Indian Foreign Policy and Cultural Values [1st ed.] 9783030546953, 9783030546960

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Indian Foreign Policy and Cultural Values Kadira Pethiyagoda

Indian Foreign Policy and Cultural Values “Departing from conventional studies of India’s foreign policy that assimilate it within normative visions of geopolitical calculation, Pethiyagoda excavates another set of concerns animating the country’s struggle to find its place in the international order. He shows that beneath the shifting strategies and short-term considerations of various Indian administrations, lie a number of long-term values and principles that sometimes resist India’s own strategic interests.” —Professor Faisal Devji, Professor of Indian History, University of Oxford and Author of The Impossible Indian: Gandhi and the Temptation of Violence

Kadira Pethiyagoda

Indian Foreign Policy and Cultural Values

Kadira Pethiyagoda Melbourne, Australia

ISBN 978-3-030-54695-3 ISBN 978-3-030-54696-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54696-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Maram_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

I dedicate this book to ummi and uppi, who spent most of their lives making my life better, and my two athammis who always had faith in me.

Preface

My account of how this book came to be is in keeping with the premise of the project itself: that every choice has a long trail of causality stretching into the past. Just as the book sits at the intersection of world politics, culture and India, so too the inspiration to write it was accumulated from years of personal, professional and academic discovery across these areas. It was as a teenager that I discovered that the world was not boring and benign and apolitical. There was a contest of values, one that connected local communities, their struggles and relationships, to the actions of states and the international order as a whole. An interest in cultural values evolved around the same time, while I was growing up in one of Melbourne’s most multicultural suburbs. I attended government schools with a student population reflecting this diversity. The students had roughly similar socio-economic backgrounds and were interacting in the same overarching Australian society. With the political and economic factors that usually influence comparisons between students’ countries of origin remaining constant as variables, cultural values was one of the few groupable differences remaining. Thereby, when observing the values of, and interactions between, various groups, the distinct role of culture became visible. An interest in India grew from even more amorphous roots, including a process of reacquainting with my own culture as a Sri Lankan-Australian and South Asian. By the late 1990s the shift of global power and attention to Asia had reverberated all the way to the southeastern suburbs of

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Melbourne. It was then, during my late teens that I felt its impact in a growing South Asian self-awareness and confidence, similar to what my East and Southeast Asian friends seemed to have experienced earlier. Years later, as it did for millions around the world, 9/11 and the Iraq War triggered a re-politicisation for me, particularly in relation to international affairs. To quote India’s Ambassador to the UN in Geneva in 2002 “With the end of the Cold War, some thought, rather triumphantly, that history had ended. The obituary was premature”. It was in this environment that my contemporaries and I began searching for graduate jobs, and ultimately, the context in which I chose to accept, above all other options, the job offer from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Later, the three components of this book all intertwined when I chose New Delhi for a diplomatic posting. Prior to and during the posting, I became increasingly aware of a seeming uniqueness. It was hinted at in the way both foreign diplomats and foreign media perceived India, in the way India positioned herself geopolitically, in the way she maintained simultaneous friendships with opposing sides of the world’s greatest strategic rivalries. A variety of experiences, personal and professional, led to a subtle unarticulated feeling, an intuition that there was something about the foreign relations of this country; something not covered in existing explanations. This distinct flavour seemed to emanate from a combination of cultural values—values arising from a civilization that gave the world both Buddha and Gandhi. It was something that warranted a more precise analysis, and so I decided to undertake a PhD on the role of cultural values in India’s foreign policy. In recent years, the importance of understanding this role has grown. Internationally, the post-Cold War unipolar moment has well and truly ended. Today’s challengers to the status quo differ from the West in more ancient ways than the USSR did. India and China’s rise necessitate attention to not just their global goals but the sources of these goals. As its population grows to surpass China’s, India will play an increasingly important role in strategic equations between Washington, Moscow and Beijing, in the shaping of international law and norms, and in responding to global challenges like climate change and pandemics. Internally, as I witnessed in New Delhi and among the diaspora in the West, there is a resurgence of cultural identity among Indian populations as there has been across other nations, not least manifested in the double victory of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This will likely stimulate greater discussion of the topic.

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This book—seeded in the diplomatic quarter of New Delhi, researched and written in the libraries of Melbourne University, the halls of Oxford University, particularly St Antony’s College, and the shining towers of Doha, and edited during the global pandemic lockdown—was only accomplished with the direct and indirect support of innumerable mentors, family, friends and supporters. Geneva, Switzerland

Kadira Pethiyagoda

Acknowledgements

Thank you to Deepa and your family for the endless care. Thank you to Gareth Evans for your support in opening such doors and sharing your wisdom. Thanks to Faisal Devji for your friendship and guidance. I wish to thank my PhD supervisors Timothy Lynch and Ralph Pettman, for your important contributions. Thank you to my co-supervisors Pradeep Taneja and David Mickler for your support. Thanks to all at Melbourne University, especially Jennifer Beard. Thank you to examiner David Malone for your encouragement. All at Oxford University who provided valuable insights: Andrew Hurrell, Jennifer Welsh, Andrew Shacknove, Patricia V. Sellers, Nazila Ghanea, Elizabeth Umlas and Sam Daws for your friendship; and Oxford’s St Antony’s College, New College, Department of Politics and International Relations, and Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict. The Australian government and public for such education and life opportunities. Brookings colleagues for your support: Ibrahim Fraihat, Sultan Barakat, Tarik Yousef, Nader Kabbani, Adel Abdel Ghafar, Noha Aboueldahab and WPS Sidhu; and Brookings for the platform. Former and current Indian officials for your time: Ranjit Gupta, Sanjay Singh, Sanjaya Baru, Mridul Kumar, Sandeep Kumar; and friends at Brookings India, IDSA and Carnegie. From DFAT, Chakriya Bowman and Murray Harris for your friendship, and others for mentoring and camaraderie. Chris Condon and James Russo for always helping. Lokku uppi and lokku ummi for your faith. For assisting generously in

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

various ways: Sisira Gunasekera, Lynette Pereira, Mary-Anne and Ian Spencer, Susil Piyanandana, Luke Donnellan, Anton Swaris, Sarath and Kevin Piyasena, Faisal, Pradeep Hewavitharana, Susantha Subasinghe, Janaka Hirimuthugoda, Nandi and Mamma, Dias family, Jude Perera, Santino Raftellis, Raman Vaid, Tissa mamma, Ranjit Soysa, Upali Wijewardena, Ratnayake family, Hemal and Bims Gurusinghe, Gyan uncle, Vino, Dayananda uncle, Bandu uncle, Danny uncle and Rose aunty, Upadasa uncle, Eric uncle, Divya, Raja Debahapuwa, Anura and Dishni Yasamana, Swati, Amila Udumulla, Manjula Wijesinghe, Kanahara uncle, Jase, Binny, Daham, Dan, Ara, Nav, Veena, Indika Sooriyaarachchi, Thomas Rice, Ben Chan, Piyali, Raz, Kamlika, Minwen Wu, Ranj Perera, Daya Bumunisinghe, Anura Withanawasam, Anura Kulasekara, Gamini Fonseka, Cynthia Hancke, Saddha Gunasekara, Sumith Perera, Sunith De Silva, Athula Embuldeniya, Vaughan Duggan and Maan Abdullah for all you have done. Thanks kindly to Palgrave-MacMillan’s Alina Yurova and Aishwarya Balachandar for supporting this project.

Introduction

The international order is undergoing the greatest upheaval in half a millennium. For the first time in the history of the Westphalian system, we are seeing a shift of global power eastward to countries which have non-European cultures. This poses new challenges for the disciplines and practice areas of international relations (IR) (particularly foreign policy analysis), diplomacy and international law. In order to understand the behaviour of rising powers, new ways of viewing world politics are needed. We must seek to understand the role played by cultural values. India, rising after centuries of geopolitical dormancy, will be a key power in the emerging multipolar world order. As a diplomat posted to New Delhi and then as a foreign affairs analyst and advisor, I learnt that a deeper, more nuanced understanding of India’s foreign policy is needed, from both an academic and policy perspective. India is one of the few countries, alongside China, to have had a largely continuous culture for several millennia (Basham 2004:4)—making this understanding all the more pertinent. This has led to a historical awareness, identity and long-term outlook. In an interview with the author, one former Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official and ambassador stated “We focus more on the long term…We do not look for immediate returns” (former Indian official, interview with author 2017). Sanjaya Baru, Former Chief Spokesman and Media Advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, added that Indian policymakers and the public share a sense of civilizational continuity, that their state is “not simply the product

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of someone drawing lines on a map”. This outlook renders India’s foreign policy particularly susceptible to the influence of cultural values. In spite of this, there has been very little attention paid to cultural values and India’s foreign policy. More broadly, aside from a few notable exceptions, cultural values have not been a major focus in the IR discipline. It was often regarded as an incomprehensible ‘wildcard’. This is particularly the case in relation to security issues (Katzenstein 1996:23,49). Understanding the roles played by culture, in both supporting and undermining interests, will help states to respond with more informed and better-equipped policy tools and institutions. This study attempts to demystify the influence of prominent cultural values on India’s foreign policy. In doing so, I hope to assist in the broader endeavours of conceptualising cultural values’ role in global politics and understanding India’s foreign policy. Interviews with Indian policymakers revealed an acknowledgement of the role played by cultural values. India’s former Ambassador to Yemen and Oman, member of Prime Minister’s National Security Advisory Board, and Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Head of West Asia Division, Ranjit Gupta stated “we run our foreign policy in accordance with our values, our civilizational ethos” (interview with author, 2015). The former MEA Secretary (East) and Indian Ambassador to Iran said “strong values are part of our national experience” and therefore influence foreign policy (interview with author, 2017). I ask the question: What is the influence of cultural values on India’s foreign policy? I seek to answer in two stages: 1) through identifying a set of values of sufficient prominence that are capable of being tested and 2) through examining the influence these cultural values have had on India’s foreign policy. Informed by literature from multiple disciplines, I begin by adopting a definition of cultural values that is both relevant to foreign policy and measureable as a variable within it. I define cultural values as observable ideals for which people of a society have some affective regard. Through a literature review it is determined that constructivism provides the most appropriate lens through which to observe the influence of culture on India’s foreign policy. Constructivist theory is complemented, at times, by the use of content analysis. The analysis is largely restricted to how internal, prominent cultural values impact foreign policy. Exploring thousands of years of history, I then seek to identify which of the innumerable and fluid values observable within Indian culture should be tested for their influence on foreign policy. A set of values

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are identified that: (1) have played a prominent role in Indian culture throughout history, (2) are prominent within present-day India and (3) are of relevance to foreign policy, including through acknowledgement in interviews of policymakers. The values identified are non-violence, pluralism, tolerance and hierarchy. For instance, influential ancient Hindu texts expound philosophical beliefs of all things being interconnected and oneness existing under infinite diversity. This then underpins values of pluralism and tolerance at the social level. I do not seek to claim that these are India’s only cultural values, or the only Indian cultural values worth examining in relation to foreign policy, or even that these values are unique to India. There may be other values worthy of investigation that can be identified through other methods. This fact, however, does not negate the usefulness of exploring the role of these prominent cultural values in Indian foreign policy in demonstrating how values influence foreign policy more generally. The study assesses the influence of these cultural values on India’s foreign policy over the last three decades. This is in the form of case studies of three critical aspects of foreign policy: nuclear policy (NP), humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (HI), and Middle East relations. These areas have been central to India’s foreign relations and have characterised its position in the world. NP is examined in detail because it has played a great symbolic role in India’s identity. HI and relations with the Middle East act as control studies, helping to determine whether values’ influence is likely to be applicable to foreign policy more broadly than just NP. These three investigations cover India’s engagement with some of the biggest international debates in recent times, including matters of war and peace, and norms of sovereignty and human security. NP and HI, in particular, illuminate Delhi’s interaction with aspects of international law. The role of cultural values is revealed through focusing on what can be seen as a plank connecting values and policy: the preferences and perceptions (P&Ps) of Indian leaders. An important part of the analysis is testing and comparing the dominant alternate explanations of India’s foreign policy—those based in realism, liberalism and other theories. Evaluating decisions involving trade-offs between adhering to or projecting cultural values and achieving strategic or economic interests helps expose the power of cultural values’ influence, a “crucial test” (Kertzer 2014:838; Herrmann and Shannon 2001). NP, HI and many aspects of Middle East relations constitute security-related issues which have traditionally been the territory of

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realism. This book allows for constructivist explanations to be judged alongside those of realism—something long called for by constructivists. Ultimately, prominent cultural values are found to have had a significant influence on the three areas of investigation and are therefore likely influence foreign policy overall. I identify cultural value-driven general, overarching P&Ps that are likely to be influential across all of India’s foreign policy. In future, while the level of influence of values on Indian foreign policy is likely to remain significant, the nature of this influence will change. Values’ influence will occur even with India’s growing power and increased engagement with international norms. That said, as India’s interests expand well outside its region, strategic concerns may increasingly clash with India’s cultural values and shape the country’s application of cultural values. Similarly, the values themselves will shape India’s perception of its strategic interests. The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is likely to continue to adhere to cultural values and continue to increase the role of one particular component-identity. The BJP’s mission of making India a ‘Vishwa Guru’ while similar to Nehru’s vision of India as a moral leader and teacher, has been infused with the more common (among nation-states) idea of overtly promoting one’s identity. Modi’s government will likely continue to promote that ‘Indian values’ are influencing the country’s foreign policy.

Contents

Part I Theory and Culture 1

Culture in International Relations Defining Cultural Values as Observable Ideals Theoretical Approach Assumptions and Limitations References

2

Which Cultural Values? History Present-Day and Relevance to Foreign Policy The Chosen Values Method of Evaluating Influence References

Part II 3

3 4 5 8 9 13 19 57 69 80 93

Sifting for Culture in Foreign Policy

Nuclear Policy Brief Background for Nuclear Policy Political Instability 1988–1998 BJP-Led NDA Rule Under Vajpayee 1998–2004

107 110 113 115

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Congress-Led UPA Rule Under Manmohan Singh 2004–2014 Conclusion References

153 177 193

Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect Non-alignment and Restraint 1987–2002 A Global Power 2003–2014 Conclusion References

203 210 226 244 252

5

Relations with the Middle East Values’ Direct Influence on Middle East Policy Influence via Major Identities Influence via Image Current BJP Government of Prime Minister Modi Advances in Relations Iran: A Special Case Future Conclusion References

259 261 268 272 274 284 285 292 295 296

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Conclusion: Extent and Nature of Values’ Influence in a Global Context Comparison of Areas of Investigation Future Generalisation and Practical Application References

301 304 315 318 320

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Bibliography

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Index

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Abbreviations

AEC BARC BJP CBMs CDS CMD CoD CPI-M CTBT DRDO EAM ECOMOG ECOWAS FMCT HI

IAEA IBSA ICISS ICNND IDSA INF IPKF

Atomic Energy Commission Bhabha Atomic Research Center Bharatiya Janata Party Confidence Building Measures Chief of Defence Service Credible Minimum Deterrence Conference on Disarmament Communist Party of India (Marxist) Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Defence Research and Development Organisation External Affairs Minister\ Minister of External Affairs Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group Economic Community of West African States Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty Humanitarian Intervention or Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect (when referring to the chapter/investigation) International Atomic Energy Association India, Brazil and South Africa’s delegation to Syria International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Indian Peacekeeping Force xix

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ABBREVIATIONS

IR ITER LOC LTTE MAD MEA MTCR NATO NCA NDA NP NPT NSA NSAB NSC NSSP NWS P&Ps PM R2P RGAP SNW START UN UNGA UNSC UPA US USSR

International Relations (discipline) International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor Line of Control Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Mutually Assured Destruction Ministry of External Affairs Missile Technology Control Regime North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Nuclear Command Authority National Democratic Alliance Nuclear Policy Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons National Security Adviser National Security Advisory Board National Security Council Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (India and US) Nuclear Weapons State (recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty) Preferences and Perceptions Prime Minister Responsibility to Protect Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan \ Action Plan for a Nuclear-WeaponsFree and Nonviolent World Order State with Nuclear Weapons (unrecognized by the NonProliferation Treaty) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty United Nations United Nations General Assembly United Nations Security Council United Progressive Alliance United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Chart 3.1 Chart 3.2 Fig. 3.1

Identified cultural values Influence of cultural values on foreign policy Statements indicating non-violence-driven preferences and perceptions (P&Ps) (BJP 1998–2004) Statements indicating non-violence-driven P&Ps (Congress 2004–2014) How cultural values influence P&Ps in nuclear policy (Key: Preference = Pf; Perception = Pp)

14 88 144 165 178

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 4.1 Table 5.1

Dasa-raja-dharma principles and cultural values Statements indicating hierarchy-driven P&Ps (BJP 1998–2004) Statements indicating non-violence-driven preferences and perceptions (P&Ps) Statements indicating pluralism- and tolerance-driven P&Ps (BJP 1998–2004) Steps to increase cooperation between US and India Statements indicating non-violence-driven P&Ps (Congress 2004–14) Statements indicating hierarchy-driven P&Ps (Congress 2004–2014) Values and P&Ps that influenced each intervention Cultural values and Middle East interventions

45 127 144 152 160 165 173 246 264

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PART I

Theory and Culture

CHAPTER 1

Culture in International Relations

To investigate the role of cultural values in India’s foreign policy we must first explore what ‘culture’ and ‘cultural values’ mean in the context of IR. The complexity of the culture concept and its multiple meanings across disciplines has contributed to the difficulty in understanding culture’s role within the discipline of IR (Walker 1990: 8). This chapter will discuss the idea of culture and its development within the social sciences, and drawing on this, adopt a definition of cultural values that: (1) is informed by and fits with much of the literature discussing culture, and (2) allows for cultural values to be examined as a variable influencing foreign policy. This Chapter then proceeds to discuss how cultural values, in any similar form to that defined here, have been understood in international relations. Some studies undertake literature reviews through assessing the current theoretical approaches to the country/issue under investigation. This is not possible here as there has been little in-depth investigation into the role of cultural values in India’s foreign policy. Some have acknowledged various values at play in India’s foreign policy which they loosely relate to culture (e.g. Jones 2006; Cohen 2001; Perkovich 1999; Bajpai 2002). Others have acknowledged the importance of the role of culture itself (Cohen 2001). However, these do not delve into how values influence foreign policy or the roots of these values within Indian culture. There is even less literature examining this area through the perspective of an IR theory. As such, this study will need to start at the more rudimentary level of an investigation of culture in the social sciences. © The Author(s) 2021 K. Pethiyagoda, Indian Foreign Policy and Cultural Values, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54696-0_1

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Why discuss cultural values? Values are one of the greatest dividing lines in international politics. Some of the dominant conceptions of international society—those which are statist and pluralist—are attractive due to the fact that there is little global consensus on values (Hurrell 2007: 247). To understand values we need to understand culture—where most values are drawn from (Williams 1994: 56). Values constitute one of the most important ways in which culture manifests itself in world affairs, leading to culture itself being seen as a great divider in world politics. Huntington (1993) defines culture as the enduring values held by civilisations. Within the social sciences, culture has long been one of the most difficult areas to conceptualise. This study attempted to understand the concept via a literature review of disciplines and approaches that have prioritised it. The culture concept was explored in anthropology, drawing on the works of Hudson (1997), Chay (1990: 9), Walker (1990: 4), Kluckhohn (1944), Geertz (1994: 214, 1973), Wedeen (2002: 713) and Lovell (1990: 91). Smith and Young (1998: 19) and others (e.g. Lal 1998: 6) define culture as ‘shared knowledge, beliefs and patterns of behaviour’, as well as their resulting material products. Ideas of ‘hegemony’ from Gramsci and ‘discourse’ from poststructuralists and other reflectivist approaches were examined (Mouffe 1979), as was the universalism-pluralism debate (Eisenstadt 2000: 1–15). Also looked at were archaeologist and historians’ approaches (Thapar 2002). Within social and political science, the research of Williams (1994: 56) was explored as was that of political culture scholars (Landes 1998; Wiarda 2007: 66–68; Almond and Verba 1965: 13–15; Zaman 2009: 69). The works of various generations of strategic culture theorists were explored, drawing on Johnston (1995), Bajpai (2002: 247), Basrur (2001: 185), Liska (1962: 12), Lapid and Kratochwil (1996), Jones (2006), Chaudhuri (2008), Williams (2007), Desch (1998: 146–147), Bozeman (1976: 78), Gray (1999), Snyder (1990: 3), and Poore (2003: 280).

Defining Cultural Values as Observable Ideals In spite of the proliferation of diverse definitions of culture, it is still possible to identify a set of fundamental characteristics of the concept— culture is ‘vague, but it is not mysterious’ (Morgan 2003: 19). This study will adopt a definition which conforms to some of the aforementioned works’ conceptualisations of culture, particularly those traditions closer to IR. It will, however, be narrow and specific enough to allow cultural

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values to be measured for their influence on foreign policy, similar to the approach taken by the ‘analytical school’ (Zaman 2009: 76) of strategic culture theorists.1 I define cultural values as observable ideals related to the social world for which people of a society have some affective regard.2 This is similar to morals. Moral Foundations Theory stipulates that all moral systems provide ‘interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together’ to facilitate social life (Graham et al. 2009: 1030). Moral systems across the world influence their states’ foreign policies. When referring to cultural values, the book may describe beliefs that are not necessarily practiced by the majority of society. Smith and Young (1998: 28) differentiate between ‘real and ideal’ cultures. This is where the behaviour of individuals, groups, or the entire society may be different to the cultural ideal, but this does not challenge the ideal. For example, social trends related to the use of violence in particular circumstances may change, but the ideal of how violence should be considered is likely to remain over time. The cultural values identified will be those which society views as what ‘should be’, even if it is not present in practice. Analytically, the values will be akin to Weber’s concept of ‘ideal types’ (Weber 1949). For instance, an ideal type Hindu may not necessarily equate to the ‘average’ Hindu. Even in terms of ideals, there is great diversity within Indian society as Chapter 2, discusses.

Theoretical Approach Except for some notable exceptions, such as strategic culture studies, culture and cultural values (as defined here or as defined in any reasonably similar way) have not been adequately addressed within mainstream international relations theory (IR), either in empirical analyses or theoretical discussion (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 58). While many IR scholars have recognised the role of culture implicitly, few have overtly positioned it as the central object of analysis. This is counter-intuitive given that, as mentioned, relations between nations and peoples at the global

1 A narrow definition is also recommended by Geertz (1994: 214) and similar approach was taken by Guth (2006: 24). 2 This is similar to Williams (1994: 56).

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level are influenced by cultural values. Similar difficulties surrounding the conceptualisation of culture detailed in other disciplines are faced by IR theorists. In recent years, however, changes in world politics saw a revival of culture in certain corners of the discipline. The end of the Cold War had theorists looking at the influence of new factors beyond strategic interests. A few works were published which acknowledged the importance of culture to understanding world politics, including Katzenstein (1996), Lapid and Kratochwil (1996), Hudson and Sampson (1999), and Chay (1990). Various IR approaches to culture were examined in order to determine which approach has insights applicable to foreign policy analysis. It was found that a more sophisticated and in-depth analysis of culture is needed to understand world politics. The theoretical tradition most capable of achieving this was found to be constructivism and hence this is the approach adopted in this study. Constructivism’s main focus is values, identities and norms in world politics. Culture reproduces identities of actors as well as the realities of their worlds. Constructivists privilege social factors in explaining issues like national security (Katzenstein 1996: 29). They question conventional IR assumptions of a universal, rational human nature and of natural international anarchy. Adler (1997: 322) states ‘manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action…depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world’ (also Zehfuss 2002: 4). Research questions are situated within spatial, historical and social contexts (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 9). States are social actors whose identity and interests are constituted by social rules (Katzenstein 1996: 23; Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 259). After the Cold War, Katzenstein (1996) advocated for an approach emphasising social factors which could shed light on issues ignored by neo-realism and neoliberalism. Today, with the rise of the non-European powers, this need is ever clearer. Given this study is largely a foreign policy analysis, it is informed by certain constructivist insights rather than the entire framework. In addition to the international social environment of states shaping their identities and values, constructivists acknowledge the role of the internal sociocultural environment (Jepperson et al. 1996: 49; Katzenstein 1996)—my focus area. While some properties of states are dependent on the cultural structures at the international systemic level, others are

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‘self organizing’ (Wendt 1996: 49). State identities and interests mutually constitute the international structure’s interlocking beliefs and identities (Wendt 1996: 49, 391). It is acknowledged that the international social structure and its norms impacted and interacted with India’s dominant cultural values. The values looked at, however, are those which were formed largely by pre-modern historical factors, internal and external. Chapter 2 analyses this interaction. This acknowledges ‘cross-fertilization of ideas and practices’ (Wedeen 2002: 717) and thereby attempts to avoid challenges faced by culturalists like Huntington (1993) in seeing culture as isolated (Eisenstadt 2000: 23). The evolution in values resulting from interaction with the external during the case studies’ periods of examination (the last three decades), and impact of this on India’s foreign policy, however, is insubstantial. Where new norms had an impact on India’s actions, this occurred largely through a process of ‘norm localisation’ where the acceptance of international norms was determined by India’s existing values (Acharya 2004). As I seek to only understand the influence of cultural values in India’s foreign policy, foreign policy analysis is sufficient. Interpretation of cultural values within the cases studies is restricted to determining the foreign policy preferences and perceptions (P&Ps) they drive. Therefore, the assessment of the small amount of interaction with the external will be restricted to how external norms, e.g. ‘Responsibility to Protect’, interacted with India’s values to shape foreign policy. There exist a number of constructivist IR approaches which vary in terms of: their position along the reflectivism-positivism continuum, the concepts they place at the centre of analysis and even the different intellectual traditions they rely upon (Zehfuss 2002: 9). They can roughly be divided into the conventional, critical and postmodern strands (Katzenstein et al. 1998). I will lean more towards the positivist approaches due to my focus being the Indian state and security-related issues. By dealing with problems that favour traditional security studies I hope to, to some extent, address the concerns of critics like George (1989). My approach is similar to Katzenstein’s (1996), seeing culture as a variable that can be isolated sufficiently from other aspects of the social world in order to witness its impact on the choices made by states.

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Positivist approaches are useful as they allow for more empirical analysis of the traditional IR problems which I tackle. Katzenstein (1996: 30) argues that when challenging conventional IR’s epistemologically and ontologically contrasting approaches, it is best to do so on ‘the ground of evidence’. This goes some way to addressing critiques calling for greater ‘systematization and theoretical rigor’ (Berman 2001: 233). Furthermore, a positivist approach tackling security issues allows my insights to be compared to those of traditional IR theories. Comparisons with Other Countries While the intention of this book is to explore the role of cultural values in Indian foreign policy, including in comparison to other drivers of policy, I will seek to contextualise this role by briefly referring to the role values have played in other major countries’ foreign policies. A future comparative study of the influence of cultural values across different countries would increase the usefulness of this analysis.

Assumptions and Limitations In light of the criticisms made of conventional IR theory for its culturally specific biases and assumptions, it must be acknowledged that this study does not claim to be ‘value free’. The choice of a constructivist research question reveals ontological assumptions, including that: cultural values exist, they matter in world politics and are worth researching. While acknowledging that cultural values cannot be isolated completely from other social phenomena, the thesis makes the assumption that it is possible to isolate them sufficiently to identify and understand their influence. My interpretation of the information is also likely to be impacted by personal assumptions. The first Nuclear Policy Case Study faced limitations in access to primary documents. Unlike in later years, the Indian MEA published few documents prior to around 1999. This was remedied through using the available documents from media, other external sources and secondary texts. Acknowledgements It is acknowledged that cultural values can also impact India’s image directly, through influencing the way India is seen by foreign audiences (governments, publics and other actors), independent of government

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efforts. The Middle East Case Study will examine this more than the other case studies. This is because it is more feasible to assess the views of foreign audiences in a limited geographic area, like the Middle East, than the entire world as the other case study topics would require.

References Acharya, A. (2004, Spring). How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. International Organization, 58(2), 239–275. Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. European Journal of International Relations, 3(3), 319–363. Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1965). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Boston: Little Brown. Bajpai, K. (2002, November). Indian Strategic Culture. In M. R. Chambers (Ed.), South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances. Carlisle: US Army War College. Basrur, R. M. (2001, March). Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture. Journal of Peace Research, 38(2), 181–198. Berman, S. (2001, January). Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis. Comparative Politics, 33(2), 231–250. Bozeman, A. B. (1976, Spring). War and the Clash of Ideas. Orbis, 20(1), 61– 102. Chaudhuri, R. (2008). Recovering Indian Strategic Culture. International Studies Association Paper. London: King’s College. Chay, J. (1990). Cultural and International Relations. New York: Praeger. Cohen, S. P. (2001). India: Emerging Power. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. Desch, M. C. (1998). Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies. International Security, 23(1): 141–170. Eisenstadt, S. N. (2000, Winter). Multiple Modernities. Daedalus, 129(1), 1–29. Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Geertz, C. (1994). Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture. In M. Martin & L. C. McIntyre (Eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. George, J. (1989, September). International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate. International Studies Quarterly, 33(3), 269–279. Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. (2009, June). Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(5), 1029–1046.

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Gray, C. S. (1999, January). Strategic Culture as Context: the First Generation of Theory Strikes Back. Review of International Studies, 25(1), 49–69. Guth, J. (2006, April). Religion and Foreign Policy Attitudes: The Case of the Bush Doctrine. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago. Hudson, V. M. (1997). Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda. In V. M. Hudson (Ed.), Culture and Foreign Policy. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Hudson, V. M., & Sampson, M. W. (1999, December). Culture Is More than a Static Residual: Introduction to the Special Section on Culture and Foreign Policy. Political Psychology, 20(4), 667–675. Huntington, S. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations. Foreign Affairs, 72(32), 22– 169. Hurrell, A. (2007). On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jepperson, R. L., Wendt, A., & Katzenstein, P. J. (1996). Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security. In P. J. Katzenstein (Ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Johnston, A. I. (1995a). Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jones, R. W. (2006). India’s Strategic Culture: Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, Contract No: DTRA01-03-D-0017. Government of United States of America: Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Katzenstein, P. J. (Ed.). (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Katzenstein, P. J., Keohane, R., & Krasner, S. (1998). International Organisation and the Study of World Politics. International Organisation, 52, 645–685. Klotz, A., & Lynch, C. (2007). Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations. New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc. Kluckhohn, C. (1944). Mirror for Man. New York: Fawcett. Lal, D. (1998, April). Culture, Democracy and Development (Working Paper, No. 783). Los Angeles: University of California. Landes, D. S. (1998). The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor? New York: Norton. Lapid, Y., & Kratochwil, F. (1996). The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Liska, G. (1962). Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lovell, J. P. (1990). The United States as Ally and Adversary in East Asia. In J. Chay (Ed.), Cultural and International Relations. New York: Praeger.

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Morgan, F. E. (2003). Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan. Westport: Praeger. Mouffe, C. (Ed.). (1979). Gramsci and Marxist Theory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Perkovich, G. (1999). India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Poore, S. (2003). What Is the Context? A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture. Review of International Studies, 29, 279–284. Price, R., & Reus-Smit, C. (1998). Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism. European Journal of International Relations, 4(3), 259. Smith, S., & Young, P. D. (1998). Cultural Anthropology: Understanding a World in Transition. London: Allyn and Bacon. Snyder, J. L. (1990). The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor. In C. G. Jacobsen (Ed.), Strategic Power: USA/USSR. New York: St Martin’s Press. Thapar, R. (2002). The Penguin History of Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300. New Delhi: Penguin Books. Walker, R. B. J. (1990). The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations. In J. Chay (Ed.), Cultural and International Relations. New York: Praeger. Weber, M. (1949). The Methodology of the Social Sciences (E. A. Shils & H. A. Finch, Trans.). New York: Free Press. Wedeen, L. (2002, December). Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science. American Political Science Review, 96(4), 713–728. Wendt, A. (1996). Identity and Structural Change in International Politics. In Y. Lapid & F. Kratochwil (Eds.), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Wiarda, H. J. (2007). Comparative Politics: Approaches and Issues. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Williams, M. C. (2007). Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security. London: Routledge. Williams, R. (1994). The Analysis of Culture. In J. Storey (Ed.), Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader. Harvester-Wheatsheaf: Hemel Hempstead. Zaman, R. U. (2009, January). Strategic Culture: A “Cultural” Understanding of War. Comparative Strategy, 28(1), 68–88. Zehfuss, M. (2002). Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 2

Which Cultural Values?

Historian A. L. Basham (2004: 489) describes the cultural heritage of India as the heritage of all mankind. How can one adequately describe the cultural values for a society which is thousands of years old, has seen numerous migrations, has been a home to all of the world’s major religions and given birth to three of them? This is possible, in part, due to the ‘nationwide scope’ of values in religiously diverse contemporary nationstates. For instance, drawing on data from the World Values Survey, Inglehart and Baker (2000) highlight that on certain dimensions, the basic values of Indian Muslims are more similar to Indian Hindus, than they are to Muslims in other countries. Cross-national differences ‘dwarf’ within-nation differences (ibid.). There are innumerable cultural values within Indian national society. I therefore identify a particular set of values that must fit certain criteria. They must: (1) have played a prominent role in Indian culture throughout history, (2) are prominent within present-day India and (3) are of relevance to foreign policy, including through acknowledgement in interviews of policymakers (Fig. 2.1). These criteria ensure the values identified are worthy of being used in an examination of culture’s influence on foreign policy. The criteria also mean that only a few extremely prominent values are chosen. I undertake a sifting process whereby Criteria 1 identifies several values and these are then tested to ensure they pass Criteria 2 and 3. Throughout this chapter, particularly in relation to Criteria 3, attempts are made to choose values whose influence it is possible to compare to the © The Author(s) 2021 K. Pethiyagoda, Indian Foreign Policy and Cultural Values, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54696-0_2

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Values chosen for examination in this book

Values prominent in present-day India

Values prominent throughout history

Values relevant to foreign policy

Fig. 2.1 Identified cultural values

influence of the same or comparable values in studies of other countries’ foreign policies. Criteria 1 and 2 are described in more detail below. Major secondary texts are relied upon. The existing literature is sufficient because prominent cultural values are usually the easiest for historians to identify and such values occupy much of the focus in literature. Primary texts (mainly religious) will also be used, alongside their interpretations. The texts will cover a vast period of history, from ancient to modern times. Criterion 1: Prominence Throughout History The cultural values identified must have been prominent throughout substantive parts of Indian history. Often, this includes having been among the dominant values. This section occupies the greatest focus, given the importance of a historical perspective(Klotz and Lynch 2007: 9; Katzenstein 1996: 23). It covers major influences on and components of Indian culture throughout history. It begins with the Indus Valley civilisation then travels through the Vedic period, India’s ancient empires, medieval times, the Mughals, and British colonial rule. It is divided into major categories of cultural influence, for example religious traditions and

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major changes in societal and political structure.1 I examine these factors only in terms of their introducing values or shaping existing values. When discussing post-Enlightenment Western society, any study referring to a ‘state’s cultural values’ may be critiqued as being based on the assumption that these values are ‘timeless’ (Williams 1994: 56) and ahistorical. This is understandable as most Western states have not held largely continuous cultures for millennia. While culturalists may rely on ‘a reified, frozen system of meaning’ (Wedeen 2002: 718), this study acknowledges that cultures evolve (Hudson and Sampson 1999: 668). They are usually better described as a ‘dynamic and unfolding process’ rather than a ‘completed product’ (Momin 1996). Contextual and historical contingency cannot be ignored (Vivekanandan 2011; Varadarajan 2004). The degree of change over history, however, varies between cultures. Indian culture is somewhat unique in the level of continuity it has had over millennia (Jones 2006). Choosing values that have been prominent from ancient times does not imply that these values are timeless. As Basham (2004: 4) and others (Jones 2006: 3; Lal 2001) state, India, along with China, constitute ‘the oldest continuous cultural traditions in the world’. India stands out from other ancient civilisations like Egypt and Greece in that its traditions have largely been preserved ‘without a break down’ (Basham 2004: 4). Ancient India’s cultural connection to present-day India is far stronger than ancient Greek, Roman or AngloSaxon culture is to present-day Western states. It is also stronger than the connection between the ancient Sumeria, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, and other Middle Eastern civilisations and the present-day Middle East (though Persia–Iran differs to some extent as explored later). This is due to a range of factors, not least the Judeo-Christian influence on Western Europe and Islamic influence on the Middle East after the ancient or axial ages. Therefore, with regard to India it is possible to argue both that certain values date back as themes for thousands of years, and that these values are neither timeless nor innate, having arisen at particular times. The enduring nature of Indian culture also means that it will not be problematic to examine an immense span of time as this study seeks to do. Furthermore, by searching for cultural values in their simplest form, continuously prominent values can be identified that have maintained 1 It is noted that modern terms like religion, religious tradition, ideology and beliefs may not perfectly describe ancient Indian beliefs/practices.

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their essence over time (unlike searching for comprehensive strategic cultures for example). From a constructivist perspective, it worth noting that the Indian public and policymakers’ perceptions of their state’s culture contain strong awareness of this antiquity (Basham 2004: 4). Several of the values identified are likely to be perceived by many in present-day India as ‘timeless’ (Williams’ 1994: 56). The fact that the values chosen have endured throughout history mean they are likely to remain relatively stable throughout the short period examined in the case studies. Jones (2006: 3) contends that there are core traits of Indian strategic culture that have persisted since independence. People’s politico-cultural attributes are quite durable (Inglehart et al. 1998: 5; Wiarda 2007: 78). Mindful of Indian culture’s continuity, the major focus of this section is the period spanning the Vedic to early medieval eras. These are widely acknowledged as the ‘formative’ stages of the Indian civilisation and culture that expresses itself in the present nation-state (Cohen 2001: 9; Eraly 2005; Basham 2004; Allen 2012). It is the influences during these periods that had the greatest impacts on constituting and shaping India’s cultural values. Cohen (2001: 9) states that during this stage ‘the foundations of Indian social and philosophical thought were laid down and codified’. It has been argued that each state’s strategic preferences are rooted in its early or formative experiences (Johnston (1995: 34). Four ways in which norms can emerge include: spontaneously evolving, as social practice; consciously promoted, as political strategies to further certain interests; deliberately negotiated as a way of conflict management; or as a combination of the three (see Katzenstein (1996: 21) and others). In this study, the values of relevance largely emerged as social practice during the formative period of Indian history. India’s cultural values interacted with a variety of external forces throughout history. These forces had the greatest impact during the formative period. Indian civilisation absorbed, adapted and digested elements of external cultures to varying degrees, including: Aryan during ancient times (within the formative period)2 ; Turkish, Persian and Arab in the late medieval period (just after the formative period); and Western during modernity. 2 There was subsequent interaction with Mesopotamian, Greek, Roman and Scythian peoples, though this did not significantly impact India’s dominant values.

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Attention is paid to the competition between values (Nett 1958: 297). The elevation of different values at different times will be touched on, informed by constructivist insights into the dynamics of contestation over meanings. Interests driven by ruling elites, religion, politics, invasions, empires, population movements, economic systems and class interaction all influence which values are elevated to prominence. Thus I seek to avoid the criticisms of culturalists like Huntington (1993) for ignoring the diversity and contention within cultures (Sen 2005: 54; Wedeen 2002: 717), with notions of cultural isolation or ‘purity’ have often been based on myth and reflect political intentions (Wedeen (2002: 14). The distinctiveness of the outcome of this variety of influences, however, can still be identified and labelled meaningfully as India’s cultural values, knowing that there may be overlaps with the values of other societies. Sen (2005: 121) calls for understanding the heterogeneous character of each culture while emphasising the importance of distinctiveness between cultures. Momin (1996: 290) argues ‘every civilization evolves certain unique features of its own which…constitute its dominant configuration and differentiate it from other civilizations’. By prominence, I refer to those values that were the most prominent throughout history, having survived change and remained meaningful. This may be due to their having been held by the elites or other dominant segment of society, or due to being held by the majority of society. As such, they are the values discussed most by historians in the major secondary texts I draw on. In terms of practice, however, the values seen as prominent or dominant may not have necessarily been the most prevalently practised by the majority or even sizeable parts of the population throughout history. They were nevertheless, prominent or dominant as ideals. While not always followed in daily life, they were seen as what ‘should be’. Ideals are particularly important if we accept Lal’s (2001) characterisation of India having a ‘shame’ culture as opposed to the ‘guilt’ cultures of the Judeo-Christian world. Shame requires an external witness, meaning being seen to adhere to an ideal is more important than actually adhering to or believing in it. At the very least, these values would be those that present-day Indian leaders, public and leading international scholars believe were prominent throughout history (Basham 2004: 4). Historically prominent values are most likely to have been adhered to by leaders when making foreign policy than other values. This is because

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post-independence leaders have usually been from upper castes and therefore most likely to have a pedagogical heritage where cultural values and philosophies are carefully handed down (Jones 2006: 8). Furthermore, the need for popular support for re-election in a democracy ensures India’s leaders are also more likely to demonstrate their adherence to cultural ideals in foreign policy than are ordinary citizens in daily life. The values identified will be defined in their most simple and basic forms. This allows for acknowledging the historical evolution and changes in understandings, traditions and practices associated with a value, while still clearly and unambiguously capturing its essence. As mentioned, the values will be similar to the Weberian analytical construct of ‘ideal types’ (Weber 1949). Moral Foundations Theory posits that finite number of discrete ‘moral foundations’ form distinct moral profiles ‘while accounting for cultural and individual variation’ (Graham et al. 2009; Haidt et al. 2009; Kertzer et al. 2014: 828). The simple values I identify will provide a basic measure allowing both understanding of Indian culture and comparison to other cultures. Criterion 2: Prominence in Present-Day In addition to history, the chosen values must also be prominent today to be accurately labelled ‘India’s prominent cultural values’. By ‘presentday’ I refer to the period since independence. While India has an array of subcultures of various size and power, it is possible to find a particular set of values that can be described as prominent. An important part of present-day prominence is that the values are part of, or at least highly relevant to, India’s national identity. This also ensures the chosen values are the most pertinent to foreign policy. Constructivists highlight identity as key in understanding state interests in international relations (Checkel 1998). Leaders acting on foreign affairs matters adhere to national identity. Hudson and Sampson’s (1999: 671) three most fundamental questions to be answered when undertaking a cultural analysis of world politics are all identity related: ‘Who are “we”?’, ‘What is it that “we” do, or should do?’, and ‘Who are “they”?’. The definition of national identity adopted will be the common image the nation has of itself in relation to outsiders, including other states, in the international realm (Smith 1991). While certain values may have been prominent throughout history and the present-day, for these to be relevant to national identity, they must be consciously associated with the

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Indian nation. Some values may be more relevant to national identity because they are seen as differentiating India from others. Having national identity as a criterion also ensures that the values chosen are relatively stable and durable during the three decades examined in the case studies. While identities are ‘inherently contestable’, they have varying degrees of stability depending on the contexts (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 70). The national identity criterion also ensures that the values identified are, to a certain extent, applicable nationwide, across India’s domestic diversity.

History Indus Valley The earliest civilisation in the subcontinent was the Indus Valley/Harappan civilisation which existed from the late fourth millennium BC to circa 1750 BC.3 Thapar (2002) describes the Indus as the most extensive of the ancient riverine civilisations. During this civilisation, around the third millennium BC, began the process of acculturation— which continuously recreates the diversity associated with Indian culture (Momin 1996: 290). The common view of the culture and society of Harappa was one of drabness, utilitarianism, of ‘competent dullness’ (Mackay 1935; Piggot 1950; Eraly 2005: 40). To Piggot (1950) there was a ‘dead level of bourgeois mediocrity’. While conceding that this common view exaggerates dullness, Eraly (2005: 45) suggests that this lack of a vibrant culture may have contributed to the collapse of the civilisation. One must be careful, however, in accepting modern judgements of vibrancy of a society so far removed culturally and historically. Beyond these views, conclusions may be drawn from archaeological findings which show relatively little evidence of weapons and the physical destruction arising from warfare, and the absence of recognisable religious buildings, sacred sites or elaborate burial rituals in comparison to other ancient civilisations (Thapar 2002: 84, 85). The newly arrived Indo-Aryan speakers (Aryans) described the Indus peoples as without rites, ‘non-sacrificers’, without prayers and 3 In an archaeological sense, civilization implies a pattern that is more complex and sophisticated, incorporating urban living and all its connotations, ‘conscious aesthetic awareness, sophisticated religious beliefs and use of texts’ (Thapar 2002: 70).

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without the god Indra (Eraly 2005: 55). It is likely, however, that the Aryans merely did not understand the rites, prayers and gods of the Indus people. From this information, one might draw conclusions that the cultural values of the Indus people included a focus on order, efficiency and utilitarianism, and a relative lack of religious observance. Unfortunately, since the language of the Indus civilisation is yet to be successfully deciphered (Thapar 2002: 84) there is little knowledge of the Indus culture beyond these basic speculations. Therefore, it can tell us little about India’s cultural values. More informative will be the stage which boasted the earliest literary source, the period whose narratives are regarded as the beginning of formative period of Indian history—the Vedic period (Thapar 2002: 63, 105). Hinduism Early Vedic Society Many historians and archaeologists contend there was a distinct break between the Indus civilisation and the Vedic society that succeeded it (Thapar 2002; Basham 2004). Some however, especially in recent years, have pointed to the adoption and incorporation of Indus traditions, rituals and even mythologies by subsequent cultures (Thapar 2002: 86, 88). Eraly (2005: 49) offers that while the material progress of the Indus civilisation was lost, the intangible residues of its society would permeate that of its Aryan successors. He likens the influence of the Indus people on the Aryans to the civilising influence of the Aegeans on the Hellenic Greeks (2005: 57). The current Hindu god Shiva was formed as a fusion of the Vedic god Rudra and an Indus deity described as ‘proto-Shiva’ (Basham 2004). Some even contend that the Harappa culture was a ‘lineal ancestor’ of subsequent cultures in the subcontinent (Thapar 2002: 69). Others, including those who subscribe to a Hindutva ideology, suggest that the Harappan civilisation itself was created by people of Aryan ethnicity who also wrote the first Veda or Vedic scripture, the Rig-Veda. Adherents to this viewpoint use the term ‘Indus-Saraswati civilization’ instead of ‘Indus civilization’. Scholars like Thapar (2002: 108) dispute this view, suggesting that it fails to understand the archaeological evidence available. Sen (2005: 65–67) contends that the Indus-Saraswati view is part of an active effort to paint Hinduism as omnipresent throughout Indian history. While the connections between Harappa and Vedic society

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should not be ignored, for the purpose of identifying a set of examinable cultural values, whatever remains relevant today of the cultural values of the former can be seen as having been subsumed into the latter. In much of contemporary India, particularly among Hindutva activists, Indian civilisation itself is almost synonymous with Vedic civilisation. Indian history is argued by some to have begun with the coming of the Indo-Aryan speaking people who composed the Vedic corpus of texts (Thapar 2002: 105). While there is contention over whether to label this the starting point for what we refer to as ‘Indian history’ (Sen 2005: 65– 66), it is during the Vedic period that we can really start to see the cultural values which have continued to be prominent up until today. The Vedic period is highly relevant to contemporary Indian values. Cohen (2001: 9) cites this period as the first part of the ‘formative’ stage of Indian history. It is where we see the writing of the Hindu scriptures and the first glimpses of Hinduism—the religious tradition which has had the greatest durability in Indian history and has the strongest influence on Indian society today (Cohen 2001: 9). The Vedas or Vedic corpus was the work of Indo-Aryan speaking peoples who had migrated (Thapar 2002) or invaded (Basham 2004; Eraly 2005) their way into India from Western and Central Asia.4 The corpus is likely to represent the prominent cultural values of Indian society from the time of the Aryans’ ascendance.5 This is because it represents values emphasised by those in positions of power and the ‘ideal culture’ (Smith and Young 1998: 28). Like much of the information we have about this period, the Vedic texts were composed by Brahmans— priests who would have described the culture and values of their society in a manner which supported their own views and interests. As such, certain values of Indian society may be emphasised more than others. For instance, caste stratification may be painted as less permeable and less variable than the reality (Thapar 2002: 9–10).6

4 As mentioned, some scholars have suggested that these peoples were indigenous to India (Prinja 1996: 10; Lal 1998). This is, however, not the mainstream academic view. 5 While scholars argue that the Vedic corpus was distinct in several aspects from latter day Hinduism (Thapar 2002: 127), many of the values of Vedic society continued throughout the development of Hinduism. 6 While scholars have questioned the uncritical reliance upon Brahman literature on Indian history by early European Indologists(Thapar 2002: 9–10), it is not problematic for this book, given my focus is on prominent values only.

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Hierarchy The Vedic corpus provides evidence of hierarchy being a not only prominent, but dominant, value during Aryan rule. The earliest section of the Vedic corpus is the Rig-Veda, thought to have been composed in the second millennium BC (Basham 2004: 234; Thapar 2002: 13). The Rig-Veda makes reference to varna, literally ‘colour’, which was used to classify groups of people and express their differences (Thapar 2002: 112). The arya-varna refer to the Aryan composers of the text while the dasa-varna are the ‘other’, thought to be the indigenous people of the lands into which the Aryans had incurred. Earlier interpretations took varnas to mean racial groups differentiated by skin colour with dasa meaning dark-skinned (Basham 2004: 35; Raj and Pradhan 1997). More recently however, scholars have suggested that the term colour was only used as a symbolic classifier of differences. These later interpretations suggest the Rig-Veda is describing various societies with differing cultural norms, rather than different races (Thapar 2002: 112). Of course, because the Rig-Veda was composed by Brahman priests, there would have been a vested interest to denigrate, in those whose religious beliefs did not involve patronising Brahmans. Regardless of whether the differentiation was based on race or other attributes, it is clear that Vedic society found it worthwhile differentiating between themselves and other groups of people. While the Aryans, at the times of the earliest hymns of the Rig-Veda, maintained a largely unstructured and fundamentally egalitarian tribal society, having no classes or castes, such openness was not extended non-Aryans. Initially, the RigVeda reflected disdain and contempt towards the dasas, who were seen as an enemy to be vanquished (Eraly 2005: 55). As the nomadic pastoralist Aryans took to agriculture, and territorial states supplanted kinship groups, society became hierarchically organised and new beliefs and values emerged. Internal equality combined with xenophobia gave way to the early conceptions of the cultural values of hierarchy and deference. In later Vedic literature, there is no reference to battles with dasas. Over time, the term dasa had evolved from a reference to an enemy ‘other’, to mean slave, while arya continued to mean a person of status who spoke the Indo-Aryan language (Basham 2004: 33; Thapar 2002: 112). It is worth noting that the Rig-Veda shows little evidence of cruel treatment of slaves, particularly in comparison to India’s civilisational contemporaries (Lal 1994).

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However, we only see the caste system emerge in a form akin to what we have today in the Vedas after the Rig-Veda. Instead of the dasavarna and the arya-varna, here there is mention of the four varnas we see today: Brahman, kshatriya, vaishya and shudra.7 These indicate the sharpening of social divisions (Thapar 2002: 124). The varnas are said to denote different occupations (Thapar 2002: 124). The Hindu epic, the Mahabharata, explains that each caste has a different colour: ‘brahmans are fair, kshatriyas are reddish, vaishyas are yellowish and the shudras are black’ (Raj and Pradhan 1997). Later, jatis were introduced which further subdivided the existing varnas (Basham 2004: 149), although according to Thapar (2002: 124), who cites normative texts, the jatis were only a division of the lowest varna. The cultural value of hierarchy in Indian society was strengthened when caste ranking began to be associated with ritual purity. The Brahmans were at the top, which they capitalised on to reinforce their status and the system itself. The Rig-Veda, through a hymn added in at a later time, provides religious sanction for the division. Caste divisions were enforced and perpetuated through elaborate rules of marriage, generally meaning one could only marry within one’s caste. Commensality was also strictly regulated. One could only accept food from, or eat in the presence of those of an equal or higher caste. Furthermore, rules regarding occupation prevented the movement of economic power between castes (Thapar 2002: 62–68). The Hindu caste system played an important role in the stratification of Indian society (Raj and Pradhan 1997). Raj and Pradhan (1997) contend that the Hindu tradition ‘does not believe in the concept of equality’. They argue that the practice and prevalence of inequality have both divine sanction and the backing of the dharmasustras —a composition of jurisprudence, social codes, obligations and duties (Thapar 2002: 164). Speaking in the context of human rights, Raj and Pradhan (1997), assert the Hindu system of social hierarchy was so rigid that there was no equality before the law.

7 Thapar (2002: 123) suggests the root causes of the caste system lie in economic realities such as the division of labour. According to Lal (1998), the geography of the region led to political instability which ruled out the possibility of slavery, indenture and limits on migration as forms of labour control. The need to control a stable labour supply therefore necessitated the caste system.

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A look at the development of government in early Vedic society reveals certain democratic traditions, as have been found in other tribal societies (Gillin 1919: 705–706). The purpose of the chief was to serve the clan, whether as leader or protector. Legends on the origin of government spoke of the gods electing a chief or raja from among themselves to lead them in a war with the demons. However, as witnessed around the world, the evolution from a tribal, clan based society to a territorial state saw these democratic traditions recede. The leader’s role evolved from that of chief, to that of king taking on a status above the ordinary, imbued with divine elements. The role of the clan became subordinated in terms of selecting the king. The office of raja came to be hereditary (Thapar 2002: 120–121). With the Brahman priests being the ones who could imbue this divinity, we see the beginnings of both an interdependence and a contestation over status between the Brahmans and the kshatriyas, the king/warrior caste (Thapar 2002: 120–121). This contest between ‘sacral and temporal’ power would last many centuries and impact on the evolution of the value of hierarchy. Pluralism and Tolerance The Vedas evince the central belief that all things in the universe are connected and are ‘one’ in the deepest sense. This provides the philosophical underpinnings for pluralism and a tolerance of diversity at the metaphysical level, leading to such values being the norm at the moral and social levels. The Sama-Veda conveys that everything in existence is an expression of one divine entity (Coles 1954: 173). All things, human and non-human, living and non-living are interconnected in oneness. The Sama-Veda’s verses in praise of the divine force can be seen as a celebration of the ‘innumerable, small variations’, the diversity of all that exists, that is underpinned by this unitary force (ibid.: 174). The prayers for attainments like wealth, power, wisdom and happiness are intended to assist reintegration of the individual with the cosmic whole (ibid.). The Yajur-Veda postulates that God is everywhere, in all objects—animate and inanimate. This philosophical assumption leads to the normative call for tolerance, because all beings are ‘linked by the God that dwells in all’ (ibid.: 176). It stipulates that one should look at others as they would search for diamonds. Bad traits are merely the mud that covers the deeper goodness. ‘All beings are regarded by me with the eye of a friend’ (ibid.). One of Hinduism’s best known characteristics—the multiplicity of deities

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all representing different forms of the same omnipresent god—provides both the foundations and one of the strongest indicators of pluralism. Vedic philosophy of time also evinces underpinnings of pluralism. The Rig-Veda expounds a conception of time, somewhat reminiscent of those held by certain modern theories of physics, that the past, present and future are not different but all one (Coles 1954: 175). This is reflected in the cyclical nature of time reflected in the Rig-Veda: birth, life and death; the spinning of the earth; sun rise and set. At the societal level, while they may not have been conscious, moral preferences among all people at the time, the values of pluralism and tolerance took root as norms during this period. Through the interactions of the Aryans with the Indus people we also see the first glimpses of diversity and the hybrid, polymorphic culture that would come to characterise India. While the Rig-Veda speaks contemptuously of the dasas, there was extensive intermingling, interbreeding and intermarriage between the Aryans and Indus peoples (Momin 1996: 290), as well as Aryans and other groups, both indigenous and foreign (Thapar 1992: 84). This increased with time. Several Vedic sages were openly described as sons of dasa women—dasi-putra brahmans (Eraly 2005: 95; Thapar 2002: 122). While they were initially reviled, they eventually came to be respected upon demonstrating their effectiveness as priests (Thapar 2002: 122).8 Thapar (2002: 122) surmises that the inclusion of non-Aryan ritual priests is likely to suggest the acceptance of other outsiders as well into Aryan society. Vedic society was, from these early times, internally differentiated and pluralistic, rather than ‘monolithic and homogeneous’ (Momin 1996: 290; Subramaniam 1979: 22). It was, according to Momin (1996: 290), an amalgam or synthesis of Aryan and non-Aryan, including tribal elements. The deities of tribal populations and other non-Aryan groups were absorbed into mainstream Vedic culture. Momin (1996: 290) argues that while the process of Aryanisation or Sanskritisation often entailed the adoption of Sanskrit names and Brahmanical rituals, customs and habits, it did not necessary bring uniformity and homogeneity. The Atharva Veda refers to the vratyas who were outside the fold of Hinduism. Rather than segregating these outsiders, Brahmans were said to have made considerable efforts to draw them to the mainstream of

8 For instance, ‘Badarayana the Black’ (Eraly 2005: 95).

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Vedic society (Momin 1996: 290). The same text also provides evidence of local rituals being absorbed into Vedic worship (Thapar 2002: 122). Momin (1996: 290) maintains this incorporation and assimilation of regional features is attested to by both linguistic and philological evidence. Thapar (1992: 68) summarises that since its very inception, Hinduism appears to have been a ‘mosaic of distinct cults, deities, sects and ideas’. At various times evidence shows that: the cult of Sun-worship was brought to India by the magas (Jairazbhoy 1963: 69–75); Krishna worship was brought in by a foreign pastoral tribe called the abhiras (Basham 2004); deities Narayani and Durga, originating from non-Aryan tribes, were absorbed into classical Hinduism as consorts of Shiva (Shivapadasundaram 1934); serpent and phallus worship originated from forest-dwelling tribal communities (Basham 2004); and various heterodox sects and cults, such as the shakta and tantric traditions, incorporated features from indigenous, particularly tribal cultures (Woodroffe 1951). The tolerance for Harappan, tribal and other indigenous beliefs also included views of life and death. Later, the increasingly complex system of varnas and jatis would further facilitate the inclusion of outsiders into Vedic society. The caste stratified society made it easier to absorb new cultures and groups of people. Foreigners who came into contact with the Aryans, such as the Yavanas (Ionians or Greeks) mentioned in the Mahabharata, or the Sakas (Scythians) who entered India around the first century BC were incorporated into the caste hierarchy (Bose 1967; Momin 1996: 290). Hierarchy and social division, ironically, led to further inclusion, diversity pluralism. In a philosophical sense, Vedic Hinduism contends that there is no viewpoint, or way of seeing the truth that is superior to another. Most scholars refer to this view by citing the Rig-Veda’s quote ‘truth is one, though the sages know it variously’ (Wilson 1866). The pluralism in Vedic thinking is even more evident when considering the variety of views and gods accommodated in comparison to Hebraic thought with its strict monotheism and dualism, or Persian thought with its clear dualism (Subramaniam 1979: 23). At this early stage in Indian history, we can see how Vedic pluralism and to a certain extent tolerance, set the foundation for these values to shape later Hinduism. Non-violence Non-violence does not seem to have been as dominant a value in the Vedic period as it was to become later. Battles conducted by Vedic

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tribesmen are described by Eraly as ‘a singularly savage affair’, ‘even for those primitive times’ (2005: 89). Far from being considered a crime, the killing or robbing of a stranger was often seen as a duty (Eraly 2005: 89), not uncommon across the world at the time. Much of the extreme barbarity of Vedic slaughters and sacrifices did not survive to the modern day, despite animal sacrifice still occurring among certain sects (Basham 2004: 486). The earliest Vedic literature lists Kshatriyas as the highest ranking caste, with Brahman priests in second place (Eraly 2005: 75). By the end of the Vedic era, however, their rankings were switched with Brahmans supreme. Legend tells of the Kshatriyas being destroyed for their tyranny by the sixth avatar of Vishnu. Texts such as the Manu-smrti (a book of Hindu law), and the dharmasustras speak of this as a victory for the Brahmans (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2013). Scholars cite this story as reflective of the ongoing conflict between Brahmans and Kshatriyas which continued from Vedic times into the Buddhist period of the last few centuries BC (Eraly 2005: 99; Thapar 2002; Encyclopaedia Britannica 2013). This eventual pre-eminence of the priests over the warriors may have supported the rise in prominence of non-violence as a value. Development of Hinduism Non-violence Hinduism’s conceptions of non-violence evolved significantly throughout the formative period of Indian civilisation. The value itself grew to become more prominent in Hindu philosophy and morality. The central value of Hinduism is encompassed in the formula ‘ahimsa paramo dharma: the highest religion, the ultimate law of our being, is nonviolence’ (Easwaran 2009: 321). Easwaran (2009: 326) argues there is no higher dharma or teaching, than non-violence. This was due, in part, to the influences on it by political and social changes occurring, such as urbanisation and changes in economic production. Non-violence within Hinduism was also influenced by new philosophical/religious traditions such as Buddhism and Jainism. It was between the Vedic period and the great empires of the third century BC that the epic, the Mahabharata, was written (Datta 2005). The epic contains both philosophical and devotional material, discussing the concept of violence extensively. This includes the moral dilemma of waging war for a righteous cause. It exemplifies the tension between the ideal of intending no-harm and the view that pain must be caused

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in certain circumstances (Robinson 2003: 117). The concept of dharmayudda, or righteous war is discussed. Some scholars assert that this is an argument in favour of just war theory where violence is justified for the right cause (Robinson 2003: 117). However, in terms of its influence on India’s most prominent cultural values, we must consider the entire sociopolitical-cultural context in which the verses were drafted and interpreted. There was a broader Hindu tradition in which non-violent ideals of not intending harm and not causing pain were the highest ideals (Robinson 2003: 123). Overall, the civilisation was far less accustomed to violence than its contemporaries in the Middle East and China. India’s greatest empire— the Maurya—arose during the fourth century BC from the state of Magadha (present day Bihar and Eastern Uttar Pradesh). In comparing it to the Chinese empire founded by Qin Shi Huang not too long after, Fukuyama (2011: 179) highlights that the wars which facilitated Magadha’s rise to dominance were not ‘prolonged brutal affairs’ as experienced by Qin. Furthermore, the relations between Magadha and its empire were far ‘gentler’ than those of Qin (Fukuyama 2011: 179). The conquest of one Chinese state by another often meant the extermination or exile of an entire ruling lineage and the absorption of its territory under another, so much so that under the Easter Zhou Dynasty the number of Chinese elite lineages dropped substantially (Fukuyama 2011: 179). By contrast, in India, conquest only meant that the existing ruler was defeated in battle and accepted the nominal sovereignty of the Mauryas. Fukuyama (2011: 179) adds that unlike Qin, in Magadha there had not been a killing off of the old elites through wars and Magadha had not experienced any threat that necessitated mobilisation of the entire male population. The Hindu philosophical texts Upanishads, formed around the same period. The ideas within the Upanishads are described as Vedanta ‘the end of the Vedas ’. They summarise the Vedas, particularly the Rig-Veda and Sama-Veda (Coles 1954: 176). The Upanishads are said to constitute the ‘doctrinal basis’ for the Hindu religion (ibid.: 173). These texts combine philosophy and metaphysics with ethics regarding relationships. The Upanishads’ non-violence is a natural product of the philosophy of “‘at-homeness’ in the world’” (Easwaran 2009: 326). Non-violence is said to be both implicit and explicit in the Upanishads’ teachings of unity (Chandogya Upanishad IV.17.4; Easwaran 2009: 321). This links with the Maha Upanishad’ s values of interconnectedness, manifested in the concept of vasudhaiva kutumbakam—the world is one family.

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Some argue that Gandhi’s non-violence is ‘Upanishadic to the core’ (Easwaran 2009: 326). For instance, its verses state: May we live with love for all May we live in peace with all (Easwaran 2009: 68)

They speak of the only ‘just’ wars being internal ones—conflicts waged within one’s own mind. They argue that any external need to cause pain could be rectified internally, eliminating the need for external action. This applied to the social values of ordinary people as well. The Upanishads state that householders should ‘strive for peace’ and ‘master the passions’ (Easwaran 2009: 250). Upanishads often end with the benediction ‘om shanti shanti shanti’ meaning perfect, transcendent peace (ibid.: 342). Easwaran (2009: 304) argues that the Upanishads are rooted in the disposition of shanta, ‘peace,’ which is ‘what happens when all mental dispositions are brought to rest’. He adds that the Upanishads are an ‘end of the Vedas.’ Centuries after they originated, the Upanishads were to be revived by one named Shankara meaning ‘giver of peace’. Of the Mahabharata, Easwaran (2009: 305) states that the text, “however violent on the surface, itself teaches detachment from worldly gain and communicates the predisposition of inner calm (shama) leading also to spiritual peace (shanta)”. Within one of the Mahabharata’s stories, the Bhagavad Gita, one of the main characters, Arjuna, undergoes a transformation which sees him root out anger and hatred and cease dividing the world into friends and enemies (Robinson 2003: 122). Tolerance and Pluralism Both pluralism and tolerance continued as themes, rising in prominence during the phase of urbanisation in the first millennium BC and throughout Hinduism subsequently. The Mauryan Empire made no attempt to introduce uniformity of languages spoken in its territory or to standardise weights and measures (Perlin 1985: 415–480). The lack of uniform standards would persist in India until the British Raj nearly 2000 years later (Perlin 1985: 415–480). Fukuyama (2011: 179) highlights that this was in sharp contrast to China’s Qin Dynasty. The Chinese had standard measures, common written script and centralised public administration.

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Momin (1996: 296) contends that pluralism has been one of the ‘quintessential features of Hinduism both at the metaphysical as well as socio-cultural level’ (Karve 1961: 1–14). The ‘inherently pluralistic ethos’ (Momin 1996: 296) of Hinduism is reflected both in its ideas and beliefs, and in its customs, traditions and behaviour patterns. It has led to the distinctive syncretism seen throughout the religion. At the metaphysical and philosophical levels, truth itself was considered at once pluralistic (Karve 1961: 1–14) and monistic—similar to beliefs during the Vedic period. The early Upanishads stipulate that ‘wise men talk about it differently but it is all one’ (Subramaniam 1979: 23). These sacred texts constantly extol that the deepest conceptions of reality are necessarily pluralistic. Continuing the theme of the Vedas , the Upanishads’ is often understood as surface level diversity coexisting with unity at the core, two sides of the same coin. All things, living and non-living are connected and non-duality is a central principle. This connection consists of a universal consciousness ‘prajñam brahma’ that all reality is consciousness (Easwaran 2009: 266). This stems in part from a creation myth where ‘one manifested itself as the many’ (ibid.). Tolerance and celebration of diversity is a central value. For instance: He is this boy, he is that girl, he is this man, he is that woman, and he is this old man, too, tottering on his staff. His face is everywhere. He is the blue bird, he is the green bird with red eyes, he is the thundercloud, and he is the seasons and the sea. (Shvetashvatara Upanishad IV.3–4)

This extends beyond intra-species diversity: The Self is in all. He is all the gods, the five elements, Earth, air, fire, water, and space; all creatures, Great or small, born of eggs, of wombs, of heat, Of shoots, horses, cows, elephants, men, and women; All beings that walk, all beings that fly, And all that neither walk nor fly (Aitareya Upanishad III.1.3)

In the Bhagavad Gita, an incarnation of God states ‘As people approach me, so I receive them. All paths lead to me’ (Easwaran 2008: 194). This contrasts with Abrahamic religions that believe only each of their

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respective paths leads to God or truth. Even the concept of dharma as eternal law does not exclude the pluralism with the existence of the concept of svadharma: each individual’s own law or way. The Upanishads saw good and evil as relative terms only, though there were ‘helpful’ and ‘unhelpful’ things from the perspective of the seeker of truth. Conventional values like benevolence, sacrifice and ascetism were only ‘good’ in that they helped one attain enlightenment (Basham 2004: 255). Momin (1996) cites the example that even if two traditions cited in sacred Hindu texts are in conflict, both are still to be held as law. Sen (2005: 354–355, 46–47) sees Hinduism as a heterodox religion and cites its history of accommodating diverging concepts. This extends to present-day India where followers hold vastly different beliefs (Sen 2005: 354–355). At the level of customs and rituals, pluralism and syncretism are conspicuous in the number of non-Aryan deities, rituals and ceremonies in Hinduism (Momin 1996). This can be witnessed in those villages which had been engulfed by the Aryan expansion (McKim 1955: 209–210). Pluralism also colours the Hindu epics. The Mahabharata accords a prominent place to Naga tribal genealogies and myths (Kosambi 1987: 94; Thapar 1978: 122–151) while the Ramayana has several different versions (Raghavan 1980; Richman 1992). Also, as mentioned, Hinduism’s pluralist values are manifested in the stratification of its traditions and society. The aforementioned dharmasutras were adjusted along with the acceptance of new groups into mainstream society (Thapar 2002: 164). Tolerance was and is an intrinsic and prominent value within Hindu thinking. It is not taken for granted, Sen (2005: 46) citing that there is pride in Hinduism’s liberality and tolerance. He contends that liberalism itself is ‘part and parcel’ of the Hindu approach and is one of Hinduism’s greatest contributions to the world of thought. Divergence in religious beliefs need not prevent an accepted basic code of conduct or dharma. At the societal level, this created an atmosphere where spiritual travellers have been ‘unusually free’ to transcend all religious forms and not only follow their own path but also help characterise the culture as a whole (Easwaran 2009: 309). Major Hindu texts like the Ramayana display a tolerance of dissent (Sen 2005: 47). Early European colonialists found Hinduism baffling, partly because its valuing of tolerance contrasted so much with their own understanding of religion (Thapar 2002: 3).

