinating role was effectively used as a precedent to create a series of other such coordinating authorities/Vice-Presidents. Moreover, under TEU Article 17(6)c, the European Commission President may appoint Vice-Presidents, but the position of Frans Timmermans11 as ‘First Vice President’ with an over-arching role, owed nothing to the Treaties and subliminally diminished the High Representative’s special status and particular authority. A similar process occurred in 2019, with the creation of the Ursula von der Leyen Commission. Thus, the current High Representative, Josep Borrell, is preceded in a hierarchical order by three Executive Vice Presidents (a title which, like ‘First Vice President’, is based on rule-making autonomy and presidential authority rather than a treaty article) and, in chairing the ‘Group’ of Commissioners for ‘A Stronger Europe in the World’,12 is one of six such coordinating Vice-Presidents, and his mission letter (addressed to him by the Commission President)13 sets out a set of specific and constraining instructions

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(including an obligation to provide a weekly update to the Commission which will necessarily curtail his travel plans). Beyond such esoteric considerations about titles, roles, mandates and logistics are the openly declared ambitions of the new European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, to lead a ‘geo-political Commission’14 and the plans of the new President of the European Council, Charles Michel, ‘to get stuck into foreign policy and international security during his five-year tenure’.15 Intra-Commission and inter-institutional coordination under these circumstances represents a major challenge to the new High Representative, who must somehow both intermediate between the various actors and assert his Treaty-ordained role. Continued dynamic tensions between the EU and its Member States, individually and collectively, are also still very much apparent in the foreign affairs/external relations field. Several different phenomena are involved. The first is a latent tendency for Member States to pursue their own foreign policies, thus side-lining the HR/VP and the EEAS and, indeed, the EU. This has perhaps particularly been the case with the larger Member States, with their historical (post-colonial) ‘baggage’ and sizeable and effective diplomatic machines that have not yet perhaps entirely adjusted to the new post-Lisbon reality. But this is both an understandable phenomenon and a tendency that will probably decline over time, as the domestic policies of the Member States adjust and evolve. The second, in a context of consensus (meaning unanimity) in the European Council and in the General Affairs Council (and the PSC) is an inability of Member States to agree among themselves, leading effectively to foreign policy paralysis. Like its Juncker predecessor,16 the von der Leyen Commission is eager to encourage the European Council to make use of the so-called ‘passarelle’ clause (TEU Article 31(3)) to extend the QMV procedure to CFSP matters which do not have military or defence implications (the Juncker Commission singled out human rights promotion, EU sanctions and civilian missions as early candidates for such a transition) but the Member States will, understandably, resist. Sooner or later, though, in the balance of probability, a precedent will be set, probably in the context of some pressing crisis, and QMV will gradually impose itself. The third phenomenon is a simpler push-back by the Member States, through the European Council and the President of the European Council, against any perceived encroachments on intergovernmental prerogatives. Who or what, ultimately, should provide the EU’s response to US policy, for example? Is it simply a matter of trade, or are

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there broader political considerations at stake that are more the preserve of the European Council? And what, recalling Chapter 4, about Africa? Clearly, both Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen have identified the African continent as a geo-political priority, but will they concur, or compete, on the ground? And, in either case, where does that leave the High Representative? It is these sorts of considerations and questions that lead to questions from pundits and the media such as, ‘Can Josep Borrell get EU foreign policy off the ground?’ The new High Representative, as the article continued, ‘must quickly show his 27 fractious and sceptical passengers that he is the right man to fly them to safety and dissuade them from hijacking the plane’.17

A Clear Collective Logic And yet. The European Union has had a vision for quite a long time now, and a clear-eyed strategy based upon that vision. As Milton and KellerNoëllet observed in 2005, the (2001) Laeken Declaration was already, ‘remarkably long on prescriptions and surprisingly short on questions;’ Under ‘Europe’s new role in a globalised world’ it asks two questions. One is rhetorical (does Europe, now that it is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order?), and the other (what is Europe’s role in this changed world?) it answers itself, seeing the Union as an enlightened ‘power’ acting in support of the greater ‘good’.18

Three waves of accession (2004, 2007, 2013) have occurred since then and, notwithstanding the UK’s seemingly quixotic exit at the end of January 2020, the vision remains strong and clear. It is a vision based on a stark fact which is that, even as Europe seems to be reaching some sort of pinnacle of cooperative achievement, its collective power, both demographically and economically, is fading and may even now have peaked.19 As I have written elsewhere: The challenge from the East – particularly China’s burgeoning economy and geopolitical influence, but also the Indian and other Asian economies – is already the subject of much concern. The challenge from the South is only now beginning to emerge into public consciousness. It can be illustrated through simple demographic statistics. In 1950, Germany, Italy and the UK were among the ten most populous countries in the world. By

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2015, they had long since gone, replaced by the likes of Brazil, Pakistan and Nigeria. By 2100, five of the ten most populous countries in the world will come from the African continent – Congo, Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania (the others will be China, India, Indonesia, the USA and Pakistan).20