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Both tolerance and pluralism may be, in part, a result of Hinduism at the philosophical level being underpinned by a worldview which is ‘organic’; one that does not focus on control to the extent that characterises the modern West’s ‘architectonic’ worldview (Bowes 1986: 22). Furthermore, the underlying philosophy in much of Hindu thinking goes beyond distinctions. This differs from the Persian, Abrahamic and JudeoChristian worldviews which have tendencies to make distinctions of good and evil, ‘man’ and nature, etc. (Bowes 1986: 47). Some strands of Indian philosophy also exhibit an aversion to defining things according to temporal human understanding. Absorptive Capability According to Subramaniam (1979: 23), the values of pluralism and tolerance, manifested in cultural synthesis and accommodativeness, led to positive outcomes for Hindus during their interactions with other cultures throughout history. Initially, it made it easier for the Aryans to bring groups—who had either been conquered or overrun by them—into the Vedic fold. Later, when it came to the Greek and Kushan conquerors in the subcontinent’s North Western borderlands, Aryan acquiescence coupled with absorption of the foreigners into Aryan society, led to the outsiders accepting some form of Hindu worship (Subramaniam 1979: 23). In certain respects, it allowed the conquered to convert the conqueror. In effect, the Greeks and Kushans, as well as the Sakas, Pahlavas and Huns were all absorbed into Indian society, socially and culturally (Chopra et al. 1974: 28). The embracing of protest in the form of beliefs and insisting only on ritual or behavioural conformity in a broad sense, contributed to Hinduism surviving Buddhism and Jainism as the dominant religious framework in India (Basham 2004: 267). The beliefs of Buddhism, Jainism and other sects, which opposed the dominant Vedic Brahmanism of the time (Thapar 2002: 172), were debated by the Brahman orthodoxy, but not violently suppressed (Subramaniam 1979: 25; Thapar 2002: 164). Subramaniam (1979: 121) describes a period where Hindu statues and carvings competed with Buddhist art and both flourished rather than one repressing the other. In a philosophical sense, Bowes (1986: 21–22) states that while the doctrine that the world was an illusion was inconsistent with much of Hindu thought, and had in fact been repudiated by major Hindu figures such as Shankara who had said it was an import from

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Buddhism, the Hindu tradition had no problem in accepting this doctrine and allowing it to ‘fit in’. As alluded to previously, all opinions are allowed as ‘different ways of seeing the same thing’ (Bowes 1986: 21–22). As long as the Buddhist or Jain laity still conducted certain rituals and prescriptions for social life, they were considered to be within the fold for as long as possible (Subramaniam 1979: 23). While the ‘mind and tongue wandered free’ (Subramaniam 1979: 23), the body still conformed. Over time, in later generations, the mind ‘rendered inactive or indifferent, would succumb to the body’s ritualism’ (Subramaniam 1979: 23). When Buddhism’s arguments, ideas and philosophies were long forgotten, the Vedic rituals and social norms remained. Basham (2004: 267–268) cites that while a Buddhist family would give its chief support to the local monastery, it would still rely, at all times, on the services of Brahmans at births, marriages and deaths. Rationalism Pluralism and tolerance also help enable the strong threads of rationalism that flow through Hindu thought. The Paramahamsa Upanishad for instance highlights the symbolic nature of rituals observed by householders. These are argued to be, at best, aids to the ultimate inner objective of enlightenment (Easwaran 2009: 281). Hierarchy The Maurya Empire was also characterised by a relatively rigid hierarchy in state administration. This was reflected in sacred texts. The Upanishads include ‘endless variety’ of hierarchical relations between things; ‘from the inanimate world to some forms of consciousness…to consciousness itself, or from outer things to our awareness of things – or feelings’ (Easwaran 2009: 318). Medieval Period The latter part of the first millennium AD saw an evolution whereby the Vedic Brahman tradition separated to form sects such as the vaishnava and shaiva—now known as Puranic Hinduism. The term ‘Hindu’ only came into use around the eighth century AD when Arab traders used it to describe all those beyond the Indus (Thapar 2002: 275).

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Pluralism Hinduism’s pluralist tradition was reinvigorated in several ways during its resurgence in medieval times, following the dissipation of the Mauryan and Gupta empires, decentralisation, and the concurrent decline of Buddhism. One way was through the interaction of Aryan and Tamil cultures which occurred at the time from the sixth to the ninth centuries AD. Subramaniam (1979: 52) finds that the infusion of Aryan ritualism, philosophy, Puranic stories and yoga with Tamil heroic and romantic tradition led to common cultural features such as the Bhakti movement, a secular ethic and a decadent romanticism. Later on, this was said to have played a role in keeping India together as a unitary entity (Subramaniam 1979: 7–8). Advaita, translated as non-dualism, evolved as one of the six orthodox schools of Vedanta. It taught a set of tenets that had earlier been expressed in the Upanishads. Ramachandra Gandhi (1992) describes the concept of advaita as an ethic of inclusiveness, which may well be Indian civilisation’s contribution to humankind. It stands in contrast to the destructive duality of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Its founder Gaudapada and leading medieval proponent Shankara, are said to have drawn heavily on Buddhist philosophical sources for their arguments (Deutsch and Dalvi 2004: 157). Several heterodox Hindu sects also sprouted in medieval times. They rejected ritualism and Brahmanical orthodoxy, placing importance on universal tolerance, communal harmony, human equality and freedom (Raj and Pradhan 1997). In this way, they shared values with earlier Buddhist traditions. It is worth noting though, that according to Subramaniam (1979: 25), the missionary Hindu reaction created by Buddhism’s long dominance, was more ‘polemical’ and less ‘syncretistic’ than older forms of Hinduism. Bhakti was a movement within Hinduism which emphasised devotion to a personal god. Speaking in the common Hindi of the Middle Ages rather than Sanskrit which was the preserve of the elite at the time, the movement is credited with challenging the hierarchical Hindu caste system as well as racial division and segregation (Raj and Pradhan 1997). One of the greatest Bhakti poets and saints, Kabir, criticised caste inequality (Vanina 1996: 11) and highlighted that rituals were merely aids along the spiritual path (Easwaran 2009: 281). The Bhakti movement also brought about more cultural exchange between North and South India.

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Hierarchy In spite of the Bhakti movement, some scholars describe the orientation of medieval Hindu civilisation as being towards servility and hierarchy, among other things (Sharma 2000: 467). In relation to the outside world, a hierarchical worldview where India occupies a place at the top of the global hierarchy can be witnessed. Central Asian scholar and eleventhcentury Persian traveller, Al-Biruni, wrote upon his visit to India that ‘the Hindus believe that there is no country but theirs, no nation like theirs, no kings like theirs, no religion like theirs, no science like theirs. They are haughty, foolishly vain, self-conceited and stolid’ (Chengappa 2000: 68). Fatalism Often involved in the perpetuation of hierarchy and non-violence was a tendency towards fatalism in the Hindu and Indian worldview. Some, most importantly in the lower castes, saw their lot in life as unchangeable (Tanham 1992: 17). Such beliefs were based in the philosophical traditions in which the present life is but one component of an ongoing samsara, the cycle of rebirth. Fatalism was also related to the Hindu concept of time as cyclical and repetitious, with no past and future, only an eternal present. While some see fatalism as evidence of Indian culture holding intuition, emotion and tradition above rationality, the tendency to accept rather than attempt to manipulate reality, can be argued to be based firmly in logic (Tanham 1992: 17). Tanham (1992: 17) notes that it might be seen as a pragmatic, realistic approach to life. It certainly fits with the B-theory of time, accepted by many physicists, that the future is pre-determined, and most of modern science that sees free-will as illusory. Continuing Prominence Beyond the medieval period, Hinduism’s values of pluralism, tolerance, non-violence and hierarchy would largely remain prominent up to contemporary times. Though Sen (2005: 53, 535) argues present-day Indian identity is not wholly a derivative of Hindu identity over others, he acknowledges that nearly every part of Indian culture bears the historical imprint of Hindu thoughts and practices. For instance, the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Centre claims the Hindu caste system goes against several articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly 1948), namely the

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articles relating to respect for individual dignity, the right to recognition as a person. While hierarchical Hinduism was alleged to also deny explicitly the right to freedom of opinion and expression, it is said to grant the right, implicitly, to freedom of religion. This was a result of the innate pluralism within Hindu beliefs. Hinduism’s values would, however, be impacted by various forces during the Buddhist, Mughal, British and post-independence periods. Buddhism The role played by Buddhism in shaping India’s most prominent cultural values has been, in modern times until very recently, largely underestimated by many scholars and the Indian public. This is now changing with India’s public rediscovering Buddhism. This rediscovery is part of the country’s growing awareness of the influence its culture has had on the world. As such, it is worth exploring in depth. Buddhism reigned as the dominant religion in India for nearly a thousand years. It remained strong from the sixth century BC, peaking during emperor Ashoka’s reign, starting to decline in the fifth century AD and finally being eradicated during the thirteenth century (Eraly 2005: 270; Sen 2005: 56). Basham (2004: 265–266) cites that of all the religious archaeological findings dating from 200 BC to 200 AD, ‘those of Buddhism outnumber those of…Hinduism and Jainism together’. Scholars stress Buddhism’s impact on India’s cultural values, thought and intellectual life, past and present (Sen 2005: 56; Subramaniam 1979: 129). Sen (2005: 56) cites the dominance of Buddhism in his challenging of the belief that India was a ‘Hindu country’ prior to Islam’s arrival. Buddhism’s strong influence on defining India’s cultural values can be attributed, in part, to politico-historical factors. The religion emerged against a backdrop of growing empires, urbanisation and bustling new cities. The previously discussed pluralistic society was reaching its zenith in philosophical speculation and discourse—something unsurpassed for centuries to come (Thapar 2002: 164). There was both accommodation and philosophical, not violent, contestation between the established Vedic Brahmanism and multiple newly rising groups and ideologies (Thapar 2002: 164). Wandering ascetics debated ideas about the nature of existence. Crowds would gather to see philosophical face-offs at kutuhalashalas, ‘places for creating curiosity’ (Thapar 2002: 164). Several sects arose reflecting great divergences in thinking. All this was underpinned

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by a culture of pluralism and tolerance in religious, intellectual and social life. When Buddha began to propagate his teachings or dharma, he did not face violent repression from the dominant religious groups. Opposition came largely in the form of verbal debate with Brahmans and sages. It was a clash of ideas, not a clash of armed followers (Thapar 2002: 164). The peaceful rise of Buddhism remains unparalleled in the religious experience of Europe and the Middle East. Buddhism’s dominance was in part due to the elite strata of society which it attracted (Eraly 2005: 270). While it railed against the caste system (Eraly 2005: 229; Thapar 2002; Basham 2004) its practicalities ensured that it attracted mainly the upper classes and castes, namely the kshatriyas (Eraly 2005: 231).9 The fact that it was active mainly in towns also meant it attracted more educated followers (Eraly 2005: 229) as well as artisans and merchants (Thapar 1975: 41). This enabled Buddhism to influence the constitution of India’s most prominent cultural values, even if we accept arguments by some that its popularity was restricted to this demographic (Eraly 2005: 270) Eventually, Buddhism would grow to become the major religion across all of India and much of Asia (Thapar 2002: 275). This was as a result of the patronage of Emperor Ashoka (Eraly 2005: 327). A continuation of the Maurya dynasty and ruling from 268 BC to 232 BC (Eraly 2005: 321; Thapar 2002: xiv), Ashoka’s empire was the greatest in Indian history, in terms of geographical spread and influence (Basham 2004). Ashoka’s reign deserves particular attention as it is credited with laying the foundations for India as a nation state (Allen 2012). The Emperor’s support allowed Buddhism to deeply influence Indian culture (Eraly 2005: 327). This was through both the prestige of royal patronage and emphasising Buddhism’s ethical content. Ashoka transformed Buddhism ‘from a primarily monastic movement to a religion of the masses’ (Eraly 2005: 327). All the goals of Ashoka’s reign revolved around the Buddhist dharma using legislation and other state machinery, as well as persuasion to propagate it (Eraly 2005: 328, 336; Sastri 1952). Ashoka’s objective was ‘the moral regeneration of a whole nation’ (Sastri 1952). He dotted the countryside with iron pillars inscribed with 9 Buddhism’s rejection of the Vedic tenets, rituals and the caste system threatened Brahman dominance in society, thereby strengthening the position of kshatriyas who could escape having to patronise Brahmans (Eraly 2005: 231).

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edicts extolling Buddhist values (Eraly 2005: 328). After Ashoka’s reign, however, the absence of royal patronage combined with other factors, led to Buddhism’s decline (Subramaniam 1979: 25). Non-violence and Compassion Of all of the values which Buddhism instilled or reinforced in Indian society, ahimsa or no-harm, usually translated as non-violence, has been the most influential. It is motivated by the related value of compassion which Basham (2004: 286) cites as chief of Buddhism’s virtues (Rahula 1978: 46). Non-violence has also been the value most associated with Buddhism (Raj and Pradhan 1997). Buddhism’s contribution of non-violence to Indian culture surpassed that of other sects which also preached this value. Buddhism can be credited as having furthered the transformation already taking place due to the Upanishads (which espouse non-violence) of Vedic society to one in which non-violence was a prominent and at times dominant cultural value (Basham 2004: 215). Violence was not condoned regardless how important the ends were. The Theravada canonical scriptures, the older of the two major strands of Buddhism, contain no instance in which violence is advocated as a means of achieving anything (Deegalle 2006: 79). This stands in slight contrast to Hinduism’s aforementioned discussion of righteous war. Buddhism considers war and conflict as evil and calls for individuals to transcend conflict. All wars and conflicts in external society are products of ‘unskilled’ mental states within individuals (Deegalle 2006: 79). Ashoka’s personal transformation from a ‘realist’ ruler to an advocate of non-violence provides an important example of Buddhism’s role in imbuing non-violence into society. Ashoka was driven strongly into the Buddhist fold upon witnessing the horrific suffering of his conquest of Kalinga. From this time on he dedicated his life to non-violence and spreading its message throughout India and the world. Ashoka abandoned wars of aggression. Concern for humanity’s welfare became an overriding priority (Eraly 2005: 328–329). Ashoka worked tirelessly to improve his subjects’ worldly and spiritual lives (Eraly 2005: 341). Buddhism’s non-violence and compassion is sometimes most clearly evident in its attitude towards non-human animals. Here Buddhism clearly distinguished itself from Vedic Brahmanism. Ashoka embodied ahimsa through giving up the royal pastime of hunting, his influence

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resulting in the royal family virtually giving up meat eating.10 As a ruler, he enforced ahimsa through forbidding animal sacrifice, restricting the slaughter of animals for meat, banning killing of certain species and providing medical aid to animals and people (Eraly 2005: 328;337–338). Non-violence stemming from Buddhism would maintain its influence as a prominent cultural value long after the religion itself had largely disappeared. During the medieval period, Bhakti sects opposed violence for reasons similar to those of both the Buddha and Jainism’s founder, Mahavira (Thapar 2002: 482–483) (noting that the Upanishads had also preached non-violence). Those involved in Puranic Hinduism at the time conceived of non-violence in a similar manner (Thapar 2002: 482–483). Hindu vaishnavites, worshippers of Vishnu, began to frown on animal sacrifices and practised vegetarianism (Basham 2004: 215). Tolerance and Pluralism Buddhism also reinforced the tolerant trends already present in Indian culture. The tolerance within Buddhism is partly a result of the culture of open debate which existed at the time of its inception. Rahula (1978: 5) argues that tolerance has been ‘from the beginning one of the most cherished ideals of Buddhist culture and civilization’. He cites Buddhist stories of the Buddha encouraging people to respect other religious sects (Rahula 1978: 5). Sangharakshita (1975: 98) adds that the extent to which Buddhism was tolerant of other religions would seem ‘incredible’ to the monotheisms of the Middle East and Europe. Unlike Christianity, for instance, there was no central authority to enforce uniformity of practice across Buddhist monasteries, each was able to be guided by their own interpretation of teachings (Basham 2004: 285). Discussion and dialogue were components of Buddhism’s social values (Sen 2005: 81). Buddhist councils were some of the earliest open general meetings in the world. These facilitated open debate of alternate viewpoints on religious and social matters (Sen 2005). Though the goals of empire required a certain level of cultural homogeneity, Ashoka passionately advocated religious freedom (Thapar 2002: 175; Sen 2005: 284). While giving his chief patronage to Buddhism, Ashoka honoured and respected all religions and called on his subjects

10 Vegetarianism was an early requirement of some strands of Buddhism.

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to do likewise (Basham 2004: 264; Smith 1909: 170–171). This is stipulated in his 12th Rock Edict on ‘toleration’ (Basham 2004: 264; Smith 1909: 170–171). Ashoka decreed that a ‘person must not disparage the beliefs of another without reason’ and that ‘the sects of other people all deserve reverence’ (Smith 1909: 170–171). The growth of Buddhism also added to the already pluralistic and composite character of Indian civilisation through furthering interaction with the outside world (Sen 2005: 81). Indian insularity, internal focus, suspicion of foreigners and a sense of civilisational exclusiveness (Embree 1971: 19) were all challenged by Buddhism. This was through both Buddhism’s universalist underpinnings and links from sharing the religion with others (Sen 2005: 173). Citing medieval traveller Al-Biruni, Eraly (2004: 446) states that the spread of Buddhism greatly expanded the Indian cultural world. The religion was the primary factor in India’s great intellectual exchanges with China (Sen 2005: 161–190). Buddhism’s key role in moulding the distinctive civilisations of East Asia (Basham 2004) eventually resulted in it being repackaged and again influencing Indian culture, albeit through a different avenue. Equality and Impact on Hierarchy Equality was one of the most socially radical values espoused by Buddhism. Caste was philosophically irrelevant and spiritually detrimental (Eraly 2005: 253; Thapar 2002: 168–169). One’s status was said to be determined by one’s actions, not one’s birth (Eraly 2005: 257; Basham 2004; Thapar 2002: 169; Raj and Pradhan 1997). Equality was embodied in the life of the sangha—the community of monks—which was open to all castes, as well as women (Eraly 2005: 257; Basham 2004: 285). Ashoka—unlike Aristotle who was also advocating freedom and liberal values around the same time—included women, slaves and tribal peoples as worthy of enjoying rights (Sen 2005: 136, 284). Equality and an emphasis on the individual led to Buddhism imbuing democratic ideas into the hierarchically organised society. While the Brahmans asserted that government and state existed as the will of gods, Buddhism saw them as the logical outcome of the social construction of the family and ownership of land (Thapar 2002: 168; Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Centre 1997; Eraly 2005: 85). These societal divisions caused friction, requiring the people to elect someone to govern them and institute laws (Thapar 2002: 168).

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Similar to Hinduism, Buddhism held a contractual view of government, with the relationship between king and subjects marked by reciprocity (Eraly 2005: 85). However, Eraly’s (2005: 85–86) comparison of discussions of the origin of kingship in the Mahabharata and Buddhist Digha Nikaya, reveal significant differences in this contract. Hinduism saw the contract as a result of divine intervention, discussed it from the point of view of the king, and emphasised royal privileges. Buddhism viewed the contract from the point of view of the subjects and focused on royal obligations. Buddhism’s social and moral attitudes, its view of government and belief that the law is for welfare of all and not just the elite, are said to be in line with contemporary conceptions of human rights, including Article 21 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly 1948). These views were embodied in the democratic and egalitarian monastic life of the sangha (Basham 2004: 285). Singhal (1980: 161–162) draws a contrast between Buddhist sangha and the Christian Church in terms of equality and control. The Buddhism-inspired equality, however, did not reach as prominent a level in Indian society as some of the aforementioned values. This is due to equality being more directly in opposition to the existing brahmanical tradition than non-violence, tolerance or pluralism. It is also because of the threat equality posed to the existing higher castes and classes in society. Nevertheless, Buddhism’s support for equality did have a lasting impact in shaping conceptions of hierarchy. This included among subsequent Hindu sects and traditions, several of whom espoused milder hierarchical viewpoints after Buddhism (Deutsch and Dalvi 2004: 126,157; Thapar 2002: 350; Subramaniam 1979). For instance, worshippers of Shiva started to downplay the importance of caste distinctions in religious practice. Interestingly, the extent of inequality in modern Indian society would eventually lead to a re-emergence of Buddhism as a religion attracting significant numbers through the post-independence dalit movement led by B. R. Ambedkar (Guha 2007: 379; Wolpert 1997: 109). Ambedkar, who had chaired the drafting of India’s constitution, also invoked the democratic traditions of the Buddhist sangha. Rationalism and Education Buddhism’s strong emphasis on rational deduction, though likely to have been influenced by earlier Upanishadic thought, had its own distinct

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impact on Indian culture. Buddhism stands apart from other world religions in its downplaying of the relevance of the supernatural (Eraly 2005: 220, 240–241). This is a result of an emphasis on causality and logic (Thapar 2002: 168). The idea of the ‘self’ or ‘soul’ was an illusion which caused craving. All things were impermanent and devoid of intrinsic meaning. Caste identity was irrelevant and supernatural intervention was cast aside. While the Brahmins asserted government and state existed as the will of gods, Buddhism saw them as the logical outcome of the social construction of the family and ownership of land. According to Buddhism, these societal divisions caused friction, which required the people to elect someone to govern them and institute laws. And these ideas occurred 2000 years before Western democracy, 2000 years before Marx’s Historical Materialism. Today Buddhism stands alone as the only world religion in which, rather than a God or gods occupying the central focus, it is one’s mind. The language and themes of Buddhism find more common ground with theoretical physics and quantum mechanics than with most other religions. The Dhamapada, a collection of the Buddha’s verses includes ‘all that we are is the result of what we have thought: it is founded on our thoughts, it is made up of our thoughts’. Nagarjuna of the third–second century BC is widely considered one of the most important Buddhist philosophers. His M¯ ulamadhyamakak¯ arik¯ a investigated in-depth Buddhist concepts such as ‘sunyata’—the lack of a ‘self’ and emptiness, or purely relational existence, of all things. Like the aforementioned Paramahamsa Upanishad, descriptions of true spirituality found in the Buddhist Dhammapada’s last chapter discussing Brahmins highlight the fact that rituals are, ultimately, only symbolic aids on the path towards enlightenment. This rational approach had a major impact in terms of education. Unlike in Hindu tradition which largely aimed at training Brahmans in the elite language of Sanskrit, Buddhist places of learning were open to all castes (Thapar 2002: 170) and contained a wide syllabus of secular subjects. The Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Centre (1997) asserts that ‘the introduction and spread of secular education for all became one of the most significant contributions of Buddhism’. Sen (2005: 81) argues that one of Buddhism’s effects was to enhance the social importance of general literacy, and points to countries where Buddhism has survived having high literacy rates.

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Several universities were founded under Buddhist initiatives, including Nalanda, the world’s first residential university and the world’s largest university at the time (Sen 2005: 354). The university provided free education to students from all over the world and accommodated 10,000 students (Basham 2004: 166). In addition to Buddhism, it taught subjects ranging from the Vedas and Hindu philosophy, to mathematics, astronomy and medicine (Basham 2004: 166; Sen 2005). Nalanda’s legacy is acknowledged in present-day India with the government reestablishing the university. Buddhism left a lasting impact by strengthening the social value already placed on education in Indian society. It is likely that the ancient Buddhist tradition of monasteries simultaneously acting as places of learning influenced a similar occurrence in subsequent Hindu practices during the medieval period (Basham 2004: 166). In its original form, Buddhism—in line with other India philosophical traditions—had an individualist focus. Enlightenment could only be reached by an individual, through their own endeavours, without outside help (Basham 2004: 273). However, the first and second centuries AD saw the division of Buddhism into orthodox, individualist Theravada stream, and the more communalist Mahayana stream (Basham 2004: 266–276; Santideva 1981: 256). Today, the Theravada stream has taken hold in South and Southeast Asia, where most cultures are influenced and derived from relatively individualist Indian culture. In contrast, the Mahayana stream took hold in East Asia where more communalist cultures dominate. Lasting Impact While Buddhism has not maintained large numbers of adherents in India up to the present-day, several of its values continued to dominate Indian culture many centuries after the religion’s downfall. Much of Buddhism’s imprint is witnessed in the sects which constituted the Hindu resurgence of the medieval period; a resurgence that saw the end of many of the ancient heterodox movements like Buddhism (Thapar 2002). The sects within the aforementioned Bhakti movement were heavily influenced by Buddhism and Jainism. This was in spite of their stated hostility towards the latter two (Thapar 2002: 350). The Vedanta school of Hindu philosophy borrowed heavily from Mahayana Buddhism, although officially its teachings were based on the Upanishads (Deutsch and Dalvi 2004: 126,

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157). Leading proponent, Shankara, is often described as a Buddhist in disguise. Sangharakshita (1975: 98) argues that while Buddhism had initially appropriated the cultural forms of Hinduism, Hinduism had assimilated ‘something of the spirit of Buddhism’ (see also Sen 2005: 56). In fact, this re-absorption of Buddhist values into Hinduism can be seen as having further precipitated the former’s decline in India with Hindu sages taking a missionary approach and founding monastic orders to propagate their religion. In a subtle way, modern India’s conceptions of self also continue to be influenced by Buddhism due to the fact that vast amounts of knowledge about ancient Indian history—from everyday life in the cities and villages, to maps of the region—come from Buddhist texts. Buddhism also influenced India’s cultural values through its lasting imprint on governance and state administration. Ashoka’s proclamations of ‘victory through righteousness’ were cultivated by later rulers who strove to emulate him (Sangharakshita 1975: 98). Of particular relevance is Buddhism’s dasa-raja-dharma, the ten principles a just ruler should follow (Vitanage 2011). Each principle reflects certain cultural values, see Table 2.1. Jainism and Other Sects Unlike Buddhism, Jainism has held a consistent following in India up to the present-day. While not as influential as Buddhism, Upadhye (1977: 100) argues that the religious instincts inculcated by Jainism have left an abiding impression on Indian life (Eraly 2005: 192). Founder Mahavira preached ahimsa. To this day Jains are noted for their adherence to nonviolence, being extremely careful to avoid harming other living beings. Non-violence was Jainism’s greatest influence on India’s cultural values. The Acaranga Sutra proclaims: “All beings are fond of life; they like pleasure and hate pain…; to all, life is dear”. (Jacobi 1887: 18)

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Table 2.1 Dasa-raja-dharma principles and cultural values Dasa-raja-dharma principle

Cultural values

(1) Liberality, generosity, and charity

Pluralism, liberalism, tolerance, generosity General morality Selflessness, generosity

(2) A high moral character (3) Sacrificing everything for the good of the people including all personal comfort, name, fame and life (4) Honesty and integrity. Ruler must be free from fear or favour. Should not deceive the public (5) Kindness and gentleness that tells about a genial temperament (6) Austerity in habits. A ruler should live a simple life (7) Freedom from hatred, ill will, enmity. A ruler should bear no grudge against anybody (8) Non-violence. A ruler should not harm anybody and should attempt to prevent war (9) Patience, forbearance, tolerance and understanding. A ruler should be prepared to accept hardships, difficulties and insults without losing temper (10) Non-opposition and non-obstruction. A ruler should not oppose the will of the people (Vitanage 2011)

Honesty, integrity, incorruptibility Compassion, non-violence Austerity Non-hatred, peacefulness Non-violence Patience, forbearance, tolerance, peacefulness, inner strength, accommodativeness Selflessness, accommodativeness

Another influence was its strong themes of rationality. Mahavira was atheistic in his metaphysics (Eraly 2005: 193).11 Jains in ancient times held a theoretical concept of the atom as the ultimate indivisible unit of matter (Upadhye 1977: 103). The furtive philosophical period during which Jainism and Buddhism arose also gave birth to a number of other sects. Some were fundamentally contradictory to Vedic Brahmanism. While their lasting influence on India’s cultural values is questionable, as they never enjoyed the spread and dominance of Buddhism or the consistent following of Jainism, they further prove the pluralistic philosophical environment of the times. Sects included the atheist philosophical traditions of Lokayata and Charvaka, the latter being devoutly materialist (Thapar 2002: 165). Also noteworthy 11 While Jainism accommodates the existence of supernatural beings, they have no relation to the creation or ruling of the universe (Eraly 2004: 193).

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is the atheistic Ajivika sect, which held a philosophy characterised by a belief in determinism and whose precepts and practices would be drawn on by Buddhists and Jains (Basham 2004: 297–298; Eraly 2005: 185). Arthashastra It was during the same phase in history that saw the rise of the first empires that treatises on rajniti—the science of statehood and polity— were written. The most widely celebrated was the Arthashastra (Tanham 1992: 34). This manual on statecraft was written by the Brahman Kautilya, advisor to the first Mauryan emperor, Chandragupta. The approach taken in his mandala model of geopolitics is ‘ultrarealist’ (Cohen 2001: 41; Jones 2006: 21; Rangarajan 1992). It downplays certain ideals and values, in favour of an overriding objective of the sovereign acquiring and maintaining power (Cohen 2001: 201; Modelski 1964: 549–560). Kautilya, however, accepted that the nature of Indian society had implications for his strategic advice (Zaman 2009: 72). Kautilya’s work embodies much Indian social and political thought around the fourth century BC (Cohen 2001: 9) and has been cited by students of Indian foreign policy (Tanham 1992: 34). In line with the aforementioned relative non-violence of the Mauryan empire, the Arthashastra suggests that weak rulers should submit sovereignty and voluntarily render homage to their stronger neighbours (Fukuyama 2011: 179). Despite this, the Arthashastra’s realist values did not permeate through society to leave a lasting impact on Indian culture. Bajpai (2002: 250) states it would be difficult to show that the Arthashastra’s tenets were widely known historically in India and that it does not have the status that Western or Chinese military classics have in their respective cultures. Generally, there is little to suggest that ancient strategy texts are more likely to influence present-day foreign policy than cultural values that have been broadly prominent throughout history and influence the value-systems maintained by leaders. While the Arthashastra may be a work of statecraft which itself is a product of the existing sociocultural values, it does not necessarily reflect prominent cultural values. When leaders cite the Arthashastra to justify their positions (Tanham 1992: 34), they are drawing on an important part of Indian history, but not necessarily on India’s prominent cultural values (Cohen 2001: 42). Furthermore, their very use of the Arthashastra

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for policymaking and for publicly justifying policy decisions is itself partly resultant of deeper, baser values like hierarchy and rationality. As such, this study will not undertake an in-depth analysis of the Arthashastra. More Recent Influences Following the formative stage, India was subject to several external influences which affected the constitution of its cultural values. This included interaction with Islamic cultures in the medieval period and Western culture during modernity. Islam Islam influenced Indian culture to some degree, given its political dominance of much of India from the Turko-Afghan conquest in the eleventh century up to the colonial period. Many Indians converted to Islam during this time (Basham 2004: 481). The culture of the Islamic conquerors was one based in Arab heritage, having absorbed aspects of the preceding civilisations of the Middle East, namely Persia, Egypt and remnants of Greco-Roman civilisation (Chopra et al. 2003: 6). The interaction of the Islamic invaders’ culture and that of the existing Hindu society is qualitatively different to the cultural interaction that had occurred during previous incursions by the Greeks, Kushans, Scythians and others. While the former had been absorbed into Hindu culture and society, this was more difficult with the Muslims due to the nature of their monotheistic religion. The Turko-Afghans’ Islamic culture brought with it strong values with regard to social structure, philosophy and law (Chopra et al. 1974: 28–29). Despite this, Islam and its values evolved into something more akin to the pre-existing Indian culture while in India. While the conquerors may not have been completely ‘conquered’, as had occurred with the Greeks and others, India made its imprint on the conquerors’ religion. This was partly a result of large numbers of lower class and lower caste people converting to Islam while continuing to practise their own customs and beliefs (Chopra et al. 1974: 76). While this meant that Islam did not significantly alter the constitution of India’s most prominent values, it infused novel ideas that shaped existing values to some extent. Much of this occurred through the Sufi mystic orders, due to their ability to attract the masses and communicate with Hindu society. According to Chopra et al. (1974: 76) several orders,

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such as the Chishti and Suhrawadi, tried to bring Muslim and Hindu communities closer and thereby attracted a large number of converts. The Chishti Order understood Indian conditions, and the religious views and aspirations of the people. It made an effort to resemble Hindu and Buddhist practices, with its leaders conforming to vegetarianism, and embracing poverty (Chopra et al. 1974: 77–78). The Chishtis held liberal and pluralistic values, recognising that there were many paths to God. The Order’s founder took a pantheistic approach. All this endeared the Chishti Order to the local population and increased converts (Chopra et al. 1974: 77–78). Equality The value of equality was a key characteristic of Islam and attracted huge numbers of lower caste and outcaste Hindus into the fold, particularly in Bengal (Chopra et al. 1974: 29; Momin 1996: 290). Compared to hierarchical Hinduism, in which these groups were looked down upon, barred from entry to temples, forbidden to read the scriptures, and sometimes seen as untouchable, the Islam offered by the mystics entailed less discrimination. Within the Sufi gathering places or khanqahs, everyone worked, dined and slept together (Chopra et al. 1974: 29). Restrictions on marriages and inter-dining were seen as ‘repugnant’ (Chopra et al. 1974: 29) to Islam’s teachings which permitted almost free marriage with no restrictions. Islam’s egalitarian ethos, however, is unlikely to have directly penetrated the values of those unlikely to convert, namely those in the higher rungs of Hindu society. The ideal of brotherhood and theoretical equality among its adherents was in stark contrast to the prominence in Hinduism of the caste hierarchy (Chopra et al. 1974: 29). Chopra et al.’s (1974: 31–75) detailed compilation of various aspects of social life during Islamic rule in India reveal clear differences between Muslim and Hindu customs, suggesting separate lives of the two communities. This may have further decreased the impact of Islamic values like equality on those who did not convert. With regard to present-day India, this influence is even less as the majority of the custodians of Indian Islam are now living in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Like Buddhism had done earlier, Islam perhaps made its most lasting impact on Indian culture indirectly, via developments occurring in Hinduism at the time. Ideals and precepts of Sufism influenced the thinking of Hindu reformers who would lead the Bhakti movement

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(Momin 1996: 290; Chopra et al. 1974: 85, 87). Bhakti leaders were attracted to the Sufi belief that the path of devotion was superior to rituals, pilgrimages, fasts, books of knowledge and wisdom. Entwined with this placing of simple faith above religious ceremonies, was the belief that all true devotees are equal. Religion was to be made more accessible to the common people (Chopra et al. 1974: 85, 87). Chopra et al. (1974: 85) reason that this thinking is likely to have contributed to the leaders of the Bhakti movement not being of the ‘upper stratum of society’. Chopra et al. (1974: 86–87) argue that while the anti-caste movements of Hinduism at this time did not originate from Islam, they were revived and strengthened by it. Tolerance While tolerance was already deeply embedded in Indian culture, the Sufis gave it their own monotheistic slant (Gabbay 2010). They stressed a unity between different religions. Sufi poet Amir Khusrau observes ‘though [the] Hindu is not faithful like me; he often believes in the same God as I do’ (Chopra et al. 1974: 84–85; Gabbay 2010). This broad and cosmopolitan approach helped pave the way for rapprochement at all levels, social and ideological, between Hindus and Muslims (Gabbay 2010). Sufis adopted Hindu terms in order to have a common medium for dialogue, thus giving birth to the Urdu language (Chopra et al. 1974: 85). The motivation for these tolerant attitudes is questioned by some who contend it was clearly aimed at facilitating conversion towards Islam (Vanina 1996: 8; Alam 1989: 41–47). However, this does not negate the fact that tolerance was still held up overtly as an ideal. Islamic ideals of tolerance arguably had their greatest impact through the rule of history’s most renowned Mughal emperor, Akbar. Akbar made unequivocal pronouncements of religious tolerance, stating ‘no man should be interfered with on account of religion, and anyone is to be allowed to go over to a religion that pleases him’ (Smith 1917: 257). While Akbar’s tolerant views and policies may have been influenced by the pre-existing Hindu culture, he was still considered a ‘proper Muslim’ (Khan 1997: 78). Akbar’s policies helped ensure that the existing tolerant, secularist and pluralistic ideals would continue their presence in Indian culture into the present-day. This was in part because of his development of a theory of the state, despite this having been borrowed from earlier Indian ideas of the divine origin of royal power (Vanina 1996: 39).

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He insisted that the state should be impartial to different religions, laying the formal foundations of the religious neutrality of the modern Indian state, including its secular legal structure. Akbar arranged intercommunity dialogue involving various religious people and atheists. This entailed an acceptance of plurality at the onset (Sen 2005: 39). He eliminated the taxes placed on non-Muslims. Akbar filled his court with non-Muslim intellectuals and artists, appointing a former Hindu king as the commander of his army (Chopra et al. 1974: 28–85; Sen 2005: 39). Tolerance and pluralism were prominent in Indian culture before Islam and even influenced Islam. However, the union of Islam with Hindu society led to the germination of a particular conception and approach to these values. This was partly via the syncretism which resulted from protracted interaction between Hindus and Muslims over seven centuries (Chopra et al. 1974: 29). It was the first time India had had to contend with a strictly monotheistic religion (Chopra et al. 1974: 28–29). The interaction gave rise to an ‘Indo-Islamic tradition’ (Momin 1996: 290) which encompassed art, literature, folklore and names. Sufism’s pluralism has lasted up until today with shrines located across India being thronged by millions and serving as focal points of integration (Jain 1975; Troll 1989). The Bhakti and Sufi saints left a legacy which continues to inspire secularist forces in modern India (Vanina 1996: 192). Even Vanina (1996: 191), a critic who attempts to look overly positively at the influence of liberal thinkers in the medieval period, acknowledges that liberal ideas from this epoch brought about transformation and development that lasted for centuries. Beyond shaping tolerance and pluralism, interaction with Islam also strengthened these values. Sen (2005: 18, 59–61) argues that while tolerance, pluralism and secularism existed before Akbar, his championing gave a ‘tremendous boost’ to secularist politics in India. Momin (1996: 290) argues that the ‘creative synthesis of Hindu and Islamic civilizations…represents the zenith of India’s composite tradition’. Islam also brought values of righteousness, which can be seen as sometimes contradictory to tolerance and pluralism. According to Chopra et al. (1974: 85) the high moral standards set by the Sufis impacted the general Indian population beyond converts. Sufis raised their voices on social matters such as slavery, drinking and gambling. At the extreme end of anti-tolerance and anti-pluralism sat a minority of Indian Muslims who gravitated towards Wahhabism under British colonialism (discussed later). Allen (2005: 87) contends that Islamic

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fundamentalism in India had long been under-recognised by British colonial rulers. Syed Ahmad Bareili began a holy war against the Sikhs in 1824 to restore Punjab to Muslim rule. Allen (2005: 87–88) argues Ahmad was indoctrinated into Wahabbi values within India itself, rather than during a pilgrimage to Mecca. Ahmad was a student of Shah Abdul Aziz, who was son of Shah Waliullah of Delhi. Waliullah while known largely as a moderniser of Islam within India, learnt at the same school in Arabia as Wahhabism founder, Abd al-Wahhab, and sought to expound teachings gained there in India. These involved the novel approaches of interpreting established religious law himself while calling for a ‘return to basics’ (Allen 2005: 88). Waliullah’s son and successor Abdul Aziz proclaimed it was incumbent upon Muslims to restore Islam to India, after the takeover of Delhi by the British. Wahhabism’s influence on Islam was, nevertheless minimal as and even less so for Indian culture overall. Waliullah failed in his attempts to impose his reading of Islam on fellow Indian Muslims, unlike al-Wahhab had in Arabia. As present-day India has a large Muslim population, it is also worth looking at the values that lasted within this community specifically. According to Ahmed (1964), Islam in South Asia holds values of isolationism, self-confidence and conservativeness. He argues the community is deeply conscious of the need for change but distrustful of innovations, accepting of speculation in theory but dreading it in practice, and insular in its contact with other civilisations. Non-violence Many have argued that violence was critical to Mughal ruleThe Princes of the Mughal Empire, most notably under emperor Aurangzeb (Faruqui 2012; Searle-Chatterjee 1993). This included both violence against the indigenous population and violence among the ruling aristocracy (Faruqui 2012). Restraint, however, also characterised the Mughal rulers—in a way in which realists have been unable to explain. Along with tolerance and pluralism, Akbar is noted for his practice of accommodating adversaries instead of using violent force. Despite having military power far superior to rival rulers within India, the Mughals sought to pacify enemies such as the Rajputs and draw them into alliances (Vivekanandan 2011). Vivekanandan (2011) attributes this to strategic interests—namely the need for legitimacy in order to rule. However, the stark difference between Mughal accommodation of rivals and the heavy reliance on force by other empires of the day (Spanish and Portuguese for example)

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suggests more than strategy at play. Like tolerance and pluralism, the Mughal rulers are likely to have absorbed Indian traditions of nonviolence-driven restraint as an end in itself—just as the Greek and Kushan conquerors before them had adopted indigenous traditions. Even if nonviolence was not seen as an end in itself, the value at least impacted and skewed Mughal strategic calculations towards maintaining a perception that accommodation would work better than force. Sikhism In Punjab around the sixteenth century, Guru Nanak attempted to work out a compromise between Islam and Hinduism, protesting the social inequalities of Hinduism (Basham 2005: 481). Historical processes however, led to the birth of the new religious order of Sikhism. Sikhism’s impact did not much alter the cultural values of broader Indian society. This is because of the religion’s similarity to Hinduism in beliefs and values (Singhal 1980: 228). Sikhism drew on the Bhakti school of Nirgun, close to Kabir and Ravidas, and its conception of the value of equality was similar (Vanina 1996: 121). The last human Guru was Guru Gobindh Singh. Singh strongly advocated equality, including between races. His message of equality among castes is thought to be one of the reasons he was attacked by a coalition of hill chieftains (Singh 1998: 10–21). While Guru Nanak professed strict monotheism, rejected rituals and forms of external worship, Hindus look upon the Granth Sahib as a sacred book and visit Sikh shrines, reflecting Hinduism’s aforementioned absorptiveness (Vanina 1996: 121; Singhal 1980: 228). This approach was also held by Guru Gobindh Singh who disregarded idol-worship and belief in ‘futile, arid rituals’ (Singh 1998: 14). Furthermore, Sikhism did not permeate throughout the whole of Indian society, being localised around the Punjab. Its relative recentness has not left it much time to have a significant influence on India’s values beyond those of its followers, in whom it instituted the ideal of equality. The conflict between Sikhs and the Mughals is politically based, due to the growing power of the Gurus being seen as a threat to Mughal rule. The ‘warlike’ reputation of Sikhs popular in present-day India is most likely a result of their political history and not any divergence of core values or ideals away from non-violence (Vanina 1996: 122).

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British Colonial Rule and Western Influence To appreciate the influence of the British on Indian cultural values, the existing social situation of the time must be understood. The post-Mughal ‘disintegration of the political fabric’ (Chopra et al. 1974: 77) had led to social rigidity. India of the eighteenth century was said to be more conservative than it had been at the start of the Muslim invasions (Basham 2004: 483). According to Chopra et al. (1974: 77), there was a growth of ‘irrational’ social practices in the lives of ordinary villagers. This included untouchability and sati (1974: 81, 88). The latter is said to be irrational as it is based on what Muller (1898) claimed was a misinterpretation of the Rig-Veda (Chopra et al. 1974: 89). Relative to other periods, there was less rationality. Religion was characterised by rigidity and a focus on ritualism and purity. While it maintained its internal amorphousness, the various forms of Hinduism all succumbed to idolatry, fetishism, sacrificial rites and sorcery (Chopra et al. 1974: 80). The rigidity of caste separation is said to have reached its highpoint in the eighteenth century, reversing the social ethics and egalitarian gains of the sixteenth century (1974: 80). This hierarchical division still, however, managed to manifest itself in a diversity of views with eighteenth-century French traveller, Tavernier, being astonished by the diversity of opinions and customs among Hindus and citing this as the reason for their subjection by the Mughals (1974: 80). The Muslim ruling class at the time was also instituting religious intolerance in its state policy through oppressive laws. During this time, in the latter part of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, Muslims in the subcontinent detached themselves from the rest of society and withdrew inside an orthodox shell (1974: 80). British colonial dominance had several impacts on the Indian society of the day. The British were ‘far more alien’ to the Indians than the Muslims had been and there were less attempts at social contact (Basham 2004: 483). In part, Hindu society also reacted to the British colonisers by withdrawing itself into its ‘closed circle of ancient traditions’ (Basham 2004: 483). As such, the British influence occurred largely in an indirect fashion. Though the British brought with them an ‘aggressive culture’ and there was a somewhat wholesale adoption of British values by small groups of elites in Bengal and elsewhere, this was far from a nationwide phenomenon (Basham 2004: 484). Great masses of people were not persuaded to take up ‘British values’.

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Rather, India’s culture was impacted through the process of interaction with Western ideas. Sen (2005: 132) argues that the West has influenced India and vice versa, and that the issue of what is Indian and what is Western can only be decided in ‘more dialectic terms’. He states ‘the origin of ideas is not the kind of thing to which ‘purity’ happens easily’ (Sen 2005: 132; Wedeen 2002: 14). A combination of British imposition, and Indian accommodation, resistance, assimilation, antagonism, reaction and reform led to India’s intellectuals looking at their own culture and society with a critical eye (Bowes 1986: 1). This was furthered by interaction with Christian missionaries who were independent of the British East India Company. Christianity failed to attract large numbers in India, especially higher castes and classes who had a strong influence on broader religious practice and values.12 However, the spread of Christian ideas and the missionaries’ ‘crusade’ against Hinduism led Indian society to look closely at its existing values (Chopra et al. 1974: 95–97). The Western impact led to a re-engagement with rationalism among Indian intellectuals. The inquiry led to reform movements such as the Brahmo Samaj (Chopra et al. 1974: 97–108) which drew directly on the Western Enlightenment. The movement was inspired by Ram Mohan Roy, a Western education Bengali (Basham 2004: 484). Roy found no contradictions between the ‘liberty of liberalism’ and the ‘intrinsic values of Hinduism’ (Singhal 1980: 207; Sarma 2000: 69). He emphasised the Upanishads ’ teachings against rituals and rites (Dung 2007). Also of note was the Prarthana Samaj, who were attracted to modern Western ideals and attempted to rationalise Hindu socio-religious habits (Chopra et al. 1974: 97–108). Popular in Northern India was the Arya Samaj, which sought to return to the religious practices of the Vedic Aryans. The movement attempted to re-introduce Hinduism’s absorptiveness. It formed educational institutions which taught not only Vedic studies but also sciences and humanities (Chopra et al. 1974: 97–108, 113–115). However, Vanina (1996: 190) points out that these modern reformers could not have appreciated the ‘useful and progressive’ features of Western values without earlier religious reformers in medieval India. Another influential figure was Ramakrishna, who emphasised cosmopolitanism. His disciple, Swami Vivekananda, had a major impact

12 Only certain pockets in the Northeast and South boasted large Christian populations.

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on India’s national awakening, during his life and more so afterwards. He was said to have created an ‘ethical nationalism’ (Chopra et al. 1974: 108– 113). Vivekananda supported values of cosmopolitanism and tolerance, as well as progress and prosperity. He combined rationalism and modern science with ancient wisdom and medieval devotion (Chopra et al. 1974: 108–113). Vivekananda prioritised direct personal experience ‘samadhi’ over scripture ‘sruti’, a diversion from Shankara (Rambachan 1994). The individuality of personal experience and resultant diversity further underline the continuation of pluralism and tolerance in Indian philosophy. One of the most distinct contributions to the evolution of spiritual ideas in twentieth-century India was from Sri Aurobindo (Chopra et al. 1974: 137–138). Aurobindo discussed transcendence of the mind to higher planes of consciousness, but always defended his ideas through logic, not wanting his philosophy classified as ‘religion’ (Heehs 2008: 277). Part of the revitalisation of rationalism was due to the direct influence of Indians receiving a Western education. Western education and learning English became essential for middle class Indians who wanted their children to obtain government employment (Basham 2004: 484). India’s Muslims also reacted to interaction with the West through internal reform movements. Syed Ahmad adopted the Wahhabi conception of jihad and began a military campaign against the British, but was defeated and Wahhabism effectively suppressed. The Ahmadiya movement, in contrast, adopted a cosmopolitan approach and rationalist values (Chopra et al. 1974: 123–125). Another major imprint of the interaction with British colonialism was on the somewhat antagonistic values of hierarchy and equality. This occurred both directly and indirectly. Similar to the Greeks and Kushans in ancient times, the British invaders themselves adopted Indian cultural values of hierarchy and social stratification to a certain degree. The Indians saw the British as a lowly caste which had managed to wrest political power, and were not worth interacting with, while the British saw themselves as so exalted above Indians that friendly association was frowned upon (Basham 2004: 483). Colonial rule of India, both at the time and in its legacy, served to strengthen the hierarchical worldview. It energised both this worldview’s components: that the world was arranged into a hierarchy; and that India should be at the top of it. Institutionalised memories of colonialism have been cited as a tool for understanding Indian foreign policy (Miller 2013).

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Despite this, Western Enlightenment ideas of equality managed to permeate through Indian society at the elite levels, reigniting those egalitarian traditions that had been seen in Buddhism and Jainism in ancient times, and the Bhakti movement and Islam in medieval times. This largely occurred in reaction to the material and psychological subjugation of India by the British (Singhal 1980: 229). Western classificational dichotomies towards India which were used to justify colonialism, also created an external identity of India that was childlike, inferior, irrational, feminine, other worldly and mired in mythology (Birch et al. 2001: 9–13, 101). Indians identified with the oppressed and colonised people of the world. This had major impacts post-independence on early foreign policy. Zinkin (1955: 193) notes Indians’ identification with the Bolsheviks in the Russian revolution. She adds that in the early years of independence, India’s entire attitude towards foreign policy was tinged by anti-colonialism. Colonialism combined with pre-existing values of hierarchy to strengthen a preference that India should be at the top of the global hierarchy of states that would find expression post-independence. Delhi’s opposition to international structures and foreign state policies that maintain Western dominance was driven not only by the view that other countries should not be subjugated or dominated by the West. Offence at the fact that the West dominated/dominates others is sharpened because India, which should be a great power, was also dominated. Today, Delhi’s preference for a multipolar world order is driven both by an opposition to Western domination and also a preference that India be one of the new powerful ‘poles’ in such an order. More than installing any new cultural values, changes instituted by the British led to the strengthening, revival and spread of certain values and the decline of others. The British altered conceptions of pluralism through the instituting of legal and political systems. The use of legislation nationwide to standardise behaviour in certain ways led to some diminishing of pluralist ways of imagining society. With the support of local activists, the British administrators used legislation to oppose certain cultural practices which presented an extreme affront to their values (Chopra et al. 1974: 126–137). These included sati in certain regions, infanticide in the North and Northwest, and human sacrifice in the hill tracts of Orissa (Chopra et al. 1974: 126–133). The eradication of practices would have had an indirect impact. Over time, what was seen as acceptable by certain segments of the Indian population was altered, reducing pluralism.

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Present-Day and Relevance to Foreign Policy Assessing India’s history identified the cultural values of tolerance, pluralism, non-violence, rationalism and hierarchy as prominent. For these values to be worth examining, however, they must be prominent in present-day India and of relevance to foreign policy. Diverse Culture India has a diverse and ‘highly differentiated culture’ (Brodersen 1957: 468). There are innumerable subcultures—both real and ideal—which are reflective of differences in geography, religion, age, ethnicity, class and caste, among other things. Even in less diverse states, there has been significant difficulty in attempts to identify a uniform set of values and beliefs for a whole society. The ‘national character’ (Gray 1988: 42) studies undertaken during World War II and the Cold War have been criticised for not having been effective when looking at highly differentiated cultures (Nett, Brodersen and Almond in Chay 1990: 91). Despite these divisions, there remains a set of prominent cultural values in India. This is partly because of the culturally integrating processes which began in medieval times, were accentuated under Islamic and British rule, and then furthered under Indian nationalism and nationbuilding (Subramaniam 1979: 7–8, 46). Momin (1996: 293) delineates five interrelated processes for pan-Indian cultural integration: Sanskritic Hinduism; a composite cultural tradition; patriotism and nascent nationalism; the secular–democratic ethos of modern India and the countrywide process of modernisation. He adds that acculturation and integration also occurred at the regional levels. Rabindranath Tagore (1921) argued against the idea of India as merely the sum of separate and alienated cultures. The government of newly independent India displayed its support for this unity of cultural heritage through choosing distinctly cultural symbols for its two most important items—the flag and the national emblem. The former displays at its centre the Buddhist Dhamma Wheel, as represented in the ‘Ashoka Chakra’. The latter consists of the ‘Sarnath Lion Capital of Ashoka’. The impact of any differences between religious values is negated by the fact that a significant majority of the population follow Hinduism, and Hinduism itself has been influenced by major religious traditions that have existed in Indian history, including the next most populous religion,

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Islam. Singh (2002: 96–101) adds that interaction, exchange and integration often characterise inter-community relations in India with ‘cultural traits’ and a common ethos cutting ‘across religions and sectarian differences’ and binding the local people together. Similar sentiments were held by Tagore who admitted he was the result of Hindu, Muslim and British cultures (Sen 2005).13 Elite Values Most of the prominent values in present-day India are those held by the elite. Elites can be defined as a powerful and politically influential segment of the ‘attentive public as opposed to the general public’ (Almond 1960; Johnston 2004: 604; Ganguly 2003). They are not restricted to the political class, and may include influential economic classes, castes, political institutions, political parties and pressure groups. They elevate their preferred values to prominence through these or other avenues. The values held by elites can be considered worthy of examination because it is elite values that are most likely to influence India’s leaders (AkgulAcikmese 2011: 73), compared with the other ‘power nodes’ (culturally influential segments of Indian society) (Hudson and Sampson 1999: 672). States’ strategic preferences are said to be partly rooted in the cultural, cognitive, philosophical and political characteristics of its elites (Johnston 1995: 1, 34). Elite influence is, however, mitigated by electoral calculation and need for democratic legitimacy. Elites have greater influence on foreign policy than the rest of society (Cohen 2001). India’s foreign policy is largely ‘elite-driven’, similar to its strategic culture (Jones 2006: 8). While the Almond-Lippmann consensus (Holsti 1992) of downplaying the impact of the mass public on foreign policy has been discredited in several ways in relation to the US, it still has some applicability to India’s highly stratified society. Furthermore, leaders themselves are likely to come from the elite demographic. Neoclassical realists Lobell et al. (2009) highlight leaders’/elites’ perceptions as one of the important domestic factors impacting world politics.

13 Furthermore, the previous section’s discussion of the major religious\sectarian influences in history highlighted those values that remained dominant until the present-day. This encompasses any significant differences between the present-day religious\sectarian groups, as they too are products of historical influence.

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National Identity Another key indicator of a value’s prominence in present-day India is that it is part of the national identity. India has a delineable national identity which exists in relation to the external world. Values which are important to this identity are usually those which help a state stand apart from other states. Two major streams have fed into present-day India’s national identity. Both of these are rooted in a single, though broad, civilisational framework (Momin 1996: 295). One stream is constituted by a set of views delineated by the dominant strands of the independence movement and Gandhi, and carried into the post-independence period by Nehru. The other is a set of views which have arisen to challenge this long dominant notion in the last two decades, reaching its zenith in some respects under Prime Minister Modi—the Hindutva movement. Despite this challenge however, both streams, to a large extent, accepted the same set of cultural values for India’s national identity. In later chapters, we will examine the Modi Government’s foreign policy for cultural values’ influence. The study, however will not discuss this government as a source for shaping India’s values due to several reasons. Firstly, it was only elected in 2014 and most of the case study period is prior to that. Secondly, the recency of the Modi Government’s impact on shaping or creating the deep-seated and prominent social values, means it can only be properly assessed in years to come. Finally, it is difficult to apply the same analytical lens to the current government’s 6 year-rule as it is the thousands of years of cultural history, or at least decades of influence of Nehruvian or pre-Modi Hindutva politics, that this chapter explores. Nationalist Movement The first stream starts with the nationalist movement and the experience of colonialism (Zinkin 1955: 181). It was here that many of the cultural values described previously were incorporated into a newly forming identity for a modern nation-state among other nation-states. The senses of identity expounded by various segments of the nationalist movement were influenced by a continuation of the previously discussed prominent cultural values, combined with a reaction to the West (Muppidi 2004: 85). Muppidi (2004: 85) argues that certain policy practices of Indian

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leaders today are still ‘within the parameters of a postcolonial Indian identity dominated by concerns about colonialism’. Perhaps the most important shaper of India’s national identity during its formation was Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi held true to many of the dominant values of Hinduism and Buddhism, religions which he felt were inextricably linked (Anand 2004: 1). Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first PM, also made a significant contribution to India’s identity pre and post-independence. He was the most important figure in laying the foundation of India’s foreign policy. Nehru had a free hand in foreign policy partly because India was not attached to any international alliance and had no past international treaties to honour (Levi 1951: 50; Zinkin 1955: 179–180). He also had more interest and expertise in international relations than his peers (Hall 2019: 11). Nehru’s values and broad views on India’s foreign policy were largely shared by the first generation of the country’s leaders. His impact on foreign policy continued after the post-independence period due to a combination of successors who were either unskilled at foreign policy or were ‘Nehruvian’ in outlook themselves (Cohen 2001: 37). Rationalism The tradition of valuing rational thinking spans across India’s history and its present-day diversity (Cohen 2001: 9; Sen 2005: 343). This was reflected in the World Values Survey (Inglehart and Welzel 2010). The rationalism of Buddhism, Hinduism’s Upanishads and other traditions are unrivalled within world religions. Despite this, the value is not of central importance to national identity and therefore will not be examined in relation to foreign policy.14 This is partly due to Indian elites reflecting Western conceptions of India. The formation of national identity during the independence struggle was influenced by conceptions of how India was perceived by the West (Sen 2005: 139–140). This is due in part to a degree of deference to what is valued in the West, stretching from colonial times (Sen 2005: 140). Sen (2005: 141–154) suggests two ways in which the West sees India’s intellectual traditions: the exoticist, putting Indian spirituality on a pedestal; and the magisterial, seeing India as subordinate and downplaying Indian rationality. As a result, traditions in maths, science, logic, 14 The value of fatalism will also not be chosen, due to this reason.

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medicine and epistemology are not part of the broader Western imagery of India (Said 1978: 5). These Western conceptions led to Indian elites themselves failing to give due regard to the value of rationalism, while acknowledging more the anti-rational aspects of Indian culture. According to Chatterjee (1993: 6), the nationalist movement created a division between the material and spiritual worlds. The former was where the West was seen as strong and therefore had to be copied, while the latter was where Indian culture was strong, so it had to be preserved. Sen (2005: 139–140) argues that even reactions to Western conceptions which aim to take a more ‘Indian’ approach to Indian culture, end up in a similar place—overemphasising cultural differences and Indian particularism. This downplaying is compounded by rationalism being ubiquitous in the contemporary international system. It even less important to Indian national identity because it is seen as a value found commonly among all modern states.

Non-violence Non-violence is a value that is highly relevant to national identity. Johnston’s (2004: 622) study of Chinese attitudes towards international affairs looks at the degree to which Chinese citizens thought of their own people as ‘peace-like’ or ‘war-like’ in relation to Americans. In contrast to rationalism, non-violence became entrenched in India’s national identity. Thanks to Gandhi and the independence movement more broadly, non-violence was raised to new levels of political importance, not seen since Ashoka. In defining themselves in relation to the British, India’s independence leaders saw non-violence as part of their nation’s identity. It became enshrined as the defining characteristic of the Indian independence movement globally, and remained a key cultural value in national identity after independence. Those like Bhagat Singh who advocated violent overthrow of the British were the exception, not the norm. Singh was inspired by European revolutionary ideology including Marxism and anarchy. In mourning the execution of Singh, Congress dissociated itself from political violence ‘in any shape or form’ (‘Naked to Buckingham Palace’, 1931, Time, 6 April). Ahimsa or

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non-violence is what Gandhi was of course most widely known for propagating. He espoused non-violence even if it contradicted the teachings within various the religions he revered as a pluralist (Gandhi 1937). Non-violence also came to characterise Hinduism and Indian culture, impacting India’s image to foreign audiences, which then reinforced this identity among India’s leaders. Today, non-expert foreign audiences are much more likely to associate Hinduism with Gandhi’s non-violence than with the war-like image of the Vedic Aryans painted by historians (Basham 2004; Eraly 2005). Partly influencing this non-violent national identity was the British and Western views of India as feminine and Indians as effeminate. This had made its way into Indians’ self-conceptions (Sinha 1995; Birch et al. 2001: 7). Despite his agnosticism, Nehru’s values were derived partly from his social background in the upper echelons of Hindu society, as a high caste, Kashmiri pandit. Non-violence was a keystone of his value system and this can be witnessed in the almost obsessive preoccupation with maintaining or achieving peace, found in his policies and pronouncements (Nehru 1961; Zinkin 1955: 184–206). India’s Constitution, when discussing foreign policy, reflected the United Nations Charter in its fixation on peace. It directs Indian governments to ‘endeavour’ to ‘promote international peace and security’, ‘foster respect for international law and treaty obligations’ and encourage the settlement of disputes by arbitration (Constitution of India 1950; Hall 2019: 11). Ambassador Gupta stated that under Nehru, India was wary of even the idea of a standing army (2017). Pancha-sila/Panchsheel or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Republic of India and People’s Republic of China 1954) underpinned Nehru’s foreign policy. These principles were directly drawn from Buddhist values of non-violence. During Nehru’s time the valuing non-violence pervaded the engine rooms of Indian foreign policy. Indian diplomats and policymakers differentiated themselves against their American counterparts, in part to through seeing the latter as violent (Rotter 2000). Hierarchy As a reformer, one of Gandhi’s more radical cultural imprints was in relation to the values of hierarchy and equality. Inspired by Buddhism and

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other cultural traditions, Gandhi (1937) campaigned against untouchability—the most extreme manifestation of the value of hierarchy. He emphasised an egalitarian social order (Basham 2004: 485). Gandhi’s efforts, while having some impact, like Buddhism and Islam in earlier times, failed to dislodge hierarchy as a prominent and deeply entrenched value. This was the case both in practice and in terms of ideals. The product of a Western education, Nehru was heavily influenced by humanist Enlightenment values. He was most attracted to the values found in socialism, which he saw not only as a scientific economic doctrine, but also as a philosophy of life (Bose and Jalal 1998: 157). Key among socialism’s values was equality. This formed a basis for Nehru’s economic and social policies. He aimed to forge an alliance between the anti-colonial movement and progressive social forces in India and Britain. Nehru aimed to synthesise the ‘humanistic values, ideals and the scientific spirit of the West, with the wisdom and enduring cultural traditions of the East’ (Joshi 1983: 2130). He made a sharp distinction between two Indias, one of the saints and sages like Buddha and their messages of brotherhood and equality, and the India of caste (Joshi 1983: 2128). Nehru saw India’s struggle for cultural regeneration as not only against colonialist forces in Britain, but also against caste-ism and communalism at home (Joshi 1983: 2130). While Nehru’s Fabian socialism had economic equality as an objective and aimed for the upliftment of the masses in a broad sense, it also fit in well with the traditional hierarchy of the caste system. The caste system’s ‘intention’ at least as generally understood, was to preserve inequality of status rather than, necessarily, inequality of economic means. As such, it was not necessarily incompatible, at least in a practical sense if not ideologically, with India’s mild form of socialism. The Fabian preference for state ownership and bureaucratic leadership, sat well with the Brahmans, reinforcing their higher status in relation to the merchant castes (Richardson 2002: 26). Hindu society’s hierarchical system can be said to have contributed, at least in part, to independent India’s selection of a top-down economic development model focusing on ‘central planning, an expansive public sector and overbearing regulation’ (Richardson 2002: 26). The Fabian approach also denied oxygen to any ideas of violent or extreme left revolution by the very downtrodden. Having said this, independence also saw the most extreme manifestation of the value of hierarchy blunted with the banning of untouchability (Chopra et al. 1974: 136). Cohen (2001: 21) argues that while the caste

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system has always been evolving, its rate of change has accelerated over the past century, partly due to state intervention and partly due to the reality of India’s democratic system. Tolerance and Pluralism The values of pluralism and tolerance were also strengthened in the formation of India’s national identity. Rajan (2011: 67) argues that while tolerance was seen as a ‘constitutive or perennial aspect of Hinduism’s religious tradition’, its prominence in Hinduism’s ‘self-description’ is more recent and occurred during independence. What Rajan (2011: 67) describes as Hinduism’s ‘self-description’ is closely aligned with India’s national identity. Echoing Ashoka and Akbar, Gandhi expounded tolerance, arguing that ‘preservation of one’s own culture does not mean contempt for that of others, but requires assimilation of the best…in all the other cultures’ (Raghavan 1987: 451). Religious and spiritual quests did not need to be tied to a communal identity (Gandhi 1937). Gandhi’s (1937) take on Hinduism emphasised its pluralist underpinnings, arguing that ‘there is in Hinduism room enough for Jesus as there is for Mohammed, Zoroaster and Moses’. Gandhi (1937) held an outlook of ‘enlarged pluralism’ on a global scale which he felt was enabled by his emphasis of never rejecting other traditions of thought in the search for truth. The centrality of tolerance to India’s national identity is partly due to its expression in secular policies. In turn, India’s particular take on secularism, was in the past and is now, resultant from the cultural value of tolerance—something not necessarily the case when considering the idea of secularism in its European, modernist setting. Nandy (1995: 36) argues that India has a distinct conception of secularism. This sees it as more closely aligned to the value of tolerance than the standard Western experience. Rather than emphasising a separation of the religious from the political, the Indian conception emphasises respecting all beliefs. Akbar, for instance, refused to ban all religious rituals, despite not favouring any himself (Sen 2005: 287). It can be argued that it is the all-pervading undercurrent of tolerance that has allowed a civilisation in which religion has been so central, to form a secular nation-state (Sen 2005: 69). During this formation, ‘Indian secularism’ was seen as an aspect of Hindu tolerance (Rajan 2011: 67). Nehru was an agnostic and had a strong belief in the need for a secular

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society. The secularist beliefs of Nehru, Tagore and Gandhi, can be argued to have come partly from the long history of pro-secular rulers in India, from Ashoka to Akbar (Sen 2005: 287). While Gandhi’s Hindu identity was more assertive than his contemporary, Tagore, both still favoured secularism and refused to privilege one narrow religious perspective when interpreting Indian identity (Sen 2005: 348–350). All of India’s nation builders, including those with views as far apart as Tagore and Gandhi, held a consensus when it came to accepting that tolerance straddled the diversity of the country (Sen 2005: 49, 348– 349). Even the then Indian founders of Pakistan envisioned a Muslim majority state where Hindus, Sikhs and Christians could live as ‘contented minorities’ (Cohen 2001: 205). Nehru’s tolerance extended to the international realm. As mentioned, the foremost basis of his foreign policy was Pancha-sila or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Pancha-sila left a strong mark on India’s national identity. Some argue it has acquired even greater ideological weight in the Indian worldview since then (Singh 2005). The concept of Panchasila was directly drawn from Buddhism’s five precepts which included tolerance and pluralism, in addition to non-violence (Republic of India and People’s Republic of China 1954). Nehru stated that India respected other states’ views and chose its own path (1961: 102). Pancha-sila principles were first codified in India’s treaty with China in 1954 (Republic of India and People’s Republic of China 1954). Nehru’s approach to China was that the country should be able to choose its own political system, despite it not being a system favoured India (Zinkin 1955: 183). India’s constitution, an important artefact of national identity, provides further evidence of the importance placed on tolerance and pluralism by independence leaders. It also demonstrates leaders’ beliefs that these values were important to the Indian people and their confidence that the people could share an national identity without having to share a religious identity (Sen 2005: 353). Sen (2005: 309) cites that the framers of the Indian constitution wanted to give appropriate recognition to the extensive religious pluralism of the Indian people. They did not want the notion of ‘Indianness’ derived from any specific religious identity. Ambedkar, chairman of the constitution’s drafting committee, stated that ‘if the Muslims of India are a separate nation, then, of course, India is not a nation’ (Devji 1992). While there is no perfect harmony between the values enshrined in the constitution and the whole corpus of Indian

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tradition (Momin 1996: 298) the constitution and its laws have in turn further strengthened tolerance and pluralism in Indian culture. Tolerance is a prominent value among India’s elites, noting that India’s elite society extends beyond the current political leadership that receives international media coverage. This is seen in their approach to opposing views. During the height of the Cold War, the views of India’s political elite ranged from urging greater partnership with the US, to aligning with the USSR and everything in between (Nehru 1961; Levi 1951: 50). This in turn exerts influence on the justifications, range of options available, and objectives of different actors in Indian foreign policy (Elkins and Simeon 1979: 143). One of India’s staunchest anti-communist politicians demonstrated the relevance of tolerance to conceptions of Indian identity when, in a private comment, he implicitly criticised America’s denial of the right of other peoples to self-determination even if it is under communism, arguing that Indians are more ‘democratic’ because they allow this right (Zinkin 1955: 200). Tolerance in the political realm has led to the liberal central government allowing the repeated popular election of communist state governments in West Bengal and Kerala. Hindutva More recently, the Hindutva movement has had some impact on the values of tolerance and pluralism in India’s national identity. Hindutva’s core beliefs consist of a view that India is a Hindu nation, with all ‘culture, civilization and life’ owing a debt to Hinduism (Goyal 2000: 17– 18; Golwalkar 1996). This has, at times been expanded to include other indigenous religious like Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism. Compared to the Nehruvian identity, the Hindutva approach is more characterised by a conscious elevation of Indian culture and values as a basis for identity which then influences foreign policy, rather than values directly driving policy. Indian values and identity are labelled as belonging to the Hindu religion. The Hindutva ideology is propagated by a broad umbrella group of organisations known as the Sangh Parivar, which includes both national political parties and grassroots movements (e.g. the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS]). While there is only a small hardcore of Hindutva ideologues, it is surrounded by what Sen (2005: 53) labels ‘proto-Hindutva enthusiasts’—those who see Hinduism as deserving pre-eminence in India.

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The movement gathered strength with the electoral success of the BJP in 1996 and 1998. Sen (2005: 51) states that recent decades saw Hindutva come to challenge the broad, inclusive, spacious and tolerant identity of India that had ‘commanded sweeping allegiance’ postindependence. Then under Modi, the party saw its two biggest election wins: in 2014 with 52% of the Lok Sabha seats and its first outright majority, and in 2019 a thumping majority of 56% of seats. By cordoning off and strengthening identity defined by the Hindu religion, the Hindutva movement’s practice is at odds with pluralism and tolerance. It has been accused of religio-cultural chauvinism. Momin (1996: 296) argues that Hindutva ideology presents an ‘over-simplified and distorted’ picture of an ‘otherwise amorphous and pluralistic Hindu ethos’. He states Hindutva’s identification of Hinduism with nationalism is xenophobic, exclusivist, at variance with ‘the spirit of Indian civilization’. Hindutva ideology rejects what it deems as foreign (Sen 2005: 131). Non-indigenous religions are alien and deserve subordinate national status. The Hindutva movement has attempted to ‘rewrite history’, including denial of Vedic Hinduism’s foreign origins (Sen 2005: 62–63; Friese 2002). This has involved altering school text-books and pressure against historians (Sen 2005: 62–63; Friese 2002). The frame of action within which Hindutva operates is itself, ironically, sourced from the colonisers who sought to oppress India’s Hindu population. It is rooted in what postcolonial theorists may refer to as mimicry (Pyper 2014: 170). Both Indian nationalism and Hindu nationalism emerged in resistance to cultural and economic imperialism. Pyper (2014: 170) asserts that the latter owes much to the Christian Bible’s model of nationhood and its unifying of land, people and language. Indian defenders of the Vedas had to define their authority and value in a way in which the British colonialist proponents of the Bible would recognise (ibid.: 181). King (1999: 103) even proposes that ‘Hinduism’ as we know it today is a modern construct, shaped by colonialism. Brahmins accepted the Western modernist understanding of Hinduism as it preferenced their brand of spirituality. Indians searching for a national identity post-Mughal rule that could compete with British imperialism also welcomed the idea of a unitary Hinduism (Stietencron 1989: 14–15). Swami Dayananda took a particularly ‘Christian’ approach: arguing in his Satyarth Prakash that the Vedic texts are exclusively the word of God, making harsh critiques of the Bible and Koran, even being compared to Voltaire (Dayandanda Sarasvati translated by Bharadwaja 1915; Pyper 2014: 182).

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The movement has also faced criticism for being restrictive, even within Hinduism. Hindutva’s ‘essentialised’ concept of Hindu culture appears to be in line with highly Brahmanical conceptions of culture and society, ignoring the long-term struggles against Brahmanic elitism within Hinduism (Washbrook 2008: 153). For much of the RSS’s life these conceptions were reflected in its high caste leadership and largely North Indian appeal; however, this changed by the early 1990s (Guha 2007: 648).15 The rise of Hindutva, however, had not until recent years, significantly weakened the dominance of the values of tolerance and pluralism in India’s national identity, particularly in the minds of foreign policymakers. Firstly, the Hindutva ideology and movement is more focused on strengthening Hindu identities, rather than reframing the basic cultural values of Hinduism. While they themselves may not support tolerance in practice, most Hindutva leaders acknowledge a national identity of India as tolerant, both in the past and present (Rajan 2011: 68). The most extreme Hindutva ideologues have portrayed this in a negative light, with outsiders taking advantage of this tolerance and Hinduism being oppressed (Golwalkar 1996). They believe the history of India consists of the struggle of Hindus to preserve their culture against the onslaught of these aliens. The mission of the Sangh is to support unity and consolidation of Hindus (Goyal 2000: 17–18; Golwalkar 1996). They do not, however, question tolerance as a key value in Indian culture. Even hardcore activists do not advocate for the violent subjugation of other religions. Communal violence is usually carried out by lower class groups riled up by opportunists, rather than the middle classes which drive the Hindutva movement. While these mobs are riled up by Hindutva ideologues, they are usually also motivated by economic factors. More moderate Hindutva advocates highlight tolerance as a cultural value that is central to Hinduism and important to national identity (Swamy 2009). Some claim that while Hindutva may not be seen by all as true to Hinduism’s core values, it is inoffensive because Hinduism itself supports plurality and tolerance of divergent paths to truth (Jones 2006: 4). While challenging state secularism in the Western sense, Hindutva leaders have not completely jettisoned the idea of the secular state (Nandy 1995: 37). 15 Other Sangh Parivar organisations like the Shiv Sena and the VHP were largely drawn from middle castes (Guha 2007: 648).

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Furthermore, Hindutva’s level of overall influence while impacting levels of tolerance and pluralism in society, has not completely undone the ingraining of these values over millennia of culture. Sen (2005: 54–57) argues that most Hindus still do not hold religion as the most important identifier politically. At the height of the first wave in the BJP’s popularity (in 1998), it was only able to get 26% of the total vote (Sen 2005: 51). This occurred immediately after the pivotal economic restructuring which occurred in the early 1990s and it is often in times of great change that a nation questions its core values (Hudson and Sampson 1999: 672). Even this electoral success was based on a number of other factors in addition to Hindutva ideology, such as the BJP’s economic platform which appealed to the middle classes, and various deals made with regional parties. As mentioned above, this is a moving feast and it remains to be seen how the more popular, electorally powerful and assertive Modi Government will shape India’s values. Even the challenges of some of the by-products which Hindutva has played a role in contributing to—communitarianism, parochialism and cultural isolationism—have not managed to dislodge pluralism as first instinct among most Indians. Cohen (2001: 302) argues the balance between elements like pluralism and secularism with nationalism and democracy—as established by India’s first generation of leaders—is deeply rooted in the ‘social and political fabric of the country’ and no government is likely to tip it in another direction. To a small degree, it can be argued that Hindutva has had the effect of strengthening the association of historically prominent cultural values with national identity. This is because Hindutva has revived a sense of national identity more overtly associated with the dominant values of Hinduism. Nandy (1995: 37) discusses how Hindu nationalist leaders have actually attempted to push secularism to its furthest point, by attempting to mitigate the assertiveness of religious minorities ‘who seem less reconciled to the idea of secularism’.

The Chosen Values Through assessing history, present-day India and relevance to foreign policy, a handful of values were identified that justify examination. These are pluralism, tolerance, non-violence and hierarchy. These values also roughly match some of the range of values identified by IR scholars as

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predictors of foreign policy attitudes. Tolerance and pluralism are of relevance to the value of ethnocentrism identified by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987). Hierarchy has been explored by Rathbun (2007). And nonviolence, of course, is of relevance to the ‘morality of warfare’ discussed by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987). While discussed separately here, pluralism and tolerance will be coupled together in case studies where they have largely combined to influence foreign policy. How these values have impacted foreign policy has varied somewhat since independence, as the case studies will demonstrate. Bajpai (2002: 245) identifies three viewpoints that have had varying influences on Indian strategic culture—Nehruvian, neo-liberal and hyperrealist.16 Rather than contradicting the above analysis which identifies a single set of values, each of the three strategic viewpoints constitute a layer sitting atop this one set of values. Under different leaders, different strategic viewpoints may have held greater sway, but they were still subject to influence by the same set of cultural values. The changes would have been in the way values influenced foreign policy. This will be examined in the case studies. Pluralism Pluralism has been prominent throughout Indian history, remains so today, and is relevant to India’s national identity. It shapes motivations, interests and public justifications for foreign policy. I define pluralism in a somewhat similar manner to its definition in Sociology—that the presence of diverse groups, cultural forms and beliefs within a society is accepted as the norm. Momin (1996: 296) asserts that a ‘dialectic or complementary between pluralism and syncretism seems to pervade the fabric of Indian civilization’. He cites India’s heterogeneity, accommodating ethos and composite character, as features which distinguish it from other civilisations and, in their entirety and interrelatedness, constitute its dominant configuration. This is the result of both historical adaptation, and interaction among various groups and India’s pluralist or composite cultural tradition (Momin 1996: 293). Sen (2005: 138) proclaims ‘in our heterogeneity and in our openness lies our pride, not 16 While India’s strategic culture is closely tied to its foreign policy, the two are not the same. Foreign policy encompasses aspects other than the strategic/military and draws on a broader range of cultural influences.

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our disgrace’. He argues for a pluralist understanding of India’s intellectual traditions, both on the rational side and the mystical side (Sen 2005: 159). Deriving from Hinduism, India’s conception of pluralism entails the view that no one way of knowing the truth is superior to another. Indian culture does not adhere to a dichotomous, dualistic or ‘good versus evil’ worldview like much of Western/Abrahamic-rooted cultures (Prithipaul 1993). Hinduism opposes dividing the world into friends and enemies. Zinkin (1955: 208) argues that India’s foreign policy outlook sees the world in shades of grey as opposed to the US, for instance, which takes a more black and white view. This refutes arguments that Indian culture supports ‘just war theory’ in the same way Western culture does, simply because Hindu texts discuss it. The syncretistic and the absorptive traditions of India go back to the arrival of the Vedic Aryans, and have resulted in the value of pluralism having a continuous and strong presence throughout history (Momin 1996: 296). According to Momin (1996: 294), in addition to the Aryanisation mentioned earlier, the process of acculturation that began in ancient India included three other interrelated dimensions: diffusion of cultural traits; miscegenation; and incorporation of regional and foreign beliefs. Regarding the latter, Cohen (2001: 11) cites Indian society’s absorptive power as always having been impressive. This pluralistic and composite ethos was later supplemented by the rise of Buddhism and Jainism, including during the days of great empire under Mauryan rule, and then further reinforced during the early medieval period with the Bhakti Movement (Momin 1996: 296). Unlike in the West’s Abrahamic traditions, the religions (and even the minor sects) of India vary not only in their beliefs, but also have completely different ontologies (Subramaniam 1979: 135; Basham 2004; Thapar 2002; Eraly 2005; Sen 2005). The legal foundations of modern India’s pluralism can be seen as having been laid out by Akbar during the Mughal period (Sen 2005: 287). Sen (2005: 287) links this period to the present through a continuity of legal scholarship and public memory. Pluralism allowed for the establishment at independence of today’s multi-religious, multi-ethnic society, within a broad and absorbing identity (Sen 2005: 348). Pluralism is prevalent partly due to the social and geographic diversity of modern India. It is a ‘civilizational-state’, rather than a strict nation-state (Kumar 2002). Pluralism within India has three dimensions:

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the pan-Indian; within the fold of Hinduism and the regional context (Momin 1996: 296). Momin (1996: 296) argues that the pan-Indian dimension encompasses ‘racial diversity and admixture, linguistic heterogeneity as well as fusion, and variations as well as synthesis in customs, behaviour patterns, beliefs and rituals’. India’s national leaders have proclaimed pride in this diversity. Cohen (2001: 22) argues that ‘unity in diversity’ is practically the national motto. Krishna (1999: xxxiii) states that respecting diversity was a way in which India defined itself against the other ‘inferior’, ‘monological’ national visions of its neighbours. When talking of India’s values and collective memory impacting its national policy, Cohen (2001: 302) notes ‘this is not a country that can be ordered to march to a single beat’. At the regional level, while each community has a distinctive identity and ethos of its own, it forms part of an extended and dynamic network. Inter-community relations are characterised by interaction, exchange and integration (Momin 1996: 296). The sharing of space, regional values and cultural attributes cuts across religious differences and binds the people of a region together (Singh 2002: 96–101). While communalist sentiments may surge in certain communities at certain times, until the last few years this was not openly admired, even by Hindutva supporters. In contrast, for most Indians, pluralism was consistently seen as the ideal. At the more operational level, India’s complex pluralistic society, with crosscutting themes of caste, language, ethnicity, class and religion make Indians especially skilled at foreign policy (Cohen 2001: 23). Tolerance Tolerance is a fundamental concept of contemporary political theory (Devellennes 2017) and therefore relevant to foreign policy. While tolerance in Indian culture flows from many of the same roots as pluralism, and indeed is influenced by the pluralist outlook itself, it differs slightly. Pluralism helps define what is considered the norm in societal configuration. It shapes foreign policy in terms of an explanatory understanding of the world. Tolerance will be defined as something more normative. It is an attitude towards the ideas, beliefs, identities and practices—i.e. the things which matter to people—in others. It entails a more conscious (relative to pluralism) acceptance of others’ differences in these areas.

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Tolerance has been a consistent value throughout much of Indian history (Sen 2005: 19). This is partially reflected in India’s historical willingness to absorb ideas and practices from outside (Sen 2005: 131). Momin (1996: 8) describes one of the remarkable achievements of Indian civilisation as its tolerance and accommodation of diverse identities, as well as the ‘facilitation of a creative synthesis of these identities’. Having said this, some periods of history have seen greater tolerance than others (Chopra et al. 1974: 77). Tolerance has been one of the major factors contributing to the longevity and resilience of Indian civilisation (Momin 1996: 8). India has had periods of religious tolerance unrivalled elsewhere in the world— particularly in the formative period which saw the creation of the Upanishads, the birth of Buddhism and Jainism and the flourishing of a number of atheistic and materialist sects (Sen 2005: 355). During this period and others, royal patronage was extended to more than one religion, including atheistic sects; something in sharp contrast to Europe where only a single religion, or even a single denomination, would receive the sovereign’s backing, both at the time and for millennia to come (Thapar 2002: 3; Eraly 2005: 325). Subramaniam (1979: 117) attributes the challenges faced by efforts at centralisation in ancient and medieval India to a religio-cultural tradition that tolerated ‘so much diversity’. This tolerance has led to ancient India’s dominant language, Sanskrit, having the greatest atheist tradition of any classical language (Sen 2005: 45–46, 354–355). In various ways, tolerance has been expressed through Sanskrit dramas like Sudraka’s Mrcchakatika in the second century BC (Basham and Sharma 1994) and poetry like Kalidasa’s Meghaduta around five centuries later (Sen 2005: 19; Kalidasa 1882). Indian civilisation’s long traditions of science, mathematics and rational investigation are underpinned by a tolerance of different opinions (Sen 2005: 69). Historically, tolerance significantly influenced the interactions of the vastly different religious beliefs found throughout India, as well as impacting each religion individually. Sen (2005: 47) notes that India has a broad culture of tolerance in which Hindu heterodoxy was vigorously present, but where some of the most ardent proponents of tolerance have not been Hindu—notably Buddha, Ashoka and Akbar. Recent campaigns for repealing British introduced anti-sodomy laws have drawn on tolerance of homosexuality in ancient and medieval India, relative to the Judeo-Christian tradition (Tiwari 2010). Human Rights Watch even headlined their report against the laws ‘This Alien Legacy’

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(Human Rights Watch 2008). Monuments to Indian tolerance include the communities of Jews, Parsees and Christians in the past, and more recently Tibetans and Bhutanese, who have come to India to escape persecution in their homelands (Sen 2005: 49, 308). In post-independence India, tolerance is a pervasive norm, particularly when compared to other countries of similar levels of wealth. The concept of tolerance that couples surface diversity with deep unity underneath is pertinent to India’s foreign policy. The last five years of inter-communal intolerance, when viewed within the context of a 1.3 billion person population and compared to other similar states, while challenging the value of tolerance, have yet to displace it—particularly among the elite classes. Scholars conceptualising global governance, like Richard Falk (1985: 139), highlight the need for global solidarity. Simultaneously the global system must tolerate a variety of values and cultures among and within states if it is to maintain peace. As such, Indian conceptions of tolerance fit in with certain aspects of the international system, helping to underpin a positive image outside its region. According to the 2010–2014 World Values Survey (Inglehart and Welzel 2015), India scores higher on the axis of ‘Survival Values vs. SelfExpression Values’ than any of the other Asian countries listed. Scoring higher on this scale indicated tolerance of certain out-groups. This helps inform the political views of elite Indian society (Cohen 2001). There is a striking level of tolerance for opposing views. Furthermore, by playing a large role in shaping India’s national identity in relation to other states, tolerance is highly relevant to India’s foreign policy. It gives India the image of a tolerant and secular state internationally (Cohen 2001: 302). Only since around 2015 during the Modi government has this international image faced serious challenges. India’s leaders, particularly those hailing from the plethora of non-BJP political parties, hold the view that the country embodies the greatest of all civilisations partly because it has been tolerant of ‘extreme diversity’ (Cohen 2001: 53). This in turn ensures it is well suited to the modern international realm and resides in the company of great states (Cohen 2001: 53). The value is a potential motivator of India’s foreign policy. This is particularly the case because in the Westphalian system of sovereign states, tolerance of different political systems, cultures and interests is a central theme. Tolerance for other regime types combined with democracy at home gives India a somewhat unique position. India can act as a broker

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in the intercultural dialogue between the Western and Asia, a role it has played historically. India’s tolerance answers proponents of the ‘Asian values’ viewpoint who see the value as belonging to Western culture (Sen 2005: 135–136, 286). Also related and contentious within the Asian values debate are human rights. India’s tolerant cultural traditions have had a significant impact in this regard, further providing it a unique international position (Chay 1990: 8; Raj and Pradhan 1997). Non-violence Though it has held different levels of prevalence in terms of practice, the cultural value of non-violence has, for millennia, remained a prominent and distinctive theme running through Indian culture. While non-violence may not have been the only ideal within Hindu culture, it is still a highest ideal (Robinson 2003: 123). Basham (2004: 8–9) asserts that Indian civilisation stands out from all others due to its humanity. A component of this is non-violence. Non-violence is of course centrally relevant to the world of foreign policy where violence and the use of force is a key form of currency. Strategic culture itself is defined in part by the consistent patterns in attitudes and conceptualisations of the use of force (Johnston 1995). Cohen (2001: 53) notes that India’s ancient emperors had no compunction alternating between conquest and philosophical nonviolence. The very fact that they held philosophies of non-violence, however, meant that their conquests were that much less violent. Furthermore, the fact that it was an ideal meant that the non-violent values were passed down through history. While wars and violent acts have occurred in Indian history, the maintenance of non-violence as an ideal was relatively strong compared to Indian civilisation’s historical contemporaries in the Middle East and China. Comparing it to other civilisations at similar times, such as Assyria, Basham (2004: 8–9) notes that India has had fewer tales of massacring civilians and less slavery. Zinkin (1955: 182–183) states that Indian history has never seen violence comparable to that of Europe. Massacres which had taken place in India, like those under Timur, had been ‘hotblooded’ orgies rather than the organised mass-murders of Auschwitz and Ukraine (Zinkin 1955: 182–183). The variance is reflected in numerous interactions between the West and India. For instance, when only Indians and Arabs participated in Indian Ocean trade routes there were no attacks

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upon competitors. This changed only when the Portuguese entered, introducing a culture of naval warfare (Lal 1994: 280–281. Non-violence’s prominence spans across India’s diversity. A major impetus for non-violence came during Buddhism’s dominance in ancient times. This was furthered by Hinduism’s reaction to Buddhism and Jainism. The value now pervades most Indian religious traditions. India’s history of being on the strategic defensive to foreign invasions, from the Aryans to the British, is also seen by some as the cause of its present-day non-aggressive defence policies (Tanham 1992: 52). Furthermore, the subcontinent’s sufficient riches are said to have negated the need for its sovereigns to pursue expansionist policies (Tanham 1992: 55). Non-violence was revived and gained prevalence during the struggle for independence, becoming firmly entrenched in the Indian national identity. While there were notable national heroes who held contrary views, such as Swami Dayananda and Bhagat Singh, Gandhi’s uncompromising and passive non-violence was dominant (Cohen 2001: 119). While there have been critiques made against realism for its almost exclusive focus on violence, it is true that much of international relations revolves around violence and potential violence. As such, cultures’ conceptions and approaches to violence are of key relevance to foreign policy. Indian culture’s conception of non-violence has permeated its foreign policy since independence. Importantly, non-violence points to an area where India differs from other major powers. Non-violence has led to India having a general predisposition against large-scale destruction in war, something seen in the restrained conduct of all its three wars with Pakistan (Bhimaya 1994: 644–645; Karnad 2008: 3). Non-violence is also clearly visible in India’s nuclear policy from independence onwards (Cohen 2001: 161; Basrur 2001: 186; Bandyopadhyaya 1979: 286–321). Nuclear policy is a key area of national identity. Soon after independence, India was said to have held true to its belief in peace when dealing with the issue of Sri Lanka and its Indian Tamil population (Zinkin 1955: 206). Haas (1990: 172) goes further to argue that when it comes to international relations, all of Asia shares the same culture-driven goal of peaceful relations and cooperation. Contrary to what some argue (Sengha 2011: 30), however, the dominant conception of non-violence in Indian culture is passive rather than active. Ahimsa translates to no-harm. The context in which it is adhered

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to is one of detachment, not one of protecting others (Harvey 2001). Tanham (1992: 59) argues that India’s passivity in military affairs is partly the result of aspects of Hindu philosophy. India’s view of violence in international relations has been a very specific conception. It is largely concerned with violence between states. Violence within states, affecting individuals, is less on the country’s radar. India’s consideration of states and ‘peoples’, rather than individuals, is potentially due, in part, to the country having a more collectivist perspective than Western states (Pandey 2004; Triandis 1995). Similar to the ideas in the Mahabharata, the Nehruvian view sees adversaries in international relations as impermanent. War arises ‘from misperceptions and ideological systems that colour the attitudes of states and societies and spread fear and hatred’ (Bajpai 2002: 254). Bajpai (2002: 254) explains the adversary is seen as misunderstanding India. Its leadership may be at fault with its citizens supporting it out of ignorance. The adversary therefore can be made into a friend by contact with India at all levels (2002: 254). This view has been maintained long after Nehru by much of the political elite, including the Indian Foreign Service. Hierarchy The value of hierarchy is defined here as the perception that social relations exist in a hierarchical system and normative acceptance of this. Hierarchy has had a long history in Indian culture, stemming from the development of caste during the Vedic period, through to the present-day. This is in spite of various influences on Indian culture which promoted equality, such as Buddhism, Jainism, the Bhakti movement, Islam, Sikhism and modern egalitarian political movements. These influences themselves were born and gained popularity, at least in part, as protests against the established hierarchical nature of Indian society. This is evidence of the enduring strength of the value of hierarchy as entrenched and seen as ‘common sense’. While India’s concept of hierarchy involved a stratified society, this did not mean it supported the idea of certain groups having authority over others. This separates ancient India from other comparable civilisations. Compared to civilisations such as Greece, Rome and Egypt, the level of authority some could hold over others in India was less extreme. This can be seen in the fact that ancient India had fewer slaves than these civilisations. India also witnessed relatively mild treatment of slaves. Statements

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by influential figures during the formative stages of Indian civilisation, such as Buddha, Ashoka and Kautilya call for the compassionate treatment of slaves (Lal 1994). The treatment was so mild it was said to have led ancient foreign visitor Megasthenes to think that slavery did not exist in India (Jash 1984). Ancient India’s economy also relied less on slaves than its civilisational contemporaries. Slaves were not treated as commodities for earning profit through sales (Lal 1994). Hierarchy remains a prominent value despite its influence within society somewhat diminishing over the last century through democracy, policy decisions, economic development and the ongoing social evolution in caste relations (Cohen 2001: 114). Within society, hierarchy exists between individuals and groups. At the level of the international system, it entails the ‘hierarchical worldview’ perception (Cohen 2001: 22; Jones 2006: 8; Tanham 1992: 16). Here leaders see the world of nation-states arranged as a hierarchy. The arrangement in this hierarchy is determined by images of countries held by internal and external audiences. A state’s position can be described as its level of prestige, status, stature and standing, among other terms. While the measures of standing have changed over time (including: strategic, military and economic power as well as morality, ideology, intellectuality, and culture), the value of hierarchy has continued. Jones (2006: 8) argues that Indian strategic culture sees the outside world hierarchically, including in measures of intellectual and ideological competence. Similarly, Tanham (1992: 16) argues that Indians rank nations hierarchically according to size, culture and power. This can be seen in statements by Indian leaders (Narayanan 2001). Coming out of this are: the perception that India’s ‘rightful place’ is at the top of this hierarchy with prestige and high standing, and the preference for attaining this position. Despite Indian policymakers being reluctant to articulate a grand strategy on which to base strategic policy, there is a strong consensus that the country should recover its rightful place as a major player in world politics (Schaffer 2008: 201). When observing India’s broader foreign policy after independence— largely under Nehru—it may seem that there was support for the equality of states. This was, however, only in terms of certain aspects. India opposed racism and colonialism (Zinkin 1955: 183). It provided longstanding support for international law and the UN (Jones 2006: 9). Supporting legal or racial equality, however, did not equate to viewing every state as equal in terms of all important characteristics. In measures

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of moral, cultural and philosophical greatness, India still considered itself superior to most others. While hierarchy itself may not draw any conscious affective regard from Indian society, the P&Ps that emanate from it do, making hierarchy highly relevant to national identity. This includes the perception that India’s ‘rightful place’ is at the top of this hierarchy, and a preference for rising up to this position. Despite Indian policymakers being reluctant to articulate a grand strategy on which to base strategic policy, there is a strong consensus that the country should recover its rightful place as a major player in world politics (Schaffer 2008: 201). India’s leaders thereby seem to adopt a more ‘relational conception of power’ than a capabilities-based approach (Mukherjee 2019). Rising up the hierarchy and achieving prestige are ends in themselves. Status itself is considered a ‘good thing’ worth striving for. As mentioned, this is of course a subjective perception that cannot be rationalised any further. In my analysis, hierarchy is only assessed as a driver of foreign policy when status is the ultimate objective, not when it is simply an avenue to other goals. While there are other material benefits that accrue from high international status, these are separated out as different driving factors in this study to ensure a clear picture of the role played by cultural values. While India is not unique in its preference to rise up the global totem pole, its reasons for doing so are, in significant part, due to the cultural value of hierarchy. Other countries may have the same preference but be motivated by a different constellation of reasons, which may or may not include their own cultural values. India’s rejection of a conception of hierarchy which entails some groups having authority over others may have evolved into active opposition through the experiences of foreign domination of India’s own elite under Mughal rule and then British colonialism. This has relevance to foreign policy, entailing a strong opposition to one state dominating another. This is evident in India’s support for anti-colonial struggles throughout the post-independence period. It has also contributed, along with other values, to India taking a more sanguine approach to powers dominating their own region. This form of domination has less resemblance to India’s own experience of British or Mughal rule. Similarly, India’s concept of hierarchy does not mean it supports authoritarian regimes and the repression of populations by governments. The two religions which have had the biggest impact on India’s

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cultural values—Hinduism and Buddhism—both hold contractual views of government. This is influenced by, and further buttressed, India’s democratic tradition. Hierarchy also influences Indian foreign policy by ensuring that policy is driven by elites rather than the masses. The value also shapes how leaders interact with foreign counterparts and the skills they have in quickly taking the other’s measure (Cohen 2001: 22). The relevance of hierarchy to India’s national identity is partly a product of the country’s regional image. India’s civilisational centrality in the subcontinent is widely assumed. The subcontinent is seen as a single entity due to culture and civilisation, and the national identities of different countries are discounted (Nizamani 2000: 49–50). Subrahmanyam (Nizamani 2000: 49) states that smaller regional countries’ views ‘that India should not act as a bigger brother are seen as based in utopia because any other role for India is not credible’.

Method of Evaluating Influence Having identified the values we will be searching for, it is worth discussing in more detail the methods to be adopted to conduct the search. Via case studies, I focus on leaders’ preferences and perceptions (P&Ps), use evidence from discourse and state behaviour, and compare alternate explanations to identify gaps. Structuring the research this way addresses some of the criticisms of constructivism for its lack of systemisation. This also helps the research to be tested by others. Choice of Case Studies Three critical sites of foreign policy are examined as case studies: nuclear policy (NP), humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (HI), and India’s relations with the Middle East. These have been chosen as they can demonstrate the role played by values in foreign policy overall. The three cases have either been central to India’s foreign objectives or have characterised its position in the world. While the NP chapter is the most extensive, the three investigations complement each other. The HI and Middle East chapters ensure any observed influence is not simply an anomaly or particular to NP, but evidence that cultural values have a significant influence throughout India’s foreign policy. NP provides indepth analysis of India’s own actions in a policy realm that has been

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central to Delhi’s foreign relations and often characterised its chosen role in the world. Investigating HI and R2P assesses the country’s attitude towards the actions of other states on an area of foreign policy linked to values and one of the major debates in international affairs. These two case areas do not explore the Modi Government as much as the Middle East chapter, as there had been less change in NP and HI (expected and actual) under Modi at the time of writing. India’s relations with the Middle East reveal the roles played by cultural values in influencing foreign policy directly and via identity, image and soft power. This case study also looks at a longer period than the others, encompassing the Nehru and Modi eras, enabling comparison of the two. In doing so, it examines the major approaches and decisions by leaders instead of using content analysis. This diversity of methods helps screen out any biases within methods, allowing us to examine culture’s role through a broader lens. Perceptions and Preferences Cultural values act as a motivator for Indian foreign policy. They do this through influencing and driving certain P&Ps of Indian leaders. The vast majority of the expression of cultural values within Indian foreign policy is thereby found in the form of P&Ps. As such, this study focuses on P&Ps, especially in the NP and HI cases. For example, India’s leaders may hold a preference for global disarmament. Why is global disarmament seen as a good thing? It is in significant part because of the cultural value of nonviolence. The majority of P&Ps looked at in this book are those that have existed within Indian foreign policy over most of the three decades of examination. P&Ps are similar to what Mazarr (1996: 177) sees as one of the four models of how culture is described within IR literature as impacting global politics. He discusses cultural perspectives as strongly influencing ‘the way…leaders view policy problems…and often determine the solutions they choose’. Leaders may have varying degrees of awareness/unawareness of the influence of cultural values on their P&Ps. In determining whether certain P&Ps were influenced by cultural values, some level of subjective interpretation is necessary (Larson 1988: 248; see e.g. Weldes et al. 1999). In most cases, subjective interpretation is less of a problem because the P&P itself is clearly related to a particular value. When needed, however, I determine the extent to which

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cultural values did drive the P&P in question through looking at the context of the statement in which the P&P was found, as well as looking at related state behaviour. The understanding of context, largely through qualitative analysis, helps to reduce uncertainty. Laverty (2003: 21) argues that interpretations arise ‘through the fusion of text and its contexts’. While researchers can never completely bracket off their own experiences, a systematic approach—that contextualises key concepts; makes explicit any interpretive filters and is supplemented by rigorous methodological tools—helps to identify and reduce the impact of pre-existing biases. The interpretation is assisted by examining alternate explanations for P&Ps, and identifying potential gaps. It is acknowledged that there are other factors that would have influenced the same P&Ps which were influenced by cultural values. These can be considered intervening variables, interests which are not cultural values. For example, Rajiv Gandhi may have had a preference for global nuclear disarmament not only because he was influenced by the cultural value of non-violence, but also because it would help to improve the strategic situation for India. Again, the understanding of context helps to clarify the level of influence other factors have had on P&Ps. By not taking a purely positivist approach and with the focus being on understanding culture’s role, it is accepted that the degree to which it is possible to determine the extent of values’ influence on each P&P, in comparison to other factors, is variable. The P&Ps are largely ‘officially sanctioned’ and expressed through state behaviour and government statements. Because foreign policy is by definition official, it is these P&Ps that demonstrate how values influence it. These may be overt, such as a preference for disarmament, or somewhat covert like the preference for maintaining a non-violent image. The latter can be driven by both the value of non-violence and strategic and other interests which may be served by maintaining a non-violent image. This study will examine perceptions like, for instance, a hierarchical world order. Our perceptions of the world are coloured by the lens of culture (Chaudhuri 2008; Gray 1999). Cultural values influence how leaders see foreign relations. This may also include perceptions of other actors and perceptions of their state’s position and role in world affairs, what analysts call ‘national role conceptions’ (Holsti 1970; Wish 1980; Shih 1988). This influence is usually not conscious among leaders. Feng (2007: 5) critiques neo-realists for not specifying how perception comes about. When it comes to decision-making, culture ‘conditions the range

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of issues to which attention will be devoted’ and ‘influences the way those issues will be defined’ (Elkins and Simeon 1979: 143). Perceptions shape and constrain leaders’ choices and thereby affect state behaviour (Larson 1988: 253; George 1989; Lebow 2008). Constructivists argue that utilitarian calculation is only possible after an actor adopts an attitude towards a stimulus and that rationality itself is preceded by norms (Kratochwil 1987: 311). Neoclassical realists also acknowledge leaders’ perceptions as one of the most important domestic variables (Lobell et al. 2009). North et al. (1963: 42) base their entire study on the examination of perceptions in foreign policy texts through content analysis. Preferences can be seen as the missing plank between cultural values and foreign policy. Hudson and Sampson (1999: 669) posit that an understanding of culture may reveal that certain options are preferred because of their link to a society’s mythological history or current value system. Even Lustick’s (1997: 11–14) work with rational choice theory discusses culture’s relation ‘directly to the production of preference orderings’. Preferences are often the product of, and closely related to, interests. Constructivism, unlike most conventional IR theories in contrast, argues for the need to focus on how interests are formed, rather than take them as given (Larsen 1997). Contrary to realism and other materialist explanations, interests are not always based in objective material goods, and can be ideational. Leaders’ preferences often more directly influence foreign policy decisions than perceptions. This includes through, among other things: determining justifications, the range of options available and objectives. Culture limits the range of options considered within a given issue domain (Elkins and Simeon 1979: 143). Johnston (1995: 34) says that each state’s strategic preferences ‘are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites’. Similarly, Liska (1962: 12) states that strategic culture establishes a set of long-lasting strategic preferences. In a constructivist study of Chinese foreign policy, Johnston (1996: 226) stipulates that preferences are ‘cultural forms’ found in foreign policy texts. He uses strategic preference ranking across pre-modern texts to determine whether China has a single strategic culture (1996: 226). Similarly, Hudson (2008: 782) argues for the importance of looking at

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the preferences of influential individuals, pointing to the relevance for foreign policy of various Chinese leaders having cooperative ‘operational codes’ based in Confucianism. Some preferences and perceptions will be closely intertwined. Also, some perceptions maybe just as accurately described as preferences and vice versa. For instance, the perception that nuclear weapons could not be used in war was enmeshed with a preference that they should not be used in war. Leaders and Policymakers This study focuses on leaders and policymakers because they are by far the greatest vector or conduit through which cultural values influence foreign policy. This includes drawing on interviews with former senior policymakers and current policymakers, including exploring their understanding of the motivations of political leaders. Structures, such as culture, can constitute actors and limit their range of actions (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 57). Haas (1990: 172) sees the role of culture as the ‘shared beliefs and sentiments that serve to orient leaders of states to their roles as international actors’. Neumann (1996) argues that the influence of culture on leaders’ preferences is significant, because leaders may be embedded in social structures and less able to make real choices independent of the social context. Rotter (2000) states ‘policymakers and diplomats do not shed their values, biases, and assumptions at their office doors. They are creatures of culture, and their attitudes cannot help but shape the policy they make’. Neoclassical realists also acknowledge the importance of looking at leaders’ thinking when understanding the impact of domestic factors in international relations (Lobell et al. 2009). Focusing on leaders and policymakers, and their P&Ps acknowledges the significance of agents. Hudson (2008) and Berman (2001: 246) emphasise the importance of looking at the views of influential individuals on foreign policy (Hudson and Sampson 1999: 672). A leader-focus also recognises the importance of delineating clearly the connection between ‘ideas, norms, and culture and the political actors embodying them’ (Berman 2001: 246). An emphasis on leaders may address some of the critiques of constructivism that focusing on social structures and norms too often ignores agents (Checkel 1998: 324). Constructivism’s ontological assumption is

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that people are socialised into their situations but also capable of transformative actions (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 59). While informal rules and formal bureaucracies create frameworks within which people act, their actions can support or oppose this dominant discourse (Klotz and Lynch 2007:44). Berman (2001: 246) emphasises the importance of going beyond the sometimes used social science practice of looking only at structures, to recognise the impact political actors can have in shaping, ideas, norms and culture. Constructivism emphasises the ‘mutual constitution of agents and structures’ (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 259). Having said this, for the most part, I only focus on certain aspects of leaders’ agency—their expression and implementation of P&Ps based on cultural values. A focus on leaders and policymakers is particularly relevant to this study because, in a similar vein to Jones’s (2006: 8) assessment of India’s strategic culture, the country’s foreign policy is ‘elite-driven and patrician-like rather than democratic’. India’s constitution delegates foreign policymaking and implementation to the core executive, subject to some oversight from the legislative branch of government, from the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha (Bandyopadhyaya 1979; Hall 2019: 10). In practice as with many other democracies, foreign policymaking became even more centralised under the PM and his office very early on (Hall 2019: 11) As such, the leaders focused on will be key-decision-makers in foreign policy such as the Prime Minister (PM), External Affairs Minister (EAM), cabinet ministers, and others in the foreign policy establishment, such as MEA officials. For instance, with regard to NP, the views of some nonpoliticians may be worth considering as there is little understanding of nuclear weapons technology among politicians (Panini and Kumar 1998). On a few occasions, it may be helpful to look at opposition politicians, though this will be limited as they often change their views once in power. It is important to pay particular attention to leaders who are influential in foreign policy (Bloom 1990: 77; Holsti 1992: 439). For instance, in Case Study 1, there will be a greater focus on Rajiv Gandhi than other leaders, because he had a greater impact on NP. The leaders focus is particularly important for the three foreign policy areas examined. NP is determined almost exclusively by a tiny circle of senior government decision-makers. Perkovich (1999: 445) argues that individual personalities have been ‘at least as important’ as the external security environment in determining Indian nuclear policy.

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Mattoo (1996: 46) observes that even discourse on NP is controlled by a handful of scholars and former officials (Tanham 1992: 52). Similarly, India’s approach to HI entails potential use of force involving other states and therefore warrants decision-making at the top levels of government. Middle East policy involves areas of critical national interest combined with sensitive domestic politics, again requiring decision-making at the highest levels—particularly for PM Modi. The influence of cultural values on public opinion in India will not be looked at in depth. This is because of both the little direct impact public opinion has on NP, HI and to some degree Middle East policy (which is less than say, Pakistan policy), and the low importance the Indian public places on these issues (Cortright and Mattoo 1996: 118).17 Cortright and Mattoo (1996: 118) argue that public opinion is not a significant variable in determining nuclear policy. A few key instances where public opinion driven by cultural values had a direct and significant influence on leaders’ P&Ps will be examined. Forms of Evidence—Discourse and State Behaviour Two types of evidence are drawn on to provide an in-depth and comprehensive picture of India’s foreign policy—state behaviour and discourse. This conceptual separation provides clearer understanding of exactly how cultural values influence foreign policy (similar to e.g. Basrur 2001). Public discourse (often aimed at foreign government audiences or various publics as a form of public diplomacy), can reveal cultural values when looked at over a period of time, and in tandem, with state behaviour. Public pronouncements are most likely to reflect the influence of cultural values, if any. The focus on discourse is also supported by constructivism and its roots in the theoretical tradition of social constructionism. Social constructionism is largely reflectivist and mentalist, in that it sees knowledge as not simply a reflection of reality but rather as a result of our ways of categorising the world—as products of discourse (Potter 1996: 98; Foucault 1972).

17 It is, however, acknowledged that the influence of cultural values on leaders is, in part, due to leaders’ operating within a social context which includes the public/society. When values’ influence on leaders is through leaders making electoral calculations, this will be highlighted.

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Realists criticise the focus on public discourse, arguing that it is deployed to disguise realpolitik motives, i.e. that discourse does not accurately reflect P&Ps or the cultural values that drive them. In addressing this it is useful to draw on insights provided by the ‘representational’ and ‘instrumental’ models of communication (de Sola Pool 1959). The argument by realists applies to statements reflecting the instrumental model. Here statements may not directly express the true P&Ps of leaders. The instrumental model entails ‘the assumption that an individual may use language to gratify desires or influence others rather than to communicate psychological states’ (Larson 1988: 248). Statements are designed to achieve, sometimes unstated, outcomes such as obtaining material benefits. The expressions of P&Ps are adapted to suit a number of audiences, namely those who are in a position to provide rewards (see ibid.; Arkin 1980). This will mainly include other states but also domestic and, to a lesser extent, foreign publics via public diplomacy. As such, to understand what P&Ps leaders actually hold, and thereby the cultural values that drive them, this study will need to gauge the potential tactical goals underlying the discourse (de Sola Pool 1959: 93– 95; Larson 1988: 254). The outcomes that leaders are seeking can thereby be observed, even if these are not directly expressed (Larson 1988: 248). This will require taking the context of each statement into consideration. However, many statements suspected of being largely instrumental, may still demonstrate the influence of cultural values. For instance, a statement expressing a preference for global disarmament may not genuinely reflect this preference. The statement is not, however, purely motivated by material interests. Rather, it reflects a preference to construct and maintain an image of India as non-violent, as an end in itself (in addition as a way to ehance soft power). The cultural value of non-violence therefore is likely to play a role. Public discourse is one of the main tools a state uses to project its preferred image. It demonstrates state compliance with shared social expectations (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 17). The diplomatic effort and resources dedicated to maintaining such an image indicate its importance. The broader context of the statement must then be examined to determine the degrees to which the preference for a non-violent image is driven by the value of non-violence compared with other factors. This can be understood by weighing up the non-cultural factors driving for and against maintaining this image. For instance states may have strategic interests in presenting themselves as peaceful, or alternatively, they may

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derive strategic benefits from convincing rivals they are prone to military force. In the representational model of communication, ‘verbal content is supposed to reflect accurately beliefs…drives…or attitudes, so that inferences may be drawn directly from the subjects’ statements without taking into account their context’ (Larson 1988: 248). Statements fitting this model can be described as genuine—they accurately reflect the preference or perception that they express. Discourse is complemented by analysis of state behaviour, including, for example: policies and strategies; military actions, like developing nuclear weapons; diplomatic efforts, like voting at the UN and bilateral agreements; cooperation with other powers; and approach/attitude towards international regimes. While governments may not overtly state that their actions are due to particular P&Ps, analysis will demonstrate that these P&Ps are the most likely cause. This in turn reveals the role of the values which influenced these P&Ps. Figure 2.2 presents the pathway through which values influence foreign policy.

India’s prominent cultural values

Influence

Leaders’ preferences and perceptions (P&Ps)

As seen in

As seen in

Influence

Various internal and external factors over time

Fig. 2.2 Influence of cultural values on foreign policy

State Behaviour

Discourse

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Sources The case studies use both primary and secondary texts. State behaviour is mainly, though not exclusively, assessed through secondary texts and discourse is mainly, though not exclusively, assessed through primary texts. As discussed, the primary texts examined most are public pronouncements. These include speeches, statements and other documents from government. As such, the exclusion of previously confidential documents does not present a limitation.18 Other primary texts include treaties and UN documents/voting records. For quantitative content analysis of discourse, particular types of public statements are used. The sample consists of government speeches and statements. Most focus is on documents on the MEA websites, including embassy websites. As most of these documents/statements are what the government has freely decided to place on either their own websites, or express at premier international forums like the UN, they are a representative sample of India’s leaders’ official P&Ps. Where it is uncertain if a website document constitutes completely government rhetoric, are not used in the quantitative analysis. This includes the MEA’s magazine, India Perspective, and factual press releases (discussed in a different section). The types of samples used for the three areas of investigation differ. Semi-structured interviews are conducted with present and former officials from the Indian Government and other governments who deal with India, as well as other relevant individuals. Secondary sources include mainly media, NGO/government reports and major literature/research. Content Analysis The study uses both qualitative and quantitative content analysis methods in a complementary fashion. This creates a balance between objectivity and systemisation through quantitative tools on the one hand, and appreciation of context and nuance through a qualitative approach on the other (Larson 1988: 248). Combining the findings from both methods will also help to increase reliability (Larson 1988: 253).

18 The Indian Government does not publicly release material that was once confidential.

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Qualitative Analysis Texts for the relevant period are read to identify P&Ps driven to a significant degree by cultural values. As mentioned, bias or uncertainty are reduced through understanding the context. This involves taking into consideration: the statement or action itself; the context of the statement or action in relation to the rest of the text or surrounding actions; the producer and consumer of any message; and the broader geopolitical and foreign policy context within which the message is being communicated or the action undertaken. This understanding of context also helps to determine the influence of the aforementioned intervening variables (Larson 1988). The frequency and spread over time of various P&Ps is assessed to help understand the level of influence of cultural values. The intensity of each P&P is also considered through understanding context.19 It is acknowledged that in judging intensity there is a certain level of subjectivity. Aspects that influence intensity include: the force with which the statement is communicated; and the producer and consumer of each statement, particularly when the instrumental communication model is applicable. Given the leaders expressing the statements are senior statesmen, often speaking to foreign audiences, they are likely to express most P&Ps more diplomatically and less intensely. Understanding the consumer is important given potential divergences in interpretation (Elder and Cobb 1983: 35). The P&Ps are grouped into categories under the cultural value that influenced them. P&Ps may variously be referred to as, for example in the case of hierarchy, ‘hierarchy-driven P&Ps’, ‘hierarchy-influenced P&Ps’, or ‘hierarchy-rooted P&Ps’. As stipulated by Larson (1988: 247) the categories represent variables in the theory being tested, in this case cultural values. As discussed, values that have been identified by looking at India’s pre-independence history (Part 1) will be tested within present-day discourse to determine their influence on modern India’s foreign policy (Parts 2, 3 and 4). By using one set of materials to derive a hypothesis and set of categories, then using another body of data to test it, I avoid what methodologists see as content analysis’s potential to violate preferred scientific procedure (Larson 1988: 247) and create circular reasoning (Cicourel 1964: 148–149;Holsti 1969: 27). Larson (1988: 247) suggests that to further prevent bias, alternate 19 According to Larson (1988: 248) qualitative procedures can yield a reliable and valid assessment of intensity.

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theoretical categories could be included. This is not essential in this book because the categories used are not abstracted from the same texts being researched. Nevertheless, as mentioned, through qualitative analysis this study tests the variables of other explanations, for example realist variables such as material/strategic interests. Quantitative Analysis Quantitative analysis is used to assess discourse through primary texts in the NP (time periods 2 and 3). This involves counting and categorising while understanding context (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 19). Quantitative analysis adds degrees of objectivity that traditional reading and sifting of evidence alone cannot provide (Larson 1988: 252). It minimises individual bias through identifying P&Ps at the smallest level. It also allows for comparing the level and nature of influence of cultural values: across different periods and between India other countries. Aspects of content analysis methodologies suggested by North et al. (1963: 38) and Larson (1988) may be drawn on. The weaknesses of quantitative analysis in attempting to quantify complex concepts are not an issue because it is coupled with qualitative analysis. Quantitative analysis is not used to analyse state behaviour. Counting actions would not be useful because: each action is unique in a qualitative sense (more so than statements in discourse); and there are unquantifiable differences in the intensity and meaning of each action. Coding Texts from the sample are first read to identify ‘statements’ (also referred to as references or expressions) related to NP and HI. Statements can consist of a number of sentences, one sentence, or part of a sentence. They communicate a single message and cannot be broken down further. North et al. (1963: 45) refer to this as ‘atomic-themes’. For quality assurance, in case some statements are missed, a key word search is conducted using the search strings which form the roots of words related to either NP or HI. These depend on the case study. For example, some search strings used in the nuclear cases were: ‘nuc’, ‘dis’, ‘deterr’, ‘mass’, ‘atom’, ‘wmd’ and ‘proli’. Finally, when discussion of NP/HI is found, the text surrounding the statement is reread to establish context. Using the aforementioned qualitative methods, statements are identified that represent P&Ps significantly driven by cultural values. The cultural value categories used in the qualitative analysis are drawn on.

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The statements representing the value-driven P&Ps are then grouped into subcategories according to the P&P they represent (e.g. Larson 1988). In the case where a statement represents more than one P&P, it is listed under every corresponding P&P subcategory—though this is extremely rare. The number of statements for each P&P subcategory is counted. Then the total number of statements for each cultural value category is tallied. This score gives an indication of the level of influence each value has had on the area of foreign policy examined. Measuring frequency reveals the ongoing importance placed on a P&P and thereby, its driving cultural value. Values which are the broadest and most enduring across time and events will exhibit the highest overall numbers, and values which are the most specific and transient, the lowest (Elder and Cobb 1983: 36). Due to the aforementioned issue of statements representing more than one P&P (on rare occasion), the total for each cultural value category may be different to the sum of all its P&P subcategories. Unlike in some other studies, intensity is not measured in my quantitative analysis (Larson 1988: 248). This is because appraisal of all the foreign policy discourse reveals a generally uniformity of intensity. Furthermore, frequency is more important than intensity for studies looking at trends over many years, as this book does. The most obviously intense and illustrative statements, however, will be referred to individually in the discussion. Example of Coding: As an example, we can look at the Rajiv Gandhi’s speech on NP at the United Nations (UN). We can extract the following statement: Disarmament accompanied by coexistence will open up opportunities for all countries.

The statement suggests a preference for disarmament. This preference is inferred to be rooted, at least in part, in the value of non-violence. This inference is confirmed through understanding context. The disarmament P&P subcategory and all the statements reflecting it are therefore placed in the category of non-violence. Realists may argue that statements supporting disarmament are not due to non-violence but rather due to strategic interests like India’s need to reduce external threats (Gupta 1967: 8). Such claims are tested and refuted through examination of

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other relevant discourse and state behaviour. The study can thereby determine the degree to which the disarmament preference was influenced by non-violence, as opposed to strategic factors. At the very least, the preference demonstrates that Gandhi wished to portray a non-violent image of India.

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PART II

Sifting for Culture in Foreign Policy

CHAPTER 3

Nuclear Policy

Nuclear policy (NP) has been central to India’s foreign relations, has often characterised its chosen role in the world and reveals Delhi’s interaction with certain areas of international law. India is the only state that has publicly debated its decision to go nuclear, indicating NP’s relevance to its identity (Perkovich 1999: 448). Nuclear weapons are highly symbolic and there is a close relationship between symbolism, national identity and culture. As such, if cultural values do impact India’s foreign policy, they should be visible in NP. NP is a key area in which constructivist ideas can be used to explain security policy. Therefore, three sub-investigations are conducted, each focusing on an era of government: 1988–1998, 1998– 2004 and 2004–2014. Many scholars argue the importance of domestic factors in NP, such as Perkovich (1999) and Basrur (2001), rejecting the view that external security concerns universally and decisively determine states’ nuclear policies (Perkovich 1999: 445). Perkovich (1999: 447) argues that while security concerns created conditions allowing India’s leaders to justify nuclear weapons, domestic factors played a greater role. This study builds on this recognition. While some commentators perceive the ‘restraint versus nuclear advancement dichotomy’ in Indian nuclear policy and the P&Ps on each side, they do not acknowledge or explore the cultural values behind them. A few come close, though not examining the extent and nature of culture’s influence and its roots. Basrur (2001: 181) acknowledges the © The Author(s) 2021 K. Pethiyagoda, Indian Foreign Policy and Cultural Values, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54696-0_3

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role of beliefs and assumptions from Indian strategic culture in shaping nuclear policy. Perkovich (1999: 448) refers to ‘national identity’ and ‘normative aspirations’. There is, however, a tendency to see culture and values influencing only the anti-nuclear side of the dichotomy (Basrur 2001), with little examination of their role in the pro-nuclear side, which this study will seek to address. A process of elimination is undertaken whereby I examine existing explanations and identify the gaps to reveal the degree of influence of cultural values. Given strategic and other interests were widely thought to be the justification for India’s nuclear tests, I do not spend as much time on these factors. It is worth introducing several common nuclear P&Ps prior to the case studies, each relating to a different value. Non-violence The capacity of nuclear weapons to unleash unrivalled destruction makes them more symbols of violence than other weapons, despite the fact that other weapons, light arms for instance, may cause more violence globally. This makes NP a good theatre in which to test the strength and understand the nature of the influence of non-violence. Disarmament is the P&P least in line with India’s direct and indirect strategic interests. Directly, as a state with nuclear weapons (SNW), India has something to lose in a world without nuclear weapons. India’s indirect strategic interests are also negatively affected in that advocacy for disarmament is, unlike all the other common P&Ps, likely to conflict directly with the interests of the great powers. The great powers are mostly Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs)—a group of states ‘recognised’ as having nuclear weapons by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They would not like to see advocacy for an initiative that may negatively impact their strategic advantage. It contrasts with the other common P&Ps which would have a neutral impact on great power strategic interests or, as in the case of non-proliferation, a positive impact. The preference for non-proliferation means support for less nuclear weapons and thereby less violence resulting from nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation is a preference that is, in comparison to disarmament however, potentially more susceptible to influence by factors other than the value of non-violence; for instance, the preference to be seen to adhere to international norms.

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Also driven by non-violence is a general preference for restraint and peace in the context of nuclear weapons. Karnad (2008: 3) argues that nuclear deterrence overlays a conflict system peculiar to the subcontinent which is marked by ‘extreme restraint’ and controlled wars. Nuclear weapons, if they have any effect at all, are likely to reinforce this dynamic of restraint. This reflects the type of subsystem described by Rosen (1996: 5) with local cultural norms surviving against the dominance of the ‘anarchic’ international system. Many states desire to settle disputes peacefully and display restraint in dealings with nuclear-armed rivals. My argument does not suggest that all restraint by all states is due to the value of non-violence. Rather, I demonstrate that non-violence is part of the mix of factors that drive restraint in Indian nuclear policy. Other P&Ps driven by non-violence include: the preference for a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-use against non-nuclear powers; and the preference for civilian rather than military control over nuclear policy, exclusion of the military and a level of cautiousness regarding the military. The latter may relate to aforementioned ancient Brahmin–Kshatriya divide, combined with the effect of modern elites looking down upon the idea of military service, in contrast to say, states like the US or UK where the military is held atop a moral pedestal above civilian public servants. All of the aforementioned preferences are also reinforced by the preference for maintaining a non-violent image. This is the result of both the cultural value of non-violence directly, and the non-violence-driven policy tradition of maintaining a non-violent image since independence. Hierarchy Nuclear weapons being powerful symbols of status and prestige make them susceptible to the influence of hierarchy. Nuclear policy has a major impact on images of India and its conception of where it sits in the international hierarchy. Hierarchy led to a key perception amongst all administrations during the period—the ‘hierarchical worldview’. All other P&Ps flowing from hierarchy do so through the prism of this perception. These include the: preference to not join international non-proliferation regimes; perception that nuclear weapons development represents scientific achievement;

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perception that nuclear weapons have brought India more global recognition and prestige and hierarchy in general related to nuclear weapons. Tolerance and Pluralism Tolerance and pluralism have less potential to impact nuclear policy than hierarchy and non-violence. Any influence is likely to be through the pluralistic and tolerant worldview. India also held a preference to maintain a tolerant and pluralistic image.

Brief Background for Nuclear Policy Nuclear policy since independence provides context for the cases and gives an indication of trajectory in terms of the balance between pro and antinuclear viewpoints. The foundations of India’s nuclear policy were set during the tenure of Nehru from 1947 to 1964. This included the establishment of patterns in the way the ideational component (cultural values) interacted with the praxological component (policy behaviour) (Basrur 2001: 186). Cultural values had a strong impact on nuclear policy under Nehru. The same adherence to moral principle that guided Nehru’s foreign policy more broadly, also impacted his nuclear policy (Bandyopadhyaya 1979: 286–321; Zinkin 1955: 179–180). The value of non-violence supported preferences for global disarmament and restraint in nuclear policy. Nehru completely rejected nuclear weapons as usable instruments of foreign policy (Basrur 2001: 186) and commissioned the world’s first unclassified study of the effects of nuclear weapons (Cohen 2001: 161). According to Ambassador Gupta (2017), under Nehru, India was a ‘founding champion’ of the movement for disarmament and non-proliferation. Nehru stated that the use of nuclear weapons ‘amounts to genocide’ (Mullick 1972: 161), that even by accidental use ‘might very well spell an end for everything living’ (Ghatate 1998: 12). Nehru’s aversion to the bomb is even more evident when considering subsequent revelations that the US had expressed support for India to conduct nuclear tests prior to the Chinese tests of 1964 (‘US Wanted India to Detonate n-bomb in 1964: Dixit’, 2001, Times of India, 18 March). There is speculation that the US even offered to support India gaining the status of a legitimate nuclear power but Nehru rejected this (Nanda 2016). This is likely to have been

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influenced by Mahatma Gandhi’s rejection of nuclear weapons as immoral (Basrur 2001: 185). Nehru’s aversion to nuclear weapons was related to a broader reticence regarding military affairs. One Air Marshall described the attitude of Indian political leaders towards the armed forces during the decade after independence as ‘that of a teetotaller who had inherited a brewery’ (Kundu 2004: 6). Hierarchy also affected for anti-nuclear P&Ps. The question of nuclear weapons could act as another arena where India could fulfil its destiny as a moral teacher to the world. Perkovich (1999: 448) states that both Gandhi and Nehru, India’s ‘two great moral exemplars’, were seen to represent not only India’s, but humanity’s moral campaign against nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Nehru did keep open the possibility and refused to approve any agreement that might preclude this option for India. This was due, in part, to strategic concerns (Kapur 1976: 193–194). He also acknowledged the value of deterrence in preventing war between the US and USSR. Hierarchy also influenced Nehru’s nuclear policy in the pro-nuclear direction. The worldview that India should be at the top of the international hierarchy, combined with anti-colonial sentiments led to preferences and advocacy for non-discriminatory arms control, railing against ‘nuclear apartheid’ (Muppidi 2004). Arguments criticising Nehru’s nuclear policy for being too restrained were usually centred around hierarchy—that nuclear weapons could enhance India’s standing (Erckel 2008: 6). The mix of realism and non-violence/hierarchy-driven nuclear policy reflected an ambivalence that was said to have permeated Nehru’s foreign policy more broadly (Bandyopadhyaya 1979: 286–321). Despite this, it is clear that during this first period of post-independence nuclear policy, the anti-nuclear viewpoint dominated. Shortly after Nehru’s death, China tested a nuclear device triggering a six-month debate over nuclearisation. The Chinese challenge and its implications for Indian status and national dignity became the prime consideration proponents like scientist Homi Bhabha used to support the pro-nuclear case (Cohen 2001: 160). Underpinning the anti-nuclear case was moral aversion to the weapons, mainly due to non-violence. The actual military dimensions of India’s nuclear program figured only marginally in the debates (Cohen 2001: 160). Non-violence is also likely

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to have had an impact on sustaining a prolonged debate and in making the debate public, unlike in most countries. India had a subsequent debate in 1968–1969 over the NPT. The treaty, as with much of international law, was shaped by the interests of Great Powers. US non-proliferation interests, and the interests of other NWSs, were protected by the NPT. These interests were described in the Gilpatric Committee report which stated that ‘our (US) diplomatic and military influence would wane’ if more states had nuclear weapons (Rai 2009: 2). India is likely to have recognised this fact and seen the NPT as not genuinely aiming for global disarmament. This and the previous debate over the Chinese challenge would set the pro and anti-nuclear cases for the next two decades (Cohen 2001: 160). Nehru’s successor, Shastri (1965–1966) continued his non-violence influenced restraint with regard to nuclear policy. He resisted his own Congress Party’s pressure to build weapons capability (Subrahmanyam 1998: 27). This was prior to the NPT, and as such, the restraint against nuclear weapons development largely ‘came from within’ (Basrur 2001: 186). Following Shastri, Indira Gandhi took over and ruled from 1967 to 1977 and 1980 to 1984. Gandhi’s prime ministership saw India’s first nuclear weapons tests, exploding a device in 1974. When looking at the country’s nuclear restraint in the face of threats during the period, it seems India’s long professed nuclear reluctance was genuine and Delhi had been forced to test. Threats included those from China and its potential collaboration with Pakistan, and from the US. But rather than significantly strengthening India’s strategic position, the tests can be seen as largely symbolic, suggesting they were driven at least in part, by the need for status. Unlike every other state that had conducted a nuclear test since 1945, India did not test again or overtly weaponise for another 24 years (Abraham 2006: 8). ‘No attempt was made to incorporate nuclear weapons even conceptually into the framework of national security policy’ (Basrur 2001: 186). Instead India opted for nuclear ambiguity and waited to see how genuine the major powers were in their pledges to disarm. Non-violence continued to have an impact via a preference for a nonviolent image when compared to other nuclear states. The tests were referred to as a ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ and officially described as a ‘demonstration’ (Abraham 2006: 7–8).

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India’s ambiguity may have been due, in part, to the multiplicity of views within the country’s leadership on the utility and morality of nuclear weapons (Cohen and Frankel 1991), likely informed by non-violence. Abraham (2006: 14) describes nuclear ‘opacity’ which is an outcome of indecision at the highest political levels. During her second stint as PM, Gandhi first sanctioned another round of testing but then changed her mind, stating ‘I am basically against weapons of mass destruction’ (Chengappa 2000: 260), again revealing the preference for a non-violent image. The value of hierarchy was by this time linked to nuclear weapons, with Indian commentators often seeing attempts by outside powers to obstruct India’s nuclear advancement as trying to ‘undermine India’s stature’ (Nizamani 2000: 258; Pathak 1980).

Political Instability 1988–1998 The 1988–1998 period involved numerous changes of government with a succession of administrations under: Rajiv Gandhi 1984–1989, Vishwanath Pratap Singh 1989–1990, Chandra Shekhar 1990–1991, Narasimha Rao 1991–1996, Atal Bihari Vajpayee 1996, Haradanahalli Doddegowda Deve Gowda 1996–1997 and Inder Kumar Gujral 1997– 1998. The investigation into this period (which will not be included in full in the interest of brevity)1 identified that NP could not be explained only by security concerns, domestic politics, economic interests or internal lobbies. Values needed to be examined. Rajiv Gandhi’s prime ministership set the tone for the decade. Major changes in the strategic environment, including growing threats saw an incremental response in terms of nuclear advancement. Non-violence drove Gandhi’s overarching preference for global disarmament. The most important and iconic piece of nuclear policy of the period, and possibly within the last three decades, was the Action Plan for a Nuclear-WeaponsFree and Non-violent World Order (RGAP) which Gandhi proposed at UNGA (Gandhi 1988; Aiyar 2011). RGAP’s honouring of non-violence represents what Hudson and Sampson (1999: 668) refer to as the obeisance paid to a cultural element of an ascendant cultural story. RGAP 1 No quantitative content analysis in this case study could be undertaken as the sample sizes of statements for each administration are too small to provide meaningful data for analysis.

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provides perhaps the clearest articulation of how India’s P&Ps on nuclear policy during the period were influenced by non-violence. Its main elements included: 1. a binding commitment by all nations to eliminate nuclear weapons in stages within 22 years; 2. the participation of all NWSs in the process of nuclear disarmament, while ensuring that all other countries are also part of the process; 3. the demonstration of tangible progress at each stage towards the common goal; 4. changes are required in doctrines, policies and institutions to sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. Negotiations should be undertaken to establish a comprehensive global security system under the aegis of the UN. Gandhi dramatically confronted some of the basic values which dominated the culture of international relations at the time, suggesting a fundamental recalibration of towards ‘a system…firmly based on nonviolence’ (Mian and Nayyar 2010). A pluralistic outlook and level of tolerance were also preferences RGAP evinced—prerequisites for Gandhi’s new order to succeed in a world of competing political and economic systems. While some argue RGAP was proposed with no expectation of the international community adopting it, recent developments, including Soviet disarmament proposals and a global focus on disarmament, suggested the plan was feasible. The P&Ps articulated and demonstrated in RGAP reflected the behaviour and discourse of Indian leaders over the next decade (Regehr 2011; Gujral 1996). In the governments that followed, nuclear policy and major decisions could only be explained fully with the inclusion of values as a factor. For instance, PM V. P. Singh’s restraint in the face of an increased threat perception from Pakistan was influenced by non-violence, as were multiple leaders’ preferences for excluding the military from nuclear decision-making (see for example Gowda 1998). All governments during the period exhibited a preference for projecting a non-violent image of India and steps towards nuclear advancement were incremental. Perkovich (1999: 446) described the era as a protracted period of ‘fitful self-restraint’. India’s moral and cultural ambivalence towards nuclear weapons worked against the country taking significant steps forward

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(Perkovich 1999: 317; Chellaney 1997: 10). The decision to test was long deliberated and twice retracted. Narasimha Rao’s initial decision to test weapons was spurred by hierarchy, while his aborting of the same was significantly influenced by non-violence. Hierarchy helped drive most governments of the period to promote India’s achievements in the realm of nuclear technology, but took on a greater role shaping NP under the BJP (see Vajpayee 1996). The disarmament preference continued throughout, with the diplomatic stage time and resources expended on it pointing to Delhi’s sincerity.

BJP-Led NDA Rule Under Vajpayee 1998–2004 On 19 March 1998, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) assumed power after being elected with a slim majority and formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition. It was led by party veteran and Hindutva intellectual, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Less than two months after coming to power, the Government welcomed the auspicious day of Buddha Purnima on 11 May, when two millennia ago the Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama was born in a small kingdom straddling modern-day India and Nepal. It was on this day that Hindutva activist, L. K. Advani (2008), now Minister of Home Affairs recalled sitting in the PM’s living room: The message came, slightly before 4 pm, …: ‘Tests Successful’. India’s nuclear scientists had succeeded in conducting three simultaneous nuclear explosions, heralding India’s emergence as a nuclear weapons state. None of us in the room could control our emotions. I perhaps the weakest in this regard, had tears in my eyes.

The tests conducted at Pokhran in the deserts of Rajasthan that day were the most significant event in India’s nuclear policy since 1974. They were said to have ended the ambiguity that characterised Indian nuclear policy (Nizamani 2000). Some scholars contend that the late 1990s and early 2000s saw major pressures come upon the largely consistent, cultural values-driven nuclear policy India had held since the 1960s (Perkovich 1999: 377). They describe the restraint of the past being shoved aside by realist concerns (Karnad 2008: 1). Bajpai (2002: 291) argues that India’s strategic culture shifted in a ‘hyperrealist’ direction, prioritising the accumulation of military power.

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Several explanations for the Government’s decision to test have been offered. This includes domestic politics. Both the BJP and its leader had been affected by the premature collapse of its 1996 Government. This was compounded by the similarly vulnerable situation the Government found itself early in now (Bajpai 2009: 39). The BJP may have reasoned that testing would help its political fortunes. Boosting electoral chances, however, is unlikely to have been the major reason behind testing. The plan to explode a nuclear device had been part of the BJP’s policy long before it formed government (Swaminathan 2003). Bajpai (2009: 39) argues that Vajpayee wanted to be seen as keeping his promise of nuclear advancement to help ensure his political survival. Chakma (2005: 233), however, highlights that the top BJP leadership was aware that the tests would add little in terms of political support because BJP’s policy on the nuclear issue was already well-known. Furthermore, nuclear issues were far from being a central plank in the BJP’s electoral platform. The tests did little to improve the BJP’s overall electoral strength, only delivering a few weeks of increased popularity. The party even suffered remarkable defeats in four state elections due to the rise in onion prices which meant more to voters than demonstrations of nuclear capability (Chakma 2005: 233). National Security was not as important to India’s masses who faced daily struggles for their own security from hunger and want. Swaminathan (2003) cites the need to go to an early parliamentary election as evidence of this. BJP political analysts and pollsters would have likely predicted that testing would not impact electoral performance given the low importance voters usually place on nuclear policy. Furthermore, previous PM, Rao, had also been in a politically difficult position but had chosen not to test (Bajpai 2009: 38). Some attribute this to Rao being more risk-averse. Bajpai (2009: 38) however, suggests that Rao could have assumed greater political risk by backing away from testing. India’s pro-nuclearist scientific establishment was said to have driven the tests. The tests would have provided the AEC and DRDO with the data they needed in order to build functional nuclear weapons. Swaminathan (2003) dismisses this as the sole reason, however, due to the consistent control exerted over the scientists and military by the political leadership. With these domestic explanations failing to fully account for the decision to test, we must examine foreign causes. Realist interpretations cite

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security interests as the reason for testing. The Government itself claimed on occasion that the tests were necessitated by the regional security environment (Acharya 1999). The Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine (Draft Nuclear Doctrine or DND), released a year later explained that India’s nuclear weapons program was simply in response to the threat posed by nuclear states who believe in first use and the use of nuclear arms against non-nuclear states (MEA 1999a). PM Vajpayee himself stated in a letter to US President Clinton that China was the major threat to which Pokhran II was responding (Acharya 1999). Vajpayee described an ‘overt nuclear weapons state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962’ that ‘has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapon state’ (1998). With the power asymmetry between India and China, Delhi’s only viable counterbalance was thought to be nuclear capability (Swaminathan 2003). A former Chief of Army Staff and Member of Parliament, stated the tests were ‘a prudent measure of future insurance’ against China (Swaminathan 2003). The Defence Ministry’s Annual Report in 2001 (Kundu 2004: 30) noted the overwhelming superiority of Chinese nuclear weapons in comparison to India’s. It added that all major Indian cities are within range of Chinese missiles, and that China was cooperating with Pakistan in developing missiles and nuclear weapons. Analysis of the outcomes of Pokhran, however, reveals that India’s security vis-à-vis China was not improved by the tests. According to Perkovich (1999: 439–440), security is derived from the balance between four components—one’s own intentions and capabilities and those of one’s rivals. Amongst these components, the nuclear tests could have had the result of impacting India’s capabilities and China’s intentions. In both of these areas, however, it failed to serve India’s interests (Perkovich 1999: 439–440). Firstly, the tests had the effect of making China’s intentions towards India less peaceable (Acharya 1999). This was partly due to India’s citing of China as the reason for the tests (Chandrasekharan 1999). Furthermore, of the five NWSs, China has been the most vehement in condemning Pokhran II. The tests also threatened to alter China’s previous goal of sharply curtailing any military rivalry with India to avoid diverting resources from its longer-term security challenges in East Asia (Perkovich 1999: 440).