Whereas the world’s population is expected to rise by more than 41 percent by 2100, Europe’s population will continue to age and shrink. A 2019 survey found that EU28 countries made up thirteen percent of the word’s population in 1960, but they account for less than seven percent this year and will account for just four percent in 2100. Economic forecasts tell a similar story. In 2019 the Pardee Centre for International Futures at the University of Denver21 published projected GDP figures for 186 countries up to 2100. Counting back to 1960, it found that the EU28 countries together then represented more than a third of the world’s GDP. By 2100, they will probably make up just one-tenth. Nine of the ten countries expected to make the biggest relative gains in GDP are in Africa. China will overtake the US as the world’s biggest economy by the end of the 2030s, and India will take China’s place by the end of the century.22 The clock is ticking. On 2 September 1902, at the Minnesota State Fair, Theodore Roosevelt famously declared, ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far’.23 As yet, the EU has no such ‘big stick’ but, even without the UK, it is currently a trade and regulatory giant and the world’s biggest donor of development aid. In other words, the EU has a large, wealthy market and capacious and deep pockets, and these it is using, as much as it can and as far as it can, to encourage the world to adopt its model, to follow its lead, to embrace multilateralism and the economic, social and political models and values that have done so much to enable Europe to prosper since the end of the Second World War and, later, the Cold War.24 Thus, the EU’s strategic vision, as currently set out in the 2016 Global Strategy, is one of enlightened self-interest, bringing ‘principled pragmatism’25 to bear, being ‘generously selfish’26 As Atlanticism fades, so the EU is championing what might be termed ‘Europeanism’. If the EU does not succeed before its powers and populations wane, the world risks being a harsher, Westphalian one. That tacit common understanding lies behind the EU’s actions and is surely the reason why, despite all of the complexities and sensitivities described above, the EU continues to progress.

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The Final Test In an interview soon after the end of her mandate as High Representative, Federica Mogherini declared, ‘The EU has unparalleled ‘‘soft’’ power—in economic, diplomatic, and cultural terms—and we are increasingly active as a global security provider, building our ‘‘hard’’ power as never before. In Syria and Libya, we are not a military player—and I am proud of this. Violence has brought more violence, while we have always worked for peaceful and negotiated solutions’.27 ‘This is no time’, the 2016 Global Strategy declares, ‘for global policemen and lone warriors’. And yet the Western world has grown used to an enlightened American hegemon acting, precisely, as the global policeman. Indeed, in her introduction to the Global Strategy Mogherini made much of ‘deepening the transatlantic bond and our partnership with NATO’. At the same time, the American hegemon is withdrawing from multilateralism and Atlanticism and, as Pedro A. Serrano de Haro documents in Chapter 5, the EU is steadily working towards the vision in the Lisbon Treaty of a common defence policy, if not a common defence. Defence was, in a sense, in at the beginning of the European integration process. Indeed, who knows where Europe might be now if the French Assemblée Nationale had not rejected the 1952 Treaty of Paris? What if Europe had already erected a pan-European architecture in the 1950s? In any case, the EU knows, as Pedro A. Serrano de Haro so convincingly argues in Chapter 5, that it must become increasingly self-reliant, even if the NATO relationship remains strong. In Brian Aldiss’s Super-State: A Novel of a Future Europe (2002), a future European Union President prosecutes a war in a former European colony somewhere in Asia. For the moment, such visions remain the stuff of science fiction. But can one imagine the EU as a permanent member of the UN Security Council? (In November 2018 German Vice-Chancellor and Finance Minister Olaf Scholz proposed that the French permanent seat on the Security Council should become a joint EU one.28 ) Can one imagine the EU fielding its ‘own’ soldiers and tanks and battleships and missiles? Can one imagine the EU, qua EU, invading a territory? As the US has known for a long time, with strength comes responsibility, and with responsibility comes hard choices.

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A Glass Half Full? From all of the foregoing, and the excellent contributions to this book, it is clear that the momentum towards the strategic vision of greater autonomy and self-reliance, including on defence, is there, but that what is lacking is speed. Unless faced with urgent crises—the eurozone, the migration crisis—Europe doesn’t do ‘fast’. All the tried-and-tested emphasis is on ‘learning by doing’, ‘walking before running’, ‘small steps’, ‘slowly but surely’ and all the other favoured phrases used to describe the Union’s cautious, accretive integration methodology. The European Union’s foreign policy, like many aspects of the integration process, will remain a work in progress for a long time to come. And, like a repeat visitor to Barcelona’s Sagrada Familia cathedral, each study, like this one, will comment on the state of progress of the construction process, and each study will note that, while much has been done, much remains to be done. In conclusion (to end with a flourish of mixed metaphors), the glass is definitely half full, and the bottle is pouring, but the clock is ticking, and, in relative terms, Europe is shrinking. The window of opportunity is still open, but the question remains as to whether the EU will pass through it before it closes. It is, in any case, both a noble enterprise and the only possible solution, given what we know about the future.

Notes 1. Recalling Andrew Shonfield’s memorable title, Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination. 2. See Milton and Keller-Noëllet (2005, pp. 60–66) for an account of the Convention’s deliberations on external relations and defence. 3. Both from the EEAS’s July (2013) Review. 4. See Lehne (2012). 5. The distinction between an Institution, in the sense of TEU Article 13, and other bodies (for example, the advisory bodies—the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions), so important to the post-1979 directly elected Parliament, has lost in prominence as the Parliament’s role has steadily strengthened, but relates primarily to budgetary and rule-making autonomy and the right of Institutions to defend their prerogatives before the European Court of Justice.

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6. TEU Article 27(3); ‘This service … shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States’. 7. European Parliament (2013). 8. Council of the European Union (2013). 9. EEAS (2013). 10. Westlake (2016). 11. Who happened also to be a former (Dutch) Minister of Foreign Affairs (2012–2014). 12. European Commission (2019a) 13. European Commission (2019b). 14. Bayer (2019). 15. See, for example, Peel (2020) and Herszenhorn (2019). 16. In his September 2018 State of the Union speech (Juncker 2018). 17. Bond and Scazzieri (2019). 18. Milton and Keller-Noëllet (2005, pp. 60–61). 19. As David Cameron declared in his 2013 Bloomberg speech, ‘The map of global influence is changing before our eyes’ (Cameron 2013). 20. Westlake, (2019). 21. https://pardee.du.edu/. 22. Busquets Guàrdia (2019). 23. Oxford University Press (1985, p. 408). 24. See, for example, European Commission (2019c) and Grevi (2019). 25. A term used in the 2016 Global Strategy (European Union, 2016). 26. A term used by Federica Mogherini in a 2019 interview (Mogherini 2019). 27. Mogherini (2019). 28. DW (2018).