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Secondly, Pokhran did not increase any of the capabilities that India could meaningfully use against China (Cohen 2001: 197). Prior to the tests, India’s conventional forces were capable of successfully defending against a Chinese conventional attack (Subrahmanyam (1998). Presentation at the University of Wisconsin, 17 October). In the event they could not, India’s no-first-use policy makes it less likely that Delhi would deploy nuclear weapons following a Chinese conventional attack anyway, so they would likely be of little use. This would leave only the possibility that the nuclear weapons were aimed at deterring a Chinese nuclear first-strike. China, however, had a publicly known no-first-use policy. Even it this was deceptive, given China’s other, more important security interests, it would not risk the likely international repercussions that would occur from conducting a nuclear first-strike on India (Perkovich 1999: 439–440). Subrahmanyam (1998: 22) even stated after the May 1998 tests that it ‘is not a question of Chinese aggression or military threat’. Also, India’s nuclear arsenal would only be effective as a deterrent against a Chinese firststrike if it could survive such a strike and then deliver a counterblow against important Chinese targets. Pokhran did not add to this capability (Perkovich 1999: 439–440), despite assisting other technical and logistical improvements (Kundu 2004: 11). All these outcomes are likely to have been foreseen by India’s leaders. Strategic analysts would have predicted that the tests would not reduce the Chinese threat. Strategists and commentators at the time had not detailed exactly how the tests would add to India’s capabilities against China, or adjust China’s intentions towards India in the latter’s favour (Perkovich 1999: 439–440). The increased threat from Pakistan centred on Islamabad’s development of its nuclear and missile capability. In January 1998, just prior to India’s decision to test, news emerged of Pakistan’s new ballistic missile, the Ghauri, tested in April 1998. The Ghauri’s development was thought to have been supported by China, though later found to have been North Korean supported, potentially with Beijing’s approval (Perkovich 1999: 405). For the first time, Pakistan could deliver a nuclear warhead to India’s major cities (Perkovich 1999: 410). Years later, NSA, Brajesh Mishra claimed that the PM only decided to carry out the explosions after Pakistan’s Ghauri missile tests (Swaminathan 2003) and after Islamabad began to talk of war (‘War Threats from Pakistan Prompted India’s Nuclear Tests’, 2000, Agence France-Presse, 10

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November). India’s Pokhran tests were said to have checked the coercive power of Pakistan’s missile (Swaminathan 2003). Despite this, evidence suggests that Ghauri was not a major factor in motivating India’s tests. The BJP’s foreign policy spokesman stated that the Government had not, at the time, decided on the necessity of conducting tests and that nuclear weapons could be inducted without tests (Perkovich 1999: 413–414). Bajpai (2009: 42) views that Pokhran II had little to do with the Ghauri threat. The Pakistan threat more generally is unlikely to have been the main trigger for the tests. Applying Perkovich’s (1999: 439–440) criteria, we see Pakistan’s intentions towards India were only hardened by the tests. Just weeks after Pokhran, Pakistan tested six nuclear weapons, declaring itself an overt nuclear power (Kundu 2004: 12). This further increased the threat India faced, rather than diminish it, thereby harming strategic interests. Again, it is likely that the Indian Government’s strategic analysts would have predicted something similar to this before the tests. Indira Gandhi in the 1960s had predicted this outcome (Patil 1969: 54). Most Indian analysts failed to provide systematic assessments of precisely how nuclear capabilities could enhance security (Tellis 2001: 125). This suggests with a low priority placed on determining the tests’ advancement of India’s security interests. Another realist argument is that testing, by overtly displaying nuclear weapons would deter Pakistan. The previous strategy of ambiguity and ‘recessed deterrence’—an undeclared capability to deploy nuclear weapons at short notice which induced doubts in the minds of adversaries—was considered obsolete (Kundu 2004: 11). The added value of the 1998 tests after already testing in 1974 is, however, debatable. In any case, this motivation is unlikely as the wars between India and Pakistan prior to the nuclear tests only occurred under extreme provocation (Swaminathan 2003). Swaminathan (2003) argues that while nuclear weapons may deter nuclear attacks or ‘unacceptable’ levels of provocation, they fail to prevent limited, localised wars and low-intensity conflicts, common to the subcontinent. The Government may have also felt Pakistan would respond with tests of its own and this nuclear parity could lead to stability and decreased risk of war (see Waltz 1993). Analysts have, however, called into doubt the suggestion that decision-makers in either India or Pakistan believed that nuclear weapons would ‘protect them from each other’ (Swaminathan 2003). This criticism is vindicated by the outbreak of the Kargil conflict in the year following Pokhran

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(Kundu 2004: 16). Furthermore, India and Pakistan could not accept a doctrine of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction (MAD) because both countries’ arsenals were quite limited (Coll 1991). Had security considerations been behind the tests, the decision is likely to have been the product of rational strategic assessment. Evidence suggests, however, the decision to test was not strategically vetted and the PM did not have a specific nuclear doctrine in mind when he authorised the tests (Perkovich 1999: 412, 432). There still remained no coherent, analytically buttressed national security strategy (Perkovich 1999: 438– 439). The tests did little to change India’s war-fighting doctrine (Kundu 2004: 33). Prior to the tests, the PM had designated a task force to prepare recommendations for the constitution of a National Security Council (NSC) which would undertake a Strategic Defence Review (Perkovich 1999: 411). Despite promising otherwise, however, Vajpayee went ahead with the tests before any review could take place. The Government could have waited for the Review to be completed and still conducted the tests prior to the entry into force of the CTBT but chose not to (Perkovich 1999: 409). Testing prior to a strategic review suggests that the tests and were not for strategic purposes. The nation’s strategic experts were not consulted on the tests. Those scientists and engineers who spearheaded the pro-nuclear drive were not experts in military-strategic affairs or international relations. They had no specialist insight into how nuclear weapons would affect India’s relationships with Pakistan, China, the US and others (Perkovich 1999: 438–439). Even if one accepts that nuclear weapons furthered India’s security interests, the tests themselves are argued to have been unnecessary for the induction of nuclear weapons. Home Minister, L. K. Advani had later admitted, that scientific experts had advised him as much (Perkovich 1999: 407). Furthermore, testing supported the development of the hydrogen bomb not something that most Indian strategists, including K. Sundarji (1996: 18), thought necessary for deterrence. Perkovich (1999: 432) surmises that some of India’s pro-nuclear analysts would find justifications and strategic imperatives for the H-bomb only after testing. This raises questions about the authenticity of the security justifications. Furthermore, India’s scientists were said to have desired to develop a full suite of strategic weapons associated with being a major military power

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(Perkovich 1999: 413–414), rather than developing weapons for strategic or any other material purposes, which would then have the by-product of making India a major power. Another factor in any realist rational calculation deciding to test is the economic cost. These also seemed to have been largely ignored, with economic experts not being consulted. This is despite the Finance Ministry estimating the cost of the tests due to international sanctions would be $3 billion (Perkovich 1999: 412; Kundu 2004: 33). With most of the claimed security objectives for conducting the tests not being achieved, it may have been possible that the BJP Government and scientists simply miscalculated. The lack of attempted strategic assessment, however, suggests that material objectives were never the sole reason for testing. While each one of the above explanations sheds light on some motivating factors, they cannot provide a full account.2 Hierarchy It is likely that there were other reasons behind testing, and behind India’s nuclear policy more generally under the BJP—reasons that lay in ‘less explicit intuitions, desires, and aims’ (Perkovich 1999: 441, 447). To understand these, we must consider what neoclassical realists refer to as ‘unit-level variables’. We must consider culture. At the very least, cultural values are likely to have complemented any strategic drivers behind Delhi’s nuclear policy. State Behaviour Testing to Climb International Hierarchy The value of hierarchy played a central role in the decision to test. This was largely through the aforementioned hierarchical worldview perception and its related preference for high standing internationally. While leaders’ felt that Indians themselves believed their country was already a genuinely great power (Nizamani 2000: 67), there was a need for the world to recognise this. To a far greater degree than all previous administrations, the BJP saw nuclear weapons as an avenue for doing this. The tests were the BJP’s way of achieving this international status for India 2 Other possible reasons relate to the CTBT, pressures of coalition government, and changing global relations beyond nuclear threats. These, however, are not widely cited by scholars or policymakers and/or fall into the broader reasons already described.

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(Swaminathan 2003). They were a ‘bold statement’ (Perkovich 1999: 438–439). Chakma states that nuclear weapons may deliver higher status from ‘military power nuclear weapons inherently add, from scientific and industrial strength associated with nuclear forces and from the increased great power attention’ (2005: 190). Pokhran II had far greater symbolic implications, removing any ambiguity about India’s nuclear status, than the country declaring itself a nuclear weapons state (Jasjit Singh 2013: 766–779). This was particularly salient to the BJP, given its faith in India’s ‘destiny’ to be a major power (Swaminathan 2003) with nuclear weapons linked to a powerful Hindu India (Nizamani 2000: 64). NSA Mishra and many Indian analysts felt that possession of nuclear weapons conferred a degree of recognition and status (Sanghvi 2000; Swaminathan 2003). ‘Self-confidence’ was the main theme of public discussions of the tests (Varadarajan 2004: 330). This contrasts with other states. Israel’s nuclear ambiguity is deliberate, deterring adversaries while enabling claims to be a victim under threat, particularly in the eyes of key Western audiences. India’s conception of nuclear weapons as a pathway for establishing international prestige, contrasts to Pakistan’s incorporation the weapons into practical military strategy (‘Pak Moving Ahead of India in Nuke Capability’, 2002, The Press Trust of India, 25 March). On the other hand, Britain and France were likened to India as states who sought nuclear weapons to raise status (Chakma 2005: 190). The tests were meant to and did, play a greater symbolic role than serve any practical strategic objective. The Prime Minister stated: India has never considered military might as the ultimate measure of national strength. …I would therefore say that the greatest meaning of the [nuclear] tests is that they have given India shakti, they have given India strength, they have given India self-confidence. (Vajpayee 1998)

Perkovich (1999: 441) states ‘the desire for international standing and autonomy explained the nuclear tests better than a specific security explanation’. Tellis (2001) argues that along with security, the tests gave India a nuclear capability which provided status and prestige. In an extensive examination of the decision to test, Perkovich (1999: 439) offers seven objectives or preferences which the tests were aimed at achieving or at least, not detracting from. Of these, five are due, at least in part, to the cultural values of hierarchy and non-violence, though

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not recognised explicitly by Perkovich (1999). The hierarchical worldview led to preferences for: winning recognition of India as a major power; matching China in terms of ascendance, status and strategic deterrence and reasserting technological and strategic superiority over Pakistan. India’s leaders perceived China and Pakistan as not only the main strategic rivals, but also major competitors for status. The perception that China had already beaten India in this race may have ‘alarmed Indian officials so much so that they saw nuclear weapons as a way of symbolically equalizing’ (Perkovich 1999: 441). As with the previous BJP government, India was seen as too far behind on the painstakingly slow economic route to status and needed to take the shortcut of nuclear weapons. India’s leaders would have also wished to rise above and escape comparisons of their country to ‘lowly’ Pakistan (Cohen 2001: 26). The motivation for the development of the H-bomb was something to ‘put Pakistan in its place’ (Perkovich 1999: 431). The fixation with status and hierarchy can also be seen in India’s dealings with the US regarding the tests. India refrained from requesting meetings with the Americans for its envoy, Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Singh, for fear of being rejected and losing face. When Singh finally met with US Deputy Secretary of State, Talbott in June 1998, Talbott was said to have given India the level of attention and ‘respect’ it had considered vital and that had been absent in earlier dealings (Perkovich 1999: 435–436). The hierarchical worldview which motivated the tests seemed to be reinforced by it as well. Following Pokhran, a permanent seat on the UNSC was seen as not just an objective, but as India’s ‘rightful due’ (Ogden 2011: 295). Technical Prowess One way in which India would rise up the hierarchy through Pokhran was by demonstrating its technological prowess (Cohen 2001: 168). This was a key motivator for the tests. Technology was particularly salient to India’s leaders’ perception of status because of its association with intellectual achievement and education—aspects associated with the top of the hierarchy within Indian culture. The extent of this as a motivator can be seen in the Government’s need to emphasise the technological achievements of the tests. Of particular note is the reaction to Western experts publicly doubting the levels of yield that India had claimed. The AEC Chairman ‘bristled at the lack

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of respect’ (Perkovich 1999: 426). The Chairman and others went to great lengths to allay the West’s doubts (Chidambaram 1999; Bakshi et al. 1998: 324). This included even issuing contradictory statements (see: ‘Weaponisation not complete, say scientists’, 1998, Hindu, 18 May; Albright 1998: 21; Perkovich 1999: 427). The nuclear establishment also tried to claim that the yield of the 1974 blast was significantly higher than former leaders were said to have disclosed in private (Perkovich 1999: 428). Further evidence can be seen in India’s reiterations that its nuclear accomplishments were the results of indigenous efforts (‘No clandestine procurements: AEC chairman’, 2001, Press Trust of India, 30 August; ‘No review of n-weapons policy: Chidambaram’, 2001, Hindu, 16 November; ‘Pokhran-II tests fulfilled all objectives’, 2001, Hindu, 21 July). These were a continuous theme before and after the Pokhran II tests. It is also demonstrated in the importance placed on the country’s developing an H-bomb. Anti-colonial Sentiment The hierarchy-driven need for status was intensified by the national experience of colonialism. The BJP Government wanted to send the message that India could no longer be pushed around (Khare 1998: 11; ‘India Conducts 3 Underground N-Tests’, 1998, Hindustan Times, 12 May). America’s and the international community’s reaction to the tests were said to have revived colonial memories for BJP senior figure and soon to be EAM, Jaswant Singh, and others (Perkovich 1999: 436). Many have argued that India’s behaviour and identity must be understood as specifically postcolonial (Muppidi 2004; Krishna 1999). Public Though, as mentioned, electoral gain was not the main driver of testing, hierarchy played a role in driving leaders’ perceptions that the Indian people wanted a shortcut to international status (Perkovich 1999: 441)and that achieving a ‘great India’ is important to voters (Kundu 2004: 10). In particular, the BJP base had to be placated after the party’s backing away from its more extremist Hindutva policies regarding Article 370 and building a Hindu temple at Ayodhya. Quickly delivering international status through nuclear weapons was the means to do this (Perkovich 1999: 409).

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Response of International Community While the domestic public and media reacted positively towards the tests, the international community reacted negatively in the immediate term. There was almost universal condemnation and the US and Japan imposed sanctions. Whether India rose up the international hierarchy in the eyes of other states and publics is of course subjective and debatable. Perkovich (1999: 43–441) claims that those who supposedly confer status had, for the most part, ‘seen India’s attempt to take a shortcut to major power status as a detour’. Ogden (2011: 295) meanwhile, states that the tests, through making India’s nuclear status more overt and thereby making clear the desire to be a Great Power, transformed the country’s global relations. This seems to have been true vis-à-vis the US in the medium term. America refocused attention on the region and the two countries held the longest high-level dialogue since 1963 (Ogden 2011: 296). Therefore, while none of the major, proffered security objectives were achieved by the tests, the hierarchy-driven objective for rising in status seemed to have been partially achieved—albeit indirectly. The US accepted the new significance of India, not only due to its growing economic power but also its loudly self-proclaimed nuclear capabilities (Ogden 2011: 296). Perkovich (1999: 417) states that from the standpoint of the status it yielded, India’s tests could be seen to make nuclear weapons more attractive to others. Hierarchy Beyond Pokhran Hierarchy’s influence continued throughout BJP rule. In relation to the Ghauri missile test by Pakistan, hierarchy-driven perceptions had an impact which negatively influenced India’s security interests. Initially the test had been thought a hoax due to a lack of intelligence about them. However, it was also due to the ‘general Indian contempt for Pakistan’s technical capabilities’ (Perkovich 1999: 410). This can also be seen in India’s strategic enclave vehemently denying that it competed with Pakistan (ibid.). During the tensions following the parliament attacks in 2001, India repeatedly rejected Pakistan’s proposal that both states abandon nuclear weapons. This was partly due to the hierarchical perception that India was incomparable to Pakistan. India’s strategic elite is said to have been embarrassed and even angered by comparisons with smaller South Asian neighbours (Cohen 2001: 26). India is perceived as a great power in the

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same league as the US, Russia and China, and as such should maintain nuclear weapons like these powers. The perception of incomparability with Pakistan is also seen in the aftermath of the Parliament attacks. India moved to an even more restrained and more conciliatory approach because leaders felt that the country could not take its rightful place in the world as a great power while bogged down by conflict with the regional thorn in its side— Pakistan (Kundu 2004: 31–32, 34). This presents the possibility that nuclear weapons’ status function was more important than security interests vis-à-vis Pakistan. If security were more important, and even accepting that India’s weapons were primarily aimed at China, Delhi could at least offer to consider sacrificing them for the strategic payoff of Pakistan doing the same, leaving India with its conventional weapons advantage over Pakistan. Discourse Nizamani (2000: 144) states that India’s dominant nuclear discourse portrays the country as a worthy great power that is not given its due place in the international hierarchy. Rather than being aimed at achieving security by projecting an image of power, the nature of the discourse suggests that status is an end in itself. NSA Mishra stated ‘I have always felt that you cannot in today’s world be counted for something without going nuclear’ (Sanghvi 2000). President Kalam, speaking about India’s nuclear program announced that ‘Strength respects strength. Unless we have strength we are not respected’ (‘Unless India Has Strength It Would Not Be Respected’, 2002, Press Trust of India, 15 December). In fact, of the 95 official speeches and media releases which refer to nuclear weapons during the NDA’s reign, there were around 32 mentions of India’s status in the international hierarchy, see Table 3.1: Pokhran II The discourse justifying the Pokhran II tests presents perhaps the most important example of hierarchy driving India’s nuclear policy. Most significantly, it is evident in the rhetoric of the small circle of key nuclear decision-makers. PM Vajpayee couched the explosions in terms of India’s rise in the global order (1998: 28). He states ‘Millions of Indians have viewed this occasion as the beginning of the rise of a strong and self-confident India. I fully share this assessment and this

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Table 3.1 Statements indicating hierarchy-driven P&Ps (BJP 1998–2004) P&P

Number

Perception that nuclear weapons development represents scientific achievement Perception that nuclear weapons/posture bring India higher global standing/Preference for using it for this end Perception that India is superior to Pakistan in nuclear matters Hierarchy in general related to nuclear weapons Total number of unique statements for Hierarchy Total number of references to nuclear policy

16 13 1 2 32 357

dream’. He emphasises the status-obtaining nature of India’s weapons ‘India has never considered military might as the ultimate measure of national strength…I would, therefore, say that the greatest meaning of the tests is that…they have given India strength, they have given India self-confidence’ (Vajpayee 1998). Years after the tests, Home Minister Advani (2008) reflected sentimentally, ‘Our government’s greatest achievement was instilling a sense of pride, confidence and hope in Indians, both within and outside India. A major contributor to this national resurgence was of course, a historic event that took place on May 11, 1998, confirming our resolve to make India “shaktishali” (strong), “samruddha” (prosperous) and “swabhimani” (self-confident)’. He stated ‘primary aim of [the] tests was to make Indians self-confident’ (Nizamani 2000). Jaswant Singh emphasised India’s deserved place at the top of the world hierarchy in an interview in the US. This statement was all the more relevant to India’s prestige given that it was directed at a foreign audience. ‘All that we have done is give ourselves a degree of strategic autonomy by acquiring those symbols of power…which have universal currency…A country the size of India – not simply a sixth of the human race, but also an ancient Civilization-cannot in this fashion abdicate its responsibility’ (Singh 1998). Hierarchy is also seen in leaders’ preferences on how the tests were sold to the public. On the first anniversary of Pokhran, the day was given the title of ‘Resurgent India Day’. While security is stated as the justification for the tests, on numerous occasions in the years after Pokhran, key nuclear decision-makers—the PM, EAM and NSA—followed mention of the tests with statements recounting India’s climb up the global hierarchy. These included stating

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that: India’s global prestige had risen (Vajpayee 2001b, 2003); the country had gained autonomy (Sinha 2002a, b); India had emerged as a key global player (Sinha 2002c) and other countries now better appreciated India’s views and concerns (Sinha 2002c; Mishra 2003; Vajpayee 2001a). This reflects a view, implied if not overt, that the tests played some role in India’s rise up this hierarchy. While soon after testing there were some references to deterrence as a use for nuclear weapons, these reduced substantially a few years after the tests. The tests were also seen to remedy the problem of India being seen as ‘soft’ or ‘weak’. While non-violence was still maintained as an important value for India to hold, ‘softness’ or ‘weakness’ was not deemed a natural result of it. The latter was thought to have negative impacts on the country’s international status. Defence Minister Fernandes stated following the tests and the launch of Agni II, that India has been transformed from ‘a soft state’ into a ‘strong’ one (‘Security Must Be Assessed, Says Fernandes’, 1999, Hindu, 29 April). Hierarchy also influenced support for the tests by those outside the core decision-making circle. Former Foreign Secretary Dixit, declared the explosions would ‘infuse India with a great sense of confidence and pride’ (Narayanan 1998). Even the pro-nuclear ‘weaponeers’ (Perkovich 1999: 427) from the nuclear scientific establishment seemed to have been aiming more at raising India’s standing than pursuing the country’s strategic interests. There was also an intensification of India’s leaders’ hierarchical worldview in the discourse justifying the tests. Jaswant Singh made numerous overt references to India not being prepared to accept colonialism anymore (Perkovich 1999: 436). Technical Achievement India’s leaders perceived that the country could rise up the world hierarchy by demonstrating its technical prowess in the nuclear realm. At least 16 references to scientific achievement in the context of nuclear weapons were found. Nuclear weapons were included in lists of India’s technological achievements (Vajpayee 2001a; Kalam 2002). India was said to have ‘made its mark’ in the international arena (Kalam 2002). Vajpayee (2002) paid homage to Homi Bhabha, one of India’s pioneering nuclear scientists speaking of ‘stellar achievements’, ‘hundreds of other innovations’ and ‘greater heights of innovation and achievement’. He encouraged this ‘great legacy’ of achievement to be carried forward. The PM asked that

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nuclear scientific achievements are always kept ‘relevant and responsive to national needs and aspirations’. These aspirations of course include India’s aim to rise up the global hierarchy. The EAM stated ‘Our…nuclear science… and other high-tech capabilities are a matter of pride’ (Sinha 2003a). In addition to ‘Resurgent India Day’, the anniversary of the tests was also labelled ‘National Technology Day’. Of key importance in India’s nuclear-derived prestige is the fact that its accomplishments were wholly indigenous. This is mentioned at least five times in official statements and speeches (see Vajpayee 2002; Kalam 2003; Mishra 2003). The EAM states ‘We have developed our technology indigenously. We did not have to go and borrow. Our technology is…our own’ (Sinha 2002c). Had the publicising of India’s nuclear advancement been for deterrence/security purposes, it would matter somewhat less that the technology had no foreign assistance. Conceptions of Others Hierarchy also influenced Indian leaders’ perceptions of other states on nuclear weapons matters. India’s nuclearisation was seen as befitting of a great power, rather than seen as aggression against its neighbours. Nizamani (2000: 67) states that within the dominant discourse, it was standard to dismiss neighbours’ fears of India as paranoia and figments of their imagination. This belief is further compounded by leaders’ perception of India as a non-violent power. In contrast to India’s nuclear program, Pakistan’s was couched as: supported by outsiders as the country is clearly incapable of technological achievement itself; and aimed at attaining a higher international status for itself than it deserves. The MEA’s official statement on Pakistani missile tests in 2002 included ‘…we are not particularly impressed with these missile antics of Pakistan…Pakistan’s missiles are based on clandestinely imported materials…and technology’ (MEA 2002). The Reforming the National Security System report states that Pakistan’s ‘traditional hostility and single-minded aim of destabilising India, is…focused…on a search for parity’. Pakistani efforts are seen as aimed at reducing India’s international ranking, rather than merely focused on strategic gains in Kashmir. Using the language of hierarchy, it states ‘Pakistan believes that nuclear weapons can compensate for conventional military inferiority’ (Ministry of Defence 2001: 9–10).

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Hierarchy and the Media The hierarchical worldview also influenced broad support for the tests from the Indian media (United States Information Agency 1998; Perkovich 1999: 377). This reflected and likely reinforced hierarchydriven P&Ps among BJP leaders. The tests were thought to have brought ‘national self-respect’ (Nizamani 2000: 64). Pokhran II was said to be a landmark moment in the narrative of India that sees the country as a ‘great power’, worthy of respect by its neighbours (Nizamani 2000: 64). The tests had been dubbed ‘explosions of self-esteem’ and ‘megatonnes of prestige’ (Mitra 1998: 1; Shiva 2005: 42). The little negative coverage of the tests was also mainly couched in terms of status, rather than in material costs (for instance: Vanaik 1998 and ‘Pokhran Quick Fix’, 1998, Times of India, 14 May). The media sources holding these views are likely to have subscribed to the aforementioned Nehruvian conception of hierarchy, where status is tied to the value of non-violence. Ramanna, who had presided over the production of India’s first nuclear bomb, stated that the prestige-related aims of the tests had not been achieved (Perkovich 1999: 441). Non-violence While changing the nature of non-violence’s influence, the BJP’s tough talk and testing of weapons did not constitute a major detour when it came to continuing adherence to the value.3 In fact, behind the Hindutva bravado, there was still an overwhelming force calling for a restrained approach in military affairs and nuclear weapons in particular. Tellis (2001) argues that India’s ‘force-in-being’ nuclear capability following the tests (with dispersed nuclear components, only assembled during a supreme emergency), while delivering status, also allowed the Government to simultaneously exhibit restraint. Non-violence influenced the perception of nuclear weapons as pathways to achieve status in the international hierarchy rather than a tool to inflict violence during war, and the resulting lack of incorporation of the weapons into a comprehensive strategic doctrine for most of the period. The BJP maintained the non-violence-driven P&Ps of previous administrations, including: support for global disarmament, general restraint (to a

3 See Singh (2013: 766–779).

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lesser degree), non-proliferation (to a lesser degree), no-first-use and nonuse against non-nuclear states (both of which reduced the strategic ‘threat value’ of nuclear weapons and projected an image of non-violence), and exclusion of the military. These were maintained in the face of increased threat perceptions. No-first-use, for instance, has been maintained despite critics suggesting it restricts New Delhi’s options in a conflict with Pakistan (Dalton 2019). If Islamabad believed its various conventional and hybrid warfare actions might provoke India to use nuclear weapons first this would strengthen India’s stated strategic objective of deterrence. Furthermore, using nuclear weapons early in a conflict could effectively destroy Pakistan’s limited nuclear forces before they could be used against India. The BJP continued previous governments’ preference for global disarmament, though it was not as overt about it Congress (‘Bharatiya Janata Party Manifesto’, 1996, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 10 May, p. 11). Total abolition continued to be India’s central goal globally (Singh 2013: 773). Even back in 1996, prior to the BJP’s election, it cited the need for other nuclear powers to agree to time-bound disarmament when arguing why it would not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) (‘Opposition Party Backs Indian Nuclear ‘Sword’, 1996, Washington Times, 8 April, p. A10). Vajpayee stated that he expected Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs) to begin the elimination of their arsenals, and if not, India would do ‘whatever is required’ to safeguard its security (Raghuvanshi 1996). Conventional thinking would suggest that India would do what is required to preserve its security first and foremost, not only because NWSs failed to begin disarmament. Instead, we see that security interests implied as secondary to the disarmament preference. The BJP’s continuation of the preference for restraint is seen through comparing its lack of significant divergence from previous administrations, comparisons with Pakistan, responses to domestic pressures, the nuclear command structure and its response to perceived increased threats from China and Pakistan. State Behaviour Lack of Divergence While the Pokhran tests were touted as the high mark of the BJP’s divergence in nuclear policy, it was Congress Governments that had laid the technological foundations for the tests and planned to test themselves.

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PM Rao had informed Vajpayee that the bomb was ready when the latter took the office in 1996 (Malhotra 2004). Even changes in India’s nuclear doctrine were not so drastic as to throw off the influence of non-violence. India moved from ‘minimum deterrence’—broadly defined as a level that threatens the lowest amount of damage needed to prevent attack, with the fewest number of nuclear weapons possible (Basrur 2009: 25)—to the more elastic and sophisticated concept ‘credible minimum deterrence’ (CMD) (Karnad 2008: 2). This involved a consensus on the staged build-up of 200 nuclear weapons (Karnad 2008: 2). Nevertheless, it also included—as mentioned by Vajpayee post-tests—a statement that tests were not essential for deterrence, affirmation of the no-first-use policy, and a reiteration that disarmament and arms control were still priorities. In October 1998, India introduced a resolution to the UN’s Committee on Disarmament titled ‘Reducing Nuclear Danger’ which demonstrated India’s fear that ‘the hair-trigger posture of nuclear forces carries…risk of…accidental use…’ (Prasad 2006a). Furthermore, defence spending as a percentage of GDP was on average 2.93%, slightly less than the 3.0% average of the ten years prior to the BJP’s rule (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2012). Defence spending as a proportion of total government spending was also largely consistent with that of the decade before BJP rule (2012: 32). India’s relative restraint under the NDA administration can also be seen in comparisons with Pakistan. India was assessed by Jane’s Intelligence Review in both 2001 (Koch 2001) and 2002 (‘Pak Moving Ahead of India in Nuke Capability’, 2002, The Press Trust of India, 25 March) as adopting a slower pace in weapons development than its neighbour. Pakistan had been quicker in deciding on, completing and implementing delivery systems, evolving procedures, tactics and doctrine for nuclear use, as well as for ensuring effective control over nuclear forces. Pakistan actually overtook India in nuclear capability following the 1998 tests. India’s slower progress seems to have been by choice rather than necessity, an example being the decision not to nuclearise the country’s sea force despite having the capability to do so (‘No Plan to Nuclearize Indian Ships Yet—Navy Chief Singh’, 2003, BBC Monitoring International Reports, 13 August). The Government’s restraint can be seen in the average level of defence spending as a percentage of GDP being lower than Pakistan’s, in line with previous Indian governments. The NDA’s 2.93% average during its

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rule was significantly less than Pakistan’s 3.9% during the same period (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2012). When looking at defence expenditure as a proportion of total government spending India spent less than Pakistan every year from 1998 to 2001, by roughly 8% each year (Kundu 2004: 32). The discrepancy cannot be explained as the result of Pakistan having a significantly smaller GDP and government expenditure, and therefore having to spend a greater proportion of it on defence. For instance, the US—a country with a larger GDP—spent 3.3% on defence during the 1998–2004 period, higher than India. While true that the US has a greater military presence globally, it also faced less direct strategiclevel threats for most of the period. If we compare increases in defence spending with China—another fast growing economy, but with a larger GDP—India’s restraint is even clearer. Throughout BJP rule China’s defence spending saw a 2.13 fold increase while India only saw a 1.47 fold increase. Over a broader time period, from 1989–2012, we see a 9 fold increase in China’s spending compared to a 2.4 fold increase by India. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2012). Opinions of the Public, Strategic Elite and Opposition Alongside the preference for testing, the public were concerned, to a certain extent, that the BJP’s decision to test and subsequent bellicose statements would undermine India’s existing normative identity (Perkovich 1999: 422–423). A poll conducted in 1998 showed that support for the nuclear tests fell from 91% in May just after Pokhran, to 44% (Perkovich 1999: 439). Strategic elites were also found to prefer restraint (Basrur 2001: 191). The BJP Government responded to these opinions soon after the tests through discourse and through a moratorium on further tests, and subsequently to translate this into a ‘formal obligation’ through negotiations with other countries (‘After the storm, India edges towards nuclear compromise’, 1998, Agence France-Presse, New Delhi, 23 May). These actions are likely to also have been the result of leaders themselves having a preference for India to not divert too far from its traditional non-violent image. Non-violence inspired criticisms of the tests by opposition Congress and Left Wing parties. The Government’s response suggested it preferred to maintain a non-violent image. Vajpayee was dismayed by the attacks

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(Burns 1998: 3). Many Government members tempered their earlier arguments (Perkovich 1999: 424). Nuclear Command Structure Non-violence influenced for a preference for restricting the circle of nuclear policymakers. The value helped BJP leaders to recognise the gravity of nuclear weapons. Only the highest office-holders in the country should be involved in deciding on how and if weapons should be used (Nizamani 2000: 48) largely Vajpayee, his closest adviser Mishra (Bajpai 2009: 40) and a few senior BJP leaders (Perkovich 1999: 404). The decision to test involved consulting only Mishra, senior members of the nuclear scientific establishment and a few party members (Chengappa 2000: 29–30). Other parties within the NDA coalition were not consulted (Perkovich 1999: 404). Like previous governments, leaders held a perception that nuclear weapons could not be used in war and thereby a preference for not including them in a strategic command structure. This perception relates to the broader aversion to large-scale destruction during war (Bhimaya 1994: 644–645; Basrur 2001). India’s weapons were largely symbolic. At the very least, this demonstrates that the BJP’s nuclear policy did not contravene non-violence. The value of hierarchy had provided impetus to develop and test weapons to achieve status, rather than any strategic military goal. Non-violence then restricted these weapons to this symbolic task and further reduced the option, in the minds of leaders, of their actual use as tools in war. The chief of India’s integrated defence staff stated that ‘it defies logic that a country of this size…should not have a nuclear command and control structure’. He added that that India’s nuclear arsenal is a ‘political’ one and ‘not intended to be a military one’ (Roche 2002). An Indian army general stated ‘the task of India’s nuclear force will be to deter…as nuclear weapons are not war fighting weapons’ (Bedi 2001). Tellis (2001) states the tests took India’s nuclear policy to a compromise somewhere between a recessed deterrent and a ready arsenal. India’s nuclear capability after testing was still short of a ‘ready arsenal’—a nuclear force consisting of a sizable weapons cache maintained by the military, including in peacetime, and ready for immediate use (Tellis 2001). He describes this nuclear policy as growing out of a very specific doctrinal conception of the value of nuclear weapons as political instruments rather than tools of defence.

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India’s non-violence-driven perception that nuclear weapons are not usable tools is evident in comparisons with Pakistan. India’s comparative slowness at achieving operational nuclear capability was attributed by Jane’s Intelligence Review to a political leadership that did not regard nuclear weapons as useable instruments in the battlefield (Koch 2001). Meanwhile Pakistan’s weapons were more fully incorporated into the country’s overall military strategy (‘Pak Moving Ahead of India in Nuke Capability’, 2002, The Press Trust of India, 25 March). India’s non-incorporation of nuclear weapons into a command structure was done, in part, by excluding the military, in contrast to Pakistan (Koch 2001). The military was largely excluded from the decision to test (Kundu 2004: 34). The chiefs of the armed services were only informed a day before the tests (Nizamani 2000: 63). Even Defence Minister, George Fernandes, had not been informed beforehand (Perkovich 1999: 408). There was no consultation with the armed forces on the eventual deployment of nuclear weapons prior to the tests (Kundu 2004:34). Retired AEC chairman P. K. Iyengar stated years later that to ensure near-instant retaliation in case of an attack, and thereby have effective deterrence (the professed purpose of India’s nuclear arsenal), the entire system of nuclear deterrence should be put at the disposal of the armed forces. Instead of this, an objective considered during the tests was to maintain civilian control over nuclear weapons. India’s post-Pokhran II nuclear policy avoided any weakening of the long tradition of strict civilian control over the military (Tellis 2001). The exclusion of the military was furthered by the non-violence-driven cautiousness in relation to the institution. This is evident in the Government’s broader relations with the military. The military was in need of significantly greater financial resources to modernise its forces (Perkovich 1999: 413). It was not given control over its budget and had little autonomy. This is in stark contrast to Pakistan during civilian rule, where the armed forces had a major input in the country’s formal nuclear war-fighting strategy. When the NSC was created after the tests, in November 1998, it maintained a civilian hierarchy of expertise including key ministers with Principal Secretary Mishra named NSA (Kundu 2004: 12). A Strategic Policy Group was also set up. Still like in the past, no single entity emerged with sufficient power to enable long-term strategy and implementation (Perkovich 1999: 451).

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It was only in September 2002, after decades of inaction, that the chief of India’s armed forces announced the incorporation of nuclear weapons with other military assets into a single command structure (Roche 2002). Later in 2003 was there an announcement of a new Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), responsible for the management of India’s tactical and strategic nuclear weapons (Kundu 2004: 34). It comprised a political council chaired by the PM, still the only person able to authorise use. The NCA maintained tradition with further transfer of control away from the armed forces (‘No Squabbling for Nuclear Button: India’s Chief Commander’, 2003, Agence France-Presse, 16 January). The preference for minimising the military’s role can also be seen in the Government’s efforts to establish a national security doctrine. A Government-tasked group of senior ministers reviewing national security recommended establishing a post of Chief of Defence Service (CDS)—a single head of the defence forces. While all of the group’s other recommendations were accepted by the Cabinet Committee on Security, the Committee promised to only decide on the CDS after consulting both within and outside the Government (Pandit 2004). The CDS was rejected because of the power it would carry (Kundu 2004: 19; Pandit 2004; ‘Navy Chief Says No to CDS’, 2001, Statesman, 18 May). It was feared too radical a change to India’s tradition in civil–military relations. Increased threats were perceived from Pakistan and China during the period. Realist explanations would predict an increase in pro-nuclear state behaviour driven by strategic interests. The Government’s restrained response, however, points towards the influence of non-violence. Kargil Conflict From May to July 1999, goodwill following the Lahore Declaration plummeted when India and Pakistan had their first armed conflict as overt nuclear powers. The US blamed Pakistan for infiltrating the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC) (Clinton 2004). The conflict raised the threat India perceived from Pakistan, particularly when the latter’s foreign secretary insinuated that his country would use nuclear weapons against an Indian conventional force. This threat was confirmed by reports that US intelligence had detected Pakistan preparing for deployment of nuclear weapons against India when Pakistani defeat looked possible. In the face of this threat, India displayed restraint in its military action, including refraining from crossing the LOC itself (Mohan 1999; Basrur 2001: 194).

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The Pakistani leadership (Army Chief) declared that India did not ‘dare not attack Pakistan because of the fear of a nuclear strike’ (Hoodbhoy 1998: 78). If this is correct, it suggests a greater aversion to the violence of nuclear war by Indian leaders than by Pakistani leaders. As dictated by India’s publicised doctrine of second strike, Islamabad’s use of nuclear weapons against India would have resulted in Indian nuclear retaliation. This would mean that Pakistan would also suffer a nuclear attack should the conflict escalate in the manner predicted by Pakistani analysts. Pakistan is also likely to have fared worse, with India being able to absorb an attack while Pakistan was likely to face state failure. Despite this, Pakistani leaders were more willing to risk escalation. These differing levels of aversion cannot be explained by strategic interests and are likely to be at least partially due to non-violence. An alternate explanation suggests even greater restraint on India’s part. India’s perceptions may have been that its conventional superiority was sufficient to counter Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability, but it nevertheless maintained restraint. Analysts have stated that Pakistan’s expectations of the extent to which nuclear weapons can deter an Indian conventional attack were not mirrored by reality (Ahmed 2000: 791). This explanation is supported by the way the conflict concluded—with a ‘hard-pressed’ Pakistan approaching the US to mediate an end to the fighting (Ahmed 2000: 789). The US acted on the proviso that Pakistan withdraw behind the LOC. Pakistan was ultimately forced into an unconditional withdrawal (Ahmed 2000: 788–789). This suggests India’s restraint was driven by a preference to avoid violent conflict. This could not have been because of tactical reasons, given that India’s forces were capable of defeating Pakistan. Rather, it is likely due, at least in part, to the value of non-violence. Whether it was a greater preference to avoid nuclear confrontation, or to avoid any conflict at all that caused India’s restraint, it is clear that there is a predisposition amongst India’s leaders against large-scale violence in war (Basrur 2001). This bias has also been evident from India’s restrained conduct in all its other wars with Pakistan (Bhimaya 1994: 644–645). It is also evident from Kargil, that the influence of non-violence on India’s leaders was greater than on their Pakistani counterparts. This included indirect influence, through Indian leaders’ preference for maintaining a non-violent image impacting nuclear rhetoric and military action.

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Parliament Attacks and Border Build-up Further evidence of non-violence can be seen in India’s response, in terms of its nuclear policy, to the increased threat perceived from Pakistan with the December 2001 attacks on India’s parliament and the ensuing tensions. India’s non-violence-driven nuclear policy is seen in the contrast in rhetoric and state behaviour between itself and Pakistan. Non-violence affected India’s restraint and the image it wished to portray. The Parliament attacks were thought to have occurred with the consent of those in high levels of the Pakistani army and Government (‘Parliament Attack: Advani Points Towards Neighbouring Country’, 2001, Rediff , 14 December). During the first few months of 2002, tensions grew. Both countries amassed troops along the border and testfired missiles, which in Pakistan’s case were capable of carrying nuclear warheads. India’s perception of the increased nuclear threat from Pakistan is likely to have been accurate. Among Western circles, the danger of the conflict becoming nuclear was seen as mainly coming from Pakistan. The CIA stated that ‘If India were to conduct large-scale offensive operations into Pakistani Kashmir, Pakistan might retaliate with strikes of its own in the belief that its nuclear deterrent would limit the scope of an Indian counterattack’ (‘Annan Offers UN Help to India, Pak to Resume Dialogue’, 2002, The Press Trust of India, 7 February). Pakistan’s comparative conventional weakness put the country ‘in a position where they had to be serious about early use’ (Coll 2006). A US Colonel based in Pakistan had told the New Yorker that were India to ‘Cross the red line, they would use it…If their country was destroyed, so be it. They would take India down with them’ (Coll 2006). Western countries feared the outbreak of nuclear war to such an extent that they advised their citizens to leave the region and made preparations for evacuating embassies (Coll 2006). Beyond tactical considerations, the West’s assumption that Pakistan would be more likely to use nuclear weapons is likely to have been influenced, in part, by India’s relatively non-violent image nuclear restraint. Delhi’s fears were compounded by Pakistan’s lack of a no-first-use policy and statements made by the country’s leaders (Kundu 2004: 21). Even prior to the conflict, India’s army chief had proposed fine-tuning the country’s nuclear strategy to respond to a first-strike, and in March India’s defence forces had undertaken training which simulated a nuclear war. Indian statements discounting the Pakistani nuclear threat are likely

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to have been merely aimed at publicly downplaying Pakistan’s abilities as well as reassuring domestic and international audiences that there would no nuclear war. The Pakistani Government itself had issued warnings that it could use nuclear weapons. While Musharraf made comments indicating that Pakistan would only use nuclear weapons if his country was in ‘danger of vanishing off the map’ (‘Pakistani Leader Says Use of Nuclear Weapons Against India Would Be “last resort”’, 2002, Associated Press, 7 April; Rao 2002), he later claimed to have conveyed to India that there was a lower threshold for Pakistan using nuclear weapons. He stated that if India passed the LOC, ‘they should not expect a conventional war’ (‘Musharraf Says Pakistan Was Ready to Use Nuclear Weapons’, 2002, Japan Economic Newswire, 20 December). The threat was reiterated by Pakistan’s representative at the UN and a General. Despite these statements, there was uncertainty of the conditions under which Pakistan would actually use nuclear weapons, particularly within Indian Government circles (Coll 2006), further increasing the perceived threat. It was exacerbated by the fact that Pakistan was under military rule, led by Musharraf, the chief architect of the Kargil conflict—a conflict in which military elements were found to have been manoeuvring nuclear weapons without the then PM’s knowledge or approval (Kundu 2004: 20). This was a possibility in the present crisis, in addition to nonstate actors potentially accessing Pakistani weapons. Indian and Pakistani perceptions of each other’s irrationality and the inapplicability of theories like deterrence and game theory further increased the perceived threat (Coll 2006). Despite the increased threat India maintained restraint. In January 2002, Defence Minister Fernandes and other leaders publicly ruled out the possibility of India even reviewing its no-first-use policy (‘India Sticks to No-first-use on Nuke Weapon’, 2002, The Press Trust of India, 7 January). The international community held at least some confidence in India’s restraint as manifested by this no-first-use policy and supreme civilian control of nuclear weapons (Kundu 2004: 21). India also continued on its comparatively slow pace of developing weapons capability and non-incorporation of nuclear weapons into military strategy throughout the stand-off (‘Pak Moving Ahead of India in Nuke Capability’, 2002, The Press Trust of India, 25 March). During the crisis, India rejected Pakistan’s repetition of its proposal that both states abandon nuclear weapons. India repeatedly rejected this

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due to the aforementioned China threat but, as before, explained its refusal by calling for global disarmament rather than rely only on strategic justifications. The crisis ended in June 2002 when India stepped back from the standoff, withdrawing its troops from the border. A realist explanation for this rests in strategic calculation. India’s PM claimed the drawdown had been conducted in response to Musharraf’s promise to ‘end infiltration’ by jihadi groups into Kashmir (Misra 2002; Kundu 2004: 22). However, according to US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, Musharraf never promised an end to all support to Kashmiri groups, he only agreed to reduce it (Coll 2006). Furthermore, as early as April 2003, India itself was again accusing Pakistan of continuing to fund separatists (‘Sinha Says India Not to Be First to Use Nuclear Weapons in Any War with Pakistan’, 2003, World News Connection, 1 April). A more likely explanation lies in India’s aversion to the violence of nuclear conflict. President Musharraf stated that India’s pullback was due to such a fear (Kundu 2004: 22; Coll 2006). Some analysts also claim that the NDA Government was convinced to adopt a non-military response by the impending threat of nuclear war (Kundu 2004: 34). The Government’s aversion to even the smallest risk of nuclear war was so strong that it forwent escalation, despite domestic support for such action (Kundu 2004: 34). In responding to Islamabad’s claims that India’s pullback was due to nuclear fear, Delhi merely denounced Pakistan’s ‘nuclear blackmail’. This suggests that Pakistan’s assertions had been at least partially correct. The blackmail comment was repeated later that year by Vajpayee in response to a nuclear threat by Musharraf (Gupta 2002). India also criticised its neighbour’s ‘loose talk’ on the issue, projecting an image of itself as more restrained and as a country which held a graver view of nuclear weapons. If Pakistan’s deterrence had been the real reason for the drawdown, it suggests India’s Government had less tolerance for the violence of a nuclear war than Pakistan. Others argue that India had not held the same level of fear of a nuclear war occurring as the West had, but had used the threat to leverage Western pressure onto Pakistan to halt its aid to insurgents (Kundu 2004: 22). While difficult to speculate, had this been the case, it is likely that India would have pushed the envelope to a greater extent and extracted something better than Musharraf’s pledge to merely reduce support for militants. Delhi would have attempted to inflict more damage on

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Pakistan’s Kashmir ambitions while at the same time encouraging Western pressure, rather than pulling back the troops without an incursion. Whether deterrence had contributed to the drawdown or not, the value of non-violence had proven to be highly significant. It added impetus to the decision. This was through the preference for a non-violent image, both for India and for Vajpayee himself. NSA Mishra stated that India had been on the brink of going to war, but Vajpayee had pulled back (Coll 2006). At the end of a long political career, Vajpayee apparently wanted to be remembered as a man of peace (Coll 2006). This preference did not result purely from domestic political pressures. The Government had enough domestic support to escalate the conflict had it wanted to (Kundu 2004: 34). The value of non-violence interacted with the value of hierarchy in the intensification and conclusion of the crisis. Leaders in both countries needed an avenue to do so without losing face (Coll 2006). For India, Musharraf’s pledge to reduce infiltration is likely to have provided that avenue. The threat of nuclear violence shocked the Indian Government into taking an even more restrained approach in future—one grounded political patience and negotiations. There was said to have been a tacit decision to react through non-military means to continuing jihadi attacks (Coll 2006). This acceptance stands in contrast to states like the US, Israel and Russia, which have usually employed more aggressive policies following high publicity terrorist attacks. EAM Singh attributed this to India’s civilisational history and tradition of resiliently absorbing shocks (Coll 2006). Kundu (2004: 34) goes so far as to say that the lessons learnt have meant that the use of force was no longer seen as an option to settle disputes in South Asia. Conciliatory Approach Despite Fear of Nuclear Attacks Non-violence also affected for India maintaining a conciliatory approach to Pakistan and China despite increased nuclear threat perceptions from both countries outside the aforementioned periods of overt confrontation. Such an approach is far from a universal response to nuclear threats. It is unlikely India’s conciliatory behaviour was caused by Chinese and Pakistani nuclear deterrence alone. Deterrence by one state does not necessarily cause other states to be conciliatory when these states themselves are nuclear weapons powers. In similar situations, other states

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have increased aggressive rhetoric and engaged in further nuclear weapons development and operationalisation. This includes at various times: US, USSR, China, and North Korea. Non-nuclear states have reacted to deterrence similarly with conventional weapons. India’s Reforming the National Security System report stated that Pakistan’s leaders had not concealed their desire to use nuclear weapons against India (Ministry of Defence 2001: 9–10). This was seen in Pakistani statements (‘Musharraf Says Pakistan Was Ready to Use Nuclear Weapons’, 2002, Japan Economic Newswire, 20 December; Keys 2004). India’s annual defence report in 2003 warned that every major Indian city was within the reach of Chinese missiles. The report also noted that the asymmetry between India’s and China’s nuclear forces was likely to become greater as China responded to counter US advances in missile defence (‘Defense Report Softens Outlook on China’, 2003, Hindu, 31 May). The sincerity of India’s fear of nuclear attack can be seen in the devoting of resources in 2003–2004 to respond to such attacks (see: ‘Indian Parliament May Build Bunkers to Protect MPs from Nuclear Attack’, 2003, Agence France-Presse, 26 June; Abdi, S., 2004, ‘Taking No Chances, India Builds War Bunkers’, South China Morning Post, 11 February; ‘India to train paramilitary forces to deal with nuclear, chemical disaster’, 2003, BBC, 7 December). Despite increased threat perception the BJP/NDA Administration still took a conciliatory approach towards Pakistan in 2003 and 2004, and talks on nuclear security were conducted. This included a focus on stimulating economic growth beneficial to both countries, while downplaying security issues (Kundu 2004: 31). The same was true for India’s approach to China with the Government agreeing that it should pursue constructive dialogue (Perkovich 1999: 424; Kundu 2004: 32). Discourse As with its state behaviour, India’s discourse belies the assertion that there was a fundamental overhaul of nuclear policy under the BJP\NDA Government. The discourse suggests a continuation of many of the non-violence-driven P&Ps that guided nuclear policy in previous administrations. Nizamani (2000: 63) states that the dominant nuclear discourse in relation to identity demonstrated continuity rather than divergence during the nuclear tests. Even before being elected, the BJP issued a manifesto that seemed to back away from some of its earlier, tougher nuclear rhetoric (Perkovich

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1999: 407–408). Similar rhetoric was displayed prior to the tests. This was partly aimed at not alarming its nuclear-averse, non-violence influenced coalition partners before a confidence vote. Defence Minister Fernandes stated that induction of nuclear weapons was not a foregone conclusion and testing did not need to occur (Perkovich 1999: 408). BJP defence specialist, Mohan Guruswamy—described as an ‘extreme voice’—echoed this ambiguity about conducting tests (Perkovich 1999: 408). In 2002, EAM Sinha called the perception of a radical shift in nuclear policy under the BJP ‘questionable’ (2002b). Vajpayee (2001d) stated that it was wrong of international observers to see Pokhran as India’s ‘repudiation’ of the objective of global disarmament. According to Sinha (2002b), the tests did not imply complacency in India’s ongoing drive for disarmament, ‘On the contrary it emphasises India’s awareness of and commitment to greater restraint’. The EAM cited India’s maintenance of only a minimum credible deterrent, no-first-use and increased confidencebuilding measures with neighbours. The Pokhran tests left unaltered the ‘essentially, defensive character of our security policy’ (2002a). The positioning of India as a ‘mature’ power which takes its nuclear responsibilities seriously is oft repeated (‘India—A “Mature” Nuclear Power, Says Foreign Minister’, 2004, Press Trust of India, 12 March). For years after the tests, leaders couched India as being compelled to, but not wanting to ‘make the transition from nuclear abstinence to that of a reluctant nuclear power’ (2004a). Within the 95 official speeches and media releases on the MEA website which refer to nuclear weapons during the NDA’s reign, there were around 181 mentions, either overt or implied, indicating non-violent P&Ps (Table 3.2 and Chart 3.1). This is out of only 357 references to nuclear weapons overall. Of the mentions of nuclear weapons which did not refer to non-violence-driven P&Ps, the majority alluded to terrorism or the disarmament of Iraq. The importance of these P&Ps can be seen in the fact that most of them were included in the speech Vajpayee made in Parliament soon after the tests, outlining a strategy for India’s now overt nuclear capability (Kundu 2004: 12). Here, these non-violence-driven P&Ps acted like caveats dotted throughout India’s nuclear policy. Furthermore, the 181 mentions do not include statements indicating non-violent preferences with regard to general foreign/strategic affairs.

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Table 3.2 Statements perceptions (P&Ps)

indicating

non-violence-driven

preferences

and

P&P subcategories

Number

Preference for global disarmament Perception that nuclear weapons are not useable in wars Preference for no-first-use/non-use against non-nuclear powers Preference for non-proliferation Preference for restraint/for peace generally in context of nuclear Program Preference for moratorium on testing Total number of unique statements for Non-violence Total number of references to nuclear policy

97 2 17 63 40

400

4 181 357

357

350 300 250 200

181

150 100 50

97 63 2

17

40 4

0

Preferences and Perceptions

Chart 3.1 Statements indicating non-violence-driven preferences and perceptions (P&Ps) (BJP 1998–2004)

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Nuclear Doctrine The draft of India’s nuclear doctrine (Draft Nuclear Doctrine or DND) was prepared in November 1998 by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) under Subrahmanyam, and released in 1999 (MEA 1999a; Nizamani 2000: 65). The draft’s findings would lay out the basis from which successor governments could draw up a nuclear doctrine/strategy (‘Jaswant Rejects US Concerns’, 1999, Hindu, 20 August; Kundu 2004: 16). Beyond stating that India would maintain a survivable deterrent through assembly and deployment of nuclear weapons, the draft repeated the non-violence-driven P&Ps from Vajpayee’s speech in Parliament, adding India’s commitment to non-proliferation (MEA 1999a, b; Nizamani 2000: 65; Ogden 2011: 296). Even the release of the document itself was accompanied by attempts to reassure foreign audiences that the draft was a restrained discussion paper and not aimed at specific adversary countries (‘Jaswant Allays US Fears on Nuclear Policy; Opposition Assails Government’, 1999, Times of India, 19 August). In January 2003 India outlined its eight-point nuclear doctrine with largely the same non-violent P&Ps as the draft (MEA 2003b). The doctrine maintained the preference for civilian authority over nuclear weapons. The preference for non-proliferation was revealed through: strict export controls; participation in the proposed fissile material cutoff treaty and continued observance of the ban on testing (MEA 2003b; ‘India Outlines 8-Point Nuclear Doctrine’, 2003, Xinhua News Service, 5 January). General Restraint in Nuclear Policy Of the 181 non-violence based statements, 40 reflected a preference for general restraint in nuclear policy. This was particularly the case soon after the tests. Perkovich (1999: 415) notes that for every bellicose sound emanating from India at the time, a reassuring diplomatic signal can also be found. Shortly after the tests, Vajpayee reminded parliament that India, as an ‘ancient civilization’, would reflect a ‘sense of responsibility and restraint’ (‘PM Offers to Move Towards CTBT’, 1998, Hindu, May 28, p. 1). After Pokhran, BJP leaders attempted to indicate restraint through emphasising the minimalist deterrent nature of India’s nuclear policy (Mishra 2001; Sinha 2002a; Mishra 2003; Sharma 2003; ‘India Will Not

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Use N-weapon First’, 1998, Hindu, 19 May). There were repeated assurances that India did not wish to engage in an arms race by Vajpayee and Singh (‘Task force submits report on NSC’, 1998, Hindu, June 27; Perkovich 1999: 435, 437–438) and the Foreign Secretary (Sibal 2003). Leaders also indicated India’s restraint through mouthing support for initiatives aimed at restricting nuclear weapons and reducing stockpiles such as the CoD (Sood 2002), the Pugwash Conferences (Singh 2002), and keeping Southeast Asia a nuclear weapons free zone (‘Southeast Asian Leaders Hold First-Ever Summit with Nuclear India’, 2002, Associated Press, 5 November). Also trumpeted was India’s post-Pokhran attempts to increase confidence-building measures (CBMs) with its neighbours (Sinha 2002b). India reiterated its aversion to nuclear weapons by repeatedly highlighting the horrors they can produce (Vajpayee 2001c; Sinha 2003b). Disarmament India’s ongoing calls for disarmament are some of the strongest indicators of the continued influence of non-violence. Significantly, India is the only country known to have nuclear weapons that still argues for complete global disarmament (Aiyar et al. 2011: 19). Around 97 statements indicating a preference for global disarmament were found. The PM even made the connection between Indian culture and the preference for disarmament in 2001, stating ‘if you look at our spiritual traditions, the ideals that inspired our freedom struggle, the ahimsa of Mahatma Gandhi…you can well understand our passionate commitment to a nuclear weapon free world’ (Vajpayee 2001c). This was echoed by the EAM (Singh 2001). Calls for disarmament continued to be made even at the height of the stand-off with Pakistan in March 2002. The strength of India’s appeal for disarmament is such that it is couched as a prerequisite for world peace and security with a lack of disarmament equalling an increase in proliferation (Singh 2002a, b; ‘India for Time Bound Abolition of Nuclear Weapons’, 2002, Asia Pulse, 22 June). The Preamble of the aforementioned Draft Report on Nuclear Doctrine begins with a condemnation of nuclear weapons and of the abandonment of the goal of disarmament (MEA 1999a). It emphasises that India’s primary objective is prosperity within a peaceful framework. The Report couches India’s nuclear weapons program as purely a last resort.

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The certain degree of sincerity of the disarmament preference is visible in India’s consistent appeal for practical steps forward. Delhi repeatedly calls for a uniform (Sinha 2002b), legally binding compact (Singh 2002a) that is universal, non-discriminatory (Singh 2001) and time bound (Sinha 2002c), and established through multilateral negotiations (Singh 2002a). There has also been the consistent offer that, should states agree to such an undertaking, India would be the first to comply. This was uttered by the PM, and by the President in his address to the ‘International Conclave on Buddhism and Spiritual Tourism’ (‘India Willing to Destroy Nuclear Weapons If Others Do So: PM’, 2001, Press Trust of India, 6 April; ‘Indian Missile Man Speaks of Scrapping Nukes’, 2004, Pakistan Press International Information Services, 17 February). Another practical step is India’s repeated tabling of a resolution calling for a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, seen as a first step towards reducing their salience(Sharma 2003). While Pokhran II is said to have caused India to lose much of what moral standing it had held as a self-proclaimed disarmament champion, the tests had been conducted with the intention of not significantly detracting from this standing. This was one of the main considerations when deciding to test (Perkovich 1999: 439). India’s leaders gave no ground and continued to call for disarmament while discussing the tests (Ogden 2011: 295–296). The Defence Minister went to the extent of stating that the tests allowed India to ‘pursue, with credibility and greater conviction, our long-term campaign to rid the world of nuclear weapons’ (Narayanan 1998). EAM Singh reiterated immediately after the tests that India ‘has not forsaken’ its commitment to nuclear disarmament (Diwanji 1999). Non-proliferation India made consistent statements avowing its support for and adherence to non-proliferation. Delhi often made clear that its non-signing of the NPT was due to its ‘flawed’ and ‘discriminatory’ nature (‘India Dismisses NPT as “Flawed” Treaty’, 2007, The Times of India, 23 March). There were 63 statements reflecting a preference for non-proliferation. As mentioned, days after Pokhran, India announced a unilateral moratorium on testing and reaffirmed this throughout NDA rule despite not signing the CTBT (e.g. ‘India to Observe Moratorium on Nuclear Testspremier’, 2001, ITAR-TASS News Agency, 5 February; Sinha 2002b). Leaders’ asserted that the moratorium met the basic obligations of the

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CTBT and that the country supported a ‘truly comprehensive’ ban on all underground nuclear testing (‘India Meets Basic Obligations of CTBT: Jaswant’, 2000, Rediff , 20 September). Also asserted was support to work towards a ban on future production of weapon-grade fissile material. No-First-Use and Non-use At least 17 statements were found reflecting a preference for no-first-use and/or non-use against non-nuclear states. India sought to demonstrate its sincerity by seeking to ‘multilateralise’ its no-first-use policy, thereby making it more concrete through entering into commitments with other nations. This was described by EAM Sinha as one of the primary ways in which India reassures its neighbours. No-first-use was clearly stated as applicable in a situation of conflict with Pakistan (‘Sinha Says India Not to Be First to Use Nuclear Weapons in Any War with Pakistan’, 2003, World News Connection, 1 April). When the PM told party workers that India would not hesitate to use its nuclear weapons in self-defence, this was seen as too aggressive and the PM’s Office sought to remove any ambiguity whatsoever by stating that ‘India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against anyone’ (Shukla 1998). In adopting a no-first-use policy, India stands out among other nuclear weapons states in its restraint, or at least proclaimed restraint. The US, UK, France, Russia and Pakistan have all reserved the right to first-use. Only two countries, out of the eight known nuclear weapons states have made similar pledges—China and North Korea. The credibility of China’s no-first-use pledge has been questioned by foreign officials (Spies 2011). North Korea’s pledge has also been regarded as unreliable (Lodgaard 2002). The no-first-use and non-use against non-nuclear powers pronouncements stand in stark contrast to other nuclear states facing similar threat levels. Israel’s stance, as mentioned, serves its security concerns. This can also be said for Pakistan to a certain extent (Khilnani et al. 2012). India’s rhetoric also reflects the aforementioned perception among leaders that nuclear weapons cannot be used in war and the preference that they should not. Singh (2001) stated that ‘such weapons are not, and must never be war fighting instruments’ and that their only relevance was deterrence.

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Increased Threat Perception The expression of non-violence-driven P&Ps in discourse continued despite increased threats perceived from Pakistan and China. This can be seen in the 1999 Lahore Declaration (Government of India and Government of Pakistan 1999) which focused on minimising nuclear risk (Basrur 2001: 194). The statement reiterated the two countries’ belief in ‘universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation’. It also agreed that India and Pakistan would: take steps to reduce the risk of unauthorised and accidental use of nuclear weapons; have their foreign ministers periodically meet to discuss nuclear-related issues; engage in CBMs regarding nuclear weapons and abide by their respective moratoriums on testing except if ‘extraordinary events’ occurred. India was also highly restrained in its response to the A. Q. Khan revelations (Majumder 2004). Of the nuclear black market, Sinha stated that ‘It is not Pakistan alone which needs to be blamed for this’ (‘India Says Pakistan Not the Only Nuclear Proliferator’, 2004, Global News BitesFrontier Star, 9 February). Kargil While some argue that both sides resorted to coercive nuclear diplomacy during the Kargil conflict, the discourse reveals that Delhi was less willing than Islamabad to refer, either explicitly or implicitly, to its potential use of nuclear weapons (Ahmed 2000: 789). Pakistani leaders stated ‘we will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity’ (‘Pakistan May Use Any Weapon’, 1999, The News, 31 May). This sentiment was repeated later with the Pakistani PM. Pakistani media stated that its Government would not hesitate to use its ‘ultimate option’ in case of attack from India (‘India Not Daunted by Pak Nuke Threat: PM’, 1999, Times of India, 1 July). In contrast, Indian leaders stated they wanted to treat the conflict as ‘a limited war’ and ensure that it did not escalate (‘India for Treating Kargil as Limited War: Advani’, 1999, Hindustan Times, 20 June). Shortly after the conflict, EAM Singh refuted the possibility of a nuclear conflict with Pakistan, citing India’s restraint (‘Jaswant Rejects US Concerns’, 1999, Hindu, 20 August). The period of the Kargil conflict also saw India make statements indicating that it did not want to engage in an arms race (‘Fernandes Says India’s Nukes are Only a Deterrent’, 1999, Rediff on the Net, 21 June).

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Parliament Attacks and Border Build-up During the Boarder Build-up India continued to express non-violencedriven P&Ps. The Defence Minister reaffirmed the no-first-use policy and added unequivocally that ‘No sensible person can even think of using nuclear weapons. We look at nuclear weapons as a deterrent and nothing beyond’ (‘Act Fast, Don’t Test Our Patience, Says George’, 2002, Tribune India, 14 January). The commitment to no-first-use was repeated at various times throughout the crisis by various officials and ministers: EAM Singh, the BJP’s President, and India’s Ambassador to Russia (‘India Will Not Use Nuclear Weapons First: Singh’, 2002, Japan Economic Newswire, 28 May; ‘Nuclear War Not Possible: Jana’, 2002, Press Trust of India, 6 June; ‘Indian Ambassador to Russia States That India Will Not Be the First to Use Nuclear Weapons Under Any Circumstances’, 2002, RIA Novosti, 23 January). Even when belligerent statements were made these were always regarding retaliation, should Pakistan engage in a nuclear first-strike (‘India Will Use Nuclear Weapons If Pakistan Does—Defense Official’, 2002, AFX News Limited, 2 June). When the crisis began to subside and Musharraf dismissed the likelihood of a nuclear war, Defence Minister Fernandes welcomed the comments (‘India Defense Head Hails Musharraf’s Rejection of Nuclear War’, 2002, Japan Economic Newswire, 2 June). Fernandes’ language gives the impression that the idea of using nuclear weapons is so far from India’s way of thinking that it is considered insane. Image Even if the aforementioned non-violence-driven P&Ps were not genuinely held by leaders, the significant number of statements supporting them suggests a preference for maintaining a non-violent image. Commentators suggested that one of the main reasons for maintaining no-first-use was to preserve India’s reputation as a responsible nuclear power (Kazi 2011). This is connected to a non-violent image. This preference was also seen in the need to reiterate non-violent caveats in Vajpayee’s post-test Parliament speech (Kundu 2004: 12). The non-violent image preference was almost awkwardly obvious in the Draft Report on Nuclear Doctrine. In addition to its aforementioned preamble, of the 8 sections of the Draft Report, one is titled ‘Disarmament and Arms Control’. Only a country obsessively keen to maintain an image as

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a leader in disarmament would include such a section in what is otherwise a strategic and operational document. The Lahore Declaration was another attempt to salvaging a non-violent image. Pluralism and Tolerance State Behaviour While much less influential than the non-violence and hierarchy, pluralism and tolerance also influenced the Government’s nuclear policy. For instance, in addition to strategic reasons, the BJP’s pursuit of increased nuclear cooperation with the US was enticed by a perception that India shared values of pluralism and tolerance with America. Vajpayee stated that ‘the India–US relationship is based increasingly on common values and common interests’ (‘Special Press Summary: India-U.S. Bilateral Relations’, 2003, Virtual Information Center, 10 November, pp. 2–9; Kundu 2004: 29). NSA Mishra stated India and the US ‘have some fundamental similarities. We are all democracies, sharing a common vision of pluralism, tolerance’ (Jayaprakash 2003). Even if leaders had not genuinely held this perception, their citing of these values as a justification suggests the preference for maintaining a tolerant and pluralistic image. India’s pre-existing tolerant and pluralistic image also influenced the increased nuclear cooperation. This image gave leaders in Delhi and the Washington one of the main selling points they used to justify greater cooperation. This was namely through citing a key manifestation of Indian pluralism—the country’s vibrant democracy (Kundu 2004: 28). A joint statement by PM Vajpayee and President Bush in 2001 reiterated their commitment to transform India–US relations, stating ‘the common democratic traditions of our countries remain the bedrock of their relationship and the foundation for long-term strategic cooperation. Collaboration within the community of democratic states constitutes the best strategy for preserving the security, the liberty, and the prosperity of open, pluralistic and multi-ethnic societies’ (MEA 2001). When holding the Presidency of the CoD in early 2003, India assessed that the West and India’s common stated enemy, fundamentalist terrorism, sought to target ‘democracy’ and ‘pluralism’ among other things (MEA 2003a). NSA Mishra (2003) stated at the Council for Foreign Relations in the US that ‘combating terrorism and forging a new world order demand close and solid partnerships among democratic societies, which value freedom, pluralism’.