Bibliography Aldiss, Brian. 2002. Super-State: A Novel of a Future Europe. London: Orbit Books. Bayer, Lili. 2019. Meet von der Leyen’s ‘Geo-Political’ Commission, December 4. https://www.politico.eu/article/meet-ursula-von-der-leyen-geo political-commission/. Bond, Ian, and Luigi Scazzieri. Can Josep Borrell Get EU Foreign Policy Off the Ground? Centre for European Reform, September 30. https://www.cer. eu/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2019/can-josep-borrell-get-eu-for eign-policy-ground.

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Lehne, Stefan. 2012. The Review of the European External Action Service in 2013. Carnegie Europe, November 14. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategic europe/50020. Milton, Guy, and Jacques Keller-Noëllet, with Agineska Bartol-Saurel. 2005. The European Constitution: Its Origins, Negotiation and Meaning. London: John Harper. Mogherini, Federica. 2019. Shaping Europe’s Present and Future. European Council on Foreign Relations, January 11. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/com mentary_shaping_europes_present_and_future. Oxford University Press. 1985. The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peel, Michael. 2020. Charles Michel’s Mission. Financial Times, January 17. https://www.ft.com/content/91b9ccbe-38e6-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4. Westlake, Martin, 2016. Chronicle of an Election Foretold: The Longer-Term Trends Leading to the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ Procedure and the Election of Jean-Claude Eeckhout as European Commission President. LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series, No. 102. http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanI nstitute/LEQS%20Discussion%20Paper%20Series/LEQSPaper102.pdf. Westlake, Martin. 2019. Brexit: On Being More-or-Less Semi-Detached. LSE, European Policy and Politics Blog, January 9. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europp blog/2019/01/09/brexit-on-being-more-or-less-semi-detached/.

Index

A Aberystwyth University, 5 Aceh, 71 Addis Ababa, 165, 166, 174 Afghanistan, 71, 131, 147 Africa, 3, 4, 7, 9, 12, 26, 28, 62, 74, 80, 81, 131, 143, 159, 165–174, 257, 260 Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs, 169 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), 27, 131, 173, 174, 245 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), 3, 13, 167, 170 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), 80, 88 African Peace Facility (APF), 72, 80, 88, 170 African Union (AU) African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 80 Agenda 2063, 169

Protocol on the Free Movement of People, 169 ‘Silencing the Guns’, 169, 171 Aggestam, Lisbeth, 246, 248 Ahmed, Abiy, 167 Alaska, 179, 180 Albania, 131, 132, 154, 163 Alden, Chris, 7, 16 Aldiss, Brian, 261 Aleppo, 52, 157 Algeria, 131, 153, 155, 159 Ali, President Ben, 46 Al Shabaab, 168 Amsterdam Treaty, 139 Arab Islamic American Summit, 55 Arab Spring, 51, 60, 160 Arctic Circle Assembly, 186, 190 Arctic Coast Guard Forum, 189 Arctic Council, 180, 182, 186, 188, 189 Arctic region, 4, 9, 13, 159, 177–180, 182, 184–186, 189, 190

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. Westlake (ed.), The European Union’s New Foreign Policy, The European Union in International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48317-3

267

268

INDEX

climate change, 3, 13, 177, 179, 181, 185, 190 Connect Submarine Cable, 185 sea routes, 179, 183 Arctic spirit, 190 Argentina, 38, 94 Arias Cañete, Miguel, 200, 209 Armenia, 131, 132, 154 Artificial intelligence (AI), 31, 61, 77, 225 Åsenius, Maria, 8, 11 Ashton, Catherine, 140, 241, 256, 257 Asia, 4, 64, 81, 86, 92, 143, 157, 167, 181, 184, 185, 187, 261 Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), 81, 132 Assad, Bashar al-, 51, 245 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 78, 81 ASEAN-EU Plan of Action, 135 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 81 ATHENA mechanism, 71 Australia, 27, 95, 135, 183 Austria, 134 Azerbaijan, 131, 154, 159 Azov Sea, 63

B Barcelona, 262 Barents EU-Arctic Council, 188 Barents Sea, 182 Beijing, 196 Beirut, 54 Belarus, 48, 49, 131, 154, 245 Belgium, 145, 179 Berlin, 187 Berlin plus arrangements, 87 Operation ALTHEA, 70 Bicchi, Federica, 8, 246, 248 Bloomberg, Michael, 205, 263

Bocse, Alexandra-Maria, 8, 13, 26 Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), 224 Boko Haram, 39, 168 Bolivia, 129 Borrell, Josep, 10, 50, 116, 136, 140, 257, 259 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 70, 71, 131, 132, 154 Brazil, 12, 94, 129, 260 Brexit, 2, 3, 50, 157, 207, 220, 247 British Council, 128 ‘Bronze Soldier’ incidents (2007), 215 Brown, Jerry, 205 Brussels, 54, 70, 144, 145, 196, 205 Budapest, 76, 157, 158 Burkina Faso, 38, 170

C Cairo, 149, 173 California, 205 Canada, 13, 27, 129, 132, 135, 179, 198, 216 Capability Development Plan (CDP), 67, 68, 79 Cape Verde, 38 Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM), 133 Carthage Museum, 131 Caspian Sea, 160 Catalonia, 215 Central African Republic (CAR), 63, 69, 80, 86, 147, 170, 244 Centre for Planning and Conduct of Operations (CPCO), 86 Chad, 80, 170 Lake Chad Basin, 81 Chantilly, Château de, 126 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN), 63

INDEX

Chemical weapons (CW), 76, 227 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 76, 227 Chibok, 39 Chile, 38, 94 China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), 97 China, People’s Republic of, 31 and EU investment, 97, 149, 169, 198 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 4, 98, 131, 184, 245 Chinese Three Gorges Corporation (CTG), 98 CIA, 53 Civilian Compact (CC), 60, 69, 72, 83 Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), 70 Climate change, 3, 4, 8, 13, 25, 27, 65, 94, 142, 168, 169, 171, 172, 177–179, 181, 190, 195–199, 201, 203–207 Climate diplomacy, 196, 197, 199, 206, 207 Code of Practice Against Disinformation (2018), 221 Cold War, 15, 31, 64, 260 Colombia, 28, 29, 133 Committee for the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS), 77 Committee of the Regions, 162, 262 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 1, 28, 108, 111–113, 120, 136, 139–142, 148, 149, 215, 225, 227, 239, 240, 242, 246, 253, 255, 256, 258 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) ATALANTA, 69, 75 EULEX Kosovo, 80 EUPOL BiH, 80

269

SOPHIA, 69, 74, 75 Commonwealth, 5, 24 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 132 Computer Security Incidents Response Teams (CSIRTs), 219 Conference of the Parties (COP), 27, 200 Congo, 12, 80, 260 Coninsx, Marie-Anne, 8, 13 Constitutional Treaty, 239, 240 Convention on the Future of Europe, 255 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), 66–68, 82, 84, 242 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (2009), 196 Copenhagen criteria, 155, 156 Copenhagen European Council (1993), 155 Copernicus Programme, 77 Coreper, 141 Costa Rica, 133 Costello, Patrick, 8, 10, 241, 247, 254 Cotonou Agreement, 174 Council of the European Union, 33, 43, 71, 86, 87, 104, 108, 140–141, 149, 163, 199, 227, 228, 254, 257, 263 Foreign Affairs Council, 135, 140, 141, 239, 240 Political and Security Committee (PSC), 47–49, 70, 79, 141, 144, 239, 258 Counter Terrorism Coordinator (CTC), EU, 74 Cox, Pat, 117 Creative Europe Programme, 132, 222 Crimea, 3, 4, 60, 63, 117, 188, 215

270

INDEX

Crisis management, 10, 11, 65, 67–69, 71, 72, 78, 80–85, 87, 88, 147, 198, 242 Croatia, 162 Cultural and Creative Sector Guarantee Facility, 132 Cultural diplomacy, 8, 9, 11, 125–129, 132–136, 242 Cyber-attacks, 59, 64, 65, 214–219 NotPetya, 216 Wannacry, 216 Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox (CDT), 214–216, 220, 224 Cyber sanctions, 215, 217, 224 Cyber security, 60, 79, 219 Cybersecurity Act (2019), 214, 219, 223 Cybersecurity Strategy (2016), 220 Cyber-space, 65, 74 Cyber threats, 71, 214, 220, 224 Cyprus, 243 Czech Republic, 179 D Damascus, 52–54 Danish Cultural Institute, 128 Darfur, 69 David Davies of Llandinam, 4, 6, 7, 15 Davos, 102 Deir ez-Zor, 52 Delegations, 46, 54, 74, 84, 109, 114, 116, 118–120, 129, 135, 136, 141–148, 199, 200, 241 De Mistura, Staffan, 54 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 71, 129 Demography, 4, 168 Denmark, 13, 66, 180, 186, 199 Denver, University of, 260 Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), 130

De Vries, Gijs, 11 Digital Europe programme, 225 Dimitrov, Radoslav, 200, 209 Diplomatic service, 142, 144, 148, 149, 247, 263 Directive on the Security of Network and Information Systems, 218 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), 71 Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), 104 Di Vita, Gianmarco, 8, 12 E Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), 92, 133, 170 Economides, Spyros, 7, 8, 16 Egypt, 50, 54, 129, 131, 153 Eichhorn, Nele, 14 Electoral interference, 64, 215 El Salvador, 133 Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), 202 Energias de Portugal, 98 Erasmus (Plus) programme, 157, 160 Estonia, 215 Ethiopia, 12, 165, 167, 260 EUNAVFOR, 75, 87 Eurobarometer, 56, 241 European Agency for Cybersecurity, 223 European Agenda for Culture (2007), 127 European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), 144 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 161 European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG), 74, 75, 82, 87 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 253 European Commission

INDEX

Action Plan against Disinformation (2018), 221 Commissioner for Trade, 8, 11 Commissioners’ group on external action, 2, 257 Communication on tackling online disinformation (2018), 221 Cultural Diplomacy Platform, 128 Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), 199, 202, 209 Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC), 130, 132 (old) Directorate-General for External Relations, 240 Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), 130, 131, 134 Directorate-General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR), 8, 130, 131, 160 Directorate-General for Trade (TRADE), 130 Elections Package (2018), 221 Executive Vice Presidents, 257 First Vice President, 257 Framework Agreement with the European Parliament (2010), 110, 120 Green Deal (2019), 181, 208 Recommendation on Cybersecurity of 5G Networks, 223 Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), 130, 132 Vice President (HR/VP), 50, 108, 112, 116, 258 European Communities, 1, 155, 201, 239, 253