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Pluralism and tolerance were also used by India’s leaders to justify closer ties with other pro-Western democracies. The PM’s speech at a meeting with Japanese Parliamentarians stated that the ‘September 11…emphasised the need for pluralistic democracies such as ours to close ranks to protect our way of life against bigotry and intolerance’ (Vajpayee 2001c). He referred to the two countries as Asia’s two most important democracies. Mishra (Jayaprakash 2003) included Israel in his aforementioned statement regarding common values of tolerance and pluralism. In 2003, Israel and India set up a committee and working Group on defence cooperation. By 2004, Israel had become India’s largest supplier of defence materials after Russia (Kundu 2004: 29). Discourse Tolerance and pluralism were also seen in India’s discourse (see Table 3.3). India displayed an unexpected level of equanimity in reacting to Pakistan’s own nuclear tests. India’s conciliatory approach to Pakistan was, on occasion, couched in the value of tolerance. When speaking at a banquet for President Musharraf, India’s President cited Ashoka’s religious tolerance, ‘all sects deserve reverence… By thus acting a man exalts his own and at the same time does service to others’ (Narayanan 2001). He also cited the tolerance imparted by Akbar and espoused by the founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah (Narayanan 2001). Delhi also made several calls for non-discriminatory arms control which may have been influenced by tolerance/pluralism. This was, however, also likely to have been strongly influenced by India’s strategic interests. Table 3.3 Statements indicating pluralism- and tolerance-driven P&Ps (BJP 1998–2004) P&P subcategories

Number

Perception that pluralism and tolerance are the correct and natural way of being in world affairs Preference to maintain a tolerant and pluralistic image Total number of unique statements for Pluralism and Tolerance

8 8 8

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Congress-Led UPA Rule Under Manmohan Singh 2004–2014 The Congress Party led the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), a coalition of Left parties, to power in the May 2004 general elections. Manmohan Singh, a respected economist, was made PM. Ideologically, Singh was a technocrat who somewhat deviated from the Congress tradition in terms of a more Western-friendly foreign policy and promarket economic policy. The Party’s base was nevertheless brought along with his reforms by Sonia Gandhi for whom Congress stalwarts maintained an affinity. The period saw India further progress its hierarchical nuclear aspirations via the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, while the Government continued Indian (and even more so Congress) tradition of calling for global disarmament. Non-violence Nuclear policy continued to be influenced by non-violence. When India had become an overt nuclear weapons power under the BJP, Congress had reaffirmed that RGAP, and therefore non-violence-driven global disarmament, remained the ‘sheet anchor’ of its nuclear policy. State Behaviour Rapprochement India’s behaviour was significantly influenced by non-violence. Nonviolence drove a preference for rapprochement with Pakistan on nuclear matters. A month after taking power EAM Natwar Singh stated that in upcoming talks, nuclear confidence-building measures would be a priority (‘Priority Given to Nuclear CBMs in Talks, Says India’, 2004, The Nation, 10 June). The talks focused on security, disarmament and non-proliferation (‘Pak Delegation Arrives for Talks on Nuclear CBMs’, 2004, Press Trust of India, 18 June). Discussions continued regarding implementation of the 1999 Lahore Memorandum of Understanding which agreed to unilateral moratoriums on testing. India and Pakistan also agreed to establish a hotline between foreign secretaries to avert nuclear misunderstandings. It was decided to conclude an agreement on pre-notification of flight testing missiles (‘Indian Spokesperson Describes Foreign Secretary Nuclear Hotline’, 2004, BBC Monitoring South Asia, 20 June). Following the talks, it was agreed that serious dialogue should

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continue (‘India, Pakistan Agree to Continue with a Sustained Dialogue to Find Peaceful Settlement on Kashmir’, 2004, Asia Pulse, 28 June). The third round of confidence-building talks occurred in August 2005, aimed at avoiding accidental nuclear war. The two states hoped to finalise an agreement to notify each other ahead of missile tests and upgrade the aforementioned hotline (MEA 2005; ‘India, Pakistan Resume Talks on Nuclear Issues’, 2005, Forbes, 5 August). At the fourth round of talks in 2006, the two states reiterated their support for implementation of CBMs. They also discussed the draft of an agreement to reduce the risk from accidents relating to nuclear weapons (MEA 2006). Disarmament Disarmament remained one of the key P&Ps influenced by non-violence under Congress. PM Singh made statements in 2005, 2006 and 2011 that his government would maintain the commitment to global disarmament (Aiyar et al. 2011: 41). At the Global Zero Summit in London in June 2011, Singh reiterated India’s ongoing objective of global, nondiscriminatory, verifiable, nuclear disarmament. The joint communiqué issued by PM Singh and President Obama in 2010 dwelt in unprecedented detail on issues of nuclear disarmament (Aiyar et al. 2011: 25). Foreign Secretary Saran (2005) stated that non-proliferation could best be achieved by a ‘credible and time-bound commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons from existing arsenals, including India’s own…We have no desire to perpetuate the division between nuclear-have and have-nots’. The preference is likely to have been genuine. The preference continued even now when India clearly had something to lose as an SNW. A Government constituted panel undertaking the RGAP Review argued that India would have more credibility in its disarmament cause now than it had before Pokhran II (Aiyar et al. 2011: 29). India was the only state to have declared that in its perception, its security would be enhanced and not diminished in a world without nuclear weapons (Saran 2010b: PM). This perception is also clearly influenced by non-violence. Conventional strategic thinking would suggest India had more to lose than gain, security-wise from global disarmament. India’s greatest strategic threat, China, has far greater conventional forces, meaning that removing nuclear weapons from the equation would act in China’s favour. While it is true that India’s equation with Pakistan would become more

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favourable, Pakistan poses a more short-term threat and global disarmament is more likely a long-term outcome. This suggests that the influence of non-violence is strong enough to challenge strategic interests. India’s expending of diplomatic effort and resources further suggests disarmament was a genuine preference. This includes: willingness to put resources towards disarmament efforts, such as the RGAP Review; suggesting practical steps forward and devoting its limited stage time in multilateral and bilateral forums towards calling for disarmament. For instance, a few months after entering office, Singh devoted time at his first address to UNGA as PM to suggest that the abolitionist Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a good model to follow to achieve nuclear disarmament (Singh 2004b). At the very least, this suggests a preference for a non-violent image, one considered worth spending resources on. India’s diplomatic efforts for disarmament included its continued push in the CoD. This included through: tabling resolutions; making calls for disarmament; suggested practical measures to achieve this goal and provided pragmatic and flexible support for initiatives assisting the disarmament agenda. India introduced a resolution calling for a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons to mitigate their danger and create conducive conditions for negotiating prohibition (Singh 2008) through reducing weapons’ utility. A resolution was also tabled aimed at reducing the risk of accidental triggering of nuclear conflict, including through de-alerting and de-targeting of weapons (2008). Delhi introduced a resolution to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons (2008). Delhi also presented a working paper at the 2006 UNGA Committee on Disarmament and International Security (Prasad 2007). India also supported proposals regarding prevention of an arms race in space ‘hoping that they could become a basis’ for further efforts (Prasad 2006a; ‘The Conference on Disarmament Concludes Another Frustrating Year’, 2003, Disarmament Diplomacy 73, October–November). Also proposed by India was an ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament’ and the appointment of a special coordinator at the CoD to carry out consultations which could form a basis for such a group (Saran 2009, 2010a). Beyond just the CoD, Delhi advocated preserving and strengthening the authority of all elements of what it called the ‘institutional triad of disarmament’—the UN First Committee, CoD and UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) (Sharma 2004). India promoted the First Committee as a venue for those states not represented in the CoD to

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voice their views. India was effectively advocating the interests of states who, for the most part, did not have nuclear weapons or much hope of getting them—states which are highly likely to have a genuine interest in global disarmament. This adds credibility to the sincerity of India’s disarmament preference. In 2008, India presented a Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament to UNGA suggesting reaffirmation of the commitment of NWSs to complete disarmament, and negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also included negotiation of a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, and concerning their destruction, leading to global elimination within a specified timeframe (Mukherjee 2008a). Much of the Government’s arguments and proposed measures supporting disarmament were based in RGAP (Aiyar et al. 2011: 41; Singh 2008). At the 2006 UNGA, India circulated a working paper that reminded the world community of RGAP which sought to ‘usher in a world free of nuclear weapons and rooted in non-violence’. The paper called for a consensus to initiate concrete steps towards global disarmament. In addition to the aforementioned proposals of the 2008 Working Paper, it proposed: • Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; • Taking into account the global reach and menace of nuclear weapons, adoption of measures by NWSs to reduce danger, including the risks of accidental war, de-alerting of nuclear weapons to prevent unintentional and accidental use; • Negotiations of a global agreement among NWSs on ‘no first-use’; • Negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use against non-nuclear weapons states (Aiyar et al. 2011: 43). The Government sought to re-energise the disarmament agenda by constituting an informal group to report on how best RGAP’s ideas could be carried forward (Aiyar et al. 2011: 7). It asked that India ‘continue advocating…ideas contained in the time-bound…non-discriminatory,… phased process…towards the elimination of nuclear weapons as a precursor to complete disarmament and the anchoring of the international order in the principles of Nonviolence’ (2011: 15). Echoing RGAP, the Report suggests that global disarmament will require a fundamental

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change to the premise and architecture of international security (2011: 46). The Report’s key recommendation is not only that India supports global disarmament, but leads the charge—something it is said to have withdrawn from in the last decade (2011: 22). The authenticity of the disarmament preference can be seen in the Report’s spelling out of practical steps forward. This includes peeling away the military utility of nuclear weapons and a nuclear weapons convention aimed at time-bound elimination (2011: 180). The sober nature of the report’s analysis further suggests some sincerity. It assesses the benefits and costs of global disarmament. The Report’s key recommendation is partly motivated by the practical dimension that India can lead the world towards disarmament and therefore has a moral obligation (2011: 13). It states that the time is now ripe for India to champion disarmament given: India’s rise in international standing; the support for disarmament by global civil society and the current US Government—India can include disarmament in the agenda of the India– US Strategic Partnership dialogue; India’s improved ability to negotiate as an SNW and security concerns (2011: 15–20, 25). Non-proliferation India strictly adhered to non-proliferation under Congress. PM Singh stated in June 2011 that the campaign for disarmament required a renewed consensus on non-proliferation. Foreign Secretary Saran (2005) stated in 2005 that India’s ‘bold and radical’ non-proliferation efforts were ‘some would argue even at the cost of its own interests’. Saran went on to claim that India’s non-proliferation record contrasts favourably with NPT members, including NWSs, seeming to imply that Delhi’s own moral standards surpassed those required by international arms control law. Congress maintained the unilateral moratorium on testing, affirmed by Singh (2005a) in 2005 and 2008. In 2005, one year after entering office, the Government introduced a bill in Parliament to prevent proliferation and the transfer of missile technology to non-nuclear states. Defence Minister Mukherjee stated that the bill would ‘provide an integrated legislative basis’ to India’s non-proliferation commitment (‘India Govt Moves to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation, Missile Technology Transfer’, 2005, Finanz Nachrichten, 10 May). India also agreed in the Indo-US Joint Statement of 18 July 2005 ‘that it would not transfer reprocessing and enrichment technologies and would support international efforts to limit their spread’ (Saran 2005).

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Also in 2005, India called for a ‘new global consensus on nonproliferation’, taking into account challenges that have emerged since the NPT was concluded (Saran 2005), further demonstrating a perception that the treaty was unfit for contemporary reality. India signalled its willingness to be part of a new consensus by adopting a ‘very comprehensive’ WMD Export Control legislation, and harmonising export control lists with those incorporated in the NSG and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines (2005). In doing so, India was said to have fulfilled the obligations prescribed in UNSC Resolution 1540 (2005). India’s export controls were already purported to be at global standards and there was a policy of non-transfer of reprocessing and enrichment technologies. This, claimed Saran (2005), put India in an ‘NPT plus’ category—better at non-proliferation than states signed up to the NPT. India also sought to join initiatives aimed at developing technologies resistant to proliferation (2005). No-First-Use India’s no-first-use preference was maintained by Congress. The aforementioned 2006 Working Paper’s proposal for global disarmament called for negotiations for an agreement on no-first-use. Congress stuck to the no-first-use policy despite calls from the BJP in 2011 to re-examine it (Kazi 2011). In the face of warnings by the BJP about growing threats from Pakistan and China, EAM Krishna stated there would be no revision of no-first-use (Kazi 2011). Basrur (2009: 72) found that the majority of elites interviewed did not support a first nuclear strike, even if India suffered huge conventional losses, for example with the loss of Kashmir. Growing Threat Perception Congress’ non-violence-driven P&Ps prevailed despite the fact that the perceived nuclear threat to India was still great. It was believed to be greater than the threat faced by any other country (Aiyar et al. 2011). The Pakistan threat is likely to be seen as having increased with the growth of the country’s nuclear arsenal. Pakistan was thought to possess 100– 110 nuclear warheads, double India’s 50–60, and was said to be rapidly adding to its inventory (Kazi 2011). The International Panel on Fissile Material thought it was likely that in 2010 Pakistan had possession of enough uranium for 60–120 weapons, and enough plutonium for 20 bombs (2011). Pakistan also had good delivery systems, suspected to have been transferred from China and North Korea (2011).

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Intensifying India’s fear was the unpredictability of Pakistan’s nuclear policy, given the country was largely seen as a ‘failing state’ (Kazi 2011). This perception is a product of Indian leaders’ hierarchical worldview influencing them to see Pakistan as inferior. It is also the product of rational assessments that Pakistan’s government is powerless, controlled by the military establishment and unable to control terrorist groups operating within its territory. Even the US which has provided millions to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, is said to be unaware of their location (2011). Increased Cooperation with Foreign Powers The 2004–2011 period saw much of the international community warm in its approach to India’s nuclear policy, in part due to the value of nonviolence. India even began to receive somewhat ‘unique and exceptional status’ and treatment when compared to other states in similar situations (‘India Energised by Nuclear Pacts’, 2008, Agence France-Presse, 1 October). Despite not being a recognised nuclear weapons state, India would eventually be able to engage in nuclear commerce, unlike Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. The Indian Government admitted to the unique treatment. In 2005, Foreign Secretary Saran (2005) sought to answer the question ‘What does the international community gain in making an exception to the current regulations for India?’ Saran argued that India should be treated exceptionally because of its record on non-proliferation. He suggested that India is a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology. Saran (2005) went to the extent of asserting ‘there is today no other state, which has this record of responsibility and is still denied nondiscriminatory access to civilian nuclear technology’ (Mukherjee 2008b). Indo-US Cooperation The nucleus of this growing international acceptance was the increasing nuclear cooperation with the US, centred on the India–US Civil Nuclear Agreement (referred to as ‘the Deal’) (International Atomic Energy Agency INFCIRC/754/Add.3 2010). The initiation, signing and repercussions of the Deal constitute the most significant development in nuclear policy since Pokhran II. From the early 2000s, the US and India took a number of steps to increase cooperation (see Table 3.4). Throughout these steps India enjoyed unique treatment from the US. The US’s long-standing policy of not supplying to any country

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Table 3.4 Steps to increase cooperation between US and India • US dropped all demands on India to join the CTBT and the FMCT (Ogden 2011: 296) • There was a resumption of military cooperation • US lifted sanctions on India (‘USA, India to Resume Military Cooperation: Bush Administration Won’t Insist on Signing of CTBT’, 2001, Statesman, 3 May; ‘Bush Aides Conduct Classified Talks with Congress on India–Pakistan Sanctions’, 2001, Agence France-Presse, 21 September) • As part of the Deal, the US undertook to join India in seeking to negotiate an India-specific fuel supply agreement with the IAEA • US renewed nuclear safety cooperation links with India in 2003 • There were also talks on missile defence and space cooperation and talks at the Head of Government level on nuclear energy, space and high technology areas • In January 2004, the two signed the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) which looked at civilian nuclear energy, high technology trade and missile defence, among other things. It was stated that India would work with the US in ‘pursuit of shared non-proliferation goals’ (‘India to Undertake “Meaningful Steps” Under NPT Goals’, 2004, Press Trust of India, 31 March) • In July 2005, President Bush and PM Singh announced the US–India Civil Nuclear Agreement. Bush would ‘seek agreement from [the US] Congress to adjust US laws and policies’ and ‘work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India’ (Kerr 2011) • In December 2006, the US Congress approved the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 allowing it to sign the 123 Agreement with India for the commencement of nuclear trade. This enabled the transfer of civilian nuclear material to India

with enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production facilities was amended specifically for India (Singh 2007). Three requirements within the Hyde Act were waived for India. These include that the partner country: should not have exploded a nuclear device, must have all its nuclear activities under full-scope safeguards, and is not currently engaged in the development and production of nuclear explosive devices (Saran 2008). India was granted these transactions despite its status outside the NPT. Since the 1960s, India’s non-NPT status had prevented access to nuclear fuel and critical technology, hobbling the country’s civilian nuclear power industry. The Deal would afford India the same benefits as NPT membership. Later, President Obama would even use his executive powers to roll back the condition that US authorities be allowed to monitor the use of nuclear material purchased by India even from third countries.

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India entered the nuclear club largely ‘on its own terms’, a significant accomplishment (Pant 2016: 221). All this was despite the implementation of the Deal being contentious within the US. Both American law and the export guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)4 restricted nuclear cooperation with India because it possessed nuclear weapons and was not a recognised NWS under the NPT (Kerr 2011). Following the Deal, the India–US relationship continued to grow with regard to not just civil, but also strategic nuclear matters. In March 2009 Saran (2009) assessed that the relationship could grow in relation to nonproliferation and disarmament. He stated that the ‘security-related agenda is substantive and no less important than…the civil nuclear cooperation agreement’. The dominant explanations for the US’s decision to increase cooperation with India are realist (Karnad 2008). Officially, the US cited India’s growing influence in world affairs and its economic growth. The common threat of China is also a likely cause (‘Bush Signs India Nuclear Law’, 2006, Washington Post, 19 December). Strategic interests were, however, not the sole reason for cooperation. US decision-makers were also influenced by India’s non-violent image. This image would have either directly influenced US decision-makers, or at least provided them with a moral justification for increased cooperation, which they could sell to their audiences. The US saw India as a peaceful, democratic state with a restrained nuclear policy. The CIA assessed that the cooperation could benefit India in developing and producing more sophisticated weapons (‘India Continues N-weapons Development Program: CIA’, 2001, Press Trust of India, 10 August). India was the non-NPT state with arguably the greatest intertwine between its civil and strategic nuclear programs. PM Singh (2006a) stated that ‘there are hardly any other countries’ with a similar interconnectivity. The US’s moves despite this, suggest a perception that India was either unlikely to use the Deal’s benefits to produce more sophisticated weapons, or if it did, this would not prove to be a threat to US interests.

4 The NSG is a group of supplier countries that contributes to non-proliferation by restricting the export of nuclear related products to countries which do not permit fullscope safeguards under the IAEA.

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An important part of India’s non-violent image was its nonproliferation record. The US referred to India’s clean record (Saran 2010b). India’s Government repeatedly claimed that the US’s motivation for the Deal was India’s ‘unmatched non-proliferation record’ (Saran 2005). The US’s decision to cooperate with India was touted by previous PM, Vajpayee, as indicative of the world’s trust that ‘India will not use nuclear arms for the destruction of mankind’ (‘Indian Premier Says US Nuclear Cooperation a Manifestation of Trust’, 2004, BBC Monitoring International Reports, 14 January). Several argue that India’s security interests were not served by the Deal (Ganguly 2007). Karnad (2008: x) asserts that the Deal crippled India’s ability to use nuclear weapons against its enemies. The Singh Administration, however, repeatedly made strong assurances that India’s strategic program would not be impacted (Saran 2008). The truth lies in between these two arguments. Washington stated that if India were to conduct nuclear tests, the agreement would be cancelled (‘US Approves Indian Nuclear Deal’, 2008, BBC News, 2 October). While this does not technically prevent India from testing, it will provide added incentives for future Indian administrations not to test, thereby indirectly restricting India’s weapons program. Restrictions on the use of weapons that, due to non-violence, were considered unusable anyway, were not considered too great when compared with the status boost brought by the Deal. India also sought to represent the Deal as in line with its nonviolent international image. Leaders highlighted the Deal’s peaceful aspects and not the associated strategic cooperation. Foreign Secretary Saran (2005) stated that the Deal was not about nuclear weapons but rather ‘civilian…cooperation’. PM Singh (2006a) echoed this. The Government-appointed RGAP Review Group recommended that ‘India…should – press for the inclusion of global disarmament in the agenda of the India–US Strategic Partnership dialogue’ (Aiyar et al. 2011: 25). The Deal also fell in line with India’s ongoing support for non-proliferation. India agreed in a joint statement that it would not transfer reprocessing and enrichment technologies and would support international efforts to limit their spread (Saran 2005).

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Treatment by Other Actors Other international actors also granted India unique treatment and increased cooperation. This included states acting as part of multilateral bodies like the NSG. The NSG removed the 34-year ban on India’s participation in international nuclear commerce and supported the US– India nuclear agreement. The NSG decided to re-engage with India under an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA (Saran 2010b). The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) expressed concern about the NSG’s exemption for India as it required no ‘new commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation’ (Suryanarayana 2010). The IAEA’s Board of Governors endorsed a nuclear safeguards agreement with India by consensus that would permit India to add more nuclear facilities to be placed under the IAEA safeguards framework. The agreement included a few India-specific features. PM Singh stated further that India would not have an Additional Protocol like the non-NWSs which sign the NPT (Singh 2006c). States other than the US also bilaterally provided India with somewhat special treatment. This included Canada which: lifted its nuclear sanctions; reversed a previous policy and agreed to supply material—including ‘dualuse items’ which can be employed for civilian and military applications and signalled the possibility of supplying reactors. In 2010 the two countries signed their own civilian nuclear cooperation agreement (‘India, Canada Sign Civil Nuclear Deal’, 2010, Hindu, 28 June). Australia removed its ban on uranium sales to India in 2011 (‘Labor Left Concedes Defeat on Uranium Ban’, 2011, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 November). Japan lifted its sanctions in 2001 (‘Japan Lifts India, Pakistan Sanctions’, 2001, CNN World, 26 October). South Korea agreed to commence negotiations on a framework for civil nuclear cooperation in 2010 (Saran 2010a). Realist explanations would suggest that these states’ actions are the result of material interests. These could be economic, in terms of increased trade with India. They could also be strategic given that these four countries are strong allies of the US and often adhere to US foreign policy objectives. These could not be the only reasons, however, as states outside the US sphere of influence have also given India favourable treatment compared to other non-NPT SNWs. These included several NSG member states, including supposed rival China. Also, as mentioned, Russia had displayed

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even greater support for India’s nuclear position than the aforementioned Western states. Russia advocated for the NSG to re-examine the ban on cooperation with India and draw up a special agreement on India (‘Russian Ministry Wants to Lift Restrictions on Nuclear Cooperation with India’, 2003, Global News Wire, 11 November). Russia had even withstood opposition and criticism within the NSG for its supply of fuel to India. Bilateral agreements covering all aspects of civil nuclear cooperation were also concluded with Argentina, Kazakhstan, Namibia and Mongolia (Saran 2010a). If strategic and economic interests were not the sole cause, cultural values must be examined. India’s non-violent image played a key role. Leaders in Canada and Australia used this image to justify their support. Canada’s Foreign Minister stated that its cooperation was an acknowledgement of India’s ‘substantial progress’, including the moratorium on nuclear testing (‘Canada to Help India’s Nuclear Programme’, 2005, Dawn, 27 September). Russia and other countries’ cooperation was also attributed by the Indian Government to their country’s non-proliferation record (Mukherjee 2008c). While Russia had long strategic interests in nuclear cooperation with India, China did not, suggesting its acquiescence may be even more due to India’s non-violent image. The Indian Government claimed the country’s ‘unmatched non-proliferation record’ (Saran 2010b) its goal/preference for disarmament (Mukherjee 2008a) were the cause of India’s special treatment by the 45 NSG member states. Discourse Discourse revealed a strong influence of non-violence during Congress rule. This was even more overt than observed in state behaviour. The Administration consistently enunciated non-violence-driven P&Ps. Of the 55 official speeches and other documents in the sample, there were 864 references to nuclear weapons.5 Within these there were around 686 mentions, either overt or implied, indicating the P&Ps, see Table 3.5 and Chart 3.2. Most of these P&Ps were enunciated by PM Singh (2004b) in his ‘Address to the Nation’ a month after taking office. They were largely the same P&Ps articulated in RGAP. The Government made numerous 5 The sample included the 2011 RGAP Review, due to its key relevance as a public statement on nuclear posture.

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Table 3.5 Statements indicating non-violence-driven P&Ps (Congress 2004– 14) P&P subcategories

Number

Preference for global disarmament Perception that nuclear weapons are not useable in wars Preference for no-first-use/non-use against non-nuclear powers Preference for non-proliferation Preference for restraint/for peace generally in context of nuclear program Preference for moratorium on testing Total number of unique statements for Non-violence Total number of references to nuclear policy

324 3 31 221 98 10 686 864

1000 900 800 700

864 686

600 500 400

324

300

221

200 100

98 3

31

10

0

Preferences and Perceptions

Chart 3.2 2014)

Statements indicating non-violence-driven P&Ps (Congress 2004–

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references to RGAP, including that it was rooted in non-violence (Aiyar et al. 2011: 41–42; Prasad 2007). Singh stated several times that India remained committed to RGAP’s objectives, namely global disarmament (Aiyar et al. 2011: 41–42). RGAP was said to be a ‘practical’ proposal (Singh 2005b). Disarmament The discourse makes clear that the high-level, overarching objective of India’s nuclear policy continued to be time-bound, non-discriminatory and verifiable global disarmament. The Congress Government also held a strong preference for maintaining an image of India as favouring and striving for disarmament. In a speech outlining the key components of India’s nuclear policy (now as an SNW), Foreign Secretary Saran, stated first and foremost that India ‘remains committed to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons’ (Saran 2005). Content analysis revealed an overwhelming number of references to this preference. Of all P&Ps relating to nuclear policy, disarmament had by far the most references. There were 324 overt or implied expressions of the preference, over one-third of all the 864 mentions of nuclear policy. Given that, as mentioned, disarmament has the strongest untainted connection to the value of non-violence, this demonstrates the strong influence of the value. The Government’s expression of the disarmament preference has been consistent. A year after winning power, Singh stated in Parliament ‘Our commitment to work for universal nuclear disarmament, so passionately espoused by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in the long run will remain our core concern’ (Aiyar et al. 2011: 41–42). A year later in 2006, the PM stated this commitment was ‘unwavering’ and that there was no ‘dilution’ of it (2011: 41–42). In 2008, Singh called for disarmament at UNGA (Singh 2008). At the 2011 Global Zero summit, the PM stated that India was ‘steadfast’ in its support for global disarmament (Aiyar et al. 2011: 41–42). The 2011 RGAP Review made a strong case for disarmament and for India’s return to the forefront of global disarmament activism (Aiyar et al. 2011: 29). The Review cited India’s long tradition of championing global disarmament. It attempted to show a continuity between the five decades of disarmament activism pre-1998, and the current situation of India being an SNW. Now, it was argued, India had an opportunity to be the first state possessing nuclear weapons to actively champion global

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disarmament. This ‘would be only consistent with its past history’ (Aiyar et al. 2011: 29). As mentioned, India expended resources towards publicising its preference for disarmament, suggesting that it was a genuine preference, or at the very least that it was an aspect of its image worth spending resources on to maintain. The discourse makes numerous references to these efforts, including the efforts of past governments. For instance, in his address to UNGA in 2004, PM Singh cited Gandhi’s RGAP which ‘outlined a series of specific steps’ and ‘whose central proposition remains valid even today’ (Singh 2004b). In 2006, India’s representative at the CoD, Jayant Prasad (2006a), recounted the country’s disarmament proposals in the 1990s, including one to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament, and one for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Prasad also noted proposals that were not ideal for India, but which India supported anyway because it created a practical pathway forward for discussions, bringing disarmament closer in the long-term. India also continued to publicly advocate for global disarmament and criticise the NWSs and global nuclear regimes. In 2004 Singh (2004b) criticised the ‘exclusive clubs of privileged countries’ and stated that disarmament could only occur through ‘representative institutions’ (also implying that it should occur). This was despite India unofficially entering these ‘exclusive clubs’ itself. India seemed to genuinely wish to persuade states towards disarmament, arguing that it was the only guarantee of nuclear safety (‘PM Tells Summit He Wants a World Free of Nuclear Weapons’, 2012, Daily Mail, 27 March; Varadarajan 2010). This further suggests that India’s disarmament preference was genuine, because this advocacy was during a time when India was moving towards meeting all its nuclear requirements in terms of cooperation, technology development, etc., through the Indo-US Deal and other agreements. The realist argument that India had a strategic interest in global disarmament due to its own nuclear weaknesses, is therefore less likely. The Government consistently painted disarmament as its ultimate goal, more important than other non-violence-driven preferences, such as nonproliferation (Singh 2005b). As an SNW, India had more to lose strategically from advocating for disarmament, as opposed to advocating for non-proliferation, further evidence that the disarmament preference was genuine, and that non-violence has mitigated the influence of strategic interests. In line with this preference ordering, the Government continued

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to use disarmament as the ‘trump card’ justification for not signing the NPT. For instance, during a debate in Parliament, Singh stated that India would not sign the NPT unless there was global disarmament (Aiyar et al. 2011: 41–42). This also further signalled a sentiment that international arms control treaties were not fit for purpose. Non-proliferation Discourse revealed a strong preference for non-proliferation. There were 221 overt or implied expressions of this preference found—over onequarter of all mentions of nuclear policy. India sought to demonstrate its commitment to non-proliferation in several ways. One of the most common ways was to tout its own nonproliferation record and commitment to the goal (Sharma 2004). Saran (2005) stated that non-proliferation was an area in which India can ‘truly claim to be among the founding fathers’. He claimed this is because Nehru was ‘among the first in the world to appreciate the dangers that nuclear weapons posed to humanity’. This slightly suggests that India was touting its non-proliferation record more to demonstrate its adherence to non-violence than to show its credentials as a responsible global citizen, unlike some other countries. Saran (2005) also stated that non-proliferation ‘will remain one of our principal contributions to international security’. The growing Indo-US nuclear cooperation was framed as being underscored by India’s record as a responsible non-proliferator. Singh (2004c) stated that the partnership was a way that ‘together, our governments can address threats from proliferation’. Another way was to call for better non-proliferation efforts and responsibility by states and international institutions, stating that India would itself be willing to partake in such efforts (Saran 2005). In 2010, PM Singh stated that there should be ‘zero tolerance for individuals and groups which engage in illegal trafficking in nuclear items’ (Varadarajan 2010). India also sought to demonstrate its non-proliferation preference by complaining, sometimes implicitly, about instances of proliferation by others, namely China and Pakistan (Varadarajan 2010; Singh 2004c). This included citing how India’s own interests have been harmed by such proliferation and expressing fears of future proliferation, including by non-state actors (Saran 2005; Sharma 2004).

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General Restraint Congress demonstrated a preference for general restraint and peace in the context of nuclear weapons. There were 78 overt or implied expressions of this preference found. There were also 10 separate statements reiterating a preference for maintaining a moratorium on testing (Saran 2009). This expression of the restraint preference included statements overtly rooted in the value of non-violence. EAM Natwar Singh (2004a) discussed nuclear weapons at a 2004 international seminar on ‘Panchsheel’—the Nehruvian non-violence-, tolerance- and pluralismrooted policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’. Singh (2004a) stated ‘there is no alternative to acceptance of “peaceful co-existence” in a world facing…annihilation if Weapons of Mass Destruction are used either by irresponsible states or intolerant non-state actors’. The restraint preference was also expressed through statements supporting conciliatory measures with Pakistan. For instance, an India– Pakistan joint statement in 2004 touted the nuclear CBMs that had been undertaken and the discussion of a draft agreement on advanced notification of missile tests (‘India–Pakistan Joint Statement’, 2004, September 8). Hierarchy State Behaviour The 2004–2011 period also saw the influence of hierarchy. The RGAP Review’s key recommendation is partly motivated by the value (Aiyar et al. 2011). It states that championing the RGAP would increase ‘India’s own standing within the larger international community’ (2011). It adds that India would have a unique moral position, ‘the very fact that we are an SNW would make us the first of the States armed with nuclear weapons to argue the case for their time-bound elimination’ (2011: 19). India also took steps towards advancing its nuclear capabilities which are likely to have been partly motivated by hierarchy (‘India Launches Nuclear Submarine’, 2009, BBC News, 26 July). Hierarchical Motivations for the Indo-US Deal Realist explanations emphasise the role of strategic, security and economic material gains in motivating India to sign the Deal. These include:

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• India was authorised to import uranium, the lack of which had long stalled the progress of its nuclear program • Washington abandoned any efforts to constrain India from further increasing its nuclear arsenal • Washington would allow India access to nuclear technology • India was only required to apply IAEA safeguards to facilities it designates as being for purely civil purposes (Carter 2006). Many of the nuclear advancement related benefits India obtained, however, were those it was already receiving from other states, including dual-use and missile technologies (‘India Continues N-weapons Development Program: CIA’, 2001, Press Trust of India, 10 August). Russia helped build numerous reactors and leased a nuclear submarine (‘US Opposes Russian Nuclear Plant Sale to India’, 1997, Deutsche-Press Agentur, 6 February; ‘India–Russia Nuclear Deal Signed’, 2008, BBC News, 5 December; ‘Russia to Build 12 Nuclear Plants in India’, 2010, Times of India, 12 March; ‘Russia Declares Nerpa Lease’, 2010, Indian Express, 3 June). France provided fuel and lobbying support (Parthasarathy 2009; Ramachandran 2009; ‘French Supply of Nuclear Fuel to Continue’, 1992, Hindu, 16 November, p. 1). Furthermore, the US sanctions had been lifted back in 2001. The Government claimed that despite commercial engagement with other states, the US was the only country with sufficient standing to open up the existing NSG regime to accommodate India (Saran 2008). The US’s global diplomatic clout, while very important, however, does not exactly constitute an immediate and guaranteed change in NSG guidelines. The strategic cost of the Deal in terms of potentially surrendering the freedom to use nuclear weapons, combined with the fact that the Deal’s material benefits were not immense, suggests there must have been other, non-material factors motivating India’s leaders. Hierarchy played a key role via the preference for using nuclear policy to boost India’s standing in the global hierarchy. The Deal’s main return was that it delivered India recognition as a great power (Carter 2006). PM Singh (2006a) stated in 2006 that the Deal ‘will give India its due place in the global nuclear order. The existence of our strategic programme is being acknowledged even while we are being invited to become a full partner in international civil nuclear

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energy cooperation’. In a separate statement he said ‘India will be able to join the international mainstream and occupy its rightful place among the top countries of the nuclear community’ (Singh 2006b). In Parliament, he stated: This agreement with the United States will open new doors in capitals across the world. It is another step in our journey to regain our due place in global councils. When future generations look back, they will come to acknowledge the significance of this historic deal. (Singh 2007)

The Deal allowed India to bypass the constraints historically placed on it by an international legal and political order that had denied the country its due regard. It quenched Delhi’s 30-year quest for recognition (Carter 2006). Breaking with long-standing policy, the US openly acknowledged India as a legitimate nuclear power. While Americans may have seen the deal as a concession, Indians viewed it as a ‘belated and much deserved acknowledgment’ (ibid.). The Deal was described by some as an exchange of strategic support for recognition (ibid.). Most descriptions of India’s gains from the Deal highlight international status. Carter (2006) states ‘in a stroke, Washington thereby invited India to join the ranks of…the victors of World War II–as a legitimate wielder of the influence that nuclear weapons confer’. India would be accepted into the ‘elite club’ of nuclear weapons states (Overdorf 2008). Kahn (2008) states that the Deal would enhance India’s international stature. At thought of the Deal failing Ganguly (2007) notes ‘India, finally poised to step into the sun, may be about to flub its big chance. The costs of failure would be profound for…Delhi’s…hopes of achieving great-power status’. The Deal was seen as a bellwether signalling India’s rise (Thottam and Singh 2008). Singh (2006a) said that the US’s recognition of India as a nuclear power was more important than the material benefits the Deal would deliver to India’s nuclear energy needs. The PM also expressed the perception that nuclear weapons represent scientific achievement. He stated that America also publicly recognised that India had advanced nuclear technologies and as such ‘should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other States which have advanced nuclear technology’ (2006a). Recognition by the US, the current global hegemon, was a major step towards global recognition and therefore, higher world standing. The

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Deal not only commits America to treat India like an NWS, even though it was not required to sign the NPT, but to also urge other states to do the same (Carter 2006). Indian leaders highlighted that the US would work ‘with allies to adjust relevant international regimes’ (Singh 2006a). This included ‘multilateral regimes, such as the NSG, to enable the international community to also engage India in full civil nuclear energy cooperation’ (Saran 2008). The US was key as it had been ‘the principal initiator and leader of’ the ‘multilateral technology-denial regimes’ like the NSG and MTCR which had stood in the way of India’s nuclear ascendance (2008). The Deal would make India a recognised member of the ‘nuclear club’ circumscribed by the NPT (Ganguly 2007). PM Singh (2006a) stated proudly that the US indicated its support for India’s inclusion as a full partner into ‘clubs’ like the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project and the Generation IV International Forum. The importance of the Deal in symbolising India’s rise can be seen in Singh’s personal interest in seeing that it was passed. Pundits stated that it was ‘completely personal for him’ and that the ‘PM is determined to do this’ (Thottam and Singh 2008). Singh had risked the collapse of his fragile coalition government on the Deal (Kahn 2008). He even threatened to resign should it fail (Sampath 2012). Throughout Singh’s rule, the Deal was the only issue on which he exhibited such strong determination. Discourse Hierarchy was also evident in the discourse. Within 55 official speeches and other documents which refer to nuclear weapons, there were around 58 mentions, either overt or implied, indicating P&Ps rooted in hierarchy (Table 3.6). Indo-US Deal and Higher Standing The State Behaviour section provided examples from discourse of the preference for rising up the global hierarchy via nuclear policy and this preference’s role in motivating India’s signing of the Deal. Overall, discourse surrounding the Deal is drenched in the language of hierarchy. Hierarchy drove leaders’ defensive rhetoric on the Deal following its completion. This discourse provides strong evidence of the perception that nuclear status brings and is critical to global standing. The Government framed the Deal as supporting India’s rise. In addition,

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Table 3.6 Statements indicating hierarchy-driven P&Ps (Congress 2004–2014) P&P subcategories

Number

Perception that nuclear weapons development represents scientific achievement Perception that nuclear weapons/posture brings India higher global standing/Preference for using it for this end Hierarchy in general related to nuclear weapons Total number of unique statements for Hierarchy Total number of references to nuclear policy

33 14 11 58 864

the Government sought to reassure that India would not surrender any autonomy in its nuclear policy, and thereby lose standing, because of the Deal (Singh 2006a, c). The PM stated that India’s strategic nuclear program would ‘be decided by the people, government and Parliament of the country and not by any outside power’ (‘India Said to Retain Right to Hold Tests’, 2006, Washington Post, 23 August). Singh (2006c) stated in Parliament that India would not be bound by legislation in any foreign country. He adds that ‘our foreign policy…will be dictated entirely by our national interest’ (Singh 2006c). Singh (2007) also highlighted that India negotiated the Deal as an equal partner to the US. This equality was said to be the result of India’s technological prowess. India’s representative to the CoD stated in 2006 that there was ‘no question’ of India signing either a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA or an Additional Protocol of a type concluded by non-NWSs who have signed the NPT. He added that ‘we will not accept any verification measures regarding our safeguarded nuclear facilities beyond those contained in an India-Specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Therefore there is no question of allowing American inspectors to roam around our nuclear facilities’ (Prasad 2006b). The AEC Chairman indicated that India will not accept any US move to cap its production of enriched uranium and plutonium (‘Report: India Disproves Capping of Its Nuclear Fissile Material Production’, 2006, International Herald Tribune, 8 September). Officials stated that India would not be ‘compelled’ to separate its civil and nuclear facilities saying ‘we don’t have to go ahead with this’ (‘No Compulsion for India to Separate Civil and Nuclear Facilities’, 2005, Hindu, 26 November). Singh stated that India would retain its right

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to carry out future nuclear tests despite the Deal (‘India Said to Retain Right to Hold Tests’, 2006, Washington Post, 23 August). Testing was not on the cards in any case due to the publicly stated moratorium. It was already widely known India had the autonomy to do both of these actions, though they may mean that India would not receive the benefits of the Deal. Restating this autonomy in such a defiant manner reveals the importance to the Government of maintaining India’s dignity and status. Both the public’s and opposition parties’ support and concern regarding the Deal were based in hierarchy. Responding to these concerns further affected for leaders engaging in the above hierarchical rhetoric. Those who supported the Deal did so due to the boost in international standing it provided. Opposition was largely based in partly hierarchydriven fears of India losing its autonomy in foreign and nuclear policy (Singh 2006c). There were concerns that India’s leadership had ‘turned India into a US pawn’ (Thottam and Singh 2008). While similar deals had been signed between the US and more than a dozen other nations, it caused particular concern within India’s polity due to the hierarchy-driven tradition of spurning any outside review of its nuclear program (Thottam and Singh 2008). Hierarchy drove concern from both the Right and the Left (Ganguly 2007). Both the BJP and the CPI (M) complained that the Deal would undermine India’s strategic autonomy. Washington would have undue influence over Indian politics making Delhi subservient (‘Time Limited to Close India Deal, Experts Say’, 2007, Global Security Newswire, 2 November; Ganguly 2007; Moreau and Mazumdar 2007). The CPI (M) feared that Washington would use nuclear sales to ‘lord over’ India (Overdorf 2008). The CPI (M), which had made up part of the governing coalition for the previous four years, withdrew support for the Government in protest. Academic critics like Karnad (2008: x) argue that the Deal’s imposition of restrictions on India’s nuclear weapons use is harmful not only to security interests but also because nuclear weapons are the mark of a great power. He argues that India cannot accept restrictions on ‘a program that is part of its core strategy for emergence as one of the world’s major power centres’. Pro-nuclear weapons scientists expressed similar concern (Singh 2006c).

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Scientific Achievement The P&P reflected most frequently in the discourse was the perception that nuclear weapons development represents scientific achievement. There were 33 such statements found in the sample. While the statements were often in reference to general nuclear technological advances, these were often advances that could have had both civil and military applications. In 2006, the PM stated ‘the nation is justly proud of the tremendous work of our nuclear scientists and the Department of Atomic Energy in mastering all the key aspects of the full nuclear fuel cycle, often under difficult circumstances. The tremendous achievements of our scientists…will not be frittered away’ (Singh 2006a). In 2010, Singh proudly announced the establishment of the Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership in India ‘a state of art facility based on international participation’ (Nayar 2010). At UNGA in 2004 the Minister of State for External Affairs noted the Golden Jubilee of the establishment of the Department of Atomic Energy of India and commended the activities of its scientists (Singh 2004d). The tradition of the AEC Chairman indicating India’s nuclear technology achievements, including through announcing exports, continued (‘India Ready to Sell Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors’, 2010, Hindu, 23 September). Many of the technology-related statements occurred in the context of the Indo-US Deal and generally increasing international nuclear cooperation. PM Singh stated that the Deal would ‘bring India the recognition it deserves thanks to the outstanding achievements of our scientists’ (Singh 2007). Technological achievement, rather than military power from nuclear weapons, is praised for having allowed India to rise up the global hierarchy and negotiate as an equal partner. Foreign engagement with India is attributed to India’s position in the international hierarchy, rather than other countries’ strategic interests. In 2006 the PM attributed increased international cooperation to ‘the high respect and admiration our scientists enjoy internationally’ (Singh 2006a). Referring to the ongoing nuclear cooperation talks with the US, he added that ‘this gives us confidence to engage in these negotiations as an equal partner’ and that states have engaged India as a ‘valued partner’. Government statements also reveal a perception that India has now entered an elite club of states thanks to the Deal and India’s nuclear technological achievements. This club is defined not just by common interests

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in global nuclear security, but by high-tech status. The PM stated that ‘there was also public recognition that as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technologies, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other states which have advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States’ (Singh 2006a). He added that the Deal would allow for ‘India’s emergence as a full member of a new nuclear world order’. When commenting on India’s joining of the ITER project, Singh (2007) stated it would be ‘as a full and equal member along with a handful of technologically advanced countries’. India would be ‘a significant factor’ in the ‘global nuclear renaissance’ (Singh 2009). Pluralism and Tolerance State Behaviour Pluralism and tolerance impacted Congress’s nuclear policy. Continuing the BJP’s practice, Congress emphasised the shared values of pluralism when justifying nuclear cooperation with other states. Former Foreign Secretary Saran (2010a) stated that Japan and India were vibrant democracies with an interest in peace. Saran cited the two countries’ ‘deep cultural affinity due to our shared Buddhist heritage’. India’s pluralistic image had an impact on the US’s decision to increase cooperation. At the very least, India’s pluralist democratic society provided a moral reason which US leaders could tout to justify their nuclear support for India. India’s pluralism was likened to America’s. President Bush stated at the Indo-US Nuclear Deal’s signing ceremony that ‘The United States and India are natural partners’ and that ‘today, America and India are united by deeply held values’ (‘Bush Signs India Nuclear Law’, 2006, Washington Post, 19 December). Undersecretary of State Armitage said that ‘it would be unreasonable for a multi-ethnic, multi-religious democratic federation like the US not to have a more robust relationship with a multi-ethnic, multi-religious democratic federation like India’ (‘Sanctions Imposed on India Will Come Off Soon: Armitage’, 2001, Press Trust of India, 18 August; ‘Indo-US Relations to Be Robust: Richard Armitage’, 2001, Pakistan Newswire, 18 August). Other democracies also cited India’s pluralistic and democratic credentials in justifying cooperation. This included Canada and Australia (Krishnaswami 2001; ‘Labor Left Concedes Defeat on Uranium Ban’, 2011, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 November).

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Conclusion The three periods studied demonstrate a consistently significant influence of cultural values. Figure 3.1 displays values’ influence via P&Ps. Non-violence India’s nuclear policy has been influenced significantly by the value of non-violence. Cohen (2001: 161) argues that one of the two major themes influencing Indian nuclear policy has been Gandhian nonviolence. Perkovich (1999: 444–445) assesses that ‘moral considerations have had an unusually material impact on Indian policy’. He states that a normative aversion to nuclear weapons was common among all parties that had ever come to power in India (1999: 318). Former defence officials stated that cultural values like non-violence influence both the Indian military and Foreign Service officials (Former Defence Officials, Interview with Author, 5 April 2017). While preferences like global disarmament, non-proliferation and general nuclear restraint are not unique to India, in certain situations the value of non-violence is likely to have had a greater influence on India than on other comparable states. For instance, in relation to the length of time between its first nuclear test and weaponisation, India adhered to non-proliferation ideals more than most other nuclear powers. During the border build-up following the Parliament attacks, India acted with more restraint than Pakistan, given circumstances. India’s behaviour was not simply due to what neorealists argue is ‘rational’ self-interest in avoiding conflict to preserve state survival. Rather, the value of non-violence was an end in itself. Delhi’s aversion to violence included that perpetrated by India against foreign entities. Consistent Level of Influence The level of non-violence’s influence was higher and more consistent on discourse, than on state behaviour. The Singh Congress Administration wanted to make its mark on nuclear policy given that, as Singh states, ‘when we (Congress) remitted office in 1996, we (India) were not a nuclear power’ (‘Priority Given to Nuclear CBMs in Talks, Says India’, 2004, The Nation, 10 June). Adherence to non-violence was one motivation for this.

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Hierarchy

Pf/Pp = Nuclear weapons/posture boosts India’s status (stronger post Pokhran II)

Hierarchical Worldview

Pp = Hierarchy in general related to nuclear weapons

Pf = India can rise up hierarchy through nuclear restraint (stronger pre 1998)

Pp = Nuclear weapons represent scien fic achievement

Pf = Nuclear weapons are symbolic and not for use in wars

Nonviolence

Pf = Non-violent image of India Pf = Disarmament

Pf = Non-prolifera on

Pf = Restraint generally in context of nuclear posture Pf = no-first-use/non-use against non-nuclear powers

Pf = Maintain a tolerant and pluralis c image.

Pluralism and Tolerance Pp = Pluralism and tolerance are the

correct and natural way of being in world affairs.

Fig. 3.1 How cultural values influence P&Ps in nuclear policy (Key: Preference = Pf; Perception = Pp)

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The baseline level of influence can be seen in the amount of expression of non-violence-rooted P&Ps. Quantitative analysis confirmed this baseline during case studies 2 and 3. Of the 357 references to nuclear policy found in the sample of texts during BJP rule in 1998–2004, there were around 181 mentions indicating non-violence-driven P&Ps. In the Congress Administration of 2004–2011, of the 864 references to nuclear policy, 686 expressed P&Ps influenced by non-violence. This shows a variance of roughly 28%, from 51% under the BJP, to 79% under Congress. In both of these cases over half of all references to nuclear weapons were expressions of P&Ps driven by non-violence. The maintenance of a baseline amount of expression of non-violencedriven P&Ps in the discourse is also evidence of one particular preference—to maintain a non-violent image of India. Even if leaders throughout the three periods differed in terms of their genuine belief in these non-violent P&Ps, they all maintained or surpassed this baseline level of expression in order to ensure this non-violent image. While in state behaviour, non-violence’s influence was not as strong or consistent as in discourse, it still maintained a significant level of influence throughout every government in the period. Many commentators argue that Pokhran II, and the BJP’s rule more broadly, demonstrate a departure from non-violence (Mohan 2005). However, the BJP’s conception of nuclear weapons was that they were largely symbolic, prestige-providing items rather than military tools, thereby not contradictory to the Government’s practical non-violent preferences. Pokhran II did not constitute a major divergence away from nonviolence as the tests did little to change India’s reluctance to seriously engage with the idea of using nuclear weapons. Even those who within the nuclear establishment who had lobbied for the tests felt that the nuclear program should not be ‘militarised’ as it would risk an arms race (Perkovich 1999: 447–448). In addition to directly influencing preferences, here non-violence can be seen also contributing to traditions of policy which then further influenced leaders’ preferences. This is somewhat similar to what Basrur (2001: 184) describes as the ‘ideational’ component, in this case cultural values (Hatch 1997: 205), interacting with the ‘praxological’ component—repetitive patterns of action over time.

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Unchanging Nature of Influence The nature of non-violence’s influence has also remained consistent, both within each case study and throughout the three cases. In fact, nonviolence was central to the continuity of India’s nuclear policy overall. This concurs with scholars who argue that despite changes in external and internal environments, India’s nuclear behaviour was characterised by limited departures from the established posture (see Perkovich 1999; Basrur 2001: 194). Non-violence’s consistent influence has been via contributing the same P&Ps throughout the case studies. All governments in the case studies largely adhered to the key P&Ps in RGAP. Its influence may have been stronger in Congress administrations, but it still impacted other governments including the BJP, though much less overtly. It is noted that there was some divergence from the RGAP, namely against its stipulation that ‘India should not cross the nuclear threshold if the five nuclear weapon states: start negotiations on the elimination of their nuclear weapons; sign the CTBT and agree to a fissile material cut-off treaty’ (Karnad 2002: 377). However, it is highly debatable as to whether the negotiations by NWSs are genuine and in the spirit of what RGAP called for/envisioned. India also waited 10 years after RGAP to cross the threshold and even at that time significant steps were yet to be made by the NWSs on global disarmament. Realist Arguments Some may argue that India’s non-violent nuclear P&Ps were not driven by non-violence but by material, largely strategic, interests as a weak state. This may include reducing nuclear threats from others (pre-Pokhran II), obtaining nuclear cooperation or facing less scrutiny from international institutions (post-Pokhran II). Realists may claim that as India gained the capabilities to develop nuclear weapons, it did so, revealing its true motivations were never driven by non-violence. The case studies, however, suggest otherwise. Firstly, India expressed non-violent P&Ps throughout the last 25 years, despite changing strategic interests. Secondly, India engaged in non-violence-driven behaviour and discourse even when this harmed its strategic interests. This included: excluding the military from high-level NP; in relation to the Indo-US Nuclear Deal; not accelerating India’s nuclear program when Pakistan was known to be making nuclear advances; agreeing not to attack Pakistan’s

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nuclear facilities (quid pro quo); CBMs and talks and other conciliatory gestures towards Pakistan. The foregoing of strategic interests can also be seen in India’s preference for restraint in state behaviour throughout the period despite several instances of increased perceived threats from Pakistan and China. While realism would suggest that in response to enhanced threats India would have accelerated its nuclear program significantly, on crucial occasions it did not (Basrur 2001: 188). This finding of restraint concurs with the assessments of scholars who highlight India’s nuclear ‘minimalism’ (Basrur 2001; Perkovich 1999). No nation has had more democratic, lengthy, wide-ranging or intensive debates on whether to cross each nuclear threshold, and on whether to acquire or give up nuclear weapons overall (Perkovich 1999: 444–445; Cohen 2001: 157). India had the capability to test for several years but never did so. It stepped back from testing twice in Period 1 and took only incremental steps towards developing capability (Basrur 2001; Perkovich 1999). India’s nuclear weapons development was more self-restrained than China in the 1960s and Pakistan in the 1970s/1980s (Perkovich 1999: 447–448). Ongoing Preferences and Perceptions Disarmament Global disarmament was the P&P most purely driven by non-violence. This is partly because complete elimination is the most extreme expression of non-violence within the realm of nuclear weapons. Disarmament was also the most overarching preference, and seen most strongly in terms of India’s actions and discourse in all periods of investigation. It was promoted as a higher ideal than signing up to arms control treaties. Administrations including and subsequent to Gandhi’s maintained the non-violence-driven disarmament preference, as articulated in RGAP, as the overarching objective of India’s NP. Had this important preference been contested by later governments, it would have been reflected in rhetoric. Given its centrality to India’s nuclear policy, a Government making no comment on the policy is likely to mean that it endorses the policy’s continuance. The RGAP Review notes that disarmament was a preference since independence which continued after the first nuclear tests in 1974 and also after the 1998 tests when India became an SNW (Aiyar et al. 2011: 29).

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India’s preference for disarmament is likely to have been genuine. This is seen in the amount of resources India put into supporting disarmament: diplomatic initiatives, stage time at international forums, and the constitution of the RGAP Review panel. Delhi’s actions also show an effort to pursue practical steps towards global disarmament. While many nuclear powers have expressed a desire for disarmament, the consistency and strength of India’s appeal is largely unparalleled, particularly among other SNWs. India has regularly and consistently made clear that disarmament is more important to it than some of its other non-violence-driven preferences, such as non-proliferation. Disarmament was consistently used as the justification for not signing the NPT and CTBT. Some argue that India’s attempts to shape arms control law and disarmament, including when unsuccessful, have sought to advance national security aims as well and, thereby, are only partially genuine at best (Kennedy 2011: 123). The case study, however, suggests otherwise. Advocacy for binding agreements on disarmament would not have gained India favour among the great powers, as much as advocacy for nonproliferation—thereby harming its strategic interests. The main targets of India’s disarmament advocacy were the largest nuclear powers, US and USSR/Russia neither of whose nuclear weapons threatened India during the period. The USSR was in fact an ally and Russia a friend. India’s genuineness is also suggested by the sheer consistency of its calls for disarmament for over half a century, during which security interests changed. During both Congress 2004–2011 and BJP 1998–2004, global disarmament provided an example of non-violence mitigating the influence of strategic interests on nuclear policy. Disarmament would have had a negative impact on India’s strategic interests as an SNW but both administrations still put resources into pursuing it. Period 1 revealed strong and consistent adherence to the disarmament preference. In terms of rhetoric, it was promoted at UNGA by Gandhi, Rao, Gowda and Gujral. In addition to RGAP, governments presented papers in the most important multilateral forums suggesting steps towards disarmament. In Period 2, the BJP made explicit that it continued to adhere to the disarmament preference with PM Vajpayee stating that Pokhran II was not a ‘repudiation’ of the objective of global disarmament. The BJP made around 97 references to the disarmament preference during the period. Period 3 revealed an even stronger obeisance to

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the disarmament preference. Singh’s Government revived RGAP and promoted practical steps towards disarmament such as circulating working papers at UNGA reminding the world of the Plan. The Administration’s discourse contained 324 expressions of the disarmament preference, meaning 38% of all references to nuclear weapons expressed the disarmament preference. This was roughly the same number as expressions of all the other non-violence-driven P&Ps combined. Non-proliferation Another regularly and consistently witnessed P&P was the preference for non-proliferation. Despite not signing the NPT or CTBT, India’s record of unilateral non-proliferation adhered to relatively strict standards. In recent years, this record was cited as a justification by states undertaking nuclear cooperation with India. India publicised its record extensively. The second and third periods reveal more rhetoric devoted to promoting non-proliferation than the first period. This is likely due to the greater need to salvage and repair India’s non-violent image following the Pokhran II tests. This reparation, however, only involved supporting principles of non-proliferation and not joining the legal treaties enforcing it. Between Periods 2 and 3 there are differences, however. Congress made more statements than the BJP expressing the preference for non-proliferation both proportionately and in absolute terms. Congress demonstrated its support for non-proliferation through: introducing a non-proliferation bill in parliament; maintaining export controls and joining international initiatives for proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies. General Restraint Also displaying continuity has been the preference for restraint generally in the context of nuclear policy. This existed somewhat irrespective of the domestic political environment (Subrahmanyam 2004). While it is true that many states display restraint when dealing with nuclear-armed adversaries, India’s situation is somewhat unique, suggesting a significant cultural influence. India and Pakistan are the only nuclear states that have had direct armed conflict with another nuclear state. In the conflicts during the periods examined, India displayed a higher level of restraint than Pakistan, relative to its superior capabilities. India has also displayed greater restraint (relative to core strategic interests) than

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other large powers have in similar situations dealing with smaller neighbouring adversaries, e.g. Russia and Ukraine, the US and Cuba, China and Vietnam. In terms of rhetoric, the preference for restraint somewhat reflected the trend shown by the preference for non-proliferation—present in the 1988–1998 period, increasing in 1998–2004 and further increasing in 2004–2011. India’s rhetoric of restraint is perhaps most clear when it responds to aggressive actions or statements by Pakistan. Exclusion of Military All three periods showed leaders maintaining a strong preference not only for civilian control of nuclear affairs but for excluding the military altogether. This contributed to having an exceptionally small circle of policymakers deciding on nuclear policy. Throughout the cases the political elite maintained a somewhat cautious approach towards the military, including with regard to nuclear weapons. Perkovich (1999: 305) argues that exclusion of the military was a ‘long-standing’ tradition. These preferences led to leaders neglecting military affairs and less military expenditure. This stands in contrast to Pakistan where the military had been excessively influential. Not Useable Also influencing the exclusion of the military was the perception that nuclear weapons could not, would not and should not be used in war. It is this non-violence-driven perception that also meant that India did not incorporate nuclear weapons into a national security strategy or command structure until well into the BJP’s 1998–2004 Administration, years after the Pokhran II tests. Conciliatory Gestures During crises and at other times, most governments made conciliatory gestures and efforts towards rapprochement on nuclear matters with Pakistan and China. This contrasts sharply with US-Soviet arms control, which took off only after prolonged tension and repeated crises. Some scholars like Latham (1997: 120) cite the Kautilyan paradigm as a source of Indian ‘security culture’, arguing that India would be opposed to CBMs as these contradict Kautilya’s strategies. Periods 2 and 3, however, refute this. This adds weight to the argument that India’s overall cultural

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values have had a more significant impact on its nuclear policy than specific historic texts, like Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Non-use/no-First-Use Also contradicting the thrust of Kautilyan and realist arguments is India’s publicised adherence to a policy of no-first-use and non-use against nonnuclear powers. No-first-use had been expressed as a preference by the Rao and Gowda Governments. When India became an SNW, the BJP made no-first-use and non-use official policy. It was then strongly adhered to and reiterated by the Congress Government despite pressure to reexamine it from the opposition. These preferences had a direct negative influence on India’s strategic interests. A spectre of first-use may have dissuaded Pakistan, at least to a small extent, from pursuing minor cross-border incursions and supporting internal attacks by proxy actors. Similarly, non-use against non-nuclear powers would have lessened India’s ability to coerce its smaller non-nuclear neighbours, even if by a minor extent. Image The preference to maintain a non-violent image of India was especially clear when comparing the rhetoric between the different periods. The image preference helped to drive all of the aforementioned P&Ps. While each government took slightly different approaches to nuclear weapons development, they continued to promote the same non-violent P&Ps. This was particularly the case for the P&Ps for global disarmament, nonproliferation, general restraint, non-use against non-nuclear powers and no-first-use. The non-violent image preference was clear when these P&Ps were used to justify India’s opposition to arms control measures like the NPT and CTBT. Even if various leaders had different levels of genuine support for these P&Ps, they all felt it important to be seen to adhere to the P&Ps in order to maintain a non-violent image. The restraint among leaders in contrast to the consistently pro-nuclear positions of the scientists in the nuclear establishment demonstrates the impact of the non-violent image preference. Due to their positions, leaders were more concerned regarding India’s international image than scientists. Leaders were, therefore, more interested in protecting an image which was in line with their society’s cultural values. Period 3 reveals how non-violence influenced India’s image in the eyes of foreign powers and thereby, their approaches to India.

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Differences Between Cases While the influence of non-violence on rhetoric never dropped below a baseline level it is worth looking into the reasons behind the variances above this baseline. While the 2004–2011 Congress Government and 1998–2004 BJP Government were both influenced by non-violence, it was more in line with Congress tradition since independence to use this value to identify with India’s culture and identity. This was possibly due, in part, to Congress at the time being more in tune with what the Indian public was comfortable with, in terms of non-violence being expressed in foreign policy. A significant part of this variance was Congress’s rhetoric on global disarmament. While disarmament continued as a preference among all governments, its expression varied somewhat above the baseline. Congress 2004–2011 made 324 expressions of the disarmament preference, compared to BJP 1998–2004’s 97 expressions. This may be because after many years out of office, Congress sought, in its 2004–2011 rule, to reclaim its and India’s mantle as the champion of global disarmament. Also, because Congress had ruled India for the majority of time since independence, it had a longer tradition of advocacy for disarmament than the BJP (Prasad 2006). Hierarchy While most analysts contend that NP is exclusively the result of ‘poweroriented realism’ (Basrur 2009: 108), the case studies reveal that hierarchy plays a highly significant role. When compared to other states, the influence of hierarchy on India’s policy is high relative to the range of other policy drivers, which include inter alia: strategic goals, domestic politics and internal power nodes, support for international arms control treaties and economic interests. In India’s equation, hierarchy carried more weight than it did in most other states’ equations in relation to nuclear weapons. This occurred through the initial ‘hierarchical worldview’ perception. Tanham argues that ‘Gaining recognition of India’s status in the region and the world plays a pivotal role in Indian strategic thought’ (1992: 60). The preference to rise up the global hierarchy has been constant since independence (Swaminathan 2003). Realists like Morgenthau (1978) recognise prestige as a motive in IR. Realists define prestige as the image of having power. This is a somewhat

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narrower definition than I use, which includes the image of having power, but also having other social goods which place India high in the perceived international hierarchy of states. Realists argue prestige is used as a means of increasing security or power through giving others the impression that the state has material, namely military, power. It is not seen as an end in itself. The realist argument does not ring true, however, in India’s case. If security or power were the motivation behind the quest for prestige, this would mean instilling in foreign audiences that India had the power to defeat potential enemies by force. However, the consistency and frequency of rhetoric highlighting India’s nuclear restraint deflates this implied threat to a significant extent. As such, it is likely that for India’s Governments, prestige and status were objectives in themselves, driven by their hierarchical worldview. Differences Between Cases Both the level and nature of hierarchy’s influence varied more than that of non-violence. Hierarchy had a greater impact during the BJP 1998–2004 and Congress 2004–2011 administrations than during the various governments of Period 1. During the BJP’s 1998–2004 rule around one-tenth of all statements on nuclear weapons expressed P&Ps rooted in hierarchy. During Congress’s 2004–2011 rule, it was around one-fifteenth. Compared to non-violence, there was greater disparity between hierarchy’s influence on state behaviour and its expression in rhetoric. This is likely due to the different ways in which hierarchy influences P&Ps. Strengthening non-violent rhetoric is the preference for achieving a nonviolent image of India. While the preference for India holding high international standing did have a large image component, this image was not, for the most part, achieved through rhetoric (at least in governments after Nehru’s). Rather, it was boosted through actions. In addition to the level of influence, the nature of hierarchy’s influence was also more dynamic than non-violence’s. Hierarchy has not consistently influenced nuclear policy in one direction. While non-violence consistently affected for the anti-nuclear P&Ps, hierarchy resulted in both pro and anti-nuclear P&Ps. The varying influences of hierarchy constitute one of the key differences found between the BJP on the one hand, and Congress and other minor parties on the other hand.

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Differing Conceptions of Hierarchy Nehruvian View Various governments held different versions of the hierarchical worldview. Throughout the Nehru and Congress dominated first few decades of India’s independence, the hierarchical worldview took a largely consistent form. It led to a perception that moral worth was a determiner of status in the international hierarchy. Central to this moral worth was the value of non-violence. The hierarchical worldview also led to a preference for India to achieve high standing by demonstrating moral superiority. This included via opposing nuclear weapons. As such, the values of hierarchy and non-violence combined to affect for P&Ps in the same anti-nuclear direction. Founding fathers, Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru were leaders in the campaign against nuclear weapons (Perkovich 1999: 448). Refraining from the pursuit of nuclear weapons was justified by claims that India’s civilisational greatness meant that it can be the great power that leads by example and says no to nuclearism (Cohen 2001: 168). Perkovich (1999: 448) states that ‘India’s national identity is constructed around the determination to be an independent, great state that transcends its colonial past and is morally superior to its colonizers and the dominant states of the international system’. Exercising nuclear self-restraint would put India in a position of moral superiority in the eyes of the international community (Izuyama and Ogawa 2003). It would sit higher in the global hierarchy than the world’s exploitative and overly militarised great powers (Perkovich 1999: 448). Incumbent administrations continued Nehru’s mission of making India a potential source of moral transformation of the world system with regard to nuclear disarmament. Period 1 shows this conception of hierarchy was strong within Gandhi’s Congress Government, but also existed to an albeit lesser degree in Rao’s Congress Government and the Janata Dal Governments of Gowda and Gujral. It led to restrained and incremental advances in nuclear policy in terms of state behaviour, combined with strong expression of non-violence-driven P&Ps (mainly disarmament) in discourse. The later administrations of the period, particularly post 1991, saw hierarchy as more materially based than Nehru and considered economic achievement as important for India’s rise. This includes Rao, Gowda and Gujral governments. Partly due to this, they made little changes to nuclear

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policy. These administrations can be seen as having exhibited strategic cultures closer to what Bajpai (2002: 252) describes as neoliberalism. Administrations during Period 1 also began to be influenced by hierarchy-driven pro-nuclear P&Ps. This includes the perception that nuclear weapons bring India greater standing. Discourse reveals that this perception began to gather in strength in the Rao period. It was seen in Rao’s motivations to test. BJP View Like with previous governments, hierarchy influenced the BJP. The Party felt ‘Hindu India’ should be at the top of the international hierarchy as a ‘great civilization and nation’ (Perkovich 1999: 377; Bajpai 2009: 37). The BJP was, however, influenced in a different way to previous administrations. Hierarchy-driven pro-nuclear P&Ps came to decisively dominate over the hierarchy-driven anti-nuclear P&Ps, particularly in rhetoric. I note, this does not mean that they dominated over non-violence-driven anti-nuclear P&Ps—these were still stronger. Previous governments had, for the most part, seen nuclear weapons as at best a regrettable necessity—a horrific weapon only to be used in defence in extreme circumstances. The BJP, in contrast, held the perception that nuclear weapons or nuclear policy could bring status in the international hierarchy and should be used for such a purpose. This was clear in the rhetoric. Nuclear weapons constituted ‘perhaps the greatest element’ of national status (Bajpai 2009: 37). They demonstrated India’s civilisational superiority by its acquisition of the most advanced form of military power known to man (Cohen 2001: 168). Following Pokhran II, the perception slightly evolved to be that nuclear weapons have brought India higher standing. Perkovich (1999: 449) argues that the BJP was the only government to have favoured the ‘great power’ norm to almost the exclusion of the ‘moral-superiority-through-nuclear-self-restraint norm’. While Perkovich’s (1999: 449) view is slightly over-dramatic given the evidence that the BJP still adhered to non-violent P&Ps, it was true that rather than transforming the world system as Nehru had sought, the BJP wanted India to achieve great power status in the existing world system. As such, the BJP seemed to place relatively more importance on others’ views of India, seeing external actors as the conferrers of status. Of particular importance was recognition from the current hegemon, the US (Nizamani 2000: 60; Subrahmanyam 1986: 281). This was further reinforced by the public’s hierarchical worldview where the bomb was

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needed to ensure other states recognised India’s true greatness (Tanham 1992: 79). Similar to some other governments, the BJP’s conception of hierarchy involved a hierarchy of material power. However, while the BJP saw the economic development avenue favoured by others as a long-term process, nuclear weapons provided a more instantaneous source of international status (Bajpai 2009: 37). They are, as Bajpai (2002: 38) describes, ‘a spectacular announcement of power’. International hierarchy itself played a more important role in the BJP’s nuclear policy than in Congress’s, both in Congress’s 2004–2011 and pre-BJP rule. While Congress also saw India as a great nation, the BJP was much more comfortable with the politics of status (Bajpai 2009: 38), particularly in an overt way. In terms of rhetoric, this can be seen in the higher proportion of expressions of hierarchy-driven P&Ps during the BJP’s 1998–2004 reign than in Congress’s 2004–2011 reign. The BJP’s theoreticians valorised hierarchy, whether in domestic or international society (Golwalker 1996; Savarkar 1999; Bajpai 2004: 308–320). Bajpai describes it as an ‘obsession’ (2009: 37–38) with status. He emphasises the importance of strategic culture in influencing the BJP Government. While Bajpai (2009: 37–38) does not discuss this, the value of hierarchy has entered the BJP’s strategic culture due to hierarchy’s role as a cultural value more broadly. Hierarchy played a key role in motivating pro-nuclear state behaviour and rhetoric under the BJP. Period 2’s findings concurred with arguments by Cohen (2001: 197) and Perkovich (1999). In terms of discourse, there were around 58 expressions of hierarchy-driven P&Ps. Hierarchy was one of the key, if not the dominant factor driving the BJP’s 1998 tests. BJP leaders were obsessed with boosting India’s position in the international hierarchy, catching up to China and making clear its superiority over Pakistan. Pro-nuclearists within the nuclear establishment were said to have exploited this obsession (Perkovich 447–448). The discourse surrounding the tests was drenched with the language of hierarchy. The tests were couched as symbolising India’s rise up the global order. Hierarchy’s influence was also evident from the failure of the dominant existing explanations to provide a comprehensive account of nuclear policy.