271

European Council, 2, 64, 140, 156, 157, 159, 162, 208, 239, 258 Copenhagen (1993), 155 Laeken Declaration (2001), 240, 259 President, 2, 14, 29, 54, 61, 79, 140, 141, 149, 166, 174, 216, 254, 258 European Court of Auditors (ECA), 144 European Court of Justice (ECoJ), 93, 162, 163, 262 European Cultural Foundation (ECF), 128 European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre, 220, 225 European Defence Agency (EDA), 66, 68 European Defence Fund (EDF), 60, 66–68, 79, 82, 84, 85, 110, 131, 242 European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDITB), 84 European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), 67, 68 European Development Fund, 80, 131 European Economic and Social Committee, 162, 262 European Economic Area (EEA), 13, 154, 163, 180, 186 European Economic Community (EEC), 24, 155, 253 European Economic Diplomacy (EED), 170 European elections (2019), 221 European External Action Service (EEAS) Ambassador at Large for the Arctic Region, 13

272

INDEX

Ambassadors, 36, 49, 143, 148, 149 Delegations, 46, 74, 84, 119, 136, 144–147, 241 Deputy Secretary-General, Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response, 8, 10, 68, 143 Deputy Secretary-General, Global and Economic Issues, 7, 9 Directorate-General for Budget and Administration (DGBA), 12, 143 Director-General for Budget and Administration, 143 Head of Division for Democracy and Electoral Observation, 8, 10 Heads of Delegation, 119 Intelligence Centre (INTCEN), 84 Internal Audit Division (IAD), 144 Managing Director, Africa, 7, 12 Rapid Alert System (2019), 222 Satellite Centre (SATCEN), 84 European Free Trade Area (EFTA), 154, 163 European Fund for Sustainable Development, 131 European Houses of Culture, 130 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), 36, 131 European Investment Bank (EIB), 161 European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), 75 European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), 131 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 8, 142, 153, 154, 160 European Parliament (EP) agenda-setting, 110, 114, 119

Assent power, 108 Better Law-Making Agreement (2016), 111, 112 budgetary power, 108 co-legislator, 108 conference of Presidents, 109, 115 Constitutional Affairs Committee, 112 Declaration on Political Accountability (2010), 112 delegations, 109, 115, 116 Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group (DEG), 115 Development Committee, 108 Foreign Affairs Committee, 110, 114 Framework Agreement with the European Commission (2010), 110, 120 International Trade Committee, 117 inter-parliamentary bodies, 114 Jean Monnet Dialogues for Peace and Democracy, 118 Member of the European Parliament (MEP), 11, 108, 162 New European Consensus on Development (2017), 111 oversight powers, 112, 115 Parliamentary Association Committee (PAC), 117, 118 parliamentary diplomacy, 2, 11, 114, 116, 118 political groups, 109, 112, 114–117 President, 47, 111, 114, 116, 140, 181, 197, 254 resolutions, 109–111, 114, 116, 119 rules of procedure, 116, 117

INDEX

Sakharov Prize, 114, 117 European Peace Facility (EPF), 60, 69, 71, 72, 80, 242 European Union Agency for cybersecurity (ENISA), 219 European Union (EU) accession, 147, 153, 156, 160–162 Advisory Mission in Iraq, 135 Ambassador at Large for the Arctic Region, 8, 13, 188 Connecting Europe Facility Programme, 222 Cybersecurity Act (2019), 214, 219, 220, 223 development aid, 12, 37, 169, 173, 240, 260 Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 74 enlargement, 12, 45, 50, 153, 161, 163, 240, 245, 254 EU-ACP Culture Programme, 131 EU-Africa Strategy, 26 EU-Arctic Stakeholders Forum, 187 EU-AU Memorandum of Understanding on Peace, Security and Governance, 88 EU-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 95 EU-Chile Association Agreement, 94 EU-China Roadmap (on energy cooperation), 203 EU-China Strategy, 223 EU-Indonesia Free Trade Agreement, 95 EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, 92 EU-Japan-US trilateral meetings, 98 EU-Mercosur Association Agreement, 94 EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement, 94

273

EU-Mexico Association Agreement, 94 EU-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, 95 EU-Singapore Free Trade and Investment Protection Agreements, 93 EU-UN-AU cooperation, 80 EU-US trade negotiations, 102 EU-Vietnam Free Trade and Investment Protection Agreements, 93 Foreign Affairs Ministers informal meetings (‘Gymnych’), 110, 114 Global Strategy (EUGS), 9, 25, 59, 78, 82, 88, 135, 163, 168, 178, 179, 184, 186, 189, 197, 214, 215, 241–243, 260, 261 Military Staff (EUMS), 70, 84, 143 Partnership Instrument, 132 Regional Trust Fund, 132 Special Representative for Human Rights, 9, 10, 33, 34 Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms and Light Weapons and their Ammunition, 77 Trust Fund for Africa, 131, 172 European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS), 189 European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC), 129, 130, 134 Cluster Fund, 130 EUROPOL, 74, 75, 82, 87 ‘exception culturelle’, 132 External Investment Plan (EIP), 169, 170 F Fabius, Laurent, 200 Facebook, 221

274

INDEX

Faroe Islands, 180 Feira priorities, 71 Finland, 13, 180, 182, 185–187 5G, 214, 219, 223, 224 Florida, 101 Fonck, Daan, 119–121 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 30 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 95, 98, 110, 169 Screening Regulation, 224 Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), 2, 130, 132 Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF), 74 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 159, 245 ‘Fortress Europe’, 238 France, 13, 27, 50, 86, 126, 129, 132, 135, 145, 146, 186, 199–201, 207, 215, 243–245, 247 Assemblée Nationale, 261 Digital Services Tax, 102 Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 3, 93–95, 167, 169, 198 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), 28

G Gaddafi, Muammar, 62 Galileo Programme, 77 Gambia, The, 38 Gaza, 71 Gaziantep, 53 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 96 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 246 Geneva, 30, 38, 55, 99 Georgia, 38, 63, 69, 71, 131, 132, 154