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Recent Congress View Hierarchy continued to have a significant impact during Period 3, though its role shifted once again. Singh’s Congress Government had similarities to both the BJP and, previous Congress and other pre-Pokhran governments in its conception of hierarchy. Hierarchy affected for pro-nuclear P&Ps stronger than in pre-BJP Governments, but also anti-nuclear P&Ps stronger than under the BJP. Like the BJP, 2004–2011 Congress saw nuclear policy as an avenue to boost India’s position in the global hierarchy. Congress similarly held the perception that nuclear weapons/posture bring higher global standing and the preference that it be used to achieve this. This perception and preference also motivated the Government, to a significant extent, to undertake increased cooperation with foreign nuclear powers, most notably through the Indo-US Deal. This cooperation was the stand-out feature of Singh’s rule. Assessment of the Deal, its outcomes and the rhetoric surrounding it, revealed that strategic and economic interests were far from the only factors at play. The technological and strategic benefits of the Deal were questionable. The Indian Government intended the Deal to play a major role in boosting the country’s status in the international hierarchy. India was able to quench its long thirst for acceptance as a legitimate nuclear power, and therefore a great power. The influence of hierarchy can also be seen in the Government’s defence of the Deal which also centred on status. Congress rule saw greater interaction between the roles of hierarchy and non-violence than BJP rule. This impacted both the nature and level of hierarchy’s influence. Congress’s pro-nuclear, hierarchy-driven state behaviour and rhetoric was mitigated by its non-violent image preference to some extent. When Congress expressed pro-nuclear rhetoric, it was less overtly in relation to weapons and more in relation to broad advancement and cooperation. This was despite the fact that the publicised advances often could have had both civil and military applications. India’s status as an SNW remained an important implicit factor in the background. Hierarchy also combined with non-violence to motivate the RGAP Review’s key recommendation that India lead the global disarmament cause. The Congress’s Indo-US Deal and increasing cooperation with foreign nuclear powers can be compared with the BJP’s unilateral action in testing. Both achievements were aimed at boosting India’s international standing, but Congress’s steps were less drastic, suggesting less desperation to achieve high standing. While the BJP had kicked down the

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door to enter the ‘illegitimate’ nuclear club by testing, Congress had managed to wrangle an invite into the ‘legitimate’ nuclear club, through increased nuclear cooperation and recognition with NWSs, namely the US. Also, Congress’s less audacious actions left the Government room to still attempt to portray a non-violent image, something more difficult for the BJP. Of course, it could be argued that Congress had the benefits that the BJP did not, given that Congress took power after the BJP had done the hard work and faced the criticism. Continuity Along with these changes in the extent and nature of hierarchy’s influence, there were also some P&Ps which continued throughout the three cases. This aligns with the overall continuity in the role of hierarchy in shaping Indian foreign policy (Basrur 2017: 9). One P&P demonstrating continuity was the preference to not join international legal non-proliferation regimes such as the NPT and CTBT, particularly as a non-nuclear weapons state. Autonomy to decide on nuclear policy was seen as central to India’s global standing, more important than being seen to support arms control treaties. In fact, acquiescing to such treaties as a non-nuclear state was considered a degradation of this standing. This view was seen in both those governments that held hierarchy-driven pronuclear P&Ps and those that held hierarchy-driven anti-nuclear P&Ps. This was the case even when India couched its opposition as due to the regimes’ inequality, ‘nuclear apartheid’ and discriminatory nature. PostPokhran, India’s statements reflected resentment at being expected to join as a ‘junior member’, rather than as an NWS like the other great powers. All three cases reveal a perception that nuclear development represents scientific progress which in turn represents education. This is of prime importance to Indian conceptions of hierarchy and boosts India’s status. India’s nuclear scientists themselves represented ‘international rank’ and transcendence of the colonial past (Perkovich 1999: 447–448). Discourse revealed consistent touting of India’s accomplishments in nuclear technology, particularly the fact that these were achieved without foreign help. Throughout almost all administrations, in addition to statements by PMs and EAMs, there were regular statements by AEC Chairmen and the scientific establishment. All three case studies, to varying degrees, reveal the interaction of non-violence and hierarchy-driven P&Ps. The two combine to drive

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preferences for using nuclear policy to rise up the hierarchy, while maintaining the perception that nuclear weapons are not useable in war. Hierarchy meant military application was not nuclear weapons’ primary purpose. Non-violence meant considering their use was frowned upon. This restraint may have also been partly spurred by hierarchy. Cohen describes India as acquiring nuclear weapons and using them only for defensive and peaceful purposes to demonstrate its inherent cultural greatness (2001: 168). Pluralism and Tolerance The influences of the values of pluralism and tolerance were significantly less than non-violence and hierarchy. The early years of the first period examined saw these values continuing the influence they had had since independence—supporting anti-nuclear P&Ps. They influenced India’s preference to accept the alternate ideologies, and regime types of other states, and support the breaking down of global rivalries. This led to a general aversion to aggressive foreign policy and militarism. Part of this was a preference that nuclear weapons not be used as tools for diplomacy and the perception that they were of little use strategically. Tolerance also influenced for India’s equal treatment of countries when they proliferated nuclear weapons regardless of their regime type, unlike the West which for example held different standards for Israel, Iran and North Korea. Delhi, on the other hand, sought to couch its responses to proliferation based on whether states had signed the NPT or not. In Periods 2 and 3, pluralism and tolerance had an impact on nuclear policy more through India’s international image. The sharing of these values with other states provided India’s leaders a justification for nuclear cooperation with these states. Pluralism and tolerance made India a more attractive partner for nuclear cooperation for NWSs like the US.

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CHAPTER 4

Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect

Despite having a long tradition of pluralistic democracy, there is an important area in which India differs from the Western line of thinking. It is an area which saw some of the fiercest debate in international relations in recent years. India stood in opposition to the West when it came to humanitarian intervention (HI) in significant part due to its values. While India joined all other states in endorsing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005, in situations of practical application, the nature and extent of Delhi’s support was governed by cultural values. This investigation encompasses the periods: 1987–2002, and 2003–2014 where R2P is discussed. The small amount of academic discourse on India’s divergence from the West on HI is concentrated on a few traditionally cited factors: Third World Solidarity and anti-Western suspicion; adherence to international law; postcolonial identity; and strategic and realist interests, and desire for a multi-polar world (e.g. Virk 2013). Realist explanations of India’s opposition to HI regularly cite Kashmir. They argue India fears an international precedent being set for HI that could lead to, at worst foreign intervention in Kashmir, and at best more international scrutiny. This logic may be applicable to the vast majority of anti-HI developing countries. Weak states support the principle of sovereignty and the rule of international law as it protects them from being coerced, attacked and invaded by stronger states, potentially under

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the guise of HI. India’s support for sovereignty and opposition to HI overall, however, is based on different reasons. India has little to fear from setting a precedent for HI. The country’s size and strength—which is greater than all other developing states bar China—ensure that it is unlikely to be the recipient of an unwanted intervention. India even has less to fear than China, given that it is a democracy with a better international reputation for human rights. Furthermore, while the world saw HI become a more common occurrence and the growth of norms like R2P, international scrutiny of Kashmir did not increase until Delhi itself changed the status quo. The threat of intervention further decreased in the last two decades as India moved closer to the West. Realist explanations emphasising strategic/material interests are also undermined by several cases where India’s opposition to intervention came at the cost of important strategic interests by way of relations with the West. This can be seen in India’s highly publicised opposition to the Kosovo, Iraq 2003, Libya and Syria cases. India’s behaviour and rhetoric often led to disappointment among Western powers. These cases demonstrate values having a stronger, or at least as significant, influence as strategic/material interests. India’s intervention in Sri Lanka is often cited as proof of strategic interests governing India’s approach (Mohan 2011). Analysts liken India’s approach to that of other major powers who each intervene within their perceived sphere of influence (Mohan 2011). However, India’s efforts to obtain an invite before intervening, her conduct of the intervention, and her decision to withdraw at Sri Lanka’s request, indicate more than purely strategic interests at play. Some explanations cite India’s early post-independence role as a champion of independence struggles opposing recolonisation under the guise of HI and as a protector of a central principle of international law— sovereignty. This role itself is influenced by cultural values. Furthermore, Third World solidarity and anti-colonialism are no longer viable as comprehensive explanations for India’s position. These ideologies were largely jettisoned as central pillars of foreign policy over the last three decades—particularly when the BJP took power in 1998 and closer relations with the US developed. Being seen to protect international law (as an end in itself) is also unlikely to be a major reason for India’s behaviour given its aforementioned critiques of certain areas of international law.

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Domestic politics in the form of electoral calculation and individual politicians’ views have also been proffered as explanations. While these may have had some influence on India’s own intervention in Sri Lanka, they played little part in its motivations regarding other intervention cases. This is particularly evident when looking at the consistency of India’s policy despite numerous changes of PM over the three decades examined. Costs in time, money and personnel commitment are also sometimes cited as reasons for a developing country like India being averse to HI. However, such costs would not have been borne by India in those interventions where it was not asked to actively participate. Delhi’s support would only consist of voting for the interventions at the UN and/or providing rhetorical/diplomatic backing. This was the case for all the interventions in the period examined, except Sri Lanka. Even when the interventions exacted no material costs on India, Delhi opposed them if they ran against India’s cultural values. These explanations alone fail to paint a full picture of India’s motivations on humanitarian intervention in recent years. To have a more comprehensive understanding we must explore the role played by cultural values. Cultural Values What little analysis there has been on the divergence between India’s and the West’s approach to HI/R2P has not investigated the role of premodern cultural values. While Mani and Weiss (2011) discuss culture’s role, they do not examine in depth how values have shaped India’s behaviour. Virk (2013: 61) acknowledges pluralism, describing it as a ‘foundational myth’ and stating India’s internal pluralism has strengthened its support for the principle of territorial integrity in foreign policy. However, she does not deeply examine the extent and nature of the influence of cultural values like pluralism on India’s behaviour/discourse. Hall (2013: 107) acknowledges there is an influence of ‘religious beliefs and political ideologies that lean toward “pacifism”’, however, he does not dig any deeper. The concept of humanitarian intervention, and R2P in particular, is based on morals and principles. As such, it is underpinned by values, which in turn are often influenced by culture. Understanding cultural values’ influence on powers like India is essential if R2P proponents are to break the North-South/East-West impasse

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regarding action based on the principle.1 India has a unique image as a liberal, democratic and powerful Southern state, seen to act on principle and have comparatively little vested interest in most international conflicts.2 Unlike many other states, it has both domestic democracy and tolerance for other regime types internationally. India’s culture has driven its tolerance and adherence to human rights norms (Chay 1990: 8; Raj and Pradhan 1997). This somewhat refutes proponents of the ‘Asian values’ viewpoint who see such norms as not indigenous to Asia (Sen 2005: 135–136, 286). Non-violence significantly influenced India’s approach. This influence has been shaped by the particular conception of violence India holds when it comes to international relations. India applies the value of non-violence to the level of states and peoples, thereby focusing on interstate violence rather than, as liberal solidarists do, on individual or ‘human security’ (Hurrell 2007; Paris 2001). Non-violence drove or contributed to several P&Ps. Most notable is India’s preference for international peace, including the peaceful resolution of conflicts. While peace is conceived as a normative condition in a Western, democratic, liberal culture as well, the prominence of nonviolence in Indian culture makes peace an even stronger ideal among Indian foreign policymakers (Walzer 1992). Zinkin (1955: 208) contrasts India’s non-violence to the US’s ‘vigilante’ tradition in foreign affairs. Indian culture’s dominant conception of war is that it arises out of illusions stemming from ideological systems. War is therefore, not the preferred response to differences in beliefs regarding issues like human rights. From the perspective of international law, India’s default priorities seems to sit in line with the judgment of the Nuremberg Trials following WWII, that to initiate a war of aggression is the ‘supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole’ (International Military Tribunal Nuremberg 1946; Kramer et al. 2005; Falk 1971).

1 Smaller developing states fear establishing a precedent which enables powerful states to attack and coerce weaker states. 2 This is the case in comparison to both other global powers and smaller players within the region where HI is undertaken. The exception is when the HI is occurring in India’s own region. Here India does not hold a reputation of being unbiased. This is partly the result of strategic interests having a relatively stronger influence in India’s regional interactions then on its actions further afield.

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Some argue that Hinduism supports ‘just war’ (Sengha 2011: 47) due to certain Hindu stories like the Mahabharata discussing the issue. However, India is not as amenable to the use of violence as other cultures which have a greater history of accepting just war theory. This can only be understood when looking at the discussions of ‘just war’ in the broader context of Indian history. Indian history has not seen as much war and conquest as its Mediterranean, Abrahamic and European counterparts, particularly during the formative period of Indian civilization. Also strongly influenced by non-violence is the related preference for caution in using force and the related perception that force would not work (Mohan 2011). India’s strategic culture contains a strong risk aversion when it comes to using force to resolve international conflicts (2011). Non-violence, though subsidiary to pluralism and tolerance in this case, also contributed to a preference for supporting sovereignty. Threats to state sovereignty often equate to conflict or threats to peace at the international level. In this context, upholding state sovereignty implies, to a large extent, the maintenance of peace. Again, while its influence was subsidiary, non-violence also contributed to a preference for UN, or at least broad multilateral, authorisation and control of interventions. The UN providing authorisation and having control gives the intervention a less conflict-like character. The preference for maintaining a non-violent image strengthened all these P&Ps. Non-violence-driven preferences for UN authorisation/control, for international peace, and for sovereignty, can be seen in India’s historical support for UN peacekeeping through providing troops (Vira 2012). Since independence, this has been described as India’s ‘favourite expression of military power’, which in any estimate is mild compared to other expressions (Kundu 2004: 27). In addition to the obvious non-violencerelated objective of keeping peace (and the material benefits in earning foreign exchange and developing troops’ capabilities), UN peacekeeping also often entails the agreement of the sovereign state, thereby removing the aspect of international conflict. India’s policy on peacekeeping, publicised by the Government, includes the following parameters: that peaceful avenues for settlement of disputes have been exhausted first; peacekeeping operations strictly adhere to the principles of the UN Charter, including respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in states’ internal affairs; peacekeeping operations are at the request of Member states; and peacekeeping should be under the command and control of UN. Support for

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UN authorisation and peacekeeping also boosts India’s non-violent, ‘nonthreatening’ image outside of South Asia (given Delhi’s image in its own region is shaped more by the strategic weight it throws around as a large neighbour). Pluralism and tolerance had a much stronger influence on India’s approach to HI than on nuclear policy. This was largely through underpinning a perception seen in the nuclear investigations—the pluralistic and tolerant worldview. This entailed acceptance of diverse regime types. Pluralism and tolerance were seen as the normal conditions of international society (Walzer 1997: 19–21). Ambassador Ranjit Gupta, who served in the MEA during the period as an IFS official, diplomat and ambassador to several Middle Eastern states, argued that India considered regime-type ‘none of our business’. Chief among the P&Ps influenced by pluralism and tolerance is the preference for respecting sovereignty and non-interference in states’ affairs. Gupta stated that pillars of India’s foreign policy included strict non-interference in the internal affairs of individual countries, conscious non-involvement in regional disputes, and steering clear of contesting any relationship that any individual country has or seeks to develop with any other country of the world (2017, interview with author). The value of pluralism is seen as enshrined in the legal principle of sovereignty. All states have a right to manage their domestic policies as they see fit and these need not match the ideological beliefs of India or other states. This relates to the Hindu and Nehruvian view that no adversary is permanent and problems between states are transitory and therefore not worthy of conflict. It also stems from the pluralism-driven policy of Panchsheel. Gupta states that another pillar of India’s foreign policy is to make the basis of relationships ‘non-ideological pragmatism and mutual advantage’ (2017, interview with author). India also held the preference for caution regarding condemning the behaviour of other states within their borders. This included condemnations of human rights abuse. This relates to the acceptance of various regime types states may choose—democratic or authoritarian, capitalist or communist, human rights respecting or abusing. Sengha (2011: 45) notes how India’s dominant religions contain values of interconnectedness of all things in Brahma (the divine) and suggests these match with liberal solidarism and cosmopolitanism, leading to support for the idea of HI. What Sengha (2011: 45) misses, however, is that the conception that all things are interconnected is coupled with

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an pluralism-and tolerance-driven acceptance of different ways of interpreting the truth, different lived experiences, life chances, etc., among different beings. In the HI context, this translates to an acceptance of the different regime types, ideologies and systems that peoples in different states have to live under. Therefore, interconnectedness does not necessarily lead to support for fighting wars for humanitarian purposes. Pluralism and tolerance have a strong impact on the preference for UN and multilateral authorisation and control of interventions. This gives the intervention a characteristic of a multilateral international agreement among diverse states, rather than unilateral action by certain states to impose their views upon others. Pluralism also drove the related preference that no state should push its particular views onto another state. India views that no state has such an authority or the right to do so. This is due to a central aspect of India’s values of pluralism and tolerance—that no viewpoint or belief is more correct than another. India also held a preference for regional, rather than foreign interventions. Regional organisations/states were seen as more legitimate in intervening because they are more similar culturally, politically and economically to the recipient state. In a pluralistic and diverse world, this is important. As with non-violence, the aforementioned P&Ps were further influenced by India’s preference for maintaining a pluralist and tolerant image. The value of hierarchy also played a role in India’s approach to humanitarian intervention. Rather than directly driving preferences and perceptions (P&Ps) like other values, hierarchy played more of a facilitative role. It shaped and enabled P&Ps that had been driven by other cultural values. This was due to the particular hierarchical worldview India held. This entailed certain countries having higher international status than others, but not some states having authority over other states. This particularly non-authoritarian conception of hierarchy, combined with the experience of Mughal and British colonial rule over the preceding centuries, affected for an aversion towards powerful states dominating weaker states. This perception itself could be seen directly in five instances over the last three HI cases. It contributed to India’s opposition to intervention by powerful Western states against the weaker Yugoslavia, Iraq and Syria.

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The perception allowed for many P&Ps driven by non-violence, tolerance and pluralism. For instance, the pluralism-driven preference for sovereignty would not have been as strong had India held a conception of hierarchy which accepted powerful states easily intervening in the affairs of weaker states. Hierarchy influenced Delhi’s preference for contributing troops to UN peacekeeping missions. This allowed India to project itself as an important international player (Kundu 2004: 27). The value also influenced the perception that India, as a country worthy of high international standing, must present its views and lead on principle on issues like intervention and sovereignty. This perception led to India speaking out strongly and publicising its views on many HI cases, particularly when this meant standing up to powerful Western states. Which Interventions? The interventions focused on are those that: involved some interstate contention; were internationally significant; have somewhat unique circumstances and were largely framed as humanitarian crises. For each I will explain India’s varying levels of support and opposition. The greater focus is on interventions that involved some antagonism or conflict between the intervening powers, the recipient state, and other major actors. It is these cases where values’ influence, if any, is likely to be seen and can be separated from other motivating factors. There is no analysis of UN authorised/controlled peacekeeping operations simply because they involve Indian troops. This is because these are usually on uncontroversial missions. Speeches at the UN Security Council (UNSC) will draw the most focus as this is the paramount international forum regarding HI and R2P. It is where India would have most carefully constructed its rhetoric.

Non-alignment and Restraint 1987–2002 Sri Lanka 1987 India intervened in Sri Lanka’s civil war from 1987 to 1991. Delhi sent in the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) with the officially stated intention of supporting and enforcing a peaceful solution to the conflict between

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the Sri Lankan Government and the separatist militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Realist and Other Explanations Realism would argue that the intervention was a result of strategic material interests. These centre around the threat of the growing influence of India’s Cold War rivals in Sri Lanka, as suggested by: • US installing its Voice of America broadcasting facilities which may have threatened India’s defence communications systems; • US sending high-level defence officials to Sri Lanka; • defence deals being done with Pakistan and Israel; • and a Singaporean firm being given control over oil storage facilities in Sri Lanka’s strategic Trincomalee harbour (Rajasingham 2002). In responding to these threats, India was said to have intervened to ensure the survival of the LTTE. The LTTE constituted a tool to pressure Sri Lanka. It had enabled India to gain concessions through the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord (Government of India and Government of Sri Lanka 1987). The Accord included undertakings by Sri Lanka to restrict the operation of foreign powers in its territory, in line with India’s interests (Hagerty 1991: 356). Simultaneously, however, India also did not want the LTTE to maintain its position as the only voice for the Tamil minority. The prevailing view in India remains that the Indian Peacekeeping Force was intended to assist the Sri Lankan Government, an arrangement which Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka at the time, Lakhan Mehrotra (2011) argues was disrupted by the election of President Premadasa who opposed the Accord. Another Indian envoy to Sri Lanka at the time, J. N. Dixit (2003), suggests India had its own security concerns with allowing the LTTE to achieve their ambitions of a sovereign state. In the early 2000s when the LTTE was arguably the closest to achieving its separatist ambitions, India supported an outcome to negotiations that maintained the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka (Dixit 2003). Furthermore, by intervening India projected an image of power throughout the region. This, according to realists, would support the country’s strategic interests through indirectly coercing smaller neighbours to not acting against India’s interests.

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Strategic factors, however, could not have been the sole influence on India’s policy. The threat from foreign powers is insufficient to justify a costly military intervention. Particularly given that India was not a regular ‘intervener’ and this was the first intervention it had undertaken in a neighbour since the Bangladesh independence war in 1971. The timing of India’s troop withdrawal further sheds doubt on the realist claim that strategic interests were the sole motivating factor. The IPKF had not achieved its stated mission by the time it withdrew (Hagerty 1991: 358). This also weakens the ‘projecting power’ claim of realists. Further weakening this claim is India’s obtainment of a request for intervention from Sri Lanka prior to sending troops. The material interest often cited by Indian advocates for intervention— preventing large refugee flows into India—is also unlikely to have been a central factor (de Silva and Wriggins 1989: 570). There was already a steady stream of refugees which India had supported through a ferry service (Rajasingham 2002). In reality, by effectively creating a stalemate in the conflict, India ensured greater refugee flows in the long-term. Other potential motivators were based in domestic politics. The Government may have intervened to secure the support of Tamil Nadu politicians concerned about the Sri Lankan Tamils (Price 2012; Mayilvaganan 2007: 943). India may also have wished to deny any oxygen to the Tamil Nadu-based separatist movement (Omvedt 2006: 54–55). Rajiv Gandhi’s concurrent political problems may have necessitated the intervention as a diversion for the domestic public. These factors alone, however, could not account for such a major intervention. India’s behaviour decades later at the culmination of the Sri Lankan Civil War also merits attention. Traditional wisdom assumes that regional hegemons seek to involve themselves in conflicts within their spheres of influence in order to shape regions to their strategic advantage (Destradi 2012: 597). India, however, was a passive neighbour during the last phases of the conflict. Cultural Values To understand India’s approach, we must look at other factors. Discourse suggests cultural values played a significant role. Realists may argue India’s discourse is merely instrumental communication designed to project its chosen image. Even if this was only in terms of driving a preference among leaders for a non-violent image of India, however, this is still a

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significant influence given the diplomatic effort it required. Furthermore, it was not only discourse, but India’s state behaviour which demonstrates the influence of non-violence and other values. Non-violence’s role can be seen in a number of P&Ps. This included the preference for an image of India as a non-violent nation, and one that supports international peace. India’s intervention was officially at the request of the Sri Lankan Government. The request formed part of the aforementioned Accord, which was signed after India pressured Sri Lanka (Hagerty 1991: 354). The fact that India put diplomatic effort into pressuring Sri Lanka to sign the agreement and request support, rather than intervening unilaterally, suggests how important this non-violent image was. India did not send troops in without agreement due to fear of world perceptions (Hennayake 1989: 407). India still wanted to be seen as a country that disapproved of the idea of HI with the use of violence against a sovereign state. India could have intervened without Sri Lanka’s agreement, given its strength and the fact that most superpowers would not protect Sri Lanka. Even if Sri Lanka had not actively resisted, this would have been seen as interstate conflict, and it was this type of violence that India was most concerned with and most associated with its conception of violence in the international realm. Having Sri Lanka request intervention avoided this. The use of a request by Sri Lanka as justification for intervention, rather than unilateral action based on justifiable humanitarian concerns points to the prioritising of avoiding interstate violence over preventing intrastate violence (Government of India and Government of Sri Lanka 1987). If non-violence was applied at the level of the individual, then it is likely that India would have justified its intervention in terms of protecting the civilian Tamil population, regardless of the Sri Lankan Government’s wishes. In contrast, non-violence was applied at the level of the state, with India not wishing to be seen as violent towards the Sri Lankan state. The preference for a non-violent image is further demonstrated by the fact that India decided upon the Accord only after it assessed that there had been little damage to its non-violent image as a result of its recent forcible food drop over the Sri Lankan conflict zone (Hennayake 1989: 406). A decade later, India still sought to maintain this non-violent image with regard to the intervention. In an interview India’s High Commissioner to Sri Lanka during the intervention, J. N. Dixit (2000) stated

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of the decision to intervene ‘We didn’t want to send troops, who said that?’. Dixit vehemently maintained that India was invited by a Sri Lankan Government seeking to reposition its own troops to quell unrest in the country’s south. The importance of the non-violent image is also made clear in India’s withdrawal of the IPKF in 1990 at the request of Sri Lanka, albeit under the new Indian Government of VP Singh. According to Dixit (2000) India ‘withdrew because the VP Singh government…partially felt that they need to be legalistically correct: we were in a foreign country, the president of that country says “go away”, and you come back’. Behind the motivation to be seen as abiding by international law, is the motivation to be seen as peaceful. Beyond the image alone, at some level, obtaining an invitation meant that technically there was no interstate conflict. This ensured that another key non-violence-driven preference was not compromised—the preference for international peace. The role of non-violence can also be seen at the operational level of the IPKF mission, via the preference for excluding the military from decisionmaking. The operation was said to be ‘politically guided’ with ‘little or no say’ given to the armed forces (Dixit 2000). The preference for peace more generally, that is, not just interstate peace but also intrastate peace, was seen. India’s stated intention of the intervention was to support peace within Sri Lanka between the Government and a domestic non-state actor, the LTTE. The Indian Army was given charge of guaranteeing and enforcing the ‘cessation of hostilities’ (Hagerty 1991: 353). This was under the mandate of the aforementioned Accord, whose stated aim was to deliver peace to Sri Lanka (Marasinghe 1988). Following the intervention, the value of non-violence, in the form of a preference for interstate peace, was witnessed in the period 1991–2006 with India’s ‘hands-off’ approach to the Sri Lankan conflict, and its tacit approval of the Sri Lankan government’s advance against the LTTE from 2006 to 2009 (Destradi 2012: 597). Realists would argue that the Sri Lanka example belies the contention that pluralism and tolerance impact India’s approach to HI. This is not the case. The pluralism-and tolerance-driven preference for sovereignty was not overridden in the Sri Lanka intervention. This is seen in India’s need to ensure it was invited in by Sri Lanka prior to sending troops. It can also be seen in India’s withdrawal following a request by Sri Lanka. This action

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also demonstrates the preference India had for maintaining an image of itself as having a pluralistic outlook and supporting sovereignty. Also seen is the preference for caution regarding condemning the behaviour of other states within their borders. India’s language regarding Sri Lanka was always restrained with regard to humanitarian concerns. Tolerance, by way of non-interference, was present in India’s approach from right after its intervention to the culmination of the war in 2009 (Destradi 2012: 597–598). The value of tolerance acted towards that same ends as India’s strategic interest in ensuring it did not lose influence in Sri Lanka to China, which was gladly supplying Colombo with the support it needed to vanquish the Tigers. The preference for noninterference however was running counter to the domestic political imperative to acquiesce to Tamil Nadu political parties which demanded India take steps to halt the war. Successive Central Governments in India have depended upon Tamil Nadu parties for support. It is true, however, that pluralism did manifest itself in a new way in this case—the preference for enforcing pluralism internally within other states. India’s decision to intervene was based, at least officially, on enforcing pluralism within Sri Lanka. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord stated that India (and Sri Lanka) recognised: that ‘Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural society’; that ‘each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured’ and the necessity to preserve ‘its character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious plural society’ (Government of India and Government of Sri Lanka 1987). There were 9 statements within the Accord which indicated India’s preference for pluralism within the Sri Lankan state. As with non-violence, however, India’s need for an invitation reveals that this manifestation of pluralism did not override its more often seen pluralistic worldview which respected state sovereignty. Some of hierarchy’s influence on humanitarian intervention has been through directly driving P&Ps, though these were found less frequently. Such P&Ps supported intervention in the Sri Lanka case. Hierarchy manifested itself in a set of P&Ps making up what analysts variously refer to as the Indira Doctrine, Rajiv Doctrine or the Indian Doctrine (SenGupta 1983: 20; Hagerty 1991: 352). This involved the preference to strongly oppose any outside powers becoming too close or involved in the domestic affairs of smaller South Asian neighbours. Such involvement was automatically assumed to be against India’s interests. The doctrine also included the perception that any South Asian state needing external

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assistance should first request it from India. Failing to do so would be seen as ‘anti-Indian’. While these P&Ps do serve some strategic interests, they could not purely be based on rational strategic calculation as they are too broad and general to be applicable for every potential situation. If India’s behaviour was informed by rational calculation in each unique situation, it may be possible that such calculations were based purely on strategic interests. However, given that a doctrine was involved in prescribing behaviour, it is more likely that cultural values played a role. The Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord and related documents, which were artefacts of this hierarchydriven Indian doctrine, have been described as ‘remarkable both for the extent to which they reflected New Delhi’s desire for pre-eminence in South Asia and for the serious Indian miscalculations that underlay them’ (Hagerty 1991: 356). Hierarchy may have also led to the preference for projecting an image of a powerful India. While this had already been done in the region, Sri Lanka provided an opportunity to do so internationally, given the involvement of international players on the island (Kumar 2001: 52–64). The projecting-power preference with regard to Sri Lanka could not have been purely based in strategic interests. As mentioned, this can be seen in the fact that India withdrew before achieving its strategic objectives. Iraq 1991 In 1991, India had a seat on the UNSC when the Council voted in favour of a resolution condemning and demanding an end to the Iraqi Government’s repression of sections of its population and the resultant refugee flows which threatened international/regional peace and security (UN Document S/RES/0688 1991). The decision was closely connected to the issue of humanitarian concerns and preceded actions by the UN intervening in Iraq (‘Iraq Timeline’, 2012, BBC News, 18 December). There was also a debate surrounding the Council’s actions. India, along with China, abstained from voting on the resolution. India’s abstention and discourse provide evidence of the value of non-violence. In India’s statement explaining its position, there were 9 indications of non-violence-driven P&Ps (UN Document S/RES/0688 1991). India’s discourse reveals a preference for holding international peace as an utmost priority. India felt this should be the UNSC’s priority and focus

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also. In justifying its abstention, India argued that the resolution did not concentrate enough on ‘the threat…to peace and stability’ (1991). India’s permanent representative stated ‘the Council should have concentrated on…peace and security, which is its proper mandate under the Charter’. Also seen is a related preference that force be used and international peace disrupted only as a last resort in situations where inaction would lead to greater threats to international peace. This is seen in India’s views regarding the mandate of the UNSC—the only UN organ mandated to authorise the use of force. India’s statement mentions that ‘only where such conditions, including indiscriminate use of force, result in clear threat to international peace and security would it be within the competence of the Security Council to address the issue’ (1991). India criticised the resolution for focusing too much on ‘the factors that have created the present situation’—meaning Iraq’s internal repression. It states that these aspects should be left to ‘other, more appropriate organs of the United Nations’. India had also suggested changes to the sponsors of the resolution in line with these views. India’s statement demonstrates a belief that the internal repression in Iraq does not seriously threaten international peace and therefore does not justify the use of force or discussion in the UNSC. Despite these critiques, India did not vote against the resolution. This is also likely influenced in part, by the preference for peace. The resolution condemned a threat to international peace (UN Document S/RES/0688 1991). The values of pluralism and tolerance figured strongly in India’s decision to abstain from voting on the Iraq Resolution. This was largely via the preference for respecting sovereignty. Pluralism was also central in the international debate and discussion surrounding the Iraq Resolution. All three developing countries that voted against the resolution expressed opinions consistent with a pluralist worldview that respected state sovereignty (UN Document S/PV.2982 1991). The sovereignty preference can be seen in India’s successful call for the inclusion within the resolution of a reference to the sovereignty supporting Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. Despite this inclusion, India still resisted voting in favour as it felt that the resolution did not go far enough in accepting the ‘thrust’ of its amendments (1991).

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Somalia 1992 India presided over the UNSC in 1992 when the Council voted in favour of intervention in Somalia (UN Document S/PV.3145 1992: 6). India and other developing countries on the UNSC voted in favour, and the vote was unanimous (1992: 6). India’s support for this resolution does not constitute a divergence from its dominant preference for international peace. As there was no functioning nation-state to oppose the foreign force, there would be no conflict with a sovereign state and therefore no contradiction to India’s peace preference. India’s statement on the resolution cites Somalia being an ‘extraordinary situation’ with ‘no Government in control’ demanding an ‘exceptional response’ (1992: 6). It maintained that Somalia ‘should not, however, set a precedent for the future’ (1992: 6; ‘UN Votes to Send US-Led Force to Protect Somalia Famine Aid’, 1992, Guardian, 4 December). It was also as a concession to India and China that Somalia was referred to as a unique case requiring an exceptional response in the final draft of the resolution (Wheeler 2000: 186). To further reinforce its peace preference and opposition to the use of force, India adds in its speech that any future situations requiring actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (the chapter discussing action regarding threats to peace) (UN 1945), should be ‘carried out in full conformity with the Charter provisions and in the spirit of the SecretaryGeneral’s report An Agenda for Peace’ (UN Document S/PV.3145 1992: 6). The Agenda for Peace contained analysis and recommendations on the UN’s capacity to support peace through preventive diplomacy, including in peacemaking and peacekeeping (UN Document A/47/277 - S/24111 1992). Non-violence could also be seen in India’s preference that the UN maintains command and control of the operation, thereby giving it a more peaceful image. India supported the incorporation of several points into the resolution to reflect this (UN Document S/PV.3145 1992: 6). The inclusion of these points was said to have influenced India’s decision to support the resolution. Also demonstrating the role of non-violence was India’s preference for emphasising the peaceful means for improving the situation in Somalia (1992: 6). This includes promoting national reconciliation and removing the root causes of the conflict. India also expressed its non-violence-driven preference for UN peacekeeping (1992: 6).

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The preference for peace internally played a role in motivating India’s decision to support the resolution. India supported halting the violence within Somalia affecting its civilian population (1992: 6). India’s support for the Somalia intervention did not contradict its pluralist worldview. The preference for respecting state sovereignty and non-interference remained because, as mentioned, Somalia had no functioning nation-state and therefore there was no sovereignty to breach (UN Document S/PV.3145 1992: 6). India’s preference for respecting sovereignty and non-interference can be seen in several of the items of action and discourse already mentioned in Chapter 5. This includes India’s statement at the UNSC, emphasising the unique nature of the situation as an important factor in its decision to support the resolution and that Somalia should not set a precedent for future interference (1992: 6). It is also witnessed in India’s insistence on certain pro-sovereignty language in the resolution (UN Document S/RES/794 1992). India was prepared to accept the resolution because it could still maintain that the intervention would not weaken the principle of ‘domestic jurisdiction’ in Article 2(7) (Wheeler 2000: 186; Virk 2012: 156). This also demonstrates the preference to maintain an image of supporting pluralism and sovereignty. India, along with China, demonstrated the respect for sovereignty preference more than any other country on the Council (UN Document S/PV.3145 1992). This includes the five other developing countries. This can be seen in India’s insistence on language in the resolution which defines Somalia as a unique situation (UN Document S/RES/794 1992). India placed stronger emphasis on the fact that Somalia did not constitute a functioning sovereign state than other countries did (UN Document S/PV.3145 1992). Cape Verde, Zimbabwe, Ecuador, Morocco and Venezuela did not cite the absence of a government as a condition for their support. Morocco even stated humanitarian assistance as the first objective of the intervention (UN Document S/RES/794 1992). This comparison provides further evidence that India’s preference for respecting sovereignty is based on values, rather than strategic calculation. Of all those developing states on the UNSC, India had the least to fear from the resolution setting a precedent which weakened the international community’s respect for sovereignty.

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India’s size and strength ensured that it was unlikely that any actors would seek to use force against it in a HI context. This included in relation to Kashmir, which had been a human rights issue for decades but had never spurred any strong international drives for intervention. India even had less to fear than China, given that the former is a democracy with a better international reputation for human rights. In comparison to China, India also had an increasingly less antagonistic relationship with the only remaining superpower. We can also see the preference for UN control in India’s request that the organisation maintain command and control of the operation (UN Document S/PV.3145 1992: 6). If there must be intervention, then it is better that a relatively more legitimate intergovernmental body leads than a self-interested state. Similar P&Ps relating to sovereignty and interstate peace led to India’s non-opposition intervention in Haiti, Sierra Leone, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR). In Haiti intervention of 1994, India’s lack of opposition was likely influenced by the fact the intervention had UN authorisation, thereby conforming to the non-violence- and pluralismdriven preference for UN command and control. Similarly, Delhi did not oppose intervention in Sierra Leone in 1997 where the UNSC unanimously agreed on Resolution 1132 that effectively supported intervention (UN Document S/RES/1132 1997). The Government of Sierra Leone had requested intervention from Nigeria and ECOWAS. The intervention was run by African regional organisations and had strong regional backing. France’s interventions in Mali and Central African Republic did not involve a major international debate or significant interstate violence. Kosovo 1999 In 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervened in the conflict between the Yugoslavia and Kosovo independence forces. NATO justified its intervention on humanitarian grounds. India strongly opposed the intervention. Along with Russia and Belarus, India sponsored a draft resolution for the UNSC condemning the NATO action as a threat to international peace and security. It demanded cessation of NATO’s operation. India’s opposition is even clearer considering that it was not on the UNSC at the time, thereby having no obligation to express an opinion on the intervention. India also went out of its way to table the resolution and to participate in two

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UNSC debates on the issue (UN Document S/PV.3989 1999: 15–16; UN Document S/PV.3988 1999). The Kosovo case occurred right after what many argue were tectonic shifts in Indian foreign policy under the new BJP government (Mohan 2005;‘Special Press Summary: India–US Bilateral Relations’, 2003, Virtual Information Center, 10 November, pp. 2, 8–9; Kundu 2004: 29). Mohan (2005) argues that India moved from an idealist to a pragmatic, realist foreign policy. Among the baggage said to be jettisoned was anti-Western dissent and Third World solidarity (Mohan 2005). While the latter is true to a certain extent, opposition to Kosovo demonstrates that realist explanations still fail to fully account for India’s approach. In contrast, Kosovo provides an example of the strong continuity in the nature and level of cultural values’ influence. Realist Explanations In attempting to explain India’s opposition, realist arguments point to material interests, largely strategic—namely the fear of forceful foreign intervention in Kashmir. India, however, has little to fear in this regard due to its strong defensive military capability and human rights/democratic credentials. There are numerous other states which would have had greater reason to fear a norm of HI. The vast majority of these, however, took no action at the UN in opposing the Kosovo intervention. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that India’s support for the Kosovo intervention would necessarily increase the chance of foreign HI in Kashmir in future. It would not strengthen the motivation of foreign powers to intervene in Kashmir. A slightly weakened norm of sovereignty would not change the equation to such a degree as to make intervention seem attractive to a foreign power, given the high costs in challenging India. Another fear might have been that weakening the norm of sovereignty would have led to international support for the Pakistani position on Kashmir, and thereby global sympathy for Pakistan on other matters in relation to India. It may also be argued that India feared being seen as hypocritical on the issue of HI if it supported Kosovo but opposed greater autonomy for Kashmir. History demonstrates, however, that being seen as hypocritical rarely impacts states’ material interests. One example is Saudi Arabia which provided troops to help Bahrain suppress its democracy protesters

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but actively supported intervention justified by humanitarian/democracy reasons in Libya. Saudi Arabia suffered no damage to its material interests. The strategic benefits of supporting the intervention on the other hand are quite strong. The greatest benefit would have been strengthening relations with the US. In the late 1990s India, broadly speaking, was seeking to move closer to the West due to a number of reasons including material interests (‘Special Press Summary: India–US Bilateral Relations’, 2003, Virtual Information Center, 10 November, pp. 2, 8–9; Kundu 2004: 29). It was also a period when India’s nuclear policy was under heavy international scrutiny and relations with the US were at a somewhat critical juncture. Strong opposition to Kosovo did nothing to help this. Damage to relations with the West would have been even greater if India’s resolution had passed. The failure of realist explanations suggests the role of cultural values must be examined. The speeches given by India’s representative, Kamalesh Sharma, during the two UNSC debates on the intervention provide the best insights into this influence (henceforth referred to as ‘the speeches’) (UN Document S/PV.3989 1999: 15–16; UN Document S/PV.3988 1999). It may be argued that the expression of certain P&Ps is not rooted in cultural values and is not genuine, but merely an attempt to gain strategic advantage. This is unlikely, however, given the diplomatic resources expended and the strategic losses incurred from opposing the intervention. At the very least, India’s expression of cultural values demonstrate preferences to maintain and promote a non-violent, tolerant and pluralistic image. Cultural Values India’s reaction to the intervention reveals the influence of non-violence. Sharma’s speeches contained 29 statements indicating this value. The term ‘violence’ itself was used negatively four times, in addition to other terms such as ‘attacks and ‘aggression’. The most dominant non-violence-driven P&P was the preference for international peace. The major thrust of India’s draft resolution was that the NATO action was wrong because it threatened international peace (UN Document S/1999/328 1999). The vast majority of India’s 29 non-violence-driven statements relate to this preference. The term ‘peace’ was used 10 times.

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Sharma warned that the intervention would lead to ‘anarchy’ and ‘imperil regional peace and security and spread discord in the Balkans and beyond’ (UN Document S/PV.3988 1999: 15–16). He urged that: In the interests of peace and security in the region, and if the countries now attacking…truly have the interests of all Yugoslavs at heart, this arbitrary, unauthorized and illegal military action should be stopped immediately.

India’s rhetoric suggests a view that international peace is more important than human rights. It stated that even if the NATO actions were to prevent human rights violations, this ‘does not justify unprovoked military aggression’. India suggested a solution to the problems in Kosovo that was firmly in line with its international peace preference, stating ‘Domestic political problems have to be settled peacefully by the parties concerned through consultation and dialogue. Foreign military intervention can only worsen matters’. Sharma also quoted India’s EAM, stating ‘resolution…can only be through peaceful means, through consultation and dialogue, and not through either confrontation or any military action, unilateral or otherwise’ (UN Document S/PV.3988 1999: 15–16). India also strongly argued for its preference that force only be used as a last resort, and only when there was a threat to international peace (UN Document S/PV.3989 1999: 15–16; UN Document S/PV.3988 1999). This view maps very closely to the attitude of the developing country bloc on HI. The second UN debate, occurring a couple of days into NATO’s bombing campaign, witnessed even stronger non-violence-driven rhetoric than the first. India demanded ‘an immediate end to this senseless violence’ and stated that it ‘opposed the violence which it [the intervention] has unleashed’(UN Document S/PV.3989 1999: 15–16). Also driven by non-violence was the preference for UN authorisation and command/control of interventions. This was so that the interventions had a more consensual character, and looked less like conflict between states. Sharma argues that the UN ‘cannot be forced to abdicate its role in peacekeeping’ (UN Document S/PV.3988 1999: 15–16). India’s perception that force would not work well can also be seen. Sharma states that breaking international law through using force was ‘very rarely effective and often makes things worse’.

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Pluralism and tolerance also had a strong influence on India’s opposition to the Kosovo intervention. The speeches by representative Sharma contained 12 statements indicating these values (UN Document S/PV.3989 1999: 15–16; UN Document S/PV.3988 1999). These were largely centred on a preference for respecting sovereignty. India accepted Yugoslavia’s sovereignty without question, regardless of how its government ran the country or prosecuted its internal conflict. Sharma reiterates ‘that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the international border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is inviolable’ and that this ‘must be fully respected by all states’. He adds ‘the United Nations has no role in the settlement of the domestic political problems of the Federal Republic’. Sharma notes the contrast from Somalia, ‘in Somalia, there was at least the excuse that state authority had crumbled, but that excuse does not even remotely obtain in…Yugoslavia’. Further, he states ‘a peacekeeping operation can be deployed only with the consent of the Government concerned’. Sharma repeats the text of Article 2(7) to emphasise that the UN is not authorised to intervene. India also hints towards another pluralism- and non-violence-driven preference, the preference for interventions to occur only under UN sanction and control. India highlights that this intervention was not authorised by the UN, and is therefore illegitimate, illegal and wrong. This preference relates to India’s opposition to the idea of powerful states unilaterally intervening. Sharma states ‘No country, group of countries or regional arrangement, no matter how powerful, can arrogate to itself the right to take arbitrary and unilateral military action against others’ (UN Document S/PV.3988 1999: 15–16). India also attacked the states engaging in the intervention, particularly those powerful UNSC permanent members. Sharma argued that they ignored international law and reduced the Security Council to ‘helplessness’ (1999: 15–16; UN Document S/PV.3989 1999: 15–16). Pluralism found expression in India’s perception that no state has the right to dictate to another how to conduct its internal affairs. Sharma states ‘India cannot accept any country’s taking on the garb of a world policeman’ (UN Document S/PV.3989 1999). This also fits with the particular conception of hierarchy that India held. India’s speeches also revealed the pluralism-driven perception that no one ideology or political system, including with regard to human rights, is superior to another (1999: 15–16; UN Document S/PV.3988 1999).

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Kosovo provides another example where India’s pluralism-driven P&Ps mapped well to several preferences expressed by the developing country bloc regarding HI. This included consent of the host state, authorisation by the UN, and references to Article 2(7) (Virk 2012). As mentioned, if there was any international contagion of values or P&Ps, it is more likely that other developing countries acquiesced to India’s values and P&Ps, rather than the reverse. Tolerance impacted through the preference for accepting all regime types, even those that abuse human rights. This was reinforced by the aforementioned non-violence-driven peace preference. East Timor 1999 The UNSC authorised an intervention in East Timor in 1999 in response to violence following an independence vote (‘Timor Chooses Independence’, 1999, BBC News, 4 September). This was accompanied by intense international pressure on Indonesia. India made only a brief speech in the open debate on the issue, along with 52 other countries (UN Document S/PV.4043 1999). The case is still worth looking at, however, because India decided to contribute a speech despite the intervention having little relevance to the country’s material interests. Realists may argue that India’s position on East Timor was driven by a fear of intervention in Kashmir, particularly given Pakistani attempts to draw parallels (‘Inside the Maw of the Beast’, 1999, Indian Express, 13 October). While India did seek to avoid Kashmir being seen in the same light, fear of intervention there is unlikely to be the sole motivation, given the small chance of this occurring. While Indonesia was of comparable size to India, had a similarly federal structure, and was also a multi-ethnic state, it was far less powerful, in part due to its lack of nuclear weapons. The small likelihood of attempted foreign intervention in Kashmir is reinforced by the US’s assurances that it did not see Kashmir like East Timor, and it was not the US’s role to comment on elections in Kashmir (‘Kashmir Is Not East Timor: Rubin’, 1999, Hindustan Times, 9 September). India’s motivation is likely to have been, at least in part, due to its preference for avoiding the international spotlight on Kashmir in order to maintain an untarnished non-violent image. Non-violence also clearly played a role in driving India’s preference for using force only as a last resort by encouraging a non-confrontational

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approach. It stated that Indonesia needed the support and encouragement of the international community, implying this was preferable to confrontational intervention. India’s preferences for sovereignty and UN authorisation in this case were also partly driven by non-violence. India’s speech again shows the state’s particular conception of violence—focusing on the interstate conflict. It does not discuss the obvious human rights abuse of violence against individuals. India somewhat ambiguously stated that it deplored the violence and lack of law and order taking place. It tried to focus attention on overall, large scale conflict. This description makes the violence seem closer to being a threat to international peace, and therefore, and only therefore, worthy of discussion at the UNSC. India sought to ensure that the only conflicts which are considered really ‘violent’ and worth worrying about are those likely to threaten international peace. India’s speech on East Timor included four statements influenced by pluralism and tolerance (UN Document S/PV.4043 1999). Indicating its preference for accepting different regimes and their internal policies, India suggested accepting and recognising Indonesia’s insistence that it was attempting to maintain security and halt violence in East Timor, despite outward appearances. The preference for respecting sovereignty can be seen in India’s insistence that any intervention occur with Indonesian consent. Pluralism is also seen in the preference for UNSC authorisation and approval. The hierarchical worldview also played a role, longside shared cultural identity with Indonesia. Delhi refers to Indonesia as an ancient civilization (like India), suggesting that it is therefore worthy of high standing internationally. It is implied that because of this Indonesia deserves respect from other states, and that Indonesia would be appalled by the violence occurring.

A Global Power 2003–2014 Beginning in the late twentieth century, Western countries had expanded their focus beyond interstate conflict to include intrastate conflicts and ‘human security’ (Hurrell 2007; Paris 2001; van Hooft 2009). Cosmopolitan and solidarist viewpoints have had increasing influence. The rise of the norm of R2P in the 2000s created an opportunity for solidarists with developing countries beginning to open up more to their ideas.

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In Indian foreign policy, the early 2000s heralded what many saw as a shift in alignment. Raja Mohan’s (2005) notable description of this in his Crossing the Rubicon was standard pre-posting reading before I was dispatched to Delhi. In 2010, President Obama described the US’s relationship with India as ‘the defining partnership of the 21st century’ (Polgreen 2010). The 2000s were a time of much excitement about the burgeoning relationship between Washington and Delhi. The enthusiasm was particularly great among those from that milder side of the Hindutva camp which supported the BJP not because of Hindu nationalism, but because of free-market ideology domestically, and pro-Western outlook internationally. In contrast to the Third World solidarity of the Congress leaning ‘secular socialists’, this group argued that it made sense that India had growing ties with the US, as the two had fundamentally convergent interests. Despite all this, India still maintained a differing position to most Western states when it came to humanitarian intervention. Iraq 2003 Among the various justifications given for the invasion of Iraq by the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, one was clearly humanitarian—to ‘free the Iraqi people’ (Bush 2003). India strongly and consistently opposed the war/intervention. It argued the invasion was unjustified prior to and during the war. This included through two speeches at the UNSC after requesting to be heard there (UN Document S/PV.4709 2003: 35; UN Document S/PV.4726 2003: 24). In the absence of evidence otherwise, India’s overall opposition to the war can be assumed to include opposition to it as an act of HI. The US also asked India to provide troops for the invasion which Delhi refused (Malik 2003). Realist and Other Explanations Realist arguments as to why India opposed the invasion point to material interests. Firstly, there is the well-worn argument that India’s opposition came from a fear of intervention in Kashmir. However, in addition to the already covered arguments of why this is an unlikely motivation, the Iraq case was even less comparable to Kashmir than the aforementioned interventions. Among other differences, this included the starkly contrasting cost-benefit ratio for potential interveners. Iraq’s defence capabilities were far weaker than India’s, meaning little strategic cost in intervening. The strategic gain was far greater, given that, among other

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things, it was complete regime change which provided numerous prizes, beyond freeing the Iraqi people. Regime change was not a realistic option in Kashmir/India. India even stood out among other developing countries opposing the invasion as one of the least likely to face HI itself. India was larger and more powerful than all other developing countries except for China, and it held a greater democratic reputation than China. Realists would also argue the economic concern for oil supplies would have driven India’s opposition (UN Document S/PV.4709 2003: 35). India’s Government, however, claimed that ‘no major dislocation in crude oil imports is envisaged’ and ‘India has adequate foreign exchange reserves to meet a higher crude oil import bill if prices continue to rise’ (Vajpayee 2003a). Economic costs in the short-term were, in any case, minute compared with the economic benefits gained by being in the favour of the new Iraqi Government and the US. India would have known that the US was guaranteed to topple the regime and then have a major influence on a new Iraqi government. These factors would have figured in any strategic calculation India had made prior to its anti-invasion statements, given that it was widely presumed that the US had already decided to invade well before 2003 (UN Document S/PV.4709 2003: 35). It is therefore clear that India made its statements of opposition knowing the economic benefits of supporting the intervention. Another potential economic/political cost is related to the safety and livelihoods of the millions of foreign exchange-earning Indians in the Middle East (UN Document S/PV.4709 2003: 35). The PM, however, stated that there would be little chance of any large scale dislocation of these communities (Vajpayee 2003a). Realists may also argue that India was attempting to kowtow to states opposing the war such as Russia, France and other Arab/Muslim countries. None of these states, however, could offer India, in terms of strategic interests, anything remotely near what the US could. India could have gained major strategic benefits from supporting the US in one of its most globally unpopular interventions. If not providing troops, India could have at least refrained from criticising the invasion. Even years later, when India was building closer ties with the US on nuclear cooperation, Congress PM Singh (2006) stated that he still believed that the Iraq intervention was a mistake and that he opposed regime change.

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The US had publicly included the Iraq invasion as part of its ‘War on Terror’. India believed itself also involved in the War on Terror (Sinha 2003a). By supporting the Iraq invasion India could have gained, among other things, greater US support for its own conflict against Kashmiri/Islamic extremists. Domestic politics is also offered as an explanation for India’s opposition. Some argue the Government feared offending the large Muslim minority (Mohan 2011: 4). This argument is weakened by the fact that the BJP had come to power partly through the very act of excluding the Muslim minority from being part of the Indian national identity. The BJP was also the party that had pursued a relatively pro-West, pro-Israel foreign policy, diverting from earlier traditions. With the strategic benefits of opposing the intervention being completely outweighed by the costs, why did India go out of its way to express opposition? We must look at cultural values. Cultural Values Non-violence played a large role. It was the most strongly expressed value in India’s discourse on Iraq. Of the 9 speeches focusing on the issue of invasion in the years surrounding it, there were 36 statements motivated by non-violence.3 The most dominant P&P driven by non-violence was the preference for international peace and for peaceful resolutions to conflicts. 32 Statements were found reflecting this. India opposed the use of violence through armed force to bring regime change in Iraq, even if this was motivated by humanitarian goals to ‘free’ the Iraqi people. PM Vajpayee stated ‘India has consistently stood in favour of a peaceful resolution of the Iraq issue’ (Vajpayee 2003a). This statement was quoted by India’s representative at the UN during his speech on the issue (UN Document S/PV.4709 2003: 35). This continued after the invasion began with India stating ‘In the circumstances, we sincerely hope that the military campaign, which was unjustified and avoidable, will be short-lived’ (UN Document S/PV.4726 2003: 24). There were also preferences expressed for using force as a last resort and for caution when using force. At the UN debate on Iraq, India stated

3 The sample was taken from years 2003–2004 because this was when the vast majority of international debate occurred.

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‘Force should be resorted to only as a last, unavoidable option’ (UN Document S/PV.4709 2003: 35). Even when discussing humanitarian concerns, India always mentioned these as a result of the violent invasion, rather than a result of the Hussein regime. This further evinces India’s focus on interstate violence, rather than violence against individuals within states, either by authorities or other actors. An official spokesman stated ‘We also have to pay special attention to the humanitarian situation in Iraq. We sincerely hope that the Iraqi people will not be subject to further hardships, sufferings, loss of lives and damage to property from an extended military operation’ (MEA 2003). Pluralism and tolerance helped to motivate India’s opposition to the Iraq intervention. Content analysis revealed 27 statements driven by these values. This included a preference for respecting sovereignty. 10 Statements were found expressing this preference. India’s EAM stated ‘it will be the people of Iraq who will control their own destiny’ (Sinha 2003a). Even beyond the war, India opposed the use of sanctions to punish Iraq partly because they were an impingement on Iraqi sovereignty (2003a). India also strongly expressed the pluralism-driven preference for UN and broad multilateral authorisation. This was seen in 17 statements. The PM stated ‘If unilateralism prevails, the U.N. would be deeply scarred, with disastrous consequences for the world order’ (Vajpayee 2003b). Pluralism and tolerance also impacted India’s approach through a preference for a pluralistic and tolerant image. This preference led to the Government tasking the Muslim Minister of State for External Affairs, Shri E. Ahamed with making several statements on Iraq, though these were regarding Indians being held hostage there (Ahamed 2004). He referred to Islam and Allah several times. This may have been a ploy to garner favour with the Iraqi people by demonstrating India’s good treatment of its Muslim minority. India’s pluralism is implied within this impression. Reflecting pluralism and tolerance, India expressed its preference for accepting all regime types. Sinha (2003b) stated ‘India has always had the friendliest of relations with the Arab world, with Iraq’ and then a few lines later ‘India also has had a very friendly relationship with the US to develop. The United States is a democracy and there is a community of democracies in the world’.

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Responsibility to Protect In recent years India’s position on HI saw some evolution. This was likely in part due to the growth of R2P—a key international normative development since the 2003 Iraq intervention. R2P encompassed and promoted the moral and political responsibilities of states to protect their civilian populations, the responsibility of the international community to support states in doing so, and to step in when they fail to (Evans 2008; UN General Assembly 2005). In doing so its proponents sought to codify certain practices, change the language of humanitarian intervention and reconcile human security with a respect for sovereignty. India’s PM had, along with 149 other Heads of State at the 2005 World Summit at UNGA, endorsed the idea of R2P (UN General Assembly 2005). The evolution of Delhi’s position occurred within boundaries delineated by cultural values. India’s engagement with R2P occurred through a process of ‘norm localisation’ (Acharya 2004). History demonstrates that India only followed those international norms that fit with its own values and/or interests. Acharya (2004) argues that ‘norm diffusion’, the acceptance of international norms, depends on the ability of agents to gel them with pre-existing local norms. Cultural values helped determine the degree to which India warmed to R2P and which aspects of R2P it supported. On the one hand, the first two ‘pillars’ of R2P gelled with India’s values. In a 2009 UNGA debate over R2P India affirmed its support for the First Pillar—that states have primary responsibility to protect their populations (Puri 2009). Pluralism and tolerance played a key role in determining this support for this Pillar. These values support a democratic ethos and civil and political human rights, and provide room for seeing sovereignty as tied to certain responsibilities. The Pillar’s emphasis on sovereignty as responsibility also finds echo in Indian culture through Buddhist and Hindu views of government being a contractual agreement (Sengha 2011: 46; Eraly 2005: 85). This does not clash with India’s conception of hierarchy, given this conception does not entail acceptance of authoritarianism (Puri 2009). As mentioned, hierarchy did not affect for India actively supporting the repression of populations by foreign governments. The Pillar also gelled with India’s non-violence-driven P&Ps. In turn, the Pillar is likely to have contributed to India’s preference for international peace expanding to include intrastate peace.

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Sengha (2011: 45) contends the Golden Rule—do onto others as you wish done onto yourself—provides the normative foundation for R2P’s First Pillar. He argues that this should find resonance in Indian culture by arguing that Hinduism (Mahabharata 113.8) and Buddhism (Samyutta Nikaya v. 353) both support the golden rule. R2P’s Second Pillar ‘underscored the commitment of the international community to assist States’ in meeting their protection obligations (UN Document SG/SM/11701 2008). India enthusiastically supported this pillar. Delhi stated its view that the international community should ‘encourage and help states to exercise their responsibility to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity’ (Puri 2009). Non-violence is evident in India’s enthusiasm for this Pillar. It fits in with India’s preferences for peaceful resolutions of conflicts and for using force only as a last resort. This Pillar spearheaded R2P’s emphasis on exhausting all peaceful non-military methods of intervention (diplomatic, economic and legal) prior to the use of force. By emphasising cooperation and peaceful resolution, the Second Pillar shifts the focus away from the violent, forceful aspects central to traditional conceptions of HI. It lessens the likelihood of the need to resort to violent force. At UNGA 2009, India expressed its support for the use of peaceful means to prevent mass atrocities (Puri 2009). India stated: …it would be useful to recall that in Para 139 [of the World Summit Outcomes Document], the international community was enjoined to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, and I would like to repeat, peaceful means, to help protect populations in the specific situations of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity…. (Ibid.)

India’s non-violence-driven preferences for peaceful resolution and for using force as a last resort are predicators of its approach to R2P. India states: Willingness to take chapter Vll [the use of force] measures can only be on a case-by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations with a specific proviso that such action should only be taken when peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail in discharging their duty. (Ibid.)

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R2P’s stipulation that force only be used once the approval of the UNSC has been obtained, appealed to India’s preference for UN/legal authorisation of interventions. India stated at UNGA 2009 ‘These measures…have to be in conformity with the provisions of the UN Charter’ (ibid.). Also fitting this preference was R2P’s precept that a number of clearly defined criteria be met prior to using force. India warned that R2P must not be misused for ‘humanitarian intervention or unilateral action’ (ibid.). On the other hand, cultural values have influenced India’s concern and reservations over the more coercive, Third Pillar of R2P (Seybolt 2007: 2). This Pillar mentions the responsibility of the international community to take timely and decisive action with a broad range of measures, both peaceful and military, when a state is unable or unwilling to prevent mass atrocities within its borders (Evans 2008; UN Document SG/SM/11701 2008). This would potentially lead to threats to sovereignty, contravening India’s values of pluralism and tolerance. The Third Pillar could also allow for the use of force by foreign powers, potentially against a state—contravening India’s non-violence-driven preference for international peace. Some argue that Indian culture’s conception of non-violence should cause it to support all aspects of R2P unconditionally (Parra 2011: 70). Sengha (2011: 47) cites ‘just war’ doctrine as an important way world religions have responded to the question of violence. In articulating how just war doctrine is relevant to R2P, Sengha (2011: 47) describes how criteria spelled out by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and in the September 2005 World Summit contain virtually all the elements of Christian just war doctrine: just cause, proportionality, likelihood of success and right authority. However, while Indian culture contains notions of just war, it has occurred in an overall context of relatively passive non-violence being a dominant value. Just war has not been a prominent value or driver of India’s actions. The existence of descriptions of the just war viewpoint in Hindu texts does not compare, as a motivating factor, to the broad historical circumstances which have led to India maintaining a value of non-violence and more readily applying it to the issue of HI than other comparable states (Thapar 2002; Eraly 2005; Basham 2004). Similarly, Sengha (2011: 30) argues that the Hindu/Buddhist concept of ahimsa requires the protection of life. This is a misinterpretation both in the literal sense and in the spirit of the idea. Ahimsa—as it was understood throughout most of Indian history—is largely passive (Thapar 2002; Eraly 2005; Basham 2004). It is

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recommended as a practice in the context of greater detachment from the world on the path towards enlightenment (Harvey 2001: Chapter 4). Hall (2013: 107) acknowledges an influence of ‘religious beliefs and political ideologies that lean toward “pacifism”’. Parra (2011: 70) cites Gandhi as a strong influence on India’s conception of non-violence. He states that Gandhi’s interpretation of Hindu/Buddhist ahimsa, is ‘by no means passive’. Gandhi’s concept of satyagraha or truth force, was uncompromising in its conviction that truth and justice would inevitably trump oppression and unjust power. However, it is the method of achieving justice, through non-violent, passive resistance, that stood out as something exceptionally associated with Indian culture. Parra’s (2011: 70) argument therefore, may explain India’s non-support for authoritarianism and support for human rights, but fails to explain why India would approve of violent force as the method to achieve it. In contrast, the key difference between India’s freedom movement and others is the Indian movement’s disapproval of the use of force, even to achieve justice. Parra’s (2011: 70) analysis does better as a theory of why India may support the preventative, non-violent aspects of R2P. Libya 2011 The first test of India’s attitude to the new norm of R2P came in March 2011. When authorities in Libya moved/threatened to crush an uprising by anti-government protestors, Western countries agitated for intervention. This was justified for humanitarian purposes—to protect civilians from the Gaddafi regime. The UNSC was asked to vote on a resolution which imposed a ban on all flights in Libya’s airspace (a no-fly zone), and tightened sanctions on the government. It also authorised Member States ‘that have notified the Secretary-General’ to ‘take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’ (UN Document S/RES/1973 2011). The resolution was adopted. The 10 votes in favour consisted of all the Western countries except Germany, and several developing countries. India was one of the remaining five UNSC members who abstained. It was joined by China, Russia, Brazil and Germany (UN Department of Public Information SC/10200 2011; Mukherjee 2011).