Germany, 12, 27, 50, 86, 126, 129, 130, 135, 145, 146, 186, 187, 189, 199, 243, 245, 259 Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, 205 Goethe Institute, 129, 130 Goinard, Myriam, 11 Good Human Rights Stories Initiative, 10, 34, 38 Google, 221 Government of National Accord (GNA), 62 Great Lakes (Africa), 80 Greece, 86, 97, 159, 245 Greenhouse Gas (GHG), 178, 201, 202, 204 Greenland, 13, 178, 180 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 92, 103, 127, 146, 160, 182, 226, 247, 260 G7, 98, 126, 222 G20, 198 Guatemala, 133 Gulf, 62, 63, 168 Gulf of Guinea, 75, 76 H Hague, The, 76 Hahn, Johannes, 8, 12, 160 Hanoi, 93 Harley Davidson, 101 Havana, 28 Hellenic European Union Headquarters (EL EU OHQ), 70, 86 Helsinki European Council (1999), 69 Helsinki Final Act, 63 Heritage Corridors (Silk Road), 131 High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2, 10 Hoffman, Stanley, 244, 248

INDEX

Hogan, Phil, 103 Hollande, François, 200, 204, 209 Honduras, 133 Horizon 2020/Europe Programme, 180, 222 Horn of Africa, 29, 75, 168 Human rights, 7, 9–11, 15, 16, 30, 33–42, 45, 47, 48, 56, 64, 95, 110, 115, 118–120, 141–143, 155, 171, 198, 225, 242, 244, 258 Human Rights Guidelines (EU), 37 Human trafficking, 62, 74 Hungary, 126, 146, 158, 245 Balassi, 126 Hybrid attacks, 73, 79 I Ibrahim, Mo, 167 Iceland, 13, 132, 154, 157, 158, 180, 186, 188, 190 India, 12, 29, 129, 135, 179, 181, 199, 207, 260 Indonesia, 12, 38, 95, 260 Institut Français, 128, 129 Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), 72, 74, 132 Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), 113, 131, 156 Intergovernmental Conferences, 255 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), 63, 76, 79 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 28, 29 International Children’s Day, 204 International Labour Organization (ILO), 93 International Maritime Organization (IMO), 186 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 161, 167 International Relations theory, 238

275

Inter-Parliamentary Conferences (IPC), 110, 120 Interpol, 133 Investment Protection Agreement (IPA), 93 Iran, 2, 27, 31, 52, 54, 55, 131, 135, 241, 243 Iraq, 39, 56, 60, 62, 69, 132, 133, 147, 168 Iraq War (2003), 243 Ireland, 126, 134, 148 Islamic State/Isis/Daesh (IS), 133, 135, 168 Israel, 131, 154, 245 Israeli–Palestinian conflict, 62 Istanbul, 245 Istanbul Foundation of the Arts, 129 Italian Joint Force Headquarters (ITA-JFHQ), 86 Italy, 12, 50, 86, 135, 145, 186, 245, 259 J Japan, 27, 92, 97, 98, 104, 129, 180, 183, 205 Jerusalem, 245 Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES), 173 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran, 2, 27, 52 Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats, 73, 79 Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC), 70, 83 Joint Valletta Action Plan, 172 Jordan, 54, 129, 131, 132, 154 Juncker, Jean-Claude, 2, 3, 12, 15, 29, 61, 79, 101, 162, 165, 204, 209, 216, 257, 258 Juncker-Trump Joint Statement, 102, 103 State of the Union Address (2018), 12

276

INDEX

Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), 71, 74, 82 K Kara Sea, 182 Katowice COP 24 (2018), 27 Kazakhstan, 131 Keller-Noëllet, Jacques, 259, 262 Kenya, 147 Kerry, John, 52 Khartoum process, 172 Khashoggi, Jamal, 245 Kirkenes, 185 Kola Peninsula, 101 Korea, Republic of (South), 38, 208 Kosovo, 71, 131, 132, 154, 158, 159, 241, 243 Kosovo–Serbia dialogue, 147 Kuka, 97 Kuwait, 54 Kyoto Protocol, 27, 195, 198, 205 Kyrgyzstan, 131 L Lambrinidis, Stavros, 7, 9, 39, 65 Lamy, Pascal, 238, 247 La Réunion, 157 Lavrov, Sergei, 52 League of Nations Union, 5 Lebanon, 54, 131, 132, 154 Leffler, Christian, 7, 9, 80, 147, 253, 254 Lequesne, Christian, 246, 248 Level of ambition (LoA), 85, 88 LGBTI, 40 Liberal institutionalism, 238 Liberal internationalism, 5 Libya, 4, 60, 62, 69, 71, 74, 75, 79, 80, 87, 131, 132, 147, 154, 157, 161, 168, 170, 172, 243, 245, 261

Liechtenstein, 154 Liquid Natural Gas (LNG), 101, 183, 184 Lisbon Treaty, 2, 9–11, 14, 45, 49, 93, 111, 119, 140, 141, 147, 162, 214, 225, 237, 239–241, 243, 246, 253–256, 261 London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 7, 11, 13, 14, 42, 153, 237 Department of International Relations, 6, 7 Luxembourg, 128, 200

M Maastricht Treaty, 1, 127, 240, 253, 255 Macron, President Emmanuel, 126, 221 Mali, 62, 63, 80, 86, 170 Malmström, Cecilia, 8, 11 Malta, 66 Mandela, Nelson, 42 Marrakech Intergovernmental Migration Conference, 2018, 27 Martinique, 157 Mauritania, 63, 170 Medea, 97 Mediterranean, 9, 29, 69, 74, 75, 131, 172 Mercosur, 94 Mexico, 94, 129 Michel, Charles, 141, 166, 174, 258, 259 Microsoft, 221 Middle East, 28, 31, 49, 60, 62, 69, 76, 142, 143, 153, 168, 257 Migration, 2, 4, 27, 36, 59, 60, 79, 95, 131, 142, 143, 168, 169, 172, 198, 262

INDEX

Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), 60, 69, 70, 83 Milton, Guy, 259, 262, 263 Minnesota State Fair, 260 Minsk, 48, 63, 86 Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti (MICIVIH), xxvi Modi, Narendra, 126 Mogherini, Federica, 23, 25, 38, 43, 47, 52–55, 108, 128, 134–136, 140, 160, 186, 216, 241, 242, 257, 261, 263 Moldova, 63, 131, 132, 154, 160 Monocle Soft Power survey, 126 Montenegro, 131, 132, 154, 162 Montevideo, 94 Moon, Ban-ki, 27 Morocco, 131, 153, 155, 157 Mozilla, 221 Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF), 67, 72, 113, 220, 225 Multilateralism, 3, 7, 9, 11, 23–26, 30–32, 47, 56, 78, 80, 81, 120, 168, 173, 198, 260, 261 Multinational Headquarters (MNHQ), 86 Munich Security Conference, 189 Murmansk, 185 Myanmar/Burma, 244, 257 N Naval Station Rota (NAVSTA), 86 Navracsics, Tibor, 11, 136 Nedea, Alina, 14 Neighbourhood, 3, 10, 12, 35, 51, 74, 77, 115, 131, 134, 157, 159–161, 163, 168, 173, 227, 240, 243 Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), 113

277

Netanyahu, Binyamin, 49 Netherlands, the, 101, 129, 134, 186, 245 Network and Information Systems (NIS) Directive, 218, 219, 224 Network of National Coordination Centres (cybersecurity), 220, 225 New York, 34, 38, 53, 205 New Zealand, 38, 95 NGO, 205 Nicaragua, 27, 133 Niger, 12, 170, 260 Nigeria, 12, 168, 260 Noack, Johannes, 8, 12 Noel-Baker, Philip, 6, 16 North Africa, 142, 143, 153, 155, 167, 257 North Atlantic Council (NAC), 79 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 60, 61, 66, 68, 78, 79, 83–85, 87, 88, 100, 140, 188, 189, 216, 222, 245, 261 Defence Planning Process (NDPP), 67, 79, 84 Enhanced Forward Presence to the East of Europe, 79 Northern Dimension Partnership, 188 Northern Sea Route (NSR), 184, 185 Northern Window, 8, 13, 177, 190 North Korea, 27 North Macedonia, 119, 131, 132, 154, 159, 163, 245 Norway, 13, 38, 132, 154, 157, 180, 185, 186, 188, 189 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 76

O Obama, President Barack, 4, 204 Ontario, 205 Operational Headquarters (OHQ), 69

278

INDEX

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 76, 216 Organized crime, 171

Q Qatar, 54 Qualified Majority Vote (QMV), 214, 239, 243, 246, 258 Quebec, 205

P Pakistan, 12, 39, 260 Palestinian Authority, 69, 154 Panama, 133 Panama Canal, 184 Paraguay, 94 Parallel and coordinated exercise (PACE), 79 Pardee Centre for International Futures, 260 Paris Agreement, 13, 27, 171, 172, 196, 197, 199–204, 206, 208 Intended nationally determined contribution (INDC), 200 Parliamentary Association Committee (PAC), 117, 118 ‘passarelle’ clause, 239, 245, 258 Patten, Chris, 46 Pentagon, 53 Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO), 2, 28, 60, 66–68, 79, 82, 84, 85, 242 National Implementation Plans (NIP), 66 Peru, 38, 133 Petersberg tasks, 68 Poland, 145 Piraeus, 97 Political and Security Committee (PSC), 47–49, 70, 141, 144, 239, 258 PSC-NAC meetings, 79 Political assassination, 76 Putin, Vladimir, 4, 9, 126

R Rabat process, 172 Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), 75 Referendums, 25, 50, 162, 241, 242, 247 France (2005), 239 Ireland (2008, 2009), 148, 239, 256 Netherlands, the (2005), 239 Refugees, 4, 27, 41, 60, 131, 160, 172, 244 Reykjavik, 190 Rinne, Antti, 190 Riyadh, 55 Rohingya, 244 Romania, 160, 245 Roosevelt, Theodore, 260 Ross, Wilbur, 100 Rouhani, President Hassan, 55 Russian Federation, 4, 31, 52, 63, 64, 149, 154, 182, 183 Five Guiding Principles (EU), 64 Russian military intelligence (GRU), 216 S Sahel, 29, 60, 62, 63, 69, 71, 74, 79, 80, 167, 168, 170, 171, 243 G5 Joint Force, 63, 81, 86, 171 Sanctions, 47, 51, 53, 82, 116, 160, 183, 214, 216–218, 225, 227, 239, 243, 246, 258 Saudi Arabia, 54 Schengen Area, 158

INDEX

Schmid, Helga, 143 Scholz, Olaf, 261 Schuman, Robert (9 May 1950 declaration), 255 Search and rescue (SAR), 188 Seconded National Experts (SNEs), 145, 149 Second World War, 34, 96, 260 Šefˇcoviˇc, Maroš, 111, 205 Senegal, 129 Sentsov, Oleg, 117 Serbia, 2, 131, 132, 154, 162, 241 Serrano de Haro, Pedro A., 8, 10, 244, 261 Sevastopol, 63 Shanghai, 184 Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE), 76 Siberia, 179, 183 Silicon Valley, 129 Single European Act (1986), 253, 255 Single Intelligence Analysis Capability (SIAC), 84 Sirte, 62 Skripal case, 63 Slovenia, 127, 146 Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 92, 94 Small arms and light weapons (SALW), 80 Smed, Ulrik Trolle, 14 Smith, Karen E., 7, 8, 14, 15, 247, 256 Soft Power 30 Survey, 126 Solana, Javier, 140, 240 Somalia, 63, 69, 75, 80, 86, 147, 168, 170, 247 Søreide, Ine Marie Eriksen, 189 South Africa, 129 South China Sea, 64 Soviet Union, 3, 24, 31