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Several explanations are offered for India’s abstention from the vote. Realist explanations argue that India abstained from supporting the resolution because it had a strategic interest in not seeing increased Western influence in the Middle East. This is not likely to be the case, however, particularly given that increased Western influence directly harms India’s main strategic rival, China. Further evidence of this is India’s silence on the pro-West Bahraini government’s crackdown on its own democracy protestors around the same time, and its silence on pro-West Saudi Arabia’s military support for the crackdown (Mohan 2011: 4). Bajpai (2011) argues that India had a strategic interest in not having China speed ahead of it in Africa and other regions. Had India voted in favour of the resolution while China abstained, the argument goes, this would have allowed Beijing alone to ‘stand as the champion of the weak in Africa, Asia and Latin America’, further presenting itself as a ‘bulwark against bullying Western democracies’ (ibid.). India is, however, unlikely to have acted out of fear of being outdone by China’s abstention. China abstained when it could have blocked the resolution with its veto. This is far from the actions of a state acting as a ‘bulwark’ against the West. Furthermore, 6 of the 9 developing countries on the UNSC, including 3 African countries, voted in support of the resolution, making it unlikely they would have seen a country voting against it as a champion of their cause. Further evidence against the ‘anti-Western bulwark’ theory is the silence India maintained on the aforementioned Saudi intervention to support Bahrain’s government. Here was an opportunity for India to criticise a pro-Western state in the Middle East from a human security perspective. Instead, India received the Foreign Minister of Bahrain and the National Security Adviser of Saudi Arabia (MEA 2011a, b; Mohan 2011: 4). India’s non-opposition to the Saudi intervention is likely because it was invited by the Bahraini government and therefore did not constitute an interstate conflict, and thereby was not a breach of international peace. Had India followed its strategic interests, it would have supported the West’s position and voted in favour of the Libya Resolution. Western favour is a valuable strategic prize. Its value can be seen in that it is likely to have influenced China and Russia, at least to some extent, to abstain rather than use their veto power. Negotiations are likely to have occurred where China and Russia were offered something in exchange. India’s

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abstention went against a clear strategic benefit of currying Western favour. Beyond direct Western favours, India would have built a reputation among certain Western circles of being a ‘power player’, a ‘constructive member of the global community’ and a ‘responsible stakeholder’ (Bajpai 2011). This could have strengthened India’s case for permanent UNSC membership. Instead, India’s abstention had ‘disappointed many Western friends’ (Mohan 2011). This is particularly important with regard to India’s growing strategic partner, the US. Libya was the first major internationally debated intervention since the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, an agreement which was said to have entailed US expectations for Indian support and cooperation in American humanitarian interventions, among other areas (Carter 2006). Mohan (2011) argues that India’s abstention made Western states ‘wonder if India is ready to take its place among…major powers and contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security’. It is said to have even ‘complicated’ Western support for India’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat (Twining 2011). Western advocates of India’s campaign were ‘frustrated’ (ibid.). Also worth noting is the strategic benefit India forewent by not supporting the Libyan rebels. When Western intervention on the side of the rebels was foreshadowed, it would have been widely known that a rebel victory was assured, at least in the medium term. As such, it would have been strategically advantageous to throw in with the winning team (like most countries around the world) in order to have good relations with the future Libyan Government. Evidence of this is the threats made by the rebels against future investment opportunities for countries that abstained from the vote and did not support the intervention, like China, Russia and Brazil (‘Rebels Might Redraw Libya’s Oil Contracts’, 2011, RT News, 23 August; Sotloff 2012). Liberal IR theorists argue that changing international norms and increasing cosmopolitanism witnessed in the growth of the norm R2P had a major impact on India’s decision. From understanding India’s qualified support for R2P, however, we can see that R2P made the idea of HI in Libya more palatable for India only to the extent that the norm adhered to India’s cultural values. The debate on R2P in UNGA months after the Libya intervention showed developing countries generally as more amenable to the non-violent Pillars One and Two of R2P, rather than

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the force invoking Pillar Three (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 2011). Liberal explanations can partially explain India’s abstention, but only in conjunction with cultural values. Furthermore, the Libya Resolution was milder than the already mild dictates of R2P. While it authorised Member States to protect civilians, it did not say they have a responsibility to do so. It only states that the Libyan government and parties to the conflict, have a responsibility to protect civilians. Furthermore, it would have been almost impossible and somewhat useless for India to vote against the resolution, given that the usual opponents of intervention, China and Russia, did not veto it. The role of values influencing the thinking of policymakers was witnessed during an interview with one former ambassador who stated that China should have vetoed the Libya resolution (Former Indian Ambassador, interview with author, 2015, New Delhi). R2P did, nevertheless, lead to some evolution in India’s application of non-violence during the Libya case. India expressed greater concern for intrastate violence. This was in line with its support for the First Pillar—that states have primary responsibility to protect their populations (Puri 2009). Image-wise, India did not want to be seen as indifferent to intrastate violence, particularly when states considered even less liberal (China and Russia) did not veto. This influenced India to abstain rather than vote against the resolution. India attempted to present itself as concerned with violence against civilians and the humanitarian situation for the Syrian people. It stated after the culmination of the conflict ‘India strongly condemns all acts of violence committed against civilians. We believe that the right to life is one of the fundamental rights and should be the foundation of any social order. It is the obligation of all States to take appropriate measures to protect the lives of their citizens while maintaining social order’ (UN Document S/PV.6855 2012). This reflects R2P’s First Pillar. Non-violence Cultural values also influence India’s approach to Libya beyond R2P. Non-violence was a key motivator of India’s position. Within India’s speeches on Libya, there were 32 statements indicating the influence of non-violence. Non-violence’s influence was often through its role in driving India’s preference for international peace. This can be seen in India’s earliest speech at the UN on Libya in February 2011 (UN Document S/PV.6491

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2011). In the first paragraph India states ‘We deplore the use of force, which is totally unacceptable and must not be resorted to’. This statement seems to have been left deliberately open and aimed at both the Libyan authorities and the foreign powers considering using force against Libya. The emphasis on peace and aversion to the use of force is stronger than seen in the speeches from other countries. The statements were repeated in India’s next UN speech two days before the intervention began (UN Document S/PV.6498 2011). Overall, there were 12 statements found referring to India’s preference for international peace. By abstaining from voting on the no-fly zone, India’s expressed its lack of support for the use of military force—something which would have been necessary to enforce a no-fly zone over a sovereign state. In justifying its abstention, Delhi stated that it preferred a political, and thereby peaceful, solution to the conflict (UN Document S/PV.6498 2011). India supported the peaceful efforts of the Secretary General’s special envoy and the African Union’s mission. It argued these efforts must be given a chance. The preference for caution in the use of force can also be seen in India’s justification for abstaining. This preference was seen in 8 instances. India warns that the resolution authorises ‘far-reaching measures…with relatively little credible information on the situation on the ground in Libya’ (UN Document S/PV.6498 2011). India’s representative also cautioned ‘We also do not have clarity about details of enforcement measures, including who will participate and with what assets, and how these measures will exactly be carried out’ (UN Document S/PV.6498 2011). After the intervention, India expressed concern over the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) perceived military overreach (Evans 2011). This was reflected in the thinking of the country’s foreign policy establishment with one former ambassador stating that ‘Libya has discredited R2P forever’ and that ‘no developing country will ever support it at the UN again’ (Former Indian official 2015). Mohan (2011) assesses that India’s risk-averse, sceptical and cautious strategic culture regarding the use of force led it to abstain, rather than any non-aligned/non-Western identity. Caution in the use of force was intertwined with the perception that force would not work well. India feared that if force was used and there was no decisive, quick victory, it would worsen the situation and the prolong civil war (Mohan 2011). Non-violence has also led to India’s

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preference for using force only as a last resort. There were 8 instances of this preference expressed in discourse. Freer from international constraints and strategic considerations, parliamentary parties who were outside the Government could express their opinions more openly. These parties, ranging across the political spectrum from the right wing, pro-Western BJP, to the antiWestern communist parties, overwhelmingly condemned the intervention—largely due to its violence (‘LS Demands Resolution Condemning Libya Airstrikes’, 2011, Indian Express, 22 March; ‘External Forces Can’t Decide on Libyan Regime Change: India’, 2011, Indo Asian News Service, 22 March). They demanded that the Parliament pass a resolution condemning the airstrikes (Mohan 2011). The Government responded to this by raising its rhetoric against the intervention and reassuring critics that it had already expressed its unhappiness with the intervention (Mohan 2011; ‘LS Demands Resolution Condemning Libya Airstrikes’, 2011, Indian Express, 22 March). It is unlikely that the non-government parties were only attempting to score cheap political points, because they expressed appreciation of the Government’s stand on the matter. They only wished it would go further. It is also unlikely to have been a political tactic because Libya was an issue of low importance to the Indian voter. Pluralism and Tolerance Pluralism and tolerance played a significant role in India’s decision to abstain from voting on the Libya resolution and its discourse surrounding the intervention. Content analysis revealed 20 statements referring to P&Ps driven by pluralism and tolerance. As with previous interventions, this included the preference for sovereignty. This was seen in 7 statements. India’s External Affairs Minister stated that ‘No external powers should interfere in it… What is happening in Libya is an internal affair of that country’ (‘LS Demands Resolution Condemning Libya Airstrikes’, 2011, Indian Express, 22 March). Even after the conflict was over, by May 2012, India was still emphasising its preference for sovereignty. It stated at the UN ‘an inclusive, broad-based political process anchored in State sovereignty is the only way to achieve national reconciliation and overcome the multitude of problems that Libya is facing in the post-conflict phase’ (UN Document S/PV.6772 2012). Sovereignty was so strongly preferred that India even stated that it supported ‘a calibrated and gradual approach’ with

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regard to the matters referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (UN Document S/PV.6491 2011). Pluralism also led to India’s preference for UN and multilateral authorisation. India preferred efforts such as the Secretary General’s special envoy’s mission over armed intervention. The preference for UN control can further be seen in India’s voting for UN Resolution 2040, in March 2012, which extended support for the UN Support Mission in Libya. India’s rhetoric also shows a preference for operating within international law. Tolerance drove the preference to accept all regime types. India’s EAM stated ‘Nobody, no two or three countries can take a decision to change a particular regime in a third country’ (‘LS Demands Resolution Condemning Libya Airstrikes’, 2011, Indian Express, 22 March). The level of influence of the R2P on India’s decision to abstain from voting on Libya is likely to have been shaped by the role of hierarchy. As discussed, India’s conception of hierarchy did not entail support for authoritarian regimes. Syria From the start of the Syrian conflict, India demonstrated a consistent opposition to intervention. The amount of debate at the highest international levels, including at the UNSC, and support by various external powers for various parties to the conflict, means India’s position provides a good example of the role of cultural values. The country’s actions and rhetoric provide evidence of its aversion to foreign military intervention. India abstained from a 2011 UNGA resolution that called for political transition (Jacob and Raj 2012). It teamed up with Brazil and South Africa in sending a delegation (known as the IBSA delegation) to Syria to appeal to authorities to end the crackdown on anti-government protesters and implement democratic reforms (MEA 2011c). Here again, realist arguments point to strategic interests as motivating India’s position. One argument put forth against anti-interventionist Russia and China is that these countries have interests in Syria which would be harmed by regime change (Lauria 2012). This cannot be said for India. Further evidence of India’s lack of vested interests is its voting in favour of a draft resolution that would have authorised sanctions against the

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Syrian government (‘Russia, China Veto Resolution on Syria, India Votes in favour’, 2012, Times of India, 19 July). India also expressed its regret that the resolution failed (it was vetoed by Russia and China) (ibid.). If India had had vested interests, such a vote would no doubt have harmed them by angering the Assad government. Some argue that economic interests were central, particularly given India’s recent financial problems (Einhorn and Goyal 2013). This included concerns regarding oil prices. This is unlikely to be the sole reason, however, given that oil prices are likely to affect many states who have voiced support for intervention. Also cited is that instability would threaten the foreign exchange earnings of the large numbers of Indian expats in the Gulf region (ibid.). Any intervention in Syria is, however, unlikely to lead to fighting within the Gulf states, even if these states intervened in the conflict. Cultural Values With existing explanations failing to account for India’s position, cultural values must be examined. Non-violence exerts a major influence on India’s actions and rhetoric regarding Syria. Within the 10 speeches on the issue, 64 statements were found which reflected P&Ps motivated, at least in part, by non-violence. The most common preference was that for international peace, including for peaceful resolution of conflicts. 36 Statements were found reflecting this preference. Early on in the conflict India stated at the UNSC ‘We have…called for a peaceful and inclusive political process to address the grievances of all sections of the Syrian society since the beginning of the protests…’ (UN Document S/PV.6710 2012). The use of foreign military force in an intervention was opposed. India stated ‘any further militarisation of the crisis can have catastrophic consequences for the region’ (Krishna 2012). India’s rhetoric also implied its opposition to potential armed support for the rebels by foreign powers, even on humanitarian grounds. It stated ‘We unequivocally and strongly condemn all violence irrespective of whoever the perpetrators are and whatever justification is proffered’ (UN Document S/PV.6710 2012). This preference is likely to have been further strengthened by concern about NATO’s overreach after being given the green light in Libya (Evans 2011). In June 2012 at a special session of the UN Human Rights Council, India again stated that ‘all parties need to abjure violence’ if there is to be a lasting solution (Hindustan Times 2012). In January 2013, India continued

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its calls for peaceful resolution of the crisis and for the abandoning of violence by both sides (Ahamed 2013). This preference is likely to have been further strengthened by misgivings about NATO’s actions in Libya (Evans 2011), and the US’s 2003 Iraq invasion. India’s justification for supporting a 2012 UNSC resolution on Syria further demonstrates the importance of the international peace preference. India’s representative noted that ‘the resolution expressly rules out any measures under Article 42 of the Charter’. Article 42 authorises the UNSC to employ the use of force. India’s support for resolutions that favoured sanctions against the Syrian government reflects the preference for peaceful resolution of conflict. India opposed forceful intervention but did not oppose peaceful means to motivate a change in behaviour by the Syrian state. India’s slight shift in focus over the last decade towards intrastate violence is likely to have motivated it to support the sanctions. While the pluralism-/tolerance-based sovereignty preference would have affected against supporting sanctions, this would have only been to a small degree as sanctions were not a major violation of sovereignty (it is the prerogative of states to decide who they wish to trade with). Any pluralism-and tolerance-driven opposition to sanctions would have been overpowered by the aversion to the level of intrastate violence occurring in Syria, complemented by the potential strategic and economic benefits that would come from supporting the West. The Syria debate saw a slight expansion of India’s conception of non-violence—likely due in part to R2P. This expansion meant the strengthening of India’s preference for intrastate peace. Much of India’s humanitarian and human rights concerns were related to violence. India made 23 mentions indicating concern for internal violence, including violence against civilians, opposition and government forces. For instance, in a UNSC speech, India stated ‘The resolution of this problem cannot be found in violence or armed struggle and its violent suppression’ (UN Document S/PV.6710 2012). It adds ‘Unfortunately, during the past 10 months we have witnessed an increasing level of violence that has taken a heavy toll on civilians and the security forces and has destroyed civilian infrastructure’ (UN Document S/PV.6710 2012). India also indicated its preference for using force only as a last resort in several statements. This, combined with its international peace preference, can be seen as motivating the country’s contribution to the IBSA efforts.

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Pluralism and tolerance had a clear impact on India’s approach to the Syria debate overall. It underpinned the thinking of policymakers. One former policymaker criticised the interference in Syria by states like Turkey as ‘hypocritical’ and that it ‘prevented the people from choosing their own government’ (Former Indian MEA official, interview with author, 2015). Another stated ‘it’s up to the Syrians… Our position is that it [democracy] should be not imposed from outside’ (Former Indian MEA official, interview with author, 2017). On Assad, a former official stated that ‘We understand his position…two years ago majority of Syrians supported him’ (Former Indian MEA official, interview with author, 2017). Officials were conscious of values being the root of India’s positions. One noted ‘We held a similar position to China, but India’s position is based in morals while China is more pragmatic’. Publicly, 42 statements were found reflecting values of pluralism and tolerance. The most common pluralism-driven P&P was the preference for respecting sovereignty. This was reflected in 24 statements. India states ‘we believe that the main role of the international community, including the Council, is to facilitate engagement of the Syrian people with all sections of Syrian society for an inclusive political process that takes into account the legitimate aspirations of all Syrians, while ensuring respect for the country’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity’ (UN Document S/PV.6711 2012). The sovereignty preference can also be seen in India’s justification for its abstention from voting on the UNGA resolution proposed for Syria in 2011 (Jacob and Raj 2012). India said that it had objected due to the inclusion of a statement that UN Member States should sever all relations with Syria and that President al-Assad should step down from power (ibid.)—an infringement on Syria’s sovereignty. India’s pluralist worldview dictates that Syria’s sovereign state should not be made to adjust its leadership according to the views of foreign powers, despite alleged atrocities. India stated unequivocally ‘we believe that the leadership of Syria is a matter for the Syrian people to decide’ (Puri 2012). India, however, had no problem with the parts of the resolution that condemned violence on both sides. There was also some evidence to suggest R2P potentially impacting India’s preference for sovereignty. When discussing Resolution 2043 which authorised a UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) of 300 unarmed military observers—India stated ‘we note that the resolution enjoins upon the government to protect its population, indicating that it

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should have the capacity to do so’ (Puri 2012). This fully encompasses the First Pillar of R2P. It also advocates for the Second Pillar—that the international community should support states to be able to protect their populations. In line with its pluralist and tolerant worldview, India demonstrated a preference for regional player-driven solutions. This was indicated in 13 instances, namely when supporting the monitoring mission of the League of Arab States (Arab League). India states ‘The League of Arab States, as an important regional organisation, should play its required and historic role in promoting political dialogue among the Syrian parties’ (Puri 2012). India even undertook to ‘engage with fellow Council members so that the Council can speak with a unanimous voice in support of the initiative of the League of Arab States to expeditiously resolve the Syrian crisis’ (UN Document S/PV.6710 2012). There were 9 statements indicating a preference for UN/multilateral authorisation of any missions to Syria. Following recent allegations of a chemical attack, India maintained its cautious approach, waiting for the UN investigation’s findings before making judgements. As mentioned, India, like other UNSC members, voted in favour of Resolution 2043. India stated that it did so ‘with the expectation that UNSMIS will implement its mandate impartially’ (UN Document S/PV.6756 2012). The pluralist worldview also led to a preference for not condemning the behaviour of sovereign states when acting within their borders. This preference was indicated 6 times. India abstained from voting on a resolution in the UN Human Rights Council which pointed to alleged human rights violations in Syria (MEA 2011b). In doing so, India argued that it opposed country-specific resolutions in the Council as unhelpful and tantamount to ‘finger-pointing’. It stated that ‘we believe that it is imperative for every society to have the means of addressing human rights violations through robust mechanisms within themselves. International scrutiny should be resorted to only when such mechanisms are non-existent or have consistently failed’.

Conclusion The level of cultural values’ influence has been broadly consistent throughout the last 25 years. India’s approach to each international intervention or debate over intervention during this period was, in part, a factor of how the individual circumstances of the intervention either fit

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with or ran counter to, its cultural values. Those interventions that fit with India’s cultural values, the country was more likely to support and vice versa, though values were not the sole determiner. The values of non-violence, pluralism and tolerance had the greatest direct impact while hierarchy played a more facilitating role. Table 4.1 lists each cultural value and the P&Ps among leaders that the values either directly drive or enable/allow. The table also indicates which P&Ps influenced India’s approach in each intervention case. For example, non-violence drives the ‘preference for international peace, including the peaceful resolution of conflicts’ which influenced India’s approach to the Sri Lanka, Iraq 1991, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq 2003, Libya and Syria cases. It also displays how cultural values influence India’s P&Ps regarding R2P. Non-violence Non-violence is one of the most prominent cultural values impacting India’s approach to HI. It was the most highly represented cultural value in India’s discourse. In the three periods to which quantitative analysis was applied, within the 27 documents assessed, there were 128 statements reflecting P&Ps influenced by non-violence. A consistency can be seen in the influence of non-violence throughout the period—India’s support for an intervention is a product of the scale of the humanitarian need, minus the level of interstate violence and conflict required to resolve it. India’s intervention in Bangladesh, though outside the period in question, clearly reflects this thinking. The weight placed on non-violence in this equation, however, is greater than that placed on humanitarian need. This can be seen in the fact that India opposed the majority of interventions throughout the period. With India’s non-violence-driven P&Ps causing her to oppose most interventions, Delhi sits in line with the views of the large, developing country bloc—though the motivations of other states may vary. India’s non-violence-driven P&Ps matched with many of the positions held by this bloc. This included: concern for the UN Charter’s Article 2(4) prohibiting the use of force and Article 2(7) of which states the UN is not authorised to intervene in states’ domestic jurisdictions (UN 1945); opposition to the use of force except as a last resort; and the view that any use of force must be authorised by the UNSC in response to an interstate threat, or used in self-defence. The centrality of non-violence in India’s

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Table 4.1 Values and P&Ps that influenced each intervention Non-violence

Preference for international peace, including the peaceful resolution of conflicts Preference for intrastate peace

Hierarchy Interventions influenced by the P&P in question

Drives

Sri Lanka (slightly); Iraq 1991; Somalia; Kosovo; Iraq 2003; Libya; Syria Sri Lanka (slightly); Somalia (slightly); Libya; Syria Iraq 1991; Kosovo; East Timor; Iraq 2003; Libya; Syria

Drives

Preference for caution Drives in using force and for using it as a last resort/Perception that force would not likely work Preference for Drives supporting sovereignty

Preference for Drives maintaining a non-violent image Preferences for Drives UN/multilateral/legal authorisation/control Preference for accepting all regime types Preference for caution in condemning the behaviour of other states within their borders Preference for regional interventions Preference for maintaining a pluralist and tolerant image

Pluralism and tolerance

Drives

Sri Lanka (slightly); Iraq 2003; Somalia; Kosovo; East Timor; Iraq 2003; Libya; Syria Sri Lanka

Drives

Allows

Drives

Allows

Drives

Drives Drives

Somalia; Haiti; Sierra Leone; Kosovo; East Timor; Iraq 2003; Libya; Syria Kosovo; East Timor; Iraq 2003; Libya Sri Lanka (slightly); Kosovo; Syria

Allows

Sri Lanka; Libya; Syria Sri Lanka; Iraq 2003

(continued)

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Table 4.1 (continued) Non-violence

Preference for enforcing pluralism internally within other states Perception that India must present its views and lead on principle due to its status Preference for contributing troops to UN peacekeeping missions Preference for not supporting strong states to dominate weak states Perception that India was so powerful that it had little to fear from unwanted HI Preference to project a powerful image Preference to support Drives R2P’s Pillar 1 Preference to support Drives R2P’s Pillar 2 Preference to oppose Drives R2P’s Pillar 3

Pluralism and tolerance

Hierarchy Interventions influenced by the P&P in question

Allows

Sri Lanka

Drives

Kosovo; Iraq 2003

Drives

Allows

Kosovo; Iraq 2003

Drives

All interventions/debates

Drives

Sri Lanka

Allows/drives Allows

Libya; Syria

Allows/drives

Libya; Syria

Drives

Libya; Syria

opposition stood out when compared to other developing countries who were motivated more by strategic interests and a pluralist worldview. Central among the factors which influenced India’s approach to HI has been the preference for international peace, including the peaceful resolution of conflicts. In the three cases to which quantitative analysis was applied, there were 76 statements reflecting this preference. This preference has, particularly early in the period, contributed to India’s opposition, or at least reluctance to support HI. Intervention was considered to usually involve the use of force, and therefore violence,

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between states. If India had applied non-violence at the level of the individual as in the ‘human security’ paradigm, then it is likely that it would have supported intervention to prevent violence against individuals (Paris 2001). As mentioned though, India’s conception of violence focused on states. The analysis revealed that India has not applied ‘just war’ theory to its thinking on HI but rather was influenced by non-violence, stemming from its overall historical experience. Other non-violence-driven P&Ps found consistently throughout the cases include the: preference for caution in using force; perception that the use of force would not work out well; and preference for force only as a last resort. In the last three interventions, the preference for force only as a last resort was seen in 16 instances. PM Singh stated in 2011 that ‘[s]ocieties cannot be reordered from outside through military force’. While many have argued in recent years that humanitarian interventions rarely work in achieving their stated aims, the value of non-violence is likely to have impacted Delhi’s assessment of this. All the aforementioned P&Ps were also driven partly by India’s preference for projecting a non-violent image of itself. Delhi can be seen as having been somewhat successful in maintaining a non-violent image, albeit mainly outside its region (Vira 2012). Evolution In the last few years, we can see a subtle change in India’s application of its value of non-violence to the issue of HI. While the change has been only slight, and India’s primary concern remains violence between states, we can see a move to encompass more concerns regarding what happens inside sovereign states, such as violence against groups and individuals. This can be seen in India’s decision to abstain rather than vote against the Libya intervention. It is also evident in the rise of instances in the last 10 years of the preference for non-violence generally, including intrastate. The preference went from several mentions regarding Iraq 2003, to 5 mentions when it came to Libya 2011, to 23 mentions regarding Syria 2011. This evolution has been shaped by several factors. Post-independence, just after WWII, the greatest concern regarding violence in the international community, including India, was interstate violence. More recently, with the growth of intrastate conflicts and concepts of human security, there has been greater concern for violence beyond interstate conflict. This greater concern was, however,

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mainly among Western countries that more readily supported HI. With the growing norm of R2P, some developing countries had begun to change as well, though this was mitigated by strategic fears of opportunist intervention by powerful states, particularly after Libya. India, however, maintained the post WWII interstate conception of non-violence and the related opposition towards HI. This was due partly to Delhi’s more collectivist culture, relative to the West. Particularly among Western leaders and members of the public who maintain the liberal internationalist ideology, concern for the individual is prioritised (Kertzer et al. 2014: 830; Osgood 1953: 7). Another reason is India’s more passive, less active approach to non-violence. The strength of India’s adherence to the value of non-violence further impacted its reluctance to alter and expand its conception and application of the value in the way Western states had. This was furthered by the fact that in many intervention cases it was unclear as to whether the level of violence caused by HI would be less than the violence it sought to prevent. This is likely to have been a more powerful factor in India’s thinking in comparison to Western states, as India had relatively less strategic interest in supporting HI in most cases. In recent years, with closer relations with the West, a more open economy, and a new generation of leaders and Foreign Service personnel, there has been greater engagement with liberal international norms like R2P. While India’s views of R2P were almost entirely predicated on P&Ps driven by cultural values, in recent years the norm has begun to impact on India’s application of these values. This has resulted in a slight and gradual expansion of how India applies non-violence in the international realm. Pluralism and Tolerance Following non-violence, pluralism and tolerance are the values that had the strongest influence on India’s approach to HI. In the two periods there were 99 statements reflecting P&Ps influenced by these values working together. This was through instituting a pluralistic and tolerant worldview. The majority of India’s pluralism-driven P&Ps caused the country to oppose most humanitarian interventions. This led it to stand with much of the developing world. The positions taken by the developing country

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bloc included the need for host state consent for intervention and determination by the UNSC of a threat to international peace. Given India’s historical role leading the Non-Aligned Movement, it is likely that India’s views influenced other developing countries. The motivation behind India’s P&Ps regarding HI is, as mentioned, based more on values and less on strategic fear than most developing countries. Firstly, India’s civil and political human rights and democratic record separate it from many of the main developing country opponents of HI which have worse records in these areas. This would suggest India should be on the pro-HI side with Western states. The analysis, however, shows that pluralism and tolerance had an opposite effect on India’s approach to HI. India stood in opposition to the majority of domestically pluralist, human rights supporting democracies (most of which are Western states) (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011).4 This suggests a cultural difference in the conception of pluralism and tolerance. India focused more on states while the solidarist West focused on individuals and their welfare. The defining characteristic of a solidarist society of states, according to Wheeler (2000: 11–12) is ‘one in which states accept not only a moral responsibility to protect the security of their own citizens, but also a wider one of “guardianship of human rights everywhere”’. Western discourse revealed a perception that the international community has a responsibility to act to stop mass atrocities, including without the consent of the intervention recipient—clashing with India’s sovereignty preference. The liberal solidarist viewpoint also demonstrated less concern for obtaining UN or multilateral authorisation and broad interpretations of Article 2(7). Respecting sovereignty was key among India’s pluralism- and tolerance-driven P&Ps. This was seen in 41 instances across the two periods. This preference was also clearly seen in India’s support for those interventions where sovereignty was less of a concern, such as Somalia, Sierra Leone and Haiti. The preference for UN/multilateral/legal authorisation and UN control of interventions was seen in almost every intervention assessed. It was referred to 36 times in the last three intervention cases. There was a preference for regional solutions, seen most 4 While in NP India sometimes justified cooperation with other countries on the basis of shared values, this was not the case in HI. In HI, the situation surrounding the intervention itself mattered more than who was intervening, given third parties are more likely to be affected.

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clearly in India’s support for Arab League and African Union efforts in Syria and Libya, respectively. This preference found expression 13 times. India also had a strong preference to maintain an image of a state which had a pluralistic and tolerant worldview, including a respect for sovereignty. Pluralism- and tolerance-driven P&Ps played a key role in determining India’s support for the First Pillar of R2P. India acknowledged that states have a responsibility to protect their populations. These P&Ps, also however, drove India’s opposition to the Third Pillar of R2P which was perceived as more contentious in relation to sovereignty. The powerful influence of pluralism and tolerance is likely to continue into the future, as India rises as a global power. One former official stated ‘When we become more powerful, we may be more assertive but the values and principles will still be there, there will just be some added nuance to positions like non-interference. We might suggest things to other countries. We will not be like the US and say “if you don’t do this we will beat you”’. Hierarchy India’s conception of hierarchy facilitated the active influence of other values. As mentioned, India’s hierarchy value did not generally entail the perception that one group should dominate another. This translated to India having (relative to its size and other interests) a weak interest, if any, in stamping its model or will on other states. This allowed India to hold the pluralism-driven preference for UN and broad multilateral authorisation of interventions. The UN was seen as a representative of the community of states. Its authorisation gave interventions less of a ‘one state dominating another’ character. This was seen in India’s discourse and behaviour regarding Somalia which India supported, and Kosovo, Iraq, Syria which it opposed. India’s preference for UN authorisation, rather than unilateral action by powerful states was mitigated when those powerful states were regional players. This is likely due to the role of anti-colonialism in shaping India’s conception of hierarchy. Intervention by regional powers was seen as less a case of foreign domination. Hierarchy thereby allowed for the pluralismdriven preference for regional solutions. India’s ‘double standard’ or contradictory thinking when it comes to regional interventions is likely due to both cultural values and strategic

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interests. If India’s double standard was solely because of strategic interests, it would have opposed all foreign interventions and supported only strategically beneficial regional interventions. India’s support for the Arab League’s efforts in Syria and the African Union’s initiative in Libya, however, shows that the regional solution preference existed even when there were few strategic interests at stake (Puri 2012). The hierarchy-driven perception that India, as a great state and civilization, must voice its views and lead on principle was seen in 5 instances in the Iraq, Libya and Syria cases. With regard to Iraq, we see the perception that India, as one of the great civilizations of the world, had a connection with Iraq “spread over centuries” (UN Document S/PV.4709 2003: 35). Hierarchy would also have slightly influenced the perception that India was such a great and powerful state that it did not have to worry about being a potential recipient of unwanted HI. Of course, this perception was also partly made up of rational strategic calculation based on India’s size, military strength, etc. However, the bravado with which this confidence was sometimes expressed suggested more than strategic calculation. This influenced India’s thinking with regard to most interventions during the period, contradicting the realist argument of fear-based motivation.

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CHAPTER 5

Relations with the Middle East

Relations with the Middle East provide an insight into culture’s role in India’s foreign policy. This case study will seek to reveal the roles played by cultural values in influencing foreign policy directly and via identity, image and soft power. ‘Cultural traditions, spiritual values and shared heritage’, these underpin India and the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) social and foreign policies according to the Joint Statement issued by the two states following Indian Prime Minister Modi’s visit (Press Information Bureau 2015). Sitting just outside India’s sphere of influence but of growing strategic and economic import, Delhi’s rhetoric and behaviour towards the Middle East can demonstrate the interplay between cultural values and other policy drivers. Furthermore, Indian leaders will be aware of the attention this relationship receives due to: India’s status as a rising power, the Middle East’s position as one of the world’s most geopolitically contested regions, and domestic communal politics. The high-profile nature may elicit a relatively more conscious consideration of values in policymaking. Studies of foreign policy in Middle Eastern states have

This chapter draws on the following papers: Pethiyagoda, K., 2015a, ‘Dealing with Delhi: How Culture Shapes India’s Middle East Policy’, Brookings Doha Centre Policy Briefing, December; and Pethiyagoda, K., 2017, ‘India-GCC Relations: Delhi’s Strategic Opportunity’, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, no. 18, February. © The Author(s) 2021 K. Pethiyagoda, Indian Foreign Policy and Cultural Values, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54696-0_5

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revealed that understanding culture is particularly imperative when it comes to the region (Razi 1988: 689−723). Furthermore, the Middle East, alongside Southeast and East Asia, constitute the regions which, outside of subcontinent have the greatest cultural connections with India. Of all emerging and established great powers, none have deeper or longer cultural ties with the Middle East, than India. Moreover, no major power is arguably as dependant on the region as India, due to both energy trade and remittances. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is India’s largest trading partner. In addition to the economic interests long-underpinning India-Gulf ties, relations are now increasingly strategically relevant given changing global dynamics (Pethiyagoda 2015). At this pivotal time, culture can act as a foreign policy tool to achieve both economic and strategic interests, as well as a driver of policy behaviour and rhetoric. This chapter examines how cultural values influence Delhi’s approach to the Middle East through three avenues: (1) directly; (2) via its impact upon identity; and (3) via its influence on India’s image in the region. The three avenues of influence are examined first in relation to previous governments and then in relation to the present government of Narendra Modi.1 Because a substantial aspect of values’ direct influence on Middle East relations has been via India’s positions on humanitarian interventions in the region, the case study builds on the previous chapter’s examination of these interventions. A special examination is undertaken of Iran, given the unique influences cultural values have had on that relationship, combined with the fact that the country has traditionally been of major economic and security interest to India—as a top oil import source and a state allowing access to Central Asia (Gupta in Ganguly et al. 2016: 309). Finally, there is an assessment of future India–Middle East relations.

1 As the Modi Government was not discussed in earlier cases, it is worth noting an

administrative change it oversaw. Under Modi, the roles of the PM and EAM altered to further centralise foreign policymaking in the PM’s Office. Modi himself directed highlevel policy and made key decisions, while the EAM spent most of their time on foreign visits and consular work, including ensuring the welfare of India’s diaspora, especially migrant workers in the Middle East (Hall 2019: 15).

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Values’ Direct Influence on Middle East Policy The varying nature, but continuing strength, of Indian cultural values’ impact on foreign policy since independence is evident in relations with the Middle East. Before the early 1990s, India’s Congress Partydominated foreign policy and strategic culture was a mix of ‘Nehruvian’ idealism and Indira Gandhi’s realism. These approaches left legacies of thinking within the foreign policy establishment, particularly in the Indian Foreign Service (Nehru 1961). During the post-independence period from the 1940s up to the 1970s, this was expressed through Nehru and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser founding and leading the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). NAM’s ideology grew largely out of India’s nonviolent independence movement and prioritised the peaceful resolution of international disputes. The movement maintained a pluralistic character. This aligned with India’s pluralistic approach to regime types, human rights standards and societal norms in the international realm. Concomitant with its values-driven support for NAM, India’s foreign policy elite supported the Arab nationalist struggle led by Egypt. While India leaned towards the secular socialistic republics over the pro-Western monarchies during the intra-regional ‘Arab Cold War’ of the 1950s and 1960s, Delhi still took a relatively unbiased position when compared with other major powers. After this Cold War ended, India’s position became even more neutral. Ranjit Gupta (2015b) (former Head of the MEA’s West Asia North Africa division, Ambassador to Yemen and Oman, and served in diplomatic posts in Egypt and Saudi Arabia) highlighted this neutrality principle stating that after the Nehru-Nasser era ‘we never took sides in any regional dispute’. Similarly, despite India’s fervent anticolonialism, distrust of the West, not voting for the Partition of Palestine, voting against Israel’s entry into the UN, and voting for Zionism to be condemned alongside racism, New Delhi subsequently recognised the Jewish state in 1950. With regard to Iran, values of tolerance and pluralism acted as an anchoring force to ensure relations did not swing too far in one direction or another following the toppling of Mosaddegh and the 1979 revolution. Joint Secretary for the West Asia and North Africa, Sandeep Kumar, stated that despite the sharp divisions in the Middle East, India sought to be ‘friends with all’. Values of pluralism and tolerance also underpinned India’s acceptance of the foreign relations of Middle Eastern states. For instance, Ambassador Gupta highlighted how India never protested Gulf States’ relations with Pakistan (2015b).

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As discussed earlier, following the 1990s economic crisis and consequent reforms, the end of the Cold War, and loss of Congress dominance, there was a slight alteration to how culture influenced the country’s approach to foreign policy. The rhetoric inspired by certain values reduced, though values still influenced discourse and state behaviour. Values like hierarchy maintained continuous influence, up to and during the Modi Administration (Basrur 2017: 9). The Middle East is located on the western edge of the Indian Ocean, what Delhi sees as its rightful sphere of influence, a right conferred by India’s deserved status as a great power. This continued alongside India’s strategic and economic interests in the Middle East growing, and becoming increasingly intertwined in the last decade. Former and current senior Indian diplomats handling relations with the Middle East, when pressed during interviews on the ultimate justification for many policy positions, revealed deep-seated values. ‘It is just the right way to behave’ stated Sanjay Singh (2015), former ambassador and Secretary East at the MEA. He added that India’s tolerance and pluralism internationally among other things stemmed from the country’s internal diversity and political and cultural ethos. One of the most important ways Indian cultural values impacted the country’s relations with the Middle East is through Delhi’s position on international military involvement in the region, often through humanitarian interventions. India, like many Western states is relatively democratic, pluralistic and liberal. As mentioned, however, Delhi was one of the leaders of the ‘pro-sovereignty/anti-intervention’ bloc of states (which contained most Middle East states as well). MEA Joint Secretary, West Asia and North Africa, Sandeep Kumar (2015b), stated ‘We don’t like military intervention, we don’t advocate that. We want peaceful solutions in Libya and Yemen’. He added that India took a stance based on principles of non-interference with regard to interventions in Iraq, Libya and Syria. Any diversion from this could be deemed hypocritical, given how ingrained and long-touted the principle of non-interference is in India’s foreign policy tradition (Pant 2016: 75−76). ‘We will accept what the people of those countries want’ (Kumar 2015b). These he argued helped India maintain good relationships with all states including Saudi Arabia and Iran, Israel and Palestine (ibid.; Wheeler 2000: 11−12). Engagement with regional powers has consistently featured as Delhi’s primary approach, including during the Arab Spring (Pant 2016: 76).

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As discussed, this is the result of cultural values, in addition to other factors. Non-violence has a significant impact. Former ambassador Gupta stated that India is averse to becoming overt player in the Middle Eastern geopolitics because the region is ‘engulfed in violence’. In contrast to ‘Western type solutions’, he added, ‘our solutions are always about sitting across the conference table’. This is combined with collectivist thinking. ‘Community’ has been listed as a moral value which helps predict foreign policy preferences (Rathbun 2007). India focuses more on groups and peoples than on individuals (in contrast to the West) because Indian culture is less individualistic and more collectivist and communitarian (Pandey 2004), leading to a prioritisation of interstate peace. Given some Middle Eastern governments face greater threat of foreign intervention by extra-regional and regional powers than do governments in almost any other region, India’s position on intervention helped strengthen its image in several states. While regime change in the Middle East often results in sharp realignment of bilateral relationships, relations with India remained steadier than with other Great Powers. Furthermore, Middle Eastern states and the West often differ on the application of pluralistic and tolerance-driven policies domestically, most notably in the form of human rights of the civil and political variety. As mentioned earlier, India applies values of pluralism and tolerance to the international system of states, accepting different regime types, political, social and economic systems. This meant Delhi, despite largely adhering to these rights domestically like the West, often opposed enforcing them in other countries. For most Middle Eastern states, this enhanced India’s credibility and value as a partner. Table 5.1 illustrates how the aforementioned cultural values have influenced India’s approach to various interventions in the Middle East over the last few decades. It re-arranges information found in the HI case study to include only those interventions related to the Middle East. Columns 2−4 indicate the values and whether they drove or allowed a particular P&P to be held by Indian leaders. ‘Drives’ implies a strong influence, while ‘allows’ means that the value only helped facilitate the preference/perception. For instance, regarding the Iraq 1991 invasion, the value of non-violence drove the preference for international peace. This in turn influenced India’s position on the conflict, indicated in column 6.

Iraq 2003

Drives

Iraq 1991

Allows

Allows

Drives

Drives

Drives

Drives

Hierarchy

Drives

Drives

Pluralism and tolerance

Drives

Drives

Drives

Drives

Drives

Non-violence

Cultural values and Middle East interventions

Intervention

Table 5.1

Preference for international peace, including the peaceful resolution of conflict Preference for caution in using force and for using it as a last resort/Perception that force would not likely work Preference for supporting sovereignty Perception that India was so powerful that it had little to fear from unwanted HI Preference for international peace, including the peaceful resolution of conflict Preference for caution in using force and for using it as a last resort/Perception that force would not likely work Preference for supporting sovereignty Preferences for UN/multilateral/legal authorisation/control Preference for accepting all regime types

Preferences or perceptions resulting from cultural values

Opposed invasion and rejected US request for peacekeepers

Officially neutral. Political parties protested and stopped refuelling of US jets in India

India’s position

264 K. PETHIYAGODA

Drives

Drives

Iran

Libya

Drives Drives

Non-violence

Intervention

Drives

Drives

Pluralism and tolerance

Drives

Allows

Drives

Hierarchy

Preference for intrastate peace Preference for caution in using force and for using it as a last resort/Perception that force would not likely work

Preference for supporting sovereignty

Preference for maintaining a pluralist and tolerant image Perception that India must present its views and lead on principle due to its status Preference for not supporting strong states to dominate weak states Perception that India was so powerful that it had little to fear from unwanted HI Preference for peaceful resolution of conflicta Preference for peaceful resolution of conflict

Preferences or perceptions resulting from cultural values

(continued)

Supported nuclear dispute being resolved peacefully Support for terrorism-related issues to be resolved peacefully (e.g. Singh 2004) Abstained from voting on no-fly zone. Criticised NATO’s ‘overreach’ subsequently

India’s position

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Syria

Intervention

Table 5.1

Drives

Drives

Drives Drives

Drives

Allows/Drives

Drives

Drives

Drives

Allows

Allows

Drives

Allows/Drives

Allows

Drives

Drives

Drives

Allows

Drives

Drives

Hierarchy

Pluralism and tolerance

Non-violence

(continued)

Preference for supporting sovereignty Preferences for UN/multilateral/legal authorisation/control Preference for accepting all regime types Preference for regional interventions Preference to support R2P’s Pillar 1 Preference to support R2P’s Pillar 2 Preference to oppose R2P’s Pillar 3 Perception that India was so powerful that it had little to fear from unwanted HI Preference for international peace, including the peaceful resolution of conflict Preference for intrastate peace Preference for caution in using force and for using it as a last resort/Perception that force would not likely work

Preferences or perceptions resulting from cultural values

Opposed intervention. Supported political solution

India’s position

266 K. PETHIYAGODA

Drives Drives

Drives

Drives

Allows/Drives Allows/Drives Drives

Drives

Drives

Drives

Drives

Drives

Pluralism and tolerance

Non-violence

Drives

Allows

Allows

Allows

Hierarchy Preference for supporting sovereignty Preferences for UN/multilateral/legal authorisation/control Preference for caution in condemning the behaviour of other states within their borders Preference for regional interventions Preference to support R2P’s Pillar 1 Preference to support R2P’s Pillar 2 Preference to oppose R2P’s Pillar 3 Perception that India was so powerful that it had little to fear from unwanted HI

Preferences or perceptions resulting from cultural values

a India’s rhetoric at important forums like the UN is drenched with statements reflecting non-violence

Intervention

India’s position

5 RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST

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Influence via Major Identities Values also help underpin India’s multiple national identities thereby providing another avenue through which culture influences policy. Values, both subconsciously and consciously impact leaders’ views on how India differs from the external world, i.e. its identity. This is partly the product of leaders’ perceptions of what the public feel. These ideas of difference mark the contours of the various conceptions of India’s national identity. Similarly, Middle Eastern states and regional non-state actors’ policies have been found to be influenced by values and identity. Among the multiple national identities leaders and the public graft onto the Indian nation-state, several streams have particular relevance to Middle East policy. Nehruvian Identity One stream is constituted by a set of views delineated by the dominant strands of the independence movement and by Gandhi, and carried into the post-independence period by Nehru. This national identity is coloured by the cultural values of tolerance, pluralism and non-violence. These values had a relatively subconscious, or at least not highly articulated, impact on the identity constructs featured in Gandhi-Nehru foreign policy. While the Nehruvian identity has been challenged in domestic politics since the 90s, in terms of Middle East policy, its legacy is evident from the continuing influence of values. Congress has been more enthusiastic than the BJP in promoting this form of identity. Throughout the Nehruvian period, in addition to support for Arab nationalist secular regimes, Delhi also identified with them. This was significantly underpinned by Third World Solidarity as manifested in NAM. The Indian state and Indian officials interviewed refer to the region as West Asia, simultaneously signalling commonality with the region and defiance of the Eurocentric worldview that the term ‘Middle East’ reflects. The Indo-Egyptian NAM friendship under Nehru and Nasser laid the groundwork for pro-Arab policies. It created a prism for viewing the region that lasted up to the 90s. Ambassador Ranjit Gupta stated that Iraq and Syria were also considered among India’s best friends. Parts of this identity have survived post-90s, as is evident in Delhi’s wariness of external attempts to topple Hussein in Iraq, Gaddafi in Libya, and Assad in Syria. It has also underpinned the resistance which Ambassador Gupta

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recounted had come from some quarters of India’s foreign policy establishment against Western sanctions on Iran over the country’s nuclear programme (Gupta, interview with author 2017). Economic interests in maintaining trade with Tehran were provided ideological and moral sanction by an identity coloured by Third World Solidarity. Islamic Identity The rhetoric of Indo-Middle Eastern relations is of course overflowing with references to shared culture and history. While analysts may dismiss this as diplomatic niceties, the shared Indo-Middle Eastern cultural identity may act, to some degree, as a driver of relations. Pan-Islamic identity, potentially held by up to 170 million Muslim Indians, roughly 14% of the population and India’s largest minority, necessitates consideration by leaders. This identity has in the past influenced Congress policy towards the Middle East more than it has the BJP through its reliance on Muslim votes. Congress, however, has in some ways been more restrained than the BJP by fears of losing Hindu votes due to being seen to ‘pander’ to the Muslim minority. The BJP may have more leeway to comply with policy preferences inspired by Indian Muslims’ identity given the BJP base lacks the option of defecting to a more Right Wing party. Adding to this equation is the fact that in recent years, communal tensions and ignoring of Muslim sensitivities have proved to be an electoral liability for the BJP in certain regions (e.g. the 2015 loss in New Delhi), while it continued to act as an asset in other regions. The Party does, however, require grassroots activism to support its election campaigns, particularly given voting in India is not compulsory. This compounds BJP leaders’ own cultural identity’s impact, meaning a slightly overall negative net impact on the degree of influence of Indian Muslim identity on Middle East policy under the BJP. While Islamic identity is not a major component of India’s dominant national identity generally (due to Muslims being a minority and underrepresented among the elite), the World Values Survey Values Map reveals that India’s values are closer, in various ways, to those held by the Middle Eastern countries and the Islamic world more broadly, than other Great Powers: US, China and Russia. There is acknowledgement among leaders that India has a shared history with the Islamic world. Congress, BJP and the bureaucracy still refer to the Middle East region as ‘West Asia’ suggesting a familiarity with South Asia. Despite, acute public awareness

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of the hardships Indians suffered under Mughal rulers like Aurangzeb, there is also knowledge among both the Muslim communities and foreign policy elites that India had peaceful relations with Arabs before the Mughals (Wink 1990: 68). In 2005, Defence Minister Mukherjee mentioned ‘traditional linkages’ in the extended neighbourhood as a way of addressing the deficit in security decision-making. Islamic identity among Indian Muslims is also of relevance to Middle East policy as it is one of the main layers of identity held by India’s largest minority. Muslims constituted 14.88% of the Indian population according to the 2011 census, a 180 million strong community (Singh 2015). The Pan-Islamic (Telhami and Barnett 2002) nature of this identity has significant implications, ensuring Indian Muslims take a particular interest in the country’s relations with the Middle East. For instance, in 2012 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated ‘what goes on in Iraq, what goes on in Iran, it does worry a significant proportion of our population’. While Indian Muslims maintain a diverse range of positions with regard to the complex internal dynamics of the Middle East region and therefore hold varying views on India’s foreign policy towards it, on some issues, they largely hold homogenous views. For example, Indian Muslims may, almost without exception, support India strengthening ties with Middle Eastern countries more broadly, and supporting Palestine. It is on these matters that political leaders are most likely to be influenced by Indian Muslims’ pan-Islamic identity, rather than on issues like Syria and its complex web of sectarian and non-sectarian belligerents. Indian Muslims’ pan-Islamic identity influences Congress and BJP policy via numerous forces, each force pushing policy in a particular direction and often counteracting each other. Historically, Congress was seen as having established a constituency among India’s religious minorities, including Muslims by carrying on the Nehruvian secular legacy. Indian Muslims’ self-aware support for tolerance and pluralism at home and abroad is likely to have influenced their approval of the Nehruvian approach of favouring secular Arab regimes over theocratic monarchies. Hindutva In the last three decades the alternative mainstream Indian identity of Hindutva has risen to the national level. The Hindutva movement has significant implications for relations with the Middle East. Hindutva arose in part as a reaction to a history of foreign domination. A predominant

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focus is therefore the perceived remnants of this domination within Indian society today, namely non-indigenous religions, the largest of which is Islam.2 The Hindutva movement has been accused of attempting to subordinate non-indigenous religious and values within Indian national identity. India’s ‘history wars’ have seen an explosive debate over the historical roles of Islam and Hinduism. Historians like Romila Thapar have spoken out against what they deem the politicisation of history. Diaspora Identity Another key group of identities is that of the 7 million plus Indian nationals who live in the Middle East. Interviews with the diaspora in Qatar and UAE (2015), reveal an identity that is less religiously rigid than that held by Indians in India. This group consists of both Hindus and Muslims and hails largely from Southern Indian states where Hindu– Muslim conflict is relatively less. Kerala, which sends a disproportionately high number of workers to the Middle East is also one of the sites of the earliest interactions between Arabs and India. Kerala has a history of relatively peaceful Muslim–Hindu–Christian relations. This mixed and fluid sense of identity can act as a cultural bridge between India and the Middle East. On the other hand, certain aspects of the diaspora’s identity are more ethnically nationalist and antithetic towards Middle Eastern states due to the harsh treatment Indians have received while working in the region based on their ethnicity, irrespective of religion. This may change in future if Middle Eastern states respond to labour rights issues and support the up-skilling, training and education of workers with skills they can use upon returning to India. The diaspora’s identity and policy preferences related to it could significantly impact leaders in Delhi given their importance to the economy. Indians in the Gulf States alone send home $40 billion in remittances annually. Beyond being an economic asset and essential source of foreign reserves for India, they are also politically important, particularly because they hail overwhelmingly from a handful of states giving them influence with certain state governments. This makes their security, and to some degree their welfare, a concern for governments in Delhi which rely on

2 Though ironically, the BJP has historically been more ‘pro-West’ than Congress, respite the most recent colonial conquest of India being under Britain.

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support from southern states where national-wide parties do not have as strong a presence, namely the BJP. Evidence of the political influence of this diaspora is witnessed in the increasing attention paid to them by the Indian Government. In 2004, India established a Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) and has spent substantial funds on it since then. The diaspora within the Persian Gulf region has been a key focal point of the Ministry.

Influence via Image India’s image in the region is strongly coloured by culture. Culture plays a comparatively central role in defining India’s image in comparison to other major powers due to Delhi lacking a history of political involvement in the modern Middle East. India has historically enjoyed an image of being tolerant, pluralistic and non-violent among the publics and governments of countries in the Middle East. Governments have consistently made statements to this effect as have the state-approved media, including the Arab language media suggesting these views are shared among the population and notrestricted to the elite. Former Ambassador to the region, Ranjit Gupta (2015b), said that although some Middle Eastern states are not democracies, they ‘admire India’s pluralism’ adding that India’s Muslims are seen to receive fair treatment. This was also reflected among the populations of the region, including in the Gulf where Gupta stated that India’s demonstration of its values had led to it having ‘among the best of reputations’ As a result, India was invited to send election monitors to Tunisia and Egypt. ‘We never offered them beforehand, we were asked’ (Gupta 2017). The former ambassador further added that ‘values were meant to be seen, not peddled’. Liberal Saudi columnist, Khalaf al-Harbi (2015), praised India’s culture of tolerance and pluralism and argued it remained ‘the oldest and most important school to teach tolerance and peaceful co-existence regardless of the religious, social, political or ethnical differences’. At the governmental level, the India–UAE Joint Statement following Modi’s visit highlighted parallels between India and the UAE as multicultural societies and highlighted the values of tolerance and peace as inherent in all religions (Press Information Bureau 2015).

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This is principally thanks to the role played by values in India’s foreign policy. India’s policy behaviour, including in relation to the interventions mentioned in the previous case study cemented this impression in the minds of the vast majority Middle Eastern publics and policymakers. Aside from Kashmir and altercations with Pakistan, Delhi is seen as a generally benign influence on the world. The values of tolerance and pluralism, and the P&Ps, they underpinned were particularly influential. For instance, GCC states see India as supporting sovereignty, stability, territorial integrity and non-interference (Gupta et al. 2013: 73). Sandeep Kumar (2015b) also made references to India’s support for sovereignty, non-interference and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Joint SecretaryGulf, Mridul Kumar (2015a), added that non-interference was India’s strength, that India was liked and held a good reputation as it was not given to stepping on toes or cajoling. Delhi’s policies thus far have led to it being viewed as neutral and trustworthy. Sandeep Kumar stated that ‘although there are divisions, we are friends with all’. The aforementioned Egyptian representative in India (2015b) stated that the country’s image in the Middle East was influenced positively by Delhi’s position of ‘being friends with everyone’. This image has remained for decades despite the significant Hindu– Muslim tensions the country has experienced. The preservation of India’s benign image in the Middle East despite this and despite the strength of the Pan-Islamic identity is evidence of the power of values-as-witnessedin-foreign policy as a determiner of image. Foreign policy has been found to be the key determiner of how publics in foreign countries judge a particular country and the values which appear to influence that foreign policy are of key importance. For instance, global polling of ‘soft power’, where the term is defined as how attractive a country is to foreign audiences, finds that while Russia is seen as having a corrupt government and discriminating against minorities, its overall ranking is still relatively high given a positive image regarding foreign policy (Portland Communications 2015). Leaders and publics in the Middle East still likely judge India largely through the prism of foreign affairs. In addition to Indian leaders feeling at least some shared sense of identity with the Middle East, the same is true for Middle Eastern leaders, publics and non-state actors. They are influenced by their own values and identity in their consideration of India. When the Syrian Government called for Delhi to play a role in resolving the Syrian conflict and supported India’s attendance at Geneva II, it cited cultural and historical

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ties (Gupta 2015a). An Indian MEA official stated that the invitation for India to attend was also due to Delhi’s credibility in the region, based on its record of non-interference. Countries in the Middle East are aware of the trade and immigration from Arabia, particularly Yemen, as well as Persia, prior to Islam, including in the first century AD along the coasts of Malabar and Sri Lanka, and then to the coast of Bengal (Wink 1990: 68). From the seventh to tenth centuries peoples from southern Gulf were settling in Gujarat (Sethi 2007). As far back as 629AD, one of the first mosques in the world was built in Kerala by an Arab trader (ibid). India’s hierarchy-driven affinity for fellow-ancient civilization Iran is reciprocated. The Tehran leadership’s views are reflected in its rhetoric. Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated during former PM Singh’s visit that “We are two friends and India and Iran are the cradle[s] of human civilisation” (Majumdar and Verma 2008). Middle Eastern impressions of India, particularly in Arab countries, are also anchored by the earlier discussed 7 million plus diaspora who have a reputation for peacefulness and tolerance.

Current BJP Government of Prime Minister Modi Throughout the post-Cold War era, India’s Middle East policy has seen little substantial alteration regardless of whether it was the BJP or Congress in power. Then, in 2014 India elected a government led by a Prime Minister more ‘culturally nationalist’ than any predecessor. PM Modi’s political pedigree is thoroughbred Hindutva. He arose from the RSS. Even within the BJP, Modi has long been considered one of the most zealous Hindutva supporters. His genuine faith in Hinduism is evinced by having spent five years living in an ashram as a sanyasi–– renouncing worldly interests (Kumar 2016). As a youth he had attempted to join several Hindu religious missions of the Ramakrishna Order, which had been founded by Swami Vivekananda, whom Modi sees as a personal inspiration and whose teachings he follows (Gandhi 2015). A culturally based identity has been central to his ideology and political success. His political persona interestingly represents simultaneously the nonpluralistic sentiments of the nationalistic Hindutva movement, and the religions it seeks to protect – which are distinctly pluralistic. Modi’s background also suggests he had bought into Hindutva’s reactionary approach towards Indian Muslims. He was Chief Minister of Gujarat when the state was embroiled in major riots, in which at least 1000 (mainly Muslims)

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died, and was accused of, at the very least, negligence. India’s traditional relative lack of a ‘grand strategy’ leaves foreign policy susceptible to shifts by governments including on the basis of varied interpretations of culture. All this led to apprehension over the impact of the Modi-BJP Government on Middle East relations. Modi’s election occurred during a period when the Middle East’s strategic importance to India was in ascendance. Energy security and energy as a national security interest, was indicated as a priority in the BJP manifesto (Gupta in Ganguly et al. 2016: 301−302). For this, the Middle East is essential, with India having the greatest dependence on Middle Eastern oil and gas of all Great Powers and Emerging Powers including Western countries, Russia and China. This is especially important given the development, growth, pro-business, pro-trade platform of the Modi Government. Direct Influence Under Modi Despite the rise of India’s most overtly cultural-nationalist PM, foreign policy continued on the same overall trajectory and fundamentals (Basrur 2017; Hall 2019: 147). While Modi is said to have rejected India’s ‘secular-establishment’, as described by BJP parliamentarian Swapan Dasgupta as the ‘ancien regime’ (2019: 98), his policy to the Middle East has, to a significant degree, continued to be influenced by the same values as his predecessors. Some even argue that Modi’s attempts to reinvent Indian foreign policy had largely failed (Hall 2019). Modi is said to have been constrained by India’s institutionalised foreign policy ideas (Miller and De Estrada 2017: 48). Core P&Ps remained the same as did the values which influenced them. This included the hierarchy-underpinned quest for status and maintenance of non-alignment (Hall 2019: 17), as well as the non-violence driven goal of friendly partnerships. The most striking example of continuity is perhaps the values of tolerance and pluralism. Modi’s domestic legacy and reputation outside the country has been the least pluralistic of any Indian leader. This has been born out most starkly in his relations with Muslims, suggesting implications for Middle East relations. Prior to his election, it was assumed by many that his populist domestic approach would translate to a populist foreign policy––one where a key component would be anti-pluralism (Destradi and Plagemann 2019). Domestic anti-pluralism, however, has not translated to any significant shift in the international realm, including

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in relation to the Middle East. These values continued to influence the preference for sovereignty and for caution in condemning the behaviour of other states within their borders. Interviews with officials following the Arab Spring indicated that pluralism and tolerance continued to have an impact. One official highlighted India’s friendly relations with Palestine and Israel, and with Saudi Arabia and Iran. They stated that India calls for political dialogue in Syria and peaceful solutions to conflicts in Libya and Yemen. ‘We do not export democracy’ he said. Non-interference was preferred. The MEA interviewees believed adhering to values in foreign policy served India’s interests. One value that has seen not only continuity but strengthening, is hierarchy. The preference for India rising in global status has, alongside strategic interests, motivated efforts to project strategic power towards the Middle East. This is because the region is considered India’s extended neighbourhood. This continues the approach of the previous BJP administration which launched in 2003 ‘a 20-year programme to become a world power whose influence is felt across the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf, and all of Asia’ (Janardhan 2013: 65). Since India’s maritime doctrine of April 2004, Delhi has considered its ‘legitimate area of interest’ stretching ‘from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca’ (Ministry of Defence 2004: 56). Similarly, ancient India’s Middle Eastern influence is where today’s Indian public sees their country’s destiny in future. A poll found that 94% of Indians felt that India should have the most powerful navy in the Indian Ocean. 89% thought that India should do more to lead cooperation with Indian Ocean countries (Medcalf 2013). These have contributed to greater strategic engagement in the region as described further down. With regard to hierarchy, Modi regularly talked about India’s destiny to lead on a range of international issues (Chaulia 2016). Even prior to becoming PM, as Chief Minister, he asked himself ‘can India become a superpower?’ answering ‘…yes. India can rise to be a very big power’ (ibid.). Within the context of the emerging world order and Asian Century, Modi believes it is time for India to ‘take its rightful place under the sun’ (ibid.). In the context India’s contemporaneous rise with China, he has cited the superiority of India’s democracy, young population, and judiciary as reasons why his country differed from Beijing. Investing significant prime ministerial time into diplomacy despite a lack of foreign policy experience prior to his election (ibid.), Modi was likely

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driven by the hierarchical worldview and a chance to spruik India’s greatness on the world stage. His ambitious personal leadership style, hosting enormous diaspora rallies in foreign countries, etc. is itself a representation of the greatness he believes India is destined for. In terms of the Middle East, hierarchy has continued its impact via strategic autonomy. Modi’s high-energy visits to Middle Eastern states has not been accompanied by an eagerness to sign up to choose a side in any of the Middle East’s conflicts. While India continued to progress its defence cooperation with the US under Modi, this was seen as a means to enhance its strategic autonomy (Pant and Joshi 2017: 146), rather than joining the Western ideological camp. Despite growing naval engagement with the US in the Indian Ocean, Delhi continues its tradition of abjuring the presence of foreign militaries in the world’s postcolonial states, particularly those in the Indian Ocean littoral, which includes parts of the Middle East (Mohan 2010: 143). Some highlighted that India still refrained from taking a ‘leadership role’ or ‘responsibility’. ‘Leadership role’, as it is defined by many pundits in this context, however, means aligning with one pole or the other, the West or Russia and China. The value of hierarchy acts against this, however, as in neither of these potential alliances would India be the senior partner. With regard to the preference for strategic autonomy in relation to the Middle East, we therefore see the value of hierarchy and strategic and economic interests converging in the direction they impact policy. Additionally, such alignment in the Middle East—a region where state sovereignty is regularly violated—would often require what India may consider interference and as such, against the value of tolerance. Instead, Delhi could be argued to have been leading by example as a Great Power, of maintaining friendships with all states, unlike the US and to a lesser extent Russia. Separately, hierarchy played a role in maintaining the perception that India was so powerful that it had little to fear from unwanted HI, as discussed in the earlier section. Syria Values were clearly evident in the Modi Government’s approach to the current most fundamental strategic issue in the Middle East. This is the contest between Great Powers, namely the US, Russia and China, played

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out in a regional conflict between Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran, manifested most acutely in the war in Syria. Under Modi, India continued policies and positions driven by P&Ps described in the humanitarian intervention and R2P (HI) case study. India’s agenda of maintaining and increasing its influence in Syria is driven by the hierarchy-driven preference for being an influential and leading power in its extended neighbourhood. Hierarchy also partially drove India’s objective to not be outdone by China in terms of leading, supporting and protecting small states of the Global South, particularly in this extended neighbourhood. Similarly, Delhi sees Syria as representing an ancient civilisation, like India, which is worthy of standing in the international hierarchy. The MEA page states that the countries share long-standing historical and cultural ties. On balance, these forces affected for a steadfast, though somewhat muted, opposition to foreign intervention to oust the government of Bashar al-Assad. In sharp contrast to all Western government and media rhetoric, the Indian MEA website speaks fondly of Damascus. The MEA highlights India’s diplomatic support for Syria at the UN Security Council (UNSC), stating that ‘Syria has deeply appreciated the support…from India and other members of BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa grouping] at the UNSC’ (MEA 2016a). The Syrian government sees India as a potentially influential, though quiet friend. Syria’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister visited India in January 2016, holding talks with the Indian leadership. There were even reports of Foreign Minister Muallem meeting with Prime Minister Modi (Pearson 2016). The optics of such meetings with India will be seen as a significant win by the Syrian government, given Delhi’s image throughout the region and the world as a non-violent/peaceful and tolerant/neutral country. Modi also held discussions with Syria’s Great Power backer, Russia. Delhi’s support for Moscow’s own intervention was reconcilable with its sovereignty preference given that it was in aid of, and at the invitation of, Syria’s sovereign government (Chaudhury 2015). The strength of values’ influence is clear with India maintaining this position despite intense pressure from the US to isolate the Syrian Government and Russia. It is also in spite of Modi’s own ideological affinity to the US and major efforts to ramp up relations. India again sacrificed strategic benefits in any quid pro quos from the Washington in order to oppose intervention. India will see it as a positive that its image of tolerance and non-violence will be strengthened by sitting in between two

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opposing international poles (the US and Russia) regarding the conflict with itself at neither extreme. The US would likely have viewed India’s position as a significant negative to its objectives in Syria. Evidence of the strength of India’s opposition to intervention and the significance of India’s position to the geopolitics of the conflict is seen in the Syrian government’s own behaviour and rhetoric regarding India’s position. Damascus supported India’s attendance at the Geneva II dialogue on the conflict. Syria sees India as an influential friend. Syria’s ambassador to India stated that ‘India is in a rare position where it has good relations with both Syria and the big world powers, and so it can really help’ (Kasturi 2015). This image enables India, with otherwise little strategic influence over the key actors, to have, an albeit limited, impact on peace efforts. If it were to become involved in any mediation, Delhi could employ substantial soft power due to its long-standing trusted, positive, benign reputation among almost all sides of the conflict regionally and globally. Saudi Arabia The direct influence of cultural values is also evident in multiple visits exchanged between Modi and his Gulf State counterparts. In relation to Saudi Arabia, the two countries’ Joint Statement alone included seven statements reflecting P&Ps driven by cultural values (Press Information Bureau 2016). This includes values of tolerance, pluralism, non-violence and hierarchy. For instance, the Joint Statement says ‘The two leaders welcomed exchanges…to promote values of peace, tolerance, inclusiveness and welfare, inherent in all religions’. The pluralism-driven preference for accepting all regime types and the non-violence-driven preference for international peace were evident in the statement: ‘A broad approach of humanism and tolerance and a conviction that faith should unite rather than divide can be a positive factor in international relations’. The preference for multilateral/UN control of interventions was also reflected in the Joint Statement. UAE Modi also visited the UAE and signed a Joint Statement reflecting P&Ps underpinned by values of non-violence, pluralism, tolerance and hierarchy. Around four statements reflected this. It advocated promoting ‘the values of peace, tolerance, inclusiveness and welfare that is inherent in all religions’. The Joint Statement called explicitly for supporting ‘efforts for

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peaceful resolution of conflicts and promote adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the conduct of relations between nations and settlement of disputes’. It called on ‘all nations to fully respect and sincerely implement their commitments to resolve disputes bilaterally and peacefully, without resorting to violence…’. These reflected not only India and UAE’s joint position, but also likely the policy preferences India would be keen to influence the UAE to adopt. The hierarchy-driven preference for India to rise in global status was reflected in the statement ‘The overwhelming global response to the International Day of Yoga was a reflection of global community’s ability to come together to seek a peaceful, more balanced, healthier and sustainable future for the world’. Identity While the current government is informed by several streams of thinking, including realist and liberal/trade-focused with regard to policy when it comes to the Middle East, Hindutva identity is of significance. In line with the hierarchical worldview and the perception that India is a great civilization that should be recognised on the world stage, PM Modi has sought to foreground Hindu and broader dharmic identity within foreign policy. The approach of elevating overt symbols of Indian culture under earlier BJP governments continued and accelerated under the current PM. Rao (2018: 167) contrasts Modi’s ‘selfie nationalism’, with Mohandas Gandhi’s earlier advocacy of ‘spiritual nationalism’. Modi’s symbolism included recasting the language of foreign policy in Hindutva terminology (Hall 2019: 17, 148). Prior to the Modi Administration’s election, it was anticipated that Hindutva identity entering foreign affairs could have negative implications for Middle East relations. Communalism is a larger political issue in India than in comparable major powers. It was thought that leaders making Middle East policy in the Modi Government would be wary of criticisms by a nationalist base that they were pandering to a Muslim minority whose loyalties lie more with the Middle East than India. In terms of foreign policy, however, the Modi Government has largely refuted these predictions by seeking to boost relationships with Muslim-majority Middle Eastern countries, though certain domestic policies have begun to gain negative attention in the Middle East (see Future section). Modi has even harnessed cultural identity as a tool in achieving other culture-driven

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and non-culture-driven objectives in the Middle East. The PM has prioritised soft power and cultural influence within foreign policy reflecting his approach in East, Southeast and South Asia. Israel One predictable result of identity influencing the BJP’s Middle East policy was Modi bringing ties with Tel Aviv out of the closet. This is in line with the long identification with Israel and its people held by the Hindutva movement, BJP base and BJP politicians. Modi’s confidence in increasing proximity to Israel is also due to the affinity felt by India’s population more broadly. A 2009 study commissioned by the Israeli Foreign Ministry claimed that India’s population had the most sympathy for Israel out of all major powers, including the US (Eichner 2009). The support for Israel is in part due to Hindutva’s reaction to Islam. Supporters believe India and Israel, Hindus and Jews, face a common threat from extremist Islam. Beyond this, however, identification with Israel among India’s leaders and public is also driven by cultural values. Both cultures value education and a respect for science, something accentuated among the respective diasporas overseas and acknowledged by both countries’ PMs. Indians have been ranked as the most educationally advanced and economically successful minority within America, a stereotype long associated with Jews (Richwine 2009). The Indian diaspora and Jews interact as two of the most successful minorities in the US, both being over-represented in places like Silicon Valley. This has helped facilitate significant policy changes, at least in the early years of Modi’s rule. While India has been buying Israeli arms for over a decade, under Congress, the relationship was kept discreet. In contrast, Modi held the first Prime Ministerial-level meeting in 10 years on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in 2014. Israeli PM Netanyahu’s comments on the meeting were coloured with cultural identity references. He stated the two men were from ‘some of the oldest civilizations on earth’ and are ‘two democracies, proud of our tradition’ (Mitra 2014). An Israeli representative in India (2015) suggested that while diplomats follow pragmatic national interests with regard to bilateral relations, Israeli and Indian leaders have also been influenced by history, culture and a sense of civilizational destiny. In 2017, Modi was the first Indian PM ever to visit Israel. India’s image of being a world power that takes a tolerant approach to foreign countries and is respected by many states in the developing world will have given Israel added incentives to push for

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the visit, and ensured its gratitude in the long-term. Maintaining such an image is also what had permitted India to undertake the visit without fear of significant blowback from Israel’s adversaries. Also supportive of Israel is the pro-BJP Indian diaspora in the West, particularly the US. This middle-class community holds an identity defined more by culture than by the Indian national identity forged by Nehru and Gandhi (Pethiyagoda 2014). Indian lobbies in the US, such as US–India Political Action Committee, have worked with and learned from, the Israeli lobby. The American Jewish Committee has set up an office in India. Part of the justification offered for this cooperation is common values (Tillin 2003). Arab States Despite Modi’s and the BJP’s cultural-nationalist identity, the PM has made significant efforts towards strengthening India’s ties with Muslim states in the Middle East (see Advances in Relations Section). Cultural identity has been harnessed as a unifier, rather than a divider. This is partly motivated by significant and growing strategic and economic interests. The Joint Statements following Modi’s high-profile trips to Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar reflect shared cultural identity as a driver of closer relations (Press Information Bureau 2016). The India– Saudi Arabia Joint Statement included four statements of relevance. It said ‘The two leaders underlined the close and friendly bilateral ties, deeprooted in shared history…’. It added that ‘India and Saudi Arabia have shared civilizational ties over history that are enriched by the movement of goods, peoples and ideas. They believed that this common heritage can be drawn upon to strengthen their convergence on approaching contemporary challenges’. Shared Islamic identity among Indian and Saudi Muslims was also alluded to. In the UAE, Modi visited the Grand Mosque and hailed ‘the peace, harmony inherent in Islam’ (Manoj 2015). Delhi was able to draw on the shared sense of cultural identity when strengthening ties with Arab states. In addition to the shared Islamic heritage, India and Arab states have similar historical experience with the former having been ruled by the Mughals who had Turko-Mongol ancestry while the latter was ruled by the Turkish Ottomans. Both India and Arabia engaged in struggles to overthrow this domination. Indian and Arab groups experienced some support from the British in these struggles, only to be ruled by them subsequently.