279

Space, 38, 39, 54, 60, 61, 65, 77, 109, 117, 130, 143, 178, 180 Spain, 84, 86, 145, 186, 215 Stoltenberg, Jens, 61, 79 Strasbourg, 165 Strategic autonomy, 83, 85 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMs), 98 Sudan, 63, 129, 147 Suez Canal, 29 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 70 Sustainable Development Goal (SDG), 25, 26, 29, 171, 172, 181, 185 Sweden, 13, 104, 180, 186, 187, 199 Switzerland, 3, 154, 157 Syria, 4, 31, 46, 50–54, 56, 60, 62–64, 76, 131–133, 147, 154, 157, 158, 161, 168, 243, 245, 261

T Tajikistan, 131 Taliban, 39 Tanzania, 12, 260 Tao, Hu Jin, 47 Tehran, 54 Tenerife, 157 Terrorism, 39, 55, 59, 60, 62–65, 71, 73–75, 78, 82, 95, 142, 167, 168, 170, 217, 227 Timmermans, Frans, 257 Trade, 1, 3, 4, 8–13, 15, 24, 29, 30, 47, 65, 75, 82, 84, 92–97, 99, 102–104, 110, 117, 126, 132, 133, 140, 142, 145, 169, 172–174, 182–184, 198, 202, 221, 238, 240, 246, 247, 255, 256, 258, 260 bilateral agreements, 11, 91, 92, 94, 96

280

INDEX

Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 100, 103, 132 Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), 185 Treaty of Paris (1952), 261 Treaty on European Union (TEU), 2, 4, 10, 35, 45, 49, 66, 84, 111, 112, 120, 140, 148, 149, 153, 155–157, 162, 217, 225, 254–258, 262, 263. See also Lisbon Treaty Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 108, 111–113, 127, 225, 255 Trilateral Task Force on Migration (AU, UN, EU), 172 Tripoli, 62 Tromsø, 188 Trump, President Donald, 4, 9, 28, 30, 55, 56, 100–103, 203–206 Tunis, 46 Tunisia, 38, 46, 129, 131, 132, 154 Tunisian Human Rights League, 46 Turkey, 12, 54, 129, 131, 154–162 Association Agreement, 155 Turkmenistan, 131 Tusk, Donald, 29, 61, 79, 216 Twitter, 221

U Uganda, 147 Ukraine Association Agreement, 117 Cox-Kwasniewski mission, 117 Maidan Revolution, 117 Orange Revolution, 116 Verkhovna Rada, 117, 118 Umeå, 187 UNESCO, 132, 133

Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 127 UNHCR, 37 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 54 United Kingdom, 12, 24, 27, 163, 197 United Nations Agenda 2030, 25, 29 Arms Trade Treaty, 77 Charter, 15, 16, 32, 35, 45, 88 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 187, 189 Development Programme (UNDP), 29 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 186, 195, 196, 198 General Assembly, 38 High Commissioner for Human Rights, 34 Human Rights Council, 30, 50, 245 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 206 Millennium Development Goals, 26 Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), xxvii Our Ocean Conference, 76 Pact for Migration, 245 Secretary General, 29, 30 Security Council, 25, 28, 86, 244, 247, 261 Security Council resolution (SCR), 52, 75, 135, 227 Women, Peace and Security agenda, 70, 80 United States (of America) (US) Congress, 100 Democratic National Convention (2016), 221 Department of Defense, 100

INDEX

National Democratic Institute (NDI), 118 President, 4, 28, 53, 55, 95, 100, 102, 203, 204, 206, 243 Secretary of Commerce, 100 Secretary of State, 52, 53 Trade Expansion Act (Section 232) aluminium, 100 automobiles, 100 steel, 100 tariffs, 100 Trade Representative (USTR), 102 Twin Towers, 127 Universal declaration of human rights, 40, 48 Uruguay, 38, 94 Uzbekistan, 131

281

Western Balkans, 3, 63, 69, 142, 154, 156, 158, 160, 162, 227 Westlake, Martin, 7, 8, 15, 16, 163, 237, 263 Westphalian, 4, 9, 11, 62, 260 WhatsApp, 221 Woolcock, Stephen, 8 World Bank, 161, 248 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 29 World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 98 Airbus, 102 Appellate Body, 99, 104 Boeing, 102 Doha round, 4, 103 e-commerce, 99 reforms, 99 safeguard measures, 100, 101

V Venezuela, 245 Versailles, 126 Vervaeke, Koen, 7, 12, 26, 63, 80 Vienna, 52 Vietnam, 93, 95 Vimont, Pierre, 128 Von der Leyen, Ursula, 2, 50, 102, 103, 111, 136, 165, 181, 208, 224, 257–259

Y Yamal Peninsula, 183 Yaoundé process, 76 Yazidi, 39 Yemen, 60, 62, 132, 147 Yousafzai, Malala, 39 YouTube, 221 Yugoslavia, 162

W Wales, 5 Washington, 87, 98, 196 White House, 26, 101 Welfare state, 5

Z Zarif, Javad, 52 Zimbabwe, 47 Zimmern, Sir Alfred Eckhard, 5 Zito, Anthony, 201, 208, 209