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Modi’s high-profile trips to Saudi Arabia, Iran, United Arab Emirates and Qatar and the Joint Statements following them reflect cultural identity being used as a justifier and facilitator of closer relations. The India–UAE Joint Statement sought to justify closer ties stating ‘India and UAE were shining examples of open and multicultural societies, which should work together to promote these values for a peaceful and inclusive global community’ (MEA 2015). In thanking UAE for its allotting of land for the construction of a Hindu temple, Modi further justified ties with the Muslim country to his culturally nationalist base. Syria India’s position on the region’s currently most geopolitically important conflict—Syria—may also have been influenced by shared cultural identities. The MEA website states that the two countries share longstanding historical and cultural ties, colonial experience, a secular nationalist orientation, membership of NAM and similar perceptions on many international and regional issues (MEA 2016a). Image At least up until recently, under the Modi Government, India’s image in the Middle East has remained coloured by values of tolerance, pluralism and non-violence. The PM had sought to build an image of tolerance, including with regard to Islam. This is evident in his high-profile UAE trip, where he visited the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque and hailed ‘the peace [and] harmony inherent in Islam’. India’s image is reflected in the eyes of foreign ministries across disparate Arab states. Discussions with officials from relatively secular republic, Egypt (2015), and religious monarchy Qatar (2015), both revealed impressions of India coloured by pluralism and tolerance. Discussions with an Egyptian representative in New Delhi revealed that India is still seen positively by Middle Eastern states. On the question of Indian Muslims, the representative said that the PM’s development agenda would not leave anyone out. India’s image also crossed geopolitical loyalties. In addition to the aforementioned pro-Western states, countries with frosty relations with the West like Syria also professed positive views of India’s pluralism and tolerance-driven non-interference policies (Indian Express 2015). As mentioned, according to Syria, India’s benign, pluralistic, non-violent image has placed it in a ‘rare’ position among major powers to mediate

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the Syrian conflict (Pethiyagoda 2016; Subramanian 2016). In Iraq, the goodwill towards India among Sunnis, a legacy of the Saddam-era still plays a role in Iraq in the context of freeing hostages kidnapped by IS militants (Subramanian 2014). The maintenance of this image may be partly due to the fact that when graduating from Gujarat to national politics, Modi began to reform his image and move closer to the middle of the ideological spectrum. This trend was furthered following communalist comments by other BJP leaders contributing to a significant election loss in Delhi. The Prime Minister had sought to build an image of tolerance, including regarding Islam. Domestically he met with Muslim leaders and expressed confidence that Indian Muslims would live and die for India, and that Al Qaeda would be ‘delusional’ to expect their support (The Indian Express, 17 August, 2015; The Hindu, 7 April, 2015). Modi’s efforts to change were likely motivated by an attempt to imbue prominent Indian values of tolerance and pluralism into his approach to governance, as well as some combination of seeking to: broaden his political base and reassure non-Hindutva voters; and maintain India’s tolerant international image including among Muslim countries. As well as being an end in itself, as mentioned, such an image can also bring benefits, including for strategic, security and economic interests. For instance, Indians working in volatile regions are vulnerable to kidnap by extremists and unlike other major or regional powers, as India does not have a significant ground security presence in the Middle East. In the past, major conflicts have resulted in costly airlifts. India’s tolerant image, therefore, plays a significant role in maintaining their safety. The more recent altering of this image is discussed in the ‘Future’ section.

Advances in Relations Cultural values, either by way of direct influence upon foreign policy, via identity, or by image, have assisted and helped drive significant advances in India’s engagement with the Middle East. Cultural values interact with several other factors resulting in a net increase in Indian involvement in the region, in an accelerating trend. These factors include: the growing multipolarity of the Middle East with China and Russia having a greater strategic footprint; a loss of trust in the US by Gulf States and Washington’s pivot to Asia; the weakening of states throughout the

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Middle East relative to non-state forces; and India’s growing energy needs (Pethiyagoda 2017).

Iran: A Special Case3 Iran deserves particular attention because culture and cultural values have played a somewhat unique role in its ties with India. In some cases this has occurred by directly motivating leaders and policymakers to strengthen ties with Iran. On other occasions, culture and values have helped leaders to justify and rationalise relations to the public; relations which may have been driven by other interests including: strategic and security interests in developing connectivity and balancing Pakistan and China; and economic interests in energy trade and access to Central Asia. Leaders felt the need to use culture to justify relations due to a perception it was politically popular. Hierarchy and Shared Identity These perceptions and preferences (P&Ps) have been influenced by the value of hierarchy, alongside shared cultural identity. These two cultural forces have interacted, shaping and accentuating each other in their impact upon P&Ps. Delhi’s leaders are driven to strengthen and promote ties with Iran, due to the hierarchy-driven perception that India deserves high status internationally. They perceive that, as a state sharing ancient cultural heritage and of similar civilizational age to India, Iran is also worthy of high standing in the international hierarchy of states. Within leaders’ hierarchical worldview, two of the signifiers of status in the present-day international hierarchy are ‘civilizational greatness’ and, ‘civilizational age’ (contributing to greatness) both areas in which Iran is respected. Leaders feel both states encompass entire civilizations, civilizations which are deeply linked. This shared identity is influenced by civilizational, religious, societal and people to people links. Both Indian leaders and the public feel a sense of shared civilizational identity with Iran more than any other country outside of the subcontinent. Furthermore, more-so than with Arab countries, India and Iran’s 3 This section draws on: Pethiyagoda, K., 2018, ‘India’s Pursuit of Strategic and Economic Interests in Iran’, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, no. 23, September.

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historical basis for touting a shared identity predates Islam and connects to ancient Hindu history––appealing to broader Hindu society. India–Iran relations stretch back to the Indus Valley civilization which interacted with neighbouring Persia (Smith 1920). The emotional yolk and distinctness of Indo-Iranian identity ties, was seeded later around the second millennium BC, when Indo-Aryan speaking tribes from Central Asia migrated or invaded and settled in both geographic regions (Embassy of India in Iran 2017; Goud and Mookherjee 2014). Contemporary India’s cultural affinity to Iran is intensified by the importance to Indian identity of this historical period being the time the two civilizations were most intertwined (Cohen 2001: 9; Eraly 2005; Basham 2004; Allen 2012). The ancient Aryan tribes contained the common roots underpinning Hinduism and the indigenous Iranian religion of Zoroastrianism. In fact, contemporary understanding of Zoroastrianism has been furthered by observation of Hindu religious concepts, norms and rituals. The terms for benevolent and malevolent deities within Zoroastrianism are mirrored and reversed in Hinduism. The two religions also shared gods. For instance, Hinduism’s Indra and Zoroastrianism’s Mithra are almost identical (Nigosian 1993: 18−19). From the Indo-Aryans that North India and Iran draw similar linguistic, genetic and ethnic roots (Eraly 2005). The languages of Avesta (old Persian) and Vedic Sanskrit shared vocabulary and grammar. Urdu, the language most associated with Indian Muslims, developed under the influence of Persian and Arabic (Rahman 2011). Indian Sunnis still use phrases from Persian. Gupta (2017) argues that this adds to the shared sense of identity Indian Muslims hold with Iran. India’s most common indigenous language, Hindi, also shares words with Farsi. India was said to have preserved some of the linguistic usages that Iran had lost in history (The Hindu, 20 November 2016). Millennia later, India saw a new wave of invasions under the Mughals who strengthened the Persian culture in India (Canfield 1991: 20). Persian-speaking migrants were attracted by ‘long-standing close trade relations’ and as participants in military expeditions (Nigosian 1993: 42). Persian speakers from the Iran region were among the major ethnic groups represented among ruling elites, bureaucrats, and religious leaders under the Mughals, having considerable influence on Indian politics, economy and society (Haneda 1997: 129−143). Ali’s (1985: xx−xxi)

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compilation of tables containing the ethnic composition of ranking officials in the Mughal Empire found that, in most cases, Iranian officials formed the largest of all the ethnic groups throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Richards 2012). Mughal culture continues to influence India. While the Mughal legacy has been exploited by communalist groups to stoke anti-Muslim sentiment for political gain, the negative conceptions of the Mughals and Islam among followers of these groups are generally more associated with Pakistan than Iran. India still maintains significant people-to-people ties with Iran which further influence identity among the population (Baru 2017). Millennia after the Indo-Aryans, Persians are said to have settled in India. In the eighth and ninth centuries, Zoroastrians fled Persia for Western India following Islam’s entry (Williams 2009). They formed the Parsi community which has historically occupied an influential position in Indian society. During the colonial period, they acted as mediators between Western powers and India (Nigosian 1993: 44). Despite its small and diminishing population, the community’s societal position remains disproportionately influential (Baru 2017). Parsees are known for being wealthy, educated and working together as a community (BBC News, 10 April 2017). Some of India’s biggest business empires are run by Parsees, such as Tata. Parsees are highly urbanised and prevalent in Gujarat, Prime Minister Modi’s home state. The BJP Government’s Minister for Textiles, Smriti Zubin Irani, for instance, is married to a Parsee and took on his name. Influence on Foreign Policy Hierarchy and shared cultural identity impact the preferences and perceptions of leaders and policymakers. Firstly, it creates a genuine preference for positive ties with Iran based on cultural affinity. Interviews with several former Indian officials from Cabinet offices, the MEA, and military, reveal a cultural affinity with Iran. Various former senior Indian diplomats stated that in India ‘no two nations are as similar’ (something echoed by prominent political leaders) (Former Indian officials from the MEA, Cabinet Offices and Military 2017). Ambassador Gupta (2017) stated that diplomats within India’s influential MEA align with the thinking public in holding a positive perception of Iran based on cultural connections. With regard to the influence of cultural ties with Iran, Gupta stated ‘it’s not simply rhetoric, it’s reality’. A former senior Indian official felt that Iran had a ‘considerable impact on Indian culture, especially through the

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Mughals’ and that many Indians admired Persian civilization. One former diplomat stated that much of Indian culture was borrowed from Persia. Former Advisor to PM Singh, Sanjaya Baru (2017), believed India’s relationship with Iran was significantly influenced by culture. In fact, Iran’s encompassing of an entire civilization, like India, was the ‘starting point’ of ties. A former Indian Navy Admiral (2017), stated that cultural ties to Iran have a significant influence on Indian military and Foreign Service personnel. The two states’ ancient ties were said to ‘transcend geopolitical paradigms’. Former defence officials (2017) stated that civilizational links helped cement ties that are underpinned by strategic interests. This sense of shared identity and affinity was said to impact the day-to-day interactions of Indian diplomats with their Iranian counterparts. Former Senior Indian Official dealing with Iran stated that this contributed to ‘a basic empathy for one’s interlocutor during negotiations’ (2017). ‘We generally understand where they come from; we don’t see them as different from us or foreign’. This was said to underline the ability of the two sides to ensure there was no permanent damage due to disagreements. Secondly, even in cases where the sense of cultural identity is not genuinely held by leaders, or where it does not genuinely directly motivate them to enhance ties with Iran, it still plays a role in indirectly supporting closer ties. Shared cultural identity provides governments a justification for pursuing ties which they can sell or rationalise to the domestic public and foreign audiences—thereby serving, respectively, leaders’ political and strategic interests. For foreign audiences, cultural identity can be touted as a nonthreatening driver of relations in a way security interests could not. Publicising these interests may harm India’s strategic objectives due to their sensitive nature. For domestic audiences, justifying ties with Iran based on culture, governments can appeal to the value of hierarchy among the public. Leaders and policymakers’ perceive that the public maintain a sense of shared cultural identity with Iran, impacting their political calculations when deciding on Iran policy, influencing for a preference for friendly India–Iran ties.4 This is accentuated by leaders perceiving that the Indian 4 For studies of public opinion influencing foreign policy: Rise-Kappen, T., 1991, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies’, World Politics 43, issue 4, July, pp. 479−512.

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public have a relatively high degree of awareness of their own country’s civilizational heritage. The perception in the minds of leaders and policymakers that the public feel a sense of shared identity with Iran is important in impacting Iran ties, regardless of whether the majority of the public actually feels shared identity. Similarly, leaders’ perception of the power or influence wielded by population groups who feel shared identity is relevant, independent of these population groups’ actual influence or power. Certain significant demographic segments are thought to have a particular belief in shared identity with Iran. This included the ‘attentive public’, i.e. those more interested in foreign affairs and therefore electorally relevant to political leaders in the context of making foreign policy. It also included key minority groups including Muslims and Parsis (Baru 2017; Gupta 2017). The Muslim population is particularly relevant given the BJP’s reliance upon them at the 2014 election, combined with the Modi’s fractious history with the group and present controversies over increasingly Hindu-nationalist policies. Friendly Iran ties also help appeal to those concerned by India’s growing strategic partnership with the US and increasingly open relations with Israel (Fair 2007: 260−261). Shared identity with Iran is finds particular expression in the significant Shiite Muslim community. India’s Shias represent a vote block that is concerned regarding government policy towards Iran and affects for pro Iran positions. While smaller than the Sunni community, the Shias, like the Parsees, are disproportionately influential, including at the political level. The community’s political significance is enhanced by it being more geographically concentrated than Sunnis and thereby more able to influence elections. Shias populate urban centres including Mumbai and Delhi. The community is also successful in business (Baru 2017). This perception was evidenced in interviews with former Indian officials from Cabinet offices, MEA, and military. A former senior Indian diplomat (2017) stated that in India ‘few foreign countries garner the same respect among the informed public’, and ‘when it comes to respect from the intellectual, academic and cultural community, few countries rival Iran’. A former senior MEA official (2017) stated a large number of Indians have a strongly positive image of Iran and admire Persian civilization. Former policymakers saw Shias as an influential minority, urbanised and centred in key cities (Baru 2017). Former officials (2017) stated that the civilizational connect was a stronger factor than sectarian divides,

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with Sunni Indian diplomats lacking any sectarian-based negative attitudes towards Iran. Through these avenues, culture and cultural values have shaped preferences within Prime Minister’s Government for positive relations with Iran. Former PM, Manmohan Singh (2004) stated that ‘our relations with Iran we relish a great deal. We have civilizational links’. Modi continued the approach of using ‘civilizational links’ to justify relations with Iran, which under Singh, had been asserted in the face of US pressure to isolate Tehran (Singh 2004). The MEA titled Modi’s 2016 visit to Iran ‘Civilisational Connect, Contemporary Context’. The Joint Statement from the visit contained several statements reflecting preferences and perceptions (P&Ps) underpinned by hierarchy, including references to both countries’ ‘vast civilizational heritage’. The MEA-produced ‘Iran Visit e-book’ (2016b) is drenched with cultural symbolism and rhetoric. It states that ‘In a world that talks about strategic convergence, India and Iran are two civilizations that celebrate the meeting of our great cultures’. During the signing ceremony for India’s development of Chabahar Port in Iran recently, both countries’ leaders proclaimed the partnership would ‘alter the course of history’ (Motevalli and Marlow 2016). Hierarchy also likely impacts PM Narendra Modi perceiving Chabahar as an avenue towards returning India to its high standing in Central Asia (ibid.). The priority of ties with Central Asia is itself influenced by the value of hierarchy and shared cultural identity. Modi’s approach has been to highlight, including via public diplomacy efforts, cultural ties and ancient India’s status as the centre from which Buddhist and other cultural trends radiated out to Central Asia (Singhal 1969; Ganguly et al. 2016: 361). For instance during an address in Uzbekistan, he stated that shared historical links can form the basis of present-day relations (Ganguly et al. 2016: 361). The Modi Government acted to further promote the awareness of cultural ties with Iran among the Indian public. This, if successful, creates a reinforcing loop where the government cultivates cultural affinity to Iran among the citizenry, an affinity which then influences present and future governments’ political calculations when dealing with Iran, leading to strengthening of ties. The PM’s 2016 visit to Iran was officially titled ‘The Iran Visit: Civilizational Connect, Contemporary Context’ and was replete with speeches centred on cultural links (MEA 2016b). A headline event during the visit was ‘India and Iran, Two Great Civilizations: Retrospect and Prospects’

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(ibid.). Modi (2016a) noted the ‘responsibility to familiarize our younger generations with the beauty and riches of our cultural heritage’. He urged the regaining of the ‘past glory’ of historical ties. The second-longest section of the visit’s Joint Statement (MEA 2016b) following dealt with initiatives to promote understanding and ‘cherish and preserve the shared cultural heritage of the two countries’. This included promoting Indology and Persian Studies. A Joint Working Group on tourism was said to be aimed at developing better and wider understanding of each other’s ‘vast civilisational heritage’. The visit included witnessing the signing of the India–Iran Cultural Exchange Programme and an MoU between the Indian Council for Cultural Relations and Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following Modi’s visit, he and his Iranian counterpart President Rouhani cited initiatives including organising an event highlighting India’s and Iran’s status as great civilizations, and the encouragement of scholars, media, artists and others from each country to participate in this and other events in each other’s country 9MEA (2016b). Pluralism and Tolerance Values of tolerance, pluralism and hierarchy have influenced India’s approach to Iran directly. Values helped steady relations following both the toppling of Mosaddegh in 1953 and the 1979 Islamic revolution Post-revolution, these values led to an Indian reluctance to condemn Iran on internal matters of human rights or democracy, unlike Western democracies have done, despite India itself being a Western-style democracy. Ambassador Gupta argued that non-interference, underpinned by tolerance and pluralism, was one of the three main principles of Indian foreign policy towards the Middle East. Highlighting that India was one of the few countries to hold long-time friendly ties with Iran, the Arab world and Israel simultaneously, Gupta (2017) stated ‘what countries do with other countries, is not our business’. PM Modi (2016b) has also stated that both Indian and Iranian civilizations had been known for their inclusive, welcoming nature and have contributed to the growth of tolerant societies globally, notwithstanding the present Iranian state’s authoritarian aspects. He cited Sufism, ‘a rich product’ of Indo-Iranian links and its message of tolerance, which is reflected within the Indian concept of the world being ‘one family’.

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Non-violence was also reflected with the Indian-Iranian joint statement including references to peace and stability in the region.

Future In future, cultural values may shape India’s relations with the Middle East in several ways. Modi’s success in pushing India further to the centre of the world stage has led to more attention being paid to the recent rise in intolerance inside the country. Domestic Indian policies with international impacts are seeing greater attention from the Middle East, most notably, the revoking of special status for Kashmir—a policy likely driven in part by hierarchical views of identity among leaders and leaders’ assumptions of similar views among the Indian public. The Citizenship Amendment Act also is an example of hierarchy-influenced cultural identity interacting with foreign relations. India offered a pathway to citizenship to those from neighbouring Muslim-majority states who were mainly of dharmic faiths, though it also included Christians. BJP parliamentarian Dasgupta (2019) articulates that India has an obligation to these peoples ‘left on the “wrong” side after Partition’. Modi’s Government believed that such attempts would grow national pride (Hall 2019: 148)—a goal worthy of pursuing for its own ends (demonstrating a direct influence of hierarchy) and something electorally beneficial because the public itself held a hierarchical worldview. Such developments are being broadcast to Middle Eastern audiences via global and regional media. Middle Eastern news sites publish reports of intolerant statements and actions by government ministers, authorities, those with connections to the BJP and broader Hindutva movement, and independent non-state actors; and communal violence (Madan 2016a; Madan 2016b). India’s tolerance and pluralism is being questioned in Middle Eastern media, mainly within the Arab world (Madhav 2016). The region has produced several notable editorials lamenting the perceived diminishing of Indian tolerance and pluralism (Almaeena 2016). The Saudi Gazette alone posted at least 13 articles on this topic in early 2016. What effect will this have? India’s reputation among non-state international actors in the form of extremist groups, such as the Taliban, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent and ISIS seems to have been harmed by recent events, though this was moving from an already low base due to extremists long-targetting India over Kashmir. These groups may now have greater recruiting power for actions against the Indian state.

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More importantly, whether the reported rise of intolerance against Muslims will significantly alter the general impression of India held by the Middle East’s masses and/or elites/leaders over the long-term, remains to be seen. It is likely that it will at least affect for a more complex, multifaceted image of India. For instance, the Organisation of Islamic Countries has called on India to protect its Muslim population domestically. It is also likely, however, that the aforementioned importance of foreign policy as a determiner of international image combined with an existing image ballasted by a history of non-violence, pluralism and tolerance in foreign affairs, will continue to yield buffer room for Modi. As discussed, India can also rely on a shared sense of cultural identity influencing Middle Eastern states and non-state actors to its benefit. External factors will play a role in shaping India’s culture-influenced image. The resurgence of bipolarity in the Middle East, characterised by Russia’s re-assertiveness and the Shiite-Sunni/Iran-Saudi conflict, will further increase India’s image of being non-violent, tolerant and pluralistic. Former ambassador Gupta stated that India’s continued preferred position would be one underpinned by non-violence—for the Saudis to have discussions with the Iranians (interview with author 2017). Also helping to reduce the negative impact of a tainted image is the fact that almost all Middle Eastern states have strategic and material interests in strengthening ties with India. These countries may themselves seek to use culture as a tool, appealing to India’s values and identity, seeking to neutralise culture as a liability and convert it into a positive. They may capitalise on the momentum of PM Modi’s recent visits to the region. To appeal to India’s pluralistic ethos, Middle Eastern states may follow the UAE and permit more Hindu temples within their borders, (while considering domestic public opinion). This will do invaluable benefit to their image within India. Another anchor, both for India’s image and for impact of cultural identity on Middle East policy, is provided by the Indian diaspora in the Middle East. They will likely continue to strengthen their influence on the Government’s policy towards the region during BJP rule. In addition to the BJP’s existing need to depend on state-based parties in the South, Modi has embarked on a policy of greater consultation with state governments on foreign policy matters. Soon after the BJP’s victory, External Affairs Minister (EAM) Swaraj held meetings with MPs from the South to discuss issues relating to the diaspora in the Gulf. The importance placed on the diaspora was also clear in the Government’s prioritisation of

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them symbolically and in policy discussions, during Modi’s visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Swaraj’s visit to UAE, Bahrain and Oman. The ‘main event’ of the PM’s UAE visit was an address to 50,000 expats in Dubai. The diaspora’s political salience is also evident in the allocation of the Overseas Indian Affairs portfolio to the EAM. Modi and EAM Swaraj held meetings with diaspora communities to discuss their treatment and have stated that the welfare of Indian expats, particularly in the Gulf, is a priority. If culture, values and identity influence Indian foreign policy under the BJP in a way that is seen by Middle Eastern states as inimical to their interests, they may try to emphasise their considerable importance to India’s material interests, strategic and economic. This may prove successful given the BJP was elected more for economic development than to enact a proHindutva foreign policy. For this, energy and remittances from the region are of course essential. Cultural values and their multifaceted influence on India’s foreign relations may affect for India wanting to, and being able to, have an (albeit limited) impact on peace and reconciliation efforts in the Middle East. Most importantly this could be in relation to the ongoing conflict between Western-backed Sunni states and their proxies and Russia backed Iran and its proxies. Values may work alongside strategic and economic interests to create the desire to play a role. The hierarchy-underpinned desire for influence in the region may compound the P&Ps driven by tolerance and pluralism, such as a preference to accept all regime types. The desire for international peace, underpinned by non-violence, will influence India to seek peace in the Middle East. Delhi’s ability to have an impact will be influenced by its image. India could employ its soft power when acting as mediator. Its image as a pluralistic, tolerant actor, which has enabled Delhi to maintain its aforementioned ‘rare position’ and strong ties with the major power nodes in the region: Iran, the Gulf States, Israel and other Arab countries. India is indeed exceptional in its ability to synthesise material and normative power resources like image within its foreign policy (Mukherjee in Pant 2019). In terms of the Syria conflict, this has accentuated India’s leverage with the Assad Government and with the Gulf States backing the opposition. India’s values-underpinned image also helps Delhi influence public

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opinion in Syria and globally––an important factor in this conflict. IndoSyrian solidarity through NAM may also evoke positive memories among the Syrian people. Relatedly, the strength of culture’s influence on India’s approach to Iran will be tested and further exposed with Trump Administration’s renewed hostility to Tehran changing the strategic and economic equation for India. The costs, in terms of Indo-US relations, of engagement with Iran will rise. Nevertheless, the shift of geopolitical power to Asia, and the growing presence of China in the region will create new incentives to build ties with Iran. Here Delhi may seek to utilise its cultural ties with Iran as an advantage over Beijing. Middle Eastern states may seek to learn from India’s experience of contending with sub-national identities post-independence. Domestically and regionally, India’s example could be drawn on as a country where religion and tradition is highly valued alongside pluralism and tolerance. This would provide benefits in itself, as well as bilaterally. Indian diplomats are usually keen to share their insights on applying values to policy. Working with India and through India as a broker would help supporting inter-cultural understanding with the West and the rest of Asia. India may also be drawn closer to Middle Eastern states should they tactfully recognise and employ the use of culture. Noting the role of identity, Middle Eastern states could take a coordinated approach to improving their image with relevant power nodes among India’s people, foreign policy establishment and political leadership. They may seek to separate their image as Islamic countries, from the hostility felt towards Pakistan. These strategies may be implemented at the macro-level through colouring public diplomacy campaigns. Values may be factored into messaging.

Conclusion After decades of relative strategic neglect of the region, India’s rise necessitates serious engagement in the Middle East. With the Middle East facing arguably greater challenges than at any time since its independence, it is clear both sides have significant stakes. Cultural values have clearly influenced Delhi’s relations with the region. This has been directly through a non-violent, pluralistic, tolerant and hierarchy-driven foreign policy, particularly with regard to humanitarian interventions. It has also occurred, particularly more recently, via values impact upon identity.

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Cultural values have played an anchor sorts in relations. While the election of a leader from the BJP’s Hindutva base was anticipated to disrupt relations with the Middle East, Modi undertook a substantial number of visits to Muslim Middle Eastern countries, seeking to strengthen ties with all. India’s tolerance of various regime types and preference for a pluralistic international environment continued unabated, underpinning friendships with Iran, Gulf States, Syria and Israel. More recently, culture has been a double-edged sword under the Modi Administration with identity-related domestic controversies catching the eye of publics and leaders in the Middle East. Whether the PM’s continuing of a pluralistic, tolerant and non-violent approach to the Middle East will outweigh domestic policies in the eyes of the region remains to be seen.

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CHAPTER 6

Conclusion: Extent and Nature of Values’ Influence in a Global Context

The central argument that cultural values have a significant influence on India’s foreign policy was confirmed by the three areas of investigation— nuclear policy (NP), humanitarian intervention and R2P (HI), and relations with the Middle East. This suggests that cultural values may exert influence across much of Indian foreign policy, and that values have significant explanatory power in international relations. In the realm of NP, values are likely to have had more of an impact on India than on any other declared, suspected or threshold nuclear weapons state. HI also witnessed the significant influence of cultural values, providing strong evidence that values’ influence is not restricted to NP. The value which stood out as the most influential across NP and HI was non-violence. Hierarchy was also found to be highly influential, particularly in NP. Tolerance and pluralism had a significant impact, though this was much greater in HI and Middle East Relations than in NP. Realist and Other Explanations Many of the dominant explanations for NP, HI and Middle East relations failed to provide comprehensive accounts of India’s behaviour. With regard to NP, strategic interests, domestic politics and bureaucratic pressures all failed to comprehensively explain India’s behaviour and discourse. Cultural values needed to be examined, including with regard to major decisions such as: Narasimha Rao’s decision to test weapons and © The Author(s) 2021 K. Pethiyagoda, Indian Foreign Policy and Cultural Values, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54696-0_6

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subsequent pullback; the BJP’s decision to test in 1998 and Congress’s decision to undertake the Indo-US Deal. Cultural values complemented realist explanations. In terms of HI and R2P, none of the examples of India’s approach could be understood by the current dominant explanations alone. Realist accounts argue India feared an international precedent being set for HI that could lead to, at worst foreign intervention in Kashmir. India’s size and strength, however—which is greater than all other developing states bar China—ensure that it is unlikely to be the recipient of an unwanted HI. India even has less to fear than China, in one sense, given that it is a democracy with a better international reputation for human rights. The lack of fear over Kashmir is particularly evident under Modi with the stripping of Kashmir of its limited autonomy. Liberal international norms (namely the growth of R2P), Third World solidarity and anti-colonialism, and being seen to adhere to international law, while providing some insight, cannot comprehensively account for India’s behaviour and rhetoric. Domestic politics and individual politicians’ views are largely discounted when looking at the consistency of Indian policy despite the numerous changes of PM over the period. Many instances in the investigations saw values having a stronger, or at least as significant, influence as material interests. In NP, HI and Middle East relations, at certain times, values trumped material interests in motivating leaders. This could be seen where values led to state behaviour and rhetoric that had a negative impact on material interests. With regard to NP, for instance, India’s decision to test in 1998, rooted to a significant degree in hierarchy, could be seen as harming strategic interests in terms of economic costs and increased the threat from China. Similarly, with regard to HI, India’s publicised opposition to military intervention in Kosovo, Iraq 2003, Libya and Syria came at the cost of important strategic interests by way of relations with the West. India’s behaviour and rhetoric disappointed Western powers. For instance, the US-Indo Nuclear Deal was done with Washington expecting India to support or contribute to its HI actions. Nuclear Policy In the last two decades, NP was consistently influenced by values—mainly hierarchy and non-violence. The importance of these two values relates to the intense symbolism of nuclear weapons. The two values contribute to

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the tension which characterises India’s NP—two often competing sets of preferences—anti-nuclear, leading to restraint and pro-nuclear, leading to nuclear advancement. Both anti and pro-nuclear viewpoints are deeply rooted in Indian values (Cohen 2001: 168). Perkovich (1999: 448) describes the two norms existing ‘uneasily’ together within the Indian national identity. In terms of discourse, of the 1221 statements in relation to NP found in Periods 2 and 3, 960 were, at least in part, driven by cultural values. Cultural values-influenced statements constituted the majority in all case studies. It is acknowledged that not all rhetoric is genuine, and as mentioned, some may be ‘instrumental’—aimed at achieving unstated interests. For non-violence, tolerance and pluralism, however, Delhi’s rhetoric, at the very least, demonstrates that India has devoted material resources (diplomatic effort and international ‘stage time’) to express cultural values-influenced P&Ps, and thereby project an image reflecting these values. In terms of state behaviour, non-violence and hierarchy had comparable influences. Non-violence was strong enough to restrict nuclear weapons to playing a largely symbolic role and stymie their incorporation into military strategy. However, the value could not prevent the development of the weapons themselves, non-violence being outweighed by the value of hierarchy combined with other drivers such as strategic interests. Within discourse, there were far more expressions of non-violence than hierarchy. During the BJP’s 1998–2004 rule, there were around 32 expressions of hierarchy-rooted P&Ps while there were around 181 expressions of non-violence-rooted P&Ps. Under Congress 2004–2011 the disparity was even greater with the numbers at 58 for hierarchy and 686 for non-violence. The level of influence of cultural values was consistently significant throughout the 1988–2014 period. Basrur (2001) states that despite shifts in leaders’ or parties’ preferences, ranging from explicit beliefs in nuclear deterrence and advocacy for nuclearisation (particularly under the BJP), to a strong antipathy for all things nuclear, actual policy remained within a fairly narrow range. Of course, there have been changes and evolution in the way cultural values influenced leaders’ P&Ps. This reflected the argument by Bajpai (2002: 245) that contemporary India has several competing strategic cultures. However, the cultural values influencing these strategic cultures

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have not changed, only the way the values are applied. By paying attention to changes, I sought to be mindful of what Nett (1958: 297) argues has been a lack of attention paid to ‘the role that degrees of conformity-deviation in the social structure play as an active ingredient in the dynamics of change’. Humanitarian Intervention and the R2P The level of influence cultural values have had throughout the period was broadly consistent. Throughout, India’s approach to each intervention was, in part, a factor of how the individual circumstances of the intervention either adhered or ran counter to, its values. The values that had the greatest direct impact on India’s approach to HI and R2P are non-violence, pluralism and tolerance. Hierarchy played a more facilitative role. Quantitative analysis proved particularly valuable in this case study through allowing for comparison of the P&Ps within India’s discourse to those of other states on the same occasion at the same forum, like a UNSC debate. This suggests that more quantitative comparisons with other states could have further strengthened the analysis. This could have been extended to NP as well. Middle East Relations The nature and level of cultural values’ influence on Middle East relations has varied under different governments, though has always been significant. While the role played by cultural values in influencing policy directly remained largely constant, since independence, values’ impact via identity increased under the current Modi Government. India’s image—coloured by non-violence, pluralism and tolerance—played an anchoring role in relations with the Middle East.

Comparison of Areas of Investigation The three investigations complemented each other. NP provided indepth analysis of India’s approach to actions under its own control, that is, nuclear behaviour and rhetoric. HI provided analysis of the country’s attitude towards the actions of others, that is, interventions undertaken/debated by other states, and international norms. Middle

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East relations revealed the roles played by cultural values directly and via image and identity in bilateral circumstances. Comparisons of the three investigations also reveal broad, overarching cultural value-driven P&Ps. Matching value-driven P&Ps from NP with a similar P&Ps influenced by the same value in HI or Middle East relations revealed broader P&Ps underpinning them both. These more general P&Ps are likely to be applicable and influential throughout all of Indian foreign policy, given: (1) their influence across the three disparate areas of NP, HI and Middle East relations and (2) specific reasons relating to each general P&P. These general P&Ps will be discussed under their respective values. Non-violence Within the discourse on NP, there were 867 statements found which reflected P&Ps driven by non-violence. In relation to HI there were 128 such statements found. All case study areas witnessed a consistent level of influence of non-violence. In NP, influence within the rhetoric never veered below a certain baseline. Non-violence ranged only from having a highly significant influence during Vajpayee, Rao and other governments, to being the overwhelmingly dominant influence during the Gandhi, Gujral and Manmohan Singh administrations. In HI, India’s support for intervention was consistently a product of the scale of the humanitarian need, minus the level of violence required to resolve it. NP, HI and Middle East relations also saw a consistently significant level of influence of non-violence throughout the period with regard to state behaviour. NP suggested that many commentators’ claims that the Pokhran II nuclear tests and BJP rule constituted a departure from non-violence, were somewhat exaggerated. The tests did little to change India’s reluctance to seriously engage with the idea of actually using nuclear weapons. Leaders were genuinely influenced by non-violence, and not only in terms of maintaining a non-violent image. This refuted realist claims with regard to NP that India’s non-violent rhetoric was due to its strategic weakness. The nature of non-violence’s influence, however, demonstrates a small difference between the areas of NP, HI and Middle East relations. With regard to NP, the nature of non-violence’s influence remained consistent throughout the period. In HI and Middle East policy, while the P&Ps influenced by non-violence stayed largely the same throughout most of

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the period, in the last few years there was a subtle change in India’s application of non-violence. While India’s primary concern remains violence between states, we can see a move towards being concerned about violence inside sovereign states as well. In part, this is the result of India’s engagement with R2P. This engagement itself was influenced by cultural values, however, as values determined which aspects of R2P India supported. India’s approach to HI also influenced its relations with the Middle East. Generally Applicable and Influential P&Ps Non-violence played a significant role in foreign policy whenever the use of force was an issue. It impacted three key general preferences. Firstly, there was a preference for global peace. Policymakers from Nehru to Modi’s enunciations of the concept reflect a preference for shaping the world through negotiations (Sidhu 2017). Writing in the post-independence period, Zinkin (1955: 183) states that what India values internationally includes, above all, peace. The peace preference was found in the dominant non-violence-driven P&Ps in NP, HI and Middle East relations. Within NP, this was the highly prevalent preference for global disarmament. In HI and Middle East policy, it was the dominant preference for maintaining international peace. This sits in line with interviews undertaken with Indian foreign policy officials, present and former (Various Indian officials and former officials 2017). Former Indian Ambassador Gupta revealed an understanding among policymakers that the Indian public, in the main, supported the peace preference, stating the Indian public ‘do not feel that we should have an aggressive foreign policy’. This was due to values, with Gupta adding ‘it’s part of every Indian’ (Gupta, interview with author, 2017). Former Ambassador to Iran and MEA Secretary (East), stated ‘Non-violence is a key value. Only Indian civilisation could have produced a Buddha’. A former official likened India’s foreign policy to the non-violent values evident in Emperor Ashoka’s restraint and regret over violence on the battlefield. Officials also drew the analogy to Indian sports teams ‘Even our sportsmen don’t have that killer instinct. They will never rub your nose in it once they’ve won’ (Former Indian official, interview with author, 2017). The global peace preference is highly likely to influence all areas of Indian foreign policy. International relations are governed, to a significant degree, by violence and the threat of violence, despite international

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law. NP constitutes one of the main, and indeed the most effective, single tool to inflict violence and is central to India’s identity. Therefore, if NP is significantly influenced by the peace preference, this preference is likely to also significantly impact other foreign policy areas. HI constitutes one of the few situations where many states overtly make an exception to their claimed preference for peace. If India does not sacrifice the dominance of its peace preference in the area of HI and R2P, it is unlikely to do so in other areas of foreign policy. The continued dominance of the peace preference in HI, including Delhi’s response to R2P, reveals its overwhelming strength in Indian foreign policy. For instance, the peace preference is likely to influence India’s engagement with international law. Delhi’s response to the NPT and CTBT suggests that decisions to adhere to international law are at least as likely to be spurred by the peace preference as by a desire to comply, or be seen to comply, with pre-existing rules shaped by past or present Great Powers. The two other generally applicable P&Ps are likely to be influential across all of foreign policy for similar reasons. There was a preference for caution when using military force in the international sphere. This can be seen from the preference for ‘general restraint’ in terms of NP and the preference for caution in deploying military force seen within HI. Each investigation also demonstrated the preference for maintaining a non-violent image. This preference influenced rhetoric and state behaviour both directly and via other P&Ps. While realists may argue India’s international image is only as important to leaders because it impacts the state’s ‘soft power’, the cases demonstrated that a non-violent image was also considered an end in itself (Nye 1990: 166; Mahbubani 2008: 4). In comparison to other major powers like US, Russia and China, Delhi has been relatively successful in projecting this image to audiences outside of South Asia. Comparison to Other States Comparison to studies of other states can help place the influence of values on Indian policy in context. Comparison suggests other major states’ foreign policies are also influenced by cultural values to at least some degree. Studies of the West have found that beliefs in foreign policy are ideological and a few core positions can predict views on a range of specific policy matters (Converse 2006: 11; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Rathbun 2007). Broad dispositions inform attitudes towards specific issues in foreign policy (Herrmann et al. 1999; Hurwitz and Peffley

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1987). Chay’s (1990: 89–149) research reflects findings in this book, but with regard to US foreign policy—that policymakers nurtured in and emerge from a local culture, and those biases and beliefs influence in their decision-making. Values have also been deployed in Washington’s shaping of international institutions (Chay 1990: 119–149). With regard to US foreign policy, preferences among the public for both cooperative internationalism and militaristic internationalism were found to have been influenced by moral values, confirming that values have an influence across the major traditions of US foreign policy (Kertzer et al. 2014: 825). While not explicitly stated in some studies, these values themselves stem from cultural strands within the US; strands of varying historical age. Kertzer’s et al. (2014) study refutes IR’s ‘traditional wisdom’ that the only sources of morality in international affairs were liberal or Enlightenment values with the alternative being a realist approach devoid of morality. Moral foundations of relevance to foreign policy were identified which were also based in other value systems, including Puritanism, Protestantism, Evangelicalism and other sources. Similar to India, US elites’ moral rhetoric used to mobilise the public on foreign policy decisions was likely to be based in widely held values (Kertzer et al. 2014: 838). For instance, hawkish interventionist Senator John McCain (2013) regularly justified foreign interventionism with statements like ‘for America, our interests are our values and our values are our interests’. The question of whether India’s foreign policy is more influenced by cultural values like non-violence than other states is difficult to answer via objective measurements. India’s relative historical uniqueness poses challenges for comprehensive comparisons. Also, when looking at studies of other states, it is difficult to determine whether the values they examine stem from culture in the same way that this study’s values do, e.g. having had prominence throughout history. India and China are the only two large states to have cultures largely unbroken for several millennia. This gives cultural values particular importance and resilience and ensures their influence is likely to last. Furthermore, India and China are the only modern states that embody entire civilisations (Cohen 2001). Therefore, while my approach involved an extensive assessment of Indian history, studies of other states often involve more at contemporary sources to identify values, e.g. resources like the World Values Survey (Inglehart and Welzel 2010). Another key difference between this study and others is my focus on leaders while other approaches examine public, political

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parties, lobby groups, military corporations, and the security and defence establishment. Nevertheless comparisons can show, that in cases of certain global issues, namely debates surrounding humanitarian intervention, it is more difficult to argue that US foreign policy was influenced by cultural values as it is to argue that India’s was. Values articulated as motivating US action often pushed policy in the same direction as state strategic and economic interests, and almost always in the same direction as the interests of influential elites. For instance, religious-sounding values were used to explain President Bush’s personal motivation for invading Iraq, but this policy dovetailed with the material interests of powerful domestic actors. Only on minor foreign policy matters have values contradicted state material interests, and even then only to a small extent, e.g. religious opposition to abortion and contraception impacting aid policy. This leaves open the question of the extent to which decisions on intervention were influenced by values or by other factors. In contrast, the cases explored for India in this study reveal cultural values often driving in an opposite direction to material interests and sometimes triumphing over them. Despite this, it can be said that non-violence’s status as a prominent cultural value in Indian foreign policy, spearheaded by its leaders, stands in contrast to values held by significant segments of the US foreign policy establishment. The latter’s militarist, internationalist ideology is characterised by a ‘readiness to act with force’ and aggressive pursuit of national security (Kertzer et al. 2014: 831). There is a greater acceptance of violence as a means of achieving interests. Furthermore, the value of purity—comparable and opposite to pluralism and tolerance— increases the likelihood of an individual experiencing disgust towards and dehumanising outgroups, thus facilitating support for the use of violence against foreigners (Buckels and Trapnell 2013) and foreign states. Similarly, Mead (2002: 224) examines the ‘Jacksonian’ approach to foreign policy which is underpinned by values of supporting the use of aggressive force, pre-emptive wars, and subversive tactics against governments ostensibly considered, to be morally ‘bad’. The US is said to have the strongest ‘warrior culture’ of any developed country and a ‘warlike disposition’ (Mead 2002: 223). Mead links these attitudes to US foreign policy historically, detailing the regular use of overwhelming and deadly military force by Washington, including against civilians, contending America’s record surpasses every other country. Values’ impact on policy is likely to have occurred both due to leaders’ political calculations as Mead

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argues, but also through leaders themselves maintaining values in line with the US public. The Vietnam war is used an example of public opinion supportive of violent force (Mead 2002: 222). Mead claims US involvement in the war would have ended sooner and been less intense had there not been ‘popular pressure’ for even this most ‘unpopular of wars’ (ibid.). Once wars are underway, the public preferences are for prosecuting them at the highest levels of intensity. Similar to this study, Kertzer’s et al. (2014: 832) research examined approaches to military interventions like those in Iraq and Libya to identify values. While in India cultural values like non-violence influenced for opposition to interventions, in the US both major foreign policy approaches of cooperative and militarist internationalists were supportive of the Libya intervention. Humanitarian interventions generally are seen as having the ability to gain broad support in the US due to interventions being justified in line with both militarist and liberal idealist values (Kertzer et al. 2014: 838; Snyder et al. 2009). This is now changing, however, with large segments of the population from Left and Right increasingly opposing interventionism. When comparing non-violence within nuclear policy, India, as a state with a completely independent foreign policy and facing threats from nuclear neighbours (see Singh 2013: 767), has more justification for adopting nuclear weapons for defensive strategic interests than Western states like Britain and France which are protected by the US nuclear umbrella but still maintain nuclear arsenals. As such, even if it is accepted that part of India’s drive for nuclear weapons was due to strategic interests, this is more in line with non-violence than those states who have less pressing strategic defence needs for such weapons but still maintain them. Studies of China also show a contrast with the non-violence-driven preferences of Indian leaders. Johnston’s research of norms and culture (1995a, 1996: 216–268) argues that Chinese adherence to realpolitik principles stem from a ‘parabellum paradigm’ in the country’s strategic culture, where offensive strategies and preparation for conflict are preferenced over defensive and accommodative ones. Chinese leaders are seen as having been socialised into a parrabellum strategic culture through the continued influence of ancient Chinese military literature in the form of the Seven Military Classics. Examination of the P&Ps of Mao Zedong suggests a belief that violent struggle is desirable and necessary, and that conflict is zero-sum.

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Hierarchy Each investigation saw hierarchy make its impact largely through the ‘hierarchical worldview’ perception—that countries are arranged in a global hierarchy of status/prestige/standing. It also contained a preference for India to gain such standing and rise up the hierarchy. This preference was more overtly expressed in NP than in HI. This deep-seated and basic perception and preference continued throughout the period, from Nehru’s promotion of India as a moral educator by example, to the BJP’s stated aim to project India as ‘Vishwa Guru’, a teacher to the entire world. Their visible manifestations, particularly through identity and projected image, however, have evolved—from seeking to be a moral leader under Nehru, to an economic and strategic power today. In identity terms, under decades of Congress domination India’s leaders saw the country as somewhat of a patrician on the world stage. India allocated itself high standing based on its own criteria. India’s status was determined by its positions on global issues, and by the values that influenced its decision-making. In this particular manifestation of the hierarchical worldview, reflective of the Brahman–Kshatriya caste dynamic, morality trumps material power and wealth as a determiner of status. This was the image policymakers sought to project for India globally. The 1990s saw the manifestations of the hierarchical worldview begin to evolve, a process accelerated under the 1998 BJP Government and then becoming further entrenched under Narendra Modi from 2014 onwards. Modi’s background which is somewhat unique in its distance from the education levels and class identities of most previous Indian PMs (Kumar 2016: 46), particularly the most influential ones, adds its own layer onto these manifestations. For the BJP and Modi, hierarchy remains central, but Delhi adopted certain aspects of the dominant international culture’s, i.e. the West’s, notions of what determines status. This means largely material wealth and strategic, including military, strength. This was most visible in the BJP’s approach to nuclear policy. This continued under Modi, despite some arguing that Modi is less likely to look to the West for legitimisation of policies (Kumar 2016: 46). Certain Western-preferred determiners of status, however, like individual-centred civil and political human rights, have been entertained less under Modi than under earlier administrations. Perhaps partly as compensation for acceding to certain Western criteria for status, the BJP has sought to more overtly express, promote and

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educate the world about Indian culture. Modi has attempted to be seen as shaping India’s external outreach according to the pillars of samvaad (dialogue), sanskriti (culture) and sabhyata (civilisation) (Ganguly et al. 2016: 361). Ganguly et al. go to the extent to argue that the civilisational dimension has been the hallmark of Indian foreign policy since Modi’s election (ibid.). Modi’s speeches and government public diplomacy efforts throughout Asia have always highlighted cultural ties, from Vedic era relations with Iran, to Buddhist connections with Sri Lanka, East and Southeast Asia. Appeals to Western audiences via Dharmic cultural artefacts like world yoga day are allocated diplomatic stage time. High-profile domestic policies, known by policymakers to contribute to India’s global image, have also been influenced by deference to certain Indian cultural norms and a preference to promote a Hindutva visage. Recent controversies like the cow slaughter bans, Kashmir policy shift and Citizenship Amendment Act, all affected for this end. India’s approach to the West has demonstrated both the continuity of the hierarchical worldview and the evolution of its more visible manifestations. Delhi’s anti-colonial stances post-independence may have, in part, themselves been fuelled by leaders’ hierarchical worldview and the preference for India to be at the top. Delhi opposes instances of Western global domination either via military might or international law and norm creation, partly as wrong on principle, and partly because it relegates India itself to subservient status. In the past, India criticised Western dominance, today it still criticises, albeit less stridently and complements this with steps to, through material means, displace Western states or at least join them at the top of the hierarchy. Prestige is often criticised as a residual category to explain a nuclear program that is not explicable by security or technological motives (Lavoy 1997: 71). Assessing discourse, rather than state behaviour alone, answered this criticism by demonstrating that hierarchy was likely a real motivator. While realists may argue that status was an instrumental objective in order to increase power over others, the cases demonstrated that rather, it was an end in itself. This was particularly clear in NP with publicised preferences for no-first-use/non-use against non-nuclear states reducing the coercive power of India’s nuclear weapons. Hierarchy had a significant level of influence on all three investigations but played the most active role in driving P&Ps in NP. Within

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HI, hierarchy’s role was less direct. For the most part, India’s conception of hierarchy simply allowed certain P&Ps that were mainly driven by other cultural values. While India’s leaders believed that certain countries had higher status than others, this did not entail certain states having authority over others. Therefore, among other things, hierarchy allowed pro-sovereignty P&Ps. In NP, the level of hierarchy’s influence increased under the BJP Administration of 1998–2004 and under the Congress Administration from 2004 onwards. In HI, however, the level of influence was more consistent throughout the period. NP, HI and Middle East relations saw hierarchy influence state behaviour more than it influenced discourse. Despite this, within the discourse on NP from 1998–2011, there were still 83 references to P&Ps driven by hierarchy. Generally Applicable and Influential P&Ps The hierarchical worldview is highly likely to be influential across all of foreign policy. This is because foreign policy invariably involves interactions and relationships with external actors, all of whom have a place in the perceived hierarchy. For example, the hierarchical worldview is likely to mitigate any preference to be seen as supporting certain areas of international law. This was demonstrated in Delhi’s rejection of arms control regimes describing them as ‘nuclear apartheid’ where India would have been afforded the role of a second-class international citizen. The generalizability of this worldview can also be seen in the fact that it influenced NP, HI and Middle East relations, across different governments who had varying ideas of how to achieve status. Within NP, leaders in the 1988–1998 period continued, to a certain extent, the Nehruvian preference for achieving status through moral leadership. In subsequent periods, however, we saw the preference for achieving status through material strength, including military, gain precedence. Within HI, however, it was mainly the preference for achieving status through moral worth throughout the entire period. Therefore, similar to the level of hierarchy’s influence being more dynamic in NP, so was the nature of its influence. Comparison to Other States Hierarchy’s influence across Indian foreign policy contrasts to certain strains of foreign policy attitude in the US public (though the latter’s influence on leaders’ preferences and perceptions has not been explored).

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Liberal internationalists in the US were found to maintain values of equality (Kertzer et al. 2014: 830; Osgood 1953: 7). On the other hand, the Jacksonian approach to foreign policy is underpinned by the value of honour, namely maintaining the US’s honour and obligations to others suggesting a somewhat similar perception of America’s standing in the world as the hierarchical worldview does for India. Mead (2002: 24) discusses a Jacksonian ‘honour code’. Nevertheless, the nature of hierarchy’s influence differs from the Indian case with Jacksonian US foreign policy involving the value of honour driving the use of force. Pluralism and Tolerance These two values had the greatest influence on HI after non-violence. Generally Applicable and Influential P&Ps Pluralism and tolerance impacted some P&Ps which influence beliefs regarding the core structures of the international system of nation states. As such, these P&Ps are highly likely to be influential across all Indian foreign policy. This included the overarching pluralistic and tolerant worldview perception and the P&Ps it influenced, including preferences for sovereignty and for caution in condemning the internal actions of other states. These P&Ps were particularly clear in HI. The concept of ‘vasudhaiva kutumbakam’, the world is one family, has been promoted in various forms by almost every Indian leader from Nehru to Modi (Sidhu 2017). It has been deployed to promote Indian ideals of oneness and a global commons. An overarching preference for a tolerant and pluralistic image was also found. It was highlighted by both India and partner countries when discussing nuclear cooperation. With regard to HI, arguments that this image was aimed at achieving strategic interests in terms of favour from developing countries were shown to be inadequate due to the overall strategic losses India incurred from positions in line with this image. The image was an end in itself. Comparison to Other States Again, pluralism’s and tolerance’s influence on Indian policy stand in contrast to the value of purity which helps underpin the militarist internationalist strain of foreign policy thinking found among certain segments

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in the US public and leadership. Kertzer et al. (2014: 830) states ‘purity, with its emphasis on traditional values and disgust for those who do not conform to cultural standards of decency, also revolves around protecting society from threats’. In contrast to India’s values of pluralism, tolerance and non-violence affecting for an anti-interventionist stance, in the UK, values such as cosmopolitanism and solidarity overlayed with strategic interests to affect for the use of force including in humanitarian interventions (Gilmore 2014: 541–557). Foreign Secretary William Hague (2010) regularly touted values and stated that human rights are ‘part of our national DNA and will be woven deeply into the decision-making processes of our foreign policy at every stage’. Like India, values-driven P&Ps last beyond the term of one particular government. Gillmore (2014) argues that the ethics and values-based agenda has become imbedded in UK foreign policy. This was witnessed in the stated motivations, and in part, likely actual motivations for interventions in Iraq, Libya and Syria.

Future HI, Middle East policy, NP and foreign policy overall are likely to see the influence of cultural values continue. This is because cultural values, in each area of investigation, have had a consistently significant level of influence throughout the last two decades. This concurs with assertions by those like Cohen (2001: 65) that whatever approach India takes to foreign affairs—aggressive or conciliatory—it will be justified by its principles. The inclusion of culturally and civilisationally embedded principles in foreign policy is likely to elicit both elite and popular support (2001: 65). Cohen (2001: 65) states ‘India wants to do well by doing good’. While maintaining a significant influence, there is likely to be some variation in the level and nature of influence of individual values. Consequently, various value-driven P&Ps are likely to rise and fall in the future as they have in the last 30 years. The influence of cultural values will continue even with India’s growing power and increased engagement with international norms. The HI investigation demonstrates this through revealing India’s cultural values-driven response to emerging norms like R2P. This type of interaction is likely to continue into the future. As India rises and its foreign interests expand well outside its region, there will be greater interaction between cultural values and strategic

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interests. For instance, strategic concerns may play a greater role in India’s calculations regarding HI, with more and more intervention cases impacting India’s material interests. Rather than clashing with cultural values, strategic concerns may further shape India’s application of these values onto P&Ps as they have done thus far in the Middle East. The disposition of political leaders and officials, one which entails a high degree of ‘civilizational awareness’ will act as an anchor against any drastic reduction of the influence of cultural values (Gupta, interview with author, 2017). In terms of NP, values will likely continue to exert influence on the current BJP Government of Modi through both motivating and constraining action and rhetoric. Thus far we have seen this influence take on a similar form to the Vajpayee Government, with the BJP’s relatively boisterous rhetoric corresponding with the non-violence-driven practice of giving little consideration to actually using nuclear weapons. For instance, while Modi’s 2019 election campaign included statements that India’s nukes were not just for diwali, based on available data, he had as of 2019 still not seriously grown India’s nuclear arsenal or placed it on alert (Dalton 2019). This is despite India continuing to be the world’s biggest arms importer. The justification for this as purely due to resource constraints becomes less and less tenable as India’s economy and interests grow. India’s arsenal will, however, likely see expansion if the incentives of status and strategic interest reach a critical mass again in future. In 2019, India’s Defence Minister Singh stated, while paying homage to former PM Vajpayee, ‘Till today, our nuclear policy is “no first use”…What happens in future depends on the circumstances’ (India Today 2019). This statement, influenced by hierarchy and strategic interests in a period of high tension with Pakistan, is unlikely to mean the scrapping of Delhi’s NFU. Singh has been known to make more extreme statements than the PM, providing ‘red meat’ to the BJP’s base, allowing Modi to stay somewhat above the fray, mindful of the broad coalition of voters who placed the BJP in power. India’s passive conception of non-violence is likely to lead it to use diplomacy rather than nuclear weapons development/operationalisation to achieve expanding interests. Through strategic partnership with other powers, it may seek, in a way, to outsource the ‘dirty work’ of security, though its ability to do this will lessen with time. Delhi will also likely support conciliatory solutions with potential nuclear adversaries. This concurs with predictions by those who assess strategic culture (e.g.

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Basrur 2001: 188–195). Values are likely to continue to further India’s drive for global disarmament. Hierarchy has continued to play a central role in India’s ambitions for global recognition as a ‘legitimate’ nuclear power. For instance, the PM justified keeping of India’s ‘no-first-use’ (NFU) nuclear policy by calling it a reflection of the country’s cultural heritage. Delhi has put diplomatic resources into attaining membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, ramping up the campaign it began in 2008 under Congress. Similarly, India sought membership in all other nuclear groupings, which Indian media have described as ‘elite clubs’. With regard to Middle East, India will likely still seek to, as far as possible, maintain friendships with all abjuring ideological alliances, driven by values of hierarchy, non-violence, tolerance and pluralism, as well as strategic and economic interests. The success of this will, however, be increasingly impacted by India’s domestic politics, particularly the treatment of Muslims as Middle Eastern publics and leaders begin to pay greater attention to this. As the Middle East’s seemingly endless conflicts continue, India’s strategic and economic interests may come to be impacted negatively by inaction. In this scenario we might see Delhi make further headway beyond commercial relationships and take a leadership role in relation to the fundamental issues of war and peace. All of the aforementioned values, however, will push Delhi in the direction of a conflict mediation, impartial broker type role, rather than that of a signed-up member of the Western or Russian coalition. This could involve championing an ‘Asia-Middle East Summit’ (Pethiyagoda 2016). This architecture could include Delhi and other major Asian energy consumers and labour providers, all the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa, Iran and Israel. The Summit would give all sides an opportunity to hammer out common positions and agreements on complex security and economic issues. It may provide opportunities for new relationships between the regions and act as a circuit breaker for endless conflicts. India is also likely to continue to successfully maintain a relatively nonviolent, pluralist and tolerant image in the medium term. This will give it credibility in the ongoing debates over nuclear issues and HI/R2P, at least outside its region. in comparison to most states, particularly great powers, from either the Global North or the Global South, India will continue being seen as somewhat more principled and less strategically driven. This image can make India a valuable partner in efforts by states and international organisations in nuclear matters, HI and R2P, and with

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issues in the Middle East, as well as in international affairs more broadly. The domestic policies of future Indian governments, however, can potentially alter this image, as we have seen with the Modi administration in relation to audiences in the Middle East. We are likely to see greater government efforts to increase the country’s soft power. Former Minister of State for External Affairs, Shashi Tharoor, regularly touts the value of utilising India’s culture in foreign policy and the potential of Indian soft power ‘to attract others with…culture, social values and foreign policies’ (Saxena 2009; Tharoor 2007). As India’s relations with China and other Asian countries move the centre of geopolitical attention, PM Modi is likely to continue the harnessing of dharmic cultural identity via Buddhism, the religion and philosophy that historically united almost all of Asia. One Minister has already described the government’s hopes of India being considered the home of Buddhism in the same way the Vatican and Mecca are associated with their respective religions. Soft power will be a central tool for any future competition with Beijing. For instance in Africa, where the two compete, Delhi has also sought to increase its soft power through ensuring its energy companies pursue a holistic approach to resource extraction by investing in infrastructure and downstream industries (Surie 2008). India may seek to enhance soft power through the Indian Council on Cultural Relations and Nehru Centres throughout the world which promote Indian culture, similar to Alliance Francais and British Councils. The increase in cultural value promotion is in line with growing technological capabilities which have boosted the potential effectiveness of soft power. Any meaningful measure of soft power though, must include not simply how to attracted or familiar foreign audiences are with aspects of one’s country, but the ability to translate that attractiveness into influence and/or the serving of one’s country’s interests. In this regard, it is uncertain much more or less successful Modi will be than earlier leaders.

Generalisation and Practical Application As India and other states with non-European cultures rise in power, they may seek, not simply to ascend within the existing structures, but to reshape the international order. The findings of this book can be generalised in several ways potentially useful to policymakers responding to these tectonic shifts. Most importantly, as mentioned,

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comparison of the three areas of investigation revealed that cultural values had a significant influence on India’s foreign policy overall. The research could assist governments/international organisations looking to: predict India’s nuclear behaviour; bring Delhi on board with nonproliferation/disarmament law/norms; engage India on other matters of international law or norms like R2P; negotiate with the country more generally and improve their relations with India as an important power in an increasingly multipolar world order. Indian policymakers may also find value. Beyond this, the study revealed that cultural values are likely to influence other states’ foreign policies. Given that realism-based interests contain their own values and assumptions, India’s case is useful in that it reveals realist values are not universal. Each state’s cultural values need to be understood to fully explain its foreign policy. This finding hopefully enriches the discipline of IR by raising the profile of culture, and helps academics, policymakers and international lawyers assessing and predicting the behaviour of states. It may also assist those seeking to assess or enhance a state’s image, soft power or public diplomacy efforts. The impact of cultural values could be generalised to other countries’ approaches to HI, NP and various bilateral relationships. HI is an area in which culture is known to be one of the major global dividing lines. Western and non-Western states’ traditionally held opposing views on HI were partly underpinned by cultural values. This divergence includes, for instance, differing conceptions of the individual and society, and differing scores on measures of universalism/particularism and individualism/communitarianism, etc. A cultural analysis similar to this study, but which focuses on several Western and non-Western countries on either side of the HI debate, could provide valuable insights to any actor looking to influence the discussion. It may also contribute to the broader discussion over the universality of human rights. With regard to NP, understanding the role played by cultural values greatly improves our ability to predict behaviour and support arms control. NP is an area of foreign policy that is more autonomous than HI or bilateral relations. As such, with regard to NP, analysis of domestic variables like cultural values provides greater predictive capability. My study could be complemented by further research of how India’s or other states’ cultural values impact their image directly, rather than through foreign policy. This would require the use of international opinion polls to determine foreign audiences’ image of India. Analysis

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could then be undertaken to determine how much of this image is due to cultural values. In a deeper sense, this study sought to understand how cultural values, existing in various forms over thousands of years, influence international relations—one of the most important areas of human activity and that which entails social organisation at the highest level. Better insight into this interaction may help us to appreciate that our present historical moment is just that, one moment. What we think of as right or wrong, moral or immoral, as unencumbered by historical baggage, is really just one step along a journey stretching millennia into the past and infinitely into the future. We cannot escape the roots of our thinking.

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Index

B Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), xvi, 67, 69, 74, 115, 116, 119, 121, 123–125, 130–134, 142, 143, 145, 150, 151, 153, 158, 174, 176, 179, 180, 182–187, 189–192, 204, 221, 227, 229, 239, 268–270, 272, 274–276, 280–282, 284, 287, 289, 292–294, 296, 302, 303, 305, 311, 313, 316 Buddhism, 27, 32–34, 36–45, 48, 56, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 71, 73, 76, 77, 80, 147, 232, 318

275–278, 284, 285, 295, 302, 307, 308, 310, 318 Colonialism, 50, 55, 56, 59, 67, 78, 79, 124, 128, 204, 251, 261, 302 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT), 131 Congress, 61, 112, 131, 133, 153, 154, 157, 158, 160, 164–166, 169, 173, 176, 177, 180, 182, 183, 185–188, 190–192, 227, 228, 261, 262, 268–270, 274, 281, 302, 303, 311, 313, 317 Constructivism, xiv, 6, 80, 83, 84, 86

C China, xiii, 15, 28, 29, 40, 65, 75, 83, 111, 112, 117, 118, 120, 123, 126, 131, 133, 136, 140–142, 148, 149, 154, 158, 161, 163, 164, 168, 181, 184, 190, 204, 215, 216, 218–220, 228, 234–237, 240, 243, 269,

D Diaspora, 271, 272, 274, 277, 281, 282, 293, 294 Disarmament, 81, 82, 87, 92, 93, 108, 110, 112–115, 130–132, 140, 143, 144, 146, 147, 149, 150, 153–158, 161, 162, 164–167, 177, 180–183, 185, 186, 188, 191, 306, 317, 319

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 K. Pethiyagoda, Indian Foreign Policy and Cultural Values, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54696-0

357

358

INDEX

G Gandhi, Mahatma, 60, 111, 146, 188 Gandhi, Rajiv, 82, 85, 92, 113, 166, 212 Generalisation, 318 Generally applicable P&Ps, 306, 307, 313, 314

Islam, 15, 36, 47–52, 56–58, 63, 77, 229, 230, 269–271, 273, 274, 281–284, 286, 287, 291, 293, 295 Israel, 122, 141, 148, 152, 159, 193, 211, 229, 261, 262, 276, 278, 281, 282, 289, 291, 294, 296, 317

H Hinduism, 20, 21, 24–27, 29–36, 38, 39, 41, 44, 48, 52–54, 57, 60, 62, 64, 66–69, 71, 72, 76, 80, 207, 232, 271, 274, 286 Hindutva, 20, 21, 59, 66–69, 72, 115, 124, 130, 227, 270, 274, 280, 281, 284, 292, 294, 296, 312 Human security, xv, 206, 226, 231, 235, 248

J Jainism, 27, 32, 36, 39, 43–45, 56, 66, 71, 73, 76, 77

I Identity Hindutva, 67, 280 Islamic, 269, 270, 273, 282 Nehruvian, 66, 268 Indo-US Nuclear Deal, 153, 176, 180, 236 International Law, xiii, xv, 62, 78, 107, 112, 203, 204, 206, 214, 223, 224, 240, 302, 307, 312, 313, 319 International relations theory (IR), 5 Iran, xiv, 15, 193, 260–262, 265, 269, 270, 274, 276, 278, 283, 285–291, 293–296, 306, 312, 317 Iraq, 143, 204, 209, 216, 217, 227–231, 242, 245, 246, 248, 251, 252, 262–264, 268, 270, 284, 302, 309, 310, 315

K Kargil conflict, 119, 136, 139, 149 L Libya, 204, 222, 234–241, 245–248, 251, 252, 262, 265, 268, 276, 302, 310, 315 M Modi, Narendra, xvi, 260, 290, 311 N Nehru, xvi, 59, 60, 62–65, 77, 78, 81, 110–112, 168, 187–189, 261, 268, 282, 306, 311, 314, 318 No-first-use (NFU), 317 Non-Proliferation, 108–110, 112, 131, 144, 145, 147, 149, 153, 154, 157–165, 167, 168, 177, 182–185, 192, 319 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 108 P Pakistan, 48, 65, 76, 86, 112, 114, 117–120, 122, 123, 125–127,

INDEX

129, 131–133, 135–142, 146, 148–150, 152–154, 158, 159, 168, 169, 177, 180, 181, 183–185, 190, 211, 261, 273, 285, 287, 295, 316 Perceptions, 16, 58, 82–84, 124, 125, 129, 131, 137, 139, 141, 213, 268, 283, 285 Pokhran II, 117, 119, 122, 124, 126, 130, 147, 154, 159, 179, 182–184, 189, 305 Political culture, 4 Positivism, 7 Preferences, 7, 16, 25, 58, 80, 83, 84, 109–111, 114, 122, 127, 143, 167, 177, 179, 182, 184, 185, 193, 207, 209, 222, 225, 226, 229, 232, 246, 263, 264, 266, 267, 269, 271, 280, 287, 290, 303, 306, 308, 310, 312–314 R Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (RGAP), 113, 114, 153–156, 162, 164, 166, 167, 169, 180–182, 191 Responsibility to Protect (R2P), xv, 7, 80, 203, 231, 237, 250, 251 S Saudi Arabia, 221, 222, 235, 261, 262, 276, 278, 279, 282, 283, 294 Sikhism, 52, 66, 77 Soft power, 81, 87, 259, 273, 279, 281, 294, 307, 318, 319 Sovereignty, xv, 28, 46, 203, 204, 207, 208, 210, 214, 215,

359

217, 219–221, 224, 226, 230, 231, 233, 239, 242, 243, 246, 250, 251, 264, 265, 267, 273, 276–278, 280, 314 Strategic culture, 4, 5, 16, 58, 70, 75, 78, 83, 85, 108, 115, 189, 190, 207, 238, 261, 303, 310, 316 Syria, 204, 209, 240–246, 248, 251, 252, 262, 266, 268, 270, 276, 278, 279, 283, 294, 296, 302, 315

T Third World Solidarity, 203, 204, 221, 227, 268, 269, 302

U United Arab Emirates (UAE), 259, 271, 272, 279, 280, 282, 283, 293, 294 United Nations led intervention, 205, 207, 220, 233 peacekeepers, 207, 210, 218, 247, 264 Security Council, 123, 210, 216–222, 224–227, 233–236, 240–242, 244, 245, 250, 278, 304

V Vedas/Vedic, 14, 16, 20–30, 32, 33, 36, 38, 43, 45, 54, 62, 67, 71, 77, 286, 312